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PROMOTING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: Is the European Union Up to the Challenge?

EDITED BY
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Contributions to the IX Suomenlinna Seminar on European Union crisis management in Africa, arranged by the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, National Defence College of Finland in Helsinki on 18th and 19th of May 2006.

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The 18th and 19th of May 2006



Doctor of Social Sciences Tommi Koivula was the responsible organizer of the ninth Suomenlinna Seminar. He edited this publication in co-operation with research assistant Heidi Kauppinen. Dr. Koivula works as a senior researcher at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, where he specialises in the European Union security issues. Previously, he has been a lecturer at the University of Tampere and a visiting researcher at the University of Kent at Canterbury (UK).

Editors' note

The ninth annual Suomenlinna seminar, organised by the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Finnish National Defence College, was held in May 2006. It brought together a representative group of specialists in security studies for two days of presentations and discussion about the most pressing issues of today – the challenges facing European Union's crisis management in Africa.

Most of the presentations made at the seminar are published in this volume. We wish to extend our thanks to all contributors for their patience and co-operation.

Tommi Koivula and Heidi Kauppinen
Editors
Department of Strategic and Defence Studies
NDC, Finland

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Seminar Program

Opening

Questions Asked and Some Tentative Conclusions

Colonel, Lic.Pol.Sci Juha Pyykönen

Director of the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies

National Defence College

The context and the background of the seminar

The aim of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, to shortly describe the context of the seminar's topic and reiterate the guiding questions asked in the opening of the seminar. Secondly, to draw some tentative conclusions based on the presentations and discussions during the seminar. In addition, as always, an idea of contributing to the development of contemporary civilian and military crisis management is also relevant.

The rapid development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU has brought us quite far from the beginning of the union, namely the status of customs union or the common market. When the European Council met in Helsinki in December 1999, the leaders set for themselves a new goal that became known as the Helsinki Headline Goal. The Member States declared to have a capability to deploy within 60 days up to 60.000 troops for peacekeeping or peacemaking tasks. The EU member states also decided to sustain an operation in the field for up to one year as a minimum. This capability was decided to be operational and available, if so decided, by mid 2003.

Today, this capability goal has been met, although the EU Rapid Reaction Force (EU RRF) has not been tested to the fullest yet. However, a few peacekeeping missions have been launched. Pertaining to the topic of the 9th Suomenlinna seminar, in 2003 the French-led deployment to the Democratic Republic of Congo with more than two thousands troops was a clear signal that the EU has both the political will and the capability to take action, if found necessary. A larger but less risky operation (7,000 troops) was commenced in late 2004 when the EUFOR Althea replaced NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For the time being, the EU has been involved in more than ten military and civilian operations in several continents gaining valuable collective experience on the field, and several hundreds of military personnel are working on a daily basis in the EU political and military structures for the fulfilment of the European Security Strategy.

In order to promote further progress of crisis management, the European Council has established a set of new military capability goals to be met by 2010, together with the Civilian Headline Goal to be met by 2008. The new military goals are even more ambitious aiming at a capability to rapidly deploy military forces for a more high-intensity warfare. In this discussion, Africa as a political-military environment for future EU operation has been mentioned most often.

The chain of events and goals described above establish the context for the topic of the 9th Suomenlinna seminar. In other words, the rationale for the topic is to promote further understanding of Africa taking into consideration its cultural, historic and social characteristics that make it quite different from Europe. In this regard, the question whether the EU is up to the challenge for Africa, is regarded both as worth asking and answering. The full topic of the seminar, “Promoting Peace and Security in Africa”, indicates that the issue at large is related to peace and security thus establishing the framework for the debate.

By organising this seminar, we sought to increase our understanding in particular on the following four questions,

First of all, how can we characterise and better understand African conflicts and the complex problemacy that lies beneath them?

Secondly, can we achieve a consistent approach between African and European actors in terms of crisis management?

Thirdly, what challenges are involved with European crisis management in Africa?

Finally, what is or should be the future role of European peace support operations in Africa?

The programme of our two-day seminar was structured into six sessions. The presentations of the first session elaborated the nature of African insecurity, whereas the second session concentrated on the challenges of European crises management in Africa. The focus of the third session was on the dialogue between the two continents. The fourth session elaborated then African responses to regional security threats, followed by a session devoted to Africa on the agenda of the European Security and Defence Policy. Finally, the last session dealt with the future prospects of European Union peace support operations in Africa.

Tentative conclusions and some findings

Regarding the results of the two-day seminar, it is self-evident that the following 'first impression report' cannot cover all and is subjective by nature. Wide experience and high quality of expertise of the speakers and other participants make it even more challenging to draw conclusions. Of course, numerous questions still remain unanswered and readers may derive their individual reflections based on the following chapters.

Out of the four questions asked in the opening, the first two were related to a common understanding of the basics. Presenters used numerous examples illuminating the complexity of issues that should be tackled. At the state or provincial level, high number of parties and actors involved each having different interests, tribal cultures, exclusive ethnicities and scarce natural resources together creates a set for the game that seems to be uncontrollable. At an individual level, various forces and groupings, guerrillas and mercenaries prevent effectively improvement of living conditions, level of security, economics or governance. Assurance of secure environment at all levels was commonly regarded as a precondition for better governance and the existence of a civil society. Economic growth at all levels was recognised as a necessity.

Participants discussed in depth about areas and issues that need action taken by African or European parties. The crisis cycle follows the same track than is the case elsewhere: some weeks of intensive fighting; a regional or international intervention enforcing a cease-fire; international organisations commence programmes for, inter alia, disarmament, demobilisation and reconstruction aiming at a lasting peace including overarching reconciliation. Some doubts were cast on the role of state-building and possible effectiveness of rule of law and national institutions as guiding bodies for inhabitants. As an alternative, religion, faith and prejudices as well as local traditions and habits could have a major impact in behaviour.

The remaining two questions could be merged into one asking for the acceptability of European way of getting involved in the crisis management in Africa. One of the contradicting themes was the role for the African states and organisations in crisis management. Recent experience where tangible activities in crisis management have been the responsibility for African parties, was found encouraging and worth further development. In the current debate in Europe, the conclusion is that a more comprehensive and coordinated approach is vital for future EU crisis management operations. For African force contributors, participants seemed to wish for more coordination among the states.

A rather wide support was evident towards the emerging African Union's policy to get involved in the crisis situation even in a case where sovereignty of a state would be at stake. Consequently, the role for the EU

could be for instance assistance in training as well as financial, logistic and materiel support. This is not necessarily in line with the vision expressed in the European Security Strategy dated 12 Dec 2003, and could be too modest for the EU. This view could be supported with the fact that the EU is the major financial contributor to African development projects. Some participants stated that the colonial history of some EU Members States could bring some negative flavour for their active role in African crisis management operations.

The already existing expertise and knowledge in crisis management should be utilised more extensively in the future. This is especially relevant in relation to the root causes of conflicts as well as in relation to civil society. Some cases of positive outcome were addressed as examples of tangible success.

The four questions could also be answered together, because both the issue of common understanding of the basics and the issue looking for an acceptable way for the EU to assist Africa are intertwined. Several participants wished for open discussions and debates between the African and European parties as a major remedy in relation to the common understanding of the basics. If one would prefer a more profound and ambitious approach, a shared view on core values and norms of crisis management and necessary capabilities and assets for civilian and military operations could be a solution. Furthermore, and as the second step, a commonly agreed set of crisis management concepts, doctrines, procedures etc. could be established. As an example, this would also serve as a solid basis for further development of African Stand-by Forces, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). It would also help the EU to provide more appropriate assistance and support for Africa without endangering the idea of African Ownership.

In relation to an acceptable European way of supporting and assisting Africa, one could prefer an honest co-operation to overcome security problems in the continent. Practical remedies were proposed by some of the presenters. An issue of division of labour between the African and the European actors was also addressed. As already mentioned above, one way ahead could be to leave implementation of military crisis management operations for the African parties, and let the EU to concentrate mainly on support, logistic and assisting activities. This could also include an idea of focusing on civilian crisis management, such as DDR and SSR.

In general, it became self-evident that more cooperation is a necessity in order to promote further clarification of the basics as well as a shared understanding of crisis management. Consequently, African and European experts and professionals must be brought together to do the work for enhanced security for all the peoples on the two continents.


African Insecurity

African Crises – Challenges for International Community and Local Actors

Ambassador Kari Karanko
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

The United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change recognised the severe complexity in addressing conflicts. The report states that "the unprecedented success (in crises management and resolution) was also coupled with major failures. Mediation produced settlement in only about 25 per cent of civil wars and only some of those attracted the political and material resources necessary for successful implementation. As a result, many implementation efforts failed, sometimes with disastrous consequences. If two peace agreements, in 1991, Biocesse Agreement for Angola and the Arusha Accords for Rwanda, had been successfully implemented, deaths attributable to war in 1990s would have been reduced by several million...The large loss of life in such wars and outbreaks of mass violence obliges the international community to be more vigilant in preventing them. When prevention fails, there is urgent need to stop the killing and prevent any further return to war."

We are encouraged of the results of the growth in post-war conflict countries viz. those still within a struggle for democracy and peaceful development as shown in the example by the UK's Commission for Africa report (2005 - World Bank source 2004):



Source: World Bank, 2004a

Economic growth in both Uganda and Mozambique has been significant whereas in DRC despite her enormous resources economic stagnation is evident. Many other examples from Africa already to day give strong evidence of successful peace negotiations and development work towards sustainable peace.

The cornerstones of strategic peace building for sustainable peace are guaranteed by

1. Providing security after successful peace agreement, disarmament, demobilisation of different armed fractions and reintegration of the soldiers into their respective societies including repatriation of refugees and IDP (Internally Displaced Persons)
2. Providing means and resources for the initial development efforts in rebuilding and reconstruction, economic activities, health and education facilities and especially for guaranteeing food security
3. Reconstruction of the justice system and institutions of the rule of law as well as addressing trauma and providing therapy.

Peace cannot however be sustainable if the reconciliation process is not initiated and the healing of the society started.

In mid May, 2006 in Hämeenlinna five days before the Suomenlinna-seminar, Bishop of Tampere Mr. Juha Pihkala carried on the funeral service of 3 500 unconsecrated bodies of victims of the civil war in 1918 just after the Finnish independence. We have asked here in Finland if 88 years is too late for reconciliation. Our answer has been that reconciliation is necessary and good examples from South Africa and also from Burundi and Rwanda show that reconciliation process is one of the fundamentals for building sustainable peace. We have to ask especially in Western Africa if 200 years since the devastating effects of the slavery are root causes for the mistrust and divisions in the modern states with problems added by colonial boundaries. Many national boundaries demarcated to the rivers and lakes divided people and tribes rather than provided patterns for unification and healthy nation building.

World community has developed methods for early warning in crises prevention. Actions taken by world community and regional bodies before actual conflicts will be less costly than managing actual crises. Therefore indicators and criteria for possible conflict development are necessary. World Bank Institute has developed a world-wide method to follow-up development, which may possibly lead into crises.

- **Voice and Accountability** - measuring political, civil and human rights
- **Political Instability and Violence** - measuring the likelihood of violent threats to, or changes in, government, including terrorism
- **Government Effectiveness** - measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery
- **Regulatory Burden** - measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies
- **Rule of Law** - measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, including judiciary independence, and the incidence of crime
- **Control of Corruption** - measuring the abuse of public power for private gain, including petty and grand corruption (and state capture by elites)

Country based analysis on biannual basis can be found on their pages:
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi>

Establishment of the United Nations Peace Building Commission will help the world community and regional organisations in their coordinated actions in peace building. DDR and SSR processes can not be successful without engaging well coordinated and harmonized development efforts by all actors to help war torn nations and affected people to recover. As processes DDR and SSR can be described with the following way:

DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration + repatriation of refugees and IDPs and reconciliation process

- DDR is a **crucial part of a successful peace building** process and a key to political stability
- **Disarmament** means the collection, control and disposal of small arms and light weapons and the development of responsible arms management programmes in a post-conflict context
- **Demobilization** is defined as a planned process by which the armed force of the government and/or opposition or factional forces either downsize or completely disband
- **Reintegration** is the process whereby former combatants and their families are integrated into the social, economic and political life of civilian communities
- DDR can be a demilitarization process after a decisive victory or a part of a peace settlement
- Challenges for all parties and especially for the donor community is the risk that hostilities may resume
- +R+R = repatriation of refugees and IDPs and Reconciliation is important

SSR Security System Reform

- SSR extends beyond the more traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and policing
- SSR is a key component of the broader **human security** agenda. The key idea is that **security and development are interconnected**
- The security system reform seeks to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy
- The security system includes the following **actors**: Core security actors; Security management and oversight bodies; Justice and law enforcement institutions; Non-statutory security forces
- **Challenges**: SSR comprises the most sensitive areas of state control. Also “war on terror” threatens to shift the concept of security back to the traditional security

One of the key areas for work on conflict resolution is building a just society and reconstruction of the institutions of rule of law. Key elements for the just society in practice are:

- Reconstruction or establishing judiciary system and institutions such as courts, prosecution, prison services and police
- Recruitment of judges, capacity building and guarantees to provide services in efficient manner with respect of individual rights
- In post-conflict (transitional justice) situations it is important to ensure that perpetrators of war crimes are taken to court and punished
- Overhaul democratic institutions in order to maintain separate legislative powers, governmental duties and juridical powers and support free media as watch-dog
- Enhancement of basic rights and liberties and human rights, including minority rights and gender concern

When addressing DDR, SSR, rule of law and just society and development we recognize that it is very difficult to draw strict borderlines between various actors involved in the development and implementation of various tasks. Military and civilian peace keeping and peace building need a special emphasis for interconnectivity and efforts for interoperability. International and regional actors, donor community and various non-governmental actors need to day a much better coordination than ever before.

Our common concern is to promote dialogue, security and structural stability towards sustainable peace and development in Africa. We have some common goals, internationally accepted principles for our work like:

- poverty reduction (reaching the MDG-targets)
- need to obtain sustainable economic growth
- internationally accepted principles to reach democracy and good governance

- acceptance for free media
- elements and institutions for supporting human rights
- goals towards gender equality
- sustainable use and control of natural resources (Kimberley process, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, EU-FLEGT-initiative on illegal logging)
- struggle against HIV/AIDS and other pandemics and
- reduktion of corruption

We celebrate in Finland this year the 50th anniversary of our engagement in United Nations peace keeping operations. Finland has had in those operations nearly 50 000 men and at the moment we have some 800 peace keepers in various operations round the world. Our training operations of peace keepers are famous and international courses are arranged in Finland and elsewhere. We have to keep in mind that according the United Nations statistic the top-ten list of contributors to the military peace keeping and police operations countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and India are providing the most forces for international peace keeping operations:

Secretary-General's Note

**Top Ten Contributors of Military Troops and Police Personnel to UN operations
based on monthly averages over a three year period**

rank	country	total	monthly	2005	2004	2003
1	Pakistan	264,236	7,340	114,235	94,344	55,657
2	Bangladesh	233,393	6,483	103,007	87,344	43,042
3	India	146,539	4,071	75,708	36,902	33,929
4	Nigeria	111,886	3,108	36,068	41,485	34,333
5	Ghana	98,577	2,738	36,799	36,350	25,428
6	Nepal	84,537	2,348	41,551	28,501	14,485
7	Jordan	79,648	2,212	36,180	24,507	18,961
8	Uruguay	76,476	2,124	29,644	25,743	21,089
9	Ethiopia	72,439	2,012	41,041	30,315	1,083
10	Kenya	62,244	1,729	17,914	22,834	21,496

African Union which was building on OAU in 2002 is the main actor for peace and security and development on regional level in Africa. European Union has committed in her Africa strategy (15702/1/05 14.12.2005) to engage towards the peace and security agenda in Africa and support of the sub regional organisations like SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD and others.

In the strategy EU states that "without peace there can be no lasting development. Without African leadership to end African conflicts there can be no lasting peace." So we will as stated in the strategy:

- a. Work with the African Union (AU), sub-regional organisations and African countries to predict, prevent and mediate conflict, including by addressing its root causes, and to keep the peace in their own continent. In particular, we will strengthen the Africa Peace Facility with substantial, long-term, flexible, sustainable funding. We will help develop African capabilities, such as the AU's African Standby Force, and will build on existing activities by Member States to provide training and advisory, technical, planning and logistical support.
- b. Provide direct support to African Union, sub-regional or UN efforts to promote peace and stability through Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) activities, and military and civilian crisis management missions, including potential deployment of EU battle groups; continue implementation of the ESDP Africa Action Plan; and develop the dialogue with Euromed countries.
- c. Enhance our support for post conflict reconstruction in Africa, so that we secure lasting peace and development. We will support in particular the new UN Peacebuilding Commission; the strengthening of fragile states; and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, and Security Sector Reform Programmes in African states.
- d. Redouble our efforts to stem the illicit flow of weapons, including small arms. We will encourage others to adopt minimum common standards and associate themselves with the EU Code of Conduct on Arms exports, discourage transfers which contribute to instability, develop ways to share and act on Information on illegal trafficking and support border management controls and international arms Trade treaty.
- e. Join with African states to counter terrorism worldwide. We will provide technical assistance, enhanced information sharing and support to the AU Anti-Terrorism Centre in Algiers and continue to Support the implementation of international counter-terrorism agreements.

European Union has besides her security and defence policy means also as community (commission and 25 member countries) biggest resources for engaging peace and security efforts with development means and resources for successful work towards sustainable peace in Africa.

The Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment

Henri Boshoff, Military Analyst, African Security Analysis Programme,
Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.

Introduction

It is unfortunate that “Africa” has become synonymous with conflict, increasingly violent and protracted. Since the establishment of the new regional organisation, the African Union (AU) and its Peace and Security Commission (PSO) much has been done to address ongoing conflict in Africa. Peacekeeping operations, initiated by both the AU and the United Nations are ongoing in Central and West Africa. Soldiers of troop contributing countries are daily confronted by the realities of the African conflict environment. The battle space is characterised by famine and internal displaced people, refugees, HIV/AIDS, child soldiers etc. Most of the conflicts in Africa are within the state, intra state and not between states. The biggest casualties are unfortunate civilians.

This chapter will first contextualise the global debate and the position of Africa, the current nature of conflict, the impact of conflict, the African battle space and a conclusion.

The Global Context

Africa, as a very small player in the context of the formal global economy, reacts more violently to the squalls and gales worked up by market sentiment than do larger states upon whose experience most generalisation on political economy and security are based. At the same time as Africa is swept along in the economic torrent, the international political environment has also become less favourable in terms of systemic stability. Contrary to most popular expectations the end of bipolar rivalry has made the world an altogether more peaceful place. Ironically, the end of the Cold War has contributed to the threat of Africa’s marginalisation in world affairs. The end of bipolar superpower rivalry has robbed Africa of whatever strategic significance it had. Suddenly the continent and its supporters have an extraordinary task ahead of them to convince increasingly hard-headed policy-makers in the rich North of the need to assist a region whose problematic economies and poor future prospects seem less and less relevant to the growth of richer countries.

The end of the Cold War implied a restriction of policy choices for the majority of African states. Caught in a massive and deepening economic crisis characterised by the debt trap their choice of ideology and aid

sponsors has been restricted by organisations such as the World Bank, the G8 and the United States of America. The absence of policy choices in ostensibly democratic systems also means that political competition may be stripped of ideas and reduced to a naked struggle for fruit of office. It has also meant that African countries have to indulge the fantasies of the radical free-marketers, despite the incompatibility of the economy and political courses being advocated for these very weak states. In the case of Africa it is clear that the argument about the interconnectedness of political and economic liberalisation is based upon dubious premises. Structural adjustment programmes have played no small part in destabilising the political framework.

Over the past decade a number of general trends and prominent characteristics of the international strategic environment have become clearly visible. These are also applicable in Africa:

a. *Intra-state Conflict*. The likelihood of inter-state conflicts has decline considerably with the termination of the Cold War. The vast majority of contemporary armed conflicts are taking place within the state. Africa is no exception and most ongoing conflicts in Africa take place within the state. Although occurring within states, the consequences of such conflicts in terms of refugee flows, the trafficking of small arms, and the disruption of trade, have profound spill over effects on neighbouring states. Equally, in situations where neighbouring states sponsor warring parties of an intra-state conflict, attempts to achieve a resolution are often frustrated.

b. *The Contribution of Non-State Actors to Insecurity*. The capacity of non-state actors to instigate and conduct armed conflict is significantly influencing the international strategic environment. Such actors include trans-national criminal organisations, mercenaries, rebel movements, warlords and militia. The rise of international terrorism has highlighted the lethal capacity of non-state actors.

c. *The Rise of International Terrorism*. Events within the global security environment have compelled recognition that international terrorism poses a serious security threat. Indeed, terrorism has become less territorially defined and more global in reach, including Africa. In addition, it assumes a level of anonymity that is increasingly driven by non-state actors. No country can be considered to be immune from acts of international terrorism and all are affected by the way in which the world responds to this threat.

d. *The Military Capacity of States*. While most states have retained their national armed forces and reduced their military spending, some have strengthened their military capacity. At the global strategic level, military power continues to be exercised alongside the economic and

political strengths of states. Of great concern is the use of such capacity to pursue unilateral military action in resolving disputes.

e. Competition over Scarce and Strategic Resources. The security environment is significantly influenced by the competition for access to scarce and strategic resources such as water, land oil and gas. Some countries see the interruption in the supply of natural resources of having severe economic consequences; they consider the protection of the supply of strategic resources as a significant national security concern¹. Some of Africa's conflicts are the direct result of foreign and domestic competition over the access to such scarce and strategic resources that are found on the continent.

f. Mercenaries and Private Military Companies. The nature of the activities of mercenaries and their participation in armed conflict has often been controversial. The controversy arises especially when mercenaries provide military services in violation of domestic and international norms. However, attempts to address this issue have been complicated by the difficulty of achieving a universal and concise definition of mercenarism as opposed to activities of private military and security companies. Mercenarism is a manifestation of unregulated military foreign assistance and has the potential to undermine legitimate constitutional democracies and the consolidation of collective security especially in Africa.

g. Globalisation. The cultural, economic, social and political process of globalisation is characteristics of the hyper-mobility of information and capital. The fundamental driver of the globalisation process is the rapid advancement in technology over the past decade. However, access to such technological advancements is a challenge for most people in the developing world, in general and in Africa. In a globalising world, '....no country or individual, no matter how remote remains unaffected by security-related developments.'²

h. North-South Disparities. While globalisation has increased opportunities for economic growth and development in some parts of the world, there has been an increase in the disparity between the rich and poor countries of the world. As a result there is now a major fault line regarding the levels of development and wealth between the countries of the north and those of the south, as the latter become progressively poorer. This trend has grave implications for the development and hence the security of countries in the South, including Africa.

i. Regionalism. The movement towards the consolidation of regional economic blocs continue. In the past years the expansion of the European Union bears testimony to this trend in international relations. Together with other regional economic blocs in the world, emphasis has

¹ Klare, M. *The New Geography of Conflict*. Foreign Affairs. May/June 2001.

² Kasrils, R. *Reviewing National Security after Ten Years of Democracy*. National Security Conference, CSIR, October 2004.

been on the facilitation of intra-regional trade. Increasingly though, there is a noticeable movement towards the consolidation of regional security mechanisms.

j. *Information and Communication Technology (ICT)*. Modern information and communication technology and systems are critical for commerce, trade and military operations. At the same time the presence of such technology and systems creates its own set of security challenges. The international community through the UN has undertaken to pursue mechanisms that will promote international cyber-security.

The African Context

The African continent continues to find itself within an international system structured and driven along clear lineages of economic, political and military power. The inauguration of the African Union is, therefore a milestone in Africa's quest for a dignified and equitable place in such a world³. Proxy wars that were fought on the continent in furtherance of bipolar competition during the Cold War have ended. Nevertheless, conflicts and the use of force have continued. While some of these conflicts are based on longstanding disputes, others are of a recent occurrence.

Contemporary conflicts and insecurity in Africa emanate from, among other factors: Weak and dysfunctional states; poor political and economic governance; the politicisation of ethnicity; armed competition over scarce and strategic resources; the involvement of the military in the political and economic governance of states; and unconstitutional changes of governments.

Of greater concern for the security of Africa is:

- a. Poverty and underdevelopment;
- b. Proliferation of small arms, light weapons and child soldiers.
- c. Unlawful activities of mercenaries and non-state actors in armed conflict;
- d. Inter and intra-state conflict;
- e. The continent can be used as a base for international terrorist groups as well as a target for their activities; and
- f. Increased piracy along Africa's Coast.

³ Mbeki, T. *This is Africa's Time*. The African Union Directory, 2002.

The current Nature of Conflict in Africa

A recent survey of wars and conflict in Africa over the last decade reveals the following:

- a. Any intense war fighting is limited to an average of 3 weeks
- b. Forces engaged in such intense fighting number only a few thousands, are secretive, highly mobile and assisted by limited air power, especially transport. Contingents engaged in the fighting also sometimes enjoy the support of governments/states and has elements of conventional and militia units integrated. Their purpose is to create dominant conditions for a more long-term rebel force to hold.


The impact of Conflict on Africa

The impact of wars and conflict is diverse and debilitating creating demands not only for a capacity to stop violence but also major interventions towards responding to humanitarian needs. A summary of some of the areas include:

- a. Wilful destruction of infrastructure and in some cases leaving behind landmines that for years will deny large tracts of land to be used productively unless rehabilitated.
- b. Conflicts within states, still largely based on ethnic and regional differences tend to flow beyond the borders and exacerbate ethnic cleavages that ultimately undermine state formation and regional security.
- c. Many countries are still in that twilight zone of 'no-war-no-peace' represented most graphically by Northern Uganda, a region that has not known peace since 1986 and is now host to over 1.2 million refugees/Internal Displaced People (IDPs). The majority of countries in this category can be described as highly vulnerable states.
- d. The forced and rapid dispersion of population groups into categories of the intelligentsia and professional classes fleeing into exile/Diaspora, others into refugee camps and the rest reduced to internally displaced peoples (IDPs). Of those remaining behind, Africa has experienced at least three genocides in the last ten years: Rwanda, DR Congo and in Darfur. This is the worst form of human rights violations known to man and is a phenomenon that has almost disappeared in major parts of the world. In statistical terms, there are over 9 million registered refugees throughout the world, the majority of which are in Africa while the continent is also host to a conservatively estimated 15 – 17 million IDPs.
- e. Major flight of capital and foreign direct investment
- f. Regions of the continent characterised by lack of security

The African Battle Space

The African battle space is influenced by religion conflict, HIV/AIDS, malaria, landmines, famine, small arms, child soldiers cross border crime, poaching and fundamentalism. Because of the complexity of the battle space is it very difficult for peacekeeping forces to operate in Africa. The following map of Africa explains this phenomenon.



Conclusion

Any peacekeeping or intervention force that has to deploy on the African continent must take note of the characteristics of the African conflict environment. Peacekeepers have to take note that they will find themselves in an environment in which state power is either challenged or eroded, sometimes to the point of non-existence. Administrative structures may be fragile or impotent, replaced by non-state actors if at all. Physical infrastructure may be decayed to a point where communications, water supply and medical facilities have to be brought in to an area where a force is to be deployed. A peacekeeping force will certainly need high levels of logistical support, especially in areas where the physical environment itself is essentially hostile. Local populations will probably also see in relatively prosperous expeditionary force myriad opportunities to enhance their survival. The distinction between a military operation and disaster relief may become uncomfortably blurred. Administrative and logistical skills may be in greater demand than those associated with orthodox soldering.

Not all the parties that peacekeepers shall encounter will be under effective control or even recognised by the incumbent government. Peacekeepers will need to understand the political and social environment very quickly to avoid unfortunate and costly entanglement in the local processes. Any peacekeeping or intervention force inevitably becomes part of the local political and diplomatic environment and constitutes a resource to be exploited in various ways by local actors.

In conclusion, this means that deploying on the African continent, you need an appropriate force design, heavier in skills such as engineering, logistics, intelligence and communication than usually deployed on the conventional battle field.

Promoting Peace and Security in Africa: Is the European Union up to the Challenge? - A Sociological Perspective

H.E. Josef Bucher

Ambassador of Switzerland to Finland

I have placed my contribution to this seminar publication under the title “A Sociological Perspective on the Transition from War to Peace”. It is the fruit of some observations I made during a few years I spent in the region between the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. In other words, my exposure to African reality has been limited in time and space, and these considerations are therefore limited in more than one sense.

With these limitations in mind, and the assignment given by the organizers, I am in no position to give ready-made solutions for what could be done. I just invite you to join me on a journey, where I will try to share with you some concerns that burden my mind. I offer no answers, but questions; no certainties, but doubts.

I feel that there is a growing awareness, within as well as outside the UN system, that there is a big gap between “peacekeeping” and “development”, with all the risks that this implies of falling back into violent conflicts. And it is on this gap that I wish to focus your attention.

What is the link between the cause of a conflict and the consequence of a conflict?

This is not the place for elaborating all the reasons for internal conflicts, since some speakers have already done this earlier. But on a certain level of abstraction we can observe, first, how institutional failure leads to conflict. Because of the way power is distributed and exercised within society, parts of that society are driven to violent rebellion.

Second, we can observe how conflicts damage the institutions further, either by intent, making a tabula rasa, or by neglect, warlordism and chaos. As a result, conflict-affected societies face an institutional vacuum when they move out of a conflict situation.

When I refer to power and the way in which power is exercised within a given society, I mean decision-making power regarding access to resources such as land and water as well as power over immaterial goods, such as access to justice, to information and to the political system.

Here the role of institutions comes into play. Institutions are the containers of power, their role is to contain power. That is why they are so immensely important.

In that sense we may compare institutions to structures built by civil engineers, which are aimed at controlling the physical power of nature. Look at the great civil works made along the rivers, how they are built to contain and to channel the physical force of water. Cascades, which brake the speed of the water in the mountain river. Dams, which contain the sea, or the rising water of rivers in the plain. Planted trees, which prevent the snow from forming avalanches with their destructive power. We can understand and conceive of institutions in a similar way.

Civil wars damage or destroy the institutions that should contain the power. The institutional emptiness or deficiency that follows may be the biggest challenge for a transition from war to peace. In an institutional vacuum there is nothing that contains the power, there is no stable constellation that allows power to check power.

Therefore, all too often the way out of a conflict situation is simply the reconstruction of workable institutions: institutions that provide basic protection; institutions that manage to deliver justice in a bearable manner; and institutions that provide a fair distribution of resources.

Therein lies the hidden link between the cause and the result of a conflict: The failure of institutions to contain power – as a start, and the institutions as a casualty of the war – at the end. This is the vicious circle, the recurring failure of institutions to contain power.

In this light the World Bank study entitled "Breaking the Conflict Trap" reaches the conclusion that civil war has to be seen as the major cause of another civil war.

Rehabilitation of institutions or import of institutions?

Filling this institutional vacuum is a great challenge. It is both difficult and urgent. Francis Fukuyama, in his recent book "State-Building", emphasizes that there is a great deal we do *not* know about how to transfer strong institutions to developing countries.

We know how to transfer resources across international borders, we know how to organize a humanitarian operation in the most remote places, we know how to project military power into a hostile environment. But the institutional transfer remains a challenge because well-functioning public institutions require certain habits of mind, and they operate in complex ways that resist being moved.

Institutions resist being moved as they form and are part of a society's history. Francis Fukuyama concludes that strengthening self-sustaining institutions thus becomes a central project of contemporary international politics.

The first phase of state-building concerns what has come to be called post-conflict reconstruction and applies to countries emerging from violent conflict, where state authority has collapsed and needs to be rebuilt from the ground up. Here the issue for outside powers is the short-term provision of stability.

If the collapsed state is fortunate enough to achieve some stability with international help, the second phase comes into play. Here, the chief objective is to create self-sustaining state institutions that can survive the withdrawal of outside intervention. But as we do not know how to transfer institutional capacity in a hurry, we are setting ourselves and our supposed beneficiaries up for serious disappointments.

Institutions can be defined in many ways, but they are a set of formal or informal rules, norms and processes regulating individual and collective behaviour. However, individual and collective behaviour is culturally determined. Therefore, for institutions to be successful, they must reflect the cultural underpinning of a particular society. Not only must they reflect cultural underpinning, they are also part and parcel of these cultural underpinnings.

In other words, since institutions have to contain power, and the institutional balance has to provide a system where by power checks power, institutions must be rooted in culture and political perception, they must mirror the social structure of a given society. If they are not rooted well, they offer no barrier to the force of power, and offer no resistance to the violence of a storm.

This "enracinement" of institutions can also be understood in dialectical terms: if institutions regulate individual or collective behaviour, they can do so only because individual and collective behaviour give them sense and legitimacy.

Heart transplantations fail if there is not full compatibility. We know the consequence: the patient dies. Institutional transplantations fail if there is a lack of compatibility. We know the consequence: a failing state. That is why institutional rehabilitation is better than the import of institutions.

Who would object, in theory, that institutions have to grow? Hardly anyone. Who wants to cultivate institutions on the local ground? Hardly anyone. Why is that so? There is one critical factor: time, the lack of patience for letting things grow.

But institutions have to grow, to grow like trees, like plants and flowers, like people and their culture. The process is very slow. At the end of a long day, there is always a great temptation, the temptation of taking a short cut. Could one not artificially speed up the process? The temptation of over-fertilizing our plant.

Cutting short means saving time – or rather, it aims at saving time. However, acting under great time pressure means raising expectations beyond what a society can handle, beyond what a damaged political order can cope with. To underline this point let us look closely at three elements of which we are tempted to expect too much: law, civil society and money.

Expecting too much of law

In modern western countries, formal law (law adopted by a formal institution, in a capital of a recognised state, and law shaped by international trends and standards) has developed over years, according to very diverse philosophical trends, and a long history of secularisation. However, in other societies, where social behaviour is mainly shaped by tradition, by informal laws and by religious beliefs, how relevant is modern, abstract law? How can we expect a law to guide and to protect the people where the mere legitimacy of this formal law is very weak?

But there is more. Law itself does not provide justice or protection. It does not impose itself. It needs the power of an institution. In the institutional vacuum I have mentioned, there is no institutional protection for the law. It has no hands, no teeth. We expect too much of the law.

Expecting too much of civil society

After the failure of building states in Africa, many agencies and writers took the escape route called “civil society”, out of despair, and “faute de mieux” - and got us all confused in the process. They made us believe that civil society could deliver where the state had failed.

However, civil society cannot replace the state, and it certainly cannot replace the institutions. It is rather the other way around, civil society needs institutional protection to prosper. Civil society can be used to establish institutions, but it cannot replace them. That is expecting too much of civil society.

The universal remedy for overcoming these deficiencies: money

Money should do the trick, financial assistance should bridge the gap. But are we not expecting too much of money? Financial assistance against poverty is important - but poverty is often the result of war, the result of failing institutions. Financial assistance to make the state function is important - but often it is legitimacy that the state lacks most.

All the money talk contains a message: that financial assistance may free you from a lot of homework, and an implicit message: that money can buy the solution. Is this message not preparing the ground for more corruption?

I wonder sometimes if there is another route, like learning how to manage poverty?

To manage poverty does mean that even poor societies have to be just and fair, instead of creating the illusion that greater wealth will solve the distribution issue. A poor society has to manage very carefully its wealth distribution. In fact, according to the World Bank study, those poor societies that have extremely unequally distributed income are most vulnerable to civil war.

To manage poverty, to distribute fairly very limited resources, represents an immense challenge, but it would help to avoid many civil wars. That crystallizes the great importance of the institution.

Conclusions

What does this add up to? I would say that in a transition phase from war to peace, we have above all to rescue what can be rescued locally, and this on three tracks:

- to rescue what is left of local institutions. Seemingly archaic and informal institutions are no less relevant than modern ones. What has grown in time within tribal societies, what has grown in clans and communities is still most useful to stabilize them today. What has grown locally is less prone to corruption and distortion.
- to rehabilitate customary law, and gradually to reform it, because customary law contains the seeds of any rule of law, and because customary law provides justice to the poor man.
- to mobilise local knowledge, knowledge about their environment, about ways of solving conflicts among them, knowledge about their culture and their history which form the core of their identity.

All three tracks may offer us new challenges, but in highlighting them, I have reached the end of my journey.

If there is one question which might be carried further in this seminar, I would dare to ask: How does foreign intervention affect the growth of indigenous institutions? How does it affect the rehabilitation of customary law? And how can foreign intervention help to mobilize local knowledge?

The Challenges of European Crisis Management in Africa

Africa as an Operational Environment

By COL Nicolas Richoux

Ministry of Defence of France

Introduction

EU troops are currently being deployed in DRC in support of the MONUC. It is a new challenge for many participating nations, which have no experience in Africa matters. This is the second big EU operation (after ARTEMIS in 2003) but there is no denying that it will not be the last. Africa is facing huge difficulties today and Europe is more and more involved in peace enforcement and peace keeping operations all over the world. Sooner or later such an operation in Africa will happen again.

Therefore, we have to consider into details the features of the whole area in order to be aware of the great variety of this continent. First of all, we must consider that there is not one a single continent but several different Africa:

- Almost 30 % of the whole territory is occupied by desert. The desert limits are also more or less the limits of Islam in the north,
- in the centre, it can be found savannah jungle and forests,
- in the south, bush and desert too.

So it is a huge continent wherever you go, the role of logistics will be primordial and the time you will need to fulfil your mission will really depend on the local situation. You don't move in the desert, like in the savannah or in the jungle. Geography and climate features will have a deep impact on the operational preparation. According to the country where you will be deployed, the health and sanitary rules will be quite different too.

General Features

a. Natural resources

Africa is potentially a very rich country with all kinds of oil and mineral resources. Nevertheless, it must be compared with the real poverty of the continent and the poverty level of its inhabitants. As a matter of fact, wealth is confiscated by a minority, profitable to few persons or ethnic groups, most of the time those who are in power with their families, their close relationship. This situation is favoured by a high level of corruption and incapacity of weak and poor states.

b. Borders

Borders are artificial and inherited from the colonial time. They don't match the real ethnic settlements. Thus, they are not a split line for populations and ethnic groups who often live across different countries. For instance, a lot of nomads have been used to migrating all over the continent for centuries. It can bring conflicts with farmers simply because official borders don't mean anything for them.

c. Population

Africa is composed of 821 millions inhabitants and more than 1800 ethnic groups. The average of density is about 20 inhabitants pro square km. except along the coasts and in big cities, the continent is not highly populated:

- the northern and eastern part are more Muslim and looking at the Mediterranean and Red sea,
- the middle of the continent is "black Africa" as we imagine it, and settled by black people,
- the south is more influenced by former European settlement.

The settlements are mostly along the coasts. Most of people are very poor with a high death rate, AIDS, malaria and low medical standards. Most of them still have a traditional tribal way of life and of thinking. The weight of traditional structures is still very important. Moreover, because of wars, you can find millions of refugees like in Chad or Sudan for example.

d. Languages

Most of the official languages are inherited from the colonial time (Spanish, English, French, Portuguese) but it can be found thousands of different dialects according to the ethnic groups.

e. Religions

Northern part, including Sahara, and the eastern part of the continent are composed of Muslims. Southern countries are more Christian (except southern east coast). In some countries such as Cameroon, Chad Sudan, Ivory Coast, both religions try to cohabit. But generally speaking, the gap between different religions is widening. There no denying that it is more and more and more difficult for those populations to live together. The situation is often very tense. Islam is pushing to the south and tries to promote fundamentalism. Are we going to a clash of civilisations as described by Samuel Huntington? However, those countries will probably have to face big issues in the future.

Of course, owing to different religion and traditions, the way to behave is quite different from one area to another.

f. A continent devastated by conflicts

Dozens of conflicts are observed all over the continent:

- ethnic wars: Congo, RWANDA, Burundi,
- religion wars: Sudan,
- interstates wars: Chad and Sudan,
- fighting for power: Ivory coast,
- fighting for a territory: Polisario/Marocco,
- collapsed, weak states (Liberia, Somalia)

Generally speaking, states are weak, very poor, and unable to face their responsibilities with political personnel just preoccupied to remain in power and a high level of corruption. Those conflicts generate millions of refugees and the flight of capital investment and intelligentsia.

Africa: Changes in progress

a. Political organisations

If you have a look at the number of local and regional organisations, you will immediately see how complicated, tricky and then inevitably inefficient they are. But the change is now in progress ; in the past, former colonial powers used to directly intervene in African issues. Now they just want to help African people to help themselves. Africa is evolving and getting more organised and structured, in order to enhance its own peace and security capability. Interestingly, the African Union took EU as a model in order to build its defence and security bodies. That is the reason why African Union (AU) was created in July 2002 and a Security and peace council (SPC) on the model of the EU one established. The main targets of those changes are:

- unity and solidarity between African countries,
- appropriation of Prevention & security capabilities with regional organisations,
- Defence sovereignty, territorial integrity,
- Promotion peace, security and stability of the continent,
- independence of members states,
- Promotion common positions & continental issues.

AU is a young organisation but it wants to take part in the resolution of the big issues the continent has to face. It adopted an Action Plan supported by international community which specifies goals to enforce peace in Africa. It was agreed to reach in 2010 certain autonomy in crisis management matters. Its main and critical initiative has been to decide the creation of 5

regional brigades as stand-by forces and peace keeping regional reserve, to be a part of an African comprehensive defence and security system.

But we can't fail to realise that:

- AU is still a young organisation,
- it lacks of financial resources,
- thus, subsidiarity is very difficult to reach,
- and there is a big discrepancy between regional organisations.

Therefore, AU absolutely needs the support of the international community.

b. Is EU prepared to match the challenges in Africa?

Only four European countries have an African experience: United Kingdom, Belgium, Portugal and France. Therefore, there is all over Europe a permanent suspicion and an instinctive reluctance to deal with African issues. Following common statements are often heard:

“Only Former colonial powers are responsible for this continent, they have to pay for their past”

“It is far away: it is none of our business”

Why should we pay and risk the life of our soldiers to sort out colonial issues”.

“In Africa? What to do?”

Many countries have the feeling that they have to pay for the French policy in Africa and most of time, public opinions are reluctant to any intervention on that continent. But we can't fail to realise how heavy the challenges to face are: poverty, diseases, access to resources, drug, wars, immigration, human rights, human trafficking and modern forms of slavery...not so far away from home.

c. Africa: a new interest for EU

- A. The EU interest for Africa is quite new and has already been materialised by AMIS (Sudan), ARTEMIS (Congo) and EUFOR-RDC (Congo) which is about to deploy. As a matter of fact AU has been considered by EU as the good politic frame to promote African answers to African issues. The EU current purpose consists in reinforcing dialogue and co-operation with AU and supporting the build-up of AU capabilities for peace keeping structures. The purpose is to help Africans to take their own problems into account, to provide them advises, tools and means so that they should be able to overcome themselves their continental issues. France supports the idea of multilateral a global approach to try to sort out the big issues of this continent; you can compare it with a recent past where our approach was more bilateral.

B. In this context, the support can be provided in a lot of areas: political, financial, formation, infrastructure, planning actions, equipment, direct logistic support, expertise and so on. The Action plan for ESDP (November 2004) in full respect of African ownership supports the enhancement of African peace support operations capabilities at continental, regional and bilateral levels. It stresses the following features:

- conflict prevention and management capacity building,
- planning support,
- training,
- provision of equipment,
- operational support,
- ESDP advisory of African-led ops,
- Ensure coherence and complementarity with bilateral initiatives, in full co ordination with other actors in the field: UN, AU, RECS, EU, states).

d. EU Tools

RECAMP

The Action plan for ESDP support to peace & security in Africa has many similarities with RECAMP.

Guidelines and principles are quite the same. It could be really appropriate to integrate RECAMP in a broader initiative led by the European Union. From the beginning on, RECAMP is an initiative in permanent adaptation, in response to an African will, with a multinational, flexible and open-minded approach:

- since 1997, RECAMP answers The Africans desire to progressively ensure the security of their own continent;
- this initiative fully replies to one of the major concerns of the united nations: to reinforce the African peace keeping capabilities;
- from the beginning on, RECAMP has been a multinational, flexible and opening concept to reply to both the political and field realities, in the African, European and global context at the same time;
- it is a multinational programme because it is opened to all sub-Saharan African countries and to all the non African countries, wanting to be associated with it;
- this wish was formalised, among others within NEPAD and had the full support of the G8;
- this initiative is co-ordinated with the British and American initiatives on this continent.

The principles of RECAMP initiative are the followings:

- activities of RECAMP are systematically in the general framework of international legitimacy with regards to UN charter and standards; It favours a multilateral approach, committing the international community;
- open, this approach aims to federate, on a basis of willingness, actions led in Africa by states and international organisations, in order to develop African peace keeping capabilities and to involve the Regional Economic Communities (RECs);
- RECAMP is first a prevention tool which aim is to prevent crises or limit them as soon as possible in promoting the regional integration ;
- it is also a tool for comprehensive crisis management;
- therefore its aim is to develop the civil instruments for crisis prevention, including domains of public order and security;
- It favours partnership and involvement with AU in the continental security supporting, in the development of African Stand-by Forces and focuses on prevention and military HQ structures support.

RECAMP lies on 3 main pillars:

- Co-operation,
- Training,
- support of operations.

It lays the emphasis on an internationalised effort towards Africa.

- A. to pursue this goal, we are looking for a better co-ordination and complementarity with other initiatives,
- B. wanting to adapt itself to the latest evolutions, RECAMP has chosen to support mainly the AU,
- C. RECAMP helps the AU and gives this organisation the priority when crisis management is at stake. The RECs are given mission by the AU, within the stand-by forces framework, to develop crisis management and peace-keeping tools. RECAMP helps them therefore in this process,
- D. Another priority of RECAMP is to assist the regional economic communities to strengthen their political and strategic military levels of decision making. We must admit that the 5 existing RECs are not yet equal and we aim at helping them in making their command structures more efficient and effective,
- E. Evolution towards a European dimension is the ultimate wish,
- F. Our only ambition is now to make all partners, benefit of RECAMP as a tool and a framework under an European union lead, taking advantage of the French experience, network and skills,

G. This means a close partnership with the European Union members but with the European Union itself.

The proposition for the partners would be to use the already existing RECAMP tools and procedures continuing to develop them or to make them evolve if needed.

In respect of instruction, France can take advantage of her historical links and her bilateral relationships with some African countries. Many co-operation actions are led. As for training, France has also a network of African national schools with a regional scope run by African countries with the support of France and where any African military can join and attend courses. About support of operations, France support several African battlegroups in peace keeping operations.

We maintain 3 depots in Senegal, Gabon and Djibouti, called RECAMP depot, where we store equipment to field a battalion in order to be engaged as a peace keeping force. Any other country, of course, could bring some kind of equipment in these depots and be a contributor.

A EU operational tool: Battle groups 1.500

In 2004, United Kingdom, Germany and France proposed the EU BG concept. The BGs are a tool in support of ESDP. They provide the EU with a rapid reaction capacity.

They are described as “...the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand alone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations...”

The main features of the concept are:

- 1 500 soldiers deployable within 15 days
- autonomy from 30 to 120 days (with supply),
- in the framework of Petersberg tasks are described as following:
 - Assistance to civilians /Humanitarian Aid (HA)
 - Assistance to civilians /Evacuation Operations (EO)
 - Conflict Prevention (CP)
 - Separation Of Parties by Force (SOPF)

The framework for committing the BG refers also to the EU security strategy.

e. EU operations in Africa

Lets have a look at the principal EU operations in Africa

ARTEMIS

ARTEMIS took place from June to September 2003. It was an Interim Emergency Multinational Force within UN resolution (1484) in relief of MONUC. It was a EU-led operation (Political control and strategic direction by PSC) and the first EU autonomous military operation (without any Nato support).

- A. France acted as Framework Nation. It was planned in a very short time, then led under hard operation and logistic conditions. About 1500 personnel were involved including 900 French soldiers. OHQ was provided by France (about 80 persons, 40% coming from other countries) as the FHQ settled in Entebbe (Uganda).

The Mission was:

- to contribute to stabilise security conditions and improve humanitarian situation,
- to protect airport & internally displaced persons in camps in Bunia,
- if situation requires, to contribute to safety of civilian population.
-

Among contributing nations, notice the presence of Belgium, United Kingdom, Germany, Greece, Sweden, Poland, Netherlands, Austria, and other non EU nations such as: Canada, Brazil, South Africa and Hungary. Artemis confirmed the EU capability for rapid reaction needs. It was a complete success and was over as planned on September 1st, to be relieved by MONUC 2.

DRC:

On the 27th of December 2005, UNO requested the EU to support the MONUC in the frame of the elections in DRC, planned for July 2007. The force will be composed of 2000 soldiers (800 in Kinshasa et 1 200 in Gabon) for a duration of four months. The bulk of forces have been provided by France and Germany, reinforced by other Member states such as Spain, Poland, Sweden, Austria, United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Portugal. The OHQ has been provided by Germany (Potsdam) and the FHQ by France. A forward HQ has been deployed in Kinshasa in order to make the EU presence visible. The rest of the force (on call force) will remain in Gabon (Libreville). But we must not forget that the EU is currently leading two other civilian missions in DRC:

- EU POL Kinshasa: reform of the police, EUSEC
- Kinshasa: SSR reform.

SUDAN:

EU in Darfur provides a political support, a human support (observers, support of police forces), and a financial and logistical support. As far as the logistical support is concerned, we can regret that a lot of EU members preferred NATO than EU. In this frame work, FR and GE with Luxembourg are the only nations to put their contributions under the EU flag, particularly for the relief of AMIS contingents (strategic transport). Most of EU members (including France) are reluctant to be more involved in Sudan, but we can't fail to realise that there is currently a humanitarian disaster added to a big pressure from the USA.

OPS preparation

Operational capability can be defined as a tactical capability combined with a technical, logistical and human capability.

a. General and operational preparation

First of all, it is an absolute necessity for everybody down to the private soldier, to have a deep knowledge of the country where he is supposed to be engaged, particularly regarding the following features:

- regional context and geopolitics
- history, conflicts and present situation (origins, history, fighting factions, recent developments...)
- territory (physical characteristics, climate, economy, lines of communication.)
- population/ethnic groups (history, religion, customs)
- local armed forces
- mission: risks, threats, operational constraints, limits

The operational preparation is also very important. The mission must be studied into details in order to define which tactical expertise will be requested. It is primordial to acquire technical and tactical expertise through training and of course to train specifically to tough life conditions. The equipment preparation includes Medical preparation/ health behaviour. Practical life in operation, conditions of living, dangers, must be known by heart. In France, the operational preparation lasts 4 months.

b. A French Tool: the military school for specialisation in overseas and foreign countries

The mission of this particular school is “*To inform et train soldiers designated to deploy overseas and abroad*”. It was created in 2003 to develop inter-personal skills and to learn how to behave in operation. The purpose of the training course is to facilitate the adaptation to the local physical and human environment and thus the accomplishment of the mission. 25000 soldiers were trained in 2005. It is now proposed to open this school to EU members, in order to allow them to take advantage of this particular and overseas-oriented expertise.

c. General Behaviour

The 1st month in Africa is essential!

- the training must be progressive and adapted,
- it is primordial to discover the country, natives and to try to understand them,
- You will have little time to acquire experience, take advantage of each opportunity.

In order to succeed in your mission, observe following advises:

- be modest and be keen on learning,
- don't try to import your European way of thinking,
- In a word try to adapt to the reality of the country.

How to behave:

“Bravery and stubbornness of our soldiers will never prevail over the knowledge of the field and the customs of natives” (Maréchal Liautey).

This sentence summarises the mains efforts which are to be done:

- to respect the others, local culture and customs, religion, local official and customary laws, official and customary authorities,
- to be open-minded : understand the local mental schemes,
- to be curious: try to learn the local way of life and if possible strike up contacts with the population (to discuss is very important),
- to be integrated in the local environment.

On the contrary, avoid to be:

- arrogant,
- aggressive,
- cut from the local reality.

In a word: Don't be paranoiac, Africa is a wonderful continent with wonderful people; you will only find what you will bring!

CONCLUSION:

Africa is a very challenging and demanding continent. It will take a long time until EU members states consider Africa as a natural operational environment But Africa is at the southern border of the EU: every body is concerned.

If you are not interested in Africa, sooner or later Africa will take an active interest in you. That the reason why it is important to face the challenges now. Africa has to face at the same time a lot of difficult challenges: poverty, immigration, diseases...Sooner or later it will have an impact on EU.

Logistics Experiences; the Case of Darfur

Major Janos Besenyö

Armed Forces of Hungary

I would like to present to you the logistics matters and experiences in the mission area of Darfur. Everything that is written in this article is based on my personal experience, observations and opinion and does not reflect the official position of Hungary or the Hungarian Defence Forces.

When the politicians make an agreement on a case usually the next job is for the soldiers (peacekeepers). There are a lot of kinds of jobs, which can only be done by soldiers and not by civilians. For this reason, after the Peace negotiations when the Parties (African countries, various fighting fractions-SLA, JEM, NRMD, UN, EU, NATO and the USA) agreed to send peacekeepers to Darfur to stop the violence, they had to act immediately. The African Union (AU) decided to send troops as soon as possible to the area to secure it. Because the AU as a new organisation faced serious financial shortages and lacked some capacities (Logistic, Air Ops, IT) the EU, USA and NATO offered the AU help in these areas.

After the Donor Conference all of the organisations decided to send observers to help and participate in the AU second peacekeeping mission (African Union Mission In Sudan-AMIS) in Africa. The donors started to send their aid (money and equipment as well) to the mission area but the African troops were not prepared to handle them. Both the shortage of military and police forces and the missing positions mostly in the logistics field made the situation very difficult on the ground. The African countries mostly sent infantry troops without working logistics support system (combat support units, etc). Even though the soldiers did a good job as infantry units, nobody took care of records keeping or administrative handling of the donated equipment. For this reason a lot of things were missing or were used in a wrong way. There were shortages of staff officers in the logistics and planning sections, which caused Serious and various problems with the provision (food, drinking and potable water, bed items, sanitation, communication, etc).

The donors sometimes offered complete services or facilities to the AU. For example the USA provided the construction of all of the camps through the state owned company, PAE. Although PAE made a really good job based on the contract between AU and USA, from the AU/AMIS side nobody could direct and check them properly because of the missing logistics experience.

At the same time the AU officials realised that they overcharged their troops on the ground and that they did not have enough capacity to both secure the Darfur area and run the mission as well. So for this reason they


decided to increase the number of troops and expand the whole mission. In the first phase the real strength of the troops were 138 MILOBs (Military Observers) and 195 Rwandese and 193 Nigerian Protection Forces (Aug 2004)

On the second phase the strength of the troops was supposed to be 3320 people but the AU and the participants could not manage to fill all the positions (2774 troops, including CIVPOLs were on the field by the end of June 05.). This happened in the enhancement phase as well (AMIS-II-E), where the mission was expected to expand to 6171 military personal and 1560 civilian police by the end of October 05. However they could not fill all the positions and the third phase, (AMIS III), planned to have 12300 personal, was never materialised.

On the AMIS II-E Phase launched 1 July 2005 the donors with the consent of the AU officials agreed to offer logistics advisors and expertise besides the money, equipment and Airlift to the AU. At this time the EU logistics experts were deployed to Addis Ababa, Khartoum and El-Fasher as well. Under the same accord new post were approved in the establishment to further improve the logistics capacity of AMIS.

The EU, NATO and the USA advisors worked in the ACMC section under the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), the highest organisation inside AU to co-ordinate the mission in Darfur. You can see its organisation on the next chart.

AU / APMC STRUCTURE AT ADDIS



Source: AMIS 2005

Generally the APMC is the J4 and J8 function within the DITF, working directly for the Chief of Staff. The APMC is responsible for co-ordinating all logistics support between the AU, the Donor / Partner nations and Contractors in order to provide support to the operational commanders. It provides logistics synchronisation support to the movement plan, the force generation plan, the infrastructure development plan and the equipment delivery programme working in co-ordination with the Logistics Cell at Mission HQ in Khartoum and the JLOC in El Fasher. The APMC co-ordinates and prioritises the overall sustainment effort for AMIS tasking the JLOC through the chain of command as required.

Responsibilities:

Chief APMC. He was responsible to the DITF Joint Chief of Staff for the delivery of logistics support and oversight of the theatre logistics effort.

J1/ Personnel. He acted in co-ordination with the existing J1 cell of the DITF as the J1 focus and co-ordinating authority for all non-AU personnel deployed in support of AMIS. He ensured that Donor personnel deployed to theatre in a timely and co-ordinated manner, as agreed and co-ordinated with the AU. He provided administrative support to Donor personnel to include RSOI, welfare and leave.

Log Ops and Plans. He provided logistics planning support to the Chief ACMC. Provided real time logistics support to the operation ensuring that the military and CIVPOL were properly sustained with C Sups in co-ordination with PAE.


J4/ Supply. He provided the co-ordination with Donors and contractors for the timely delivery of equipment and materiel to the AU, and acted as the interface with the JLOC to ensure that the delivery plan to AMIS meets the operational requirement and is synchronised with the deployment plan.

JFBMC (Strategic Movement)[1]. He provided Strategic Movement support to the DITF and co-ordinates and plans all strategic movement between AMIS, AU enhancement nations and the EU and NATO. Acted as the forward movement cell for the European Airlift Centre (EAC) at Eindhoven and the Allied Movement Co-ordination Centre at SHAPE.

J8/Contracts. She was responsible for all contracting support to AMIS working with PAE, Crown Agents and other contractors.

CIVPOL. He acted as the CIVPOL interface to the ACMC ensuring that all CIVPOL requirements and enhancement needs are met. Additional expertise and advisors worked in the Headquarter to help the work of the AU in Sudan (Airlift, etc.) Because Darfur is only a part of Sudan it was important to establish an HQ in Khartoum to deal with the Sudanese authorities and represent the AU in all AMIS related matters. In Khartoum we had a logistics cell as well. You can see their organisation here:

AU / LOG CELL STRUCTURE AT KHARTOUM



Source: AMIS 2005

Generally this section acted as the logistics transit hub in co-ordination with ACMC and the JLOC. Provided diplomatic clearances (Visas and Customs clearance), as required, and provided movement and contractual support to AMIS.


J1 Personnel. He provided J1 support to AMIS, including provisions of visas for all AU personnel, as required, and customs clearance with GOS. It was his responsible the delivery of the CASEVAC plan in co-ordination with the JLOC.

J4/ Procurement and Supply. He acted as the focus for Procurement and Supply in co-ordination with ACMC.

J4/ Movement. He assisted with movement of personnel and equipment, including tactical airlift moving through Khartoum.

The Joint Logistics Operation Centre (JLOC) was deployed in El-Fasher (the capital of Darfur) The JLOC organised and directed the logistics system in the mission area and did the real work on the field.

AU / JLOC STRUCTURE AT EL FASHER



Source: AMIS 2005

Generally the JLOC acted as the logistics focus within the FHQ for both the Military and Police missions. It prepared operational logistics plans in support of the operation and acted as the operational level logistics authority. The JLOC ensured that the operational theatre is properly sustained. The JLOC worked in direct co-ordination with the Logistics Cell at Mission HQ in Khartoum and the ACMC in Addis Ababa.

Chief JLOC. The Chief JLOC was responsible for the delivery of logistics support to AMIS within the operational theatre. He worked through the Deputy Head of Mission and operated on behalf of both the Force Commander and the CIVPOL Commissioner.

Deputy Chief JLOC. He acted on behalf of the Chief JLOC and is the JLOC Chief of Staff, co-ordinating all operational logistics staff effort.

Field Support Section (FSS). The FSS provided the direct logistics contact with Sectors on behalf of Chief JLOC and worked in co-ordination with the functional cells. The FSS was responsible for the delivery of up to date logistics reports and returns from Sectors to the Chief JLOC.

He was responsible in the mission area (with close relation with PAE and its subcontractors) for the food-catering service, camp management, water supply, environmental, health and camp sanitation, fire marshalling and for other orders from Chief JLOC.

Log Ops and Plans. He provided logistics planning support to the Force Commander and the CIVPOL Commissioner. Provided real time logistics support to the operation ensuring that the military and CIVPOL are properly sustained with C Sups in co-ordination with PAE.

Maintenance. He ensured that all vehicles in theatre are properly maintained and supported in co-ordination with Contractors.

Materiel Management. He ensured that all equipment is properly distributed and managed to support the needs of the operation and all equipment is properly accounted for.

Movement / Air Ops. He co-ordinated all in-theatre J4 movement including tactical airlift, SH, (when in a J4 function) and road convoys.

Medical / Environmental Health. He co-ordinated medical and health service support to include treatment and evacuation of casualties, medical logistics, preventative medicine and environmental health with PAE and other medical providers. This position was not filled either by EU or AU at this time, for this reason everybody from JLOC dealt with these matters.

Communications / IT. He co-ordinated the distribution and maintenance of all communications and IT equipment in accordance with the communications plan.

CIVPOL. He acted as the CIVPOL interface to the JLOC ensuring that all CIVPOL requirements and enhancement needs are met. EU did not man this position under my service time.

The first EU advisors arrived in the theatre on 29 June from the United Kingdom, Spain and Hungary. We spent our first weeks in Addis Ababa because we did not get our visas in time, so we occupied ourselves in Addis to help in the DITF. After we received our visas we first went to Khartoum and then to Darfur. When we arrived there we got temporary accommodation only for a time, because the camp was overcrowded. Nearly all the European experts had worked and lived in Africa before (myself in Western Sahara-MINURSO) but we were not prepared for the amount of difficulties that we had found there.

We needed a few days to accommodate ourselves and to get our job started. Unfortunately we did not have offices. The JLOC existed only on paper and not in real life. We could not find our African counterparts who we had

to co-operate with. For this reason the Force Commander decided that we have to work in the FHQ logistics section and take part in the replacement and development of AMIS II-E. Despite that we were not under the Force Commander's command we began to work with the FHQ Logistics cell and were faced with more problems.

No matter how hard the PAE and its subcontractor worked to construct new camps and to expand the existing facilities they were already late because of the rainy season (in this time the only way to transport material was by helicopter). We had to support the troops on the ground and organise the Airlift in close co-operation with AU, EU, NATO and the USA. We also had to provide accommodation, food, water and others for the newcomers.

The next chart shows the AMIS II-E deployment schedule:

Battalions	Deployme Dates	Number Pax	Estimated Freight (Tons)	Est Ammo (Tons)	Preferred APOE	Preferred APOD	Airlift Donor Nation
Nigerian Bn 1 Sector 2	1 – 14 Jul	680	40	18	Kaduna	Nyala	GER UE
Rwandan Bn Sector 1	15 – 29 Ju	680	32	16	Kigali	Nyala	US NATO
Rwandan Bn Sector 7	30 Jul – 9 Aug	538	32	16	Kigali	El Fasher	US NATO
Gambian Coy Force HHQ	30 Jul – 9 Aug	196	12	7	Banjul*	El Fasher	?
Nigerian Bn 2 Sector 8	10 – 18 Aug	876 (note 3)	40	18	Abuja*	Nyala	UK NATO
Senegalese B Sector 5	20 – 29 Aug	538	32	16	Dakar	El Fasher	France UE
Nigerian Bn 3 Sector 3	1 – 9 Sep	484 (note 3)	40	18	Abuja*	El Fasher	UK NATO
Rwandan Bn Sector 4	30 Sept – 6 Oct	538	40	18	Kigali	El Fasher	?
South African Bn Sector 6	22 – 25 Oct	550 (Note 4)	32	16	Bloemfontein or Pretoria	El Fasher	Netherlands NATO
South African Eng Coy, EOD team Reserve Coy	28 – 29 Sep	210	12	(Note 2)	Bloemfontein or Pretoria	El Fasher	Netherlands NATO
Kenyan MP Sector 1	30 Sep	25	2	-	Nairobi	El Fasher	?

Source: AMIS 2005

Of course this schedule had changed because of the circumstances (weather, readiness of camps, etc) and and it wasn't until October that we could carry out the enlargement of AMIS.

During this period all of the JLOC positions (except the CIVPOL and the Medical Environmental Health) were filled by the donor countries (Spain, France, United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, USA and Canada) but the AU didn't fill the logistics positions in JLOC until by the end of October. Until then we worked alone with all responsibility. When we received our partners it was clear that except some of them they do not have any logistics background (graduation in logistics school or field experience). This made our job more difficult.

The other problem was that none of the African units (except the South Africans) arrived with full capacity units. In the battalions Combat Support Units (Sector Support Cell), only one existed on paper. These units consisted of infantry troops only without any logistics support element. Only the South African contingent was totally equipped to comply with the requirements of a fully capable battalion in the mission area. They had their own logistics platoon and a lot of officers who had logistics qualification and experience.

With the lack of logistics skills, everybody expected full support from the civilian contractor (PAE). However there is a new trend in peacekeeping or/and other operations that civilian companies perform a lot of the tasks, for which the military does not want to waste soldiers or they do not have the necessary qualification for (Logistic, Air Ops, IT, Communication, cleaning and construction jobs). The military component has to plan the mission needs, order the service and properly check the contractors before payment. For this reason it is very important that the J4 (logistic) section is manned with qualified and capable officers, who can deal with the civilian companies in all matters and on all levels. In Darfur this did not work properly and the mission leaders did not know exactly what was in the contracts, therefore they expected sometimes more service from the contractor, than what the AU and the USA government had agreed on previously. One of our first tasks was to read through the contracts in order to finalize what the civilian companies have to do and what is our (AMIS) right and obligation. We also had to create a working system together with sectors and the civilian companies (reports, registrations, etc). After that all of us began working on this task. I was responsible for the Field Support Service, this means catering, camp management, water supply, environmental, health and camp sanitation, fire marshalling and for other orders from Chief JLOC. The mission area was the size of France and in the 8 sectors there were 33 camps located.

What made our task more difficult was that during this time (from June till the end of 2005) the security situation was relatively calm but unpredictable. The banditry attacks, stealing of livestock, harassment of the civil populace by armed militias were taking place nearly every week.

The fighting renewed in the general areas (Jebel Marra, Amu valley, Muhjeria, etc.) between Sudanese Armed Forces, Janjaweed militias and SLA and JEM. The armed Arabic militias attacked villages (Tawila, Mukjar, etc) and IDPs camps as well. The rebels attacked GOS and Humanitarian convoys as well and there were some clashes between SLA and JEM. Violent threats against AMIS, UN and NGOs (Non Governmental Organisations) have increased so the situation started to become more problematic. I believe that sometimes the fighting factions agreed that AMIS could be a common target. It happened that between Khor Abechi and Menawashi an unknown fighting fraction attacked PAE trucks, where they killed the civilian drivers and not much later another 5 Nigerian soldiers, who arrived to relive the convoy. In another case an other group attacked a patrol in Sector 5, where they took over all the equipment from the soldiers and released them without combat boots, so they had to walk back to the camp on bare foot. A lot of times they shot at AMIS helicopters convoys and camps. On 24 December 2005 one helicopter was shot down killing everybody on board. The Sudanese Army was not much better either. They painted their attack helicopters and military vehicles white and attacked the SLA and JEM positions with them. Of course after a time the fighters did not make any difference between GOS and AMIS white cars. From time to time the Sudanese Army organised us a quite nice military parade around the FHQ, which frustrated our soldiers. When we received the first Canadian APCs (Armoured Personal Carriers) the Sudanese authorities sent us an official warning letter stating that they will not tolerate any of them ending up in the hands of SLA or JEM. After this letter they organised a tour with soldiers, tanks and various military equipment (from the early 1960s till today, mostly Russian equipment). The soldiers were yelling, crying and shouting with weapons around the camp, I think they tried to show us who has the real power in Sudan. During my tour I could witness two of this kind of parades in El-Fasher.

The Humanitarian situation in the IDP camps were becoming over congested, the camp facilities were overstretched. However the Humanitarian Agencies had continued to provide life-saving Humanitarian assistance to IDPs as well residents in the villages, but some of them evacuated their aid workers because the banditries and attacks against the Humanitarian convoys and workers.

Although the situation was unpredictable the presence of Humanitarian agencies, AMIS MILOBs, CIVPOLs and foreign observers helped in stemming the tide of hostilities.

In this situation the AMIS/CFC (Cease Fire Committee) had continued to intensify its activities to reduce the incidence of cease-fire violations in Darfur. In accordance with its mandate, as contained in article 4 of HCFA (8 April 2004 AMIS) they continuously investigated allegations in response

to reports of cease-fire violations (Baraka, Graidia, Kalma, etc). The regular patrols were conducted by MILOBs to promote confidence building and also to show AU presence on the ground. Unfortunately after some shooting incident against AU personnel or in difficult situations (for example when the SLA and GOS fought for Sheria city) the leaders of AMIS gave orders to delay patrols in order to save our soldiers. These orders were only temporary and after that we begun to conduct the patrols again. The mission leaders and the CFC embarked on consultations with all parties in the conflict and the Humanitarian Agencies and attended the Joint commission meeting once a month at N'djamena, Chad. This was the real situation in AMIS-IIIE phase.

By the end of October we had 3 infantry battalions from Nigeria, 3 infantry battalions from Rwanda, 1 infantry battalion from Senegal, 1 infantry company from Gambia (as a reserve unit in FHQ), 1 Military Police Unit from Kenya and 1 infantry company, 1 engineer platoon and a EOD section from South Africa.

In the same time we had Military Observers, Civilian Police members, the contractor workers (**PAE-USA** and **Skylink-Canada**) and their subcontractors (**Amzar-Food**, catering service, **MSS-medical** and Hygienic service, etc.) and other local workers (building and cleaning camps, etc) who did not all live in the camps but they used our facilities as well. This caused new challenges to our overloaded camp systems. The strength of AMIS developed quickly and when I left it was as follows:

Military all ranks: 5611

CIVPOL:	1195
PAE:	229
AMZAR:	418
Skylink:	139
Total:	7589

As the Deputy of Field Support Service I had to work in close relationship with my African counterpart and the contractors on the below listed topics:

Food-catering service:

- To monitor PAE and AMZAR on the field, so they are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU.
- To organise the food delivery to the remote camps with AirOps in close co-operation with AMZAR & PAE.
- To co-ordinate with the PAE Food & Facilities Manager any problems regarding the AU

- To advise AMZAR in catering, training for cooks (for example I wrote a kitchen guidelines to help the cooks work, etc.).
- To co-operate with other sections (Ops and Plans, Logistics, Mess committee, etc.)
- Delegations, guests

Camp management:

- To monitor PAE on the field, so they are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU.
- To run the camp catering, liaise with the Catering Contractor on a daily basis.
- To supervise all Facilities including but not limited to Laundry, Dining Rooms, Accommodation, Camp Maintenance & Equipment Security.

Water supply:

- To monitor PAE on the field, so they are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU.
- Close co-operation with PAE water manager to provide drinkable and potable water to the whole mission area
- Regular quality control of the water

Environmental, Health and Camp sanitation:

- To monitor PAE and MSS on the field, so they are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU.
- Close co-operation with PAE camp sanitation manager and MSS operational manager
- Health & Hygiene Management within the Camp Facilities, to include waste management (Fuel spillage, waste disposal, sewage). stress management (entertainment)

Fire Marshall:

- To monitor PAE on the field, so they are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU.
- Develop and check the Fire evacuation plans
- To organise fire extinguisher delivery and replacement to the remote camps with AirOps in close co-operation with PAE.
- To co-ordinate with the PAE Operational Manager any problems regarding the AU (cooking inside the tents, etc.).

The main challenges, problems that we faced:

The circumstances were quite difficult and we were faced with some challenges. Because of the time shortage we only got one day of training in Brussels to prepare ourselves for this mission. I think later in other operations at least 2-3 day preparation courses need to be organised so that those participating in the operation get to know each other better can and make more detailed preparations.

The AU was not prepared to handle the EU-NATO-USA advisors in a right way (“white face problem”). We faced a lot of uncomfortable situations when African officers told us that we are colonialist or the spy of western countries. It happened that an African politician questioned the content of our reports from Darfur. He told us that our report did not reflect the real and true situation on the field and he sent us various e-mails, in which he stated our limited capacity to help the AU mission in Sudan. As a Hungarian I felt really bad because Hungary never-ever occupied any colonies in Africa and we do not have any economic or other interest there. We came to Africa to help and left behind us our families, jobs and risked our life and personal safety. No one of us from the JLOC received any salary or any goods from AU; we were paid by EU and our own countries. Fortunately this was not a very usual situation because most of our colleagues were helpful and from the AU officials we got all the support that we needed. However we learned that the Africans are very sensitive and to give them advice and help can sometimes be difficult.

The operational environment was quite basic, no EU standard (camp sanitation, personal hygiene, accommodation, food, etc.) As I mentioned previously when we arrived to Darfur, it was the enhancement time and most of the camps were overcrowded and that caused problems.

The different cultural conventions and different nationals, religious practice and possible oversensitivity (to work in a Muslim environment as a Christian) and a different approach to responsibilities and rights in the Mission (rank, position, qualification, etc.) caused difficulties.

Life/work in an unknown environment was challenging. The place was unknown not only for us but also for some African officers and soldiers. We had to learn to respect and understand the locals and co-operate with them.

No JOC only JLOC worked in the mission. When the JLOC was created we saw that there were some misunderstandings between the military and civilian components and this caused unnecessary difficulties in the everyday life. The JLOC begun to harmonise between the components to clarify their logistics needs and give them advice and help to fulfil their tasks. We faced other problems as well, which we could not solve alone so

for this reason we suggested to create JOC (Joint Operation Center) to harmonise the work of all parts of AMIS (CFC, military, police and civilian parts). I do not know why but some high ranking officers rejected this idea and in 2005 this organisation existed only in our dreams.

No real responsibility (missing positions such as camp commandants, logistic, hygiene and fire officers). As I mentioned before we had to take more responsibility in the work with civilian companies/contractors. For example, I suggested that we have to appoint in each camp logistics officers, camp commandants (a kind of quartermaster, who is dealing with the camp order and organise everything that is related to the camp), hygiene and fire officers, who had to work in close relationship with PAE camp managers (their responsibilities were to run the camps) and with the MSS doctors. Military people do not like it when a civilian tries to give them orders (how they have to clean their tents, behave in the camps etc.) for this reason it was important that the Army part of this mission, was not to be only a customer who order services from the civilians but a participant who takes his own responsibility to run the mission. When I left only in El-Fasher we had an appointed camp commander and his work proved that when the military and police forces took more responsibility and worked with the contractors, everything went more smoothly than before.

Slow decision-making. Lack of information, problems with communications and other short falls made it difficult to decide in time and act as rapidly as is necessary in a military operation.

No daily LOGSITREPS from sectors to FHQ. Some camps did not have radios, laptops or computers and if they sent any reports they wrote them by hand. Most of the camps did not send any daily logistics reports as we did in UN or NATO missions therefore we did not get correct information of their needs. The sector logistics officers (who were mostly infantry, artillery or other specialities) without this information could report only their request to us. For this reason they got more logistical help than the camps. When we arrived in any camp the problems came out immediately (we do not have cars, spare tires, communication equipment, cameras, computers, no enough food, etc) and we were surprised because nobody reported their real situation. If we want to run a military or peacekeeping operation smoothly it is very important to receive real information from the field and act immediately to fulfil the logistics needs.

No proper planning. It means logistically not in operations. For example it caused a lot of problems when AU officials planned their fuel needs (helicopters, cars, etc) because they planned for 12 days but the amount fuel that they calculated was enough only for 8 days. So AU could save approximately 1million USD because Canada donated the helicopters and the flight hours. For this reason in the rainy season we could not send

enough food to the camps to feed our soldiers. One soldier was supposed to get 15 kg food/week (including the wrapping materials) so we needed for the whole mission 120 tons of food a week. When I arrived we received 35-45 % of the necessary amount of ingredients and when I left 76%, but we never received the full amount. This happened because we did not get enough fuel and for other reasons as well. A lot of times the PAE used its own helicopters to supply African troops on the ground because the AMIS helicopters could not fly in lack of kerosene. As I know we were never paid for the extra work and the used fuel, flight hours to PAE. This is only one of the problems that we faced because of the improper planning.

Lack of Human resources or using them in a wrong way, in a wrong position. For example, when the positions in JLOC were filled by AU, we did not have enough African officers who graduated from Logistics school or had logistics experience. We requested an officer from FHQ who has 15 years experience in the transportation field but we could not get her, because she was the only one who could make PowerPoint presentations in her section. For this reason they did not release her and we got another officer who did not know too much about transportation matters and he had to learn. Fortunately all officers who got positions in JLOC wanted to do a good job and this made our job easier.

Lack of communication between sections or components and rivalry. First we did not have enough communication equipment and the donors did not give the same type of systems. This is a technical thing, which we could solve with professional communication and IT personnel and harmonise the systems to work. But we never had enough specialists for this job. Another problem was that there were clashes between the military and police components in the JLOC as well (rights, responsibilities, etc.). It took extra time and efforts to solve these situations

Suggestions for AMIS mission in Sudan:

- EU has to clarify the role and position of the non-African advisors;
- EU should make clear that we are in Sudan (Africa as well) to help and not impose the western will;
- Create JOC as soon as possible;
- Proper planning and training;
- Create and use LOGSITREPs;
- Enlarge the storage facilities (MRE, fresh and frozen food);
- Giving priority to food and Medevac (No VIPs or medals);
- Appoint camp commandants, hygiene officers and fire marshals in each camps as soon as possible;
- Donors have to continue to put pressure on AU to handle properly the donated equipment (missing first aid kits, car accidents, using laptops, computers, etc.).

Possible future for EU in Africa:

- Bringing some of our experience as advisors;
- Take part in the training and build of a working training system (Communications, IT, Logistics and AirOps)
- We can expect growing ethnical and religious problems in Africa and more hot place but it is not a good idea to send any European troops there, only military and police advisors and trainers (historical reasons, sensitiveness);
- Establish a planning process in the EU to be able to provide support to other organisations (AU) in crisis management operations and to provide short and long term support;
- It can be a long term support to have staff or liaison officers at AU HQ in Addis Ababa to support the AU with long term crises management (mostly in logistics and contract issues);
- Take part in the rebuilding process and help to develop the local economy

I think the EU advisors did a useful job in AMIS and if we use the experience what we got in Sudan we can prepare ourselves to do a better job in the next missions in Africa (Somalia, etc) and develop a real partnership with the African countries to solve the problems of the continent.

**Panel Discussion:
The Dynamics of Peace and Security in
Africa**

Dynamics of Peace and Security in Africa

H.E. Funmilayo A. Adebo-Kiencke
Ambassador of Nigeria to Finland

Introduction

In this session, we are to concern ourselves with the dynamics of peace and security through answers to two questions: Q.1. What are the main causes or underlying factors of security problems on the African continent, and Q.2. what would be the appropriate relationship between the European Union and African states or institutions in resolving these problems?

Although Africa is a continent three times the size of Europe, with peoples more diverse than in Europe, I believe that the answer to the first question does not differ for each country very much.

The Stanley Foundation in 1996 stated that “security” should no longer be defined in terms of military strength and action, but that having security incorporates, “political stability, healthy economy and environment and respect for human rights”.

The cause and underlying factors of the lack of security as defined above in countries of Africa do not have their origins as one would think, in something specific to the make-up of the people of Africa. Every society have some members who feel the need to attack a government or country, not necessarily their own, which they perceive to have failed them, or all or parts of its citizens, and against which a war of words or action is therefore to be waged. We should direct our minds to the Bader Meinhof group, and other terrorist groups or persons in Europe and in the US. One mistake often made is to see and judge African countries and its peoples in a different light than Europeans, yet there really is no difference. The difference is perceived, as to give reasons to lower the level of Africans to Europeans. An African brought up in a European environment will be basically no different, so it is the environment that matters.

Causes or underlying factors of contemporary security problems in Africa

African countries are bound to lack peace and security, for they have neither military strength, nor economic or stable political and social environment. It is evident that too many countries in Africa are yet to determine which form of government is most suitable for the country, with groups antagonistic to one another, and an ever-increasing population. Economic policies become secondary.

Interference by other countries in the governance of many African countries with the excuse of establishing Democracy causes insecurity and prevents the build-up of strong institutions of government and governance suitable for each country. Proffering advice differs from interference or divisive acts, for as President Halonen said, no country can survive alone, so countries depend on each other however minimal the need.

The population of African countries lack education and training, as to know their rights or even to understand their own needs, and are unable to accept responsibility for the obligations expected of them by their society. Confucius said that an enlighten citizenry will permit good governance. African ministers back the UN Decade of Education for sustainable development, which as the Director General, Mr. Koichiro Matsuurs said, “to integrate the values inherent in sustainable development into all aspects of learning, and to encourage changes in behaviour that allow for a more sustainable and juste society”. In an immature society, as in most countries of Africa, the political stability needed to provide security cannot be equated with western form of Democracy and Governance. That Democracy is the best form of governance is however not disputed.

Africa boasts of ancient civilisations that contributed to world development, yet Africans are not acknowledged as able to manage their own lives. The governments of a many countries of the Middle East and Asia, not more democratic than African countries, are acceptable by those countries that condemn African countries.

The fact that a group of persons are voted into power does not guarantee democracy, nor the active involvement of the people in governance. In some western countries, the same party is in power for several years, and sometimes the same people. Power becomes concentrated and individual rights are unequal between rich and the poor. What immediate difference is such governance, to a government that comes to power, not through a ballot, but which guarantees the needs of the people, freedom and justice, not forgetting possible assumption of power by the rigging of ballots, in an election. If a country is peaceful, why incite satisfied citizens by criticising the government as undemocratic? Most countries did not begin with democracy, and eventually developed into democracy. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in its last report states, “some feel that a period of benevolent autocracy from external actors offers the best chance for successful peace-building”. Why not, benevolent autocracy of internal actors, whose country it is, for the best chance. Only they are intitled.

The reasons for lack of peace and security, or how to receive it are old and contemporary, and not different from country to country, if we look back into history. Which country did not have a turbulent past? There is nothing African that prevents developments, and lack of peace and security, not

forgetting that this word “African” is being used to refer to peoples from many countries, sometimes more different to each other, than a comparison of the differences between the peoples of Scandinavia to one another or with countries in Europe. The consequences of slave trade, colonialism and global manipulations have contributed to the level of development in Africa.

The Indians of America, African Americans, the Aborigines of Australia, the Bantus of South Africa, the Vikings, the Samis and all other natives of countries known to us, all have had a past with lack of peace and security, and some still do not have it today, because of the same reasons as before, subjugation and control of their lives and dreams by others and yet the governments of the day were regarded as democratic.

Influence of colonialism/neo colonialism

In spite of the fact that African countries took over the governance of each of their countries, dependency has been made to continue, through control of trade, technology and the possession of military strength by super powers of the world, neo-colonialism.

In spite of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, specialists and consultants of one form or another, from the so-called developed nations, the nations in Africa continue to lack sustainable development, and therefore also lack peace and security.

Colonialism and the lack of infrastructures, unity and development during the colonial era, are definitely contributory factors to recent insecurity in African countries. In the report of the British Colonial Office in August – September 1948, Rt. Honourable Arthur Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies said, “Our conception of African development is based on western political philosophy, and as far as we can see at present, that of the African Leaders is based on the same ideas”. If that were the case, why were the countries of Africa left undeveloped? – What happened was control of their aspirations, and restriction of shearing of world power and resources. It is still today the reason for international trade and political manoeuvrings unfavourable to Africa.

Education was kept to a minimum in the colonial era, and infrastructures were inadequate for social and economic development. It is acknowledged that, “Unsatisfied appetites in an ignorant and illiterate population make it an easy prey to subversive propaganda of all kinds”.

The issue of insurgency in many regions, due to ethnic or border disputes is caused, as was said, by “the fact that the division of Africa was carried out with little regard to ethnic consideration”, and that “territorial boundaries cut across ethnic boundaries in many places, not only in the division of the

continent into countries, but also in the division of some countries into local government areas”. Where tribes are split, it was said, “it is natural that there would be a dissatisfaction and hence conflict” e.g. Somalia, Rwanda, Morocco, Western Sahara etc. The writer suggested that in some cases there should be a revision of some frontiers, but only through consultation and agreement with the African countries involved. We must also remember dispossession by whites of African land in S. Africa and Zimbabwe particularly but also Kenya and other places. No compensation was ever paid, unlike for the Jews, and Germans after the 2nd world war, when German citizens from East Germany who lost their lands received compensation. Some even could reclaim it after the unification. To redistribute land and determination of their borders, The AU could be supported in such a project if tabled, and maybe, it should be tabled formally at the UN considering the situation in Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, Morocco and Western Sahara. Redistribution of land in Africa and accessibility to development by those previously marginalized must be an issue to be considered globally, and at the UN. Others not Africans have always been compensated.

The role of the United Nations

The collaboration of the EU with the African states and institutions to ensure the proper execution of the UN Charter by giving support to the UN and strengthening the organisation would bring about the desired resolutions of some of these problems.

Strict adherence to the provision of Article I of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the provision that, “armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest” and the employment of international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all nations, will contribute to peace and security, the world over, as less developed countries will develop and will feel safe.

The Rockefeller panel report on U.S Foreign Policy in 1959 stated, “The UN stands, finally as symbol of the world order that will be built. Does the moral obligation backed by law in the UN Charter still command acceptance? To measure the UN’s contribution, one need only ask how much meaner and poorer, how much less touched by hope or reason, would be the world scene if it suddenly ceased to exist”. The UN acting in concert can assure the success of African development agenda, politically, economically and socially.

The Role of the EU

The EU itself should be, as Sir Winston Churchill stated in a speech to the Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1949, “one of several continental units which will form the pillars of the world instrument, (that is the UN) for maintaining security and be the best guarantee of maintaining peace”.

The EU can achieve much if the countries of the EU are convinced of the moral and legal justification to act more strongly. Credit must be given to the EU for all the assistance rendered to Africa so far, but much more is required for peace and security through development.

President Halonen stated in her inauguration speech that security and well being is achieved through development. A start would be laws that ensure transparency and anti corruption in trade, and in development aid giving. The priority at all times on aid should however be determined together with the government of the African countries.

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and ban on small arms and light weapons

The EU has the power to ensure that the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is strictly adhered to. There must be disarmament, which is no longer talked about since the end of the cold war, or shall we say since the collapse of the former Soviet Union!

Action is taken on nuclear arms freeze, when a country that does not previously possess the technology decides to start nuclear development. Yet, even Dr Hans Blix had once stated that nuclear technology for peaceful means should be available to all states. Unless all the countries who are members of the UN again renew the policy of disarmament, and assure those countries that do not have military might of non-interference in their internal affairs, other countries will aim to acquire nuclear technology and not only for peaceful means, especially when their territorial integrity is threatened or those of others have been violated.

My thoughts now go to suppliers of weapons used in these conflicts. Weapons export is the main trade for many countries. Non-export of weapons to countries with human rights abuse, and a ban on small arms and light weapons should be adhered to, worldwide. Disarmament should not be subordinated to trade.

In continuation of this thought, the needs of the so called developed nations for the resources of the so called developing nations could become, if it is not already, a major cause of lack of peace and security, since such

interests influence the relationship with the countries having those natural resources.

Dissidents may receive support for guaranteeing access to resources. A stable government may receive no support if it does not follow the biddings of a strong and influential so called developed country, where natural resources are in issue.

The requirements of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms should be adhered to and extended to small arms and light weapons (SLAW). The AU has advocated for a banning of the sale of small arms and light weapons to dissidents in African States, and for Africa to be a nuclear weapon free zone, but will such be agreed to, and respected?

Conclusions

1. The EU should strengthen the capacity of AU and regional organisations for capacity building, and help to strengthen the African Union peace-keeping operations.
2. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) has become the credible platform for articulating, formulating and implementing the developmental agenda of the continent. It is also the platform for collaborative engagement with African development partners across the globe.
3. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of NEPAD provides the forum for self-assessment by acceding African leaders. The processes of peer reviewing in many countries are at various levels of review. The essence is to enthrone good governance in all sectors of the national lives of the African peoples.
4. The discussion of AU and its actions should not be overlooked as unimportant, nor should the AU be seen as an unequal player in World Order. Africa is AU. It is the undermining of African countries and its people, sometimes by derogatory references, “the Blacks”, “the African” (to refer to everyone from different countries in Africa) in context where individuals of one country in Africa is meant, that has now brought a new dimension into the relationship with African countries. Stressing the existence of different religions as divisive, when it may be unimportant is damaging. Religion does not on its own influence governance detrimentally. From time immemorial it has always been used, to cause divisions for political and economic advantage.

5. On the International Scene, the Security Council should be made more representative for the nations of the world and African countries should be represented wherever decisions affecting African countries are to be made. African countries should not be condescended, to even if not equal and the AU is not in competition with the EU or the UN in its activities. The AU, as the EU in its relationship with the UN, is a collaborator for peace and security, albeit only in Africa. The AU is not an individual country, but a representative of all African countries and should be treated as such.

As President Halonen said “A more just world is a safer world, and also a better place for us to live in”. This view is shared by many including myself, as the key to peace and security.

Dynamics of Peace and Security in Africa

H.E. Dr. Hanns Schumacher

Ambassador of Germany to Finland

In 1960, a first major UN peace keeping mission in what was then called Congo succeeded in its goals of reuniting a fractious country and an at that time unknown, US-backed candidate named General Joseph Mobutu, eventually won power. Who would have thought that more than four decades later the UN has returned to the same country, which only changed its name to Democratic Republic of Congo? The underlying problems of poverty, mines, ethnical hatred, warlords and war chests have not changed.

UN peace keeping in Africa has become full circle! This alone should be dire warning enough to come to easy conclusions and in particular to quick and mostly one-sided recriminations of who or what is to be made responsible for the contemporary security problems on the African Continent.

Yes, I agree: the colonial past remains a heavy burden. Many of the African frontiers are simple geometric lines, taking little or no account of African societies that exist on the ground. European colonial powers assembled territories, merging hundreds of diverse and independent groups, with no common history, culture, language or religion.

But then: the undisputed recognition and acceptance of all existing boundaries in Africa was (and still is) the iron principle on which the existence of the African Union and her predecessor, the OAU has been based. No war in Africa was ever fought over territory or boundaries – with the exception of the most senseless one between the two poorest countries in the UNDP Human Development Index, Ethiopia and Eritrea, over a meaningless provincial dust-bowl named Badme, a place which can be hardly found on the maps.

Yes, I agree: the major donor countries have poorly failed their frequent promises and even commitments to provide at least 0,7 % of their GNP's for international development needs and are still not inclined to amend their trade and agricultural policies for the sake of Africa's revival. The total value of EU and American agricultural subsidies amounts to roughly one billion Dollars a day. The EU's subsidy for each of its cows is about 800 Euros a year – more than the average African income.

But then: since the decolonization process begun, Africa has received far more foreign aid than any other region in the world. More than 600 Billion of Western aid has been sunk into sub Sahara Africa, with little discernible result! Only four figures:

- most countries have lower per capita incomes now than they had in 1980, in some cases even 1960
- Africa's share of world trade has declined to half of what it was in the 1980's
- it is the only region in the world where life expectancy is falling – and in a very significant manner.
- and, the worst: some 40 % of its private wealth is invested abroad and on foreign accounts. African elites don't trust their own countries and people.

The result is aid fatigue and a sense of helplessness amongst the donor countries. Africa has become the bottom less pit, where not only money, but worse, ideas, commitment, strategies are thrown in to disappear without result.

Yes, I agree for once: the multi-dimensional conflicts from Somalia to Angola have sadly not received the global responses that are appropriate to the scale of the tragedies, not to speak of the utter failure of the community of states in Rwanda. The successes of UN peace keeping in Africa were sparse, with the UNTAG in Namibia as a shining example that a stringent and coherent approach of preventive peace keeping, which combines the military element of robust force and a sustainable civilian approach for economic and societal recovery is the only way for a successful intervention.

The Brahimi Report of 1999 and Kofi Annan's Millennium Report "We the people" are to me amongst the many publications still the most outstanding studies to analyse the shortcomings and failures of muddling through in Africa.

The EU has reacted to their recommendations with its new Security Strategy, the establishment of their Battle Groups embedded in a still ongoing drafting of a crisis prevention strategy, which accepts the "hard" necessities of interference with robust power, but as part of an overall developmental approach, linked with the necessary administrative efforts to provide safe and sustainable structures for the people to make their living.

Liberia was a good recent example, where the fruits of such a long-term and complex operation could be harvested.

However, I would like to highlight two problem zones, which to me are of outstanding importance for success:

1. We should be careful not to be criticised of “double standards”. Third World peace keeping can not be left to third world countries alone. The major UN troop providers under chapter VII in Africa are Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nepal and countries alike. The African Union, despite best intentions, has not (yet) the capacities, the efficiency, the experienced manpower required for comprehensive operations.
2. The ultima ratio, the *conditio sine qua non*, without which all efforts are doomed to fail and were our African friends must now deliver, is good governance! What is good governance? The term is by no means vague, but very precise; it is consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and above all – follows the rule of law, where differences are not sorted out by throwing opponents into jail – not to speak of other more sophisticated reactions – but in front of independent judges, who decide on the basis of generally accepted laws and whose judgement are respected. Honestly, I would not need many fingers of my hand to name countries in Africa, where this is the case.

In concluding and to corroborate my opinion, I take pleasure to quote from Kofi Annan’s Millennium Report:

“Conflicts are most frequent in ...countries that are ill-governed and where there are sharp inequalities between ethnic or religious groups. A healthy and balanced economic development can only be promoted combined with minority rights, human rights and political arrangements in which all groups are fairly represented ... National sovereignty must not be used as a shield for those who want only to violate the rights and lives of their fellow human beings.”

Dynamics of Peace and Security in Africa

H.E. Soad Shalaby

Ambassador of Egypt to Finland

Introduction

Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast majority of which are intra-State in origin. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. The consequences of those conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples.

Africa is a vast and varied continent. African countries have different histories and geographical conditions, different stages of economic development, different sets of public policies and different patterns of internal and international interaction. The sources of conflict in Africa reflect this diversity and complexity. Some sources are purely internal, some reflect the dynamics of a particular sub-region and some have important international dimensions. Despite these differences, the sources of conflict in Africa are linked by a number of common themes and experiences. Some are historical while others are economic or other.

In this paper, I will summarize these factors as well as present the efforts exerted by the AU in the field of Peace and Security with a list of recommendations on how the EU and international community could be committed to help in the dynamics of peace and security in Africa.

Historical Factors

The colonial powers partitioned Africa into territorial units. Kingdoms, States and communities in Africa were arbitrarily divided; unrelated areas and peoples were just separated or joined together by artificial boundaries. In the sixties, the newly independent African States inherited those colonial boundaries, together with the challenge that legacy posed to their territorial integrity and to their attempts to achieve national unity. The challenge was compounded by the fact that the framework of colonial laws and institutions, which some new states inherited had been designed to exploit local divisions, not overcome them. The tasks of state and nation building preoccupied many of the newly independent states. Too often, however, the necessary building of national unity was pursued through the heavy centralization of political and economic power and the suppression of political pluralism. Consequently, political monopolies often led to

corruption, nepotism, complacency and abuse of power. The era of serious conflict over state boundaries in Africa has largely passed, aided by the 1963 decision of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to accept the boundaries which African States had inherited from colonial authorities.

During the cold war, the ideological confrontation between East and West placed a premium on maintaining order and stability among friendly states and allies. Super-power rivalries and their interest in dominating the economic interests in Africa fuelled some of Africa's longest and most deadly conflicts. Moreover and across all Africa, undemocratic and oppressive regimes were supported and sustained by the competing super-powers in the name of their broader goals but, when the cold war ended, Africa was suddenly left to fight for itself. Without external economic and political support, few African regimes could sustain the economic lifestyles to which they had become accustomed, or maintain a permanent hold on political power. As a growing number of states found themselves internally beset by unrest and violent conflict, the world searched for a new global security framework.

In that same period of time, the international community was eager to exercise its newly acquired capacity for collective decision-making. In the early nineties, the United Nations Security Council launched series of ambitious peacekeeping initiatives in Africa. Despite a number of important successes, the inability of the United Nations to restore peace to Somalia soured international support for conflict intervention and precipitated a rapid retreat by the international community from peacekeeping worldwide. An early and direct consequence of this retreat was the failure of the international community, including the United Nations, to intervene to prevent genocide in Rwanda. That failure has had especially profound consequences on international peacekeeping efforts in Africa.

Economic Factors

Unfortunately, the long historical exploitation of African wealth destroyed the roots of its national economies. No infrastructure was built to help to support the growing economies of young African nations and to be a backbone for its economic development. On the contrary, it has hindered their national attempts to overcome poverty and deprived it from achieving an acceptable rate of growth for their economies.

The transportation networks of exports and imports were designed to promote the trade only to the colonial country with no direct effect on the local economy. Consequently, the local economy, production patterns and balance of trade continued to be linked with the same production patterns

that existed before independence. The unfavourable terms of trade and the focus on production of raw materials and primary commodities have done nothing to improve the local production and industrial skills. In addition to that, there was no improvement to the educational, technical skills or suitable training that develops the capacities of the labour force.

Despite the devastation that armed conflicts brought, there were beneficiaries who profited from chaos and lack of accountability, and who may have little or no interest in stopping a conflict and on the contrary they would strive to prolong it. Very high on the list of those who profit from conflict in Africa are international arms merchants.

In Liberia, the control and exploitation of diamonds, timber and other raw materials were the principal objectives of the warring factions. Control over those resources financed the various factions and gave them the means to sustain the conflict. Clearly, many of the protagonists of wars had a strong financial interest in seeing the conflict prolonged. The same can be said for Angola, where protracted difficulties in the peace process owed much to the importance of control over the exploitation of the country's lucrative diamond fields. In Sierra Leone, the chance to plunder natural resources and loot Central Bank reserves was a key motivation of those who seized power from the elected Government in 1997.

Other Factors

In addition to the broader sources of conflict in Africa that have been identified, a number of other factors are especially important in particular situations and sub-regions. For Example, in Central Africa, these factors included the competition for scarce land and water resources in densely populated areas. In Rwanda, for example, multiple waves of displacement have resulted in situations where several families often claim rights to the same piece of land. In African communities where oil is extracted, conflict has often arisen over adequate reap of the benefit of such resources, or the suffer from the degradation of the natural environment by unprivileged communities.

African Peace and Security Strategy

Peace and security have become a priority issue not only for Africa but also for the whole world and the international community in recent years. The international involvement in settling conflicts has become the natural way to solve uprising conflicts. Peacekeeping missions whether they are UN or AU police or military forces are actually contingents who get special peace keeping training to offer humanitarian assistance and save innocent lives from deaths and homicide.

Peace and security is recognized as the absolute prerequisite for sustainable economic development and regional economic integration and this is the focus of the new challenge that has been facing Africa in the recent decades.

Currently, there are various initiatives for peace and security in Africa. They range from grassroots peace-building efforts to specific local, regional and international programs to curtail the trade in small arms. Equally important are the local and regional programs that are initiated and focused on training and providing expertise and technical assistance for conflict stricken areas.

An excellent example of the national African initiatives that is the 30 years old, Egyptian Fund for Technical Cooperation for Africa, which extends several annual training and specialized workshops for African nationals to get high quality training in all fields including diplomacy and peace keeping missions. It also responds to the requests of the African governments to their needs of specialists in different fields of medical, scientific and educational Egyptian experts. In cases of natural disasters or human misery that occurs as a result of conflicts and regional wars, the Egyptian fund also extends humanitarian aid in the form of logistics, medical equipments medications and food aid.

The current regional climate, where the African Union is actually in charge of peace and security dynamics in Africa indicate that the time is mature for integrating existing peace and security issues within an international framework. This could be successful only if African countries contribute by funds and personnel in the peacekeeping missions. It is also of utmost importance to make full use of the officers of African police and army contingents by offering them suitable training and upgrading their skills. They should retain their essential autonomy and dynamism, at the same time they should be assisted financially by providing the necessary logistical, communication and transportation support that the AU contingents are lacking.

The combination of the AU and NEPAD provides a framework for bringing peace and security issues together with transparency, self-governance, economic development and international partnership (the core of NEPAD).

Efforts of AU towards Peace and Security in Africa

The OAU and later the AU has continuously attempted to develop and create its own instruments of peace and security. African countries expressed their continued interest in their involvement in peace missions in their different forms. Whether the missions are UN or EU or AU such as

MONUC in DRC and AMIS in Sudan all these efforts have contributed to the establishment of the African Standby Forces ASF.

The African Union has developed its own dynamic mechanisms placed by the Africans themselves to intervene militarily in case of wars or conflicts. In case of natural disasters or emergency situations they have also developed early warning mechanism to protect civilians from suffering and later to provide humanitarian assistance to the displaced victims or refugees in camps. Also special training took place under AU mandate for the African police officers that are responsible for monitoring the elections to ensure the safety and fairness of the election process.

After the creation of AU in 2002, the new peace and security structure was designed. It is composed of the Peace and Security Council where Egypt became a member recently. The Panel of the Wise, the Early Warning System and the Situation Room are regional mechanism for communication and the creation of the African Stand By Force are also new organs in the system. In the field of Peace Building it has also initiated African Peace support capacities and established a revolving peace trust fund. These organs have succeeded in forming the international links and financial set up which the previous structure of OAU has failed to achieve.

On the Economic and Social Development levels the New Partnership for Development of Africa NEPAD had also been established to reflect African governments and people's ownership of their own modules and solutions of their development programs and exploitation of their human and natural resources.

The Peace and Security Council has proved its efficiency in its 51st meeting by reaching to a compromise between all factions, except for two, to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement. This is a major breakthrough and significant step towards peace, reconstruction and democracy in Darfur and Sudan as a whole. The division of power, wealth and security arrangements will continue to be the source of conflict between the different factions until the achievement of the application of the final lasting peace in Darfur.

The United Nations and the international community have supported the UN African Partnership by committing the UNAMIS forces due to start their mission next September. The strong African participation and commitment in principle and in character in the UN peacekeeping efforts and especially in this one is highly recommended. It is the guarantor to promote peace and security and stability in Africa.

The EU has been committed to the dynamics of peace and security in Africa first by convening EU Africa summit in Cairo in 1999 and later in December 2005 by adopting the strategic partnership with Africa. The leaders of African States had been invited in recent years to present their own initiatives to be considered by the leaders of the G8. The British government has placed African issues of peace and security on top level of its African political agenda. Germany, Finland and Sweden focused on the importance of training and deploying rapid forces for emergency conflict situations in Africa. The United States administration has assumed a new strategic interest in Africa not only based on humanitarian needs but also because of its national economic interest in the natural resources of African countries. The US is currently importing 13% of its total oil imports from Africa and that percentage will be increased to 20% in the next ten years according to speculations.

Responsibility of International Community

What is critically needed now from the international community is to share the responsibility, support and sustain the progress so far made in the field of peace and security whether by countries or by AU as a whole in Africa. This could be achieved by the following commitments of both sides:

- Providing coordinated technical assistance to the AU and its peace and security organs.
- Supporting the AU in developing its capabilities to deploy unarmed military observer missions and police operations as part of conflict prevention and peace support operations.
- Providing financial and technical support, including flexible funding, for African peace support operations including transport, logistics and financial management capacity.
- Countering terrorism in Africa, through co-operation with the AU Anti-Terrorism Center in Algiers.
- Working in partnership with the AU and sub-regional organizations by helping them to develop their planned Continental Early Warning System and implement the AU Panel of the Wise to address and mediate conflicts before they erupt into violence.
- Maximizing the contribution of local and multinational companies who can direct their resources and trained staff for the issues of peace and security. This could be achieved through working with the UN Global Compact and developing OECD guidance for companies.
- Improving the effectiveness of controls over transfer and illicit smuggling of small arms and light weapons.

- Support the UN Secretary General's proposed new Peace Building Commission in which Egypt was recently unanimously elected to represent Africa in this commission.
- Taking necessary steps towards coordinating reconstruction and reconciliation efforts in post-conflict situations to secure the non recurrence of sources of conflict by allocating grant financing for reconstruction needs, including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants into civilian society.
- Ensuring the effectiveness and the speed of the arrival of necessary humanitarian assistance to the needy by supporting the local regional and AU efforts to reach the conflict stricken areas and providing logistical support in the most adequate technology.
- Trilateral cooperation with the EFTCA (Egyptian Fund for Technical Cooperation for Africa) is recommended.

These are my recommendations for the efforts that the international community can take to help to consolidate peace and security in Africa. The official organs of the EU and European Non-governmental organizations and the private sector could help the AU strengthen its mandate for peace and security. This could only happen with the support of the local efforts of the Africans themselves so that the sustainability and continuity of the assistance process is guaranteed.

African and European Responses

African Union's Evolving Crisis Management Capabilities

By Major General Henry K. Anyidoho (retired)

Former Deputy Force Commander Of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, and Leader of United Nations Assistance Cell for African Union, Addis Ababa – Ethiopia.

Introduction

“Without stability there will only be war, poverty and the continued marginalisation of Africa and little chance for economic development and growth in Africa. In the meanwhile, Africans will have to prepare to share the burden of peacekeeping on the continent but will this happen in isolation from or in partnership with the global community.”(Cillers and Mills: from Peacekeeping to complex Emergencies.)

In the past decades, the continent of Africa has been plagued with conflicts of varying degrees including genocide. This state of affairs has hampered economic and social development of many countries on the continent. As Africans continue to blame the condition of under-development and conflicts on their former colonial powers, other schools of thought have been asking whether Africa has not come of age to find a solution to the obstacles that continue to hinder its development. In the year 2000 (8 – 10 July) in Durban, South Africa, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) yielded place to the new continental organisation, the African Union (AU). Prior to that transition OAU, having found itself confronted with myriads of conflicts in almost all the sub-regions of Africa, formally institutionalised in 1993, through the Cairo Declaration, that established the OAU mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, as a vehicle for furthering the Peace Agenda of the organisation¹. Naturally the AU inherited from the OAU, the ongoing conflicts in Africa as even new disputes emerged. On the whole, Africa entered the 21st century in a state of dilemma; freed from being a pawn in the Cold War struggles for power and influence, yet a prisoner of that legacy; freed from being a superpower battle ground, and now a battleground for the challenges posted at the cross-roads². As many conflicts engulfed Africa, a number of initiatives emerged. One of such being the establishment of African Stand-by Force (ASF). This idea was conceived as a result of inaction of the UN, OAU and the international community as a whole during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The idea being that if Africa could have at its disposal, forces

¹ Among other things, the framework mechanism established the mandates of the OAU Central Organ (16 member states) and the Conflict Management Division, later designated the Conflict Management Center (CMC) under the Political Affairs Department in 1999, as part of the programme of enhancing the OAU' capacity for peace support missions.

² Josephine Odera in out of conflicts from War to Peace in Africa; p144

ready to intervene in conflicts within the continent, perhaps another Rwanda will be prevented.

In the year 2000 when the AU was born, ongoing conflicts in Africa were mainly those of Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Southern Sudan, Somalia, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Prior to that, a number of sub-regional organisations within Africa, had taken very bold steps in confronting conflicts within their own spheres of influence. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed peacekeeping troops into Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau and much later to Cote d'Ivoire. On 22nd September 1998, Southern African Development Community (SADC) launched operation "BOLEAS" into the kingdom of Lesotho in an effort to deal with the deteriorating security situation in the mountain kingdom of Lesotho, in 1997 an African multinational force deployed in the Central African Republic (CAR) and succeeded in preventing the collapse of the state which in away maintained stability in the Central African sub-region³. Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been involved in the process of finding solutions to conflicts in the East African sub-region. Those sub-regional initiatives were in some cases supported by Western European Countries. Soon after its establishment, AU realised the need to harmonise all those initiatives for a coherent peace support operations within the continent.

African Union's policy of non-interference

There were a number of reasons why the OAU's conflict resolution mechanisms were rendered ineffective. Foremost among these was organisation's nearly unequivocal commitment to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference⁴. As a response to the ineffectiveness of the OAU's mechanisms, African leaders decided in May 2001 to devise a new security regime to operate within the framework of the nascent AU. In February 2003, the AU Heads of State and Governments added amendment to Article 4(h) of its constitution that extends the right to intervene in situations that pose a serious threat to legitimate order in order to restore peace and stability in the member state of the Union upon the recommendation of the AU Peace and Security Council⁵.

³ Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa; capabilities and culpabilities* p 222

⁴ Kristiana Powell *African Union and the Responsibility to Protect*, published in monograph No 119, May 2005

⁵ Kristiana Powell, *African Union and the Responsibility to Protect*, published in monograph No 119, May 2005

Establishment of peace and Security Council

The African Union has prepared for its enhanced role in the maintenance of continental Peace and Security by establishing a Peace and Security Council that is tasked with identifying and dealing with threats to and breaches of the peace. On 25th May 2004 (African Day), the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for the solemn ceremonial launching of the PSC. In order to back the resolutions, of the council, the AU has also recommended the development of a common defence and security policy and by 2010, the establishment of an African Stand-by Force, capable of rapid deployment to keep or enforce the peace⁶.

AU's first attempt at finding solution to internal crisis – Burundi – African Union mission

African Mission in Burundi was the first peacekeeping mission deployed by the new continental organisation. This came about as a result of the fact that following the intervention of Tanzania in the pro-longed fighting among various factions in Burundi, some forms of basic Agreements, Arusha Peace and Resolution Agreement, had been signed but the fighting was still ongoing between the government of Burundi and the various rebel movements. As the United Nations was waiting for a comprehensive Agreement before deploying a peacekeeping force, the AU decided to deploy purely African force of South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique to Burundi. That operation called African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was established on 2nd April 2003. After one year in operation and following AU's appeal to UN Security Council, Resolution 1545 of 21 May 2004 establishing UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) was passed. The African Union having successfully intervened in Burundi and giving a practical meaning to co-operation between UN and Regional Organisation was encouraged to maintain the momentum in other parts of Africa.

The case of Darfur

The major peace support operations so far undertaken by AU are the ongoing efforts in the Darfur states of Sudan. The conflict between the government of Sudan and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement to the south was very well known but not much was known to outsiders about Darfur region of Sudan until Human Rights Operators, NGOs and Journalists started giving persistent reports on human right abuses in

⁶ Statement of commitment to Peace and Security in Africa, issued by the Heads of State and Government of Member States of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, at the solemn launching of the Peace and Security Council 25 May 2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia PSC/ahg/st. (x)

Darfur. In 2004, two important world personalities then decided to visit Darfur. The Secretary General of the United Nations, His Excellency, Mr. Kofi Annan visited Darfur from 29th June to 3rd July 2004 as well as the then Secretary of State of United States of America, General Colin Powell on 30th July 2004. The reports of these two personalities put Darfur firmly on the international agenda.

Prior to the visits of Mr. Annan and General Powell, AU through its own mediation efforts and with assistance of the Chadian government had secured a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) signed in the Chadian Capital, N'Djamena on 8th April 2004. The signatories to the agreement were the government of Sudan (GoS), the Sudan Liberation Army/ Movement (SLA/M) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Following the HCFA, the African Union took a decision to deploy an observer mission to Darfur. Initially only sixty (60) Military Observers (MILOBS) and 300 Protection Force were deployed and the force was established under the name, African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The MILOBS as usual were to observe and report Humanitarian Ceasefire violations. The role of the Protection Force was to protect AMIS personnel, equipment and installation⁷.

No sooner had AMIS deployed than the AU recognised how inadequate that force was. The capacity to provide direction and support to AMIS was stretched to the limit. In the communiqué adopted by the thirteenth meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union held on 27th July, 2004 on the crisis in Darfur, the PSC requested the Chairperson of the Commission to prepare and submit to it, for consideration a comprehensive plan on how best to enhance the effectiveness of AMIS. That decision, which was taken on 20 October 2004, finally led to the creation of AMIS II with a new structure and also called for increasing the force level to 3320 made up of 670 Observers, 1703 Protection Force, 815 Civilian Police (CIVPOL) and 132 Civilian Staff.

The structure of AMIS II

The structure consists of Darfur Integrated Task Force at the strategic level, located at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa under the authority of the Commissioner, AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) and its role is to give strategic guidance to the AU Military, Civilian Police and Humanitarian Operations in the Darfur region of Sudan. The Mission Headquarters is located in Khartoum (Operational HQ for AMIS) and the forward Mission Headquarters is at El Fasher, the Capital of North Darfur (Tactical level). The purpose of the structure as a whole is to deal with the holistic issues at each level of command and specifically cover the subjects of authority, roles, responsibilities and Lines of Communication (LOC).

⁷ AU PSC/ MSC/ 2 (1) Page 3 dated 18 October 2004

**Darfur integrated task force (DITF) -
(See Annex 'A' to these notes)**

The DITF was established with the following roles/ responsibilities: (still being developed)

1. Development and maintenance of strategic campaign plan
2. Development and implementation of force generation, plans and policies.
3. Development and implementation of joint force contingency plans.
4. Development and implementation of joint personnel policies and plans.
5. Development and implementation of joint intelligence policies and plans.
6. Development and implementation of joint Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and doctrine.
7. Development and implementation of joint service support, logistics and sustainment plans and policies.
8. Development and implementation of joint Civil/Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and humanitarian plans and policies.
9. Development and implementation of joint command, control, communications and information support plans and policies.
10. Maintenance of partnership with Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and international donor community.
11. Collection, analysis and dissemination of lessons learned.
12. Maintain AU strategic situation awareness.
13. Any foreseeable future responsibilities

The stated roles/ responsibilities clearly demonstrate that the correct name should have been Integrated Task Force (ITF) not DITF since the responsibilities are wide ranging and should not be attributable to only Darfur.

Role of partners an AU in the DITF

The DITF was structured in such a way that the Partners Technical Support Group (PTSG) to be discussed later, will provide a number of experts in specific areas to work with AU's own staff that will be recruited to fill the vacancies created by the establishment. Partners mainly from European Union, Canada and USA, quickly provided personnel into the DITF but AU's recruitment policy is so slow and bureaucratic like that of any large organisation hence experts from partners arrived in Addis Ababa and commenced working but had no Africans to wok with. How could knowledge then be transferred? The experts normally arrive in Addis Ababa for either three or six months tour of duty. As a result some had come and gone without having African counterparts to work with. One

would have expected that the Operations in Darfur would be treated as a situation of emergency that must be provided with immediate operational requirements in both personnel and resources but that has not been the case. However, judging from the number of years that older organisations such as UN, EU NATO took to build their present levels of capacity and the fact that the whole AMIS operation is donor funded, the AU is perhaps trying its best to cope with the situation.

Capacity of DITF

As indicated earlier, even though the establishment was created, recruitment of qualified staff to fill the vacancies in the structure was slow until the Joint Assessment Team was despatched to Darfur in March 2005⁸. That team was led by Commissioner, Peace and Security, Ambassador Said Djinnit. Other organisations/ countries were the EU, UN and USA. It was the report of the Joint Assessment Team that exposed the weaknesses inherent in the DITF and recommendations were made to strengthen the structure. Two very important components that were introduced into DITF are the positions of a Joint Chief of Staff and Administrative Control and Management Cell (ACMC). The report of the Joint Assessment Mission also emphasised production of important documents such as Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) Rules of Engagement (ROE), Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between AU and Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). The report of that Joint Assessment Team also increased the force level from 3,320 to 8,565 comprising 6,171 Protection Force, 702 MILOBS, 1,560 CIVPOL and 132 Civilian Staff.

The deployment of that expanded AMIS is still in progress with South Africa commencing deployment of the last battalion. Despite logistics constraints, which temporarily suspended the deployment in September 2005, the greater part of the enhanced force and CIVPOL components are in Darfur and indeed the first battalions in the expanded force completed their six month tour of duty and have been replaced. In the same vein, the first batch of CIVPOL have also been replaced. The Joint Assessment Mission report earlier on referred to also identified the need to establish a Joint Logistics Cell (JLOC) and Joint Operation Centre (JOC) at the forward mission headquarters in El-Fashier, North Darfur. JLOC and JOC were strongly recommended to strengthen command and control of AMIS in a co-ordinated manner. In December 2005, another AU led Joint Assessment Mission evaluated AMIS operations. Recommendations of that report emphasised the need to bring AMIS to its Full Operational Capability (FOC)⁹.

⁸ The Report of the Joint Assessment Mission of AMIS dated April 2005

⁹ The Report of the Joint Assessment Mission of AMIS dated December 2005

Co-operation between AU, UN and EU

In all these efforts, what level of International cooperation has the AU Mission been receiving? First of all the various Resolutions passed by the UN Security Council on Darfur place responsibility on UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to assist AMIS. For example operative paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005 clearly states: “requests the Secretary General to report to the Council on options for how UNMIS can reinforce the effort of AMIS to foster peace in Darfur through appropriate assistance to AMIS including logistical support and technical assistance and to identify ways in liaison with the AU to utilize UNMIS’s resources, particularly logistical operations support elements as well as reserve capacity towards this end”. In order to fulfil the above stated requirement, UN Assistance Cell for the AU has been established in Addis Ababa which in many ways is helping to enhance cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union with regard to AU’s peacekeeping efforts. The Assistance Cell includes military, police and logistics experts and provides a more suitable basis for assistance that has been extended to date. Efforts are underway to enlarge the Assistance Cell to include additional experts such as in finance, budgeting and force generation that will be readily available to assist the AU. In addition, a UN military liaison officer has been attached to the African Union Ceasefire Commission headquarters at El-Fasher, North Darfur, UNMIS has also established several offices throughout Darfur to co-ordinate, and facilitate liaison and cooperation with African Union Mission in Darfur especially in the humanitarian sector. The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and Special Representative of Chairperson of the AU Commission, (SRCC) meet often in Khartoum where both are based. In April 2005, the Secretary General dispatched his special envoy Lakdar Brahimi to AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa to discuss with the AU Commission Chairperson the way forward with regards to the operations in Darfur. The Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operation Jean-Marie Gueheno also visited AU headquarters and Darfur in May 2005. The Secretary General H.E. Kofi Annan then followed with a visit to AU headquarters in Addis Ababa on 25 – 26 May where he co-chaired the pledging conference for the funding of the enhanced mission of AU in Darfur. Also present at the pledging conference were Secretaries General of EU and NATO. The SG of UN continued to Darfur to see for himself efforts being made by AMIS to restore stability in that region of Sudan. Currently, there is a proposal to hold another pledging conference in Brussels to seek for additional funding for AMIS.

The United Nations has not been alone in level of co-operation with AU. There has been overwhelming goodwill from the International Community towards AU Mission in Darfur. At the strategic level in Addis Ababa, there are two important cooperative groups that meet regularly to discuss and assist AMIS operations. First, the *Liaison Group* (LG) meeting which takes

place at the AU on Mondays and Thursdays and often chaired by the head of DITF, with Senior Military, Police, and Political Affairs Officers and regularly attended by representatives of European Union, Canada, United States of America, European Union experts and UN experts. During LG meeting, the AU indicates its requirements and partners ask pertinent questions related to the support to be provided. Second the *Partners Technical Support Group* (PTSG) meeting on the other hand is normally held on Wednesdays chaired by a senior member of European Union delegation in Addis Ababa and attended by experts from the delegation, representatives from the embassies of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States of America, the United Nations and NATO. At the PTSG meetings, the partner nation/organisation representatives discuss among themselves the division of responsibility in support of AMIS. The idea of establishing these two fora on AU Mission in Darfur is to appropriately identify the needs and to coordinate support for the mission. These mechanisms were developed from experience as initial attempts at assisting the AU were so fragmented and therefore tended to confuse the AU senior staff members instead of assisting them. Through the Liaison Group and the Partners Technical Support Group, AMIS has continued to receive the necessary funding, technical support in terms of experts and training of MILOBS, staff officers and Civilian Police. The August 2005 UN led MAP-EXERCISE conducted jointly by AU, UN, EU, NATO and USA was another effort in strengthening command and control structures of AMIS. Another product of the MAP-Exercise was the involvement of Staff of Kenya Peace Support training Centre in Nairobi and Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana. These two African centres of excellence therefore benefited from the planning and the execution of that MAP-EXERCISE which could form the basis for similar exercises in both institutions.

In the second half of 2005, EU seconded a number of Senior Civilian Police Officers to the DITF, headquarters of CIVPOL in El-Fasher and to the eight (8) sectors throughout the entire AMIS area of operation. The aim being to train and strengthen the Civilian Police component of AMIS which has a tremendous role to play in Darfur if Law and order have to be established and policed as pertains in democratic societies.

Funding

The European Union through its *Peace Facility* plays the lead role in funding AMIS operations. The cash donation which pays the allowances of the staff of DITF, Military and Civilian Police observers and also for the Protection Force (PF) comes from the EU. Within the EU are major contributing countries such as the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark. Norway a non-EU member constructed thirty (30) offices for the

CIVPOL in the IDP camps and has the proposal to construct additional thirty. The matrix attached as Annex 'B' clearly demonstrates the level of support from the EU as at March 2006. The government of Canada and United States of America are major donors outside EU.

Training

Training for AU personnel has been organised at various levels. In 2005, UN assisted in training staff officers for AMIS during pre-deployment training of UNMIS personnel at Kenya Peace Support Training centre in Nairobi. UK carried out training of MILOBS in Darfur and France is currently training MILOBS at Koulikoro in Mali. NATO also carried out two stages of training at the DITF in Addis Ababa and at the forward mission headquarters in El- Fashier. The EU police officers are currently training newly arrived AU police officers in Darfur. Training as a whole is an on-going process. Fortunately, the AU has recently recruited its own training officer who has the responsibility of co-ordinating all the training needs and the execution of such programmes.

Major operational equipment

In Darfur, apart from 658 vehicles donated by the UK government through the EU, (additional 452 vehicles are on order) Canada provides a total of 25 helicopters and three (3) from Netherlands. Canada has further donated 105 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) with a package to include fuel supply, ammunition and maintenance cost. These operational vehicles majority of which have been delivered are expected to greatly enhance the image and operational effectiveness of AMIS. The Netherlands and Germany provided the bulk of communication equipments. The entire camp facilities (construction and maintenance) are provided by the government of USA and Norway has constructed thirty police stations for AU police in the camps for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

Movement control unit

Since June 2005 and during the deployment of the expanded AMIS, NATO and EU deployed Air Movement Control personnel to Addis Ababa who established a Forward Air Movement Base (FAMB) and directed the air assets donated by EU and NATO member countries for the strategic airlift of Troops and Civilian Police from their home countries to Darfur. Liaison officers from the unit together with AU and UN officers normally carry out pre-deployment visits to all the Troop Contributing Countries to assist in the smooth deployment of troops to Darfur.

Current state of AMIS

As much as the African Union Mission in the Sudan has tried to maintain stability in Darfur, the Government of Sudan and the rebel movements have continuously violated the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, which they signed on 8th April 2004. Fighting escalated in Darfur and split in the rebel movements degenerated into tribal affiliations and fighting. The government of Sudan failed to disarm the Janjaweed and sometimes accused of conducting offensive air manoeuvres. On the other hand the inter Sudanese talks in Abuja, Nigeria towards a comprehensive Peace Agreement continued to drag on until 5th May 2006 when the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in Abuja Nigeria. The escalation of the fighting and increased insecurity in Darfur, compelled the African Union to indicate in a communiqué issued at the end of its 45th Session on 12th January 2006 the possibility of a transition of AMIS operations to the United Nations. Following that statement, UN Security Council issued a presidential statement on 3rd February 2006 requesting the Secretary General to initiate contingency planning for the transition of AMIS to UN. That proposal was further reiterated in a communiqué at the end of AU Peace and Security Council 46th Session on 10th March 2006. As these notes were being prepared, consultations continued in New York, Addis Ababa and Khartoum as to the future of peacekeeping operations in Darfur.

Darfur peace agreement (DPA)

On 5 May 2006, through the concerted effort of the AU mediation, EU, UN, UK, USA, Canada, Norway and personal intervention of President Obasanjo of Nigeria, the DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT (DPA) was signed in Abuja, Nigeria between the Government of Sudan and Mini Minawe group of SLM/A. The other faction of SLM/A of Abdul Wahid and JEM failed to sign the DPA. Efforts continue in Africa and elsewhere to get the two factions also to sign the DPA which when policed properly will bring a lasting peace to Darfur. There are certainly many formidable challenges ahead if the DPA is to produce the desired results on the ground in Darfur.

African standby force (ASF)

The speed with which AU despatched a mission to Darfur in June 2004, clearly demonstrates the need for the ASF. As indicated in the opening paragraphs of this presentation, the idea of establishing ASF came to the fore as a result of the failures in Rwanda. Twelve years have elapsed since then and the discussions continue. The AU has given itself a target year of 2010 when the ASF would have become operational. As there are visible signs of work in progress within some of the sub-regions notably East

(Inter-Governmental Development Authority – IGAD), West (Economic Community of West African States – ECOWAS), and South (the Southern Africa Development Corporation –SADC), the same degree of visibility is not recorded in the central and the northern sub-regions of Africa. In working towards the realization of ASF, the G-8 partners and UN have been consistently concentrating on capacity building. Series of workshops were planned for November 2005 for developing practical modalities towards realisation of ASF. Since the sub-regions of Africa are responsible for providing the Standby Brigades for the African Union, it is essential that the development of the capacities of these entities are not overlooked. Currently, there are series of workshops being held with support of partners in building capacity towards the realization of the ASF.

Capacity retained or lost?

Whatever capacity is being built now with the ongoing operations in Darfur should become capacity retained but not lost. For example, the human resources being developed by the AU in handling the operations must be fully documented for easy future reference. There is the need now for AU and its partners to start thinking seriously as to the future of vehicles, APCs, Communication equipment and other stores donated to the AU. There must be a policy for the control of such items. Another important feature of capacity building is the mutual learning taking place between western armies and those of Africa. As African armies have the opportunity of being exposed to technological and organisational advances, Western European officers can also take advantage of experiences gained by African armies in practical peacekeeping over a decade of direct involvement.

Conclusion

In the past decades, the region of Africa has been the one that has experienced and continue to experience conflicts of varying degrees including genocide. The first continental organisation, the OAU made some attempts at mediating and playing negotiation role but it was obvious that the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states hindered total involvement and bold steps in finding solutions to protracted conflicts on the continent. Some sub-regional organisations within Africa took bold decisions in trying to contain conflicts within their areas of influence but the continent as a whole continue to search for practical and effective ways of finding peace and stability. Without peace and stability the conflicts will continue strengthening poverty and hence marginalization of Africa. The African Union, since its inception in July 2000, has realised the need to boldly confront conflicts on the continent and therefore adopted the policy of non-indifference in the internal affairs of member states. In that regard, through the establishment of the Peace and Security Council,

has given pragmatic meaning to its approach to managing conflicts. The intervention in Burundi in April 2003 and the current ongoing operations in Darfur are clear manifestations of AU's evolving crisis management capabilities. The organisation can however not do it alone. In this regard, the support of United Nations, European Union, NATO and other committed Western European nations will ever be needed if the desired goals are to be achieved. The involvement of International Partners in the ongoing Darfur operations is a demonstration of co-operation between regional organisations, the UN and International Community as a whole.


Recommendations

The following points are recommended for the strengthening of the cooperation between African Union, United Nations and European Union together with other partners.


- The European Union's peace facility is a good example of helping African Union's effort in peacekeeping operations. Whilst calling for the continuation of the EU peace facility, the AU must take useful lessons from this facility and establish its own assessed contribution of all member states. For any operation which relies solely on donor funding stands a risk of losing momentum towards a successful conclusion.
- The United Nations Assistance Cell for the AU in Addis Ababa should be enlarged as soon as possible to include experts in critical areas of financial management, Force generation, Training and Evaluation, Police trainers and Legal experts.
- Depots must be established for storing vehicles, and any item of equipment that are being donated to the AU in Darfur.
- Human Resources being developed in the Darfur operations must be retained.
- The African Standby Force is the surest way of rapid reaction to conflict situation. Every effort should be made towards its realization.
- Other efforts directed towards training of peacekeepers at African centres of excellence should continue and to include pre-deployment training organised by the UN for AU staff officers and military observers.
- The process of mediation by the AU and its partners coupled with negotiations among parties as was experienced in Abuja created useful lessons that must be retained.

Annex 'A'

AU/ DITF STRUCTURE AT ADDIS



AU / JLOC STRUCTURE AT EL FASHER



Annex 'B'

Updated 24 March 2006 Donor Pledges for AMIS/DITF/ABUJA

DONOR	Pledge		US \$ counter value (not Received in gray)	Contribution in kind	Component	Purpose /earmarked	Last date of transfer	Expenditure allocation (USD)
	Amount	Currency						
Belgium	500,000	EUR	\$300,000.00		AMIS II			
Canada	16,552,746		\$397,329.94	YES	AMIS II	Up to 18 Helicopters, incl. contractor services	12/10/2004	\$397,329.94
Canada	170,000,000	CAD	\$133,000,000.00	ALL	AMIS IIE	Up to 25 Helicopters, training, information capacity, tactical aircraft, 2000 Bullet proof jackets and 1900 helmets, LCol as Deputy Chief JLOC (principal advisor to AU Chief JLOC) in El Fashir, Contracts/J8 Addis Movements/Air J4 Khartoum	26/05/2005	
Canada	20,000,000	CAD	\$16,000,000.00		AMIS IIE	JET A1 Fuel		
TCHEK Rep.						10 x Power Generators, 4 KW; 10 x Power generator, 4 kW; 4 x Power generator, 6 kW 3000 x Field uniform set, 3000 x Sleeping set, Field Uniform set includes: shirt, battle dress blouse, coatee, trousers, sweater, summer socks, undershirt, underpants Sleeping set includes: bed sheet, cover, pillow		
China	400,000		\$400,000.00	ALL	AMIS IIE		26/05/2005	
Denmark	4,500,000	DKK	\$736,664.25		AMIS II		22/05/2005	\$400,000.00
Denmark	801,458		\$801,457.71		AMIS I & II		01/05/2005	\$247,094.52
					DITF		17/12/2004	

Denmark					YES	DITF/ AMIS IIE	Senior Legal Advisor Police, power generators, tbc		
Denmark	2,000,000	DKK	\$330,000.00			ABUJA		12/10/2005	
EC	12,000,000	EUR	\$11,083,604.09			AMIS I	DSA MILOBS/CivPol	08/08/2004	\$3,013,626.40
EC	79,987,113	EUR	\$82,136,000.00			AMIS II	DSA MILOBS/CivPol	27/12/2004	\$91,196,126.63
EC	850,000	EUR	\$863,600.00			ABUJA			
Finland	250,000	EUR				AMIS II E	police component		
France	1,200,000	EUR	\$1,085,481.96		YES	AMIS II	4 times air transportations for Abuja Talks; SEN ammo air cargo	12/07/2004	\$1,085,481.68
France	2,000,000	EUR	\$2,580,000.00		PART	AMIS IIE + ABUJA	strategic airlift, tactical rotations, operational and Log planners, training Nigerian and Senegalese troops-Aerial observation-Mirage F1 CR C135 Air tanker and Breguet Atlantique	26/05/2005	
Germany	1,000,000	EUR	\$1,311,750.00			AMIS II		29/11/04 &7/12/04	\$1,311,750.00
Germany	130,000	EUR	\$144,000.00		YES	AMIS	Communications; airlift GMB contingent; binoculars	31/08/2005	
Germany	950,000	EUR	\$1,165,120.00			AMIS I		17/08/2004	\$1,165,120.00
Germany	250,000	EUR	\$321,500.00			ABUJA			\$318,300.00
Germany	1,000,000	EUR	\$1,290,000.00			AMIS IIE	construction CIVPOL Office posts in IDP camps, strategic airlift of 1 Battalion	26/05/2005	
Germany	1,000,000	EUR	\$580,000.00			ABUJA		10/10/2005	
Ghana			\$20,000.00			AMIS IIE		26/05/2005	
Greece	100,000	EUR	\$132,626.00			AMIS I		31/12/2004	\$132,626.00
						AMIS/ Abuja talks/ DITF			
Japan	2,070,000		\$1,509,000.00				23 sleeping bags, 1000 sleeping mattress, logistic planner	31/03/2005	
Hungary					ALL	AMIS IIE			
Ireland	500,000	EUR	\$659,750.00			AMIS II	HR and Humanitarian Affairs Officers	08/12/2004	\$8,384.32

Ireland	1,000,000	EUR				AMIS IIE	Police stations	01/12/2005	
Italy	240,000		\$240,000.00			AMIS I			\$240,000.00
Italy	443,000	EUR	\$588,352.83			AMIS II		20/12/2004	\$588,353.00
Italy	32,000	EUR	\$43,100.00			ABUJA			\$43,100.00
Italy	383,000	EUR	\$486,410.00	PART		AMIS IIE	strategic airlift, tactical airlift, logistic planners	26/05/2005	
League Arab States	99,962		\$99,962.00					12/06/2004	
League Arab States	100,000		\$100,000.00			AMIS IIE		26/05/2005	
Luxembourg	75,000	EUR				AMIS IIE		26/05/2005	
Mauritania			\$50,000.00			AMIS IIE		26/05/2005	
Netherlands	5,020,848		\$5,020,848.02	YES		AMIS II	Vehicles, HF radios, Handheld radios, repeaters 3 Helicopters, from October 2004 onwards, vehicles, Airlift SEN contingent	16/02/2004	\$5,020,848.02
Netherlands	2,000,000		\$2,000,000.00	YES		AMIS II	Payment to the JMC in Khartoum	01/07/2004	\$2,000,000.00
Netherlands			\$1,111,111.00			DITF		16/02/2004	\$104,150.29
Netherlands	300,000	EUR	\$300,000.00			ABUJA			
Netherlands							Training CivPol - Water road tankers and medical supplies, For Rwandan troops, 0.8 M€+ transportation costs 0.5 M€ communication equipment, fixed wing transport and rotations of MILOBs and police officers	26/05/2005	
Netherlands	6,300,000	EUR	\$8,127,000.00	ALL		AMIS IIE		16/11/2005	
Netherlands	550,000	EUR				ABUJA			
NATO				ALL		AMIS IIE	Personnel for JLOC, MAPEX and Training in El Fasher and Khartoum	26/05/2005	
Norway	750,000	USD	\$750,000.00			AMIS II	Non-Military	12/20/04 & 31/12/04	\$750,000.00

Norway	250,000	USD	\$250,000.00		DITF			27/12/2004	\$215,500.70
Norway	5,000,000	NOK	\$811,016.85		AMIS II		Non-military	21/12/2004	\$808,250.62
Norway	4,000,000		\$5,160,000.00	ALL	AMIS IIE			26/05/2005	
Norway	2,000,000		\$2,000,000.00	ALL	AMIS IIE		Police posts in IDPs camps	28/06/2005	
Norway			\$150,000.00		ABUJA			16/11/2005	
OIC			\$250,000.00		AMIS IIE			26/05/2005	
							Power generators, 300 beds, 145 chairs, 145 stools, 2 x An-2 aircraft Equipment is prepared and ready for transportation in 60 days		
Poland				ALL	AMIS IIE		Without crew, AN-2 Pilot training		
Portugal				ALL	AMIS IIE		Logistic and operational planner	26/05/2005	
Slovenia				ALL	AMIS IIE		5 MILOBS		
South Korea	200,000		\$200,000.00		AMIS I			14/09/2004	\$200,000.00
Spain				ALL	AMIS IIE		2 x C212 Aircraft, C212 Maintenance Support, C212 Pilot Training, 5 MILOBS	26/05/2005	
Sweden	1,000,000	SEK	\$134,066.23		AMIS I		Non-Military	21/07/2004	\$134,066.23
							2 tranches of 2 M SEK, the 2nd for the Civilian Component of DITF, logistic planners		
Sweden	4,000,000	SEK	\$294,557.00		DITF			27/12/2004	
Sweden	1,000,000	SEK	\$125,000.00		ABUJA				
							police officers (6), milobs and experts. 1/3 Gender/HR, 1/3 Civilian component, 1/3 Abuja"		
Sweden	1,800,000	EUR	\$2,000,000.00	PART	ABUJA - AMIS IIE			26/12/2005	
Turkey			\$50,000.00		AMIS IIE			26/05/2005	
							30 vehicles, VHF radios and Thuraya, rations for 30 days, training of MILOBS		\$16,500,000.00
UK	12,000,000	GBP	\$21,600,000.00	YES	AMIS II				
UK	2,000,000	GBP	\$3,676,000.00		AMIS I & II			06/06/2004	\$2,812,049.30

UK		GBP		\$12,000,000.00	ALL	AMIS IIE	Vehicles and rapid deployment equipment (possibly including policing), planners and advisors	26/05/2005	
UK	19,000,000	GBP			ALL	AMIS IIE	vehicles and rapid deployment equipment (possibly including policing), maintenance of police posts, funding strategic airlift, equipments, planners and advisors		
UK	250,000			\$250,000.00		ABUJA		16/11/2005	
USA	95,386,485			\$95,386,485.00	YES	AMIS I & II	construction/vehicle and commo maintenance PAE		
USA				\$2,500,000.00	YES	AMIS I & II	Airlift		\$2,500,000.00
USA	50,000,000			\$50,000,000.00	ALL	AMIS IIE	camp construction/ PAE Airlift, 3experts OPS-LOG and G2, MILOBs, for logistical package no final decision yet	26/05/2005	
USA	500,000			\$500,000.00	ALL	AMIS IIE	Night flight equipment		
Total				\$473,101,792.88					\$131,192,157.65

European Security and Defence Policy, Africa and Finland's EU Presidency – A Challenging Equation

Jaana Heikkilä

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If I were to sum up my topic *The European Security and Defence Policy, Africa and Finland's EU Presidency*, I would say: a challenging equation. To solve it, Finland has no previous experience to lean on. The first time we held the EU Presidency in 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy was just coming into existence, but at the time we did not think of Africa. It was not until 2003 that the continent appeared on the ESDP agenda as the European Union conducted its first autonomous military crisis management operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

When Finland took the lead of the Council for the second time in July 2006, the EU had just started deploying troops to the DRC in order to support again the UN MONUC peacekeeping operation. But it is not only the DRC and crisis management operations that we are talking about when we refer to the European Security and Defence Policy, Africa and Finland's EU Presidency. The scope of ESDP activities towards Africa is much broader, ranging from technical support to the possibility of deploying an EU battle group. These possible ESDP activities should not be seen in isolation from the strategic objectives of the EU and from the comprehensive approach for which the EU is now striving.

This is why I would first like to introduce briefly the key documents stating the objectives and principles that guide ESDP activities aimed at contributing to peace and security in Africa. Then I will point out the main challenges with which the EU needs to cope in order to live up to its objectives. Finally, I will move on to the specific challenges of the Finnish Presidency regarding the ESDP and Africa.

Coming from the Ministry of Defence, I will focus on military aspects of crisis management. By this I don't mean to understate the importance of civilian efforts. On the contrary, I will argue in favour of a comprehensive approach and a better integration of civilian elements in African capacity building.

¹ The views presented in this article are personal and may not necessarily reflect the position of the Ministry of Defence.

Key Documents regarding the ESDP and Africa: Objectives and Principles on the Paper

The European Security Strategy² underlines that Europe needs to get ready for a wider spectrum of crisis management missions, which is also reflected in the Action Plan for ESDP Support to Peace and Security in Africa³ and in the EU Africa Strategy.⁴

The European Security Strategy states that Europe should take more responsibility for global security. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, but the EU is committed to strengthening its co-operation with the UN to help states emerging from conflicts. The EU is also committed to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations. This means that the EU should be prepared for early, rapid and robust interventions.

According to the Security Strategy, one of the objectives of the EU is to be able to tackle the security threats posed by, for instance, regional conflicts and failed states. This type of crises can be found especially in Africa, where the conflicts of neighbouring countries are often intertwined and long cycles of civil war have destroyed the functioning state apparatus. It is obvious that these problems cannot be tackled by purely military means. In this respect, the EU is well equipped: it has a wide array of instruments at its disposal, such as political and diplomatic means, military and civilian assets, trade, and development policy. The challenge is to learn to use these existing instruments coherently.

In this regard, the EU Strategy for Africa represents an important step: it addresses the African security and development in a comprehensive manner that takes into account all policy sectors from trade and development assistance to conflict prevention and crisis management. This document called "*The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic partnership*" was adopted by the European Council in December 2005. This year is crucial as regards its implementation. We need to show that the strategy, which aims at the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, is more than just ambitious words. A progress report on the implementation of the Africa Strategy will be presented to the European Council in December 2006.

² A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy (15895/03), 12.12.2003.

<<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/newsWord/en/misc/78348.doc>>

³ Action Plan for ESDP Support to Peace and Security in Africa (10538/4/04), 16.11.2004.

<<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/04/st10/st10538-re04.en04.pdf>>

⁴ The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership (15961/05), 19.12.2005.

<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/87673.pdf>

The EU Strategy for Africa is composed of five clusters: peace and security; human rights and governance; development assistance; sustainable economic growth, regional integration and trade; and investing in people. Regarding the peace and security cluster, various activities are already undertaken in the field of European Security and Defence Policy. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, one military operation and two civilian missions are ongoing, and in the Darfur region of Sudan, the EU is supporting the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Moreover, the Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa, approved by the Council in November 2004, covers several forms of support, such as capacity building, planning support, training, provision of equipment, operational support, and ESDP advisory or executive missions in the framework of UN or African-led peace support operations.

Both the EU Strategy for Africa and the Action Plan articulate clearly the underlying philosophy of the African ownership. All EU action should be based on African needs and requests. In order to help the Africans to keep the peace in their own continent, the EU is committed to the capacity building of the African Union (AU) and the Sub-Regional Organisations. The EU is also prepared to provide direct support to the African organisations or to the UN through ESDP missions. According to the Africa Strategy, this direct support includes the potential deployment of EU battle groups.

All three documents – the Security Strategy, the Action Plan and the Africa Strategy – highlight the need to support also post-conflict reconstruction. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of combatants (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) are preconditions for long-term stability.

Main Challenges regarding the ESDP and Africa: Difficulties in Brussels and in the Field

Different sort of ESDP operations and African capacity building imply lots of challenges – in Brussels, in capitals and in the field. I am not trying to offer a complete list of these challenges but rather an idea of the obstacles setting limits to the EU ambitions regarding Africa.

First of all, there are general structural constraints that apply to all ESDP missions. The crisis management structures of the EU were created several years and operations ago. As underlined by High Representative Javier Solana, the EU is currently close to the limits of its capacity.⁵ We would need more resources and more flexible financing and planning mechanisms.

⁵ Follow-up on Hampton Court discussions regarding certain CFSP aspects by EU HR Javier Solana, letter to the European Council (S416/05), 14.12.2005.

http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/87644.pdf

Crisis management operations can hardly anymore be labelled as military or civilian, since in most cases they include both assets. At least purely military operations need a civilian follow-up. However, the planning and financing structures are still separated into military and civilian side – both at the EU and national level. The establishment of the Civ/Mil Cell in Brussels is a step in the right direction, as well as the recent proposals of the High Representative Solana to strengthen the assessment, planning and implementation capacity within the Council Secretariat. However, it will take time for the civil-military co-ordination as a culture to become rooted in all crisis management efforts.

Furthermore, as emphasized by High Representative Solana in his contribution to the EU Strategy for Africa⁶, we would need better tools and increased financial resources for the ESDP support to African partners.

In addition to the structural and financial constraints, the EU suffers from capability gaps – notably in the field of strategic lift. The ongoing capability work tries to address these recognised shortfalls, but one cannot expect solutions overnight.

ESDP operations in Africa also have particular challenges of their own, such as logistical arrangements, medical care and personnel gaps. As we all know, Africa is a very demanding area of operation due to its extreme weather conditions, diseases, long distances and lack of infrastructure. For instance, the surface area of Darfur equals to that of France, but there are only two main roads. Especially during the rainy season the AU-led AMIS II operation is totally dependent on airlift provided by partners.

High health and security risks are probably one reason for the difficulties in finding enough troops and other personnel to the ESDP missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Sudan. Besides, many member states do not have that much of experience of crisis management, local conditions and customs in Africa.

However, it is extremely important for the EU personnel deployed to Africa, especially in support of the African Union, to know how things are done the African way. The EU and Africa have a lot to learn from one another. This is one challenge concerning the EU support to the African crisis management efforts. For instance, the European experts supporting the AMIS operation have not always been fully involved in daily work. Even though they are there to provide help, they sometimes face difficulties in making themselves appreciated and their advice heard in a different cultural and organisational setting where personal contacts, for instance, are more important than in Europe.

⁶ Contribution by EU High Representative Javier Solana to the EU Strategy for Africa (S377/05), 21.11.2005.

http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/87088.pdf

These cultural problems also relate to a more fundamental question of African ownership versus partnership and mutual responsibility. On the one hand, the EU has to respect the African ownership, which means that it should be careful and not too keen to offer its advice. On the other hand, as a partner, it needs to ask for mutual accountability. Although the EU is the biggest donor of the AMIS operation, it does not always have as much credibility or visibility as other partners such as the United States, Canada and NATO. This might be partly due to the fact that the EU has not always succeeded in talking with just one voice. The Commission, the EU Special Representative, the High Representative, the Presidency and the Member States with their bilateral activities can easily blur the image of the EU as a unified actor. Besides internal co-ordination, external co-ordination with partners, such as the UN, NATO and G8, is essential so that we do not waste scarce resources in duplicate efforts.

Although I have focused on the difficulties, I do not wish to paint a gloomy picture for the way ahead. Realism – or rather pointing out those things that require further work – should not be confused with pessimism. After all, there are important achievements in the field of ESDP and Africa, and even though the EU is facing some challenges in trying to live up to its objectives concerning Africa, it has recognised the problems and is trying to address them. Besides, as the EU gains more and more experience of ESDP missions in Africa and identifies lessons to be learnt, the planning and conduct of new possible operations and supporting actions should become easier. On top of that, the international community as a whole is showing considerable political will to strengthen African capabilities. So, we are definitely moving in the right direction, and we hope to advance things further during Finland's EU Presidency.

Specific challenges of the Finnish Presidency: the DRC, Sudan and African Capacity Building

During the Finnish Presidency there are major challenges ahead in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Sudan. In the DRC, the first parliamentary and presidential elections in more than 40 years, and in Sudan, the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement represent a chance for peace and security. Nevertheless, these are fragile processes that need full support of the international community.

Following a request by the UN, the EU agreed to provide timely and focused support to the UN MONUC operation in the DRC. This military operation called EUFOR RD Congo is not meant to substitute MONUC but to help the blue-helmets in case they face serious difficulties during the crucial election period, which started at the end of July. The EU has also reinforced temporarily its police mission EUPOL Kinshasa, since the maintenance of public order is a key element for the success of the electoral process. This police support is of an advisory nature.

Main challenges concerning EUFOR RD Congo relate to the fact that there is only a small EU force, an advance element of about 1,000 troops, in a huge country. However, the main responsibility for the security belongs to the Congolese police and army backed by 17,600 MONUC peacekeepers. The EU troops will always be the last resort. In this respect, two things are crucial. First of all, the information campaign should create a deterrence effect by making clear that the EU is ready to support the election process – even by military means, if necessary. The campaign should hold back the potential spoilers as well as make sure that the EU force is understood as a neutral force. Secondly, good intelligence is essential so that the EU troops can react before things get out of hand, including the possibility to resort to the on-call force in the neighbouring country Gabon.

The polls are expected to go without major problems since the main players – with the exception of UDPS party – are committed to the process. Nevertheless, EUFOR RD Congo needs to be prepared to tackle possible security threats. The riskiest moment will probably be the proclamation of the election results as many people currently in power and backed up by armed groups are expected to lose. Also if the elections cannot be declared free and fair, there is a risk of violent contestations. Even if the results are widely accepted, we need to keep in mind that the Congolese are anxious for change. Once the new government is in place, they need some indications that things are getting better.

After the elections, the EU will need to assess thoroughly in what way it can best continue to support the development in the DRC. The Security Sector Reform will be a top priority, since the soldiers who are not getting paid due to lack of resources and wide spread corruption are currently more of a threat than of protection to the civilians. There are estimations that they commit even 80 per cent of all crimes in the DRC. It is evident that unless the army is disciplined and able to guarantee secure conditions, all other aid will be a waste of money.

The EU has already been active in the field of SSR. In addition to providing training and mentoring to the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in Kinshasa, the EU has supported the integration of a new Congolese national army and the reform of its pay system. The Union's advisory mission, EUSEC RD Congo, and its chain of payment project have succeeded in introducing significant progress with only a small contribution. However, this SSR mission is struggling with personnel shortfalls, which will need to be addressed in order to ensure its efficiency.

The EU's other main focus area in Africa is the Darfur region in Sudan. During the Finnish Presidency, the EU needs to support three intertwined processes in Darfur. The first priority is the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Secondly, this calls for the enhancement of the operational capability of AMIS operation, so that it will be able to perform

the new tasks arising from the peace deal. Thirdly, we need to strive for a smooth transfer of AMIS to the UN. In addition, the regional dimension of the Darfur crisis, particularly its impact in Eastern Chad, requires attention.

The DPA signed in May 2005 by the Government of Sudan and the main faction of SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army) is an important breakthrough in Darfur crisis. Unfortunately the other rebel movements have not joined the agreement, and there is a risk that the rebel groups could end up fighting against one another. In any case, the implementation of the peace deal – notably the disarmament of Janjaweed militia – will be an enormous challenge. The longer it takes to implement the DPA, the greater is the risk of violence escalating.

A large and robust UN-led operation is widely considered as the only viable option in Darfur. The African troops have done significant work in severe conditions, but the AU is ready for the handover to the UN as the Abuja peace process has been concluded and as the organisation has other important challenges ahead, such as its own capacity building and possible new missions like Somalia.

However, the reluctance of the Government of Sudan to accept the blue-hatting of AMIS has complicated and delayed the transition process. The transfer needs to be carefully planned so that the UN does not inherit the current shortcomings of AMIS II. The EU and NATO are both continuing their support to the operation in view of the UN take over, and their experience and assets could also be of use in the transition phase. All in all, a close co-operation between the AU, the UN and other partners, including the EU and NATO, is the only possibility to stabilise the Darfur region.

Interagency co-operation is a necessity also in the development of African crisis management capabilities. During the Finnish Presidency, the EU continues to support the African capacity building. In this field, the main project is the African Stand-by Force. The African organisations aim to create by 2010 a Stand-by Force, which would be composed of five regional brigades and civilian police elements. The ASF should be capable of conducting a wide spectrum of missions ranging from military advice and observer missions to complex peacekeeping operations and intervention in case of genocide.

The EU has already acted as a leading partner in ASF workshops dealing with the doctrine and Standard Operating Procedures. The conceptual ASF work has proceeded well, but the challenge is to find a balance between the needs, the ambition level and the resources available. It is also important to ensure that civilian elements will be included in the concept, so that the African actors can develop a comprehensive approach to crisis management from the very beginning. In this regard, the EU is in a favourable position to support the capacity building process in which many other actors are also involved. The need for co-ordination is again obvious

to ensure the efficient use of resources. Each player has its own strengths, and there is certainly plenty of work for everyone. The division of labour taking place between the United Kingdom, France, Canada, the United States and the EU as regards the ASF workshops is a good example of this, as well as the Africa Clearing House organised by the G8.

Better co-ordination is also needed in Brussels, regarding the Union's resources and Member States' bilateral activities. The Council Secretariat and the Commission have been considering together how the EU could better use and co-ordinate all of the existing instruments and what new measures could be initiated in order to enhance the EU support for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. These proposals are being considered during the Finnish Presidency.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is in our interests that Africa develops into a stable and prosperous region. In the past few years, the European Union has started devoting more and more attention to the prevention and management of conflicts in Africa. It stands ready to conduct crisis management operations on the continent, when no other actors are capable or willing to do so. In the long term, the Union will try to ensure that the Africans are able to resolve their own conflicts, as African actors show clear determination to tackle the crises and development of the continent. The creation of the African Union and the efforts to build up the African Stand-by Force are examples of this political will.

Nevertheless, Africa is likely to remain a permanent item on the ESDP agenda for many years to come. Also Finland will need to take into account the growing importance of Africa as a potential area where peace support operations are needed. For instance, the EU battle groups could be used to support the United Nations or African-led crisis management efforts in Africa. Also training and other expertise will be of use in African capacity building in which a comprehensive approach is a necessity and also the comparative advantage of the EU.

For Finland, the ESDP and Africa related issues form a national challenge, since we do not have significant experience of crisis management activities in Africa. Our peacekeeping and training efforts have focused elsewhere, notably in the Western Balkans. In this respect, the EU Presidency is a welcome occasion for us to gain more expertise on the African conflicts and to promote peace and stability on the continent.

**Panel Discussion: The Future of the
European Union Peace Support
Operations in Africa**

The Future of the European Union Peace Support Operations in Africa: Fatoumata Siré Diakite

H.E. Ms Fatoumata Siré Diakite
Ambassador of Mali to Finland

After having heard not very beautiful images painted on Africa in different communications, I'm relieved to know that there is still a way forward, which means that everything has not yet been lost for our region. So in order to find ways and means to continue with the reconstruction of what needs to be, it's important to acknowledge the great efforts made by some African countries, this was done despite difficult environment.

I will start to make a very important point: Africa is not a country but 53 countries with different cultures and historical backgrounds, like Europe. Yes, there are countries in conflicts in Africa but besides this, there are also some countries where there is stability and there are some other countries which gained peace and got of out long term conflicts which need to be recognised: Mozambique, Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Congo Brazzaville, RCA, Algeria, Morocco etc. That's the reason why the map on African countries in conflict should be updated.

I'm proud to say that HE Mr Amadou Toumani Touré, President of the Republic of Mali and Late Me Alioune Blondin Beye, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mali played key roles in bringing peace, respectively in Central Africa Republic and Angola, as Special Representatives of the Secretary General of United Nations. HE Amadou Toumani Toure was member of the Group of outstanding personalities selected by UN Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan to be involved in the peace building process in Rwanda some years ago.

Mali had a rebellion in its Northern region in 1990, for its resolution there was no external intervention to bring peace in this part of Mali. We went into our own traditional mechanisms to establish a long-term peace through:

1. The signature of National Pact and the burning of 3000 arms voluntary collected from the rebels.
2. The establishment of a Committee of wise people called the Elders.
3. The establishment of a permanent dialog between the Government and the rebels.
4. The nomination of a mediator whose task was to listen to both sides and try to bring the two positions closer.
5. The facilitation of the meeting between the two sides until agreements were reached.

The Women groups were greatly involved in the mediation. Each side respected the commitments made. More than three thousands of arms were voluntary collected by the National and local Authorities as a proof of the end of the rebellion. Those arms were gathered and burned down in an official ceremony called “Flame of Peace”, at this place was built a “Peace Monument”. This ceremony was attended by many African Heads of States and the Representative of UN and others international and regional organisations. This example of Mali to bring peace through its own ways and mechanisms was duplicated by some African Countries.

Another point I want to make is about the power and great commitment of African women to bring peace in different countries in conflicts in Africa when they are given support and consideration, they are the first victims of arms conflicts in every part of the world e.g. Bosnia Herzegovina when their opinions are never demanded when it comes to making war.

That’s why March 14th, 1997 a delegation of high committed African women was received by the Secretary General of UN Mr Kofi Annan to whom we gave a Memorandum on conflicts prevention and management in Africa and the real involvement of women in the whole process, not when it’s too late as usually is the case. We commented on the participation of women soldiers in the UN peace-building missions and the positive changes they will bring within the missions. I had the honour to chair this delegation of African women received by UN Secretary General Mr Kofi Annan.

This will bring me to make the following remarks.

Our region is facing conflicts for different reasons. Countries involved in the management of those conflicts by providing troops to UN are usually also the ones which are selling arms to the different parties despite the different resolutions of UN imposing arms embargo, e.g. the case of Côte d’Ivoire.

So, when Africa is getting poorer and poorer because of the different conflicts going on, some Western and Asian countries are getting richer and richer from the same conflicts. The double standard policies of the International Community e.g. the case of Sudan, because of secular interest of some countries there, is the reason why it’s impossible to adopt any Resolution within the UN in order to bring peace, save lives and make accountable the Government and its allied. Africa has become a place of experimentation of new arms and armaments but also a “depotoire” for some other countries which decided to get rid of their old armaments. The way the International Community faces its responsibilities vis à vis the conflicts in Africa is questionable for its lack of real political will, the economic interest prevailing. Yes, I agree that Africa leadership has its own responsibility to assume but the International Community is also taking

advantages of this political, social and economic disorder going on in some parts of Africa e.g. case of DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) where enormous resources of this country have been shamefully exploited by some African countries with the support of the same International Community. UN Resolutions were adopted against those countries but who cares? They continued openly to exploit CRD natural resources with no fear of being worried one day.

Then my contribution in order to really bring positive changes in the management of conflicts in some African countries by the next EU presidency.

1. Recognition of progress made in Africa by some States in terms of good governance and democracy and sustain and encourage them to play “role models” in the region.
2. Identification of the real causes of conflicts in Africa and give a lot of chance to prevention more than intervention for peace building.
3. For this prevention strategies the African civil society and women organisations have an essential role to play in order to train populations at risks in particular, and the entire population on “the culture of peace and human rights issues and to introduce those topics in the school circular at all levels.
4. To give substantial and long-term support to civil society. And NGOs to do this task of education and prevention of conflicts at all levels and to identify actions of prevention, to multiply them and bring people to identify the premises of conflicts.
5. To develop and spread the concept of strategies of dialog concentration and consensus more than using arms which could not be a way to solve any conflicts.
6. To train and select the suitable soldiers to be part of the peace building contingents in the regions in conflicts in Africa, the training should be on the physical and human environment but also on the issues of human rights and humanitarian laws.
7. To help create a real complementary partnership between the different armed forces involved in the peace building process instead of having competition, suspicion which are detrimental to their missions.
8. To have strong policy and real political will and commitment on different levels, nationally and internationally, against the proliferation of small arms in Africa, there are no industries of armaments in Africa but it’s easier to find any type of small arms circulating more than having clear water or medicine against malaria in our region.

The Republic of Mali took a lead for a project of Convention against the proliferation of small arms in Africa within the Human Security Network. This Convention will need the new European Union Presidency support means Republic of Finland in order to make Africa a “zone free of small arms”.

Last but not the least, to support the African Union in the true and real implementation of NEPAD and the President of the AU Commission HE Alpha Oumar Konaré in his inspiring vision to create sustainable growth in Africa, means to alleviate poverty, sustain good governance and democracy and create and maintain peace all over Africa.

In conclusion, I would like to quote a former political leader who said in 1945, I quote:

“The fight for peace should be conducted on two fronts, the first is the front of security where to win means to get rid of fear/ fear of famine and hunger and of violence, the second one is the economic and social front where to win means to get rid of the lack of basic needs: only a victory of the two fronts together can guaranty to the World a sustainable peace” for wars and conflicts in Africa is not peace in Europe and in the rest of the world.

So, is the European Union up to the Challenges? My answer is definitely **Yes**, but in a strong and genuine partnership with the African Union.

The Future of the European Union Peace Support Operations in Africa: Sirpa Mäenpää

Sirpa Mäenpää, Director, Unit for East and West Africa,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Looking at crisis management from the angle of its political context in a given country, and as one of the many instruments by which EU tackles conflicts, some theses are presented:

In military crisis management in Africa, EU is not only EU

True, the development of EU autonomous crisis management capabilities, both military and civilian, will most likely increase the use of this capacity. Yet, often the first option of peace-keeping organisation in Africa is still today some other organisation. EU supports African Union peace-keeping efforts by financing through her African Peace Facility and with technical assistance, i.e. advisors. Our very rough estimate for the order of magnitude for which we have political will to support African peace-keeping by EU is 100 Mill. Euros per year. This amount is now secured from the beginning of 2008 to 2010, but we still have to find funds to bridge the months till then. African peace-keeping has rapidly grown into a new pillar in global peace-keeping architecture beside UN, EU, NATO etc., and seems to be here to stay. The troop-contributing African countries cannot naturally be expected to finance alone their involvement in African peace-keeping, as African conflicts are an issue of collective security, for which the whole international community is responsible. Yet, it will take some time to find a permanent way of financing this new pillar. United Nations peace-keeping is still for the moment the best option and model for other organisations in many ways: its sustained financing through the assessed contributions of the United Nations is more guaranteed once an operation is launched; it has grown into multidimensional operations that include various civilian strands (human rights, humanitarian efforts, rule of law etc.) so that the conflict is dealt with in a comprehensive way; it stays longer beyond first peace-time elections in order to prevent the countries from relapsing back into conflict.

EU, AU and UN increasingly cooperate not only by changing responsibilities of an operation in phases, but even during an operation commanded by one of them.

The scope of EU crisis management often comprises interplay of military and civilian efforts

The general impression of crisis management as activity only by soldiers is obsolete. UN operations are already multidimensional. EUSR Haavisto earlier proudly presented the new face of EU crisis management as the lady policeman - an advisor to AMIS, who speaks Arabic and organises AMIS female policemen into networks to tackle the security concerns of the female refugees in the camps. Particularly the emerging fields of DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration into civilian life) and SSR (security sector reform, integrating former combating militias into a smaller peace-time army under civilian control and establishing a police force) require an approach with a mix of military and civilian expertise. This leads to financing problems - some particular efforts could be financed by official development assistance, but most not, as financing for military is broadly not counted as ODA. There are not many financing sources that lend themselves to supporting DDR and SSR as comprehensive programmes, and often DDR and SSR processes fail for lack of sustained financing. This means that former combatants resort again to their arms to find subsistence, which doesn't come cheap to the international community either.

More discussion will be needed on what is the mission of the mission

What is the objective on a crisis management operation? Peace is a relative concept. Sometimes the aim is to reduce gross human rights violations. There are trends to talk about humanitarian interventions, define security in terms of human security at the level of communities and individuals, underline need of protections of civilians and the primacy of human rights. Discussion is carried out at this stage case by case once an operation is in a pipeline. More general analysis is waiting for experience to be accumulated.

For instance electoral violence is a serious threat to peace - often it erupts as last flames of civil war, when those former combatants who didn't win the war by bullet cannot face losing also by ballot in the elections, and mobilise their supporters into violent riots. Yet, electoral violence wasn't really among the main threats discussed in public as examples of the need for EU or AU evolving crisis management, before the UN request to EU to support MONUC during DRC elections was presented and before AU launched a military electoral observation mission in the Comoros. Discussion in a democratic society is useful - clarity of values helps in avoiding unintended mission creeps.

Crisis management is one part of the management of crises

One could look at conflicts as a continuum with the form of a wave - from low early phases into an escalating conflict rising to its eruption into violent war, and later reducing again when peace is negotiated and implemented and reconstruction started. Crisis management or peace-keeping is particularly needed at the height of violent conflict. Yet, it is useful to recognise that there are many efforts of conflict prevention that try to impede a conflict from escalating. African Union Peace and Security Council follows the conflict situations in the continent and sends mediators to negotiate with the parties. Also the European Union makes both high-level efforts by its top leaders of external relations, and also everyday patient discussions on worrying trends by the Heads of Mission of its member countries. Besides diplomacy, other dimensions of conflict prevention can be used. As many African wars are carried out for the natural riches of the continent, economic measures such as the Kimberley process for tracing diamonds that are from conflict zones can reduce the potential for profit through war. In another dimension, monitoring of human rights violations can halt the increase of these violations into massive scale.

In summary, future peace support operations in Africa may still grow in numbers and in scale, but also into more comprehensive in dimensions.

Concluding Remarks

Analytical Summary

Tommi Koivula

Editor of the 9th Suomenlinna Seminar Publication

The previous pages of this volume offer a great amount of insight and a considerable variety of perspectives. Undoubtedly, this variety of views reflects the wide and partially open-ended set of questions that the organisers asked the speakers to address. These guiding themes of the seminar are presented in this book's opening pages by Colonel Juha Pyykönen.

Yet, in our opinion the multitude of views and perspectives was not just a consequence of the wide set of guiding questions provided by the organisers. While many ideas regarding Africa's insecurity and EU's role in it seem to be generally agreed upon, the content of this volume also reveals different understandings of the more fundamental issues regarding the causes and solutions of African security problems and EU's role. In other words, while we can scrutinise EU's role in African security from many possible perspectives, we also seem to have substantial fields of different readings and different understandings of some of the basic questions.

That's why we think the 9th Suomenlinna seminar and this publication in which most of its presentations are published, serves a purpose: in highlighting not just areas of agreement but also of different understanding and disagreement, it underlines the profound need for a further discussion and debate.

The three articles of the first chapter highlight different aspects of African insecurity.

In his opening text "African Crises – Challenges for International Community and Local Actors" Ambassador *Kari Karanko* discusses the cornerstones of peace building and sustainable peace. He emphasises the importance of the reconciliation process as a fundamental in the healing of the conflict-torn societies.

In this undertaking, a number of issues should be addressed. These include the processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) along with the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons and security system reform (SSR). In addition, rule of law and the principles of just society play a crucial role.

However, he notes that these processes cannot be successful without engaging in well-coordinated and harmonized development efforts by all actors. He also emphasises that when addressing the necessary requirements for sustainable peace, it is very difficult to draw strict borderlines between various actors involved in the development and implementation of various tasks. Military and civilian peace keeping and peace building need a special emphasis for interconnectivity and efforts for interoperability. That's why, there is today an unprecedented need for the international and regional actors, donor community and various non-governmental actors to coordinate their activities.

In the article "The Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment" military analyst *Henri Boshoff* gives an overview of the vast and heterogeneous continent from the point of view of military conflicts. He points out that there are a number of both global and particular elements affecting the nature of current African conflicts. As a consequence, the African conflict environment becomes a very complex one and exceptionally difficult for international peacekeeping forces to operate in.

This kind of environment causes certain demands for troops engaging in crisis management activities. Deploying on the African continent, the role of appropriate force design, skills in such areas as engineering, logistics, intelligence and communication becomes much more significant than on the conventional battlefield.

In his article "A Sociological Perspective on the Transition from War to Peace" Ambassador *Josef Bucher* approaches the question of African insecurity by highlighting the role of social institutions. He notes that institutional failure often leads to conflicts and, in addition, ongoing conflicts damage the institutions further, either by intent or by neglect, warlordism and chaos. As a result, conflict-affected societies face an institutional vacuum when they move out of a conflict situation.

Filling this institutional vacuum is a great challenge containing both difficulty and urgency. In this undertaking, he suggests that instead of expecting too much of law, civil society and money, which we easily tend to do, we should above all rescue what can be rescued locally. This means rescuing what is left of local institutions, rehabilitating customary law and mobilising local knowledge. On this basis, he concludes by raising three questions: how does foreign intervention affect the growth of indigenous institutions; how does it affect the rehabilitation of customary law, and how can foreign intervention help to mobilize local knowledge?

The two articles of the second chapter concentrate on the challenges of European crises management in Africa with emphasis on the operational and tactical side of military crisis management. It is opened by Colonel *Nicholas Richoux's* "Africa as an Operational Environment". He begins by describing the main physical, cultural and social features of the African continent and by noting that it is an absolute necessity for everybody participating crisis management operations to have a deep knowledge of the country where s/he is supposed to be engaged. This includes, among other things, sufficient knowledge of regional context and geopolitics; history and present situation of the conflict; the characteristics of territory and population; local armed forces as well as mission and the risks, threats, operational constraints and limits involved.

To achieve these aims, he highlights the main efforts needed: those participating operations should be prepared to respect the others, local culture and customs, religion, local official and customary laws as well as official and customary authorities. Besides, an open-minded attitude, including understanding the local mental schemes is a necessary requirement. In addition, he points out that one should be curious and try to learn the local way of life and if possible strike up contacts with the population and adds that those manage best who are willing to be integrated in the local environment.

Major *Janos Besenyö* approaches the same issue from the more grass root level in his article "Logistics Experiences; the Case of Darfur", the basis of which are his personal experiences in AMIS II operation in Darfur, Sudan during the latter half of the year 2005.

He discusses a number of problems and shortcomings faced during the operation, originating from various sources such as lacking preparation, insufficient management capabilities, difficulties in cultural interface with Africans etc. Together, these factors caused the operation severe restraints during his stay. To meet these shortcomings, he makes a number of practical recommendations regarding both the AMIS operation and the EU involvement in Africa in more general sense.

Chapter Three contains views given in a panel titled "The Dynamics of Peace and Security in Africa". There, participants were asked to give their perspectives to the questions of what are the main causes or underlying factors of security problems on the African continent, and what would be the appropriate relationship between the European Union and African states or institutions in resolving these problems. Thus, the three following interventions are individual commentaries to the same topic.

Ambassador *Funmilayo Adebó-Kiencke* emphasises in her article the idea that the causes and underlying factors of the lack of security in Africa countries do not have their origins in something specific to the make-up of the people of Africa. Rather, interference by other countries in the governance of many African countries with the excuse of establishing democracy has often caused insecurity and prevented the build-up of strong institutions of government and governance suitable for each country.

In addition, other factors such as the consequences of slave trade, colonialism and neo-colonialist structures as well as global manipulations and weapons exportation have contributed to the present level of development in Africa.

In her view, a desired resolution of some of these problems would be brought about by the collaboration of the EU with the African states and institutions to ensure the proper execution of the UN Charter by giving support to the UN and strengthening the organisation. She gives credit to the EU for the assistance rendered to Africa so far, but points out that much more is required to achieve peace and security through development.

Ambassador *Hanns Schumacher* approaches the same questions from a different angle. Although recognising the many shortcomings of the international community in helping the African nations, he underlines the severe failures made by African states and leaders themselves, including the inability of African states and organisations to change many flawed structures, that were created during the colonial era and which continue taking little or no account of African societies that exist on the ground. He also criticises the inability for African states to utilise the substantial aid given to them during the past decades.

In order to successfully tackle the present unhappy situation, he suggests that the efforts should be concentrated on two problem areas: first, that the third world peace keeping can not be left to developing nations alone and second, that there is an absolute demand for good governance in African states.

The third contribution to this chapter was written by Ambassador *Soad Shalaby*. She underlines the idea that the sources of conflict in Africa reflect the diversity and complexity of the vast continent. Some sources are purely internal, some reflect the dynamics of a particular sub-region while some have important international dimensions.

Despite these differences, the sources of conflict in Africa are linked by a number of common themes and experiences, some of which are historical while others are economic or other.

She suggests that the combination of the AU and NEPAD provides the most feasible framework for bringing peace and security issues together with transparency, self-governance, economic development and international partnership. She concludes her article by proposing a number of steps the EU and the international community could take in order to help to achieve a sustainable peace and development.

The fourth chapter, African and European Responses, is comprised of two contributions, both of them presenting a point of view of a relevant institution.

Its first article is Major General *Henry K. Anyidoho's* "African Union's Evolving Crisis Management Capabilities". He highlights the main AU organisational reforms compared to its predecessor, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), the conflict resolution mechanisms of which were rendered mostly ineffective. He moves on to briefly discuss the first AU operations and continues by describing the ongoing AMIS operation in Darfur.

The article contains a detailed description of Darfur integrated task force (DITF), its capacities and partners. He regards it along with the intervention in Burundi in April 2003 as clear manifestations of AU's evolving crisis management capabilities. However, the support of United Nations, European Union, NATO and other committed Western European nations will be needed if the desired goals are to be achieved. To achieve these goals of strengthening of the cooperation between African Union, United Nations and European Union together with other partners, a number of recommendations are made in the article.

In her article "European Security and Defence Policy, Africa and Finland's EU Presidency – A Challenging Equation" *Jaana Heikkilä* notes that notwithstanding of the present EU involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the scope of ESDP activities towards Africa is much broader, ranging from technical support to the possibility of deploying an EU battle group. These possible ESDP activities should not be seen in isolation from the strategic objectives of the EU and from the comprehensive approach for which the EU is now striving.

In her text, she shortly introduces the objectives and principles that guide ESDP activities aimed at contributing to peace and security in Africa. Then she continues by pointing out the main challenges with which the EU needs to cope in order to live up to its objectives, and moves on to the specific challenges of the Finnish EU Presidency in 2006 regarding the ESDP and Africa. She notes that Africa is likely to remain a permanent item on the ESDP agenda for many years to come and that Finland will need to take

into account the growing importance of Africa as a potential area where peace support operations are needed.

The last chapter of the publication again provides views presented in a panel concentrating on the future of the European Union peace support operations in Africa.

The first of the two texts is provided by Ambassador *Fatoumata Siré Diakite*, who emphasises that it's important to acknowledge the great efforts made by some African countries in building a sustainable peace to region, despite difficult environment.

She shares the view that Africa is facing conflicts for different reasons. Yet, she criticises countries that are involved in the management of those conflicts by providing troops to UN but who at the same time are the ones that are selling arms to the different parties despite the different resolutions of UN imposing arms embargo. In her view, Africa has become a place of experimentation of new arms and armaments but also a “depotoire” for some other countries, which decided to get rid of their old armaments.

She acknowledges that African leadership has its own responsibility to assume, but her main criticism goes to the international community, substantial parts of which are also taking advantages of the political, social and economic disorder going on in some parts of Africa by utilising its resources.

The final article of this publication is provided by Director *Sirpa Mäenpää*. In her text, she looks at crisis management as of one the many EU instruments for tackling conflicts. She notes that African peace-keeping has rapidly grown into a new lasting pillar in global peace-keeping architecture beside UN, EU, NATO etc. Notwithstanding of the development of autonomous EU crisis management capabilities, often the first option of peace-keeping organisation for EU in Africa is still today some other organisation.

Today, the EU, AU and UN cooperate increasingly not only by changing responsibilities of an operation in its various phases, but even during the same operation commanded by one of them. As a consequence of the increasingly multidimensional nature of operations, characterised by the emphasis in the processes of DDR and SSR, a mix of military and civilian expertise is needed. At the same time, a common understanding of the objectives of crisis management operations remains to be achieved.

Yet, there are financial problems involved in the increasing emphasis on the multidimensional elements of crisis management. She points out that often the processes of DDR and SSR fail because lack of sustained financing. This means that former combatants easily resort again to their arms to find subsistence. In summary, future peace support operations in Africa may still grow in numbers and in scale, but also into more comprehensive in dimensions. However, the financial questions should be solved.

Further Reflection: In Search of a Common Agenda

Heidi Kauppinen

Editor of the 9th Suomenlinna Seminar Publication

The topic of the 9th Suomenlinna Seminar was "Promoting Peace and Security in Africa – Is the European Union Up to the Challenge?" The seminar speakers have highlighted many important aspects of this question in their papers.

However, in order to fully tackle this complex question, we have to agree on certain key issues, such as what crises management in Africa really entails, which problems this tool is to target and who is to be the party ultimately responsible. In other words, finding a common understanding and a common agenda between the two continents is crucial in order to successfully address the ongoing and future crises on the African continent. This means to put the cat on the table and face many of the strains and unresolved issues that exist between the two continents. In this respect, addressing at least the following issues could help us forward.

- Who is, or should be, the African counterpart to the European Union?
- Why is it in the European Union's interest to conduct crisis management operations on the African continent?
- What are our expectations regarding crisis management on the African continent?

Finding a common agenda between the two continents is crucial if we wish to see progress in the evolving co-operational relationship between the EU and Africa.

Promoting Peace and Security in Africa – Is *Africa* up to the Challenge?

The issue of defining who the African counterpart to the European Union is, or should be, has been brought up in different contexts by many of the seminar speakers. Both the Africans and the Europeans have stressed the importance of coming to an agreement on how the African continent should be represented when dealing with the EU in the context of crisis management. This question is related to an even bigger issue, the question of African identity. During the seminar it was frequently discussed whether Africa can be seen as just one entity or whether it should be seen as a diverse and vast continent consisting of a multitude of different nation states. In other words, can we talk about Africa as one compact unit? Africa is a vast continent full of differences and contrasts, split into of 53 states. Still, the idea of African identity is strong and should not be overlooked as

unimportant. Is it entitled to simplify and categorise all the peoples of Africa as just African? What does it mean to be African and how does the choice of identity affect the co-operational relationship with the EU in the field of crisis management?

When dealing with the issue of crisis management, it is most important to have a clear understanding of the parties responsible of conducting the operations. If we stick to the topic of the seminar, one of the two partners, the European Union, is already defined. The question of the African counterpart remains, however. Should the EU work with every state separately or should there be an African umbrella organisation, representing the whole of Africa? The African Union represents the African countries and has so far been the main African partner to the EU. The African Union seems to claim a great deal of support and acceptance, both from the Africans themselves and also from their European partners. Although the organisation is very young and has its own problems, especially in the field of resources and finance, the AU still seems to enjoy steadily increasing confidence both by its own members and by the surrounding international community. For this reason alone the AU seems to be one of the best partners for the EU on the African continent.

The previous discussion is related to another issue, the question of ownership and shared responsibility. Following this logic one could perhaps reformulate the question as: promoting peace and security in Africa – is *Africa* up to the challenge?

By reformulating the question like this, the issue of African ownership comes to the fore. It seems quite clear that the ultimate responsibility of the safety on the African continent lies with the Africans themselves. The best way to solve problems is to solve them in the context where they appeared, using tools that have been created, or rather should be created, for the purpose of solving the problems in that conflict environment. In other words it might be useful to try and solve African problems by using African tools. This does not however mean that the Africans should be left alone to deal with their problems. As will be presented more closely in the chapter ahead, it can also be most beneficial for the EU to be involved in crisis management in Africa.

It is evident that the majority of Africa is not yet ready to take full responsibility of the safety and security on the African continent. This does not mean that this would nor should be the case for ever. The ideal situation would be if the peoples on the African continent, for example within the frames of the African Union could take care of managing the crisis on the African continent. The AU is showing potential of being able to become an effective and reliable actor on the African continent. It needs a lot of support from the international community, including the EU, and it is crucial that it receives this support. The practical division of the tasks

between the EU and the AU should be thought of thoroughly. The experts in this field can ponder more closely on the distribution of tasks between the two organisations, but the following notions are, however, made here. The African actor should be the party ultimately responsible, with the power to decide if and how to intervene in a crisis situation. The European counterpart should have mostly a supporting role.

Crisis Management on the African Continent – The European Interests

There are many who ask themselves, both Europeans and Africans, why it is in the interest of the EU to conduct crisis management operations in Africa. Some Africans associate this with some sort of neo-colonialism, while some Europeans wonder why the EU should make the Africans problems their own. The world is never completely black nor white. Today's globalized world makes more than ever sure that "their" business is "our" business and vice versa. Even though the idea of global and common responsibility is important on its own, it is also important to look at the issue of European Union crisis management from another angle and reflect on the interests of the EU.

It is obvious that in order to win something you have to risk something. This is also true the other way around. In order to be willing to put something at stake and risk losing, there also must be something to gain. It is most bizarre that when discussing crisis management, especially in Africa, we usually do not talk about what there is to gain for the EU. Of course the idea of shared global responsibility and the will to help plays an important role, but realistically this concept is not enough on its own. It seems like it has almost become taboo for the helping party to have any other interests than the humanitarian value of helping *per se*.

The fact of the matter is, however, that the EU has something to gain and also to protect by conducting crisis management operations in Africa. First of all crisis management should first and foremost be looked upon as a preventive tool. Crisis management is an effective tool in the sense that it is possible through an early and effective intervention to completely or partly prevent transnational security threats from appearing and evolving. It lies within the interest of the EU to protect its member states against threats like organised crime, refugee floods, epidemics and terrorism. These are phenomena, which rapidly appear and grow in areas of crises as the chaotic situation fosters their rapid growth and uncontrollable dissemination. To deal with these kinds of problems when they are already knocking on our back door, or worse when they have already entered, costs the EU incredible sum of money every year. It also puts a tremendous amount of pressure on the Union's social system and remains on the top political agenda of many member states. If targeted, timed and carried out correctly,

crisis management can be used to if not completely prevent then at least limit the progress of these security threats, and thus promote the vital interest of protecting the union's integrity against these hazards. The idea is in other words to deal with the problems where they are born, or rather before they are born, instead of dealing with fully grown, escalated problems on our own territory. This fact alone makes the conduct of crisis management operations in Africa a European interest.

From an integrational point of view, one might want to stress the fact that the only area where any real progress is being made inside the EU at the moment is the area of the European Security and Defence Politics (ESDP). The EU is eager to test its new capabilities at the same time as the need for success in any area is growing. Critically, one can argue that the EU is desperately in need of successfully solving crises outside its borders, as it clearly does not seem to be able to solve crisis within its own. There is a need to prove the importance of the union's existence. As the need for success is big but the room for failure is small, the union is keen on finding conflicts which will enhance its prestige through success, like the ongoing operation in Democratic Republic of Congo, but which still are not too difficult and in which the risk for failure still would not be too big. The current crisis in Darfur could be such an example.

Regardless of from which angle one chooses to look at the European union's activities in relation to crisis management and Africa, it is important to note that the EU naturally has interests it wants to promote. Assuming otherwise would be naive.

What are Our Expectations Regarding Crisis Management?

Among the issues to be pondered upon are the expectations regarding military crisis management in Africa. What effect do we expect the crisis management operations to have? Do the parties' expectations match or do they differ? Are our expectations realistic or are we expecting too much of the crisis management concept? It is clear that military crisis management as such cannot be the cure for all the problems on the African continent. In order to avoid feelings of failure, dissatisfaction and frustration on both sides, it is important to reach a common understanding on what exactly we wish and can achieve through the crisis management concept.

The fact is that crisis management is a very limited tool to work with. As a preventive tool it is effective, if used and timed correctly. Still one can't fix social problems like poverty and corruption by using military crisis management. These problems require bigger tools to work with, tools which the Africans themselves first and foremost need to create in order to make them as effective and the results as lasting as possible. However, military crisis management is effective and important in the sense that

problems, even big ones like the ones mentioned above, can be prevented before they are given a chance to grow. At its best a well carried out crisis management operation can bring peace and control into very difficult and chaotic situations, which slowly in time will foster bigger problems. There are no limits to human desperation and there are little moral boundaries when it comes down to the very basic question of survival. Human desperation is a most effective breeder of big problems. Crisis management strives towards relieving the situation of desperation and chaos before it has the chance to escalate and become uncontrollable. This is what we can do with crisis management; prevent problems before they are born in a certain time, in a certain place. We cannot, however fix the same problems that have already occurred, that would be expecting too much of crisis management.

The Common Agenda

Finding a common agenda on crisis management is one of the most important, urgent and challenging tasks that lie in front of the two continents' new co-operational relationship. Discussion forums, such as the 9th Suomenlinna Seminar, are important as they give representatives from all sides an opportunity to exchange views and ideas and thus work towards finding a more concrete form of co-operation in the future. Finding a common agenda between two partners as different as Africa and Europe is hard but necessary. This task involves finding a suitable partner for the EU to work with and coming to an agreement on the effective division of tasks. It also involves an objective and realistic reflection on the effectiveness and usefulness of the tools we have to work with when fighting peace and security threats on the African continent. It is also important to start looking at the European – African relationship as a partnership that entails mutual gains for both partners. Partnership is a keyword. So is time.

On one hand, time is something that many of us don't have, especially the people suffering under the pressure of crisis. That is why the EU and her African partner need to act fast.

On the other hand, there can't seem to pass enough time, for either of the two parties to put the facts of history behind them and start thinking about the future. History is important, it defines in many ways who we are and where we came from. History should not be forgotten, but, it should, however, be reflected on in a realistic way, so that we can see the lessons that should be learned instead of clinging on to facts that can't be helped and can't be changed. History is important, but there comes a point when history needs to be left alone, so that the future may be better than the past.

IX Suomenlinna Seminar

**PROMOTING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA:
IS THE EUROPEAN UNION UP TO THE CHALLENGE?**

The Suomenlinna Officers' Club, 18.-19.5.2006

THURSDAY, MAY 18th: MAPPING THE PROBLEMS

- 09.20 Ferry to Suomenlinna
- 09.40 Arrival of the guests
- 10.10 Opening Remarks: Colonel Juha Pyykönen, Director of DSDS
- 10.20 Keynote Address, followed by discussion: Pekka Haavisto,
European Union Special Representative to Sudan
- 11.00 **SESSION I: AFRICAN INSECURITY**
Chair: Juha Pyykönen
- “African Crises – Challenges for International Community and Local Actors”*
Ambassador Kari Karanko, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
- “Characteristics of the African Conflict Environment”*
Military Analyst Henri Boshoff, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa
- “The Transition from War to Peace: A Sociological Perspective”*
Ambassador Josef Bucher, Embassy of Switzerland, Helsinki
- 12.00-12.40 Discussion
- 12.40-13.40 Lunch

13.40

**SESSION II: THE CHALLENGES OF EUROPEAN CRISIS
MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA**

Chair: Mika Kerttunen

"Africa as an Operational Environment"

Colonel Nicolas Richoux, French Joint Defence Staff

"Logistical Experiences: the Case of Darfur"

Major Janos Besenyö, Hungarian Defence Forces

*"Facing European Soldiers in Africa: The Case of the Somali
Culture"*

Amran Mohammed Ahmed, Refugee Woman of the Year in
Finland 2005 (Somalia)

14.40-15.20

Discussion

15.20-15.50

Coffee Break

SESSION III: DIALOGUE BETWEEN CONTINENTS

Chair: Aapo Pölhö

15.50

"Dynamics of Peace and Security in Africa"

A Panel of African and European States' Ambassadors in
Scandinavia, participated by

Funmilayo A. Adebo-Kiencke (Nigeria),
Hanns Schumacher (Germany),
Soad Shalaby (Egypt) and
Jan Van Dessel (Belgium)

17.40

Ferry to Helsinki

18.00-20.00

Buffet reception, provided by the City of Helsinki, hosted by Mayor
Pekka Korpinen and Helsinki Emergency Planning Manager Matti
Latvala

FRIDAY, MAY 19th: WAYS AND RESPONSES

- 10.00 Ferry to Suomenlinna
- 10.20 Arrival of the guests
- 10.40 **SESSION IV: AFRICAN RESPONSES**
Chair: Pekka Sivonen
- "African Union's Evolving Crisis Management Capabilities"*
Major General (Retd) Henry K. Anyidoho (Ghana), followed by discussion
- 11.30-13.00 Lunch break, including a guided tour of Suomenlinna (optional)
- 13.00 **SESSION V: AFRICA ON THE AGENDA OF THE EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY**
Chair: Heikki Hult
- "Africa, European Union and the Finnish Presidency"*
Jaana Heikkilä, the Ministry of Defence of Finland
- "A Transatlantic View"*
Gregory Thome, Chief of Political Section, U.S. Embassy Helsinki
- 13.40-14.20 Discussion
- 14.20 **SESSION VI: WAY FORWARD**
Chair: Kari Karanko
- "The Future of the European Union Peace Support Operations in Africa"*
Panel discussion participated by
- Henri Boshoff, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa,
Fatoumata Siré Diakite, Ambassador of Mali in Berlin,
Sirpa Mäenpää, Director for East and West Africa, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, and
Pertti Salminen, Brigadier General, Commandant, National Defence College, Finland
- 15.20 Concluding Remarks: Director of DSDS
- 15.40 Ferry to Helsinki

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