Experiences at the strategic level of the Afghanistan operation

Abstract

The aim of the presented thesis is to find answers to the main question: What strategic experience can be learned from the operation in Afghanistan? The research method uses open source information to analyze events and actions. The main objectives of the operation in Afghanistan were the removal of the Taliban from power, the destruction of al-Qaeda units and the construction of a capable and sustainable state. These changes in the country could not occur without the activation of hostilities by the US and a coalition. In order to form this coalition NATO activated Article 5 of collective security for the first time in its history. Despite the military victories and the superiority of the US troops over the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, military success was not enough to achieve the operation’s objectives. Therefore, in order to create a favorable environment for economic growth and to improve the welfare of the local population it was necessary to provide a comprehensive approach to developing the political, economic and social domains. In parallel with the hostilities, measures were taken to stabilize and restore the non-military component of the operation. However, the continued conflict has affected the level of security in the country and the overall effectiveness of the operation. Additionally, corruption and the ambition fueled power struggle of the political leadership has limited the extent of reforms in Afghanistan. Key to all of this, the combat readiness of the ANSF has remained at a low level, leaving the local security forces unable to conduct independent operations. The most important factors for the success of the operation are: the level of security, the sustainability and organization of political governance, the level of corruption, economic and social growth, Pakistani-Afghan relations and the characteristics of Afghan society.