


Maria Ackrén

Conditions for Different Autonomy Regimes in the World

A Fuzzy-Set Application





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Cover: Jonas Wilén, Artist from the Åland Islands

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IN THE WORLD

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Preface and Acknowledgments:

A long journey has come to its end. Eventually, the project launched in the autumn of 2004 has found its harbor. To write a dissertation demands patience, planning and discipline. Without these qualities no academic work of this dimension would see the light. This is, of course, a familiar story for anyone undertaken this kind of project. Sometimes things are going in a rapid pace quite smoothly, sometimes you find yourself lost and faced with problems. During the journey you face a lot of challenges and there are many decisions you have to make to realize that you have to use your imagination and creativity under way. At the final stage you have to decide when to really put a stop to the project, before it goes out of hand.

It is impossible to list all the persons who have contributed to my thinking and my ideas that I present in this dissertation. However, the most influential and inspiring ones deserve acknowledgments. First, I would like to thank Professor Emeritus Dag Anckar for his encouragement and support in the beginning of my career. I am also deeply thankful for my supervisor Professor Carsten Anckar for his insightful comments and constructive criticism throughout the process. I would also like to thank Professor Lauri Karvonen for his engagement in the early stages of my dissertation.

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The colleagues from Mid-Sweden University in Östersund also deserve some gratitude for all the help and discussions during my stays as Visiting Lecturer at their university. Special thanks go to Professor Marie-Louise von Bergmann-Winberg, who gave me the opportunity to practice teaching in a Swedish environment. The time of exchange in research and teaching environment has been a rewarding one.

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A variety of institutions and organizations has supported this work financially and without their help it would have been impossible to write this dissertation. My deepest thanks go to the Research Center at the Åbo Akademi University Foundation, the Foundation of the Åland Islands 75-years Jubilee, the Ella and George Ehrnrooth Foundation, the National Graduate School of Political Studies (Politu), ECPR Mobility Fund, the Department of Political Science at Åbo Akademi University, the Waldemar von Frenckell Foundation, AICIS and other sources which have given me

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Finally, I would like to thank all my friends for a great private life. It has been important to have a counterbalance to research and all my friends have contributed to that for which I am very grateful. I am also very grateful to my parents who have always encouraged and supported me in every aspect of my life. I would also like to thank my brother and his family for their support and social activities.

Åbo, Gripen June 9, 2009

Maria Ackrén

1 Introduction

Autonomy is a disputed matter in social science literature, as there is no universal definition of the concept. In social sciences, it is customary to talk about personal, cultural, functional, administrative and territorial or legislative forms of autonomy.

In a recent article, Michael Tkacik (2008) distinguishes between these different forms by modeling scope and depth of autonomy as it moves according to a spectrum from one form of autonomy to another.¹

On the lowest level in Tkacik's figure,² we encounter personal autonomy with very few numbers of issues controlled by locals and a low level of depth of control. Personal autonomy often refers to the guarantee of certain individual rights, such as civil liberties and civil rights. Sometimes personal autonomy also refers to minority rights. On the second level, we encounter cultural autonomy, which refers to specific rights based on membership of a particular group. Cultural autonomy is often related to minority issues and indigenous rights. The Sami people in Finland, for example, would illustrate this kind of autonomy. The third level of autonomy is functional autonomy, which spans over one area of subject matter or over a few areas that are not otherwise connected such as education, the church or language. The Swedish-speaking minority in Finland could be classified into this kind of category. As we move up towards administrative autonomy, the phenomenon becomes more blurred. Administrative autonomy could mean a territorial base with a greater control over local issues, by means of which a region acquires regulatory powers or more limited legislative powers. Corsica is a good example of this kind of model. In organization theory, administrative autonomy refers to institutions or various organizations and their scope of competencies and functions. At the highest level, we find legislative autonomy, which most often also refers to territorial autonomy. The legislative autonomies are those with major powers and more in-depth control over their internal affairs. Regions belonging to this category are, for instance, the Åland Islands, the

¹ Michael Tkacik (2008). 'Characteristics of Forms of Autonomy', *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, Vol. 15, No. 2-3, 2008, pp. 369-401.

² Michael Tkacik (2008), op.cit., see figure 1, p. 372.

Faroe Islands, and the Isle of Man. There are grey zones between all these categories, but it helps somewhat to organize and define what we mean by autonomy in different contexts. In this study, the main focus is on territorial autonomies.

The theoretical framework in this investigation rests specifically on one major concept and that is autonomy. The research interest lies in territorial forms of autonomy, so the focus will be on territorial arrangements when discussing the concept of autonomy. Furthermore, the interest is mainly placed on interstate relationships, relationships between the state/central level and the highest regional level of government within states. The overall research problem will be to explain why special territorial autonomous arrangements occur and to what degree they have autonomy. It is, to my knowledge, the first time an investigation tries to combine territorial autonomy as to both kind and degree at the same time.

There are authors arguing that autonomy and federalism are different arrangements.³ This is also my point of departure. Some other authors do claim that territorial autonomy includes confederalism, federalism, regional autonomy and cantonization.⁴ In this investigation I will follow the perspective that autonomy and federalism should be seen as different phenomena.

As the focus is on territorially unique arrangements in the world, federal constituent states have been excluded from the investigation and other regional arrangements are used only as control mechanisms. This means that separate analyses have been made, the first with the special autonomy arrangements and then in combination with the other regional arrangements. The concept of autonomy could be seen as an overarching concept, while territorial autonomy is seen more as a subordinate concept to autonomy as a whole.

³ See, for instance, Ruth Lapidoth (2001). 'Elements of Stable Regional Autonomy Arrangements', *C.A.P. Working Paper*, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München <<http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2001/ra/Lapidoth1.pdf>>

⁴ Donald Rothchild and Caroline A. Hartzell (2000). 'Security in Deeply Divided Societies: The Role of Territorial Autonomy', p. 260 in W. Safran and R. Máiz (eds.): *Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Within the broad understanding of autonomy, even the concept of territorial autonomy might be challenged by those in the discourse who think that territorial autonomy implies the granting of exclusive legislative powers to a decision-making body of a territorially circumscribed entity. In opposition to this way of thinking, others have the opinion that an entity, which is territorially defined and furnished with some decision-making powers, could also be described as a territorial autonomy.⁵ The former understanding is related to hard core opinions within autonomy, while the latter points in a direction that raises the possibility of the existence of other forms of autonomy. Researchers often make a distinction between territorial autonomy and non-territorial forms of autonomy. Another distinction which is very commonly made concerns the different perspectives on territorial autonomy and federalism. Some notes about why federalism is excluded in the investigation are considered in this particular study.

Some authors argue, as will be shown, that territorial autonomy and federalism are concepts that are virtually linked, while others argue that they should be seen as totally different from each other. Authors with the view that these concepts are interconnected with each other, have the perspective that federalism includes territorial autonomy as a form of federacy or quasi-federal arrangement.⁶ Different approaches give different answers. Whatever approach is used, the lack of larger empirical comparative studies is still an issue in the field. This investigation will try to explore some of the gaps in the field which are related to autonomy. My point of departure will be a qualitative comparative approach. The phenomenon is analyzed through the perspectives of both degree and kind at the same time.

⁵ André Légaré and Markku Suksi (2008). 'Rethinking the Forms of Autonomy at the Dawn of the 21st Century', *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, Vol. 15, No. 2-3, 2008, pp. 143-144.

⁶ Ronald L. Watts and Daniel J. Elazar refer to federacies and associated states as labels for these territories. See, e.g. Ronald L. Watts (2005). 'Comparing Forms of Federal Partnerships', pp. 235-237 in Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Norman (eds.): *Theories of Federalism – A Reader*. New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, and Daniel J. Elazar (1987): *Exploring Federalism*. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, pp. 55-57.

Federalism as a theory has been excluded in the analysis for a number of reasons. First of all, federalism is a similarly vague concept as autonomy.⁷ There is no coherent theory on federalism. Federalism has many similarities with autonomy and is often associated with it, but in this investigation only territorial autonomies have been included. Second, to take federal constituent states into account would broaden the dissertation beyond a reasonable scope. As Elazar notes, the federal states in the world are divided into over 350 constituent or federated states.⁸ Third, the various models of federalism are also complicated. Some federal systems are more symmetrical than others. In the perfectly symmetrical federal system, each unit is equal according to territorial and demographic size and has similar social, economic and political characteristics. This system is related to the idea that each unit would exercise similar power nationally. In an asymmetrical federation, units would be unique, differing from other units and the federal system at large.⁹ The majority of the federal states in the world lie in between these two extremes. As Michael Burgess (2006) argues, asymmetrical forms can be seen in every federal system at various degrees. The asymmetry then lies in the social cleavages between the different constituent states, the contrasts between center-periphery and urban-rural relations, the socio-economic conditions where regional disparities are large and in the demographic structure within the federal states.¹⁰ At the regional level asymmetrical forms come into play.

Therefore the question could be asked as to what is the purpose of the investigation. The investigation can be seen as a contribution to the debate concerning how states organize their territory in various ways. States that have approved territorial autonomy

⁷ See e.g. Michael Burgess (2006). *Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice*. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 25-49 for a more thorough discussion on how to define federalism; Burgess gives an outline of the definitions of federalism throughout history.

⁸ Daniel J. Elazar (1996). 'From Statism to Federalism – A Paradigm Shift', *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 17, No. 4, p. 426.

⁹ Ronan Paddison (1983). *The Fragmented State*. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd., p. 116. See also Charles D. Tarlton (1965). 'Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation', *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Nov. 1965), pp. 861-874.

¹⁰ Michael Burgess (2006). op.cit., pp. 209-225. See also Alfred Stepan (2001). 'Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, (Multi)Nationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism', pp. 320-323 in Alfred Stepan (ed.): *Arguing Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stepan divides symmetrical and asymmetrical forms into three ideal types, which he calls "coming together", "holding together", and "putting together" variants.

within their state borders might have used a very flexible mechanism. Governments have been pressured to decentralize by political, ethnic, religious and cultural groups seeking greater autonomy in decision-making procedures and these groups have even called for stronger control over natural resources.¹¹ The development of some decentralization in the world is, in fact, clearly indicated when examining certain statistics. By the early 1990s, almost all countries with a population of more than five million had undertaken some form of decentralization. At the end of the 1990s, about 95 percent of the countries with democratic systems had sub-national units of administration or government.¹² In this investigation, several of the various forms of decentralization will be highlighted while studying the phenomenon of territorial autonomy and non-autonomous regions. The definition of the concept of territorial autonomy is further elaborated on in section 2.3.

1.1 Purpose of the Study and Research Problem

The purpose of the study is to outline and explore the special autonomous arrangements in the world, i.e. territorial autonomies, and at the same time provide the reader with an exploration into qualitative comparative strategies throughout the investigation. The major purpose is to describe and analyze which factors constitute special autonomous arrangements and which factors explain the various degrees of autonomy within this particular group. The secondary purpose is to use a rather new method called fuzzy-set to be able to outline necessary and/or sufficient conditions for territorial autonomy. The combinatorial effects of the possible explanatory factors are in focus in this study and it is assumed that different paths lead to the outcome in question. The ambition here is not to try to establish a complete list of territorial autonomies in the world, but rather to investigate as many cases as possible. A sufficient number of cases should provide an adequate amount of information with which to be able to generalize an outcome.

¹¹ G. Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondelli (2007). 'From Government Decentralization to Decentralized Governance', p. 4 in G. Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondelli (eds.): *Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

¹² G. Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondelli (2007), op.cit., p. 8.

1.2 Research Design


The starting point in this investigation is to select on the dependent variable in order to map the cases of interest, i.e. the special autonomous arrangements in the world. The technique for selecting on the dependent variable is described in more depth in chapter 3. I have selected this point of departure since there are no studies (to my knowledge), which have mapped all possible special autonomous arrangements in the world. Some lists are to be found on the internet¹³, but as noted previously my ambition is not to include the total population. A large sample group is sufficient for this study. There are some studies conducted in this area, but a number of authors have limited themselves to island regions or taken a sample group into account.¹⁴ The latter procedure is also my intention. The design follows the feature presented in the following section.

In the first part of the study, the special autonomous arrangements in the world will be derived from constitutions and other relevant sources. The special autonomous regions could be seen as asymmetrical regions, which do not fit into the general pattern within the state, as regards the distribution of power, decentralization or federal systems. They might be considered as deviant cases in this context. The next step in the investigation is to map all potential explanatory factors (independent variables) that can be found in the literature in relation to autonomous arrangements as such. These factors will then be tested as to whether they are necessary for the outcome. In the first section the degree of autonomy is of interest between the cases.

¹³ See e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_autonomous_areas_by_country. However, the list includes federal constituent states as well.

¹⁴ See e.g. Pär M. Olausson (2007). *Autonomy and Islands: A Global Study of the Factors that Determine Island Autonomy*. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press and Hurst Hannum (1996). *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination. The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights*. Revised Edition. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Figure 1: The First Step in the Research Design




To overcome the problems of bias, when selecting on the dependent variable, a control group with non-autonomous regions has been considered. The group of non-autonomous regions are a group of arrangements other than the special ones. These regions might have limited powers and scope of competencies or lack the degree of autonomy which is called for. These regions can be seen as dissimilar (or negative) cases. These regions are used to be able to outline the sufficient conditions in the study.

The problem with the whole design, besides the fact that I start by selecting on the dependent variable, is that autonomy could be considered to lie in the middle of a continuum ranging from non-autonomy to sovereignty. As has been described by Sorens (2004), the continuum between centralism and independence could be seen as a six-graded scale, where 0 indicates full centralism within the state and 6 indicates full independence, and at the midpoint we would have federalism.¹⁵ According to this view, my entities would be somewhere between 2 and 4 on this kind of scale. The best solution would be to have cases from the whole continuum, but the limitation of a dissertation makes this impossible. Autonomy, as a concept, is also very vague in this field of research, so this means that I had to try to isolate the cases of territorial autonomy at first glance and hopefully in this respect be able to outline the contrasting cases of non-autonomy in the next step in the investigation. The solution, in my opinion, was to take a control group into account, which adjusts the design to follow a more appropriate direction:

¹⁵ Jason Sorens (2004). 'Globalization, secessionism, and autonomy', *Electoral Studies* 23, Figure 1, p. 730.

Figure 2: Second Step in the Research Design



The design is not perfect, but more sophisticated than the first section. One can argue, that the range of variation has been truncated, since I do not include sovereign countries. The interest of previous research has been to explain why special autonomous arrangements occur within countries, therefore I considered that the problem would be of another nature, when moving from a sub-national level to a macro-level. Having entities on two different levels of analysis is not an option in this context, since the main interest rests on the sub-national level and interstate relations between the central level and the regional level within states. Territorial autonomy can be seen as a specific mechanism which governments use for different purposes. The unique arrangements of autonomy are of particular interest in this inquiry.

The choice of external factors will be made openly and transparently, and here I follow an idea based on Gisèle De Meur and Dirk Berg-Schlosser,¹⁶ which involves listing all possible independent variables at first-hand and then reducing them second-hand. The outcome being that only all the relevant variables are considered. Other ways to reduce variables are with statistical analyses. One method would be to use

¹⁶ See e.g. Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Gisèle De Meur (1994). 'Conditions of Democracy in Interwar Europe. A Boolean Test of Major Hypotheses', *Comparative Politics*, Volume 26, Number 3 (April 1994), pp. 253-279, Gisèle De Meur and Dirk Berg-Schlosser (1994). 'Comparing political systems: Establishing similarities and dissimilarities', *European Journal of Political Research* 26, pp. 193-219 and Gisèle De Meur and Dirk Berg-Schlosser (1996). 'Conditions of Authoritarianism, Fascism, and Democracy in Interwar Europe. Systematic Matching and Contrasting of Cases for "Small N" Analysis', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (August 1996), pp. 423-468.

factor analysis or discriminant analysis.¹⁷ In factor analysis, it is possible to combine possible independent variables which are conceptually related. A selection of candidate independent variables is made to identify underlying dimensions that link these variables.¹⁸ In discriminant analysis, variables are grouped according to the same outcome. It is possible to find deviant cases with this particular technique.¹⁹ In this investigation, calibration with fuzzy-set scores was used as the ultimate method of transforming variables to set membership according to qualitative anchors or qualitative groupings.²⁰

De Meur and Berg-Schlusser have used pairwise comparisons according to a most similar systems design with different outcomes and a most different systems design with the same outcome. In my design one possible approach might have been to use a most different systems design with the same outcome, since I only consider territorial autonomies at first-hand. The authors mentioned have only used dichotomized variables according to the Boolean approach. In my investigation, a fuzzy scale is used to maintain the variations as much as possible. Boolean procedures are only used where it might be appropriate.

The methodological procedures are further elaborated in the methodology section of this dissertation (see chapter 5).

The study is divided into seven major parts. Subsequent to the introductory chapter, the second chapter describes and explores the concept of autonomy from different perspectives and provides the principal definition of territorial autonomy used in the investigation. The third chapter discusses how the mapping of the cases was undertaken and how the cases were operationalized according to the degree of

¹⁷ Dirk Berg-Schlusser and Gisèle De Meur (2002). 'Reduction of Complexity', pp. 270-272 in Dirk Berg-Schlusser & Jeremy Mitchell (eds.): *Authoritarianism and Democracy in Europe 1919-39: Comparative Analyses*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

¹⁸ B. Guy Peters (1998). *Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., pp. 70-71.

¹⁹ Dirk Berg-Schlusser and Gisèle De Meur (2002), op.cit., p. 271.

²⁰ For a more in-depth description of how to calibrate fuzzy-sets see Charles C. Ragin (2008). 'Fuzzy Sets: Calibration versus Measurement', pp. 174-198 in David Collier, Henry Brady, and Janet Box-Steffensmeier (eds.): *Methodology Volume of Oxford Handbooks of Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

autonomy. The fourth chapter explores the possible explanatory factors that are assumed to lead to the occurrence of territorial autonomy and the various degrees of territorial autonomy. In the fifth chapter, the first analysis is taken into account with a description of the methodological technique used in the study. The sixth chapter describes the selection of the control group consisting of non-autonomous regions and their characteristics. The seventh chapter takes into account the second analysis, and the last chapter concludes with a summary of the whole study.

2 The Dependent Variable

2.1 The Concept of Autonomy

The concept of autonomy is derived from Greek; ‘*auto*’ meaning ‘oneself’ and ‘*nomos*’ meaning ‘laws’ or ‘rules’.²¹ Autonomy is therefore to rule over oneself according to one’s own laws or rules. The concept of autonomy is used in a wide range of disciplines and can have different meanings depending on the circumstances.

The terms ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-government’ are often used synonymously. Self-government could be said to constitute a special condition between, on the one hand, a geographically distinct territory and its political institutions, and on the other hand, the territory in question’s external relations. Municipal or local government specifies the extent to which the doctrine regarding local self-determination is consistent with the nation-state’s representative democracy.²² According to the European Charter of Local Self-Government (1985/1991), local self-government is the establishment of locally elected assemblies with meaningful powers, lucid territorial boundaries, and financial autonomy in the form of local taxes and duties.²³ Local self-government is based on the state’s willingness to devolve power to a lower level, which means that the central level, at any point in time, could withdraw the power of the municipalities. The Council of Europe, on the other hand, supports the right to self-determination/self-government as a means to protect national minorities and, in this way, tries to reduce the ethnic tensions that otherwise could emerge and be dispersed.²⁴

²¹ Yoram Dinstein (1981). ‘Autonomy’, p. 291 in Yoram Dinstein (ed.): *Models of Autonomy*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

²² Jon Pierre (1994). *Den lokala staten – Den kommunala självstyrelsens förutsättningar och restriktioner*. Göteborg: Almqvist & Wiksell, p. 10.

²³ Markku Suksi (1995). *Frames of Autonomy and the Åland Islands*. Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-statvetenskapliga fakulteten vid Åbo Akademi, Rättsvetenskapliga institutionen, Ser. A:433. Åbo: Åbo Akademi, p. 13.

²⁴ Gunnar Jansson (2000). ‘Introductory Speech: Autonomy as a Conflict-Solving Mechanism within the Council of Europe’ in *Seminar on Autonomy as a Conflict-Solving Mechanism*. Stockholm: Regeringskansliet, UD, p. 10.

The concept of autonomy in a wider perspective is considered to be the granting of internal self-government to a region or a group of people that is acknowledged as a partial sovereignty in relation to the national government. This autonomy could include, in such a case, both actual and formal sovereignty in the political decision-making process.²⁵ This means that it is possible for the autonomy to act in its own name without any external influences. In national public law, autonomy can refer to autonomy for universities, cities, municipalities, and churches. This kind of autonomy is always in relation to the state, and describes the state's limitations and autonomy determination, and the regulation of specific affairs in certain institutions.²⁶ Because of political and economic factors, autonomy could be granted to a specific territory. This territory would then be a part of a greater political and judicial entity, but the autonomy granted would confer the political freedom to regulate certain specific internal affairs without influence from the central government. The granting of autonomy allows the population of a territory to directly control important affairs of special interest, while the central government retains power over the territory as such, and exercises authority over areas of common interest for both entities.²⁷ Autonomies are simply self-governing territories due to their characteristics, which have acquired a certain position in their relationship with a federal or unitary state.²⁸

Autonomy could also be seen as a new State paradigm, where the principle of autonomy replaces the modern principle of sovereignty in the distribution and organization of power. Autonomy is here seen as a principle of integration and organization of a political community.²⁹

²⁵ Svante E. Cornell (2002). 'Autonomy as a Source of Conflict – Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective', *World Politics*, Vol. 54, No. 2, January 2002, p. 249.

²⁶ Rudolf Bernhardt (1981). 'Federalism and Autonomy', p.26 in Y. Dinstein (ed.): *Models of Autonomy*, op.cit.

²⁷ Louis B. Sohn (1981). 'Models of Autonomy within the United Nations Framework', p. 5 in Y. Dinstein (ed.), op.cit.

²⁸ Markku Suksi (1996). 'Aspekter på autonomi' in *Minorities and Conflicts – Minoriteter och konflikter*. Meddelanden från Ålands högskola, nr. 9. Mariehamn: Ålands högskola, pp. 93-95.

²⁹ Carlos Eduardo Pacheco Amaral (1997). 'Autonomy and the State of the Autonomies: Autonomy and Subsidiarity as Techniques for Conflict Management and State Building'. Paper presented at the XVII World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Korea, August 1997.

Autonomy from a narrower perspective is considered to be the protection of minorities and their self-determination. This is the approach by which the concept is used in modern international law.³⁰ If we use this narrow definition, we enter a jungle of conventions, charters and other international agreements that deal with human rights issues, minority rights issues and indigenous people's rights and so forth. The common characteristic in all forms of autonomy is that they are granted through international agreements or through interstate agreements or other public legislation within a state.³¹

Within the European Union there are minimum criteria for regionalization and regions are required to have the highest possible institutional status within the national legal system. They are also required to have their own institutions, which are democratically elected, and be able to organize their power through these institutions. It is also mandatory that their economic development and cultural and linguistic traditions are promoted and managed. The regions should also enjoy economic freedom and have sufficient resources. Between state and region there should be mechanisms for the distribution of power, which gives the opportunity for the regions to compensate for any unequal distributions of tax revenues, and above all, compensate imbalances between the regions. Furthermore, the regions should have the opportunity to participate actively in trans-border cooperation, especially at the interregional level, and the regions should also be given the opportunity to supervise their own interests through the member states and through the Union's different bodies.³²

Autonomy becomes an instrument for the democratizing reform of the state in so far as it entails a vertical distribution of power amongst various communities in which the state organizes itself. Autonomy can be understood as a response to the problems and demands of social, economic, cultural, and political challenges within states.³³

³⁰ Rudolf Bernhardt (1981), *op.cit.*, p. 26.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Markku Suksi (1995), *op.cit.*, pp. 14-15.

³³ Carlos E.A. Amaral (1997), *op.cit.*

The most common characteristics for all forms of territorial autonomies are distribution of power, functions, constitutional basis and some form of control over generic autonomy provisions. Usually, territorial forms of autonomy possess a locally elected assembly with some independent legislative authority. These territories have the right to take charge of all executive and administrative functions, which are provided by central state institutions except in the areas of foreign and defense policy or within the broad framework of economic and monetary policy. There is often a constitutional definition of the status of autonomy and specific rights concerning the overall control over generic autonomy provisions.³⁴

These features may vary, however, between different territorial autonomies. Some regions may have full legislative rights while others possess only regulatory powers. Distribution of power may be clearly outlined within some territories, while this characteristic may not be as clearly outlined within all territorial autonomies. Full control over internal functions related to the region in question is always an attribute available. These functions may, however, be shared with central state institutions in some areas while the autonomous region has extensive rights even beyond the state level in other areas. The regional legislatures' competencies are often defined in the constituent document either in the constitution of the country or in the statute/act regulating the territorial autonomy as such. There is not always an independent judiciary with full responsibility for interpreting regional laws. Instead, there may be a joint dispute-settling body or other mechanisms established to solve disputes between the autonomous and the central governments. The control over generic autonomy provisions may also vary between various territorial autonomies. Some regions may have the ultimate right of control, while other regions have a consensual relationship with the central level or some form of referendum mechanisms available.

An autonomous region should enjoy effective control over matters primarily of local/regional concern within the overall framework of the fundamental norms of the

³⁴ Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit., p. 467-468; Guyala Csurgai (2002). 'Geopolitical Aspects of the Minority Question in Central and South Eastern Europe', p. 67 in Kinga Gál (ed): *Minority Governance in Europe*. Budapest: LGI Books; Stefan Wolff and Marc Weller (2005). 'Self-

state. Autonomy is not equivalent to independence and autonomous governments should not expect to be immune from the influence of central governments. At the same time, however, the state must show flexibility to enable the autonomous region to exercise real power.³⁵ Territorial autonomy can be seen as a compromise between divided societies in a country. The existing examples of territorial autonomies are often a result of long negotiations and are sometimes even enforced by international agreements.³⁶

2.2 Different Autonomy Regimes

Territorial autonomy is referred to by some authors as an arrangement where the population is granted special rights to run its own affairs in certain areas.³⁷ Autonomous regions which possess some ethnic or cultural distinctiveness have been granted separate powers of internal administration without being detached from the state of which they are part.³⁸ The establishment of a regime of autonomy requires a division of powers between the central authorities and the autonomous entity. The powers of the autonomy are usually related to matters of education, culture, language, environment, local planning, natural resources, economic development, social and health issues and other services such as access to governmental civil service and representative local structures.³⁹ There is, however, a great diversity between the degrees of autonomy and the extent of the powers transferred to the autonomous entities. The powers can range from very limited to larger powers and even up to a high concentration of major powers in the above areas.⁴⁰ Should territorial autonomies then be seen as quasi-federal arrangements? Some authors, such as Elazar, seem to

determination and autonomy – A conceptual introduction’, p. 14 in Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (eds.): *Autonomy, Self-governance and Conflict Resolution*. London and New York: Routledge.

³⁵ Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit., p. 468.

³⁶ Balázs Vizi (2002). ‘Minority Groups and Autonomy from an International Political Perspective’, p. 49 in Kinga Gál (ed.): *Minority Governance in Europe*, op.cit.

³⁷ Ruth Lapidoth (2001). ‘Elements of Stable Regional Autonomy Arrangements’, *C.A.P. Working Paper*, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München. <www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2001/ra/Lapidoth1.pdf>

³⁸ Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Lillich (1980). ‘The Concept of Autonomy in International Law’, *American Journal of International Law*, Volume 74, Issue 4 (October 1980), p. 858.

³⁹ Ruth Lapidoth (2001), op.cit. and Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit., p. 458.

⁴⁰ Ruth Lapidoth (2001), op.cit.

suggest that territorial autonomies could be seen as such arrangements.⁴¹ The variations in concepts used in this particular area are quite confusing and there is no explicit way to derive a common understanding of what territorial autonomy really stands for. This is why authors have to use their own definitions.

Most authors make distinctions between personal, administrative, functional, cultural and territorial forms of autonomy. These distinctions are, however, quite blurred. Non-territorial autonomy is referred to as personal, cultural, administrative and functional autonomy. Personal and cultural autonomy are closely linked to each other and refer to minority rights or indigenous rights. Administrative and functional autonomy are more associated with various institutions and their functions and powers, but can also be based on territorial grounds. These forms of autonomy are closely related to the discussion concerning multi-level governance.

Hooghe and Marks (2003) argue on the subject of two types of governance which contrast with each other. Type I governance is federalism, which is concerned with power sharing between a limited number of governments and which operates solely on a few levels. It is the fundamental relationship between the central government and a tier of non-intersecting sub-national governments. Membership is usually on a territorial basis. The jurisdictions frequently adopt the structure of an elected legislature, an executive, and a court system. Type II governance is an alternative form of multi-level governance in which the number of jurisdictions is vast rather than limited and operate on numerous territorial scales. This structure is more task-specific and therefore more flexible. Independent jurisdictions fulfill distinct functions. Type II governance is organized across a large number of levels where the borders interact between the different layers of governments.⁴²

The broad spectrum of territorial autonomy can be divided into federalism, federation, associated states, confederation, home-rule government and other special forms of

⁴¹ Daniel J. Elazar (1987). *Exploring Federalism*. Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, pp. 49, 54-57.

⁴² Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2003). 'Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-Level Governance', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 2, May 2003, pp. 233-243.

autonomy. Elazar lists various forms of federal systems such as union, consociation, federation, federacy, condominium, confederation, league and inter-jurisdictional functional authorities. A union is clearly bounded according to territorial lines and its units retain municipal powers only while sharing power concentrated in the central government. A consociation is more of a non-territorial form of government, where constituent units share powers with the central government. A federation has strong self-government and constituent units are linked within a strong but limited government. Federacy is a form of asymmetrical relationship between two self-government units, where the larger unit has specific powers within the smaller unit in exchange for specific privileges. A condominium is a joint rule or control by two units over a third or over some common territory or enterprise. A confederation has strong self-governing constituent entities permanently linked by the loose, limited purpose of a common government. A league has loose but permanent linkages for limited purposes without a common government, but has established some joint body or secretariat. Inter-jurisdictional functional authorities are joint or common entities organized by the constituent units to undertake special tasks.⁴³

Autonomy can also be interpreted as an overall framework and mode of participation in public decision-making, which can exist within a variety of political structures, from federalism to consociation, devolution or decentralization.⁴⁴ Devolution occurs when power is voluntarily transferred from the central government to the regional government. There are two fundamental models of legislative devolution, i.e. the retaining model and the transferring model. The retaining model exists when all powers are devolved to the new body apart from the powers retained centrally (see, for example, associated states like the Cook Islands). This implies that the regional parliament can do everything which is not specifically prohibited. The transferring model clarifies the specifics of what the devolved parliament is permitted to do (see,

⁴³ Daniel J. Elazar (1996). 'From Statism to Federalism – A Paradigm Shift', *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Table 1, p. 424.

⁴⁴ Kinga Gál (2002). 'Minority Governance on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century', p. 3 in Kinga Gál (ed.): *Minority Governance in Europe*. Budapest: LGI Books.

for example, the Faroe Islands and Greenland).⁴⁵ Decentralization is often described as the delegation of powers from the central level to the lower levels within the state. It can also occur within empires when the former imperial unity is replaced by a voluntary association or confederation of semi-sovereign or fully sovereign territorial entities takes place. The evolution of the British Empire through the British Commonwealth of Nations to a very loose consociation of fully sovereign countries is a good example of this process.⁴⁶

Control over territory is essential for the creation of the normal organs of local or regional government and may also be important in terms of economic viability or development.⁴⁷ The territory can be seen as a primary guarantor of two fundamental human needs: identity and security.⁴⁸ The identifying character may be seen by a group of people as a “homeland” where ancestors have lived for centuries. The security to have a place to live could be seen as a guarantor for threatened groups in a country. Where minority groups are dispersed throughout the state, there may be a need to have a defined territory in which these community members can feel secure.

The various autonomy regimes undertaken in this study will be the special/unique autonomy arrangements, which occur as asymmetrical features, as distinguished from the normal distribution of regions within the states and the control group of other regions with less or no autonomy.

In the next section, a more in-depth discussion about the definition of territorial autonomy will take place, followed by a summary with reference to the major concept described at the end of this chapter. The definition of territorial autonomy will function as a primary principle when selecting the cases of interest.

⁴⁵ Douglas Chalmers (2002). ‘Scotland Year Zero – From Words to Action’ pp. 138-139 in Kinga Gál (ed.): *Minority Governance in Europe*, op.cit.

⁴⁶ Ivo D. Duchacek (1986). *The Territorial Dimension of Politics. Within, Among, and Across Nations*. Boulder and London: Westview Press, Inc., p. 62.

⁴⁷ Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit., p. 463.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 464.

2.3 Definition of Territorial Autonomy

Territorial autonomy can be defined as an institutional arrangement that delimits a regionally-based, self-administering entity or entities within a state as having explicit policy-making responsibilities in one or more political, economic or cultural spheres.⁴⁹

Autonomy in a political and legal context refers to the power of social institutions to regulate their affairs by enacting legal rules. A part of the state is authorized to govern itself in certain matters by enacting laws and statutes, but without constituting a state of its own.⁵⁰

Territorial autonomy can also be seen as an arrangement aimed at granting the population of a sub-state unit a means by which it can express its distinct identity and run its own affairs in certain spheres.⁵¹ Pär Olausson uses a definition of territorial autonomy as *a defined geographical territory that, in relation to the majority of other sub-national territories, enjoys a special status including some legislative powers, within the state, but does not constitute a federal unit, or an independent state.*⁵²

Autonomy can further be defined as the granting of internal self-government to a region or a group of persons, which can be determined by the degree of actual as well as formal independence enjoyed by the autonomous entity in its political decision-making process.⁵³ Another definition derives from Kjell-Åke Nordquist for whom autonomy means an interstate territory, which has a jurisdictional base where the autonomous entity has a more extensive self-government than any other region within a state.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Donald Rothchild and Caroline A. Hartzell (2000), op.cit., p. 259.

⁵⁰ Svante E. Cornell (2002). 'Autonomy as a Source of Conflict. Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective', *World Politics*, Volume 54, Number 2, January 2002, pp. 248-249.

⁵¹ Ruth Lapidot (2001), op.cit.

⁵² Pär M. Olausson (2007), op.cit., p. 25.

⁵³ Svante E. Cornell, op.cit., p. 249.

A territorial autonomy is, according to my perception, *a geographically defined area which differs from other sub-regions (like municipalities, federal states, etc.) in a specific country and has received special status with legislative and/or regulatory (administrative) powers*. My definition is somewhat similar to the definitions mentioned by Olausson and Nordquist. The territory needs a jurisdictional base in the form of being enshrined in the constitution or it should have an autonomy act of its own in order to be regarded as having special status. The region should also possess extensive self-government in specific matters accepted by the central government or in collaboration with the central government of the state. Regulatory powers mean that the region has some kind of power to initiate legislation or furnish laws or rules which have to do with the region. Although the territory does not possess full legislative power, there should, however, be political institutions established in the region. Political institutions refer here to the legislative/regulatory powers and administrative powers. The regions are not obliged to have their own judiciary since this feature is often lacking in these regions. Territorial autonomies are often directly under the national judiciary. The territory should further function as a stable entity where no disputed matters are under consideration.

2.4 Summary

To summarize, it can be stated that autonomy has a number of dimensions. These dimensions include the following: the legal position and whether this is defined constitutionally or through ordinary legislation; the political competences according to the sub-national level; the degree of participation in national policy-making; the possibility of engaging in activities beyond the frontiers of the national territory; the degree of control over other sub-national levels; and finally, the degree of financial autonomy from, or dependence on, the national government.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Kjell-Åke Nordquist (2001). 'Åland i ett jämförande internationellt perspektiv' in Harry Jansson and Johannes Salminen (red.): *Den andra Ålandsfrågan – Autonomi eller självständighet?*, Julius Sundbloms Minnesstiftelse. Mariehamn: Ålands Tidnings Tryckeri AB, p. 96.

⁵⁵ John Loughlin (2000). 'Regional Autonomy and State Paradigm Shifts in Western Europe', *Regional and Federal Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 25.

Autonomy stretches over a wide range of disciplines, and is related to self-government, protection of minorities and the relationships between the different levels of government. These perspectives on autonomy are vital as a theoretical framework in this study. The assumption is that there are some general characteristics that have to be fulfilled in order for territorial autonomies to occur.

Table 1 below illustrates the theoretical summary of the concept of territorial autonomy.

Table 1: The Major Concept in the Study

CHARACTERISTICS	TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY
Distribution of Power	Yes, can vary between strong or weak
Functions	Varies from limited up to high concentration of powers
Constitutional Basis	Yes, the region is enshrined in the constitution and/or in ordinary legislation
Control over the Generic Autonomy Provisions	Varies from full control to consistency and/or referendum possibilities

3 Selecting the Cases

The point of departure in this investigation is the outlining of the main territorial autonomies in the world. A complete list will not be available, since territorial autonomy as a concept is a living and not a static phenomenon. It would be impossible to consider all territorial autonomies, because of the different definitions used and the fact that some territories might change their status over time. Different definitions lead to various populations and my own definition has functioned as the guiding principle, but it is not possible to guarantee that all entities fulfilling my criteria have been mapped, since it is hard to survey all autonomy arrangements in the world. In the first section, I therefore explain the logic behind selecting on the dependent variable, and in the following section map the cases. The regions are described by common characteristics such as distribution of power, functions, constitutional basis, and control over the initial generic autonomy provisions; these features being regarded as the common conditions for territorial autonomies. Subsequently, possible explanatory factors will be included to identify the similarities and differences between the cases in chapter 4. The research problem will be to answer which kind of factors lead to territorial autonomy and to analyze how the degree of autonomy differs between the cases. The control group is included in the following phase in order to investigate which factors constitute territorial autonomy proper and which constitute the degree of autonomy proper. Such a control group consists of non-autonomous regions.

In the first phase of the analysis, all potential explanatory factors are taken into account, and tested against the initial autonomous arrangements (special autonomy) in the territory, to see which factors are necessary. A second analysis then follows, including the non-autonomous regions, in order to test the sufficiency combinations of factors which constitute a proper territorial autonomy. After this analysis, it is possible to outline which paths lead to territorial autonomy.

3.1.1 Selecting on the Dependent Variable

The point of departure is to explain the logic behind qualitative strategies, and how the techniques are used in this study. In qualitative research, and especially when dealing with *small-N*, we often encounter problems with selection bias in some form. The section discusses the selection on the dependent variable first from a more general view, and then my own empirical work illustrates how I overcame such problems. This discussion has been inspired by reading the influential work of King, Keohane and Verba (1994).⁵⁶ The authors argue that in every study undertaken qualitative researchers should always include a section concerning foreseeable bias, and how the researcher has overcome such biases.

The literature on selection bias has emerged from areas related to quantitative methods in which a given set of cases is analyzed with the aim of providing insights into what is often a relatively well-defined larger population. In this context, the central challenge is to provide good estimates of the features of the population in question.⁵⁷ In qualitative research in international and comparative studies, the definition of population framework is more frequently ambiguous or a matter of dispute. The challenge is to address the disputes about selection bias before these issues can be resolved.⁵⁸

Qualitative researchers often start without well-developed and readily testable hypotheses, and therefore methodological tools for developing testable hypotheses are of great value to comparative scholars who seek to move from research topics to specific propositions.⁵⁹ The benefit to scholars who pursue qualitative research is that they tend to have less inaccurate, partial, or misleading measurements. The reason behind this is the case-oriented nature of qualitative design. By learning a great deal about the cases, qualitative researchers avoid errors that may be common in some

⁵⁶ See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (eds.) (1994). *Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

⁵⁷ David Collier and James Mahoney (1996). 'Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research', *World Politics*, Vol. 49, No. 1, p. 66.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

large-*N* studies.⁶⁰ The attainment or the isolation of answers to the questions scholars pose is often logically precluded by their method of selecting cases. The question of how determinants are related to one another in the process that leads to a certain phenomenon is as important as which factors are the original determinants.⁶¹

Qualitative research often starts by selecting cases where the outcome of interest occurs (often called ‘positive cases’). This is obviously of particular interest, when the researcher is aiming at obtaining explanations for specific outcomes.⁶² This approach is also categorized as ‘selecting on the dependent variable’.

The decision as to which observations or cases to select has a crucial effect on the outcome, and on the degree to which it can produce accurate and reliable results. King, Keohane and Verba argue that the selection of observations should allow for the possibility of at least some variation on the dependent variable.⁶³ Naturally, this should be quite obvious to the researcher, but, however, in some cases it is not done.

Sometimes scholars adopt the strategy of deliberately selecting on the dependent variable. This strategy aims at achieving more insight into the phenomenon under investigation and its specific causes. It could also be used to explore insights into previous theories, conceptualizations, measurement procedures, and empirical studies.⁶⁴ The investigator begins by listing all cases with the same outcome and then works in reverse in order to explore and understand the factors that preceded the reported events.⁶⁵

⁵⁹ James Mahoney (2007). ‘Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics’, *Comparative Political Studies*, Volume 40, Number 2 (February 2007), p. 124.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

⁶¹ Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr (1982). ‘Case Selection, Conceptualizations and Basic Logic in the Study of War’, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (November 1982), pp. 834-835.

⁶² James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2006). ‘A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research’, *Political Analysis*, Volume 14, p.239, 10.1093/pan/mpj017.

⁶³ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (eds.) (1994), *op.cit.*, pp. 128-129.

⁶⁴ David Collier and James Mahoney (1996), *op.cit.*, p. 72.

⁶⁵ Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr (1982), *op.cit.*, p. 836.

If selecting on the dependent variable is considered, it is necessary to be aware of the bias and seek to correct for it. In some instances, the research design allows variation on the dependent variable, but that variation could be truncated. This means limiting ourselves to less than the full range of variation on the dependent variable, and therefore only taking part of the real world into account in our investigation.⁶⁶ Some analysts restrict their cases where the outcomes have a narrow range of variation, by focusing on cases that all have high or low scores on the particular outcome, whatever it might be. The goal of this approach is to look as closely as possible at actual instances of the outcome being studied.⁶⁷ The problem of underestimating the effect of the main explanatory variable will then occur. By contrast, if we select on the explanatory variable, then for any given value of that variable, the dependent variable could assume any value.⁶⁸

In comparative studies, it is often common to use selection on the dependent variable to find the necessary conditions for a given outcome, or to eliminate some hypothesized necessary conditions. This technique is what J.S. Mill called 'the method of agreement'. All cases agree on the dependent variable, and it could be used as a first step in causal analysis.⁶⁹ A second reason for having one value on the dependent variable is related to counterfactuals as a means of testing hypotheses within the framework of *small-N* analysis. Scholars can employ counterfactual analysis by introducing variance in their studies when they have isolated cases of similar outcomes.⁷⁰ The Boolean approach could be seen as a technique dealing with counterfactuals. The aim in such research is to identify necessary causes and combinations of factors that are sufficient for outcomes.⁷¹ Instead of focusing on the net effects of causal conditions, case-oriented explanations emphasize their combined

⁶⁶ G. King, R.O. Keohane and S. Verba (1994), *op.cit.*, p. 130.

⁶⁷ David Collier and James Mahoney (1996), *op.cit.*, p. 57.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁶⁹ David Collier (1995). 'Translating Quantitative Methods for Qualitative Researchers: The Case of Selection Bias', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 2 (June 1995), p. 464 and James Mahoney (2007), *op.cit.*, p. 134.

⁷⁰ David Collier (1995), *op.cit.*, p. 464.

⁷¹ James Mahoney (2007), *op.cit.*, p. 135.

effects.⁷² More recently, Ragin (2000) has introduced fuzzy sets as a means for continuously coding variables according to the degree to which they correspond to qualitative categories of interest. Fuzzy-set is appropriate for analysis of necessary and sufficient causation, including probabilistic assumptions where different degrees of necessary or sufficient causation are considered.⁷³ Counterfactual analysis is employed whenever a researcher makes a causal inference based on the analysis of naturally occurring social data in which limited diversity is the norm.⁷⁴

One strategy used for analyzing necessary and sufficient causes is probabilistic fashion. According to this method, it is possible to evaluate causes that are necessary or sufficient by means of a quantitative benchmark, e.g. necessary or sufficient 90 percent of the time. Another probabilistic strategy is to measure variables continuously rather than dichotomously. In this context, causation can be considered necessary or sufficient if all cases are consistent with its interpretation when variables are adjusted to allow for a small amount of measurement error. A final procedure is to focus on statistical levels of significance with deterministic or probabilistic coefficients.⁷⁵

3.1.2 Coping with Selecting on the Dependent Variable

One formula for overcoming selection bias used in this study, is to include a section which carefully explains the assignment and selection processes. This discussion includes the rules used, and an examination of all foreseeable hidden bias and the preventative measures taken.⁷⁶ It is essential to identify the specific contrasts on a variable, in the view of the researcher, that make it an interesting outcome to explain.

⁷² Charles C. Ragin and John Sonnett (2005). 'Between Complexity and Parsimony: Limited Diversity, Counterfactual Cases, and Comparative Analysis', p. 180 in Sabine Kropp und Michael Minkenberg (eds.): *Vergleichen in der Politikwissenschaft*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

⁷³ James Mahoney (2007), op.cit., p. 136, see also Charles C. Ragin (2000). *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

⁷⁴ Charles C. Ragin and John Sonnett (2005), op.cit., p. 185.

⁷⁵ James Mahoney (2004). 'Comparative-Historical Methodology', *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 30 (August 2004), pp. 84-85, see also Bear F. Braumoeller and Gary Goertz (2000). 'The Methodology of Necessary Conditions', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 44, No. 4, October 2000, pp. 844-858 for a more thorough discussion regarding necessary conditions.

⁷⁶ G. King, R.O. Keohane and S. Verba (1994), op.cit., p. 199.

This diversity might help the researcher to define a framework of comparisons for evaluating the explanations. One way to do this exploration is to include negative/opposite cases or to broaden the scope of comparable cases through increasing the N .⁷⁷ In my study, this bias is not really an issue since I am dealing with necessary and sufficient conditions, and have a dependent variable which is graded according to variations between the cases. This investigation is not focused on linear relationships.

Researchers who are interested in particular a X/Y relationship must avoid an exclusive focus on cases in which X is present. They should also include control groups in which X does not occur and the same could be argued about Y . Both the existence of Y and the non-existence of Y should be investigated.⁷⁸ This is exactly my point of departure.


In this study I commence by mapping most of the territorial autonomies in the world. The mapping of the cases is derived from the constitutions and other relevant legal documents where territorial autonomies are mentioned as special autonomous regions within the states. In order to be able to test for both necessity and sufficiency, I then move on to include a control group with opposite cases, of the so called non-autonomous regions. This selection of entities is further developed in chapter 6.

The logic behind the study can be illustrated by a Venn-diagram and this is also the logic behind the fuzzy-set thinking as such.

⁷⁷ David Collier and James Mahoney (1996), *op.cit.*, p.67.

⁷⁸ Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr (1982), *op.cit.*, p. 840.

Figure 3: Venn-Diagram Illustrating the Logic in the Investigation



The entire rectangle indicates the universe of autonomy, i.e. all forms of autonomy in general. Circle A illustrates the sub-set of territorial autonomies (according to my definition) and circle B illustrates the sub-set of non-territorial forms of autonomy. Outside the circles, we would find federal constituent states, municipalities, and regions with no special status and so forth. Both forms of autonomy are intersecting with each other at some point, since there might be features that are common for all forms of autonomy, theoretically speaking. What I have done is to take the sub-set of territorial autonomies out of its context, and therefore the interest lies in explaining the variations within this particular sub-set, using an initial impression. In the next part of the investigation, cases which are found outside the circles are included, and these entities are then the non-autonomous regions (regions with possibilities to develop into territorial autonomy). This is done in order to unravel which factors lead to territorial autonomy proper.

3.2 Mapping the Cases of Interest

A previous investigation done by the author has identified 48 territorial autonomies in the world.⁷⁹ I have further developed this mapping, since new arrangements may have appeared and also included the Spanish regions of interest in the study. In this previous research, I considered that Spain was evolving into federalism, but since this

⁷⁹ See Maria Ackrén (2005). *Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk studie över de självstyrda områdena i världen*. Mariehamn: Ålands fredsinstitut.

kind of federalism is only possible from a bottom-up perspective, (i.e. the regions themselves must bargain with the national level to be recognized as special regions) the regions that are diverse from other regions in the Spanish context will be included. In the Spanish context, these regions are the six historical regions which are believed to have bargained a better position for themselves when the constitution was implemented than the other regions. The total number of territorial autonomies has therefore increased. To map the entities, I use a truth table with the conditions that I believe must be fulfilled for the cases in question. These are as mentioned above: distribution of power, functions, constitutional basis, and control over the generic autonomy provisions.

Distribution of power is one of the prerequisites when it comes to the administration of states as well as regions. In an article by Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Lillich⁸⁰, it is argued that the minimum criteria for a fully autonomous territory include a clear division of powers between legislative, executive and judiciary powers. My definition, however, excludes the judiciary power. The powers between legislative and executive should be clearly divided between the national/central power and the autonomous territory in question. Other factors of importance are the functions delegated to the autonomous sub-units. Territorial autonomies run their own affairs in certain spheres without external influence.⁸¹ Another common characteristic is that autonomous regions are granted through international agreements or through interstate agreements or other public legislation within a state.⁸² There is always some kind of constitutional basis in the form of a mention of the autonomous region in the constitution or by establishing a special autonomy act. Control over the general autonomy provisions could be essential for the autonomy. Who has the ultimate power of control? How easy is it to amend autonomy constitutions, acts or statutes? This could be relevant for the autonomies' survival. The power of control refers to the

⁸⁰ See Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Lillich (1980). 'The Concept of Autonomy in International Law', *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 74, Issue 4 (October 1980), pp. 858-889.

⁸¹ See e.g. Ruth Lapidoth (2001). 'Elements of Stable Regional Autonomy Arrangements', *C.A.P. Working Paper*, <www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2001/ra/Lapidoth1.pdf>

⁸² Bernhardt, Rudolf (1981). 'Federalism and Autonomy' pp. 23-28 in Yoram Dinstein (ed.): *Models of Autonomy*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

generic autonomy provisions and not to the competencies used by courts or similar institutions.

Distribution of power will simply be dichotomized according to strong or weak for the autonomy in question. Strong, in this study, implies that there is a clear distribution of power between different levels. A weaker form of distribution indicates that there might be an absence of one or two levels. The attribute of functions will be outlined as internal matters, shared functions or even external functions. There might also be autonomies that include two elements of the three elements, i.e. they have both internal and shared functions at the same time, or internal and external functions. The constitutional basis is indicated, as mentioned, in the national constitution or by a separate act. Here both elements could be available as well. The control over the generic autonomy provisions will be indicated according to who has the ultimate power to change the autonomy act, statute, or constitution. There are possibilities that this function is made by consent in some way with the autonomy's representative(s). Table 2 below shows the overview of this mapping.

Table 2: Territorial Autonomies in the World

Autonomy	Distribution of Power	Functions	Constitutional Basis	Control over the Generic Autonomy Provisions
Åland Islands (Finland)	Strong	Internal and external	National Constitution 2000 and Act on the Autonomy of Åland Islands 1991	Consistent decision of the Parliament of Finland and the Åland Parliament
American Samoa (US)	Strong	Internal	Own Constitution 1967	The Governor and a Constitutional Convention
American Virgin Islands (US)	Strong	Internal	Virgin Islands Code 1954	Secretary of the Interior and the Congress of USA
Andalusia (Spain)	Strong	Internal and shared	National Constitution 1978 and own constitution 1982	An assembly of the Provincial Councils and Members of Congress and Senators sent to <i>Cortes Generales</i>

Anguilla (UK)	Strong	Internal	Anguilla Constitution Order 1982	Her Majesty the Queen and Her Privy Council
Aruba (NL)	Strong	Internal	Own Constitution 1986	Act of Parliament in the Netherlands in consent with the Aruba Parliament
Azores (Portugal)	Strong	Internal	National Constitution 1976 and own statute 1976	The Assembly of the Republic
Balearic Islands (Spain)	Strong	Internal and shared	National Constitution 1978 and own constitution 1983	<i>See Andalusia</i>
Basque Country (Spain)	Strong	Internal and shared	National Constitution 1978 and own constitution 1979	<i>See Andalusia</i>
Bermuda (UK)	Strong	Internal	Bermuda Constitution Order 1968	The Legislature of Bermuda together with the Governor
Bougainville (Papua New Guinea)	Strong	Internal	National Constitution 1975 and own constitution	The Bougainville Executive to the Minister responsible for Bougainville matters
British Virgin Islands (UK)	Strong	Internal	Own Constitution 1967 and British Overseas Territory Act 2002	Her Majesty the Queen and the Governor of the Islands
Canary Islands (Spain)	Strong	Internal and shared	National Constitution 1978 and own constitution 1982	<i>See Andalusia</i>
Catalonia (Spain)	Strong	Internal and shared	National Constitution 1978 and own constitution 2006	<i>See Andalusia</i>
Cayman Islands (UK)	Strong	Internal and external	Own Constitution 1972	<i>See British Virgin Islands</i>
Cook Islands (NZ)	Strong	Internal and external	Own Constitution 1965	The Parliament of the Islands with two-thirds majority
Corsica (France)	Weak	Internal	Special Statute 1991	The French Parliament in consent with the population on Corsica
Crimea (Ukraine)	Weak	Internal	National Constitution 1996	Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
Falkland Islands (UK)	Strong	Internal	Own Constitution 1985	Her Majesty through a Secretary of State

Faroe Islands (DK)	Strong	Internal and external	Own Constitution 1948	Referendum on the Islands or by the National Government
French Polynesia (France)	Strong	Internal	National Constitution 1958 and own Law 1984	Referendum or by the President of France
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy)	Strong	Internal and shared	National Constitution 1948 and own constitution 1963	The Regional Council approved twice by its members or referendum
Gagauzia (Moldova)	Strong	Internal and external	National Constitution and Autonomy Statute	Three-fifths majority is required in the Moldovan Parliament
Galicia (Spain)	Strong	Internal and shared	National Constitution 1978 and own statute 1981	<i>See Andalusia</i>
Gibraltar (UK)	Strong	Internal	Own Constitution 2006	Her Majesty the Queen of UK
Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan)	Weak	Internal	National Constitution 1994	General referendum with two-thirds majority
Greenland (DK)	Strong	Internal and external	Own Constitution 1979	<i>See Faroe Islands</i>
Guam (US)	Strong	Internal	Organic Act 1950	The Congress of USA
Guernsey (UK)	Strong	Internal and external	The Reform (Amendment) Law 1972 and common law/statutory law	Guernsey itself
Hong Kong (China)	Strong	Internal and external	The Basic Law 1990	National People's Congress of China and the Legislative Council of Hong Kong
Isle of Man (UK)	Strong	Internal and external	The Isle of Man Act 1961 and common law/statutory law	Her Majesty the Queen of UK or the Lieutenant Governor
Jeju Island (South Korea)	Weak	Internal	The Special Act on the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province 2006	The National Parliament of South Korea
Jersey (UK)	Strong	Internal and external	Common Law and statutory law	<i>See Isle of Man</i>
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan)	Strong	Internal	National Constitution 1992 and own constitution	Referendum and the Oliy Majlis of Uzbekistan
Kosovo (Serbia)*	Strong	Internal	National Constitution 2006	Kosovo is in a state-

			and international agreements	building process
Macau (China)	Strong	Internal and external	The Basic Law 1993	<i>See Hong Kong</i>
Madeira (Portugal)	Strong	Internal	National Constitution 1976 and own statute	<i>See Azores</i>
Mayotte (France)	Weak	Internal	National Constitution 1958	Referendum or by the President of France
Mindanao (Philippines)	Strong	Internal	National Constitution 1986 and Republic Act No. 9054	The Congress of the Philippines with two-thirds majority in both houses
Montserrat (UK)	Strong	Internal	The Monsterrat Constitution Order 1989	Her Majesty the Queen and a Secretary of State
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan)	Weak	Internal	National Constitution 1995	Referendum
Netherlands' Antilles (NL)	Strong	Internal	Statute 1954	<i>See Aruba</i>
New Caledonia (France)	Strong	Internal and external	National Constitution 1954 and 1998 Nouméa Accord	<i>See Mayotte</i>
Niue (NZ)	Strong	Internal and external	Constitution Act 1974	The Niue Assembly with two-thirds majority
Norfolk Island (Australia)	Strong	Internal	Norfolk Island Act 1979	The act of the Senate and House of Representatives of Australia
North Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	Weak	Internal	National Constitution and Autonomy Statute	By request of the Regional Assembly according to the National Constitution's procedure
Northern Ireland (UK)	Weak	Internal	Northern Ireland Act 1998	Referendum or the Secretary of State
Northern Mariana Islands (US)	Strong	Internal	Own Constitution 1978	By constitutional convention, legislative initiative or popular initiative
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor)	Weak	Internal	National Constitution 2002	The National Parliament of East Timor
Pitcairn Islands (UK)	Weak	Internal	Local Government	The Governor in New

			Ordinance 1964	Zealand
Puerto Rico (US)	Strong	Internal and external	Own Constitution 1952	The Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico with two-thirds majority in each house
Rodrigues (Mauritius)	Weak	Internal	Regional Assembly Act 2001 and National Constitution	The National Assembly of Mauritius
Sardinia (Italy)	Strong	Internal and shared	National Constitution 1948 and own constitution 1948	<i>See Friulia-Venezia Giulia</i>
Scotland (UK)	Strong	Internal and shared	Scotland Act 1998	Scottish Parliament, Her Majesty the Queen and the House of Commons in London
Sicily (Italy)	Strong	Internal and shared	National Constitution 1948 and own constitution 1948	<i>See Friulia– Venezia Giulia</i>
South Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	Weak	Internal	National Constitution and Autonomy Statute	<i>See North Atlantic Autonomous Region</i>
St Helena and Dependencies (UK)	Strong	Internal	Own Constitution 1988	Her Majesty the Queen and the Governor
St Pierre and Miquelon (France)	Strong	Internal	National Constitution 1958	<i>See Mayotte</i>
Tokelau (NZ)	Strong	Internal	Tokelau Act 1948	The Governor-General
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy)	Strong	Internal and shared	National Constitution 1948 and own constitution 1972	<i>See Friulia-Venezia Giulia</i>
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK)	Strong	Internal and external	Turks and Caicos Constitutional Order 1998	The Governor and the Legislative Council of the Islands
Valle d'Aosta (Italy)	Strong	Internal and shared	National Constitution 1948 and own constitution	<i>See Friulia-Venezia Giulia</i>
Wales (UK)	Weak	Internal	Government of Wales Act 1998	The Secretary of State
Wallis and Futuna (France)	Weak	Internal	National Constitution 1958	<i>See Mayotte</i>
Zanzibar (Tanzania)	Strong	Internal	National Constitution 1977	The Revolutionary

			and its own constitution 1984	Government of Zanzibar in accordance with the Constitution of Tanzania
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Sources: Maria Ackrén (2005). *Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk studie över de självstyrda områdena i världen*. Mariehamn: Ålands fredsinstitut. CIA – The World Factbook 2007 <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>>, Constitution Finder <<http://confinder.richmond.edu>> and various web-pages like encyclopedias and government pages. Pär M. Olausson (2007). *Autonomy and Islands: A Global Study of the Factors that Determine Island Autonomy*, p. 58.

*Kosovo declared itself independent on February 17, 2008, but since the new state is not yet internationally recognized by all states in the world and the EU is helping to reconstruct the institutions, Kosovo will be regarded as a special region. The region is currently in a state-building process and cannot be seen as a fully-fledged sovereign state.

The table shows the first mapping and descriptions of the autonomous regions in the world. There are currently 65 territorial autonomies in different parts of the world distributed among 25 countries. Most of these regions are islands (44 in total), and the rest of the 21 territories are land-locked areas. The characteristics chosen demonstrate quite a similar pattern. Of the territorial autonomies, 51 have a strong distribution of power, and it might be questioned as to whether the autonomies that have a weak distribution of power really are territorial autonomies proper. I have nevertheless included these areas, since they are considered special regions from a national point of view. However, they might be considered as administrative autonomies from a more general position.

Thirty-eight autonomies only share internal functions, i.e. they have been granted powers to handle internal matters that are important to the regions in question. Twelve regions have both internal and shared functions. This means that they have been granted powers to take over matters of specific importance for the regions in question, and at the same time, they share a number of the functions with the national level in a particular form of consensus relationship. Fifteen autonomies have internal and external functions. Internal functions, once again, refers to internal matters specific to the territories in question, and external functions means that the regions might have the right to be members of international organizations as nations in their own right or have the ability to reach international or bilateral agreements of their own. Thirty-three territorial autonomies are regulated by their constitutions or statutes. Twenty-five autonomies are regulated both through national constitutions and their own

constitutions or statutes. Only seven autonomies are regulated through the national constitutions alone. The control over the generic autonomy provisions varies between the regions.

Most autonomous regions (24) have the possibility to amend their constitutions in consent with their respective National Parliament. Either there is a combination of referendum in the regions together with an ultimate decision by the Central Government or, the Legislative Assembly/Parliament in the regions has to make a decision and then send it to the National Parliament for approval. The Regional Parliament has the ultimate power to amend its own constitution in eleven cases.

Eight of the former British colonies are ruled by the Queen of the United Kingdom and Her Privy Council or the Secretary of State. In fourteen of the cases, the National Parliament has the ultimate power to change the status of the regions. In five of the regions, the appointed Governor, together with another institution (at a regional level) or the Governor himself has the right to amend the constitutions of the regions. The last two cases, that of the American Virgin Islands and Guam are ruled directly under the Congress of the USA and the Secretary of the Interior. Kosovo is, currently, a disputed territory and its status is in process of changing. Kosovo will be under EU surveillance for many years to come, but is chosen here according to its status before February 17th, 2008. During the time of writing this thesis Kosovo has declared itself independent, but it is unclear if the region will succeed in becoming a sovereign state or if it will continue as an autonomous region.

Another feature, which has an influence, is that most regions are constituted as belonging to European countries and former colonial powers; this applies to 49 of the territorial autonomies. Only 16 regions belong to Asian or African countries or those countries newly emerged from the former Soviet Union.

To receive more information about the regions' political systems and details about the territorial autonomies, see the appendix. In the appendix, background information is

outlined about the different characteristics. The following is a description of how the variable degree of autonomy was operationalized.

3.3 Degree of Autonomy

To be able to operationalize the degree of autonomy, I established indicator scores illustrating the variations between the cases. The indicator score is composed of the different characteristics mentioned previously and includes tax abilities, which are not mentioned in the table. Tax abilities are included as a dimension of the economic sphere of the territorial autonomies, but are not seen as a characteristic for territorial autonomy as such.⁸³ There are five features and the total score one region can receive is five and the scores are translated into fuzzy scores. To get the fuzzy score for each region, a calibration is made using the fuzzy technique software program, fs/QCA.⁸⁴ Fuzzy-sets are designed to handle degree-vagueness. In this context, fuzzy set theory defines a degree of membership between qualitatively different states of autonomy.⁸⁵ The degree of set membership ranges from 0.0 (full exclusion from a set) to 1.0 (full inclusion). The calibration technique within the fs/QCA program uses the direct method of calibration. This means it focuses on three different anchors: the threshold for full membership, the threshold for full non-membership, and the cross-over point. The standard formula behind the calibration is the following: degree of membership = $\exp(\log \text{ odds}) / (1 + \exp(\log \text{ odds}))$, where exp represents the exponentiation of log odds to simple odds.⁸⁶ In the program it is a simple matter to run the calibrate function by

⁸³ Devolved units have often less fiscal autonomy, particularly with regard to taxation. See e.g. Robert Agranoff (2004). 'Autonomy, Devolution and Intergovernmental Relations', *Regional and Federal Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring 2004, p. 28.

⁸⁴ The fs/QCA Software Program is developed by Charles C. Ragin, Kriss A. Drass and Sean Davey and can be freely downloaded at: <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml>. For guidelines how to use the program see Charles C. Ragin (2008). *User's Guide to Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis*. Tucson, Arizona: Department of Sociology, University of Arizona and see also Charles C. Ragin (2008). *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy-Sets and Beyond*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

⁸⁵ Michael Smithson and Jay Verkuilen (2006). *Fuzzy Set Theory – Applications in the Social Sciences*. Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 147. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, pp. 6-7.

⁸⁶ Charles C. Ragin (2008). 'Fuzzy Sets: Calibration versus Measurement', pp. 174-198 in D. Collier, H. Brady, and J. Box-Steffensmeier (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*. Oxford: Oxford University. The article discusses the calibration technique in more detail and provides some examples.

selecting the compute dialog box and name the target fuzzy set and then click calibrate (x,n1,n2,n3) in the Functions menu.⁸⁷

The indicators for territorial autonomy are: 1) distribution of power, 2) functions, 3) constitutional basis, 4) control over the generic autonomy provisions, and 5) tax abilities.

- 1) The distribution of power can be divided into lawmaking abilities and regulatory abilities. Having lawmaking powers is given one point and regulatory powers zero points. This means that all regions, which have own lawmaking powers, are favored with points, and those regions without lawmaking powers receive no points according to this feature.
- 2) Functions can be divided into three categories: internal functions, internal combined with shared functions, and internal combined with external functions. This final category receives the highest score, i.e. one point, internal combined with shared functions receives a half-point, and internal functions receives only a zero.
- 3) The constitutional basis can be divided into strong and weak. Strong is related to the fact that where the region is both mentioned in the national constitution and has its own statute/constitution/act, it receives one point. If only mentioned in the constitution, it receives zero. If the region only has its own constitution/statute or act, it receives a half of a point. The mentioning in the national constitution or the territory's own statute/constitution/act should refer to the specific status within the country.
- 4) The control over the generic autonomy provisions can be divided into three values. One point indicates that the region, by itself, has the possibility to amend its own constitution/statute or act. A half-point indicates the combination of having a consensus between the region's government and the national government. The score of zero indicates that

⁸⁷ See Charles Ragin (2008). *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, pp. 104-105 where the steps in the program are outlined.

it is only the national level that has the power to amend autonomy constitutions/statutes or acts.

- 5) Tax abilities are divided into two values, a score of one indicates that the region possesses important tax abilities and a score of zero indicates that the region lacks or has negligible rights to this ability.

All the scores are presented in the table 3 which follows. The first column shows the total scores of points based on the indicators and the second column indicates the fuzzy scores. In this context, the fuzzy scores are the membership scores in the subset of territorial autonomy.⁸⁸

The threshold for membership, in this case, is illustrated by the indicator score of 4.5 (fuzzy set of ≥ 0.95), the cross-over point is 2.5 (fuzzy set of 0.5) and the full exclusion of the set is 0 (fuzzy set of ≤ 0.05). The score of 4.5 is the highest score any territorial autonomy can reach. In theoretical terms, the highest possible score is 5, but the empirical world shows us that 4.5 is the maximum in this context. Full autonomy would be indicated by 5, but according to my harsh criteria, no region is fully autonomous. The cross-over point indicates the middle between the minimum and maximum value. Obviously the value 0 indicates the full exclusion of the set.

Table 3: Territorial Autonomies according to Different Scores

Autonomy	Indicator Score	Fuzzy Score
Åland Islands (Finland)	3.5	0.82
American Samoa (US)	3	0.68
American Virgin Islands (US)	2.5	0.50
Andalusia (Spain)	4	0.90
Anguilla (UK)	2.5	0.50
Aruba (NL)	3	0.68
Azores (Portugal)	3	0.68
Balearic Islands (Spain)	4	0.90

⁸⁸ See e.g. Michael Smithson and Jay Verkuilen (2006), op.cit.; Charles C. Ragin (2008). 'Fuzzy Sets: Calibration versus Measurement' op.cit., for more information on the calibration technique within fuzzy-sets.

Basque Country (Spain)	4	0.90
Bermuda (UK)	3.5	0.82
Bougainville (PNG)	3	0.68
British Virgin Islands (UK)	2.5	0.50
Canary Islands (Spain)	4	0.90
Catalonia (Spain)	4	0.90
Cayman Islands (UK)	3.5	0.82
Cook Islands (NZ)	4.5	0.95
Corsica (France)	1	0.14
Crimea (Ukraine)	1	0.14
Falkland Islands (UK)	2.5	0.50
Faroe Islands (DK)	4	0.90
French Polynesia (France)	3.5	0.82
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy)	4.5	0.95
Gagauzia (Moldova)	4	0.90
Galicia (Spain)	4	0.90
Gibraltar (UK)	2.5	0.50
Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan)	0	0.05
Greenland (DK)	4	0.90
Guam (US)	1.5	0.23
Guernsey (UK)	4.5	0.95
Hong Kong (China)	4	0.90
Isle of Man (UK)	4	0.90
Jeju Island (South Korea)	1.5	0.23
Jersey (UK)	4	0.90
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan)	2	0.35
Kosovo (Serbia)	2.5	0.50
Macau (China)	4	0.90
Madeira (Portugal)	3	0.68
Mayotte (France)	0.5	0.08
Mindanao (Philippines)	1	0.14
Montserrat (UK)	2.5	0.50
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan)	0	0.05
Netherlands' Antilles (NL)	3	0.68
New Caledonia (France)	4.5	0.95
Niue (NZ)	4.5	0.95
Norfolk Island (Australia)	2.5	0.50

North Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	1	0.14
Northern Ireland (UK)	1	0.14
Northern Mariana Islands (US)	3.5	0.82
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor)	1	0.14
Pitcairn Islands (UK)	1.5	0.23
Puerto Rico (US)	4.5	0.95
Rodrigues (Mauritius)	2	0.35
Sardinia (Italy)	4.5	0.95
Scotland (UK)	3.5	0.82
Sicily (Italy)	4.5	0.95
South Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	1	0.14
St Helena and Dependencies (UK)	3	0.68
St Pierre and Miquelon (France)	2.5	0.50
Tokelau (NZ)	3	0.68
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy)	4.5	0.95
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK)	4	0.90
Valle d'Aosta (Italy)	4.5	0.95
Wales (UK)	0.5	0.08
Wallis and Futuna (France)	1.5	0.23
Zanzibar (Tanzania)	3.5	0.82

The table shows that there are a number of variations between the cases. Looking at the indicator scores, it can be seen that two regions score zero for degree of autonomy. These regions are Gorno-Badakhshan in Tajikistan and Nakhichevan in Azerbaijan. These regions are cases that are theoretically possible within the set of territorial autonomies, but due to the categorizations and computation of the scores for autonomy, their result is zero. Other weak autonomies are Mayotte and Wales. Strong autonomies are found in Europe and even in America, Asia and the South Pacific, in connection with regions functioning as commonwealth regions or associated states. The fuzzy scores show the same pattern.

Membership scores of 0.95 are given to the following regions: Cook Islands, Friulia-Venezia Giulia, Guernsey, New Caledonia, Niue, Puerto Rico, Sardinia, Sicily,

Trentino-Alto Adige and Valle d'Aosta. The five special autonomous regions in Italy⁸⁹ seem to have the highest degree of autonomy in Europe, along with the British island of Guernsey. The regions belonging to New Zealand, the Cook Islands and Niue, show a similar pattern. Even a French region, New Caledonia, reaches the highest score, as does the US Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Most regions exceed the cross-over point of 0.5, which is indicative of a realistic view of the world. There are many regions, which reach a fuzzy score of 0.90, and as mentioned previously these regions with the lowest degree of autonomy are: Gorno-Badakhshan, Nakhichevan, Mayotte and Wales. The scores of these regions indicate that they are almost fully outside of the set of territorial autonomy. The fuzzy scores are due to the calibration being outside the total scale of 0.0 to 1.0. The reality is, of course, that no territorial autonomy reaches the highest possible score of autonomy (i.e. 5). With different anchors, it would be possible to receive different fuzzy scores, but the thresholds used in this context are based on common sense.

There are also regions which call themselves autonomous, but in reality they do not function as special regions. It might be useful to mention these regions, since it is a common misconception that they are fully- fledged autonomies. The next section will deal with these non-autonomous regions.

3.4 Dubious Cases

When mapping the territorial autonomies, I have encountered some regions, which call themselves autonomies or initially seem to be regions with special status. Upon further investigation however, they were found to lack the special status required. The regions might be disputed matters within their own states or lacking in the political institutions crucial to their functioning as territorial autonomies. Other problems related to these regions might be that the definition of autonomy used within their countries might be somewhat different to that which I use in the context of this study.

⁸⁹ Italy has adopted a new constitution in 2001, which has equalized the system between the regions. The five special regions are selected here are due to the historical position of these regions. It is hard, at this point in time, to draw any conclusions concerning the new constitution and how this has affected the other 15 regions.

The dubious cases might also be situated within countries which are currently in a process of state-building. It can therefore be hard to actually declare them as autonomous regions as such as it might not be clear which kind of system these states have at the sub-national level. The regions might also be victims of ongoing conflicts where no solution is at hand. These regions will be excluded from the list of territorial autonomies.

In China there are, for instance, five so-called Autonomous Regions. The Government has set up these regions where the non-Han population predominates. Although some important concessions have been made to the non-Han population, no meaningful autonomy exists.⁹⁰ The regions possessing the label of Autonomous Regions are Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Tibet and Ningxia. The decision to establish an autonomous area is made by the State Council on the recommendation of lower-level state organs after relevant consultations, including discussions with the minority concerned. There are no hard criteria and no minority can claim autonomy as such. The system in China denies true autonomy of choice and the organs of self-government are bound by the key principles of the Chinese state system, i.e. ruled by the Communist Party.⁹¹

The island of Rotuma, is a dependency belonging to Fiji. The Island functions as a district and therefore only has a local government. This means that Rotuma follows the same system as other districts on the mainland of Fiji.⁹²

In Georgia, there are two so-called Autonomous Republics: Abkhazia and Ajaria, but these territories are disputed matters. Abkhazia has been striving for independence since the collapse of the USSR, but the independence declared in 1994 has never been recognized by the international community. The fragile peace is maintained by UN military observers and CIS peacekeepers. UN efforts to mediate have not had any

⁹⁰ Autonomous Regions of China <www.paulnoll.com/China/Provinces/autonomous-regions.html>, accessed from the Internet 21 May 2007.

⁹¹ Yash Ghai (2000). 'Autonomy Regimes in China: Coping with Ethnicity and Economic Diversity' pp. 77-98 in Yash Ghai (ed.): *Autonomy and Ethnicity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁹² Laws of Fiji, Rotuma Act, Chapter 122 <www.pacii.org/fj/legis/consol_act/ra103/>, accessed from Internet 21 May 2007.

results to date.⁹³ Ajaria has been spared from major violence and ethnic unrest since Georgia became independent, but nevertheless, problems have not been entirely resolved. The assembly in Ajaria has been approved to control powers over local affairs, but the head of the government (who is appointed by the Georgian president) has the right to dissolve the assembly and government and overrule local authorities on issues where the constitution of Georgia is contravened.⁹⁴ Ethno-regional divisions continue to be Georgia's most serious obstacle to state building. These divisions make it extremely difficult to establish the institutions necessary to stabilize the state and make it capable of supporting institutional and economic reforms.

Greece has one autonomous region, Mount Athos, a Greek-Orthodox community consisting of male monks who have jurisdiction over their territory.⁹⁵ This area cannot be considered a territorial autonomy as mentioned above because of its particular characteristic as a religious community; instead, Mount Athos can be considered as a functional autonomy.

The Aceh region in Indonesia has been in conflict for over 30 years. Some improvements have been made by the EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). The best proof of progress made in restoring peace and stability is the fact that the first-ever direct, local elections were held in Aceh on December 11th, 2006. The EU will continue to support peace in Aceh, supervising implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding signed August 15th, 2005 by the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).⁹⁶ Since this region is currently under a 'nation-building' process, it is excluded from the list.

⁹³ BBC News, Regions and territories: Abkhazia <<http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/>>, accessed from Internet 22 May 2007.

⁹⁴ BBC News, Regions and territories: Ajaria <<http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/>>, accessed from Internet 22 May 2007. For more details about the background to the conflicts related to the Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia and Ajaria, see Monica Duffy Toft (2001). 'Multinationality, Regional Institutions, State-Building, and the Failed Transition in Georgia', pp. 123-142 in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3, Autumn 2001.

⁹⁵ See Markku Suksi (2005). *Ålands konstitution*, note 57, p. 18. Åbo: Åbo Akademis förlag.

⁹⁶ EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh <www.consilium.europa.eu/aceh/>, accessed from Internet 22 May 2007.

São Tomé and Príncipe are made up of seven municipal districts, six on São Tomé and one encompassing the Autonomous Region of Príncipe. Every district functions in a similar way. Each district has a governing council that has some autonomous decision-making power.⁹⁷ The autonomy in the region of Príncipe has increased since 1995, and Príncipe now acts as a region and as a district simultaneously. There is a regional parliament with seven members and a regional government consisting of five members.⁹⁸ There is no unique arrangement available at the regional level.

The Autonomous Province of Vojvodina in Serbia functions as a cultural autonomy. There is considerable protection offered to the Hungarian minority in the region, but the province has not yet developed into a fully-fledged territorial autonomy. The Agreement on Self-Government, in the province, constitutes a peculiar form of autonomy where there is a combination of Hungarian personal autonomy, Hungarian territorial autonomy and the autonomy of Vojvodina. The Agreement has provisions for the future status of Vojvodina, its powers, procedures, and composition of organs. The Agreement is primarily a political document of the Hungarian political parties. It is a one-sided draft proposal articulating the claims of the Hungarian minority and not a final autonomy arrangement resulting from negotiations between the representatives of the Hungarians and the Serb-dominated state.⁹⁹

These territories just mentioned, are simply a few examples of places labeled autonomies, and they illustrate the variations available when it comes to calling an area autonomous. These regions might be seen as potential candidates for territorial autonomy or even outright independence in the future. Since many of the regions are victims of ongoing conflicts, their status is very unstable and they cannot be analyzed according to my criteria, which I have created for the set of territorial autonomies. After this exploration, the potential explanatory factors are highlighted. First, there is a theoretical discussion and then evidence from the empirical world is evaluated.

⁹⁷ Georg Thomas Kurian (ed.) (2007). *Encyclopedia of the World's Nations and Cultures*, Volume III. New York: Facts on File, p. 2038.

⁹⁸ Dag Anckar (2008). 'Decentraliserade litenheter. En kartläggning och en förklaring.' Conference Paper for the *XV Nordic Congress in Political Science* in Tromsø, Norway, 6-9 August 2008.

4 The Independent Variables

Some reflections are now made on external factors, which might be considered explanatory in constituting both the form of territorial autonomy and the various degrees of autonomy. These factors have been derived from the literature regarding autonomy issues. The most common features are included, and it must be admitted that some external factors have a strong relation to theoretical statements while others have a weaker position in the literature.

In the overall literature on the subject of autonomy, it is impossible to exclude completely the federal perspectives, since some explanatory factors might be the same for federal systems as for territorial autonomies as such. In the literature, we encountered both top-down models and bottom-up models for autonomy and their possible explanatory factors. Top-down models refer to federal and other territorial forms of autonomy, while bottom-up models refer to administrative and non-territorial forms of autonomy.

Top-down models of autonomy are used specifically for federal or other power-sharing arrangements, where regions exercise a high degree of self-government within an existing state structure. The desire to maintain self-government in this type of model is satisfied through the decentralization of the power from central authorities to autonomous regions. Federal systems often work according to a predestined structure between the national level and the federal units in question. The federal systems depart from the perspective that the federal units are equally equipped with certain functions and competencies. It is then the prerogative of the constituent states to deal with their functions and competencies in a manner of their own choosing. Consequently, some asymmetrical federal systems might arise. Stepan, for example, describes three various ideal types: “coming-together”, “holding-together” and

⁹⁹ Tamás Korhecz (2002). ‘Chances for Ethnic Autonomy in Vojvodina: Analysis of the Latest Autonomy Proposal of Hungarian Political Parties in Vojvodina’, pp. 273-297 in Kinga Gál (ed.): *Minority Governance in Europe*. Budapest: LGI Books.

“putting-together”.¹⁰⁰ The *coming-together* variant is based on the classic federalism with the USA as the prime example. The system is characterized by a symmetrical division of powers between the national level and the federal states. The *holding-together* variant is more an asymmetrical version of federalism, where the constituent parts are held together by some specific matter, such as language, culture or tradition. India would be a good example in this case. The *putting-together* variant is then a form of shaky federalism, where the state has forced the entities to form a federal constituency. For this model variant, the former Soviet Union is a prime example. Federalism becomes an organization principle.

Bottom-up models of autonomy are used when separatist groups or other groups (ethnic, linguistic and cultural) are striving for a future with sovereignty or independence as their goal, and where self-government is here seen as the first step in the process towards sovereignty, which is the ultimate goal. Insurrections or revolts and violence are the principal factors which lead to bottom-up models of autonomy.¹⁰¹ Bottom-up models were common when former colonies seceded from their metropolitan states. Today Corsica could be seen as a more modern example of this kind of model.

Other bottom-up strategies are evident when internal struggles or international revolutions or wars take place. For example, the autonomy of the Åland Islands has emerged from the sequence of events after Finnish independence and the First World War, while the autonomy of the Faroe Islands was a consequence of the Second World War. In Spain, the autonomies emerged in the context of the republican revolutions and of the second restoration of the Monarchy, along with the fall of Franco and the transition to democracy. In Italy, the autonomies were established in the framework of the restoration of the Italian state after fascism and the Second World War. Finally, in Portugal the autonomies were acknowledged to be the

¹⁰⁰ Alfred Stepan (2001). ‘Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, (Multi)Nationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism’, pp. 320-323 in Alfred Stepan (ed.): *Arguing Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹⁰¹ David Newman and Ghazi Falah (1997). ‘Bridging the gap: Palestinian and Israeli discourses on autonomy and statehood’, *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Royal Geographic Society, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1997, pp. 112-113.

outcome of the revolution of 1974, which put an end to that country's dictatorial regime and marked the transition to democracy.¹⁰²

Geographical remoteness could also be a factor that needs taking into consideration. The past relationships between the center and periphery may determine the status of the autonomy. The autonomous region may have been a colony; it may have been an independent but weaker state; it may have been transferred from one state to the other; it may have been one of several semi-independent units that merged into a unitary state; or it may have been detached from a state and become internationalized.¹⁰³

Some authors believe that territorial autonomy is a defined area where minorities are compactly settled and therefore have demands for self-rule. Regional autonomy occurs when a region is created as a homeland for an ethnic group or when a minority group constitutes a large majority of the population of an autonomous state structure and perceives it as its own.¹⁰⁴

Control over natural resources varies greatly between autonomous arrangements. Those entities that enjoy greater autonomy tend to control their own natural resources, but control over some natural resources may be exercised by the central government.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, natural resources may be an obstacle in several cases of autonomy. Different solutions may be adopted for above-ground resources, and underground minerals.¹⁰⁶ Many disputes over natural resources may lead to demands for autonomy.¹⁰⁷

In the literature, there was also evidence that no autonomy has so far has succeeded in a hostile environment. It is generally agreed that autonomous regimes should be endowed with democratic institutions. The prospects for success are greater when

¹⁰² Carlos E. P. Amaral (1997), op.cit.

¹⁰³ Ruth Lapidoth (2001), op.cit.

¹⁰⁴ Svante E. Cornell (2002). 'Autonomy as a Source of Conflict. Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective', *World Politics*, Volume 54, Number 2, January 2002, pp. 245-246.

¹⁰⁵ Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Lillich (1980), op.cit., pp. 879-880.

¹⁰⁶ Ruth Lapidoth (2001), op.cit.

¹⁰⁷ Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit., p. 465.

both the central government and the autonomous authorities are based on democratic regimes.¹⁰⁸

External factors can be divided into state related factors, regional specific factors and factors which affect the relationship between the regional and state or national level. The state related factor has to do with the mother country in question. One potential state related factor is the choice of regime made by the state, whether the state is a democracy or an authoritarian state or somewhere in between. This could have an impact on how well countries cope with territorial autonomies and how these regions develop their autonomy status. It is argued by many authors that autonomy emerges only in democratic environments.¹⁰⁹

Regional specific factors are those factors directly related to the autonomous region as such. These include the historical strategic importance, geographical distance from the center, the possession of natural resources and the existence of regional movements/parties and/or separatist movements. Some questions related to these factors include whether or not the autonomy has been an outpost for supervision of military activities or for security reasons. How far do the regions lie in relation to the center? Geographical distances might have an impact on how the states have organized themselves, and it might also lead to special treatment for regions situated on the periphery. It can be hard to administrate a country which is greatly dispersed. Do the regions possess important natural resources of some kind, which could secure their position and cause them to have a certain relationship towards the state? What effect does the existence of movements/parties or separatist groups have as regards a voice for more autonomy?

The potential explanations affecting the relationship between the state and the region include factors such as ethnic distinctiveness, size, and economic viability in the form of GDP/capita. Autonomy can be seen as an instrument for approval for ethnic or

¹⁰⁸ Ruth Lapidoth (2001), op.cit.

¹⁰⁹ See e.g. Yash Ghai (ed.) (2000). *Autonomy and Ethnicity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; W. Safran and R. Máiz (eds.) (2000). *Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

other groups to maintain their distinct identity and exercise direct control over issues that are of special interest to them, while allowing the greater entity to have the powers over common interests. There is no uniform application of the terms for various arrangements of autonomy.¹¹⁰ Many authors believe that federalism, decentralization, regionalism and non-territorial forms of autonomy occur because of ethnic diversity.¹¹¹ This is why ethnic distinctiveness will be included as a main indicator explaining territorial autonomies. Size according to population is another feature that might be important for autonomy. Larger territories might be in a better position to bargain for special status than smaller regions. The economic situation might also be of importance. Rich regions with a high degree of GDP/capita might find it easier than poorer ones to reach autonomy.

A note concerning the time perspective should also be mentioned as it is important to go back in time to look at the conditions before the regions claimed autonomy. This is very problematic, since these regions have achieved their autonomy in different time periods during the process of development. Some regions have emerged as the result of the First and Second World Wars, others have been objects in short-lived conflicts, and yet other regions might have been the result of decentralization or devolution processes within the countries. Additionally, the regions should then have to be placed into their different historical contexts. Another problem with elapsing time is that some autonomous regions might have been less autonomous or even independent during a particular historical period, while others have ceased to exist. Taking into account these considerations and fluctuations in development is problematic. It then becomes important to measure autonomy at different times and divide the regions according to this perception. Thus the regions are seen from the perspective of present day. I will also, in this investigation, test all explanatory factors according to the existing situation, so the entities are on an equal footing in this sense. The historical

¹¹⁰ Yash Ghai (2000). 'Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis', pp. 1-26 in Yash Ghai (ed.): *Autonomy and Ethnicity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹¹¹ See e.g. William H. Riker (1996). 'European Federalism. The Lessons of Past Experience', pp. 9-24 in J.J. Hesse and V. Wright (eds.): *Federalizing Europe? The Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Robert Agranoff (1996). 'Federal Evolution in Spain', in *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 385-401; Svante E. Cornell (2002). 'Autonomy as a Source of Conflict – Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective',

dimension is included, this aspect emerges when discussing the historical strategic importance. All other possible explanations are derived from the present situation.

First, there is a theoretical discussion about every explanatory factor and then the operationalization of each factor is included in every section dealing with each indicator. A final section deals with the first analysis according to fuzzy-set as a set-up explaining the necessary conditions for the territorial autonomies. This analysis will illustrate how well each indicator fits according to the entities in question.

4.1 The State Related Factor: Democracy versus Authoritarianism

Democracy as a concept is derived from the Greek – *demos*, meaning the people, and *kratos*, meaning authority.¹¹² One of the primary arguments for representative democracy and used in the defense of it, is that it is the best system for governing a complex society with different and pluralistic interests. As Ghai argues, it is evident that of all autonomy arrangements in liberal societies, communist states and developing countries, the most successful examples are found in liberal democracies.¹¹³ Liberal democracies have long traditions of the rule of law, and therefore pluralism is valued and there is respect for cultural, ethnic and religious differences. The law functions as a guarantor for the relations between the center and the regions and defines the powers of respective governments.¹¹⁴ In the Jacobin democracy, where every person enjoys equality, ethnic autonomy would be unnecessary, for instance, since most ethnically specific needs can be fulfilled under existing conditions, because the state permits or facilitates such fulfillment.¹¹⁵ The criteria for determining an ethnic or religious minority's entitlement to autonomy is then seen through the political and socioeconomic context of the country as a whole. The role of territorial autonomy is a disputed matter, but the argument in its favor is

in *World Politics*, Vol. 54, No. 2, January 2002, pp. 245-276; Daniel J. Elazar (1996). 'From Statism to Federalism – A Paradigm Shift', in *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 417-429.

¹¹² R.J. Jackson and D. Jackson (1993). *Contemporary Government and Politics – Democracy and Authoritarianism*. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, p. 69.

¹¹³ Y. Ghai (2000) op.cit., p. 16.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

that it maintains the external borders of the state, thus preserving its sovereignty, and may even help to give expression to institutional pluralism.¹¹⁶

Authoritarianism is used to depict regimes which contrast with democracy by being more based on the obedience of citizens rather than on their consent. It is considered to be a very old form of government because of its association with tyrants, despots, monarchs, sultans and czars. These states are often on the extreme right or the extreme left of the political spectrum.¹¹⁷

Democracy involves specific rights and freedoms for the inhabitants of the country. This is specifically important in territorial autonomies since there are often minority groups present. Democratic principles underlie the mechanism allowing participation by minority groups in a country at the various levels of governance. In some countries, this takes the form of quota systems within the electoral systems or in others, different mechanisms may be established to secure minorities' participation within political systems. By granting a territorial unit autonomy, a compromise between conflicts of different interests is established as a means of securing territorial integrity.

Successful autonomy solutions are often based on constitutional consensus. The establishment of an autonomy regime is followed by negotiations with representatives between the central and the sub-national level. Formal acts of approval are enshrined in the representative bodies and the national parliament. The institutions of self-governance should be representative of those on whose behalf the autonomy is initially adopted.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ William Safran (2000). 'Spatial and Functional Dimension of Autonomy: Cross-national and Theoretical Perspectives', p. 19 in W. Safran and R. Máiz (eds.): *Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

¹¹⁶ Donald Rothchild and Caroline A. Hartzell (2000). 'Security in Deeply Divided Societies: The Role of Territorial Autonomy', p. 254 in W. Safran and R. Máiz (eds.), op.cit.

¹¹⁷ R.J. Jackson and D. Jackson (1993), op.cit., p. 72.

¹¹⁸ Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (2005). 'Recent trends in autonomy and state construction', pp. 265-267 in Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (eds.): *Autonomy, Self-governance and Conflict Resolution*. London and New York: Routledge.

As mentioned previously, it has been argued by many authors that autonomy arrangements are established in democratic environments, but the truth of this statement could be called into question. Is it possible that autonomy might also occur in authoritarian regimes and to what degree would this be possible, if this were the case? The reasoning is, naturally, that democratic regimes might be more flexible in their solutions dealing with different arrangements and have a sense of respect for differences within the countries. An authoritarian regime might oppress inhabitants to obey certain rules and there might not be much scope for diverse interests.

In this context, democracy is used as a feature of civil liberties and political rights. These dimensions include both the feature of elections and the feature of various freedoms according to human rights. There is extensive literature in this context. Carsten Anckar (2008), for instance, divides the different definitions of democracy surveyed into three categories.¹¹⁹ The first category is made up of authors who advocate a minimal definition of democracy, which only includes electoral dimension. A second category consists of authors who include both the electoral and civil rights dimension. A third group of authors incorporates democratic output into their definitions.¹²⁰ I follow the second category in this matter and proceed from a definition of democracy where attention is paid to both civil liberties and political rights. I found this important since territorial autonomies need to have a functional political system where people could exercise meaningful power and freely express alternative views. An important source dealing with these measures of democratic quality is without doubt Freedom House's annually conducted survey on political rights and civil liberties. This source is widely used by different researchers, and therefore has become a standard asset when conducting research.

Operationalization of Democracy

In the context of this study, the democracy status is derived from the Freedom House index. *Freedom in the World*, the publication of Freedom House, is the standard-

¹¹⁹ Carsten Anckar (2008). 'Size, Islandness, and Democracy: A Global Comparison', *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 437-438.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

setting comparative assessment of global political rights and civil liberties. Published annually since 1972, the survey ratings and narrative reports on 193 countries and 15 related and disputed territories are used by various actors and researchers.¹²¹ In this study, the rating position that has been used for the different countries is according to the latest rating of the territorial autonomies. The ratings used in this context are the ratings for the political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL). Some ratings, where they are available are separate ratings for the territorial autonomies in question. As mentioned in chapter 3, territorial autonomies occur in 25 countries. The fuzzy score are derived from the sum of each rating according to the calibration technique used in the fs/QCA program. In the first column of the table, the countries' name is stated, with the second column showing the ratings according to Freedom House of both political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) and the third column showing the sum of the rating's scores and the last column presents the fuzzy score according to the calibration technique.

Table 4: Democracy Ratings

Country	Freedom House		Sum	Fuzzy Score
	PR	CL		
Australia	1	1	2	0.99
Azerbaijan	6	5	11	0.08
China*	7	6	13	0.03
Hong Kong	5	2	7	0.50
Macau	6	4	10	0.14
Denmark	1	1	2	0.99
East Timor	3	4	7	0.50
Finland	1	1	2	0.99
France*	1	1	2	0.99
Wallis and Futuna	2	4	6	0.73
Italy	1	1	2	0.99
Mauritius*	1	2	3	0.98
Rodrigues	3	3	6	0.73

¹²¹ See <www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2006>The methodology of Freedom House is a scale running from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest degree of freedom. The scores are derived from survey investigations done in the countries.

Moldova	3	4	7	0.50
Netherlands	1	1	2	0.99
New Zealand	1	1	2	0.99
Nicaragua	3	3	6	0.73
Papua New Guinea	3	3	6	0.73
Philippines	3	3	6	0.73
Portugal	1	1	2	0.99
Serbia*	3	2	5	0.88
Kosovo	6	5	11	0.08
Spain	1	1	2	0.99
South Korea	1	2	3	0.98
Tajikistan	6	5	11	0.08
Tanzania	4	3	7	0.50
Ukraine*	3	2	5	0.88
Crimea	3	3	6	0.73
United Kingdom	1	1	2	0.99
USA	1	1	2	0.99
Uzbekistan	7	7	14	0.01

Sources: Freedom of the World <www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=21&year=2007>; Freedom in the Territories <www.mherrera.org/territories.htm>, accessed from the internet 17th October 2007. Countries with * indicate where there are different scores for the territories in question. For Hong Kong and Macau, for instance, the scores indicate that the regions are partly free, whereas China as a country is not free. Wallis and Futuna belonging to France have scores indicating a status of partly free, whereas France is free. Rodrigues in Mauritius is also partly free, while Mauritius is free. Kosovo in Serbia is not free, while Serbia is considered free; Crimea in Ukraine is considered partly free, while Ukraine is rated as free.

The table shows that the majority of countries are free, according to the Freedom House ratings. Fifteen countries are considered fully democratic. Six countries are partially free and four countries are not free at all. This illustrates the fact that democracy might be a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition, for territorial autonomies to occur. It is very interesting that territorial autonomies, in some cases, are established even in non-democratic environments. The ratings for the territorial autonomies are used according to the countries' ratings despite there being cases where separate ratings occur. The sum of the ratings provides a scale running from 2 to 14. The value of 2 indicates the fuzzy score of a full degree of democracy (i.e. $2 \geq 0.95$), the value of 7 indicates the cross-over point (i.e. 0.5) and value 10 indicates the lowest degree of democracy (i.e. $10 \leq 0.05$) in this context. As we can

see from the fuzzy scores, there is only one country which is out of the set of democracies, and that is Uzbekistan. A low degree of democracy is also found in other newly established states in the former Eastern block such as Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. China is almost out of the set of democracies, scoring 0.03, while the regions belonging to China have a higher score.

4.2 The Regional Specific Factors

The regional specific factors are conditions that are directly related to the regions in question. First, the historical strategic importance is considered and then other factors are deliberated on, such as geographical distance, possession of natural resources, and the existence of regional movements or parties and/or separatist groups.

4.2.1 Historical Strategic Importance

Many of the territorial autonomies have been military strategic outposts during both World Wars and during the Cold War. Other regions have functioned as colonies for their respective metropolitan powers. Some regions have even at times been disputed territories. During the 1960s, decolonization reached its climax with dependencies becoming sovereign states. In the 1960s and 1970s, decolonization became a global phenomenon as the Caribbean and South Pacific island microstates were established. By the 1980s, however, the pace of decolonization had slowed down. Decolonization was most rapid during the period of economic growth that coincided with diffusion and more widespread acceptance of notions of the nation-state.¹²² The island territories around the world could be considered remnants from the colonial heydays. Occasionally, states have changed borders, and therefore new maps have emerged, resulting in countries having different internal as well as external patterns.

The prospects of establishing autonomy arrangements are strongest when the state undergoes a regime change. A period of regime change provides opportunities for

¹²² Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998). *The Last Colonies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 7.

autonomy for a variety of reasons.¹²³ The leaders in charge of the transition in a country may have been opposed to the previous political system and a new balance of forces may facilitate the restructuring of the state. Groups wanting secession or autonomy may press their demands in a situation where a new regime may be weak. Autonomy could be established as a compromise among local groups or as a consequence of former colonial rulers.¹²⁴ The kind of autonomy which is associated with home rule or local self-government has a long tradition. It extends back into antiquity, at least to the time of the great empires, when imperial masters traded off respect for local leadership and local governing customs in exchange for tribute and the promise of security.¹²⁵

A general trend regarding the issue of self-determination and autonomy can be traced back to the period after the First World War. The League of Nations paid attention to autonomy issues in three distinctive ways. First, new countries were established as a result of the war; second, colonies which belonged to the defeated powers were taken over by the victorious powers and were organized under a special commission system; third, in over 20 of the peace treaties, arrangements for protection of minorities as well as autonomy were enforced.¹²⁶

Decentralization and autonomy could also be seen as a national project. Every country establishes its own system according to the currently existing circumstances. Hans-Joachim Heinze argues, for instance, that autonomy should not be seen as a static phenomenon but as a phenomenon changing through time and space.¹²⁷ This leads to different autonomy arrangements occurring during various periods. It can also be difficult to distinguish between territorial and non-territorial forms of autonomy in particular periods. Autonomy becomes a process of development.

¹²³ Yash Ghai (2000). *Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework of Analysis*, op.cit., pp. 14-15.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Robert Agranoff (2004). 'Autonomy, Devolution and Intergovernmental Relations', *Regional and Federal Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring 2004, p. 27.

¹²⁶ Lauri Hannikainen (1998). 'Self-Determination and Autonomy in International Law' in Markku Suksi (ed.): *Autonomy – Applications and Implications*. The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, p. 79.

Territorial autonomies have also been used for military or strategic advantages in terms of natural boundaries, access to the open sea, and control over transport routes and waterways.¹²⁸ Overseas outposts have functioned as geopolitical counters where rival powers have tried to secure military bases and intelligence stations in order to achieve their strategic goals.¹²⁹ Metropolitan states have often stationed troops, paramilitary officers, and weapons in territories as an affirmation of sovereignty. The troops can ward off real or perceived dangers of foreign attack or irredentist expansion by neighboring states.¹³⁰ The military presences in some regions also function as a means of giving assistance in natural disasters, training-grounds for war games and combat practice. Furthermore, supervision of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones are also protected by such troops.¹³¹

Territories where military bases are located benefit from government transfers, investments in infrastructure, local employment, and the income from the purchasing of goods by military personnel stationed there.¹³²

Operationalization of Historical Strategic Importance

Historical strategic importance is divided into whether or not the region has been a strategic military outpost or is still functioning as that today; whether or not the region has been a colonial territory for a considerably long time; and whether or not the region has become a territorial autonomy as a result of war or a conflict situation. Historical strategic importance will be considered as a possible explanation for the different degrees of autonomy.

There might be regions that have been both military outposts and colonies at the same time, and other combinations might also be possible. Table 5, which follows,

¹²⁷ Hans-Joachim Heinze (1998). 'On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy' in Markku Suksi (ed.) *op.cit.*, p. 19-20.

¹²⁸ Stefan Wolff and Marc Weller (2005). 'Self-Determination and autonomy: a conceptual introduction', p. 6 in Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (eds.): *Autonomy, Self-governance and Conflict Resolution*. London and New York: Routledge.

¹²⁹ Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998), *op.cit.*, p. 11.

¹³⁰ Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998), *op.cit.*, p. 169.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

illustrates the historical strategic importance in this context. The factors are indicated by a yes or a no, for simplification.

The fuzzy scores have been derived based on the following reasoning: if a region has a combination of all three indicators, it receives the value 1; if a region has a combination of two indicators, it receives the value 0.67. If the region only has one indicator present, it receives the value 0.33, and if the region lacks any of the indicators, it receives the value 0. The aforementioned, means that every indicator is equally important in this context.

Table 5: Historical Strategic Importance

Autonomy	Military Outpost	Colony	War or Conflict Resolution	Fuzzy Score
Åland Islands (Finland)	Yes	No	Yes	0.67
American Samoa (US)	Yes	Yes	No	0.67
American Virgin Islands (US)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Andalusia (Spain)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Anguilla (UK)	No	Yes	Yes	0.67
Aruba (NL)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Azores (Portugal)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Balearic Islands (Spain)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Basque Country (Spain)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Bermuda (UK)	Yes	Yes	No	0.67
Bougainville (Papua New Guinea)	No	Yes	Yes	0.67
British Virgin Islands (UK)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Canary Islands (Spain)	Yes	Yes	No	0.67
Catalonia (Spain)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Cayman Islands (UK)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Cook Islands (NZ)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Corsica (France)	No	No	No	0

¹³² Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998), op.cit., p. 190.

Crimea (Ukraine)	Yes	No	No	0.33
Falkland Islands (UK)	No	Yes	Yes	0.67
Faroe Islands (DK)	Yes	No	No	0.33
French Polynesia (France)	Yes	Yes	No	0.67
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Gagauzia (Moldova)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Galicia (Spain)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Gibraltar (UK)	Yes	Yes	No	0.67
Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Greenland (DK)	Yes	Yes	No	0.67
Guam (US)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Guernsey (UK)	Yes	No	No	0.33
Hong Kong (China)	Yes	Yes	No	0.67
Isle of Man (UK)	Yes	No	No	0.33
Jeju Island (South Korea)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Jersey (UK)	Yes	No	No	0.33
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan)	No	No	No	0
Kosovo (Serbia)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Macau (China)	Yes	Yes	No	0.67
Madeira (Portugal)	No	Yes	Yes	0.67
Mayotte (France)	Yes	Yes	No, but the Comoros claim the island	0.67
Mindanao (Philippines)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Montserrat (UK)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan)	Yes	No	Yes	0.67
Netherlands' Antilles (NL)	Yes	Yes	No	0.67
New Caledonia (France)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Niue (NZ)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Norfolk Island (Australia)	Yes	Yes	No	0.67

North Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	No	Yes	Yes	0.67
Northern Ireland (UK)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Northern Mariana Islands (US)	Yes	Yes	No	0.67
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor)	No	Yes	Yes	0.67
Pitcairn Islands (UK)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Puerto Rico (US)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Rodrigues (Mauritius)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Sardinia (Italy)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Scotland (UK)	No	No	No	0
Sicily (Italy)	No	No	Yes	0.33
South Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	No	Yes	Yes	0.67
St Helena and Dependencies (UK)	Yes	Yes	No	0.67
St Pierre and Miquelon (France)	No	Yes	Yes	0.67
Tokelau (NZ)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Valle d' Aosta (Italy)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Wales (UK)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Wallis and Futuna (France)	Yes	Yes	No	0.67
Zanzibar (Tanzania)	No	Yes	Yes	0.67

Sources: Main sources used: Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998): *The Last Colonies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Hurst Hannum (1996): *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination – The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; Maria Ackrén (2005): *Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk studie över de självstyrda områdena i världen*. Mariehamn: Ålands fredsinstitut; CIA – The World Factbook 2008 <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>>

The table reveals that a majority of the territorial autonomies are *de facto* former colonies (i.e. 42 regions). There are also many regions which have been granted

autonomy as a result of wars or conflict situations. Other regions have served as military outposts during different time periods. There are only three territorial autonomies that have not had any strategic importance during their history, according to this categorization. These are Corsica in France, Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan, and Scotland in the United Kingdom. Corsica, as mentioned below, received its autonomy as a consequence of a decentralization process in France during the 1980s. Karakalpakstan has been an autonomous republic in the former USSR, and when Uzbekistan became independent, the region continued as an autonomous region within the new republic. Scotland has been an independent state over its history but received its present autonomous status as a consequence of the British devolution system in 1998 (including Wales). There are six territories, which have a combination of all three indicators. These are the Azores in Portugal, Guam and Puerto Rico in the USA, Mindanao in the Philippines, New Caledonia in France, and Turks and Caicos Islands in the UK. These territories have all received the value 1 according to the fuzzy scores. A brief résumé of the twentieth-century follows, in order to give an overview of the overall development of established territorial autonomies.

After the First World War, asymmetrical institutions were established in the Åland Islands, Memel (a German-speaking region of Lithuania) and Danzig (a German-speaking city in Poland).¹³³ Nowadays, out of these regions, it is only the Åland Islands that still function as a territorial autonomy. The United Kingdom granted asymmetrical autonomy to both parts of Ireland in the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, but the act came into force only in Northern Ireland where it lasted until 1972 when Northern Ireland became autonomous.¹³⁴ A number of autonomous arrangements also occurred after the Second World War, especially in Italy including the regions of South Tyrol, Valle d'Aosta and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. After the Franco dictatorship in Spain, asymmetrical autonomy was granted to the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia. France granted a very limited form of autonomy to Corsica in 1982. Ukraine granted autonomy to Crimea in 1991 and Moldova granted autonomy

¹³³ John McGarry, Queen's University, Canada (2005). 'Asymmetrical Federalism and the Plurinational State'. Working Paper for the 3rd International conference on Federalism, Brussels, 3-5 March 2005, p. 1.

to Gagauzia in 1994. In Africa, some regions have been autonomous for a short period of time, such as Eritrea, which enjoyed autonomy from Ethiopia between 1952 and 1962, and Sudan's southern region had autonomy from 1972 to 1983 but the region is still a disputed matter. Zanzibar, though, has been able to hold its position as an autonomous region within Tanzania since 1964. In Asia, the Philippines have agreed to the autonomy of the Muslim region of Mindanao since 1996 and Papua New Guinea granted autonomy to Bougainville after 2002.¹³⁵ These are several cases of asymmetrical regions that have become autonomous during the twentieth century.

There are other cases where negotiations for asymmetrical autonomy arrangements are ongoing. These cases, however, are excluded in this study. See, for example, the section concerning the dubious cases.

4.2.2 Geographical Distance

Geographical distance is often seen as a center-periphery division in the research. Centers and peripheries can be seen from different perspectives such as geographic, economic, and cultural divisions where mobilization of resources is the major concern.¹³⁶ The convergence of institutional relations between the center and periphery often leads to decentralization or regionalization, and this has an effect on integration between the center and periphery. Local or intermediate governments increase their autonomy where they were once dependent.¹³⁷ Centers and their hinterlands are mutually dependent. A regional center, for instance, serves and depends upon the customer base found in hinterland settlements, while the hinterlands support and depend upon the regional center for specialized functions. Strong centers

¹³⁴ John McGarry, Queen's University, Canada (2005). 'Asymmetrical Federalism and the Plurinational State', *op.cit.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ See e.g. Karl W. Deutsch (1987). 'Towards the scientific understanding of nationalism and national development: the crucial contribution of Stein Rokkan', *European Journal of Political Research* **15**, pp. 653-666.

¹³⁷ Richard Balme, Philippe Garraud, Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot, Stéphane Le May & Evelyne Ritaine (1994). 'Analysing territorial policies in Western Europe: The Case of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain', *European Journal of Political Research*, **25**, p. 391.

can help to promote strong regions and are essential for global competitiveness.¹³⁸

The fact that regions are cut off from the rest of the country as a whole, could reflect the fact that they develop their own separate culture and view themselves as an agent affecting viability.¹³⁹ Distance may promote autonomy or even secession in some cases.

Geographical distance is considered to be one of the main factors for the successful occurrence of territorial autonomy regimes.¹⁴⁰ Distance from the mother country seems to be important in receiving a special status of some kind. Geographical distance might function as a hindrance for the national government to exercise control over its peripheral territories.¹⁴¹ Territories far away are problematic to govern effectively from the center.

Autonomy regimes often operate in remote or otherwise geographically unique locations, such as islands and enclaves.¹⁴² Territorial autonomies are recognized as constitutionally different from the mainland and distant from the metropolitan states. Their geographical basis as being attached to a particular nation-state is often a consequence of history.¹⁴³

Geographical distance can be measured as the distance between the autonomous region and its mainland and/or as proximity to a foreign country.¹⁴⁴ Other measurements of distances are related to the center-periphery relation according to powers of control. Change in any autonomy arrangement is usually made by the center in consensus with the territorial unit in question.¹⁴⁵ The communications

¹³⁸ Kathryn A. Foster (1997). 'Regional Impulses', *Journal of Urban Affairs*, Volume 19, Number 4, pp. 378-379.

¹³⁹ Jason Sorens (2005). 'The Cross-Sectional Determinants of Secessionism in Advanced Democracies', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3, April 2005, p. 319.

¹⁴⁰ W. Safran (2000). 'Spatial and Functional Dimensions of Autonomy: Cross-national and Theoretical Perspectives' in W. Safran and R. Máiz (eds.): *Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies*. London: Frank Cass Publishers, p. 22.

¹⁴¹ Pär M. Olausson (2007). *Autonomy and Islands: A Global Study of the Factors that Determine Island Autonomy*. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, p. 84.

¹⁴² Stefan Wolff and Marc Weller (2005), op.cit., p. 1.

¹⁴³ Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998), op.cit., p. 4.

¹⁴⁴ Pär Olausson (2007), op.cit., p. 83.

¹⁴⁵ Robert Agranoff (2004), op.cit., pp. 31-34.

between the decision-making centers are crucial for the autonomous regions to develop and take over more matters if they wish to do so.¹⁴⁶

Operationalization of Geographical Distance

Geographical distance is measured in this study according to the distance to the metropolitan capital. It is believed that the distance between the region's capital and the capital of the metropolitan state has a major impact on which kind of degree of autonomy has been implemented in the peripheral region in question. A longer distance from the metropolitan power should lead to a higher degree of autonomy, since it is believed that a longer distance gives the region possibilities to rule more freely on its own. The reason why the distance between capitals has been chosen is its reference to the different centers of major power and the major political power vested in the capital of a country or a region. The communication relating to the distribution of power is therefore outlined between the capitals. The fuzzy scores will be computed with the calibration technique within the fs/QCA program. Thresholds for long distance, middle distance, and short distance will be used when calibrating the fuzzy scores.

Table 6: The Geographical Distance

Autonomy	Distance (km)	Fuzzy Score
Åland Islands (Finland)	280 km	0.04
American Samoa (US)	11870 km	0.98
American Virgin Islands (US)	2650 km	0.17
Andalusia (Spain)	420 km	0.05
Anguilla (UK)	8750 km	0.90
Aruba (NL)	9650 km	0.94
Azores (Portugal)	1800 km	0.11
Balearic Islands (Spain)	525 km	0.05
Basque Country (Spain)	280 km	0.04
Bermuda (UK)	7200 km	0.79

¹⁴⁶ Daniel Elazar (1987). *Exploring Federalism*. Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, p. 37.

Bougainville (Papua New Guinea)	1000 km	0.06
British Virgin Islands (UK)	8700 km	0.90
Canary Islands (Spain)	1785 km	0.10
Catalonia (Spain)	490 km	0.05
Cayman Islands (UK)	9350 km	0.93
Cook Islands (UK)	3780 km	0.31
Corsica (France)	875 km	0.06
Crimea (Ukraine)	630 km	0.05
Falkland Islands (UK)	13500 km	0.99
Faroe Islands (DK)	1300 km	0.08
French Polynesia (France)	18450 km	1
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy)	420 km	0.05
Gagauzia (Moldova)	87,5 km	0.04
Galicia (Spain)	472,5 km	0.05
Gibraltar (UK)	1800 km	0.11
Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan)	300 km	0.04
Greenland (DK)	3450 km	0.26
Guam (US)	15670 km	1
Guernsey (UK)	262,5 km	0.04
Hong Kong (China)	2000 km	0.12
Isle of Man (UK)	402,5 km	0.04
Jeju Island (South Korea)	500 km	0.05
Jersey (UK)	280 km	0.04
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan)	800 km	0.06
Kosovo (Serbia)	245 km	0.04
Macau (China)	2000 km	0.12
Madeira (Portugal)	1092,5 km	0.07
Mayotte (France)	8800 km	0.91
Mindanao (Philippines)	900 km	0.06
Montserrat (UK)	8900 km	0.91
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan)	300 km	0.04
Netherlands' Antilles (NL)	9850 km	0.95
New Caledonia (France)	19800 km	1
Niue (NZ)	3375 km	0.25
Norfolk Island (Australia)	2295 km	0.14
North Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	400 km	0.04

Northern Ireland (UK)	490 km	0.05
Northern Mariana Islands (US)	15400 km	1
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor)	150 km	0.04
Pitcairn Islands (UK)	17640 km	1
Puerto Rico (US)	2500 km	0.16
Rodrigues (Mauritius)	550 km	0.05
Sardinia (Italy)	420 km	0.05
Scotland (UK)	507,5 km	0.05
Sicily (Italy)	420 km	0.05
South Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	250 km	0.04
St Helena and Dependencies (UK)	8100 km	0.87
St Pierre and Miquelon (France)	4500 km	0.42
Tokelau (NZ)	4320 km	0.39
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy)	455 km	0.05
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK)	8550 km	0.89
Valle d'Aosta (Italy)	577,5 km	0.05
Wales (UK)	210 km	0.04
Wallis and Futuna (France)	20745 km	1
Zanzibar (Tanzania)	400 km	0.04

Source: *Bonniers stora världsatlas* (1994). Bonnier Lexikon AB. Various scales and maps have been used, therefore the distances should be seen as a mere estimation. Distances have been drawn as straight lines without considering the longitudes and latitudes.

The distances are all given in kilometers in this context. Wallis and Futuna has the longest distance from a metropolitan state; its relation being with Paris in France. Other French regions lying in the periphery are New Caledonia and French Polynesia. Among the American regions, we find that Guam and Northern Mariana Islands are a long way from Washington D.C., and among the British regions, the Pitcairn Islands and the Falkland Islands are the most remote areas in relation to London. The closest areas in relation to their respective metropolitan capital are Gagauzia in relation to Moldova's capital Chisinau and Oecussi Ambeno in relation to East Timor's capital Dili.

The thresholds used for the fuzzy scores have been undertaken according to the following grounds: a long distance is indicated by 10 000 kms and over (as a full

membership in the set of long distance ≥ 0.95); the middle distance is indicated by 5 000 kms (as a cross-over point 0.5); and the short distance is indicated with 500 kms (as a non-membership in the set of long distance ≤ 0.05). As can be seen from the point of the fuzzy scores, most regions are not too distant from the metropolitan power. There are 17 territorial autonomies that reach high scores, but the majority of the regions are not too remote from their respective metropolitan state.

4.2.3 Possession of Natural Resources

Most Commonwealth regions (parts of the former British Empire) can be divided into four major categories in terms of their export orientation: agriculture and fisheries; petroleum and minerals; tourism and services; and a group that has a mixture of the above mentioned orientations.¹⁴⁷ One particular area of trade that has developed, especially in the Caribbean region, is offshore banking and financial services.¹⁴⁸

Natural resources can be divided into renewable and non-renewable resources. Renewable resources are, for example, in the form of coral reefs, forestry, fisheries and wildlife, while non-renewable resources are in the form of minerals. There are, of course, regions that have both renewable and non-renewable resources at the same time, such as beaches and wetlands. Even the climate can be counted in the mixed category.¹⁴⁹

Exploitation of natural resources can be regarded not only in negative terms, but also as including the development of natural resource assets or infrastructures (e.g. building a dam, planting trees, developing a mine, exploring petroleum). Natural resource exploitation also consists of the extraction of resources, the process of utilizing resources as utilities and the sale of processed products.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ *A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability* (1997). London: Commonwealth Secretariat, p. 34.

¹⁴⁸ *A Future for Small State...*, p. 35.

¹⁴⁹ *A Future for Small States...*, p. 86.

During the twentieth century, many national governments devolved control of natural resources to private individuals, community groups, or sub-national governments. One of the benefits of this form of decentralization is that it provides a basis for participation and collective action. The drawback, however, has been that national governments have often rescinded control over land and other resources only after the ecosystem and the economic productivity of the area have been badly degraded. In many cases, natural resource decentralization initiatives are also driven by strong international forces. Although environmental protection has now, become an important factor when dealing with natural resources.¹⁵¹

The possession of natural resources can be seen as a factor securing a region for having a special relationship between the region and the state. The region might be an important source for the exploitation of resources not found anywhere else within the state or for having assets for important utilities.

Control over natural resources is a complex issue. Many states, which recognize various forms of territorial autonomy, view sub-soil resources as part of state patrimony, and thus can be exploited by the central government in the best interests of state economic development.¹⁵² In all cases, the exploitation of natural resources is almost certain to heighten conflicts between local/regional communities and central authorities.¹⁵³ Indigenous peoples, for instance, living in peripheral regions have a spiritual idea of their relationship with the land and earth, which is basic to their existence and to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and culture.¹⁵⁴ Conflicts arise between indigenous groups and dominant populations regarding exploitation of natural resources, if state-defined development projects do not have indigenous consent, or if adequate compensation is not outlined.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ William Ascher (2007). 'Issues and Best Practices in the Decentralization of Natural Resource Control in Developing Countries', p. 293 in G. Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondelli (eds.) (2007): *Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices*.

¹⁵¹ William Ascher (2007), op.cit., pp. 293-295.

¹⁵² Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit., p. 465.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit., p. 91.

¹⁵⁵ Hurst Hannum (1996), op.cit, p. 85.

Generally, a territorial autonomy must have resources at its disposal. In a number of instances, institutions of self-governance have been left with significant tasks, but few financial or fiscal means to realize them. Sustainable autonomy settlements include a reasonable balance between the right to raise revenue locally, and the need to obtain additional funding from the center.¹⁵⁶

In Denmark, for example, the natural resources of Greenland and the Faroe Islands are treated differently. In Greenland, the natural resources are recognized in the Home Rule Act but the exploitation of the resources are to be managed according to a joint agreement between the Danish government and the Greenland government (*Landsstyre*).¹⁵⁷ Revenues are then to be divided equally between Greenland and Denmark. The Faroe Islands, on the contrary, manage their own natural resources, including what may be major oil deposits on the Faroese continental shelf.¹⁵⁸ Control and rights over natural resources seem to vary between different autonomy regimes. Some territories have exclusive rights and control over their own resources, while other regions have shared rule over these matters. It is not clear if specific natural resources lead to special status.

Operationalization of Possession of Natural Resources

Natural resources can be categorized as important, less important, or lacking. Important natural resources are those that can be exploited by industries and have the capacity to be extracted and transformed into other products. These include oil, gas and various forms of minerals. Less important natural resources are those that relate to the nutritional requirement of a region such as those impacting agriculture and fisheries. Some regions might have fertile soil for products such as fruits and vegetables, which do not grow anywhere else, or surrounding waters with unique fishing stocks. The lack of natural resources refers here to a negligible amount of

¹⁵⁶ Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (2005), *op.cit.*, p. 266.

¹⁵⁷ Robert Agranoff (2004), *op.cit.*, p. 46 and Hurst Hannum (1996), *op.cit.*, p. 345.

¹⁵⁸ Elisabeth Nauc ler (2005). 'Autonomy and multilevel governance: Experiences in Nordic and Continental European cooperation', p. 101 in Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (eds.): *Autonomy, Self-governance and Conflict Resolution*, *op.cit.*

natural resources or no resources at all. The categorization of each factor will be indicated with yes or no in the table.

The fuzzy scores are based on the following logic: if a region possesses both important and less important natural resources in combination, the region will receive the value 1; if the region only possesses important natural resources, the region will receive the value 0.67; and if the region only possesses less important natural resources, it will receive the value 0.33. The lack of natural resources will be graded with the value 0.

Table 7: Possession of Natural Resources

Autonomy	Important Resources	Less Important Resources	Lack of Natural Resources	Fuzzy Score
Åland Islands (Finland)	No	No	Yes	0
American Samoa (US)	No	Yes	No	0.33
American Virgin Islands (US)	Yes	No	No	0.67
Andalusia (Spain)	Yes	No	No	0.67
Anguilla (UK)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Aruba (NL)	Yes	No	No	0.67
Azores (Portugal)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Balearic Islands (Spain)	Yes	Yes	No	1
Basque Country (Spain)	Yes	No	No	0.67
Bermuda (UK)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Bougainville (Papua New Guinea)	Yes	No	No	0.67
British Virgin Islands (UK)	No	No	Yes	0
Canary Islands (Spain)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Catalonia (Spain)	No	No	Yes	0
Cayman Islands (UK)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Cook Islands (NZ)	No	No	Yes	0
Corsica (France)	No	No	Yes	0
Crimea (Ukraine)	Yes	No	No	0.67
Falkland Islands (UK)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Faroe Islands (DK)	Yes	Yes	No	1

	(possible)			
French Polynesia (France)	Yes	Yes	No	1
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy)	No	No	Yes	0
Gagauzia (Moldova)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Galicia (Spain)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Gibraltar (UK)	No	No	Yes	0
Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan)	Yes	Yes	No	1
Greenland (DK)	Yes	Yes	No	1
Guam (US)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Guernsey (UK)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Hong Kong (China)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Isle of Man (UK)	No	No	Yes	0
Jeju Island (South Korea)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Jersey (UK)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan)	Yes	Yes	No	1
Kosovo (Serbia)	No	No	Yes	0
Macao (China)	No	No	Yes	0
Madeira (Portugal)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Mayotte (France)	No	No	Yes	0
Mindanao (Philippines)	Yes	Yes	No	1
Montserrat (UK)	No	No	Yes	0
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan)	Yes	No	No	0.67
Netherlands' Antilles (NL)	Yes	No	No	0.67
New Caledonia (France)	Yes	No	No	0.67
Niue (NZ)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Norfolk Island (Australia)	No	Yes	No	0.33
North Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	Yes	No	No	0.67
Northern Ireland (UK)	No	No	Yes	0
Northern Mariana Islands (US)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor)	No	No	Yes	0
Pitcairn Islands (UK)	Yes	Yes	No	1
Puerto Rico (US)	Yes	No	No	0.67
Rodrigues (Mauritius)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Sardinia (Italy)	Yes	No	No	0.67
Scotland (UK)	Yes	No	No	0.67

Sicily (Italy)	Yes	Yes	No	1
South Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	Yes	No	No	0.67
St Helena and Dependencies (UK)	No	Yes	No	0.33
St Pierre and Miquelon (France)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Tokelau (NZ)	No	No	Yes	0
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Valle d'Aosta (Italy)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Wales (UK)	Yes	No	No	0.67
Wallis and Futuna (France)	No	No	Yes	0
Zanzibar (Tanzania)	No	Yes	No	0.33

Sources: CIA - The World Factbook 2008 <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>> and other Encyclopedias on the Internet.

The table shows that there are 25 regions that have less important natural resources and only nine regions which possess both important and less important natural resources at the same time. There are 15 regions which possess only important natural resources and 16 regions which lack natural resources altogether.

4.2.4 Existence of Regional Movements, Parties and/or Separatist Groups

Political participation takes many forms and has different aims. Sometimes state nationalists object to asymmetrical arrangements that discriminate between regions on the basis of nationality, in this sense, meaning that the region's citizens are members of a distinct national community. States often seek to prevent such claims from arising by maintaining uniform centralization, by campaigns of assimilation, and even by banning political parties that claim to speak for national minorities.¹⁵⁹ Other states permit autonomy, but ensure at the same time, that the borders of the regions are drawn in such a fashion that they do not serve as a focus for minority claims.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ John McGarry, Queen's University, Canada (2005), op.cit., p. 4.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

Establishing a special relationship between a region's government and its people is considered a means of encouraging loyalties to that government. On the other hand, asymmetrical forms of government are said to threaten the core principles of liberty and equality. Establishing a regional government on the basis of nationality suggests ownership of the region by a particular group and second-class citizenship for those outside the group. It also suggests that members of the common legislature from the asymmetrically autonomous region will be able to influence decisions that do not affect their region, while members from the rest of the country will have no say in the asymmetrically autonomous region.¹⁶¹

The basis for ethnic mobilization can be seen through a variety of cultural markers: the use of skin color in the United States, language in Canada, tribal loyalties in Africa, religion in Northern Ireland and so on. Some movements demand outright secession; others aim for autonomy or pursue equal rights within the prevailing political system. These movements can be seen as powerful expressions of group identity and a desire for a more equitable distribution of political economic resources.¹⁶² Secessionist parties usually favor independence within a customs union arrangement, as the *Scottish National Party* (SNP) proposes with the respect to the European Union, and the *Parti Québécois* (PQ) with respect to Canada.¹⁶³ Regional parties, on the other hand, are primarily organized to defend regional interests and traditions, but this defense often takes the form of closer integration with the center. The aim of many regional parties is to capture more resources from the center rather than to become more autonomous.¹⁶⁴

Development can lead to a rise in ethnic mobilization, since it provides resources to ethnic groups in the periphery. This increases their bargaining position and organizational capacity for action.¹⁶⁵ Countries with significant secessionist parties,

¹⁶¹ John McGarry, Queen's University, Canada (2005), op.cit., pp. 4-5.

¹⁶² Rita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset (1992-93). 'Racial and Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 107, No. 4 (Winter 1992-1993), p. 586.

¹⁶³ Jason Sorens (2004). 'Globalization, secessionism, and autonomy', *Electoral Studies* 23, p. 728.

¹⁶⁴ Jason Sorens (2005). 'The Cross-Sectional Determinants of Secessionism in Advanced Democracies', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3, April 2005, p. 315.

¹⁶⁵ Rita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset (1992-93), op.cit, p. 596.

for instance, are more likely to decentralize rather than place emphasis on regions. Governments offer autonomy to regions to reduce the appeal of secessionist claims.¹⁶⁶

In the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), it is stated that:

All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.¹⁶⁷

If a state contains a section of the population that constitutes a “people” or a “nation”, then they are considered to have a right to self-determination in relation to that state. It is commonly held that such a “people” have some right to a special status of autonomy within the state.¹⁶⁸

Operationalization of the Variable

The existence of regional movements/parties, separatist movements/groups and national parties has been dichotomized according to whether or not the region has any parties or movements.

The fuzzy scores are determined from the dichotomous characteristics of having a regional movement/party or not, having a separatist movement or not, and having national parties or not. There are six combinations. A region can have all three characteristics and then receive the value 1, a region can have regional parties in combination with separatist movements and receive the value of 0.83, and the region can have regional parties in combination with national parties and receive the value of 0.66. If the region only has regional parties, it receives the value of 0.50; if the region only has national parties available, it receives the value of 0.33; finally, if the region does not have any parties or movements present, it receives the value of 0.16. The

¹⁶⁶ Jason Sorens (2004), op.cit., pp. 740-741.

¹⁶⁷ John Kilcullen (2008). ‘Self-Determination and the Right to Establish a Government’, Working Paper <<http://www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockham/HelsinkiB.html>>, accessed from Internet 17 March 2008. See also Menschenrechte. Dokumente und Deklarationen, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn, 1999, pp. 60 and 71.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

value of 0.16 explains the fact that there is still political activism available in the form of independent candidates and whether parties or movements do not exist.

The assumption is that if a region has all three characteristics available, it is a stronger region and has, therefore, a higher degree of autonomy. Regional movements/parties and separatist movements are considered as a stronger autonomy aspect than national parties. A regional identity might have been developed through these regional movements and there might be stronger links to the degree of autonomy in that perspective.

Table 8: Existence of Regional Movements, Parties and/or Separatist Groups

Autonomy	Regional Movement/Party	Separatist Movement	National Parties	Fuzzy Score
Åland Islands (Finland)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
American Samoa (US)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Am. Virgin Islands (US)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Andalusia (Spain)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Anguilla (UK)	Yes	No	No	0.50
Aruba (NL)	Yes	No	No	0.50
Azores (Portugal)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Balearic Islands (Spain)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Basque Country (Spain)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Bermuda (UK)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Bougainville (PNG)	Yes	Yes	No	0.83
British Virgin Islands (UK)	Yes	No	No	0.50
Canary Islands (Spain)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Catalonia (Spain)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Cayman Islands (UK)	Yes	No	No	0.50
Cook Islands (NZ)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Corsica (France)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Crimea (Ukraine)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66

Falkland Islands (UK)	No	No	No	0.16
Faroe Islands (DK)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
French Polynesia (France)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Gagauzia (Moldova)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Galicia (Spain)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Gibraltar (UK)	Yes	No	No	0.50
Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Greenland (DK)	Yes	Yes	No	0.83
Guam (US)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Guernsey (UK)	No	No	No	0.16
Hong Kong (China)	Yes	No	No	0.50
Isle of Man (UK)	Yes	No	No	0.50
Jeju Island (South Korea)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Jersey (UK)	Yes	No	No	0.50
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Kosovo (Serbia)	Yes	Yes	No	0.83
Macau (China)	Yes	No	No	0.50
Madeira (Portugal)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Mayotte (France)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Mindanao (Philippines)	Yes	Yes	No	0.83
Montserrat (UK)	Yes	No	No	0.50
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Netherlands' Antilles (NL)	Yes	No	No	0.50
New Caledonia (France)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Niue (NZ)	Yes	No	No	0.50
Norfolk Island (Australia)	No	No	No	0.16
North Atlantic Autonomous Region	Yes	No	Yes	0.66

(Nicaragua)				
Northern Ireland (UK)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Northern Mariana Islands (US)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Pitcairn Islands (UK)	No	No	No	0.16
Puerto Rico (US)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Rodrigues (Mauritius)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Sardinia (Italy)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Scotland (UK)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Sicily (Italy)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
South Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
St Helena and Dependencies (UK)	No	No	No	0.16
St Pierre and Miquelon (France)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Tokelau (NZ)	No	No	No	0.16
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Turks- and Caicos Islands (UK)	Yes	No	No	0.50
Valle d'Aosta (Italy)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Wales (UK)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Wallis and Futuna (France)	Yes	No	Yes	0.66
Zanzibar (Tanzania)	Yes	Yes	No	0.83

Sources: CIA – The World Fact Book 2007 <<http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/>>; List of active autonomist and secessionist movements <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_autonomist_and_secessionist_movements>, accessed from Internet 4th December 2007.

Looking at the table, it can be seen that there are several territorial autonomies that reach the value 1; fourteen regions having all three aspects available. Six autonomies do not have any political movements or parties at all. These regions are the Falkland Islands, Guernsey, Norfolk Island, Pitcairn Islands, St Helena and Dependencies, and

Tokelau. In the parliaments in these regions, there are only independent candidates as representatives. Five regions have a combination of regional and separatist movements/parties. These regions are Bougainville, Greenland, Kosovo, Mindanao and Zanzibar. The majority of the regions have a combination of regional movements/parties and national parties.

4.3 The Factors Affecting the Relationship between State and Region

Factors affecting the relationship between state and region are potential explanations for territorial autonomy related to the level of the state. Ethnic distinctiveness is considered to be one of the most important factors in this case and is therefore given more consideration than other factors. Diverse perspectives exist on the concept of ethnicity and its relationship to the concept of minority. Therefore, the concept of ethnicity is outlined in the first section and the concept of minority is then scrutinized in a more general manner. Second, ethnic distinctiveness is believed to lead to autonomy, to a certain degree, especially in countries with several minorities, or where minorities are in a majority within a delimited territory. The assumption is that ethnic distinctiveness, in some form, gives rise to a certain degree of autonomy. The operationalization is considered in the last section of the first part of the study and then the size factor and economic viability are discussed once more in relation to the mother country.

4.3.1 Ethnic Distinctiveness

The concept of ethnicity has been used within anthropology since the 1950s and 1960s and is still a central concept in the research. The term came into being in the United States to signify the quality of belonging to an ethnic group within a larger national state and territory. In this sense, ethnicity denoted minorities.¹⁶⁹ The European sociological tradition does not focus exclusively on minorities. Ethnicity is seen in this context as a quality that can pertain to large and dominant groups such as

¹⁶⁹ Anthony D. Smith (2006). 'Ethnicity and Nationalism', p. 170 in Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar (eds.): *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*. London: Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications Ltd.

the French or Poles as well as small groups such as the Frisians and Pomaks.¹⁷⁰ The ancient Greek term *ethnos* covers everything from a small band to a large nation.¹⁷¹

In social anthropology, ethnicity refers to aspects of relationships between groups, who think of themselves as being different and who also are seen as culturally different by others.¹⁷² In addition, the concept has its place within other social and cultural disciplines. Within sociology, a similar definition is used, but here the concept has a wider meaning. Besides referring to cultural praxis and cultural values, characteristics such as languages, historical heritages, religions, clothing, and customs are also included.¹⁷³ Ethnicity could also refer to a collective consciousness – a “we-feeling”- that is not followed by the primordial characteristics (such as language, religion, heritage and the like). In this sense, ethnicity could be a situational or an instrumental process where the experience is determined by some kind of common project with a common future. The experience is according to this definition, a subjective feeling of “we” in contradiction to “the others”. If the group experiences an external threat, then the ethnic consciousness might be strengthened and lead to a struggle for material resources and cultural survival. According to this approach, an ethnic group is a collection of individuals that organize themselves to reach their specific goals.¹⁷⁴

Anthropologists have differentiated between different ‘levels’ of ethnicity. At the lowest level, we encounter a mosaic of ethnic categories: groupings of individuals classified as such by others or outsiders who endow them with a name, and look for commonalities according to cultural characteristics (e.g. a dialect or customs) and perhaps even a link to a specific location. At this level, the members of the ethnic group are aware of who they are not, but have no idea of themselves as a distinct cultural group with a common relationship. It is at the next level where ethnic

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Thomas Hylland Eriksen (1993). *Ethnicity & Nationalism – Anthropological Perspectives*, pp. 1-6. London: Pluto Press.

¹⁷³ Anthony Giddens (1994). *Sociologi*, Volym 2, p. 52. Lund: Studentlitteratur.

networks and associations with common activities and purposes come into play. This leads to a sense of collective selfhood, at least among elites. At this point, oral traditions evolve and often shared myths of common ancestry and ties of presumed descent become important. Finally, at the most developed level, an ethnic community is aware of 'who' they are, 'where' and 'when' they are, together with an ethno-history, for example, in chronicles and epics, and at this level a sense of solidarity emerges.¹⁷⁵

An ethnic group remains more or less discrete but is conscious of and in contact with members of other ethnic groups. This means that ethnic groups are established through contacts with others. Group identity is defined in relation to what they are not, i.e. in relation to non-members of the groups. The concept of an ethnic group has come to mean approximately the same as 'people'.¹⁷⁶ Ethnic groups could also be defined according to physical similarities, or similarities in customs, or both, or due to memories of colonization or migration, where they have a notion of common heritage and where this heritage becomes very important for the occurrence of group formation. In this sense, it is insignificant if there is any ties of blood or not (compare this with the concept of race).¹⁷⁷ Ethnic groups are often locally rooted and their cultural identity is connected to a certain region's ecological peculiarities and a specific way of resource exploitation. If this condition is altered, then separatist movements can emerge. During the colonialism in Central America, for example, there were conflicts regarding the use of land.¹⁷⁸

It is estimated that there are about 5,000 ethnic groups in approximately 160 states in the world. This implies that just one state out of ten could be considered homogenous regarding ethnicity.¹⁷⁹ This also indicates that the borders between different peoples do not follow national borders. Other figures state that there are over 600 living

¹⁷⁴ Björn Hettne (1990). *Etniska konflikter och internationella relationer*, pp. 22-24. Göteborg: Padrigu Papers.

¹⁷⁵ A.D. Smith, op.cit., pp. 171-172.

¹⁷⁶ T.H. Eriksen, op.cit., pp. 9-10.

¹⁷⁷ Max Weber (1983). *Ekonomi och samhälle – Förståendesociologins grunder I*, p. 277. Lund: Argos.

¹⁷⁸ B. Hettne, op.cit., p. 40.

¹⁷⁹ B. Hettne, op.cit., p. 55.

language groups in 184 states in the world.¹⁸⁰ There are many more ethnic groups than there are ethnic nationalist movements.¹⁸¹

Ethnic identity is approximately the same as class-consciousness, a proposed order, or a categorical identity.¹⁸² Personal relationships dominate in more simple societies. A typical conception in these circumstances is that personal relationships and positions go hand in hand. In more complex societies, the personal relationships are more diversified and the relationships are at many levels at the same time. The individuals have different networks and frames of reference.¹⁸³ A society is considered to be ethnically homogenous if its citizens belong to one and the same cultural and linguistic tradition, or heterogeneous if there is a division of the population in two or several different cultural and linguistic groups.¹⁸⁴

Ethnically divided societies, where ethnic communities are geographically settled, tend to have decentralized state systems. These systems can, of course, differ in nature such as federalism in Switzerland, Austria and Belgium, regionalism in the Netherlands, and so forth. By contrast, ideologically divided societies tend to have centralized systems, although the degree of centralization may vary in each case as well as through time.¹⁸⁵

Politically, ethnic groups can be and are defined by their political aims. They are content to be called minorities if their aspirations do not extend beyond special linguistic, educational, or religious facilities. They proclaim their ethnicity if the goal is a particular form of autonomy. Furthermore, they may even designate themselves a 'nation' or a 'nationality' if they aim to establish a separate state of their own.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁰ Will Kymlicka (1998). *Multicultural Citizenship*, p. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹⁸¹ *Encyclopedia of Nationalism* (2001). Volume 2, p. 152. San Diego: Academic Press.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ Joseph Marko (1995). *Autonomie und Integration*, pp. 129 and 137, Rechtsinstitute des Nationalitätsrechts im funktionalen Vergleich. Wien-Köln-Graz: Böhlau Verlag.

¹⁸⁴ J-E Lane & S. Ersson (1994). *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, 3rd Edition, p. 75. London: Sage Publications.

¹⁸⁵ Sergio Fabbrini (2000). 'Political Change without Institutional Transformation: What Can We Learn from the Italian Crisis of the 1990s?', *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 21, No. 2(April, 2001), p. 179.

¹⁸⁶ Yash Ghai (2000). 'Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis', p. 7 in Yash Ghai (ed.): *Autonomy and Ethnicity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Autonomy is sometimes seen as a device to allow ethnic or other groups, claiming a distinct identity, to exercise direct control over affairs of special concern to them. The geographical concentration of a group is essential to territorial autonomy.¹⁸⁷

Territorial autonomy can reassure minority groups about their ability to control social, cultural, and economic matters that are important to the maintenance of communal identities and interests. The aim is to cede responsibilities over specified subjects, and a certain degree of self-determination, to a group that constitutes the majority in a specific region.¹⁸⁸ Autonomy becomes the top of the hierarchy and constitutes the maximum legal status a minority may achieve within a state.¹⁸⁹

Societies can be classified on the basis of their level of ethnic heterogeneity through an index which measures the distribution of the population according to ethno-linguistic fragmentation. In such a case, the probability of two random people belonging to various ethno-linguistic groups is an approximation. Compare this with Rae's and Taylor's fractionalization index, which computes the ethnic, linguistic and religious fragmentation. In this sense, we get a value between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates low fragmentation and 1 high fragmentation.¹⁹⁰ Another approach is to look at the percentage of the population using the dominant language or belonging to the dominant ethno-linguistic group.¹⁹¹

Definitions on Minority

The concept of ethnicity is closely related to the term of minority, which has just been mentioned. According to the *World Directory of Minorities*, a minority must be a non-

¹⁸⁷ Yash Ghai (2000), op.cit., p. 8.

¹⁸⁸ Donald Rothchild and Caroline A. Hartzell (2000). 'Security in Deeply Divided Societies: The Role of Territorial Autonomy', pp. 259-260 in William Safran and Ramón Máiz (eds.): *Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies*, op.cit.

¹⁸⁹ Georg Brunner and Herbert Küpper (2002). 'European Options of Autonomy: A Typology of Autonomy Models of Minority Self-Governance', p. 17 in Kinga Gál (ed.), op.cit.

¹⁹⁰ Carsten Anckar, Márten Eriksson and Jutta Leskinen (2002). 'Measuring Ethnic, Linguistic and Religious Fragmentation in the World'. Department of Political Science, Åbo Akademi University, Occasional Papers Series Nr 18/2002.

¹⁹¹ J-E Lane & S. Ersson, op.cit., p. 75.

dominant group. Its members should possess ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population. They must also show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion, or language.¹⁹² This definition could be said to originate from the American tradition. Another very similar definition is Francesco Capotorti's definition concerning groups that are numerically inferior to the rest of the population of the State, in a non-dominant position, whose members possess the same characteristics as mentioned above (i.e. ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics).¹⁹³ A third definition similar to the previous two is Jules Deschênes' definition, but he goes a little bit further and includes not only the non-dominant position and the special characteristics with the sense of solidarity, but also a collective will to survive and the minority's aim to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law.¹⁹⁴

There are several international documents that deal with definitions of minorities. According to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, recommendation 1201 states the following definition in Article 1: a national minority is:¹⁹⁵

A group of persons in a state who:

- a) reside on the territory of that state and are citizens thereof;
- b) maintain long-standing, firm and lasting ties with that state;
- c) display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics;
- d) are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest of the population of that state or of a region of that state;
- e) are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their traditions, their religion or the language

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, there is no satisfactory universal definition of the term "minority", which has proved acceptable. The difficulty in arriving at an acceptable definition lies in the variety of

¹⁹² Minority Rights Group International (ed.) (1997). *World Directory of Minorities*, p. xv. UK.

¹⁹³ G. Brunner and H. Küpper (2002). 'European Options for Autonomy: A Typology of Autonomy Models of Minority Self-Governance', p. 15 in Kinga Gál (ed.): *Minority Governance in Europe*. Budapest: LGI Books.

¹⁹⁴ Brunner and Küpper, op.cit., p. 15.

¹⁹⁵ Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly: *Recommendation 1201 (1993) on an additional protocol on the rights of national minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights*.

situations in which minorities exist. Some live together in well-defined areas while others are scattered throughout the state. Some minorities have a strong sense of collective identity on a well-remembered or recorded history while others retain only a fragmented notion of their common heritage. In certain cases, minorities enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy. In others, there is no past-history of autonomy or self-government. Some minority groups may require greater protections than others, for particular reasons, such a long period of residency in a country, or they have a stronger will to maintain and develop their own characteristics.¹⁹⁶

The most commonly used description of a minority in a given state can be defined as a non-dominant group of individuals who share certain national, ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which are different from those of the majority population.¹⁹⁷

Other groups of individuals may find themselves in situations similar to those of minorities. These groups include migrant workers, refugees, stateless individuals and other non-nationals. These groups do not necessarily share certain ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics. They are protected against discrimination by the general provisions of international law, and have their additional rights guaranteed in, for example: the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families; the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons; the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; and the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live.¹⁹⁸

Different countries use various concepts and dimensions for identifying and defining minority populations. These often involve references to numerical weight, racial or

<http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta93/erec1201.htm>, retrieved 14 December, 2006.

¹⁹⁶ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Fact Sheet No. 18 (Rev. 1)*, *Minority Rights*. Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/fs18.htm>, retrieved 14 December, 2006.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

ethnic origin, language, migration status, and religious affiliations.¹⁹⁹ Another problem is the collection of data and in several countries this kind of data is not collected because of privacy legislation or because it might be considered too sensitive.²⁰⁰

Within an autonomous territory there may be people of ethnic groups other than the one which constitutes the majority in the region in question. When establishing an autonomous regime, the rights of these groups must also be guaranteed.²⁰¹ Every autonomy regime should include guarantees for the respect of human rights and non-discrimination among all inhabitants. Similarly, a minority that has been granted autonomy should enjoy minority rights.²⁰²

Operationalization of Ethnic Distinctiveness

Ethnic distinctiveness is considered from the minority perspective where specific characteristics play a part. Ethnic distinctiveness, therefore, is taken to refer to a non-dominant group of individuals who share the dimensions of certain ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which are different from those of the majority population in a given state. The ethnic distinctiveness of a region is contrasted with the mother country in question. If the autonomy varies in some primordial characteristic, this is indicated by the language, religion, or ethnic origin. The territorial autonomies are compared in relation to their respective metropolitan power in this sense, as the ethnic origin should be different from the mother country in question. If, for instance, a region has an ethnic origin derived from African roots, but where the population of the mother country is derived from European descent, this will indicate the difference between the mother country and the region in question. Language has been indicated where the region has another official language than the state in question or where there might be various official languages used at the same time. Language also indicates cases where another majority language is used other than that of the overall

¹⁹⁹ Economic and Social Council (within UN): Economic Commission for Europe (2006). *Gender and Minorities*. ECE/CES/GE.30/2006/21. 3 July, 2006.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ruth Lapidoth (2001), op.cit.

country. Dialects or various accents will not be included. Religion will be indicated if there is a different religion practiced in the region than in the majority of the state it relates to. The major religions in the world have been considered with Christianity divided into Protestantism, Catholicism and other, since these religions are often in conflictual relationships with each other. More divisions in the different religions are not considered here due to the difficulty of differentiating between different religious communities. Some manner of ethnic distinctiveness is believed to lead to different degrees of autonomy in this context.

Table 9 provides an overview considering ethnic distinctiveness amongst territorial autonomies in the world. The fuzzy scores are divided according to the following logic: if a region differs in all three aspects, the region receives the value 1. If a region differs in two aspects, it receives the value 0.67. If a region only differs in one of the aspects, it receives the value 0.33. Finally, if a region does not differ in any aspect, it receives the value 0. This means that every primordial characteristic is equally important in this context.

Table 9: Ethnic Distinctiveness amongst Autonomies in the World

Autonomy	Ethnic Distinctiveness	Fuzzy Score
Åland Islands (Finland)	Language	0.33
American Samoa (US)	Language and ethnic origin	0.67
American Virgin Islands (US)	Ethnic origin	0.33
Andalucia (Spain)	No diversity	0
Anguilla (UK)	Ethnic origin	0.33
Aruba (NL)	Ethnic origin and language	0.67
Azores (Portugal)	No diversity	0
Balearic Islands (Spain)	Language	0.33
Basque Country (Spain)	Language	0.33
Bermuda (UK)	Ethnic origin and language	0.67
Bougainville (Papua New Guinea)	No diversity	0
British Virgin Islands (UK)	Ethnic origin	0.33
Canary Islands (Spain)	No diversity	0

²⁰² Ibid.

Catalonia (Spain)	Language	0.33
Cayman Islands (UK)	Ethnic origin	0.33
Cook Islands (NZ)	Ethnic origin	0.33
Corsica (France)	Language	0.33
Crimea (Ukraine)	Language	0.33
Falkland Islands (UK)	No diversity	0
Faroe Islands (DK)	Language	0.33
French Polynesia (France)	Language and ethnic origin	0.67
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy)	Language	0.33
Gagauzia (Moldova)	No diversity	0
Galicia (Spain)	Language	0.33
Gibraltar (UK)	Language and religion	0.67
Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan)	No diversity	0
Greenland (DK)	Language and ethnic origin	0.67
Guam (US)	Ethnic origin and religion	0.67
Guernsey (UK)	Language	0.33
Hong Kong (China)	Language and religion	0.67
Isle of Man (UK)	Language	0.33
Jeju Island (South Korea)	No diversity	0
Jersey (UK)	No diversity	0
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan)	Language	0.33
Kosovo (Serbia)	Ethnic origin, language and religion	1
Macau (China)	Language and religion	0.67
Madeira (Portugal)	No diversity	0
Mayotte (France)	Ethnic origin, language and religion	1
Mindanao (Philippines)	Religion	0.33
Montserrat (UK)	Ethnic origin	0.33
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan)	No diversity	0
Netherlands' Antilles (NL)	Ethnic origin and language	0.67
New Caledonia (France)	Ethnic origin and language	0.67
Niue (NZ)	Ethnic origin, religion and language	1
Norfolk Island (Australia)	Language	0.33
North Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	Ethnic origin and language	0.67

Northern Ireland (UK)	Language and religion	0.67
Northern Mariana Islands (US)	Ethnic origin and language	0.67
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor)	Language	0.33
Pitcairn Islands (UK)	Language and ethnic origin	0.67
Puerto Rico (US)	Language and religion	0.67
Rodrigues (Mauritius)	No diversity	0
Sardinia (Italy)	Language	0.33
Scotland (UK)	No diversity	0
Sicily (Italy)	No diversity	0
South Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	Ethnic origin and language	0.67
St Helena and Dependencies (UK)	Ethnic origin	0.33
St Pierre and Miquelon (France)	No diversity	0
Tokelau (NZ)	Ethnic origin and language	0.67
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy)	Language	0.33
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK)	Ethnic origin	0.33
Valle d'Aosta (Italy)	Language	0.33
Wales (UK)	Language	0.33
Wallis and Futuna (France)	Ethnic origin and language	0.67
Zanzibar (Tanzania)	Religion	0.33

Sources: Maria Ackrén (2005). *Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk studie över de självstyrda områdena i världen*. Mariehamn: Ålands fredsinstitut.; CIA - The World Factbook 2007 <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>>, Constitution Finder <<http://confinder.richmond.edu>> and various web-pages such as encyclopedias and government pages.

The table shows that eight autonomies differ when it comes to ethnic origin in relation to their respective mother country and eighteen autonomies differ in language. Language here means that the majority of the population in the region speaks a different mother tongue than the rest of the majority in their specific country, or that the region has several official languages in respect of its mother country. Mindanao in the Philippines, and Zanzibar in Tanzania, differ only in religion as both islands are Muslim territories. Thirteen autonomies have a combination of different language and ethnic origin in relation to their mother countries. Three autonomies (Kosovo, Mayotte, and Niue) differ in all three aspects in relation to their mother countries. Five autonomies differ in both language and religion. Guam differs in ethnic origin and religion. Fifteen autonomies have no differences in relation to their mother

countries. As can be observed, some kind of difference is very common. It seems that ethnic distinctiveness might be a sufficient condition for the occurrence of territorial autonomy.

4.3.2 Size

Size has been used in several studies as an independent variable. Dahl and Tufté (1973) saw a relationship between size and democracy; Hadenius (1992) also found a relationship between size and the level of democracy; additionally, Carsten Anckar, in his doctoral dissertation, has looked at the relationship between size and party systems in 77 states of the world.²⁰³ Krister Lundell has tested the relationship between size and electoral system choice in his doctoral dissertation, arguing that large countries tend to apply proportional systems to a higher extent than small countries.²⁰⁴ Dag Anckar writes, in a proposal for a research program, that size could have an effect on responsive rule in politics. He argues that as a consequence of size, smaller units are more prone to responsive rule than larger ones, even though this is in a form of dual relationship. The distance between leaders and the ordinary public is minimal and the possibilities for direct participation are guaranteed. On the other hand, since the units are small, specific problems occur. Resources are limited and units are politically and economically dependent on external actors. Dag Anckar furthermore, states that small units are less complex, more lucid and more open in their way of dealing with politics.²⁰⁵ In the field of international politics, the size of countries is seen as an assumption explaining the differences in their capabilities, and differences in size might also have an impact in leadership-styles and organizational climate in organization theory.²⁰⁶

²⁰³ See Carsten Anckar (1998). *Storlek och partisystem. En studie av 77 stater*. Åbo: Åbo Akademis förlag.

²⁰⁴ See Krister Lundell (2005). *Contextual Determinants of Electoral System Choice. A Macro-Comparative Study 1945-2003*. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press, pp.158-163.

²⁰⁵ Dag Anckar (1991). *Size, Remoteness, Type of Government: The Small Island States of the World*. Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-statsvetenskapliga fakulteten vid Åbo Akademi. Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Serie A:341, pp. 6-7.

²⁰⁶ Carsten Anckar (1997). 'Size and Democracy. Some Empirical Findings', p. 19 in Dag Anckar and Lars Nilsson (eds.) *Politics and Geography. Contributions to an Interface*. Mid-Sweden University Press.

In an article about size, insularity, and democracy, Dag Anckar and Carsten Anckar depart from Hadenius' work containing the assumption that island states are more democratic than others. While islands are, as a rule, small, and results indicate that size is connected to democracy, insularity is linked even more strongly with democracy.²⁰⁷ In a report from the Commonwealth Secretariat, economists show that there is a high correlation between population size and different economic indicators such as total GNP and land area.²⁰⁸ Another feature taking into account the relationship between size and other factors is research that considers the relationship between small states and vulnerability. It is argued that being small in size increases the necessity of facing high risks/threats which are unavoidable. Small states tend to face external constraints, risks, and threats which have an impact on them to a degree both qualitatively and quantitatively different from other states.²⁰⁹

Size, in the matter of categorizing states, has two major dimensions, one where population size matters and the other where territorial area matters. It is accepted that the more people living in an area, the larger the unit. Large units have therefore large populations, while small areas have small populations. When the territorial dimension is used, it is argued that large units have large areas at their disposal and small units have small areas.²¹⁰

In research considering microstates, an arbitrary cut-off point is often made at 1,000 km² or one million inhabitants.²¹¹ Microstates are then states with less than one million inhabitants. In the research on islands and island autonomy, it is argued that size is a determinant in the sustainability of political autonomy, but it is not the only factor. There are a number of various factors leading to the sustainability of political

²⁰⁷ Dag Anckar & Carsten Anckar (1995). 'Size, Insularity and Democracy', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 211-229.

²⁰⁸ *A Future for Small States. Overcoming Vulnerability* (1997). London: Commonwealth Secretariat, p. 8.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

²¹⁰ Dag Anckar (1991). *Världens små östater. Populationen jämfördespopulationer*. Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-statsvetenskapliga fakulteten vid Åbo Akademi. Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Serie A:350, p. 11.

²¹¹ Dag Anckar (1991). *Världens små östater ... op.cit.*, p. 18. and *A Future for Small States ... op.cit.*, p. 8.

autonomy.²¹² In autonomy research, size should be considered in combination with other factors.

The size of an ethnic group, for example, could function as an incentive for a state to accommodate that group, because otherwise it may disrupt the political system.²¹³ On the other hand, it might be less risky to accommodate smaller communities, because they represent little danger to the system.²¹⁴ The motivation for smaller, self-governing political units has been accentuated by the desires to make governments more responsive to the individual citizen and to give expression to primary group attachments.²¹⁵ Territorial autonomies function under the motto of, *Parva sub ingenti*, 'the small under the protection of the great'.²¹⁶ The metropolitan state often takes care of foreign affairs, defense, and security issues, while the autonomous region has total internal self-government.

Operationalization of Size

In my study, I connect size to territorial autonomy. This suggests an approach other than that dealing with countries, since my interest lies in sub-units within the states. In the previous investigation, I used various thresholds for population size. I divided the territorial autonomies according to four categories: territories with less than ten thousand inhabitants, territories with more than ten thousand but less than hundred thousand inhabitants, territories with over one hundred thousand but less than one million inhabitants, and lastly, territories with over one million but less than ten

²¹² Ronald L. Watts (2000). 'Islands in Comparative Constitutional Perspective', p. 33 in Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne (eds.): *Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands. The Resourcefulness of Jurisdiction*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. and New York: St. Martin's Press Inc.

²¹³ William Safran (2000). 'Spatial and Functional Dimensions of Autonomy: Cross-national and Theoretical Perspectives', p. 18 in William Safran and Ramón Máiz (eds.): *Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies*, op.cit.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ronald L. Watts (2000). 'Islands in Comparative Constitutional Perspective', p. 19 in Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne (eds.): *Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands...*, op.cit.

²¹⁶ Wayne MacKinnon (1998). 'Dependency and Development in Prince Edward Island', p. 175 in Godfrey Baldacchino & Robert Greenwood (eds.): *Competing Strategies of Socio-Economic Development for Small Islands*. An Island Living Series, Volume 2. Canada: The Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island.

million inhabitants.²¹⁷ This categorization was employed in the same manner when using states as units of investigation. This might not be the most appropriate way for sub-units. It would perhaps be better to address size in percentage points instead, computing the percentage of the population in the territorial autonomy in relation to the total population of the state in which the autonomy lies. This would also be better in a comparative view when comparing territorial autonomies with other regions within the states. Another problem relying on thresholds is that there are a number of territorial autonomies belonging to the same country in several cases. The share of the total population provides a more accurate picture of size according to the population as such. Large size is here considered to lead to a higher degree of autonomy than smaller size. This assumption is based on the logic that a larger population has more power to give to a voice for more autonomy.

The table below illustrates the size factor. I have included the population in the autonomous region and the area in square kilometers. The third column shows the percentage of the population in accordance with the total population of the country, where the autonomy lies. The last column shows the fuzzy scores according to the calibration technique as used in previous sections. The thresholds for the calibration are 10 percent for fuzzy values ≥ 0.95 (full inclusion in the set of large size), 5 percent for the cross-over point and 0 percent for the fuzzy value of ≤ 0.05 (full exclusion in the set of large size). The thresholds have been chosen according to the distribution of the cases in this context.

Table 10: Size according to Population and Area

Autonomy	Population	Area in km²	Percentage of the Total Population	Fuzzy Scores
Åland Islands (Finland)	26,700 (2005)	1 527 km ²	0.51 %	0.06
American Samoa (US)	57,800 (2006)	199 km ²	0.02 %	0.05
Am. Virgin Islands (US)	108,600 (2006)	1 910 km ²	0.04 %	0.05
Andalusia (Spain)	8,000,000 (2006)	87 268 km ²	19.78 %	1

²¹⁷ Maria Ackrén (2005), op.cit., p. 118.

Anguilla (UK)	13,500 (2006)	102 km ²	0.02 %	0.05
Aruba (NL)	71,900 (2006)	193 km ²	0.43 %	0.06
Azores (Portugal)	241,800 (2006)	2 333 km ²	2.27 %	0.16
Balearic Islands (Spain)	1,001,100 (2006)	4 992 km ²	2.48 %	0.18
Basque Country (Spain)	2,100,000 (2006)	7 234 km ²	5.19 %	0.53
Bermuda (UK)	65,800 (2006)	53,3 km ²	0.11 %	0.05
Bougainville (PNG)	175,200 (2000)	10 570 km ²	3.02 %	0.23
Br. Virgin Islands (UK)	23,100 (2006)	153 km ²	0.04 %	0.05
Canary Islands (Spain)	2,000,000 (2006)	7,447 km ²	4.94 %	0.49
Catalonia (Spain)	7,200,000 (2006)	32,114 km ²	17.80 %	1
Cayman Islands (UK)	45,400 (2006)	262 km ²	0.07 %	0.05
Cook Islands (NZ)	21,400 (2006)	236,7 km ²	0.52 %	0.06
Corsica (France)	264,000 (2002)	8 680 km ²	0.41 %	0.06
Crimea (Ukraine)	2,280,000	26 100 km ²	4.62 %	0.44
Falkland Islands (UK)	3,000 (2006)	12 173 km ²	0.005 %	0.05
Faroe Islands (DK)	47,300 (2006)	1 399 km ²	0.87 %	0.08
French Polynesia (France)	274,600 (2006)	4 167 km ²	0.43 %	0.06
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (I)	1,208,300	7 845 km ²	2.08 %	0.15
Gagauzia (Moldova)	170,000 (2005)	1 832 km ²	3.93 %	0.34
Galicia (Spain)	2,769,200	29 574 km ²	6.85 %	0.75
Gibraltar (UK)	27,900 (2006)	6,5 km ²	0.05 %	0.05
Gorno-Badakshan (Tajikistan)	250,000 (2004)	70 000 km ²	3.53 %	0.29
Greenland (DK)	56,400 (2006)	2 166 086 km ²	1.03 %	0.08
Guam (US)	171,000 (2006)	541,3 km ²	0.06 %	0.05
Guernsey (UK)	65,400 (2006)	78 km ²	0.12 %	0.05
Hong Kong (China)	6,940,400 (2006)	1 092 km ²	0.53 %	0.06
Isle of Man (UK)	75,400 (2006)	572 km ²	0.12 %	0.05
Jeju Island (South Korea)	583,000 (2006)	1 848 km ²	0.01%	0.05
Jersey (UK)	91,100 (2006)	116 km ²	0.15 %	0.05
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan)	1,200,000 (2005)	160 000 km ²	4.32 %	0.40
Kosovo (Serbia)	2,000,000 (2003)	10 887 km ²	19.70 %	1
Macau (China)	453,100 (2006)	28,2 km ²	0.03 %	0.05
Madeira (Portugal)	240,500 (2001)	794 km ²	2.26 %	0.16
Mayotte (France)	201,200 (2004)	374 km ²	0.32 %	0.06
Mindanao (Philippines)	2,803,800 (2000)	12 695 km ²	3.08 %	0.24
Montserrat (UK)	9,400 (2006)	102 km ²	0.02 %	0.05

Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan)	372,900 (2005)	5 500 km ²	4.60 %	0.44
Netherlands' Antilles (NL)	221,700 (2006)	960 km ²	1.34 %	0.10
New Caledonia (France)	219,200 (2006)	19 060 km ²	0.34 %	0.06
Niue (NZ)	2,200 (2006)	260 km ²	0.05 %	0.05
Norfolk Island (Australia)	1,800 (2006)	34,6 km ²	0.009 %	0.05
North Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	249, 700 (2005)	32 159 km ²	4.40 %	0.41
Northern Ireland (UK)	1,700,000 (2001)	13 843 km ²	2.80 %	0.21
Northern Mariana Islands (US)	82,500 (2006)	477 km ²	0.03 %	0.05
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor)	58,500 (2004)	815 km ²	5.40 %	0.56
Pitcairn Islands (UK)	45 (2006)	47 km ²	0.0000 %	0.05
Puerto Rico (US)	3,927,200 (2006)	13 790 km ²	1.30 %	0.10
Rodrigues (Mauritius)	40,000 (2006)	109 km ²	3.20 %	0.25
Sardinia (Italy)	1,655,700 (2006)	24 090 km ²	2.85 %	0.22
Scotland (UK)	5,094,800 (2005)	78 772 km ²	8.38 %	0.88
Sicily (Italy)	5,017,200 (2006)	25 703 km ²	8.63 %	0.90
South Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	382,100 (2005)	27 407 km ²	6.73 %	0.74
St Helena and Dep. (UK)	7,500 (2006)	413 km ²	0.01 %	0.05
St Pierre and Miquelon (France)	7,000 (2006)	242 km ²	0.01 %	0.05
Tokelau (NZ)	1,400 (2006)	10 km ²	0.03 %	0.05
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy)	962,500 (2004)	13 607 km ²	1.66 %	0.12
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK)	21,100 (2006)	430 km ²	0.03 %	0.05
Valle d'Aosta (Italy)	122,900 (2005)	3 263 km ²	0.21 %	0.05
Wales (UK)	2,935,300 (2005)	20,779 km ²	4.83 %	0.47
Wallis and Futuna (France)	16,000 (2006)	274 km ²	0.03 %	0.05
Zanzibar (Tanzania)	981,800 (2002)	2 332 km ²	2.49 %	0.18

Sources: Main sources used: Maria Ackrén (2005). *Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk studie över de självstyrda områdena i världen*. Mariehamn: Ålands fredsinstutit, CIA – The World Factbook 2008 < <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>>; Various government pages on the Internet.

The table shows that there are huge differences between the cases. The smallest region is the Pitcairn Islands with a population of only 45 inhabitants. The largest territory according to population is Andalusia in Spain with nearly eight million

inhabitants. The smallest territory according to area is Gibraltar with only 6.5 km² and the largest territory according to area is Greenland with over two million km². When considering the relative size in the relation to the metropolitan countries, it can be seen that Andalusia is the largest constituting 19.78 percent of the total population of Spain, followed by Kosovo and Catalonia in relation to the total population of Serbia and Spain respectively. These figures give a more accurate picture of the autonomies' relation within their respective countries. The relative size shows how large the territory really is in the context of their respective country.

The fuzzy scores reveal that most of the regions are small. Nine regions are positioned over the cross-over point of 0.5, but most regions are located in the lower end of the spectrum.

4.3.3 Economic Viability

Small territories often face problems related to a small local market, external shocks, high transport costs, lack of economies of scale, lack of know-how, and a one-way production focusing on just one product or service.²¹⁸ The most successful territories, however, have been those able to exploit new niches in the global circuits of capital, both legitimate and illegitimate. These regions have set themselves up as offshore financial centers. Financial service industries have particular attraction for overseas territories because other economic activities are weakly developed, and few local resources are required.²¹⁹ Furthermore, offshore financial centers also bring other sectors with them, such as banks, insurance companies, trust and company firms, ship management, stockbrokers etc.²²⁰

²¹⁸ Godfrey Baldacchino (2003). 'Jurisdictional Self-Reliance for Small Island Territories', *The Round Table*, Issue 365, January 2003, p. 349.

²¹⁹ R. Aldrich and J. Connell (1998). *The Last Colonies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 84-85. See also Mark P. Hampton and John Christensen (2002). 'Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies, Tax Havens, and the Re-configuration of Global Finance', *World Development*, Vol. 30, No. 9, pp. 1657-1673 for more information about OFCs and Tax Havens.

²²⁰ Stephen Carse (1998). 'Sustaining Small Island Development: Isle of Man', p. 271 in Godfrey Baldacchino & Robert Greenwood (eds.): *Competing Strategies of Socio-Economic Development for Small Islands*. An Island Living Series, Volume 2. Canada: The Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island.

Economic advances are said to occur in societies where innovation and creativity are encouraged. People must feel free to express their ideas and have the ability to participate in politics in a broad manner.²²¹ Small entities often make use of free trade, which allows them to use their resources to sell certain goods and buy those commodities they cannot produce by themselves. In this way, a global marketplace is created which leads to greater economic competition.²²² Jurisdiction could also be seen as a tool for economic development. Some of the most successful offshore dependencies around the world have inherited and maintained the core values of the British notion of the rule of law.²²³ Common Law practices can be seen to uphold confidential relationships between banker and client, strategic use of low or no direct taxes, and flexibility in developing commercial regulations and company laws.²²⁴

Investigations have shown that there is clear evidence of a positive association between political dependence on larger states and levels of real per capita income in small islands. An alternative explanation would be that each island economy has been converging to the income level of a counterpart large economy or economies in the core of the global economy, so that island living standards derive their relativities from sources external to the region. The studies, therefore, show that politically integrated island territories generally exhibit the highest per capita incomes. There is a strong convergence to the metropolitan GDP, while those territories, which are situated in the periphery, exhibit weaker convergence and hence lower incomes.²²⁵

Economic studies between non-sovereign islands and small island states reveal the fact that non-independent islands receive 36 times more bilateral aid than comparable

²²¹ Henry F. Srebrnik (2000). 'Identity, Culture and Confidence in the Global Economy', p. 57 in Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne (eds.): *Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands: The Resourcefulness of Jurisdiction*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press in association with Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island, Canada.

²²² Henry F. Srebrnik (200), op.cit., p. 61.

²²³ William R. McKercher (2000). 'The Isle of Man: Jurisdictional Catapult to Development', pp. 92, 103 in Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne (eds.), op.cit.

²²⁴ Mark Hampton (1998). 'Accident or Design? The Role of the State in Jersey's Development as an Offshore Finance Centre' pp. 293-295.

²²⁵ Geoffrey Bertram (2004). 'On the Convergence of Small Island Economies with Their Metropolitan Patrons', *World Development*, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 343-364.

independent island states.²²⁶ This naturally needs to be considered when looking at the economic viability of the territorial autonomies. Most territorial autonomies receive aid or subsidies from their mother country. There is a clear relationship of dependence established between the metropolitan state and the autonomous region in question, partly because of the autonomous region's wish to have the same living standards as the mainland. It could also be seen as insurance for the metropolitan state to have the autonomous region integrated into the economy of the country as a whole.

Operationalization of GDP/Capita

In this context, I used GDP/capita as the measurement of economic viability. This measurement is not without problems, but since I am dealing with regions, GDP/capita is the vital (and sometimes the only) measurement used for these territories. The operationalization of the variable was obtained from the World Bank Atlas methodology. The World Bank has used other measurements²²⁷ for their categorization, so here the limits between the categories are used as thresholds for what can be considered low income, lower middle income, upper middle income, and high income regions. The low-income group is categorized with US\$905 or less, the lower middle-income group is lying in the range US\$906-US\$3,595; the upper middle-income group is lying in between US\$3,596-US\$11,115 and the high-income group lies at US\$11,116 or more.²²⁸

To generate the fuzzy score, I used a value 1 for the high-income group, value 0.67 for the upper middle-income group, value 0.33 for the lower middle-income group and 0 for the low-income group. High income is supposed to lead to a high degree of autonomy.

²²⁶ Geoff Bertram & Bernard Poirine (2007). 'Island Political Economy', p. 352 in Godfrey Baldacchino (ed.): *A World of Islands*. Canada: The Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island in association with Agenda Academic, Malta.

²²⁷ World Bank uses per capita GNI (gross national income, formerly GNP) as their measurement dealing with the countries of the world, see e.g. <<http://go.worldbank.org/50KY0015VO>>, accessed from Internet 31 March 2008.

Table 11: GDP/Capita for the Territorial Autonomies:

Autonomy	GDP/Capita in USD	Fuzzy Score
Åland Islands (Finland)	35,690 (2000)	1
American Samoa (US)	5,800 (2005)	0.67
Am. Virgin Islands (US)	14,500 (2004)	1
Andalusia (Spain)	24,879 (2006)	1
Anguilla (UK)	8,800 (2004)	0.67
Aruba (NL)	21,800 (2004)	1
Azores (Portugal)	12,326 (1995)	1
Balearic Islands (Spain)	29,943 (2002)	1
Basque Country (Spain)	30,680 (2004)	1
Bermuda (UK)	69,900 (2004)	1
Bougainville (PNG)	819 (1988)	0
Br. Virgin Islands (UK)	38,500 (2004)	1
Canary Islands (Spain)	16,445 (1999)	1
Catalonia (Spain)	24,858 (2005)	1
Cayman Islands (UK)	43,800 (2004)	1
Cook Islands (NZ)	9,100 (2005)	0.67
Corsica (France)	26,752 (2006)	1
Crimea (Ukraine)	1,576 (1999)	0.33
Falkland Islands (UK)	25,000 (2002)	1
Faroe Islands (DK)	45,250 (2006)	1
French Polynesia (France)	17,500 (2003)	1
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy)	29,260 (2000)	1
Gagauzia (Moldova)	-	0.33*
Galicia (Spain)	15,630 (2001)	1
Gibraltar (UK)	27,900 (2000)	1
Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan)	-	0.33*
Greenland (DK)	20,000 (2001)	1
Guam (US)	15,000 (2005)	1
Guernsey (UK)	44,600 (2005)	1
Hong Kong (China)	37,300 (2006)	1
Isle of Man (UK)	35,000 (2005)	1

²²⁸ To see the categorizations visit World Bank <<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf>>, accessed from Internet 31 March 2008.

Jeju Island (South Korea)	16,457 (2006)	1
Jersey (UK)	57,000 (2005)	1
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan)	-	0.33*
Kosovo (Serbia)	1,066 (2001)	0.33
Macau (China)	24,300 (2005)	1
Madeira (Portugal)	19,000 (2000)	1
Mayotte (France)	4,900 (2005)	0.67
Mindanao (Philippines)	-	0.33*
Montserrat (UK)	3,400 (2002)	0.33
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan)	-	0.67*
Netherlands' Antilles (NL)	16,000 (2004)	1
New Caledonia (France)	15,000 (2003)	1
Niue (NZ)	5,800 (2003)	0.67
Norfolk Island (Australia)	45,343 (1996)	1
North Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	-	0.33*
Northern Ireland (UK)	19,940 (2000)	1
Northern Mariana Islands (US)	12,500 (2000)	1
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor)	560 (2004)	0
Pitcairn Islands (UK)	-	0.33*
Puerto Rico (US)	19,300 (2006)	1
Rodrigues (Mauritius)	3,754 (2001)	0.67
Sardinia (Italy)	19,360 (2000)	1
Scotland (UK)	22,690 (2000)	1
Sicily (Italy)	16,780 (2000)	1
South Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	-	0.33*
St Helena and Dependencies (UK)	2,500 (1998)	0.33
St Pierre and Miquelon (France)	7,000 (2001)	0.67
Tokelau (NZ)	1,000 (1993)	0.33
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy)	34,940 (2000)	1
Turks- and Caicos Islands (UK)	11,500 (2002)	1
Valle d'Aosta (Italy)	31,570 (2000)	1
Wales (UK)	19,280 (2000)	1
Wallis and Futuna (France)	3,800 (2004)	0.67
Zanzibar (Tanzania)	303 (2004)	0

Sources: CIA – The World Factbook 2007 <<http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/>>; Maria Ackrén (2005). *Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk studie över de*

själstyrda områdena i världen. Mariehamn: Ålands fredsinstitut, pp. 106-107;
 <<http://www.imedeia.uib.es/pressdbfiles/000218/02-03.pdf>>, accessed from Internet 13 December 2007;
 <<http://islands.unep.ch/IHD.htm#859>>, accessed from Internet 13 December 2007;
 <<http://www.demographia.com/db-intlppp.region.htm>>, accessed from Internet 14 December 2007;
 <http://www.crimea_portal.gov.ua/index.php?=-4&tek=&par=&art=194&date=>>, accessed from Internet 13 December 2007;
 Ignacio Lago-Peñas and Santiago Lago-Peñas (2005). 'Does the Economy Matter? An Empirical Analysis of the Causal Chain Connecting the Economy and the Vote in Galicia', *Economics & Politics*, Volume 17, No. 2, July 2005, p. 225;
 <http://www.cgc.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0016/3427/Section_09_-_Chapter_4_-_The_Norfolk_Island_Economy.pdf>, accessed from Internet 14 December 2007;
 <<http://ethnia.org/ethnia-fiche.php?ask=Th-06>>, accessed from Internet 14 December 2007;
 <<http://thesea.org/coralreef/africa/MauritiusRodriguez.htm>>, accessed from Internet 14 December 2007;
 <<http://www.tzdac.or.tz/main/DPG%20subgroups/zanzibar/>>, accessed from Internet 14 December 2007;
 <<http://english.jeu.go.kr/contents/index.php?mid=0203>>, accessed from Internet 6 March 2008.

Fuzzy scores with * indicate estimations performed by the author.

The table shows that most of the territorial autonomies are in the high-income group (a total of 41 regions). There are nine regions belonging to the upper middle-income group and twelve regions belonging to the lower middle-income group. There are only three regions which belong to the low income-group and these are Bougainville, Oecussi Ambeno and Zanzibar.

As has been argued, there are many autonomous islands that are aid-funded, and therefore their per capita income might be higher than otherwise expected. The most subsidized economies within the group of autonomous islands are French Polynesia, Greenland, Mayotte, Montserrat, New Caledonia, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, St Helena and Dependencies, St Pierre and Miquelon, Tokelau, and Wallis and Futuna.²²⁹ The figures for these regions should to a certain extent be disregarded.

After this theoretical and empirical outline, the study then proceeds with the first analysis and a further exploration of the relations between the fuzzy-set and the dependent and independent variables.

5 Analysis of Territorial Autonomy According to Fuzzy-Set

Fuzzy-set as a method has been seen as a middle path between quantitative and qualitative research.²³⁰ As a middle path, its strength has been to overcome some of the limitations within the conventional methods by using set-theoretic principles. As Ragin (2008) argues, fuzzy-set should be seen as an alternative approach and not as a compromise between the two worlds of quantitative and qualitative approaches.²³¹

The fuzzy-set approach is employed, in this study, as the major technique for analyzing the set-theoretic relationships between the variables in this investigation. In section 5.1, the fuzzy-set technique is generally outlined according to the basic logic within this particular technique. In section 5.2, the first fuzzy-set analysis is carried out to obtain the necessary conditions for the degree of autonomy. After the first analysis, we will move on to select the negative cases of non-autonomous regions, and thereafter, the second analysis for sufficiency is employed.

The answer as to why a fuzzy-set has been used in this study is that the technique is rather new within the discipline of social sciences and the study employed will test this method to its limits. The underlying idea is to show how this method works within comparative politics, especially in the field of autonomy. There are few studies where the technique has been used throughout the entire study.²³² Some studies have been replicated using this technique, but this study shows how it could be applied in the field of comparative politics. Territorial autonomy could be seen as a sub-set of the universe of autonomies, which has been shown in a Venn-diagram earlier in the study.

²²⁹ Geoff Bertram & Bernard Poirine (2007), Appendix 1, pp. 374-377 in Godfrey Baldacchino (ed.): *A World of Islands*, op.cit.

²³⁰ See for example Charles C. Ragin (2000). *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

²³¹ Charles C. Ragin (2008). *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

²³² See e.g. Svend-Erik Skaaning (2007). 'Explaining post-communist respect for civil liberty: A multi-method tests', *Journal of Business Research* 60 (2007), pp. 493-500; Jon Kvist (1999). 'Welfare Reform in the Nordic Countries in the 1990s: Using Fuzzy-Set Theory to Assess Conformity to Ideal Types', *Journal of European Social Policy*, Vol. 9 (3), pp. 231-252 and Paul Pennings (2003). 'Beyond dichotomous explanations: Explaining constitutional control of the executive with fuzzy-sets', *European Journal of Political Research* 42, pp. 541-567.

Some notes about the calibration technique, and why it is important to mention it in this study. The fuzzy scores represent the case-oriented focus on sets and set membership; at the same time, they are also variable-oriented, allowing degrees of membership, and they show fine-grained variations between the cases.²³³ The calibration gives the researcher the possibility of distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant variation. Set-theoretic principles include subset relationships, which are central to the analysis of necessity and sufficiency. The principles also give the opportunity to look at set-intersection, which is central to the study of cases as configurations (combinations), set-union (which is central to the examination of alternate paths to the same outcome) and truth tables (which are used to explain causal complexity).²³⁴

In comparison to the logic of regression analysis, fuzzy-set takes combinatorial factors into account. In regression analysis, for instance, the researcher estimates which condition (independent variable) has most effect on the dependent variable. There is no possibility of obtaining a combination of factors, but what we achieve instead is a competition between the independent variables of which one has the most probable explanatory power for the outcome in question. The variables in the equation compete on equal terms.

Regression analysis gives the net effects of all variables. It has been stated, by some authors, that the difference between regression methods and fuzzy-set should be seen as two totally contrasting approaches, i.e. we cannot test the same hypotheses while conducting these two methods for the same data.²³⁵ We should be aware of which research question we are attempting to answer.

²³³ Charles C. Ragin (2008), *op.cit.*

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

5.1 The Fuzzy-Set Approach

Fuzzy-set is a method that combines qualitative and quantitative approaches. The method is used in various disciplines, including everything from artificial intelligence to washing machines and stock markets.²³⁶ Fuzzy-set gives the researcher an opportunity to use an interpretive algebra, a language, which is half verbal / half conceptual and half mathematical / half analytical. Its greatest contribution for social scientists is its potential for enlivening, intensifying and extending the dialog between ideas and evidences in social research.²³⁷

Fuzzy-set is derivative of set theory within mathematical sciences. The values used are always at an interval between 0.0 and 1.0.²³⁸ The value 1.0 indicates full membership in a class or set, while value 0.0 indicates full non-membership.²³⁹ It is the prerogative of the investigator to choose the values between 0 and 1, but it must always be done openly and explicitly so that other researchers can test and evaluate the entire fuzzy-set.²⁴⁰ Fuzzy-set implies both differences in kind and degree at the same time.²⁴¹ The value 0.5 is applied as the benchmark between what is more in than out, and less than 0.5 is more out than in, according to a specific set.²⁴² To construct a fuzzy-set it is necessary to specify qualitative benchmarks on a continuum (between 0.0 and 1.0). This means that the researcher has to combine fuzzy values with substantive theoretical criteria. The method's aim is to establish a better fit between

²³⁵ See e.g. Aaron Katz, Matthias vom Hau and James Mahoney (2005). 'Explaining the Great Reversal in Spanish America: Fuzzy-Set Analysis versus Regression Analysis', *Sociological Methods & Research*, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 539-573.

²³⁶ Charles C. Ragin (2000). *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, p. 3.

²³⁷ Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., p. 4.

²³⁸ Paul Pennings (2003). 'Beyond dichotomous explanations: Explaining constitutional control of the executive with fuzzy-sets', *European Journal of Political Research* 2003, **42**, p. 542.

²³⁹ Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., p. 6.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., p. 149 and Jon Kvist (1999). 'Welfare Reform in the Nordic Countries in the 1990s: Using Fuzzy-Set Theory to Assess Conformity to Ideal Types', *Journal of European Social Policy*, 9 (3), p. 234.

²⁴² Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., p. 157.

theory and data, which is otherwise impossible with more conventional techniques. The method enhances the dialog between ideas and evidence.²⁴³

Fuzzy membership scores address the varying degrees to which different cases belong to sets, not how cases rank relative to each other on dimensions of open-ended variation. Fuzzy-sets pinpoint qualitative approaches while at the same time assessing varying degrees of membership between full inclusion and full exclusion. In this sense, a fuzzy-set can be seen as a continuous variable that has been calibrated to indicate the degree of membership in a defined set.²⁴⁴

The method offers the researcher the possibility of studying both qualitative and quantitative variations simultaneously. As a tool, it enables us to decide if the changes are marginal in nature when it comes to counting differences in degrees, or fundamental when counting differences in kind.²⁴⁵ Fuzzy-sets are used for deciding conjuncture causation (combinations of conditions) for a specific outcome. The logic behind this is to find causal patterns (i.e. necessary and sufficient causal conditions) behind the variables for the dependent variable (the outcome).²⁴⁶ The method enables the researcher to model complex and diverse constellations of case aspects, and to assess set-theoretic relations.²⁴⁷

The fuzzy values indicate the degree to which relevant cases belong and the range of categories that the researcher uses for describing and analyzing them. These fuzzy-set scores reflect the concepts that exist in theoretical discussions. The investigator is obliged to think in *terms* instead of *variables* e.g. financial security instead of income; dangerous neighborhoods instead of criminal rates; rich countries instead of GDP per capita etc.²⁴⁸ While fuzzy-set is closely related to theoretical concepts, these concepts can be manipulated in a number of ways and offer new possibilities for presenting and

²⁴³ Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., pp. 160-162.

²⁴⁴ Charles C. Ragin and Paul Pennings (2005). 'Fuzzy Sets and Social Research', *Sociological Methods & Research* 2005, Vol. 33, No. 4, p. 424.

²⁴⁵ Jon Kvist (1999), op.cit., p. 235.

²⁴⁶ Paul Pennings (2003), op.cit., p. 543.

²⁴⁷ Charles C. Ragin and Paul Pennings (2005), op.cit., p. 425.

²⁴⁸ Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., pp. 165-167.

evaluating social theories.²⁴⁹ The method is very diverse in itself, which reflects the many ways in which fuzzy set assignments can be obtained.²⁵⁰ There is no universal application of fuzzy-set. Instead, there are numerous ways in many different applications.

In fuzzy-set, it is possible to use the same strategies as in Boolean algebra, but the functions are slightly different. Negation or minimization is used to minimize with 1, e.g. fuzzy membership in non-A=1-fuzzy membership in the set of A. The logical *and* can be established by taking the minimum value of every case in a set where there is interaction between different values. For example, if a country's value in poor countries is 0.34 and its value in democratic countries is 0.91, then the value in combination of both poor and democratic countries is 0.34. The logical *or* shows the maximum value in combination of every cases' membership in a union. For example, if a country has the value 0.15 in the set of democratic countries and 0.93 in the set of developed countries, then the value 0.93 indicates the set of countries that are either democratic or developed.²⁵¹

The fuzzy values can be seen as a vector with 2^k corners, where k gives the number of attributes, or conditions, which are available in a property space. With two fuzzy-sets there are four corners, with three fuzzy-sets there are eight corners and so on. The cases can vary in degree in the crisply defined locations (between fully in and fully out), and have partial membership in every location and in some cases even vary in degree according to membership in the outcome.²⁵² In this study, I have eight possible conditions, i.e. $2^8 = 256$ attributes or combinations in total. This implies that there are many combinations without empirical cases. This suggests that it is necessary to reduce the availability of possible combinations.

Fuzzy-set is useful for identifying, categorizing, and measuring complex patterns of similarities and differences between the cases. The study of diversity is the main

²⁴⁹ Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., p. 171.

²⁵⁰ Charles C. Ragin and Paul Pennings (2005), op.cit., p. 429.

²⁵¹ Michael Smithson and Jay Verkuilen (2006). *Fuzzy Set Theory: Applications in the Social Sciences*, p. 5 and Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., pp. 172-173.

strength in this type of method, while it is possible with partial membership.²⁵³

The total of logically possible groupings is also possible to calculate, when all separate conditions, all supplementary conditions and all two - or - more combinations of conditions are taken into account. The formula is $3^k - 1$, where k again represents the number of conditions. This means that with three conditions we would have 26 possible groupings, with four conditions 80 and with five conditions as many as 242 groupings.²⁵⁴ This could be used for multiple tests of sufficiency.

There is a degree of arbitrariness when it comes to the decision about whether or not one set is a subset of another. This is due to the fact that the fuzzy scores are elastic. It is said that a condition, for instance, is necessary when the value is consistently higher than the outcome (the outcome is then a subset of the condition); and a condition is seen sufficient when its value is consistently lower than the outcome (the condition is then a subset of the outcome). The logic can be illustrated by an example, it can be assumed that all politicians are popular, but that popularity alone might not be sufficient for success. In order to be successful, politicians must also obey party discipline, avoid scandals etc. Hence, popularity is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for success.²⁵⁵ It is said that necessary and sufficient conditions constitute a deterministic approach, while statistical analysis is more probabilistic by nature.²⁵⁶

Fuzzy-set values offer a parsimonious way to identify necessary and sufficient conditions, while the values give the opportunity to apply the subset principle. When a case is necessary, then it is the outcome of a subset of the cause (i.e. $Y_i \leq X_i$, or if the outcome is present, then the cause is also necessary). In a case of sufficiency, it is the reverse: the cause is a subset of the outcome (i.e. $X_i \leq Y_i$, or if the cause is present, then the outcome is also present).²⁵⁷

²⁵² Charles C. Ragin (2000), op.cit., pp. 183 and 194.

²⁵³ Paul Pennings (2003), op.cit., pp. 545-546.

²⁵⁴ Carsten Q. Schneider & Claudius Wagemann (2007). *Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Fuzzy Sets*. Opladen & Farmington Hills: Verlag Barbara Budrich, pp. 63-64.

²⁵⁵ Paul Pennings (2003), op.cit., p. 554.

²⁵⁶ Gary Goertz and James Mahoney (2005). 'Two-Level Theories and Fuzzy-Set Analysis', *Sociological Methods & Research*, Vol. 33, No. 4, p. 499.

²⁵⁷ Paul Pennings (2003), op.cit., p. 554.

The weakness of fuzzy-set is that it demands a high degree of correspondence between concepts and fuzzy membership values. This means that it necessitates a close observation of analytical constructions of theoretical concepts and empirical evidence, which are both used to indicate membership in the sets. Different criteria are used to establish qualitative benchmarks and translations of data to fuzzy intervals and verbal qualifiers.²⁵⁸ If labels of sets are changed, the calibration should also change according to new anchors. Different sets require different scores and labels.

Most concepts are vague in political science and hard to define or categorize. Fuzzy-set is a proposed method for managing vagueness. The method helps the researcher to be more explicit about what he or she means and it can be used to help make analyses less fuzzy, when the vagueness is managed formally.²⁵⁹ Smithson argues that fuzzy-set could be appropriate to use, along with statistical methods, for evaluating the results.²⁶⁰

There seems to be no clear limitations with fuzzy-set, since the method could be used in a number of ways. The only limitation is the scale, since every variable has to be between 0.0 and 1.0. The researcher decides which values to use and, simultaneously, which can be seen as weaknesses. A great deal of work is determined by the researcher.

Some critics have disparaged the use of QCA for not being able to distinguish a real model from a random model and for being too deterministic in its approach.²⁶¹ Other critical points are related to missing variables.²⁶² The critique is largely misguided because in QCA, there is no explicit connection of randomness, whether in the model, in the real world, or in the conception of causality. Neither is any assumption made

²⁵⁸ Jon Kivist (1999), op.cit., pp. 236-237.

²⁵⁹ Jan Verkuilen (2005). 'Assigning Membership in a Fuzzy Set Analysis', *Sociological Methods & Research*, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 462-464.

²⁶⁰ Michael Smithson (2005). 'Fuzzy Set Inclusion: Linking Fuzzy Set Methods With Mainstream Techniques', *Sociological Methods & Research*, Vol. 33, No. 4, p. 432.

²⁶¹ Stanley Lieberman (2004). 'Comments on the Use and Utility of QCA', pp. 13-14 in *Qualitative Methods*, Newsletter of the American Political Science Association, Organized Section on Qualitative Methods, Fall 2004, Vol. 2, No. 2.

²⁶² Jason Seawright (2004). 'Qualitative Comparative Analysis vis-a-vis Regression', pp. 14-17 in *Qualitative Methods*, op.cit.

regarding variables (conditions) outside the model.²⁶³ The critique related to the discussion of omitted variables is not only specific to QCA; it is applicable to any empirical approach that attempts to explain a phenomenon through its characteristics.²⁶⁴

The possibilities with fuzzy-set seem, in some ways, to be almost endless. It is up to the researcher to use this method according to his or her own judgment. The analysis should always be done openly so that the inter-subjectivity criterion is maintained. Fuzzy-set could be useful to use in combination with statistical methods, or seen as an alternative to conventional methods.

5.2 Necessary Conditions

First, an analysis with the necessary conditions is conducted. This is due to the discussion concerning selecting on the dependent variable. In section 3.1.1, it was outlined that selecting on the dependent variable can be seen as a tool for determining the necessary conditions for a positive outcome. The first part of the analysis only takes into account the territorial autonomies, and this is precisely the technique that is used in order to be able to reduce important explanatory factors for the next step in the investigation. It has also been stated by Mahoney and Goertz (2004)²⁶⁵ that research designs focused on necessary conditions are the only partial exception, where a researcher can test necessary cause hypotheses by selecting only cases with positive outcomes.

This technique can also be illustrated by the fact that it is possible to distinguish between degree and kind in this context. For degree, we only need to take the

²⁶³ Gisèle De Meur, Benoît Rihoux and Sakura Yamasaki (2008). 'Addressing the Critiques of QCA', p. 159 in Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin (eds.): *Configurational Comparative Methods*, Applied Social Research Methods Series, Volume 51. Sage Publications.

²⁶⁴ Ibid. See also Benoît Rihoux (2003). 'Bridging the Gap between the Qualitative and Quantitative Worlds? A Retrospective and Prospective View on Qualitative Comparative Analysis', *Field Methods*, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 351-365. The article discusses the major critiques regarding the QCA techniques overall.

²⁶⁵ James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2004). 'The Possibility Principle: choosing negative cases in comparative research', *COMPASS Working Paper* WP 2004-19, 30 January 2004, can be accessed at <http://www.compass.org/Mahoney_Goertz2004.pdf>.

territorial autonomies into account, but for the analysis of kind we have to include negative cases of non-autonomous regions. Otherwise, it would be impossible to unravel the conditions for territorial autonomy proper. In the next part of the analysis I take non-autonomous regions into account. See chapters 6 and 7.

A hypothetical example would be: If we were interested in investigating the degree of democracy, the point of departure would be to choose countries where democracy occurs. Non-democracies or authoritarian states, which lack any form of democracy, would then be unnecessary to have within the investigation, since they do not belong to the set of democracies. However, to obtain the conditions as to why the democracy occurs, we need to include non-democracies or authoritarian states within the study. This is the same logic as applied here.

To be able to evaluate trivial and relevant necessary conditions there are some tests that can be conducted. A trivial necessary condition is one that is present in all cases in the universe of analysis, both when the dependent variable is present and absent.²⁶⁶ In set-theoretic terms, this means that X is a necessary condition for Y if Y is a subset of X . It is also stated that a maximally important necessary condition is also a sufficient condition at the same time. A trivial necessary condition is when X always occurs, and an irrelevant necessary condition is when Y never occurs.²⁶⁷ A necessary and a sufficient condition in fuzzy logic is one that lies on the $X=Y$ diagonal line in a plot. The relevant necessary conditions are those where all the observations lie on or just below the diagonal line.²⁶⁸

The assessment of analyzing the territorial autonomies is done with the fs/QCA program. All the variables in this study also have to be in a truth table, showing the degrees of membership in every subset in relation to the outcome. The independent variables that have been operationalized in the previous chapter are: democracy (D), historical strategic importance (H), geographical distance (G), natural resources (N),

²⁶⁶ Gary Goertz (2003). 'Assessing the importance of necessary or sufficient conditions in fuzzy-set social science', *COMPASS Working Paper* WP 2003-7, 11 June, 2003, can be accessed at <<http://www.compass.org/goertz2003.pdf>>.

²⁶⁷ Gary Goertz (2003), op.cit.

existence of regional movements/parties and/or separatist groups (P), ethnic distinctiveness (ED), size (S) and economic viability (E). The dependent variable or the outcome is the degree of autonomy (A). The following Table 12 shows the summary.

Table 12: The Fuzzy-Set Truth Table for Degree of Autonomy

Autonomy	D	H	G	N	P	ED	S	E	A
Åland Islands (Finland)	0.99	0.67	0.04	0	1	0.33	0.06	1	0.82
American Samoa (US)	0.99	0.67	0.98	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.05	0.67	0.68
American Virgin Islands (US)	0.99	0.33	0.17	0.67	0.66	0.33	0.05	1	0.50
Andalusia (Spain)	0.99	0.33	0.05	0.67	1	0	1	1	0.90
Anguilla (UK)	0.99	0.67	0.90	0.33	0.50	0.33	0.05	0.67	0.50
Aruba (NL)	0.99	0.33	0.94	1	0.50	0.67	0.06	1	0.68
Azores (Portugal)	0.99	1	0.11	0.67	0.66	0	0.16	1	0.68
Balearic Islands (Spain)	0.99	0.33	0.05	0.33	0.66	0.33	0.18	1	0.90
Basque Country (Spain)	0.99	0.33	0.04	0.67	1	0.33	0.53	1	0.90
Bermuda (UK)	0.99	0.67	0.79	0.33	0.66	0.67	0.05	1	0.82
Bougainville (PNG)	0.73	0.67	0.06	0.67	0.83	0	0.23	0	0.68
British Virgin Islands (UK)	0.99	0.33	0.90	0	0.50	0.33	0.05	1	0.50
Canary Islands (Spain)	0.99	0.67	0.10	0.33	0.66	0	0.49	1	0.90
Catalonia (Spain)	0.99	0.33	0.05	0	1	0.33	1	1	0.90
Cayman Islands (UK)	0.99	0.33	0.93	0.33	0.50	0.33	0.05	1	0.82
Cook Islands (NZ)	0.99	0.33	0.31	0	0.66	0.33	0.06	0.67	0.95
Corsica (France)	0.99	0	0.06	0	1	0.33	0.06	1	0.14
Crimea (Ukraine)	0.73	0.33	0.05	0.67	0.66	0.33	0.44	0.33	0.14
Falkland Islands (UK)	0.99	0.67	0.99	0.33	0.16	0	0.05	1	0.50
Faroe Islands (DK)	0.99	0.33	0.08	1	1	0.33	0.08	1	0.90
French Polynesia (France)	0.99	0.67	1	1	1	0.67	0.06	1	0.82
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy)	0.99	0.33	0.05	0	0.66	0.33	0.15	1	0.95
Gagauzia (Moldova)	0.50	0.33	0.04	0.33	0.66	0	0.34	0.33*	0.90
Galicia (Spain)	0.99	0.33	0.05	0.33	1	0.33	0.75	1	0.90
Gibraltar (UK)	0.99	0.67	0.11	0	0.50	0.67	0.05	1	0.50
Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan)	0.08	0.33	0.04	1	0.66	0	0.29	0.33*	0.05
Greenland (DK)	0.99	0.67	0.26	1	0.83	0.67	0.08	1	0.90

²⁶⁸ Ibid.


Guam (US)	0.99	1	1	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.05	1	0.23
Guernsey (UK)	0.99	0.33	0.04	0.33	0.16	0.33	0.05	1	0.95
Hong Kong (China)	0.50	0.67	0.12	0.33	0.50	0.67	0.06	1	0.90
Isle of Man (UK)	0.99	0.33	0.04	0	0.50	0.33	0.05	1	0.90
Jeju Island (South Korea)	0.98	0.33	0.05	0.33	0.33	0	0.05	1	0.23
Jersey (UK)	0.99	0.33	0.04	0.33	0.50	0	0.05	1	0.90
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan)	0.01	0	0.06	1	0.33	0.33	0.40	0.33*	0.35
Kosovo (Serbia)	0.08	0.33	0.04	0	0.83	1	1	0.33	0.50
Macau (China)	0.14	0.67	0.12	0	0.50	0.67	0.05	1	0.90
Madeira (Portugal)	0.99	0.67	0.07	0.33	0.33	0	0.16	1	0.68
Mayotte (France)	0.99	0.67	0.91	0	0.66	1	0.06	0.67	0.08
Mindanao (Philippines)	0.73	1	0.04	1	0.83	0.33	0.24	0.33*	0.14
Montserrat (UK)	0.99	0.33	0.91	0	0.50	0.33	0.05	0.33	0.50
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan)	0.08	0.67	0.04	0.67	0.33	0	0.44	0.67*	0.05
Netherlands' Antilles (NL)	0.99	0.67	0.95	0.67	0.50	0.67	0.10	1	0.68
New Caledonia (France)	0.99	1	1	0.67	0.66	0.67	0.06	1	0.95
Niue (NZ)	0.99	0.33	0.25	0.33	0.50	1	0.05	0.67	0.95
Norfolk Island (Australia)	0.99	0.67	0.14	0.33	0.16	0.33	0.05	1	0.50
North Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	0.73	0.67	0.04	0.67	0.66	0.67	0.41	0.33*	0.14
Northern Ireland (UK)	0.99	0.33	0.05	0	1	0.67	0.21	1	0.14
Northern Mariana Islands (US)	0.99	0.67	1	0.33	0.66	0.67	0.05	1	0.82
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor)	0.50	0.67	0.04	0	0.33	0.33	0.56	0	0.14
Pitcairn Islands (UK)	0.99	0.33	1	1	0.16	0.67	0.05	0.33*	0.23
Puerto Rico (US)	0.99	1	0.16	0.67	1	0.67	0.10	1	0.95
Rodrigues (Mauritius)	0.73	0.33	0.05	0.33	0.33	0	0.25	0.67	0.35
Sardinia (Italy)	0.99	0.33	0.05	0.67	1	0.33	0.22	1	0.95
Scotland (UK)	0.99	0	0.05	0.67	1	0	0.88	1	0.82
Sicily (Italy)	0.99	0.33	0.05	1	1	0	0.90	1	0.95
South Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	0.73	0.67	0.04	0.67	0.66	0.67	0.74	0.33*	0.14
St Helena and Dependencies (UK)	0.99	0.67	0.87	0.33	0.16	0.33	0.05	0.33	0.68
St Pierre and Miquelon (France)	0.99	0.67	0.42	0.33	0.66	0	0.05	0.67	0.50
Tokelau (NZ)	0.99	0.33	0.39	0	0.16	0.67	0.05	0.33	0.68
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy)	0.99	0.33	0.05	0.33	0.66	0.33	0.12	1	0.95
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK)	0.99	1	0.89	0.33	0.50	0.33	0.05	1	0.90
Valle d'Aosta (Italy)	0.99	0.33	0.05	0.33	0.66	0.33	0.05	1	0.95

Wales (UK)	0.99	0.33	0.04	0.67	1	0.33	0.47	1	0.08
Wallis and Futuna (France)	0.73	0.67	1	0	0.66	0.67	0.05	0.67	0.23
Zanzibar (Tanzania)	0.50	0.67	0.04	0.33	0.83	0.33	0.18	0	0.82

* Estimations performed by the author.

The first step will be to explore the subset relationships between each independent and the dependent variable. This could be said to be a kind of “bivariate” analysis. With fuzzy-set, a subset relation is indicated when membership scores in one set are consistently less than or equal to their corresponding membership scores in another set.²⁶⁹ This is done with simple XY-plots. It is also possible to use a combination of causal conditions as well, according to the logical *and/or* and *negation* strategy. This is the next step in the analysis and it is simply done to be able to say something about the necessary conditions in this sense. An argument for causal necessity can be supported when it can be demonstrated that instances of an outcome (dependent variable) constitute a subset of instances of a causal condition (independent variable).²⁷⁰ Figure 4 illustrates this fuzzy-set relation. In this figure, the outcome (Y) is a subset of the causal condition (X). This means that all Y_i values are less than or equal to their corresponding X_i values.

Figure 4: Fuzzy Subset Relation with Perfect Consistency



²⁶⁹ See Charles C. Ragin (2000, 2008) op.cit.

²⁷⁰ Charles C. Ragin (2008), op.cit., p. 53.

Set-Theoretic Consistency: 1.00

Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.58


The figure shows a perfect necessary condition with 100 percent consistency in this case. This has been done with hypothetical data only, in order to demonstrate perfect consistency. It is necessary to think in triangles in fuzzy-set, while using XY-plots. On the right-hand side underneath the line we have a necessary cause, even if the cases are scattered around in the triangle.

In my analysis, I first tested the relationship between the degree of membership in the set of democracy (D) and the degree of membership in the set of autonomy (A) according to the same logic applied previously.

Comparing the democracy ratings with degree of autonomy from the previous chapters supplies a notion of how the scores relate to each other. Beginning with Australia, and its Norfolk Island region, it can be seen that a high degree of democracy does not always relate to a high degree of autonomy. Norfolk Island is placed in the middle of the scale when it comes to the degree of autonomy. Azerbaijan has a low degree of democracy and its region Nakhichevan also has a low degree of autonomy, so there seems to be a connection between a low degree of democracy and a low degree of autonomy in this case. China has a low score for degree of democracy, but Hong Kong has a better score for that particular degree. The interesting situation here is that both Hong Kong and Macau, both regions belonging to China, score high on degree of autonomy. The situation is reversed since a low degree of democracy here is correlated with a high degree of autonomy. Denmark has a high degree of democracy, which corresponds to a high degree of autonomy, in the regions of the Faroe Islands and Greenland. East Timor has a quite low degree of democracy, and here the relation to the region of Oecussi Ambeno is straightforward. The low degree of democracy is correlated with a low degree of autonomy in the region. Finland scores high on degree of democracy and its region, the Åland Islands, have a high degree of autonomy, so here the connection between high degree of

democracy and high degree of autonomy can be visualized. France scores high on degree of democracy, but only two of its regions (French Polynesia and New Caledonia) have high degree of autonomy. The other regions (Corsica, Mayotte, St. Pierre and Miquelon, and Wallis and Futuna) score low on degree of autonomy. Therefore, there is no clear relation between degree of democracy and degree of autonomy which all these examples illustrate. Both a high and a low degree of democracy can lead to both a high and a low degree of autonomy. The assumption cannot be verified or falsified according to this description. The fuzzy-set analysis will give us a more accurate picture of the situation described here.

Figure 5: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and Democracy



Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.94

Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.68

The figure shows the relationship between the two sets where the degree of autonomy is the outcome and democracy is seen as the condition for the outcome. The set-theoretic consistency shows a score of 0.94 (or 94 percent consistent). Consistency scores should be as close to 1.0 (perfect consistency) as possible.²⁷¹ The consistency assesses the degree to which instances of the outcome agree in showing the condition

²⁷¹ Charles C. Ragin (2008), op.cit.

thought to be necessary for the outcome. The set-theoretic coverage, on the other hand, displays the relevance of the necessary condition.²⁷² Consequently, there is little point in looking at the coverage scores if consistency scores are low. In general, the level of consistency in correspondence with the subset principle used to identify necessary conditions should preferably exceed 0.85 or be at least 0.90.²⁷³

It is, of course, possible to calculate the consistency level by hand. For calculating the consistency level for necessary conditions, the following formula is used:

$$\text{Consistency for Necessary Conditions } (Y_i \leq X_i) = \sum (\min (X_i, Y_i)) / \sum (Y_i),$$

where “min” indicates the selection of the lower value of the two values. When all Y_i values are less than or equal to their corresponding X_i values this formula returns a value of 1. When many Y_i exceed their corresponding X_i values by wide margins it returns a value less than 0.5.²⁷⁴ If we calculate the subset of the two conditions we receive the value of 0.94 (i.e. $38.32 / 40.64 = 0.94$).

The coverage level could also be calculated by hand according to the following formula:

$$\text{Coverage/Relevance of Necessary Conditions } (Y_i \leq X_i) = \sum (\min (X_i, Y_i)) / \sum (X_i),$$

where “min” again refers to the lower value of the two values and it is the same formula as for consistency, but the denominator is changed to $\sum (X_i)$ instead of $\sum (Y_i)$. A very low coverage corresponds to an empirically irrelevant or even

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Svend-Erik Skaaning (2007). ‘Explaining post-communist respect for civil liberty: A multi-methods test’, *Journal of Business Research*, op.cit., p. 495. See also Carsten Q. Schneider & Claudius Wagemann (2007), op.cit., p. 213.

²⁷⁴ Carsten Q. Schneider & Claudius Wagemann (2007), op.cit., p. 213 and see also Charles C. Ragin (2006), ‘Set Relations in Social Research: Evaluating Their Consistency and Coverage’, *Political Analysis*, Volume 14, Number 3, Summer 2006, pp. 291-310.

meaningless necessary condition.²⁷⁵ If we do this calculation for the subset relation of democracy and autonomy we receive the value 0.68 (i.e. $38.32 / 56 = 0.68$).

As can be seen from the figure, degree of autonomy can be seen as a subset of democracy, which means that democracy is necessary for autonomy to occur. Necessity is shown when the cases are on the right below the diagonal in the plot. The points represent the cases. Sometimes the same point illustrates several cases at the same time, since there might be cases with the same combination. Democracy indicates that it is a superset of the outcome. Recalling the discussion about democracy in section 4.1., the necessary condition established is in line with the theoretical arguments about the relationship between these conditions. Most authors have noticed this relationship and it is also valid empirically as shown in this figure. Since a necessary condition exists, the causal condition of democracy can be omitted from the analysis of the sufficiency of causal combinations.


Let us then proceed to looking at the subset relationship between historical strategic importance (H) and degree of autonomy (A).

Comparing the degree of autonomy with the historical strategic importance gives us a representation of how historical events have affected the kind of autonomy each territory has received. Looking first at the six regions with the highest score on the historical strategic factor, we obtain the following pattern: three of the regions (New Caledonia, Puerto Rico, and Turks and Caicos Islands) all have a high degree of autonomy, but the other three regions (Azores, Guam, and Mindanao) have a lower degree of autonomy. The Azores are above average, while Guam and Mindanao are at the lower end of the spectrum. Looking then at the three regions with no historical importance, we can see that it is only Scotland that has a high degree of autonomy, while the other regions (Corsica and Karakalpakstan) have a low degree of autonomy.

²⁷⁵ Carsten Q. Schneider & Claudius Wagemann (2007), *op.cit.*, p. 214 and Charles C. Ragin (2006), *op.cit.*

The historical strategic factor does not give any clear image of the relationship between historical events and the degree of autonomy.

Figure 6: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and History



Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.68

Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.78


This figure shows that the cases are distributed quite equally between the two sets. As has been argued in section 4.2.1, historical events have played a major role in the progression to autonomy, but this factor should be viewed in combination with other factors, since history in itself does not explain the degree of autonomy as such. Different paths leading towards autonomy will be scrutinized further on in the study.

It is then necessary to consider the appearance of the relationship between the degree of autonomy (A) and geographical distance (G).

When looking at the most remote areas, we observe the following relationship between long distance and degree of autonomy. French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Northern Mariana Islands all score high on degree of autonomy while the other remote areas such as Guam, Pitcairn Islands, and Wallis and Futuna all have a low score as to the degree of autonomy. If we then look at regions which are located near

the metropolitan center, we receive the following picture. Among the twelve regions situated closest to the metropolitan power, the Åland Islands, the Basque Country, Gagauzia, Guernsey, Isle of Man and Zanzibar all have a high score as to the degree of autonomy while the other regions score low on degree of autonomy. There is no clear evidence that a considerable distance should lead to a high degree of autonomy. It seems that it is almost the reverse.

Figure 7: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and Geographical Distance




Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.37

Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.70

The figure shows that most cases are positioned above the diagonal on the left hand side, which implies that geographical distance might be considered as an irrelevant necessary condition in this context. The consistency is at 0.37 and can therefore be considered very low.

If we then look at the relationship between the degree of autonomy (A) and the possession of natural resources (N) we receive the following picture:

Figure 8: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and Natural Resources




Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.50

Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.74

The plot of the graph shows an uncertain relationship between the two sets. It could be argued that possession of natural resources could be a somewhat necessary condition, but it is hard to estimate when looking at the figure. The possession of natural resources seems to have no effect on the degree of autonomy in this sense.

Proceeding on to the mapping of the relationship between the degree of autonomy (A) and the existence of regional parties/movements and/or separatist groups (P) the following plot has been created:

Figure 9: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and Parties



Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.78

Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.77


The plot shows a consistency level of 0.78 and a coverage level of 0.77. The cases are scattered quite evenly in the figure. If we look at the relationship between a high degree of autonomy and a high degree of political mobilization, we can see that regions scoring 1, in the above figure, are in most cases those that also have a high score as to the degree of autonomy. It is only Anguilla, Corsica, Northern Ireland and Wales that have a lower degree of autonomy. Political activism in the form of various movements seems to have somewhat of an impact on the degree of autonomy.

The following figure shows the relationship between the degree of autonomy (A) and ethnic distinctiveness (ED). This relation has in theory a very important impact in order for autonomy to occur, but it can also be questioned as to whether it is empirically relevant.

When comparing the differences between ethnic distinctiveness and the variations in the degree of autonomy, it can be noticed that the absence or a low degree of ethnic diversity seems to lead, in most cases, to a higher degree of autonomy than otherwise.

There are, of course, exceptions, but a high degree of ethnic diversity seems to lead to a low degree of autonomy. This implies that ethnic distinctiveness might not be as crucial as has been argued by many authors in previous investigations. Figure 10 demonstrates the relationship.

Figure 10: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and Ethnicity




Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.48

Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.78

This figure shows that ethnic distinctiveness might be seen as a somewhat irrelevant necessary condition for autonomy. Most cases are in the upper left hand side of the figure. It remains to be seen if this variable is relevant when testing combinations of factors.

The next figure illustrates the relationship between the degree of autonomy (A) and size (S). The plot of the graph below shows the relationship.

Figure 11: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and Size



Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.28

Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.76


The figure shows that size could be seen as an irrelevant necessary condition. Size does not seem to have any impact on the variations in the degree of autonomy, since a small size can also lead to a high degree of autonomy as well as a large size. Size may be significant, but again a combination of causal conditions testing sufficiency is needed to be able to explain the relationship. In theory size is of importance in several areas of research, but in the field of autonomy it is stated that size is relevant in combination with other factors. See section 4.3.2.

The final necessity to be tested was that of the economic viability.

When looking at the relationship between the various income groups and the degree of autonomy, it is clear that most of the regions belonging to the high-income group also have a high degree of autonomy. There are naturally, some exceptions such as Corsica, Guam, Jeju Island, Northern Ireland and Wales. These regions are weak autonomies, but nevertheless belong to the highest income group. The regions belonging to the lowest income group show some diversity between each other.

Bougainville and Zanzibar score high on the degree of autonomy while Oecussi Ambeno is seen as a weak autonomy. The GDP/capita does seem to have an impact on the various degrees of autonomy, but a further exploration is needed. Plot 12 reveals the relationship between degree of autonomy (A) and economy (E).

Figure 12: Fuzzy Subset Relationship between the Degree of Autonomy and Economy



Set-Theoretic Consistency: 0.91

Set-Theoretic Coverage: 0.71

The plot of the graph shows us that a necessity is evident between the degree of autonomy and economic viability. It seems that economic viability is a superset of the outcome in this case. Economic viability can then be omitted from the analysis of the sufficiency of causal combinations.

The negation of every variable should be tested in order to see if there might be necessary conditions according to this alternative method. In this context, while running the same analysis with the negation of every variable, no necessary condition was found. The only variable reaching a quite high consistency is that of a small size (s) with a consistency at 0.85 and coverage of 0.69. Since no variable reached the consistency of 0.90, no necessary condition was found.

To summarize this exercise it can be said that two possible necessary conditions have been found for the degree of autonomy and those are the degree of democracy and economic viability. Other conditions must be tested according to the sufficiency of causal combinations. The two necessary conditions differ in a sense, since democracy has both a strong theoretical and empirical base, while economic viability is based on a theoretically weaker position.

There were initially eight conditions overall, and this implied that the number of possible combinations were $2^8 = 256$ combinations in total. This, of course, told us that there were many combinations without empirical cases. After the necessity test, we can say that there are only six conditions left to be tested. The possible amount of combinations is then reduced to $2^6 = 64$ combinations in total. There is, therefore, a risk that only two cases are to be found that share the same combination, and all the other cases represent one combination each. This appears to be true when testing the total combinations. It is only the pair of Trentino-Alto Adige and Valle d'Aosta that shares the same combination and outcome in this context (see table 12). Consequently it became necessary to further reduce the possibility of too many combinations, and when reduced to five conditions $2^5 = 32$ total combinations were obtained. It could be argued that this is still too many combinations, since the risk remains of having only a few cases in every combination.

The question then arose of which condition should then be excluded from the analysis. One possibility was to only choose the conditions that have a strong theoretically grounded position in the literature, and leave out some of the more empirically based conditions. It could be argued that the conditions that have a strong base in theory should be the most vital conditions for autonomy. Conversely, some more empirical conditions could lead to new options that had not been evaluated before. Since fuzzy-set is argued to aim at a better fit between theory and empirical data, we choose the most theoretically relevant conditions in this instance. This choice is also in line with the arguments made by some methodologists. It is argued that to be able to test the theory in question, we need those independent variables that constitute the core of the theory for the phenomenon, which usually comprise of five or fewer

independent variables.²⁷⁶ In consequence, the possession of natural resources (N) has been excluded from the analysis. The conditions to be tested for the sufficiency of causal combinations are: historical strategic importance (H), geographical distance (G), existence of regional parties/movements and/or separatist groups (P), ethnic distinctiveness (ED) and size (S). The assessment of the sufficiency test was carried out after the selection of the control group had been accomplished.

²⁷⁶ Gary Goertz and James Mahoney (2006). 'Negative Case Selection: The Possibility Principle' p.186 in Gary Goertz (2006). *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

6 The Selection of the Control Group

The selection of the control group had to be made in an appropriate manner. The problem was how to choose between relevant and irrelevant cases. Fortunately, there were some suggestions in the literature about selecting cases where the principles followed could be found. According to Mahoney and Goertz, one departure would be to follow the so-called Possibility Principle.²⁷⁷ According to this principle, cases should be chosen where the outcome was of interest, i.e. territorial autonomy, as one possibility.²⁷⁸ Cases where the outcome is impossible are irrelevant. The Possibility Principle then states that the negative cases should be those where the outcome has a real possibility of occurring. Cases that lack both the cause and the outcome are, of course, irrelevant, since the hypothesis then cannot be tested. Furthermore, the Rule of Inclusion tells us that cases are relevant if their value on at least one independent variable is positively related to the outcome of interest.²⁷⁹ The Rule of Inclusion means that an outcome should be seen as possible if at least one independent variable of the theory under investigation predicts its occurrence. The negative (or control) cases are used to test the theory in question.²⁸⁰ In this context, we tested which conditions lead towards territorial autonomy proper. It is assumed that there are various paths leading to the outcome, so a combination of conditions is therefore of interest. As has been stated earlier, the five conditions of historical strategic importance (H), geographical distance (G), existence of regional parties/movements and/or separatist groups (P), ethnic distinctiveness (ED) and size (S) constitute the core of the theory in this context. These five conditions are seen relevant for territorial autonomy to occur together with the already stated necessary conditions of democracy (D) and economic viability (E). We have to remember that every condition defined as necessary, in effect, is also included in every sufficient combination. In set theoretic

²⁷⁷ James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2004). 'The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98, No. 4, November 2004, pp. 653-669.

²⁷⁸ Gary Goertz and James Mahoney (2006). 'Negative Case Selection: The Possibility Principle' p. 178 in Gary Goertz (2006), op.cit. See also James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2004). 'The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research', op.cit.

²⁷⁹ Gary Goertz and Mahoney (2006), op.cit., p. 186.

²⁸⁰ Gary Goertz and Joseph Hewitt (2006). 'Concepts and Selecting (on) the Dependent Variable', p. 159 in Gary Goertz (2006), op.cit.

terms, if for example AB is sufficient for Y, and C is necessary, the pattern is $AB \leftarrow Y \leftarrow C$.²⁸¹

Another approach would be to use the Rule of Exclusion. The Rule of Exclusion provides a tool for categorizing an observation as irrelevant if it possesses a value on a variable that is known from previous research to make an outcome of interest impossible.²⁸² This rule is used in conjunction with one or more independent variables that have already been tested and established as variables that can be eliminated. Since the theory under investigation has not yet been tested, this approach is not applicable in this circumstance.

To be able to apply the Possibility Principle within fuzzy-set analysis, two general steps can be followed. First, since the interest lies to test whether the variables are jointly sufficient for the outcome, we can apply the *AND-to-OR* Replacement Rule.²⁸³ This is the fuzzy version of the Rule of Inclusion. At least one independent variable is present in the combination. It is the highest value of the independent variables that is then taken into account, according to the logical *or*, where the maximum value is in focus. Second, the next step is to decide and justify the exact threshold or cut-off point at which the outcome is considered possible. In practice, one usually has to set this threshold at a fairly high level (e.g., > 0.50) to ensure that at least one independent variable is clearly present in all cases.²⁸⁴ A lower threshold could be considered, if it serves the purpose better, i.e. if there are reasons to believe that a higher threshold will exclude too many cases as irrelevant.²⁸⁵

Possible cases would be island regions and land-locked regions that do not have a special status within their countries. The regions should be at the highest administrative level within their states but they should not meet the definition of territorial autonomy used in the investigation. Island regions are chosen since evidences show that most territorial autonomies in the world are *de facto* islands (44

²⁸¹ E-mail conversation with Charles C. Ragin 9 April 2008.

²⁸² James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2004), *op.cit.*, p. 658.

²⁸³ James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2004), *op.cit.*, p. 659.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

out of 65). This implies that island regions seem to have an ability to develop into an asymmetrical form of government more often than land-locked areas. Furthermore, it is assumed that some of the important explanatory factors are available for the island regions. Some regions might have played a role as former colonies or have been military outposts for their metropolitan states. They might lie on the periphery and therefore a specific identity might have been established. Island regions would also be small in size and so forth. Some land-locked regions should also be chosen to uphold the relationship between the different forms of areas. A smaller amount of land-locked regions in respect to island regions was selected, since the proportion of land-locked regions is smaller than that of island regions within the investigation. The same reasons should apply as for island regions. Another aspect to remember is that one of the two necessary conditions has to be fulfilled. This means that the regions had to be chosen from either a democratic environment or because of economic viability.

In a previous dissertation about island autonomy, only island autonomies and islands without autonomy were chosen according to the criteria that the islands were to be found on the sub-national level, but above the municipal level within the states.²⁸⁶ Islands without autonomy were considered regions without any special status in this study. An article about conditions for island autonomy shows a sample group of non-autonomous islands where the selection has been conducted as a random group with as wide a dispersion over different parts of the world as possible.²⁸⁷ A conference paper about microstates and their decentralized systems shows that among the 43 microstates in the world, ten states have decentralized systems of which four are federal states.²⁸⁸ These lists from a previous dissertation, the article and the conference paper formed the basis for selecting the cases for my purpose in this investigation.

²⁸⁵ James Mahoney and Gary Goertz (2004), op.cit.

²⁸⁶ Pär M. Olausson (2007), op.cit., p. 34.

²⁸⁷ Maria Ackrén and Pär M. Olausson (2008). 'Condition(s) for Island Autonomy', *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, Vol. 15, No. 2-3, pp. 227-258.

²⁸⁸ Dag Anckar (2008). 'Decentraliserade litenheter. En kartläggning och en förklaring'. Conference Paper for the *XV Nordic Congress in Political Science*, Tromsø, Norway, 6-9 August 2008.

One aspect of importance when choosing the negative cases in my context was, of course, to follow the characteristics mentioned in section 3.3. The non-autonomous regions should be regions with a weak form of distribution of power. They should possess internal functions only, and they should be directly under the national jurisdiction within the state and have no involvement in amendment procedures, concerning the constitution or other statutes or acts. Furthermore, they should lack or have negligible abilities to impose taxes of their own. This means that the regions should score 0 on the degree of autonomy. As mentioned earlier in the study, two such cases had already been found, i.e. Gorno-Badakshan (in Tajikistan) and Nakhichevan (in Azerbaijan). To be able to outline the sufficient conditions, several cases that score 0 on the dependent variable were needed, and a possible number of cases for this purpose would be approximately fifteen cases. Ten of the cases should then constitute island regions and five land-locked areas to be able to have the same proportion as in the set of territorial autonomy. The non-autonomous regions are described in a superficial manner since they are only considered as a control mechanism, enabling the analysis of sufficiency in this context.

6.1 Non-Autonomous Regions

The microstate of Antigua and Barbuda in the Caribbean is divided into six parishes and two dependencies: Barbuda and Redonda. According to the constitution of Antigua and Barbuda, there has to be a Council for Barbuda, which acts as the local government on the island. The Parliament of the country decides the functions and membership of the Council of Barbuda. The national parliament may also alter any provisions of the Barbuda Local Government Act from 1976.²⁸⁹ This means that Barbuda only deals with internal matters specific to the island and acts as a region in relation to the national government. Barbuda will be considered as one of the possible cases for territorial autonomy. The other dependency of Redonda is an uninhabited island.

²⁸⁹ The Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda <http://www.ab.gov.ag/gov_v2/shared/constituion.html>, accessed from the Internet 2 May 2008.

Denmark has two autonomous islands as has been mentioned in the set of territorial autonomies (i.e. the Faroe Islands and Greenland). Metropolitan Denmark is divided into five regions since January 2007. One of the regions encompasses the capital area of Copenhagen.²⁹⁰ The region of *Syddanmark* could be seen as a potential candidate for territorial autonomy, since there is a German minority living in this particular region. Each region has a regional council with 41 members. The regions are a result of an administrative reform which abolished the former counties.

Estonia is divided into counties and towns at the regional level.²⁹¹ There are two island counties: Hiiumaa and Saaremaa. The county government (*Maavalitsus*) of each county is led by a county governor (*Maavanem*), who represents the national government at the regional level. Governors are appointed by *Eesti Valitsus* (government) for a term of five years. Since every county functions alike, there is no difference as to which county we choose. I chose Saaremaa since it is the largest island of the two island counties.

Fiji is divided into four divisions and a dependency: Rotuma.²⁹² Rotuma has been mentioned in the section about label autonomies. The island functions as a province and a district within the republic of Fiji. Each province is governed by a council with an executive head (*roko tui*) whose appointment has been approved by the Fijian Affairs Board, which must also approve all rates and by-laws applied by the provincial council.²⁹³ Rotuma will be considered as a possible case in this context.

France has a complex system of various administrative divisions in communes, departments, regions, special status areas, and overseas territories.²⁹⁴ Some of the territorial regions have been mentioned and included in the sphere of territorial autonomies, but there are still some overseas departments/regions that have not yet

²⁹⁰ CIA – The World Factbook <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/da.html>>.

²⁹¹ See Chapter XIV in the Constitution of Estonia at

<http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/en00000_.html>, accessed from the Internet 2 May 2008.

²⁹² CIA – The World Factbook <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fj.html>>

²⁹³ <http://www.fiji.gov.fj/uploads/FToday2006_2007.doc>, accessed from Internet 2 May 2008.

²⁹⁴ See Title XII, Article 72-77 in the French Constitution.

been included in the study. These are Guadeloupe²⁹⁵, Martinique, French Guiana, and Réunion. French Guiana was excluded, because the region functions in the same manner as the other regions of France and because of the need to reduce the French influence in the sample group. The regions of Guadeloupe, Martinique and Réunion will be included as the group of French Overseas Departments/Regions. These regions are considered to function as the other departments of the mainland of France with the possibility of developing into territorial autonomies in the future. Guadeloupe and Martinique are situated in the Caribbean, while Réunion is in the Indian Ocean outside Madagascar and Mauritius in Africa.

Greece is divided into 13 peripheries and 51 prefectures, and as has been mentioned in the section of dubious cases, the country has one autonomous region (Mount Athos).²⁹⁶ The peripheries all function in the same manner, so I chose Crete as the example illustrating the possible territorial autonomy in this context.

Hungary is divided into 19 counties and 23 urban counties (consisting of towns) on the regional level.²⁹⁷ While amending the Act XXI of 1996, the Act XCII of 1999 divided Hungary into regions in accordance with the requirements of the European Union. Since then, Hungary has established seven planning statistical regions, which cover all the counties, and county and regional development councils have also been established.²⁹⁸ The seven regions will take over the responsibilities of the counties in the near future. The region of Southern Great Plain will be chosen as a possible case for territorial autonomy in this context.

²⁹⁵ The islands of Saint-Barthélemy and the French part of Saint-Martin have become overseas collective territories and seceded from Guadeloupe in 2007. They were formerly part of Guadeloupe. This means that the territories function in a similar way to French Polynesia, Mayotte, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, and Wallis and Futuna, and could therefore be included in the group of territorial autonomies. Since they have recently been granting this status, they are, however, excluded from the analysis in this context. <<http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9117392/Guadeloupe>>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2008.

²⁹⁶ CIA – The World Factbook <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gr.html>>. See also p. 43 for an explanation about Mount Athos.

²⁹⁷ CIA – The World Factbook <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hu.html>>.

²⁹⁸ <<http://www.magyarorszag.hu/english/abouthungary/data/country/administration.html>>, accessed from Internet 28 May 2008.

Latvia has undergone some changes over time with regard to administrative division of the country. In 1998, the Law on Administrative Territorial Reform was adopted. Until the completion of this reform, the country's division into five statistical regions (the Riga region including the cities of Riga and Jurmala and the district of Riga, plus the regions of Vidzeme, Kurzeme, Zemgale, and Latgale) remains in force. This division can be seen to align most suitable with the NUTS level 3 regional criteria that are accepted in the European Union, and it is closely based on the administrative territorial division of Latvia during the first period of independence.²⁹⁹ Since this regional division is used within the EU, I have followed the same division here. The region of Vidzeme was seen as the possible case in this context.

The Netherlands has two overseas areas as has been mentioned in the section about territorial autonomies. These are Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles in the Caribbean. The mainland of the Netherlands is divided into 12 provinces which, in their turn, are divided into municipalities. The provinces handle all sub-national and regional matters of importance. They all have provincial governments elected every fourth year.³⁰⁰ Since every province function in a similar manner, there is no difference which province was chosen. I chose Utrecht as the possible case in this context.

Norway is divided into 19 counties and every county has some autonomy in accordance to the state level. Some functions are divided between the state level and the municipalities.³⁰¹ Finnmark was chosen as the possible case, since the region has the Sami population and there have been some suggestions that the Sami people should be given more autonomy.

São Tomé and Príncipe have been mentioned in the section on label autonomies. The country is divided into seven districts. Six are located on the island of São Tomé and one encompasses the island of Príncipe. Príncipe has more autonomy than the other

²⁹⁹ Portrait of the Regions <http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/regportraits/info/data/lv_national.htm>, accessed from Internet 28 May 2008.

³⁰⁰ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provinces_of_the_Netherlands>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008.

³⁰¹ CIA – The World Factbook <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/no.html>>.

districts and can therefore be considered as a possible case; as the island can be considered to function as a region and a district at the same time.

The Solomon Islands in the Pacific Ocean are divided into nine provinces and one capital territory. The provinces function in the same way.³⁰² The provinces have local elections and handle internal matters related to the regions. The provinces are divided, in their turn, into municipalities.³⁰³ I chose Santa Isabel as the possible case in this context. Santa Isabel is an island province among other island provinces belonging to Solomon Islands.

Vanuatu has a similar system to the Solomon Islands. Vanuatu is divided into six provinces in which all have their local regional councils; representatives in the council have to consist of custom chiefs.³⁰⁴ Here the province of Malampa was chosen. Malampa consists of three islands: Malakula, Ambrym and Paama. The first letters of the islands constitute the name of the province.³⁰⁵

The previously mentioned regions were my control group of the 15 non-autonomous regions in this context. As summarized in the table below, we see that three of the regions belong to France, and the other twelve territories are scattered around different parts of the world and belong to different countries. The regions have been chosen with the necessity of democracy in mind. All countries except Fiji and the Solomon Islands are democracies. Fiji and the Solomon Islands are partly free according to Freedom House. Another approach has been to choose some of the regions from countries that have already experienced territorial autonomy. It is believed that these countries are subsequently more often willing to give some regions special status.

³⁰² See Chapter XII, Article 114 in the Constitution of the Solomon Islands
<http://www.pacii.org/sb/legis/consol_act/c1978167/> and CIA World Factbook 2008.

³⁰³ Dag Anckar (2008), op.cit.

³⁰⁴ Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu, Chapter 13
<<http://www.vanuatugovernment.gov.vu/government/library/constitution.html>>, CIA – The World Factbook 2008 and Dag Anckar (2008), op.cit.

Table 13: The Non-Autonomous Regions

Non-Autonomous Region	Degree of Autonomy	Fuzzy Score
Barbuda (Antigua and Barbuda)	0	0
Crete (Greece)	0	0
Finnmark (Norway)	0	0
Guadeloupe (France)	0	0
Malampa (Vanuatu)	0	0
Martinique (France)	0	0
Príncipe (São Tomé and Príncipe)	0	0
Réunion (France)	0	0
Rotuma (Fiji)	0	0
Saaremaa (Estonia)	0	0
Santa Isabel (Solomon Islands)	0	0
Southern Great Plain (Hungary)	0	0
Syddanmark (Denmark)	0	0
Utrecht (The Netherlands)	0	0
Vidzeme (Latvia)	0	0

All regions scored 0 at the degree of autonomy and therefore also have a fuzzy score 0 in this context. The five land-locked areas are Finnmark, Southern Great Plain, Syddanmark, Utrecht and Vidzeme. All other regions are island regions. In the next section I outline the characteristics of these regions, regarding the five most important explanatory factors.

6.2 Characteristics of the Non-Autonomous Regions

All possible explanatory factors follow the same pattern and operationalization, which has previously been conducted within the set of territorial autonomies. The same strategy is followed here, when using the set of non-autonomous regions. Only the five most important factors will be included. As mentioned above, these are historical

³⁰⁵ Dag Anckar (2008), op.cit.

strategic importance, geographical distance, existence of regional movements, parties and/or separatist groups, ethnic distinctiveness and size.

Beginning with historical strategic importance, it had to be considered whether the region had been a military outpost, a colony, or a victim of war or conflict. The following table shows the historical strategic importance.

Table 14: Historical Strategic Importance for Non-Autonomous Regions

Non-Autonomous Region	Military Outpost	Colony	War or Conflict	Fuzzy Score
Barbuda (Antigua and Barbuda)	No	Yes (together with Antigua)	No	0.33
Crete (Greece)	Yes	No	No	0.33
Finmark (Norway)	Yes	Yes	No	0.67
Guadeloupe (France)	No	Yes	Yes	0.67
Malampa (Vanuatu)	No	Yes (refers to the whole country)	Yes	0.67
Martinique (France)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Príncipe (São Tomé and Príncipe)	No	Yes (together with São Tomé)	Yes	0.67
Réunion (France)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Rotuma (Fiji)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Saaremaa (Estonia)	Yes	No	Yes	0.67
Santa Isabel (Solomon Islands)	Yes	Yes (refers to the whole country)	No	0.67
Southern Great Plain (Hungary)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Syddanmark (Denmark)	No	No	No	0
Utrecht (The Netherlands)	No	No	Yes	0.33
Vidzeme (Latvia)	No	No	Yes	0.33

Sources: <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2336.htm>>, accessed from Internet 5 May 2008; <<http://www.interkriti.org/intro.htm>>, accessed from Internet 5 May 2008; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/country_profiles/4252578.stm>, accessed from Internet 5 May 2008; <<http://www.vanuatutourism.com/vanuatu/cms/en/vanuatu.html>>, accessed from Internet 6 May 2008; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/4537753.stm>, accessed from Internet 6 May 2008; <<http://saotome-principe.tripod.com/history.html>>, accessed from Internet 6 May

2008; <<http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-6135/Reunion>>, accessed from Internet 6 May 2008;
 <<http://www.rotuma.net/os/History.html>>, accessed from Internet 6 May 2008;
 <http://www.saaremaa.ee/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=195&Itemid=261>, accessed from Internet 6 May 2008;
 <http://www.pacificislandtravel.com/solomon_islands/about_destin/santaisabel.html>, accessed from Internet 6 May 2008; <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finmark>>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008;
 <<http://www.hungary-tourist-guide.com/southern-great-plain.html>>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; <<http://www.provincie-utrecht.nl/prvutr/internet/plaatjes.nsf/all/StartEnglish?opendocument>>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008;
 <http://circa.europa.eu/irc/clsis/regportraits/info/data/en/lv002_geo.htm>, accessed from Internet 30 May 2008.

As can be seen from the table, the same kind of patterns are evident as were seen in the territorial autonomies. Two of the French territories (Martinique and Réunion) score 1 on the fuzzy score since they have all the categories available. Some regions have a combination of colonialism and war or conflict situations in the past; other regions have functioned simply as a colony or have been victims of wars or conflict situations in history. It is only Syddanmark that scored 0 on this feature.

As regards geographical distance, the distance was measured between the capitals as had been done with the territorial autonomies. The table below indicates the distances in kilometers.

Table 15: Geographical Distance for Non-Autonomous Regions

Non-Autonomous Region	Distance (km)	Fuzzy Score
Barbuda (Antigua and Barbuda)	50 km	0.04
Crete (Greece)	315 km	0.04
Finmark (Norway)	1500 km	0.09
Guadeloupe (France)	8100 km	0.87
Malampa (Vanuatu)	270 km	0.04
Martinique (France)	8100 km	0.87
Príncipe (São Tomé and Príncipe)	150 km	0.04
Réunion (France)	9900 km	0.95
Rotuma (Fiji)	675 km	0.05
Saaremaa (Estonia)	192,5 km	0.04
Santa Isabel (Solomon Islands)	135 km	0.04
Southern Great Plain (Hungary)	140 km	0.04
Syddanmark (Denmark)	180 km	0.04

Utrecht (The Netherlands)	35 km	0.04
Vidzeme (Latvia)	87,5 km	0.04

Source: *Bonniers stora världsatlas* (1994). Bonnier Lexikon AB. Various scales and maps have been used, therefore the distances should be seen as a mere estimation. Distances have been drawn as straight lines without considering the longitudes and latitudes.

The table shows that Utrecht is the nearest region being located only 35 kms from its capital, and the French regions are, of course, the most remote areas according to geographical distance. The other regions are located in the range of 50 km to 1,500 km from their respective national capitals. The fuzzy scores show the same pattern and the same thresholds have been used as in the previous set of territorial autonomy (i.e. 10 000 km \geq 0.95, 5 000 km = 0.5 and 500 km \leq 0.05), when using the calibration technique. The non-autonomous regions share the same pattern as territorial autonomies with regard to geographical distance. Some regions are far away while others are close to their respective metropolitan capitals.

The following table considers the existence of regional and national parties, movements and/or separatist groups. I have used the same categorization as has been used for the set of territorial autonomies (see section 4.2.4 and the discussion regarding the operationalization of the variable).

Table 16: Existence of Parties and/or Movements within the Non-Autonomous Regions

Non-Autonomous Region	Regional Party	National Party	Separatist Group	Fuzzy Score
Barbuda (Antigua and Barbuda)	Yes	Yes	No	0.66
Crete (Greece)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Finnmark (Norway)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Guadeloupe (France)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Malampa (Vanuatu)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Martinique (France)	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Príncipe (São Tomé and Príncipe)	No	Yes	No	0.33

Réunion (France)	Yes	Yes	No	0.66
Rotuma (Fiji)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Saaremaa (Estonia)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Santa Isabel (Solomon Islands)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Southern Great Plain (Hungary)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Syddanmark (Denmark)	Yes	Yes	No	0.66
Utrecht (The Netherlands)	No	Yes	No	0.33
Vidzeme (Latvia)	No	Yes	No	0.33

Sources: <<http://www.barbudaful.net/politics.html>>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2008; <<http://www.interkriti.org/intro.htm>>, retrieved 7 May 2008; <http://www.theodora.com/wfb/guadeloupe_government.html>, retrieved 7 May 2008; <<http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Vanuatu-POLITICAL-PARTIES.html>>, retrieved 7 May 2008; <<http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Martinique.htm>>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2008; <http://saotome-principe.tripod.com/political_parties.html>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2008; <<http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Reunion.htm>>, retrieved 7 May 2008; <http://www.fiji.gov.fj/uploads/FToday2006_2007.doc>, accessed from Internet 2 May 2008; <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/en.html>>; <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2799.htm>>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2008; <<http://www.ssb.no/kfvalgkand/tab-2007-06-26-01.html>>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; <<http://www.regionsyddanmark.dk/wm182138>>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; <<http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/news/Newsletters/Theme-in-Focus/4168/>>, accessed from Internet 30 May 2008.

The table shows that national parties are the only groups available to most of the regions, which is not surprising since they are all under the national supervision. Barbuda, Réunion and Syddanmark have a combination of both regional parties and national parties, and Guadeloupe and Martinique are the most politically active with all types of possible movements available.

In the next table, how ethnic distinctiveness appears within the group of non-autonomous regions is indicated. In this context, I also followed the same principle as I have done with the other variables. See section of 4.3.1 and the discussion about the operationalization of the variable.

Table 17: Ethnic Distinctiveness within the Non-Autonomous Regions

Non-Autonomous Region	Ethnic Distinctiveness	Fuzzy Score
Barbuda (Antigua and Barbuda)	No Diversity	0
Crete (Greece)	No Diversity	0
Finmark (Norway)	Ethnic origin and language	0.67
Guadeloupe (France)	Ethnic origin	0.33
Malampa (Vanuatu)	No Diversity	0
Martinique (France)	Ethnic origin	0.33
Príncipe (São Tomé and Príncipe)	No Diversity	0
Réunion (France)	Ethnic origin	0.33
Rotuma (Fiji)	Ethnic origin and language	0.67
Saaremaa (Estonia)	No Diversity	0
Santa Isabel (Solomon Islands)	No Diversity	0
Southern Great Plain (Hungary)	No Diversity	0
Syddanmark (Denmark)	Language	0.33
Utrecht (The Netherlands)	No Diversity	0
Vidzeme (Latvia)	No Diversity	0

Sources: <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ac.html#People>>; <<http://www.interkriti.org/intro.htm>>; <<http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107545.html>>, retrieved 7 May 2008; <http://www.vanuatuparadise.com/NewFiles/anglais/iles/mallico_ ang.html>, retrieved 7 May 2008; <<http://www.studentsoftheworld.info/infopays/wfb.php3?CODEPAY=MTN>>, retrieved 7 May 2008; <<http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/S-o-Tom-and-Pr-ncipe.html>>, retrieved 7 May 2008; <<http://www.everyculture.com/No-Sa/Reunion-Island.html>>, retrieved 7 May 2008; <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/shop_pickandmix/free_chapters/fiji-rotuma.pdf>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2008; <http://www.saaremaa.ee/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=207&Itemid=259>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2008; <http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=sb>, retrieved 7 May 2008; <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finmark>>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; <<http://www.hktdc.com/emergingmarketguide/2-1.htm>>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; <<http://www.toppensidor.com/om/danmark/default.asp?topic=Danmark>>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; CIA – The World Factbook 2008 <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/lg.html#People>>.

As can be seen in the table, the non-autonomous regions differ very little in their relationship with their metropolitan states. The French regions differ in ethnic origin, while Finmark in Norway (has a population of indigenous Sami) and Rotuma in Fiji differ in both ethnic origin and language. Syddanmark differs only in language, since a minority of German speakers is to be found there. All other regions lack any diversity.

The last variable to be taken into account, before the actual analysis, is size. The size variable follows the same pattern when conducting the operationalization, as has been done in the previous analysis with the territorial autonomies.

Table 18: Size according to the Non-Autonomous Regions

Non-Autonomous Region	Population	Area in km²	Percentage of the Total Population	Fuzzy Score
Barbuda (Antigua and Barbuda)	1,500	175 km ²	2.1 %	0.15
Crete (Greece)	630,000	8 336 km ²	5.9 %	0.63
Finnmark (Norway)	72,399	48 618 km ²	1.5 %	0.11
Guadeloupe (France)	445,000	1 705 km ²	0.7 %	0.07
Malampa (Vanuatu)	35,329	2 779 km ²	16.4 %	1
Martinique (France)	394,000	1 100 km ²	0.6 %	0.07
Príncipe (São Tomé and Príncipe)	6,000	136 km ²	2.9 %	0.22
Réunion (France)	802,911	2 510 km ²	1.3 %	0.10
Rotuma (Fiji)	3,000	30 km ²	0.3 %	0.06
Saaremaa (Estonia)	39,231	2 922 km ²	3 %	0.23
Santa Isabel (Solomon Islands)	30,000	2 999 km ²	5.2 %	0.53
Southern Great Plain (Hungary)	1,367,000	18 339 km ²	13.6 %	0.99
Syddanmark (Denmark)	1,194,659	12 191 km ²	21.8 %	1
Utrecht (The Netherlands)	1,190,604	1 386 km ²	7.3 %	0.80
Vidzeme (Latvia)	257,883	15 346 km ²	11.5 %	0.98

Sources: The same sources as in the previous tables have been used and also the following sites <<http://www.finnmark.no/page.jsp?id=2&mid=1>>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regions_of_Hungary>, accessed from Internet 29 May 2008; <<http://www.latreg.lv/pub/default.php?lang=eng&lpa=82&oid=82>>, accessed from Internet 30 May 2008.

The table shows that the Hungarian region, the Danish region, the Dutch region and the French island of Réunion are the most populous. The smallest region according to population is the island of Barbuda with 1,500 inhabitants. The smallest region according to area is Rotuma with only 30 km² and the largest territory according to

area is Finnmark in the northern part of Norway with over 48 000 km². Looking at the relative size, we see that Syddanmark is the largest with a population of 21.8 percent of the total population of Denmark, Malampa follows with 16.4 percent of the total population of Vanuatu, and Southern Great Plain has 13.6 percent of the total population of Hungary. The fuzzy scores are derived from the same categorization used in the previous section about the set of territorial autonomies (i.e. 10% \geq 0.95, 5% = 0.5 and 0% \leq 0.05). The table shows the same pattern as for the territorial autonomies. Some regions are large, while others are small.

The next chapter includes these fifteen units of analysis into the main analysis in order to test the sufficiency of combinations for the outcome of territorial autonomy proper. The following table is a summary of the fuzzy table for the non-autonomous regions. Historical strategic importance (H), geographical distance (G), political parties, movements and separatist groups (P), ethnic distinctiveness (ED), size (S), and degree of autonomy (A) are all included in the table.

Table 19: The Fuzzy-Set Truth Table for Non-Autonomous Regions

Non-Autonomous Region	H	G	P	ED	S	A
Barbuda (Antigua and Barbuda)	0.33	0.04	0.66	0	0.15	0
Crete (Greece)	0.33	0.04	0.33	0	0.63	0
Finnmark (Norway)	0.67	0.09	0.33	0.67	0.11	0
Guadeloupe (France)	0.67	0.87	1	0.33	0.07	0
Malampa (Vanuatu)	0.67	0.04	0.33	0	1	0
Martinique (France)	1	0.87	1	0.33	0.07	0
Príncipe (São Tomé and Príncipe)	0.67	0.04	0.33	0	0.22	0
Réunion (France)	1	0.95	0.66	0.33	0.10	0
Rotuma (Fiji)	0.33	0.05	0.33	0.67	0.06	0
Saaremaa (Estonia)	0.67	0.04	0.33	0	0.23	0
Santa Isabel (Solomon Islands)	0.67	0.04	0.33	0	0.53	0
Southern Great Plain	0.33	0.04	0.33	0	0.99	0

(Hungary)						
Syddanmark (Denmark)	0	0.04	0.66	0.33	1	0
Utrecht (The Netherlands)	0.33	0.04	0.33	0	0.80	0
Vidzeme (Latvia)	0.33	0.04	0.33	0	0.98	0

The table shows all combinations for the non-autonomous regions according to the fuzzy sets. There are two groups consisting of four regions each which share the same combination of four conditions out of the five conditions used in this context. The only factor that distinguishes these regions is size. The first group consists of Malampa, Príncipe, Saaremaa and Santa Isabel. The second group consists of Crete, Southern Great Plain, Utrecht and Vidzeme. The next sections deal with the sufficiency test that has been stated to be required.

7 Analysis and Results

The second step in the analysis is to include the previously mentioned non-autonomous regions into the fs/QCA program together with the set of territorial autonomies in order to unravel the possible combinations leading towards territorial autonomy proper. This implies that 80 entities are under investigation in this latter analysis. Section 7.1 discusses the steps in the program, and what obtained from running the analysis. In section 7.2 an evaluation of the results is outlined.

7.1 Fuzzy-Set Approach with Sufficient Conditions

The assessment of the sufficiency of causal combinations was carried out with the Truth Table Algorithm within the fs/QCA program. Turning the fuzzy sets to truth tables has three main advantages. First, it shows the direct correspondence between the rows of a truth table and the corners of the vector space defined by fuzzy-set causal conditions. Second, the distribution of cases can be assessed across the logically possible combinations of causal conditions. Third, consistency of the evidence can be assessed for each causal combination, with the argument that it is a subset of the outcome.³⁰⁶ It is important to note that when using the truth table to analyze the results of fuzzy set assessments, the truth table rows do not represent subsets of cases, as they do in crisp-set analyses (or Boolean approaches). Rather, the rows represent the 2^k causal arguments that can be constructed from a given set of causal conditions.³⁰⁷

The table obtained by running the analysis in the fs/QCA program appears as follows:

³⁰⁶ Charles C. Ragin (2008), op.cit.

³⁰⁷ Charles C. Ragin (2008). Chapter 5: 'Qualitative Comparative Analysis Using Fuzzy Sets (fsQCA)', pp. 87-121 in Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin (eds.). *Configurational Comparative Analysis*. Sage Publications.

Table 20: Truth Table within the fs/QCA Program

Row	H	G	P	ED	S	Number	Outcome A	Consistency
1	1	1	0	0	0	2	1	0.88
2	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0.87
3	1	1	0	1	0	2	1	0.84
4	0	0	0	1	0	2	1	0.81
5	1	1	1	1	0	6	1	0.80
6	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0.80
7	1	0	1	1	0	3	1	0.79
8	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0.78
9	1	1	1	0	0	3	1	0.77
10	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0.72
11	1	0	1	0	0	7	0	0.71
12	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0.70
13	0	0	1	0	0	14	0	0.70
14	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0.66
15	1	0	0	0	0	5	0	0.65
16	0	0	1	0	1	7	0	0.62
17	1	0	0	0	1	3	0	0.45
18	0	0	0	0	1	4	0	0.41
... 32						0		?

The rows represent the configurations or possible combinations, and the letters indicate the explanatory factors as have been mentioned earlier. The number column shows the number of cases that have a membership in the respective causal combination higher than 0.5. The consistency value shows the consistency level for the entire fuzzy-set, not just each configuration. The consistency level is always based on all cases in the Truth Table Algorithm.³⁰⁸ The threshold for consistency has been chosen at 0.75 in this context showing the value 1 at the outcome variable. This means that 75 percent of the cases' fuzzy membership scores in a causal combination must be consistent (i.e. they must lie above the main diagonal in the XY-plot) for a positive outcome. A consistency level should at least capture 75-80 percent of the

³⁰⁸ Explanation by Charles C. Ragin at the "Short Course in Qualitative Comparative Analysis and Fuzzy-Sets" at University of Arizona, September 16, 2008.

cases in an analysis of this kind. The threshold is also chosen due to the gap between the consistency scores of 0.77 and 0.72. Where there is a large gap between the consistency values, this is where the cut-off point has to be made. Furthermore, this means that the cut-off point determines which causal combinations pass fuzzy-set theoretic consistency and which do not. Causal combinations with consistency scores above the cut-off value are designated fuzzy subsets of the outcome and are coded 1, while those below the cut-off value are not fuzzy subsets and are coded 0.³⁰⁹ As can be seen from the table, it is only row 1-18 that involve the studied cases. From row 19-32, no empirical evidence was found. These rows show what is called logical remainders in this case. The logical remainders have been excluded in this context.³¹⁰ I have only been taken combinations which involve the cases. Logical remainders appear as a consequence of limited diversity. This is due to the fact that several cases share the same combination and therefore it is not necessary to include all logically possible combinations in the analysis.³¹¹

When running the analysis through the program, we obtained three different solutions: the complex, the parsimonious and the intermediate solution. All three solutions are valid, but in general, the parsimonious solutions are too parsimonious, since they often eliminate important conditions (e.g. necessary conditions). On the whole, the complex solutions are too complex for they include causal conditions that are irrelevant from the perspective of knowledge, and superfluous according to the results of the parsimonious solution. Usually the intermediate solution makes most sense and is the solution taken into account.³¹² The program uses three different treatments of the remainder combinations, i.e. the combinations, which have been set to the value of 0. In the complex solution, all remainders are set to false, which leads to no

³⁰⁹ See Charles C. Ragin (2004). 'From Fuzzy Sets to Crisp Truth Tables', *COMPASS Working Paper* WP-2004-28 (Posted 7 December 2004), can be accessed at <http://www.compass.org/Raginftzt_April05.pdf>

³¹⁰ In csQCA the minimization procedure calls for another approach when managing the logical remainders than in fsQCA, see e.g. Benoît Rihoux and Gisèle De Meur (2008). 'Crisp-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA)', pp. 56-65 in Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin (eds.): *Configurational Comparative Methods*, op.cit.

³¹¹ See Carsten Q. Schneider & Claudius Wagemann (2006). 'Reducing complexity in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA): Remote and proximate factors and the consolidation of democracy', *European Journal of Political Research* **45**, pp. 751-786.

³¹² E-mail conversation with Charles C. Ragin 9 April 2008. See also Charles C. Ragin (2008), op.cit.

counterfactuals being allowed. In simplistic terms, no remainders are used. In the parsimonious solution, any remainder that will help generate a logically simpler solution is used (remainders are used without evaluating their plausibility), and in the intermediate solution, only remainders that are “easy” counterfactual cases are allowed to be incorporated into the solution.³¹³ This means that logical remainders are restricted to those that are most plausible.

The discussion about “easy” and “difficult” counterfactuals is concerned with how the remainders are treated in the program. Here, a continuum can be imagined, where at one end there are “easy” counterfactuals where it is assumed that by adding a redundant causal condition to a configuration known to produce the outcome, will still produce the outcome. Then at the other end the more “difficult” counterfactuals, which attempt to remove a contributing causal condition from a configuration displaying the outcome, on the assumption that this cause is redundant and the reduced configuration, still produces the outcome.³¹⁴ Most researchers prefer explanations that are somewhere between these two extremes, the so-called intermediate solutions. Intermediate solutions are simply subsets of the most parsimonious solution and supersets of the solution allowing maximum complexity. This solution is based on the interest in causal conditions that are shared by the positive cases, i.e. believed to be linked to the outcome, and not displayed by any negative cases.³¹⁵

The intermediate solution used in this context has been chosen according to the presence of each condition. In the program, it is possible to choose three different options, the first being the presence of the conditions, the second being the absence of the conditions, and the third being the inclusion of either presence or absence of conditions. It is, of course, possible to have a combination of both present and absent conditions as well. Since my assumption is that every condition should be present in order to unravel it, that is if the combination of conditions are relevant for territorial

³¹³ Charles C. Ragin (2008). *User's Guide to Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis*, Tucson, Arizona: Department of Sociology, University of Arizona, p. 81.

³¹⁴ Charles C. Ragin (2008), op.cit., p. 162.

³¹⁵ Charles C. Ragin (2008), op.cit., pp. 164-166.

autonomy to occur, and therefore I have included every variable as present. The table below shows the intermediate solution obtained in the program.

Table 21: The Intermediate Solution within the fs/QCA Program

Combination	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
ED-s +	0.4552	0.2104	0.7315
H-G	0.3201	0.0753	0.7113
Solution Coverage	0.5305		
Solution Consistency			0.6971

Uppercase letters indicate presence and lowercase letters absence or negation. The sign “+” indicates the logical *or* and the sign “.” indicates the logical *and*.

We obtained two different routes leading towards territorial autonomy. The first indicates that ethnic diversity in combination with small size leads to territorial autonomy while, the second indicates that a combination of historical strategic importance, together with long geographical distance, is sufficient for autonomy. These paths are so-called INUS-conditions. INUS-conditions mean causal conditions that are insufficient but necessary parts of the causal recipes which are themselves unnecessary but sufficient.³¹⁶ These conditions are capable of generating the same outcome.

To illustrate how the cases occur within each combination of conditions, Table 22 lists the cases in each combination according to their respective fuzzy set values.

Table 22: Configurations for the Regions

<i>Region</i>	<i>ED-s</i>	<i>H-G</i>	<i>Degree of Autonomy</i>
Åland Islands (Finland)	0.33	0.04	0.82
American Samoa (USA)	0.67	0.67	0.68
American Virgin Islands (USA)	0.33	0.17	0.50
Andalusia (Spain)	0	0.05	0.90

³¹⁶ Explanation by Charles C. Ragin at the “Short Course in Qualitative Comparative Analysis and Fuzzy-Sets” at University of Arizona, August 26-September 18, 2008.

Anguilla (United Kingdom)	0.33	0.67	0.50
Aruba (The Netherlands)	0.67	0.33	0.68
Azores (Portugal)	0	0.11	0.68
Balearic Islands (Spain)	0.33	0.05	0.90
Basque Country (Spain)	0.33	0.04	0.90
Bermuda (United Kingdom)	0.67	0.67	0.82
Bougainville (Papua New Guinea)	0	0.06	0.68
British Virgin Islands (UK)	0.33	0.33	0.50
Canary Islands (Spain)	0	0.10	0.90
Catalonia (Spain)	0	0.05	0.90
Cayman Islands (United Kingdom)	0.33	0.33	0.82
Cook Islands (New Zealand)	0.33	0.31	0.95
Corsica (France)	0.33	0	0.14
Crimea (Ukraine)	0.33	0.05	0.14
Falkland Islands (United Kingdom)	0	0.67	0.50
Faroe Islands (Denmark)	0.33	0.08	0.90
French Polynesia (France)	0.67	0.67	0.82
Friulia-Venezia Giulia (Italy)	0.33	0.05	0.95
Gagauzia (Moldova)	0	0.04	0.90
Galicia (Spain)	0.25	0.05	0.90
Gibraltar (United Kingdom)	0.67	0.11	0.50
Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan)	0	0.04	0.05
Greenland (Denmark)	0.67	0.26	0.90
Guam (USA)	0.67	1	0.23
Guernsey (United Kingdom)	0.33	0.04	0.95
Hong Kong (China)	0.67	0.12	0.90
Isle of Man (United Kingdom)	0.33	0.04	0.90
Jeju Island (South Korea)	0	0.05	0.23
Jersey (United Kingdom)	0	0.04	0.90
Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan)	0.33	0	0.35
Kosovo (Serbia)	0	0.04	0.50
Macau (China)	0.67	0.12	0.90
Madeira (Portugal)	0	0.07	0.68
Mayotte (France)	0.94	0.67	0.08
Mindanao (Philippines)	0.33	0.04	0.14
Montserrat (United Kingdom)	0.33	0.33	0.50
Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan)	0	0.04	0.05

Netherlands' Antilles (NL)	0.67	0.67	0.68
New Caledonia (France)	0.67	1	0.95
Niue (New Zealand)	0.95	0.25	0.95
Norfolk Island (Australia)	0.33	0.14	0.50
North Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	0.59	0.04	0.14
Northern Ireland (United Kingdom)	0.67	0.05	0.14
Northern Mariana Islands (USA)	0.67	0.67	0.82
Oecussi Ambeno (East Timor)	0.33	0.04	0.14
Pitcairn Islands (United Kingdom)	0.67	0.33	0.23
Puerto Rico (USA)	0.67	0.16	0.95
Rodrigues (Mauritius)	0	0.05	0.35
Sardinia (Italy)	0.33	0.05	0.95
Scotland (United Kingdom)	0	0	0.82
Sicily (Italy)	0	0.05	0.95
South Atlantic Autonomous Region (Nicaragua)	0.26	0.04	0.14
St Helena and Dependencies (UK)	0.35	0.67	0.68
St Pierre and Miquelon (France)	0	0.42	0.50
Tokelau (New Zealand)	0.67	0.33	0.68
Trentino-Alto Adige (Italy)	0.33	0.05	0.95
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK)	0.33	0.89	0.90
Valle d'Aosta (Italy)	0.33	0.05	0.95
Wales (United Kingdom)	0.33	0.04	0.08
Wallis and Futuna (France)	0.67	0.67	0.23
Zanzibar (Tanzania)	0.33	0.04	0.82
<i>Barbuda (Antigua and Barbuda)</i>	0	0.04	0
<i>Crete (Greece)</i>	0	0.04	0
<i>Finnmark (Norway)</i>	0.67	0.09	0
<i>Guadeloupe (France)</i>	0.33	0.67	0
<i>Malampa (Vanuatu)</i>	0	0.04	0
<i>Martinique (France)</i>	0.33	0.87	0
<i>Príncipe (São Tomé and Príncipe)</i>	0	0.04	0
<i>Réunion (France)</i>	0.33	0.95	0
<i>Rotuma (Fiji)</i>	0.67	0.05	0
<i>Saaremaa (Estonia)</i>	0	0.04	0
<i>Santa Isabel (Solomon Islands)</i>	0	0.04	0

<i>Southern Great Plain (Hungary)</i>	0	0.04	0
<i>Syddanmark (Denmark)</i>	0	0.04	0
<i>Utrecht (The Netherlands)</i>	0	0.04	0
<i>Vidzeme (Latvia)</i>	0	0.04	0

The table shows the fuzzy-set scores for each region within each configuration of combination. The highlighted cases are those that have a degree of autonomy, which is 0.50 or higher, and where some of the fuzzy-set scores are lower than the outcome (fuzzy scores of 0 are not considered, due to non-membership in the set). These cases are those that are explained according to the analysis of sufficiency. The cases with italics constitute the non-autonomous regions in this context. There are 32 cases overall, which cover both configurations and explain the positive outcome. This means that there is an overlap between the two paths. The cases have ED·s·H·G in their configurations. All four conditions are present for the 32 cases in this context. The other cases are considered inconsistent according to the fuzzy logic. The total number of 34 cases is explained by the combination of ethnic distinctiveness and small size alone, and 44 cases are explained by the combination of historical strategic importance and geographical distance alone. As can be seen in Table 21, the raw coverage for the configuration of ethnic distinctiveness in combination with small size lies at 0.46 and the consistency is at 0.73. The configuration of historical strategic importance and geographical distance has a coverage score of 0.32 and a consistency at 0.71. The solution coverage reaches a value of 0.53, which measures the proportion of membership in the outcome that is explained by the complete solution. The solution consistency is in this case 0.70 and illustrates how often membership in the solution is a subset of membership in the outcome. The unique coverage shows the cases covered by the configuration of ED·s or H·G alone without the overlapping cases. These scores are low since there are a large number of cases which overlap. This also means that the overlapping cases are overdetermined by the conditions in this context.

As can be seen from Table 22, there are also cases which are not covered by any of the four conditions in this context. Most cases do have a degree of autonomy under the crossover limit of 0.50, but there are still cases, such as the Falkland Islands and

Scotland, which are not explained by the four conditions used in the analysis. This means that there are other possible explanations regarding these cases, which are not unraveled here. To be able to unravel the conditions for these cases, a more in-depth analysis should take place, which takes other possible explanatory factors into account.

For illustration it can be of importance to show why it is problematic to examine INUS causes as single instances. Table 23, that follows, shows the logic behind this argument.

Table 23: The Problem with Examining INUS Causes as Single Instances³¹⁷

	X absent	X present
Outcome present	1. There are cases here because multiple recipes exist for the outcome, including some that do not involve X	2. There are cases here because X is an INUS condition – an ingredient in at least one of the recipes for the outcome
Outcome absent	3. There are cases here because some cases lack both outcome and membership in the recipes that do not include X	4. There are cases here because X sometimes occurs without the other ingredients that it must be combined with in order to generate the outcome

There are cases in every cell, since combinations are vital to produce the outcome in question. It is not sufficient that one condition is present or absent. It is the combination which is of importance. In a conventional statistical analysis, cases would preferably be in cells 2 and 3. Cases in cells 1 and 4 would undermine the researcher’s argument.

The assessment of fuzzy-set gives us a value-added analysis in the form of the negative outcome as well. It is possible to run the same analysis and reach the sufficiency for non-autonomy in this circumstance. When running the same kind of

³¹⁷ Ibid.

analysis as mentioned previously, with the negative outcome, we receive the following truth table:

Table 24: Truth Table for Non-Autonomy

Row	H	G	P	ED	S	Number	Outcome ~A	Consistency
1	0	0	0	0	1	4	1	0.93
2	1	0	0	0	1	3	1	0.92
3	1	1	1	0	0	3	0	0.83
4	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0.82
5	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0.82
6	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0.80
7	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0.79
8	1	1	0	1	0	2	0	0.76
9	1	0	0	0	0	5	0	0.75
10	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0.73
11	1	1	1	1	0	6	0	0.70
12	0	0	1	0	1	7	0	0.69
13	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0.66
14	1	0	1	0	0	7	0	0.66
15	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0.65
16	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0.64
17	0	0	1	0	0	14	0	0.63
18	1	0	1	1	0	3	0	0.58

The sign “~” is indicating the negation of the outcome.

As can be seen in the Table, the consistency threshold has been chosen at 0.90 in this case, since the drop between 0.92 and 0.83 signals a huge gap between the different configurations. This means that 90 percent of the cases are taken into account in the analysis. Table 25 indicates the intermediate solution.

Table 25: The Intermediate Solution for Non-Autonomy

Configuration	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
p-S	0.2825	0.2825	0.9368

Solution Coverage	0.2825		
Solution Consistency			0.9368

As we can see, the consistency for the solution is very high at 0.94, but the coverage is quite low at only 0.28. This might be explained by the fact that not all non-autonomous regions have been included in the investigation, since we have only used a control group in this context. The path explaining non-autonomy is no existence of parties/movements in combination with a large size.

What do the results indicate? The positive outcome, i.e. territorial autonomy, is explained by the two configurations of ethnic distinctiveness and small size and/or historical strategic importance combined with long geographical distance. These two configurations also include the necessary condition of democracy. We have to remind ourselves that necessary conditions should be included with the sufficiency conditions as well. Since the threshold for the positive outcome was chosen at a consistency level of 0.75, this implied that the limit was to cover 75 percent of the cases in this context. With a higher threshold, another result may have been attained. In set-theoretic terms, coverage of 75 percent of the cases is satisfactory. As in conventional methods, it is sufficient to be close to the ultimate truth. It is hard to arrive at perfect consistency levels in social sciences, as the real world is too complex to allow the unraveling of the great truths.

The result does not bring any surprising evidence on to the table. Democracy as a necessary condition for territorial autonomy to occur has been stated by many authors and this empirical test merely confirms the statements made in previous research. The paths of ethnic distinctiveness combined with small size also confirm some of the theoretical statements made by many authors. Here a small warning can be given: ethnic distinctiveness alone is not a sufficient condition, but in combination with small size, it is quite different. The path of historical strategic importance combined with long geographical distance also seems plausible in light of previous research. The evidence is that some former theoretical statements have been proved to hold true with a larger set of empirical material than has been undertaken before. The

interesting feature with fuzzy-set is that a researcher is able to do more in-depth analyses with regard to any diverse cases that might have appeared. This analysis can be seen as a starting point for more in-depth investigations in the future. Another factor is that we are also able to say something about the negative outcome, i.e. non-autonomy in this case. For territorial autonomy to occur, absence of parties/movements and existence of large size might seem to be a hindrance for developing into the special status that has been called for. Since a control group of only 15 entities has been used for the negative outcome, this result can only be valid for this particular context.

7.2 Evaluation of the Results

The necessary conditions were obtained from one state related factor, democracy, and one interrelated factor, economic viability. As has been argued by many authors conducting research on autonomy, democracy could also be argued to be valid for the group of territorial autonomies. Most regions belong to democratic states and therefore score high on the degree of democracy. The factor of economic viability shows that most regions belong to the highest income group according to the World Bank Atlas methodology. This evidence can only be seen in a more empirical light. It seems that autonomous regions have become prosperous by establishing new niche markets and have therefore been able to compete on the world market. Economic viability should perhaps be seen as a consequence of autonomy and not as a condition for it. Having autonomy means that regional governments can plan and organize their own economy in a way that fits their own context. Since there is a weak causal relation in the literature between economic viability and territorial autonomy, it is impossible to say in which direction the causal mechanism might go. Regional governments may have full decision rights regarding the economic sphere, and therefore economic issues can be seen as being more related to the competencies of the regions as a whole. On the other hand, some regions, which have been rich regions from the beginning of their autonomy status, might have been able to continue as prosperous regions throughout their development.

We obtained two possible directions as regards what was considered to constitute special autonomous arrangements. These were the combination of ethnic distinctiveness combined with small size and/or historical strategic importance combined with geographical distance. The various degrees of territorial autonomy were explained by democracy and economic viability in this context. In comparative analysis, it is crucial to be aware of what research question(s) we really would like to answer and which kind of tool we should employ for different studies. The models used in quantitative statistical analyses are not perhaps the best tools to answer our current research questions. We have to remember that statistics is best applicable when a relatively large number of cases and a given population is available. Both fuzzy-set and regression strategies have their own strengths and weaknesses. Fuzzy-set gives us combinations of factors which statistical analysis do not give us. The additional value with fuzzy-set is that counterfactual cases can also be taken into account.

The investigation has shown a generalization in the set of territorial autonomies. We obtained clear results from the fuzzy-set analysis. Two different trends leading to territorial autonomy have been elaborated and at the same time some evidence was obtained concerning different degrees of territorial autonomy. The cases undertaken in this investigation need to be put into a wider context, and the following section prior to the conclusion, seek to provide this broader context about these cases.

Governments that have established territorial autonomy have had to consider flexible solutions for diverse societies. It is clear that ethnic distinctiveness and small size are crucial factors for constituting special regions. Historical factors and geographical distances are also crucial elements leading to special treatment by the governments of states. The special autonomous regions are cases with a diversity from the majority perspective and at the same time they play a role as unifying the states' territorial integrity. What can be learned from this study is that to be able to establish a successful territorial autonomy, regions must have a minority that is capable of demanding special rights in order to preserve their own culture, language and ethnic origin. The regions should not be too large, and some historical traditions play a part

e.g. special status or involvement in conflicts and wars, being border regions, being former colonies. The regions should also be situated in the periphery so as to be able to show that they can manage on their own independently from the center. Another important factor is that to be able to succeed in establishing these asymmetrical regions, a democratic environment is necessary.

The condition of existence of parties/movements and/or separatist groups has not, in this context, had any major effect leading to territorial autonomy. However, the variable cannot be totally excluded, since it appears that the non-existence of this condition together with large size explains the negative outcome. The condition might have some significance in other possible configurations not undertaken in this investigation. Theoretically, the variable has some importance affecting the establishment of autonomy. The variable of economic viability as a necessary condition for the various degrees of autonomy was omitted in the latter analysis, since it was not clear which causal direction this variable took.

If the territorial autonomies are viewed from a federal perspective, we can say that regions of this kind can be seen as some kind of quasi-federal arrangements. Federalism is designed to achieve some degree of political integration based on a combination of self-rule and shared rule. There is always a written constitution that declares the terms by which powers are shared in the political system, and which powers can only be altered by extraordinary procedures. Decentralization is the norm by which the political system functions, where the constituent units participate as partners in national governmental activities. In federal systems, it is also essential to have an internal division of authority and power based on a territorial basis. These elements seem to exist for territorial autonomies as well. Usually, a territorial autonomy is consequent upon a constitutional or at least some jurisdictional basis, and there is a system of decentralization between the national/state level and the autonomous region in question. Some powers might be shared, while others are explicitly in the hands of the autonomous region. The element of participation as partners in national governmental activities is often connected to economic or sometimes international matters.

Through further study of territorial autonomies, there is the potential for establishing better developed theories in conflict studies and nation-building. Territorial autonomies can be used as examples when evaluating which option a state should adopt. Territorial autonomies could also serve as successful examples of conflict-solving mechanisms. Within studies of nation-building or state-building, territorial autonomies provide examples of how potential new countries could emerge. There is much room for combining these cases with other relevant areas of inquiry. This study is simply a first step in illustrating the diversity of mechanisms available.

8 Conclusions

The aim of this study has been to outline the concept of autonomy both from a general view and from a more delimited view focused on territorial autonomy in particular. Autonomy in a broad perspective takes various forms such as personal, cultural, functional, administrative, and legislative autonomy. The territorial autonomies used in this study refer to administrative and legislative forms of autonomy. These asymmetrical regions within states constitute the two highest levels according to Tkacik's model. The contribution of the investigation has been to map the asymmetrical, special/unique, territorial sub-national units that do not fit into the general pattern of the state of which they are part. The entities can be seen as flexible solutions of governance within states.

In this investigation, 65 territorial autonomies have been analyzed within 25 countries in the world. The set of territorial autonomy has been ascertained from the constitutions and other relevant jurisdictional documents. A type of index has been established to review the different degrees of autonomy between the cases. Characteristics used, for this purpose, have been: distribution of power, functions, constitutional basis, control over generic autonomy provisions, and tax abilities.

The purpose of the study has been to elaborate on both the different degrees of territorial autonomy and the routes leading to territorial autonomies as such. Degree and kind have been analyzed simultaneously according to a step-by-step mode. In order to elucidate the different paths leading to territorial autonomy proper, a control group of fifteen other sub-national regions with less or no autonomy was chosen.

Another part of the study illustrates how an alternative comparative approach, such as fuzzy-set, could be applied within this area of research. The method commences from what conventional statisticians would call "the forbidden fruit", by conducting the selection on the dependent variable. Fuzzy-set is a more inductive, bottom-up model, which relates to set-theory within mathematical science. The technique also considers complex configurations, and is not used to consider any net effects. The problem

when using this technique was the elaboration according to a two-step strategy. The first step was to analyze the degree of territorial autonomy according to necessary conditions, and the second step was to analyze the territorial autonomy proper according to sufficient conditions.

A broad range of various possible explanatory factors was used in the investigation. These factors were chosen according to the general literature about autonomy. Democracy was chosen, since there is a mutual understanding between authors that territorial autonomy can only be established in democratic environments, if they are going to be functional and stable. The findings show that democracy is indeed a necessary condition for the different degrees of territorial autonomy, and at the same time democracy is also included as a sufficient condition for territorial autonomy to occur.

Historical strategic importance has been crucial for the occurrence of territorial autonomies. Some regions have functioned as colonies or operated as military outposts, or have been established as the result of war or conflicts. Historical events have not affected the establishment of territorial autonomy in isolation. Findings show that historical strategic importance is crucial in combination with geographical remoteness. Geographical distances from the mother country, together with the historical position, are the features of importance for territorial autonomy to occur. This combination explains 44 out of the 65 territorial autonomies.

Possession of natural resources has been assumed to explain the different degrees of autonomy, but this factor does not seem to have any effect on territorial autonomy. It is not possible to conclude that possession of natural resources really plays a significant role in this context. This factor was omitted in the second analysis, since it did not have any major theoretical basis.

Existence of regional parties/movements or separatist groups was seen in the light of demands for more self-government and the fact that governments seem to offer

regions autonomy to reduce secessionist claims. This factor, however, does not show any significance in either the degree or kind of autonomy in this context.

Ethnic distinctiveness, according to many authors, plays a major role in establishing territorial autonomy. Results show, however, that ethnic distinctiveness is only important in combination with small size, not as a feature of its own. The combination of ethnic distinctiveness and small size explains 34 out of the 65 cases.

Economic viability has been seen as a possible factor resulting in both different degrees and kinds of autonomy. Economic viability is a necessary condition constituting the different degrees of territorial autonomy. It is, though, doubtful if this factor can be seen as a condition for autonomy but rather that it should be seen as a consequence of autonomy instead.

The paths leading towards territorial autonomy proper overlap, and a total of 32 cases can be explained by the four conditions together of: ethnic distinctiveness, small size, historical strategic importance, and geographical distance. This means that all four factors play a crucial role in establishing these special systems of governments.

In conclusion, we can say that the two most important factors for the degree of territorial autonomy are democracy and economic viability. These factors are necessary conditions, while the combinatorial factors constituting a territorial autonomy proper are sufficient conditions. For development or establishment of territorial autonomy, it is clear that ethnic distinctiveness in the form of a minority should exist and the population in the region should not be too large. Other features which also contribute are the historical strategic importance of being former colony, the remnants of war or conflicts, and even military outposts together with geographical distance. The relationships between the center and periphery, both from a historical and current perspective, seem to have a tendency to lead to special management of territories.

An added value with the fuzzy-set analysis, is that conditions were also obtained explaining the negative outcome, i.e. non-autonomy. While running this analysis we identified a combination of the non-existence of parties/movements and separatist groups combined with large size as the path explaining non-autonomy. This analysis is, however, only valid for this particular context, since we have used a limited number of non-autonomous regions.

As a consequence of this investigation, further questions have arisen. One example is the question of why some governments tend to choose asymmetrical solutions above other alternatives. It would be interesting to investigate the similarities and differences between the countries possessing territorial autonomies. This would be analysis of countries at a macro-level rather than the sub-national level examined here. Another interesting line of investigation would be as to find out the reason why some countries are more successful in developing autonomous regions, while other countries prefer more symmetrical systems, such as those found in some brands of federalism. Such questions as these would be interesting to investigate in the near future.

Svensk sammanfattning

Autonomi är ett mångfasetterat och omdiskuterat begrepp inom det samhällsvetenskapliga området. Det finns ingen universell vedertagen definition. Istället diskuteras begreppet ur olika synvinklar med olika innehåll. En del författare försöker dra gränser mellan olika former av autonomi, såsom personlig, kulturell, funktionell, administrativ och territoriell eller lagstiftande autonomi.

Min avhandling tar avstamp i området kring de territoriella formerna av autonomi. Med territoriell autonomi menas i detta sammanhang ett *geografiskt definierat område som skiljer sig från andra subnationella enheter (federala delstater, kommuner etc.) i en specifik stat och som erhållit någon form av specialstatus med lagstiftande och/eller regelgivande (administrativ) makt*. Territoriell autonomi används här i en vidare betydelse för att erhålla så stor variation som möjligt mellan enheterna i undersökningen.

Syftet är att kartlägga vilka områden som kan räknas till gruppen territoriell autonomi ur ett globalt perspektiv och vilka förklaringsmekanismer som ligger bakom upprättandet av dessa regioner. De potentiella förklaringsfaktorerna identifieras med nödvändiga och tillräckliga villkor enligt en färsk metod kallad fuzzy-set som härrör från mängdläran inom matematiken.

Forskningsdesignen utgår ifrån att välja på den beroende variabeln, d.v.s. territoriell autonomi i detta sammanhang. Designen har valts eftersom det inte finns någon vedertagen lista över de specialområden som behandlas i kontexten.

Den första delen i avhandlingen diskuterar kartläggningen av områdena utgående från ländernas konstitutioner och andra juridiska dokument där vi kan finna spår av territoriella autonomier. Områdenas maktfördelning, funktioner, konstitutionell grund och ändringsmöjligheter vad gäller förändringar i regionernas egna författningar/statut/självstyrelselagar räknas upp som definierande aspekter för dessa områden. Dessa aspekter ligger till grund för graden av autonomi eller den variation

som råder mellan regionerna. På detta sätt går det att avgöra vilka territoriella autonomier som har en starkare autonom ställning jämfört med svagare territoriella autonomier.

De oberoende variablerna eller de möjliga förklaringsfaktorerna är hämtade från den allmänna litteraturen kring autonomifrågor i stort. I detta sammanhang har de vanligaste förekommande faktorerna valts. Faktorerna delas in i statsrelaterade förklaringar som har med moderlandet att göra, regionalspecifika faktorer som är direkt anknutna till regionen som sådana och faktorer som är i ett inomstatligt förhållande mellan stat och region.

Demokrati är den enda statsrelaterade förklaringsfaktorn som används. Här antas att regimtypen av en stat har betydelse för hur tänkbart det kan vara för en territoriell autonomi att etableras. Demokrati operationaliseras med hjälp av *Freedom House* indexet och kalibreras sedan med fuzzy-set. De flesta autonoma regionerna förekommer i demokratiska stater. Hela femton länder är fria, medan sex länder är delvis fria och endast fyra länder hör till kategorin icke-fria länder.

De regionalspecifika faktorerna utgörs av den historiskt strategiska betydelsen som regionen haft i tiderna, det geografiska avståndet i förhållandet till moderlandet, tillgången på naturresurser och existensen av regionala rörelser eller partier och/eller existensen av separatistgrupper.

Den historiskt strategiska betydelsen delas in i om området utgjort en militär utpost, koloni eller varit offer för krig eller konfliktsituationer. Det geografiska avståndet mäts fågelvägen mellan huvudstaden i landet och huvudorten i regionen ifråga. Här är tanken den att avståndet mellan maktcentra har betydelse för om regionen uppnått en specialstatus eller inte. Tillgång på naturresurser delas in i viktiga, mindre viktiga och obefintliga tillgångar. Regioner som innehar viktiga naturresurser anses ha en bättre chans att erhålla specialstatus i sammanhanget. Existensen av regionala rörelser/partier och/eller separatistgrupper delas in i endast ja eller nej. Existensen av nationella partier tas även med i beaktande. Existensen av regionala rörelser/partier

och/eller separatistgrupper anses utgöra en viktig faktor för att en region ska kunna få sin röst hörd och via dessa kanaler påverka sin egen situation.

De inomstatliga faktorerna eller faktorer som är relaterade till både moderland och region utgörs av etnisk särprägel, storlek enligt befolkningsmängd och ekonomisk livskraft. Etnisk särprägel utgår ifrån minoritetsperspektivet där regionens befolkning jämförs med majoritetsbefolkningen i landet. Karaktäristika som ligger till grund för en etnisk särprägel utgörs av etniskt ursprung, religion och språk. Storleksvariabeln mäts som procentenhet mellan den totala befolkningen i landet jämfört med regionens andel av befolkningen. Ekonomisk livskraft utgörs av BNP/capita och här används Världsbankens indelning som måttenhet.

Allt som allt börjar den första analysen med att ta alla åtta förklaringsfaktorer i beaktande enligt nödvändighetstestet i fuzzy-set. Fuzzy-set används här som en tvåstegsmodell där första analysen endast tar de 65 territoriella autonomierna i beaktande. Inom fuzzy-set är alla variabler eller villkor kalibrerade enligt en skala från 0 till 1. Värdet 0 illustrerar fullvärdigt utanförskap i ett set eller i en klass/mängd, medan värdet 1 illustrerar fullvärdigt medlemskap i ett set. Forskaren väljer själv sina gränsvärden för alla variabler i sammanhanget, men det bör ske öppet så att andra kan utvärdera hela fuzzy-set tabellen och utföra en replikering av analysen. Inom fuzzy-set är det möjligt att erhålla kombinationer av variabler som förklarar det utfall som intresserar oss. Fuzzy-set kan ses som en alternativ metod till mer konventionella metoder. Inom fuzzy-set är det möjligt att kombinera kvantitativa och kvalitativa analyser på en och samma gång. Metoden möjliggör att förklara grad och typ på samma gång. Medlemskapsvärdena i fuzzy-set utgör medlemskapsvärden i undergrupper och på samma gång illustrerar värdena graden av medlemskap i en viss klass. Tekniken ger oss möjlighet att bestämma vilka konfigurationer som är viktiga för ett specifikt utfall, hur dessa kombinationer ser ut i förhållande till varandra, och vi kan även utnyttja metoden för att göra vidare analyser.

Nödvändighetstestet har här gjorts med enkla XY- diagram för att visa hur enheterna ligger i förhållande till den beroende variabeln. Analysen görs även för att kunna

eliminera de nödvändiga faktorerna, så att dessa inte behöver störa den senare analysen för tillräcklighet. Då analysen genomförts erhåller vi två nödvändiga villkor i detta sammanhang och dessa utgörs av demokrati och ekonomisk livskraft. Dessa variabler elimineras i den andra delen av analysen.

I den andra delen av analysen som är ett test för tillräcklighet har vi även eliminerat tillgång på naturresurser som en irrelevant variabel i sammanhanget. Tillgång på naturresurser har endast en svag förankring i litteraturen i förhållande till territoriell autonomi. Dessutom har en kontrollgrupp på möjliga territoriella autonomier tagits med för att vi ska kunna testa tillräcklighet på ett vettigt sätt. De möjliga fallen utgörs av en grupp regioner som kunde tänkas utgöra territoriella autonomier men som inte uppnått den status som efterfrågas. Dessa utgörs av en grupp regioner från olika delar i världen och uppgår till 15 stycken. Tillräcklighetsanalysen ger oss två olika vägar som leder till territoriell autonomi. Den ena kombinationen utgörs av etnisk särprägel kombinerat med liten befolkningsstorlek och den andra kombinationen är historisk strategisk betydelse kombinerat med geografiskt avstånd. De flesta fall täcker båda kombinationerna. Demokrati har även här använts som en nödvändig faktor som bakgrund till valet av kontrollenheter.

Resultatet bekräftar tidigare forskning i sammanhanget. För att en territoriell autonomi ska kunna uppkomma bör det finnas en minoritet i området, befolkningen bör inte vara alltför stor, det bör finnas någon historisk bakgrund till tidigare specialförhållanden och regionen bör befinna sig på ett tillräckligt geografiskt avstånd i förhållande till moderlandet. Vidare bör en demokratisk miljö vara förhärskande för att territoriella arrangemang av detta slag ska få sin livskraft och kunna fungera.

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<<http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Reunion.htm>>, retrieved 7 May, 2008

Appendix: Territorial Autonomies in Alphabetic Order

The territorial autonomies will be outlined according to table 1 pages 30-35. Starting with the Åland Islands and ending with Zanzibar ever autonomy is covered together with a short description of each territory.

Åland Islands

The Åland Islands are governed according to the Act on the Autonomy of the Åland Islands 1993. The Islands are also mentioned in the Finnish National Constitution. The powers are vested in a Legislative Assembly (*Lagting*) and an Executive Authority (*Landskapsregering*). The Legislative Assembly has 30 members, who are elected according to universal adult suffrage, for a four-year term.

The Act on the Autonomy of the Åland Islands can only be amended by joint decisions of the Parliament of Finland and the Åland Parliament. In the Parliament of Finland, decisions are made according to the provisions specified in the amendment of the National Constitution; in the Åland Parliament decisions are ratified by having a two third majority of the votes cast.³¹⁸

American Samoa

American Samoa is an unincorporated territory belonging to the USA. Under the terms of the 1967 constitution, executive power is exercised by a Governor who is directly elected for a four-year term. The Governor has the right to appoint heads of government departments, endorse the approvals of the assembly, and can veto legislation. The assembly, called the *Fono*, is a two-chamber body, comprised of an 18-member Senate, elected, according to Samoan custom, from among the local male chiefs (*matai*) for four-year terms, and a 20-member House of Representatives, whose members are popularly elected every two years. Swain's Island also sends one non-

³¹⁸ Act on Autonomy of the Åland Islands 1993 <<http://www.lagtinget.aland.fi/eng/act.html>>, accessed from Internet 28 February 2007.

voting member to the House. The Fono convenes twice a year, in January and July, for a maximum of 45 days a year. American Samoa has, since 1981, also sent a non-voting delegate to the US House of Representatives, and this delegate is elected every two years.³¹⁹ American Samoa controls its own internal affairs.

To revise the constitution in American Samoa, the Governor appoints a new Constitutional Committee, five years after the effective date of the current Constitution to prepare amendments or a revised draft constitution to be submitted to the Governor. The Governor calls a constitutional convention to do the same, with the delegates to the convention being selected by their respective county councils. The number of delegates from each county is the number obtained by dividing the population of the county, as shown by the last preceding Federal census, by 400. Each county should therefore have at least one delegate and Swains Island is guaranteed one delegate selected in an open meeting by the permanent adult residents of the Island (the elders). When the constitutional convention has made a decision about a revision or draft constitution, this has to be submitted by the Governor to the voters eligible to vote for members of the House of Representatives at the next general election. If a majority of the voters approve the amendments or the proposed revised constitution, the Governor submits the amendments to the Secretary of Interior for his approval. The Secretary of the Interior is the final authority in this case.³²⁰

American Virgin Islands

The American Virgin Islands have been granted a measure of self-government under the constitution of 1936, which has been amended several times i.e. in 1954, 1970 and 1973. Executive power is exercised by a directly elected Governor who serves a four-year period. The Governor appoints, on the advice of the assembly, the heads of government departments and is required to approve any legislation. The assembly, called the Senate, is a single-chamber body, comprising 15 members, popularly

³¹⁹ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999). *Political Systems of the World*. New Edition, Volume Two. Oxford: Helicon Publishing Ltd., p. 867.

³²⁰ Revised Constitution of American Samoa 1967, Article V, Section 4
<<http://www.asbar.org/Newcode/rcas.htm>>, accessed from Internet February 15, 2007.

elected for a two-year period, who represent two legislative districts. Since 1968, the US Virgin Islands have elected a non-voting delegate to the US House of Representatives. The Islands' citizens are excluded from voting in US presidential elections.³²¹

The territory functions directly under US jurisdiction and is supervised by the Secretary of the Interior. The Congress of the United States has the ultimate power to annul any Act made by the legislature of the Virgin Islands.³²²

The American Virgin Islands handle all internal matters and function as an unincorporated territory of the US. Proposals for increased autonomy have been rejected in referenda held in March 1979 and November 1981.³²³

Andalusia

Andalusia in Spain has been considered as one of the historical regions. Andalusia has an autonomy statute, which has been ratified by referendum. The Spanish Parliament can transfer legislative and executive functions without a reform of the statute of autonomy. The Spanish Constitution has established that each autonomous region should have a legislative assembly elected by universal suffrage, a government headed by a president, and a high court of justice. The administrative organization is decided by each autonomous region.³²⁴ Some of the matters are shared with the central level, but Andalusia is considered to have full autonomous status.

The government of Andalusia has established offices in Brussels with the legal status of limited trade companies.³²⁵

³²¹ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 870.

³²² U.S. Code Title 48, Chapter 12, Subchapter III, §1574 and Chapter 12, Subchapter I, §1541 <<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/display.html?>>, accessed from Internet February 15, 2007.

³²³ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 870.

³²⁴ Francese Morata (2001). 'Spanish Regions in the European Community' in Barry Jones and Michael Keating (eds.): *The European Union and the Regions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 116.

³²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 125.

The draft of the Statute of Autonomy is drawn up by an assembly of the members of the Provincial Council and respective members of Congress and elected Senators and then sent to the *Cortes Generales* to be drafted as an Act.³²⁶ Amendments to the Statutes of Autonomy follow the procedure mentioned in the National Constitution and require approval of the *Cortes Generales* through an organic act.³²⁷

Anguilla

The 1982 constitution, which regulates Anguillan affairs, was amended in 1990. The British Crown is represented by an appointed Governor who is responsible for external affairs, defense, the judiciary, the 'offshore' banking sector, and internal security. The Governor presides over meetings of the Executive Council and the House of Assembly. The Executive Council, or cabinet, comprises a chief minister, with whom the Governor works closely and three other ministers selected from the House of Assembly, as well as *ex officio* members, the Attorney General and the Permanent Secretary for Finance. The House of Assembly consists of seven members directly elected for five-year terms, as well as two nominated and two *ex officio* representatives.³²⁸

In Anguilla, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom reserves the right, together with Her Privy Council, to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Anguilla.³²⁹ This also applies to amendments to the Anguillan constitution.

Aruba

In Aruba there is a 21-member single chamber assembly, called the Island Council (Staten). The assembly is elected by universal adult suffrage for a four year period

³²⁶ Spanish Constitution of 1978, Part VIII, Chapter 3, Section 146
<http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/index.html>, accessed from Internet February 15, 2007.

³²⁷ Spanish Constitution of 1978, Part VIII, Chapter 3, Section 147 (3)
<http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/index.html>, accessed from Internet February 15, 2007.

³²⁸ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 853.

and subject to dissolution during that time. Executive authority for internal affairs is exercised by an eight to ten member Council of Ministers, headed by a prime minister and responsible to the Staten. Dutch interests are overseen by a crown-appointed Governor, who serves a six-year term as Commander-in-Chief of the Island's armed forces and has executive authority in external matters. Any proposal for full independence needs approval in a referendum and the support of a two-thirds majority in the Staten.³³⁰

Aruba has direct ties with the Dutch Kingdom. These ties are a manner of "Commonwealth" relationships between the different parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Revisions and amendments are decided by an Act of Parliament. The Dutch Parliament has the ultimate right to change the island's status together with the consent of the Island Council.³³¹

There has been some turbulence during recent years among the different parts of the Netherlands. The larger islands of the Netherlands Antilles have been striving towards the same status as Aruba (*status aparte* since 1986). It seems feasible that Bonaire, Curaçao and Sint Maarten will secure a direct relationship (*status aparte*) with Amsterdam, and the two smallest islands will become municipalities of the Netherlands proper, leading to a fragmentation of the Netherlands Antilles. The Dutch government is likely to only remain responsible for defense and foreign affairs, and each island will manage and be responsible for its own internal affairs.³³²

³²⁹ Anguilla Constitution Order 1982 <[http://www.gov.ai/images%20 Const.pdf](http://www.gov.ai/images%20Const.pdf)>, accessed from Internet 21 February 2007.

³³⁰ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 840.

³³¹ The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 2002, Chapter 7, Article 123 <http://www.minbzk.nl/contents/pages/6156/grondwet_UK_6-02.pdf>, accessed from Internet 21 February 2007.

³³² Maria Ackrén (2006). 'The Faroe Island's Options for Independence', *Island Studies Journal*, Volume 1, No. 2, 2006, p. 232. See also G. Oostindie (2006). 'Dependence and Autonomy in Sub-National Island Jurisdictions: The Case of the Kingdom of the Netherlands', *The Round Table*, Vol. 95, No. 386, pp. 609-626.

Azores

The Azores have a legislative assembly which has competence to legislate in many internal matters ranging over administration of the islands, taxation, budget control, healthcare, social security, transport and education. The state of Portugal has control over defense, police, order, customs, immigration and some other jurisdictional areas.³³³

The Azores have a Regional Legislative Assembly of elected members and a Regional Government. The president of the Regional Government and its ministers are appointed by a resident Minister of the Republic, who represents the Portuguese national government in the islands. The Azores also elect members to the parliament in Lisbon.³³⁴

The Assembly of the Republic may revise the constitution of Portugal five years after the date of publication of the last ordinary revision law. There is also a possibility of revision when a four-fifths majority of all Members (in the Assembly) take extraordinary revision powers at any time in full exercise of their office. The Azores and Madeira are regulated under the constitution of Portugal even though the islands possess their own statutes.³³⁵

Balearic Islands

The Balearic Islands as well as Andalusia belong to the historical regions of Spain. Similar to Andalusia, the Balearic Islands have their own legislative assembly elected by universal suffrage, a government headed by a president, and a high court of

³³³ M. Carlos Cesar (2000). 'Status of the Autonomous Region of the Azores' in *Quel Statut pour les Îles d'Europe? What Status for Europe's Islands?* Commission des Îles Conférence des Régions Périphériques maritimes d'Europe: L'Harmattan, p. 340.

³³⁴ Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998). *The Last Colonies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 49.

³³⁵ Constitution of the Portuguese Republic 2005 <http://www.parlamento.pt/ingles/cons_leg/crp_ing/index.html>, accessed from Internet 21 February 2007.

justice.³³⁶ The president is elected by parliament from amongst its members. The parliament of the Balearic Islands approves all the laws of the Autonomous Community, including general budgetary legislation, and it supervises all acts of government. The government consists of the president, the vice-president (whenever appropriate) and the councilors. The government is responsible for controlling the Autonomous Community's local administration and all public bodies, services and entities, which are dependent upon the latter. The government can also create regulations. Each councilor heads a specific department.³³⁷

The draft of the Statutes of Autonomy in Spain are drawn up by an assembly of members of the Provincial Council or inter-island body of the provinces concerned, and respective Members of Congress and elected Senators and has to be sent to the *Cortes Generales* for drafting as an Act.³³⁸ Amendments of Statutes of Autonomy follow the procedure mentioned in the Spanish Constitution and require approval of the *Cortes Generales* through an organic act.³³⁹ All Spanish regions follow the same procedure as regards amendments.

The Balearic Islands have two co-official languages, which denote that the two languages have official status on the Islands. One is the Community's own native language, Catalan, which has been spoken since the 13th century, and the other is the official state language, Castilian. The educational system guarantees an adequate knowledge of both languages.³⁴⁰

³³⁶ Francesc Morata (2001). 'Spanish Regions in the European Community', op.cit., p. 116.

³³⁷ The Statute of Autonomy: The Foundations of Balearic Autonomy (<http://www.caib.es/kfcont.htm>).

³³⁸ Spanish Constitution of 1978, Part VIII, Chapter 3, Section 146

<http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/index.html>, accessed from Internet February 15, 2007.

³³⁹ Spanish Constitution of 1978, Part VIII, Chapter 3, Section 147 (3)

<http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/index.html>, accessed from Internet February 15, 2007.

³⁴⁰ The Statute of Autonomy: The Foundations of Balearic Autonomy

<<http://www.caib.es/kfcont.htm>>.

Basque Country

The Basque Country is also one of the cultural and historical regions of Spain that has its own legislative assembly and government. The amendment procedure follows the same pattern as for Andalusia and the Balearic Islands.

The autonomous community of the Basque Country has sole jurisdiction in the following matters: delimitation of municipal territory, organization, regime and functioning of self-government; internal electoral legislation affecting the Basque Parliament and Provincial Councils, local government and local administration; and preservation, modification and development of traditional, regional and special civil law. Other matters included are procedural rules and those concerning administrative and economic procedures, public domain and property, woodland and forestry resources and services, agriculture and livestock farming, fishing, etc. All matters are listed in the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country.³⁴¹

In the Basque Country, there are also two official languages, one being the language of the Basque People, 'Euskera', and the other being the official state language, Castilian. Both languages can be used and are guaranteed equal status in the Community.³⁴²

Bermuda

Bermuda is internally self-governing. The United Kingdom remains responsible for the Island's external affairs, defense, and internal security, including the police. British interests are represented by an appointed governor. The Island's assembly has two chambers: the 11-member Senate and the 40-member House of Assembly. Three of the Senate's members are appointed by the governor, five by the prime minister and three by the leader of the opposition. The members of the House of Assembly are all directly elected by universal adult suffrage for a five year period, from 20 two-

³⁴¹ The Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country, Article 10 <<http://www.parlamento.euskadi.net/>>.

³⁴² The Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country, Article 6 <<http://www.parlamento.euskadi.net/>>.

member constituencies. As late as 1990, the minimum voting age was lowered from 21 years to 18 years. From the majority grouping in the House of Assembly, the governor appoints a prime minister to preside over a cabinet of approximately 14 ministers of his or her own choosing. At least six cabinet ministers must be selected from the assembly. There is also a Governor's Council for consultative purposes between the governor and the ministers.³⁴³

In Bermuda, the appointed governor may make amendments at any time within a twelve month period after the commencement of the Bermuda Constitution Order. The Legislature in Bermuda has authority to amend, repeal or revoke any existing law.³⁴⁴

Bougainville

Bougainville is regulated according to the Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea. The Bougainville Constitution is included in the State's Constitution. To amend this constitution, the Bougainville Executive has to give notification of any amendment to the Minister responsible for Bougainville matters. The National Government may consult the Bougainville Government in relation to any proposed amendment of the Constitution.³⁴⁵

Bougainville as a territory has been in conflict with Papua New Guinea for a considerable length of time since the independence of PNG in 1975. The conflict was first concerned with decolonization and this was followed by discord over the mining industry. Ethnic tensions have also had a role, even though these have not been the essential cause of the conflict.³⁴⁶ The Bougainville factions first met to discuss a peace settlement in July 1997. The parties involved agreed on a permanent ceasefire

³⁴³ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., pp.854-855.

³⁴⁴ Bermuda Constitution Order 1968
<http://www.ubp.bm/downloads/BermudaConstitutionOrder_1968.pdf>, accessed from Internet 22 February 2007.

³⁴⁵ Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Article 287
<http://www.paclii.org/pg/legis/consol_act/cotisopng534/>, accessed from Internet 22 February 2007.

agreement on the 30th April 1998. A comprehensive Bougainville Peace Agreement was signed in August 2001, which included a weapons disposal plan and provided for elections in order to establish an autonomous government in Bougainville. The Agreement also provided for a referendum after 10-15 years on the question of Bougainvillean independence. On 21st December 2004, an agreeded Constitution for the Autonomous Region of Bougainville was established by the PNG government. The Constitution allows for an assembly of 33 elected members, a president, a speaker, three representatives for women and three representatives for ex-combatants.³⁴⁷

British Virgin Islands

Under the terms of the 1977 constitution, the British Crown is represented by an appointed governor who has sole responsibility for external affairs, defense, judicial, and internal security matters. The governor also serves as chairperson of a six-member Executive Council and possesses reserve legislative powers. There is also a 15-member Legislative Council which is comprised of nine members directly elected from single-member constituencies, four elected according to a single national constituency, one appointed as speaker and one as an *ex officio* member, the attorney general. From the majority grouping in the Legislative Council, a chief minister is chosen and three other ministers are selected and these members constitute the Executive Council together with the Governor and the Attorney General.³⁴⁸

The British Virgin Islands are ruled by the British Crown, and Her Majesty the Queen has the right to amend any laws and constitutions relating to the Islands. In some circumstances, even the appointed Governor of the Islands has the right to amend laws.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁶ Yash Ghai and Anthony Regan (2000). 'Bougainville and the Dialectics of Ethnicity, Autonomy and Separation', pp. 242-265 in Yash Ghai (ed.): *Autonomy and Ethnicity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³⁴⁷ Bougainville Peace Process <<http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/bougainville/>>, accessed from Internet 26 April 2007.

³⁴⁸ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 856.

³⁴⁹ The Virgin Islands (Constitution) Order 1976 (As Amended) <<http://www.dpu.gov.vg/AboutUs/Constitution.htm>>, accessed from Internet 22 February 2007.

Canary Islands

The Canary Islands have an elected legislature and residents also choose deputies to the Spanish parliament. The Islands have their own government and are composed of two provinces, Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Las Palmas. The Canaries have a considerable degree of self-government on such matters as finances, public works and day-to-day administration. Responsibility for other areas, such as international affairs and defense, remains with the national government.³⁵⁰

The Canary Islands' fiscal and economic system is different from the general Spanish one. The Canaries have some exceptions as part of the European Union in the fiscal and economic area. The Islands have a special tax regime, with low taxes and other incentives for business.³⁵¹

Catalonia

Catalonia in Spain belongs to one of the cultural and historical regions. Catalonia's first autonomy statute was already approved during the Second Spanish Republic 1931-1939. This autonomy had an interval when Franco was in power. After Franco's death, nationalist mobilization began throughout the state and this led to a major reform which resulted in the 1978 National Constitution.³⁵²

The Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia was approved in 1979, after a popular referendum in which 61 percent of those eligible voted, of whom 88 percent supported autonomy. Catalonia achieved an autonomous government (*Generalitat*) and its own parliament. The Statute declared Catalan as Catalonia's own language, but it had to share the status of an official language with Castilian.³⁵³

³⁵⁰ Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998), op.cit., p. 51 and 270.

³⁵¹ Spain: The Canary Islands Special Zone <<http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/offon/spain/spncan.html>>, accessed from Internet 26 April 2007.

³⁵² Daniele Conversi (2000). 'Autonomous Communities and the Ethnic Settlement in Spain', pp.123-125 in Yash Ghai (ed.): *Autonomy and Ethnicity*, op.cit.

³⁵³ Ibid, p. 130.

Cayman Islands

The British Crown, represented by an appointed governor on the Islands, has sole responsibility for external affairs, defense, judicial, public service, and internal security matters. The governor also serves as the chairperson of the Executive Council which is comprised of three appointed *ex officio* members including a chief secretary, and five elected representatives drawn from the Legislative Council. The latter five serve as ministers. The Legislative Council consists of three official representatives and 15 members elected by universal adult suffrage, from six electoral districts, for a four year period.³⁵⁴

The Cayman Islands are ruled under Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, who has the right to amend any laws and constitution relating to the Islands. In some circumstances even the appointed Governor from the Islands has the right to amend laws.³⁵⁵

Cook Islands

The Cook Islands have a 25-member Legislative Assembly which is elected for a five-year term by universal adult suffrage. Ten members represent the main island of Rarotonga, 14 represent constituencies on the other 14 islands, and one represents the Cook Islanders resident in New Zealand. The Assembly selects a prime minister who oversees an eight-member cabinet of his or her choosing and also holds a wide range of functional portfolios. Hereditary island chiefs are represented in a second assembly chamber, the House of Ariki, which has up to 15 members. This chamber has, however, no legislative powers. An appointed High Commissioner represents the

³⁵⁴ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 857.

³⁵⁵ The Cayman Islands (Constitution) Order 1972
<<http://www.gov.ky/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/CIGHOME/GOVERNMENT/CONSTITUTION/CONSTITUTION/CONSTITUTIONAMENDED2004ORDER.PDF>>, accessed from Internet 22 February 2007.

British Crown as the Islands' formal Head of State, and the New Zealand government has a representative on Rarotonga.³⁵⁶

On the Cook Islands, the parliament has the possibility to amend its constitution, if the final vote receives the affirmative votes of no less than two-thirds of the total membership (including vacancies) of the parliament and there is an interval of not less than 90 days between the date on which the final vote was taken and the date on which the proceeding vote was taken. The decision should be accompanied by a certificate endorsed by the speaker, in order to take effect.³⁵⁷

Corsica

Corsica forms an integral part of France, which is called a collective territory. The Island has its own parliament with 51 members and it is directly elected. The parliament has the right to scrutinize bills passed by the National Assembly and to propose amendments applicable to the island. The 'Joxe Plan' autonomy bill approved by the National Assembly in 1992, gives the island still greater autonomy in the education, training, transport, and tourism sectors.³⁵⁸

The French Parliament has the right to amend Corsica's Special Statute, but it must be in consent with the population of Corsica. A referendum on the Island has to be held first and after that a debate in the Government should follow.³⁵⁹

Crimea

Crimea has an asymmetric institutional autonomy arrangement within the Ukraine. Crimea belongs to one of the Free Economic Zones in Ukraine with a special tax regime. It is the only region where the Russian population is in the majority, i.e. about

³⁵⁶ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 843.

³⁵⁷ The Constitution of the Cook Islands <http://www.pacii.org/ck/legis/num_act/cotci327/>, accessed from Internet 22 February 2007.

³⁵⁸ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 837.

³⁵⁹ French Constitution of 1958 <<http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp>>, accessed from Internet 22 February 2007.

60 percent, in relation to 23 percent of Ukrainians. There is also a segment of Crimean Tatars of about 10-12 percent and up to 100 smaller segments of nationalities.³⁶⁰

Crimea is labeled as the 'Autonomous Republic of Crimea' and has its own government and elected assembly (*Verkhovna Rada*). The Crimean assembly only has the right to initiate legislation and pass normative acts rather than laws. The responsibilities of the assembly are limited, but there is some flexibility to modify and be granted more competences.³⁶¹

Crimea is directly under Ukrainian jurisdiction and this means that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has the ultimate power to amend the Constitution. The President of Ukraine or no less than one-third of the National Deputies of Ukraine need to support the amendments.³⁶²

Falkland Islands

The Falkland Islands are administered by a crown-appointed governor, who works with an advisory Executive Council composed of two non-voting *ex officio* members, a chief executive, a financial secretary and three representatives elected by the Legislature. The Falkland Islands' Legislative Council is comprised of eight directly elected members and the two non-voting *ex officio* representatives.³⁶³

The Commissioner (governor) may make laws, to be styled Ordinances, for the peace, order and good governance of the Falkland Islands. Her Majesty, through a Secretary of State, has the right to disallow any Ordinances made by the Commissioner.³⁶⁴

³⁶⁰ Gwendolyn Sasse (2001). 'The 'New' Ukraine: A State of Regions', *Regional and Federal Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 70, 74-75 and 86.

³⁶¹ *Ibid*, pp. 91-94.

³⁶² Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Article 135 and Article 154

<<http://www.ukraineinfo.us/about/constitution.html>>, accessed from Internet 22 February 2007.

³⁶³ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, pp. 858-859.

Faroe Islands

The Faroe Islands have an elected 32-member assembly (*Logting*). Twenty-seven of its seats are filled by direct election with universal adult suffrage, on the basis of proportional representation in seven multi-member constituencies. There are a further five supplementary seats, which are dependent upon the numbers of people voting. The parliamentary term is for four years. A six-member cabinet headed by a chairperson functions as the executive. This chamber has full authority over internal affairs. The Danish government is, however, represented by a High Commissioner, who has the responsibility over foreign affairs and some civic matters. The Islands elect two representatives to the Danish parliament (*Folketing*).³⁶⁵

The Faroe Islands can amend its Home Rule Act through a referendum, or the National Parliament of Denmark can call for amendments according to the National Constitution.³⁶⁶

French Polynesia

The 1984 constitution as amended in 1990 and 1996 regulates French Polynesia. An appointed French high commissioner controls defense, foreign policy, justice and monetary affairs. The 57-member Territorial Assembly, which is directly elected for a five-year period, appoints, from its own ranks, a president and a six to 12-member Councils of Ministers (COM). The COM has considerable autonomy in internal policy matters. French Polynesia also elects two representatives to the French Senate and Economic and Social Council. The territory is also represented at the European Parliament in Strasbourg.³⁶⁷

³⁶⁴ The British Antarctic Territory Order 1989 <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1989/Uksi_19890842_en_1.htm>, accessed from Internet 22 February 2007.

³⁶⁵ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., pp. 819-820.

³⁶⁶ Constitution of Denmark, Part X, Section 88 <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/da00000_.html>, accessed from Internet 23 February 2007.

³⁶⁷ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 832 and CIA World Factbook 2007.

The overseas territories in France are all ruled under the French Constitution and their own statutes. Amendments to the statutes can be made by a referendum in the regions by the registered voters. Another possibility is that the President of the Republic of France may, on a proposal from the Government, consult the voters in the overseas territories to amend its organization, status and the like. The amendments should be made after consultations with the overseas' decision-making assemblies.³⁶⁸ This applies also to Mayotte, New Caledonia, St Pierre and Miquelon, and Wallis and Futuna.

Friulia-Venezia Giulia

Friulia-Venezia Giulia belongs to the Special Regions in Italy. The region has its own Legislative Assembly and a Government (*Junta*). The government is comprised of a President for the region and ten members appointed by the Legislature. The Legislative Council is elected according to a direct, equal and secret ballot system. The number of representatives is decided according to one member per 20,000 inhabitants or a fraction of over 10,000 inhabitants according to the latest population census. The Regional Council has a five-term period.³⁶⁹ The region has a fairly complex language system, since there are officially three linguistic minorities settled in the region: Slovenes (in the Provinces of Trieste and Gorizia), Friulians (in the Provinces of Udine and Pordenone) and German-speakers (in one or two villages in a remote valley, called Val Canale).³⁷⁰

The Italian Special Statutes could be amended by the Regional Council by a law approved twice by a majority of its members. Votes should be taken within an interval of no less than two months. Within thirty days of its publication, the Central Government may challenge the constitutionality of the Regional Statute before the Constitutional Court. The Statute has to be submitted to a popular referendum, when,

³⁶⁸ The Constitution of France 1958, Articles 72-1, 72-4 and 74 <<http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp#TITLE%20XII>>, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007.

³⁶⁹ Maria Ackrén (2008). 'Italiens regionalisering med fokus på Friulia-Venezia Giulia', pp. 165-177 in Pontus Tallberg (red.): *Regioner i Europa*. Utgiven av Region Skåne, Västra Götalandsregionen och Regionplane- och trafikkontoret.

within three months of its publication, a request is made by one fiftieth of the electors of the region or by one fifth of the members of the Regional Council. The Statute submitted to a referendum may not be promulgated unless approved by a majority of valid votes.³⁷¹ This also applies to the regions of Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-alto Adige and Valle d'Aosta.

Gagauzia

Gagauzia is an Autonomous Territorial Unit of Moldova. The People's Assembly of Gagauzia has power to deal with internal administration and organization, local elections and referenda, as well as political, economic and cultural development. The members of the assembly are elected for four-year terms. The Legislative Assembly consists of 35 deputies. The Governor, who is head of the Assembly, is also elected for four years. The Executive Council fulfills the functions of a government. Gagauzia has been approved to participate in Moldova's external affairs in the form of participating in Moldovan delegations. Amendments to the Autonomy Statute require a three-fifths majority in the National Parliament.³⁷²

Galicia

Galicia is considered one of the historical and cultural regions in Spain. As in other regions in Spain, there is a Legislative Assembly which is elected by universal suffrage, a Government headed by a president, and a High Court of Justice. The regions enjoy financial autonomy within limits. Their revenue is derived from shared and assigned taxes, limited regional taxes and an equalization fund. All the main revenue sources are, however, controlled by the Central Government.³⁷³ Galicia has two official languages, Galician, and the official language of the state, Castilian.

³⁷⁰ Francesco Palermo, Professor and Director of the Institute for Studies on Federalism and Regionalism, University of Verona, E-mail Contact at 21 April, 2007.

³⁷¹ Constitution of Italy, Article 123 <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/it00000_.html>, accessed from Internet 23 February 2007.

³⁷² Claus Neukirch (2002), 'Autonomy and Conflict Transformation: The Gagauz Territorial Autonomy in the Republic of Moldova' pp. 105-123 in Kinga Gál (ed.): *Minority Governance in Europe*. Budapest: LGI Books.

³⁷³ Francesc Morata (2001), 'Spanish Regions in the European Community', op.cit., pp. 116-117.

The amendment of the Galician Autonomy Statute follows the same procedure as other regions in Spain, i.e., an amendment should be sent to the *Cortes Generales* for approval.³⁷⁴

Gibraltar

The 1969 constitution of Gibraltar regulates the area. British interests have been represented by an appointed governor, who is advised by the Gibraltar Council. The Gibraltar Council comprises four *ex officio* and five elected members of the House of Assembly. The United Kingdom is responsible for the territory's defense and external affairs as well as matters of internal security. Since 1969, full control over residual internal affairs has been vested in the elected House of Assembly and the Council of Ministers, drawn from the majority grouping within the Assembly.³⁷⁵

The House of Assembly consists of a speaker appointed by the governor; two *ex officio* representatives, the attorney general and the financial and development secretary; and 15 members who are popularly elected for a four-year period. The electoral system is unique. It allows each elector to vote for a maximum of eight candidates and the party with the largest share of the vote is restricted to a maximum of eight seats. The Council of Ministers, which constitutes the territory's executive, has seven ministers and a chief minister drawn from the House of Assembly.³⁷⁶

Gibraltar is directly ruled under Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom. Her Majesty has the right to amend Gibraltar's Constitution.³⁷⁷

³⁷⁴ Spanish Constitution of 1978, Part VIII, Chapter 3, Section 146
<http://www.senado.es/constitu_i/index.html>, accessed from Internet 15 February 2007.

³⁷⁵ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 850.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

Gorno-Badakhshan

Gorno-Badakhshan is a region belonging to Tajikistan. It is a very mountainous region with peaks up to 7,000 meters high. Since the end of major hostilities in 1993, the region has been making a reappearance.³⁷⁸

Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region has its own parliament and it has the right to introduce draft legislation. The region is considered to be a component and an indivisible part of the Republic of Tajikistan. There is a clause requiring permission of the people's deputies in the regional parliament to alter the borders of the territory. The people's deputies are elected in accordance with established laws, regardless of the size of the population. Gorno-Badakhshan has also its own Court. The President of the Republic of Tajikistan appoints and dismisses the chairs of Gorno-Badakhshan. One of the assistants to the Chair of the National Parliament must be a people's deputy from this region. The powers related to internal matters of the region are determined by constitutional law.³⁷⁹

Gorno-Badakhshan is directly under the rule of Tajikistan. Amendments to the Constitution are introduced through general referendum. A referendum is held if two-thirds of the people's deputies vote for this solution. Proposals to amend or add to the Constitution are introduced by the President or on the petition of no less than one third of the people's deputies of Tajikistan. The proposals are published in the press three months before the referendum.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁷ The Gibraltar Constitution Order 2006
<http://www.gibraltar.gov.gi/constitution/new_constitution/NewGibraltarConstitution.pdf>, accessed from Internet 23 February 2007.

³⁷⁸ TVE's Earth Report: Where Families and Mountains Meet,
<<http://www.tve.org/earthreport/archive/doc.cfm?aid=882>>, accessed from Internet 2 May 2007.

³⁷⁹ Constitution of Tajikistan 1994, Chapter 7, Articles 81-84 and Chapter 6, Articles 53, 60 and 63
<<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/unpan003670.htm>>, accessed from Internet 2 May 2007.

Greenland

The 1979 Home Rule Act regulates the division of powers in Greenland. The Parliament of Greenland (*Landsting*) consists of 31 members, elected according to universal adult suffrage for four-year terms. A seven-member Government (*Landsstyre*) is drawn from the *Landsting*, being based on the strength of the parties, and is headed by a prime minister. Denmark is represented on the Island by a High Commissioner who has control over foreign affairs, defense, monetary policy, and constitutional matters. Greenland also sends two representatives to the Danish Parliament.³⁸¹

The amendment of the Home Rule Act follows the same procedure as for the Faroe Islands. The Act can be amended through a referendum or by the Danish Parliament.³⁸²

Guam

Guam is regulated by the 1950 Guam Organic Act. Executive power is exercised by a governor who is directly elected for four-year terms. The legislature is comprised of a 15-member parliament whose members are elected biennially. It has legislative powers over local affairs. A member, who may vote in committees but not otherwise, is elected to the US House of Representatives every two years. The residents of Guam are US citizens, but they cannot vote in US presidential elections.³⁸³

Guam is directly under Title 48 of the US Code. The Congress of the United States has the ultimate power to amend Guam's Organic Act.³⁸⁴

³⁸⁰ Constitution of Tajikistan 1994, Chapter 10, Articles 98-99, op.cit.

³⁸¹ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 821.

³⁸² Constitution of Denmark, Part X, Section 88 <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/da00000_.html>, accessed from Internet 23 February 2007.

³⁸³ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 868.

³⁸⁴ U.S. Code Collection, Title 48, Chapter 8A, Subchapter 1, §1421b <[http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode48/usc_sup_01_48_10_8A.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode48/uscode48/usc_sup_01_48_10_8A.html)>, accessed from Internet 23 February 2007.

Guernsey

The Bailiwick of Guernsey consists of three islands: Guernsey, Alderney and Sark. They all have their own legislative parliaments and courts but their competences differ. The legislative parliament of Guernsey is called the States of Deliberation, in Alderney it is called the States of Alderney, and in Sark it is the Chief of Pleas.³⁸⁵ In the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Crown is represented by a lieutenant governor who appoints the bailiff (president of the parliament). The government on the Islands is conducted by Committees appointed by the States of Deliberation. The States of Deliberation consists of 12 counselors, who are indirectly elected by the States of Election, a 108-member body comprising local political and judicial officers, for a six-year term, half retiring every three years; in addition there are 33 people's deputies directly elected for a four-year term and ten Douzaine representatives, who are elected by their respective parishes, and two Alderney representatives. In Alderney, the parliament has 12 members directly elected for three years periods, and in Sark, the assembly consists of 12 popularly elected members plus 40 tenants nominated by the feudal suzerain of the Island, the seigneur.³⁸⁶

Guernsey has its own right to amend its constitution. The lieutenant governor is Her Majesty's personal representative and official channel of communication between the Crown, the UK Government and the Bailiwick of Guernsey.³⁸⁷

Hong Kong

Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region belonging to China since 1997. The region has considerable autonomy. Hong Kong has legislative powers and its own executive as well as judicial powers. The Chief Executive of the region is the Head of Hong Kong, and should be a Chinese citizen of not less than 40 years old and a

³⁸⁵ Sören Silverström (2004). *De rättsliga ramarna för vissa autonomiers och mikrostaters förhållande till Europeiska unionen*. Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-statsvetenskapliga fakulteten vid Åbo Akademi, Rättsvetenskapliga institutionen, Ser. A:543, Åbo 2004, p. 16.

³⁸⁶ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 851.

³⁸⁷ States of Guernsey, Constitution <<http://www.gov.gg/ccm/navigation/about-guernsey/constitution/?textonly=yes>>, accessed from Internet 23 February 2007.

permanent resident of the region. The Chief Executive is indirectly elected by a nominating committee and appointed by the Central People's Government of China for a five-year term. The members of the Executive Council are appointed by the Chief Executive from among the principal officials of the executive authorities, members of the Legislative Council, and public figures. The Legislative Council has to be composed of Chinese citizens who are permanent residents of the region and elected by universal adult suffrage for a four-year term.³⁸⁸

The power to amend the Basic Law concerning Hong Kong lies in the hands of the National People's Congress of China. The power to propose bills for amendments to this Law is vested in the Standing Committee of National People's Congress, the State Council and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Amendments from the Hong Kong Region should be submitted to the National People's Congress by the delegation of the Region to the National People's Congress, after obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the deputies of the Region, two-thirds of all members of the Legislative Council of the Region, and the Chief Executive of the Region.³⁸⁹

Isle of Man

The Isle of Man is substantially self-governing and is represented by the Crown through an appointed lieutenant governor. The UK is responsible for defense and external relations. The Court of Tynwald functions as the legislative assembly and has two chambers: the Legislative Council or Upper House and the House of Keys as the Lower House. The Legislative Council consists of the Lieutenant Governor, a President, the Lord Bishop of Sodor and Man, the Attorney General and eight members elected by the House of Keys. The House of Keys is comprised of 24 members who are directly elected by universal adult suffrage for five-year terms.

³⁸⁸ The Basic Law of Hong Kong 1990, different Articles
<http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law.icl/hk00000_.html>, accessed from Internet 22 November 2002.

³⁸⁹ The Basic Law of Hong Kong 1990, Article 159
<http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/content0208.htm>, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007.

Both chambers sit together as one body in the legislature but they vote separately. There is also a ten-member government headed by a Chief Minister.³⁹⁰

The Isle of Man is a Crown Dependency under Her Majesty the Queen of UK. Her Majesty the Queen, or Lord of Man, is the Head of State. The Lieutenant Governor, who is appointed by the Crown, has, along with the Queen, the right to amend the Constitution of Isle of Man.³⁹¹

Jeju Island

In February 2006, the Special Act on the Jeju Special Self-Governing province in South Korea was introduced. The Island has an autonomous status that differs from the other provinces in the state. There is a council consisting of 41 members and three members function as political advisory members to each standing committee. There are seven agencies functioning as various departments on the island. Tasks are being transferred to the region from the national level in stages. Jeju Island will have its own police force and its own fiscal system according to the free-market principle. The national parliament has the ultimate right to amend the Special Act.³⁹²

Jersey

The Bailiwick of Jersey is a Crown Dependency under Her Majesty the Queen of the UK, similar to the Isle of Man. In the Bailiwick, the Crown is represented by a Bailiff. On Jersey, the Legislative Assembly consists of 12 senators who are elected for six-year terms, half of the senators retiring every three years. At the local and at-large levels, there are 12 constables and 29 deputies, directly elected for three-year terms.³⁹³

Jersey has the same system as Isle of Man as regards amendments to the constitution.

³⁹⁰ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 852.

³⁹¹ The Constitution of Isle of Man <<http://www.gov.im/isleofman/constitution.xml>>, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007.

³⁹² Jeju Special Self-Governing Province <<http://english.jeju.go.kr/contents/index.php+mid=0202>>, accessed from Internet 6 March 2008.

³⁹³ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 851.

Karakalpakstan

Karakalpakstan is an autonomous republic in Uzbekistan. The region has its own constitution and parliament ruling the area. The government is headed by the Council of Ministers of Karakalpakstan. This autonomous republic possesses the largest oil and gas deposits of Uzbekistan.³⁹⁴

The Republic of Karakalpakstan has independence as regards the determination of its administrative and territorial structure. The Head of Government of the Region should be an *ex officio* member of the Cabinet of Ministers in Uzbekistan. Karakalpakstan also has its own judicial system.³⁹⁵

The constitution of the Republic of Karakalpakstan is in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Karakalpakstan has the right to secede from Uzbekistan on the basis of a nationwide referendum held by the people of Karakalpakstan. Amendments to the Constitution rest in the hands of the Parliament of Uzbekistan.³⁹⁶

Kosovo

Kosovo is a disputed territory at the moment. The status of Kosovo is under debate and a proposal for Kosovo's status has been approved in the Kosovo parliament. This proposal states that Kosovo should receive "supervised independence". The proposal has been outlined by the UN conciliator Martti Ahtisaari and has also been sent to the Security Council of the United Nations. The so-called Contact Group, which has been working with the Kosovo case since the peace process, will discuss this proposal

³⁹⁴ The Republic of Karakalpakstan <<http://www.umid.uz/Main/Uzbekistan/Regions/Karakalpakstan/>>, accessed from Internet 4 May 2007.

³⁹⁵ The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Article 73, 98 and 107 <<http://www.umid.uz/Main/Uzbekistan/Constitution/constitution.html#Part%20Four>>, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007.

³⁹⁶ The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Article 69-74, op.cit.

before it reaches a UN Resolution status. The Contact Group consists of the United Kingdom, the USA, Russia, Italy, Germany and France.³⁹⁷

Macau

Macau similar to Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region in China. The region exercises a high degree of autonomy and enjoys executive, legislative and independent judicial power. The Chief Executive is the head of the region and should be a Chinese citizen of not less than 40 years of age and a permanent resident of the region. The Chief Executive should be selected by election through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government of China. The term of office is five years for this position. The Executive Council of Macau should assist the Chief Executive in policy making and is composed of seven to eleven members. The Legislative Council of Macau comprises permanent residents of the region and the majority of its members should be elected. The term of office is four years.³⁹⁸

In Macau, the power of amendment is vested in the National People's Congress of China. The power to propose bills for amendments to the Basic Law is vested in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the State Council and the Macau Special Administrative Region. Amendments from the Macau Region should be submitted to the National People's Congress by the delegation of the Region, after obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the deputies of the Region, two-thirds of all the members of the Legislative Council of the Region, and the Chief Executive of the Region.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁷ 100 ja till Kosovo-plan, Svenska Dagbladet 5 april, 2007

<http://www.svd.se/dynamiskt/utrikes/did_14992590.asp>, accessed from Internet 4 May 2007.

³⁹⁸ Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China 1993, Chapter I, Chapter II and Chapter IV, various Articles
<http://www.imprensa.macao.gov.mo/bo/i/1999/leibasica/index_uk.asp>, accessed from Internet 4 May 2007.

³⁹⁹ Macau Basic Law 1993, Chapter VIII, Article 144

<<http://www.umac.mo/basiclaw/english/ch8.html>>, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007.

Madeira

Madeira has the same status as the Azores within the Portuguese system. The autonomous region has its own Legislative Assembly and Government. Residents also elect delegates to Portugal's parliament, and a minister represents Lisbon in Madeira.⁴⁰⁰ The region has a high degree of autonomy in internal affairs. An amendment to the status of the region is in the hands of the Assembly of the Republic of Portugal.⁴⁰¹

Mayotte

Mayotte is a Collective Territory, which is an intermediate level between an Overseas Department and an Overseas Territory. The Islands are administered by an appointed French government prefect who works with the assistance of an elected 19-member General Council. Mayotte also elects one member to the French National Assembly and one representative to the French Senate.⁴⁰²

The overseas regions in France are all ruled by the French National Constitution and the statutes of these regions. Amendments to the Statutes can be made by a referendum in the regions by the registered voters. Another possibility is that the President of the Republic of France may, on a proposal from the Government, consult the voters in the overseas territories on the question of to amendments to the organization, the status and any other matters. The amendments should be made after consultations with the overseas' decision-making assemblies. This rule is also applied to regions such as New Caledonia, St Pierre and Miquelon, and Wallis and Futuna.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰⁰ Robert Aldrich and John Connell (1998), *The Last Colonies*, op.cit., p. 270.

⁴⁰¹ See the section on the Azores for more details.

⁴⁰² J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., pp. 829-830.

Mindanao

Mindanao is an autonomous region in the Philippines. The President of the Republic of the Philippines exercises general supervision over the autonomous region. An organic act regulates the basic structure of government, consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly and special courts. The region has responsibility over an extensive part of internal matters.⁴⁰⁴

The Organic Act of Mindanao can be amended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds of the Members of the House of Representatives and of a separate vote by the Senate. The Regional Assembly of Mindanao has the power to initiate proposals for amendment or revision. However, the amendment or revision also requires the approval of the Congress of the Philippines by a vote of two-thirds of the Members of the House of Representatives and of a separate vote by the Senate.⁴⁰⁵

Montserrat

The 1960 Constitution, which regulates the Island, was amended in 1977 and 1989. The British Crown is represented by an appointed governor who is responsible for defense, foreign affairs and internal security. The Governor also serves as president of a seven-member Executive Council, which also includes a Chief Minister, three other ministers drawn from among elected members of the legislature, and the Attorney General and a Financial Secretary. The Attorney General and the Secretary are both *ex officio*. The Legislative Council comprises 12 members for a five-year term. There are two official members, three nominated, including a speaker, and seven members

⁴⁰³ The Constitution of France 1958, Articles 72-1, 72-4 and 74 <<http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp#TITLE%20XII>>, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007.

⁴⁰⁴ The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Section 16, 18 and 20 <<http://www.gov.ph/aboutphil/a17.asp>>, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007.

⁴⁰⁵ Republic Act No. 9054, Article XVII, Section 1-2 <http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ra_11/RA09054.pdf>, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007.

directly elected. The Executive Council's Chief Minister and other ministers are chosen from the Legislative Council.⁴⁰⁶

Montserrat functions as a self-governing territory ruled under the Crown of the United Kingdom. It is Her Majesty and Secretary of State that have the right to amend the Constitution Order of Montserrat.⁴⁰⁷

Nakhichevan

Nakhichevan forms an Autonomous Republic in Azerbaijan. The legislative power in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic is executed by the Regional Parliament. The executive power should be implemented by the Cabinet of Ministers and the judicial power exercised by the courts of the region. The Chairman of the *Ali Majlis* (the parliament) is the highest official in the autonomous republic. The parliament should consist of 45 members for a five-year term.⁴⁰⁸

Nakhichevan is directly ruled under the Constitution of Azerbaijan. This means that an amendment to the status of Nakhichevan follows the same procedure as the Constitution in this case. It is only possible to make changes via a referendum in Azerbaijan.⁴⁰⁹

Netherland's Antilles

The Dutch government is represented by a Crown-appointed Governor, who serves for a six-year period and functions as Head of State, having control over the Islands' defense and external affairs. The Governor is assisted by an Advisory Council. The executive power for internal affairs rests with a ten-member Council of Ministers.

⁴⁰⁶ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 862.

⁴⁰⁷ Statutory Instrument 1989 No. 2401, The Montserrat Constitution Order 1989 <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1989/Uksi_19892401_en_4.htm>, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007.

⁴⁰⁸ Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, Section IX in the Constitution of Azerbaijan <http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/local_azerbaijan.pdf>, accessed from Internet 26 February 2007.

The elected assembly, the *Staten*, is comprised of 22 members for a four-year term and functions as the legislature. Each island group forms an electoral district for electoral purposes, Curaçao returning 14 members, Bonaire and St Maarten three each, and Saba and St Eustatius one member each. A proportional representation system is used.⁴¹⁰

The Netherland's Antilles are directly ruled under the Dutch Kingdom and have the same relationship within the Kingdom as that of Aruba. The three parties are in a loose construction forming a kind of 'confederation'. The Dutch Parliament has the ultimate right to change the Islands' status in consent with the Parliament of the Netherland's Antilles.⁴¹¹

New Caledonia

New Caledonia has received a considerable degree of autonomy. The French government is represented by a High Commissioner who has the control over defense, foreign policy, finance, external trade, secondary education and justice. New Caledonia is comprised of three provinces: North, South and the Loyalty Islands. Each province has the status of a self-governing territorial unit, and has its own directly elected assembly headed by a president. Assembly terms are up to six years. The three assemblies together constitute the Territorial Congress, which sit under the French High Commissioner. The Territorial Congress has responsibility over the budget, fiscal affairs, primary education and infrastructure. The provincial assemblies are responsible for cultural affairs, land reform and local economic development. New Caledonia elects two deputies to the French National Assembly, one Senator and one Economic and Social Councilor, and is also represented in the European Parliament in Strasbourg.⁴¹² See the section of Mayotte relating to amendment procedures.

⁴⁰⁹ The Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic 1995, Section IX, Article 134 and Section XI, Article 152, op.cit.

⁴¹⁰ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 841.

⁴¹¹ See the section on Aruba.

Niue

Niue has an elected 20-member Legislative Assembly, constituting 14 village representatives and six members elected on a common roll. The government is in the hands of a cabinet of four, headed by a Prime Minister and drawn from the Assembly's ranks. New Zealand is represented by a High Commissioner on the Island.⁴¹³

In Niue, it is possible for the Legislative Assembly itself to amend or modify its constitution. The amendment should pass two readings and achieve affirmative votes of no less than two-thirds of the total membership of the Assembly.⁴¹⁴

Norfolk Island

Norfolk Island has both legislative and executive powers. The Legislative Assembly has nine members, from which a five-member ministerial Executive Council is drawn, headed by a president. In 1985 the powers of the Legislative Assembly were extended to include matters such as civil defense and public works and services. Elections are held every three years and are determined by an unusual 'cumulative method of voting' in which electors are allowed to cast as many votes as there are vacancies, subject to the provision that they may not give more than four votes to each candidate. The Australian government is represented on the Island by an administrator, appointed by the Governor General of Australia and responsible to the Minister for Territories.⁴¹⁵

Norfolk Island is ruled under Australia and therefore an amendment is only possible under the Act of the Senate and House of Representatives of Australia.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹² J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 834.

⁴¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 844.

⁴¹⁴ Niue Constitution Act 1974, Part II, 35 <http://www.legislation.co.nz/browse_vw.asp?content-set=pal_statutes>, accessed from Internet 27 February 2007.

⁴¹⁵ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 817.

⁴¹⁶ Norfolk Island Act 1979

<<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/ncet/NorfolkGov/NorfolkIsland79.pdf>>, accessed from Internet 27 February 2007.

North Atlantic Autonomous Region and South Atlantic Autonomous Region

The North Atlantic Autonomous Region and the South Atlantic Autonomous Region are two regions belonging to Nicaragua. Each region has a directly elected Regional Council with administrative powers. Each Council adopts resolutions and ordinances within its jurisdiction, electing a chief executive known as the Regional Coordinator. The Regional Coordinator prepares a draft budget for the region in conjunction with the national Ministry of Finance. All regional resolutions and ordinances are subordinate to the Nicaraguan constitution and national laws. Amendments to the Autonomy Statute may be requested by the two regional assemblies and adopted by the National Assembly according to its normal procedures.⁴¹⁷

Northern Ireland

The Northern Ireland Assembly was established as part of the Belfast Agreement in 1998. The Assembly was suspended, however, in October 2002, due to tensions between the Protestants and the Catholics in the area. New elections took place in March 2007 and now the restoration of the self-government in the territory is under discussions and promising progress has been made in cooperation with the different parties.⁴¹⁸

The status of Northern Ireland can be changed via a referendum, in which the majority of the people of Northern Ireland vote affirmatively. If the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form a part of a united Ireland, the Secretary of State is obliged to send before the Parliament such a proposal. In order for this request to have effect it must

⁴¹⁷ Hurst Hannum (1996). 'The Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua' pp. 203-225 in Hurst Hannum: *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights*. Revised Edition. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

⁴¹⁸ Northern Ireland Assembly <<http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/>>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2007.

also be agreed upon by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland.⁴¹⁹

Northern Mariana Islands

The Northern Mariana Islands are considered internally self-governing as a US 'Commonwealth Territory'. The Executive power is vested in a governor, who is directly elected for a four-year term, and the legislative power is within a bicameral assembly (the Northern Marianas Commonwealth Legislature) composed of a nine-member Senate and an 18-member House of Representatives, elected biennially. The Islands' inhabitants enjoy US citizenship. Northern Mariana Islands send a non-voting deputy to the US Congress who is elected every four years.⁴²⁰

In Northern Mariana Islands, amendments may be proposed by constitutional convention, legislative initiative or popular initiative. All these procedures are described in more detail in Article XVII, Section 1-4 in the Commonwealth Constitution.⁴²¹

Oecussi Ambeno

The Oecussi Ambeno enclave is an isolated district of East Timor. In June 2000, the International District Administration proposed that the enclave should be developed into a Special Economic Zone (SEZ). This called for a soft border regime with Indonesia, reduced taxes and tariff rates. In July 2000, the District CNRT Congress called for a governmental arrangement in which Oecussi would become a province rather than a district.⁴²² Oecussi Ambeno is recognized by the Constitution of East Timor as a special administrative and economic region. This means that amendments

⁴¹⁹ Northern Ireland Act 1998, Part I <<http://www.statute.law.gov.uk/>>, accessed from Internet 27 February 2007.

⁴²⁰ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 871.

⁴²¹ The Commonwealth Constitution, Article XVII, Section 1-4, <http://cnmilaw.org/constitution_article18.htm>, accessed from Internet 27 February 2007.

⁴²² Arsenio Bano and Edward Rees, *The Oecussi-Ambeno Enclave* <<http://www.serve.com/inside/edit71/Oecussi.htm>>, accessed from Internet 7 May 2007.

follow the National Constitution and it is the National Parliament that has the ultimate power to revise the Constitution.⁴²³

Pitcairn Islands

Pitcairn Islands are administered by the British High Commissioner in New Zealand. The High Commissioner governs in consultation with a ten-member Island Council, presided over by the Island Magistrate who is elected for a three-year term. The Island Council consists of an *ex officio* representative, two appointees, and three members elected by the elected deputies. Elections are held annually in December. There are no parties only independents are elected.⁴²⁴

The Islands are ruled under the Governor appointed by Her Majesty, and as mentioned, who resides in New Zealand. It is the Governor who has the ultimate power to amend the Pitcairn Order.⁴²⁵

Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing 'Commonwealth' voluntarily associated with the United States. Both states share a common currency and market while the US is responsible for the Commonwealth's defense. Puerto Rico's inhabitants are US citizens, able to vote in national party primary elections, but they may not vote in presidential elections. The Island is represented in the US Congress only by a resident Commissioner elected every four years; he/she participates in House of Representatives' debates but can only vote in committee. Executive power is exercised by a governor who must at least be 35 years old; he/she is directly elected for a four-year term and works in a cabinet of around 15 secretaries. Legislative power is held by a two-chamber Legislative Assembly which is comprised of a 28-

⁴²³ Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor 2002 <http://www.constitution.org/cons/east_timor/constitution-eng.htm>, accessed from Internet 27 February 2007.

⁴²⁴ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 863.

⁴²⁵ The Pitcairn Islands Order 1970 <<http://www.government.pn/Laws/PitcairnLaws.html>>, accessed from Internet 27 February 2007.

member Senate and a 54-member House of Representatives. Assembly members are elected every four years. Senators must be at least 30 years old and representatives at least 25 years old. The legislative process is similar to that in the United States.⁴²⁶

The Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico may propose amendments to this Constitution by a concurrent resolution approved by no less than two-thirds of the total members of each house. All proposed amendments are to be submitted to the qualified electors in a special referendum, but if the concurrent resolution is approved by no less than three-fourths of the total number of members of which the house is composed, the Legislative Assembly may require that the referendum be held at the same time as the next general election.⁴²⁷

Rodrigues

Rodrigues is a dependency belonging to Mauritius. The Island is mentioned in the National Constitution and has its own Regional Act. There is an established Regional Assembly with 18 members elected for a five-year term. The Assembly is empowered to make regulations and initiate legislation. The Island also has its own Executive Council comprising of a Chief Commissioner, the Deputy Chief Commissioner and not more than five other members of the Regional Assembly appointed by the President. The Regional Act can be dissolved by the President or the National Assembly.⁴²⁸

Sardinia

Sardinia, similar to Friulia-Venezia Giulia, is a special region in Italy. The region has its own legislature and executive authority. The region also has financial autonomy and implements its own taxes. Sardinia has two official languages, Sardinian and

⁴²⁶ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 872.

⁴²⁷ Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Article VII, Section 1 <<http://welcome.topuertorico.org/constitu.shtml>>, accessed from Internet 27 February 2007.

⁴²⁸ The Rodrigues Regional Assembly Act 2001 <<http://www.gov.mu/portal/sites/ncb/rra/traact.htm>>, The Constitution of Mauritius <<http://www.gov.mu/portal/sites/ncb/rra/const.htm>>, The Regional

Italian.⁴²⁹ As regards amendments to the special statute, see the section on Friulia-Venezia Giulia.

Scotland

Scotland is subject to the devolution system in the United Kingdom. Devolution is the delegation of power from a central government to local bodies. Scotland received its power of devolution by passing the Scotland Act of 1998. The region has its own parliament with devolved powers: matters such as education, health and prisons are decided in Scotland while reserved powers are directly ruled under the UK Parliament at Westminster. There is also a Scottish Executive functioning as the government branch.⁴³⁰

Since Scotland is a part of the UK, it operates under the National Parliament's supervision. An amendment of the Act should therefore be conducted in accordance with agreement between the Scottish Parliament, Her Majesty the Queen (by advice of Lords Spiritual and Temporal) and the House of Commons at Westminster.⁴³¹

Sicily

Sicily has a high degree of autonomy similar to the other special regions in Italy. Some of the region's competencies are shared between the central and the regional government. The amendment issue has been discussed in more detail in the section concerning Friulia-Venezia Giulia.

Assembly <<http://www.gov.mu/portal/sites/ncb/rra/assembly.htm>>, accessed from Internet 22 May 2007.

⁴²⁹ Maria Ackrén (2005), *Territoriella autonomier i världen – En empirisk studie över de självstyrda områdena i världen*. Mariehamn: Ålands fredsinstitut, p. 58.

⁴³⁰ The Scottish Parliament <<http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/corporate/powers/index.htm>>, accessed from Internet 8 May 2007.

⁴³¹ Scotland Act 1998 <<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80046--a.htm#1>>, accessed from Internet 28 February 2007.

St Helena and Dependencies

St Helena and Dependencies are administered by an appointed Governor who works with a Legislative Council and an advisory Executive Council. The Legislative Council consists of the Speaker and the Chief Secretary, the Financial Secretary and the Attorney General as *ex officio* members, and 12 elected members. The Executive Council, presided over by the governor, includes three *ex officio* members noted above and five of the elected members of the Legislative Council. The task of the Legislative Council is to supervise the work of government departments. The dependencies of Ascension and Tristan da Cunha are governed by appointed administrators. Tristan da Cunha also has an advisory Council consisting of eight elected and three nominated members.⁴³²

St Helena and Dependencies are directly ruled under Her Majesty the Queen; therefore it is the Queen, together with her appointed Governor, who has the power to amend the Constitution.⁴³³

St Pierre and Miquelon

The Islands are administered by an appointed French government Prefect who is assisted by a 19-member General Council. The General Council consists of 15 members elected from St Pierre and four from Miquelon for a six-year term. The Islands also elect one member to the French National Assembly, one representative to the French Senate, and one to the Economic and Social Council.⁴³⁴ The amendment issue is described in more detail in the section on French Polynesia.

⁴³² J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 864.

⁴³³ The St. Helena Constitution Order 1988

<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si1988/Uksi_19881842_en_1.htm>, accessed from Internet 28 February 2007.

Tokelau

The Islands are governed directly by a resident administrator of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Much of the executive work is delegated to an official secretary based in Tokelau. At the local level, however, the Islands are substantially self-governing. Each atoll has a Council of Elders, consisting of Heads of family groups plus two members elected every three years by universal adult suffrage. The minimum voting age is 21 years. One of the elected members is the Faipule, the Commissioner, who presides over the Council and represents the atoll in dealings with the New Zealand administration, and the other is the Pulemuku, who is responsible for village affairs. Twice a year, 15 delegates from each atoll of the Council of Elders (*Taupulega*) convene in a General Fono, or meeting, chaired by one of the Islands' three Faipules. The General Fono has limited, but increasing, legislative powers.⁴³⁵ The Governor-General appointed by New Zealand has the ultimate right to change the Tokelau Act.⁴³⁶

Trentino-Alto Adige

Trentino-Alto Adige is also called South Tyrol. The region has three official languages, Italian, German, and Ladin. The German minority forms the majority in the autonomous territory. South Tyrol has a high degree of autonomy with its own legislature and executive authority. All powers at each level are allocated in a system of continuous communication, mutual information and constitutional verification.⁴³⁷ See details about the amendment issue in the section concerning Friulia-Venezia Giulia.

⁴³⁴ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 831.

⁴³⁵ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), op.cit., p. 845.

⁴³⁶ Tokelau Act 1948 <<http://www.tokelau.org.nz/Government/law1.htm>>, accessed from Internet 28 February 2007.

⁴³⁷ Karl Rainer (2002), 'The Autonomous Province of Bozen/Bolzano-South Tyrol', pp. 89-103 in Kinga Gál (ed.): *Minority Governance in Europe*. Budapest: LGI Books.

Turks and Caicos Islands

The executive power on the Islands is exercised by a crown-appointed Governor who is responsible for defense, external relations, internal security and official appointments. The Governor presides over an eight-member Executive Council, comprising three *ex officio* representatives and five, including a Chief Minister chosen from among the elected members of the Legislative Council. The Legislative Council consists of seven appointed members and 13 deputies directly elected for a four-year term.⁴³⁸

Turks and Caicos Islands are ruled by the Queen of the United Kingdom. The appointed Governor and the Legislative Council of the Islands have the right to amend the territory's constitution.⁴³⁹

Valle d'Aosta

Valle d'Aosta is one of the special regions in Italy. There are two official languages: Italian and French. As well as other special regions, the region has its own legislative parliament and executive authority. Amendment of the Special Statute follows the same procedure as Friulia-Venezia Giulia.

Wales

The National Assembly for Wales is the representative body with legislative powers in devolved areas. It has 60 elected members. The Government is responsible for many issues, including health, education, economic development, culture, the environment and transport.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁸ J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 865.

⁴³⁹ Constitution of Turks and Caicos Islands 1998 <<http://www.turksandcaicosislands.gov.tc/OtherPages/THE%20CONSTITUTION.pdf>>, accessed from Internet 28 February 2007.

⁴⁴⁰ National Assembly for Wales <<http://www.wales.gov.uk/>>, accessed from Internet 11 May 2007.

Wales is a part of the United Kingdom. It is the Secretary of State who has the ultimate power to amend Government of Wales Act 1998.⁴⁴¹

Wallis and Futuna

The Islands are administered by an appointed French Chief Administrator who is assisted by a 20-member Territorial Assembly. This Assembly is directly elected for five-year terms on a common roll and has its own president. The Territory elects one member to the French National Assembly and one representative to the Senate. The three traditional kingdoms, one on Wallis and two on Futuna, retain a number of limited powers and have their own Council of Ministers. The three Kings and their own Council of Ministers, along with three appointed members of the Territorial Assembly, form a six-member Council of the Territory which advises the Chief Administrator. The Islands are also represented at the European Parliament in Strasbourg.⁴⁴² For the amendment issue, see the section on French Polynesia.

Zanzibar

The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar is an executive government which has authority over matters related to Zanzibar. There is a President, who presides over the Government, and there is also a Chairman of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council. The President appoints and assigns responsibilities to Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. The President should be elected by the people in Zanzibar. The Revolutionary Council is the principal organ for advising the President. The House of Representatives in Zanzibar is a two-chamber assembly. One chamber consists of members who are elected or appointed and are referred to as Representatives. The other chamber consists of the President.⁴⁴³

⁴⁴¹ Government of Wales Act 1998 <<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80038--q.htm#151>>, accessed from the Internet 28 February 2007.

⁴⁴² J. Denis Derbyshire & Ian D. Derbyshire (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 836.

⁴⁴³ Constitution of Tanzania 1977 <<http://www.tanzania.go.tz/images/constitutioneng.pdf>>, accessed from the Internet 28 February 2007.

Zanzibar has an own Constitution which is included in the National Constitution. Amendments are made by the Revolutionary Government in Zanzibar in accordance with the Constitution of Tanzania.⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

The investigation can be seen as an inductive, empirical and more theory building study within the field of autonomy. First, it highlights the mapping of territorial autonomies in the world. Second, it shows how “good practice” of fuzzy-set QCA should be used within comparative research with not so small N.

The study answers the questions of what conditions that explain the occurrence of territorial autonomy and what kind of different degrees of autonomy that exist within the group of territorial autonomies as such. These questions are answered through a stepwise application of using fuzzy-set QCA as the methodological technique. First, an application of necessary conditions is conducted only with the set of territorial autonomies in hand. Second, an elaboration of sufficient conditions is outlined with both the set of territorial autonomies and a set of non-autonomous entities as a control group.

Results show that there are two paths leading to the establishment of territorial autonomy. One path is the combination of ethnic distinctiveness and small population size and the other path is the combination of historical strategic importance and geographical distance. The underlying necessary condition for both paths is democracy. Without a democratic environment it would be harder for a territorial autonomy to see the light.

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