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Essays on structures and identities in the North of Europe

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Finland and Russia

The millenium of history shared by Finland and Russia, which later became the Soviet Union, and Russia again, is intimately linked to a waterway: the route which leads from the Skagerrak and the Kattegat through the Baltic Sea to the Gulf of Finland, along it to the Neva and from there through Lake Lagoda to the isthmuses which provide access to the river systems of Russia.

The Russian state came into being during the ninth century along the shores of the waterways between the Baltic Sea and Constantinople. Novgorod was in the north and Kiev at the midway point. Constantinople, the new Rome, was then one of the world's leading centres of education and commerce, as well as the capital of a world power. Its religion and culture, Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and the Greek-based Cyrillic alphabet, are some of the many things which Russia inherited. In distant Novgorod Greek monks were painting icons and spreading Christian culture to the city's endless northern hinterlands. Around the year 1000 these included much of what is now Finland.

Among the users of the eastern passage the Scandinavian Vikings, also known as Varangians, played an important role, and Finns were probably among those who made trips to the distant imperial city. The Varangians played a significant role in the establishment of Novgorod. Commerce and industry grew, as did Novgorod, and when the Scandinavian states began to take shape, strife arose with respect to the ownership of the shores or the Gulf of Finland. The thirteenth century was decisive. This century saw the Germans, Danes and Swedes attempt to extend their power eastwards while, at the same time, the Mongols were pressing Russia from the east,
eventually conquering the entire country with the exception of Novgorod. The southern shore of the Gulf of Finland as well as the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea wound up belonging to the Germans and the Danes, while the northern shore fell into the hands of the Swedish state which was beginning to emerge at the time and to which part of western Finland belonged. The Swedish state expanded into the interior of Finland, and during the third and fourth decades of the 13th century the area of the Tavastians, now the province of Häme, was incorporated into it. After securing this flank Sweden renewed her efforts to expand up to the Neva, but Novgorod halted this expansion in 1240. After renewed attacks and “eternal peace” was signed in 1323 on the island of Pähkinäsaari, Swedish Nöteborg, German and Russian Schlüsselburg at the mouth of the Neva. The treaty affirmed that the entire northern shore of the Gulf of Finland belonged to Sweden. The Swedes had already secured this previously uninhabited area, the present province of Uusimaa, by colonizing it with people drawn from the isthmus of Karelia through vast uninhabited tracts all the way to the Bay of Bothnia. This resulted in Finland becoming part of and developing within the culture of western Christendom.

During the 15th and 16th centuries Sweden expanded its actual power by colonizing the areas at the northern end of the Bay of Bothnia and in the interior of Finland. Olavinlinna castle at Savonlinna served as its point of support, and the cultivation by clearing and burning over woodland typical of the eastern Finnish province of Savo was its method. The liberation of Russia from the power of the mongolians strengthened this state, which was now governed from Moscow, and during the latter half of the 16th century it waged a long war with varying success in Estonia and Karelia. The internal disorder and confusion which characterized Russia at the beginning of the 17th century served as another favorable factor for the armies of Sweden and of Poland as well. The border which was drawn in the year 1617 remained valid for almost a century, and it shut Russia off completely from contact with the Baltic Sea. Sweden had become a great power including not only Karelia and Ingermanland but also Estonia and Livonia in addition to its possessions on the southern shore of the Baltic Sea.
The mediaeval royal castles in Finland are few but impressive. Their role was to secure internal cohesion and the eastern frontier of the Swedish realm. The castle of Hämeenlinna (Tavastehus) and its predecessor were built to control the interior of Finland. The expansion of the realm eastwards along the Gulf of Finland demanded domination of the hinterland.

The long period of Swedish expansion to the east – it may be said to have begun with the Viking raids of the 9th century and to have reached its peak in the 17th century – was followed by a period of Russian expansion to the west. Peter the Great wanted to make Russia into a maritime power on two seas – the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. In 1703 he established the fortification of St. Petersburg at the mouth of the Neva, and made it the capital of his vast empire nine years later. In 1714 he defeated the Swedish navy near Hanko, having already defeated King Charles XII’s infantry at Poltava in 1709. The peace concluded in 1721 secured Karelia, Estonia and Livonia for Peter the Great, and twenty years later his daughter Elizabeth moved the border of Russia somewhat further west to the Kymi river. The clearest manifestations of Swedish defence were the construction of the
vast Sveaborg fortification complex immediately outside of Helsinki and the construction of a navy to defend the archipelago.

The rearrangement of European borders as well as the power politics of the major countries allowed Russia to move its border even further westwards from the Kymi river to the Åland Islands as a consequence of the war of 1808–09. What had been the eastern part of Sweden was incorporated into Russia as a separate entity, the Grand Duchy of Finland, in 1809. A new administrative capital, Helsinki, was built for it in the style of St. Petersburg, but Finland retained its old Swedish form of government, laws, religion, and culture with respect to civil affairs. During the course of the century Finland constructed its own national culture. The country had the opportunity to develop its own political and economic system, and by the end of the 1860s it had acquired its own parliament and monetary unit (the markka). In 1906 the parliament was made unicameral, women were granted the right to vote, and universal suffrage was established. With respect to Russia proper, Finland seemed a pioneer in many respects.

Russian interest in Finland was primarily of a military nature. The purpose was to prevent the Swedish and, in particular, the English navies from operating in the Gulf of Finland in the immediate vicinity of St. Petersburg. The rise of Germany to the status of a great power at the end of the 19th century meant a change in the balance of power in the Baltic area as well as in Russian policy towards Finland. Russia saw itself as compelled to take steps aimed at strengthening the bonds between the Grand Duchy and Russia proper. Throughout the First World War Russia expected Germany to mount an invasion in Finland and Estonia, and it maintained its Baltic Navy in positions of readiness in both Helsinki and Tallinn. During the final phases of the war, after the October Revolution, the Germans had established themselves both in Helsinki and Tallinn. Finland had declared its independence after the October Revolution on December 6, 1917, and Lenin’s government had given its consent. At the end of January 1918 revolution broke out in Finland as well. Aided by the Germans, the Whites quelled it, expelling the Russian troops from Finland at the same time. The Germans made efforts to
A plan of the Virta or Koljonvirta battlefield in Iisalmi in 1808. This was the northern route for the Russians advancing northwest towards the Gulf of Bothnia. The Swedish (Finnish) troops were commanded by the famous Colonel, later Field-Marshal Sandels. "Sandels beer" is nowadays brewed in Iisalmi.
associate Finland closely with the German Empire, but Germany’s collapse and the weakness of the new Russia aided both Finland and the Baltic countries in establishing true independence.

The consolidation of Soviet power and the new threat it perceived from Hitler’s Germany injected tension into the situation between Finland and the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Second World War. After Finland’s refusal to make territorial exchanges the Soviets felt were necessary for the defence of the Leningrad area, the Soviet Union began the Winter War. This war, characterized by resolute Finnish resistance, ended in a peace which was concluded in 1940. The terms of the peace agreement forced Finland to cede Karelia to the Soviet Union, in addition to which it also leased the Soviets a base, Hanko, at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. A new war broke out in 1941, and it ended in 1944 with the same result. The Soviet Union subsequently relinquished the base, which was Porkkala this time, in 1955. There were two reasons for this action. First of all, the Soviet Union was now capable of utilizing modern weapons to control the Gulf of Finland from Estonia, which was a part of the Soviet Union. Secondly, political relations between Finland and the Soviet Union were based on a peace treaty and a separate agreement concluded in 1948 according to the terms of which Finland obligated itself to prevent the use of its territory for any attack on the Soviet Union. Finland was to remain outside of both military alliances and conflicts between the great powers.

The close relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union was based on two factors: the rather successful practice of the doctrine of peaceful co-existence of different political and social systems, a visibly useful relation resulting from their proximity. Trade with the Soviet Union accounted for a fifth or a quarter of Finnish trade before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the high technology products and consumer articles Finland exports to the Soviet Union are highly prized. Both parties consider it important to emphasize a beneficial policy which is based on realistic interests.
The Nordic Countries (Norden) and Europe

The Nordic identity has emerged in a way contrasting with that of Continental Europe. Our historical development has for long periods been a reflection of the movements that characterize wealthier civilizations to the south, but at times it has been possible to assert a 'uniqueness of remoteness'. The geographical and cultural distances have played a crucial role in our contracts with the Continent and our participation in the evolution of European traditions.

During the Middle Ages the Western universal Church and the German mercantile culture were predominant, even in the Nordic region, which still did not at that time form a distinct unit in the European community. It was not until the Reformation and the Wars of Religion that the central sovereign states of the Norden were formed, initially orienting themselves in relation to one another. They did not assert themselves in a Continental European context until the Thirty Years' War.

The Norden as periphery

In relation to Central Europe, Sweden (which then included Finland) was a large peasant country, but a highly militarized one. It could be compared to the 'new' Germany east of the Elbe, which had been gradually united, though mainly only after the year 1,000, with 'Roman' Germany, and which was a feudal-
military agricultural country. The difference lay in the social structure. Instead of the 'pure' feudalism of eastern Germany, and above all of the Baltic region, Sweden was and remained a peasant country with yeoman farmers (later farmers were granted land by the Crown) as the dominant element alongside the manorial estates. Basic geological factors alone provide a conclusive explanation for this: compared with the large plains of Northern Germany and the Baltic region, the farmland here usually divides naturally into small units. The difference is most apparent if you compare the north and south sides of the Gulf of Finland.

While Sweden's outward propaganda and inward construction of a national identity were first directed towards Denmark, her position in relation to Europe, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire was established during the 17th century. To these countries Sweden was primarily a military power recalling the triumphal progress of the period of the great migrations. Like the marauding Goths and Vandals, the Swedes and Finns were regarded by the Germans as barbarians and, like their early predecessors, the 17th century conquerors were influenced by the culture and customs of the areas they conquered. Sweden took to 'Europeanization', the nobility being gradually transformed from a breed of high-handed farmers with extensive lands to a 'presentable' court aristocracy. A clergy and a civil service were turned out by the many universities which were founded in the realm – the University of Uppsala got going in earnest during the 1620s, Åbo University (now the University of Helsinki) was established in 1640, and for the newly captured provinces of Livonia and Skåne the universities of Dorpat/(Tartu) and Lund were founded in 1632 and 1668 (1683), respectively. A firm line was taken to render the burgher towns modern and European, and the farmers were subjected to tough discipline: not only were they forced to learn to read and write but, in general, were made to abandon their old ways of life, which were branded as idle and wasteful, in favour of hard work and thrift.

By the same token and with the same aims, Peter the Great went in somewhat later for modernizing and organizing his people for greater efficiency. The same movement was afoot, though in very different ways, in Prussia.
A Milanese map from Napoleonic times stresses the importance of mountains as frontiers in the North: the chains of mountains make the old Swedish-Finnish entity Svezia a natural realm surrounding the sea. The description of the mountains is not accurate, but the basic idea is valid and worth keeping in mind. An appendix to the map says that Finland has belonged to Russia since the Congress of Vienna in 1815, but in reality the transfer had been negotiated in 1809.

During the 17th and 18th centuries Sweden was characterized by a combination of an inferiority complex coupled with an active involvement in military exploits. The latter half of the 18th century brought increased equality and polish; the political and military pretensions had been sufficiently toned down, while cultural endeavours started to yield results. The
society became bourgeois, and thus drew nearer to that on the Continent.

But the great period of change that started with the French Revolution brought a long period of uncertainty, and was a great blow to the Nordic region. The Nordic identity had to be recreated according to the idealistic, political and economic circumstances of the times. The Age of Sentiment paved the way for an idealization of nature whereas an anti-revolutionary standpoint linked it with a popular conservatism, and the economic and political role played by the Norden, now consisting of four nations, was small. Population growth, which had been considerable during the 18th century, continued during the 19th century, and despite advances in farming and industry the numbers of poor people grew continually. This led to widespread emigration and difficult regroupings within society. The keynote was a sense of poverty coupled with an idealization of nature – the most familiar manifestation being the Finnish poet Runeberg's *Our Country* (written in Swedish), which even in Sweden was long conceived of as the national anthem.

Against this background the rise in the standard of living and expanded social security arrangements became, even ideologically, extremely important in Sweden. During the 1930s and later in the 1950s and 1960s, the concepts *folkhem*, the people's home, as Swedes describe their welfare state, and *välfärd*, welfare, had a particularly positive ring. Foreign policy, defence and patriotism were pushed aside, partly due to faith in the international peace-preserving bodies and partly because Finland had emerged as an independent state, furnishing protection on the most vulnerable flank.

A consequence of the military and social policy traditions was that the higher forms of culture have not enjoyed the same priority as in France, Germany or Italy. It has usually been thought that we could not afford 'useless' culture. There are exceptions such as the predominantly ecclesiastical high culture of the 15th century and the first – unsuccessful – attempts to found a national university; church architecture and art; the mid 17th century with its great castles and country estates; the Gustavian epoch with its interest in literature, theatre, Antiquity, Italy and France; perhaps even the *Jugend*
Art (Art Nouveau) and the great philosophical literature of the turn of this century. But otherwise the practical, social-minded, i.e. short-term, perspective prevailed, reflecting the demand for immediate or very rapid returns. This has had its positive side since high culture was imported from Germany and France and the link with these countries still remains. But it need hardly be pointed out that imports have completely overshadowed exports.

This applies not only to the visible aspects of culture. Ideas have also been imported – though usually in a rather superficial way, which is understandable enough in the light of the resources available. What is always dangerous with imported ideas is that the debate that surrounds the new ideas in the ‘big, wide world’ does not usually manage to accompany it, so that on the periphery even these conceptual products are received in simplified, abbreviated form. The basis and tradition for detached treatment of ideas is weak. This would require a long educational tradition emphasizing conceptual analysis and active creativity.

From the Continental European viewpoint, Nordic ‘non-intellectualism’ or ‘Unwissenschaftlichkeit’ is perhaps the Norden’s most typical feature, though as a rule we ourselves are quite unaware of this. The Nordic peoples never have been, and are still less today, able to raise themselves to the level of thought and writing achieved by Continental Europe, which has a deep-rooted philosophical and Latin background. This may quite certainly also be attributed to the rapid social mobility of Nordic society.

In a densely populated Europe, despite urbanization and industrialization, the Norden – primarily Sweden, Norway and Finland – is sparsely peopled. The population is, and will remain, small compared with France, England, Germany, Russia, Poland, Italy, etc. Each of these countries has a population considerably larger than the whole of the Norden, which is, furthermore, by no means a unified whole in practice.

Consequently Sweden, Finland and the other Nordic countries are and will remain small and peripheral, and can only temporarily, under favourable or dramatic political, ideological or economic circumstances, hold their own globally.
The overall identity of the North was created during the XIXth century and is here represented by a drawing by the Finnish artist V. Blomstedt as a sketch for an affiche for a Finnish art exhibition in Russia. The North is represented as a wilderness, but a beautiful one, with migrating birds, and is somewhat naively surrounded by summer flowers. Man’s presence is minimal, and poor.
Under certain circumstances, however, even a peripheral region can exercise influence or earn approval. The bravery of the Portuguese in the 16th century, the Scottish Enlightenment during the 18th century, Czechoslovakian democracy in the 1920s, Finnish endurance during the Winter War, Swedish social ideologies of the '60s, all serve as examples of what the rest of Europe has talked about and admired at some particular period. But for the most part the influence flows outwards from the centre.

For this reason any attempt to assess the Norden's status in Europe must view events from a long, historical perspective.

The objective and the subjective Europe

The concept of Europe can be broken down into at least three separate levels of interpretation – which, of course, constantly interact with one another. We have, _pro primo_, the geographical concept of Europe, _pro secundo_, a concept of Europe based on organizational and communications relationships, and, _pro tertio_, a concept of Europe that is a subjective interpretation and perhaps expresses better what we think Europe _ought_ to be than describes how we see it.

The geographical concept of Europe is clearly defined, and thus the least interesting. That there is far too little interest in geography, and the usual school geography is far too limited and ill rewarded these days is another matter. In schools, a knowledge of facts of this type, together with a knowledge of animal and plant species, historical dates and personalities, has had to give way to the spirit of the age, which does not believe in memorizing and learning things by heart but overestimates the desire and ability of a child to learn structured thinking and broad truths.

Mass tourism appears to have done nothing at all to increase knowledge or interest in maps and handbooks: it seems to be only the main roads that we learn, and pre-determined sights that are seen and stay in the mind – or at least on film. Take the average Nordic person and ask him to describe where the
Carpathians are, to name the cities on the mouth of the Weser or the Oder, say what seas the Garonne, the Po or the Volga flow into, whether St. Petersburg has more inhabitants than Geneva or Athens – the likelihood of getting the right answers is slight. Nevertheless a good, general education in geography would be of utmost importance to a better understanding of our own country, its history and future.

It is true, of course, that people from major nations know even less about the world beyond the boundaries and cultural circles of their own countries (and perhaps colonies), but that is hardly an excuse for us, who so often have occasion to reproach them for their narrow ideas about the world. We in the Norden, who know that our languages are not of much use in international contexts, should have some insight into the narrowness of outlook of the peoples of the great powers, as clearly as we repudiate their assumption of the universality of their own language.

A large number of organizations include the word European in their name, and there are also a large number of ‘European’ organizations that no longer exist. For instance, Compagnie internationale des wagon-lits des grands express européens... Nowadays many of these ‘European’ attributes stem from the European free trade market organizations and their areas of influence. As we know, current usage has increasingly gone in for equating Europe with the Common Market. Instead of l'Europe des six or l'Hexagone, today we often say merely ‘Europe’.

Free trade, common measurement systems and so forth have a great deal to do with communications and exchange of goods, knowledge, people. The absence of strictly controlled borders and customs boundaries, and all kinds of relaxations on interaction seem attractive, while at the same time the outward borders are growing in importance and becoming increasingly difficult to enforce.

Goods, the material culture, their movement and flow and the organizations and communications network associated with them, are important. But there is cause to remember that it is not always the exchange of goods that leads the way. It may come first, and bring with it a form of culture that eventually assumes organizational shape right up to government level. But
national, political and military initiatives can also be the primary forces, with trade and other forms of culture adjusting themselves accordingly. The development of Europe after World War II has basically been a consequence of the outcome of the War and of which areas were occupied, but by degrees this has had to give way to other forces, to trade and culture.

It is perhaps not particularly worthwhile trying to determine what is primary and what secondary. In the Crusades of the Middle Ages, religious ideology and politico-commercial interests were united. The answer to the famous question of why Sweden took part in the Thirty Years’ War in Germany makes no difference. It is only an over-smart posterity that has chosen to determine whether political or religious interest were predominant; it all amounts to the same thing. This is also true of the present day – ideology is trade and trade is ideology, even if we, as participants in the action do not have to account for or even notice the connection.

During and after World War II, the greater part of Europe was divided into two military camps – Russian forces on the one side, American and British on the other. They shook hands with one another as liberators and friends, and then military alliances were formed, which also harbour ideological and trade policy interests. Were we to apply the same yardstick as we usually do to history, we would designate both parts of modern Europe 1945–1990 as occupied territories. That is, of course, a gross caricature of a complex reality which can never be wholly compared with the past. But various kinds of simplification are perhaps needed to bring out the difficulties involved with concepts that tend to have different ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ meanings. People cannot usually say whether they feel like Europeans without first asking “What do you mean?” Are we talking about a political or a cultural concept, about language or lifestyle? Is it a manifesto?

Europe as Greece

To understand our concept of Europe, we have to go back to the Phoenicians. Their trading routes are the background against
Viking romanticism played an enormous role in the XIXth century, countering the fatalist view of the North as poor and remote. The Vikings came to represent the active and conquering mind, later on often combined with germanism and aryanism.

which the other coasts of the Mediterranean take shape: there was Asia, i.e. what we, using a term dating back to Roman times, refer to as Asia Minor, and Africa, the north coast of the Mediterranean.

Europe was thus defined from the start in relationship to the East and the South, while the West and the North remained open – Europe’s ‘hinterland’, as the Levant and Africa each had their own ‘hinterland’. As known to everyone at the time, the ‘Near’ East, the Levant, extended to Mesopotamia and India. And somewhere at the source of the Nile, beyond the desert, there were no doubt more people, and tradable goods. That was how it was to the West and the North. Colonies would be established west of the Alps, around the mouth of the Rhone, as they could on the coasts of the Black Sea where the mouths of rivers we know as the Danube, the Don and the Dnieper linked the Greeks with the products of the vast forests.

From this perspective, what we now call the Norden – the area around the Baltic and the North Sea – is automatically a periphery. The word Nordic indicates something peripheral and remote, something you neither know nor need to know
much about, something that gradually recedes into vague, hazy areas of knowledge, to do with the end of the world, the rest already belonging to the world of legend, as Tacitus ends his *Germania*, "cetera iam fabulosa".

For better or worse, this sense of being on the periphery of Europe is an essential ingredient of the Nordic people’s self-image, a source of both their inferiority complex and their hybris. And yet the borders have been quite flexible. Though not northern, the Romans had nevertheless already been western upstarts to the Greeks, and the battle between northern force and southern culture is a recurrent theme throughout European history.

The geographical relationships have, furthermore, been anything but constant. The north has spread southwards during the period of the great migrations, the Middle Ages, during the Thirty Years War, and in Hitler’s time. The South, the culture of Antiquity, has reconquered lost terrain in the Nordic consciousness through the renaissances, the Carolingian epoch in the 9th century, the 13th century Renaissance with its gothic style, universities and Crusades, through 15th and 16th century humanism, through the neo-humanism of the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century, and so forth. The progress of Latin was certainly linked with the empires formed by Charlemagne and Napoleon, who both wanted to restore the Roman Empire.

The Christian Church has created powerful links between the North and the culture of the Mediterranean; we usually see biblical inscriptions and proverbs in Latin and Greek, Greek pillars and columns, and Roman basilicas. The whole Mediterranean culture has jointly represented, and still does represent, an ideology defined in relation to what is ‘pagan’, what is ‘Nordic’.

Politically, the Athenian ideal of the citizen returns hand in hand with the renaissance and humanist movements. It was not only the French Revolution that wanted to restore the democratic tradition of Antiquity: the revolutions in North and South America and the states founded thereafter also wanted to establish new Greek societies. Marx read the classics, and Grundtvig, Geijer and Runeberg saw in Greek thought a major potential for national revival in a Norden shattered by the
Napoleonic Wars. At the beginning of the 19th century, Berlin, Helsinki and many other cities were transformed into Greek polises, city states, with temples and colonnades, white statues, classical ornamentation and friezes, and a literary extolment of the virtues of Antiquity. I myself have lived practically all my life under the cloak of the Classicism that dominates Senate Square in Helsinki, constantly reminding us, as in so many other places throughout the world, of Europe as Hellas. The heroes in the *Elk Hunter*, the *Tales of Ensign Stål* and *Frithiof's Saga* are Greeks in disguise: the *kalokagathos* ideal (beauty and good) is incarnated in the poor crofter of the Finnish hinterland. Faust is also a Greek, a seeker of truth and tester of morals, the true European.

Being European has, in fact, again and again meant being Greek, directly or indirectly. The Greek ideal of beauty, the Greek concept of citizenship, the Greek method of seeking the truth, all these have been essential components of the human ideal in Europe; whether this is historically justified in relation to the true Ancient Greece is irrelevant. It is not Ancient Greece itself, above all not in the concrete sense, but the *understanding* of the classical ideal is important. Because knowledge of and interest in Greek culture varies, the Greek heritage often has an indirect effect, but there is no reason to deny or forget its significance.

The Divided Europe

The division of Europe flows like a compelling pattern throughout the ages: the principles of division and actual borders have, on the other hand, varied.

The Roman Empire stretched enduringly to the northern limit of the viticultural area in Germany. There the great fortifications and defence line, the *Limes*, were built in the course of a few hundred years. In this remarkable way Europe was divided into two parts, the Roman and the Germanic. The right flank belonged to the Germanic world, peopled by tribes which by then were classified as Slavic, Finnish, Latvian, etc.,
and the left flank, including Brittany, Wales and Ireland, which still contained linguistic relics from the time when the Franks, the Angles and the Saxons had not yet expanded as far west as they did later.

The division of Rome and Germania was succeeded by another bisection, between the West Roman and East Roman Empires, Rome and Byzantium. Thus, West and Germania were gradually fused, primarily under the Carolingian Empire of the 9th century, while East Rome was gradually excluded, in the religious sense as well. Throughout the centuries, the division of Christianity had been a difficult, much-debated problem, that finally dissolved in the 15th century when East Rome (Constantinople) fell to the Turks. The Greek tradition lives on in the Orthodox church, but in weakened form and is perceived as peripheral by the rest of Europe.

On the other hand, a new division then arose within Western Europe. Protestantism became mainly a Nordic and North-western religious form in opposition to that of the old Europe. England and Holland took up the tradition that the Italian, Dutch and German cities had developed in opposition to the religious and territorial powers. In lieu of faith and sovereign, or the traditions of military organization, they developed a bourgeois morality and a practical view of the world. The idea of a universal realm under the leadership of an emperor or the Pope was left to the Germans. As such, this idea continued to be administered in the European manner, according to the traditions — not least the idealistic existence — of the Roman Empire, with Latin as the European language.

In addition to the trading nations of England and Holland, the kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden developed into minor empires. But they did not manage to repeat the achievements of the Ancient Germans of conquering the Roman Emperor and occupying Rome or Vienna. They did, however, succeed in establishing their own uniqueness, and consolidating themselves by means of an identity that no longer emphasized a cultural colonial relationship to the Church of Rome and the Roman concept of the state.

The weakness of Germany after the Wars of Religion helped France to achieve a leading position in Europe, but England on the one hand and Austria on the other wanted to balance this
Snow is generally seen as something positive. It falls after a rainy period and stays for the winter. It permits traffic and it protects the fields. Snow gives more luminosity, especially by reflection in the darkness.

position. At the end of the 18th century we again have a clear division of Europe according to two principles: revolutionary France against the rest of Europe. To start with, France under Napoleon, was the victor in this battle.

Austria’s role as an counterweight to France was at this stage transferred to Russia, which during the 18th century had assumed an increasingly strong profile as an effective great power with global political interests.

In 1807 the western emperor Napoleon and the eastern emperor Alexander divided Europe into spheres of interest. A bisected Europe emerged. The Napoleonic wars had lasting effects on the formation of states in Europe; the Swedish and Danish kingdoms were both split into two, while the borders of the Netherlands, Poland and Italy were reorganized.

In the 19th century the division was different. Western Europe, including England, Belgium and France, was domi-
nated by industrialization, the first railways, and liberalism, with the bourgeoisie and money as the prime social forces. Prussia, Austria, Russia and so forth were dominated by agriculture, conservatism and centralism. Instead of the bourgeoisie, it was the aristocracy and the peasantry, the military-agrarian complex, which steered society.

From the 17th to the 19th century, Western Europe was drawn into colonial expansion which previously had mainly involved Spain and Portugal. Now England, France and Holland predominated. Historically speaking, however, the real epoch of the French, Dutch and German colonial powers was relatively brief. Where Portugal and England are concerned, what happened can perhaps be described by saying that the daughter gradually grew larger and more influential than the mother – first on the political, and then on the linguistic and cultural level. Through this process the European dichotomies came to be governed by interests outside Europe.

After World War II both superpowers further underlined this non-European influence, but new organizational and identification processes have gradually become discernible. From an historical point of view, it is interesting to note how the European Community, the EC, has in recent times spread in a south-westerly and south-easterly direction and thus has come to embrace the area of the old Roman Empire, so that the EC is more Catholic (and Orthodox) than Protestant. The role of Ancient Germania was taken over by the so-called East European states, East of the Elbe; in the intermediate area we have the EFTA countries, which have not, however, taken a particularly strong cultural stand nor are their populations yet comparable in size to those of the other groupings.

The Norden, Russia and Germany

In the Norden, the religious border between western and eastern political and military expansion was established in the 13th and 14th centuries. Roman Catholic expansion stopped at the Neva and Lake Peipus, when Novgorod warded off the
Swedes on the one side and German expansion on the other. Denmark also established its position on the Gulf of Finland at that time. Nevertheless the first peace treaty between Sweden and Novgorod, the Peace of Nöteborg of 1323, gave Russia influence north of the Gulf of Bothnia and in Lapland. The opportunity for a highly spectacular expansion by the Swedes, Danes and Germans had arisen through Mongolian invasions from the east. All the coasts of the Baltic came to belong to the Western church, and the German urban culture established itself economically for many centuries in the most important coastal cities, from where it was to exert as great an influence on material culture as the ecclesiastical organization had on the spiritual one.

The Reformation had an enormous effect on the position of the Norden. To start with, the Nordic region was a periphery of Lutheranism, but the Wars of Religion weakened Germany to such an extent that the Nordic, particularly the Swedish, nations were firmly established, allowing Sweden, through its temporary position as a great power, to win a lasting identity both at home and abroad. This position was not so securely established, however, that Russia, Germany and Saxony-Poland under Charles XII did not plan to divide the country between them, or that France in 1808–1809 did not try to get Russia to take Stockholm as well as Finland, so that Sweden not only would have been split but, like Poland, completely divided.

Since at the end of the 19th century both Russia and Germany had established themselves as political, military and economic great powers in Europe, development in the Norden came to depend on their relations with one another. For a long time these were excellent and during this period the Baltic Sea area was relatively safe. Russia no longer feared a Swedish or Danish attack, and was not afraid of a German one. The unknown element was the British, who had wanted to affect politics here through their naval presence and fleet operations as early as in 1808–1809, mainly during the Crimean War of 1854 and 1855, and even during the final stages of World War I.

Russia and Prussia were linked by dynastic ties, military traditions dating from the campaign against Napoleon, and resistance to both social and national nineteenth century
The slash-and-burn method of grain production was rather easy and productive, but constantly demanded new areas to be managed in the same way. This method, applied in the wilderness, explains the population expansion in the XVIth and XVIIth centuries, especially in eastern and northern Finland, by the savolaxians, and later in the central Swedish and Norwegian wildernesses by migrating savolaxians.

revolutionary movements. The Prussian support for Russia during the subjugation of the Polish rising of 1863 bound these states together, and Russia expressed gratitude by allowing Bismarck's Germany to emerge during the following eight years.

This pattern changed during the 1890s. Russia allied itself with France against Germany, and the situation in the Baltic Sea area changed rapidly. Germany started rearming its navy which was centred in Kiel on the Baltic, while Russia pursued a new policy in Finland aimed at bringing the Grand Duchy closer to the Empire in military terms, as well as politically and
psychologically, bearing in mind the possibility of invasion by Germany. Sweden was drawn closer to Germany, but also tried to maintain good contacts with Russia, as evidenced by Czar Nicholas II’s state visit to Sweden and Prince Wilhelm’s dynastic marriage to the Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna. During World War I Sweden’s neutrality was stretched to the limit. But despite obvious sympathy for the Germans, they managed to keep out of the war if the Åland expedition in 1918 is disregarded.

In the Baltic area the constellation of forces which appeared in World War I was largely repeated during World War II, involving German and Russian occupations of Lettonia and Estonia, Sweden’s pro-German attitude and neutral assistance, Finland being independent but on the German side in the struggle against Russia. In contrast, the situation in Denmark, and particularly in Norway, was very different during both world wars.

Whereas both the great powers in the Baltic were defeated after World War I, after World War II one great power was completely defeated, occupied and demoralized, while the other was not only among the victors but procured the status of superpower in the post-war years. In the Baltic region, the Baltic States were, as we know, incorporated into the Soviet Union. Poland’s borders were greatly changed. Germany collapsed and was divided. The military policies of the Nordic countries took shape against the background of their wartime experiences. At the end of the ’40s Norway and Denmark joined the American military alliance, while Finland undertook to ensure that neither “Germany nor states allied with Germany” would use its territory for an attack against the Soviet Union.

Consequently, the situation around the turn of the century has to some extent been restored, since Russia and West Germany, this time with Denmark, again stand against each other. The Russian sphere of influence had shifted considerably to the west on the southern shores of the Baltic. Territorially, however, the Russian position in the Baltic was weaker than at the turn of the century when the Russian military presence extended to Åland and the Bothnian coast, as compared with its current limit at the present Finnish-Soviet border and especially in the period since the new sovereignty of the Baltic
States. The Soviet Union no longer has the bases it thought fit to demand at the signing of the armistices with Finland in 1940 and 1944, first in Hanko and then in Porkkala. Hanko was recaptured by the Finnish army in 1941 and Porkkala, which was leased to the Soviet Union until 1994, was given back in 1955.

But the situation can also be compared with the time before the powerful emergence of Germany, when Russia was the only real great power on the Baltic but still had to be on the look-out for foreign (British and French) fleets, which could turn up in the Baltic in times of war and even, during the Crimean War, wreak considerable damage along the coasts. The havoc caused by ‘the Englishmen’ along the Finnish and Bothnian coasts is still not entirely forgotten.

People and freedom

We have examined above the political, and to some extent religious dichotomies in Europe. The adoption of a philosophical pattern of division would further contribute to the analysis.

A dynamic relationship between accentuation of the individual and of the social runs through history. According to this viewpoint even Athens and Sparta may be regarded as paired opposites, and what we call the Renaissance was a glorification of human and individual awareness as against social organization and collective identity.

The idea of freedom, that is to say individualism, became the basic principle of the French Revolution and of the North and South American revolutions at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries. With no revolutionary background, the merchant-dominated Dutch, Swiss, English and Scottish traditions joined this movement, though they usually also harboured a revolutionary attitude to the church (Catholicism) and centralized power. Basically this part of the world opposes limitations and customs duties whether they be on goods or ideas, political opinions or religious notions, or the freedom to depict in words and pictures anything whatsoever.
The concept of Nation was linked early on with that of liberty. The nation consists of free individuals, of people liberated from tyranny. Against this we have the concept of the Volk dating from the beginning of the 19th century, an organic whole united by language, tradition and a feeling of affinity. All movements seeking to promote the common cause, to represent the masses and build on their solidarity are founded on the legacy from this latter tradition. Modern 19th century nationalism implanted old, vague feelings of solidarity into the system, and stood primarily for a conscious process of indoctrination, to which primary schools, in particular, made an effective contribution.

Obviously, in a country as linguistically, historically and racially uniform as Germany, this was more successful than it could possibly be in multi-ethnic, multi-lingual countries such as the United States or Russia/the Soviet Union. In these countries, freedom and socialist identification have worked best, because the concept of the Volk has not been as easy to apply.

Nowhere, of course, do these ideas appear in pure form, but it is still important to think about them. It is evident that the Americans in World War II were fighting primarily for ideas and ideological domination as they were in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, whereas with the Germans, and no less the Russians, it was largely a question of their native land and its expansion or defence, regardless of the dominant ideology. Thus, the Americans may in the future attach more weight to ideas and overlook the importance of common historical experience that has been of vital importance to national unity and identity for all peoples who have suffered during wars.

Individualism and collectivism are of course socially rooted attitudes also, and are linked to methods of production. The traditional split between town and country, between trade and farming has already been intimated above.

There has been no lack of efforts to bridge the gaps between the interests of the individual and those of society, to counteract the narrow egoistic principles of the one, and the anonymous, stifling element of force in the other. At an earlier stage, societies and 'movements' functioned as links. Later, people tried to work out a 'personalistic' view of society that
The Senate Square in Helsinki was built after the city had become the capital (1812) of the newly established Grand Duchy of Finland (1809). It was built in the Russo-German empire style, and the new political entity got a completely antiquisant outlook. The idea was that Finland be seen as a new Greece, as a poor, mountainous (!) northern country, but exalted by the morality, faith, and aesthetic capacities of its people.

would preserve freedom of the individual while taking man's personal qualities as a social being into account.

The European tradition is permeated by the moral views of Antiquity; personal freedom stands in relation to duty towards society. Through the centuries, this moral view has been taught in schools and universities: studying Latin meant growing up with the civic morality taught by Cicero, and told us by Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch in their depictions of the lives of great men. The great storytellers, such as Zacharias Topelius in Finland, as well as Verner von Heidenstam in Sweden, and leading philosopher-poets such as Runeberg and
Rydberg, grew up in the classical tradition whose values they passed on.

A later age has come to emphasize freedom and rights to the extent that duty has been almost entirely forgotten. Equality is much spoken of as a right to strive for; a great deal less is said of its value as a challenging duty to others. Fraternity is seen as something that can give me something, not as something I can give others, and so forth.

Christian morality – which is to a very great extent tied to Greek morality, preaches love, submission and no expectation of reward, but the far more primitive eye-for-an-eye morality is very widespread in today's world. Morality as such is afforded little attention. Huge sums are sacrificed on the altar of technology, while the person who is to take advantage of this technology and be responsible for it is left on his own, with only limited opportunities to ponder the present and the future in terms of concepts and morality.

Religion and morality have been pushed aside into the private sphere. But clearly, parents, day-care staff, teachers and officers in charge of conscripts are far too seldom aware of their role as representatives of public morality, nor yet do they have the ability to teach it. At some juncture, children are given a fleeting opportunity to read the UN Charter on basic human rights or something similar. And yet morality and responsibility cannot be grasped without thorough study and independent thought. The most effective means would be classical art and recognized literature, which always deals with the individual's relationship to his environment, with decisions and solutions that have good and bad consequences.

In the post-war period, freedom and duty were disastrously polarized by the so-called superpowers, each pursuing these principles from its own camp in absurdum, thereby contrasting two principles that should rather be providing strength and legitimation to one another. Europe, were it to take hold of its traditions and origins, should not only be able to make a unique stand but also strive to improve and ennoble the world by stressing classical virtues such as tolerance, restraint and the Golden Mean.
A European renaissance

As a result of World War II, Europe became impotent, and the two non-European – or semi-European – ‘superpowers’ came to dominate the world in military, material and ideological terms. But it became obvious that the post-war system was no longer tenable, especially at the ideological level. Both the new liberalism of the United States and Soviet socialism were ultimately – like all other forms of liberalism and socialism – based on the legacy of what is called the Enlightenment. The Age of Enlightenment – a name loaded with subjective evaluations – has been presented almost without criticism as a positive phenomenon for many generations of school education and public opinion, and yet the many shortcomings and morally dubious aspects of this universal approach had already been exposed by contemporaries such as Goethe and Schiller.

Militarily in Vietnam and Afghanistan, ideologically in the undreamt of importance of religion in Iran, Poland, Ireland and the whole of South America, as a criticism of both ‘capitalism’ and ‘real socialism’ in the youth revolt and the ‘Green movement’, formerly in ‘Maoism’, philosophically not least in France, politically in the many scandalous and frustrating experiences of working in the Third World; all these are signs of both old and new criticism of the apparently rational and sensible traditions of the Enlightenment and its new triumph during the 20th century. It is not surprising that the expansionist powers of the Soviet Union and the United States have paid homage to the advantages that the highly material and utilitarian traditions of the Enlightenment have offered.

The unquestionable merit of the ideology of the Enlightenment lay in its criticism of what was outdated and degenerate in the previous epoch and cultural tradition. But this does not, of course, stop the ideas of the Enlightenment from themselves becoming degenerate and outdated in turn. Despite criticism of variable worth, Enlightenment ideas concerning money and military power have held their own. One could perhaps say that as long as the legacy of the Enlightenment has been to battle with romanticism and idealism, with the generation of Nietzsche, Strindberg and Bergson, with Fascism, Communism,
'Maoism', and with their time-honoured opponent Conservatism, this legacy has also been forced to renew itself. That is not the case today.

Just as the tradition of the Enlightenment — when strongly criticized in Europe — received unexpected support from new parts of the world, criticism of this tradition may also be strengthened through developments outside Europe. John Paul II's pontificate will go down in history as a period when the political significance of the Church in South America, Poland and many other countries increased to an extent that was unexpected in many quarters. The developments in Iran have forced the rest of the Islamic world into religious thinking and action. At this stage, it is primarily the Protestant world that is unprepared: on the one hand, various forms of sectarianism are spreading, on the other, various bizarre surrogate religions are emerging and drugs being used to alter consciousness; all symptoms of a spiritual and ideological vacuum.

It is therefore of vital importance that we be able to preserve and renew man's incredibly rich potential — and in our case our European cultural heritage. But at the same time this calls for an attitude of humility. Whether such humility can be attained without outward defeat in war or catastrophe of another kind is, however, something that many people question. Let us hope they are not proved right.
Continuity in Finnish Representation

The present Parliament of Finland dates back to 1863. This year is so important that it was engraved on the monument to Emperor Alexander II in Helsinki’s Senate Square as if it could be taken for granted that every passer by would be aware of this milestone in modern Finnish history. Alexander II convened the Finnish Diet in 1863; six years later the same ruler promulgated a new act, making the Diet a permanent institution with regular sessions. The traditions and role of our representative institution were established during the reign of Alexander II. Alexander III shortened the interval between sessions from five years to three, and created a ‘protoparliamentary’ link between the representative body and the government; that is, between the Diet and the Senate. At the beginning of his reign he appointed the most important party leaders to the Government of the Grand Duchy. In 1906 Nicholas II amended the election law and system of representation. Russia obtained a parliament of its own, the Duma, at the same time. The relationship between the unicameral parliament based on universal suffrage and the Government remained unchanged at the outset. The members of the Senate (the Government) were chosen from among the leading men of the parties in Parliament, as proposed by the parties themselves. There was no emerging parliamentarianism of this kind from 1909 to 1917; in that period the Senate was a government formed only by the Monarch, and not chosen from Parliament or composed of individuals enjoying its confidence. In spring 1917 the close link between the Senate and Parliament was restored. In 1919
this relationship was formalized in a constitution and the power of Parliament was enhanced. The Government must enjoy the confidence of Parliament, which does not, however, prevent the formation of minority or caretaker cabinets.

The structure and role of the Diet do not follow the great watersheds of Finnish history; rather, they represent a continuity transcending these periods. The Diet when Finland was annexed to Russia in 1809 and from 1863 on was similar in structure to that of the Swedish period. When Finland was separated from Russia in 1917–1918 Parliament remained the same as that established in 1906. This is also true of the position of Parliament with respect to the central administration and the rest of the civil service; the civil service and Parliament were closely related – the dominant Members of Parliament were civil servants throughout the period of the Grand Duchy and during the Republic up to the Parliament elected in 1945.

Historically and functionally, the civil service has itself been — in different ways at different times — part of a representative institution, as is the general will, the voice of the people, which is manifested otherwise than in elections and by sending representatives to the Diet; that is, the opinion and power represented by the press, literature and civic associations and organizations. The effect of this will is directed at Parliament, but also at other powers of state, bypassing Parliament, and at institutions which are not part of government.

The meaning of 'representation' is in fact old and of fundamental importance. In contrast, 'the people' is an ideological concept of the late romantic period whose political significance extends back to the French Revolution and to the conversion of the Estates into a National Assembly in summer 1789.

In Finland the Estates were retained in 1809 and significantly strengthened in 1863 and thereafter. The idea of a national assembly, in the classical, all-powerful sense, was not applied in Finland until 1917 and 1918, when Parliament declared the country an independent state and later elected a king for it.

Election of the ruler has been one of the four main functions of popular representation since way back; the others are regional representation and representation through the estates, taxation and law-making, which are all interrelated. Election of
The Northern realms on a British map showing the situation between 1703 and 1721. St. Petersburg is already there, but Estonia and Livonia are still represented as parts of Sweden. The title of the map is Sweden and Norway. Today Finland would be the central country on the map, but at that time it was a natural part of Sweden.

the ruler, the President of the Republic, was subsequently removed from the jurisdiction of Parliament by the 1919 Constitution, and Parliament has chosen the President in an actual election only twice, in 1919 (Ståhlberg) and 1946 (Paasikivi), and twice through special legislation, in 1944 (Mannerheim) and 1973 (Kekkonen).
Election of the ruler gradually became election of the ruling house; for us, the transition from an elected monarchy to a hereditary one was formally made in 1544 at the Västerås Riksdag, although in order to facilitate the transfer of power it had already been customary to choose the oldest son while he was still young. The elections had always entailed negotiations of a sort, in which the 'candidate' and his representative (his father) had to promise in return to preserve the former privileges of the electors or to increase them. The advent of hereditary monarchy eliminated this possibility, although approval of the new king in conjunction with the coronation entailed the sovereign's pledge, confirmation of privileges and coronation gifts. These included entertainment and gifts of money to the people gathered at the coronation and symbolic awards to the upper class and most important officials of the realm – honours, titles and ranks. Erik XIV, the first hereditary monarch, established the titles of count and baron in the Swedish realm at his coronation in 1561, and the Emperor and Grand Duke Nicholas II also presented these symbolic gifts to many of his Finnish subjects at the last coronation in 1896. It was also planned that Prince Friedrich Karl, elected King of Finland in 1918, would bestow similar symbolic gifts on the leaders of the realm when he ascended the throne. The 1919 Constitution grants the President of the Republic the sole right to bestow decorations and titles.

Participation in the election of the ruler was justifiably considered, both historically and in principle, the most important form of influence by the 'people', and in Finland February 15, 1362, is regarded as the beginning of recognized political activity in Finland and the cornerstone of an unbroken political tradition. Haakon, son of the then King Magnus Eriksson, who had already been elected King of Norway, was chosen co-ruler with his father at that time. In this political situation, one of the most important aristocrats of the realm, leader of the opposition to the King, the former Lord High Chancellor, Justice of the Eastern Lands (Finland), Nils Turesson (Bielke), arranged for himself, and thus for the Eastern Lands, the right to take part in election of the King.

"We Haakon, by the grace of God King of Sweden and Norway, make ... it known that we ... on the advice, and with
the consent and good will of our father King Magnus and the Privy Council of Sweden, when we are chosen King, we will include master Nils Turesson, Justice of the Eastern Lands, in that election, which the justices of Sweden have long performed, and in which they will elect the King and place him on the throne. Therefore, and whenever a King is to be chosen, the Justice must come to elect the King together with the priests and 12 men of the people on behalf of all the people of the Eastern Lands...

Here we see the modern state and modern monarchy that began from the actual formation of the Swedish realm in the 13th century. Before this there were of course elections of tribal chieftains and local kings as well as other political institutions in the territory of modern Finland. But no tradition for the modern Finnish state and culture of Finland is derived from them.

In the Republic of Finland the electors chosen by the people choose the President of the Republic on February 15, the same St. Sigfrid's day on which the manifesto of King Haakon referred to above was signed in Uppsala.

There were problems involved in the establishment of a hereditary monarchy. Erik XIV, the eldest son of Gustavus I Vasa, who established it, was overthrown, as was King Sigismund, son of Gustavus' second son John III, and Queen Christina, granddaughter of the third son, Charles IX, who had neither children nor siblings, and who abdicated, but succeeded in having the crown passed to her cousin, Charles X Gustav. Although the elected monarchy had been abolished, the factions took part in the struggle for power among the members of the royal house, and demanded rights and privileges for themselves. It is known that out of a desire for economic advantage, some of the Finnish peasantry took part in the struggle between King Sigismund and his uncle who sought the throne, later to become King Charles IX. This peasant revolt of 1596–97 is known as the 'Cudgel War' in Finnish.

Establishment of a hereditary monarchy was an integral part of efforts to centralize the State; this was obvious in taxation. From the 1520s on the Swedish State became increasingly centralized. This trend became stronger in the 1610s, and culminated in the 1670s. Centralized monarchies of this kind
The city of Porvoo (Borgå), where the Grand Duchy of Finland was constituted in 1809 by the Huldigung of the Finnish Estates of Alexander as Monarch of Finland. The mediaeval church is on the hill along with the Gymnasium. On the river are the merchants' warehouses, regarded as picturesque since the end of XIXth century.

were a pan-European phenomenon involving the creation and imposition of uniform legislation, taxation, administration and culture. This in turn led to the development of a uniform system of representation for purposes other than election of a king. The tradition of our Diet actually began in the 1520s, with the efforts at centralization made by Gustavus I Vasa. At the outset the King's policy was based on the anti-Danish tendency of the Kalmar Union period and suppression of the Danish party, and then focused on acquisition of the power and property of the church for the state through the Lutheran
Reformation. It ended in the internal unification and standardization of the realm by increasing the direct control of the central administration in many areas, particularly taxation and settlement.

Nevertheless, for many years the crown still had to resort to regional diets to win the acceptance of the people for certain measures and to reconcile the old privileges and practices with its new needs and goals, in the name of both internal efficiency and the external strength of the realm. A regional diet of this kind convened in Helsinki in 1616. The young King Gustavus II Adolphus wanted the Estates to advise him on how to deal with the intrigues of Sigismund, the former king, and with Russian attacks, and on these grounds requested their consent for an extra war tax. The King requested the Finns to approve the edict on providing a stagecoach system accepted at the diet the previous year. The Estates approved all the King's proposals. A complete inventory of the military resources of Finland was also drawn up. This was, of course, important for purposes of administration and taxation too, and assessed and confirmed obligations to outfit and maintain infantry and cavalry. In these days it was still felt that the right to consent to new taxes was held by the provinces or territorial entities or by the estates separately, and not by a diet representing the entire realm or all the estates together. As late as the 17th century, voting on all decisions of the peasant estate was by region. Apart from the regional diets, meetings of the estates were also held; certainly one of the most important of these was the 1593 meeting of the clerical estate in Uppsala. This assembly had considerable influence with respect to both confession of faith and related instruction and to succession to the throne bound to confession.

The first order of Parliament was promulgated in 1617, before the Örebro Riksdag, and it is still known as one of the Constitutional laws of Finland. In the same year, after the victorious Peace of Stolbova, King Gustavus II Adolphus was crowned in Uppsala, the nobility were granted more extensive privileges and several towns received special benefits and all the advantages arising from a ban on trading outside the towns. The coronation ceremonies were celebrated with tournaments and plays in which the King took the role of the victorious ancient King Berik.
The constitution of 1617 was an important step in the conversion of regional diets and assemblies of the estates into a permanent and comprehensive diet. It also established the forms in which political negotiations both between the King and his council and the estates, and among the latter, were to take place. In 1627 a Permanent Secret Commission of the Estates was established. This was an important State body, especially for the conduct of foreign affairs. Nevertheless, the estates remained separate and independent. Reconciliation of their decisions to form a single policy was problematic both in theory and frequently in practice as well. The significance of the estates was enhanced by the fact that at the same time they became coherent social classes and organizations united internally by privileges and rules. This development was most apparent in the nobility, which was finally converted by the 1626 act on the House of Nobility from what was, at least in principle, an open, untaxed military estate into a modern, hereditary nobility; it was also consciously developed from a military estate into an estate of public servants.

The 1626 act is also an important step in our parliamentary history in that it allocated meeting rooms in Stockholm for the noble estate. Stockholm was thus designated the permanent venue for the Riksdag, and in 1641 construction began on the magnificent Riddarhus, which was thus also the first house of the Finnish Parliament. The nobility was always the estate with the most members. While the burghers and peasants generally had fewer than 200 members in the 17th and 18th centuries and the clergy around sixty, there were always hundreds of nobles, and as ennoblement took place at a very rapid pace, the number of families whose head had the right and duty to be present eventually reached the thousands.

The other estates did not acquire a house of their own in Stockholm during the time (until 1809) that Finland was part of the Swedish Kingdom; up to then each had separate temporary meeting rooms.

In the mid 17th century tension between Parliament, which represented regional decentralization and decentralization based on the estates, and the monarchy, which supported centralization, led in both England and France to civil war; in England, Parliament emerged the victor, in France the
monarchy. In Sweden royal absolutism advanced greatly during the last quarter of the 17th century, the most visible measure of centralization being the revocation of noble fiefs by
the crown. When, after the devastation of the Great Northern War, absolutism evolved towards more powerful estates through the constitutional acts of 1719 and 1720 and the constitution of 1723, the idea of national unity had been considerably strengthened, and it stressed the nature of a parliament in comparison with estates convened as a diet. Even so, the expression ‘the most honorable estates of the realm’ was still used in the 18th century. The estates were an institution, but not to the same degree as the diet, their joint assembly.

The diets of the ‘Age of Freedom’, particularly those from 1738–1739 onward, intervened in many ways in government, not just in the enactment of laws and taxes, but particularly with regard to official appointments. The omnipotence of the estates was elevated into a political doctrine, and the ‘hats’ and the ‘caps’ formed two distinct Riksdag parties, whose power fluctuated.

Estate parliamentarism also began at the Riksdag mentioned above, when six members of the Council of State were accused of acting against the instructions of the Secret Commission of the Estates issued in 1734. Five of the State Councillors were dismissed, and one was allowed to submit his resignation; ‘licensing’ of the Council of State was also practised later.

General dissatisfaction with the power of the parties and fear that the realm would be weakened in relation to foreign powers led to constitutional change in 1772; Gustavus III succeeded in forcing passage of a new constitution that shifted the centre of power to the king. The same year the great powers divided the territory of Poland, the other parliamentary state of the time. When caught between powerful neighbours, parliamentary power meant external weakness. Later, in 1789, Gustavus III further reduced the power of the Estates with a new constitution. The constitutions of 1772 and 1789 formed the basis for the Grand Duchy of Finland in 1809, although it was not until 1855 that Alexander II specifically referred to them as the constitution of the Grand Duchy. They were preserved as such in Finland until 1919, but only until 1809 in the new, smaller Sweden.

Like the Estates, the Council of State had long exhibited certain progressive features; it was in general composed of the most powerful men in the realm on the basis of family and
influence, originally from the families of local kings and tribal chieftains. The Council was comprised of a very uniform social stratum, the ‘Council nobility’, over the centuries, and had close family ties. When the Riddarhus was founded in 1626, the nobility was divided into three classes, the first two of which were small and exclusive, the class of counts and barons and that of knights; that is, the offspring of the Councillors; by virtue of this class division, these two dominated the much more numerous gentry in the Riksdag. By the 16th century the term ‘knights and nobles’ had already become established. The former meant the ‘peerage’, who were the descendants of the ancient leadership stratum. They were closely interrelated, and held significant property in land throughout the realm. At many times – during the reigns of Gustavus Vasa, Eric XIV, and then during the absolutism of Charles XI – the kings tried to strengthen their position with respect to the peerage by ruling
with the aid of non-nobles or recently ennobled officials. But the peerage always returned to power when the authority of the king declined, even in important respects during the 'Age of Freedom'.

The old basic demand of the Council of State still lives on in Finland: the ruler must make his decisions in council.

Especially in the 18th century, the Estates also repeatedly demanded the right to appoint Councillors or to take part in their appointments and, as mentioned, in the dismissal of the Council.

The Council was not actually an executive organ of state in the sense of Montesquieu's separation of powers. The executive body was the king, together with the five high officers of the realm: the lord high chancellor, marshal, chancellor, admiral and treasurer. These were also members of the Council. The number of Council members was set by the 1634 constitution at 25. Not all of them resided in Stockholm; for example, the president of the Turku appellate court (Hofgericht) was a Councillor. If the ruler was under-age or absent, the government of the realm was primarily the responsibility of the five high officers of the realm.

The Council of State can in a sense be considered a forerunner of later parliaments, but this interpretation is complicated by changes in the status of the Council, in particular with respect to the king on the one hand and to the estates on the other. This interpretation is also important in examining the situation in the Grand Duchy of Finland in 1808–1863.

Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers and other 18th century theory had a strong influence on ideas about the jurisdiction and the nature of the organs of state, while the social reality behind the estates and the efficiency and scope of the administration increased. A very significant change was the conversion of the French Estates into a National Assembly in 1789, and the evolution of the concept of nation during the French Revolution.

When the Estates of Finland convened in March 1809, after the occupation of Finland by Russia, they acted as an assembly of the estates in accordance with the old Swedish tradition, law and constitution. But the situation provided them with a
function that was reminiscent in a sense of a national assembly, jointly accepting the new ruler through the hyllning (homage) act. The function of the estates had not been to elect a new dynasty, because Finland had not chosen Alexander. Alexander had chosen Finland. Still, the Emperor convened a diet, that is a landtag, in Porvoo, not so much to resolve practical matters as to observe ceremonies connected with the opening and closing of diets. There is no doubt that the Emperor was concerned with the fundamental issue of government.

What was said and decided in Porvoo is not so important. What is important is that by convening the estates of Finland, the Emperor recognized their existence and considered them the representatives of the Finnish nation. Before them he declared himself Grand Duke of Finland and gave his pledge as sovereign. On the second day he presented questions of state concerning taxation, the privileges of the estates and economic matters relating to them, for the consideration of the Diet. The Emperor expressed his actions in terms of acknowledgement, although one could just as well, or even more appropriately, say that he created the Finnish diet and the Finnish nation, because they had not previously existed. The fact that the form of the Finnish State was to represent direct continuity with that of Sweden appeased the Finns and was in all ways fortunate. Moreover, arrangement of ‘popular representation’ for Finland did not come to signify a morally binding precedent in Russia with respect to the timely, but very difficult, question of establishing a Parliament there. This issue was unresolved for a century primarily because of the social conditions caused by the French invasion; these conditions favoured the military or noble estate. Moreover, Russia’s international situation did not permit fundamental changes in the internal order for a long time.

Establishment of the Diet of Estates in 1809 should already have been anachronistic, although its preservation was in contrast entirely natural, a bicameral legislature being the normal form in the 19th century. In 1809 in Russia — and in Sweden as well — things French were in vogue, which meant that there was recognition for the idea that in principle all people and citizens had some rights. In agrarian and peripheral
The Finnish unicameral Parliament convened under a statue representing the Finnish Lion (from the XVIth century coat of arms of the country) with the personification of the nation, the Maiden Finland, holding a shield with the word Lex. Russia also had a Parliament by 1906, and the fear of unification with Russia, here represented by the train of the approaching future, was overwhelming.
Finland, the old division into four estates remained in fact very functional. From Russia's point of view it included a feature that seemed very modern but was actually primitive: the idea that the peasants, too, were entitled to representation at the national level. Emancipation of the serfs was at that time one of Alexander I's important reform projects. It was also postponed by the external situation, and was not carried out until 1861, during the reign of Alexander I's nephew, Alexander II. Alexander I himself carried out these important reforms in Estonia and Livonia.

There was once more talk of convening the Finnish Estates in the 1810s. It was very nearly carried out in 1819, but the international situation once again prevented it. From that time up to the end of the Crimean War in 1856, Russia was primarily responsible for guaranteeing the system established by the Congress of Vienna. This meant that in Finland, too, society was developed from above, not on the basis of impulses and proposals from below. In the rudimentary political conditions of Finland, and in a situation in which the intellectual and material potential for the public debate essential for a parliament was very modest indeed, the fact that the estates were not convened was not cause for alarm. The Imperial Senate was in this respect, at least, a representative institution of a sort, or actually an upper house, whose composition was based on parity between nobles and non-nobles. Thus the Senate was not a purely executive body in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers.

At the end of the Crimean War there was lively public debate in both Russia and Finland, and demand arose for parliamentary institutions. Criticism of the obsolescent four-estate system also arose in Sweden, and led to the adoption of a bicameral legislature. This change took place in Sweden in 1866 and is comparable to that of Finland in 1906. It was accomplished without revolution or a national assembly, although it was under the pressure of external opinion. Thus there is an organic continuity of representation in Sweden and Finland, as in Britain, in contrast to other countries. This organic continuity was also obvious after the Swedish reform of 1866 and the Finnish reform of 1906, in that numerous members of the former legislature, especially persons of
political significance, were elected to the new Parliament. This, of course, does not happen when the change in the political system is profound or even when there is a desire to make it look as though it were.

There were no personal ties between the Finnish Estates convened in 1863 and the previous meeting in 1809, but the institution itself had remained, and was preserved all the more carefully. Revival of the old Estates and their recognition and continuation were politically feasible for the Emperor, while foundation of a new parliament would have been impossible, due to prevailing opinion in Russia. Because of the Polish rebellion, which was raging at the time, the Emperor had to appeal to the national conservative circles in Russia that supported the autocracy. With regard to Russian opinion, he would not have been able to establish a new, modern parliament in Finland. Although there was considerable pressure for a move of this kind in Russia, the rebellion in Poland made it impossible.

Thus Finland got its parliament in 1863 as a reward for relative loyalty and because it made a good impression in Western Europe, where pro-Polish sentiment ran high. This occurred after what were as such important phases, by virtue of which it could be said that modern political life, regulated or accompanied by the press and public opinion, began in Finland in 1861–1863.

The four-estate legislature not only proved justified in terms of foreign policy and great power relations and as an institution significantly emphasizing the internal continuity of Finland; it also proved a largely functional and appropriate system until general social change at the turn of the century revealed its outmoded features, again in a framework created by great power politics.

In the mid 19th century, in 1863, the members of the peasant estate still had rather limited opportunity for political participation, although the rapidly growing Finnish-language press and various voluntary forms of education organized later furthered political awareness.

The estate of burgesses was of rather limited significance for a long time because the towns were so small, although urbanization and industrialization gradually increased the
The Parliament House in Helsinki from 1931 in its neoclassical majesty is a monument to the sovereign Republic of Finland; nevertheless, the Constitution and Praxis do not regard the Parliament as being as central in the State structure as one might imagine from the building.

pressure of interests represented by the estate. The clerical estate was numerically small, but was important because it had close ties with the university and because in this estate 'fennomania', the rising political pro-Finnish ideology, obtained its most important sounding board with the regular accompaniment of the other rural estate, the peasants. The most numerous and important estate was the knights and nobles, whose composition was regulated by the Government (the Emperor) through frequent ennoblement. It was precisely those who had been elevated to the noble estate who played a very important role in the political leadership of the estate. The political weight of the relatively numerous members of the noble estate granted their rank during the Swedish period.
appears to have been minor; in contrast, the significance of nobility born between 1809 and 1863 may have been relatively great. The political debate most typical of the 19th century political tradition was waged in the noble estate. It included, for example, V. J. von Wright, leader of the Finnish non-socialist labour movement, and N. R. af Ursin, leader of the socialist labour movement.

In the late 19th century and early 20th century the Finnish Diet assumed a strongly conservative or defensive position in opposing Government policy. Defence of Finland's special status also led to the rejection of social reforms and to general resistance to any change. Issues of insurance for the working class and provision of land to the landless rural population were not resolved, although Russia tried to press for their implementation.

The Diet had spent the previous years in fruitless resistance to the Government prior to the period of upheaval caused by the Russo-Japanese War, which began in 1905. On the other hand, the upheaval brought out unsolved social problems seen as a result of the outmoded structure of the Diet. The division into four estates, which had been reasonable enough at the beginning of the 19th century, no longer conformed to the structure of society. In both town and countryside the groups lacking suffrage in either the bourgeois or the peasant estates had grown tremendously, both relatively and in absolute terms. There had been many disputes, particularly about expansion of the estate of burgesses.

It would have perhaps been natural if the nobility and the clergy had evolved into an upper house and the bourgeoisie and peasants into a lower house. But the solution adopted in 1906 was the most radical in Europe; the right to vote at once became universal and women obtained full suffrage for the first time anywhere as well as the right to stand in Parliamentary elections. Parliament became unicameral, which was also exceptional. It was unusual, too, that Finland could retain its own Parliament and strengthen it as Russia obtained its Duma, while the Finns, unlike the other minority nationalities in the Russian Empire, did not obtain a separate quota in the Duma.

The principle of geographical representation was also upheld by the system adopted in 1906, since all members of the uni-
cameral Parliament were to be chosen from regional electoral districts. In the previous system the districts in the peasant and bourgeois estates, the judicial districts and the towns, were considerably smaller than the new electoral districts, while the dioceses in the clerical estate were considerably larger. In the clerical estate the representatives of the University and in principle the noble estate were on the whole ‘national’. In fact, the representatives of the Helsinki election district have since then often been considered more generalist than the other Members of Parliament, since they do not actually work for issues of interest to their electoral district in the capital and its government offices as most of the other Members of Parliament do.

It is extremely important that the change brought about by the 1906 constitution made the sessions of the body annual; this was the origin of the tradition of a continuous Parliament. This in turn – with increasing effectiveness – virtually excluded all but professional politicians from standing for parliamentary elections.

From 1905 to 1909 the system in Finland was virtually parliamentary, the party leaders being in the Senate. Beginning in the latter year there was a period of crisis during which conflicts concerning the legislative jurisdiction of the Empire and the Grand Duchy led to the resignation of the parliamentary Senate and to a caretaker government (‘the admiral senate’). In contradiction to the one-hundred-year tradition, a number of Russian members were appointed to the Senate.

In 1909–1910 Parliament issued three declarations that caused the Emperor to dissolve the body immediately and to call for new elections in order to avoid loss of Russia’s prestige as a great power.

Conflicts of prestige between Parliament and ruler, and formation of the Senate from people who did not enjoy the confidence of Parliament had an impact on the latter’s status and prestige. Dissatisfaction concerning Parliament’s inability to act as an instrument of social change spread among the Left, although in the first elections, which were held in 1907, the Socialists obtained what was a significant position in Parliament, and exceptionally large by international standards. Similarly the large number of Socialists, a majority in the
A XVIth century picture representing the old method of election of the King of Sweden, which took place on the holy “stones of Mora” near Uppsala. The representatives of Finland were confirmed as legal participants in the election in 1362.

elections of summer 1916 (103–97), aroused fear and concern in bourgeois circles. The February Revolution of 1917 in Russia altered the situation entirely, and the Russian Provisional Government appointed a new coalition Senate composed of the leaders of the various groups in Parliament. There were six Socialist senators, one being the chairman of the Senate and six bourgeois representing four parties. In summer 1917, Parliament attempted to take over the power of the former ruler with respect to Finnish affairs; foreign policy and military affairs would be left to the Russian Provisional Government. But when the Parliamentary majority decided with the votes of the Socialists not to submit the decision to the Provisional Government in Petrograd, the Provisional Government dissolved Parliament. In the new elections held in October the Socialists lost their majority (winning 92 out of 200 seats). After the October Revolution the bourgeois section of Parliament began to separate Finland from Russia, first by transferring the
power of the former Emperor to a special regency committee, but then decided to exercise supreme power itself and appointed a new Senate in November. This Senate then proposed — at the suggestion of Germany — that Parliament declare Finland’s independence. This was approved by Parliament on December 6, 1917. The Russian Soviet Government recognized Finnish independence on January 4, 1918, after which France, Sweden and Germany immediately followed suit. Recognition from Greece, Denmark, Norway and Austria-Hungary came soon, whereas Britain and the United States only recognized Finnish sovereignty in the summer of 1919.

From January to May 1918 there was civil war in Finland. It was in part the struggle of the bourgeoisie to drive Russian troops out of the country, in part a war between the Socialists who had made the revolution and taken over southern Finland and the troops of the Senate, as well as an attempt by Germany to secure its interests against Russia. German troops landed in April 1918 and defeated the Red government in Helsinki. The Russians fought on the side of the Reds, and Red Finland and Soviet Russia signed a treaty. The war ended in May 1918, and the ties with Germany made at the time were annulled when Germany collapsed in autumn 1918. Peace with Soviet Russia was signed in 1920 on the basis of the old frontiers between the Empire and the Grand Duchy. (Finland also obtained an extensive corridor to the Arctic Ocean in the Petsamo area, which was lost in 1944.)

In May 1918 certain leaders of the bourgeois parties proposed the formation of a Parliament in which a proportion of the representatives would not be chosen by public election. These delegates would represent industry and the intelligentsia. It was also proposed that Finland become a monarchy, which would have meant a considerable concentration of power in the government as opposed to Parliament. At the same time Parliament called on Svinhufvud, President of the Senate, to exercise supreme power. Changes in the Parliament were not considered more extensively, although under the 1772 constitution the 1918 Parliament (with a small majority and while the Socialists were still in no position to exert an influence in consequence of the Civil War) elected Prince Friedrich Karl of
Hesse, brother-in-law of the Kaiser, as King of Finland. Because of Germany's collapse, however, he did not ascend the throne, and Svinhufvud, leader of the pro-German faction, was forced to resign. Mannerheim, a cavalry general and commander of the White forces in the Civil War, was called upon as regent to exercise the former power of the Emperor-Grand Duke (riksföreståndare, Reichsverweser). Thus Parliament attempted to exercise supreme authority in summer 1917 and did so in autumn 1917, when it chose the Senate, and again in May 1918, when Svinhufvud appointed the (Paasikivi) Senate.

The constitutional debate that began in May 1918 ended on July 17, 1919, with the signing of the existing constitution by Mannerheim as regent. It is a compromise between the monarchical and republican positions that conforms to the practice of separation of powers, and provides the President of the Republic with substantial power in both legislation and in administration and official appointments. The President is chosen by a special college of 301 (previously 300) electors. Understandably, a large number of electors are Members of Parliament, although the difference in principle between the electoral college and Parliament is considerable, despite the fact that both are representative institutions, and the right to vote and stand for election is identical in both.

At the time of promulgation of the constitution, there was already a new Parliament, elected in 1919 according to the constitution of 1906. The Socialists, with 80 members, were again the largest party. The position of Parliament long remained that of 1907–1909, except that the right to express its lack of confidence in the Council of State was written into the constitution. However, parliamentarianism in the classical sense did not become the typical form of government in Finland. Since the 1920s, except on a few occasions (1936, 1953, 1957, 1958), governments in Finland have not resigned because of a vote of no-confidence. On one occasion an individual member of the Council of State was the subject of a vote of no-confidence. Finnish Governments have almost always been coalitions, and they have resigned because of internal differences of opinion, and in connection with a parliamentary or presidential election. Governments have also resigned when Parliament has been dissolved by the President of the Republic (1971, 1975).
Broad coalitions (which have ruled in various countries, particularly during war time) have made the parliamentary opposition in Finland both weak and divided on many occasions. From the mid 1960s to the 1990s and earlier, Governments have comprised Social Democrats, with about one quarter of the seats in Parliament, together with one or two small parties and one or other of the two major bourgeois parties – the Conservatives or the Centre Party (agrarian). The other bourgeois party and (in general) the Communists have formed a loose opposition. Under the coalition principle, Parliament does not have a distinct, influential Opposition, and in Finnish politics Parliament and Government do not differ as much as they do in many other countries. There are also party groupings with in the Government, and regional representation and other factors not entirely derived from the idea of executive power are taken into account in forming the Government.

The principle of political representation has also been followed in Finland with respect to the civil service – most obviously in the 1970s, but at other times as well. Members of coalition governments have demanded and succeeded in having their own supporters appointed to civil service positions, particularly in the central administration. This has, of course, reduced the importance of Parliament as a representative of the people and the parties. An interesting political phenomenon in Finland that contradicts the classical doctrine of separation of powers is the institution of parliamentary committees, which means that the parties take part in the process of drafting legislation. In issues of far-reaching import this is an attempt to achieve even greater parliamentary dominance over a Government enjoying the confidence of Parliament. The aim is to commit those party groups not represented in a majority government to the process of drafting legislation.

This principle also explains why Parliament exercises direct administrative authority in the Finnish Broadcasting Company and the Social Insurance Institution. The position of the Bank of Finland, directly subordinate first to the Estates and then to Parliament, can be explained according to the principle that the supervision of the basic economic rights of the people, primarily with regard to taxation, by the central bank during the
frequently long intervals between sessions was delegated to members of the Estates.

Continuity is a salient feature in the history of popular representation in Finland. The 1809 assembly of the Estates represented continuity with the period of Swedish rule. The Diet of 1863 and subsequent Diets represented continuity with the 17th and 18th centuries with respect to form. Numerous representatives of the 1907 Parliament and succeeding Parliaments were former members of the Estates; there were many University professors who had been active in the first and second estates. Neither the form of Parliament nor the election system was altered in the great changes that took place in 1917–1919.

Since 1931, the idea of Parliament has been closely connected with an imposing building. It has symbolized the powers of the Finnish State much more than the authority actually exercised by Parliament.
Helsinki and St. Petersburg — the cities of a historical route

Helsinki is an older city than St. Petersburg, though the basic idea of St. Petersburg which also explains the essence of the foundation of the city of Helsinki dates back to an earlier time. St. Petersburg is situated on the estuary of the River Neva, a historical commercial and military centre where the sea and Russia embrace each other. The traditional meeting places included Novgorod, Narva, Wiborg and Tallinn which came to see Helsinki, founded in 1550, as their rival.

Over the centuries Denmark and particularly Sweden had wanted to gain control of the shores of the Gulf of Finland. After the war operations towards the close of the 16th century, peace was finally concluded at Stolbovo in 1617, and thus Sweden excluded Russia from all contacts with the Baltic Sea.

The reaction started under the reign of Peter the Great. He first lost the battle of Narva in 1700 against Charles XII (of Sweden), but won at Pultava in 1709 and at sea off Hanko in 1714. In 1703 he has built St. Peter’s (St. Peter’s and St. Paul’s) fortress which in 1712 he declared the capital of all Russia. Under the Treaty of Uusikaupunki (Nystad), Peter the Great’s possession of his new acquisitions was recognized: all of the southern shores of the Gulf of Finland, including the Saa-renmaa shore, and the northern shore passing Wiborg towards Hamina (as today). The Sveaborg fortress outside Helsinki was then built to stop this expansion, but as a result of the war of 1808–1809, the entire northern shore of the Gulf of Finland, including the Åland Islands, Helsinki and the Sveaborg fortress, were incorporated into Russia.
The modernisation process of the Northern countries demanded new types of traffic connections to the Continent and Britain as main transportation routes for timber, butter and other products. For Finland one of the problems was the winter ice in the Baltic Sea. The southernmost peninsula, Hangö/Hanko, was made an important export centre and was served by the country’s new railway system. This system also guaranteed an all-year-round contact with St. Petersburg, its great market, and its connections further on to Moscow, Warsaw and Berlin.

In 1812, a hundred years since St. Petersbourg became the capital of Russia, Helsinki was declared the capital of the new Grand Duchy of Finland. Its city centre was to be built as a “miniature St. Petersbourg” embodying the ideas of the German-Greek Empire style. The reborn Helsinki with its Senate building, university, three majestic barracks and the imposing Nicholas’ Church, featured both its Imperial-Russian and Classical-European facets – just like St. Petersbourg.
As a symbol of modern times, the train makes its way through the dark winter wilderness.

During the Crimean War, Helsinki and Wiborg suffered bombings by the British–French navy, which of course had St. Petersburg as its final aim.

The important phase of modernization following the Crimean War saw the beginning of railway building in Finland also.

The railway administration was to centralize the entire country to an economic-administrative organization in Helsinki and link it with St. Petersburg. In fact, the first railway ran from Helsinki to Riihimäki and Hämeenlinna, and the next stage extended from Riihimäki to St. Petersburg. The track gauge adopted was naturally that of Russia, and besides the economic purposes, the railway line was naturally also of military interest.

At the same time another railway line was built south of the Gulf of Finland, St. Petersburg now having a rapid military-economic connection with the West and a close approach to the ice-free ports. Later on, the secondary lines to Hanko and Turku
were completed, both aiming primarily at St. Petersburg (via Toijala and Hyvinkää) and not Helsinki.

Towards the latter half of the 19th century, Helsinki grew substantially as a result of its railway and the centralization policy. Finns frequently travelled to St. Petersburg, from where various products, often originating from Central Europe, e.g. wines, found their way to Finland. Even prior to the railway, a special chapter of history had been elaborated by numerous artists, musicians, theatre companies, circus artists, photographers and confectioners, many of them originated from far-away countries, whose colourful lives have been described in numerous interesting studies. They travelled between Stockholm and St. Petersburg and also gave performances in Finland, e.g. in Turku, Wiborg and particularly in Helsinki. Actually the expansion of the cultural life and these forms of entertainment and their effect on the life and the habits of the growing bourgeoisie united the Helsinki of the past century and the beginning of our century with the corresponding social classes of St. Petersburg and Stockholm.

The polyglot St. Petersburg greatly influenced Finland. Finnish civil servants and officers soon spoke fluent French and were thus able to manage in the offices, the elite units and the court of St. Petersburg. The Emperor generally spoke French – sometimes German – with the Finns. St. Petersburg with its strong social impact introduced certain aspects of social life to the population of Helsinki, e.g. sailing, operettas, piano playing, mahogany furniture, summer-house life, an admiration for French novels, etc. Several major sources of inspiration in Finnish art also have their roots in this rich world of stimuli, St. Petersburg being one of the most important European centres of music, drama, ballet, painting and sculpture. At the beginning of the century, both classical music and painting in St. Petersburg with the revolutionary ideas of modernism strongly influenced the arts, the ideologies in Finland, and very obviously the well-known modernism in Swedish-language literature in Finland.

The Revolution in Russia led to profound tumult in society and to the separation of Finland from Russia; since 1918 the border
Finland as a political entity and a nation is a result of the dynamics of the Gulf of Finland as a commercial and military route over more than a thousand years. This map shows the Gulf and its coasts as an region of influence between St. Petersburg and Stockholm.
between Russia and Finland has been under strict control, not allowing any adventitious crossings. The extensive trade between Finland and the Soviet Union has been extremely important from the 1940s up to the 1980s, and Finnish tourism to St. Petersburg has been a part of it, though its cultural benefits have proved very modest. In the 80s and specially after the
crisis in 1990–91, the crucial importance of St. Petersburg – the new city as built on the old one – has again been clearly underscored.

The more St. Petersburg has connections with Central Europe and the other continents, the more important this city seems to be in the eyes of the Finns, and the better Helsinki is capable of acting as a link on this traditional route.
Finland and Europe before 1809

Finland, or that part of Finland which was inhabited a thousand years ago, has strong connections to south and west; artefacts found, words in the language and concepts as well as folklore, all testify to such relations. The Baltic Sea formed, as it has always done, a central field of communications which put its shores in contact with each other. The tribes of the interior were, compared with the inhabitants of the coastal strips, in the more peripheral role of producers, but their furs, too, were bought for trade with the more developed cultures of the south or the west. It was undoubtedly not always a question of trade: the mode of communication was sometimes violence and subjugation; but that, too, promoted the spread of words, thoughts, customs and technical innovations.

In Finland, as elsewhere, there was an upper class whose valuable artefacts, weapons and treasures have been left for posterity to discover. How this ruling class related to the ordinary people in linguistic, tribal or power structures has remained unclear, but the Finnish nation today is descended from all the people who have arrived here, at different times and for different reasons and with different ways of making a living. For the forebears of today’s Finns everything had its own meaning.

The preservation of the Finnish language – or, before the development of a general language, the different dialects – so characteristic in its peculiarity of the Finns, appears to demonstrate to posterity that the Finns are descended from an ancient world of forest dwellers sandwiched between the
Germans and the Slavs. But when this is compared with genetic studies of the Finns’ blood groups, there appears to be a discrepancy, for the Finnish genetic inheritance looks Nordic-Germanic in the extreme. An important key to this apparent contradiction is given by a closer analysis of the Finnish language: there, just as in Finnish folklore and culture, the German influence is seen particularly strongly, even if in the case of language it can be detected only by specialists. Very many words that have come down to the contemporary language appear in Finnish in an older form than in contemporary German or Swedish, because the pronunciation of these languages has developed more quickly than that of Finnish.

The semantic content of Finnish, in particular, binds it to the Germanic area: from social terms to weapons, both words and their meanings are common, and when, first in connection with the translation of the Bible and legal documents in the 16th and 17th centuries and then when a cultural language was being created in the 19th century, new words were invented, they were built semantically on the Swedish model, even if they were not always Swedish in form. Finnish as a cultural language was invented by people whose educational and cultural language (together with Latin and German) was Swedish.

The conversion of Finland and Sweden to Christianity happened slowly. The attempts of Charlemagne failed, and they were followed by a long semi-Christian period. This phase in Finnish history was also influenced by connections with Byzantium and the eastern Church that came about as the result of eastern Viking raids until, after 1000, the schism between the eastern and western Churches began to affect the Nordic countries.

The western front against the Slavs and Finns as well as the northern Scandinavians advanced, sometimes with great difficulty, in the 11th and 12th centuries. It was not until the 14th century that the last non-Christian tribe on the shores of the Baltic, the Lithuanians, was vanquished. In the mid 12th century the new, English-based wave of Christianisation had confirmed the old Svean centre of Uppsala as such a strong Christian centre that the then emerging kingdom of Central
An academic disputation in the XVth century: the heads, eyes and mouths of the actors are full of arguments. A picture from Uppsala.
Sweden could set its sights on integrating western Finland more thoroughly into its old sphere of influence through the legendary ‘crusade’ of king Eric the Holy and the English-born bishop, Saint Henry, in the 1150s. Nevertheless, Finland, in the shape of the diocese of Turku, joined the Roman Catholic Church permanently in the 1220s, after the Danish crusade to Estonia had shut off southern Finland’s ancient connections to the south along the eastern shores of the Baltic.

Parisian influences

A permanent ecclesiastical structure strengthened Finland’s ancient semi-Christianity into a systematic cult, a culture, with education and tax. Its essential characteristic was a close relationship with the other parts of the Church, conducted by letter, particularly with its centres. These were, of course, the administrative centre of the Church, Rome (and later Avignon) and the theological centre, Paris.

Turku, the centre of the Finnish diocese, gradually became an important general distribution centre of (western) European culture. Between the 13th century and the Reformation dozens of churches were built in the diocese, most of them of granite, and decorated with wall paintings, wood carvings, tapestries and so on. At the beginning, though, it was more a question of faith itself and of religious instruction.

At the very same time as the diocese of Finland was set on an established footing, Pope Honorius III in 1219 commanded the archbishop of Uppsala and all the bishops of Sweden to fasten their attention on theological study and to send students from their bishoprics to Paris. Consequently it was decided that anyone who had studied diligently in Paris for five years would, when he returned home, receive a prebendary, or cathedral clerical post that carried a regular stipend. In practice, these magisters were put in charge of the religious education of priests, and with time they became canons, members of the cathedral chapter, and bishops.

In the history of the kingdom of Sweden the 13th century was
a time of significant expansion eastwards as Sweden, like Germany and the Teutonic Order, exploited the plight of Russia as the Mongol hordes attacked its other flank. During this century Sweden’s jurisdiction spread into the interior of Finland, the hinterlands of the Gulf of Bothnia and Karelia – in 1293 Wiborg became an important fortification, and the first real and ‘eternal’ peace treaty in 1323 divided the Karelian isthmus and central Karelia between Sweden and Finland, thus defining the limit of Swedish eastward expansion for centuries to come. At the same time the modern concept of Finland was born. It came to mean recognition by the Roman Catholic Church and membership of the Kingdom of Sweden. The need for correct theological knowledge in the Turku diocese was therefore acute, both from the point of view of converting the inhabitants and from that of the confessional needs of this frontier diocese. The conversion of the Finns to Christianity appears to have been carried out both peacably, through teaching on the west coast, and forcibly in Häme.

As early as the end of the 13th century the Dominican order began to teach in Finland, soon to be followed by the Franciscans. Turku and Viipuri were the centres of these orders, and it was in these important trading towns that the first Finnish schools were set up – convent schools and in Turku a cathedral school. Among the few Finnish medieval documents that have survived is a letter from the Roman Curia of 1412 which speaks of the pupils’ alms and the need for assistance and other things, and in which the educational institutions of the diocese appear to be thoroughly established.

The main threads in the cultural history of medieval Finland are ecclesiastical scholarship, closely tied in with the theological tradition of the university of Paris, and the urban tradition of lower Germany, whose influence, through both immigration and the visual environment, was to become important: buildings, art objects, food and drink were to a great extent the same on all the shores of the Baltic. The situation in the countryside was different, since the feudal system operated in Balticum and Germany, while the Swedish land-owning structure was largely based on the peasantry.
An academic oration against drinking from 1660. The university of Finland was founded with the aim of civilising the people of the Kingdom of Sweden, regarded as rough and barbarian in contrast to the Continent. Gustavus Adolphus, Oxenstierna and Christina were convinced propagators of renaissance humanism and European higher manners.
Foreign students

There are records of Finnish students in continental universities from 1313 onwards: a catalogue of that year lists students at the university of Paris, showing fifteen students from the kingdom of Sweden, two of them members of the Turku cathedral chapter. The real figure is estimated to have been significantly higher than that indicated by this document. Between 1313 and the beginning of the Reformation in 1519, it is known that the Turku diocese sent 140 men both young and old, to higher studies, but this is a minimum. Paris was dominant in the 14th century; subsequently Prague, Leipzig and Erfurt were all important for short periods. Paris became important for Finns again in the 15th century, until at the end of the century the new universities on the southern shores of the Baltic, Greifswald and particularly Rostock, became dominant. At this time it was a question of more than the clergy and education for high ecclesiastical office. Despite the generally German cultural direction of the late medieval period, the Turku bishopric up to the end of the Catholic period was generally held by Paris graduates.

Thus it is that in Finland it has for centuries been remembered with joy and pride that two Finns – curators of the English faction – were rectors of the university of Paris. Their terms of office did not, it is true, take place in very illustrious circumstances, but symbolically this fact has had an undeniable importance in demonstrating Finland’s ancient connection with the heartland of European culture.

Finland was, in the medieval period and the 16th century, one of the dioceses of the kingdom of Sweden, large in area, but fairly small in population; its unusual feature was its frontier position regarding Novgorod Russia and Danish–German Estonia. The majority of the population spoke Finnish dialects, but some spoke Swedish. During the Catholic period the ecclesiastical culture had already partially adopted the Finnish language, but the languages of the high culture were the Swedish of the aristocracy, the German often spoken by the burghers and the Latin of the clergy, although all these groups had, as far as we can tell, some command of the demotic.

The high standard of theological study in the Turku
bishopric brought about the birth of the first libraries in Finland. The cathedral was allowed to inherit the books of the bishop, *preciosos libros Theologiae et Juris canonici multos or plurimos Theologiae et Juris libros and usum Ecclesiae*. The library catalogue of the blessed Bishop Hemming, who died in 1367, has survived: ‘... *item in uno volumine quatuor libros Damasceni, Ysidori de summo bono, Jeronymi super Marcum undecim libros, Anshelmi Pastoralem, Gregorii et Ambrosii de officiis; item in uno volumine librum de consideratione Bernhardi, et Epistolae suas diversas, cum omelia sua supra missa: item librum de proprietatibus rerum ... item manipulum florurn.*’ The library could have belonged to any prominent bishop in western Christendom.

**German relations**

In the mid to late 15th century the mainstream of culture was seen in Nordic religious art in all its manifestations and in other matters celebrating the beauty of life and religion. At the same time the scholarly life flowered, and the new universities of northern Germany, Copenhagen and Uppsala (1477) demonstrated the broadening and deepening of literary civilisation. Others besides future priests were already benefiting from it.

During the time of the Nordic State Union Copenhagen, too, was in a way an almost domestic university for Finns, and the same was true of Uppsala. The first book was printed in Stockholm as early as 1483. All the same, it looks as though the universities of northern Germany, supported by the strong bourgeois culture, dominated the spiritual life of Finland and many other Swedish dioceses at the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th. This is also demonstrated by Lübeck’s position as printer of works commissioned by the Turku diocese. It was from there, too, that the Lutheran Reformation reached Turku as early as the 1520s.

The significance of the Reformation in the development of Finnish culture was twofold. It was linked with the replacement by the centralised principality of Sweden of the decentralised Sweden-(Finland) that had been a part of the
The fight against bad manners, drinking, swearing, lack of self-control and sexual promiscuity was central to all European states as a means to a well-organised state and controlled society. It was the first real trial in creating a “welfare state”, through state control and mercantilism. This centralisation and rationalisation naturally produced opposition as well.

Nordic Union. The removal of power from the church to the monarch was part of state centralisation, and this was seen particularly clearly in the economic sphere. Church property was transferred directly to the state, and state taxes and centralised bailiwicks took the place of the ecclesiastical and highly independent castle provinces. The capacity of the church to maintain a high standard of artistic and scholarly culture disappeared; no more granite churches were built in Finland, and the university of Uppsala was disbanded. At the same time links with Catholic Europe were broken.

On the other hand, the 16th century also meant the establishment of a continuous and permanent printing industry in the kingdom of Sweden, with its centre in Stockholm – the
centre of the state, not of the church. In the 16th century it was no longer conceivable that Turku diocese’s books should be printed in Lübeck or Rostock, but it was not yet possible to begin printing in Turku. The printing of Finnish-language literature, on the other hand, had from time to time an important impact on the book trade in Stockholm in the 16th century. This is connected with Bishop Mikael Agricola and the prolific activities of his ‘workshop’ in the 1540s and 1550s.

Turku’s first printing works opened its doors in 1642, the year that the first Finnish Bible finally appeared — printed in Stockholm. The Bible translation and its printing were closely connected with the fact that in 1640 the cathedral school in Turku, which had in 1630 been expanded into a learned gymnasium, was converted to a smallish university. (This university moved to the new capital of Helsinki in 1828 and its name is now the University of Helsinki.) Although the university did not differ greatly from the gymnasium, one of its European characteristics was the printing of doctoral theses and orations rather than their copying by hand. This meant that the work of the institute became generally accessible — and, in principle, accessible to the entire civilised world, although in practice the publications of Turku university were sent mainly to the other educational institutes of the kingdom of Sweden, and only a few reached Germany, for example.

The foundation of the university of Turku was closely linked with the raising of the high culture of the entire kingdom during the time of Gustav II Adolf and Christina. The university of Uppsala was refounded as a Lutheran institution in 1595, but it was not until the 1620s that it was able to function at a high level. In 1632 a new university was founded in Tartu in Estonia. The universities of Uppsala and Tartu in particular had very close connections with Germany; Turku was made more clearly Finland-Swedish. All the same, it clearly took part in the task of Europeanisation of its own diocese and of the kingdom as a whole. In place of the unified ecclesiastical culture of the medieval period there came, after a pause and mutatis mutandis, the unified academic culture of the 17th century.

But its aims were no longer the whole of Europe, for denominational borders limited the continent as seen from Finland to the Lutheran parts. In the middle of the following
Queen Christina in 1642, on the frontispiece of the Bible in Finnish. The New Testament and large parts of the old had already been translated into Finnish a century earlier. Christina is here surrounded by the provincial coats of arms of the realm of Sweden. On the right side of the main coat of arms is, first, that of the heraldic Grand Duchy of Finland and then the three for the actual provinces in Finland. Other Finnish provinces are found in the column at right. Christina, born in 1626, began her reign in 1644.
century the work of Montesquieu, Rousseau and Voltaire rapidly became known in the Finnish university, often via Stockholm. Outside the university and the clergy there had in the 17th century been a certain number of educated and literate aristocracy; now, in the second half of the 18th century, more and more of the petit bourgeois homes along the Finnish coasts began to boast libraries. The manors of eastern Finland and Viipuri, with its relations to the rest of the world, had their own special characteristics, but instead of Latin, everyone was reading French.

The Encyclopédie had taken the place of the medieval Sorbonne, but the orientation was the same. On the other hand, it was followed by a German influence, the new universities of the medieval period, Lübeck’s printing works and the Wittenberg reformation and, at the end of the 18th century, the new humanism and Kant. In 1808 and 1809 Finland’s centuries-long union with Sweden was broken, and cultural life in Finland received a new frame of reference.
The University of Helsinki

Under Swedish rule

The first period in the University’s history extends from its foundation in 1640, when Sweden enjoyed the status of a great power, to 1808–09, when during the Napoleonic Wars the Swedish realm was split into two, the present-day Sweden and Finland. This split was effected against the will of the nations concerned, as a result of power-political conflicts. The Academy founded in 1640 in Turku counted as one of the Swedish universities, which were all located outside the capital of Stockholm. In Sweden proper there was one university in Uppsala, in the province of Svealand. Another university, for Estonia and the recently annexed Livonia, was founded in 1632 in Tartu-Dorpat. During the Thirty Years’ War the Pomeranian city of Greifswald with its university came under Swedish rule, and Pomerania remained part of Sweden until the Napoleonic upheavals. A university to serve the province of Götaland and the provinces gained from Denmark was founded in Lund in the late 17th century.

The Royal Academy of Turku, or the University of Christina or of Aura, as it was also called, remained a small institution all through the 17th and 18th centuries. Yet it took over the European university tradition with determination, primarily following the German pattern. During the Swedish rule, its graduates published over 3 000 shortish Master’s theses usually written in Latin; it arranged public lectures in Latin and held solemn graduation ceremonies. The students coming from all over Finland and Sweden split up according to their home
ORATIO
DE
MERITIS
GUSTAVIANÆ
FAMILIÆ
IN PATRIAM,
Quam,
AUGUSTAM NATIVITATEM
SERENISSIMI DOMINI
GUSTAVI,
REGNI SVECLÆ
D.G. PRINCIPIS HÆREDITARIÆ
LONGE EXOPTATISSIMI,
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In Regia Academia Aboensi die III. Maii
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HENRICUS HASSEL

ABOÆ,

One of the orations in the Royal University of Finland was given in honour of the reigning house as a Gustavian house, i.e., originating from Gustavus Wasa in the XVth century. The new crown prince, born in 1746, was baptised Gustavus, and was to become the third after the famous Gustavus I and Gustavus Adolphus.
provinces into several ‘nations’ or fraternities, and these became a supporting framework of both studies and social life. Most of the graduates entered the clergy or the civil service, although some of the students with a gentry or burgher background did not really aim at academic degrees but merely wanted to enjoy an education based on European learning, to read some philosophy, some history and some foreign languages.

The Academy started a printing press and a library; it employed professors, some of whom were prolific in turning out publications of varying length to prove their learning in various fields. All these were published by the students as theses or dissertations and publicly defended in Latin. Academic publishing brought Finland into contact with the higher learning of the European continent; later, as civil servants and priests, the students would hand on the truths they had learned and the beliefs they had adopted.

The Russian era

When Finland had become a Grand Duchy of Russia in 1809, the University was immediately given a new central role. The lenient conqueror, Emperor Alexander I, did not wish to integrate Finland into Russia, but allowed the country to have an administrative and political system of her own. This created the need for a Finnish civil service and for a national and political consciousness. The task of raising the national spirit was assigned to the University, the resources of which were nearly doubled. The main building, which had been under construction during the Swedish era, was completed in Turku. When the University, with the civil service, was moved in 1828 to Helsinki, which was growing into the new administration centre, the new buildings erected for the University were really quite impressive, considering the circumstances and the national resources.

The main building was located on Senate Square, opposite the building which housed the Finnish government; both were
directly subordinate to the Emperor, the University through its Chancellor. It was a special favour that the Chancellor's post was held by the heir to the Russian throne nearly all through the 19th century. In 1828 the University was given the right to bear the name of the Imperial Alexander University of Finland after its great benefactor. Although the University was closely connected to the domestic government, it still enjoyed an equal and independent standing, which showed the importance attached to its educational and national duties.

In the course of the 19th century, Finland developed a modern administration, for which the University educated all civil servants, clergy, teachers, physicians and some other professional groups. University studies became a necessary qualification for the civil service, which meant that the University had a monopoly of the professional and intellectual education of civil servants. In professional academic terms it carried out its duties well on the whole, and on the cultural and intellectual level it did so with great enthusiasm. The University became a national centre of intellectual life, and, to a large extent, also of political life. No major action was initiated and no significant results were achieved without some contribution from University teachers and students.

It is probably true that no one university in any country has been more important to society or has played a more significant role in building up national unity than the University of Finland. Throughout the period of autonomy, the University was in many ways the nation's heart and its students were the nation's hope, spes patriae, as the oft-quoted inscription on the façade of the Old Student House goes. The Old Student House is a monument to the remarkable influence of students' social and political activities, at times unanimous and at times split by party-political conflicts and differences of opinion. Debating important issues helped students to grow into citizens, and at social events and merry-making many a life-long friendship was formed.

The New Student House built by the Student Union by the side of the old one was completed in 1910, and the Uusimaa and Ostrobothnia Student nations erected impressive buildings of their own. The first Swedish and Finnish student newspapers were established at about the same time. The
The actual main building of the University of Helsinki dates from 1832, built immediately after the transfer of the university from Turku to the new capital, Helsinki. The architect was C. L. Engel, but the Emperor Nicholas I personally took part in the planning of the facade, and also gave the university the name of his brother and predecessor Alexander I, creator of Finland as a state in 1809 and great benefactor of the university.

Teaching provided by the University was reaching higher scientific standards and becoming more specialized, which was emphasized by new scientific institutions and laboratories. Among the first were a beautiful library and an observatory; then followed the departments of chemistry, botany, physics, physiology, and others, and the University hospitals. Throughout the Russian era the University was very much in favour with the Emperor and the government. The number of its professors grew tenfold, and it was provided with many other teaching posts and enjoyed remarkable financial advantages.
Independence

The University took an active part in the country's political life during and after the First World War, but its own status deteriorated, relatively speaking. Among the other independent government offices it did not enjoy the same national symbolical value in the new republic as before, nor was it any longer the only university in the country. Two new, albeit small, private universities were founded in Turku and others elsewhere in the country. Alexander University became simply the University of Helsinki, and the Student Union of Finland became the Student Union of the University of Helsinki.

The deterioration of the University's status was due first of all to diminishing financial resources and substantial reductions in the teachers' salaries. Consequently, travelling abroad and buying new equipment became more difficult. The decline was accentuated in the 1920s and 30s by the language conflict between Finnish and Swedish speakers, both parties accusing the University, its teachers and its students of taking the wrong side. This conflict was finally settled in 1937 by an amendment to the University Act maintaining its bilingualism; otherwise the University's position in relation to the state had been defined by the statutes of 1923. The University again began to receive new posts and new buildings. The most important projects were the extension of the main building, the Forestry building on Unioninkatu, and the new hospitals. During the Winter War, the University's indispensable influence on Finland's cultural life and legal system was again generally recognized. On its tricentenary the University was granted a unique honour, the Cross of Liberty awarded by Field Marshal Mannerheim, which was later embedded in the design of the University seal.

Student numbers had begun to grow rapidly before the World War, and after it reached a total of 10,000. The growth rate rose again in the late 1950s, and the steeply rising trend continued all through the 1960s. Department buildings, lecture rooms, libraries and Student nations became crowded, and the teachers were overloaded with work. By and large it became difficult to maintain the old teaching systems and other academic traditions, even though some new premises were
An oratio from the inauguration of the Christina University of Finland in 1640 in Turku, founded in the name of the then young Queen of the realm.
obtained, such as the Porthania building, which was completed in 1956. Quite a number of new senior and junior teaching and research posts were established in the 1960s, and the professorial salaries were raised somewhat. But there were also some movements that began to weaken the University's position. For example, there was a strong trend towards the regional development of higher education, by way of founding new universities. This meant that the development of the University of Helsinki was put aside for quite some time. Another new development was that political confrontations at times had quite a strong effect on academic life. In terms of student culture, the 1960s had been varied and active, culminating in the occupation of the Old Student House in 1968 in connection with the centenary celebrations of the Student Union. The ideological and political upheavals of the 1970s resulted in political tension which caused a great deal of mutual distrust and recrimination between teachers and students. However, towards the end of the decade the atmosphere changed again: traditional conferral ceremonies and annual opening ceremonies regained esteem, the weakened and inactive Student nations were revived, and the disastrous fire at the Old Student House in 1978 gathered together many generations with their memories of student life. At about the same time the government's attitude towards the University began to become more favourable, and in the 1980s the government showed this both symbolically and financially. The founding of new universities came to an end, and the ones existing in different parts of the country established their relative positions. However, the University of Helsinki still has to apply strict limitations to student admission, a policy which is much criticized; the number of young people applying for entry is much higher than the number of places that the University, for various reasons, can offer.

The national standing of the University of Helsinki as the country's principal, largest and oldest university is generally recognized. Even in relative terms, it maintains more international relations, produces more research and awards more degrees than others. The University's role in Finnish education, in integrating the Finnish nation into European culture, is more and more clearly appreciated. The University's
The Finnish explorer and later professor of Economics at Turku University Petrus Kalm made a well-known voyage in the colonies of North America and later published a large report of his travels, first in Dutch.
work of research and teaching, the contribution of its academic community to society at large, and the positive critical attitudes of the young people who study here are all of great importance not only for Finland but, in a sense, to all mankind.
The frontier

At the end of the last century Frederick Jackson Turner presented his theory of American history. According to Turner, American history must be understood in terms of the frontier, the idea that unsettled or nearly unsettled land was always available in the West. Taking possession of this land became the foundation of American life. Turner described America as a product of this frontier; as the pioneers settled the land and began to farm it, the virgin prairies and forests changed them, creating American culture in the process.

Studies of the details of settlement and the influence of the frontier have not borne out Turner's thesis. Turner's belief that American democracy was rooted in life in the forest has been criticized and stress placed instead on the importance of British parliamentarianism in this ideological tradition. Turner has also been taken to task for overemphasizing the effect of the Western frontier on culture as a whole; after all, influences continually arrived from the east, from Europe, and from the Atlantic coast. But this criticism has not entirely undermined the Turner thesis. Its importance for posing new questions is recognized. And, as is often the case, a bold, general theory begins to live a life of its own; despite their validity, studies which have corrected the thesis have not won a wide following. Likewise, the concept of a nation of pioneers, pushing westward, is deeply rooted in both American and European thinking.

However, the spread of European culture was not limited to the North American continent. There were areas in Europe that were not part of the "heartland of European culture", the Mediterranean. The expansion of the cultural tradition of
ancient Greece, Rome and the Orient from the Mediterranean to the north was also colonization. Admittedly, the pace was slower and the new areas more settled than in North America, but as far as integration is concerned, this earlier process is reminiscent of that which brought America into the same cultural fold. The Scandinavian countries, and probably Finland, too, are peripheral to Europe in this sense. To what extent is their history comparable to that of the United States?

The importance of emancipation

Emancipation and liberation played a central role in United States history. Immigrants from Europe broke free from the ethnic and social milieu of the old country. In fact, the need to make this break was often the reason for leaving. And not only individual immigrants, but American society as well broke away from Europe, first from its colonial ties and then through the Monroe doctrine from participation in the affairs of the old world. Thus Americanism became contra-Europeanism or opposition to Europe.

Opposition and liberation of this type are not apparent in the colonization of northern Europe. At times settlement in Finland moved very rapidly toward the empty forests of the east and north. The expansion of Savo settlement in the 16th century was one of the most dynamic chapters in Finnish history. This eastern Finnish expansion was based in the main on slash and burn technique, in which the land was not ploughed deeply. The forest was merely burned off, leaving an area that would remain fertile for a few years. Land use thus seemed to be of the pioneer type, moving forward rapidly and relying on the existence of unsettled land. In this sense it is reminiscent of later conditions in America. Contact with unsettled landscape, long distances and a harsh climate have certainly left their mark on Finnish national character and culture. Long distances from centres of populations isolated settlers in both Finland and America from the services, culture, and technical progress offered by the towns, and also from the excessive proximity and control of government and the power structure. The result was the basis for independence and democracy.
Slash-and-burn work became something of a symbol of Finnish poverty in the XIXth century with its rapidly growing overpopulation, as in most European countries.
Colonization in Finland and the United States

The relationship with the State, however, was not the same. The settlement of wilderness areas in Finland was not an attempt to break away, the expression of a yearning for freedom. In contrast, it took place in co-operation with the State. The State wanted to increase the land under its control through settlement so that here the "frontier" was between Sweden and Russia. At the same time the settlers built new farms which in time would pay taxes, and alongside temporary or semi-mobile slash-and-burn agriculture genuine farming began to develop. The government in Stockholm (the period under discussion is that before 1809, when Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire) also transplanted some of these successful pioneers to the forests along its western borders. As a result, eastern Finnish dialects were spoken and slash-and-burn farming was practised along Sweden's border with Norway. But all along, colonization in principle was part of a policy of expansion directed from Stockholm. In America, at least according to the Turner thesis, the frontier itself was all-important and in no case was colonization directed systematically by the State.

But despite this important difference, settling the wilderness perforce included much that was similar to the American experience. In comparison with the European continent, roads and the governmental and ecclesiastical organization were in part of very recent origin. In many places it is not difficult to imagine what the area had been like before the arrival of settlers and administration, or there are people who can remember the arrival of institutions that linked the area with the outside world. Features of the virgin landscape are still in evidence, while the hand of man long ago altered the old agricultural civilisation on the continent, including the forests and other vegetation.

Of course there are areas on the east coast of the United States and in western and southern Finland which are "European" in this sense. But their effect on the culture as a whole has been slight. The same also applies in Russia; venerable cultural landmarks exist, but do not dominate the culture as they do in
England, Spain, or Czechoslovakia. Youth is characteristic of the civilization.

The importance of the pioneer tradition

The United States has generally represented this idea of youth in European cultural history. But the Nordic countries, and especially Finland and Norway, display similar features. The importance of the pioneer tradition is great in Finland, Sweden and Norway. Norway and Finland lack ancient historical centres, for they were long ruled from Copenhagen or Stockholm. As a capital, Helsinki reminds one of Washington—or Brasilia. It was built to be an administrative centre; it did not evolve naturally. Admittedly, Helsinki received its town charter as early as the mid sixteenth century, but it was not until the Finnish State was established in 1809 that the need for a separate capital emerged. Subsequently a suitable complex of buildings was erected, sufficiently handsome to show foreigner and Finn alike that a new state had been born and that it had a capital of its own. The new Helsinki was, therefore, created by a political decision in almost the same way as Washington; an entirely new kind of town was built on the ruins of the old, which had been burned in the 1808–1809 war.

The absence of a feudal nobility, the lack of a large class of officials, long distances and climatic conditions have led Finns to see similarities between their own history and that of the United States. The political self-confidence of the farmer was certainly a contribution of the American democratic tradition to our own. The parliamentary reforms of 1906 made this segment of the population politically important, and independence in 1917 made them a factor of first-rate importance in Finnish politics. The American ideal of equality certainly had its effects at the beginning of this century through literature, stories told by emigrants, and, as mentioned above, through political change. It seems apparent that the American way of life and an ideal of equality that stresses individual efforts, thereby deviating from European historical development, has also had its effect through Sweden, for emigration from that country to America was much greater than from Finland.
Traditionalism is strong in Finland

Nevertheless, the tradition of American-style freedom in Finnish history should not be unduly stressed. There are other traditions in Finland besides those of the pioneer and slash-and-burn expansion. One of these is a strong traditionalism expressed as loyalty to the State. Under Swedish rule and also under Russian rule in the 19th century, the Finns were considered among the most loyal of subjects. A fundamental factor in Finnish history is the conservation of cultural features and institutions. It may to some extent be part of a lag characteristic of the periphery, but it is even more a reflection of caution. At the same time this conservatism has frequently proved a boon. Partly through force of circumstances, but also

A Finnish type – not always blond as often suggested.
because she so desired, Finland was able to maintain much of the old Swedish heritage in culture and administration when the former mother country, after losing her in 1809, set out on a new course, and also in 1917 when Russia began an entirely new phase in her history. The tradition of “youth” itself has led to difficulties in a world where there are many younger states and nations, with new concepts of liberty, equality and fraternity.

The United States and Scandinavia have certainly had their share of ideological headaches as they have placed their own tradition of “youth” and expansion (understood in a favourable sense) into the context of the modern world. Fortunately the diversity of the past can help reveal paths for future development that permit renewal of this tradition and national reorientation on a course towards the future.
Finland: from Napoleonic legacy to Nordic co-operation

The Napoleonic legacy

Important elements of modern national feeling were created by the period of the Napoleonic wars, the growth of Romanticism in cultural terms coinciding with the mass-mobilization of armies, and of all population groups facing the problems of frontier, power, imperium, and nation. Politico-national feelings were divided between feelings of victory and pride on the one hand, and apprehensions of disaster and danger on the other. These sentiments had a military and political matrix, but they were interpreted and enlarged into ideologies during the period itself and even more in the subsequent rapid historical description and assessment of that change.

France was victorious even though defeated; the victories of Arcole, Austerlitz, Jena and Wagram became elements of her national identity, and from about 1840 and especially under the Second Empire a great revival of interest in interpreting the Napoleonic era began. England’s victory was also commemorated, with Nelson and Wellington becoming national heroes. In contrast Austria and especially Prussia, even if saved, had to build up their identities on the fact that they had lost important battles and had been occupied by the enemy.

The Russian case is especially interesting. Napoleon’s invasion of 1812 was extremely threatening, but the invader
was finally forced to almost total defeat. This was the result of a national uprising against the French, a common battle of all the classes and groups of Russians. In Russia, there was no Romantic national sentiment of any importance, either in the French sense where nation was identified with the political idea of liberté, or in the German mode, where nation meant Volk, an historicoco-linguistic unity. In Russia, where the old national identification was strictly Christian, a new kind of identification arose with the war and especially with the invasion of Napoleon. A striking example of a new feeling of national community is the monument in Red Square in Moscow completed in 1818 by the famous Martos, which represents the village elder Minin and Prince Pozharsky uniting themselves in a national struggle against the Poles in the early seventeenth century – an allegory pointing in reality to the unity of the recent war period. Minin is described in the inscription as grazhdanin, which means citoyen, civis. National feeling means unity of the classes when the patria is at war.

In Germany, and more significantly for Finland, in Denmark and Sweden, the period around 1810 was associated with feelings of defeat and humiliation. Prussia had been defeated at war against France in 1805–7, Sweden in its war against Russia in 1808–1809. Denmark lost Norway, which was formally conceded in 1814. In this part of Europe, the German Romantic tradition of ethnic and historical inquiry flourished apace, offering a way of positive identification in a difficult situation.

Finland has been a part of Sweden from the earliest consolidation of the realm in the thirteenth century. At Tilsit in 1807, Alexander I and Napoleon divided the world into zones of influence. The coasts and hinterlands of the Gulf of Finland were of great military interest to Russia, especially after 1712, when St. Petersburg was made capital of the Empire. In the war of 1808–1809, Russia forced Sweden to cede the eastern part of the realm of Finland. From the Russian point of view the aim was to gain hegemony in the Baltic Sea. Russia now had total control of the Gulf of Finland, and with the possession of the western Finnish Turku and Åland archipelago, and control of the access route from the Gulf of Bothnia as well. From Kurland and Lithuania up to the northernmost part of the Baltic, the water frontier was now solely owned by the Russian empire.
The leading Finnish classes understood this politico-military process as representative of current trends, since there had been much defeatism in Sweden ever since the partition of Poland. Russia had advanced westwards all through the eighteenth century in Poland, and from the era of Peter the Great, in the Baltic. Sweden had ceded the Baltic provinces, Ingria and Karelia in the Peace of Nystad (1721), and a further part of Finland in 1743. In 1809 it ceded Finland (including Aland), and there were fears for even larger parts of northern Sweden on the western side of the Gulf of Bothnia, at that time occupied by the Russians after a successful campaign over the frozen sea. During the nineteenth century, the Swedes often came back to the fear of Russia – the “Norrland question”. Sweden’s defence policy was centred on the searching question – “how did we lose Norrland?” First the Baltic provinces went, then Finland, when would it be Norrland’s turn?

Finland as a Grand Duchy

Whereas the educated classes of Finland and the whole of Sweden saw little possibility of winning the 1808–9 war against Russia, the Finnish peasantry fought all over the country with frenzy in a sort of guerilla war against the Russians. The common people did not wish to become Russians; they wanted to remain Swedish. There was a common fear of the Russian religion and a fear of the Russian social system. The Finns identified themselves deeply with Lutheranism and the old Swedish legal and social order, and respect for and trust in the monarchy.

The new regent, Emperor Alexander I, responded to the feelings of the Finns in a most generous way: Finland was attached to Russia solely for military purposes. Otherwise it became a state in itself, the Grand Duchy of Finland, where the new monarch, an autocrat in Russia, ruled in 1809 as a constitutional monarch with the Diet of the country, composed and working in the same manner as the Swedish Diet. The Swedish legal and official system was maintained, as well as the position of the Church. Continuity became the key word in the everyday life of Finland. For example, “The Law of the
The arrival of General Count Buxhoewden, the Russian conqueror of Finland in Turku, the most important city of Finland. Turku was one of the two episcopal sees and the academic city, but the capital of Finland was, of course, Stockholm. Helsinki was now made capital of the Grand Duchy.
Swedish Realm”, the great codification of 1734, was printed several times in Finland under that title during the period of the Grand Duchy until 1917, when Finland became a sovereign country.

But even if Finland, in terms of culture and structures, continued as part of old Sweden, the new “little-Sweden” after 1809, now minus Finland, changed rapidly. A new dynasty of revolutionary origin (the Bernadottes), a new constitution, the rapid flowering of Romanticism and then, later on, an earlier experience of industrialization than in agrarian Finland, all produced a difference between the new Sweden on the one hand, and Finland, still identifying itself with the old Sweden, on the other. A large part of Finnish cultural identity was to consist in a conservative continuation of the way of life and a culture characteristic of the former periphery and now disappearing in the centre.

However, Finnish identity did not emerge solely out of its relation to the past and the tradition of the former capital, Stockholm. The essential feature was its relationship to Russia. In the Diet of 1809, the Emperor Grand Duke pronounced the famous words constituting the Finnish nation, namely placeée désormais au rang des nations. He described this national existence by appealing to the maintenance of the old laws and social order. The Finns would not have to think of the old order with any nostalgia since it had been preserved, but only to look forward to peaceful collaboration with their former Swedish con-patriots. The emphasis on the Finnish legal and constitutional tradition meant an organizational separation from Russia, and in fact Finnish bureaucracy was to have extremely little to do with the Russian administration during the whole period of the Grand Duchy, the Tsar Grand-Duke himself guaranteeing the union.

The organization of Finland as a part of the Russian Empire has been compared with the position of other Russian territorial acquisitions. In fact, maintaining local legal and administrative systems was not unusual. What was most unusual in the Finnish case was maintaining and strengthening of these characteristics during the whole period until the Russian Revolution of 1917, when centralizing tendencies elsewhere tended to diminish and destroy local and national differences –
not only in the Russian Empire. But no other new acquisition had the effect of creating a new nation.

Within the realm of Sweden, Finland had been a well-known part of the kingdom, and it was said that it had in olden times been a kingdom itself. Very little evidence can be shown for such theories. The main parts of the Swedish kingdom were the old kingdoms of Svecia and Gothia, but Finland was a duchy, and from 1581 a Grand Duchy. Previously it had been called the Eastland as there was also a northern land, Norrland. Finland was sometimes mentioned as a separate unity in formulas like “Sweden and Finland”, but more often included in the formula “Sweden and Gothia”. In 1650, a leading political theoretician said that Sweden, Gothia and Finland form a plenissima foederatio. Some phenomena can be stressed as Finnish peculiarities – such as the more eastern political orientation of the Finnish nobility in earlier times, but mostly the absence of any special Finnishness is striking, if normal local patriotism is not over-interpreted.

The main differentiating characteristic of Finland was its dominant language – Finnish. But the language of the peasantry was not an important issue after the religious and legal systems had been established. The Bible had existed in Finnish since 1642 and the General Law also; pastors preached in Finnish, and in the Parliament in Stockholm there was a Finnish interpreter for the Finnish representatives in the Estate of peasants. Other non-Swedish languages existed also in Sweden, especially German, Danish and Lappish, and previously, Estonian and Lettish. Laws and decrees were printed in Swedish, but the more important of them in Finnish also. Written language in non-religious matters did not really become important in the people’s lives until the middle of the nineteenth century with general schooling and the advent of less expensive books, newspapers, indoor lighting, and a need for and interest in learning and communication. Thus the special Finnish identity stressed in the creation of the Finnish nation in 1809 was not based on linguistic definition. For a long time Finnishness meant special administration, law, and bureaucracy, both civil and ecclesiastical.
Enlightened bureaucracy and Empire classicism

The role of the bureaucracy can hardly be overstressed in Finnish history. It was due to both ideological, structural and political factors. Indeed to a large extent there were no other structural and political factors, since for a long period there was no other political and economic power in the country which could have acted as a pressure group. No great cities existed; it took a long time before Helsinki, declared to be the capital of the Grand Duchy, became in addition a city of economic importance. Rather, it was purely an administrative, military and educational centre as its architecture indicates. Those three functions dominate the inner city built in St. Petersburg Empire Classicism: administration buildings – the Imperial Senate of Finland, nowadays the State Council; the Imperial Palace, nowadays the Palace of the President of the Republic, etc; educational buildings – the Imperial Alexander University, now Helsinki University, with its great library, its observatory, university gardens and clinics; and military buildings, such as the great barracks of the Imperial Finnish Guards, today the Army Headquarters, and the buildings of the Finnish Sea Equipage, now the Foreign Ministry. The absence of a wealthy bourgeoisie also meant the absence of a strong liberal pressure group and that of artists and journalists in any quantity, similar to that supported by bourgeois patronage elsewhere in Europe.

Also absent was a wealthy landed aristocracy, the Finnish nobility being small and rather poor. Promotion to noble rank continued until 1906, and was still important in the period after 1863, when Parliament began meeting regularly. But those new noblemen were mostly civil and military bureaucrats, very close to the state.

Absent also of course was the Court, the Emperor Grand-Duke residing in St. Petersburg or its surroundings (Tsarskoje-Selo, Peterhof, etc.) and visiting Finland rather seldom. And, after the 1809 Diet which drew up the constitution, the parliamentary estates were also absent until 1863, after which they met regularly, but only every fifth or third year. From 1907 there was the unicameral Parliament, elected by universal suffrage including women, but the Government (the Imperial
The border between the Grand Duchy of Finland and Russia was partly the ancient frontier from 1323 between Sweden and Novgorod. This “River Frontier” itself was by no means a natural obstacle, and did not even divide the original population. The Russian side was inhabited by Finnish speaking Ingrians, not by ethnic Russians.

Senate for Finland) was not dependent on Parliament’s trust, and in fact did not have it between 1909 and 1917.

A reflection of the bureaucracy’s importance was the fact that a sense of national feeling was not founded on opposition to the fatherland or its institutions. The leading idea was a respect for, even worship of the Regent and loyalty towards him. The dominant ideology of the Russian Emperor was that of enlightened autocracy, and much was done to make the bureaucracy really enlightened. In this sense, Finland had many advantages. Its Lutheran-ascetic traditions, and the sort of military order of the old Swedish society which resembled nearby Prussian ideals set the tone for Russian state ideology. The Emperor’s fight against corruption drew upon his new subjects’ traditions. In general, The Russian state and military
organization benefited much from the skill and loyalty of officials recruited in the western and Lutheran parts of the Empire – Finland, Estonia and Livonia.

Enlightened bureaucracy corresponded with Classicism in style and thinking, and was in opposition to the Romantic trend of the nineteenth century. Taste, harmony, self-command and civic virtue were central ideals – not Romantic individualism, the cult of genius, la vie bohème or extravagant fantasy. Of course, many of these phenomena reached the “Prussian” part of Europe, but were not transformed into or understood as a social ideology.

The University’s role in forming an enlightened bureaucracy for Finland was almost unique in that the University, which had been founded in 1640 by Queen Christina, was in 1811 transformed by the Emperor Alexander into a much more modern and enlarged institution, which was then transferred from Turku – the ecclesiastical capital of Finland to the new capital, Helsinki, and given the name of Imperial Alexander University in Finland. It was given a monopoly in the education required for all kinds of learned professions: the ministry, civil service, school teaching, medicine and pharmacy and later on, the training of personnel in agriculture and forestry. Only military training was separate, with Finland possessing its own Cadet School in Hamina (Fredrikshamn), which trained officers for posts throughout the Russian Empire.

It is important to underline that the University was not only a school of bureaucracy, but a free University, whose task was to create a national ideology. The University became, as planned by the Emperor and his counsellors (Archbishop Tengström, Count Speransky, Count Armfelt and others) the centre of almost all the intellectual life of the country, and thereby of all kinds of activity: the arts, journalism, even economic entrepreneurship. The professors and the students played a central role in developing a civic life.

The central line of early Finnish nationalism is that of neo-Classical conservatism, identifying Finland and the Finns as something like northern Greeks, a nation in harsh climatic conditions, but sublime in its trust in God and Fate, its sense of duty in the Roman mould. To this was added, in the 1830s, a strong feeling of archaic-artistic legitimation by the Kalevala, a
Lönnrot and Runeberg worked in a tradition corresponding to "official" nationalism, and in opposition to western, revolutionary ideas trying to find their way into Finland as well. This happened first at the beginning of the 1820s, then at the time of the Polish rebellion in 1831, again during 1848–9, and also during the Baltic theatre of the Crimean War in 1854–6. All these events produced a specifically Finnish reaction to a situation whereby the western liberal and leftist ideologies extended their influence, especially among students, a situation which was of great concern to Russia, as a guarantor of the Congress of Vienna state system in Europe.

The reaction to all these events produced a strengthening of the specially Finnish component of the national ideology. This almost satisfied both parties in the question: for the liberals this could be seen as something national and non-governmental, and from the Imperial point of view, it did not go so far as to encourage revolutionary tendencies.

This was seen especially in 1848, when the students organized a great spring celebration on a green field outside Helsinki. The first Finnish national flag was used, a Finnish national anthem recently composed to the words of Runeberg was sung several times, speeches were made and generally a great spirit of solidarity was created. But all this happened in a loyal way with toasts to the Emperor and the heir apparent, who was Chancellor of the University, to the Senate, to Bureaucracy and Fatherland. The national anthem "Vårt Land", written by Runeberg and composed by the University’s music master F. Pacius, is anything but revolutionary, emphasising the moral values of nature and the countryside, national destiny, and the Finn’s consciousness of all that the future could win through faith, hope and work. In those same days
and months, most of the other European students and intellectuals trusted not to fate, hope and work, but to revolution, arms and action.

For the main architect of the University-based enlightened bureaucratic patriotism, Archbishop Tengström, the essential goal in 1808–1809 had been to protect the Finnish peasant’s Lutheran faith and free possession of his lands and not to expose him to russification on either of these central points. It was of lesser importance if the small educated classes lost something of their political prerogatives in the parliamentary tradition. Instead the University became a new sort of Parliament, a centre for intellectual activity. This was apparent by mid-century. Finland preserved its special autonomous status in the Russian empire during the period between the 1848 revolutions and the decline of political liberalism in the 1870s. Much of Finnish development can be seen in contrast to that of Poland, or to the nobility-dominated rule of the Baltic provinces. Finnish rural-based loyal conservatism yielded political dividends every time the Poles, relying on their traditional national pride, rebelled against Russia. Thus around 1863 especially, when the Polish rebellion was crushed and the reforms in Russia stopped, Finland reaped the gains of a new parliamentary life, its own currency (the mark), the declaration of Finnish as the official language of administration and jurisdiction, and a series of modernizing reforms, such as communal autonomy, joint-stock company law, and separation of schools from the Church. Later still came a Finnish army, and something known as proto-parliamentarianism, whereby the leaders of the political parties were nominated as senators (ministers) by the new Emperor.

Alexander III in 1881

Certainly a very influential role was played by the Finnish rural, peasant class. It was always the largest though not necessarily the most dominant group in Finnish society, even if the timber industry and other areas of employment began to develop, especially during and after the 1860s, with foreign trade, the expansion of railways and canals, and a money-based
The University Library of Helsinki is famous for its neoclassical harmony and fine proportions. It was completed in 1844, when the Gothic style was already dominating many other parts of Europe.
During the non-Parliamentary period after 1809 peasants did not play any active role in civic society, but their importance was great. The patriotism of Runeberg's and Lönnrot's work was based on an idealization of the Finnish peasantry; being Finnish entailed accepting the peasants as an integral part of the nation. The peasants' language, Finnish, that of the majority, was understood to be the "national language", the "mother tongue" in principle, in spite of the fact that all higher cultural life was carried out, for practical purposes, in Swedish. Thus respect for the language was in line with the government's aims in promoting Finnish: it meant first of all being distinct from Sweden, and secondly, better administration, more enlightened government. Finnishness was thus not in any way in opposition to the Emperor's viewpoint; it could make for career difficulties for those of the bureaucratic elite (especially in Western Finland) who did not speak any Finnish at all, or whose command of it was weak. From the 1840s the government began to demand training in Finnish from future civil servants, from 1863 Finnish was accepted as an administrative language, and from 1882 it became obligatory when the subject demanded it, so that in the early years of the twentieth century Finnish became the dominant language of the administration.

The social background of the Fennomanian movement

Although the importance of the peasant role was acknowledged, this meant no participation in the liberal sense. In the 1840s, the young philosopher J. V. Snellman tried to import German and Swedish-influenced political debate into the country. In many respects, he was ahead of his time; conditions in Finland did not yet correspond to the more industrialized, bourgeois areas of Western Europe. But Snellman's ideas of "education of the nation and nationalization of the educated" expressed the important idea of participation. This idea was carried out by a growing press in Finnish. In the revolutionary period 1848–50, the government for some years prohibited
publication of Finnish political literature, except on economic and religious issues. But from the 1850s, newspapers and books in Finnish became more common, and due to the economic growth of the peasant class, Finnish-language publication became important. The rise in timber prices brought a great deal of money to the peasants, and important consequences included Finnish publications and Finnish secondary schools.

The Estate of the peasantry was one of the four Estates of the Diet, and it worked mainly in Finnish. The Estate of the clergy, who worked closely with the peasantry, shared much of its outlook. They were Fennoman, working for culture and education in Finnish, moral conservatism, and agrarian values. This meant political conservatism and pro-Russian attitudes, but also social progressivism, promotion of social mobility through education, and a demand for better administration, especially for Finnish to be used for a variety of services.

In the other two Estates, for nobility and burgesses, liberal ideas, pro-industrial sympathies, and Western orientation were predominant, but did not override a general patriotism, including loyalty to the monarchy. Industrial and other kinds of progressivism were counter-balanced by a certain social conservatism which took a legalistic form in the desire to maintain the special Finnish system of administration and legislation. This meant differentiation from Russia, but also maintenance of social privileges as part of the frequently old-fashioned legal system. This Finnish legalism often was seen as nationalistic and chauvinistic overtones by the Russians. Swedish was valued highly not because it was the language of a Swedish-speaking minority of peasants and fishermen, but because it was the carrier of the cultural and legal tradition of the country from Swedish times and the formative period of the nineteenth century, and Runeberg, Snellman and most of the other founders of Finnish patriotism had written in Swedish.

A very important aspect of Finnish nationalism and national development consists of the transformation of these elites. During the last decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, the dominant language of Finnish cultural and political life changed from Swedish to Finnish, over a long period of active bilingualism. Bilingualism had old traditions, especially among the numerically largest portion of
The Imperial summer cottage of Langinkoski by the River Kymmenen-Kymi in Finland, often used by Alexander III.

the educated classes, the clergy. In earlier times, Finnish was the language of practical everyday life, more spoken than written, notwithstanding the religious literature printed since the Reformation, whereas Swedish was the language of education, administration, and written culture in general. Now Finnish, from the 1840s and the 1860s onwards, rapidly developed into a language of written and philosophical culture. The social background here is telling: Finnish literature was almost always developed by individuals with Swedish – and therefore German and Latin – as a background, as the language in which they had learned to think and write, and had received their higher education. So Finnish was, and became, a language expressing the common Finnish culture, but extended also to its highest forms modifying the language to be able to express the general European cultural tradition. This process had already begun in the sixteenth century, with Biblical and legal
texts, and was now rapidly extended to the whole field of culture: novels, poetry, science, journalism and administration.

Socially this change was carried out by the Fennomans, i.e. people who believed in the future of Finnish spoken culture and were convinced that this special Finnish culture, with its Swedish and Lutheran roots, could only be maintained in Finland if translated into Finnish. Finland could have been Swedenized — the process was already in a highly-developed phase in some social and regional sectors in Finland when the political change occurred. Social factors assured that in spite of change and the promotion of Finnish, Swedenization made headway during the nineteenth century, for upward social mobility was impossible without a good command of Swedish. But contrary to the case of Ireland, this process was counter-balanced by the promotion of Finnish.

The state was responsible for promoting Finnish: measures to stabilise the grammatical structure and regulate orthography date from the 1810s; a lecturership in Finnish at Alexander University dated from 1828, followed by a Chair; language instruction for pastors and civil servants was obligatory from the 1840s, and the administration was bilingual after 1863. But the economic advancement of the Finnish-speaking rural classes had even greater impact as it entailed greater general cultural and political participation. This had the result that elements of the educated classes began not only to declare themselves Finnish-speakers in principle, but also to adopt Finnish increasingly as their language in practice — an aim already canvassed by Snellman and the young Fennomans of the radical 1840s. Much of this was due to the press and to publications in Finnish, but the decisive factor was the establishment of secondary schools where teaching took place in Finnish, starting in the 1850s, but accelerating in the 1880s and 1890s. These schools resulted in the emergence of a new educated class consisting of the offspring of traditionally educated groups such as the clergy, and of upwardly-mobile rural groups such as peasants, merchants and so on. Common schooling created common ideals, marriages and generally speaking a gradual transformation of the dominant culture linguistically and socially. This became a true Finnish model, still exerting influence in the 1950s and 1960s.
Other groups of the educated classes continued to maintain the Swedish-speaking tradition of Finnish culture. Their aim was to stress cultural continuity and links with Sweden and Western Europe in general, coupled with a fear that over-rapid social and cultural development would produce an intervening layer of culturally weak groups, who would be vulnerable to russification measures were they to be introduced in Finland. Both the Fennomans and the liberals were aware of developments in the Baltic provinces but were confident that Finland’s future would take a different form.

Despite conflicts between Finnish agrarian interest groups, and the Swedish legalist industrial lobby, both shared the main constituent of Finnish patriotism: their attitude to Russia. Even though sympathy to Russia varied, all wanted to preserve an ethnically, legally and religiously non-Russian Finland, and to maintain and develop the special Finnish administration and Parliament. On the other hand, few hoped for a renewal of the union with Sweden, which had now altered its orientation in a union with Norway.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the peasantry was rather homogenous, consisting mainly of freeholders. But as a result of the high birthrate social conditions changed. Those land-owning peasant farmers who were in a position to profit from the continent-wide rise in timber prices, innovations in agriculture and the switch to animal production, with butter in demand in London and St. Petersburg, became wealthier and wealthier. But on the other hand, peasants with little or no land were transformed into a rural proletariat, only a portion of which found a livelihood in the growing but still small cities with their small-scale, albeit increasing, industry, or through emigration to St. Petersburg and, later, to America, or by cultivating new land in northern Finland.

The Twentieth Century: Populist Nationalism, Socialism and Bilingualism

The proletariat became a force in Finnish social and political life very late but to great effect, during the Russia-wide ferment of 1905–7, which was a landmark for Finland too. At this point,
after the first elections based on universal suffrage in 1907, the old Fennomanian party developed a strong nationalistic, Finnish-language platform, with the aim of gaining support form the proletariat with a populist programme of nationalism and social reforms. This programme also served to defend them from the accusations of the bilingual, legalist front, who thought

Press, telegraph and telephone as symbols for a modern nation. In Finland, the press in both languages emerged rapidly from the 1860s and especially the 1880s.

the “old” Fennomans had gone too far in their monarchism, and in recent political negotiations, especially the Finno-Russian administrative conflict of 1899–1905.

“Old” Fennomanian populistic nationalism succeeded in shaping a new middle-class nationalism, and some 200,000–300,000 people out of a population of 2.5 million changed their Swedish family names into Finnish in 1906 as a manifesto of political-social identification. But this was mainly a middle-class phenomenon, in which neither the Fennoman “aristocracy” nor the workers were interested. Workers in the countryside and the towns preferred voting socialist, and their party gained 40% of the seats in a new unicameral Parliament. This rapidly undermined Fennoman linguistic and social populism. But the latter had already left a lasting legacy in

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precipitating the creation of a Swedish party which began to move from the legalist tradition into a Swedish-speaking agrarian and populist direction, and to cultivate links with Sweden. There, a Swedish party had gained much ground in public opinion, especially after the rupture of the union with Norway. Swedish irredentism, eyeing the Swedish-speaking coastal population of Finland, was on the increase.

If Fennoman populist propaganda and socialist social propaganda created uncertainty in both the Swedish-speaking upper classes and the Swedish-speaking peasantry, who now found themselves together in the Swedish party in 1906, their new Suecomania created opposition among many Finnish-speakers. A stronger identification with different cultures and social groups began to gain ground at the expense of the former bilingualism of upper class society. Many families divided along linguistic lines. These problems were apparent by the 1920s.

The constitution of the Finnish Republic dating from 1919 (still in force), the 1922 language act and the Helsinki University statutes of 1923 all provided for a bilingual state, administration, and general cultural outlook. Finnish and Swedish are the national languages, and command of both is required from all officials, civil servants, and the educated populace in general. Being educated meant and still means bilingualism to some extent. But during the 1920s and 1930s social mobility, propagandistic echoes from 1906–1914, fascistic influences in common with Europe, and the absence of the Russian factor put a new language struggle into effect. However it is important to note that in spite of much agitation practically no legislation was changed, the country remaining bilingual. As in the Liberation and Civil War of 1918, the new war against Soviet Russia in 1939–40 and 1941–44 demonstrated the national, patriotic unity of the Finns, true as much in the former war, where the dividing line between Whites and Reds was not one of language as in the latter.

Since the Second World War Finnish national feelings have mostly been anchored in a patriotism concerned with defending the national heritage at a cross-roads of different social and historical systems. Finland remains a Nordic country as to its traditions, religion, social system and lifestyle. But it
has a special flavour because of its proximity to Russia, as experienced in the period of the Grand-Duchy 1809–1917; in the wars in 1918 and 1939–1944, fought on both sides with heroism and without the experience of occupation; and in the successful cohabitation (especially in the economic sphere) with the Soviet Union. Very close co-operation with Sweden and other Nordic countries perpetuates the importance of the Swedish language, but more as a matter of practical utility than as an aspect of national agitation. Popular feeling from time to time has not altered the general consensus.

The Finnish nation and its national character need to be explained in an international context, especially that of rival powers in the Baltic. Economic and social development is a part of this greater context, and ideologies influence both political and social conditions, which are in turn interpreted in both aesthetic and social terms.
Runeberg’s two homelands

Fänrik Ståls sägner (The Tales of Ensign Stål) is Runeberg’s best-known work. Usually present-day readers regard this series of narrative poems as a single piece of cloth; they do not attach any special import to the fact that The Tales of Ensign Stål actually consists of two collections, the former printed in 1848, the latter in 1860.* But since it is common knowledge that Runeberg wrote his “ensign poems” slowly, it would be both natural and proper to remember that the poems are a series produced over a long stretch of time; the separate cantos have been grouped into two collections in accordance with their order of birth. To be sure, the poems comprise a united whole in many respects. But in at least one instance there is a noteworthy difference between the start and the conclusion,

Notes by the translator professor George Schoolfield.

This essay was originally published as “Runebergin kaksi isänmaata”, in Matti Klinge, Kaksi Suomea (Helsinki: Otava, 1982), pp. 126–142; and “Runebergs två fosterland”, in Klinge, Runebergs två fosterland (Helsingfors: Söderström & Co., 1983), pp. 71–87.

between the first and the second cycle. The difference has to do with the concept of a homeland, and it appears most clearly in the introductory poems of each part: in “Our Country” from the first collection and in “The Soldier Boy” and “The Pori March” from the second.

In the very first stanza of “Our Country”, it is made clear that the homeland is essentially a landscape. The homeland is dear to our hearts; we love our northern tract, our fathers’ earth. Then in the second stanza the landscape’s constituent parts are directly listed:

To us, with heath and height and isle,
It is a land worth gold.

In the third Stanza, the depiction of Finland’s nature continues, bearing persuasive witness to our love for it:

We love the rushing of our streams,
The babble of our brooks,
The gloomy soughing of dark woods,
Our starry night, our summer light,
All that which here as sight or song
Once touched our very hearts.

In the eighth of the eleven stanzas of “Our Country”, an all-embracing picture of the land is presented, and the meaning of the landscape for patriotic feeling is emphasized in a rhetorical climax:

And see, this land is here and here,
Our eye beholds it here;
For here we may stretch forth our hand
And gladly point at lake and strand
And say: gaze out upon this land,
It is our fatherland!
Colonel von Döbeln was one of the heroes in the central national poem of Finland set in 1808, Runeberg’s The Tales of Ensign Stål, of 1848 and 1860. Runeberg’s masterly poems celebrated virtue and courage in a Roman sense, not in a modern nationalistic manner, successfully balancing the Swedo-Russian influence, and creating a separate Finnishness on the basis of the classic tradition.
Between stanzas 1 and 8 the poet talks of our forefathers’ deeds and their endurance, their hunger and their sufferings, and of those times of peace when earlier generations carried out the task of cultivating the land “with thought and sword and plow”. Yet, in connection with the present essay’s theme, it is most important to note that the historical references (or allusions to the past) are kept altogether general, without concrete details. Runeberg’s vision of the landscape, emphasizing its calm and its stillness, is neoclassical. It has its roots in the ideals of antiquity, although the “starry nights” are taken from romanticism; the picture is concrete to the extent that its contents can be described. But on the historical side there is nothing which is not altogether classical and thus generally applicable; the poem’s words about the forefathers’ struggles and their works of peaceful cultivation could be used to describe almost any nation. Taken in sum, “Our Country” presents a picturesque vision of classical antiquity’s ideal place, the locus amoenus. The picture created in the poem is reminiscent of the utopian and serene landscape familiar from old-fashioned etchings, with contented and industrious folk standing both in the foreground and against the horizon. The tempests that have raged in nature and in human life are now ended, the future is bright, and the sweet and blissful aura of the morning hovers over the landscape.

But how different the homeland is in “The Pori March”! Here the landscape is not mentioned at all; in the very first line we meet the word “people”, to which the concept of the homeland is now directly joined. And the people of Finland are clearly and distinctly specified – that is, people of the present day are closely linked to their forebears: “Sons of a people that bled ...” The history of this people is no longer a picture, painted with broad strokes, of the forebears’ efforts in war and peace, a picture of general applicability. Now the question of the Finnish people’s history is expressly discussed, a history which – by the naming of names, Narva and Poland and Leipzig and Lützen – can be directly attached, with exact dates, to the actual past: the Battle of Narva of November 20, 1700; Leipzig, doubtlessly an allusion to the Battle of Breitenfeld of September 7, 1631; and the Battle of Lützen of November 6, 1632.

Next we must make a brief comparison of “The Pori March”
with “The Soldier Boy”. Here, too, definite events of the military past are described – something unimaginable in the first part of *The Tales of Ensign Stål*:

My father fell on Lappo’s field,
His banner close at hand:
They say it was the only time
That he grew pale in war!
At Uttismalm, for Gustaf’s land,
*His* father died, his sword unsheathed;
And *his* father fell at
Willmanstrand —
A man from Charles’s time.

If “The Pori March” alludes to battlefields from the period when Sweden was a great power, “The Soldier Boy” presents a series of conflicts on home soil. A defeat precedes the victories on the list: the rout of Lappeenranta (Willmanstrand) on August 28, 1748, during the so-called Little Conflict; the fight – or skirmish – at Utin Nummi (Uttismalm) on July 28, 1789, in which Gustaf himself turned the Russians back; and the Battle of Lapua (Lappo) on July 14, 1808, when Finland’s main army triumphed over Rajevski’s troops.

Everyone knew these episodes from history – they were still somehow a part of living memory in the 1840s, when Part I of *The Tales of Ensign Stål* was written. But why did they rise to the surface of the poet’s consciousness only toward the end of the 1850s, when the poems of Part II were slowly but surely produced?

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The young Zacharias Topelius had given a negative answer to the question “Does the Finnish People Possess a History?” in his famous lecture of 1843.* Before 1809, the Finnish people

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The Finnish National Anthem written by Runeberg and composed by Pacius, was entirely inspired by the students: the poet dedicated the poem to the young, the “we” of the song must be understood as the students, and the students commissioned the composition from their teacher in music, Pacius. The first general performance and breakthrough of the song to popularity was in the Students’ Spring outdoor Festivity on the 13th of May 1848, when Finnish students gathered in a spirit of conservative and aesthetic nationalism. This manifestation was cleverly organised by some of the student leaders with the aim of preserving the autonomy of Finland and of the University in a most dangerous situation created by the Revolution on the Continent.

had not had a political existence, he argued, and thus the country could not be regarded as a legitimate topic of historical investigation. The people of Finland had not been independent agents; they had not been actors on history’s stage, since they had never moved on their own behalf and in a way distinguishing them from other peoples of the past. Thus the history of Finland’s people began only in 1809. This interpretation doubtless held water (and still does) in a good many respects. Topelius’s view of Finland’s history depended upon a concept
of reality and of the realization of the Idea in history, quite in accordance with Hegel’s theory. At the same time his analysis also corresponded neatly to the actual situation in Finland at the beginning of the 1840s. Finland had been taken from Sweden not at the wish of the Finns themselves but because the two emperors, Alexander I and Napoleon, had reached a decision without inquiring after Finnish opinion, intended to diminish Sweden’s power and as a result of Russia’s need to acquire the northern side of the Gulf of Finland as a shield for its capital, St. Petersburg, and as a support for its hold on the Baltic.

In this situation, the awakening national consciousness of Finland was nourished principally by food taken from the past. In Finland the Gustavian period, already finished in Sweden proper, continued. The Swedish language, the Lutheran church, the laws and the administrative system all represented – in Finland’s new relationship with Russia – traditions and values of Finland’s own, underlining its special quality. But in the field of culture, Finland simply had nothing peculiar to itself, until Lönnrot* and Runeberg made their invaluable contributions to the national consciousness. The Kalevala gave Finland a mythical prehistory, a literary monument which, viewed both from within Finland and without, had a noteworthy and captivating cultural originality and flavour. For his own part, Runeberg created an idealized picture of Finland’s nature and its people, presenting the latter’s several social segments in Älgskytтарне (The Elk Hunters, 1832), Hanna (1836), and Julkvällen (Christmas Eve, 1841). The new and specific cultural identity that Runeberg and Lönnrot bestowed on Finland was historical through and through. This is particularly remarkable in view of the fact that, elsewhere in the world at that time, interest in history had become an especially important element in the nurturing of a national spirit and a national consciousness.

But Runeberg also showed a new interest in historical motifs. In 1840, after the composition of his epic poems with Finnish

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* Elias Lönnrot (1802–1884), the compiler of the Finnish national epic, the Kalevala.
themes, he composed *Nadeschda* (1841), the work of his which perhaps seemed the most foreign to a Finnish audience but which spread his reputation in Europe much more effectively than the poems with Finnish motifs and a Finnish background.

*Finland as described by Runeberg — divine peace and harmony in the wilderness and poverty, where man lives close to Fate and to God. This is the message of the Finnish National Anthem, the first poem of The Tales of Ensign Stål. Edelfelt’s illustrations to the Tales date from the turn of the century.*

*Nadeschda* begins in the unspecified past, although its twin pair of princely brothers, with their hunting falcons and lovely slave girls, suggests the Middle Ages, in which the European romanticists of the time found their inspiration to such a great extent. Nonetheless, the latter part of *Nadeschda* is firmly anchored in a particular historical period, the age of Catherine
the Great, with its tales about Potemkin villages and the war against Turkey.

It may be suspected that behind Nadeschda – as later, behind Kung Fjalar (King Fjalar, 1844) – lies Runeberg’s desire to pass from topics connected with Finland to a broader stage. Having given initial proof of his literary mastery, he wished to reach higher goals, or, having achieved a reputation in his homeland and within the Swedish realm, he wished to capture attention in Russia and Western Europe. Nadeschda was translated directly into Russian (a prose translation, to be sure), but the censor forbade its publication in its complete form.

Runeberg had enthusiastically embraced efforts intended to bring literary circles in Russia and Finland closer to one another, efforts begun during the celebration of the bicentennial of the University of Helsinki in 1840. The outstanding literary scholar and translator Jakob Karlovitch Grot, who at that time was a kind of cultural ambassador to Finland, also became Runeberg’s friend, and their friendship lasted until Grot’s death. Grot edited an album devoted to the cultural connections between Finland and Russia that appeared in 1842, and among the contributors were Runeberg, Lönnrot, Castrén, J. E. Öhman (Runeberg’s fellow resident in Porvoo), and F. M. Franzén, who, a Finnander by birth, had removed to Sweden as early as 1811.*

On the Russian side, apart from Grot himself, a close friend of Grot should be mentioned, Pjotr Pletnyov, the rector of the university in St. Petersburg, the author of the following interesting lines about Russo-Finnish cultural links and history’s meaning for literature:

> Until the present, it seems to me, Russians and Finns have not sufficiently studied that which is most essential for

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* The Swedish title of Grot’s (1812–1893) album – which also appeared in Russian – was Calender till minne af kejserliga Alexanderuniversitetets andra secularfest (Calendar Commemorating the Second Centennial of the Imperial Alexander University). Mathias Alexander Castren (1812–1852) was a pioneer in the fields of Finno-Ugric philology and ethnography. Johan Edvard Öhman (1809–1856) was Runeberg’s colleague on the teaching staff of the Porvoo (Borgå) Gymnasium – his contribution to the album was “Om det finska nationallynet” (“Concerning the Finnish National Character”). Frans Michael Franzen (1771–1847) was Finland’s most gifted lyric poet before Runeberg.
literature: the special features of history, the people's national life, the spirit of the language, popular stories and traditions, customs, prejudices, and, above all else, the monuments of popular poetry. It is quite well-known that poetry, without these sources, is pale or lacking in spirit. But we live in a period which promises much in the way of improvement. From your university, which has celebrated its centennial so brilliantly, young men are already hastening to Moscow, in order to study the organism of Russia's life in its very heart. Thus let us hope that Finland will not remain in our debt, and that soon someone among your young men of letters in Helsinki will repay us with the same attention as that which some of us have vouchsafed you. I am almost convinced of it, in consideration of this general urge among the most distinguished minds of Europe to study the sources of all historical knowledge. Learned men no longer believe that scholars can penetrate everything by a mere logical process, without leaving the studies where they sit brooding over their theories. Some of them set out on journeys, in order to convince themselves, by means of personal observations, of the truth of the hypotheses they have set up and of the narratives set down by other hands; still others, who have become antiquaries, linger in dusty archives, questioning, in their silent conversations, the very past itself, employing its expressive languages which have so long been forgotten.*

Continuing, Pletnyov remarks on the curious fact that, a mere quarter of a century earlier, no one was particularly interested in history; since then, though, the situation has radically changed, thanks in particular to the historical novels of Sir Walter Scott. In the same article — written in the form of a letter to Fredrik Cygnaeus** — Pletnyov mentions having heard that Runeberg had written a poem called Nadeschda and that he

* Calender till minne av Kejserliga Alexanders Universitetets andra secular-fest.

** Fredrik Cygnaeus (1807–1881) was a Finnish aesthetician, poet, dramatist, and historian (writing, of course, in Swedish); he is perhaps best known for the speech he gave at the student celebration in Helsinki on May 13, 1848, when Runeberg's "Our Country" was first publicly performed to the musical setting of Fredrik Pacius.
intended to publish this work a work set in the age of Catherine
the Great soon.
It seems as though Runeberg and many other intellectuals in
Finland at the time entertained the notion that Finland (within

The moral beauty of wilderness — a
Finnish echo from Rousseau’s and
Ossian’s world.

the framework of its special character) would achieve a cultural
rapprochement with Russia and that, in this way, Russia’s
history would become familiar material to Finns. If Finland was
regarded as not having a history of its own, then a choice must
be made between Sweden’s history or Russia’s. For many
reasons, Russia’s history in this period seemed to be both more
important and better suited to the situation at hand, and thanks
to Grot and his circle of literary acquaintances in high places,
Russia’s history made an interesting, even fascinating impres-
sion. It may be noted that Runeberg, in a particular episode of
Nadeschda (one unnecessary for the development of the plot),
idealizes the young Major General Kutuzov at the expense of
Prince Potemkin – Kutuzov who was destined to be the hero of 1812. The sufferings Russia endured in that year as a consequence of Napoleon’s invasion and then the victory which was won over the invader – these events, in 1840, lay scarcely three decades away. And, on the basis of such memories, Russia had built and continued to build its historical identity. At the same time, these sufferings and triumphs made Russia’s earlier history seem all the more intriguing.

Yet the general development of ideas led, as it turned out, in quite a different direction. Culturally Finland did not join Russia; however, it never returned to a clear-cut community with Sweden. Even though Topelius’s question about the Finnish people’s ownership of a history got a negative answer as late as 1843, the very query showed a growing interest in ties to the Finnish past. At least one might imagine that – even though Finland did not have a history, not yet – it could acquire one, beginning with 1809. In much the same way, people nowadays occasionally seem to think that we have a history of our own only from 1917 or 1918 on – yet that this 75-year history is worth something, at any event. Thus Finland would acquire a history or a future as a nation; it was a teaching which Snellman,* in his special and persuasive way, had proclaimed in his newspaper Saima (written in Swedish), starting in 1844. And Topelius himself (who, according to his diaries, had a skeptical attitude about connections with Russia in 1840) wrote enthusiastically in 1844:

Suomi’s rivers spring from their own sources; from its own sources may its future come!

Some years later, Topelius delineated an independent future for Finland’s culture still more plainly:

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* Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806–1881) was the Hegelian philosopher and patriotic publicist whose early friendship with Runeberg later became clouded by Snellman’s extremist and anti-Swedish position on Finland’s language question.
If we forget the culture Sweden
gave us,
We shall not take this turn for
Russia's sake.**

Runeberg did not go quite as far — not yet. The political emphasis in the first part of *The Tales* did not have a social import in Snellman's sense, and did not contain demands for a more democratic future in the interest of a purely Finnish culture, nor was it inspired by the young Topelius's enthusiastic pan-Fennicism. The patriotism in "Our Country" is descriptive and hopeful, not prophetic and importunate. The poems "The King" and "The Field Marshal" contain some sharply negative criticism of Sweden, but in his important poem "Kulneff" (which is included in the first part of *The Tales*, as are "The King" and "The Field Marshal") Runeberg consciously and convincingly sets out to build a bridge, a political bridge, to Russia's historical memories. He even asserts that "Finland's every son" already knew the most famous Russian generals, even before the war:

In Russia's army there were names
Which history wrote upon its sheet,
And which were hither brought by
fame
Long ere the war began.
Barclay, Kamensky, Bagration,
Were known to Finland's every son,
And Finns expected keen-fought
strife
When these men led the van.

** The first quote is from "Sång, tillegnad de den 21 juni 1844 promoverade filosofie magistrane" ("Song, Dedicated to the Masters of Philosophy graduated on June 21, 1844.") See Zacharias Topelius, *Samlade skrifter*, vol. 1 (Helsingfors: G. W. Eklund; and Stockholm: Bonnier, 1904) p. 134. The second quote is from an untitled poem that was not published in Topelius's lifetime because of censorship. See Zachris Topelius, *120 dikter*, ed. by Olof Enckell (Helsingfors: Svenska Litteratur-sällskapet i Finland, 1970) pp. 70–71.
However, Kulneff became a familiar figure only after he appeared on Finnish soil, and every Finn learned to like him:

Yet Finland's army, taken whole,
Did not contain a single man
Who did not love old Kulneff as
A comrade met in arms.
And if his well-known face was seen,
Straightway a grin of pleasure flew
Toward the Cossack country's bear
From his brother born on Saima's strand.

In another poem in the first collection, "The Dying Warrior", Runeberg likewise proclaimed the message of peace and brotherhood between foes while calling attention to the miseries of war.

But there is no poem of this sort in the second collection. In "The Provincial Governor" (put in the penultimate position of the second cycle), the refined Barclay de Tolly gives way, to be sure, after having heard Wibelius's speech.* Yet at the poem's start he has been presented as the maker of unpleasant demands, and the victory falls to Sweden's law and its defender. "The Soldier Boy" and "The Pori March" contain allusions to a Sweden of the past — as a matter of fact, in the latter poem Runeberg had originally spoken of "Sweden's colours". In the final version, however, the banner is described thus: "A shred's still left with Finland's ancient colours there." Runeberg's view of history, formerly Finnish—Russian, had now been transformed to Finnish—Swedish, or simply anti-Russian.

* Wibelius, a simple official, "hidden in Finland's far reaches", refuses to accede to the demand of an unnamed Russian general (was it Michael Barclay de Tolly or the Russian commander in chief Friedrich Wilhelm von Buxhövden?) that he sign an order by which the families of Finns who continued to fight for Sweden would be "driven from their farm and earth". According to Wibelius's successful argument, "Swedish law" — the continued application of which has been guaranteed to Finland by the victorious czar Alexander I — stipulates that "the husband does not pay for his wife's crime, nor the wife for her husband's."
Finland's Governor-General, Count Berg,* was extremely displeased by "The Pori March" and linked the poem to the revolutionary movement of the day. He reported to St. Petersburg that it was better suited for singing in Garibaldi's camp than by Finland's students. Runeberg himself was aware of the

One of the most cherished types in Runeberg's Tales is "the Finnish Major" – a harsh but paternal chief knowing his boys and their backgrounds and maintaining his composure as well in the battle as in exercises. One of the models of this type in a caricature from about 1800.

* Friedrich Wilhelm Berg (1797–1874) was a member of the German-speaking Baltic aristocracy and the Czar's Governor General in Finland from 1854 to 1861.
political import of his march, for, having heard it performed in Viipuri in the Governor-General’s presence, he made a point of remarking that the march had not been written to be played for the Governor-General or for governors in general; public performance of the song then remained forbidden for a good many years to come.

But why, finally, was Runeberg seized by an interest at the end of the 1850s – to be sure, an interest of a transitory nature – in memories of Narva and Lützen and in the history of Swedish-rulled Finland?

The most important explanation might well be that times had changed. Runeberg was by no means alone in his historical pursuits. The 1850s in particular were a vital decade for the spread of historical enthusiasm in Finland, especially a devotion to earlier history, i.e., the period before 1809. As a matter of fact, Runeberg was exposed to these historical passions in his own home. During the 1850s, Fredrika Runeberg* was absorbed by historical themes, having both finished and published the historical narratives she had composed earlier (such as Fru Catharina Boije, printed in 1858), and written new ones as well, such as Sigrid Liljeholm, which appeared two years after the second part of The Tales but which she had been working on for a number of years.

Fredrik Cygnaeus was likewise busy writing historical dramas in the 1850s, dramas taking place in the sixteenth century; and, most important of all, Topelius’s Fältskärns berättelser (The Stories of a Field Surgeon), the novella cycle destined to make a deep impression on the whole of Finland’s cultured reading public began to appear in 1853. The first of Yrjö Koskinen’s** historical works also came out during the 1850s. It would seem quite clear that Runeberg borrowed the allusions to Narva, Poland, Lützen, and Leipzig directly from Topelius’s field-surgeon’s tales. These names would not previously have had the same clear import and emotional

* Fredrika Runeberg (1807–1879) was Runeberg’s wife.
** Yrjö Koskinen (1830–1903) was a Finnish historian and politician; his major work from the 1850s was Nuijasota, sen syyt ja tapaukset (The Club War: Its Causes and Events, 1857–1859).
content for readers in Finland — or in Sweden, where both Runeberg and Topelius had such an important market for their books.

All these examples of the historical interests of the 1850s focused attention upon the annals of the Swedish period and, as it were, they negated the argument promulgated by the young Topelius that Finland had a history only from 1809 on. Simultaneously, these interests — this renaissance of history — had the effect of tying Finland’s creative circles and its readers (at this time, almost exclusively Swedish-speaking) to Sweden, where a similar devotion to history and to historical fiction flourished. In 1851, not long after the appearance of the first cycle of *The Tales of Ensign Stål*, Runeberg made his only journey abroad, his trip to Sweden, where he was enthusiastically received on all sides and where he also had the chance to put his business affairs in order — it was then that he established his connection with the publisher Abraham Bohlin. It would not be an unreasonable surmise that thenceforth he paid greater attention to his Swedish readership; indeed, the second cycle of *The Tales* was eagerly awaited in Sweden, where the poems were subsequently read and sung with extraordinary interest. They had, for example, an important role to play in the so-called “sharpshooters’ movement”, a volunteer militia. Beyond question, the attitudes in this group were patently anti-Russian. Around 1840, Runeberg took Russia and St. Petersburg as the most important points on his foreign compass, but by 1860 the emphasis had clearly been moved over to Sweden.

* * * * *

The fresh emphasis on history and the fact that Sweden had become a centre of attention once more — these circumstances thus had the effect on Runeberg of changing his Finland from a primarily geographical realm to a primarily historical concept. Both in Finland and elsewhere, the mode of historical thought was doubtless influenced by the revolutionary events on the continent in 1848 and 1849 and then by the Crimean War in the middle 1850s. After a long static period, history’s dynamic forces again appeared to be on the march, and a time of change
and radical transformation ensued. Russia, a prime guarantor of law and order and of Europe's so-called reactionary forces (and the world's mightiest power as well), was forced to its knees in the Crimean War. A new epoch followed, the modern liberal age represented by France and England, an epoch of industry and free trade. Now poetry about nature did not suffice; challenging verse that called for action was required.

Thus the landscape no longer provided the same inspiration as before; human beings, the nation's people, and history itself had begun to rival it at least as far as the landscape presented in "Our Country" is concerned; an Arcadian, static, passive landscape. Industrialization made its entry: after the opening of the Saimaa Canal in 1856 and the building of Finland's first railroads in 1862, people realized that Finland's landscape must change. Articles in the newspapers appeared about the profitable use of forests and about the sawmill industry.

One of the Russian soldiers also made heroic by Runeberg, was colonel Kulneff. Many of the Russian officers from the Finnish campaign in 1808–1809 later became famous in the war against Napoleon in 1812–1815. French was of course the common language, even if not always completely mastered in field conditions.
In 1863 Topelius published his novel of ideas, *Tant Mirabeau*, in which a herald of the new age, the railroad builder, tells an idealistic girl, an admirer of Finland’s fells and ridges and lakes, that Finland is in fact an ugly place:

To my way of thinking, a country is beautiful when at every hundred paces one finds well-tended farms, pleasant villages with fertile meadows and fields, grazing herds of cattle, smoking factories, hard-working towns, sails and steam on every body of water, strokes of the axe and blows of the hammer wherever one turns – a land, simply, where man rules nature by force of his intelligence and his inexhaustible industry. But what I call an ugly country is one where nature, no matter how beautiful it may seem in its lonely grandeur, is in fact a murderous tyrant, and man a feckless, lazy slave, content to drag his wretched life along from one harvest to the next, a creature on sufferance, who at any moment can be deprived of his daily bread and cast out onto the highway. Judge for yourself which of these two depictions of a country bears the greater resemblance to Finland.

The associations produced by factory smokestacks and factory smoke change from age to age. Topelius and many of his contemporaries regarded them as signs of happiness and prosperity in a land that was wracked by famine and filled with homeless wanderers. Runeberg, to be sure, could not become the poet of industrialism, nor would industrialism become a factor of any major importance in Finland for years to come. But “Our Country” and “The Pori March” represent Runeberg’s two mutually dissimilar attempts to find a national identity for Finland and its people. These efforts and the expression he gave them have become permanent properties of the nation, ideas familiar to every Finn. As the parade march of the Finnish army (and thus the tune always played to greet the president of the Republic of Finland), “The Pori March” has become a second national anthem, alongside “Our Country”. In these poems, Runeberg gave final verbal form to two aspects of his notion of a homeland and his love for it – the one a call to action, the other a patriotism once serene and reflective.
The Opera and the Spirit of the Times

Zachris Topelius wrote his drama The Hunt of King Charles for the use of F. Pacius in 1850; the opera was premiered in March 1852. Excerpts from the opera were published prior to this in 1851, in an eight-page booklet entitled *Fragmenter ur Kung Carls jagt. Musik af F. Pacius* (‘Fragments from the Hunt of King Charles. Music by F. Pacius’). This play was a contemporary of Topelius’s first great dramatic work, *Efter femtio år* (‘Fifty years later’), which was premiered in March 1851.

‘Efter femtio år’ and The Hunt of King Charles were both historical in their respective ways, although comparison between them highlights certain important differences. The former was set more or less in modern times, in the year 1838, although the action of the prologue was set in 1788. In this play, the 18th century in all its ungodliness, false rationalism and immorality is clearly subjected to criticism; this criticism was to become a major theme in Topelius’s work. By displaying the immoral and anti-religious traits of the previous century, he wished to advocate the converse values in his own time. This in turn bears witness to Topelius’s idealistic view, which tended towards a kind of constructive conservatism. This view also included a social aspect, the criticism of splendour, opulence and upperclass egoism. Topelius had a practical and tolerant personality and an eye for the human and humorous side of things, which enabled him to present his moral points in an entertaining guise. This is especially true of his fairy tales, which naturally always have a moral but are still fun and exciting.
The theme of *The Hunt of King Charles* is loosely based on actual history. Chance plays a significant role in the progression of the plot, and, as always in Topelius's world, objects—in this case a belt and a piece of jewellery—are important pieces of evidence and magic.

*Efter femtio år* concludes with the lines: “— so much philosophy and so little virtue! Champagne is foaming—an era slipping past!” *The Hunt of King Charles*, on the other hand, ends with a paean of praise to Finland, the fatherland, and all things Finnish. The patriotism of the final chorus is of the general and romantic variety:

“And may thou live glad and rich and free,  
Thou land of ours, we sing to thee.  
Our voices we raise, in greeting a hand  
To thee, to thee, O beloved land!”

This was preceded, in Topelius’s text but not in the final opera libretto, by a dialogue between two choirs: the ‘Swedish choir’ of the courtiers and the ‘Finnish choir’ of the Åland people compare Finland and Sweden, describing Finland as poor but loyal. When the Swedish choir boasts that “we have conquered the people of the land,” the Finns, alluding to the ancient field-breaking traditions, answer: “but we have conquered the land.” This comparison is somewhat naive and historically very biased indeed, but it is an interesting manifestation of the vestiges of leftist-populist thinking which Topelius still retained. However, they soon disappeared. On one hand, the declaration of patriotic love with which *The Hunt of King Charles* closes may seem superfluous or extraneous to the structure of the drama; on the other hand with hindsight it may seem vague and non-committal. However, the situation in 1851 was rather complicated.

The dominant ideology of the day in 1851–1852 was general European neo-absolutism. The years 1848 and 1849 had seen the ‘February revolution’, the ‘spring of nations’, and the ‘mad year’. The political, artistic and ideological unrest and criticism which had been mounting during the 1840s had led to revolutions and rebellions, all of which had been quelled. The previous great wave of revolutions in Europe two decades
earlier had led to the birth of two new states, Belgium and Greece, and to profound reforms in France and Britain. But the system agreed upon in Vienna in 1814, the dynastic principle, had been kept in force, and it remained in effect even after 1848–1849. After the revolutionary phase came the

Like the architect C. L. Engel, who created the cornerstones of architecture in Finland, F. Pacius orginated from Berlin. He created the musical life and musical tradition in Finland, writing and conducting all kinds of music, including operas. He was a teacher of music in the Imperial Alexander University of Finland and the Great Ceremonial Hall of the University was also the main concert hall for the country for one and a half centuries.
reaction of conservative principles, a general tightening of
control measures and an increased emphasis on efficiency and
discipline.

In the neo-absolutist atmosphere of 1850–1852, the leftist
politics and ideological debate of the previous decade which
Topelius had participated in with a passion were strongly
criticized. The ideas of the 1840s were condemned not only by
governments but by large conservative groups of citizens. In
France, Prince Louis-Napoléon was elected President; in 1851
he concentrated all power in himself and in 1852 declared
himself Emperor. France had also reinstated the Pope in Rome
and left troops there to protect the Supreme Pontiff from the
mobs and the democrats.

However, the major instrument in quashing the revolution
and upholding the Vienna system was the Russian Empire,
which Finland was part of at the time. The Finns had behaved
rather calmly during the 'mad year', and the ideological leaders,
including Topelius, had converted the passion of the day into
loyal Finno-Imperial patriotism. In the spring of 1848, when
students in the rest of Europe fought at the barricades and made
strong political speeches, Finnish students assembled to cheer
the Czar and to sing *Vårt land* ('Our land'), a poem written by
Runeberg as Finland's national anthem and set to music by
Pacius for this particular occasion. *Vårt land* is wholly
conservative politically, and in the midst of a period of social
demands and change, it exhorted a heightened moral standard
and resignation to Fate through an aesthetic experience.

This was why practically no 'purges' were needed in
Finland, although it was still necessary to remain wary and in
touch with the spirit of the times.

The *Hunt of King Charles* had an important social aspect
to it, which Topelius expressed in a poem written “to the civi-
lized young people of Helsinki” after the opera had been
performed.

A total of 96 amateurs had participated in the performances,
assembled from the “civilized young people of Helsinki”; their
sense of belonging together had increased throughout the 74
rehearsals and nine performances. This collection of socialites
consisted of young gentlemen, most of whom were students,
and the young ladies of the upper social echelons of the city.
*The Hunt of King Charles* is also a significant chapter in the history of women’s education and social participation in Finland. Professional actresses were at that time a category unto themselves outside the social circles. In this project, women were involved in more than just acting and singing, and the great cast formed a sort of unofficial association. In the 1840s, women had been increasingly thought of as citizens, and women’s participation in associations was advocated.

Topelius’s entire output shows a strong interest in women’s education and participation. Even in *The Hunt of King Charles*, the main character is a bold and witty young woman, of lower birth than her adversary. This was significant not only to Topelius but to the young performers as well. In most plays and novels, the leading character was a man of lowly birth, who through his virtues wins the hand of a noble-born girl; here, exceptionally, the leading character was a young woman. Topelius had not renounced his social ideals of the 1840s, although he no longer believed that they would be achieved through revolution. Actually, he returned to the policy also advocated by his mentor, Runeberg: loyalty to the ruler and trust in that he acts fairly and within the bounds of the law. This idea was also aimed at the young gentlemen in the performing company.

The neo-absolutist control measures led to strict regulations in Russia in spring 1849, the numbers of students in all universities being reduced and the young people subjected to a stricter surveillance than ever. The aim was to prevent political activities and morally suspect behaviour, these two phenomena being connected in that they both constituted a protest against the prevailing social order. In May 1849, a committee was appointed to revise the administration and organization of the Imperial Alexander University of Finland, and at the same time the rules of all associations in the land were taken up for scrutiny. In 1850, a resolution was passed forbidding the publication of political literature such as novels in the majority language, i.e. Finnish.

When Appeals Court Chairman Count Mannerheim, who had been appointed chairman of the University statute committee, arrived in Helsinki in 1849, he was appalled: “I could never have imagined, dear brother, that the situation at the University
Student choirs had a great ideological role in the XIXth century in the Nordic countries and in Germany, and the white cap became a common emblem of Nordic students.

would be so despicable and alarming as I have now found it to be at first hand. The morals of the student population have degraded greatly. Groups of inebriated students can be seen daily, even on Sundays and during church services, and sometimes patrols pick up students in the gutters at night. The tavern and the brothel have gained an alarming precedence over academic achievement.”

Topelius and Pacius were both, in their ways, responsible for the young people and, undoubtedly, as concerned about the rapid deterioration of the situation as Count Mannerheim was. In spring 1848, it had still been possible to rally the students together with patriotic fervour. Pacius had then, by rehearsing the University choir to sing his composition Vårt land, fashioned the nucleus of the movement from this group of youths. By repeating the new national anthem countless times at the Flora festival, a central occasion for opinion-moulding,
on May 13, 1848, they had taught the song to all the students assembled — and moreover, they had thus prevented the emergence of revolutionary songs. This operation was approved of by Emperor Nicholas, and Finland was thus saved at a critical juncture. However, the situation changed rapidly after the spring of 1848, and the disillusionment caused by failed revolutions had spread to Finland from the continent.

The Hunt of King Charles can thus be seen also as a University activity on the part of Pacius and Topelius, a means for guiding the young people, or at least its social vanguard, from politics, taverns and brothels into civilized society, to mingle with genteel ladies and to undertake aesthetically, historically and patriotically acceptable pastimes.

The preservation of the spiritual and formal freedom of the University, the bastion of the sciences and the arts, was crucial to preserving Finland's exceptional status. Topelius addressed this in his famous poem ‘Vår enda arfvelott’ ('Our only heritage'), in which he showed how the nationhood of Finland owed more to the University than to anything else. It was essential to take action to prevent the University from being dissolved or fundamentally constrained.

Historism was an important new element which permeated the 19th century, an element which had surfaced in various countries especially after revolutionary schemes failed. Finland went through a long non-historical period, one important reason for which was that the history of the old regime, Sweden, no longer applied as such after 1809, but the history of the new regime, Russia, did not suit Finland either. There was talk of a Finnish viewpoint, and as a young man Topelius had participated in the discussion with his famous lecture 'Eger Finska Folket en Historie?' ('Do the Finnish people have a history?'), published in 1845. In this lecture, he uses a Hegelian argument to reach a negative conclusion: before 1809, Finland had no separate history of her own.

The elk-hunt of King Charles XI in Åland in 1671 provided a subject in which the youth of the King, the placement of the events in Finland, and their having nothing to do with wars against Russia defined a subject which was eminently suitable to the tightly controlled atmosphere of 1850–1852. It was a bit of history which was both real and fictitious in suitable
The exaltation of spring belongs to the classical themes of student poetry and music in the German-influenced world. This Swedish picture from the turn of the century juxtaposes the singing students (below) with the nature they are singing about.
proportions, ‘Swedish’ and ‘Finnish’ in suitable proportions, and generally speaking loyal and politically harmless.

Topelius was a moralist and a politically conscious citizen, but he was also vivacious and pragmatic as a person and as an author; having long had an ardent passion for the theatre, he knew that a play should contain diverse scenes. The market scene, with its strolling Jews and topical references, creates the necessary lightening effect between the elements of sentiment, patriotism and suspense.

*The Hunt of King Charles* had an enormous effect on the bourgeois urban culture of Helsinki and Finland. Young, rising talent was engaged in its performance and production, and the opera performances sparked the venture of building a new, large and up-to-date-theatre building in Helsinki.

The opera had many qualities which kept it long in the repertoire both in Sweden and in Finland. However, concepts of drama and music changed in the 1880s, after which *The Hunt of King Charles* only returned to the stage in Helsinki on historical occasions, such as on the 100th anniversary of Topelius’s birth in January 1918, immediately before the outbreak of the Finnish Civil War. As a dramatist, Topelius’s fame came to rest virtually only on his plays for children; Pacius was remembered primarily as the composer of certain important patriotic songs. The realist and symbolist periods of the late 19th and early 20th century, as well as the later modernist and politically conscious movements, have been equally uninterested in the time of Topelius and Pacius, its stylistic and aesthetical ideals.

Different eras seek parallels in the past in order to understand themselves. In the economically prosperous bourgeois Europe of today, which has enjoyed a long period of peace, the Biedermeier style has again become a focus of interest and appreciation. The bourgeois, the private, the role of the family and the woman, antique objects, art shops, home culture; all these have been rediscovered and considered fundamental European values. Work, diligence, harmony and restraint are valued instead of revolutions, wars and radical change. Human complexity and existential questions always exist.
The Evolution of the Linguistic Situation in Finland

The problems relating to the existence of two or several languages in a country are rarely confined to problems relating to two languages and of two civilizations only. In most cases they are the result of social inequalities created by political conditions. It is very much more a question of the language of the conquerer and that of the vanquished; it is a matter of the language of the higher class versus the language of the lower class rather than a matter of the language of the numerical majority or minority. Questions and disputes concerning languages can rarely be considered as solely linguistic problems, especially not in cases where the two languages are not very close to each other. It is extremely rare that the borders of linguistic regions are coincident with the political borders, at least where the languages concerned form a cultural coherent circle, as is the case for instance with Denmark, Norway and Sweden. These characteristic features can be distinguished very clearly as regards the problems of the language of Finland, and towards 1850 they led to a certain number of disputes which lasted to the beginning of the World War II, and which coincided with other tendencies, that is to say, those of political emancipation.

The bilingualism of Finland – Finnish and Swedish – dates back approximately a thousand years. The first inhabitants of the country are to-day represented by the Laplanders. These were nomads, pushed towards the North by the Finnish who
came to the country from the South and the East. The colon-
ization of the latter started at the beginning of our era. The
Finnish belong to the finno-ugrian linguistic family amongst
the members of which only the Hungarians, the Finnish, and
the Estonians — whose language is very close to that of the
Finnish — have risen to the level of civilized peoples and
consequently have developed their language to the level of an
instrument for cultural needs. This development took place
under the influence of the wider civilization to which they now
belong, that is to say Western civilization. These three nations
have lived at the borderline of two civilizations, and this has
often given rise to political and cultural controversies, but this
has also led to reciprocal cultural influences. The Hungarians,
who differ much more from the Finnish and the Estonians from
an anthropological than from a linguistic point of view, have
been fighting against the Turks; apart from the Church, their
contact with Western civilization has been maintained by the
Austrians to whom the Hungarians were subjected. In Estonia,
it was the Germans who were the masters of the country, who
entertained the struggle against Russia and, after the annexation
of the country to Russia in the 18th century which has lasted up
to our century, still constituted the higher class of culture and
of administration, as well as the class of great landowners.

Finland has been politically united to Sweden, (the central
part of Sweden of our times) on account of the interests of the
Swedish policy towards its Eastern neighbours and for the
interests of the Western Church. This started in the course of
the 12th century and the “Eastern” region was successively
extended towards the East and the North until the middle of the
16th century by means of what may be called the crusades, the
fortifications, the treaties with Russia (Novgorod) and, in
particular, by means of the colonization of the vast virgin areas
of Finland. In this political and administrative community of
Finland and Sweden, which was strengthened over time,
Finland was on the contrary only a group of provinces of
Sweden, with the same political rights as the other provinces.
(In the Middle Ages and up to the middle of the 17th century
and later till the beginning of the 19th century, Sweden was
quite different from the aspect it presents to-day, the southern
border being situated far more to the North than is the case.
A familiar view of the lutheran Pastor, the vicar, with his wife and the vicarage. The clergy has played a very central role in the Nordic world, living together with the peasantry, and being often the only representative of higher culture or society in the parishes. The nobility and the bourgeoisie have been more absent from the Nordic everyday life than on the Continent or in Britain.

to-day, and the eastern border reaching as far as St. Petersburg. In Finland, the Sweden of that period is often called Sweden-Finland, which though erroneous from a historical point of view, gives us an idea of the actual conditions of that time.)

The Swedish period with its trade, cultural and religious relationships from the 12th century and until 1809 marked the initiation of the Finns into Western civilization. The Swedish language was the language of the administration and, side by side with Latin, that of education. In the course of the centuries it extended its field to practically all the occupations relating to
administration, to trade, and to industry; agriculture, on the contrary, remained faithful to the old language, and the Church for its part addressed itself to the people mainly in the language of the people, according to one of the principles of the Lutheran Reform of the Church. There are reasons to believe that the nobility of the country mastered and used Finnish as late as the 17th century, but the tendency to make the conditions of this class uniform throughout Europe, so that the landowners became gentlemen in the French and Italian style, as well as the influences of the great wars of that century have contributed to a modification of this state of affairs. In the 18th century the civil servants and the bourgeois of the cities began to follow this example. The continuous process of adopting the Swedish language by the higher classes of the country was not the result of a deliberate programme established in the interest of the nation. It occurred all by itself, because the stronger and more developed civilization, as well as the attitude of the government, emphasized the official language at the expense of the national language.

This evolution was accelerated by the immigration of Swedish officials, soldiers and tradesmen as well as by weddings and parent relationships with members of the family living in Sweden (in the narrow sense of the word). According to the way of thinking of that time, neither the government nor anybody else could see any harm in the ongoing process of modification of the character of Finland, as far as language was concerned; but on the other hand, nothing was done to precipitate this process. At the Diet there were interpreters in order to facilitate the task of the Finnish peasants and so as to enable them to participate in the work of the Diet. Decrees were published in Finnish as well and the clergy did its best to teach reading and writing to all concerned. No discontent as such could be noted among the Finnish peasants. Civil servants' ignorance of Finnish was only considered as a fault if other reasons for discontent also occurred, and in that event, all negative factors would be argued against them. However, civil servants' ignorance of the national language never seems to have been a primary cause of complaint.

Finnish literature had begun somewhere between 1540 and 1550, when the New Testament and fragments of certain other
biblical works had been translated into the Finnish language. In 1642, the entire Bible was published in Finnish. At the beginning of the 18th century the first dictionary was published and, at the same time, one finds the first expressions of Finnish

points of view as regards history, and the first scientific interest in the Finnish language and the national culture of the Finns. In the last half of the 18th century, the Herder period, Henrik Gabriel Porthan, a librarian and professor of the old University of Åbo (Turku), a farsighted scholar and a collector, started

The philosopher on the throne. Finland’s first public statue of a real person is that of Porthan, professor of rhetoric at the Finnish University. The statue was erected in Turku in 1863, even though the University had already been long since transferred to Helsinki.
scientific research on Finland, its geography, its language and in particular its history, and its quite unique popular poetry (folklore).

Apart from its scientific influences, the work of Porthan has been of importance for the birth of a national romanticism which emphasized the role of the language in political affairs. The research and the teaching spread throughout the country from the chair of Porthan, particularly through the clergy, helped to strengthen the educated people's notion of Finland's cultural situation in the Kingdom of Sweden. In the course of the 18th century several wars had shown that the resources available in Sweden for the maintenance of Finland were extremely doubtful. When Russia conquered the country during the wars against Napoleon in 1808–1809, the higher classes were easily convinced to accept the new regime, because the administration was not changed, and instead of becoming one of the ordinary provinces of Russia, Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy. The fact that the country maintained its Swedish laws and its representative government is due to the ideas of Alexander I and his advisers, according to which one should not level down a well-developed administration in the interest merely of uniformity. This also meant that the Russian language was not imposed upon us and that the Swedish language kept its position as the language of administration, cultural life and education. As social promotion and the general civilization involved a continuous transition from Finnish to Swedish — in particular in the cities — this major political change did not have a great influence on the linguistic conditions or on the evolution of the languages in this country.

In spite of the birth of quite a large theological literature in the Finnish language and, consequently, the creation of the Finnish written language, and in spite of the fact that modest journals and papers for peasants had been produced in Finnish during the years 1770–80 and 1820–30, the language was still but little evolved and could not be really used as a means of expression of a higher culture. As none of the related languages were sufficiently advanced to be used to that end, insinuations were made here and there in the course of the 19th century, that the Finnish language could perhaps never be used as a means of
communication in a higher culture. This conception was supported by the fact that in the field of linguistics Finnish as well as Hungarian are synthetic and agglutinative languages which were considered as inferior to analytic languages. The

Runeberg in his later days, already a national poet. He belonged to the clergy as a former gymnasium teacher and member of the Porvoo episcopal chapter.

“Kalevala”, the epic published for the first time in 1835 by Elias Lönnrot who had composed it on the basis of popular epic poems and cycles of poetry on the model of the Homeric epics, became a true precursor of the struggle against the opinion that the Finnish language and people were of an inferior kind. Very rapidly the Kalevala was translated into Swedish and French and other languages, and it was extremely well received on the
continent. It has helped to make the Finnish country and people known not only in Europe but also in Finland, by giving them a civilized profile.

The Literary Society of Finland, which was founded in 1831, and whose activities were at rather an academic literary level, worked in order to establish a national civilization in the classical-romantic spirit, and used Porthan (who had died in 1804) and the *Kalevala* as the ideal cornerstones. The poet Johan Ludvig Runeberg wrote poems in the same spirit, although he used the Swedish which was his native tongue. Besides the *Kalevala*, it is to him that the Finnish owe their cultural emancipation.

In his poems in hexameters, Runeberg gave a picture of the Finnish countryside and the Finnish people, which was to play a fundamental role, both in the life of the Finnish and in the foreign opinion of Finland probably up to the period of World War II. To Runeberg, it was harmony and serenity that characterised the landscape and the people of Finland. To him people were honest and peaceful, and they lived in arcadian simplicity. The epic song, more magical than heroic, attributed the higher ends of life to the characters depicted by Runeberg.

These Homeric and Herderian ideals were very well adapted to the conditions imposed by the political situation of the country, and whilst calling the attention of the world to everything that was original and characteristic in the country, could also contribute to turning eyes away from the continent and the currents of political liberalism and romanticism which were steadily increasing on the Continent, Sweden included. The decades that started in 1830 and, in particular, that which started in 1840 were in Europe a period of political discontent, a period where the claims to obtain the right to organize meetings and a democratic government were gradually strengthened and burst out finally in 1848–49 in a series of revolutions, not only against monarchical absolutism, but also against the cultural, religious and social conditions developed under the protection and according to the ideal of the authoritarian systems.

In many countries and, in particular, in Germany, in Italy, in Poland and in Hungary, the tendencies towards liberal
emancipation were linked to the national issues. Supernationalist programmes were established here and there, such as Scandinavianism and Panslavism. These liberalist and

Franzén, the forerunner of Runeberg, one of the most important poets of Finland. He moved to Sweden in 1810 after having been elected to the Swedish Academy, and then became bishop in the then northernmost see of Sweden. Many Finnish-speakers also lived in his diocese, and Franzén was fluent in Finnish.

nationalist ideas of the Continent were introduced into Finland by Johan Vilhelm Snellman. In the 1830s, as a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Helsinki, and president of one of the
students' associations, Snellman tried to find favourable acceptance for the ideas of Hegel and Schelling on the true meaning of university studies, and of the intimate solidarity of the academic world. A study trip to Sweden and to Germany which lasted three years produced a considerable radicalization and a desire to apply these social ideas, which were now to be extended outside the sphere of academic life so as to encompass the entire nation, to practical life. During his stay abroad Snellman wrote two books, one of them on political science. Upon his return to Finland, he went in for journalism and with his newspaper "Saima", he obtained rapidly the support of the young generation. Nevertheless, it took some time to break down the aesthetic nationalist ideals, (represented by the Kalevala and Runeberg) to the benefit of Snellman's radical ideas on nation, religion and society, characterized by the doctrines of the left wing politics of Hegel. The conditions of censorship cut short the propagation of Snellman's ideas. Living far from Helsinki, he did not even have any direct personal contact with the students, whom he considered, however, as the only element in the country with whom it should be possible to try to build up a different future.

The political programme of Snellman consisted in emphasizing the importance of a social critique instead of submitting oneself blindly to bureaucracy. His national programme had the same objective. It was based on a concept of history according to which the Finnish nation could subsist in universal history only as long as it would be in a position to create its own culture. Now, this would necessarily imply the contribution of the entire nation, and not only of the educated classes. Hence it was important to obtain cultural independence and, moreover, national and political independence, founded on the creative activity of the Finnish language. To that effect it was necessary to lead the national movement in a more practical direction with the objective of educating the people, and of encouraging it to take an interest in its cultural and political affairs. Snellman's objective was to create a civic society instead of a bureaucratic – authoritarian society, and the essential problem therefore was to promote participation. It was a matter of broadening the basis of the movement and of obtaining the
collaboration of the majority, these being the vital questions for the future of the nation. That was why Finnish should some day predominate over the Swedish language and become the language of civilization and administration of the country.

Aleksis Kivi was the first important writer to use Finnish in the 1860s and 1870s. His Holberg-type drama The country Shoe-makers and his great novel Seven Brothers are very much living literature today.

Snellman’s nationalist ideas and projects for future were, in general, very well received by his contemporaries, who, however, considered often the reforms concerning the position of the Finnish language as somewhat too hasty at that time. Snellman himself did not consider himself able to adopt the Finnish language and he did not even think it was necessary, so that until his death in 1881 he remained faithful to the Swedish language, his own mother tongue. But he expected that the young should study Finnish and that they should work for the
education of the people. The aim of his activities, which were first and foremost based on philosophical arguments, was to impart this ideal to the younger generation. In his work as a journalist and in his university career, as well as in the expression of the ideas for which he was struggling, he rapidly met strong resistance from the Government which gave him to understand that this type of activity for the propagation of political tendencies was not desirable. His journal "Saima" was suppressed after having been published for a year and a half, and Snellman was not appointed professor of philosophy, as had been expected.

The attempts to modify the Literary Society of Finland, the objective of which was to make it a more general association, were stopped, and the plan to associate peasants and students with it was rejected just when it was about to be achieved. The reform of the Literary Society was accompanied by a plan to publish a series of literary works, including the social critiques of contemporary writers as Victor Hugo and Eugène Sue in Finnish; but this project, together with other points of view which had been expressed and which the Government considered dangerous, led to the prohibition of publishing any literature in Finnish except economic or religious works. This happened in 1850, when the reactions of the Government had grown acrimonious as a consequence of the attempts at revolution which had been made here and there – in particular in Hungary – and which had been suppressed.

The prohibition of printing books in Finnish was therefore established in order to eliminate the idea of participation for which Snellman had striven. This decree which did not have great practical effect was partly abolished four years later, and totally abolished after ten years, but nevertheless strengthened the position of the Finnish language from an emotional point of view. As the Government for its part was ready to increase the share of the Finnish language progressively, although slowly in the administration, the 1840's can be regarded as a period of transition as regards the position of the Finnish language. A new current had now been born, running against the Swedenization due to social promotion and for the strengthening of the position of Finnish. At that time, the two currents were not apparent at the University. Journalism and
literature ran ideologically counter to each other. The priority of the Finnish language was recognised in principle, and even people who had considerable trouble with expressing themselves in it called it their mother tongue. In the future, the

Z. Topelius, journalist and professor of history had an enormous influence in Finland and Sweden as an historical novelist, writer of fairy tales, drama, as well as the basic readers for the elementary classes in the schools.

Finnish language would carry the day completely over the Swedish language, but this future seemed illusory to most of the educated Finnish; it seemed so remote that it did not imply any practical consequences. Others on the contrary wanted to go ahead and change rapidly, thinking particularly of the political consequences — the attitude towards Russia — that
would follow greater social participation. As I said before, the Government wanted to suppress a nationalism which by its political tendencies advocated the education of the people. In return, it was ready to improve the knowledge of Finnish as far as civil servants were concerned. To that end a professorship of the Finnish language was instituted at the only university of the country, that of Helsinki, in 1851, at a time when the chairs for the teaching of modern languages were very rare. For ideological reasons, the study of this subject was very popular, although for a certain time, the national interest as such was disregarded in favour of the liberal tendencies which marked the modification of the policy of the Government of Nicholas I, whom Alexander II succeeded in 1855.

Alexander II became famous in history mainly on account of the colossal land reform which he accomplished in 1861, eliminating serfdom in Russia. His reform policy met with considerable difficulty and could not be fulfilled in Russia, but in Finland, with no serfdom, the reign of Alexander II was a period of enlightenment. The Diet, which for decades had only existed on paper, was revived and censorship was considerably reduced. All this meant that a remarkable democratization of the society, and a really civic participation by the population were achieved. Snellman, who had earlier tried to achieve all this, had made himself available to the Government at the time of the change of the regent. He was first appointed half political professor in philosophy and later he was made a senator and Head of Finance. He was one of Alexander’s counsellors on Finland’s political affairs. Through the influence of Snellman, the regent was convinced to publish a bill in 1863 which all of a sudden made Finnish an official and administrative language side by side with Swedish, although this reform only came into force twenty years later. In the 1860s the Finnish language was introduced into secondary education where its share increased easily, although not without disputes. At the same time, the Finnish language made its first steps in the field of science and at the University. Journalism and literature etc. started working in this language. Finnish civilization blossomed. There was already a national civilization, which so to speak was now translated into Finnish. Problems of terminology were sometimes difficult to solve, of course, but after all we did
not have to create everything, since there was already a background.

Considering the previous doctrines which in principle recognized the priority of Finnish and considering its role as a

E. Lönnrot, later first professor of Finnish language and literature, collected popular poetry in the Finnish and Russian Karelian periphery and composed from these elements a great epic, the Kalevala. National epics had become the great idea of the epoch following 'Ossian' and Herder, and the new political situation of Finland after 1809 demanded a new mythical explication of its origins. Lönnrot however wrote his work with Homer in mind.
proper mother tongue, the progress of Finnish should have been generally accepted and favoured even amongst the educated classes. However, on a long term basis, the reaction was quite different at least in part, and this is due to the fact that the language problems were related to political problems, which were considered of vital importance in relation to any other problem. It was first and foremost the question of the political attitude vis-a-vis Russia and also in part, vis-a-vis Sweden. In 1854–56, on the occasion of the Crimean War which took place not only at the Black Sea but also at the Baltic Sea and later on during the struggle for the independence of Italy in 1860, a movement in Finland arose among the literary circles and the students, hoping that Finland could in fact be detached from Russia and associated with Sweden. The partisans of this movement understood that from a cultural point of view the independent position of Finland would not be possible on a long term basis. As a political change was out of the question, those concerned indulged a cultural Scandinavianism which implied a cultural association with Sweden on a voluntary basis. The Finnish cultural tendencies had no importance from that point of view, and might even be negative, because if the country was really to become more Finnish this would mean a removal from the Scandinavian cultural sphere. Apart from this movement, there was also a liberal minority which recommended a prudent progression towards the promotion of Finnish, so as to make it the official language and the sole language, or at least the main language of the civilization. They feared that a sudden change accompanied by a broadening of the basis might entail a lowering of the cultural level. Instead of the old educated class which spoke Swedish, there would be a new leading cultivated class who were more numerous, but whose education was also more superficial. They felt that the tradition of this class towards civilization and the Finnish rights would mean a weakness vis-a-vis the Russian claims which could be fatal and which could in fact lead to the loss of internal autonomy for the country before the new class had had the time to raise itself to the cultural level of the former leading class. These dangers were not only considered as theoretical. In fact, the movement of Snellman accepted a less negative attitude towards Russia. According to the theory of Hegel
adopted by Snellman, there was nothing more important for the subsistence of a nation than the development of everything that was really specific to it, and first and foremost its language. That is why no alliance with Sweden, either cultural or political, was desirable, because the result would have been of course that Swedish would override the Finnish language. On the other hand, the educational trends and the transition from Swedish to Finnish as an official language was to be recommended, it was even indispensable. In order to achieve that end, Snellman was ready to abandon his attitude of opposition and to cooperate politically. The “fennomanian” party was then quite ready to cooperate with the Russians in order to obtain national advantages, but it was precisely this collaboration which seemed clearly dangerous to the liberal and the Scandinavian circles. It seemed to be a broad road open to concessions in constitutional matters. Snellman was even ready to sacrifice form in favour of his cause, for instance as regards the implementation of the manifest of languages in 1863. But who could affirm, asked the others, that the constitution would not be violated on the initiative of the Russians? This theory is obviously not sufficient to give an ideological explication of the attitude of Snellman and his colleagues. Very probably their attitude was based on a “Realpolitik”; according to him it was necessary to proceed to true positive work instead of mobilizing forces for the defence of the constitution. After all, it seems that all that the partisans of a given idea consider as “Realpolitik” is in fact considered by others as opportunism and submission.

In these circumstances, the language became a distinctive sign of different opinions and different ideologies, not only in matters of language but also in other matters. But as the attitude towards language had become a common measure for political opinions, its importance had of course become dominant. In the Scandinavian camp, called later on “Suecomania”, A. O. Freudenthal created an ideology in order to support the rights of the Swedish language in Finland, pretending that there was (and there still is) a population of Swedish origin, consisting of the descendants of the Swedish who, in the course of the Middle Ages, had settled in Finland. This theory did not take into account the fact that the major part of the educated class
did not come from these Swedish settlers but from Finnish families speaking Finnish. In any case, the theory was accepted only by a part of those who continued to speak Swedish. Other similar groups were composed,

1) of a large number of elderly civil servants who abided by all that was old and purely conservative and,

2) the large heterogenous liberal group for whom the language in itself could not play such a vital role as for those who accepted the theory of national ideology of Hegel in one form or another. Amongst these partisans of liberalism there was also an important group of people who worked hard for the propagation of Finnish civilization in Finnish, but who did not want to affiliate themselves to “fennomania” because of its tactics of collaboration, as they said.

Towards the end of the century the grouping of the parties was the following. There were two Finnish parties, the old fennomanian party, which now had got a considerable position both in the administrative and in cultural and economical establishment and became conservative, and the young-Finnish liberal party. There was also an essentially liberal Swedish party to which belonged the Freudenthalians. Consequently, these parties reacted differently to the political crisis with the Russia government which started in 1899. The Swedish party and the members of the young-Finnish party were clearly on the defensive, although it was a passive defence, whilst the old Finnish party proposed ensuring that the Finns, by a partial concession, should at least have a share in the administration of the country.

The Diet in Finland included four estates up to 1906. Most of the partisans of the fennomanian ideology were amongst the clergy and amongst the peasants, whilst the nobility and the urban bourgeoisie were mainly adherents of the Swedish party. The major reform of the Diet in 1906 introduced a Chamber of Representatives and, instead of limiting the right of voting to the small number of the nobility, of the clergy, of the bourgeoisie of the cities who had a certain income and of the land-owners, universal suffrage was introduced. The industrial and agricultural workers who had so far been deprived of all political rights were now equal to all the others, which meant that 40 % of the seats were occupied by socialist represen-
The Fennomania of the turn of the century was described by liberal Swedish opinion as a destructive trend, demolishing the legal, cultural, linguistic and historic ties to the old Swedish times and to the Western tradition. This destruction opened the way for the black birds from the East.

The reform of the representation has considerably influenced the party system, which is now organized on a modern basis. The Swedish party especially has been affected by this new system, having dominated in two of the four orders, but now for the first time, having to gain the support of the electors in the real modern sense of the word. The Swedish population of the coast which so far had remained in the background (because the order of the peasants was fennomanian) became suddenly very important. This meant that the liberal Swedish ideology which had the character of a higher class and which had so far predominated, now had to give in to the “countryside Swedicism” i.e. to the Freudenthalism. Freudenthal’s notion of two nationalities within the country is accepted at present as the basis for the new Swedish party
which has even succeeded in getting 10% of the votes, a number which corresponds to the number of Swedes. The Reform of the Diet has therefore introduced an accentuated nationalism amongst the population which spoke Swedish. They feared that the Swedish language would disappear totally after having lost its political support and because a new educated class which spoke Finnish had been born towards the end of the 19th century, and had now become equal to, if not even stronger than the Swedish class in the administration and cultural life. This new Finnish educated class was composed in part of people who, following the ideology of Snellman, had voluntarily changed their language and sent their children to Finnish schools. Another ever increasing group was composed of children from Finnish families who – due to economic development and to the Finnish schools – had been able to go on to higher education and reach the level of qualifications required for the civil servants.

The accentuated nationalism among the Swedish-speaking population appeared at the time of Finland’s declaration of independence which occurred at the same time as the Russian Revolution, towards the end of 1917, and which was followed by the Civil War between the bourgeois Finnish Government and the revolutionary socialists, supported by Russians. This struggle for independence and the civil war provided an important basis for the ideological evolution of the country because they resulted in radical attitudes on more points.

The nationalist Swedish movement was afraid that the Swedish language could not keep its official position as equal to Finnish under the new conditions and required therefore an internal territorial administrative and cultural autonomy. These claims, however, were not accepted – except perhaps as far as education and church matters are concerned – but they lost their topical interest when the new constitution of 1919 explicitly ensured both Finnish and Swedish of the right to be considered national languages, and that there should be full equality from the cultural standpoint for the two linguistic groups. In 1921 a law relating to languages was promulgated, based on the principle of equality and reciprocity, and specifying the system according to which languages should be used in local administrative units.
No sooner had the Swedish radicalism waned than the Finnish nationalist movement appeared. This movement, based on the ideology of Snellman and of the old Finnish party was initiated in 1923. Making claims for the settlement of the condition of the languages which would give the Finnish language the right to be the only official language, so that the State University of Helsinki would become more Finnish, etc. This movement, known as the "pure Finnish" movement, associated itself with the demand of the nationalist movement for the annexation to Finland of East Karelia, a vast region beyond the Finno-Russian border, where the majority of the population spoke a Finnish language. The Finnish volunteers had even tried to conquer this region at the time when the conditions in the USSR had not yet been stabilized after the revolution and the civil war. This new nationalism was marked by national socialist emphasis on the union of the people after the civil war, around the national ideal which should be used as a bond and present the power of the nation as the objective of the future. This power was necessary specially for the Eastern policy, being needed for the annexation of the irredentas as well as for the defence of the country against the Russian invasion which was feared.

This new nationalism was mainly a movement of students directed by a semi-fascist organization, the Karelian Academic Society. It owed its existence to need to put itself forward provoked by the young political group of the country, and it was quite clearly also directed against Sweden: they considered the Swedish opinion to be paternalistic and that Sweden did not seem sufficiently to appreciate its youthful neighbour, whose historic mission — it was thought — was to defend the West and especially Scandinavia against an invasion from the East. Therefore, in spite of the character of this nationalism which could be designated as a youth movement and, in spite of the youthfulness of its members and its tactics, this movement did, however, by its strong organization, its education, its comradeship, its persuasion and its indefatigable activity, succeed in putting forward a view which was strong enough to bring back aggression in language matters and to revive the old struggle over language, particularly in the countryside. In politics, the Agrarians, a very important centre party took over
Finland was historically a part of the Swedish Realm and Swedish culture and tradition prevailed in Finland long after the political rupture. The Fennomanian ideology arose against this which from the Svecomanian and also from the Liberal standpoint meant a destruction of central values and traditions.
the programme relating to linguistic matters of this movement. As the other right-wing parties and even certain social democrats had a sneaking sympathy for the claims of this nationalistic movement, the question of languages was to remain on the agenda of the Parliament from the early 1930s right up to the beginning of the Second World War. To all parties, however, it was a matter of secondary importance that was put forward only at the time of an electoral campaign and when the party was in opposition. All the parties in power were on the contrary extremely moderate on this particular point during the period where they were in fact in Government. This is also true for the Agrarians. Nevertheless, the question of linguistic conditions at the State University, which had become a symbol of the entire new struggle over languages, led to an extraordinary convening of the Parliament in 1935, and to demonstrations, etc. organized by the students as before. The exceptional convocation of the Parliament and the demonstrations, were the culmination of this new struggle over languages. The general economic and cultural evolution contributed considerably to satisfying the need of the country to put itself forward. This is also true on the level of internal politics, because the Swedes were no longer considered as the (only) higher class. The influence of universal politics was even more clear. The question of annexation of Karelia lost its importance on the eve of the great war. The Scandinavian orientation, which had always and in particular after the declaration of Finnish independence had many supporters was strengthened, for reasons of defence of the country against invasion also. When towards the end of 1935, the Parliament made a proclamation on the general Nordic orientation of the country, this was a hard blow to the pure Finnish movement, having militated against everything that was Swedish. Towards the end of the 1930s it was thus possible to envisage a reconciliation in the language struggle. It had not been able to satisfy the demands as far as principles were concerned, but nevertheless, it had created an opinion which was sufficiently strong, and which for instance expressed itself in attempts to give Swedish surnames – which for historical reasons were numerous in Finland – a Finnish form.

However, the parties, like certain organizations, were so keen
on their programmes, and their attitudes were so radical that it was only an external cause that could solve all the problems at the same time. The war was in fact to be that cause. The solitariand Winter War against the USSR from November 1939 to March 1940 was so perilous for the existence of the country that all internal struggles had to be set aside. Naturally, the difference of opinion came up again after the war and even during the war of 1941–44, but appeasement in the language struggle has become definitive.

In the main the post-war period has been peaceful as far as linguistic questions are concerned; on several occasions the majority has stressed the importance of maintaining the position of Swedish in Finland. Many outstanding personalities who in the years 1920–1930 had been partisans of Finnish nationalism have changed their opinion, and the expression of pre-war nationalism which comes up from time to time is not really important and does not have any real impact among the youth. Swedish does not owe its relatively strong position to the Swedish population of the country, which only represents some 7% of the total population. Though the importance of this group, due to its high level of education, is greater than this percentage would seem to indicate, it is essentially through the Nordic orientation and the need for collaboration with the Scandinavian countries that the position of Swedish in Finland has remained so steady.

The second language of the country has until now been the first compulsory language after the mother language in all secondary schools of the country, which means that more than 90% of all the children have learnt Swedish at school. Now on the eve of a school reform, the objective of which was to establish a comprehensive system, the Government has decided to propose that English should be the first foreign language at all schools. This proposal has, however, met great resistance on both sides, and the Parliament resolved that both Swedish and English shall be obligatory subjects.

The bilingualism of Finland is mainly a reminiscence of a period of 600 years during which Finland was part of Sweden. But the Swedish language in Finland was not the language of the conqueror, and it never had the character of being a foreign sovereign’s mode of expression. Swedish has rather been the
medium through which the Finns were connected to Western civilization, to the political and literary traditions, to the industrial and commercial progress of the Western world. For nearly a thousand years and until to-day there has been a large number of people in the country who are more or less bilingual. The Finns to-day who have attended the secondary schools – and their percentage is one of the highest in the entire world – have learned to write and read and to express themselves at least satisfactorily in the second language of the country, and in many places, in shops, and in kindergartens in all bilingual regions, people are in contact with the second language. These facts will lead you to understand that bilingualism does not present any major difficulty in the daily life of the country.

It is also obvious that the strongest party is favoured by this coexistence, and that the language of the majority in mixed marriages, which are very numerous, can easily determine the education of the children, etc. On this subject the sociologist would assume a greater aggressiveness on the part of the minority for the strengthening of the internal front. But on the other hand, one might wonder if the language in itself is sufficient to establish a bond, as one does not have the impression of being a member of another nationality and as the Finns consider themselves as a nation with two languages. This question is not analysed here. I have only glanced at it to indicate that bilingualism is not a stable state but that it can be modified and altered constantly and reciprocally both from a linguistic point of view – and this standpoint is not analysed here – and from the point of view of sociology, which has an influence on the policy which governs our environment.
A Patriotic enterprise

In 1881 the founders of a new, specifically Finnish fire insurance company chose a demanding name: Fennia, the Latin name of their fatherland. They probably did not realise they were doing anything so very extraordinary or solemn as it would seem in our time to name a private enterprise after a country and a state. At that time many other companies with similar types of names were doing business in Finland – Svea – Sweden, Rossija – Russia, Norden – the Nordic countries, Skandinavien – Scandinavia and even de Nederlanden – the Netherlands. Some years later the Suomi (Finland) company was established in Finland and Norge (Norway) in Norway so that one may almost say that in many countries it became a rule rather than exception for insurance companies in particular to be named after the country. Naming the Finnish fire insurance company Fennia cannot, however, be considered merely as following the practice in other or coincidence. The name, Fennia, incorporated a programme, as was confirmed when Fennia established an accident insurance company subsidiary six years later. This was named, following the same ideological pattern, Patria. Fennia-Patria, Finland-Fatherland, a company whose aim and task were to work for the benefit of Finland and Finnish society. It was obvious and important that the interests and goals of both the company and the nation were identical. Opinions about one’s country, in other words the society, and of the individual as an element and influential member of that society vary, as do opinions as to the fundamental goals and incentives of a country’s prosperity; constant discussion of these issues is healthy. This debate was at its liveliest around the time when Fennia was founded and the choice of name can
certainly be associated with this debate and controversy over Finland’s future. The decision to establish Fennia was made in the spring of 1881 and only a few weeks later its Articles of Association were approved by the government. On May 31st 1882 the company went into operation.

The insurance business had already existed in Finland for some time and many foreign companies particularly had expanded their activities to Finland. This was one of the reasons why the newspapers had written so much about insurance companies. The prominent Finnish statesman and scholar, J. V. Snellman, for example, who had himself worked as an insurance agent had discussed the issue on several occasions. However, words were turned into deeds at a very interesting and significant time for Finland.

At the turn of 1880 the establishment of a Finnish fire insurance company was widely discussed in the Finnish press particularly in the leading newspaper, the liberal Helsingfors Dagblad. It was pointed out that this had been attempted on several earlier occasions. The risk incorporated in this kind of enterprise had been the primary obstacle. Minor risks had, to a great extent, been handled by Finnish companies but it was now a question of major risks and the inherent dangers were also emphasized in articles related to the establishment of Fennia.

Industry was particularly interested in a sufficiently large and strong company. Finnish industry was, however, only beginning to develop and the number of people employed by it was very small. Finland was still a primarily agrarian country but circles existed which pondered future alternatives.

The founders of Fennia were closely associated with the group which in December 1880 published the first written political party programme in Finland, that of the liberal party. A circular following the publication of the party programme was signed by men who played a major role in the establishment of Fennia, including A. W. Wahren and Th. Wegelius. Otherwise ties to the liberal group which included such prominent Finns as Leo Mechelin, Robert Lagerborg, A. H. Chydenius and others who supported the views of the Helsingfors Dagblad were clear. No actual Liberal Party was in fact formed around this programme. The idea met with very
severe criticism — particularly from J. V. Snellman. An event significantly affecting Finland’s future prospects took place in the spring of 1881 — when both the Liberal Party programme and the establishment of a new fire insurance company were topical — the assassination on March 13th of Czar Alexander II who was also Grand Duke of Finland.

We may perhaps generalize the situation and say that one hundred years ago Finland could be divided into two according to political party or still more philosophy: the Fennoman line represented rural occupations and values whereas Liberalism dominated in coastal and urban areas, industry and trade. The Fennoman line which was supported by the Clergy and Peasantry stressed Finnish Nationalism and national solidarity and development based on traditional values. It was very close to the religious movements, did not accept the brilliance and elegance of Modern Times and was unhesitatingly monarchist. The Fennoman’s Finland was poor but faithful and put its trust in education to improve living conditions in the future.

In Finland, as elsewhere, Liberalism stressed the importance of the individual and enterprise both in trade and industrial life and in the domain of religion and ideology. This view, supported by the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals, underlined the importance of the exchange of both goods and ideas, trade, and foreign relations. It saw unchained intellectual and material enterprise as a condition for the elimination of social misery and the satisfaction of intellectual needs.

Both of these lines considered themselves patriotic. The Fennoman line associated the concept of patriotism with language and literature, enlightenment and national tradition whereas the liberal view had, at that particular time, begun more concretely to link the uniquely Finnish development perspectives with its economic progress. An important liberal ideologist, professor E. G. Estlander had in a well-known pamphlet, “Den Finska Konstens och Industrins utveckling hittills och händanefter” (“The Development of Finnish Art and Industry in the Past and in the Future”, published in 1871) put forward the idea that the national existence of Finland was dependent on the development of Finnish industry and specifically on the development of highly-processed industrial production. The very first large-scale industrial exhibition in
Finland held in Helsinki’s Kaivopuisto Park in 1876 was visited by the Czar and Czarina themselves and proved that Finland had already taken a significant step forward. The exhibition displayed everything that Finland had and was – from industrial products to works of art, from machines to stands displaying local Finnish folklore.

All this showed the future of Finland’s material development. It was only in the 1860’s that Finland had experienced a severe famine which resulted in the deaths of hundreds and thousands from hunger and disease. Such a famine had not been experienced in Central Europe for centuries. The Finnish historian and author, Z. Topelius, wrote that the smoking factory chimney, work, activity, means of transport all were more beautiful than Nature that could try men in such a cruel way.
The surplus rural population, the large class of landless and poor, constituted a still greater problem. Large numbers had moved to the towns, particularly to St. Petersburg but the problems of the majority remained unsolved. One solution lay in the jobs created by industry and the related growth of the towns, another in the agrarian reform, the abolition of the small-tenant farm system and the redistribution of land. The latter alternative in particular would have required extensive changes in legislation which was not considered possible at the time. The agrarian reform was postponed until the 20th century and was finally implemented during the dramatic events of Finland's struggle for independence. Significant possibilities for industrial development on the other hand had been created during the reign of Alexander II. As the railway network grew communications developed and technical and commercial education became available. The trend of developments was underlined by the introduction of a Finnish unit of currency, the mark, which was tied to the metal standard (the silver standard in 1865 and the gold standard in 1878), company legislation, the banking system, etc. In 1881, however, all this was very new.

In 1881 people still remembered the Famine of 1867–68 when there had been no railway connection to St. Petersburg or 1863 when the National Diet had finally assembled in Finland or the year 1860 when Finland had got its own unit of currency. When in the spring of 1880 the 25th anniversary of the reign of Alexander II was celebrated, the feeling that the period had been one of great changes and positive development was emphasized. In this connection, the regular assembly of the Diet, the development of the status of the Finnish language, the establishment of primary schools, new companies and associations were referred to. But the most important development seemed to have been the economic sector: the railway to the Russian capital, St. Petersburg, had led to a significant increase in Finland’s exports and had linked Finland to Europe.

The new links and markets offered a great promise for the future, but were also a challenge. How would Finland's relations with Russia develop; communications and markets were, of course, open to both East and West. There were also signs of Russia’s willingness to invest in Finland. According to
a foreign newspaper the Finnish industrial exhibition of 1876 could be compared to the National Diet since it also expressed the voice of the people and proved that Finland had entered the world of nations. As early as 1809 Czar Alexander I had declared Finland a nation by making it an autonomous Grand Duchy but it was only gradually that this administrative entity grew into a uniform independent and distinct cultural and economic area. Each company with its network of agents created a uniform Finland and linked the different parts of Finland to one another rather than to its neighbouring countries.

The future, however, could as always be formulated in a different light and with different emphasis. The reign of Alexander II had seen the growth of Liberalism at legislative, economic and cultural levels. After the assassination of the Czar in 1881 a change in Finland’s position was to be anticipated since the Russian Nationalist group was expected to achieve a stronger position than before both as a result of the assassination and of the attitude of the heir to the crown, Alexander III. It was thought that this might lead to a more conservative policy and the renunciation of free trade and economic Liberalism and that the special position of Finland might be threatened. There can be no doubt that one reason for the rapid establishment of Fennia and the swift government approval of its Articles of Association was the fear of a sudden change among the Finnish ruling officials. This fear was not unfounded: in June Finland was given a new Governor General and in September a new Minister Secretary of State was appointed.

Contrary to Western Europe, in Finland political Liberalism could not be formed into a political party in the spring of 1881 but there were other channels for promoting these ideas. One example of this was the cultural publication of the liberal Fennoman group, Valvoja (The Watchman) which was first published in 1881. Following the demise of the Helsingfors Dagblad, the “Young Fennoman faction” established its own newspaper, Päivälehti, in 1894. The largest advertisement on the front page of its first issue was Fennia’s and this was repeated in the first issue of Päivälehti’s successor, Helsingin Sanomat.

All this may be seen as a common link between the company
established under a liberal era and a liberal newspaper. Many shared the view, however, that liberal ideas could be better promoted by deeds than by words. The increase of Finnish prosperity and the maintenance of Finnish economy in Finnish hands was a patriotic enterprise. In the conditions prevailing one hundred years ago the founders of a large new fire insurance company had a definite purpose in mind when they named their company Fennia – Finland.
Mannerheim’s ride to China

The future Marshal of Finland, twice head of the Finnish State, three times Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Armed Forces, began his military career in the Imperial Russian army, as did so many other Finns during the long period in which Finland, as a Grand Duchy, formed part of that Empire.

In 1906 he was a newly-appointed colonel, and was in March called to the General Staff in St. Petersburg, where the Chief of Staff, General Palitsyn, offered him the opportunity to join an archaeological expedition led by the French Professor Paul Pelliot through Chinese Turkestan as an intelligence officer and military observer. After some hesitation, it seems, the 39-year old colonel accepted and started his expedition in June of that year. It was to take two full years and cause him to travel 14,000 kilometres on horseback — “across Asia from West to East”, as he said himself on publishing his great diary in English. This diary, printed in 1940, is of course in itself a very valuable source for the history of Asian studies, but due to its publication in difficult times and to the fact that the edition was quite restricted, it has not gained very much recognition abroad. In Finland, the Asian expedition is mostly seen as a part of the “prehistory” of the future national hero, of his “years of preparation”, to cite the title of the work by Dr. John Screen.

The situation in the Far East had rapidly deteriorated in the 1890s, when the internal Chinese struggles between reformists and traditionalists were confronted with the Western and Japanese imperialist aspirations. From the Russian viewpoint, the advances of Japan on the one hand and those of Great Britain, Germany and France on the other were unwelcome.
The general direction of Russian policy was to maintain China as a great but rather passive Empire. Russia's plans for economic expansion in Siberia and on the Pacific coast were based on the idea of relative peace in that part of the world. Great expectations rested on the Trans-Siberian Railway. The struggles in Turkestan and on the frontier against British—Indian interests and also on the Sino—Russian frontier had been solved (in the 70s and 80s) and there was no interest in expanding Russian power in these sectors.

Alexander III, who reigned from 1881 to 1894, concentrated on internal reform, especially economic and transport development. Subsequently Japanese activity — e.g. the victory over China in 1895 — and the Chinese reform movement stressed the importance of an active policy by Russia in the Far East. The young Emperor Nicholas was personally much more interested in proposals for such a policy and the result was the disastrous Russo—Japanese war. Being in conflict with Japan, Russia tried to conserve something of the relative goodwill it had acquired in China, but with no special success.

Mannerheim participated in the Russo—Japanese war as a volunteer, and his activities during the war seem to have broadened his outlook. He had much to do with the cartographic and other information services and without doubt he used the period for general study, not only of the war itself but of the East as a whole and the politico-military aspects of that great region, until then little understood in St. Petersburg's leading political and military circles. It was obvious that the importance of the Far East in general was rising.

During the Japanese campaign, Mannerheim conceived the idea of returning home by riding through Mongolia. Of this plan practically nothing is known, but it is evident that he had put the idea to his superiors, and that the expedition of 1906 was the result.

For Mannerheim, participation in the Japanese war must have been of great importance, affecting both his personal life and his career. He certainly needed a change as well as an achievement which would be important for his self-esteem and ambition. His life had of late proved to be quite difficult for three reasons.

The first of these was his divorce. His marriage had been
arranged by court circles and united an admired and handsome young officer to a rich heiress; it certainly seemed felicitous at the beginning. Mannerheim had much to do and he was interested in managing his wife’s estates. But the deterioration of relations must have been connected with the rising national conflict between Russia and Finland, in which Mannerheim’s relatives in Finland supported the extreme opposition. Mannerheim’s stay in Russia, his marriage and later on his participation in the Japanese War were increasingly criticised by his brothers and relatives, to whom he was much attached. His divorce and departure for the Far East indicate a kind of escape, as did perhaps the plan of riding through Mongolia from East to West.

It is not possible to understand the metamorphosis of a captain of the highly respected Chevaliers-Guardes in St. Petersburg society and high life into an explorer of Inner Asia without mentioning the importance that A. E. Nordenskiöld held for him.

Nordenskiöld was Gustaf Mannerheim’s uncle by marriage. As a 13-year old boy, Mannerheim had been impressed by the enormous triumph of Nordenskiöld after the latter’s Vega expedition through the North-East passage. In addition his uncle had provided an example of how one can transform one’s failure and difficulties into success and renown. Nordenskiöld had, as had Mannerheim’s father, practically been expelled from the Imperial University in Helsinki for unpatriotic attitudes during the Crimean War. He then settled in Sweden, but maintained close contact with Finland and Russia. During his visits to St. Petersburg, Nordenskiöld was several times in contact with his nephew. It cannot be doubted that Mannerheim had read not only Nordenskiöld’s great book describing his expedition, but also the voluminous works of Nordenskiöld’s main scholar, Sven Hedin.

Hedin had already published a book in 1887 dealing with south-western Asia entitled *Genom Persien, Mesopotamien och Kaukasien*. Three years later Hedin travelled in Transcaspia and reached Kashgar over Terekdevan. The book *Khorasan och Turkestan* deals with that expedition. Most important was Hedin’s third expedition, beginning in 1893 from Tashkent, traversing the Pamir and the Kara kul and returning to Kashgar.
Having spent 1894 in the Pamir, the next year he rode in the Takla-Makan area in most difficult conditions, reached Kashgar again and continued from there to Khotan. Passing Takla-

Mannerheim, then General-major stationed in Warsaw, published a valuable contribution to Asian studies in the Journal de la Société Finno Ougrienne in 1911.

Makan again, he reached Tarim, studied the Lopnor area with success and came back to Khotan. Finally he rode from there with a great caravan to northern Shansi and thence to Peking in 1897. Hedin had traversed Asia from West to East on
horseback, and published his *En färd genom Asien* in 1898. From 1899 to 1902 Hedin once again explored Central Asia, beginning his trip this time from Kashgar. His work *Asien* was published in two further books and translated into many languages. In 1905 he undertook yet another expedition.

Mannerheim’s idea in 1904 or 1905 to ride through Mongolia from East to West can thus be seen in the context of Hedin’s work and the great reputation he had achieved. This certainly was something more demanding but also more remarkable than the possibility proposed by his brothers of returning to Finland or Sweden and dedicating himself to economic activity.

Nordenskiöld was also a member of the *Société Finno-Ougrienne* in Helsinki, almost from the beginning. The Finno-Ugrian Society and the leading personalities around it, Professor Otto Donner, philologist, and Professor J. R. Aspelin, archaeologist, had for a long time planned a great expedition to Central Asia, and Aspelin led two expeditions to the upper Yenisei area. Central Asia was to remain on the programme of Finnish scholars until Finland ceased to be part of the Russian Empire. There might have been proposals for scientific work in the manner of Hedin or Aspelin in Mannerheim’s original plan. Otherwise it would be difficult to understand why the Russian General Staff in 1906 suggested that he should join the archaeological expedition of Professor Pelliot and why Pelliot agreed to include a Russian officer in his party. Even though Mannerheim stayed some months in Helsinki in 1906, it is improbable that he acquired all his Asian background knowledge in such a short time, the more so since he was busy with other activities as well. The fact that the Fenno-Ugrian Society and the Finnish National Museum had confidence in his aims and sponsored his trip might also be seen as proof of his scientific seriousness.

Clearly the primary task of his trip was military; to collect information and military statistics in Sinkiang, Kansu, Shensi, Honan and Shansi; to observe the extent to which the recent reforms had been carried out; to inform himself on the state of China’s defence, the training of the troops and Chinese colonisation and administration; to investigate the attitude of the inhabitants to the Chinese Central Government and popular opinion in regard to Russia and Japan; to investigate the routes
towards Kashgar, and thence to Lanchow and Peking; and more especially to discover the best way in which to move cavalry detachments towards Lanchow. He would map the route from Kashgar to Taushkan–Darya, explore the oasis of Aksu and the route Aksu-Kuldja throught the Muzart Pass and find out how well-prepared Lanchow was as a military base. The Chinese also revealed that he was interested in military espionage.

Here, Mannerheim’s expedition can be seen in the context of the Russian military tradition, represented by the names of General Kuropatkin and Colonel Kozlov. Kuropatkin, the Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese campaign, had preceded Mannerheim in riding across Asia from West to East, following the Silk Route.

For a description of the expedition, I quote from Professor Aalto’s *Oriental Studies in Finland. The History of Learning and Science in Finland 1828–1917*. Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1971, pp. 114–116: “Mannerheim was accompanied by two carefully chosen Cossacks, four Sarts as caravan men, a servant and a Chinese interpreter when on August 11 he started from Osh for Kashgar, where the expedition arrived on August 30, and where he separated from the Pelliot expedition, which he was supposed to rejoin at the end of the year in the Yulduz valley; in fact, the two expeditions did not meet any more. From Kashgar, Mannerheim made a trip via Yarkand, where he had to stop for five weeks because of ill-health, to Khotan. In this city and in its surroundings he collected numerous antiques and ethnologic objects. Back in Kashgar he investigated the neighbouring Abdals, among other things making anthropological measurements. The neighbours of the Abdals maintained that the latter used among themselves a language of their own, but Mannerheim was not able to verify this claim, since the Abdals told him that they spoke only Sart. Via Uch-Turfan and Aqsu (Aksu) the expedition crossed the Tien-Shan to Qulja (Kuldja) which was reached after a most difficult ride. From here Mannerheim made excursions to surrounding towns, making archaeological excavations. Having left Qulja, he passed through the Torgut and Kirghiz areas and investigated both these peoples anthropologically and copied numerous inscriptions and rock-drawings on the way. After a most difficult crossing of the Narat Pass, the expedition reached
| 15 | *pešigerma* |
| 16 | *axltigerma* |
| 17 | *żitigerma* |
| 18 | *saksigerma* |
| 19 | *tuksigerma* |
| 20 | *jigerma* | *xorún* | *qorin* |
| 21 | *pōrots* | *xorunigé* | *qorin nigen* |
| 22 | *skots* | *etc.* |
| cup | *aják* (T. II 12) | *ajgá* | *ajaga* |
| bread | *kemza* | *pursák* | *bogursag* |
| cheese | *tšurme* | *tśörmí* |
| sour milk | *tšutšak* | *nāan* | *umdan* |
| milk | *sul* | *sun* | *sun, sü* |
| cream | *xajak* | *kaják* |
| to milk | *sakš* | *kukýn* | *kökü-* |
| to weave | *sokš* | *nékia* | *neke-je 'I will weave'* |
| thread | *žip* | *stasyn* | *utasun* |
| cloth | *jurém* | *urgumé* (coarse örmüge, örmeg woolen-) (T.IV 24) |
| to twist (baskets) | *talakš* | *kuriá* | *güre-je 'I will twist'* |
| " (hair) | *jyr* | *tologoi syn* | *tologai üsün* |
| twist | *jašmak* |
| " on the back | *tśyik* | *k'kull* | *kalmuckian: kökül* |
| good day! | *jakšima* | *tsein-erevú* | *ta sajin irebüü* |

Word-lists from Mannerheim's article from 1911. Later on, in 1940, during the Winter War, the very large diary of the expedition was published in English, under the title Across Asia from West to East.

Qarashahr, where excavations were carried out, and Urumchì, the administrative centre of Sinkiang. In this town of some 80,000 inhabitants, the reform programme of the Government was obviously being carried out much more successfully than
in the other centres visited by Mannerheim. He therefore stopped there for a whole month in order to acquaint himself with developments in various fields. The expedition reached Turfan on September 25 via Guchen, where archaeological investigations were carried out. Numerous manuscript fragments in various languages were found in Turfan and in Chiktyn to the east of Turfan. Having passed through Qara-Khoja and Idiqut-Shahri to Barkul, the expedition climbed the easternmost range of the Tien-Shan and arrived a month later at Hami, a city which Mannerheim describes in detail. After five days' stay he continued through the Western Gobi to Ansi, from where he made a trip to Tun-huang, and passing through Chia-yu-kuan, one of the thoroughfares of the Great Wall, he reached Suchow on December 1. The topography, economy etc. of this city are described in detail by Mannerheim.

"After Suchow, the expedition rode through the region of the Sarö-Yögurs. Among these previously almost unknown people Mannerheim carried out many kinds of investigations. Having reached Kanchow on December 19, after Christmas he visited Kang-lung-su, the principal shrine of the Shera Yögurs, investigating the anthropology, ethnology and language of this tribe. Back in Kanchow, he completed his Yögur studies and prepared a detailed description of the city and its surroundings. After a week's ride, Mannerheim then reached Lian-chow (described very thoroughly in AA). Here he photographed the Hsi-hsia inscription and visited the Flemish fathers of the Catholic mission. A further week's ride brought the expedition to Lan-chow where it stayed for some six weeks. Mannerheim was thus able to study the rather discouraging results of the reform work carried out by the local Viceroy Shen. After having left Lan-chow, the expedition made a trip to the magnificent Tibetan lamasery town of Labrang where the population and the lamas gave it a most unfriendly reception. However, Mannerheim finally managed to get permission to visit the temples but, despite this, several temples were closed to him. Having been able to buy a number of ethnologic objects, he rode through the land of the Tanguts and the province of Shen-si, arriving at Hsi-an-fu on April 28. In this province as well as in Ho-nan modernization had made remarkable progress, particularly in the organization of the army and the schools. On the
road to Kai-feng, Mannerheim visited the mountain temples at Hwai-shan and the cave temples at Lung-meng. From Kai-feng to Tai-yuan, he travelled by train and then continued on horseback to the famous Wu-tai-Shan lamasery where the Dalai Lama was living in exile. On June 26 Mannerheim was the second westerner to be received by His Holiness. Proceeding to the north, the expedition reached Kuei-hua te capital of Inner Mongolia, where Mannerheim celebrated the second anniversary of his departure from St. Petersburg. The health of one of the Cossacks had compelled Mannerheim to send him home from Qulja, the second one left him at Tai-yuan, and Mannerheim arrived at Kalgan accompanied only by a couple of Chinese caravanmen. Here the journey of the expedition officially came to an end.

"Having reached Peking by train, Mannerheim lived for about a month at the Russian embassy, writing his report, arranging his collections and re-drawing the most important sections of his itinerary map. He then visited Japan for a short time and sailed from there to Vladivostok from where he proceeded by train to St. Petersburg. As soon as he had presented his report to the Chief of the General Staff and to the Emperor Nicholas, Mannerheim went to Helsinki to meet Donner with whom he had been in continuous correspondence throughout the journey. His account of his visit to the Sarō and Shera Yögers was dated August 10, 1909, and it was published in 1911. In addition to a description of Yöger ethnology, social organization, and anthropology he also included a list of several hundred words from the languages of both these tribes. These linguistic notes are excellent, taking into account the shortness of his stay and the inconvenience of questioning through an interpreter. Mannerheim had had no special training as a linguist but possessed a large practical command of several languages, including Kirghiz and Chinese. An article published by Ramstedt at the same time dealt with a fragment of a xylograph with Mongolian "quadratic" script (c. 1300 AD), discovered by Mannerheim, the first material proof there had been that this script had ever been used in print. Somewhat later J. N. Reuter published Mannerheim's fragments in Sanskrit and Khotanese. Some Chinese fragments were presented by Kaare Wulff in the biography of Mannerheim by Kai
Donner (in Swedish, 1934). The main part of the material brought back by the expedition remained, however, unpublished until 1936.

The military results of the expedition have been well analysed by Dr. John Screen in his *Mannerheim. The Years of Preparation*. I quote some passages from his account: "Members of the Russian Legation in Peking found the draft of the report interesting; Mannerheim considered it dry and boring. His judgment was certainly too harsh. Its vocabulary is considerably richer than that usually employed in military writings, and the style has individuality. Although naturally more restrained than the diary or his private letters, descriptions of terrain,
people and places are often completed by an agreeable phrase, and he permitted himself a few expressions of personal feelings, such as his reaction to listening to the sound of the distant whistle of a locomotive at Chenchow, 'with more enthusiasm than I had ever listened in the past to the delicate sounds of an opera'. As completed in St. Petersburg, the report amounted to 192 typewritten foolscap pages. The first part consisted of a summary of the journey and an outline of the development of reforms in China. The second part dealt with specific topics — railway construction, military forces, schools, industry and mining, the influence of the Japanese, and colonisation, ending with an assessment of the prospects for
further reform. The appended maps, reconnaissance and statistical material completed the report and constituted 'the main result of my journey'.

Mannerheim recognised the conflict going on within the court at Peking between the conservatives and the progressives, the influence of the former gradually fading away before the demands of the masses and the rapidly growing forces of public opinion in southern China. The central government, though stopping short of reforms threatening the traditional structure of the state, had given viceroy's and governors a series of apparently similar directives, the more important of which related to railway construction in the provinces, the reorganisation of the army, the exploitation at the expense of the treasury of local mineral resources and the development of industry, the opening of schools, the suppression of opium smoking, and the improvement of order in the towns. These directives were being carried out everywhere but without equal consistency and precision. The broad independence enjoyed by the provincial authorities meant that in one province the reorganisation of the army might have been started and in another the provision of schools, while other reforms were neglected completely. Such independence would become an advantage, he believed, when the progressives were generally in control, since it provided the administrator 'with the possibility of developing his own initiative widely and fearlessly in conformance with the local conditions and as guided by his own personal ideas ...'

"The lack of people trained in the western manner that was holding up the development of the country was being gradually remedied by the accomplishment of the programme of educational reform. This programme, which had been thought out intelligently and on a broad scale and was closely linked to the practicalities of life, was making progress in the northern provinces in proportion to their distance from Peking, a pattern that was repeated in all other fields of reform. In two years or so 30,000–40,000 schools had been opened throughout the Empire, a remarkable achievement and a reflection of the government's heavy expenditure on education. The quality of the teaching was often poor, but the return of the many Chinese studying abroad, particularly in Japan, would improve the general level of knowledge and ability ..."
“The military results of the expedition were considerable and significant. Mannerheim compiled extensive and detailed military statistical material about the whole of his route, and in particular the Aksu oasis, and combined reports of the strength and distribution of Chinese army units with a careful assessment of their fighting potential. In general, the efficiency of the army increased as he went east. ‘The picture which I saw during my travels round Turkestan was, for a soldier, an extremely sad one. In 1906–07 the military reforms had barely touched the Sinkiang province. It was in Urumchi only that there were organised units in which they had started to introduce the new service requirements.’ In Kashgaria, and in the detachments stationed on the roads along the Tien-Shan, the old military system prevailed unaffected by the new regulations and instructions sent to the officers there . . .”

Mannerheim devoted several pages of his report to an interesting assessment of the importance of Sinkiang in the context of war between Russia and China. He saw the province as a secondary theatre of operations which it would be rash of the Russians to ignore since the Chinese troops there, without a rail link with the rest of China, were in a hopeless position.

‘The success of our action in this province could not, of course, have any decisive effect on the course of the war, but it would draw off 3–4 divisions (those of Sinkiang, Kansu, Ili and perhaps Shensi). The annexation to our Asiatic possessions of this very extensive territory, with a sparse population and vast deserts, would hardly interest us, except as regards the Ili district and perhaps a few more small parts, but Sinkiang in our hands at the time when peace was declared would surely be an inestimably weighty argument, regardless of the result of operations in the main, i.e. Manchurian, theatre of war.’

It was obvious that Mannerheim appreciated the political significance of military action. The plan of operations he suggested was designed to achieve the political aim of seizing Sinkiang, and he was not tempted to pursue further operations which would be militarily difficult and yield no political advantage.

Mannerheim’s achievement certainly impressed the Emperor, who spoke about it with keen interest and admiration to Sven Hedin at an audience in January 1909, advising Hedin to
get in touch with him as soon as possible. It became clear to Mannerheim that his work had been well received. After completing the report in St. Petersburg – it was dated 31 October – he was able to write with satisfaction that people felt particularly pleased with the result of his journey. The Chief of the General Staff was evidently satisfied and his rapid advancement was assured.”

I now go back to some observations relating to Mannerheim’s career. As I said before, there were three problems in his life around the year 1904; his divorce, the state of Russo–Finnish politics and his lack of higher military training. Mannerheim never went to military academy, which was held in very high esteem in Russia. A career in the Guards could take the place of the academy for those seeking high ranks in the Army, but the Guard’s connection with the Court and its St. Petersburg context could possibly turn to something less attractive in the
period of reforms now approaching. Experiences on the Manchurian front may also have influenced Mannerheim's ideas of the Russian Army as a whole and of the ways of making a career there.

His participation in the Japanese war and the Asian expedition can be seen as necessary achievements on the path to higher command. Mannerheim became commander of a regiment, followed rapidly by promotion to general, commander of a cavalry brigade of the Imperial Guards in Warsaw, and Général de la Suite de sa Majesté. Thus he succeeded in becoming a high commander in the Imperial Guards, the topmost élite of the Russian army. In 1914, the Guards counted some fifty generals, not all of whom were de la Suite.

Warsaw at that time was the location of one of the three Infantry Divisions and a separate cavalry brigade plus an artillery brigade. Of the Warsaw generals, only Mannerheim belonged to the Suite of His Majesty. From there he went to the First World War, serving in difficult conditions mostly close to the Carpathians.

In 1913 Mannerheim was discussed as a candidate for the appointment of Minister Secretary of State of the Grand Duchy of Finland, although the project was later abandoned. The post was very high-ranking and included working regularly with the Emperor. The previous Minister for Finland was General Baron Langhoff, who had been appointed during the period of reform in 1906. He had then proposed the nomination of Mannerheim's brother, Count Carl Mannerheim, as Senator, that is Minister of Finance of the Grand Duchy. Carl Mannerheim was one of the leading opposition men and had been expelled by the government from Finland to Sweden almost at the same time as his brother Gustaf went to fight for the same government in Manchuria.

Langhoff had a very good impression of the brothers Mannerheim. He must have known Gustaf rather well, being a former chief of the famous Semenovsky Guards and subsequently of the most prestigious First Infantry Brigade of the Imperial Guards (consisting of the Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky, Izmailovsky and Jägerski regiments). Langhoff ordered financial support to be given to Mannerheim from the Finnish State
Secretariat, thus making the Asian expedition an undertaking not only of the Russian General Staff but also of the Finnish state. Langhoff also ordered a copy of the secret report of the expedition to be sent to the General Staff.

Mannerheim’s first report was published by the Russian General Staff for internal use; he also reported personally for the very interested Emperor Nicholas II.

No sources have been found to describe the relation between Mannerheim and Langhoff (and, in the background, the Emperor). Nevertheless, I would like to propose the hypothesis that a “Mannerheim project” existed. Finland had great need of
men of good capacities, trained in St. Petersburg, having a Guards officer’s or other special relationship to the Monarch, but also with good contacts in the Grand Duchy. Mannerheim not only fitted these requirements; he was practically the only one of the middle generation who did. The tradition whereby the Finnish nobility served close to the Emperor had not worked for a long time. If a “Mannerheim project” existed, it would have been logical to get him away from troubles and from politics for some time. Certainly when he returned from Asia he was neither a government man nor a member of the Finnish political élite, but remained free and uncommitted when Langhoff’s period of office was over. Nomination to Poland also held him in reserve for possible high office in the Grand Duchy later on. In 1906, already preparing for the expedition, he participated in the last session of the Finnish Four-Estates Parliament as a member of the nobility, but only as an observer and without using his right to speak. He thus got valuable knowledge of political life and personalities – an important preparation for future high administrative office.

Membership in the Finno-Ugrian Society and contacts with the Finnish scientific world possibly also had value in the eyes of the fennoman political movement which was not without potential significance for the future.

The Asian expedition was the achievement Mannerheim needed for his career and also for his self-esteem. He returned strengthened in mind and trained in hard circumstances.

It is, on the other hand, obvious that neither he himself nor others needed the Asian achievement to prove his valour after his role in the Finnish Liberation and Civil War of 1918 and after his Regency in 1918–1919. By then he had other more outstanding political and military achievements to his credit. However Mannerheim’s Asian expedition can be evaluated in the Russo–Finnish cultural, political and military context as an interesting and in many ways central development for the understanding of present-day Finland.
The difficult and dramatic periods in Finland's recent history can be described as a function of the rivalry between the two leading great powers in the Baltic area, Russia and Germany. The foundation-stone for this period of rivalry was laid in 1870–71 when Germany became a great power after crushing France, hitherto the most powerful continental state apart from Russia. The new German empire was also the immediate neighbour of the Russian empire.

The Germany of 1871 was not yet the strong and united empire it came to be. Skillful diplomacy and dynastic ties held Russia and Germany together as allies as long as Alexander II and Prince Gorchakov on the one side and Kaiser Wilhelm I and Otto von Bismarck on the other were at the helm. Relations began to deteriorate in the 1880s, and in the early 1890s Russia concluded an alliance with France directed against Germany. Both Russia and France wished to protect themselves against Germany's growing strength and capacity for expansion. The alliance gave France guarantees of support in the event of a defensive or a revanchist war with Germany, while Russia obtained great economic advantages from the link. There was heavy French investment, not least in the remarkable expansion of the Russian railway network, a development whose military, economic and national importance for Russia cannot be exaggerated.

However, French investment did not affect Finland. In the 1880s Finland's cultural orientation had been towards France, but Berlin and Vienna began to exercise a strong influence in the 1890s. As French and British influences grew in Russia, Finland began to be drawn culturally and econo-
mically towards Germany. After the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance this trend first attracted attention and then caused unease within influential circles in Russia. An important background factor consisted of developments in Russia’s Baltic provinces where, especially during the 1880s, the imperial government had pushed through a series of reforms designed to reduce the political and social importance of the German-speaking upper class. This led to the Russian language being favoured, but it also stimulated the emergence of local, national cultures, not least in Estonia. The imperial government sought to reinforce the ties between the Baltic provinces and Russia by weakening the German element, but also wished to promote a social renewal which would favour the non-German population of the provinces in all respects.

In Finland too a Finnish-patriotic and Finnish-national form of the culture had gradually emerged, largely with the government’s blessing, since the country’s incorporation into the Russian empire in 1809. The rising Finnish-speaking middle classes began to play an increasingly active political role, especially after the accession of Alexander III in 1881.

The central role of the University in Finnish life arose out of an ‘accumulation of cultural capital’, which also manifested itself politically, especially at those times when the Diet was not in session (it met in principle every third year during the latter part of the nineteenth century and up till 1905). The political division of the four estates into two (the nobility and the burghers) which supported liberalism and two (the clergy and the farmers) in which Finnish nationalism dominated was reproduced within the University, above all within the student body, which was sometimes torn by heated party struggles. The teachers there were more sophisticated in their political activities; both liberalism and Finnish nationalism derived many of their most important ideologues and leaders from among the professors. When parties in the proper sense were formed during the governor-generalship of N. I. Bobrikov (1899–1904), it became clear that only a minority inside the University regarded themselves as supporters of the governing Old Finn Party, while a majority of teachers and students adhered to various groupings or tendencies within the opposition.
The essential cause of the Finnish-Russian conflict while Bobrikov was governor-general lay in Russian military policy, since the imperial government felt obliged to secure its hold on Finland in view of the possibility of German invasion. The Russians naturally regarded a potential German invasion of Finland then, as later, as a threat to the security of the imperial capital, St. Petersburg.

Finnish resistance to the measures of russification introduced by the Russians therefore had an important international dimension, especially since immediately after the outbreak of the dispute in 1899 the resisters turned abroad and attempted to rouse foreign opinion against Russia and its policies in Finland. A central role in these Finnish efforts to attract foreign support was played by members of the University.

Many opportunities were provided by the personal contacts which so many Finnish scholars had acquired during their years of study abroad. Germans played a leading part in the great international address signed by prominent foreign scholars and cultural figures (even though Italian signatories were more numerous than German, and British only slightly less so). The Finns largely appealed to French and British opinion in the name of general principles of freedom, which they did not believe were sustained in the same way by the German tradition. However, it soon became apparent that the French tradition of human rights provided little real support for the Finnish case in the dispute, and the Finns increasingly turned their thoughts from ideals of justice towards the realities of power. The marked growth of Germany’s economic, political and military strength began to make an impact, not least after Russia’s defeat by Japan and the events inside the Russian empire (including Finland) in 1905–07.

The idea that a European or world war was imminent was quite widespread for many years before the assassination at Sarajevo. It arose essentially from a change in outlook on the world. From the 1890s the positivist-optimistic way of thinking with its faith in material expansion gave way to a new mode of thought based on pessimism and individualism in art, repudiation of the dominant symmetrical forms and a greatly increased interest in the religious, especially the theosophical and occult dimensions of human life. At the same time, radical
political groups placed great expectations on the potential of a future great war for creating social and political revolution. Nor were the expectations in industrial circles without importance. As with the revolutionaries, their expectations were fulfilled, though perhaps in a way and in a sequence which they had not anticipated.

A central aspect of Finnish activity around 1900 was the attempt to publicise Finland’s problems abroad through a deliberate appeal to foreign opinion over an internal crisis within the Russian empire. Part of the background for this development was the general optimism at the time about the force of law, which found expression, for example, in the establishment of the International Court of Arbitration at the Hague on the initiative of Nicholas II. The peace movement, represented by such well-known names as Bertha von Suttner and Frédéric Passy, was a significant force in Europe in the 1880s and 1890s, and in Finland attracted the support above all of Zachris Topelius. The works of his declining years, not least Stjärnornas Kungabarn, were devoted to the cause of peace. The Dreyfus affair and the Boer war also served strongly to reinforce anti-militaristic and anti-imperialistic tendencies. In
addition to more self-interested calculations, this optimism about the force of law must be seen as an important motive or at least justification for the Finnish appeal to ‘enlightened’ European opinion.

However, optimism concerning peace and the force of law suffered a number of critical setbacks during the first years of the new century. One reason for this was the growth of terrorism and political assassination, above all in Russia but soon in Finland also. Even more important were events outside Europe, namely the British victory in the Boer war and especially the Russian defeat in the war against Japan. Power and force, not negotiation, had proved decisive. Finnish appeals to Britain, the oppressor of the Irish and the Boers, or to France, whose alliance with Russia continued and grew stronger, seemed increasingly inappropriate. European opinion had had no effect, but the Japanese war and internal pressure had produced changes throughout the whole Russian empire, including Finland.

Interest in international politics appears to have been slight in Finland between 1899 and 1914. No detailed studies of this subject seem to have been undertaken, but it is likely that the country’s inability to conduct an independent foreign policy, the lack of a network of foreign correspondents abroad and the absence of interest in political science at the University, combined with the preoccupation of Finnish politicians with Finnish-Russian questions and internal party political problems, produced a situation in which there was little expertise in foreign policy matters. There were on the other hand highly developed economic, cultural and intellectual ties with other countries. The importance of Germany for Finland increased throughout this period, and in the years immediately before the First World War so did that of Finland for Germany.

The economic, cultural and military rise of Germany after unification in 1870–71 began to be clearly apparent around the turn of the century. Germany’s population grew from 41 million in 1871 to 68 million in 1914. (In contrast, the population of France only increased by 3.5 million during the same period.) By the outbreak of the First World War Germany was producing twice as much steel as Britain and four times as much as France; production of coal, iron etc. had increased more rapidly
there than in any other country; and Germany was undoubtedly the leading country with regard not only to production but also to training and research in the chemical and electrical industries, both areas of the most advanced modern technology. Germany had also become a colonial power during the 1880s and 1890s, and between 1898 and 1908 a large and powerful modern fleet was constructed to ensure it a first-rank position in world politics and colonial questions.

In the realm of ideas, this growth was matched by an expansionist ideology of Germanism, which was sustained above all by the *Alldeutscher Verband* (1891) and the racist *Gobineau-Vereinung* (1894). These organisations sought to emphasise Germanism, *Deutschthum*, in all its aspects. In Finland, as in some other foreign countries, this was reflected in the growing importance of the German language. The point is well illustrated by changes in the language in which academic dissertations were published. In 1885 out of a total of ten doctoral theses defended at the Imperial Alexander University, three were written in German. By 1914 eighteen out of thirty-seven were in German, and one each in French and English, and the proportion had steadily risen throughout the years in between. Thus the scholarly world in Finland had gradually been drawn into the German cultural empire.

This is hardly surprising in view of the potential represented by German scholarship and the German universities. Germany had developed a strong university system which, in comparison with France and Britain, was both modern and oriented towards research. For Finnish scholars there was no alternative, at least close at hand, since both Russia and Sweden were just as German in their orientation in several disciplines, above all in chemistry. In medicine, too, Germany (and Austria) had also outstripped the rest of the field and put an end to the earlier orientation towards France. The self-portrait given by a Finnish scholar in 1914 may be taken as typical: ‘I speak both our native languages equally well — or equally badly, if you prefer — but German is my mother-tongue when it comes to scholarly matters.’

The outbreak of the world war forced the Finnish public to speculate about what the future might hold, both in general terms and specifically in relation to Finland. An important and
insufficiently emphasised factor is that since the time of Bobrikov there had been no conscription in Finland and the Finns therefore had no troops of their own. As a result, they were not psychologically involved in the war in the same way as other inhabitants of the belligerent countries and instead were able, like the neutrals, to turn their minds to speculation and how best to react to such situations as might arise.

It is clear that during 1914 the conduct of the Germans, not least in Belgium, aroused some antipathy in Finland, and that there was also a resurgence of traditional loyalty towards Russia and the imperial family. However, the Russians failed to exploit such currents of opinion either psychologically or in their propaganda, and the Russian defeats in East Prussia soon created a situation in which pro-German sentiment began to gain ground.

It was often claimed during and after the war in reports and statements emanating from Finland to the Entente powers that German agitation in Finland began immediately after its outbreak. Reports to this effect were produced during the war by a Frenchman resident in Helsinki, Dr Jean Poirot, who had particularly good contacts there, and after the war the same view was advanced, and defended in the press, by Professor Yrjö Hirn. There would appear to be no written sources describing German agitation in Finland, but this is inherent in the nature of such activity. We know that the German minister in Stockholm was ordered immediately after the outbreak of war to attempt to organise seditious activity in Finland, in the same way as the Germans tried to do this in India, Ireland and other sensitive parts of the British empire. We also know that an organisation whose aim was an uprising against Russian rule in Finland was set up in 1915, and that the potential leaders of this revolt soon received military training.

In this connection, a central role was played by the University, by some of its teachers and some of its students. The most senior local administrator at the University, the Vice-Chancellor Edvard Hjelt, was the first and most influential of the older persons to lend support to the activities which eventually led to the formation of a Finnish Jäger battalion in Germany. Hjelt was strongly oriented towards Germany in two particular ways. First, he was a chemist, and chemistry
The Finnish volunteers in The German Imperial Forces, the Jägers, dreaming of women and decorations, the Eisernes Kreuz.

was the discipline under the strongest German influence. As a young man, he had studied in Germany and he returned there regularly on visits. In contrast, to judge from his private papers, he did not know Russian or English and had only a limited command of French. Hjelt was not only tied to Germany by his scholarly contacts, but like his father and both his brothers, he belonged to the circle around the German church in Helsinki.

The German community in Helsinki also provided the two young students, Walter Horn and Bertel Paulig, who established contact between the German legation in Stockholm and the activists among the student body in Helsinki. With Herman Gummerus, an anti-Russian Finnish academic who was sent from Rome to Stockholm by the Germans, Horn and Paulig drew up the document which set out the guidelines for the military training of Finnish students in Germany. The former German consul in Helsinki, Goldbeck-Löwe, who served as the chief contact in Stockholm to the naval attaché Fisher-Lossainen, was one of the pillars of the German colony and the German church in Helsinki.

A central role in the movement of opinion in favour of Germany was played by students, particularly that group among them which had recently adopted a Germanistic ideology. This was true of the young, active circle among
Swedish-speaking students, especially those who belonged to the *Nylands nation* student association and, to some extent, the *Vasa nation* student association. The ideology of Swedishness that was developed within this circle was clearly racist in tendency, and in contrast to the pessimistic emphasis on idleness of the preceding generation, its proponents adopted a view of life which emphasised action (*Tataktivismus*) and manliness as displayed through military or sporting skills. The first Finns who travelled to Germany were recruited from this group, and they subsequently provided the Finnish commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the *Jäger* battalion. This first contingent of Finnish troops in German service were disguised as Boy Scouts, *Pfadfinder*, and they are known by this name.

The social background of the *Pfadfinder* group was an elevated one both in comparison with the student body as a whole (most of them were students) and especially in comparison with the troops who served in the later 27th Royal Prussian *Jäger* battalion as a whole. The dangerous choice made by these young men and the sense of self-sacrifice they displayed had an important psychological effect on their parents and other relatives, and thus helped to shape the attitudes of influential circles. The actions of the *Pfadfinder* group therefore created something concrete to which other Finns with German sympathies ultimately had to react, and to react in a positive manner.

It is of some significance that the idea of armed rebellion under the leadership of Finns trained in Germany aroused a response not only among Swedish-speaking but also among Finnish-speaking students. There had been quite an amount of pro-Russian enthusiasm for the war in August and September 1914 among Finnish-speaking students, but opinion changed after the great Russian defeats in the early stages of the war. In Finnish minds, and not least in Finnish-speaking circles, Germany's military successes were associated with the religious and scientific impulses from Germany that were so much admired in Finland. During the war political contacts between Finland and Germany were channelled through Sweden, where a strong body of pro-German opinion was only too happy to assist in a variety of ways. It is noteworthy in this
connection that just before the war activist circles in Sweden exercised an important influence on the development of opinion among Finnish students. During the spring of 1914 the chairman of the Uppsala Students' Union, Dr Olof Palme, succeeded in winning over a number of Finnish-speaking student leaders to a pro-German line and in bringing about a political rapprochement between Swedish-speaking and Finnish-speaking student circles with the express purpose of resisting Russia more effectively.

The opposition which in Bobrikov's time had had a legalistic and political basis re-emerged during the second decade of the century in a new guise. Changes in general attitudes to the world had led to less emphasis on formal and analytical modes of thought and greater sympathy for explanations resting on concepts like intuition, race, struggle and will. The earlier form of opposition gave way among the new generation to an ideology of action and struggle, which found significant expression in the publication Svenskt i Finland, utgiven av Svenska Studenters partidelegation (Helsinki 1914).

In addition to Russia, the socialist working class now constituted a new threat to the values of the circles which the Pfadfinder group represented in social terms. It has become common in school textbooks and in many general accounts to regard the Bobrikov years, 1899–1905, and the period after 1909 or 1912 as the first and second ‘periods of oppression’. However, it has been convincingly demonstrated that there were differences between Russian policy in these two periods, and in addition another fundamental difference was the changed nature of relationships between social groups in Finland.

It is understandable and natural that those who served in the Jäger battalion, and the body of opinion which supported them, indignantly rejected the accusation that they had prepared themselves in advance for the civil war which broke out in the unforeseeable circumstances of 1918. However, the circles which sustained the idea of rebellion and the Jäger movement were deeply concerned by the way society had developed in Finland since 1906. The threat to the continuance of the social order and to the legalistic tradition that was central above all to the Swedish-speaking educated class no longer came in the first
instance from Russia and the Russian government but from socialists and the proletariat. The possibility that the Russian government could not in the long run keep the masses under control was often discussed. It was therefore consistent to seek external support for the maintenance of the 'Germanic' social order against the threat from the Finnish and Russian masses, given that the point of departure consisted of the theories of race and cultural formation that were so prevalent during these years.

The period of conflict in Bobrikov's time was an internal Russo-Finnish matter. There were appeals to European opinion, but their purpose was to restore the 'status quo ante Bobrikov', not to detach Finland from the Russian empire. During the second decade of the century and especially after the outbreak of war, the question at issue was whether Finland should move from the Russian to the 'Germanic' cultural and political sphere. It was not a question, at least in the first instance, of laws and Finland's formal status, but of the country's social identity in the future: it was regarded as a question of race and cultural psychology.

Such patterns of thought were common in young Swedish-speaking circles at the University. The ideological development of these circles was largely determined by impulses from Uppsala (Kjellén and his supporters) and from Gothenburg (W. Lundström and his Riksförening för svenskhetens bevarande i utlandet (National association for preservation of 'Swedish-ness' abroad)), two centres which in their turn were greatly influenced by Germany. In this connection, P. Rohrbach's book Russland und wir attracted a great deal of attention in Sweden.

Despite the new feelings of linguistic and racial identity experienced by Swedish-speaking students, Germanism nonetheless created bridges between them and Finnish-speaking circles, since it pushed the legalistic aspect, which had previously been of such central importance, into the background. Swedish-speakers came to accept something of the outlook previously asserted by the Fennomani, who had created their own political doctrine on the basis of Hegelian ideas about cultural formations. Their doctrines had concentrated on the nation and its cultural strength, not on the state and law. The Finnish-language nationalists had applied this ideo-
logy in relation to Russia when they argued that the crucial goal was to preserve the nation, not its laws. Swedish-speaking youth had now come to the same conclusion via another route and had accepted that what was decisive was not the form, namely the law, but culture and its strength and power, which in extreme cases would mean its physical strength and power. The older theological and more recent economic contacts of the Finnish-language nationalists produced a more traditional but no less strong Germanophilia. In times of crisis, it was possible for these two brands of Germanophilia to find each other, and this created the pro-German front which ruled Finland from the autumn of 1917 to the autumn of 1918.

The academic world played an important role in this confluence of various pro-German currents. Traditionally, the University occupied a central place in the formation of opinion in Finland, and its role was accentuated when parliament was prevented from functioning or was not summoned and when strict press censorship was imposed. During the second decade of the twentieth century the authority of the University in this respect had only increased, since the Finnish Senate, as a ‘government of civil servants’, did not enjoy the confidence of either parliament or the public. In contrast, the University, which still retained its full autonomy in relation to the Senate and the Governor-General, experienced a period of general growth and of external and internal development.

The Swedish and Finnish language student newspapers, Studentbladet and Ylioppilaslehti founded in 1912 and 1913 respectively, the new student union building, and the University’s scholarly activities bear witness to a spirit of enterprise and faith in the future within the academic world. During the first decade of the century the University’s position was improved by the creation of a great number of new posts and scholarly institutions, increased salaries for academic staff and the modernisation of the examinations system. The personal links between the University and the highest levels of the administration had been close for several decades and during the period of reform between 1905 and 1909 the leading men in the Senate were either active or former professors. The voice of the University was therefore something Finns were accustomed
to listening to, and this was particularly so during periods of wartime censorship.

Against this background, it is easy to understand the low spirits of the Entente over the situation in Finland. In his precise reports to Aristide Briand and other French leaders, Dr Poirot pointed out that only one in six of the professors could be regarded as friends of the Entente and the majority of them did not dare to declare their sympathies openly before their Germanophile colleagues. All the students' associations, especially Nylands nation, were pro-German, as were those newspapers which were closest to the young intelligentsia.

After the declaration of independence on 6 December 1917 and its recognition on 4 January 1918, the University felt it desirable to mark what had been achieved with a magnificent academic celebration in January 1918. The festivities were purely pro-German in nature, and the singing of *Die Wacht am Rhein* obliged the French consul to leave the hall. The fact that France alone among the Western powers had recognised Finland's independence was not noted in any way. The academic festivities after the spring of 1918 were even more pro-German, and even after Germany's collapse in November 1918 the University and its students long continued to manifest their German sympathies. From a Finnish point of view, Germany was and would remain a great power, even if it were temporarily defeated and weakened, and no other great power had emerged to replace it in the Baltic area. After the world war, it was the traditional Germany — the Germany of theology, medicine and chemistry; the Germany that the University had always known — which remained, even if Germany in its economic and military manifestations had not been regarded, especially during a world war, as something independent from the German cultural entity.
St. Petersburg — a cultural city

The history of St. Petersburg is a good example of cultural concentration. Its cultural importance derives from the accumulation of power, wealth and population.

When Estonia, Livonia and Karelia were annexed to Russia at the beginning of the 18th century, the new areas' access to the sea affected the entire Russian situation. After this expansion Peter the Great could direct the main part of the trade, which had been handled by Reval, Narva, Nienshants, Vyborg and Novgorod, to the new town of St. Petersburg. The new capital of the Russian Empire influenced even Riga and other Baltic Sea ports, at least in a relative sense. A new junction, with technically developed communications, became now a centre along the ancient trade route between East and West. St. Petersburg's position, much nearer the coast than Novgorod and further east than Reval and Narva, was determined partly by the new Ladoga canal, partly by the navigability of the Gulf of Finland, and building of new Russian military strongholds. Technical development had its parallel in political and military fields. Russia rose from a relatively weak position, where it had been for centuries. Russia still lost a battle at Narva in 1700, but won a great victory at Poltava and at the Cape of Hanko, and in a century its boundaries were at the Gulf of Bothnia and west of Weichsel. In 1703 St. Petersburg was a fortress on the outskirts of Russia, in 1814 the town was clearly more in the middle of the expanding imperium whose troops had reached Paris.

The concentration of trade and communications, the incorporation and accumulation of the western towns' (also the
more easterly Novgorod’s) functions, had its parallel in the centralisation of administration and resources. There is a functional and symbolic connection between the foundation of St. Petersburg and the development and centralisation of Russia’s administration. Peter the Great and his administrative apparatus started the modernisation of the Russian nation with large-scale centralisation and planning which naturally met strong opposition. But autocratic effectiveness made Russia and Prussia modern states in northern Europe in the 18th century, while democratically governed countries such as Poland and Sweden lost both their importance and large areas of land.

St. Petersburg had a different status in trade and seafaring than its predecessors. St. Petersburg’s function as a trading town became secondary, however, compared with the new town’s military, administrative and cultural importance.

Maintaining administration, the military, schools and other public institutions means that tax revenues and work forces were transferred to St. Petersburg at a steadily increasing pace from all over the empire.

Most of the nobility, with country properties all over Russia and the Baltic countries, had to spend at least part of the year in St. Petersburg, initially at the tsar’s specific order, later as part of the nobility’s way of life. In this way a great deal of the income from country properties flowed to the capital and formed as important a transfer of wealth to St. Petersburg as a maintenance of its public institutions.

These two centralising forces, partly trade, partly administration, in both fiscal and symbolic concentration, continued for two centuries. This generated a rapid increase in population and at the same time intensive and extensive building activities. The population increase and building generated in turn a great number of jobs for workers and servants. Many buildings were built with public funds for the tsar’s court, government, army and navy, while private building involved all groups of society. It was very important that the building activities had a symbolic value from the outset, which lead to unique distinction both in townscape and the use of space. Excellent architects, mostly foreign, were trusted without prejudice. The result was a systematically planned city centre in late baroque and classicisist style, surely the most uniform in its style in the
High society young woman in St. Petersburg in the 1830s.

world, where public buildings predominate. The city centre is much larger than in other comparable towns, and well-preserved, too. St. Petersburg beats mercantile Venice for its scale and proportions. The water element and spaciousness in townscape overshadows the papa Rome. The town is more uniform in style and more magnificent than Napoleonic Paris. Its vastness and numerous waterways overshadow Berlin, not to mention businessmen’s London, Amsterdam or New York, where public building is a secondary matter. It is the classical city centre that is the main cultural characteristic of St. Petersburg. Its message of historic ideas is clearly bound to 18th and 19th centuries’ main ideas: human harmony, striving for order, right proportions, light and beauty, which derives from the admiration of antiquity. If Moscow in its way is a third Rome, St. Petersburg can be regarded as a fourth Rome for its stylistic appearance, and as an example of a great imperator’s centralisation tradition.
St. Petersburg, Berlin, Munich, Helsinki and the new Athens belong to those centres, where classicism was of great importance at the beginning of the 19th century, while many West European cities had stopped building after antiquity and had started to adopt ideas from the Middle Ages in the form of Neo-Romanticism (Byzantine style), Neo-Gothic and later Neo-Renaissance. Classicism’s long-lasting dominance in Russia, Prussia and Austria was related to these countries’ political and social situation. They remained for a long time an agrarian and conservative part of Europe, quite different to the western countries of industrialisation and liberalisation. Tsar Nicholas I was as meticulous in his opinions on political stability, as when personally studying the proportions in the drawings for new public buildings.

The great centre had such vital cultural importance that its influence spread widely, even far into the periphery of the country. Over the whole of Russia, in the Baltic countries and in Finland, hundreds, if not thousands, of manor houses were built, which were directly or indirectly influenced by St. Petersburg, its models and architects. Finland is a good example: a typical town plan, a typical manor house, and the most important church building tradition, not to mention Helsinki’s monumental centre, were all based on the Prussian-Baltic-Russian style of Neo-Classicism. In administrative and social respects it was possible to plan, to get plans approved and to build only because of the importance and concentration that classicism had as a style and cultural form in St. Petersburg.

Architecture is admirably suited to illustrate the Roman in St. Petersburg’s appearance and influence manifested in the town’s ability to import, incorporate and diffuse culture. St. Petersburg was founded to accumulate and spread western influences. It was not ancient Russian or Orthodox culture that were absorbed in Finland and other areas which were under the influence of St. Petersburg; it was the accumulating modernity in the tsar’s town which had cultural influence, and it could be Italian, German or French architects’ classicism, English engineers’ steam engines, or Prussian officers’ science of warfare.

The use of cultural elements belonged to the civilisation of
St. Petersburg, as it belongs to the civilisation of all large centres. This absorption is culture in itself, which engenders a steady quest for further culture. St. Petersburg, the court, the aristocracy, the burghers, in different phases and in different ways, each for themselves, wanted for example an immense number of art works, furniture, jewellery, instruments, books, written music, which were ordered and purchased abroad or produced in the home town. It naturally included all that which was expended more quickly, such as clothes, wines and
everything else that goes with culinary art, and all immaterial culture besides, countless lessons in piano playing, in dance, in French, concerts, plays or choreographic productions. In the city there was a vibrant ‘traffic’ culture, everything from the court’s own and the elite cavalry regiments’ horses, their saddles and all the paraphernalia, and the carriages and coachmen of the wealthiest, to working horses of building sites and material transporters and their harnesses, carts and sledges, and eventually also trams and motor vehicles.

St. Petersburg’s potentiality for culture shows especially in its musical life: all great personalities were invited to come to the city in the 18th century and at the beginning of the 19th century. Many artists stayed for a longer period or returned to perform every year. Besides the great ones a long succession of lesser musicians, as well as various circus and variety artists, photographers and portrait painters came as well.

Social, religious and ethnic diversity was evident in this rich civilisation, probably more clearly than in any other European centre. It showed in speech, eating habits, level of education and leisure time activities, but it was, however, a continuous dynamic internal driving force. The highest social stratum isolated itself socially, but a great number of their servants also had contact with lower classes. German master craftsmen and Jewish shopkeepers had Russian clients; different elements were mixed in the army, and Lutheran congregations at least functioned as channels for social communication. Foreigners were an integral part of St. Petersburg, but the difference between local and foreign was often blurred.

There were many non-Russian groups in the tsar’s empire. The Baltic states had already been annexed in the 18th century, Poland and Finland in the 19th century, inhabitants of the latter often being called Swedes. After the 1812 campaign and later there were many Frenchmen in St. Petersburg from Monsieur Tiquet’s colleagues to General Jomini at the War Academy. In the 18th century there were Scottish military and in the 19th century English engineers. The most important group was the Germans, who were represented even in the House of Tsars. Prussia and its modernisation in the 18th century was an important model for Russia, not least the organisation of the Prussian army. The German element was strengthened at the
beginning of the 19th century particularly through extensive importation of innovations for craftsmen's trades. In Russia and especially in St. Petersburg remarks were made – often contemptuously – about German characteristics such as a mind for organisation, efficiency and especially industriousness, Oblomov's Stolz being a classic incarnation of these characteristics. Great Russian writers, such as Goncharov and Tolstoy began to study and define the Russian in relation to the German, who had a central position especially in St. Petersburg. The German had a close connection to Protestantism and Lutheran religious practice, which were represented by many active congregations and good schools.

Most of the Germans in St. Petersburg became Russian subjects, but there always were also those who were at the beginning of the immigration process and who had not made a final decision about settling. Illustrative of the strong German influence is that in the 1860s six newspapers were published in Russian, three in German and one in French, in St. Petersburg.

Newcomers from Germany were assimilated with the Germans, who already lived in St. Petersburg, and with those who had come from the Baltic provinces, or with the Estonians who either spoke German fluently or to some degree. At the end of the 19th century Swedes in St. Petersburg made contacts in a similar manner with the Swedish-speaking Finns, through congregations, societies and clubs. All this produced a dynamic civilisation, where fresh social and ideological ideas and professional innovations spread.

A large diplomatic corps, which until the revolution brought its own cultural stimuli, also lent its character to St. Petersburg.

One category in itself was the learned, whom the government at an early stage persuaded to come to the city from abroad. The Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Arts entirely depended on foreigners. When a commercial high school and later a technological institute were founded in the 19th century in St. Petersburg, models were taken from Germany, and teaching was partly given in German. The German influence was a natural extension of the German influence in the Baltic countries, and because of the contact the language encouraged technological and cultural stimuli from Prussia and the Rhine.
Painting and music in St. Petersburg in 1838. A very large number of the male inhabitants of the city wore the uniform of the army or of the ministries, and civil offices, as well as the professors, teachers, students and schoolboys.

area were absorbed, while a steady immigration from these areas continued.

St. Petersburg became, according to its founder's plans, a port for importing West European, mainly German technical, military, scientific and artistic culture, to Russia. The city could accomplish all this because of the state government, and resources were concentrated there and were used for promoting the modernisation process. Politically and dynastically Russia had most of the time a close relationship with Prussia. Only when Russia expanded during Bismarck's time did the
Russian–German relationship begin to change. At the same time social development in Russia also brought about a cultural change towards a markedly Russian-speaking direction. Technological, administrative and scientific culture started to take Russian language forms of expression, though the contents remained. Tolstoy revised *War and Peace* by radically eliminating French from the original version: the circle of readers had rapidly extended to social classes in which a command of French was non-existent. Count Witte knew hardly any German, though he came from a Baltic–German family on his paternal side. German was no longer necessary. The Danish born Empress Maria Feodorovna never forgot the humiliation Bismarck had caused to her homeland.

At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, Russia had a divided attitude towards Germany. In its foreign policy and social structure Russia was becoming estranged from the German influence which had previously been vital for the civilisation of St. Petersburg. At the same time the Germans in Baltic countries had difficulties with the government, rising Estonian and Latvian national consciousness and social reforms. On the other hand scientific and technological progress in Germany, especially in chemistry and electrical technology, had great importance for development and industrialisation in Russia as well.

A local middle class had, however, already emerged in Russia and St. Petersburg, and the inhabitants of foreign origin began to be Russianised. If one looks at art, literature and sciences in St. Petersburg, one notices clearly that this development did not happen in any spirit of isolation. The city retained its role as a cultural intermediary in a world where the social and linguistic structure had changed. St. Petersburg was the Russian Empire’s rational, extrovert and international head, while Moscow, Russia’s heart, accumulated the ideal of ethnic Russianism, Orthodoxy and Slavism.

Cultural diffusion from St. Petersburg to the rest of Russia is surely almost identical to the general historical cultural process of change in Russia. Auditors from St. Petersburg arrived in order to check civil servants’ efficiency, but materials and furniture and all the new dinner, ballroom and conversation forms, which the social change presumed, new concepts and
terms, and a new mentality also came from there. All this was transmitted and modified according to local conditions and structures.

Innovations and the way of life spread from St. Petersburg to the non-Russian parts of the imperium, to the Baltic countries and Finland. The large population of eastern Finnish workers in St. Petersburg took household utensils and innovations back to their country districts in Finland. The burghers in St. Petersburg already had great influence on running hotels and restaurants in Estonia’s and Finland’s coastal towns at the beginning of 19th century, and especially from the following century onwards; they also managed casinos and bathing establishments in Finnish lakeshore towns. The highest social stratum in Finland absorbed the Russian aristocracy’s ways and manners — highly continental — which people in Stockholm were surprised at. Finland’s leading stratum also had to take part in government politics and often went through a hard school from narrow provinciality to wider horizons. Finland’s higher culture, including Finnish jewellery art and ballet, has been in many ways strongly influenced by St. Petersburg, in some cases only after the revolution, by emigrants from St. Petersburg. St. Petersburg’s influence on art and architecture in the 20th century has hardly been studied, the same applying to sources of inspiration in literature and theatre.

The First World War, the revolution and civil war hit St. Petersburg hard, and it lost its importance. The war severed relations abroad, the revolution transferred the capital’s functions, government and diplomacy to Moscow, and the civil war lead to extensive emigration, mainly from St. Petersburg. Emigration meant that just that part of the population which was important for cultural mediation decreased, while the Soviet Union’s new isolationist policy also reduced the need for cultural exchange. In addition St. Petersburg became a frontier town, since Finland, Estonia and Latvia became independent.

St. Petersburg’s years of glory, 1703–1917, were a period of western cultural contacts and social modernisation in Russia’s history, while the country’s role as a superpower was being formed.
The North, Nature, and Poverty: Some Background on the Nordic Identity

No other point of the compass in Europe has such a stark and clear profile as the north: a uniform area with a uniform culture in relation to the rest of the continent. One country, Norway, takes its name expressly from its point on the compass. How important the very concept ‘north’ is for the ‘northmen’ is illustrated by the national anthems of Finland, Sweden, and Norway, where ‘the North’, and not the country in question, is presented as the object of love.

This clear profile of the Nordic countries as a cultural and political unit is a direct result of their geographical location. Throughout the ages they have been surrounded by other large units which have to a large extent decided their fate. The Atlantic Ocean is less important in this respect than the large states to the east and south; Russia and Germany.

The eastern border with Russia seems more sharply defined than the southern border. Contacts with the Russian empire from the Viking era to today’s commercial contacts have always been lively and important, have often taken the form of wars, often that of trade. But the decisive difference when it comes to history and identification lies in religion. In the prolonged historical process which divided the Roman Empire into east and west, the Nordic countries came to belong to the west, while Russia became part of and heir to Byzantium. The Russians use the Greek-Cyrillic alphabet, while the Nordic countries use the Latin one. The Vikings did, it is true, learn
Greek letters in Constantinople, and the oldest written document we have in Finnish is written in Cyrillic characters. Large parts of present-day northernmost Finland, Sweden, and Norway were within Novgorod’s sphere of influence in the Middle Ages, and Lapland was not divided between the Swedish(-Finnish) and Danish(-Norwegian) kingdoms until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Many Lapp villages paid taxes to two, at times three kingdoms. The northern border with Russia expanded towards the east during the long period of Russian weakness from the thirteenth century to the time of Peter the Great. Peter turned the direction of expansion in his favour at Poltava in 1709 and at Hanko in 1714.

As a result of changes in the borders and in international politics, the concept ‘Norden’ – the Nordic countries – is politically ambiguous even to this day, though what is generally
understood by the term are the independent and intimately linked countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Historically, Estonia and Latvia, although not part of the Nordic entity today, should at least be included in an analysis of it. All or parts of the two Baltic countries belonged to the Danish or Swedish kingdoms for centuries, and strove during their periods of independence to come closer to the Nordic countries, especially to Finland and Sweden. As far as religion and culture go, they are overwhelmingly bound to the western tradition, even though they were politically part of Russia from the beginning of the eighteenth century, with a break during their periods of independence between the two World Wars.

Geologically and agriculturally, through large farms and feudalism, the Baltic countries are similar to Denmark and to the southernmost part of Sweden, Scania. But linguistically, Estonia and to some extent Latvia are aligned with Finland, as members of the Balto-Finnic family of languages, a language group which structurally shows similarities to eastern languages and to Hungarian, but has a vocabulary strongly influenced by Germanic languages and Nordic-Lutheran semantics.

We come now to what is probably one of the most characteristic elements of the Nordic identity from a historical point of view: Lutheranism. At the Baltic Sea, it creates a clear border with the Lithuanian–Polish Catholic bloc. On the other hand, even today it theologically unites the Nordic countries with northern Germany, birthplace and stronghold of Lutheranism. Only in the Nordic countries has the Lutheran state church survived in the form it took during the Reformation. In these countries it seems natural for the head of state (in Sweden, this now means the government) to appoint bishops, but from a Calvinist and Catholic point of view, this practice seems strange. Only the Anglican church can be compared to the Nordic Lutheran churches in this respect.

Lutheranism can be seen as a move towards simplicity. As a conservative movement, it turned against refinement and luxury, and emphasized primitiveness and simplicity. In this way it came to set the norms for the populist movements of the future.
In addition, Lutheranism became an important factor in the development of centrally governed states in the north during the sixteenth century. Sweden and Denmark (or Sweden-Finland and Denmark-Norway-Iceland) moved towards absolutism, in contrast to trends in Poland and even Germany for quite some time to come. Absolutism lasted in Denmark until the Napoleonic era and even longer; in Sweden, its dominance was not as continuous, but it was sufficient to allow the country to develop a sense of nationhood.

In the Baltic and North Sea areas, the German and Dutch commercial presence was always important, especially during the period of the Hanseatic League. In the Middle Ages, the Nordic countries were in a way a periphery of Germany, and German cultural and economic power started to influence politics, as royal names from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries show: Albrekt of Mecklenburg, Erik of Pomerania, Christopher of Bavaria. But this trend was interrupted by the move towards centrally governed ‘national’ states in the sixteenth century. Culturally, however, the German influence was accentuated through the collapse of the Catholic church. One of the consequences of this collapse was the ‘Germanizing’ of the Swedish and Danish languages through sixteenth-century Bible translations and church handbooks. A large number of German-Latin concepts and structures were introduced in the same way into Finnish and Estonian. The Nordic university system, which had its beginning in the fifteenth century, was greatly expanded in the first half of the seventeenth century following German (and Dutch) patterns and scientific traditions.

But Germany’s cultural influence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was much greater than its political and military influence, and thus the two Nordic kingdoms were able to secure their existence in this period. During the eighteenth century, however, two modern, powerful states emerged on the borders of the Nordic countries which in their dealings with Poland had already shown what they had in store for weak neighbours. These kingdoms were the new Russia and the new Prussia. For the next two hundred years the Nordic kingdoms tested their might against these powers.

The most profound upheaval for the Nordic countries
The Nordic woman, active with her writing, her indoor gardening and her keys.

undoubtedly occurred during the Napoleonic Era when definitive political boundaries were drawn and decisive ideological positions taken. The Nordic countries as we now know them are the result of this period of turmoil. The old Danish and Swedish kingdoms were torn apart. Norway was separated from Denmark, Finland from Sweden. Old ties and traditions were lost. The new states found it difficult to build up an identity, and the old states – Denmark and Sweden – felt mutilated and threatened with annihilation like Poland in the
previous century. Furthermore, the age’s general ideological
developments made deep wounds in the old religious and
monarchic identities.

As the number of Nordic countries rose from two to four
(Norway, it is true, in union, this time with Sweden, and
Finland as a Grand Duchy of Russia, but retaining its old law,
religion, language, etc.), relations between the countries
changed. In the wake of the tribulations brought about by
international politics, the centuries-old antagonism between
Swedes (Finns) and Danes (Norwegians) began to subside. A
‘Nordism’ or ‘Scandinavianism’ began to emerge. One of the
uniting factors was the new belief in ‘natural man’, who was to
be preferred to his civilized counterpart.

Rousseau and French ‘provincialism’ formulated and
disseminated this ideology of the natural, which meant a
negation of luxury, refinement, subtlety in art and science. The
emphasis was no longer on industry and the cities, but on the
moral superiority of rural life. Those who lived a simple and
modest life were considered to be closer to the divine and the
eternal than those whose minds were filled with thoughts of
luxury, intrigue, and sophistry.

Nature in its unspoiled, wild form also acquired its human
complement during the latter half of the eighteenth century. In
the Nordic countries, Ossian and pre-Christian European
mythology, together with Greece and Homer, came to represent
the primitive, uncorrupted, anti-industrial and anti-Latin trend.
Like Rousseauism, they were against the cities, and against
luxury, science, and profit.

This interest in the primitive received support from the ro-
mantic theories propounded by Chateaubriand and Bernardin
de Saint-Pierre. They turned the love of the wilderness or
unspoiled nature into a fashionable movement. The Nordic
countries, after a short-lived love affair with Lapland, turned to
the less exotic but more convincing wildernesses of the forests
and lake districts. But it was not enough to have the theme ‘love
of the wilderness’; it was necessary to place a moralistic
interpretation on nature’s beauty in relationship to man.

Neo-humanism’s concept of Homeric Greece was contained
in the ideal of ‘noble simplicity and quiet grandeur’. The
aesthetic-moral world view was thought by Winckelmann to be
found in Greek art as seen in the light of the new archaeological discoveries. But it was not confined to the past. ‘New Greeks’ in Europe were to be sought in areas not yet spoiled by civilization.

Runeberg and Edelfelt’s “soldier boy”
— the young hero trusting in the future.

According to Montesquieu and others experience seemed to show that barren and cold climates would produce a people who were intelligent, hardy, and freedom-loving. In what could be called a pre-Darwinistic spirit, it was believed that only those who were physically and morally superior could survive in these conditions. The all-too-easy life in the lowlands unfortunately enabled the weak and unhealthy to flourish.

Soon these ideas found their way to the north, and people began to compare the moral characteristics of the various regions. The first landscape art which took its motives from the wilderness emerged, but it was concerned with topography, rather than with the mood of the landscape.
All these theories proved to be of the greatest importance in the difficult situation which arose in the Nordic countries during the Napoleonic Wars and military and moral defeats, beginning with the British naval offensive against Copenhagen in 1807 and the Russian-French alliance the same year in Tilsit which decided Finland’s separation from Sweden and united it with Russia in 1808–9, were followed by economic problems.

After Copenhagen’s bombardment, the Danish clergyman Grundtvig began to formulate his idea of the Nordic countries as the new Greece. The inhabitants of the north and the Greeks were ‘natural’ people with their own mythology and folklore, as opposed to the ‘artificial’ people, who did not create things themselves, but borrowed their culture from others. Grundtvig’s ideology made it necessary to exclude all that was Latin and Catholic. The direction was away from Rome, as during Luther’s time, but now with new positive overtones.

This Nordic fusion of folk poetry and neo-humanistic ideals was populist in nature and led to a rejection of the conspicuous consumption and elegant life-style of the aristocracy and well-to-do bourgeoisie. But it was not a revolution in the French tradition. Instead of seeking freedom and equality through force, it hoped to achieve its ends through moral education.

Sweden’s greatest poets in the first half of the nineteenth century, Tegnér and Geijer, were among the leaders of this development. Tegnér’s *Fritiofs Saga* showed how greatness lay in conquering oneself, not in overthrowing the establishment. Geijer glorified the Nordic peasant’s simple pride and freedom, and explicitly compared Greece and the Nordic countries. This ideology was carried to its extreme by J. L. Runeberg, Finland’s national poet, who was also much admired and read in Sweden and Norway.

Runeberg created an idealized picture of the Nordic man and his surroundings: the people of the North are like new Greeks, especially the poor and industrious people of the inland areas, who live in magnificent natural surroundings. Poverty is seen as the ideal. The poor inland dweller is closer to God than the inhabitant of the lowlands or the townsman because he lives a tranquil inner life and does not strive feverishly for worldly success. In *Our Land* (Finland’s national anthem, and express-
Runeberg and Edelfelt's "a Number 15, Stolt", the wounded and poor soldier without boots confirms his will to fight. Much in Finland must be understood against the background of the military tradition.

...ive of feelings in Sweden and Norway too), Runeberg speaks of nature, man's love of it, and the world that nature mediates. The poem concludes with the assurance of a bright and hopeful
future, which comes from love as a process of maturation, and is based on a submission to fate. This view of life takes on a special meaning when contrasted with the revolutionary tendencies at the time it was written, 1846–8. For the people in the Nordic countries, nature was enough: more was not possible, nor even desirable.

The idealization of poverty became an important, almost central feature of the Nordic identity. It was given added vitality by the religious tradition and by the often harsh geographic and climatic conditions which prevailed in the north. But there was real poverty, especially in the nineteenth century, when the increase in population was not matched by an equally large increase in production. During the great famines of the 1860s, hundreds of thousands of people died of hunger and epidemics. Emigration to America occurred on a massive scale. From Finland, emigrants also went to the metropolis of St. Petersburg. Difficult years came later, too, with the two World Wars, especially in Finland, the Nordic country which suffered most. Today the Nordic countries are among the richest in the world, but the tradition of poverty persists, often giving rise to feelings of guilt.

Alongside the tradition of poverty, however, there is also one of wealth and optimism, of industry and liberalism, which finds expression in literature and in art, for example in the works of Ibsen and Edelfelt. The art nouveau period of the turn of the century again sought out the wilderness. The silent land of the forests, untouched by man, became a source of inspiration, as the painting, literature and music of the time bear witness.

Much of the ideology of simplicity, poverty, and local democracy has lived on in the Nordic agrarian parties and, in some ways, in the social democratic parties. The tradition of liberalism has been relatively weak or has only emphasized religious sectarianism (resistance to the state church in Sweden). From a French or German point of view, the Nordic tradition also seems to be unscientific. German thoroughness and French logic have no obvious place in the Nordic mentality.

There is none the less an old and firm link in the Nordic tradition to the urban and intellectual world which in various
ways has exerted an influence since the Middle Ages. On an ideological level, however, the traditions of populism and simplicity, and the idealization of nature have dominated. They stem perhaps from the Nordic countries’ sense of being on the periphery of the world, set apart as it were from the rest of Europe.
Finnish Russophobia in the Twenties: Character and Historical Roots

After the Bolshevik Revolution, in December 1917, Finland obtained her independence from Russia, with Lenin’s signature of approval. But a bitter civil war between reds and whites had to be fought to keep the Revolution outside the country. Finland emerged closely bound to Imperial Germany which had helped the whites to victory, and it was only after the German collapse that Finland became a fully independent and neutral state. The Russian Civil War continued until 1920, and in that year the Peace of Tartu brought a regularity in the relations between the new Republics of Finland and Russia.

In the early twenties a deliberate campaign was begun by certain elements in Finnish society to stir up hatred against Russia, and a distinct coolness in Finnish attitudes prevailed until after the Second World War. It is my aim in this article to examine the ideological evolution and organisation of this ryssänviha, as it is called in Finnish (literally, hatred of the Russian), and to draw some conclusions about its age and continuity.

As elaborated in certain inflammatory articles of the twenties, ryssänviha may properly be defined as the acceptance of the following theses:

1. The Russians both as people and individuals are detestable, first because of their racial and national character, and secondly because of their eagerness for expansion, which is a direct threat to Finland.
2. The negative attitude (and hatred) towards the Russians is of long standing; the Russians have always been the hereditary enemy of Finland.

3. Thus there is between the Russians and the Finns an animosity directly stemming from historical circumstances, which does not require current justification and which is based not on reason but on intuitively experienced reality. The animosity is expressed in the wish of the two nations to destroy each other and the despising of the political institutions and cultural achievements of the other.

*Ryssänviha*, as thus formulated, was clearly manifested in two publications, the first published in 1922 under the title *Ryssästä saa puhua vain hammasta purren* (One can speak of the Russki only with grinding of teeth) and later, slightly revised, as *Herää Suomi* (Wake up, Finland), and the second in 1923 entitled *Suursuomi on yhtä kuin isänmaa* (Greater Finland is the Fatherland). *Suur-Suomi* (Greater Finland) was to be an expanded Finnish state including Eastern Karelia and perhaps also the Kola Peninsula, both parts of Russia but populated by Finnish-related peoples. This latter pamphlet had also been published earlier as the “racist issues” of *Ylioppilaslehti* (The Student Journal). Erkki Räikkönen, the editor, claims to have distributed the pamphlet in large numbers in Southern Bothnia where Vihtori Kosola, Vihtori Herttua, Orrenmaa, Antila and other anti-Russian activists from the Imperial period assisted in the distribution. The pamphlet, better-known later under its other name, was often referred to in parliamentary speeches and political causeries as late as the 1930s. Some longer quotations from writings of the period will provide an idea of the arguments used for *ryssänviha* and the literary quality of the propaganda.

In the article *Vihakin voimaa* (Even hatred is strength), perhaps written by Räikkönen, one finds the following:

> Look around you citizens! Is our land not full of traitors, Ephialtes who have sold and continue to sell their small and unfortunate country to their archenemies? Tens of thousands of our Communists live on Eastern gold, cowering under the errands of the ryssä, and waiting for a night dark enough to sell the blood of their fellow citizens to the enemy. They are
not hungry or cold, that they abandon thereby their last bit of honour; they are not ignorant and simple mountain herdsmen unable to distinguish good from evil; but they do everything willingly, in full knowledge of their deeds. Confronted with them, Ephialtes himself would blush for shame. It would be interesting to present each of our traitors with his family record and tell him to look backwards a few centuries. It might just happen, and it would happen frequently, that he would there find pages that would slightly chill his love for the ryssä. Perhaps it was one of his forefathers who fell on the threshold of his own home, with skull split by a Russian sabre. Perhaps it was his grandmother, dragged with bound hands into a burning building, and his young relatives slain by the Cossack to decorate fence-posts. And all this did not happen just once but often in his family, over many generations. And now all those victims of Eastern cruelty are moaning and feeling sick in their earthy graves and mouldered ashes of their ruined homes when they hear that one of their descendants has sold his Finnish brother to the bloodthirsty ryssä. —

Now all that is past and gone. Tens of thousands of our people are kissing the Russkis, are prepared to sell their country to the Muscovite at any time, without asking anything in return. They are obedient like dogs to their masters, and the loathsome smell of the Russian attracts them as carrion attracts a jackal.

But we who once drove the Russians out of this country, we who know what marks they have stamped on this land, we must learn and teach others to hate the Russian so deeply and strongly that the roots of that hate will not wither even at the moment of death. Let us remove the name of the devil from our curses and put ryssä in its stead. It is as good, it is even better! For whatever evil has occurred in this land or will occur in the years to come, the ryssä is always, in one way or another, behind it. We must impress on our children the clear understanding that, while their feelings and moods may change in whatever direction, one thing shall remain steadfast: ryssänviha.

The writer's call for ryssänviha is prompted by Finnish Communism. But historical explanation assumes such prominence that the writer apparently regards Communism as a manifestation of the Russian spirit, or else he depreciates it
expressly because it was, as considered in Finland during the twenties, a Russian phenomenon.

In another article, entitled *Suomen itsenäisyyden peruskivi* (The Cornerstone of Finnish Independence), the writer V. R. V. (Reino Vähäkallio?) finds other justifications for *ryssänviha*. Neither Communism nor the historical relation between Russia and Finland is the important thing but it is the deep antagonism between Russia and the Occident that the writer heavily draws on: “Russia has always been and will always be the enemy of humanity and of human progress.” It has been the historical task of Finland to fight against Russianism, a fight not only for her own rights but for “the whole world”. The writer goes on to ask if the existence of the Russian people has been in any single respect useful to humanity, and answers in the negative: “It would be fortunate for humanity if Russia were to disappear off the face of the earth.” He continues:

The mere existence of the Russian people is an obstacle to the development of mankind. Its immense number and fertility make it an unprecedented menace for Western civilization. In the space of about 300 years it will be greater in number than all the nations of Europe together. Like a stream of mud it floods out over its neighbours, threatening to bury one nation after another, as it has from the beginning of history done to many a Finnish tribe and was about to do to Finland herself.

Why, then, is the Russian people so despicable and loathsome? What is the underlying reason for this? It lies in the character of the people. The Russians are lacking that basic quality of civilised nations — a sense of responsibility. Without it a human being is not human but animal. Therefore the Russki has never been able to construct a state and advance the culture of mankind. The Vikings, the Tartars, the Germans, and the English have, from time to time, wrought for it the external signs of a realm, comparable to others, but even the skill of foreigners has been unable to achieve the same inwards. Now it is the turn of the Jews to govern Russia. For how long they can manage it the future will show.

Many equally colourful quotations could be found. It serves our purpose better, however, to look at the force which was behind
Russian batteries' possibilities for attacking Sveaborg, the great fortress complex outside Helsinki constructed from 1748 to protect Finland as part of the Swedish realm. Sveaborg then served from 1808 as a Russian place d'armes, and fought in the Crimean war against the Anglo-French aggressors. In 1906 and 1917, the Russian navy troops garrisoned there were inclined to be revolutionary.

the publishing and propagation of ryssänviha: the student organisation “The Academic Karelia Society” (Akateeminen Karjala-Seura, AKS) and particularly a secret group within it, “Vihan veljet” (Brotherhood of Hate).

The secretary and effective leader of the Vihan Veljet, Erkki
Räikkönen, has described the formation of the society as follows: E. E. Kaila, who had taken "an indifferent, even negative" attitude towards the AKS when its activity was concentrated on the East Karelian issue and the support of Karelian refugees escaping from the Russian Civil War to Finland, nevertheless appreciated the possibilities of the society and its political colour. He asked Räikkönen to gather together "a few ... brave and fearless men" to whom he made a powerful speech. He requested those who accepted his ideas to raise their hands and take an oath "in the name of God, Fatherland and home" to hate the ryssä eternally. Those who had taken the oath later confirmed it with their signature. Thus the Vihan Veljet was founded, with the explicit objective of spreading ryssänviha among the people.

In its weekly meetings the Vihan Veljet discussed questions of principle, pondering "the justification and necessity for ryssänviha" and planning suitable propagandist activity. Räikkönen tells us: "We took all the most important members of the AKS as members of Vihan Veljet, which gradually became an important force, with more and more influence on the activities of the AKS. We decided that all members of the executive committee of the AKS must also be members of Vihan Veljet, and belonging to Vihan Veljet was a prerequisite to standing for office on the executive committee."

The activities of the AKS and Vihan Veljet became more and more closely associated, especially after the election of E. E. Kaila as chairman of the AKS. The stronger the AKS became, the more influence the Vihan Veljet wielded. Vihan Veljet soon extended its activities to the countryside where "circles" consisting of three members were founded in a number of places. Someone not from the area was sworn in and entrusted with the establishment of a circle. The members of Vihan Veljet had a round silver emblem which they wore, with the swords of the east and west set against each other and the text: "Against the devil and ryssä."

Vihan Veljet became an important force in 1922–23 when the AKS expanded its original programme of aiding East Karelian refugees to incorporate the aims of this secret society. The oath, flag and emblem of the AKS were created in this period, and even later, when the nature and activities of the
AKS changed, it always preserved the symbols, rituals and expressions created in the spirit of ryssänviha (for instance the motto ryssän vihassa that often preceded the signature in the circular letters of the AKS and in the private correspondence of the members of the AKS). “The AKS and Vihan Veljet were”, says Räikkönen, “as hatred and love, the two sides of a medal; the AKS was the symbol of patriotic love and Vihan Veljet that of ryssänviha.”

In the spirit of anti-Russian feeling the AKS organised in 1924 a sizeable student protest against the renting out of the Festival Hall of the Old Student House for a Russian charity concert. In addition to a whistling demonstration on the night of the concert, the matter was raised in the general meeting of the Student Union, where the demonstrators had the opportunity to present their views to a large audience. The fact that some 500 students took part in the requested vote of confidence suggests that the incident aroused great interest among the students. In the following year, 1925, the AKS obtained a majority of the student votes. The large number of students educated in the circles of the AKS in the twenties and thirties guaranteed an effective and wide diffusion of the views of the society. Through the efforts of these academic cadres, a significant influence was exerted on the education of the following generation.

Besides the creation of a body of supporters the activities of Vihan Veljet were directed toward the concrete aim of fighting “ryssäläisyys” (Russianism) in Finland. The “nationalisation” of the Finnish army was an important matter of the mid-twenties. Apparently Vihan Veljet had a considerable part in achieving this goal. “Some Jaeger officers of high position” had joined the Brotherhood, and the idea was to obtain the important posts in the army for the Jaeger officers rather than for officers who had served in the Russian army. The Jaegers, in this context, were Finns who during the First World War had illegally gone to Germany and, in agreement with the German government, received military training in the 27th Royal Prussian Jaeger Battalion, even fighting on the eastern front. Returning to Finland in 1918, the Jaegers fought on the White side in the Finnish Civil War and many of them continued as officers in the new Finnish Army. The Jaegers, who inexorably
hated the ryssä, and they alone could give the army the right spirit and will for defence. E. E. Kaila, chairman of the AKS and Vihan Veljet and, at the same time, and editor of Suojeluskuntalaisen lehti (Organ of the Civil Guards) and correspondent of Ilkka, the principal organ of the Agrarian Party, was in charge of the campaign to renew the leadership of the army. Kaila’s article Ryssäläisyydestä puolustuslaitoksessamme (Russianism in our National Defence System) was published by the AKS.

While Kaila was travelling in Germany for six months in 1922, Räikkönen assumed the editorship of Suojeluskuntalaisen lehti. The Vihan Veljet also had some influence on the right-wing weekly Suunta (The Direction). Räikkönen relates that “purging” of the army was at first carried through “by means of discussion with the highest authorities of the country, but later newspaper attacks were employed as well.”

The founding of Vihan Veljet and the adoption of radical ryssänviha as the central part of the programme of the AKS during its early years were not the only manifestations of anti-Russianism. After Finland’s attainment of independence, such feelings found expression in a number of incidents. A Russian chapel in Helsinki was tarred by students in 1919 and later pulled down, for example. The names of some towns and streets were changed, though they were often ones that had never been popular. (The name of the important town Nikolainkaupunki/Nikolaistad, for instance, had never entirely supplanted the older name of Vaasa/Vasa except in official use.) Most of the attempts to wipe out memories of the Russian period were made later, in the twenties or thirties, when the sowing of ryssänviha was already beginning to bear fruit. Some of the garrison churches no longer used for orthodox services were “nationalised” by the removal of decorations, and the names of some streets were modified in several towns. For the most part, however, changes were limited to street names with a blatantly foreign sound. Thus Vladimirinkatu and Speranskintie went, while Aleksanterinkatu and Mariankatu remained. The statue of the Emperor Alexander II in the Senate Square of Helsinki likewise remained, but the colossal bust of Alexander I was removed from the Festival Hall of the University of Helsinki after persistent demonstrations in the thirties. As late as 1930, among nationally minded students, the removal of
From the 1840s, a negative image of Russia was rapidly spread in Western Europe; one of the important figures in Russophobia was the marquis de Custine, later much used in the American anti-Russian propaganda in the Cold War. Marquis de Custine was convinced that all foreigners were constantly watched by the police; this of course was partly true, but the question remains to what extent and whether this was unique to Russia.

memorabilia of the Russian period was considered highly important. The students considered the depth of ryssänviha in Finland inadequate because so many remembrances of the past were still to be seen, but their efforts to collect signatures supporting their views did not meet with success.

The fact that the AKS and Vihan Veljet took it as their explicit objective to create and spread ryssänviha would suggest that such hatred did not exist to any great extent, or at least not sufficiently. They believed nevertheless that there was in the Finnish people a latent anti-Russian feeling which could fairly easily be fanned into an active hatred. The above-mentioned writer V. R. V. offers the following reasons why a latent hatred of the Russians must surely exist: “What good have we ever received from Russia? Nothing! Only death and
destruction, plague and the stench of the Russian. The dreadful days of *Isoviha* are only 200 years behind us (*Isoviha* — The Great Hatred — is the term used in Finland for the period 1713–1721, when Finland was occupied by the Russians) and the trace of the attempted Russification of the past two decades are still clearly to be seen. The former stooges of the Russian gendarmes are placidly allowed to keep their posts in government.” But despite all this the writer evidently did not find real hatred against the Russians because he called for it to be incited: “People and country must wake up and realize what an infinite strength hatred is. The French won the World War through their fierce hatred of the Germans. The hatred multiplied their strength. How important hatred is for us, a small and weak country, is self-evident. If we hasten in rage to the eastern frontier, when the order sounds, the ryssä will never be able to destroy our independence.”

The last sentence gives us a key to the efforts to stir up hatred against the Russians in the early twenties. The political constellation had made Finland and Russia “neighbours against their own will”, and between them suspicion and ill-will reigned. The Finns feared that Russia might destroy their newly won independence, out of the pressure of communistic ideology on the one hand and to regain the old frontiers of the empire on the other. Hatred of the Russians, as part of the “psychological preparedness for war”, was seen as one means of arming for the defence. At the same time, the provocation of anti-Russianism would serve to strengthen the national identity; a new patriotism was needed to replace the traditional patriotism of the nineteenth century, which consisted essentially of trust in and love of the tsar, Grand Duke of Finland. The new patriotism must be active and aggressive, even expansionist, in contrast to the old patriotism, which had been based, after the fashion of Saarijärven Paavo, on quiet perseverance and peaceable improvement of one’s condition. (Saarijärven Paavo — in Swedish Bonden Pavo — was a peasant figure created in 1831 by the poet J. L. Runeberg and embodying the strength, persistence and trust in God imagined as typical of the ideal Finn.) V. R. V. envisaged this strengthening of the national identity in the following way: “But gradually, as the deep wounds inflicted by the Civil War connected so closely to
the War of Liberation, start to heal, fresh spring winds will begin to blow and Finland will again see the dawn of national revival. The compelling force is to be — as strange as it may seem — a violent hatred of the Russians.” Ryssänihiproffered as the medicine needed to “integrate our nation”, a task that the AKS adopted as the main plank in its programme a few years later.

Ryssäniha emerged as the consequence of a specific political situation, that is, Finland’s separation from Russia. There was now a true frontier between Finland and Russia.

It was widely suggested in the speeches and writings of the twenties that ryssäniha was a spontaneous Finnish sentiment with strong popular roots. In an attempt to assess the historical validity of this argument I examined the proverbs preserved in the collections of The Society for Finnish Literature. And the conclusion to which I have come is that there was no deep-seated, “natural” hatred of the Russians before 1917. After this time, the influence of anti-Russian propaganda can indeed be seen in the proverbs.

The older proverbs in which Russians are mentioned are for the most part purely descriptive and without negative insinuation. To the question whether there are, on the other hand, any positive characterizations I have little to offer at this point. I would, however, refer to two popular songs: Oolannin sota from the time of the Crimean War and Kauan on kärsitty from the time of the Turkish War 1877–78. (Oolannin sota — The Aland War — boasts, very unhistorically, of the bravery of the Finnish defence against the British, who “sailed with 300 ships to our shores”, and Kauan on kärsitty — There has been cold and hunger — describes the fate and bravery of the Finnish Battalion in the Russo-Turkish War in the 1870s.) Both songs, still quite popular today, are clearly and explicitly loyal and “Imperial.” There is also a short article by a student in the 1870s, in which it is concluded from an examination of popular political opinion that both Russia and Sweden were strange and distant lands to the common man. Passages could be quoted from peasant poetry as well, but suffice it to state here that there are many poems expressing admiration and gratitude towards the Emperor and respect for the powers he represents — economic power, for example, which was thought to be an
assurance against famine, and political power in his waging of a Christian war against the Turks.

In view of the evidence cited, I would be inclined to agree with Yrjö Koskinen, one of the leading historians and politicians of his day, when he stated in the 1870s that the Russophobia dating from the time of Swedish rule (if indeed there was such) had totally disappeared. Nearly 70 years of co-existence, he argued, had totally changed the attitude of the Finnish people towards the Russian. Russia protects us, he continues, and she knows that she has in us a faithful brother at arms and that we are ready to defend our side of the Empire with our forces. And we know that they, for their part, will honour the national and political status we have achieved. By “the people”, Koskinen probably meant the estate of the land-owning peasants in the Parliament, that is, the most politically conscious representatives of the people. When the so-called Russification began in 1899 and a great popular petition was drawn up to present to the Tsar, the students and other people who collected signatures for it from all over the country had to concede that the population of the countryside, and very probably the majority there, had virtually no idea of the existing political situation and thus no way of judging the new developments. The narrow geographical and social environment of their home district was for most people the whole world. Their ideas about Russians – and other nationalities in general – were practically non-existent or, at most, informed by vague hearsay and the occasional wandering merchant from East Karelia.

While arguing that political ideas and ideas about other nations were foreign to the majority of the Finnish people, it should also be mentioned that especially in Eastern Finland many people sought employment in St. Petersburg. The needs of the metropolis and the over-population in the eastern provinces together encouraged the migration. But this hardly brought with it Russophobia, but rather only greater familiarity with Russia.

If then there is strong evidence to suggest that there was little real popular Russophobia or antipathy towards Russia and Russians in Finland in the nineteenth century – I shall return to this question later – the case with Sweden is quite different.
In the French propaganda during the Crimean war the adversary's State was depicted by Doré as despotic, even if the France of that time in the early years of Napoléon III, was also governed in a rather autocratic way. The negative idea of Russia was largely propagated by Polish émigrés.

Because of the strong intellectual and otherwise close relationship between the two countries, the question of Swedish Russophobia is of considerable importance to the present analysis, and to this I now turn.

Though in Sweden (incl. Finland) there was an ancient tradition of Russophobia, we have little information about it. Wars and war propaganda fanned it, the latter assuming importance after the death of Gustavus Wasa and up to the time of Gustavus Adolphus (ca. 1560–1630). Gustavus Adolphus shifted the political and military orientation of Sweden from east to the south-east and finally to the south, and with this the thrust of propaganda was shifted away from Russia towards the Pope and the German-Roman Emperor. Sweden was faced with other and more pressing enemies than Russia. The Great Nordic War and the Battles of Narva (1700) and Poltava (1709) of course played their part in arousing feelings against Russia —
yet not long after we find a group of Swedish diet members successfully negotiating with Russia for money to support their cause. The two Russian occupations of Finland in the 18th century left negative memories in the northern parts of Finland, but they were rather mild in the main areas. The men of Anjala certainly did not fear Russia. (The Anjala conspiracy was a plan of some Swedish and Finnish officers during the Swedish-Russian war of 1788–1790 to effect a peace, restrict the powers of the King and perhaps, in some way, separate Finland from the rest of Sweden, possibly under Russian protection.) After Finland came under Russian rule in 1809 there was no wave of emigration and many important Swedes made the choice to live in Finland. There might have been some popular antipathy towards Russia during these centuries, but in written sources we meet mostly echoes of general European attitudes towards the Muscovite realm and its strange inhabitants. We know very little about actual popular thinking, and the fact that the government had from time to time to make anti-Russian propaganda argues more for a non-existent or weak Russophobia than for an active one.

I should like to underline that even if in the eighteenth century there may have been an antipathy towards Russia in the Kingdom of Sweden, there were also factors for mutual understanding. The Empire was known to the Swedes and Finns in the first place through its western parts, which were German, Karelian or Estonian, mostly Lutheran in faith, and all of them former parts of the Swedish realm. St. Petersburg was a sort of modern Narva, not particularly Russian, and with a strong German and Dutch flavour. The eighteenth century frontier was by no means closed; clergymen, merchants and students crossed it easily, and there were social connections between manors on either side of the frontier.

In Finland, the awakening interest in national history and language at the end of the century was suggesting an eastern origin for the Finnish people. So keen was the feeling that the poet Frans Mikael Franzén could write in 1809 that the son of the East was now returning to the family fold. Such sentiments prepared Finland for entry to the Russian Empire in 1809. Ironically perhaps, Russia was then governed by the same dynasty as Gustavian Sweden, i.e. the Holstein-Gottorps, while
Sweden, with the Revolutionary French Marshal Bernadotte as ruler seemed to be dashing into the maelstrom of European Revolution.

In Sweden "proper", the loss of Finland led to the inclusion of revanchist themes in the new nationalism awakened during the Napoleonic Wars. Swedish revanchism in part reflected a real fear. In 1809 Russian troops had landed not only in the Aland Islands and in Northern Sweden but near Stockholm itself. With the annexation of Finland, Russia was approaching dangerously near to the capital. Many Swedes questioned whether Russian expansion would really halt at the Gulf of Bothnia. In the early nineteenth century it was thought that the principal interest of Russia in Scandinavia was the Danish Sund. Only later on, and partly by English inspiration, did the northern parts of Sweden and Norway begin to be regarded as the principal objects of Russian expansionism.

Esaias Tegnére, doubtless the most influential Swedish poet during the two first decades of the nineteenth century, gave voice to a very strong anti-Russianism. His monumental poem Svea called for the forging of a new national identity and consciousness for the now diminished Sweden – alluding disparagingly to a throne erected on a swamp (i. e. St. Petersburg). The Russian expansion would continue, he warned: "What's left for us soon? The giant presses closer and closer." In The Crowned Bride, a poem from the eighteen-twenties, Tegnére includes a long passage in which the Russian is cast as the stereotype of all brutality and barbarism.

Tegnére's attitude towards Russia was certainly a reaction to actual developments as well as an expression of older folk fears and imaginings. But it must also be remembered that Tegnére originated from and lived in a part of Sweden that was geographically distant from Russia. There the Danes, not the Russians, were the "hereditary enemy". Tegnére was the father of Scandinavianism. So he could not and would not provoke anti-Danish sentiments in his nationalist pleas.

Nor was the fear of Russian advance towards the west merely a literary motif: political Scandinavianism was in part based on this fear as well. In 1809, rumours were already abroad that Alexander and Napoleon had agreed to divide Sweden between Russia and Denmark, with the boundary running through the
city of Motala. Prince Christian August, pretender to the Norwegian and Swedish thrones, regarded Russia as a threat to the entire North. An actual confrontation, he believed, would see Sweden reduced to a Russian province. “God forbid,” he wrote to the King, “a war, which would doubtless sooner or later bring Norway under that barbaric yoke and the dissolution of the fatherland as a result.” Instead, a Scandinavian union should be established, “which can, in due time, shake the throne of Russia.” It bears notice in passing that the Prince characterised Russia as a barbarian nation.

Here we meet a stock theme of nineteenth century thinking: Russia as an eastern and barbarian, autocratic and authoritarian power in opposition to and threatening Western Europe. The signing of the Holy Alliance under the urging of Tsar Alexander assisted in crystallising the ideological situation. The Holy Alliance, and Russia in particular, put itself forward as guarantor of conservative and reactionary régimes throughout Europe. Democratic and liberal elements, for their part, made their opposition to reaction a special opposition towards Russia. The future of the world was seen as resting upon the outcome of a duel between Russia and liberalism. This struggle was very often spoken of in the prophetic words of Napoleon at St. Helena, to the effect that if the present political orientation were to continue the whole of Europe would in ten years be either a republic or a Cossack state. Later on the time limit was extended to thirty and then to fifty years. This prophecy was very well-known, even as far away as Lapland.

As we see, the Western view tended to identify Russia with the Cossacks, a word which in turn conjured up the Huns and other cruel, Mongol races. While a more subtle notion of the Eastern Empire did come to prevail in European discussion, especially in France (I refer to the observations of Michel Cadot in his penetrating study La Russie dans la vie intellectuelle française), the “Cossack” image of Russia made for extremely powerful propaganda.

We meet the Cossack idea in the Scandinavianism of Swedish students in the forties. The most effectual of its poets, Strandberg, writing under the pseudonym Talis Qualis, portrays in a very lucid way the connection of liberalism and anti-despotism with aversion to Russia. For him, Russia was
not only a tyrant state but a dangerous neighbour, which had already subjugated Finland. His best-known poem *Vaticinium*, acclaimed with enormous success at the Scandinavian Student Meeting of 1845, calls for the chains of the Finns to be broken and the Cossacks to be stained with blood. This evocative poem (which begins with the word *Finland*) was thus an updated and more militant continuation of Tegnér’s rhetoric.

Feelings of fear and hatred towards Russia ran strong in Sweden also in the 1850’s, when Sweden came very near to joining Britain and France in the Crimean War. The war being waged in the Baltic around her raised the fever for war and prepared the ground for the *skarpskytte* (sharp-shooter) movement. The goal of this movement was the formation of a volunteer army, and the Garibaldi campaign of 1860 assisted it to very rapid success. Within the space of a few months there were 40,000 men enlisted. Much more than a regular army, of course, this voluntary military organisation needed an ideology to explain its aims and motives, and poets and orators thus assumed a central importance.
Russophobia was a very important theme, Russia being the presumed enemy. At the same time, a new approach to national history was being propagated. The soldier-king Charles XII became celebrated as the hero of national liberalism, and his statue was erected in Stockholm in 1868, pointing with its sword to the East.

With the liberalisation of Russia under Alexander II and organisation of the military along defensive lines, opinion in Sweden towards Russia became more peaceable. The defence debate of the sixties and seventies was indeed lively, but no longer were Russia but Prussia and Germany singled out as the possible aggressors. During the final decades of the nineteenth century the relations between Russia and Sweden, while cool, were mostly rather good. There was later some fear that Russia might launch an attack on Norrland and Finnmarken, where she was thought to desire the iron mines and an ocean port. But at the same time Sweden was pursuing commercial expansion in Russia, most notably represented by the person of Alfred Nobel. The constitutional conflict between Russia and Finland beginning in 1899 aroused anxiety in Sweden as well, especially in the eastern and northern parts, with repercussions on the defence policy.

Notwithstanding, the Emperor paid an official visit to Stockholm and a dynastic marriage was arranged (1908) between Prince Wilhelm of Sweden and the Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna of Russia, a marriage that was, it may be added, neither a personal nor a political success.

It would indeed be surprising if the Swedish Russophobia, in some instances so ardent, had had no counterpart at all in Finland. We find, however, only relatively feeble echoes of it. When student Scandinavianism was at a peak in Sweden in the 1840s, Finland and its students and intellectuals were likewise nursing nationalist ideas, but this nationalism was neither Scandinavianism nor Slavophilism but Fennomania. Among its ingredients were an enthusiasm for the Finnish national epic *Kalevala*, a student campaign to enlighten the people, J. L. Runeberg’s great poem *Vårt Land* (Our Land) and J. V. Snellman’s writings on democratic nationalism. Only after the revolutions of 1848–1849 did a part of the young Finnish intelligentsia turn towards liberalism, and this in the first
instance was not nationalistic as much as constitutional. Russia was seen not so much as an oppressor of Finland but as a menace to Europe in general – Hungary in 1849, for example. In the years from 1849 to the end of the Crimean War Russia, and especially its Tsar Nicholas I, was more than ever singled out as the adversary of all culture, all Europeanism, all democracy and liberalism. But the arsenal of arguments was basically the same as in the preceding decades.

The anti-Russian sentiments in Finland in the fifties were essentially limited to students and the young intelligentsia. An examination of opinions shows, moreover, little reference in Finland to Russia’s "barbarianism" or the "cossacks". The important question was liberty and representative government. Hence it is also easy to explain why Finnish liberalism assumed a loyalistic course after the important constitutional concessions of Alexander II in 1863. Constitutionalism was the distinguishing feature of Finnish liberalism up until 1917. The liberals recognised, of course, the dangers to which the Finnish constitution was exposed when at the mercy of an autocratic Russia. There was a continual looking towards Europe – an attraction which sometimes led to separatist ideals – but then Russian liberals were likewise seeking a Europeanisation of their country. This aspect of Finnish liberalism was thus no characteristically Finnish phenomenon.

In the “Suecomanic” or Scandinavian movement in Finland we can at last, I think, find some real Russophobia. The leader of the movement, A. O. Freudenthal, as early as 1863, penned the slogan of the liberation of Finland from Russia. Freudenthal and his friends thought this liberation probably would take the form of a reintegration or union of Finland with Sweden. Though this direction was not pursued further, Russophobia continued as an intellectual current in the student “nation” *Nyländska afdelningen* whose leader Freudenthal was. Once in the sixties, for example, it was resolved that the members of the “nation” should not study Russian at the University. But even in the *Nyländska afdelningen* real Suecomania did not obtain a lasting majority but became integrated with liberalism. There were among its members, it may be added, many sons of Finns serving in the Imperial Army and sons of Russian merchants living in Helsinki. Thus the Russophobia of the *nylanders* also
tended to be more an opposition to Russian autocracy and less clearly to Russia and the Russians. Even this Russophobia is rarely mentioned in the minutes of the organisation. And nothing appears to have aroused the concern of the Governor-General or of the University staff in Helsinki.

In fact, the loyalty of the Finns was measured by the Russians in occasional opinion investigations, especially during the Crimean War, and nothing alarming was noted. In my opinion this is the most telling argument against the claim or the Vihan Veljet that there was a deep-seated Russophobia in Finland: Russian officials stationed in Finland as a sort of intelligence service had nothing special to remark. If there had existed a strong Russophobia or aversion towards the Russians, it would certainly have provoked some suppressive action on the part of the Russian Government, but so far as we know, there was no such action. Nor, so far as we know, did the anti-Finnish press in Russia accuse Finns of ethnic Russophobia. What they did protest was the slow but real separation of Finland from the Empire, which was occurring through the consolidation of Finland’s parliamentary system and administration especially during the reigns of Alexander II and III, the growing strength of industry and commerce in Finland, and the emergence of a distinctive and self-conscious Finnish cultural life. Finns were criticised at the same time for their lack of interest in Russia and the Russian language.

The important question remaining is how did the increasing tension in Finno-Russian relations after 1899 influence the general attitude of the Finns towards Russia and Russians. If we examine the different political groupings, we first note that, to the socialists and that large part of the population that they represented politically, nothing had changed. To them the conflict was a part of the continuing struggle between the Finnish and Russian bourgeoisie, and their own sympathies were with the anticzarist movement in Russia. The policy of the “Old Finnish” party was to keep the issue to the background rather than foment it. The constitutional party, very strict in its formal legalism, rejected on principle any appeal to nationalism. Its opposition to “illegal” legislation, espionage, bureaucratism in general and other expressions of authoritarianism and autocracy was unrelenting, but the coolness towards
Russia did not take on a nationalist, anti-Russian flavour. It was assumed that Finland would in any event stay a part of the Russian Empire, and this assumption was sufficient in itself to mollify attitudes.

French propaganda from 1855: the defeat of Napoleon I in 1812 must be transformed into victory by Napoleon III.

It is in fact remarkable how often the opposition to Russia took the form only of an antagonism to specific individuals. Governor-General Bobrikov was seen as personally responsible for the so-called Russification measures, and the Russian people as such were seldom mentioned. The Governor-General and his gendarmerie were accorded little kindness, but the
thousands of Russian soldiers in the garrisons in Finland apparently experienced no difficulties with the local population. I know of no demonstrations against Russian churches, Russian soldiers, Russian merchants, Russian goods, literature or music. Up until the very last years of Russian rule we find expressions of monarchism and warm attachment to the Imperial and Grand-Ducal House, as shown by the names Nikolai and Aleksanteri given to Finnish babies up until 1916, and as shown by the support of the Entente in 1914. It is difficult to believe that Russophobia was hereditary, deep-seated, widespread or self-evident when we see the whole Finnish press denouncing Germany and siding with the Entente in 1914, the voluntary ambulances of the Finnish Red Cross manned by Finnish businessmen, and the signing up of hundreds, perhaps thousands of young men as volunteers in the Imperial Army. I would rather wish to defend the thesis that the pre-war attitude towards Russia and Russians in Finland was not marked by a general and conscious hatred or animosity. The opposition was of a political and often merely legal kind, and it was directed towards the government and the Russian nationalist party press and its leaders rather than against Russia as such. Especially after the founding of the Duma there were in Russian political circles both friends and enemies of Finnish autonomy and separatism.

The electoral successes of the socialists in Finland brought the bourgeoisie in some respects nearer to Russia. Several of the laws passed by the socialist and centre forces in the Diet were not approved by the Imperial Government, e. g. the prohibition law, and the bourgeoisie could see a guarantee for their own programme in a continued attachment to the Empire. The majority of the Finnish bourgeoisie continued to be opposed to independence during the spring and summer of 1917 when the Provisional Government was in power in Russia. Finland had important commercial interests in Russia, especially during World War I, and after the March Revolution even sought to broaden cultural contacts.

The outbreak of World War I brought a changed atmosphere in Finland which encouraged political thinking and activism. It was the hope among all circles that the war would trigger some important political changes. Some wished to repair Russia's
lost confidence in Finnish loyalty, while others fixed their hopes on Russia's enemy, Germany. During the war years the socialists were very successful in Finnish elections, even achieving a majority in the Diet in 1916. The lack of food provisions during the war increased the strength and aggressiveness of the socialist agitation. There were also many Russian soldiers in Finland, and in the absence of German aggression they had considerable free time. After the March Revolution these soldiers became a real source of irritation in Finnish life. I would refer by way of example to a newspaper article from August 1917, written by one of the chief protagonists of the independence movement then taking shape, Erik Grotenfelt. It was after the beginning of the war, he says, and especially after the March Revolution, that the real Russification began, "from below and from within the nation". The nation is now being consumed by a cancer, and the only remedy is independence, total elimination of the Russian element.

The revolutionary and undisciplined liberty ("svoboda") of the Russian soldiers that Grotenfelt feared was a phenomenon for which ideological currents of the time could provide a singular explanation. Not only were racist ideas widespread in Germany and also in Sweden, but concepts of history and politics were changing as well. Until this time, the expansionism of nations had been seen as an expression of royal and military will, but now under the influence of intuitionist thinking and the theory of the state as organism, attention was turning from sovereigns to the psychology of nations and races. The "yellow peril" became generalized and diffused, especially in the German-speaking world, to apply to the Russians, and a theory of the Russian race was developed, according to which the Russian was not only inferior to the German but also expansionist by nature. The ranks of Paul Rohrbach in Germany, Rudolph Kjellén and Sven Hedin in Sweden and Sir Halford Mackinder in England, all of whom were convinced of the Russian danger, were joined by the Finnish historian and activist Herman Gummerus, who in Stockholm in 1916 published his book Russia as it really is (Ryssland sådant det är). The publication was partly financed by the German government.

A Swedish-nationalism also sprang up in Finland in the
second decade of this century, built around racial and cultural notions. The leaders of this movement, which corresponded to a contemporaneous nationalistic movement in Sweden, saw the Swedish-speaking part of Finland as Suecia irredenta and, observing that socialism had won adherents among the Finnish-speaking but not the Swedish-speaking elements of the population, concluded that a struggle between Swedish and Russian racial and cultural dominance was under way in Finland. The movement of political events made it easy to associate socialism with Russia and bourgeois ideals with German influence, even before the October Revolution. There is no doubt that when Grotenfelt writes about Russification “from below and from within the nation” he means to refer to socialism. In his view and the view of many others, the Finnish mind, i. e. the “real” Finnish mind, could never accept the subversive doctrines of revolutionary socialism. There was still much left of the nineteenth century conception of the Finns as poor but content, silent but harmonious people. The Finn was Saarijärven Paavo. The Slavic peoples, by contrast, were painted in racist language as inveterately incapable of building a nation – a theme frequently aired in AKS propaganda – and a natural soil for socialist subversion.

The Finnish Civil War provided further good reason to exploit the line of argument that socialism was foreign to the Finnish mentality. If one wished, as did most of the bourgeois, to avoid explaining the Civil War in terms of class struggle, resort to arguments of Russian infiltration and agitation became very useful. It was just this general notion of Russians as a subversive race aiding and abetting the Finnish Civil War that in my opinion was fundamental to the rysśānviha of the twenties.

The anti-Bolshevik insurrections in East Karelia and the flow of refugees to Finland did their part, too, to foment anti-Russianism, and especially that of the AKS student movement.

A third source of the anti-Russianism in Finland is, I think, to be found in the widespread fear of an eventual Soviet take-over. Many feared that the Bolsheviks had agreed to Finnish independence only out of necessity and that they intended later to reincorporate Finland, as had happened in the Ukraine. Krister Wahlbäck suggests that Finno-Soviet relations after
1918 were in many respects a continuation of the earlier relations between Sweden and Russia, with Finland having become the frontier state, and a local arena for German–Soviet rivalry. Wahlbäck’s point can also be applied at the ideological level. It is rather amusing, in fact, to see the Swedish anti-Russian rhetoric, beginning from Tegnér, being picked up in the anti-Russian propaganda in Finland. The paper of the white civil guards, Suojeluskuntalaisen Lehti, for example, announced in 1923 a competition for the best Finnish translation of the most anti-Russian section of Tegnér’s poem Kronbruden, and stories and events from the days of Charles XII were evoked in the national papers and youth novels of the period.

There is one further source of ryssänviha to be noted: the German influence. During the War, German propaganda was, of course, bitterly anti-Russian. The German soldiers who came to Finland in 1918, many of whom stayed for some time, were certainly a considerable force for anti-Russian attitudes in Finland. So too were the Finnish Jaegers, who had received training in Germany with the Jaeger battalion and had risen to positions of command in the army. German writings attracted great interest in Finland during the first years of independence. Even though the political influence of Germany in Finland ended with its military collapse in 1918, Rohrbach, Ludendorff, Spengler and other anti-Russian protagonists continued to be read and admired, swelling the Finnish arsenal of arguments against Russians. The wartime anti-Russian propaganda and the opposition towards Communism easily merged into a single theme.

The ryssänviha of the twenties and thirties in Finland was, then, essentially an aversion to Communism, both Finnish and Soviet. This aversion was clothed in anti-Russian nationalist/racial rhetoric – partly because it was easier and more effective for its protagonists to think in nationalist/racial terms than in social or ideological ones, and partly because there existed a tradition of Russophobia, albeit a feeble tradition, and mainly of Swedish and to some extent German origin.
To the reader

The essays in this collection were written in the 80s and the 90s, having been prepared for various occasions or publications, but all reflect my present historical ideas. The book is to be seen as a follow-up to my previous collection of historical essays in English, *Let us be Finns*, 1990, 2nd edition 1992. These shorter pieces have been written parallel with my other books in Finnish and Swedish. Since 1981 I have published some nine shorter books in Finnish and five in Swedish, most of them composed as series of essays or studies around some central idea, in parallel with my project on the history of the University of Helsinki 1640–1990, on which I worked for most of the eighties. The history was published in three volumes 1987–1990, in Finnish and Swedish, and a compendious one-volume edition in German was printed in 1992.

I wish to thank all my translators and those who have cleaned up my English, especially Robert McConchie of the University of Helsinki, who did the final revision. Likewise, I wish to thank my critics and supporters. Finally I would like to express my gratitude to the Finnish Historical Society and its secretary-general Rauno Endén.

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