Russian Concept of War, Management and Use of Military Power : Conceptual Change
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu
Sotataidon laitos
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu
2022
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-3288-9
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-3288-9
Sisällysluettelo
CONTENTS
Klaus Ilmonen
SPEECH BY MANAGING DIRECTOR OF THE MANNERHEIM FOUNDATION ON THE EVE OF THE SEMINAR
Pentti Forsström
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE PUBLICATION
Pentti Forsström
2. INTERPRETATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN CONCEPT OF WAR
Dima Adamsky
3. COMMAND AND CONTROL CULTURE À LA RUSSE
Leonid Nersisyan
4. NEW RUSSIAN STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEMS – CHANGE OF THE BALANCE?
Jukka Viitaniemi
5. STRATEGIC ACTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES – CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
Jyrki Terva
6. SCHRÖDINGERS CAT IN EASTERN UKRAINE – HOW RUSSIA’S WAR IN UKRAINE CREATES AND DESCRIBES NEW RUSSIA-WEST CONFLICT
Juha Wihersaari
7. EVGENY MESSNER’S THEORY OF SUBVERSION WAR VS. HYBRID WARFARE
Oscar Jonsson (and Bryce Johnston - absent from the seminar)
8. RUSSIA’S REVOLUTION IN INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS
Rod Thornton and Marina Miron
9. INTERFACE BETWEEN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND CYBER. CREATING REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS? THE RUSSIAN MILITARY’S UTILISATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO ENHANCE ITS CYBER OPERATIONS: THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
Jonna Alava
10. REPRESENTATIONS OF WOMEN SOLDIERS IN RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES 2008–2021
Aristide M. LaVey
11. ADMIRAL USHAKOV: A STUDY OF RUSSIAN POWER PROJECTION
Santeri Kytöneva
12. JUSTIFYING THE USE OF FORCE: RUSSIA’S SPIRITUAL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Justin Bronk
13. DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIAN COMBAT AIR SPENDING AND LIKELY OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Lester W. Grau (and Charles K. Bartles)
14. RUSSIAN MANEUVER DEFENCE AND THEIR CONCEPT OF THE FRAGMENTED BATTLEFIELD
Michael Kofman
15. ON PRESENT WAR IN UKRAINE - KEYNOTE 2
Klaus Ilmonen
SPEECH BY MANAGING DIRECTOR OF THE MANNERHEIM FOUNDATION ON THE EVE OF THE SEMINAR
Pentti Forsström
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE PUBLICATION
Pentti Forsström
2. INTERPRETATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN CONCEPT OF WAR
Dima Adamsky
3. COMMAND AND CONTROL CULTURE À LA RUSSE
Leonid Nersisyan
4. NEW RUSSIAN STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEMS – CHANGE OF THE BALANCE?
Jukka Viitaniemi
5. STRATEGIC ACTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES – CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
Jyrki Terva
6. SCHRÖDINGERS CAT IN EASTERN UKRAINE – HOW RUSSIA’S WAR IN UKRAINE CREATES AND DESCRIBES NEW RUSSIA-WEST CONFLICT
Juha Wihersaari
7. EVGENY MESSNER’S THEORY OF SUBVERSION WAR VS. HYBRID WARFARE
Oscar Jonsson (and Bryce Johnston - absent from the seminar)
8. RUSSIA’S REVOLUTION IN INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS
Rod Thornton and Marina Miron
9. INTERFACE BETWEEN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND CYBER. CREATING REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS? THE RUSSIAN MILITARY’S UTILISATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO ENHANCE ITS CYBER OPERATIONS: THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
Jonna Alava
10. REPRESENTATIONS OF WOMEN SOLDIERS IN RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES 2008–2021
Aristide M. LaVey
11. ADMIRAL USHAKOV: A STUDY OF RUSSIAN POWER PROJECTION
Santeri Kytöneva
12. JUSTIFYING THE USE OF FORCE: RUSSIA’S SPIRITUAL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Justin Bronk
13. DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIAN COMBAT AIR SPENDING AND LIKELY OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Lester W. Grau (and Charles K. Bartles)
14. RUSSIAN MANEUVER DEFENCE AND THEIR CONCEPT OF THE FRAGMENTED BATTLEFIELD
Michael Kofman
15. ON PRESENT WAR IN UKRAINE - KEYNOTE 2
Tiivistelmä
This publication consists primarily of articles presented in the annual Russia Seminar 2022 organised by the Department of warfare of the Finnish National Defence University (FNDU) and titled as “Russian Concept of War, Management and Use of Military Power – Conceptual Change”. The aim of the Seminar was to raise a discussion on Russian military policy and military power. The focus of the seminar was on the Russian concept of ”war” – that is – the use of lethal military force in order to achieve certain political objectives. It should be noted that the publication is not an exhaustive presentation of all the aspects related to the concept of war. This leaves room for themes and questions to be researched also in the future.
The use of force is one of the two main functions of the Russian military power, the other one being deterrence, which was discussed at the Russia seminar 2021. The objective of deterrence is to influence the conciousness of the adversary - to change adversary’s behaviour and make it relinquish possible ideas of aggression or threat to use military power against Russia. In the 2021 seminar the main emphasis was on the military aspects and prerequisites of preventing a war.
As we know now, at the time of writing these lines, in May-June 2022 – these aspects and methods of deterrence conducted by Russia and its military during the past year were not only aimed at preventing war, but also, they were actual preparations for a war. Furthermore, despite the fact that these means and capabilities were partly escalatory and threatening by nature, they did not enable Russia to achieve its political, military-political or military objectives. Regarding Ukraine, or more broadly the security structure of Europe, they were set by Russia, perhaps, intentionally on a level which was clearly unacceptable. In this manner Russia could justify to Russian people – after the launch of the operation – that there is no other solution than to conduct “a special military operation” in Ukraine.
In this introductory chapter I will briefly introduce the articles or presentations of this report which were contributed in the seminar. All the presentations and discussion can be found on the FNDU YouTube-channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?-v=ywyasBuw7vg&t=3263s.
The use of force is one of the two main functions of the Russian military power, the other one being deterrence, which was discussed at the Russia seminar 2021. The objective of deterrence is to influence the conciousness of the adversary - to change adversary’s behaviour and make it relinquish possible ideas of aggression or threat to use military power against Russia. In the 2021 seminar the main emphasis was on the military aspects and prerequisites of preventing a war.
As we know now, at the time of writing these lines, in May-June 2022 – these aspects and methods of deterrence conducted by Russia and its military during the past year were not only aimed at preventing war, but also, they were actual preparations for a war. Furthermore, despite the fact that these means and capabilities were partly escalatory and threatening by nature, they did not enable Russia to achieve its political, military-political or military objectives. Regarding Ukraine, or more broadly the security structure of Europe, they were set by Russia, perhaps, intentionally on a level which was clearly unacceptable. In this manner Russia could justify to Russian people – after the launch of the operation – that there is no other solution than to conduct “a special military operation” in Ukraine.
In this introductory chapter I will briefly introduce the articles or presentations of this report which were contributed in the seminar. All the presentations and discussion can be found on the FNDU YouTube-channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?-v=ywyasBuw7vg&t=3263s.
Kokoelmat
- Julkaisut [506]