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NORDIC COOPERATION AND THE FAR NORTH

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THE THIRTEENTH SUOMENLINNA SEMINAR



**The 2nd and 3rd of June 2010
Helsinki**

FOREWORD

The Department of Strategic and Defence Studies at the National Defence University of Finland arranged its thirteenth annual ‘Suomenlinna Seminar’ in Helsinki, on the 2nd and 3rd of June, 2010. Participants of the seminar included key representatives of political, military and academic life in Finland as well as a selected group of international guests, totalling about 90 persons.

The seminar was divided into a set of subthemes that focused on two geographical regions whose development is of vital importance to Finland and the whole of Scandinavia and the rest of the world. The first keynote speeches tackled with the Arctic and the new challenges it faces in the 21st century. The second half of the day was contributed to the Baltic Sea Region, especially from strategic and military points of view. The following day went more into practical experiences and details on Nordic defence cooperation, national defence strategies and future perspectives.

The regions in question have undergone major changes in the past two decades. The significance of the Arctic and the Baltic Sea Region in international political forums has shifted greatly. However, the contemporary world is again paying more and more attention to the Arctic as well as the Baltic Sea Region. Soon opening vast economic opportunities and intensifying political, social and military cooperation have increased the interest of the two areas in the eyes of both scholars and decision makers. The strengthened collaboration among not only Nordic partners but also Baltic countries gives positive signs of the overall development of the area.

Nonetheless, new possibilities do not only contribute to the common good of all Arctic and Baltic coastal and concerned states but may create a fierce competition for untapped natural resources and transport routes within a diverse group of actors. The authors of this publication try to capture the multiplicity of issues and potential conflict areas of the Arctic and the Baltic Sea Region. The articles also shed light into the past and try to give explanations why certain matters surface now and should be investigated in particular.

First, Timo Koivurova opens the floor by discussing Arctic resource development from a legal perspective. He argues that the current state behaviour in the Arctic cannot only be explained through a race to resources storyline but through an orderly development in the sphere of international law. Marlène Laruelle analyses the Russian stance on territorial conflicts in the Arctic. She stresses that Russia’s political

rhetoric, which often is mostly directed at domestic audience, should be kept separate from the pragmatic international cooperation the country has with other states. Laura Salmela, in turn, collects the thoughts of Jacob Børresen introduced in *Military Aspects of Arctic Security* at the Suomenlinna seminar. Although military presence and interests continue to matter in Arctic affairs, future conflicts will be fought more over economic assets rather than geostrategic positioning of states' armed forces. Niklas Granholm, on his part, concentrates on Arctic change. He focuses on depicting the main factors leading into the emergence of a New Arctic.

Magnus Christiansson examines the Baltic Sea region states through the concept of military balance. When used as the sole explanatory theory, military balance produces too narrow a picture of international relations and state foreign policy behaviour. Later, Erik Männik evaluates more in detail Estonia's views on security. Within a ten years' time, state security thinking has developed into a more mature and comprehensive direction. Thorvald Stoltenberg reflects upon Nordic cooperation in foreign and security policy. Geographical proximity and long historical ties, both economic and cultural, form the foundation also for enhancing future cooperation. Peter Göthe concludes the research report by presenting the current main features of Swedish defence policy.

All in all, as conflict potential in both of the discussed areas can never be erased as many of the authors emphasized, a focus on further developing peaceful cooperation should be mended. Only through cooperation can all states benefit from the newly opening opportunities both in the Arctic and the Baltic Sea Region.

I would like to express my great gratitude for the colleagues at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies for organizing a fruitful seminar, and Mrs Salmela for her efforts in editing this research report.

Helsinki, November 2010

Director of DSDS,
Colonel

Pekka Holopainen

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SCRAMBLE FOR RESOURCES OR ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT – WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE ARCTIC?

Timo Koivurova

Considerable media attention has been focused on the polar areas in recent times. Much of this attention has concentrated on the perceived competition between the Arctic coastal states as they seemingly view each other as claiming the biggest stake over territory in the Far North. One area of contest and assertion of territorial claims is the continental shelf in the Arctic. Media narratives suggest that control over the Arctic will give states rights of access to lucrative and plentiful hydrocarbon resources lying underneath the seabed. Such reporting of a race to riches presents the Arctic states as positioning themselves to exploit oil and gas reserves. The Arctic is often represented as one of the last resource frontiers on Earth. The storyline is built on the idea that since climate change is opening this previously inaccessible region to natural resource development – region in which resources are supposedly plentiful – the states are engaging in typical power-politics as to who is the first to access these resources. Even though the storyline seems extremely appealing (and newsworthy), I argue in this paper that it is a simplified account of what is really taking place in the Arctic. In contrast with the opposite view, the whole development related to the continental shelf claims in the Arctic Ocean seabed can actually be explained by states observing their duties in accordance with law of the sea.

To argue this, I proceed in this paper as follows. First, I suggest that it is important to take the “race to resources” storyline seriously, because it is not only various media that perceive that such a development is going on in the Arctic as a knee-jerk reaction to climate change. Also many academic and policy researchers share this point of view. The scheme needs to be taken seriously, because it distorts public understanding on the Arctic. In addition, it has implications for how researchers draw policy recommendations. This paper aims at analysing why this storyline has become so popular in explaining the continental shelf claims in the Arctic. Before explaining why the continental shelf claim development can be seen as an orderly process (which would perhaps not make it so interesting to many news media) rather than a situation of geopolitical posturing, it is useful to discuss

some basic concepts related to the seabed from the geophysical point of view. This helps to grasp how the law of the sea regulates the ocean floor and its resources. Thereafter, a brief overview on how the seabed law has evolved in the law of the sea is offered. The overview is later followed by an attempt to prove why the law of the sea can indeed be seen as the best explanation for the current continental shelf claims in the Arctic Ocean.

The “Race to Resources” storyline

For many who support the rationalist and realist thinking of international relations, it must have seemed only a matter of time when the natural resources of the Arctic would be exploited. Indeed, in a low inhabited area there would not be many to stand against natural resource development. Only the inaccessibility of this region created barriers in utilizing the vast natural resources. As soon as the necessary technology would be developed, states along with domestic and international companies would arrive to harness these tempting resources.

However, the news soon revealed the scientific findings that stated the Arctic to be the region to suffer the most from climate change. Since ice and snow are first to react to global warming, researchers have noted that the climate change has already had an impact on the Arctic. Further change in the Arctic will be more intense than in other regions of the world.¹ It has been argued that one of the major consequences of climate change is that this previously inaccessible region will open to resource development. To concur, there certainly are several compelling reasons why the world should make use of the supposedly vast hydrocarbon deposits in the Arctic seabed.

First of all, despite the growing international demands for the development of renewable energy resources, fossil fuels still seem to have a future in the energy markets. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has recently estimated that despite the efforts of the climate regime to convert our energy use towards renewables, our dependence on fossil fuels will continue to grow until 2030, if the present energy development scenarios realize.² The Arctic hydrocarbon resources as a way to meet future demand seem tempting from two perspectives. Firstly, they are estimated to be excessive. Secondly, the deposits are located in areas with no on-going political conflict making the region safe for companies operate in. Thus to conclude, the

¹ *Impacts of a Warming Arctic*, ACIA Overview Report, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004, [ACIA Synthesis Report]; see generally the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Final Scientific Report, [<http://www.acia.uaf.edu/>].

² See the IEA’s *World Energy Outlook* website, [<http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/>].

combined effect of climate change and commercial interests might be the driving force behind the recent efforts of states to stake their claims over seabed areas in the Arctic Ocean.

The current political interest in high latitudes accompanied with a burst of state activity in mapping the geology of the region, started with the vast claim of the Russian Federation in 2001. The object area of the claim covered almost half of the Arctic Ocean seabed.³ There was an immediate official response to Russia's action from all of the other littoral states of the Arctic. In particular, the United States criticised many aspects of the Russian claim, especially Russia's attempt to assert sovereign rights over the Lomonosov Ridge that runs through the Central Arctic Ocean Basin. According to the US the Lomonosov Ridge "is oceanic part of the Arctic Ocean basin and not a natural component of the continental margins of either Russia or of any State"⁴. It was exactly underneath the North Pole on the Lomonosov Ridge where the Russians planted their flag in August 2007, provoking heavy protests from the other Arctic coastal states. As reported by the British *Guardian* newspaper:

Russia symbolically staked its claim to billions of dollars worth of oil and gas reserves in the Arctic Ocean today when two mini submarines reached the seabed more than two and a half miles beneath the North Pole. In a record-breaking dive, the two craft planted a one metre-high titanium Russian flag on the underwater Lomonosov ridge, which Moscow claims is directly connected to its continental shelf. However, the dangerous mission prompted ridicule and scepticism among other contenders for the Arctic's energy wealth, with Canada comparing it to a 15th century colonial land grab.⁵

In a 2007 edition of *Foreign Affairs*, Scott G. Borgerson, an International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former Lieutenant Commander in the US Coast Guard, argued that even military conflict of some sort may be possible:

The situation is especially dangerous because there are currently no overarching political or legal structures that can provide for the orderly development of the region or mediate political disagreements over Arctic resources or sea-lanes. The Arctic has always been frozen;

³ Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Submission by the Russian Federation 2001, 20 Dec 2001,

[http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm].

⁴ See the US official reaction, [http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS_USAtext.pdf].

⁵ "Russia plants flag on North Pole seabed", *The Guardian*, 2 Aug 2007, [<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic>].

as ice turns to water, it is not clear which rules should apply. The rapid melt is also rekindling numerous interstate rivalries and attracting energy-hungry newcomers, such as China, to the region. The Arctic powers are fast approaching diplomatic gridlock, and that could eventually lead to the sort of armed brinkmanship that plagues other territories, such as the desolate but resource-rich Spratly Islands, where multiple states claim sovereignty but no clear picture of ownership exists.⁶

As a response to a recent NATO Advance Research Workshop on “Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean”, the media again came up with unexpected explanations over what was happening in the Arctic. The Guardian reported in a news release titled “Climate change could lead to Arctic conflict, warns senior Nato commander” the following:

One of Nato's most senior commanders has warned that global warming and a race for resources could lead to conflict in the Arctic. The comments, by Admiral James G Stavridis, supreme allied commander for Europe, come as Nato countries convene on Wednesday for groundbreaking talks on environmental security in the Arctic Ocean. The discussions, in the format of a "workshop", with joint Russian leadership, are an attempt to create dialogue with Moscow aimed at averting a second cold war [...] Berkman, a key figure in organising the workshop, with funding from the Nato science for peace and security programme, said the challenge is to balance national and common interests in the Arctic Ocean in the interests of all humankind. "Strategic long-range ballistic missiles or other such military assets for national security purposes in the Arctic Ocean are no less dangerous today than they were during the cold war. In effect, the Cold War never ended in the Arctic Ocean."⁷

The news release took the present author and many of the conference participants by a surprise. There was a general agreement among the members of the workshop that if anywhere in the globe it is in the Arctic that peaceful orderly development proceeds.⁸

Overall however, I do feel that the “race to resources” storyline explains the behaviour of states to a certain degree. In this frame-up, unprecedented and rapid climate change re-opens the Arctic as a power politics terrain where states compete over exclusive first access to the hydrocarbon re-

⁶ Scott Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming”, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2008,

[<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63222/scott-g-borgerson/arctic-meltdown>].

⁷ “Climate change could lead to Arctic conflict, warns senior Nato commander”, *The Guardian*, 11 Oct 2010, [<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/oct/11/nato-conflict-arctic-resources>].

⁸ Personal observations by the author, during the Workshop (13.–15.10.2010).

sources of the Arctic Ocean seabed. Nonetheless, this straightforward yet simplified account does not explain what is currently taking place in the Arctic. The reasons for this will be discussed in the next chapter.

The rights of states over the seabed riches in the Arctic

Before moving to consider how the present law of the sea regulates the ownership and the use of sea bed and its resources, it is useful to clarify the difference between the terms used in geophysics and international law over the various portions of the seabed. In addition to this, a short account of how the law relating to seabed has evolved will be provided. Because geophysics tries to examine the physical formation and reality of the sea bed, it has much more nuanced concepts for describing it: the continental shelf proper adjacent to the coast dives down till an average depth of 180 metres, which then gives way to a steep slope averaging up to 2,500 metres in depth and continues with the less steep continental rise, which then transforms into the ocean floor. As a result, geophysics materializes the seabed with the concepts of a continental margin covering the continental shelf, the continental slope and the rise. The present law of the sea, as mostly codified in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),⁹ grants the coastal state sovereign rights over the resources of the legal continental shelf, which can in most cases be equated with the continental margin (which is not the geophysical continental shelf).

Before World War II, coastal states enjoyed sovereignty only over a narrow strip of territorial seas extending 3–4 nautical miles. After the war, the situation dramatically changed with the 1945 Truman Proclamation by the US which declared the following: “Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its natural resources, the Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control”¹⁰ The declaration initiated an era of creeping coastal state jurisdiction, especially in regard to the seabed. The outer limit of the seabed was defined in Article 1 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention as follows:

⁹ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 Dec 1982, [http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm].

¹⁰ 150 - Proclamation 2667 - Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf. The President of the United States of America Harry S. Truman, 28 Sep 1945, [<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12332&st=truman&st1=sea=1>].

For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.¹¹

The problem with this definition was that it effectively permitted the coastal states with the possibility to claim larger seabed areas with the development of technology, to the extent that even ocean floors could have been divided between the coastal states. A counterforce to this trajectory came from Maltese ambassador Arvid Pardo who in 1967 proposed in the UN General Assembly that the ocean floor should be designated as a common heritage of humankind. Pardo argued that the ocean floor should be administered and overseen by an international governance mechanism, whereby the economic benefits of the ocean floor riches could be shared equitably between developing and developed states. Pardo's proposal was one of the major reasons for why the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was convened in New York in 1973 (UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II were held in Geneva in 1958 and 1960 respectively). The aim of the 1973 conference was to produce a comprehensive "constitution" of the oceans, which later became the UNCLOS.¹²

The Convention was negotiated over an extended period of time – from 1973 to 1982 – as a package deal, permitting no reservations to the Convention.¹³ UNCLOS was able to achieve a compromise between various groupings of states having differing kinds of interests related to the seabed. For instance, broad continental margin states were able to have rules accepted, which allowed the whole continental margin to be subjected to the sovereign rights of the coastal states. On the other hand, the geologically disadvantaged states (those whose continental margin was minimal) managed to push for a rule that entitles all states to a minimum of 200 nautical miles along the continental shelf (meaning that these states effectively exercise powers over the ocean floor as well). UNCLOS was successful also in defining more clearly the outer limit of the continental shelf than its 1958 predecessor convention, and in designating the ocean floor as part of the common heritage of mankind and being under the governance of International Sea-Bed Authority (ISBA).

¹¹ Convention on the Continental Shelf. Geneva 29 Apr 1958, Found at Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators, [<http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/continental.shelf.1958.html>].

¹² The earlier attempts produced four separate law of the sea conventions (I of 1958) and the second was a failure (1960).

¹³ See Article 309 of the UNCLOS.

During the negotiations, even though broad continental margin states were able to extend the outer limit of the continental shelf to cover the whole geophysical continental margin (and in some exceptional cases beyond), they also had to make compromises. For example, the broad continental margin states had to submit to rules requiring them to transfer some of the revenues from offshore hydrocarbon exploitation in their extended continental shelf to developing states via the ISBA¹⁴ and, more importantly, they had to prove the extent of their continental shelf scientifically in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS or Commission). CLCS is a scientific body with 21 members.¹⁵ If a coastal state perceives that its continental margin exceeds 200 nautical miles, the submission must be made within 10 years when the state became a party the UNCLOS.¹⁶ The Commission can only make recommendations. However, the recommendations it gives are legally influential, because the outer limits of the continental shelf become final and binding only, when they have been enacted on the basis of the recommendations.¹⁷ The deadline for such submissions is fairly tight given that states need to provide the Commission with vast amounts of scientific and technical data. This was done because it was seen as necessary to define the outer limits of continental shelves as quickly as possible. Only after knowing the outer limits, it is possible to know where the boundary between states' continental shelves and the area, which is under the jurisdiction of the ISBA, lies.

Which explains the continental shelf activity better – A scramble for resources or UNCLOS?

Even though the “race to resources” storyline appears to be a more popular explanation for why states are engaged in staking continental shelf areas, my argument is that this is not the case at least for now. Two arguments will be offered to prove the point.

States are arguing that they only abide with their UNCLOS duties. This is supported by the fact that at least for the time being, states have followed their duties under the UNCLOS in an ideal manner. Russia was the first country to make the submission to the CLCS. Russia was also the first country to which the Commission issued recommendations that required

¹⁴ See Article 82 of the UNCLOS.

¹⁵ See Article 76 of the UNCLOS.

¹⁶ This date was postponed by the parties to the Convention to those states that had become parties before May 1999, thus extending their submission deadline to May 2009. See Annex II to the Convention, Article 4.

¹⁷ Article 76 (8) of the UNCLOS.

the country to revise its submission in the Central Arctic Ocean Basin.¹⁸ Although the flag planting may have had some symbolic importance for Russia's domestic policy, the country has not indicated that the act would have any legal effect.¹⁹ The Russians have assured that the revised submission will be returned to the Commission within the new deadline. Norway made a submission in 2006 to three separate areas in its North East Atlantic and Arctic continental shelves, which invoked some reactions from other states towards the status of the sea bed around the islands of the Svalbard archipelago.²⁰ Yet, as explained by the Norwegian foreign ministry, this is an issue unrelated to the outer limits of continental shelf.²¹ The CLCS has now made recommendations to Norway as to how to draw the outermost limits of its continental shelf.²² Canada and Denmark (Greenland) face their deadlines in 2013 and 2014 respectively. Both states are desperately trying to collect the necessary data and information to meet these tight timeframes. According to news sources, the US has also started to develop its continental shelf submission, even though it is not a party to the UNCLOS. Already the Clinton and Bush Administrations aimed at making the country a party to the convention. However, as both efforts failed also the current Obama Administration continues to pursue this policy objective.²³

¹⁸ See short summary of these recommendations, available at: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/629/28/PDF/N0262928.pdf?OpenElement> (12.6.2008).

According to paragraph 41: "As regards the Central Arctic Ocean, the Commission recommended that the Russian Federation make a revised submission in respect of its extended continental shelf in that area based on the findings contained in the recommendations". For an overview, see Mel Weber, "Defining the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf across the Arctic Basin: The Russian Submission, States' Rights, Boundary Delimitation and Arctic Regional Cooperation", *The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law*, 24, 2009, pp. 653–681.

¹⁹ Article 77 (3) of the UNCLOS.

²⁰ Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Submission by the Kingdom of Norway, 27 Nov 2006, [http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor.htm].

See, e.g. the reaction of Spain,

[http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/esp_0700348.pdf].

²¹ E-mail response 8 April 2008 from the official of the Ministry (on file with the author).

²² Summary of the Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in regard to the Submission made by Norway in respect of Areas in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea on 27 November 2006, 27 Mar 2009, [http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_rec_summ.pdf].

²³ "Continental Slope Off Alaska 100 Nautical Miles Further Off Coast Than Assumed", *ScienceDaily*, 12 Feb 2008, [http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/02/080211134449.htm].

The UNCLOS was negotiated during a time period when there was not much awareness of climate change. Without the globally affecting phenomenon, would the states behave in the same way in deciding whether to submit a claim to the CLCS? I argue that any rational state would make their submission exactly as wide as possible on the basis of UNCLOS, and they would be compelled to do it now since the UNCLOS entered into force in 1994. Since we cannot predict how fast and in which direction technology will develop, it would only be rational for a state to act this way. Even without any impacts of climate change, the advancements in technology might have opened these regions for resource development. With this in mind, I maintain that the onset of the competition over hydro-carbon resources is not only linked with the upcoming changes in the atmosphere.

Are the Arctic states just blindly following the rules?

What I have argued in this article is that the underlying factors motivating state activity in claiming continental shelf areas in the Arctic are in fact legal. So far, the states have acted according to their UNCLOS and law of the sea commitments in a textbook manner. This does not mean that the process would come to an end in an orderly fashion (e.g. with states settling their overlapping continental shelf claims via the UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanisms). It only means that the development so far has been orderly and fully in accordance with international law, and thus there is also no reason to presume that the process would naturally finish in a conflict. Yet, it is also important to ask why the states are observing these rules. Territorial enlargement is one of the core policy areas for any state. Accordingly, it would seem fairly unrealistic to think that states would completely disregard their strategic interests. It is however, important to keep in mind what states are in effect observing. The broad continental margin states were able to negotiate as flexible rules as possible for drawing the outermost limits of their continental shelves. They benefit to a large degree from the settled standards: They have considerable discretion in drawing their outermost limits as far out onto the seabed as possible. At the same time the states gain legitimacy and finality for those limits.

Even if following the rules has clearly dominated the actions of Arctic Ocean coastal states, it is by no means given that such development will continue. It is important to keep in mind that Norway is the only one that has received a full set of recommendations from the Commission. Most of the difficult issues still remain fully unresolved. The Lomonosov Ridge is a good example of this. Russia considers the ridge to be a natural prolongation of its land areas, as symbolized by the flag planting in 2007. Russia also made its stand clear in the 2001 submission to the CLCS. The US re-

acted swiftly to this arguing that Lomonosov Ridge is of oceanic origin and cannot be part of the continental shelf of any state. Canada and Denmark have also made it clear that they consider the Lomonosov Ridge to be part of their continental shelves. However, their submissions are not due until 2013 and 2014.²⁴ Moreover, the Commission returned Russia's submission in 2002 for further scientific-technical studies as regards the Central Arctic Ocean Basin, signalling that it may not endorse Russia's view on the Lomonosov Ridge.

It is necessary to note that the UNCLOS and law of the sea in general are not understood similarly by all. International lawyers are very careful when defining the types of sovereign rights that coastal states enjoy over their continental shelf. States are only entitled to explore and exploit the natural resources (mainly hydrocarbons) of the continental shelf. Beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone, state action is limited mainly to drilling oil and gas. However, it is easy to understand why the military establishments of the world do not share the same perspective. They do not primarily think of what specific rights and obligations a state has in its nearby waters, but see lines on a map indicating an area which they are meant to protect. These areas are often taken by the navy as parts of state territory rather than a joint zone where the coastal and other states have various kinds of privileges and responsibilities. If navies are given a stronger role in the high Arctic, it can be argued that military-strategic calculations prompt states to establish spheres of influence, a scenario which may lead more easily to controversies, even military ones. Russia for example published a strategy paper in 2009 where it outlined plans to create a new military force to protect its interests in the disputed Arctic maritime regions.²⁵

Concluding remarks

The reasons for media and many International Relations scholars to read too much into climate change and an irresistible temptation to utilize the Arctic hydrocarbon resources, are probably due to the readership pressures and the desire to tell a good story (whether it is a popular news story or an academic one). Another reason is that it has taken so long time for the UNCLOS continental shelf process to unfold. UNCLOS was negotiated

²⁴ “Natural Resources Canada: Government of Canada Welcomes New Mapping Data on Canada's North”, *Canadian Business*, 8 Aug 2008, [http://www.canadianbusiness.com/markets/ccn/article.jsp?content=20080808_125504_2_ccn_ccn]. See generally Alex G. Oude Elferink, “The Continental Shelf in the Polar Regions: Cold War or Black-Letter Law?”, *Netherlands' Yearbook of International Law*, vol. xl, 2009, pp. 121-181.

²⁵ “Russia plans to create Arctic military force”, Associated Press, 27 Mar 2009, [http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29916834/].

over a long period of time, from 1973 till 1982, and it entered into force as late as 1994. The year 2004 was the first deadline for countries to submit the required additional information over their claims of extended continental shelf. It is exactly now when the submissions need to be made, and many states are increasingly working on them. It might be difficult for a person without legal background to imagine that a process starting from 1973 still constitutes the main cause for present state activity towards the continental shelf, especially when climate change is offering other rather compelling explanations.

From a disciplinary perspective, it is sometimes difficult for an international lawyer to understand why orderly processes are often dramatized, especially in the media. Evidently, media has its own pressures, and they many times need to dramatize stories to gain readership. Yet, when distributing close to completely false information as in the crudest forms of news stories about the continental shelf claims, it does pose difficult questions for the credibility of the media. In contrast, International Relations scholars have their own dominant schools of thought where they often seem to disregard the power of rules and regulations shaping state behavior. However, as has been pointed out in this paper, sometimes rules do matter. Rules especially matter in explaining how international processes unfold, a task which International Relations, not international law, is supposed to do. On the other hand, international lawyers should also be cautious when arguing that all what is happening is blind observance of international law. International lawyers have been busy explaining that the “scramble for resources” storyline is just a media stunt and that states behave very much in line with law of the sea. Nonetheless, when thinking about the way ahead, nothing is self-evident. Only with on-going and open inter-disciplinary dialogue we can provide better accounts of important international developments.

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2

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GEOGRAPHICAL REPRESENTATIONS: THE RUSSIAN STANCE ON TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS IN THE ARCTIC

Marlène Laruelle

The main Arctic power Russia, thanks to its geography and history, has always played a key role in international negotiations linked to the High North. It has been part in the rises of tension levels between the coastal states that have focused on questions of hard security and national sovereignty. However, Russia has also contributed to the region's strategic de-escalation and the promotion of international cooperation.¹ Indeed, Mikhail Gorbachev's famous speech in Murmansk in 1987 inspired the negotiations, which began two years later, for an Arctic environmental protection strategy, and called for a series of wide-ranging proposals to be adopted on regional cooperation in the Arctic (restrictions on naval activities, the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Northern Europe, and the development of trans-border cooperation).² In contrast to its position as a central zone of American-Soviet opposition during the Cold War, marked by numerous incidents which could have led to an escalation of the conflict, the Arctic is today in the process of becoming a space where coastal states, both large and medium, exercise projections of their power, and test out their motifs for tension and cooperation, as well as their neighbour's ambitions.³

For two decades, the tendency has very clearly been one of desecuritization: despite the reprisal of some military activities, the Arctic region is conceived by all protagonists as a growing space of cooperation, where the central stakes pertain to soft security, environmental challenges, and human security. As A. J. K. Bailes rightfully notes, since Arctic challenges are cross-sectoral, multi-functional, and multi-institutional,⁴ they push toward geopolitical and legal innovation. If the growing economic interests of the Arctic encourage the littoral states to stake out claims for sovereignty, all appeal to the unequivocal support for international law in the resolution of remaining jurisdictional disputes. Given the length of its

¹ Trenin, Baev (2010).

² Åtland (2008), pp. 289-311.

³ Tunander (2008), pp. 164-184.

⁴ Bailes, in Holtsmark, Smith-Windsor (2009), p. 32.

Arctic coastlines, Russia is very active in the juridical debates on the status and the state delimitations of the Arctic. It is involved in all three categories of existing legal dispute, concerning bilateral exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf disputes; the delimitation of the continental shelf; and on vessel transit in the straits.

The Arctic legal framework, successes and limits

There is currently no universally accepted definition for the spatial scope of “the Arctic”. Some definitions only take into account the Arctic Ocean, the smallest of all the oceans, with only 3 percent of the world’s total ocean surface area and 1 percent of its volume. Others include lands, and in this case the criteria of delimitation often pertain to bioregions: either the natural borders at which vegetation ceases to grow (the tree-line), either the zones whose temperatures do not exceed 10 degrees Celsius in July, either the regions where the permafrost begins, and so on.⁵ Still other definitions consider that the whole of the Arctic circle ($66^{\circ} 33'$ North) must be included, which means the whole of Greenland and Faroe Island, as well as Bering Sea and the Aleutian Islands. The issue of the Arctic’s southern borders is important because it changes the number of states directly concerned by Arctic questions: only five states, the so-called “Arctic Rim”, have Arctic coastlines (Russia, Canada, USA, Norway, and Denmark/Greenland), while three more have Arctic territory without coastlines (Finland, Sweden, and Iceland).

The Arctic is often presented in the media and public opinion as a new Far West, in which international law is either nonexistent, or not applied by the rival players. Quite to the contrary, the Arctic has many complex legal charters, sometimes overlapping, and some specialists consider that there is rather too much than too little legal framework. Indeed, there is no dearth of international jurisdictions. Possessing no particular status, the Arctic Ocean is subject to the decisions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Moreover, it also comes under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was signed in 1982 and came into force in 1994. The Convention has been ratified by more than 150 states including all the Arctic coastal states except the United States, and therefore has a major legal influence over the region.⁶ According to it, all states possess legitimate rights and interests in high seas and deep seabeds, in the Arctic as in the other Oceans, and are therefore able to participate in decision-making, which some have not hesitated to point out. Accordingly, the European Union, China, Japan, and South Korea have been accepted as

⁵ Koivurova (2009), p. 46.

⁶ Rothwell, Joyner (2001), pp. 1-22.

ad hoc observers in the Arctic Council, some of them having applied for observer status, others for permanent observer status.⁷

In addition to the states directly engaged in the Arctic, it is impossible not to mention the great number of regional institutions involved in decision-making linked to this region.⁸ Many regional organizations are involved in the future of the Arctic. All the Western Arctic Ocean states are members of NATO (USA, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, and Norway). Some of them, such as Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, are members of the EU, but not Norway, which means that the EU does not have any Arctic coastline, but only lands. Greenland opted out of the then European Economic Community (EEC), while Iceland and Norway are members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In addition, the situation is evolving since Greenland and the Faroe Islands may well proclaim their independence from Denmark in the years to come, becoming new independent players, and reducing the role of Copenhagen. Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland make up the Nordic Cooperation. Three Arctic states are members of the G8: USA, Russia, and Canada. The same three are federations that have given some autonomous rights to their sub-administrative units and their indigenous peoples. The presence of the USA-Russia partnership in the Arctic and the memories of the Cold War complicate the negotiations, as well as the perceptions of threat.

Apart from the organizations mentioned above, two others are specifically devoted to the Arctic question: the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Arctic Council. The BEAC was formalized by the Foreign Affairs Ministries of Finland, Norway, Sweden, Russia, Denmark, Iceland, and the European Commission in 1993. Today, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom and the USA participate as observers. The BEAC engages in manifold activities, from managing spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, simplifying border crossings, and cooperating on the environment and emergency and rescue, to strengthening the history and cultures of the region, with the involvement of indigenous peoples.⁹ Still today, the Barents region remains Europe's largest region for interregional cooperation.

The Arctic Council, established in 1996, is an intergovernmental forum designed to build consensus on issues of environment and sustainable development, as well as to monitor pollution, disseminate information, and promote cooperation among the eight Arctic nations. It was born from the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), which was founded in 1991

⁷ Koivurova (2010), p. 5.

⁸ Bailes, in Holtsmark, Smith-Windsor (2009), pp. 47-48.

⁹ *The Barents Euro-Arctic Region Cooperation and Visions of the North*, no date.

to deal with the threat of polar pollution. It preserves the initial four AEPS working groups,¹⁰ and adds two new more groups, one on sustainable development (SDWG) – particularly active after the 2004 Arctic climate impact assessment (ACIA) – and the other on Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP). It has worked in particular to improve the membership status accorded to the Arctic's indigenous peoples: their NGOs are now permanent participants, equal to the states. The Arctic Council works mainly on issues related to environmental protection and sustainable development, and excludes matters linked with military security.¹¹ In the absence of a permanent secretariat, the work of the Arctic Council is heavily influenced by the priorities determined by whichever state is chairing the presidency, which rotates on a two-year basis.

The forthcoming climate change will profoundly affect the way the Arctic states see their waters and coastlines. They will face challenges at an ecological level; their littoral populations will be confronted with drastic climatic, demographic, and economic changes; and new possibilities will open for the exploitation of the water column, the seabed, and the subsoil. However, to date, only one genuinely circum-Arctic agreement has been signed, the 1974 agreement for the Protection of Polar Bears. Many experts have underlined the fact that all the Arctic regulatory legal systems and the region's supervising institutions are founded on soft law status, an *ad hoc* funding system, and consensus. In case of serious tensions, there seems to be no sufficiently coercible legislation or institution. For instance the Arctic Council has no regulatory mandate, and cannot enforce its decisions on member states. It has even been challenged by its own members, since the Ilulissat Declaration in May 2008 outlines an agenda for cooperation between the Arctic Rim states over high-level ocean policy issues, without the participation of the three state members with no coastline, which do not want to be excluded from the decision-making process.¹²

Expectations linked to climate changes have pressed all participants to consider a more consistent normative framework, since the Arctic Council is currently able to do little to induce sustainability in the region. More and more states, as well as the EU, question whether it is able to perform the tasks expected of a forum in charge of managing a region that is undergoing so huge a transformation. For several years, the idea of an Arctic Treaty, based on the model of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the 1983 Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, has been regularly evoked as a means of giving the region a strong institutional

¹⁰ The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), and the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP).

¹¹ Koivurova (2009), pp. 44-60.

¹² Koivurova (2010), pp. 146-156.

structure, but without opening onto anything precise. Both regions, the Arctic and the Antarctic, are fundamentally different geographically (the first is an Ocean inhabited by man, the second a continent devoid of humans), but above all legally: much of the Arctic falls under the sovereignty of various states, while claims on Antarctic have been frozen.¹³ During the Ilulissat Declaration, the five states of the Arctic Rim stated that they saw no interest in forming a new comprehensive international legal regime for the region.

Expected climate changes has led the littoral states to focus on the stakes of delimitation and of sovereignty, especially as the continental shelf occupies a much higher proportion of the Arctic Ocean than of any other ocean. UNCLOS recognizes that each state has the right to 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, 24 of contiguous zone and 200 of exclusive economic zone (EEZ). On territorial seas, sovereignty is exercised over the airspace, the water column, the seabed, and the subsoil. Within the 200 nautical miles of EEZ, each state has sovereign rights over all living and non-living resources in the water column, seabed, and subsoil, and the passage of foreign ships must be guaranteed. Beyond these 200 nautical miles, state jurisdiction can no longer be applied to the water columns, which are defined as high seas subject to free circulation. It can, however, be applied to a continental shelf if a state has UNCLOS recognize a territorial contiguity of up to 350 nautical miles or 100 nautical miles beyond the 2,500-meter isobath. Beyond this, the deep seabed is regarded as the heritage of humanity and is managed by the International Seabed Authority.¹⁴

As regards the Arctic, there exist three categories of dispute: a first category involves disputes about bilateral EEZs and continental shelves, a second the delimitation of continental shelves, and a third deals with the straights. There have been eight disputes over bilateral EEZs and the continental shelf in the region: one between the USA and Canada on the Beaufort Sea (problem of delimitation of hydrocarbons-rich waters lying between the Yukon and Alaska); another between Canada and Denmark/Greenland about the Davis Strait (issue settled in 1973 despite continuing disagreement over Hans Island); a third disagreement existed between Denmark/Greenland and Iceland over the Fram Strait (settled in 1997); and another between Denmark/Greenland and Norway over Svalbard (settled in 2006). A fifth disagreement existed between Iceland and Norway over Jan Mayen (settled in 1993–1995); and another between Denmark/Greenland and Norway about Jan Mayen (settled in 1981). Russia was involved in two disputes: one with the United States over the Ber-

¹³ Koivurova (2008), pp. 14-26.

¹⁴ Complete information on the Commission on the website of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf at [www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm].

ing Sea; and another with Norway over the Barents Sea and Svalbard. The disputes over the straits bear on Northwest Passage and the Northeast Passage: Canada and Russia consider them as territorial waters, and therefore claim the right to regulate vessels traffic, while the other states, especially the USA, consider them as international waters.¹⁵

The Soviet historical referent: the 1926 Decree

The Russian legal tradition is characterized by the notion of sectoral line, that is, the line of longitude that starts from the terminus of land boundary and intersects with the North Pole. The division of the Arctic into national sectors began at the start of the 20th century, when Canada first, in 1909, proclaimed its sovereignty over the lands stretching between its territorial border and the North Pole. Czarist Russia took up the Canadian criteria of sectoral division, a decision which Soviet Russia pursued after the Revolution of 1917. On April 15, 1926, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union issued a Decree, *On the Proclamation of Lands and Islands Located in the Northern Arctic Ocean as Territory of the USSR*. The decree stated that “all lands and islands, both discovered and which may be discovered in the future, which do not comprise at the time of publication of the present decree the territory of any foreign state recognized by the Government of the USSR, located in the northern Arctic Ocean, north of the shores of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics up to the North Pole between the meridian 32°04'35" E. long. from Greenwich, running along the eastern side of Vaida Bay through the triangular marker on Cape Kekurskii, and the meridian 168°49'30" W. long. from Greenwich, bisecting the strait separating the Ratmanov and Kruzenstern Islands, of the Diomede group in the Bering Sea, are proclaimed to be territory of the USSR.”¹⁶

The territory defined in the decree is based on the internationally validated limits of the time: to the east, those between the United States and Russia defined in the 1867 Convention on Alaska; and to the west, the border between the Soviet Union and Finland. Moscow laid claim to sovereignty over all the territories between these two points along the meridian up to the North Pole. At a time when Russia regarded itself as surrounded by capitalist enemies, a main characteristic of which was their “imperialism,” the objective of this decree was to prevent other states from proclaiming their sovereign will over unknown territories. The law thus has a prospective intention, namely to preserve the future of Soviet Arctic discoveries. Later, some Soviet researchers extended the scope of the decree, for example, V.L. Lakhtin, who published a monograph titled *Prava na severnye*

¹⁵ Hakon Hoel, in Holtsmark, Smith-Windsor (2009), pp. 87-93.

¹⁶ Butler (1978), p. 72.

polyarnye prostranstva (Rights on Northern Polar Spaces) as early as 1928. In it, he advanced two new arguments: first, that all lands and islands, regardless of who effectively occupied them, had to be under the sovereignty of the owner of a sector in accordance not with the contiguity theory but with the principle of “region of attraction” (*raion tiagotenia*); second, that fast ice should be equated to land territory, that is, be included in the sovereign part of a sectoral state, as well as the air space above it.¹⁷

The 1926 decree was designed to regulate the questions of sovereignty on the Arctic Ocean and was not supposed to serve as a general principle for the demarcation of maritime borders. However, it was considered within Soviet legal practice as an historical precedent and therefore led Moscow to propose a sectoral division of all the maritime borders. The Soviet Union stuck to this principle throughout its existence. Soviet works, as for them, remained divided in their interpretation of the decree’s scope. Those which had a restricted reading of it considered that only the islands of the sectoral zone make up part of the contiguity territorial of the state, not the waters between the islands and the continent. Those which had a broader interpretation of it claimed that the islands, the waters, and the air space must also fall under national jurisdiction. In practice, Moscow did not uphold this broader interpretation of the 1926 decree and never perceived the border of the Arctic sector as its territorial border.¹⁸ Officially, Moscow did not lay claim to water situated outside the limits of its national jurisdiction, as the circulation of U.S. submarines showed in the 1950s, since they succeeded in reaching the North Pole (the Nautilus in 1958 was the first watercraft to reach the geographic North Pole), in passing through Soviet-controlled Arctic waters and straits north (the so-called USS Blackfin), and even in entering Russian territorial waters (USS Gudgeon in 1957 close to Vladivostok).¹⁹

Since the disappearance of the USSR, the Russian legal position has softened and adapted to international norms. During its border conflicts with the Caspian states, for example, Moscow yielded without demanding sectoral demarcation for the Caspian Sea, in large part because demarcation using the principle of the median line has provided it with zones that are rich in hydrocarbons. Moreover, the method of sectoral division has met with little international success: Denmark, Norway, and the USA have all rejected it publicly, and Russia is alone to promote it *per se*.

¹⁷ Timtchenko (1997), pp. 29-35.

¹⁸ Timtchenko (1997), p. 32.

¹⁹ Sasgen (2009).

Russian claims on the Arctic continental shelf

Under the UNCLOS, a coastal state has exclusive sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of its continental shelf up to 200 nautical miles from its shores. Beyond this limit, it has to provide scientific evidence to establish the extent of the legally defined continental shelf in order to exercise the same rights. These rights apply to the exploitation of the living and non-living resources of that state's share of the shelf's seabed and subsoil but do not extend to resources in the water column such as fish stocks, which are covered by a separate regime. Thanks to the marine research that has been carried out systematically in the Arctic from the 1960s, in 2001 Russia became the first country to refer to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), a review body of scientists created under the UNCLOS. In so doing, it created a legal precedent, which the other states hastened to follow.

After ratifying UNCLOS, each state has ten years to submit an application for the recognition of its continental shelf, and then can hand in as many claims as it wishes once the first application has been made. The Commission is made up of 21 members chosen for their expertise in geology, geophysics, and hydrography, but they are also elected with due regard for geographic representation, so having a member of one's nation elected can be a positive element for a state that is submitting a claim. The Commission's decisions require a two-thirds majority but rulings cannot be given that disadvantage other states, even if the state in question has not submitted a claim but deems it is potentially disadvantaged.²⁰ This measure is designed to protect the weakest states, those that do not have the financial and technological means to submit a request. This rule, called Rule 5, can be used to prevent the Commission from giving a verdict which would be binding. The Commission is also unable to settle border disputes between states except if the governments concerned ask for the arbitration of the Commission. The legal games are therefore complex and can go on almost forever.²¹

In addition, the definition of the continental shelf such as it is found in article 76 of UNCLOS is made up of many technical and geological elements that scientists often adjudge incomplete or contradictory. It also leaves open some definitions that are likely to evolve in accord with technological progress, even if a scientific and technical guideline is supposed to help interpret the terms used. UNCLOS states that “[t]he continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the *natural prolongation* of its

²⁰ Spielman (2009), p. 340.

²¹ Spielman (2009), p. 317.

land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin.”²² Several criteria are thus to be taken into account: the thickness of sedimentary cover, a distance of 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental slope, a distance of 350 nautical miles from the country’s baseline, and/or the 100 nautical miles from its 2,500-meter isobath. In addition, claims must first show that the prolongation requested does not concern an oceanic ridge, since this term has a complex definition apt to be interpreted in multiple ways. Indeed, UNCLOS does not clearly define differences between oceanic ridges and natural components of the continental shelf.²³

In its claim, Russia argues that the Lomonosov Ridge and the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge are both geological extensions of its continental Siberian shelf and thus that parts of the Central Arctic Ocean, as well as parts of the Barents Sea, the Bering Sea, and the Sea of Okhotsk, fall under its jurisdiction. Most of this area, amounting to about 1.2 million square kilometers of Arctic waters, is situated in a triangle-shaped zone, “the top of which is the North Pole, the eastern side is approximately the meridian 170° W, the western side is an irregular line running southward from the North Pole to the cross point with the EEZ outer limit (81° N, 120° E), and the base is the outer limit of the Russian EEZ.”²⁴ In 2002, the CLCS gave a recommendation about the additional data and information it requested from Russia by 2009. With this in view, Moscow organized the much-publicized 2007 Arctic expedition of the Mir 1 and 2 submarines, during which the Russian flag was planted on the Arctic seabed, an act devoid of any legal significance but which incited the anger of the other states. The economic crisis, however, has slowed down the progress of Russian Arctic missions, forcing Russia’s claim, as well as the extremely complex collection of the requested information, to be delayed until 2011–2012.²⁵

A technical analysis of the Russian claims lies outside the scope of this chapter and can in any case only be conducted obliquely, since all claims are subject to confidentiality. Only the executive summaries have been made public, as have the appeals submitted by the other states, which thus make it possible, through the responses they provide, to surmise the exact nature of the claims and the arguments put forward.²⁶ Since Moscow’s initial submission, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway, and the United States have filed their responses to the executive summary of the Russian text. Norway has issued official documents which indicate that the Russian request infringes upon its own claims. As the Commission cannot give rul-

²² U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 76(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

²³ Górska (2009), pp. 51-60.

²⁴ Górska (2009), p. 51.

²⁵ This information was confirmed during an interview conducted with Oleg Aleksandrov, from the MGIMO.

²⁶ More detailed comments on the Russian claim in Spielman (2009), pp. 309-350.

ings that disadvantage another state, it cannot give a verdict inasmuch as the claims of the other states remained unexamined. Thus, after Norway itself deposited a request for recognition of its continental shelf in 2006, including an express reservation of the right to claim additional territory, it came to light that two zones were being claimed by Moscow as well as by Oslo, the Loop Hole and the Western Nansen Basin. In the absence of any territorial delimitation treaty between both states until spring 2010, the Commission was unable to give rulings in favor of either one or the other and both invoked the Rule 5 protection against any prejudicial decisions. In 2008, the Commission endorsed Norway's description of the seabed outside of its established border, thus allowing the country to widen its economic zone in the Arctic by 235,000 square kilometers, however without giving a ruling on the two zones under dispute.²⁷

Canada and Denmark, for their part, stressed that the oceanographic data contained in the Russian executive summary was insufficient to determine their stance on Moscow's claims. Nonetheless, the Canadian and Danish governments have been working together since 2005 to submit their claims to the Commission.²⁸ In 2006, both countries, considering that the stakes were of such importance, put their dispute over Hans Island to one side, and undertook a dual scientific expedition known as "The Continental Shelf Project" to collect the bathymetric, seismic, and gravity data of the Lomonosov Ridge to establish claims to territorial expansion.²⁹ They are collecting data on the seabed north of Greenland and Ellesmere Island and are organizing the Lomonosov Ridge Test of Appurtenance (LORITA) Project in order to prove that the Ridge, which passes through Greenland to Canada's Ellesmere Island, is a natural extension of the North American continent.³⁰ Canada and Denmark have until 2013 and 2014 respectively to submit their claims.

The United States, although it has not ratified UNCLOS, has also submitted a document contesting Russian claims on the scientific level, with detailed references to the technical aspects of the Russian submission. The U.S. document claims that the Russian text does not propose objective data sources concerning the location of the 2,500-meter isobath and the foot of the continental slope. The main scientific argument put forward by Washington, however, seems to be that the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge System is a geologic feature formed by volcanism (a submerged "hot spot"), and therefore cannot be considered a natural prolongation of the continental shelf or

²⁷ See the executive summary of the Continental Shelf Submission of Norway in respect of areas in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea (2006), and "Limits of Norway's Arctic seabed agreed" (2009).

²⁸ Riddell-Dixon (2008), pp. 343-359.

²⁹ Riddell-Dixon (2008), pp. 343-359.

³⁰ Jokat, Uenzelmann-Neben, Kristoffersen, Rasmussen (1992), pp. 887-890.

continental margin.³¹ Regarding the Lomonosov Ridge, Russia seems to have more leeway with its potential claim for continental shelf expansion but needs to give sufficient arguments to prove the relationship between the ridge and the Russian continental shelf, otherwise the ridge will be defined by the Commission as an oceanic one. However, in 2002, State Department representatives mentioned that the U.S. view of Arctic geology is evolving and that, in hindsight, their notification reflected an inadequate appreciation of the scientific complexities involved.³²

The Russian-U.S. Agreement on the Bering and Chukchi Seas

In the 1970s, the United States, although not a signatory to UNCLOS, proposed to the Soviet Union to begin negotiations about the length of their common maritime border, which is the longest in the world, in order to settle their points of disagreement: the EEZs of both countries intersect in the Bering Sea as well as in the Chukchi Sea; part of the continental plateau is claimed by both superpowers; and part of the open sea has to be delimited. Long a zone of tensions during the Cold War, the Bering Sea was one of the first winners of perestroika after Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech in October 1987. An agreement was signed by both parties on July 1, 1990, resulting in the so-called Baker-Shevvardnadze line, which is a compromise between a median line and a sectoral line approach along the boundary of more than 2,500 kilometers.³³ According to the agreement signed by each of their Foreign Affairs Ministers at the time, the Soviet Union recognized American sovereignty over 70 percent of the waters of the Bering Sea. Of its own free will, it lost three areas of water from its EEZ, which it ceded to the United States, one in the Bering Sea (more than 23,000 square kilometers), one in the Chukchi Sea, and another in the Pacific Ocean (45,000 square kilometers). In exchange, the USSR was to have guaranteed fish quotas for its fishermen – but the invasion of Afghanistan and U.S. sanctions put an end to them – a small part of the American EEZ in the western sector, and sovereignty over the islands of Chukchi Sea, including Wrangel.³⁴

The treaty was ratified by the United States in 1991 but not by Russia. The Duma refused to validate the text, arguing that it harmed the interests of the Russian state in terms of fishing, and potentially of oil reserves. The arguments advanced by Russian politicians and jurists are multiple. In 1990, with the Soviet Union right in the middle of perestroika, the decision-

³¹ Spielman (2009), p. 329.

³² Baker (2010), p. 270.

³³ "Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the maritime boundary" (1990).

³⁴ Prokhorov (2006a).

making system was complex. Many have accused Eduard Shevardnadze of having ceded too easily to U.S. demands in order to obtain Washington's support.³⁵ Moscow, in fact, hoped to sign a whole package of agreements with the United States, including the withdrawal of missiles from Europe, and did not want to slow down the process by bringing the case before the UN International Court of Justice in The Hague, which, in addition, was still decried as a tool of capitalism. Nikolai Ryzhkov, who at the time occupied the post of President of the Council of Ministers, stated that neither the Politburo, nor the Council of Ministers were able to examine the text of the agreement before its signature – a contestable argument, since the current Foreign Affairs Minister, Sergei Lavrov, has stated the contrary.³⁶

In 1996, the Duma held parliamentary readings on this subject, though refrained from making a decision. In 2002, the Russian Audit Chamber provided a detailed opinion on the state of Russian fishing and concluded that because of this agreement Moscow had lost between 1.6 and 1.9 million tons of fish between 1991 and 2002.³⁷ In addition, it is likely that the zones ceded are rich in hydrocarbons, even if the absence of offshore wells and the lack of seismic data mean that the hypotheses are unverifiable for the time being. According to data gathered in 2006, the estimated total of recoverable resources of the East Siberian and of the Chukchi Seas is more than 8 billion tons of oil equivalent.³⁸ In 2007, the Director of the North American Department within the Foreign Affairs Ministry declared that the text of the agreement did not harm the interests of the Russian state, except in terms of fishing, and that negotiations were taking place with the United States in order to compensate for Russian losses, but a solution is yet to be found.³⁹

On the legal level, the Soviet-Russian position has been weakened by its inconsistency. The United States proposed to Moscow to take the same line of demarcation as that mentioned in the 1867 Convention of Cession of Alaska, which determines a geographical line west of which all the territories are American, and to the east of which all are Russian. This line was mentioned in the 1926 decree to delimit Soviet Arctic territories. However, the 1867 Agreement actually only applied to emerged territories, and not to seas, and the USSR could base itself on a legal precedent, since a decision made by a court of arbitration confirmed that the Convention of Cession of Alaska did not concern seas. However, the USSR did not object to the U.S.

³⁵ Shebarshin (2000), pp. 36-49.

³⁶ Oreshenkov (2009b).

³⁷ Palamar (2009).

³⁸ Verzhbitsky, Frantzen, Savostina, Little, Sokolov, Tuchkova (2008).

³⁹ "Interv'iu direktora Departamenta Severnoi Ameriki MID Rossii I.S. Neverova agentsvu Interfaks 2 dekabria 2007 o situatsii vokrug razresheniia spora mezhdu Rossiei i SShA" (2007).

request, since it played in favor of its argument about the sectoral line at a moment when the debates with Norway were in full swing. Moreover, according to the U.S. statement on the Russian claim to UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, it seems that, in its submission, Russia refers to the 1990 agreement on the Bering Sea, which in this case means that the country is now bound to the treaty even without having ratified it.⁴⁰ Despite the absence of definitive legal resolution, the Bering Sea is not a cause of major tensions between Russia and the United States. An agreement signed in 1992 concerning the regulation of fisheries in high seas beyond the 200 nautical miles of each EEZ enables both countries to take advantage of the sea's fish stocks.

The Barents Sea issue and its 2010 solution

The territorial conflict in the Barents Sea was probably the most complex to settle. It was part of a geopolitical context stamped by the Cold War (for many decades, Norway was the only member of NATO, along with Turkey, to have common borders with the Soviet Union), involved important economic questions (which, since the 1970s, have mainly related to fisheries, and now increasingly concern the exploitation of hydrocarbons), and has a symbolic weight in terms of national sovereignty and nation-building for Norway as well as for Russia.⁴¹

The border between Norway and the Soviet Union in the Varangerfjord was agreed on in a treaty signed in 1957. The negotiations concerning the delimitation of maritime borders between the two countries began in 1974. In 1976–1977, both protagonists proclaimed their maritime border in a unilateral manner. Norway based itself on the principle of a median line between Svalbard, on the one hand, and Novaya Zemliya and the Franz Josef Land Archipelago, on the other, which is recognized by UNCLOS as the basic principle of division of marine territories. The Soviet Union, although a signatory to the treaty, refused this principle on the basis of the “special circumstances” clause provided by UNCLOS. According to Moscow, the 1926 decree amounts to an historic precedence which makes provision for a sectoral zone that starts out from Russian territory, and proceeds in a straight line as far as the North Pole. As a result, about 155,000 square kilometers came under dispute, including the overlapping EEZs within this area, to which has to be added the 20,000 square kilometers of overlapping claims further north in the Arctic Ocean.⁴² Since 1980, when the Soviet Union tried to undertake oil extraction, both Moscow and Oslo agreed on a

⁴⁰ Spielman (2009), p. 339.

⁴¹ Moe (2008), pp. 75-85.

⁴² Stepanov, Ørebech, Brubaker (2005), p. 9.

first moratorium prohibiting oil and gas exploration, and geological prospecting in the disputed area, which meant that fishing took a center stage in the underlying economic debates on border division.⁴³

Despite the impossibility of reaching a legal agreement, both countries quickly decided to cooperate in terms of fishing. As early as 1978, an agreement concerning the so-called Grey Zone was signed. The 65,000 square kilometers of Grey Zone includes the Loop Hole, a high seas triangle bound by Russia's EEZ, the disputed waters between both countries, and the Svalbard fisheries zone protection, but also 23,000 square kilometers of Norway's EEZ and 3,000 square kilometers belonging to Russia. The Grey Zone agreement, which is extended on a yearly basis, is a classic mechanism of enforcement and control in the management and conservation of fish stocks in international or disputed waters.⁴⁴ For many decades, both countries cooperated in terms of the management of shared and straddling fish stocks.

Through the 1990s and 2000s, regular tensions between the two countries arose over the inspection and boarding of Russian fishing boats by the Norwegian Navy. For ecological reasons, Oslo has implemented strict rules to regulate the fishing industries, and has fixed quotas of how many fish are permitted to be caught depending on the species, which it considers to be its duty to apply in its EEZ. The question of nuclear waste from Soviet nuclear plants on the Kola Peninsula and industrial pollutions, mainly from nickel, of the Barents Sea is also a cause of disagreement. Oslo criticizes regularly the lack of sustainable management of Moscow's maritime resources. More recently, the discovery of oil and gas deposits straddling the border heightened the stakes of this maritime territorial division. Lastly, the context of the post Cold-War period is sometimes difficult to manage and is subject to misunderstanding. For example, Oslo wants to normalize the provincial border of Finnmark by opening it up for public and collective military activities in the framework of NATO, but this evolution reinforces Russian concerns about the militarization of the zone.⁴⁵

Despite elements of significant tension and a complex geopolitical context, Russian-Norwegian cooperation has been a success in terms of its everyday management of maritime relations.⁴⁶ In addition, economic evolutions, in particular the growing capacity to exploit the hydrocarbon wealth of the seabed, has pushed both states to join together in cooperation. Although they are in direct competition for control of the European gas and oil mar-

⁴³ Prokhorov (2006b), pp. 114-116.

⁴⁴ "The Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone."

⁴⁵ Åtland, Pedersen (2008), pp. 227-251.

⁴⁶ Jensen, Vigeland Rottem (2010), pp. 75-83.

ket, as well as for fishing zones, Oslo and Moscow are also partners and are aware of their need of one another: Norway needs to diversify away from the increasingly depleted hydrocarbon resources in the North Sea by involving its state-run company Statoil Norsk Hydro in Russia.⁴⁷ It is estimated that about 30 percent of all undiscovered and potential Norwegian resources lie in the Barents Sea.⁴⁸ Russia, as for it, is keenly interested in the Norwegian companies' advanced technologies of offshore extraction of mineral resources, without which it would not have the competencies enabling it to exploit its own deposits.⁴⁹

This pragmatic cooperation has made it possible to overcome legal conflicts and to reach a definitive agreement, concluded in April 2010 during Dmitri Medvedev's visit to Norway and solemnly signed on September 15, 2010 (though it has still to be ratified by both parliaments before it enters into force).⁵⁰ Norway has withdrawn some of its territorial claims, and Russia has consented to a shift of the 1926 demarcation line to share the 175,000 square kilometers in two almost equal parts defined by eight points.⁵¹ The endpoint is still undefined because of the undefined edge of each parties' continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean. Russia was granted EEZ rights in the area to the east of the boundary that lies within 200 nautical miles of the Norwegian mainland but more than 200 from Russian territory. The treaty is also accompanied by agreements on the cooperation on fisheries and petroleum activities in cases where oil or gas deposits extend across the delimitation line. The Norwegian-Russian Joint Fisheries Commission will continue its activities but the agreement effectively terminates the Grey Zone fishing arrangement of 1978. On the Russian side, this decision is eminently political: it was taken against the advice of some jurists in charge of the dossier at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, who criticize Moscow for having overly compromised.⁵²

However, the 2010 Russian-Norwegian agreement leaves unresolved another point of contention, namely that of Svalbard/Spitzenberg. This archipelago, covering 61,000 square kilometers in the Barents Sea, is the object of a complex legal debate concerning the limits of Norwegian sovereignty since the independence of the country in 1905. Despite the many conferences organized around this question in Oslo between 1910 and 1914, no solution was found and it was necessary to wait until the Paris Peace Con-

⁴⁷ Godzimirski (2007).

⁴⁸ Norway, Ministry of Petroleum and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 2008.

⁴⁹ Aleksandrov (2009).

⁵⁰ "Agreement between Norway and Russia on maritime delimitation."

⁵¹ "Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean."

⁵² Anonym interview with jurists working on the Arctic at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Moscow, September 2010.

ference in 1920 to attain the signing of a treaty favorable to Norway. The Svalbard Treaty, signed by more than 40 states in the absence of Soviet Russia, which had no international legal recognition at the time, confirmed Norwegian sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago but under specific limits and conditions.

In 1924, lacking international recognition, the USSR finally accepted Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard in exchange for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Oslo. In 1935, the USSR ratified the Svalbard Treaty, but kept on asking for joint jurisdiction over Svalbard itself and for the inclusion of Bear Island under Soviet jurisdiction. For this, it had requested that legal delimitation be decided according to the principle of equity, which supposes that factors of economic importance (Russian fishing in the region) and of historical precedence (the archipelago has allegedly been peopled with Pomorian Russians since the 17th–18th centuries, but the Russian villages were destroyed during the Crimean War, leaving only the Russian and Ukrainian population of the small mining town of Barentsburg) are to be taken into account.⁵³ Lastly, Moscow also wanted to establish its sovereignty over a territory stretching to the Norwegian river Tana so as to rectify provisions of the 1826 convention establishing the Norwegian-Russian border which the Soviet Union found cumbersome.

The disputes around Svalbard/Spitzenberg are twofold and are linked to the question of economic exploitation, whether of mineral reserves or of fishing. The Treaty contains complex clauses stipulating that ships and citizens of contracting parties are permitted to undertake fishing and hunting on the territories and in their territorial waters on an equal basis, and that all signatory states have equal access to economic activities in the archipelago. The mining code in force in the archipelago has to be favorable to foreign investors, such that the taxes paid promote the archipelago, but not the budget of the Norwegian state.⁵⁴

In addition, the 1920 Treaty does not make any explicit mention of the question of territorial waters or continental shelves, which were only legally formalized after the Second World War. For Oslo, Norway is entitled to exercise the normal rights of a coastal state over its maritime spaces beyond the territorial sea. A non-discriminatory Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone, and a 200-nautical-mile area of EEZ were therefore introduced without obtaining the consent of the signatory countries of the Paris agreement (only Canada and Finland recognize them). According to those states most opposed to Norway's claims, such as Great Britain, the Treaty does not authorize the establishment of maritime zones or enable coastal state jurisdic-

⁵³ Oreshenkov (2009a).

⁵⁴ Oreshenkov (2009a).

tion beyond the territorial sea without the agreement of the signatory parties. Other states have taken a halfway position and recognize Norway's right to establish a fisheries zone and to exercise coastal state jurisdiction, but maintain that the rights and obligations contained in the Treaty also apply to the fisheries zone and continental shelf around Svalbard.⁵⁵

According to Russian interpretations, it is alleged that Norway has not respected the conditions stipulated in the Treaty and has unilaterally set in place a mining code to apply to the islands' geological shelf. However, some Russian experts consider that the waters and shelf surrounding Svalbard constitute high seas, and that fishing and petroleum activity are subject only to the authority of the flag state.⁵⁶ The Russo-Norwegian relations over Svalbard/Spitzenberg are linked to the question of perceived threat. As analyzed by Kristian Åtland and Torbjørn Pedersen, some of Norway's decisions, such as its introduction of a Svalbard Environmental Protection Act that could obstruct Russian mining operations, its enforcement of measures against Russian fishing vessels in the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone, and its construction of radars and satellite stations in the officially demilitarized region of Finnmark, have accentuated Russian interpretations of the ongoing conflict potential of the archipelago.⁵⁷

Conclusions

Despite the media depictions of a forthcoming "Ice Cold War", none of the five Arctic coastal states are involved in violent confrontation or unlawful occupation of disputed territories. State behavior is guided by the agreed rules of international law, and territorial disputes have been characterized as much by symbolic competition as by pragmatic cooperation. Using the effective legal framework of the Arctic, all coastal states have been proposing innovative ideas in order to map out future areas of cooperation. Russian scientists have shared the charts, maps, and data used in their 2001 submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and have declassified some materials collected by the Russian Armed Forces. Despite state competition, Russian and Canadian scientists are exchanging information on the Lomonosov Ridge. In 2007, Canadian, Danish, and Russian officials, all of them representatives from their respective ministries or departments of Natural Resources, discussed the possibility of collaboration in the Arctic.⁵⁸ All these efforts have contributed to the unprecedented availability of information about the Arctic Ocean. During the

⁵⁵ Anderson (2009), pp. 373-384; Pedersen (2006), pp. 339-358.

⁵⁶ Vylegzhannin, Zilanov (2007), p. 57.

⁵⁷ Åtland, Pedersen (2008), pp. 227-251.

⁵⁸ Riddell-Dixon (2008), p. 351.

Ilulissat meeting, Russia put forward some innovative ideas for collective search and rescue bases in the Arctic. Moscow is a very active player in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and a pragmatic partner of the Norwegians in the framework of bilateral cooperation. This stance made possible the recent 2010 agreement to one of the main legal disputes, that of the Barents Sea.

Though the “conquest” of the Arctic signals the return of a kind of nationalist and romantic rhetoric, discourse must be distinguished from acts. Two elements explain Russia’s often hard-line stance on the Arctic question, as seen in the declarations of the President’s special representative for cooperation in the Arctic and Antarctic, the famous polar explorer and member of United Russia, Arthur Shilingarov. First, Moscow views the world through a prism of fear of its being confined to the periphery of international decision-making. The need to project power, to be recognized by the other states as an equal partner, as well as complex perceptions of threats continue to influence the way in which Moscow talks about the Arctic, but not its legal practices. Second, as in Canada, the Arctic issue is often presented as an identity-building project and a new flagship for Russia. As such, it has a high symbolic value for domestic policy, which has to be dissociated from state behavior on the international arena.⁵⁹

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⁵⁹ Baev (2007).

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3

THE ARCTIC FROM A MILITARY VIEWPOINT – A SUMMARY OF JACOB BØRRESEN’S PRESENTATION AT THE SUOMENLINNA SEMINAR

Laura Salmela

Jacob Børresen approaches the Arctic theme of the Suomenlinna seminar from a military perspective. Commodore Børresen’s experienced views stem from his long career in the Royal Norwegian Navy. He worked as the Chief of the Navy Staff until his retirement in 2000. After graduating from the Naval Academy in 1968 Børresen served on submarines for nearly ten years. Later he has also served on surface fleet; as a military secretary for the Defence Minister and in NATO and the National Defence College. Between the years 1994–1997 Børresen worked as the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff OPS/LOG SHAPE in Belgium and was assigned to the Assistant Director of the operation for Bosnia. After his retirement Jacob Børresen has worked as a senior consultant for the Norwegian Institute for Strategic Studies; the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Royal Ministry of Defence.

Jacob Børresen’s presentation begins with a brief introduction to the geopolitical properties of the Arctic. The presentation is later followed by a short outlook to the special case of Svalbard and by a discussion on the potential areas of competing interests in the Arctic. His concluding remarks deal with the current military structures and related activities in the Arctic and their future prospects.

During the Cold War, the Arctic developed into a key confrontation area between the two rivalling blocs. Both the Soviet Union and the United States with their allies had built powerful naval capabilities in the region. The Arctic was not only monitored by surface fleet but also extensively by tactical and strategic nuclear submarines of each country. Norway as one of the Scandinavian countries served as the training ground for large scale NATO joint exercises that were closely observed by the Soviet Union. In reverse, any major Soviet army training was scrutinized with equal suspicion by the NATO forces.

Today we face a rather different Arctic. Contemporary North can be better referred to in the words of Norway’s Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre:

High North – Low Tension. All littoral countries agree upon such a state of affairs and support the continuation of peaceful development of the region. Nonetheless, as the Arctic is faced with an increasing number of challenges, peace and stability do not evolve on their own but require active state participation, cooperation and material contributions. Børresen indicates that the challenges are a product of the dramatic changes in the geopolitical architecture of the Arctic that have occurred over the past 25 years. The re-configuration of the Arctic geopolitical structure is not expected to stop to the present day but is going to continue another three decades or so. The Arctic might also again become a stage of major power rivalry as state competition over a secure access to vast natural resources and transportation routes accelerates.

Børresen notes that there are many explaining factors behind the current changes in the Arctic. Firstly, the end of the Cold War, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the birth of the Russian Federation, altered the geopolitical situation in the region. Secondly, the discovery of new oil and gas deposits and the development of extraction technologies at a time of aggravating demand and rising prices, contribute to the intensification of competition for them. Thirdly, a general shortage of food in the world puts pressure to the fisheries industries of the North. Ownership of areas which entail rich fish stocks may become a disputed issue. Lastly, global warming is producing mixed results in the region. Rising temperatures threaten the subsistence and cultural basis of Arctic indigenous peoples. In contrast however, global warming makes the ice-covered sea areas more accessible to commercial activities.

Military-strategic significance of the Arctic

In military strategic terms, the Arctic is important because of its geographical location between the North American and the Eurasian continents. The shortest line between Russia and North America runs across the Arctic. Its proximity to the North Pole is also decisive. The area also contains strategically significant naval and military bases.

With the development of long range bombers and intercontinental missiles, the anticipated direction of aerial attacks came from the *North* for both the Soviet Union and the North America. Consequently during the Cold War, radar stations with early warning systems were placed in the surrounding Russian and North American coastlines of the Polar Sea. Ground based defence systems in the Canadian Arctic and the Russian Siberia are still operational and form an important part of the national defence of the United States and Russia.

The Arctic is also important from a military perspective because it serves as the only unrestricted access to the Atlantic Ocean for the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy. It is claimed that for this reason after the Second World War, the Russian leaders decided to prioritize the Northern Fleet and develop the fleet's bases on the Kola Peninsula. During the Cold War, the Kola military complex has been argued to be the largest military base area in the world. With collapse of the Soviet Union as Russia lost its Baltic base areas, the importance of the Northern Fleet's base complex has again increased considerably. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Arctic waters are likewise important exercise areas for the Northern Fleet and the supporting naval air forces. Both the Russian Navy and the Air Force have again become more active in the Barents Sea region and the Arctic Ocean after a significant economic downturn of the country in the 1990s. However, as Børresen emphasizes this should not be seen as a threat but a positive sign of Russia gaining a state of regularity and stability.

The Northern Fleet has the majority of Russia's strategic submarines. Besides the important location of the Kola military complex in terms of transit routes, the deep Central Basin of the Polar Sea and the North Norwegian Sea are extremely well suited as operation areas for submarines. In addition to the ice cap of the Polar Sea, the combination of an extremely broken and hilly sea bottom with large variations in ocean salinity and temperature makes detection of submarines difficult. Submarine launched nuclear weapons still constitute an important part of the deterrent force of the nuclear powers, and the Norwegian Sea and parts of the Polar Sea are among their most important operation areas. The Polar Sea is also a meaningful transit route for American nuclear submarines that travel between the East and the West Coast of the United States.

As two of the coastal states are transcontinental major powers with global interests, the region and the states within may be affected by conflicts of non-Arctic origin. The Arctic served as a stage for superpower confrontation during Cold War, although as such the long standing conflict did not have anything to do with the region itself. Børresen maintains that during the iron curtain divide for example Norway was compelled to stand against the Eastern bloc, even though it had had a long history of good diplomatic relations and alliances with Russia. In the contemporary world, as the Arctic is becoming more and more important as a source of natural resources, conflicts in the Middle East and the Central Asia might reverberate to the region. Disruptions in traditional energy networks and transportation channels put pressure on the extraction of resources from less disputed areas. In addition, as long as the Northern Fleet and the Kola Peninsula base complex constitute key instruments of Russian foreign and security policy and a central source of Russian military might, conflicts within the post-Soviet space and other former areas of Soviet influence may quickly spread to the

Arctic. Børresen indicates that in certain situations transcontinental Russia can be seen as a conveyor belt for the transportation of distant conflicts into the Arctic.

The special case of Svalbard

A particular military aspect of Arctic security is the demilitarized status of the Svalbard archipelago in accordance with the Paris treaty of 1920.¹ The treaty made Svalbard a part of the Kingdom of Norway. Under Article 9 of the Svalbard treaty, Norway cannot establish a naval base or build any kind of fortification on the islands. The article states that the islands may never be utilized for purposes of war. However, according to Børresen Norway does not consider this a prohibition against all kinds of military activity. Norway interprets that the article is specifically directed at acts of war, or at activities that have war as their purpose. Military measures strictly for defensive purposes are not covered by the treaty. Svalbard's distinct military significance may however challenge Norway's view of the treaty.

Firstly, Svalbard has important military meaning especially for the Russians, because it is located on the exit route of the Russian Navy when it sails from the Kola Peninsula home base to the Northern Sea. Secondly, Svalbard is relatively close to the North Pole. Satellites in the polar orbit play an increasingly important role in military operations for surveillance, communications, navigation and weather forecasts. In order to be able to download information from the satellites in near to real time, a ground station located at high latitude is a necessity. The Svalsat station at Svalbard is an ideal point for these kinds of activities. Svalsat is currently used for civilian purposes such as weather forecasting. Nonetheless, there is a possibility that it will be utilized for military objectives in particular situations. However, as Børresen stresses the military option as such does not violate the Paris treaty.

To put it differently, military activity at Svalbard is accepted to a certain degree. Svalbard is regularly visited by the Norwegian Coast Guard, the Norwegian Navy and the Norwegian Air Force. This has been an established practice for many years. Foreign military activity on the island is on the other hand strictly forbidden and would be seen from the Norwegian side as a grave violation of state sovereignty. If foreign military or other state vessels wish to enter the Norwegian territorial waters around Svalbard, they have to apply for diplomatic clearance well in advance. Despite

¹ For full text of the Svalbard Treaty see [<http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/01/1-11/svalbard-treaty.xml>].

the possibility of visits, Norwegian authorities seldom allow diplomatic clearances to Svalbard.

Areas of potential conflict in the Arctic

In discussing possible future disputes in the Arctic, Børresen introduces Kristian Åtland's definitions on potential conflict areas in the region.² The potential conflict areas dealt with conflicts between different interest groups and sectors as opposed to states, conflicts over access to oil and gas resources, conflicts over access to marine resources, and conflicts over access to shipping lanes.

Conflicts between interest groups and sectors

Conflicts between interest groups and sectors have to do with conflicts between sub-state actors such as the military, indigenous peoples, the petroleum industry, the fishing industry and the shipping companies. The dividing lines between sub-state actors are not as defined as between interstate actors. This may serve as an incentive for actors to behave with restraint. For example the relationship between the Russian military and the petroleum industry in the Barents Sea region went in the course of the 1990s from a state of rivalry to a state of pragmatic partnership. Still, there is no denying that some conflicts are deeper than others. As the interests towards the Arctic as a resource base for economic activity grow, interstate conflicts may sharpen and the relationships between non-state actors such as industrial entrepreneurs and indigenous peoples may become more complicated. As it has turned out before, the commercial interests of a company and the maintenance of traditional livelihoods often do not correspond well with each other.

According to Børresen, Kristian Åtland denotes that sub-state actors often define security in terms of threats to their interests or subsistence. Threats are caused by an on-going or planned development. The challenge is that their respective security agendas are not always compatible. The state-centric hard security agenda of military establishments that typically focuses on the maintenance of political and military stability in the region may not necessarily be consistent with the energy security agenda of industrial actors. The agenda of industrial actors again may be incompatible with the environmental security agenda of environmental NGOs, or the societal

² For report see *Security Implications of Climate Change in the Arctic*, Kristian Åtland, 2010, [<http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2010/01097.pdf>]. Kristian Åtland works at Norway's Defence Research Establishment, [http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/start/?_jsessionid=FZP2LOAJXKRJTQFIZYGSFEQ?_requestid=32029].

or human security agenda of indigenous or other groups. In the Arctic, threats may emerge not only at the state level, but also at the level of societies and groups. The mobilization of various counter-measures against the perceived threats is operationalized at the different levels.

Conflicts of interest between various sub-state and non-state actors are likely to arise in several places of the Arctic in the coming decades without necessarily jeopardizing the political stability of individual countries or the region as a whole. Many of the conflicts and disputes are going to be solved through negotiations, private bargaining or court procedures at the local level. Some conflicts may have to be addressed at the governmental level. Each Arctic state will need to formulate its priorities and find ways to balance their sometimes conflicting economic, environmental and security interests in the region. Overarching *Arctic strategies*, such as the ones that have been formulated by a number of Arctic states in recent years³, can be helpful insofar as they lay down basic goals and principles for future activities.

Conflicts over access to petroleum resources

In the report *Climate Change and International Security* published in March 2008⁴, the European Commission addresses the climate-induced resource conflicts in the Arctic. The Commission argues that increased accessibility of hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic is changing the geo-strategic dynamics of the region with potential consequences for international stability and European security interests. Børresen asserts that such an outlook also interests the militaries of different Arctic states because it offers a reason to increase the budgets of these institutions. This is visible for example in the report *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power*⁵ which was published by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandants of the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Coast Guard in 2007. According to Børresen, the report uses the potential for resource-related conflicts in the Arctic as an argument to strengthen the U.S. Navy. Competition over energy resources as a source of interstate tensions is not only noted in the United States but concerns Russia.

³ See for example *The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy*, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 December 2006, [<http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/strategien.pdf>].

⁴ For full report *Climate Change and International Security, The High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council*, 14 March 2008, see [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf]

⁵ For full report *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power*, see [<http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf>].

Although the Arctic states might regard their neighbours as potential opponents in the quest for natural resources on the continental shelf, the possibility of an interstate war is low. All coastal states see the use of military force as an option of last-resort. In addition, as Børresen points out most states prefer to settle their arguments according to the rules and regulations of international law. Unilateral action that disregards international law might also direct foreign investments elsewhere. Moreover, the littoral states want to avoid the potential arms race that might be caused by acting without considering others' opinions.

Although the stakes are often high, competition for energy resources is not going to lead to an armed conflict. Børresen presents that this is mainly because most of the currently known, unexploited deposits are located in areas of unchallenged national jurisdiction. It is unlikely that countries would engage in costly offshore projects in territories outside their national borders in disputed waters. Furthermore, four of the five Arctic coastal states are signatories to the UN convention on the Law of the Sea. All four of them seem to take their legal commitments seriously, as stated in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration⁶. The same goes for their collective "stewardship" responsibilities in the region. As a result, Børresen underlines that it will be science and international law, not military power, which will define the extension of continental shelves and their delineation between the neighbouring coastal states. The clarification of the outer limits of the national offshore domains through undersea mapping, legal procedures and bilateral negotiation will alleviate uncertainty and disagreements and steer the interstate relations towards a more cooperative direction. By solving their more than 40 year old dispute over the delineation of their continental shelves in 2010, Russia and Norway set a good precedent for others to follow.

However, in the long term predictions there exists a conflict potential between the littoral states and the remaining members of the Arctic Council (Iceland, Sweden, and Finland). Interstate relations could also be destabilized by the involvement of a non-Arctic state, especially in resource related disputes. For example, China's possible commercial or other presence in the region could lead to frictions within the already established Arctic community.

Conflicts over access to marine resources

The Arctic contains some of the world's most valuable commercial fishing stocks. Moreover, fishery forms an important part on the economies of the Arctic coastal states. Fishery is particularly extensive in the Norwegian

⁶ For *The Ilulissat Declaration of 2008*, see [http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/Ilulissat-declaration.pdf].

Sea, the Barents Seas and in the eastern part of the Bering Sea. It is hard to predict the impact of climate change on fish stocks in these and other sea areas close to the Arctic Ocean. Nonetheless, the most likely scenario is that the stocks will gradually move northwards as sea temperatures rise in their current habitats. A study conducted by the US Arctic Research Commission in 2002 concluded that “climate change is likely to bring extensive fishing activity to the Arctic, particularly in the Barents Sea and Beaufort-Chukchi region”, and that “Bering Sea fishery opportunities will increase as sea ice cover begins later and ends sooner in the year.”⁷

A decline in the proportion of fish in the southern waters may influence the relations of the Arctic states. A negative trend in fish stock growth might also reflect to the relations between Arctic and non-Arctic states. Stock migrations from exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of one country to that of another and from coastal jurisdiction of state to international water might raise tensions as well. Nevertheless, this does not mean that fisheries related disputes would escalate into a military conflict. Even though when force is used it is rarely responded to as historical examples illustrate. Inter-state fisheries disputes seldom become militarized although the potential of conflict escalation remains. Despite the progress of recent years to address collective marine management challenges in the Arctic such as illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU), the competition over resources has prevailed. Each coastal state wants to secure its share of the vast natural resources. Regulatory measures of one state, particularly in areas of unclear jurisdiction, may be interpreted by another state as biased and unjustified rather than being motivated by objective management needs. Misinterpretations as such may be a potential conflict source.

Conflicts over access to shipping lanes

Børresen reports that there are also a number of lingering disagreements between some of the Arctic states, when it comes to the legal status of the two main maritime transport corridors leading through the Arctic – the Northern Sea Route (north of Russia) and the Northwest Passage (north of Canada). In Russian literature, the coastal waters of the country have generally been referred to as *internal waters*, *historic waters*, or *closed waters* that are subject to full Russian sovereignty. On the one hand, this claim is justified by referring to *historic rights*. On the other hand, it is claimed that ice covered waters constitute *land like structures*. Throughout the Cold War, the United States challenged Russia’s position and the status of the Polar Sea by deploying ice breakers, military aircraft and submarines as

⁷ For the full study *The Arctic Ocean And Climate Change: A Scenario For The US Navy*, October 2007, see [http://www.arctic.gov/publications/arctic_and_climate_change.pdf].

well as building ice research stations to the Russian sector of the Polar Sea. As a reaction, Russia unilaterally laid a claim to a 200 nautical miles wide exclusive economic zone in 1977. Also Norway has made a similar claim.

Canada's claim to the Arctic waters dates back to 1907. The main unresolved issue in Canada's territorial waters concerns the legal status of the Northwest Passage. Disagreements have arisen from Canada's claims over its right to draw straight borderlines between its Arctic islands increasing the boundaries of its sovereign rule over these waters. Since the incident caused by the USS Nautilus' voyage to the North Pole in 1958, Canadian authorities have regularly detected foreign submarines transiting the straits of the Canadian Arctic. Canada has regarded these events as violations to national sovereignty. The last reported incident was in 2005. Consequently, the Canadian government has seriously considered building a third fleet to protect its territorial integrity from both the Eastern and the Western bloc. The plan for the build-up of a new fleet was however later set aside.

Overall, during the Cold War Canada chose not to establish any significant military presence in the North despite the fact that it has the second longest Arctic coastline. In spite of the trespassing submarines, Canada's defence heavily depended on the military power of the United States. Also today the United States continues to be the main provider of military security in North America as it is the only country that has the financial means to establish meaningful military capabilities in the Arctic.

Although the ice cap has significantly reduced in recent years, traffic volumes in the Arctic transportation corridors remain modest. In general, trans-Arctic traffic is low. Børresen expects that the situation will not change soon. However, eventually as large parts of the Polar Sea become ice-free for considerable parts of the year shipping will increase. The quantities of cargo ship and other vessels are also linked with other strategic transit points such as the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal. If these transit routes become jeopardized as a result of a regional conflict, the importance of optional intercontinental sea lanes heightens on a temporary or permanent basis. The management and use of the Arctic transportation routes may become a contested interstate issue in the near future.

The future of the military and international alliances in the Arctic

Conflicts between different interest groups and conflicts over energy and marine resources and shipping lanes rarely lead into open military conflict. Problems related to these issues are in most cases solved in diplomatic negotiations or by legal measures in relevant court systems. Although the military is not used in its traditional sense in the Arctic, it still has an im-

portant purpose to serve in the region. Firstly, its presence in disputed areas helps to defuse or contain potential conflicts before they escalate into open confrontation. Armed forces are routinely employed by states to maintain state sovereignty and to exercise sovereign rights in adjacent sea and air-space in accordance with international law. Børresen asserts that by using the military as an instrument the Arctic states have every opportunity to keep the region as a zone of peace and stability.

Secondly, the military has a significant role in demonstrating commitment and intentions of a state to controversial issues. The delineation of exclusive economic zones and continental shelves between neighbouring countries continues to be a debated case. Regular presence of the navy and air forces in these areas can be a way to assure the opposing party that a state is committed to the issue. It is not relevant whether the conflict is solved in bilateral negotiations or in an international court. The disagreement of Canada and Denmark over the Hans Island in the Nares Strait between Greenland and Baffin Island serves here as an example. The uninhabited island was visited by naval vessels of the two countries. Both the Danish and the Canadian flag were planted on the island and cairns of stone were built to mark their claim. Canada and Denmark were of course very far from a true open conflict. However, as the situation shows even modern democratic western states still use the military as a political and diplomatic tool in their relations with each other.

Besides underlying the weight of the national militaries in the Arctic, the presented conflict areas also highlight the participation of alliances in the region. In its report *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*⁸ a group of specialists named protecting “the global lifelines that sustain modern societies” as one of the recommended core task of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The report also states that “the potential for major energy supply disruptions should figure prominently in NATO’s strategic assessment and contingency planning activities”. For example Norway is now openly discussing the prospect of NATO patrolling new sea lines in the Arctic as the Polar Sea opens for commercial traffic. Furthermore, the role of the Arctic as an energy supplier makes it an increasingly important object for NATO. In addition to securing worldwide transportation routes, the organisation might also have a part in assisting states to cope with challenges stemming from climate change such as growing number of catastrophic storms or the melting polar ice cap.

⁸ For full report *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*, see [http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_05/20100517_100517_expertsreport.pdf].

To conclude, if the recommendations of the NATO 2020 outlook are complied with, we may once more see NATO as a prominent actor in the Arctic. Four of the five Arctic coastal states are members of NATO, while the fifth is an old adversary of the alliance. Consequently, one might ask whether allocating a role for NATO in the Arctic would not imply a re-introduction of the old east west divide to the region. Potential conflicts could be also seen through that out-dated spectrum, where Russia operates alone against the rest. Moreover, one can wonder whether NATO's increased participation is conducive to continued peaceful development and cooperation in the Arctic for which all coastal states proclaim to thrive. Nevertheless, NATO's official view emphasizes that the organisation has a role to play in the Arctic. The task at hand is rather to make sure that this role is properly defined and in line with the overall security concerns its Arctic member states. In other words, as Børresen underlines NATO should not be excluded from the Arctic but its role should be carefully assessed. Furthermore, NATO's partner Russia under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council should be brought into that discussion and be allowed to influence the outcomes.

Conclusions

Despite the current and emerging unresolved issues of jurisdiction and security, the Arctic is generally a stable and peaceful region, and the long-term conflict potential should not be exaggerated. The five Arctic coastal states' commitment to finding peaceful solutions to outstanding issues through diplomacy and negotiations, in accordance with the existing Law of the Sea framework, has been reiterated on a number of occasions. The Ilulissat Declaration signed at the Arctic Ocean Conference in Greenland in May 2008, is a good example of deepening cooperation. In the end, the battle for the Arctic will hopefully be fought by scientists and lawyers, not by soldiers and sailors. The weapons of that battle will be information and scientific data, not missiles and guns, and the battleground will be conference halls and courtrooms. The conflict lines will run between competing suppliers and competing customers, not between categorized blocs of western/eastern and northern/southern states.

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4

A NEW ARCTIC – STRATEGIC ISSUES IN A DYNAMIC REGION

Niklas Granholm

Meanings of the Arctic vary.¹ It might be defined on the one hand as the territory between the Arctic Circle and the North Pole. On the other hand, it can mean the areas that share a 10 centigrade equal temperature level in July. The territory might also be bound by the level of the tree-line or the Northernmost inhabited areas. Additionally, the political significance of the Arctic and the extraction points of natural resource might also serve as a defining factor of the region. Nonetheless, for the purpose of this article and in order to include most of the complexities of the Arctic, the 60th parallel has been chosen.²

Arctic analysis

Many things suggest that we are going to have a new Arctic. The region will be different from the one we see today. But the complexities of the developments in the Arctic are hard to grasp and our knowledge of the dynamic of different factors under change is incomplete. Our understanding is further complicated by the interaction of these factors that may produce second-order effects capable of driving the Arctic setup in unexpected directions.

The analysis of the new Arctic will be difficult to undertake but not impossible. However, it must be based on a dispassionate analysis and done with an open mind. We have to make better use of insights from several different disciplines to inform the debate on the shape of the new Arctic. We still have a long way to go in this respect. In addition, different national agendas sometimes tend to colour or even cloud the analysis. The lack of knowl-

¹ This article is based on a presentation made at the *XIII Suomenlinna Seminar* in Helsinki 2–3 of June 2010. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the policies of the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden.

² This definition also has an added value in connection with the maritime fortress *Suomenlinna*. The latitude 60° 8' N firmly places it within the territory of the Arctic.

edge of many policy-makers on Arctic issues also contributes to the sharp intensification of the debate from time to time.

Sweden, as one of the Arctic nations and with more than a century-long tradition of scientific research in the area, has a substantial knowledge-base to draw from. However, during the last 15 years the security aspects of the Arctic affairs have been less significant. Soon after the end of the Cold War the military tensions of the region weakened, and the focus was more directed into other issues. Until recently, this has been the trend. About two years ago, the Swedish Defence Research Agency was tasked by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to conduct a pilot-study of the changing Arctic. All in all three studies and some articles have so far been published.³

The changes in the Arctic are dominated by, but not limited to, the substantial and fast changes in Arctic climate. The transformation of the Arctic climate is now accelerating at a pace quite unanticipated only a few years ago. Some researchers even claim that a tipping-point may have been reached so that there is no stop to the melting of the ice and the increase in temperatures. Whether the worst-case predictions are correct or not, the second-order effects triggered by climate change are already visible. There is a general agreement among many governments, NGOs and populations in the Arctic that action should be taken now, although there is no complete scientific data of the phenomenon. All actors want to avoid the failure of not responding on time. Nevertheless, this dynamic might not only produce positive effects. It might lead into situations where fast-moving social and political processes are followed by increased friction or open conflict. Wary of this possibility, governments have in recent years acted more carefully and deliberately to lessen this risk.

Six factors of Arctic change

The greenhouse effect is not the only factor affecting the changing Arctic, although some of the factors are indirectly linked to it. Six additional elements will be discussed here.

Firstly, a more assertive Russia has been seen for the past five or six years, and her assertiveness has not been limited to the Arctic arena. Open ex-

³ For studies, see *Arktis – Strategiska frågor i en region i förändring*, Niklas Granholm, Peter Haldén, Robert Larsson, Fredrik Lindvall, Bo Ljung, Karlis Neretnieks, Ingmar Oldberg, January 2008, [<http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir2469.pdf>], *Delar av ett nytt Arktis*, Niklas Granholm, December 2009, [<http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir2861.pdf>], *Olja och gas i ett nytt och förändrat Arktis*, Niklas Granholm and Ingolf Kiesow, March 2010, [<http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir2971.pdf>]

changes of scientific data on the composition of the Arctic seabed are mixed with flag-planting expeditions and a marked increase in military activities in the Arctic. So far the rules of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS⁴, have been adhered to. The recent agreement with Norway over the dispute in the Barents Sea⁵ has strengthened UNCLOS.

Secondly, Russian Arctic assertiveness seems to have triggered activities by several of the other Arctic states. Policies of sovereignty assertion can be heard and seen from some of the states not normally using such language and methods.

Thirdly, the US presidential administration seems to have started a development of an Arctic policy. The discussion has been going on in policy-making circles for some time. In part, this is based on the presidential decision directive 66, released in the last days of the former administration.⁶ A process towards US accession of the UNCLOS is underway. What course of action the United States chooses and how it will be implemented will be central to how the new Arctic will develop.

Fourthly, the external actors, mainly states without territory in the Arctic but with perceived interests there, have become more active. What these actors have in common is the notion that the changing situation requires also their interest and participation. For instance, China has been granted an observer status in the Arctic Council. China also runs a research station on Spitsbergen and has recently decided to acquire a second ice-breaker. France, the United Kingdom and Germany are all in various ways showing increased interest in the Arctic.

Moreover, two of the Arctic states are undergoing changes that might influence the overall development pattern of the region. Greenland gained extended self-rule in 2009. New constitutional arrangements are now in place after the referendum in 2008. Greenland's small economy might over time become strong enough to be able to support itself. Until then, Greenland continues to rely on economic support from the central government in Copenhagen. If optimistic predictions come true, the future economy of Greenland would be based on oil and gas extraction, mining, hydroelectric power, shipping and tourism. There is also US military base at Thule that links Greenland to the military strategic situation.

⁴ *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982*, [http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf]

⁵ Agreement between Norway and Russia on maritime delimitation, The Norwegian Mission to the EU, [<http://www.eu-norway.org/news1/Agreement-between-Norway-and-Russia-on-maritime-delimitation/>]

⁶ National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 66, 9 Jan 2009, [http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf]

Constitutional change, the political will expressed by the new government and economic prospects put together point towards a full independence for Greenland. The speed and character of this process are difficult to determine, but a timeline of 10 to 20 years seems probable.

However, the question remains on the future outlook of an independent Greenlandic state. On the one hand, we might see an *Arctic Kuwait* that is economically strong and reasonably stable and secure state. In the other outcome, Greenland might resemble more an *Arctic Micronesia* that is indeed independent but lacks the resources to uphold its sovereignty.

Another national process in the Arctic is the three simultaneous crises Iceland is going through. The severe economic crisis, or “*Kreppa*” in Icelandic, has limited Iceland’s room for manoeuvre and led to social upheaval and unrest. Recovery will take many years, even though the economic fundamentals are sound.

In addition, Iceland is going through a crisis in security affairs. Since the US military presence on Iceland ended in 2006, NATO member states have helped to uphold Iceland’s sovereignty with air power. Air-policing, as this is called, means an intermittent military presence for a few weeks in each quarter. Most of the time, Icelandic airspace is without air defence, even though a state-of-the-art radar chain is operational on the island and is now linked to the European NATO-commands instead of the earlier NORAD system in North America. All the same, the air policing on Iceland has not yet proved to be stable. Each deployment is preceded by a bilateral negotiation over costs. The dispute between Iceland, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands over the Icelandic banks that defaulted in the autumn of 2008, directly influenced these negotiations and resulted in a gap in deployment.

Iceland is also faced with a crisis that can be described as a crisis brought by speedy modernisation. The fast societal changes since the end of World War II – by no means unique for Iceland – have led to feelings of apprehension. Today, many Icelanders question their country’s role in the world and her domestic development.

These three crisis described above interact with each other. Where Iceland is headed, is not clear. Iceland’s application for EU-membership barely made through parliament, and public opinion remains divided on the issue.

Lastly, the Barents region, relatively quiet for a long time, is now changing. Here, several if not all of the factors under change are interlinked: shipping, overlapping territorial claims, energy resources, military strategy, and not the least fishing. The concentration of most of these factors in one small area is a possible source of friction in the near future.

Energy

In the case of energy issues, estimates of oil, gas and mineral deposits must be seen as potential rather than actual. According to the US Geological Survey, 13 % of the world's undiscovered oil and 30 % of the undiscovered natural gas deposits can be found in the Arctic.⁷ Even if the Arctic sea-ice is receding, the climatic challenges to gas, oil and mineral extraction in the Arctic are still formidable. New technology, some of which has recently been put to use in gas extraction in the *Snøhvit*-gasfield to the north of Norway⁸, can over time overcome some of these obstacles. Nevertheless, so far the conditions are too challenging and costly for large-scale extraction in all other parts of the Arctic. The extraction is unlikely to begin anytime soon. The utilization of the natural resources always depends on access, price and available technology.

The potential energy resources in the Arctic are sometimes used to manifest strategic foreign policy goals and signal interest, which feed into some of the territorial issues in the Arctic. The huge potential of natural resources in the Arctic could also work in the opposite direction. A more confrontational stance could be tempered by a realisation among the different parties that there is much to be gained from cooperation. One example of this could be Russia's need for advanced off-shore technology for energy extraction.

It seems likely that the trends over energy resources in the Arctic will not be uniform over the whole region. Elements of cooperation, competition and confrontation will probably all appear in parallel.

Overlapping territorial claims

Another important issue to be mentioned is overlapping territorial claims. The majority of them probably are mostly issues of incomplete oceanographic data collection. The shape of the Arctic seabed is incompletely mapped. Once sufficient data has been collected and submitted to relevant international agencies – a process over many years – the existing international legal regimes will be used to decide whose territorial claim shall be accepted.

⁷ *Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Potential*, U.S. Energy Information Administration, 19.10.2009, [<http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/arctic/index.html>]
EIA uses in its report data from US Geological Survey.

⁸ Facts about *Snøhvit*, Statoil website, [<http://www.statoil.com/en/OurOperations/ExplorationProd/ncs/snoehvit/Pages/default.aspx>]

But some of the overlapping claims are more difficult to settle, not just because of lack of data, but more because the stakes are as high. If the value of access to the natural resources and hard security reasons of the state are deemed more important than adherence to international legal regimes, a decision not in favour of the claimant might lead to a temptation to refuse such an outcome. This in turn might put the legal regime under strain or even jeopardise it. The likelihood of this is hard to ascertain, but should not be ruled out.

New sea lanes

Shipping has yet to take off in the Arctic. The melting ice will over time open new Sea Lines of Communication, or SLOCs for short, but so far it has not led to a substantial increase in commercial shipping in the Arctic as a whole. Leaving the intra-Arctic sea lanes aside, the three main transoceanic routes through the Arctic now under discussion are the Northern Sea Route, the Northwest Passage and the North Polar Route.⁹

These three SLOCs will all be considerably shorter than those available today. Without question, anyone in the shipping industry will be interested in SLOCs that are up to 40 % shorter than the ones used today.

According to very rough estimates, the Northern Sea Route becomes available for commercial shipping in 5 to 10 years, the Northern Passage in 10 to 20 years and the North Polar Route in 20 to 30 years given that the Arctic Ocean will turn ice-free.

These three SLOCs will all become accessible in different timeframes depending on the speed of climate change and the amount of allocated resources for making them commercially viable and safe to use. Even with less ice, the Arctic continues to have a harsh climate for sea traffic. With fierce storms and dark and cold conditions, it will remain a demanding environment for vessels and their personnel.

It is difficult to determine, when the SLOCs will be fully accessible. However, when it happens, it will probably be very sudden and come without much advance warning. With all three SLOCs operational, routes through the Arctic offer alternatives for shipping. The Arctic sea routes come handy for international shipping if disruptions occur in other SLOCs or international maritime choke-points making them unavailable for use. The future

⁹ For graphics, see e.g. Hugo Ahlenius, UNEP/GRID-Arendal, [<http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/arctic-sea-routes-northern-sea-route-and-northwest-passage>].

opening of these three SLOCs will have global geopolitical effects. These are yet to be determined.

Military strategic developments

For a long time the Arctic has not been a high priority in military strategic terms. The High North issue waned rapidly in parallel with decreasing deployments and changing exercise patterns soon after the end of the Cold War. Patrols with strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs and SSNs) also decreased to very low levels, a trend that now seems to have stopped and reversed. Given the importance attached to these ultimately powerful weapons, an increased air and naval activity can be expected in the Arctic.

Two issues regarding the Arctic's military strategic role will be addressed here. Firstly, the strategic nuclear submarines have used and probably will continue to use the ice-sheet as an effective protective cover for outside detection. Subsequently, it raises a question on, how the strategic nuclear balance and the upheld military systems will be affected by the receding Arctic ice-sheet.

Secondly, the Arctic plays a role in the development of the US Missile Defence.¹⁰ Possible opponents for the United States in a future missile scenario might be Iran or North Korea. The shortest missile trajectories cross the Arctic. Sensors and missile bases placed in and around the region link the Arctic into a larger strategic context. It is yet too early to determine precisely what effects the plans of the US administration not to deploy component parts of the missile defence system to Eastern Europe will have in the long-term. If countries that invest in missile defence systems start to prefer sea-based solutions to land-based ones, in 5 to 10 years the Arctic might be chosen as the most suitable location for concentrating such resources.

We are going to have a new Arctic – but what kind of Arctic?

After this broad sweep over some of the Arctic issues, what remains striking is the degree of uncertainty on how the developments will affect the region now and in the future. Both possible threats and opportunities in the New Arctic were discussed in this paper. There is no doubt that a new Arc-

¹⁰ For further reading on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence, see *Increasing Security, but Avoiding a Security Dilemma – Perspectives on the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence in Europe*, Jyri Saanio, 2010, [[http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi/wcm/2cbe3980435c771bb06bb9faaf38e570](http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi/wcm/2cbe3980435c771bb06bb9faaf38e570/SratL2_No43_Saanio.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=ur&CACHEID=2cbe3980435c771bb06bb9faaf38e570)].

tic is rising, although it is unclear what it will be. The Arctic might turn into an arena for a new and a frostier version of the 19th century Great Game with a low degree of international regulation. The future of the status of the indigenous peoples and the environment in Arctic politics can also be seen as a great question mark. Another worry is that the Arctic will become more militarized with a relatively high risk of incidents where escalation to open confrontation is not ruled out. The tensions in such an Arctic could also pressure multilateral security organisations and the existing international regimes to redefine their role.

The development of the Arctic could also take a more benign direction. In this case, we might expect an Arctic, where there is general agreement that the region needs international regulation, and where international legal regimes are adhered to and developed further. In contrast with the more negative outlook, the military strategic interest would remain low and the incidents would not escalate easily. We also might see an Arctic where great care and concern is shown for the environment and the regulation of shipping. The extraction of natural resources would be carried out in accordance with environmental legislation keeping the nature intact.

The emerging new Arctic needs to be studied and analysed. This is supported by the fact that our knowledge of the interaction between the changing factors is incomplete. Moreover, the respective factors have in themselves different lead-times and operate according to their internal logic. This may well produce unforeseen second-order effects. To formulate Arctic policies under these circumstances will be a challenge to say the least. We are most likely only in the beginning of this policy-formulating process.

* * *

A new and different Arctic with greater geopolitical significance is emerging. This New Arctic, however it turns out, cannot and should not be seen as something separate from the rest of the world, of interest only to a select group of highly skilled specialists. The New Arctic is linked to and affects the rest of the world. What happens in other parts of the world will affect the shape of the New Arctic.

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5

THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION – NOTES ON A DEFUNCT CONCEPT

Magnus Christiansson

When the organisers proposed the topic “The Military Balance in the Baltic Sea Region” for my lecture at the XIII Suomenlinna Seminar I was at first a little sceptical. What military balance? After all, the framing of a subject in those terms sounded like an anachronism since “military balance” has largely moved out from the political discourse. It reminded me of the Cold War, and it reminded me of a concept that many of my colleagues, for good reasons, are far from happy to use.

In fact, what happened after the Cold War was that most European politicians came to cultivate the idea that something fundamental had happened in world politics. Not only was there an end to the confrontation between Superpowers, but the cooperative relations between states in Western Europe was now seen as extendable also to Eastern Europe. A process of enlargement of both the EU and NATO commenced. This was a New Europe. The fundamental idea of security among states was formulated in the 1990 *Charter of Paris for a New Europe*: “Security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others.”¹ This is perhaps the clearest example of how power politics and spheres of influence were pushed aside in the discourse by treaty based cooperative politics. Furthermore, the idea of partnerships that blossomed in the 1990s was essentially a way to accommodate irregular security interests among the states in this New Europe.

Another driver of this development was the introduction of a term that successfully came to colonize the public discourse during the 1990s – globalization. This is not an argument that relates to the ongoing debate about what this phenomenon is, but rather that it became a concept that every successful politician in the 1990s had to be familiar with. Globalization was both cause and effect. It was a promise for many and a horrible prospect for others. Sometimes an ideological gesture, sometimes a depiction.

The principal loser in globalization is the state. The economic significance of the state is questionable in times when the global financial systems, or

¹ CSCE (1990), p. 5.

the electronic herd as Thomas Friedman would say, could overrun every country. Related to this, some would claim closely related, was the regionalization that in the European case was manifested by the accelerating integration process of the EU. This, often called “Europeanization”, was expressed by the efforts to coordinate a number of policy areas – foreign policy, monetary policy, environmental policy, migration policy, to name just a few – via different degrees of EU institutionalization.

Consequently, a state-centric public debate on security faded away in many European countries during the 1990s. Since traditional power politics was absent from the agenda attention turned to other problems. The focus of the *Council of the Baltic Sea States* (CBSS) is illustrative of this – environment, economic development, energy, education and culture. Not only is it common ground among its members, but it also reflects a diffusion of non-traditional security concerns. Security replaced strategy in the discourse.

This development was further accentuated after 9/11 and the US led Global War on Terrorism. Following the relative calm in the Balkans and the successful enlargement processes, an integrated Europe was now seen as normality and the major security concern was how much to support the remaining Superpower in its global endeavours. The NATO countries of the Baltic Sea region met this debate directly during 2003 when the “transatlantic rift” put loyalties to test. The EU countries of the Baltic Sea region met this debate indirectly as the common security and defence policy was gradually designed. Power politics was associated with the US. Europe equalled “effective multilateralism”.

But then something happened. Geopolitics and power politics came back into the discourse. Actually, there had always been scholars and politicians of the old school that never believed in a “New Europe”.² However distinguished, during the 1990s they had a hard time finding any significant place in the debate or in the corridors of political power. Many experts on Eastern Europe and Russia pointed out in the early 1990s that the democracy developed under the Yeltsin regime was indeed “stillborn” and only vaguely similar to Western democracy.³ But these experts, often critical to the “shock therapy” introduced by ingenuous Western economists, were marginalised and their warnings largely ignored.⁴ The conclusions of these early observers put a question mark after the rhetoric on a whole, free and integrated Europe that most politicians were using. Furthermore, this questionmark suggested that many of the policies associated with this “New Europe” were in fact dangerous and illusionary.

² See for example Mearsheimer (1990).

³ See for example Gill & Markwick (2000).

⁴ Hedlund (2005).

However, it took more than a decade for these thoughts to enter the mainstream of the debate. When Vladimir Putin came to power he seemed for many to belong to a new species in the post Cold War order: the elected autocrat.⁵ His agenda was gradually revealed, as he openly contested the principles of an open society, centralized means of power and installed vas-salls from the old Soviet security apparatus. The military clash with Georgia in August 2008 was not a surprise for the experts, but proved to be an eye-opener for many in the Western European political circles. Over a se-quence of a few days, it seemed for some, the Charter of Paris became an obsolete document from a previous era.

The British journalist Edward Lucas published an influencial book called *The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces both Russia and the West* in which he argues that the West underestimates the danger that Russia poses for the world.⁶ His message echoed what many Eastern European countries had warned of and feared as junior partners in the trans-atlantic integration process. Shifting attention to issues on a wider security agenda and military transformation based on a notion of a “New Europe” seemed risky if Rus-sia’s behaviour challenged the very cornerstones of the European security order. For example, when the Estonian President Toomas Ilves openly asked the question “Can Berlin be defended?”⁷ he was not referring to a broad concept of societal security, but the idea of territorial defence aban-doned after the Cold War. Quite suddenly terms like “history”, “power politics” and “spheres of influence” entered the public debate in some countries. Admittedly, this shift in the debate was not paradigmatic, but it definitely represented a new diversity in the European debate.⁸

So, after reconsidering the proposition to lecture on the military balance in the Baltic Sea region, I realized that there had emerged a political agenda that reintroduced many of the concepts from the Cold War in the debate, and that this indeed made it an interesting subject from many perspectives. The discourse had shifted and this, I would argue, is a challenge for the academic discipline of International Relations. A great deal of the devel-opment of academia after the Cold War has been dedicated to revising and criticizing the traditional perspectives that had proved to be both mislead-ing and hollow. The comeback of these very concepts, as used by key ac-tors in European politics, provides a good opportunity to revisit theory in the light of an agenda set by the actors we are to study. This is the purpose of this chapter.

⁵ Zakaria (2003).

⁶ Lucas (2008).

⁷ Thielbeer (2008).

⁸ Valasek (2008).

The article will have four sections. In the first I will make my way into the conceptual jungle of the key concept of military balance provided to me by the organizers of the Suomenlinna Seminar. I will shift focus to military balancing. I will show in which ways it is possible to use this term, and what knowledge it could guide us to. In the second section I will describe the current military capabilities in the region. It will be a brief account that will represent fixed points that do not have theoretical or empirical importance in themselves. In the third section I will briefly describe and analyse the patterns of balancing behaviour among the states in the region using the theoretical toolbox introduced. Finally, I will discuss a few conclusions, both regarding military balancing in the Baltic Sea region as well as theory.

What is military balance?

As hinted above it is far from obvious that there is academic support for a new agenda of power politics in Europe. Some would argue that revisiting obsolete theory would be to surrender to or even indirectly support politics that create a more unstable and conflict prone Europe. To use military balance is in fact using discursive power that will marginalise cooperative politics, and in the end become a self-fulfilling prophesy.

However, as pointed out by Alexander Wendt, the notion that international politics is shaped by power relations is not reserved for any specific strand in International Relations.⁹ Applying it does not imply a specific agenda in itself. This means that the opposite argument could be made: after the clash in Georgia 2008 it would be to use discursive power to hide the importance of power politics in Europe. Instead, the theoretically important question is in what way power, including military power, matters. This is why the title of the lecture was wrongly formulated, not because it refers to a flawed (neo)realist heritage, but because it did not address the importance of military power in a meaningful way.

Balance, whether military or other, is a metaphor. As Richard Little points out, this aspect of metaphor must be taken seriously “because the source of the metaphor (balance) has the ability to transform the accepted meaning of the target of the concept (power).”¹⁰ Using it is an invitation to think of a scale where masses of military assets make the scale tip over to the advantage of the most powerful actor. Accordingly, when the *International Institute for Strategic Studies* (IISS) publishes their annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics, it is named *The Military Bal-*

⁹ Wendt (1999), pp. 96-97.

¹⁰ Little (2007), p. 19.

ance.¹¹ However, an assessment of the Armed Forces around the Baltic Sea could tell us something about proportions of matter. But this in itself it does not give any clue of the importance or impact of these proportions. An assessment could be used to find out patterns of defence spending and proportions of military equipment, but the label is misleading since it appears to provide an insight into which actors are more “heavy” than others in a specific region or conflict. To take but one contemporary example: one could argue that a country like Pakistan is just as important an actor in the Afghanistan conflict as the US, even if the latter ranks much higher on defence spending and military equipment.

One common way of describing this in theoretical terms is that power is a relation and not a resource. Whether defence spending of an actor results in this actor becoming “heavy” or not depends on the context. This relational approach to power underlines that any given power resource (like military resources) must be connected to a relation where power is to be exercised in order to assess its value. Some kind of framework of assumptions of which actor is trying to get which other actor to do what needs to be established, before the importance of military capabilities could be determined. Some scholars call this a “policy-contingency framework”. Not to use such a framework would be, in the words of David Baldwin, to discuss what constitutes a good card hand without knowing which card game to play.¹²

However, I side with Olav Knudsen in that power as resource and power as relation do not necessarily rival each other. Power is on the one hand determined by the actor’s own assessments where appearance of power becomes the guide to understanding relational action. At the same time the appearance interpreted by actors is the image of resources.¹³ There are two crucial elements in this reasoning: the first concerns the constant process of resource assessments performed by governments, and secondly the subjective element of the actors, based on interpretation and role identities. Or in other words, the power of a government is, to a large extent, what other governments *think* it is.¹⁴

According to Knudsen it is this process of estimation and assessment that constitutes a researchable phenomenon. This defines balancing of power: “a tendency or a pattern of behaviour of compensatory reaction to perceived power differentials.”¹⁵ It is important to underline that Knudsen makes a major point that (neo)realists, like Kenneth Waltz, have been too focused on military capabilities, since the process is ubiquitous. Thus, the

¹¹ IISS (2010).

¹² Baldwin (2006), pp. 179-180.

¹³ Knudsen (2007), p. 11.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 26. This applies if governments are the actors.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 26.

military balance is something distinct from the balance of power. An analyst can make a serious mistake by assuming that the study of military balancing does in fact give him a view of the balancing of power.

This angle provides the theoretical scope of this essay. In the following I will use the statistics of current patterns of defence spending and capabilities in the Baltic Sea region as the point of departure of this process of assessment. This part of the essay is simply a way to briefly sketch which (military) playing cards exist among the countries in the region. After that I will look closer at the different role conceptions, the (military) strategies that we find in the region. A meaningful use of military balance is thus a scholarly description of the cards while also covering the respective cardgames defined by the actors.

Finally this leaves us with a few limitations related to the scope of the study. From the chosen approach to military balance it is not entirely clear why there necessarily needs to be a regional limit. Indeed, as could be suspected, many factors and actors outside of the Baltic Sea region are likely to influence the strategies under study. International bodies like NATO are likely to have an impact and perhaps most importantly the policies of the US. It is quite likely that any process of balancing is not limited to the geography of the Baltic Sea. In other words: is there a Baltic Sea cardgame? This is the second reason why the title “The Military Balance in the Baltic Sea Region” is awkward – balancing behaviour *in* the region might not necessarily be limited *by* the region.

While the process of balancing could describe the patterns of state actors in the region, it could simultaneously provide us with empirical input to evaluate the status of the Baltic Sea region as a “level of analysis” in international politics.¹⁶ Theory could show us important dimensions in state behaviour, and state behaviour could in turn show in what sense there is a regional dimension. These are the caveats when the lexical definition of “Baltic Sea region” will be defined as the states in the CBSS, not counting Iceland which does not have an armed force.

¹⁶ According to Buzan & Waever (2003) the Balkans constitutes a sub-komplex. In principle, the Baltic Sea region could emerge as such a sub-complex.

Capabilities¹⁷

The 2009 ranking of the Baltic Sea region from the rough criteria of military spending in US\$ gives the following list:

- 1) Germany 46.5bn
- 2) Russia 41.05bn
- 3) Poland 8.63bn
- 4) Norway 5.94bn
- 5) Sweden 5.61bn
- 6) Denmark 4.58bn
- 7) Finland 4.21bn
- 8) Lithuania 501m
- 9) Latvia 382m
- 10) Estonia 358m

The Baltic states

The three Baltic countries have the smallest set of military playing cards. All three have decreased their defence budgets in 2009. For example, Latvia cut down its defence budgets by 21%. Lithuania is by far the greatest spender in US\$ with 501m. Estonia and Latvia are close together with 382m and 358m US\$ respectively. It is well worth noting that the total defence spending of the Baltic states (1.241bn US\$) is less than half of the second smallest spender in the region, Finland.

The composition of the Armed Forces of the Baltic states are all shaped by the process of defence transformation leading up to the NATO membership. The Armies have invested heavily in expeditionary participation in US led missions like Afghanistan. They are all dependent on reservists, and active components vary from ca. 1000 to 2500 troops in each country. The Navies have set up a joint unit BALTRON with bases in Liepāja, Riga, Ventspils, Tallinn, and Klaipeda. The total surface capabilities include a couple of frigates, 19 patrol vessels of various specifications, and some 11 mine warfare ships. The Air Forces lack any fighter component and are limited to transport, a few helicopters, and support capabilities.

Denmark

The defence budget in Denmark was increased from 4.46bn US\$ in 2008 to 4.58bn US\$ in 2009. The plan is to gradually increase the budget until 2014. The style of the Armed Forces is that of an expeditionary corps with

¹⁷ All figures are taken from IISS, *International Institute for Strategic Studies* (2010). I would like to thank Carina Solmirano of SIPRI for valuable advice on defence statistics.

limited ability for self-reliance. Despite budget increases there will be cuts in the number of operational tanks, aircraft, and maritime response ships.

The core of the Army is a mechanized infantry brigade, supplemented by a training brigade. The training brigade consists of some 9 training units that supply the mechanized brigade with expeditionary units. Besides this there are individual independent battalions and units in reconnaissance, special forces, engineers, and air defence. The ambition of the Army is to field 2000 expeditionary troops.

The Navy has prioritized patrolling tasks and features some 49 ships for this purpose. Other than that there are 14 mine warfare ships and capabilities for flexible logistic support. There are two major bases at Korsør and Fredrikshavn.

The Air Force is still depending largely on the F-16AM/F-16BM system. The political decision to purchase a replacement has been put on ice. The forces consist of 48 combat capable F-16s, and one squadron each of search and rescue and transport.

Norway

Norway has, perhaps a bit surprisingly, the largest defence budget among the Nordic countries. However, considering the near levelling of GDP figures when compared to neighboring country Sweden, it might seem more understandable. Norway spent 5.94bn US\$ in 2009 and that is a slight increase from the previous year.

The gist of the Army, based on conscription, is the *Northern Brigade*. One mechanized battalion in the brigade, (the *Telemark* battalion) is reserved for high readiness operations. Furthermore, assets include 1 special forces commando, 1 guards battalion, and 1 reconnaissance battalion.

The Navy has three major components: naval units, schools, and coast guard. The principal surface combatants are 3 frigates supported by 6 patrol ships and 6 mine warfare ships. The Navy has 6 *Ula* submarines. The facilities include bases at Bergen, Ramsund, and Trondenes. The coast guard, with its base in Sortland, has some 13 patrol craft.

The Air Force has 3 squadrons of F-16s. In November 2008 Norway decided to procure *Joint Strike Fighter*. Complementing the fighter capability are individual squadrons of maritime reconnaissance, search and rescue helicopters, electronic warfare, as well as transport. The total of combat capable aircraft is 52.

Finland

The neighboring country Finland has had a different development over the last years. Defence spending increased from 3.55bn US\$ in 2008 to 4.21bn US\$ in 2009. General conscription is maintained and thus the reserve forces still have an important function in the defence system. Thousands of reservists do refresher training every year.

Apart from the regimental size rapid reaction forces, the Army of Finland is based on mobilization of conscripts. The 4 military commands have a total strength of 3 Jaeger brigades, 2 air defence brigades, and 1 brigade each of armour, artillery, engineers, and signals. However, fully mobilized the Army has another 2 Jaeger brigades and some 6 infantry brigades, 29 infantry battalions, and no less than 170 companies in battle groups.

The Navy, with its headquarters in Turku, has maintained its focus on patrolling and coastal defence. It has 8 fast patrol craft and 19 mine warfare vessels, plus some 30 vessels for logistics and support. The amphibious forces are organized in a naval brigade. The Air Force is centered around the 3 fighter wings with F-18 *Hornets*. There is one fighter wing in each of the three air defence areas (West, East, and North) that Finland is divided into.

Sweden

The Swedish defence budgets have slightly decreased over the past few years and was 5.61bn US\$ in 2009. We can note the relatively high level of arms procurement, as well as the total of 800m US\$ that placed it as the world's 8th country in global arms deliveries in 2008. The non-socialist coalition government has had the dual policy of not adjusting defence spending, while maintaining the existing regiments and flotillas. Domestically this has led to a dual criticism: for creating under-financed defence budgets, and for hampering the rationalization and transformation of the Armed Forces. General conscription was *de facto* abandoned in July 2010.

The aim for the development of the Army is 8 mechanized battalions, 2 artillery battalions, 3 air defence battalions, 3 engineer battalions and 2 logistics battalions. The Home Guard is to be organized into 60 multi purpose battalions. Recent development has created pressure to integrate armoured units as companies in the mechanised battalion structure.

The Navy organization has been restructured to include 2 surface flotillas, 1 surveillance battalion, 1 amphibious battalion, 1 submarine flotilla, and 1 logistics battalion. It has 4 submarines. The surface capabilities of the Navy are centered to the corvettes of *Visby*-class, with diverse operational qual-

ties but with limited durability at sea. The Navy features some 22 vessels for mine warfare, but only one major cargo ship. The specialty of the amphibious battalion is combat in the archipelago (“brown waters”).

The Swedish Air Force is dominated by the 4 squadrons with the fighter-ground attack plane JAS 39 *Gripen*. The original model with rather limited range is to be replaced with a long range version. Signals intelligence, air-borne early warning, helicopters and air transport have one squadron each. Fighter control and air surveillance share one battalion, and there are 2 air base battalions.

Poland

Despite the initial plans for reductions of the Polish defence budget, resulting in the abandonment of the ambition to keep the goal of defence spending at 1.95% of GDP, the final decision came to an increase. The budget was 8.63bn US\$ in 2009.

The Army is centred around its mechanized corps (including the contribution to NATO’s MNC NE Corps HQ). The corps consists of 1 armoured cavalry division, 3 mechanized divisions, 1 assault brigade, and 1 air cavalry brigade. The corps assets include 2 reconnaissance regiments, 2 artillery brigades, 2 engineer brigades and 1 engineer regiment, as well as chemical warfare components. The Polish have their 2 helicopter regiments as a part of the Army.

The Navy is divided into a surface combatant flotilla, a coastal defence flotilla, and a naval aviation brigade. The total of 8 major surface combatant ships include 3 frigates and 5 corvettes. It has 5 submarines. The mine warfare capability includes some 20 ships, and it has 8 light and medium landing ships. Naval bases are located in Kolobrzeg, Gdynia, Swinoujscie, Hel peninsula, and Gdynia-Babie-Doly.

The Air Force, with notable official individual flying hours for pilots at 160 to 200 hours per year, has 128 combat capable aircraft. There is an interesting mix between old Warsaw Pact systems like MiG-29 and US platforms like F-16. The Polish have organized them into 2 tactical wings, and have also a transport air wing, a special air transport wing, as well as 2 rocket air defence brigades.

Germany

The development of the German defence budget over the last years is strongly linked to the financial crisis of 2008. However, unlike the Baltic states, the defence sector has been the target of the government’s stimulus

package. Thus, the Grand Coalition government raised the 2009 budget from 41.6bn US\$ in 2006 to 46.5bn US\$ in 2009. During 2010 the German debate has featured suggestions for substantial capability cuts as well as a highly controversial abandonment of conscription.

The German transformation of the Armed Forces will create units in three categories: response forces, stabilization forces and support forces. The Army consists of 12 brigades in total, commanded by 5 headquarters, of which 3 are deployable. The composition features an armoured division, a mechanized division, a special operations division, and an air mobile division.

The Navy has merged its Type Commands into two mixed flotillas: one with submarines, mine countermeasures, patrol boats, as well as special forces, and one with frigates and auxilliary squadrons. It has some 18 surface combatants, 37 mine countermeasure vessels, 12 submarines, 3 amphibious craft. The bases include Olpenitz, Wilhelmshaven, Glücksburg, Warnemünde, Eckendorf, and Kiel.

The air component consists of three main systems: Eurofighter, Phantom, and Tornado. The organization no longer has any Warsaw Pact systems. Germany has 303 combat capable aircraft. The Air Force also features a substantial transport command with 96 aircraft, and 83 helicopters.

Russia

The Russian defence system is perhaps the most difficult one to substantiate without major errors. A substantial part of the budget is classified. The Russian Armed Forces have been undergoing different forms of reform for more than one decade. This is a process that is continuing. One estimate of defence expenditures approximates spending to 41.05bn US\$ in 2009, a slight increase on the year before.

Russia possesses a military playing card that none of the other countries in the region have: nuclear weapons. The Strategic Deterrent Forces, with personnel from the Navy and the Air Force, include 14 ballistic-missile submarines, 3 rocket armies, and 2 heavy bomber divisions. The doctrine still places great emphasis on these capabilities.

The Army consists of some 395,000 personnel, this is a figure that most likely will decrease over the coming years. It is organised into 6 military districts. The Leningrad Military District has 2 motor rifle brigades, a Spetsnaz brigade, 1 airborne division, plus various support elements.

The Navy consists of 142,000 personnel. It is organised into 4 major Fleet organisations: Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Baltic Fleet, and Black Fleet (not counting the Caspian Sea Flotilla). The Baltic Fleet, with bases in Kronstadt and Baltiysk, has 2 submarines, 5 surface combatants, 22 patrol craft, and 11 mine warfare vessels. There is a substantial air component attached: fighters, ground attack, and helicopters. There is also 1 naval infantry brigade.

The Air Force consists of 160,000 personnel. The organisation will see significant restructuring over the coming years. The main components are the 37th Air Army with 2 heavy bomber divisions, 21 regiments of tactical bombers, 24 regiments of fighters, and 20 regiments of attack helicopters.

Summary

Comparison of military capabilities of the states on the Baltic Sea Region is presented in the summary table 1 underneath.

| | BALT | DEN | NOR | FIN | SWE | POL | GER | RUS |
|---------------------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|
| Reg. Army brigades | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 15 | 12 | 58 |
| Surface combatants | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 8 | 18 | 42 |
| Amph. landing craft | 0 | 0 | 20 | 73 | 185 | 8 | 3 | 27 |
| Combat capable air. | 0 | 48 | 52 | 63 | 165 | 128 | 303 | 1859 |

Table 1: Summary of military capabilities on the Baltic Sea region

The summary table is a highly rhapsodic way of portraying the “military costumes” in the Baltic Sea region – not counting nuclear capabilities, mobilization units and many other relevant capabilities. Strategists should object to its value, not just because its highly contestable value in relation to the notion of power, but to the fact that it says very little about the *qualitative* dimension. Nevertheless, despite these objections it has some value since it hints at the bulk of military capabilities in the region. In the following we will study the impact and role of military capabilities in the behaviour of actors around the Baltic Sea.

Balancing behaviour

Firstly, let us not assume that we should connect state behaviour to capabilities in themselves, but rather that identities, perceptions of history, and strategic culture could be just as useful for understanding these patterns. Hence, we should not group countries into “small”, “medium” and “major” state categories after looking at the bulk of military hardware. Regardless of causal mechanism for behaviour: the point about the following section is

to note the role of military balancing as discussed earlier. Very roughly we could then group the countries in the Baltic Sea region into three different types of strategic behaviour: assurance, avoidance and self-realization.

Strategies of assurance

The typical characteristic for strategies of assurance is that reliance on foreign powers is relatively uncontroversial. Accordingly, the foreign policy behaviour of the US is relatively uncontroversial and there is often a great understanding for its pivotal role as strategic actor. In practice this means that NATO is the primary international security arena. The Baltic States, Denmark, Norway, and Poland all fall into this category.

One striking pattern of balancing is that all the proponents of a revitalisation of Article 5 within NATO could be found in this group of European countries. With the exception of Denmark, the other states have openly declared that the alliance should strengthen and uphold a credible deterrence in the region.¹⁸

Perhaps the clearest example of balancing behaviour seems to be the strong foreign policy signals from the Baltic States after the Georgian crisis in 2008. However, this behaviour is more complex than one might assume. The Baltic States were hit by the financial crisis in 2008 and, as we have seen, their actual military capabilities were down during 2009. One could say that Lehman Brothers 2008 was just as important strategic factor as Georgia 2008.

Furthermore, as we noted above, the Baltic countries lack air force capabilities. This is definitely a “perceived power differential” that has led to intense policy initiatives. Not least since these countries decided to abstain from developing their own capabilities in the run up to membership in NATO. In this sense they all have rather extreme strategies of assurance. Note that Estonia has, apart from the symbolic representation in the Nordic Battle Group, some 150 men in Helmand province. Perhaps the signals about increased attention from the US, including the concept of “extended deterrence”, will be sufficient for the needs of the Baltic states. The “wise man’s group” report by former Latvian prime- and foreign minister Valdis Birkavs and former Danish defence minister Søren Gade, as well as the recent visit of US Chief of Naval Operations to the region, might be seen as further signs of increased attention.¹⁹

¹⁸ Jonson (2010).

¹⁹ NB8 (2010) and US Navy (2010) CNO visits Norway, Sweden [http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=55522].

Though Denmark shares many of the traits of a rather pronounced strategy of assurance, it is difficult to notice any patterns of balancing behaviour. Quite contrary, capability differentials in the region are generally dismissed as a strategic factor. One telling fact is the almost total absence of naval capabilities adjusted to a Baltic agenda. The role of strategic assurance is firstly that it will give greater influence for a country with only 5.5 million inhabitants. It is in this light we should regard the relatively high casualty figures and the active role taken in Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather than “balancing” it is the unexpected costs in Afghanistan that is the major reason for the increased defence budget.

Norway has shifted its strategic attention to the North. Not only are some key military facilities relocated to signal this, but the strategic debate has pointed out the potentials of the Barents region as a major interest. However, the recent settlement with Russia on border disputes in this area has lowered the potential for any military confrontations considerably. Nevertheless, Norway has decided to purchase Joint Strike Fighter which fits with a strategy of assurance.

Poland has, like Denmark and the Baltic states, invested heavily in the transatlantic link. It has had nearly 2000 troops as a contribution to ISAF. However, the country is also one of the “defencists” in NATO. Concerns over energy security has been on the top of the strategic agenda, but following the tragic plane crash incident in the Spring of 2010, that killed Lech Kaczynski and a great part of the military leadership, there have been quite healthy relations between Poland and Russia.

Strategies of avoidance

The defining trait of a strategy of avoidance is a traditional military self-reliance. It is also marked with an ambiguous view of the US. Not surprisingly the EU constitutes the primary security arena. In the Baltic Sea region Sweden and Finland pursue this strategy.

However, there are some important differences between the two countries. They have made different choices between paths leading to a flexible operations defence or the maintenance of territorial defence. Sweden stumbles down the former path while Finland clings on to the latter.

In general Finland has kept its focus on territorial tasks for the Armed Forces. After the clash in Georgia in 2008, Sweden reintroduced a national perspective in its defence planning, reintroduced regional commands, national objectives and national exercises. The reactions in Finland rather confirmed the chosen path and reinforced existing arrangements. It is fair to say that the country, with its readiness brigades, mechanized battle

groups, helicopter battalion, regional battlegroups, as well as fighter squadrons, maintains a deterrence force. In terms of balancing behaviour it is clear that there were different reactions to Georgia: Finland raised its defence budget by 16%²⁰, while Sweden prolonged the analysis for its Defence Bill without any financial commitments.

However, there are also similarities. Both countries have great hopes for Nordic defence and security cooperation. Though this process arguably started in 2007 as a Swedish-Norwegian initiative, Finland soon became a part of it. A relatively successful project, at least from an organizational perspective, was the setting up of the Nordic Battle Group. However, this process was initiated before the clash in Georgia and was not motivated by balancing concerns.

More broadly, though, the whole project of Nordic defence and security cooperation is motivated by a concern for sustaining military capabilities over longer time. This includes both expeditionary as well as national systems. Connected with this is a gradual discursive move into solidarity, also in military terms, among the actors in the region. It is difficult not to regard this development without its implications for territorial integrity in the regional context. Regardless of the driving forces behind this declaratory solidarity, it certainly has created a discussion about its meaning for the Baltic states. Hence, the process behind the suggestions for declared solidarity in the EU-Nordic context might not have been an act of balancing, but it could produce patterns of balancing behaviour. If clarified, it becomes something to potentially act upon.

The historical track record of solidarity in Sweden and Finland, in military terms, is rather meagre. Sweden pursued a policy of condemning the Soviet aggression in the Winter War 1939 – but without officially sending any troops in support for Finland. After the fall of the Berlin Wall it was Denmark that first offered bilateral defence agreements with the Baltic States. Finland was the first to offer weapons, while Sweden waited to provide weapons until the Soviet troops had returned home. Accordingly, there has not been any official assurance from Sweden to provide military assistance in a case of turbulence in the Baltic States.

All together it is difficult to see the development as purely acts of military balancing. Though the Baltic Sea region is important for Sweden and Finland, it is not clear in what ways the military capability development is connected with this. In many respects Sweden has had a “deterritorialized” policy, and for Finland the policy has not changed too much, even if the

²⁰ IISS (2010), p. 117.

compensatory tendencies at least could be registered after the Russian actions in Georgia.

Strategies of self-realization

A strategy of self-realization is a method of realizing the inherent possibilities as perceived by a state. In essence: to become something more. Perhaps the opposite strategy could be defined as bandwagoning; a strategy that is essentially an act of submission. The two countries in the region that pursue this strategy are Germany and Russia.

The post-Cold War order has put these two states in juxtaposition. This gradually became evident as there was no general EU mechanism for interaction with Russia. No doubt the bilateral dialogue is more important for the two. But this has also created a few question marks regarding the intentions and role of these countries in the Baltic Sea region.

Perhaps the strongest strategic bond between Russia and Germany is the energy issue. While Russia has an incentive to sell its gas and other energy products, Germany is dependent on deliveries of these products. Russia is Germany's leading energy supplier.²¹ Germany has helped in exploiting gas fields in Russia, and the Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea is perhaps the most strategic joint venture up to date. One could of course speculate about the degree of interdependency, but it would be misleading not to note this common strategic interest.

However, there are also diplomatic signs of common strategic interests. Both countries ended up on the same side against the Americans in the events leading up to the 2003 Iraq war. On 4–5 June 2010 Russian President Medvedev met with Chancellor Merkel at Schloss Meseberg in Germany. The memorandum²² that followed the summit is interesting from many perspectives. It suggests an EU-Russian Political and Security Committee on ministerial level, for diplomatic consultations. However, it also suggests the establishing of “ground rules for joint EU-Russia civil/military crisis management operations.”²³ An area for practical cooperation is defined as Transnistria where “EU-Russia engagement [...] would guarantee a smooth transition of the present situation to a final stage.”²⁴ It seems that the German course set to re-engage the Russians in a constructive dialogue that concerns the frozen conflict in Moldova, but it is not without risks. The

²¹ German Foreign Ministry (2010) [<http://www.aktion-europa.diplo.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Russland/Russland-Wirtschaft-Energie.html>].

²² German-Russian Foreign Ministries (2010).

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

signal of Germany and Russia making “suggestions” about the old Bessarabian question has many bad historical connotations.

The strategic juxtaposition is not the only trend. There are also many signs that Germany policy has been shifting. The Germany that once, in the words of Chancellor Kohl, was addicted to American power, has slowly drifted on to a new course. Germany is one of five NATO countries that have demanded withdrawal of US nuclear bombs from its soil. This is not only a German signal for disarmament and confidence building, since it is not coordinated with American interests. This does not necessarily raze the US pillar in its security policy, but it certainly weakens it.

Furthermore, there is also a German domestic factor to take into account. In late May 2010 President Horst Koehler resigned after a row over remarks where he linked the use of military forces to national interests. While it says something about the country’s pacifist strategic culture it is also an interesting insight into the discourse of leading politicians. On the road to the upcoming military reform the almost sacred structure of conscription has been questioned. Not only does interaction shape a change of German policy, so is the domestic dimension.

In Russia, the general tendency since the late 1990s has been to give priority to rearmament. The planned procurement of *Mistral* class amphibious landing craft, for use in the Baltic setting, complicates things even further. A French-Russian bargain would put the Alliance coherence into question, since the Americans have been lukewarm and the Baltic states outright alarmistic.

Apparently, one of the lessons drawn from the clash in Georgia in 2008 was that the Russians won most because of vast superiority. This, and other factors, has triggered a response for an ambitious military reform that is yet only in its initial stages. Also, the simulated nuclear assaults and the presidential authority to deploy forces outside the country without parliamentary permission, has created international attention. However, one must also consider its domestic background for the Medvedev-Putin duoviriate and not only its function as balancing behaviour.

Conclusions

As we have seen there are many patterns in the region that fit with the notion of balancing behaviour. However, it is also clear that many of these patterns must also be attributed to other factors. It is striking how a purely military focus could lead to wrong conclusions. In that sense, military bal-

ance cannot, and should not be used as the sole explanatory theory of international relations.

A second conclusion regarding the balancing behaviour is that it is not only thematically too narrow, but that it is ill-suited for regional studies. It just seems to be impossible to understand and explain the foreign policy behaviour of any of the countries in the region from purely looking at regional factors. Just to mention a few of these: the relationship to the US is a key factor, but also processes that take place within the EU and NATO. The theoretical implications are noteworthy. As hinted in studies of Nordic regional cooperation there always seems to be processes from the outside that set in when regional factors become too independent.²⁵

However, it is equally clear that a study of military capabilities and the courses of action in the Baltic Sea region is also fruitful. We have seen that the Baltic States, with small capabilities and a pronounced strategy of assurance, act very much in line with balancing theory. Finland is an example of a country with compensatory behaviour, while pursuing a strategy of avoidance. Countries like Denmark, Norway, and Poland have all trusted a strategy of assurance, but have not had a clear pattern of balancing. Sweden is perhaps the best example of a country that is “post security” to use the words of Pertti Joenniemi.²⁶ Sweden has neither balanced, nor sought security guarantees. The aforementioned trends are compiled in table 2 underneath.

| | | ASSURANCE | |
|-----------|--|-------------------------|---------|
| | | Yes | No |
| BALANCING | | BALTIC STATES | FINLAND |
| Yes | | | |
| No | | DENMARK, NORWAY, POLAND | SWEDEN |

Table 2: Balancing and assurance for countries with small or medium capabilities in the Baltic Sea Region.

The policy conclusions, or speculations, are also of interest. The policies of assurance and avoidance are both dependent on faith in multilateral solutions and international regimes. Thus, no state expects to deal with major security problems in the region alone. But this also means that there will be major challenges in a situation when these institutions and regimes cannot function or provide functioning tools. Such “bad case scenarios” could be an interesting test of the value of any security policy pursued. The question is then: which course is best suited for stormy weathers – balancing with

²⁵ Sundelius (1982) and Ring (2009).

²⁶ Joenniemi (2007).

assurance (the Baltic States), balancing without assurance (Finland), assurance without balancing (Denmark, Norway, and Poland) or a policy of post security (Sweden)?

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6

ESTONIA'S VIEW ON SECURITY IN 2010

Erik Männik

Since 1991, the Baltic states have been continuously learning how to be independent states capable of providing security for their people and warding off various security risks, threats and challenges. In that process, 2004 was seemingly a year of a major breakthrough, named even as the “end of history”.¹ There was a strong feeling in the Baltic states that their membership of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was going to protect the three small states from at least many sorts of security challenges² originating from other states.

But was it really the “end of history” many had hoped for? Only three years later, in April 2007, Estonia experienced serious political pressure and riots, accompanied by cyber attacks from abroad. In 2008, the conflict between Russia and Georgia demonstrated with shocking clarity that an armed conflict between states still remains a real possibility in Europe. An economic crisis led to shrinking of the Baltic economies by 14–18% in 2009³ and affected seriously several countries in the euro area. Moreover, at the time of writing of this paper, situations in Afghanistan and Iraq are still uncertain, despite years of relentless military and civilian efforts of large coalitions of countries.

These developments suggest *prima facie* that one of the most fundamental lessons learned by the Baltic states after joining the EU and NATO is that the strengthening of security of an independent small state never ends, the allies are not omnipotent, and the external guarantees of security can never be sufficient. Has such a lesson been learned?

The answer to that question is sought by analysing basic security policy documents of the smallest of the Baltic states – Estonia. In particular, the

¹ A joint Vilnius Roundtable in co-operation with the Institute for National Strategic Studies, George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, and Konrad Adenauer Foundation (2003), p. 108.

²The approach adopted in this paper views “security threats” as being intentional, “security risks” as almost everything unintentional that may affect security, and “security challenges” as a broader term covering both “threats” and “risks”.

³ Eurostat (2010).

threat assessments and key security policy areas of Estonia's National Security Concepts adopted in 2001, 2004 and 2010 will be analysed and compared. It is assumed that the realisation of limits of external security guarantees by Estonia ought to be reflected in growing emphasis on strengthening the state internally. The analysis of security concepts as a method for establishing the changes in Estonia's security thinking has its roots in Wallander's views on Russian National Security Concepts and Military Doctrines. Wallander describes them as "not binding [...] but important for understanding Russian security policy nonetheless because they reflect the priorities, assessments, compromises, and negotiations within the Russian political and security elite[.]"⁴

The next section of this paper evaluates Estonia's threat perceptions expressed in the years between 2001 and 2010. It is followed by an insight into key security policy areas and related changes during the last decade. Key findings of these sections will be summed up and evaluated in the final part of this study.

Estonia's threat perceptions from 2001 to 2010

To begin with, it is necessary to say that the year 2001 was an important milestone in the development of Estonia's security-related thinking. By the end of that year Estonia had reached a status where it had for the first time a comprehensive set of basic security-related documents (security concept, military strategy and laws).⁵ They outlined the country's fundamental security choices, main security policy objectives and the ways for carrying out the required actions.

In 2001, Estonia's overall perception of security trends in the world was quite optimistic. The integration process was well on track in the Euro-Atlantic area, and the EU and NATO enlargements were seen as the most important development for Estonia's security. Various arms control and confidence-building measures were strengthened, updated and renewed, whereas the danger of a large-scale military conflict had decreased considerably. In the midst of these sweeping changes, the Baltic region had remained stable and good neighbourly relations had prevailed. Estonia's economic ties were growing (Estonia joined WTO in 1999 and aspired for the OECD membership) and it was acknowledged that "Estonia has become an inseparable part of the web of international relations."⁶ However, the EU

⁴ Wallander (2000).

⁵ Männik (2002), p. 80.

⁶ Riigikogu (2001). [author's translation]

and NATO enlargements were considered incomplete as the Baltic states and other aspiring countries had not yet joined these organisations.

Estonia's first security concept outlined in detail four categories of security challenges: (1) military, (2) political, (3) economic and (4) untraditional security challenges. Globalisation and rapid changes in technology and economy were considered to be partially aggravating factors. In 2001, Estonia did not expect any direct military threat or political pressure to arise in the foreseeable future. The most serious security challenges were various crises, instability and uncontrollable developments. Russia was seen as going through a process of reducing its forces in the vicinity of Estonia and adopting new strategic documents. Estonia's resilience to external pressures was to be achieved through political and economic development and integration into the international economic and security system. Economic challenges arose from globalisation and global economic fluctuations and Estonia's dependence on external markets and external energy suppliers. New security challenges included ecological risks, ethnic conflicts, international organised crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Estonia had a potential to be affected by industrial disasters, deepening socio-economic gap in society and various types of crime (drug and arms trafficking, cyber-crime and so forth).⁷

Having become a member state of NATO and the EU in April and May 2004 respectively, Estonia adopted a new National Security Concept in June 2004. The need for an update was obvious as the previous document envisioned integration into the two organisations as a policy objective. In addition, in 2001 the world had witnessed catastrophic acts of terrorism, NATO had invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and a global campaign against terrorism had been waged on several theatres of operations. The Russian Federation looked upon NATO's enlargement to its borders with increasing suspicion. The global security environment had changed considerably in just a couple of years.

Estonia's security outlook, however, remained rather optimistic. The highest importance in the overall security developments was attributed to the development of cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area where the EU and NATO enlargement processes continued. Terrorism had emerged as a new threat and states had to cooperate closely to deal with it effectively. However, the ability of international organisations to solve these new problems had remained mostly unchanged. Globalisation was seen – more than previously – as a factor that exacerbated new security challenges. There was an increased possibility that Estonia could be threatened by problems originating from the distant geographical regions. Moreover, joining the EU and

⁷ Riigikogu (2001).

NATO had expanded the geographical range of Estonia's security policy interests to areas where there had been little, if any, interest before.⁸

The number of specific security challenges to Estonia's security increased considerably in the security concept of 2004. Instead of previously described four categories, eight different categories of security challenges were outlined: (1) military threats, (2) threat of external coercion, (3) international terrorism, (4) organised crime, (5) manmade and natural disasters, (6) social risks, (7) economic risks, (8) risks and threats related to information technology. Of these, substantial changes were visible in the first six categories, while almost nothing had changed in the areas of economy and information technology. The most serious challenges to Estonia's security were instability, uncontrollable developments in the world and international crises. The document warned about uncertain outcomes of the democratisation processes in "certain neighbours of these alliances [EU and NATO]" that could threaten Estonia's security.⁹

In 2004, more attention was paid to the nature of security challenges. This way, while defining various military crises as the most likely threat to Estonia, it was also stated that they could be brought about by unexpected military deployments in Estonia's vicinity, military exercises near Estonian borders (carried out in violation of arms control agreements), and intentional violations of Estonia's air space, territorial waters and land borders. The overall level of military threats was considered, however, low even in the long-term.

The probability of Estonia becoming a subject of external political pressure with the aim of altering Estonia's policies was considered equally low. Such a pressure could be accompanied by various actions of foreign special services and the use of economic and other means against Estonia. Estonia's EU and NATO membership, Estonia's social policies and successful development in general were expected to prevent such pressure or counter it effectively.

Terrorism and organised crime were described as being frequently intertwined and spreading to those areas in the world with weak rule of law. While terrorism was described as a new threat substituting the diminishing traditional threats, it was not outlined as a direct and acute threat to Estonia. International organised crime was considered to be spreading corruption and influencing politics that could undermine the functioning of the state.

⁸ Riigikogu (2004).

⁹ Riigikogu (2004) [author's translation].

In 2004, Estonia's outlook regarding the risks of manmade and environmental disasters changed considerably. The possibility of climate change and generally worsening condition of the environment were acknowledged. It was stated that storms and floods were the most likely environmental disasters facing Estonia.

The perceived social risks had changed also. The spread of narcotics, alcoholism, HIV/AIDS (which was officially declared epidemic in 2001¹⁰) and potential refugee flows resulting from various disasters in the neighbouring areas were perceived as major concerns.¹¹

The latest security concept brought along a considerable change in Estonia's assessment of its security. The document differs from previous visions considerably in its structure and estimates. In terms of structure, the security environment is divided into three layers: (1) global security environment, (2) the Euro-Atlantic environment, and (3) Estonia's immediate environment. The overall perception of security environment is much more sombre than in previous years.

The global security environment is undergoing a process of globalisation that creates not only closer relations between states and societies, but also leads to intertwining and rapid proliferation of security challenges. There are multiple ongoing processes in the world that could affect Estonia's security. While the Western powers remain the strongest nations in the world, their relative importance and influence in the world is decreasing. The resulting global change in power balance might lead to an unfavourable shift in values and principles in international relations. The evolution of information technologies has given rise to the information warfare that could affect interstate relations and radicalise various groups within states. A globalised environment is also conducive to rapid spread of crises. Climate change, combined with the shortage of natural resources, is likely to increase instability that will affect poorest countries the most. Economic fluctuations may also destabilise the security environment, while various states may use their energy resources as a means for gaining political leverage. Arms control measures aimed at controlling the proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction have had only a limited effect in strengthening international security. Terrorism has become a global problem that influences a growing number of countries, whereas growing reliance on and the spread of information systems has increased their abuse by terrorists and criminals.

¹⁰ Vabariigi Valitsus (2002).

¹¹ Riigikogu (2004).

Situation in the Euro-Atlantic area is perceived as quite stable and peaceful. Enlargements of the EU and NATO have deepened peace, stability and integrated Estonia into a single Euro-Atlantic area. NATO has remained the cornerstone of the Euro-Atlantic security, but the EU is also increasingly engaged in enhancing security of its member states. The security of the region is strongly influenced by the stability of neighbouring countries and their democratic development.

While the situation in the Baltic Sea region remains stable and the strategic importance of the region is growing, the behaviour of the Russian Federation is raising concerns. Despite growing mutual dependence, the EU-Russian relations have been inconsistent. Moscow has considered NATO's enlargement being against its interests, while interpreting the latter through the prism of a major power that does not refrain from confrontations and is willing to bring its political, military and economic resources to bear on such situations.

Estonia's immediate security environment is influenced by all the above processes. Threats to Estonia are contingent, above all, on the situation in the Euro-Atlantic area and relations with countries in the immediate vicinity. The worst threat to Estonia's security would be posed by some powerful combination of external and internal factors.

Whereas Estonia considers a direct military threat unlikely in the present and the near future, it can not be excluded in the longer term. The threat of external coercion is assessed, however, as being quite possible. It may occur as discrediting of Estonia, a creation of internal instability, military pressure, or coercion of Estonia – or its allies – into adopting decisions to the detriment of Estonia's security interests and independence. Estonia's economy could be affected by a downfall in export markets and subjected to pressure due to Estonia's position as a transit country of hydrocarbons. Estonia's current isolation from the interconnected European energy networks underlines these security challenges. Similarly, information networks and Estonia's growing dependence on them have serious ramifications for state's security. In the social sphere, spreading radical ideologies, uneven regional development and poorly adapting social groups have the potential to weaken the cohesion of society. The spread of narcotics and infectious diseases still pose security risks. Finally, the threat of terrorism, organised crime and the risk of manmade and natural disasters continue to challenge Estonia's security.¹²

¹² Riigikogu (2010).

Key security policy areas 2001–2010

Now that Estonia's threat assessments and changes in the perceptions of its security environment have been outlined, it is time to take a look at various policies that have been outlined to deal with security challenges. The attempt is not to review all the policies and their changes in this section, but to focus on the most significant policies and remarkable changes in Estonia's views.

In 2001, Estonia's security policy objectives were to maintain territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state, to safeguard Estonia as a democratic state, and to guarantee the existence of Estonian people, language, identity and culture. The latter objective suggests that the existential fears regarding survival of Estonian culture and identity that had fuelled Estonia's independence aspirations¹³ were still present after a decade of independence. Such a policy objective was not included in the next concepts where security policy objectives comprised protection of Estonia's territorial integrity, sovereignty, constitutional order and public safety.¹⁴

The categories of activities required for achieving these goals have also changed from document to document reflecting changes in thinking about national security. In 2001, there were two broad policy areas: (1) foreign and security policy, and (2) domestic activities. In 2004, there were (1) foreign policy, (2) national defence and (3) protection of constitutional order, sectors of vital importance and public safety. As of 2010, the key security policy areas have expanded into four categories: (1) foreign policy, (2) defence policy, (3) internal security policy, and (4) resilience and cohesion of society.¹⁵

Foreign policy

The most prominent areas of Estonia's foreign and security policy have been the efforts to integrate into and activities within NATO and the EU. NATO membership (that is the membership in a military alliance) has been seen as "the best way to protect and strengthen the modern democratic state"¹⁶ suggesting that there has been a deeper military threat perception than shown in security assessments.¹⁷ Estonia's NATO policy has evolved through several stages. In 2001, it was mostly about various activities carried out in the integration process. In 2004, Estonia's policy was about as-

¹³ Tarand (2001), p. 149; Veidemann (2001), p. 55.

¹⁴ Riigikogu (2001), Riigikogu (2004) and Riigikogu (2010).

¹⁵ Riigikogu (2001), Riigikogu (2004) and Riigikogu (2010).

¹⁶ Riigikogu (2001). [author's translation]

¹⁷ Väljaru (2005), pp. 1632-1633.

suming the role of an active new member of the Alliance and supporting various initiatives aimed at NATO's capability development. In 2010, Estonia works to ensure the cohesion and solidarity of the Alliance in order to strengthen its deterrence and collective defence. The growing pragmatism of Estonian views is reflected in the statement (missing from previous security concepts) that NATO's enlargement must be supported because it has contributed to the Euro-Atlantic security, but new members must be accepted unanimously and they must be able to contribute to the security of Alliance.¹⁸

Estonia's EU policy has evolved in a quite similar manner to its NATO policy. Estonia's security concept adopted in 2001 focused on various steps Estonia was taking to become a member state of the Union. It was stressed that Estonia's support for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) did not contradict with its NATO integration in any way. It was seen crucial that developments in NATO and the EU did not duplicate or contradict with each other. In 2004, Estonia's support for CFSP and ESDP was re-affirmed and the cooperation between the EU and NATO was seen as a foundation to European security. It was important to avoid duplication of defence efforts and not to jeopardise transatlantic cooperation.

The latest security concept outlines a more comprehensive approach to the EU. It states that Estonia works toward deepening integration and increased cohesion within the Union as only a strong EU could promote internationally these values and norms that Estonia considers crucial to its security. While the CFSP and ESDP extend Estonia's ability to influence various developments, the EU's Neighbourhood Policy and its Eastern Partnership in particular are also mentioned. Estonia seeks to strengthen these policies with the aim of developing them into tools that facilitate integration of prospective members and cooperation with the Union in general.¹⁹

The third most prominent area of Estonian foreign and security policy has been bilateral and multilateral relations. An analysis of respective sections of Estonia's National Security Concepts reveals the importance Estonia has attributed to the relations with the US. One may even see this relationship as the third most important foreign policy measure in ensuring Estonia's security. In 2001, the "true, deep and enduring interest"²⁰ of the US in the Baltic security was mentioned. In 2004, the US military presence in Europe was treated as a cornerstone of European security, and in 2010 similar views were expressed, adding that cooperation between the US and the EU

¹⁸ Riigikogu (2010).

¹⁹ Riigikogu (2001), Riigikogu (2004) and Riigikogu (2010).

²⁰ Riigikogu (2001). [author's translation]

was a prerequisite for solving global political, economic and environmental problems.²¹

Relations with Latvia and Lithuania have been traditionally very important as the three Baltic states have had common security concerns while striving toward the EU and NATO membership. The Baltic states have run joint military projects in peacekeeping, naval cooperation, air surveillance and military education (BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTNET and BALTDEF-COL respectively) to improve their defences and to demonstrate their ability to cooperate effectively at international level.

However, it is interesting to point out that in Estonia's latest security concept the cooperation with the other Baltic states is mentioned in a larger context of promoting security in a wider Baltic region. Estonia seeks cooperation with the Baltic and Nordic states in the fields of defence, energy, infrastructure and protecting environment.²² Such a statement reflects also a shift in Estonia's views on relations with the Nordic countries. While Estonia's relations with the Nordic countries were previously described as supporting Estonia's integration into the EU and NATO through economic and defence assistance, the latest view reflects an understanding that a wide variety of different cooperative activities are required to enhance the security of the Baltic region.

The last, but not the least aspect of bilateral and multilateral relations in Estonia's security policy is Estonia's relationship with the Russian Federation. The changes in this area have been similar to those in Estonia's general security outlook from 2001 to 2010. Estonia has moved from optimism expressed in 2001 to a rather cool statement that Estonia takes advantage of all opportunities to pursue practical cooperation with Russia.²³ There are areas of mutual interest such as fight against crime and terrorism, environmental problems, etc. Cooperation in these areas is pursued in parallel with the respective efforts made by the EU and NATO.²⁴

Other areas of Estonian foreign policy like participation in crisis management and arms control measures have changed little. The only remarkable addition to the foreign policy areas and activities occurred in 2010 when development cooperation was added as a measure supporting Estonia's security. It encompasses political, social and economic spheres, and assistance in security sector reform. Estonia strives for greater coherence in the

²¹ Riigikogu (2010).

²² Riigikogu (2010).

²³ Riigikogu (2010).

²⁴ Riigikogu (2001), Riigikogu (2004) and Riigikogu (2010).

EU development cooperation efforts and applies itself in the regions significant to the EU and NATO security.²⁵

Defence policy

The unchanging principles underlying Estonia's defence efforts have been total defence and conscription, both enabling maximum mobilisation of resources if necessary. In 2001, Estonia's military defence in an actual conflict was envisioned as territorial defence, whereas in 2004 and 2010 it was described simply as an operation "foreseen in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty".²⁶ In 2001, the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF) had to possess "independent defence capability", and in 2004 and 2010 – "primary independent defence capability".²⁷ This slight difference in wording corresponds to Estonia's changed status as a member state of NATO and the subsequent scale-down of defence ambitions.

However, a comparison of the stipulated tasks of the EDF in 2004 and 2010 shows growing importance attributed to the development of independent capabilities for crisis prevention and crisis management. In 2004, the most important task for the EDF was collective defence followed by demonstration of sovereignty, crisis management, defence cooperation and providing assistance to civilian structures. In 2010, these tasks consist of demonstration of sovereignty, providing early warning, development of mobilisation system, development of deployable rapid response units, and ensuring readiness for collective defence operations.²⁸ These changes do not mean that Estonia considers participating in NATO missions or supporting the development of various Alliance capabilities less important than before, but they rather indicate Estonia's realisation of the need to have its own credible and functioning defence system for enhancing collective security.

Resilience and cohesion of the society

The inclusion of a chapter specifically dedicated to the ways and measures increasing resilience of society to various security challenges represents a major change in Estonia's thinking about its security. In previous documents, the sections on domestic activities and internal policies discussed mainly the tasks and activities of various state agencies (law enforcement,

²⁵ Riigikogu (2010).

²⁶ Riigikogu (2004) and Riigikogu (2010). [author's translation]

²⁷ Riigikogu (2001), Riigikogu (2004) and Riigikogu (2010). [author's translation]

²⁸ Riigikogu (2004) and Riigikogu (2010).

rescue services, etc.) and outlined some theoretical considerations on how to improve security. In the latest document, the missions and activities of government agencies are concentrated into a section on internal security policy, whereas the new chapter describes what measures are expected to ensure Estonia's surviving under pressure. It does not say much in terms of detailed policy²⁹, and its focus is rather on the principles and basic approaches that ought to be followed in crafting various policies aimed at strengthening the state. The chapter covers resilience of critical services, electronic communications, cyber security, transport infrastructure, energy security, environmental security and security of the financial system, psychological defence, harmonised regional development, integration, and public health protection. Of these, the issues of psychological defence, harmonised regional development and integration of society are of special interest. The events of April 2007 reminded Estonia about the crucial importance of these areas of activity and forced Estonia to introduce a different approach to strengthening its society.

In 2001, Estonia was described as a democratic state based on the rule of law and being very attentive to the protection of human rights and national minorities. Estonia's policies envisioned strengthening democratic institutions and integration of national minorities on the basis of special integration programme. The integration process consisted of two aspects: (1) social harmonisation of society through increasing the numbers of Estonian-speakers and Estonian citizens; (2) acceptance of ethnic differences and recognition of the cultural rights of minorities. As a whole, the integration process had three dimensions: a linguistic-communicative, a legal-political and a socio-economic dimension.³⁰

In 2004, the integration process of society was described in similar terms. It had two aspects: (1) spreading knowledge of Estonian language and increasing citizenship; (2) preservation of ethno-cultural diversity. The state guaranteed minority rights and the integration process proceeded in the framework of national integration policy.³¹

The latest document takes a different – value-based – approach to integration and psychological defence. The document stresses a need to develop a culturally versatile society based on a strong identity and shared values and it must be supported by a harmonised regional development. The latter requires Estonia's government to apply measures promoting economic growth in regions and to enhance local administrative capabilities. All in

²⁹ Policy is considered in this paper as a purposive flow of action. Baylis, et al. (1987) p. 2.

³⁰ Riigikogu (2004).

³¹ Riigikogu (2004).

all, the values shared by the whole society, in combination with social and economic development must form the basis for Estonia's psychological defence and protection against external subversive activities.³²

Summary and conclusions: lessons learned

In order to sum up the discussion about Estonia's views on security in the 21st century, it is reasonable to say that it has provided three snapshots of a country in different stages of development.

In 2001, Estonia was a state, first and foremost, striving for international recognition as an independent state being worthy of EU and NATO membership. Its threat assessment was in accordance with these aspirations and it did not mention any serious security challenges to Estonia's security. Therefore, it was in harmony with the direct requirement of NATO to candidate countries and new members of the Alliance to contribute to NATO's security and avoid creating various security problems.³³ The four categories of security challenges listed in the concept indicate the adoption of a wider approach to security and considering more than traditional security challenges. However, the text of the document and the top policy priority – joining military alliance – underline the dominant role of a military threat in Estonia's threat perceptions.

Security concept of 2004 presents a state that has achieved its two main security policy objectives. Estonia's approach to its security is broader (and more outspoken). The number of security challenges has doubled and much more attention is paid to the possible causes of potential military crises that could affect Estonia directly. As in 2001, primary security concerns are various crises. The security assessment reflects a great belief that the EU and NATO membership would ward off various threats (e.g. that of coercion). Estonian society is quite cohesive and threatened mostly by drugs and diseases. There is a deepening recognition of the seriousness of environmental risks and terrorism.

Estonia's optimism in assessing its security seems to have decreased after six years in the EU and NATO. In 2010, Estonia's security is connected primarily to that of the Euro-Atlantic area. However, there are developments at the global stage (e.g. decreasing influence of the West in the

³² Riigikogu (2010).

³³ North Atlantic Council (1995); EU did not stipulate such a direct requirement, but the candidate countries were expected to enhance the security of the EU through adhering to the *acquis communautaire*. This requirement could explain the absence of any reflection of the massive Russian military exercise "Zapad-99" (see e.g. Kipp, 2001) in Estonia's security assessment.

world) that may be unfavourable to Estonia. The views on Russia have shifted from treating it as a reforming state to considering it an opportunistic power that aspires to global status and is willing to take its chances in confrontations with other states. The military threat is not fully excluded in the long-term. Similarly, there is a possibility of external coercion and in the worst case scenario external challenges could coincide with an internal upheaval. Such a consideration of internal factors in the latest threat assessment indicates a deep change in Estonia's view of itself.

Throughout most of the period from 2001–2010, foreign and defence policies have played key roles in Estonia's security policy. Opting for NATO and EU membership has been Estonia's key strategic choice in providing for national security. However, the latest document points to a growing realisation of what constitutes the most fundamental basis of national security. It is the unity and cohesion of society and its willingness to live in accordance with shared values. External measures cannot protect Estonia from the lack of internal unity. Moreover, even the development of language skills, the protection of minority rights and the overall economic development of the state seem to be insufficient for forging such a unity. The latest studies suggest that the Russians living in Estonia have fewer incentives and less desire than before to apply for Estonian citizenship.³⁴ If this process is not reversed, Estonia's internal stability and security could become increasingly susceptible to external manipulations.

Finally, it is time to return to the question asked in introduction: has Estonia learned that strengthening of security of an independent small state never ends, the allies are not omnipotent, and there could never be sufficient external guarantees of security? The evidence reviewed above suggests that it has. Indeed, at the conceptual level one can see a deepening understanding of the nature of security challenges as well as a more considered approach to tackling them. Estonia's thinking about its security looks much more mature and comprehensive in 2010. There is a clear emphasis on strengthening Estonia internally. It is understood that whereas it is impossible to predict correctly all future threats, it is always possible to strengthen the Estonian society to better handle the challenges of our increasingly unpredictable world.

³⁴ Kivirähk (2010).

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7

STOLTENBERG RAPPORTEN – NORDISK SAMARBEID OM UTENRIKS- OG SIKKERHETSPOLITIKK. NOEN REFLEKSJONER ETTER ET ÅR

Thorvald Stoltenberg

I juni 2008 fikk jeg som oppdrag av de fem nordiske utenriksministrene å skrive en rapport om nordisk samarbeid om utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk. Utenriksministrene ønsket nye tanker og nye ideer. Det ble derfor sagt at rapporten gjerne kunne gå 25 % lenger enn det som var realistisk.

Rapporten¹, som innholdt 13 konkrete forslag, ble overlevert i februar 2009 til et ekstraordinært nordisk utenriksministermøte på Voksenåsen i Oslo. Etter den tid har rapporten vært til behandling i de fem hovedstedene, og den har vært tema på de faste nordiske utenriksministermøtene. Det er også tema på det nordiske utenriksministermøtet i Helsingfors i april 2011.

Jeg er i dag bedt om å skrive en artikkel til “Suomenlinna research report” der jeg utdypet tenkningen bak rapporten og kommer med en vurdering av utviklingen etter at rapporten ble lagt fram.

Hvilke problemstillinger ligger bak selve rapporten? De av dere som har lest rapporten, har sikkert egne syn. Jeg vil her komme med mine tanker.

For meg dreier rapporten seg om noe mer enn å gi de nordiske land større tyngde og mer gjennomslag i internasjonal politikk.

Det er åpenbart at vi kan nå lenger når et eller flere nordiske land samarbeider om utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk. Det er åpenbart at hvis ikke de nordiske land selv hegner om sine interesser, så kan de ikke vente at andre skal ta seg av disse interessene. Det er også åpenbart at avslutningen av den kalde krigen gjorde det mulig for de nordiske land å samarbeide om sikkerhetspolitikk, noe som nesten var utenkelig under den kalde krigen.

¹ For the Stoltenberg report, see [www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/nordicreport.pdf].

Det viktige for meg har vært å se framover, og da langt framover. Har vi et tidsperspektiv på noen tiår, så kan de nordiske lands situasjon være helt ulik den vi har i dag. Det gjelder også Nordens omgivelser. Vi vet ikke hvordan EU ser ut, om alle nordiske land er medlemmer, og vi vet heller ikke mye om NATO. Kanskje har vi dagens NATO, eller kanskje har vi en helt annen organisering av sikkerhet.

Mitt utgangspunkt er at vi kan være i en situasjon der vi trenger sterke regionale politiske samarbeidsstrukturer i Norden. Vi må ha en beredskap for en slik situasjon. Derfor må vi legge en solid grunnmur for et framtidig nordisk samarbeid om utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk. Har vi fått slike strukturer på plass nå, vil det bli lettere å skalere opp disse strukturene dersom behovet er der. Og dersom det ikke er noe stort behov for det, kan vi la samarbeidet ligge. Jeg tenker altså i en nordisk beredskap.

Jeg kan ta et annet utgangspunkt for å illustrere min tenkning. Jeg vil hente fram den franske “politiske tenker”, Jacques Attali. Han var i sin tid rådgiver for president Mitterand og er nå diplomatisk rådgiver for Sarkozy. Attali har skrevet boken “Kort historie om framtida”² som også er kommet ut på norsk, og da med forord av utenriksminister Jonas Støre.

I boka ser Attali på hvorledes vår verdensdel kan utvikle seg i tiårene som kommer. Han spør hvilke dynamiske sentra vil vi ha i Europa i 2030. Han mener at Helsingfors-Stockholm-Oslo har et potensial til å bli et såkalt “center of influence”, et dynamisk sentrum, i den framtidige europeiske orden. I Norden, viser han til, har man et eksepsjonelt samarbeidsklima, det er høyteknologisk industri, ledende universiteter, store energiressurser, høyt utdanningsnivå, godt sosialvesen og høy levestandard. Det er område som kan trekke til seg en kreativ elite fra resten av verden.

Dette er noe vi liker å høre fra en utenlandsk observatør. Men så fortsetter Attali med å si at han ikke tror Norden vil bli et slikt senter.

Etter min mening kommer likevel ikke de nordiske landene til å ville blande seg opp i andres saker på annet vis enn som diskrete diplomater. De vil verne seg mot verdens farer og har ikke lyst til å ha kontakt med folk som er fiender av frihet. De vil ikke spille rollen som “dynamisk sentrum” fordi et sentrum aldri er nøytralt.

Jeg vil ta denne utfordringen fra Attali. Jeg mener at det nordiske området vil kunne bli et dynamisk senter i et framtidig Europa, og jeg ser ikke noe

² For further reading in English, see *A Brief History of the Future: A Brave and Controversial Look at the Twenty-First Century*, Jacques Attali, 2006, Paris: Fayard.

fare i at vi ikke vil blande oss i andre lands saker på annen måte enn diskrete diplomater.

Men jeg mener at skal Norden bli et slikt dynamisk senter, økonomisk og politisk, så må vi i større grad ta ansvar for egen sikkerhet. Vi kan ikke overlate det til andre. Vi må også ha på plass en politisk samarbeidsstruktur slik at vi virkelig sammen kan gå inn i rollen som et slikt sentrum. Her er jeg tilbake til behovet for å få på plass nordiske politiske samarbeidsstrukturer i dag som vi kan komme til å trenge sårt i fremtiden.

Hvis Norden skal ta et større ansvar for egen sikkerhet, så må vi begynne med måten vi tenker på. I min rapport forsøker jeg å tegne et *nytt mentalt kart* over nordisk sikkerhet.

De tradisjonelle mentale kartene i hovedstedene bygger på at sikkerhet har å gjøre med forsvar av hvert lands grenser. Landene ser i helt ulike retninger: Norge nordøstover, Sverige og Finland østover og Danmark så sørover så lenge landet hadde et militært forsvar.

I det mentale kart jeg forsøker å tegne i rapporten ser jeg Norden mer som en sikkerhetspolitisk region. De nordiske land har store sikkerhetspolitiske fellesinteresser. Det er for eksempel i alle nordiske lands interesse at det er stabilitet og ro i Nordens nærområder. Dette er et ansvar vi må ta sammen.

Selv om dette mentale nordiske sikkerhetskortet er nytt, så har vi hatt elementer av dette i utviklingen etter at den kalde krigen tok slutt. Vi ser en slik nordisk vilje til å ta felles ansvar i forhold til omgivelsene bak Barentssamarbeidet der det var viktig for oss å invitere de andre nordiske land med. Vi ser dette for så vidt også i den nordiske deltagelsen i Østersjøsamarbeidet. I 1990-årene tok de nordiske land et særlig økonomisk og også politisk ansvar for det baltiske området etter at de ble selvstendige. Det er denne tenkningen jeg mener nå må utvides til å gjelde alle områdene rundt Norden.

I rapporten legger jeg fram tretten konkrete forslag. Flere av dem er uttrykk for mitt ønske om at de nordiske land sammen skal ta større ansvar for stabilitet i områdene rundt Norge.

Jeg tenker da særlig på forslag som kan bli elementer i en slik prosess:

- Forslag 2: De nordiske land bør samme gå inn å ta et ansvar for luftovervåkingen over Island (som ledd i NATO-oppsettet).
- Forslag 3 og 6: De nordiske land bør sammen ta et ansvar for havovervåkingen rundt Norden, og bør samarbeide om arktiske spørsmål.

- Forslag 4 og 12: De nordiske land bør utvikle en nordisk amfibisk styrke med en arktisk kompetanse. De nordiske land bør utvikle en maritim innsatsstyrke (kystvaktsamarbeid).
- Forslag 7: De nordiske land bør samarbeid om forsvar mot digitale angrep.

Selv mener jeg at forslag 2 om nordisk luftovervåking over Island, og forslaget om nordisk samarbeid om havovervåking er særlig viktige. Jeg tror og håper vi vil se konkrete resultater her i årene som kommer.

Jeg må her også nevne forslag 13 hvor jeg foreslår en nordisk solidaritetserklæring. Etter mitt syn er en slik erklæring meget viktig selv om jeg kun foreslår en ren politisk erklæring og ikke en juridisk bindende erklæring.

EU-landene har kommet med en liknende erklæring i Lisboa-traktaten. Det ville det vært et dårlig tegn dersom de nordiske land ikke skulle være i stand til å gjøre det samme. Vi må ikke få en situasjon hvor nordiske land uttrykker en sterkere solidaritet med landene sør i Europa enn med sine nordiske naboland.

Jeg håper at de fem utenriksministeren kan bli enige om en slik erklæring i 2011. Det vil i så fall være et sterkt uttrykk for en politisk vilje til å fremme nordisk samarbeid om sikkerhet. En slik erklæring vil gi en viktig politisk impuls som igjen kan gjøre det lettere å iverksette andre av de 13 forslagene. Kanskje kan en erklæring gjøre det lettere å heve ambisjonsnivået for flere av forslagene.

Jeg vil ta et eksempel. I forslag 7 foreslår jeg at det etableres et nordisk kompetansenettverk mot digitale angrep, altså angrep på viktige samfunnsområder som bankvesen, elektrisitetsforsyning og kommunikasjoner. Slike digitale angrep vil kunne lamme våre samfunn. Jeg mener at det er her og ikke på det militære området, de nordiske land i står overfor de største sikkerhetsutfordringer i dag.

En nordisk solidaritetserklæring vil også måtte omfatte digitale trusler mot det nordiske området. For vi kan ikke se et digitalt angrep på ett nordisk land isolert fra resten av Norden. Et digitalt angrep på elektrisitetsforsyningen i Norge er samtidig et angrep på elektrisitetsforsyningen i Sverige. Lammes bankvesenet i Sverige, får det følger for Finland. Rammes det norske telenettet får det følger for svenskene. Jeg kunne tatt mange liknende eksempler.

Blir det enighet om en nordisk solidaritetserklæring i Helsingfors i april, så bør vi heve ambisjonsnivået på forslag 7 om et nordisk kompetansenettverk

mot digitale angrep. Jeg antyder i min rapport at vi bør videreutvikle et nordisk digitalt kompetansenett slik at vi får et samordnet nordisk system for varsling og håndtering av digitale trusler. Jeg vil her og nå lanserer et forslag om at vi gjør det ved å etablere noe jeg foreløpig vil kalle *Nordisk digitalt forsvarsforbund*.

Vi klarte ikke å få til et nordisk militært forsvarsforbund i 1948/49. Men nå burde vi kunne få på plass et nordisk digitalt forsvarsforbund. På den måten kan vi styrke samfunnssikkerheten i alle de nordiske land. Vi kan møte en av morgendagens viktigste sikkerhetsutfordringer sammen.

Hva skjer med forslagene?

La meg med en gang understerke at jeg ikke ventet at de nordiske utenriksministre skulle komme sammen og vedta en rekke av forslagene. Jeg ser dette som en langsiktig prosess, hvor min oppgave er å agendasette nordiske samarbeid om utenriks- og forsvarspolitikk, og få i gang prosesser i en slik retning.

Jeg mener at det første har vi klart. Rapporten har trukket oppmerksomhet mot tema nordisk samarbeid om utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk. Det har blitt skapt mer debatt og kommer flere reaksjoner enn jeg ventet. Norden er igjen satt på den politiske dagsorden. Jeg noterer også nye viktige visjonære innlegg i denne debatten som Gunnar Wetterbergs artikkel om "Forbundsstaten Norden" i Nordisk Råd og Ministerråds årbok.

Jeg mener også at de fem utenriksministrene har satt i gang viktige politiske prosesser selv om vi foreløpig ikke har sett så mange konkrete resultater av de 13 forslagene.

Nå visste jeg selvsagt at det også ville komme motreaksjoner på flere av mine forslag, særlig når man drøftet konkrete opplegg. Jeg vet jo fra tidligere erfaring at så snart man kommer ned på detaljnivå og taler om nye ressurser, så kommer motforestillinger. De kommer ofte fra grupper som ser seg tjent med dagens ordning og som derfor ikke ønsker endring.

Det er heller ikke overraskende at mye av støtten til rapporten kommer fra regjeringene og parlamentene i de nordiske land, og fra opinion, mens de administrative elitene i nordiske land er mer skeptiske. Det forhold at vi er inne i en fase med økonomisk tilbakegang, gjør det enda vanskeligere å få til nye opplegg.

Men samtidig må jeg peke på at det skjer en god del på nordisk plan. Jeg tenker da ikke minst på samarbeid om forsvaret. Dette bygger på et initiativ

som tre nordiske forsvarssjefer tok før jeg kom i gang med rapporten min, men jeg som jeg aktivt støtter.

Den norske og svenske forsvarssjefen tok et initiativ til nærmere samarbeid i 2006. Senere har den finske forsvarssjefen sluttet seg til dette. Senere har den danske forsvarsjef fått anledning til å studere opplegget.

Dette var ikke noe politisk utspill fra forsvarssjefene. Det hadde snarere en økonomisk begrunnelse. Den norske forsvarssjefen, Sverre Diesen, formulerte det enkelt. Det koster stadig mer å holde et moderne høyteknologiforsvar. De små nordiske land vil ikke kunne følge med i dette uten at de samarbeider. Det enkelte nordiske land har simpelthen ikke råd til å utvikle et slikt forsvar alene. Alternativet til nordisk samarbeid om forsvarsspørsmål kan derfor bli at landene ikke får råd til å holde et moderne forsvar.

Jeg tror at et slikt praktisk samarbeid om forsvarsspørsmål kan bli en “driver” for et nordisk samarbeid om forsvar og sikkerhet. Det henger sammen med at dette antakelig vil presse seg fram uansett. Og har vi først et vidtgående samarbeid om anskaffelse av forsvarsmateriell, om felles opplæring og felles øvelser, blir vi før eller senere tvunget til å tenke i nordiske solidaritetserklæringer og samarbeid om sikkerhet.

Men her møter vi også raskt motkraftene. Den kommer gjerne fra de som er sterkt forankret i dagens atlantiske og europeiske strukturer. De mener nordiske samarbeid kommer i konflikt med hensynet til NATO-samarbeidet og EU-samarbeidet.

Mine forslag i rapporten mener jeg kan komme i tillegg til det som skjer innenfor dagens NATO- og EU-strukturer. Jeg tror at dette er uproblematisk i en tid hvor Sverige og Finland har et vidtgående partnerskapssamarbeid med NATO, og Norge og Island EØS-avtaler med EU. Jeg har i alle fall ikke fått noen konkrete innvendinger fra NATO- og EU-hold.

Dessuten vil jeg peke på at det i dag er en tendens til mer regionalt samarbeid i Europa, også innenfor NATO og EU. Det henger simpelthen sammen med at begge disse organisasjonene nå har så mange medlemmer med til dels ulike interesser, at det blir naturlig for grupper av medlemmer å samarbeide. Jeg tror dette er en tendens som vil forsterkes i årene som kommer.

Jeg vil ikke gå inn på alle de tretten forslagene, men bare kort omtale et par. Jeg har alt nevnt forslag 7 om nordisk digitalt kompetansenettverk og tanken om å utvide forslaget til et Nordisk digitalt forsvarsforbund. Her tror

jeg vi kan få til mye, særlig hvis det blir enighet om en nordisk solidaritetserklæring. For kommer en slik erklæring bør den raskt gis et konkret innhold. Da er det naturlig å se hva de nordiske land kan gjøre ut av forslag 7 om digitalt forsvar.

Jeg vil også nevne forslag 10 om samarbeid mellom de nordiske utenrikstjenestene selv om det ikke har med sikkerhet å gjøre. Her ble det tidlig innvendt at det berørte et felt der EU nå er aktiv. Mitt svar var at når EU kommer med et opplegg, må de nordiske land selvsagt kunne tilpasse seg det. Men min erfaring er at slike forslag tar tid i EU-systemet. Det er derfor ingen grunn til at de nordiske land ikke skal gå foran, jeg forstår at det er en interessant prosess i gang omkring forslag 10. Her burde jo det forhold at vi har økonomisk vanskelige tider tale for forslaget og ikke mot. Når et nordisk land nedlegger utestasjoner av økonomiske grunner, bør det åpne for samarbeid med de land som fortsatt har stasjoner der.

Mange vil spørre om det i det hele tatt er realistisk at de nordiske land får i gang et politisk samarbeid. Noen vil hevde at historien om nordisk politisk samarbeid er historien om de mislykkede prosjektene: Nordisk forsvars forbund, NORDØK, nordisk TV-satelitt mm. De gikk ikke i nordisk sammenheng. Men vil de si, de nordiske land har fått realisert mange av sine samarbeidsambisjoner men det har skjedd innenfor rammen av europeisk samarbeid (EFTA, EU, EØS) eller innenfor en atlantisk ramme (NATO, PfP).

Fortiden må ikke hindre oss i å komme med nye forslag, for nå er vi jo på mange måter i en helt ny tidsfase i det nordiske samarbeidet. Den første store testen på om det er vilje til å gå videre får vi på nordisk utenriksministermøte i Helsingfors i april 2011. Da får vi se om tiden er moden for en nordisk solidaritetserklæring.

I min rapport har jeg lagt vekt på at noen land kan gå foran ved gjennomføring av forslagene og så kan andre komme etter når tiden er moden. Det ville vært best om alle nordiske land sto bak en nordisk solidaritetserklæring, men også her mener jeg at det er greit om noen går foran. Så kan andre komme etter når tiden er moden. Det samme gjelder forslaget om et nordisk digitalt forsvars forbund. La de som er mest interessert gå foran og la ikke de som er mest nølende bestemme tempoet!

Jeg er optimist på vegne av Norden og nordisk samarbeid. Jeg vil avslutte denne artikkelen med å nevne to grunner til denne optimisme:

- Vår nordiske historiske arv og kanskje særlig den skjeve balansen mellom Sverige og andre nordiske land gjorde det vanskelig å få til et samarbeid i fortiden. Jeg mener at vi nå er inne i en fase der det er

en bedre økonomisk og mental balanse i Norden som begunstiger samarbeid. Jeg mener at det er langt mindre frykt for en svensk dominans enn før. Jeg tror det også gjelder Finland.

- De nordiske land fått mer felles interesser å ivareta. Tidligere var Norden en perifer og mindre interessant del av Europa. Nå har Norden blitt mer relevant ikke minst som transittområde og produksjonsområde for energi, for utviklingen i Arktis og som transittområde for framtidige skipstransport mellom Atlanterhavet og Stillehavet. Vi får dermed større interesse i å sikre nordisk stabilitet og å sikre at nordiske stemme blir hørt.

Så får vi se om dette vil gi seg praktiske utslag i form av mer nordiske samarbeid om utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk. Vi vil få se om Jacques Attalis tanker om Norden som ett dynamisk sentrum i det nye Europa, blir virkelighet.

Jeg er, som sagt, optimist!

Oslo, desember 2010

8

NORDIC DEFENCE COOPERATION – SOLIDARITY AT HOME AND ABROAD? – A SWEDISH VIEW

Peter Göthe

Almost a year ago, the Swedish Parliament passed a bill on the transformation of Sweden's armed forces¹, from a force based on the mobilisation of conscripted reservists, to an all-volunteer force with standing units manned by regulars as well as units manned by voluntary reservists. On the 1st of January 2010 the decision went into effect. Sweden is now in the process of implementing this historic and momentous decision, in fact, the most significant defence reform in Sweden for at least 50 years. This reform alters Sweden's defence and security policies. The changes are also of importance when it comes to Swedish cooperation and solidarity, including within the Nordic context.

Against this background, this paper will take the opportunity to briefly discuss the transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces with the aim of giving a greater understanding of the Swedish standpoint on how cooperation is viewed today, and what can be achieved in the future.

The on-going reform can be seen as the final step in a journey that began at the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Sweden had built powerful and large armed forces in the two decades after 1949. But in the years that followed, the political support for the funding needed to supply such a large force with modern equipment was fading. A radical restructuring of the Swedish army was necessary. The number of units was then heavily reduced to a figure the defence budget could support. Most of the remaining units were mechanised and given modern equipment: Gripen fighters, modern submarines and corvettes, German Leopard tanks, new Swedish infantry fighting vehicles (CV 90), new radios, and new personal equipment.

However, the structural reforms undertaken were not sufficient in comparison to the challenges and threats that were needed to tackle. Beginning in Bosnia in 1993, international peace-support operations under the UN Charter's chapter VII gradually became the focus of attention and with time also

¹ A Functional Defence 2008/09:140. For further information about the bill, see [<http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/12/30/22/3ed2684c.pdf>].

the cooperation within NATO's Partnership for Peace and the EU's Security and Defence Policy. As the armed forces' units were manned by conscripted reservists, they could not be used abroad unless Sweden was at war. In addition, a decision on mobilisation to use them was needed. Thus, in order to participate in various missions, Sweden used temporary units that were set up for a specific purpose and later disbanded.

The Nordic Battle Group 2008² was a particular case in point. Much money and effort went into creating the unit and supplying it with first-rate resources. However, the NBGs were not deployed for any mission and the units were eventually disbanded. Although many of the soldiers were on an individual basis offered an opportunity to join other missions such as ISAF in Afghanistan, the experience lead to a growing support for reform so that units of this kind could be used instead of having them for no purpose. In addition to this, the used mobilisation system meant that it would take between one and three years to mobilise a unit and put it on war footing. Altogether, the system was not considered to be in line with the challenges and threats of the contemporary world.

In the Defence Commission, representatives from all parties in the Parliament agreed on a formula for a new type of defence. The main objectives were to create a single set of units for tasks in Sweden, in its vicinity, and globally. Moreover, the units should be constantly available, fully trained, manned, and well-equipped. The units should also be rapidly deployable. In order to achieve this, a transition from conscription was considered necessary. Also a shift to a procurement strategy with more emphasis on buying proven equipment from the shelf to improve time-effectiveness was seen as central.

In parallel with the transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces, the security policy also faced a change. There came a stronger and clearer emphasis on solidarity and cooperation. Neutrality is often misleadingly believed both by domestic and foreign observers to be the policy that Sweden pursues. However, the Swedish Parliament dropped that policy already in 1992, and the security policy has since gradually come to state that Sweden seeks security in cooperation with others.

The Swedish Defence Commission drafted a declaration of solidarity, now adopted by the Swedish Parliament, according to which Sweden would not remain passive, should a disaster or an attack strike another EU member, or a Nordic state. Sweden expects these countries to act in a similar manner, should Sweden be the victim. To underpin the solidarity declaration, a new

² For Nordic Battle Group, see e.g. [<http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/Organisation/Nordic-Battlegroup/Nordic-Battlegroup-2008/>].

task was given to the Swedish Armed Forces, namely that Sweden should have the ability to give and to receive military support. The fact that Sweden should be able to receive military assistance from the outside is not new. Sweden's security has ultimately been dependent on the support of a friendly great power. During the Cold War, Swedish security policy was based on the presumption of help from abroad in crisis situations, even though this policy was highly classified and known to very few.

However, what is new is that Sweden openly says this, and the assignment also binds the country's armed forces. New is also the notion that Sweden should be able to give help to others, including military assistance, not just to receive it. The form of Swedish assistance will probably vary from case to case and be subject to a sovereign decision, depending on the situation, the needs, and the country's assets. The spectrum for possible Swedish action would be wide, as the declaration of solidarity covers both civilian and military emergencies.

It also needs to be noted that security is interlinked. Any incident, crisis or military conflict in the region would affect also countries not directly involved. Sweden thus needs to work together to prevent conflicts from occurring, and – should they still come – be prepared to handle them.

The Baltic Sea region has been significant for Sweden throughout history and the regional perspective is even more underlined in the new policy. It is important to stress that the Baltic Sea region is characterized by stability, dialogue and cooperation. A single armed military attack targeted directly at Sweden is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Crises and incidents that also involve military force cannot, however, be excluded from the region and similarly in the longer term, the threat of military attack can never be counted out.

The regional perspective is also evident in the procurement of new ships, boats and aircraft for the Coast Guard. The new Poseidon-class multi-role ships are the most powerful Swedish coast guard vessels to date, with the ability to tow also large tankers in hard winds, and to put out fires. The new sea-surveillance aircrafts have longer endurance and better sensors. One aircraft is currently proving its worth in the EU-led maritime Operation Atalanta, helping to contain and fight piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa.³

The distance from the Baltic Sea to the Gulf of Aden may seem long, but securing material flows is a matter of strategic importance in a globalised

³ More on European Union Naval Operations Against Piracy, see e.g. [<http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/>].

world, not least for a highly trade-dependent nation like Sweden. Without secure strategic flows, the country would soon find its production lines stopped and shop-shelves empty. There are also other strategic flows that reach the Northern regions. Every year, more than 6,000 oil tankers pass through the Baltic Sea. The consequences of even one of these ships being damaged would be catastrophic. Preventing such an accident is an issue of the highest priority.

But challenges or threats of this kind cannot be handled by national means only. Sweden has established a common electronic sea-surveillance system with Finland and Denmark, which in a very cost-effective manner improves the capabilities to monitor the intense traffic of the county's internal waters. Other states are also in the verge of joining this system which is labelled as the Sea Surveillance Co-operation in the Baltic Sea, SUCBAS. Nonetheless, other forms of cooperation also need enhancing. Good examples of this are the EU's Baltic Sea strategy pilot-project on civilian maritime surveillance MARSUNO, and the cooperation between rescue services under the Hague declaration agreed last year among Nordic Ministers for civil crisis preparedness. Demanding exercises on the civilian side are also needed, for example, within the Helcom Response.

It should not be forgotten that Sweden and Finland are Arctic nations. What happens in the Arctic, matters to Sweden and Finland. Both countries are members of the Arctic Council. Several factors now contribute to a heightened interest in the Arctic. The melting of the polar ice cap may open up new routes for navigation, while natural resources, both living and fossil, draw interest. The Arctic is an area of cooperation, not confrontation, and it is believed remain so also in the future. The recent settlement between Norway and Russia on the demarcation of their economic zones in the Barents Sea is a welcomed development in this regard. Therefore, not only the Baltic Sea Region but the Arctic should be seen as zones of cooperation.

The Nordic Defence Cooperation also serves as an example of the new policy of cooperating with others. Two principles govern the Swedish view on cooperation. Firstly, the cooperation is flexible to allow for two or three Nordic countries to participate in a certain project. There is no need for all Nordic countries to participate in all projects. Secondly, for Sweden there are no limitations on how broad or how deep Nordic Defence Cooperation or other similar cooperative efforts are pursued, as long as it is made sure that the sovereign decision making power on how to use the operational capabilities is kept. The level and depth of the cooperation will be decided on a case by case basis and is dependent on the surrounding circumstances.

The basic logic which underpinned the initial enthusiasm for Nordic Defence Cooperation still applies. The establishment of NORDEFCO is a step

forward, but we need to get past ministerial meetings and speeches, and get practical cooperation rolling even more. Deliverables are needed in order to maintain momentum and interest.

Several developments toward this direction can be already observed. For example: Norway and Sweden are procuring the Artillery system ARCHER; training for Forward Air Controllers is on-going; coordination of courses for non-commissioned officers and specialists is underway to avoid unnecessary duplication; training for the countering of improvised explosive devices is up and running; the respective Air Forces of Sweden, Finland and Norway are conducting joint training in the northern part of the respective countries; and Norway, Finland and Sweden are deepening their cooperation within ISAF in Afghanistan. The success of the common sea-surveillance system SUCBAS⁴ is extremely encouraging, and there are high hopes for the ASDE⁵-cooperation on air surveillance. SUCBAS is also a very good example of how synergies can be found between civil and military actors. In a longer perspective and building on the experiences from cooperation like SUCBAS and ASDE, more areas of operational cooperation should not be excluded.

The Swedish security policy, which is based on solidarity, the transformation of the armed forces to a versatile and flexible force and the increased capabilities in the field of civil emergency, requires a greater emphasis on cooperation with other countries in general and the neighbouring states in particular. Sweden not only wants to, but actually needs to, work together with others, both when dealing with challenges far way and those closer to home.

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⁴ Sea Surveillance Cooperation in the Baltic Sea.

⁵ Air Situation Data Exchange.

XIII Suomenlinna Seminar

NORDIC COOPERATION AND THE FAR NORTH

Helsinki, 2nd – 3rd June, 2010

Organized by the National Defence University of Finland,
Department of Strategic and Defence Studies

SEMINAR PROGRAMME

The seminar will take place in the building of the Finnish National Defence Courses, Maneesikatu 6, Helsinki.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 2ND, 2010

| | |
|-------------|--|
| 09:30-10:00 | Registration and Coffee |
| 10:00-10:10 | Opening of the seminar: Director of DSDS, LtCol Jyrki Heinonen |
| 10:10-12:30 | FIRST SESSION: CHALLENGES ON THE ARCTIC AGENDA Chair: Commander Juha-Antero Puistola <i>Why Different Disciplines Define the Border of the Continental Shelf in Such Different Ways in the Arctic.</i> Professor Timo Koivurova, University of Lapland <i>Russia's Arctic Ambitions.</i> Senior Fellow Marlène Laruelle, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute <i>Military Aspects of Arctic Security.</i> Jacob Børresen <i>A New Arctic: Strategic Issues in a Changing Region.</i> Senior Researcher Niklas Granholm, Swedish Defence Research Agency |
| 12:20-14.00 | Lunch |
| 14:00-15:30 | SECOND SESSION: THE BALTIC SEA REGION Chair: Senior Researcher Tommi Koivula <i>The Military Balance in the Baltic Sea Region.</i> Mr. Magnus Christiansson, Swedish National Defence College <i>A Baltic View on Security.</i> Professor Erik Männik, Baltic Defence College |

15:45-16:45 Keynote Speech on Nordic Defence Cooperation:
HE Thorvald Stoltenberg

19:00-21:00 Dinner at the DSDS, Maurinkatu 1

THURSDAY, JUNE 3RD, 2010

9:00-9:30 Coffee

**9:30-11:30 THIRD SESSION: NORDIC DEFENCE
COOPERATION – NORDIC SOLIDARITY AT HOME
AND ABROAD**

A Swedish View. Peter Göthe

A Finnish View. Colonel Juha Pyykönen, Defence Command
Finland

12:00-13:00 Concluding Panel Discussion
Chair: Professor Tuomas Forsberg
Participants: Stoltenberg, Göthe, Pyykönen, Männik

13.00 - Farewell Remarks and Lunch
Director Jyrki Heinonen

ABBREVIATIONS USED

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| ACAP | Arctic Contaminants Action Program |
| ACIA | Arctic Climate Impact Assessment |
| AEPS | Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy |
| ASDE | Air Situation Data Exchange |
| BALTBAT | Baltic Battalion |
| BALTDEFCOL | Baltic Defence College |
| BALTNET | Baltic Air Surveillance |
| BALTRON | Baltic Naval Squadron |
| BEAC | Barents Euro-Arctic Council |
| CBSS | Council of the Baltic Sea States |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| CLCS | Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf |
| EDF | Estonian Defence Forces |
| EØS / EEA | European Economic Area |
| EEC | European Economic Community |
| EFTA | European Free Trade Association |
| ESDP | European Security and Defence Policy |
| HELCOM | Helsinki Commission |
| IEA | International Energy Agency |
| IMO | International Maritime Organization |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Force (<i>NATO mission in Afghanistan</i>) |

| | |
|------------------------|---|
| ISBA | International Sea-Bed Authority |
| LORITA | Lomonosov Ridge Test of Appurtenance |
| MARSUNO | Maritime Surveillance North (<i>Part of EU's strategy for the Baltic Sea region</i>) |
| MNC NE Corps HQ | Multinational Corps Northeast Headquarters |
| NBG | Nordic Battle Group |
| NORAD | North American Aerospace Defence Command |
| NORDEFCO | Nordic Defense Cooperation |
| NORDØK | Nordisk Økonomi (<i>planned organisation for Nordic economic cooperation 1968–1970</i>) |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| PfP | Partnership for Peace |
| SDWG | Sustainable Development Working Group |
| SLOC | Sea Lines of Communication |
| SSBN | Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (<i>Nuclear-powered submarine armed with ballistic missiles</i>) |
| SSN | Ship Submersible Nuclear (<i>Nuclear-powered submarine</i>) |
| SUCBAS | Sea Surveillance Co-operation in the Baltic Sea |
| UNCLOS | United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea |

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Magnus Christiansson has compared in his studies the Nordic countries' military strategies and security and defence policies. He has worked as the Head of Political Science Department (2001–2006) and as a Lecturer at the War Studies Department (2006–2007) at the Military Academy Karlberg. Christiansson currently works as an Associate Lecturer at the Department of Strategy at the Swedish National Defence College.

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Niklas Granhom is the Deputy Director of Studies at FOI, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, Division for Defence Analysis. He works also as an Associate Fellow at Royal United Services Institute in Great Britain. He currently heads a study project on behalf of the Swedish Foreign Ministry studying the strategic developments in the Arctic. Granholm was seconded to the Swedish Ministry of Defence in 2007 and headed between 1999 and 2006 the project for international peace-support and crisis management operations on behalf of the Swedish Ministry of Defence. His main fields of interest are e.g. future threat developments; Arctic, Nordic and Baltic security issues.

Peter Göthe

Peter Göthe is long-standing civil servant at Sweden's Ministry of Defence. His current position is the Deputy Director General and the Head of the Department for Strategy and Policy. Göthe has worked previously in various posts in the Ministry of Defence, such as the Head of the Department for International and Security Affairs. In Brussels, he has worked as Defence Counsellor at the Swedish Permanent Representation to the European Union.

Timo Koivurova

Research Professor Koivurova is the Director of the Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law in Arctic Centre/University of Lapland, Finland. He is also Adjunct Professor of International Law in the Universities of Joensuu and Turku. He has specialized in various aspects of international law applicable in the Arctic and Antarctic region. His current research includes topics such as law of the sea in the Arctic waters, the role of law in adapting to climate change and the function and role of the Arctic Council in view of its future challenges. He has also been involved to many international research projects such a global research project on the theory and practise of trans-boundary environmental impact assessment, and he works as a research leader-in-charge in the Finnish Academy funded CIGSAC (The Capability of International Governance Systems in the Arctic to Contribute to the mitigation of Climate Change and Adjust to its Consequences).

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Marlène Laruelle is a Senior Research Fellow affiliated with the Russian and Eurasian Studies Program at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, Washington DC. Her main areas of expertise are nationalism, national identities, political philosophy, and the intellectual trends and geopolitical conceptions of the Russian elites. She has expertise in Russian foreign-policy and has working experience in domestic think tanks and academia. Her English-language publications include *Russian Eurasianism. An Ideology of Empire* (2008); *In the Name of the Nation. Nationalism and Politics in Contemporary Russia* (2009); ed. *Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia* (2009). She has published "Russia's Arctic Ambitions: Transforming the 'Cost of Cold'" (ISDP Policy Brief, no. 7, 2009), and is now working on a monograph on the same subject matter.

Erik Männik

Dr Männik is currently Adjunct Professor at the Baltic Defence College. He has previously worked as a Professor (Head Chair of Strategy) at the Estonian National Defence College. Männik's research interests include small states' security and defence; modern conflicts and terrorism. He has taught military history and Estonia's security policy and defence strategy. In his research Männik has focused e.g. on ESDP's role in Estonia's security policy.

Laura Salmela

Laura Salmela worked as an intern at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies at the National Defence University during the summer 2010. She studies at the University of Tampere in the Finnish Russian Cross-Border University Master's Programme. She is currently writing her Master's Thesis on the participation of different interest groups in the Russian energy policy. Her main research interests include Eastern European Studies, especially the energy and the security policy of the Russian Federation. She holds a Bachelor's Degree in International Relations from the University of Lapland.

Thorvald Stoltenberg

Thorvald Stoltenberg is the former Defence and Foreign Minister of Norway, Ambassador to the United Nations, UN Head Representative Mediator to Balkans from 1993–1996, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Ambassador to Denmark and the President of the Norwegian Red Cross. For the five Nordic Governments he draw up a report in 2009 with proposals for closer foreign and security policy cooperation between the Nordic countries. At the moment he is chairing a commission for the Norwegian Government that is asked to deliver a report on the new drug policy for Norway.

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