

Legitimacy in crisis

A study of legitimacy building in counterinsurgency operations

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Political Science with Mass
Communication

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Abstract

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<p>Introduction: The purpose of this thesis is to give an insight into which variables affect legitimacy in conflict-torn states, with a special focus on the relationship between values and services. The specified research question is what are the views of the population on legitimacy in areas where counterinsurgency operations have been conducted?</p>	
<p>Theoretical framework: Whether a political system is considered to be legitimate or not inherently revolves around the values of the population. The values determine which services are expected to be provided by the political system to the population. The different sources of legitimacy presented account for the heterogeneity of the population. Instrumental types of legitimacy include types of legitimacy based around the needs of the population. Substantive legitimacy focus on the values of the population. The heterogeneity of the population is ever more important to consider in the context of conflict-torn spaces and when conducting counterinsurgency operations.</p>	
<p>Methodology: A repeated cross-sectional study using case study design was chosen. The data was collected by Böhnke et al. (2017) during the years of 2007 to 2015 and the total number of respondents was 12,428. Survey questions were operationalized according to the different sources of legitimacy.</p>	
<p>Results: Input legitimacy results show a strong involvement of societal institutions in decision-making. Input on a governmental level is relatively important, but the trend has remained stagnant over time. Output legitimacy indicate an initial sharp improvement in security which afterwards stagnates or even declines in 2011. Services provided by the government are initially at low levels, but with a positive trend. Throughput legitimacy indicate the importance of both patronage and societal institutions. Patronage is primarily based around economic and military influence. External legitimacy results indicate sharp changes. COIN forces and NGO:s are initially viewed in a very positive light. This changes especially in the case of COIN forces over time, since they are viewed in a more negative light later in the study. The norms and values of the respondents do not change considerably over the scope of the study. Tradition is portrayed to be an important aspect of everyday life, and a break from tradition results in negative consequences. However, a trend can be seen that external actors are viewed to have a more negative impact on local customs. Patrons are viewed as important even though the results show them to not be a large contributor of services.</p>	
<p>Conclusions: Pure types of instrumental legitimacy are more prone to change during a short amount of time. Substantive types of legitimacy in combination with input and throughput are much more stable since they are connected to population values. The results support the theory that traditional societies cling to their values when experiencing a short-term increase in improved living standards. Societal institutions remain more important than democratic elections and political institutions.</p>	
Key words: Legitimacy; State-building; Counterinsurgency	

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1 Introduction

Nearly two decades after the 9/11 attacks and the start of the war on terror, young men and women, who were not even born at the start of the conflicts, can participate legally in the still ongoing fighting. It is difficult to regard the operations in the Middle East as a success, considering the fact that the campaigns have resulted in the exertion of unimaginable amounts of resources and the health and life of both innocents and guilty. The explosive emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the resurgence of the Taliban showed that none of the goals of the counterinsurgency operations had been achieved. The goals were to provide security, which would entice the creation of stable governments. Stability would in turn root out the conditions for terrorism (ISAF see UNSCR 1510; MNF-I see UNSCR 1546). This raises the question as to why legitimacy building actions and effective state-building are so difficult to achieve in fragile and conflict-torn states?

The apparent lack of stable – and to some extent legitimate – governments in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively is even further startling when considering the fact that the military doctrine that shaped the two operations is especially adamant on the importance of building legitimacy. The *Counterinsurgency Field Manual – 3-24* (FM 3-24, 2006) – based on the initial years of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq – modernized the U.S. armed forces into the 21st century regarding how to fight an insurgency. The need for a new doctrine was apparent with the change of the conflicts from conventional warfare to irregular warfare in the shape of insurgencies. The importance of the doctrine was illustrated by the fact that it was unofficially used as NATO's doctrine for counterinsurgency operations and the fact that Britain went so far as to completely adopt it as its own doctrine up until 2009 when Britain published its own counterinsurgency doctrine (Nyhamar, 2009, 7-10). A further attest to the importance of legitimacy can be seen with the doctrine's new version called *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies – FM 3-24* from 2014. The new doctrine contains lessons learned from 10 years of counterinsurgency conflicts, where legitimacy is brought forward as a specifically important variable (FM 3-24, 2014). Still, with both the means and the motivation through overwhelming resources and operation goals which aim to create a legitimate government, the desired result would not follow suit.

This creates the question of what can explain this deviation between theory and practice? Wiechnik (2012) claims that the failures to create stable governments in Afghanistan and Iraq are grounded in a legitimacy problem. He pinpoints three problems with the counterinsurgency manual: first, that the phenomenon of political legitimacy was not sufficiently taken into account and handled in a constructive way, second, that it was clearly visible that the doctrine was written when policy focus was on spreading liberal democracy, also in stability operations, and third, that forcing the incorporation of a democratic system too early on in an counterinsurgency operation might have contra-productive consequences. Again, FM 3-24 (2006) clearly pinpoints legitimacy as a main variable in counterinsurgency operations, and even more in the updated version of the doctrine (FM 3-24, 2014), but at the same time neglects going deeper into the theory of political legitimacy and instead leaving the explanation as follows:

Legitimacy, the acceptance of an authority by a society, and control are the central issues in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. This is true however the U.S. enables a host nation to defeat an insurgency. The population of a particular society determines who has legitimacy to establish the rules and the government for that society. A population's values and cultural norms will determine who that society perceives as a legitimate authority. Both the insurgency and the host nation attempt to control the population by some mixture of consent and coercion.

FM 3-24, 2014, 1-27

While this definition highlights the importance of values and norms, it leaves room for significant interpretation regarding the varying levels of importance of specific norms and values. Wiechnik (2013) puts a larger focus on values when talking about what builds legitimacy, and because of this claims that many of the methods presented in FM 3-24 are useless since they focus on good governance. Also, the actual practices of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq – where US domestic political pressure was put on spreading liberal democracy – had long-term negative effects in building legitimate governments, which instead could have been democratized in the long run. However, this goes against theories of deliberative democracy, as Bohman (1997, IX) puts it: “Broadly defined, deliberative democracy refers to the idea that legitimate lawmaking issues from the public deliberation of citizens”, which instead of focusing on norms in general puts a focus on the levels of involvement that citizens have

towards the government. A government is considered to have democratic legitimacy if its citizens have insight into the decision-making process and can affect the decisions made, but what level of involvement is expected among the citizens? Other theories on legitimacy are also valid, which instead focus on the services provided by the government or good governance, but what type and level of service is expected by the citizens?

These conflicting points regarding legitimacy building highlight a need for further studies within the subject area, while also being politically relevant with the conflicts still going on. This implies a failure in either the doctrine's view on legitimacy or the implementation of the doctrine. The worst scenario consisting of a failure of both view and implementation. This leads to the purpose of the thesis, which is to give an insight into which variables affect the origin of legitimacy in conflict-torn states. Focus is placed on the relationship between values and services. What norms and values are perceived important by the population and to what importance regarding which services are provided and at what level of quality? Also, to what degree do the citizens feel that they need to have influence in the decision-making process? The objective of this study is to test these variables and different theories against each other. Hopefully, this results in an increased understanding of differing theories and an awareness of factors that helps or hinders the advance of legitimacy.

This introductory chapter has worked as a way to give a primary demarcation of what this thesis will take into account, while also motivating the societal relevance and research value in the primary research question. Next follows a chapter regarding the theoretical framework of relevant research regarding the thesis. The first part of chapter 2 focuses on the phenomenon of state-building, by presenting both theories and real-world examples. Focus then shifts to the concept of legitimacy and how it is presented and the different views that exist regarding which variables affect changes in legitimacy. The impact of norms and values is further investigated. Different definitions are brought forward and discussed, both regarding legitimacy in itself and other societal phenomenon that have a special impact on the conditions in conflict-torn spaces, creating a deeper theoretical understanding of the subject area. Finally, the chapter shifts focus towards relevant research about counterinsurgency as a phenomenon. This gives an insight into what has been the focus in counterinsurgency operations – e.g. in Afghanistan and Iraq after conventional warfare has ended with

the occupation of the respective countries and the establishment of new regimes – and what methods are used to achieve the goal of stability in conflict-torn states. After the theoretical review, the research question will be specified from its current form: Why are legitimacy building actions and effective state-building so difficult to achieve in fragile and conflict-torn states? Chapter 3 discusses the choice of methodology for the analysis of the thesis and how the analytic part of the study is conducted. Chapter 4 consists of an empiric analysis which is done to try to answer the specified research question. Chapter 5 summarizes a closing discussion based on the entire thesis. Finally, chapter 6 provides a summary of the whole thesis in Swedish.

2 Theoretical framework

This chapter focuses on previous research regarding state-building, legitimacy and counterinsurgency theory that is relevant for the research question of the thesis. Principally, general definitions are given regarding different societal phenomena, and the definitions are also used to describe differing scientific theories, which then are weighed against each other in the context of the research area. This is done to create a context to the current scientific view regarding the different subjects and enable a further demarcation of the research area while giving insight into what is the best methodology to answer the research question.

2.1 State-building

State-building is the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones. In this book I argue that state-building is one of the most important issues for the world community because weak or failed states are the source of many of the world's most serious problems. [...] The dominant trend in world politics for the past generation has been, after all, the critique of "big government" and the attempt to move activities from the state sector to private markets or to civil society. But particularly in the developing world, weak, incompetent, or nonexistent government is the source of severe problems.

Fukuyama, 2004, ix-x

Fukuyama describes above the basics of state-building and also claims that the implementation of large and strong state institutions are necessary to counteract the chaos that would appear if the state does fail, citing the collapse of the Soviet Union as an example. Fukuyama (2004, 119-121) does acknowledge that the contemporary trend of cutbacks that have been done if the power of the state have been warranted and that the situation of the Cold War with overpowered states pitted against each other is nothing to desire. However, he still does stress the importance of a strong legitimate state. Only through enough power is the state able to create stability through the rule of law both domestically and internationally. He also cites that the benefactors of a weaker state – e.g. non-governmental organizations, corporations, syndicates – only further spreads out the power and legitimacy of the state to multiple actors and works against stability. The complexity of state-building is also underlined by Bliesemann de Guevara (2010) who studies the involvement of actors on national and local levels that

not necessarily have the same views as the Western international community regarding the end goal of state-building. Compromises are needed among actors to achieve a stable end goal, and the context is ever more complex with the onslaught of globalization and informalization. A level of balance is required in state-building.

Fukuyama (2004, 92-93) also mentions the so-called failed state as a major problem in the modern globalized world. The domestic situation of a failed state that lacks functioning institutions able to create stability affect other countries more than ever. The existence of a failed state creates the dilemma of when an external actor is justified to intervene and encroach on sovereignty of another actor. However, other scholars have conveyed criticisms towards Fukuyama's view on "failed states". Weigand (2015, 7) claims that the Weberian state has become the usual go-to definition as the end-goal when discussing state-building. Weigand finds this definition lacking and criticizes Fukuyama for defining every state without a centralized power center as "failed". The definition is overgeneralizing and to some degree derogatory since it lumps a wide array of different political systems into the same non-Weberian failed category. The "failed" state – further down more closely described as a hybrid system (e.g. OECD, 2010) – has other institutions, which revolve around other systems of political and economic organization and is not necessarily in need of external intervention to be "fixed". Boege et al. (2009, 13-14) agrees with Weigand and encourages the usage of the term hybrid political orders instead of failed states. They claim that the mainstream view in Western political thinking that failed states are a hinderance to peace and economic growth is misleading. The strengths of the states are not considered and the lens of state-building needs widening.

No matter the view on what constitutes a failed state, there is a consensus that states arise and develop differently. Answers to this diverging development can be found in several theories. Fukuyama's view that institutions are responsible for the development of states towards a Weberian state system can also be seen in Weber's writings. Weber (2013) describes how Protestantism was a contributing cause as to why capitalism evolved. However, this view has received criticism from several other scholars and Weber himself also agrees that his conclusions are not exhaustive but maintains there being a cause and effect relationship between culture and state-building. Diamond (1999) sums up his view on why societies evolve differently in one sentence: "history followed different courses for different peoples because of

differences among peoples' environments, not because of biological differences among peoples themselves". Diamond adheres to the theory of geographic determination, which claims that it is the environment around the people that shape the characteristics of said people's society. Diamond (1999) portrays a cause and effect relationship that explain through ultimate (the east-west axis enabling species and domesticated plants spreading) and proximate factors (technological and organizational advancement and epidemic diseases) why for example it was the Spanish conquistadors who invaded the Inca and not vice versa.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) on the other hand discard Diamond's theory since it does not explain the differences between poor and wealthy in the modern globalized world. Weber's (2013) earlier mentioned culture explanation as to why some nations fail and why others do not is also criticized by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). Culture does explain differences in social norms that might incentivize institutional differences, but at the same time is culture more of a symptom of a larger issue which is not explained by the culture theory on its own. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) explain why poor countries remain poor because those with authority want the country to continue to be poor, their explanation follows suit as to that of Fukuyama; institutions. Extractive institutions that have unclear law and order while incentivizing absolutism has been the norm through history. On the other hand, inclusive institutions that have a clear law and order while incentivizing pluralism create more favorable circumstances for growth. However, the development from traditional extractive institutions towards inclusive institutions is disincentivizing towards potential economic and political losers of an institutional change. Similarities can be seen here between the Weberian state and inclusive institutions, and between hybrid states and exclusive institutions.

However, before continuing regarding state-building is it prudent to further clarify what constitutes a state in the contemporary world. Visoka (2018, 1-2) describe this phenomenon in closer detail and out of the context of Kosovo. He states that the number of recognized states has increased drastically with the end of colonialism, but the recognition of states is still met with resistance and no definite criteria of recognition exist. The reasoning behind this is that the changing of states results in not only regional differences, but on a more global scale where other actors search for a mandate for increased self-determination. Some basic criteria to be considered a state

can be found in the recognition of the separatist state from the host-state – which in the case of Kosovo is Serbia – and the admission into the UN. This shows that the international community considers the state to have a certain level of legitimacy, which in turn enables the state to function in the ever globalizing world. This links to the source of legitimacy called external legitimacy, which will later be discussed in closer detail. Fukuyama (2004, 37-38) continues on this topic and why institutions are so important in state-building concerning failed states. External support to shape a host nation from a failed state is defined instead as nation-building. While external support has an impact on both the development of the society and the legitimacy of the host nation, it does not necessarily have the desired outcome of the external actor. An external lender does have a level of impact on societal development but is still largely dependent on domestic conditions. An external occupier – e.g. the United States (US) in Afghanistan – on the other hand does have a larger influence on the policies of the host nation, but this on the other hand disturbs the legitimacy of the host nation government. An external occupier deciding the actions of the host nation paint a picture among the population of the host-government being an illegitimate puppet.

However, Fukuyama (2004, 97) does not claim that external actors should let populations conduct state-building towards legitimacy in total isolation. Instead he goes even further and claims that external actors have an obligation to act against violations of human rights. This is based on the idea that contemporary states can no longer be considered legitimate solely on the basis of the leader of a centralized state, along the lines of the Westphalian system that claims that the state has complete sovereignty over its own territory. Fukuyama cites examples such as the transgressions of “legitimate” nationalist leaders such as Milosevic in multiethnic former Yugoslavia or the absence of a functioning centralized government in states such as Somalia or Afghanistan. However, it seems as if the humanitarian reasoning for intervention that is promoted by the United Nations (UN) and different non-governmental organizations (NGO) does not align with those of different governments. This division on when international intervention is justified can be seen clearly in the conflicts of the Bush administration in the early 2000s. Fukuyama (2004, 104-106) claims that the defining view change regarding state sovereignty had come with the end of the Cold War through the humanitarian interventions of the 90s. With the US as the world’s only superpower were the risks for reprisals on US interventions significantly lower. This

would create a division between the US and Europe with the breaches of human rights regarding the handling of Afghan terror suspects and the invasion of Iraq. From this Fukuyama (2004, 99) concludes that the will to intervene and promote state-building – through democratic legitimacy and self-sustaining institutions – in so called failed states derives from the will to either stomp out the grounds for terrorism or to create the means for economic development.

Fukuyama (2004, 100-102) cites three stages of nation-building. First comes the post-conflict timeframe, when active fighting has recently stopped. First priority is to stabilize the area through short-term solutions, e.g. humanitarian aid in the type of basic goods and services while also restoring law and order. Next step is to create the groundwork for self-sustaining state institutions that over time take over more and more responsibility and enables the external interveners to exit the host nation. Finally, the third step – which is deeply intertwined with the previous step – involves strengthening state authority in more expertise type areas such as banking and property rights that in the long run enables growth and further stability. What level of support that is needed and within which areas of government is determined largely by the existing institutions of the host nation. Did the host nation previously have a functioning centralized state with institutions or not? Does the population have a history of democratic values or not? The easy part is to put an end to active fighting and to find short-term stabilizing solutions. The hard part is to be able to create long-term self-sustaining institutions that are perceived as legitimate among the population, and “since we do not in fact know how to transfer institutional capacity in a hurry, we are setting ourselves and our supposed beneficiaries up for large disappointments” (Fukuyama, 2004, 104).

Schedler (1998) convey the democratization process post World War II as something to be admired, but that sustaining the democratic system is often as difficult as establishing it. Schedler (1998, 105) concludes that “no democracy will never be fully consolidated”, but constant work is needed for the actions of liberal peacebuilding to continue. However, not everyone is as convinced that nation-building and intervention in the name of liberalization and democracy is justified. Paris (2010, 338) criticize the notion of liberal peacebuilding as a sort of formula for peace in conflict-torn spaces but admits that criticism towards it has in some areas been overinflated. Paris (2010, 339) thereby propose revalue liberal peacebuilding by “(1) continuing to press forward

with efforts to dissect and understand the paradoxes and pathologies of peacebuilding, and (2) ensuring that this critical enterprise is well-founded and justified". Richmond (2010) agrees with Paris that the current form of liberal peacebuilding is not to be preferred. hybrid solutions between liberal and local practices can have severely negative consequences if local circumstances are not considered. Tailored solutions for liberal peace are needed in accordance to the local societal context.

The results of state-building through external intervention – also known as nation-building in the US – are varying. Fukuyama (2004, 38-39) cites the flurry of postcolonial states that arose with the decline of European colonialism post World War II as examples of failed nation-building. Post World War II Germany and Japan on the other hand are examples of successful nation-building, which was a result of the massive economic investments that were made but mostly because of the still existing institutions that were allowed to continue and in the long run created the opportunities of a democratic market system evolving. The postcolonial states did not have the same kind of institutions available to themselves which combined with the earlier and ongoing extortion of economic resources and governments with close ties to external actors further worsened the opportunities for state-building.

Böhnke et al. (2017) describes in further detail the effects of state-building in a post-war context. They look at the interactions between state and society in Afghanistan and the impact of external actors. Also here is legitimacy and a social contract between the state and the people brought forward as central in the state-building process. Studies are presented that the efficiency of external actors to implement liberal peacebuilding is far from easy – citing examples such as multiple legitimate actors and differing values – and that instead focus has been put on increasing output performance to increase legitimacy, which is in accordance to the steps of state-building presented earlier by Fukuyama. Böhnke et al. (2017, 20-21) find in their study that in the context of Afghanistan is state formation and legitimacy very sensitive to external circumstances, but that the state-building process has to be based around the host nation context.

State-building has a crucial part in creating stability in the ever more globalized world. The what, when and where of interventions and goals of state-building are debated, but in any case necessary to take into account when looking at the legitimacy of a political system, since the two phenomenon are closely knit together. Next will focus

shift towards what exactly constitutes legitimacy and from where legitimacy originates.

2.2 Legitimacy

During the Age of Enlightenment, an idea of a social contract was raised. Philosophers such as Hobbes (1651), Locke (1690) and Rousseau (1782) believed that a society needs to organize itself through a sort of agreement called the social contract, which stipulates what is to be expected of individuals towards the society, alternatively between the ruler and the ruled. The contract needs to be based on the values and interests of the people in question to determine how the society in question should be managed, and this would then legitimize the political system. This is a precursor to modern legitimacy theory, although the idea of a legitimate rule through some type of “right” goes even further back in history and will be discussed in more detail later on. What needs to be addressed early on is the fact that perceived legitimate rule varies considerably and is based on the specific societal context. Continuing the example of the three Enlightenment philosophers, these differing views can be seen clearly. Hobbes (1651) who lived through the devastating English Civil War advocated for an authoritarian leader with supreme power. Locke (1690) had another point of view and believed that citizens have the right to rebel and that power should be divided among different political systems. Finally, Rousseau (1782), who came to inspire the French Revolution, supported deliberation and active citizenship to bring forward the will of the people. Further on in this chapter, it will become apparent that all three views can be discerned in different schools of modern legitimacy theory.

However, before diving deeper into the theoretical framework, is it prudent to point out that as with all types of societal concepts, there is no definite consensus on how to define said concept and determine what variables that affect it. The same applies to the concept of legitimacy, which is a multidimensionally constructed concept that looks at relationships between multiple actors, making it close to impossible to take every variable that affects the relationship into account (Lillbacka, 1999, 3-5). This means that different contexts demand different definitions of legitimacy. Power and legitimacy are closely intertwined. For one person to have power over another individual is in itself common and understandable, but what level of power that is

legitimate in another circumstance is instantly much more complicated (Beetham, 1991, 3). However, a good baseline of the concept of legitimacy stems from the field of sociology, where Weber defines a state as a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1946, 3-4).

This type of a definition might seem backwards for a thesis focusing on legitimacy since the definition explores what defines a state, but Weber apparently sees the two concepts of a state and legitimacy as co-dependent. To be defined as legitimate, a state needs to be able to exercise a certain level of control over its people within the territory in question, which is concretized through a monopoly on legitimate physical force. What then is the definition of legitimate force? This has to do with who exercises the force and under what jurisdiction. For example, the military or police force of the state exercise force with the direct jurisdiction of the state, while citizens or private companies – such as private security companies – might be given the right to use force by the state under special circumstances, e.g. the right to practice self-defense or the use of licensed security guards. What specifically constitutes legitimate use of force has to do with different types of legitimating actions that provide authority, which will be defined later. Weber (1978, 215-216) talks about three “pure types” of actions that legitimate the state on different grounds:

- Rational-legal: beliefs in enacted rules and the rights of those elevated to authority result in the concept of rational-legal authority
- Traditional: beliefs in established traditions and the legitimacy of those who exercise authority result in the concept of traditional authority
- Charismatic: beliefs in an exceptional character or individual and the legitimacy of the actions and thoughts of him/her result in the concept of charismatic legitimacy

Presented above is a categorization of different roads to a legitimate state. Legitimacy through rational grounds requires people to believe in the rule of law and to follow and respect both the rules of the state and of those who uphold them, e.g. the police, the military, and the courts in modern so called Weberian states enacting the rule of law. Legitimation through traditional grounds, on the contrary, draws from people’s beliefs in established norms and traditions that shape the culture within the territory in

question, e.g., believing in Christian values and those who represent them when living in a Christian area. Finally, legitimation through charismatic grounds can be achieved when people find and believe in a person who is qualified through his/her qualities or actions which stem from the person's charisma. Real world examples could be great leaders such as Alexander the Great or Augustus who reached divine levels of charismatic legitimacy, or a more recent example such as Barack Obama or Nelson Mandela who also came to great positions of power largely based on their own achievements and charisma. However, it is worth noting that all of the previously mentioned examples have a polarizing effect within the public opinion and more than a few met their end violently.

This type of charismatic legitimacy that Weber portrays can be traced back to another theory, that of the "great man". Carlyle (1993) can be attributed as one of the forefathers of this societal theory that claims that a single individual – the hero – is essentially born to lead and have a decisive impact on the future of a society at historical crossroads, citing examples such as Napoleon in the wake of the French Revolution and Martin Luther regarding the Protestant Reformation. This view on the cause and effect of history has over time lost favor, with the motivation that proponents of great man theory oversimplifies history, which then implies that an overt emphasis on the actions and characteristics of a single individual is far from a satisfying explanation to what legitimizes a political system. However, even if the romanticized view of the hero might be an oversimplification, there is certainly some truth to the school of thought. No matter if a leader is born to lead or molded by his/her surroundings, the person can in no way be considered "normal" in respect to the overwhelming responsibilities that the office entails (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991). Furthermore, "All the rigorous scholarly research and theorizing we may undertake cannot diminish the human striving to locate heroic leaders" (Spector, 2016, 258).

Moving on to other views on legitimacy. Easton (1965, 286-288) agrees with Weber on that there are more to the legitimacy of an authority than the political system itself – and that the population in question also plays a part in the formula – but further adds that when faced with the loss of legitimacy, the political system needs to determine what kind of legitimacy is affected and towards what aspect of the political system. However, Easton uses a similar but more complex classification of legitimacy according to what exactly the legitimacy supports and from where the legitimacy

originates. He separates between the type of legitimacy that is directed towards a regime as a whole and legitimacy towards specific people in roles of authority. Easton (1965, 190-191) defines a regime as “the persistence of systems in the face of change” and claims that inoperability is inevitable if a system or its members cannot sufficiently support the regime. Authorities on the other hand are according to Easton (1965, 212-213) the occupants of authority roles who on a continuum have varying levels of discretion and responsibility for making decisions. The two categories are both important in the functionality of the political system, which can be seen in how they are based on legitimizing ideologies, as portrayed below.

[...] the power of authorities and of the regime both depend on upon continuing validation through some set of values, a legitimating ideology. [...] an ideology purveys an image of the purposes, organization, and operation of a system in terms of which obedience to the authorities and acceptance of the regime may be considered right and proper, and therefore, morally binding.

Easton, 1965, 292 & 294

As for Easton’s sources of legitimacy – presented below in table 1 – distinct similarities can be seen in the previous categorization of Weber. The similar structure of sources of legitimacy between these two leading social scientists shows that a similar classification of legitimacy sources is legitimate in itself.

Table 1. Easton's (1965, 287) classification of legitimacy sources

Sources of Legitimacy	Objects of Legitimacy	
	Regime	Authorities
	Ideological Legitimacy	
Ideology	Moral convictions about validity of regime	Moral convictions about validity of incumbents of authority roles
	Structural Legitimacy	
Structure	Independent belief in validity of the structure and norms	Overflow from belief in structure to the incumbents of the authority roles
	Personal Legitimacy	
Personal Qualities	Overflow from belief in the validity of the incumbents of authority roles to the authority roles (structure and norms of regime) themselves	Independent belief in validity of authorities because of their personal qualities

Beetham (1991, 1 & 19) makes a clear distinction between the different terms authority, power and legitimacy. He maintains that power acquired and exercised under justifiable rules and with consent can be considered legitimate and that political institution then have authority over the other system in question. At the same time, while the exertion of power illegitimately is marked by forms of resistance among the population is it still a type of authority. It is important to emphasize that what is considered legal and justified varies both between and within populations over time and space, which will be discussed in more detail later on. However, first some terminology needs to be addressed.

Dahl and Stinebrickner (2003, 28) defines a political system as a “collection of elements that interact with one another and that individually and collectively exercise influence over the individuals and collectivities that make up the elements or parts of the system”. This includes – among other things – governments and institutions subordinate to said government. Authority on the other hand is a type of influence where the ruled follows the wishes of the ruler more or less automatically. This is the desired end goal of the political system according to Dahl and Stinebrickner (2003, 38-43 & 60-61) who claims that authority is achieved through six different methods: inducement, power, force, coercion, persuasion, and manipulation. The political system is thereby presented by a multitude of methods to achieve authority. Authority is preferably achieved through legitimacy since that is an especially cost-efficient way

to rule, while the alternative – authority through coercive means – does not entail automatic obedience and acceptance as easily.

This division in what is an acceptable method of achieving authority – legitimate actions and/or coercive actions – can be seen in the established categorization between the Weberian and hybrid political systems (OECD, 2010, 16-19). A Weberian system includes modern Western states where the ruling government succeeds in having a monopoly on violence within its territory that it controls, directly or indirectly provides its citizens with some level of services – which connects to a distinct difference between public and private sectors – and finally is recognized by other states. In a nutshell, the Weberian state includes stable modern states with rule of law and a free market. A hybrid political system on the other hand are to a larger degree made up from kin and community ties, reflected in the rules of the system and a lack of distinction between private and public. Services through public responsibility are not an universal right and are instead determined through social groups. Using a concrete example of the differences between the two systems – while recognizing the occurrence of stark differences within the two categorizations – would be through the phenomenon of corruption. While corruption in a Weberian system is looked down upon as a crime or nepotism, in a hybrid system could something that might look as corruption instead simply be viewed as an acceptable occurrence of patronage (OECD, 2010, 25-26).

2.1.1 Sources of legitimacy

A number of academic subjects study the phenomenon of legitimacy in different aspects. While the disciplines might differ in their specific goals in understanding the cause and effect of legitimacy on different phenomena, in their essence they emanate from the same theory that legitimacy infer a form of acceptance. An example of this can be found in organizational theory when looking at the moral legitimacy of an organization using Suchman's (1995, 574) definition – that “legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” – to see how a social enterprise gain legitimacy and thereby support among constituents and stakeholders (Sarpong & Davies, 2014). The study revolves

around the concept of legitimacy as a form of acceptance that involves social constructs, which closely resembles the outline previously given by Beetham, Weber and Easton. However, the specifics of what affects and what is affected by legitimacy is presented differently both between and within the disciplines. This warrants a further explanation of the different specific views on legitimacy within the demarcation of the thesis.

Democratic legitimacy is one of the most studied types of political legitimacy. Scharpf (2003) came to define the basics of democratic legitimacy when trying to define the level of legitimacy of the European Union (EU). Scharpf (2003) argued that when dealing with modern Western political systems that the trust in institutional elements is the key explaining factor, which he translated into two types of legitimacy: input and output. Input legitimacy is determined by what degree the will of the people is represented in the decision-making process, while output legitimacy is made up from the effects of said decisions. In a nutshell, input legitimacy is determined through the effectiveness of elections, deliberation and active citizenship, while output legitimacy is determined through the type and quality of the services and policies that are enacted. The measurement of democratic legitimacy has later been even further expanded by Schmidt (2013), who added a third source of democratic legitimacy; throughput. This view considers how the process between input and output is made up, touching upon issues such as transparency and corruption. The focus of a political system when it comes to democratic legitimacy can be seen as a trade-off. Too large of a focus on input legitimacy might strengthen citizen participation and the claim that the system is democratic, while at the same time the output performance might be hampered since too many people are involved in too many areas. The alternative is focusing on output performance while neglecting input, which in turn might result in an effective but far from transparent technocracy that can then be considered to suffer from a democratic deficit.

One explanation to why this view on legitimacy is needed in a political system as the EU could be the fact that among the conditions to become a member state – defined in the Copenhagen criteria (1993) – is that the member state needs to “have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”. Essentially, a member state needs to not only fulfill the criteria of the Weberian state, but also have solid democratic values. The values of EU

member states are basically grounded in democratic values, leading to the usage of democratic legitimacy being an accurate tool of measurement when it comes to levels of legitimacy. However, this would not necessarily be the case with a conflict-torn political system where the population might never have been socialized with democratic values and may have experienced even lower levels of democracy during the preceding conflict. Again, the norms and values of the population determines what needs to be measured when determining the level of legitimacy of a political system.

The idea that deliberation and citizen participation is not the best tool when building legitimacy is prevalent also when using other lenses. When discussing theories of democratic legitimization in the context of the EU, Karv (2019, 59 & 66-67) points out that it is only in the context of a political community based on democratic values that democratic behavior legitimizes the state – essentially linking democratic legitimacy to public attitudes – which cannot be accurately determined to be democratically legitimate or not because of the lack of an exact “threshold”. A further complication of an exact threshold of democratic legitimacy is illustrated by Linde and Ekman (2003, 405-406) that talks about how the state can through successful economic and political development generate goodwill among the population that weighs up a temporal setback in regards to outputs, which links to Easton’s (1965) theories of specific and diffuse support for political systems. Specific support according to Easton (1965, 267-268) is about meeting public demands and translates into support as “a consequence from some specific satisfactions obtained from the system with respect to a demand that the members make”. Diffuse support on the other hand is according to Easton (1965, 273-274) a type of reservoir of good will that weighs up negative impacts from the outputs affecting specific support. Diffuse support can materialize through a sort of blind belief in a higher cause, e.g. patriotism towards an authoritarian regime.

This lack of a threshold to be declared democratically legitimate and the existence of methods to gain legitimacy even when lacking democracy indicates that values and norms are a major deciding factor when building legitimacy. The view that one’s own personal needs and safety are deemed more important than self-actualizing views like democracy in the context of a crisis affected area is in accordance with the theory of hierarchy of needs constructed by Maslow (1954). This would be the case especially if the population in question never has had an established experience of democracy

and thereby no democratic values or a sense of democracy being the norm. It is hard to believe that a quick implementation of democratic institutions would legitimize the state without the grounded existence of relevant values within the population, e.g. Afghanistan that up until the toppling of the Taliban never had had neither an established democratic government or an efficient centralized government (OECD, 2010, 31).

Continuing the earlier example of Afghanistan to further illustrate the necessity of different measurements of legitimacy. The lack of a centralized government is concretized especially in tribal areas in Afghanistan where so-called “warlords” has the legitimate rule and maintains legitimacy with armed forces loyal to him personally (Nourzhanov, 2005). A legitimate leader like the warlord can be identified with traits like having access to armed forces while operating in a failed state with undemocratic tendencies, which works against the creation of a legitimate centralized state, especially one based on democratic legitimacy. This is related to a more traditional type of legitimacy called numinous legitimacy that relates to having the divine right to rule, in accordance to the to the type of government called theocracy, where the ruler is legitimized through fundamentalism and traditional beliefs (Beetham, 1991, 75). This can be seen in feudal Europe’s political system where the king was seen as ruling with *God’s mandate* while a similar situation occurred in China where the principle of the *Mandate of Heaven* gave the emperor the right to rule.

Returning to a more contemporarily relevant view on legitimacy. Weigand (2015, 4) defines a fragile state as a conflict-torn area where a number of armed groups are present, meaning that the state does not have the “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force”. He continues that it is persistently hard to build legitimacy in a fragile setting, in response to the lack of a conceptual understanding of the relevant context. Weigand (2015, 15-17) presents a view on legitimacy – by looking at legitimacy either “top-down at the authority’s claims and justifications, or bottom-up, looking at the subjects’ perceptions” – in a conflict-torn setting through five factors:

- Referent objects: a conflict-torn space has multiple actors who strive for authority, who have differing relationships to the population in regard to legitimacy determining factors.

- Claimed vs. perceived legitimacy: with multiple actors who claim to have justified legitimacy over the population, the perception of legitimacy from the population's point of view needs to be considered.
- Audience: as well as there are multiple actors striving for legitimacy, there are multiple groups within the population that experience legitimacy building actions differently, which needs to be considered on a more detailed level.
- Degrees of legitimacy: when determining the level of legitimacy of an authority, different classifications are to be used in relation to population support to the authority. Specifically, active support, passive support, passive resistance or active resistance.
- Sources: from where does legitimacy originate? Two dimensions are presented as instrumental and substantive legitimacy. Instrumental includes more rational sources such as the needs of the people and the services provided by the authority. Substantive on the other hand involves more abstract sources such as shared values about what is "right", which essentially includes all of the earlier mentioned sources of Weber.

Weigand offers a more detailed tool of measurement of legitimacy by considering the societal context of the conflict-torn space. Multiple actors try to influence the population, what level of legitimacy does actor A claim to have and how is actor A perceived by the different groups that make up the population? And how do these opinions of support and resistance translate into actions? Finally, Weigand offers a view on sources of legitimacy that through substantive legitimacy involves Weber's traditional view of norms and values, and through instrumental legitimacy involves Scharpf's view of input and output of the authority. This categorization creates a complex and detailed tool to determine legitimacy in the equally complex context of a conflict-torn space.

One final view on sources of legitimacy in conflict-torn spaces is presented by OECD (2010, 23-29). Input is based on the process of agreed rules and norms of the society. In a democratic state input would be the same as the earlier presented input legitimacy by Scharpf while in a traditional society the process would be based around traditions and customs. Output is based on the services provided by the authority, with security being the most basic of public goods. What level of quality of the services and goods

are produced and are they universal or bound to ethnicity or tribal belonging? Shared beliefs constitute the norms and values of the population. What type and levels of religious beliefs is prevalent among the population? What is considered tradition and how are different actors influencing the populations views on tradition? With the absence of traditional leaders and a failing rational-legal system increases the chance of a charismatic leader to appear, which also is related to shared beliefs. Finally, international legitimacy is determined in regard to the state's sovereignty, recognition and support from other international actors. OECD's presentation of sources of legitimacy follows mostly the same pattern of earlier presented views on legitimacy, however adding the fourth factor of external actors and at the same time involving modern international relations theories into the concept of political legitimacy.

From the research presented above, a pattern can be seen where the importance of population values is highlighted which then determines the expectations of the relevant population towards the political institution in question. In all cases is some level of basic economic and physical security expected for a state to be considered legitimate, but which further services that are expected are instead determined by what the population in questions deems necessary. How values are formed and manipulated will be described further in chapter 2.2. This norm-based view on legitimacy means that there will be significant differences in values among populations, both in regard to time and place. What is considered legitimizing in the rational-legal welfare state Finland in the 2010s is far from the same as what would be considered legitimizing just 20 years earlier, and an even larger difference would be with a hybrid state that does not even revolve around a democratic national state with a functioning rule of law. Now with a general overview of the concept of state-building and legitimacy established, can a connection be seen in that the values and norms of the population are central to a stable and legitimate political system. How the values and norms of the people develop over time and can be affected will be examined closer next through the phenomena of social conditioning.

2.3 Social conditioning

This chapter will look closer at this behavior and its impact on political legitimacy. A political system that wants to be considered legitimate needs to base its rules and

practices on values that are grounded in the beliefs of the population. While traditions that shape norms and values might seem timeless and to have evolved organically over a long period of time, this is not always the case since a common occurrence is that the traditions in question are both of recent origin and sometimes also invented. In Hobsbawm et al. (2012, 1-2) is the so called “invention tradition” described as including traditions both “invented, constructed and formally instituted and those emerging in a less easily traceable manner within a brief and dateable period – a matter of a few years perhaps – and establishing themselves with great rapidity”. An invented tradition is thereby described as a set of practices that – often through the utilization of the past – instill a certain type of behavior among the population, while *customs* on the other hand involves the precedent of certain long-term established actions. Thereby, there is a form of duality of actions that evolve norms and values either organically over time or synthetically and are affected either through overt or tacit means.

With this in mind it is not far-fetched that the absence of beliefs in democratic rule does not make the sudden introduction of a democratic political system to be considered legitimate, same as a gradual shift in beliefs from traditional and fundamentalist values towards secularism and modernism would destabilize a medieval European king ruling with the mandate of God like “a bridge whose foundations have been weakened by the slow processes of erosion” (Beetham, 1991, 75). A contemporary example of a divide between rational and traditional that counteract each other can be found in the caste system in India. The ancient caste system that categorizes individuals in a hierarchical way although in law abolished, is still very much present in everyday society, which pertains to a separation between the passing and the enacting of legislation because of a deviation between laws and values (Gupta, 2005). Therefore, the beliefs and values of a population can both help and hinder the legitimacy of a political system. However, since the values of people change over time can the values then be actively manipulated to either undermine or strengthen the legitimacy of a political system?

Going back to Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs and societal values, another theory is relevant. Inglehart (1971 & 1977) was the first to present the categorization of materialist and postmaterialist values. He claims that values in postindustrial societies change and present empirical evidence from Western European countries by

comparing value change in relation to living standards. This led to the categorization of values between materialists and postmaterialists, and how the values correlate to societal change. Materialists value economic and political stability, while postmaterialists value types of self-expression (Inglehart, 1977, 28). Which type of value that is increasing in the society in turn reflects what it is currently lacking. This in turn is connected to the hierarchy of needs from which the determination of materialist and postmaterialist values are formed. Maslow (1954) determined that people need to fulfill different types of needs, which Inglehart (1977, 22) interpreted as values change towards a certain direction under certain conditions. Materialist values make up the lower levels of Maslow's hierarchy – which includes economic and physical security – while Postmaterialist values make up the top – which includes self-actualization. This connects to the phenomenon of counterinsurgency that will be discussed later in chapter 2.4. The most important aspect when conducting counterinsurgency operations is to create a sense of safety, ergo satisfying basic human needs – the lower levels of Maslow hierarchy and materialist values – since that is what the population covet the most with the current societal context.

While regional variances of materialism-postmaterialism are significant, there is an overall trend towards postmaterialism with increased freedom and liberty. Welzel (2013, 2) talks about emancipative values – “the idea of existing free from dominion” – are in themselves old ideas of human philosophy, but it is only with the relatively recent increase in living standard starting with the Industrial Revolution that life has become more promising. This has enabled more and more people to “ascend the utility ladder of freedoms” that translates into more tolerance, freedom and better life offers (Welzel, 2013, 2-3). This trend can be seen below in table 2 regarding the different capabilities (empowered through technological advancement) and guarantees (empowered through democratic achievement) of different political systems, where the shades of gray represent expected likelihoods of cases to be found, with the darker shade indicating a higher likelihood.

Table 2. Stages of Human Empowerment over the Capability and Guarantee Domains (Welzel, 2013, 20)

		GUARANTEES		
		<i>Narrow</i> (Nondemocracies)	<i>Modicum</i> (Hybrid Regimes)	<i>Wide</i> (Democracies)
CAPABILITIES	<i>Weak</i> (Traditional Economies)	Human Suffering	Intermediate-Low	[Paradox]
	<i>Modicum</i> (Industrial Economies)	Intermediate-Low	Human Struggling	Intermediate- High
	<i>Strong</i> (Knowledge Economies)	[Paradox]	Intermediate- High	Human Thriving

This study of value changes over time and space be further studied using the database *World Values Survey* (WVS) by Inglehart and Welzel (2005). Here Inglehart and Welzel (2010) expanded the materialist-postmaterialist division to traditional-secular values and survival-self-expression values. Traditional values include family ties, religion, respect for authority and national pride, secular-rational values serve as their antipole. Likewise, survival values prioritize physical and economic security while self-expression values prioritize social justice, tolerance and environmental protection. When the societal context changes the values of the population also changes in accordance to the society, however with a quite considerable time lag since the values of the individuals reflect the values of his/her youth (Inglehart, 1977, 23). For example, a change towards better physical security and a higher standard of living would in turn increase postmaterialist sentiment, but only after a period of time.

Going back to great man theory, Hook (1945, 15) presents a form of conditioning that reinforces the legitimacy-building abilities of the individual. He argues that the cult of the hero is in the modern day more and more a synthetic product. Especially authoritarian states – then and now – reinforce the beliefs in the leader though different forms of psychological induction. However, nowadays the efficiency of the conditioning is reinforced through the advancement of technology. Hook compares the building of statues that a Roman emperor could order, while a 1940s dictator had the opportunities to mass-produce images of himself through lithography. This comparison does not make it far-fetched that the introduction of social media and a

totally digitalized society even further enhances different types of conditioning. Social conditioning can be seen as a reinforcement of Weber's (1978, 215-216) charismatic legitimacy and Easton's (1965, 287) personal qualities. The previous description of how authoritarian states condition – or socialize – the population to behave in a certain way is closely similar to a description of the phenomenon of propaganda.

Oberschall (2010) looks at the impact of the media in the example of the war in Yugoslavia. First, he compares the four views on ethnic violence: the primordial view that claims that violence between ethnicities is ever present, the instrumentalist view that ethnic sentiment can be manipulated by other actors for political goals, the constructionist view points out that ethnicity is just one among many identities that affect people, and finally a fourth model focusing on state breakdown over ethnicity in itself as a factor. “The driving motivations are not ethnic hatreds but fear and insecurity”, says Oberschall (2010, 984) and brings forward the idea of “latent nationalism”, that can be activated through manipulation by authority figures. The idea of fear being the driving motivation to ethnic conflicts is supported by earlier discussed ideas of the hierarchy of human needs. This manipulation was according to Oberschall (2010, 987) just one of many different methods that leaders of a crumbling soviet political system used to remain in power, by spreading fear and uniting around the idea of ethnonationalism were elites able to stay in power, providing one explanation as “the media unleashed the war of words and symbols before the war of bullets”. This leads back to how norms and values not only be change over time but can also manipulated. Even tough Yugoslav leader Tito had tried to dampen the ethnic hostilities during his reign had the menacing values prevailed among “older people, the families of victims, intellectuals and religious leaders” (Oberschall, 2010, 989). Even after being conditioned to live in harmony under a communist regime for decades, were populist leaders able to revive the dormant hostilities after a significantly shorter time of conditioning. Loveless (2009) describe the effects of media on population values through the example of Western media in post-communist states. Exposure to media portraying Western values does affect population preferences, but only when also exposed to the right institutions. Again, the media is a tool that can be used to shape the norms and values of the population, but not single-handedly. By using political mobilization through the medium of mass media, political actors were able to revert previous conditioning and during a shorter frame of time.

This is in accordance with the polarization of values that occur in times of economic turmoil, e.g. the polarization towards communism and national socialism in the waning days of the Weimar Republic (de Bromhead et al., 2012).

Continuing on the earlier example of authoritarian regimes, the conditioning of a personal cult around Adolf Hitler in Nazi Germany can be seen as an extreme of the usage of this type of legitimacy. While Nazi Germany would be considered illegitimate if measured through the lens of a modern day rational-legal system, the opposite would be the case if measured through the loyalty of the conditioned members of the Hitler youth, who since the early 1930s had been indoctrinated through the personal cult of Hitler to put country over their own lives (Shirer, 1991, 222-227). Propaganda of the type called “the big lie” focus on using an underlying technical truth and then distorting that truth to such a degree that no one would think it was made up. This has been seen as an underlying reason for a shift in public opinion against Jews in Nazi Germany, eventually leading to the Holocaust (Pulzer, 1988, 15; Herf, 2006, 211; Herf, 2005, 61).

What initially had enabled this type of extreme social conditioning can partially be accredited to the societal values and socioeconomic situation that had preceded the rise of the national socialists in Germany at the end of the roaring twenties. The forced implementation of a democratic system on a population that had no tradition of democratic values and also during times of extreme economic troubles, combined with the fact that economic uncertainties correlate with political polarization created the means for the social conditioning that Nazi Germany conducted (King et al., 2008). This shows that, as discussed earlier in chapter 2.1, the influence and legitimacy of the great man through characteristics can be decisive but is shaped through the context which can be described as the values of the population in question and the specific environmental circumstances.




Figure 1. The impact of values and the determination of legitimacy

In conclusion, it seems – as presented in figure 1 above – as if both what rules and laws that are perceived as legitimate and likewise which qualities about an individual that constitute as legitimizing depend on the norms and values of the population in question. The category traditional – that involves norms and values of the population in question – is central to the legitimacy of a political system. Norms and values decide whether the output, input and throughput of the system can be considered legitimate, and to involve Easton's (1965, 287) more faceted view, what type of political system is in question and of whom does the system consist? Norms and values in turn determine what qualities makes a figure to be considered as charismatically legitimate. Laws are also impacted by the norms and values of what is perceived as right or wrong in a society, and in turn then also affected by the so-called traditional legitimacy. All of the aforementioned categories then together determine the legitimacy level of the political system that materializes in through the level of responsiveness of the population to different political decisions. Again, legitimacy can be seen as practicing authority without having to use force. Then again it is much harder to draw a definite real-world line as to what is legitimate and what is not, while also determining what type of legitimacy has a bigger or smaller impact on the political system's legitimacy. This is something that has to be described closer in detail when conducting an empirical analysis, which will be done in chapter 3 when motivating the methodology

of the thesis. With the concept of how norms and values appear and change over time concluded, the next chapter will instead look at more specific theories regarding what is to be done when trying to create stability and legitimacy in a conflict-torn space.

2.4 Counterinsurgency

Revolution, plot (or *coup d'état*), and insurgency are the three ways to take power by force. [...] A revolution usually is an explosive upheaval – sudden, brief, spontaneous, unplanned. [...] In a revolution, masses move and then leaders appear. [...] A plot is the clandestine action of an insurgent group directed at the overthrow of the top leadership in its country. Because of its clandestine nature, a plot cannot and does not involve the masses. [...] an insurgency is a *protracted struggle* conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.

Galula, 2006, 2

Galula describes above the differences between a revolution, a plot, and an insurgency, separating these types of conflicts from the more traditional form of conventional warfare. While all types of conflicts have some overlap between each other regarding characteristics and are relevant in the study of conflict-torn spaces, it is insurgencies that are of special interest in this thesis. Galula is considered to be one of the leading theorists of modern counterinsurgency (COIN). Galula (2002) came to this leading role within counterinsurgency theory as a result of his two-year involvement in the Algerian war of 1954-1962. The war between the French colonial power and Algerian insurgents boiled down to “the struggle for control of the population”, which would continue to be the first goal of any counterinsurgency operation (Galula, 2002, 59; Galula, 2006, 4).

A contemporary counterinsurgency theorist Kilcullen (2010) sees an insurgency as an organized struggle that involves both political and military means to weaken the control and legitimacy of the ruling government in favor of the insurgents. A counterinsurgency then is a catch-all term for the methods used to fight an insurgency, the methods including not only military measures but all types of methods available to the ruling government. Kilcullen (2010) compares an insurgency with cancer, meaning that there is no one straight forward solution to conducting counterinsurgency operations. Instead, are defining factors needed to be determined continuously since

the circumstances relevant to the counterinsurgency is never static and constantly needs to be adjusted. This can be seen in the fact that even before the start of the conflict there already occurred a struggle between different actors over authority and legitimacy towards the population (Kilcullen, 2006, 2-3). Actors such as a central government, militias, ethnic groups, corporations, NGO:s and criminal organizations all try to improve their legitimacy standing among the population within different areas. This behavior is ever more prevalent within hybrid systems and conflict-torn spaces where no actor can claim to have definite monopoly on legitimate violence.

Kilcullen (2010, 2-13) define three factors that affect the evolution of the insurgency that create “the struggle to adapt” that can be applied through different principles. The principles being the nature of the insurgency, the nature of the counterinsurgent and the human environment. As mentioned, both in respect to counterinsurgency and legitimacy are the views and norms of the people essential. This can be seen in the counterinsurgency theory that Kilcullen (2010) advocates, which focus on understanding the local context of what drives the conflict and to respect noncombatants. The reason for the insurgency thriving can differ even on a local level, again disproving any silver bullet solution. Respecting noncombatants, even though they might be involved with the insurgency as either passive or active supporters/sympathizers, creates stability and legitimizes the view that insurgents have more to win by talking than by fighting. Some lethal violence is impossible to avoid, but simply relying in genocidal killings have a stark negative effect on the counterinsurgency operation. Kilcullen (2010, 5-6) cites Nazi brutality within occupied territories on the eastern front during World War II as reasons to the strong partisan presence. Instead Kilcullen (2010, 5) says that “scrupulously moral conduct, alongside political legitimacy and respect for the rule of law, are thus operational imperatives: they enable victory”.




Figure 2. Inter-agency Counterinsurgency Framework according to Kilcullen (2006, 4)

This struggle to adapt rests on the framework that Kilcullen (2006) calls the three pillars of counterinsurgency, presented above in figure 2. Information on different levels serves as a basis for the conduction of counterinsurgency operations. Then security, political, and economic pillars serve as the applied methods that in turn create control and stability. All of the capabilities of the counterinsurgent are put to use, and the specific focus of the operation needs to constantly be adjusted to serve their intended purpose to legitimize the counterinsurgent while delegitimizing the insurgent. Another aspect in contemporary counterinsurgency operations is that if the operation is domestic or expeditionary. Domestic operations occur on the home turf of the counterinsurgent, while an expeditionary operation further involves a third external actor further complicating which methods that are to be enacted and their efficiency. Kilcullen (2010, 11-12) claims that operating in another setting regarding both geography and culture is significantly more demanding and is further hindered by the fact that domestic policy in liberal-democratic states often want to give over control before the situation has reached a stable enough point.

Kilcullen (2010, 29-49) also tries to give concrete practical advice how to implement the theories of counterinsurgency into practice. The advice revolves around the already discussed important aspects of understanding local conditions through intelligence

gathering and networking, pragmatic leadership and decision-making, and most important of all: keeping the initiative which enables the counterinsurgent to gain the trust and legitimacy of the population. Anyhow, finding out whether the actions implemented have the desired effect is as hard to decipher as knowing which action to pursue in a counterinsurgency operation. Also, regarding this provides Kilcullen (2010, 56-76) different tools that indicate success and adversity in the many relevant societal areas when conducting counterinsurgency operations. Some metrics are to be avoided – e.g. body count and area accessibility – since while they do say something about the input of the counterinsurgent, they do not necessarily say anything about the output. The proposed metrics to be used are instead based on output performance of the relevant actors – population, host nation, external actor, insurgents – and is also closely related to different sources of legitimacy. For example, increasing numbers of businesses, new urban construction efforts and clear property rights are both indicators of the efficiency of the counterinsurgency operation and the legitimacy of the state moving towards a more Weberian model with inclusive institutions and physical safety. Another example is the occurrence and price of luxury goods which says something about the economic safety of the population. A final example is the influence of host nation institutions like courts and the level of tax collection that the host nation can conduct, all of this says something about the populations perceived legitimacy towards the central government with emphasis on output-performance.

It is evident that there is a significant amount of similarities between counterinsurgency theory and the earlier discussed phenomena of legitimacy and state-building. As with legitimacy is the population the main factor in a counterinsurgency operation. Being perceived as more legitimate than the insurgent is a main objective of the counterinsurgent. All parts of the host nation government are needed to create stability, which can be identified through the economic and physical security of the population, once again referring back to the theories of both Maslow and Inglehart. There appears to be a will among external actors – when fighting an insurgency along with a host nation – to strive towards liberal peacebuilding and trying to fix the “failed” state. This relating to the previously discussed phenomenon of state-building where the views of Fukuyama and Weigand among others were presented. Fields (2010), former Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, illustrates in a hearing the need for interinstitutional cooperation when conducting

counterinsurgency. He claims that reconstruction is closely tied to security and the incorporation of local needs and values. This is in turn achieved in the long run through the growing involvement of local institutions in the reconstruction process. Anyhow, counterinsurgency is a complex type of operation and requires constant adaptation to have any chance of success.

With the relevant theoretical framework presented follows next a summary of said framework and a specification of the research question.

2.5 Summary of the theoretical framework

Legitimacy is a deeply complex phenomenon but is in its essence based around the feelings of the population that determine what constitutes a legitimate political system. Whether a population considers a political system to be legitimate or not revolves around the populations expectations towards an authority. The most basic of expectations is the assurance of physical and economic safety of the people. Here it is important to remember that it is not enough that people are statistically safe, they need also to feel safe. This relates back to another definition of legitimacy meaning to have monopoly regarding legitimate violence, and also that the basics of human needs can be ranked according to Maslow's pyramid of human needs and Inglehart's classification of materialist and postmaterialist needs.

Based on the presented theoretical framework is it necessary to motivate the demarcated usage of legitimacy in this thesis to answer a more detailed version of the current research question: why legitimacy building actions and effective state-building is so difficult to achieve in fragile and conflict-torn state? Next follows a motivation of which views regarding the phenomena presented in the theoretical framework that will be used when trying to answer the more detailed research question. One categorization that can be done is that there are differing tendencies between non-democratic and democratic political systems, presented below in table 3.

Table 3. Character tendencies among different political systems

Non-democratic	Democratic
Materialist	Postmaterialist
Exclusive institutions	Inclusive institutions
Human suffering	Human thriving

Non-democratic systems – or hybrid, failed – tend to have more materialist values and consist out off more exclusive institutions, this means that there is a larger chance for human suffering according to the theory presented earlier by Welzel (2013). Democratic systems – or Weberian, liberal – tend to have more postmaterialist values and consist out of more inclusive institutions, this means that there is a larger chance for human thriving according to Welzel (2013). In short, the more democratic a state is, the more it is likely to have a higher standard of living thanks to inclusive institutions, which makes the population more likely to value self-fulfillment. The opposite is true for more non-democratic states that have lower standard of living thanks to more exclusive institutions, which makes the population more likely to value physical and economic safety over e.g. equal rights. This division in values needs to be considered when trying to decipher the level of legitimacy of a political system, presented below in figure 3.




Figure 3. Detailed sources of legitimacy

Figure 3 aims to compile the different sources of legitimacy presented in the theoretical framework. First, there is a division of instrumental and substantive types of legitimacy (Weigand, 2015). Instrumental types of legitimacy revolve around rational types of legitimacy, based on the needs of the people and the services provided. This includes the earlier mentioned category rational-legal described by Weber (1978) and ideological by Easton (1965). Rational-legal/ideological legitimacy revolves around

moral convictions in rules and authority roles, which in turn is affected by established norms and values. This is illustrated by the subcategories of input, output, throughput, and external which pertains from OECD (2010), Scharpf (2003) and Schmidt (2013). Input being the opportunities to participate in the decision-making process. Output describe the type and quality of the services and policies being enacted. Throughput looks at the process between input and output, looking at occurrences of e.g. corruption. External support derives from non-domestic actors e.g. recognition from the international community, an expeditionary counterinsurgency force or funding from emigrated nationals.

What the population considers to be the responsibility of the authority to provide is then instead determined by substantive types of legitimacy, which can be divided into the subcategories traditional (structural) and, charismatic (personal) taken from Weber (1978) and Easton (1965). The norms and values of the population – meaning substantive legitimacy or shared values – determine what services are expected, if democratic participation is valued, if corruption is looked down upon or considered patronage, and if external support makes the host nation seem stronger or to be considered a puppet. There being different norms and values in nondemocracies, hybrid regimes and democracies is only natural. Traditional/structural legitimacy looks at beliefs in norms and traditions. Charismatic/personal are based around the characteristics of a single individual pertaining to the great man theory (Hook, 1945).

All of these characteristics needs to be considered when trying to determine the legitimacy of a political system. However, when dealing with a conflict-torn space are even more variables needed to take into account. Weigand (2015) summarized the circumstances of a conflict-torn state into four categories. First, the referent objects need to be considered, since a conflict-torn space contains multiple actors who strife for authority and to be considered legitimate in the eyes of the population. Secondly, there is a need to distinguish between the claimed legitimacy of an actor and the perceived legitimacy of the actor from the perspective of the population. Thirdly, the need to recognize that the population is not a homogenous actor but consists of multiple groups with varying interests. Fourth, classifications of support among groups toward actors need to be constructed, e.g. through active or passive support and passive or active resistance. Finally, the different types of support for the actors needs to be considered. Easton (1965) defined specific support as meeting public demands for

output – linking to instrumental legitimacy – and defined diffuse support as a reservoir of good will pertaining from a sense of purpose towards the actor. Even though an actor might act against the population's own best interest, the actor might still be considered legitimate in the eyes of the public thanks to diffuse support.

This summary concludes the theoretical framework of the thesis, making the specified research question: *what are the views of the population on legitimacy in areas where counterinsurgency operations have been conducted?* Next will the expectations towards the empirical study be presented as well as the motivations as to which type of methodology will be used.

3 Methodology

Previous chapters have established the complexity of political legitimacy and state-building. A multitude of factors need to be taken into account when trying to determine the views of a population regarding the legitimacy of a political system. This is ever more complicated when the societal context is one where a full-on conflict has occurred, and afterwards stability is aimed to be achieved through the usage of state-building through the lens of counterinsurgency theory. The theoretical framework shows that the specific sources of the legitimacy of the political system are necessary to investigate further when trying to create stability.

Instrumental types of legitimacy – based around the needs of the population and services provided – combined with substantive types of legitimacy – based around the norms and values of the population – determine the actual level of legitimacy of the political system, while also affecting what level of effect specific types of legitimacy building actions will have. The duality of instrumental and substantive legitimacy is also reflected in the categorization of specific and diffuse support. Specific support can be considered more logical and based on the obvious gains of the population for supporting the political system. Diffuse support on the other hand is more abstract in the sense that it pertains from a sort of reservoir of goodwill, which might materialize through e.g. patriotism. For example, the norms and expectations of the population towards democratic input and insight into the decision-making process determine the effect of creating more or less democratic institutions. While a decrease in transparency and input might have a negative impact on the legitimacy of a political system in a Weberian state – e.g. a country within the EU – the same might not be the case for a non-Weberian state – e.g. Afghanistan – where there is no established norm of a working centralized political system based around democratic liberty and the rule of law.

Furthermore, when dealing with the case of a conflict-torn space, the societal context is ever more important. This means that further factors need to be considered than when examining an area that is politically stable and does not suffer from security and economic risks as a result of e.g. war or an insurgency. This creates a societal context where multiple actors actively strive for control. There is a difference between the claimed and the perceived legitimacy of the population, which is far from homogenous and might show differing levels of support and/or resistance towards different actors.

Next, the aforementioned sources of legitimacy will be used to answer the research question *what are the views of the population on legitimacy in areas where counterinsurgency operations have been conducted?* How exactly the research will be conducted will be discussed in detail in this chapter. First, some reflections on the advantages and disadvantages of different relevant research designs. Then follows a discussion regarding the data that will be used in the research. This motivates why the data from the later on chosen case is the most expedient when answering the research question. Afterwards, the variables will be operationalized for analyzing the data. A discussion will be held regarding the validity and reliability of the research, while also stating the strengths, weaknesses, and realistic goals of the research. The chapter concludes with a summary of the methodology – concisely stating how the research will be conducted, with what material and through which type of categorization – enabling an analysis through the described methodology.

3.1 Research design

The theoretical framework shows that the values of a population change over time, and this in turn has an impact on what is considered to be legitimate. Since the research question looks at the specific case of population views on legitimacy under specifically demarcated circumstances, the argument can be made that this research is of a theory testing character, also called deductive theory (Esaiasson et al., 2012, 91-93; Bryman, 2018, 47-50). When testing a theory, the most desirable conditions would be to run the same specific scenario multiple times while at the same time being able to manipulate different independent variables. This would enable drawing conclusions regarding the cause and effect of different variables. Since this is not humanly possible, the next best option is to instead conduct systematic comparisons that involve both homogeneity and variations. The observed cases should be similar in many ways to be comparable, but at the same time be different so conclusions can be drawn regarding cause and effect. A systematic comparison can be conducted in several different ways by using different research designs. Every design has its own strengths and weaknesses, meaning that that there is no “correct” way to conduct research. This chapter will try to motivate the chosen research design of the thesis. Different designs will be presented and compared to other relevant studies, enabling a choice of design to answer the research question of this thesis.

The argument can be made that the closest the researcher can come to turning back time and manipulating circumstances is through experimental design (Esaiasson et al., 2012, 93-96 & 327-345; Bryman, 2018, 77-87; Ekengren & Hinnfors, 2012, 80-84). While there are multiple ways to conduct an experiment within the social sciences, the common denominator is that there are at least two groups: an experiment group and a control group. The experiment group is exposed to a stimulus while the control group is not. The stimulus represents the independent variable which the researcher wants to investigate to find out if and then how it affects the dependent variable. The controlled circumstances give the experimental design high internal validity, and the effects of the stimulus are easy to observe. However, experimental design suffers from low external validity. This is the case since the sample used, while partially countered through randomization, in no way guarantees to represent the entire relevant population. Furthermore, the environment and context of the experiment might not be representative of the intended real-world circumstances or have an unintended impact on the results of the study. However, using experimental design would be inexpedient in the case of this thesis. Finding a representative sample to use would be unreasonable within the scope of this thesis, which can also be said about creating the correct circumstances to actually conduct the experiment. This leads to the fact that another research design needs to be considered.

Another research design to be considered is the comparative design (Esaiasson et al., 2012, 101-108 & 210-226; Bryman, 2018, 102-107; Ekengren & Hinnfors, 2012, 80-84). This design compares two or more cases to each other, and the data can be both qualitative and quantitative. The cases have to be different to some extent, however to what level is determined by what specific type of comparative design is being used. Using the most alike design, the cases must be as similar as possible, apart from the suspected causes and related effects. By pinpointing the few differences between two cases, conclusions can be drawn regarding the cause and the effect of different variables. The alternative method is using the most different design. Here the cases must be different in many aspects, while being alike in outcome and having a few similar variables. This also enables conclusions regarding cause and effect, but the other way around in comparison to the most alike design. The strength of comparative design is drawing conclusions regarding cause and effect. A few carefully selected cases can be analyzed in depth. However, complex societal phenomena can rarely be

explained through a few variables, which is further problematized by the hardships of generalization. Even if there appears to occur causality in cause and effect regarding two cases, there is no guarantee that would be the case when involving other cases. Problems in reliability can also occur from errors in data gathering and categorizations, especially when dealing with multiple sources of data.

Ortmann (2010) uses a comparative design to study the democratization process in Singapore and Hong Kong by looking at regime legitimacy. The two cases are similar in many ways, while at the same time having differing outcomes regarding democratization. Ortmann (2010) categorizes different levels of regime oppositional behavior by investigating the occurrence of social conflicts, public meetings and protests, and policy decisions. The research design used is a most alike design, using qualitative data. This research design in relation to this study is not the most suitable. Two well-rounded cases to compare which are alike in many ways and have been exposed to state-building through counterinsurgency are Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the theoretical framework shows that the norms and values of the population are essential when gaining legitimacy. Deciphering value change might prove to be demanding when using regime documents and data regarding social conflicts. Another solution would be to use other types of data, e.g. interviews or surveys. In this case the availability of comparable data is the problem. WVS would be optimal since the database records population values and has included Iraq since its fourth wave (2000-2004). However, WVS has no data on Afghanistan. Using data from different sources complicates the comparative aspect. Gathering data independently by conducting surveys or interviews in Afghanistan and Iraq is outside of the reasonable expectations of this thesis.

Since finding data from two state level comparable cases proved to be difficult, a more concentrated deep dive into one case is of more relevance to this thesis. A case study focuses on a societal phenomenon and the relevant societal context (Esaiasson et al., 2012, 108-110; Bryman, 2018, 96-102; Ekengren & Hinnfors, 2012, 80-84). The case being studied is demarcated in three aspects: socially, regionally and chronologically. This deep focus enables conclusions regarding cause and effect within the demarcated area of the case-study. Also, the usage of qualitative, quantitative, or both types of data does not matter. The advantage of case studies is the opportunity to deeply study complex societal phenomena, which creates a high internal validity since the

opportunities to determine the effects of specific variables are greater than in a study with a wider focus. However, this has the effect of a lower external validity, since it is harder to generalize the results of a case study to other cases.

Böhnke et al. (2017) conducted a repeated cross-sectional study in a part of the northeast Afghanistan, using both surveys and semi-structured interviews. The usage of repeated survey data gathered in a specific region creates some interesting research possibilities. Cross-sectional surveys are gathered at a certain point of time and within a short timeframe (Esaiasson et al., 2012, 227-250; Bryman, 2018, 87-92; Ekengren & Hinnfors, 2012, 80-84). Data is gathered regarding a large number of variables, enabling statistical analysis. A repeated cross-sectional study uses the same data-gathering methods during several measurement points but utilizing different respondents every wave. This gives a longitudinal aspect to the study. Going back to Böhnke et al. (2017), they looked at state formation through legitimacy in two different regions in Northeastern Afghanistan. The argument can be made that this makes the study a comparative study involving several regions, alternatively a case study looking at a specific larger region. The strong points of cross-sectional data are that it is easy to replicate the results and it is more believable to generalize the results to the entire population, giving the design a strong external validity. However, strong external validity requires both randomization and representativity of the sample. Disadvantages include low internal validity, since it is hard to determine causality when the data is gathered at certain point in time. The data-gathering disadvantage is reduced when conducting a repeated cross-sectional study. One final point of concern is the data gathering process. It is hard to determine the honesty of the respondents and to make certain there are no misunderstandings when answering the questions.

The cross-sectional data collected and used by Böhnke et al. (2017) is also suitable to answer the research question of this thesis. A more detailed reasoning regarding the characteristics of the data is conducted in the next section. The data enables a versatile research design. The data gathered is of a cross-sectional design, but with longitudinal elements since the survey is repeated. However, the study is not entirely longitudinal since a new sample is used with each new wave when conducting a repeated cross-sectional study. A case study element is also present since the societal context of Afghanistan is relevant to the research question and further enables comparative aspects between the two different regions where the data was gathered. The versatility

of the design strengthens already strong points of the different research designs: looking at the underlying reasons of one case, comparing to other cases, and conducting statistical analysis. The weak points of the designs when used separately are decreased: generalization to other cases and low internal validity since data is gathered at one point in time and including too few variables. However, it is important to keep in mind that more complex designs require more attention to detail when drawing conclusions, since the risk for human error when handling the data is ever greater (Bryman, 2018, 788).

Böhnke et al. (2017) use the gathered data to study the state formation process in Afghanistan. They motivate their choice of case by referring to the historical context of Afghanistan. The absence of a social contract can be seen in the historical lack of ties between the state and the society in Afghanistan. Foreign actors have provided external support to leading Afghan political institutions: European imperialist powers during the Age of Imperialism, the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War, and Western donors and the ISAF during the 21st century. While Böhnke et al. (2017) look at similar issues such as state formation. This thesis aims to use another categorization to study legitimacy change and include the lens of counterinsurgency theory. This different lens hopefully provides further insights into what Böhnke et al. (2017) already have presented in their study. Figure 4 below describes the planned analysis of this thesis.




Figure 4. Analysis of legitimacy change over time after the implementation of COIN doctrine

The implementation of counterinsurgency theory works as the independent variable (X) of this thesis. The change in population views regarding legitimacy is then analyzed over time to determine the effects of counterinsurgency doctrine on state-building. The takeover of responsibility in Afghanistan of the ISAF in 2003 can be seen as the implementation of counterinsurgency theory. Then follows a resurgence in Taliban fighting, all the while COIN tactics using Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT:s) are implemented and evolved. This continues up until the dismantlement of the ISAF and the partial withdrawal of the international COIN force in 2014, giving over state-building responsibilities to the Afghan government. Three different measuring points of legitimacy are used to study changes in population views towards legitimacy. Specifically, the survey waves of Böhnke et al. (2017) conducted in 2007 (t^1), 2011 (t^2) and 2015 (t^3). The fact that 2003 (t^0) is before the first measuring point is not necessarily an issue, since value change happens over a long period of time.

With the presentation and motivation of the research design of the thesis concluded, is focus shifted towards the data used in the next chapter.

3.2 Data

The cross-sectional data of Böhnke et al. (2017) enables a statistical analysis to answer the research question. Esaiasson et al. (2012, 346-391) describe this research design in detail. Statistical methodology enables the analysis of large amounts of data, e.g. through descriptive or regression analysis, utilizing statistical measurements such as means and levels of correlation. The statistical analysis of the data in this thesis is twofold. First, the levels of internal reliability of the operationalizations are measured using Cronbach's alpha to ensure that they measure the same type of legitimacy. Afterwards, a descriptive analysis to give an insight into the levels and trends of different sources of legitimacy.

Next follows some words about the data used in the analysis. Some essentials regarding the sample of the five repeated cross-sectional studies are summarized below in table 4.

Table 4. Descriptive overview of the sample collected by Böhnke et al. (2017)

d1 age in years		d1 ethnic belonging			d1 gender			d2 can you write?		
	N		N	%		N	%		N	%
Minimum	16	Pashtoon	2,125	17.1	Female	8	0.0	Literate	2,599	20.9
Maximum	110	Tajek	4,629	37.2	Male	12,405	99.8	Illiterate	9,769	78.6
Mean	46.1	Hazara	662	5.3	Missing	15	0.1	Missing	60	0.5
		Uzbek	3,941	31.7						
		Turkman	317	2.6						
		Arab	432	3.5						
		Aimaq	221	1.8						
		Other	27	0.2						
		Baluch	50	0.4						
		Missing	24	0.2						
Valid N	12,414	Valid N	12,404	99.8	Valid N	12,413	99.8	Valid N	12,368	99.5
Total	12,428	Total	12,428	100	Total	12,428	99.9	Total	12,428	100

Note: total percentages might not show 100 % due to rounding (one decimal)

Table 4 above gives an overview of the data collected and used by Böhnke et al. (2017). The data was gathered through a repeated cross-sectional survey, during the springs of 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015. An in-depth report on the methodological approach of the cross-sectional data can be found in Böhnke et al. (2013). The surveys were conducted through interviews with the heads of households in a total of 80 different villages in the two provinces of Kunduz and Takhar in northeast Afghanistan. The survey consisted out of 66 questions on the subjects of the performance of different actors (government, international, military, traditional) and the experienced threat levels towards the community. The response rate was high throughout the cross-sectional study, always exceeding 90 %. The focus of the surveys was on household and community level, not on individuals, because of the communal culture of Afghanistan. To attain higher external validity were 50 % of the communities chosen through randomization and the remaining 50 % through five different diversity criteria: size, remoteness, estimated natural resource base, estimated vulnerability to natural disasters, and ethnic and religious composition (Bryman, 2018, chapter 8; Böhnke et al., 2013 & 2017). The households within the communities were in turn chosen through randomization. The confidence intervals of individual waves and between questions varies. At a 95 % confidence interval, Böhnke et al. (2017) recommends using ± 2.0 % for questions using simple percentages and ± 2.6 % when using questions with percentages from multiple category answers. The implementation of the data gathering was carried out by the Organization for Sustainable Development and Research, formerly Coordination of Afghan Relief, along with one of the authors of the article.

Using survey data, the experiences of the respondents are in focus. Even though subjective views do not necessarily correlate with the de facto situation, this potential deviation is not a problem in the case of this thesis. The reason being, when dealing with legitimacy, the views and experiences of the population are exactly what is interesting. However, it is still important to reflect on the realistic possibilities of what the survey data can accomplish. Since the data is not original, but collected and used within another survey, are questions regarding reliability and results validity hard to affect. Reliability deals with problems stemming from chance and negligence when collecting the data, while results validity deals with systematic errors, e.g. unclear questions leading to misunderstandings or some form of wrongful handling of the data

(Esaiasson, 2012, 63; Bryman, 2018, 253-255). There is no realistic way to review the data gathering process.

Some limitations to be considered regarding generalizations when dealing with survey data is presented by Bryman (2018, 252-253). Generalizations can only be made in relation to the population from which the sample is collected. What type of geographical area this infer and for how long of a time needs to be discussed and considered. Data from a sample located in in Afghanistan is in several way expedient to answer the research question. Afghanistan has during the 21th century experienced all the stages relating to counterinsurgency: conventional warfare in the wake of the 9/11-attacks, which was followed by the evolvment into an insurgency battling the multinational counterinsurgency force ISAF which assisted the state-building efforts of the Afghan national government. The data collected by Böhnke et al. (2017), while concentrated to a specific timeframe and region of Afghanistan, is still a prudent solution to trying to see the relationship of the population towards legitimacy in the context of a counterinsurgency operation. The population where Böhnke et al. (2017) collected the data consist of a heterogeneous population – regarding ethnicity – and the counterinsurgent force of the region was under German command with several other nationalities also being represented.

The diverse circumstances create interesting but also demanding circumstances from a research point of view. It is also important to keep in mind is the underlying will and representativity of having the head of the household answering the survey. The sample consists out of almost exclusively male heads of households, with varying levels of literacy and deriving from multiple ethnic groupings are circumstances which need to be considered. As mentioned above are reservations needed when conducting generalizations to a larger population. One way to counter this threat is to use other data sources to relate the regional data indicators to the national level, e.g. by using the Quality of Government Institute's *QoG Standard Dataset*, which includes several other databases which among other issues looks at security levels, transparency, repression and factionalism. However, the strength of using one single measuring tool at several points in time should also not be understated. Even if the repeated survey would suffer from some unexpected fault in reliability, continuous over- and underestimations tend to even out each other and the long-term trend is still valid (Esaiasson et al, 2012, 64).

This concludes the deliberation on the data to be used in the analysis. Next follows a discussion regarding the operationalization of the data material, which enables a systematic analysis.

3.3 Operationalization

According to Esaiasson et al. (2012, 55-56), the operationalizations of the relevant theoretical definitions are important, since they have an elemental impact on the validity of the results. To conduct a systematic analysis with the end goal of answering a research question, two types of concept definitions are needed: a theoretical and an operational. The Theoretical definitions have already been motivated and established in the theoretical framework regarding the different sources of legitimacy. However, a theoretical definition does not necessarily enable systematic measurements of the phenomenon in question. This creates the need for operational definitions, which are engineered to enable the measurement of the phenomenon in question. How exactly the operationalization is conducted might have a severe impact on the results of the research, this in turn creates the need for grounded motivations as to why one operationalization is more suitable than another. It is a twofold matter of validity. Is there an accordance between the theoretical definition and the operational definition? Does the operationalization actually measure what the research aims to measure? These two questions need to be answered thoroughly before conducting the analysis. Furthermore, is there a need to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of the research, regarding the data and operationalizations.

As mentioned above, the theoretical definitions of the different sources of legitimacy – summarized in chapter 2.5 – will be assigned operationalizations. In this thesis, will this process be implemented by assigning a number of survey questions from the data collected by Böhnke et al. (2017) to each of the different sources of legitimacy. The categorization can be seen below in table 5.

Table 5. Operationalization of the research variables

Source	Theoretical definition	Nr	Operationalization through survey questions in Böhnke et al. (2017)	Cronbach's α
Instrumental (rational-legal/ideological): rational forms of legitimacy based on human needs and services				
Input	The level of which the views of the population is represented in decision-making, ability to conduct active citizenship	q20	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help?	0.436
		q32	In your opinion, why are some development projects chosen and others not? Is it because...	
		q31	Is the shura involved in the identification of development projects?	
Output	The quality and quantity of the policies and services which are being produced by the political system	q10	Has security increased or decreased over the past two years in your village?	0.677
		q11	Did the following actors contribute to these changes?	
		q44_b	In the last two years the government has helped to:	
Throughput	The process between input and output, which also states the level of corruption within the political system	q21	Parties to a conflict may use various means to influence the outcome of the conflict in their favor. How often do you think that the following means are applied?	0.547
		q27_2	If only some households of your community attend the shura, these are usually households that...	
		q18	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources, which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict?	
External	The relationship of international actors in relation to the political system (COIN, finance, recognition)	q12_a	Please indicate, if you are afraid of the following groups: foreign forces	0.701
		q44_a	In the last two years international development organizations have helped to:	
		q44_e	In the last two years international forces have helped to:	

Note: table 5 continues on the next page

Table 5. Operationalization of the research variables (cont.)

Source	Theoretical definition	Nr	Operationalization through survey questions in Böhnke et al. (2017)	Cronbach's α
Substantive: the norms and vales of the population, which in turn determine expectations towards instrumental sources				
Traditional	The beliefs in norms and tradition of the population	q39	If you or members of your family were asked to participate in a hasher or similar obligations, and nobody participated in it though everybody knew that someone from your family could have done it, what would be possible consequences of that for your family?	0.411
		q55	I will read six statements to you. Please indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree to each of them. Effect on culture by schooling of boys, schooling of girls, wage-labor, state-schooling, foreign aid, foreign troops	
Charismatic	The beliefs of the population in the abilities of an individual, also involving levels of charisma	q20	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help?	0.663
		q24	Why do you think this person is powerful?	
		q44_c	In the last two years an influential person has helped to:	

The categorization seen above in table 5 is intended to be used in the analysis to answer the research question. The coding can be studied in detail in Appendix A. The Cronbach's alpha test was done on the operationalizations to determine the reliability of the study. Cronbach's alpha measures the internal reliability – or internal consistency – of the answers of different respondents on several questions (Bryman, 2018, 208-209). The results of the test can vary between 0 (no internal reliability) and 1 (perfect internal reliability). A Cronbach's alpha level of around 0.7 is considered to be acceptable. However, the scaling of the items and the number of items analyzed can have an inflating or deflating effect on the final value, meaning that the test results should not be seen as definite on their own. The Cronbach's alpha test scores of the operationalizations varied between 0.411 and 0.701. These relatively low test scores create the need for further motivations regarding concept validity to establish the choice of operationalization to every source of legitimacy.

Input legitimacy derives from decisions being made in accordance to the views of the population, and in the context of a democratic system this also includes transparency and ability to conduct active citizenship. The question q32 *is the shura involved in the identification of development projects?* investigates suitably the characteristics of input legitimacy. Since the shura is a grass-roots level semi-formalized institution and considerably close to the people affected by decisions, the results of this question can be used to determine if the views of the population are met when choosing development projects. Some words about the nature of different institutions in Afghanistan, also mentioned by Böhnke et al. (2017). There is no simple line between governmental and societal institutions in Afghanistan as in e.g. modern rational-legal states. Societal institutions are to differing levels recognized by the central government. The categorization used when gathering the data and in this study goes as follows. Societal institutions include the shura (traditional village and district councils) and a number of different local influential people with the titles of jirga, elders, arbob/malik/khan/, mullah and commander. Governmental institutions include the wolliswol (the district administration or district governor), qazi (a local judge), huquq (the justice department), and the Community Development Council which later became the District Development Assembly (a state run and democratically elected institution of community representatives). Continuing with the survey questions, the question q20 *Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not*

correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? indicate how exactly active citizenship is conducted. Who do you consider to be the “right” – i.e. legitimate – authority to solve a conflict? The question q31 *Is the shura involved in the identification of development projects?* indicate if grassroots-level institutions are involved in the decision-making process. How close to the people affected are the decisions done? Even when dealing with a social institution with a semi-formalized relationship to the central government.

Output legitimacy derives from the quality and quantity of services provided by the institution towards the population. The question q10 *has security increased or decreased over the past two years in your village?* describes output legitimacy in a suitable manner. Furthermore, is providing a sense of stability and safety the most basic of needs both regarding the hierarchy of human needs and in counterinsurgency doctrine. Question q11 *did the following actors contribute to these changes?* adds to the previous question in that the relationships between different actors are revealed, which has been mentioned to be essential in conflict-torn spaces. Finally, the question q44_b *in the last two years the government has helped to:* takes a more in-depth look at the achievements in legitimacy of the Afghan government.

Throughput legitimacy derives from the process between input and output, meaning effectiveness and levels of transparency. The question q21 *parties to a conflict may use various means to influence the outcome of the conflict in their favor. How often do you think that the following means are applied?* includes the characteristics of throughput legitimacy. How different actors lobby on different levels can indicate levels of corruption and views regarding what is considered corrupt behavior or simply patronage. The next question q27_2 *if only some households of your community attend the shura, these are usually households that...* looks at views and occurrences of corruption on grassroots levels. The shura is a traditional societal institution which have been semi-formalized by the Afghan government, how decision-making is done in the shura and changes over time can indicate changes in what is perceived legitimate. Finally, the question q18 *if you were involved in a conflict about natural resources, which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict?* is suitable for this source, since the choice of institution says something about the view of the population regarding the different institutions and perceived levels of efficiency.

External legitimacy derives from the relationship between the political institution and international actors. In the case of Afghanistan includes this the multi-national counterinsurgency force ISAF in relation to the Afghan central government, but also foreign investors in relation to the Taliban. The question q12_ *a please indicate, if you are afraid of the following groups: foreign forces* indicate the views of the population towards counterinsurgents. If the counterinsurgents are considered more of a threat than a stabilizing actor, then there is a severe discrepancy regarding legitimacy in the context of counterinsurgency doctrine. The question q44_ *a in the last two years, international development organizations have helped to* and the question q44_ *e in the last two years international forces have helped to* both indicate the actual output of counterinsurgents and international NGO:s. This data can then in turn be analyzed in relationship to the level towards foreign forces, indicated by q12.

Traditional legitimacy derives from the beliefs in norms and traditions of the population. This source should prove essential in the context of Afghanistan, considering the strong survival and traditional values of the Islamic region, according to the cultural map of the WVS (2010). The question q39 *If you or members of your family were asked to participate in a hasher or similar obligations, and nobody participated in it tough everybody knew that someone from your family could have done it, what would be possible consequences of that for your family?* continues to build on the previous question regarding the legitimacy and the influence of the shura and how strong traditional values are in the community. The same can be said about the final question q55 *I will read six statements to you. Please indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree to each of them* with sub-questions regarding the effect on culture by schooling of boys, schooling of girls, wage-labor, state-schooling, foreign aid and foreign troops.

Charismatic legitimacy derives from the beliefs of the population in individual characters, affected by characteristics and charisma. The level the population values the views and abilities of individuals can be discerned through questions regarding the influence of individual characters. The question q23 *whom do you consider the most powerful person in your village?* and question q24 *why do you think this person is powerful* says something of what level of legitimacy individuals possesses, and on which grounds. For example, societal characters on traditional grounds and officials through either legitimate power or patronage. The underlying reasons as to the level

of legitimacy influential persons possess can be discerned by the question q44_c *in the last two years an influential person has helped to*.

The survey material was recoded to enable analysis using the previously mentioned operationalizations, and also to avoid issues with a between waves varying composition of answer alternatives. The following four categories were recoded: governmental, societal, external and patronage. The governmental category includes different governmental institutions such as provincial administration, police, the courts and the district development council. The category societal includes grassroots level institutions like the shura or local militias. The category patronage includes individuals who in themselves hold a significant level of influence, e.g. the mullah, village elders, or a security commander. The category external includes both international NGO:s and international counterinsurgency forces. The categories follow the same logic as the different sources of legitimacy and institutional categorization of societal and political institutions. This enables a deeper analysis of change over time.

However, no matter how expedient the survey questions would be in relation to the aims of this thesis, the fact remains that only using data of one type and from one source creates a number of difficulties. As mentioned above, the backsides of cross-sectional surveys are the fact that they are conducted at specific points in time, involving different people when doing repeated studies, and suffering from losses within the sample. This leads to a decrease in internal validity, no matter the quality of the operationalizations. One way to counter this would be to involve other types of data, as Böhnke et al. (2017) did by also conducting semi-structured interviews. Unfortunately this data has not been attainable. Another way to weigh up the downsides of cross-sectional data which was considered is to use national level data from other sources. However, this instead requires other considerations regarding generalizations and is not used in the analysis.

It seems as if from the current standpoint, that the data and operationalizations available will be sufficient to answer the research question. With motivations regarding operationalizations and validity presented, follows next a summary of the entire methodology.

3.4 Summary of the methodology

This chapter has motivated the methodological approach of this study in relation to the specified research question, looking at the views of the population on legitimacy in a conflict-torn societal context. Different research designs have different strengths and weaknesses, which are needed to take into account when deciding on how to answer a research question. Alternative designs such as experimental and qualitative comparative design have been presented. Experimental design has the strong suit of being the closest possible option to turning back time and observing relationships regarding cause and effect, providing a high internal validity. However, experimental design has the disadvantage of suffering from low external validity since recreating the circumstances to accurately represent the “real-life” situation is close to impossible. Qualitative comparative design has the strength of describing causality in a profound manner regarding a few cases. This however has the disadvantage when trying to generalize the results in a wider context, since the same causality might not be relevant outside of the few cases studied using comparative design. The research design finally chosen for this thesis is a case study design using repeated cross-sectional data, which enables statistical analysis. Case study design is chosen partially since finding suitable data to conduct a comparative study proved challenging. The deep focus of the case study enables research into complex phenomena, while the repeated cross-sectional data enables generalizations to the entire relevant population. However, reservations are needed regarding generalizations pertaining from the low external validity of the design, while questions regarding reliability is also needed to be considered concerning the data-gathering process.

The data used in the analysis is the repeated cross-sectional data of Böhnke et al. (2017). The data (N = 12,428) was collected through interviews with heads of families in the provinces of Kunduz and Takhar in northeast Afghanistan. The communities and households involved were chosen through both representativity and randomization. The respondents are almost entirely male with a mean age of 46 years. A significant number of ethnic groups are represented, and the sample has a literacy level of 21 %. The diverse societal context in combination with the international counterinsurgent force in the region presents excellent grounds to analyze the data within the demarcations of the study.

To enable an analysis of the data, are operationalizations conducted on the survey questions in relation to the theoretical definitions of the sources of legitimacy. Three suitable survey questions are assigned per legitimacy source. The internal reliability test Cronbach's alpha gave results between 0.411 and 0.701, which is needed to be considered in the analysis. Questions regarding the representation of the views of the population in the decision-making process are assigned to the category input legitimacy. Output legitimacy is assigned questions regarding the quality and quantity of the decisions made by the political institution. Throughput legitimacy is assigned questions regarding the transparency and process between input and output. External legitimacy is assigned questions regarding the influence of international actors towards domestic actors. Traditional legitimacy is assigned questions regarding the influence of tradition and norms on decision-making. Charismatic legitimacy is assigned questions regarding the influence of individual characters in a societal context.

This summary concludes the methodological chapter, providing a motivation regarding the choices of research design, data and operationalizations. Next follows the analysis of the data using the described methodology.

4 Results

This chapter presents the findings of the empirical analyses. Two different tests are done on data from three waves, described in chapter 3.1, using SPSS to produce the results later analyzed. The One-Way ANOVA test is conducted to compare variances, more specifically by looking at the mean result using scales. The chi-square test is conducted to describe the distribution of shares of the data. The tests are categorized according to the earlier described sources of legitimacy. The results are then described systematically in each sub-chapter, ending with a summary describing the overall levels and trends of the results, finally enabling a summary discussion about the results in relation to the research question and the theoretical framework.

4.1 Input

Input legitimacy focuses on the ability of the people to be involved in the decision-making affecting their everyday life. Table 6 below looks at which types of institutions people would go to if they feel as if a decision made by the district government is not correct.

Table 6. Institutional input

	2007 (N=2 034)		2011 (N=3 041)		2015 (N=2 235)	
	\bar{x}	std.dev.	\bar{x}	std.dev.	\bar{x}	std.dev.
Governmental ^a	0.17	0.13	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.13
Societal ^b	0.10	0.17	0.04	0.10	0.01	0.06
Patronage ^c	0.15	0.12	0.20	0.13	0.21	0.16
Taliban ^d	NA	NA	0.03	0.16	0.08	0.27
Nobody ^e	0.01	0.11	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.21

Note: ^a $F=29.277$ (df=2) $p<.001$; ^b $F=361.55$ (df=2) $p<.001$; ^c $F=113.52$ (df=2) $p<.001$; ^d $F=100.19$ (df=2) $p<.001$; ^e $F=75.652$ (df=2) $p<.001$. Variable scale goes from 0-1, where a higher amount implies a higher input legitimacy. See q20 in Appendix A for the phrasing of the question.

Table 6 shows that the input legitimacy of governmental institutions are consistent over all three waves, while societal institutions on the other hand have lost a significant amount of input legitimacy. Patronage seems to have replaced some of the legitimacy of societal institutions over the course of the surveys. The overall trend of small changes show that population values do not change quickly, since which institution

people turn when wronged do not change significantly over time. Table 7 below looks closer at the shura which is a societal grassroots institution.

Table 7. The involvement of grassroots societal institutions in decision-making

	2007		2011		2015	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Is the shura involved in the identification of development projects? ^a	97.1	1,401	99.9	3,001	97.8	2,171
In your opinion, why are some development projects chosen and others not? Is it because:						
the majority of the households voted for it? ^b	94.9	1,403	92.8	2,794	95.3	2,131
some powerful households wanted it? ^c	7.3	108	4.9	149	4.7	105
the NGO/IO wanted it? ^d	14.0	207	58.3	1,756	8.9	199
Total		3,119		7,700		4,606

Note: ^a $\chi^2=67.677$ (df=2) $p<.001$; ^b $\chi^2=17.458$ (df=2) $p<.001$; ^c $\chi^2=13.928$ (df=2) $p=.001$; ^d $\chi^2=1,721.510$ (df=1) $p<.001$. Percentages shows number of respondents who agreed with the different questions. See q31 and q32 in Appendix A for the phrasing of the question.

Table 7 paints a different picture than table 6 regarding societal institutions. While table 6 shows a decreased importance in societal institutions, table 7 shows a consistent strong involvement of the shura in development projects. This discrepancy most likely derives from differences in what is expected from different institutions, e.g. conflicts of interest are usually not associated with societal institutions. This in turn is portrayed by the lower Cronbach's alpha level of the input operationalization. The results of table 7 implies strong input legitimacy since the grassroots level institution is involved in development projects, which have a direct impact on the lives of the affected population. While the fact that the shura is involved in development projects remains constant, the reason as to which projects are chosen vary between the waves. The democratic choice is the most common reason in all three waves as to why a development project is chosen. This implies a strong grassroots level input legitimacy, especially since the influence of strong households in the decision-making is overall low and has even decreased over time. The most radical change is that of the involvement of international actors. They appear to have a stronger impact on which project is chosen or not than individual powerful households. However, in 2011 a significant increase appears in the influence of international actors. The reason for this might derive from varying circumstances of respondents between waves, or a change in the manner of how development projects are conducted.

The results provide an image of satisfying input legitimacy from a COIN or state-building perspective. While the institutional input of governmental institutions have remained constant and patronage appears to have become more important, the involvement of grassroots institutions in local level decision-making has remained strong throughout and have even become more focused on democratic decision-making. The next section focuses on output legitimacy.

4.2 Output

Output legitimacy focuses on the quality and quantity of the policies and services which are being produced by the political system. One example of this is the perceived safety of the population, do they feel safe? This is portrayed below in table 8.

Table 8. Security change over time

	2007		2011		2015	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Increased somewhat or very much	99.3	2,006	12.3	373	35.0	783
Neither nor	0.5	11	67.6	2,051	42.3	946
Decreased somewhat or very much	0.1	3	20.1	608	22.6	506
Total		2,020		3,032		2,235

Note: $\chi^2 = 5,664.268$ (df=8) $p < .001$. See q10 in Appendix A for the phrasing of the question.

Table 8 shows that almost every respondent believes that their security level increased in 2007. The trend of increasing safety smoothed out by 2011. Now the majority felt that the security level had remained constant, while more respondents imagined a security decrease over a security increase. By 2015 the results are more mixed, as most respondents still have not experienced a change in security, while over a third again have experienced a security increase and as many as in 2011 have experienced a security decrease. Another aspect to consider is the possible effect of the sharp increase in 2007, which might have saturated the security level and disabled a further positive trend. These changes create the questions as to which actors have contributed positively or negatively to the security level. This relationship is pictured below in table 9.

Table 9. Actor influence on security change

	2007 (N=1 907)		2011 (=N=2 827)		2015 (N=2 038)	
	\bar{x}	std.dev.	\bar{x}	std.dev	\bar{x}	std.dev.
Governmental ^a	0.39	0.07	0.30	0.09	0.30	0.09
External ^b	0.52	0.14	0.39	0.11	0.42	0.10
Societal ^c	0.20	0.07	0.32	0.04	0.35	0.06
Taliban/Mujahedin ^d	NA	NA	0.24	0.12	0.34	0.18

Note: ^a $F=757.452$ (df=2) $p<.001$; ^b $F=735.343$ (df=2) $p<.001$; ^c $F=4,251.146$ (df=2) $p<.001$; ^d $F=547.79$ (df=1) $p<.001$. Variable scale goes from 0-1, where a higher amount implies a stronger positive influence on security and a low amount implies a negative impact on security. See q11 in Appendix A for the phrasing of the question.

Table 9 shows that in 2007, during the largest increase in security, external actors have the most positive impact on the security level, while governmental actors comes second and societal actors appears to have had a negative impact on security. In 2011 the levels even out between the actors, mirroring the stagnation in overall security increase. The Taliban and Mujahedin are now also included in the survey and receives the lowest grade on security increase of the actors. This changes in 2015, when the government has the lowest grade while societal institutions and the Taliban and Mujahedin received similar scores. Only external actors again receive a higher score, but not as high as in 2007 during the large increase in security. However, other services are also indicative of the level of output legitimacy, portrayed in table 10 below.

Table 10. Government – Services

	2007		2011		2015	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Rather agree or fully agree						
Increase the quality of drinking water ^a	5.5	111	24.2	735	64.3	1,437
Increase the quality of agricultural production ^b	6.1	124	57.4	1,741	56.1	1,249
Increase the quality of roads ^c	12.9	262	29.3	888	74.0	1,653
Create more jobs ^d	0.0	0	18.5	562	24.5	548
Increase the access to electricity ^e	2.8	57	14.6	442	34.6	773
Increase the quality of schooling ^f	33.9	690	82.5	2,503	81.2	1,812
Increase income opportunities ^g	NA	NA	1.4	42	16.9	378
Increase access to health services ^h	NA	NA	66.4	2,015	54.2	1,212
Total		1,244		8,928		9,062

Note: ^a $\chi^2 = 3,251.435$ (df=6) $p<.001$; ^b $\chi^2 = 3,429.312$ (df=6) $p<.001$; ^c $\chi^2 = 3,729.926$ (df=6) $p<.001$; ^d $\chi^2 = 1,519.170$ (df=6) $p<.001$; ^e $\chi^2 = 1,219.423$ (df=6) $p<.001$; ^f $\chi^2 = 2,400.479$ (df=6) $p<.001$; ^g $\chi^2 = 776.445$ (df=3) $p<.001$; ^h $\chi^2 = 116.586$ (df=3) $p<.001$. See q44_b in Appendix A for the phrasing of the question.

Table 10 portrays views of the respondents on the impact of the government on essential services. The overall trend is that the government have had a positive impact on the services mentioned. However, it is important to keep in mind that the absolute level of quality of the services can not be observed by this data, only the changes in perceived quality. The services which are perceived to have increased the least in quality are income opportunities and the creation of jobs, while services relating to schooling, health care and infrastructure have been prioritized. This is interesting considering services that drain government spending are prioritized over services which would long-term stimulate economic growth and produce tax revenue.

The results concerning output legitimacy show that the perceived safety of the population increased especially in the earlier waves. The actors mostly responsible for this positive change were of an external character, while governmental, societal or Taliban actors had a perceived moderate or even negative impact on security. Services provided by the government increased overall in quality, with a focus on schooling, health care and infrastructure over economic growth. The next section focuses on throughput legitimacy.

4.3 Throughput

Throughput legitimacy focuses on the process between input and output, e.g. the efficiency of the bureaucracy and the occurrence of corruption. One indicator of the level of throughput legitimacy is which institution a person turns to in the case of a conflict regarding natural resources, this is portrayed below in table 11.

Table 11. Institution importance regarding conflict resolution

	2007 (N=2 034)		2011 (N=3 041)		2015 (=2 235)	
	\bar{x}	std.dev.	\bar{x}	std.dev.	\bar{x}	std.dev.
Patronage ^a	0.16	0.09	0.18	0.08	0.14	0.08
Societal ^b	0.20	0.15	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.05
Governmental ^c	0.05	0.04	0.11	0.06	0.13	0.06
External	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02
Taliban ^d	NA	NA	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.11

Note: ^a $F=108.837$ (df=2) $p<.001$; ^b $F=3,168.785$ (df=2) $p<.001$; ^c $F=1,356.82$ (df=2) $p<.001$; ^d $F=123.463$ (df=2) $p<.001$. Variable scale goes from 0-1, where a higher amount implies a higher importance regarding conflict resolution. See q18 in Appendix A for the phrasing of the question.

Patronage has been considered an important actor regarding conflict resolution, only in 2007 were patrons not the most important actors when societal actors instead had the highest score. Societal actors went from being the most important actor in 2007 to almost totally unimportant in the two other measuring points. The reason for this might be a validity issue, since the recoded societal variable consists of the local, community and district shura, but the alternative of answering the local shura is only present in the 2007 wave. This is also indicative in the lower Cronbach's alpha level of the throughput operationalization. The government has become more important over time and is by 2015 considered to be as important as patronage. This is positive from a throughput perspective, since patronage is a form of corruption and has a negative impact on throughput legitimacy. External actors and the Taliban have consistently low numbers in all waves. The results of actor importance regarding conflict resolution creates the question how the population views different means of influence. This is portrayed in table 12 below.

Table 12. Means for influence on the outcome of conflicts

	2007 (N=1945)		2011 (N=3 011)		2015 (N=2 222)	
	\bar{X}	std.dev.	\bar{X}	std.dev	\bar{X}	std.dev.
Connections/kin ties ^a	2.86	0.80	3.22	0.67	3.07	0.84
Money ^b	3.38	0.80	3.14	0.85	3.29	0.94
Force ^c	2.21	0.95	2.11	0.85	2.79	1.07

Note: ^a F=126.222 (df=2) p<.001; ^b F=49.941 (df=2) p<.001; ^c F=356.308 (df=2) p<.001. Variable scale goes from 1-4, where a higher amount implies a higher influence on the outcome of conflicts. See q21 in Appendix A for the phrasing of the question.

The results show that, in the long run, wealth is considered to be a more effective means of influence than ethnicity or kinship. This is especially interesting in the societal context of a deeply traditional society. Different means of influence is further investigated below in table 13.

Table 13. Types of households which attend the shura

	2007		2011		2015	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Are land rich and wealthy ^a	26.0	392	11.5	345	6.6	148
Are elected ^b	96.6	1,459	97.3	2,932	98.5	2,202
Are invited/appointed by a powerful person ^c	6.0	90	1.0	30	1.5	33
Belong to a specific ethnic group or groups ^d	14.8	224	25.5	768	1.1	25
Belong to a specific tribe ^e	22.8	344	5.2	158	1.1	24
Belong to a specific clan ^f	15.2	229	0.5	15	0.8	18
Total		2,738		4,248		2,450

Note: ^a F=308.981 (df=2) p<.001; ^b F=14.954 (df=2) p<.001; ^c F=121.366 (df=2) p<.001; ^d F=596.480 (df=2) p<.001; ^e F=640.347 (df=2) p<.010; ^f F=665.122 (df=2) p<.001. Percentages shows number of respondents who agreed with the different statements. See q27_2 in Appendix A for the phrasing of the question.

The results of table 13 mirror the results of table 7 and table 12. Democratic principles such as voting and elections have a constantly high level of importance regarding decision-making in the shura. This is mirrored in the fact that all statements that imply a lower level of throughput legitimacy have experienced a decreasing trend during the surveys. The results of table 12 are also mirrored in the fact that wealth is considered more important than ethnicity. The influence of individuals is consistently low and furthermore experiences a decline between the three survey waves.

The analysis provides some conflicting results regarding throughput legitimacy. On one hand, patronage has been and continues to be an important tool when conducting conflict resolution. On the other hand, who is represented in grassroots institutions is mostly determined by elections. However, the democratic aspect of said elections is unclear. Wealth appears to be the most important aspect in having influence on other actors, with kinship and ethnical belonging being the second most important, and force being ranked the least important aspect. The next section focuses on external legitimacy.

4.4 External

External legitimacy focus on the relationship of international actors in relation to the political system. The relationship of external actors both regarding the host nation and

the population is of interest. The former relationship is investigated closer in table 14 below which portrays the level of fear of the population towards COIN forces.

Table 14. Fear towards foreign forces

2007 (N=2,031)		2011 (N=3,025)		2015 (N=2,112)	
\bar{x}	std.dev.	\bar{x}	std.dev	\bar{x}	std.dev.
1.09	0.40	1.89	0.81	1.73	0.78

Note: $F=820.975$ ($df=2$) $p<.001$. Variable scale goes from 1-3, where a higher amount implies a higher fear towards foreign forces. See q12_a in Appendix A for the phrasing of the question.

The results of table 14 portray a trend of increasing fear among the population towards foreign forces. This trend correlates with the results of table 8 and table 9 which look at the overall change in security level and which actors have what kind of influence regarding security change. 2007 includes a low fear towards COIN forces, a significant increase in the overall security level, and external actors are perceived to have had the most positive impact on this trend. The correlation continues in 2011 which has the highest level of fear of the population towards the COIN forces. Simultaneously the overall security level is perceived to have decreased by 20 % of respondents and the positive impact of external forces on security change has decreased significantly according to table 8. This trend evens out in all three tables by 2015.

While physical safety is one of the most fundamental services to be provided which enable legitimacy, further legitimacy increase requires the affording of also other services. This is portrayed below in table 15 in relation to services provided by international development organizations.

Table 15. International development organizations – Services

Rather agree or fully agree	2007		2011		2015	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Increase the quality of drinking water ^a	61.0	1,240	36.3	1,103	68.5	1,532
Increase the quality of agricultural production ^b	15.9	323	65.2	1,979	43.8	975
Increase the quality of roads ^c	61.0	1,241	31.5	956	72.0	1,609
Create more jobs ^d	2.6	52	7.4	224	24.9	557
Increase the access to electricity ^e	12.2	248	18.7	567	31.7	708
Increase the quality of schooling ^f	40.1	816	52.7	1,599	77.6	1,732
Increase income opportunities ^g	NA	NA	5.2	158	17.7	396
Increase access to health services ^h	NA	NA	53.6	1,627	48.7	1,088
Total		3,920		8,213		8,597

Note: ^a $\chi^2 = 1,215.952$ (df=6) $p < .001$; ^b $\chi^2 = 2,537.793$ (df=6) $p < .001$; ^c $\chi^2 = 1,789.818$ (df=6) $p < .001$; ^d $\chi^2 = 1,318.505$ (df=6) $p < .001$; ^e $\chi^2 = 867.866$ (df=6) $p < .001$; ^f $\chi^2 = 1707.199$ (df=6) $p < .001$; ^g $\chi^2 = 567.846$ (df=3) $p < .001$; ^h $\chi^2 = 110.727$ (df=3) $p < .001$. See q44_a in Appendix A for the phrasing of the question.

Table 15 shows that international development organizations have had a positive impact especially regarding fundamental services such as clean drinking water, schooling and health services. Other basic services such as agricultural production, electricity and infrastructure are also portrayed in a positive light. The services with the least positive trends are the creation of jobs and income opportunities. Short-term solutions are prioritized by NGO:s, while services which create self-dependency does not have the same positive output. The continuous trend of a positive increase in services from 2007 to 2015 with a downturn in 2011 can once more be observed.

Data regarding services provided by international forces was also analyzed. However, the lack of data from all three waves together with a low N lead to a low level of significance. The existing data from 2011 and 2015 indicate an almost inexistent view that international COIN forces have had a positive impact on basic services. The most positive results were in 2011, when 6 % (N=182) of respondents stated that international forces had had a positive impact on schooling and 3.3 % (N=101) on health services. All other data shows a positive view on services which never exceeds 1 % of respondents.

The results indicate that even if international COIN forces have had a positive impact on the overall security level, they have not had a positive impact on other services which increase living standards. However, NGO:s have instead had a positive impact

on the most basic of services like health care and clean water, while the impact of NGO:s on income opportunities have been moderate at the most. An overall trend of a positive impact by external actors can be seen, however with a recession in 2011. The next section focuses on traditional legitimacy.

4.5 Traditional

Traditional legitimacy focuses on the beliefs in norms and tradition of the population. This also works as an indicator of the level of postmaterialism among the population. One way to measure traditional legitimacy is by scoping how the population would react in the case of a break from tradition. This is portrayed below in table 16 in the context of not participating in a hasher without reason.

Table 16. Consequences from a break from tradition

	2007 (N=2,020)		2011 (N=3,037)		2015 (N=2,235)	
	\bar{x}	std.dev.	\bar{x}	std.dev.	\bar{x}	std.dev.
People would censure us ^a	2.09	0.87	1.81	0.78	1.91	0.87
People would exclude us from the events in my village/community ^b	2.97	0.22	2.99	0.13	2.97	0.20
A local official would refuse to help us ^c	2.14	0.84	2.07	0.82	2.11	0.79
People would spread slanders about us ^d	2.34	0.83	2.77	0.60	2.1	0.89
People would avoid talking to us ^e	2.59	0.72	2.73	0.61	2.54	0.76
No consequences ^f	2.67	0.65	2.84	0.49	2.41	0.80

Note: ^a F=108.837 (df=2) p<.001; ^b F=7.689 (df=2) p<.001; ^c F=4.4 (df=2) p<.05; ^d F=534.34 (df=2) p<.001; ^e F=56.136 (df=2) p<.001; ^f F=295.676 (df=2) p<.001. Variable scale goes from 1-3, where a higher amount implies a lower risk of occurrence. See q39 in Appendix A for the phrasing of the question.

Table 16 indicates no extreme trends in population views on a break from tradition. Someone who would break from tradition would be most likely subjected to censorship, while it would be almost unthinkable to be totally excluded from the community. The almost stagnant trend supports earlier presented evidence that population values do not change rapidly or under a short amount of time. Another measurement of traditional legitimacy can be seen below in table 17, which looks at the views of respondents on statements regarding tradition.

Table 17. Views on tradition

	2007 (N=2,033)		2011 (N=3,033)		2015 (N=2,235)	
	\bar{x}	std.dev.	\bar{x}	std.dev.	\bar{x}	std.dev.
Education of boys in schools has a positive impact on our community. The state should therefore improve the availability of schooling for boys in our community	3.97	0.16	3.96	0.21	3.97	0.21
Education of girls in schools has a positive impact on our community. The state should therefore improve the availability of schooling for girls in our community ^a	3.70	0.51	3.62	0.54	3.71	0.50
Wage labor is becoming more and more important for the financial well-being of households. It would be good for the community if off-farm job opportunities would increase for both men and women ^b	3.42	0.87	2.27	0.87	2.68	0.86
State-schooling is complementary to local customs and Islamic values. I think it has a positive impact on the moral constitution of the community ^c	3.67	0.51	3.63	0.53	3.6	0.53
I feel that foreign development aid is threatening our local way of life and Islamic values in our community, although it may bring material benefits ^d	1.89	0.99	1.97	0.87	3.01	0.84
The presence of foreign troops is threatening local customs and Islamic values in our community ^e	2.40	1.26	3.19	0.78	3.30	0.80

Note: ^a $F=23.302$ ($df=2$) $p<.001$; ^b $F=1,056.946$ ($df=2$) $p<.001$; ^c $F=10.543$ ($df=2$) $p<.001$; ^d $F=1,096.232$ ($df=2$) $p<.001$; ^e $F=550.554$ ($df=2$) $p<.001$. Variable scale goes from 1-4, where a higher amount implies a higher level of agreement with the statement. See q55 in Appendix A for the phrasing of the question.

Table 17 indicates the same results as table 16. Values stay mostly the same over all three measuring points, e.g. the trend of the views of the population on the added value of state schooling. The education of boys is perceived to be more important than the education of girls, indicating the traditional aspect of society. The same goes for the inclusion of women into the workforce. However, one clear deviation can be seen in the effect of external actors on the values of the local community. External actors are over time viewed as more of a threat to local values, even when material benefits are gained. COIN forces are once again portrayed in a worse light than international NGO:s, mirroring the results of chapter 4.4.

The results indicate that traditional legitimacy have remained almost constant over all measuring points. The views of the respondents indicate that they have a traditional

character, e.g. there are likely some consequences from the community towards a family in the event of a break from tradition and the education of boys is perceived to be more important than the education of girls. Traditional legitimacy also mirrors the characteristics of diffuse support since local values are deemed to be more important than help from external actors, especially help from international COIN forces. The next section focuses on charismatic legitimacy.

4.6 Charismatic

Charismatic legitimacy focus on the beliefs of the population in the abilities of an individual, also involving levels of charisma and patronage. Table 6 indicated that patronage is the most important tool to use when feeling wronged by the district government. This raises the question regarding which services influential patrons provide to the population. This is portrayed in table 18 below.

Table 18. Influential person – Services

	2007		2011		2015	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Rather agree or fully agree						
Increase the quality of drinking water ^a	3.6	74	1.7	51	1.9	42
Increase the quality of agricultural production ^b	0.4	8	0.8	24	0.4	8
Increase the quality of roads ^c	1.1	22	2.5	73	1.9	41
Create more jobs ^d	0.0	0	1.8	52	0.3	7
Increase the access to electricity ^e	2.8	56	14.8	435	8.3	179
Increase the quality of schooling ^f	0.5	11	1.0	30	2.4	51
Increase income opportunities ^g	NA	NA	0.3	10	0.0	0
Increase access to health services	NA	NA	0.0	1	0.1	2
Total		171		676		330

Note: ^a $\chi^2 = 1,215.952$ (df=6) $p < .001$; ^b $\chi^2 = 2,537.793$ (df=6) $p < .01$; ^c $\chi^2 = 1,789.818$ (df=6) $p < .01$; ^d $\chi^2 = 1,318.505$ (df=6) $p < .001$; ^e $\chi^2 = 867.866$ (df=6) $p < .001$; ^f $\chi^2 = 1,707.199$ (df=6) $p < .001$; ^g $\chi^2 = 567.846$ (df=3) $p < .05$. See q44_c in Appendix A for the phrasing of the question.

Table 18 indicates that there is a low output in services from influential persons. The table also depicts consistently low levels regarding all listed services and a stagnated trend over time, the exception being the provision of electricity in 2011. The discrepancy between the perceived importance of patronage and the actual output of patrons might be explained by the fact that patrons influence the decision-making of other actors, while the patrons do not directly themselves provide better services.

Another explanation might be that of diffuse support, rooted in a traditional view of the importance of certain individuals whose objective output directly translates into a representative output of services. However, this raises the question from where patrons draw influence. This relationship is portrayed in table 19 below.

Table 19. Reason for influence

	2007 (N=1,995)		2011 (N=3,019)		2015 (N=2,235)	
	\bar{x}	std.dev.	\bar{x}	std.dev.	\bar{x}	std.dev.
Because of his wealth ^a	1.57	0.96	1.84	0.10	2.06	1.13
Because of his guns ^b	1.02	0.16	1.10	0.49	1.42	0.97
Because he has a position in the state administration ^c	1.46	0.81	1.34	0.80	1.26	0.75
Because he has a position with a NGO ^d	1.07	0.32	1.01	0.13	1.03	0.22
Because he is respected as a spiritual leader ^e	1.62	0.99	1.38	0.88	1.32	0.82
Because he is respected as a community leader ^f	3.79	0.58	3.55	0.79	3.27	1.04
Because he was elected by the community ^g	NA	NA	3.63	0.82	3.52	0.95
Because of his education	NA	NA	2.04	1.11	2.10	1.16

Note: ^a F=119.564 (df=2) p<.001; ^b F=253.741 (df=2) p<.001; ^c F=34.341 (df=2) p<.001; ^d F=50.764 (df=2) p<.001; ^e F=66.232 (df=2) p<.001; ^f F=210.331 (df=2) p<.001; ^g F=19.963 (df=1) p<.001. Variable scale goes from 1-4, where a higher amount implies a higher level of agreement as to what is the reason for the influence of an influential person. See q24 in Appendix A for the phrasing of the question.

Table 19 shows that most of the reasons for influence do not change considerably over time, e.g. having an education, being a government or NGO official. However, the importance of hard power – i.e. economy and military – has increased (Nye, 2004, 5). This is mirrored in the fact that the importance of soft power – i.e. diplomacy and culture – has decreased, which can be seen in the increased importance in being elected, while being a spiritual or community leader has decreased in importance. These trends indicate a deviation from political stability under both democratic and traditional principles.

Patronage through the influence of individuals has not only remained strong but even increased over time. The actual output of patrons is however questionable, which might pertain from reasons such as indirect influence on services or diffuse support from the population. The reasons that make a patron influential has changed somewhat over time, favoring hard sources over soft sources. The next section provides a general summary of the results presented.

4.7 Summary of the results

The results of the statistical analyses are here portrayed categorically according to the different sources of legitimacy. This enables a structured comparison between different sources of legitimacy and actors, while also enabling comparisons of absolute numbers and trends over time.

Instrumental legitimacy includes rational forms of legitimacy, i.e. input, output, throughput and external, based on human needs and services. The analysis of input legitimacy shows a constantly strong involvement of grassroots societal institutions in the decision-making process, indicating a positive result. However, the input levels of governmental actors, while proportionally important, have remained stagnant over time while patronage has increased in importance. Output legitimacy increases greatly at the first measuring point, but later on stagnates or is even to some degree perceived to decline. External actors have the most positive impact on security, especially at the first measuring point when the security level increases greatly on a general level. Services provided by the government, while initially at very low absolute levels, have increased greatly over time. Patronage, primarily based around wealth, is an ongoing important phenomenon indicating low throughput legitimacy. However, grassroots institutions are consistently involved in relevant development projects. External actors had an especially positive impact on the security level in 2007, while later on losing this portrayal. In the context of other services provided, COIN forces are seen in an especially negative light, while NGO:s instead have had an especially positive impact on the provision of basic services.

Substantive legitimacy involves the norms and values of the population, which in turn determine the expectations of the population towards the services provided which are included in instrumental legitimacy. Traditional legitimacy remained largely constant throughout the study. Respondents displayed views pertaining from traditional values revolving around the importance of following tradition and roles within the community. The most considerable changes in values over time were an increasing dissent towards external actors, with the motivation of protecting local values. This value change was also portrayed in the context of potential material gain when cooperating with external actors, indicating traditional values and perhaps also diffuse support. Charismatic legitimacy is portrayed through the level of importance of patronage. While the actual output of services provided by patrons is questionable, the

support for patrons have remained strong. The underlying reasons for this might be to this study hidden outputs of patrons. The trend of what makes a patron influential shows that military power and economic wealth has become more important than culture, religion and democratic elections.

This concludes the summary of the findings. The next chapter aims to answer the research question by discussing the results in the context of the theoretical framework.

5 Discussion and conclusions

This chapter provides a summary of the thesis up to this point and presents a discussion which aims to put the results in the context of the theoretical framework. This should enable conclusions regarding the answering of the research question. The thesis is concluded with a discussion regarding flaws and criticism of the thesis along with future research opportunities and some final remarks.

5.1 Summary

The Global War on Terrorism has highlighted the need for legitimacy in state-building when conducting counterinsurgency operations. This lesson has been received on a theoretical level by external actors, e.g. seen through FM 3-24 (2014). However, the implementation of the doctrine has been lacking in efficiency, portrayed through the immense amount of resources used in fighting the insurgencies. The purpose of this thesis was to give an insight into what affects legitimacy in conflict-torn spaces, with a special focus on the relationship between values and services. The specified research question is *what are the views of the population on legitimacy in areas where counterinsurgency operations have been conducted?*

The theoretical framework focused on state-building through legitimacy in a conflict-torn context. Whether a political system is considered to be legitimate or not inherently revolves around the values of the population. The values determine which services are expected to be provided by the political system to the population. However, a hierarchy exist following the logic presented by Maslow (1954). The most fundamental services include physical and economic safety while secondary services include opportunities for self-actualization. This theory is similar to other theories of human values presented by Inglehart (1977) and Welzel (2013), who essentially claim that a higher standard of living leads to more postmaterialist beliefs. However, value change does not occur quickly, but slowly over a longer period of time even though living-standards have already increased. This creates the need for different characterizations of legitimacy, especially in the context of a conflict-torn society which is far from homogenous regarding values. The values and expectations towards the government of a population living in a modern Weberian state are not the same as the values and expectations of the population living in a hybrid state. Different sources of legitimacy

were presented to account for the heterogeneity of the population. Instrumental types of legitimacy described by Weber (1978) and Easton (1965) include types of legitimacy based around the needs of the population. This is measured using the definitions input (active citizenship), output (services provided), throughput (efficiency and corruption) and external (international actors), presented by OECD (2010), Scharpf (2010) and Schmidt (2013). Substantive legitimacy focus on the values of the population, which is described through traditional and charismatic (individuals) legitimacy also presented by Weber (1978) and Easton (1965). These sources of legitimacy determine the overall level of legitimacy of the political system. In the context of a conflict-torn space presents Weigand (2015) a number of variables to also consider. Namely, multiple actors strive for dominance, discrepancies in claimed and perceived legitimacy, the heterogeneity of the population, classifications of support and resistance, and types of support which can be related to the categorizations of Easton (1965) between diffuse and specific support. The heterogeneity of the population is ever more important to consider in the context of conflict-torn spaces and when conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Different research designs are considered, weighing their strengths and weaknesses. A repeated cross-sectional study using case study design was chosen. This methodology has the strength of deeply studying a complex phenomena but requires caution when conducting generalizations. The data is collected by Böhnke et al. (2017) during the years of 2007 to 2015 and the total number of respondents is 12 428. Survey questions are operationalized according to the different sources of legitimacy. Cronbach's alpha was conducted to determine the level of internal reliability of the operationalizations.

Input legitimacy results show a strong involvement of societal institutions in decision-making. Input on a governmental level is on a relative level important, but the trend has remained stagnant over time. Output legitimacy results indicate an initial sharp improvement in security which afterwards stagnates or even declines in 2011. External actors are perceived to be extra important initially but afterwards declines in popularity to similar levels as societal and governmental actors. Services provided by the government are initially at low levels, but portray a positive trend. Throughput legitimacy indicates the importance of both patronage and societal institutions. Patronage is based primarily around economic and military influence, which is surprising in the context of a deeply traditional society. External legitimacy results

indicate sharp changes. COIN forces and NGO:s are initially viewed in a very positive light, increasing the security level and providing basic services. This changes especially in the case of COIN forces over time, since they are viewed in a more negative light and are to some degree viewed to have a negative impact on both the security level and the values of the community. The values of the respondents do not change considerably over the scope of the study. Tradition is portrayed to be an important aspect of everyday life, and a break from tradition result in negative consequences. Patrons are considered to be important even though the results show them to not be a large contributor of services. However, the underlying reason to the influence of patrons might likely stem from influencing other actors leading to gains to clients indirectly. The concept of diffuse support is also necessary to take into account when dealing with substantive legitimacy.

This concludes the summary of the purpose, theoretical framework, methodology and results of this thesis. Next follows a discussion of the results in relation the theories presented earlier in the thesis to answer the research question.

5.2 Discussion

The results of the statistical analysis portray a number of interesting trends regarding legitimacy in the context of state-building through counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. The complexity of both the phenomenon of legitimacy and the complex societal situation of the respondents provide a multifaceted answer to the research question and requires an analysis.

The majority of the types of legitimacy has not undergone considerable changes, while output and external legitimacy are the two exceptions. One explanation to this is grounded in the theoretical framework regarding value change. Pure types of instrumental legitimacy are easier to manipulate in a short amount of time, while substantive types of legitimacy together with input and throughput legitimacy are considerably more stable since they are more closely linked to the values of the population. For example, it is easier for actors to improve the accessibility of healthcare, education and clean water than it is to change the views of the population regarding their views on the legitimacy of democratic elections. In other words, the results support the theory of Inglehart (1977) that even if the living-standards of a

population increases does the values of the population not become more postmaterial in the same amount of time. A deeply traditional society clings to their customs which values societal institutions more than democratic elections and political institutions. Behavior that would be considered corruption in a Weberian state would in the societal context of a traditional society, e.g. Northeastern Afghanistan, be considered legitimate patronage.

Some views on counterinsurgency regarding the results of the study. Kilcullen (2010) proposes a metric of success where the actions of different actors are compared, namely the population, host nation, external actors and insurgents. The actions relevant to compare are the outputs of the different actors in comparison to the perceived effects of the actions among the population. All of these actors and relevant actions are portrayed in the results. The importance of the values of the population are again highlighted. Even if the output of the host nation and external actors are largely positive are the views of the population towards these two actors over time either stagnant or a somewhat more negative than in the beginning of the study. The goals of counterinsurgency operations are mirrored by Fukuyama (2004) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) who both highlight the importance of institutions. The end-goal is to transition from extractive institutions, indicative of traditional political systems with unclear law and order, to inclusive institutions which favor pluralism and growth along the lines of modern Weberian political systems. However, it should be underlined that democracy promotion to create fully inclusive institutions is a long-term goal. The reason having already been stated above; population values change only over a long period of time. Longer involvement is needed to cement long-term economic growth to a Weberian political system which would enable stable grounds for legitimacy.

The challenges of creating inclusive institutions are portrayed through the discrepancy between values and legitimacy in counterinsurgency operations. Wiechnik (2012, 29-30) highlights this issue and comments on COIN doctrine that “which form of legitimacy the people will embrace [...]. It was a question we [the US military] were not previously required to ask because U.S. policy had always dictated the answer”, democracy promotion. However, the US Department of Defense appears to have realized the importance of the values of the population in the context of legitimacy. This is illustrated by the highlighted importance of population values in the updated version of FM 3-24 (2014) in comparison to the earlier version of the doctrine. True

legitimacy requires not only output and external support, but also actions that build substantive legitimacy. The effects of legitimacy building actions are grounded in the values of the population, e.g. whether the implementation of democratic elections is seen as a positive change or foreign meddling that corrupts local customs. This concludes the discussion of the results in the context of the research question and the theoretical framework. The next section provides some reflections on the limitations of the study.

5.3 Limitations and future directions

One discrepancy between the findings of this thesis and the findings of Böhnke et al. (2017, 9) worth discussing is the portrayed impact of different actors on security. This thesis portrays the impacts of all four actors as quite equal, while Böhnke et al. (2017) presents the impact of the government on security in a very positive aspect. This stems from a difference in operationalizations and the type of analysis conducted. Böhnke et al. (2017) separate the impact of different types of law-enforcement from the government, while this thesis has all governmental institutions categorized together. The reasoning for the operationalization used in this thesis is to categorize overhanging actors together, which enables a consistent comparison regarding all sources of legitimacy. This together with the usage of sum variable analysis might hide sub-level differences within the operationalizations but instead enables a more effectively analyzed overview when all sub-level actors are grouped together logically. However, it would be justifiable to reconsider the strengths and weaknesses of the operationalizations when conducting future research.

Furthermore, a deeper understanding of the societal context would be of benefit. The line between societal and political institutions is vague in the Afghan context. A deeper understanding would also shed some light on who of the respondents fell off from answering the surveys, and the underlying reasons. The quantitative data used in this thesis would benefit from supplementing qualitative data, e.g. the associated interviews also conducted by Böhnke et al. (2017). A more multifaceted data material would enable further generalizations and tests of the theories presented. The current data is gathered from only a small area and this should be kept in mind when analyzing

the results and conclusions of the thesis. Future research in this area of focus will hopefully enable future insights, both in depth and in relation to other cases.

5.4 Concluding remarks

The difficulties of legitimacy building are highlighted throughout the thesis. Short-term instrumental actions are not enough when trying to conduct long-term state-building. The values of the population also need to be considered, since they decide on the positive and negative effects of legitimacy building actions. This thesis has given a deeper insight into what are the views of the population on legitimacy in areas where counterinsurgency operations have been conducted. However, more research is needed to further demarcate the effects of different legitimacy building actions in different contexts.

6 Summary in Swedish – Svensk sammanfattning

Avhandlingens svenska titel är *Legitimitet i kris – En studie av legitimitet i upprorsbekämpningsoperationer*. Kriget mot terrorismen har understrukit hur viktigt legitimitet är i statsbyggande under upprorsbekämpningsoperationer. Detta har externa aktörer förstått på ett teoretiskt plan, exempelvis genom den amerikanska doktrinen FM 3–24 (2014). Däremot har implementeringen på det praktiska planet inte uppnått önskad verkan. Detta exemplifieras av det osäkra läget i operationsområdena i kombination med den oerhörda mängd resurser som använts i upprorsbekämpnings syfte. Målet med denna avhandling är att ge en inblick i vad som påverkar legitimitet i konfliktområden. Speciellt fokus läggs på förhållandet mellan värderingar och tjänster. Avhandlingens specificerade frågeställning är: *vad är befolkningens syn på legitimitet i områden där upprorsbekämpningsoperationer har pågått?*

Huruvida ett politiskt system anses vara legitimt eller inte kretsar kring befolkningens värderingar. Värderingarna bestämmer vilka tjänster som befolkningen förväntas få från det politiska systemet. Tjänsterna kan enligt Maslow (1954) i sin tur kategoriseras i olika nivåer. De mest grundläggande tjänsterna kretsar kring fysisk och ekonomisk säkerhet, medan sekundära tjänster omfattar olika former av självförverkligande. Denna teori anknyter till teorierna om människans värderingar som Inglehart (1977) och Welzel (2013) presenterar, nämligen att en högre levnadsstandard på lång sikt leder till mera postmaterialistiska värderingar (se tabell 2). Denna förändring i värderingar sker med en fördröjning, så även om befolkningens levnadsstandard ökar snabbt finns det inga garantier för att deras värderingar utvecklas på motsvarande vis.

Även om en befolkning är långt ifrån homogen återfinns även logiken gällande vad som innebär legitimitet i de politiska systemens sammansättning. Befolkningen i en modern demokratisk rättsstat har inte samma förväntningar på sin regering som befolkningen som lever i en mera traditionell hybridstat. Se tabell 3 för skillnaden i karaktärsdrag mellan dessa två typer av politiska system och figur 1 för normers och värderingars inverkan på vad som anses vara legitimt. Detta skapar ett behov av en kategorisering över vad som skapar legitimitet. Kategoriseringen är extra viktig i kontexten av ett instabilt konflikttrabbat område. Instrumentella former av legitimitet beskrivs av Weber (1978) och Easton (1965). Se tabell 1 för kategoriseringen av Eastons (1965) former av legitimitet. Det gemensamma karaktärsdraget är att instrumentella former av legitimitet fokuserar på befolkningens behov. Följande

underkategorisering av instrumentell legitimitet används baserat på OECD (2010), Scharpf (2010) och Schmidt (2013): input (aktivt medborgarskap), output (tjänster som förmedlas), throughput (effektivitet och korruption) och extern (internationella aktörer). Den andra överordnade kategorin är substantiv legitimitet som fokuserar på befolkningens värderingar och normer. Underkategoriseringen som tillämpas på substantiv legitimitet baseras även på Weber (1978) och Easton (1965) enligt kategorierna traditionell och karismatisk (tilltron till individer) legitimitet. Figur 3 beskriver den överordnade kategoriseringen av olika former av legitimitet. Befolkningens heterogenitet är ännu viktigare att ta i beaktande i den sociala kontexten av konfliktområden och under upprorsbekämpningsoperationer. Weigand (2015) beskriver legitimitet i konfliktområden i närmare detalj, medan Kilcullen (2006 & 2010) fokuserar på upprorsbekämpning (se figur 2).

Olika möjliga forskningsdesigner presenteras och deras respektive styrkor och svagheter vägs mot varandra. Fördelen med experimentell design är att designen har en hög intern validitet, men har samtidigt låg extern validitet. En undersökning med jämförande design har goda möjligheter att förklara kausalitet, men kräver lämpligt jämförbara fall och resultatet kan inte generaliseras till en större kontext. En upprepad tvärsnittundersökning i form av en fallstudie valdes för denna avhandling. Styrkan med designen är att den möjliggör en djupdykning i ett invecklat fenomen. Samtidigt kvarstår begränsningar gällande generaliserbarhet. Enkätmaterialen är insamlade av Böhnke med flera (2017) i nordöstra Afghanistan under åren 2007 till 2015 med totalt 12 428 respondenter. Se figur 4 för en visualisering av undersökningens data. Lämpliga enkätfrågor ur materialet är utvalda och operationaliserade enligt de tidigare behandlade formerna av legitimitet. Testet Cronbachs alfa utfördes för att bestämma operationaliseringarnas interna reliabilitet. Tabell 4 beskriver enkätmaterialen medan tabell 5 beskriver operationaliseringarna och resultatet från reliabilitetstestet. Se bilaga A för en genomgående beskrivning av hela enkätmaterialen och dess operationalisering.

Resultatredovisningen sker kategoriskt enligt de olika formerna av legitimitet. Resultaten för input-legitimitet (tabell 6–7) tyder på en stark inblandning av samhällsliga institutioner i relevant beslutsfattande. Input på myndighetsnivå är viktigt i förhållande till andra aktörer, men trenden är stagnerad över tid. Resultaten för output-legitimitet (tabell 8–10) tyder på en inledningsvis stark förbättring av det

allmänna säkerhetsläget. Denna trend avtar däremot över tid och resultatet tyder även på en försämring av det allmänna säkerhetsläget mot slutet av undersökningsperioden. Externa aktörer ses inledningsvis som viktiga i förbättrandet av säkerhetsläget, men tappar med tiden popularitet och likställs med samhällsliga aktörer och myndighetsaktörer. De tjänster som myndigheterna erbjuder befolkningen är inledningsvis få, men genomgår en över tid stark positiv trend. Resultaten för throughput-legitimitet (tabell 11–13) understryker betydelsen av beskyddarskap och samhällsliga institutioner. Beskyddarskap baseras huvudsakligen på ekonomiskt och militärt inflytande trots den starkt traditionella samhällsliga kontexten. Resultatet för extern legitimitet (tabell 14–15) tyder på tvära förändringar. Opinionsen gällande internationella upprorsbekämpningstrupper varierar mest. Upprorsbekämparna ses först ha en positiv inverkan på säkerhetsläget, men med tiden anses de ha en negativ inverkan både på säkerheten och på lokala värderingar medan synen på icke-statliga organisationer är mera positiv. Resultaten för traditionell legitimitet (tabell 16–17) genomgår inga kraftiga förändringar. Tradition framförs som en viktig del av vardagen, vilket illustreras av att ett brott mot traditionen troligen resulterar i negativa konsekvenser. Resultaten för karismatisk legitimitet (tabell 18–19) tyder på att beskyddarskap är viktigt, samtidigt som beskyddare inte står för en betydande mängd tjänster. Den underliggande orsaken till beskyddares inflytande kan grundas i att påverka andra aktörer och i sin tur ha en indirekt inverkan på tjänster. Resultatet av substantiv legitimitet tyder på att fenomenet diffust stöd som presenteras av Easton (1965) även bör tas i beaktande.

Resultaten ger ett spretigt svar på forskningsfrågan. Majoriteten av formerna av legitimitet har inte genomgått större förändringar, medan exempelvis output och extern legitimitet har genomgått betydligt större kast. Förklaringen till detta grundas i att renodlade former av instrumentell legitimitet är mera benägna att förändras på kort tid, medan substantiva former av legitimitet samt input och throughput är mycket mera stabila eftersom de är kopplade till befolkningens värderingar. Det är exempelvis betydligt lättare för aktörer att tillföra hälsovård, utbildning och rent vatten än att påverka befolkningens värderingar. Resultatet stöder Ingleharts (1977) teori om att även om befolkningens levnadsstandard ökar snabbt blir inte befolkningens värderingar lika snabbt mera postmaterialistiska. Ett djupt traditionellt samhälle håller fast vid sina värderingar där samhällsliga institutioner är viktigare än demokratiska val

och politiska institutioner. Något som skulle anses vara korruption i en västerländsk rättsstat anses fortsättningsvis vara legitimt beskyddarskap i ett traditionellt samhälle, exempelvis i nordöstra Afghanistan. Den diskrepans mellan mål i upprorsbekämpning och befolkningens värderingar som resultatet antyder på är något som även Wiechnik (2012) lyfter fram. Även USA:s försvarsmakt verkar ha tagit till sig denna lärdom eftersom den uppdaterade versionen av FM 3–24 (2014) i förhållande till den tidigare versionen (FM 3–24, 2006) lägger ett större fokus på befolkningens värderingar i kontexten av legitimitet. Fortsatt forskning borde överväga förändringar av operationaliseringarna, eftersom en viss diskrepans uppstod mellan avhandlingens resultat och Böhnke med fleras (2017) resultat. Vidare skulle en ännu djupare förståelse för den lokala samhällliga kontexten vara av fördel. Gränsen mellan samhällliga och politiska institutioner är otydlig i den afghanska kontexten. En komplettering av andra former av data vore även till fördel för att kunna styrka det kvantitativa materialet som användes i denna avhandling. Data från andra liknande fall skulle möjliggöra vidare generaliseringar gällande synen på legitimitet bland befolkningen i områden där upprorsbekämpningsoperationer har pågått.

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Appendix A – Operationalization of the data

The main data used in the analysis is collected via repeated cross-sectional surveys by Böhnke et al. (2017). The data was then operationalized according to the different sources of legitimacy presented in the theoretical framework. A first thinning of the survey questions was conducted to exclude questions not at all relevant to the study. A second thinning was conducted afterwards, eliminating questions which were only asked at certain waves. This in turn led to the compiling of all possible usable questions. An overview of the amount of questions and in relation to which source of legitimacy can be seen in table A1 below, while all the relevant questions as a whole can be viewed in table A2. Finally, were a smaller amount of expedient questions chosen to be used in the analysis.

Table A1. Overview of the relevant survey questions of Böhnke et al. (2017)

Source	Frequency
1 Input	27
2 Output	67
3 Throughput	12
4 External	30
5 Traditional	70
6 Charisma	31
7 Other	23
Total	260

Table A2. All survey questions deemed relevant from Böhnke et al. (2017)

Source	Database	Question, nr	Question, written
2	A	q10	Has security increased or decreased over the past two years in your village?
4	A	q11_a	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? International organizations
4	A	q11_b	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Foreign forces
6	A	q11_c	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Local commanders
2	A	q11_d	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Local government
2	A	q11_e	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Provincial government
2	A	q11_f	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Central government
5	A	q11_g	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Village shura
5	A	q11_h	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Local militias
2	A	q11_i	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Government
2	A	q11_j	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Afghan security forces
5	A	q11_k	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Taleban
5	A	q11_l	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Village people (themselves)
4	A	q11_m	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? International development organizations
2	A	q11_n	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Local Police/ Mudschahedin / Arbakee / Militias
5	A	q11_o	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Community shura
2	A	q11_q	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Local police (ALP)
5	A	q11_r	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Mujahedin
7	A	q11_p	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Other
5	A	q11_s	Did the following actors contribute to these changes? Arbakee / Militias
4	A	q12_a	Please indicate, if you are afraid of the following groups: Foreign forces
2	A	q12_f	Please indicate, if you are afraid of the following groups: External armed men
2	A	q12_g	Please indicate, if you are afraid of the following groups: criminal groups
5	A	q18_a	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions1 to 3!] - Local shura

6	A	q18_b	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions 1 to 3!] - Jirga
6	A	q18_c	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions 1 to 3!] - Khan/Arbab
1	A	q18_d	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions 1 to 3!] - Qazi
5	A	q18_e	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions 1 to 3!] - Elders
6	A	q18_f	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions 1 to 3!] - Mullah
5	A	q18_g	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions 1 to 3!] - District shura
1	A	q18_h	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions 1 to 3!] - Wolliswol
6	A	q18_i	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions 1 to 3!] - Commander
4	A	q18_k	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions 1 to 3!] - NGO
1	A	q18_l	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions 1 to 3!] - Provincial authorities
1	A	q18_m	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions 1 to 3!] - Central authorities
7	A	q18_n	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions 1 to 3!] - Other
7	A	q18_o	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions 1 to 3!] - Don't know
7	A	q18_p	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions 1 to 3!] - Refused to answer
1	A	q18_q	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions 1 to 3!] - Police

5	A	q18_r	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions1 to 3!] - Community shura
1	A	q18_s	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions1 to 3!] - CDC
6	A	q18_t	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions1 to 3!] - Khan/Malik/Arbab
1	A	q18_u	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions1 to 3!] - District Development Assembly
5	A	q18_v	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions1 to 3!] - Taleban/Taleban court
1	A	q18_w	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions1 to 3!] - Huquq
7	A	q18_other	If you were involved in a conflict about natural resources (water, land, pasture, forest), which are the first institutions you would turn to resolve the conflict? [Rank order of institutions1 to 3!] - Other
5	A	q19_a	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Local shura
6	A	q19_b	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Jirga
6	A	q19_c	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Khan
1	A	q19_d	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Qazi
5	A	q19_e	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Elders
6	A	q19_f	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Mullah
5	A	q19_g	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Distric shura
1	A	q19_h	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Wolliswol
6	A	q19_i	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Commander
4	A	q19_k	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - NGO
1	A	q19_l	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Provincial authorities
1	A	q19_m	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Central authorities
7	A	q19_n	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Other
1	A	q19_o	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Police
5	A	q19_p	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Community shura

1	A	q19_q	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Community development council
6	A	q19_r	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Khan/Malik/Arbob
5	A	q19_s	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Taliban/Taliban court
1	A	q19_t	In your opinion, do you think that the following institutions usually resolve conflicts in a just way? - Huquq
5	A	q20_a	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Village shura
5	A	q20_b	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - District shura
1	A	q20_c	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Governor/Provincial administration
6	A	q20_d	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Security commander
5	A	q20_e	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Tribal authority
6	A	q20_f	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Influential patron
6	A	q20_g	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Mullah/Spiritual authority
1	A	q20_h	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Police
1	A	q20_i	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Court
7	A	q20_k	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Nobody
7	A	q20_l	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Other
7	A	q20_m	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Don't know

7	A	q20_n	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Refused to answer
1	A	q20_o	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Provincial council
5	A	q20_p	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Community shura
1	A	q20_q	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - District development assembly
6	A	q20_r	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Commander
5	A	q20_s	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Elders
5	A	q20_t	Suppose that you think that a decision by the district government is not correct. To whom of the following would you most likely turn for help? - Taliban/Taliban court
3	A	q21_a	Parties to a conflict may use various means to influence the outcome of the conflict in their favor. How often do you think that the following means are applied? - Connections/kin ties/quam
3	A	q21_b	Parties to a conflict may use various means to influence the outcome of the conflict in their favor. How often do you think that the following means are applied? - Money
2	A	q21_c	Parties to a conflict may use various means to influence the outcome of the conflict in their favor. How often do you think that the following means are applied? - Force
7	A	q21_d	Parties to a conflict may use various means to influence the outcome of the conflict in their favor. How often do you think that the following means are applied? - Other
6	A	q23	Whom do you consider the most powerful person in your village?
2	A	q24_a	Why do you think this person is powerful? - Because of his wealth
2	A	q24_b	Why do you think this person is powerful? - Because of his guns
1	A	q24_c	Why do you think this person is powerful? - Because he has a position in the state administration
4	A	q24_d	Why do you think this person is powerful? - Because he has a position with a NGO
5	A	q24_e	Why do you think this person is powerful? - Because he is respected as a spiritual leader
5	A	q24_f	Why do you think this person is powerful? - Because he is respected as a community leader
7	A	q24_g	Why do you think this person is powerful? - Other

7	A	q24_h	Why do you think this person is powerful? - Don't know
7	A	q24_i	Why do you think this person is powerful? - Refused to answer
1	A	q24_j	Why do you think this person is powerful? - Because he was elected by the community
1	A	q24_k	Why do you think this person is powerful? - Because of his education
2	A	q25	In your opinion, is this person more important or less important for solving significant problems of your community than the wolliswol?
5	A	q26	Do you or a member of your household regularly participate in the shura?
5	A	q27_1	Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: In our community usually only some households attend the shura to discuss matters of concerns
3	A	q27_2a	If only some households of your community attend the shura, these are usually households that... (multiple choice possible) - ... Are landrich and wealthy
3	A	q27_2b	If only some households of your community attend the shura, these are usually households that... (multiple choice possible) - ... Are elected
3	A	q27_2c	If only some households of your community attend the shura, these are usually households that... (multiple choice possible) - ... are invited/appointed by a powerful person
3	A	q27_2d	If only some households of your community attend the shura, these are usually households that... (multiple choice possible) - ... Belong to a specific ethnic group or groups
3	A	q27_2e	If only some households of your community attend the shura, these are usually households that... (multiple choice possible) - ... Belong to a specific tribe
3	A	q27_2f	If only some households of your community attend the shura, these are usually households that... (multiple choice possible) - ... Belong to a specific clan
3	A	q27_2g	If only some households of your community attend the shura, these are usually households that... (multiple choice possible) - Don't know
3	A	q27_2h	If only some households of your community attend the shura, these are usually households that... (multiple choice possible) - Refused to answer
3	A	q28	I will read two statements to you. Please indicate to which you agree more! 1 = Agrees more to the statement: Usually, the decisions taken by the shura are in the best interest of the entire community. 2 = Agrees more to the statement: Usually, decisions taken by the shura are in the best interest of a few influential households only. 98 = Refused to answer. 99 = Don't know

6	A	q29_a	Shuras may take decisions that are important to your community. Do you think that these decisions are influenced by powerful people not from your community? - An external landlord/Arbab/Khan
6	A	q29_b	Shuras may take decisions that are important to your community. Do you think that these decisions are influenced by powerful people not from your community? - Commander
4	A	q29_c	Shuras may take decisions that are important to your community. Do you think that these decisions are influenced by powerful people not from your community? - A member of an international organization
1	A	q29_d	Shuras may take decisions that are important to your community. Do you think that these decisions are influenced by powerful people not from your community? - A member of district/provincial government
7	A	q29_e	Shuras may take decisions that are important to your community. Do you think that these decisions are influenced by powerful people not from your community? - Others
7	A	q29_f	Shuras may take decisions that are important to your community. Do you think that these decisions are influenced by powerful people not from your community? - Not applicable
5	A	q29_g	Shuras may take decisions that are important to your community. Do you think that these decisions are influenced by powerful people not from your community? - Taleban representative
4	A	q29_h	Shuras may take decisions that are important to your community. Do you think that these decisions are influenced by powerful people not from your community? - A member of an international development community?
6	A	q30_a	If so, do you think that external influence on how decisions are taken is rather good or rather bad for the village? Please specify for the external sources of influence named above. - An external landlord/Arbab/Khan
6	A	q30_b	If so, do you think that external influence on how decisions are taken is rather good or rather bad for the village? Please specify for the external sources of influence named above. - Commander
4	A	q30_c	If so, do you think that external influence on how decisions are taken is rather good or rather bad for the village? Please specify for the external sources of influence named above. - A member of an international organization
1	A	q30_d	If so, do you think that external influence on how decisions are taken is rather good or rather bad for the village? Please specify for the external sources of influence named above. - A member of district/provincial government
7	A	q30_e	If so, do you think that external influence on how decisions are taken is rather good or rather bad for the village? Please specify for the external sources of influence named above. - Others
4	A	q30_f	If so, do you think that external influence on how decisions are taken is rather good or rather bad for the village? Please specify for the external sources of influence named above. - A member of an international development organization
5	A	q30_g	If so, do you think that external influence on how decisions are taken is rather good or rather bad for the village? Please specify for the external sources of influence named above. - Taliban representative

1	A	q31	Is the shura involved in the identification of development projects?
1	A	q32_a	Is the shura involved in the identification of development projects? In your opinion, why are some development projects chosen and others not? Is it because... - ... The majority of the households voted for it?
3	A	q32_b	Is the shura involved in the identification of development projects? In your opinion, why are some development projects chosen and others not? Is it because... - ... Some powerful households wanted it?
4	A	q32_c	Is the shura involved in the identification of development projects? In your opinion, why are some development projects chosen and others not? Is it because... - ... The NGO/IO wanted it?
7	A	q32_d	Is the shura involved in the identification of development projects? In your opinion, why are some development projects chosen and others not? Is it because... - Other
7	A	q32_e	Is the shura involved in the identification of development projects? In your opinion, why are some development projects chosen and others not? Is it because... - Don't know
7	A	q32_f	Is the shura involved in the identification of development projects? In your opinion, why are some development projects chosen and others not? Is it because... - Refused to answer
5	A	q38_a	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you agree with each of them. A) Each member of a community should devote his/her time and money to common projects and events of his/her community.
5	A	q38_b	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you agree with each of them. B) It's up to a person to decide how to spend his time and money
5	A	q38_c	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you agree with each of them. C) If a family is doing something that contradicts common norms of behavior of my community such behavior should be corrected
5	A	q38_d	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you agree with each of them. D) If a family is doing something that contradicts common norms of behavior of my community they shouldn't stay in our community
5	A	q39_a	If you or members of your family were asked to participate in a hasher or similar obligations, and nobody participated in it though everybody knew that someone from your family could have done it, what would be possible consequences of that for your family? (You can choose more than one option) - A) People would censure us
5	A	q39_b	If you or members of your family were asked to participate in a hasher or similar obligations, and nobody participated in it though everybody knew that someone from your family could have done it, what would be possible consequences of that for your family? (You can choose more than one option) - B) People would exclude us from the events in my village/community
5	A	q39_c	If you or members of your family were asked to participate in a hasher or similar obligations, and nobody participated in it though everybody knew that someone from your family could have done it, what would be possible consequences of that for your family? (You can choose more than one option) - C) A local official would refuse to help us

5	A	q39_d	If you or members of your family were asked to participate in a hasher or similar obligations, and nobody participated in it though everybody knew that someone from your family could have done it, what would be possible consequences of that for your family? (You can choose more than one option) - D) People would spread slanders about us
5	A	q39_e	If you or members of your family were asked to participate in a hasher or similar obligations, and nobody participated in it though everybody knew that someone from your family could have done it, what would be possible consequences of that for your family? (You can choose more than one option) - E) People would avoid talking to us
5	A	q39_f	If you or members of your family were asked to participate in a hasher or similar obligations, and nobody participated in it though everybody knew that someone from your family could have done it, what would be possible consequences of that for your family? (You can choose more than one option) - F) No consequences
5	A	q39_g	If you or members of your family were asked to participate in a hasher or similar obligations, and nobody participated in it though everybody knew that someone from your family could have done it, what would be possible consequences of that for your family? (You can choose more than one option) - G) Don't know
5	A	q39_h	If you or members of your family were asked to participate in a hasher or similar obligations, and nobody participated in it though everybody knew that someone from your family could have done it, what would be possible consequences of that for your family? (You can choose more than one option) - H) Refused to answer
4	A	q44_a1	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. A) In the last two years international development organizations have helped to: 1) increase the quality of drinking water.
4	A	q44_a2	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. A) In the last two years international development organizations have helped to: 2) increase the quality of agricultural production
4	A	q44_a3	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. A) In the last two years international development organizations have helped to: 3) to increase the quality of roads
4	A	q44_a4	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. A) In the last two years international development organizations have helped to: 4) create more jobs
4	A	q44_a5	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. A) In the last two years international development organizations have helped to: 5) increase the access to electricity

4	A	q44_a6	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. A) In the last two years international development organizations have helped to: 6) increase the quality of schooling
4	A	q44_a7	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. A) In the last two years international development organizations have helped to: 7) increase income opportunities
4	A	q44_a8	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. A) In the last two years international development organizations have helped to: 8) increase access to health services
2	A	q44_b1	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. B) In the last two years the government has helped to: 1) increase the quality of drinking water.
2	A	q44_b2	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. B) In the last two years the government has helped to: 2) increase the quality of agricultural production
2	A	q44_b3	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. B) In the last two years the government has helped to: 3) increase the quality of roads
2	A	q44_b4	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. B) In the last two years the government has helped to: 4) create more jobs
2	A	q44_b5	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. B) In the last two years the government has helped to: 5) increase the access to electricity
2	A	q44_b6	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. B) In the last two years the government has helped to: 6) increase the quality of schooling
2	A	q44_b7	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. B) In the last two years the government has helped to: 7) increase income opportunities
2	A	q44_b8	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. B) In the last two years the government has helped to: 8) increase access to health services
6	A	q44_c1	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. C) In the last two years an influential person has helped to: 1) increase the quality of drinking water.

6	A	q44_c2	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. C) In the last two years an influential person has helped to: 2) increase the quality of agricultural production
6	A	q44_c3	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. C) In the last two years an influential person has helped to: 3) to increase the quality of roads
6	A	q44_c4	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. C) In the last two years an influential person has helped to: 4) create more jobs
6	A	q44_c5	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. C) In the last two years an influential person has helped to: 5) increase the access to electricity
6	A	q44_c6	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. C) In the last two years an influential person has helped to: 6) increase the quality of schooling
6	A	q44_c7	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. C) In the last two years an influential person has helped to: 7) increase income opportunities
6	A	q44_c8	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. C) In the last two years an influential person has helped to: 8) Increase access to health services
5	A	q44_d1	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. D) In the last two years we have done a lot ourselves in our community: 1) to increase the quality of drinking water
5	A	q44_d2	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. D) In the last two years we have done a lot ourselves in our community: 2) to increase the quality of agricultural production
5	A	q44_d3	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. D) In the last two years we have done a lot ourselves in our community: 3) to increase the quality of roads

5	A	q44_d4	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. D) In the last two years we have done a lot ourselves in our community: 4) to create more jobs
5	A	q44_d5	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. D) In the last two years we have done a lot ourselves in our community: 5) to increase the access to electricity
5	A	q44_d6	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. D) In the last two years we have done a lot ourselves in our community: 6) to increase the quality of schooling
5	A	q44_d7	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. D) In the last two years we have done a lot ourselves in our community: 7) to increase income opportunities
5	A	q44_d8	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. D) In the last two years we have done a lot ourselves in our community: 8) to increase access to health services
4	A	q44_e1	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. E) In the last two years international forces have helped to: 1) increase the quality of drinking water.
4	A	q44_e2	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. E) In the last two years international forces have helped to: 2) increased the quality of agricultural production
4	A	q44_e3	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. E) In the last two years international forces have helped to: 3) to increase the quality of roads
4	A	q44_e4	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. E) In the last two years international forces have helped to: 4) create more jobs
4	A	q44_e5	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. E) In the last two years international forces have helped to: 5) increase the access to electricity

4	A	q44_e6	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. E) In the last two years international forces have helped to: 6) increase the quality of schooling
4	A	q44_e7	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. E) In the last two years international forces have helped to: 7) increase income opportunities
4	A	q44_e8	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. E) In the last two years international forces have helped to: 8) increase access to health services
5	A	q44_f1	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. F) In the last two years the Taleban have helped to: 1) increase the quality of drinking water
5	A	q44_f2	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. F) In the last two years the Taleban have helped to: 2) increase the quality of agricultural production
5	A	q44_f3	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. F) In the last two years the Taleban have helped to: 3) to increase the quality of roads
5	A	q44_f4	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. F) In the last two years the Taleban have helped to: 4) create more jobs
5	A	q44_f5	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. F) In the last two years the Taleban have helped to: 5) increase the access to electricity
5	A	q44_f6	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. F) In the last two years the Taleban have helped to: 6) increase the quality of schooling
5	A	q44_f7	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. F) In the last two years the Taleban have helped to: 7) increase income opportunities
5	A	q44_f8	I will read four statements to you. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree to each of them. All of the following statements relate to the community. F) In the last two years the Taleban have helped to: 8) increase access to health services
2	A	q45_a	Which of the following sources do members of your household regularly consume water from? A) Stagnant open water sources (ponds, puddles)
2	A	q45_b	Which of the following sources do members of your household regularly consume water from? B) Open channel sources

2	A	q45_c	Which of the following sources do members of your household regularly consume water from? C) Rivers
2	A	q45_d	Which of the following sources do members of your household regularly consume water from? D) Uncovered wells
2	A	q45_e	Which of the following sources do members of your household regularly consume water from? E) Covered wells
2	A	q45_f	Which of the following sources do members of your household regularly consume water from? F) Piped water schemes
2	A	q45_g	Which of the following sources do members of your household regularly consume water from? G) Don't know
2	A	q45_h	Which of the following sources do members of your household regularly consume water from? H) Refused to answer
2	A	q46_a	Does your household receive from one of the following sources? A) Does your household receive electricity?
2	A	q46_b	Does your household receive from one of the following sources? B) Individual household generator
2	A	q46_c	Does your household receive from one of the following sources? C) Generator shared between a number of households
2	A	q46_d	Does your household receive from one of the following sources? D) Micro-hydro scheme
2	A	q46_e	Does your household receive from one of the following sources? E) Public electricity (landline)
2	A	q46_f	Does your household receive from one of the following sources? F) Don't know
2	A	q46_g	Does your household receive from one of the following sources? G) Refused to answer
2	A	q46_h	Does your household receive from one of the following sources? H) Solar power system/generator
2	A	q46_i	Does your household receive from one of the following sources? I) Battery
2	A	q48	Over the last year, how would you rate the quality of schooling? Please indicate which of the following statements resembles your opinion best
5	A	q49	We don't have children at school because
2	A	q50	A police force is being built up in Afghanistan. What is, in your opinion, the impact of the police for the security in your community? Please indicate which of the following three statements resembles your impression the best!
2	A	q51_1 + q51_2	Suppose your household needs a (salam) credit of about Afs. 1 500. How difficult it is for you to get this credit?
2	A	q52_a	Whom would you most likely turn to for this credit? Indicate the three persons you would turn to most likely in order! - A) Nobody
5	A	q52_b	Whom would you most likely turn to for this credit? Indicate the three persons you would turn to most likely in order! - B) A relative
5	A	q52_c	Whom would you most likely turn to for this credit? Indicate the three persons you would turn to most likely in order! - C) A neighbor (not a relative)

5	A	q52_d	Whom would you most likely turn to for this credit? Indicate the three persons you would turn to most likely in order! - D) A friend (not a neighbor or relative)
6	A	q52_e	Whom would you most likely turn to for this credit? Indicate the three persons you would turn to most likely in order! - E) A rich member of your community (not a neighbor or relative)
6	A	q52_f + q52_f1	Whom would you most likely turn to for this credit? Indicate the three persons you would turn to most likely in order! - F) (Khan/)Malik/Arbob (not a neighbor or relative)
2	A	q52_h	Whom would you most likely turn to for this credit? Indicate the three persons you would turn to most likely in order! - H) An Afghan state bank
4	A	q52_i	Whom would you most likely turn to for this credit? Indicate the three persons you would turn to most likely in order! - I) A credit scheme from an international organization or NGO
7	A	q52_j	Whom would you most likely turn to for this credit? Indicate the three persons you would turn to most likely in order! - J) Other
7	A	q52_k	Whom would you most likely turn to for this credit? Indicate the three persons you would turn to most likely in order! - K) Don't know
7	A	q52_l	Whom would you most likely turn to for this credit? Indicate the three persons you would turn to most likely in order! - L) Refused to answer
5	A	q52_m	Whom would you most likely turn to for this credit? Indicate the three persons you would turn to most likely in order! - M) Taleban
5	A	q53_1a	In the past year, did your household pay one of the following taxes? - Zakaat
5	A	q53_1b	In the past year, did your household pay one of the following taxes? - Ushr
2	A	q53_1c	In the past year, did your household pay one of the following taxes? - State taxes
5	A	q53_2a	In the past year, did your household pay one of the following taxes? If yes, to whom did you pay? - A) Zakaat
5	A	q53_2c	In the past year, did your household pay one of the following taxes? If yes, to whom did you pay? - B) Ushr
2	A	q53_2e	In the past year, did your household pay one of the following taxes? If yes, to whom did you pay? - B) State taxes
2	A	q54	Do you think the wolliswoli or provicional government takes care of the needs of your village's population?

5	A	q55_a	I will read six statements to you. Please indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree to each of them. A) Education of boys in schools has a positive impact on our community. The state should therefore improve the availability of schooling for boys in our community
5	A	q55_b	I will read six statements to you. Please indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree to each of them. B) Education of girls in schools has a positive impact on our community. The state should therefore improve the availability of schooling for girls in our community
5	A	q55_c	I will read six statements to you. Please indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree to each of them. C) Wage labour is becoming more and more important for the financial well-being of households. It would be good for the community if off-farm job opportunities would increase for both men and women
2	A	q55_d	I will read six statements to you. Please indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree to each of them. D) State-schooling is complementary to local customs and Islamic values. I think it has a positive impact on the moral constitution of the community
4	A	q55_e	I will read six statements to you. Please indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree to each of them. E) I feel that foreign development aid is threatening our local way of life and Islamic values in our community, although it may bring material benefits.
5	A	q55_f	I will read six statements to you. Please indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree to each of them. F) The presence of foreign troops is threatening local customs and Islamic values in our community
2	A	q56_a	Has your household been a beneficiary of development cooperation over the past two years? A) We received food aid
2	A	q56_b	Has your household been a beneficiary of development cooperation over the past two years? B) We received training or advice
2	A	q56_c	Has your household been a beneficiary of development cooperation over the past two years? C) We received salary or rent (e.g. for renting out offices)
2	A	q56_d	Has your household been a beneficiary of development cooperation over the past two years? D) We received a credit
2	A	q56_e	Has your household been a beneficiary of development cooperation over the past two years? E) We received other services
2	A	q56_f	Has your household been a beneficiary of development cooperation over the past two years? F) We received income, salary or rent
2	A	q57_a	Has your community as a whole been a beneficiary of Development Cooperation during the last two years? A) The community received food aid
2	A	q57_b	Has your community as a whole been a beneficiary of Development Cooperation during the last two years? A) The community has profited from training, advice and/or capacity building

2	A	q57_c	Has your community as a whole been a beneficiary of Development Cooperation during the last two years? C) Schooling in the community was improved
2	A	q57_d	Has your community as a whole been a beneficiary of Development Cooperation during the last two years? D) Electricity supplies of the community have been improved
2	A	q57_e	Has your community as a whole been a beneficiary of Development Cooperation during the last two years? E) Jobs for persons from the community have been created
2	A	q57_f	Has your community as a whole been a beneficiary of Development Cooperation during the last two years? F) Extension services have been provided to farmers of your community
2	A	q57_g	Has your community as a whole been a beneficiary of Development Cooperation during the last two years? G) Roads and bridges important to the community were built
2	A	q57_h	Has your community as a whole been a beneficiary of Development Cooperation during the last two years? H) The quality of the community's drinking water has been improved
2	A	q57_i	Has your community as a whole been a beneficiary of Development Cooperation during the last two years? I) Irrigation for community fields has been increased
2	A	q57_j	Has your community as a whole been a beneficiary of Development Cooperation during the last two years? J) Access to health services was improved
2	A	q59	How would you rate the security of your household currently?
2	A	q60	How would you rate the overall security situation in Afghanistan today?
2	A	q61	Over the past two years, do you remember any incidents that were security threats to you or members of your household in this region?
6	A	q62_a	Whom do you consider the most powerful person in your district?