Increasing Security, but Avoiding a Security Dilemma
Perspectives on the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence in Europe

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INCREASING SECURITY, BUT AVOIDING A SECURITY DILEMMA

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JYRI SAANIO
Abstract

Since 2001, the USA has taken the initiative into its own hands to prevent the homeland from coming under renewed attack, this time possibly by a limited strike with ballistic missiles. Therefore, the USA has decided to develop an integrated Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) to intercept and repel missile attacks by the so-called “rogue states”, namely Iran and North Korea. This paper concentrates on the U.S. project to build up a BMDS in Europe. This is done within the theoretical framework of the concept of security dilemma by surveying, elaborating and assessing the following questions:

(1) Why and based on what rationales has the USA emphasized the BMDS in Europe?
(2) What could have been the likely negative long-term implications of the BMDS in Europe, if deployed following the plans of the Bush administration and perceived negatively by Russia and certain European allies?
(3) How could the negative long-term implications of the BMDS have outweighed original U.S. interests, and thus, led to a security dilemma for the USA and its allies?
(4) Why has the Obama administration decided to alter the BMDS plans for Europe?

The research at hand is based on the hypothesis that by building up the BMDS in Europe in accordance with the Bush administration’s plans, without integrating Russia into the strategic dialogue and making concessions to Russia, the USA would have been likely to cause a security dilemma for itself and its allies in the long run. In this paper, the concept of security dilemma refers to a situation, particularly in a readily conflict-prone security environment, where a state, by actions aiming at enhancing its own security, triggers balancing reactions from rivaling states. As a result, the state seeking added security faces counter-measures by the rivals which could make it even less secure than in the first place.

In today’s security environment, the traditional nuclear deterrence and the possibility of pre-emptive use of military force have demanded alongside a “softer” defensive option, the BMDS, for guaranteeing U.S. national security. In addition to national security, the security of the allies and the promotion of WMD and ballistic missile non-proliferation have been the publicly stated main arguments supporting the BMDS. These arguments have sought to point out the pure military necessity of an effective BMDS.
It is likely, however, that there have also been other interests, which have made the BMDS a rational choice for the USA, instead of other policy options available for dealing with the threat posed by the “rogues”. These interests include, for example, enhancing deterrence vis-à-vis Russia and China, extending national defence geographically, making nuclear arsenals superfluous, fostering and exploiting technological advantage, and simply keeping the domestic military industrial complex running and competitive. Some of these potential interests have likely been perceived as indications of malign intent and greed by U.S. rivals, particularly Russia. Even many major European allies and the European public opinion have treated the American BMDS plans with caution.

Presumably, the original U.S. decision to build up the BMDS in Europe was based on rationales related to (1) threat perception, (2) political goals, (3) deterrence, non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as on (4) geopolitical, (5) sovereignty and (6) technological motives. On the other hand, Russia’s opposition to the BMDS has been mainly based on (1) general political and (2) geopolitical arguments, (3) a different threat perception, (4) deterrence and balance of power allegations, as well as on somewhat more debatable (5) technological and security arguments.

And due to the negative Russian perceptions, the danger stems from a possible security dilemma caused by the USA, who, by developing the BMDS in order to increase its own security, undermines that of Russia. This gives Russia incentives to develop counter-measures which, in the end, might lead to a renewed arms race and other negative long-term implications harmful for U.S. security. Without doubt, the BMDS build-up has already led to balancing by military means by Russia. Many of the Russian counter-measures have been likely to affect the security of the USA and its allies negatively. Therefore, it is questionable how worthy the BMDS in its originally planned form would have been.

As suggested above, the BMDS build-up in Europe according to the original Bush plan would most likely have undermined U.S. security in several ways. First of all, this could have led to a renewed arms race between the super-powers. Furthermore, this arms race could have encouraged the militarization of the outer space, as well as undermined major disarmament and arms control treaties. The erosion of international arms control regimes combined with the struggle between the Western democracies and their adversaries could also have led to a full collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In addition, Russia would probably have moved towards a more offensive force posture and speeded up its own ballistic missile modernization and space weapons programmes in order to be able to penetrate the U.S. missile defence, if necessary. In addition, Russia would likely have started developing a corresponding missile defence of its own, which could have further undermined the weight of the U.S. nuclear deterrence. At the worst, an escalating conflict between the great powers could have had unpredictable effects on the future strategic stability.

In addition to this negative overall development of the security environment, the BMDS would have concretely affected the security and other interests of the U.S. allies. One outcome could have been that countries like Poland and the Czech Republic could have become targeted by Russian ballistic missiles. At the very least, NATO allies would have become categorised according to their contribution to the BMDS and its defensive coverage. This could have weakened the cohesion of NATO and the sense of security of many member states.

To avoid such developments and a security dilemma, without giving up the ambition of an effective missile defence, President Obama has decided to apply a “smarter” BMDS approach. In addition, the USA now aims to engage its adversaries as part of the cooperative non-proliferation efforts through closer political, diplomatic and economic ties. Despite this, the USA still wants to create the BMDS, but in combination with sufficient confidence-building measures, cooperation, institutional checks and balances, and even concessions to parties with objections. The aim is to avert unanticipated negative consequences for the security of the USA and its allies.

In the question of the BMDS, President Obama has chosen not just to pursue U.S. national interests unscrupulously and gain the short term military advantages, but to resort to more cooperation and restraint. This has been done in order to reduce Russian concerns about U.S. unilateralism and greed. In this delicate issue, the USA now seems to want to avoid inciting rival states to increase their counter-power to balance the USA. Doing so, the USA has shown more sensitiveness to others’ interests. The U.S. reassurances, legitimization of own measures and readiness to bargain have been put into practise. And it seems apparent that a more multilateral BMDS approach could help the USA to avoid causing a security dilemma for itself and its allies.

But in spite of the turn of the Obama administration’s BMDS policy, the long term negative prospects of a security dilemma still loom. After all, the Obama administration has not backed out of the basic objective of creating a strategic BMDS. An operationally capable BMDS, extended as a worldwide system in one form or another, can in the end undermine the long standing strategic balance between Russia and the USA. Thus, the BMDS could still contribute to an escalating spiral of hostile measures and counter-measures, and, in the worst case, to a “hot conflict” between the great powers.
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“We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security. … We’ll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”1

“Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with the sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint. … We are the keepers of this legacy. Guided by these principles once more we can meet those new threats that demand even greater effort, even greater cooperation and understanding between nations. … With old friends and former foes, we’ll work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat…”2

“…our new missile defense architecture in Europe will provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America’s allies. It is more comprehensive than the previous program: it deploys capabilities that are proven and cost-effective; and it sustains and builds upon our commitment to protect the U.S. homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats; and it ensures and enhances the protection of all our NATO allies.”3


INTRODUCTION

The prevailing opinion among the U.S. leaders and the public during the last nine years has been that the “rogue states” and their terrorist allies pose a grave danger to the United States and the world peace.4 When faced with such a threat, American leaders often tend to rely on their nation’s power to meet the high U.S. demand for security. Therefore, the USA has since 2001 sought to seize the initiative so as to prevent the homeland from coming under renewed attack, this time possibly with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

In order to respond to the proliferation of the WMD and ballistic missiles,5 the USA has traditionally relied on its nuclear deterrence and sought to make good use of diplomacy, international arbitration, persuasion and positive sanctions. Furthermore, it has promoted punitive international sanctions and other coercive measures against states like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria. But since 2001, the USA has acted unilaterally6 and in ways harmful to its reputation, by taking advantage of its military supremacy. At the same time the USA has formed coalitions of the like-minded and supported vital allies in order to counter rogue regimes. It has also launched a “global war on terrorism”, which includes fighting regimes that support terrorist organizations. For this purpose, the USA has invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, and still continues to maintain large-scale military presence on the regions surrounding the “rogue states”7. These actions have provoked balancing efforts from rivalling powers.

4 The President’s State of the Union Address.
5 Despite the net-decrease from the Cold War numbers, the geographical proliferation of short- and intermediate-range (but not long-range) ballistic missiles is likely to increase in the foreseeable future due to the lack of effective control regimes. The proliferation of these capabilities may lead to an arms race on a regional level. See D.M. Gormley, C.M. Kelleher & S. Warren, Missile Defence Systems: Global and Regional Implications. Geneva Papers 5. Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva 2008, p. 4 and 19 and J. Cirincione, The Declining Ballistic Missile Threat 2005. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Outlook, February 2005, pp. 4-7 and 10.
7 Z. Lachowski, Foreign Military Bases in Eurasia. SIPRI Policy Paper No. 18, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2007, pp. 1-4, 6-16 and 31-42 and
And last but not least, the USA further damaged its reputation of benign intent under the George W. Bush administration by deciding to withdraw from the ABM treaty and create the Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS). The goal was to be able to intercept and repel possible attacks by the “rogues” with ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads, should other policy options prove to be unsuccessful. By doing this in order to increase its own security, the USA has impacted the security of other states, as well. At this point in time, the development of the BMDS has progressed so far and cost so much that a complete withdrawal from this legacy of the Bush administration would be senseless to Washington.\(^8\)

The Obama administration, in turn, has not been willing to further contribute to this conflicting development and has not exploited the indisputable leading position of the USA as openly as the Bush administration. Instead, it has sought to change course by altering U.S. policy towards a more conciliatory or “smarter” BMDS approach. In other words, the Obama administration has so far combined a somewhat détente flavoured engagement policy, sanctions and the goal of developing effective BMD capability when dealing with the “rogues”.

This research concentrates on the question of deploying the BMDS particularly in Europe. The aim is to survey, elaborate and assess following questions:

1. Why and based on what rationales has the USA emphasized the BMDS in Europe? (Chapter 3)
2. What could have been the likely negative long-term implications of the BMDS in Europe, if deployed following the plans of the Bush administration and perceived negatively by Russia and certain European allies? (Chapter 4)
3. How could the negative long-term implications of the BMDS have outweighed original U.S. interests, and thus, led to a security dilemma for the USA and its allies? (Chapter 5)

The paper discusses the background of this controversial subject in the context of great power rivalry. This will be done by examining the subject in the light of the concept of security dilemma. For obvious reasons, this work is mainly based on the U.S. initiatives, policy-making and the international public debate during the eight years of the Bush administration. While the differences of President Obama’s policy in comparison with the Bush administration are already visible, this paper also tries to point out the ambivalence of the Obama administration concerning the BMDS, as well as its attempts to avoid the BMDS causing a security dilemma for the USA and its allies. Bearing in mind these starting points, the research is based on the following preliminary assumptions:

1. **Historical assumption**, according to which the idea of the build-up of the BMDS was not introduced by the previous Bush administration. Instead, it is a long-term U.S. aspiration dating back to the early years of the Cold War, which has experienced peak moments such as the development of BMD systems allowed by the 1972 ABM treaty, President Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI, Star Wars) and the Clinton administration’s National Missile Defence/Theatre Missile Defence (NMD/TMD) plans.\(^9\)
2. **Threat assumption**,\(^10\) according to which the Iranian WMD and ballistic missile capability exists, keeps developing and is internationally noticed. Despite this fact, the U.S. intelligence community or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cannot currently be sure of Iran’s real intentions, actual nuclear status or the imminence of this threat

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\(^10\) The notion of threat often refers to the co-existence of both the (i) military capability and the (ii) political intention (will) to use it (Threat = Capability x Intention/Will). If either of these variables is non-existent, the threat can only be treated as a risk or a possible threat. Because military capability usually is a slowly developing and fairly stable variable, whereas the intention (will) may change “overnight”, most states base their threat assessments and military preparedness on the existence of possibly threatening capabilities in their security environment. See C.S. Gray, *European Perspectives on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense. National Institute for Public Policy, Fairfax, March 2002*, p. 13. U.S. Missile Defense Agency classifies the ballistic missile threats as follows: short-range (range less than 1 000 kilometers), medium-range (1 000-3 000 kms), intermediate-range (3 000-5 500 kms) and long-range (more than 5 500 kms). See Missile Defense Agency, *Fiscal Year 2009 (FY 09) Budget Estimates, Overview. Missile Defense Agency, Department of Defense, retrieved 19 March 2009*, <http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/budgetfy09.pdf>, p. 5.
to the USA or its allies.11

(3) National security assumption, according to which the national security, the security of the allies, and layered defence (active defence-in-depth) against the ballistic missile and WMD capabilities of the “rogue states” are the main U.S. motives behind the build-up of the BMDS.12

This paper focuses on the BMDS project in Europe and its possible negative long-term repercussions on the relations and strategic balance between the USA and Russia. This approach has been chosen due to the limited length of the paper and, above all, due to the fact that much of the logic of the issue of the BMDS in the European-Middle Eastern theatre can also be projected to the Far Eastern-Pacific theatre. This is where the other front of the BMDS is being built to prevent the threat posed mainly by North Korea. Supposedly, the rationales of the USA and the implications of the BMDS to the U.S.-Russian relations in the Far Eastern-Pacific theatre will be equivalent to what is taking place in Europe. Concentrating on the European theatre is justifiable also on the grounds of the differing nature of the threats posed by North Korea and Iran, the latter being judged as more serious due to its extremist and expansionist ideological nature. Similarly, this paper does not deal with the Chinese criticism on the BMDS in the Far Eastern-Pacific theatre, because China’s perceptions on how the BMDS undermines its limited nuclear deterrence follow largely the same logic as the perceptions of Russia.13 Before long, as in Russia’s case, the BMDS will likely alter the weight of the Chinese nuclear arsenal and its second-strike capability vis-à-vis the U.S. nuclear deterrence.

The objects and scope of this research include, firstly, the U.S. policy options available to deal with the Iranian threat, the U.S. politico-military (strategic) interests behind the BMDS programme and the rationality of the BMDS as a policy choice (chapter 3). Secondly, the disputed U.S. rationales are reflected on the critical argumentation of Russia, on the viewpoints of the closest U.S. allies in Europe supporting the BMDS, and on the opinions of some European states more hesitant and qualified vis-à-vis the BMDS. Furthermore, the paper seeks to point out the likely implications of the original plans concerning the BMDS deployment on future strategic stability in Europe (chapter 4). Finally, this research concentrates on the clash of interests between the USA and Russia, as well as on the impacts of the original BMDS plans on alliance cohesion in Europe. As a conclusion, the attempts of the Obama administration to avert the BMDS-related security dilemma will also be elaborated (chapter 5).

The point of departure of this work is the following hypothesis: By building up the BMDS in Europe in accordance with the Bush administration’s plans, without integrating Russia into the strategic dialogue and making concessions to Russia, the USA would have been likely to cause a security dilemma for itself and its allies in the long run.

In this research, the term Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) refers to the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence project on the strategic level with the focus on the originally planned Ground-based Midcourse Defence (GMD), and the current plans for substituting, mainly sea-based, assets in Europe. Originally, the Bush administration’s plan included a ground-based interceptor (GBI) site in Poland and radar sites in the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and Denmark. Recently, the Obama administration has decided to replace the GBI’s in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic with Aegis vessels and sea-based SM-3 (Standard Missile-3) systems. According to the overall U.S. plans, this limited BMDS in Europe will eventually incorporate also ground-based SM-3 facilities, presumably at least in Romania, as well as deployable and mobile theatre level and tactical missile defence systems, while becoming part of a worldwide defensive grand system.

Often, especially during the Clinton administration, the BMDS has been referred to as the National Missile Defence (NMD). This term emphasizes the nature of this defensive capability as primarily national system under U.S. command providing security for the U.S. homeland. However, for the sake of consistency, the term BMDS will be used throughout this work in order to emphasize the technical nature of this system rather than its national security character.

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11 On Iran’s lack of compliance with the NPT treaty, see Assessing Compliance with Arms Control Treaties. Report of the International Group on Global Security - IGGS. Centre d’études de sécurité internationale et de maîtrise des armaments (CESIM) and Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), September 2007, pp. 27-29.


Increasing Security, but Avoiding a Security Dilemma

BMDS AS A POSSIBLE CAUSE OF SECURITY DILEMMA - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to understand and explain the standpoints of the USA and Russia, as well as those of the European allies of the USA involved in building the BMDS in Europe, it is necessary to resort to theoretical explanations on international politics in today’s unipolar world. This background lays a framework in which different arguments and perceptions concerning the BMDS, the rhetoric used, the concrete actions taken, and the shorter or longer term political and security impacts of the whole project can be assessed.

The issue of the BMDS in Europe incorporates a number of aspects of the realist theory of international relations. These include e.g. traditional power politics and the balancing of power among the rivaling poles of the international system, classical bandwagon policy for security gains by lesser states, and the legitimate right of sovereign states to defend themselves against military attacks or imminent threats of attacks. Furthermore, the issue of the BMDS relates to the disputability of subjective national threat perceptions, the utility of traditional nuclear deterrence, the problem of the justification of military prevention and pre-emption, and the challenges to alliance building and cohesion, as well as the presumption of rational cost-benefit calculations by state actors. And last but not least, the BMDS highlights the prospect of an emerging security dilemma if short-term security benefits are pursued at the expense of other powers. The following pages will explore more closely the nexus between the BMDS project and the concept of security dilemma.

The theoretical starting point of this research is the fact that, while the USA still remains the sole superpower, the competition with its rivaling powers, especially the autocratic Russia, has returned. The end of the Cold War did not end the ideological and strategic competition between the leading powers. In addition to the (1) contest on status and influence between the great powers, the USA, Russia and China in particular, there is an ongoing (2) competition between liberalism and autocracy, as well as a (3) struggle between radical Islamism and Western secularism. In Robert Kagan’s words, “global competition between democratic and autocratic government

14 On the concept of “imminent threat”, see e.g. F. Heisbourg, A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences. The Washington Quarterly 26:2, Spring 2003, pp. 75-88.
15 See L. Shevtsova, Think Again: Vladimir Putin. Foreign Policy, January/February 2008, p. 34.
will become a dominant feature of the twenty-first-century world.\textsuperscript{17} The former block consists of the USA and its democratic allies and the latter of autocratic states like Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and several others.

The absence of a traditional power struggle between the great powers in the 1990’s was only a temporary feature followed by the current state which resembles more a “Cold Peace”. This paradigm shift in U.S.–Russian relations has been characterized by renewed Russian nationalism and Russia’s willingness to challenge and balance the U.S. power and to promote a multipolar international system. According to Robert A. Pape, second-ranked states like Russia often tend to balance the unipolar superpower, like the USA, in order (1) to reduce the threat of a direct military attack, (2) to avoid indirect harm caused by the military actions of the superpower which may, sometimes unintentionally, undermine their security, or (3) to prevent the superpower from becoming a global hegemonic power able to damage their political, military or economical interests.\textsuperscript{18}

Examples of Russian efforts to balance U.S. power include e.g. the country’s own military capability build-up, attempts to block a further eastward enlargement of NATO, securing its own spheres of influence within the “near abroad”, and protecting Russian citizens living in these regions, by force, if necessary. Furthermore, Russia has opposed West on the question of Kosovo and has flexed its military muscles in Caucasus. On top of that, Russia has used natural resources as a political bargaining chip and has cooperated with anti-Western nations such as Iran and North Korea.

The shift in the Russian approach has been made possible by the country’s economic rise with the help of oil and other energy exports, as well as by the centralization of political power in the hands of the “putinist” elite. In its promotion of a multipolar world order, Russia is not only aiming for a new balance of power, but also competes on values and ideas which form another aspect of multipolarity. Today, Russia is able to hinder the intents of the USA and its allies concerning e.g. Iran, or Ukraine’s and Georgia’s NATO aspirations, not to mention the BMDS in Europe.\textsuperscript{19} In all fairness it must be said, however, that the current financial crisis has forced Russia to seek, at least temporarily, a somewhat more conciliatory policy.

While Russia has sought to build up its strength, the USA has largely resorted to a preventive and even aggressive national security strategy. This strategy has focused on fighting international terrorism, the “rogues” and the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles. While executing this strategy under President Bush, the USA also clearly utilized its unipolar status in order to gain national security benefits, more influence in world politics and increased military presence around the world. Efforts to build up the BMDS in Europe were merely one embodiment of this policy.

The “Bush doctrine” called the U.S. reputation into question and raised concerns on behalf of other major powers about the potentially malign intents of the USA. The U.S. sensitiveness to the threat of the “rogues” and the country’s high subjective demand for security undermined its common interests with other major powers, and, thus, paved the way for increased suspicion. The prevalent negative perceptions of U.S. intentions compelled especially Russia and China, as well as the “rogues”, to rethink their security and resort to hard balancing by military means. In this way, controversial political objectives in a unipolar world affected the conflicting parties’ perceptions of each other’s intentions. Therefore, the BMDS project has further increased fear and suspicion, competition of power and balancing measures, and may lead to an escalating spiral of conflict, if the evolving security dilemma is not addressed through confidence-building, cooperation and institutional checks and balances.\textsuperscript{20}

By using the terminology of the Cold War, the USA is today in the middle of a new kind of containment policy. Instead of the communist ideology, the objects of containment are international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles. Despite the mutual understanding between the USA and Russia on the need to prevent these global threats, it can be argued that Russia still interprets the U.S. containment as a policy aimed against it.\textsuperscript{21} This is the case largely because the containment of terrorism and WMD proliferation is conducted mainly in the same strategic areas, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, Africa, Central Asia and the Far East, where the U.S. containment policy of the Cold War era was conducted. Since security


measures taken by the USA tend to be perceived as malign intent by Russia, this new version of containment policy may prove to be dangerous, if Russia is not engaged constructively in the effort. Europe, for its part, has found itself compelled to come to terms with this era of “Cold Peace” between the USA and Russia. As Robert Cooper has claimed, (Western) Europe has, after the Cold War, experienced the end of the traditional balance of power. Instead, some Western European states are under a transitional period towards a “post-modern state system”, where the realist views of power struggle, sovereignty and national interests no longer define the behaviour of these states to the same extent as they did in the Cold War era.22

This applies especially to the core states of European integration, namely Germany and France. Western Europe, largely because of its history and limitations of power, has, unlike the USA under President Bush, turned away from power politics in favour of multilateralism. The perceptions of France and Germany on the “Bush doctrine” and the original BMDS plans for Europe clearly reflected this. Thus, these European powers have often resorted to soft balancing against the USA. This has been done by non-military tools, such as denial of political and other concrete support to U.S. military efforts, or institutional checks and economic leverage in order to add to the drawbacks of the unilateral use of U.S. power.23

For its part, the rivalry between the democratic West and the autocratic “rogues” manifests itself most clearly over the question of the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles. The West, under the direction of the USA, promotes the norm of non-proliferation of these capabilities and sanctions to those who do not refrain from acquiring these military capabilities. However, at the same time the West takes advantage of its own technological superiority by developing and deploying whatever military capabilities necessary for maintaining its own security and lead position in the power struggle. This has been accomplished even at the expense of fundamental Cold War era arms control arrangements, like the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty shows. Furthermore, the West applies double standards vis-à-vis its own allies and partners, such as Israel or Pakistan, who already possess nuclear weapons capabilities.24

In the meantime, countries like Iran and North Korea have stood up to challenge the Western power. These “rogues” have e.g. sought to resist the “value imperialism” practised by the West, to balance their military short-handedness by developing WMD and ballistic missile capabilities, and to cooperate with other non-Western nations like China and Russia, as well as with non-state actors. As Stephen M. Walt puts it, the sheer power of the USA and the ways and means by which the USA uses or misuses its power arise suspicion, fear and resistance among other states, especially those - like Iran or North Korea - being targeted by this power.25

To sum up, the question of building the BMDS in Europe contains aspects of all of the above mentioned basic conflicts of today’s international system. It can be seen as (1) part of the power struggle on status and influence between the USA and Russia. Being so, it at the same time makes (2) a sub-plot in the competition between American liberalism and Russian autocracy. And finally, as described above, the BMDS also represents (3) the conflict between radical Islamism and western secular democracies headed by the USA. Since all these aspects of conflict are intertwined, it is no wonder that the debate around the BMDS has reached such proportions.

In this framework, the danger stems from the notion of security dilemma. It could be the result of the USA developing the BMDS in order to increase its own security vis-à-vis the “rogues”, while, unintentionally, undermining Russia’s sense of security, and, thus, provoking counter-measures that may undermine its own sense of security or that of its allies. The concept of security dilemma is based on the assumption that states cannot achieve security without impacting the security of others. According to Barry R. Posen, “what seems sufficient to one state’s defence will seem, and will often be, offensive to its neighbours.” Or as Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler put it, “those weapons that states can use for their own self-protection, potentially or actually threaten harm to others”…“even when those weapons are not intended to be used except for self-protection following an attack, or in the event of a threat of an attack”. Thus, by enhancing its own security, a state may trigger balancing reactions from other states, even when it has no expansionist goals. As a result, the balancing measures can make the state less secure than it was in the first place.26

Taking into account the concept of security dilemma, it is obvious that Russia, feeling uncertain, challenged and vulnerable under the ongoing power struggle with the USA, and trying to interpret U.S. motives and intentions, has fiercely opposed the BMDS in Europe and sought to hard balance the increasing U.S. power. In the Russian mindset, the BMDS potentially jeopardises the traditional balanced deterrence, the principle of mutual assured destruction (MAD), between the USA and Russia. Thus, this U.S. project gives Russia incentives to develop counter-measures which might lead to a renewed arms race. This could lead to an escalation of conflict not favourable to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area.

According to the realist political theory, in this kind of context the lesser powers can either choose neutrality or have two other policy options. First of all, the lesser powers can choose to bandwagon the unilateral power, in this case the USA, for national security or political gains. This is what countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and just recently also Romania and Bulgaria, have sought to do in the case of the BMDS. Secondly, other lesser states may seek to (soft-) balance the unilateral power. The main European powers, Germany and France, have largely followed this policy line in the issue of the BMDS in Europe.

As the theoretical background of the build-up of the BMDS in Europe is as described above, the short-sighted policy of the USA and its closest bandwagoning allies could before long lead to a security dilemma. While the BMDS appears as a legitimate means to increase the security of the USA and its allies vis-à-vis the “rogues”, Russia has obviously perceived it as a measure decreasing its security. Although defensive by nature, the BMDS has most likely had a negative influence on Russia’s perceptions on the true U.S. motives. In Russian eyes, the build-up of the BMDS is not motivated only by legitimate security reasons, but also by politics and greed. Therefore, Russia has interpreted the original BMDS plans for Europe as an “offensive” force build-up and as excessive compared to the actual threat. In other words, the USA has sought to enhance its own power and security at the expense of Russia. Thus, the BMDS build-up has obviously invoked a hard balancing reaction from Russia, which in the long run might lead to “a spiral of mutual hostility”, or a situation called the “security paradox”, undermining also the security of the USA and Europe.

This could be the result if Russia (1) decided to reposition and retarget its nuclear forces on a more offensive posture and develop nuclear missiles with more efficient warheads and counter-measures for BMDS. Furthermore, Russia could withdraw from strategic arms control agreements with the USA or the INF treaty and CFE treaty, and transfer its military technology, e.g. WMD know-how and components, to U.S. adversaries such as Iran. In this case the BMDS could actually reduce the security of the USA and its allies by altering the offence-defence balance. This in turn could lead to (a) an increase of U.S. offensive capabilities and subsequently to a renewed arms race, or (b) continuous enhancement of the missile defence capabilities until the USA can be sure that the BMDS is able to ensure strategic balance despite Russian offensive capability build-up. Either way, the U.S. counter-measures would obviously only induce Russia to continue enhancing its offensive posture. Moreover, Russia could balance the build-up of the BMDS (2) by making itself more immune to the enhanced U.S. deterrence by, even forceful, expansionism and extension of its sphere of influence in order to gain new allies, far-away military strongholds, strategic depth and more secure borders. Only if Russia decided to stick to balancing

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28 V. Rukavishnikov. The U.S.-Russian Dispute Over Missile Defence. Connections, The Quarterly Journal, Volume VII, No. 4. PIP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, Fall 2008, pp. 84-86 and K. Booth & N.J. Wheeler 2008, pp. 2, 4-9 and 51-57. Booth & Wheeler define a “security paradox” as “a situation in which two or more actors, seeking only to improve their own security, provoke through their words or actions an increase in mutual tension, resulting in less security all round”.


The BMDS by developing its own corresponding defensive system, could the
security of both parties increase, and their offensive nuclear forces become
more obsolete. However, because of technological and economic reasons,
this defensive method of balancing is not as tempting for Russia as the above
mentioned offensive options.31

The question is how the USA could avoid causing a security dilemma with-
out compromising its own national interests and the goal of developing an
effective worldwide BMDS? Theoretically speaking, the controversial is-

(1) Communicating benign U.S. motives concerning the BMDS while
basing the U.S. non-proliferation strategy vis-à-vis Iran primarily on dip-
loamy, persuasion and cooperation with Russia.
(2) Multilateral BMDS and other military cooperation between the USA,
its European allies and Russia e.g. in the form of joint threat assessments,
common manoeuvres, exchange of observers, supranational inspections
or pre-notifications of operational deployments.
(3) Delaying the BMDS operational use in Europe until the Iranian threat
can be confirmed, and restructuring the BMDS deployment plans ac-
cording to Russian expectations.
(4) Scaling down the BMDS build-up in Europe in accordance with mul-
tilateral threat assessments while concentrating on the theatre and tactical
level missile defence systems, and refraining from further development
of space-based BMDS elements and deployment of fixed installations in
countries surrounding Russia.
(5) Seeking to join Russia and its missile defence facilities in a joint ef-
fort to build a BMDS which would benefit all parties involved without
undermining the nuclear deterrence of either party or the strategic bal-
defs between the major nuclear powers.
(6) Seeking new arms control agreements limiting offensive nuclear ca-
"s between both sides.33
(7) Reducing the U.S. offensive nuclear arsenal unilaterally below the
level of balanced deterrence while developing the BMDS, and revising
the U.S. nuclear posture.34

31 Both the Obama administration and its Russian counterpart have put emphasis on the
resumed nuclear disarmament process referring to the replacement of the START I treaty
expired in December 2009. See Joint Statement by Dmitriy A. Medvedev, President of the
Russian Federation, and Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Re-
garding Negotiations on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms. The White House,
whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-Dmitriy-A-Medvedev-and-Barack-
Obama/>. In early 2009 there were indications of aims to agree on the level of 1 500 or even
1 000 nuclear warheads including possible restrictions on delivery vehicles and sufficient
verification mechanisms. By that time, getting below the level of 1 000-1 200 warheads
would have to have been compensated, in the Russian opinion, by putting constraints on
the BMDS. See U.S. and Russia to Consider Reductions of Nuclear Arsenals in Talks for
Obama and President Medvedev signed in Moscow a framework agreement on reducing
the two countries’ nuclear arsenals to 1 500-1 675 operational warheads. See Medvedev;
Obama sign Kremlin deal to cut nuclear arsenals.RIA Novosti, 6 July 2009, retrieved
Congress underlined that the follow-on treaty to the START I should not include or be con-
ected to any limitations on the BMDS or U.S. space capabilities. See National Defense Au-
bgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:b2647enr.txt.
pdf>, p. 360. On 8 April 2010 the “New START” treaty between the USA and Russia was
signed in Prague. The new treaty, pending ratification, limits the U.S. and Russian strategic
warheads to the level of 1 550, but does not set limitations on the BMDS. See Treaty Be-
tween The United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Fur-
ther Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. 8 April 2010, retrieved 8 April
and 19-21. In connection with the signing of the treaty, Russia stated that future build-up of
the American BMDS could be used as justification for Russian withdrawal from the “New
START”. See A New START in Prague. The White House Blog, 8 April 2010, retrieved

Cold war echo: Russian military maneuvers with Venezuela. The Christian Science Monitor,
p01s05-womn.html?page=1>; Putin moves to bolster Cuba ties. The Financial Times,
4a1e-000077b07658,s01= 1.html?nclick_check=1> and Russian Subs Patrolling Off
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/world/05patrol.html?_r=1&hp>.
and 174-179. See also J. Baylis, International and Global Security in the Post-Cold War
Era in J. Baylis & S. Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to
International Relations (second edition), Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 257-258 and
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U.S. INTERESTS BEHIND THE BMDS

3.1 U.S. options in dealing with the Iranian missile and WMD threat

Theoretically, there are six rational policy options for the USA to prevent, counter or neutralize the ballistic missile and WMD threats posed by states like Iran or North Korea. These can be differentiated on the scale of “soft power - hard power” and can be implemented as such or be combined, like the carrot-and-stick approach. Sometimes, however, implementing two or more of these options at the same time is difficult or even impossible. For example, how to negotiate with a regime that one wishes to influence, if one meanwhile supports the opposition to this regime in order to bring down the negotiation partner?

So far, the USA has used external pressure and sanctioning, as well as diplomacy and dialogue, emphasizing from time to time the former and then again the latter, to deal with “rogues” like Iran and North Korea. Often the outcome of such a policy mixture, especially when speaking of Iran, has been nothing but counter-productive for the interests of the USA. Despite this, it is clear that the more options the political and military leadership of the USA has to choose from, the more flexibility and freedom of action it has. Furthermore, effective diplomacy, especially in the case of the “rogues”, always needs some “harder” power as further leverage. This also seems to be the viewpoint of the Obama administration that underlines the importance of the combination of engaging diplomacy and sanctions when dealing with Iran. Examining the pros and cons of these different policy options helps to better understand the reasoning of the USA in its pursuit of the BMDS. At the same time, they are helpful in interpreting other countries’ perceptions of the BMDS. These policy options are:

1. Engagement (“soft power”)
2. Support for domestic opposition (“soft power”)
3. Sanctions (political, economic) (“soft/hard power”)
4. Development of defensive capability (“soft/hard power”)
5. Reliance on nuclear deterrence while accepting Iran’s nuclear status (“hard power”)

Until now, the Obama administration seems to have inclined itself towards engagement policy in the case of Iran. Even Iran itself has shown some willingness to negotiate provided that Iran’s right for nuclear programmes is recognised. But despite President Obama’s preference for engagement, this option alone hardly fills up the tool-box of the U.S. foreign policy. This is the case especially when dealing with the kind of threat that Iran’s ballistic missiles with possible nuclear warheads represents to the USA and its allies, particularly Israel. For the USA and its allies, too compliant a policy could indicate a fearful mentality rather than a deliberate choice of a superpower. Israel’s push for more concrete action to take down Iranian nuclear ambitions is representative of this way of thinking. On the other hand, engagement could give a boost to the Iranian regime and its proxy actors as proof of success of their power politics. Furthermore, the USA or its allies have few political or economic incentives to offer for Iran, which, as an energy-rich country holds the negotiation cards largely in its own hands. The unwillingness of Iran to accept any external conditions and its deep-rooted suspicions and hatred towards Western secular powers leave the option of engagement, at least as a sole policy choice, with apparently little chance of permanent success.

**Support for domestic opposition** and regime change have been the means the USA has sought to make good use of during decades when seeking to topple unwanted regimes threatening U.S. interests. The logic behind supporting and empowering opposition forces in Iran is that promoting democracy and human rights would increase internal pressure on the Iranian regime and level off its threatening external ambitions while forcing it to deal with the domestic democratic movements. Means like funding and supporting the Iranian exile opposition, dissidents, pro-democracy groups and non-governmental organizations, launching information campaigns and

(6) Pre-emptive use of force (“hard power”).

This paper will first deal with the options of engagement, support for domestic opposition, sanctions, reliance on nuclear deterrence and pre-emptive use of force. After these, also the option of development of defensive capability, under which the build-up of the BMDS in Europe falls, will be discussed.

**Engagement** as a policy choice means encouraging Iran to turn into a responsible negotiation partner, as well as a rational and reliable user of civilian nuclear technology. The USA and other main actors of the international community would need to tie Iran in an enhanced political dialogue in the context of an overall rapprochement and concessions. At the same time, the USA would have to renounce its ambitions for a regime change in Iran and the option of using military power against Iran. On top of this negative security guarantee, the USA would need to offer Iran positive incentives like restoring diplomatic representation and resurgence of the economic cooperation, trade and investments. On the other hand, Iran would have to do its part by abiding to common nuclear practices, such as meeting its NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) safeguards obligations and the global efforts for non-proliferation of WMD. Furthermore, Iran would have to take down its secret military nuclear programmes, accept continuous and comprehensive international verification measures, agree to internationally regulated nuclear fuel supplies and, last but not least, refrain from developing long-range ballistic missiles.

Engagement has sometimes proven to be an efficient option for foiling the nuclear plans of “rogue states”. An evident success story of diplomacy, negotiations and positive incentives is Libya, which renounced its secret nuclear weapons programme in December 2003. North Korea, as well, highlights the prospects of engagement policy in comparison to sanctions. Since 2007, the country has seemingly accepted a partial dismantling of its nuclear programmes and international verification measures. In exchange, North Korea has gained economic rewards, energy supplies, diplomatic concessions and other positive sanctions, such as being removed from the U.S. list of terrorist states. But in spite of this, North Korea, like Iran, still continues its long-range ballistic missile development.

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facilitating opposition broadcasting could be used to cause increasing civil unrest inside Iran in order to bring down the Islamic regime.\textsuperscript{44}

Achieving this aim would help to democratize Iran and dismantle its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities with the support of a parallel engagement policy executed in cooperation with the new western-minded, secular and democratic regime.\textsuperscript{45} This policy option has been tried out since the Islamic revolution of 1979, but not always consistently. For years, the USA has sought to isolate and delegitimize Iran’s radical Islamic and hostile regime. But the support for the Iranian opposition has often been compromised by a largely secret engagement policy towards the clerical regime in power.

For the USA, however, even under President Obama, supporting the Iranian opposition can hardly be the main option for dealing with the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile threat, simply because of the uncertainty of the outcome. Although the approach has been tried out for almost three decades, the Islamic regime maintains a firm grip on power, and there are no actual signs of democratic change. Pro-democracy activism has been on the increase since the early 1990’s and there have been hopes for a slow transition towards democratization in Iran, but the confrontational Islamic regime has strengthened again its hold on power since 2005. Some experts also suggest that the Iranian opposition is not ready and capable of being mobilized as an effective anti-regime movement, and that this kind of approach would only stimulate the anti-American atmosphere in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{46} This became evident during the opposition protests and regime counter-measures in the aftermath of the June 2009 presidential elections. A regime change in Iran might, in fact, have unfavourable consequences to other vital U.S. interests in the region. It is also doubtful whether the new regime would be ready to give up the ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities already in Iranian possession.

\textbf{Sanctions,} whether political or economic or combined, have traditionally been the only policy option between engagement and direct use of military force for preventing evolving nuclear threats.\textsuperscript{47} Sanctions could be seen as a mixture of soft and hard power to achieve desired effects on the behaviour of the target country. Politically, the USA could seek to impair the position of the decision-making elite of Iran as well as to expel Iran from the international venues in which the Islamic regime has so far been able to further its cause. In addition, the USA could put more effort on insisting that the IAEA

sanctions Iran through the United Nations Security Council resolutions despite possible objections expressed by Russia and China. As President Bush stated in 2002, the USA should seek to deny Iran “the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction”.\textsuperscript{48} In addition, the USA could mobilize like-minded countries as a broad coalition enforcing comprehensive political, diplomatic and economic sanctions on Iran including e.g. blocking Iranian energy exports and imports and freezing Iranian assets abroad.\textsuperscript{49} Furthermore, sanctions could be accompanied by threats of the use of military force if not fully complied with.

In fact, the U.S. intelligence community, combining sanctions with engagement, suggested in 2007 that “some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might - if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible - prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program.” By that time, Iran’s government was also assessed having become less determined to get nuclear weapons mainly due to international diplomatic pressure since 2003. As the 2007 intelligence estimate put it, “Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on this issue than we judged previously”, and “Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs”. This implies that Iran’s clerical regime might after all be considered as a rational actor despite many opposite beliefs.\textsuperscript{50} Just recently, the USA has stressed the need to enforce new sanctions on Iran due to the country’s unwillingness to accept international offers of cooperation in return for halting the Iranian nuclear programmes. At the same time, the USA has indicated a departure from the above mentioned intelligence assessment on Iran.\textsuperscript{51}

What makes the effective use of sanctions problematic for the USA is the fact that both Russia and China have the right to veto at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).\textsuperscript{52} These two permanent members of the UNSC

\textsuperscript{44} K.R. Timmerman 2006, pp. 313-314 and 327-330.
\textsuperscript{45} A. Jafarzadeh 2008, pp. 221-237.
\textsuperscript{47} K.R. Timmerman 2006, pp. 312-313.

\textsuperscript{48} The President’s State of the Union Address.
\textsuperscript{50} Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. National Intelligence Estimate. National Intelligence Council, November 2007, retrieved 11 November 2009, <http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf>. In this case, also the necessity to build up the BMDS in Europe, as well as the utility of the traditional U.S. nuclear deterrence, would have to be seen in quite a different light.
have consistently opposed tight sanctions on Iran due to their own national interests. Many European allies of the USA also have their own economic reasons to be cautious about sanctioning Iran too hard. Furthermore, sanctioning Iran, possessor of one of the largest oil and natural gas resources in the world, would be a two-way street because Iran could always play the energy card, cut short its supplies, and by doing so cause quick rise in energy prices and thus inevitable economic problems around the world. Hard sanctions could also hit the ordinary Iranian citizens the hardest, and thus unite the Iranian public in support of the anti-western regime in power. These reasons, for example, have given little hope for the U.S. attempts to enforce new sanctions on Iran as a follow-up of the October 2009 six-party talks in Geneva after the latest revelation of a formerly unknown Iranian nuclear facility in Qom.53

Reliance on nuclear deterrence while accepting Iran’s nuclear status would be the easiest, as well as the least provoking policy option for the USA for dealing with the Iranian WMD and ballistic missile threat because it would not require any active measures. But this option has been defined by the U.S. leadership as non-applicable, despite the fact that during the Cold War the security of the USA relied on the country’s nuclear deterrence. Since then, the traditional deterrence policy of the USA has been largely replaced by a preventive military strategy.54 According to former President Bush, today’s new threat environment makes traditional deterrence unreliable because “means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend” and “unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies”55. And Iran’s clerical regime has repeatedly threatened to strike Israel with its missiles, should Israel (with the support of the U.S.) attempt to neutralize Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.56 If, in the case of Iran or North Korea, the USA cannot be absolutely sure of the rationality of the leaders of these countries, it cannot count on its own nuclear deterrence and retaliatory capacity to ensure the “no-first-launch” principle. Because of this, the Americans think they have every reason to decrease reliance on traditional nuclear deterrence and make sure they can intercept a possible first strike by ballistic missiles.57

Evidently, this policy approach is also the choice of the Obama administration, particularly due to its ambition for a total abolition of nuclear weapons and their deterrent capability. As for the “rogues”, the Obama administration has also been doubtful of the utility of the traditional nuclear deterrence.58 Furthermore, the acceptance of the Iranian nuclear weapons would mean extending the U.S. nuclear deterrence to protect allies like Israel, Turkey and Saudi-Arabia, as well as other friendly Arab countries in the Middle East in order to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons by these countries. 59 All of this would be counter-productive in the light of the Obama administration’s nuclear disarmament policies.

Pre-emptive use of force, or threats of the use of force, would be the riskiest and politically most disputable policy choice. This would mean destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and expertise possessed by individual nuclear scientists, possible nuclear weapons as well as their delivery vehicles. Despite the risks, the doctrine of pre-emption in countering WMD threats was emphasized in the 2002 and 2006 U.S. National Security Strategies.60 In addition, President Bush warned Iran in 2005 that the military option to solve the evolving Iranian nuclear threat was kept on the table. Israel, as well, has underpinned a military solution, and has been suspected of having a secret assassination programme for the elimination of Iranian nuclear scientists with the quiet approval of the USA.61 And lately, even President Obama has

stated that his administration does not rule out the military option in the case of preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons despite his preference on diplomacy.\textsuperscript{62} Without doubt, the USA, with or without the involvement of its allies, has the capability to undertake such a pre-emptive strike or a series of strikes, if it so decides, despite the fact that it is currently tied up militarily both in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But pre-emption by the USA or its allies would give Iran an unavoidable propaganda benefit. Iran could claim to have become a victim of Western and/or Jewish aggression. Surely, Iran would mobilize terrorist proxies around the world and turn off the oil taps for all the countries it would see as enemies. Furthermore, nobody could be sure of the ability of the USA and its allies to destroy all Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities by the first strike. The decentralized and well-constructed underground facilities would make it very difficult to put Iranian threat down for good with mere air strikes. Effective pre-emption in the case of Iran would require large-scale and lengthy air and special operations, and in the worst case even a massive ground attack.\textsuperscript{63} And in the end, military pre-emption or a large-scale assassination plan would not wipe out the nuclear know-how already possessed by Iran, as they would only delay the Iranian nuclear ambitions. As the U.S. political leadership and the intelligence community have admitted, only a political decision by the Iranian government would finally stop the country from seeking to produce nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{64}

Furthermore, the active use of military force by the USA - alone or in cooperation with its allies - or an assassination programme revealed, would surely face strong opposition around the world due to the questionable “imminence” of the Iranian threat.\textsuperscript{65} The use of force would inevitably face international condemnation, if it were to cause widespread civilian casualties and be considered as conflicting with the international law. As a result, pre-emption would make the USA seem more and more eager to resort to force whether or not the threat was real.\textsuperscript{66} And it would also show president Obama, now a Nobel Peace Prize winner, in quite a peculiar light.

Despite its pitfalls, pre-emption has been used successfully twice by Israel to take out an evolving nuclear threat. The first time took place in 1981, when the IAF destroyed Iraq’s OSIRAK nuclear reactor. The second time was an air-attack against an assumed nuclear facility in Syria in September 2007.\textsuperscript{67} Common to both of these operations were the point targets attacked, and the unlikelihood of any retaliatory actions by the targeted countries due to their lack of capability to execute effective counter-strikes. This is why it is worth asking whether the USA and Israel have already lost their momentum on Iran and whether pre-emption is out of question. Iran, unlike Iraq in 1981 or Syria in 2007, is capable of retaliating against Israel or the U.S. forces in Iraq and in the Persian Gulf region with ballistic missiles, even though it does not yet possess nuclear warheads. Similarly, the pre-emptive use of force is out of question in the case of North Korea. This “rogue state” has been capable of retaliating against South Korea and the U.S. troops stationed in the region for years with its massive artillery force and, more recently, with its assumed nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{68}

3.2 Development of the BMDS as a rational U.S. policy choice

The development of defensive capability in the form of the BMDS has gained importance in the USA due to the judgement that the “rogues” will continue their nuclear programmes despite any measures taken by the USA or its allies. The political and military leaders of the USA have concluded that, in addition to the “hard” military options available - the traditional nuclear deterrence and the pre-emptive (offensive) use of military force - a geographically extended defensive option is needed in order to fulfil the national security interests.

This was highlighted in the 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. The document was based on the establishment of a “New Triad” consisting of nuclear and non-nuclear offensive strike systems, active and passive defensive systems, as well as a defence infrastructure capable of providing new capabili-


\textsuperscript{65} K.R. Timmerman 2006, p. 312.

\textsuperscript{66} S.M. Walt 2005.


\textsuperscript{68} F. Heisbourg 2003, p. 85.
ties to meet the emerging threats. The “New Triad” was described as being able to “…both reduce our [U.S.] dependence on nuclear weapons and improve our ability to deter attack in the face of proliferating WMD capabilities”. Furthermore, according to this nuclear policy formulation, “the addition of defenses…means that the U.S. will no longer be as heavily dependent on offensive strike forces to enforce deterrence as it was during the Cold War”.69 Thus, as the traditional nuclear deterrence of the USA is believed to be non-applicable in the case of Iran, and other above described policy options have been assessed or shown to be too uncertain, time-consuming and ineffective, too submissive for a superpower, or simply too risky, the USA has since 2001 finally inclined itself to carry out the BMDS.

Obviously, the U.S. national security interest (homeland defence), the security of the closest allies and the promotion of the non-proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles have been the publicly stated main arguments in support of the build-up of the BMDS. These arguments have sought to point out the pure military necessity of an effective BMDS. However, it is worth noting that there have probably also been other, often political interests (motives) which have made the BMDS a rational policy choice for the USA. As discussed earlier, some of these motives are likely to be perceived negatively by the U.S. rivals, particularly Russia.70 The following list is not an exhaustive one, but gives an idea on the complexity of the possible U.S. motives behind the BMDS:

(1) Homeland (and the allies’) defence (layered defence against “rogues”’ ballistic missile and WMD capabilities).
(2) Non-proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles by demonstrating U.S. defensive capabilities (deterrence by denial of the rationality of acquiring any WMD and ballistic missile capabilities).
(3) Gaining strategic advance and lead position with regard to Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals (enhanced deterrence).
(4) Gaining geopolitical advantage vis-à-vis Russia and China (geographically extended defence).


(5) Fostering nuclear disarmament (making nuclear arsenals superfluous, “mutual assured defence”).
(6) Preserving U.S. military primacy by fostering and exploiting technological advantage vis-à-vis other military and space powers.
(7) Keeping domestic military industrial complex employed and competitive.71

The following pages seek to further explain the U.S. rationales on which the build-up of the BMDS in Europe has so far been based.

Threat perception rationale. In Iran’s case, the USA bases its national threat perception on the country’s ongoing development projects of WMD and ballistic missile capabilities. According to the public U.S. intelligence estimate of 2007, Iran did not, at that time, with “moderate-to-high confidence”, possess nuclear weapons, nor had it obtained enough fissile material for weapons use. Nevertheless, Iran was estimated, sooner or later, to have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, if it so wished. Only a political decision by Iran to give up the nuclear weapons ambitions “would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons”. The earliest possible time for Iran to be capable of producing fissile material for nuclear weapons would be late 2009, but most probably this would not take place until 2010-2015. For weapons plutonium production, the corresponding timeframe would be 2015.72

As far as the Iranian missile capabilities are concerned, the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) Shahab-3 constitutes today Iran’s principal arsenal.73 Iran has produced several variants of this missile, like Shahab-3A, Shahab-3B, Shahab-3C and Shahab-4. It has been assessed that, in order to mount Shahab-3 missiles or the more advanced Shahab-4 missiles with small enough nuclear weapons, the warheads should be based on plutonium implosion device.74 So far, the USA has estimated that Iran could, depending on the level of foreign assistance, develop an inter-continental ballistic mis-

71 Missile Defence and European Security, pp. 28-30. See also Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, pp. 7 and 11-12. Remarkably, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report of the Obama administration underlines China as one of the expected regional ballistic missile threats, and thus, one of the reasons to develop BMDS capabilities. According to the report, “Chinese missiles will be capable of reaching not just important Taiwan military and civilian facilities but also U.S. and allied military installations in the region”.
74 Timmerman 2006, pp. 63-65, 122-123, 146, 197-199, 204-205, 239 and 292-295. The initial version of Shahab-3 had a range of approximately 1 200-1 300 kilometers and
a warhead of 1 200 kilograms. The more advanced variants of Shahab-3 have a range up to 2 000 kilometers. See also Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Executive Summary. 15 July 1998, pp. 6-7 and Jafarzadeh 2008, pp. 167, 171-173 and 178-179.

In addition, some estimates suggest that Iran could have acquired KH-55 cruise missiles from Ukraine in 1999-2001 and would by now be able to produce its own cruise missiles based on this type.\(^77\) This might reflect aspirations to find ways to develop a missile arsenal capable of evading most of the BMD systems. Currently, Iran is also about to finish the development of the solid-propellant ballistic missile (Ghadr-110/Ashura/Sejjil) with the range of 2 000-2 500 kilometers (in some estimates even 3 000 kilometers). As a possible end result, Iran could threaten the whole Middle East, as well as large parts of South Eastern Europe, Russia and India with both ballistic and cruise missiles.\(^78\)

Political rationales. The Ballistic Missile Defence System - and the key word here is “defence” - is in many ways the easiest, though not the cheapest or technologically least demanding way to prevent and repel the threat of the unpredictable “rogues”. Unless banned by a arms control treaty, such a defensive capability can be interpreted as part of the legitimate right, provided by the UN Charter, of any sovereign state to defend itself against military attacks. In many ways, this approach can also prove to be successful. The keys to success lie in the hands of the USA, if only it can overcome the technological and budgetary obstacles slowing down the build-up process. Politically, now after the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, the BMDs is a relatively safe way to resort to military measures without being dependent on multilateralism, international institutions and all the restraints of international law. Furthermore, any level of military superiority achieved by the development of the BMDs would evidently also translate into political weight vis-à-vis potential adversaries.\(^79\) As for domestic affairs, it is also psychologically important for the Americans in the post-9/11 era to have a BMDs, although the purely military necessity may be disputable. The possession of a reliable BMDs itself would reassure the public by complementing the U.S. nuclear deterrence and give political credit to the ruling administration.  

Deterrence, non-proliferation and disarmament rationales. The BMDs represents a capability-based “deterrence by denial” approach with regard to the evolving Iranian ballistic missile threat.\(^80\) The BMDs and the simultaneous efforts to develop theatre level and tactical missile defences are meant to counter any strategic advantage offered by limited offensive use of ballistic missiles and protect against their accidental launches. As any defensive system, the BMDs is meant to be a threshold system discouraging WMD and ballistic missile proliferation and causing potential enemies armed with ballistic missiles to think twice before launching them. In the end, this logic would make U.S. adversaries come to the conclusion that using such missiles or even developing them further would be a wasted effort, simply because it would be highly unlikely that they would reach their targets. This way, the BMDs functions as a deterrent factor denying the benefits of the actual use of ballistic missiles against the USA or its allies and promoting global non-proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles.\(^81\) And finally, the BMDs, as part of the deterrent power of the “New Triad”, opens, intention-
ally or unintentionally, prospects for gaining long term strategic advantage vis-à-vis other major nuclear powers, namely Russia and China.

The logic behind the building of the BMDS can be traced back to the Cold War era. The founding idea behind the ABM treaty between the USA and the Soviet Union was to make sure that the mutual vulnerability of the nuclear powers would force them not to begin a nuclear war. It was beneficial for both parties to accept the ban of defensive systems which could undermine this balance of power. But this whole idea of mutual assured destruction was based on the assumption of the rationality of the political and military decision makers of the opposing parties. Today, as the USA cannot be sure of the similar rationality of the political and military leaders of the “rogues”, it has come to the conclusion that the traditional nuclear deterrence cannot be applied in the case of Iran.\textsuperscript{82}

On the other hand, one of the positive long term outcomes of the BMDS might be a significant decrease of the importance of maintaining a nuclear deterrence, which might lead to a global disarmament of nuclear weapons, even down to the level of “zero option”. In this sense, the BMDS build-up, especially under the Obama administration, is based on a dual-tracked motive, similar to that of the SDI aspirations of the Reagan administration in the 1980’s, combining active missile defences with reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals.

**Geopolitical rationale.** At the same time, the BMDS project represents an alternative way for the USA to promote closer cooperation and unity within its own framework of like-minded states. Just like the enlargement of NATO and the transformation of its set of tasks have incorporated additional nations and geographical areas to the defensive circle of the USA and its interests, while limiting the influence of Russia in the regions surrounding Europe, the BMDS contributes to the same end. In addition, the stationing of the BMDS facilities in Poland, the Czech Republic or any other former country of the Warsaw Pact would be a relatively safe and justifiable method of getting around the “principle of two noes”. According to this principle, the NATO enlargement to East-central Europe was not supposed to include any permanent positioning of NATO forces or U.S. nuclear weapons on the territory of the new member states. In fact, the attempts at enhancing the collective security of NATO and strengthening the trans-Atlantic unity have been linked to the goal of building up the BMDS facilities in Europe. Furthermore, the USA also supports NATO’s parallel plans to protect its own deployed forces by Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) by the year 2010.\textsuperscript{83} Operational and effective BMDS would strengthen the USA’s and NATO’s position in Europe and its rim areas, not only militarily but also geopolitically.

**Sovereignty rationale.** The BMDS build-up also involves new forms of alliance building that do not undermine the sovereignty of the USA. As in the case of the Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, when the USA assembled a “coalition of the willing” around itself, it has now in the case of the BMDS sought to form a “coalition of the willing states” by resorting to bilateral cooperation agreements. As the U.S. Missile Defense Agency has stated, the BMDS must be conducted “with the support of a coalition of friends and allies”.\textsuperscript{84} By accomplishing the coalition building this way, the USA shows that its crucial national interests or the fulfillment and operational activities of a vital and extremely costly weapons programme, like the BMDS, will not be left under the demands of unanimous alliance decision-making in NATO. In the NATO framework, the “weak allies” of the “Old Europe” could hinder or delay decisions - possibly ones that are of utmost importance to the security of the USA - related to the operational use of the BMDS. Instead, the USA intends to keep the BMDS firmly under its own command in order to guarantee the ability to carry out the time-sensitive defensive measures if facing an actual ballistic missile attack by e.g. Iran. Bilateral agreements with the “reliable allies” of the “New Europe”, such as Poland or the Czech Republic or Romania, would not compromise this freedom of action. In exchange, the USA is prepared to provide other security benefits and compensations for the chosen BMDS host countries.\textsuperscript{85}


\textsuperscript{83}Missile Defense – Worldwide, pp. 8-9.

\textsuperscript{84}Ibid., p. 9.

Technological rationale. Developing the BMDS seems to be based also on the assumption that military applications of new technologies have to be explored constantly. The USA wants to build a BMDS simply because it can and needs to stay ahead of possible adversaries, especially in the aerospace domain.\textsuperscript{86} The demonstration of missile defence technologies has actually been pointed out as a significant reason for the fielding of the BMDS elements.\textsuperscript{87} In other words, the BMDS, in addition to its other advantages, fosters U.S. military technological progress and keeps the domestic military-industrial complex busy, as well as helps to maintain its competitiveness. This rationale becomes even more evident considering the fact that the BMDS - operated in conjunction with deployed theatre and tactical missile defence systems - could not provide watertight defence against the ballistic missiles launched against the U.S. homeland or its allies. The threatening “rogues” or their terrorist proxies could always find new ways to exploit the dead spaces and angles of this defensive system in order to deliver WMD on enemy soil.\textsuperscript{88}

4
NON-U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF THE BMDS

4.1 Russian opposition and criticism

In the early 1990’s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Russian Federation as its successor brought about significant changes in Russian foreign politics. The traditional power politics of the Soviet Union was replaced by Boris Yeltsin’s peaceful co-existence and international cooperation. Competition between the USA, Russia and other power centres was expected to continue only in the form of peaceful economic competition.\textsuperscript{89} These hopes continued in the early days of Vladimir Putin’s presidency in Russia, when some U.S.-Russian rapprochement took place right after the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001.\textsuperscript{90}

Despite this temporary warm period of U.S.-Russian relations, the USA has kept pushing forward to strengthen its own and its allies’ position during the last two decades. This has been done by enlarging NATO towards the east, by resorting to military power in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, and by gaining more influence in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf, as well as in Central Asia and Caucasus. In these areas, the USA has been filling up the vacuums left behind by the Soviet empire. This, as well as the intense export of democracy and freedom by the USA, has raised deep suspicions in Russia. The fact that Western democracies have ignored the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention by interfering in the internal disputes of other states, often autocratic ones, has only added to the suspicions.\textsuperscript{91}

While the USA has seen the threat of WMD and ballistic missile proliferation only as a conflict between the Western democracies and the “rogues”, Russia, for its part, has seen the preventive measures of the USA, like the BMDS, as signs of a power struggle against the rising rivals, namely Russia. The conflicting views of the necessity of the BMDS and of the motives behind it stem from the different perceptions, even misperceptions, of the nature of the ongoing conflicts in the international system.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Missile Defense – Worldwide}, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{89} R. Kagan 2008, pp. 6-8.
Against this background, the following sub-chapter describes, firstly, the Russian argumentation against the U.S. plans for the BMDS in Europe and, secondly, Russian efforts to counter-balance the BMDS build-up. Thus, this paper seeks to indicate what would have been the likely negative long-term political and security implications of the BMDS project, had the Obama administration decided to pursue the plans formulated by the previous Bush administration.93

**Threat perception arguments.** A fundamental source of disagreement over the BMDS between the USA and Russia is the fact that Russia does not share the U.S. threat perception on Iranian WMD and ballistic missile capabilities. Russia, as any other country, bases its assessments and long-term military planning on possibly threatening capabilities, not intentions (will). Therefore, it has consistently underrated the ballistic missile threat posed by the “rogues” to the USA. Russia has stated that ballistic missiles truly capable of threatening the U.S. mainland or Europe would need to have an inter-continental range of 5,000–8,000 kilometres. This is far more than the Iranian or North Korean missiles will have in the foreseeable future. And lately, even the Obama administration has admitted that Iran seems to concentrate more on the development of short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles. In this sense, Russia sees itself more threatened than Europe, not to mention the USA. Thus, Russia perceives that the real threat, on which the BMDS in Europe as well as NATO’s missile defence plans have been based, lies rather on its own territory than in the Middle East or in the Persian Gulf region.94

To put it simply, Russia does not consider the U.S. national security interest, or WMD and ballistic missile non-proliferation, as legitimate grounds for the build-up of the BMDS in Europe. In fact, according to the Russian interpretation, behind these publicly stated motives there are other interests, which could, in the end, be harmful to Russia. In this way, a U.S.-led military capability build-up in the form of the BMDS, just like the enlargement of NATO, is prone to undermine the Russian national security in Russian eyes.

**Political arguments.** It is, however, justifiable to argue that the Russian opposition to the BMDS in Europe has mainly been driven by political motives. Primarily, the Russian objections to the BMDS need to be seen as part of a wider political frustration and dissatisfaction with the international order of the post-Cold War era. In the Russian mindset, this order has been characterized by lack of a fair deal with the West, the treatment of Russia as a junior partner by the West, and the exploitation of the prevailing power balance in favour of the USA. In this sense, the BMDS development is likely to only add to the political gains of the USA. No matter what explanations the Americans make, Russia sees the scrapping of the ABM treaty, the BMDS programme and the bilateral BMDS agreements with any East European states as provocative, unilateral and as signs of expansive power politics pursued by the greedy USA. Furthermore, there are no doubts in Russia over the true political motivation behind particularly Poland’s and the Czech Republic’s decisions to offer their territory to host the American BMDS facilities, this being Russia itself.95

During the last decade, Russia has attempted to balance the USA by trying to divide the West and to alienate the European allies politically from the USA. The build-up of the BMDS facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic would have complicated this in the future. Because the BMDS cooperation has so far been largely based on bilateral arrangements instead of the NATO framework, it would be more difficult for Russia to cause political ruptures among the “BMDS coalition”. This is not the case when Russia deals with NATO or the EU, where a consensus on taking concerted measures against Russian intentions is much harder to achieve.96

On the other hand, the BMDS objections, just as any other aspect of the hard-line politics of Russia towards the USA, need to be seen as part of domestic politics in Russia, favourable to the “putinist” centralized govern-

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94 W.W. Putin, *Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy*, 10 February 2007, retrieved 11 October 2008, <http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=en&id =179>; V. Rukavishnikov 2008, pp. 85, 88 and 92 and K. Booth & N.J. Wheeler 2008, pp. 58-61. Many western experts share the doubts about Iranian (and North Korean) ballistic missile capabilities stating that the currently used liquid-propellant technologies are likely to limit the range of these missiles to a maximum of 3,000 kilometres. Even if the solid-propellant technologies were developed, it would be unlikely that this would inevitably provide the “rogues” with inter-continental ballistic missile capabilities. See D.M. Gormley, C.M. Kelleher & S. Warren 2008, p. 6.


Deterrence and balance of power arguments. Russia perceives that the BMDs programme will have the potential for altering the status-quo by diminishing the weight of the Russian nuclear deterrence and by violating the principle of MAD in the long run. Thus, the BMDs could in the future undermine the basic guarantee of Russia’s super power status and upset the strategic balance between Russia and the USA. Russia does not believe that the USA and its allies will settle for stationing only limited BMDs assets in Europe and around the regions bordering Russia. Instead, Russian military experts anticipate that the BMDs development will lead to a global chain of installations and assets around the Russian and Chinese borders. This could question Russia’s nuclear second-strike capability by 2020, when a large part of the Russian ICBM arsenal is expected to become obsolete, unless a costly modernization programme is implemented.

Russian suspicions have been reinforced by the U.S. plans to develop the next generation BMDs as more responsive to the changing threat environment and to make it into a more exhaustive, effective, mobile and deployable but less vulnerable grand system. As a matter of fact, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency has quite frankly admitted that “in order to protect national territories, deployed forces and our friends and allies most effectively, the BMDs must be worldwide”. Furthermore, the recent Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report of the USA states that “because the potential global demand for missile defense assets over the next decade may exceed supply, the United States will develop capabilities that are mobile and relocatable”. This requires international cooperation with partners and allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, Israel, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Italy and possibly Bulgaria or Hungary.

And the Obama administration, after announcing its change of the BMDs approach, has underlined that their new plan provides “greater flexibility to adapt as new threats develop” and “even more robust protection against longer-range threats on about the same timeline as the previous program”. Thus, the USA indicates that it is currently only “strengthening – not scrapping – missile defence in Europe”.

In Russian eyes, this leaves little room for doubts about the ultimate long-term strategic intent of the USA - although Russia itself has been pointed out as a potential BMDs partner. Russians foresee a BMDs capable of defending the USA against any, including Russian or Chinese, ballistic missile second-strike capability. In this sense, one might also argue that while the Obama administration’s recent change of BMDS policy might indicate short-term political success for Russia, it might also mean a long-term military loss. By basing the BMDS more on mobile and deployable assets rather than on fixed installations, the USA actually takes an immediate step towards the next generation BMDS in Europe. This is why the Obama administration’s renewed plans have also been met with somewhat reserved tones from the Russian side, although the initial responses from the political leaders were mostly positive.

101 Missile Defense – Worldwide, pp. 8-9 and Missile Defense Agency, Fiscal Year 2009 (FY 09) Budget Estimates, Overview, pp. 26-27, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, pp. vi and 23-27 and Romania to host US missile interceptors, Associated Press, 4 February 2010, retrieved 6 February 2010, <http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14515370>. The Obama administration has stated that it “also seeks to engage Russia and China on missile defense”. In the case of Russia this means “a broad agenda focused on shared early warning of missile launches, possible technical cooperation, and even operational cooperation”. But at the same time it also stresses that “the administration will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on U.S. ballistic missile defenses” as long as the BMDS related discussions with Russia are ongoing. See Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, pp. vi and 34.


It is also worth keeping in mind how, in his February 2007 speech, Vladimir Putin - the Russian president at the time - referred to the U.S. plans on the BMDS as “appearance of new, destabilising high-tech weapons” and “the militarisation of outer space”. According to Putin, the BMDS would “have unpredictable consequences for the international community, and provoke nothing less than the beginning of a nuclear era”. Furthermore, at that time, the U.S. plans on expanding the BMDS to Europe would have been seen as an inevitable path to a renewed arms race between Russia and the USA. Since the 2002 SORT treaty lacked its own verification mechanism, the Russian concerns were also influenced by the possibility that, after the expiration of the START I treaty in December 2009, there would have remained no nuclear disarmament verification regimes in force.

Geopolitical argument. Alongside the above described general political arguments, views have been expressed that the primary reason for the Russian opposition to the BMDS is not the fear that the system will be able to undermine the Russian nuclear deterrence. Instead, the BMDS could endanger Russia’s aim to create a special strategic zone on its western and south-western flanks. Inside this “geopolitical fault line”, NATO member states like Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic States, or NATO aspirants like Ukraine or Georgia, would have a lesser status in the family of NATO and partner countries. This would help to guarantee Russian influence in these regions. In other words, the build-up of the BMDS facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic would have hindered the aim to strengthen the Russian geographical sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Instead, this area would have fallen under the stronger influence of the USA. For the same reason, Russia has so far done its best to prevent Ukraine and Georgia from joining NATO. And lately Russia has also argued against any deployment of BMDS assets in Ukraine or Georgia.

Furthermore, for Russia, the BMDS facilities in Europe would only have represented a renewal of the USA’s Cold War practice of geographically extended defence and seemed as an excuse to bend the promises made after the end of the Cold War. In Russian eyes, constructing an interceptor site in Poland and a radar site in the Czech Republic would only have been a further step in the increase of the U.S. military strongholds around Russian borders - a development which has taken place during the last decade - and would have served as evidence of the residual Cold War mentality of the USA.

According to Russia, if the BMDS in Europe had originally been aimed solely against the limited ballistic missile threat posed by Iran, the interceptors should have been stationed in Turkey or in appropriate sea areas in the south. Admittedly, Russia has a point here. It is hard to think of a weapon system whose only function is to counter a threat by a single country or by a group of countries. No weapon system, especially if it costs billions to develop, will be specified in a way that makes it capable of firing only at targets launched by a certain pre-determined country. And any weapon system, even if clearly defensive by nature, has at least some value in the case of offence. In this sense, all weapon systems, including the BMDS, are universal by nature. Even if a fixed or mobile weapon system is originally built and stationed geographically so that it can be used only against some limited targets or threats, this does not exclude the possibility of its use in other contexts. Once a weapon system is operational, it can be multiplied, its effectiveness can be increased and it can be stationed or deployed according to one’s strategic or operational needs virtually anywhere, as long as one has the territory, air space or waters, or allies to provide them. In this sense, the renewed more flexible BMDS plan of the Obama administration based on mobile assets could in the long run be seen by the Russians as an even worse option than the original Bush plan. These concerns have already manifested themselves in some Russian comments on the possible alternative deployment areas of the American sea and land-based BMDS elements, such as the Arctic Ocean, Baltic Sea, Black Sea or Caucasus.

Technological and other security arguments. In addition to the potential for undermining Russian general political or geopolitical interests, or weakening the Russian nuclear deterrence and having an adverse effect on the balance of power between the superpowers, the BMDS in Europe may also pose technological and other security related threats for Russia. Russian experts have claimed that the interceptors originally planned to be stationed in Poland, let alone mobile land-, sea- or air-based missile defence systems, could easily be converted for the use of offensive weapons as well. Further-

more, if the Iranian ballistic missiles could be shot down by the interceptors in Central Eastern Europe, other types of air- or space-borne targets could also be intercepted by these same missiles. Potential targets could include Russian aircraft, such as strategic bombers, and space-based (satellite) systems, even if repelling Russian inter-continental ballistic missiles would be out of question. Therefore, the militarization of outer space, or an “arms race in space”, caused by the BMDS development, has been a concern of Russia. After all, Russia would inevitably be an underdog in this contest.112 Moreover, the interceptors launched from Poland or other locations in Eastern Europe could be used to deceive the Russian (ABM treaty based) ballistic missile defence around Moscow to react in the case of an actual nuclear attack. Russians have also shared the concerns of many other European states about possible intercepted missile debris falling on Russian or on third countries’ territory causing, in the worst case, substantial collateral damage. And last but not least, as the Russians have claimed, the planned radar site in the Czech Republic could have been used for intelligence gathering by monitoring Russian ballistic missile activities, including test launches within the radar coverage.113

Yet, the latter argumentation has to be put in the political context, because pure scientific calculations would show that the radar in the Czech Republic would not have been very useful for observing Russian missile tests, which are normally carried out in the direction west to east. Furthermore, the USA is already able to gather intelligence on Russian missile launches by satellites without a fixed radar installation in Central Eastern Europe. At the end of the day, one can also consider how beneficial the cancellation of the fixed radar in the Czech Republic is for Russia. The alternative for this might be the flexible deployment of the Aegis cruisers or destroyers with their sensors on the Baltic Sea, the Arctic Ocean and even on the Black Sea, or a land-based BMDS radar station in Caucasus.

4.2 Russia balancing hard the BMDS build-up

Russia’s efforts to balance the BMDS plans in Europe have been defined as an asymmetric response. These asymmetric measures have been characterized e.g. by an increase on Russian military expenditure and by attempts to mobilize the Polish and Czech public opinions against the planned BMDS facilities and to cause political frictions between the USA and its European allies.114

Russia has also threatened to respond by “hard” military means. These include developing Russian offensive weapon systems, targeting possible BMDS facilities in Eastern Europe by nuclear forces, deploying tactical surface-to-surface missiles in Kaliningrad and/or Belarus, as well as strengthening the arsenal of the Russian Baltic Fleet. Russia could also withdraw from the INF treaty in addition to the 2008 suspension of abiding by the adapted CFE treaty. Especially the ground-launched intermediate-range (500-5 500 km) missiles prohibited by the INF treaty would represent a cost-effective deterrence aimed at Europe to balance the evolving U.S. strategic superiority. Furthermore, the Russian military leadership has stressed that Russia could use military force, including nuclear weapons, also preventively, if threatened by countries seeking global hegemony.115

While opposing the BMDS in Europe and conducting military operations in Caucasus, Russia, after gaining additional power, has now sought to set the limits for the NATO enlargement and the spread of U.S. political and military influence towards the east. Russia itself has at the same time increased its defence expenditure and its military presence around the world. The latter has so far involved e.g. long-range strategic bomber flights on the Northern Atlantic and the Pacific, naval exercises with Venezuela, plans to restore strategic links with Cuba, and negotiations to reopen Russian naval bases in the Mediterranean. In other words, Russia has pursued enhanced military cooperation with like-minded autocratic states in order to show force and balance the power lead of the USA. Recently, Russia has also demonstrated military force by exercising on the Baltic Sea. In addition, Russia has put more emphasis on further development of its own ballistic missile arsenal.

which can be seen in the deployment of Topol-M1 (SS-27A) missiles and in the numerous recent tests on RS-24 and Bulava missiles. Furthermore, Russia has considered the acquisition of space-based weapons, especially anti-satellite weapons, in order to match the technologies developed by the USA and China. The planned build-up of the BMDS in Europe has given Russia further justification for these military measures.

The initiatives for missile defence cooperation with the USA have also been a significant part of Russia’s asymmetric response to the BMDS, and a way to gain time for other balancing measures. In fact, Russia made a very clever move once the Bush administration had announced its original plans to build the BMDS facilities in Europe. As part of the pursuit for “Pan-European Missile Defence”, in June 2007, Russia offered one of its own radar sites, that of Qabala (Lyaki) in Azerbaijan, to be used as part of the BMDS. On this condition, Russia would have withdrawn its objections to the BMDS in Europe. For Russia, the acceptance of this offer would have indicated the sincerity of the American efforts, but, in the end, the U.S. refusal strengthened Russian suspicions on U.S. intentions. Furthermore, Russia has claimed that the Americans made oral offers of permanent Russian military representation at the planned BMDS sites in Poland and the Czech Republic in order to ensure that these systems would not be used against Russia, but these offers were shown to be groundless. Similarly, Russia has blamed the USA for withdrawing from a plan not to activate any BMDS elements without a joint evaluation of potential threats with Russia. From the Russian perspective, the USA under the Bush administration rejected all Russian proposals for developing collaborative missile defences, thus deliberately alienating Russia.

It has also been hinted that, despite obvious and publicly stated mutual interests concerning nuclear non-proliferation, Russian involvement in Iranian missile and nuclear weapons programmes would have been a strategic choice in order to counter the increasing U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian regions. By supporting the military build-up of Iran, e.g. by providing modern surface-to-air missile systems, and practising military cooperation, Russia has sought to gain a fierce challenger of the USA on its side, as well as one more bargaining chip in this strategically vital region. Against this background too, it is easy to imagine why Russia would not be too happy about an effective BMDS that would undermine Iranian leverage. The Russian opposition to the BMDS could also partly be interpreted as pure maliciousness. Although, in principle, on the same side with the USA in the struggle against radical Islamism, Russia seems to prefer own political and economic interests in Iran to cooperation with the USA. Because of the prevailing distrust between the USA and Russia, it has been tempting for Russia to let the USA grapple with the problems concerning Iran, and to ensure that these problems are as difficult to solve as possible.

All of these concrete counter-measures and rhetoric statements by Russia undeniably represent signs of perceived security deficit, an evolving escalation spiral typical of the concept of security dilemma, and as such, potentially significant setbacks on the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. As the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has stated, having experienced the build-up of the BMDS, the growing U.S. military presence around its own borders and the NATO enlargement, Russia has to take these actions into account when considering its own defence policy as part of a reviewed security strategy until 2020. And just recently, the Russian President signed the new military doctrine emphasizing the threats posed by the expansion of NATO and the deployment of foreign military forces around Russian borders, as well as the development and deployment of the American BMDS.

It has to be mentioned, though, that being drawn into renewed and prolonged arms race, including the militarization of the outer space, would not be in the Russian interest simply because of the current economic restraints. This was proven to be the case already in the 1980’s when responding to the prospects of the American SDI turned out to be beyond the reach of Soviet resources.
4.3 Support from European allies

Many Central and Eastern European states, like Poland and the Baltic states, fear the power politics pursued by Russia vis-à-vis the so-called “near abroad”. Therefore, they are bound to seek a tighter strategic linkage with the USA to balance Russia. As NATO has moved away from its original core task of collective defence towards out-of-area crisis management, these member states see their national security interests as not being fully guaranteed by NATO. Instead, tying vital U.S. national interests tighter to their soil would presumably prevent the USA from withdrawing its political support and commitments to the hard security of these European allies. And simultaneously, this would help to block Russia’s attempts to increase its political influence on them. In other words, agreeing with the USA on the BMDS facilities, Poland and the Czech Republic, and lately even Romania, have sought to bandwagon the USA for additional political support and military protection against Russia, as well as increase their own political status as U.S. allies.

Incentives accompanied by the USA within the late bilateral security agreements on the BMDS, namely the modernization of Polish defence and investments in the Czech Republic, paved the way for the acceptance of the missile defence facilities in these two countries. However, this did not take place without political disputes. The BMDS agreements were signed despite the fact that in both Poland and the Czech Republic the public opinion was very sceptical about the rationality of hosting the BMDS facilities on domestic soil. Much of this opposition in both countries, and in Europe at large, was based on arguments concerning the questionable stability of the Iranian threat, the negative implications on relations with Russia, as well as on the high costs and the low reliability of the BMDS. Furthermore, the public opposition expressed concerns over decreased national sovereignty and NATO cohesion, non-involvement in the command and control of the BMDS, possible falling debris from intercepted missiles, and host countries becoming targets of “rogue” or Russian ballistic missiles.

Regardless of the external and domestic doubts expressed, in August 2008, in the midst of the Russian intervention in Georgia, Poland and the USA signed an agreement on the deployment of 10 GBI’s accompanied with a maximum of 500 U.S. military and civilian personnel in Poland. The agreement was supposed to enter into force only after the ratification of the Polish parliament and remain in force initially for 20 years. Simultaneously, the two states also issued a declaration on strategic cooperation. According to these documents, the signatories shared a similar threat perception on WMD and ballistic missile proliferation. In their view, the deployment of the interceptors in Poland in connection to the radar station in the Czech Republic would have been an appropriate means to deal with this threat. The interceptors deployed in Poland were seen as providing a critical capability for the defence of both parties, as well as other NATO nations against long-range ballistic missiles, “thus enhancing the security of the United States, Poland, and the North Atlantic area”.

Furthermore, the BMDS agreement was recognized to be the first step towards an intensified bilateral strategic relationship between Poland and the USA involving e.g. the modernization of the Polish Armed Forces. At the same time, the USA also committed itself to the security of Poland and the defence of Poland against ballistic missile attacks by all BMDS capabilities. Despite the fact that the interceptor site would have been set under Polish command, the USA would have had exclusive command and control over operational BMDS activities in the base including an exclusive right to use the interceptors. The only exception from this principle would have been the fact that the USA could not have conducted flight tests of interceptors without the consent of the Polish government. The interceptors were supposed to...

to be used only for purposes consistent with the international law, including the principles of the UN Charter on the right to individual or collective self-defense.\textsuperscript{124}

Similar agreement on a BMDS radar site with a maximum of 250 U.S. personnel was signed between the USA and the Czech Republic in July 2008. Like in the case of Poland, the two signatories recognised the evolving WMD and ballistic missile threats facing both countries and their allies. The radar site planned was considered, by providing precise tracking and discrimination data for the interceptors, to strengthen international peace and security and contribute to the security of the signatories, as well as other NATO members and allies. With this agreement, the USA confirmed its commitment to the security of the Czech Republic. In addition, the USA promised to defend the Czech Republic against potential ballistic missile attacks, as well as to develop bilateral security cooperation between the two countries. The contracting parties also agreed to deal together with the possible threats facing the Czech Republic because of the existence of the radar site. Furthermore, the radar in the Czech Republic would have been used only for activities consistent with the UN Charter. As with the anticipated interceptors in Poland, the USA would have had exclusive command and control over any BMDS operations involving the radar site. The agreement with the Czechs also affirmed the mutual aim to integrate the BMDS with the future NATO missile defence system. The agreement on the BMDS cooperation required the ratification of the host country parliament in order to come into force. Like in Poland, the ratification process in the Czech Republic proved to be a complicated political issue. And in the end, these processes were cancelled due to the Obama administration’s renewed BMDS policy.\textsuperscript{129}

Although the BMDS was considered to enhance the security of the countries involved, as well as the larger Euro-Atlantic area, the ratification of the facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic would have raised concerns about an evolving security dilemma. The intimidating behaviour of Russia showed that, by accepting BMDS elements on their soil, these countries would have made themselves more likely targets in the case of a conflict between Russia and the Western alliance. And the same would probably have applied to Iranian missiles, had Iran ever considered attacking the USA or Europe with ballistic missiles. Russia issued warnings to Poland and the Czech Republic about possible retaliatory actions following the acceptance of the stationing of the BMDS elements on their territory. And recently, Russia conducted a large military exercise on the Baltic Sea involving a simulated attack on Poland. Considering these actions, the security gains achieved by the two countries with their bilateral agreements with the USA could be questioned. As evidence of the BMDS-related security concerns, Poland demanded an additional Patriot tactical missile and air defence battery from the USA. It is quite clear that this was done mainly because of the threats issued by Russia.\textsuperscript{130}

Despite the initial mixed reactions in Poland and the Czech Republic to the Obama administration’s new BMDS approach, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. compensations and the new type of defensive coverage of the BMDS will, in the end, be more favourable to these two countries. It is still possible that Poland or the Czech Republic will host certain BMDS elements in the future, despite the recent news on the initial agreement between the USA and Romania on substitutive ground-based SM-3 interceptor deployment.\textsuperscript{131} And the USA still plans to deploy a Patriot missile battery in Poland, which will involve U.S. troop presence in the country, and to cooperate in the modernisation of the armed forces of both countries.\textsuperscript{132} If the U.S. military compensations will not be perceived as provocative by Russia and will not bring about increased Russian threats, the end result for Poland and the Czech Republic might be positive in comparison to the expected negative security impacts of the original BMDS deal.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{131} The Romanian approval to receive U.S. ground-based SM-3 missiles on its territory by 2015 might even indicate some competition among the East European countries on host- ing the American BMDS elements. See Romania approves US missile defence shield and Romania to host US missile interceptors. Also Bulgaria and Hungary have shown interest to host BMDS elements in the future.


In addition to the above described government level cooperation agreements, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency has so far signed six bilateral framework agreements on BMDS cooperation, including, in addition to Australia and Japan, European allies such as Denmark, the Czech Republic, Italy and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom and Denmark, on their behalf, have agreed to the modernization of the Fylingdales early warning radar by 2008 and the Thule early warning radar in Greenland by 2010. In addition, the British government has allocated the RAF base in Menwith Hill to host the European ground station for the Space-Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS) related to the BMDS. Earlier, the Brits have also shown interest to receive on their territory the same kind of ground-based interceptors as were planned for Poland. The United Kingdom, while promoting arms control and non-proliferation and maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrence, has also acknowledged the threat of WMD and ballistic missile proliferation and supported the BMDS build-up in Europe. But this has been done only on the condition that the appropriate balance between the BMDS investment, traditional nuclear deterrence, and other defensive and preventive strategies is accomplished, and that the implications of the BMDS to the strategic stability and to relations with Russia are thoroughly considered. In addition, the United Kingdom has promoted NATO cohesion and has supported the common efforts of the alliance in the fields of theatre level and tactical missile defence.134

The above described examples of cooperation have continued the tradition of close transatlantic ties between the USA and some of its closest European allies. In addition, NATO as a whole expressed its support for the BMDS project in the Bucharest Summit of 2008. As a response to the evolving WMD and ballistic missile threats posed by the “rogues”, the NATO member states recognised the importance of the planned European-based BMDS assets in protecting the alliance from long-range ballistic missile threats. Furthermore, NATO members stressed the importance of linking the planned American BMD with NATO’s own missile defence aspirations. This would be done in order to integrate the two projects and create an indivisible, comprehensive missile defence architecture covering all NATO territory in the future.135

For most of the European BMD partners, the recent reconsiderations of the Obama administration concerning the structure of the BMDS in Europe have been something of a relief. The Obama plan has represented a policy change to the direction emphasized by the Brits and NATO as a whole. This new U.S. approach opens up better prospects for a common NATO missile defence system, for better cohesion within the alliance, as well as for closer relations with Russia.136 Thus, the Obama plan seems to be able to provide additional security for the U.S. allies without contributing to a potential security dilemma with all of its negative repercussions.

USA to modify combat systems onboard Dutch navy frigates capable for ballistic missile detection and tracking.


4.4 Hesitations expressed by certain European allies

Despite the principled consensus on the risks posed by WMD and ballistic missile proliferation, the USA and some of its major Western allies, like Germany and France, have not always agreed on how they should deal with “rogues” like Iran, or great powers like Russia and China. Furthermore, the preventive and aggressive military actions taken by the USA under the label of the “Bush doctrine” have underlined their need to soft balance the U.S. power.

It has been argued that the disagreements boil down to the historical experience, culture and geopolitics of the European powers. Germany and France have been reluctant to undermine the prevailing security order and strategic stability by breaking relations with Russia and China, which seemed to be the evident outcome of the BMDS project during the Bush administration. They have also preferred sufficient consultations and dialogue with the countries affected by the BMDS. As long as the USA would continue its operative use of the system, and not least due to the negative consequences of the BMDS for their own interests in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, and, of course, the negative perceptions of Russia, if their support for the U.S. project is too strong. The hesitant Europeans have also feared the negative consequences of the BMDS for their own interests in the Persian Gulf region and its role as the “global enforcer”, most probably has to face the prospects of the Iranian missile threat practically alone. Only Israel could share this threat perception with the USA with good reason.

Even if the above mentioned European powers felt threatened by Iran, they could hardly put their trust in the BMDS due to their no say in the decision-making concerning the operational use of the system, and not least due to mere technical reasons. The hesitant Europeans have also feared the negative consequences of the BMDS for their own interests in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, and, of course, the negative perceptions of Russia, if their support for the U.S. project is too strong. The fact that the EU lacks a coherent and concrete strategy on how to address potential threats caused by ballistic missile and WMD proliferation has only added to these hesitations. After all, the BMDS originally planned for Europe would not have been able to provide equal defence to all European NATO member states.

Furthermore, the interests of the European NATO members could have been harmed by the U.S. missile defence aspirations, had the BMDS only accelerated WMD proliferation in the regions surrounding Europe and this way diminished the weight of traditional nuclear deterrence. As discussed earlier, the BMDS might also have undermined the collective strategy and cohesion of NATO, weakened global arms control regimes, and led to a renewed arms race between the great powers, which would all have been harmful to the U.S. allies. These prospects explain to a considerable extent the hesitations expressed by U.S. allies like Germany and France. Naturally, the
renewed Obama approach on the BMDS in Europe represented a welcomed policy change to these countries.145

France’s stance on the BMDS reflects its long tradition of attempting to balance the superpowers and to promote its own status as the potential leader of Europe.146 Should the BMDS lead to a renewed arms race between the USA and Russia, it would also undermine the significance of the French nuclear deterrence. Strategic autonomy, built on the ultimate security guarantee of the nuclear deterrence, is still vital for France. As a matter of fact, France has also acknowledged the evolving threat that ballistic missile proliferation poses to Europe, but when dealing with this threat, France has laid emphasis on independent deterrence, on European intelligence and early warning capabilities, as well as on a preventive strategy instead of a Ballistic Missile Defence. In addition, France has recognized the growing risk of militarization and offensive use of outer space which could be accelerated by the BMDS.147

Although the Sarkozy administration has shown to be more pro-American and pro-NATO than its predecessors, France will hardly compromise its national decision-making autonomy, abandon the above mentioned ambitions and support the American BMDS plans in Europe without at least some objection. In fact, in November 2008, President Sarkozy denied the security benefits of the BMDS and called for a time-out in the BMDS deployment to facilitate discussions proposed by Russia on a new pan-European security framework between the USA, Russia and European countries. But despite the above mentioned reservations, France, too, has been interested in the development of theatre level and tactical Ballistic Missile Defence systems. One prominent example of this is the cooperative SAMP/T project between France and Italy.148

Germany, on its behalf, has wavered between the maintenance of the trans-Atlantic link and the old traditions of Ostpolitik. Like France, Germany has acknowledged the evolving threat that WMD and ballistic missile proliferation poses to Europe and the dangers of a new nuclear arms race. But unlike in France, the hesitations in Germany have concentrated, for geopolitical reasons, particularly on the expected negative effects of this project to the relations between Russia and the West. According to German views, the USA did not consult Russia or its own NATO allies sufficiently when pursuing the Bush administration’s plan for the BMDS build-up in Europe. Germany, having promoted effective multilateralism, preventive diplomacy, disarmament, and a policy of détente vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Russia for decades, as well as fostering close economic ties with Russia, has naturally been worried about such consequences.

Therefore, Germany has called for greater mutual trust between the USA and Russia, as well as understanding of their respective security interests and threat perceptions. The German opinions are clearly reflected in this statement by the former German foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier: “lasting peace is today based less than ever on military deterrence, and more than ever on the willingness to cooperate and to overcome political divides [...] “a new Cold War between the US and Russia, even if it were a war of words, would be detrimental to the security interests of... [Germany]”. This is why Germany has sought to promote transatlantic-Russian dialogue on “common efforts towards missile defence” alongside the use of preventative diplomacy targeting countries developing WMD and ballistic missiles. At the same time, these measures should, in the German view, be linked to serious disarmament initiatives by the existing nuclear powers.149

Moreover, Germany has raised concerns about NATO’s role vis-à-vis the BMDS. Since NATO has so far been largely set aside in the development of this system, the BMDS build-up in Europe might have negative repercussion...

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sions on the collective defence principle among the alliance. If the USA continues to base BMDS cooperation on bilateral security agreements, the rest of the European allies of the USA would presumably have little influence on decisions related to the use of this system. This, in the end, could lead to a categorization of the U.S. allies within the NATO framework according to their importance for U.S. national security.\(^{150}\)

However, despite its hesitations, Germany has, like France taken part in several cooperative efforts linked with the BMDS. For example, the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) is a cooperative undertaking of the USA, Germany and Italy to develop a networked, mobile and transportable air and missile defence system. Germany has also participated with the USA in experiments involving the use of laser technology for space communications related to the BMDS. In addition, German F124 type frigates have been equipped to be able to contribute to the theatre level ballistic missile defence.\(^{151}\)

5

CONCLUSION – AVOIDING THE BMDS CAUSING A SECURITY DILEMMA FOR THE USA AND ITS ALLIES

The decision of the Bush administration to begin building the BMDS in Europe was based on the conviction that the U.S. nuclear deterrence and military pre-emption would be non-applicable, or too risky, when dealing with the potential threat of Iranian WMD and ballistic missiles. The softer policy options were also dismissed as being too uncertain and ineffective, too submissive or too time-consuming for a superpower like the USA. In the American reasoning, the BMDS build-up was supported by rationales related to political interests, deterrence, non-proliferation of WMD and ballistic missile capabilities, disarmament, as well as geopolitical, sovereignty and technological rationales. Moreover, the BMDS aspirations had a strong historical legacy among both the republicans and the democrats, dating back to the early days of the Cold War.

The responses from Russia, however, have become more and more defi-

ant, and the desired benefits of the original BMDS plans have become out-

weighed by the potentially negative implications. In other words, the BMDS project seems to have had the inevitable consequence of a security dilemma. Thus, it is questionable how worthy the original BMDS would have been in the long run in terms of its repercussions on the strategic balance between the USA and Russia. Had the Obama administration continued with the confrontational “Bush plan” and ignored the Russian security concerns, it would only have further emphasized the role of the USA as the only superpower, or even a hegemonic power. In Russian eyes, the alleged threats posed by the “rogues” would only have served as an excuse for the USA to gain strategic and military-technological advantage at the expense of other powers, particularly Russia.

The build-up of the BMDS, ultimately a global grand system, has the primary goal of making the U.S. homeland and the U.S. allies safer. The outcome, however, might have been strategic instability due to the diminished sense of security of Russia (and China) and the effects it would have had on their strategic nuclear deterrence. Thus, by giving Russia (and China) and the “rogues” impetus to resort to hard balancing by military means, the BMDS could have contributed to a renewed global arms race. At the very least, it is likely that Russia would have moved towards a more offensive force posture, and speeded up its own ballistic missile modernization and space weapons programmes in order to improve the ability to penetrate the U.S. missile defence. In addition, Russia would likely have started develop-

\(^{150}\) D. Möckli 2007, pp. 2-3 and C.M. Kelleher & S. Warren in D.M. Gormley, C.M. Kel-


ing a corresponding missile defence of its own, which could have further undermined the weight of the U.S. nuclear deterrence. As a result, the beginning of a new Cold War-type competition between the two strongest nuclear powers could have had unpredictable effects on the strategic stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Furthermore, the BMDS might also have had a direct negative effect on the security and other interests of the U.S. allies. In this sense, one possible outcome could have been Europe being threatened by Russian short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Particularly Poland and the Czech Republic would likely have become targeted by Russian, and even Iranian, ballistic missiles. At the very least, NATO members and other U.S. allies would have become categorised according to their contribution to the BMDS and its defensive coverage. This could have caused political ruptures between the allies, and undermined the cohesion of NATO and the sense of security of many member states.

In addition, the BMDS could have had other unintended negative consequences, like the weakening of global disarmament and arms control regimes, proliferation of cruise missiles, and militarization of the outer space, as well as an accelerated Chinese military build-up. The weakening of international arms control regimes combined with the ideological struggle between the Western democracies and their autocratic rivals could have led to a total collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the end, the overall (political, military, economic) costs of the build-up of the BMDS could have outweighed, in the long run, the short term security benefits gained, and therefore diminished the security of the USA and its allies. This kind of outcome can hardly have been in the interest of the USA or its allies.

The Obama administration now seems to want to avoid these negative repercussions, without, however, giving up the ambition of developing and deploying an effective BMDS in Europe and other regions of strategic importance. Since the BMDS development has already reached the point where there is no political, let alone technological, turning back, it is evident that the Obama administration cannot and does not want to call off the American BMDS aspirations. Instead, the USA has to try to make the best out of the existing BMDS technologies without losing its face, or compromising its political and security interests or those of its allies.

To avoid the evolution of a security dilemma, the USA under President Obama has chosen to pursue a policy aimed at convincing other powers of the benign intents of the USA. Instead of gaining short-term advantages by unilateral actions, the USA has now sought to engage rivals like Russia and China, even Iran, as part of the cooperative non-proliferation efforts through closer political, diplomatic and economic ties. USA still wants to create an effective, even “stronger, smarter and swifter”, worldwide BMDS, but this will be accomplished in combination with sufficient confidence-building measures. These include military cooperation, institutional checks and balances and even concessions to parties with objections in order to avoid unanticipated negative consequences and a spiral of escalation.152

The USA has come to realize that it cannot achieve security without impacting the security of other states. In other words, the Obama administration has shown that it understands the prospects of a security dilemma caused by the BMDS. Therefore, President Obama has chosen not to pursue U.S. national interests unscrupulously and seek the short term military advantages, but rather to legitimize its own measures and to reduce Russian concerns about U.S. unilateralism and greed. In order to maintain its power in the global security environment, the USA now seems to want to avoid inciting rival states to increase their counter-power by e.g. acquiring new offensive military capabilities or forming alliances with other like-minded states. Instead of using power, the USA prefers persuasion and cooperation. Furthermore, the USA has shown more self-restraint, sensitivity to the interests of others, and readiness to bargain.153 And it is apparent that a more multilateral approach in the question of the BMDS project will help the USA to avoid inflicting a security dilemma.

In principle, when taking over from the Bush administration, the Obama administration was in position to change the conflicting course of the BMDS issue by resorting to a set of optional confidence-building measures. These included e.g.:

1. (1) Withdrawing from the further development of the BMDS on strategic level, putting the BMDS in Europe on hold in consensus with the European allies, and concentrating on the theatre and tactical level systems;

2. (2) Scaling down or delaying the strategic level BMDS project particu-
larly in Europe on the plea of budgetary and technological restraints, or;
(3) Continuing the BMDS build-up in Europe as planned while engaging
Russia in dialogue and cooperative practices with regards to the BMDS,
and making necessary compromises, e.g. in the field of nuclear disarmament
or BMDS technical features, in order to pay respect to Russian
security concerns.

All these options would have been suitable for consolidating transparency
and trust between the USA and Russia, and thus, for avoiding a development
leading to a spiral of escalating conflict.

In practice, the Obama administration’s BMDS policy so far combines as-
pects of all the above mentioned options. According to the decisions an-
nounced in September 2009, the USA has taken a step back from the origi-
nal plans to develop a strategic level BMDS, cancelled the build-up of the
interceptor and radar sites in Poland and the Czech Republic and indicated
an emphasis on the development of the theatre and tactical level missile de-
fence systems as regional entities.154 This is argued to have been done due
regionally in the subject of the BMDS in Europe, the USA
has sought to put into practice the notion of “smart power” introduced dur-

In other words, in the controversial subject of the BMDS in Europe, the USA
has sought to put into practice the notion of “smart power” introduced dur-
ing the forming of the Obama administration. In the case of Iran, President
Obama has given priority to the softer policy options at USA’s disposal,
rather than resorted purely to hard military power. By this way it seems to
be possible for the USA to persuade Russia and the hesitant European allies
to join the overall U.S. cause of countering the threats of WMD and ballistic
missiles of the “rogues”.156 And most importantly, the USA is now in position
to make good use of the current prospects of a warm-up of U.S.-Russian
relations, e.g. in the field of nuclear disarmament, without compromising the
original national rationales in favour of the BMDS build-up.

After all, it is worth noting that the Obama administration has not backed out
of the basic objective of creating a worldwide BMDS. Generally, the U.S.
democrats have been more moderate in their views on the BMDS than the
previous conservative administration, mainly in order to avoid any strategic
imbalance or a severe political rift between the USA and Russia. After tak-
ing office, President Obama indicated that Russian support for the resolution
of Iran’s nuclear issue could make the BMDS deployment in Europe unnec-
essary. In this sense, the Obama administration has even sought to use the
BMDS in Europe as a “bargaining chip” to gain Russian support vis-à-vis
Iran. But in practice, the Obama administration has aligned itself with the
deployment of the BMDS “as long as the threat from Iran persists”. This
will be accomplished in a different way than was planned by the Bush ad-
mistration, namely under the label of “regional architecture”. But in com-
parison with the “Bush plan”, the BMD capability build-up will likely take
place faster and in no way scaled down, provided the technologies chosen
will be proven reliable and the costs acceptable.157 In this sense, the U.S.
democrats have only given preference to different BMD technologies over
the inadequately tested and non-operational ground-based interceptors.158

154 See Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, pp. 11-12 and 19-28. It remains to be seen
what the impact of the substitutive deployment of ground-based SM-3 interceptors to Ro-
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Therefore, despite the practical turn of the Obama administration’s BMDS policy, the long term negative prospects of a security dilemma still loom. The building of an operationally capable and effective BMDS, and extending it as a worldwide grand system in one form or another, could in the long run undermine the mutual nuclear vulnerability between Russia and the USA in favour of the latter. Therefore, the Russians might, after all, experience a disappointment after the initial delight following the introduction of the Obama BMDS plan for Europe.

The BMDS project still has the potential, because of misunderstandings or deliberate counter-measures, to lead to a conflict between the superpowers. In the worst case, the BMDS issue could end up being part of a wider negative development of the superpower relations leading to a “hot conflict”. In this sense, the Obama administration has at least managed to buy more time in order to be better prepared to deal with the potentially evolving renewed dispute on the BMDS. If the build-up of the BMDS in Europe turns out to be a severe strategic miscalculation, its impacts could be unpredictable and the project could result in a spiral of escalation in accordance to the concept of the security dilemma. This is the case simply because strategic misjudgements made by superpowers like the USA, or Russia, always affect the prevailing international order on a larger scale than those made by lesser powers.

Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972)</td>
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<td>ALTBMD</td>
<td>Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
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<td>BM</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
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<td>BMDR</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense Review</td>
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<td>BMDS</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence-building measure(s)</td>
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<td>CFE</td>
<td>Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1990), adapted 1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2BMC</td>
<td>Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GBI</td>
<td>Ground-based Interceptor</td>
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<td>GMD</td>
<td>Ground-based Midcourse Defence</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IAF</td>
<td>Israeli Air Force</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Inter-continental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (1986)</td>
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<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutual Assured Destruction</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
<td>Missile Defense Agency</td>
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### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>MEADS</td>
<td>Medium Extended Air Defence System</td>
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<td>MKV</td>
<td>Multiple Kill Vehicle</td>
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<td>MRBM</td>
<td>Medium-range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NMD</td>
<td>National Missile Defence</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970)</td>
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<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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<td>RV</td>
<td>Re-entry Vehicle</td>
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<td>SAMP/T</td>
<td>Sol-Air Moyenne Portée Terrestre</td>
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<td>SBIRS</td>
<td>Space-Based Infra-Red System</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Initiative (“Star Wars”)</td>
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<td>SM-3</td>
<td>Standard Missile-3</td>
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<td>SORT</td>
<td>Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (2002)</td>
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<td>SRBM</td>
<td>Short-range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>START I</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (1991)</td>
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<td>THAAD</td>
<td>Terminal High Altitude Area Defence</td>
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<td>TMD</td>
<td>Theatre Missile Defence</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction</td>
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Increasing Security, but Avoiding a Security Dilemma

Bibliography


Theoretical framework of the research
Technical features of the planned BMDS in Europe

1. Background

The layered integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) has been developed by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) under the Department of Defense (DoD) since 2002. The DoD’s programme for Ballistic Missile Defense has originally been based on the following guiding principles:

- “Missile defense is most effective if it is layered; that is, able to intercept ballistic missiles of any range in all phases of their flight.
- The United States seeks effective defenses against attacks by small numbers of longer range missiles as well as defenses against attacks by larger numbers of short- and medium-range missiles.
- Missile defense systems, like all military systems, can be less than 100-percent effective and still make a significant contribution to security by enhancing deterrence and saving lives if deterrence fails.”¹

In practice, the BMDS has so far been designed to be capable to intercept a limited number of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) launched against the U.S. homeland, as well as larger numbers of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBM, MRBM) launched against U.S. allies or U.S. forces deployed abroad. The funding of the MDA has risen substantially since 2002 from prior annual level of 4-5 billion USD to the annual level of some 9 billion in 2008. Until 2009, the MDA planned to use 4.5 billion USD in the years 2008-2013 only for expanding the BMDS to provide defence against Iranian long-range ballistic missiles.²

The DoD’s proposal to the Congress for the defence budget for 2010 included expanded funding for proven, mainly theatre level and tactical missile defence systems (Aegis, THAAD, Patriot PAC-3 and Patriot/MEADS; see below), while cutting the funds for less mature technologies (airborne laser, multiple kill vehicle, kinetic energy interceptor; see below). This, alongside recent decisions of the Obama administration, has meant cancelling the

original Bush administration plans for the deployment of ground-based interceptors in Poland and a midcourse tracking radar in the Czech Republic by 2013. Despite these changes, the expenditure for the BMDS for 2010 requested by the DoD remained on the level of 9.1 billion USD.

2. Functional principles

The layered integrated BMDS is supposed to be capable of destroying a ballistic missile during any of the three phases, the boost, midcourse or terminal phase, of its trajectory. The BMDS at strategic level, meant primarily for the defence of the U.S. homeland, is supplemented by deployable and mobile theatre level and tactical missile defence systems, as well as deployable and mobile land- or sea-based sensors, thus forming a defensive grand system. All the subsystems, sensors and interceptors are integrated by a centralized command, control, battle management and communications (C2BMC) network. Additional satellite sensors provide continuous ballistic missile tracking and coverage in the dead spaces of other BMDS sensors. According to the original plans, the multiple kill vehicle (MKV) payloads were supposed to allow a single interceptor to repel multiple warhead targets in the future. This, according to the MDA, would have dramatically altered “the battle space in favour of the United States, its allies, and friends”. Right from the beginning, the MDA’s “capability-based acquisition approach” has sought to develop missile defence systems, which not only respond to the threats defined in advance, but also to future changes in the threat environment.

3. Original features of the BMDS in Europe – the Bush plan

According to the Bush administration’s original BMDS plans, the missile interception (1) during the boost phase would have been carried out by airborne high-energy lasers, or in the future by kinetic energy interceptors. (2) During the midcourse phase, the applied systems were supposed to be the ground-based interceptors (GBI) and the sea-based Aegis missile defence systems. So far, altogether 30 GBI’s in fixed silos have been put up in California and in Alaska for defence for possible ballistic missile attacks by North Korea. According to the Bush plan, some 54 additional GBI’s were planned to be stationed by 2013. Ten of these GBI’s, linked with the midcourse tracking radar in the Czech Republic, were planned to be set up in Poland for defence against the Iranian ballistic missile threat. (3) During the terminal flight phase the deployable theatre and tactical missile defence systems, like THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), Patriot (PAC-3), Arrow or MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System), were supposed to be used to intercept the warheads re-entering the atmosphere. As of 2006, the initial BMDS has provided a limited capability to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with Patriot (PAC-3) missiles and sea-based...
Standard Missile-3’s (SM-3). This initial BMDS capability has also enabled repelling intermediate-range and inter-continental ballistic missiles in their midcourse flight phase with GBI’s stationed in the USA.\textsuperscript{6}

In comparison to the three stage GBI’s deployed in California and Alaska, the interceptors planned for Poland would have had only two stages because of the proximity of the launch site to Iran, and due to this, shorter engagement ranges. For the time being, this technology had still been inadequately tested. According to a 2007 report by the DoD, the operability of the two stage GBI’s planned for Poland could not have been guaranteed at that time. A further programme of at least three more flight tests would have been necessary for ensuring their operational effectiveness. Because of the fact that only seven of the thirteen previous tests on the three stage GBI’s had been successful, it would have been highly likely that the BMDS deployment in Poland would have been delayed from the planned 2013. This would have been the case even if the U.S. political support and required budgetary resources had been secured, and host country parliamentary authorization for deployment achieved in good time.\textsuperscript{7}

4. Current features of the BMDS in Europe – the Obama plan

In September 2009, the Obama administration introduced its renewed “phased and adaptive” plan for the BMDS in Europe. This plan was based on an updated intelligence assessment of the Iranian ballistic missile threat, and an intention to deploy technologies which were not only operationally proven and cost-effective, but also adaptable to the changes in the security environment. In practice, this meant giving up the plans to deploy GBI’s in Poland and the midcourse tracking radar in the Czech Republic, as well as the development programs for airborne laser, multiple kill vehicle and kinetic energy interceptor. The GBI’s deployed and operational in California and Alaska, for the strategic level defence against potential inter-continental ballistic missile threat posed by North Korea, would be kept in service as planned.

Based on this renewed plan, the Obama administration published just recently a Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) setting the policy priorities for the future BMDS development as follows:

- “The United States will continue to defend the homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.
- The United States will defend against regional missile threats to U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves.
- Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions.
- The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term.
- U.S. BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change.
- The United States will seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense.”\textsuperscript{8}


\textsuperscript{7} K. Reif 2008.

\textsuperscript{8} Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, pp. iii-iv, 11-12 and 40-41.
First and foremost, the Obama plan is supposed to provide immediate defensive capability with higher degree of flexibility provided both by sea-based as well as re-locatable or deployable land-based assets. According to the White House, this renewed BMDS plan provides defence that is cost-effectively adjustable and adaptable to any changes in the ballistic missile threat. These BMD assets are still planned to be deployed in Europe in consultation with NATO as a whole, with individual allies in Europe such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania, and with Russia.9

The phased and adaptive BMDS build-up approach of the Obama plan consists of:

- **Phase I (-2011):** Deployment of proven BMD systems available currently, including the sea-based Aegis BMD system, the SM-3 interceptors (Block IA), and sensors such as the forward-based Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance system (AN/TPY-2) to provide immediate defensive coverage for regions most vulnerable to current short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats.

- **Phase II (-2015):** Deployment of more capable and tested sea- and land-based versions of the SM-3 interceptor (Block IB) alongside with more advanced sensors to expand the defended area geographically against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

- **Phase III (-2018):** Deployment of the more advanced SM-3 Block IIA interceptors for the defence against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles covering all of Europe.

- **Phase IV (-2020):** Deployment of the SM-3 Block IIB interceptors for more effective defence against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles as well as potential future inter-continental missile threats to U.S. homeland. This deployment will augment the existing strategic level BMDS facilities in California and Alaska, and help to sustain the defence of U.S. homeland.10

The U.S. Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the USA could deploy land-based SM-3 interceptors at two locations in Europe supported by two transportable forward-based tracking radars at approximately same costs as the BMDS in Europe in accordance with the Bush plan would have cost. Instead, the deployment of SM-3 interceptors on Aegis vessels and their permanent stationing at three locations in European waters would cost almost twice as much as the Bush plan. This would be the case largely because of the need to increase the number of Aegis fleet.11

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Iranian ballistic missile threat

Areas within range of near-term missile threats from Iran

Note: Dark shading indicates selected regions within range of a given missile launched from north-western Iran. Missile symbols indicate the location of the modeled missile launch site in Iran.

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

**Areas within range of potential future missile threats from Iran**

Note: Dark shading indicates regions within range of a given missile launched from any of the three modeled launch sites in Iran. Missile symbols ▲ indicate the locations of the modeled missile launch sites in Iran.

Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Performance parameters assumed for near-term and potential future missile threats from Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Stages</th>
<th>Fuel Type</th>
<th>Maximum Burn Time (Seconds)</th>
<th>Nominal Maximum Burn-Out Velocity (Kilometers per second)</th>
<th>Nominal Maximum Range (Kilometers)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Missiles Posing a Near-Term Threat</td>
<td>Shahab-3</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1,300</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shahab-3A</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
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<td>Ashura</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2,100</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
<td>5,200</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Liquid-Fuel ICBM</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
<td>17,800</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Solid</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>12,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: IRBM = intermediate-range ballistic missile; ICBM = inter-continental ballistic missile.

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems (Coulson, Surrey, United Kingdom: Jane’s Information Group, 2008) and Steven J. Isakowitz and others, Space Launch Systems, 4th ed. (Reston, Va.: American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2004).

Altitude versus ground range for various types of missile threats

Note: The upper panel shows the full trajectories and total flight times for the various types of missiles; the lower panel shows detail of the missiles’ trajectories near the launch site as well as their burnout times and position at burnout (diamond-shaped symbols).

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Defensive coverage of the Bush BMDS plan for Europe

Note: Darker shading indicates the defended area. NATO capitals indicated with asterisk.

Defence against IRBM`s from Iran

Defence against liquid-fuel ICBM`s from Iran

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Defence against solid-fuel ICBM’s from Iran

Defence against solid-fuel ICBM’s from Russia

Using CBO’s modeled version of the two-stage GBI

Using a two-stage GBI with a higher burnout velocity
Defensive coverage of the Obama BMDS plan for Europe

Note: Darker shading indicates the defended area. NATO capitals indicated with asterisk.

Defence against IRBM’s from Iran

Sea-based SM-3 Block IIA

Land-based SM-3 Block IIA

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Defence against liquid-fuel ICBM’s from Iran

Sea-based SM-3 Block IIA

Land-based SM-3 Block IIA
Defence against solid-fuel ICBM’s from Iran

Sea-based SM-3 Block IIA

Land-based SM-3 Block IIA
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