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**A Political Biography
of a Tsarist Imperialist
as Administrator of Finland**

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Education

Inheritance and Personality

Frans Seyn was born on 27th July, 1862.¹ His father was Aleksandr Jakovlevič Seyn, colonel of artillery, and then, in civil service, councilor of state. His mother Anna's family name was Moraz.² The Seyn family was of German descent, confessing the Lutheran creed, and belonged to the nobility of the Vitebsk governmental district or *gubernija*.

The Seyns had no landed property. Either the military or the civil service was the proper career for Frans Seyn. He was sent to the military school, *voennoe učilišče*, at Polock to prepare for entering the officers' school.

Vitebsk and Polock are situated in White Russia, on the river Dvina, 70 and 125 miles to the northwest of Smolensk. About a third of the inhabitants were Orthodox White Russians, a quarter were Catholic Poles and Lithuanians, and one-tenth were Jews. The ancient, mighty Polock was only a small town in the nineteenth century, as late as 1910 there were only 30,000 townspeople. The district had been torn from Poland in 1772 and annexed to the Russian Empire. During the rebellion of 1863 the Poles had schemed to reunite these regions with the hoped-for independent Greater Poland.

1 Personal file of Seyn, KKK Fh 7 no. 96. VA. This is the source for all facts concerning Seyn's career mentioned in the following text where no other document is referred to.

2 Tasihin, *Venäjän kieli* . . . p. 100



F.A. Seyn
(Museovirasto)

Thus, Seyn grew up surrounded by ethnic and religious problems, in a region where the security of the empire was not completely ensured. These were the essential questions he was destined to deal with later on.

Seyn was industrious, conscientious, and even enthusiastic in his work. Not even his enemies were able to accuse him of corruption, drinking, or profligacy. The Germans in Russian service were known for their *Tüchtigkeit*, they had to be exceptionally competent and loyal to make headway in competition with Russians, especially in the era of chauvinism. The final stage of Seyn's career lay in enforcing the Russian will on Finland and Finns explained Seyn's zeal with his origins: "... we would much prefer a real Muscovite; Seyn, a German renegade, is worse than the worst".³

There are no reminiscences of Seyn left by people who were favourably disposed towards him. Finns remember him well, but their recollections are so full of rancour that on them it is difficult to have any insight into Seyn's personality:

"Seyn was extremely ambitious, fawning upon his superiors or people he was dependent on; hard and without any consideration to subordinates. He had a detestable fawning way, which made him repulsive from the first moment; in addition to that he was quite unreliable and false. His manners were awkward and clumsy, and his attempts at haughtiness often made him ridiculous..."⁴ He was "mawkishly polite..."⁵, "of gendarme disposition. When he opened the (Finnish) Diet with his shrieking voice it was as if a *Feldwebel* was yelling his commands..."⁶ "... a vile-minded *provocateur*".⁷

It was said that Seyn did not enjoy any popularity in the Russian colony in Helsinki. He had been promoted too fast and was very condescending towards his former colleagues. "That I had often heard at Helsinki".⁸

3 Aspelin-Haapkylä, *Kirovuosien* . . . p. 247

4 Langhoff, *Seitsemän vuotta* . . . p. 172

5 Hjelt, *Från händelserika* . . . I, p. 259

6 Tanner, *Nuorukainen* . . . p. 348

7 Langhoff, *Seitsemän vuotta* . . . p. 347

8 Malin, *Historiallinen* . . . p. 4

The picture resembles the *činovniki* drawn by Gogol or Saltykov-Ščedrin; of course, any bureaucracy produces such despots. It is not easy to distinguish between personal characteristics and the behaviour and habits created by office. Perhaps there is no distinction, suitable people only being adopted to the service. Position creates mentality and milieu dictates opinions; serving for pay and preferment, the careerist contributes to the high ideals he professes to serve. Without property and protection, it was in Seyn's interest to identify with the service, on which he was totally dependent.

Seyn married Sofja Ivanovna, daughter of Major General Ivan Ivanovič Stewen. The Helsinki gossips knew that Seyn's aid Borovitinov was Mrs. Seyn's lover.⁸ After Seyn's death the lady became Borovitinov's housekeeper in Soviet Russia.⁹

Perhaps the zeal Seyn brought to his service was compensation for disappointment or frustration in other spheres of the man's life. Unfortunately no definite conclusion is possible on the scant evidence.

As far as religion, the fine arts, and culture in general are concerned, there is no evidence of any interest on Seyn's part. This view is partly due to the fact that only official papers are available to document his activity. But the Finnish memorists would probably have mentioned it if he had frequented the church, the galleries, or the theatre. In the light of his activity and the official documents he left after him, religion and culture were for him means of furthering his political aims.

Women's rights were of no interest for Seyn (or his colleagues). Women clerks were employed in his office, but not in senior positions. Doctor Tekla Hultin had been given a dispensation by Bobrikov to enter the civil service (in the Senate offices). Her oppositional opinions were deemed to be brazen ingratitude.¹¹ Thus, a woman had no right to office, she ought to have been thankful for being officially freed from her femininity.

⁹ Aspelin-Haapkylä, *Kirovuosien* . . . p. 256

¹⁰ Malin, *Historiallinen* . . . p. 4

¹¹ Lipskii to the Senate 25.XII 1911/9.1.1912. KKK 1912, III dept. no. 56-1, VA

An Officer's Mental Horizon

Frans Seyn started serving the Emperor in 1879. That was the year he entered the Michaelian artillery school. After three years he was promoted sub-lieutenant and appointed to the 38th artillery brigade in Caucasia.

Seyn does not seem to have had any protectors in high places. Nor were benefactors necessary in the artillery; ability was enough for advancement in this branch of the service, as well as in the engineers. For a cavalry officer high birth and protection were essential, while the Guards were totally closed to men lacking these advantages. On the other hand, in the line-infantry it was all too easy for an officer to sink into the stagnant alcoholic slough of the provincial garrisons, which Kuprin has described so depressingly.¹²

The Guards and the Imperial Court were the path to the highest positions in the army, but there *was* a chance for men like Seyn: the military academy. "The Nicholaevan Academy of the General Staff" was professionally on a high level, even if the students were lacking in general culture.¹³ "Officers of the general staff are able and industrious, but they do not know very well the field troops . . . they are rather office workers than field officers"¹⁴ but they were "intellectually superior compared with other officers, so that it is easy to understand that they are favoured in promotions".¹⁵ — These were the views of French officers on their Russian colleagues. They apply rather well to Seyn, too.

Promoted lieutenant, Seyn was accepted into the academy in 1885. His studies did not proceed without reverses: he failed in the first annual examination, had to leave the academy and return to his battery in Caucasia. Seyn did not give up; he tried again, succeeded in the examination, and was readmitted to

12 Bushnell, *The Tsarist* . . . p. 753—780

P.A. Zaiončkovskii, *Soslovnyi sostav* . . . p. 148—154

Stein, *Der Offizier* . . .

13 Travail d'étude du capitaine Paul Dreyfus de l'Etat-Major de la 32^e Division en 1896. Etude sur l'Armée Russe. EMATSH 7 N 1486

14 Rapport sommaire du Capitaine Pendrement 10.X 1912. EMATSH 7 N 1486

15 Rapport du Capitaine Lelong 7/20.VI 1914. EMATSH 7 N 1486
Mayzel, *The Formation* . . .

the academy. He finished the course in 1889 and was promoted junior captain, *štabskapitan*, "on grounds of excellence in studies". About one-tenth of the officers were promoted "for excellence", *za otličie*, a year earlier than the rest of the age class, who were promoted for seniority only, *za službu*.

There is no documentation on Seyn's thoughts during these years of study. All currents of ideas prevalent in Russia touched the élite of the officer corps, too. From Tolstoy to Lieutenant Schmidt, many members of the intelligentsia started their career in the army. But conservative, patriotic ideas won more general support; serving the Emperor and defending the Empire was the *raison d'être* of the military profession. In the light of Seyn's later activity, it would seem that he belonged to those who shared these latter ideas.

The most conservative officers tried to uphold all inherited values. For instance Fadeev, the military author, opposed universal military service, because it made class distinctions disappear. A professional soldier was apt to consider dissatisfaction with the prevailing conditions as an evidence of a lack of discipline, which was best corrected with punishment, not remedied with reform.¹⁶

But soldiers were seen among reformers, too. Many men understood that Russia had to keep up to date in order to maintain her military might. Miljutin, the Minister of War from 1861 to 1881, aimed at the the might, greatness, and unity of the Empire; his means was the unifying and modernization of the army. This activity was in line with the general European trend towards a centralized, bureaucratic state.¹⁷

This trend was connected with national unification. Common military service was intended to promote patriotism,¹⁸ transform the men of the ethnic minorities so that they would Russify their home districts after leaving the army.¹⁹

The centralizing administration found a common language in

16 Fadeev, *Vooružennyja sily* . . .

17 Concerning Russia, this development has been best studied in the field of civil administration, e.g. Orlovsky, *The Limits* . . ., or Yaney, *The Systematization* . . .

18 "Novoi povorot v naših voennyh reformah" (by Miljutin in 1870). Gosudarstvennaja Ordena Lenina Biblioteka SSSR imeni Lenina/Mf NL 218, VA, p. 90—100

19 Zolotarev, *Materialy* . . . p. 359

all corners of the Empire of great importance. The national diversity of the Empire was also beginning to seem a cause of internal frailty and external weakness in an era of nationalism.²⁰ Germany, by contrast, seemed nationally unified and therefore powerful.

Russians also thought that there were too many Poles, Caucasians, Baltic Germans, even Finns, in the leading positions of the Empire. It was asserted that the least advantageous position was to be a Russian in Russia. The claim "Russia for the Russians" was raised.²¹ This current of thought began to spread in the leadership of the Empire and the central military staffs during the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II. It seemed that the former Empire of many peoples had to change into a realm of Russians only.

The military men became infected by expansionist imperialism, too. Without authorization, or perhaps with the Emperor's knowledge but without a clearance by the Chancellor, they advanced towards India, provoking British hostility. Military morale, which had suffered an eclipse in the Crimean war, was refurbished by massacring the inhabitants of the Central Asian oases.²² The conquest of Afghanistan and Persia was dreamed of, thus opening the way to India and the Indian Ocean.²³

Most of these hussars were eager Pan-Slavists. General Černjaev, dismissed for insubordination, joined the Serbs in their war of liberation. Skobelev incited the French to pursue their revanche, so that Russia would be able to settle her accounts with Austria without German interference and then seize the Turkish Straits. This was the reason for which

20 "The Russians are surrounded by minor nations, some of whom are indifferent or apathetic, but a few are hostile and positively dangerous" was the impression a French officer on mission in Russia got from his allied colleagues. *Conférences sur l'armée Russe faites par le Capitaine Mahon*, 1903. EMATSH 7 N 1506

21 Kuropatkin, *Zadači* . . . p. 231—238

22 Gortkoff, *Military* . . . p. 243—, Kiernan, *European* . . . p. 129

23 H. de Bouillaue de Lacoste, Chef de Bataillon d'Infanterie, "La Russie et Grande Bretagne en Asie Centrale". EMATSH 7 N 1544

"Rapport sur un voyage fait en Russie par le Capitaine de la Taillie en Novembre et Decembre 1899" EMATSH 7 N 1484

"L'Angleterre et la Russie en Perse". Moulin, French Military Attaché, to the Minister of War 17.II 1902. EMATSH 7 N 1506

conservative Pan-Slavist patriots favoured an alliance with the republican France.²⁴

Alexander III did sign the Dual Alliance, although its intention was defensive. But in discussing the annexed military convention the chiefs of the allied general staffs, Obručev and Boisdeffre, expressed the view that Russia was to have Galicia and the Straits, while France was naturally to have Alsace and Lorraine.²⁵ In the event of the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, Russia intended to liberate Bohemia, Transylvania, and Bosnia.²⁶ The Emperor ordered the naval staff to prepare for expeditions to the Bosphorus; on their own the staff planned the extension of Russian naval power to the Mediterranean. After the occupation of Port Arthur in 1898, a strong squadron was formed in the Pacific Ocean.²⁷ The general staff of the army prepared plans for conquering Korea and invading Japan.²⁸ War and conquest was regarded as a proof of the virility of a nation. There was an air of imperialist superiority over the Turks, the Persians, the Chinese, the Indians, not to speak of the Africans, who were doomed to fall prey to the conquering nations.

Of course, many officers did not think at all. The generals and Guards officers enjoyed their life in the St. Petersburg saloons without worrying over the philosophical, social or political implications of their position.²⁹ They did not ask what Russia was, to whom and how it was useful, and what right it had to reign over so many peoples. The Empire was part of the natural world order, a given way of life and a network of

24 Kennan, *The Decline* . . . p. 30—33, 92, 151, 259

Manfred, *Obrazovanie* . . .
Rozenal, *Diplomatičeskaja* . . .

25 Boisdeffre to Freycinet 15/27.VIII 1890. DDF VIII/1, no. 165

26 Moulin to the Minister of War 18.III 1899, "au sujet de l'hypothèse du démembrement de l'Autriche". EMATSH 7 N 1475

Moulin to the Minister of War 24.VIII 1899, "au sujet de certain démarche de l'Empereur d'Allemagne et de l'actualité du partage de l'Autriche". EMATSH 7 N 1475

Moulin to the Minister of War 5.II 1901, "sur les appetites de l'Allemagne à l'égard de l'Autriche". EMATSH 7 N 1476

cf. Luntinen, *French Information* . . . p. 69

27 "Accord naval entre la France et la Russie. Hypothèse d'une guerre avec l'Angleterre". (A discussion of the Russian and French naval chiefs 5.I 1903). AMAE C.P. Russie, N.S. 36

28 *Istorija russko-japonskoj* . . . p. 93

29 cf. memoirs by the Tsar's officers, e.g. Dreyer, A.A. Ignat'ev, Linder, Mannerheim, Krasnov . . .

human relations. Serving the Emperor was the accepted way of making a living and advancing one's interests. It was legitimized by God and long tradition, to question its value was incomprehensible and criminal.

The accepted values were Russia's greatness and stability, the glory and prestige of the Empire, the centralization and uniformity of its administration, the efficiency of its army and navy, a good life for its servants, and Russian rule over national minorities and neighbouring Slavs. This was no clearly defined ideology; there were religious and ideological factors with tendencies of a functional and expedient kind, while Russian and European traditions and influences worked together.³⁰

Staff Officer in the Military District of Finland

After leaving the academy, Seyn was appointed staff officer in the military district of Kiev. There he served a year as the senior aide-de-camp on the staff of the 19th division. Then, on 9th April 1890, he was transferred to Helsinki, to the staff of the Russian military district of Finland.

Seyn was given his first order, the Order of St. Stanislav, third class, in August 1890. The following April he was promoted captain. Then he spent a year in Krasnojarsk to practise commanding a company in the 95th infantry regiment. In 1894 he was given the Order of St. Anna, third class. Next year he was promoted lieutenant-colonel and appointed to the post of senior aide-de-camp in the staff of the military district of Finland. The medals and promotions were due to seniority and faultless service, not to any special distinction. Seyn was proceeding in his career as an average, capable staff officer.

The Governor-General of Finland was commanding officer of the military district; the elderly Heiden occupied the post from 1881 to 1897. Preparing the military district for war was the

³⁰ a short introduction: Luntinen, *Keisari-Venäjä*n aatehistoria

task of the chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Glazov. Seyn countersigned the signature of Glazov in the defence plans — it seems that he had aided his chief in preparing the details of the plans, which was indeed the task of a junior general staff officer.³¹

As a theatre of war Finland was of secondary importance, i.e. not without importance. Russia had annexed slices of Finland in 1721 and 1743 in order to have a bulwark for St. Petersburg, and finally the whole of the Grand Duchy had been conquered in 1808—1809. During the years of Russian pre-eminence in Eastern Europe, 1815—1853, the capital had seemed completely secure. During the Crimean War the Allied fleet had caused considerable havoc on the Finnish coasts in spite of Russian precautionary efforts — the wartime garrison in Finland had consisted of 71 1/2 battalions, 18 sotnias and 84 field guns, in addition to the 689 guns in the coastal fortresses. Obviously it was of no use to disperse troops along the thousand-mile coast. This conclusion was confirmed by the committees preparing for the defence of Finland during the crises of 1863, 1876—78, and 1885—1886.

By the year 1890 it was decided to leave the north and interior of Finland out of count; those regions were deemed remote and impenetrable. The western coastal towns, for instance Turku or Hanko, were important, but there were no troops available to defend them. The detachments at the disposal of the military district were to be concentrated in Helsinki.

The future war was expected to be fought out on the main front against Germany and Austria; but a German flank attack was expected through Finland to St. Petersburg. Most probably the Germans, aided by the Swedes, were to land to the west of Helsinki. The Russian and Finnish troops were to defend the Finnish capital and the landward flank of the fortress of Sveaborg, thereby preventing the enemy from advancing towards the Imperial capital. A landing was also possible more to the east, on the Karelian Isthmus, for instance. Then the Helsinki troops were to join the Viipuri garrison. This eventuality was not very probable, because the enemy would be exposed to an attack on two flanks, from Viipuri and from St. Petersburg.

The military district of Finland disposed of one infantry

division with its brigade of artillery. In 1894 the division was replaced by a rifle brigade. In addition there were the eight rifle battalions of the Finnish army, and the immobile garrisons of Sveaborg and Viipuri. In the opinion of the district staff this was far from sufficient. But they were promised reinforcements only in the eventuality of actual enemy threat. The railway line from St. Petersburg to Helsinki made possible after 1870 sending the troops, although there was no connection in St. Petersburg over the river Neva with the Imperial network. Making up the Russian detachments with reservists from the interior of the Empire was slow; the staff calculated that the mobilization would take from ten days to two weeks, while the enemy landing was to be expected within a week of the declaration of war. Only the Finnish dragoon regiment (established in 1889) would be on a war footing by then. On the other hand, there was a time when the general staff in St. Petersburg wanted to add the Finnish battalions to the reserve in the Ukraine or White Russia behind the principal front.³²

Physical conditions in Finland, the rocks, forests, and lakes, caused problems for the Russians even in the southern parts of the country.³³ Seyn led the autumn manoeuvres of 1895 and got interested in these problems. He wrote that the artillery had proved useless because of the problem of finding, occupying, and guarding firing positions; a cavalry attack was unthinkable, at least with anything bigger than a squadron. But the local cavalry (i.e. the Finnish dragoons) were able to achieve "brilliant results" even in the thickets. Small infantry detachments also, if led with initiative, were useful. Availing themselves of the natural cover, guerrillas would be well able to take by surprise marching or bivouacking troops.

This study was published in the military journal *Voennyi Sbornik*.³⁴ This was the first time that Seyn had distinguished himself from the mass of officers.

31 Russian military documents = Ven sot asiak, no. 7947, VA. Cf. Luntinen, *Suomi Pietarin* . . . The following story is a resumé of this, a more detailed study

32 Moulin to the Minister of War 7.VI 1888 and 10.X 1889. EMATSH 7 N 1471. Cf. Luntinen, *French Information* . . . p. 26. The Finnish battalions were to be positioned at Kursk, Minsk, or Gomel. The report does not mention the fact that the 1878 Finnish law of national service forbade taking the battalions out of the Grand Duchy.

33 Al'ftan, *Voennoe obozrenie* . . .

34 Seyn, *Podvižnyi* . . .

Political Apprenticeship

Finland in the Russian Imperial System

It was during these years that Seyn adopted his ideas on Finland's position in the Russian Empire. There are no documents to prove this, but he was ready to aid Bobrikov when the latter was appointed Governor-General of the Grand Duchy in 1898.

In the conservative Orthodox-Muscovite as well as in the modern bureaucratic and chauvinist view Russia was to be one and indivisible, autocratic, orthodox, and Russian. This was a difficult ideal in a rambling empire of many nations and several religions, of distant provinces and different traditions. For instance, the Finns lived as if the Grand Duchy had been a separate, constitutional state. Finland was a Lutheran country where the Orthodox church was merely tolerated. The higher culture was Swedish, and Imperial opposition to it had benefited Finnish culture but had not led to any Russo-Finnish assimilation. Some of the Russians who had settled in Finland had adapted to the local society, but those who had remained Russians felt foreigners, not masters in the country. As early as the 1860s the national revival stimulated by the Polish rebellion had made Katkov, the well-known nationalist, complain of the situation in Finland.³⁵ But in fact the

³⁵ KKK 1864, no. 38, VA

consciousness in Finland of being a separate society was only beginning to develop then.

Alexander III visited Finland in 1885. The magnificent and spontaneous ovation he received could leave no doubt about the loyalty of the Finns towards their Emperor and Grand Duke; but a Russian still was not able to feel at home in Finland.³⁶

Professions of loyalty were not enough to convince the chauvinists, who by the 1880s were making headway in Russian society and in the administration. Because the Finns had their own way of life and political institutions they were suspected of separatism, which was both high treason and treason to the country, in the Moscow view. The Finns were a small nation, with nothing to contribute to the history and with no ability to live on their own; an independent Finland was unthinkable. Therefore the Finnish nationalism could not be genuine; the separatist tendencies were a proof of support for Swedish schemes of reconquest or German imperialist schemes.

K.F. Ordin, an Imperial courtier, was the first to study extensively the Finnish question. He found that the Finnish provinces had had no special status in the composition of the Swedish state. During the war of 1808—1809 the Emperor had declared Finland forever united with the Empire. The Russian sovereignty had been internationally confirmed in the Peace of Hamina (Fredrikshamn, in 1809). During the Diet of Porvoo (Borgå, in 1809), the Emperor had confirmed the ancient laws, privileges, and religion of the Finns, and had organized the administration of the Grand Duchy. The latter meant that within Finland there was an Imperial Finnish Senate, while in St. Petersburg the Minister State Secretary presented Finnish matters to the Emperor.

Thus, Ordin continued, the Finns were in no way justified in their claim that an autonomy could be derived from the Swedish constitutions of 1772 and 1789. They had been able to build an unauthorized separate state organization because there had been no competent Russian official present to safeguard the general Imperial interests when Finnish

³⁶ Baron Budberg, accompanying the Emperor to Finland in 1885, to State Secretary Sol'skiif 2.IV 1906. KKK 1906, dept. IV, no. 36, VA

questions had been referred to the Emperor.

From 1863 onwards, when the Finnish Diet had started functioning, the situation worsened. Alexander II had reminded the Finns that it was not in their interest to underline their separateness. In spite of this the Finns had acquired monetary system, postal service, and customs service of their own. They had composed a national hymn and designed a coat-of-arms and national colours. Some of them had proposed remaining neutral in the event of Russia getting engaged in a war against England in 1885, repeating a similar treasonable proposition made in 1863. All this had been crowned by the establishment of the separate Finnish army in 1878.³⁷ — The exactness of Ordin's observations cannot be denied. It might be added that Finland's economy and culture developed as part of the Western European industrial society, simultaneously with its parallel, if slower, advancement to Russia.

In 1864 a committee had proposed codifying the Finnish constitution. The basis was to be the ancient Swedish constitutions of 1772 and 1789. But Governor-General Rokassovskiï had rejected the proposal because it implied diminishing the authority of the Governor-General and in fact of the Emperor, too.³⁸ Later, Governor-General Heiden emphasized the view that the Emperor's authority in Finland was defined by Russian, not by Swedish laws. After 1809 the Russian laws had been obeyed in Finland, it was only since 1863 that there had been problems, Heiden argued.³⁹

The Finns had no uncontested document on which to base their claims, but they "were firmly convinced of the truth" that the laws of 1772 and 1789 had been implied by the "constitution" which Alexander I had confirmed in 1809. They thought that the Emperor was entitled to make new laws for Finland only with the consent of the four Finnish Estates convened in a Diet. To the Russian nationalists this was sacrilege: the Emperor of All the Russias, Autocrat by the

37 Ordin, *Pokorenie* . . .

38 KKK 1864, no 42. VA, includes the draft constitution and objections by the Governor-General 9/21.VIII 1865. The question has been thoroughly dealt with by Jussila, *Suomen perustuslait* . . . and *Finnland in der* . . .

39 KKK, K 3 no. 2 Protocols of the committee chaired by Heiden, in October-November, 1890. VA

Grace of God, could not be dependent on a provincial diet. — In fact, the nationalists were also implying that the Emperor was unable to safeguard Imperial interests against Finnish schemes when Russian authorities had no say in the Finnish legislative and administrative process. — Alexander III referred the problem to a committee chaired by State-Secretary Bunge.

It was not possible to reach a Russo-Finnish unanimity. Alexander I's measures of expediency did not form a juridically coherent basis for Finnish autonomy, which had grown on the strength of unspoken assumptions. The view of Finland as a constitutional Grand Duchy living in union with the autocratic Empire was defined most clearly by Leo Mechelin.⁴⁰ It was propagated through university lectures, school books, and brochures. Russo-Finnish differences were turned into a quarrel by press polemics.⁴¹ The Finns had a near-religious faith in the rightfulness of their cause. Russians in Finland were sometimes subjected to *tracasserie*, for instance letters posted with Russian stamps were not accepted by a post office on the Karelian Isthmus, where numerous influential St. Petersburgians used to spend their summer.⁴² Between Russian soldiers or itinerant merchants and Finnish jobs there were brawls and frays.⁴³

This collision was probably unavoidable. If Finland was part of Russia, in the Russian view, the Finnish self-assertion was an insolent effrontery to the Russians. If Finland was not part of Russia, in the Finnish opinion, the Russian reaction constituted wilful oppression by the bigger nation in the case. Historical and juridical arguments hardened the beliefs on both sides, without convincing the opponents. Polemics only polarized the opposing views and made mediation difficult.⁴⁴

40 Mechelin, *Précis* . . .

41 Sinkko, *Venäläis-suomalainen* . . .

42 Hämäläinen, *Karjalan kannaksen* . . . 1969 & 1974; *Vanhan Suomen* . . .

43 for instance, KKK 1895, no. 42, VA, contains complaints about sailors' and gendarmes' "behaviour" towards Finnish girls, pushing Miss Hultin down from the pavement, disturbing an engaged couple, and stealing spirits

44 The Russian Empire collapsed, and since then the Finnish view remained the historical truth in Finland. Even the Finnish "party of compliance" was deemed to have been nearly treasonable. It was not until the 1960s that the constitutional tradition was broken. — As early as 1911 Boris Nolde, the political jurist, diplomat, and historian, was of the opinion that

Estonians, Letts, Lithuanians, Poles, Ukrainians, Armenians, and Muslims caused to the Empire similar problems in the different border regions. The Jews were a special problem. Only the Asiatic aborigines remained submissive. The revolutionary and constitutional opposition, which in fact cut across the national distinctions, seemed to Tsarism to be caused by aliens, too. Capitalists, westernizers, Jews, workers, radicals, any malcontents were not real Russians. There was nothing wrong with Russia, hard discipline was deemed to be the way to bring these elements to heel.

Bobrikov Comes to Finland.⁴⁵

The defence of the north-western confines of the Empire and the military service of the Finns was a question where Russian interests and Russian principles became vitally involved with the constitutional position of the Grand Duchy in the Empire. The Russian generals had hoped that shared military service would draw the Finnish youth closer to their Russian brethren.⁴⁶ But the Finns had succeeded in organizing a separate army of their own in 1878, when the Balkan crisis absorbed the attention of the Imperial army chiefs.⁴⁷ The Minister of War Miljutin was angered because everything Russian had been excluded from the Finnish military establishment, and because the military burden was much easier in the Grand Duchy than in the Empire.⁴⁸

The St. Petersburg military district was charged with the

both the Russian and the Finnish extreme views were unfounded, but it was not until 1981 that he was taken notice of in Finland by Osmo Jussila, *Suomi Venäjän...*

45 Polvinen, *Valtakunta ja rajamaa...* is the most recent and competent work dealing with Bobrikov.

46 Zapiska General-Maiora Zalesova (1870s). *Ven sot asiak* 202, p. 211—242, VA

47 Seitkari, *Vuoden 1878...*

48 *Dnevnik D.A. Miljutina* 1873—1881 IV, 12.II 1881, cf. also Immonen, *Sotaministeri...*

task of defending the capital and the Baltic coast in the event of a war. In 1886 Bobrikov, the chief of the district staff, remarked that there were considerable difficulties in this region. The military district of Finland and the Finnish conscripted battalions were under separate command. There was not money and men enough for the defence because the Finns did not contribute their share. Finnish autonomy thus made impossible a united, powerful defence in the north-west.⁴⁹

Miljutin had been comforted, mistakenly, in the belief that the Finnish law of 1878 had been decreed only for a probationary period of ten years. In 1891 Alexander III ordered Vannovskii (Minister of War 1881—1898) to prepare for a revision. The Finnish military system was to be made to conform with the Russian system, and the military burden was to be raised to the Russian level. The reform was delayed by the death of the Emperor, among other reasons, but the War Ministry set up a committee chaired by General Dandeville in 1896—1897 to calculate the number of men to be conscripted and sums of money to be collected for military purposes in Finland.⁵⁰

Nicholas II understood that the Finnish constitution was harmful to Imperial interests and unbearable for Russian national feeling. In Bobrikov the centralizers of the Russian state found a man who was deeply convinced that the military reform in Finland presupposed a constitutional revision. It was inadmissible that the Finnish Diet aspired to legislative power in military questions. The Emperor signed the February Manifesto in 1899 which decreed that the Imperial matters were to be attended to by the appropriate Imperial instances, with an opinion only being requested of the Finnish Estates.

For the Russians, this was a timely measure to reduce Finland to its proper, supposedly original role in the Empire. Bobrikov explained:

”Russia is one and indivisible, just as is one and indivisible the Imperial throne, which has sheltered

49 *Otčet o polevoi poezdke oficerov general'nogo štaba S.Peterburgskago i Finljandskago voennyh okrugov v 1886 godu.* (signed by Bobrikov). *Ven sot asiak* 202, p. 23-28, VA

50 Luntinen, *Sotilasmiljoonat*, p. 20—

Finland's progress to its present welfare. That is why any Finn, to whom the interest of his country is dear, ought to be animated by a natural feeling of oneness with Russia".

For the Finns, the February Manifesto was a *coup d'etat*.

Bobrikov knew it:

"It is well known to His Majesty that there exists a widely-spread mistaken interpretation of Finland's position in the Empire".

He did not expect that every Finn would display the sympathy which in fact ought to have been due to his unificatory policy.⁵¹ Knowing the power of Russia and the rightfulness of its cause, Bobrikov, nevertheless, trusted that the sensible Finnish people would give up their opposition if confronted with unrelenting firmness.⁵² But if Finland refused to obey the Russian dictates, it was necessary for "the WIELDER of the ALL-RUSSIAN SCEPTRE to lay HIS MIGHTY HAND upon Finland".⁵³ A division consisting of four Guards regiments reinforced with cavalry and artillery was mobilized in St. Petersburg, ready to intervene in Finland in the event of open protest.⁵⁴

By this time Seyn was an eager apprentice of the Governor-General.⁵⁵

Bobrikov started the policy of integrating Finland with Russia in order to strengthen the military security of the Imperial capital. Military security is a reason to which great powers often appeal as an excuse for their acts of aggression. It might be well to remind the reader that military necessity is not a concrete measurable fact. It is only what the generals hold desirable. The security of St. Petersburg does not make the annexation of Viipuri to Russia legitimate, or more excusable

51 Bobrikov's address to high officials when entering office 30.IX 1898. KKK Hd 80, no. 1, VA

52 Bobrikov's Most Loyal account 5.II 1901, draft. KKK Hd 80, no. 1, VA

53 Bobrikov's Most Loyal account 22.VII 1902, draft. KKK 80, no. 1, VA

54 "Mesures de précaution contre l'éventualité de troubles en Finlande". Moulin to the Minister of War 4.IV 1899. EMATSH 7 N 1475

55 Documents referred to in notes 52 & 53 countersigned by Seyn

than a hypothetical analogous Finnish desire of annexing St. Petersburg to Finland in order to secure Viipuri.

Seyn Studies the Finnish Military Question

Towards the end of the nineties Seyn continued to attend to the duties of a staff officer. For a few months in 1898 he was "Chief of railway and waterway military transports" of the military district. He discharged the duties of the chief of staff of the rifle brigade in the summer of 1900. On St. Nicholas's day 6/18.XII 1899 he was promoted colonel *za otličie*.

At the same time he had politically important tasks. Bobrikov had complained that it was "hard to live and work here surrounded by open and masked enemies. I shall carry on my cross with patience". The only comfort for the Governor-General was the Russian army.⁵⁶ It seems that Bobrikov at once took notice of the capable and right-thinking staff officer. Seyn was ordered to take care of the correspondence concerning the military reform in Finland. He frequented the War Ministry to discuss the problem and he participated in the meetings of the Dandeville Committee.⁵⁷ The available documents do not tell what was on the agenda then and what was Seyn's contribution. The general task of the committee was to prepare the proposal of the War Ministry staff⁵⁸ for a new law on military service for Finland and for equalizing the military burden.

Seyn made an exhaustive study of the Finnish military question. He found out that the Finns had carried a heavy military burden during the time the country had been under Swedish sovereignty. During the period of the great wars,

56 Borodkin, *Generalguvernör* . . . p. 27

57 26.XI—3.XII 1898 and 5.—20.XII 1899. Obolenskiĭ to Minister State Secretary 1/14.X 1905. KKK 1905, dept.III, no. 19 II, VA

58 *Glavnyi Štab* was the administrative staff of the Ministry of War, not to be mixed with the *General'nyi Štab*

1560—1721, 14,000 to 18,000 men or 3 % of the population had been in the army. By the end of the Swedish era 2 1/3 % of the population had served in the *indelsta*, the military tenure establishment.

Seyn's calculations of Finnish effectives in the <i>indelsta</i> army	
infantry	17,773
cavalry	1,125
artillery	950
navy	2,089
Guards	900
in all	<u>21,957</u>

The burden had been much easier during the Russian era. *Indelsta* conscription had been suspended in 1809, and only 4,500 to 1,600 men had served in a few enlisted battalions (of which the most important was the 3rd, Finnish, rifle battalion of the Imperial Guards). During the Crimean War 6,057 *indelsta* men and 4,654 enlisted men had been called to arms. After the war only the Guards battalion had continued military service; even the tax in lieu of the *indelsta* service had been suspended because of the famine of 1867.

The Finnish national service according to the law of 1878 had been much easier than the Russian national service decreed in 1874. In Russia 1,6 % of all men or 39,5 % of an age group entered military service; the corresponding percentages in Finland were 0,5 % and 9,2 %. Military expenditures devoured 28 % of the Imperial budget, while the Finnish military payments made up only 16 % of the Grand Ducal budget.

The separation of the Finnish army from the Russian military establishment was a grave defect, too. In spite of the fact that Finns were allowed to serve in Russia,⁵⁹ Russian officers were

59 Gallén, *La Finlande...* is a compact overview of Finnish military questions during the autonomy period. Pikoff, *Landsmän...*, and Screen, *Våra landsmän...* and *Undersåte...* deal with Finns in Russian service. These officers were in fact aristocrats serving their Imperial sovereign, not Finns serving Russia, the Russo-Finnish contradiction emerging only with the increasing nationalism in both societies.

not admitted into the Finnish army. And the latter was allowed to defend Finland only, it had not to be sent out of the Grand Duchy. Men who were not needed for the rifle battalions or the dragoon regiment (to serve their period of three years) were trained (for three months) in reserve companies. Finns were thus becoming a nation-in-arms outside the system decreed to the rest of the Empire.

The War Ministry proposed that the supernumerary Finns should be conscripted into Russian detachments in Finland or in the neighbouring districts. But the Finnish Senate and Diet (in 1899) did not accept the proposal (they made a proposal of their own for increasing the Finnish army from 5,600 to 12,000 men, but decided to keep it Finnish). They tried to keep the military system within the sphere of the local Finnish legislation.

This attempt was inadmissible, Seyn stated. Military uniformity was necessary because of the "convenience of command". It was also necessary as a first step towards unified legislation for Finland within Russia. The proposal of the War Ministry rested on the basis of the Tsar's wish to put the Finnish military system within the general organization of the Imperial armed forces.

"Being part of the Russian realm, and in the shelter of the Russian military might, the Grand Duchy obviously has no need or right for a separate army. Finland was not allowed an army of her own in order to have un-Russian alien troops in the vicinity of the Capital; it was granted because the Emperor magnanimously believed that, appreciating the trust of the Sovereign in them, the political leaders of the border country would voluntarily unite their military establishment with the Russian army. Time has not vindicated the Imperial trust."⁶⁰

Seyn stated that for general political reasons Finnish autonomy could not be allowed to grow any further through the development of the separate military establishment. The military burden should be levelled, too. The Finns should serve

60 For a Finn, this seems cynical. There had never been any intention of revising the law of 1878 or of otherwise Russifying the army. Such hopes were "foolish errors": Palmén, *Asevelvollisuusudesta*, p. 178

on an equal footing with the Russians, in Russian detachments in Finland or in the St. Petersburg district.⁶¹

Seyn based his advocacy on the materials that the War Ministry committees had collected and on the criticisms made by Miljutin, Vannovskii, Kuropatkin (Minister of War 1898—1904) and Bobrikov of the Finnish system. Seyn's contribution was a compact, clear, and sharp presentation. The text shows that the colonel had adopted the Governor-General's view of the Finnish autonomy as being the result of the purposeful, underhand, malevolent work of the Finns.

Seyn was commanded to read his lecture to various officer groups of the Finnish and St. Petersburg military districts. It was published by *Russkii Invalid*, the newspaper of the War Ministry; it was published also as a brochure, which was translated into Finnish, too.⁶²

In spite of Finnish protests, the military system was reformed in 1901. The Emperor sanctioned the proposal of the War Ministry, brushing aside all scruples uttered by the State Council. All Finnish troops were disbanded, even the dragoons and the Guards battalion (in 1905). Finnish conscripts were to serve in Russian detachments. A second rifle brigade was formed to replace the Finnish battalions.

The Staff Officer Turns Administrator

Bobrikov also pursued Russification in the civilian sphere. Opposing Senators were replaced with more compliant ones, a few Russian Governors were appointed, the Russian

61 Materialy po voennoi reforme v Finljandii 1898—1900. KKK Hd 14, no. 1, VA. The dossier includes Seyn's lecture.

62 "Voinskaja povinnost'ju v Finljandii po sravneniju s obščeeobjazatel'noju voinskoju povinnost'ju v Imperii. Soobščenie general'nogo štaba podpolkovnika Zeina, sostavlennoe po oficial'nym istočnikam i pročitanoe 10-go i 11-go dekabnja v Gel'singforskom voennym sobranii 1898 g." KKK 1906, 2. dept. no. 1-1, VA
Russkii Invalid, no. 275, 276, 278/1898, 4, 5/1899
Seyn, *Suomen* . . .

gendarmerie was strengthened to enable them to keep an eye on the Finns. The Russian language was introduced in the correspondence of the higher administration, and schools were ordered to teach the Russian language better. More emphasis on Russian history and geography would counteract the previously taught false doctrine of Finnish autonomy. In St. Petersburg v.Plehwe (the police official, then State-Secretary and finally Minister of the Interior 1902—1904) occupied the office of Finnish Minister State-Secretary, and Russified his office. But the trouble Bobrikov provoked in Finland was troublesome for his backers in the capital. Neither Plehwe, Kuropatkin, nor Pobedonoscev wanted to give the unstinted support the Governor-General desired.⁶³

Seyn never wavered, in his minor role. As a specialist in the military question he had shown so much zeal that Bobrikov appointed him director of the Governor-General's office on 9th November, 1900. Some doubts were expressed, because Seyn had no university education, he was no Finn, and he was not acquainted with the local laws. But Bobrikov held him competent, because it was customary to employ officers in civilian offices, and because old laws could be interpreted as giving Russians the right to serve in the Finnish administration (later Bobrikov had a decree enacted which made such appointments doubly legal). The decisive factor was that a Russian was much more useful than a Finn for the policy of the Governor-General.⁶⁴

Seyn certainly was suitable. He even adopted the Bobrikovian language:

"knowing closely the Finnish people, characteristic of which is cold-blood, perseverance, and obstinacy, I dare affirm that only by showing identical characteristics can the government instill respect and humility in the population"

and

"It is necessary always to be prepared for laying the

63 Polvinen, *Valtakunta* . . . p. 24

64 Bobrikov to v. Plehwe 16.VI 1900. KKK Fh 7, no. 96 a, VA

Mighty Hand of the Sovereign upon Finland in all the instances when the Grand Duchy refuses to follow the Russian policy, and to preserve the integrity of the Sovereign's prerogatives, the limitation of which has long been an ardent desire of the Finns".⁶⁵

These sentences in a telling manner reflect Seyn's understanding of his office and of the task of the Russian administration in Finland.

The first task of the new director was to Russify the Governor-General's office. It was remodelled on the Imperial government offices. Officials were recruited from Russia, and the normal procedure of filling a vacancy and the normal qualifications required were sometimes ignored. There were about 25 permanent officials with 10—11 additional officials "for special tasks", and numerous translators, copyists, and servants.⁶⁶ Prince Obolenskiï, Bobrikov's successor, testified:

"Seyn was extraordinarily hard-working and assiduous and self-sacrificing, devoting all his energy to the service. His aim was to Russify the office, and he attained this goal in a very short time; for example, he changed the personnel and made Russian the language of the office. He enlarged the office and replaced the local officials with Russians. He tried to get acquainted with local laws and social conditions as fast as possible."⁶⁷

For his meritorious and industrious service Seyn was granted the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class, in 1902.

Besides his civilian duties, Seyn still made his contribution to military reform. He participated in the sessions of the Grand Duke Konstantin Konstantinovič's committee, which was deciding the fate of the Finnish military school (*Kadettikoulu*, *Kadetskiï korpus*, est. 1779, 1819). Seyn thought that the school should admit Russian pupils to familiarize Finns with Russians. Being taught the Russian language, literature,

65 "Programma voprosov" (draft in Seyn's own hand) KKK Hd 94, no. 2, VA

66 KKK 1808—1918, Pm 332:3, VA (a history of the office of the Governor-General, compiled by the Finnish Public Record Office), p. 4-5, 23, 26

67 Obolenskiï to Minister State Secretary 1/14.X 1905. KKK 1905, III dept. no 19 II, VA

history, and geography, the Finnish students would learn to love Russia.⁶⁸ But in the end Bobrikov decided that the school could not produce officials who were loyal to Russia; on the contrary, the Finns would corrupt even the Russian pupils. Thus the school was shut down.⁶⁹

Seyn also sat on Lieutenant General Afanas'ev's committee. The task of this committee was to calculate the contribution of the Finnish treasury to the upkeep of the Russian detachments that were to receive the Finnish conscripts. The work was wasted, because the military reform did not turn out as expected. But Bobrikov made Finland pay ten million marks to the Imperial Treasury in 1902—1903, to which Obolenskii added four million in 1904.⁷⁰ Seyn thought that Finland could, and ought to, pay fourteen million marks each year.⁷¹

68 "Položenie o Finljandskom Kadetskom Korpuse", proekt. Report by Seyn 27.XI 1901. KKK Hd 13, no. 3, VA

69 Po voprosu o preobrazovanii Finljandskago kadetskago korpusa. KKK 1901, I dept, no. 254, VA

Voennaja reforma Finljandii 1898, no 3: Finljandskii kadetskii korpus. KKK Hd 13, VA

70 Luntinen, *Sotilasmiljoonat*, p. 39—40

71 Vedomost' preimernago rashoda kotorym trebovalsa-by soderžanie finskih voisk v tom slučae, esli hodataistva seima 1899 goda ob uveličenii sih voisk s 5600 do 12 000 čelovek raznyh rodov oružii odostoili by. (Signed by Seyn). KKK 1905, 2. dept. no. 13, VA

Fighting the Finnish Rebellion

The Undercover Rebellion

As an administrator Seyn was mainly charged with security questions, aided by the first department of the Governor-General's office and the gendarmerie. His meritorious and industrious service was described by the Helsinki newspaper *Hufvudstadsbladet*: "The Governor-General's office was the centre of intrigue and dark schemes, the spying and persecution of law-abiding citizens was controlled from there."⁷²

From the Imperial point of view Seyn's work was no scheming or persecution, but a desperate attempt to overcome the Finnish rebellion against vital Russian interests.

The Finns had not accepted the reforms of 1899 and 1901. The previous political groupings, built upon linguistic and social contradictions, began to form new alignments. The Swedish party and the Young Finns formed the de facto "Constitutionalist party". They took up passive resistance: all illegal (from the Finnish point of view) orders were to be ignored. The constitutionalists were chased out of office, of course, but they trusted that justice would win in the end. The Old Finns, on the other hand, adopted a policy of compliance and appeasement, in the belief that there was some sense in the Russian demands and in the Russians, and that in any case it

72 citation in KKK 1908, I dept. no. XVIII-7, VA

was not good policy to provoke the powerful neighbour. They entered the posts left by the constitutionalists. They thus prevented these posts from being completely Russified and they incidentally contributed to the start of making the administration of the Grand Duchy Finnish. Neither party adopted the view that Finland was part of Russia even though they admitted that she was part of the Empire.⁷³

The constitutionalists collected half a million signatures for an address of protest, and they got more than a thousand signatures from distinguished European intellectuals, too. Many youths refused to be drafted in 1902—1904 when the Russian military law of 1901 was imposed.

Seyn stated that the Finns had never been loyal subjects. In 1788 their separatist scheming had been directed against Sweden. During the difficult years of 1853—1856 Emil v. Qvanten (a Finnish emigree in Sweden) had proposed secession from Russia and rejoining Sweden. Ignoring Alexander II's wish, the Finns had cunningly acquired their own customs service, monetary system, coat-of-arms, national hymn, and armed forces. They were shameless enough to claim that the Emperor of two hundred million Russians was the Grand Duke of two million Finns, and had to acquire the sanction of a provincial diet for his decrees. General Schauman, a Finnish Senator, had said in 1891 that the military defence of Finland should not depend on alien (i.e. Russian) troops.⁷⁴

Seyn's view on Finnish history was, thus, in complete accordance with the opinion of Ordin. A few cuttings of the chauvinist *Moskovskija Vedomosti* were attached to his memorandum, pointing out another source of inspiration. He continued on the basis of his own experience: opposition and evil had burst out in 1899. Senators had then been insolent enough to discuss whether the Imperial Manifesto of February was to be published or not. Provincial Governors did not obey the Governor-General. The unchastised activity of the Diet encouraged other institutions and individuals in their opposition. At first it had been hoped that the agitation would

73 *Imperiija* meant Russia only, *Gosudarstvo* was Russia with Finland included, when Russo-Finnish relations were discussed in official documents

74 A memorandum signed by Seyn 5.II 1901. KKK Hd 80, no. 1, VA

contaminate the Swedish gentlefolk only, but no — "the criminal wave from Helsinki surged over the whole country". Addresses were signed, young men emigrated to avoid being drafted into the Russian army. The separatist propaganda extended to the Finnish army, even its officers and cadet school were infected. The protest was propagated abroad, too.

The Senate tried to explain away the protest, ignoring the obvious fact that it was directed against His Majesty. The Senate itself criticized the introduction of the Russian language for the correspondence of the higher government offices. The press disapproved of the appointment of Russians for vacancies left by the dismissed officials. Mechelin asserted that the military law was not valid, because it rested upon an illegal manifesto. The "most loyal" petition of the Diet was nothing but a sheer accusation against the Governor-General. The underground press brazenly denied the Russian Autocrat the right to govern Finland through by-passing the local Diet, which in fact was only an advisory body. *Fria Ord*, the underground organ, stirred up resistance; the criminal separatists were made heroes, but Yrjö-Koskinen, the leader of Old Finns, was persecuted because he understood the Imperial imperatives.⁷⁵

There could be no doubt about the existence of a mighty secret organization, which terrorized both private citizens and officials. Informers told of secret meetings and preparations. The underground rebels organized a riot in the central square of Helsinki in 1902.

"All this only weakly reflects the reality of the political life in the Grand Duchy at present; the Swedish party is growing and getting powerful, and the poor Finnish people, peaceful and hard-working, will be led by the rebels on a road which does not correspond to Imperial interests or to Finland's welfare."

But it was difficult to unmask the undercover rebellion, because governors, magistrates, and the police were recalcitrant. That was why exceptional measures were needed. Otherwise it was impossible to guarantee peace and progress in

75 On the Finnish press of this period cf. Leino-Kaukiainen, *Sensuuri* . . .

Finland and its further integration with the Empire. As early as in 1809 Barclay de Tolly, the Commander-in-Chief and Governor-General, had said that it was better to leave Finland without a Governor-General than to appoint one with too limited powers.⁷⁶

An Enjoyable Time for a Russian in Finland

The documents cited in the previous chapter reflect the honest rage and lack of understanding of an Imperial militarist and bureaucrat when confronted with Finnish civil opposition. The Finns' almost religious belief in the rightfulness of their cause was not taken seriously; for a Russian it seemed an expression of a wilfully false view of history and law. Finland's position was not a legal one; it was the result of a century-long separatist conspiracy.

Seyn's conclusion shows that his collection of tales of the Finnish misdeeds were intended to serve as an argument for Bobrikov's demands for more powers. That is why informers were eagerly believed; in the threatening situation even quite innocent occurrences seemed dangerous.⁷⁷ Only the most wildly concocted stories were not taken seriously, although even they were recorded carefully.⁷⁸ Bobrikov and his aides seem to have

76 A memorandum signed by Seyn 5.II 1901. KKK Hd 80, no. 1, VA Pamjatnaja zapiska proisšestvijam v političeskoj žizni Finljandii za 1899—1901. Signed by Seyn 31.XII 1901. KKK Hd 79 no 7c, VA The gendarmes agreed with Seyn's views, cf.: Svedenija po Finljandii s 1900 g. Delo departamenta policii. Antti Hackzellin kokoelma 5, VA

77 For instance, informers reported that workmen in the Tampere iron works had acquired iron mittens for some secret purpose. KKK 1901, special dept. no. 101, VA

78 For instance, the gendarme chief had learned that 40,000 rifles had been imported from America hidden in pork crates; and that Finnish emigrants were training in England in order to return to Finland to lead the rebellion. Spravka o vvoze oružija v Finljandii, KKK 1902, special dept., no. 38, VA.

Also KKK 1901, special dept., no. 202, VA

felt the need for larger powers in order to be able to keep order in Finland, and that was why they made their reports rather gloomy.

The reluctance of the St. Petersburg notables was overcome and Bobrikov was given his powers in 1903. The Finns called it the "degree on dictatorship". In fact the Governor-General's powers "for preserving social peace and public order in Finland" were modelled on the 1881 Russian Temporary Regulations to Protect State Security and Public Order. They allowed authorities to arrest, to exile, to suspend, to close down, to prohibit; the powers were large, but not unlimited.

The results seemed to vindicate this determined policy. The power of the opposition was broken by the exile of Mechelin and other leaders. The authority of the Russians seemed to be strengthening. The Old Finns were encouraged in their compliance. The poor people were thankful for the treatment meted out to the proud gentlefolk. The strike against conscription was broken, although only a few men were in fact drafted into the Guards battalion; the young men who refused to appear were threatened with a severer form of service, while compliant draftees were freed from service — the principle of the thing was important to Bobrikov, not training Finnish soldiers.

This view on a peaceful, happy Finland under the firm hand of Bobrikov was recorded afterwards by nostalgic gendarmes.⁷⁹ It is a view that Finnish historians would hardly agree with. In that time, too, the cultured high society of St. Petersburg sometimes disapproved of the "dirty non-commissioned officer" Bobrikov.⁸⁰ But for Bobrikov's aides this was the period when it was possible for a Russian to enjoy the service in Finland.

79 *Obzor revoljučionnago dviženija v Velikom Knjažestve Finljandskom za 1903 god*, signed by Freidenberg, the gendarme Major-General. Antti Hackzellin kokoelma 5, VA

80 Polvinen, *Valtakunta* . . . p. 268

The Activist Opposition

In fact, Bobrikov with his gendarme-minded aides had not succeeded in discouraging the Finnish opposition. They had only made it secret and in the end violent, even revolutionary. This was not an easy transition for the Finns, for in the nineteenth century they had been the Tsar's most uncritically loyal subjects. But some of the younger exiles in Stockholm began to think that the Tsar would never regain his senses, nor would justice win unaided. Of course, two million Finns had no chance of a victory against one and a half hundred million Russians; but if the Finns joined the other Imperial subjects dissatisfied with Tsarism, they would in fact be in majority. This was a descent into illegality, and the activists parted with the constitutional party. Their leader, Konni Zilliacus, organized a meeting of Russian, Polish, Caucasian and Finnish opposition groups in Paris. No definite unity was achieved, but co-operation in the smuggling of propaganda material and arms was established, with Japanese financial backing. Terrorist acts were planned.

The war against oppression was started by a private act, however. Eugen Schauman, a young official, shot Bobrikov on 3rd June, 1904, in an attempt to draw the attention of the Emperor to the arbitrary policy of the Russian administration in the Grand Duchy. Schauman did not approve of murder and immediately afterwards shot himself. — Six weeks later v. Plehwe was murdered in St. Petersburg by the Social Revolutionaries.

Prince Obolenskiï was appointed to continue Bobrikov's work. Yet no revenge was taken on the Finns for the "unheard-of outrage" by this "Hangman of Kharkov", who had pacified peasant riots in southern Russia with the usual methods. Instead, a manifesto was issued declaring that the Finnish people were not guilty of the abominable murder. Consequently, the separate system of administration and legislation, "which was well suited for Finland", could be continued. The Diet was invited to convene by the end of the year, and the exiles were allowed to return and to participate in its work. But, the manifesto emphasized, the policy of integrating Finland with Russia was to be continued, because

history had inseparably united the Grand Duchy with the Empire.⁸¹

It is not known how this policy was decided on, but obviously it reflected the trend of development in St. Petersburg. Shattered by the reverses in the Far East, the Tsarism could no longer be maintained by v. Plehwe's gendarme politics. Instead, his successor Svjatopolk-Mirskii tried to win public confidence in his government, although the Emperor did not allow any compromising of the autocracy.

The opposition was tamed neither in Russia nor in Finland. The concessions granted did not inspire love towards the Sovereign or the Empire, because they were seen to be forced, as the gendarmes observed.⁸² Ignoring the Imperial statement of Finland forever being united with Russia, the Diet concocted a "Grand Petition" demanding the revocation of all unificatory measures decreed since Bobrikov's appointment. Thus the year 1905 was looked forward with a heavy heart by the Russians who had suffered much sorrow and many insults in this province, which had only the appearance of a cultured country, the gendarme report concluded.⁸³

The year 1905 was worse than expected. The activists tinkered amateurishly with their bombs, but they succeeded in killing a gendarme-colonel and Soisalon-Soininen, an Old Finn deemed to be a traitor. The Deputy Governor-General Deutrich survived a bombing, as did Governor Papkov; Governor Mjasoedov was wounded in his private parts. Governor Kaigorodov with his aide Rheinbott were on the assassination list, and Seyn was hunted by the most reckless of the activists. But thanks to the extraordinary security measures taken their lives were saved.⁸⁴

The gendarmes seem to have been quite succesful in spying out the leaders of the Finnish opposition. But when the constitutionalists demanded that Seyn with the others be

81 Draft by Obolenskiĭ for the "most loyal report for 1904". KKK Hd 80 no. 8, VA

82 Političeskiĭ obzor za 1904 god, by Major-General Freidenberg, chief of the gendarme corps in Finland, p. 111—112. Antti Hackzellin kokoelma 6, VA

83 Političeskiĭ obzor za 1904 god (= 82), p. 112

84 Partija aktivnogo soprotivlenija v Finljandii, za 1905 g. p. 14—15. Osobyĭ otdel departamenta policii. Antti Hackzellin kokoelma 6, VA

"removed", it was difficult for the gendarmes to discern the legal opposition from the activist terrorism; all opposition was criminal under an autocracy. Mechelin was supposed to be the head of the organization, with Zilliacus the leader of the fighting organs.⁸⁵ The Finnish people proper were always thought of as remaining loyal, and Socialists were as yet not mentioned as a serious threat. "The January riot" (i.e. "the Bloody Sunday" in St. Petersburg) agitated the Finnish population, too, but the police succeeded in quelling the excitement. Showy military parades reminded the population of the Imperial might.⁸⁶

The military service decreed in 1901 was suspended in March 1905. It was deemed best to disarm the Finns until they would learn the identity of their interests with those of the Empire.

"It is hardly to be expected that these men would learn a sense of duty even in the ranks of the Russian army, so that the agitators could not use them for their criminal purposes."

Instead, a payment of ten million marks was to be transferred from Finnish funds to the Imperial Treasury.⁸⁷ Thus the draftee strike was a qualified success after it had been broken.

The activists did dream of an armed rebellion. An organization of rifle associations was to prepare for it. A sketch plan of such an organization was found at the home of the murderer's father, General Schauman.⁸⁸ This made the Russians very nervous, and informers, who were paid for their stories, told of hidden arsenals everywhere.⁸⁹ That there was some reason for their apprehensions was proved by the matter of the SS. "John Grafton", which ran aground on the Finnish coast

85 Partija . . . (= 84), p. 16—17

86 Draft by Obolenskii for the "Most Loyal report for 1904—1905". KKK Hd 80, no. 8, VA

87 = 86

88 Kotitarkastuksissa löydettyä aineistoa, F.W. Schauman. KKK Hg 16

89 Numerous documents of the special dept. of the Governor-General's office: for instance, О фактах, могущих способствовать вооруженному сопротивлению или разрушению. Spravka o ovvože oružija v Finljandii. KKK 1902, special dept. no 38, VA

and was found to contain rifles.⁹⁰ The irrepressible Konni Zilliacus had bought the guns with Japanese money and had tried to smuggle them into Finland; part of the consignment was intended for Russian revolutionaries.⁹¹

It was at the end of the summer of 1905 that the last remaining Finnish detachment, the Guards battalion, was dissolved.⁹² Rumour had it that Obolenskiï imagined an army of 75,000 Finns waiting for the return of the battalion from its summer training to start the rebellion.⁹³

The Russian forces in Finland were made up only of two rifle brigades, with their attached artillery brigade and dragoon regiment, and the fortress battalions in Sveaborg and Viipuri. Bobrikov had asked for more, but he had been given only two Cossack sotnias to keep order in Helsinki. More were to be sent only in case of actual need. After Bobrikov was dead, the military district of Finland was united with St. Petersburg military district. The troops in Finland then formed the twenty-second army corps. Thus the defence of the Baltic coasts was centralized, and the civilian lead in Finland was divorced from the military command.⁹⁴

To warn the Finns, or to disarm his critics, Obolenskiï said in a newspaper interview that the government was prepared to send a division from St. Petersburg to Finland in the event of disturbances.⁹⁵

The Russian right and the gendarmes were not satisfied with Obolenskiï's policy. *Svet*, which was close to the army, criticized the Governor-General. It was known in Helsinki that the articles were written by Bobrikovians.⁹⁶ They did not like the suspension of Finnish military service, and they disapproved of letting the Finnish courts punish collaborators; for instance, the notorious Bobrikovian police officer Pekonen

90 Draft by Obolenskiï for the "Most Loyal report for 1904—1905". KKK Hd 80, no. 8, VA

91 Zilliacus, *Sortovuosilta*, p. 142—166
Fält, *Japanin* . . .

92 Rasformirovanie Leib Gvardii 3. štel'kovago finskago bataliona. KKK 1907, 2. dept. no. 7, VA

93 Estlander, *Elva ärtionden* . . . III, p. 312

94 Al'ftan, *Voennoe obozrenie* . . .

95 *Novoe Vremja* 6.X 1905, cit. Tasihin, *Venäjän kieli* . . . p. 51

96 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . I, p. 151, 5.IV 1905

was sentenced in Finland to jail for embezzlement. The local police was allowed to investigate political crimes. A committee had been set up to draft a constitution for Finland. (This must mean the committee chaired by Senator Tagancev, which tried to draw the demarcation line between local Finnish and Imperial legislation). Government (i.e. Obolenskiï) remained passive, calculating that concessions were the best means of appeasing the border country. As a token of the mood in Finland, *Svet* noted that the cabmen had changed their Russian uniforms back to the Finnish fashion.⁹⁷

Seyn did not impose his personal views on official documents. A few rough drafts by Seyn are identical with the "most loyal reports" of Obolenskii, but of course the director of the office wrote under the orders of his chief. The newspaper of the office, *Finljandskaja Gazeta*, published a review of the revolutionary movement, written by Pekonen. He stated that the opposition clique had organized the massive emigration of young men to avoid conscription; it supported revolutionary socialism; praised terrorist acts in Russia and organized murders in Finland. The activist party had declared the Finns free from their oath of loyalty, because it argued that the Emperor had first broken his word. The activists cooperated with the Russian revolutionaries. Their aim was to overthrow the established order and to replace the Empire with a federation.⁹⁸ These were deadly sins, in the view of all "true Russians", *istinno russkie*, i.e. reactionary chauvinists. Pekonen's views were nearly identical with those written in the gendarme reports, excepting that the latter did not trust even Pekonen, because he was a Finn, after all.⁹⁹

It may be taken that Seyn's views were close to those of the gendarmes and Pekonen. Of course he could not record his criticism of his chief in the official documents. Obolenskiï procured the Order of St. Vladimir, 3rd class, for Seyn. He also proposed promoting Seyn to major general.

97 *Svet*, 22.VIII 1905, no. 218

98 Zapiska kriminal-komissara Vil'ho Pekonena o terrorističeskom revoljucionnom dviženii v Finljandii, 28.III 1905. *Finljandskaja Gazeta* 62, 63, 64/1905

99 Političeskii obzor za 1904 goda, p. 27. Antti Hackzellin kokoelma 5, VA

"Colonel Seyn is extraordinarily hard-working, talented, and devoted to the service; he is a most precious assistant in his present office, and merits special recognition."¹⁰⁰

The War Ministry was somewhat reluctant, observing that colonels in the civilian service could be promoted only after their military contemporaries were promoted major generals. But someone favourably disposed towards Seyn found a decree from the eighteenth century, according to which Seyn could be promoted "for distinction in service". This occurred on December 6th, 1905.¹⁰¹

Promotion was not necessarily a recognition of merit. People in Helsinki supposed that Obolenskiĭ had a few people promoted in order to make easier their removal from Finland.¹⁰² This is not impossible, but of course it may have been wishful thinking.

The October Revolution

The Russian army lost battle after battle against the Japanese. The Russian navy was destroyed. A white Christian colonial Great Power had been conquered by yellow monkeys.¹⁰³ The incompetence of Tsarism was again revealed, and in a way that deeply hurt the Russian national feeling. Added to the old social evils, vexing bureaucracy, and troublesome everyday life, this provoked the nation to demonstrations, strikes, riots, mutinies, jacqueries, and rebellion. A workers' Soviet was formed in St. Petersburg, chaired by the fiery Trotsky. Nicholas II was compelled to promise a constitution and civil rights on October 17/30th 1905.

100 Obolenskiĭ to the Minister State Secretary 1/14.X 1905. KKK 1905, III dept. no. 19 II, VA

101 Deputy Minister of War Polivanov 13.X 1905. Imperial Manifesto of 18.II 1762. KKK 1905, III dept. no. 19 II, VA

102 *Hultin*, *Päiväkirjani* . . . I, p. 151, 187

103 With apologies to the Japanese; this is how Emperor Nicholas II described Russia's enemies in the Far East.

The Finnish General Strike, or the October Revolution as the gendarmes called it (30/17.X—6.XI/24.X), was not part of the Russian revolution, nor yet was it independent of the movement in Russia. It was indeed an autonomous rising. For a few years now the Social Democrats had successfully organized the discontent for which there were plenty of grounds in Finnish society. Nationally- and politically-conscious people were provoked by the Tsarist oppression. The Russian movement was an inspiration and a guarantee of success for the Finns.

The government had been prepared for an armed rebellion, but not for the general strike, which cut off all communications and thus paralyzed the Russian military might. There could be no question of calling up the division from St. Petersburg; Obolenskiĭ was unable to get help from the barracks round the corner, when the Helsinki mob surged into his office. He decided to consider the strike as an internal Finnish disturbance and to enter into discussions with the insurgents, in spite of the fact that the Socialists and activists had elected a temporary government of their own and very nearly declared war on him. The constitutional leader Mechelin — no longer called a criminal separatist — was promised the restitution of Finland's legal rights and the Socialists were promised universal suffrage. The unificatory measures were suspended.¹⁰⁴ This was "a colossal political mistake" from the perspective of the "true Russians".¹⁰⁵

The army refused to accept any guilt for inactivity and for the precarious position in which the Governor-General had been left. The commander of the army corps accused Obolenskiĭ for cringeing in front of the Finns — where was the dignity of the representative of His Majesty?! The army had not had any authority to act on its own; and keeping to its barracks it had avoided incidents and bloodshed. If the Governor-General had asked for help, the garrison would have defended him to the

104 Obolenskiĭ's draft for the "Most loyal Report" for 1905, KKK Hd 80, no. 9, VA

The General Strike from the Russian point of view, cf. Jussila, *Vuoden 1905* . . . p. 208—218

105 Vladimirovič, *Revoljucija* . . . p. 38

last drop of blood. Obviously he had been in collusion with Mechelin from the very beginning.¹⁰⁶

In fact, it seems that the garrison had been afraid of the Finnish rebel army, created by the imagination of the gendarme informants. The commanding general explained that he had only three thousand troops, while the Finns had tens of thousands of armed men, who tried to provoke the Cossacks to the streets to be massacred. Obolenskii had had warships at his disposal, why had he not bombarded the town?¹⁰⁷ — Obviously, divorcing the military command from the civilian authority had not been a success for the Imperial interest.

It is true that the Finns did have a National Guard, formed to replace the striking police and to be the vanguard of the revolution; but it had no military capabilities. A false alarm "the Cossacks are coming" caused a panic among the mob. And Obolenskii did make the ships ready to bombard Helsinki, whence Russians and their families were transferred to Sveaborg.

But meanwhile a pilot ship had fetched the Emperor's signature to the manifesto agreed on by Obolenskii and Mechelin, and thereafter the situation began to ease. Mechelin was to form a constitutional Senate, and the universal suffrage was to be decreed as soon as possible (the Diet was convened in 1906 and the law was enacted in the summer).

It is true that all Finns were not completely satisfied.

"But in the background the Red Guard stood gloomy and menacing, manifesting and foreshadowing that discontent was to continue and that henceforth it would be directed against those who had interrupted the strike."¹⁰⁸

The warships anchored nearby were an important argument against any further rebellion, although the Reds were reluctant to believe that the government had already won the upper hand in St. Petersburg — the revolutionaries there did not realize their situation and sent optimistic reports to Helsinki. But the Finnish Red Guard put off its action. A commentator

106 Draft reports by the 22nd army corps staff. KKK Hd 80, no. 11, VA

107 Draft reports . . . = 106

108 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . I, p. 280

wrote: "As far as I can understand, the menace of the Russian naval guns made the workers sober up at the last moment."¹⁰⁹

It seems that the moment was indeed very nearly the last one. The War Ministry was already starting an expedition to pacify Finland; the district of Viipuri had been declared under martial law. It was only with difficulty that the Minister of War Roediger was made to believe that the Finns were satisfied with the manifesto given to them.¹¹⁰

Thus it may have been thanks to Obolenskii that Helsinki was saved from bombardment by the Russians and from revolution by the Finns. The Russian sovereignty and the Finnish constitutional framework were both saved; questions of Finnish independence and social justice were adjourned until the second Russian revolution made them the issue of the civil war of independence in 1918.

The gendarmes were besides themselves in the new situation.

"After the October revolution all notions of loyalty and opposition towards His Majesty have been turned upside down and do not conform to any regulation, so that it is impossible to say at the present time who can be regarded as a true servant of His Majesty... The local administration is headed by the instigators of the revolutionary movement, who only a moment ago were exiled as utterly detrimental elements... They have stopped the anarchy because there is nobody left to rebel against."¹¹¹

Obolenskii was dismissed because his behaviour and concessions were too much even for the new Russia; but the acting Governor-General, the commander of the army corps Baron Saltza, was, to the gendarmes, suspected because of his inactivity during the rebellion — wasn't he of German (Baltic) origin, and related to the worst of Finns?¹¹² His successor Gerard was no improvement, as will be seen later on.

109 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . I, p. 264

110 Törngren, *Från Finlands* . . . p. 225—235

111 Načal'nik Finljandskago Žandarmskago Upravlenija 8.XII 1905. Antti Hackzellin kokoelma 6, VA

112 O soobščestve "Sila" v Finljandii. Soveršenno sekret'naja zapiska načal'nika Finljandskago žandarmskago upravlenija, 1906. Antti Hackzellin kokoelma 6, VA (The relation was the Grotenfelt family)

Seyn was no central actor during these October days. We have only a few glimpses recorded of him. When the mob surged into Obolenskii's office, Seyn was seen among the other aides of the Governor-General, sitting at a table and resting his head on his hands. Obviously, for him the appeasing of the Finnish constitutional activists had led to the logical conclusion. When the Russian families escaped to Sveaborg, Mme. Seyn exhorted everybody to leave, because Helsinki was to be destroyed.¹¹³ — Wishful thinking?

Seyn was given four months' leave of absence starting from the beginning of January, 1906, because of neurasthenia.¹¹⁴ If the military doctor's diagnosis is genuine, we can conclude that the political turmoil was a shattering experience for Seyn, no less than to the gendarmes; as indeed it was to most representatives of the Tsarism.

113 Estlander, *Elva årtionden . . . III*, p. 366

114 Certificate by Il'jasev, M.D., *kolležskii asessor*, junior physician in the military hospital at Helsinki. KKK 1905, III dept. no. 19 II, VA

Tsarism Menaced

Constitutional Autocracy

Autocratic Imperial Russia was a bureaucratic *Rechtsstaat* and a paternalistic *Polizeistaat*. It was no unmitigated despotism, albeit there existed much arbitrariness and lawlessness as well as corruption and inertia in its administration. If the Ministries of Interior and Education were reactionary, the Ministry of Finances tried to pull the sluggish economy towards the machine age, especially during Witte's tenure of office (1892—1903). Prosperity had encouraged the emergence of the sort of public who wanted to participate in the formation of politics; the autocrats, advised by reactionaries who were afraid of the shattering consequences of any concessions to modern ideas, were reluctant to give consent to any political reforms. This pushed the most impatient towards the intransigent violence of revolution, but nevertheless the moderate constitutionalists survived. It was to appease them that the Tsar had consented to the manifesto of 17/30th October 1905.

Witte had opposed both the reactionary policy advocated by Plehwe, and the Far East adventure, so dear to the Emperor; consequently he lost his influence in 1903. After the defeat, Witte was called to save what was left of the Empire. He succeeded in making a tolerable peace with the Japanese, who were exhausted by their victories. Returning to St. Petersburg, he was appointed Russia's first Prime Minister.

Witte was no constitutionalist, and even less was he a democrat; he understood that an autocrat was necessary to modernize Russia, to overcome the reactionary inertia. But with Nicholas II on the throne the incoherent and bureaucratic police-military Empire was unable to withstand the destructive forces. A unified government with popular support was necessary. That was why Witte advised Nicholas II to consent to the October Manifesto. Thereafter the constitutional opposition was somewhat appeased, and the armed rebellion in Moscow and the mutinies in Siberia were successfully quelled. War and revolution had disorganized Russia's finances; France assisted in the revival of her ally with a giant loan. In return Russia had to support France against Germany at the Algeciras conference; thus the Dual Alliance was revived.

The new constitution was promulgated in April 1906. The Emperor was called autocrat and remained supreme in ministerial appointments, in foreign policy and in military and naval questions. Laws were to be made and taxes to be imposed with the consent of a two-chamber representative institution, consisting of the Council of State and the State Duma.

Witte was rather too much of a success. It began to be rumoured that he was aspiring to the presidency of a future Russian Republic. He was unable to hide his contempt for Nicholas II. On the other hand, he was not able to achieve complete and immediate pacification of the land; constitutionalists refused to enter his government; strikes, riots, pogroms, and jacqueries re-emerged here and there in the spring of 1906. After the French loan was concluded, Witte was dismissed.

Witte's view on the Finnish question differed from the policy of Bobrikov and his circle. As Minister of Finance, he had been asked for a statement on the proposed military reform of 1901. He had been of the opinion that the Finns could not be suspected of separatism. They had participated in Russia's wars at their own expense. Nor was it justified to contend that Finland prospered at Russia's expense because of her lighter military burden: Finland was the sole border province that had never given raise to any costs for being disciplined and pacified.

The doctrine of the existence of a Finnish state, the basis of

the progress and prosperity of the country, was no proof of a wish for independence from Russia, Witte argued. The governmental system decreed by Alexander I caused no inconvenience to Russia and spared her from large expenditures. Alexander II had understood that people could be both good Finns and loyal subjects. Alexander III had not loved the Finnish constitution, he had not allowed its further development and he had even attempted integration. "But he did not approve of breaking the fundamental laws, of political cunning, or of Jesuitism."¹¹⁵

That was Witte's judgement on Nicholas II's, Bobrikov's and, consequently, on Seyn's policy. He thought that the good Russo-Finnish relationship, created by a century-long effort, ought not to be broken with abrupt measures of integration. It was better to make Finns convinced of the benefits of a closer association with Russia.

For a Finn, this seems sensible. But the respecting of Finnish laws and institutions, Witte's belief in the possibility of convincing the Finns, must have been incomprehensible for Bobrikov and Seyn: for them such an approach contained exactly the criminal concessions that were the root and cause of Finnish separatism.

The difference had reference to policy, ways and means, not aims:

"In order to avoid misunderstandings, I deem it necessary to state that the authority of the Autocratic Russian Sovereign to take all necessary measures concerning Finland is above all dispute and doubt; Finland is an inseparable part of the Russian Realm; Finnish legislation cannot limit the competence of the Russian government — on the contrary, the sovereign Russian legislation circumscribes the jurisdiction of the particular Finnish institutions."¹¹⁶

There was no difference in the aims of the decent (from the Western point of view) Russians and the Bobrikovians. The indivisibility of the Russian Empire and the Imperial

115 Witte, *Vospominanija III*, p. 255—256

116 Witte to Plehwe 14.I 1901. KKK 1908, IV dept, no. 51 II, VA

sovereignty in Finland were self-evident principles for all Russian statesmen. Witte hoped for an eventual integration of Finland; he had no understanding for the view that the Grand Duke together with the Estates were a Finnish Sovereign which was not under any Russian authority.

But the difference in ways and means is often critical. Aims may remain unfulfilled, while the ways and means applied constitute the sole accomplishment. In Finland's history Witte's time is a breathing-space between two periods of oppression.

True Russians Expelled from Finland

Witte's Russia was represented in Finland by the new Governor-General N.N. Gerard, a civilian in a long line of military men.

The November Manifesto caused a "reversal in circumstances", so that "many officials had to leave service in Finland". Gerard stated that this was hard but unavoidable in order to achieve a pacification of the country. For instance, letting the very competent General Dračevskii stay on in his post as the director of railways would have caused a renewed strike in Finland.¹¹⁷

Gerard had much worry about these men, because they had been appointed legally, according to Russian law, but the Finns could not stomach them. Vacancies had to be found in Russia for Papkov, Mjasoedov, and many others.¹¹⁸ They felt no gratitude for Gerard's efforts. Rheinbott, transferred to Moscow, kept writing articles in the reactionary press, accusing Gerard of endangering Russian influence and security in Finland.¹¹⁹ — This was to become a favoured argument against the new policy in Finland.

One of the men to be got rid of was Seyn. He had been given

117 Kratkii obzor dejatel'nosti Gerarda N.N. 1906. CGIA SSSR/Mf Nl 173, VA

118 Gerard to Witte 26.III/8.IV 1906. KKK Fh 7, no. 96 a, VA

119 Rheinbott in *Novoe Vremja* 29.X 1906, with a draft answer by Gerard. CGIA SSSR/Mf NL 173, VA

consilium abeundi by the constitutionalists before the October revolution. Now, in December 1905, Mechelin, the new chairman of the Senate, "earnestly exhorted Gerard to purge his chancery from such persons as Seyn and his ilk, and Gerard understood the necessity of it".¹²⁰ A few days later Seyn sent a message to the Diet in Russian. Mechelin called Gerard's attention to the matter and told how incensed the representatives had been. "You can see how Seyn makes himself impossible."¹²¹ Evidently, Seyn was not going to adapt himself to the prevailing political winds, he pursued the Russian policy as interpreted by Bobrikov.

Gerard stated that "characteristic of the service of these men was the unfaltering execution of the Tsar's orders, and it is not their fault that they must quit the service". It was the government's duty to take care of them.¹²² Thus, incidentally, the conscientious Gerard made certain that the confirmed Bobrikovians, the bitter enemies of his policy in Finland, obtained influential positions in Russia.

The Emperor presented Seyn with a tobacco box, adorned with brilliants, on 2nd/15th February, 1906. It must have been comforting for Seyn, because the date (of the February Manifesto of 1899) proved that some one near the Autocrat had not forgotten Bobrikov's policy nor his aide. But for the present he could not be employed in Finland.

As desirable employment for himself in Russia Seyn listed the position of chief of staff of the gendarme corps, the chief of post and telegraphs, chief of the prison administration, chief of a department in any ministry, or chief of staff of the frontier guard corps.¹²³ This range of choice confirms our conception that Seyn felt closest to the gendarme way of life and the police view of the world.

But there was no vacancy in St. Petersburg. Witte put Seyn on the list of possible provincial governors.¹²⁴ His leave of

120 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani . . . I*, p. 317, 19.XII 1905

121 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani . . . I*, p. 321, 29.XII 1905

122 Gerard to Witte 2.III 1906. KKK 1906, III dept., no. 50 I, VA

123 Zapiska dlja pamjati (a memorandum in Seyn's archive s.d.). KKK Fh 7, no. 96 a, VA

124 Witte to Gerard 8.IV 1906. KKK 1906, III dept., no. 50 I, VA

absence had to be extended because no vacancy was found.¹²⁵ It seems that Witte did not appreciate Seyn; he wrote: "Of these three men — Seyn, Rheinbott, Dračevskii — he was the most unfit and unscrupulous man."¹²⁶ Gerard had to write to the new Minister of the Interior, Stolypin, that a vacancy had to be found for Seyn, because it was impossible to admit him back to Finland.¹²⁷ Stolypin answered that the Major General was unfamiliar with circumstances in the interior of Russia; he had to wait for a vacancy in a border region.¹²⁸ At last, an office was found for Seyn in Grodno, where he was appointed governor in June, 1906. Stolypin himself had been the Governor of Grodno in 1902—1903. "It is difficult to imagine anything better than this old fortress of the Polish Kings"¹²⁹, the Minister's daughter Marija wrote.

"After the October Revolution the revolutionary Finnish party of activist opposition, officially called the Constitutional Party, systematically expelled all Russians and Finns who were true to their oath to the Throne and Sovereign",¹³⁰ the gendarmes complained. They were thrown out of the Grand Duchy, often with some violence: their weapons were confiscated, their lodgings were searched, their papers torn to shreds, their clothes were rent, the men themselves were hauled along the streets and imprisoned and threatened with death "if you should return"; one gendarme was killed. The killers could not be punished, because the Finnish courts believed only their compatriot witnesses, who had perceived only justice taking place, no violence or robbery.¹³¹

It was thanks to the rifle brigades that Russian power in Finland was saved. The garrisons were too strong to be attacked by the Finns.

125 Leave of absence extended for two more months 2/15.V 1906. KKK Fh 7, no. 96 a, VA

126 Witte, *Vospominanija III*, p. 476

127 Gerard to Stolypin 4/17.V 1906. KKK Fh 7, no. 96 a, VA

128 Stolypin to Gerard 15.V 1906. KKK Fh 7, no 96 a, VA

129 Bok, *Vospominanija* . . . p. 114

130 O soobščestve "Sila" v Finljandii. Antti Hackzellin kokoelma 6, VA

131 O nasilijah nad žandarmami vo vremja bezporjadkov. KKK 1906, I dept., no. I-1, VA

Mechelin Rules over Finland

Gerard was one of the "good" Governor-Generals in Finnish history. Of him it has been written: "He was a considerate administrator, who was careful not to interfere in the jurisdiction of Finnish authorities; thus he was able to restore confidential relations between the Governor-General and the Senate."¹³² When he was about to leave Finland, a meeting of citizens sent an address to him, "unreservedly acknowledging the lawfulness in Finland during the reign of Your Excellency, and the impartiality with which you have attended to both Finland's and Russia's interests"¹³³

Gerard administered Finland in mutual understanding with Mechelin. Both of them were mindful not only of Russo-Finnish relations but also of the necessity to safeguard the legal and constitutional order from Russo-Finnish revolutionary commotion.¹³⁴

Lawful order was restored and officials dismissed by Bobrikov were re-appointed. This meant that the Old Finns appointed by the dictator suffered, of course. People guilty of illegal acts on Bobrikov's orders were prosecuted. Constitutional reforms were planned. The constitutionalists, being concerned with legal and constitutional problems, with law and order, and often being personally well-off, were perhaps too forgetful of social problems.

For the gendarmes, the representatives of the reactionary chauvinist Russia, the new policy in Finland was incomprehensible.

"Gerard expressed his utter hatred towards the administrative system of Bobrikov; he fell completely under the influence of Mechelin, his old friend; Russians were expelled and activists appointed instead."¹³⁵

132 *Otavan Iso Tietosanakirja* 2, p. 1713

133 Pöytäkirja kansalaiskokouksesta Wiitasaarella 14.XII 1907. KKK 1907, I dept., no. XXXV-I, VA

134 Jussila, *Nationalismi*... p. 87 — discusses the Russian-Finnish co-operation, both the revolutionary and establishment kinds

135 O soobščestve "Sila" v Finljandii, p. 2. Antti Hackzellin kokoelma 6, VA

For the gendarmes, for the "true Russians", Witte's policy in the Empire and Gerard's policy in the Grand Duchy was mistaken, because it was based on foreign, western ideas. It diluted Russia's autocratic, Orthodox, and Russian nature, and, on the other hand, it was unable to convert adversaries into true subjects. Internal reforms only provoked more extreme demands, and self-government fostered separatism. Concessions were criminal, especially in Finland. Finns had always abused their autonomy to appropriate new privileges.

Seyn's view on this period was identical with gendarme opinion. He felt that the October occurrences had led to the suspension of Russian national policy in Finland, thus allowing the separatists Mechelin and Wrede (the chairman of the justice department of the Senate) to start with "extraordinary energy" annulling Bobrikov's accomplishments in order further to separate the border country from the interior parts of Russia. Mechelin subjected the administration to the separatists, divorced it from Russian governmental power. The Russian language was excluded from the government business; Mechelin referred official matters to the Governor-General in French, as if Gerard had been the ambassador of a foreign country.

The results were seen in everyday life, too. Russian street signs were taken down, meetings were held without permission, newspapers printed whatever they liked.

Universal suffrage produced a Socialist majority in the new Finnish Diet in 1907. It was extremely fractious and tried to limit Russia's sovereignty in Finland. For instance, it was said in the Diet that no law concerning the inviolability of the person of the Emperor was necessary in Finland, because Finland's monarch was Grand Duke. And the Socialists added that the man did not need any better legal protection than any other citizen.¹³⁶

As an example of the rumours circulating, it was alleged that Wilhelm II had told the French naval attaché that the Grand Duke Nikolai Mihailovič had had discussions with Gapon at Monte Carlo and had also negotiated with the Finns saying

136 Političeskoe položenie v krae i vyzvannaja im mery dlja ohraneniija gosudarstvennago projadka i obščestvennago bezopašnosti (a draft memorandum by Seyn, after he had returned to Finland). KKK Hd 99, VA

"now is the time for us Grand Dukes to think about ourselves".¹³⁷ Did the Grand Duke want an independent Grand Duchy of Finland for himself? The break-up of the Swedo-Norwegian Union in 1905 may have inspired analogous schemes for the future of Finland. Until further proof is found, the story may be taken as an evidence of the Kaiser's fertile imagination. But the gendarmes can be excused for suspecting that the Finns were planning secession and wanting, if not an independent Grand Duchy, a grand northern union of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland.¹³⁸

A Separatist Constitution for Finland?

Finns did not understand that they had been disloyal. The Socialists were planning a just society, while the wealthier classes were trying to restore and safeguard the lawful status quo. But Seyn's suspicions were not completely without foundation.

When Gerard replaced Seyn with a milder Bobrikovian, Knipovič, Mechelin said that it was against the constitution, according to which all officials had to be Finnish citizens. "Regrettably" the Governor-General was able to appeal to "a certain decree" (by Alexander III in 1891). But, Mechelin continued, it was "against the trend and spirit of the constitution".¹³⁹ Thus, constitution was not what was decreed, it was what the Finns imagined or hoped it to be. They held that no Russian had anything to say in Finnish affairs.

Many Russians thought that Bobrikov's methods had been too brutal. The committee chaired by Tagancev had been set up to discuss Finno-Russian legislative problems; only two Russian members, the Bobrikovians Professor Sergeevskii and

137 Bihourd, the French Ambassador in Berlin, to his Foreign Ministry 8.II 1906. AMAE C.P., Russie N.S., no 13

138 O soobščestve . . . (= 135), p. 1

139 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . I, p. 329

General Borodkin, approved of the martyr's policy. But all Russian members were unanimous on the aim:

"Finland's interests must be subordinate to the Imperial interests, and the Finnish population must learn to understand the inevitability of such subordination."¹⁴⁰

The new Russian Imperial draft constitution of 1906 declared:

"The border countries in Russia's sovereign possession, although enjoying the right of local legislation and self-government, make up an indivisible unity together with the Empire."

The Emperor was to possess identical rights in Finland and in Russia. The sovereign Imperial government was to determine the competence of the local representative and administrative organs. Foreign policy, the political police, posts and telegraph, the army and navy, the Orthodox church, were to be administered by Imperial offices, even in Finland. Imperial laws were to be decreed for Russia and for Finland by the central legislative, Finnish point of view being represented only by the endorsement of the Minister State-Secretary. All Russians were to be entitled to serve in Finnish offices, and all Christian subjects of the Emperor were to enjoy the local Finnish rights of citizenship.¹⁴¹

In principle, Gerard did not find any fault with this proposal. He only emphasized that the jurisdiction of Finnish organs of administration ought to be clearly demarcated. He would have preferred the customs service, the monetary system, and the railways added to the list of matters to be administered by the Imperial instances. Also, he wanted to make clear the jurisdiction of the Imperial authorities in Finland, especially for investigating the revolutionary activity.¹⁴²

Later Gerard emphasized that the position of Finland was not due to any contract between Russia and Finland; it was

140 Protocols of the Tagancev committee, p. 89. KKK 1908, IV dept, no. 51 II, VA

141 A draft of the Russian constitution, discussed by the committee of the State Secretary Sol'skii. KKK 1906, IV dept., no. 36, VA

142 Gerard to Sol'skii 24.II/9.III 1906. KKK 1906, IV dept., no. 36, VA

ordained by the Emperor. Finland was not a state separate from Russia.¹⁴³

The Tagancev committee came to nothing, and the Russian constitution was ignored in Finland, although Finnish criticism caused a few paragraphs to be rewritten. No Russian law could be held valid by the Finns. But the Russian Constitution of 1906 is not without importance in the Finnish history. Heiden and Bobrikov had made their programmes for the Russification of Finland, and Seyn's programme will be discussed later on; the programme included in the Constitution was no deviation from the series, in spite of the fact that it was made by the "good" Russia, represented by Witte and Gerard.

Mechelin criticized the Russian proposal: Finland was not in Russia's sovereign possession. Finnish governmental organs were not subordinate to Russian organs. It was true that Finland was inseparably united with the Russian Empire, but she was governed according to her own constitution. Tagancev answered that Mechelin's interpretation of Finland's position in the Swedish period was totally mistaken, nor did it hold true for her position as a part of the Russian realm. Finland was not united with Russia, she was conquered by Russia. "Mechelin's view cannot be admitted without fatal injury to Russia."¹⁴⁴

During the years 1904—1906 Mechelin drafted a codification of Finland's constitutional rights. In his view Finland and Russia were separate states with separate governmental organs; the sole uniting link was the fact that the Grand Duke was simultaneously the Russian Emperor. Instead of a Governor-General there should be a parliamentary Minister-President. Identical laws by the Finnish Diet and the Imperial Legislature were to regulate Imperial questions affecting the two states. Members of the Economy Department of the Senate (i.e. the government) were to be responsible to the Finnish Diet. The Justice Department of the Senate was to be transformed into a Supreme Court of Justice.¹⁴⁵ The costs for foreign

143 Gerard interviewed by *Birževyja Vedomosti* 1.I 1908. KKK 1908, I dept., no. XXXV, VA

144 Comments on the draft for the constitution of 1906. KKK 1906, IV dept., no. 36, VA

145 O preobrazovanii Sudebnago Departamenta v vyššii Sud. KKK 1906, IV dept., no. 10-2-0-, VA

representation and defence could be arranged with Russia in coequal negotiations.¹⁴⁶ The young Ståhlberg (President of the Finnish Republic 1919—1925), also a constitutionalist, thought that it was in Finland's interest to have nothing in common with Russia excepting the Monarch.¹⁴⁷

Mechelin admitted that the reform would reduce the Emperor's power, but "it would only restore the ancient constitutional principle . . . and set the Justice Department apart from all politics . . ." In this occasion Gerard opposed Mechelin. The Governor-General in fact upheld the Emperor's and Russia's suzerainty in Finland and his own position as the head of the Finnish administration on the Emperor's behalf. His stand caused "sorrow" and "deep disappointment" to the constitutionalists.

It seems that many of the constitutionalists totally failed to appreciate the Russian standpoint. Miss Tekla Hultin, who was the first woman to become a doctor of philosophy in Finland, a convinced constitutionalist, often discussed these questions with the admired Mechelin. She did not understand the revolutionary implications of the latter's plans, she was constitutionalist with a good conscience. When she heard of Norway's declaration of independence, she wrote: "When shall we be so far?" Nevertheless she sincerely thought that "Russia has no reason to be apprehensive for her interests; Bobrikov was guilty of the whole quarrel, we Finns are always able to be tactful and moderate".¹⁴⁸

It is not clear whether Mechelin himself always acted in good faith, but it seems so. Until after the Second World War Finnish historiography, too, sincerely assumed only Russian guilt for the years of oppression. On the other hand, it is easy to understand that the Russian chauvinists had difficulties in believing the Finnish protestations of loyalty, and that the gendarmes could not tell constitutionalists apart from separatists, activists, and Socialists.

Baron Budberg, an ancient courtier of Alexander III, wrote to State-Secretary Count Sol'skii: the Finnish theory of a personal union between Russia and Finland was unfounded,

146 Törngren, *Från Finlands . . .* p. 71

147 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani . . . I*, p. 211

148 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani . . . I*, p. 198, 207, 267

but equally groundless was the contrary Russian claim that Alexander I had not given Finland any special status. The truth was in Speranskii's statement: Finland is a state, not a *gubernija*.¹⁴⁹ Such a statement from the good old days was not listened to by anybody.

The Finnish Embassy in St. Petersburg

The Minister State-Secretary for Finland was the official charged with the task of keeping the Emperor informed of Finnish questions. During the nineteenth century the trusted Imperial servants, Finnish-born aristocrats but with no nationalist bias, had understood that having a peaceful progress in Finland was in the Imperial interest. It was not until v. Plehve was appointed to that office that nationalist Russian interests became the dominating concern; after his death and the revolution of 1905 the constitutional Finnish perspective emerged forcefully in the office. It is true that the constitutionalists were not able to have their candidate appointed to the post; the Emperor preferred Lieutenant General Langhoff, the commander of a Guards brigade. But in office the new Minister State-Secretary adopted a stiff constitutional line, and replaced Russian officials by Finns in his department.

In Helsinki Mechelin and other constitutionalists hoped to be able to create a committee, or a Senate delegation, in St. Petersburg to help the Minister State-Secretary. The Russian press was alarmed: Finland was going to set up an embassy in the capital. The Minister of the Interior Durnovo warned Witte: the Governor-General would be paralysed by the two Finnish Senates, and only the Finnish point of view would be referred to the Emperor. There had been a similar Committee of Finnish Affairs from 1857 to 1891; that had been, in Durnovo's opinion, the period of unchecked Finnish separatist development. What was needed was a committee where the Ministry of the

149 Budberg to Sol'skii 2.IV 1906. KKK 1906, IV dept., no. 36, VA

Interior, the Ministry of War, and the Ministry of Finances had their representatives, to safeguard the Imperial interests against Finnish schemes.

Gerard, for his part, proposed a committee of two Finnish and two Russian Senators, with a chairman appointed by the Emperor. This committee was to work out all Russo-Finnish legislation that had reference to Imperial interests.

The Emperor adjourned his decision on these proposals. Previous mixed Russo-Finnish committees (Heiden's, Bunge's, Tagancev's) had not succeeded in reconciling Finnish and Russian interests. Witte did not like uselessly provoking the Finns, who did not want to submit their affairs to any kind of Russian influence.

Instead of the proposed committee, the Finns succeeded in having two high officials (of Senatorial rank) appointed "for special purposes" in the Minister State-Secretary's office. Robert Hermanson, professor of constitutional law, was competent to advise Langhoff. Dr. Adolf Törnngren was well-known in St. Petersburg society; his task was to spread information (propaganda, said the Russians) in the Duma circles. Their mission was not a success; their goal of seeking to reverse the direction of Stolypin's policy, to be described later, was too much for them. They left office by 1909.¹⁵⁰ Langhoff remained and was the cause of much nuisance to Seyn.

The Finnish Army to be Resurrected?

Mechelin's Senate tried to restore the constitutional order in the military sphere, too. Soon after the general strike they made a "most loyal" proposal about recreating the Finnish Guards battalion. The riflemen were to form the cadre of a new conscripted army.¹⁵¹

150 Seyn to Kokovcov 17.XII 1913 (a historical review of the committee question, from the Governor-General's point of view). VSV Hc 2, VA

151 A Most Loyal Proposal by the Senate 21.XII 1905. KKK 1906, 2. dept., no. D 2-1, O vozstanovlenii finskih voisk. VA

Her weakness notwithstanding, Russia was able to leave "without consequences" such a dangerous and, in Russian eyes, even treasonable proposal:

"It has no serious justification, it is only an attempted political coup, a plot to return to the state of affairs before 1901, which has been condemned from the Throne, as being against the principle of unity of the Imperial armed forces."¹⁵²

Instead Finland was to go on paying the annual ten million marks ordered in 1905. After a discussion concerning the constitutional aspects of the proposal, the Diet decided to pay a further ten million marks for the years 1906 and 1907 each. It was to be a temporary measure; the Diet strongly demanded the restoration of the constitutional military establishment.¹⁵³ The decision was adopted by 105 votes to 90. The Social Democrats said that no money should be given to be used by the Tsarist oppressor against the Russian proletariat. The Socialists preferred a national militia to a standing army of the old militarist model.¹⁵⁴

In conformity to the Diet's wish, the Senate made a new attempt to have the military law decreed, but it came to nought.¹⁵⁵ That was only to be expected, because by 1908 the Tsarist order was much strengthened in Russia. It only confirmed the Russian belief that Mechelin was an uncorrigible separatist.

Mechelin's Senate was not the only one to attempt the rearming of Finland. During the revolutionary days in October-November 1905 the activists had perceived the double danger of an armed Red revolution and an armed Russian intervention in Finland. To safeguard the established order in Finland they

152 Governor-General to the Minister State-Secretary 30.XII 1905/12.I 1906, and Minister State-Secretary to the Governor-General 5.II 1906. KKK 1906, 2. dept., no. D 2-1, O vozstanovlenii finskih voisk. VA

153 Valtioapäivät 1907, Pöytäkirjat III. (Protocols of the Diet). Correspondence concerning the question in KKK 1907, II dept., no. 8-2 C I and II, VA

154 Valtioapäivät 1907, Pöytäkirjat III

155 Senate to the Governor-General to Stolypin 11.V and 22.V 1908; and Osobyĭ Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 11.VI 1908. KKK 1908, II dept., no. 38, VA

organized groups for military training all over the country, masked as athletic clubs. The organization, called the *Voima* (or "Force"), acquired 3,125 military rifles (of the obsolete Wetterli-model, the kind of which the "John Grafton" had tried to smuggle into the country in the previous year).¹⁵⁶ At the same time, the Red wing of the National Guard of 1905 continued their meetings, preparing for the armed defence of the poor people's rights.

This activity was noticed by the gendarmes and made the military chiefs rather apprehensive. Gerard tried to calm them down — he explained that the Red Guard was not anti-Russian, and the *Voima* was interested in sports only.¹⁵⁷ But in the summer of 1906 the Helsinki Red Guard joined the military mutiny in the fortress of Sveaborg, and the *Voima's* smuggled rifles were discovered. It was also discovered that Finnish activists and Socialists were aiding Russian revolutionary refugees in Finland and thus contributed to the latter's crimes against the Tsarist establishment.

Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevič, the Commander-in-Chief in St. Petersburg, very nearly declared a state of military emergency in Finland; troops were to be sent to the Grand Duchy to keep order. With a great effort Langhoff obtained a promise from Stolypin, the new Prime Minister, that no state of military emergency was to be declared if the Senate could successfully dissolve the Red Guards. In fact, also the *Voima* was dissolved after the rifles were found, in order not to provoke the Russian government. The Helsinki police force was strengthened and military rifles were acquired for them to be used in the event of disturbances.¹⁵⁸ But the Russian Government, its gendarmes and military chiefs, did not want to remain unprovoked: to them the armed Helsinki police seemed a new embryo Finnish army.

156 Parmanen, *Taistelujen* . . . IV, p. 560—740

Jussila, *Nationalismi* . . . p. 102—105, 189—199

157 Nikolai Nikolaevič to Gerard 10.VI 1906, Gerard to Nikolai Nikolaevič 20.V/2.VI 1906. KKK 1906, I dept., no. XV, VA

158 Parmanen, *Taistelujen* . . . IV p. 740

One of the main themes of Jussila, *Nationalismi* . . . is the "compliance" of the constitutionalists, the co-operation of Mechelin and Gerard, in order to save the Finnish constitutional order and the Russian security interests as the Governor-General understood them; e.g. p. 150

In the event of a declaration of a state of military emergency in Finland the military chiefs planned to send Guards troops to the Karelian Isthmus and Viipuri to keep order in the vicinity of the Imperial capital. Other troops were to be transported to Helsinki by sea to help the two rifle brigades to pacify the rest of the country. The navy (what there was of it, after the Tsushima) was to attempt to guard the coasts of Finland against the arms smugglers.¹⁵⁹

Russian regulations concerning the state of military emergency had been declared valid for Finland in 1904, in Bobrikov's time. By them the commander-in-chief was to be the supreme ruler during the emergency, with extraordinary powers; officials had to obey military orders, and the population had to keep calm, under the threat of field justice and military counter-measures. The problem was that all unconstitutional decrees had been suspended in November 1905. The commandants of the Sveaborg and Viipuri fortresses had also lost their extra-legal powers in their fortress districts (e.g. the right of expelling unreliable persons). Grand Duke Nikolaï Nikolaevič angrily demanded restoration of the decree of 1904. Gerard advised against provoking the Finns in vain; with good will the matter could be regulated to the satisfaction of both parties. But the Grand Duke could not accept the view that the Emperor's *Kommandogewalt* was dependent on the Finnish constitution.¹⁶⁰ This was one further example of the Finnish usurpation; and obviously, Gerard was not the man to safeguard the Imperial interests against it. It was supposed that it was this question that made the Grand Duke and Commander-in-Chief an enemy of Finland.¹⁶¹

159 Mery po obezpečenii gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti. KKK, Hd 14, no. 6, VA. Guarding the coasts interfered with foreign shipping, causing many diplomatic problems, cf. Luntinen, *The Baltic* . . . p. 84—, Luntinen, *The Åland* . . . p. 557—

160 KKK 1906, 2. dept., no. XIV (B), VA contains plenty of documentation on this problem

161 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . I, p. 412

Revolution Rampant

The Ministry of the Interior felt seriously alarmed about the unchecked activity of the Russian revolutionaries in Finland.

"The (November) manifesto repealed the special decree for safeguarding the political order in this country. It also abolished the exceptional powers of the Governor-General, his aide, and the Governors. Therefore the country has reverted to the state of things before the unificatory reforms. At the same time all restrictions for crossing the border have been nullified, as well as the control of the import and trade of arms, which can be imported as freely as any other metal goods according to the Finnish customs regulations. Because of such an extraordinary state of affairs in this country, a considerable number of anti-government people have arrived in Finland, where they freely organize meetings to devise ways and means for active revolutionary struggle . . ."¹⁶²

It was difficult for the Russian government to investigate these crimes, because the Finnish authorities were reluctant to cooperate. Revolutionaries and terrorists were able to skulk behind the Finnish frontier a few versts from St. Petersburg and prepare "the most serious crimes". On the Imperial side of the border, Stolypin maintained, there was intelligence and capability for the fight against the criminals, but the Finnish police were totally unexperienced in such activity, and many policemen were completely indifferent to Imperial interests. It was impossible for the Russian agents to fulfil their duty on the Finnish side of the border, where the officials were inactive and the population persecuted the Russians.¹⁶³

The Prime Minister demanded official authority for his policemen and the full collaboration of the Finnish officials.¹⁶⁴ For instance, in Viipuri in an incident involving revolutionaries

162 The chief of Gendarmes in the Ministry of the Interior to Gerard 28.VII 1906. KKK 1906, I dept., no. 1-3, VA

163 Stolypin to Langhoff 5.XII 1907. KKK 1908, I dept., no. XXVI, VA

164 Stolypin to Langhoff to Gerard 4.I 1908. KKK 1908, I dept., no. XXVI, VA

the Finnish police had dawdled for two weeks, giving the criminals ample opportunity to destroy all evidence; this was inadmissible. Keeping to formalities (=constitutional legality?) was not the way to fight the revolutionary menace against the Empire; it was tenacity and resolution that was needed.¹⁶⁵

The military chiefs were troubled by revolutionary agitation among their troops. They also demanded help from the Finnish officials.¹⁶⁶ After the mutiny at Sveaborg they were especially worried. In 1907 they complained to the Prime Minister that rumor ran rife of a new mutiny, agitation went on unchecked, but the local administration did not do anything.¹⁶⁷

The local administration answered back:

"May it please Your Highness to take note that the agitation among the troops, referred to in the Circular, exists as little in this district as the alleged nests of mutiny or rebellion quarters".¹⁶⁸

Gerard explained that Finns were free to organize all kinds of associations, festivals, and meetings, which made police surveillance difficult. There were not political police in Finland, and the local police could arrest people only on clear evidence. Criminals had been jailed in all cases that were legally warranted. For instance, the Finnish participants in the Sveaborg mutiny had been condemned to 4—6 years' hard labor.¹⁶⁹

The Senate proposed to let the problem be solved by the Diet. It was no use taking administrative measures in disregard of the law, even on the pretext of exceptional necessity. Only strictly legal action by the government could guarantee the cooperation of the local officials and population, indispensable to the successful unearthing of the criminal schemes.¹⁷⁰ A circular was sent to Governors and police chiefs, advising them to

165 Stolypin to Langhoff 1.II 1908. KKK 1908, I dept., no. XXVI, VA

166 22nd army corps to Gerard 19.V 1906 and 12.VII 1906. KKK 1906, I dept., no. V 4, VA

167 Stolypin to Gerard 25.VI 1907. KKK 1907, I dept., no. XV, VA

168 Police Chief in Oulu 10.VIII 1907. — Reports from all districts in KKK 1907, I dept., no. XX-6, VA

169 Gerard to Stolypin 22.IX/5.X 1907. KKK 1907, I dept., no. XX-6, VA

170 Senate to Boeckmann 21.III 1908. KKK 1908, I dept., no. XXVI, VA

regard with favour any request for official help by their Russian colleagues. But the Senate emphasized that the Imperial investigators had no official authority in Finland.¹⁷¹

In fact, Russian revolutionaries received much aid and comfort in Finland. A police officer in Helsinki promised to warn them of coming gendarme actions.¹⁷² The well-known artist Gallén-Kallela left on a trip to Africa to get a moment's peace from the Russian revolutionaries who were used to enjoying his hospitality.¹⁷³ Innumerable meetings were held in Finland; the best-known is the conference of the Russian Social Democratic Party in Tampere in 1905 and 1906, which Lenin attended and where Stalin met the leader for the first time.¹⁷⁴ The gendarmes heard of twenty-five such meetings in 1907. Political crimes were not only discussed in Finland: the Imperial State Bank was robbed, "expropriated", in Helsinki by Baltic refugees.¹⁷⁵

Finns were also participating in this illegal activity, the gendarmes believed. The *Voima* and the Red Guard had been dissolved in 1906, and in fact only a few half-criminal incorrigibles continued the activity, although the idea survived to be revived in 1914.¹⁷⁶ Hostility towards the Russians was widely diffused; for instance, the cult of Eugen Schauman, or insults to the Orthodox clergy testified to it.¹⁷⁷ It was difficult to believe that the Finns had given up their arms and plans of an armed rebellion.

Finns were spied upon by the gendarmes, by other agents of the Ohrana, and by military observers. Meagre evidence was found, and that was why additional and better evidence was fabricated by the spies, and informants were well paid for bits

171 Senate to Boeckman 11.V 1908 and to all governors 11.V 1908. KKK 1908, I dept., no. XXVI, VA

172 Tanner, *Nuorukainen* . . . p. 380

173 Aspelin-Haapkylä, *Kirovuosien* . . . p. 191
Wuolijoki, *Yliopistovuodet* . . .

174 The room where the meeting took place in the Workers' House nowadays contains a Lenin Museum

175 *Političeskoe položenie v krae i vyzvannaja im mery dlja ohraneniija gosudarstvennago bezopašnosti i obščestvennago projadka*. KKK Hd 99, VA (a review by Seyn)

176 Kujala, *Suomalaiset* . . .

177 *Političeskoe* . . . = 175

of intelligence. The *Voima* was reported on as if it were a mighty army. "Obviously, many arms have been smuggled into the country, although they have not been found" — 35,000 or 200,000 rifles had been imported. It was alleged that there were White, Red, and even Blue Guards having nocturnal field practice in the forests.¹⁷⁸ The stories were repeated in the chauvinist Russian press, especially in the *Moskovskija Vedomosti*, *Novoe Vremja*, and *Svet*.

The Senate admitted that there had been some regrettable incidents in 1906, but "they were not characteristic of this people and its earnest work to develop its culture". It was unfortunate that Russian agitators had come to Finland to incite the uneducated against "the Capital", and that the *Voima* had served as a pretext for the malevolent to blacken Finland.¹⁷⁹

Finnish Law — a Mortal Danger for Russia

Stolypin was extremely angry with the Senate. He believed that the Red Guard and the *Voima* had been allowed to arm; the Senate had gone as far as to defend the latter, saying that it only tried to guarantee the people's freedom "against social revolution and the oppression of the previous years" — i.e. it was the armed force of separatism. It was shameless to call "fantastic" the news in the Russian press about the massive weapons smuggling. The smuggling and hiding of weapons, with the criminal consent of the Finnish customs and the other authorities, was a fact. The "sad conclusion" was that the leadership of the country was ignorant of all that was going on there.¹⁸⁰

178 Delo Voimy, KKK Hd 87, no 2, VA. Concurring views by a couple of publicists cf. Kamenskii, *Sovremennoe* . . . , and Rumjancev, *Finljandija* . . .

179 A "Most Loyal" address by the Senate 20.III 1907. KKK 1907, I dept., no. IV-12, VA

180 Stolypin to Langhoff 2.IV 1907. KKK 1907, I dept., no. IV—12, VA

Part of the blame was directed against Gerard, of course, because he was the head of the administration in Finland. He had belittled the danger of the Finnish armed rebellion, and he had forbidden the commandant of the Viipuri fortress from intervening to keep order in the town.¹⁸¹ The Sveaborg mutiny shocked Gerard, but did not shake his trust in the loyalty of Finnish constitutionalists. The gendarmes' opinion of Gerard was:

"Governor-General Gerard was a man of weak and trustful character, completely under the influence of Messrs Mechelin & the Senators, without having men devoted to Russian interests in his suite. He seemed to the Finns the most suitable representative of Russia, because his protection enabled them to prepare for an armed rising, so that the eventuality of losing him seriously alarmed them . . ."¹⁸²

Langhoff noticed that

"Stolypin was extremely exasperated with Finland . . . the Viipuri district was teeming with Russian revolutionaries, and the Finnish authorities do absolutely nothing . . ."¹⁸³

The Emperor agreed. Langhoff wrote that Nicholas II was

"goodnatured . . . but instinctively a dislike for our country sometimes flashed across his countenance . . . He was specially displeased with Finland and our authorities because after the revolution the Russian rebels sought and found a refuge in Finland and, the Russian officials alleged, without hindrance prepared revolutionary acts and murderous attempts on Imperial statesmen and even, as far as the Ministry of the Interior believed, on the Emperor himself, and our authorities did not attempt to prevent this activity with sufficient energy, disregarding

181 Gerard to Grand Duke Nikolaï Nikolaevič 20.V/2.VI 1906. KKK 1906, I dept., no. XV, VA

182 Zapiska načal'nika Finljandskago žandarmskago upravljenija o političeskom nastroenii v Finljandii v konce 1907 goda, p. 7. KKK Hd 105, no. 5, VA

183 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 270

the fact that the Imperial capital was in the immediate vicinity, and displayed an unexcusable feebleness . . .¹⁸⁴

"Many times the Emperor expressed his displeasure with this state of affairs, and I am convinced that it was the above-mentioned circumstance, more than anything else, that strengthened his conviction of the necessity of the Imperial legislation, which was later to become so pernicious to our country".¹⁸⁵

Langhoff thought that the Imperial displeasure was uncalled-for: everything had been done that was allowed by the Finnish law.¹⁸⁶ For him, it ought to have been enough: "it was impossible to suppose that a policy, which desired to violate Finnish laws and thereby caused discord and conflicts with incalculable consequences, could be in the Imperial interest".¹⁸⁷

The good General thus understood the reasons for the Russian policy against Finnish autonomy; nevertheless he wrote as if he held the Emperor and the Prime Minister to be off-course. Edvard Hjelt, Mechelin's successor in the Senate, understood the situation better, at least afterwards when writing his memoirs. He said that Stolypin knew the Finnish situation much better than the Finnish government did. The Ministry of the Interior had good connections with Russian revolutionaries and Finnish activists, among others, through the double agent Azev.¹⁸⁸

But even Hjelt agreed with Langhoff: the Finnish authorities could not consent to the requests of their Russian colleagues, although they were well-founded. Authorizing the Russians to act in Finland would have been against the law.¹⁸⁹

The law in Finland was held above political considerations of expediency. It was sacred, and honoring it was Finland's sole strength against the immense power of Russia, for the constitutionalists, at least.

The activists and Socialists, for their part, had no reason to

184 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 134—

185 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 137

186 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 137

187 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 278

188 Hjelt, *Från* . . . I, p. 200

189 Hjelt, *Från* . . . I, p. 200

persecute Russian revolutionaries in order to appease the Tsarist authorities. The revolutionaries were natural allies in the fight against the common oppressor.

The gendarmes, the Prime Minister, and the Emperor agreed in their view that a Finland headed by Gerard and Mechelin was not under Russian control. It was a dangerous nest of revolution. Its constitutional, separate system was a contagious example for the Russian opposition and national minorities.¹⁹⁰ A new system and new men were needed.

The Russo-Finnish conflict which followed may have been unavoidable. Even the "good" Russians were unable to accept a separate Finland. Old Russia was unable to win over the Finns with concessions; perhaps no concessions would have been enough. Probably a modern national Finnish society was incompatible with a modern Imperial Russian society. An agreement would have presupposed either party giving up something that it regarded as vital. Nevertheless, it seems that inept policy and lack of understanding contributed to the emergence of the conflict.

190 A statement by Professor K.F. Šacillo in Moscow 19.II 1982

Russian Revival

Stolypin's "Bonapartism"

Witte was first replaced by Goremykin, an ancient bureaucrat, who did not have the capability to cope with the unwonted situation. For a moment Nicholas II, advised by his most open-minded aides, thought about inviting the Constitutionalists to form a government, perhaps with the hope of making them reveal their incompetence and thereby discrediting themselves.¹⁹¹ But Nicholas II did not like to acquiesce in further concessions; constitutional reforms would have whittled away the remains of the old order, without guaranteeing complete pacification of the country. By the summer of 1906 the conservative forces, the aristocracy and provincial landowners, were organizing themselves and gaining influence at the court.

"The chauvinist Stolypin was appointed leader of the government" the Finnish historian Juva wrote in 1937; "Stolypin was a typical representative of the unmitigated Russian police system" Kari O. Virtanen declared in 1974. Finnish historiography long preserved the dismal colours of Stolypin's portrait painted during the years of oppression. (K.G. Idman's acknowledgement in 1953¹⁹⁴ of the Prime

191 e.g. Čermenskii, *IV gosudarstvennaja Duma* . . . or Starcev, *Russkaja* . . .

192 Juva, *Suomen* . . . IX, p. 470

193 Virtanen, *Ahdistettu* . . . p. 295

194 Idman, *Maamme* . . . p. 50

Minister's patriotism and his exertions to reform Russia and make her strong against reaction and revolution was exceptional).

It is true that Stolypin did serve many years in the Ministry of the Interior. This office cherished the traditional administration of Old Russia, which was characterized by an outlook of paternalist tutelage over the Tsar's subjects by autocratic and bureaucratic methods. By the end of the nineteenth century the features of the modern police state had been added.¹⁹⁵ Arbitrariness, corruption, inefficiency are common epithets used to describe this system, "the savagery, criminality, and absurdity of Tsarism".¹⁹⁶

But the tradition did not imply government only by unmitigated coercion. Many high officials of the Ministry of the Interior had understood that it was necessary somehow to organize popular support for the state. The *Zemskie sobory* of the seventeenth century had seemed an ideal prototype, because they had strengthened the Russian state, autocracy, and social estates. These ideas came to nothing until 1905; autocrats were always reluctant to give up autocracy, bureaucrats were apprehensive of losing control, the nobility was fearful of losing the Imperial protection of their privileges; and there was always the haunting memory of an unleashed popular anarchy, of Bulavin, Razin, Pugačev, kept alive by the recurring peasant disorders and revolutionary outrages.

Recently Stolypin has been studied less emotionally. Soviet historians have tried to elucidate the class substance of Stolypin's system. In their view the revolution of 1905 was a bourgeois one, but Tsarism remained feudal; the government can be explained to have represented either the nobility or capitalism; or, because both classes were weak, the government can be seen as balancing between them and hence preserving a degree of independence. This is called "Bonapartism".¹⁹⁷ For Western historians these discussions are not very relevant, because for them Stolypin's government was no mere puppet of social forces, in spite of the fact that he needed society's

195 e.g. Orlovsky, *The Limits . . . or Russian Officialdom . . .*

196 Davidovič, *Samoderžavie . . .* p. 223—224

197 Avreh, *Tsarizm . . .* and Djakin, *Samoderžavie . . .* are the most relevant Soviet reviews. On Bonapartism cf. also Hagen, *Der russische . . .*

support. In the first instance for Western historians Stolypin is to be considered neither as a nobleman nor even less a bourgeois; he is to be considered as Russia's Prime Minister. His aim was to make the Empire strong and powerful. The established order was to be preserved, in order to prevent Russia from dissolving; the established order was to be reformed, to prevent Russia from decaying.¹⁹⁸

The first two Dumas, elected in 1906, were intransigently against the government. The constitutionalists demanded democracy, parliamentarism, civil rights, and an amnesty. The peasants, who had been supposed to be loyal monarchists, demanded the partition of landed property among the tillers of soil. The Constitutionalists may have been willing to discuss mutual concessions with the government, but they could not make the peasants give up their demand for more land. In 1907 Stolypin made a new electoral law which favoured the well-off and produced a more manageable Duma. Thus he avoided a Rightist reaction, military dictatorship and reducing the Duma into a consultative meeting of the estates.

In the third Duma a strong centre supported the government. Both the Socialist-Constitutionalist Left and the Moderate-Nationalist-Extreme Right had less than one-third of the mandates. The fourth Duma from 1912 to 1917 was a bit more difficult, the three blocks being supported by about one-third of the deputies each.¹⁹⁹

Violent opposition, anarchic, revolutionary, or separatist, was subdued by military expeditions, courts martial, and vigorous police action. Thousands died by shooting or by "Stolypin's tie", hanging. Stolypin saw no reason to have pity on the terrorists or insubordinate peasants; and their victims, the court, the aristocracy, and the landowners, demanded strong measures. Rightist pogroms and murders were not so eagerly investigated, but they abated in a few years.

The vital problem in Russia was the agrarian question, the one-hundred million peasants, who had paid for the modernization of Russia but had not benefited from it. A reform, planned since 1902, was started in the autumn of 1906.

198 On Stolypin cf. Hosking *The Russian Constitutional . . .* and Conroy, *Petr Arkad'evich . . .*

199 Cf. Levin, *The Third . . .* and Rexhausen, *Dumawahlen . . .*

No gentry land was expropriated; the manor was a more economic unit of production than the peasant plot; and the government could not alienate the gentry, their most important supporter. Peasants were given civil rights, the redemption payments were annulled, and those who wished were allowed to leave the village commune. It was hoped that in time they would grow into a prosperous farmer class and provide a strong support for the Empire and its government. Poor peasants, who had no tools and no cattle for independent farming, suffered; but the Prime Minister explained that Russia could not be made dependent on the idlers, the incapable, and the drunkards.

Foreign policy was to guarantee twenty years of peace, indispensable for the success of the reform. But no great power could avoid imperialism, which was intrinsic to European culture, and after eight years the great war cut the reform short.

Further plans were laid out for reforming the court system, for bringing into being a system of public instruction, for creating a measure of workers' protection, and for the institution of local government. There were plenty of difficulties. The underprivileged grew restless waiting for their lot to improve. The Right was apprehensive that its privileges and philosophy would suffer by the reforms. These reforms would also have made the Left revolution futile. The Emperor grew jealous of Stolypin's position as leader of the government.

The support of the Centre in Duma was not enough for successful government. Stolypin tried to keep the court, the Council of State, and the moderate nationalist Right favourably disposed by a rough-handed policy towards national minorities. Nor was nationalism uncongenial to the Prime Minister himself. He had served in Western Russia and had become well acquainted with the problems caused by the national-religious minorities. Separatism in the border districts could be a threat to the Empire and its military security.

Even the Finnish historian admits that "mere malice does not suffice to explain" Stolypin's policy towards Finland.²⁰⁰

200 Virtanen, *Ahdistettu* . . . p. 301

The Emperor and His Court

Nicholas II had been educated by Pobedonoscev to carry on autocracy as a God-ordained burden, which it was a mortal sin to give up. It is a long-established notion that he was an incapable autocrat: he was not able to understand the challenge of modern times, nor was he able to stake out a clear policy for his ministers and favourites. He signed the 1905—1906 constitution under compulsion, and he never desisted from the conviction that it was his duty to save Russia by restoring autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationality. Monarchy was fast losing its strong popular support; Russian society could not identify with it much longer, because it was too much encumbered with the past and with the privileged. The British monarchs and even William II succeeded somewhat better in serving as symbols of patriotism and loyalty.

Nicholas II has been described in innumerable memoirs and biographies;²⁰¹ he was undeniably a nice man and a weak character; much fun has been made of his inane diaries; and his tragic end brings to mind the similarly hapless monarch Louis XVI. But a modern, *wissenschaftliche* study is still lacking and may cause these notions to be revised.²⁰²

Finnish autonomy and the Finnish constitution offended the man who religiously believed in autocracy and in the unity of the realm. Diets, constitutions, and parties were alien contrivances, devised to separate the monarch from his subjects instead of their being one like the faithful were one with God.

Nicholas's mother, the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna, born Dagmar, Princess of Denmark, warned him against maltreating Finland, recalling Alexander III's imperious but strictly legal policy. Nicholas did not obey: "Dear Mother, what I do I feel in my conscience in duty bound to do because of Russia."²⁰³ (It was the same conscience that prevented Nicholas from granting equal rights for Jews, as proposed by Stolypin.²⁰⁴)

201 "An intimate account" of the Imperial family: Massie, *Nicholas* . . .

202 Hagen, *Nikolaj II* . . . p. 60- points out the lack of research

203 Letters by Nikolai Romanov to his mother, p. 963, s.d. CGIA, SSSR, fond 642/Mf NL 171, VA

204 Kokovcov, *Iz moego* . . . I, p. 238

The Empress Alexandra Feodorovna passionately wanted to preserve the autocracy, for it to be left as an unreduced inheritance to the Tsarevich, who was tragically ill. She admitted to the court various charlatans, the most notorious of whom was Rasputin, a representative in the Emperor's eyes of the simple Russian people. The Empress and her "Friend" were influential in choosing ministers who were loyal, devoted monarchists, but not very competent, or trusted by the political circles. The scandal of Rasputin's power lowered the Imperial family in the public esteem.

Nicholas was not advised more competently by his cousins and uncles, "an incompetent, disastrous race". The Grand Dukes were appointed to high posts, where, as irresponsible administrators, they caused plenty of havoc, e.g. Sergei Alexandrovič in Moscow, Mihail Nikolaevič in Caucasia, Aleksei Alexandrovič in the navy, Nikolai Nikolaeviči, father and son, in the army, etc. None of these men was known for progressive opinions, none of them was able to understand the Finnish point of view. Sergei Mihailovič, inspector of artillery, pointed out simply in 1906 that Finland was the most dangerous enemy of Russia because she was closest to the capital.²⁰⁵

The courtiers belonged to the Imperial nobility and Guards regiments, decent people without a doubt, but not very much in touch with modern times. This aristocratic-conservative Russia was represented for instance by Baron Fredericksz, the Minister of Court, who had no political ambition but exerted much influence on important appointments. Notorious is the clique of favourites who supported Nicholas II in the Far East adventure which resulted in the Japanese war, defeat, and revolution.

The influence of "dark forces" is a much-used theory when it is otherwise difficult to explain the progress of events. The court clique cannot be denied all historical importance, although whispering in the corridors has hardly been able to be documented. The camarilla did not love independent, powerful Prime Ministers (Stolypin 1906—1911, Kokovcov 1911—1914);

205 Marine-Attaché für die Nordischen Reiche v. Hintze, an Seine Majestät den Kaiser und König, 13.II 1908. Politisches Archiv. Auswärtiges Amt, Abt. I A, Russland 63, Akten betreffend die Aalandsinseln, Bd 2

only a man without any initiative (Goremykin 1914—1916) or a creature of Rasputin (Stürmer 1916) could be trusted not to narrow down the Emperor's authority. Whether the court was influential or not, it does not seem to have favoured Finland, the Dowager Empress excepted.

The Police and the Armed Forces

With the Minister of the Interior, Stolypin, being simultaneously Prime Minister, the everyday administration was discharged by his aide Makarov and then Maklakov, who was promoted minister during Kokovcov's time.

The Ministry of the Interior, with its governors and *ispravniki*, looked after the everyday life of the Empire; police affairs were only one field of activity, albeit an important one. These were led by the police department; the security section, Ohrana, was charged with political supervision, aided by the corps of gendarmes, a uniformed political police. With the aid of their spies, informers, and *agents provocateurs* they kept watch over the subjects of the Empire.

In a way, the Imperial secret service was efficient. They were well aware of the activity of the Social Revolutionaries and Social Democrats, for they had infiltrated almost all oppositional organizations. Almost all later Soviet leaders were well known to, and often jailed or exiled by, the Ohrana.

But they did not succeed in definitely liquidating the opposition. Police activity was so confused and founded on fantasy that no lasting results were attained. "Even at that time I judged the Ohrana and the gendarmes to be organs faultily set up, causing more harm than benefit to the state", and "the gendarmes and the Ohrana failed in 1905 as in all serious occasions", Suhomlinov, Minister of War, wrote.²⁰⁶ For instance, it has been impossible to say whether Evno Azev was a policeman or a terrorist. He organized murders and arrested

206 Suchomlinov, *Erinnerungen*, p. 136, 150

the murderers. Stolypin himself was a victim of the system: his assassin Bagrov was a double agent.

It seems that the means available for the police were not enough to pacify the country. They were able only to repress the opposition. For many officials of the Ministry of the Interior it was difficult to understand that there was more to politics than keeping order. Reasons for discontent were not successfully eliminated.

The Imperial armed forces were in a bad condition after the Japanese war. The navy had been destroyed. From 1909 onwards the naval administration was reformed, but the plans for rebuilding a mighty navy were never realized. The army was disorganized and incapable of war. It was needed for keeping order, for quelling strikes, riots, and rebellions, which retarded military revival. Serious work for improvement was not started until 1908, and it was only under Suhomlinov, Minister of War 1909—1915, that organization, armaments, and war plans were brought up to date, so as to correspond to the obligations of the Dual Alliance.

Poland was expected to become the principal theatre of war. The military effort was directed to mobilizing and concentrating enough troops for the first decisive battle against Austria and Germany, in order to keep the enemy divided between his two fronts, thereby giving the Russo-French alliance a chance of beating the mighty foe. The Baltic coast and the Caucasus were secondary theatres of war.²⁰⁷

The national minorities, living in the eventual theatres of war, caused the military staffs much worry. Poles, Jews, Letts, Estonians, Finns, and Armenians had demonstrated their discontent in the revolutionary year and could not be trusted. We have seen how the St. Petersburg garrison had to keep troops prepared for an intervention in Finland; the few ships left in the navy patrolled the Gulf of Finland in search of revolutionary arms smugglers in the navigation season in 1906 and 1907 — "eighty ships patrolled throughout the summer and did not find a single gun" an observer ridiculed.²⁰⁸

207 Luntinen, *French Information* . . . deals with the military problems in more detail

208 Pourtalès, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to Bülow 2.I 1908. Politisches Archiv, Auswärtiges Amt, Dänemark 37 geheim, Bd 10

Currents of Opinion

Liberalism was supported by many zemstvo members and zemstvo officials, as well as by professional people and the moderate members of intelligentsia. Social justice, legality, and self-government were believed to be the solution to Russia's problems. The reforms of the 1860s had been a promising start. The reaction of the 1880s, the growing problems of the 1890s, the police regime of the turn of the century, pushed the liberals into opposition. Loyal opposition was incompatible with autocracy; the national "Union of Liberation", established in 1903, was an illegal organization. A legal party could not be formed until the successful revolution of 1905; but then the liberal movement was split into two.

In the discussion after the revolution of 1905 the Constitutional Democrats, KaDets, did not look upon Witte's constitution as genuine. They demanded secret elections, proportional representation with universal suffrage and parliamentary responsibility for the government. They were willing to accept a radical land reform. With the wisdom of hindsight it seems that their doctrinairism doomed them to fruitless opposition, and their programme did not correspond to the specific needs of any social group.

The Union of October, or the "Octobrists", decided to accept the constitution. They were the strongest party in the third Duma, having one third of the mandates. They hoped to revive and modernize Russia in co-operation with Stolypin. A powerful, unified Russia was their aim.

The Right held ideologies in suspicion, but they were defenders of traditional values. Accustomed to the paternalistic way of life, they were slow to organize politically, but the peasant riots of 1905—1906 awakened them. Fear of revolution made them supporters of a strong executive power. The moderate Right supported Stolypin. The extremists wished for the restoration of autocracy; otherwise ancient privileges could not be preserved.

The moderate conservatives shrank from the populist extreme Right, who pretended to represent the totality of the Russian people. One of the oddities of Russian history is the fact that sometimes Nicholas II and the Ministry of the Interior

sided with this rightist opposition, who did not approve of the constitution, the Duma, or any restriction of the autocracy.

The peasants were supposed to be loyal monarchists, and that was why they were allowed a rather large representation in the first Dumas. It is true that they had long believed in the Tsar, hoping that the monarch would give them the land the nobility had usurped. In the Duma they demanded the immediate expropriation of manorial lands. Outside the Duma military expeditions were needed to keep down peasants who made "illuminations" by burning manor houses. In the end, there was no solution to the land hunger of the peasants, no party succeeded in taming the Russian countryside; the Bolshevik government had to resort to war and famine to make *kolhožniki* out of the peasants.

The workers were living through the consequences of forced industrialization. They went on strike and demonstrated, demanding better wages and conditions of work; they were shot at, and, taught by the revolutionaries, cried down autocracy.

The revolutionaries were idealists, believing that they knew the right way to a perfect society, sacrificing themselves and anybody else to the future phantasm. With superb arrogance they usurped the right to speak for the oppressed and with cynicism inflated their rancour and hatred. Social Revolutionaries believed that the future society could be built upon the natural socialism of the peasants; by terrorist acts they tried to shatter Tsarism. The Social Democrats, good Marxists, believed in the revolutionary potential of the workers. Under the Tsarist oppression there was not much room for a moderate labour movement on the Western model.

Extremists on the Left and the Right did not acknowledge the Duma as a useful legislative chamber. The Socialists either boycotted the elections or used the tribune for propaganda; Puriškevič and Markov on the right used it for obstruction and scandal.

It is far from easy to find the social background of these political and ideological currents. Soviet scholars have "hastily applied class labels", for obvious reasons, instead of conducting serious research; Western scholars are hampered by the inaccessibility of the archives.

Landowners, apprehensive of losing their position and

privilege, supported Rightist ideas; but there were many common people, "the Bazaar mob", among the Rightist activists, the "Black Hundreds". On the other hand, there were many landowners among the Octobrists; Octobrists and Kadets are often labelled "bourgeois" parties, but in fact there were few entrepreneurs or capitalists among them. Professional people and the *intelligenty* were active in the centre and left parties. Few of the many parties were clearly defined interest-groups.

An additional problem is caused by the fact that in Russian society the estates had lost most of their importance, and the class boundaries were fluid. There were proletarian nobles, and peasant millionaires. The individual's social position is not always clearly defined in the sources, e.g. the Duma or election documents.

Russia was not a feudal state. The nobility was, in fact, no feudal estate, but an order of state servants. Its position and privileges were dependent on the state. By the end of the nineteenth century landowning and state service were in process of separation, and government policy did not favour agriculture. Witte favoured industrialization, not for the industrialists, but for Russia, to make her modern and powerful. Many bureaucrats identified with the Right and with conservative ideas, not because of their feudal origins, but because conservative ideas and aims seemed parallel to the policy of the paternalistic, bureaucratic government.

The Holy Synod was a government department. The high clergy had been educated and appointed by Pobedonoscev, the Procurator of the Holy Synod, who thought that Russia must be kept unchanged, because she was so rotten that moving anything would destroy everything. The village priests helped the police to keep an eye on the peasants and the clergy supported the Rightist parties in the Duma elections. It was not necessarily only by order; the state and the traditional system was a shield against godless modernity, against liberalism and socialism. The autocrat had a religious function, St. George was the defender of the church against the dragon of heathenism. On the other hand, there were currents of thought among the clergy, the monastic orders, and the Orthodox laity favouring a separation of the church from the state, but these opinions had not much importance until the

Tsarism was destroyed.²⁰⁹

Nationalism was a concept shared by Octobrists, nationalist Rightists, Conservatives, and many bureaucrats. It was not a clearly defined ideology, but a vague idea of "the welfare, happiness, greatness, power, and consciousness of the entire nation". The conservative and bureaucratic Right did not make a clear distinction between the State and the Nation. This distinction was important to the more modern nationalists, who stressed the pre-eminence of the Russian people, the basis of the Empire. This "zoological" nationalism was especially characteristic of the southern and western provinces, where competent Poles and Jews were a threat to the prosperity of Russian landowners and entrepreneurs. Jews were despised by all, segregated by bureaucrats, but actively persecuted only by the extreme Right. There were comparatively many Jews among the revolutionaries.

The Octobrist strength was crumbling by 1909, for the political current was moving rightwards. A nationalist party was formed in the autumn, with a programme emphasizing the unity of the Empire, loyalty to the Autocracy, the development of the Orthodox church, the inviolability of private property, opposition to equal rights for the Jews, the development of Russian national consciousness in schools, protecting Russians in the regions of the national minorities; "Russia for the Russians", in short.

The Russian nationalism provoked the growth and pugnacity of the nationalisms of the minorities. The problems of the various national and religious minorities cannot be discussed here in any length, in spite of the fact that comparing them with the Finnish question might be useful. Of the subjects of the Empire less than half were Russians, or if the Ukrainians and White Russians are included, about 66 %. There was no uniformity in religion, either. There were about twenty-five million religious dissidents among the Greek Catholics. There were six million Jews in the Empire. The Poles and Lithuanians were Roman Catholics, and a few million Ukrainians were Uniates. The Germans and Balts were mainly Lutherans. The Armenians had their own Orthodoxy as the

209 Smolitsch, *Geschichte* . . . p. 210—, 306—, 521—

basis of their national identity. In Caucasia, on the Volga, in Central Asia there were several million Muslims; and in Siberia there were a few pagans in the remoter regions. To make all peoples of the Empire Orthodox, Russian, and autocratically governed was a foredoomed attempt, at least by the moderate means available to the Imperial government, and bearing in mind the legal restrictions it operated under.²¹⁰

The censorship crumbled in 1905 and after this the Russian press was comparatively free. The government became irritated by criticism, earned and unearned, and unpleasant revelations, and towards 1914 it tried to apply more stringent measures, but the press was never successfully muted until the war. All political currents had their press, but the most successful papers and journals were not party organs. They depended on high-class writers — members of the intelligentsia, journalists, artists, philosophers — as well as on news reporting and advertising for their popular appeal. Such press were read by the educated classes, but also by workers, women, and in an increasing measure by peasants. Thus political interest was awakened in ever larger spheres of the Russian society. With subsidies and government papers the government, not very successfully, tried to lead the movement. The best paper, journalistically, was the progressive-nationalist *Novoe Vremja*. The most serious Rightist newspaper was *Moskovskija Vedomosti*; *Graždanin* was influential because it was favoured by the court; *Zemščina* and *Russkoe Znamja* were extreme Rightist, populist or rabulistic papers. Moderate liberal papers were *Golos Moskvy* (Octobrist) and *Birževyja Vedomosti*, a paper with a many-sided appeal. *Russkoe Slovo* was the most successful paper, with a daily issue of 65,000 in 1907 growing to 750,000 in 1916. Radical liberal papers were the Kadet party organ *Reč*, edited by Paul Miljukov, and *Slovo*, printed in a typography owned by the Finnish industrialist, later General, Rudolf Walden and accused by the Right of Finnish and Jewish sympathies. The Left had also many

210 Too many works have been written about the Russian history of ideas and parties to be listed here. In addition to the works mentioned in footnotes above, the books by Edelman, Rexhauser, and Rogger may be mentioned; P.A. Zaiončkovskii, Korelin and Solov'ev have written valuable studies on the bureaucracy and nobility.

papers, the most famous of which has become Lenin's *Pravda* established in 1912.²¹¹

Seyn in Grodno

The everyday life of local administrators was concerned with the execution of the policy decided on by the central government and keeping an eye on the currents of opinion, described in the preceding chapters, in the areas under their jurisdiction.

Seyn arrived in Grodno in June 1906, just after the worst riots. In his report to the Ministry of the Interior he explains that in March it had seemed that the revolution had been overcome and the state of military emergency was suspended, but then riots and murders burst out again. The worst nest of disturbances was Belostok, "61 % of whose population are Jews, but also the Christian workers have weapons". A church procession had been shot at, and because of that the mob had attacked Jews. Troops had been called up to restore order, and even they had been shot at. Two members of the Duma had arrived to investigate the riot, but this had only worsened the agitation. Seyn does not mention it in his report, but the investigators had found out that the authorities had not tried to prevent the pogrom and that the soldiers had participated in it.²¹² Of course, the investigators were not impartial, either; the first Duma was definitely against the government.

The agitation had been general. It had been difficult for the authorities to fight against it, because they had not been given any support by the population. For instance, people had given a revolver baked in a loaf to a prisoner, who had shot three guardians and escaped. From the lists of revolutionary parties the peasants had elected two Jews to the first Duma.

The Viipuri Manifesto, the protest against dissolving the first Duma, had very nearly caused new disturbances in Grodno.

211 Cf. Hagen, *Die Entfaltung . . .* and *Russkaja periodičeskaja pečat'*

212 Rosenthal, *L'antisemitisme . . .* p. 98

But they had been prevented by the energetic action of the authorities. Seyn did not underline the fact that he had just then entered on his governorship. Conscription had also succeeded without any disturbances.

Agitators had been punished by administrative justice; courts could not be resorted to, because their witnesses were terrorized by the revolutionaries. Punishments had sobered up the population. No meetings had been allowed, and the printers were under special surveillance. The Governor himself had travelled throughout the *gubernija*, explaining that nothing unlawful could be allowed and that legality would be restored with absolute firmness.

Much work for the Governor was caused by Stolypin's land reform. Innumerable meetings had to be held to start the partition of the village communes. Much information had to be gathered in preparation for the reform. The population of the *gubernija* amounted to about one and a half million. There was about half a desjatin of land for each soul, ranging from 0,22 to 0,94 (in the marshy districts) desjatins. Loans had to be procured for acquiring additional land, and those who were in a mind for emigrating were assisted to the virgin lands of Siberia; there were 780 emigrants in 1906 and 213 in 1907.

No definite results could be expected of the reform in the short time Seyn was to remain in Grodno.

Seyn also supervised the elections for the second and third Dumas. Of the illegal parties there were in Grodno the Lithuanian-Polish Social Democratic Party, the party of Anarchist-Communists, the party of Socialist-Maximalists, the Polish Socialist Party, the Social-Revolutionary party, the Revolutionary Fighting Organization of Grodno and Brest, the Zionist-Socialist party, and the Jewish Bund. This is an example of the multiplicity of parties and fractions in the aftermath of revolution. Seyn wrote that their "total liquidation has not yet been accomplished".

Polish Catholics were a special problem in the border district. Incited by their clergy, they dreamed of the ancient empire, which had included the Grodno district. They reminisced about the exploits of 1863, and they had started propaganda immediately after freedom of speech and religion had been decreed in 1905. Their Constitutional-Catholic party demanded a Polish administration and Polish armed forces,

leaving suzerainty only to Russia.

Luckily the major part of the population (Seyn must have meant the Orthodox White Russian peasants) supported the Russian power. The Imperial regime was held to be a guarantor of peace and happiness, the population felt safe under a stern, just, and firm administration. The government was supported by the "Sofian Brotherhood", led by the Bishop of Brest and Grodno. Seyn heartily approved of their patriotic activity, which was "not political but national; these men are not ashamed of being Russians".²¹³ It is true, however, that there is no direct evidence of official co-operation with the religious nationalists.

An energetic, zealous administrator was thus restoring order in a border region, where the good Russian peace had been disturbed by non-Russian separatist and revolutionary people of alien religion; order was restored not with concessions and by keeping to legal niceties, but by determination and expediency, by punishment, censorship, and the attempted liquidation of violent opposition. The Governor did not admit any defects in the established system; everything was all right once the administration was firm and stern enough.

Grodno *gubernija* had elected Leftist members to the first two Dumas. The neighbouring Kovno and Vilna *gubernijas* were still represented by the Left opposition in the third and fourth Dumas. The Grodno *gubernija* sent one Pole and one Progressive, but five Nationalists to the third Duma.²¹⁴ This result cannot have reflected any discredit on Seyn in the Ministry of the Interior, although he had not exactly created it.

Militarily, Grodno was not an unimportant *gubernija*. Belostok was a central point of mobilization and concentration for the principal wartime army, and the fortress of Grodno was an important base for the flank attack which was to be directed towards East Prussia. But it appeared as if the most important political problems had been solved in 1906 and 1907 by the efficient Governor; it was possible to transfer Seyn elsewhere, where his proven capability was more urgently required.

²¹³ Material from the Grodno period is collected in Seyn's dossiers KKK Hd 23 and 24, VA. His own perspective can best be seen in Vsepoddannejšii otčet grodnenskago gubernatora za 1906 goda, and Spravka o političeskom sostojanii Grodnenskoi gubernii za 1907 goda.

²¹⁴ Rexhauser, *Dumawahlen* . . . p. 22 and 228

The Reconquest of Finland Begins

The Old Bobrikovians

Nationalism was most virulent where Russians were threatened by minority rivals. There were Russians who had suffered very much indeed from the Finns.

"When the 'revolution' was completed and all the results of Bobrikov's effort had been destroyed with one stroke of the pen, the expulsion of Russians from the country started . . . Never since the Tartar conquest have the Russians been insulted and degraded as nowadays in the border regions, the worst of which is Finland. One must live in Finland, which is indebted to Russia for all its welfare, and see all the malice of these people towards the Russians, to be able to understand the bitterness and sorrow caused by the intolerable outrage . . .

Only Mr. Gerard and some others who live in Helsinki and who betrayed their convictions when the regime was reversed, consider that all is fine and that 'Finland is the sole peaceful corner of the Empire nowadays'. It is bitter and shameful . . ."²¹⁵

215 "Correspondence from Finland". *Novoe Vremja* no. 10777/1906. KKK 1906, I dept., no. VI, VA

In a meeting of "Russian men" Rafail Elenev, a former official of the Governor-General's office, gave a lecture on the expulsion of Russians from Finland.

"It had a depressing effect on the meeting. Loyal servants of the fatherland are discriminated against and oppressed in Finland, and they have no defence... The highest representative of Russia only fawns upon the Swedomans. It is depressive for a Russian to live in the border regions nowadays, and worst of all is it in Finland. Many were compelled to leave office and country, but much more dejected are those who cannot leave. People who are true to the Russian cause are jailed, they are summoned before courts for trumped-up crimes... especially have Russian peddlers difficult times..."

Unanimously the meeting decided to condemn Finns and Gerard's policy, which favoured aliens. It was decided to send to the Emperor an address imploring him to make an end of the oppression with his sovereign word. The situation was quite anomalous if Finns had every right in Russia, while Russians were without any rights in Finland.

In conclusion "Everlasting Memory" was sung to the glory of the champion of the Russian cause, N.I. Bobrikov.

Next, a lecture was heard concerning Caucasia. There the youth was educated to hate Russia, with the aim of creating an independent Greater Armenia...²¹⁶

Colonel Nivet, dismissed from a post in the offices of the Governor-General, invited his companions in misfortune to a memorial dinner for Bobrikov on 3 rd/16th February, 1906, the anniversary of the February Manifesto.²¹⁷ The memorial dinner was to become a tradition, lasting up till 1914. Among the participants were Nikolaï Nikolaevič Bobrikov, the son of the hero, and many exiles: Deutrich, Dračevskiĭ, Papkov, Kaigorodov, Rheinbott, Mjasoedov, Borodkin, and several specialists in the Finnish question, e.g. Professor Sergeevskiĭ and N.N. Korevo.²¹⁸

216 "Vserossiĭskiĭ s'ezd russkikh ljudei. Četvertoe obščee sobranie". *Moskovskie Vedomosti* 10/23.IV 1906, no. 93

217 Avreh, *Stolypin*... p. 46

218 Tasihin, *Venäjän*... p. 79—83

These people also started publishing *Okrainy Rossii*, a periodical elucidating the Finnish question from the Rightist Russian point of view. The initiator was Sergeevskii, who hated without distinction all minorities, Socialists, Anarchists, members of the intelligentsia etc.²¹⁹ It is easy to understand that no distinction was made, because those were all elements incompatible with the Old Russian formula of autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationality; thus they were all equally destructive.

In 1908 the Old Bobrikovians organized yet another society, *Russkoe Okrainnoe Obščestvo*, to keep an eye on Finnish affairs. There were numerous similar associations propagating the submission of national minorities and trying to extend Russian settlement, education, language, and legislation, and to keep up the Russian dominance in the border regions. Special dangers to be watched in Finland were Mechelin's separatism, Finnish rearmament, economic infiltration of the St. Petersburg region, and Pan-Finnish propaganda in the Russian Karelia, Ingria, Estonia, and among the Fenno-Ugrian tribes of northern Russia and Siberia.²²⁰

Obolenskii wrote of these men:

"The majority of these men served in Finland under Bobrikov and lived through the years of battle, and they thought that the hatred they and their policy provoked was directed against the Emperor and Russia; that was why they howled about the necessity of bathing Finland in blood."

They supplied the rightist press with plenty of material concerning the "Finnish Question".²²²

The Extreme Right was in opposition against the government, as we have seen above. But in the Finnish question it was in opposition to Gerard, not to Stolypin. On the contrary, the Old Bobrikovians attained an official position under Stolypin. The Prime Minister was not well acquainted

219 Kempainen, *Suomen-kysymys* . . . p. 107—110

220 Kempainen, *Suomen-kysymys* . . . p. 160

221 left out

222 Draft report by Obolenskii 13.XI 1905. KKK Hd 80, no. 9, VA

with the problems of the north-western border country; the gendarme reports convinced him, however, that the Imperial capital was threatened from the Grand Duchy by a danger which Gerard was incapable or reluctant of perceiving, while Langhoff tried to exclude the Council of Ministers from all Finnish affairs.

In the summer of 1907 several Old Bobrikovians were invited to a "Special Session, authorized by His Majesty, to deal with certain questions concerning the Grand Duchy of Finland". By the autumn of 1907 it was convening regularly. In historiography this cumbersome appellation has been replaced by "The Committee of Finnish Affairs".²²³

The Procedure of Referring Finnish Affairs to the Emperor

One of the modern, essential features of Witte's and Stolypin's regime was the principle of cabinet government. The ancient procedure of each minister conferring with the Emperor presupposed an autocrat who was able to unify the policy of the various ministries. Obviously, Nicholas II had no such ability. The lack of direction, with its haphazard, contradictory measures, was held to be one of the reasons for Russia's recent misfortunes.²²⁴

According to the Finnish (unwritten) constitution the Minister State-Secretary explained Finnish matters to the Grand Duke without any Russian participation. From the Russian point of view, this was a glaring example of an obsolete form of government.

A flagrant example of this was Mechelin's proposal for a Finnish constitution and for restoring the Finnish army. Stolypin said that he first learned of these schemes from his

223 Saraste—Hinnemo, *Suomen asiain* . . . p. 37—40

224 Gurko, *Features* . . . passim, e.g. p. 21, 30

morning newspaper.²²⁵ Korevo reminded Stolypin that in 1891 the Minister State-Secretary had been ordered to confer with the relevant Russian ministers in the event of a Finnish proposal affecting Imperial interests; but whether the Minister State-Secretary would do so depended solely on the Minister State-Secretary himself. Now it seemed that Langhoff could not be trusted on this account. In *Novoe Vremja* Rheinbott wrote that the "Finnish Embassy" in St. Petersburg had to be suppressed, or the Minister State-Secretary be replaced by a Russian, because Langhoff was the envoy of the *Voima*.²²⁶

It has been said that the Bobrikovians took advantage of Stolypin's ignorance of Finnish affairs,²²⁷ it was supposed that Deutrich was the principal instigator²²⁸ of the renewed "oppression" of Finland. But it does not fit in with the picture we have of Stolypin that he should have let himself be led by his subordinates. Törngren seems to be closer to the mark when he wrote that Stolypin could not tolerate leaving Finland outside his sphere of authority.²²⁹ This was not due to personal ambition, but to the necessity of safeguarding Russia's vital interests, as Stolypin perceived them. The Prime Minister wrote to the Minister State-Secretary that the Finnish constitution could not be determined according to the exclusively Finnish procedure of legislation; Finland's position in Empire was in essence an Imperial question.²³⁰ From his point of view, Stolypin had reason enough to be worried; Finland was part of Russia, but the Finns did not admit it, nor did they allow Russians any say in their affairs.

Stolypin tried to govern Russia with the support of the moderate, educated, patriotic public. That was why the Finnish question was taken up in the Duma in the spring of 1908. Making a law over the procedure of referring Finnish affairs to the Emperor would have taken too much time; Stolypin's purposes were better served by discussion following an

225 Saraste—Hinnemo, *Suomen asiain* . . . 377, Kempainen, *Suomen kysymys* . . . p. 138—143, Duma 5.V 1908, p. 2923—2939

226 Saraste—Hinnemo, *Suomen asiain* . . . p. 28, 32

227 Tasihin, *Venäjäin* . . . p. 147—150

228 Hjelt, *Från* . . . p. 201

229 Törngren, *Från* . . . p. 311

230 Stolypin to Langhoff 24.VI 1907. KKK 1908, IV dept., no. 51 II, VA

interpellation. The interpellation was requested from the Octobrists, and simultaneously the Rightists produced an interpellation without request, by Puriskevič, Deutrich, Rheinbott et al.²³¹

In their interpellation the Octobrists censured the Finnish procedure of keeping the Russian authorities ignorant when Finnish affairs were referred to the Emperor. The Rightists criticized those authorities (i.e. Gerard) who had allowed the Finns to arm and to organize the *Voima*. Was it really true that the *Voima* armed, in order to separate Finland from Russia, with the knowledge and concurrence of the authorities, and that the Finns protected Russian revolutionaries? These questions aimed at a comprehensive clearing up of Russo-Finnish relations, and simultaneously they expressed offended Russian national feelings,²³² (i.e. they did not aim at a vote of no confidence in the government).

Stolypin admitted that there was something badly wrong with Finland. The *Voima* was active, and, indeed, with the knowledge of the authorities. Finnish officials had even pretended that there was nothing criminal in the *Voima's* arming against such social classes and such regimes as might violate the legal order.

The interpellants had demanded strict measures against lax authorities, but, Stolypin explained, the problem was deeper. What was wrong was the Finnish view of Finland as a separate state, although in reality it was part of Russia. It had only separate local legislation and administration. During the years of Russia's weakness matters had slipped so far that the Russian Prime Minister was informed only through newspaper reading of the Finnish Senate's projects affecting vital interests of the Empire. But now the government was preparing to extend the Emperor's power over the total area of the Empire, Finland included; of course, it would in no way violate Finland's *legal* rights.

In this work the government hoped to be supported by the patriotic elements in the Duma. Earlier the government had been alone in safeguarding Russia's rights. Now the Monarch

231 Saraste—Hinnemo, *Suomen asiain* . . . p. 70—78, Kemppinen, *Suomen-kysymys* . . . p. 159

232 Duma 1908, p. 2913—2918

hoped to be able to rest secure in the support of Russian national feeling, which had been awakened and was represented by the Duma. The Duma must not shun its responsibility as the fortifier of Russia's sovereign power. Giving up sovereignty in Finland would cause irreparable damage to Russia. Russian blood must not have flowed in vain in (the conquest of) Finland.²³³

Rhetorically, Stolypin thus appealed to Russian patriotism. Materially, the Prime Minister emphasized the unity of Russia and her sovereignty over the Finnish part of the realm. His speech was a sincere expression of the government's policy.

The procedure of referring Finnish affairs to the Emperor was changed by a decree issued in May 1908. The Minister State-Secretary lost his exclusive right to attend to the Grand Duke. Finnish questions, like all other matters, were to be referred to the Emperor in the guise of a protocol of the Council of Ministers; i.e. before the presentation to the Emperor they were to be seen to by the government and examined from the Imperial perspective. The Emperor signed the decree on May 20th/June 2nd, 1908.

From the Finnish point of view the issuing of the decree was a crime against the principle that laws were to be made for Finland only with the consent of the Diet; and the content of the decree was a crime against the rule that no Russian interference was to be allowed between the government of the Grand Duchy and the Grand Duke. An essential element of Finnish autonomy had been lost under the chauvinist, imperialist Russian attack.²³⁴

But the Finnish problem remained far from being definitely solved. K.V. von Plehwe (the son of the minister murdered in 1904) wrote that the evil-minded Governor-General ought to be

233 Duma 1908, p. 2923—2939

234 Tasihin, *Venäjä*n . . . p. 173 says "the only negative feature in the new procedure was the fact that the Bobrikovians had been allowed an influence at its birth" because, p. 163, "Stolypin aimed at peace, legality, and order, while his advisers aimed at oppressing Finland". There was a difference in degree between the statesman and his aides, embittered against Finland; but the unity of the realm was their common goal, a calamitous one from the Finnish perspective. Stolypin did aim at legality and order, but it was a different legality from that of the Finns, who did not acknowledge the validity of Russian law in Finland.

replaced, too, because he contributed to the state of affairs in Finland.²³⁵

What the Russians Thought About Finland

No systematic research has been done on the opinion of Russian men-on-the-street regarding the Finnish question.²³⁶ Only random statements have been recorded:

"Princess Liewen, an intelligent and energetic lady, said: it is true that there is much fault with you Finns; you are abrupt, you don't understand Russians, and the government has a legitimate justification in the fact that the army in the whole Empire must be unified."²³⁷

V.I. Gurko, a high official in the Ministry of the Interior, thought that

"on many points the Russian investigators of the Finnish problem were in the right . . . Finns used unfair means and even forgeries to this end (when translating Swedish laws) . . . Nevertheless, the Russian treatment of the Finnish problem was basically unsound. It accomplished nothing in the sense of assuring Russian influence and protecting Russian interests in Finland; it tended to irritate the Finns and to destroy all their fear of and respect for the Russian authority."²³⁸

Anatoli Nekludoff, the Russian envoy in Stockholm, wrote

"of the Finnish race, distinguished by its cruelty and treachery, half savage as late as two hundred years ago, at

235 Saraste—Hinnemo, *Suomen asiain* . . . p. 32

236 Korhonen, *Autonomous* . . . is concerned with the political opinion and mainly in the nineteenth century

237 Törngren, *Från* . . . p. 127

238 Gurko, *Features* . . . p. 49

first under the influence of the Swedish-Lutheran culture, afterwards utterly separated therefrom through a suspicious and narrow nationalism, and thereby fallen into the worst excesses; so different from the frank, chivalrous Slav character, often demonstrated by Russian history . . .²³⁹

The Cossack General Krasnov wrote, in exile, of the far-away days when the Tsar's officers had been so young that even a Finnish maid had seemed beautiful . . .²⁴⁰

Such comments could be collected endlessly, but they do not allow any definite conclusions concerning Russian public opinion. All that can be said is that it seems to have been difficult for Russian public to understand or to accept the Finnish point of view.

In our story also newspaper articles by the Old Bobrikovians are often referred to; the Russian press in the period 1906—1914 has been admirably mapped out by Manfred Hagen²⁴¹ but it has not been studied from the point of view of the Finnish question. It remains a problem whether the press influenced, or was influenced by, the public opinion.

The Duma existed in order to express opinion and to render such opinion politically influential; at least, some of the organized main currents of opinion were represented there.

The Octobrists said that they supported the governmental policy in Finland, that was why the interpellation had been made in the first place. They only expected the government to do something effectual in Finland now.²⁴² Later, in 1910, the Octobrists emphasized that Finland was part of the Empire, and that a whole must be able to rule its constituent parts. The Finnish constitution was valid only as far as Russian laws allowed.²⁴³ The representative of the Highest Power could not

239 Nekludoff, *En ambassadörs* . . . p. 218

240 Krasnov, *Kaksoiskotkasta* . . . p. 47

cf. also Vihavainen, *Venäläisiä ja* . . .

Stites, *Prostitute* . . . p. 351 states that many of the St. Petersburg prostitutes were Finnish girls

241 Hagen, *Die Entfaltung* . . .

242 Duma 1908, p. 2941—42

243 Duma 1910, p. 1935

submit to local laws in Finland any more than to local laws in other parts of the Empire.²⁴⁴

Rightist speakers emphasized that separatism, preparations for armed rebellion, protection for revolutionaries, and murders could not be admitted at the distance of only a few versts from the capital.²⁴⁵ The intention of Russia was to disarm separatism, not to oppress the culture of the border countries — unless the *Voima* and the Red Guard constituted Finnish culture? It was incomprehensible that Gerard and Langhoff could have said that the alarming reports were exaggerated; even the Moscow rebels (in December 1905) had had Grafton-rifles.²⁴⁶

Finland had not and could not have any constitution, because autocracy could not be limited. If such a constitutional attempt was allowed in Finland, all efforts to arouse love towards Russia in the border countries would have to be abandoned.²⁴⁷ Finnish culture had flourished at Russia's expense; there was nothing barbarian or vandalian in bringing the country back into an organic unity with the Empire.²⁴⁸ The extreme Right thought that it was not a question of rights but of what was necessary for Russia. Only a sound national selfishness made life possible.²⁴⁹

These Rightist speeches reflected envy of Finnish "culture", anxiety because of the effect of the example on other minorities, anger because the Finns did not acknowledge Russian national and racial superiority. Respecting rights, laws, and constitutions would have destroyed the ruling position of the Old Russian elites both in Russia and in the border regions.

Liberals explained that the Rightist standpoint was "a psychosis of national sadism".²⁵⁰ The fact was that Alexander I had raised the Finns into the rank of a nation and that the Finns felt a nation.²⁵¹ The leader of the Kadets, Miljukov, explained that Finland could very well be a state and

244 Duma 1910, p. 2001—2002

245 Duma 1910, p. 1982

246 Duma 1908, p. 2942

247 Duma 1910, p. 2002

248 Duma 1910, p. 2158

249 Duma 1910, p. 2235

250 Duma 1910, p. 2220

251 Duma 1910, p. 2213

simultaneously part of the Empire, from the point of view of political science. No national interest or honour demanded the crushing of Finland, who only wanted her lawful rights.

It was Russia's own fault if the Finns were hostile, he believed. Of course oppression and violation of promises provoked hostility, in Finland as well as in the Ukraine, in Georgia, in the Baltic provinces, not to speak of Poland. In the 1910 Duma session Miljukov concluded:

"a time will come when we shall repair the ties broken by you, and thereby we shall strengthen the Russian Empire and save her from civil war."²⁵²

The Leftist speakers explained that the Right hated the Russian people for whom they pretended to speak; likewise a free and civilized neighbour-nation angered the Rightists. Feigning patriotism, they wormed their way into well-paid offices in Finland, as they had done in Poland and Georgia.

"But who benefits from erecting gallows in Finland? Only government spies, *agents provocateurs*, intendents, *činovniki*, all sorts of adventurers, noble cliques and black hundreds."

The national minorities did love Russia, but not the Russia represented by the Rightists. The Socialists wanted to defend the rights of the Finnish people, as well as those of other peoples, on the basis of the common interests of the proletariat, to the benefit of Russia's civilization, greatness, and future.²⁵³

Of course, it was easy for the opposition to express sympathy for Finland, because they were not charged with the responsibility for the defence, security, and order of the Empire. For the Right Finland's position was a risk and a provocation. For the Left the Finnish question was a means of revealing the incompetence and reactionary character of the government and the savage chauvinism of the Right. All parties thought of the Finnish question in the Imperial frame of reference. They imagined that a Russia reformed according to

252 Duma 1910, p. 2042, 2072—81, 2089

253 Duma 1910, p. 1959—63, 1978, 2225—34

their programme would be acceptable to all subjects, the Finns included. It seems to have been difficult to understand that for the most advanced Finns the Grand Duchy was not a part of Russia.²⁵⁴

The centre and right majority in this as in many other questions supported Stolypin. The government was not alone in safeguarding Russia's rights in Finland, as the Prime Minister had hoped. The opposition, liberal and Socialist, was too weak; their speeches were only a message over the Russian-Finnish frontier that all Russians were not unanimously against Finland. The fact that even the Left was Imperially minded did not emerge until after the revolutions of 1917.

254 Perhaps the Bolsheviki ought to be acquitted from this accusation, because Lenin promised the right of secession to the national minorities. But that seems to have been a means of advancing proletarian internationalism, not national separation, which was only deemed to be useful for the bourgeoisie, as Stalin wrote. Stalin, *Miten* . . . p. 45—53. The problem has been very much discussed and is too large to be taken up here; cf. e.g. Jussila, *Seminaari* . . .

Seyn Returns to Finland

War Plans Against Separatism

By the beginning of 1907 the *Voima*, which was in fact already dissolved, had taken on a terrible significance in Russian eyes. The gendarmes collected imaginary information and worked it up into fantastic measures.²⁵⁵ They did not want to lose their easy jobs; and their importance grew in step with the danger of a Finnish rebellion. But "they also knew that such information pleased their superiors".²⁵⁶ Such information was published by the Rightist press, too. A booklet by Rumjancev, "Finland Arms"²⁵⁷ drew much attention. Rumjancev, if the name was not a pseudonym of Colonel Nivet's, had been informed by Nivet.²⁵⁸ Boeckman, commander of the twenty-second army corps in Finland, was very much worried about the revolutionary agitation among his soldiers.²⁵⁹ The conclusion was that "the so-called military party agrees with the extreme Right, especially on the Finnish question". The affair of the *Voima* combined with the Finnish reluctance to take the stories about the organization seriously and to act upon them set the wheels rolling against Finland.

255 Jussila, *Suomen santarmihallituksen* . . . p. 197—200

256 A statement on oath by Leonid Menšikov, a former gendarme official, in Stockholm 5.IX 1913. KKK Hd 87, no. 2, VA

257 Rumjancev, *Finljandija* . . .

258 Törngren, *Från* . . . p. 279

259 Boeckman to Gerard 31.I 1907. KKK 1907, I dept., no. XX, VA

"In military circles the re-conquest of Finland is discussed; everything is ready for action. These people hope for the return of the Bobrikov regime . . . Gerard and Mechelin must be dismissed . . .²⁶⁰

A meeting to plan the action was held at the Emperor's palace. Finland was to be declared in a state of military emergency, and a commander-in-chief was to be appointed — it would have been Nikolaï Nikolaevič, the commander of the St. Petersburg military district and Guards troops. The earlier plan of sending a division or two of reinforcements to Finland was confirmed. In addition to the troops, the ships of the Baltic fleet, the Frontier Guards, and the Finnish Customs and Pilot and Lighthouse services would have been placed under the orders of the commander-in-chief. All communications abroad would have been cut. Russian military law and military justice were to have been enforced.²⁶¹

It is not possible to say what prevented the Russians from declaring the state of military emergency in the spring of 1907. The Senate and Langhoff may have been successful in explaining the non-existence of the *Voima* to the Emperor.²⁶² Törngren, the Senate's informant in St. Petersburg, had understood that the military expected the defeat of Mechelin's constitutionalists in the first democratic elections in 1907, the "people" being monarchists and thus for Bobrikov's system.²⁶³ The Old Finns did in fact defeat the constitutionalists with their 59 mandates to the 50 Swedish and Young Finnish constitutionalists; but the 80 Social Democrat deputies were

260 Törngren, *Från* . . . p. 289—290

261 Nicholas II to Stolypin 30.I 1907. *Krasnyi Arhiv* V/1924, p. 104.

(The invitation to the meeting only)

Summary of the meeting 1.II 1907. KKK Hd 14, no. 6, VA

Po vysočaiše utverždennym žurnale Soveta Ministrov o predupreditel'nyh merah na slučai bezporjadkov v Finljandii. Zasedanie 5.X 1909. KKK 1910, I dept., no. XVIII-3, VA

Osoboe Soveščanie 10.X 1909. KKK Hd 14, no. 6, VA

Osobyi Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 1.XII 1909. KKK Hd 14, no. 6, VA

These plans of 1909 contain reference to earlier plans for a state of military emergency in Finland

262 Törngren, *Från* . . . p. 284

263 Törngren, *Från* . . . p. 290

hardly a confirmation of what the military district staff had expected.

And it appears that by the autumn of 1907 both the Emperor and the soldiers were reconfirmed in their belief in the necessity of strong measures against Finland. Russian revolutionary activity was not completely silenced yet, and the alarming gendarme-information from Finland continued. It was Stolypin who seems to have prepared the plan and proposed it to the Emperor.

It was at this juncture that Seyn returned to Finland. By the end of November 1907 the Finns learned that

”the Governor of Grodno, Seyn, has been appointed the aide of the Finnish Governor-General, without informing Finnish authorities. This is the first, severe blow against Finland, for Seyn was the director of Bobrikov’s office and, as far as is known, is a very Mefistopheles in his malice and hatred towards the Finns.”²⁶⁴

Langhoff, Gerard, and the other Finnish officials immediately concerned had been left ignorant of the preliminaries in this appointment. Langhoff wrote angrily:

”It was an insult for Gerard that Bobrikoff’s former chief of office, Major-General Seyn was appointed his aide, without previously asking his opinion. Stolypin had persuaded the Emperor to consent to this appointment, which was a complete surprise to Gerard as well as to me . . . ”²⁶⁵

The appointment was intentionally hurtful. We don’t know Stolypin’s communication to the Emperor, but Nicholas II answered

”I agree with you about the measures concerning Finland. Because Seyn is a general, it seems to me that he must be appointed Governor-General’s aide in a military Order of the Day. When Gerard comes here and learns what has been decided without informing him, he will immediately

264 Aspelin-Haapkylä, *Kirovuosien* . . . p. 143. 1.XII 1907

265 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 160

ask to be relieved of office and will not return to Helsinki. That is why Seyn must at once start acting as Governor-General, because Boeckman will be in Viipuri".²⁶⁶

Boeckman, the commander of the army corps in Finland, had previously distinguished himself in the "pacification" of the Baltic provinces; now he was designated Gerard's successor, with Seyn as his aide. During the state of military emergency he was to be in eastern Finland, where the district of Viipuri was to be detached from the Grand Duchy and attached to the St. Petersburg *gubernija*.

"The Russian General Staff wants to prevent surprises from Finland. That is why the Viipuri district and the town of Savonlinna was to be detached . . ."²⁶⁷

But then, after all, a state of military emergency was not declared and the Viipuri district remained for the moment part of Finland. There is only a slight hint of explanation in the Emperor's letter to Stolypin:

"What an unpleasant pity that a measure already decided on must be put off. I cannot understand how the rumour can have escaped? Is it due to the notorious Russian loquacity? . . . we must continue keeping the troops prepared for transfer to Viipuri and wait for a propitious moment . . ."²⁶⁸

But the Governor-General was successfully replaced. It is well known that Nicholas II did not like saying unpleasant things face to face, but this time he endured the ordeal:

"It happened as we guessed. After a long and tiresome discussion Gerard asked to be relieved of office . . . Now we must appoint Boeckman Governor-General . . . I have already spoken of it to Nikolai Nikolaevič . . ."²⁶⁹

266 Nicholas II to Stolypin 9.XI 1907. *Krasnyi Arhiv* V/1924, p. 115—116

267 Törnngren, *Från* . . . p. 289

268 Nicholas II to Stolypin 11.XI and 12.XI 1907. *Krasnyi Arhiv* V/1924, p. 116

269 Nicholas II to Stolypin 1.XII 1907. *Krasnyi Arhiv* V/1924, p. 116

The appointment was not made public until February 1908. We do not know the cause of the delay. In December 1907 Stolypin had written:

"Yesterday we had a stormy meeting with Gerard and Langhoff. I did not think it unnecessary to declare to them that Your Majesty had firmly decided, in the case the Finns continued breaking the law and did not submit to lawful requests, to proceed *manu militari*. It seems that in Helsinki they are beginning to understand that this is no vain threat and that matters are taking a turn to a more propitious direction . . ."²⁷⁰

Yet that turn did not represent a permanent change. The gendarme-reports did not abate; on the contrary. In February 1908 Stolypin said to Edv. Hjelt that the government could not allow Finland to go on granting asylum to the revolutionaries; if this was not stopped, the whole country would be put under a state of siege.²⁷¹

Another quarrel in 1907—1908 concerned the payment of the ten million marks annually for 1906 and 1907 in lieu of military service, and a few additional millions for the connecting link in St. Petersburg between the Finnish and the Russian railways. The payments had been actually promised in 1904—1905, but there was some discussion in Finland about their constitutionality. Stolypin angrily demanded the monies. "If you don't pay, you are rebels . . . (and then) we have the troops and the fortresses". Hjelt supposed that "the dark forces" were preparing to declare the refusal to pay a rebellion and had decided to make an end of Finnish autonomy in that case. Boeckman was very nervous and waited for the Finnish decision until five o'clock in the morning.²⁷² The millions were paid, for the last time voluntarily, in 1908.

The spies had thoroughly frightened the Russian generals. They had reported that the old Finnish General Schauman had been elected Commander-in-Chief of the *Voima*, with the Governor of Uusimaa Alfthan as his aide. Arms had been

270 Stolypin to Nicholas II 22.XII 1907. *Krasnyi Arhiv* V(XXX)/1928, p. 80

271 Hjelt, *Från . . .* p. 199—200

272 Hjelt, *Från . . .* p. 200, 228—289

imported. The Russian troops in Finland were to be surprised and disarmed. Then the *Voima* was to attack the Karelian Isthmus and Helsinki, where the garrison was expected to mutiny. Training was going on, under the mask of e.g. ski-clubs.²⁷³ Co-operation had been organized with the Russian Social Revolutionaries.²⁷⁴ Finnish pilots had run the Emperor's yacht aground.²⁷⁵

The staff of the twenty-second army corps was desperate:

"One must expect the worst, and, alas, the most probable alternative: Germany and Sweden will declare war on Russia, and Finland rises in rebellion... The local population will hold the situation propitious for realizing their wish of a national independence... Then, most probably, the efforts of the brigades, garrisoned far from each other, will be in vain; they ought simultaneously to mobilize, to fend off the enemy landing, and to quell the revolution."²⁷⁶

The commander — after Boeckman, Lieutenant-General Olhovskii — wondered how he could be expected to defend Helsinki and Viipuri, keep communications open to St. Petersburg, guard the coasts, and hold the population in check. He asked to be allowed to retreat to the east, abandoning Helsinki, in order not to be surrounded by the invaders and the Finnish rebels.²⁷⁷ In spite of the straightened circumstances of the army, a third rifle brigade was established in Finland in 1908: "for political and for strategic reasons military power in Finland must be reinforced in the St. Petersburg—Helsinki line to make possible the eventual mobilization."²⁷⁸

Thus, Edv. Hjelt was not necessarily right when he accused Deutrich of having been the principal instigator behind

273 Svodka svedenija iz Finljandii 1.II 1908 po agenturnym svedenijam voen-nago vedomstva. KKK 1908, I dept., no. LXVI, VA

274 Boeckman to the Governor of Uusimaa 25.VIII/7.IX 1908. KKK Dd 5, VA

275 Boeckman to the Minister of Court Freedericksz 8.IX 1908. KKK Dd 5, VA

276 Olhovskii to the staff of the military district 6.XII 1908. Ven sot asiak 6071, VA

277 cf. Luntinen, *Suomi Pietarin*... p. 110—

278 Nikolaï Nikolaevič to the Minister of War Roediger 19.XII 1908. KKK 1910, II dept., no. 12 A, VA

Stolypin's plan for military measures against Finland.²⁷⁹ It is true that Deutrich was a member of Stolypin's recently established Committee of Finnish Affairs. He may at least have put a good word for Seyn when the post of Governor-General's aide in Finland was created anew. Seyn had been his subordinate in Helsinki, and recently Seyn had distinguished himself in Grodno. It is a pity that no documents have been found to shed light on Seyn's unofficial connections with his former colleagues during his Grodno exile.

The Finnish Reception of Seyn

Finns demonstrated against Seyn's appointment. Mechelin, chairman of the Senate, did not pay the official visit required by etiquette, until Seyn complained to the Governor-General.²⁸⁰ Then the Governor of Uusimaa was unable to find accommodation for the deputy Governor-General, because the official quarters were being repaired, the Governor claimed.²⁸¹

Helsinki society was apprehensive, far from eager to accept the new regime:

"On February 16th 1908 we received a telegram saying that Gerard had been dismissed and General Vladimir Böckman had been appointed Governor-General. What does the future have in store for us? In the Duma the Rightists interpellate on the Finnish question, troops have continually been sent to Finland since the beginning of the year, and the Finnophagi papers decry and distort Finnish conditions daily. Rumour runs rife of a scheme of detaching the Viipuri district, etc. Everything is possible. Evidently the Russian government party again wants to divert attention from the wretched conditions and miserable life in their own country . . ."²⁸²

279 Hjelt, *Från* . . . p. 201

280 Seyn to Gerard 25.XII 1907/7.I 1908. KKK 1907, I dept., no. XXXV—I. VA

281 Governor of Uusimaa to the Governor-General's office, 8.I 1908, KKK 1907, I dept., no. XXXV—I. VA

282 Aspelin-Haapkylä, *Kirovuosien* . . . p. 148—149

A meeting at Kronoborg parish, one of many similar demonstrations, declared:

"When we received the sad news of Major-General Seyn's return to Finland, the effect was the same as if Bobrikov himself had returned — because he is a notorious enemy of our nationality, just cut out for undermining once again the relations between the Monarch and the people."²⁸³

The newspaper *Suomalainen Kansa* declared that such a reception would have made any self-respecting person disappear from the country, but Seyn was a thick-skinned animal.²⁸⁴ When the paper was summoned before the court, the editor claimed that speaking the truth was not a crime deserving of punishment. During Seyn's time the Governor-General's office had been a centre of dark intrigue and subterranean schemes, of spying and of the persecution of law-abiding citizens. Thus Seyn's activity *had* been that of a mole, and returning to a country that hated him, showing indifference to public opinion, *was* thick-skinned. Seyn was one of those administrators of the border regions who were called Tashkentians and of whom the greatest part were German-Jewish renegades, e.g. Plehwe, Rheinbott, and Seyn himself. It could not be in Russia's interest to have such a representative in the country.²⁸⁵

Of course, Seyn was thick-skinned enough to endure attacks of this kind. But the time of his service as the aide of the Governor-General of Finland was perhaps not completely pleasant for him. Edv. Hjelt understood that Gerard, the old gentleman, totally cut out his deputy. Boeckman also despised Seyn and tried to prevent him from interfering in Governor-General's business.²⁸⁶ Seyn was threatened and followed, so that he had to fear for his life, but the Governor-General detached

283 Protokoll sostavlennoi na narodnom sobranii v Kronoborge, v dome vol'noi požarnoi družiny. KKK 1907, I dept., no. XXXV—I, VA

284 *Suomalainen Kansa*, 19.X 1908. KKK 1908, I dept., no. XVIII—7, VA

285 *Suomalainen Kansa*, 1.II 1909. KKK 1908, I dept., no. XVIII—7, VA — The editor was fined 150 Marks. — There is no indication to Seyn's alleged Jewish origins, except that his grandfather's name was Jakob

286 Hjelt, *Från . . .* p. 195, 197

only three detectives to protect him.²⁸⁷

On the other hand, Seyn might feel that he was indispensable in his new office, and he could be assured of high support from St. Petersburg. On the 6th December 1907, St. Nicholas's day, he received the customary decoration; this time it was the Order of St. Stanislav. The correspondence of the Governor-General's office showed the impress of a renewed energy, "decisive measures", "extraordinary measures" were being demanded to prevent such occurrences as, for instance, policemen spending two hours with kitchen maids, while the criminals escaped.²⁸⁸ That was the attitude Stolypin expected of his representatives in Finland.

Boeckman Replaced

Governor-General Boeckman turned out to be an unsatisfactory representative of Russia in Finland.

Boeckman wanted to avoid an open conflict with the Finns; at least, he wanted to wait until the conflict was to be clearly seen as the fault of the intractable Finns.²⁸⁹ For instance, when the procedure was discussed for making laws with an Imperial interest for Finland, Boeckman said that the Russian realm was, of course, one and undivided; but some attention had to be paid to the fact that the Finns would oppose a procedure that they regarded as unconstitutional. Otherwise the government would have to resort to extraordinary measures, which would violate, for instance, the rules of the irremovability of judges and officials.

In other words, Boeckman was reluctant to provoke a constitutional conflict, with the consequent fight against the

287 Boeckman to the Governor of Uusimaa 14/27.VIII 1908, the Governor to Boeckman 19.VIII/1.IX 1908. KKK Dd 5, VA

288 Governor-General's office to the Senate 11/24.II 1908. KKK Dd 5, VA

289 Osoboe mnenie Finljandskago General'nago Gubernatora (concerning the reform of the Senate, to be discussed later). KKK 1908, IV dept., no. 37, VA

Finnish passive resistance, so well-known from Bobrikov's days.

Boeckman continued that it was not right to claim that an Imperial law annulled any and all local constitutions, because Nicholas II had solemnly confirmed those constitutions in 1894. It was impossible to act against the clearly documented will of the Tsar.²⁹⁰

Nor did Boeckman see any military or security interest necessitating a precipitation into conflict: the Governor-General had not noticed any wish to join Sweden in Finland, or any other kind of separatism. He felt confirmed in his view by the behaviour of the local population during the Sveaborg mutiny in 1906. Then it would have been easy to undertake a political adventure.²⁹¹

When Stolypin complained of the insolence of the Finnish press and demanded extraordinary measures of censorship, Boeckman answered that it was impossible, because such measures had been prohibited by the November Manifesto (of 1905, ending the strike).²⁹²

The blood-stained pacifier of the Baltic provinces, the alarmed commander of an army corps infiltrated by revolutionaries, had thus, quite obviously, swiftly adopted a Finnish point of view on the autonomy of the Grand Duchy. There is no proof of it, but the Old Bobrikovians in St. Petersburg must have been frustrated in their hopes, because the general was no improvement on Gerard.

Seyn, on the other hand, may have been personally hopeful. There are no documents bearing witness to his intrigues against Gerard and Boeckman, but the Finns were convinced that "Seyn's intrigues with the gendarmes against Gerard and Boeckman" . . . "were the principal reason for the fall" of the two Governor-Generals.²⁹³ This may explain why the gendarmes believed that the alarming information they sent in "pleased their superiors".

In any case, information concerning the alleged Finnish

290 Boeckman to the Council of Ministers 20.II/5.III 1909. KKK Dd 6, VA

291 Boeckman to Stolypin 28.XII 1908/2.I 1909. KKK Dd 6, VA

292 Boeckman to Stolypin 11.II 1909. KKK 1909, III dept., no. 55, VA

293 *Suomalainen Kansä*, 1.II 1909. KKK 1908, I dept., no. XVIII—7, VA

rebellion continued to pour into St. Petersburg. For instance, military spies reported how Japanese spies travelled in Finland pretending to study the wood industry, how Mechelin often visited the Japanese legation in Stockholm, how a "scientist" called Terada had studied the coastline of the Gulf of Bothnia, how Colonel Nagina visited Colonel Thesleff (commander of the National Guards in 1905), how an unknown Japanese had participated in a meeting of the *Voima*, how Konni Zilliacus had stolen the maps and defence plans of Kronstadt for the Japanese. The Emperor wrote in the margin of the report: "It would be well to make the Finnish Governor-General acquainted with the Japanese espionage".²⁹⁴

The imperial remark may have been a reproof for lack of vigilance. Boeckman answered that apparently the information could not be doubted if it had been deemed worthy of bringing it to the Emperor's attention. But he could not do anything but summon the persons suspected before the court; and the court demanded evidence before it passed any sentence.²⁹⁵ Quite clearly the Governor-General implied that he did not believe the stories, nor was he going to take any "extraordinary measures"; he was prepared to let the local justice act in its own way.

It looks as if Boeckman, a cavalry general, was fed up with the intricacies of the Finnish question by the end of 1909. He assured a Finnish meeting that as far as he was concerned, the law would be honoured.²⁹⁶ Of course, no Governor-General can proclaim an intention of ignoring the law; but in the context, Boeckman's statement could be taken to mean the Finnish constitution. This was an almost suicidal statement, and it is no wonder that such a man was replaced. Later, to Edv. Hjelt, he expressed his bitterness against Seyn, for having caused his dismissal.²⁹⁷

A Swedish paper stated in May 1909 that Boeckman was to

294 Chief of the general staff to Boeckman 16.X 1909. KKK 1910, I dept., no. XLVI, VA

295 Boeckman to Stolypin 25.X/5.XI 1909. KKK 1910, I dept., no. XLVI, VA

296 The Governor-General's answer to an address of Kotka town councillors 21.VI/4.VII 1909. KKK 1909, II dept., no. 11 b, VA

297 Hjelt, *Från . . .* p. 275

be replaced by Baron Möller-Sakomelski²⁹⁸ (Meller-Zakomel'skiï) who had been the Governor-General of the Baltic Provinces and before that had distinguished himself in quelling the mutiny on the Siberian railway in 1905/1906. No official confirmation of this piece of news appeared, and, if true, no intimation has come to light of how Seyn conquered this rival. Perhaps Stolypin had become convinced by the Old Bobrikovians that no mere military man, however blood-stained, could be trusted to represent the power of the unified government in Finland.

The year 1909 was a difficult one for Russia. There was a political crisis in the Duma. The Octobrists demanded a reform of naval administration as a precondition for approving the proposed naval estimates. The Right and the Court saw this as an usurpation by the Duma of the Emperor's prerogatives of military and naval command. Stolypin's Rightist enemies accused him of consenting to the attempted coup. The Emperor vetoed the Duma proposal. The Octobrist party started crumbling away. The Russian deputies from the western provinces formed a nationalist party of rightist Octobrists and moderate Rightists. To preserve his parliamentary support Stolypin had to shift his policy rightwards. This was important because of difficulties in foreign policy, too.

The result of the Bosnian crisis 1908—1909, the humiliation of Russia and Serbia by Austria and Germany, "a diplomatic Tsushima", reawakened nationalist, neo-Slavist feelings in Russia. Notwithstanding, Stolypin and his new Minister for Foreign Affairs, S.D. Sazonov, tried to approach Germany and to avoid new conflict with the two Germanic Empires until Russia was strong enough to stand up to them.

Russia had to submit to Austrian provocation and German ultimatum (as it was understood in St. Petersburg) during the Bosnian crisis because her army was in no condition to wage war successfully. That was why the military and naval reorganization and rearmament, started in 1908, was continued with increased vigour in 1909, under the leadership of Suhomlinov, the new Minister of War.

298 *Krieg of Fred, Allers Familj-Journals 5-öres supplement* n:r 18, 26. april — 2 maj 1909, p. 143

The approach to Germany had been calculated to appease the court and the conservative Right. Stolypin had to do something to quell the strong anti-German national feeling, too. Izvol'skiĭ, the hapless Foreign Minister was dismissed because of his clumsy handling of the crisis. In the internal politics the years 1909 and 1910 were characterized by nationalist reforms. Stolypin adopted the proposal of the local bishop to carve a Russian *gubernija* Cholm out of Polish border regions. *Zemstva* were established in the western districts, where Poles owned most manors, with stipulations guaranteeing the preponderant influence of Russian landowners.²⁹⁹

The danger of great power conflict cast its shadow over the Baltic region, too. The possibility of foreign complications added to the Finnish rebelliousness, with the necessity of demonstrating nationalist firmness, was reason enough to replace the unenthusiastic Boeckman with a more energetic agent in Finland.

Seyn Promoted Governor-General

Seyn was appointed Governor-General and promoted Lieutenant-General on 11th November 1909. His appointment was published in an Imperial military *prikaz* and did not go through the Finnish Senate and Minister State-Secretary.³⁰⁰ The Governor-General was not a Finnish official; he was the representative of the Imperial government in Finland. For this reason he received his pay from the Imperial Treasury (as Bobrikov and Boeckman had received), not from the Finnish state (as Gerard, who had reverted to the older pre-Bobrikovian position). The Imperial Treasury was reimbursed

299 Avreh, *Stolypin* . . . p. 17—21, 43; Edelman, *Gentry* . . . p. 73—91

300 Vysočaišii prikaz po voennomu vedomstvu 11.XI 1909. KKK 1909, III dept., no. 53, VA

by the Finnish Treasury, so that the operation was emphatically symbolic.³⁰¹

Is it right to say that the level of Governor-Generals had been lowered by Seyn's appointment? Witte wrote: "This man, congenial to Stolypin, is no Governor-General, he is the obliging servant of Stolypin or of any chairman of the Council of Ministers."³⁰² Of the Governor-Generals in the nineteenth century, Zakrevskii and Menschikoff had been the trusted aides of the Emperor. Adlerberg and Berg had belonged to the highest aristocracy of the Empire. Heiden and Bobrikoff had been transferred to Finland from important military posts, chief of the general staff, chief of the St. Petersburg military district staff, respectively, although neither belonged to the highest society. In a way Witte was right, in spite of the fact that as a witness he is not impartial, because he despised both Stolypin and Seyn. Previously the system of administration by Governors-General had been part of the ancient system of government exercised through trusted personal aides of the Emperor. But Seyn had very little immediate contact with the Emperor and not much independence. His appointment was an indication of the centralization, unification and bureaucratization of the Russian administration under a unified Council of Ministers.

There was little that was aristocratic about Seyn; in spite of his origins in the minor service nobility he was an example of the increasing trend throughout administration in Europe to make use of officials of a bourgeois-bureaucratic outlook. From the contemporary perspective, Seyn was without a doubt socially of lower origins than his predecessors had been in the nineteenth century. But it seems that his politics, for which his personality was well adapted, was the main reason for the hatred he provoked in Finland, not his lack of increasingly obsolescent hereditary social attributes.

301 Stolypin to the Governor-General 7.II and 10.III 1908, and *Žurnal vysočaiše učreždennago Osobago Soveščanija dlja obsuždenija nekotoryh voprosov, kasajuščihsja Velikago Knjažestva Finljandskago* 20.VI 1908. KKK 1908, IV dept., no. 24, VA. — The Governor-General received 30,000 Roubles or 80,000 Marks, his aide 15,000 or 40,000 respectively

302 Witte, *Vospominanija* III, p. 476

Congratulations and Addresses of Welcome

Nicholas II greeted his new Governor-General:

"May God help you serve me with your well-known energy and familiarity with the country, to the best of Great Russia and to the benefit of Finland".

Seyn hastened to answer:

"Great Sovereign, immeasurably happy for Your Imperial Majesty's Monarchic trust, benevolence, and high Sovereign wishes for my new office, which I receive with a heart full of boundless truly loyal subservience and love towards the divine Sovereign, I most loyally bring to Your Most Gracious Majesty my willingness to serve, without sparing strength or life, Your Imperial Majesty and the Holy Eternal Great Russia, diligently caring for the welfare of the country entrusted to me by the Highest".³⁰³

This message, drafted in Seyn's own hand, proves that he was quite a stylist. The subservient manner characteristic of Russian bureaucrats in their relations with the Tsar was a feature that in itself was hardly likely to endear these bureaucrats to the Finns. ("The general Russian servility" disgusted, for instance, Edv. Hjelt in the tricentennial jubilee of the Romanovs in 1913.³⁰⁴)

The Russian Right sent support and encouragement to Seyn. *Russkoe sobranie* hoped that his efforts "would restore the bonds, broken during a few recent years, between the Empire and its border country, indivisibly united with the other provinces, and that the duties would be imposed on it towards the common Fatherland which belong to it together with the other regions (*oblastjami*)".

In his temporary office in Grodno Seyn had been supported by the Russian Orthodox circles. They did not forget him when

303 Nicholas II to Seyn and a draft answer by Seyn 19.XI 1909. KKK 1909, III dept., no. 53, VA

304 Hjelt, *Från* . . . p. 272

he was transferred to Finland; the Sofia Society of Grodno sent "a joyful greeting and a glowing blessing".

The strongest support of Russian sovereignty in Finland and the Governor-General's succour in the ultimate emergency was the army posted in the country. The Viipuri garrison sent him a telegram avowing that "the Russian colours in your strong hands would proudly fly to the glory of our dear Fatherland".

Finljandskaja Gazeta, the Governor-General's newspaper, said that more than two hundred telegrams had been received.³⁰⁵ The paper had chosen telegrams to be published that emphasized the position of the border country as part of the unified Russia, part of the ancient Russian land. This can be taken as a manifestation of the new Governor-General's programme. Seyn himself said in his inaugural address to the high officials of Finland's administration: "I express my wish that our common work for the Imperial interests and for the true needs of the country will unite us by close ties in the most-loyal service of His Majesty".³⁰⁶ For Seyn, it was logical that the prosperity of the whole benefited the part also; he did not see himself as an oppressor of Finland but as a promotor of Russia's welfare. For the Finns, his speech was stark hypocrisy, because for them Finland was not part of Russia.

Contempt and Derision

Outside the sphere of the court, government, and nationalists, Seyn's appointment was not welcomed. To Mechelin Witte blamed Stolypin, for having made the little General the Emperor's representative in Finland. He thought that Seyn made himself ridiculous with his futile cantankerousness, having no idea of the august grandeur of his task.³⁰⁷ For Witte, zeal was not enough to make a statesman.

305 *Finljandskaja Gazeta* 24.XI/7.XII 1909, no. 177. KKK 1909, III dept., no. 53, VA

306 *Finljandskaja Gazeta* 23.XI/6.XII 1909. KKK 1909, III dept., no. 53, VA

307 Nordenstreng, *L. Mechelin* . . . II p. 463

Minister State-Secretary Langhoff also wondered at Seyn's appointment:

"How the Emperor could appoint Seyn was to me an inexplicable mystery. Personally, the Emperor knew him very little, and that perhaps makes it understandable that he could consent to his appointment, but that he, after having learnt to know Seyn better, still obstinately asserted that he was suitable for his office, made me greatly astonished . . .

Stolypin said to me that he had nothing to do with Seyn's appointment, but actually he and the group of specialists on the Finnish question, which he had collected, were always Seyn's eager supporters. In him they had found the devoted stooge who was needed for the complete Russification of Finland . . ." ³⁰⁸

Finns had no great respect for their Governor-General. *Sorretun Voima* reported on the solemn inaugural procession: "Mr. Seyn himself came to the cathedral and with him about thirty cabbage Russkies . . ." The police made way for the Governor-General through the multitude; *Sorretun Voima* described it thus: "pigs out of the path, make way for the hog". ³⁰⁹

Educated Finns were not as uninhibited as the Socialist reporter in expressing their thoughts, but they, too, were unanimous in their judgement:

"Rarely has a Governor-General in Finland been as hated, never as despised as Seyn. Personal courage he lacked totally, and being always apprehensive for his life, he always, when leaving the Governor-General's residence, was followed by a personal guard, a cluster of detectives, who, riding on their bicycles, surrounded his carriage. This made him ridiculous, in the Finnish eyes, because he was held too insignificant to be murdered". ³¹⁰

Yet Seyn's life was apparently threatened. After Stolypin had been murdered, a leaflet was found with the following appeal: "Citizens! A good reward promised to him who sends the

308 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 171—174

309 *Sorretun Voima* no. 16/1911, KKK 1911, I dept., no. 54—1, VA

310 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 72—73

scoundrel to accompany Stolypin and Bobrikoff. It's no use delaying, let the bombs sing!" Many Finns believed that Seyn lived in a world of horrors created by himself, just as the *Voima* threatening the security of the Empire was kept alive by the reports of the gendarmes. *Työmies* disapproved of the murderous leaflet, but found consolation in the belief that no one could take seriously such stupid provocation,³¹¹ i.e. the paper hinted that the gendarmes had concocted the appeal. Its author was never discovered.

Seyn actually received a continuous flow of threats and/or denunciations: "I am writing this letter because it is so difficult to meet Your Highness... There is a plot to kill Your Highness, I think it's horrible,..." The gendarme chief reported that neither the plot nor the informant had been found.³¹²

Of course, Seyn could not regard these threats as a joke, knowing the Finnish feelings towards him, and remembering the fate of Bobrikoff. Professor Aspelin-Haapkylä understood the situation: "If I am asked whether he has reason to be afraid, I must say that it is difficult to deny it absolutely".³¹³

Nicholas II wanted to save Frans Albert's life; he wrote to the Minister State-Secretary: "I hold it necessary to inform you in advance that if murderous attempts will be made against the new Governor-General, I shall take severe measures of punishment against Finland as a whole. It might be useful to make this observation known there".³¹⁴ The collective punishment Nicholas II had in mind might have been a declaration of a state of military emergency and the consequent limitation of Finnish autonomy.

311 *Työmies* 21.IX 1911, no. 217. KKK 1911, I dept., 17—29 VA

312 Anonymnyja pis'ma i hodataistva, zasluživajuščija osobago vnimanija. A letter from Berlin 9.XI 1910, gendarme chief to the Governor-General 9.I 1910. KKK 1911, I dept., no. 34—4, VA

313 Aspelin—Haapkylä, *Kirovuosien* . . . p. 212, 8.X 1911

314 Nicholas II to Langhoff 3.XII 1909. Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 171

Everyday Work

Seyn received petitioners twice a week (from eleven to twelve o'clock on Mondays, and from three to four o'clock on Fridays). The Finnish press was reported on daily (half an hour from Tuesday to Sunday). An hour was given to the Committee of Russian Schools and to *Finljandskaja Gazeta* on Tuesdays, to the Governor of Uusimaa on Wednesdays, to the head censor and the gendarme chief on Thursdays. Political and administrative business devoured two or three hours on Tuesdays and Fridays (I and III departments), juridical, economical, and personnel business also two-three hours on Mondays and Thursdays (II and IV departments). The Governor-General's office business was reviewed on Saturdays, and the Senate was received on Wednesday afternoons. Thus Finland was usually oppressed from eleven o'clock to half past four or five o'clock, Saturdays to three o'clock; on Sundays there was only the half an hour devoted to the Finnish press.³¹⁵

Every second or third week Seyn was absent from his office for two to four days, visiting St. Petersburg "on business".³¹⁶ He seems to have participated regularly in the meetings of the Committee of Finnish Affairs; he was invited to the Council of Ministers when important questions concerning Finland were on the agenda. This activity continued also during the war.

Every summer, in July or August, Seyn made inspection tours deep into the interior of Finland. He travelled by train, where possible, of course. In the eastern or northern regions, horse carriage or autocars had to be resorted to. The big lakes were crossed on pilot ships. For a week or two Seyn received local officials, communal authorities, petitioners, and inspected administrative offices and schools. He addressed meetings, in eastern Finland, where the Orthodox population was willing to see him; there he might sometimes be greeted with song, and with flowers handed to him by schoolchildren. Elsewhere the

315 Rospisanie dokladov i priemov (1910). KKK Fh 7, no. 96 b

316 O službe Finljandskago General-Gubernatora, General-Leitenanta F.A. Zeina. Ob otjezdah iz Gel'singforsa i vozvrašenijah. VSV 1915, no. 113, VSV 1916 no. 91, VSV 1917, no. 153, VA (covering the years from 1907 to 1917)

reception was cooler, and the Governor-General had much to rebuke people for — for instance, in the Rauma teacher's training school a picture had to be removed from the wall because it depicted a "typical" Russian town in Nicholas I's time, with a military sentry asleep and a pig walking down the middle of the street.³¹⁷

Somebody in Seyn's office once wondered why the Finns made so much of Governor-General Per Brahe's inspection tours (1637—1654) but ignored Seyn's longer and more frequent trips.³¹⁸ This question reveals a profound lack of understanding. Seyn thought that Finland's position in the Russian Empire was, or ought to be, similar to that it held in the Swedish state; and that his own position ought to have been regarded comparable to that of the ancient Swedish Governor-General. For a Finn, had he known of it, comparing Seyn with the idolized Count Brahe, a benefactor and reformer, would have been blasphemy or sacrilege.

These trips, undertaken during the most beautiful period of the Finnish summer, included also sight-seeing visits, for instance, to see the midnight sun in Lapland. Thus they were a kind of holiday, or at least a break from the everyday routine at Helsinki. Very seldom did Seyn take a real holiday; in 1913 on doctor's orders he spent a few weeks taking the waters in Caucasia.³¹⁹ Visiting Moscow for the unveiling of Alexander III's statue (May 1912) or the centenary of the Battle of Borodino (August 1912), or participating in the tricentenary celebration of the Romanovs in 1913 was again more of the nature of solemn official business.³²⁰

317 KKK Hd 10, Hd 36, Hd 96, Hd 97, and Hd 98, VA contain detailed programmes and reports of the inspection tours

318 KKK Hd 36, no. 3

319 Seyn to the Emperor 13.VI 1913. KKK Fh 7, no. 96 b, VA

320 "Deputations", KKK Hd 10, VA

Seyn's Programme

Seyn had no complete worked-out programme in his pocket on entering office. But there are a few reviews of the situation in Finland in his archives which reveal his understanding of the task confronting him.

The Finnish revolution had surpassed all the expectations of the activist opposition. Effortlessly the Finnish administration and justice had been submitted to the revolutionary leaders Mechelin and Wrede, with the assistance, according to Seyn's view, of short-sighted Russian representatives. Happily Bobrikoff had succeeded in dissolving the Finnish army, and Mechelin and his friend General Schauman had not succeeded in recreating Finnish military forces. All the white, red, and blue guards had been proved worthless in the first attempt, the Sveaborg Mutiny. — The terrible *Voima* was quite forgotten in this report.

In 1906 and 1907 overcoming the Russian revolution had deflected the attention of the Imperial government from the Finnish danger, but in 1908 the Russian public, which was not blind to the Red menace, was awakened. After the historical interpellation, Stolypin promised a radical change in the Finnish question, and he kept his word. The procedure for Finnish affairs was reformed.³²¹

But much still remained to be done. Opposition was strong in Finland. Russian laws were not obeyed; officials were not dependable, and courts were hotbeds of politics, while the press was quite unbridled. Attempts to integrate this frontier country with other parts of the Empire remained ineffective without conscientious administrators. Only a minor fraction of officials and policemen were dependable. Generally, they did not fight for the Imperial interests at all, many were inert, often being leaders of the passive opposition. They could not be dismissed wholesale, because there were no dependable Finns to replace

321 *Novoe Vremja* 12/25.VIII 1911, no. 1272. KKK 1909, III dept., no. 53, VA.

— The review is from the year 1911, but it describes the situation in 1909; and the Governor-General's office has put it in the dossier which contains material on Seyn's appointment and reception; consequently, it may be taken as reflecting his views of the situation in 1909.

them, and Russians did not know the local laws and languages.³²² The agitation, which had started in 1905, had not abated yet, because it had not been opposed by a strong and consequential policy, comparable to that of the government measures in Russia. The agitation kept Finland hostile to Russia; the opposition had grown on a Swedo-Finnish national basis, but there was also a large Socialist opposition.³²³

These were the main lines of Seyn's review, the details of which will be discussed later in due context. His programme resembled that of his teacher Bobrikoff. Russian influence was to be strengthened in Finnish administration and public life, and for that the Governor-General needed better assistants and more power. The opposition was "agitation"; national or Socialist, it made no great difference, they were both expressions of the same revolution.³²⁴ The Finnish opposition was unreasonable and their appeals to their constitution were "politicking"; the dictates of the Russian government were self-evident and justified, it was obviously the duty of the Finns to submit to them, without any psychological persuasion or concessions by the Imperial authorities.

Seyn did not see himself as an oppressor, he was a righteous executor of the imperial policy. For the Finns he *was* an oppressor, because they did not acknowledge the justification of the Imperial policy.

322 Zapiska, Seyn to Stolypin 27.X 1910. (This review was written after Seyn had been Governor-General for a little less than a year). Vysočaiše učreždennoe Podgotovitelnoi Kommissii Proekt zakonodatel'nyh program dlja Finljandii i materialy 1912—1913. Helsingin Yliopiston Kirjasto.

323 Seyn's oral explanations to the preceding document in the Protocol of the Committee of Finnish Affairs 28.V 1911. Vysocaise . . . (= 322), p. 103

324 Discussing this difference is one of the central themes of Jussila, *Nationalismi* . . .


Administration

The Governor-General's Office

Seyn found the Governor-General's office very much as he had left it, after the reform of 1903. There were four departments, the first one for political and administrative business, the second department for legal, judicial, and financial questions, the third one for inspection and personnel, and the fourth department for economic matters and additional miscellaneous items.

During the dark years 1905—1907 the Finnish Senate had aspired to cripple even the Governor-General's office "reducing the number of Russians there, acquainted with the political, social, and economic life of the border country". It was doubly harmful because of the Finnish striving for a separate position in the Empire, which made it vitally important to be able to appraise all local occurrences from the Imperial point of view. In this the Governor-General's office was not assisted by Russian-staffed organs at a lower level, as in the other general-governments, because the local offices in the Grand Duchy were occupied by Finns.

Thus, the temporary arrangements created in 1903 were made permanent in 1909. The director was to be an official of the fourth rank (Senior State Councillor, the equivalent of a Major General). Department chiefs were to be of the sixth rank (Court Councillor, the equivalent of a Lieutenant-Colonel), assisted by aides and senior, junior, and assistant secretaries.



The Personnel of the Governor-General's Office (Muscovirasto)

Then there were the translators, typists, copyists, couriers, etc. In addition, there were about ten high supernumerary officials (of IV to VII ranks) "for special purposes". The Governor-General had three personal military aides.³²⁵

Seyn procured better pay for his subordinates than was normal in the Empire. He needed competent aides, but Russian officials were reluctant to serve in Helsinki. There they were hated and boycotted, being compelled to pay exorbitant prices for their accommodation, without much hope of promotion, and with much work — service hours often stretched from eight in the morning to ten in the night.³²⁶

In the official personnel list for 1913 forty-four officials (typists, guards, servants excluded) are named. Six of them had entered the office in 1906—1908. Seyn had hired 22 new officials and re-hired fourteen officials who had been in the office in Bobrikov's time,³²⁷ i.e. Gerard's hirelings had been cleaned out of the office, while the Bobrikovians had been rehabilitated.

Measuring the importance of these officials in the formation of Russian policy during Seyn's governorship cannot be attempted here; it is a task for a separate study. None of them emerges as a personality comparable to Seyn in Bobrikov's time. Many papers signed by Seyn, and consequently attributed to him, were drafted by his subordinates, of course. But by signing a document Seyn undertook the responsibility for it, and it is not completely wrong to attribute it to him. It is not reasonable to suppose that any official would have views or opinions radically differing from those of Seyn. A few officials will be personally met with by name in the course of this story. The director of the office, Borovitinov, has already been mentioned (p. 12) Adam Lipskiî, the deputy Governor-General, also needs to be mentioned. Edv. Hjelt said of him:

"I was astonished at the distorted and downright simple understanding that Lipskii had on some matters . . . For

325 Seyn to Langhoff 11.XII 1909. KKK 1980—1918, PM 332:3, VA. — Seyn's proposals were accepted by the Council of Ministers and the Emperor. KKK 1808—1918, P; 332:3, p. 36

326 Seyn to Markov 25.XI/8.XII 1913. VSV 1914, no. 29, VA

327 Spisok činov upravljenja Finljandskago General-Gubernatora. Sostavljen 1-go Maja 1913 goda, ispravlen po 15-e ijulja 1913 goda. Gel'singfors 1913.

instance, he seemed to believe that Finns had caused the Russian revolution of 1905—1906 and that Mechelin was one of its organizers, because he had been in Paris during the time of the meeting of the revolutionaries... He seemed incredulous when I refuted these fallacies...'³²⁸

It seems that Lipskiî sincerely shared the anxieties of Seyn, Stolypin, and the guardians of Imperial security. Preconceived ideas and misinformation, supported by a pinch of actual evidence, coloured their picture of the situation.

The Gendarmes

The expulsion of the gendarmes in 1905 was not a permanent one; the spies returned. But, from the Finnish point of view, they returned as private persons, without any official authority; the November Manifesto had annulled the Bobrikovian gendarme decrees of the year 1903. The Emperor expressly freed the Finnish treasury from the costs of the upkeep of the spies in 1906.³²⁹

The military police, reorganized into a corps of gendarmes in Nicholas I's time, had kept an eye on Finns since 1817. The railway gendarmes had been organized in 1897. There were normally 67 railway gendarmes, led by a chief aided by two aides and two sergeant majors. In the event of war, or declaration of a state of military emergency, their numbers were to be increased to 261, with 8 aides and 8 sergeant majors.³³⁰

The Gendarme Administration of Finland was directed during Seyn's time by Colonel Utgof until 1913. We have already seen how fertile the gendarme imagination was. Part of the groundless information may have been collected in good

328 Hjelt, *Från* . . . p. 272

329 Seyn to the Senate IV/V 1912. (a copy, s.d.), KKK 1912, II dept., no. 21—26, VA

330 Istoricheskiî očerk položenii žandarmskih činov Finljandii s 1817—1902 goda, signed Elenev. KKK 1906, I dept., no. 1-3, VA

faith, because the gendarmes knew very little of Finland and the Finnish language. Military intelligence suspected *Kotiseulutulki mysyhdistys* of spying, because they made maps. Gendarmes therefore studied *Kotisdiltutki musyhelistys*, but in this case found no evidence.³³¹ A Finn sees at first glance that the name ought to be written *Kotiseututkimusyhdistys*, meaning an "Association for the Study of the Home Area and Local History", whose maps were innocent of any military importance. The gendarmes had to trust local informants, drunkards, disturbed persons, half-criminals, frustrated and embittered careerists at best.³³²

Finnish leaders were conscientiously shadowed. Without nuances they all were called *Voimisty*, i.e. members of the *Voima*. For instance,

"20.X 1912 Mechelin/He-Goat³³³ no. 25, South Esplanade St., left home at ten to eleven o'clock, visited the Swedish Club, no. 15, Fabian St. for fifteen minutes, took a cab to the Boulevard St., and after ten minutes returned in the same cab to his home and did not come out any more that day."³³⁴

A grown man was occupied a whole day to produce that report; and there are hundreds, maybe thousands of similar reports, in the gendarme archives.

Reading through the gendarme papers one gets the impression that the best information was collected from Finnish newspapers.

In 1913 Utgof was replaced by Colonel Eremin, who seems to have been more critical in receiving information, as will be seen later. It was in 1913 that the former gendarme official Menshikov revealed the credulity and the dishonesty of the

331 Svodka svedenija po Finljandii sostavlennaja štabom okruga 18.XI 1909. KKK 1910, I dept., no. XXXV, VA, and V štabe otdel'nago korpusa žandarmov (s.d.), KKK 1910, I dept., no. XXXV, VA

332 cf. Jussila, *Santarmihallituksen* . . .
Parmanen, *Taistelujen* . . . IV names a few informers

333 Every person to be shadowed had a code name. Mannerheim was *Boevož*, Fighter, but generally the code names were not quite respectful

334 Dnevnik naružnago nabljudenija po "Osvoboditel'nomu sojuzu" za 1912-i god. Santarmihallitus S 4 no. VII, VA

gendarmes, but it is not known whether Utgof's replacement was connected with the scandal.

In addition to gendarmes, Finland was spied on by the security section of the police department of the Ministry of the Interior, or *Ohrana*. In 1909 the Governor-General's office was informed that Finland was to be included in the St. Petersburg *Ohrana raion* (district). To fight the extensive revolutionary movement the police also had to be organized in large units³³⁵ (roughly corresponding to the military districts). The measure was repealed in 1914³³⁶ and does not seem to have been of any special importance; it only reminds us that Finland was kept under observation from several levels of police administration.³³⁷

Perhaps the gendarmes were dishonest in good faith. It is not unusual for a secret service to create a world of shadows around itself, so that normal peaceful people seem suspicious or dangerous. Similarly, the revolutionary terrorists saw only enemies outside their own sphere. Perhaps the double agents had no divided loyalty, because the *Ohrana* and the terrorists were complementary creatures of the subsoil culture. Seyn himself was repulsive to normal civilized people not only because of his personal characteristics, but because of the taint of his gendarme connections.

The Military

Since Obolenskii's days Finland had been part of the St. Petersburg military district, which commanded the detachments positioned in the Grand Duchy — the twenty-second army corps (of three rifle brigades, since 1908), the

335 O podčinenii finljandskago žandarmskago upravljenja v otnošenii agentura S. Peterburgskomu rainnomu ohrannomu otdeleniju. KKK 1909 I dept., no. VIII-3. VA

336 The Ministry of the Interior to the Governor-General 23.II 1914. KKK 1914, I dept., no. 1-5, VA

337 In the light of the police department material in the "Antti Hackzellin kokoelma" in VA, the *Ohrana* depended in most cases on gendarme information or used the identical spies

fortresses of Sveaborg and Viipuri, and the ships of the Baltic Fleet in Helsinki.

Consequently the Governor-General had no authority to command the troops garrisoned in the area of his jurisdiction. This division of authority was one of the reasons for the paralysis of Russian power during the revolutionary General Strike in 1905. To avoid a repetition of this situation, the Governor-General was authorized to dispose of the troops in Finland if he needed help to keep order.³³⁸

This regulation only pertained to peace-time. If a state of war or military emergency was declared in Finland, the Governor-General was to be subordinate to the military Commander-in-Chief, as decreed in the Field Service Regulations. It was further regulated that if the communication with St. Petersburg, i.e. with the Commander-in-Chief, was cut, the commander of the twenty-second army corps was to be acting army commander.³³⁹ Thus he was to be the Governor-General's superior and there would be no confusion as to who was to be in charge.

Still, it was not quite clear who was to order the troops out to help keep order. In the nineteenth century the local authorities, who knew when they were unable to keep order by their own means, had been empowered to ask the nearest garrison for help. After 1905 the Finnish Senate wanted to continue this practice. But the Russian commanders demanded the right to decide when to despatch their troops. Evidently they did not trust the Finnish constitutionalist governors and police and were afraid of their soldiers being used in the party strife of the Finns.³⁴⁰ There were important military reasons for their reluctance, too: the troops might be dispersed in small detachments in order-enforcing assignments, with no force left at their commanders' disposal. On the other hand, there was

338 Prikaz po voiskam Gvardii i Peterburgskago Voennago Okruga 3.II 1908. KKK 1908, II dept., no. 30, VA

St. Petersburg military district to Seyn 3.XII 1909. KKK 1908, II dept., no. 30, VA

339 St. Petersburg Military District Chief of Staff v. Brincken to the Commander of the twenty-second army corps Olhovskii 5.X 1909. KKK 1909, I dept., no. L, VA

340 Jussila, *Nationalismi* . . . p. 107—111

the danger of the army helplessly looking on at disorders if there was no local authority present to ask for help, or if the Finnish authority was reluctant to rely on the Russians. That was why the generals proposed that only a small detachment should be disposed of by the local authorities in the event of immediate need, but that normally only the commander concerned would be authorized to make the decision on using military force.³⁴¹

This was also a constitutional problem, because the military regulations were part of Russian law. The constitutionalist Senate said that such regulations must also be decreed in Finland according to the lawful procedure, but the Russian government thought that the Finnish procedure pertained only to local affairs, while military questions were an Imperial concern and thus the Finns had to obey the Russian law. A unified Imperial army could not act according to different rules in different regions of the realm.³⁴² Seyn proposed that the Russian regulations be published in Finland, but even that was problematic, because publication implied that the law was not valid in Finland without special publication.³⁴³ On the other hand, the Finns could not obey an unpublished law, however valid in principle. The discussion took up plenty of time, but in the end the Russian regulations were published in 1913 and 1914.³⁴⁴

341 Commander of the twenty-second army corps v. Saltza to Gerard 18.X 1906. KKK 1907, I dept., no. 46-07, VA
Commander of the twenty-second army corps Boeckman to Gerard 17.II 1907. KKK 1907, I dept., no. 46-07, VA
Olhovskii 16.IX 1911, cited in the review "Principal events in 1911", p. 103. KKK Hd 94, no. 6, VA

342 Gerard to the Senate 30.IX/12.X 1906. KKK 1906, I dept., no. 46-07, VA
Senate to Gerard 3.VII 1907. KKK 1906, I dept., no. 46-07, VA
Senate to Boeckman 21.III 1908. KKK 1906, I dept., no. 46-07, VA

343 Žurnal Vysočaiše učreždennago Osobago Soveščanija po delam Velikago Knjažestva Finljanskago 4.III 1913, po proektu pravil o prizyve voisk dlja sodeistvija graždanskim vlastjam. KKK 1912, I dept., no. 17-6, VA
Spravka k vsepoddannejšemu predstavleniju Imperatorskago Finljanskago Senata s proektom ob izmenenii deistvujuščih pravil o prizyve voisk dlja sodeistvija graždanskim vlastjam. KKK 1912, I dept., no. 17-6, VA
Osobyi Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 22.VIII 1913. KKK 1913, I dept., no. 17-3, VA

344 Vysočaiše utvrždennoe mnenie Gosudarstvennogo Soveta 188 ob

By 1913 the governors and many police officers were already dependable people. They, as well as the directors of prisons, were authorized to ask for help, but if the troops were to remain for more than a week in their order-enforcing mission, authorization was to be asked of the military commanders. The military was to be asked to intervene only in case of the utmost need; but then it was to act in earnest, with no empty threats or warning shots, which would only encourage the mob. If no civilian authorities were present, or if the Finnish authorities were not prompt enough to ask for help, the military was authorized to act on its own to curb disorder at the outset. Preserving order, for instance on the railways, was vital for the army, too.³⁴⁵

The Finnish *Voima*, the ghost conjured up by the gendarmes, kept haunting the military. For many years the defence plan in Finland remained the same: the army was to concentrate on defending Helsinki and Viipuri in the event of an enemy landing, the principal task being to keep open the communications with St. Petersburg and to protect the capital from the north-west. On the other hand, in the event of the *Voima* rebelling in Finland, the army was to secure Helsinki and Viipuri and then proceed to occupy all railway junctions and other important localities in the Grand Duchy. But what about a rebellion simultaneously with the eventual enemy landing, especially one combined with a Finnish general strike? How could the local garrisons know whether the enemy had landed or only the *Voima* was rebelling, and which plan was to be fulfilled, if the communications were cut by the rebels and/or strikers? And what a confusion if some garrisons obeyed one set of orders, and other garrisons followed other plans!³⁴⁶ The

izmenenii pravil prizyve voisk dlja sodeistvija graždanskim vlastjam.
Sbornik kasajuščihsjja Finljandii zakonov i postanovlenii obščego-sudarstvennago značeniija 16/3.XII 1913, no. 33/1913. *Suomen Virallinen Lehti* 11.VI 1914, no. 132

345 Olhovskii to v. Brincken 18.III 1910, approved by Brincken 31.III 1910, by Seyn 9.I 1911. KKK 1911, I dept., no. 53, VA

346 Soobraženija po obezpečenija soedineniija voisk korpusa s glav. silami. Ven sot asiak 6071, p. 31—, VA

Deistvija voisk korpusa v Finljandii v slučae vnutrennyh osložnenii. Ven sot asiak 11310, VA

Deistvija voisk korpusa v Finljandii v slučae vnešnyh osložnenii. Ven sot

dilemma was never satisfactorily solved. The generals in Finland kept demanding more troops and more garrisons to master the situation, but the War Ministry had no troops to spare, after the third rifle brigade had been established in 1908. Happily for the Russians — and for the Finns, too, probably — the Germans and/or the Swedes never attacked Finland, nor was there any *Voima* to raise the rebellion.

Seyn supported the military commanders in their demand for more troops. The planned concentration of the garrisons along the Helsinki—St. Petersburg railway, expected to take place after the barracks commenced in 1910 were to be completed, would leave the interior of Finland denuded of Russian troops. That was a serious defect, because, for instance, Tampere was a centre of Socialist agitation, and Sortavala was a nest of Pan-Finnish propaganda.

"Now in Finland we live in a critical period when the separatists are putting forth all their strength to oppose the Government's policy of integrating the border country with the Empire... Positioning troops over all the country would essentially contribute to the speedy bringing of disorders under control and to the strengthening of the principle of Russian sovereignty in the country."³⁴⁷

The military authorities in St. Petersburg of course supported the principle of Russian sovereignty in Finland, but more troops were needed in Vilna, Warsaw, Kiev, Caucasia, Turkestan; Finland had to be satisfied with the three brigades.³⁴⁸ It was not until 1914 that a fourth brigade was positioned in Finland and the twenty-second army corps was up to the normal army corps strength of thirty-two battalions.

Seyn proposed also an inland lake fleet:

asiak 11309, VA

These are collections of rich material from the years 1910—1911 on the military plans against internal and external enemies. Cf. Luntinen, *Suomi Pietarin* . . . p. 110—

347 Seyn to v. Brincken 9.XI 1911. KKK Hd 14, no. 5, VA

348 Chief of the General Staff Zilinskiĭ to Kokovcov 20.XII 1911 to Seyn 27.XII 1911. KKK Hd 14, no. VA

"For political reasons the fleet would be useful, strengthening the principle of Russian suzerainty in the interior of the country, with its cannons and machine guns propping up the morale of the inhabitants, and being ready to quell any rebellion or partisan movement."³⁴⁹

The military authorities adopted the plan in principle, because the inland fleet would have been useful in the event of a Swedish attack over the Gulf of Bothnia and through the central Finland towards St. Petersburg. But no suitable craft existed, the army was unable and the navy was unwilling to construct them.³⁵⁰ In the end it was not until the war years that small Finnish steamships were pressed into service with their crews and armed with small guns to form the flotilla. In Finnish memory the inland fleet remains slightly ridiculous,³⁵¹ because no Swedish attack ever took place and the ships remained idle; but, of course, the idea was strategically sound.

Saltza and Boeckman, commanders of the twenty-second army corps, had not been satisfied with Gerard's policy towards the revolutionary agitation; and Gerard had been compelled to warn the Viipuri commandant Petrov to desist from too eager methods of keeping order in his area. It seems that Olhovskii had no comparable disagreements with Seyn. The Viipuri commandant was still an energetic keeper of law and order and tried to use the Russian rights of a fortress commandant to intervene in Finnish politics; for instance, a Socialist journalist and member of the Diet was jailed. In the subsequent conflict Seyn naturally took the commandant's part against the Finnish constitutionalist opposition.³⁵²

The *ultima ratio* was not needed in fact; there were only a

349 Seyn to Stolypin 22.II 1911. KKK Hd 14, no. 7, VA

350 Statements by Nikolai Nikolaevič 18.III 1911 and 28.V 1911. —

Statements by the Navy Ministry 10.III 1911, by the Minister of War 3.V 1911. — *Osobyi Žurnal Soveta Ministrov* 4.VIII 1911. — Protocol of a mixed Committee 28.XII 1912. KKK Hd 14, no. 7, VA

351 Ruohonen, *Laivoja* . . . p. 94

352 O zasedanii Vyborgskago Ratgauskago suda po delu redaktora "Työ" — Airola. KKK 1911, I dept., no. 30—10, VA — the journalist had called Russian warships "floating coffins". — The constitutionalists tried to summon the Russian authorities before the court in Viipuri to answer for the order of expulsion for Airola: KKK 1912, I dept., no. 51-4, VA

couple of cases when troops were called out to disperse a meeting. But the presence of the army was necessary, because it kept the Finns loyal, reminding them of the fact that a rebellion would have been suicidal.

Normalizing the Senate

The first phase of cleaning the separatists out of the Finnish administration had been undertaken by Boeckman. The Imperial Finnish Senate could not be allowed to continue to play at being a Finnish government; it was vitally important to make it an organ of Russian government. Mechelin, the deputy chairman of the economy department of the Senate, was the notorious leader of the passive opposition in Bobrikov's time. He had systematically destroyed everything that Bobrikov had built and ousted everything Russian from the Finnish administration. He had planned a separate Finnish constitution and army. "He has allowed himself many measures against Imperial interests."³⁵³

Mechelin was got rid of in May 1908. The Socialists in the Diet blamed the constitutionalist Senate for a limp defence of Finland's rights; the Old Finns did not defend their rivals, and thus the Senate received a vote of no confidence. According to his parliamentary principles Mechelin asked the Emperor to dismiss the Senate. The Imperial government did not approve of parliamentarism and dissolved the Diet instead; but Mechelin's request to resign was accepted along with those of a couple of his closes aides.

The new Senate of moderate constitutionalists and Old Finns, led by Edv. Hjelt, did not last for a year. Several Senators resigned in April 1909, because the (Finnish) legal order had not been followed in the procedure of referring Finnish affairs to the Emperor; the immediate reason for the

353 Seyn's review over the political situation in Finland 1899—1916. KKK Hd 79, no. 5, VA

resignation was the fact that the Russian government had not accepted a law to protect tenant farmers, decreed by the dissolved Diet, but had decreed an identical Imperial Manifesto. A few Old Finns remained in office until the "Military Millions" for 1908 and 1909 were ordered to be paid without the leave of the Diet in the autumn of 1909.³⁵⁴

Boeckman had been reluctant to let all Finnish Senators go because "the Monarch has no Russian cadres available who would be competent in law, language and local circumstances". Boeckman would have preferred to avoid the conflict with the Senate, at least until it had been made clear that the eventual conflict was the fault of the Finns.³⁵⁵

But now the conflict was a fact. A new Senate had to be found, while no Finnish politicians were willing, and no Russian bureaucrats were able, to serve there. Boeckman found a way out of the *impasse*. The Imperial bureaus were combed for Finnish-born officials who were loyal and senior enough to be appointed Senators. A few Vice-Admirals and Major-Generals were found, who in spite of their Finnish origins were "independent of the influence of the local parties and willing to enforce the governmental policy". In addition, a few "right-thinking" Finnish jurists were found as well as a "dependable" Old Finn (not a nominee of the party). Later a few ethnic Russians even were appointed to the Finnish Senate. At first an ancient (1858) decree had to be applied, proposing that a Russian appointed in a Finnish office *ipso facto* became a Finnish citizen; later, when all Russians were allowed equal rights in Finland, there was no longer any legal problem.

It had been important to find impartial Senators, because the danger had been close that the Finnish Senators would have been chosen from the Diet majority. Parliamentarism would have decreased the Governor-General's power and made the hostile Diet the master of the Senate.

Now the Governor-General and the Senate were able to govern together, while formerly they had not even spoken the same language. One inconvenience that arose in the beginning

354 KKK 1909, IV dept., no. 8—2 26, VA Cf. Luntinen, *Sotilasmiljoonat*

355 Osoboe mnenie Finljanskago General'nago Gubernatora, KKK 1908, IV dept., no. 37, VA

was that the senators did not know much of the business of Finnish administration and were easily led by their disloyal Finnish aides.³⁵⁶ Boeckman proposed that his deputy, i.e. Seyn, would be authorized to act as the chairman of the Senate to provide the "necessary firm leadership". This proposal fell through by the dismissal of Boeckman and the promotion of Seyn to the post of Governor-General. And it was anyway rendered superfluous when Lieutenant-General Markov was appointed to the Senate; he was deemed able to give the necessary leadership.³⁵⁷

From the Finnish point of view, the new Senate was Russian, in spite of the ethnic origins of its members. It is often said that they had been Russified by their long service in the Empire; perhaps it would be more exact to say that they had adopted an Imperial, official point of view, and that they had not kept in touch with the development of the Finnish nationalism and the anti-Russian feeling provoked by the governmental policy. Finns did not see much difference between the Finnish-born and Russian senators.

There was a slight difference sometimes, however. The new Senate paid dutifully the "Military Millions" to the Imperial Treasury which the Diet had refused but which the Emperor and the Duma had ordered. But when the Imperial government demanded additional payments, for instance for the upkeep of the gendarmes or for the quartering of troops in Finland, the Senate, only the two Russian Senators excepted, opposed. The majority of the Senate explained that Finland was undoubtedly duty bound to pay its share in Imperial expenses, but only after they had been duly counted and decreed. In addition, with the recalcitrant Finnish Diet, the Senate had no revenue to be transferred to the Imperial Treasury. The "Military Millions" and the current expenses of the Finnish administration consumed all the money there was.³⁵⁸ Finns could not be made to pay more taxes nor would the Finnish bureaucracy collect

356 Seyn's review over the political situation in Finland 1899—1916. KKK Hd 79, no. 5, VA

357 O predostavlenii Pomoščniku General-Gubernatora prava prisutstvovanija i predsedatel'stvovanija v Senate. VSV 1910, no. 120, VA

358 Cf. Luntinen, *Sotilasmiljoonat*, p. 48—, 120—

any taxes which were not approved of by the Diet.

These men did not defend the financial autonomy of Finnish State for reasons of principle, but because of the fact that Finland could not be governed and oppressed without money. Thus, in practice, their position imposed on them a policy which was contradictory to their political ideas.³⁵⁹ And in this quarrel Seyn backed the Senate.

Local opposition to Imperial demands was not unknown in Russia, either. The Imperial administration was not a well-oiled machinery for a complete and frictionless execution of the decisions of the monarch and his ministers, autocracy notwithstanding. The bureaucracy had not much power of initiative, but they put the government's directives into practice and adapted them to the local reality as they perceived it, thereby creating a policy of their own.³⁶⁰ Even worse, many directives remained a dead letter because of the indolence, incompetence, reluctance, and reactionary stand of the officials. — Sociologists seem to have found such hidden functions in any organization.

In his memoirs Paasikivi says that it was feared that the Russians would dissolve the Senate and govern Finland from St. Petersburg or through the Governor-General's office.³⁶¹ It seems that no such plans existed, at least no serious preparations were made. It would have been against the trend of the Russian policy: Finnish autonomy was to be made congruent with the Imperial interests, but it was not to be completely dissolved, because it saved the Imperial government from much tedious local detail.

The Senate was reformed during Boeckman's governorship, but Seyn was satisfied with the new membership. Throughout his governorship he was able to work with this Senate. In 1913 the chairman, Markov, was transferred to the post of Minister State-Secretary, and Seyn had his office-director Borovitinov appointed to the office of deputy chairman of the Senate. This meant no change of political direction in the Senate, it was only a question of fulfilling a vacancy.

359 Jussila, *Nationalismi* . . . p. 254

360 e.g. Yaney, *The Concept* . . .

361 Paasikivi, *Muistelmia* . . . II, p. 92

The Governors

The first task for Seyn was saving the Finnish *lääni* or county administration from the separatist revolutionaries. Mechelin had dismissed all Governors appointed by Bobrikov, and the new men were all notorious constitutionalists, Swedish-speaking former Finnish officers, who had contributed to the expulsion of Russian officials and police from their counties and had supported Mechelin in his attempts to organize Finnish armed forces. They had not informed the Russian government on the Russian revolutionary movement in Finland nor on the Finnish Socialist movement, and they had not co-operated with the Russian police in investigating political crimes in Finland.³⁶²

Some of the governors were suspected of protecting the *Voima*; it may be true that they in fact belittled the importance of the Finnish opposition in order to avoid Russian intervention, although "it is a bit too categorical to say that they protected the Socialists".³⁶³ The gendarmes reported that one of them, Alfthan of Uusimaa, the county which includes Helsinki, was chief of staff of the *Voima*.³⁶⁴

A pretext for the dismissal of the disloyal Governors was found in the quarrel concerning the stamp tax, ordered by the Emperor but not sanctioned by the Diet, in the beginning of 1910. Seyn wrote:

"Passive opposition was rife. For instance, in the beginning of the year 1910 there was no budget confirmed by the Diet. That was why the stamp tax of the previous year was to be continued, as decreed in the Constitution of 1772. But many officials wanted to discredit the new Senate, whereby the stamp tax was a good pretext."³⁶⁵

Many Finns did not understand that it was for important reasons of policy and security that the Governors had to be

362 Yrjänäinen, *Kenraalikuvernöörin* . . .

363 Yrjänäinen, *Kenraalikuvernöörin* . . . p. 78

364 Soveršenno sekretnaja zapiska o voožuženii Finljandii 1911—1912 gg. KKK Hd 103, no. 14, VA

365 A memorandum by Seyn, KKK Hd 79, no. 6, VA

replaced. They supposed that Seyn acted for reasons of personal animosity.

"Seyn . . . with his usual vindictiveness started a quarrel with the law-abiding, respected Governors on the pretext that they ought to have collected the illegal tax. The result was that most governors asked to be relieved of office during the years 1910 and 1911".³⁶⁶

For Seyn, the Governors were glaringly unfit for their posts. For instance, Alfthan of Uusimaa had allowed Schauman's death coat to be shown as a relict in a museum; v. Troil of Viipuri had not believed in denunciations of a meeting of former Finnish officers; v. Knorring of Mikkeli had not informed the Governor-General of a tenant farmer under suspicion; Stenius of Kuopio contended that the *Voima* was only a sports club; Gadolin of Oulu did not believe in the arms smuggling of the revolutionaries; Borgenström of Turku allowed an exposition of Japanese pictures and flags, etc. What Seyn especially objected to was the fact that the Finnish officials were ignorant of, did not believe in, or belittled the importance of the revolutionary meetings. All the governors were unworthy from the Russian point of view.³⁶⁷

If, for instance, v. Troil of Viipuri was examined a little more closely, it could be found that he "refused to call to order disobedient officials, in spite of my repeated demands; on the contrary, he wrote on stampless paper himself" and had answered to Seyn that his oath made it impossible for him to collect a tax which had not been decreed in the manner proscribed by the constitution.

"Thus he insolently denies the legal force of a decree sanctioned by the Supreme Power, knowingly opposes its execution and protects his guilty subordinates, in spite of the fact that he bears the title of Chamberlain of the Highest Court. Thus he is not worthy of a responsible office nor of the Monarch's trust".³⁶⁸

366 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 229

367 Spravka o pričínah k uvol'nenii Gubernatorov kraja prežnago režima. KKK Hd 103, VA — KKK 1910, I dept., no. XXI 4a to 4k, VA

368 O uvol'nenii ot dolžnosti Vyborgskago gubernatora Barona fon Troilja. KKK 1910, I dept., no. XXI, VA

The eight Governors were dismissed during 1910 and 1911, one or two at a time, obviously to avoid an outcry at a massive dismissal. They were replaced by men similar to the new Senators, "Russified careerists" in the Finnish view, although the new Governors had more experience in the Finnish service than the Senators had; it was easier to find candidates in Finland for the politically less conspicuous posts.

It has been said that Seyn preferred Finnish candidates to Russians in order to direct the people's antipathy away from Russians and from himself.³⁶⁹ This is not impossible, although difficult to prove, of course; but the main reason for these appointments was their competence in local affairs. These Governors have been severely judged by Finnish historians, for instance v. Pfahler of Viipuri and af Enehjelm of Oulu, as being zealous executors of Seyn's policy. The appointment of Sillman of Vaasa was probably mistaken as far as the advocacy of the Imperial interests was concerned, for if he did not actively favour the rebellious Jäger movement during the war years, at least his lack of vigilance made it possible to enlist young men in the German service. He was then made to change posts with Sirelius of Mikkeli, an inland town, which was not strategically as important as the coastal county of Vaasa.³⁷⁰

The Long Drawn-Out Battle with the Minister State-Secretary

The procedure of referring Finnish affairs to the Emperor had been revised in 1908 and in 1909 the embryo Finnish Senate or Embassy in St. Petersburg had been got rid of when the senatorial-like officials Hermanson and Törngren resigned in a futile gesture against Stolypin's Imperial policy.

But the Minister State-Secretary remained a nuisance. Langhoff had the right of attendance at the Imperial court and

369 Turpeinen, *Keisarillisen* . . . p. 230—231

370 Turpeinen, *Keisarillisen* . . . p. 134, 230—

was thus, in the opinion of Seyn, able to misrepresent things to the Emperor, to the detriment of Russia and Seyn himself. Langhoff later admitted that he, "of course", took advantage of his audiences to demonstrate to the Emperor the unfitness of Seyn for the post of Governor-General.³⁷¹

"If, on proper occasions, I tried to remind the Emperor of Seyn's complete unfitness for Governor-General, he for one worked, so to speak, with tooth and claw, to weaken my position and to remove me from office, because many of his plans miscarried because I succeeded in thwarting them betimes".³⁷²

For instance, Langhoff got the Emperor to disapprove of Seyn's proposal for declaring a state of military emergency in Finland (in 1911, cf. p. 150—).³⁷³ Langhoff angered both Seyn and Stolypin as well as the Russian specialists in Finnish affairs when he procured proper pensions for the dismissed Governors.³⁷⁴

Seyn collected a list of Langhoff's sins, similar to the register of offences of the Governors or of Gerard and Boeckman. The gendarmes suspected Langhoff of collaboration with the separatists³⁷⁵ and alleged that "Mehelin and Langof are central personalities in the League of Liberation" (i.e. the *Voima*). The spies had "found" many ciphered orders to promote the revolution.³⁷⁶

Novoe Vremja repeated these accusations. Langhoff succeeded in finding out that some of the articles "were concocted by Seyn and his bureau".³⁷⁷

Langhoff fought a delaying battle against Russification, but his position was difficult. In Finland he could be held responsible for the unconstitutional acts of the government, but he could fight against them only by asking to be relieved of his office in protest. And this was exactly what his opponents

371 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 243

372 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 174

373 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 177

374 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 175

375 A report by the gendarme chief 24.III 1911. KKK Hd 103, no. 1, VA

376 Delo departamenta policiji o protivopravitel'stvennyh organizacijah v Finljandii. CGAOR, fond 162/Mf NL 246, VA

377 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 175. Langhoff does not cite his evidence

wished for him. The Emperor listened increasingly to his Russian advisers, the "true" Russians and the Council of Ministers, and broke Finnish law repeatedly. At last he grew tired of the protests of Langhoff and let him go in 1913.

Lieutenant-General Markov, the chief of the Russified Imperial Finnish Senate, was appointed Langhoff's successor.

It has been said that Seyn would have preferred some of the "specialists" in Finnish questions, "an enemy of Finland". Kokovcov, the Prime Minister after Stolypin, had persuaded the Emperor not to discuss the appointment with Seyn, however. It had been difficult for the Emperor, but he had consented to it in the end.³⁷⁸ This has been recounted by Edv. Hjelt, who dealt with Markov in questions relating to the Finnish University of Helsinki, and may have known more than the mere rumour of the intrigues off-stage.

Langhoff thought that "Markov is not unreasonable . . . In any case he won't initiate anything evil".³⁷⁹ He even gave Seyn a minor shock. He proposed that the vacancies left by Törnngren and Hermanson would be filled, with Russian officials this time; now, under the control of the Council of Ministers and a right-thinking Minister State-Secretary, there was no longer any danger of Finnish separatism. On the contrary, the Russian quasi-senatorial officials could strengthen the Imperial influence in Finnish affairs. Kokovcov seems to have been favourably inclined to the proposal, until Seyn remarked that it was useless to increase the expense of the State Secretariat with the pay of the two high officials. Seyn was decidedly against Markov's proposal and demanded a decision by the Council of Ministers if the Prime Minister was inclined to accept it.³⁸⁰ Kokovcov gave up, and Markov was too indolent to take up any fight with the Governor-General. The Minister State-Secretary had probably not been too earnest with his proposal. Perhaps the prospect of being the superior of two fourth-class officials had tempted his vanity. Seyn probably saw the proposal as an attempt to set up a rival office — such a hypothesis explains the heat of his protest.

378 Hjelt, *Från* . . . p. 282

379 Hjelt, *Från* . . . 283

380 The correspondence of Seyn, Markov, and Kokovcov in October—December 1913, VSV Hc 2, VA

The main preoccupation of Markov in his new post seems to have been to avoid bother. If he was not guilty of any initiatives against Finland, he did not defend Finnish autonomy, either. The State Secretariat served mainly as a post office between Finland and Russia. Seyn had no real reason to regret his statement from 1910:

"Lieutenant General Markov . . . has accepted a heavy and responsible task, has forgotten his personal interests, and has hastened to help the government in its fight for the rightful Russian cause in a country conquered by the separatists".

As a reward Markov earned the right to wear the uniform of the Ural Cossacks.³⁸¹

The Lower Echelons

In addition to normalizing the highest echelons of the Finnish governmental service, it would have been of the utmost importance to replace lower officials with loyal people. Four *gubernija* secretaries, seven police chiefs, two police officials, and three country police chiefs (*nimismies*) were changed.³⁸² For instance, the protocol secretary of the Senate, Moden, had said that were the Russian regulations for a state of military emergency to be published in Finland, it would be illegal. An official of the finance expedition of the Senate, Rikberg, did not sign the order for the payment of the "Military Millions". The constables Lenroos and Seppänen opposed the arrest of a Finn by the Russian police. The police chief of Viipuri, Lukander, investigated languidly the case of schoolboys playing a patriotic marching song in their classroom with open windows during the military church parade on St. Nicholas's day (Lukander was replaced by the Bobrikovian Pekonen), etc. etc.

381 Seyn to Suhomlinov 6.X 1910. KKK Dd 8, VA

382 Jussila, *Nationalismi* . . . p. 212

From the point of view of military security and prevention of the revolutionary smuggling, the removal out of their offices Boisman, the chief of the Finnish customs service, and Sjöman, the chief of the Finnish pilot and lighthouse service, was of the first importance. Boisman, for instance, had not obeyed the Russian decrees on the import of firearms "and was thus a seditious example for his subordinates"³⁸³

But the problem was that only the worst individuals could be removed from their posts. A complete clean-up of the whole of Finnish officialdom was impossible because they could be removed only with a court sentence; and there were no competent and loyal people available to replace them. Seyn had to think up something else.

This was how the situation was viewed from the Governor-General's office. The difficulties caused by the disloyal officials were uppermost in Seyn's mind, and he had reason to stress them when he demanded more powers to deal with the recalcitrant Finns.

In fact, the passive resistance of the Finnish constitutionalist civil servants could not be continuous and immanent. The routine administration functioned under Seyn and the Russified Senate until an official was faced with an issue where he had to decide whether he was to act according to Finnish or Russian laws — it must be emphasized again that there was very little arbitrary lawless action from the Russian point of view. The decision was made even more difficult for the lower echelons of the administration after the loyal Senate and Governors were appointed in 1909—1911, with only the constitutional publicity as a counterweight to the official pressure. For instance, J.K. Paasikivi, as the chief of the Finnish treasury (*Valtiokonttori*), sent on the "Military Millions" to the Imperial Treasury, in spite of the enraged protests of the Diet.³⁸⁴

The question cannot be answered whether Russia could have tamed all Finns and conquered all opposition if the war and revolution had not prevented her from it. It is difficult to know

383 Spisok lič, uvol'nenykh ot služba po ih nesootvetstviu služebnomu položeniju. KKK Hd 103, no. 3, VA

384 Valtiopäivät 1913, Pöytäkirjat, p. 544—610. — Blomsted, *Valtiokonttori* . . .

whether there remained among the Finns enough loyalty towards Russia and/or the Emperor as a basis on which Seyn could have built the Russian power in Finland. The ideal of Finnish autonomy and constitution made people oppose Seyn's policy of Russification. Those lacking conviction were made partisans of opposition by the fear of boycott. Collaboration, on the other hand, was strengthened by the promise of governmental support against the boycott, by the prospect of promotion and reward, and by the fear of losing office and being punished. There may have been some people who supported the Imperial policy out of conviction. It is well known that many Finns disapproved of the rebellious Jäger movement during the war years, if not out of love to Russia then because of the danger of provoking counter-measures by the Imperial government. Loyal co-operation with the temporary government was preferred to outright independence in 1917 until the Bolshevik revolution made Russia safely powerless. Thus it is easy to understand that during the times of Seyn, when the Russian Empire seemed immensely powerful, there were numerous "fawning" persons (*hännystelijöitä*) in Finland, for instance illuminating their windows in 1915 during the Imperial visit at Helsinki by Nicholas II.

It has not been easy to identify such persons, because Russia was dissolved and Finland was not integrated with it. Only the men who had somehow distinguished themselves in the service of Bobrikov and Seyn were known and judged traitors to their people, e.g. af Enehjelm, a police official, official in Bobrikov's bureau, customs chief, and Governor of Oulu.

Such loyal people have not written memoirs, nor have they left personal records; their official archives, if any, reflect their official zeal and the opinions of their superiors. The gendarme archives might make possible a study of informers, *agents provocateurs*, and other shady persons. From the point of view of the independent Finland the servants of Russia were not worth a special study; they were a rabble, "drinking town fiscals, Russified telegraphists, police commissaires, drop-out students", or "Count A. Cronhjelm, this unworthy member of the famous Swedish family".³⁸⁵

385 *Estlander, Elva . . .* III, p. 67, 71

The opposition in Finland had not been, to start with, anti-Russian, but anti-Tsarist, and it was only little by little that the two were perceived as one. Conservatives, Liberals, Socialists were, if not eager, in any case not reluctant, to find support for their ideas in Russia. We have seen the oppositional cooperation of Finnish socialists and Russian revolutionaries reflected in the gendarme reports. We have seen the cooperation of Mechelin and Gerard to set up the legal and constitutional order in Finland. Even the oppressive Russia seemed a bulwark against revolution to many Finns. The notorious "St. Petersburg road", implying an accusation that Russian support was solicited against internal political opponents, thus admitting undue Russian influence in Finnish affairs, was travelled by all Finnish parties.

Thus, perhaps, Seyn's perspective would not have been totally hopeless in the long run, if he had been left to deal with Finland in peace.

Communications

The vulnerability of the communications system revealed by the Finnish General Strike in 1905 had demonstrated the importance to Russia of being able to keep the Finnish railways serving the army in any emergency. "From the point of view of strategy, the mobilization and undisturbed functioning of the railways in war-time is more important than even the mobilization of the military reservists".³⁸⁶ The absence of Russian-speaking officials in the Finnish railway network made it difficult for the Russians to use the lines.³⁸⁷ This was one of the important reasons for Seyn's policy of promoting the Russian language in Finland.

386 Dokladnaja zapiska po povodu Senatskago Postanovlenija ot 15. nojabrja 1906 g. o znanija ruskago jazyka služaščimi Finljandskih železnych dorogah. KKK 1906, IV dept., no. 4-4, VA

387 Osobyi Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 27.III 1907, KKK 1909, IV dept., no. 4-5, VA

It was also difficult for the Russians to get the Finns to allow the presence of Russian officials in the Finnish railway administration so as to bring forth the military point of view. The Council of Ministers wanted to appoint a chief of military transports in the Finnish Railway Board in 1907, but the separatist Senate brazenly refused to accept the general as a permanent member — his attendance was to be asked for only when military questions were decided on. This was considered by the Russians as most improper, because the War Ministry could not submit to its representative being only a visiting member; and even technical or economic matters were important from the military point of view, for instance, the direction of new lines, or the designing of structures that made it impossible for the heavy Imperial rolling stock to run on the Finnish light rails.³⁸⁸

It was not until Seyn was appointed Governor-General and the Senate was reformed that this problem was solved. General Kamenskii started participating in the sessions of the Railway Board, as well as a Russian technical inspector.³⁸⁹

A most important question was that of connecting the Finnish railway network with the Imperial railways by a bridge over the river Neva. Bobrikov had been well aware of the importance of this scheme for the speedy transport of reinforcements and reservists to Finland, and he had ordered the Finnish treasury to pay half of the costs. The Finnish Diet discussed the demand again in 1908 and had then desisted from a protest (thereby avoiding, probably, the declaration of a state of military emergency, cf. p. 105). But the building of the connecting line took plenty of time, and it was not completed until 1913.

Then the Finnish lines had to be improved to allow the traffic of Russian rolling stock. Bridges had to be strengthened, profiles enlarged, curve radii lengthened etc. Finnish rolling stock had to be prepared for military transports by additional equipment, more effective brakes etc. Finnish treasury was

388 Osobyi Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 20.VII 1907, KKK 1909, IV dept., no. 4-5, VA

389 Ministry of Transport to the Governor General 1.XII and 7.XII 1909. KKK 1909, no. 4-5, VA

made to pay one and a half million marks for these improvements.³⁹⁰

The main Finnish railway line from Helsinki to St. Petersburg was dangerously close to the coast. To avoid the communication between the Empire and the Grand Duchy being cut in the event of an enemy landing, a new line had to be built from the Imperial capital through eastern and central Finland to the coast on the Gulf of Bothnia. For the Finns such a line seemed economically useless and they were reluctant to build it. By an Imperial order other, more useful, lines were not to be sanctioned until the military line was completed. The last section of the new line was not completed until 1917; the total cost was calculated to amount to 75 million marks.³⁹¹ In fact, the money was not lost for Finland, because even to-day the line is useful for traffic across the length of the country. A shorter military line for a few million marks was built to serve the defence of Koivisto against an eventual enemy landing.³⁹²

In the event of a declaration of a state of military emergency in Finland Russian railway troops and railway officials would have ensured the functioning of railways (cf. p 159). An emergency concerning the railways only was also prepared for. In the event of a railway strike or other disturbance military railway chiefs were to be given the regular extraordinary powers; placards were printed ready for immediate distribution, to advise the public of the railway emergency.³⁹³

Normally the railways were under the observation of a few

390 Spravka o rashodah finljandskoi kazny na soedinitel'nuju vetv meždu finljandskimi i imperskimi železnymi dorogami a takže na pereustroistvo dorog dlja propuska imperskago podvižnago sostava. KKK 1914, II dept., no. 91, VA

391 Spravka: Smety po nižepoimenovannym strojuščimsja železnym dorogam... KKK 1914, II dept., no. 91, VA

392 Zapiska o finansovyh tžagostjah finljandskoi kazny na voennyja nuždy. KKK 1914, II dept., no. 21-20, VA

393 Spravka o meroprijatijah na slučai objavljenija Finljandii na voennom položenii. Sovet Ministrov 17.I 1910. KKK 1913, I dept., no. 1-4, VA — St.Petersburg military district to Seyn 2.VI 1910. KKK 1910, I dept., no. XXIV, VA — Osobyi Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 19.X 1910 and 3.II 1911. KKK 1911, I dept., no. 50(58—5), VA — O raspredelenii otrjadov voisk Peterburgskago voennago okruga dlja ustranjenija besporjadkov na železnych dorogah. KKK 1913, I dept., no. 1-9, VA

railway gendarmes on the most important lines. In the event of a war 289 gendarmes were to guard 2,421 kilometres of railway line.³⁹⁴

The telegraph system in Finland was Russian-controlled, an exception in the autonomous Grand Duchy, because it had been established by the Imperial navy during the Crimean War. The Finnish Post office had been put under Imperial supervision in 1891 and Bobrikov had compelled the Finns to use postal stamps with the Imperial coat-of-arms instead of the Finnish emblem, but the office remained Finnish. The telephone network was made up of innumerable local telephone companies and it was impossible to supervise it. The telephone system remained a cause of desperation for the Russian authorities. It was served by Finnish personnel and because they were unable to speak Russian, the telephone was of no help for Imperial defence, for instance, in the event of an enemy landing.

394 Ob'javlenie mobilizacii i voennago položenija. Dejatel'nost' činov žandarmskago policeiskago upravlenii Finljand. Žel. dor. v mirnoe vremja, a ravno pri ob'javlenii mobilizacii ili voennago položenija. KKK 1914, I dept., no. 1-13, VA

Military Measures Planned

Seyn Proposes a State of Military Emergency in Finland

In September 1911, when fighting for the Russification of the Finnish administration, Seyn proposed to the Council of Ministers that a declaration threatening the proclamation of a state of military emergency in Finland should be published. He explained that the proclamation of a state of military emergency had been decided on in the event of a general strike or an attack by a mob. But there were no plans against a revolution starting from individual terrorist acts.

And the danger of revolutionary terrorism spreading to Finland did exist, because there were no means available to prevent it. The government had to act through a police and a judiciary that were full of people who were hostile or, at best, wavering in their loyalty. Gendarmes had not been given the necessary authority to act in Finland, nor had other measures demanded by the Governor-General been taken.

There was reason to fear an intensification of political terrorism in Finland. The Social Revolutionaries were improving their tactics, and their local organizations had been empowered to act on their own initiative. Almost immediately the Finnish activists had murdered Hirvikanta, a member of the Turku court of appeal. Further attempts could be expected against the Senators, according to information given by secret agents.

Any successful outrage would confuse and paralyze the local administration and police. The government would lose their support, which was, although weak and unreliable, indispensable.

Speedy and decisive measures were necessary in Finland. The tiniest hesitation or delay would be interpreted as weakness. That would make the revolutionary forces grow to the detriment of moderation. Even prudent people would join the rebels if they would seem to have chances of success.

Isolated measures were not enough. But declaring a state of military emergency would give the Russian representatives the necessary exceptional powers against the revolution. That was why it was necessary to make it clear that martial law would be declared immediately after an outrage against an official or a soldier.

It was known that the activists were afraid of the declaration of a state of military emergency. Thus it was probable that the very threat would prevent terrorist acts and that no state of military emergency would actually be necessary. A decisive act would make the Finns think before endangering their country. Thus war and bloodshed would be avoided.³⁹⁵

Further arguments were given by Seyn orally at the meeting of the Council of Ministers where his proposal was discussed. Finland was feverishly preparing for a rebellion. She was arming, training, and maintaining contacts with the revolution in Russia and abroad.

The hotbed of the activity was the League of Liberation, successor to the notorious *Voima*. Its network covered the whole of Finland. It tried to defend Finland's position as a state separate from Russia by any methods, armed resistance not excluded. Its central and local organs prepared political crimes and carried out revolutionary schemes, inspired the population with revolutionary ideas and a fighting spirit, collected resources, enlisted members, manufactured munitions, and systematically trained the cadres to act when ordered to do so by the League.

The government was unable to act, could not discover the secret organization, did not find the hidden arms, and was not

395 Seyn to the Council of Ministers 27.IX 1911. KKK 1911, I dept., no. 42, VA

able to suppress the criminal revolutionary propaganda and hatred towards Russia.

Only accidentally did bits and pieces of knowledge come out, so that the scale of activity could be deduced. For instance, the "John Grafton" and the "Peter" (importing arms in 1906) had been discovered by chance.

Local officials tried to maintain that the League of Liberation existed only in the Russian imagination, in spite of the fact that the existence of the *Voima* had been revealed by Old Finn newspapers. Its abolition by the Mechelin Senate had not had any effect. The legal proceedings against it had been a worthless farce. The courts had been unable to deny the facts, but they had interpreted them as innocent. The accused had been found not guilty because their action had not been proved to have been directed against the Russian government, although they had confessed to having been members of the board of the *Voima*. The Senate had returned the case to the court of appeal, and the new chairman Hirvikanta had taken the matter seriously. Thus his murder was evidently a politically-motivated act. The League of Liberation employed many murderers and further murders were to be expected.

The situation was such that Barclay de Tolly's statement made in 1809 sprang to mind: no Governor-General at all was preferable to a Governor-General without powers. The Governor-General was indeed powerless. The Finnish criminal law was so defective, it was so badly implemented, the courts of justice were so slow and partial, the police was so unreliable, the governmental power was so limited that the only means of preventing the revolution was the declaration of martial law.³⁹⁶

Personal Involvement

Seyn seems to have had very good additional, personal, reasons for seeing the situation in threatening colours.

396 Osobyi Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 14.X 1911, KKK 1911, no. 42, VA

The Russian spies said that the *Voima* only seemed to have disappeared because the rebels were trying to lull the Russian vigilance, but that in fact it was very much alive. For instance, it had organized the artificial campaign against the stamp tax in order to discredit the Governor-General. It was believed that inside the League of Liberation there were two currents of opinion; one of them favoured the immediate liquidation of Seyn, while the other, led by Mechelin and Langhoff, was more moderate. In June 1910 they had succeeded in postponing the attempt, but in 1911 the more radical, younger party was becoming impatient. They complained of the indecision of the elderly, who were giving up one position after another, while "we, young ones, swore an oath at the grave of the Hero (Schauman) always to follow his example and never tolerate any new Bobrikov in Finland". But the decision to murder Seyn had again been postponed because of the apprehension that it might provoke a declaration of the state of military emergency in Finland, the result of which would be the complete destruction of the League of Liberation.³⁹⁷

It was also known that the murder of Stolypin was being planned in 1910. Langhoff and Mechelin, the gendarme informants said, had contacted Rodičev and Nabokov (the well-known Kadets), who "without a doubt" served as the link between the League of Liberation and the Social Revolutionaries, while Gerard (member of the Council of State since leaving Finland) served as a spy in the higher circles in St. Petersburg. "The importance of this document" was that it not only showed that Langhoff and Mechelin knew of the intention to murder Stolypin, but that they were its initiators, "hoping for the dispersal of the clouds".³⁹⁸

Nor was the Monarch safe from his Finnish subjects. The St. Petersburg Ohrana reported that the League of Liberation planned to murder the Emperor.³⁹⁹ In March 1911, at a meeting

397 Spravka 5. VIII 1911. (Police Department) Antti Hackzellin kokoelma, no. 6, VA

398 The Chief of the Gendarme Administration of Finland to the Gendarme Commander 24.I 1910. Osobyi otdel 1910. Antti Hackzellin kokoelma, no. 6, VA

399 St. Peterburg Ohrana assistant chief 31.VIII 1910. Antti Hackzellin kokoelma, no. 6, VA

of the League, Svinhufvud (a "notorious" Finnish constitutionalist) had explained that it was not right to desist from terrorism, because all persons were to be eliminated who were against Finland, Stolypin and Seyn in the first instance; while the Emperor was to be delivered up to a popular tribunal.⁴⁰⁰

The Revolution in Portugal encouraged the Finns; the gendarmes reported that the *Savan Suomies* — i.e. the *Savon Työmies*, another example of the difficulties the spies had with the Finnish language — hoped that all the Lord's anointed would be brought down.

It is perhaps not necessary to remind the reader that these stories were wholly imaginary. But they are an example of the gendarmes' inability to discern between legal, constitutional opposition and criminal terrorism. If Seyn believed such information, he had even more reason for his apprehensions about political murders in Finland. If he did not believe it, he had no scruples in using the alarming reports as an argument for his demand for the declaration of a state of military emergency. But even if he knew that some of the information was made up by the spies, he had no reason to believe that he and other high officials were safe. Ministers and Governors kept on being murdered in Russia.

A Noisy Protest

In fact, the *Voima*, as noted, had been dead since 1907 and no League of Liberation existed; and of the Red Guards only a few half-criminal remnants continued their activism.⁴⁰¹ But it was difficult for the Governor-General and his gendarme colleagues to believe it because of the constitutional expressions of protest in Finland.

The intention to detach two parishes, Uusikirkko and

400 Spravka, Osobyi Otdel (September 1911). Antti Hackzellin kokoelma, no. 6, VA

401 Kujala, *Suomalaiset* . . . p. 106—124

Kivennapa, from Finland and to annex them to the *gubernija* of St. Petersburg provoked a noisy protest in Finland. The annexation was to occur in order to make the surroundings of the new fort Ino on the Karelian Isthmus more secure and to clear up the revolutionary nests closest to the Imperial capital.

The strength of the popular protest amazed the Russians. Stolypin expressed his astonishment to Langhoff — what a noise for merely two parishes!⁴⁰² There must be something more hidden in it.

In fact, it seems that the protest was genuine and spontaneous, especially in Karelia. The well-known patriotic poet Eino Leino composed his stirring poem *Karjalan Kannas* (the Karelian Isthmus), declaring that "the Isthmus is ours", a place of honour, to fight for freedom, against the slavery under the Boyars. Even Eino Kalima, a sensitive artist, who loved Russian culture and was later to become famous for his stagings of Tshehov, thought that he had to leave aesthetics and start training how to handle a rifle if the Russians took the Isthmus parishes.⁴⁰³ Popular meetings were held in protest against the annexation; and the Finnish press fell into a rage if the meetings were disturbed. It was extremely difficult to stifle this clamour because of the absence of censorship legislation after the revolution of 1905 and because of the reluctance of the Finnish judicial system to do anything.⁴⁰⁴

The staff officers in the St. Petersburg military district took the situation very seriously. They had even less direct knowledge of the Finnish circumstances than the Governor-General and the gendarmes had. The French military attaché in St. Petersburg wrote to Paris:

"The fact is that because of two parishes the whole country is in a state of intensive agitation, which in the event of a war will bind down two army corps to keep the Grand Duchy submissive. One of my friends, a general, told me that (when visiting Turku) his Swedish friends had to protect him against insults by the Finns; this is an

402 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . 324

403 Kalima, *Sattumaa* . . . p. 234

404 Correspondence between Stolypin and Boeckman concerning the Finnish press and censorship in 1908. KKK 1908, IV dept., no. 7-2, VA

example of the state of mind of the people, known for their brutal obstinacy”.

Of course, the Russians were not willing to leave the Finns undisciplined; the French colonel went on to say that

”a well-informed general of the Guards told me that it was the Finnish blood that was to be let first”.⁴⁰⁵

Only then would it be the turn of Austrian and German blood. In his proposal for the Council of Ministers Seyn said that the chief of staff of the military district of St. Petersburg, Lieutenant General v.d. Brincken, demanded the declaration of martial law in the event of any terrorist act, any case of weapons smuggling, passive resistance, or preparation for any of these crimes.⁴⁰⁶ As a first precaution, the military rifles, which Mechelin and Alfthan had procured for the police to be used in the event of a Red Guard uprising, were taken over by the army in 1911.⁴⁰⁷

Thus the proposal for the declaration of a state of military emergency did not arise from Seyn’s malicious whim. It may have seemed so to the Finns, who did not understand that their protest against the violation of Finland’s integrity seemed rebellion against the Imperial government and its vital interests.

The proposal is also a good example of the Imperial regime’s inability to understand their subjects and to measure the appropriateness of their own policy. In the absence of political ways and means violence was readily resorted to.

War Plans

In the reports of the Russian gendarme and military spies the

405 Colonel Janin to General Vignal 15/28.IX 1911. EMATSH 7 N 1458

406 Seyn to the Council of Ministers 27.IX 1911. KKK 1911, I dept., no. 42, VA

407 Seyn to the governors 24.IV/7.V 1911. KKK Hd 103, no. 1, VA

rebellious military activity of the *Voima*, soaring in 1907 and 1909, reached a climax in 1911.

In March 1911 the gendarme chief knew that Finland was preparing to repeat the events of 1905, only waiting for some internal or external difficulties for Russia; foreign powers were expected to support Finland.⁴⁰⁸ The military spies knew that war plans for the rebellion had been completed; the war was to be started in winter, because then the partisan detachments would be able to move on skis outside the roads and easily isolate the Russian garrisons. The half-criminal Red Guards were carrying on their activity organized in detachments of one thousand, one hundred, and ten men. The White *Voima* was even more dangerous, because it had officers and money and weapons. It was masked in the guise of sports, skiing, shooting, or gymnastics clubs or as volunteer fire brigades, or police reserves. In 1906—1907 more than 50,000 rifles had been imported, and up to 1911 about 200,000 rifles, machine guns, and mountain and field guns were hidden in Finland. Oulu and Vaasa were to be the supply bases of the *Voima*, and the headquarters were to be in Tampere. Alfthan or Schauman was to be the commander-in-chief. Russian artillery men and engineers, especially Polish and Jewish soldiers, were expected to join the rebels, and the fortress of Sveaborg was to mutiny to support them. Their vanguards were expected to advance towards Helsinki and St. Petersburg, while the main army was to be collected on the Helsinki—St. Petersburg railway to meet the Russian attack from the Imperial capital.⁴⁰⁹

Leonid Menšikov, a gendarme official who had seen the error in his ways and whose testimony we already have seen, explained that the gendarmes reported on 5,000—70,000—200,000 rifles, even though they had not discovered a single revolver. The *Voima* could not be increased beyond two hundred thousand men, because all able-bodied Finns would have to be conscripted to build up such an army; hence, no more rifles could be imported and that was why machine guns

408 A report by the Gendarme chief 24.III 1911. KKK Hd 103, no. 1, VA

409 Soveršenno sekretnaja zapiska o vooruženii Finljandii 1911—1912 gg. KKK Hd 103, no. 14, VA

and field guns had to be added to the armament of the *Voima*.⁴¹⁰

A supposed external danger made the Finnish animosity specially dangerous. Sweden was expected to join a German attack against Russia, and Sweden enjoyed considerable sympathy in Finland, especially among the Swedish-speaking intelligentsia. Even the French took the menace seriously: "The supposed Swedish plan of a conquest of Finland with German support is a logical sequel for a long common history. Thus it is rather probable that Sweden will attack Finland".⁴¹¹

The Russians thought to have reasons enough to update their earlier military plans against Finland. At least four divisions were earmarked for the operation, with additional detachments of cavalry, engineers, railway troops, and artillery, in all 62 battalions, 32 squadrons, and 80 field guns. Ships were to be held at the port of Reval ready for the crossing. The troops were to secure Helsinki, Sveaborg, and Viipuri, and thereafter they were to occupy the most important railway junctions. The railway troops were to keep trains going in spite of the expected Finnish general strike. — The troops were to be sent to Finland in their peace-time formation, because the reservists in St. Petersburg were workers, "comrades" who would only aggravate the situation in Finland.

A declaration was drawn up to explain the operation to the population. According to this the Emperor had ordered troops to be sent to Finland to bring back to obedience that part of the population that had been bold enough to rise in rebellion. The loyal peaceful population was ordered to join the pacifiers in order to avoid being held rebels. They were promised that their religion, civil liberties, life, honour, and property would be guaranteed them — in the original draft of the declaration. In the finalized declaration only religion, honour and property were guaranteed.⁴¹² Seyn had taken care that nothing was to be

410 A statement under oath by Leonid Menškov to a notary in Stockholm 5.IX 1913. KKK Hd 87, no. 3, "Delo Voimy." VA

411 Beaucaire, the French envoy in Stockholm, to Poincaré 12.VI 1912. EMATSH 7 N 1544

412 "Julistus sotatilalle asetettu ja seutu ja koskevien sääntöjen nojalla". Perepiska po voprosam, svjazannym s mobilizacieju. Pervonačal'nija deistvija, svjazannyja s objavleniem voennago položenija v Finljandii. KKK 1911, I dept., no. 58-5a, VA

promised that "would give rise to illusory hopes" among the Finns and would tie the hands of the government.⁴¹³ Mechelin had pretended that the November Manifesto of 1905 had restored the autonomous rights of Finland; such a mistake was not to be repeated.

A Short-cut through the Finnish Passive Resistance

The Russian planners were haunted by the memory of the General Strike of 1905, which had paralysed the Russian power in Finland. An essential addition to the military planning was the preparation of Russian cadres to replace the mutinous Finns in the Finnish administration in the event of a declaration of military emergency.

A list of voluntary railway officials was drawn up. In 1913 it was reported that 5770 men would be ready to leave St. Petersburg in three days from the declaration of the emergency. Quite a number of officials were necessary to keep functioning the postal, telegraphy, and telephone communications, too. Two or three hundred tshinovniki from the Imperial Treasury and the State Bank were appointed to seize the assets of the Finnish banks and public treasuries. Military jurists were needed to set up the courts martial, which were to handle all crimes pertaining to politics or security or public order. All dangerous people were to be arrested, and to avoid overcrowding the prisons — which would make escape easy — all prisoners not sentenced to death were to be transported to Russia. That was why experienced prison guards and convoys were needed, too.

The declaration of the state of military emergency would

413 Žurnal soveščanija po voprosam, svjazannym s objavleniem Finljandii na voennom položenii v slučai vooružennago vozstanija, ili zabastovka. Ven sot asiak 11210, p. 343, VA
Polivanov, *Memuary* . . . p. 83—

have given Russian gendarmes and police officers the authority to act in Finland, and the Finnish officials the duty of aiding their Russian colleagues. More gendarmes were needed, although there was the problem that the spies ought to have been in Finland at the very moment of the declaration to be able to carry out the arrests in time. The Finnish police officials were not dependable at all for such purposes, and Seyn demanded the sending of police commands to Finland at the moment of the declaration of the state of war, about 150 foot and 50 mounted police for each county.

The governors needed a reserve of 15—20 officials each to replace the unreliable Finns in the *gubernija* administration. This was difficult to set up; the list made in the Ministry of the Interior consisted of persons already serving in Finland, many of them unfit for responsible posts. There simply did not exist enough people who were reliable and acquainted with Finnish circumstances.

These preparations caused an immense amount of correspondence⁴¹⁴ but by 1913, it seems, most of the lists were completed and revised; the volunteers would be ready in three to thirteen days to be transferred to Finland when necessary. But the plans were never put in practice.

These plans reveal the fact that the Finnish administration would have been thoroughly Russified in the event of the declaration of a military emergency. Even though this would have been a temporary measure only, Finnish administration, in fact Finnish autonomy, would have been difficult to restore after such an operation. It is not difficult to understand why Seyn proposed the measure. It would have been a shortcut through all the labourious tangle of conquering the passive resistance of the Finnish officials.

414 *Žurnal soveščanija po voprosam, svjazannym s ob'javleniem Finljandii na voennom položenii* 11.—12.XI 1911. KKK 1911, I dept., no. 4, VA
Spisok voprosov, soprjažennyh s ob'javleniem Finljandii na voennom položenii. KKK 1913, I dept., no. 1-4, VA
Svodnaja vedomost', javki na sbornye punkty činov različnyh vedomstv v slučae ob'javlenija v Finljandii voennago položenija, s ukazaniem čisla ih i na kakoi den' oni javljajutsja. KKK 1913, I dept., no. 1-4, čast' obščaja, VA
O razrabotke novago plana ob'javlenija Finljandii na voennom položenii, proekt 3.VI 1914. KKK 1914, I dept., no. 1-16, VA

Closing the Frontiers

The Council of Ministers did not accept Seyn's proposal for the declaration of a state of military emergency in 1911, as will be explained later in more detail. Yet the reasons for the proposal remained, and one of the most pressing problems was preventing the alleged arms smuggling by the *Voima*. The military district of St. Petersburg was deeply concerned, because they believed that every consignment increased the capacity for battle of the *Voima*, but the smugglers were discovered only rarely, by chance.⁴¹⁵

The Council of Ministers had reproved the Finnish customs service for its lack of vigilance, but the request for improvement was ignored because it had not been given in accordance with the Finnish constitutional procedure.⁴¹⁶ The chief of the customs service was dismissed, but the defects in the service remained. It was planned that in the event of the declaration of a state of military emergency Russian customs officials would have occupied the Finnish customs stations, and all navigation on Finnish coasts would have been prohibited, excepting four or five well-guarded passages.⁴¹⁷ But the state of military emergency was not declared, and the coasts remained badly guarded; in fact, the problem remained to bother the Russian officials even during the war years 1914—1917.

That was why the border between Russia and Finland had to be well guarded. That, in turn, made difficult the economic integration of Finland with Russia; on the contrary, existing commercial contacts suffered between the Karelian localities on the two sides of the border.⁴¹⁸

415 Reskript Glavnokomandujuščago voiskami Gvardii i Peterburgskago Voennago Okruga na imja Voennago Ministra, 23.XII 1909. KKK 1910, I dept., no. II 6, VA

War Minister to Stolypin to Seyn 4.I 1910. KKK 1910, I dept., no. II 6, VA

416 Finnish Board of Customs to the Senate 10.IX 1910. KKK 1910, I dept., no. XXI, VA

417 O merah po obezpečenii gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti i obščego-sudarstvennogo porjadka v Finlandii. KKK 1911, I dept., no. 43, VA

418 The Ministry of the Interior to Seyn 21.VII 1912. KKK 1912, I dept., no. 7-14, VA

The pilot and lighthouse service was an institution that had much military and naval importance but had been spared from Bobrikov's reforms. The integration of the service with the Russian navy had been under discussion since 1908, on the pretext that the Finnish pilots had run the Imperial Yacht aground. When Seyn entered office, he immediately removed the chief of the pilot service, Lieutenant General Sjöman, from office "without the right to promotion, to wear uniform, or to other distinction", because he had tried to keep the service a separate local Finnish institution.⁴¹⁹

But replacing the chief was not enough.

"The extraordinary importance of this service for the defence of the Empire was the reason for making an end of its anomalous status as a separate Finnish service independent of the Imperial Navy and the Navy Ministry, with officials and officers not at all able to respond to the military demands to be set for the institution"⁴²⁰.

On the contrary, these men were outright opponents of all Russian demands. The local press explained the reform as being a violent Russification of the institution. The agitation provoked the decision of the Admiralty Council 15.II.1912, which submitted the Pilot and Lighthouse service under the Navy Ministry. In protest, about half the personnel left the service. "The boycott was a proof of the Finnish lack of culture, of a delirium of Finnish separate statehood, as an alcoholic dreams of white elephants or green snakes"⁴²¹. The Finnish pilots were replaced with Russian pilots from the Caspian Sea, whose lack of familiarity with Finnish passages caused some difficulties, and bitter ridicule in the Finnish press, in 1912, but in 1913 the navigation was run without mishaps.⁴²²

The Finnish protest made the Russians apprehensive of a more concrete form of opposition, e.g. it was feared that the

419 Seyn to the Navy Ministry 23.III 1910. KKK Dd 7, VA

420 *Kratkii očerk o sostojanii ločmanskago i majacnago vedomstva Finljandii, posle podčinenija v 1912 godu Morskomu Ministru.* S. Peterburg 1912, p. 12

421 *Svet* 5/18.VI 1912. KKK 1912, I dept., no. 26—B—1, part 1.VA

422 *Kratkii očerk . . .* (= 420) 1913, a revised issue

Finns might destroy navigation marks. The gendarmes cooked up a "Patriotic League" which was going to cut off the buoys, to pilot foreign ships aground in order to make the foreign countries protest against the Russian measures, to import arms for the patriotic and Social Democratic youth and the Russian revolutionaries etc.⁴²³ The Navy wanted a declaration of a state of military emergency covering the Finnish coasts in the event of the troubles forecast by the gendarmes. But the army wanted the whole country to be declared under martial law — they had reasons of their own, as we have seen; and obviously, they were jealous that only the navy might enjoy the benefits of increased powers granted when such a state of emergency was imposed. The Foreign Ministry opposed the plans, because the navy wanted the state of military emergency to extend to twelve nautical miles from the coast, while international law only admitted three nautical miles of territorial water; and Russian diplomats would hardly enjoy explaining the reasons Russia had to blockade her own coasts.⁴²⁴

The Council of Ministers rejected this measure of extended control, too, just as it had not accepted the idea of proclaiming the state of military emergency proposed by Seyn. Thus such proposals only remain as an illustration of the military inclination to see the situation in the blackest colours possible, and to use counter-measures out of proportion to the real danger. Of course, it is the duty of the military to be prepared for the worst.

Seyn was not especially eager to help the Navy Ministry in this matter. A military emergency on the Finnish coastline would not have been of much help to him in the governing of Finland. And, once the Council of Ministers had made its decision in 1911, the continuous flow of gendarme reports was not taken as seriously as previously.

423 Utgof to Seyn 7.V 1912. KKK 1912, I dept., no. 1-8, VA

424 Izvlečenii iz sekretnago predstavlenija Morskogo Ministerstva 20.IV 1912. KKK 1912, I dept., no. 1-8, VA

Žurnal soveščanija po voprosu o vvedenii voennago položenija v pribrežnom vodnom raione Finljandii, 19.V 1912. KKK 1912, I dept., no. 1-8, VA

Osobyi Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 7.XI 1913, po voprosy o vvedenija voennago položenija v pribrežnom vodnom raione Finljandii. KKK 1912, I dept., no. 1-8, VA

Arms smuggling, secret training, and other preparations for rebellion by the *Voima* or the League of Liberation continued, in the gendarme reports. A new aspect was that of threat from the air: it was reported that a Finn had been sent to France to learn to fly, and aircraft had been bought in America.⁴²⁵ Perhaps also a naval *Voima* was being established: the St. Petersburg Ohrana found out that the dismissed sea-pilots had formed a naval committee. Maps were being prepared of all Finnish roads and sea passages.⁴²⁶

This piece of news did not cause any alarm comparable to that of 1911 or 1909 or 1907; the Governor-General's office stated that the maps allegedly prepared by the *Voima* were in fact published by the Finnish Tourist Board, freely in sale in any bookshop.⁴²⁷ This seems a further indication that Seyn, at least, knew the value of the gendarme information and took it seriously only when he needed it for the purposes of his policy or his career.

This is all the more remarkable because the year 1911 was a relatively easy one for Russia; it was then that the negotiations concerning the Baghdad Railway were concluded with Germany; consequently Russia kept out of the Morocco crisis. On the other hand, the years 1912 and 1913 constituted the period of the Balkan crisis, and the gendarmes reported that the *Voima* was only waiting for an Austrian attack to start their rebellion. In the light of the comparative calm of the Russian administrators of Finland it looks as if there was no direct connection between tension in foreign affairs and the Finnish question, the handling of the two matters belonging to different departments in the Russian government. Perhaps someone in St. Petersburg understood that it was not sensible to provoke conflict in Finland if danger was drawing nigh from abroad.

425 Spravka (concerning the *Voima*). KKK 1913, I dept., no. 39-1, VA
Po dokladu Polkovnika Utgofa o predpolagaemom kontrabandnom vvože v kraj i transporta oružija 7.XCI 1912. KKK 1912, I dept., no. 8-52, VA
Staff of the 22nd Army Corps to Governor-General's office 1.IV 1913. KKK 1913, I dept., no. 9-3, VA

426 St. Peterburg Ohrana to Utgof to Seyn 7.III 1913. KKK 1914, I dept., no. 7-2, VA
Eremin to Seyn 10.VIII 1913. KKK 1914, I dept., no. 7-2, VA

427 Governor General's office to the Gendarme administration 31.VIII 1913. KKK 1914, I dept., no. 7-2, VA

After Much Ado

The state of military emergency to be declared in Finland was much discussed and thoroughly prepared, but it was never realized. The rules for the emergency were published in 1909⁴²⁸ but they were never applied in peacetime, even though the commandant of the Viipuri fortress tried to do so. The mutinies of 1912 caused the Baltic Fleet and the Fortress of Kronstadt to be declared on a war footing. Even Finnish Bolsheviki had then participated in the schemes of the Russian sailors in Helsinki. The Finns, being formally Russian subjects, were sentenced in St. Petersburg.⁴²⁹

The commandant of the Kronstadt fortress seems to have used his extraordinary powers to maintain the morals of his subordinates against Finnish illicit traders of alcohol.⁴³⁰ This caused some minor clashes with Finnish authorities in the Karelian Isthmus, in the neighbourhood of the fortress area but outside the jurisdiction of the commandant. This was an example of the difficulties caused by Finnish obstruction, which resulted in the decision that annexing the two parishes was not enough, the whole of Karelia was desired.

Thus the immense amount of planning, discussion and correspondence did not result in much. It was not until 1914 that Finland was put under martial law and then under very different conditions from those foreseen and planned for.

428 Asetuskokoelma (Publication of laws and decrees for Finland) 62/1909, Asetuskokoelma 73/1909.

429 *Birževyja Vedomosti* 1.V 1912. KKK 1912, I dept., no. 10-2, VA Governor of Uusimaa to Governor-General 5/18.V 1912. KKK 1912, I dept., no. 10-3, VA

Nya Pressen nr. XI 1912. KKK 1912, I dept., no. 10-3, VA

430 Prikaz po Kronstadskommu kreposti 1.VIII 1912, 1.IX 1912, 10.XI 1912. KKK 1912, I dept., no. 1-11, VA

Fortress of Kronstadt to Governor of Viipuri 2.VIII 1912, Fortress of Kronstadt to Governor-General 20.XI 1912. KKK 1912, I dept., no. 1-11, VA

A Change of Regime

Stolypin Tries to Tighten His Grip

Stolypin's position began to weaken in 1911. The Emperor grew tired and jealous of a Prime Minister who concentrated too much power in his cabinet. After the disaster of Bosnia in 1909, Stolypin had a relative S.D. Sazonov appointed to the Foreign Office, thereby gaining influence in Russia's foreign policy, which according to the constitution of 1906 belonged to the Emperor's sphere of control.

Stolypin's moderate supporters saw their hopes of essential reforms being thwarted as the execution of Stolypin's plans was delayed by the Rightist opposition in the court, in the Ministry of the Interior itself, and on the local level. There was also a fundamental difference between Stolypin's aims and the wishes of many of his supporters; while the Octobrists and moderate nationalists strove for genuine participation and local self-government, the government tried to recruit public support and local help for measures it had decided in advance.

The Rightist opposition, on the other hand, accepted only "organic" reforms; in fact they regarded any change in the existing system as "artificial" and "doctrinaire". They opposed the reform of local government, because the old estate system allowed the gentry to dominate the *zemstva*.

Stolypin proposed to introduce the *zemstva* system into the western regions where the majority of the gentry were Poles; a voting system with different curiae demarcated on a national

basis was to allow the local Russian landowners the decisive influence. In the spring of 1911 in the Duma the proposal was liberally amended. In the Council of State the conservatives rejected it, claiming that the gentry's position was endangered and antagonism between Polish and Russian aristocrats aroused with it. In fact, Stolypin's opponents, the most prominent of whom was Witte, found these reasons a welcome pretext. The operation had been organized by a couple of Rightists with the Emperor's knowledge.

Stolypin threatened resigning his post, i.e. admitting the defeat of the government proposal and accepting the parliamentary consequences of it. This the Emperor could not accept. Therefore he had to submit to the alternative demanded by Stolypin: the chambers were prorogued for three days and the zemstvo reform was decreed on the strength of the 87th article of the constitution; the aristocratic instigators of the rejection were banished from the capital for a year and Stolypin himself was given the right to appoint new members in the Council of State.

The result has been differently interpreted — as a victory and as a defeat for the Prime Minister. The consensus seems to be that it was a hollow victory. Stolypin had courted the support of the nationalists, who were especially vociferous in the western provinces, where the rivalry of the minority nationalities was keenly felt by the Russians. But even the most timid constitutionalists were enraged by the cavalier treatment of the representative houses. The Prime Minister seemed to be an overbearing autocrat, bent on ignoring his own rules if they were an inconvenience for his policy. On the other hand, Nicholas II was not apt to forgive Stolypin for the ultimatum and for the consequent humiliation he had had to undergo.

It has been said that during the summer of 1911 Stolypin was downcast and short-tempered. It has also been said that he was politically a dead man long before he was murdered on the 5/18th September, 1911; the murderer relieved the Emperor from seeking a pretext to get rid of the "Grand Vizir".⁴³¹

It was during this period that Seyn prepared his proposal for

431 In addition to previous references to literature dealing with the Stolypin period, cf. Edelman, *Gentry*... p. 112—140, the local problems cf. Weissman, p. 129—132, "hollow victory" p. 196

the declaration of a state of military emergency in Finland. There is no evidence that Seyn acted in collusion with the Prime Minister. But it is not impossible that in his state of mind Stolypin was inclined to listen to the complaints of the gendarmes, of the military, and of the Finnish Governor-General. A "decisive action" in Finland might have improved his position among the chauvinist and the monarchist Right, as well as at the court.

Of course, Stolypin may simply have realized that many vital reforms in Finland remained unfinished and that a strong push was needed, as Seyn obviously thought.

However that may be, Stolypin's last words, whispered twenty minutes before expiring, were: "The main thing . . . that is Finland".⁴³² The agitated, rebellious, threatening border country disturbed the last moments of the dying statesman.

The Finns were very well aware that they had lost a dangerous enemy: "When Stolypin's death was reported, the local press hid its joy with difficulty".⁴³³

Seyn, on the contrary, had no reason to rejoice.

Kokovcov Promoted Prime Minister

Nicholas II appointed the Minister of Finance Kokovcov to Stolypin's post. Kokovcov was a careful and conscientious bureaucrat, who tried his best in his new office to promote the welfare of the Empire and its peoples.

Conservative in his foreign policy, Kokovcov tried to stem the drift towards a great war which was perceptible during his years in office. He considered war a calamity for Russia and advised caution during the crises of 1912—1913.

Kokovcov's main effort was directed towards balancing the budget, often in quarrel with the War and Navy Ministers, but in general successfully, due to the propitious economic trend of

432 Olga Stolypina to Nicholas II 9.XI 1911. CGIA SSSR, fond 601/Mf NL 171, VA

433 "Main occurrences in 1911". KKK Hd 94, no. 6, VA

1909—1913. The rouble stood firm, the gold reserves grew, and the foreign debts could even be reduced in the best years. Afterwards it has been easy to accuse Kokovcov of neglecting to make economic preparations for the war; but in fact no one expected a long war with its emphasis on sustained production. Actually the army and navy got more money than they were able to spend. A part of the accusation laid against Kokovcov is unfair. Generals, for example, were eager to cover up their own incompetence in the war by finding a scapegoat. Liberals were impatient to discredit Tsarism and by attacking the Prime Minister found a way to do so. But, of course, Kokovcov had no general outlook on developing the Russian economy comparable to Witte's plans; he had nothing wider than building railways and protecting Russian credit.

The Stolypin reforms were continued without any sense of urgency. The agrarian reform slowed imperceptibly down. The Ministry of Finance promoted legislation to the protection of the workers, on the Bismarckian model. The producers and employers were against the project because of its high costs, and the Ministry of the Interior suspected all attempts of enlisting the population to participate in any administrative effort.

The Imperial court made it known to Kokovcov that he should carefully avoid any kind of ambition to play the role of a "Grand Vizir". He had difficulties with his colleagues who kept up independent contacts with the court and did not submit to cabinet discipline. Unpopular, autocratic ministers got into difficulties with the Duma; Maklakov, the Minister of the Interior, proposed in 1912 replacing the Duma by a consultative Diet, but the conservatives did not feel strong enough for such a *coup d'état*. Kokovcov was unable to curb the Duma or the Press; for instance, in respect of their criticism of the goings-on of Rasputin and his protégés. This exasperated the Emperor.

Economic revival heightened expectations, while the divided, weak and arbitrary government provoked hostility, not respect. In 1912 striking gold-miners were shot down on the river Lena; the subsequent wave of protest covered the whole Empire. Even a few naval and military detachments were found to be mutinous.

The conclusion seemed to be obvious: concessions to

liberalism and parliamentarism had been wasted, counter-productive. Goremykin replaced Kokovcov in January 1914. The new Prime Minister was an ancient bureaucrat from the Ministry of the Interior, whose lack of ideas and initiative had been noted during his first premiership in April-June 1906. Now he had no other policy but to stick to his position, acceding to the wishes of the Emperor, of the Empress, and even of Rasputin.

A New Course Expected in Finland

In Finland it was known that there had been some difference of opinion between Stolypin and Kokovcov on the Finnish question. A new course was expected of Kokovcov; the Finns supposed that he would realize that Stolypin's policy had not accorded with the true interests of the Russian state.

The Council of Ministers seemed to be delineating the new course as early as one week after the murder of Kokovcov's predecessor: when Seyn's proposal concerning the declaration of a state of military emergency was discussed on September 14th 1911, it was turned down.

The Council of Ministers declared that no state of military emergency had been deemed necessary in Finland in 1904 after the murder of Bobrikov, nor in 1905 during the October events, nor in 1906 because of the Sveaborg mutiny. In 1911, the situation in Finland was obviously much more peaceful than then. The gendarme-information was not always dependable, and all concrete evidence brought forth by the Governor-General was rather old.

Besides, a state of military emergency was no weapon against political murder. It was a blunt weapon which could not discern between the guilty and the innocent. The peaceful population ought not to be made to suffer for a few terrorist criminals. Kiev had not been declared under martial law after the murder of the Prime Minister; in the interior of Russia there were worse organizations than the *Voima*, and no state of military emergency was applied there, either. It was necessary

only in the event of whole populations disturbing the public order, e.g. in Moscow, Poland, or the Baltic provinces in 1905—1906. It was not a permanent means of government.

Suhomlinov, the Minister of War, and Makarov, the then Minister of the Interior, thought that threatening with a state of military emergency was no proof of firm decision; it was a half-measure and would compromise even the authority of the Emperor.

Seyn tried to argue for his proposal: there were no other means of increasing his powers to fight against the revolution; Finland had no law of "increased" or "extraordinary security" and therefore a declaration of a state of military emergency was the sole speedy means of pacifying the Grand Duchy.

But the Council of Ministers decided that it would be fatal for Russian power in Finland if it was seen that after one hundred years of overlordship Russia was unable to govern the land without resorting to extraordinary measures. There was time enough to carry out all the necessary reforms, demanded by the Governor-General, in due legal order.⁴³⁴

Seyn was defeated and so probably were the extreme Right who were behind his back. Led by Puriškevič, several Rightist organizations had demanded of Kokovcov that the "firm policy be continued in Poland, in Finland, and towards the Jews; in Finland especially the state of military emergency had to be declared in the event of the first political murder".⁴³⁵ Seyn's proposal may originally have been addressed to the Council of Ministers when still chaired by Stolypin, with Fate intervening to change the chairman and cause the defeat. But the proposal may equally well have been an attempt to force Kokovcov to show his cards.

The new situation seemed not unpromising for the Finns. Langhoff explained to Kokovcov that Russo-Finnish conciliation was possible if only Russia would desist from the attempted Imperial legislation in Finland, if the Council of Ministers would not intervene in Finnish affairs (as Stolypin had decreed that they should intervene in 1908), and if the Governor-General, who provoked hatred and bitterness, were replaced.

434 Osobyi Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 14.X 1911. KKK 1911, I dept., no. 42, VA

435 "Main occurrences in 1911". KKK Hd 94, no. 6, VA

Kokovcov answered to Langhoff that in principle he opposed the useless provoking of hatred. But measures already in the process of preparation could not simply be abandoned and "there were strong forces gathered against the fulfilment of our wishes". But the Prime Minister promised Langhoff that he would not initiate any new measure against Finland and would try to bury in committees a few intended measures. Langhoff received quite a favourable impression of the Prime Minister:

"He was a man who favoured Finland and whose word could be trusted . . . He agreed with me completely that the activity of Seyn as Governor-General in Finland was detrimental both to our country and to Russia".

Mechelin understood Kokovcov's position better than the Minister State-Secretary did; he explained to Langhoff that no distinctly new course could be expected of Kokovcov. But even Mechelin stressed "the importance of removing from the position of Governor-General the mean, low-minded *provocateur* Seyn". Kokovcov could not promise even this reform: the Emperor had proved reluctant to part with Seyn. But Kokovcov supposed that he might be able to restrain Seyn's zeal to a certain degree.⁴³⁶

That this was true was proved by the decision of Council of Ministers on Seyn's proposed declaration of the state of military emergency, although Kokovcov could not reveal such state secrets to the Finns, naturally. They had to wait for a public declaration of policy by him.

Kokovcov's Declaration of Policy in the Finnish Question

A couple of important laws concerning Finland were being

436 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . 329—359. Information on the expectation of the new course in Finland: *Svodka svedenii po Finljandii 1909—1911*, p. 108—109. KKK Hd 103, no. 4, VA

discussed by the Duma in the autumn of 1911. This gave an opportunity for Kokovcov to declare his policy on the Grand Duchy.

Kokovcov said first that he held the Finnish people to be industrious and honest. But their leaders alleged that the policy of the Russian government in Finland was oppression. That was not true. On the contrary, the three million Finns enjoyed all rights and liberties in the Empire (voice from the left: "we have no rights"), while the one hundred and fifty million Russians had no rights in Finland, a province of the indivisible realm. In addition, Finns had rights that did not exist elsewhere in the Empire. Giving Russians equal rights in Finland and making Finns carry equal burden of duties with the Russians was no oppression.

Finns had expected a new course in Russian policy after Stolypin's death. That was why the government wanted to demonstrate that policy was not dependant on any single individual; there existed in Russia no difference of opinion regarding the vital Imperial interests.

The deceased blessed Prime Minister had not acknowledged compromises or hinders where Russia's greatness was in question. The government's policy in Finland was inevitable, important, and just. Sooner or later the peaceful, industrious, honest Finnish people would understand that Finland's growth, peace, and culture was possible only under the mighty protection of Russia. Then they would rise to silence the agitation of their intelligentsia.⁴³⁷

The Prime Minister's speech was a disappointment for the Finns. Langhoff wrote that it was partly a tactical means of acquiring the support of the nationalists for the government; but clearly it was based on honest conviction and thus it did not promise well for Finland.⁴³⁸

The speech was clearly modelled on Stolypin's earlier performances, and part of it was demagogy; for instance, Kokovcov must have known that the industrious Finnish people did not in fact support the government's policy. But the essence of his speech was no demagogy. If Finland was part of

437 Duma 1911, p. 690—700

438 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . 358—359

Russia, it was right and just to demand equal rights for Russians in Finland.

It is inconceivable that the Prime Minister of Imperial Russia should have admitted the Finnish point of view, that is, that Finland was a separate state in union with Russia, with the Emperor the sole Russian who had anything to say in Finnish affairs, and even he only within the limits of the Finnish constitution as interpreted by the Finns.

In his memoirs Kokovcov says that on a few points he differed from Stolypin's views on the Finnish question. But there could be no difference regarding the Finnish participation in the Imperial military and financial burdens, nor in regard to the rights of Russians in Finland.⁴³⁹ The conclusion can only be drawn that the differences must have been concerned with detailed questions of how much could be done without giving provocation to the Finns.

In his memoirs of one thousand pages Kokovcov devotes a couple of lines to the Finnish problem. On about one page he explains why proposals made to the Duma by the Emperor and the Council of Ministers could not be modified, and how by defending them he acquired the support of the Duma majority. This is a useful reminder for a Finnish historian that it was as part of Russian politics that the Finnish question was important; it did not have much independent importance for the Russians.

The Prime Minister was lauded by the Duma from the Centre to the Right. The nationalists praised his statement as a first step in the right direction in the Finnish policy.⁴⁴⁰ The extreme Right was happy because "the Prime Minister had uttered such Russian words"⁴⁴¹ and that "a Russian, good, and right policy" could be looked forward to.⁴⁴²

Seyn explained the defeat of Finnish hopes: the basis of the Finnish view was the knowingly false conception that there existed a separate autonomous Finnish state. That led to their refusal to recognize the authority of the Imperial Russian

439 Kokovcov, *Iz moego* . . . II p. 12—13

440 Duma 1911, p. 738

441 Duma 1911, p. 719—725

442 Duma 1911, p. 736

government to make laws covering the territory of the Grand Duchy.⁴⁴³

The Council of Ministers, chaired by Kokovcov, declared that the Finnish organs of self-government had no authority to criticize measures taken by the central government. The policy of the Unified Government was based on the historical mission of the Russian realm. The government aimed at the benefit and interest of the whole Russian Empire, Finland included.⁴⁴⁴

The term "historical mission" was liable to appear in the vocabulary of nationalism in any country. It is a pity that the Council of Ministers did not explain their view on the conception in any more length. It is evident, however, that their policy was not due only to temporary security need or antirevolutionary measures. There may have been differences concerning the details of policy in Finland between the Emperor, the Government, the Right, the Centre, and the Left of the Duma, and the Governor-General of Finland. But they all aimed at a bigger and better Russia, whether it were national, liberal, or proletarian; in any case the Russia in question would be unified. It was difficult to understand and accept that the Finns did not feel themselves to be a part of the Russian nation.

No new course was entered on; not the course proposed by Seyn, disciplining Finland with the aid of a state of military emergency; nor the course hoped for by the Finns, Russia respecting the Finnish concept of autonomy. Seyn had to go on intergrating the Grand Duchy in the Empire slowly, with the limited means allowed to him by the cautious Council of Ministers.

443 Seyn to Kokovcov 2.V 1912. KKK 1912, II dept., no. 14-1, VA

444 Osobyĭ Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 17.V 1912. KKK 1912, II dept., no. 14-1, VA

Legislation

The Finnish Diet

In 1905 the Socialists had been promised a reform of the national representation, and the promise had been carried out in 1906. The first democratic general election in 1907 produced a Diet of 80 Social Democrats, 59 Old Finns and 50 Constitutionalists (24 Swedes, 26 Young Finns), with 9 Agrarians and 2 Christian Labour representatives. There were even women among the deputies. Of course, the Imperial court could not regard such an assembly as a genuine representative of the Finnish people. The Diet was not invited to participate in the Imperial festivities in 1912 and 1913 (Centenary of the Patriotic war, Tricentenary of the Romanovs); instead a representative of each of the ancient estates was invited. The Finnish peasants were represented by a poor old Russian-speaking man from eastern Finland.⁴⁴⁵

Of course, the Finnish Diet was an unruly meeting-ground during its first sessions, reflecting the profound social

445 Hjelt, *Från* . . . p. 271—273

Kamenskii, *Sovremennoe* . . . p. 45, for instance, is appalled by the unthinkable fact that Socialists, outright revolutionaries, sat among the deputies.

The German Ambassador Schoen reported to Bülow, 19.II and 21.IV 1907, *Russland* 63 Bd 1, Auswärtiges Amt, Izvol'skii's amazement at the women "deputies" (quotation marks in the original)

antagonisms among the electors. The representatives did not mince their words, neither in respect of each other, nor in respect of the Russian oppressors. After the Senate and the Governors had been Russified, the Diet remained the focal point of Finnish resistance. The four first Diets were dissolved prematurely, for instance, the second Diet, in 1909, at the very opening because the chairman Svinhufvud presented the Finnish view of the proposed Russian measures. The Diet did not recognize the validity of Imperial, to them unconstitutional, decrees in Finland.

For instance, the Diet did consent to the payment of the ten million marks in lieu of personal military service for the years 1906 and 1907 in 1908. The Russian government had ordered 8,2 million to be paid out of the regular revenue of the Finnish State, which in the Russian view the Emperor was entitled to dispose of; the Diet had been asked to make up the deficit of 1,8 million. But the Diet "consented" to the total amount of 10 million. This was usurping the Emperor's prerogatives and disregarding Russia's sovereign rights over Finland.⁴⁴⁶

It is true that the Diet aimed at a modern unified Budget, with the regular revenue as well as the annual taxes included. They also wanted the right to initiate legislation and other modern constitutional devices. It is not quite clear whether they understood that these reforms would have implied a diminishing of the power of the Emperor's representatives in Finland, i.e. the weakening of the Russian Empire.⁴⁴⁷

A similar quarrel occurred when the Diet was dissolved again in 1909, with an agrarian reform left incomplete. The Russian government got the Emperor to sign the law with the added explanation that this was a deviation from the rule that measures taken by a dissolved Diet were *ipso facto* invalid. This declaration was a new interpretation of Finnish constitution, unauthorized by the Diet, and thus an unconstitutional act. The government, on their part, thought that letting decrees made by dissolved Diets stand would make

446 Berendts, *Kratkii* . . . discusses the Finnish scheme from the Russian point of view

447 Tanner, *Nuorukainen* . . . p. 245 explains the programme of the Social Democratic Party, without any reference to its Imperial implications.

the dissolving futile. Dissolving the Diet was meant to be a lesson to the loquacious deputies.

The fifth Diet was allowed to go on meeting throughout the length of its session (three years, 1911—1913). After the Senate and the higher administration were reformed, the regular revenue was in practice at the disposal of the government, so that the "Military Millions" and administrative costs could be paid. If the Diet refused further taxation, it was to the detriment of Finnish communications and schools and social improvement. It was true that the Diet was loquacious and disrespectful, but the repeated elections caused a much more dangerous agitation throughout the whole country.

Seyn was naturally antagonistic to the Finnish Diet. In 1910 he agreed with Stolypin that it was deplorable that a provincial meeting called itself "The Diet of the Grand Duchy of Finland and the Representative Body of the Finnish People" and used the *pluralis majestatis* "We", and sent over its protocols to the Governor-General without a Russian translation. But Stolypin explained to his representative that this defect could be repaired only when the fundamental procedure of legislation in Finland had been revised.⁴⁴⁸

Stolypin had not had time to secure such a reform and the Diet kept annoying the Governor-General. In 1912 the latter again complained that the Diet was calling illegal all decrees aiming at the integration of Finland with Russia. Thus the Diet brazenly criticized measures sanctified by the Sovereign and called governmental policy a system of illegality. The Senate was accused of not preventing the illegality, the Governor-General was accused of stifling Finnish protests. Seyn proposed limiting the right of the Diet to address the Emperor, so that the limits of insolent criticism could not be overstepped.⁴⁴⁹

The Council of Ministers agreed with the Governor-General that the complaints of the Diet were futile, resting on no facts and based on the false doctrine of a separate Finnish statehood not subjected to Russian sovereignty. But changing the Finnish parliamentary law was an important problem, and it was to be

448 Seyn to Langhoff 20.IV/3.V 1910, Stolypin to Langhoff 22.VI 1910. KKK 1909, IV dept., no. 8-6, VA

449 Seyn to Kokovcov 12.XI 1912. KKK 1912, II dept., no. 14-9, VA

undertaken only after detailed preliminary work.⁴⁵⁰

Here again the difference between Seyn's and Kokovcov's views emerges. The Governor-General thought that Finnish disobedience was unacceptable and ought to have been curbed by decisive measures in order to stem further rebellious behaviour. The Council of Ministers agreed with Seyn in his belief that Finland was an indivisible part of the Empire under Russian sovereignty; but they felt that there was no reason to arouse agitation in Finland if this could be avoided. And, in the government's view, parliamentary law was the one branch of law that must be decreed following the Finnish constitutional procedure.

Thus the protesting voice of the Diet remained unstifled, an annoyance to the Russian statesmen, but no immediate danger to Russian power in Finland. During the war the Diet was not convened. Notwithstanding that, also the elections of 1916 were held in due order.

Imperial Legislation

Bobrikov had believed that the question of Imperial legislation in Finland had been definitely determined by the February Manifesto in 1899. But everything had been upset again by the November Manifesto in 1905. The Russian constitution of 1906 left the question open, nor had Mechelin's plans for a Finnish constitution any positive result. Stolypin's decree of 1908 submitted Finnish affairs to the Council of Ministers, but still the legislative problem remained.

In 1909 a committee was appointed, chaired by a member of the Russian Senate Haritonov, to prepare the procedure for Imperial legislation for Finland. The Finnish members were impossible, of course, for "they demanded a solution in the spirit of a dual statehood". That was why it was left to the Russian members to "steer the frontier province more closely

450 Osobyi Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 11.XX 1912. KKK 1912, II dept., no. 14-9, VA

back into the Empire". This was Seyn's resumé of the Finno-Russian difference in the committee.⁴⁵¹

For the Russian members Finland was an integral part of the unified Empire. In its internal affairs it had a local (*oblastnyi*) self-government, decreed by the Imperial laws. These Imperial laws were valid in Finland as well as anywhere else in the Empire.

If a problem was not strictly local, it belonged to the sphere of the Imperial legislation. Such laws were to be initiated by the Imperial government. The Finnish Senate and the Finnish Diet were to be asked for their views on the proposal. Then the matter would be discussed and decided on by the Duma and the Council of State. The Diet was to send four representatives to the Duma and two members to the Council of State. The Emperor's sanction made the approved proposal a law.⁴⁵² A list of matters of Imperial interest was attached to the proposal.⁴⁵³

451 *Političeskoe položenie v krae i vyzvannija im mery dlja gosudarstvennogo spokoistvija.* (A political review by the Governor General's office) KKK Hd 99, VA

452 *Žurnal Vysočaiše učreždennoi Komissii dlja vyrabotki proekta pravil o porjadka izdaniija kasajušičihsja Finljandii zakonov obščegosudarstvennogo značienii.* KKK 1910, II dept., no. 18-1, VA

453 Matters of Imperial importance

- Finnish contribution to Imperial expences
- military service and other military burdens
- the rights of Russians in Finland
- the Russian language in Finland
- executing the decisions of Russian courts in Finland
- the bases of Finland's separate administration
- safeguarding political order in Finland
- criminal law and the responsibility of the officials
- the basis and the organization of the system of courts
- order in and inspection of schools
- press regulations
- customs system and tariffs
- monetary system
- post office, telephone network, aerial navigation
- railways and their relation with Imperial defence
- navigation, pilots, lighthouses
- foreigners' rights in Finland
- copyright, trade mark, etc. rights

A couple of Russian members complained that such a list would limit the sphere of Imperial legislation, because any unlooked-for matter might turn out to have Imperial importance

In Stolypin's Council of Ministers Kokovcov and Izvol'skii, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, opposed the project. They said that it was impractical, because in Russia the bureaucratic procedure would take too long; the committee had not respected Finnish autonomy which had been confirmed by the Emperor; the reform would arouse European opinion against Russia; and the Finnish agitation would immobilize Russian troops in Finland and its vicinity.

But Stolypin and the majority of the ministers thought that the magnanimous proposal respected Finnish autonomy, which they felt was not touched on by the reform at all. The project was concerned only with Imperial matters, and of course these could not be determined through any local legislative system. Finnish and foreign opinion was a respectable factor; but the proposal was aimed expressly at strengthening the Russian state, while desisting from it would imply weakness. Russian interests dictated the reform, and compared with them no local or international considerations were of significance.

Seyn explained to the Council of Ministers that the Finns were already so full of hatred that the matter under consideration could not increase the animosity any more. This hatred was the protest of a conquered people. Russian weakness had resulted in the Finnish attempt to get rid of everything Russian. There was no reason for prevarication now.⁴⁵⁴

Nicholas II explained to Langhoff that he had been reluctant to curb Finnish constitutional rights. But this was a question where he had to take the interests of the Empire into account, and that was why he could not desist from his decision. He said to Langhoff: "I am sorry, but I could not do otherwise".⁴⁵⁵ Edv. Hjelt understood that Nicholas thought that he was no longer bound by his oath (in 1894) now that the Duma and the Council of State had taken over the responsibility.⁴⁵⁶ — If this is what the Tsar felt, it was stretching parliamentarism rather far. It would also indicate that Nicholas II had more trouble with his conscience than Stolypin had, not to speak of Seyn;

454 Osobyĭ Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 22.II 1910. KKK 1910, I dept., no. 18 I, VA

455 Langhoff, *Seitsemän* . . . p. 302, 308

456 Hjelt, *Från* . . . p. 276—277

but of course it is not possible to be sure how accurately Langhoff and Hjelt repeated the Emperor's words.

The opinions of the Duma parties have been described earlier in this story. The nationally-minded Octobrists and Rightists being in a majority, the proposed procedure for Imperial legislation for Finland was accepted against the votes of the Left; the Constitutionalist desisted from voting in protest. Puriškevič, the Rightist leader, cried, happily: "Finis Finlandiae!"⁴⁵⁷

The new law was the end of Finnish internal independence in principle. It was the assertion of the Russian will to allow Finland no equality in the Russo-Finnish partnership; it was a decision to maintain the unity of the Empire under Russian overlordship against the "separatist" tendency in Finland and elsewhere.

But there remained plenty to do for Seyn before the principle was realized in practice.

Military Law

It was in 1908 that the "Military Millions" were paid the last time on the basis of the constitutionally-valid consent of the Finns. In 1909 the Emperor ordered their payment for 1908 and 1909 in a manifesto. During the preparation of the manifesto it was pointed out that in the ancient Swedish laws (1772 and 1789) the King had been empowered to use the regular revenue for the needs of the realm; and of course, "realm" did not mean Finland but Sweden, and by transposition therefore Russia since 1809. Military questions were without a doubt an Imperial concern, and consequently they could not be dealt with by local legislation.⁴⁵⁸

457 Duma 1910, p. 2582

458 Boeckman to Stolypin 12/25.X 1909. Langhoff to Boeckman 17.X/1.XI 1909. KKK 1909, IV dept., no. 8-2 26, VA.
Asetuskokoelma 1909, no. 56

This was the reason why the last few remaining Finnish Senators left office (p. 135). The third Diet decided that the military question had to be determined by the Diet and the Grand Duke in unanimity; consequently the Imperial Manifesto was devoid of any legal meaning.⁴⁵⁹ The Diet was immediately dissolved⁴⁶⁰ and the twenty million marks were paid by the new, Russified Senate. Just as easily were eleven and twelve million marks transferred from the Finnish to the Russian treasury for 1910 and 1911 on the strength of the manifesto.

Once the law determining the procedure for Imperial legislation in Finland had been decreed, it was time for definite decision on the military question there.

Seyn stated that the government had to be exceptionally careful and firm. It was important to make clear to the Finns that the Imperial legislation constituted no oppression or violation of the Finnish constitution; it was necessary because of the vital needs of the Empire. The military question was one-such obviously vital Imperial question.⁴⁶¹

Seyn further explained that the Finns were as obliged to defend the Empire as the Russians. Physically and morally they were well able to serve in the army and in the navy.

But conscripting the Finns would have brought an annual contingent of 10,000 men into the armed forces, a force of 30,000 men in three years. After fifteen years there would have been 150,000 trained Finnish reservists, and 300,000 men in the untrained militia, i.e. an army of half-a-million men. The network of local societies and sports clubs existing in Finland were ready to prepare them for war. Finnish geography was well adapted for guerrilla war (Seyn had seen this fifteen years earlier). Remembering their separatist schemes and the vicinity of St. Petersburg, it was obvious that trained Finns would be a serious danger for Russia in the event of foreign conflicts.

Therefore financial compensation was the only conceivable way for Finland to carry out her military obligations. The

459 Toiset valtiopäivät 1909. Asiakirjat, Perustuslakivaliokunnan mietintö n:o 7

460 Boeckman to Langhoff 20.X/2.XI 1909, Boeckman to Stolypin 1.XI 1909. KKK 1909, IV dept., no. 8-6 26, VA

461 O nekotoryh merah, svjazannyh s izdaniem zakona 17 ijunja 1910 goda ob obščegosudarstvennom zakonodatel'stve. KKK 1910, II dept., no. 81-1, VA

payment of ten-million marks, growing by one additional million annually until twenty-million marks was reached, was very little. Finnish men were thus left free to work during three years of their youth while the Russians were paying for the defence of the Empire with sweat and blood in military service.⁴⁶²

Similar problems for Russia were caused by other national minorities. Baltic Germans were suspected of German sympathies. Poles hated the Russians — the feeling was mutual — and preferred Austria and perhaps even Prussia. Armenians schemed for an independent Greater Armenia, while Caucasian and Trans-Caspian Muslims dreamed of Pan-Islam or of Pan-Turkism. The Jews were not to be trusted at all; their removal from the Imperial army had already been discussed. But disarming all the unreliable peoples would have reduced the army by one-fourth, leaving the Russians alone to defend the Empire. Thus, in the end, only the Finns were kept out of military service.

Bobrikov had come to Finland to bring the Finns closer to the Empire; Seyn had to confess that the Finns were thoroughly unreliable. He does not seem to have understood that this was due to the governmental policy; for him it was, on the contrary, a proof of Finnish rebelliousness from the very beginning and of the necessity for Bobrikov's measures.

It was not to be expected that the patriotic Duma majority would oppose the Finnish military law. Some deputies only reminded the Duma that Finland was going to be made pay very little, a mere twenty-million marks for the blood of 30,000 Russians; and she did not pay anything for the upkeep and equipment of the army and the navy, as the Russians did in addition to the personal military service.⁴⁶³ A military statistician, General Zolotarev, had calculated that Finland ought to pay three or four times the amount now demanded if she was to carry a military-financial burden equal to that of the other subjects of the Empire.⁴⁶⁴

Finns did not attend to the Duma sessions because they did

462 Objasnitel'naja zapiska (Seyn to Stolypin 19.VII 1910.) KKK 1910, II dept., no. 81-1, VA

463 Duma 1911, p. 719—725

464 Zapiska general-leitenanta Zolotareva o finansovoi polozenie Finljandii 30.IV 1910. CGIA SSSR, fond 586/Mf NL 172, VA

not acknowledge the validity of the "law" of 1910, and the new military law was for them void of any legal force. The Finnish refusal did not imply any reluctance to carry out their part of the defence burden; they only wanted to do so in the manner decreed by their own constitution and in their own army (excepting the pacifist Social Democrats).⁴⁶⁵

Because the Finns refused to pay illegal taxes, the government had to be satisfied with the payment of the ultimately calculated sum of twenty million marks in lieu of personal military service. The Russian army in Finland succeeded in collecting some additional financial back-up from Finland. The Finnish state had to pay for the improvement of their railways (p. 148). New garrison areas were necessary, and the Finnish state was made to purchase them. All such attempts were not successful. Marching troops were usually billeted in Finnish farms, for payment, which the army was reluctant to go on paying out, but the Senate insisted on collecting them. The War Ministry also planned the requisitioning of horses, cars, lorries, and ships in the event of mobilization.

The Russified Finnish Senate stated that the new duties were Imperial questions and had to be determined in the framework of Imperial legislation. But this was so cumbersome a procedure that no new duties were laid upon Finland before the war broke out. During the war the Diet did not convene until 1917 and could not be asked for its statement, as the law of 1910 decreed. (The Finns did not make any unconstitutional statements, but the Russians had to ask for them, compelled by their own law).

The Senate admitted in principle the Finnish duty of bearing these new burdens, but in practice they did not wish for any new complication in Finland, nor for any financial difficulties for themselves. This is a further example of the Russified Senate upholding the Finnish autonomy in spite of their principal concurrence in the policy of integration.

465 Valtiopäivät 1910. Asiakirjat III. Valtiovarainvaliokunnan mietintö n:o 13 & 14, and Vastalauseet. Pöytäkirjat p. 1056—1075

Equal Rights for Russians in Finland

The second important Imperial law discussed in 1911 bore upon the rights of Russians in Finland. This was a general problem in most western provinces of the Empire, where the local people were on a higher cultural level than the dominant nation; as early as the 1840s Juriî Samarin had complained of the discrimination against Russians in Riga.⁴⁶⁶ That was one of the reasons for the Russian nationalism of the "Russia for the Russians" -variety. Katkov had pointed to a similar evil in Finland in 1863—1864.⁴⁶⁷ But it was not until the Bobrikov-Sejn era that the problem was taken up in earnest.

Sejn collected plenty of documentation on anti-Russian discrimination in Finland. The Orthodox religion ought to have been the dominant religion in the Empire, but in Finland it was only tolerated in the shadow of Lutheranism. Its servants were suspected and hated, Orthodox children were compelled to convert to Lutheranism, their parents were discriminated against, for instance, in appointments to public office; Orthodox holidays were not publicly observed.

The Russian language was not used nor understood, Russian documents were not accepted, Russian newspapers were not read, Russian announcements were not published, Russian diplomas were not respected (a Finnish dispensary had not accepted a prescription by Botkin, the world-famous doctor, but a Russian, not qualified in Finland), the police could not speak Russian. Russian travelling peasant-peddlers had been hunted like animals. In Finnish courts Russians were the losers because they were unable to use the local languages. Russians were boycotted, as were those who took a normal relation with them. Those who wanted to serve the government were treated in incredible ways. If a priest wanted to read out a governmental pronouncement, he was silenced by the congregation singing a hymn. The attitude towards anything Russian was offensive; in history books Russian atrocities were described in detail and the Russians were painted as cowards. Only Lutheran Finns were appointed as history teachers to

466 Samarin, *Okrainy* . . . VII p. 58, 88, 94, 498, 504, VIII p. 103—104

467 KKK 1864, no. 38

teach the false doctrines of separate Finnish statehood and personal union with Russia; the belief was disseminated that the Finns were a people chosen by God to enlighten and unite the Fenno-Ugrian tribes.⁴⁶⁸

The Finns had refused the Russians the right to vote in Finland on the pretext that they were only visitors or temporary inhabitants there. If they settled down permanently, they could be made Finnish citizens like other foreigners. Even a Governor-General as mild as Gerard had said that this was totally wrong. Russians were not foreigners in Finland, they were not outside the realm of their Emperor there; a Russian should have equality with a Finn in Finland just as a Finn was equal to a Russian in Russia.⁴⁶⁹ In this question Seyn could not but agree with his predecessor: the Finnish view was contradictory to the principle of the unity and indivisibility of the Empire.⁴⁷⁰

In the question of the unity of the Empire the "good" and the "evil" Russians were in agreement.

The franchise question in 1906 was, however, put off to be solved together with the other questions pertaining to Russians' equal rights in Finland.⁴⁷¹ Seyn with his aides collected materials concerning the abnormal status of the Russians in Finland and had them prepared for presentation when Stolypin asked for arguments for the proposed law.⁴⁷² The Duma passed the proposal for equal rights without difficulties.

The new law was important from the point of view of the principle of the equality of Russians with Finns in Finland. The intention was not to let ordinary Russians loose in the Grand Duchy — the Tsarist government was not particularly famous for its defence of the civil rights of its subjects — on the contrary there was some apprehension for the revolutionaries taking advantage of their equality in Finland and seeking the protection of the Finnish liberties for their activity. But the new law was useful for Seyn in his attempts at disciplining the Finnish administration.

468 Materialy o nenormal'nom položenii russkikh v krae. KKK Hd 99, no. 1 & 2, VA

469 Gerard to Langhoff 14/27.XI 1906. KKK Hd 41, no. 4, VA

470 A memorandum by Seyn 21.XI 1911. KKK Hd 41, no. 4, VA

471 Osobyi Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 20.III 1907. KKK Hd 41, no. 4, VA

472 Stolypin to Seyn 20.X 1910. KKK 99, no. 1, VA

Disciplining Finnish Officials

Seyn wrote that during Bobrikov's time it had been seen that the local courts of justice were a serious menace to the public order. They kept to the Finnish law and ignored the Russian decrees. This the Governor-General and his aides deemed to be politicking and partiality. Even well-disposed officials vacillated in their loyalty because they were afraid of being summoned before the court and judged on the basis of the "separatist theories", i.e. the Finnish Constitution. Thus justice was "a worthless comedy, propaganda, and insolent lack of respect for the Supreme Power". Bobrikov had tried to protect loyal officials, but by 1905 what was left of his policy was in ruins.

Finnish officials could not be dismissed without due process in a local court of justice. Thus they were able to refrain from obeying governmental orders and they could work up local public opinion. Many officials, Seyn alleged, had run into debt with the local leaders of separatism and were therefore dependent on them. Political crimes could not be punished because of the lacunae in the local criminal laws. An Imperial law was necessary, and officials had to be subject to the Imperial law courts.⁴⁷³

Seyn explained that Finnish officials were not representatives of a local state authority — such was the generally accepted view, but it was a thoroughly mistaken one. In a unified Empire there could not exist several centres of state power. Finnish officials were servants of the Imperial power, and their crimes were not against local interests only, but against Imperial interests. Thus they needed no special local system of discipline.⁴⁷⁴

Ščeglovitov, the Minister of Justice, agreed in principle. But he did not wish to burden the Russian courts with innumerable

473 Seyn repeated these complaints in several documents, for example to Stolypin 27.X 1910, "Zapiska", in *Vysočaiše učreždennoe Podgotovitel'noi Kommissii Proekt zakonodatel'nyh program dlja Finljandii i materialy 1912—1913*. Helsingin Yliopiston Kirjasto, in "Spravka", 27.X 1912, KKK Hd 100, VA, and in a similar memorandum by Seyn, KKK Hd 79, no. 6, VA

474 Seyn to Ščeglovitov 18.VIII 1912. KKK Hd 48, no. 1, VA

minor offences allegedly committed by Finnish officials. There were too few people available acquainted with Finnish circumstances to handle such cases. It was preferable to submit only major crimes against the Imperial legislation to Russian justice.⁴⁷⁵

Seyn complained that the Minister of Justice would leave the minor officials exposed to the Finnish courts while only the superior officials would be protected by the impartial Imperial justice.⁴⁷⁶

The discussion, with similar arguments repeated, went on at some length, and no Imperial law was made before the Great War broke out, after which no reforms were feasible. The Governor-General's disciplinary authority was increased in 1911; he could suspend officials for six months without pay.⁴⁷⁷ But of course this was only a temporary measure, no definite solution.

Only those Finnish officials who committed an offence against the law on equality for Russians in Finland could be summoned before a Russian court, on the strength of an article inserted in the law. Seyn tried to make the utmost use of it.

A Russian peasant opened his stall in the Viipuri marketplace in July 1912. The town magistrate forbade him to sell anything without the special permit which foreigners had to acquire. The Governor von Pfahler accused the magistrate of ignoring the Imperial law on equal rights, and the St. Petersburg district court ordered the magistrate to be jailed. The Finnish court of appeal at Viipuri ordered the magistrate to be set free, because they had not broken any law — the Imperial law was unconstitutional, i.e. non-existent. The Senate in its turn deemed the court of appeal guilty of breaking that law, and Seyn ordered its members to be jailed and judged in St. Petersburg.

At the meeting of the Council of Ministers Seyn explained that the situation was serious. Finns thought that Russia could be overcome by passive resistance. Many officials had gone over to the resistance, many loyal officials were wavering. It was

475 Ščeglovitov to Kokovcov 8.VIII 1912. KKK Hd 48, no. 1, VA

476 Seyn to Ščeglovitov 10.I 1913 and 23.VII 1913. KKK Hd 48, no. 1, VA

477 Kokovcov to Ščeglovitov 11.XII 1912, Ščeglovitov to Kokovcov 23.XII 1912. KKK Hd 48, no. 1, VA

important to demonstrate that resistance would not be left unpunished. If the government was seen to hesitate in regard to the Viipuri court of appeal, the resistance would be encouraged and the waverers would be intimidated, and other courts of appeal would join the opposition.

The Council of Ministers agreed with the Governor-General: the situation was serious. Rumours of an eventual change in the direction of the government's policy could make even loyal officials frightened. They would be afraid of dismissal and revenge, the fate of the Bobrikovian officials in 1905. That was why it was important to assure them that the political direction was to be continued without concessions and without hesitation. The Russian government would go on protecting loyal officials.⁴⁷⁸

Such a declaration was published in the Governor-General's newspaper *Finljandskaja Gazeta* on November 4/17th 1912. "These people must be taught respect towards the law", the Russian prosecutor said about the Finnish officials.⁴⁷⁹

The Minister of Justice also thought that it was important to make sure that the Russian court would find the Finns guilty; a negative sentence would only encourage the separatists and diminish the authority of the Russian government.⁴⁸⁰ That was why the case was transferred from the district court to the higher criminal cassation department of the Imperial Senate.⁴⁸¹

The Finnish officials were sentenced to be jailed for a few months. A Finnish priest in St. Petersburg visited his compatriots in the Kresty prison; he counted about fifty judges and officials who suffered for their "separatism, politicking and partiality" during the final years of the Russian empire. The revolution caused the last ones to be liberated in March 1917.⁴⁸²

It is not quite clear whether the imprisoning of the Finnish civil servants and judges had the effect Seyn and the government intended. A year in Kresty, enjoying the privileges of a political prisoner under a benevolent prison regime, with a

478 Osobyi Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 2.XI 1912. KKK Hd 103, no. 16, VA

479 Delo členov Vyborgskago magistrata v S. Peterburgskom Okružnom Sude KKK 1912, III dept., no. 89-3a, VA

480 Osobyi . . . = 478

481 Šéglovitov to the Council of Ministers 12.X 1912. KKK Hd 99, no. 1, VA

482 Wirén, *Krestyn* . . . p. 15—

patriotic society at home supporting materially and morally, was not really frightening, albeit unpleasant. Most probably the result was the opposite of what was intended: "Our lawyers, who have defied the walls of Kresty, have remarkably strengthened our faith".⁴⁸³

The Tsarist oppression was so much bound by bureaucracy, legality, decency, and divided intentions, that it provoked only spite and scorn, but not fear or dejection.

Novoe Vremja agreed with this conclusion. The Finns had not learned their lesson. The Old Finns might pretend loyalty, but only in order to keep their posts and thus keep Russians out. Even they had declared that Imperial laws would not be obeyed, although it was possible to come to an agreement on the problem of the Imperial legislation. Such an offer amounted to rejecting the principle of the unity of the Empire and placing Finland side by side with Russia. And who would Russia be coming to terms with — not the Diet, half of whom were Socialist, or the uncrowned King of Finland, Mechelin? (Of course, for *Novoe Vremja*, these people were outside the decent mankind).

The leading Russian newspaper was unable to understand the Finnish viewpoint: "And all this revolutionary rhetorics only because the Russian government demanded punishment according to the law on equal rights to criminals who would not allow a Russian to trade on the market-place of a town conquered by Peter the Great . . ." ⁴⁸⁴

A Programme of Further Imperial Legislation for Finland

Seyn kept complaining of insufficient powers, of disloyal aides, and of the lacunae in legislation, all factors hampering him in his task of keeping order in Finland and getting the border

483 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . II, p. 12. 37

484 *Novoe Vremja*, 12/25.IV 1912, 29.VIII/11.IX 1912, 18.XI/XII 1912

province closer to the central parts of the Empire. The local press was the sore point of the local life; only part of the police were dependable; the Russian language was used nowhere; national and Socialist agitation kept Finland hostile to Russia. The limited powers of the representative of Russian sovereignty were not adequate for the dangerous situation, having been designed for peaceful times and loyal subjects.⁴⁸⁵

We have already seen how the Council of Ministers tried to help their harassed representative in Finland, short of declaring Finland in a state of military emergency. However, the conflict that arose over the procedure of Imperial legislation and equal rights for Russians and the consequent agitation in Finland made the Council of Ministers wary of initiating new Imperial legislation. The Duma also grew more troublesome as the years went by and conflict with the ever more conservative government and court grew. Kokovcov also kept his promise not to annoy the Finns uselessly. Seyn could not rest satisfied with the state of matters.

The committee of the specialists on the Finnish question found the complaints of the Governor-General well founded. There were several problems which had to be solved in order to make the Empire in Finland more solid. But they felt there were political difficulties. For instance, it was known that the Duma would be reluctant to pass legislation concerning political crimes or the powers of the gendarmes. An eye would thus have to be kept on the internal political situation in Russia, not only on the matters at hand in Finland. It was important to estimate what was of prime necessity and what could be left to later times. The whole field of problems had to be mapped out and a legislative programme set up. This would require time. Laws leading to the creation of a firm Imperial order and a close unity of Finland with the Empire had to be prepared. All branches of the administration had to be asked for their opinion.⁴⁸⁶

485 Seyn to Stolypin 27.X 1910, "Zapiska", and Žurnal Vysočaiše učreždennago Osobago Soveščanija po delam Velikago Knjažestva Finljandskago, zasedanija 28.V 1911. Vysočaiše Učreždennoi Podgotovitel'noi Kommissii Proekt zakonodatel'nyh program dlja Finljandii i materialy 1912—1913. Helsingin Yliopiston Kirjasto

486 Žurnal Vysočaiše . . . 28.V 1911

The Council of Ministers agreed, once more, with the Governor-General: he had reason enough to worry about the situation in Finland. But also the comments of the specialist committee were to be taken into account. A committee, chaired by Korevo, a member of several previous committees on the Finnish question, was set up to draft the programme. Statements were collected from the various branches of the administration about the problems of integrating the Finnish aspects of their special fields of activity. Simultaneously, a committee chaired by Kurlov, the notorious gendarme general, pondered upon police problems in Finland. It took a couple of years to map out the many-faceted problems, and it was not until the spring of 1913 that the committee report was completed. Then it was discussed by the government, revised on several points, and finally approved by the Emperor in the autumn of 1914.⁴⁸⁷ Further action was then put off until the end of the war, as we shall see later. Thus the programme has importance only as a declaration of intention.

The first part of the programme consisted of measures aimed at strengthening governmental authority in Finland, keeping order and safeguarding laws. Most of the points in this section had been initiated by Seyn. The second section consisted of military measures to improve the defence of the Empire; we have seen the military deliberating these questions since before Bobrikov's times. The third section consisted of measures aimed at integrating Finland politically and economically with the Empire.

It has been pointed out that the aim of the programme was not to destroy the Finnish *autonomy*, which was actually useful for the government, reluctant to be bothered with the minor details of Finnish local administration. The aim was to submit Finland to the Russian government and to prevent her from acting against the Imperial interests. For the Russians it implied no oppression, but the Finns were afraid that the intention was to reduce essentially their political, economical, and cultural self-determination.⁴⁸⁸ Perhaps it would be more exact to say that the government did not wish to eliminate the

487 The programme has been studied in detail by Rasila, *Vuoden* . . .

488 Rasila, *Vuoden* . . . p. 12

existing organs of local administration of the Grand Duchy, while autonomy for the Finns meant *internal independence* of any Russian interference, and such an autonomy was to be eliminated by the Imperial power.

It remains to be discussed whether the contemporary Finns were right in calling the report "The Great Programme of Russification".

Russification Unattained

Making Russian the Official Language

During the years 1900—1902, of happy memory, Bobrikov had made the Governor-General's office, the office of the Minister State-Secretary, the Passport Office, the Senate, the highest boards of the administration, and *Gubernija* offices use the Russian language, and even the lower offices had given their resolutions in Russian when asked. But since 1906 only the Governor-General's office remained Russian. This was very harmful for the Imperial interests and unity, made control difficult, and debarred Russians from entering Finnish offices.⁴⁸⁹

In December 1913 Seyn sent a detailed memorandum to the Prime Minister to remind him that the 3rd article of the Russian Constitution, decreeing Russian the official and dominant language in the Empire, remained a dead letter in Finland. The Governor-General deemed that the moment had come to promote the Russian language in Finland, not only in governmental offices but on all public occasions.

The ethnic and cultural peculiarity of the Finns had always been recognized, wrote Seyn. It was important to avoid seeming to plan the use of the Russian language outside public

489 "Zapiska" by Seyn to Stolypin 27.X 1910. Vysočaiše učreždennoe podgotovitel'noi Kommissii proekt zakonodatel'nyh program dlja Finljandii i materialy 1912—1913. Helsingin Yliopiston Kirjasto

life. Divine services, literature and private intercourse in the local languages would not be affected by proposals to extend the use of the Russian language.

The Russian government did not want to deprive the subject peoples of their national identity; it wanted to create a unifying Imperial bond between them, argued Seyn.

The Finns knowingly, he went on, opposed the use and study of the Russian language. The local intelligentsia looked at the problem from a narrowly nationalistic, separatist, anti-Russian point of view. For them the local languages were the flag of separate Finnish statehood.

Thus it was of no use to order the Finns to study Russian, and then, after they had acquired the necessary mastery of the language, make it a qualification for appointments to office. The reform had to be realized immediately, as soon as possible and as widely as possible. Self-interest would then make Finns study Russian.⁴⁹⁰

In the committee of Finnish affairs the Bobrikovian-Stolypinian specialists agreed with the Governor-General.⁴⁹¹

The Senate also agreed with Seyn. The Russian language in Finland was ignored and disregarded, which was incongruent with Finland's position in the Empire. It was harmful even for the local interests.

A couple of Finnish-born Senators were of the opinion that a period of fifteen to twenty years was necessary to improve the knowledge of Russian language, not only among the officials but among the local population. As a result of trade contacts, cultural exchange, and migration, "there is no doubt of Great Russia dissolving Finland into its linguistic area, too". But the neglect of a century could not be made good in a year or two.

But the majority of the Senate thought that it was not possible to wait for fifteen or twenty years. A real improvement in the study of Russian was to be expected only from decreeing a short space of time before the language was put into use.

Russifying the administration would speed up the favourable development. It was the lack of knowledge of Russian that had prevented the local people from adopting Russian views, so

490 Seyn to Kokovcov 30.XII 1913. KKK He 5, VA

491 Protocol of the Committee of Finnish Affairs 29.III 1914. KKK He 5, VA

that the local society had developed a separate political life and a way of looking on things that was harmful for Russian interests.

This was also the way to avoid the difficulties which had accrued in the Western countries from attempts at the violent integration of linguistic minorities. (This probably referred to Prussia's Germanizing of the Poles, Alsatians, Lorraines, and Danes).

It was also important to teach the local languages to Russian officials appointed to Finland. But no flood of Russians was to be expected; the principle was to make the locals learn Russian.⁴⁹²

Lipskiî, the Governor-General's aide, draw up a programme of the conditions under which and of offices in which Russian was to be adopted as the official language. The highest administration was to start using Russian immediately; for the lesser offices the term would be from three to five years. The Russian language was to be compulsory for courts of justice, the police, railways, the post office, the customs stations, and schools in localities bordering Russia, or where troops were garrisoned.⁴⁹³

These discussions took quite a time; the World War had started when the finishing touches were put to the plan, and revolution prevented its ultimate realization except in the highest administration. Thus the language reform never came through in time to create the loyal, Russian-speaking, competent officialdom in Finland that Seyn had dreamed of.

The wider aim glimpsed in the Senate protocol, the linguistic integration of the Finns with the Russian people, was even more remote from fulfillment, of course. — Oddly enough, the Senators seem to have supposed that if Russification was started from the offices, it would not seem compulsory assimilation to the Finns. This can be taken as an indication of their ignorance of the current opinion in their country of birth. Or did they, perhaps, try to put off until a later date an unavoidable calamity?

492 Protocol of the Imperial Finnish Senate 3.VIII/21.VII 1914. KKK Hd 10, no. 44, VA

493 Pervyi proekt Pomoščnika General-Gubernatora. KKK He 5, VA

Schools and Textbooks

Seyn proposed to the Imperial Minister of Education that Finnish and Swedish should be taught in a few institutes in Russia. He explained that a knowledge of the local languages would be absolutely necessary for officials in Finland. The gradual replacement of administrative and police officials by Russians would be very useful from the viewpoint of strengthening the state authority in the country. Since the law on equal rights for Russians had been decreed, there could be no doubt about the legal feasibility of the reform.⁴⁹⁴

The Senate had also proposed this reform, although in this connection they explained that no flooding in of Russians was anticipated. But there seems to have been no fundamental difference between the Governor-General and the Senate.

The Minister of Education answered that the Imperial Institute of Oriental Studies in St. Petersburg was an experienced and prestigious school for such purposes. Officials were prepared there for posts in Armenia, Georgia, and among the Tartars.⁴⁹⁵ It is not known to the present author how many Russians were so schooled to serve in Finland. The choice of the proposed institute reminds us of the similarity of problems in the different border regions of the over-large Empire.

A few Russian schools were established in Finland. A Committee for Russian Schools was put up under the chairmanship of Lipskii to increase their number and to improve their conditions of work. The secondary schools served the Russians in Finland. Only the primary schools in Karelia were intended as means of Russifying the population. During Seyn's tenure of office more than fifty such schools were established. This was well in accordance with Stolypin's ideas of increasing Russian education in all border regions.⁴⁹⁶ In 1913 the Boys' *Gymnazija* in Helsinki was given a new school building. It was roomy and imposing enough to serve as an

494 Seyn to Kasso, Minister of Education, 23.X 1912. KKK Hd 105, VA

495 Kasso to Seyn 28.XII 1913. KKK Hd 105, VA

496 Avreh, *Stolypin* . . . p. 26

eventual Russian university in Helsinki,⁴⁹⁷ but no serious official plans for establishing such a centre for Russian culture in Finland seem to have existed.

Bobrikov had ordered Finnish schools to teach Russian to their pupils, but in 1906 the number of Russian teachers and lessons had been reduced. Seyn took up this reform, too, and by 1913 the Senate had prepared a proposal for increasing the study of the Russian language in Finnish secondary schools. Starting from 1914, the Finnish schoolboys and girls were to study Russian for four to five hours every week; by 1917 the school leavers were to take their final examinations in Russian. Teacher-training seminaries were to adopt Russian in their curriculum, too, so as to make possible the teaching of Russian in the elementary schools in the future.⁴⁹⁸

The important task of making Finnish schools turn their pupils into loyal executors of the Imperial policy, instead of separatist schemers, was even more difficult. It was not enough to increase the number of lessons in Russian if the teachers were as reluctant to teach as the pupils were to learn the language. The results remained meagre in spite of the reform. Taking up the study of Russian was held to be an unpatriotic act, "the language remained totally alien to the educated class". In 1916 only 4,2 % of the pupils took their school leaving examinations in Russian, and after the revolution in 1917 the Russian books were thrown away.⁴⁹⁹

There was much to reprove in Finnish history teachers and textbooks, too. The Moscow chauvinists already had noticed the odd views taught in the Finnish schools, and Bobrikov had demanded that a Russian point of view was to be taught.⁵⁰⁰ The Finnish pupils had been taught Swedish history until 1809, and after that Finnish, not Russian, history. It might have been expected, Seyn wrote, that Russia would have occupied a key position in the history books after 1809, but no; Russian history was taught as part of "general history", together with the history of the East European countries, Poland, Hungary, even

497 *Venäläisyys Helsingissä* . . . p. 46

498 Virtanen, *Venäjä*n . . .

499 Virtanen, *Venäjä*n . . . p. 102—105

500 Bobrikov to v. Plehwe 15.I 1901. KKK 1910, I dept., no. CL, VA

Turkey. Thus the pupils were led to believe that Finland's position in the Russian Empire somehow differed from its position as part of the Swedish Empire before 1809.

The tone was always hostile to Russia. The occupation of Finland in 1710 by Peter the Great's army was a "calamity", the war of 1808—1809 had resulted in a "defeat" and the Finns "saw the centuries-old ties broken with sorrow". In general history the Oriental wars, for instance, were credited to Russian lust of conquest, but "happily" the Berlin congress "restored the balance". In political science the Swedish laws of 1772 and 1789 or the Finnish law for the Diet in 1869 were falsely interpreted: "The Diet legislates together with the Monarch, and the civil servants must be Finnish citizens". The Finnish provincial Diet was compared with foreign Parliaments, thereby implying that Finland was a state. The geography textbooks let the pupils know that Russians lived on a primitive level of culture, without a say on the government of their country.⁵⁰¹

Seyn wrote to Stolypin that teaching and textbooks must be raised to the proper level, as dictated by the Imperial interest. The spirit of teaching was to be the spirit of respect, devotion, and loyalty. The reform was a pressing one, because the Russian cause was losing ground in the convictions of the people to the teaching of the local statehood.⁵⁰²

Some improvements in the textbooks were attained; the books were approved officially and published under the control of the school administration. For instance, the textbook of Russian geography from 1913 does not contain any intentional slurs (although there are many Eurocentric attitudes and national stereotypes, characteristic of the period in general).⁵⁰³ But the essential defect, the separatistically-minded teachers, remained irreparable. It is true that the law on equal rights expressly ordered that the Orthodox and the Russians were to be admitted as history teachers. But teachers could not be produced at will; only 35 competent teachers of the Russian language were graduated during the years 1906—1917.⁵⁰⁴ The

501 "Historian ja maantiedon oppikirjat". KKK 1904. IV dept., no. 6—19, VA

502 Seyn to Stolypin 4.XI 1910. KKK Hd 40, no. 5, VA

503 Aro-Helle, *Venäjä*n . . . 1913

504 Virtanen, *Venäjä*n . . . p. 37

elementary teacher training seminaries remained hotbeds of Finnish patriotism; the notorious example of the Sortavala Seminary will be discussed later. And the Helsinki University was downright exasperating from Seyn's point of view.

University Escapes Seyn's Control

The Imperial Alexander University of Helsinki had its own self-government, independent of the governmental system of Finland, with its Council of professors, Rector, Vice-Chancellor and Chancellor, usually the Tsesarevich.

Edv. Hjelt had been Rector during Bobrikov's time and was Vice-Chancellor during Seyn's time. He was of the opinion that the position of the University was easier during the latter period. Aleksei Nikolaevič, the heir apparent, was not born until 1904; that was why the Minister State-Secretary doubled as the Chancellor of the University, i.e. the office was filled by v. Plehwe, Langhoff, and Markov. The Governor-General had no official authority over the University. Edv. Hjelt also supposed that Kokovcov had told Seyn not to meddle with the Helsinki University.⁵⁰⁵

Seyn did have much to reproach the university students and teachers for: "They allow themselves the liberty of praising the striking pilots and are brazen enough to call the strike a fight against violence and lawlessness". Therefore the Governor-General "asked for action against the guilty and that the University would not aggravate the political situation, which was difficult enough without that".⁵⁰⁶ Seyn had to ask for action, he could not order it. In general, the University was able to avoid conflicts with diplomatic skill, without falling into compliance, and also the hot-headed students were kept from provoking the Imperial representatives. No initiative was taken to "normalize" the University.

505 Hjelt, *Från* . . . p. 268

506 Seyn to Langhoff 21.III/3.IV 1912. KKK 1912, I dept., no. 26 B-2, Va

Thus Helsinki University remained a bastion of "separatism" and of the doctrine of Finnish statehood. The University did not demand a knowledge of Russian from its students. Only Russian literature, Russian political law and the history of Russian law were taught in Russian. The University stated that "compulsory teaching in Russian does not correspond to the needs of scientific teaching, and organizing it would cause insurmountable difficulties". Let the government organize examinations for such posts where it felt that a knowledge of Russian was needed. The University did not even prepare for examinations in Russian for the year 1917 when the increased study of Russian was to reach the school leaving classes.⁵⁰⁷

During the war years the military authorities noticed that the University used German textbooks and held doctoral disputations in German. The military thought it unbecoming. The University answered that because of the students' lack of knowledge in other languages it was impossible to use any other language.⁵⁰⁸

The University's autonomy made it difficult to investigate the roots of the treasonable Jäger-movement during the war years:

"The Gendarme Administration of Finland has received information according to which the idea of creating a criminal organization in Finland with the aim of separating Finland from the Russian Empire by violent means was born among the local students. Even in general the students and teachers of the University with their separatist views have played an important role on propagating hostility towards Russia".⁵⁰⁹

Markov was as lazy a Chancellor of the University as he was lax a Minister State-Secretary. He answered Seyn that he had no means of supervising the University from his office in St. Petersburg. He had only one secretary in Helsinki for this task. That was why the University had succeeded in freeing itself from the supervision of the administration. It was much easier for the Imperial representatives in Helsinki to keep an eye on

507 Markov to Seyn 13/26.V 1915. KKK He 5, VA

508 Hjelt, *Från . . .* p. 295—296

509 Seyn to Markov 28.VII/6.VIII 1916. KKK Hd 104, no. 2, Va

the University.⁵¹⁰ We have seen that Seyn was always eager to undertake new tasks and powers, but it looks as if the wartime was causing enough trouble for him, and he refused the Chancellorship.⁵¹¹

Censoring the Finnish Press

The Finnish press was the sick point in the country in Seyn's opinion. The press law of Bobrikov's days had been made void in consequence of the November Manifesto in 1905. The press caused much harm with its hostile, brazen, knowingly false articles. It was dangerous because the Finns were a literate people and newspapers were blindly trusted. The ugly and coarse tone of the press, especially offensive about the Emperor, was the principal reason for the agitation in the country. The liberty of meeting and association was also a grave defect.⁵¹²

For the Finns the stupidity of the oppressor was a welcome relief during these gloomy days; the Russians could be at least ridiculed if nothing else could be done against them: "The fear, felt by the Imperial government and their representatives in the country, of an armed popular rising in Finland, has reached comical forms, against all common sense, to the detriment of the authority of the governmental power in the country".⁵¹³

The armed forces were extremely angry at the headlines in the newspapers, e.g. "Several Nelsons drunk during the Battle of Tsushima", "Officers steal bath-towels", "The Russian swimming coffins", "A Russian soldier intent on rape",

510 Markov to Seyn 1.IX 1916. KKK Hd 104, no. 2, Va

511 Seyn to Markov 20.XII 1916/2.I 1917. KKK Hd 104 no. 2, VA

512 "Zapiska" by Seyn to Stolypin 27.X 1910. Vysočaiše učreždennoe Podgotovitel'noi Kommissii Proekt zakonodatel'nyh program dlja Finljandii i materialy 1912—1913. Helsingin Yliopiston Kirjasto

513 *Nya Pressen* 13.IV 1911, *Hufvudstadsbladet* 14.IV 1911. KKK Hd 103, no. 1, VA

"Cossacks disturb the peace", "The Ino batteries prepared for the song festival at Terijoki".⁵¹⁴

It was extremely difficult to stifle this noise because of the lack of censorship legislation and because of the reluctance of the Finnish justice.⁵¹⁵

To the post of the chief censor was appointed Vladimir (Voldemar) Kanninen, who agreed with the Governor-General's view that during the years 1906—1908 the press was in bad way, being in a state of complete freedom. Not even sample numbers of newspapers had been sent to the Press Board, and legal action had only seldom been brought against the worst offenders. It was not until April 1909 that the Senate had allowed the Press Board 10,000 marks, so that they could subscribe to newspapers and hire people to read them. Twenty-seven cases of *lèse-majesty* were brought to court, as well as five cases of blasphemy.

Next year, under the new Governor-General and a right-thinking Senate, more money was allocated for the censors. The most important towns got their press supervisors. The Senate ordered all newspapers to send copies of their issues to be censored — Old Finns obeyed, other political groups were reluctant. The result was 25 cases of *lèse-majesty* and 42 other cases.

In 1911 the work for the re-establishment of legality was continued. Starting newspapers without leave was stopped. Surveillance was improved, although it remained far from satisfactory. The police started prohibiting theatre performances for which permission had not been asked. Newspapers imported from the Empire were confiscated, but censoring foreign newspapers imported into Finland remained a problem. In spite of all this, the press remained intractable, especially the Social Democratic press.⁵¹⁶

The above report of Kanninen's is a bit self-congratulatory; it seems that the press remained a problem until the war-time. Then the military authorities set up a tolerably effective

514 Sotaväkeen kohdistuneet loukkaukset (Insults against the military). KKK 1911, I dept., no. 44 1-9

515 "Zapiska" . . . = 512

516 Dokladnaja zapiska po voprosu o predstavlenii očerka položenija pečati v F. 1909—1912. (signed by V. Kanninen). KKK Hd 105, no. 18, Va

preventive censorship. The report is also interesting as a proof of the official, appalled attitude to the liberty of the press, which was looked on as equal to anarchy or revolution.

Bobrikov had set up an official organ of his own, the *Finljandskaja Gazeta*, to counteract the "false, separatist propaganda" of the Finnish press by impartial, true, and exact information and reproducing the Imperial point of view. It was to remove misunderstandings in Russia concerning Finland, and it was to make the best sides of Russia known to the Finns, to counterbalance the blackenings of Russian circumstances by the Finnish press. To the Finnish Senate Bobrikov explained that the aim was peace, friendship, and closer ties between Finland and Russia. The paper was published under the auspices of the Governor-General, but paid for by the Finnish state. It was modelled on the *Varšavskii Dnevnik*.

The Governor-General's newspaper was published from 1900 to 1917, but it was not a success. It was rarely read by anyone but the Russians in Finland, the circulation did not surpass one thousand at the best. Thus as a propaganda effort it was a failure. During the Mechelin years the *Finljandskaja Gazeta* only just managed to survive. During Seyn's time the paper was revived by the provision of renewed financial support, but it looks as if the Governor-General soon lost his teacher's faith in its propaganda effect. It remained an official paper for the Governor-General's office and for the Russified Senate, publishing official announcements and advertisements for the Russian colony in Finland. The editors were trusted members of the Governor-General's office; they changed rather often, without any one proving to have outstanding talent or personality.⁵¹⁷

Neither the preventive effect of the censorship nor the positive effort of propaganda were able to make good Imperial Russians out of the separatist Finns, who were too deeply imbued with their "false separatist doctrines". The war-time military censorship only suppressed the outward signs of the "agitation" in the Grand Duchy.

517 Torvinen, *Venäläiset* . . . p. 241—257

The Russification of the Orthodox

A visit to the *Uspenskiî* Cathedral in Helsinki was included among the formalities of Seyn's inauguration programme when he entered office in 1909. Sergeî, "Archbishop of Viipuri and of all Finland", addressed him:

"We hope that Your Gracious Excellency, loving the country and being industrious, with God's help, will fulfill our hopes and endeavour to govern the country to the benefit of our common fatherland and, identical with it, in the interests of the progress of Finland".⁵¹⁸

We have seen the Orthodox church in Grodno supporting the Right and the pro-government parties and their nationalist policies. There were a few Orthodox Russians settled in Finland, and their position was referred to in the argument for the equal rights which the law of 1912 aimed for, as we have seen. But many of these Russians caused a disappointment to the Governor-General and his aides. They adopted the Finnish point of view; some of them had even Finnicized their names; and the Helsinki Orthodox congregation had been reluctant to admit transient Russian officers and officials as members.

The Orthodox church had been saved from the degradation of being under Finnish authorities when the diocese had been established under the Holy Synod in 1882; consequently its position had not been a cardinal point in Bobrikov's programme. But from the Imperial point of view the first Bishop, Antoni, had not been quite up to his task; he had even allowed divine service to be held in Finnish where the parishioners did not understand the Slavonic language. It was not until Sergeî was appointed archbishop in 1905 that the Tsarist attack really began to be supported by the Church. The contradiction between their Orthodox religion and Finnish nationality caused problems for many people.⁵¹⁹

518 *Finljandskaja Gazeta* 23.XI/6.XII 1909. KKK 1909, III dept., no. 53, VA

519 Sergeî, originally Ivan Starogorodskii, Archbishop of Finland 1905—1917.

It is perhaps characteristic of the patriotism of the man that when appointed Metropolitan (Nižniĭ Novgorod 1917, Moscow 1934) he contributed to the submission of the Russian church to the Soviet power

In Lutheran Finland there was not much hope that religion would help to reinforce the Russian position. It was enough if the Russian power could make life bearable for the Orthodox congregations, jeered at by the more loutish Finns. The alliance of the Altar and the Throne was symbolized by the fact that Orthodox churches were built in the garrison towns.

But in the Eastern Finland, in parts of Karelia, there remained an Orthodox population. It was threatened by Pan-Finnism and Lutheranism, (that is, many enlightened Orthodox people had adopted the Finnish national viewpoint and the model of the cultural and social work of the western church).⁵²⁰ In his inaugural address Sergei reminded the Governor-General

”of the vital spiritual needs of the population in eastern Finland, of the necessity of safeguarding their religion, confessed in communion with the Russians since ancient times; he asked the Chief Official of the Land for his mighty support for the actions and endeavours of the Orthodox priesthood to preserve the souls, the religious convictions, and the sympathy towards the Russians, of this people”.

Deeply moved Seyn promised to cherish the Arch-pastorial words of His Holiness in his heart.⁵²¹ The inaugural programme included also a visit to the Lutheran church of St. Nicholas in the centre of Helsinki. It is probable that the formally correct greetings there were not so deeply felt and so graciously received as in the first cathedral. Nor did Seyn ever remind anyone that was actually a Lutheran. He even donated 1,000 marks to the building of an Orthodox church for the second Russian rifle regiment.⁵²²

Because of their Orthodox religion and of their Russian sympathies, there really existed a possibility of acquiring

and patriotic defence in 1941, which led to his advancement to the See of the Patriarch of Moscow in 1943

520 The problems of being a Finn and an Orthodox has been discussed, from the Finnish point of view, by Koukkunen, Okulov, Setälä

521 *Finlåndskaja Gazeta* 23.XI/6.XII 1909. KKK 1909, III dept., no. 53, VA

522 Seyn to Lieutenant General Olhovskii 2/15.VIII 1910. KKK 1910, II dept., no. 3-12, VA

support among the people of easternmost Finland for the governmental policy of integrating the country with Russia and even for Russification. Since the twelfth century Karelia had been part of the sphere of influence of Novgorod, then of Muscovy, and it was only since the seventeenth century that Sweden had conquered the Western Karelia; and Peter I had retaken part of it in 1721. Religion and the way of life united many of the Karelians to the Russians, while Lutheran Finns were "Swedes" for them.

Finns, on their part, thought that because their language was Finnish, all Karelians were Finns. In 1812 Alexander I joined the part of Karelia that Peter I had conquered to the Grand Duchy. But it was not until the 1880s that Finnish culture began spreading into Orthodox Karelia. The Karelian railway made the frontier Karelia part of the Finnish national economy. Local self-government, started in the 1860s, brought in Finnish laws, customs, and officials to the province. The most pernicious influence to the Russian cause was that of the elementary schools, whose teachers were trained at the Sortavala teachers' training Seminary, inspired by Finnish nationalism and even Lutheranism.

The idea of a Greater Finnish nation stretched beyond the frontiers of the Grand Duchy into Russian Karelia, too, with voluntary propagandists setting up schools and libraries. The inhabitants of Ingria, in the immediate vicinity of the Imperial capital, were reminded of their Finnish roots. The cultural contacts over the Gulf of Finland with the Estonians, the closest relatives of the Finns, were extremely lively. A scientific and artistic interest covered the most obscure and far-away Fenno-Ugrian tribes in Siberia. The most nervous Russians saw emerging the threatening chimaera of a Pan-Finnish movement, only waiting for its Alexander the Great, to create a Finnish Empire from the Gulf of Bothnia to the Pacific Ocean.⁵²³

523 *Sovremennoe položenie del v finljandskoi Karelii.* (a memorandum by V.I. Krohin, an official at the Office of the Governor General.) KKK 1907, IV dept., no. 49, VA — *Pravoslavnaja Karelija. Očer. S. Peterburg, 1914*, pp. 143. KKK 1911., II dept., no. 5—6, VA — *Zapiska ob ofinenii Karelii i o merah k presečeniju sego prinjatyh.* KKK 1912, II dept., no. 55-3, VA — *Panskandinavskijja i panfinskijja stremlenija finljandtsev.* KKK 1914, I dept., no. 26-B-15, VA

Thus it was both necessary and possible to support the Orthodox religion in the eastern parts of Finland. It implied strengthening the Russian influence there and fortifying the idea that both Karelia and Finland were parts of the indivisible Russian Empire.

A proposal was made to put Karelia under the Bishop of Olonets, but it was deemed to be too far away. Instead, Kiprianos, a young and zealous aide of Sergei, was appointed Suffragan Bishop of Sortavala in 1913. He also led the "Orthodox Karelian Brotherhood of Victorious St. George", established in lieu of the dissolved Finnish-tainted Brotherhood of St. Herman and Sergius, in the attack against the Lutheran influence. The attempt to remove the Seminary from Sortavala was unsuccessful, but instead an Orthodox teacher's training school was established in Viipuri. Starting from 1908 the Finnish state was made to pay for the Russian schools established in Karelia, the number of which was increased by the efforts of Sergei and Seyn, with the support of the Holy Synod and the Ministry of Education. For instance, in 1912, in celebration of the bicentenary of uniting Karelia with Russia, several chapels and schools were opened, some of them donated by local Russian-speaking inhabitants. One of the schools was dedicated to the memory of N.I. Bobrikov, another was christened "Sofiiskaja" in honour of Seyn's wife.⁵²⁴

Plans for Detaching Karelia from Finland

These measures could be of no decisive importance as long as Orthodox Karelia was under a Finnish administration, which

524 Hämynen, *Kahden kulttuurin...* — Otčet o dejatel'nosti pravoslavnago karelskago bratstva vo imja vs. velikomučenika i pobenostsa Georgija, v predelah finljandskoi Karelii, za pjatii bratskii god, s 1-go dekabnja 1911 po 1-go dekabnja 1912 goda. Vyborg 1916. — Ob otkrytii v Finljandii russkoi učitel'skii seminarii. KKK 1911, II dept., no. 5-6, VA — O prazdestvah v Salme. KKK 1912, III dept., no. 99. VA

was not completely controlled by Seyn. In fact, local and school authorities managed to be almost completely outside his control. The economy aggression of the Finns could only feebly be counteracted by a new railway connecting Karelia and the interior of Finland with St. Petersburg. A branch of the Imperial State Bank was opened in Viipuri, but it was not very effective in tempting Russian entrepreneurs into the province. Something else had to be found.

In 1909 the military authorities had demanded that the two frontier parishes, Uusikirkko and Kivennapa, be removed from under Finnish jurisdiction to be annexed to the *gubernija* of St. Petersburg, in order to establish the Russian rules of fortress administration in the surroundings of the new fortress of Ino. We have seen the violent Finnish protest and the suspicion it provoked in the Russian mind.

It was a proof that the Finns were unreliable; this meant that the annexion of two parishes was not enough. The line of defence of the capital was moved forward to the Kymijoki—Suursaari—Narva line, the island of Koivisto was to be fortified, and an inland lake fleet was being planned, to be based at Lappeenranta and Savonlinna. The military authorities decided that the whole of the Viipuri *gubernija*, i.e. Finnish Karelia, was to be annexed to Russia. The inhabitants were to lose their Finnish citizenship and they were to serve in the Russian army. Their property and personal rights would be protected by Russian laws, the property of the Finnish state was to be taken over by the appropriate Imperial authorities. A committee was set up to work out the details; the work was supposed to take two years, from 1914 to 1916,⁵²⁵ i.e. the realization of the planned measure was in fact put off until 1940 and 1944.

Seyn had supported the proposal eagerly. Of course, he accepted the military reasons for the annexation, but he added that it was the sole means of effectively protecting Orthodox and Russian-minded Karelia from Pan-Finnish violence. It would cut through the economic, social, and cultural dependence on Finland. It would strengthen the historical ties

525 Žurnal Vysočaiše učreždennago osobago soveščanija po prisoedinenii Vyborgskoi gubernii k Imperii, 21.IV 1914. — Osobyi Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 29.VIII 1914. KKK 1914, II dept., no. 104, VA

of the Karelians with the Russians, would safeguard the foundations of Russian nationality and culture from the Finnish menace, would prevent the Finnish teachers, bankers, and administrators in Sortavala from propagating nationalism and hatred towards Russia. It would be a decisive strike against Pan-Finnism; it would ward off the Finnish aggression into the *gubernijas* of Olonets, Archangelsk, and St. Petersburg. It would also make easier the extremely difficult position of the Valamo and Konevitsa monasteries, threatened by Finnish hooligans.⁵²⁶

Seyn's hopes in respect of Finnish Karelia came to nought, but the Finnish propaganda on the Russian side of the frontier, in Karelia and Ingria, was prohibited and the Finnish schools and libraries closed down or Russified by the Imperial administration in 1911—1914.

That Seyn was personally interested in the Karelian cause was proved by the fact that he donated 10,000 marks (from his pay of 80,000) to the work of reviving the national idea in Karelia and to the fight against Pan-Finnish propaganda.⁵²⁷ Thus the "Karelian population could clearly see that the representative of His Majesty took a personal notice of their needs".⁵²⁸

If imperialism is defined as the spreading over a weaker culture of another culture with more military, financial, commercial, industrial, educational, and organizational power or appeal, then we can speak of a clash between Russian and Finnish imperialisms in Karelia and among the Finnish tribes. The fear of the Moscow chauvinists for the Pan-Finnish threat need not have been so ridiculous as it nowadays seems, nor was the idea of a Greater Finland inherently any more absurd than, for example, the idea of Greater Serbia. It is only because of greater Russian might that Finland has a right to no more than a tiny part of Karelia.

526 O neobhodimosti otdelenija Vyborgskoi gubernii. KKK 1913, I dept., no. 1-7, VA

527 Seyn to Sergei 16/29.IV 1910. KKK 1910, II dept., no. 3-9, VA

528 Sergei to Seyn 19.X 1910. KKK 1910, II dept., no. 3-9, VA

Russification as the Final Solution

There were people in Russia who thought that Finns ought to be and could be made to be Russians. Törnngren, from his observation post in St. Petersburg, concluded:

"I have noticed that people in all Russian circles are convinced of the feasibility of assimilating the Finnish population in Finland in the course of a comparatively short time. From experience they know that the Finnish tribes have not opposed Russification at all. Even the East Karelians, who were at the highest stage of development, lost their individuality at once when Russian schools were organized among them".⁵²⁹

A proposal to teach the national minorities in their own languages "deeply hurt the national pride and patriotic feelings of the Russian participants" at a teachers' meeting. They declared in their most loyal address to the Emperor that

"they tried to serve the great Russian cause with their humble efforts, to unite politically and culturally all the tribes and nationalities which for centuries had been gathered under the mighty Russian sceptre".

The Emperor was pleased and cordially thanked the Russian elementary school teachers for their love and loyalty "to our great Russia".⁵³⁰

One of the reasons for national military service had been the hope that it would imbue the youth of the ethnic minorities with Russian patriotic feeling and encourage them to spread Russian influence after their service among their people.⁵³¹ Such had been one of the intentions behind linking a Finnish military service with the Imperial forces. The general who

529 Törnngren, *Från* . . . p. 298

530 The director of Russian elementary schools in Finland to Seyn 16.III 1914 (with the address attached; the Emperor's marginal note 19.III 1914) KKK Hd 104, no. 5, VA

531 (Miljutin 1870:) *Novoi povorot v naših voennyh reformah*, p. 90, 100. Gosudarstvennaja Ordena Lenina Biblioteka SSSR imeni V.I. Lenina/Mf NL 218, VA

wrote the memorandum said that it would be ridiculous to try to Russify the Finns, but they were to be made to adopt the Imperial Russian way of thinking.⁵³² The organization of a separate Finnish army had been completely contradictory to these aims and was to the detriment of Imperial defence and unity of the Empire.⁵³³ Bobrikov had come to Finland to reconquer the Grand Duchy, and one of his essential reforms had been the new military law of 1901 unifying the military establishment in Finland with the Imperial army and increasing the number of Russian troops in Finland, with the express intention of Russifying the Finns.⁵³⁴ There were several instances where Bobrikov wrote of *obrusenie*, and Witte called Bobrikov's policy "Russification".⁵³⁵

Seyn never called his policy Russification. His aim was to unite Finland politically with the other parts of Russia and to strengthen the Russian influence by planting Russian culture there, supporting the Orthodox religion, and favouring Russian economic enterprise. In Karelia the nationality of the people did not prevent attempts of Russification, which religion and popular attitudes seemed to make feasible.

The contemporary Finns believed that Russification was the fate that was designed for them, because of an irrational Russian chauvinism and imperialism, which the Russian state served. Another, later explanation was that the Russian government was only interested in securing its power in Finland in order to guarantee the military safety of the Imperial capital. We have seen that the reform of the official language did not aim at preventing Finns from using their native language in private or cultural life.⁵³⁶ Leafing through Seyn's documents, it seems that his aim "was not Russification, it was making the order-keeping machinery loyal and strong".⁵³⁷ Perhaps Seyn ought to be declared innocent of the chauvinist crime of Russification.

532 Zapiska General-Maiora Zalesova (s.d., from the end of the 1860s). Ven sot asiak 202, p. 211—242

533 Zolotarev, *Materialy* . . . 356—359

534 Bobrikov to Plehwe 29.IX 1903. KKK Hd 80, no. 5, VA

535 Witte, *Vospominaniya* III, p. 270

536 Jussila, *Förfinskning* . . . p. 1—17

537 Jussila, *Nationalismi* . . . p. 248

There is some doubt left lingering, nevertheless. When planning the programme of adopting Russian as the official language of the higher administration, Seyn wrote for himself an aide-memoire: "from particular to general step by step".⁵³⁸ In the Senate the two Finnish-born members declared that Russia would in the end "dissolve" Finland. It has also been remarked that the aim of safeguarding power and military position does not contradict a chauvinistic wish for Russification.⁵³⁹ The Emperor's approval of the patriotic feelings of the teachers shows that Nicholas II did not oppose the strengthening of the Russian education to the detriment of local minority cultures. Preparation for elementary education in Russian was not called for by any needs of the administration.

There is no definite proof of the existence of a programme of Russifying the Finns in the official documents. But official documents are not the whole historical truth; they only show what the government held to be immediately possible and necessary. And the government was identical with Russia only juridically; it cannot be said that Russia definitely wanted or did not want to Russify the national minorities. There were currents of thought for and against it and some were indifferent to it, with more or less chance of having influence in the decision-making process. Complete Russification might have seemed to be the best way of definitely solving all the problems Seyn faced. At the same time it would have satisfied the nationally-thinking part of the Russian public, thus securing the government their support; that seems to have been at least part of Stolypin's motives, as we have seen.

In any case, happily for Finnish national society, the Imperial government was unable to achieve and could not even really try to achieve a final solution of Russification for the problem of its north-western frontier. But it is not completely wrong to call the years of Imperialism in Finland the era of Russification.

538 Draft programmes by Seyn. KKK Hd 103, no. 3, item VI, VA, and a draft "Programma voprosov" p. 2, item "Russkiĭ jazyk", KKK Hd 94, no. 2, VA

539 Polvinen, ref. Jussila *Nationalismi* . . . p. 101—104

Uphill Work

Economic Integration

Finland had a monetary system of its own, and the finances of the Finnish State were based on revenue from its own customs service. Thus the politically autonomous Finnish state was independent of Russia economically, which strengthened the development towards political particularism. We have seen the difficulties the Russians had in making Finland pay the "Military Millions". The separate state finances made even the Russified Senate oppose further Imperial demands on Finnish tribute. The people could not be made to pay taxes which were not approved by the Diet. The Russian state was not willing enough or powerful enough to exploit Finland financially.

It is true that export to and import from Russia was important for Finland,⁵⁴⁰ and many Finns went to work in St. Petersburg,⁵⁴¹ while the society of the capital loved to spend their summers and much of their money on the Karelian Isthmus.⁵⁴² Thus economic independence was not total, but any national economy is an integral part of the neighbourhood, European, and world economy.

Neither the Russian government nor Seyn was able to

540 Pihkala, *Suomen Venäjän-kauppa* . . .

541 Engman, *St. Petersburg* . . .

542 Hämäläinen, *Karjalan kannaksen* . . . 1969 & 1974

mobilize Russian capital for an economic conquest of Finland. Seyn had been educated as a soldier, an administrator, a gendarme, and economic questions do not seem to have had much interest for him. The Russian Ministry of Finance was led by Kokovcov up to 1914, and by Bark after that; neither of them was a zealous chauvinist in relation to Finland so that financial and bureaucratic arguments for the independence of the Finnish economy were acceptable to them. It is true that Seyn favoured establishing a branch of the Imperial State Bank in Viipuri and building a railway from St. Petersburg through eastern Finland in order to encourage Russian landowners and commercial or industrial entrepreneurs to settle in the Grand Duchy. But, in advocating these measures, Seyn was not speaking for the interests of Russian finance or capital. His aim was, as always, political and military; increasing Russian influence and thereby strengthening Imperial security and might in the border country.⁵⁴³ Nor was Seyn's attempt a very energetic one; he did not make a second proposal until five years later. In January 1917 the Governor-General suggested establishing further branches of the State Bank in Finland, first of all in Helsinki, Tampere and Turku.⁵⁴⁴

Russifying the Finnish capital market was a task different from legislative and administrative Russification. The support of the Moscow chauvinists did not help much in economic issues, and the attempt did not receive any support from Russian capital or the bourgeoisie; on the contrary, the latter opposed attempts at integrating the customs service.

The Emperor Alexander III had in his own hand written in 1889 that a customs union must be achieved, and that it was inadmissible for the Finnish postal and monetary system to exist separately. In 1897 Nicholas II had renewed the Imperial order, and in 1900 a committee had been set up to prepare for the customs union. There were many kinds of formal and practical difficulties — by an Imperial decree of 1821 the town of Tampere enjoyed a freedom of import duties until 1905 which prevented the review of the system, while in 1905 the revolution effectively prevented any general reform. The

543 Seyn to Stolypin 30.III 1911. KKK Dd 9, VA

544 Bark to Seyn 12.I 1917. Seyn to Bark 21.I 1917. KKK 1917, II dept., no. 40, VA

commercial treaties (1894, 1904) with Germany excluded Finland from the Russian customs area. It was only in 1910 that the Council of Ministers decided to speed up the realization of the customs union, and Nicholas concurred: "I specially stress the execution of this project".⁵⁴⁵

Seyn attached special importance to the question of the corn tariff. German corn was driving Russian rye out of the Finnish market. Seyn wrote that Russian sellers ought to be more aggressive, Russian banks ought to support them, and the Russian state could help by lowering the railway tariffs for corn exports to Finland and by creating a railway link over the river Neva. But the most effective measure would be to make the German corn pay import duties.⁵⁴⁶ Even here the political aspect seems to have been more important for Seyn than favouring the Russian rye producers, the Rightist landowners: German corn was alienating Finland from Russia, and tariff autonomy was a support for political separatism. The corn duty was increased in 1914, but the importance of this step cannot be measured, because the war made imports from Germany impossible in any case.⁵⁴⁷

The general integration of the customs service was studied by a committee in 1912—1914, this committee continuing the work of the 1900 committee. There were representatives of both Finnish and Russian industry on the committee in addition to the governmental members. The Russian representatives remarked that the corn duty could be laid down independently of the general regulation of tariffs, which was a very difficult question. It was true that the Russian industry could gain an additional market of three-million people, but the Russian market of one-hundred-and-fifty million people would be opened to the Finnish industry, which would then be a deadly rival for Russian producers. The highly trained Finnish workers, the cheap energy in Finland, the different level of taxation there and many other factors would result in a competitive situation causing insuperable difficulties for Russian wood, paper, textile, metal, ceramics and other

545 *Materiály po voprosu ob ob'jedinenii v tamožennom otnošenii Finljandii s pročimi častjami Rossijskago Gosudarstva*, 1912. VSV Hc 1, VA

546 Seyn to Stolypin 20.VIII 1911. KKK Hd 10, VA

547 Rasila, *Vuoden 1914 viljatulli* . . .

industries; Finnish ports and shipping would take over much of Russia's sea-trade.

For Russian capital, Finland was thus a deadly rival to be closed out, not a market to be conquered. Carl Enckell, then active in the business world, later maliciously reminisced over the helpless anger of the bureaucrats and chauvinists who had to give up their attempt to coerce Finland.⁵⁴⁸

The war interrupted the work of the committee, but the tariff question was further discussed in 1915 and 1916. A meeting chaired by Goremykin, the Prime Minister, decided that the nomenclature of the Finnish tariff ought to be made identical to that of the Imperial tariff in a decree to be given by the Emperor. The general unification of the customs area of Finland with the Imperial customs was to follow later. The necessary legislation would follow the Imperial procedure decreed in 1910.⁵⁴⁹

The Senate noted that many problems were involved in the integration of the customs services, because the system of taxation was different in the Grand Duchy from that of Russia, while the state finances of Finland were built mainly upon the customs revenue, only additional taxes being voted by the Diet. It would too be difficult to calculate the proportion of the integrated customs revenue which would fall to the treasury of the Grand Duchy. The Senate also found a few arguments for the integration, but thought that it was not necessary to take any concrete measures while the war was going on.⁵⁵⁰ Thus again the Russified Senate opposed any immediate restriction of Finnish autonomy, trying to preserve their own sphere of activity.

After his initial statement, Seyn does not seem to have participated very energetically in this discussion, although his office kept him informed, of course. Working out the financial details, without political or security implications, fell within

548 Enckell, *Poliittiset* . . . I p. 36

549 *Žurnal Osobago Soveščanija* 18.IV 1915. VSV Hc 5, VA

550 *Ministerstvo Finansov* 22.XII 1916. Po voprosu o dal'nejšem napravlenii dela o tamožennom ob'jedenenii Finljandii s pročimi častjami Rossiiskago Gosudarstva. VSV Hc 7, VA (includes a review of the discussions since 1911)

the competence of the Senate and the Ministry of Finance.⁵⁵¹

All this would seem to show that Russian imperialism vis-à-vis Finland was not due to economic factors or capitalist pressure; it was "military-feudal" imperialism.⁵⁵²

During Bobrikov's time the Russian golden coin had been made official tender in Finland, but in practice the metal coin was not in circulation and thus monetary independence was maintained. During the war years the Russian rouble decreased in value, and the Finnish gold reserve was threatened, because of the obligation of the Finnish Bank to buy roubles at the compulsory rate of exchange of 2 2/3 marks. The Senate said that the loss might be regarded as Finland's contribution to the Imperial war effort, but that notwithstanding asked the Imperial government to free the mark from its bondage. An "extraordinary" meeting decided that the compulsory rate of exchange was inflating the Finnish money and making life expensive in Finland, while being of no vital importance for the Imperial finances. The necessary amount of marks could be raised by government loans.⁵⁵³

The Finnish mark remained in practice independent of the Russian rouble. This was not what Seyn had proposed in the meeting. He had favoured an obligation upon the Bank of Finland to buy unlimited amounts of roubles at the compulsory rate of exchange. This would have revived the circulation of the rouble in Finland, which would correspond to the principle of Russo-Finnish unity. Bark, the Minister of Finance, admitted that the solution would mean the integration of the Finnish monetary system into the Russian system; but the moment was not propitious for such a difficult measure, which could be taken only in normal times.

Seyn reminded the meeting of the ultimate aims of Russian

551 The customs and other economic relations between Finland and Russia are discussed at some length by Kornilov, *Russko-Finljandskie . . .* and Bobovič-Bovykin, *Venäjän ja Suomen . . .*

552 The nature of the Russian imperialism has been discussed endlessly; a useful and not wholly doctrinaire overview, written during the post-Stalin "thaw", is Sidorov, *Ob osobennosti . . .*

On the Russian economy during the war years, cf. e.g. Sidorov, *Finansovoe položenie . . .* or Pogrebinskiĭ, *Gosudarstvennye finansy . . .*

553 *Žurnal soveščanija po voprosu ob uregulirovanija kursa rublja v Finljandii* 26.IX 1915. VSV Hc 5, VA

policy in Finland, but the dictates of the war-time financial crisis were teaching practical wisdom to the Imperial government. It were the Imperial interests that dictated that the Finnish autonomy be left undisturbed. This was to be a recurrent theme in war-time discussion, as we shall see later.

Buying Popular Support

During Easter 1903 Bobrikov had made the garrison kitchens feed the poor people of Helsinki. The hungry mob wept out of gratitude.⁵⁵⁴ For the Russifiers the Finnish intelligentsia was suspect in principle, being mostly Swedish-speaking, and in any case contaminated by western ideas of legality, constitutionalism, a narrowly local nationalism etc. But the poor people were believed to trust in the Tsar and to be prepared to stand for Russia. It was supposed that the Russian cause could be built upon the support of the Finnish nation proper, ignoring the alien educated strata.

The Emperor Alexander III had felt a paternalist compassion for the landless, even in Finland; he had written that it was "extremely necessary" to study ways and means for the improvement of their lot.⁵⁵⁵ That was why Bobrikov had attached a special importance to the improvement of the conditions of life of the landless proletariat in the countryside; his initiative had led to some remarkable studies of the problem, but not to any material improvement.⁵⁵⁶

Politically most important was the situation of the crofters, the highest strata of the landless, who in fact worked land although they did not own but paid in labor for the right to work it and were always in the danger of being evicted. In 1909 the Diet made a law protecting the tenants from arbitrary

554 Estlander, *Elva  rtionden* . . . III, p. 207

555 The Emperor's margin on the report: *Sostojanii Finljandii po ot etam gubernatorov za 1881—1884. Kratkii vsepoddannei ii ot et.* KKK 1899, no. 72, VA

556 Kairamo, *Maanhankinta* . . .

eviction. We have seen the constitutional conflict which followed the dissolution of the Diet before the Emperor had sanctioned the new law and the subsequent unconstitutional Imperial manifesto. But the unconstitutional law was obeyed in practice, and thus the Russian Emperor was seen as the protector of the poor Finns in contrast to their Finnish landlords who resorted to a constitutional pretext in order to be able to lord it over their tenants.⁵⁵⁷

It is not clear whether Seyn was able to make known to the poor people that it was the Emperor who protected them; he had no effective means of propaganda at his disposal, the official proclamations excepted. The Emperor had given five million marks to help the landless; in 1908 it was decreed that every time a loan was to be given out of the interest from these funds, the Emperor was to be asked personally for the loan, to make clear his concern for the poor.⁵⁵⁸

In the 1914 Diet the Finnish parties were still unable to agree on the status of the crofters. Seyn explained that the local parties defended the poor people dishonestly, wanting to annul the protection given to them in 1909 and that they were only trying to foist the guilt on the Imperial government. The Socialists were equally dishonest, because an improvement in the conditions of the rural proletariat and the consequent elimination of class hatred was not in the interest of the party, Seyn maintained. The decision was put off until the next Diet, to be convened in 1917. Seyn doubted whether a positive result was to be expected even then.

But, meanwhile, the temporary protection given to the crofters was to expire in March 1916. Eviction threatened 61,000 crofters, i.e. about 300,000 persons in all. A meeting of crofters had decided to oppose any eviction. Seyn was afraid of massive social conflict in which the Russians might find themselves on the wrong side, as in 1906 Cossacks had been called to help Finnish officials to evict a few recalcitrant crofters.

557 *Osoyí žurnal Soveta Ministrov* 7.III 1909, 5.V 1909. VSV Hc 1, VA. For a thorough discussion of the crofter problem: Rasila, *Suomen...* and Rasila, *Torpparikysymyksen...*

558 Council of Ministers to the Governor-General 6.XII 1908. KKK Hd 40, no. 5, VA

The initial Russian reaction had been to think about calling an extraordinary Diet as soon as the war had ended, in the autumn of 1915 at the latest. But the war did not end, and no good was expected of a Finnish Diet during wartime. A conclusive solution to the problems of the landless population had therefore to be put off till more peaceful times. The mass eviction and the consequent social disturbance were avoided by an Imperial manifesto by which the protection for the crofters granted in 1909 was continued until the definitive regulation occurred.⁵⁵⁹

The industrial workers, many of them Social Democrats, were the most suspected population group in Finland from the gendarme and government point of view. The gendarme-reports bear witness to the zeal with which the labour movement and press was spied upon. The Red Guard was, in these reports, seen as a constituent part of the *Voima*. All that notwithstanding, the belief in the inherent loyalty of the lower orders was so deeply ingrained in the ideas of the Russian elite that sometimes the Socialists were preferred to the passive opposition. The Socialist leaders were not members of the separatist, mostly Swedish-speaking intelligentsia; they were "half-educated school drop-outs or self-taught troublemakers", and thus not very dangerous. Their idea of class-conflict was a useful means of dividing the Finnish national opposition, and their internationalism implied the approving of equal rights for Russians in Finland. The possibility that the Socialists would join the resistance was not excluded, once the general situation became dangerous for Russia; but in general the Socialists hated other Finnish parties, not the Russian government. This was the view of General Ivanov from the Stavka.⁵⁶⁰

This much at least can be said: that the Finnish Socialists did not definitely know whom to hate more, the local bourgeoisie or the Imperial oppressor.

The Russian conviction in the loyalty of the poor people was not completely without a basis in reality. Everyday life was not

559 Osobyí Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 3.X 1914, 1.XII 1914, 2.IX 1915. — Osoboe soveščnie po delam V.K.F... 23.VI 1914, 18.IV 1915, — Seyn to Goremykin 30.III 1915. VSV 1915, no. 78. VA

560 Pamjatnaja zapiska o mestnom naselenii Finljandii. Gen.ad. Ivanov, Stavka, 23.IX 1916. VSV Hc 7, VA

always coloured by the political contradiction. Russians were regarded as human beings; people traded with them and worked with them, and even socialized with them. The politically-thinking Finnish elite observed this with disapproval:

"in the fortification work the workers fraternized with the Russian comrades and learned to be paid for imaginary work, deceiving their foremen . . ."

and

"it was humbling to see how immorally many Finns had intercourse with the alien garrisons . . . I heard of many 'engagements' of even educated Finnish girls with Russian soldiers, so it is not to be wondered at the simple servant girls who could not ward off the amatory advances . . . The only solace is that the offspring will be educated in the Lutheran belief of the mother"⁵⁶¹

In the circumstances under which the poorer classes lived, the abstract Finnish law was hardly important or useful enough to make people reject well-paid work or the rare enjoyments that the Russian presence offered. And the legality of the better-off people only too often seemed to be a means of preserving privilege and keeping the poor people out.

Most of the voluntary informants of the gendarmes were poorly-educated persons. Their existence was an unpleasant surprise for the elite, who had been taught by the poet Runeberg to idolize the Finnish people (in the usual nineteenth-century romantically-nationalist outlook, as the font of wisdom and virtue). It was reported that

"our Governor-General (Bobrikov) had succeeded in organizing a system of information . . . a number of native spies and informers had entered his service, revealing a feature in our national character of which we had been ignorant . . ."⁵⁶²

561 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . II, p. 122—164, 284

562 Estlander, *Elva* . . . III p., 95

This was well known to Seyn, and from his period as Governor-General may be found numerous letters offering services to him in his archives. Of course, there were even educated people among them, but most of the letters were very poorly written. A Tahvo H. asked to be admitted as a secret agent, Paavo K. and Heikki J. offered their services to the Governor-General, "a loyal subject" reported that there was no picture of the Emperor in a school,⁵⁶³ Antti O. wrote that the poor people were quite satisfied, there were only a few gentlemen "here" who were dissatisfied. Then Antti O. asked for a job . . .⁵⁶⁴

Such information may have strengthened the conclusion that the poor people in Finland were remaining loyal. The strength of the Socialists in the democratic Diet must have been an unpleasant surprise, but then the Diet was not recognized by the Russians as a genuine representative organ of the people, as we have seen; it was regarded as a foreign and elitistic contrivance to separate the people from the government; and anyway, in the light of General Ivanov's remarks, it would seem that the existence of the Socialists was not entirely negative.

Seyn did not have very effective means of mobilizing this supposed support for the government. The very working of the autocratic-bureaucratic system of the Russian government was alien or hostile to the idea of popular mobilization; the people were to be humble, loyal, and quiet. Only the Orthodox church was in touch with the people, and its influence covered only the easternmost corner of Finland; and we have seen that not all Orthodox, nor even all Russians, in Finland favoured the policy of Russification.

The loyalty there was among the poor people was an indication of their backwardness, of the traditional "naive" monarchism. When these people entered the current of modern, industrializing life of Finland, they were taught by the elementary school, by the local Finnish administration, or by their Socialist organizations to adopt ideas and attitudes inimical to the Imperial idea.

563 Governor-General's office to the Gendarme chief in Finland 24.III 1911. KKK Dd 9, VA — KKK 1911, I dept., no. 34, VA — to take only a few examples

564 Antti O. to the Minister State-Secretary 24/11.X 1914. VSV Fc 6, VA

Thus the final conclusion of General Ivanov, in spite of his favourable view of the Finnish Socialists, was that the representative of the Empire was without influence in Finland. Russian power was only recording hostile features of local life, but did nothing to counteract them. The country could be kept pacified only by the help of the military forces and martial law. The garrisons had to be increased, the gendarmes strengthened, and the governors given really effective powers, in order to be able to maintain Russian power in Finland even during the future peace-time.⁵⁶⁵

There existed in the Russian conservative circles a belief that the people proper were for Tsarism, and not only in Russia but also among the national minorities. Only the schljachta in Poland was rebellious, while the peasants, good Slavs, were for the Russian power. Examples could be furnished of Lithuanian peasants fighting against the Polish landlords. They were rewarded by a generous regulation of their serfdom, compared with the lot of their Russian brethren.⁵⁶⁶ Jurii Samarin had believed that the Letts and Estonians would side with the Imperial government against their oppressors, the Baltic German barons.⁵⁶⁷ In Russia, it was well known that the rebels had believed Dmitrii or Pugačev to be the real Tsar, fighting only against a nobility who had secreted the charter of freedom given by the Tsar.⁵⁶⁸ This belief was alive after 1861, and in the 1880s Russian soldiers told Finnish crofters that they might expect to be given their freedom by the Tsar soon.⁵⁶⁹ The Russian officers were conservative populists, who believed in the Russian people and especially in the peasants' extraordinary quality. When revolution separated the peasants from the traditional order, the officers deemed this to be the

565 Pamjatnaja zapiska o mestnom naselenii Finljandii. Gen.ad. Ivanov, Stavka, 23.IX 1916. VSV Hc 7, VA

566 Murawjew, *Der Dictator* . . . — Leslie, *Reform and* . . . p. 140—161, 249—252 etc., — Petrovich, *The Emergence* . . . p. 80

567 Samarin, *Pis'ma iz Rigi & Istorija Rigi*, e.g.p. 58, 94, 504—506 *Socinenija* . . . VII

568 Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People* . . . Riasanovsky, *A History* . . . p. 288

569 Ministerstvo Voennoe, *Glavnyi Štab. Topografičeskaja sjemka*. 27.X 1886. KKK 1886, VA

work of the Jews.⁵⁷⁰ Nicholas II went to the front in 1915 in order to be among his people in uniform, and as late as in 1918 the Imperial couple expected that good Russian men would liberate them from the Jewish revolutionaries.⁵⁷¹

Severing the Finns' Foreign Relations

Finns tried to win foreign sympathies for their disobedience, and they were successful up to a point, which caused Seyn much bother. He well remembered the "Cultural Address" of protest by some 1,500 European personalities in 1899. The *Voima* had been supplied with foreign weapons, starting from the "John Grafton", financed by the Japanese, in 1905. Perhaps the government remembered the success of Polish propaganda after 1831, the Hungarian blackenings of Russia after 1849, or the Western opinion threatening intervention in Poland in 1863.

In 1910—1911 Finns succeeded in getting German professors, experts of international law in England, friends of the rights of small nations in France, and liberal and Jewish western newspapers to protest against the Russian policy in Finland. At the Berlin Tourist Exhibition Finland was presented as a separate country, with the tomb of Eugen Schauman, "the national hero", among the sights to be seen. At the London Ethnographic Conference the presence of Finns and the absence of Russians had been explained as an expression of the higher level of development of the former.⁵⁷² Tekla Hultin succeeded in getting the *Manchester Guardian* to publish an article by her. The sympathy of the liberal paper was for Hultin's cause:

570 Petrovich, *The Emergence* . . . p. 193 — Thaden, *Conservative* . . . p. 33, 189, — Riasanovsky, *A Parting* . . . p. 104, 114—116, 228 — Rauch, *Russland*, p. 129. — Kenez, *The Ideology* . . .

571 Massie, *Nicholas and* . . . p. 475—476

572 Finljandskaja agitacija zagranicei. KKK Hd 105, no. 15, VA

For a view of a Finnish propagandist cf. the memoirs by Törn gren

"She sums up very clearly the gross injustice of which the Russian government is guilty in lopping off from Finland two of the parishes of Viborg . . . It is all of a piece with the violence and unconstitutionality which have marked the whole of Mr. Stolypin's policy towards liberal and cultivated Finland . . ." ⁵⁷³

Of course, such propaganda was inadmissible. The Governor-General asked for the help of the Foreign Ministry to prevent Finns from participating in international meetings except as members of Russian delegation. Finland was an indivisible part of the Empire and she could not have any international role. Best of all was to close Finns out of any such meetings. ⁵⁷⁴

This was not always possible. The Russian pressure was strong enough to make the Swedish government deny Finns the right to carry the Finnish national flag at the Olympic games in Stockholm in 1912. But the Finns marched keeping a small distance from the Russian team, carrying a placard where "Finland" was written. Thus the gold medal of Hannes Kolehmainen was to become a Finnish national triumph, not a Russian one. Seyn demanded that at the Olympic Games of 1916 in Berlin the mistake should not be renewed. The Olympic committee and foreign governments were to be asked to prevent the separatist agitation of Russia's enemies in Finland and abroad. The Finnish Olympic committee was to be dissolved. ⁵⁷⁵ The last item was impossible, because the Finnish committee had been internationally recognized and its suppression would have necessitated a vote in the international Olympic committee, independent of direct governmental influence. ⁵⁷⁶

Thus Seyn did not worry himself for nothing about the foreign relations of his subjects. The Finns, on their part, found it increasingly difficult to make the foreigners interested in the

573 "The Mutilation of a People", *Manchester Guardian* 11.IX 1911. KKK 1912, III dept., no. 56—1, VA

574 Seyn to Sazonov 10.I 1911. KKK Dd 9, VA — Seyn to Stolypin 12.IV 1911. KKK Dd 9, VA — Seyn to Neratov 13.V 1911. KKK Dd 10, VA — K.V. Pleva to Seyn 21.VI 1911. KKK Dd 10, VA

575 Seyn to Goremykin 1.IV 1914. VSV Hc 4, VA

576 Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Goremykin 1.IV 1914. VSV Hc 4, VA

Finnish dilemma as the great war grew an ever more distinct menace.⁵⁷⁷ The Consuls in Helsinki and the Ambassadors in St. Petersburg kept informing their governments on the Finnish question, which sometimes looked as if it was the central political problem for the Imperial government. The reports were not always hostile to the Finns, although it was difficult for foreigners to understand nationalism on so small a scale. But the Finns never succeeded in getting any official international support or guarantee for the constitutional position of the Grand Duchy. No power wanted to disturb their relations with mighty Russia by favouring the Finnish separatists.⁵⁷⁸ Finland was regarded as an integral part of the Empire and Russian policy there was an internal problem of the Tsarist government.⁵⁷⁹ The great colonial powers had no reason to take up the cause of local national separatists.

But the sympathy of the Western liberal opinion towards the Finnish constitutionalism was a moral factor that encouraged the passive resistance. The Finns imagined themselves to be fighting for Western values against the Tsarist Oriental barbarism on a scene looked upon by the progressive humanity.

Such moral factors were of concrete importance during the great war, when propaganda was one of the important weapons. In May 1916 the Finnish agents at Stockholm sent to President Wilson "a traitorous, brazen, lying" address of the League of the Oppressed People of Russia.⁵⁸⁰ Propaganda in the West made the victors support Polish, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav independence. Germany tried to break up Russia with the help of the national minorities. The Jäger movement, the military training of Finns in Germany in 1915—1917, was one of the decisive factors in the successful separation of the Grand Duchy from the Empire in 1918. The multinational Empires had reason enough to be worried about the foreign relations of their national minorities.

577 Törnqren, På utländsk . . . 259

578 Kerkkonen. *Suomen sortovuodet* . . . p. 121

579 For example the British attitude has been discussed by Maude

580 Seyn to Stürmer 5.V 1916. KKK Hd 104, no. 10, VA. Concerning the League cf. Zetterberg, *Die Liga* . . .

Festivities Without Response

In 1909 Finland had lived one hundred years under the Imperial Sceptre and it was time to organize the centennial jubilee. The Finno-Russian quarrel overshadowed the festivities. Stolypin's letter to the Emperor made the issue clear:

"The Finnish *gubernijas*, mentioned in the fourth article of the Fredrikshamn (Hamina) peace treaty, were transferred to the proprietorship and sovereign power of the Russian Empire and united with it forever. Thus, the Fredrikshamn treaty, sanctioning Russian sovereign power over the so-called New Finland, is the basis of the juridical existence of Finland in the Russian Realm. That notwithstanding, the Finns are trying to transfer the jubilee from 5th September, the date of the peace treaty, to 16th March, the centennial of the opening of the Borgå (Porvoo) Diet, where, in the false view of the Finns, a contract was made between the Monarch of all the Russias and the Finnish people. They are going to erect a statue of Your Imperial Ancestor (Alexander I) in the Cathedral of Borgå, whom they, falsifying historical facts, picture as the creator of an independent Finnish statehood. That is historically wrong and politically utterly inadmissible, and the occurrence must not be given the character of the centennial jubilee which belongs to 5/18th September".⁵⁸¹

The September Jubilee was celebrated by the Russian garrisons in Finland with parades, illuminations and flag-flying. Russian schools had a holiday on the 18th September and texts were read out stressing the importance of the Hamina peace treaty. Governor-General Boeckman and Archbishop Sergei attended a commemorative divine service, and an Imperial dinner of celebration was given to the notables in Helsinki.⁵⁸² A private initiative was made by the Russian merchant Resvoi to erect a

581 Stolypin to Nicholas II 16.II 1909 to Langhoff 21.II 1909. VSV 1910, no. 60, VA

582 Boeckman to Langhoff (to the Emperor) 26.VIII/8.IX 1909. VSV 1910, no. 60, VA

memorial chapel at the Uspenski Cathedral in Helsinki; it was financed by a popular subscription in Russia.⁵⁸³ (It was barbarically destroyed after Finland was made independent, as a hateful monument of oppression).

A memorial "Peace Tower" was erected at Hamina. In 1902 a proposal had been made to erect a monument at Tammissaari to the memory of the Russian soldiers who had fallen there in 1808—1809 and 1854—1855. The Governor-General had given 1,000 marks for the purpose and 500 marks plus 375 roubles had been subscribed, mainly by Russian officers. The money had been pilfered by Rheinbott, the notorious *gubernija* secretary during Bobrikov's time, afterwards transferred to Moscow. But with the help of the highest military authorities he was made to reimburse the money which was used to finance the Peace Tower, because an investigation showed that no Russian soldiers had been killed at Tammissaari.⁵⁸⁴

These festivities served to stress the Russian belief in their right to dispose of Finland, but they could hardly have the effect of making Finns give up their "separatist" opinions. The bicentennial of the conquest of Viipuri by the troops of Peter I in 1710 was celebrated with military divine services and parades, with a marked absence of Finnish enthusiasm. The festivities tended to bring out the view that Russian power was based on the right of conquest, not on any Finno-Russian contract. The naval battle at Hankoniemi (Hangöudd in Swedish, pronounced Gangut in Russian) in 1714 was a defeat from the Finnish point of view, and thus they had no reason to participate in the Imperial naval bicentennial.

In 1912 and 1913 Seyn led official delegations to the centennial jubilee of the Battle of Borodino, to the unveiling of the statue of Alexander III in Moscow, and to the tricentennial of the Romanov Dynasty. In their official capacity a few Finns participated in these trips, but the Finnish people saw no reason to celebrate, in spite of the fact that a jubilee amnesty

583 Boeckman to Langhoff 2/15.X 1908, Langhoff to Stolypin 11/24.X 1908, Stolypin to Langhoff 9.X 1908, 11.XII 1908. VSV 1910, no. 60, VA. — Polvinen, *Resvoin* . . .

584 Boeckman to Langhoff 18/31.X 1909, correspondence between Langhoff, Seyn and Suhomlinov in February—March 1910, the proposal accepted by Nicholas II 2./15.IV 1910. VSV 1910, no. 60, VA

made free a few political prisoners from the *Kresty* prison in 1913.

The festival propaganda was not able to heal the wounds left by the everyday politics of the government; in fact, the festivities only provoked anti-Russian feelings.

Finland Industriously Governed

Preparing the frontier country for defence against enemy great powers was the task of the Military District of St. Petersburg and of the twenty-second army corps in Finland. The main lines of their plans, explained earlier in this story, remained constant; the principal aim was to secure the Imperial capital from the north-west, and in the event of a major enemy landing in Finland the army corps was to retreat to the Kymijoki and to take up a defensive position there, in order to prevent the enemy from advancing towards St. Petersburg and cutting the communications at Viipuri. The forward defence was timidly pushed westwards as the naval fortifications at Porkkala and Nargen started to take shape.

But the civil administration led by Seyn had the militarily vital task of keeping the population docile in the event of war — it was one of the reasons for which Bobrikov had started his reforms and for which Seyn had been appointed to succeed him after the hiatus of the calamitous Mechelin-Gerard period. Much work was caused by the task of building garrisons for the additional rifle brigades in southern Finland; barrack grounds and training areas had to be acquired. Preparing the railways for their eventual military tasks required continuous efforts. Plans for the security measures in the event of a declaration of war had to be kept up to date. The eventual military mobilization presupposed much help from the civil administration for the acquisition of horses and carts, lorries and cars, ships and boats, fodder and food, and so on, endlessly.⁵⁸⁵

585 For more details cf. Luntinen, *Suomi Pietarin...*, *Venäläisten sotasuunnitelmat...*, *French Information...*

In addition to the military requirements, the Governor-General had a long list of other tasks waiting to be undertaken, of varying degrees of importance. These included the definite liberation of the Orthodox from all Finnish influence and authority, reforming Finnish judicial procedure, transforming the collegiate central offices to work under the sole authority of the chief (which meant more centralized control by the government), organizing the care of destitute people (previously auctioned to be taken care of by private people at the least possible cost to the commune), instituting loans for the landless to acquire land, degreeing Kosher butchers for the Jews, preventing the usage of lighting candles on windows in the Swedish Day, making regulations for labour conflicts, even preparing for the quadricentennial of the Protestant Reformation for the year 1917, organizing youth clubs at schools . . .⁵⁸⁶

In 1911 Finns were astonished by a measure taken by the Governor-General relating to youth work: "Seyn is always himself. His latest exploit is to dissolve the boy scout-organizations. They seem to be dangerous enemies of Russia!"⁵⁸⁷ The scout movement's declared aim was to unite Finnish society, hitherto divided by language, party, and social differences, and to create a unified Finnish people (underlined by Seyn), unanimously defending the country and its law. The movement was led, Seyn believed, by hostile politicians. With map and compass the scouts were training to be a cadre of patriotic pathfinders to be mobilized when the Finnish separatists would start up active operations. Thus the scout movement was a serious danger to the Russian cause in the border country.⁵⁸⁸ It was a bit difficult to dissolve the scout clubs, because of the freedom of association and of assembly which was rampant in the Grand Duchy. But because it was obvious that the scout training was military in character, and detrimental to school studies, the organization could be "lawfully" dissolved by a decree of the Senate.⁵⁸⁹

586 Perečen' voprosov principal'nogo haraktera, skorejšee razresenie koih predstavljaetsja želatel'nym (1914). KKK Hd 22, VA. Another variant: KKK Hd 21, "ratkaistavia kysymyksiä", VA

587 Aspelin—Haapkylä, *Kirovuosien* . . . p. 211

588 Seyn to Stolypin 25.II 1911. KKK Hd 9, VA

589 Seyn to Kokovcov 15.IX 1911. KKK Hd 40, no. 30, VA

Thus Finland was governed, industriously and zealously, and always with the Imperial interest in mind. It was no misplaced philanthropy that made Seyn include the destitute people on his list of reforms to be undertaken; he was thinking of the danger of social unrest and of the chance of winning these people to the Imperial side, so as to break the threatening unity of the Finnish people.

The period in 1913 and in the first half of 1914 were less hectic for Seyn than the previous years of re-asserting control in Finland had been. In a review he stated that the government had continued to pursue its policy of a closer union of the Finnish border country with the rest of the Empire; defence had been made more effective and the bridge over the River Neva had at last been completed. But no important initiatives had been made for implementation through the Imperial legislative procedure decreed in 1910. Committees were pondering over the annexation of Karelia, the judicial procedure for dealing with the crimes of civil servants, the adoption of the Russian language in Finland, the uniting of the two customs areas; but no results were yet forthcoming.⁵⁹⁰

It does seem that even the Finns were more peaceful in this period — more resigned and hopeless, a Finn would say. The Finnish routine administration worked, in spite of the voluble protest against the government by the Diet and the press, and contrary to the earlier apprehensions of the Governor-General. Nor did Seyn plan any important new measures. There was no necessity to talk exaggeratedly about the *Voima*, because Seyn was on top of his career; and it was in 1913 that Menšikov in his confession made public the gendarme methods. It has also been supposed that the Old Bobrikovians were digesting the law on equal rights and "Military Millions", and no pressure for new reforms was felt from their side.⁵⁹¹ Kokovcov did as he had promised, all important reform-proposals had been shunted into committees and no new ones were taken up.

Of course, vigilance could not be let up. In the beginning of 1914 Mechelin died. Seyn had to forbid the national

590 Obzor vydajuščihsja sobytii i važnejših pravitel'stvennyh meroprijatii po upravleniju Velikago knjažestva Finljandskago za 1913-i god. KKK Hd 21. no. 5, VA

591 Kemppinen, *Suomen-kysymys* . . . p. 237

subscription for a foundation in the memory of the former dangerous opponent. Finns deemed the refusal mean and small-minded.⁵⁹² But the gendarme-chief had reported that the money would have been used for agitation abroad to emphasize the separate statehood of Finland.⁵⁹³ The traitorous idea survived even though Mechelin was dead.

592 Nordenstreng, *Mechelin* . . . II, p. 557

593 A report by the gendarme chief 13.II 1914. KKK 1914, I dept., no. 9—1, VA

The Hard School of World War

A Surprise at the Beginning of the War

The war started in Poland and East Prussia, but even Finland was declared in a state of military emergency and part of the theatre of war, because of the imminent danger felt of a German landing. At last Seyn, under the authority of the Sixth Army, and on the strength of the regulations of martial law, could forbid, order, search, arrest, expel, close, dissolve, as he had always dreamed of being able to do. The military censorship effectively cut out any undesirable agitation (and reliable information) in the press. The most important of the persons exiled was Svinhufvud, sent to Siberia in the autumn of 1914, because he did not obey an unconstitutional order to desist from his activity. A couple of hooligans from Viipuri were hanged when convicted of the murder of a non-commissioned officer; their sentence was in accordance with martial law.⁵⁹⁴

But the reality of war was far from what had been expected. The German navy were reported approaching the Finnish coasts, and coastal towns were evacuated in a panic; but in fact no invasion materialized. Contrary to the expectations or apprehensions of Seyn and the Russian military, there was no

594 Wirén, *Krestyn* . . . p. 253



Seyn with Mme Seyn and Borovitinov visiting a military hospital (Muscovirasto)

Finnish rebellion, no general strike, no sabotage of the railway, telephone, or telegraph lines.

On the contrary, the general outbreak of loyalty, observed in all European capitals at the beginning of the war, did not spare even Finland. The Russian army had reason to thank the population of Helsinki for the friendly treatment of the mobilizing detachments.⁵⁹⁵ The twenty-second army corps publicly thanked the Finnish railways for helping to carry through their mobilization with speed and zeal, without any hitch or mishap.⁵⁹⁶

The army corps was mobilized and deployed on the southern coast of Finland, as planned. Because no German landing materialized, these troops were soon transferred to the main front. Instead, second line troops were positioned in Finland, and out of them the forty-second army corps was formed, with its headquarters in Tampere. Defence lines facing west were dug across Finland and forefront positions were established on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia. These troops were part of the sixth army and, when it was formed, the northern army group (or front, as it is called in Russian).

There were private discussions about re-establishing the Finnish army to participate in the war to defend the Empire.⁵⁹⁷ These discussions came to nothing, but then about five hundred volunteers entered the Russian army.⁵⁹⁸ Many members of the passive resistance shook hands with government officials and promised to forget past differences.⁵⁹⁹ "Many women even in cultured spheres started in their simplicity knitting shooting gloves for the Russian Red Cross".⁶⁰⁰ The Finnish industry — which received big orders from the Russian army — equipped an ambulance or, as it was called, "The Field Hospital of the Finnish Industrialists".⁶⁰¹ Several hundred temporary hospital

595 Aspelin—Haapkylä, *Kirovuosien* . . . p. 253

596 Commander of the 22. army corps to Seyn 17.VII 1914. KKK 1914, I dept. war no. 3—5, VA

597 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . II, p. 55—56

598 Seyn to the Minister of the Interior 16.XI 1916. KKK 1917, I dept., no. 2—32, VA

599 Otčety o poliitičeskom sostojanii ražnyh gubernii. KKK Hd 105, no. 4, VA

600 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . II, p. 164

601 Enckell, *Poliittiset* . . . p. 54

beds were voluntarily organized in Finland for wounded soldiers.⁶⁰²

This must have been surprising to Seyn and the soldiers and gendarmes, if they had believed in their own reports on the unreliability of the Finns; and a bit disturbing, because their activity had been explained to be necessary mainly in order to secure the Empire against the Finnish danger. A few Finns at least suspected Seyn of trying to disturb the picture of a loyal Finland; Borovitinov and Seyn's wife usurped the direction of the organization of the military hospitals:

"I guess that this is one of Seyn's plots to prevent Finns from showing any loyalty"⁶⁰³

and

"It is said that Seyn is against the hospitals organized for the wounded by the Finns — Finnish loyalty does not accord with what he has reported from Finland . . ."⁶⁰⁴

At least one demonstration of loyalty certainly angered Seyn. The Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna returned home from abroad via Finland, and she was met with popular acclaim because it was known that she had opposed the Finnish policy of her son. The Imperial hymn was sung for her, and after that she asked for the March of the Pori (Björneborg) Regiment,⁶⁰⁵ composed to Runeberg's patriotic words. Seyn, among the suite, had to stand to attention and listen to a song for the singing of which he usually punished people, because it was a demonstration for Finnish "separatism".

Seyn did not like such demonstrations of loyalty but not only because they showed his reports to be false. He felt that they were not sincere, as the acclaim for the Dowager Empress showed. He knew that the Finns

"after the outbreak of the war hoped that the Russian government would desist from their reactionary oppression in Finland, who had kept unshakeably loyal".⁶⁰⁶

602 KKK 1917, II dept., no. 21—10, perepiska 1, VA

603 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . II, p. 81

604 Aspelin—Haapkylä, *Kirovuosien* . . . p. 255

605 Aspelin—Haapkylä, *Kirovuosien* . . . p. 251, Evgenin, *Finljandija* . . . p. 21

606 Enckell, *Poliittiset* . . . p. 54

The promise of the future restoration of a united Poland, given in the name of the commander-in-chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevič, encouraged the Finnish hopes, too. Of course, the hopes were mistaken. The scheming demonstrations of conditional loyalty were no reason for abandoning the governmental policy.

Eino Voionmaa, an Old Finn, was falsely accused of spying by the Ohrana and gendarmes. A Russian officer explained to him the reason: "The alleged loyalty of the Old Finn party has often been a harmful hindrance for those who claim that no Finn can be trusted".⁶⁰⁷ — This is only a small episode, and no conclusive proof of Seyn's aims: but the story fits in with the pattern of Seyn's methods we already know.

The fact remains that numerous students, journalists, and businessmen adopted an "Imperial attitude" at the outbreak of war.⁶⁰⁸ During the war years Finland was further integrated in the Russian war economy. Russia was the sole market open to Finnish exports, a market that absorbed any amount of goods because of the unlimited consumption at the front. Full employment and easy money created boom conditions in 1915—1916, (with consequent difficulties — unemployment and hunger — when exports were cut off after the revolution in 1917).⁶⁰⁹ It is well known that businessmen were reluctant to support the new activism or any idea of separatism, for which they were bitterly criticized by the politically-aware elite: "They make *Affäre* without thinking whether they are harmful for our country . . ."⁶¹⁰

607 Voionmaa, *Tsaarivallan* . . . p. 162. — Fortunately for Voionmaa, during the war Helsinki was under the jurisdiction of naval court, which did not love the gendarmes nor the Ohrana and did believe that an agent had slipped the plan of fortifications into Voionmaa's pocket as a provocation. Voionmaa was an editor of *Uusi Suometar*, the principal newspaper of the Old Finn party.

608 Klinge, *Vielä* . . . p. 618

609 For a detailed study cf. Pihkala, *Suomen ja Venäjän* . . .

610 *Hultin*, *Päiväkirjani* . . . II, p. 133

Loyalty Shattered

After a couple of months the chief of staff of the Stavka asked whether it was true that some new law had made the Finns hostile to Russia.

Markov, the Minister State-Secretary, answered by saying that at the beginning of the war there had been sympathy for Russia's fight, and a hope that Finnish loyalty would make the government alleviate its strict unificatory policy. The Polish declaration inflamed this hope.

No new Imperial law had been made for Finland for two years. The only measure, Markov said, that might fit the general's query was the publication of the programme of measures and legislation projects for Finland ("The great programme of Russification"). It was unpleasant for Finns and had caused a feeling of deception after the hopes at the beginning of the war.

The aim of the programme was the strengthening of the governmental authority in Finland, securing the Imperial defence in the Duchy, and its political and economic integration with the other parts of the Empire. On the 16th September 1914, the preparatory committee had received the Imperial leave to send the projected programme to the Council of Ministers and to the various administrations and to ask for their opinions. Thus, it was far from definitely approved.

The anti-Russian press in Stockholm, Markov continued, under German influence, had distorted the piece of news, alleging that the government had decided to make an end of Finnish autonomy now that the war prevented foreign powers from intervening. A few Russian (liberal) newspapers had also written that the proposal had been definitely approved. That was why in the *Birževyja Vedomosti* an article titled "Russia and Finland" had been published in order to make clear that there was nothing new and nothing definite in the matter. It ought to have calmed the Finns.

But among the upper classes in Finland dissatisfaction continued. For instance, professors were worried about their loss of tenure, because it had been proposed that the VI and VII class *činovniki* would no more be protected against dismissal. Happily the deep masses of the Finnish people were unmoved

by these concerns of the intelligentsia. For instance, the Social Democrats had declared that any invader would be an enemy, and money had been collected for the Russian army.⁶¹¹

The report of the Minister State-Secretary well illustrates the Russian conceptions of Finnish attitudes, and it is a good summary of the story of how the great programme of Russification was made public. It is really possible that the first intimation of the document was leaked out because of the normal bureaucratic lack of concern. It was held to be a routine document, and the bureaucrats were unable to foresee that the Finns might be alarmed at it. They supposed that the explanation published in *Birževyja Vedomosti* would be enough to calm down the professors who were afraid of losing their tenure.

There is another possible explanation, however. Bearing in mind Seyn's methods and his apprehension about the unfortunate expressions of loyalty, it is not impossible that he or his St. Petersburg backers, who participated in the preparative work for the programme, had let the information slip out to the press. Seyn must have known its effect on Finnish opinion better than Markov could guess (or had let the Stavka understand). The false loyalty of the Finns would be choked off and their real unreliability would come to the surface.

It is difficult to know whether there existed any chance of the government changing its Finnish policy. In Russia, the government did not try by change in the political system to mobilize popular participation for the conduct of the war; on the contrary, the expressions of patriotism and loyalty were taken advantage of to reinforce the autocracy under the pretext of wartime expediency. The declaration for Poland was mainly due to pressure by Sazonov, who thought it important to win over the inhabitants then right in the midst of the theatre of war; the nationalist conservative partisans of a unified Russia were outraged at the declaration. But the possibility exists that Seyn was apprehensive of a similar manifesto and of an eventual change in the government's policy towards the Grand Duchy.⁶¹²

611 Markov to General Januškevič 3/16.XII 1914. VSV Fc 3, no. 16, VA

612 This is only guesswork, of course

The fact is that the news about the great programme of Russification shattered the Finns and killed any hope of alleviation through demonstrations of loyalty. It is true that the news that came out in November were not the first intimation of the existence of the programme.⁶¹³ Nor did it make the Jäger movement emerge overnight; the idea of the *Voima* had been asleep but alive since the dissolution of the movement in 1906. After the war had broken out, a few Helsinki students had discussed, perhaps inspired by the Germans, an eventual armed opposition against the Russian oppressor and a future independent Finland.⁶¹⁴

Yet shattering the news was, precisely because its publication was so open and "especially as it was added that the Emperor had approved of the proposal. If such a thing happens in wartime, when the minimum caution ought to be shown . . . What will happen if Russian arms should triumph in the present conflict and Russian chauvinism be able to surge like an eagle?"⁶¹⁵

As the Stavka general had stated, the Finns were again hostile towards Russia. As yet the oppressors had no intimation of the rebellious Jäger movement. Finnish hostility seemed to be of the normal, everyday submissive kind.

In this oppressive, hopeless atmosphere, closely watched by the censorship, the only way for the Finns to ease their feelings was malicious gossip:

"There is a continual quarrel between the committee and the Finnish hospitals. Mme. Seyn and Borovitinov are the first culprits . . . Mme. Seyn's and other high Russians' behaviour has been too insulting"

and

"it is reported of Mme. Seyn that when purchasing materials for the Red Cross at Stockmann's, she bargains hard for lower prices, but then according to the Russian custom demands that original prices be written on the bill".⁶¹⁶

613 Rasila, *Vuoden 1914 venäläistämäs* . . .

614 cf. the discussion of Apunen—Kalliala—Klinge—P. Zilliacus

615 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . II, p. 89—90

616 Aspelin—Haapkylä, *Kirovuosien* . . . p. 255—256, 265

Thus by the end of 1914, Russia faced a hostile population in Finland and an energetic Governor-General was needed to keep them docile. Seyn could feel safe in his office. But the next year was to bring with it a threat to his position.

Seyn's Position Shaken

The defeat in Poland in the spring and summer of 1915 shattered Tsarism. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers the Minister of War explained that operations in Poland were "in the phase of evacuation and running away", and he declared: "The Fatherland is in danger".

The educated, patriotic public demanded a more energetic government which would enjoy public trust. The Emperor deemed it best to dismiss the most reactionary ministers who were held to be the most ineffectual, too. The new Minister of War, Polivanov, was expected to be appointed Prime Minister in Goremykin's stead.

At this phase of events even Finland was discussed. It was complained that the Finns did not take any part in the war but went on selling the products of their national economy to the Imperial army. While Russia suffered from the war, the Finns profited from their export of war materials and even speculated on the rate of exchange of the rouble. "Some limits must be set to the Finnish shamelessness".

But the Minister for Foreign Affairs Sazonov warned: "For God's sake, don't egg on General Seyn, leave the Finns in peace. The Swedes observe these things very closely". In this difficult phase of the war Russia could not afford to provoke Sweden, whose neutrality was far from certain. The Swedes were extremely angry at the British measures of blockade, and their ancient fear and hatred of Russia were inflamed by pro-German activists who dreamed of a reconquest of Finland, or, at the minimum, of Åland, with German help. The Russian envoy in Stockholm warned his government against fortifying Åland or increasing troops in Northern Finland lest the Swedes take additional offence. In fact, it seems that the Swedish

government was firmly neutral and the vocal activists had no strong support, but the Russians could not be certain of it. In the very critical situation in which Russia found herself the addition of Sweden to the strength of the enemy coalition could have been fatal. Thus it was important to act cautiously even in the internal policy in Finland because of the close relations of the Finnish elite with Stockholm.⁶¹⁷

Goremykin agreed:

"We have difficulties enough without worrying about the Finns. May the Devil take them all. Let us see how this all ends. Until then let us not take up the Finnish question".

On the contrary, Seyn was enjoined to be very cautious in his policy. The treatment and living conditions of Svinhufvud in Siberia were improved.⁶¹⁸

Thus the "Finnish shamelessness" was not limited. On the contrary, voices were raised pleading for a change of policy in Finland. In the list of changes the liberals demanded was included an item about "a conciliatory policy in the Finnish question, especially a change of the personnel of the Senate and of the administration and stopping the litigation against civil servants".

This was dangerous for Seyn, too. The Council of Ministers understood that Frans Aleksandrovič did not enjoy the warm sympathy of the Duma members or the St. Petersburg society. "We must expect requests for his replacement by a man who can more closely correspond to the present opinions of the people". Even demands for a revision of the Imperial procedure of legislation could be expected.

Goremykin was again of the opinion during the war such important questions of principle could not be taken up, "and after the war — let us see what comes then". The Council of

617 For a more detailed discussion cf. Luntinen, *The Åland...* — The Germans did envisage an attack with the help of the Swedes, but the two General Staffs could not agree on a plan, and the Swedish government did not approve of this co-operation. Cf. Steven, *Saksalaisten...*, Carlgren, *Neutralität...* and Schubert, *Schweden...*

618 Jahontov, *Tjaželye...* p. 35

Ministers decided that in practice a benevolent policy was to be adopted towards Finland; but no promises were to be made concerning the revision of the Imperial legislation, in order not to bind the hands of the government.⁶¹⁹

These meetings were secret, but rumour carried an echo of them to Helsinki. The gossips knew that "Seyn carries away his property in the night. It is not known whether this is true and what is the reason for it — whether he is afraid of the Germans, or whether he knows that very little time is left for him in Finland?"⁶²⁰ and also "that Seyn's removal from Finland has been discussed. It is said that Count Benckendorff, the Ambassador in London, has demanded it to satisfy English opinion. But now Seyn sits tight again, after having sent in a few reports on the disobedience of the Finnish youth".⁶²¹

The escape from Poland had in the meantime saved the Russian army, though with terrible losses. The German attack ran out of breath — the horse-drawn supply columns could not keep up with any attack in the First World War. Nicholas II blamed the commander-in-chief, his uncle Nikolai Nikolaevič, for the retreat and dismissed him. To the astonishment of all sensible ministers, the completely incapable Emperor appointed himself commander-in-chief and went to the Stavka, to join his people in uniform, and to carry the direct responsibility for all future disasters.

The supreme power in St. Petersburg was left in the hands of the Empress Alexandra and Rasputin. No government based on popular trust was formed. Goremykin kept to his position for another six months, to be succeeded by Stürmer, who was recommended by Rasputin. Those Ministers who had disapproved of the Emperor's move to the Stavka were suspected of opposition, of liberalism, or of something, and they were dismissed; the "ministerial merry-go-round" started. For a while autocracy, or the system called Tsarism, was saved, and even made more effective in a measure. Members of the public and industrialists were recruited to war production committees, which were, nevertheless, led by the bureaucrats. The Russian war effort was essentially improved in the first

619 Jahontov, *Tjaželye* . . . p. 110—112

620 Aspelin—Haapkylä, *Kirovuosien* . . . p. 265 (23.VIII 1915)

621 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . II, p. 139

half of 1916. (It was only after the effort resulted in the initially successful but in the end disastrous attack in the summer of 1916 that a new wave of opposition and strikes arose in the autumn).

These successful attempts to stiffen up Tsarism saved Seyn, too, for a time. After the Finnish Diet had in 1914 sent the usual list of complaints to the Imperial government, Seyn had composed an unusually detailed answer to it in a letter of May 1915. Perhaps he was already feeling his position threatened by the rising wave of opposition. Once the wave had abated, Goremykin's Council of Ministers accepted Seyn's answer without discussion, simply dismissing the address of the Diet. It was judged to be a demonstrative act only, of significance merely as a continuing proof of the aspirations of the local separatists, repeating previous, false, unproved allegations and accusations of illegality.⁶²²

It was at this time that the government decided not to convene the Diet in wartime. No fruitful legislative work could be expected from its meetings. The state of military emergency was enough to set aside the stipulations in the law concerning the convening of the Diet. The Form of Government of 1772 authorized the Monarch to decree additional taxes in wartime.⁶²³ The Diet of 1914 had not made any move towards unity with Russia. It was not to be expected that the Diet would improve in 1915; it would undoubtedly be deaf to the wishes of the government, and would start quarrelling by making claims about the legality of the government's action, perhaps even demanding an army of Finland's own. The apprehension of the Governor-General that difficult conflicts might be in the offing was the decisive argument. It was he who was responsible for keeping order in the country.⁶²⁴

Thus Seyn survived the crisis of 1915. But the discussions

622 Osobyí Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 5.X 1915. VSV Hc 6, VA

623 There was a certain lack of consistency about the old Swedish constitution in Russian policy. It was denied decisive importance, and sometimes even existence, when Finns appealed to it against the measures decreed by the Russian legislative or administrative system. But the near-autocratic stipulations of Gustaf III were taken advantage of when they fitted in with Russian needs. The inconsistency does not seem to have disturbed anyone.

624 Osobyí Žurnal Soveta Ministrov 27.IX 1915. VSV Hc 6, VA

and decisions of the Council of Ministers during the hectic days of the summer do explain a few features in Seyn's policy that might otherwise seem out of character.

Wartime Cares

The army held Seyn responsible for keeping Finland peaceful and under control. Sometimes difficulties arose from the fact that the military did not always understand the problems the Governor-General had to face, which were partly due to the army itself. The number of gendarmes had been increased according to the pre-war plans, but there were insufficient men available to fill all the vacancies, and some of the remaining spies were ordered by the army on other missions. Seyn complained:

"This makes it difficult for the gendarmes to fulfill their duties, which are very necessary during the present time and even more necessary as a preparation for the future time when the state of military emergency will be repealed and elements hostile to the Government will emerge anew. Even the military ought to be interested in that problem".⁶²⁵

The Gulf of Finland was effectively closed by the coastal fortifications and the fleet, but the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia had to be guarded against spies, the smuggling of forbidden materials, and even enemy landings. The commander of the troops in Finland positioned small garrisons of border guards close to the coast.⁶²⁶ Seyn criticized the organization of the coastal guard. He referred to Finnish law which did not allow giving police authority to the military. The number of gendarmes ought to have been increased instead. Even Sweden

625 Seyn to the Staff of the VI army 8.I 1915. KKK 1915, I dept., war no. 2—2, VA

626 Organizačija ohrany zapadnogo Finljandskogo poberežja. VI army to Seyn 29.XII 1914. KKK 1915, I dept., war no. 2—2, VA

might become nervous if the coast were being watched by an increased number of troops.⁶²⁷ The military authorities promised to remember this warning as far as possible. The crossing of the border river at Tornio was left free (for a time) and the guards were stationed instead further back at Kemijoki. But the guards were military personnel, not police or gendarme agents.⁶²⁸

It is understandable that Seyn did not like his own importance being diminished by military measures for the keeping of law and order, which was the task of the Governor-General. What seems remarkable is his appeal to Finnish law; we have not been used to thinking about Seyn as a defender of the rights of the Grand Duchy.

The military did not have enough men to guard everything, however. The civilian administration was ordered to guard the Saimaa Canal and the new field fortifications which had been constructed across Finland in case of a Swedo-German attack from the west towards St. Petersburg. Seyn protested: the civilian administration had no funds for the purpose, and the local population could not be armed, not even the police was dependable enough.⁶²⁹

Here we see the zealous Governor-General refusing additional authority, against the wishes of the army, which had been so important an ally in his peace-time career. His wartime task was to keep order and not to provoke difficulties, protests, or disorder in Finland. It seems that he was, after all, no doctrinaire oppressor, but well able to learn from experience and to execute rationally the policy decided on in the Council of Ministers.

Thus he opposed Russifying Finnish time. In 1916 the commandant of Sveaborg demanded that the fortification area, consisting of the town of Helsinki and the surrounding communities of Espoo and Sipoo, should adopt the St. Petersburg time. It was used by the fleet and in the fortress, and many difficulties were caused by the difference of one hour

627 Seyn to the Staff of the VI army 8.I 1915. KKK 1915, I dept., war no. 2—2, VA

628 VI army to Seyn 31.I 1915. KKK 1915, I dept., war no. 2—2, VA

629 KKK 1916, I dept., war no. 2—55 and 2—56, 2—126. VA

between St. Petersburg and Helsinki times.⁶³⁰

Seyn answered that the change presupposed a change of legislation, which was outside his authority. In addition, having a different time in the capital of Finland from elsewhere in the Grand Duchy would cause endless confusion. For instance, railway traffic from the fortress area to the rest of Finland, vital even for the Imperial defence, would fall into disorder and suffer from innumerable accidents.⁶³¹

Even the strictest Finnish constitutionalist could agree with this stand of Seyn's. In fact, the closer integration of the border country with the rest of Russia was successfully opposed by Seyn in several major issues, which might have been fatal for Finland if the original proposals had gone through.

But the work of the Imperial representative in Finland was not concerned with major issues only. The dossiers of the Governor-General's office bear testimony to the fact that the greatest part of the work were routine matters which were not important enough to be discussed here in any length, but ignoring which would leave a false picture of the worries of the Governor-General. A random case might be picked up as a sample, for instance, the case of white mice.

The Supreme Chief of the Detachments for the Evacuation of The Wounded, Prince Alexander of Oldenburg, asked whether white mice could be obtained in Finland. Seyn hastened to send inquiries to all governors and central boards of administration. Most of the answers were negative:

"With respect to the telegram of Your Excellency from the 6th January current, no. 210, I humbly presume to report that in the *gubernija* Most Graciously trusted to me, there do not exist mice of the kind specified in the said telegram.

On the 22nd January 1917.
Lieutenant-General Sillman"

630 O vvedenii Petrogradskogo vremeni vo vseh pravitel'stvennyh i občestvennyh učreždenijah krepostnogo raiona. The Commandant of Sveaborg to Seyn 20.VII 1916. KKK 1916, I dept., no. 2—153, VA

631 Seyn to the Commandant of Sveaborg 7.VIII 1916. KKK 1916, I dept., no. 2—153, VA

Happily, the Institute of Pathology of the Imperial Alexander University at Helsinki, the Maternity Institute, and other such instances were able to help. 477 rodents in all were sent to the Prince, at the cost of 2,980 marks 35 pennies, cages and fodder included.⁶³²

Seyn and the Jäger Movement

In the autumn of 1914 a few students decided to start preparing a rebellion against Russia, because no good was to be expected if Russia came out of the war victorious. We have seen the importance of the Great Programme of Russification for this decision. Neutral Sweden did not dare to provoke Russia by helping the Finnish rebels, but Germany was willing to cause Russia as much nuisance as possible; perhaps the idea had been inspired by the Germans. The German army promised to train a couple of hundred leaders for the Finnish active resistance movement at the beginning of 1915, and later the number was increased to two thousand. An organization was set up in Finland for recruiting the men, who were then sent via Sweden to the Lockstedt Lager. After a period of training, the Finns were formed into the 27th Royal Prussian Jäger Battalion. They were transferred to fight against the Russians on the northern flank of the eastern front, waiting there a propitious moment for starting the battle in Finland. After the March Revolution in 1917 the battalion had further training at Libau until it was transferred to take part in the War of Independence in 1918 (which to the Jägers was no civil war).⁶³³

In the spring of 1915 the authorities received the first intimation of the Finnish preparations for a rebellion, and more precise bits of information in the autumn. Military intelligence found out enlistment and smuggling out of the country of young men.⁶³⁴

632 Correspondence in KKK 1917, II dept., no. 35-1, VA

633 For the complete story: Lauerma, *Kuninkaallinen* . . .

634 VI army to Seyn 28.IX 1915, 42th army corps to Seyn 30.IX 1915. KKK 1915, I dept., no. 2-85, VA

The gendarme-chief belittled the danger. He admitted that German propaganda was inciting the Finns to take to arms. But the Finns would certainly not move until a successful revolution in the interior of the Empire made their rebellion safe. Sweden might win over the Swedes in Finland, but the Finnish nine-tenths of the population did not wish for the resurrection of Swedish power in Finland.⁶³⁵ The Governor-General responded to the military that no trace of a rebellious organization had been found, that the enlistment had been stopped, and that young men did not emigrate in abnormally large numbers.⁶³⁶ As late as January 1916 Eremin, the gendarme chief, told Seyn that the Germans were enlisting Finns to act as guides in the event of a landing, but no intimation of preparations for an armed rebellion existed.⁶³⁷

But more information flowed in from spies via Paris, London, and Rotterdam by the New Year 1916. A few recruiters of the movement were arrested in the same period, and they were surprisingly voluble during their interrogation. But it was not until the summer of 1916, when the battalion was transferred to the front and four Jägers went over to the Russian side, that a detailed picture of the size of the movement, of the organization of the battalion, and even the names of many of the Jägers came to light.⁶³⁸

The military authorities thought that Finns were given

635 Gendarme chief to commander of division Kafalov 31.X 1915. KKK 1915, I dept., no. 2-85, VA

636 Seyn to VI army 15/28.XI 1915. Seyn to the Ministry of the Interior 3.XII 1915. KKK 1915, I dept., no. 2-85, VA

637 Gendarme chief to Seyn 25.I 1916. KKK 1915, I dept., no 2-85, VA

638 *Kratkii očerk prestupnago občestva, obrazovavsa gosja v 1915 godu v Finljandii, s čelju otdelenija poslednei ot Rossii, pri pomošči Germanii.* KKK 1915, I dept., no. 2-85, VA

What the Russians knew of the Jäger movement was first studied by Manninen, *Venäläisten . . .* p. 63—66, and recently a thorough study has been made by Turpeinen, *Keisarillisen . . .*

The German intentions when helping the Jägers were, of course, part of the *Kriegsziel*-question. The intention in 1915—1916 seems to have been to make Finns help operations on the eastern front by creating a diversion, perhaps with Swedish support, and in 1917—1918 to detach Finland from Russia into the German sphere of interest, and in 1918 to oppose the Allied intervention and the Bolsheviki in the north.

passports for foreign travel too easily.⁶³⁹ Young men pretended to emigrate to America; it was not sensible to let the working force of Finland emigrate, and even less to let them be enlisted in German service.⁶⁴⁰ Tightening the passport regulations⁶⁴¹ was not enough; the staff of the northern army group demanded tighter control of emigration or the complete prohibition of it.⁶⁴²

Seyn protested. It was difficult to organize a water-tight control, and it would cause much delay for those who emigrated on useful business, e.g. Russian spies or Finnish youth to serve as sailors in Allied ships.⁶⁴³

The military did not forbid emigration, but the control was tightened. Emigration to America was allowed only if the emigrant presented a paid ticket for the voyage, and sailors had to present themselves to the Russian consul in the country where they enlisted.⁶⁴⁴ The sixth army also ordered Seyn to inform the Finns that if men of 17—35 years left the country illegally, they would be sentenced to death if caught, and if not, their closest relatives, e.g. parents, would be punished.⁶⁴⁵

Seyn made a project for such a declaration, but demanded that the opinion of the Council of Ministers be asked, because the question was politically and internationally important; and the declaration would be a public confession of the existence of the rebel movement.⁶⁴⁶ In the question of tightening the passport controls Seyn had already appealed to the Council of Ministers to counteract the too-rigorous measures ordered by the military.⁶⁴⁷

639 VI army to the St.Petersburg military district 20.VII 1915. KKK 1915, I dept., war no. 13-14, VA

640 VI army to Seyn 3.XI 1915. KKK 1915, I dept., war no. 13-14, VA

641 Seyn to Goremykin 10.XII 1915. KKK 1915, I dept., war no. 13-14, VA

642 Seyn to the Council of Ministers 18.I 1916. KKK 1915, I dept., war no. 13-14, VA

643 Seyn to the northern army group 4.IV 1916 and 11.V 1916. KKK 1915, war no. 13-14, VA

644 VI army to Seyn 27.I 1916, 15.II 1916, 3.V 1916. KKK 1915, I dept., war no. 13-14, VA

645 VI army to Seyn 6.VIII 1916. KKK Hd 48, VA

646 VI army to Seyn 12.VIII 1916, with a secret "project" of the declaration. KKK Hd 48, no. 4, VA

647 Seyn to the Council of Ministers 18.I 1916. KKK 1915, I dept., war no. 13-14, VA

The protest helped: the military continued to demand tighter controls, but did not speak any more of revenge on the relatives of the criminals.⁶⁴⁸

At first sight the relaxed attitude of Seyn and of the gendarmes to the rebellious real Jäger movement is surprising, especially if we remember how nervously they had reacted to the by then imaginary *Voima* movement.

Eremin seems to have been less credulous than Utgof, but that is only a partial explanation. Thanks to the state of military emergency, no popular meetings and noisy press articles could alarm the authorities. It was seen, more clearly than in 1907—1909—1911, that the whole population was not rebellious, that the Jäger movement was supported only by a tiny fraction. It was supposed that the timid Finns would not rise in a hopeless rebellion, as long as Russia remained strong.

A further explanation could be, if we accept the view that Seyn had never been completely taken in by the gendarme-reports, that he had now no need for any more alarming information. The military correspondence is full of complaints for the laxity of civilian control, and it was in Seyn's interest to show that the danger was not very great and that control was effective enough, especially bearing in mind the undesirable complications of too strict measures. Seyn was not inclined to protect the Finnish rebels, but he was answerable for keeping Finland peaceful. For instance, a complete prohibition of crossing the Swedish frontier would have made the emigration to Germany more difficult, but the consequent dissatisfaction of the population would have caused a disturbance of the social and political order which would have been much more serious than the loss of a few potential traitors over the frontier.

A typical example of Seyn's attitude came when the military authorities started to complain about the Sortavala Seminary. They said it was working for the separation of Finland from Russia and for Pan-Finnish propaganda among the Orthodox Karelians; and, to top it, the Seminary was involved in the Jäger movement. The son of the director had been arrested together with a couple other terrorists sent over from the

648 Commander-in-chief of the northern army group to Seyn 21.XI 1916. KKK Hd 48, no. 4, VA

battalion in Germany. It was necessary to close down the Seminary.

Seyn in his reply admitted that the allegations of the military were correct, but explained that it was of no use closing the Sortavala Seminary. It was no exception among the teacher-training colleges in Finland. It was a typical example of Finnish nationalism and separatism that had permeated the whole people. Closing the Seminary would thus be of no use, but it would anger the Finns and give the halo of martyrs to its teachers and pupils; and its personnel would be dispersed around the country to contaminate the people still further with their ideas. In addition, the personnel would have to be paid their severance pay and pension, to the detriment of the straightened finances of the Senate; and after the war, with the ending of the state of military emergency, all regulations made in the emergency would be annulled and the Seminary would be re-opened, which would be very embarrassing to the Russian authorities. In any case, closing the Seminary was a measure of such gravity that the opinion of the Council of Ministers had to be asked. Seyn recommended that an eye be kept on the personnel and only those should be dismissed who were clearly disloyal, although it was true that it was difficult to investigate the loyalty of anyone because the gendarmes or the Ohrana could not be introduced into the Seminary.⁶⁴⁹

Here again we see Seyn reluctant to resort to the "decisive measures" which had been dear to him before the war, and appealing to the civilian government against the military demands which might have provoked difficulties for the keeper of order in the Grand Duchy. It seems that wartime taught Seyn the skill of governing. Psychology was necessary because now the Empire, which had appeared so mighty in peace-time, could not afford any more enemies. For the military this was more difficult to understand, because they saw the immediate problem but were not trained in the administration of difficult populations. In the area of military administration, on a large zone behind the fronts, they governed so heedlessly that it has been held for one of the principal reasons of the Russian

649 Delo o Serdobol'skoi seminarii 1912—1913. Serdobol'skaja seminarija 1916. KKK Hd 105, VA

revolution. The treatment of Jews in Galicia, especially, was such that even hardened anti-Semites were aghast.⁶⁵⁰

This was not the last example of the contradiction between Seyn and the military.

Feeding the Finns

Finnish agriculture had specialized in cattle-breeding. Grain was imported and from the beginning of the war the Russian grain was the sole means of providing bread for the Finns. The disorder in the Russian railways made difficult the feeding of the big cities, and the producers were reluctant to sell their grain because the rouble was losing its value. The St. Petersburg military district advised Seyn to avoid purchases in the capital because there speculation was rampant. Seyn had to try to gather grain from the distant *gubernijas* to secure bread for his subjects.⁶⁵¹

The grain trains made the military authorities suspicious, since the Finns were perhaps re-selling the grain via Sweden to Germany. Protests by the *Finljandskaja Gazeta*⁶⁵² were of no avail. Why did the Finns build up grain stores if not for feeding the enemy they expected to land shortly? The military argued that the export of grain to Finland had to be forbidden. Seyn had to explain that no rebellion was being prepared in Finland nor had the gendarmes any information about such preparations or stores of grain. Cutting imports would thus be useless on the one hand, and extremely dangerous on the other: hunger and high prices would cause popular discontent and disorder.⁶⁵³

650 Graf, *Military rule* . . . p. 390—392

651 St.Petersburg Military District to Seyn 17.II 1915. Seyn to Moscow, Dvinsk, Kiev, Odessa, Vladikavkaz, Ekaterinodar, Novočerkassk, Stavropol, Orenburg, and Kazan 1.IV 1915. KKK 1915, II dept., no. 58-1, VA

652 *Finljandskaja Gazeta* 17/27.V 1915

653 Seyn to the staff of the northern army group 30.I 1916. KKK Hd 104, no. 11, VA

The staff of the northern army group answered that they did not mean a popular armed rebellion, but help to the enemy after the expected invasion. Even a reluctant population could be forced to give up their grain to the enemy. Perhaps it was unnecessary to cut the import from Russia, but the administration had to see to it that no grain was stored in any area that might fall within the reach of the enemy.⁶⁵⁴ The northern army group staff sent similar complaints to the Stavka, too, reminding them of the Jäger movement and of the necessity of vigilance in Finland, and stressing that the precondition for success was an action with unified forces of all the authorities. But, they alleged, the governing authority, which was responsible for the direction of affairs in Finland, had not followed this principle. In questions of defence all authorities ought to follow the directions laid down by the military authorities.⁶⁵⁵

Seyn naturally took a stand against so grave an accusation. He collected statistics from all Governors to show that there were no grain stores in Finland. There were only 225 tons of oats at Kaskinen, collected for fodder by the military themselves. The Finnish daily consumption was 96—127 waggons of grain,⁶⁵⁶ i.e. no grain was left over to be stored. The Council of Ministers supported Seyn.⁶⁵⁷ (They did not like the disorderly government by the military of the theatre of war,⁶⁵⁸ although it is not quite clear how much more competent they were themselves).

The quarrel was left to be decided by the Stavka. The Supreme staff complained of the "immense amount of material" that had been collected by the local administration, the customs service, the gendarmes, and the northern army group and the sixth army. The administrators were able to build their defence on exact facts, while the attack of the northern army group was based on what "could be thought"

654 The staff of the northern army group to Seyn 6.II 1916. KKK Hd 104, no. 11, VA

655 The staff of the northern army group to the Chief of staff of the Stavka 4.II 1916. KKK Hd 104, no. 11, VA

656 "Spravka" 24.II 1916. KKK Hd 104, no. 11, VA

657 Council of Ministers to Seyn 11.I 1916. KKK Hd 104, no. 1, VA

658 Jahontov, *Tjaželye* . . . p. 42

and was "held possible" "on the basis of deep conviction". Thus the Stavka found the accusations unfounded.

The Stavka supposed at first that even the information about the Jägers was equally baseless. When the information was confirmed, the Stavka comforted themselves with the fact that the Jägers had been sent to the front, not to start a rebellion in Finland. No massive emigration to Germany had been noticed, either.⁶⁵⁹

No Additional Finnish Tribute for Russia

The "Military Millions" were far from sufficient compensation for Finnish freedom from all military burdens. They were only a payment, and a cheap one, in lieu of personal military service of the Finnish youth; what the Finns ought to have paid for armaments and for the upkeep of the army, navy, diplomacy, Imperial court and other Imperial institutions could not even be estimated.

After the war broke out, it was found that military expenditure was growing to unexpected and gigantic proportions. "A greater Finnish participation in the costs caused by the war" was demanded by the Russian government as early as August 1914. At least 200,000,000 marks ought to have been paid at once, as an immediate down payment from the final tribute. This time it was the Senate, in charge of the Finnish finances and answerable for the smooth running of the administration in the Duchy, that answered. They willingly admitted the duty of Finland to participate in the common patriotic effort, in principle. But in practice, they refused to pay. They reminded the Council of Ministers of the poverty of Finland, due to her northern situation. The Emperor had ordered Finland to contribute more to the war effort, and the Council of Ministers had proposed that Finland should take

659 Lemke, *250 dni* . . . p. 542, 667

over 1,8 % (the proportion of the Finnish population of the number of inhabitants of the Empire) of the Imperial war debt. The Senate answered that the Russian government had no right to order future payments for Finland; the problem presupposed legislation according to the Imperial procedure, which was not practicable in war-time. Besides, the exact amount to be paid was impossible to calculate. Nor was there any certainty of Finland not suffering the fate of Poland, with the incalculable material loss that had there ensued. On the other hand, there was the certainty of victory and of making the enemy pay for everything. The Senate also resorted to the most effective obstruction, delay: this answer was given late in 1916.⁶⁶⁰

As a partial concession to the desparate financial situation of the Imperial government, the Finnish state bought Russian war bonds for a few tens of million marks, and took a loan on the London market to alleviate the Russian lack of Finnish and foreign currency. Much of the export to Russia was paid for with roubles, which lost their value when the Empire collapsed in 1917—1918. Thus, in the end, the Finnish contribution to Russia's war amounted to a little above 200 million marks, in addition to the 194 "Military Millions" from the years 1902—1916.⁶⁶¹

Finns To Be Conscripted After All?

The Great War consumed more men than had ever been

660 Osobyí Žurnal Soveta Ministrov po voprosu o vypuska finljandskoju kaznoju zaïmov na pokrytie časti padajuščih na dolju Finljandii črežvyčajnyh rashodov, vyzvannyh nastojaščeju voinoju. KKK 1914, II dept., no. 94, VA

Ministry of Finances to Seyn 10.VIII 1916. KKK 1914, II dept., no. 94 II, VA

Keisarillisen Suomen Senaatin lausunto Raha-asiaiministerin lakiehdotuksesta joka koskee Suomen osanottoa niiden ylimääräisten menojen korvaamiseksi, joita sota on aiheuttanut valtakunnanrahastolle. KKK 1914, II dept., no. 94 II, VA

This question has been discussed by Bobovič, *Russko-finljandskie* . . .

661 Luntinen, *Sotilasmiljoonat*, p. 172

expected, and it began to seem as if there were hardly enough Russians to feed into the war-machine. In all, fifteen or sixteen million men were conscripted into the Imperial army during the war.

In the beginning of 1916 it was rumoured that even the Finns were to be conscripted. The military authorities supposed that this rumour was one of the reasons for the increased emigration and they proposed the publication of a declaration that no military service was intended for the Finnish youth.⁶⁶²

Seyn opposed the declaration. He said that it would only remind the population of the Empire of the unpleasant privileges the Finns enjoyed. It might be preferable to tighten the control of emigration — as outlined above — and to state the reason for the tightening-up. People would then know who were the culprits and the criminals would lose their popular support. The Russians would learn to appreciate the value of the Finns. It would help later when the time came to regulate the relations of Finland and Russia in the right way.⁶⁶³

Seyn always remembered his basic aim and the necessity of continuing his pre-war policy when peace would be re-established. That was why it would have been useful to remind the Russians of the lack of loyalty in Finland. But no declaration was published and had it been, this would have been against the general line of policy of not acknowledging the existence of a rebellious movement.

The question of the Finns' military service was turned upside down in the autumn of 1916. In the ministerial merry-go-round the post of Minister of War fell on General Šuvaev in March 1916. He had been distinguished as a member of the staff of the War Ministry in the committee which tried to make Finland pay more for quartering Russian troops. Now, in October 1916, he proposed conscripting all Finnish men between 18—43 years of age and recruiting them for the field army or for labour detachments. The Minister explained that now, when the natives of the Steppe, Siberia, and Turkestan were being conscripted, Finland was the only part of the Empire that did

662 The staff of the northern army group to Seyn 5.XI 1916. KKK Hd 105, VA

663 Seyn to the staff of the northern army group 24.I 1914, Seyn to the Stavka 4.III 1916. KKK 1915., I dept., no. 2-85, VA

not participate in the war effort. Its population was healthy and educated, well able to learn military skills.⁶⁶⁴

The proposal was accompanied by ominous articles in the *Novoe Vremja*. Was it really possible, the paper asked, that the Finns did not understand that they had to bear their part of the common burden of the Empire? Were the Finns really reluctant to shed a drop of blood for liberty — oh no, some of them had crossed to the German lines . . . After the war it would be asked what had been Finland's share in it. The answer would be that Finland, which Russia had called forth into existence from the slavery of the Swedish time, had remained outside the mortal battle, that even some Finns had sided with the enemy. What then could be left of Finland?⁶⁶⁵

The proposal of the Minister of War was well in accord with the chauvinistic "true Russian" view that as an integral part of Russia Finland was obliged to participate in all the ordeals of the common fatherland. But Seyn saved the Finns from this fate.

Seyn explained that since the beginning of the war only 544 volunteers had joined the Imperial army. They were regarded as moral outcasts by the political public in Finland. Thus it was probable that conscription would strengthen Finnish hostility and separatism, would stimulate the illegal emigration, and would bring into the Russian army elements antagonistic to Russian patriotism. There were many Germanophiles in Finland, and among them even German spies and saboteurs might infiltrate the army. These were the reasons for which the "Military Millions" had been decreed instead of military service and they remained valid.

If conscription should be ordered, it was to be decreed through the Imperial procedure. It could not be a matter of the local legislation for this would be conceding to separatist claims. But the Finns would not agree willingly to Imperial regulation of this matter. German and Swedish activists would take advantage of the conflict in their anti-Russian

664 The Minister of Interior to Seyn 31.X 1916. KKK 1917, I dept., no. 2-32, VA

Cf. Manninen, *Venäläisten* . . . p. 397—412, Turpeinen, *Jägarrörelsen* . . . p. 329—340

665 *Novoe Vremja* 3.IX 1916. KKK Hd 48, no. 4, VA

propaganda. The disorder that would be bound to arise would make necessary an increase in the number of Russian troops in the Grand Duchy. Perhaps the military would have to take charge of the whole administration, police, and railways, lamed by an eventual general strike. The confusion might provoke the enemy to direct its attack on Finland, and substantial detachments from other fronts would have to be transferred to Finland. Thus Finnish conscription would weaken, not strengthen, Russia's military potential.

Finnish labour service would be equally detrimental to Russia. There were 735,000 men between 17—55 years of age; the proposed service would mean a loss of 200,000 or 300,000 men. Clearly it would be a fundamental loss to the national economy. Of course, not Finland's but Russia's interest should be paramount. But actually it would be Russia's interest that would be harmed by the loss.

And then Seyn presented an immense body of material proving how the Finnish economy was working for the Russian interest. In 1915 the war materials produced had amounted to 130 million roubles; in 1916 it would probably be more than 200 million roubles and in 1917 even more. Horses, cattle, and agricultural produces and firewood were exported for the army, the navy, and the Imperial capital. The troops in Finland consumed products of all kinds to the tune of 145 million roubles in 1915; in 1916 even more. Finns with their carts and horses also transported war materials from the Arctic coast to the railheads.

The proposed labour conscription would cause discontent just as much as the military conscription. Prisoners of war could not replace the conscripted, as the experiment with Chinese coolies (about 3,000 men on the fortification works) proved. To avoid hardships for the population, exports from Russia ought to be increased to avoid disorder and "centrifugal schemes".⁶⁶⁶

A Finnish historian has summarized Seyn's dispatch in the following way:

"Hardly any Finnish statesman would have been able to

666 Seyn to the Minister of the Interior 16/29.XI 1916. KKK 1917, I dept., no. 2-32, VA

save the Finns from the threatening military service or hard labour with their legal arguments as effectively as Seyn did with the immense material which he sent to the Russian government.⁶⁶⁷

Of course, legal arguments would not have been relevant at all, because the Russian government considered that it had the full right to dispose of Finland as was deemed expedient. But during the war it was of vital military and economic interest for Russia that life in Finland continued without any disorder. Finnish autonomy was not only a political theory; it was an every-day fact that Finns lived separately from the Russians. That fact made Seyn, as the chief of the country responsible for keeping order there in the Russian interest, a defender in practice of Finland's separate status.

Thus Seyn differed in his outlook from the hard line of *Novoe Vremja*. This does not imply disparaging him from the Tsarist point of view, or rehabilitating him in the Finnish eyes. In principle he did not approve of Finnish autonomy, and in many of his statements can be seen the intention of continuing the policy of integration after the war. But he was no blind chauvinist; he was the representative of the Russian government. Not even the Jäger movement caused any lynching frenzy; the movement was investigated according to the strict norms of (Russian) legality.⁶⁶⁸

Plans for Burned Earth

Seyn saved Finland because the Russian interest demanded it, but the fate of the Grand Duchy might have resembled that of Poland if the Germans and/or Swedes had attacked Russia through the Grand Duchy. The government prepared for an operation of evacuation and retreat even here. The public archives and cash in the banks were to be moved inland. Problems of evacuating women and children were discussed.

667 Manninen, *Venäläisten* . . . 403

668 As is emphasized by Turpeinen, *Keisarillisen* . . . p. 233

Means of transport were earmarked for the operation, the fortress of Viipuri was prepared to receive the Bank of Finland in the event of German cruisers approaching the Finnish coast.⁶⁶⁹ The part of the Governors' offices which was indispensable to maintain basic functions was to be transferred to safety, other officials were to be paid a two months' salary and transport costs were they wished.⁶⁷⁰

In addition to safeguarding the public money, documents, and servants, the enemy had to be prevented from benefiting from an occupied Finland. It was planned to remove all foodstuffs to the interior of the country. All cars, lorries, and motorcycles were to be given over to the army. The telephone network was to be destroyed. The Governors had to prepare for all necessary demolition work, without scaring the population.⁶⁷¹

The authorities were ordered to plan for the evacuation of the population, without resort to military help or the railways, which would be taken up with the battle against the invader. The population would have to be evacuated on foot; they would not be compelled to leave, but no provisions would be made for those who remained, as everything was to be removed or destroyed or sequestered. The people would be removed to the eastern part of Finland, leaving the western part of the country free for operations.⁶⁷²

It has been noted that many Governors were reluctant to plan a catastrophe on this scale, the probable consequences of which were known from the Polish example.⁶⁷³ The evacuation plans are definite if superfluous proof of the fact that neither Seyn nor the military had any sympathy for the Finnish people; his efforts at feeding them or sparing them from the Russian conscription were dictated by his duty to keep them quiet and usefully occupied in the interest of the Imperial defence effort.

669 Vyvoz po voennym obstojatel'stvom vnutri strani bankovyh čennostei i del Pravitel'stvennyh učreždenii. KKK 1914, I dept., war no. 1-2, VA

670 O meroprijatijah po voprosu ob organizacii evakuacii graždanskih lic i pravitel'stvennyh učreždenii. KKK 1915, I dept., war no. 2-6, VA

671 Instructions to all police officials 22.II 1915. KKK 1915, I dept., war no. 2-6 II, VA

672 The Governor of Vaasa to his subordinate officials 29.V 1915 and 20.VI 1915. KKK 1915, I dept., war no. 2-6 II, VA

673 Turpeinen, *Keisarillisen* . . . p. 131

Evaluation

Self-Appraisal

The usual address of complaints by the Diet in 1914 made Seyn, as we have seen, write a lengthy review of his activity in answer.⁶⁷⁴ The Diet blamed the Imperial government for its post-1899 policy: for the usurpation of Finnish legislation by the Imperial legislative organs, meddling with the Finnish administration by the Council of Ministers, and occupying the local administrative offices by Russian-born officials. The complaint, wrote Seyn, was based on the mistaken view of Finland's position as an autonomous state with its own constitution. In fact, Finland's self-government was local and based on the Russian constitution and Imperial grace. Denying the Supreme Power the right to legislate for Finland — a right specifically reinforced by law on the 17th June 1910, only proved the disloyalty of the Diet. The making of the Council of Ministers the guardian of Imperial interests in 1908 had not been detrimental to Finnish interests because both sets of interests were identical, Finland being part of the Empire.

The complaint further reflected, Seyn went on, the dissatisfaction of the Diet with the new Minister State Secretary (Markoff), who did not support their centrifugal

674 Seyn to the Council of Ministers to the Emperor 5.V 1915. KKK 1914, II dept., no. 14—15, VA

schemes. Accusations against the reformed Senate proved that it had fulfilled its duty without bending under local pressure. The leaders of the local parties had refused to serve in the Senate, wanting to compel the government to concessions, but their devious scheme had come to nought, because the government had found impartial and loyal replacements among Finns and Russians. Of course there had been initial difficulties, but in a few years' time there was no longer any question of inexperience or incompetence. The Senate had worked industriously to prepare local and Imperial reforms.

The Procurator (the highest legal official in Finland) was accused by the Diet, Seyn said, of collaboration with the Governor-General and the Senate in the integration of Finland with the other parts of the Empire. But it was the duty of the Procurator to prosecute partial, politicking judges. He would have ceased from being the highest guardian of legality if he had acknowledged only the local laws, interpreting them in the separatist light.

Equally groundless were the numerous complaints concerning the administration. All Governors excepting one were Finnish-born and knew the local languages. There were only a few cases where a Russian had been appointed to any office in Finland; the law on equal rights had been very rarely applied. Complaints against it only implied a brazen non-acknowledgement of the jurisdiction of the Russian legislation in Finland.

The complaints over disciplinary punishments were admitted by the Diet itself to be baseless, when it stated that only officials reluctant to obey the law on equal rights or other "unconstitutional" decrees had been so punished. Of course the government tried to quell any sign of mutiny among its servants. The complaint against officials "deviating from Finnish law" was a valuable acknowledgement of the fact that the passive resistance was weakening in consequence of the support of the government for loyal servants.

Further, said Seyn, the Diet mentioned the loss of the national character of the Finnish administration with the consequent menace against the independence of the country. But the third article of the Russian constitution clearly stated that the Russian language was the Imperial language, obligatory in all public instances. For many reasons was the

Russian language in Finland in a far from satisfactory position; it was used only exceptionally even in the higher government offices. Such a situation could not be regarded as normal. A reform had been decreed, to be realized over five years, supported by a programme of teaching the Russian language to Finns. Thus no one could say that local interests were ignored.

After the November Manifesto the censorship had been abolished in Finland. The subsequent anarchy in the press had not been tackled until 1909, and this work demanded continuous effort. The cases of lèse-majesty, complained of by the Diet, were due to the brazen wilfulness of the press. So-called "violations" of the freedom of association and assembly were legal measures against criminal speeches and unauthorized meetings. The military had been called to disperse meetings only twice. It was their own fault if some associations had been forced to disclose information on their membership, finances, and political opinions of their leaders — what reason had they to wish to function secretly from the government? Demonstrations for separatism — flag-flying, illuminations, etc., had been prevented by the police on legal grounds; such public display was not "private celebration".

Seyn continued that the police did not employ any criminal elements, and only a few Russians had been enlisted. The local law allowed policemen to be prosecuted, and the local press eagerly disclosed all cases of incorrect behaviour. One drunkard had died in a brawl among the arrested, another had been shot while escaping. There was only one case of manslaughter; the guilty policeman had been immediately dismissed and sentenced to imprisonment.

The Diet further complained of the illegal proclamation of the rules for the administration of fortresses in 1909 and the expulsion from the fortification area of Viipuri of a few journalists and former pilots. But the journalists had denigrated the military and incited disobedience, and the pilots had proved their disloyalty by leaving their posts (in 1912) and attempting to continue work as private pilots. The commandant of the fortress had used his right of expulsion, and the complaint against his action had been found "of no consequence" by the Emperor.

There was no end to the list of complaints concerning measures in preparation — the annexation of parts of Karelia;

military requisitions of horses, cars, ships; submitting political crimes to the Imperial courts of justice; opening Russian banks in Finland; the procedure for obtaining Russian nationality; carrying police investigations at the request of the Imperial authorities etc. The complaints were not worth answering, Seyn stated. They only demonstrated the wish to separate from the other parts of Russia and not to acknowledge the force of Imperial laws in Finland.

"The Diet, 'the representative of the Finnish people', instead of being an example for the people, supports as always the mistaken and hopeless demands of the local separatism. It remains deaf to the demands of the Russian state power, denies the legality of its acts, and demands concessions."

Thus the Diet was the yeast that did not allow the local life to subside into calm.

In conclusion, Seyn stated that even if, contrary to fact, the Imperial interest had been in conflict with local interest of one part of the Empire, the only solution was the submission of the part to the whole.

For his own part Seyn said that he was accused of initiating laws to curb Finnish autonomy and of support for all measures for this end. The Governor-General could only admit that he was guilty of all that he was accused of:

"Because these accusations . . . are based on my activity, which is known to all, I hold it impossible to say anything in my defence and leave matters to be decided on by the Council of Ministers."

The accusations of the Diet were a resumé of the Russian policy of oppression during Seyn's tenure of office, as seen by the Finns. The answer of the Governor-General is a summary of the identical policy from the opposite view of the government. It was the Finns that were wrong, Seyn felt, always trying to separate themselves from Russia. Separatism emerged in all fields of Finnish life, compelling the Governor-General to interfere in everything.

The welfare of the Empire was the highest good to Seyn. It was self-evident to him, just as was Russia's right to own

Finland. Finns ought to have understood it; they probably did understand, and thus their opposition was wilful, brazen, false, vicious. Concessions to them would have been weakness, provoking further demands, detrimental to the unity of the Empire.

Seyn did not pretend to originality in his activity; he publicly acknowledged his debt to his predecessor. A school established in Karelia was dedicated to the memory of Bobrikov; another school in Helsinki was called "the School of Adjutant General Bobrikov".⁶⁷⁵ Ten years after the death of the great patriot, on the 3/16th June 1914, a memorial mass was held in the Senate House. Officials of the Senate and central offices were ordered to attend. "What a humiliation" Tekla Hultin fumed, but worse, for a Finn, followed. *Finljandskaja Gazeta* demanded that the Finnish State erect a monument to the memory of Bobrikov. "If such a thing should come to happen, may Hell swallow it" Hultin continued.⁶⁷⁶ No monument was erected, but the Senate asked for Imperial approval to put up a bust in a niche in their office

"to the memory of their late chairman, who with his characteristic fortitude and energy executed the measures for the closer unification of Finland with the other parts of Russia as decreed by His Imperial Majesty."⁶⁷⁷

Appreciation

Tsarism showed its appreciation of its servant. Seyn was accorded the Order of St. Anna, 1st class, in 1910. A medal for the bicentennial commemoration of the Battle of Poltava was given in 1912. In 1913 Seyn received a bronze medal in

675 Osvjašćenie Sernesskoi imeni General-Ad'jutanta Bobrikova školy. KKK 1912, III dept., no. 108, VA

676 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . II, p. 38

677 O postanovka v zdanii Senata bjusta General-Ad'jutanta Bobrikova i učreždenii v nekotoryh S. Peterburgskih učebnyh zavedenii stipendi ego imeni. VSV 1915, no. 60, VA

commemoration of the Patriotic War. Seyn also received a medal for those who had personally congratulated the Emperor at the tricentennial jubilee of the Roman Dynasty. Seyn even received a foreign order. The King of Sweden made him Knight Commander of the Order of the Sword. This cannot have been meant as an encouragement for Seyn, whose work in Finland the neighbouring state regarded as a preparation for an advance westwards, but was a diplomatic gesture. It was undoubtedly part of the attempt to improve Russo-Swedish relations in 1912—1913 (a royal visit, a dynastic marriage). Neither Bobrikov nor Seyn was given the Order of St. Seraphim, the highest symbol of honour in Sweden, which Menschikoff and Adlerberg, Governor-Generals in the previous century, did receive.⁶⁷⁸

The Seyns received appreciation from lower levels, too. Sofia Ivanovna Seyn was made honorary member of the Karelian Brotherhood in 1910, and in 1911 Seyn received a medal of the Brotherhood for the work he had done for their common aim.⁶⁷⁹ In 1915 Seyn was made a honorary member of the Voluntary Fire Brigade of Ollila⁶⁸⁰ (a village populated by numerous Russians on the frontier closest to St. Petersburg).

There was also some talk about transferring Seyn elsewhere. In the spring of 1914 *Reč* and *Den'* reported that he would be appointed Governor-General in Warsaw. He would be replaced by Žilinskii, who had had enough of his staff work as the chief of the General Staff.⁶⁸¹ Some other newspapers talked of Seyn's extraordinary administrative abilities, which made him worthy of being appointed to the vacant office of Governor-General in Kiev.⁶⁸² In the Duma there was some talk of Seyn being replaced by the chief of the St. Petersburg military district staff, von der Brincken. Seyn was to be made a count and a member of the Council of State, it was supposed.⁶⁸³

An appointment to Warsaw or Kiev, capitals of the

678 Coats of Arms of the Knights of the Order of St. Seraphim in the Church at Ridrarholm, Stockholm

679 Archbishop Sergei to Seyn 26.XI 1910. KKK Fh 7, no. 96b, VA

680 Personal file of Seyn 19.II 1917. KKK Fh 7, no. 96b, VA

681 Cited by *Nya Pressen* no. 60/1914. KKK Fh 7, no. 96b, VA

682 Cited by *Uusi Suometar* 21.III 1914. KKK Fh 7, no. 96b, VA

683 Cited by *Helsingin Sanomat* 7.III 1914. KKK Fh 7, no. 96b, VA

strategically most important frontier military districts, would have been a promotion for Seyn; membership of the Council of State would have been an honorable retirement. There is no information available on the background of these rumours. In January, 1914, Kokovcov was replaced by Goremykin. The change could not imply any change in the direction of the Finnish policy of the government; neither Žilinskiĭ nor von der Brincken were notorious for their liberalism, and Brincken had supported Seyn's plans in 1911 for a state of military emergency in Finland.

Finns did not dare to hope for any improvement in their lot: "nothing official has as yet been heard. But it is hardly to be expected that the Russian misery would disappear"⁶⁸⁴ but even so Seyn's departure would have been a relief: "we heartily wish *bon voyage* for him"⁶⁸⁵. As we have seen, Seyn was neither promoted out of Finland in 1914 nor removed from office in 1915. On the contrary, the Council of Ministers accepted without comment Seyn's answer to the complaints of the Diet.⁶⁸⁶

Seyn went on gathering further honours. He was given a bronze medal for meritorious mobilization work and a medal for the bicentennial commemoration for the Battle of Gangut (1914). Imperial gratitude was officially recorded for the order kept during Nicholas II's official visit to Helsinki in 1915. The Order of the White Eagle was given him for distinguished and industrious service. The Empress Alexandra thanked him for the 24,936 roubles 23 kopeks that had been collected in Finland for wounded Russian soldiers.⁶⁸⁷

All these distinctions were made in 1915. The next year there was again some talk of his retirement from Finland. There is no direct record of what the War Ministry thought about Seyn's defence of the Finnish special rights in 1916, but it seems clear that at least the Old Bobrikovians did not like it. It was difficult for them to attack the representative of the Imperial government and their recent favourite, Seyn. But the chairman of the Senate, Borovitinov, came under fire. The Moscow chauvinists accused him of insufficient zeal, competence, and

684 Aspelin—Haapkylä, *Kirovuosien* . . . p. 247, 13.III 1914.

685 *Nya Pressen* no. 60/1914. KKK Fh 7, no. 96b, VA

686 *Osobyĭ Žurnal Soveta Ministrov* 5.X 1915. VSV Hc 6, VA

687 Personal file of Seyn, 19.II 1917. KKK Fh 7, no. 96b, VA

integrity, because of the Senate's reluctance to accept for Finland her share of the Imperial war expenditure.⁶⁸⁸ These war-time attacks resemble the earlier accusations against Gerard and Boeckman, but this time Seyn and the accused were on the same side.

There seems to have been some talk in St. Petersburg of dismissing Seyn. It was said that "Seyn displeased not only the local population but also the circle of Old Bobrikovians, led by General Borodkin, and Deutrich, Member of the Council of State". They accused him of trusting Borovitinov too much and falling under his influence. The mistaken policy of Seyn was reflected, among other things, in the hostile attitude of Sweden. That was why, the rumour went on, a Finnish Senator had sent an address through Rasputin and Vyubova (a friend of the Empress Alexandra) to the Emperor. A return to the regime of Gerard was asked for. But Seyn was informed of the scheme, contacted Borodkin and Deutrich and managed to make up the quarrel with them. Then, with the aid of Markov he gained admittance to the Emperor and succeeded in warding off his appointment to the Council of State, i.e. dismissal from the Governor-Generalship.⁶⁸⁹

There is no document to prove or to disprove this gossip. It was at this time that the Emperor read Seyn's report on the participation of the Finnish economy in the Russian war effort. The Governor-General was rewarded by an Imperial marginal note: "It would be very well to develop further such participation in the war".⁶⁹⁰

It is not quite certain whether Borodkin and Deutrich were influential enough to cause the dismissal of the Governor-General, if they had wanted it; it is a fact that the chauvinist Rightist opposition in general had some influence at the Imperial Court. As it is, the passage above may remain as a sample of the rumours that kept circulating in the murky atmosphere of St. Petersburg.

In the summer of 1916 the Navy Ministry proposed that Seyn

688 Torvinen, *Borovitinov* . . . p. 226—231

689 *Padenie* . . . IV, p. 473—474, statement by Beletskii, an official of the Ministry of the Interior

690 Nicholas II's marginal comment on Seyn's Report 12.XI 1916. KKK Hd 10, no. 4, VA

be promoted full General, because he had distinguished himself in helping to organize military transports during the winter. But the Ministry of War was reluctant and found reasons for not promoting Seyn. He had not yet served the period necessary for promotion, and a promotion for distinction was only allowed on St. Nicholas's Day, 6th December, and on Easter Synday.⁶⁹¹ Seyn remained Lieutenant-General, comforted by the Emperor's expression of gratitude for his efforts.⁶⁹² The reluctance of the War Ministry to promote Seyn may reflect an animosity towards the Governor-General caused by his numerous clashes with the military and his appeals to the civilian authority of the Council of Ministers.

A Finnish Point of View

The monument for Bobrikov, proposed by Seyn, would have been a supreme provocation for Finns, who were accustomed to demonstrate their constitutional loyalty at the statue of Alexander II, the "good" Emperor, and who took down the portrait of Nicholas II after the February Manifesto. But in a way both Bobrikov and Seyn might have earned their monument for their service for the Finnish national cause.

For ninety years, from 1809 to 1899, had the Russian Emperor been the monarch of Finns, their Grand Duke. The union of Finland with Russia was juridical, political, and military, but not national. The Russian government had let the Finns to live in peace, and the Finnish self-government had developed into an autonomy, with strong economic and cultural as well as ideological bases and with well-working political organs. In spite of the common monarch, the sense of national difference from the Russians grew, especially with the start of the national movement and political life in the 1840s and 1860s.

691 The Naval Staff to the Bureau of the Governor-General 18.VIII 1916. KKK Fh 7, no. 96b, VA

692 Personal file of Seyn 19.II 1917. KKK Fh 7, no. 96b, VA

The Finnish separation began to seem disloyal and dangerous for the chauvinist and bureaucratic unifiers of the Russian Empire. The nationalism of so small a nation seemed a bit ridiculous, and not quite genuine; it was suspected of being inspired by foreign influence, Swedish or German. Measures for the closer unification of the Finnish *gubernijas* with other parts of Russia were carried out so clumsily that the alleged separatism was stirred into life after 1899. But we have seen that, nevertheless, Finns were able to have normal relations with Russians. Socialists, Liberals, Conservatives met their Russian counterparts on the "St. Petersburg Road". Businessmen negotiated with their Russian partners and rivals. The wave of loyalty in 1914 showed that the feeling of belonging to the Empire had survived the efforts of two Governor-Generals to destroy it; the basis of living together with the "good" Russia remained, had Russia allowed the Finns any room to live.

The service of Seyn for the Finnish national cause was that he demonstrated the impossibility of living together with Russia. Seyn was so laborious, conscientious, and zealous, he respected so little the feelings of his subjects, that he roused an increasing number of Finns against himself and his cause. His activity seemed provocation and *tracasserie*, his reasons hypocritical and cynical, his personality mean and officious. Not a single favourable word on Seyn can be found in contemporary Finnish texts. If Bobrikov was hated and feared, Seyn was disliked and despised.

To be able to grow, the national feeling needs a contrasting force against which the picture of its own nationality can be drawn. The Russia of Katkov, Ordin, Bobrikov, and Seyn was such a black background. In Seyn's person Russia was so ridiculous and hateful that it was unthinkable to go on living united with it. The most aware contemporaries realized this:

"Until the Finnish national feeling was strengthened enough, it was certainly good that the Russian society did not send its best representatives to us"⁶⁹³

The Finnish political elite learned to suspect the profitable

693 Hultin. *Päiväkirjani* . . . I, p. 139

business relations: "Our industrial politicians ought to understand that no trust can be had on the Russian fleshpots". Humanitarian activity was not approved, if it benefited the Russians and not their opponents.⁶⁹⁴ Even the best products of Russian literature were disliked, because they were Russian.⁶⁹⁵ The Finns who continued serving the Emperor and wanted to remain Finns had plenty of trouble to explain it to the people at home.⁶⁹⁶ People who continued having normal relations with Russians were regarded unpatriotic cosmopolites.

"The years of oppression" can be seen as an attempt at a conquest or reconquest of Finland, where power had been usurped by the Finns. In this conquest the Russian bureaucrats replaced the Swedish-speaking elites on the leading posts in the Grand Duchy, and the Finnish-speaking emerging elites were frustrated in their ambitions. More distant, but in the end more fatal, was the menace of Russian culture and Russian language replacing the cherished Finnish national culture; for the Finns, national existence was in question. The Finnish resentment at this internal imperialism adopted national vocabulary and feelings, with even racial tones, because the Russians were held to be lower in morals, competence, education, and hygiene. The conclusion was:

"We must avoid fawning to the Russians, however favourably disposed towards us they may be. In any Russian, be he a revolutionary or a reactionary, there lies hidden in the bottom a Bobrikoffian."⁶⁹⁷

Because of the governmental policy, the unpleasant features of Finnish chauvinism were thus strengthened, resulting in the *ryssäviha*, hatred of anything Russian. That in turn was indispensable for realizing the ideal of the *Voima* and the Jägers and for the unconquerable will to fight for independence in 1918, 1939—1940 and 1941—1944, until Russia learned to respect the Finnish determination to live apart from the Empire. After the era of nationalism, imperialism, and

694 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . II, p. 69, 133, 164

695 Kalima, *Sattumaa* . . . p. 271

696 e.g. Mannerheim

697 Törnngren to Hultin, cited in *Päiväkirjani* . . . I, p. 323

totalitarianism 1890—1944 the Russo-Finnish relations have again been tolerable.

In fact, Seyn's time was not the period of unmitigated oppression the contemporary Finns felt. The reformers of the Russian state aimed at a unified national state, but as yet the aim was far from attained. The frightening might of the Russian Empire which the Finns saw threatening them was hamstrung by inertia, lack of cohesion, divided purposes, notions of legalism, bureaucratic obstruction. One of the main themes in the correspondence of first Bobrikov and then of Seyn was their feeling of helplessness and lack of powers in the face of Finnish opposition.

For the Finns this *was* a period of oppression, because they remembered the very different Russia of Alexander II and even of Alexander III. They could not know that they were spared the really effective means of oppression that were yet to be created. Then, pacifying restless populations was to be much more straightforward: "*Dies geschehe am besten dadurch, daß man jeden, der nur schief schauet, totschießt.*"⁶⁹⁸

Tsarism, in the person of Seyn, put the brakes on necessary reforms in Finland. It is true that Seyn governed Finland industriously and promoted a few reforms even; but the aim of these reforms was always to strengthen the Russian power in Finland, not to solve problems because they would contribute to the welfare of Finland. The political battle for Finnish rights absorbed the energy of Finnish elites, so that they tended to ignore or belittle the importance of the internal social problems. The "Military Millions" reduced the amount available for education and communications in Finland. On the other hand, it is not certain that the Finnish propertied classes would have been more eager reformers if left in peace by Russia; or that the Russian revolution would not have aroused the poor Finns even if they had not been quite so badly off. However that may be, Seyn represented Russia in Finland and for his part helped to bind the frontier country to the fate of the Empire during the era of the great upheavals. The Finnish Civil War of 1918 was neither a part of nor yet independent of the Russian Revolution; it took place under the influence of the

698 A. Hitler 1941, cited by Hillgruber, *Die gescheiterte . . .* p. 101

revolution in the neighbouring country, but partly thanks to Seyn, it was also a War of Independence.

Why Seyn Was Important

Seyn was a little man, with a small and suspicious mind. He was capable of intrigue and provocation. His activity was an expression of Russian hatred, envy, and malice towards a more cultured people; his arguments were hypocritical and cynical. He was over-conscientious, boorish, and rather lacking in imagination.

As a man Seyn is perhaps not worthy of being studied at this length, even if we admit that he was industrious, zealous, conscientious, not corrupt, nor a drunkard, nor tainted with any other vice. He certainly was no time-serving careerist: he did not change his colour in 1905. There are plenty of such people among us. But Seyn is important because he represented Imperial Russia. If the Finns have unpleasant memories of Seyn's time, it is because of the kind of Empire Russia was in its final phase.

The Old Russia was not a criminal organization, in spite of its occasional terrible crimes; it was only rigid and heartless. For many of its members it was as acceptable a state as any other state. Many people in Russia understood the urgent need for reassessment and reform. The power elite of the Old Russia tried to strengthen the Empire and their position in it and to prop up the ancient religious-monarchical loyalty of the subjects by modern police methods and a nationalist ideology. Traditional Russia was paternalist, autocratic, bureaucratic, coercive. It was an obsolete system of government, far from being able to realize its aims. Its effectiveness was fettered by bureaucratic obstruction, police corruption, lack of popular education, economic backwardness, and a selfish retention of privileges by the elites. Too many people saw the danger of being compelled to give up their position and their ideas. Reforms seemed to be sinful and dangerous concessions to disastrous modern forces, proof of weakness, a portent of

decline and fall. Nationalism did not fit well with Old Russia for thus was emphasized the importance of the people, with the additional problem that the Empire was made up of many peoples. National unity implied Russifying the national minorities. Orthodox religion, confessed by only a part of the subjects of the Empire, was not able to bind them together and to cover over social and national contradictions. Thus the regime provoked all emerging forces in the multinational society against itself. Politics were reduced to the maintenance of law and order. In the end the Empire did not satisfy anyone. The masses lived in poverty, the better-off people were not allowed due participation in politics, the patriotic saw the bureaucracy steering the Empire towards disaster, the elite could not be secure of the support of a state that fumbled at reforms, national minorities felt oppressed by the Russian majority. Corruption and failures in foreign policy destroyed the majesty of the monarchy.

The Empire was not a class state of the nobility; the main strength of Tsarism was its officers and officials, men who were wholly dependent on the state, on their office. They were convinced that they had the right to govern Russia, that they represented God's will and Russia's true interests. Seyn was a typical representative of such men, part of the officialdom that kept up its loyalty to Tsarism to the end.

Seyn was no arbitrary tyrant but a conscientious servant of the Empire. He did not invent his policy; he adopted the ideas of the environment he was bred up in. He served the established order, he fulfilled the requirements of the office given to him, he took initiatives only in the direction of current policy. Whether he was an egoistic careerist or loyal public servant, he worked with zeal, industry, suspicion, and pedantry. He enjoyed his position, took his pay, ate the jubilee dinners, hung the orders he was accorded on the uniform he wore. Seyn might have been a very good servant of a modern totalitarian state. Better men were not useful for Russia, as was proved by the fate of Gerard and Boeckmann.

Seyn was important because his career reflects the various forces at work during the last years of the Old Russia. He was part of Tsarism and contributed to making Tsarism impossible.

The aim had been a one and indivisible Russia; autocratic, Orthodox, and Russian, with Finland wholly dissolved in the

Imperial society. The outcome was a Bolshevist Russia; even if the Soviet Union has realized a few features of the powerful, unified Empire Russia's reformers dreamed of, it was to be without Finland.

History is an attempt to understand what human life is all about. The biography of a single man may not be of much interest. Seyn was a very average man, easy to understand and to identify with, not a very pleasant one even if not the unmitigated rascal the Finns remember. But he was appointed to an exalted post, at a crucial point in the development of many cultural, national, and political structures, in the cross-current of Russian and Finnish life. Collectives, structures, societies, histories of however long an endurance, have no reality if they are not lived by a human being.

Seyn is interesting as an example of the human condition, and as a Tsarist bureaucrat and European imperialist, an embodiment of the development of a modern European great power and of the difficulties that development caused for Russia. The Finnish reaction to these events help to draw his biography with more relief, but the story is mainly written from his own and the Russian point of view. That is especially important for a Finn as a reminder of the problems caused by living in the neighbourhood of a big, strong, fearful, blustering great power. It also reveals that the view of Russia and/or Finland as monolithic actors in history is very much of a simplification; history is not simply to be seen as a conflict between states, because there are many facets of particularism, division, and unity in addition to or superseding the national ones.

The End

Seyn was fated to see the destruction of his world, the futility of his efforts, and the realization of what he had tried to prevent. In the end he had to pay with his life for his activity in the service of a fallen power.

The End of Tsarism

The Russian revolutionaries were in prison, in Siberia, or in emigration. Even Lenin in his moments of despair did not believe that he would see the revolution in his lifetime.

But in fact the endurance of the people was reaching a breaking-point in the beginning of 1917. The aristocracy planned a palace coup, the Duma accused the regime of stupidity and treason, the St. Petersburg housewives went out on the streets to demand bread, the workers in the factories started striking, the military did not shoot the demonstrators in contravention of the Imperial instruction to restore order.

On the day of revolution, 27th February/12th March, Seyn was told that "the Petrograd station has this morning been occupied by armed revolutionary mob". The Governor-General ordered the Governors and gendarmes to take measures to prevent the disorder from infecting Finland. Agitators had to

be arrested, attempts at rebellion quelled at once. The railway to Petrograd had to be opened.⁶⁹⁹

A military train started from Viipuri to open the railway through to the capital. The operation had been planned earlier, although as a part of action against a rebellion by the *Voima*. But the train was stopped at Valkeasaari, on the frontier.⁷⁰⁰ All measures against the revolution ordered by the Emperor came to nought.

An alarming piece of news from Petrograd was that all prisoners had been freed, among them the Finns in *Kresty* and *Špalernaja* (i.e. the last of the constitutional opposition and the Jäger activists). The district court had been burned, the Police Department and Ohrana destroyed, the arsenals were occupied by the revolutionaries, ministers had been arrested.⁷⁰¹ It was possible that some of the freed prisoners were attempting to come to Finland, with weapons for the local revolutionaries.⁷⁰² Seyn ordered all Governors to keep a watchful eye open and arrest all suspicious persons. The military was asked to guard the frontier near Petrograd and to help the police where necessary.⁷⁰³

Seyn must have been not a little proud when he informed the Emperor on 1st and 2nd March that life in the frontier country continued normally, that all measures had been taken to maintain order, and that revolutionaries had been turned back at Ollila to Petrograd.⁷⁰⁴

The Governor-General could not know that on the same day, 2nd/15th March, 1917, the Emperor had abdicated. When Tsarism was no more, the existence of order in Finland did not save Seyn.

699 Seyn to the Commander of the Baltic Fleet 27.II 1917. KKK 1917, I dept., no. 2—19, VA. — cf. Polvinen, *Venäjän vallankumous* . . . I p. 1—

700 Railway Gendarme Chief to Seyn 28.II 1917. KKK 1917, I dept., no. 2—19 II, VA

701 Railway Gendarme Chief to Seyn 28.II 1917. KKK 1917, I dept., no. 2—19 II, VA (second message on the same day)

702 Railway Gendarme Chief to Seyn 1.III 1917. KKK 1917, I dept., no. 2—19 II VA

703 Seyn to all Governors, to the Gendarme Chief, and to the 42nd army corps 1.III 1917. KKK 1917, I dept., no. 2—19 II, VA

704 Seyn to the Minister State-Secretary 1.III 1917 and 2.III 1917. KKK 1917, I dept., no. 2—19 II, VA

The End of a Career

The Duma and the Temporary Government in Petrograd decided to restore the status quo ante Bobrikov in Finland. Rodičev and D.D. Protopopov were appointed Commissars for Finnish affairs. The intention was to prevent disorder and a general strike in Finland and the consequent disturbance in the supply of food to the Baltic Fleet. A few Finns resident in the capital advised the Commissars that it was of the utmost importance to arrest Seyn and Borovitinov and to clean the Senate of Russians in order to pacify the country and to prevent their counter-measures. The only man able to carry out the arrestation was the Commander of the Baltic Fleet, Vice-Admiral Nepenin. He was contacted via the naval telegraphy, the only means of communications that was still functioning. The Admiral was a bit undecided, asked for confirmation by Lvov, the new Prime Minister; probably it was the Naval Staff that finally made him act.⁷⁰⁵

Nepenin acted with caution. Seyn and Borovitinov were invited to a conference on the flagship of the Admiral before dawn, on the 16th March. They arrived in a car over the ice, boarded the "Krečet" suspecting nothing, and were disarmed and locked up in officer cabins.⁷⁰⁶ It was reported that the sailors were hurt that their ship had been made the goal of such men.⁷⁰⁷

Soon the prisoners were made to realize what the Russian revolution was all about. It was reported that the soldiers who were ordered to guard them were not polite to the Governor-General. This was held to be a bad omen by the Russian officers. During the following day many of them disappeared from the Helsinki streets. In the night many officers were killed, and at the time that Seyn and Borovitinov arrived at Petrograd, a bullet shot from the back hit Admiral Nepenin at the Officers' Club at the naval base in Helsinki.⁷⁰⁸

Seyn and Borovitinov had been removed from the vessel and

705 Schoultz, *Några revolutionsminnen* . . . p. 105—8

706 Polvinen, *Venäjän* . . . I, p. 16

707 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . II, 16.III 1917

708 Malin, *Historiallinen* . . . p. 4

taken to St. Petersburg by the night-express. During that night it had snowed hard and the train had to stop far from the Finland station. Some one tried to get a cab for the prisoners marching in the snow, but the mob shouted: "These men have spoiled the Russian cause in Finland, let them march now". When Seyn himself tried to call for a cab, a soldier pushed him with rifle butt, growling "guljai, sabak".⁷⁰⁹

In Petrograd the prisoners were taken to the Taurian Palace, where they met old acquaintances: Markov was writing something, paying no attention to the others. Many notable persons of the *ancien régime* were sitting in the "Ministers' Pavilion". After a few days many of them, Seyn and Borovitinov included, were transferred to the Petro-Pavlovskii fortress.⁷¹⁰

Sofia Ivanovna Seyn had arrived at Petrograd, too, but of her fate only one glimpse is recorded. When in 1921 the victuals donated by the Helsinki University to starving Russian professors were dealt out, "the former head of our oppressive government, Borovitinov, was among those receiving the gift; Sofia Seyn was his housekeeper".⁷¹¹

Evidently, Seyn was freed afterwards. An Order for Army and Navy on 27th October 1917, informs us that Seyn had been dismissed from the service, at his own request, with the right to wear uniform and with an annual pension of 1,703 roubles from the Emerital foundation. The War Ministry asked the Governor-General's office to obtain for him the rest of his pension in accordance with the statutes of the office.⁷¹²

The Ministry received the answer that the Governor-General's office was not the appropriate office in which to apply for Seyn's pension. He had not been in the Finnish service but in the Imperial one. (cf. p. 113). He had better apply for his pension to the Imperial Treasury.⁷¹³ (Gerard and


709 "Walk, you dog". Malin, *Historiallinen* . . . p. 4. It does not seem that Malin had witnessed the scene, he probably repeats what was told to him

710 Perec, *Zapiski* . . . p. 62, 7, 79

711 Malin, *Historiallinen* . . . p. 4

712 Administrative Main Staff of the War Ministry to the Governor-General's Office 25.XI 1917. KKK Fh 7, no. 96b, VA

713 Governor-General's Office to War Ministry 9/22.XII 1917. KKK Fh 7, no. 96b, VA



Seyn Leaves Helsinki on the 16th March 1917 (Museovirasto)

Boeckman, escaping the revolution, were given asylum and pensions in Finland).

Bureaucratic routine continued with the paperwork even though after the Bolshevik revolution there soon was no Imperial Treasury left, while the business of the Governor-General's office was being wound up.

Seyn was not missed in Helsinki. "Opening of the (Finnish) Diet 11th April 1917. What a relief that the disgusting sight of Seyn and his clique does not any more disturb the divine service".⁷¹⁴

714 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani* . . . II, 11.IV 1917

The End of Seyn

The Russian revolution progressed into a phase of terror in the summer of 1918. Among many other occurrences, a great number of officers was drowned in the sea between Petrograd and Kronstadt.⁷¹⁵ It is not impossible that Seyn was among them: "Later, probably in July, 1918, he was murdered . . .";⁷¹⁶ "it was reported that Seyn was drowned in the Gulf of Finland somewhere near Kronstadt".⁷¹⁷

715 Kokovcov, *Iz moego* . . . II, p. 464

716 *Kansallinen elämäkerrasto* . . . V, p. 100

717 Malin, *Historiallinen* . . . p. 4. *Padenie* . . . VII, p. 342 (Index) says that Seyn lived 1862—1918. No source is given.

Acknowledgements

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Afterword

This story is based on the documents found in Finland after the Russians left in 1917—1918. Additional documents exist in Soviet archives, and a few of them are available as microfilm copies in Helsinki. The Russian war archives are still closed, but by resorting to the reports from St. Petersburg by French military attachés it is possible to illuminate the military background of Russian policy during Seyn's lifetime.


A complete bibliography was not attempted. Only the books and papers consulted during the study are listed here. The customary classification was not feasible, because the distinction between published documents, memoirs, and research studies does not emerge clearly. Many memoirs border on research, numerous historians have been participants in the occurrences they study, diaries and collections of published documents have been edited with the wisdom of hindsight or with propagandist intention.

Kyrillic words have been transcribed according to the International Standard recommendations, excepting in cases where a person's name was originally written in Latin characters; thus Seyn or von Plehwe, not Zein and Pleve; but Gerard, according to established usage, not Gerhardt or Gérard. Bobrikov and Markov is the customary way of writing these names, although as Tsarist officers they ought to be called Bobrikoff and Markoff, according to the rule adopted by Russian emigré organizations.

Dates are given in both styles where possible, Old Style/New

Style, with the month indicated by Roman numeral.

Rossija or *Imperija* is translated in English as "Russia", and *Imperskiî* as "Russian", if the state without *Velikoe Knjažestvo Finljandskoe*, "the Grand Duchy of Finland" or simply "Finland", is indicated. Together they formed the *Rossiïskoe gosudarstvo*, "the Russian Empire"; *obščegosudarstvennyî* is translated "Imperial". The difference is usually but not always indicated in the source documents and therefore there may be some inconsequence in the translation. *Finskiî* is "Finnish", of course, but *Finljandskiî* may be Finnish or Russian in Finland, e.g. the Russian rifle brigades stationed here.



Sources

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- VA *Valtionarkisto*, The Finnish Public Record Office, Helsinki
KKK *Kenraalikuvernöörinkanslia*, Office of the Governor-General
Aktit, Dossiers, 1853—1917
Sisällön mukaan järjestetyt asiakirjat, Thematically ordered documents:
Dd Secret letters
Ed Gendarmes
Fh Personnel of the Office
Ha Press
Hd Seyn's collection
He Lipski's collection
Hg Material found when searching suspects' homes
K3 Heiden's Committee
- Ven sot asiak *Venäläiset sotilasasiakirjat*, Russian military documents
- VSV *Valtiosihteerinvirasto*, Office of the Minister State-Secretary
Aktit, Dossiers
Hc *Ministerineuvostosta lähetettyjä, Suomea koskevia asiakirjoja*, Documents concerning Finland sent from the Council of Ministers
- Senaatin arkisto*, The Senate
Pöytäkirjat, Protocols

- Prokuraattorin toimituskunta*, Office of the Procurator
V. Procopén kokoelma, V. Procopé's collection
 Mf NL *Mikrofilmijäljennöksiä Neuvostoliiton arkistojen asiakirjoista*, Mikrofilm copies of documents from Soviet archives
- HYK *Helsingin Yliopiston Kirjasto*, Library of Helsinki University
 Vysočaiše učreždennoe Podgotovitel'noe Kommissii Proekt zakonodatel'nyh program dlja Finljandii i materialy 1912—1913
- AA *Auswärtiges Amt, Politisches Archiv*, Bonn
 Russland 63, Die Ostseefrage
- AMAE *Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères/Archives et Documentation, Ministère des relations extérieures*, Paris
 CP Russie NS *Correspondence politique, Russie, Nouvelle serie*
- AVPR *Arhiv Vnešnei Politiki Rossii*, Moscow
 Fond kanceljarija ministra
 Sekretnyî fond
- EMATSH *Etat-Major de l'Armée de Terre, Service Historique*, Vincennes
 7 N 1471 — 7 N 1544 *Attachés Militaires, Russie*
- SHM *Service Historique de la Marine*, Vincennes
 Bb 7 *Attachés Navales, Russie*

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Asiakirjat, Documents
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- Cf. the attached bibliography for additional books of partly documentary character, e.g. Armfel't; Aspelin—Haapkylä; Frantz; Hagen, *Nikolaj*...; Hultin; Kirby, *Finland and Russia*...; Materialy...; Miljutin; Padenie...; Polivanov; Screen, *Våra*...

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