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University**

**Military Sociological
Society of Finland**

THE SCIENCE OF UNIT COHESION – ITS CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPACTS



Mikael Salo & Risto Sinkko (Eds.)

**Department of
Behavioural Sciences**

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PREFACE

Academic sociology is a relatively recent discipline, formally established in 1895. In that year, French scientist Émile Durkheim, the father of sociology, set up the first European department of sociology at the University of Bordeaux. Understandably, the origins of Finnish military sociology do not predate the main academic discipline.

Academic structures were gradually organized, helping contemporary military sociology to break through as an outcome of the Second World War. In that era, a young Finnish sociologist called Knut Pipping served as a sergeant in a fighting unit and gathered empirical material systematically both during and after the Finnish wars. His work entitled *Infantry Company as a Society* was presented in Swedish as a doctoral dissertation at Åbo Academy in 1947. This was two years before the publication of *The American Soldier*, an academic masterpiece that has been considered to represent the beginning of empirical studies in military sociology. Thus, Finnish military sociology had a very early start, but unluckily behind the Anglo-Saxon language barrier.

Pipping's *Infantry Company as a Society* is the root of Finnish military sociology as a discipline. Another key work is the novel *The Unknown Soldier* by Väinö Linna. Like Pipping, Linna was a sergeant and made his notes on the battlefield. Published in 1954, *The Unknown Soldier* is considered to be a national debriefing on the war. The book is seen as an insightful reflection of real military life, but in the form of fiction.

These two fountainheads of Finnish military sociology have not only fostered but also impeded the discipline in later years. To revitalize the stagnant field of military sociology, General Jaakko Valtanen, former Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Defence Forces, accepted an initiative proposed by young officers to establish and chair the Finnish Military Sociological Society in 1994.

The Military Sociological Society of Finland (MISSOF) is a small independent scientific association. The society aims to support Finnish fundamental and applied research in military sociology. The society defines military sociology as a multidisciplinary humanistic social science that involves studying not only inter-military functions but also civil-military relations and relations between all security-related actors in society. Part of its task is to establish contacts between domestic and international researchers and help their work to flourish.

To that end, the Finnish Military Sociological Society translated Knut Pipping's early work into English and published it together with the Department of Behavioral Sciences of the Finnish National Defence University. Moreover, the Society organized a seminar and subsequent tour of lectures in 2011 commemorating the early work of Finnish military sociologists and highlighting topical military sociological themes that have both scientific and practical implications for military units.

The main event was a seminar entitled “Unit Cohesion and its Impacts on Group Performance”. The respected guest speakers were doctors Reuven Gal from Israel and James Griffith and Guy Siebold from the USA. They, together with their Finnish colleagues, contributed to the whole project, including this publication. The Finnish Military Sociological Society warmly thanks the contributors and the Finnish National Defence University, the Army Academy, and especially the donor organizations for their wholehearted support: The only solid basis for building the military of the future is to understand how one’s own and other societies function and evolve. In the globalizing world, this is increasingly important also in Finland.

Kalle Liesinen

Chairman of the Finnish Military Sociological Society

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Kalle Liesinen

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BIOGRAPHY OF THE AUTHORS

Colonel (G.S.), **Kalle Liesinen** is a founding member and present chair of the Military Sociological Society of Finland (MISSOF). He served in the Finnish Defence Forces as Chief of Training and Education and in the Finnish Ministry of Interior as National Co-ordinator for civilian crisis management training, evaluation and research. His previous engagements include the position of Executive Director of Crisis Management Initiative headed by President Martti Ahtisaari. He has contributed to several military and civilian field missions and has an extensive experience in the field of crisis management. He is a renowned mentor, lecturer and columnist.

Major (G.S.), Dr. **Mikael Salo** has graduated from the University of Tampere (Doctor of Philosophy) and from the University of Helsinki (Doctor of Social Sciences). Currently, he works at the Defence Command in the J5 Plans and Policy Division. He has conducted research on socialization, military adjustment, unit cohesion, and small group leadership.

Mr. **Risto Sinkko**, M.Sc and Major in Reserve graduated at the Tampere University (Communication Sociology) in 1972. As an officer in reserve he was called to take part in survey research on reservists' opinions during several main field exercises of the Finnish Defence Forces. He is a member of the Board of Military Sociological Society of Finland (MISSOF). In addition, he is a doctoral student and part-time student advisor in the Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy at the Finnish National Defence University and engaged with several research projects in the Department of Behavioural Sciences.

Colonel **James Griffith** has served over 36 years in the U.S. Army active and reserve components. Currently an Army uniformed research psychologist previously assigned to the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, he is now assigned to the National Guard Bureau to study factors placing soldiers at-risk for suicide, alcohol and drug abuse, violence, etc. His 50-plus peer-reviewed publications have examined effects of common training and deployment (Unit Manning System) on soldier morale and unit cohesion, in addition to the recruitment, retention and readiness of reserve soldiers, and more recently, their adaptation to war and reintegration. With scientific achievements recognized by the American Psychological Association, he has been awarded Fellow status in two Divisions, and, by the U.S. Army Surgeon General, he has received an award of excellence in social science research ("Designator A"). Colonel Griffith received his Ph.D. in applied social psychology from The Claremont Colleges and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.

Professor **Jukka Leskinen** is head of the Department of Behavioural Sciences at the Finnish National Defence University since 2006. He graduated as a Doctor of Psychology from the University of Helsinki in 2004. Before that Professor Leskinen worked as a psychologist, consultant, and development manager/researcher for improving occupational health and safety (1982–2002). His field of expertise covers military psychology, military sociology, and work and organizational psychology.

Dr. **Reuven Gal** holds a BA and MA both in Psychology and Sociology from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a PhD from the University of California at Berkeley. He served in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as a platoon leader and company commander (1960–

1963), and during the Six-Days War he commanded a reserve recon-unit, participating in the battles on Jerusalem. Subsequently, he founded and commanded the IDF's Department of Behavioural Studies and served as Chief Psychologist of the Israeli Defense Forces. Dr. Gal retired from active duty in 1983 with the rank of Colonel. He founded and headed the Israeli Institute for Military Studies (IIMS), later renamed the Carmel Institute for Social Studies (1985–2002). In 2002, he was appointed Deputy Head of Israel's National Security Council, responsible for domestic and social policy. In 2007, Dr. Gal was appointed General Director of the Authority for National Civic Service, at the Prime Minister's office. As of 2010, Dr. Gal serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Kinneret College on the Sea of Galilee, as well as at the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology. Dr. Gal is the author of numerous books and articles, among them *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier* (1986); *Handbook of Military Psychology* (1991); and *Service without Guns* (2006).

Dr. **Guy L. Siebold** is a social psychologist with over 35 years of research experience centered on group cohesion, motivation, leadership, training, and unit performance. He received his BA, MA, and Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Illinois at Chicago, 1970, 1972, 1975 and his J.D. in law from the American University, Washington, D.C., 1980. He is a Vietnam War veteran and was a leading US Army civilian researcher on projects examining home station determinants of subsequent Combat Training Center performance and preparatory training for overseas deployment. Dr. Siebold is a recognized expert who has written numerous book chapters, articles, papers, and reports on military group cohesion, motivation, attrition, training, and leadership that have appeared in leading military research books and journals.

Mr. **Olli Harinen** is Licentiate in Political Science, University of Helsinki, and Major in Reserve. He has worked on Finnish Defence Forces' work atmosphere surveys and conscript and reservist studies since 1981. Founding member and secretary of the Finnish Military Sociological Society. Currently works as a project researcher at the Finnish National Defence University in the Department of Behavioural Sciences.

Lieutenant Colonel (G.S.), Dr. **Juha Mälkki** is currently working at the Defence Command in the Personnel Division. He graduated from the University of Helsinki as a Master of Social Sciences in 2000 and as a Doctor of Social Sciences in 2008. His publications have examined areas of military classics, art of war, leadership, armed forces and society, and war history.

Professor **Klaus Helkama** is professor emeritus in social psychology at the University of Helsinki. His main research interests involve values and morality from a cross-cultural perspective.

Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (G.S.), **Aki Huhtinen** is Docent of practical philosophy in the University of Helsinki and Docent of social consequences of media and information technology in the University of Lapland. Huhtinen is also Docent of information security and information operations in the University of Technology in Tampere. Huhtinen works in the Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy at the Finnish National Defence University.

1 INTRODUCTION

Mikael Salo & Risto Sinkko

Cohesion is a valuable property in any group, as cohesion increases the amount of influence that is exerted and accepted by the members on their values, attitudes, and behavioral rules. Cohesion intensifies the social pressure to conform to group norms, and even makes the members disregard their own opinions and adopt the opinions of others. Uniting forces strengthens them – but also increases the pressure to communicate, which results in more intense discussions that reveal the opinions of other group members, and may lead to possible conflicts. Therefore, a cohesive group settles disagreements and attains consensus more easily compared to a non-cohesive group, and thus exerts more influence on its members. As a consequence, group cohesion causes changes in the values, interests, and beliefs of individuals, produces uniform opinions and behavior, and reduces the amount of deviation from group norms and standards.

Unit cohesion comprises several components based on different structural relationships. At the primary group level, *social cohesion* builds on the affective, emotional relationships between group members and leaders, whereas *task cohesion* is influenced by the quality of the instrumental, task-related functions that extend to the unit level. On the other hand, secondary-group cohesion comprises *organizational cohesion* created through the bonding of the personnel with their closest higher unit, and *institutional cohesion* denotes the degree to which the group members identify with their organization's institutional characteristics. The more tightly integrated the members of a group are in terms of peer, leader, organizational, and institutional bonding, the more difficult it is to pull them apart, the more capable they are of joint action, and the more they may invest in their interpersonal relationships.

Ever since soldiers' primary groups were found to be important for determining unit effectiveness in WW II, there have been empirical attempts to either show that cohesion causes effective combat behavior or that it does not do so. Basically, the lowest levels of performance are achieved in groups with low task and low social cohesion. Such groups are outperformed by groups with either high social cohesion but low task cohesion, or low social cohesion and high task cohesion (Zaccaro & McCoy 1988). Finally, maximum performance levels are achieved in groups in which both types of cohesion are strong (*ibid.*). However, the cohesion components support performance due to different reasons. Task cohesion is a strong "performance enhancer", having a direct positive effect on group and personal performance, whereas social cohesion with its indirect positive relations serves as a "performance enabler" (Griffith 1988). In the end, cohesion in a group with a balanced, relatively strong profile is a "force multiplier" (Manning & Ingraham 1983), enabling that group to outperform other groups. The fundamental question is why various cohesion components facilitate performance in certain but not all circumstances. In this book, Reuven Gal, James Griffith, and Guy Siebold all tackle this problem in different ways in their articles.

This book sheds light on essential information about cohesion, its impacts, and future directions for cohesion research from psychological, social psychological, and sociological perspectives. In his article, Dr. Griffith details the content and functions of cohesion and its importance to modern military organizations. Moreover, Griffith offers several future directions for cohesion studies. Particularly, Griffith suggests that resilience and social

identity should be examined in order to improve comprehension of unit cohesion and its buffering functions. Dr. Gal explains why cohesion is important in the military context. Specifically, Gal argues that cohesion is an invaluable asset for winning a battle because cohesion (1) improves combat motivation, (2) enhances combat effectiveness, and (3) reduces stress reactions in combat. Dr. Siebold elaborates on the science of military cohesion by assessing the construct of cohesion and possible methodological constraints limiting the research. Moreover, Siebold presents interesting findings on military group leadership, and ends his article by proposing issues and topics for future military cohesion research.

The Finnish scholars provide wide-ranging commentary on the articles of Gal, Griffith, and Siebold. Professor Leskinen argues that a sense of coherence may be a buffer against experienced stress in crisis management operations. The results indicate that a group of people can facilitate dealing with a stressful situation by (a) organizing a structured and predictable life situation in the group, (b) providing peer and leader support for meeting the demands of the situation, and (c) increasing the meaningfulness of the situation in order to guarantee the members' personal investment in the group situation. Licentiate Harinen summarizes the main findings of Dr. Pipping and other researchers, and describes how a cohesive group develops a uniform set of standards, directions, and norms that further influence whether cohesion has an impact on group performance. LTC, Dr. Mälkki explains why task cohesion is more important for unit effectiveness than social cohesion, and discusses social comparisons whereby "the other" formulates a source for cohesion among the peer group members. MAJ, Dr. Salo presents a standard model of unit cohesion and depicts some of its theoretical and practical implications.

Professor Helkama links cohesion to a broader context of theoretical constructs such as equality, trust, and fairness. Helkama argues that a sense of equality and fairness in an organization supports interpersonal trust, which in turn improves group cohesion and unit effectiveness. Professor Huhtinen discusses the upcoming changes in the Finnish Defence Forces and how they may have an impact on the public reputation of the organization. His argument is that a cohesive organization influences its members by formulating a clear, practical, and meaningful strategy that is reflected in people's discussions. Consequently, a successful organization values partnership and encourages its members to work together for the good of the organization. COL Liesinen concludes the book by inviting scholars to study demanding military operations in order to support units in different sociocultural settings. Particularly, the service members need quality training in order to increase their skills, knowledge, and cultural sensitivity, all of which are required for effective cross-cultural cooperation.

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2 COHESION FORGOTTEN? REDUX 2011 – KNOWN AND UNKNOWN

James Griffith

Abstract

This article is a re-visitation to a once popular construct in military psychology, cohesion, which now has been largely missing in today's U.S. military lexicon. I provide an update concerning what is known about the construct characteristics of cohesion applied to the military, its content and function. I relate two recently more popularized constructs – resilience and social identity – to cohesion, which offer a further understanding of cohesion, specifically, cohesion's buffering function and its ties to individual cognitions, and offer additional insights into the construct of cohesion. Even so, several important questions remain for future study and research, including: Why is cohesion no longer part of the U.S. military's lexicon? How do stressors change the structure and function of groups? How can other familiar constructs, such as organizational trust and collective efficacy, better elaborate the construct of cohesion?

Over many decades, militaries have viewed cohesion an essential element to military performance, combat effectiveness, and winning battles. Perhaps the most vivid example of cohesion is the Greek and then later Roman phalanx, consisting of soldiers in several lines or ranks (Sekunda, 2000). Soldiers in each rank interlocked shields and advanced while maintaining the rank-and-file structure to fend off attacks. Less evident, though critical, were the social-psychological advantages of the phalanx. The formation suppressed egocentric needs of the soldier for the needs of others. Soldiers had to trust neighboring soldiers to protect them and be willing themselves to protect others. To further develop trust and confidence on others, phalanx formations were often deliberately organized to include family and friends, providing additional social-psychological incentives to support others and disincentives to break and run through shame and guilt. The tight organization of soldiers spanned from ancient times through medieval, Napoleonic Wars, and American Civil War to World War I. The phalanx strategy increasingly became too costly due to modern lethal weaponry and mobile forces. In modern times, small mobile groups of soldiers increasingly conducted warfare.

The Importance of Cohesion to Modern Militaries

Without the benefits of physical closeness, military leaders and soldiers alike had to rely more on social-psychological forces in order to keep soldiers united as a group when confronting enemy forces. Shils and Janowitz (1948), in their classic study of the German Wehrmacht during World War II, concluded that the army's continued resistance in the face of overwhelming odds was attributable primarily to the solidarity among members of small groups of soldiers:

“When the individual’s immediate group, and its supporting formations, met his basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem from both officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power and adequately regulated his relations with authority, the element of self-concern in battle, which would lead to *disruption of the effective functioning of his primary group, was minimized*” (p. 281).

Shils (1950) made similar observations of the American Army in World War II. He reported that the cohesive primary group “served two principle functions in combat motivation: it set and emphasized group standards of behavior and it *supported and sustained the individual in stresses* he would otherwise not have been able to withstand” (p. 25). More recently, Vaughn and Schum (2001) examined 20 published narrative accounts of American combat soldiers in Vietnam War. Most commonly mentioned reasons why American combat soldiers fought were: for members of their primary group (e.g., squad), for respected and valued leaders, out of a sense of duty, and for survival. These reasons are further corroborated by observations of American soldiers during World War II (Traversa, 1995), the Korean War (Kellett, 1987, Little, 1964), the Vietnam War (Moskos, 1977), and the Iraqi War (Wong, Kolditz, Millen, & Potter, 2003).

Cohesion Forgotten

In the mid-1980s, there was great interest in cohesion in the aftermath of Vietnam. Failures in that war were, in part, attributed to the individual replacement system in which soldiers served one year in a unit, though each soldier had different dates for rotation back to the U.S. (Savage & Gabriel, 1976). In the 1980s there was also interest in multiplying the fighting power of lightly armed, more mobile units (called light infantry) through unit cohesion (Griffith, 1989). After a flurry of policy interest and studies of cohesion in the 1980s and 1990s, cohesion has largely dropped from the military lexicon, being replaced by constructs, such as resilience. The *Zeitgeist* contributing to this transition is unclear. One possible explanation is the increased prevalence of posttraumatic stress and other combat-related disorders among soldiers who served in the recent Iraq and Afghanistan wars (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, (2006; Hoge, Castro, Messer, McGurk, Cotting, & Koffman, 2004). The disorders are individual level in their manifestation and are treated primarily by the military medical department, which has a decidedly individual-level focus in treatment and prevention. Resilience is a decidedly individual-level construct, and currently, through instruction in principles of behavioral-cognitive coping skills (Master Resilience Training; Reivich, Seligman, & McBride, 2011), the U.S. military expects to better equip soldiers against combat stress reactions. In this article, I revisit the construct of cohesion, describing what is currently known about the content and function of cohesion, and the benefits of relating two emerging, complementary constructs – resilience and social identity. Resilience and social identity have their unique literatures and add different perspectives to the study and application of cohesion.

What is Cohesion?

Constructs in the social sciences can be described in terms of what they consist of or their content and how they work or their processes. Accumulating evidence suggests specific content and functions of cohesion (Beal, Cohen, Burke, & McLendon, 2003; Carron & Brawley, 2000; Cota, Evans, Dion, & Kilik, 1995; Dion, 2000; MacCoun & Hix, 2010; Mullen & Copper, 1994).

Content. The literature to date (MacCoun & Hix, 2010) considers cohesion as best described in terms of two components: task cohesion and social cohesion. Task cohesion refers to the shared commitment among members to achieve a goal requiring collective efforts of group members. Social cohesion refers the quality of interpersonal relationships among group members – whether members would provide material and emotional support to each other. Both task cohesion and social cohesion can have two different referent groups – (1) peer members of the primary group or horizontal cohesion, peer-to-peer relationships and (2) leaders of the primary group or vertical cohesion, peer-to-immediate leader relationships (Griffith, 1988; Siebold & Kelly, 1988). Table 1 provides a summary of the content of cohesion.

Table 1. Content of Cohesion

Content	Direction
Task, instrumental – shared commitment among members to achieve a goal requiring collective efforts of group members.	Horizontal – peer members of the primary group or horizontal cohesion, peer-to-peer relationships
Social, expressive – the quality of interpersonal relationships among group members – whether members would provide material and emotional support to each other.	Vertical – leaders of the primary group or vertical cohesion, peer-to-immediate leader relationships
Group pride – describes the degree of a group member's identification with the group.	
Collective efficacy – shared expectancies among group members to achieve intended goals of the group	
Trust – having confidence that the trusted entity will behave as expected. Trust has been applied to individual members (i.e., fellow soldier performs duties to provide safety for others) and members as a whole (i.e., higher headquarters provides equipment and materials as promised).	

MacCoun and Hix (2010) described other notable aspects of cohesion evident in more recent research; these include: group pride or individual identification to the collective group; morale and esprit de corps; collective efficacy or group potency. Group pride describes the degree of a group member's identification with the group (Dion, 200; Griffith, 2009a; Mullen & Copper, 1994; Shamir, Brainin, Zakay, & Popper, 2000). Popular terms used when speaking about cohesion often include morale and esprit de corps. Manning (1994) made a distinction between these two terms. Morale describes the individual member's enthusiasm and persistence in engaging in behaviors prescribed by group membership, whereas esprit de corps describes the degree of cohesiveness among higher organizational entities. Collective efficacy (Bandura, 2000) is a recent construct regarding how group members see themselves as cooperatively achieving intended goals of the group. The greater the shared expectancies, the greater group efforts can produce intended effects. Some military studies show that these perceptions contribute more to group performance than do other aspects of cohesion (Jordan, Field, & Armenakis, 2002; Shamir et al., 2000).

The construct of trust has also been discussed in the context of cohesion occurring at various levels in the organization. Trust may be defined as having confidence that the trusted entity will behave as expected. Trust has been applied to individual members (i.e., fellow soldier performs duties to provide safety for others) and members as a whole (i.e., higher headquarters provides equipment and materials as promised). Trust, then, can refer to the individual's trust in fellow soldiers, in primary and secondary leaders, and in the broader organization and institution (Griffith, 1988; Siebold & Kelly, 1988). Expectancies are largely based on defined role of the trusted individual or entity. A construct of more recent interest suggests that trust can develop quickly under certain conditions. Evidence shows that trust can develop expediently among group members based on other individuals membership in trusted groups (e.g., medical professionals), role-based trust (e.g., rank as indicator of past experience and knowledge), and rule-based trust (e.g., shared norms about what is expected behaviors) (Kramer, 1999; Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Holingshead, 2007).

Function. The construct of cohesion is best known for what it gives or provides. In the military, cohesion has been thought to contribute to combat effectiveness and winning battles. Cohesion has been examined as having a direct effect on performance, largely group performance rather than individual performance, and having a moderating effect on deleterious stressors on individual and group performance (called the "buffering hypothesis" or effect, Cohen & Wills, 1985). Studies to date have shown a reliable positive relationship between cohesion and performance. Table 2 provides a summary of the function of cohesion.

Table 2. Function of Cohesion

Performance Enhancer	Performance Enabler
<p>Direct effect Cohesion contributes to group performance. Task cohesion best predicts performance followed by group pride. Once task cohesion was statistically controlled, both social cohesion and group pride showed no reliable relationship to performance (Mullen & Copper, 1994).</p>	<p>Moderating or buffering effect Cohesion's positive relationship with performance occurs when groups undergo stressors. That is, the generally negative relationship between stressful conditions and performance will be less affected under higher rather than lower level of cohesion.</p>
Some Qualifications	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Current performance affects future cohesion, increased collective efficacy. 2. Task component of cohesion has shown stronger association with performance than social component. 3. Type of tasks relates to the strength of the cohesion-performance relationship; greater interdependencies and coordination among group members, stronger associations are observed. 4. Stronger were found: when reported at the group level rather than at the individual level; and among sports team rather than among military units 5. Small unit leadership appears more important in buffering negative effects of stressors on soldiers. 6. "Buffering effects" appear to occur only at the individual level, not group level. 	

Mullen and Copper (1994) reported that among the components of cohesion, task cohesion best predicted performance followed by group pride. Once task cohesion was statistically controlled, both social cohesion and group pride showed no reliable relationship to performance. Beal et al. (2003) reported similar effects for the task component of cohesion. Noteworthy is that Beal et al., due to the way they coded study variables, could not control for task cohesion when examining the relationship of social cohesion to performance (see MacCoun & Hix, 2011, p. 142). The relationship between cohesion and performance, however, is not straightforward (summarized in Mullen & Copper, 1994; MacCoun & Hix, 2010). First, the positive relationship between the two is in part due to current performance affecting future cohesion. That is, teams that succeed are more likely to share beliefs about their collective efficacy. Second, the task component of cohesion has shown stronger association with performance than social component. Third, the nature of the task relates to the strength of the cohesion-performance relationship. When tasks examined required greater interdependencies and coordination among group members, stronger associations are observed (Beal et al., 2003; Chiocchio & Essiembre, 2009). In similar vein, Zaccaro and his colleagues showed that the association of cohesion's task and social components with performance varied by type of tasks. For additive tasks, task cohesion facilitated performance, whereas social cohesion gave no benefit (Zaccaro & Lowe, 1988). For disjunctive tasks, both

task and social cohesion improved group performance (Zacarro & McCoy, 1988). Level of analysis is also important in describing the cohesion-performance relationship. For example, Gully, Devine, and Whitney (1995) and Oliver, Harman, Hoover, Haynes, and Pandhi (1999) reported stronger associations between cohesion and performance when reported at the group level rather than at the individual level. Additionally, stronger associations are found among sports team rather than among military units (Mullen & Copper, 1994). Another line of research has argued that evidence for the positive effects of cohesion are not evident until the group experiences stressors, discussed below.

For Shils and Janowitz (1948), cohesion was related to the integrative quality of relationships within the primary group, functioning to *buffer* the negative effects of stress individuals and the group, to keep the group intact, and to enable the group to carry on its assigned tasks and mission. Similar descriptions of the relation between stress and cohesion as maintaining individual and group integrity and performance are found in the academic literature. By defining *cohesion as "the resistance of a group to disruptive forces,"* Gross and Martin (1952) emphasized the strength of relationships or bonds among group members during crises (p. 553). Coser (1956) also viewed conflicts as increasing group members' social integration. External threats lead "to the mobilization of the energies of the members of the group" (Stein, 1976, p. 145), thus intensifying solidarity among group members.

These accounts portray cohesion as a *performance enabler*, not a *performance enhancer*, that cohesion's relation to performance is indirect rather than direct and that the effects of cohesion are most noted under stressful conditions. Indeed, Marlowe (1979) argued that cohesion can best be observed during stressful times (e.g., battle), and he differentiated cohesion, performance, and group maintenance: "While *cohesion and morale* do not correlate with technical performance ... they do *correlate with military performance by maintaining the organized group at its tasks in the face of severe stresses of battle*" (p. 47). This perspective is clearly evident in Army guidance to unit leaders and soldiers: "One of the most significant contributions of World War II and modern warfare was the recognition of the *sustaining influence* of the small combat unit on the individual member Interpersonal relationships develop among soldiers and between them and their leaders It is these relationships which, *during times of stress*, provide a spirit or force which *sustains the members as individuals and the individuals as a working, effective unit*" (U.S. Department of Army, 1982, p. 1-1). Others (Griffith, 2007) have pointed to research evidence in the health psychology literature and wartime observations that social cohesion is important to group members, especially to sustain them combat. Differences regarding which dimension of cohesion contributes most to performance may have to do with conditions in which the stressor-performance relationship is studied. Meta-analyses of the cohesion-performance relationship (Mullen & Copper, 1994) have included few, if any, samples of people who have undergone extremely stressful conditions, like combat. Most salient in these conditions are self-esteem and attachment needs most likely met by socio-emotional support (Jacobson, 1986; Shils & Janowitz, 1948; Solomon, Mukilincer, & Hobfoll, 1986).

Evident from these studies is that the function of cohesion in military contexts is to increase group solidarity or integration during times of stress, enabling individual members to undergo stressful circumstances and perform effectively and contribute to group tasks and missions. In this way, the construct of cohesion resembles current work in social support

(Griffith, 1989). Under stressful conditions, cohesiveness among group members binds individuals together providing task direction and assistance as well as needed material and emotional support to continue with group-defined individual roles (Ahronson & Cameron, 2007; Solomon & Mikulincer, 1990; Steiner & Neumann, 1978). Small unit leadership, in particular, has shown to be crucial in soldier adaptive responses to stressors (Solomon et al., 1986). This perspective sees cohesion as moderating the negative effects of stress on the group and on group members. Analytically, the buffering effects of cohesion have been examined at the group and individual levels. Evidence to date suggests that cohesion operates at the individual level rather than the group level (Ahronson & Cameron, 2007, Griffith, 2002). That is, the relationship of stressors to individual well-being lessened when *perceived support* at the *individual level* was considered. However, in hierarchical linear modeling, unit perceived support did not reliably predict variations in the relationship of stressors to well-being by unit (i.e., the cross-level moderating effect; Hofman, Griffin, & Gavin, 2000).

Summary, Cohesion Content and Function

Cohesion has several construct characteristics, including content (task, social, pride, collective efficacy, and trust) and function (direct effect and buffering effect). With some qualifications, there is a demonstrable reliable cohesion-performance relationship, primarily task cohesion on performance, though likely dependent the type of tasks, whether requiring interdependent behaviors or not. There also is evidence for a buffering effect of cohesion but appears to operate primarily at the individual level rather than group level, i.e., social support. There are at least two new areas in the health and military psychology literatures that further benefit the understanding and application of the construct of cohesion – resilience and self identity.

Buffering Effect of Cohesion as Resilience

In the military literature, cohesion has been largely seen as yielding positive outcomes, such as increased individual and unit performance and buffering the negative effects of stress on individuals. Then again, cohesion has also been associated with negative outcomes in the social psychological literature, e.g., Janis' (1972) groupthink. A recent construct in military and health psychology, "resilience" (Reivich et al., 2011), may help clarify these opposing influences of cohesion. Resilience in the physical sciences describes the extent the object is able to withstand external pressures, for example, by absorbing and bending with force surge, and then to bounce back and retain original form. Applied to the individual, resilience is a process whereby the individual is better able to withstand stressors and continue effective functioning. Specifically, resilience is defined as: "*the ability to persist in the face of challenges and to bounce back from adversity*" (Masten, 2001, p. 25). Perhaps then, resilience better describes the positive effects of cohesion when individuals are organized in groups and experience stressors, namely, the buffering effect of group cohesion.

Resilience has been largely treated as a narrowly individual level property, and therefore, is less understood at the group and organizational levels. Resilience applied to groups is the capacity of groups rather than individuals "to foster, engage in, and sustain positive social

relationships and to endure and recover from stressors and special isolation” (Cacioppo, Reis, & Zautra, 2011, p. 43). Resilience of the group *presumes knowledge of stressors* – their content, processes, and effects on these entities, in addition to those processes that *moderate the relationship* between stressors and their negative effects.

Implications of Resilience for Cohesion

What does the definition instruct us about cohesion? Tying stressors to changes in group structure and process better describes the buffering effect of cohesion. Hence, the construct of resilience when applied to the group, first, better specifies those stressors that impact the group, in particular, those that adversely affect the group. The second part of the definition is useful in identifying moderating variables of the stressor-stain relationship at the group level. These then can be used as preventive measures against the deleterious effects of stressors on groups.

Group stressors can be defined as “...an external circumstance that involves potential loss for a group” (Turner & Horvitz, 2001, p. 446). External sources of stress include competition for resources, status, and prestige; loss of clientele; attractiveness of membership in other groups; undermining of group norms, roles, and functions; and adverse physical and environmental conditions. Much of the literature on group reactions to stressors comes from the stress-rigidity hypothesis (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). Stress reactions occur in three broad domains: information-processing, cognitions; and behaviors. Regarding information processing, group members *reduce information* to be apprehended. Members *narrow attention* to dominant cues and exclude peripheral cues. Cognitively, group members *understand the environment in terms of prior expectations and internal hypotheses* out their environment. Behaviorally, the group is more inclined to *perform dominant, well-learned response* rather than novel responses. Under prolonged exposure to stressors, the group performs the same behavior repeatedly (fixates) as well as does not perform at all or freezes.

Other research has shown groups to react to stressors in relatively predictable ways. For example, external threats to the group are often accompanied by increased cohesiveness, leadership support, and pressure for uniformity. Generally, threats to groups are associated with increased ties among members within the group and with decreased ties among groups. The increased attention to ties within the group often leads to increased liking and cohesiveness among group members. Threats to groups also affect leadership. Groups under stressful circumstances often centralize authority as well as replacing leaders, particularly, if leaders are associated with failures of the group to meet challenges (Hamblin, 1958). When groups experience stressors, group members seek consensus on problem definition and what is to be done, but consensus often means restriction of information, discounting deviant positions, and generating new solutions. Positions of dominant members are more easily accepted, resulting in controlling information to confirm such positions, ultimately resulting in faulty decision-making. Threats to groups often result in increased pressures for uniformity in attitudes and behaviors among group members (Festinger, 1950). In such circumstances, increased communication is aimed to achieve uniformity but if this is not achieved then the individual member is excluded or ostracized from group interactions (Schachter, Nuttin, Monchaux, Rommetveit, & Israel, 1954; Janis, 1972).

These reactions then inform us about possible ways to intervene in the stressor-strain relationship to yield more adaptive group responses (see Table 3), including: encouraging information-gathering; interpreting the meaning of information from various perspectives (Weick, 1969); countering groupthink (Janis, 1972); resisting repeated performance of routine behaviors (Weick, 1969); and opposing autocratic leadership. Additionally, Bowers, Weaver, and Morgan (1996, pp. 165–167) described several constructs of groups that moderate the relationship between stressors and group performance. These include: norms that work for the good of the group; individual goals subordinated to those of the group; norms that promote social cooperation and collective action; flexible leadership, not hierarchical leadership; and expectations that each member would be paid in kind over time. In a similar way, socially resilient groups are characterized by structure that encourages resilience-fostering thoughts, feelings and behaviors, such as prosocial emotions and behaviors, interactions that promote acceptance and bonding among group members, trusting and collaborative problem-solving, and cooperative governance (Cacioppo et al. 2011). Thus, norms for group effort, flexible leadership, and trust among group members are potential moderators of the negative effects of stressors on group structure and functioning.

Table 3. Characteristics of Resilience Applied to Cohesion

Resilience Defined	<p>The capacity of groups rather than individuals “to foster, engage in, and sustain positive social relationships and to endure and recover from stressors and special isolation” (Cacioppo, Reis, & Zautra, 2011, p. 43).</p> <p>Resilience of the group <i>presumes knowledge of stressors</i> – their content, processes, and effects on these entities, in addition to those processes that <i>moderate the relationship</i> between stressors and their negative effects.</p>
What Does Resilience Do for the Stressor-Strain relationship?	<p>Defines Typical Adaptations of Groups, Often Ineffective</p> <p>Gathering information From an initial flurry until channels become overloaded. Input processes are subordinated to output processes. Reduced gathering and use of information from the environment; the amount, complexity, and variety of information are reduced dramatically.</p> <p>Interpreting and responding The number of genuinely new alternatives are low. Heavy reliance on standard operating procedures. Inability to interpret and respond to ambiguous or highly complex environments. Outputs are those with which the group or organization is most familiar in producing.</p> <p>Leadership Increased centralization of authority, more extensive formalization, and standardization of procedures. Members exert pressures on one another to achieve uniformity of opinion and action, and the support of group leaders. Existing procedures and the policies of current leaders are supported by group members.</p>

	<p>Regulating group members' behaviors Controlling human behaviors and processes to present a unified response to stress.</p> <p>Decision-making Opinions of dominant members prevail. Greater consensus among members often results in restriction of information and consideration of alternative opinions. Actions and often lead to faulty decision-making (see Janis' (1972) "groupthink"), leading to dissensus among members (Staw et al., 1981, pp. 510–511) and leadership instability and possible replacement.</p>
Implications for Bolstering Group Resilience	<p>Develop information-gathering; interpreting the meaning of information from various perspectives (Weick, 1969); counter groupthink (Janis, 1972); resist repeated performance of routine behaviors (Weick, 1969); and oppose autocratic leadership. Promote norms that work for the good of the group, subordinate individual goals to those of the group, and increase social cooperation and collective action; flexible leadership, not hierarchical leadership; and expectations that each member would be paid in kind over time (Bowers et al., 1996, pp. 165-167).</p> <p>Socially resilient groups are characterized by structure that encourages resilience-fostering thoughts, feelings and behaviors, such as prosocial emotions and behaviors, interactions that promote acceptance and bonding among group members, trusting and collaborative problem-solving, and cooperative governance (Cacioppo et al. 2011).</p>

In summary, the construct of resilience when applied to cohesion better captures the buffering effect of cohesion against the negative effects of stressors on individual and group performance and well-being. Group or social resilience offers a more precise description of stressors that deleteriously affect the group structure and process. Knowing how groups typically react to stressors, in particular, those considered maladaptive, suggests possible moderating variables and thus can be used to intervene in the stressor-strain relationship.

Building Cohesion as Resilience

In a recent issue of the *American Psychologist*, several strategies were offered to increase social resilience. First, the social structure should "encourage patterns of positive adaptation rather than sources of vulnerability." Second, resilience should be designed with specific sources of adversity in mind along with coping and adapting with adversity. Third, the social structure should foster adaptive social ecologies for groups and organizations (Cacioppo et al., 2011, p. 46). Turner and Horvitz (2001) offered several interventions for groups to increase their ability to withstand stressors, including: stress inoculation stressor inoculation training and instruction on coping skills in relation to stressors (Johnston & Cannon-Bowers, 1996); structured discussions of group members in order to delay solution selection and consider varied alternatives in problem-solving; and install protections for minority opinions in the group. Others have suggested other strategies, such as developing functional diversity

and response diversity (Walker, Gunderson, Kinzig, Folke, Carpenter, & Schultz, 2006); resource dependency; leadership responsive to conditions affecting the organization (Walker et al., 2006); collaborative planning and participation; networks (bonding and bridging) to develop human capital (Adger, Brown, & Toimpmkins, 2005); and benefits from “local people’s” knowledge base of how to react to and respond to environmental changes.

Cohesion and Self-identity: Linkages between the Individual and Group

Lacking in the cohesion research is a discussion of how individuals come to develop relationships with group members. In other words, there are few, if any, discussions of individual mechanisms related to the social context that link the individual to the group. In this regard, social identity theory has filled the gap. Key terms here are: social identity or identity of the self in the context of the group; social categorization or perceptual distinction between oneself along with group members and people outside the group; and the prototypical member or the embodiment of attributes of the idealized group member.

Social identity theory was first introduced by Tajfel and then later elaborated on by Turner, Hogg, and others (Hogg, 1992; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherall, 1987). According to the theory, the individual is assumed to have several identities, each identity informing the individual of who he or she is and what this identity entails. Which identity the individual assumes is dependent on circumstances surrounding an individual. Thus, the term “social identity” is used; it is the individual’s response to “Who am I?” derived from perceived membership in social groups. The influence of such groups on the self-concept depends on the meaning the individual attaches to group membership (Hogg & Vaughan., 2002). In the words of Tajfel, social identity is “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his membership of a social group (or groups), together with the value and emotional significance attached to this” (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p. 63).

There are two key processes in social identity development. The first, “social categorization,” is the process whereby people gain identity from their social contexts. People tend to classify themselves and others by social categories, such as by gender, age groups, religious affiliations, and organizational membership (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Hogg (1992) defines the process of social categorization as:

... a way of thinking about the self and others that emphasizes group memberships in groups, rather than personal qualities.... Social categorization ... cognitively assimilates self to the ingroup prototype and, thus, depersonalizes self-conception ... and it brings self-perception and behavior in line with contextually relevant ingroup prototype.... Prototypes ... capture the context-dependent features of group membership, often in the form of representations of exemplary members (actual group members who best embody the group) or ideal types (an abstraction of group features) (p. 200).

The second process, the “group prototype,” is the mental image of a group member who embodies characteristics that in particular make in-group members distinct from out-group members (Van Dick, Wagner, Stellmacher, Christ, & Tissington, 2005). In the words of

Hornsey (2008): “When a category becomes salient, people come to see themselves and other category members less as individuals and more as interchangeable exemplars of the group prototype. The prototype is not an objective reality, but rather a subjective sense of the defining attributes of a social category that fluctuates according to context. The group identity not only describes what it is to be a group member, but also prescribes what kinds of attitudes, emotions and behaviours are appropriate in a given context. The notion of depersonalization was assumed to underpin a range of group processes such as cohesion, influence, conformity, and leadership” (pp. 208–209).

To the extent group members share and display attributes of the group prototype, group members will (1) have positive feelings among group members and (2) be cohesive (Hogg, 1992). These two consequences then serve a basis for individual motivation to achieve group goals. Thus, this identification would be most evident when group members positively evaluate the group to which they belong (Hogg & Terry, 2000). As “...the individual defines him- or her-self in terms of membership in an organizational group (e.g., work team, organization, occupation), the more his or her attitudes and behaviors are governed by this group membership. For the organization, this should result in greater performance, lower absenteeism, and turnover, and more extra-role behaviors” (Van Dick et al., 2005, p. 192).

Implications of Social Identity for Cohesion

Identity theory has much to offer to cohesion. First, broadening identity theory to stress adaptation among soldiers has intuitive appeal and provides understanding to current experiences of war veterans. This is evident from several recent reports – Sugar’s (2005) “warrior identity” explaining discharged soldiers’ difficulties in post-service life; Musheno and Ross’ (2011) “adaptive,” “struggling,” and “resistant” reservists explaining differences in postdeployment adjustment; and the Army’s new suicide report concerning “risk-takers” (U.S. Department of Army, 2010). Second, mechanisms of identity theory explicate underlying individual level processes of constructs often associated with effective individual and group functioning, such as cohesion, social support, and of leadership. For example, Hogg and others (1992) have argued that the basis of cohesion lies in self identity. That is, the extent to which group members’ identities coincide with the attributes of the group’s ideal or prototypic member, the more members feel united and are cooperative and mutually supportive. Reicher, Haslam, and Platow (2007) explained effective leadership as shared identity among group members. The member who best represents the group member’s shared identity has the greatest influence over group members’ behaviors and attitudes, and thus, can best shape the agenda and goals of the group and the member.

Third, identity theory relates to the individual’s experience of stressors and subsequent adaptation. Identity intervenes in the relationship of potential stressors to strain. Haslam, Jetten, Postmes, and Haslam (2009) have described how identity can determine symptom appraisal and response; health-related norms and behaviors; social support; coping resources; and clinical outcomes (pp. 9–14). Social identity influences positive or negative health outcomes by focusing on the way in which individuals understand and respond to potential stressors (Haslam & Reicher, 2007). Other studies show that anticipated events having positive or negative consequences, often generate imagined selves prior to the events (Cross

& Markus, 1991), which serve to define the future context provide behavioral motivations, and “an evaluative and interpretative context for the now self” (Markus & Nurius, 1986, p. 962). Indeed, evidence suggests that how veterans view combat experiences often determine later adjustment. Aldwin, Levenson, and Spiro (1994), for example, reported that World War II and Korean War veterans who perceived their military experiences positively and as having had desired effects (e.g., teaching them to cooperate, cope with adversity) expressed fewer PTSD symptoms than those who did see military experiences as having positive effects. Broad, culturally-based identities also likely affect postwar adjustment. Freidman (1998) reported the lowest lifetime prevalence rates of PTSD among veterans who came from cultures having collective identity, Japanese American.

Individual identity intervenes between stressors and strain. Some identities decrease the negative experience of stressors, whereas other identities increase experienced stress. Attributes of a specific identity that meet the demands of reserve military service would likely lead to lower levels of perceived threats and experienced stress (Haslam et al., 2009). For example, deployment can provide a practical way for a “soldier warrior,” “identity seeker,” and “conservative ideologue” to have meaning and purpose in reserve military duty, which otherwise historically, often is not meaningful, not worthwhile, and waste of time (Griffith, 2009b). Conversely, attributes of a specific identity that diverge with the demands of reserve military service would likely lead to higher levels of perceived threats and experienced stress. An “instrumental volunteer” who joined for educational benefits and attends college would find deployment more stressful owing to its interference with career plans than a “soldier warrior” who joined to become a professional soldier. Yet another example is a “weekend warrior” who would experience deployment more stressful than “soldier warrior” due to expectations regarding reserve military service and likely unpreparedness. Indeed, reservists’ concerns about being inadequately prepared for deployments (lacking soldier warrior identity) have been associated with postdeployment posttraumatic stress symptoms (Erbes et al., 2008; Griffith, 2010; Vogt, Samper, King, & Martin, 2009). Individual identity and its salience depend on many factors, including characteristics of the immediate group, such as the group prototype and group members shared perceptions of the group prototype, and geopolitical events associated with threats to national security and military plans incorporating the reserve force.

Table 4. Characteristics of Social Identity Applied to Cohesion

Social Identity Mechanisms	What Does Social Identity Do for the Stressor-Strain Relationship?	Implications for Bolstering Social Identity
<p>Group prototype, is the mental image of a group member who embodies characteristics that in particular make in-group members distinct from out-group members.</p> <p>Social categorization is the process whereby people gain identity from their social contexts by finding similarities among members of their group and differences in members of other groups.</p>	<p>Social identity can determine:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – symptom appraisal and response; – health-related norms and behaviors; – social support; – coping resources; and – clinical outcomes (Haslam et al., 2009, pp. 9-14). 	<p>Development of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Lucid, uncomplicated <i>unit prototypes</i> can develop soldiers' awareness and identification with the unit. – Embodiments of attributes of ideal unit members in stories, heroes (e.g., Audie Murphy), traditions (e.g., "hail and farewells"), rituals (new recruit induction ceremony), and symbols (Army Combat Uniform with cavalier helmet). – Early, positive socialization for new entrants, including assigning a sponsor, introducing new members to the chain-of-command and unit members, explaining the unit's mission and so forth. – Structured, purposeful experiences communicate organizational norms and values, and an understanding of normative behavior and roles to new employees.

Social Identity as Building Cohesion

Social identity can be deliberately developed. Lucid, uncomplicated *unit prototypes* can develop soldiers' awareness and identification with the unit. Attributes of ideal unit members are embodied in stories, heroes (e.g., Audie Murphy), traditions (e.g., "hail and farewells"), rituals (new recruit induction ceremony), and symbols (Army Combat Uniform with cavalier helmet). The importance of these aspects of unit life in establishing soldiers' trust of and commitment to fellow soldiers, leaders, the unit and the military organization were recently recognized by Bondy (2004). He proposed that Western militaries return to social forces associated with their military effectiveness, including military ceremonies, symbols, explicit values, and institutional narratives be resurrected as part of unit experiences. These aspects of unit life can be combined with imagery to further develop and convey what the small-group and organization stands for, and thus, serves as a mechanism to achieve the desired self-identification of group members (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).

It would be expected that soldiers who appraise their unit positively and cohesively would be more likely to aspire to achieve important and relevant group goals, such as group members' commitment to the group and group perceptions of the unit's combat readiness (Hogg, 1992, pp. 99–100). To large extent, soldiers' positive feelings toward the unit depend on his or her initial experiences with the unit. In the organizational literature, it has long been recognized that initial entry of new employees into an organization is important for both the individual and the organization. When an individual joins an organization, he or she experiences new challenges – contextual features often determining whether challenges are experienced as positive or negative. New employees can either learn to cope and adapt, and enjoy these new experiences, or new employees can find that these new experiences do not match up to their expectations, leading to dissatisfaction and decisions to leave the organization. As noted by Schein (1978), socialization plays a key role in this process, "... the effectiveness of socialization determines employee loyalty, commitment, productivity, and turnover. The basic stability and effectiveness of organization therefore depends upon their ability to socialize new members."

Common methods of socialization are programs to introduce and orient new employees to the organization, in addition to assigning them mentors or buddies who guide them through the organization (Steers & Black, 1994). Structured, purposeful experiences communicate organizational norms and values, and an understanding of normative behavior and roles to new employees. To the extent these experiences are positive, the new employee develops a self-image or identity consistent with those of other members. Military units have procedures to help new members feel comfortable with the unit and its members, including assigning a sponsor, introducing new members to the chain-of-command and unit members, explaining the unit's mission and so forth.

Concluding Remarks

Evident then are several advances made with regard to the construct of cohesion. First, considerable improvements have been made in the conceptual development of cohesion, its component parts and processes (MacCoun & Hix, 2010), yielding several reasonably reliable and valid measures of cohesion (Siebold & Kelly, 1988; Griffith, 1988). Second, conceptualizing cohesion in a broader framework (Siebold, 1993; Griffith & Vaitkus, 1999) has allowed better specification of antecedents and consequences of cohesion, in addition to how each are related to different components of cohesion (see MacCoun, 1993; Wong, 2006). Third, advances in multilevel modeling have allowed a better understanding of how individual perceptions of group relations and health and well-being are related to group level measures of cohesion (Griffith, 2002). Results thus far seem to imply that cohesion's buffering effect works largely at the individual level. That is, the buffering effect is most evident in the interaction of cohesion and stressors on individual well-being rather than cohesion's cross-level moderating effect on unit relationships of stressors to strain (slopes as intercepts in hierarchical linear modeling) (Griffith, 2002). Fourth, in the 1980s and 1990s, cohesion was prevalent in the U.S. military's lexicon, in part, due to the experiences in Vietnam, where cohesion among U.S. soldiers was considered at its lowest (Savage & Gabriel, 1976). In fact, several Army pamphlets were developed specifically on the topic of cohesion and its role in combat readiness and countering the effects of combat stress reactions (U.S. Department of Army, 1982).

Despite these advances, there are crucial questions remaining for future study and research. First and foremost, is where has cohesion gone in the U.S. military's lexicon? The construct of resilience seems to have replaced cohesion. As described earlier, this actually may better capture the meaning of cohesion's buffering effects. However, resilience in its presence form in the U.S. military is decidedly individually-based, training soldiers on individual coping skills when under stressful conditions (Reivich et al., 2011). There would be great benefit in expanding the construct of resilience to broader entities such as groups and units (Cacioppo et al., 2011). This remains an area for future research and practice.

A second issue centers largely on the nature, both conceptually and analytically, of the cohesion-performance relation. In this article, I have summarized studies that clarify this relation as indirect rather than direct. The distinction of cohesion as an indirect versus a direct effect is more than an academic exercise. Each perspective has very different implications for research, applications, and expected effects of cohesion on group performance. For example, if cohesion is viewed as having a direct effect on performance, then methods to enhance cohesion would be expected to increase group performance (Beal et al., 2003; Mullen & Copper, 1995). Not observing the expected effects would then lead to the conclusion that cohesion makes no difference. However, such a view and consequent conclusion are at-odds with historical accounts of soldier motivation during combat and with the social support research, which have shown cohesion effects to be most evident during times of extreme stress (Kolditz, 2006). If then the cohesion-performance relation is not direct, then it may be either a moderating or mediating effect, each having different implications (Baron & Kenny, 1986). If cohesion is understood as a moderator, then cohesion effects are most evident and beneficial for units undergoing extreme stress. Moderating effect implies bolstering cohesion components among soldiers who report high levels of stress, as well as soldiers who

are expected to experience stressful events. If cohesion is understood as a mediator, then cohesion's effect on outcomes, such as group performance, should be studied as not as direct relations but indirect through group constructs such as leadership, group appraisal of threats, groupthink or stereotypic thinking among group members, etc. For example, cohesion may operate through group schema or shared perceptions of competence among group members may enhance member cohesiveness, perceptual consensus or "groupthink" (Janis, 1972), and commitment to task performance (Seashore, 1954), resulting in a less negative appraisal of external demands (Hogg, 1992). Third, there is very limited research on how groups and group members react to stressors. The two primary sources here are Bowers et al. (1996) and Staw et al. (1981). A future direction is for more research and systematic compilation of group responses to stressors, both positive and negative, as these then would suggest predictable ways groups respond to stressful conditions and how best to intervene to provide more positive outcomes. Fourth, a future direction for research is how best to incorporate emergent relevant constructs into cohesion, such as trust (at the unit level, MacCoun & Hix, 2010) and at the organizational level (Bryk Schneider, 2002; Mishra, 1996) and collective efficacy (Bandura, 2000). Important considerations are whether these are facets of cohesion, antecedents or consequences of cohesion, and too, their relative importance to cohesion and outcomes typically associated with cohesion. Fifth, consideration should be given to the implications of combining resilience and social identity. For example, which social identities (Griffith, 2011) can be developed to yield the most resilient group? Alternatively, what attributes of resilience imply particular social identities to be developed (Griffith, 2010)?

In this article, I have attempted to describe the current state of affairs of the construct of group cohesion as applied to the military. I have suggested that two recent, emergent constructs – resilience and social identity – can further benefit the understanding of cohesion, specifically, cohesion's buffering function and cohesion's ties to individual cognitions and offer additional insight into what might enhance group cohesion. Finally, I concluded by offering several future directions for cohesion study and research.

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3 SENSE OF COHERENCE AS A BUFFER AGAINST CRISIS MANAGEMENT VETERAN'S STRESS

Jukka Leskinen

This article is based on a survey that aimed to study the impact of peacekeeping missions on the crisis management veterans' (CMV) psychosocial well-being after operations. The specific interest was to examine the prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and to discuss the quality of peacekeepers' cumulative, non-PTSD stress. An internet-based questionnaire was posted to 500 peacekeepers returning from different operations in 2008 and 328 of them filled out the questionnaire (66%).

During the last decades, the main interest of the research on CMVs' well-being after homecoming has focused on PTSD. It is a strictly defined psychiatric diagnosis. Before 1994, its adequate criteria were milder than today. A person could be diagnosed with PTSD if he or she was predisposed to personal vulnerability or had witnessed human suffering and distress.

In 1994, the PTSD diagnostic criteria were amended such that in order to be diagnosed with PTSD, a person has to experience *an extreme psychological trauma* that evokes *a strong emotional response*. The reasons for introducing more stringent criteria were mostly economic. This was a way to decrease the amount of insurance compensations paid.

Theoretically, the modern PTSD criteria give support to the idea that all severe post-traumatic stress disorders are only due to traumatic experiences during the operation. In this way of thinking, long-term burdensome life circumstances or milder, but frequent and cumulative traumatic experiences would not play any remarkable etiological role in severe stress reactions.

Internationally, the incidence of PTSD among CMVs is 1-9%, depending on the nature of operations. Among Finnish CMVs, the incidence has been about 1%. In this study, there were only a few PTSD diagnoses; that said, it included several other kinds of stress reactions of comparable severity.

In this article, I will study the factors related to CMVs' stress reactions after a hard mission (Afghanistan) and a reasonably peaceful mission (Kosovo). My intention is to highlight how some cumulative factors, burdensome circumstances, or stress before and during the mission can be related to stress reactions after the crisis management mission. Likewise, I aim to show how some positive personality orientations, like sense of coherence (SoC), may help prevent severe stress reactions after traumatic experiences. SoC is a personality orientation that expresses a person's confidence that 1) the life situation is structured and predictable (comprehensibility), 2) the available resources are adequate to meet the demands of the situation (manageability), and 3) the demands of the situation are worthy of personal investment and engagement (meaningfulness).

CMVs in Kosovo experienced less operation-focused stressors and traumatic events. However, alcohol consumption was significantly higher in Kosovo than in Afghanistan. No differences were seen in symptoms like depression or PTSD. But there were notably great differences in potentially traumatic events. It seems that Afghanistan was a much more dangerous place to serve. Potentially traumatic events included meeting with indirect or direct fire, heightened alert at the base, witnessing wounded or dead people, being forced to cross minefields, facing hostile behavior from the local population, or witnessing violence toward other people. (Figure 1)




Figure 1. Potentially traumatic events. Case KFOR vs. ISAF. Experienced at least seldom compared to never (%). Only statistically significant differences are shown ($p < .05$, $n = 237$).

Mild and Severe Stress Reactions

We had different measures concerning the outcomes of the mental stressors. For example, measures of the depressive symptoms (DEPS = Short Depression Scale and BDI = Beck Depression Inventory), Traumatic Stress questionnaire (TSQ, military), and a list of stress reactions.

The peacekeepers did not have many mental symptoms, excluding stress reactions. The possibility of having only mild stress reactions or none at all is 70% in the whole data, and the possibility of having moderate or strong stress reactions is 30%. This split has been made technically because the distribution was skewed. *The cut point was not meant to be considered clinical in any sense whatsoever.*




Figure 2. The stress buffering effect of sense of coherence to stress reactions after the peacekeeping mission: logistic regression coefficients

The logistic regression analysis is here carried out to highlight the contribution of significant factors to the typical stress reactions after the operation. Figure 2 shows the cumulative risk level of developing moderate or severe stress disorders after the mission. The baseline is the estimate for all operations. ISAF and KFOR curves highlight the comparison of each measure to the baseline. Prior to the operation: CMVs' assessments of their burdensome life circumstances before the mission were somewhat different from each other. Those returning from Afghanistan reported slightly higher levels of prior stress than those from Kosovo. We can notice the same difference in every measure. We notice also how the personality factor Sense of Coherence provides support against stress reactions. The harder the mission, the better the support given by this personality factor. The risk of being grouped into the moderate or severe stress reaction group is 47% after Afghanistan and 14% after Kosovo.

This study gives support to two hypotheses: (1) Stress reactions may be a consequence of a cumulative process, where not only traumatic experiences, but also some personality factors (especially SoC) and emotionally burdensome circumstances in the past play an important role. (2) PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) diagnosis is not distinctive enough in order to identify the CMVs who need support due to their mental status. The same level of stress reactions may occur among those who have milder trauma experiences, but at the same time have a more severe burden history and/or do not have positive personality characteristics that protect them.

4 WHY IS COHESION IMPORTANT?

Reuven Gal

First, in the beginning of this article I want to make a personal note. I come from a country where wars and combat experiences eventually, and quite unfortunately, are a common event. So, my experience with regard to unit cohesion, morale and military leadership is based primarily on my personal experience in several wars in which I've participated as a combat commander. In addition, however, I have also participated as a military psychologist in many encounters with soldiers and commanders – immediately before battles, sometimes during the battle, and almost always after the battle.

This combination, of being a combat officer on one hand and the Chief Psychologist of the IDF on the other hand and, in addition, being a researcher in this field for many years – gave me a rich perspective for what I will try to explain here briefly. The Handbook of Military Psychology, of which I'm one of the authors (Gal & Mangelsdorff, 1991), is 700 pages long and many of them deal with cohesion; I'm going to deal with only some aspects of cohesion here for less than ten pages.

Why is cohesion important? Guy Siebold, in his article in this book, mentions 10 reasons why cohesion is important; however he did not mention 'combat' in his list. My list is much shorter; I'll give you only three reasons. However, they all focus on combat.

Cohesion, in my opinion, is important for three reasons:

1. It is a main source of **combat motivation**.
2. It enhances **combat effectiveness**.
3. It reduces (prevents?) **combat reactions**.

Admittedly, there are many more reasons why cohesion is important, and Siebold's list is much more comprehensive and descriptive. But if you want to really boil it down to what are the three most essential reasons, I would list those three. Unit cohesion among military troops is important, first, because it is the main source of combat motivation; it drives the combatants on the battlefield. Second, it is important because it enhances – and we can argue whether it indeed enhances or merely enables – combat effectiveness, or unit performance. And third, it has a tremendous impact on the prevalence of combat reactions, shell shock, combat shock, psychiatric casualties – whatever you call them. In short, if you look at these three reasons, they focus on the **human factor**. I emphasize this, because the popular narrative now-days in military schools is about technology, communication strategy, tactics, intelligence and so on. These are all important, but if you want to focus on the human aspect, there I would say cohesion and leadership are the most important aspects. That's why we have to talk about them together.

There are thousands of **books** written about this human factor, from Thucydides and Xenophon to Clausewitz and Knut Pipping. Interestingly enough, many of the good books about combat, cohesion and morale were written by non-combatants, people who have never been in the military, never set foot on a battlefield. One such example is the book by Stephen Crane, called *The Red Badge of Courage*. Stephen Crane was an American novelist

in the late 19th century and he wrote this book about the Civil War. He was not a soldier at the Civil War; In fact, he was born 6 years after the end of the war. But his description of this young recruit, called Henry Fleming, is exceptionally realistic. Of particular interest is the description when this young soldier had this very powerful battle exposure for the first time and he experienced the comradery, the friendship and bonding with his peers. Crane calls it 'brotherhood'. That experience suddenly made Henry Fleming overcome his initial fears and shame and become a hero on the battlefield.

The other example is John Keegan, in his book *The Face of Battle*. Keegan spent most of his adult life at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, near London. The book is a fantastic description of three major battles in European history – the battles of Agincourt, Waterloo and The Somme – with vivid details of how the soldiers behaved, how they spoke to each other, what dresses they put on and how they performed during the battle. Yet, John Keegan never served as a soldier, he never was on a battlefield, unless as a tourist perhaps... The face of military unit-cohesion, then, is a phenomenon that can be studied, certainly be understood, even without personally experiencing the horror of battle.

Cohesion as the Main Source of Combat Motivation

There is a question I am frequently asked – and this is, indeed, an elusive mystery – why would an infantry soldier, deep in his foxhole, when under heavy fire, shelling and a complete hell around him, why would he charge out of the foxhole and attack? Why would a tank commander order his tank driver to move forward from behind the hill to the front of the hill, exposing his tank to heavy enemy fire and risking his and his crew's lives? Why does a fighter pilot engage in a 'dog fight', putting his life on the line? Why do combatants do this? What is the source of combat motivation? I claim that there are three primary sources, unit cohesion being one of them; the other two are leadership and self-preservation.

Let me quote Ardant du Piquet, a French historian, who said, in 1880, something very interesting:

"Since the invention of fire arms, the musket, rifle, cannon – the distances of mutual aid and support are increased between the various arms. The more men think themselves isolated, the more need they have of high morale... We are brought by dispersion to the need of cohesion greater than ever before."

The more the man in battle thinks he is isolated, the more he needs high morale and strong cohesion. In the Greek phalanges and Roman legions the 'cohesion' was literally physical, they fought shoulder to shoulder. In the battle of Agincourt there were 20,000 troops on a battlefield that was less than one square mile. In modern warfare you will have a squad of ten men to cover the same area; but they will be quite dispersed... *"We are brought by dispersion to the need of cohesion – greater than ever before."*

I want to share with you some experiences from the IDF, the Israeli Defense Forces. In Israel, the Kibbutz is a model of life. The Kibbutzim members comprise only about 4% of the total population, but they are a very powerful model for Israeli society in general. The Kibbutz life is very collective, it is a commune life, everyone is responsible for the others, and there is

a collective responsibility. Eventually it became kind of a norm in Israeli culture and society, this **mutual responsibility**.

The manning system in the IDF is a good example of this norm. Conscripts are called up in groups, and then they are trained together as a group. Together with some others from this same group they enter leadership training and continue to serve in the same Brigade for the rest of their regular service. Some of them will continue to serve together for many years as reservists. This is the Israeli manning system; we move troops as groups, we create life-time cohesion and strong mutual responsibility. That has a very powerful impact on combat motivation and performance.

Building cohesion is also predominant in training practices. Everything is done within the unit framework. Even the kitchen choirs or going out on a leave – you always go as a group, you don't have individual leaves. Field exercises always end up with a march back to the base, ten or twenty kilometers, carrying the 'wounded' guys on the shoulders, or on the stretchers. This is done again and again. It is done so in order to internalize the sense of what the group really is. You are carrying your wounded buddies and never leave them behind.

All our research findings show, that combat readiness and combat effectiveness is highly correlated with lateral bonding, with trust in peers and leaders and with a strong sense of mutual responsibility. This is the cohesion factor.

There are **two aspects** to the cohesion factor. One is exquisitely described by S.L.A. Marshall:

"When fire sweeps the field, be it in Sinai, Pork Chop Hill, or the Normandy coast, nothing keeps a man from running except a sense of honor, of bound obligation to people right around him, of fear of failure in their sight which might eternally disgrace him."

This is the **shame**, or **pride**, aspect of cohesion. When your friends around are risking their lives – you cannot stay behind.

The other aspect of cohesion is **trust**. Trust, in a cohesive unit, means to be ready to sacrifice your life for your comrades in the squad or platoon and to know for sure that they will do the same thing for you. So, you are out there on the battlefield and you risk your life charging the enemy against deadly fire – and you know that your friends in the unit will risk their lives to rescue you and bring you back. Trusting your friends is becoming a tremendous source of combat motivation.

Cohesion is also a combination of leaders and comrades. I take another quote from Field Marshal Montgomery: *"...Because in the crisis of battle, the majority of men will not derive encouragement from the glories of the past, but will seek aid from their leaders and comrades of the present."* I don't wish you, my reader, to be involved in any future war; but I assure you, if you will be in combat, you will not think about *The Unknown Soldier*, or about Knut Pipping. You'll be thinking about your friends next to you and about your leader. Because this is what will lead you forward – not history, not patriotism and not the love for your country. I'm not saying these are not important issues. They are. They are especially important as a source of motivation to join the military, to become an officer, or and to be a good soldier. But when you are under fire, it's your friends and your leaders that will make you fight and continue fighting.

Cohesion as the Main Source of Combat Effectiveness

Second reason why cohesion is important is because it enhances combat effectiveness. Cohesion can best be observed during stressful times. Jim Griffith writes that cohesion is a performance enabler, not a performance enhancer, and I'm going to argue a little about that. Griffith quoted Marlowe (1979): *"While cohesion and morale do not correlate (directly) with technical performance ... they do correlate with military performance by maintaining the organized group at its tasks in the face of severe stresses of battle."*

Does cohesion, then, only contribute to '*maintaining the organized group*' under stressful conditions, or does it also enhance soldiers' performance even when their unit is almost disintegrating?

Let me bring again an example from the Israeli history. In the Yom Kippur War (1973), during the fierce armor battles on the Golan Heights, there was a moment when the Israeli battalion, battalion number 77, lost half of its tanks, and the Syrians had three times more tanks. The battalion commander, LCol Avigdor Kahalani, realized that his unit is on the verge of panic and disintegration. At that moment, Kahalani took the mike of his radio and opened the radio-net for all soldiers. "Listen, we are the best battalion in our Brigade and in our Division. You are the best tankers in the IDF. We are not going to give those f---d Syrians to kick us out. I want all of you to stick together and follow my tank". A moment later he started to move forward, and the other 12 tanks moved on in to the front line and started to fire like crazy – and after two hours the battle was over. This half-size battalion had swept over more than a brigade size of Syrian tanks. Kahalani was later awarded the highest award of heroism. In this act he demonstrated the importance of cohesion and leadership under extremely stressful conditions.

I want to give you two more examples to show that cohesion not only enables, it also enhances combat effectiveness. In 1982, when I was still the Chief Psychologist of the IDF, I assigned one of my young Lieutenants, Aaron Tziner, to run an experiment at the Armor School. At the end of the Armor basic training, after they had completed their MOS training (as gunners, drivers, loaders and tank commanders), the young trainees are teamed, randomly, into four-men tank-crews. So, I asked Lt. Tziner to conduct, instead, a sociometric experiment. Every soldier had to write down with whom he felt closest, most comfortable, to serve with in the same tank. Then I asked him to compose the tank crews according to the sociometric choices. The results in performance-level were very clear when compared to a 'control' unit, where the crews were assembled randomly. This example just demonstrates that troops who know and trust each other, like each other, feel cohesive of each other – will eventually perform better as a team. Tziner's experiment is documented in professional journals (Tziner et.al., 1985).

The second example deals with replacement policy. There are two practices applied in the IDF: No replacements by new troops during combat period; and injured soldiers return to their original units. Both practices are used in order to maintain the original manning of the unit, especially in time of war.

Cohesion – Reduces (Prevents?) Combat Reactions

A third clear reason why cohesion is important is because it reduces – perhaps even prevents – prevalence of combat reactions. This is almost a miracle. I quote from two Israeli military psychiatrists, Steiner and Neumann (1976): “*The main predictor of Combat Reactions among Israeli combatants – [is] whether or not they fight with their original team.*” This is something I need to explain. The routine policy in the IDF is to keep permanent manning of the combat units. The same guys fight in the same units, same tanks, throughout their entire military service, including the reserve-service years. However, during the Yom Kippur (1973) War – because of the surprise attack on Israel – soldiers were sent to the front line not always within their original units. As a result there were many cases where combatants found themselves in a tank with guys who were not members of their original teams. After the war, we conducted a study on combat reactions, comparing incidents of CR’s in different units.

Table 1. Unit-Factors Related to Combat Reactions. Yom-Kippur (1973) War.

F A C T O R S	COMBAT-REACTION GROUP (N= 74)	CONTROL GROUP (N=100)
1. Perceived unit morale during combat as low.	72%	0%
2. Experienced ‘Loneliness’.	76%	29%
3. Felt no trust toward immediate command.	42%	5 %
4. Served during this war within units other than their original unit.	43%	12%
5. Changed teams during combat.	63%	15%

We have this Combat-Reaction Group, 74 guys, who developed severe combat reactions after the war. The Control Group soldiers served in the same frontier, were exposed to the same severity of battlefield – but did not show any combat reactions. Look at items 4 and 5: In the Combat-Reaction Group there are merely four times more (!) guys who served during the war within units other than their original ones.

If you look at these numbers, it shows very clearly that bonding and cohesion is probably the single best preventive measure against combat reactions. It is so powerful that it’s almost hard to believe, that what makes the difference between surviving mentally the war or not is whether you are in a tank with your close friends or with non-familiar guys, competent as they may be.

Changes in the Warfare through History

Modern warfare is significantly different from the former wars – be it the Napoleonic wars, the great World Wars, or the Israeli-Arab wars.

The transformations in the warfare are, in my mind, in three dimensions:

- Nature of **Wars**
- Nature of **Battlefields**
- Nature of **Youth**

First, transformations in the nature of wars: Instead of wars between blocks, nations, powers – we have nowadays wars between ethnic groups, insurgency groups, and *intifadas*. Instead of all-out wars there are Low-Intensity Conflicts (LIC) and war against terrorism. Instead of national armies defending their own states – we have multinational peacekeeping forces (UN, NATO).

Second, there is a transformation in the nature of the battlefield. There are electronic, digital, virtual, technological ways of fighting – instead of just shooting at each other. There are no more phalanges, regiments, cavalries but the growing importance of the system-operators and soldier-technicians; of field-scouts over Field Marshals...

But the most important change is the change in the nature of modern youth. Surprisingly, there has not been enough reflection on this aspect. The youth of our times are more sophisticated, more skeptical, more democratic and more 'global'. Perhaps nothing can be more proving of the transformations in the nature of modern youth than what happened in the last few months in the Arab countries, especially in Egypt and Lybia. Israel, too, has undergone lately very intensive demonstrations (more on social and economic issues) – led by young citizens. Young people, in short, are not anymore just recruited or conscripted; rather, they are the ones to initiate transformations, create movements and lead revolutions.

In light of all these changes, one might ask whether those three reasons – for why cohesion is important – are still valid. Let's examine them one by one:

- **Combat motivation** – many of the modern operations are not combat; and unit cohesion is not of much relevant in front of the radar screen, the HQ monitor, or the UAV control system...
- **Combat effectiveness** – again, many situations are not really combat in modern warfare. Unit cohesion will not help Peacekeeping soldiers solve moral dilemmas in front of women and children in a refugee camp...
- And **combat reactions** – they are not as widespread in the modern warfare's "fox-holes" as they were in the Maginot Line...

We need to think about something else, another source of **fighting motivation**, that will be with the soldier-technician, or the Peacekeeping soldier; will be there also when not under enemy's fire; will be there even when the individual soldier is not protected by the bonding of his squad, platoon or company comrades; and will be with him also when there is no commander there leading from the front...

The Need of Commitment

I would like to claim, that what we need in modern warfare, in addition to unit cohesion, is the individual's **sense of commitment**. Of the many ways to define commitment, I chose this one: "*The relative strength of an individual's identification with and involvement in a particular organization*" (Steers, Mowday & Porter, 1981). The commitment I'm talking about here is the commitment to the military, **to the military profession**. To be a soldier in a modern military, you need something to identify with, to believe in, to internalize, and to be ready to sacrifice for.

Do not get me wrong: I am not saying that unit cohesion, strong bonding and trust in leadership have no importance any more. What I am saying is that in the new era we are in – with different kind of military engagements and a whole new generation of global, Web-based youth – those driving factors are not enough. Our young troops need yet another ingredient – that of internal commitment. It will give them not only motivation; it will also provide the legitimacy for their ways of action as soldiers (Wyatt & Gal, 1990).

This is one of the main tasks of military leadership nowadays: To use transformational leadership in order to create identification with your missions and goals rather than mere discipline; to instill conviction instead of fear. As I have once demonstrated (Gal, 1985) commitment can be more powerful than obedience. People will go a long way, including risking their lives, because they are committed to their role, while they may or may not be obedient.

Commitment-Oriented Leadership – is a concept gradually evolving in our literature. In 1987 I published a paper entitled *Military Leadership for the 1990's: Commitment-Derived Leadership* (Gal, 1987). This was long before September 11th, Google, Facebook, or the end of Presidents Mubarak of Egypt, or Kaddafi in Libya... But if this was true for the 1990's – it's certainly true for the 2020's and ahead...

Commitment-Oriented Leadership consists of following features:

- Influence – not formal authority
- Identification – not compliance
- Trust – not fear
- Inspiration – not replication
- Commitment – not obedience.

A more recent study that I've conducted with my colleagues on Israeli junior commanders, added two more ingredients connected with the motivation to lead – ideology and patriotism (Amit, Lisak, Popper and Gal, 2007).

I shall end my article with this summary assertion: It is the sense of role-commitment, the strength of internalized values and the commitment to the society and the military organization – that will predominantly affect young soldiers in the future wars.

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5 THE SCIENCE OF MILITARY COHESION

Guy L. Siebold¹

In 1897 the post-impressionist artist Paul Gauguin completed a painting by inserting in the upper left hand corner the questions: “Where do we come from? What are we? Where are we going?”² Although the questions come from art, they are useful to organize this effort concerning the science of military group cohesion. In this current effort, in different order and wording than that of Gauguin, is presented first the question: Who are we? Pertinent to that question are the ways different disciplines view cohesion, methodological limitations, and the construct of cohesion. The next question presented is: Where have we been? That question is addressed in general in one section and with respect to leadership in another section. The general first section deals with the typical methodology used in military group cohesion research, constraints limiting the research, and research dead ends. The second section presents a number of important findings concerning military group leadership. The final question presented is: Where are we going? Under this question are noted some issues and topics for future research. One issue is the need to migrate some of the science of cohesion into the technology of military group cohesion with attendant products and usable information for leaders. Another issue is organizing research so that more can be shared with a wider military community and other types of organizations in such fields as medical care, sports, business management, and academia. Also noted is the opportunity to weaponize cohesion research in the form of social demolition. Finally, this effort concludes with a discussion of the potential changes in the bases of cohesion to the extent a military force transitions from a mostly modern to an increasingly post-modern military.³

Who are We?

Disciplinary Differences. Most intellectual disciplines in a portion of their theory concern themselves with the relation between some whole and the parts which compose it (Siebold, 2011a). In the social sciences, this is typically the relationships among the members of a group and the group as a whole. As the social sciences differ in their level of analysis, they differ in their cohesion focus. A psychologist may focus on an individual’s capacity for commitment or to trust others, for example, while a psychological social psychologist might focus on the extent to which an individual can identify with the group as a whole and its repercussions. A clinical psychologist may concentrate on how much group cohesion can reduce stress. Meanwhile, a sociological social psychologist is likely to hone in on the social

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² The Paul Gauguin (1848-1903) painting was created in Tahiti and now hangs in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, MA, U.S.A. The questions, taking one line each, were in French with the first letters of each word capitalized and no question marks.

³ A great amount of detail, information, and relevant references have, of necessity, been left out to keep the length of this text within reason, to insure it is centered on its purpose, and to avoid the repetition of matters of substance previously presented by the author in generally accessible military research literature. For those interested in a more thorough literature review, the following are recommended: Oliver et al., 1999; Salo, 2011; Siebold, 1999, 2006, 2011. For those interested in more about measures, the following are recommended: Salo, 2011; Siebold, 1996, 1999; Siebold & Kelly, 1988a, 1988b; Siebold & Lindsay, 1999.

relationships among group members and with the group as a whole. On the other hand an anthropologist may mostly concern himself with the cultural characteristics and system of symbols within the group. Finally, a sociologist might look at the structure of action within the group and the group as a whole and possibly the reduction in the capacity of the group to act when some structures break down such as in the case of battle casualties in the leadership structure of a military group (Siebold, 2006).

Cohesion Defined. Given that the author was trained as a sociological social psychologist, that perspective is reflected in this current discourse. The particular emphasis is on cohesion as a group property based on the social relationships among the members and with the group as a whole. The foundation is the social relationship as seen in the underlying values, norms, and mutual obligations developed in that relationship. In this context, the bonding developed in these social relationships over time includes both instrumental (action) and affective (emotional) aspects. Central to the instrumental aspect is bonding based on the group’s capacity for action (strong to weak). Central to the affective aspect is bonding based on the trust and caring among group members. Of importance is the need to distinguish properties of cohesiveness such as ordered behavior, cooperation, and the creation of social capital, which can vary, from the bases creating cohesiveness such as member expectations and the ongoing social relationships. The pertinent relationships include those among the members of the group (horizontal bonding), between the subordinates and their leaders (vertical bonding), between the members of the group and the next higher command level (organizational bonding), and between the members of the group and the larger institution of which it is a small part (institutional bonding) such as an army or navy (Siebold, 2007; Siebold & Kelly, 1988b); see Table 1. Some researchers have posited that there is a relationship between the group members and their wider society, yet this author and others have found bonding with the wider society to be a negligible influence on military group cohesion (e.g., in a mercenary unit).

Table 1. Standard Military Group Cohesion Components

<i>Bonding Level</i>	<i>Affective</i>	<i>Instrumental</i>
<i>Horizontal Bonding</i>	Member Peer Bonding Leader Team Peer Bonding	Teamwork Capacity Leader Teamwork Capacity
<i>Vertical Bonding</i>	Leader Caring	Leader Competence Learning Climate
<i>Organizational and Institutional Bonding</i>	Military Values Unit Pride	Individual Goals Met Rule Clarity Individual Needs Met

On a general level, group cohesiveness is defined as the extent to which the members come together to form the group and hold together under stress to maintain the group (Siebold, 2011a). More specifically, group cohesiveness may be defined as the degree to which mechanisms of social control operant in a unit maintain a structured pattern of social relationships between unit members, individually and collectively necessary to achieve its purpose (Siebold, 1999). Those forces of social control include law, regulation, rules,

identities, norms, habits, socialization factors, and the requirements of action or group goals (see Pipping, 2008). This latter definition of course portrays cohesion in terms of group social structure rather than in terms of individual feelings or cognitions but, importantly implies that a group member will perceive many mechanisms of social control as external to him. Further, the structural definition implies that group cohesion must be built (i.e., the structure is created) and sustained (i.e., the structure must be continually maintained). Without that structure of positive relationships, the bonds are gone and cohesion dissipates. As an analogy, you may take the case of a silver coin. If you saw the coin into pieces and the pieces into small pieces, you will end up with a pile of silver pieces and dust. All the original molecules of the silver coin are still there, but they have lost the bonding structure that formed the coin. Similarly if you eliminated the relationship bonds that hold a group together, what would remain would be a collection of people who were neither necessarily trusting nor caring nor capable of cooperative and coordinated group activities. The military group and its actions have claims on the member regardless of his attraction to the group and are therefore seen as powerful. In exchange the group is a source of power for the member (Siebold, 1999). Note that this conceptualization of cohesion does not need to or distinguish social cohesion from task cohesion (cf. Salo, 2011). In contrast, this conceptualization separates the cohesion of the group (including the trust between the members and their capacity for coordinated action) from the action or tasks of the group itself. The success or failure of the group action or tasks in turn feeds back into the group cohesiveness.

The micro analog to this definition of group cohesiveness is what Erving Goffman depicted as a fundamental social structure, the *with*. A group of friends walking down the street together are *with* each other. Four friends sitting around a table eating at a restaurant are *with* each other. Although these are brief temporal events, the fact that the people are with each other implies cultural norms and values that structure the behavior of the participants in each event and set standards for that behavior. For example, one cannot leave the table at the restaurant without offering an obligatory explanation (e.g., to go to the restroom or to speak to the waiter). Likewise, military group members are involved in a continual series of events, activities, or situations (however loosely defined) with their associated norms, values, and rules. The actions taken by the members in these events and activities in (or not in) accordance with the norms and rules establish and change the social relationships among the members over time. Thus action and group cohesiveness are linked in the real world in real time. Compatible partial approaches to analyzing behavior relevant to social relationships (and, hence, cohesion) include exchange theory (a version of conflict theory concerning micro-motivation and perhaps related to Freud's *Id*), social constructionist theory (perhaps related to Freud's concept of the rational *Ego*), and structural functionalist theory (perhaps related to Freud's *Superego*). Changes over time may be interpreted in terms of such general processes as the principle of least effort and the limits of social complexity. Nevertheless, the group level definition of cohesiveness based on the social control of social relationships is not isolated from other social science theories but fits in with a coherent whole, even if currently that whole is not fully fleshed out or has inconsistencies.

Along with the definition of group cohesiveness, it is useful to highlight the particular features of a military small group that differentiate it from other groups often used in laboratory settings or non-military field research. Military groups are real world groups that for the most part exist continuously over time. The members interact in multiple situations and

contexts, including unilateral, bilateral, and multi-lateral exchanges that can be concurrent or take place over an extended time. The groups exist within a larger organizational hierarchy with real leaders, who may clarify and enforce group norms. While the members may compete with one another (i.e., win or lose) in some contexts such as promotions, assignments, rewards, status, or risk, the members predominantly share common values, motivation, goals, and lifestyles. Thus military group members are quite different than most participants in experimental laboratory research. Further, by their nature military activities can involve highly dangerous equipment and weapons and life threatening situations for the members, which require and justify powerful rules and norms surrounding relevant behaviors. Therefore military groups can be distinguished from most groups studied in non-military settings such as medical teams and business management groups. Further, since military groups do exist in a hierarchical organization, there are additional layers of social relationships that the members develop with group leaders, the next level up in the hierarchy, and with the military institution itself (Siebold, 2007).

Nonetheless, some experimental laboratory research has been useful to the degree it teases out separate variable effects and complements the definition of cohesion described in this section. In general, the laboratory research has found that through repeated successful interaction, group members develop mutual trust, regard, and feelings of attachment toward one another and the relationship itself; the repeated exchanges become a relationship, meaning a social object distinct from the members themselves and specific interactions. Cohesion is seen as a multidimensional construct, consisting of interpersonal (member to member) and relational (member to relationship) bonds (Kuwabara, 2011).

Who We Are. Most researchers in the area of military group cohesion are social psychologists, either psychological or sociological, with a few cultural anthropologists as well (e.g., Kirke, 2009). Their main methodologies are interviews, observation, and the administration of questionnaires. Few are active laboratory experimentalists. Some are clinical psychologists. Most have some connection to the military. Because of personnel turbulence and limited budgets, there are few opportunities for extended participant observation (cf. Pipping, 2008). The researchers are located all over the world, although mostly in developed countries. Some researchers concern themselves with medical problems such as reducing stress and disciplinary problems while many approach improving cohesion as a means to improve training and unit performance. What this all means is that an international, dispersed array of social scientists has tackled issues concerning military group cohesion for some time. Generally their methods are similar and their findings are compatible. However, in part for reasons identified in the next section, the research on military group cohesion is not deep, not precise, and not far along.

Where Have We Been? – General

Existing Summaries. There have been a number of summary descriptions of important research projects dealing with cohesion (e.g., Marlowe, 1985; Siebold, 1996; Vaitkus, 1994) and reviews of research progress (e.g., Oliver, Harman, Hoover, Hayes, & Pandhi, 1999; Salo, 2011; Siebold, 1999, 2011a). There is no need to repeat them here. However, it may be useful to examine the typical methodology used in order to get a sense of “where we have

been.” While each research project is different in detail and some are only quick, partial efforts, the longer more thorough research has followed certain general methodological steps as presented in Table 2.

Table 2. General Methodological Steps for Research on Military Cohesion

-
1. Clarify research purpose, focus, and resources
 2. Review literature for definitions, methodology, findings, and issues
 3. Interview military personnel with observations in the field
 - get soldier perspective
 - clarify wording and concepts
 - pilot test measures
 4. Report initial findings in conference papers, briefings, and progress reports to get feedback
 5. Design and conduct large scale data collection
 - use questionnaires and more interviews
 - measure cohesion variables, predictors, co-variants, and criteria
 6. Carryout basic data analyses of validity, reliability, correlations, and descriptive statistics
 7. Report basic findings in briefings, conference papers, reports, and articles
 8. Carryout advanced data analyses, including modeling and specialized statistics
 9. Report out advanced analyses
 - present major and minor findings
 - compare to prior findings in the literature
 - point out issues to be clarified and further research needed
 10. Conduct further research for longitudinal data and address identified issues
-

The point of the table is to show that, where possible, most cohesion research has followed the design and procedures to be expected from well trained knowledgeable social scientists. This is a positive reflection on their graduate training and research organizations. The quality of their analyses and publications further indicate the professionalism of most cohesion researchers. Due to their collective efforts, cohesion research has progressed from description to prediction and to a greater understanding of the subject matter. A review of the literature would show in particular that early descriptive and qualitative research developed into sophisticated quantitative investigations with emphases on assessing appropriate criteria, identifying the important predictors, establishing the effect of co-variants and similar constructs (e.g., morale and motivation), creating feasible causal relationships (e.g., charts with variables in boxes connected by arrows), and reaching the stage of a relatively standard model (Salo, 2011; Siebold, 2007, 2011a). Nonetheless, progress has been halting and erratic due to the six tyrannies.

Six Tyrannies. The word *tyranny* is used here because the issue represents a major constraint on research and is not under the control of the scientist. The first tyranny is N. If one considers cohesiveness to be a group level variable, then one needs a sufficiently large number of groups to collect and analyze data from (cf. Harinen & Hult-Miekkavaara, 2011). It is relatively

easy to conduct research on individual service members given that most militaries have a large number of members and can make them available in a one to one setting or *en mass* in a gym, cafeteria, or theater. Getting designated groups together is much more problematic because of the large number needed for advanced analyses (e.g., 50 similar infantry platoons), missing members of a group at any given time, and the logistics of collecting data from them within a minimal time span. Therefore, careful and extensive project design efforts and approvals are needed in order to carry out quality cohesion research at the group level.

The second tyranny is time. To be effective, much cohesion research needs to be carried out under a longitudinal design. Cross-sectional research cannot adequately get at the changes in cohesion and associated factors that develop over the life cycle of a unit. The difficulty in designing and conducting longitudinal research is probably the biggest factor in inhibiting progress in research on military group cohesion.

The third tyranny is personnel turbulence. In order to determine changes in a group over time, the group has to remain relatively similar in composition from one time period to the next. Of particular concern is the reassignment out of the group of unit members who are not adjusting to the military or have intra-group squabbles and group leaders who are moving up in rank or position. Additional problems can be caused by turnover in higher level leaders supporting the research and, indeed, turnover in the research staff conducting the project. Substantial constraints on a cohesion research project may occur unless it is to some extent institutionalized as an ongoing, organizationally supported effort.

Table 3. The Six Tyrants of Military Cohesion Research

1.	The N needed for groups
2.	Need for longitudinal designs
3.	Personnel turbulence
4.	Lack of standardized measures and procedures
5.	Technological obsolescence of old data reading devices
6.	Lack of a theory of the respondent to assess data collection context

A fourth tyranny is the lack of standardized measures of cohesion and procedures for carrying out the measurement (cf. Marlowe, 1985; Salo 2011; Siebold & Lindsay, 1999). The difficulties in obtaining sufficient N and carrying out longitudinal research designs are made worse because the lack of standardization limits the ability to accumulate data and findings across research projects or to use data from other projects to fill in gaps in a particular project. Further, it makes meta-analysis somewhat suspect. This lack of standardization is common across the social sciences but nonetheless is another factor hampering progress in cohesion research. Numerous projects with different scientists using different measures and different techniques result in the cliché of “reinventing the wheel.” This lack of standardization limits cooperation in similar research projects and the ability to share and compare data in such areas as sports, business management, and medical delivery (e.g., Powell, 2011).

A fifth tyranny, perhaps peculiar to this time in history, is the obsolescence of data collection and analysis technology. This author, for example, had data using relatively comparable measures and methods over a twenty-five year span. Some data on organizational main frame computers have long since been erased. Other data on floppy disks and 3 ½” diskettes,

if readable, survive, but there no longer are machines readily available that can read them. In short, the rapid change in research technology further limits the capability for the accumulation and re-examination of research data.

A sixth tyranny is a problem for much of military social science research. That is the lack of an appropriate theory of the responding service member (Siebold, 1993a). Social scientists request that service member subjects respond to interview questions and questionnaires. Yet the researchers have few techniques to determine how much the respondent is telling the truth, how much he is withholding, or what the respondent's definition of the situation may be. For example, this author once questioned two soldiers responding to a questionnaire who appeared to be conferring with one another. It seems one soldier could not read English, and the other soldier was translating the questions and answers for him. In another case, this author was with a team collecting data over a three week period in Europe. In the middle of the data collection period a major international combat event took place. Responses in the second half of the data collection period showed a marked increase in the quality level at which soldiers assessed their leaders. Although it is relatively easy in data analysis to control for demographic variables such as rank, sex, and racial-ethnic group, it is hard to explain why a given respondent changes his ratings over a longitudinal study or may change his research identification number. It is time for at least a basic theory of the research subjects to help establish the validity of their responses.

Dead Ends. Experience is a hard task master. Cohesion researchers have learned a few things, especially things not to do. One example concerns the use of certain methodologies such as sociometry (i.e., social choice among the members of a group on various dimensions such as whom one would prefer to lead the group, select as a combat buddy, or go on leave with). While some of the results of the research can be interesting, the intensive time, energy, and resources to collect and analyze the (what amounts to ambiguous) data for multiple groups far outweigh the benefits (Harinen & Hult-Miekkavaara, 2011; Salo, 2011). Another example of what not to do is to ask soldiers about themselves without the researcher providing a context. This author did this and found that soldiers did not say anything about their military life or situation because they thought that that was a given and that the researchers wanted to hear about the soldiers' non-military life and goals.

An additional dead end is to look for cohesion effects in situations where there is little occasion for cohesion to be influential. Specifically in intensive individual training situations (such as foreign language learning), group cohesiveness appears unrelated to the outcome (such as of language learning). Similarly in machine and equipment dominated environments (e.g., advanced battle tanks) where the equipment sets the pace of drills, activity, and performance, the cohesiveness of the crews and teams has a reduced relation to outcomes. Further, while there may be *esprit de corps* differences in large military formations such as regiments and divisions, by definition small group cohesion is an inapplicable construct at such large-sized echelons in which the variations in the human elements average out across the small groups. Finally, the tracking of the cohesiveness of small units with the quality of their leaders over time has frequently proven futile. If graphed, with "time the leader spends with his group" on the x axis and "cohesiveness of the group" on the y axis, the shape of the curve is a semi-circle. Initially (in a sample of group leaders) as the time a leader spends with his unit increases, cohesiveness increases; then the cohesiveness flattens out; and eventually as the

time the leader spends with his unit lengthens further, cohesiveness begins to decrease to lower levels. While this result may seem unexpected, what is happening methodologically is that the better leaders increasingly get pulled out of their units (and the research sample) to fill higher level positions or get promoted out, thus leaving lower average quality leaders behind who are less able to sustain high levels of cohesion. The loss of quality leaders from the subject pool thus presents a false graphical picture and distorts patterns in the data, which also creates another methodological dead end.

Where Have We Been? – Leadership

Leadership. Leaders have a huge influence on unit cohesion, which in turn is important to the success of their leadership as measured by numerous criteria. Thus, leaders need to be concerned about unit cohesiveness (Table 4). In essence, the “business” model of leaders is to produce trained, motivated, cohesive military units that can carry out their designated missions under their leadership.

Table 4. Why Leaders Should Be Concerned with Unit Cohesiveness

Strong Cohesion:

1. Increases unit combat performance
 2. Improves training effectiveness
 3. Increases stress resistance among unit members
 4. Reduces time wasted on disciplinary problems
 5. Increases member retention
 6. Helps communication
 7. Reduces casualties
 8. Improves overall unit efficiency
 9. Aids member motivation and morale
 10. Makes leaders more effective and leadership more enjoyable
-

The findings of cohesion research provide details of the leadership and unit cohesion relation. If one graphs out the relation between unit cohesion (on the x axis) and unit performance (on the y axis), one finds a strong correlation with higher cohesion resulting in higher unit performance (Siebold, 1999, 2006; Siebold & Lindsay, 1999). A typical correlation is $r = .4$ (Oliver et al., 1999). What is especially noteworthy is the typical slope of the (least squares, best fit) line demarcating the unit cohesion and unit performance relation. That slope indicates that increases in cohesion (not difficult to obtain) result in a noticeable increase in objectively measured unit performance. The latter is typically difficult to generate, particularly without substantial increases in training time and resources.

Data indicate that the impact of good leaders on the relation is significant. Under good leadership (i.e., above average rated leaders in terms of leader team cohesion or command learning climate, see Table 5), the correlation between cohesion and performance increases to around $r = .6$, and the slope is steeper, comparable to that of the steep slope in the relation between increases in motivation with increases in unit performance under good leadership (Siebold, 1994, 1999). On the other hand, under mediocre leaders (below average rated

leaders), the correlation between cohesion and unit performance is an insignificant $r = .1$. Since leadership is activated by a chain of leaders (e.g., squad leader, platoon sergeant, platoon leader, company commander), the quality of the whole chain is important. If one leader in a chain is weak as perceived by the group members, cohesion decreases significantly. If two leaders in a chain are weak, cohesion decreases even more. If three or four leaders in the chain are weak, cohesion becomes very weak (Alderks, 1994). The most influential positions in the leader chain on cohesion are those of the platoon sergeant and platoon leader (or equivalent positions).

Table 5. Leadership Questionnaire Measures

Leader Team Cohesion Scale:

1. Leaders in this platoon really care about each other.
2. Leaders in this platoon work well together as a team.
3. Leaders in this platoon pull together to get the job done.

Learning Climate Scale:

1. Soldiers are assigned to the work they have been trained to do.
 2. Soldiers are given a lot of responsibility for their work.
 3. Soldiers are encouraged to do things on their own even if they sometimes make mistakes.
 4. Soldiers get feedback on how they are doing.
 5. The emphasis in this company is on getting things right and not just on looking good.
 6. Soldiers can admit their mistakes and are helped to learn from them.
 7. The leaders have confidence in the soldiers doing their jobs right.
 8. When assigned new duties, soldiers are provided with guidance and direction.
-

Note. Leader Cohesion Scale $\alpha = .89$; item-total r range = .73-.85. Learning Climate Scale $\alpha = .87$; item-total r range = .47-.68; (Siebold & Lindsay, 1999).

Leadership in Deployment. As noted, the investigation of cohesion and leadership requires a longitudinal research design where possible in order to determine how the variables and their relations change over time. Fortunately several projects were able to use longitudinal designs (e.g., Marlowe, 1985; Siebold, 1989a, 1996) and that involved unit deployments. The research results were instructive. Siebold (1996) examined three overlapping hypotheses with respect to squad member cohesion. The first hypothesis was that squad member cohesion over the deployment would be a function of demographic similarity (Durkheim's mechanical solidarity) in age, race, ethnic group, geographical origin, marital status, educational level, and so forth due to ease of communication and trust. Over the course of a deployment, this hypothesis was rejected in that demographic characteristics were generally unrelated to squad member cohesion (as also found in Siebold & Lindsay, 1999). The second hypothesis was that squad member cohesion would be a function of rational choice and normative forces where there were clear and coherent rules, a positive climate, and an accepted group mission (Durkheim's organic solidarity). Group members would choose to work together, trust one another, and develop and support norms of behavior that would accomplish group goals. There was some support for this second hypothesis, especially at the pre-deployment stage

in which scales measuring rule clarity, unit pride, learning climate, and mission motivation were all correlated at $r = .5$ or higher with pre-deployment squad member cohesion.

The third hypothesis was that squad member cohesion would be a function of strong leadership that inspired group members to bond to each other and go beyond themselves in achieving elevated group goals (Weber's charismatic-leader-based solidarity). There was only limited support for this hypothesis during pre-deployment. However, deep into the deployment leadership variables, especially perceptions of leader effectiveness and leadership team cohesion, became much more strongly correlated ($r = .63$ and $.68$ respectively) with squad member cohesion (Siebold, 1996). This pattern is not inconsistent with the forming-storming-norming-performing view of group development (Tuckman, 1965) in which groups form in a positive aura of high expectations, then storm as the members conflict over roles and norms, then go through a stage of clarifying and accepting roles and norms, and finally get down to performing. During the forming stage of pre-deployment, rule clarity was important, but as the units were far along in their deployment in the performing stage, leadership team cohesion and leader effectiveness were key to sustaining group performance and overcoming (von Clausewitz's) friction.

Leadership team cohesion was also an interesting variable. During the pre-deployment stage, its strongest correlate was mission motivation ($r = .81$). However, during the late stage of the deployment, the strongest correlate with leadership team cohesion was leader effectiveness ($r = .90$), while the correlation between leadership team cohesion with mission motivation was at a lower level ($r = .62$). The drop in perceptions of leader effectiveness during the deployment was associated with the decrease in leadership team cohesion ($r = .71$). Generally the level of late deployment leadership team cohesion appears to be a function of the reduced level of job and mission motivation and unit pride and, in cases, micro-management by higher leaders.

Management of the Commons. It is relatively easy to describe leadership in the abstract as something like providing purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinates. However discussions of leadership often turn to listings of required leader competencies. Lists of such competencies abound and are often associated with organizational level such that lower level leadership is described as direct, mid-level leadership is described as indirect, and upper level leadership is described as strategic. Sometimes leadership is described as an attitude or a function or a role. Likewise leadership has been categorized as task, socio-emotional, contingent, transactional, and transformational. All this morass of labels seems more confusing than helpful.

For clarity here, the term leader will be used to include officers, non-commissioned officers, and warrant officers. A leader in his or her job has tasks associated with that position requiring specialized knowledge, skills, and capabilities. Also, a leader must exhibit a certain level of character befitting his or her status of being a leader as well as general knowledge about how the military organization operates. But a leader also has a nebulous function to perform—leadership, carried out by leaders individually or collectively, which must be grown in part through observing role models, being mentored, and gaining experienced-based understanding.

This nebulous function of leadership may be referred to as management of the commons (Siebold, 1993b). Management here means the building, monitoring, shaping, and maintaining the commons, but it is peculiar in that a leader is an influential participant but not in control. Part of that management involves forging cohesive, productive teams, which is a primary objective of leadership. The commons is what has been described as public goods or property of the collective. Non-military examples of public goods include common village fields for grazing cattle, a bridge over a river, and vaccinations against disease. Obviously, there are physical commons in a military unit such as equipment, weapons, buildings, and land owned by the government. In addition, there may be physical property owned in common by a specific unit. There are also intangible commons, the important cultural infrastructure. The cultural infrastructure includes such things as the meaning of the unit mission, goals, and history, the definition of the situation, command climate, image, cohesion, values, standards, norms, nicknames, interaction styles, priorities, incentive systems, and other factors of greater or lesser detail and impact. The cultural infrastructure determines how the unit sees itself and how it operates. A primary function of leadership is the management of this cultural commons to provide a meaningful sense of purpose, clear direction, and full motivation such that the unit members are influenced to accomplish the mission. Without a working cultural infrastructure, the members of a unit are just people standing around not knowing what to do or how to do it.

The components of the cultural infrastructure exhibit certain properties which may be used to classify a component into a category of the commons. For example, an effective incentive system will benefit unit cohesion and motivation, but like common village grazing areas, there must be restraint through norms or rules on a given individual's receipt of incentives. Otherwise, his "over-grazing" may defeat the system of incentives. On the other hand, "under-grazing" may also create a problem because it may reduce the aggregate productivity of the unit. Similarly, high unit cohesion, like getting together to build a bridge over a river, requires supportive, pro-active teamwork from sufficient unit members to sustain it. Some members of the unit may slough off on the teamwork (i.e., act as free riders) although benefiting from being in a unit with high cohesion. Likewise, an individual's effort to build his skill proficiency is done mostly for himself and the rewards it brings. Yet, like obtaining a vaccination, the more soldiers that acquire high skill proficiency, the better will be the unit overall, and the more advantageous it is for each member of the unit.

Each leader is an influential participant in the commons but does not control it. This lack of direct control makes leadership difficult. He can order subordinates to do a task but cannot effectively order them to understand and commit to the unit's mission, to be cohesive, to be motivated, or to abide by all unit norms and ways of doing things. Thus the leader must be a salesman, a communicator, a designer, and a reinforcer of the cultural infrastructure. This applies to leadership teams and the chain of command as well. In the unity of leaders working together there resides a critical mass of influence to manage the commons. As noted previously, the highly cohesive leader teams are the ones that can turn the cohesion and motivation of their unit members into high unit performance.

Building Unit Cohesiveness. Fortunately, small unit leaders usually start out with most things going for them as they work towards building and sustaining unit cohesiveness. Most service members want their groups to be cohesive and to be able to trust each other. Most service

members want to grow and develop in knowledge and skills. Most service members want and expect their immediate leaders to be competent and treat them fairly. There is a general expectation that units will work towards being efficient and not waste resources or the time of their members. Perhaps most of all, people want their group to be productive and perform well with a mission of importance and meaning. Thus like a sports coach at the start of the season or a medical doctor at the beginning of treating a patient, the new small unit leader enters a period of group optimism with high expectations that can be used to build and sustain strong cohesion.

Service members new to the military are mostly idealistic youth. Therefore the group leaders should set their group sights high and amplify the patriotic purpose of their service. In the context of the idealistic service member, it is all right if a leader does not know everything or have a particular skill; service members for the most part understand that a given person is not necessarily going to be great at doing everything or knowing everything. However, while lack of skill in an area is forgivable, lack of integrity is not. Being forthcoming and truthful are necessary for trust, and trust is necessary for leaders to be accepted. Leaders should not display envy or disrespect for others, be pessimistic and gloomy, or over-react to criticism or suggestions. Character counts.

In relating to service members, the leader must remember that it is his (or her) job to prepare himself and his service members to perform their duties and missions. In doing so, his primary human resources for unit performance are group cohesion, member motivation, and member capacity (i.e., knowledge and skills). The leader should teach them to anticipate that bad stuff will periodically pop up to annoy, distract, and hinder their efforts but that they need to take it all in stride and move forward. The leader should hold his unit to high standards for behavior and training. He should treat all subordinates fairly (e.g., in duties assigned and in awards). Overall, the leader should keep a positive “can do” attitude, and be a good role model and mentor who takes care of his/her subordinates. While the leader provides direction, he is not a dictator. He works with the unit to set or interpret goals and standards, not micro-manage people and actions (Siebold, 1996). As Pipping (2008, 255) noted, “one can ask how the men of a field army would have survived many years at the front, if they had not molded the formal system into such a shape, that they themselves considered to be just.”

It is important that the leader keep a balance among the human elements in his group—among cohesion, motivation, and skill development. A highly motivated set of members without much cohesiveness or leader direction will go off in all different directions preventing coordinated action. A highly cohesive group without motivation or direction may create a deviant subgroup that resorts to crime or taking drugs. A highly cohesive and motivated group, but without many skills or military knowledge, may engage in reckless, overly ambitious actions on the battlefield. Therefore the leader should try to develop his group over time with a balance maintained between strong cohesiveness, high motivation, and continuous growth in military skill and knowledge.

One of the most important means to building and sustaining unit cohesion is through the active shaping of unit culture (i.e., the management of the commons). For example, most leaders are taught to discipline soldiers in private but praise and recognize them in public.

In that public recognition, a positive unit culture would include the recognition also of spouses and other family members who often make continuing contributions to support their service member and unit (from preparing uniforms to helping with social events to assisting families of unit members in need of aid). A positive attitude must be demanded of all. That culture must establish and reinforce the desired values, norms, and attitudes of unit members as they interact and as they proceed through the stages of group development (forming, storming, norming, performing; Tuckman, 1965) and experience unit entropy and friction. Overall, over time, the unit is a moral order not a machine; its culture must reflect that.

Where are We Going?

Containing the Six Tyrants. One of the directions researchers should go, need to go, and ultimately will go is to find ways to lessen the impact of the six tyrants described previously. In particular, as the first step measures and procedures need more standardization. Once some modicum of standardization takes place, then sharing of results across researchers, time, and organizations can occur so that there will be accumulation of comparable data to address the need for more N and group development assessments over time. Shared data can quicken the research time so that the problems of infrequent research projects and technology obsolescence can be limited. Such larger data bases will help improve the analyses needed to drive cohesion theory into the future and beyond its current state. In terms of sharing, military researchers should also reach out and share with those in adjacent areas of research, again, such as sports, business management, and medical delivery.

The creation of a theory of the responding service member perhaps simply awaits the right scientist in the right situation at the right time. Starting the creation of such a theory would benefit, of course, many areas of military personnel research. However, it is not likely to be a priority for most organizational budgets. That is because such a theory might end up subverting historically prior research results, may annoy older researchers who conducted the previous research before they could take advantage of the theory of the respondent, and may conflict with desired findings. Therefore, there is only limited pressure for pursuing such a theory. Similarly, the research community is not likely to be able to do much about personnel turbulence among group members, leaders, or even researchers on a project. Humans desire to maximize their individual opportunities, and leaders and managers need to be able to allocate personnel in whatever ways are needed to meet their organizational missions and goals. However, the acknowledgement of the six tyrannies in the training of researchers is an important foundation for making improvements concerning them over time.

Social Demolition. Cohesion research has developed sufficiently enough that there is now the opportunity to weaponize the results in the form of social demolition. The world is full of seriously nasty groups and organizations with a penchant for cruel and unlawful actions. Many of these nefarious organizations cannot be terminated or adequately vitiated by current military or police strategies and tactics. Different approaches or emphases are needed to augment or supplant the usual military and/or police efforts. One new approach is *social demolition*, a subset of social warfare that primarily attacks the social cohesion and integration of the target entity.

More broadly, social demolition is the concept, subfield, and process of taking actions to destabilize, break up, and destroy enemy or nefarious social organizations and networks (such as terrorist networks or drug cartels). It takes a systems approach to go after recruitment, retention, attrition, leadership, morale, and cohesion in the targeted organization by using the reverse of social processes that modern military forces learned to use in building up organizations, especially concerning trust and collective competence. Concrete goals include attempts to break links in the organization, separate the organization from the potential supporting populace and networks, increase operating friction, and de-motivate members through decreasing trust, reducing teamwork, and breaking up coordinated action. While there has been preliminary development of the concept (Siebold, 2011b), more details remain to be worked out within the mission and context of appropriate sponsoring or implementing organizations. Nonetheless, given the exorbitant costs of modern planes, ships, tanks, and other weapon systems and their technological support systems, social demolition becomes a cost-effective alternative in places. One advantage of social warfare, and social demolition in particular, is that it allows a military to win the war (the conditions and parameters affecting the war) essentially before it begins to fight, as directed by the ancient Chinese warrior-philosopher Sun Tzu.

Cohesion Products. On a general level, one can consider science the creation of knowledge and valid information and consider technology the creation of ways to use that knowledge and information for practical purposes. At present, there is a substantial amount of science about cohesion but only limited technology. For example, there is no validated observational checklist that leaders could use to get a quick fix on the status of cohesion in their unit. Such a checklist might prove useful to leaders developing their groups of service members.

While leaders might confer with one another to assess the state of cohesion, research findings suggest that while leaders are very confident in their opinions about cohesion in their unit, they simply do not agree among themselves very closely (Siebold, 1989b). Leaders need to be trained about what to observe and how to assess what they see. A one sheet, easy-to-score cohesion questionnaire was developed for unit leaders, but it probably should be put on a shareable electronic medium (see Siebold & Kelly, 1988a). Likewise, practical policy guides might be helpful to articulate some of the typical dilemmas leaders face. These include such issues as whether to rotate a headquarters element as a group for maximum efficiency and internal communication or to rotate staff members individually over time to the headquarters they will be replacing for maximum continuity in the staff positions at the new location where the staff members about to rotate out can train the new arrival. Another issue is whether to keep a good leader or service member in his unit or re-assign him to a higher level unit where his capabilities can be more fully utilized. This is the dilemma of unit equity (what is best for the original unit) versus individual equity (what is best for the service member). Likewise, what are the implications for cohesion of promoting a service member and keeping him in his same original unit versus re-assigning him with his new status in a different group? In short, there are many practical applications if the science of military group cohesion can be better incorporated into useful cohesion technology.

Cohesion in a Post-Modern Military. Most of the research on cohesion has been done on personnel and units in modern military organizations. There has been little done to anticipate how cohesion might operate in a post-modern military. A typology for military

organizational change was presented by Moskos (2000). He characterized the *modern* military (1800–1947) as the product of the rise of the nation state that was distinctly different from civilian society and with conscript citizen-soldiers in its lower ranks. Moskos characterized the *late modern* military (1948–1991) as a product of the Cold War with an increasingly professional officer corps and mostly conscripts in lower ranks. Finally in his typology, Moskos described the *post-modern* military (1992 to date) as the product of the collapse of communism and that was increasingly permeable with civilian society and used a volunteer force. Moskos' typology was expanded upon by this author (Siebold, 2008) in order to build a more sensitive framework for looking at change in the military.

Siebold started with a typology consisting of a series of continua that dealt with the moral basis for the individual service member serving in the military (from it being a sacred calling to forced labor), the nature of the military organization in controlling its members (from a total institution controlling almost all behavior 24 hours per day to a temporary ad hoc group controlling little behavior for only a short time), the kind of training predominating (from full enrichment training such as advanced academic degrees for the long serving member to the just-in-time special skill training for a specific set of tasks), the extent to which the military was separate and distinct from the society it served (from completely separate and distinct to an organization that mingled with and operated among many different civilian government and non-government agencies and groups), and the extent to which the military engaged in the spectrum of warfare (from all intensities of warfare to a narrow scope of war), as shown in Table 6.

Table 6. Analytic Framework to Address Change in the Military

1. Moral Orientation of a Career

Sacred Calling-----Profession-----Wage Labor-----Forced Labor

2. Organizational Totality

Communal Total Institution----Industrial Organization----Temporary Ad Hoc Group

3. Training Concept

Enrichment-----Replacement-----Just-in-Time

4. Military-Civilian Interpenetration

Full Military Dominance-----Interagency Task Force-----Few Dominant Spheres

5. Engagement Spectrum

Total Spectrum-----Mid-Intensity War-----Specialized Niches

The Moskos and Siebold typologies can be merged into a common framework that describes the dimensions of change with the shift from modern to post-modern militaries. In short, as militaries became modern, they shifted from a traditional, normative, *Gemeinschaft* organization to one based on the marketplace, economic man, and *Gesellschaft*. If they shift from a modern to late modern military-industrial totality to a post-modern one, they might exhibit substantial civilian penetration, open group boundaries, and overly complex big organizations and associated concepts to justify them. Such a change might include an emphasis on using increasingly high technology where there would be high marginal returns on any military engagement and the sharing of combat responsibilities with coalition partners to cover the spectrum of warfare as needed.

Table 7. Military Typology—with Analytic Frameworks

<i>Military Type</i>	<i>Approximate Years</i>	<i>Characteristics</i>
Modern	1800-1947	<p><i>Moral Orientation:</i> Substantial proportion of forced labor and low wage labor (impressed sailors; conscript soldiers)</p> <p><i>Organizational Totality:</i> Communal total institution</p> <p><i>Training Model:</i> Replacement</p> <p><i>Interpenetration:</i> Limited civilian penetration</p> <p><i>Engagement Spectrum:</i> Mid-Intensity, some asymmetric</p>
Late Modern	1948-1991	<p><i>Moral Orientation:</i> Substantial proportion of low wage labor with forced labor but increasing officer and NCO professionalism</p> <p><i>Organizational Totality:</i> Industrial organization</p> <p><i>Training Model:</i> Replacement</p> <p><i>Interpenetration:</i> Increasing civilian penetration</p> <p><i>Engagement Spectrum:</i> Full spectrum in superpowers</p>
Postmodern	1992 to date	<p><i>Moral Orientation:</i> Increasingly professional</p> <p><i>Organizational Totality:</i> Increasing use of temporary ad hoc groupings</p> <p><i>Training Model:</i> Increasing enrichment and just-in-time training</p> <p><i>Interpenetration:</i> Substantial civilian penetration</p> <p><i>Engagement Spectrum:</i> Full spectrum, so far, but with increasing niche-oriented militaries</p>

The point here is that as the structure of the military might change from the late modern to the post-modern (with the weakening of the nation state), the social relationships among the members and between the members and their organizations and the institution may be expected to change in a post-modern direction as well. In particular, one might expect that authority would be based more on expertise and network connections than on rank or organizational position. Authority lines may become blurred as military members work more closely with civilians. Likewise, bonding among service members might loosen and be based more on voluntary individual exchange relations than on group norms and social

obligations that are derived from group membership and goals. This would be especially the case with frequent assignments to temporary working groups in which members do not invest in relationships with each other. The most appropriate analogy perhaps is the difference between working in office (with similarly situated fellow workers whose tasks are done in parallel rather than interdependently) and conducting military exercises in the field (with all group members in a difficult environment, carrying out interdependent tasks, and depending on the group for survival and success). Further, the potential ineffectiveness of large scale bureaucratic organizational units may increase conflicts with subordinate units in terms of inconsistent plans, lack of understanding of each other's situation, and non-responsiveness. People may lose faith in the large organizations which have gone beyond an effective economy of scale. In fact, a large problem in a post-modern military may be that of *ennui* or apathetic meaninglessness rather than the problems of too much or too little normative control by the group or perceived lack of norms.

It of course would be desirable that any measures and fundamental principles developed concerning cohesion could be applied in a post-modern organization to predict results, identify potential problems, and suggest the appropriate array of fixes or solutions to reestablish trust, meaning, capacity for group action, and an appropriate economy of scale. The Moskos-Siebold framework in Table 7 should be generally applicable, since it deals with social relationships, even as post-modern warfare changes, for example, to be increasingly cyber-computer, robotic, social, and economic warfare.

Reification of Terms. A last issue about where we are going concerns semantics. As cohesion science and technology move into the future, it is important that researchers understand that cohesion, leadership, and related terms are abstract concepts that represent only in part the concrete human thoughts, feelings, behaviors, and capacity for action that underlie them. Social relationships and leadership are complex, multi-dimensional things. To state that an observed interaction pattern is a good relationship or that a given action by a leader demonstrates good leadership is the observer categorizing the interaction pattern or action within a framework he has for the most part learned and asserting a judgment about the pattern or action. Another observer may categorize the interaction pattern or action differently or use a different frame of reference or judge what he sees in another way. Consequently, the researcher needs to pay special attention to what he means, what he refers to, and how he measures and relates the variables that are ambiguous estimates of referent constructs. The dynamics of the military small group are not similar to that of a machine that can be engineered to obtain a desired result. Rather, the military small group, its members and leaders, are living, changeable, humans with all their excellent features and all their flaws who construct their reality and relationships as best they can within the time and resources available, including each other. As Paul Gauguin might say, the science of cohesion is also an art.

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6 **KNUT PIPPING'S FORGOTTEN STUDY OF A WW II INFANTRY COMPANY AND HIS RESULTS ABOUT SOLDIERS' INFORMAL GROUP NORMS¹**

Olli Harinen

Knut Pipping's Forgotten Military Sociological Study of a WW II Infantry Company Finally in English

It could usually happen only in researchers' dreams that important empirical military sociological studies of WW II military units come to light and are published in English sixty years after they were written. This is, however, exactly what has happened to Knut Pipping's long-lost study *Infantry Company as a Society* (1947, 2008).

During the Second World War, Knut Pipping, a young Finnish sociologist, served as an NCO (conscript) in a Finnish machine gun company. During the war against the Soviet Union (1941-1944), he carried out an extensive sociological study of his own company. He gathered empirical material systematically both during and after the war, and in 1947 his work was published as a doctoral dissertation in Turku. (Pipping later became Professor of Sociology.)

The book was first published in Swedish in 1947 in a very small print run. The Finnish translation was published in 1978 and was immediately taken into use as a university textbook on sociology in Finland. It is on Finnish Cadets' reading list to this day.

Pipping gathered his empirical material by systematically observing the behavior of soldiers in different situations during one year, from 1943 to 1944. He had excellent opportunities to observe soldiers' behavior as he served as an orderly (NCO) in his company in 1941-1944. Pipping also collected statistical and other material by means of interviews. After the war Pipping collected more material by using the company's war diaries and other documentary material in the Defence Forces' War Archives. In the Finnish Army, differing from many other WW II armies, all units, including companies, kept a detailed war diary documenting even the smallest details of daily company life. As a result, Pipping was able to cover a time-span of more than three years, from 1941 to 1944.

Pipping's study was thus a very thorough empirical sociological investigation of one small military unit at war. Pipping (1978, 34) himself formulated the subject matter of his study as follows: "In this book I am trying to describe the interaction between the formal and informal organization in our war-time conscript and reservist army."

Since Pipping's classical work is unknown to the English-speaking readership and since there are very few similar small unit WW II studies, the Finnish Military Sociological Society

¹ This article is a revised version of a paper for the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS), Chicago, 23-25 October 2009.

wanted to have it translated into English. The English version has now been published by the Department of Behavioral Sciences of the National Defence University (Knut Pipping: *Infantry Company as a Society*, National Defence University, Department of Behavioral Sciences, Publication series 1 Number 3/2008). *It is freely available online in pdf form from the Finnish Defence Forces' home pages (search word: Pipping).*²

Pipping's Study Compared to Other Military Sociological Studies in the 1940s

Pipping's study (1947) can be compared to other military sociological studies based on data from WW II. Edward A. Shils has written about *The American Soldier* (Stouffer et al. 1949), a classical WW II study which was published two years after Pipping's dissertation:

“For the most part, *The American Soldier* is based on studies of the attitudes of individuals. There is no direct observation of groups in action and only occasional, indirect observations of group performance. The actual operation of primary group life is not described and indeed is seldom referred to.” (Shils 1950, 18.)

In contrast, Pipping carried out an extensive analysis of the social structure of his company and the soldiers' informal norm system with which it was linked. He studied how this informal social structure influenced the men's behavior and attitudes in different situations ranging from rest to combat.

Another study is a research article by E.A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II” (1948). Alexander L. George wrote about these two American studies and their relation to primary groups:

“Earlier studies based on World War II experiences in Western Europe (Stouffer, et al., 1949; Shils and Janowitz, 1948), postulated or seemed to imply the existence of a rather rich cluster of primary group ties shared by many members of units as large as squads or even platoons. In the more recent literature, however, a new conception of primary group ties ... has emerged. They are now described as being more molecular or granular in structure, often taking the form of a series of two-person relationships rather than affiliations among larger numbers of men.” (George 1971, 298)

In his study Pipping (1947) not only “postulated or seemed to imply” the existence of a rich cluster of primary group ties, like Stouffer and Shils & Janowitz had done, but actually carried out a thorough empirical study of those primary group ties, i.e., of the formal and informal groups in his unit during 1941–1944.

If modern researchers had only these two above-mentioned classic military sociological WW II studies (Stouffer and Shils & Janowitz) at their disposal, they would not have a very detailed scientific description of the nature and composition of the informal military groups in any World War II army unit. Were those informal groups dyads, triads, squads (sections), platoons, or even whole companies and batteries? The fact that both *The American Soldier* and the study by Shils and Janowitz failed to give any detailed description of the informal

² It can also be easily found by typing Infantry Company as a Society in Google, Yahoo, etc.

groups of WW II soldiers is probably due to the research method used. Large surveys and mass interviews, which provided the empirical material for *The American Soldier*, are not the best method if one wants to study small military groups like squads, platoons, and companies. The same can be said about interviewing a large number of individual POWs from different German units (Shils & Janowitz 1948).

Pipping's method of participant observation of one small military unit and his subsequent data collection methods (unit members' interviews, unit's official War Diaries, official unit statistics, painstaking post-war field studies in the company's soldiers' home area) are suited better for this kind of empirical research on small groups.

One notable feature in Knut Pipping's work is the long time-span of his systematic observations. The results obtained by similar later participant observation studies that were carried out, for instance, in Korea (Little 1964) and Vietnam (Moskos 1970) were based on only weeks or months of participant observation. Pipping was able to observe the internal dynamics of a small combat unit systematically in literally hundreds of different situations, combat included, during one whole year. Before this, he had already served two years in the same company. He also interviewed soldiers during and after the war and examined the company's detailed war diaries, company statistics, and other written documents, thus covering a time-span of more than three years, from 1941 to 1944.

This research approach using various methods produced a comprehensive study and ultimately a small goldmine of detailed empirical data.³

Pipping as a Researcher of Soldiers' Informal Group Norms

Knut Pipping (1947) was one of the first, if not the first, researchers to study soldiers' informal group norms in a scientific way. After having first studied thoroughly the social structure, i.e., the various formal and informal groups in his infantry company, he proceeded to a thorough analysis of informal norms in those groups. Finally he wanted to study the relation of these informal group norms to formal military norms and authority.

Pipping writes about informal group norms in a long chapter that is divided into six subchapters, each dealing with informal norms in the following areas of military life, and how they influenced soldiers' behavior:

- courage (or norms about risk-taking, behavior in combat)
- norms about private and public property
- alcohol and sexuality
- religion, superstition, and information
- discipline (including work duties)
- helpfulness

³ In military sociology, there is almost a small tradition in this kind of methodology starting from Pipping (1947, WW II). It includes studies by, for instance, Little (1964, Korean War), Moskos (1970, Vietnam), Hockey (1986, Northern Ireland), Wong et al. (2003, Iraq War), and Kirke (2009, British Army). This kind of at least partly qualitative, even sometimes ethnographic method is loosely connected to many things, including the earlier Chicago School of Sociology, industrial sociology and human relations school (Hawthorne studies, etc.), and symbolic interactionism (Blumer, Goffman, etc.).

After Pipping's (1947) book, new studies have been published dealing with soldiers' informal organization and norms during war or in war-like conditions. One of these is Little's "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance" (1964) about a U.S. rifle company in the Korean War. Another one is John Hockey's excellent book *Squaddies, Portrait of a Subculture* (1986). Hockey collected the main body of his material by living three months with private soldiers and NCOs of a British rifle company.

Informal Group Norms as One Possible Intervening Variable between Cohesion and Group Performance?

Pipping's thorough WW II study of soldiers' informal group norms may have some relevance in the discussion about the old, much-researched question about the relation between group cohesion and performance.

Group cohesion and sometimes also group norms have been studied in a large number of empirical studies dealing with military groups, sports teams (Carron), and different kinds of industrial and other "civilian" work groups or teams. The pioneer study in this field was the series of Hawthorne investigations in Chicago in the 1930s (Mayo et al.). Besides revealing the importance of small informal work groups, the Hawthorne studies also shed light on the functioning of informal group norms, as later formulated more theoretically by Homans (1968). Group norms were also studied in the 1930s and 1940s in several classic social psychological experiments (Sherif, Asch).

Ever since soldiers' primary groups were found to be important in WW II studies (Stouffer 1947, Shils & Janowitz 1948), there have been empirical attempts to show that cohesion either causes effective combat or other behavior or that it does not do so. One of the first to do so was Goodacre (1951), who used a sociometric test (which has been used to measure group cohesion) as a predictor of combat unit effectiveness.⁴

Fifty years later, in 1999, Oliver et al. published a meta-analysis, where 40 scientifically valid military cohesion studies ($n = 37\ 226$ soldiers) were sorted out from the total of 199 such studies carried out between 1951–1991. The authors wanted to find out what these remaining scientifically valid empirical studies said about the relation of group cohesion to relevant criteria. They concluded that "group cohesion results in desirable outcomes for the military and that the research has implications for policy and training issues."

⁴ In the Finnish Defence Forces, Harinen and Heini Hult-Miekkavaara (2008) studied two infantry platoons in a field experiment. The relation between the data from sociometric measurement, interviews, and a group cohesion survey and the squad's real behavior in a simulated combat situation was studied. The observation groups consisted of one squad from each of the platoons on two successive days. The platoon attacked against a defender on each day in similar terrain and other conditions (weaponry, etc.). The behavior of each squad member was videotaped and researchers followed the squad members at close range through the whole action making observations. Data from laser rifle simulators and medical measurements as well as from NASA situation awareness questionnaires (the measurement was done during "freezing" points) were also studied. Officers made observations on small unit tactics and the use of terrain. Squad members were interviewed after the action. It was found, among many other things, that the sociometric structure of the squad was related to soldiers' real (simulated) combat behavior in a very interesting way.

Another meta-analysis was published by Mullen and Cropper in 1994. MacCoun, Kier, and Belkin (2006) write about it as follows:

“In their analysis of sixty-six cohesion-performance correlations from forty-nine studies, Mullen and Cropper found that the relationship between cohesion and performance was ‘due primarily to commitment to task than interpersonal attraction or group pride’. This meta-analytic review found, in other words, that to the extent that there is a relationship between cohesion and performance, it is task cohesion – not social cohesion – that correlates with performance. In addition, the review found that the causal relationship differs from what is commonly assumed: the link from performance to cohesion is stronger and more reliable than the link from cohesion to performance.” (MacCoun et al. 2006, 647–648.)

Yet another meta-analysis was carried out by Beal, Cohen, Burke, and McLendon. According to Griffith (2007, 143), its findings contradicted those of Mullen and Cropper. “First, three aspects of cohesion (interpersonal attraction, group pride, and task commitment) were each independently and positively related to performance” (Griffith 2007, 143).

One more point is the relevance of different types of studies that have appeared in this kind of meta-analysis. There are studies dealing with military units during war or in war-like conditions and studies carried out in civilian surroundings or in peace-time garrison or war exercise conditions. There has been discussion whether the results of the latter type of studies are fully relevant to soldiers’ behavior during war. Kolditz (2006) writes about this as follows:

“The idea that behavioral and social scientists may test the robustness of their theories by studying the same phenomenon across noncombat and combat settings is not new. True combat settings carry with them the threat of death and, therefore, have a powerful and unique influence on human behavior. (...) Without ... any physical threat, even research conducted in military organizations ... may not generalize to combat settings. Research on military personnel is most often accomplished in nonoperational venues, such as basic training or field maneuvers. (...) Empirical work relevant to combat should ideally be conducted in situ, under circumstances where death must be actively avoided. Leadership researchers have referred to such situations with a unique term, *in extremis*, or ‘at the point of death’. (...) Although such research is methodologically challenging, physically demanding, and sometimes dangerous for researchers, it is an invaluable tool to help describe or explain behavior that occurs in such settings.” (Kolditz 2006, 656.)

Although many studies like the ones mentioned above have shown a correlation between cohesion and effective performance, the problem still remains that in some other empirical studies this correlation has been low or nonexistent. Perhaps it could be said that the question about the relation between group cohesion and performance is still “open”.

What has all this got to do with informal group norms (and Pipping)? To answer this, one must take a brief look at other WW II studies and the way informal group norms are linked to the definition of military cohesion.

Informal Group Norms as a Possible Intervening Variable?

One of the authors of *The American Soldier*, Robin M. Williams, writes in a retrospective article published in 1984 about the relation of military group cohesion to soldiers' behavior.

He says that later research has generally supported the conclusion presented in *The American Soldier*, namely that cohesive primary groups provide a strong causal nexus for military behavior (Williams 1984, 190). "Our findings agreed with several other studies and with those of such trained observers as S.L.A. Marshall in holding that social solidarity or group cohesion was an essential basis for combat effectiveness of infantry soldiers" (Williams 1984, 191). He writes, however, that "the influence may be either supportive of or in direct opposition to goals and norms of higher authority" (op. cit., 190).⁵ He speaks in this connection of the "goals and standards or norms that primary groups enforce" (ibid., 190).

From Williams' text one could draw or deduce a conclusion (or a hypothesis) that he sees the informal group norms as a kind of mediating or intervening phenomenon between group cohesion and soldiers' behavior.

Group cohesion – Informal group norms – Soldiers' (effective or ineffective) performance

It is self-evident that informal group norms can influence soldiers' behavior, since group norms are, by definition, behavioral rules of the group that the group enforces through sanctions. This may sound like a tautology, but it is not, at least not always, because in a cohesive group those norms can exist already *before* the group or its members do something related to its task, i.e., before group performance.⁶

Military Psychology's theme number (2/1995) included an article entitled "Military Team Research: 10 Years of Progress" (Salas et al. 1995). The authors came to the conclusion that "research is needed to study the complex relation between cohesiveness and performance" and that this should be "coupled with an identification of the mechanisms that allow ... cohesiveness to affect team performance."

In survey methodology, relations between x and y are often studied by introducing intervening or moderator variable z into the analysis. When z is put between x and y, the correlation between x and y may be strong with some values of z and low or nonexistent with some other values of z. Many empirical cohesion vs. performance studies have not included intervening "z" type variables. Group cohesion has just been measured by different kinds of survey-type cohesion scales or indexes, the effectiveness of performance (criteria) has been measured by

⁵ See also Siebold: Theoretical Challenges to the Standard Model of Military Group Cohesion, Draft of 14 Sep 09 for the IUS 2009 conference, pp. 5–6.

⁶ Homans (1968) says that norms are not the same as behavior. "They are not behavior itself, but what people think behavior ought to be" (Homans 1968, 124).

other kinds of variables, and then the correlations between these two types of measures have been calculated.⁷ Sometimes correlation has been found to exist, sometimes not.

Group Goals and the Definition of Military Group Cohesion

Cohesion researchers, for instance Carron and Siebold, have apparently come to the conclusion that cohesion is a concept that is more complex than the earlier interpersonal attraction-based definitions suggested. Cohesion has been divided, for instance, into social (affective) cohesion and task (instrumental) cohesion (Siebold & Kelly 1988, Siebold 2000, 2007, MacCoun et al. 2006, Salo 2011) along with vertical cohesion and organizational cohesion. Then the above-mentioned empirical results, where correlation has sometimes existed between cohesion and effective performance and sometimes not, could perhaps be partly explained by saying that different studies have measured different dimensions or “parts” of cohesion.⁸

While all this is plausible, yet *another, complementary way to approach the problem presented by inconsistent empirical results is to try to examine some possible intervening variables between cohesion and performance.*

Following Festinger (1950), Etzioni defined cohesion as “a positive expressive relationship between two or more actors” (Etzioni 1966). This definition could be compared to Henderson’s later definition of cohesion in a military group:

“cohesion exists in a unit when the primary day-to-day goals of the individual soldier, the small group with which he identifies, and of unit leaders are congruent – with each giving his primary loyalty to the group so that it trains and fights as a unit with all members willing to risk death to achieve a common objective.” (Henderson 1986, 4.)

It is obvious that Henderson’s definition (and other somewhat similar definitions)⁹ has a new element compared to Festinger’s and Etzioni’s earlier definitions. Festinger and Etzioni say nothing about group goals, while common goals are a part of Henderson’s definition. (Harinen 1992, 63–64.)

Oliver (1990) has written about the relation between cohesion, performance, and the congruence of personal and organizational goals between them as follows.

“One can view the congruence of personal and organizational goals as a moderator variable which affects group performance differently depending upon the degree to which such congruence exists. It seems more parsimonious ... to restrict the definition of group cohesion to horizontal and vertical cohesion ... and to deal with commitment to organizational goals as a moderator variable.” (Oliver 1990, 5.)

⁷ Examples of the use of this kind of method are studies by Alderks (1992) and Yagil (1995).

⁸ Salo (2011) has studied how different dimensions of cohesion correlate with different criteria. This seems like a rational empirical way to approach the cohesion – performance question.

⁹ In “civilian” surroundings, for instance Carron.

It is not entirely clear to this author what Oliver means by “the congruence of personal and organizational goals”. One possibility is that it could mean a situation where a military group’s own norms are congruent with formal, official norms and goals.¹⁰

However this may be, *informal group norms* could be thought of as an intervening moderator variable between cohesion and group performance. This is because informal group norms in small military groups link, almost by definition, the goals of the formal military organization to the goals of small soldier groups and individual soldiers in the military organization.¹¹

The question remains, are those informal group norms usually congruent with the goals of the formal military organization or are they not? And in which kinds of situations?

To answer questions like this, it would be important to know, to begin with, which kinds of informal, unofficial norms exist and have existed in small military groups, for instance in buddy groups, sections, platoons, companies, and so on. In other words: if informal group norms are thought of as an intervening variable between cohesion and group performance, then it would be important to study them (for instance the kind of behavior they regulate, the situations where they occur, etc.) more closely.

* * *

Here we came back to *Pipping*. He studied soldiers’ informal group norms in his company and their relations to formal, official norms and goals in different situations.

To shed more light on group norms, Pipping’s results about informal norms and their relation to formal norms are shortly reviewed below together with two later studies dealing (among other things) with soldiers’ informal norms, i.e., Roger Little’s “Buddy Relations and Combat Performance” (1964) and John Hockey’s *Squaddies, Portrait of a Subculture* (1986). All three studied an infantry company at war or in war-like situations and all were also dissertations in sociology.

Pipping, Little, and Hockey describe soldiers’ informal norms and norm systems and their relation to formal organizational goals. They also studied the sanctions that cohesive soldier groups used to enforce group norms, i.e., they studied the concrete mechanism through which norms, as behavioral scientific concepts, were transformed into real behavior.

Pipping (1947, 2008) says that he was “trying to describe the interaction between the formal and informal organization in our war-time conscript and reservist army”.

Little says that his task is “to understand why in combat the primary group relations – the buddy system – operated to support organizational goals to a greater extent than in the reserve areas.” (Little 1964, 196.)

¹⁰ It is possible that soldiers could have private personal goals that can differ not only from official goals but also from informal group goals.

¹¹ It is basic social psychology that more cohesive groups have more influence on their members’ behavior, i.e., the informal group norms in them are “stronger”. “The extent to which a group may exert negative sanctions for nonconformity depends upon its cohesiveness.” (Secord & Backman 1964, 351).

Hockey says that his aim was “to study two sides of privates’ routine patterns of behaviour. On the one hand there is behaviour which is in conformity with the official organizational demands (...) Such behaviour is officially considered conducive to organizational objectives. On the other hand, there are unofficial patterns of behaviour which conflict with official organizational demands. (...) I try to show what motivates privates to engage in *both* forms of conduct, and the consequences for the privates and for the military organization when they do so. (...) ... in the collective struggle to survive, social cohesion is a precondition for success, and the privates’ conduct, whether it be deemed integrative or the opposite, is a decisive factor.” (Hockey 1986, 1.)

One more point should be added, keeping in mind what for instance Kolditz (2006) has said about the relevance of studies dealing with military units during war or in war-like conditions compared to studies carried out in civilian surroundings or in peace-time garrisons or field exercises. Pipping, Little, and Hockey studied infantry companies that were *at war* or in war-like situations (in Hockey’s case, in Northern Ireland).

Pipping’s Results in Infantry Company as a Society

Pipping describes formal and informal norms in relation to courage (Pipping 1947, 2008; Harinen 2008). Pipping refers to “the economic principle in the behavior of combat soldiers”. This principle meant that soldiers strived to live as comfortably as possible, as safely as possible.

Pipping mentions the balance between safety and comfort. Each group decided in each situation and depending on the men’s spirits how this balance was to be achieved. It should be pointed out that Pipping here speaks of the group, not of individual soldiers, as the actor in this balance.

According to Pipping every soldier was expected to show “a certain normal amount of courage”. If someone failed to show a “normal amount” of courage, he was ridiculed and became a butt of jokes.

Pipping then describes what happened if someone showed more than the “normal” amount of courage. In such a case, the men’s attitude (or rather, the group’s attitude) depended on whether the risk-taking improved or reduced their safety. If such risk-taking improved safety, it was approved or even praised. However, if risk-taking reduced the safety of other soldiers or the group, the men disapproved of it. An example of this kind of behavior could be a group member who voluntarily, without orders, engages with the enemy and starts a firefight, thereby drawing others into conflict. (The formal military organization naturally approved of this kind of risk-taking and at times rewarded it.) If risk-taking had no relation to the safety of the other soldiers, men reacted nonchalantly. An example could be a group member who volunteers for a patrol sent behind enemy lines.

Pipping’s analysis here bears a resemblance to Little’s (1964) study of a U.S. Army rifle company in the Korean War (see below). Little tells that in every platoon there was the role of a “dud”, that is, a soldier who performed inadequately compared to men’s informal

behavioral norm. Little tells that the “dud” became a butt of jokes and in this role served to define the lower limit of acceptable behavior.

Pipping says that both the formal army regulations and the men’s own morale (in later terms, informal norms) sought to maintain the security and comfort of the community (1978, 202). There were, however, big differences between these two. Pipping says that the men evaluated each task and order using the well-being of the community as a standard or a yardstick. The men thought that many tasks and other things that they were ordered to do were useless from this point of view. Pipping says that men and officers (and NCOs) often had differing opinions about the measures that were taken to improve the safety and comfort of the community (*ibid.*).

The men thought, for instance, that close-order drill was useless, but they also thought that certain tasks involving building or repairing trenches and fortifications were a waste of time. If the men were ordered, for instance, to build some fortifications, and they themselves thought that such fortifications were necessary to ensure their safety, they accepted the order. If, however, they thought that the fortification, trench, etc. was useless, their reaction was different. Then they dawdled, or, if they were not kept under strict control, simply did not do it. The men thought that they knew what was important and what was not. (The reader is here reminded of the things that Pipping told about the men’s courage and risk-taking. To an outsider, the men’s behavior might have looked surprisingly reckless, Pipping says, but the men thought that they knew from experience which kinds of risks one could take without severe danger, and when it was time to take precautions.)

The men evaluated each order and task using the safety and comfort of the community as a yardstick. If a task was more or less useless from that point of view, it was allowable or even praiseworthy to dawdle or to shirk from doing it. When men were punished for behaving in this way, other men felt sorry for them.

Pipping says that the formal military organization had very different views of such things as obeying an order and carrying out a certain task versus dawdling and shirking from it. From the viewpoint of the formal military organization, it was important to obey every single order regardless of the real practical value or benefit that would follow in a given situation if/when the order was obeyed. It was important because every task was a part of a totality, “the discipline of the group”. The army regulations were meant to condition a disciplined behavior pattern and obedience. So an order (and obeying or breaching it) was not evaluated by judging whether it was beneficial or not, but by seeing it as one part of the totality, military discipline.

Pipping says that although the men might have understood this “theoretically”, they did not approve of it, which was shown, for instance, by their attitudes toward punishments. (The description above was just a very small fraction of Pipping’s results; see Pipping 2008 and Harinen 2008.)

Informal Group Norms in a U.S. Infantry Company in the Korean War

Roger W. Little observed soldiers' behavior in an American rifle company during the Korean War. Little lived with a rifle company, which he studied for more than three months at the end of 1952 and at the beginning of 1953. His research methods were participant observation, interviews, conversations, and a kind of sociometric interview (see Little 1964, 196 and 198).

Little (1964, 200–202) found that the following informal norms regulated the behavior of the buddies.

1. A soldier had to “understand” his buddy. They became therapists to each other.
2. A soldier should not make the buddy relationship too “public” in the squad or in the platoon. (This was necessary to maintain the impression that every man in the squad was his buddy.)
3. A soldier should not boast of his combat skills or compare his actions to those of others. “The man who often boasted or expected recognition for his combat skills was considered the one most likely to forget, in a combat crisis, that he had a buddy and that buddies had to depend on each other.” (Little 1964, 201)
4. A soldier should not demand his buddy to make a choice between loyalty as a buddy and obligation to the formal organization (see Little 1964, 201).
5. Loyalty to a buddy was more important than loyalty to the formal military organization. In a crisis situation, the soldier had to think first of his loyalty to his buddy and only secondarily of his obligation to the formal military organization.

Little (1964, 202–204) found that in each platoon there were two roles that were given to some soldiers. “The dud” was a soldier who refused to do his share. “He was not called a dud because he lacked skill, or was awkward, or nervous. To such men the others always gave more help and attention” (Little 1964, 202). The dud often became the butt of jokes. He became isolated from the other men in the squad.

“The hero” was the opposite role. He wanted to do more than his share for the organization. He thought first of himself and only secondarily of other soldiers in his squad or in his platoon. Although the formal military organization rewarded the hero with decorations and awards, the men isolated him and in this way punished him for his behavior. Little tells that the man often changed his behavior.

“The range of behavior defined by the roles of dud and hero has an implication for the larger organization. The role of the dud defined the minimum performance standards of a member. Below those limits, his failure to perform involved a distortion of the functional integrity of the unit. The negative definition of the hero's role tended to discourage episodes of reckless, aggressive behavior which would exceed the support capability of the larger organization, and enabled it to function with predictable routines.” (Little 1964, 204)

Little speaks about the consequences of these norms for the official military organization. He says that they defined the limits of behavior. “The minimum contribution was that which fell below the standards exemplified by the dud. The maximum effect was that of

and beyond the actions of the hero. Within this range of expected behavior, the larger organization was able to function within predictable limits.” (Little 1964, 218)

Informal Group Norms in a British Infantry Company in the 1980s

In his book *Squaddies, Portrait of a Subculture* (1986) John Hockey describes a British infantry company from basic training to real action in Northern Ireland. Hockey collected the main part of his material by living three months during 1979–1980 with private soldiers of this rifle company. During this time the company was in barracks in the north of England, on exercise in Alberta, Canada, and in a security forces’ base during actual operations in Northern Ireland (Hockey 1986, 1). Hockey’s methods were participant observation, combined with discussions and interviews.

One important theme in Hockey’s book is to show that the social order in the military organization is not like Max Weber’s model of the bureaucratic organization, where order is based on hierarchy, rules, and sanctions. Hockey talks about “negotiated order”, where social order comes about as a result of “negotiations” between enlisted men and their officers, with both parties having to give back and be flexible to a certain extent.

In the Finnish WW II company that Pipping studied, especially NCOs were – Pipping observed – often in a position where their authority was not strong enough to get the men to obey immediately. Instead, the NCOs, who were reservists like their men, were forced to discuss the order with the men to get the work done.

Hockey describes an informal norm system, or “a normative code”, as he says, of the soldiers. He says that this normative code was the privates’ (not the officers’) unofficial norm system. It was related to their position at the bottom of the military hierarchy and the privates’ relations to their superiors (“us” and “them”) and the official norms. Hockey describes the norms that form this normative code and the sanctions that were used against those soldiers that did not conform to the norms.

The central principle in this normative code (or norm system) was that the privates had to “look after their mates”.

“This normative code can be summarized by stating the one overriding concern, articulated by privates themselves, namely ‘look after your mates’. Privates are concerned to provide support in various fashions, to their peers in all possible situations, in the face of internal (all those who hold superior rank) and external (the ‘enemy’) opposition. The operation of this overriding norm of ‘looking after your mates’ serves to classify as deviant all behavior, not conforming to its dictates.” (Hockey 1986, 123–124)

This general principle or norm included or consisted of several more specific norms, which were (1) giving mutual aid (reciprocity), (2) doing one’s share, (3) not getting other peers into trouble, (4) moderation, conforming to group standards, and (5) loyalty to peers. (Hockey 1986, 124.)

(1) The norm about mutual aid meant that all men had to help each other in all kinds of situations, helping each other against constraints or danger either from outside the organization (enemies) or within the organization. Hockey mentions such things as loaning money, covering a buddy whose absence from duty has been noticed by a superior, and helping a buddy in a dangerous situation during a patrol in Northern Ireland.

(2) The norm “doing one’s share” meant that everyone had to do his share of the work, whether it was a question of physical work in the barracks or accomplishing one’s responsibilities during a patrol. In the former case, everyone was expected to take part and do his equal share of even distasteful tasks in the barracks. In the latter case it meant being “switched on” and being alert, for instance checking one’s arc of fire, covering others, etc. (Hockey 1986, 124)

(3) The third norm said that one should not get peers into trouble. An example of getting peers in trouble or “dropping them in shit” is when some privates fail an equipment inspection and, as a consequence, the whole company has to stand a new inspection the next day. This kind of “fucking up” can be collective, as in the above example, or individual, and it can take place both in the barracks and garrison, or on patrol, where the consequences could be fatal. (Hockey 1986, 124–125)

(4) The fourth norm was about moderation in behavior, or conforming to a group standard. Being too energetic or zealous was negative if it caused undesired consequences for other privates.

“An excess of zeal by a peer was discouraged on the same grounds as those held by industrial workers, namely, that such behavior might result in the group suffering undesired consequences. Just as in industry where the ‘rate buster’ (a worker on piece rates whose output is so high that it leads to the employer reducing the rate paid for each unit of output) is disliked by his or her peers, so privates also viewed such individuals with a jaundiced eye.” (Hockey 1986, 125)

Here Hockey refers to the Hawthorne studies, where somewhat similar observations were made.

Pipping wrote that everyone was expected to show “a fair amount of courage”, and the men in his company ridiculed deserters who were brought back to the company by the military police. He told about private 148 who during a difficult battle phase stayed mainly near the field kitchen section feigning sickness. Later he was heard to tell about his experiences during battle. After this the field kitchen section was renamed “148’s front line”. Veterans of the company used this name three years after the incident. Pipping also wrote about men’s negative attitude toward soldiers who took unnecessary risks and thereby increased the risk for other soldiers.

(5) The fifth norm demanded loyalty to one’s peers. A soldier could be disloyal to another or others by not helping him, by stealing his property, or by “bubbling”, that is, by getting peers into trouble by informing on them to superiors. Hockey says that the loyalty that was demanded was not “monolithic”; there was variation as to who, for instance, deserved mutual aid or whose equipment one could or could not scrounge. Hockey says that in a

battalion privates insisted that they would not steal from members of their own company, but actually such things happened. Hockey says that actually one's own platoon was a group inside which it was really forbidden to "scrounge".

Conclusion

Some results from three empirical studies (Pipping 1947, 2008, Little 1964, Hockey 1986) about soldiers' informal group norms have been shortly presented above. Of these studies, Pipping's long-lost study about a WW II infantry company (1947) was published in English in 2008, making it available for the English readership sixty years after it was written. All these studies dealt with a small military unit at war or in war-like conditions. They all used methods like participant observation and interviews. It was shown in them that informal group norms had an important role in soldiers' behavior. Although these studies focused on different military units in different armies and in different kinds of conditions – from WW II to the 1980s, from a conscript and reservist army to a professional army – there seemed to be striking similarities in some of their results.

More research is needed to show whether these similarities were accidental or whether they could be found in other small military units in somewhat similar conditions. More research is also needed to find out whether these and other research results about soldiers' informal norms can be relevant when studying the relation between cohesion and performance.

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7 COHESION, REAL WAR, AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ORGANIZATION

Juha Mälkki

Why Effectiveness and Cohesion?

Cohesion is a multidisciplinary concept, as is well argued by Dr. Guy L. Siebold in this book. In this article, the theme of cohesion will be given a fresh meaning and significance in the context of warfare and fighting. Cohesion is a multidisciplinary concept but there is always a danger that it will lose its coherence if considered outside the context of the spheres of influence of social interaction and its affective and emotional domains. In this article, the purpose is not to mix the existing definitions of cohesion that are already well expressed in this book, but to analyze how cohesion might emerge in different organizations and how it might influence the effectiveness of the troops. These observations will, eventually, reveal new aspects of the theoretical models of cohesion as well. This article focuses on the concept of cohesion from two interrelated viewpoints. On the one hand, the concept of cohesion is not treated as a construct of military psychology but more as something related to traditional set-ups of sociology. In addition, the concept is connected to the discussions on military effectiveness that are at the core of the military art and sciences. The military organization is built for battle, as demonstrated by Dr. Reuven Gal in his article. In relation to this idea, the aim is to consider the theme of cohesion in the context of cultural ways of fighting wars, as there are always cultural differences and even national characteristics that might impede the generalization of the phenomena.

Effectiveness is understood in this article as a process whereby the military convert their animate and inanimate capacities into fighting power (Millet 1986). In addition, effectiveness is not understood as merely a presumption of future success, but rather as an analysis of the features that might have led to success during the battles. In this article, the concepts of effectiveness and cohesion are combined in order to understand organizational behavior in warfare, from preparing for battle until the actual battles. The focus is not on individuals and their survival, but on the possible influence of the activity of organizations on individuals. Furthermore, the aim is to describe the factors that might possibly impede and disturb cohesion, even when it has already proven to be excellent. In other words, this article sheds new light on the theme of vertical bonding and the role of organizational and institutional bonding.

It is well known that sociological set-ups are too easily understood as being either too broad or alternatively too narrow. The challenge lies in the combination of micro and macro approaches within the context of the armed forces. Actually, the void in the middle of these two approaches should be filled with academic discussion. Perhaps the theme of “cohesion” has potential in facilitating the implementation of strategic-level guidance for tactical-level action. At the very least, this would broaden our understanding of the coercive built-in forces and tensions that take place in any bureaucratic organization and that will eventually lead the members of the military organization to an ethos of self-sacrifice and unselfish behavior. This

“bonding” is of crucial importance, regardless of its methodological foundations in either qualitative or quantitative approaches. In fact, there is always a danger that the methodology used in the studies will eventually be more prominent than the research material itself. However, my intention is not to underrate the importance of primary group-level integration or a social cohesion that is based on interaction between individuals. The action competence (Toiskallio 2004) of the soldiers is naturally important in micro-sociological considerations. The problem lies in extending and generalizing the micro-sociological discoveries to cover the phenomenon at the level of entire organizations.

The structure of the article and the relations between the sections are based on the hermeneutical iteration of the theme of cohesion from theoretical considerations to the cultural and structural considerations of the military organization. The first section will provide the context for the cohesion. The main argument is based on Carl von Clausewitz’s ideas concerning extremities in war. In the next two sections, the effectiveness of military organizations is analyzed within the theme of cohesion. These sections are based on the views of operational art and the influence of warfare on human performance. The last short section proposes further studies, clarifying the possibilities for extending the area of interest with more comprehensive analyses addressing the theme of cohesion in the context of warfare, especially modern complex operations.

Clausewitz’s Extremities in War – A Context for Cohesion

Carl von Clausewitz recognized that every age has its own kind of war. This idea was recently quoted by Milan Vego, professor of operations in the Joint Military Operations Department at the U.S. Naval War College. He emphasized that there are still certain elements that do change over the time, like science, technology, and ideology. Naturally, warfare itself offers more questions than answers, as real warfare cannot be systematized, even if there is a strong will to do so (Vego 2011). Clausewitz had witnessed how the hours of waiting in the battlefield unexpectedly wore down the troops that were still waiting for a mission. He noted how the troops “burned” while preparing for a battle, and that when they should have performed the orders, they were already useless: there were only ashes left. Naturally, the level of anxiety during the first battles is higher than later on. In US Army Field Manual 22–51 (1994), it is argued that there is a crucial difference between soldiers fighting their first battle and soldiers with earlier experience. The distinction is based on how combat may influence true battle performance. Soldiers in their first battle have been reported to feel “high fear in battle” whereas the more experienced soldiers experience “low fear in action”. Naturally, “overstressed veterans” will eventually react to combat in a similar way as green soldiers in their first battle.

This example is important when trying to grasp the true nature of warfare and separate it from the experiences that should be understood as being the “war on paper”. In Clausewitz’s book *Vom Kriege*, war is understood as reciprocal human interaction. Clausewitz’s argumentation is interesting and probably timeless, especially so when the focus is on human experimentation. Actually, without interaction between the opponents, war should be referred to as slaughter and not war. The extremes (*Äußerste*) are separated into three different levels. The first “extreme” is based on the idea that war is a strategic or national (but also community) level

phenomenon. The second level of extremes is the phase when the belligerents are preparing to face each other as living forces (Clausewitz 1989, 75–77). This (intermediate) phase can be seen as a breakaway from the planning phase (war on paper) toward the experience of real war. The true aim of war is to overcome the enemy or to disarm him. Therefore, the potential of vertical bonding will be tested, as the organization will face its true (living) adversary and the chaos of warfare will be visible to all the members of the organization.

The third extreme exposes the genuine preparedness of the belligerents, putting their fighting ability to the test. Hence, the true effects become evident only when the living forces, or the collective of individuals, sufficiently increase their resistance vis-à-vis the adversary. It is actually this third extreme that is of the most crucial importance, because if the other belligerent (which is comprised of individuals) does not take the other “living force” seriously, it can find itself vulnerable to any kind of misfortune. This will happen if the adversary does not expect strong resistance (Clausewitz 1989, 75–77). It is at this level that the “buddy relationships” and the horizontal type of cohesions are tested and it is revealed whether the individuals are ultimately willing to rely on the primary groups of the organization (Little 1964, Mälkki 2008). Unfortunately, this is not a domain of cognitive delivery and there is hardly any empirical data on how individuals actually experience this level of extremity, as it is a domain of strong emotions and primitive types of human reactions. It is also a domain of traumatic stress and other psychological disorders. This level is truly the one that separates real war from war on paper.

The third level of cohesion reminds us of the permanent features of the battlefield – chaos, change, and friction – that dominate land operations as much today as when Clausewitz wrote about them after the Napoleonic wars (FM 3–0, 1–15). Friction is a useful term if one is trying to understand how the personal-level experience of war affects one’s judgment and cognitive abilities and performance. It is the true source of cognitive, emotional, and physical performance. Friction is the source of misjudgment, distortion, and other shortcomings of human efforts (Mälkki & Mälkki 2011).

It is possible that S.L.A. Marshall understood the importance of different levels of “bonds” between soldiers in his examination of infantrymen fighting during the Second World War. There are no references to Clausewitz’s extremes but the levels can be found in the argumentation. According to the studies by Marshall, the first priority in combat motivation was not the national ethos or political reasons, but the nearest comrade. The national ethos can be understood as being parallel to the idea behind Clausewitz’s first extremity, which is important but hardly visible in real war environments, where the presence of the “nearest comrade” is more important.

Marshall’s study *Men Against Fire* (1947) emphasized the importance of interpersonal relationships. Similar observations were presented by Roger Little in his article “Buddy Relations and Combat Performance” (1964), as well as in E.A. Shils & Morris Janowitz’s “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II” (1948). The last article is especially interesting, as it presents an important observation that it was cohesion, not ideology, that made the *Wehrmacht* fight so furiously during the later phases of the war. The American observers could not find any truly rational reason for the behavior of the Germans,

as the missions lacked strategic-level sense. According to Shils & Janowitz, the Nazi ideology was, therefore, only of minor importance to the performance of the military.

Naturally, one must bear in mind that the German POWs that were interviewed were well aware of the fate of their *Vaterland* and the future of Nazi ideology. Their answers might have been very different indeed had they been asked in the year 1940, just after the collapse of the French resistance. An individual's immediate group was supported by the sense of power offered by the organization. It must be kept in mind that those soldiers were part of an invincible organization, and that must have been a significant factor in forming superior fighting spirit, even if the effective strength in the battlefield was usually unfavorable to the Germans. In the later phases of the war, when the tide of the war had turned against the Nazi regime and it had become apparent that the Germans did not have military supremacy, the self-esteem of the soldiers shrunk. This probably had less to do with the poor condition of uniforms and the feeling of being dirty, as Shils & Janowitz suggested, than with the realization of the inevitable destiny of the *Vaterland*.

Meanwhile, Finland was affected by the traumatic memory of the civil war that had torn the nation into two opposing groups (in 1918). Politics was avoided, especially by those who had lost the war, because the nation was not ready to deal with all those memories. In Finland, it was feared that political issues would paralyze the entire citizen soldier army, making it incapable of fighting for Finland. These kinds of fears were still in the air in the late 1930s, on the eve of the Winter War. Hence, it was believed that the true military potential built up over two decades was inadequate. The assault launched by the Soviet Union, starting the Winter War, provided an ideological rationale for the operations of the military. During the Second World War, it was not fashionable to talk about politics, although everybody knew where the true enemy was and how that enemy was different in terms of politics, ideology, and religion (Mälkki 2008). Naturally, the role of ideologies and politics to an individual soldier in everyday speech and especially in the battlefield is under constant transformation and therefore depends on the environment and situation.

In our own time, politics and ideologies play a prominent role in discussions, even in military affairs. According to Morris Janowitz, this is a consequence of the conduct of modern warfare, where ideological and political explanations might have a strong foothold in military affairs (Janowitz 1959, 15–20). This might be the case in modern complex operations, where experiences of close combat and its devastating effect on the human psyche (third extremity) have become more unexpected than natural phenomena (Wass de Czege 2000).

In his article, Reuven Gal brings to light a very important subject, namely, the importance of the human factor in thousands of books that have been written about battle. Even more important is his idea that the best descriptions are provided by non-combatants. One example he mentions is the works of Stephen Crane (1871–1900), and especially his book *The Red Badge of Courage. An Episode of the American Civil War* (1900). Crane never experienced the battlefield, but he did manage to discover the essence of a military organization, especially the unofficial features that are usually indiscernible to observers who do not belong to the organization and especially to its social networks.

The Red Badge of Courage was turned into a film in 1951, in the middle of the Korean War. The lead actor was Audie Murphy, a well-known American war hero who had fought in the Second World War. He had the honor of playing a “young” and inexperienced soldier in the American Civil War who flees from the frontline during his first battle. The film deeply examines the themes of fear, horror, and anxiety, along with the themes of pride and shame (also presented by Dr. Reuvel Gal in this book). It is interesting to discover that Murphy suffered from PTSD symptoms after the war. The hero turned out to be only human, after all. The ethos of pride and shame can similarly be found in other military cultures as well, such as the Finnish army during the Second World War, as will be demonstrated in the next section. According to the Finnish Army Regulation concerning garrison duty (1929), honor was a soldier’s most precious treasure. In addition, many soldiers in the Finnish military also had feelings of guilt and shame (Mälkki 2008, 175–176).

Organizational “Tension” or Vertical Cohesion?

History is full of events where a single serious blow has shaken the foundations of the whole armed forces. Strong and impressive peacetime armies have performed poorly during real battle operations. Some interpretative conclusions can be drawn from the social cohesion of small groups. That said, areas that are more comprehensive, namely, those in which the mentalities of the armed forces are forged, provide even more interesting findings. Naturally, these observations are largely based on cultural-level considerations. Actually, in Finland during the early 20th century, people were typically suspicious of those from other provinces and even had aggressive feelings toward them (Mälkki 2008). Knut Pipping noted that “home district groups” were important in forming social groups (Pipping 2008), but it should be understood that their role in present-day Finland is different. The idea of “we” versus “them” became deeply rooted in the Finnish military during the Second World War.

The study *The American Soldier* (Stouffer et. al. 1949) observed the attitudes of individuals, but not the military culture itself. The role of citizen soldiers was to accept the dominance of the military ethos, discipline, and hierarchical methods. It is interesting to notice that Knut Pipping criticized the approach taken in *The American Soldier* study. He was convinced that, to the lowest levels of the army, the informal organization was more important than the formal organization. He suspected that the study deliberately neglected features that would have revealed something about the organization that might have been unfavorable to the military. The other case that Pipping presented concerned the limits of scientific explanation within the disciplines that were in charge of doing the study. It is quite apparent that Pipping did not use psychological methods (Pipping 2008, 56). Such methods could be used in such a way that they provided predetermined answers from the empirical material. That said, it may well be that *The American Soldier* systematically neglected the unofficial organization because the researchers were well aware of the critical and even impudent attitudes of the “micro-level” organization, which were not fit for print at that time.

The theme of “the other social group” (or peer group) is important in Knut Pipping’s work *Infantry Company as a Society* (originally published in 1947) and in another famous Finnish publication, namely Väinö Linna’s (sociological) novel *The Unknown Soldier* (1954). The theme of connecting the informal and formal organization should be treated within the

theme of vertical cohesion, namely in the context of considering the bonding of the different levels of the organization together with different kinds of measures. One identifies “the other social group” after one realizes what “our own group” is. Hence, the participant is more committed to one group and is likely to treat the other group with caution or even with hostility. At least, this was the case in the Finnish Army during the Second World War, where there were two different communities within the same organization. These communities were the official and the unofficial organizations. The former was the official military organization with its official hierarchy and military ideals. The latter was the unofficial organization whose norms and values were closer to the norms and values of a civilian community than to those of the military (Mälkki 2008).

The tension between these groups was a major source of friction inside the military organization. Linna’s book remains almost inconceivably popular to this day because it attempts to define and legitimize the informal organization and to distinguish it from the formal organization. Both Linna and Pipping had experienced socialization into the military and they both witnessed battle several times. They understood that the process of turning civilians into soldiers was not achieved by the official norms and regulations but with the assistance of the peer group. They took a “grassroots” view of the official organization, as they shared the idea that the other group comprised those who have a more official role in the military, for example the professional military NCOs and officers. This kind of division had been common in the Finnish military since the early 1920s. The conscription army was, even so, “a band of civilians” in military uniform and therefore the norms and habits dictated by military regulations were considered strange by those who were supposed to obey them unconditionally (Janowitz 1959, Mälkki 2008).

Hence, the miracle of the Winter War is a myth, as the great performance of the Armed Forces was not the outcome of iron discipline or the miraculous unification of the nation due to the war. Unexpectedly, the battle performance of the conscripted / citizen soldiers was amazingly courageous. Unfortunately, the myth has turned into a legend as the majority of the veterans of the war have passed away. It is interesting to discover that among the conscripts / citizen soldiers, the iron discipline of the military was understood as a matter that would only concern privates, who were treated like ignorant children by the older citizen soldiers. The process of socialization would, eventually, raise their status, but that would take several months during peacetime training and perhaps weeks during wartime. Likewise, the battle performance of the privates was understood to be poor, because the privates had not yet learned that the highest level of performance was based on the understanding that the main burden of the battle was shouldered by the citizen soldiers and not by the regular army. Therefore, the norms of the regular army should be understood to be only descriptive and not normative (Linna 1954, Mälkki 2008, Pipping 2008). The privates were actually treated, among the older soldiers, like regular army soldiers. This was because they were still naïve soldiers who did not understand that mastering the mechanical aspects of soldiering did not guarantee success or even survival in real warfare (Linna 1954, Mälkki 2008).

At the top of the hierarchy of the citizen soldiers, there were the “old men” or mature citizen soldiers who experienced (collectively) their position as full members of the military and as an opposite force to the professional military. In a way, they understood their position inside the army as being out-and-out representatives of ordinary society. Therefore, the citizen

soldier army had a peculiar appearance during the Second World War, and particularly during the Winter War (Mälkki 2008). Actually, the miraculous effectiveness of the Finnish Army during the Second World War did not materialize out of nowhere on the eve of the war. In fact, the process of constructing the informal organization, the organization of citizen soldiers, had played a decisive role during the interwar years. Citizen soldiers were barely tolerated during the first years of conscription training and the military kept a close watch on their behavior in the garrison. The reason for this was the bloody civil war in 1918 that ripped the whole country into polarized parties. There were constant threats of revolutionary action in Finland. The distinction between “gentlemen” and “lads” was present in society well after the Second World War, and “the other” and “otherness” still played a role in informal social bonding. Their relationship was hostile, with a constant threat of conflict that could erupt even during real battles. It must be kept in mind that the features of any military are based on cultural-level characteristics that should not be generalized. In addition, the era itself involves unique features and conditions that constructed the specific features of the time.

The confrontation between the regular army and the conscripts has features that are not pleasant to analyze. The true faces of “vertical bonding” were perhaps not based on the idea of (soft) caring and respect. That said, the examples should not be interpreted too hastily. Nevertheless, the unwritten method of bonding the citizen soldiers and the professional soldiers together was based on combining both extreme severity and kindness in communication. Actually, similar methods were used in Germany (Shils & Janowitz 1948). If severity was overemphasized as a method during battles, the conscripts were dissatisfied. Knut Pipping offers one dramatic example where one army captain would have been shot had he dared to come close to the front line. This captain was understood to be a “man killer” and therefore he was not respected, but hated (Pipping 2008, 166). Such unofficial norms are alarming, but we should judge this case in the context of the Finnish armed forces during the Second World War, where the major social groups confronted each other every day, although this did not always erupt into violence. As a means of vertical bonding, this kind of “duel” between the regular army and its civilian soldiers was not particularly effective, if it is compared to the highly consistent ethos and identity fostered by professional armies. The true face of vertical cohesion was, at least in Finland, marked by tension and even hostile feelings, but that did not prevent the citizen soldiers and the professional soldiers from uniting their strength against the enemy of the nation (Mälkki 2008).

During wartime, the only change in the Finnish military personnel was the amount of reservists that joined the ranks in wartime as the small peacetime organization expanded into a huge wartime organization. Even nowadays, the organization of the Finnish Defence Forces is structurally similar in both peacetime and wartime, including both professional and non-professional soldiers. The informal organization is still there, although nobody really knows its true character. Call-up will eventually reveal the true potential of the military, if the military is based on conscription (Mälkki 2008). This was not the case in the U.S. military, because it did not become a citizen army until halfway through the Second World War. Therefore, the U.S. military had problems with their citizen soldiers simply because the regular armed forces were not used to dealing with the habits and values of normal society

(Stouffer 1965, 74–75). The process of turning civilians into professional soldiers will, eventually, take years. This time is needed to separate the individuals from their previous (civilian) lives (Janowitz 1966, 127).

Cultural differences can be revealing. For example, American observers could not understand why the Germans were so stubborn in their defense of some islands in the English Channel in the final stage of the Second World War. The observers could not find any rational reason for this behavior, as the missions lacked a strategic-level purpose. A probable reason was that the fear of disgrace elicited an emotional reaction that improved battle performance (Mälkki 2008). Perhaps this is the main reason why German discipline had a certain reputation for ruthlessness; the role of the German soldier was merely to submit to the process of being treated as an object (Shils & Janowitz, 1985). There are, thus, other explanations, as will be explained in the next section.

Effectiveness – Task Cohesion?

Robert MacCoun and colleagues (2005) claimed that social cohesion and task cohesion should be more clearly separated. Their paper criticized an interesting investigation by Leonard Wong and others (2003) entitled *Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War*. According to MacCoun's arguments, social cohesion should be seen as something that exists in groups whose members like each other and feel emotionally close to one another. Task cohesion, on the contrary, should be understood as referring to the "shared commitment among members for achieving a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group" (MacCoun, Kier, & Belkin 2005). Naturally, without tasks, there would be no military units. In addition, the military needs a clearly defined adversary (see: Laitila 1989). War is a clash of human will (Clausewitz 1989) and therefore every military organization needs a clear definition of the enemy.

It could make sense that task cohesion and the idea behind "shared commitment" should be understood as being dependent on the tasks that are given by the upper level of leadership. The commitment should, therefore, be understood as a requirement for the organization to demonstrate its combat effectiveness willingly. Obviously, cultural differences make it impossible to draw generalizations about organizational commitment. In other words, the given task itself should be understood as being the primary source for the behavior of the whole organization. The shift from focusing on the observation of individuals to a more comprehensive approach involving the action of all military organizations is confusing and too broad to be justified in only a few sentences. Still it is the mission or the task that will eventually determine the nature of the action that the organization, and therefore the individual, will encounter. It could be seen as a source of the compelling force that makes the organization functional (Janowitz 1959). In addition, the task will determine the actual conduct in the environment where the troops will be in action and where they should share the commitment to the group and with the group. This aspect will be analyzed in greater detail in the next section. Naturally, human behavior and group cohesion will have a crucial impact on how the tasks will be carried out, but this does not diminish the importance of the tasks that are given and the importance of vertical cohesion that will, eventually, be tested in battle.

Knut Pipping emphasized the importance of organizations as social unities. His study was based on observing a company rather than a battalion or a platoon. The company level was important, because it was the organization where “work, accommodation, supply and maintenance and holidays were determined”. The company was the inner group for the soldiers (Pipping 2008, 47) and the basis for social structures. Nevertheless, the battalion level is not neglected in Pipping’s study. This level was significant when the organization faced the enemy. The battalion was an important unit during the Second World War, especially in the context of the Finnish Army. Therefore, companies were not given names such as “commander’s favorite”, as was the case with battalions. The actual evaluation of the performance of the battalion was understood to be important, especially if a battalion had performed badly during the latest battles. This was the case during the battles in the Karelian theater of war in Ihantala (summer 1944) when one battalion was badly scattered. Pipping argues: “thus the attitudinal model of the 2nd Battalion’s men was to look down upon the 1st Battalion. This attitude became weaker in the long run, because the men came to see that the 2nd battalion did not differ particularly from the 1st Battalion” (Pipping 2008, 207). This is interesting “evidence” on how the effectiveness of task cohesion is translated into the performance of military units and vice versa. This same phenomenon was earlier in this article described as the process of making the “other” appear to be the opposite of “us”.

In his book, Pipping describes the importance of social cohesion at the company level and the crucial significance of task cohesion in estimating general military capabilities. Social cohesion helped individuals survive the battles, and especially the devastating influence of the Clausewitzian third extremity. It helped individuals to understand the demands of the official organization. According to Finnish practice, anyone could argue about the rationality of the tasks and compare them. Just after the Russian Army had launched its massive attack against the Finnish front lines in early June 1944, some of the units began leveling serious criticisms against the other units and even mocked them. Both the leaders and the rank and file accused each other of being responsible for the Finnish Army’s bad performance. The negative accusations were considered to be fatal to the whole organization, and the Army Headquarters forbid any criticism, fearing that it could paralyze the effectiveness of the whole army (Mälkki 2008, 274). This was actually proof of the activity and the process of forming “the other” that would encourage troops to be better than “the other”. Task cohesion was extremely high, as was proven during the crucial and heavy battles fought in late June and in early July.

In our own time, the Iraqi military defeat was understood as being the result of low task cohesion. The Regular Army soldiers are said to be motivated by coercion. This is not surprising, as the media have reinforced the view that this kind of phenomenon is true. Fear of the dreadful Baath Party is said to be their true motivator, in a negative way (Wong 2003, 6-7). The report did, ultimately, pay only little attention to the cultural ideas that were behind the willingness to fight against the Coalition. The Western way of attributing meaning to the battle and to matters concerning pride, shame, and dignity cannot be claimed to be universal. Especially, the personal status of citizens particular to Western nations cannot be generalized to cultures that are mainly based on loose connections between tribes and regions. Thus, it is necessary to ask whether we can actually determine and define a universal meaning for the concept of cohesion.

Effectiveness and Cohesion during Military Operations

Military tasks will eventually determine the use of troops and force in a certain time and place. The use of a military organization in operations is a deadly serious business, because of its violent potential and its destructive power to the human body and mind as well as to entire organizations. Military history is full of evidence of situations where a party has found itself unable to continue the battle or may even have drifted into a state of imbalance and faced total destruction. The battle of Cannae is perhaps the most famous historical battle of this kind – the entire Roman army was destroyed in only one single battle. On this occasion, like in so many similar episodes, the qualitative or quantitative differences between the parties were not evident, and thus no one could foresee the outcome of the events on the eve of the battle. If the theme of tasks in the previous section is broadened to include the actual influence of the environment, the adversary, and the other conditions of the battle, there will be even more answers and further questions concerning the pressure that the military mission will cause to the military organization.

There are always explanations for misfortunes in war, but they are usually based on analyzing the physical lines of the operations and seldom on the actual psychological effects that these lines of operations caused to the battle performance of the troops. Task cohesion might be understood as referring to the “shared commitment among members for achieving a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group” (MacCoun, Kier, & Belkin 2005). These collective efforts will be tested during reciprocal action, but an even more crucial test will be faced when the troops are maneuvering in the theater of war, as this will inevitably influence the troops. The tolerance of the troops is, naturally, based on their battle experience, as suggested earlier in this article. How, then, is it possible that some troops are exposed to stressors even though they have not faced the true nature of the war? During the Gulf War, a number of sailors suffered PTSD symptoms although they did not participate in the actual battles (Ikin et al. 2005). Perhaps these experiences had further intensified the cohesive effects among the troops, even though they were produced by unfavorable conditions.

In western military writings, there are only few propositions made concerning the influence of the battlefield and the positions of troops in relation to the adversary. Common sense might lead one to suggest that the troops that are situated deep in the enemy's rear areas, having only minor contact with other friendly troops, face more enervating circumstances than those that are safely in garrison areas. One might even suggest, according to common sense, that a situation in any military operation where the lines of communication are cut off and the troops are in danger of being surrounded by the enemy is to be understood as a critical situation. These feelings are in fact described in Sunzi's famous book *The Art of War*, written thousands of years ago. He describes nine types of terrain that have a different meaning and different influence on military performance. Sunzi argues: “according to the method of waging war, there are the following types of terrain: dispersed, easy, contested, intersecting, having a crossroads, encumbered, unfavourable, surrounded, desperate” (Sunzi 2007, 117). In this article, it does not make sense to explain all these mysterious “terrains” but to focus on two of them due to their current relevance, namely, surrounded and encumbered terrain.

According to Sunzi, our troops will be in encumbered terrain when they “enter deeply into the territory of the foe and are next to his walled cities and town”. Desperate terrain is the one “where my army will survive if we quickly do battle but will perish if we hesitate” (Sunzi 2007, 118). These terrains are not just the relative geographical positions of friendly forces and the adversary, but also positions that will eventually cause widespread influences that will affect the whole organization. This will eventually influence the cohesion of the troops at every level.

The military is willing to find such desperate terrains because those would ensure that the troops will have the possibility to fight properly. Earlier in this article it was described how the American observers could not find any truly rational reasons for the behavior of the German military during the later phases of the war, as the missions lacked strategic-level sense. Similar observations were made during the Soviet general offensive in the Karelian Isthmus (Finland) during the summer of 1944. The Finns put up unexpectedly fierce resistance in the Bay of Vyborg and Äyräpää. These were not just names on the map but suitable terrains for battles involving “desperate” fighting. In the Bay of Vyborg, the battles were mainly fought on a little island called Teikari. The only way the troops could retreat was to swim. In Äyräpää, the Finns were defending a beachhead that was only a hundred meters wide, with a broad river at their back. Again, one would have needed to swim long distances in order to flee. The troops had to fight because they could not retreat. Perhaps the high effectiveness of the troops was based on superior cohesion, but it surely was not because of their own choice, but due to circumstances. Therefore, it is important to recognize that heroism during military operations is not always a matter of superior discipline or training or even excellent cohesion, as there are also terrestrial and other conditions that might have an even more profound influence on battle performance (Mälkki 2011).

The U.S. military (as well as Finnish and other troops in Afghanistan) are suffering from different syndromes than their predecessors during the Second World War and the Korea War, when battles were fought in symmetric environments. The focus has shifted from fighting the battles to preventing casualties during the operations. Battles are over before they have even begun, as the enemy tends to flee rather than fight. This leads to frustration, as the military is always preparing to shift from the Clausewitzian second extremity and its reciprocal-type of action to the third extremity, where the living forces of the belligerents will sufficiently increase their resistance vis-à-vis the adversary. What the military wants is something similar to Sunzi’s “desperate terrain”, where you have to fight in order to survive. This would ease the pain and stress of waiting for battle and release the tension.

This is not possible, however, as the enemy have understood their situation as unequal, dissymmetric. Therefore, they have to fight asymmetric warfare, which will eventually lead to situations where the western troops will face “encumbered” terrain. That has already led to situations where the troops are at risk of enemy attacks but can hardly respond to the threat, as that would require a more aggressive policy toward the civilian population – which is in fact helping to hide the adversary. Sunzi actually recommends practicing pillage in this type of terrain, perhaps because it causes frustration to the attacker. This might be just what is happening in those operations, at least mentally if not physically, but we should not blame the soldiers for their misbehavior. Rather we should blame the designers and planners of war for causing such incidents.

Perhaps the education for soldiers on asymmetric and complex missions should be more culture-oriented and concerned with understanding foreign cultures instead of focusing on trying to solve crises by violent means. These ideas may sound like platitudes, but we must bear in mind that modern complex operations might be too demanding for any military, especially if they are long term. Perhaps it is only logical that the general attitude of American soldiers abroad is hostile against the natives (Moskos 2004). The massacre of My Lai during the Vietnam War was a manifestation of positive cohesion that led to negative outcomes, even several decades after the actual incident. The reasons for that kind of cruelty and even the reasons for the atrocities in Abu Ghraib prison during the aftermath of the Iraq War were not merely coincidental. These actions were done in “terrain” that was more “encumbered” than “easy”. More attention needs to be paid to the psychology of the troops in certain “terrains” in order to foresee possible misunderstandings during actual operations.

Proposals for Further Studies

Cohesion has been previously presented in the light of macro-sociological considerations and especially with a focus on organizational effectiveness. There have been no efforts to try to link psychology-oriented studies with the observations that were made in this article. Perhaps the articles of this book will, eventually, contribute to establishing that link. However, it might be even more topical to study the link between the effects of different operational environments on group cohesion and the action competence of the individual soldiers, a topic that has to date remained unexplored. We should be able to provide tools that are more practical for the military planners in order to prevent unnecessary human suffering on both sides of the conflict. These subjects are extremely important, as it might be even more difficult to justify military operations in the future. This is because the gap between the military and civilians is growing, especially in nations with all-volunteer recruitment (Mills 2011).

Military effectiveness is always based on relative success between two or more organizations. Effectiveness, therefore, depends on gaining an advantage over the other party. Success in battle might not be a true indicator of significant effectiveness, if the adversary continues fighting in spite of heavy casualties. Effectiveness might be perceived through cohesion, provided that its definition is broadened to cover the military action, the reciprocal action (with different levels of “extremities of war”), and the environmental and conditional aspects as well. This might shed light on the inefficient concepts of system thinking (Vego 2011) that have dominated the field of military studies during the past decade. The question is not how effectiveness and destructive power should be guaranteed by technological superiority, but how the adversary’s cohesion should be understood as a cultural and organizational-level challenge. Reciprocal action during military operations always involves two organizations that have their own cultural ways of understanding cohesion. The adversaries will unavoidably influence our own cohesion as well because in war nobody is fully protected and nothing will remain untouched.

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8 UNIT COHESION – THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Mikael Salo¹

A Standard Model of Unit Cohesion: An Overview

Cohesion is a dynamic, constantly changing, and developing product of *social integration* generated by positive social and task-related relationships among members (peers and leaders) and their shared, uniting experiences as members of specific groupings (e.g., nested group, organization, and institution). Specifically, it is created through an ongoing social integration process involving members of the primary group, group leaders, and the larger secondary organizations of which the group is a part. This view places cohesion within a larger perspective and facilitates the identification of significant connections with organizational behavior and processes.

Unit cohesion comprises several components based on different structural relationships: horizontal or peer bonding among members on the same hierarchical level, vertical bonding between those on different levels, and organizational bonding (e.g., between unit members and their larger organizational entities) (Griffith 1988; Siebold & Kelly 1988a, 1988b).

Hierarchically, the model comprises two main levels, primary-group and secondary-group cohesion. Primary-group cohesion includes peer and leader-subordinate cohesion. On the other hand, secondary-group cohesion comprises *organizational cohesion* created through the bonding of the personnel with their closest higher organization such as the unit or department, and *institutional cohesion* denoting the degree to which the group members identify with their organization's institutional characteristics. Alternatively, cohesion could be evaluated on the primary-group level based on the combined strength of social and task cohesion. Whereas *social cohesion* builds on the affective, emotional relationships between group members and leaders, *task cohesion* is influenced by the quality of the instrumental, task-related functions that extend to the unit level (Figure 1).

Overall, the social-integration model posits two dimensions of cohesion. Primary-group cohesion builds on the affective, emotional relationships existing between the members and the leaders and is influenced by the quality of the group's instrumental, task-related functions (as defined by Griffith 1988; Siebold & Kelly 1988a, 1988b). On the other hand, secondary-group cohesion, although both affective and instrumental, depends on the exchange of various benefits and the sense of purpose generated by the organization to secure loyalty and obedience from the group members. Together these components and dimensions constitute a psychological force field that binds the members to the group and to the organization, and represents nested foci that an individual can commit to or bond with.

¹ This article is based on an academic dissertation (Salo 2011). Earlier the article was presented as a paper at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS), Chicago, 22-24 October 2011.




Figure 1. Cohesion Components

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The valence and magnitude of unit cohesion is influenced by the attractiveness of and satisfaction with the group and the unit, its members, and activities. Based on the model, cohesion is a product of the total field of uniting forces that could be assessed in terms of the degree of bonding with peers, leaders, and subordinates among group members, and their attachment to their membership and the organizational characteristics of the unit to which they formally or informally belong or operate with.

In other words, cohesion is created through a series of uniting forces that encourage (a) social and (b) task cohesion on the primary-group level, and (c) organizational, (d) institutional and even (e) national/societal cohesion on the secondary level. Theoretically, each component independently influences group members' identification with one another and with the

group as a whole. In sum, the combination of the components and dimensions represents the *multidimensional paradigm of unit cohesion* (Figure 2).



Figure 2. The Standard Model of Unit Cohesion

The standard model of unit cohesion exemplifies the forces and mechanisms at each level that make people identify with and commit to the unit, its members, and the larger institution. Each component represents a unique set of individual positive sources that motivate members to stick with their nested primary and secondary groups. Moreover, each component serves distinctive purposes in the social-integration process and facilitates satisfaction with unit membership.

Theoretical Implications Based on the Cohesion Model

The standard model supports the existing literature on cohesion and organizational commitment suggesting that an individual could commit to one or several levels of membership at the same time (e.g., Ellemers 2001; Meyer & Allen 1997). However, the motives for making such commitments are not necessarily identical, and individuals in a group may be united with their team and their unit for totally different reasons. In addition, the cohesion components seem to develop as a function of different predictors despite the variables that explain more than one type of cohesion. In all, the relative importance of particular antecedents varies among the types of cohesion and based on the organizational situation.

A group has its unique set of cohesion components. Moreover, each member bonds with the characteristics of the unit in a unique way. It would be useful in future research to examine and compare the personal bonding *profiles* that reflect varying degrees of the components.

These profiles may form clusters that could be further examined in terms of their predictors and consequences in organizational membership.

The components and their dimensions constitute the building blocks for effective social integration, and future studies should identify the favorable combinations of these elements. However, it should be bear on mind that the components are distinct and independent, there are units in which strong cohesion in one component does not necessarily result in positive cohesion in another. For example, strong social and task cohesion do not guarantee strong organizational or institutional cohesion in the unit.

Associations between cohesion measures are to a certain extent, reciprocal, and some components may share other connections in different circumstances. For example, the basic assumption is that social cohesion develops more rapidly than task cohesion, and once the group members have created strong task cohesion it reinforces their social cohesion. Thus, more research is needed in order to further define the similarities and differences in the predictors, components, and outcomes of unit cohesion in diverse situations.

Future research could also unify and test the diverse *measures and models* of unit cohesion (see Carron 1982; Carron, Brawley, & Widmeyer 1998; Carron & Chelladurai 1981; Carron, Widmeyer, & Brawley 1985; Griffith 1988, 2002; Hogg 1987, 1992; Siebold 1996, 1999, 2006; Zaccaro 1981, 1991; Zaccaro & Lowe 1988; Zaccaro & McCoy 1988) that typically emphasize the primary-group level. These could then be further compared with the dimensions identified literature on the organizational commitment (e.g., Meyer & Allen 1997) that focuses on the secondary group (typically on the individual level of analysis). Moreover, in contexts in which the organization also has a national purpose, the research could investigate levels of nationalism and patriotism. All these different measures should be tested in accordance with their attitudinal, behavioral, and performance criteria.

The bonds that keep the group united are different from the bonds that keep it goal-oriented and functional in performance. As a simple distinction an *action* requires a certain direction and preferably clear goals for cooperation, teamwork, and collective performance, whereas the *social component* depends on the members' satisfaction with the quality of the on-going relationships. However, the best outcomes are likely when both dimensions (i.e., affective, social component and instrumental, action/task component) are well organized and when all the cohesion components are in balance. The two functions are mutually supportive in a well-balanced, cohesive group, resulting in satisfaction with interpersonal relationships and a willingness to participate in and contribute to the group activities. The implication is that the organization benefits from maintaining a balance between group functions and cohesion components, and therefore it would be useful to consider all possible ways of supporting the cohesion structures in the units.

As long as the cohesion components are congruent, the individual is in harmony with the unit membership. However, if the components are not in balance, there may be forces that pull the group members in different directions. For example, in a situation in which a group has strong peer cohesion but weak leader-subordinate, organizational, and institutional cohesion, there is a risk that the members will become alienated from the "normal flow" of the unit and start to act in unproductive and even harmful ways from the perspective

of unit management. Future research could further examine *unbalanced cohesion structures* in groups, and their effects on shared mental models, organizational-citizenship behavior, and group performance. Moreover, the investigation of cohesive, unproductive groups and gangs would enhance understanding of social cohesion and the influence of norms, informal leadership, and social relationships on group dynamics.

Cohesion has its origin in *group processes* (Zaccaro 1981), and therefore the situation may define the ideal pattern of integrating forces and determine the valence, direction, and effect of the forces acting upon the group members. Future research should pay attention to the particular situation in the unit and between the groups because the degree of cohesion and the relative value of each component vary depending on the characteristics or developmental stage of the group. Future research should therefore also take into account group-level moderators of cohesion such as size, type, functions, task characteristics, and goals. Different situational characteristics could be considered, such as having a simple task under a clear authority, having several tasks and multiple leaders, and having no tasks and no official leaders. Different types of groups could also be included, such as low- vs. high-status groups, small and homogeneous groups vs. large and more heterogeneous units, and stable groups vs. units that have a higher turnover and more changes in personnel.

Cohesion is influenced by (a) factors that persuade an individual to seek group membership, (b) the quality of interpersonal relationships and of the leadership, (c) the rewards and prestige attached to unit membership, and (d) the factors that make the individual stay in the group as a productive member. Research could focus on whether these basic reasons for unit membership vary as a function of the situational factors mentioned above.

The type of cohesion influences the processes and characteristics that are favored in the group, and therefore research could reveal what kind of influences group cohesion has on routines, norms, and leadership. For example, cohesion strongly fosters altruism, task orientation, good conduct, and positive attitudes toward the organization, staying in the group, and turning membership into a career. Given these positive outcomes, it would be worth analyzing the possible indicators of low cohesiveness such as disintegration of the group, violence and harassment within it, tardiness or absence, and deviant behavior and lack of conformity among the members to find out whether these and other negative group phenomena are directly related to cohesion or moderated by some other situational factors.

The relation between cohesion and performance is well established (Evans & Dion 1991; Gully, Devine, & Whitney 1995; Mullen & Copper 1994; Oliver 1988; Oliver, Harman, Hoover, Hayes, & Pandhi 1999). However, more research is required in order to understand the effect of the different components of cohesion on (a) self-efficacy or perceived personal performance, (b) collective efficacy or perceived group performance, (c) measured personal performance, and (d) measured group performance. Controlling for the viable moderating factors should yield theoretically and practically useful results. The causal relation between cohesion and performance would also be an interesting research topic. Cohesion may encourage group members to work harder and perform better, which in turn enhances performance, increases satisfaction with group membership, and strengthens the cohesiveness of the group. Performance success may also encourage more people to

participate in activities or to apply for group membership, and thus may even have an influence prior to membership through facilitating initial bonding.

Cohesion is essentially a group attribute or property (Carron & Brawley 2000; Hogg 1992), whereas bonding and commitment refer to the individual properties of an association (Siebold 1993; Siebold & Lindsay 1999). As a group phenomenon, the cohesion composite could be assessed, for example, (a) within a group, (b) across groups on the same lateral level, (c) between groups on different levels, (d) within the unit, and (e) between the units (cf. Siebold 1993; Siebold & Lindsay 1999). It would also be useful to establish which level of cohesion is most crucial in terms of the personal satisfaction of members as well as group performance among teams (3–10 people) or small departments / workgroups (10–40 people). If there are more than 40 people, where is the line between primary- and secondary group bonding? It would also be worth investigating whether there are consistent differences in cohesion components among the different types of groups depending on recruitment, selection and socialization process, and the organizational rules and regimentation. Such differences are likely to affect the interpersonal relationships, norms, and cohesion in a given group, and call for more attention in longitudinal, multi-level analyses.

The double arrow in the standard model of cohesion (Figure 2) represents the *linking-pin leader* (Likert 1961) who transfers organizational goals and requirements to the individual level of group life, and conversely transmits the needs of the group to the organizational-management level. He or she represents the secondary group in his or her team, and correspondingly is the representative of the team in organizational events and meetings. Research on leadership could address the following research questions, for example. What kind of leadership creates strong social and task cohesion in the group? What kind of leadership links the group members with the organization and its purpose? What is the influence of the properties of cohesion on leadership? What are the best practices that leaders could use during the different stages of the group process? How can a leader survive in a situation in which the group is falling apart due to internal or external reasons?

There are also situations in which the group members carry out tasks and maintain the production rate without any input from the leader. It would therefore be useful to study *unsuccessful leaders* who have no meaningful impact on the satisfaction and performance of their followers. Conversely, successful leadership may result in a situation in which the members of a cohesive group are highly motivated to achieve their shared goals with minimal supervision (Zazanis, Zaccaro, & Kilcullen 2001), and research aimed at identifying leadership behavior that leads to such a situation would be worthwhile. Official organizational representatives such as commanders and higher executives could also be assessed in terms of their direct and indirect effects on performance, retention, satisfaction, and organizational and institutional bonding in their units.

However, the main factors and variables that determine organizational and institutional cohesion are not yet well-defined. The theory and research on cohesion, social identity, and commitment could therefore be applied in order to enhance understanding of the processes and variables that lead to secondary-group cohesion in organizations. In more practical terms, future research could explore how organizational cohesion is created in various social and organizational entities. One option would be to investigate whether group members'

attitudes and behavior vary as a function of organizational differences in terms of size, unit structure, span of control, information flow, hierarchical levels, management, personnel policy, resources, and/or climate and atmosphere.

Practical Recommendations for Improving Social Integration in Small Units

Aspects of the group-formation process are of relevance in the construction of a strong foundation on which to develop group cohesion. *In their first group experiences*, the newcomers are familiarized with the physical surroundings (e.g., work places, meeting rooms, and restrooms) and the basic rules, standards, and organizational regulations. They adopt the appropriate attitudes, values, and behavior, and internalize the behavioral norms of the team, such as open communication and a willingness to help others. In cases in which all the members are newcomers the leader has a unique opportunity to set the group norms, routines, and standards. He or she may also utilize capable and willing mentors in helping newcomers to learn the ropes. After these first experiences the new members are more capable of acquiring the necessary social skills to engage in interpersonal relationships, as well as the task-related skills required for acceptable job performance (e.g., Likert 1961).

The guidelines for supporting the process of group formation and socialization should cover the multifaceted aspects of social life by enhancing knowledge about taskwork vs. teamwork, instrumental vs. emotional group functions, goal orientation vs. social orientation, formal vs. informal relationships, and different outcomes on the personal and group levels. All this will ensure that the process will have a holistic and pervasive impact in terms of enhancing the personal satisfaction of the individuals and the effectiveness of the group.

During the forming stage, the main concerns of newcomers are related to gaining the acceptance of the other members, forming trusting relationships with their immediate leaders, adjusting to the conditions, and adjusting to the rigors of group life. In the sustaining phase, they start to trust in their leaders and the other group members, form friendship ties, learn to live and behave in accordance with the accepted norms and standards, and start to perform as an effective group demonstrating competence in their work. Organizations should thus take into account these developmental phases when they impact information, carry out training, allocate responsibilities, and provide guidance and support in order to maximize social integration: personal concerns and ambitions as well as processes change over time.

The maintenance of a group structure and cohesion may be even more demanding than their formation. Therefore, more effort is needed to support social integration during the normal organization flow given that cohesion and commitment typically weaken over time. Socialization programs and organizational interventions should take account of various aspects of personal behavior that indicate proper social integration. Specifically, interventions should aim at creating and maintaining a cohesive unit in which the members:

- Form close-knit friendship ties (and discourage isolates and cliques);
- Show concern, such as exchanging greetings and giving congratulations;
- Are more successful in reducing tension and solving interpersonal problems, which results in less aggression and a heightened sense of well-being among the members;

- Disseminate information faster (and circulate both unofficial and official information to everyone);
- Reinforce normative codes, social comparison, and social learning in order to regulate behavior, attitudes, and performance;
- Discuss viable alternatives and then accept and act on the shared decision;
- Show initiative and take action (before being obliged to do so);
- Influence others' attitudes and behavior;
- Influence the decisions made in the group;
- Pull together to maintain effective cooperation and coordination;
- Have intense feedback discussions in order to improve current levels of performance;
- Meet standards and deadlines, and aim to achieve consistent results;
- Share the same vision and goals, and work together in order to meet group objectives;
- Have a strong sense of belonging to and identification with the group;
- Take pride in the unit and the institution.

The desirable outcomes include the adoption of similar language patterns, consistent performance in line with organizational goals, commitment to organizational customs and traditions, the sharing of mental models, which reduces the need constant communication, and are pride in common accomplishments and group membership. Overall, leaders would do well to consider these characteristics of a cohesive group when engaging in the process of team building.

On the individual level, group members can facilitate their integration into the group by:

- a. Being proactive and sociable;
- b. Making and maintaining friendships;
- c. Talking with other group members;
- d. Spending time and doing things with others;
- e. Helping others with tasks;
- f. Doing their share and never letting friends down;
- g. Acting for the benefit of the group;
- h. Being loyal to the group and protecting its reputation;
- i. Settling disagreements between members;
- j. Protecting and helping slower learners or performers;
- k. Inviting other members to join in the group activities;
- l. Supporting the group leader and helping him or her to make effective decisions.

Leaders and researchers could systematically and periodically evaluate the characteristics of a cohesive group in order to fully understand the quality of group life and how better to achieve integration. The evaluation could be made on the basis of observation, discussion, questionnaire data, and feedback, suggestions, and complaints received from members of the group. Perhaps the best way of sensing the pulse of the group and the unit atmosphere is to live and work with the members. The constant presence of the leader may be stressful at first, but in the end it produces shared experiences that support shared mental models, social identity, and stronger cohesion. Gaining first-hand experience makes the leader more capable and better equipped to minimize the weaknesses on the group and develop its strengths.

Over time, the influence of each cohesion component on the others and on the potential outcomes of team behavior varies. Therefore, the different components should be promoted separately. Similarly, the group processes, the salience of specific team behavior, and experiences in the group may vary over time, influencing the effectiveness of team-building

methods in strengthening cohesion (Spink & Carron 1994). For example, the need for social and task support may differ as the group develops and matures. Therefore, unit leadership should draw attention to different aspects of critical team behavior over time and adjust its tools and methods to match each developmental phase.

Social integration works against *alienation*, referring to a sense of powerlessness and meaninglessness, normlessness, social isolation, and value isolation (cf. Seeman 1972). Involving group members through active participation in the planning of options and decision-making weakens the feeling of *powerlessness*, and pays off in terms of organizational improvements, task cohesion, being better able to adjust the group performance in changing situations, and the more active involvement of the members in cooperation and the coordination of tasks. Commanders and higher-level leaders should therefore delegate more control and authority to their subordinates in the planning of daily activities, organizing events, making decisions, and allocating rewards, sanctions, allowances, and passes. Through goal-setting, subordinates are able to influence essential decisions and tailor their group life to the achievement of objectives. As a consequence, they formulate a shared mission and accept the necessary means for its accomplishment. A sense of control, responsibility for tasks and processes, and freedom of choice in deciding how the given tasks are carried out strengthen the sense of ownership on the lower levels of hierarchy, and in the end support authority (e.g., Henderson 1985; Kirkland 1987; Lawler 2001; Yoon & Lawler 2005).

Social integration counteracts a sense of *meaninglessness* through the creation of a meaningful context for group activities and a general sense of purpose for the mission. Management can support the process by providing group members with all the time and resources they need to carry out their work. Moreover, leaders should periodically explain the purpose of the group and its specific functions and performance in practical terms because a sense of *meaningfulness* may be even more important than the working conditions. Clear, practical, attainable personal and group goals give meaning to otherwise tedious activities, whereas a lack of vision and an unclear mission undermine the importance of daily work. Training in sports, at schools, and in the military is used as a vehicle for social integration and for giving meaningfulness to organizational membership. Specifically, the quality of training, the provision of information and feedback, the physical element, and the standard of the equipment all help to convey the message that the personal needs of the individuals are taken care of and that the organization is interested in the personal growth of its personnel.

Setting and maintaining standards, exerting reasonable social pressure and fostering an orientation to consensus and conformity serve to weaken a sense of *normlessness*. A clear set of values, explicit and simple rules, and behavioral and production norms that foster discipline and obedience as well as compliance facilitate social integration. The social structure may have an impact on the creation and upholding of norms. The preferred combination according to the results of this study is a three- to four-person team that is nested in a seven-to-ten-people group, which in turn is part of a larger unit. In that case every person has a close buddy or two in the group and the buddy system is effectively integrated in the unit structure, thereby supporting compatible norms from buddy relations to the unit level.

A social isolate may find a cohesive group difficult to cope with. *Social isolation* is associated with increased levels of dissatisfaction and depression, and with the likelihood of leaving the group. It thus works against social integration and may lead to disintegration. On the individual level, the group could minimize social isolation by ensuring that the strongest members in terms of social abilities help the weakest ones. The mottos “One for all – all for one” and “No man is left behind” exemplify the group spirit that has prevailed over centuries in order to avoid social isolation. Leadership could promote the acceptance of all members by rewarding people based on their social and task support, and not tolerating harassment in the group.

Those responsible for group dynamics should also take into account the physical surroundings and existing interaction patterns in order to facilitate social contact and reduce the likelihood of *social isolation*. The hierarchical structure and physical distance may inhibit direct interaction between leaders and their followers, which in turn has a negative influence on unit cohesion. Focusing on information flow, fostering formal and informal contacts between leaders and their subordinates, and ensuring that the unit members are familiar with their immediate supervisors could minimize this effect. Informal events allow leaders to acquaint themselves with their subordinates without being burdened by authority. In organizations in which the official hierarchy limits the interaction in daily routines, social events allow people to forget differences in rank differences and to interact and cooperate on the basis of other than work-related skills and knowledge. Thus, people of different rank are able to interact more naturally, and subordinates may even outperform their supervisors (Ingraham & Manning 1981). Furthermore, subordinates are able to witness at firsthand how their leaders perform, which may increase their confidence in the leaders. All in all, the organization should aim to create a situation in which its members can invest their care and support in the same people who satisfy their social, emotional, and instrumental needs. Physical working and living conditions that encourage everyone in the group to interact and cooperate tend to be the best basis on which to develop cohesive, effective units.

Value isolation through self-estrangement can be tackled by connecting the individual's needs, hopes, and expectations with his or her experiences of personal growth and development. It may be possible to avoid value isolation by the following means:

- Linking the person with the traditions and values of the unit by instilling shared values that relate to the purpose of the group;
- Making them aware of the unit's distinctive history;
- Honoring the past and confirming the future purpose in events, rituals, and ceremonies;
- Acknowledging the value of retiring workers or group members;
- Retaining information about organizational heroes.

Moreover, the characteristics that express the uniqueness of the secondary group could be instilled in the socialization process, reinforced through organizational events, and transformed into daily habits in the form of language, gestures, symbols, decorations, insignia, and clothing.

Maintaining a sense of purpose and meaning and fostering social integration require *active leadership* and organizational effort. Immediate superiors are instrumental in facilitating group formation, the maintenance of the functions, and the members' well-being in the

unit. Their main purpose is to take care of the tasks and functions of the group as well as the basic needs of its members. In brief, leaders could facilitate social integration by offering social support, task support, and will support:

- Social support focuses on personal adjustment to the group and the maintenance of rewarding social relationships and teamwork;
- Task support facilitates cooperation, coordination, and group efficiency;
- Will support strengthens motivation and commitment to the unit membership.

In terms of task support, the immediate superior is responsible for creating and giving purpose, direction, and motivation to his or her subordinates, supporting their personal growth and the fulfillment of their membership needs, and creating demanding goals that advance the development of the group. With regard to task performance, he or she can foster social integration by allowing the subordinates to participate in goal-setting, providing feedback on group performance, and rewarding the whole group when an important stage has been reached, high standards have been met, and useful techniques, methods, or other innovative solutions have been developed.

In conclusion, every organization should identify the best practices through which to offer the peer, leader, and organizational support that fit the specific context and needs of its members. Tackling the aforementioned aspects of alienation in group-formation and socialization programs will support unit cohesion. Such group-level interventions are beneficial because they improve the nature of the social relationships, intensify the functioning of the group, and enhance the likelihood of positive experiences of group membership.

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9 EQUALITY, TRUST, FAIRNESS, AND COHESION

Klaus Helkama

Being a social psychologist with general interests, not a specialist in cohesion or even group processes (they have been my hobby), I must start by saying that I learned a great deal from both Griffith's and Siebold's papers. My comments inevitably reflect my current interests: values, morality (justice), and cross-cultural psychology.

Griffith notes that cohesion has disappeared from the US military lexicon. One can say that it has also almost disappeared from the lexicon of social psychology in general (in the sense of being an active topic of research). Looking at the massive amount of literature reviewed by Salo (2011), Hogg (1992) seems to be the last monograph in general social psychology devoted to group cohesiveness. Haslam's (2004) *Psychology in Organizations* only pays lip service to cohesion. Is this because we already know enough about the topic? Salo's doctoral thesis suggests that the answer is probably not. As Griffith points out, there is a great deal to be done also with regard to incorporating emerging relevant concepts into cohesion. I will make a number of suggestions here.

Siebold's focus is more on the influence of leaders and leadership on group cohesion, and I was particularly struck by his findings concerning leader influence on the correlations between cohesion and performance – for good leaders, cohesion explains almost 40% of the variation in performance, while for poor leaders its effect is almost negligible. The most recent basic text on leadership in general social psychology, Haslam, Reicher, and Platow's (2011) *New Psychology of Leadership*, is well on Siebold's lines, as it sees that the creation of cohesion is an important outcome of good leadership. Cohesion still seems to be hard currency in the social psychology of organizations. Resiliency, by contrast, does not (yet?) figure in the social psychology textbooks.

Let me make a few comments on the topic of leadership and cohesion, in particular from the point of view of **trust**. A few years ago, I was involved in a multidisciplinary, international study of economic competitiveness, funded by the Finnish Innovation Fund, SITRA. We (Tuija Seppälä and I) were supposed to look for the value correlates of national-level economic competitiveness. We applied all current taxonomies in cross-cultural psychology to the competitiveness index developed by the economists of the Innovation Fund. Nothing worked, until we hit upon the notions of social capital and trust. We found that interpersonal trust (a component of social capital) was a consistent predictor of the competitiveness index over time both within the OECD countries and the EU countries (correlations $r = .70$ – $.90$; Helkama, 2004; Helkama & Seppälä, 2004).

Now, it makes sense to argue that interpersonal trust prevailing in a social system, such as a national state, is from a conceptual point of view close to collective-level cohesion, and economic competitiveness could be seen as equivalent to collective performance. What is interesting, in this context, was our finding that the best predictor of nation-level interpersonal trust among the OECD and EU countries was low power distance (Hofstede, 2001), the degree to which equality is expected to be a norm in interpersonal relations. However, low

power distance as such did not *directly* predict macroeconomic competitiveness. It seems that equality is likely to lead to trust, which in turn leads to high performance.

It is a well-documented finding that inequality leads to mistrust. In the United States, increase in economic inequality between the early 1960s and the late 1990s has been closely followed by a corresponding decrease in trust (the percentage of people agreeing with the statement “most people can be trusted” dropped from almost 60 in the sixties to 38 in the mid-nineties; Uslaner 2002). Those who want hard experimental evidence can find it from Morton Deutsch’s (1985) classic studies, which manipulated the principle of justice used in rewarding the members of the experimental groups for their performance. Equality led to trust and benevolence, while strict proportionality according to individual performance resulted in competition, suspicion, hostility, and mistrust.

From a military standpoint, the strong association between equality and cohesion seems paradoxical or perhaps even awkward at first blush. In the manner of all life-and-death professions, such as physicians and police, armies are hierarchically organized, by necessity, even in the most egalitarian (or perhaps a more appropriate expression would be “the least hierarchical”) countries. In theory, strict hierarchical discipline and high cohesion should go hand in hand. Two considerations could be helpful to dispel the apparent paradox.

First, in less hierarchical societies, even hierarchies are likely to be less hierarchical. Indro Montanelli, later to become the *Grand Old Man* of Italian journalism, attended military exercises on the Karelian isthmus on the eve of the Winter War, as a young foreign correspondent of the *Corriere della Sera*. What struck this observer coming to Finland from a far more hierarchical culture was the low power distance, to use Hofstede’s term. Montanelli wrote to the *Corriere* from the Finnish-Soviet frontier on 24 October 1939, five weeks prior to the start of the Soviet attack: “There is a lot of comradeship between officers and rank and file, a kind of comradeship that would even seem excessive if the discipline relied on external coercion. However, it relies on an innate sense of duty, which exempts the superior from showing his hierarchical superiority in rank. Indeed, officers and soldiers are dressed in an identical manner, they sleep in the same tent, and the difference in rank is hardly perceptible. In sum, this is a small army, but it is very serious, with serious command and preparation.” (Montanelli 1992, 30–31.)

The sense of duty observed by Montanelli was certainly not innate, but a result of generalized interpersonal trust, typical of egalitarian societies, as shown by the evidence presented above. In egalitarian societies, trust also leads to smooth functioning in hierarchical contexts.

Second, equality has many aspects. We can measure equality in a society by many indicators. The Gini index of income equality is a purely economic one, Hofstede’s power distance a more psychological one. To illustrate the inadequacy of a purely mechanical, economic approach to equality, consider the discussion ignited by Wilkinson and Pickett’s (2010) *The Spirit Level*, which produced a great deal of evidence for the claim that (among rich countries) more equal societies are better for everyone. While I am inclined to agree with Wilkinson and Pickett, a look at the counterarguments advanced by Snowden (2010) in his book *The Spirit Level Delusion* forced me to somewhat revise my views. Wilkinson and Pickett (2010, 52) show that in their set of rich countries, income equality and trust are

highly correlated. Snowden (2010, 58) points out that when former socialist countries, which meet the criterion of being rich, are taken along, the association between equality and trust almost disappears. Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia are relatively equal in terms of income distribution but in these countries the level of interpersonal trust is low. As is well-known by now, in those countries the socialist system was not felt to be fair, which probably explains this exception to the rule (Snowdon neglects or misrepresents the otherwise strong support for the equality – trust link). In any case, equality and fairness are psychologically intertwined.

A fair organization, whether military, economic, or scientific, provides for instance **equal** opportunities for promotion to its members. A journalist writing under the pseudonym Schumpeter in the *Economist* (2011) cites a 2007 study of leading economies, showing that France is unique in the widespread dissatisfaction among both middle management and lower-level workforce. Big French companies rely on educational and governmental elites instead of promoting internally on the basis of job performance. Likewise, in family firms, family members are promoted more often than non-family ones (Philippon 2007). Unfair management has led to a collapse of cohesion in French economic organizations.

What has taken place in France could be an example of the leader trap that Haslam (et al. 2011, 214) put forward in their *New Psychology of Leadership*. When leaders, not followers, get credit for organizational success, the sense that the leader is “one of us” is undermined, and lack of shared social identity (cohesion) leads to poor performance.

The social identity theory of leadership has found strong support for the importance of leader prototypicality – that the leader is perceived as being a prototypical ingroup member, “one of us”. Fairness is an equally important quality of the leader, but interestingly enough, the prototypicality of a leader seems to influence perception of his or her fairness. Of course, fairness as such plays an important role in organizational success (see, e.g., Helkama 2009, 261–274 for a review of relevant research). I feel the social identity approach to leadership and cohesion is an important antidote to the recent trends that exaggerate differences between those who are high and those who are low in a hierarchy. This philosophy is likely to eventually result in a leader trap.

In the Finnish collective consciousness, the two contrasting leader prototypes are found in Väinö Linna’s *The Unknown Soldier*. Lammio, the authoritarian leader, is definitely not “one of us” in Linna’s portrayal. He has traditionally been seen as the villain of the book, and the social psychology of leadership and cohesion, old and new alike, suggests that he would still be viewed as the villain today. Koskela, by contrast, meets the prototypicality and fairness criteria of the present social identity approach, as he previously epitomized effective democratic leadership. The first company commander I met in performing my military service was a pronounced Koskela-type leader, who later became a general and the commander of the Finnish Border Guards.

As Salo (2011) clearly empirically demonstrates, to understand cohesion in basic military units, it is essential to consider different organizational levels and their mutual interaction. In view of the observations from France on promotion opportunities, Koskela – even though he is a fictional character – provides an illustrative contrast of Finland and France.

Koskela had a highly suspect background as his father had been the leader of the local Red Guard 20 years earlier, but this did not prevent him from becoming an officer, based on his performance alone. Fairness and equality were essential components of the effort to rebuild national cohesion and resiliency soon after the civil war.

To sum up my somewhat rambling comments: In setting the agenda for future research on the links between leadership, cohesion, and performance, it would be fruitful to incorporate trust, both theoretically and empirically, in the research designs. How does trust relate to those phenomena?

Should trust be seen theoretically as part of cohesion, or is it rather a societal background phenomenon that does not play a direct role at the interpersonal or small group level? We know at a general level that inequality leads to mistrust, and equality and reciprocity to trust, but we do not know much about their dynamics. For instance, since 2002, income inequality has been increasing in Finland, but trust has remained here at the same high level, as measured in the European Social Survey. Interpersonal trust seems far more stable than for instance value priorities, which are rather stable themselves (Helkama 2010). Information on the temporal interrelationships between changes would improve our understanding of these phenomena. And finally: disentangling the effects of equality and fairness in creating trust, cohesion, and effectiveness would be a fruitful task.

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10 REPUTATION – ONE PART OF SOCIAL (MEDIA) COHESION ALSO IN A MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Aki-Mauri Huhtinen

Introduction

A well-dressed and healthy Finnish soldier is the best reputation builder for the Finnish Defence Forces. In addition to that, if you are polite and have the skills to communicate in different media, have clear and well-grounded opinions, are empathetic, and support common values, no one can really speak evil of you. Of course you should still be proficient in your profession as a soldier.

According to Aula and Heinonen (2011) the rise of social media is challenging businesses to evaluate their relationship with publicity. A good reputation brings in money because it influences decision-making when clients and other interest groups consider their choices. Social media has given rise to more and more new dimensions in managing security risks. In a crisis situation, collaboration services are at the fore of forming a picture of the situation.

Traditional military leadership has usually been situational, with an emphasis on quick decision-making. This has required meticulous planning and analysis of the activities that decide which options are excluded. When an officer is leading a live-fire exercise or a surgeon is operating on a fatty heart, discourse has no meaning. Discussions are not appropriate in that situation. Meticulousness, behavioristic, very specific actions, and the accuracy of muscle memory are what count. Slogans like “the devil is in the details” or “trust is good, control better” still apply to the professional requirements of extreme leadership tasks. Our everyday lives give us a feeling of continuity and ease in life, but for the officer military, combat duties still involve many risks and challenges as well as many breaks in activity. In addition to a primary plan, you need many back-up plans – and you need to test them.

“It is better to make a bad decision than to make no decision at all” has been the fundamental idea behind efforts to control the rational world. Evaluating the thought processes of the opponent’s central leaders has also been emphasized. The classic German art of war divided command and leadership into order-type tactics and mission-type tactics. In order-type tactics, the subordinate is given both a mission and also execution orders for the mission, whereas the idea of mission-type tactics is that the subordinate has the freedom to execute the orders the way he/she sees fit as long as the mission is accomplished. Often the reason for using mission-type tactics is that the person giving the mission does not have the resources to support his subordinate or because the subordinate has the best grasp of the possible courses of action. In Finland, the professionalism of an officer has been based on the ability to plan combat actions, to understand the utilization of weapons, to train your own people, and to eventually command and lead them in battle. Both as a quiet toiler and as a person

of action, the Finnish officer has always been at his/her best as the leader of squad-, platoon- or company-sized units. When you have only a few subordinates and you know them, it is easy to lead their activities. Leadership is based on the professionalism of your own actions. Officers refer to their subordinates as “my men” and base their communication on body language and facial gestures.

The professionalization of western armed forces, the decrease of general conscription, emphasis on the individual, ageing of the population in European societies, and the transfer of security needs from national borders into society’s social and information structures are rapidly changing the organizations of armed forces. The trust in authority that is central to an officer’s profession is challenged by society and by new operating environments where the armed forces increasingly often have to carry out their tasks with non-military actors. Guns no longer speak after words, but side by side with words and images. This inevitably causes clashes of meanings and the media does not make the situation any easier. Western armed forces are moving toward systems thinking. Armed forces are built on jointly used sensor systems, and robust and combat-durable action. Military organizations emphasize the use of data transfer systems that support mobility and decentralized command as well as decision-making systems relying on artificial intelligence. Systems thinking also requires various lethal and non-lethal sensor, information, and weapons systems, the capability to protect all the troops, and an efficient logistics and maintenance system. According to Kosola, in order to harness the effectiveness provided by technology for military capabilities, we need to overhaul military organizing and procedures. Directed energy weapons and information systems warfare can crash the entire technology-based defense system. (Kosola 2010.)

Table 1. Capabilities, Forces, and Platforms

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Operating principle</i>	<i>Capability</i>
Situational awareness	Don’t be caught off guard	Advance warning (positioning, communications, sensors)
Information dimension	Don’t be seen	Reserves, decentralization, diversion
Physical dimensions (ground, sea, air)	Avoid being hit	Resources, awareness of faults
Force protection	Avoid penetration	Unit’s operation capability
Platform	Recovery, minimizing the damage	Damage protection

Heated discussion is ongoing in Finland about how the Finnish Defence Forces should be oriented in terms of their three main tasks. The traditional defense of the country over large areas is significantly different from what is happening in Afghanistan, for example. Wars and armed conflicts are moving from forests and wilderness, the traditional theaters of war, to information networks and urban centers. Then again, approximately 90 percent of the world's cargo is still transported by sea and it does not seem that air traffic will decrease, despite the growing risks associated with it. General conscription is facing challenges and further pressure for changes. Furthermore, the use of weapons technology requires new experts and reorganization of traditional tasks. All of this also affects the structures of the Finnish military organization. The military faces challenges with regards to the job descriptions and well-being at work of both soldiers and officers.

In the future, officers will require new skills in their profession. Their career path might no longer involve rising from the bottom, through tactical small unit leadership to the operational level, and finally to high-level command duties at the strategic level. Information technology is phasing out the traditional barriers. Despite the default level, the actor with the best situation picture will become the strategic factor. No longer will anyone automatically own the sensor or identification and weapon systems that create the desired effect; instead, they will use them as necessary. (Kosola 2011.)

In this article I will describe the planning and leadership philosophy principles of the western militaries in crisis management. Furthermore, I will explore how this new way of thinking is connected with the changes in organizational thinking in western societies. Although Finland is not a full member of NATO, in terms of public administration we are strongly tied to western and European principles also in the field of security and its systems. Almost all of the European Union member states are building their defense based on NATO. *The message of the article is that the traditional division of labor associated with the officer profession is also changing.*

From Structures to Production of Services

Organizations that are constantly looking for new rules and are slow and hierarchical in their communication cannot cope with the communications requirements in new areas of information activity. Although those at the grassroots level are aware of problems, information about them does not travel up the chain to the decision-makers because the culture is closed and leader-centered. When an organization fears making mistakes and losing face, it is inevitably already in the grip of the merciless 24/7 media world. When a slow organization is still analyzing what has happened, different media are already making decisions without that organization's input.

Despite the ongoing mediatization and technologization, Finnish leadership still emphasizes responsibility for people, goal-directed thinking, the approachable nature of leadership, and the paranoia that shapes our human nature. One should no longer seek to micromanage, but instead take a broader approach to management, relying on satisfied employees who work independently. To improve the quality of your social reputation, it is best to start by seeing to it that your people enjoy good health and well-being. You cannot forge a good

reputation for yourself solely through communications. Only those organizations that are fair have a good reputation. If there are defects in the structures, they need to be fixed. In reputation management, it is not enough to merely state that the structures do not work. Building a reputation is a never-ending self-improvement project. It cannot be controlled. One can manage the reputation-building process together with interest groups.

According to Aula and Heinonen (2011), everyone has a reputation, whether they want one or not. Ever more important reputation builders are the so-called ad hoc interest groups that cannot be controlled but run into your organization by accident and start to communicate about it without giving you an opportunity to control their communications. A reputation creates itself and, unlike a building, cannot be constructed according to a precise plan. The best way to get a good reputation in social media is to live very much in an “offline” state, that is, outside the media.

A long-lasting good reputation can become a trap. Stockmann, one of the best-known retail companies in Finland, was forced to recall all the meatballs it was selling when news spread that some of them were still being sold after their use-by date. This could be allowed for a small retail company but not for a big, well-known one like Stockmann. Stockmann’s management took this little detail seriously and declared that customers would get 100 euros for each expired meatball package that they found. The devil is always in the details.

According to Aula and Heinonen (2011), a reputation manager or leader does not use technospeak, abbreviations, or numbers. He is able to construct a story about what he wants to say. No one is interested that a company is “C4I” or that it has a “believable capability”, but that the company has a beginning, a story, people, values, and something it is moving toward. Acronyms and jargon have no place in effective reputation management. Every person wants to be treated as an individual human being. If you hide the story or the lack of a main idea under statistics, calculations, IT abbreviations, or psychological metaphors, you are underestimating people.

At the beginning of 2010, NATO implemented a new leadership philosophy that emphasizes a comprehensive approach instead of traditional functional planning and command. Comprehensiveness means that all levels involved in the actions are included in the planning of the action right from the beginning. Action is no longer seen as a problem that needs to be solved, but rather as a model for how, through different forms of influence, you end up with a solution to how certain practical activities are to be done. (cf. Takanen & Petrov 2010, 31.)

Afghanistan is a mirror for western security organizations. The crises in that country tell of the crises of the West. The situation reflects on the development of the West: why do people in Asia and Africa have so little prosperity and wealth when Europe and North America are so wealthy? Political actors have emphasized that democracies do not wage war against each other. Unfortunately, there are many areas around the world where it is not possible to build a democracy as the basic model of society because the economic preconditions for it do not exist.

NATO's new planning model provides a voice for all of the actors right from the beginning. The starting point is that everyone has the opportunity to get their voice heard in open planning. The Olympics and the Eurovision song contest are good examples of large events that are challenging to organize and whose success is affected by the simultaneous activities of many large and small organizations. To bring a marginal phenomenon to the fore in a traditional power arrangement requires that the so-called marginal actors personally know the rules of the traditional power arrangement. You cannot break the rules if you do not know how they work. The verb "be" always has some set of values attached to it. In the past, military planning was conducted in a closed organization with the military elite planning the overall advance of the actions down to the minute details; now, from the very start, the planning process involves not only the military actors, but also the non-military communities and organizations that will affect and be active in the area of operations.

NATO might just have learned from the United States' experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan that if you define the goals and meters too rigidly in the beginning, there is no room for either comprehensive planning or a renewal process. Planning should always be a growth process as well, one that renews the operating culture. (cf. Takanen & Petrov 2010, 34-35.)

When a person moves into a freer and more open operating environment, the more efficient s/he needs to be in terms of self-control and administration. The behavioristic model of human behavior still lives on. Maslow's hierarchy of needs has not disappeared anywhere, but it is required that people personally monitor every level of their own needs.

Finnish Security-Related Public Administration is Changing

For a number of years now, Finland has also sought to develop public sector corporate steering at both the municipal and national level. There is no overall view of corporate steering. Corporate steering is based on system thinking where the Prime Minister, with the help of the Government, leads the process to reach politico-strategic goals and effects. The Council of State and the Ministry of Finance should work in tighter cooperation with the Prime Minister and the Government in order to implement the Government Program. The highest tasks in government should be subject to systematic job rotation, leadership evaluations, and the requirement to pursue professional development as a leader. The leadership must make contracts that state and define the responsibilities involved in the politico-strategic goals. Measured effectiveness is no longer enough; instead, the effect must be evaluated from the point of view of citizens, companies, and communities. (Määttä 2010.)

Table 2. Comparing Civilian and Military Leadership

	Terhi Takanen's "power wheel" (Takanen & Petrov 2010, 36)	OODA loop
Renewal through processes	Realization	Observe the sensors
Renewal through experimentation	Liberation	Orientate (plan) command processes and systems
Recognizing a renewing culture	Clarifying	Decision (decision-making and risk analysis)
Making it part of everyday tasks	Practicing it	Act, effect evaluation

Renewing leadership and pedagogic leadership are often seen to be problematic because new working methods are immediately evaluated with an eye on the end results and for this reason renewal does not lead to the desired results. Furthermore, when one engages in pseudo-discussions rife with polite euphemisms, one loses the opportunity to listen to different points of view. A rush to achieve results further narrows the thought model.

Table 3. Scharmer's Dialogue Model (Takanen & Petrov 2010, 43)

Contemplative	
Stream – Creative dialogue	Contemplation – Contemplative dialogue
Emphasis on unity	Emphasis on parts
Politeness – monologue delivered together	Crisis – culminating opinions
Accusing	

People often have a strong desire to be controlled and an inability to face anxiety. That said, freeform doodling or storytelling inspire a group, unlike traditional box and line charts. One reason for Finland's victory in the World Hockey Championship in 2011 was that every member of the hockey team found his role, performing his job in order to provide optimal support to the team. The players were not playing for themselves but for the team, united in their effort to reach the common goal. This spirit was born and remained high during the Championships. A community spirit like this is unlikely to be found in permanent structures and institutions.

Working life is founded on continuities and security – and, on the other hand, also involves growing inconsistencies and irrational practices. Our work is almost permanently attached to us and we to it. That said, at the same time it seems that work management is running beyond our reach. Work is the sum of many things and often includes surprising and random as well as unwanted and hurtful end results. For the “incidents at work” working group, we hope to get presentations on empirical research and personal experiences on incidents, events, continuity, and other matters at work; in other words, we wish to find out about everyday life at work and how people experience it.

Table 4. Roles of the Customer and Public Administration (Takanen & Petrov 2010, 69)

Subordinate	Order	Person who dictates
Person being trained, i.e., the executor	Instructions and recommendations	Instructor
Applicator	Guidance, information	Supporter
Partner	Contemplating and doing together	Partner
Person who creates things together with others	Building the prerequisites for creating something in a group	Facilitator

Arbitrary rules often become permanent rules. We forget that most concepts are just words, originating in everyday practices that do not have a related theory. We randomly name them and forget to observe the historic nature of words that do not actually have a history. The same goes for many researchers. At first we call them stubborn, fickle, and difficult to manage, and in the end we call them tough, determined, conscientious, and independent. (Taleb 2007, 56.)

Professions without a scale are very competitive by nature. Success in these professions is random and the bases for bonuses are often random and unfair. In his book *The Black Swan*, Nassim Taleb draws on Bertrand Russell's ideas to poke fun at how we, through our confirmation biases and compulsion to generalize, imagine the future through history. We learn rules and regular aspects of life, but we do not learn about unforeseeable factors that are more likely to materialize in the future than regular events. The same hand that feeds you your information, may chop off your head tomorrow. (Taleb 2007, 73.)

Often one has the greatest sense of security when the risk is the greatest. In addition to that, we worry about things too late. We focus on pre-chosen parts of that which we have seen and we generalize the unseen. This is called the illusion of reinforcement. We look for clear stories. This is called narrative fallacy. The discovered facts do not prove something as strongly as an asymmetric and negative phenomenon does. Beliefs are born out of habits, rather than of facts. Often a person wants to be wrong in an incredibly accurate way rather

than be approximately right. Stability and lack of a crisis encourage risk taking, smugness, and underestimating the possibility of problems. Administrations are masters at telling what they have done instead of what they have not done.

In a primitive environment, the senses are the essential source of information. Frequently the problem is not the issues at hand, but how we perceive them. The world is what we sense, but at the same time we need to learn how to sense the world. Are observations always diverse because our observations are tied to our body in this time and place? The hidden sides of the visible become apparent when we switch time and place. But at the same time, that what is seen is obscured. The connection in our body between the sensing part and that what is sensed is hidden. We do not live the lives of others, but we can live with them in that moment. The other person is simultaneously both near and far. I do not experience what s/he experiences but I can communicate about his/her experiences.

A skill cannot be separated from the action itself (Mutanen 2010, 10). Renewal is done through our own internal activities. You cannot predict the future. Instead, you must build it. The skills of individuals are not directly transferred to the organization as the organization's skills, and renewing an organization has no direct impact on individuals. The skill to cooperate is required of both. You need skill clusters, those who share and broker skills (ibid., 12). You need a negotiation approach, not a meeting approach. In a small country like Finland, where the highest political decision-makers, officials, and the officer corps know each other through national defense training and cooperation networks, there has been no need for a written, spelled out military strategy. (Kerttunen 2010, 6.)

Table 5. Military Strategic Thought Model (Kerttunen 2010, 66)

	Conceptual	Physical
Political	GOALS	OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
Military	PROCEDURES	RESOURCES

Military history shows that planning defense is always more difficult than planning an attack. The attacker frequently has both the initiative and superior numbers to his advantage. New asymmetric threats in cyberspace, terrorism, and environmental threats pose major challenges to traditional military planning. On the other hand, wars still seem to be traditional in nature: death, wounds, suffering, and poverty. More important than predicting the direction of new military technology is the armed forces' ability to control and use technology, especially in urban environments, indirect warfare, and low-level conflicts, such as terrorism. An organization and its people are expected to have high technical skills and know-how and to be well-versed in new ways of warfighting. A human's role as the immediate operator of the systems diminishes as human reaction speed narrows. Then again, a human's ability to be holistic will for a long time be superior to machines. The specific challenge lies in the boundary between machine and man. A human's discipline, courage, and ability to assess are characteristics that machines will not be able to achieve for a long time. Technology is

replacing the leader in the decision-making process. The struggle between restoring and maintaining combat capability and non-lethal weapons is heightened. The deterrent value of firepower is emphasized, along with speed and accuracy. We cannot afford collateral damage because of the media and the West's changed image of people. Civilian society places considerable restraints on the use of weapon systems, for example in urban areas. (Kosola 2011.)

The question of how we organize ourselves is also based on how we look at information. The amount of energy we put into planning is often obscene, at least if considered in relation to the randomness of the results. Then again, the rewards for understanding the unknown are disproportionately large, because we have little to lose but a lot to gain from this knowledge (Taleb 2007, 19). We have a tendency to handle our information like personal property that should be protected and defended.

Defense Administration Challenges

The Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) are an organization that participate specifically in the community and the building of society. In addition to their main wartime mission, the Finnish Defence Forces also support activities in many other sectors of society. They cannot achieve their own structural change without also building the society as a whole. All too frequently, the principle applied in solving problems is to look for a person to fix the ailing machine: a managing director or a business director who will fix the machine. A person who steps into this position to renew things will be thinking of how to keep the machine running even though s/he is removing essential parts from it bit by bit. The true strategic responsibilities start where the cuts and savings end.

The funds of the Defence Forces are tied to barracks and materiel. Instead of the barracks, we should use the funds for activities. In the same way as some states and cities host the Olympics or famous rock stars hold massive concerts, the Defence Forces and the services, especially the Army, could give up "bed spaces" and offices for their public servants, classrooms, and dining halls by moving the training of conscripts and reservists to the real wartime operating environment: outside, to the sea, the air, and cyberspace. The trainees, instructors, weapons, and support functions will be deployed in natural training areas, employing a logistics model and drawing on their theoretical knowledge. After the action, no traces are left in the field or in the operating environments. Also, local civilian actors can produce goods for agreed locations. With specialist technology, the FDF still relies on fixed structures. This is how you create a living reputation and how the FDF's reputation could be built in people's and groups' minds and discussions. A young person who weighs his/her options individually will not think that a stone building, palace, fortress, or barracks is a tempting choice. Finnish stone buildings are a metaphor for a statue fetish that lives deep inside us. A house is often more important than a person. When the construction of the single family home is finished, the relationship will be in a crisis. Stone churches are mainly empty and practically museums, whereas Facebook attracts almost two million Finns into its realm.

In Finland, public buildings are usually open and in use from 8 am to 4 pm. However, we live on Internet time and offer services around the clock, so why couldn't we keep public

buildings open for business based on the same principle? Why must hospitals or schools have an individual place for every person? Couldn't functionalities be staggered by time? Must every public servant be at work at the same time? Why do public servants not work in three shifts like the rest of the global information economy? A soldier's place is in the area of operations, not in a barracks. Why do we cling to physical space, the home as a specific location, and the workplace as a specific location? The Internet and technology make it possible for us to enjoy the comforts of home and work regardless of where we are in time and space. Our physical life and work methods are clearly different from how we live on the Internet. The larger the gap becomes, the harder it is to foresee the behaviors of the communities of people and organizations. Inequality in a community and social polarization are partly the result of the separation of the virtual and real world.

According to Aula and Heinonen (2011) it is easy to commission brand promises from an advertising agency, but it is much more difficult to fulfill those promises in real life. How do you recognize an organization with a good reputation, one that has a strategy that it implements in practice? When you ask a cleaner what he/she is doing, he/she will not answer "I am cleaning the stairs" but rather "I am building network-enabled defense." So, the cleaner is doing work that is meaningful. The job of leading is to support beneficial circumstances so that they are always affecting the organization on all levels. A successful organization must also withstand mistakes and errors. An indifferent leadership style is content to only communicate or observe the organization, whereas leadership that values partnership and fosters a good reputation is active and works together with people for the good of the organization.

Technology or Man

Innovative leadership is trendy. The term, along with architecture, is being massively overused. Sitra, the Finnish Innovation Fund, has published a new book (Ruckenstein et al. 2011) that encourages people to forget innovation and to concentrate on creating values. This means that organizations should not create new sub-organizations or tasks, but instead find the value of their own actions again. The book talks about innovation archaeology, which is not a technical method, model, or process but rather a frame of reference through which you can look at existing methods or processes in the organization that are maintained by people. In addition, innovation archaeology directs thoughts first to the human and only then to the technological solutions. The fact remains that people use technology and not vice versa. Something originating from humans is never complete, unlike a technical product. Competent people are the prerequisite for innovative leadership.

For an organization, this means that it is no longer enough for it to have a strategy in writing and pictures, but that the organization's strategy is primarily manifested in what the people in the organization do. Strategy is not a subject, but a mode of action. If an organization is reformed or changed, the first task of the management is not to draft a new organization chart or a list of personnel in order to start operations; rather, their task is to first discuss things and work among the employees of the organization. During the final phase of the renewal process, a consensus is born, for example an organization chart on how the reform or change is "locked". Of course, if there is no time for discussion or practical actions, the

leadership must make the decisions quickly without consulting the organization. Frequently, the new chart of the organization, which is drafted by a small circle of people, then lives on as the model of a reform, and results in grumbling or water cooler talk. You should try to prevent rumors of changes or cuts from getting out and try not to declare that they are going to happen. Above all, change involves discussing and doing things together. The battle against the “Wikileaks culture” is won by listening to everyone and including everyone in the planning. Taking advantage of social media in planning and management and leadership includes the entire organization in the process from the beginning as well as stops rumors from spreading and different cliques from forming.

Organization’s Conception of Man

Innovation anthropology’s conception of man is not focused on the individual but rather on social relationships. People consume products and services as individuals, but they are increasingly often searching for togetherness through social media. Individuality is born only in the networks of relationships. In the future, without a social media account, you might not exist. A person’s job or actions must be socially tempting in order to become a success or an innovation. The same goes for management: even the best technical expert will no longer be successful in the organization if his actions do not generate socially acceptable actions. You can write exceptionally good orders but if no one follows the spirit of those orders in their work, your actions do not matter at all. Usually the solutions for the management’s problems have already been discovered at the grassroots level of the organization without the help of expensive consultants, but the leadership models of the organization prevent the adoption of such innovations. Furthermore, organizations focus too much on their customers and do not understand that the employees’ well-being at work and the innovativeness of the work are absolutely vital for the success of overall management. If the work is meaningful and that meaningfulness is supported, it will most likely create the types of innovations that the customers want. It is often hard to perceive that the customers and their needs and social relationships might be conflicting. Due to the immateriality of services, people need to be offered experiences and events that will lock them in the process of the service.

The meta-leadership of a military organization is based on the camaraderie of the organization’s leaders or officers. In Finland, this camaraderie is born from so-called cadet education. A thing that has been, and still is, characteristic of Finnish officers is the mutual trust and respect that helped the leadership stay firm, for example in the wars of 1939-1945, despite the organization’s undermanning and lack of technology. Finnish military leadership has thus been based on an officer corps that permeates all levels of Finnish society: these men and women have cherished the camaraderie and trust of the officer corps and thereby instilled that spirit in the culture of the entire organization. The Finnish Defence Forces has also counted on the high education level of the citizens to support its activities. Like the strong civilian education system, officer training has developed continuously, guaranteeing that the education level of Finns is globally competitive. In the past, we knew each other’s habits and ways of doing things before we chose which technology to use. Today it seems like technology is guiding our ways of doing things – and in the future, we might no longer know each other. Let us hope that this does not happen.

Individuality vs. Togetherness

Today, for a Finnish youth, individuality is realized through social relationships and increasingly in social media. The key concepts in social relationships are emotions, actions, and activity, which are formed in an atmosphere of trust. Often the leadership of an organization does not know which people interact in the organization and how they interact. Collecting statistical data on the organization's key figures does not shed light on the organization's capability for innovation. How the work is actually done and how the employees fit into the structures of the organization is not revealed in development discussions, quality assurance processes, or working environment polls. Instead, the management and leadership must, in accordance with sound anthropological traditions, work as "employees" among the employees in order to discover how everyday activities are actually carried out. If leaders and managers do not have the time to do so over and above their administrative duties, they will completely misunderstand the leadership process in the organization, or the norms regulating it will suffocate the activities. We should try to move from project steering to leading activities and innovations.

In a military organization, the basic idea has been that the unit's commanders and leaders are the main instructors of their people and the unit's combat leaders. The leader also needs to know how to plan and to understand technology. However, most of his/her working hours should be spent "inside" his/her organization. In military organizations, staffs and headquarters have been responsible for planning and execution of the arrangements. Hence, a Finnish military leader has led from the inside of the organization as one of the "employees" or from the front

Measuring Leadership

Innovation should not be measured only by economic indicators, since the relationship of the social value of innovations to their economic productivity might be indirect. Therefore, an innovation leader lives and experiences events in the organization; s/he does not attempt to solve the administrative problems of the organization. The leader's place is in the front, not hiding behind the administration or key figures. A user-based approach is not enough either, because it simplifies the organization's activity to a relationship between the user and technology. Today, in Finland, most physical labor is performed in the service sector, not in industry. The employee's and organization's know-how and skills are both physical and social at all levels of the organization. Also, the leader must do physical work in order to know and experience how the services in his/her organization work. Immaterial values require a new leadership culture. A good leader is no longer a technical expert who knows the facts; instead, a good leader is someone who can communicate and create emotions and the necessary social relationships. So, s/he needs to work among the people of his/her organization. The purpose of technology is to free the leader from the burden of onerous planning and administration so that he/she can serve as a leader of the organization's social relationships and culture.

There is nothing new about innovations. A good example of this is the "invention office" set up in March 1944 in the Finnish Headquarters to assist the Operations Division: in a little

over six months, this office looked at 500 inventions or combat technical innovations that were born out of necessity. Many suggestions concerned improving weapons or procedures, since the individual soldier's need for cover, movement, or fire was not met by what the equipment and organizations provided in theory. Some of the innovations were circulated for comments and only a few of the inventions were put into serial production and the inventors rewarded. The essential contribution was the spirit that the employee doing the work in practice was encouraged to improve the quality of his work and to present these improvements to his superiors. This kind of "bottom-up" activity respects the person and does not give too much power to elitist "think-tanks". When we do not value history as a tool to research the future, we forget that the last wars could provide us with completely usable operating models for attempting to solve the conflict between plans, reality, and the available equipment. "Strategy workshops" led by consultants do not really help if the actors participating in them do not have the experience of grassroots work in the organization. Only a few consultants have the time to familiarize themselves with the material. Not everyone has the time. Usually, the best source of what should be done in the company is the organization's own long-time employees. But can they get their voices heard?

Defense Will is Not an Object

The value of an issue is not born out of objects, topics, or people but of activities that strive to promote the creation of meaningful relationships. Meaningful innovations form the relationships between objects, topics, and people in an interesting way. They can also create all-new relationships. When you lead something, the main point is to ensure that the chosen models and procedures are based on people and their ways of working instead of technology. Innovative people are brought together by the ambition to find and use new information. That is why innovations are not born out of new networks or on the "boundaries" of technology, but out of new relationships between people. An innovation must therefore be clearly owned by a person – a simple process or network is not enough.

We should give up the habit of first announcing that a new device is complete and then issuing a user manual on how to use it. A better way would be to first collect information on how people use the existing devices and ask them for their improvement ideas concerning their own work. From the FDF perspective, it is worrisome that the funds earmarked for activities and procurement are not equal. How can we purchase something new if we do not know how we operate now? Slogans like "change is a permanent state of affairs" or "there's always room for improvement" mainly serve the goals of the consultants and companies that are fighting for the organization's economic resources.

It is clear that without new weapons and organizations you cannot wage war or fight a battle. But in light of military history, technology or weapons have not always been the decisive factor – instead, the key has been a military organization's ability to make its own actions meaningful in a new way. It is easy to request more weapons or more money or demand more skilful personnel, but the real war chiefs have won battles with the equipment and people available to them because they had the skill to manage interrelationships in a new way. They discovered how to do things differently with their existing tools and people. Hitler was not saved by secret rocket weapons and the atomic bomb did not achieve everlasting world

peace. A machine cannot be brave or make a model that would be emotionally meaningful for it. Today, cyber technology will not solve the meaning of life or grant us eternal peace. It is clear that technology must be observed and used, but in matters of life and death, humans always make the decisions.

On Human's Terms

One central reason why Western military organizations have to cut their personnel in order to keep their technology is the strategies that have been chosen to reorganize the organization. The main rule seems to be the idea that the organization will be overhauled by means of technology. This will lead to unending increase in costs. If the Western militaries had started from an anthropocentric point of view, the development of costs would be completely different and we would have noticed that the strength of the organization, especially in the military, is based on strong social community spirit, i.e. defense will. There is still a strong "desire for safety" in Finnish society – meaning that people wish to feel protected 24/7 – but in terms of fostering defense will, actions such as technology-based FDF organization renewal might lead to a loss of opportunities for the citizens, at least from the point of view of issues such as volunteering and innovation. In the future we might see voluntary national defense and private security actors expand to places where people are connected by a social wish for security without high-technology norms and wielding of power.

We speak of leadership behavior even though we mean the measuring of interaction. Behavior is always based on norms whereas an act born out of activity can happen simply because a person does not know how to behave or he/she is consciously breaking etiquette. Interestingly, the most horrific acts have often been well-organized and led. There's nothing so practical as a good theory, said Kurt Lewin. An officer can be an infallible official, but a lousy soldier. Or vice versa. Training often seeks to find a balance between the two. Pleasures, thinking, and exercising in moderation will keep a good officer fit. Too much sweat will turn your brain to mush and talking will not win the battle.

Military Leadership and the Doctor's Profession

In terms of research and teaching, military leadership aims to create the best chances for leaders and leadership to succeed in battle. The nature of an officer's job requires a special skill to combine theory with practice and to withstand the pressure caused by extreme circumstances and sudden events. The profession of an officer is on many levels like that of a doctor: the nature of the activities is the same process reversed. It is the job of the doctor to save lives; it is the job of the officer to lead battles where lives are lost. Practicing for the realities of combat is difficult and even impossible. You cannot really train with "live ammunition". Likewise, a doctor cannot place a healthy person at risk when training for his/her profession. In both cases, preparing for the profession requires having a tight link to the people who are the target of that job and at the same time you need to constantly interpret the link from a theoretical point of view. The challenge is finding the right balance between theory and practice so that you can be considered professional. Doctors frequently train

around real patients and officers lead potential combat troops. Doctors take advantage of different types of cameras when looking inside a patient.

Combat/helmet cameras can help officers to combine theory and practice. Training helps them to command, but will not completely guarantee its success. Building a situation picture is always more than the sum of planned and learned details. The ways in which orders are given and understood are culture specific. Do you use non-verbal body language, long monologues, text, or pictures: it all depends on the education level and action experience of those being led. It is not always enough for the leader to list all the points correctly in a managerial way if the recipient is in the wrong state of mind. You can only theoretically separate leadership and leading.

Our era teaches people to engage in discussions from a young age and to analyze the world through discussion. When a person is in physical distress, seriously ill, or his/her physical security is threatened, discussion does not particularly help in that situation. Unfortunately, leadership places too much faith in discussion, feedback, and equal interaction. When a person's life is at stake, he does not want to be helped with discussion; instead, he wants someone to ensure and protect his existence. The only way to lead when protecting someone in a time of a physical threat is by an act based on strict authority, compulsion, or discipline. Unfortunately, raising a person to accept extreme disciplinary measures from their childhood onwards is objectionable. This leads us to a situation where people can no longer be led in extreme circumstances and so they become more of a danger to themselves. When I wake up and see that my bedroom drapes are on fire and I see that my child's life is at risk, do I know what to do? "Rescue my child, dial the emergency telephone number, prevent the fire from spreading, extinguish it, guide rescue units." Or will I start to panic, scream for help, become paralyzed with fear, and try to text a friend?

The lack of discipline can clearly be seen in how people need a massive amount of text messages and e-mails to organize simple things. People feel that they cannot eat, drink, and walk without communicating about it. On Facebook, people are telling others that they are drinking coffee. The physical aspects of our everyday lives are so easy that we do not understand that life is actually extremely dangerous. We live in a time where there is a need to make every action meaningful either with words or with pictures.

Conclusion

The starting point of Asko Sariola's leadership is the idea that issues are stated in a way that avoids detailed explanations, since no one wants to eat pre-chewed bread (Jabe & Häkkinen 2010, 208).

Asko Sariola's leadership doctrine highlights the point that people who withhold their ideas do not have too many of them. The road to the idea is more important than the idea itself. It energizes. Only when people fail are they ready to give up their habits and routines. A leader must know the territories of the stars. Energy needs territories. Questions are more important than the answers.

In a similar fashion, on the annual trip of the “doctor team” to Tallinn in 2011, Pauli Juuti emphasized that resisting change in the leadership paradigms is the starting point for living organizations. People might not be aware of the winds of change that are blowing or that the organization has used other methods. Internal and external forces aim to change the organizational culture. The traditional development models focus on individuals and content, whereas processes and organizations should be affected by developing systems and activities.

The challenge facing Western militaries in the professional development of personnel is over-education. The need for organizational development may stem from needs, strategy, or the solutions that are used. The feeling of ease and fluency is a central goal in utilizing technology. When work is constantly “disturbed”, how does technology support its continuity? The effectiveness of technology depends on the person’s experience and his or her time management skills.

Every actor, whether man or machine, is primarily an information source as part of the networked armed forces. For every actor, the most important task is sharing your own situation picture with others and maintaining you own situation picture. With people, this means constantly updating your own awareness, maintaining your comprehensive capability, lifelong learning, and a leadership style that commits and engages the people. With machines, logistics and maintenance must work. Network-centric command and leadership only works if we base our actions on constant communication and always keep in mind that we do not automatically understand each other. The leader must be able to define the desired end result and to give his/her subordinate the freedom of action by supporting him/her with constant updates of the situation picture and the authorization to use different sensors and effect systems. Command and Control becomes Command and Consultation. (Kosola 2010.)

Table 6. Game Logic of Information Warfare

DEFENSE	ATTACK
Don’t be caught off guard	Surprise
Don’t be seen	Make valuable targets visible
Avoid being hit	Effect and measure effect
Avoid penetration	Push through and revise/dominate
Minimize damage and recover	Subdue and make passive/activate in a way beneficial to you

Networking therefore means mission-type tactics and gives us the possibility to affect leadership and management on all levels, in both the planning and decision phases. The central challenge is, do we have the courage to participate in and include ourselves in divided leadership?

According to Jari Sinkkonen, there is no human skill more important than negotiating common plans and deals. Social skills mastery is given even greater emphasis. Military planning also requires new kinds of agreement skills. These skills are either learned or not learned in nurseries, daycare centers, schools, or on sports teams. They are disappearing from the world of politics, economy, and science. Perhaps the world of those who produce security is also threatened. Maybe adults should return to their roots and go play in the yards and the forests. (Sinkkonen 2002, 39.)

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11 **MILITARY SOCIOLOGY MEETS THE GAP BETWEEN CULTURES**

Kalle Liesinen

Military sociology must be ready to enter into new fields of interest; nowadays the military is increasingly often used worldwide and in new roles. During the Balkan wars, the involved militaries discussed the difficulties that fighting units faced in adopting the peace-keeping mode. The real problem turned out to lie in the gap between reality and the mandates of various organizations rather than in fighting or non-fighting roles. The discussion revealed how the military in crisis management missions was confronted with fresh challenges posed by the evolving definition of security.

New fields require new kinds of insight. For example, the goals set in Afghanistan cannot be reached without a deep understanding of the local culture. As a former commander of both military and civilian crisis management organizations, I have learned to respect the experience of sociocultural anthropologists in these matters. Unfortunately, the code of conduct held by most anthropologists requires them to abstain from close cooperation with the military.

Many anthropologists even object to the use of anthropology for the benefit of the state. As a background: the skills of anthropologists were used during the Second World War and are still used in many intelligence organizations, creating local mistrust against researchers. Bearing this in mind, the bitter controversy within the discipline is understandable. Nevertheless, world events are also shaking the position of pacifism in anthropology. The military will need the discipline for peace, not for war.

Anthropologists if anyone can well understand how two people locked in the same place together will find a human being and a friend in each other, as in novels did Robinson Crusoe and Mr. Friday, or Genly Ain and minister Estraven. They all came from different cultures and were suspicious of each other at first, but eventually established a connection. Envoy Genly Ain and Therem Harth rem ir Estraven are characters in Ursula K. Le Guin's breakthrough novel, *The Left Hand of Darkness*. In this sci-fi story only one of the two main characters is a human being – the other is a bipedal hermaphrodite who lives on a planet called Winter.

As humans, we want to believe in the possibility of a safe relationship between two people, or even two species, and such stories please us. For some reason, however, our feeling of human security begins to weaken when the direct connection between people wanes. Instead of ordinary human beings, we become representatives of our cultures and end up on a path full of traps. How do our ideas about other cultures affect our missions and how can we escape from xenophobia, while retaining our own values and clear military judgment?

Our Assimilated Culture

In crisis management missions, there is no way to restrict the military solely to the hit and survive role. In complicated assignments, warfare is only one of the battles in a great campaign, in which the military bridges the gap between cultures. Culture is a complex network of interdependencies, assumptions, and meanings. All of us are prisoners of our own culture and we look at the world through lenses colored by it. We may be able to describe local events, within a limited time and place, with reasonable correctness. Even so, we cannot avoid the effects of our own culture on our interpretation; we have been conditioned to our group's or our organization's values, interpretations, and behavioral models¹.

The cultural layers that are built into our minds extend from the national level to the subcultures of our own reference group. Inside our own national culture we are also affected by ethnic, linguistic, and religious factors. The differences between the sexes and the generations, as well as social classes, change our approaches. Our political views tend to distort the interpretation in the direction of our beliefs. Our good intentions may blind us so that we refuse to accept reality when it does not correspond to our expectations.

Experimental, behavioral scientific studies have shown that the researcher's cultural background is a critical factor in his or her cross-cultural observation. Cultural differences seem to have an especially strong effect in performance evaluations inside organizations and in cross-cultural management². Results that have been obtained from within the spheres of anthropology, psychology, and sociology confirm the knowledge conceived of in multinational circles: our way of observing communities and social situations is colored by our own cultural background and it dictates what we sense, what we perceive, how we interpret, and how we communicate our observations.

In Finland, people often jest about how interested they are in the perceptions of others about Finland and Finns. Finns easily interpret this as uncertainty or shyness, which in reality are not especially typical features of the Finnish culture. Especially in Russia, but also elsewhere, Finns are considered to be honest, simple and even silly, but reliable. This impression is strengthened by the often rough communication skills of Finns. It is relatively easy to believe that Finns act on the basis of morals and ethics and not in the direct pursuit of their own interests. Also, the romantic self-portrait of Finland, based on the nation's "Runebergian growth years," accepts the idea of the straightforward and blue-eyed Finn, but at the same time is connected to the fear of being deceived and mocked, and the difficulty in dealing with problems openly³.

Finns need to understand that on a global scale, they are at the periphery and are a peculiar and exceptionally solid group. Finns are prosperous, emphasize welfare, and are unable to

¹ For how to define the concept of culture, see Kroeber, A. & Kluckhohn, C. (1952). *Culture: A critical review of concepts and definitions*. Cambridge: Harvard University. About the effects of culture on strategies and organizations, see Schneider, S. (1989). "Strategy formulation, the impact of national culture", *Organization Studies*, 10(2), 149–168, Department of Organizational Behavior, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France.

² Li, J. & Karakowsky, L. (2001). Do we see eye-to-eye? Implications of cultural differences for cross-cultural management research and practice. *Journal of Psychology*, 135(5), 501–517.

³ The chairman of the Somali League in Finland, Said Aden, considers the tolerance campaigns of the 90s as a mistake of Finnish immigration policy because they required toleration, but the problems were not dealt with through an open discussion. Keskinen, Rastas, & Tuori (2009). *En ole rasisti mutta...* (p: 27). Tampere: Vastapaino & Nuorisotutkimusverkosto.

understand structural corruption or extreme appearances of wealth and poverty. For Finns, it is difficult to understand communities that are based on family, relatives, and tribe, and not on the power of the individual and of the welfare state.

Interest in what others think about us is essentially a positive phenomenon, even if it might involve undercurrents of suspicion. We can perceive our own cultural blind spots and avoid unnecessary conflicts and misunderstandings when we find our own place on the cultural map of the world. Analyzing one's own cultural standpoint may have many positive by-products. For example, in Finland, understanding the mechanisms of overemphasized sense of justice (envy) and, at the same time, having knowledge about Finns' built-in fear of being cheated would cool down discussion about immigration, which occasionally becomes overheated.

From Human to Human

In cultures foreign to us, we can end up in situations that shake up our ideas, and the environment might present us with messages that are incomprehensible to us. At worst, the messages we receive may seem familiar but their meaning is in fact different from how we decode them. I believe that all of the readers of this article would do their best to understand a strange culture. However, that is not enough; the observer first has to understand his or her own culture and its position in relation to the other culture.

Landing in the middle of a foreign culture challenges a normal person's understanding about the basics of life. My personal enlightenment took place in Iran's Kurdistan, where I worked as a UN military observer at the end of the 1980s. During the long winter months, there was time to become closely acquainted with the young Iranian guardian soldiers. They had fought against Iraq for eight years, since the time they had been small boys, under the strict rules of Khomeini, the Grand Ayatollah. I once happened to complain about the total lack of toilet paper and the traditional method of "the water pitcher and left hand" used in local lavatories. Bringing up the matter brought out an Iranian point of view. The 20-year-old soldiers revealed that they had been contemplating long and hard why rich westerners use scraps of paper to smear their butt with excrement instead of washing themselves like all civilized people have learnt to do since childhood. There were no possibilities for my wish for toilet paper to be heard.

This example may be trivial, but it shows how differently things can be perceived and how difficult it is to decide what is right and what is wrong. Uneasy feelings concerning human security and negative preconceptions can be based on small things, and opening these up to closer examination uncovers a completely new perspective.

Bookstores around the world offer simplified guidebooks to help foreigners get around in different countries. In the globalizing world, neutral behavior that reaches across cultural boundaries is part of social skills. The frantic business world and translators have produced a vast number of articles with practical advice about recommended behavior in different cultural surroundings. Also, educational material that has been made for different purposes

can be found both in books and on the Internet. All this kind of information is useful, or at least entertaining – if one can put it into the right frame of reference.

Businesspeople, diplomats, and both military and NGO staff working in international assignments form an “upper culture” communicating between cultures. However, it is only one cultural circle among others, and belonging to this multinational club is no guarantee at all that one understands the native cultures of the other privileged individuals. The multitude and diversity of cultures can cause us to build a map of cultures from false stereotypes, groundless generalizations, and the perspective of only our own culture. This is dangerous enough in old-fashioned warfare but can even lead to total catastrophe in Crisis Management missions.

Studying might make it easier to become familiar with another culture, but one can only truly get to know a culture from within. One does not need to be afraid of a strange culture since foreigners are usually allowed to behave ignorantly as long as they show respect and the desire to learn. On the other hand, a stranger’s eagerness to get involved, direct the locals, and show his or her superiority causes rejection.

The difference between individuals within a culture helps us to find like-minded people inside other cultures. With them, even well-learned skills about transcending cultural obstacles remain secondary and cultural understanding is based on trust between people and a sense of safety. In the same way, difficult circumstances, by forcing us to meet the basic steps of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, uncover common denominators between living creatures. The flight of Le Guin’s characters from the barrenness of the planet Winter is a great sociopsychological description of kindred spirits, who – by necessity – break through their cultural boundaries, even between species.

Adaptation or Profound Understanding?

In the competitive 80s, the thought grew stronger that people could develop multicultural skills through adaptation and study. The term cultural competence refers to people’s ability to work effectively in a multicultural environment with people from another culture or ethnic group. In personal evaluations, a person’s knowledge of his or her own culture can be examined, an open-minded attitude toward other cultures can be favored, information about different cultural practices and worldviews can be appreciated, and multicultural skills can be measured. It is thought that a culturally-skilled person can develop a sensitive and understanding attitude toward other ethnic groups and, at the same time, can adopt new attitudes and values. The properties that are sought after are openness and flexibility toward others, qualities of interpersonal interaction that are respected everywhere.⁴

⁴ In the United States, the integration of different cultures is part of the national story and multicultural skills are a part of the development of human security. See, for example: http://cecp.air.org/cultural/Q_research.htm (1.11.2011).

In this decade, there has been a lot of talk about cultural sensitivity. In crisis management discourse, this term has been used especially when there has been a desire to appease the enthusiasm for changing other cultures and planting western practices in them. Warnings have also been heard from development cooperation fieldworkers and people exposed to cultural relativism for long periods of time. According to them, experience shows that people's beliefs and actions can be understood only against their cultural background. This kind of thinking is sometimes called the frustration of development workers and is considered dangerous, especially when there has been a conceptual mixing of cultural relativism and moral relativism, in which the truth itself is relative and depends on the culture.⁵

Experiences from development cooperation have shown that the risk of failure increases if projects designed by outsiders are put into action without adapting them to the recipient's social and cultural reality. Outsiders do not know what functions best in a given community and in a given situation. Experiences and best practices cannot necessarily be transferred from one culture and organization to another culture and organization. Forcing your help on others leads you to underestimate the recipient's genuine needs, requirements, and hopes. Accusations of international arrogance increase if local communities are not able to have influence on personal matters or on their relations with foreigners.

Western thinking is strongly goal-oriented. Multicultural skills don't help if their purpose is only to advocate more effectively the aspirations of our own culture. The compulsion to be right can prevent us from seeing the real possibilities of another culture to embrace something new. Technically speaking, a direct jump from the Stone Age to the digital era is certainly possible, but not without the development of all aspects of life⁶. This point may cause disappointment to aid workers, since there are hardly ever enough resources to do everything that needs to be done. It is also difficult to understand that change can take generations⁷.

Human action in all cultures is bound to power and survival structures that, in turn, are linked to earning mechanisms. Knowing a culture well requires sensitive information about its internal flows of power and resources. These kinds of structures are not always open and transparent. Neither are they adaptable without losing one's integrity. Human security inside a culture might be fragile due to innumerable mannerisms, dependencies, and economical mechanisms. Fixing one thing might do more harm than good if we do not profoundly understand what exactly we are modifying.

⁵ See here for a discussion concerning cultural relativism: Laitinen, A. (2003). *Strong evaluation without sources*. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä; and <http://www.cultural-relativism.com/> (read 1.11.2011) and <http://www.gotquestions.org/cultural-relativism.html> (1.11.2011).

⁶ Sometimes functional short cuts can be found: the cell phone has quickly spread even to the poorest countries. However, without the invention of prepaid phone cards, the whole mobile phone system would have had to wait for population registers, an established post and banking system, and a culture accustomed to billing and paying bills.

⁷ Women's voting rights provide an example of the time perspective necessary for change. Finland was the first European country to give voting rights to women, in 1906, and Liechtenstein the last in 1984. Thus, it took 78 years in Europe to assimilate the issue and, even then, some cantons in Switzerland hesitated to put the voting right into action.

Culture and War

French professor Dominique Moïsi has summarized the cultural circles of the world into three zones: cultures of hope, cultures of humiliation, and cultures of fear. In addition to them, some special areas, such as North Korea, form their own local exceptions. Economically-developing Asia is mostly made up of the cultures of hope. The zone of fear is composed of western cultures and the zone of humiliation of the Islamic world, which experience that the bright future is already behind them.⁸

Professor Samuel P. Huntington predicted that, with Europe's appetite for war being over, other cultures will turn against the arrogant western civilization that uses the world's wealth. Huntington's thoughts are simplified to the idea that we have stepped into the age of "Muslim wars."⁹ These perspectives help structure a worldview, but also attract extremist elements on the edges of religious and cultural groups and accelerate the spiral of prejudices. Xenophobia and populism feed the idea of the confrontation of religions as some kind of categorical imperative. In reality, the fundamentalist problem of Islamic countries is more internal than external and its solutions will also be found from inside these countries.

The biggest threat to international peace and security is the despair caused by bad governance, corruption, and lack of vision. It leads to organized crime, regional conflicts, and collapsing states, and also gives birth to terrorism and promotes the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The international community has a duty to protect when necessary. Also, humanitarian intervention is accepted quite generally. These terms, however, sometimes embellish wars, sometimes crisis management operations or both, such as in the case of Afghanistan and Libya.

The targets of humanitarian intervention easily consider interventions as a plot by Western and developed nations. Behind the obvious reason for these interventions they see ulterior objectives that raise cultural resistance.¹⁰ From the Western viewpoint, the thoughts that represent the highest good are, in addition to the promotion of democracy, the removal of impunity, the improvement of women's position, and the creation of various civil liberties. Looked at, for instance, from Iran's perspective, these matters may seem like international arrogance and the continuation of the Religious Crusades, and this constricts attitudes. Attitudes have also tightened in Finland.¹¹

In particular, the demands for intensifying the fight against impunity have grown stronger. Due to UN resolution 1325, the demand to end impunity spans from genocide to sexual and other violence directed toward women and girls. Also, culturally different interpretations of

⁸ Moïsi, D. (2009). *The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World*. New York: Doubleday.

⁹ Professor Samuel Phillips Huntington worked as an advisor for Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter. His theory about the clash of civilizations has been described in the book: Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order*. New York: Touchstone.

¹⁰ The Western and prevailing idea of human rights is based on the UN's Declaration of Human Rights: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/> (read 1.11.2011). Its counterbalance is the Islamic declaration of human rights based on Sharia law: <http://www.arabhumanrights.org/publications/regional/islamic/cairo-declaration-islam-93e.pdf> (1.11.2011) that is affirmed in The Arab Charter on Human Rights on 22 May 2004.

¹¹ Finland's National Action Plan for implementing the UN's resolution on Women, Peace and Security: <http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentId=137328¬eId=32278> (1.11.2011) has stronger wording than the original UN resolution http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf (1.11.2011).

the need for victims to get legal rights is connected to the human security question, since some opinions on the rights of victims incline toward revenge and the continuation of the cycle of violence. The torture and lynching of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi by a civilian mob demonstrates the need for law and order as a basic principle¹².

The idea of bringing instigators of war and war criminals to justice is correct but might, if taken all the way, force a war to the last man because people who have been labeled as war criminals do not usually negotiate or surrender. Especially problematic is when the question of war and peace is decided by a person who is being sought after for crimes against humanity and who, in addition to peace, would have to choose his own downfall. This would have been the case of Sudan's president, Omar Hasan Ahmad al Bashir, in the year 2010 if the policy of Western developed countries had been accepted globally.¹³

Strict policy lines and tightening stances regarding human rights, the removal of impunity, women's position in society, and the adoption of western operation models frighten traditional communities and the people who cherish these cultures. Unfortunately, this situation – which has also been called a gulf between the north and the south – is also seen in the setting of goals. During the last two decades, the EU has had to witness its former African allies and several Islamic countries separate from the European mainstream and lean on China's and Russia's loose interpretations, both in the UN, as well as in other international organizations.¹⁴

This is a worrying trend that compels us to examine new military tasks and human security as a whole and to consider the possibility of cultures to develop and to adopt new ideas. The friction between cultures seems to reflect concerns about human security rather than open belligerence. To military crisis management, the slowness of cultural processes is nerve-racking and politics make it worse through aggressive Western practices, values, and demands for short-term effectiveness.

Cultural changes cannot be made by giving orders but by learning, teaching, and becoming acquainted with one another. Justice should not be ushered in by violence, if that can be avoided, but by allowing enough time for a constitutional state and the rule of law to be established.

There is no other option than to accept that changes that are too big and sudden unavoidably cause a strong counter-reaction. Intervention and peace by force can be imposed quickly, but lasting peace will sometimes take generations to achieve and this ideal has to be passed on from human being to human being.

¹² Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was captured alive after his convoy was attacked by NATO warplanes protecting civilians as Sirte fell on 20 October 2011. Gaddafi was then beaten, sexually assaulted, and killed by armed civilians. The events rapidly spread around on YouTube on the Internet.

¹³ The International Court of Justice in Hague issued an arrest warrant for President al Bashir on 4 March 2009. So far, the warrant has been condemned by the Arab League, the African Union, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and by China and Russia, which together represent the majority of the world population and of the UN member states.

¹⁴ Ahtisaari, M. (2009). *Can the international community meet the challenges ahead of us?* Special Edition, pp: 14–15. Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation.

The new military tasks require our moral consideration and we must remember that this phenomenon is also deeply bound to culture and puts us face to face with our own cultural interpretations. The least we can do is to clarify our objectives to ourselves, understand the mechanisms on which and with which we have an effect, and deliberate on the consequences of our actions in cultures that are foreign to us.

Military sociology is used to study internal military social questions and the military in its own society. The future ushers in an endless need for research about the relationship of the military with foreign and often rather reluctant cultures.

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