Processes and Practices in Military Training and Education

Soili Paananen | Antti-Tuomas Pulkka (eds.)
PROCESSES AND PRACTICES IN MILITARY TRAINING AND EDUCATION

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INTRODUCTION

National armed forces and international military institutions face volatile missions, diverse tasks, and ever-changing complex, multilevel operational environments. In this sense, change is the only constant. However, the instructional function of military organizations is also a constant. Individuals already in service adapt to and actively adapt their thinking and skills when sudden shifts in context and given tasks demand this; such is the nature of the military profession. However, both serving members and new recruits in all phases of their careers undergo organized military education and training.

Traditionally, military education is understood to provide military professionals with the necessary skills, certain mental models, and operating procedures that professional training, and on-the-job learning reinforce. Understood more specifically, a military professional is seen as a carrier of previous work history and experiences, professional knowledge, competencies and commitments, and these are connected to how professional agency is acted out. Hence, professional knowing is treated as an individual process. It is related to personal experience as well as the acquisition of disciplinary competences resulting in an understanding of what, how and why things are done (Boud & Hager, 2012). In sum, this reflects the perception of learning as the individual acquisition of knowledge and skills.

Although values and key skills are important, professional learning also involves participation in both teaching/learning and work practices. In a theoretical sense, practices are sequences of human activities that consist of several interconnected elements such as forms of mental activities, objects and their use, know-how, materials and emotions (Reckwitz, 2002). Practices rely on relations in which heterogeneous combinations of different entities are brought into existence. Participating in practices is an ongoing process, and involves a notion of becoming professional. Thus participation produces knowledge, knowers and the known (Fenwick, 2014). This also orients discussion on learning from skills acquisition towards what happens in these relations and why, or rather towards actions within these practices and the kind of knowledge they give rise to.

It follows that the focus is then on the everyday activities of education and learning. This pays attention to the dynamics of everyday actions as well as teaching and learning practices: how practices are organized, produced, reinforced or changed, and the kind of information or know-how that is inherent in these practices (cf. Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011). These practices shed light on how things become processualized and organized, and the actions also highlight what is significant. Hence, action generates information and influences our knowing (Fenwick, 2012: 5; Gherardi, 2014).

The viewpoint chosen in this anthology is the examination of practices and processes in military education and training that have not received sufficient attention in the scientific military debate. In this respect, the focus is on everyday activities that produce significant professional knowledge for military students and personnel both intentionally and/or otherwise. These activities bring into focus habitual practices,
and disturbances that open up new opportunities or actions that preserve, transfer, or prevent knowledge that might have been possible to acquire. These actions and the knowledge they produce are further understood as a resource that can be incorporated into professional learning.

Four scholars, writing from different points of view, have contributed to this anthology, and we believe that their contributions provide a rich and interesting picture of the landscape of varying military educational challenges in the 21st century. All of the chapters were peer reviewed, two by the editors of this anthology, while two underwent a double-blind peer review process in which the reviewers were academics with specific expertise in the given field, holding at least adjunct professorship in social or military sciences.

Dr. Marenne Jansen (Radboud University & Netherlands Military Academy) examines in her chapter how the contradiction between standardization and uncertainty is experienced in the Dutch military. Her PhD research, on which this chapter was based, uses observations from fieldwork in the Dutch military and is framed within the theoretical perspective of dealing with uncertainty. Jansen’s chapter was peer reviewed, and accepted based on reviewers’ consideration of revisions.

Jarrod Pendlebury is a PhD candidate at the University of Sydney and Sir Richard Williams Foundation Air Power Scholar whose research explores military identity construction and performance. He has more than 20 years of experience in the Royal Australian Air Force. In his chapter, he examines the construction of military identity in air force officer basic training in the framework of Bourdieu’s theory of social practice, utilizing focus group data from Royal Air Force College Cranwell, the United States Air Force Academy, and the Australian Defence Force.

Thomas Crosbie (corresponding author of the respective chapter) is an Assistant Professor in the Institute for Military Operations at the Royal Danish Defence College. His research interests include military politics, military education and the sociology of private security. He is co-editor of The Sociology of Privatized Security (Palgrave Macmillan), and has published more than a dozen scholarly articles in journals including Joint Force Quarterly, Sociological Theory, and Armed Forces & Society. Co-author Edward R. Lucas is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Military and Strategic Studies at the United States Air Force Academy. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the American University and is a graduate of the Royal Military College of Canada. Prior to entering academia, he served for ten years in the Royal Canadian Navy. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force, the Department of Defense or that of the US Government. Nicolai Withander, Master of Political Science (MSc), is a research fellow at the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College. His research interests include defence policy, military education, military operations, asymmetrical warfare, and counterinsurgency (COIN).

Crosbie and his co-authors examine a somewhat unexplored area of Professional Military Education (PME) in the context of the NATO military institute. To this end, they look at two institutions, the US Air Command and Staff College and the Royal Danish Defence College in order to discuss a new comparative approach to the study of global patterns in military education.
Ulla Anttila holds a PhD in military sciences from the National Defence University (Helsinki, Finland) and an MA from the University of Helsinki. Her doctoral thesis focused on crisis management and learning, and her post-doctoral work explores peacekeepers’ thinking as regards their homecoming and the subsequent change management. Anttila specifically examines both homecoming and change management after an international crisis management operation. The research reported in her chapter derives from data on three Finnish focus groups, which have experience of returning home after military crisis management operations.

References


COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY: A DISCREPANCY IN MILITARY ORGANISATION?

Marenne Jansen

Abstract

“With military precision” is not simply just another expression or soundbite. It refers to probably the best-known characteristics of an army: its order, structure, and hierarchy. Yet, an equally applicable observation on military practice is its dynamic, complex environment. Both statements might be considered truisms, perhaps even a little cliché. Based on extensive fieldwork in the Dutch military itself, as well as theories on dealing with uncertainty, this article aims to investigate how the contradiction between standardisation and uncertainty is experienced in the Dutch military. From an ethnographic point of view, it is interesting to note that the rhetoric of the military and its personnel focuses on the complexities of military work—the importance of flexibility in unknown circumstances—whilst their daily routine mainly concentrates on processes of standardisation. Although the co-existence of processes of standardisation and an uncertain environment is not in itself problematic, it does include some pertinent risks for an organisation operating in insecure environments. In conclusion, the extent to which the existence of multiple military realities should be acknowledged in military education is questioned, because the challenge of preparing cadets for dual realities—for complexity and uncertainty on the one hand, and well-ordered professionalism on the other—requires more than simply allowing them deal with the paradox.

Keywords: complexity, uncertainty, organisational theory, military practice, military education

2.1 Introduction

War, civil unrest, and almost all conflict situations are by their very nature “messy” affairs, not only for the warring parties and the people caught up in them, but also for those reacting to such crises—not least, military personnel. As has become well-established since the end of the Cold War, the global security landscape has changed drastically, and it is widely acknowledged that contemporary military and peacekeeping missions have become increasingly complex (Beebe & Kaldor, 2010; Chandler, 2012; Collier, 2003; Crocker, 2007; Frerks, 2007; Singer, 2009; Ul Haq, 1995; UNDP, 1994). Notable works detailing these developments are Mary Kaldor’s (2007) famous intervention on the difference between “new” and “old” wars, or analyses of UN peacekeeping missions in the 1990s (Easterly, 2006; Meisler, 2007; Rubinstein, 2015; Schnabel, 2001; UNDP, 1994). More recent studies argue that “multilateral peace operations are increasingly confronting a set of interrelated and

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1 This chapter underwent a double-blind peer review process in which the two reviewers were academics with specific expertise in the given field. Manuscript was accepted based on editors’ and reviewers’ consideration of revisions.
mutually reinforcing security challenges that . . . have causes and effects which cut right across the international security, peacebuilding and development agendas” (van der Lijn, 2018, p. 1). Whilst Jair Van der Lijn focuses here on UN peacekeeping operations only, NATO (2018) acknowledges that “[t]oday, the Alliance is faced with a security environment that is more diverse, complex, fast moving and demanding than at any time since its inception,” (p. 1). Clearly, military practice is characterised by dynamic complexity—the unknown nature and uncertainty of the working environment.

At the same time, military service is characterised by protocols, doctrines, and standardisation (Posen, 2016). Michele Chwastiak (2006) refers in this respect to “US war managers” (p. 51) and “cause-effect war” (p. 37), in order to describe the bureaucratic aspects of the Vietnam War. Some studies claim that there is “an increasingly obvious discrepancy between the high complexity and interdependence of conflict, and a comparably under-complex strategy and toolbox used to handle this complexity properly” (Ropers, Korppen, & Giessmann, 2011, p. 7).

Both the military’s internal bureaucracy and the increasing complexity of the world in which it operates have been extensively discussed by scholars and practitioners alike. However, most studies focus either on the uncertainty of the complex environment of military practice, or concentrate solely on the bureaucratic characteristics of the military, which are characterised by processes of standardisation. The aim of this article is to investigate how this contradiction is experienced within the Dutch military and, in conclusion, to assess the consequences for military education.

The article starts with a discussion of existing literature on uncertainty and standardisation in military practice. This analysis is used to define and situate clearly the above contradiction between complexity and standardisation. Subsequently, the process of data collection and analysis are discussed. The analysis, based on organisational theories on how to deal with uncertainty, suggests that whilst using a rhetoric of uncertainty, the military is still predominantly focused on standardisation. Finally, the article reflects upon the contradictions present in military practice, and the consequences for military education. Rather than intending to be conclusive, this article aims to serve as an invitation for further research into the implications of contradictory elements in military practice, and their consequences for military education.

2.2 Methodological Design

Data collection and analysis

Data were collected during four years of field research from 2014 to 2018. During these four years, one observation consistently seemed of particular importance, namely, the tension between the standardisation of the work on the one hand, and the uncertainty and complexity of the working environment on the other. This
apparent contradiction became the starting point for this article. All interviews, which were recorded and transcribed, took place in the working environments of the participants. The interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. All participants were male and aged between 17 and 37. Participants were asked to describe their daily chores, talk about their military education, and reflect on their work. Participants were made aware that their stories would be processed anonymously and used for scientific research only. All participants gave oral consent.

The data presented in this study are part of a PhD research that was designed based on the principles of informed grounded theory (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2015; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Perry & Kempster, 2014). Unlike classic grounded theory, informed grounded theory specifically encourages the use of pre-existing literature and theories as a means for both understanding the empirical material at hand, and supporting the analysis of the phenomena observed (Parry & Kempster, 2014, pp. 86–87; Thornberg, 2012). The analysis in this article is supported by a conceptual framework based on existing theories from Gareth Morgan (2006) and Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe (2007), both of which examine how organisations deal with uncertainty. This guiding framework helps to make sense of the collected data and to focus not only on the experiences of the Dutch servicemen themselves, but also on how their experiences are connected with underlying organisational mechanisms of the Dutch military, specifically with regard to organising uncertainty.

Organising uncertainty

Organisations have dealt with uncertainty in many different ways. Generally speaking, there are three fundamentally different perspectives in organisational theory concerned with dealing with uncertainty: classic organisation theory; an open system approach; and self-referential organisations (Morgan, 2006). The three perspectives are summarised in Table 1, which will serve as the guiding framework in the analysis and discussion, and is explained below.

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2 The PhD study focuses solely on male infantry officers. Until recently, infantry was a male-only service in the Dutch military. The study is divided into two parts. The first part is an ethnography of military education at the Netherlands Defence Academy (see Jansen & Kramer, 2018). The second part studies the operational context. Semi-structured interviews were held with 19 members of an infantry platoon in Afghanistan over a period of two weeks. This resulted in a case study on military leadership (see Jansen & Delahaij, 2019). Data regarding the domestic military environment were gathered via semi-structured interviews conducted with nine infantry officers over a period of six months.

3 Grounded theory was developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967) as a method for conducting qualitative research, in reaction to the dominant tradition of positivist and deductive social research. Its central tenet is that research starts from data, rather than theory. “By adopting grounded theory methods you can direct, manage, and streamline your data collection and, moreover, construct an original analysis of your data” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 2).
Table 1: Organisational Design and Dealing with Uncertainty

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<th>Reducing uncertainty by</th>
<th>Internal organisational design for dealing with uncertainty</th>
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<tr>
<td>Classic organisational theory</td>
<td>creating and maintaining stability and predictability</td>
<td>top-down design of control loops</td>
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<tr>
<td>Open system approach</td>
<td>“absolute” adaptation</td>
<td>aimed at maximum variation and adaptability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-referential organisations</td>
<td>bounded or selective adaption</td>
<td>aspects of design influence “self-organisation”</td>
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Firstly, in classic organisational theory, the system is oriented towards internal stability. Organisations within this paradigm understand management as a “process of planning, organization, command, coordination and control” (Morgan, 2006, p. 18). There will be defined lines of communication, mostly represented in “classic” organisational charts. Work is structured, and employees are understood as parts of the “machine.” The management of uncertainty is expected to come from “numerous control loops” (Moorkamp, 2017, p. 27) and “compliance to a prescribed code” (Blom, 1997, p. 14). Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) argue that in such organisations, “unexpected events can get them into trouble. When people form expectations, they assume that certain sequences of actions are likely to happen” (p. 41). Secondly, an open system approach stands in stark contrast to classic organisational theory. In this perspective, the environment is a given in which the organisation is an organism, rather than a machine (Morgan, 2006, pp. 11–64). Hence, the organisation will aim to adjust itself completely to its environment. Making changes within the system is not problematic for these organisations, as they will try to vary and adapt themselves to uncertainty. Thirdly, the perspective of self-referential organisations falls somewhere between the classic and the open approaches. These organisations are based on principles of selective adaptation (Blom, 1997). This perspective advocates a certain level of “closedness,” and generally, their organisational design both enables and restricts an organisation's options to adapt to environmental demands (Blom, 1997). The question within this perspective is when to adapt, and when to stay put.

2.3 Uncertainty and Standardisation in Theory

The underlying premise for this article is that there is a contradiction between the uncertainty and chaos of war, and the military's preference for standardisation. This is not a new concern for armies – much military theory aims to devise means for overcoming the chaos by means of imposing routines on soldiers. Strategic theory from Von Clausewitz (1984) onwards considers the nature of the chaos. Military organisations must deal with high levels of uncertainty (Posen, 2016, p. 172). Some of this uncertainty stems from the international political environment (NATO, 2018; van der Lijn, 2018), whilst still more arises at an individual level: “The modern soldier is no longer simply a warrior: he (or she) is at once a peacekeeper, diplomat, leader, sibling and friend” (Beard, 2014, p. 274). Research by Wendy Broesder, Tessa op den

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4 Adapted from Moorkamp (2017, p. 30), based on studies from Blom (1997) and Morgan (2011, pp. 11–26).
Buijs, Ad Vogelaar, and Martin Euwema (2015) confirms that soldiers struggle with these multiple identities. Additionally, soldiers are trained to handle confrontation—large scale violations of human rights, political complexity, flagrant injustices, poverty, death and disease, (sexual) abuse, and an enemy who, most of the time, cannot be distinguished from the civilian population (Kaldor, 2007; Paris & Sisk, 2009). Significantly, the perpetrators of such conflicts do not behave according to the same rules as military personnel (de Graaff, Schut, Verweij, Vermetten, & Giebels, 2016).

Furthermore, due to developments in (social) media, military operations and actions within these operations have become subject to extreme levels of scrutiny and exposure. Meanwhile, public and political opinion regarding military missions can change quickly. Instead of returning as a hero, the soldier might equally have become an example of national shame. The cases of Srebrenica (van Baarda & Verweij, 2006; Blocq, 2006) and Abu Ghraib (Giroux, 2004) are exemplary here. Whilst the complexities of operating in such conditions are widely acknowledged and might even be considered to have become largely taken for granted, simultaneously, the bureaucratic nature of the military is equally widely observed. The complexity of such situations contrasts starkly with the way in which military organisations are designed.

Historically, a typical military organisational design is mechanical. Gareth Morgan (2006) traces the particular mechanistic world design back to the time of Frederick the Great (1712–1786), who “introduced many reforms that actually served to reduce his soldiers to automatons. . . . Frederick’s aim was to shape the army into an efficient mechanism operating through means of standardized parts” (p. 16). In a similar vein, in Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault (1977) argues that

the ideal figure of the soldier . . . [in the seventeenth century] bore certain signs . . .

By the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become something that can be made;

out of a formless clay . . . the machine required can be constructed. (p. 135)

In fact, Frederick the Great’s vision of a mechanised army gradually became the blueprint for modern society, as well as the operating basis for factories and offices. Referring to Max Weber’s “proliferation of bureaucratic forms,” David Graeber (2015) coined the term “total bureaucratization” in order to refer to the perverse logic of bureaucracy. He explains: “If you create a bureaucratic structure to deal with some problem, that structure will invariably end up creating other problems that seem as if they, too, can only be solved by bureaucratic means” (Graeber, 2015, pp. 149–150). Eric Hans Kramer (2007) elaborates: “When one cuts a process into pieces, one inevitably needs glue to put it together again. This glue can for example take the form of rules” (p. 119). This type of organisational design remains the blueprint for most military organisations (Posen, 2016; Soeters, Winslow, & Weibull, 2006).

The observation of the contradiction between the widely acknowledged complexity of operating in crisis situations on the one hand, and the pervasiveness of the bureaucratic way in which the military is organised on the other, is in itself hardly groundbreaking. As Martin van Creveld (1985) argues, military organisations have struggled with this contradiction since Roman times, in the sense that large-scale military operations are seldom flexible in their scope. Military personnel often have to carry out tasks in a “dynamically complex environment” (Kramer, 2007, pp. 24–27), whilst “the military has emerged as a prototype of the mechanistic organization” (Morgan, 2006, p. 16).
How servicemen and -women experience this contradiction in their daily work has not received much attention. This study aims to fill that gap. As Anders Sookermany (2017) explains, “[i]t is commonly accepted that the nature of military operations is one of such character that no matter how well you prepare, there will still be an expectation of having to deal with the unknown and unforeseen” (p. 310). The question is how this might be achieved.

2.4 Uncertainty and Standardisation in Practice

This section aims to illustrate the contradictory nature of the military environment by showing the two faces of military practice (uncertainty and standardisation), using excerpts from interviews with officers and cadets on how they experience life in the Dutch military. In order to give greater perspective on the individual experiences presented, further context is provided where necessary. The following presentation of the data starts with an introductory paragraph detailing the education received by military infantry officers at the Netherlands Defence Academy and concludes with a description of military practice.

In the description of the military academy, two examples are given. One is a description of the first day of training for a new batch of infantry cadets; the second is an example of military education described as a mechanical process. In this second part on military practice, examples are given from the domestic and expeditionary environment.

Military academy

The official narrative of the Netherlands Defense Academy (NLDA) is that they “educate the leaders of the future” (Dalenberg, Folkerts, & Bijlsma, 2014, n.p.). The NLDA emphasises the importance of a broad education and academic knowledge for officers. They do not strive to teach precisely what to do when working as an officer, but rather aim “to build character” (Dalenberg et al., 2014, 38). This narrative emphasises both authenticity and complexity. Dutch military education is characterised by a hierarchal educational style, learning to take orders, and gaining knowledge of rules and procedures. Mechanistic structures in military education control how personnel dress, when they eat, when they engage in sporting activities, and when they work.

The following notes, which I made on the day a new intake started their education, are rather characteristic:

Still wearing civilian clothing, they have to stand in formation; in order of height, in four rows, an arm’s length apart, badge on the left. Because they all arrive at different moments, it takes a long time. Very long. I am told 80% of military life is waiting. They are patient, and expectant. After a while, they start marching. Their movements seem unfamiliar. They get their lunch packages. They still call it lunch package, soon it will be shortened to “lupa.” After lunch, a long lecture follows on their rights and obligations as servicemen. The lecture is filled with military jargon. I observe a certain

5 A detailed overview of life and study at this institute can be found in Dalenberg (2017); Groen and Klinkert (2003); Jansen and Kramer (2018).
schizoid character in these lectures. They are all about being authentic and pro-active, while the same PowerPoint presentation is used every semester. There is hardly time for questions, but most things are repeated at least twice. Whilst I am noting this all down, outside in the sun, the first newly formed platoon exits the building. “Group ‘Bravo’ here,” they shout, and find their places in the formation quickly. (field notes, August 2015, Breda, the Netherlands)

I am not the only one to have made these observations. Giuseppe Caforio (2006) argues that “procedures are used in order to induce strong normative compliance, such as community life, discipline, emphasized hierarchical order, rules for public and private behavior, and a system of sanctions” (pp. 255–256). In the context of the US military, Lieutenant Colonel Joe Doty and Major Walter Sowden (2009) describe how the army designs education in “a compartmentalized manner”:

This is evident as you examine unit-training schedules. We refer to classes . . . as mandatory or chain teaching. To execute this training, . . . “canned” PowerPoint slide decks [are issued] . . . Once the training is complete, the “block” is checked and the unit moves on to the next task. (p. 70)

In accordance with the above, most of the instructors I met in the Netherlands talked about the educational system as a set of neatly segmented processes, and are thus likely to show organograms and schematic PowerPoints, representing causal relations in learning processes.

I now turn to the second example, namely, military education as a mechanical process. From the very start, the selection process is characterised by a duality between standardisation and apparent arbitrariness. Before being admitted to the academy, aspirant officers are interviewed and tested for their IQ, physical fitness, and psychological health. The primary instruments for selection are standardised tests, and a confidential form on which a number of the cadet’s key dispositions are divided into many boxes and predefined questions. However, despite these tested methods and instruments, the military psychologist who welcomed me to the selection center elaborated: “In fact, the AAC [Acceptance and Advice Commission] is the most important. They give binding advice whether to hire someone or not. And their process is a black box” (psychologist, personal communication, June 10, 2015). However, the AAC, which is chaired by a retired colonel, disagrees with the psychologist’s assertion, and told me that they function as a “machine bureaucracy” (Colonel, chair of the Acceptance and Advice Commission, personal communication, October 29, 2015). The metaphor used by the colonel is not unique: instructors and cadets alike often talk about themselves in metaphors such as “products” and “manufacturing.” As a further example, a course instructor (a sergeant) talks about his work in factory metaphors: “the military academy does not produce officers, but makes semi-manufactured products, the technical training is responsible for the next step in line” (field notes, November 2014, Breda, the Netherlands).

Nevertheless, the “assembly line” is considered far from perfect by those responsible for “operating” it. Instructors at the Netherlands Defence Academy and the technical infantry training all share the feeling that they constantly have to “unlearn” that which was previously taught, either at high school, at university, or sometimes even at other military units: “We first have to unlearn whatever they did before, and we will teach them how it really works,” explains an instructor at the military academy (Captain,
personal communication, 2015). A major, responsible for the technical training of the cadets following their education at the Netherlands Defence Academy, explains:

My biggest challenge is to break down the habits they learned at the military academy. What they have built up during those years in Breda has to be broken down. They will soon find themselves in a completely different world. (Major, personal communication, October 6, 2016)

This “completely different world” has at least two contexts: the domestic and the expeditionary military environments. In the following section, I give a few examples from the Afghanistan case study and from interviews conducted with infantry officers in the Netherlands, in order to illustrate the comparable dynamics in the military practice.

Military practice

Domestic

Although soldiers are best known for the role they play in military conflicts, they spend most of their time in peacetime, domestic settings—the nature of any military task being fundamentally different from the situation “at home” (Posen, 2016). The priority in domestic operational military units is to be well-trained and prepared, in case the need arises for the battalion to be sent on a mission. Hence, much energy is invested in getting soldiers to the required level of proficiency. An important aspect of the domestic situation is therefore the pre-deployment phase.

This study draws upon the experiences of one platoon, preparing to go on a mission to Afghanistan. The platoon’s assignment will be to transport political advisors safely from their compound to other locations within the country. When a platoon is tasked to go on a mission, they need to do additional, mission-specific training. For some individuals, this means obtaining a specific driving licence for a vehicle that is used at the designated location, for others it means learning how to use different kinds of weaponry, whilst a third might need to update their technical knowledge. Hence, most platoon members follow training courses spread across various locations and time periods. Furthermore, they all need to have their dental controls and vaccinations fitted in at different moments in time because of the various training courses. Finally, most commanders want to give soldiers the opportunity to spend some time with their families and friends before they leave. In view of these multifarious demands on their schedules, little time is left to prepare for their actual mission—in practice, only a couple of days. I was invited to accompany them to one of their training locations. A former camping site was militarised, and empty holiday houses functioned as an Afghan village. Here, they practiced how to get those under their protection in and out of the military vehicles, how to safety-check a location, and how to drive from A to B. “As they will drive the same roads for four months, the platoon is trained to stay alert when things become repetitive. This training is to prepare them” (Lieutenant, field notes, October 15, 2014).

Besides pre-deployment training, there are the regular activities. Most trainee officers believe that most of their time will be spent literally “in the woods,” enduring mental and physical hardship, and always being ready to fight an enemy. In reality, however, these so-called “green moments” are scarce. The reality for junior officers is often
different, including a significant amount of administration: “There is always someone sick, becoming a parent, off for study leave, or a planning needs to be made. ‘Running around in the woods’ is no daily business at all” (Infantry Officer, personal communication, January 7, 2015). This difference between the ideal of spending time with their men in the woods, and the daily reality of spending time behind their desks, is just one example of the two faces of military reality.

In order to support its officers with their planning, the Dutch military makes use of an integrated information system. However, most operational officers are not very enthusiastic about these information systems and planning tools. They are considered labour intensive and, according to one battalion commander, take up too much of their time: “There are too many rules, and the young lieutenants stick to them fiercely. They put rules above the privates. While you should actually be able to understand the privates’ position” (Lieutenant Colonel, personal communication, August 10, 2015). A colonel describes how he sees the work of junior officers:

The “regulatory frenzy” does not give them [junior officers] any exit option. You have to lie to comply with all the rules, rules that you can never comply with. For example, the number of obliged trainings simply does not fit in a year. You might be able to achieve the desired level [of professionalism of your platoon], and if you have managed that, you just tick some boxes, and make sure you are covered on paper. (Colonel, personal communication, August 18, 2015)

These officers reveal a “sore point” of military practice, namely, that for those working in such a bureaucratic environment, there is a real risk of failing to connect, either to the people or to the environment around them, becoming fixated on compliance with the rules instead.

**Expeditionary**

In order to learn about the expeditionary environment, in January 2016, I visited the Dutch part of a military base in Afghanistan. For Dutch troops in Afghanistan, 2016 was considered relatively calm, compared to 2007–2008, when troops often experienced combat. When I arrived, soldiers complained that they had nothing to do, and that they were bored of playing poker and going to the gym. The following excerpt describes my first hours spent in the camp:

The container is locked. Whilst waiting for someone to open it, comments are made about the lack of “bitterballen,” a typical Dutch fried snack. It is 7 o’clock in the morning, and I just got off the plane that took me to Afghanistan. The last thing I would want right now is a fried snack. It is also the last topic I expected to discuss in a country where “we” are fighting a war. Interestingly enough, it is not a joke—it is a serious complaint. I am told they are “the forgotten mission,” [and] they have to ration these products, whilst in Mali, there is plenty of everything. Inside the container there are small offices on both sides, and one briefing room. This will become my office, but right now I am given a safety briefing, and several maps and instructions on what to do in case of an attack are handed to me. Things that seem rather arbitrary to me are explained in great detail, and supported by an extremely well-structured PowerPoint presentation. What I actually need to do, or where to go “when the shit hits the fan,” is quickly summed up afterwards. For now, I decide to trust in the assessment that this place is rather safe right now. (field notes, January 2016, Afghanistan)
What I observed here was that in the face of actual uncertainty, procedures were relied upon to “take care of it”, whereas when things of less importance (for example, fried snacks) were concerned, there was plenty of time for discussion. In a way, this can be interpreted as a strategy by which to ignore uncertainty, covering it up with procedures. Another remarkable observation was that the majority of the roughly 60 Dutch personnel working at the military base never left the compound:

“Camp tigers,” they are called by the ones who do leave. They have breakfast at 07:15, lunch at 12:00, and dinner at 17:30, every day at the same long table, in the same dining hall, where other nationalities (Germans, Croats, and Americans) all have their own undesignated, but apparently agreed upon, tables. Television screens on the wall. Jokes about the lousy food. The same type of jokes that are made in the Netherlands. The dining hall, like the rest of the compound, is run by Germans, whilst the food is prepared by—mostly—Sri Lankan civilians. I am told that if they work here for a couple of years, they get German citizenship. This might indicate that this is theoretically not even Afghanistan. The camp tigers can, in their spare time, go to the German or American gym, to a pizza place, a coffee corner, or one of the two shops; one for cigarettes and chocolate, the other one for fancy military gear. In the evenings, they sit with their laptops in their bunk beds or drink a malt beer or a soda in the “Lion’s Rock”—the Dutch bar—where they can also play some pool, table tennis, darts, or poker. The next morning, they collectively drink coffee, watch yesterday’s news, and get their morning briefing. I attend once and learn that one important message is to ration plastic cups, because, like the snacks, these cups always get delivered late, and less are delivered than the number ordered. (field notes, January 2016, Afghanistan)

The discrepancy between the detailed PowerPoint presentation and the rather loose verbal instructions in case of an emergency was not only slightly worrying; it also summed up my observation of the two realities of military practice. The discrepancy between seemingly banal topics such as snacks, the rationing of plastic cups, and the daily routines on the one hand, and their professional presence in supposedly one of the most dangerous areas in the world on the other, was striking. Contradictions such as these seemed an inherent part of military practice on this mission. A major is rather pessimistic:

What we do is to send out a lieutenant with maybe 70 people to the “sandbox” [i.e. Afghanistan]. There he should talk to civil representatives and village elders, and then he is expected to “act in a stabilising manner,” all on his own... He is maybe 23, 24 years old. (Major, field notes, February, 2017)

This statement suggests the impossibility of the assignment: a young commander is supposed to “stabilise” a warzone, with barely sufficient experience or people.

### 2.5 Discussion: Organising Uncertainty

The observations and interview data illustrate how infantry personnel in the Dutch military experience a contradiction between uncertainty and standardisation. The above also demonstrates that both the domestic and the expeditionary military environments have (at least) two faces that are not necessarily compatible. From an ethnographic point of view, it is interesting to note that the rhetoric of the military and its personnel focuses on the complexity of military work and the importance of
flexibility under unknown circumstances, whilst their daily lives are mainly focussed on processes of standardisation.

The existence of processes of standardisation in combination with an uncertain environment does not in itself present an untenable situation, and there surely are plenty of (military) skills and drills that prove useful, even (or perhaps especially) when the world is uncertain. However, as Weick and Sutcliffe (2007, p. 41) argue, when an organisation is designed on the premise that the whole world can be captured using clear-cut processes, the focus on standardisation is the very thing that makes dealing with uncertainty difficult. This triggers an existential question for the military, namely: How can an organisation that is explicitly destined to have an impact on unstable environments be designed according to principles that “belong” to stable situations? Obviously, it is not possible to run an organisation of this size without any form of standardisation and procedures, however, the question is whether the level at which things are organised offers enough space for manoeuvre in uncertain circumstances.

Through the lens of the conceptual framework introduced earlier, the military organisation seems organised in a classic way, whilst acting in an environment that is highly uncertain. The problem here, as Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) argue, is that “unexpected events can get them [classic organisations] into trouble” (p. 41). Because of the organisational design, there is a risk of focusing mostly on internal processes. “The assumptions, which are embedded in its routines, rules, norms, training, and roles, establish orderly guidelines for performance and interpretation” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 41). However, if an organisation believes that all systems are in place in order to produce the “right” or expected outcomes, it ceases to reflect critically on its own systems. “When people form expectations, they assume that certain sequences of actions are likely to happen” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 41). Hence, a pertinent risk of this type of organisation is not so much that people have “unlearned” their ability to deal with uncertainty, but rather that standardisation becomes a goal in itself.

Comparable dynamics can be found in other sectors that deal with high levels of uncertainty in combination with possible losses of life, for example, health care, where there is a tendency “to give greater emphasis to the actual process of doing their work than to the results of that process” (Bucher & Stelling, 1977, p. 283). Such organisations run the risk of becoming completely geared towards their own internal processes, whilst failing to adapt to whatever is happening in their environment. Instead of dealing with uncertainty, uncertainty is thus ignored. This resonates with Mary Uhl-Bien’s (2007) work on complexity leadership theory, which argues that the challenges that organisations face in a “fast-paced, volatile context” (p. 299) requires complexity in both leadership and organisation. Hence, what happens in the military is similar to developments in organisational theory. Moreover, Weick (2015) argues that “reliable organisations” need to learn how to “grasp ambiguity” (p. 122–123), in order to deal with complex environments.

2.6 Conclusion

Based on extensive fieldwork in the Dutch military, analysed in the context of theories on dealing with uncertainty, this article investigated how the contradiction between standardisation and uncertainty is manifested in the Dutch military, and assessed the
consequences for military education. This article aimed to illustrate how Dutch military personnel experience this contradiction. It established the idea that military practice has at least two sides—one of control and standardisation, and one of complexity and uncertainty. In the analysis, it was argued that this contradiction is not necessarily incompatible, because military mechanisms will work to a certain extent to deal with uncertainty. However, there are some risks to this type of classic organisational design.

Whilst the complexities of military operations are widely acknowledged and might even be considered to have become largely taken for granted, simultaneously, the bureaucratic nature of the military is equally well-known and widely observed. Obviously, it is not possible to run an organisation of this size without any form of standardisation and procedures. However, the question is whether the degree to which things are organised offers enough space for manoeuvre in uncertain circumstances. A pertinent risk of this type of organisation is not so much that people have “unlearned” their ability to deal with uncertainty, but rather that it will become more difficult to respond flexibly to uncertainty. Thus, when it comes down to the external environment of the military, especially in its expeditionary work, the question remains if such an inward-oriented organisation is prepared for the uncertainty, unknowns, and complexities that are characteristic of their field of operation. Considering that one of the main ambitions of a military organisation is to have an impact on the world (fight a war, build peace, disarm conflicts, and promote political stability) in highly uncertain environments, it is very unlikely that their ambitions will be achieved by continuing to focus on internal standardisation.

Suggestions for further research

Based on this conclusion, it is suggested that these multiple military realities should be acknowledged in both the professional and the educational realms. In the professional realm, the possibility to question how to organise oneself most effectively in an insecure environment should be kept open. At a professional level, military organisations operating in insecure environments need a certain level of “open design”, in order to be able to have an impact on the external environments in which they operate. However, a risk for “open-designed” organisations is that they become a slave to their environments, as they are constantly adapting themselves to their surroundings. As a result, they might experience difficulties steering their own path, as their actions become mostly reactive. Hence, a legitimate question is when to adapt, and when to stay put. This question invites further research into flexible responses to uncertain environments.

With regard to military education, another important discussion arises: cadets are destined to perform professionally in light of future challenges, but are educated according to a predominantly mechanistic worldview. Whilst this mechanistic way of organising might be current practice, this article questions whether this should indeed be the norm. It is suggested that military education should offer more than simply allowing personnel to deal with the discrepancy on their own. The current situation seems to be to deny the challenge of preparing cadets for the multiple realities of the military domain—complexity and uncertainty on the one hand, and well-ordered professionalism on the other. Thus, the question is how the existence of multiple
military realities and daily discrepancies can be acknowledged in military education and practice.

References


BOURDIEU IN THE MILITARY: THE FIELD OF OFFICER TRAINING IN THREE AIR FORCES

Jarrod Pendlebury

Abstract

Initial training at military academies and officer training schools is an intensive period of socialisation; the transformation of new recruits into functioning military officer is expected to occur within a relatively short timeframe. Often this training is conducted in a socially detached environment that closely resembles Erving Goffman’s “total institution”. By design, this social isolation seeks to focus the development of a unique military identity congruent with the values of the broader organization. Yet such social isolation can also breed norms and behaviours that contradict values espoused by the government a military is bound to serve.

This chapter will mobilise Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social practice in an effort to understand the construction of military identity in air force officer basic training. Drawing on focus group data from air force training schools in the UK, US and Australia, I will explore the unique environment of the officer training institution, presenting Royal Air Force College Cranwell, The United States Air Force Academy and The Australian Defence Force Academy as social fields serving to coordinate a coherent and uniform air force habitus. The chapter will argue that a Bourdieusian analysis of training institutions offers a way to understand how divergence can occur between the values and norms of Government and those of the military in a liberal democracy. Moreover, this chapter will demonstrate the utility of Bourdieu’s theory to contemporary efforts to create representative and inclusive military forces.

Keywords: Bourdieu, habitus, field theory, military sociology, civil-military relations, women in the military, Goffman, total institutions, diversity, inclusion

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3.1 Introduction

Few other public institutions match the military’s ability to weather the forces of societal change. Despite the flattening of rigid social class hierarchies throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the overwhelming majority of militaries retain rank structures that construct a stark dichotomy between an upper (commissioned officer) and lower (enlisted ranks) class. Rank is one of many characteristics that indicate the unique
social resilience of the military organisation; a phenomenon I will explore in this chapter.

In the pages that follow, I will examine this social resilience by harnessing case studies of basic air force officer training in three liberal democratic states, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. In recent years, each government has grappled with questions surrounding the right of various members within society to serve. As suggested by US experiences with post Second World War racial integration, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, and the current debates surrounding the rights of transgender personnel, a disconnect exists between the social and political values espoused by some liberal democratic governments and those practiced by the military. The aim of this chapter therefore, is to apply sociological theory to the field of air force basic officer training in an effort to provide some reasons why military institutions in liberal, democratic states can remain resistant to broader political and social norms.

While the military has long been of interest to the sociological academy, it presents a variety of challenges to the critical sociologist. For instance, barriers to research are woven into the very purpose of the organisation; such as the physical limits placed on outsiders in the form of access control to facilities and members. Scholars have also suggested that the instrumental purpose of the organisation limits the scope of much academic enquiry, resulting in an institutional reluctance to support research that lacks a specific instrumental outcome (Harries-Jenkins & Moskos, 1981, p. 3). Still others have observed that the complex social environment presented by the military demands a multi-disciplinary approach, meaning that findings are diffused across a wide literature, rather than “housed” within a single discourse (Kümmel, 2003, p. 417).

In a 2008 article published in The Australian Defence Force Journal, the Australian sociologist and Army Reserve Brigadier Nick Jans opines the state of military sociology in Australia. In particular, he points to the general lack of interest in the discipline within the Australian academic community – including, notably, The Australian Defence Force Academy – suggesting it would be “safe to say that very few Australian officers are aware that there is such a field as military sociology and that it can inform on practical ‘people issues’ in the military institution” (Jans, 2008, p. 43). Jans further underscores his argument by contrasting the interest in the US, UK and Canada where a “strong nucleus of scholars”, supported by the military, conduct research and teaching from established positions within military academies and staff colleges (Jans, 2008, p. 43). It is telling that the recommendations arising from his paper (the establishment of two military sociology positions at key Australian tertiary institutions, and Australian Defence Force sponsorship of regular military sociology conferences) are yet to be implemented, ten years hence.

In sum, there appears to be evidence to support Jans’ lament as to the “sorry state of military sociology” (Jans, 2008, p. 43), and in this chapter, I seek to help redress a limitation I see in the literature: a reluctance to draw on wider social theory. This chapter will harness the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu in an effort to bridge the gulf between military sociology and the broader discipline. In doing so, I will draw on Bourdieu’s theory of practice, positing the basic officer training environment as a social field in which a cadet’s existing habitus is molded and shaped through an intense socialisation process; the purpose being to produce a junior officer who will act reliably and predictably following graduation. The utility of Bourdieu’s theory to this
project emerged through an iterative process; with the design of initial fieldwork informed by Erving Goffman’s theory of Presentation, and Judith Butler’s concept of Performativity (Butler, 2006, 2011; Goffman, 1959). During early data analysis it became apparent that while a sequential deployment of these theories enabled the construction of a basic model of identity construction (Pendlebury, 2018), such analysis was limited to explaining how ideal identities came to be constructed and perpetuated, rather than why certain embodied characteristics become the basis of these ideal identities. As this chapter will argue, Bourdieu’s theory provides a useful macro lens or framework, inside of which the micro processes of identity construction operate.

Drawing on qualitative data collected in the course of focus groups at air force officer training establishments in the UK, US and Australia, this chapter will focus on basic training’s process of identity construction as a significant location where the social norms and behaviours of the broader organisation are demonstrated and reinforced. Ultimately, through Bourdieu’s lens, I seek to demonstrate how the military institutions in the US, UK and Australia can remain resistant to the implementation of social norms that fully reflect liberal, democratic values.

The chapter begins with an overview of the broad guiding principles of civil-military relations in the liberal democratic state, in which I suggest that a disjuncture exists between the norms and values of such a state and those practiced in the military. Bourdieu’s work will then be presented as a way of making sense of the reasons behind such a disjuncture, at which point I will sketch the key elements of his theory of social practice. After some preliminary comments on the method underpinning my qualitative data gathering in support of this research, I will use these data schematically in an effort to show how Bourdieu’s theory can illuminate the way that unique, military cultures are created and perpetuated in the armed forces, at the same time that liberal societal norms are resisted.

3.2 Civil-Military Relations in the Liberal Democratic State

The debate surrounding the ideal relationship between the liberal democratic state and its military has drawn heavily on the work of two scholars, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. In The Soldier and The State, Huntington argues for a clear delineation between the social and political values espoused by the government, and those cultivated in the military (Huntington, 1957, p. 64). Conversely, Janowitz sees a necessary link between the values of the state and its representative institutions, arguing that it is necessary for the military to reflect the “goals of democratic political control” (Janowitz, 1960, p. 440).

The intense public debate surrounding the inclusion of women in the military (Maginnis, 2013; Medina, 2016; Norman, 2018), combined with slow achievement of inclusion policy outcomes (Australian Institute of Family Studies, 1991; Department of Defence, 2015) suggests an unresolved tension between the Huntingtonian and Janowitzian models. While it is outside my scope here to address this debate, my argument below rests on the premise that, in a liberal democratic state, the military should broadly reflect the values and norms of the government it serves; a view expressed by each of the three governments studied in this chapter (Her Majesty's
Government, 2015, p. 6; Payne, 2017; United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011, p. 16). Indeed, contrary to instrumentalist arguments that advocate for an “unrestrained” military, governments frequently place boundaries on their militaries to align with the nation’s espoused values. The Australian Government’s ban on the use of anti-personnel landmines is an example here (Government of Australia, 1997).

If then, we are to accept that a liberal democratic government can reasonably expect its military to reflect its values and norms, the question arises as to why, despite extensive policy initiatives and directives (Department of Defence, 2012; Her Majesty’s Government, 2015; James, Welsh, & Cody, 2015), levels of representation of various social groups – particularly women – remain low (Department of Defence, 2016; Lim, Mariano, Cox, Schulker, & Hansen, 2014; Ministry of Defence, 2018)? Put more simply, how does the military in a liberal democratic state remain resistant to liberal democratic norms such as equality of opportunity and freedom of choice for the individual? What mechanisms enable it to remain a stable social microcosm, exhibiting class and social structures that are particularly resistant to change? Here, I believe Pierre Bourdieu’s work provides some useful tools to explore such questions.

Much of Bourdieu’s scholarship focuses on the structures and processes influencing social practice, and central to his theory are the concepts of habitus, capital and field. For Bourdieu, social behaviour and norms result from a complex interplay between the three, and it is noteworthy that he views the relationship as co-constitutive; a modification to any one element affects not only the resultant social practice, but also the other two elements.

Bourdieu’s concept of field provides a useful departure point when analysing his theory in the context of the military, as it does a great deal of work in establishing the social environment and structure within which he suggests social practice emerges:

[The field is] a structured social space, a field of forces, a force field. It contains people who dominate and people who are dominated. Constant, permanent relationships of inequality operate inside this space, which at the same time becomes a space in which various actors struggle for the transformation or preservation of the field. All the individuals in this universe bring to the competition all the (relative) power at their disposal. It is this power that defines their position in the field and, as a result, their strategies (Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 40–41).

Of note is Bourdieu’s emphasis on inequality, or power imbalance as characteristic of the field. Also of interest is his use of terms such as “universe” and “space”, which resonate with other analyses of the military that posit the organisation as a closed social system par excellence (Freeman, 1948, p. 79; Goffman, 1961, p. 5; Huntington, 1957, p. 465; Janowitz, 1960, pp. 204–208). For Bourdieu then, within a single society, a variety of fields operate according to their own logics, in which social actors harness their relative power to negotiate the social environment. Importantly, this relative power can be accrued through both formal (by rank or appointment, for instance) and informal means (such as seniority or the possession of particular skills, experiences or attributes), an area to which I will return later in the chapter. It is within this sense that I posit the military as a Bourdieusian field.

Another sociologist, Erving Goffman provides an additional model to allow us an insight into how the military is capable of remaining isolated to the extent that it can form its own “logics”. In Asylums, Goffman presents the concept of the “total
institution”; a useful lens through which we can gain a sense of the type of field represented by the military:

The central feature of total institutions can be described as the breakdown of the barriers ordinarily separating these three spheres of life [sleep, play and work]. First, all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority. Second, each phase of the member’s daily activity is carried on in the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing together. Third, all phases of the day’s activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity leading at a pre-arranged time into the next, the whole sequence of activities being imposed from above by a system of explicit formal rulings and a body of officials. Finally, the various enforced activities are brought together into a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution (Goffman, 1961, p. 6).

For Goffman then, a key characteristic of the total institution is “isolation” from a normalised world; a concept that resonates closely with the world of the military, particularly in basic training institutions, where new recruits’ lives closely resemble those he describes above. Moreover, the life of a new recruit is permeated with an awareness of significant power imbalance. Indeed, this can be understood as the primary purpose of such training, which seeks to inculcate junior members into a steeply hierarchical organisation. Officer cadets are frequently reminded of their uniquely lowly status since enlisted members – the cadets’ future subordinates – exercise authority over them while under training.

In the following analysis, I will therefore treat the social environment created in basic officer training as a Bourdieusian field; a coherent “universe” in which clear power imbalances are perpetuated and harnessed in order to transform (the new recruits) while also preserving the extant power structures inherent in military hierarchies.

With power imbalance as central to his concept of field, Bourdieu necessarily devotes a great deal of attention to the mechanisms through which this relative power is displayed and deployed. Capital is the term he applies to describe “assets that bring social and cultural advantage or disadvantage” (Moore, 2008, p. 104), and his use of the term encompasses a wide variety of “assets” acquired through an individual’s experience in the cultural, economic, linguistic, academic and social realms.

Bourdieu further delineates capital into that which he describes as objectified (such as an art work) or embodied. The latter is of most interest to this analysis, as it describes capital incorporated into the body of a social actor (Moore, 2008, p. 105), an idea holding useful explanatory power when analysing basic military training. For Bourdieu then, capital is at once intangible (apparent in one’s taste in music, for example), while also readily apparent in an embodied sense. For an organisation such as the military that is uniquely focused on uniformity of appearance, symbols and iconography, Bourdieu’s idea of capital helps unpack how and why certain characteristics denote privileged status within the field of military basic training.

Finally, the concept of habitus is central to much of Bourdieu’s work, and represents one of his major contributions to sociological theory. For Bourdieu:

The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate
and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively “regulated” and “regular” without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 53).

Bourdieu’s emphasis on the structural underpinnings of social practice is evident here, further reinforcing the utility of his theory of practice to a rigidly hierarchical organisation such as the military. To Bourdieu, habitus fundamentally informs and shapes our response to the social environment, and it does so in a manner that transcends intentionality. This is not to say that social agents act as mere automatons, but rather that these “transposable dispositions” enable a suite of available strategies that serve to limit the available responses to any given social situation. Importantly, the social field and an agent’s available capital strongly influence the range and scope of these strategies, underscoring the co-constitutive nature of the elements of Bourdieu’s theory.

A useful analogy to illustrate the nature of habitus is that of a game. Played out on a field, a game is governed by rules that constrain, but do not force a player’s actions. In a social field, as with sport, the most successful “players” demonstrate a “proleptic adjustment to the demands of the field […] a ‘feel for the game’” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 66). As on the sporting field, this “feel for the game” results from experience informed by structures such as the laws of the game and the field, but is not readily demonstrated solely through an understanding of (or “obedience” to) the rules. Likewise, an authentic (and effective) “feel for the game” transcends intentionality, and is evident in the “ease” with which the possessors of cultural capital navigate the social space of art:

The competence of the “connoisseur”, an unconscious mastery of the instruments of appropriation which derives from slow familiarization and is the basis of familiarity with works, is an “art”, a practical mastery which, like an art of thinking or an art of living, cannot be transmitted solely by precept or prescription. Learning it presupposes the equivalent of the prolonged contact between disciple and master in a traditional education, i.e., repeated contact with cultural works and cultured people (Bourdieu, 2010, p. 59).

Thus, as is the case with the connoisseur, the habitus is formed through repeated contact with social environments that build and refine an agent’s “toolbox” of transposable dispositions. Viewed through such a Bourdieusian lens, military basic training represents an environment in which new recruits – already possessing a habitus formed in their civilian lives – undergo a process of socialisation in which it is intended that a new, “military” habitus is formed.

3.3 Method

This chapter draws upon qualitative fieldwork conducted between 2015 and 2018 at five air force officer training institutions in three countries. Each of these countries – The United Kingdom, The United States of America and Australia – have political systems that can be broadly described as liberal democratic, with all three placing significant emphasis on the primacy of the individual and individual rights.
While three of the military institutions focus on providing the minimum level of training for an air force officer, the other two deliver tertiary education in parallel with officer training. I will refer to the former (The Royal Air Force (RAF) College Cranwell, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Officers’ Training School (OTS) and the US Air Force's (USAF) Officer Training School (OTS)) as “direct entry” establishments, while the remaining two (The Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) and The United States Air Force Academy (USAFA)) I will term “academies”.

I conducted a series of focus groups at each institution in an effort to gather narratives indicating cadets’ understanding of the ideal characteristics of an air force officer. Focus groups were chosen as an efficient method enabling the collection of narratives from a much larger sample of cadets than individual interviews would allow. This was an important consideration given the tight schedules of officer cadets, particularly at direct entry establishments where cadets were expected to learn the essential skills and knowledge expected of a junior officer in as few as eight weeks. In each focus group, I moderated a semi-structured discussion guided by a series of questions designed to draw narratives from cadets relating to their perceptions of what characteristics contributed to a model of an “ideal” air force officer.

A key requirement of ethics approval at each institution was full disclosure of my status as a serving air force officer. To this end, I began each session with a short introduction in which I provided a brief overview of my career, as well as a synopsis of the project. Although it is difficult to discern how this disclosure of myself as a military “insider” affected the data, I was relieved to find most participants eager to engage in the discussion, and the frankness of some narratives allayed my fears that the cadets would be reluctant to divulge their true thoughts to a senior air force officer.

Each session began with questions seeking to understand participants’ motivations for joining, as well as their perceptions of air force identity prior to joining. I was particularly interested in whether cadets were inspired by any particular role models prior to joining. Following these initial questions, the discussions focused on cadets’ experiences during their basic training, with particular emphasis on concepts of belonging and identity. The primary aim of each focus group was to seek an understanding of the types of identities that cadets valued, with these narratives building a dataset I could subsequently compare and contrast with official discourse to see whether these “ideal” identities were congruent with the inclusive “diverse” air force each nation forming part of this project seeks to build.

At each venue, I aimed to convene three unique sets of focus groups, mixed gender, female only, and male only, however the combination of cadet availability and tight schedule pressures made it impossible to collect female only data at USAFA and ADFA. Each focus group consisted of between 3-10 participants, all of whom were undergoing officer training at the time of the focus group. The age range of participants varied depending on the institution with USAF trainees, on average, being younger than their UK and Australian contemporaries. Overall, participant ages

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6 The eligibility requirements at the USAFA were the most stringent with respect to age. Applicants must be “[a]t least 17 but not past [their] 23rd birthday by July 1 of the year [they] enter the Academy” (USAFA, 2018).
ranged from 18 to 50, and a total of 31 focus groups were convened during which I collected narratives from 208 participants7. The subsequent data were coded using content and discourse analysis.

3.4 Analysis

Although widely applied across a vast array of social environments including paramilitary organisations such as police (Chan, 1997), it is puzzling that Bourdieu’s theory remains sparsely deployed by military sociologists. As outlined above, his emphasis on structure and capital, combined with the clearly demarcated nature of the military as a social field (denoted by the existence of a word to describe those who do not belong: “civilians”) suggests significant utility of his work in unpacking the construction and perpetuation of military identities and behavioural norms. Moreover, through deconstructing the inputs to social practice, Bourdieu’s theory can help point to discrete processes and practices that may remain uncovered in atheoretical approaches to military cultural change. In the following section therefore, I will analyse the qualitative data gathered in the course of my fieldwork through Bourdieu’s lens in order to demonstrate how a unique military field is constituted as a microcosm within the broader liberal democratic society. In doing so, I also hope to demonstrate the contribution I believe Bourdieu’s work can make to military sociology, particularly to studies focusing on the arena of basic military training.

Once again, I will use field as the entry point. As total institutions, the militaries of liberal, democratic states have, over hundreds of years, developed a unique set of cultural and social norms that differentiate themselves from other organisations. In the case of the US, UK and Australia, a commonality – borne of traditions developed in the British Army and Royal Navy – is evident in many areas ranging from rank terminology to the broader organisational structure. The perpetuation, and indeed celebration, of a distinction from the “civilian” world reinforces the accuracy of descriptions of the military as a total institution, and more broadly, a Bourdieusian social field.

Such parallels are still more striking at the micro level of the basic officer training institution. Despite variations across institution type and country, all of the training units forming part of this research project fulfilled each of Goffman’s criteria for a total institution. First, all trainees conduct their training in the same institution, under the same authority (Goffman, 1961, p. 6). Each of the units from which participants were drawn was a dedicated officer training institution. As distinct from an operational squadron that might be responsible for both the training and operational employment of personnel, basic training is most often conducted within dedicated training units. In each case examined in this analysis, officer training was delivered via intensive, residential blocks. At USAFA and the three direct entry units, an obligation exists for cadets to remain “in residence” for the duration of the period of training. ADFA stands alone as an institution allowing cadets to reside in off-base accommodation in cases where the member has family obligations (ie an interdependent partnership, or dependent children). Of note, such arrangements at

7 Detailed participant numbers were as follows: USAFA – 35, RAF Cranwell – 31, ADFA – 16, RAAF OTS – 61, USAF OTS – 65.
ADFA are suspended during certain training blocks where residence is mandatory, such as Year One Familiarisation Training (YOF) and exercise deployments. All five institutions, therefore, create an environment at various points, where “all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority” (Goffman, 1961, p. 6).

Goffman’s second criterion for a total institution concerns day-to-day activity, where “each phase of the member’s daily activity is carried on in the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing together” (Goffman, 1961, p. 6). In this sense, the field of the basic officer institution is the clearest representation of collective training the air force officer will undergo in their career. Unlike subsequent, operationally-focused training (such as learning to fly or training as an Air Traffic Controller) which tends to be conducted in comparatively smaller groups – the field of officer training brings together a large number of personnel who are expected to undergo a uniform process by which they will learn the knowledge and skills necessary to be competent, junior leaders. Although each group I spoke with included members who had previously served as enlisted personnel (variously labeled “re-treads”, “ex-rankers” or “prior-enlisted”), this conferred no special privilege. Indeed, a number of these members observed that while their previous service was useful in certain areas (such as drill and uniform maintenance), it was not sufficient to prepare them for the academic aspects of the training, where many sought the assistance of their colleagues who had no previous military experience. It became apparent from the data that air force officer basic training, in all three countries, represented an environment in which all members underwent the same course, facing challenges in various areas depending on their background.

Air force officer training also reflects a third characteristic of a total institution, where “all phases of the day’s activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity leading at a pre-arranged time into the next, the whole sequence of activities being imposed from above by a system of explicit formal rulings and a body of officials” (Goffman, 1961, p. 6). As I articulated above, this was particularly evident in the case of the academies, where cadets frequently reported their experience in negotiating a tightly managed program where there was little margin for error:

I remember being left behind while the sergeant made them run ahead, and getting there at least 10 to 20 minutes late to the next class, simply because of that [a minor injury affecting the cadet’s ability to keep up with her classmates] (Female ADFA First Year cadet).

Goffman’s reference to formal rulings is also of interest here. In a similar way to how a cadet responds to the “demands of the field” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 66) through the development of an innate and informal “feel for the game” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 9), the new recruit’s navigation of the basic training field is also informed and governed by a complex array of formal orders, instructions and publications. By overlaying Goffman’s and Bourdieu’s theories across the field of basic officer training, one could argue that it is both the formalised rule structure of the military, as well as the more informal social interactions that coalesce to give a unique character to this Bourdieusian field.
Finally, and most obviously, the field of military basic training represents an environment in which “the various enforced activities are brought together into a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution” (Goffman, 1961, p. 6). As I articulated above, the basic training unit is unique in its singularity of focus on the ends to be achieved. Although clearly a busy work environment, these establishments are rarely subject to the vagaries of operational activities, resulting in a tendency for them to develop institutional inertia or conservatism. Historically, at its most extreme, this has manifested itself in cases of hazing by senior academy cadets who perpetuated cultures of abuse by insisting that rituals they endured as new recruits must be inflicted on each new class in order to establish “the pecking order” (Goyne A et al., 2017, p. 73; Graney, 2010; McCoy, 1999, p. 199).

[Hazing] is an illicit rite of passage (against the rules of the institution) that provides opportunities for veteran members to include or exclude new members on the basis of a variety of trials that involve varying degrees of physical and psychological stress […] newcomers submit to whatever torture or trials are asked of them, comforted by the assurance that all abuse will cease after the organisation declares them full members. During the next cycle, the new veterans get to turn the tables and haze the next set of newcomers (Nuwer, 2018, pp. 31–32).

Data gathered during my fieldwork suggest the existence of other processes that work in a similar manner, often remaining latent due to a veneer of normativity. For instance some focus group participants articulated sentiments surrounding a need for senior cadets to “maintain standards” in relatively insignificant facets of basic training:

When it comes to eating at basic, we always had to do specific things to get things. I think about the freshmen from when we were sophomores, and when those freshmen came in, they would just waltz around like they owned the place. I feel that was ... it was... they didn't have that right, technically. I think just because I was a sophomore, and in my mind, I was, "Who are these people to come in here like that?" We would have got dropped on the spot if we would have did something like that (Male USAFA First Degree (Senior) cadet).

In bemoaning the reduced standards to which junior cadets are held (compared with his time as a four degree (junior) cadet), this cadet highlights the singularity of purpose of the academy, namely, the development of naïve, civilian recruits into military officers. More broadly, his comments are also reflective of the way in which such singularity of focus can be used to argue for “the way things have always been done”, reinforcing institutional inertia, resistance to change and the normative value of such micro processes that serve to control the behaviour and attitudes of trainees. The concept of resistance to change is one to which I will return later in the chapter.

Through the lens of Goffman’s theory therefore, air force basic officer training is clearly a total institution, which tells a great deal about the specific type of Bourdieusian field it represents – a bounded social environment, governed and informed by rules in which “constant, permanent relationships of inequality operate” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 40).

As I highlight above, for Bourdieu, capital represents a type of currency helping agents negotiate the social field. As we have seen, he describes the field as a space where:
all the individuals in this universe bring to the competition all the (relative) power at their disposal. It is this power that defines their position in the field and, as a result, their strategies (Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 40–41).

The term “relative power” here refers to capital, which is clearly central to unlocking and enabling the strategies available to an individual agent. Put more simply, the amount and type of capital available to a social agent fundamentally influences the strategies they can deploy in the field, and therefore, the formation and content of the habitus.

I spoke earlier of the importance of symbols and iconography in military organisations. Much can be ascertained from the appearance (or absence) of various symbols and accoutrements on the uniform of an air force member. For example, in the RAAF, a member’s uniform carries a great number of markers indicating the capital available to the individual. For instance, aircrew are differentiated by the wearing of a “brevet” (or “wings”) denoting their particular specialisation. Similarly, the course of the member’s career can be deduced by the ribbons or medals that represent various types and quality of service. These ribbons will denote whether the member has undertaken active (warlike) service, for how long they have served, and whether they have been recognised for acts of exceptional or distinguished service, or heroic acts. Each ribbon is presented in a strict, formalised “order of precedence”, which serves to accord significant prestige to the recipients of the highest orders (Government of Australia, 2007). In addition to badges of specialisation and honours, all air force uniforms allow for the display of badges of rank, perhaps the most visible and enduring representation of social standing in any occupation.

All these physical representations of status represent embodied capital that, in a Bourdieusian social field, strongly influences the agency and social standing of an individual. Through a similar process, capital also circumscribes the strategies available to a social agent. For example, members of the lowest officer rank – Officer Cadet in the RAAF – have limited access to senior leadership in order to influence decision making with respect to their social environment. Cadets articulated such a reality during focus groups:

You know, like, if I need a form signed from my DO [Divisional Officer – a staff member of Lieutenant/Captain/Flight Lieutenant rank], I need to go through the cadet DDO [Divisional Duty Officer], who takes it to the sergeant, who takes it to the DO. And it’s just really unnecessary, and it makes you sort of feel like … I don’t know, especially [in] my division…we always feel like we can’t go to staff. Like we often put off issues that need to be dealt with, because we feel intimidated. But like, we’re going to be bothering them, by just asking them for something. And it really shouldn’t be like that. (Female ADFA First Year Cadet).

The embodied capital described above can be seen to operate in a formal sense, and is a common artefact of such a strictly hierarchical organisation. Moreover, strict adherence to elaborate chains of command are a common element of basic training, designed to build professionalism in cadets (through the emphasis on bureaucratic process) while simultaneously reinforcing their lowly position in the organisation.

There are however, other forms of capital that similarly influence an individual’s available social strategies, but operate in an informal sense. Data gathered from each training institution suggested that gender represents something of an informal social
marker. The emphasis on gender as a source of capital varied across the institutions, with the academies yielding the most striking data suggesting that being male assigned a relatively higher social status than being female:

I have been ridiculed because I put so much emphasis on my family, especially since I am married and I put so much emphasis on my husband and my family of two, [and I have faced] a lot of ridicule because they think that you are not suited for Defence, because guys can go away for three months and not have to worry about it because there is a stereotype that men can be away from their kids for three months. Whereas the stereotype [is] that women can't, you can't be away from your kid for more than a day or you are a bad mother kind of thing (Female ADFA Third Year cadet).

In the US, discussions surrounding gender tended to focus on perceived, generalised – and essentialised – differences in strength and endurance, as well as the popular notion that women represented a risk in combat due to – again in an essentialised sense – men’s natural inclination to “protect women”:

Like, women are generally not as good at pull-ups as guys are. That's just how physically it works. There's nothing you can do about that. I mean, are there exceptions? Obviously yes, but in general [...] [physical standards] are designed to keep people alive in the situations that have been experienced. I think you can’t adjust that just to make someone happy or to make it so someone else can join. It's just like saying, “well, then let's allow people who don't have arms to be infantrymen”, then you can't do the job, but should we adjust the rules to make it so this group of people can do something [when] they're not physically able to do the job as well? (Male USAFA Three Degree (Sophomore) cadet).

[Down range, at forward operating bases men don't actually…] I guess [have] communication with women on a very often basis. So, those few women who do make it through those tests are now subjected to all these guys. As much as we like to have integrity and state our core values as the military, men obviously have certain instincts and that could cause problems. Not only that, but it’s also a man’s intuition to protect a woman so I've heard of special operators saying they've had women with them down range and, of course, not on clandestine missions or anything of that nature. But, when something happened to [those] women, then men would do something they normally wouldn't do, break their own rules and barriers to protect her, and then ultimately expose the rest of their unit (Male USAFA Three Degree cadet).

Thus, in a way related to how relative power in the military social field is formally represented (by rank and other physical embellishments), we can see that a similar effect is achieved informally, by the assignment of relative status in other areas, such as gender. As the data above suggests, within basic training institutions, women, by virtue of their apparent gender, are often assigned a relatively lower status than males. In a Bourdieusian sense then, the existence of this – often latent – microprocess moderating gender relations limits the strategies available to women as social agents. Moreover, by artificially bounding the available modes and quantity of capital, the development of habitus, which can be seen as a primary goal of basic training, is significantly affected.

Bourdieu’s concept of habitus has been deployed widely to help explain social practice in a large number of disparate fields, however it is, as I observe above, noticeably
absent from much of the literature associated with military sociology. This is unfortunate, as I believe habitus represents a useful prism – in concert with Bourdieu's broader theory of social practice – to unpack both how identities are developed and perpetuated in air force basic officer training, but also which particular identities predominate. In helping understand these processes, I see Bourdieu's theory as a useful way to unpack the fundamental reasons behind the military's divergence from liberal, democratic norms in the US, UK and Australia.

As outlined earlier, Bourdieu describes habitus as a set of “transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 53). This structural aspect hints at a dual role of habitus as both rooted in the past, or “structured by conditions of existence” while also informing and shaping one’s current and future social practice in a structuring way (Maton, 2008, p. 51). Habitus’ dual nature, at once conservative while also forward looking or “structuring” resonates closely with the dichotomous nature of contemporary air forces. Of the three major military services, air forces have perhaps the most complicated task in resolving the tension between tradition and technology. This has become even more apparent in recent years, with air forces becoming something of a “catch-all” organisation for new capabilities. Consequently, the traditional role of an air force – the application of air power (Royal Australian Air Force, 2013, p. 31) – has been augmented with emerging capabilities. Some, such as Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) have a close connection with the air force’s traditional role. Others, such as space power have a clearly tangential relationship while still others, such as cyber operations seem to have been placed within the purview of air forces due to its reputation as the most “technological” service.

All this is to say that fundamentally, habitus, as both “structured” and “structuring”, represents a powerful tool through which to analyse social practice in the air force. While an in-depth exploration of habitus warrants much greater detail than is possible in this chapter, my aim here is to briefly sketch the processes and mechanisms through which habitus can mould and influence social practice, thereby working to reaffirm and reinforce social norms and processes that are, in some cases, in disagreement with liberal democratic tenets.

Representations of basic military training are ubiquitous in popular culture. During focus groups, cadets described the influence of cinema and other mass media (such as YouTube) in providing cadets with expectations as to what they would endure during their introduction to the military. In many cases, reality failed to match these expectations:

Before I came here, I wanted to get ready for basic training, like get as prepared as I could get, so I watched tons of YouTube videos and stuff on basic training. I saw certain aspects of basic training but the majority of ones that I watched were operational, for like enlistment, so they were much different. They were more mental than physical, those basic trainings. However, the academy, it was a lot more physical than I thought. The beat sessions, if you call them, were a lot more physically demanding and the wake-ups were more – I couldn’t have been prepared for that. […] Like, the way you eat meals and stuff, I was not expecting it to be like it was... so even the smallest movement of your head, you’re getting yelled at for. So there was a lot of things that surprised me, but I knew it was gonna be rough, so...I was really coming in with that expectation to be army, rah rah rah down the line every
day. I mean, its still like hard work but not as hard as I thought (Male USAFA Four Degree cadet).

There's other little things that I found, like just sensitivity levels are a bit higher than I was expecting. I wasn’t expecting Full Metal Jacket per se, but there were things that have happened where someone’s gone back after it crying because you’ve dropped a swear word in after telling someone six times, and I feel like if you’re in the military, man up and crack on with that…(Male RAF Cranwell officer cadet)

The apparent disjuncture between reality and popular representations of basic training suggests a complex method by which the habitus of a recruit is influenced and shaped during basic training.

Basic military training is often described as a process through which the civilian identity is “broken down”, to be replaced with one more congruent with the military environment (Janowitz, 1960, pp. 127–131; Schemo, 2010, p. 6). The veracity of such a formulation was evident in the data. Very few cadets reported basic training as an easy process, and indeed many suggested that it was an experience for which nothing could have prepared them. Through Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of habitus as a series of “transposable dispositions”, this would suggest that, in the majority of cases, the dispositions necessary to negotiate oneself effectively through the social field of the military are unique to a military habitus or at least very rarely taken on in civilian life.

It follows therefore, that in addition to learning a variety of instrumental skills during basic training, cadets are expected to develop these uniquely military dispositions or more simply: develop a military habitus. In seeking to understand the first key question here, which is how identities are formulated in basic training, it is useful to recall Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of habitus as a “structured structure”, highlighting the importance of the past as a key reference point. In the military, this is a fairly simple connection to make. Again, symbols and iconography are an example of the power of tradition and precedent in determining the types of capital that contribute to successful negotiation of the military social field. A reliance on stories and artifacts of the past emerged with great frequency in the data, suggesting that the actions of cadets’ forebears had a strong effect not only on the dispositions taken on by cadets, but also on the way in which their basic training was structured and delivered.

You asked [about] my role models, I think that we get a lot of historical role models, we have ... Buildings named after specific officers and [in] freshman year, we’re drilled on the history of the place, the history of these different war heroes, basically, and I think underline ideas that [say] “try and be like...” They don’t say that, but why else would we study that stuff? (Male USAFA Three Degree cadet).

The effect of “structure” in developing ideal air force officers is indelibly linked with the corresponding “structuring” nature of the habitus that develops during basic training. This interrelated nature of habitus – at once informed by structures while also informing those very structures itself – is critically important to understanding military cultures. It is the structuring aspect of habitus that can help explain the types of characteristics that tend to help a social agent accrue capital in the military field.

An example that emerged frequently in the data was the notion of physical training standards. Physical Training, abbreviated to “PT” in some military circles, performs
a dual role in basic training. First, and most obviously, it serves to develop physical strength and endurance in cadets, ostensibly to prepare them for their operational roles following graduation. Second, pushing cadets to their physical limit serves as a process to build professionalism by developing self-discipline and tenacity. In many cases however, the instrumental purpose of PT is supplanted by its more unofficial role as a way of differentiating and categorising cadets. This happens both between cadets:

I've been injured for a while, but my injury was ... I got one, and I got another. So it was one on top of the other. But I've had people who look at me in a weird way if I ... Simply because I do not do the same testing as them, and do not do the same PT system as them, since I have to do rehab. And that makes you feel like an outsider. You can't be part of that group, or if you try to integrate yourself into that group, simply because you're not physically fit, you can't keep up with them (Female ADFA First Year cadet).

But also by some staff:

Yeah, it's a lot focused on ... The academic side of it is looked at "Ps [Passes, generally considered to be a mark of 50%] get degrees. You don't need the degree after this [after graduation from the academy]." However, as a logistics officer, I'm going to be dealing with contracts and [...] I'm doing business. So obviously my degree matters. But it's kind of belittled a bit, like your DO for, say, passing a subject, you'll get a "Good job." And for a distinction you get a "Good job." And then they'll go, "However, you only did 10 pull ups. You need to work on that. You need to be able to do 20." And "Actually, no. I'm going to make you do 30." (Male ADFA First Year cadet).

By emphasising physical fitness over other aspects of a cadet’s training, staff and cadets are contributing to the ongoing perpetuation of a set of “ideal” characteristics – individual elements of Bourdieusian capital – that, when amassed by an individual cadet, differentiate that cadet from others. Moreover, given the importance associated with certain characteristics (such as pull ups), embodiment of these elements seems to denote success in terms of negotiating the social space. At its most base, such a meritocracy resonates with the liberal foundations of UK, US and Australian society. But problems can arise if the types of capital necessary to excel in basic military training unnecessarily or arbitrarily privilege some over others, and evidence emerged at both USAFA and ADFA to suggest that it can be difficult for some members to reproduce or perform certain roles in order to build social capital. Women were particularly consistent in reporting the difficulty they faced in building viable capital:

I know a lot of people who still have a problem with women being here. Not outwardly, and it’s not like anybody would walk up to you, a girl, and be like, “you don’t deserve to be here.” But, they just have different standards for women. I think that they’re judged a little bit more harshly in their leadership positions, because they’re either a pushover, or they’re, for lack of a better word – pardon my french – a bitch. And so I think it’s very rare that a female has the same leeway as a man might (Female USAFA First Degree cadet).

In my division, there's a strong competitive nature. We have a lot of ... Even the RAAF males are very ... like, and to their credit, they're very physically fit. And they are just as competitive as the Army and Navy. But quite a lot of the time, for a couple
of us girls, even, we get sort of put down for even just meeting the standard. It's like well ... you know, you don't put down someone who's passed in academics, just because they only just passed. Like it doesn't matter. If that's the minimum, and you've got that ... Like, I understand there's a difference between that and ... like, pushing people to improve is a whole 'nother story. And like, I'm all for that. I'm for improvement and doing better [...]. But to be blatantly saying "You're not good enough." When you're told that you met the standard ... Like it seems to be a whole blurred line sort of thing (Female ADFA First Year cadet).

As evident in the comments above, the emphasis on physical fitness, (particularly the capital accrued by performing activities requiring high levels of upper-body strength), at ADFA and USAFA has a structuring effect on the development of habitus during basic training. In this case, women are obliged to “fit” a particular template – regardless of its relevance to their career field – and, as articulated by the first cadet’s comments, face a double bind in which they are either assessed as too masculine, or not masculine enough. The apparently persistent inability of women to “fit” therefore reinforces the template in the “structuring” manner outlined by Bourdieu, resulting in a stubbornly enduring impression of women as unsuited to military service. Moreover, this addresses the second major question of which identities are inculcated and perpetuated in military basic training, and provides further insight into the reasons behind the inertia exhibited in military organisations facing direction and pressure to change their cultural norms.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that the modest success achieved by liberal democratic militaries in building inclusive and representative forces demonstrates a curious disjuncture between the values and norms of the polity with reference to the military. Following Morris Janowitz, I have argued that this is problematic if one is to assume that state institutions should represent the values of the government they serve. Unfortunately, the realm of military officer training, as with the military in general, has been quite successful in avoiding the eye of the critical sociologist. While there are undoubtedly systematic reasons for this, I have argued in this paper that a primary contributing factor is a general lack of social theory applied in many existing analyses.

I have sought to address this oversight somewhat by applying Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice to the field of basic officer training in an effort to understand some of the processes and mechanisms that serve to insulate the military from broader society. Prior to unpacking Bourdieu’s theory, I suggested that the arena of basic military training represented a Goffmanian “total institution”; a social environment cut off from wider society through a variety of means. Goffman’s theory is thus a useful pathway to understanding the landscape of Bourdieu’s concept of social field as it applies to the military. More simply, Goffman can help us understand of the type of Bourdieusian field that exists in basic military training. From this starting point, the chapter harnessed data gathered from qualitative fieldwork to help underscore the applicability of Bourdieu’s theory to the military in general, and the field of basic training in particular.

With respect to a second element of Bourdieu’s theory of practice, I presented some examples of the types of capital that are valued within the basic military training field.
Particularly evident from the data was the difficulty with which certain measureable minorities, such as women, are able to accrue the amount – and indeed the type – of capital that enables a successful negotiation of the social field of basic training.

Building on the discussion of field and capital, this chapter presented the concept of air force basic military training as a period of socialisation in which a certain type of military habitus is developed. In common with the types of capital that are valued in the air force, I have suggested that an ideal military habitus contains characteristics that make it difficult for some groups to draw on the full toolbox of “transposable dispositions” and develop a “feel for the game” denoting full belonging in the military social field. In addition to providing a structural basis for the development of this habitus, I have suggested in this chapter that the apparent success (in negotiating the social field) of those embodying the ideal characteristics reinforces the primacy of the associated identity characteristics, re-affirming Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the habitus as both “structured” and “structuring”.

The applicability of the theory of practice to the military makes Bourdieu’s absence from the realm of military sociology intriguing. As a theory that places great emphasis on structure and power imbalance, it seems clear that his work can be readily applied to the armed forces, thus it is surprising it has not been more widely deployed by military sociologists. Absent of space in this chapter to fully explore the utility of Bourdieu’s theory, it is hoped that the work here might provide some momentum for further research into an area that has, to date, remained regrettably tangential to the broader sociological field.

References


EDUCATING MILITARY ELITES: PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN NATO COUNTRIES

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Abstract

Research on military affairs is experiencing a resurgence of interest both in the academy and in the popular press, particularly among sociologists. Alongside a shift toward conventional military concerns at the geopolitical level, we are witnessing a dramatic increase in the visibility of military elites in domestic and global politics. Most dramatically in the United States, but to lesser degrees also noted in Europe, military leaders occupy increasingly central and prominent political roles. This reflects a deeper transformation of the military organization, which globally has experienced quite dramatic structural transformations. While the role played by Professional Military Education (PME) in the rise of military elites has been overlooked by scholars, there are strong indicators to suggest that political leaders around the world are coming to recognize the strategic importance of PME as a tool of soft power, and indeed the world’s most powerful militaries are transforming their PME institutions into strategic assets. This chapter describes the ecology of NATO military education, drawing particularly from a close examination of the education of officers at two institutions, the U.S. Air Command and Staff College and the Royal Danish Defence College. By looking closely at how these two very different institutions teach their future leaders how to think about international and domestic politics, we take the first steps in developing a new comparative approach to the study of global patterns in military education.

Keywords: professional military education, civil-military relations, international security

4.1 Introduction

Research on military affairs is experiencing a resurgence of interest both in the academy and in the popular press, particularly among sociologists (West & Matthewman, 2016). Alongside a shift toward conventional military concerns at the geopolitical level, we are witnessing a dramatic increase in the visibility of military elites in domestic and global politics. Most dramatically in the United States, but to lesser degrees also noted in Europe (Mérand & Barrette, 2013; see also Libel, 2016), military leaders occupy increasingly central and prominent political roles. This reflects a deeper transformation of the military organization, which globally has experienced quite dramatic structural transformations (King, 2011). While the role played by Professional Military Education (PME) in the rise of military elites has been overlooked by scholars, there are strong indicators to suggest that political leaders around the world are coming to recognize the strategic importance of PME as a tool of soft power (Atkinson, 2014). The world’s most powerful militaries are transforming their PME institutions into strategic assets (Ruby & Gibler, 2010; Van Oudenaarden & Fisher, 2016).
However, and despite broad European efforts to improve PME exchanges between nations following the Bologna Process, Paile (2010, 2011) and others offer compelling evidence that these processes have only scratched the surface. Accordingly, there remains a major gap in the literature: although we know that military elites matter more than ever, we know little about how they are taught to think. This book addresses the processes and practices in military education and training with the intention of helping to fill this gap in the literature. The present chapter aims at a more specific target by providing detailed examinations of two cases, the United States Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama and the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC), at Svanemøllen’s barracks in Copenhagen. By looking more deeply into the syllabi and readings of key instructional programs at these two institutions, we will provide a snapshot of how NATO officers in two “ideal types” of staff colleges are taught to think about politics.

In the first part of the chapter, we will make our case for the value of looking inside military education programs, arguing that this is of interest not only to scholars and military education professionals, but also to military professionals concerned with preparing for future conflicts. In the second part of the paper, we move through our two case studies, ACSC and RDDC, providing a detailed account of how officers at these two institutions are taught about politics. In the third section, we reflect on what the case studies suggest about the character of NATO officer education in the first decades of the twenty-first century. We conclude with a call for more sustained research on these timely topics.

4.2 Educating NATO Officers

To understand the impact of NATO officer education on cycles of war and peace, we must look beyond traditional academic disciplines, and instead work at linking insights from across sociology and political science. In approaching the topic through an interdisciplinary theoretical lens, we follow the path set out by Masland and Radway’s (2015 [1957]) groundbreaking Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy, the first major analysis of PME. Masland and Radway’s (2015 [1957]) guiding insight was that structural innovations in the field of PME were contributing to a new generation of military elite, which differed significantly from its predecessors. Janowitz (2017 [1960]) blended Masland and Radway’s (2015 [1957]) study of military education with earlier theoretical reflections on military elites (Lasswell, 1941; Mills, 2000). He argued that a new model of managerial officer was replacing the heroic model of officership of an earlier generation. Ironically, although Janowitz’s study gave rise to the field of military sociology, later generations of scholars largely ignored the role of PME. More recently, sociologists have once again turned their attention to the importance of military leadership and the role of education (Allen, 2010; Snider

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8 The Bologna Process is an intergovernmental endeavor initiated in 1999 by a group 29 countries intending to align and adopt a system of higher education. The Bologna Process established the European Higher Education Area (EHEA). The goal was to create a set of quality guidelines, ensuring enhancement of education and learning, as well as recognition of educational degrees across borders of these countries. As of 2018, 48 countries are part of the EHEA. (ehea.info, 2018)

9 For a discussion of Weberian concept of ideal type, see Kim (2017).
& Matthews, 2005), echoing a dramatic increase in the US Department of Defense’s focus on professionalism (Crosbie & Kleykamp, 2018).

This shift in the sociological literature has coincided with two developments in the political science literature. Civil-military relations scholars recognize that military leaders have much more political agency than Huntington (1957) theorized. At the same time, international relations scholars have increasingly focused on the state and individual levels (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011; Colgan & Lucas, 2017; Colgan & Weeks, 2015; Moravcsik, 2000), moving away from the structural accounts that have long dominated the field (Keohane, 1984; Mearsheimer, 2003; Waltz, 1979). By employing this approach, studies have demonstrated that prior military service affects how political elites conduct foreign policy, including their willingness to use military force (Horowitz & Stam, 2014; Horowitz, Stam, & Ellis, 2015).

As senior military officers take on larger roles in determining domestic and foreign policies — best exemplified by the first twelve-to-eighteen months of Donald Trump’s presidency — understanding how these elites form their views in domestic and international politics becomes increasingly central to understanding domestic and international politics more broadly. Research on military affairs is experiencing a resurgence of interest press (West & Matthewman, 2016). Most pressing in the Nordic context has been a renewed sense of the conventional-force threat posed by a revisionist Russian state (Richey, 2018). In such scenarios, military expertise is universally recognized as a key feature in the reassurance of allies and deterrence of regional forces. Alongside this shift toward conventional military concerns at the geopolitical level, we are witnessing a dramatic increase in the visibility of military elites in domestic politics. Most extreme has been the transformation of the American military, featuring mission creep and “new militarism” (Bacevich, 2013), so that “everything became war and the military became everything” (Brooks, 2017). This is why any suggestion of a global drift toward the American approach to educating military elites should be examined cautiously: although the American case is utterly unique in scale and geopolitical consequences, its organizational logic may well be scalable.

While the role played by PME in the rise of military elites has been overlooked by scholars, there are strong indicators to suggest that political leaders around the world are coming to recognize the strategic importance of PME as a tool of soft power (Atkinson, 2014; Mujkic, Asencio & Byrne, 2018). The world’s most powerful militaries are transforming their PME institutions into strategic assets (Ruby & Gibler, 2010; Van Oudenaren & Fisher, 2016). And while scholars are starting to call for increased exchanges between PME institutions (Paget, 2016), this has long been endorsed by the United States (Cope, 1995). Closer to home, the benefits of improving exchanges between Nordic PME institutions and limitations in the current system have been explored by several scholars (Graeger, 2007; Schaub, 2014). However, the major international efforts to organize PME exchange operate almost entirely as a means of exchanging training (the imparting of technical skills) rather than education (learning as such) (Johnson-Freese, 2013). Accordingly, there remains a major gap: we know that military elites matter more than ever, but know almost nothing about how they are taught to think.

While political scientists and sociologists are increasingly recognizing that elites matter and elite education matters, the literature on PMEs remains disconnected from these
disciplines almost entirely (exceptions include Atkinson, 2014; Johnson-Freese & Kelley, 2017; Libel, 2016). Questions of military education have been most productively debated in the pages of Joint Force Quarterly, which is published by the United States National Defense University under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Featuring contributions by retired and still-serving officers in addition to academics from both civilian and military educational institutions, debate in Joint Force Quarterly has consolidated around a handful of insights into PME that have relevance throughout NATO.

Critical perspectives on PME abound in Joint Force Quarterly, with a consensus emerging that new and different approaches are needed if the quality of education is to meet the needs of military organizations. Ogden (2017) explores the obstacles to education erected by military careers, while Kuehn (2016) explores structural constraints, including the consequences of losing supporters in the legislature. What Ogden and Kuehn agree upon is that PME is not uniform— and is not easy.

Many of the PME articles that have appeared in Joint Force Quarterly have focused specifically on the challenges of shifting from a tactical or operational mindset to the strategic or political level. Miller & Wackwitz (2015), for example, describe the transitional quality of an American officer’s final PME experience, a process intended to lead them from officer to “warrior scholar”. McCauley (2016) argues along similar lines that today’s military leaders face awesome challenges in managing complexity that demands very effective education. Allen and Filiberti (2016, p. 53) argue that “[s]enior leaders are not grown or educated overnight. And at the strategic level, pedestrian performances can have profound negative consequences”— nevertheless, they systematically reveal the bureaucratic pressures acting on policymakers, which continuously undermine support for education in the careers of senior officers.

A final theme that has emerged in the literature and which relates to the concern with complexity is the growing recognition that interoperability is a critical military competency (Paget, 2016). A glance at recent military history will confirm the importance of clear and timely communication between military communities. The post-Cold War era has seen a parade of alliances, coalitions, and partnerships working together in unexpected configurations, from NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Resolute Support in Afghanistan, EU-NATO cooperation in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa, or Operation Unified Protector in Libya 2011— each of which has been marked by the need for militaries with few historical ties to work together seamlessly in highly complex settings. Multinational cooperation puts pressure on the interoperability of such partnerships, and thus emphasizes the requirement for more effective Command and Control (C2), agility, and understanding (Moro, Cicchi, & Coticchia, 2018). National differences in training, education, organizational culture, and doctrinal traditions abound. The increase in operational complexities as well as campaign scope underscores the need for a common metrics and a common language. Stavridis, Rokke, and Pierce (2016) point particularly to the need for standardized approaches to joint planning, lawful targeting, and strategic communication, in addition to more technical interoperability concerns with aerial refueling and the like. Effective education has the promise of enabling officers to identify and potentially fill the operational gaps that emerge across partner countries’ capabilities.
Our research is intended to help rectify problems in the existing research on PMEs, which are reflected in limitations in the theory, empirics, and comparative logic of the field. For the most part, PME has been undertheorized, serving as a black-box variable (Ruby & Gibler, 2010) rather than as a complex and variegated process. In terms of empirics, the handful of studies that have been published have drawn on data with very limited generalizability (Franke, 1999) or from personal and anecdotal data (Johnson-Freese, 2013). Finally, the theoretical and empirical limitations are reflected in the absence of guiding comparative logic. For nearly all of the published research on PME in the United States, the logic of comparison is between services (Shepherd & Horner, 2010). While Libel (2016) has broken ground with his comparative approach, his work remains limited by its focus on only a handful of European countries. Accordingly, while the research to date is imperfect, it does provide a useful foundation for a new wave of military education research, as evidenced throughout the present volume.

4.3 Methods and Case Selection

This chapter is a probe for a larger project, which aims to provide the first empirical baseline for NATO PME through detailed case studies of the entire population of military education programs in NATO. Our goal at present is to sketch professional military education in two settings (Maxwell AFB, USA and Copenhagen, Denmark). By doing so, we will provide an initial baseline for a comparative, case-oriented approach that can be scaled up through future research (Ragin, 1987, pp. 32–52). This section clarifies the logic of our research methods and case selection, and highlights the key considerations and potential pitfalls for researching officer education.

Following the research process outlined by Rietjens, this chapter focuses on the data collection, reduction, and presentation phases of analysis (2014, p. 139). Employing this case-oriented comparative method of inquiry will allow us “to make meaningful comparisons of cases as wholes” (Ragin, 1987, p. 16). While the broader research project will study a wide array of variables, in this chapter, we focus our comparison on three key metrics: form of education (residence, hybrid, or online learning); focus of education (service-specific vs. joint); and hours of instruction, operationalized by number of hours students spend in lectures and seminars, both on campus and via online platforms (this is sometimes referred to as “contact hours”). These three variables provide an initial overview of the key differences and similarities between these PME programs, and will provide a foundation for further analysis. Together with these specific variables, we also provide a detailed description of the subject matter covered in each of the courses and programs examined.

Because this chapter functions as a probe, our case selection demanded careful consideration. The challenge has been that even the simplest parameters for analysing this topic remain resolutely underdetermined. For example, simply answering the question of how many PME institutions exist in the NATO member states has proven unattainable. We derive our cases from a sample that has undergone three conceptual refinements: first, we distinguish between education and training; second, we separate the institutions into four tiers; and finally, we isolate mainline programs within institutions.
Contemporary research on PME is particularly indebted to Joan Johnson-Freese’s (2013) careful distinction of education (understood in the humanistic sense of learning as such) from training (understood as the guided acquisition of narrow or technical skills). In this sense, PME may be understood to fall under a larger umbrella of adult learning, and encompasses only those efforts by military organizations to teach their adult students (who are mostly but not entirely officers) how to think in abstract and theoretical terms about topics considered relevant to the knowledge base of an officer. This is not simply an analytic distinction, but rather maps onto internal logics within the global population of how militaries teach. By focusing on military education, we drop all institutions dedicated to military training, from military nursing colleges to flight schools to chaplain seminars. Further, by focusing on professional military education (PME), we drop all instances of enlisted, non-commissioned officer and warrant officer education, and all cases of education primarily focusing on defence-sector civilian employees (including, for example, paramilitary employees such as coast guard or gendarmerie).

Let us briefly consider the global population of PME institutions, that is, institutions educating, not training, primarily officers. There is no reliable public data that comprehensively lists these institutions. To gain an overview of this population, we systematically searched through public records for all 193 sovereign states that were members of the United Nations as of 2018. This public data scrape yielded well over four hundred distinct institutions named in public records on the internet, from Afghanistan’s Marshal Fahim National Defence University to the Zimbabwe Military Academy. This population has a low confidence threshold, since many institutions lack an official web presence and there is a significant likelihood that many institutions are “not missing at random” (for example, some countries may prefer to hide details about their education of officers).

Narrowing in on our particular interest, NATO PME, we find over sixty distinct institutions named in publicly accessible sources on the internet in the 29 NATO member states. In order to improve our confidence in both the accuracy of the institutions we have named and the information on missing data not being lacking, we submitted official Requests For Information through the network of Danish defence attachés for each member state. From this process, we have confirmed the accuracy of our data for twelve countries, although we withhold our full confidence in this assessment, as security considerations may lead officials to dissemble.

Militaries educate their officers in a variety of settings for a variety of purposes, and so many different logics of categorization may be employed to give order to this diversity. One important distinction lies between single-service-based education and joint or whole-of-defence-based education. Equally justifiable would be to distinguish based on size of the state, size of the force, the basic organization of the force (all volunteer or conscript-based, for example), and any other number of distinctions.

For our purposes, the most salient distinction, and the one that would provide us with the most intellectually valuable source of comparison, comes from career level. Regardless of context, junior officers around the world are charged with a set of responsibilities that resemble one another to a high degree, and differ in equal part from the responsibilities of senior officers. Junior officer education and senior officer education are thus appropriate categories of comparison across national contexts. We further refine this distinction by separating our population into four tiers of
education. At the bottom of the pyramid, militaries educate young adults to become officers, the pre-commissioning phase of PME. Next, militaries educate their young officers to occupy various command and staff positions. Some of these young officers will find success in their careers, and eventually (in many countries) they are educated to become leaders within the organization. Finally, in a small number of countries, these leaders are educated to become the leaders of the organization.

To capture the full scale of PME in the twenty-first century, we have thus drawn ideal types for each of these four levels. The ideal types are (1) junior officer academy, (2) command and staff college, (3) war college, and (4) senior officer finishing school. This logic encompasses all but the final rank of a NATO officer career scale, from (pre-)commissioning (level 1, roughly NATO ranks OF-D, OF-1, and OF-2) to command and staff assignments (level 2, OF-3 and OF-4) to war college (level 3, OF-5 and OF-6) to senior officer finishing school (level 4, OF-7 to OF-9).

These have the benefit of mapping onto the actual system employed in the United States, where the ideal types can be compared to the real institutions quite directly. Thus, the United States Army has its Military Academy at West Point, New York (level 1); its Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (level 2); and its War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (level 3). In the United States, “finishing” is done through the Joint Service CAPSTONE (for 1-stars) and PINNACLE (for 2- to 3-stars) programs (level 4), which are not separate institutions, but rather programs organized through the National Defense University (see Watson, 2007, pp. 28, 39, 55).

In order to compare across national contexts, we must remain alert to the diversity of educational pathways, and here, the United States is the outlier. Of the four levels that are clearly distinct in the American system, most countries in the world appear to have only the first two. NATO member states uniformly appear to have academies to educate their officers (with commissions sometimes awarded at entry and sometimes at departure) and command and staff colleges, but there are few war colleges and fewer senior officer finishing schools. This means that for many NATO officers, the education they receive in their command and staff college may well be the last time they receive a military education, even if they manage to become the four-star generals and admirals leading their services.

While all four levels of PME have equal claims on our attention, level 2 (command and staff college) is significantly more standardized than the other three. At level 1, states differ dramatically in the role assigned to the military academy, and alternative pathways to education abound. While an elite cohort of American Army officers are educated at West Point, for example, many others take civilian degrees and become officers through the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps or Officer Candidate School. Likewise, many countries require their officers to receive civilian bachelor degrees and limit their academies to training roles. For these reasons, researching NATO education at the junior officer level is analytically challenging. PME at level 3 (war college) poses different challenges, since many countries lack war colleges altogether. Finally, because PME at level 4 (senior officer finishing school) prepares officers for

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10 Our four-tier approach draws inspiration from the U.S. Department of Defense’s method of organizing its Joint Education programs into JPME 1-4.
their very specific national contexts and because very few of these programs have any publically accessible records, effective research is not yet possible.

As noted above, the American senior officer finishing schools are not “schools” in the traditional sense, but rather programs. This brings us to our final analytical distinction, between institutions and programs. A rich understanding of how officers are taught to think about politics (our goal) requires that we focus not at the level of institutions, but rather of military educational programs — that is, the particular pathways through which specified content is conveyed to students in a controlled setting. Educational programs are not perfectly nested within institutions: some institutions offer multiple programs, while some programs may cut across multiple institutions. While there are inevitably exceptions as individuals navigate through the education system in creative and unexpected ways, militaries do have standard pathways designed to control the quality of learning. These mainline educational pathways are of greatest value in comparing across cases.

As researchers come to recognize the importance of PME to domestic and international politics and consequently to social life generally, the need for a sustained and informed dialogue becomes ever more obvious. Throughout this section of this chapter, we have made the case for how we think PME should be studied as a global phenomenon. First, we strictly distinguish between education and training, focusing our attention on how militaries teach their officers to think abstractly about political life. Second, military education can be analytically reconstructed as four stages, which map roughly onto the existing institutional landscape. Third, to unlock the actual learning processes, we need to look inside the curricula and syllabi of individual educational programs, rather than compare among institutions. The programs that most interest us are the mainline programs designed by military organizations to educate their officers at each critical career juncture, from pre-commissioning to command and staff assignments, war college, and senior officer finishing school. We propose that scholars focus specifically on the command and staff level, since this is the most tractable and provides the most readily comparable data.

Finally, then, we can turn to our two cases. For this probe, we chose to focus on one American service command and staff college, the United States Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), and one European joint service college, the Royal Danish Defence College (Forsvarsakademiet) (RDDC). This comparison allows us to explore the mainline mid-career officer education at both a service-based college and a joint-based college, asking basic questions about how American Air Force officers and Danish military officers are taught about politics. At the outset, it is not clear whether these two institutions are expected to teach politics in a similar way or not. On one hand, given the United States’ geostrategic position and given the way air power intersects with politics, we may expect ACSC students will be taught very differently from RDDC students. Further, the two countries differ dramatically in terms of political culture, demographic diversity, size, history, and many other important indicators. On the other hand, Denmark is a NATO member and close American ally, so we may expect some degree of commonality. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, Danish officers have excellent English-language skills. In the next section, we provide an overview of the relevant programs at these two institutions, and in the following section, some preliminary conclusions for our probe.
4.4 The Political Education of Officers at ASCS and RDDC

In the following sections, we will outline the ACSC and RDDC curricula of international relations and strategy, thereby illustrating the similarities and differences in fundamental thought instilled in the students.

US Air Command and Staff College

ACSC is located physically and administratively within the Air University (AU), an umbrella organization which itself is located on the Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama. Students who enroll in ACSC’s in-residence degree program live on campus for the ten-month degree program, and are required to attend seven mandatory courses as well as four electives. In the core curriculum, students study global politics primarily in the following courses: War Theory (Aug-Oct), International Security I (Nov-Dec) and International Security II (Jan-Mar). We examine the syllabi for these courses from the 2017-2018 (War Theory) and 2018-2019 (International Security I and II) academic years. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the course progression.

**Figure 1**: United States Air Command and Staff College Degree Plan (Source: airuniversity.af.edu/ACSC/Curriculum/#acsc-core-curriculum)

**War Theory.** War Theory aims at preparing leaders and military professionals of the joint force to be “strategically minded, critical thinkers and skilled joint warfighters” (ACSC War Theory Syllabus, 2017, p. 3). Thus, at a time when the international security environment is highly complex and uncertain, it is the goal of the course to provide military professionals educational competences to develop their own “theory of war”, and prepare them intellectually for future armed conflicts (ACSC War Theory Syllabus, 2017, p. 4). The course is divided into three phases, employs an interdisciplinary approach to the study of war by integrating several scholarly disciplines, and carries a methodology that combines foundational theories of war with close analysis of historical and contemporary case studies. This allows students to understand the importance of adaptation and innovation, as well as how theory...
and principles of war apply to the operational level of war across the range of military operations. Further, it expands students’ ability to think critically about war in general – beyond the level of tactics to that of policy, strategy, and operations – and to anticipate and recognize change in armed conflict, and communicate such understanding with clarity and precision (ACSC War Theory Syllabus, 2017, p. 3). In total, students in this course have 48 hours of instruction.

The first phase of War Theory explores the nature of war, thus seeking to deepen students’ understanding of war as political, social, and cultural phenomena, with its own inherent and fundamental purpose and logic (ACSC War Theory Syllabus, 2017, p. 3). Students are introduced to the works of classical military theorists as a way of grasping the underlying purpose, role, and function of armed forces. Here, politics is introduced through close readings of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu in particular, with Clausewitz representing war as “direct” politics and Sun Tzu representing war as “indirect” politics. The second phase of War Theory deals with the question of how war and military thought, in other words, theory and principles of war, have evolved across the military domains over the last two centuries. This phase begins with three days’ studying the land, maritime, and air domains, and a further three days’ studying each of the three offsets (nuclear, precision-guidance, and information predominance). Students are exposed to the land domain through the lens of positional warfare and movement, to the maritime domain through the lens of strategic airpower debate. The three offsets are presented in an evolving history of American thinkers adapting new technologies to ensure military superiority over near-peer adversaries. The final phase of the course is quite short, with just two meeting days in which the students discuss the new wars debate and the challenges of strategic uncertainty. The politics theme is reintroduced in the final readings, particular in selections of Emile Simpson’s *War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics*. The syllabus glosses Simpson as arguing “contemporary armed conflict has blurred the distinction [between] military activity and politics. As you read, consider the implications of his argument for future armed conflicts” (ACSC War Theory Syllabus, 2017, p. 37).

**International Security I.** International Security I provides the foundations for understanding the international system of states. The course presents three overarching theories from which to build: Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism\(^\text{11}\) (ACSC International Security 1 Syllabus, 2018, p. 5). These theories and their core concepts are all part and parcel of prompting thoughtful reflection of the power symmetry – or lack thereof – at the grand strategic and military perspective, which is the subject of the course. This understanding allows decision-makers at the tactical and operational levels of war to understand and amalgamate the multiple levels in the context of the international environment. It is thus a course that drives students to think critically on the underlying assertions about the international system, which continuously drive US grand strategy. Throughout the course, the students will apply these theoretical frameworks on different analytical cases. The course draws liberally from philosophy, political science, history, and security studies (ACSC International Security 1 Syllabus, 2018, p. 5).

\(^{11}\) To gain a greater insight in these theories, see Jackson and Sorensen (2007).
As with War Theory, International Security I consists of three phases, each covering a 5-day period. The themes are: 1) the geopolitical environment, 2) the unipolar moment, opportunities, and challenges, and 3) emerging multipolarity and 21st century security issues. The initial phase covers the theories and foundations of realism, liberalism, constructivism, international order, and US foreign policy and grand strategy. The second phase covers globalization, nationalism, human security, WMD proliferations, and the cyber domain. The final phase covers Iran and North Korea, China, Russia, violent extremist organizations, and strategic surprise. All elements are anchored in a broader framing of the overarching theoretical foundations of international relations, in other words, realism, liberalism and constructivism (ACSC International Security 1 Syllabus, 2018, pp. 4–5). In total, students in this course have 48 hours of instruction.

Phase 1 focuses on the development of the understanding of the theories and placing them in an international context. Specifically, it delves into the setting of the power and capabilities in the anarchical system, meaning security, and how states pursue security through the framework of the three traditions. This phase uses primarily the Cold War and the example of the great power interactions – in other words, grand strategy – which is the focus of the first phase (ACSC International Security 1 Syllabus, 2018, pp. 4–5). The second phase expands on the great power struggle, exemplified through the use of the case of the Cold War and dives into the aspect of globalization and nationalism in the context of the international system. Here, the focus is on their underlying drivers. Again, the worldview is US-centric, and concerns itself with what is, essentially, the grand strategic response to emerging globalization (ACSC International Security 1 Syllabus, 2018, p. 5). The third phase focuses on the emerging powers and the emergence of the multipolar world. Again, the focus is on how to understand this in the setting of the international system, and through the lens of the different theoretical frameworks of the theories of international politics (ACSC International Security 1 Syllabus, 2018, p. 5).

**International Security II.** The course International Security II builds on the first course, by delving into deeper understanding of military strategy, and strategic employment of the US military in relationship to its capabilities and limitations. In this course, the goal is to understand what strategy is, and how US military strategy in the context of achieving national security interests can be employed. This is done by splitting the course into three distinct phases, which all tie into what military strategy is, and how to understand it in different contexts. The course introduces students to specific theoretical strategic concepts, applies these concepts to various cases, and thereby invites students to evaluate the validity and utility of these strategic concepts (ACSC International Security 2 Syllabus, 2018, pp. 4–5). In total, students in this course have 48 hours of instruction.

Phase I examines decision-making by focusing on the nexus of “political-military integration and strategic outcomes” (ACSC International Security 2 Syllabus, 2018, p. 4). Phase II builds on phase I, by integrating into the equation of military strategy the factors that shape strategic assessment, adaptation, and decision-making during wartime. Adding this element allows the student to understand the unknowns, the cognitive and psychological biases, and the process of conducting civilian military relations under fire. It adds in factors that affect the strategy and the ability to formulate it, thus reinforcing students’ understanding that military strategy does not
happen in a vacuum (ACSC International Security 2 Syllabus, 2018, pp. 4–5). Phase III concentrates its efforts around taking into account the point of view of the Department of Defense’s Geographic Combatant Commands (Africa Command, Central Command, European Command, Indo-Pacific Command, Northern Command, and Southern Command). Students are introduced to the military-strategic objectives, capabilities, and limitations of command, and encouraged to reflect on the reciprocity between military actions and political objectives. This is done through a series of case studies intended to foster critical thinking (ACSC International Security 2 Syllabus, 2018, p. 5).

**Royal Danish Defence College**

American officers typically attend their own service’s command and staff college, although many do elect to attend another service’s college and some attend the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. By contrast, Denmark has consolidated its PME in a single institution, the Royal Danish Defence College, which includes both PME level 1 within separate military academies that also serve as internal administrative units, and a joint service degree program (the Master of Military Studies), which serves as the *de facto* command and staff college.¹² Unlike ACSC, all Danish advanced military education is undertaken through blended learning, meaning a mix of both resident and distance learning, and the students remain employed in their regular military “day jobs” throughout their studies. (RDDC homepage: Uddannelsens formål og indhold).

![Figure 2: Royal Danish Defence College Degree Plan](source: fak.dk/uddannelse/mms/indhold/opbygning/Pages/default.aspx)

¹² The Royal Danish Defence College (Forsvarsakademiet) includes the three service-based Danish military academies (*Hærens Officersskole*, *Søværnets Officersskole* and *Flyvevåbnets Officersskole*), although the army academy is physically located nearby at Frederiksberg Palace.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the course progression in Danish. The left scale is number of European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) points per course, and the right scale is time (“three years”). Near the bottom of the figure, three courses, Military Leadership, Military Strategy and Military Operations, are listed as mandatory (alle moduler er obligatoriske). Above these are six courses from which students must choose one per topic (Military Leadership Advanced A and B, Military Strategy Advanced A and B, and Military Operations Advanced A and B). Next, students choose from a range of FLEX modules (elective courses), and finally, they must complete a thesis (Masterprojekt) on a topic of their choice. Whereas the mandatory courses on leadership and operations may touch on political questions, the heart of political education for Danish officers comes from the three Military Strategy courses, of which all students must do at least two. Notably, war theory (represented on the figure as militærhistorie) is an elective. (RDDC homepage: Opbygning)

**Basic Military Strategy.** The RDDC’s Basic Military Strategy course is a required part of the Master of Military Studies program. The course investigates how the use of military power correlates with the state’s strategic objectives and how the military interacts with the other instruments of state power in the pursuit of national security interests. This is intended to enable students to comprehend the strategic relationship between ends, ways, and means; understand the international political frameworks and context in which the planning and execution of military operations is entrenched; and finally, comprehend and contribute to the formation of political directives relating to planning and execution of military operations (RDDC Basic Military Strategy Syllabus, 2018, p. 1). In total, students in this course have 66 hours of instruction.

The course has three residence periods of about three days each, interspersed with distance learning tasks. In the first residence period, students are introduced to the purpose, role, function, and constituent elements of strategy, and then discuss how strategy is anchored in the political sphere (RDDC Basic Military Strategy Syllabus, 2018, p. 5). The second residence period focuses on the how strategy can be employed in responding to what are now termed “hybrid threats”, where an opponent uses both military and non-military instruments to multiply effects. The point of departure here is on Russia-backed hybrid threats and how Denmark can respond in such cases, with particular attention paid to the cooperation between military and non-military agencies (RDDC Basic Military Strategy Syllabus, 2018, p. 5). The third residence period examines cases where Denmark has been directly involved in armed conflict.

**Military Strategy, Advanced A: Military Strategy and International Conflicts.** While all Danish military Master students are required to take Basic Military Strategy, they have a choice of which advanced strategy course they will take. Some students may take both advanced strategy courses, using one to satisfy the requirement and the second as an elective. The first advanced course focuses on interstate conflict. Building on the Basic course, this seeks to further students’ understanding of international politics, strategic theory, and international law, giving the student the skills necessary to analyze and advise on military strategy at the international level (RDDC homepage: Militær Strategi, Basic module). In total, students in this course have 54 hours of instruction.
The interstate conflict course has three residence modules. The first introduces students to classical international relations theories and also acts as a summary of Basic Military Strategy. Students are then guided through a typology of international conflicts, exploring the causes of conflict, and are briefly introduced to topics in international law. The second module focuses on the South China Sea for an extended case study, exploring the main actors’ military strategy, methods, actions, framework conditions, and international law. The third module looks at emerging military-strategic developments. The focus is on the Baltic Sea and the Arctic as possible sites of competition between Russia and NATO, although other cases are also considered. Students are prompted to reflect on what options a country like Denmark may have in each of the possible strategic engagements on the horizon (RDDC Advanced Military Strategy A Syllabus, 2018, pp. 1–4).

Military Strategy, Advanced B: Military Strategy and Intrastate Conflicts. Where the first advanced course focuses on interstate conflict, the second focuses on intrastate conflict. Particular attention is paid to conflict resolution, how conflicts emerge, and what military, strategic, and social science theories might explain and supply solutions to the different drivers of internal conflict, such as armed rebellion, insurgency, terrorism, civil war, and more. The course draws extensively from social science literature in the attempt to give explanations and solutions to the ongoing internal challenges that multiple collapsed, failed, and near-failing states suffer from. The course is centered around four residence periods, each with its own focus (RDDC Advanced Military Strategy B Syllabus, 2019, p. 4). In total, students in this course have 59 hours of instruction.

The first of the four modules is focused on the causes, background, and handling of intrastate conflicts. Students are invited to consider how conflicts emerge, what drives conflict, who the stakeholders in a conflict are, what are their motivation and goals, and what is the character of such conflicts. This draws from sociology, economic theory, and international relations theory. The period revolves around the institutions and power-dynamics – or lack thereof – in Syria and Iraq, coupled with external stakeholders’ motivations, goals, and actions (RDDC Advanced Military Strategy B Syllabus, 2019, pp. 4–5). The second module delves into the different strategies that militaries might employ in the attempt to resolve such a conflict. These include different forms of counterinsurgency, host nation support, foreign internal defense, and more. This presence period takes a strategic perspective of the conflict (RDDC Advanced Military Strategy B Syllabus, 2019, pp. 4, 6). The third module discusses the options regarding international law, considering what options and limitations there are regarding the employment of different strategic tools for various types of intrastate conflict (Advanced Military Strategy B Syllabus, 2019, pp. 4, 7). The fourth and last of the modules shifts to consider the operational options of the case scenarios, focused on the use of special forces. Students are given examples from mission deployment, to allow them to reflect on how special forces may be employed successfully in intrastate conflicts (RDDC Advanced Military Strategy B Syllabus, 2019, pp. 4, 7–8).
Table 1: Sum up of findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of education*</th>
<th>Focus of education**</th>
<th>Geopolitical Outlook</th>
<th>Hours of instructions***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Command and Staff College (ACSC)</td>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>Service specific</td>
<td>National (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC)</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>International (NATO)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Residence, hybrid or online, ** Service specific or joint, *** Contact hours per course

As we can see in Table 1, despite their many similarities, the ACSC and RDDC curricula do differ in certain important respects. ACSC is a residential program; RDDC’s program is hybrid, with students expected to do much of their learning outside the classroom. The focus of the ACSC program is service-specific, in this case oriented around the Air Force and concepts of air power. The RDDC program is joint, with equal time given to land, maritime, and air power concepts. The ACSC program expresses an American national outlook, while the RDDC program is international, rather than Danish, in its outlook. While the ACSC courses take place residually over a period of 48 contact hours each, the hybrid-learning RDDC program entails many contact hours over a short period.

4.5 Discussion and Conclusions

This chapter compares officer education at the United States Air Command and Staff College and the Royal Danish Defence College. What did we discover through this comparison? First, it is important to note two major structural differences. The American program is a residential program and therefore it demands much more of students’ time than the Danish program. In addition, the Danish college is a joint service college, and therefore introduces students to topics from land, maritime, and air perspectives, while the American case is, of course, a service college, and unsurprisingly offers a much more air-centric curriculum. Nevertheless, both offer comparable introductions to international security, covering similar themes and drawing upon many of the same authors. Indeed, we find the similarities between the programs to be more compelling than the differences.

This chapter serves as an introduction and probe. We introduce a problem that we believe should concern the social and political sciences broadly, namely, the absence of good data on how military officers are taught to think about politics. We argue that this is indeed a problem, given the expanding role of high-ranking officers on the world stage. We conclude from the theoretical framing that there is an urgent need for a new empirical baseline for NATO professional military education, understood as a global phenomenon with a huge amount of diversity. As a probe, we present here a simplified account of two cases. Our research question asks how NATO officers are educated to think about politics. From these preliminary cases, we infer that different institutions, unsurprisingly, have different perspectives, and that these map onto their broader institutional affiliations and national perspectives. These officers
are taught along standard academic lines, and are presented perspectives that may be joint or single-service-oriented, and nationally or internationally focused. This is, however, only the initial probe into a broader comparative logic of educating military elites.

The logic of comparison is, in our view, of equal value to the specifics of what we have found in these cases. To compare across something as diverse as military education, it is necessary to find ways to make the data tractable. To that end, we understand our research topic as adult learning conducted within military organizations. We narrow our field by focusing only on the education (understood in its narrow sense) of professional officers, leaving aside the role of military training. Further, we divide PME into four levels, and argue for the benefits of this initial phase of research focusing on the command and staff college level (the education of captains and majors). Finally, we argue that scholars of PME need to look under the hood, so to speak, by analyzing the specific content of programs of study, rather than the organizations and institutions housing those programs.

At the United States Air Command and Staff College and at the Royal Danish Defence College, international politics is framed through the lens of basic academic international relations theories. These theories are then used to make sense of cases of historical and contemporary conflicts. For the ACSC students, significant stress is placed on Clausewitz’s insight that war is fundamentally political, although from the syllabi, it appears that this focus on politics tends to recede as the students look more deeply into how American military thinkers have theorized the battlespace in the past. ACSC students walk away from an intensive, 11-month-long residential degree having been exposed to the role of politics in land, maritime, and air domains, and with familiarity with the US Geographic Combatant Commands and emerging strategic challenges. Students at the RDDC are given more or less the same scholarly foundation, but have much less time for the courses. Their education focuses richly on a handful of highly salient case studies. It is important to note that where the American students are taught broadly about possible American responsibilities in the global security environment, Danish students are taught about a narrower spectrum of cases, but with the additional focus on not only their own national role, but also the American and NATO alliance roles in each case. The differences between the programs, tabulated in Table 1, reflect what we expect to be a typical range of variations, but what is more striking is the deep intellectual commonalities in these two cases. It remains to be seen how much variance exists in the total population.

The chapters of this book address a topic that is at once extremely relevant for both political and social scientists broadly, and also largely uncharted. There are many unknown unknowns. The literature thus far, which we have argued has been built on weak empirical foundations, propagates the belief that many PME programs are plagued by a vicious circle. The logic here is that militaries incentivize operational roles and discourage talented officers from returning to teach the next generation of leaders. This may (or may not) lead to a cycle of poor officers being assigned to teaching roles, and doing that job poorly as well, with generation after generation of officers benefitting less and less from their education. Thus, we have spirited critiques of PME ranging from Johnson-Freese (2012) to Cancian (2016) to Ogden (2017) and beyond.
Our aim in this chapter is constructive. We encourage commenters and policymakers alike to think comparatively and explore the range of options before drawing their own conclusions. As a final point of consideration, the global academic job market is today marked both by dramatic oversupply of PhDs (“They called my university a PhD factory”, 2018) and by declining numbers of traditional tenured jobs (Heffernan, 2017). This may be the place to look for a structural solution, a supply of permanent staff educated in how to educate and able to teach from a research perspective.

References

Syllabi

Secondary Material


TRAINING FOR RETURNING – PEACEKEEPERS’ HOMECOMING EXPERIENCES

Ulla Anttila

Abstract

Homecoming and change management after it may be more challenging than leaving for a deployment in an international crisis management operation. This article focuses on the thoughts of three Finnish focus groups, which have experience of homecoming from military crisis management operations. The interviewed focus groups were recently returned peacekeepers, volunteers for peacekeepers telephone support hotline and a group of disabled peacekeepers.

The results of the study are interpreted in the context of understanding the change management, which returning peacekeepers go through. The results are analysed in the context of action competence and resilience in terms of developing military training, education and psychosocial support practices. This article focuses on how the training of the peacekeepers could be developed in order to support peacekeepers’ homecoming and change management related to it. Peer support, familial issues and psychosocial support are also discussed due to their importance to peacekeepers.

In accordance with the results of the study, the follow-up of Finnish veteran peacekeepers’ wellbeing and arrangements for their training after homecoming could be developed in order to enhance post-operational change management. Such recommended follow-up and training procedures could also be studied in order to get data, how to develop further the follow-up and training for veteran peacekeepers. Besides, the wider question of developing the education of the military and training procedures for peacekeepers prior to and during the operation are assessed at a more general level. Even though the deployment in military crisis management does not usually lead to severe mental problems, it may still have a strong impact on an individual after the operation. More elaboration of these questions is also needed in different curricula for the education of soldiers and officers.

Keywords: peacekeepers, veterans, homecoming, training, change management

This chapter underwent a double-blind peer review process in which the two reviewers were academics with specific expertise in the given field. Manuscript was accepted based on editors’ and reviewers’ consideration of revisions.
5.1 Introduction

**Armed conflicts, peacekeeping and military crisis management**

After the era of Cold War, peacekeeping and peace support operations have become more robust and complex and they often consist of higher risks (Curran 2013). Contemporary wars typically “take place in the context of the disintegration of states”, and violence is mostly targeted against civilians. Often the distinction between private and public is far from clear in warfare, which complicates the situation. (Kaldor 2007, pp. 3–5.)

Riskier operations are also more challenging for the personnel involved. Especially since the 1990s the United Nations and the international community have focused on the questions, how to provide protection to the victims of the armed conflicts. Peacekeeping activities and support to peace operations have been developed. According to Mac Ginty, Joshi and Lee (2019), UN peacekeeping, which supports a liberal peace accord, positively affects the duration of peace.

Changes in armed conflicts and conflict management also challenge how the training of the peacekeepers should be carried out. Besides military training, also training to promote negotiation and conflict resolution skills of the peacekeepers has been emphasized (Curran, 2013). Regarding UN peace operations, it has been found important to strengthen training programmes’ ability to get trained personnel also be deployed in UN missions (Solli et al., 2011).

Finnish peacekeepers have been deployed since 1956, and approximately 55,000 deployments with 50,000 individual peacekeepers from Finland have taken place. Nowadays, Finland contributes to nine missions, of which UNIFIL in Lebanon is the largest one. (Finnish Defence Forces, 2018; Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2018a and 2018b; Holma, 2018.) Due to the changes in armed conflicts and especially their management in the context of the EU and NATO peace operations, Finland renewed the law and changed the name of the legislation in 2006 (Finlex, 2019; Palosaari, 2013).

**Action competence**

Action competence refers to a holistic approach to human beings, and it underlines inseparable physical, psychological, social and ethical dimensions of each of us to be able to act and react in purposeful ways. This holistic perspective is useful in the world, in which individuals may need to change their identities. (Toiskallio, 2009, pp. 48–50.) Action competence has been widely used as defined by Jarmo Toiskallio (2009) in military pedagogy in Finland, and therefore, it is also well known as a concept among the military in Finland. Due to its wide applications in military pedagogy, action competence is a useful concept for developing practices and policies to enhance peacekeepers’ wellbeing.

Jarmo Toiskallio has enlarged a more traditional view of action competence with an ethical dimension. This enlargement is especially relevant regarding soldiers’ work because they have a mandate to use armed force in their duties, which require taking responsibility. As Jarmo Toiskallio (2017) defines it, responsibility is at the core of the
ethical competence. Schok et al’s (2007) finding that “construing positive meaning from war and peacekeeping experiences, especially related to combat exposure or high perceived threat, is associated with better psychological adjustment” can be interpreted in terms of action competence. Finding meaning of the operation may be crucial for finding a personal balance in ethical and psychological terms after returning home from an operation. Prior to, during and after peacekeeping or military crisis management operations, action competence is a relevant concept in relation for understanding the wellbeing of peacekeepers and any challenges to it.

**Change management and resilience**

Homecoming from an operation may be more challenging for a soldier than leaving home for a deployment in military crisis management (Anttila, 2012). Therefore, it is important to understand, what kind of dynamics these changes from home to the operation and from the operation back home include. As work, military crisis management and peacekeeping duties include both higher risks and moving away from one’s home country. These changes may be much more intensive than, for example, working in military duties which do not require a deployment in a higher-risk environment in another country.

Potentially traumatizing events’ impact on soldiers and peacekeepers has been studied. Much research has focused on severe symptoms caused by being deployed in the battlefield or in peacekeeping operations with higher risks. However, in the aftermath of Vietnam war more research focused on soldiers’ reactions after traumatic events, and the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has existed only since 1980 (Seligman, 2013, p. 155; Poijula et al., 2015). In studies with broader than a military focus, the emergence of PTSD has been found affected by a multitude of factors, including gender, cultural factors and age (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2014, pp. 485–491). In the research focusing on Finnish peacekeepers, however, the risk for post-traumatic stress disorder has been found low (Kaikkonen & Laukkala, 2016).

Traumatic experiences do not necessarily cause posttraumatic stress disorder. There is also an option of posttraumatic growth, which means that a traumatic experience contributes to posttraumatic growth instead of posttraumatic stress disorder (Seligman, 2013). Through training it is possible to provide tools for supporting posttraumatic growth in advance to or during the deployment. Because it is impossible to predict who face potentially traumatizing events during the peacekeeping operation, supportive education and training should be provided to all the soldiers.

Regarding homecoming and the period after it, less attention has been paid to the personnel in less risky operations, long-term impact of the operations as well as women peacekeepers’ homecoming and coping (Brounéus, 2014). However, both riskier and less risky operations signify changes for the deployed personnel, and it is important to understand the meanings of the changes in relation to different types of operational environments. Talking about passed experiences in peacekeeping operations has been found beneficial for peacekeeping veterans (Greenberg et al., 2003).

Handling the changes after homecoming from a military crisis management or a peacekeeping operation is defined as *change management* in this article. In the
psychological framework, resilience signifies a "competence or positive and effective coping in response to risk or adversity" (Mayordomo et al., 2016). Change management can be identified as part of resilience and action competence. A resilient person can handle his or her resources adequately even when having noticeable symptoms due to the adversity (Southwick & Charney, 2018). Change management can also be analysed in the framework of psychological, social, physical and ethical action competence. It is related to psychological action competence, but it may also be related to its social and physical action competence and to a certain extent also to ethical action competence.

**Family resilience**

Recently more research has focused on military families and their resilience. Further research on the topic of family resilience in military families is needed. However, for example, a deployment’s impact on the children of military families appears to be mediated by parental reactions including their wellbeing, stress and psychopathology both on behalf of the parents, who are deployed or who stay at home with the children (Palmer, 2008; Paley et al., 2013). The partners of the peacekeepers, who suffer from PTSD, have a higher risk of getting psychological symptoms than the partners of peacekeepers who do not suffer from PTSD (Dirkwager et al., 2005). Familial issues, including support from the family, affect peacekeepers’ motivation as well as how motivated they are to be deployed in later operations (Tomforde, 2005).

In Finland, peacekeepers’ families’ reactions during or after the operation have not been extensively studied, which can be seen as a deficit of knowledge concerning understanding the impact of peacekeeping service. Family members have been found to be affected by a peacekeeping deployment, but the peacekeepers in the study had not been affected by PTSD, and therefore the impact on the families has not been found large either (Kallionalusta, 2010).

**Developing training and education by learning from the experiences from the field**

Resilience training and education have been developed for the military context in order to strengthen psychological resilience, facilitate soldiers’ adaptation and to prevent post-traumatic stress disorder. Resilience training consists of different components including understanding the relations between an adversity, its emotional consequences and beliefs related to the adversity. One consequence of the training is a better understanding of the fact, that emotions are not derived from an adversity but are rather an outcome of an individual’s interpretation of it. (Seligman, 2013, pp. 152–181.)

In Finland, the training and education of a peacekeeper takes place after military service, which is based on the conscription of male citizens. A peacekeeper’s training consists of the following phases: preliminary training, basic training, complementary training and post-operational training, of which the preliminary training is planned to be part of the education for the peacekeepers, who work in demanding duties (Finnish Defence Forces, 2019a; 2019b). A peacekeeper’s potential psychological difficulties after returning are described in the Peacekeeper’s Guide, which is an information booklet for peacekeepers and their families (see Finnish Defence Forces, 2019b).
In the Finnish context, questions related to homecoming, are handled in the education and training of soldiers, but it is, however, relevant to ask, whether there has still been sufficiently training and education concerning the topic. In the training prior to the operation, psychosocial support to the peacekeepers and the legislation, on which the services are based, are introduced (Ryhänen, 2019). The official guide, which is distributed to all the recruited peacekeepers, their families and close relations, also contains guidance related to peacekeepers’ wellbeing and homecoming. Potential challenges after homecoming are not a prioritized theme in these trainings prior to the operation, but the various questions related to the homecoming are in the programme of the post-operational training.

Finnish soldiers who are deployed to military crisis management duties, attend at least in the preoperational and one post-operational training. A post-operational survey for the returned peacekeepers is also carried out concerning every veteran (Finnish Defence Forces, 2019b). In Finland, training for peacekeeping is only part of the soldiers’ training, while for example in Denmark, crisis management training plays a major role in soldiers’ training (Oikarinen, 2014). These differences are dependent on the priorities in the defence policy.

Peacekeepers’ decisions to be recruited and how they motivate the recruitment to the operation to their families are dependent on the information, which they receive prior to the operation (Nybo, 2016). In 2015 approximately, one third of the peacekeepers were recruited from the personnel working for the armed forces on a regular basis. On the other hand, a majority of Finnish professional soldiers have been found unwilling to serve in crisis management. (Niemelä, 2016.)

Methods based on Stress Exposure Training have been found successful in the training for military crisis management (Vähä-Mäkilä, 2013). There is potential for stress reduction training, because it may be useful for peacekeepers due to the practical techniques of stress control and of one’s awareness on one’s reaction to stress.

5.2 Material and method

When developing practical solutions to improve training and education of the crisis management personnel, it is important to understand former peacekeepers’ experiences. Therefore, in this research, the interviewees are seen as experts, who, through telling about their experience, can help understand how policies on homecoming and especially on training can be improved in order to facilitate the lives of peacekeeping veterans. Traditionally, Finland has deployed a large proportion of its troops for peacekeeping duties from the reserves, and therefore, this research elaborates largely their perspectives on homecoming. The research question for this research article is defined as follows:

How could peacekeepers’ training be developed in order to support peacekeepers’ homecoming and to provide the best forms of psychosocial support?

In Chapter 5.1, the theoretical background of the article has been introduced, and the material and methods are presented in Chapter 5.2. The results are documented first (5.3) in accordance with the focus groups of the study. The results from the three
focus groups are analysed later in this chapter also by comparing the results from different focus groups. The results are finally analysed in the context of military education and peacekeepers’ training and the recommendations for further research in the Discussion of the article in Chapter 5.4.

Three focus groups and the specific features of the research procedure are introduced in Table 1 below. All the interviewees were Finnish, and they were informed about the and the background of the study. The interviews and surveys were carried out in 2018.

Table 1. Research Procedure and focus groups of the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>recently returned peacekeepers</th>
<th>Volunteers in the telephone support hotline</th>
<th>Disabled peacekeeping veterans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=13</td>
<td>N=10 (survey); N=4 (group interview)</td>
<td>N=4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returning no more than three years ago (with one exception).</td>
<td>Experienced with volunteering in the telephone support hotline for peacekeepers, peacekeeping veterans and their families.</td>
<td>Disability or other health problem that had started during or after homecoming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Two focused interviews 2. A writing activity called &quot;a letter from the future&quot; between the interviews 3. A survey questionnaire with complementary questions</td>
<td>1. A survey questionnaire to all the volunteers in the telephone support hotline 2. A group interview 3. An opportunity to comment on a summary of the interview and a complementary questionnaire</td>
<td>1. A group interview 2. survey questionnaire with complementary questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To understand how recently returned perceive homecoming and how they intend to develop veterans’ support system (including post- operational training) for veterans.</td>
<td>To understand how peer support volunteers/experts perceive peacekeepers’ homecoming and need for support and training</td>
<td>To understand the specific needs of peacekeeping veterans with disability in terms of psychosocial support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All the interviewees had personal experience from peacekeeping work as well as from returning home from peacekeeping missions. By interviewing the three different focus groups it is possible to get complementary information about peacekeepers’ thinking after homecoming. The recently returned peacekeepers can memorize their recent experiences of homecoming and describe how they assess the needs to develop both training and psychosocial support of the peacekeepers.

Because the focus groups have different experiences, the idea of the study was to get different focus groups’ perspectives included when intending to assess the further needs to develop psychosocial support for the returnees. Both questions related to health care and social services as well as peer support were handled in research interviews.

Even though these ideas are embedded especially in Finnish peacekeeping legislation and voluntary peer support activities, that are mostly carried out by the Finnish Peacekeepers Association. The interviewees’ documented views, how they perceive the changes related to coming home from a mission, may provide relevant information for considering, what kind of long-term impact various missions may have on the lives of peacekeeping veterans.

All three focus groups of peacekeeping veterans were interviewed about their views, how to develop support to former peacekeepers after homecoming. Recently returned veterans were also interviewed in detail about their experiences after homecoming. The recently returned peacekeepers were interviewed between January and August 2018 and filled in a questionnaire consisting of complementary questions in Autumn 2018. The telephone support volunteers filled in a survey and group of them attended a group interview in May 2018. The disabled reservist peacekeepers attended a group interview in June 2018. The interview technique in use was focused or half-structured interviewing.

The study is largely based of using qualitative interviews. The interviews of the recently returned peacekeepers were focused or half-structured interviews. Understanding different ways of thinking about homecoming and the best forms to psychosocial support among the interviewees is at the focus of this study. Qualitative research is interpretive, because it is used for interpreting symbolic material, different interpretations can be valid and because it focuses on research questions, which explore personal or social meanings (Schreier, 2012, p. 21).

A letter from the future was a voluntary exercise for the recently returned peacekeepers to do between the two interviews. They were asked to write “a letter from the future” and to imagine to be in the future so that ten years would have passed since coming home peacekeeping duties. This kind of technique applies a solution-focused procedure to strengthen an individual’s perspectives on the future, today and the past (Isebaert, 2017, p. 132).

The interpretation of the interviews and small-scale survey material is at the centre of this study. However, due to the limited sizes of the samples, the results are interpreted as views of the interviewees, and further research is needed to see whether the results from this study are generalizable.

Because three focus groups of peacekeepers are represented in this research, it is valuable to assess how much the results in these groups have resemblance. Therefore,
the use of three different focus groups plays a role of partial methodological triangulation. Methodological triangulation means using “the same method on different occasions or different methods on the same object of study” (see Cohen et al., 2007, p. 142). In this research, triangulation means gathering material focusing on different focus groups with slightly different methods and the analysis of the results from different focus groups to see how similar the results are. This kind of triangulation is to strengthen the reliability of the analysis.

5.3 Results by the Focus Groups and their Comparison

The main results are presented mostly by focus groups in this chapter, and some comparison of the results is made at the end of the chapter.

Recently returned peacekeepers

The average age of the interviewees was 37 years. Two of the interviewees were women and eleven were men. These interviewees had served in 2.7 operations on average, and four of the interviewees had experience of only one operation. A majority of the interviewees had served for UNIFIL in Lebanon at least once.

Social and economic aspects

Many of the recently returned peacekeepers reported that soon after homecoming, it was easier for them to communicate about the issues related to the past operation with some comrades from the same operation. Many of the recently returned peacekeepers identified themselves with the comrades who had served for the same operation as they. Peer support from the comrades of the same operation was often preferred soon after returning home. Some of the returnees assessed that it was difficult for them “to be present” at home soon after returning. Strengthening one’s ability to talk about passed peacekeeping experiences was recommended by the interviewees in all the focus groups. This difficulty to be present is related to both social and psychological action competence.

Another important aspect of social questions is employment. Some interviewees emphasized that homecoming had been more challenging to them, when they had not had any work where to go, or they could not study either. These interviewees described that they had experienced a clear difference between homecomings when employed and when not. The problem of peacekeepers’ potential unemployment mostly exists, when peacekeepers do not continue to work for the defence forces but are rather recruited from the reserves. Therefore, the social impact of post-operational unemployment is a problem, which requires attention in the countries like Finland, where a large number of reservists are deployed to military crisis management duties.

Finding meaning

Personal processes of thinking about the meaning of the operation may be central to both peacekeepers who are deployed or who have returned from an operation. As one interviewee described, the peacekeeping experience had an impact on his world view (1), and another expressed (6) that he had had difficulties to get motivated at
work after coming back home because he had felt that his previous operational duties had been apparently more important than his duties at work after returning home.

For an interviewee, who had had difficulties to describe his duties and their significance to his personal contacts, the lack of respect on their behalf had been problematic, when searching for the meaning of his duties in Afghanistan (9).

Four of the interviewees found “a letter from the future” exercise very useful and recommendable to other peacekeepers. One interviewee believed that the exercise would be fruitful especially for those peacekeepers, who have not been able to go through the experiences from the operations prior to the exercise.

**Physical and psychological aspects of stress**

Returning home from an operation sometimes means a significant reduction of stress. If the operation has caused stress, both psychological and physical to reduce stress are important. Three of the interviewees (2, 6, 8) underlined that it is important to take a sufficiently long vacation after returning home. Two veterans from Afghanistan mentioned that they still tend to keep their backs towards the wall in outer spaces due to their experiences of risk reduction outdoors during their duties in Afghanistan.

**Change management and support after homecoming**

The change management of the recently returned peacekeepers was assessed with scaling questions. With a scale of 1-10, the interviewees were asked to assess their level of change management immediately after homecoming and at the time of the interview. The best level of the change management in the scale was 10 and the lowest level was 1. The change management level of the recently returned peacekeepers was estimated simply by asking the interviewees about their personal assessment of the level of the change management. Immediately after homecoming the change management level of the respondent had been on average 7.2, when assessed in the first interview, and at the time of the first interviews it was 8.7. Some of the interviewees had felt that their feeling of change management lowered soon after homecoming, even though the level later came higher. However, even though this scaling question on change management is not a standard scale, the result can be interpreted both as a positive sign concerning the evolvement of change management after returning home and as encouraging feedback to follow veterans’ personal views about change management.

Three of the interviewees (7, 10, 12) compared their experiences of homecoming after different operations and concluded, that it was much more difficult to return, if you had no working place or a place, where to start to study. This topic makes a clear difference between the peacekeepers who are recruited from the reserves and who are career soldiers, because career soldiers do not usually need to think about further c.

**How to develop training procedures after homecoming**

Recently returned peacekeepers had slightly controversial views on how to develop the training procedure after homecoming. The interviewees underlined that the post-operational training 1-2 months after homecoming had mostly been successful and
that this type of training procedure could be developed further. There were both supporting and opposing views in terms of developing a second training after returning home from military crisis management duties. Nowadays, recently returned peacekeepers participate a training approximately two months after returning home from a mission. Due to this contradiction, a complementary survey questionnaire was sent to the participants of this focus group.

11 out of 13 interviewees filled in the complementary survey questionnaire. Nine out eleven respondents were in favour of arranging a second (mandatory) post-operational training approximately one year after homecoming. On the other hand, two respondents opposed this type of event for the returnees, and the other one of those two believed that a post-operational training would not be a preferable form of providing psychosocial support for the individuals, who might need it.

Family support

Due to the interview discussion favouring the idea of strengthening support to the families and the close individuals, some questions of the questionnaire focused on what kind of support would be beneficial for family members and also for the interaction in families. Information booklets for family members and close relatives to make the post-operational change management of the peacekeepers more understandable, was one of the ideas that received unanimous support from the respondents.

As one interviewee (8) described, the interaction between a peacekeeper and his/her family change over the time of the deployment. The realities before the deployment, during it, during the vacation and after the deployment are different for the peacekeeper and his or her family members, which affects familial interaction. It is noteworthy that realities and “timelines” of a peacekeeper and the family transform through such processes, which may deteriorate familial interaction and communication. On the other hand, understanding these differences in the realities and their interpretation may improve familial communication.

Coping with challenges

Even though the interviewees could describe their personal challenges after homecoming, it did not necessarily mean that they would have been going through a personal crisis. Some of the interviewees had experience of consultations with professionals of psychosocial support. Three of the interviewees reported such consultations after earlier deployments, one after the latest one and one during the latest operation. However, some of the interviewees also intended to provide support to other returnees from peacekeeping duties and, of them, two had received professional psychosocial support at some earlier time. This finding may emphasize the fact that challenges of change management or some other mental challenges after homecoming do not necessarily mean that these persons would have constant problems in their mental health.

On the contrary, change management as a concept provides opportunities to understand how a temporary phase in an individual’s life span may have impact on his or her mental health, but that with adequate support, it is also possible that a
recovery takes place and that these individuals are capable to provide peer support on their behalf.

**Long-term support and reflecting action competence**

Some of the interviewees underlined that the significance of the long-term support after the operation to the deployed personnel in order to prevent problems in mental health during and after operations. Both female interviewees were in favour of the idea, that peacekeeping operations should provide services of psychologists to the deployed peacekeepers. This type of services would facilitate the communications of the peacekeeping communities, which may not favour communicating about personal challenges as well as change management after homecoming due to their military culture.

Social and psychological action competence are central for change management and dealing with the experiences after homecoming from a peace operation, for example in relation to keeping contacts with previous comrades from an operation or being able to be present and communicate at home. However, also ethical and psychological action competence are relevant for finding meaning for a mission, and physical and psychological action competence in terms of relaxation. On the other hand, change management is related to an individual and his or her psychological capacity to work on various changes.

**Telephone support hotline**

According to telephone support hotline volunteers’ responses to the survey questionnaire, sometimes individuals who call to the hotline are individuals who are in a deep crisis in their lives. In the group interview, the expert of the peer support described, that individuals who typically call to the hotline are either peacekeeping reservists, who have returned to Finland more than five years prior to taking a contact to this service, or family members, who are worried about the current situation with their spouses or other family members, whose are serving or have served as peacekeepers.

According to the survey, the most common reason to call to hotline was assessed to be “a difficulty to communicate”. Topics that had often been discussed were also money, alcohol, insomnia, mental health, adaptation difficulties, fear, question related couple relations, chaotic everyday life and suicidal aspects. If a difficulty to communicate remains as a problem for at least some of those peacekeeping veterans, who have returned home more than five years ago, it means that there is a group of peacekeeping veterans who may benefit from some other psychosocial services than telephone support hotline to alleviate their problems. However, the number of individuals who belong to this group cannot be assessed to the methodology of this study.

The experts of telephone support assessed that post-operational training and support to the returnees can be developed to better respond to the needs of the returnees. A conclusion of the group interview is that returned peacekeepers may need new forms of support. One potential idea would be a peer-support based chat service to the peacekeepers and their families. This expert group was also in favour of the idea that
those individuals who have served in challenging operations would have one or two consultations with an expert of psychosocial support after homecoming. There would also be a need to develop special support for those individuals who have ceased their peacekeeping service. The results on psychosocial support from this focus group also mainly focused on social and to a certain extent on psychological action competence.

According to the experts of the telephone support hotline, peacekeeping experiences may have a dual meaning. On the other hand, it may be a burden even years after the experience, and on the other hand, it may also function as a source of resources and positive memories, and therefore some peacekeeping veterans may call to this hotline, when they face a new personal crisis, because they believe that peer support from a member of a peacekeeping community is reliable.

### Disabled peacekeepers

The interviewed group of four disabled peacekeepers participated in a rehabilitation course for disabled peacekeeping veterans. All of them had gone through major changes in their lives due to becoming disabled either by severe physical injuries or psychological symptoms.

Cooperation improve the situation of veterans with disabilities was important for this focus group. They reported that had they identified themselves to other veterans in the same group, not as much to the veterans who had served in the same operation as they had. Peer support is especially important for the veterans in this group and peer support may also make it easier to seek professional psychosocial support to work on one’s thoughts and emotions.

The interviewees also described that they had actively cooperated to improve the legislation concerning disabled peacekeeping veterans. Active and altruistic work for supporting other veterans with disabilities appeared to be an important part of their lives.

Change management and long-term adaptation are also central processes for disabled peacekeepers. For both those having had severe mental problems after homecoming or having become physically disabled, change management and long-term adaptation require attention. Disabled peacekeepers were in favour of the idea that all the returnees would participate in a second post-operational training approximately one year after homecoming.

Family support is an important issue for those veterans who have become disabled or got mental health problems due to their service in military crisis management. The interviewees’ families had not necessarily received any other official support than one telephone call from their service place after the incident, which had led to the disability. As one interviewee described the process: “No other support besides the one and only phone call, was provided!” The family members would need a support person at least for a year after they have received the information on a peacekeepers’ disability, as one interviewee suggested. The procedures how to support the families of disabled peacekeeping veterans need to be clarified in order to alleviate the lives of these families who face extreme challenges in a completely new situation.
According to the interviewees, the information material provided to the families of all the peacekeepers should also include a kind of list of potential more severe symptoms of mental health problems. This kind of list would help the family members of peacekeeping veterans to react, when needed and to communicate with the veteran about the potential need to seek psychosocial support.

Regarding action competence, the focus in this group discussion was on all aspects of action competence, especially on social and psychological action competence. The participants of the group discussion also emphasized that professionals in the professions in health and psychosocial support services should get further instruction and training concerning the potential impacts of peacekeeping duties for an individual. Nowadays, according to the participants, many professionals may not check this issue when working with the clients of health services.

**Emerging themes in all the focus groups**

The need to improve the follow-up of returning peacekeepers was emphasized by the representatives of all the focus groups of the study. For the recently returned peacekeepers, change management was a process, which they could describe. On the other hand, the experts from the telephone support hotline emphasized that besides that many reservists, who had returned more than five years ago contacted the hotline service in order to get psychosocial peer support. Therefore, there seem to be both shorter term change management and long-term adaptation, which occur as peacekeepers’ internal processes after homecoming.

Peacekeepers who have interrupted the operation should have a special follow-up, because they may need some further support after the operation (an idea from the telephone support hotline). Both peer support and professional psychosocial support should be provided to the returnees. They are options, which are used by individuals in different situations.

The theme of supporting families emerged from all the focus groups. Especially many recently returned peacekeepers emphasized the idea. For the disabled peacekeepers, this theme was important because lack of support to their families had been a notable problem, when their families had received the first calls about the accident/incident from the armed forces.

A better understanding of the potential psychological impacts of the peace operation could facilitate the wellbeing of the families and peacekeepers and their communication.

There are similarities and differences between the groups in terms of the priorities how to develop training of the peacekeepers and relevant services facilitation post-operational change management. The most relevant findings of the article are introduced by focus groups in Table 2.
Strengthening psychosocial support to the returnees was a common theme regarding all the focus groups. For example, some interviewees representing recently returned peacekeepers underlined that further psychosocial support would be needed also during the operation, and two of them proposed that there should be a psychologist consulting every peacekeeping operation.

On the other hand, the disabled peacekeeping veterans underlined, that in the basic and applied education and training of health care personnel, issues related to peacekeeping operations and their potential impact on peacekeepers should be dealt with.

Peacekeepers may feel strong solidarity with their comrades. This solidarity or a strong will to support one’s comrades was found in the interviews of all the focus groups. It reflects altruism, which can be interpreted in the context of posttraumatic growth. Even though not all the interviewees had faced traumatic experiences, they had gone through a life-changing experience of being a peacekeeper. The consequences of emerging solidarity or altruism for comrades may be similar to posttraumatic growth. Work for helping the comrades in the same situation in and after a peacekeeping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peer support identification</th>
<th>Recently returned peacekeepers</th>
<th>Volunteers in the telephone support hotline</th>
<th>Disabled peacekeeping veterans</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The identification especially to the comrades from the same operation.</td>
<td>The telephone support hotline is based on peer support. The identification of peacekeepers tends to change over time. Usually the peacekeepers first identify themselves with their operational service comrades.</td>
<td>Disabled peacekeeping veterans identify to the comrades in the same position.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Change management and longterm adaptation</th>
<th>Recently returned peacekeepers</th>
<th>Volunteers in the telephone support hotline</th>
<th>Disabled peacekeeping veterans</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The change management usually improves gradually, or there may be a kind of collapse soon after homecoming.</td>
<td>Long-term adaptation may differ from the change management soon after homecoming.</td>
<td>PTSD symptoms may come later, which is important for understanding the dynamics of the homecoming.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Family support</th>
<th>Recently returned peacekeepers</th>
<th>Volunteers in the telephone support hotline</th>
<th>Disabled peacekeeping veterans</th>
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<tr>
<td>A booklet for the families needed; the focus should be on the psychology of the operations. Broader opportunities for the families to get information concerning the operation and the psychology of peacekeeping.</td>
<td>Family members take contact to telephone support hotline during and soon after the operation.</td>
<td>Family members of all the peacekeepers need information on potential severe symptoms due to the operations. For the families of the peacekeepers, who have become disabled or got mental illness due to the operation, it would be reasonable to arrange follow-up and support by a support person. The follow-up should continue for at least a year.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Implications for training and follow-up</th>
<th>Recently returned peacekeepers</th>
<th>Volunteers in the telephone support hotline</th>
<th>Disabled peacekeeping veterans</th>
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<tr>
<td>A second training for the returned peacekeepers. It is necessary to develop follow-up mechanisms for the recently returned peacekeepers.</td>
<td>A special consultation for the returned peacekeepers in specific risk groups (those who have interrupted or served in a riskier operation or face potentially traumatizing events).</td>
<td>A second training for the returned peacekeepers. Specified follow-up for the families of the disabled peacekeepers.</td>
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operation can be interpreted as a will to be altruistic due to these life-changing experiences, though they may not have been traumatizing.

In terms of action competence, the results mostly focus on social action competence, which is also dependent on the fact that social contexts were emphasized in the interviews. However, the processing of homecoming is a psychological process. Some of the recently returned peacekeepers also pointed out the physical aspects of homecoming, and some of them also emphasized the ethical action competence by underlining the significance of the operation.

The conclusion from the results is that questions related change management and long-term adaptation can be categorized mostly to be part of social and psychological action competence. This conclusion is necessary to mention to better understand what kinds of implications the results do have in terms of the education and training of soldiers and peacekeepers.

### 5.4 Discussion

The relevance of the results concerning change management and homecoming can also be assessed in the context of the training of peacekeepers and the education of soldiers and officers. Psychological resilience, change management and long-term adaptation deserve strengthening in the curricula of military education and peacekeepers’ training.

Psychological resilience is its nature a psychological concept, and many aspects of action competence contribute to it. It is necessary to analyse how these aspects raised from the results from the empirical analysis of this study and what kinds of impact these results have in terms of developing military training and education and further research. As Southwick and Charney (2018) describe, psychological resilience is based on a multitude of factors, which are not only psychological. Therefore, resilience training requires versatility and knowledge on the basis of resilience.

Operational support and training for personal resilience and change management can be interpreted as part of institutional learning to deal with complex operational environments and their impact on the deployed personnel. Increasing cooperation of peacekeeping training centres and intensifying use of e-learning based methods provide new opportunities for teaching and training of peacekeepers (Curran, 2013, pp. 91–92). Therefore, international co-operation can be a vital part of developing training and education on resilience, change management and long-term adaptation after homecoming.

Reservists were largely on the focus of this research, in particular, when concerning the recently returned peacekeepers. It is necessary to underline that the context of professional soldiers may be slightly different especially when analysing unemployment issues and their impact after homecoming, because professional soldiers mostly continue to work in military duties after homecoming. However, the results can be applied to military education and training. Comparison of the results in different focus groups is a kind of methodological triangulation, which makes the results more reliable.
As it was concluded in the previous chapter, questions related change management and long-term adaptation after homecoming mostly focus on social and psychological action competence and relate to psychological resilience. Therefore, education and training focusing on these themes can be combined with the curricula on social and psychological action competence. However, ethical and physical action competence are also relevant for understanding change management and long-term adaptation.

**Framework for homecoming and long-term adaptation after homecoming**

The results of this study help us think about peacekeepers experiences after homecoming and how we could consider peacekeeping veterans’ homecoming and their change management and long-term adaptation processes.

Psychosocial adaptation to one’s disability or illness has been studied for decades (Järvikoski & Härkäpää, 2014). But what should we think about change management and long-term adaptation to an individual’s personal life after homecoming from a peacekeeping operation? Definitely, this type of change management and long-term adaptation cannot be considered as a similar phenomenon as adapting to any disability or illness.

What are the prerequisites for change management after homecoming from a peacekeeping operation? At least, the ability to communicate about one’s passed peacekeeping experiences and his or her feelings after homecoming appear important. Peer support and familial support alleviate potential challenges. This is consistent with Greenberg et al.’s (2003) findings, according to which speaking about passed experiences is beneficial for peacekeepers and informal networks including peers and families are of importance for getting support.

![Figure 1. Change management, long-term adaptation and symptomatic reactions after homecoming from a peacekeeping operation](image)

Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between change management and long-term adaptation. It is, of course, possible that PTSD may emerge during a deployment or in the midst of long-term adaptation, even though it usually emerges in six months after traumatizing events or experiences of major negative affection (Finnish Institute for Health, 2012, p.180). PTSD may emerge also during the operation.

Change management, which is a shorter-term process after homecoming seem to be improving among recently returned peacekeepers. But as the experts from the
telephone support hotline described, mostly those taking contact to the hotline have challenges in their lives even though they had mostly returned back home several years prior to calling to this service.

There are reasons to believe that change management soon after homecoming and long-term adaptation later after homecoming are slightly different kinds of processes. Both of them may include positive psychological changes, which resemble posttraumatic growth, even though the involved peacekeepers may not have faced potentially traumatizing events during his or her crisis management duties. This phenomenon may be called as internal post-operational growth. It is noticeable that many veteran peacekeepers collaborate to help their former comrades and express this type of altruistic behaviour. In this study, many of the representatives from all the focus groups told about their activities to support their former comrades and other veteran peacekeepers. Naturally, this type of behaviour was part of the selection criteria to the focus group of “the experts of telephone support hotline”. But in the other two focus groups, there were no selection criteria according to which it would have mandatory for the participants of the interviews to carry out altruistic behaviour.

If we relate Figure 1. to the focus groups’ views related to peacekeepers or veterans’ various needs for psychosocial support, it is clear that adequate professional and peer support can play a crucial role in the prevention of severe symptoms. Therefore, it is important that both types of psychosocial support are provided - and strengthened - in order both to prevent and potentially also cure severe psychological symptoms. On the other hand, for getting confirmation of the model as well as deeper understanding on this distinction, it would be valuable to study more the period after veterans’ homecoming as well as, how much change management and long-term adaption differ from each other to get confirmation about this distinction.

However, veterans, who have returned from a military crisis management operation, do not necessarily need any special form of professional psychosocial or peer support. But we have to keep in mind the option that they may need training and support to find themselves rather in the process of posttraumatic growth instead of PTSD. This aspect is relevant for military education and training as well as for the training for health professionals. Regarding military training and education, it is important that the dynamics after homecoming from a military crisis management operation would be handled as a topic, which requires elaboration.

Because peacekeeping veterans with disabilities and rehabilitation needs have not been studied thoroughly, it would also be important to study this group in order to get a more detailed understanding how to develop a comprehensive approach to their needs for service, also including the services to their families and close relations.

**Military training for peacekeeping and military crisis management: a proposal for a development and research project**

The results provide support to the idea of a second post-operational training to be arranged approximately one year after homecoming. It would be a method to strengthen returning peacekeepers’ overall capacity to handle change management after homecoming. However, the recently returned peacekeepers did not support this idea unanimously and the focus group of the experts on telephone support hotline were in favour of a selection of the risk groups and specified service production for
them. One option would be to study the idea introduced above within a Pilot Project, which would be studied within a research procedure with some comparison group. If the suggested procedure to study a second post-operational training is carried out, it will be possible to get research results and information about returned peacekeepers’ perceptions on the training and assess its positive impact in relation to the investments (money, use of time etc.) and to the alternative ways to provide education and support to the returned peacekeepers.

In the same study, it would also be possible to study some other ideas which were developed within the interviews and surveys for this study. It might be possible to compare the procedures of a second training after one year from homecoming and questionnaire surveys or telephone interviews of the returnees or a combination of survey questionnaires and telephone interviewees of the returnees. It may be possible, that the selection to different focus groups of the study could be conducted consistently with the risks of the operations.

Military education

Understanding change management and long-term adaptation as relevant processes for returning peacekeepers is a theme, which may need to be strengthened in military education. When assessing the level of military education, at which this theme should be handled, it is important to take into account that in Finland, a large proportion of peacekeepers are deployed from the reserves. The results of this study focus more on reservist peacekeepers. Therefore, some instruction on this theme would also be adequate in the basic education of soldiers.

At different levels of education for career soldiers and officers, the theme is extremely important. It is also necessary to provide information on the potential differences between career soldiers and reservists in relation to challenges after homecoming. Consistently with the results described in this article, special attention to the employment of the returning reservists may be needed also when teaching, what kind of differences are relevant between deployed reservists and career soldiers. In the Finnish context, change management and long-term adaptation could be handled in the courses of military pedagogy with the focus on international crisis management and peacekeeping operations.

As a scientific discipline, military pedagogy needs to be critical to the education and training of the military (Toiskallio, 2017). In this context being analytical is important. In depth analysis also includes the idea of responsibility to teach and educate military personnel to act with responsibility and to support getting clarifications for understanding the meaning of the operation, which is also important for enhancing resilience among soldiers.

Differences of the timelines after homecoming and familial support

Understanding the differences in a returnee’s timeline may facilitate to arrange relevant training for the returnees and also for those, who provide services for the returnees and their families. For all the persons involved, it is important to understand inner processes of peacekeepers before, during and after operations. If change management and long-term adaptation are seen at least partly different kinds of
processes, it they require slightly different training. Change management takes place soon after homecoming, and long-term adaptation may be a lifelong long-term process. Lifelong training arrangements for the returnees may also be required, if they are necessary for long-term adaptation.

With these results it is impossible to know, how many peacekeepers would need further training also for their long-term adaptation. Is long-term adaptation a suitable term concerning all the returnees or only a limited group of them? It may be difficult to assess this question and find precise research methods for the assessment. However, at least a long-term follow-up procedure concerning the need for psychosocial support could be a way to get more information on this topic.

Peacekeepers’ families may need further information on the psychological impacts of the operations, and this material should also include a check-list for potential more severe impacts of an operation on a returning veteran. The recently returned peacekeepers were in favour of the idea of producing material for the families especially in terms of the psychological impact. However, as the returned peacekeepers in this study have also described the challenges of homecoming as an outcome of difficulties with interaction, the communication questions could also be seen as a theme to be handled in the material and training for the families in order to facilitate communication within the families of returned peacekeepers. Because interaction within a family or a couple may be problematic, more practical tools for dealing with the challenges of interaction and the ways how to improve the communication may also be needed.

It is important that special support is provided to the families of those peacekeepers who have become disabled due to the peace operation. A support person who could have a contact to the family for at least one year was a practical idea expressed by one interviewee for this study. Guidelines for persons who provide the information on a peacekeeper’s wounding would also be needed, and broader guidelines related to policies to support a wounded peacekeeper’s family and close relations might also be needed. In my view, a research project for studying veteran peacekeepers’ families and their adaptation is also recommended.

References


Ryhänen, T. (2019). Notes of the discussion between Timo Rhänen and the author from January 15th, 2019, are in the author’s possession.


Aikaisemmin tässä sarjassa on julkaistu

