Jean d’Amour Banyanga

Social Suffering and Healing Among the Rwandan Diaspora in Finland and Belgium

The 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi led to the exile of many Rwandan people and the establishment of diasporic communities in Africa, Australia, and in Western countries. Many Rwandan people who reside both in Finland and Belgium after surviving the genocide and its aftermath, still suffer from the social and psychological wounds that the ethnic violence and the genocide have left them with.

The thesis investigates the social suffering experienced by the survivors of the Rwandan genocide against Tutsi and its aftermath. A combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies was applied. The study may hopefully serve as a tool for improving relations and communication among the communities during social interactions, not only in Finland and Belgium, but also elsewhere. For Rwandans in Finland and Belgium, this study could hopefully work as a bridge-builder between the ethnic groups. In addition, the thesis provides the authorities of the migrant-receiving countries with information about how they could better support the traumatised migrants.
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Portrait photo: Fotoyks, Dixi, Tikkulira
Cover photo: Taken in January 2017 by the author, Akagera National Park of Rwanda
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Developmental Psychology
Faculty of Education and Welfare Studies
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Vasa, Finland, 2019
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ISBN (printed) 978-952-12-3785-0
ISBN (digital) 978-952-12-3786-7
Painosalama Oy Turku, Finland 2019
Abstract

The Rwandan people encountered genocide against Tutsis in 1994. The ethnic cleansing led to the exile of many Rwandan people and the constitution of diasporic communities in Africa, Europe, Australia and Northern America. Many Rwandans residing in Finland and Belgium after surviving the 1994 genocide and its aftermath went through such tragedy that they still suffer from the social wounds that the ethnic violence and genocide left them with. After a traumatic experience, it is very significant for the survivors to preserve a good mental and psychological health and have healing strategies to cope with their trauma.

The overall aim of this thesis aims is to study social suffering experienced and expressed by survivors of the Rwandan genocide against Tutsis and its aftermath, who nowadays reside in the diaspora both in Finland and Belgium. More particular aims are to (a) provide an analysis of the role of the church before and after the genocide, (b) explore how frequent various forms of traumatic experiences during the genocide are among member of the diaspora in Finland, (c) compare the mental well-being of victims of rape during the genocide with the mental well-being of those who were born as a result of such rape, and (d) investigate coping methods and compare services aiming at trauma healing among genocide victims in Belgium and in Finland. It puts emphasis on the experience and narratives of how Rwandan migrants conceptualize and give meanings to their social suffering and how they cope with their traumatic situation psychologically and culturally meaningful ways, and through Western justice.

Questionnaires were distributed in 27 different locations of Finland and Belgium in schools and in churches (13 locations in Belgium & 14 locations in Finland). A total of 341 respondents (166 males, 175 females), 50 from Finland and 291 from Belgium, participated in the study. The respondents had come to Belgium and Finland either as refugees or on other grounds after the 1994 genocide. The participants were selected according to the following criteria: They had to be above 20 years of age, they should be native Rwandans; they should speak the local language, Kinyarwanda, and have a residence permit. Participants filled in questionnaires and were also interviewed with open-ended questions. The data were collected during 13 months in the period of
1.8.2015–30.8.2016. The quantitative data were analysed with multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs). The findings are explained in four different articles presented in this dissertation, describing social suffering and healing among the Rwandan diaspora in Finland and Belgium. The respondents reported in the interviews that the consequences and aftermath of the Rwandan genocide led to severe personal and social trauma. Many Rwandans in Belgium and Finland have suffered the 1994 genocide against Tutsi; they have lost one or several members in their families: siblings, parents, wives, husbands, children, as well as neighbours, friends, and property. Some have family members still scattered in the refugee camps in African countries while others are in prisons. There are also a few respondents who have been imprisoned many years in Rwanda without any formal charges, and without any compensation. Because of these difficulties, some suffer from sleeping problems because they do not know how their beloved ones died, and they did not have time to bury them in dignity. In addition, some who are HIV/AIDS positive do not have hope for the future. In regard to counselling received, relatively few Rwandans were able to receive counselling from Belgian and Finnish psychologists, and likewise, few were able to receive governmental social benefits.

Study I presents an analysis of the dual role of religion in regard to the genocide. Due to the fact that church administrations in Rwanda before the genocide, both Catholics and Protestants, favoured Tutsis, an ethnic division was created. Therefore, religious institutions unintentionally came to pave way for the genocide. On the other hand, after the genocide, religion has played an important role in the coping process.

Study II is both a quantitative and a qualitative study, presenting data on the genocide experience of 40 Rwandans living in Finland. It was found that 57.5% of the respondents had lost one or more family member during the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. In this sample, 72.5% reported being traumatised, and of these, 37.5% extremely traumatised. Fifty percent reported having sleeping problems often, and of these, 22.5% very often. Seventy-five percent reported having bad dreams at least sometimes, 30% of these often, and 20% very often. Thirty percent of women and 5% of men reported having been raped. Of these, 15% of the women became pregnant due to the rape, and 10% were contaminated with HIV/AIDS. Ten percent of the respondents were born as a result of rape. Although 50% reported living peacefully with other Rwandans, 35% considered reconciliation difficult or extremely difficult.
In conclusion, the Rwandan diaspora living in Finland were severely traumatised by the genocide, and still, 22 years later, reconciliation appears difficult.

Study III describes the trauma of women who had been raped during the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath, and of children who had been born as a result of rape during the genocide. In the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi population, systematic sexual molestation, mutilation and rape of Tutsi women and girls were used as a tool to terrorize and annihilate the ethnic Tutsis. A questionnaire was completed by 341 members of the Rwandan diaspora, over 20 years of age (166 males, 175 females), who are living in Finland and Belgium. Of the women, 18 (10.3%) had been exposed to rape, and 9 individuals (2.6%) were born as a result of rape. The findings indicate that the women who had been raped experienced a much more severe trauma than the children who were born as a result of rape.

The objective of Study IV was to investigate coping strategies and the experience of mental health interventions in Rwandans traumatised by their experiences during the 1994 genocide and its aftermath, living in Belgium and Finland. It was based on the same questionnaire as Study III, completed by 341 Rwandans. The results showed that Rwandans in Belgium were more satisfied than those living in Finland with the therapeutic interventions, survivors’ group activities, and social support they had received in their host country. Rwandans in Finland, on the other hand, relied more on psychopharmaca and the use of alcohol as coping mechanisms than those living in Belgium.

Keywords: Belgium, diaspora, Finland, genocide, healing, migrants, Rwanda, social suffering, trauma
Acknowledgments

If I had a thousand tongues, I would have screamed to the ends of the world to say to all who fulfilled a positive role in completion of my studies, thank you! I thank my supervisor and colleague Professor Kaj Björkqvist and my co-supervisor Karin Österman who were so close to me throughout my studies. Thank you for your guidance to my study. I appreciate your skills, knowledge, instruction, and loyalty; I could count on you. I would like to thank the reviewers, Senior Researcher and Docent Marja Tiilikainen, and Prof. Victor Adetula, for their thorough examination and valuable remarks.

I owe much gratitude to all my colleagues at the Developmental Psychology department: Dr. Patrik Söderberg, PhD candidate George Darko, PhD candidate Owen Ndoromo, PhD candidate Ingrida Grigaityte, and Dr. Klas Backholm. You were all so kind, co-operative and full of encouragement. Without your support, I doubt whether I would have made it this far. I especially want to thank researchers and colleagues around the world, for their insight and encouragement suggestions to improve my studies. Thank you so much Professor Anna Rastas, Professor Laura Hutunen, Professor Axel Fleisch, Professor Andreas Maercker, Professor Camilla Orjuela, Professor Richard Bryan, Professor Mark Stein, Professor Ahn Hyunnie, Professor Thomas Elbert, Professor, Anne Mikkola, Dr. Jean Paul Niyigena, Dr. Pia Nyman-Kurkiala, Dr. Jelly Van Essen, Dr. Sofia Holmqvist, Dr. Silke Stroh, Dr. Charlotta Hilli, Dr. Stuart Turner, Dr. Tobias Hecker, Dr. Evariste Habiyakare, Dr. Rita Nordström-Lytz, Dr. Petra Skeffington, and Dr. Anselm Crombach.

This work has been supported by grants from the Graduate School at Åbo Akademi University, Svensk-Österbottniska Samfundet, and Högskolestiftelsen i Österbotten. I am indebted and grateful for your financial support. Pastor Henrik Nymalm, beloved brother to our family as well as Christina, thank you for your encouragement and support in all respects. I burst into tears when I think of all your help since I came to know you in 2004. You were there with unfailing support whenever I shouted. Sometimes even before I opened my mouth, you understood, and you fought for me. People like you are very rare to find in this world. To the language editor of my work, Dr Paul Wilkinson, thank you.
for the outstanding work done by you. I also thank the staff of the libraries of Åbo Akademi University and the University of Helsinki.

My Love, Laurence, thank you very much. I could never ask for better. God gave you strength to carry me with all the burdens I placed on your shoulders. You are a darling. You never lost patience with me. Long live! I would like to acknowledge my blessed children Elisé, Nathalie, Gaëlle and Lambert, who missed my presence and love during the period of this study. I know that you needed to see me nearby; my absence was painful to you. I dedicate this work to the members of the Rwandan diaspora in Finland and Belgium who generously shared their stories and live experiences with me during some of their darkest hours.

Father God, I praise and worship you. If you were not on my side, I would not have been here. I would not have made it. You carry my life in your hands. You have long in advance prepared beauties for me. I thank you for the work of the Holy Spirit in my life. All glory and honour belong to you in Jesus' name.

Vanda, March 2019

Jean d’Amour Banyanga
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List of Abbreviations

AIDS: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.
CDR: Coalition pour la Défense de la République.
CPPCG: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
FAR: Force d’Armé Rwandaise.
GNP: Gross National Product
HIV: Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICTR: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IMF: International Monetary Fund
MDR: Mouvement Démocratique pour Républicains
MRND: Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (English): National Revolutionary Movement for Development
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
NRM: National Resistance Movement
PARMEHUTU: Partie du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu
PDC: Parti Démocrate-Chrétien
PL: Parti Libéral
PSD: Parti Social-Démocratique
PTSD: Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
RDR: Resssemblement Démocratique Rwandais
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front
SAP: Structural Adjustment Program
UN: United Nations
UNAMIR: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAR: Union National Rwandais
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
WHO: World Health Organization
List of Original Publications

Study I:

Study II:

Study III:

Study IV:

Author Contribution
The first author is responsible for the collection of all data, and for writing most of the text. The statistical analyses have been conducted jointly within the re-search group.
1. Introduction

The Rwandan people experienced a genocide directed against the Tutsi in 1994, which caused terrible bloodshed among men, women, and children. The genocide led to the exile of many Rwandan people and the establishment of diasporic communities in Africa, Europe, Australia, and North America. Many Rwandan people who reside both in Finland and Belgium after surviving the 1994 genocide and its aftermath, went through such tragedy that they still suffer from the social and psychological wounds that the ethnic violence and genocide have left them with. The study aims at studying social suffering experienced and expressed by the survivors of the Rwandan genocide who nowadays reside in the diaspora both in Finland and Belgium. More particular aims are to (a) provide an analysis of the role of the church before and after the genocide, (b) explore how frequent various forms of traumatic experiences during the genocide are among members of the diaspora in Finland, (c) compare the mental well-being of victims of rape during the genocide with the mental well-being of those who were born as a result of such rape, and (d) investigate coping methods and compare services aiming at trauma healing among genocide victims in Belgium and in Finland.

One may ask, why study Rwandans in Finland and in Belgium? The choice of Finland is partly due to convenience, since the present author is living in Finland. However, the Rwandan community in Finland is relatively small and was to a large extent established only after the 1994 genocide. On the other hand, the Rwandan community in Belgium is the largest in Europe, and it is of a considerably older age. Belgium was a Rwandan colonizer and there have been strong political, cultural, social, and economic ties between the Belgian people and the Rwandan regimes (1962-1994); Belgium was among Rwanda’s principal donors between the 1960 and 1994 (Schildt, 2013, pp. 24–25; Prunier, 1998, p. 33). Accordingly, it is of interest to compare the well-being of the Rwandan diaspora in Belgium and Finland, and compare the effect of the psychological interventions they have received in the two countries.
1.1 Socio-historical Background of the Rwandan Conflict

1.1.1 The Republic of Rwanda

Rwanda is a small, hilly country in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa and it has a land area of 26,338 square kilometres. To Rwanda’s west lies one of Africa’s largest countries, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaïre), and to east is Tanzania. The country directly to the north is Uganda, while Burundi is located to the south. Rwanda contains many geographic features, such as volcanoes where the altitude rises to nearly five thousand meters above sea level and declines from west to east. Volcanoes located in the northwest of Rwanda and gorillas can be found at the slopes of the Kalisimbi and Nyiragongo. Rwanda has many lakes and rivers, and it also has been referred to as “the land of a thousand hills” and “the land of gorillas”. The climate of the country is particularly favourable for human occupation with an average annual temperature of 18°C and between 900 to 1600 mm of rainfall per year; with two rainy seasons and two dry seasons (Prunier, 1998, p. 2; Adekunle, 2007, p.1).

![Map of Rwanda](image.png)

*Figure 1: Map of Rwanda*
The main agricultural products are coffee and tea, but other products include beans, sorghum, maize, cassava, banana, cotton, peas and tobacco. Coffee and tea are Rwanda’s most important cash crops. They were first introduced into the country by the Belgian administration in the 1920s, and coffee cultivation was compulsory in many areas of Rwanda. The variety grown is mostly Arabica and it is considered on the world market to be of very good quality (Mamdani 2001, pp. 95–96). The mountainous areas in the country prevent communication, industrial development, and commercial encouragements. In these areas, infrastructure such as roads and railways are either lacking or inefficient. Rwanda’s population is young and predominantly rural. Christianity is the largest religion in the country. The country’s language Kinyarwanda is spoken by all Rwandans, while French and English serve as official languages, and Swahili as commercial language.

In spite of having a long history as well as natural and physical beauty, not much has been written about Rwanda’s culture and customs (Adekunle 2007, p. ix; De Lame, 2005, pp. 3–4). Rwanda was, and still is, one of the poorest countries in the world due to a lack of important mineral resources, and it is the most densely populated country on the African continent. The capital Kigali has developed into the economic centre for Rwanda. Many cities like Butare, Kibuye, Gisenyi and Ruhengeli are experiencing modernity and Western influence. Rwanda is a land-locked country, which for its economy depends on a costly and vulnerable transit trade to the Indian Ocean through Tanzania, Uganda, or Kenya; and to the Atlantic Ocean through the Democratic Republic of Congo. The distance from Kigali to the Indian Ocean is approximately 1500 kilometers, and 2000 kilometers to the Atlantic coastline. The majority of the Rwandan population lives on agriculture (Adekunle, 2007, p. 1; Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 51; Hinga, Kubai, Mwaura, & Ayanga, 2008, p. 49; Luck, Brown, Humphries, & Adlington, 1999, p. 583; Kamukama, 1997, p. 1; Prunier, 1998, pp. 1–2; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 7).

According to the National Institute of Statistics, Rwanda is largely an agricultural country: 85.3% of the population lives in rural areas and 95% are substantially farmers (Republic of Rwanda, 2011, p. 22). In Rwanda, the literacy rate is extremely low (Republic of Rwanda 2005, pp. 46–47). In the 1994, Rwanda’s population of seven million was composed of three ethnic groups: Hutu (approximately 84%), Tutsi (15%) and Twa (1%) (Cook, 2006, p. 217; Kamukama, 1997, p. 1; Luck, 1999, p. 583; Union
The Rwandan population was, in 2017, about 12.5 million (Republic of Rwanda, 2017). However, the modern state of Rwanda does not contain all the areas over which its monarchs reigned in earlier times, while it also covers regions in which the king’s authority was at best nominal at the close of the nineteenth century. Rwanda was much bigger country before the 1885 conference of Berlin than it is today. Nowadays, Rwanda is known as the land of violence and the land of genocide. Therefore, after the 1994 genocide, Rwanda came into the focus of attention for the international society and world organizations.

1.1.2 Rwanda in the Pre-colonial Period

The contemporary nation of Rwanda, like other African nations, has its origins in the colonial divisions of Africa in the late nineteenth century, but it had an antecedent in the pre-colonial kingdom of Rwanda, which included much of the territory now contained within the boundaries of the modern state. According to some researchers, the Kingdom of Rwanda began expanding from a main kingdom in the central Rwandan region known as Nduga in about the sixteenth or seventeenth century, bringing neighbouring kingdoms and regions under varying degrees of control through conquests or alliances (Dorsey, 1994, pp. 6–7; Kamukama, 1997, pp. 9–10; Longman, 2010, p. 34).

Most historians, geographers, and anthropologists agree that Rwanda was probably originally occupied by Twa hunter-gatherers and forest-dwellers, who have inhabited the country from as early as 2,000 B.C, but today form only a small minority in the country. For centuries, they were erroneously and offensively categorized as ‘pygmies’ and relegated to be a marginalized people in the Rwandan society (Dorsey, 1994, p. 6; Kamukama, 1997, p. 8; Malkki, 1995, p. 21). Around 1,000 A.D, a migration of farmers began to settle and displaced Twa by cutting down trees and cultivating. This migration was part of the so-called Bantu expansion, which, in the case of Rwanda, can be followed from the savannahs of present Cameroon or Chad, to the Great Lakes region. They wore goat and lambskins and bark cloths and organized themselves into lineages and clans under the leadership of heads or chiefs respectively. Hutu co-existed with Twa, and traded skins and meat in exchange for salt and iron goods (Destexhe, 1995, pp. 36–37; Kamukama, 1997, p. 8; Malkki, 1995, p. 21; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 10; Straus 2006, pp. 17–19). By the 15th century, the Hutus were organised into small “states”. Each of these states was controlled by a dominant clan (a social
category whose members acknowledge descent from a common ancestor), composed of several different lineages under a ruling lineage headed by a king (umuhinza), who was a land chief as well as a ritual leader in charge of rain-making. Later, in 15th century, Tutsis cattle-herders migrated from the North, and east from Karagwe to this fertile area, well-watered by the many lakes and rivers that cut through its valleys and hills. They began to dominate the other tribes by controlling the use and distribution of cattle, forcing the Hutu cultivators to exchange agricultural products in return for the use of their cattle and protection against raids (Kamukama, 1997, p. 8; Luck et al., 1999, p. 583; Malkki, 1995, pp. 22–23; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 10; Tutu, 1994, p. 2). However, there is a theory that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa constituted -classes within a clan. They argued that all three ethnic groups are mixtures derived from the same clan, which is a common denominator that unites many different lineages who do not necessarily know each other (Gatwa, 2005, p. 10; Kamukama, 1997, p. 9; Malkki, 1995, p. 24). This led some of them into building up coercive and ideological machineries, culminating in the emergence of broader political entities which were like kingdoms. When the Tutsis entered Rwanda, both the Hutus and the Twa had settled in clearly defined areas. There were small, effective, independent kingdoms within what is called Rwanda today, such as Bukunzi and Busoga in the south and Kibari, Bushiru, and Buhoma in the north (Desforges, 1999, pp. 31–32; Kamukama, 1997, pp.6–7; Longman, 2010, pp. 34–34). Nevertheless, peaceful co-existence was usually followed by the Tutsi conquest, resulting in the establishment of a direct Tutsi military rule and administration.

The further expansion of Rwanda’s boundaries occurred after the accession of King Ruganzu Ndori to power in the 17th century; a series of invasions were launched against formerly independent Hutu areas in the west and north (Dorsey, 1994, pp. 6–7; Kamukama 1997, pp. 9–10). By the late 18th century, Rwanda and Burundi formed a single Tutsi dominated state, ruled by a king (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, pp. 3–5; Dorsey, 1994, pp. 6–7; Kamukama, 1997, pp. 8–9; Luck, et. al., 1999, p. 583; Tutu, 1994, p. 2). In the 18th century, cultivators and pastoralists lived intermixed in most areas, although the cool, wet highlands of the north had few pastoralists and the drier, hotter east had more. With fertile soil and regular rainfall, the region was productive, and population grew to a point where Rwanda was in 1994 the most densely populated nation on
the African continent. Cultivators skilled in making war and able to mobilize large groups of followers rose to importance through the military system, particularly under the late nineteenth century Rwandan monarchy of Kigeri IV Rwabugiri, who brought Rwanda to the height of its power. In its drive to expand, Rwanda attacked neighbouring people regardless of whether they were pastoralists or cultivators, and regardless of whether they were organised in lineages or in states (Desforges, 1999, pp. 31–32; Longman, 2010, p. 34). By the end of the nineteenth century, the king administered the central region closely through multiple hierarchies of competing officials who ruled men, cattle, pasturage, and agricultural land. As the Rwandan state grew in strength, the ruling elite became more clearly defined and its members, like powerful people in most societies, began to think of themselves as superior to ordinary people. However, even though the terms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa existed, the children of Hutu who became sufficiently powerful would be considered as Tutsi and could marry Tutsi women, while Tutsi families that lost power finally would became Hutu (Destexhe, 1995, pp. 36–37; Lemarchand, 1970, pp. 145–154; Longman, 2010, pp. 34–35).

Furthermore, apart from the Rwandan mode of production, the Rwandan people share a common heritage with a number of shared cultural aspects; the only distinction is their mode of life - one group is agriculturalist while the other is pastoralist - and both had lived side by side, each with a role to play for the other. In practice, when the Tutsi arrived in Rwanda, they were integrated by the Hutu. Tutsi learned the language spoken by Hutu (Kinyarwanda) and incorporated their traditional-cultural practice and myths; and they had the same religion (Bangamwabo, Maniragaba, Munyantwali, Nduwayezu, Nyagahene, Rukiramakuba, Rumiya, & Uwizeyimana, 1991, pp. 94–96; De Lame, 2005, pp. 99–100; Dorsey, 1994, p. 6; Gatwa, 2005, p. 10; Kamukama, 1997, p. 6; Sebasoni, 2000, p. 31; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, pp. 9–10; Tutu, 1994, pp. 2–3). However, cattle were the dominant form of wealth, also giving the Tutsis greater power (Bangamwabo et al., 1991, p. 51; Tutu, 1994, p. 3; Sebasoni, 2000, pp. 22–23).

The Tutsis developed the sacred political institutions of the King and used the royal drum (Kalinga) as a symbol for the unity for the Rwandan kingdom. In a well-organized and stratified culture, the power was held by the Tutsi kings and chiefs, and this was also clearly identifiable in Hutu areas (De Lame, 2005, pp. 99–100; Tutu, 1994, p. 3). To demonstrate
his supremacy, the King controlled and distributed land. There were three types of chiefs who assisted and advised the king in performing his political duties: the military chief, whose responsibility was to defend and expand the kingdom; the cattle chief, who was in charge of grazing and settling disputes; and the land chief who administered agricultural land and harvest (Adekunle, 2007, p. 5; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 68–69). Apart from chiefs, there were abiru (royal traditional religious people), who performed complex religious rituals in order to consolidate the king’s power. The ubwiru was a council of religious hereditary experts established presumably by the first king, not only to perform regular rituals but also to serve as religious and political advisors to the king. Like other chiefs, abiru owned land as a source of revenue, and Hutu could work for the m without expecting any pay (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 63–64).

In conclusion, the identification of Tutsi pastoralists as power-holders and of Hutu cultivators as subordinates was becoming common before the arrival of the Europeans in Rwanda at the turn of the 18th century, but it was not yet completely fixed throughout the country (Desforges, 1999, p. 33; Destexhe, 1995, pp. 37–41). A number of studies have shown that even though the terms “Hutu, Tutsi and Twa” existed in the pre-colonial period, they did not have the same implication as later. In the late 1800s, chiefs began to require Hutu to engage in uburetwa, a form of forced labour, which added to the ethnic distinction and contributed to tensions between the groups. This process of ethnic differentiation continued under colonial rule (Bartov & Mack, 2001, pp. 140–147; Longman, 2010, p. 36; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 65–66; Straus, 2006, pp. 20–21). The description of Rwandan ethnic groups was partly based on indigenous mythology, which was supported and diffused by outsiders; and it came to represent the generalized western view of the Rwandan people.

1.1.3 Rwanda during the Colonial Period
During the divisions of Africa among the European powers in Berlin 1884, Rwanda was accredited to be a German colony from 1889 to 1918. It became a Belgian colony in 1918 (after WW1), until it received independence on July 1, 1962 (De Lame, 2005, pp. 57–59; Destexhe, 1995, p. 38; Luck, 1999, p. 583; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 9; Union African, 2000, pp. 12–14; Uvin, 1998, p. 16). Before the arrival of the Europeans in 1895, the people of Rwanda had been organized and lived together, and Rwanda was a highly controlled and hierarchical country.
The structure was based on divisions between province, district, hill, and neighbourhood levels. When the Germans colonizers arrived in Rwanda, they followed a policy of indirect rule and allowed Rwanda’s monarchy to continue; and they also identified the royal Tutsis as their favourites, exploiting the pre-colonial structures. German colonial rule continued the Tutsi dominance and reinforced the position of power of the Tutsis. In colonial times in Africa, the colonisers could not bring enough of their own citizens to the colonies; instead they chose certain Africans tribes to lead their fellow Africans. Blessed by the German colonists, Tutsi chiefs began to demand that Hutus to work for them and pay tributes in physical labour, farm products, and personal loyalty to Tutsi chiefs without expecting anything in return (Destexhe, 1995, p. 39; Dorsey, 1994, p. 14; Kinloch & Mohan, 2005, p. 170; Prunier, 1998, p. 27). In addition, through the custom of “Ubuhake “(the right to own cattle), which transferred from father to son, Tutsi domination was effectively assured. The king was the owner of all cattle which he distributed to individuals who could in turn pass them on to others. Power was in the hands of the Tutsi pastoralists, and hard labour was forced upon the Hutu agriculturalists and Twa hunters (Destexhe, 1995, pp. 39–40; Longman, 2010, pp. 36–37). When the Germans arrived in 1895, the king, Yuhi V Musinga, had only recently succeeded to the throne, and the advances made by the king’s son Rwabugiri to extend the power of the royal court were under challenge. Later, the German colonizers helped the king to centralize the political power; they established the borders of the Rwandan kingdom, and they supported efforts by the court to bring all areas within those boundaries under the control of the king. They assisted the Rwandan monarchy in calming independent Hutu kingdoms, especially in the North, that had existed until the beginning of Musinga’s reign (Destexhe, 1995, p. 40; Longoman, 2010, pp. 38–40).

With Belgian trusteeship under the League of Nations after the 1st world war, the position of the Tutsis as the ruling elite was gradually institutionalized by giving them educational advantages and administrative positions. Hutus were systematically excluded from all levels of power and left in a subordinated position (Bangamwabo et al., 1991, pp. 78–80; Dallaire, 2003, p. 47; De Lame, 2005, pp. 101–102; Kamukama, 1997, pp. 20–22; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 3–5; Tutu, 1994, p.3; Uvin, 1998, pp. 16–18).
For the Belgians, despite the fact that Hutus and Tutsi had intermarried for centuries, the Tutsi were tall and gracious people with smaller noses; people who in the eyes of the Belgians conducted themselves well, kept cattle and had an understanding of monarchical institutions. The Belgian period was characterised by ethno-cultural conflict. Identity cards were introduced in the 1930s to identify Rwandan ethnic groups.

This designation could not be changed except by paying an enormous bribe (Bangamwabo et al., 1991, p. 63; Destexhe, 1995, pp. 40–41; Tutu, 1994, p. 5; Uvin, 1998, pp. 16–18). Due to the fact that intermarriages were common in certain parts of Rwanda, it was impossible to divide many Rwandans into certain groups on the basis of their physical features alone. Wealth could also be a decisive factor in gaining an identity card; people who had a lot of money or many cows were often able to obtain a Tutsi card. The cards caused discrimination against the Hutu population in all aspects of daily life, which forced many Hutu to flee the country to neighbouring ones (Grünfeld & Huijboom, 2007, p. 29). Education, employment, and economic opportunities were reserved for Tutsis, producing a huge gap between the ethnic groups, which was
at the root of the Hutu anger and resentment that inspired the 1959 uprising (Bartov & Mack, 2001, p. 146; Prunier, 1998, pp. 32–33).

According to some studies, the German and Belgian colonisers blamed the imbalance in the schools for the low social standing of the Hutu; they also played a crucial role in creating an ethnic split and ensured that the feeling of belonging to a social group was driven by ethnic and racial hatred (Cook, 2006, pp. 163–164; Lemarchand, 1970, p. 145; Uvin, 1998, pp. 16–18). Moreover, by controlling all educational facilities in Rwanda, the Roman Catholic Church ensured that at least some Tutsis had enough education and abilities to become administrators and encouraged them to treat the Hutus as inferior (Sandström, 2005, p. 49; Tutu, 1994, p. 4). Furthermore, missionaries and colonizers even developed a theory that Tutsis were Hamitic people who may have been Christianised in Ethiopia, making them more open to re-evangelization and genetically and intellectually superior to Hutus (De Lame, 2005, p. 102; Kamukama, 1997, p. 20; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, pp. 10–11; Tutu, 1994, p.2). After the conversion of the King Mutara Rudahigwa to Christianity in 1931, even the Roman Catholic Church identified with the Tutsi leadership. Hutus were often oppressed into forced labour, a kind of slavery that was legally abolished in 1927 (Kamukama, 1997, p. 26; Tutu, 1994, p. 3; Uvin, 1998, pp. 16–18). In addition, the Hutus were subjected to both monarchical and colonial exploitation and oppression (Bangamwabo et al., 1991, p. 52; Dallaire 2003, p. 47; Destexhe, 1995, p. 39; Gatwa, 2005, pp. 30–31; Kamukama, 1997, p. 25; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 11). Moreover, many researchers argue that, from the beginning, the Catholic Church enjoyed a warm relationship with the Belgian colonizers and the Tutsi royal court, quickly becoming the second most powerful institution in the country. A few small Protestant missions of the Reformed and Anglican traditions were established late in the 19th century by missionaries from Belgium, Britain, Denmark, and Switzerland (Bartov & Mack, 2001, pp. 142–146; Patte, 2010, p. 1116; Tutu, 1994, p. 4).
2. Rwanda during the Post-colonial Period: Republics

2.1 The First Rwandan Republic

The few Hutu who joined formal education found an opportunity for enlightenment and advancement. Education gave rise to an elite middle class among the oppressed (Bangamwabo et al. 1991, p. 139–144; Kamukama, 1997, p. 25). The Belgians’ strategy of segregation caused conflict and led to civil war. Between 1952 and 1959, when the Belgian political reforms threatened the intermediary position of the Tutsi oligarchy and provided some limited autonomous political space to the Hutu, which challenged the privileged position of the Tutsi, political violence between the Tutsi and the Hutu escalated (Lemarchand, 1970, pp. 145–154; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 11). On March 24, 1957, Gregoire Kayibanda who had been secretary to the Roman Catholic Archbishop André Perraudin and editor of a Catholic newspaper “Kinyamateka” created the Hutu social movement Partie du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU). This movement demanded the abolition of class privileges, access to all jobs, schooling for all classes, and freedom of expression (Bangamwabo et al., 1991, pp. 151–152; Kamukama, 1997, pp. 28–29; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 12; Tutu, 1994, pp. 4–5).

However, Tutsis also formed their own party Union National Rwandais (UNAR), which was militant, pro-monarchy, and anti-Belgian colonizers. There were conflicts between UNAR and PARMEHUTU. According to some scholars, the spark which ignited the revolution was very small. A Hutu sub-chief and PARMEHUTU activist, Dominique Mbonyumutwa, was walking home in Gitarama on November 1, 1959. He was attacked by young members of the Tutsi party UNAR, and he was harshly beaten. In retaliation, the Hutus attacked a notable Tutsi chief, and many Tutsis’ houses were burnt without making any distinctions between high-lineage and ordinary Tutsi (Kamukama, 1997, p. 31; Prunier, 1998, pp. 48–49). During that incident, the Belgian authorities supported the Hutus fully and even allowed them to burn Tutsi houses without any intervention. On November 28, 1959, there was a Hutu revolution reacting to the exclusive rule exercised by the Tutsi clan leader (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 5; Bangamwabo et al., 1991, pp.
The Hutu leaders insisted on fundamental change, and the Tutsi leaders resisted. There was tension and then violence, initially against the Tutsi chiefs and then progressively against the wider Tutsi population (Kamukama, 1997, p. 31; Kinloch & Mohan, 2005, p. 175). With the coloniser’s support, more than half of the Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs were replaced by Hutus within the space of a few months (Kinloch & Mohan, 2005, p. 175; Mann, 2005, p. 434; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 13). In addition, king Kigeli V Rwabugiri was overthrown and fled the country. The Hutu revolution took 20,000 lives and led 300,000 Tutsis to flee to Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and the DRC (Zaïre) [Kamukama, 1997, pp. 32–33; Malkki, 1995, pp. 30–31; Prunier, 1998, pp. 61–62; Tutu, 1994, p. 5]. On October 26, 1961 Gregoire Kayibanda became president. However, the UN trusteeship status was formally terminated, and independence was granted on July 1, 1962 (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, pp. 5–7; Bangamwabo et al., 1991, pp. 165–168; Kamukama, 1997, pp. 31–33; Prunier, 1998, p. 54; Union Africaine, 2000, pp. 17–20).

Rwanda became a Hutu nation, and Tutsis were marginalised and excluded from key positions. In addition, southerners were also regarded as too infected by the Tutsis to be trusted in a truly Hutu nation (Bangamwabo et al., 1991, p. 62; Malkki, 1995, pp. 30–31; Strauss, 2006, p. 23; Tutu, 1994, p. 6). Two major political trends dominated post-independence Rwanda. First, the principles of the Hutu Revolution guided official policy, which meant that Hutu dominated the government and military, often to the exclusion of Tutsi. Grégoire Kayibanda discriminated the Tutsi even more than his successor. Under his leadership, there was a series of anti-Tutsi massacres in the early 1960s and in 1973. Second, regionalism shaped significant political conflict among Hutus. Kayibanda came from the Gitarama Prefecture in the south-central region of the country. His rule tended to favour Hutus in central and southern regions (Destexhe, 1995, pp. 44–45; Strauss, 2006, p. 23). The ethnic hate campaign continued after independence. The Hutu government’s anti-Tutsi policies evoked militant response from the Tutsi who had become refugees in neighbouring Uganda and Burundi during the 1959 Hutu Revolution. The militants among these refugees mounted a series of attacks against the southern part of Rwanda between 1961 and 1967, which earned them the demeaning name of *Inyenzi* (cockroaches). The attacks were perceived by Hutus as an attempt to

However, most of the prominent Tutsi leaders of the UNAR and Ressemblement Démocratique Rwandais (RADER) who had opted to stay in Rwanda were executed on suspicion that they sympathised with *Inyenzi* attackers. In addition, the attacks led to massive revenge killings of innocent Tutsi and forced them to flee the country. Since the Tutsi attacks, the Kayibanda government faced much criticism. The critique focused on government policy in education and employment. Some claimed that the government was not doing enough to advance Hutu representation in civic society. The critique first came from unemployed Hutu school graduates. Many Hutus had left primary school for lack of resources, and were ploughing urban streets looking for employment (Longman, 2010, pp. 84–85; Mamdani, 2001, p. 135). Furthermore, even though Hutus formed the majority in schools, university enrolment in the middle and late 1960s was nearly 90 percent Tutsi. This was so in spite of a government policy restricting Tutsi enrolment in postsecondary institutions to be between 10 and 20 percent of the overall figure. By the early 1970s, about half the teachers and about half of the students in secondary schools and in higher education were still Tutsi. Tutsis were also particularly successful in the private sector (businesses). The critique no doubt put great pressure on the government to take control of the educational system that was mainly under Church control (Mamdani, 2001, p. 135–135; Strauss, 2006, p. 189–190).

The 1959 Hutu revolution in Rwanda had an impact on Burundi, forcing Burundians to pay no attention to the intragroup divisions that had moderated ethnic clash during the colonial period. Instead, they started to define their interests increasingly in ethnic terms. Tutsi refugees from Rwanda played a radicalising role in Burundi, warning Burundi’s Tutsis of the danger of giving power to Hutus, while the Burundian Hutus were inspired by the happenings in Rwanda to request greater political power. After an uprising in 1965 by Hutu army officers, hundreds of Hutus were killed, and Hutus were expelled from the army and government. After Burundian king Rwagasore, who had acted as a moderating force on ethnic issues, died in 1966, the son who became king was unable to maintain Burundian unity, and in November 1966, a
group of Tutsi army officers took power under the leadership of the new president Michel Micombero, a member of the lower status Hima group of Tutsi, who had historically been excluded from power (Lemarchand, 1970, pp. 59–75; Longman 2010, pp. 84–85).

In order to avoid a Rwandan-model revolution, Burundi’s new leaders excluded all Hutus from any position that might offer them a platform for rebellion. After an attack in May 1972 on southern Burundi by a group of rebels supported by Mulelist Congolese rebels, the Burundian military responded by systematically slaughtering as many as 200,000 Hutu, targeting in particular intellectuals, professionals, and any others perceived by the military as holding the potential to organise rebellion (Longman, 2010, p. 84; Mamdani, 2001, p. 137). The massacre led to a Hutu refugee influx into Rwanda and to anger and insecurity, particularly among Rwandan Hutu elites. Unlike Rwanda, Burundi did not undergo an ethnic reversal of power at independence. Rather, Tutsi from a particular region dominated the government, the military and the economy. In January 1973, violence began in Rwanda against Tutsi because of their fellow Hutu-Burundian’s situation (Cook, 2006, p. 219; Mamdani, 2001, p. 137; Strauss, 2006, p. 189).

The violence began in the secondary schools, the national university, public offices, and state companies. The goals were purely to order Tutsis to leave the institutions to which they were attached either as students or workers. However, the violence did not initially involve killing but rather removing: Hutu students descended on secondary schools, teaching colleges, and the national university with a list of Tutsi students to expel. In some circumstances, party and government officials assisted the students publically. The attacks forced out large numbers of Tutsis from secondary schools and from the university. The violence then spread to the public and private sectors. Notices were posted, declaring that such and such persons on the lists were no longer allowed to set foot in a particular institution in Rwanda. Surprisingly, subsequent eruptions of violence went beyond the ethnic divide when the natives of the south and centre of the country became the next victims (Gatwa, 2005, p. 122; Mamdani, 2001, p. 136–137; Strauss, 2006, p. 189). Among those targeted were children of mixed marriages, who were accused of having changed their ethnic affiliation. The threat was enough to get the bulk of the two hundred Tutsis students at the university to leave. Soon lists began to proliferate at places of employment-banks, private businesses, and even at an embassy. Once again many of the named Tutsi employees left.
Radio Rwanda was used to broadcast appeals inciting the Hutu to rise up and avenge against Tutsis. The agitation expanded in concentric circles. Just as it had begun in the educational institutions and moved into ministries and enterprises, it grew by a ripple effect, with each ripple bringing into the fold yet another tension both within power and within society. In the speedily exacerbated situation, a number of Tutsis were murdered, and many others fled the country to neighbouring ones (Cook, 2006, p. 283; Longman, 2010, p. 85; Mamdani, 2001, p. 137; Union Africaine, 2000, pp. 17–20).

The army used this ethnic violence as a pretext to make a coup in 1973 against the regime of Grégoire Kayibanda. On July 5, 1973, Rwandan military officers, primarily from the northwest region (Gisenyi) performed a coup led by thirty-six-year-old Juvenal Habyarimana. The officers’ stated objectives were to end ethnic division, regional favouritism, and to restore national unity. Still, Tutsis who had been chased from their posts were not allowed to return to their previous positions (Cook, 2006, p. 219; Mamdani, 2001, p. 138; Strauss, 2006, p. 190-191). Kayibanda was arrested and died under house arrest in 1976. His key assistants were imprisoned in Ruhengeri in the northern part of the country. According to some authors, the terrible conditions under which they were killed were similar to those of the horrific massacres of 1994. Some were buried alive; others put in bags and beaten to death; and some were tied to the bonnets of speeding cars on the roads between Ruhengeri and Gisenyi (Gatwa, 2005, p. 122–123; Strauss, 2006, pp. 190–191).

2.2 The Second Rwandan Republic

Taking advantage of the government’s inability to meet these challenges, the army Chief of Staff, Juvenal Habyarimana, moved on in July 5, 1973, to sack President Kayibanda, and installed himself as president. In his installation speech, Habyarimana said that ethnic problems constituted the reason for his coup d’état. He mentioned that the First Republic had not fully implemented the objectives of the 1959 revolution. In addition, Habyarimana criticised the First Republic for not advancing Hutu representation in education and in civil society in general (in the First Republic, 90% of the university students were Tutsi), and in government employment in particular (Cook, 2006, p. 21; Longman, 2010, pp. 83–86; Mamdani, 2001, p. 136). Furthermore, the inaction of the Kayibanda
regime, the agitation in the whole country, and the power struggle between Hutu from the North and Hutu from the South prompted Habyarimana to take power (Gatwa, 2005, pp. 122–123; Longman, 2010, pp. 83–86; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 136–138). Habyarimana moved quickly to bring order to the country by banning political activities for two years, and to mitigate the causes of the most recent round of ethnic violence, by establishing ethnic quotas for education and employment. He reorganised the state administrative apparatus, centralising political authority and strengthening state capacities, and in 1975, like Kayibanda, Habyarimana established a single political party dictatorship, le Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (National Revolutionary Movement for Development, MRND), to help maintain order, ensure support for the regime, and organise popular participation in economic development. The single party stuck with its extremist policy which was used as basis for the distribution of resources and opportunities. However, president Habyarimana continued the discriminatory policies of the past government toward the Tutsis in land redistribution, education, and employment opportunities. He was a regionalist and directed foreign assistance into his home region. The south became a hotbed of oppositional forces represented by both Tutsis and disaffected Hutus (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, pp. 72–74; Destexhe, 1995, p. 45; Kinloch & Mohan, 2005, p. 177; Longman, 2010, p. 88; Prunier 1998, p. 76).

From 1973 to the late 1980s, the Habyarimana regime had enjoyed strong popularity; the regime presided over a period of economic growth, infrastructure improvement, diplomatic openings, inter-national support, and general economic and political stability. It had attracted extensive international development investment and had effectively managed the unstable ethnic situation. Foreigners regarded the regime as a model in a troubled area. There were regional and economic inequalities and cleavages, but ethnic divisions narrowed in Habyarimana’s presidency. He also kept the Tutsi presence in government and education, but to a minimum level (Bartov & Mack, 2001, pp. 150–151; Cook, 2006, pp. 8–10; Destexhe, 1995; p. 45; Longman, 2010, pp. 88-89; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 138–141; Straus, 2006, p. 192). By 1987, Rwanda had the lowest debt, the lowest inflation rate, and the highest rate of growth of the gross national product (GNP) of any country in the region. The share of primary activities, mainly subsistence agriculture, in the GNP had declined from 80 percent in 1962 to 48
percent in 1986. At the same time, secondary activities had risen from 8 percent to 21 percent, and services from 12 percent to 31 percent. The rate of mortality was down. Hygiene and medical care indicators were improving. The proportion of children in school had gone up from 49.5 percent in 1978 to 61.5 percent 1986. There had been no political executions since 1982, and there were fewer political prisoners than in most African countries. The record was impressive in three sectors: agriculture, reforestation, and infra-structure (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 144–145).

The second republic followed a national goal and sought to arrive at a balance between two tension-ridden objectives: justice and reconciliation. Reconciliation with the Tutsi was to be in a context of justice for the Hutu. The model of such justice was to be through a system of balance within previous Tutsi-dominated institutions, particularly the church, education, and employment (Longman, 2010, p. 88; Mamdani, 2001, p. 138). With his presidency, Habyarimana also shifted the power base from Gitarama, the home region of the deposed President Kayibanda, to his home region of the northwest. This shift in power to the northern Hutu alienated those in the south (Destexhe, 1995, pp. 44–45; Prunier, 1998, p. 61). Despite the apparent period of appeasement, the ethnic question remained very much alive. Fear was the radicalising element in the conflict, each ethnic group was guarding the memories of the members who were killed in ethnic clashes. The President Habyarimana forced all citizens at age of 18 to pay a MRND membership fee. The membership was compulsory, and the MRND party could oversee the local implementation of national government programs, such as animation, ritualized expressions of support and loyalty to the regime, and umuganda, a program of weekly community service, such as planting trees, building bridges, and repairing roads (Longman, 2010, pp. 88–91; Strauss, 2006, pp. 191–192).

In the mid-1980s, however, the Rwandan population was discontent with the regime, due to the high level of official corruption and the luxury lifestyle of state officials. A collapse in the price of coffee, which was Rwanda’s main export that financed the government, seriously affected both small farmers and the middle class (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 66; Strauss, 2006, pp. 191–192). As the central African governments came under pressure to allow democracy and personal freedom; the Habyariman regime stood out, and many Rwandan people began to object increasingly to the required MRND membership,
communal labour, and loyalty rituals. Hutu from the south and central of the country and Tutsi opposed to the control of the political system held by Hutu from Habyarimana’s home region (Gisenyi) in the north. In 1989, an explosion of new publications appeared in Rwanda after the oldest paper in the country, the catholic biweekly *Kinyamateka*, began to ignore censorship rules and published open accounts about corruption and the country’s economic problems. Various groups that had begun to emerge in the 1980s outside the umbrella of the MRND, such as women’s groups, youth associations, and informal associations of intellectuals, became increasingly politicised and began to demand Habyarimana to implement democratic reforms. The democratic movements in Rwanda gained momentum after the national conferences in Benin and Congo in February 1990 replaced authoritarian rules in those countries (Bartov & Mack, 2001, pp. 150–151; Longman, 2010, pp. 88–91; Strauss, 2006, pp. 191–192).

Feeling gradually more pressure on him, Habyarimana announced in July 1990 that he would allow a free debate on the country’s future and would begin to implement reforms. Being assured that Habyarimana was sufficiently vulnerable to be easily driven from power by a rebel army based in Uganda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was composed primarily of Tutsi refugees from the ethnic violence of the 1959, 1963, and the 1970s, invaded Rwanda in October 1990; this added further pressure on the regime, but it also provided Habyarimana with a justification for cracking down on his critics. Some church leaders and institutions like the newspaper *Kinyamateka* supported the democracy movement, and the Catholic hierarchy published pastoral letters in February and May which in vague terms denounced corruption and called for expanded respect for human rights (Bartov & Mack, 2001, pp. 150–151). Although Habyarimana ended the ethnic violence against Tutsis in 1973, the policy continued to operate on a measure system according to the population size of each tribe. The MRND also possessed a very strong intelligence system which it used to further the interests of the Habyarimana regime. By the end of his rule, Habyarimana’s regional and later family politics led to his almost total reliance on kinsmen from the northern region to perpetuate himself in power. Determined to maintain their power, they are believed to have eliminated rival allies such as Colonel Stanislas Mayuya in 1988, and critical opponents such as journalist Father Silvio Sindambiwe, and a member of the opposition in Parliament from Butare, Félecula Nyiramutarambirwa. This explains
why the first victims of Hutu extremist genocide in 1994 were mostly from the central and southern regions of Rwanda (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 65; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 141–142). By the time of the RPF invasion of Rwanda, the central command in the country had been shaken. The Habyarimana regime, which had entrenched itself politically through its party, the MRND, found out that it was not only being challenged by the military invasion of the RPA, but also by opposition from newly formed political parties, journalists, the international community, and other organizations of groups or individuals (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, pp. 64–65). In the attempt to fortify their previous unchallenged social, political, and economic position, the seeds of the extremism sown in the colonial period in the ethnicisation of politics were now growing in the narrow-minded regional clans that saw all outsiders as threats to their monopoly on power.

Political liberalization swept Africa in the late 1980s, including Rwanda. This generated hope among elements in the Tutsi diaspora that they could negotiate their return to Rwanda. However, the Habyarimana government refused to accept a peaceful resolution of the status of expatriate Tutsi refugees (Cook, 2006, p. 219; Destexhe, 1995, pp. 45–46). The 1986 National Resistance Movement (NRM) takeover in Uganda was to have important political implications for Rwanda: Most of the young men and women who participated in the Uganda guerrilla war were Rwandese refugees living in Uganda. Some of them acquired very high ranks and positions in both the government and the Ugandan army. This was one of the first shock wave messages to the regime of Habyarimana. For the first time, he saw in these young soldiers in Uganda a possible formidable opposition force against him. This was perhaps an explanation why on July 27, 1987, the Central Committee of the MRND issued a declaration announcing that it would not allow the immigration of large numbers of Rwandan refugees, offering the excuse that the country’s economy and the Rwandan soil were incapable of sustaining increased numbers. The announcement was made at this time because the Habyarimana regime feared that Rwandan refugees would want to return home and that the Rwandan refugee group in Uganda would be the first group to return. When president Habyarimana visited Uganda in February 1988 to discuss the problem of refugees with his colleague president Joel Museveni, this brought the problem his regime was facing much closer. In addition to the refugee problem, political tension was increasingly mounting within the country as well. The economic crisis
facing the country, to which the president personally admitted on June 16, 1987, by appointing a management committee for the crisis, added to the pressure on the regime. Coffee prices collapsed in 1986 due to bad weather, and the country suffered food shortages. The World Bank and IMF were forcing a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) on Rwanda, and severe aid cuttings were also made by his supporters. At the same time, a few incidents in the early 1990s demonstrated the increasing political tension as well as the boldness of the opposition. There were signed petitions by intellectuals in August 1990, calling for a movement for democratic reform (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 66; Destexhe, 1995, p. 45; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 146–148).

The French president François Mitterand called on African countries to open up to the democratic process during a conference in La Baule in summer 1990, showing that he was ready to put pressure on francophone African countries in order to achieve democracy. Meanwhile, the Tutsi diaspora in neighbouring countries had begun to organize themselves to return by force. In Uganda, a Tutsi group formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that gave considerable support to President Museveni in his struggle for power. Many Hutus regarded the group as the descending from the Tutsi aristocracy that had fled Rwanda in 1959, as many of them had been born outside the country. They had little or no personal knowledge of Rwanda, and they spoke English rather than French. They claimed, however, that they also were Rwandan citizens and demanded the right to return home (Destexhe, 1995, pp. 45–46). On October 1, 1990, the Tutsis attacked northern Rwanda from their Ugandan base. Banding themselves into a military outfit, the Rwandan Patriotic Front was led by Major Fred Rwigema, with the express purpose of power-sharing with President Habyarimana (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, 73–74; Bangamwabo et al., 1991, pp. 209–210; Cook, 2006, p. 217; Dallaire, 2003, p. 47; Destexhe, 1995, pp. 45–46; Kamukama, 1997, 45–46; Luck et al., 1999, p. 583; Mann, 2005, p. 439; Prunier, 1998, p. 93; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, pp. 14–15; Tutu, 1994, p. 8; Uvin, 1998, pp. 61–63; Willame 1997, p. 27). The event encouraged the opposition significantly. The invasion was initially followed by a wave of arrests and murders in the country. Moreover, pressure from the international community demanded the Rwandan government to open up the democratic process and allow multiparty existence in the country (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 66; Kamukama, 1997, p. 52; Uvin, 1998, pp. 61–63).
The first major incident of violence took place after a night of gunfire in Kigali on October 5, 1990. The following day, Habyarimana blamed the RPF for the shooting, claiming that the rebels had infiltrated the capital. More than 10,000 civilians were arrested, most of them Tutsi, but the group also included Hutu opponents to the regime from the central and south of the country. The main reaction of the government was to use force to counter any move against it (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 66; Gatwa, 2005, p. 124; Straus, 2006, p. 192; Uvin, 1998, p. 61–63). This issue brought distrust between Tutsi and Hutu. At the beginning of 1991, in the northwest of the country, more than 1,200 Tutsi-Bagogwe were massacred during reprisals carried out by armed militia close to the government. A month after the RPF invasion, Habyarimana spoke to the legislature, and allowed the establishment of a multiparty system in the country. By July 1991, about twelve new political parties were functioning in the country, not only the MDR (Mouvement Démocratique pour Républi-quain), the PSD (Parti Social-Démocratique), the PL (Parti Libéral), the PDC (Parti Démocrate-Chrétien), and the MRND, but also seven smaller parties instigated by Habyarimana, possible as a deliberate attempt to make a pretend of multipartism. The extremist Hutu CDR (Coalition pour la Défense de la République), Coalition for the Defense of the Republic was founded in 1992 and led by Martin Bucyana (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 69; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 152–153).

However, it is important to note that the history of political parties in Rwanda exemplifies primarily ethnic cleavage rather than nationalism or ideology. Parties, prior to independence and after, were formed along ethnic lines first, and then in accordance with ideology or personalities (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 61). The fighting was fierce but neither side could win, and by the end of March 1991, a ceasefire was negotiated which included a neutral monitoring group and political talks with the president Habyarimana (Adelman & Suhrke, 1995, pp. 66–67; Tutu, 1994, p. 9). In March 1992, in the region of Bugesera in the south, Hutus carried out a series of attacks against Tutsis, killing around 300 of them. In late 1992, the campaign against the Tutsi took a new turn. Large-scale violence was inaugurated by an inflammatory speech by Dr Léon Mugesera, the vice-Chairman of the MRND in Gisenyi. At a rally in Kabaya, on November 22, 1992, Mugesera blamed the Tutsis and the opposition for betrayal of the country in negotiating with the rebellion of the RPF Inkotanyi. Some argue that Mugesera’s speech was to encourage
the Hutus to kill Tutsis (Gatwa, 2005, p. 214; Straus, 2006, pp. 196–197). The Mugesera speech is frighteningly virulent, a window into the angry, radical mindset that ultimately led the hardliners to unleash the genocide in April 1994. His main point is that the ruling party is under attack externally and internally; the propaganda was that Tutsi were foreigners who had come to Rwanda to exploit the rightful occupants (Hutu), and they should be sent back through the Nile. To respond to this threat, he argued retaliation, unity, and self-defence. He also invoked violence as retaliation, as self-protection, and as prevention. His advice of “not letting yourself be invaded” was a call for the Rwandan population to take the law into its own hands and to defend the country from internal and external threats. Following Léon Mugesera’s speech, at the beginning of 1993, more than 1,000 people were killed in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi (in the northern part of the country). The killings provided a pretext to the RPF to attack the cities of Ruhengeri and Ngarama on February 8, 1993, stopping 25 miles short of Kigali (Destexhe, 1995, p. 46; Gatwa, 2005, p. 125; Straus, 2006, pp. 192–196).

According to many scholars, Hutu peasants had economic motivations for killing Tutsi in the genocide. At the structural level, increasing pressure on the land, over-population, ecological degradation, and a fall in the price of key export crops such as coffee and tea, are mentioned as contributing factors to growing unease, rivalry, and conflict between neighbours in Rwanda in the early 1990s (Destexthe, 1995, p. 13; Tutu, 1994, pp. 6–7; United Nations, 2001, p. 7; Uvin, 1998, pp. 107–108). At the individual level, it is reported that this unease and conflict made it possible for Interahamwe and the government officials to promise material rewards to potential killers, such as property, material benefits, cows, and land (Prunier, 1998, p. 142).

2.3 Social Inequality and Division

The consequences of the colonialism policies and the church’s “divide and rule” principle during colonial times were overall negative (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 87). Because of these policies, many Church leaders were very close to political power in the Habyarimana regime, and they were perceived as being close to the hard-line Hutu extremist ideology (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 86; Tutu, 1994, p. 67). As a result, their priests, pastors, and other Christians participated in killing their brothers and sisters in the genocide. Some priests and pastors ran away
from their people, remaining inactive; others committed acts of betrayal
and murder (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 87; Anderson & Menon, 2009,
Tutu, 1994, p. 69). After the genocide, some Christians left the church,
saying that God was no longer there because many Rwandans had died
in the churches which they had believed to be sanctuaries and havens
from violence (Destexhe, 1995, p. 31; Hammond, 1996, p. 23; Prunier,
the male fatality rate was 50 percent higher than the female rate. Unlike
the Nazi’s conception of the Jews, Hutu extremists do not appear to have
felt that the Tutsi posed a biological threat to the Hutu. Rather, they
simply argued that virtually all Tutsi were supporters of the RPF. A
former member of the Interahamwe explained that “they did not have a
role of exterminating all Tutsi, but it was said that every Tutsi cooperates
with the RPF”. These conceptions were encouraged after the RPF began
recruiting heavily from the Tutsi civilian population in Rwanda in late

Scholars agree that all genocides in history have been organised, and
legitimised by the state (Cook, 2006, p. 3; Destexhe, 1995, p. 25; Mann
2005, pp. 240–241). In the case of Rwanda, the origins of the genocide are
rather to be found in the regime’s peasant ideology, which existed long
before 1990 (Anderson & Menon, 2009, p. 55; Cook, 2006, p. 3). Cook
argues that when revolutionary leaders espouse a mono-ethnic peasant
ideology to legitimize their power and want to hold on to that power at
all cost, genocide may become their ultimate strategy (Cook, 2006, p. 3).
Education is the key factor leading to the development of understanding,
attitude and values (Luck et al., 1999, p. 225). However, according to the
United Nations, the literacy rate was very low and Rwandan education
suffered from poor quality (Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 9; United
Nations, 2001, p. 25). The 2002 census showed that the level of education
in Rwanda still remained in a rudimentary phase: only 60% of the
population aged 15 years and above could both read and write a text in
any language. Another 4.4% could only read, while 35.6% could neither
read nor write. In urban areas of the country, the proportion of literacy
was higher than in rural areas (76.7% against 56.6%). Men were more
literate than women (66.5% against 54.7%). Overall, 31% of the resident
population in Rwanda had never been to school, and those who had
attended but were at the moment of the study out of school constituted
45%” (Republic of Rwanda, 2005, pp. 46–47).
This alarming disproportion was a strong criterion in predicting mass participation in genocide. It was, therefore, easy for propagandist and exponents of ethnicity to reach the general populace. Many scholars argue that the main agents of the genocide were ordinary peasants who belonged to the frustrated uneducated people (Bangwa-nubusa, 2009, p. 20; Cook, 2006, pp. 163–164; Destexhe 1995, pp. 30–31; Kinloch & Mohan, 2005, pp. 25–26; Prunier, 1998, p. 247). Furthermore, as Prunier (1998, p. 245) suggests, “the state can be defined by its monopoly of legitimate organized violence.” In a time of war, people who refuse to carry out orders to commit acts of violence may be shot. This principle was put in practice in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Obedience helps individuals to raise a feeling of belonging to the group and diminishes feelings of guilt (Destexhe, 1995, p. 34). In the 1994 Rwanda genocide, killing became normal as a result of economic personal rivalries, and a culture of fear or obedience (Cook, 2006, p. 168; Sandström, 2005, p. 48). However, scholars note that the Hutu reaction to RPF attacks was a consequence rather than obedience to a feared existing authority (Cook, 2006, p. 169). In addition, cultural beliefs in a supernatural power probably played an important role. Alongside the supernatural power, there is a strong belief that the king has all powers and what he does is just. The Rwandan people accepted that the king has a divine right and sovereignty over the people, because he was born with the seeds (Prunier, 1998, p. 245). Ordinary people in Rwanda just submitted to the exercise of power by the king. Furthermore, the religious societies would accept elite rule on the basis of political formulae. Rwanda falls into this category, where the Church has played a major role through a number of missions throughout the country jointly with previous administrations (Rutayisire, 1987, pp. 27–32).
3. Genocide

3.1 Definition of the Term

Genocide is a crime that has been committed throughout the ages. Indeed, every century of recorded history has been stained by genocidal acts. The term genocide has been used on many occasions during the course of a conflict, in particular in regard to the Holocaust, but also in connection with the Vietnam war, where it was used both by the French philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre and by the Russell Tribunal (Destexhe, 1995, p. 17). Towards the end of the Second World War, when the full horror of the extermination and concentration camps became public knowledge, Winston Churchill stated that the world was being brought face to face with ‘a crime that has no name’. History was of little use in finding a recognised word to fit the nature of the crime that Nazi Germany, a modern, industrialized state, had engaged in (Destexhe, 1995, pp. 2–3). According to Raphael Lemkin (a Polish-Jewish jurist who lost his entire family in the Holocaust), the term “genocide” signifies ‘the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group’ and implies the existence of a coordinated plan, aimed at total extermination, to be put into effect against individuals chosen as victims purely, simply and exclusively because they are members of the targeted group (Destexhe, 1995, p. 3; Totten & Bartrop, 2009, pp. 3–9). Lemkin was arguing that murders could not stand behind sovereign immunity by killing their own citizens, and that a collective international agreement was required to ensure universal repression of barbarity and vandalism. He tried to convince American intellectuals and politicians that the Nazi conquest of Europe was not only a contest between armies for territory, but also aimed at the total destruction of the Jewish people of occupied Europe (Brannigan, 2013, p. 49). Lemkin’s argument and his single-minded perseverance brought about the Convention for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) which was voted into existence by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1948. After stating in article 1 that genocide is a crime under international law, the Convention laid down the following definition: “Genocide is the mass killing of a group of people as defined by article of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) as any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such as killing members of
the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (Kinloch & Mohan, 2005, pp. 16–18; Totten & Bartrop, 2009, p. 4; Valentino, 2004, pp. 12–13).

The Cambridge International Dictionary of English defines genocide as the murder of a whole group of people (as killing, bodily or mental injury, unlivable conditions, pre-vention of births) calculated to bring about the extermination of a nation, race, politics, and cultural group or to destroy a language or religious group (Cambridge International Dictionary of English, 2002, p. 588; Luck et al., 1999, p. 280) defines genocide as a systematic and deliberate destruction of a racial, religious or ethnic group (noncombatants) in times of war or peace. According to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), genocide is such a serious crime that direct and public encouragement to commit such crime must be punished, even where such incitement fails to produce the result expected by the perpetrators (Grünfeld & Huisjboom, 2007, p. 19).

In Rwanda, several specific crimes were committed during genocide such as conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide. All genocide perpetrators were constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, and private individuals. Their trials were held in the traditional jurisdiction Gacaca, and in international tribunals in Arusha (Tanzania), Europe and in North America.

Genocide is a purely human experience, for only man is capable of genocide. Yet genocide also brings into question the humanity of man; the poison of genocide kills the souls of the perpetrators, sears the hearts of the survivors, and eliminates another uniquely human attribute, man’s capacity for mercy (Odom, 2005, p. xiii). However, the term genocide has progressively lost its initial meaning and the word is becoming dangerously commonplace. In order to shock people and gain their attention to contemporary situations of violence or injustice by making comparison with murder on the greatest scale known in this century, ‘genocide’ has been used as synonymous with massacre, mass killing, oppression and repression, overlooking that what lies behind the image it evokes is the attempted annihilation of an entire race or ethnic group (Destexthe, 1995, p. 6, Kinloch & Mohan, 2005, pp. 16–18). With regard to the issue of “in whole or in part”, studies have debated over what that
means in reality. The fact is that no genocide in recent times has ever brought the complete extermination of a group of people. The Rwandan genocide, of course, intended to eliminate every single Tutsi in the whole country, but there were good Hutus who spared and hid some Tutsis because they were their friends and relatives. Therefore, it is not impossible, of course, for a group, particularly a small indigenous group, to be wiped out “in whole”, but to date, at least as far as anyone knows, no group has been wiped out as a whole. Even concerning the genocide against the Jewish people committed by the Nazis, there are still Jewish survivors. This fact is implied by the expression “in part”. However, it is genocide even if any of the acts mentioned above are intentionally targeting the total destruction of a specific group of people.

Helen Fein, a pioneer of genocide studies, provided a detailed analysis of a host of alternative definitions developed by genocide scholars from the fields of psychology, political science, sociology, and history. Her proposed definition of genocide is: genocide is the calculated murder of a segment or all of a group defined outside the universe of obligation of the perpetrator by a government, elite, staff or crowd representing the perpetrator in response to a crisis or opportunity perceived to be caused by or impeded by the victim (Fein, 1984, pp. 25–26; Totten & Bartrop, 2009, p. 37). According to Fein, in order for genocide to take place, it has to be organised and authorised by the state or kingdom. However, in certain situations, the state or kingdom may not be openly involved in the genocide, but it might provide tactics and instruct the local authorities about how to do it.

The genocide convention was adopted in 1948 by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva; unfortunately, genocides did not stop. Genocides occurred during the cold war in Asia (Cambodia 1975–1979) and in Africa (Rwanda in 1994; Darfur-South Sudan, since 2003) and in Europe (Srebrenica 1995) (Grûnfeld & Huijboom, 2007, p. 1). Although scholars and interna-tional organisations dealt with the issue of early warning signs of gross human rights violations before the genocide in Rwanda, the international community has had to acknowledge its failure to prevent or even stop this tragedy. The international community observed the Rwandan genocide with a complex mixture of shock and insignificance. Rwanda was a small and strategically unimportant country, and there were no economic interests involved (Prunier, 2009, p. 29). The UN Security Council even went so far as to reduce its small peacekeeping force which was present in Rwanda.

Genocides have been perpetrated by and against a wide range of nations, culture, forms of government, and ethnic and religious groups. According to some studies, between 60 million and 150 million people worldwide probably have perished in episode of genocides during the twentieth century alone (Valentino, 2004, p. 9). Accordingly, the Rwandan genocide is a lesson to the whole world that it is not possible to ascertain that there will be no new genocide during the twenty-first century.

3.2 Genocide against the Ethnic Tutsi

On April 6, 1994, President Juvenal Habyarimana was returning from Tanzania where he had attended peace talks in order to secure a ceasefire between his government and the rebels, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). At 20:30, as the presidential plane was approaching Kanombe military base in Kigali, three missiles were fired at the plane. The plane crashed in the ground of the presidential palace and all on board died: President Habyarimana, the Burundian President Cyprian Ntaryamira, Rwanda’s Chief of staff Deogratias Nsabimana, several senior members of the presidential staff, and members of the French crew that operated the plane. The Rwandan government blamed the RPF and the Tutsis for killing the president. In retaliation, the Hutu extremist group Interahamwe started to kill the Tutsi and Hutu sympathisers (Cook, 2006, p. 221; Dallaire, 2003, pp. 223–224; Destexhe, 1995, p. 31; Kamukama, 1997, p. 88; Kinloch & Mohan, 2005, pp. 187–188; Tutu, 1994, p. 12). Although it is not yet known who was behind this assassination, it is clear that it acted as the fuse for the eruption of the violence which led to the tragedy (Destexhe, 1995, p. 31; Kamukama, 1997, p. 63; Prunier, 1998, p. 229).

The massacre started in Kigali on 7 April 1994 and spread throughout the country as groups of militia were sent to different areas to coordinate the killings with the government personnel. In little more than 100 days in 1994, more than 800,000 Rwandans were butchered in one of the most intense genocides in the twenty-first century (Aguilar, 2009, p. 23; Anderson & Menon, 2009, p. 54; Dallaire, 2003, p. 375; Hinga et al., 2008, p. 49; Prunier, 1998, p. 265; Tutu, 1994, p. 13; Union Africaine, 2000, p. 28
121; United Nations, 2001, p. 7). According to the 1991 Rwandan census, Kibuye had the highest concentration of Tutsi within Rwanda. They were 252,000 before the genocide. By the end of 1994, there were between 7,000 and 8,000 Tutsis left in Kibuye. Kibuye is only one of the many examples of a systematic annihilation of an ethnic group by fellow nationals within Rwanda (Aguilar, 2009, p. 27). In fact, interim president Théodore Sindikubwabo expressed his appreciation for the killing of so many Tutsis in Kibuye.

Scholars argue that the genocide placed people in incredibly complex moral and social dilemmas (Prunier, 1998, p. 257). In the case of Rwanda, some Tutsis could be denounced by somebody who knew them personally: pupils were killed by their teachers, shop owners by their customers, neighbour killed neighbour, and husbands killed wives in order to save them from a terrible death. Some people were denounced by their colleagues who wanted their jobs, or killed by people who wanted their property, while others were saved by unknown Hutu disgusted by the violence (Cook, 2006, pp. 182–183; Destexhe, 1995, p. 31; Prunier, 1998, p. 257). Frequent intermarriage had produced many Hutu-looking Tutsis and Tutsi-looking Hutus. In towns and in some rural areas, Hutus who looked like Tutsis were very often killed; their denials and proffered cards with the ‘right’ ethnic mentioning being seen as a typical Tutsi deception (Prunier, 1998, p. 249). The Hutu killers Interahamwe turned against their fellow Hutus who tried to save Tutsis, and the vast majority of Hutus abandoned their homes and fled the country to Zaire (now DRC) as a result of propaganda-inspired fear of RPF reprisals (Anderson & Menon, 2009, p. 54; Destexhe, 1995, p. 33; Mugerwa, 2000, p. 7). A Hutu husband might have to give all his money to be allowed not to kill his Tutsi wife and her relatives when they were stopped at militia roadblock (Prunier, 1998, p. 257).

3.3 Social Suffering during Genocide and Displacement

Armed conflicts, especially genocides, profoundly damage social, physical, and human psychological health in countries and impede their economic growth during and after the conflict (Stewart, Cindy, & Michael, 2001). The World Health Organisation argues that social suffering is a public health problem (WHO, 2002, p. 3). Collective suffering intensifies mortality and illness in conflict war zones; 10% of the people who are killed in contemporary warfare are soldiers; and 90%
are civilians, including vulnerable children, women, and people belonging to socially oppressed groups (Joop & De Jong, 2010; Kleinman, Das, & Lock, 1997). Social suffering produces tremendous psychological as well as physical injuries and increases the burdens of diseases associated with negative mental health outcomes (Baingana, Banon & Thomas, 2005). Therefore, social suffering may cause a wide range of human problems. Systematic or targeted violence such as genocide and torture expose the victims to an enormous psychological trauma. The victims experience multiple adversities and losses, often accompanied by forced displacement (Elbert & Schauer, 2002).

Suffering is an unavoidable part of being a human, and an experience most people will experience sooner or later (Kleinman et al., 1997, p. ix). However, in war and genocide, suffering is extreme. As an example, the use of systematic rape is common; it is often organised and used in order to annihilate the targeted ethnic group (Natalya, 2014, p. 151). During the 1994 genocide, systematic sexual molestation, mutilation, and rape of Tutsi women and girls were used as a tool to humiliate and annihilate the ethnic Tutsi (Amnesty International, 2004; Hamel, 2016). According USAID (United States Agency for International Development), after the genocide, some Hutu women were also sexually abused by RPF soldiers in revenge for what Hutu men previously had done (Newburg & Baldwin, 2000, p. 4). The Rwandan women who were raped are marginalised, and the children that are born as consequences of rape are not accepted in their communities (Mukangendo, 2007, p. 47). Through the process of stigmatisation, certain individuals are systematically excluded from particular social benefits because they possess a certain characteristic or belong to the enemy group (Bloom & Kessler, 1994; Major & Schmader, 1998; Steele & Aromson, 1995; Weitz, 1990). Therefore, raped Tutsi wives of imprisoned Hutu men are marginalised and excluded from genocide survivor organisations, because the members do not perceive these women as true survivors (Burnet, 2012, p. 139). A stigma arises during a social interaction when a child’s actual social identity does not meet the community’s normative expectations of the qualities that the child should possess (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). Elliot, Ziegler, Altman, and Scott (1982) suggested that a stigma is a form of deviance that leads others to judge an individual as illegitimate for participation in an interaction.

The stigmatisation process might be distinctive in the context of intergroup aggression when members of advantaged groups
systematically exclude out-group members from economic and social benefits (Sidanius, 1993). Thus, Rwandan children born of rape are stigmatised not simply because they are evaluated negatively or possess the blood of their fathers, but rather because they possess a characteristic viewed by the community as constituting a basis for avoiding (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). The stigmatisation of children born of rape has become an alarming characteristic of modern society, both in the developing and the developed world. As a matter of concern, studies have found that parents’ negative perceptions of children have damaging effects on their behavioural development and school performance (Patterson, Shaw, Stewart-Brown, 2009; Van Ee, Kleber, & Mooren, 2012; Weitz, 1990). In many cases, due to violence at home, children are inclined to become street children, drug abusers, beggers, and criminals. Twenty-four years after the Rwandan tragedy, reconciliation is still a big challenge for Rwandan people, both in the country and abroad (Nowrojee, 2005, p. 4).

3.4 Trauma and Healing

The concept of trauma has been described as the mental scar that a tragic event leaves on an individual victim or on a witness – sometimes even on the perpetrators. A trauma may also be seen as the collective imprint on a group of a tragic historical experience that may have occurred decades, generations, or even centuries ago (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009, p. xi). Trauma is an uncontrolled reaction to the traumatic experience that people have gone through. In Kinyarwanda, the language spoken in Rwanda, the trauma from the genocide is called ihahamuka or ibikomere byo mu mutima, which refers to a variety of mental and emotional manifestations originating from the violence against the Tutsis and its aftermath. Thus, trauma is the result of exposure to an overwhelmingly stressful event or a series of events, such as war, genocide, rape or abuse, and it is a normal response by normal people to an abnormal situation (Langberg, 1999, pp. 52–53; Schiraldi, 2000, p. 3).

In the present study, the healing strategies and community resources utilised by Rwandan people in Finland and Belgium have been investigated. Most international organisations base their trauma counselling on the Western model, but because they were unfamiliar with or even ignored Rwandan culture, many traumatised Rwandans
have turned to traditional and religious healers to seek help. Therefore, the trauma healing and coping practices and facilities in Finland and Belgium have been explored and compared. Unlike their traumatised Rwandans in Rwanda, Rwandans in Belgium and Finland do not necessarily have regular access to traditional and religious healers; but there are persons and organisations in the community, for example pastors and churches, that provide spiritual and emotional support and consultation. According to Friedman, Keane, and Resick (2007), cultural competency skills are essential to either effectively treat or research any medical condition, and especially psychiatric disorders, because of the interplay between culture and concepts of health or illness, expressions of distress, and healing beliefs and practices. They argue that across all diseases and illnesses, culture determines the local expression of symptoms (idioms of distress and illness behaviour), illness attributions, coping, locally sanctioned treatments, as well as the acceptance of treatments; both Western and non-Western (Friedman et al. 2007, p. 425).

All in all, the existence of a collective trauma speaks of the painful link connecting peoples’ present to their past. It defines the empirical way in which contemporary societies problematize the meaning of their moral responsibility in relation to the distress of the world.

3.5 Western Justice

After the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsis in 1994, the United Nations (UN) Security Council established an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania, to prosecute individuals responsible for the genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law that were committed during the period from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1994 (Des Forges, 1999, p. 1123; Grünfeld and Huijboom, 2007, p. 18; Moghalu, 2005, pp. 153–156). In creating the ICTR, the Security Council affirmed its conviction that the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violation of international humanitarian law in Rwanda would promote a number of goals: (a) to bring justice to those responsible for the genocide in Rwanda, (b) to contribute to the process of national reconciliation, (c) to restore and maintain peace in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region of Africa in general, (d) to prevent future violations and effectively redress such violations that have been committed.
In order for the ICTR to fulfil its mandate, the Security Council exhorted that it should receive the assistance of all states. An article of the statute requires states to cooperate with the ICTR in its investigations and prosecutions, if a request for assistance is issued. Suspects indicted by the ICTR have been arrested in many African and European countries and transferred to the ICTR, demonstrating the respect and support foreign national governments exhibit toward the tribunal (Grûnfeld & Huijboom 2007, p. 19; Totten & Bartrop 2009, p. 474). Article 2 of the ICTR statute deals with genocide, conceptualized as acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. This article is similar to article 2 and 3 of the 1948 genocide convention, in which genocide is defined as specific crimes against humanity committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds (Totten & Bartrop 2009, p. 474). The ICTR has been able to deliberate in an extensive way on the exact meaning of the article 3. This article declares that the following acts shall be punishable:

(a) genocide,
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide,
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide,
(d) attempt to commit genocide,
(e) complicity in genocide.

The ICTR’s first trial began on January 9, 1997, and on June 17, 1997, trial chamber 1 permitted the prosecutor to amend Akayezu, who was Mayor of the commune Taba, to be the first person who was convicted for direct and indirect incitement to genocide. His conviction was based on a speech that he made on 19 April 1994 in his commune, in which he was encouraging the population to eliminate their enemies, the accomplices of the inkotanyi (Des Forges, 1999, p. 1131; Grûnfeld & Huijboom, 2007, p. 19). The ICTR ruled that Akayezu’s speech was understood by the community as an invitation to kill the Tutsi population, and that Akayezu himself was aware of the impact of his statements. The tribunal ruled that there was a causal relationship between Akayezu’s speech and the killings of the Tutsi minority (Des Forges, 1999, p. 1131; Grûnfeld & Huijboom, 2007, p. 19; Totten & Bartrop, 2009, p. 484).

The second ICTR trial on genocide suspects took place in Belgium in 2001 with four accused Rwandans: two nuns, a professor of physics at the national university of Rwanda, and a businessman. The court found three of the accused guilty of genocide and sentenced them to jail terms
varying from twelve to twenty years (Des Forges, 1999, p. 1162). Even though the RPF soldiers saved tens of thousands of Tutsis from annihilation, the RPF had also killed thousands, including noncombatants as well as government troops and members of militia. In defeating the genocidal government, RPF soldiers reportedly killed thousands of civilians in violation of international humanitarian law (Des Forges, 1999, pp. 1073–1187; Reyntjens, 2004, pp. 197–198; Totten & Bartrop, 2009, p. 331). The RPF-Inkotanyi killed tens of thousands of innocent Hutu civilians before and after the genocide, apparently provoked by vengeance against suspected killers of Tutsi and collective reprisal against Hutu (Reyntjens, 2004, pp. 197–198; Punier, 2009, pp. 42–46; Totten & Bartrop, 2009, p. 331).

In Zaire (DRC), the supporters of the genocide activated conflicts against people of Tutsi origin, destabilising the country. The security implications for Rwanda and the intermittent massacres perpetrated at the border were among the factors that led the Rwandan army to help Laurent Kabila to overthrow the government of Mobutu and perpetrate genocidal massacres against the refugees who had been driven east, away from the Rwandan borders. According to some studies, the Security Council took no action after being given evidence that both the government of the Congo and Rwanda were responsible of killings of Hutu refugees in Eastern Congo (United Nations, 2001; Prunier, 2009, pp. 116–125).

The chief prosecutor of the ICTR announced in 2002 that she had launched investigations of several high-ranking RPF officers for such crimes, but the Rwandan government responded by imposing new travel restrictions for Rwandans, making it impossible for some witnesses to leave Rwanda and travel to Arusha-Tanzania to testify in court. As a result, the ICTR had to suspend three trials in June 2002 for the lack of witnesses (Des Forges, 1999, pp. 1131–1132). When a European Union delegation visited Rwanda in June 1998, the British Minister of state Tony Lloyd said that European countries were discussing how to ensure that every suspect of being a genocide perpetrator is arrested in every European country. Dozens of such genocide suspects are living in Europe and North America. Hundreds of others are in various African countries. Although some African states have arrested a number of genocide suspects who were transferred to the International tribunal, none has yet shown a willingness to begin genocide trials in their own courts (Des Forges, 1999, p. 1163).
With the Security Council pressing the ICTR to bring its prosecutions to a swift conclusion, no RPF soldiers have yet been indicted or brought to trial, raising doubts as to whether anyone from the RPF will ever face prosecution in an international court for crimes during 1994. This prosecution of accused from only one ethnic Rwandan group has given the impression to some people that the tribunal is working in the interest of one side only (Brannigan, 2013, p. 63; Des Forges, 1999, pp. 1174-1154). Furthermore, the ICTR and Rwandan traditional justice Gacaca was unable to deal with RPF crimes and revenge-killing by Tutsi civilians (Kapteijns & Richters, 2010, p. 180; Moghalu, 2005, p. 3). This issue brings further division among the Hutu and Tutsi diaspora in Finland and Belgium, because there is a deep longing among the Hutu population for acknowledgement of their own suffering during the violence. However, Western justice had played an important role in promoting accountability for perpetrators of the genocide; this has had an important impact on the Rwandan diaspora, which closely follows the events in their home country. In addition, Western justice has played an important role to Rwandan diaspora groups regarding their trauma healing. Some perpetrators have been prosecuted in Western countries, such as Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA (Totten & Bartrop, 2009, p. 473).

As of early 2004, the ICTR had convicted twelve individuals including a number of senior members of Rwandan government, civil society, and clergy. Convicted individuals include Jean Kambanda, the Prime Minister of Rwanda during the genocide; Jean-Paul Akayesu and Juvenal Kajelijeli, both local mayors; Georges Rutaganda, a militia leader; Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, a Seventh-Day Adventist pastor; and George Ruggiu, a Belgian-born radio journalist whose broadcasts encouraged the setting up of roadblocks and congratulated those who massacred Tutsi at these roadblocks (Totten & Bartrop, 2009, p. 478).
4. **Population and Aim of the Study**

4.1 **The Rwandan Diaspora in Finland and Belgium**

According to National Statistical Bureau, outside the African continent, Belgium has ranked number one in taking Rwandan refugees (Schildt, 2013, p. 17). Belgium has a particular status owing to the fact that it not only hosts the largest community of Rwandans living in Europe, or more generally in the Western countries, but also to the historical ties between the former Rwandan elite and its Belgian counterparts. Among the educated class in Rwanda in 1994, a very significant percentage of those who had studied abroad, through government scholarships or through private means, or who had gone overseas for professional training courses, had studied and trained in Belgium. This contact also applied to the army and national gendarmerie, as much as some of them conducted their academic, medical professional, and other training courses in Belgium. In addition, large numbers of Belgians lived in Rwanda before and during 1994, working in different organisations in the private sectors, in NGOs, schools, in the church, and in government institutions. Accordingly, Belgians and Rwandans worked together for many years, both in Rwanda and in Belgium, creating strong ties at both the professional and personal level (Prunier, 1998, p. 33).

When the ex-FAR (Force d’Armé Rwandaise) crossed *en masse* into Zaïre (now DRC) in mid-July 1994, a number of senior officers spent only a very short time in the camps in Congo before Belgian friends and former colleagues, and possibly also some Rwandan relatives living in Belgium, made the necessary arrangements for them to travel to Belgium, where they have remained ever since. According to a study by Schildt (2013, p. 17), by 2012, the number of Rwandans living in Belgian territory was 30,000–40,000. They had 1035 projects: shops, cleaning companies, travel agencies, restaurants and bars, churches, and saloons.

Even though there have been historical ties between Rwanda and Belgium, asylum seekers and immigrant Rwandans coming to Belgium since 1990 has increased remarkably. These refugees and their families have been placed in different parts of the country; however, Brussels has attracted the majority of them. Both Hutus and Tutsis live in Belgium (Schildt, 2013, p. 25; Udahemuka 2012). However, there were still divisions between the Rwandans living in the diaspora. For instance, Tutsi and Hutu in Belgium had their own separate areas, bars and
churches, in which a person from the one of the ethnic groups could not enter if it belonged to the other group, because they had been severely traumatised and thought that members of the other group were all killers (Omaar, 2008, pp. 191–194; Udahemuka, 2012). Moreover, many Rwandans in Belgium are extremely opposed to the current Rwandan government. These Rwandans left the country around July 1994, and they are associated with and supported by Belgians who lived and worked in Rwanda before 1994; they have since then rarely or never returned to the country (Schildt, 2013, p. 25). In addition, there have been mutual accusations among Rwandans in exile, and some are suspected of spying on other refugees for the Rwandan government. For example, in Belgium, Great Britain, and Sweden, authorities have discovered subtle activities among some Rwandans spying on their nationals for the current regime (Cuffe, 2011; Meldrum, 2012; Milmo, 2011; Wizeye, 2015). At the same time, there have been reports of accusations made against some Rwandan nationals who are said to be hiding from justice in countries such as Belgium, Canada, the Democratic Republic of Congo, England, France, Germany, Malawi, Norway, Kenya, USA, Sweden, Zambia, and South Africa.

Since Finland has not previously had any significant ties with Rwanda, only a few Rwandans came to Finland to study or to apply for political asylum. According to Statistics Finland (1990–2017), by 2018, Finland hosted 503 (254 males and 249 females) Rwandans who came both as refugees, students and on other grounds. In 1994, during the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsis, there was only one single Rwandan individual in Finland. He came to Finland through a church connection (Finnish Baptist church in Vaasa - Union Baptist in Rwanda). The first Rwandan asylum seekers came to Finland in 1995, and the process has continued up to the present date (Holmberg, 2009, p. 25; Statistics Finland, 1990–2017). They came from different parts of Africa: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Malawi, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. They are both Tutsis and Hutus. According to Statistics Finland (1990–2017), Rwandan people in Finland are living in the following municipalities: Helsinki, Espoo, Oulu, Turku, Vaasa, Kotka, Lappeenranta, Porvoo, Kokkola, Savonlinna, and Vantaa. They also work in many different sectors: health care, public transport, education, social care, cleaning, restaurants, post, and industries.
Rwandan people do not have many economic projects in Finland. Some are unemployed, and others are retired. With respect to religious affiliation, some are church goers (Roman Catholic Church, Mission Church, Pentecostal Church, Methodist Church, and Lutheran) and other animists. There have not been any ethnic clashes among Rwandans in Finland. However, there is still a lack of trust between the different ethnic groups, which may be noticed at the individual level. As a result, people may be reluctant to interact and visit each other, or to participate in events such as weddings and burials (Turner, 2012, p. 138).

4.2 Aim of the Thesis
The research aims to study social suffering experienced and expressed by the survivors of the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath who nowadays reside in the diaspora both in Finland and Belgium. More particular aims are to (a) provide an analysis of the role of the church before and after the genocide, (b) explore how frequent various forms of traumatic experiences during the genocide are among member of the diaspora in Finland, (c) compare the mental well-being of victims of rape during the genocide with the mental well-being of those who were born as a result of such rape, and (d) investigate coping methods and compare services aiming at trauma healing among genocide victims in Belgium and in Finland. It puts an emphasis on the experience and narratives of Rwandan migrants, on how they conceptualize and give meaning to their social suffering, and how they cope with their traumatic situation psychologically, in culturally meaningful ways. By studying Rwandans in Finland and Belgium, the researcher hopes to contribute to the understanding of how a healing process takes place among a highly traumatized diasporic group, in its specific cultural context. Anthropological and psychological studies have shown that for various reasons, the Western model of coping strategies and psychological treatment may not be suited to African contexts (Brewis, 2008; Tiilikainen, 2003). Instead, traditional and religious healing, religious communities, and storytelling events, have been reported to be effective means of dealing with traumatic memories (Neimeyer, 2001; Schiraldi, 2000).
5. Method

5.1 Mixed Methods Design

A combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies was applied in order to approach the research interests of this study. The quantitative data were collected with a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. A variety of outcomes were in focus in the four articles (Studies I to IV), which were assessed in different ways by using various indicators and measurements. The use of different study designs and methods within this research project was motivated by the fact that social suffering and healing is a multi-dimensional concept (Luttrell, 2010, pp. 1–2). One commonly mentioned benefit of using mixed methods is that the methods may strengthen the internal and external validity of the research (Bryman, 2006; Morse & Niehaus, 2009). Therefore, Study I used documental analysis of existing literature in combination with interviews in order to understand the role of religion regarding the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis and its aftermath (Yin, 2014). In the other three studies, qualitative methods were also used in addition to the quantitative ones to better comprehend the actions and practice in which Rwandan individuals engage in everyday life and the meanings they ascribe to their experience (Layder, 1993). Otherwise, Studies II to IV were based on quantitative data collected with questionnaires.

The main reason to collect the data in both Finland and Belgium was that the Rwandan diaspora residing in Finland is a relatively small community with little formal organisation, while the opposite is the case in Belgium. Belgium has a historical tie with Rwandan people, it has a huge Rwandan community, and it has many Rwandan churchgoers and schools, which could easily be contacted for data collection. The data collection was carried out over a period of 13 months: 6 months in Finland and 7 months in Belgium.

5.2 Data Analysis

Mixed methods for data analyses were applied due to the variation in study design and data material used in this thesis. In Study I, the data were analysed by using inductive or “open” coding (Bernard, 2006, p. 493), and the qualitative results were thematically presented. In Study II, statistical differences between, for instance, males and females were not
calculated due to the small sample size. Quantitative results are therefore presented in the form of frequencies only. Qualitative data were thematically grouped together (e.g. responses concerning traumatic experiences; help from Finnish authorities; counselling and coping strategies; hope and reconciliation; and forgiveness). In Study III, two separate multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) were conducted, with eight dependent variables each: the dependent variables measured symptoms of trauma and ways of coping with trauma. In the first MANOVA, women who had been raped during the genocide or its aftermath were compared with women who had not been raped, who served as controls. Children born as a result of rape were compared with participants who were not born as a result of rape. In Study IV, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to measure differences between Rwandans living in Belgium and in Finland on the thirteen dependent variables of the study, with age as the covariate.

5.3 Ethical Considerations

Due to the potential sensitivity of the questions and the vulnerability of the target group, ethical questions were considered very carefully. The respondents were informed of the purpose and procedure of the study, and understood that their participation was voluntary and that no consequences would follow if they refused to participate in it (World Medical Association, 2013). Furthermore, real names, occupations, or other identifying facts were not collected. Complete anonymity was guaranteed. The author’s own background as a Rwandan was an asset as it enhanced access to the field, but it also brought forth ethical challenges that were considered carefully during the whole research process. The study adheres to the principles concerning human research ethics of the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2013), as well as to the guidelines for responsible conduct of research issued by the Finnish Advisory Board on Research Integrity (2012).
6. Overview of the Original Studies

This section gives a brief overview of research findings and the theoretical contribution of each article separately. More detailed information is found in the original publications.

6.1 The Dual Role of Religion Regarding the Rwandan 1994 Genocide: Both Instigator and Healer

6.1.1 Aim and Research Questions

In 1994, Rwanda experienced a genocide in which an estimated 800,000 people were killed during a little more than 100 days. Basically, Hutu hardliners killed Tutsis, and Tutsi sympathizers among the Hutus. Study I explores the complex role of religion regarding the 1994 Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. There is evidence to suggest that religion played a crucial role in helping to create the conditions which made the genocide possible in the first place. This argument is presented through an analysis of existing literature and documents on the matter, in combination with interviews with members of the Rwandan diaspora in Belgium (n = 291, 141 men and 150 women). The respondents had come to Belgium either as refugees or on other grounds after the 1994 genocide. At the time of the interview, they were staying in different locations of Belgium: Brussels, Aalst, Liege, Leuven, Charleroi, Limburg, Luxembourg, Namur, Turnhout, Soignies, Sint Niklaas, Tielt and Vervières.

6.1.2 Findings

The churches of the former colonial times, both Catholic and Protestant, favored the Tutsis and oppressed the Hutus, thereby laying the ground for the future catastrophe. On the other hand, seemingly paradoxically, religion has also played a central role in the trauma healing process among the genocide survivors. Members of the Rwandan diaspora in Belgium were interviewed about their experiences of the genocide and its aftermath.

The Rwandans in Belgium still feel traumatized 24 years after the genocide against the Tutsis and its aftermath. Many Rwandans in
Belgium lost one or many members of their families: siblings, parents, wives, husbands, children, neighbors, friends, and property. Many of them spent time as refugees in another African country, especially in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where they were severely traumatized when they were forcibly repatriated back to Rwanda by the Rwandan army; some were imprisoned without any reason or criminal charges. However, religion has been successfully used as a coping and healing mechanism for genocide survivors among the Rwandan diaspora in Belgium.

Regarding peace and reconciliation, this study showed that Rwandans in Belgium are to a large extent still ethnically divided and feel hatred toward individuals from the other ethnic group. Ethnicity still rules their hearts. Furthermore, the study revealed that many Tutsis still believe that all Hutus have killed or participated in the genocide against the Tutsis, and this belief is a severe obstacle against reconciliation. It was felt that reconciliation among the Rwandan diaspora in Belgium will take long to achieve, albeit there are already individuals who have been able to reconcile with the people who killed their relatives.

6.2 Trauma Inflicted by Genocide: Experiences of the Rwandan Diaspora in Finland

6.2.1 Aim and Research Questions
The aim of the study was to gain understanding about how Rwandans living in Finland were affected by the 1994 genocide and its aftermath, and the degree of traumatization and suffering they feel during their displacement. Another aim was to investigate to what extent they have received counselling in Finland, and what other means they use for coping with their trauma. Furthermore, the respondents were asked about how reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis living in Finland may be achieved, if at all, and their hopes for the future. Qualitative and quantitative data was collected through interviews of 40 Rwandans, twenty males and twenty females. The respondents were from the following locations in Finland: Helsinki, Espoo, Turku, Vaasa, Kotka, Lappeenranta, Lohja, Oulu, Porvoo, Kokkola, Savonlinna, Salo, Tuusula, and Vantaa.
6.2.2 Findings

The results show that many Rwandans in Finland had lost one or more family member, friends, neighbours, and property during the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. In the sample, 35 % reported being traumatized, and an additional 37.5 % extremely traumatized. 27.5 % reported having sleeping problems often and an additional 22.5 % reported having sleeping problems very often. Twenty-five percent reported having bad dreams sometimes, 30 % often, and 20 % very often. Thirty percent of women and 5 % of men reported having been raped. Of these, 15 % of the women became pregnant due to the rape, and 10 % were contaminated with HIV/AIDS. Ten percent of the respondents were born as a result of rape. Although 50 % reported living peacefully with other Rwandans, 35 % considered reconciliation difficult or extremely difficult. The findings of this research show that the violence of the 1994 genocide and its aftermath left many Rwandans in the diaspora in Finland profoundly traumatized.

Among Rwandans in Finland, there is still anger and hatred against those who brought this trauma upon them. They cannot understand how a person could kill his neighbours, classmates, teachers, co-workers, and friends. Hutus again are angry because they are not able to honour and remember their own lost beloved ones publically, and their suffering is not recognized.

According to the findings of this study, many members of the Rwandan diaspora in Finland want to participate in peace building and reconciliation among themselves. Some Rwandans were given the opportunity to talk to Finnish psychologists, and they benefited from the therapy that they were given, but they wish that Finnish authorities would arrange camps and conferences on trauma and that Rwandans in Finland may meet often in order to discuss their traumatic experiences.

Many Rwandans in Finland argue that Finnish authorities should talk to asylum seekers in order to know about their good and bad experiences. With regard to reconciliation, the Finnish social system and how Finns treat each other are good learning examples for Rwandans in Finland. The respondents felt that Finnish authorities should fight against racism and show love towards immigrants, because people who are traumatised feel even worse if they face racism. Finnish authorities should give more time for integration to immigrants to familiarize with the system, due to what some refugees have gone through. According to
the interviewed Rwandans, three years of integration is a short period for people who have been severely traumatised.

6.3 The Trauma of Women Who Were Raped and Children Who Were Born as a Result of Rape during the Rwandan Genocide: Cases from the Rwandan Diaspora

6.3.1 Aim and Research Questions
In the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi population, systematic sexual molestation, mutilation and rape of Tutsi women and girls were used as a tool to terrorize and annihilate the ethnic Tutsis. The aim of the third study was twofold: to investigate (1) the trauma experienced by women who were raped and (2) the trauma of children born as a result of rape, during the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsis and its aftermath, who are staying in Finland and Belgium.

6.3.2 Findings
The research showed that the women who had been raped experienced a much more severe trauma than the children who were born as a result of rape. Children who were born as a result of rape during the 1994 genocide or its aftermath were much less traumatized than the women who had been raped. These findings were perhaps somewhat surprising, considering previous results on so-called “war babies” (Balorda, 2004; Carpenter, 2010).

The children born as a result of rape reported having less fears than the controls; they also reported, to a higher extent than the controls, that they could love and forgive the perpetrators of the genocide. On five of the eight variables, there was no significant difference between them and the controls. However, they reported using alcohol as a way of coping compared to the controls. Their trauma is mostly a result of the differential treatment they received from their mothers, family, and community.

For the mothers, raising a child born from rape involves many challenges. Throughout their lives, they have had to face stigmatization from spouses, family, and community; and in many cases, they questioned their own identity within the community. However, some women who had gone through counselling had a happy relationship
with their children born as a result of rape. Thus, for these women, their children provided a meaning to their survival of the 1994 genocide as well as a purpose to go on living in the present. There are some women survivors of rape that have turned to alcohol and drugs to help them to cope with their PTSD.

Some Rwandan women had started to view their children born as a result of rape as a gift rather than a curse. Thus, if these women could build a good relationship with their children, there is hope that these relationships may act as a good model for Rwandan reconciliation in Finland and Belgium.

6.4 Coping Strategies and Psychological Interventions among Traumatized African Migrants in the Western World: A Comparison between Rwandans in Finland and Belgium

6.4.1 Aim and Research Questions
The objective of the fourth study was to investigate coping strategies and the experience of mental health interventions in Rwandans traumatised by their experiences during the 1994 genocide and its aftermath, living in Belgium and Finland.

6.4.2 Findings
Relatively few Rwandans reported having been able to receive counselling from Finnish and Belgian psychologists. Among them, there was a substantial number of respondents who claimed that they did not benefit from the counselling they received. Many of the respondents argued that Belgian and Finnish authorities should talk to asylum seekers more, in order to get to know about their good and bad experiences. They feel that they need to be listened to.

The results showed that Rwandans in Belgium were more satisfied than those living in Finland with the therapeutic interventions, survivors’ group activities, and social support they had received in their host country. Rwandans in Finland, on the other hand, relied more on psychopharmacata and the use of alcohol as coping mechanisms than
those living in Belgium. It appears that they suffered more from their trauma, due to loneliness and the language barrier.

In Belgium, there is a big Rwandan community with many restaurants, bars and associations, where Rwandans can meet and discuss their issues. Being a French speaking country, it is easier for Rwandans to integrate into Belgium’s system and culture, while in Finland; it takes three years to learn the country’s language and understand the culture. This might be one reason why there appear to be, in relative terms, more traumatized Rwandans in Finland in comparison with Belgium.

There could be more and better efforts from both Belgian and Finish authorities to reconcile Rwandans who live in their country. They should fight against racism and show concern towards immigrants, because people who are already traumatised on their arrival to Europe get even more troubled if they also have to face racism in their new country. Rwandans in the diaspora suggest that Belgian and Finnish authorities should organize activities such as conferences, games, seminars, sports, summer camps, etc., so that Rwandans can discuss their problems, as part of the reconciliation and healing process.
7. Conclusive Remarks

Much has been written about the Rwandan genocide and its violation of human rights during the 1994 genocide against Tutsis and its aftermath. The studies included in this thesis will hopefully provide additional information, in particular from a psychotraumatological point of view.

The data collection was not always easy to conduct. The genocide occurred 24 years ago, and some respondents said that they wanted to forget their experiences and move on. Some feared that narrating their terrible memories could have a negative impact on their present lives. This may be a reason why some were hesitant to be interviewed or to speak publicly about the happenings of 1994. Some Rwandans in Belgium even asked the researcher if he was sent by the current Rwandan government to spy on them.

It is clear from the results that the healing process is not over for most of the respondents. One reason may be that they to large extent have not received counselling, and they have not yet made peace with the situation. According to World Medical Association (2013), it is unavoidable that a researcher would be confronted with ethical dilemmas during a research process of this kind. Regarding peace and reconciliation, this study showed that the Rwandans in the diaspora are still, to a large extent, ethnically divided and feel hatred toward individuals from the other ethnic group. Ethnicity still rules their hearts. It was expressed that reconciliation among the Rwandan diaspora will take long to achieve, albeit there are already individuals who have been able to reconcile with the people who killed their relatives.

These studies also aimed at identifying psychologically and culturally relevant methods and strategies to enhance the healing process among traumatized Rwandans in the diaspora. Therefore, it may hopefully serve as a tool for improving relations and communication among the communities during social and employment interactions, not only in Finland and Belgium, but also elsewhere in the world. For Rwandans in Finland and Belgium, this study could hopefully work as a bridge-builder between the ethnic groups. It also shows how the authorities of the migrant-receiving countries better could support the traumatised Rwandan migrants. This study could be of practical relevance for various international relief organisations such as the UNHCR, the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières, and the Lutheran World Foundation, as well
as medical organisations that work with African immigrants. It could be beneficial for teachers who work with refugees. In addition, this research provides a deeper understanding of local concepts of mental illness, which is of utmost importance in the planning of future aid projects in East and Central African conflict zones. Finally, this study contributes to the literature on migrants, in particular, African migrants in Finland and Europe.
8. References


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Jean d’Amour Banyanga

Social Suffering and Healing Among the Rwandan Diaspora in Finland and Belgium

The 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi led to the exile of many Rwandan people and the establishment of diasporic communities in Africa, Australia, and in Western countries. Many Rwandan people who reside both in Finland and Belgium after surviving the genocide and its aftermath, still suffer from the social and psychological wounds that the ethnic violence and the genocide have left them with.

The thesis investigates the social suffering experienced by the survivors of the Rwandan genocide against Tutsi and its aftermath. A combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies was applied. The study may hopefully serve as a tool for improving relations and communication among the communities during social interactions, not only in Finland and Belgium, but also elsewhere. For Rwandans in Finland and Belgium, this study could hopefully work as a bridge-builder between the ethnic groups. In addition, the thesis provides the authorities of the migrant-receiving countries with information about how they could better support the traumatised migrants.