From Stockholm to St. Petersburg

Commercial Factors in the Political Relations between England and Sweden 1675—1700

By

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The dating of letters and documents is that of the originals. This means that Swedish documents are dated Old Style, whereas the English ones are usually dated according to both Old and New Styles. Where only one style is used this can be assumed to be the Old Style, which in the seventeenth century was for both England and Sweden ten days behind that of the New Style used on the Continent. One exception to the contemporary dating has been adopted. In England the year began officially on Lady Day, March 25, though in many cases Englishmen, particularly when writing from abroad or to someone abroad, indicated the year between Jan. 1 and March 25 by double dating. For the sake of clarity I have always taken the year to begin on Jan. 1.

Preface

Northern Europe provides us with a sector of English foreign policy during the 17th and 18th centuries in which elements of power politics and commercial policy came together in an interesting way. Interests of trade and power were closely entwined in the political relations between England and the Nordic Kingdoms. The commercial element in England's Baltic policy during these critical years, especially at the beginning of the 18th century, has already been strongly emphasised by historians.[1]

So far, however, research has principally been concerned with connections between England and Russia and their economic aspects. Thereby, an interesting phase of England's Baltic policy has been bypassed. During the latter part of the 17th century, Sweden, the leading political and economic power in the Baltic, played as England's political and economic partner a role which strongly reminds one of that of Russia after 1700. This was based partly on the same political and economic factors, the control of important Baltic harbours and products. This applies particularly to the period after 1670, when England intensified her trading with Sweden's Baltic dominions.

From the mid-1600's to the end of the century, Sweden's command of important export harbours and production areas caused trade with areas under Swedish domination to occupy a more central position in England's Baltic trade than at any time before or after. The period from the middle of the 17th century up to the wars of Charles XII might well be called the 'Swedish period' in the history of England's Baltic policy. After this turning-point it became more and more concentrated on Russia, whose acquisition of Swedish territory in Carelia, Ingria, Estonia and Livonia in 1721 offered her completely new opportunities for direct trade with the West. Russia was able gradually to put on the market products (such as iron, tar and pitch) which at one time had almost been a Swedish monopoly.

An investigation of this nature ought to have been carried out by an English or a Swedish historian, as such a person could make full use of the extensive archives either in London or in Stockholm. But relations between England and Sweden in the latter half of the 17th century have, on the whole, been touched upon to an insignificant extent by research in

[1] E.g., J. J. Murray, "Baltic Commerce and Power Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century", *Huntington Libr. Quart.*, New Ser. VI (1942—43), 293 ff. J. J. Murray, "Robert Jackson's Mission to Sweden (1709—1717)", *Journ. Mod. Hist.* XXI (1949), 1 ff.

the two countries concerned. Consequently, I have been encouraged to attempt to map out at least the commercial side of these political relationships, using far-off Finland as my starting-point. My subject is, in fact, only one aspect of English-Swedish relations, although it is a very important one. It is to be hoped that some day the connections between England and Sweden during the latter part of the 17th century will receive the comprehensive and penetrating investigation they deserve.

I am fully aware that I have not been able to make such use of the material in the archives of England and Sweden — not to mention those of Denmark, Brandenburg, Poland and Russia — as even this undertaking would seem to demand, especially from the point of view of an orthodox diplomatic historian. Unfortunately also, Birger Steckzén's excellent *Guide to the Materials for Swedish Historical Research in Great Britain* (1958) had not yet appeared when I was carrying out my researches in London in 1956 and 1957. This book shows how rich the English diplomatic source materials are, and at the same time how scattered they are over many places and collections. The Swedish ones are considerably more centralised in *Riksarkivet* in Stockholm. But I by no means wish to claim that when in Sweden I was able to exhaust the relevant sections of, for example, that great collection, the *Diplomatica Anglica*, in their entirety.

Finland, though part of the Swedish state, seems at a superficial glance to stand outside these Anglo—Swedish relations. In 1675, the young English observer William Allestree wrote in his description of 'The King of Swedens Havens', "We have no merchants in the Botnick Sea, because those people as far as to a great city call'd Abo bring their comodities to Stockholm, and so are look'd upon as its dependants". And he adds that "All those of the Sinus Finnicus on the north East side come to Stockholm . . .".[1] But what Allestree does not mention in this connection is the fact that, as the main tar-producing area, Finland indirectly played an important part in English imports of naval stores.

I should not have been able to carry out my researches in English archives without the financial help I received in 1956 from the Foundations of Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth, Waldemar von Frenckell, and Oskar Öflund. I should therefore like to express my deep gratitude to the trustees of these funds for their sympathetic attitude towards my project. In this connection I am especially grateful to Professor Hugo E. Pipping, Chancellor of Åbo Akademi, for his valuable help in furthering my plans.

[1] S.P., For. 95/9, f. 238 ff.

Professor E. G. Dickens, of the University of Hull, gave me the encouragement a historian needs in order to break free from the one-sided study of his own country. I am deeply indebted to him for his help.

I owe a very special debt of gratitude to Dr Ragnhild Hatton, of the London School of Economics and Political Science. I am sorry that I have only been able to make belated use of her outstanding knowledge of the period under discussion and its problems, as my own presentation was already completed in manuscript. Unfortunately, ill-health has prevented me from incorporating many of the amplifications and elucidations which Dr Hatton has recommended to me, and I should be the last person to dispute the justness of her suggestions. I have only been in a position to put right certain errors and omissions in my treatment of the theme.

Mr Michael Webster, of the Swedish School of Economics, Helsingfors, and Miss Diana Colman, of Helsingfors University, have carefully and competently translated this work from Swedish. I thank them both. On behalf of the publishers, The Finnish Historical Society, Dr Hatton has checked the English translation from the terminological point of view.

Finally, I should like to thank Dr W. R. Mead, of University College, London, for the kindness and helpfulness he showed to my wife and myself during our research trips to England. His great interest in present day Anglo-Scandinavian relations has also proved to be of great help to those who wish to study these relations in the past.

The manuscript was completed in the Spring of 1960, when it was read by Professor Aulis J. Alanen and Professor Eino Jutikkala and accepted for publication by The Finnish Historical Society. For this, too, I should like to express my gratitude.

I alone am responsible for any defects in this presentation, and likewise for the fact that my illness has made it impossible to check quotations and references.

I hope to be able to publish in another connection the results of my researches on the geographical expansion and economic organisation of England's trade with the Baltic during the Seventeenth Century, as well as a critical analysis of the most important source-material on which these studies are based, the Customs accounts.

Helsingfors, September, 1961.

Sven-Erik Åström

CONTENTS

The Staple Products of the Baltic Area, their Colonial Substitutes, and the English Market

At the end of the 17th century, trade with Northern Europe formed a sector of English foreign trade which was quite modest from the point of view of the money concerned.[1] About 1700, lawful imports from Northern Europe comprised only 10 % of total English imports. Exports to Northern Europe were of an even more modest nature, amounting to only 5 % of the total exports. Northern Europe played, relatively speaking, an even smaller role in the import and export trade of London than in that of England as a whole. If we confine ourselves to the import side, however, it is worth noting that imports from North Europe to London showed a slow increase during the course of the 17th century. For example, in 1634 imports of commodities from Northern Europe formed slightly over 6 % of the capital's total imports. In 1663 and 1669 (on the average) they were nearly 8 %, and at the end of the century they touched 10 %.[2] But this gradual relative growth can partly be explained by the fact that some North European imports which had previously come via Holland (the United Provinces) and Germany were now coming straight from North European ports because of the increase in direct trading. Bearing in mind the enormous development in the transoceanic sector of England's foreign trade, we can hardly expect as violent an expansion in her trade with the plains and forests of Northern Europe as in that with her new rich overseas markets; for this north-eastern corner, though nearer, was poor both in purchasing power and in range of products.[3]

I

Ever since the trade offensive which had begun in the reign of Elizabeth I, the North European market had been monopolised by two privileged trading companies, the Muscovy Company (later known as the Russia Company) and

[1] Scotland, Ireland and the Channel Islands, which were quite separate customs areas, have been disregarded in this presentation.

[2] Percentages from the tables in A. M. Millard, *The Import Trade of London 1600—1640*, (unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1956, P R O, Round Room 15:87 D) and R. Davis, "English Foreign Trade, 1660—1700", *Econ. Hist. Rev.* 2nd Ser, VII (1954—55), 164—165.

[3] Cf. *Davis*, 150 ff., 161—162.

the Eastland Company.[1] At that time the two concepts 'Russia' and 'Eastland' were also used in connection with both trade policy and commercial statistics. When the Muscovy Company was founded in 1553, 'Russia' consisted of the Russian White Sea harbours and the port of Narva (in Estonia), which then belonged to Russia. The concept of 'Eastland' embraced Norway, Sweden and Finland, Copenhagen and Helsingör (Elsinore) in Denmark, and the whole Baltic coast from Estonia to the Oder, where 'Germany' began. Within this sphere the following ports were of interest to England: the Norwegian timber ports, Gothenburg, Stockholm, Riga, Königsberg and Danzig. The rest of Denmark and the coastal belt west of the Oder (Pomerania and Mecklenburg) were divided between the Eastland Company and the Merchant Adventurers. Commercial contacts between England and Baltic ports in Denmark and in Germany west of the Oder were practically non-existent after 1660. Consequently, the Eastland Company became, in reality, England's 'Baltic Company', while the Merchant Adventurers functioned as a kind of 'North Sea Company' centred on Hamburg (the 'Germany' of contemporary trade statistics). One should not forget that Narva belonged to the Russia Company's sphere of interest, and that Gothenburg and the Norwegian timber ports had not only been allotted to the Eastland Company by privilege, but were also included in 'Eastland' in matters of economic geography and statistics.

When English imports from Sweden proper and Denmark-Norway were freed from company monopoly in 1673, this caused the break-up of the old concept of 'Eastland' as a legal and geographical entity. 'Sweden', 'Denmark-Norway' and the 'East Country' began to be used instead as smaller entities. The 'East Country', the coastal strip between the rivers Narova and Oder, was all that now remained of the area in which the Eastland Company had held its privilege. The Southern Baltic region was thus divided politically into several states, but it was unified by an export structure which the region had in common. After the Russian conquest of Estonia and Livonia during the Great Northern War (1700—1721), Reval (Tallinn) and Riga were still considered as belonging to the East Country. It is necessary to note these changes in the division of the North European market in order to interpret the trade statistics on which we must principally base our knowledge of England's imports from North Europe in the latter part of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th.

The heart of this extensive trading area was the Baltic sea, its ports and

[1] See, e.g. E. Lipson, *The Economic History of England* II, London 1948 (5th ed.), 318, 334.

the districts they served. The 'Sweden', 'East Country' and 'Russia' of the trade figures can roughly be defined as the 'Baltic Area'. Its outlet was the Sound (Öresund). Gothenburg and Archangel could in theory offer the same products as the Baltic ports. But the products of the Russian market could not all be sent via Archangel,[1] and the natural export harbour for the Swedish iron deposits was Stockholm, which was merely supplemented by Gothenburg.[2]

II

The export goods of the Baltic area consisted to a large extent of heavy and bulky staple products. The factors of production in the plains and forests of the North directed production towards raw materials and semi-manufactured goods. If we proceed from the three traditional production factors, land, labour and capital, it is quite clear that land and labour were relatively cheaper in the Baltic area than in Western Europe, whereas capital was the most scarce and valuable of the three. This combination of production factors determined the character of exports to distant lands. Because of low rents and wages, heavy and bulky commodities could be produced at prices low enough to bear the cost of transport to the West European market. England lacked all the climatic factors and raw material resources necessary to produce iron and timber products on a greater scale than was already done. But cheap production factors enabled Swedish iron, copper, and brass, Russian potash and hemp, Polish flax, and Prussian oak planks to compete on the English market in spite of the high transport costs.

It was oak planks and copper and brass wire which, along with iron, hemp, flax, potash and tar-pitch, came for the most part directly from the Baltic area.[3] But in terms of value, oak planks played an extremely modest role in the import trade from the Baltic area. Nor did copper and brass manage to maintain their position on the import list, because of increased domestic production.[4]

[1] A. Öhberg, "Russia and the World Market in the Seventeenth Century", *Scand. Econ. Hist. Rev.* III (1955), 127—162.

[2] E. F. Heckscher, *Sveriges ekonomiska historia från Gustav Vasa* [Economic history of Sweden from the reign of Gustavus Vasa] I:2, Stockholm 1936, 389.

[3] These conclusions are based on the official trade figures for the closing years of the 17th century, and refer to both London and the outports. Customs 3/1, 3/2, 3/3, 3/4, P R O. On the nature of the statistical material, see G. N. Clark, *Guide to English Commercial Statistics 1696—1782*. R. Hist. Soc. *Guides and Handbooks* 1, London 1938, XV, 33 ff. Cf. *Davis*, 155.

[4] See Appendix I.

Consequently, we have good reason to confine our interest to the other above-mentioned bulk products, typical of the Baltic area, which had a real importance both in actual value and over a long period. This means that we must first study the imports of these commodities in relation to England's total imports from the various regions within this area. The average imports of iron, flax, hemp, potash and tar-pitch for 1699 and 1700, expressed as percentages of the total imports from each region, were as follows:[1]

'Sweden' 86 % 'Russia' 77 % 'East Country' 54 %

It appears that the five bulk products in question dominated England's imports from 'Sweden' and 'Russia', whereas the 'East Country's' exports to England were of a more heterogeneous nature. It is also worth analysing the more detailed distribution (according to place of origin) of England's total imports of iron, hemp, flax, potash and tar-pitch. The part played by Holland in this connection is of particular interest.

England's total imports of iron, hemp, flax, potash and tar-pitch for 1699 and 1700 (averaged) distributed according to place of origin.[2]

	Iron %	Hemp %	Flax %	Potash %	Tar-pitch %	Total %
'Sweden'	81.8	5.1	15.2	0.0	87.2	44.2
'Russia'	0.6	38.1	45.3	72.9	1.8	24.4
'East Country'	0.7	54.1	35.3	27.1	1.0	22.2
'Denmark-Norway'	1.8	0.2	—	—	8.4	1.3
'Holland'	1.8	2.3	3.7	—	0.0	2.0
Other areas (including colonies)	13.3	0.2	0.5	0.0	1.6	5.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The information given by this table may be briefly summarised as follows. The Baltic area obviously enjoyed a monopolistic position as the supplier of iron, hemp, flax, potash, tar and pitch. 'Sweden' stood practically alone as

[1] For sources and absolute figures, see Table 1.

[2] For sources and absolute figures, see Table 1. Because of differences in the quality and price of the same commodity as supplied by different areas, the percental distribution has been calculated on the basis of import values rather than of quantities. Values rather than quantities have been consistently used in the tables because this is the only possible way of making a comparison between different commodities. Smuggling has not been taken into account and the comparative figures are merely approximate, just as the underlying statistics of goods are also approximate both in respect of values and quantities.

the exporter of tar and pitch, a commodity which was for the most part produced in Finland, but which was shipped abroad via Stockholm. 'Sweden' also had an undisputed lead in iron. The share which fell to other countries consisted principally of Spanish iron (11.9 %). Hemp and flax were the characteristic staple products of the 'East Country' and 'Russia', and were Polish and Russian in origin. Smaller quantities of hemp and flax were also exported via ports in Sweden proper. Potash was a typically Russian product.[1]

Because of the fact that part of the staple products of Russia and Poland went out through the Swedish-owned ports of Riga and Narva (assigned respectively to the 'East Country' and 'Russia' in the trade figures), Sweden at the time of her full territorial extension was more important as a *transit country* in this trade than the table shows. On the other hand, as the table shows, Holland played an extremely modest role in the transit of Baltic products to England. To some extent, Sweden had assumed the mantle of Holland. Towards the end of the 17th century this fact became apparent to influential circles in England.

III

Sir Francis Brewster says in his *Essays on Trade and Navigation* (of 1695): "That there is nothing of greater consequence to a people that live by Trade, than to be makers of their own Tools by which they work, none will deny; now Shipping are the Tools and Utensils of the Nation; to fetch them from abroad is to Trade by Licence; Whenever our Northern Neighbours please, we must lye still, or pay such rates as they please . . .". Similar arguments can easily be found in the economic pamphlet literature of the period.

As is well known, during the whole of the 17th century and for some time afterwards it was a standing aim of England's commercial and colonial policy to free herself from her dependance for 'naval stores' on the Baltic market. It was principally in her colonies on the mainland of North America that she saw, on the basis of their climate and raw material resources, the chief alternative to the Baltic.[2]

[1] Potash is used by the glass industry, in the dyeing of cloth, and in the making of soap.

[2] General review of policy in C. M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period of American History* IV. *England's Commercial and Colonial Policy*, New Haven 1938, *passim*. R. G. Albion, *Forests and Sea Power. The Timber problem of the Royal Navy 1652—1862*. Harv. Econ. Stud. XXIX, Cambridge, Mass. 1926, chapter VI, particularly with regard to the provision of timber. E. L. Lord, *Industrial Experiments in the British Colonies of North America*. John Hopkins Univ. Stud. Hist. Pol. Sc. Extra vol. XVII, Baltimore 1898, *passim*. C. Nettels, "The Menace of Colonial Manu-

Hakluyt had already cast glances at North America's potentialities in this respect. Several other writers discussed the same problem round about 1600. One of the objects in view when Virginia was founded was its possibilities as a source of naval stores. Its iron ore was to be utilised, and moreover, it was intended that this densely wooded colony should produce tar, pitch and potash. The climate was thought to offer good prospects for the cultivation of flax and hemp. But all the early experiments came to a premature end. Labour turned out to be dear, transport over the Atlantic was costly, and there was no working tradition to build upon. As late as 1679, the newly appointed governor of Virginia, Lord Culpepper, was instructed to promote the production of hemp, flax, pitch and potash. Lord Culpepper himself pointed out that hemp and flax did well there, but that the inhabitants were devoting themselves to the cultivation of tobacco. Some years later he asked for hemp and flax seed to distribute among the poor so as to encourage cultivation. But instead tobacco came to occupy the position that had been intended for staple products of the Northern European type.[1] Virginia is an excellent example of the inability of colonial policy to shape reality according to the pattern prescribed by wishful thinkers in the mother country.

New motives and new colonial regions were drawn into the discussion towards the close of the 17th century. One argument was that there was a danger that the northern colonies would reach a high degree of industrialisation and so begin to compete with the mother country, instead of acting as a market for English manufactured goods. New England lacked suitable commodities to send in exchange so as to pay for her surplus imports from the motherland. The production of naval stores would therefore enable the colonies to solve their payments problems. Another related argument was the unfavourable balance of trade with North Europe, which had been caused by increased imports of the great staple products of the Baltic area, coupled with export difficulties in the opposite direction.[2] The instructions

facturing 1690—1720", *New Engl. Quart.* 4 (1931), 230—269 (The author has limited himself to purely American problems, and has consequently failed to appreciate the justified anxiety at that time over the monopoly enjoyed by Northern Europe).

[1] T. J. Wertenbaker, *Planters of Colonial Virginia*, Princeton 1922, 7—20. G. Adler, "England's Versorgung mit Schiffsbaumaterialien aus Englischen und Amerikanischen Quellen vornemlich im 17. Jahrhundert", *Viert. Soz. Wirtsch. Gesch.*, Beiheft 16, Stuttgart 1929, 48—65, 84 ff. W. F. Craven, *The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century*, 1607—1689. *A History of the South* I, *s.l.* 1949, 35, 48, 69, 140—141, 313. Council of Trade and Plantations, Colonial Papers 6/12 1679 (C. O. 1/47, p. 272), Journals 19/11, 13/12 1681 (C. O. 391/3).

[2] K. E. Knorr, *British Colonial Theories 1570—1850*, Toronto 1944, 50—59, 81—105. J. F. Rees, *Mercantilism and the Colonies. The Cambridge History of the British Empire* I, Cambridge 1929, 569 ff. Cf. *Nettels, passim.*

for the new Board of Trade (1696) emphasised the desirability of obtaining naval stores from the colonies. In the same year, one of the Customs Commissioners, Charles Godolphin, investigated the unfavourable balance of trade with Northern Europe and its causes. His memorandum on this ended with the same old recommendation to let the colonies furnish the mother country with naval stores.[1] It was now principally the northern colonies, and especially New England, which he had in view. In the 1660's these had begun to supply ships' necessities, principally masts, to the Navy. The South had begun to adapt itself to a production system of a different character, a plantation economy, in which tobacco, rice and cotton were to become the main commodities.

The outbreak of war in 1689, coupled with rising prices and difficulties in obtaining strategically important commodities from the Baltic area, led to an increased interest in the resources of the colonies. In the 1690's there was a stream of applications for monopolies in the production of naval stores in some colony or other, for the right to form a company for the mining of copper or iron, and so on.[2] Officials of the colonial administration held out to the central authorities the prospects of possible North American substitutes for the products of the Baltic. Among these was Edward Randolph. In 1696 he sent the Board of Trade a memorandum on how the colonies could be made more useful. He points out the unfavourable balance of trade with Northern Europe, and says that England can be supplied with "Masts, Ship Timber, Oaken Planck, Pitch, Tarr, Rozin, Hemp, Flax and Salt Petre from her own Colonies and Provinces in America and Islands Adjacent". Flax and hemp "grow very kindly, very large, and very plentifully in all Plantations & some Colonies have Lawes Obligeing them to sow yearly a Quantity of Hemp and Flax seed. . ."[3] In the Spring of 1696 a Bill was presented to encourage the importation of naval stores from the colonies, but for some unknown reason it was never discussed or passed by Parliament. The threat which hung over supplies from the Baltic during this crisis, together with the zeal of the various enterprises and the enthusiastic prospectuses which the colonial officials presented to the authorities in Whitehall, did, however, eventually have their effect. The well-known Act of 1705, which placed import bounties on tar-pitch, hemp, and timber for masts and spars,

[1] Charles Godolphin on the trade with Sweden and Denmark 31/7/1696, (copy) (C. O. 389/15, p. 25).

[2] *Lord*, 15 ff. *Nettels*, 240 ff. Cf. L. F. Stock, *Proceedings and Debates* etc. II *1689—1702. Carn. Inst. Publ.* 338: II, Baltimore 1927, 175.

[3] Edward Randolph's 'Discourse how to render the Plantations more beneficiall etc.' C. O 323/2, A 2.

represented official sanction for the efforts to find in the North American colonies an equivalent to the import of Baltic products, which was so questionable from many points of view.[1] At various times later on, iron and flax were also on the point of being drawn into the bounty system.[2]

Apart from the American colonies, Ireland was the great hope from the 1690's onwards. To the economic policy-makers of that time, Ireland seemed able to offer alternative means of supplying England with strategic staples of the Baltic type. As part of this policy it was intended that those refugees from the Palatinate who were sent across to Ireland and the colonies in 1709 should be employed in the production of naval stores, particularly hemp and flax.[3]

This happened after the abandonment of attempts to revive the declining production of flax and hemp in England. In the 1660's an Act of Parliament was passed concerning the compulsory cultivation of flax and hemp. This legislation, however, had no effect, as in 1678 Parliament was again debating a Bill concerned with encouraging the cultivation of flax and hemp in England. At the time, the Swedish resident in London, Johan Leijonbergh, pointed out how inadequate were England's provisions of hemp and flax. The bill aroused a great response in Parliament.[4] The science of economics was not sufficiently advanced for people to realise that England had reached a

[1] *Lord*, 56—86 and J. Williams, "English Mercantilism and Carolina Naval Stores, 1705—1776", *Journ. South. Hist.* I (1935), 169—185. — See also p. 109.

[2] Board of Trade, Representations 28/3/1717 (C. O. 390/12). Cf. a pamphlet of 1721 on the bounty system with a plea for premiums on imports of pig-iron and flax (Goldsmith's Library, Broadsides, vol. IV, 312). Nevertheless, iron was at the same time a home product, and consequently all attempts to encourage the colonial iron industry during the first half of the 18th century met with violent opposition from interested parties such as the English foundry-owners. On the other hand, flax was a product in which the Baltic did not have so undisputed a monopoly. From the strategic point of view, flax played a less important role. Moreover, it could be obtained elsewhere in a refined form, from Holland and Germany. Cf. T. S. Ashton, *Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution*, Manchester 1951 (2nd ed.), 106—108, 113—114, 116 ff., 139. A. C. Bining, *The Regulation of the Colonial Iron Industry*, Philadelphia 1933, *passim*. The discussion is reflected in pamphlets such as *Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Naval Store-Bill* etc. (1720), Goldsmith's Library, (E. L.) XVIII. 20, *The interest of Great Britain in Supplying herself with Iron Impartially considered* (1756?), Goldsmith's Library, (E. L.) XVIII. 56. and *Reasons for making copper and iron in H. M. Plantations in N. America*, BM, Tracts on Commerce 816 m. 13.

[3] W. A. Knittle, *The Early Eighteenth Century Palatine Emigration*, Philadelphia 1936, 89, 135 ff.

[4] *Adler*, 10 ff. A. F. W. Papillon, *Memoirs of Thomas Papillon*, Reading 1887, 169. 'Bör efterfrågas' (To be looked into), Wachtmeister's dispatches to the King of Sweden and others, 1679, Dipl. Angl.

stage at which both land and manpower were too expensive for crops like flax and hemp, which required laborious and extensive cultivation. After 1689, when wartime requirements had made the provision of these commodities a matter of immediate importance, attention was directed towards Ireland. Just as in the case of the North American colonies, English cloth interests were afraid of a competitor in the growing Irish weaving industry. The Act of Parliament of 1699, which stopped all export of cloth from the American colonies, simultaneously forbade the export of Irish clothing fabrics except to the mother country.

The Act of 1699 had been preceded by decrees concerning the duty-free import into England of flax and hemp and also of linen yarns and fabrics from Ireland. Now it was followed by a great expansion in the importation of Irish linen, which in no way directly interfered with imports of flax from the Baltic area. Hemp, on the other hand, did not gain a foothold in Ireland any more than it did in the American colonies. Hand in hand with these measures to encourage the cultivation of flax and hemp in Ireland went the attempt to stimulate the Irish iron industry.[1] Exports were promoted by lowering the import duties on Irish pig-iron, but this was of low quality, and the deposits of ore on which the Irish iron industry was originally based soon ran out.[2]

It was thus only the cultivation of flax which took root in Ireland and made linen spinning one of her national industries.[3] Consequently, English policy was successful in this sector, but it is doubtful whether this should be credited to the inherently favourable economic or climatic conditions or to the effectiveness of the policy that was pursued.

[1] G. A. T. O'Brien, *The Economic History of Ireland in the Seventeenth Century*, Dublin & London 1919, 77—79, 149, 188, 224, 231. C. Gill, *The Rise of the Irish Linen Industry*, Oxford 1925, 8—15. Ashton, *Iron and Steel*, 105. H. L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century* I, New York 1924, 128, 147—148. H. F. Kearney, "The Political Background to English Mercantilism, 1695—1700", *Econ. Hist. Rev.* 2nd Ser. XI (1958—59), 484—496. Cf. C. O. 391/9, p. 16, 20, 37, 52 and C. O. 391/11, p. 41, 65, 152, 154, 158, 162, 164, 243—246.

[2] E. McCracken, "Charcoal-Burning Ironworks in Seventeenth and Eightenthe Century Ireland", *Ulster Journ. Arch.* 3rd Ser., 20 (1957), 123—126. J. H. Andrews, "Notes on the Historical Geography of the Irish Iron Industry". *Irish Geography* III (1955), 144 ff.

[3] Cf. J. Horner, *The Linen Trade of Europe during the Spinning Wheel Period*, Belfast 1920.

IV

The attention which 17th century Englishmen paid to the trade with Northern Europe had *de facto* very little to do with its economic significance from the point of view of pure monetary value. The fact that it occupied the minds of statesmen and was drawn into parliamentary debates and public discussion was really connected with other factors.

Strategic raw materials and semi-manufactured goods were of great importance in the import trade. Consequently, under the general term 'naval stores', timber, iron, tar, hemp and flax from Northern Europe were drawn into the discussion of naval policy.[1] The fact that a major part of the production and transiting of naval stores lay in the hands of a single Baltic power, Sweden, neutral or possibly pro-French, was a constant cause of uneasiness. Moreover, the goods in question were heavy and bulky commodities which demanded much tonnage in proportion to their monetary value. It was here that aspects of shipping policy entered into strategic considerations. The question whether the naval stores should be imported by means of English or foreign ships brought the debate at the same time into the sphere of commercial policy. Where the exchange of goods in the one direction was represented by bulk products which were relatively cheap but required a lot of tonnage, the freight charges played an important part in the balance of payments. The payments situation was aggravated by the fact that Northern Europe could not offer an adequate market for English export goods, especially cloth, which, in spite of the appearance of new commodities for re-export, continued to occupy an important place in English exports.[2] In discussions of these problems, the marketing difficulties of the cloth trade during the critical situation at the end of the 17th century were thus readily associated with the adverse balance of trade. The export of precious metals to bridge the gap between imports and exports became the constant lament of the champions of a balanced trade.

There was a further reason for the attempt to shake off dependence on Northern Europe either by home production or by means of supplies from the

[1] See above, p. 14.

[2] R. W. K. Hinton, *The Eastland Trade and the Common Weal in the Seventeenth Century*, Cambridge 1959, 95 ff. L. A. Harper, *The English Navigation Laws*, New York 1939, *passim*. C. Wilson, *Profit and Power. A Study of England and the Dutch Wars*, London 1957, 2 ff., 17, 42, 51—52. D. C. Coleman, "Naval Dockyards under the later Stuarts", *Econ. Hist. Rev.* 2nd Ser., VI (1953—54), 145—146. J. Ehrman, *The Navy in the War of William III, 1689—1697*, Cambridge 1953, 38—58.

colonies. By restraining the economic development of both Ireland and the colonies and concentrating their commerce and industry on the production of raw materials and semi-manufactures, an additional aim would be achieved. The colonies and Ireland could also continue to provide a market for the mother country's manufactures, and thereby guarantee the level of employment in the classic English export industry, cloth-weaving. But the whole complex of political actions and economic discussions on the theme of Ireland and the colonies had always to be co-ordinated with the difficulties which England experienced, especially in war-time, over the strategic staple commodities from the Baltic.

Intensified Commercial and Shipping Contacts between England and Sweden

Up to 1660, political frontiers in the Baltic area had been just as flexible as they were to become stable during the remainder of the century. Sweden's territorial expansion at the expense of the other Baltic countries reached its climax at this date. From the point of view of both political geography and power politics, the *status quo* remained unshaken from the peace treaties of the 1670's till the Great Northern War. The great power of the Baltic was Sweden. By holding Ingria, Estonia and Livonia, Sweden had cut off the ports of Riga, Reval (Tallinn) and Narva from their *hinterland*, those parts of Poland and Russia which they served. Russia had no coastline or harbours on the Baltic after 1617. The Brandenburg possessions on the south coast of the Baltic were split in two by the Polish Corridor, which extended along the Vistula down to the Baltic. Brandenburgian Pomerania lacked commercial centres of more than local importance. East Prussia's only important seaport, Königsberg, opened on to Polish Lithuania, as did Sweden's Riga. Brandenburg was an expanding power just as much as Sweden, and in 1657 she had extended her sovereignty so as to include East Prussia. But after that her progress on the Baltic coast came temporarily to a halt. The Hanseatic town of Danzig was the principal grain port on the Baltic, thanks to her position at the mouth of the Vistula. Swedish Pomerania, the Duchy of Mecklenburg, and that close ally of Sweden, Holstein-Gottorp, had no products of importance to the Western European market. By the 1660's, Lübeck had degenerated into a regional market town, though it is true that this market extended into North Germany, Scandinavia and Russia. But this was no substitute for the role as intermediary between North-Eastern and Western Europe which the city had once held. The direct contacts between this formerly powerful Hanseatic city and the countries on the other side of the Sound had been considerably weakened. The neighbouring city of Hamburg increasingly overshadowed Lübeck as the new financial centre of Northern Europe. Both the ruler of the tiny Duchy of Courland and the Elector of Brandenburg had ambitious plans for active trade westwards. Courland's commercial policy, however, was controlled by Sweden, though officially the country owed allegiance to the King of Poland.

Sweden was the most powerful of the Baltic countries, owing to her political prestige and economic resources. England had to take Sweden into account when considering any political combination or trade offensive. Denmark

-Norway was a North Sea power as much as a Baltic one, although she had to be reckoned with as an important economic and political factor in the Baltic. Denmark both levied a customs toll at the Sound and possessed a not inconsiderable Navy, which at strategic moments could be directed at the Baltic.[1] But Norway was undoubtedly of the greater importance for English mercantile interests in the Kingdom of Denmark-Norway. The lion's share in the exchange of goods between England and Denmark-Norway went to Norwegian timber.

I

The seizure of *Narva* and *Riga* (in 1581 and 1621 respectively) improved Sweden's position at that end of the Baltic. It was via these ports that Russian and Polish products were to some extent compelled to go in order to reach consumers in Western Europe. The normal prices given for heavy and bulky goods such as bales of flax or hemp from the areas surrounding these ports could not stand the cost of long-distance transport to the Arctic coast.[2] The conquest of Norway's south-eastern provinces and of the old Danish province of Scania (1658, 1660) also influenced Sweden's trading possibilities with the West, as it gave her a long coastline facing the Sound, the Skagerak and the Kattegat. At the same time it strengthened her strategic position in the Sound. Through these changes of frontier, the new seaport of *Gothenburg*, which in the optimistic Swedish dreams of large-scale trading had been thought of as the main Baltic emporium, acquired a large and well-timbered area of supply and better-protected connections with the booming iron industry of Värmland. The fourth Swedish seaport of importance to the English was *Stockholm*, the capital city of the Kingdom. Around 1670, connections between England and Stockholm were of very recent origin, but they were nevertheless of great importance.

English commercial expansion in the Baltic during the 17th century can be traced through the merchants and factors who handled this trade. The Prussian harbours of Danzig, the nearby Elbing, and Königsberg were the focus of English commercial interest up to the 1650's, when the English suddenly appeared in Riga. As the years went by, the English merchant

[1] A good survey of Denmark's relations with Sweden and England will be found in G. Landberg, "Johan Gyllenstiernas nordiska förbundspolitik i belysning av den skandinaviska diplomatiens traditioner" [Johan Gyllenstierna's policy of Nordic alliances in the light of the Scandinavian diplomatic traditions], *Uppsala Univ. Årsskr.* 1935:10, Uppsala 1935, 34 ff. 53 ff., 64 ff., 159 ff., 166 ff.

[2] See above, p. 13.

colonies in the Swedish ports of Stockholm and Narva became as strong numerically as that in Riga.

Westbound English ships from Danzig, Königsberg, Riga and Narva passing through the Sound, 1650—1699.[1]

(average for each decade)

	Port of departure			
	Danzig	Königsberg	Riga	Narva
1650—59	8	12	3	1
1660—69	11	15	7	2
1670—79	25	41	37	15
1680—89	40	28	64	37
1690—99	11	12	47	25

Note: The table does not show the foreign tonnage, mostly Swedish, which was chartered by the English, especially during periods when England was at war.

It is true that the shipping with Riga was quantitatively greater than that with Narva.[2] But at the end of the 17th century the English were the leading foreign colony in Narva. This development had roots in the past. Trade with Narva had already been an object of English interest in the 16th century. After the town fell into Swedish hands in 1581, however, Reval (Tallinn) was, to begin with, favoured by the Swedish government at the expense of Narva. This policy was not altered until the Treaty of Stolbova, 1617, when Russia lost all direct access to the Baltic. Narva, along with the newly-founded town of Nyen at the mouth of River Neva, now got the support of the Swedish state in its efforts to control trade-routes to and from Russia.[3]

[1] N. Bang & K. Korst, *Tabeller over Skibsfart og Varetransport gennem Øresund*, etc. [Tables of shipping and transport of goods through the Sound, etc.], 1661—1783, I, *Tabeller over Skibsfart* [Shipping tables], Copenhagen 1930. (As a control I have compared the shipping information given by the books of the authorities at the Sound with the Customs accounts of English ports, Port books, Series E. 190, PRO. The correspondence is good. I hope to be able to publish in another connection the results of this critical scrutiny of the value of the English Customs Books as source material).

[2] *Hinton*, 106—107, 113 (Shipping statistics based on the books of the Toll authorities in the Sound).

[3] *Öhberg*, 123—162. A. Attman. *Den ryska marknaden i 1500-talets baltiska politik 1558—1595* [The Russian market in 16th century Baltic politics, 1558—1595]. Lund 1944, 315 ff., 360 ff. A. Attman, "Freden i Stolbova 1617" [The Treaty of Stolbova, 1617], *Scandia* XIX (1948—49), 41, 47. A. Soom, *Die Politik Schwedens bezüglich des russischen Transithandels über die estnischen Städte in den Jahren 1636—1656*. Opetatud Eesti Seltsi Toimetused XXXII, Tartu 1940, 28—

Because of the increased Dutch competition in Archangel and the hard-handed treatment the English received from the Russians, England was all the more attracted by the idea of shipping through the Swedish port of Narva.[1] The Narva traffic became a matter of international politics. The English ambassador to Sweden in 1654, Bulstrode Whitlocke, agreed with the Swedish negotiators that in the future Narva should be the focal point of England's trade with Russia. The Swedish-English trade treaty of 1665, Art. XXIV, includes the right for Englishmen to hold a 'commercial court' *(handelshov)* in Narva. After the Swedish-English alliance was renewed in 1672, the Swedish minister in London, Johan Leijonbergh, had an audience with King Charles II in which he put forward the possibilities of out-distancing the Dutch in Archangel by means of the Narva trade. The English had been promised, and, as we shall see, were enjoying a greater freedom of trade in Narva than in any other part of the Swedish realm.[2] English and Swedish economic and political interests were more closely allied in Narva than in Riga. Geographically Narva was the nearest Baltic equivalent to Archangel, that thorn in Sweden's side.

An entirely new trade route based on Gothenburg and Stockholm was opened up by the iron from central Sweden and the tar and pitch from Finland. Hemp and flax were obtained from the Swedish-owned ports of Riga and Narva. In the 1650's this traffic between England and Swedish ports in the mother country and the Baltic provinces had increased, and it was the 1670's that saw the great break-through in English trading activities in the Baltic.[3] But after this the trend continued to point in the same direction, the tendency to concentrate on Stockholm, Gothenburg, Riga and Narva as the sources of English imports from this area.

42. T. S. Willan, *The Early History of the Russia Company 1553—1603*, Manchester 1956, 157 ff. R. Liljedahl, *Svensk förvaltning i Livland 1617—1634* [Swedish administration in Livonia, 1617—1634], Uppsala 1933, 473 ff.

[1] J. Lubimenko, *Les relations commerciales et politiques de l'Angleterre avec la Russie avant Pierre le Grand*. Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes. Sc.Hist. Philol. 261, Paris 1933, 210 ff.

[2] Leijonbergh to the K. of Sw. 29/7/1672, Dipl.Angl. — See further p. 74 ff.

[3] Cf. *Hinton*, 106 ff.

Ships leaving Gothenburg and various Baltic ports, with cargoes for England, 1670—79 and 1690—99.[1]

From	1670—79 %	1690—99 %
Swedish-owned Baltic ports....	53.1	64.9
Gothenburg	15.2	15.9
Swedish ports in general	68.3	80.8
Non-Swedish Baltic ports	31.7	19.2
Totals	100.0	100.0

In the 1630's there was only insignificant commercial and shipping contact between these seaports and England. In the 1670's Swedish-owned ports were responsible for over two-thirds of the shipping traffic between the Baltic and England. By the 1690's their share had risen to four-fifths. This is the basic feature in the new pattern of England's Baltic trade which took shape at end of the 17th century.

II

This was the political and commercial set-up which faced the English diplomats and commercial agents in the Baltic area at the end of the 17th century. Through them, Whitehall and the City of London obtained their information about the situation and events in this part of the world. English Baltic policy was shaped in these two centres of the rapidly growing capital, the metropolis of England's expanding commercial and colonial empire. The main lines of this policy were drawn up in Whitehall, but merchants in the City were able to make their voice heard in various ways. One means of co-ordinating the requirements of politics and trade was through the various Councils of Trade and Plantations which were set up during this period. These bodies listened to the opinions of the mercantile world by allowing the various City groups who had interests in the Baltic trade to have their say. When decisions affecting commercial policy were about to be taken, a hearing was always given to representatives of the Eastland and Muscovy Companies and of the new group which had crystallised out under the name of 'the Swedish Merchants'. The policy towards Northern Europe officially came

[1] See note to previous table, also I. Lind, *Göteborgs handel och sjöfart 1637—1920* [Gothenburg's trade and shipping, 1637—1920], Skrifter utg. till Göteborgs stads trehundraårsjubileum genom jubileumsutställningens publikationskommitté [Essays in honour of Gothenburg's tercentenary, published by the Publications Committee of the Jubilee Exhibition] Vol. X, Gothenburg 1923, Tab 70.

under one of the two Secretaries of State, the Secretary of State for the North. But often his brother-in-office also took part in deciding matters connected with the Baltic. Under the early Stuarts, the formulation of foreign policy was less clearly defined than it was either before or after. The importance of the Privy Council had declined, and the idea of a Cabinet had not yet taken full shape. Moreover, questions of privilege and customs duty were the concern of Parliament. Conflicts of opinion and interests both between and within the two Houses complicated the picture. In addition to all the political machinery at home which laid down the line of official policy, there were also the ambassadors, residents and consuls in the capitals and commercial centres of the Baltic area. These were by no means passive spectators.[1]

To politicians and diplomats, trade was one element in politics as a whole; to the mercantile interests it was an end in itself. The merchants and their agents in 'Eastland' were governed by their solicitude for their affairs out there. Their points of view can be seen in the list of 'grievances' about the trade with 'Eastland' which were at various times submitted to the authorities, either spontaneously or on request. To the men of Whitehall and their correspondents in the cities of Northern Europe, trade was, of course, of vital interest to the nation, but it was only one counter in the game. It was merely one of the factors that had to be taken into consideration in England's relations with the sovereign states of Northern Europe. In this way, the aims of English foreign policy in the Baltic area took shape in the tug-of-war between various groups and interests, and, in the last resort, between various motives.

[1] See G. Clark, *The Later Stuarts 1660—1714*, 2nd ed., Oxford 1955, 13, 43—44. D. Ogg, *England in the Reign of Charles II*, 2nd ed., Oxford 1955, I, 192—197, (and the literature cited therein).

The Diplomatic Framework: Treaty of Alliance *versus* Trade Agreement

> 'Och såsom H:r Cantz:ii Råd:t icke obekandt wara kan, huru wåra Alljancer medh Engeland, lenge redan ähro förflutna, och man på Engelske sijdhan har wehladt ingå Commercii Tractaten, men separera dhen dheel af dhe förre tractaterne, som kunde touchera mutuelle deufensive Alljance, och afgöra dhen wijdh een thijdh som kunde falla Engeland lägligare, men att Wij dherimoot gärna kunde tillstå en separation af bägges sujetterne, dock så att dhe bägges uno eodemque tempore afgiordes, så hafwa dhe nu bägges alth sedhan hwijladt sigh . . .'.
>
> Johan Leijonbergh to Principal Assistant Secretary Bergenhielm, 15th August, 1684.[1]

Anglo-Swedish political relations bore an outwardly peaceful aspect throughout the 17th century. No direct causes of friction arose in the form of territorial aspirations or demands. After the small Swedish colonies in Africa and America fell into Dutch and finally into English hands, Sweden resigned herself to her position as a purely European power. After 1670, the feverish interest in transoceanic affairs which developed in Denmark, not to mention Brandenburg and the little state of Courland, was not shared by Sweden. England and Sweden regarded one another as pieces in the great political game of alliances which could be formed and then broken again. It was a completely unsentimental link between two nations which had no great direct contact with one another except in matters of trade. Consequently, motives and aims of a commercial nature were an important feature of the diplomatic intercourse between the two countries. Trade brought them together, and then estranged them, when the commercial interests of the one country threatened to tread too closely upon those of the other.

It is characteristic that around 1670 there were French and Dutch factions in the Swedish Court, but no English one." . . . nor amongst the whole number of Senatores is there any one who may be extraordinarily inclined to oblige our

[1] "And as the Principal Assistant Secretary cannot fail to be aware that our Treaties with England have long expired, and that on the English side there has always been a desire to enter into a Commercial Agreement, but to separate that part of the previous treaties which might concern a mutual defensive alliance, and to settle this at a time which would be more convenient to England, but that we on the other hand could willingly admit a separation of the two subjects, provided they both be settled *uno eodem tempore*, and for this reason nothing has been done for a long time . . . ."

traders . . .", wrote an English observer of the 1670's from Stockholm.[1] It was not until the Danish and Dutch war of 1675—79 that people in Sweden began to take a serious interest in collaborating with England. The President of the Swedish Board of Trade *(kommerskollegiet)*, the Finnish Baron Knut Kurck, was one of those who in the course of their official duties had already moved in English diplomatic circles in Stockholm during the critical war years. Later on it was Chancellor Bengt Oxenstierna — the leading figure in Swedish foreign policy from the 1680's onwards — who cultivated friendship with England as part of his policy of a balance of power with respect to France, a policy which has become known as 'Bengt Oxenstierna's political system'.[2]

Sweden's commercial policy was preoccupied with safeguarding her shipping in western waters in wartime, and with forcing the trade of Russia down to the Baltic. Sweden wanted to ensure her maritime lifeline with the salt harbours of the south, and to put into effect one of the dominant ideas in her commercial policy, the control of the Russian-Polish market. For all its daring, this aim was defensive and restricted to the Baltic area. The English aspirations were more far-reaching. Their object was to prohibit other nations from trading with the Baltic area.

Holland and Sweden were England's most dangerous commercial competitors in Baltic waters. Holland had her superior trade and shipping organisation and her great capital resources to fall back on. Sweden's competitive strength was based on the exportable nature of her products, her sovereignty over important export harbours, and her potentialities as a maritime nation. Denmark also had a powerful navy, a large population, a strategic position at the entrance to the Baltic, and the great timber resources of Norway. But all this did not fully make up for the mercantile weakness of Denmark proper, which lay in her lack of export goods for the western market.

At the same time England's political interests required a balance of power in the Baltic. For example, in 1678 the English envoy Sir Edward Wood reported that he had had a confidential interview with Nils Brahe, a member of the Council, in which he declared that it was incompatible with His Britannic Majesty's interests that any ruler or state should be 'Master of the Baltick'.

[1] W. Allestree, secretary to the English envoy Sir Edward Wood, in a memorandum on behalf of Sir Joseph Williamson, S.P., For 95/10, f. 97—118.

[2] The best modern survey of political combinations between powers interested in the Baltic, and of the general course of events in Baltic politics, most particularly from the Swedish angle of approach, is given by G. Landberg, *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia* [History of Swedish foreign policy] I:3, *1648—1697*, Stockholm 1952.

In practice, this policy of balance of power meant not only trying to impede the rise to power of one particular Baltic country but also trying to prevent or break up dangerous coalitions.[1] Sir Philip Meadowe, an expert on Baltic affairs, thought that England and Sweden had a common interest in seeing to it that Holland and Denmark did not join forces.[2] Keeping the Sound open for the naval stores traffic was the inflexible line taken by English Baltic policy from the 1650's onwards. In England's relationship with Holland it was Dutch maritime and commercial superiority which was a constant source of irritation. Here especially, English and Swedish diplomats were fighting the same battle. Each side kept inciting the other against the detested Dutchmen.[3]

I

The Anglo-Swedish treaties during Cromwell's Protectorate and the first few years of the Restoration were treaties of alliance combined with trade agreements. This applies particularly to the Treaty of Friendship and Trade of 1661 which formed the cornerstone of Anglo-Swedish relations throughout the century, even when the validity of later treaties expired. The Anglo-

[1] Wood to Coventry 9/1/1678, Coventry Papers LXVI.

[2] (P. Meadowe), *A narrative of the principal actions occuring in the wars betwixt Sueden and Denmark* etc., 1677, 114—115, 170, 171. Cf. also Meadowe's *An Essay to some considerations in reference to the Northern Kings in case of Warr happin betwitxt England and Holland*, Coventry Papers LXVIII; Cf. J. Robinson, *An Account of Sueden*, London 1692.

[3] S. I. Olofsson, *Efter Westfaliska freden. Sveriges yttre politik* 1650—1654 [After the Peace of Westphalia. Sweden's external policy 1650—1654]. K. Vitt. Hist.Ant.Akad.handl. Hist. ser. 4, Stockholm 1958, 17—18, 28—29, 253 ff., 317 ff., 484 ff. B. Grabbe, "Den nordiska allianstanken under holländsk-engelska kriget 1652—1654" [The idea of a Nordic alliance during the war between Holland and England 1652—1654], *Hist. Tidskr.* 1938, 269 ff. B. Fahlborg, *Sveriges yttre politik 1660—1664* [Sweden's external policy 1660—1664], Stockholm 1932, 44—58, 480 ff., 518 ff. B. Fahlborg, *Sveriges yttre politik 1664—1668* [Sweden's external policy 1664—1668] I. K. Vitt.Hist.Ant.Akad.handl. 68, Stockholm 1949, 2 ff., 61 ff., 83 ff. S. U. Palme, "Sverige och Holland vid Lundakrigets utbrott" [Sweden and Holland at the outbreak of the Lund War], *Karol.Förb.Årsb.* 1938, 86 ff. R. Hoffstedt, *Sveriges utrikespolitik under krigsåren 1675—1679* [Sweden's foreign policy during the war years 1675—1679], Uppsala 1943, 184. Ambassador Sparre to K. of Sw. 20/7,27/7/1675. Leijonbergh to Ehrensteen 29/1/1675 (copy among L's letters to K. of Sw.). K. of Sw. to Leijonbergh 24/8/1677, Dipl.Angl. Wood to Coventry 31/8/1672, 20/10/1677, Coventry Papers LXVI (cypher decoded p. 605). Cf. also Allestree to Williamson 20/7, 29/9, Oct. (undated), 1677. S. P. For., 95/10. Council of Trade and Plantations, minutes 9/12/1675 (C. O. 391/1) and 2/7/1679 (C. O. 391/3).

Swedish treaty of 1665, which in 1674 was renewed in London for a further two years by Baron Pehr Sparre, was of of the same nature.[1]

In contrast to its predecessors, however, the Renewal Agreement of 1674 took a form which was a departure from precedent.[2] After prolonged negotiations in London, agreement was reached on the articles of alliance, but, at Sparre's suggestion, the commercial negotiations were finally referred to trade commissioners.[3] Conflicts of interest between the two powers then postponed the solution of the questions of trade until the following century.

The commercial matters which were excluded from the treaty of 1674 were to be discussed by commissioners within six months of ratification of the treaty. In 1675 the necessary steps were taken on both sides to get these negotiations under way in London, where the Swedish resident, Johan Leijonbergh, had been instructed to act as the Swedish commissioner.[4] But

[1] Cf. the literature quoted above and Landberg, *Den svenska utrikespolitiken* [Swedish Foreign Policy], 77, 79, 133, 140—141, 163—165, 173, 187, 196. E. Ekegård, *Studier i svensk handelspolitik under den tidigaste frihetstiden* [Studies in Swedish commercial policy during the beginning of the period of freedom], Uppsala 1924, 57 ff., 66. A. W. af Sillén, *Svenska handelns och näringarnes historia under de tre Carlarnas tidehvarf* [History of Swedish trade and industry during the Caroline era], Upsala 1871, 23.

[2] Through the Anglo-Swedish Agreement of 4/14 April, 1672, Sweden was afterwards drawn into the Anglo-French encirclement of Holland. One of the factors that tempted Swedish statesmen was the promise that this alliance would release them from commercial dependence on Holland. The treaty of alliance indirectly secured for English shipping free access to Swedish harbours, a valuable privilege in naval warfare. (Landberg, *Den svenska utrikespolitiken* [Swedish Foreign Policy], 164 ff. A. A. von Stiernman, *Samling utaf Kongl. Bref, Stadgar och Förordningar etc. angående Sveriges rikes Commerce, Politie och Oeconomie etc.* III [Collection of Royal letters, statutes, edicts, etc. referring to the Kingdom of Sweden's commerce, policy, economy, etc.], Stockholm 1753, 947. Henry Coventry's letters of appointment. 11/7/1671. The Treaty of Alliance between England and Sweden 4/14 April, 1672. Originals of treaties, England N:o 9, RA. Draft of treaty in Coventry papers LXVIII). On the 30th September / 10th October, 1674, there was a renewal of the Anglo-Swedish alliance, which had formed an integral part of the system of alliances of both countries since the beginning of the 1650's. As an ally of France, Sweden was at that time well on the way to being drawn into the conflict between France and her enemies, Holland and the Habsburg. The alliance gave the Swedes a line of retreat towards one of the two great Maritime Powers, Holland's old enemy England. (Treaty between England and Sweden, Westminster, 30/9 (10/10) 1674, § 4, Originals of treaties, England N:o 10, RA).

[3] Sparre to K. of Sw. 8/9, 2/10/1674, Dipl.Angl.

[4] Council of Trade and Plantations, minutes 6/12, 9/12/1675, 7/8, 21/11/1676 (C. O. 391/1), *Cal. S. P., Dom.*, 1675—76, 292. K. of Sw. to Sw. B. of T., 13/3, 4/6/1675, RA.

there matters rested. In the same year, Sweden, as an ally of France, was drawn into war with Brandenburg. Her position further deteriorated when both Denmark and Holland joined the anti-French side. The only maritime power to remain outside the conflict was England. As the only neutral nation actively trading in the Baltic, the English could profit from the agreeable situation that had arisen without the aid of a new trade agreement.[1] This is presumably the reason why London did not seize its opportunity and did not act upon the urgent exhortations of the English colony in Stockholm to exploit the situation in order to obtain an advantageous trade treaty.[2]

During his mission to London, Sparre received the impression that in leading English circles it was considered to be in the country's interest to allow the war in Europe to continue. In this way the contesting parties (France and Holland) would be weakened, and in the meantime England would enjoy a profit from trading.[3] Now that Sweden had been drawn into the conflict, attempts were being made by her to have the Anglo-Swedish alliance put into operation. But these stranded on the English belief that Sweden was the aggressor in the war with Brandenburg.[4] Instead, England tried to extract every commercial advantage from Sweden's isolated position. During the next few years Sweden's trade with Western Europe went over from Swedish and Dutch keels to neutral English ones.[5] The Swedish government gave in to some of the English demands for increased trading privileges. In 1675 English importers secured exemption for bonded goods in Landskrona and Helsingborg. Because of the fact that the regulations giving exemption or half exemption from some customs dues were temporarily extended to foreign merchants and ships, the latter were put on the same

[1] Anglo-Swedish relations between 1675 and 1679 and their international background are surveyed by Landberg, *Den svenska utrikespolitiken* [Swedish Foreign Policy] 190—203 and *Hoffstedt*, 41 ff., 53 ff., 140 ff., 156 ff., 184, 188—189, 206—207, 214, 223 ff., 258.

[2] Sir Edward Wood to Coventry, 14/7/1675, Coventry Papers, LXVI.

[3] "Engelland i medlertijd niuta profijt af Commercierna", Pehr Sparre's "Memorial för H. Secreteraren Swanhielm angående min commission här i Engeland" [Memorandum to Secretary Swanhielm concerning my commission here in England] (Windsor 9/6/1674, § 6), in Royal Secretary Swanhielm's reports 1674, Dipl. Angl. Same idea in Sparre's "Hwadh som widh den Engelske Commission ähr passerat A:o 1674" [What happened during the mission to England in 1674], Pehr Sparre's memoranda on his ambassadorial missions, 1672—76, Dipl.Angl.

[4] Pehr Sparre's instructions 3/4/1675, K. of Sw.'s letters to Sparre 1675—76, Dipl.Angl. "Memorial uhr Engellandh, A:o 1675 och 1676" [Memorandum on England, 1675 and 1676]. Pehr Sparre's memoranda on his ambassadorial missions, 1672—76, Dipl.Angl.

[5] See Francis Sanderson (Danzig) to Whitehall 10/8/1675, S.P., For., 88/14.

footing as domestic shipping as regards customs liabilities in Swedish harbours. The reduction in customs charges for English shipping was explicitly intended to give it an opportunity to out-distance the Dutch, who had lower operating costs, and consequently cheaper freights.[1]

The Swedish authorities did not dare go further for fear of provoking England's commercial rival, Holland, in spite of the fact that they were at open war with the Dutch. In fact, in the autumn of 1675 an agreement was signed between Sweden and Holland in Stockholm. All merchant ships which were provided with a certificate and were not carrying contraband were assured of a free passage by both warring parties. It is natural that under such circumstances Sweden hung back in her negotiations with England. At the same time the Swedes put off the exchange of treaties with Holland until the following summer, which shows their hesitation in the face of the exigencies of the moment and their policy of balancing between the two great maritime powers. It was also essential to keep an eye on Sweden's shipping interests with a view to the peaceful times which were bound to come. Swedish ships would then once more be asserting themselves in competition with Englishmen and Dutchmen.[2]

It was not until 1677 that both Swedish and English circles began once more to be interested in putting new life into the trade negotiations. The Anglo-Swedish Alliance of 1674 had now expired. Sweden was in pressing need of allies who could be played off against the country's enemies. Under the protection of the treaty between Sweden and Holland, the Dutch shipowners had recovered from their set-backs in the Baltic during the first two summers of the war. The Danish-Dutch fleet controlled the entry into these waters. Against this background, Swedish diplomacy was trying to exploit the old antagonism between the two competing commercial powers, England and Holland. England's newly-acquired trading position in Baltic waters was beginning to be threatened. These were the strings that Sweden was pulling.

In December 1677, the Swedish expert on trade with England, Abraham Cronström, Assessor to the Swedish Board of Trade, was sent to England.[3]

[1] von Stiernman, *Kongl.Bref.* etc. IV, Stockholm 1760, 138, 161, 163. Sir Edward Wood to Coventry 1/8/1676, Coventry Papers LXVI. William Allestree to Williamson 29/6/1677, S. P.,For., 95/10. K. of Sw. to Sw. B. of T. 23/1/1677, RA.

[2] *Palme*, 150 ff. K. of Sw. to Pehr Sparre, 10/11/1675, Dipl.Angl. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 7/4/1676, RA.

[3] William Allestree to Williamson 29/6 and 8/11/1677, S.P., For. 95/10. Johan Leijonbergh to Ambassadors Bengt Oxenstierna and Johan Paulin Olivekrans 5/1/1677, Dipl., Peace Congress Nijmegen. Johan Leijonbergh to K. of Sw. 18/11/1677, Dipl.Angl. Sw. B. of T. to Council 27/9/1677. Olivekrans to K. of Sw. 6/6/1678, Olivekrans' Collection (draft), all in RA.

Sweden's desperate situation in the early months of 1678 made her government willing to make great concessions. The Swedish Council *(riksrådet)* went so far as to discuss the possibility of mortgaging to England some of the towns on the Kattegat and the Sound (Marstrand, Hälsingborg, Landskrona) or in Ingria (Narva, Nyen).[1] These were towns with good situations as trading posts, either at the mouth of the Baltic or for contact with the Russian market. Even though proposals such as these never reached the other negotiating party, they show how serious the situation was judged to be. At the same time this proposition shows the efficacy which Swedish circles attributed to enticements of a mercantile nature in their relationship with England. Purely commercial experts were no longer sufficient as representatives in London. Principal Assistant Secretary *(kanslirådet)* Johan Paulin Olivekrans arrived in London in March, 1678. In his report on the state of the negotiations, Olivekrans said that he thought that the complaints of the English colony in Stockholm over the stringent Swedish laws for aliens, and also over the tar and tobacco monopolies, should be met in order to create goodwill. The trade agreement now became a trump card in the political game.[2] It never had to be used, however. As is well known, the crisis was solved by cunning French diplomacy.[3] The peace treaties between the warring European powers began to be drawn up in the summer of 1678, and during the following year Sweden began to participate in the blessings of this peace.

The price paid for peace with Holland was a trade treaty (1679) between the two countries which was extremely unfavourable to Sweden, and indirectly equally unfavourable to England as well. For example, it meant the abolition of the differential customs rates for Swedish and Dutch ships in Swedish harbours in Germany and the Baltic provinces. For important Swedish export goods such as tar and timber the low customs tariffs of 1659 were to be granted to the Dutch. These regulations increased Holland's competitive ability.[4] On the other hand, the treaty increased the possibility of an Anglo-Swedish *rapprochement* in the commercial field. Sweden could continue with her game of balancing between the two rival western commercial powers. One important reason for this was the trading advantages that Sweden could offer.

In the autumn of 1678, Johan Leijonberg, the Swedish resident in Lon-

[1] Council to K. of Sw. 2/1/1678, Council's letter to K. of Sw. 1678, RA.

[2] Olivekrans to K. of Sw. 9/6/1678 (extract). Negotiations 1661—1679, Dipl. Angl.

[3] See, e.g., *Cal.S.P., Dom.* 1678, 561 (notes by Williamson).

[4] *Hoffstedt*, 336 ff.

don, informed the English government of the negotiations which were taking place in Nijmegen and of the Dutch plans to seize control of the Baltic trade once more. Leijonbergh began his memorandum by showing how trade between England and Sweden had not gathered momentum, in spite of the efforts which both governments had been making since the 1650's. According to him, the English merchants were adopting a sceptical attitude towards the Swedish market. They felt that freights were high in comparison with the value of the goods, that the period during which sailing was possible was short, and that there was a limited sale for Swedish goods in England. Nor did the Swedish area offer a market for English export products. Leijonbergh dismissed these arguments as Dutch propaganda, however, and pointed out that rumours were also being spread in Sweden to the effect that England was inundated with Baltic products and that the English merchants did not abide by their contracts. He tried to show by means of shipping statistics how an English merchant fleet had maintained the traffic with the Baltic and with Sweden during the war. This showed the potentialities that lay in commercial connections between the two countries.[1]

In reality, in 1678 as previously, Swedish policy was guided by a feeling that it would not do for Sweden to throw herself unreservedly into the arms of England. At the same time ambassador Johan Paulin Olivekrans wrote to his government from London that it would not be advisable to give special trading privileges to any one nation — Dutch, English or French. In his opinion this practice led only to a 'dominium' in trade; it was harmful to one's own subjects and it aroused indignation and enmity on the part of the nations discriminated against.[2] But it was not easy to keep the balance, as events were to show.

II

Holland's mercantile superiority and her well-established position in the Baltic trade forced Swedish policy-makers to grant concessions such as those of the treaties of 1675 and 1679. Both these agreements caused great uneasiness in England because of the commercial advantages that Sweden

[1] Leijonbergh's memorandum to Charles II, 17/11/1678, Leijonbergh's register of letters to the English authorities 1672, 91, Dipl.Angl. (also translated into German, enclosed with Leijonbergh's letter to K. of Sw. Nov. 1678.)

[2] Leijonbergh to K. of Sw. 20/12/1675, Dipl.Angl. Wood to Coventry 2/6, 10/11, 28/11/1675, 17/5/1676, 17/7, 20/9/1677, 16/3/1678, Coventry Papers LXVI.

was thereby compelled to grant Holland.[1] In the summer of 1679, when an armistice in the North seemed likely, the problems of England's trade with the Baltic received careful consideration in England. The matter was discussed by the Privy Council; it was investigated by the Council of Trade and Plantations; the Eastland merchants and the Commissioners of the Customs were asked to give their opinion. A plan was drawn up for a trade agreement, in which it is interesting to note that the projected agreement between Sweden and Holland served as a model. At the same time it was intended to incorporate everything that had been of value to England in her previous agreements with Sweden. One of the aims of the new project was the confirmation of England's position as 'most favoured nation', so as to be on equal terms with Holland. Consequently it was hoped that parity in customs matters between English and Swedish ships in Swedish harbours could be achieved.[2] The fear that the competition of Swedish shipping might once more become dangerous is clearly present. The preliminaries for the opening of negotiations made slow progress, however. The plans were part of an English diplomatic offensive aimed at consolidating England's position in Northern Europe in the new situation which had arisen through the peace treaties. Emissaries were sent to Denmark and Brandenburg with offers of alliances and trade agreements.[3] Sweden's turn would come later.

In April, 1680, Philip Warwick was at last commissioned to go as as envoy to Sweden in order to convey the English wishes that negotiations for a treaty of trade and alliance should begin in London, to which place Sweden was expected to send an ambassador. Warwick did not reach Sweden until the autumn of that year. His first reports were optimistic. The feeling towards England struck him as favourable. On the 13th of November, Warwick wrote from Stockholm, "And really most people do seeme here mightily to value y^{e} English Nation. For they all confess we were extremely usefull to them in y^{e} last warrs . . .".[4] He submitted to the Swedish government a note expressing the wish for trade and friendship between the two Kingdoms.[5]

[1] Olivekrans to K. of Sw. 9/6/ 1678 (extract). Negotiations 1661—79, Dipl. Angl. Cf. Landberg, *Johan Gyllenstierna*, 84 and Å. Stille, *Studier över Bengt Oxenstiernas politiska system och Sveriges förbindelser med Holstein-Gottorp 1689—1692* [Studies in the political system of Bengt Oxenstierna and Sweden's relations with Denmark and Holstein-Gottorp 1689—1692], Uppsala 1947, 87.

[2] Council of Trade and Plantations, minutes 2/7, 9/7/1679, C. O. 391/3 (also in C. O. 388/1).

[3] C. Brinckmann, "The Relations between England and Germany, 1660—1688", *Eng. Hist.Rev.* XXIV (1909), 449 ff.

[4] Warwick to Jenkins 13/11/1680, S.P.,For. 95/11.

[5] Warwick's note 1680. 'Engelska beskickningars memorial och noter' [Memoranda and notes of English embassies] 1591—1692, Dipl.Angl.

In Stockholm, much was hoped from England. The new Swedish foreign policy, which in the eyes of posterity was to bear the signature of Bengt Oxenstierna, aimed at securing for the exhausted and enfeebled Sweden a long period of peace in the security of undisputed frontiers. Oxenstierna believed that through an association with the great maritime powers, especially Holland, he would be able to neutralise France, which was the explosive element in European politics. In Holland, important discussions were going on with the Swedes which were to result in the so-called Guarantee Treaty. Sweden was prepared for economic concessions in order to obtain her political objective, security.[1] This also gave rise to a well-disposed attitude towards the English emissary. In one of his talks with Warwick, Count Bengt Oxenstierna emphasised the value and importance of trade relations between England and Sweden. The two countries were exchanging substantial commodities to their mutual advantage.[2]

Warwick devoted his first few months to orientating himself in Swedish affairs and to contacting Swedish officials and English businessmen in Stockholm, Narva, Riga, Gothenburg, Norrköping and Västervik. The businessmen were given the opportunity to express their points of view either in person or by letter.[3] During this period Warwick received constant instructions from London, where there was some anxiety whether the Swedes would accept the treaty of 1665 as a basis for negotiation. In the letters which the Secretary of State, Sir Leoline Jenkins, wrote to Warwick it is at the same time made clear that internal politics were absorbing the government's interest at the expense of concern for England's relations with other countries.[4] Not until 21st January 1681 did Whitehall send Warwick formal authority to open negotiations for a treaty of trade and alliance in Stockholm.[5] It had been hoped by the English that the negotiations would take place in London, and not on foreign soil.

Warwick's instructions required that a trade agreement should be concluded *before* negotiations about an alliance could be entered into.[6] Because of the

[1] Landberg, *Den svenska utrikespolitiken* [Swedish foreign policy], 213 ff. K.-E. Rudelius, *Sveriges utrikespolitik 1681—1684* [Sweden's foreign policy 1681—1684], Uppsala 1942, 12—48. G. F. Fåhraeus, *Om förändringen av Sveriges alliianssystem åren 1680—82 i dess sammanhang med de europeiska förvecklingarna* [On the change in Sweden's system of alliances in 1680—82 as related to the complications in Europe], Uppsala 1891, 116 ff.

[2] Warwick to Jenkins 1/12/1680, S.P., For. 95/11.

[3] Warwick to Jenkins 10/11, 13/11, 27/11, 15/12/1680, S.P., For. 95/11.

[4] *Cal. S.P., Dom.* 1680—81, 4, 33, 47, 52, 86, 95, 126, 140.

[5] Warwick's letters of appointment 21st Jan. 1680/81, Originals of treaties, England N:o 11, RA.

[6] Warwick's instructions in S.P., For., Letterbooks of Secretary of State 104/153 f. 16 ff. and in Rawlinson MS. A. 256, f. 199 ff., Bodleian Library, Oxford.

opposition between Crown and Parliament, those in charge of foreign affairs in England presented a divided front in the field of power politics. But the warring factions could be united in actions to the advantage of English commercial interests. The central point in Warwick's instructions may therefore be interpreted as a reflection of the current state of affairs in England. At the same time, the procedure in the case of the Swedish-Dutch negotiations was also at hand as an example well worth emulating — first commercial advantages, then political ties. These instructions also implied that the questions of trade and alliance should at least formally be kept apart.

The plans for such a trade agreement began to take shape in London, and it was possible to send them over to Warwick for his inspection and comments.[1] Warwick also received 'directions' in the form of notes to the text of the agreement.[2] Through his contacts with the English trade representatives in Sweden, Warwick added fresh points to the project. He called for the inclusion in the text of paragraphs demanding the breaking up of the Swedish companies which were monopolising the trade in salt, tobacco and tar. He also thought the treaty should contain guarantees of freedom of worship and give English subjects prompt help from the Swedish courts in legal matters.[3] Also, the exclusive staple rights of the English in Gothenburg were thought to be threatened because of the fact that in 1681 staple privileges had been extended both to Swedes and to other foreigners.[4]

Nevertheless, the vital point was the parity in customs matters which the English were demanding in Sweden. In August, 1681, Warwick pointed out in a letter that the Swedish customs system of whole or half indemnity, along with Swedish customs indemnity in the Sound, gave the Swedes a superiority on the freight market under peace-time conditions. "If no more be granted... We must be content to that the Swed[s] Shipps have the employ on one side of y Baltick & keep wt we can on the other".[5] Warwick's dispatches were now more pessimistic than those of his first few months in Sweden. Furthermore, in the autumn of 1681, Anglo-Swedish relations entered upon a new phase. The Guarantee Treaty between Sweden and Holland had been signed,

[1] Correspondence over treaty plans at the beginning of 1681, (C.O. 388/1). The plans for the trade treaty with Sweden (49 clauses) exist in an English version in Rawlinson MS. A. 292, f. 112.

[2] Warwick's directions in S.P., For., Letterbooks of Secretary of State, 104/153, f. 17 ff. Cf. also Rawlinson MS. A. 256 and A. 292, f. 171 ff.

[3] Extracts from Warwick's dispatches, along with other correspondence over the treaty, are included in C.O. 389/11, p. 217—218, 220, 221—223, 226—228, 279—287.

[4] Cf. below, p. 44.

[5] Warwick to Whitehall 3/8/1681, S.P., For., 95/11.

but England could not be induced to accept this.[1] The right moment had passed for concluding a trade treaty advantageous to England, as Swedish interest in a commercial agreement had decreased when they saw that the English were unwilling to commit themselves to a political alliance.

Originally, however, the Swedish government had serious intentions in respect of a trade agreement. This was undoubtedly regarded in the first place as one link in a chain of agreements aimed at supporting the somewhat precarious structure of the Swedish state. The preliminaries for the trade talks were begun on the Swedish side at the turn of the year, 1679—80. The Swedish Board of Trade *(kommerskollegiet)* issued no fewer than three pronouncements on the eve of the treaty negotiations. In all of them they reverted to the need for a clearer wording of those sections of the old treaties which referred to shipping in wartime (contraband and freedom of passage). Swedish ships had suffered much at the hands of English privateers during the last two wars between England and Holland. In matters relating to customs and excise, the Board wanted a greater degree of equality between Swedish and English ships in English harbours. In another respect, the Navigation Acts also came under fire. The demand that goods from the Levant, India and Spain should be re-exported only by means of English ships was held to be an injustice. After all, the English were allowed to export the products of the Russian-Polish market from Swedish ports in the Baltic provinces by means of English ships, provided they paid higher customs charges. The complaints of the English merchants over the treatment they were receiving in Sweden and the Swedish empire were dismissed with a reference to current laws and regulations. The Board thought that Plymouth was badly situated as a staple for the Swedes. Hull, Bristol or Portsmouth would be preferable.[2]

While the Swedish Board of Trade was prepared for reciprocal treaty terms in relation to England, merchant circles in Stockholm were more hesitant. Ever since the negotiations with Warwick had got under way, the Swedes had been able to study and comment upon his draft treaty. The big merchants in Stockholm urged restraint. They were afraid that if the government demanded increased rights for Swedish trade and shipping in England, the English would only reply by asking for greater advantages in Sweden. Active Swedish trade in England was neglible compared with the volume of

[1] *Rudelius*, 48—50. *Cal. S.P., Dom.* 1681—82, 513, 607 (Jenkins to Warwick).

[2] Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 1/1, 2/4, 17/12/1680. Cf. also abstract in 'Liggare, avskrifter och anteckningar rörande handelstraktater 1641—1815' [Registers, copies and notes concerning Trade Treaties 1641—1815], Archives of Sw. B. of T., all in RA.

English business operations in the most important Swedish ports of shipment.[1] This reveals the basic difference between the Swedish and English views on what should be the central point in a trade and navigation treaty. The *shipping* clauses were of vital interest to Sweden, whereas to England, with her great trading activities in Sweden, it was the sections dealing with customs and other purely *commercial* matters that were equally vital, if not more so.

As has already been indicated, the attitude of those in charge of foreign affairs in Sweden towards the Anglo-Swedish treaty negotiations underwent a gradual change during the year 1681 — to some extent because of reasons connected with Sweden's policy in general. Then came the rude awakening which the Swedish court received from Warwick's instructions to divorce commercial matters completely from the business of the alliance. Eventually it began to be clear that a trade treaty with England based on reciprocal terms was impossible so long as the rigorous regulations of the Navigation Acts remained in force. The material supplied by the Swedish resident in London clearly showed how bound England was to her 'navigation system'. Swedish experts rightly doubted whether Whitehall was either able or willing to induce Parliament to make a breach in this armour.[2]

[1] Burgomaster and Council of Stockholm to Sw. B. of T. Letters received, Arch. of Sw. B. of T. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 9/7/1681, all in RA.

[2] Neither 'Kanslitjänstemäns koncept och mottagna skrivelser, Karl XI:s tid' [Drafts made by and communications received by Chancery officials in the reign of Charles XI] nor 'Memorialer, betänkanden o. relationer i utrikesärenden 1680—83' [Memoranda, reports and relations concerned with foreign affairs 1680—83] (both in RA.) give any information on the course of the negotiations. Admittedly, the last-named series contains 'Ett oförgrijperligt [memorial] upsatt aff de avantager och desavantager som den 64/65 åhrs slutna Tractat medh Engelandh had medfördt' [An objective appraisal of the advantages and disadvantages which have been incurred by the treaty with England concluded in the year 64/65] (probably written by the Court Chancellor Edvard Ehrensteen, see below.) — but that is all. On the other hand, one volume in Engeström's collection, KB. (Engestr. B:IV, 2, 9) contains extracts made by the well-known collector Gustaf Benzelstierna (1687—1746) from 'public documents'. The volume consists partly of transcripts of memoranda, mostly by Samuel Månsson Åkerhielm (pp. 305—322, 383—583). The first transcript of interest for our purpose is of the above-mentioned 'Ett oförgrijpeligit etc.'. This enables us to suppose that the transcripts were made from documents in the Chancery archives which have now been lost. As a Chancery official, Benzelstierna had access to the material in its archives, from which he diligently made excerpts. For the Swedish point of view see also, 'Extrait des ordres du Roy au Comte Bengt Oxenstierna contenant les points qui serviront de reponse à Monsieur Warwick, Envoyé Extraord^re^ du Roy de la Grande Bretagne', S.P., For. 95/11, f. 164—165. The only published account (though unfortunately defective) of the negotiations is to be found in *af Sillén*, 24—26.

From the memoranda which Secretary Samuel Månsson Åkerhielm penned in 1681 for Swedish policy making, we see that the Swedes intended to give England the same commercial advantages as she had given the Dutch. These memoranda bear witness to a diligent study of the previous Anglo-Swedish treaties, and at the same time they make it clear that there was considerable inclination in Swedish quarters to use the Swedish-Dutch trade treaty of 1679 as the basis for negotiations. A *technical* division of the subject-matter into two treaties, one of trade and one of alliance, is also recommended in Samuel Åkerhielm's report, but this does not imply a retreat from the principal Swedish standpoint, that the two treaties should in reality be coupled together.

Consequently, in the winter of 1681—82, the great question arose whether England could in any way be induced to sign an alliance *before* she signed a trade treaty. The Swedish commissioners, Bengt Oxenstierna and the Court Chancellor Joel Örnstedt, were putting pressure on both Warwick and the Swedish Board of Trade, which was considering the problems involved. Warwick excused himself by referring to his instructions, and explained that the merchants in England were dead set on the 'commercial business'. Warwick himself had recommended an alliance on Swedish terms. In September, 1681, he wrote home: "Our Trade here especially after Navall Provisions as Iron, Pitch, Tarr, Hemp etc is very Considerable & y^{e} vent of Cloth, Pewter, Lead, Silke & yarne Stockins & manufactures is not dispicable, So y^{t} to give them a satisfaction in the Allyance may be worth y^{e} while to secure & make free y^{e} trade. Els the Hollanders will sonely clapp in and re-establish them selfes in y^{e} trade w^{ch} our Eng^{sh} have worked them out of with great Industry".[1] It was his fear of the ability of the Dutch to regain the position they had lost which Warwick gave as his reason for agreeing to Swedish wishes. In the letters to Warwick written by Secretary of State Sir Leoline Jenkins in December, 1681, we see quite unmistakably England's fear of committing herself to a political alliance and her inability to do so. England's exposed position, coupled with the deplorable financial state of the country, prevented her from embarking upon adventurous alliance projects or binding commitments.[2] Moreover, reports were coming in from Leijonbergh in London that a section of the English court still wanted the alliance negotiations to be held in London. At the same time as Leijonbergh, Lord Conway, Sir Leoline's successor as Secretary of State, emphasised the fact that England was thinking of following the Dutch example by reaching an agreement on the commercial questions first of all.

[1] Warwick to Jenkins 21/9/1681, S.P., For. 95/11.
[2] *Cal.S.P., Dom.* 1681—82, 634, 648 (Jenkins to Warwick).

Sweden did not fail to react to this. Bengt Oxenstierna said that he suspected that the English were just trying to gain time in the alliance negotiations. Warwick had asked that the right to enjoy equal privileges with the Swedes in customs matters should also be granted to the English merchants during the summer of 1682.[1] Doubts about the advantages of the 'commercial business' for Sweden had grown much stronger. Caution was now being advocated by the Swedish Board of Trade, also. In a letter to the Swedish commissioners (15th June, 1682) it pointed out that Sweden had no need of a treaty, as the trade she conducted was a passive one. It would profit only the English, who, moreover, would not be satisfied with less advantages than the Dutch. It is true that the Board points out that times can change, and that Sweden's trade could become an active one, but the tone is quite different from that of the previous autumn.[2]

The negotiations in Stockholm were accompanied by an exchange of notes in London. In a letter to the King of England (headed Kongsör, 30th Jan., 1682) the Swedish monarch expressed his displeasure over Warwick's statement that the Swedish court would prefer friendship with Holland to friendship with England. Supplementary to the King's letter, Johan Leijonbergh submitted a memorandum on the 14th of April of the same year, in which the Swedish views are set forth. The Swedes felt it was now impossible to move the negotiations to London. The Swedish insistence that the plans for treaties of trade and alliance were cognate to one another was again emphasized," . . . the Treaty of Alliance should go before the Treaty of Commerce, as being the ground and basis whereupon the other ought to be builded". According to Leijonbergh, this is how it was with the negotiations between Sweden and Holland in 1679; the armistice re-establishing the previous treaties was signed at the same time as the trade agreement. Warwick's powers covered both. The English now drew in their horns a little. In Lord Conway's reply (6th of May) the assurance was given that Stockholm would be allowed to remain the centre for the negotiations. But the English still clung stubbornly to the principle that the treaties of trade and alliance should be separate. England was waiting for the Swedes to submit a draft treaty of alliance. At the same time they wanted an answer to their own

[1] Cf. above, p. 36. K. of Sw. to Bengt Oxenstierna 8/11, 30/11/1681, 4/2/1682, Letters to the President of Chancery. Bengt Oxenstierna to K. of Sw. 12/11, 16/11, 14/12, 30/12/1681, 2/2, 18/3/1682, Letters to Karl XI. Johan Leijonbergh to K. of Sw. 10/1/1682, Dipl.Angl., all in RA.

[2] Sw. B. of T. to Bengt Oxenstierna and Joel Örnstedt 15/6/1682, Letters to Bengt Oxenstierna, vol. 12, Oxenstierna collection, E 1169, RA.

suggestion for a trade and navigation treaty.[1] The English views were also being presented in Stockholm by Warwick.[2]

During the following winter a final attempt was made in Stockholm to get out of the deadlock. About the turn of the year, Warwick had frequent conferences with Oxenstierna and Örnstedt.[3] There was still disagreement over the terms of the trade treaty. There were some stipulations in the treaty of 1661 which were of great value to the English, and they tried to hang on to these for as long as possible.[4] Warwick regarded this treaty as if it were still in force. Swedish import duties, which Warwick thought too high, also proved to be a bone of contention right up to the very end. Finally, on the 7th January, 1683, Warwick announced his intention of going to England for a while on personal business, but assured the Swedes of his eventual return. The trip was begun, but Warwick never reached London. He died in England on the 13th of March while on his way to the capital.[5]

It is difficult to decide whether the final phase of Warwick's task in Sweden should be interpreted as pure shadow-boxing. But it is possible that neither side wanted to take the risk of breaking off the negotiations and therefore kept them alive by artificial means. John Robinson, who represented English interests in Stockholm after Warwick's departure and death, tried once more in the summer of 1684 to assure the Swedes of the seriousness of England's intentions. According to him, the hitch had been caused only by Warwick's death.[6] From the point of view of the treaty negotiations, however,

[1] S.P., For., Letterbooks of Secretary of State 104/153, p. 26 ff. (copies), Warwick to Conway 22/3/1682, S.P., For. 95/12.

[2] Warwick's memorandum to Bengt Oxenstierna and Joel Örnstedt 16/6/1682, (Memoranda and notes of English embassies 1591—1692), Dipl.Angl.

[3] Samuel Åkerhielm's protocol memoranda Dec. 1682 — Jan. 1683, (transcript) Engeström Coll. B:IV, 2, 9, (cf. above, p. 40).

[4] Cf. above, p. 39.

[5] *Cal.S.P., Dom.*, 1683 January to June, 105. The Swedish proposal for a commercial treaty (40 clauses), which Warwick took home with him, can be found (in Latin) in Rawlinson MS. A 292, f. 126 ff. As the Swedish draft omits the clauses referring to the staple in Gothenburg (see above, p. 38) and various other English postulates, the text and the number of clauses had shrunk in the Swedish version. The state of the negotiations at the time of Warwick's departure is very clearly illustrated by the surveys preserved in what remains of the archives of Warwick's embassy. (Rawlinson MS. A. 292, f. 18 ff.). In the present connection it is neither necessary nor possible to go into all the controversial interpretations of the minor issues between the English and the Swedes.

[6] John Robinson to Lord Godolphin 2/7/1684, S.P., For., Letterbooks of Secretary of State 104/153.

the English diplomatic offensive which had been associated with Warwick's embassy failed to achieve the wanted results.[1]

As we have seen, the consequences of the agreement between Holland and Sweden of 1679 gave the English no peace. The privileged position of the Dutch in the Kingdom of Sweden was the focal point of Warwick's negotiations in Stockholm during the following years. Of all its commercial clauses, it was chiefly the fact that customs dues for Dutch ships in harbours in the Baltic provinces had been reduced to the same level as that for Swedish ships which threatened the promising English shipping activities at the eastern end of the Baltic. Exports of English salt to Sweden, considerable during the war, were also thought to be endangered. In 1684 the English began a new drive to obtain parity with the Dutch in the Baltic provinces. According to the Treaty of 1661, England should enjoy the same privileges as the 'most favoured nation'. The first representations led to no result.[2] This object was not to be achieved until later on, when the political scene had changed.

[1] Robinson to Lord Sutherland 19/3/1684 (copies in C.O. 389/11 and S.P., For. 104/153). P.C. 2/70, p. 180. Godolphin to Robinson 5/6/1685, S.P., For. 104/153. Robinson's memorandum 27/6/1684. Memoranda and notes of English embassies 1591—1692, Dipl.Angl.

[2] The outcome of the bonded-goods negotiations, which were coupled with the trade ones, was also a defeat for English interests. On the 17th January, 1681, the bond facilities in Gothenburg which had arisen from the treaty of 1665 were withdrawn. *(von Stiernman* IV, 303, *Ekegård*, 58, 69—70, 83—84, H. Almquist, *Göteborgs historia* I [The history of Gothenburg I], Göteborg 1929, 632 ff. II, Göteborg 1935, 246 ff.) Behind this step lay the dissatisfaction which had long been shown by the burghers of Gothenburg, the customs authorities, and the Swedish Board of Trade. (See above, p. 38. Burgrave, President and Councillor of Gothenburg to Sw. B. of T., 1/7/1670, Communications received, archives of Sw. B. of T. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 17/12/1680, 11/4/1681, RA.). The English were very anxious to be allowed to retain their privileges in Gothenburg. Some months after he arrived in Sweden, Warwick submitted a note (dated 1st Dec., 1680) which included the request that the English merchants should continue to enjoy the right to keep goods in store without paying customs dues. He received the cold reply that the bonded warehouse led to misuse and fraud. Nationals of other countries had put in goods in the name of Englishmen. (Memoranda and notes of English embassies 1591—1692, Dipl.Angl. Warwick to Whitehall 26/10/1681, extract from letter, S.P., For. 95/11. Rawlinson MS. A. 292, f. 182, answer of Sweden and Eastland merchants to Council of Trade and Plantations). Back in England, all parties concerned, officials as well as merchants, were single-minded about the use of the Gothenburg staple. During the course of the subsequent negotiations, therefore, Warwick attempted to get a restitution of bond privileges, but restricted to manufactured goods of the coarser sort. But nevertheless, he did not get anywhere with this matter either. For the discussion in England in 1681, see the correspondence in C.O. 389/11, 279 ff., and P.C. 2/69 (9/12/1681), p. 424.

III

When strong hands once more seized control of the half-disabled English state, and England was involved at the side of Holland in the great war with France, there was a perceptible need for a more solid and binding form of relationship between England and Sweden. The Dutch Stadtholder and King of England William III, was looking for allies. On Dutch initiative, the treaty of alliance and trade between Sweden and Holland had already been renewed in 1686. Sweden was in the process of getting involved in a league of states orientated against France. Two years later, Sweden by virtue of this alliance hired out troops to William of Orange, who was just then preparing to land in England.

At this juncture, the rivalry between England and Holland ceased to have a fundamental influence on power politics and commercial policy in the Baltic world. The conflict of interests between the two great maritime powers continued to find expression in commercial competition, of course, but the actions of the English and Dutch states were geared together after William of Orange took over in 1689.[1] The two powers pursued a common Baltic policy during the war of the 1690's. For example, Dutch and English diplomats in Stockholm worked together to neutralise the effect of the measures taken against foreign merchants and factors.[2] Swedish policy had very little opportunity to play off the two maritime powers against one another, as it had done in the 1670's. It is very likely that here we have one of the reasons for the reserve and stinginess shown by Sweden during the trade negotiations with England at the time when Robinson and Duncombe were representing England in Stockholm.

It was opposition to France which formed the political bond between the two maritime powers. Naturally, commercial rivalry still continued below the surface, but it was kept down by the threat from France. The French naval rearmament under the aegis of Colbert took place in the 1660's. The commercial counterpart of this was a trade offensive to ensure the import of 'naval stores' from the Baltic area. It is true that this French maritime activity soon died out.[3] But in any case, the English and the Dutch had a common interest

[1] Cf. O. Burrish, *Batavia Illustrata* etc., London 1728, III, 569—570.

[2] Cf. below, p. 65.

[3] P. Boissonade & P. Charliot, *Colbert et la Compagnie de Commerce du Nord* (1661—1689), Paris 1930, *passim*. G. W. Cole, *Colbert and the Century of French Mercantilism* II, New York 1939, 83—103. P. W. Bamford, *Forests and French Sea Power, 1660—1789*, Toronto 1956, 4 ff., 14 ff., 136 ff. P. W. Bamford, "French Shipping in Northern European Trade, 1660—1789", *Journ. Mod. Hist.* 26 (1954), 207—209.

in blockading the enemy's supplies of naval stores and military contraband.[1] It is also true that from the English point of view there was a potential danger that the Swedish politicians and the Dutch merchants might in their several ways collaborate with the French, since France's trade with Northern Europe was effected through the Dutch. But these tendencies did not alter the fact that the political and commercial rivalry between the two great maritime powers was considerably dampened down after 1689.[2]

In the summer of that year, when full-scale war had already broken out, an English envoy was sent to Stockholm. The person appointed was William Duncombe, a man with powerful connections in the City.[3] His mission was chiefly concerned with policy in general, to draw Sweden into a coalition against France and to ease the tension between Sweden and other Baltic powers. This was threatening communications *via* the Sound and English trade with the Baltic. Robert Molesworth was working for the same end in Copenhagen.[4] The idea was also to work on renewing the 1661 treaty of friendship and trade between England and Brandenburg which had long ago expired.[5] But once more the aims of commercial policy were interwoven with those of power politics. In defiance of the doctrines of international

[1] Cf. below, p. 54.

[2] Cf. G. N. Clark, "Anglo-Dutch relations of commercial policy and the Nine Years War of 1688—1697", *Verslag van de Algemeene Vergadering der Leden van het Historisch Genootschap* etc. 1932, Utrecht 1932, 5—18.

[3] For Duncombe's embassy to Sweden see C. F. Firth (ed.), *Notes on the Diplomatic Relations of England with the North of Europe. List of English Diplomatic Representations and Agents in Denmark, Sweden and Russia, and of those Countries in England, 1689—1762* (contr. by J. F. Chance), Oxford 1913, 20. *British Diplomatic Instructions* 1689—1789, vol. I, Sweden, 1689—1727 (ed. by J. F. Chance), R. Hist. Soc., Camden Ser. vol. XXXII, London 1922, 1—13. J. F. Chance, "William Duncombe's 'Summary Report' of his Mission to Sweden, 1689—92", *Eng.Hist.Rev.* XXIX (1924), 571 ff. G. N. Clark, *The Dutch Alliance and the War against French Trade 1688—1697*. Publ.Univ.Manch. Hist.Ser. N:o XLII, Manchester 1923, 93, 100 ff. R. Hatton, "John Robinson and 'The Account of Sweden'," *Bull.Inst.Hist.Res.* XXVIII (1955), 137—138. *Stille*, 156 ff., 202 ff. J. Thyrén, "Den första väpnade neutraliteten" [The first armed neutrality], *Lunds Univ.Årsskr.* XXI, XXII (1884—85, 1885—86), Lund 1885—87, 84 ff., 103—137, Landberg, *Den svenska utrikespolitiken* [Swedish foreign policy], 240 ff.

[4] Cf. C. F. Allen, *Bidrag till Danmarks Historie under Christian V, samlede fra udenlandske Arkiver.* [Contributions to the history of Denmark during the reign of Christian V, collected from foreign archives] VI. Engelske Relationer 1689—99 [Relations with England 1689—99]. Danske Samlinger, Andre Raekke, IV (Copenhagen 1874—76), 211. H. Rachel, *Die Handels-, Zoll- und Akzisepolitik Brandenburg—Preussens bis 1713.* Acta Borussica. Handels-, Zoll- und Akzisepolitik I, Berlin 1911, 795.

[5] Cf. below, p. 88.

law, all trade with France was forbidden by the allies in August, 1689. Duncombe was given the more than delicate task of informing the Swedish government of the Anglo-Dutch decision to impose this blockade. At the same time, through both Leijonbergh in London and Duncombe in Stockholm, England offered Sweden a trade agreement as a complement to the proposed alliance.[1] The idea was that England and Holland should take over the trade that Sweden would lose by being cut off from France. It was really French access to 'naval stores' that the allies principally wanted to block. Swedish merchantmen were offered an Anglo-Dutch convoy system to protect them from French privateers. Duncombe immediately began preliminary investigations. He got in touch with the English agents in Riga and other ports in order to get their views on the final shape which the treaty should take.[2] In October, Duncombe was given the authority to conclude the treaty of alliance and trade with Sweden; in December, he received a Swedish counter-proposal. But the negotiations on both the political and commercial aspects petered out inconclusively. In spite of the fact that the palms of Bengt Oxenstierna and other influential advisers of the King had been 'greased', the Swedish government was not disposed to give up either its position of neutrality or its trade with France.[3] As is well known, the ruthless Anglo-Dutch violations of neutral shipping led instead to a collaboration between Sweden and Denmark for the protection of Nordic shipping. Duncombe left Sweden in the autumn of 1692 with his mission unaccomplished. His work had failed, in spite of the support of Dutch diplomacy, now co-ordinated with English.[4]

In the year this happened, there was speculation in Sweden on the advantages which the neutral role could offer. In spite of English, Dutch, French and Spanish privateering, the Swedish merchant navy was keeping to the seas.[5] But gradually the disadvantages of the position became apparent. The Swedes, who had previously refused to acknowledge that the treaty of 1661 was still in force, now changed their attitude. A bad agreement was better than none at all. In 1690, Leijonbergh exerted pressure in London to get the shipping and commercial clauses of the 1661 agreement declared valid.[6] From

[1] Leijonbergh to K. of Sw. 13/8/1689, Dipl.Angl.

[2] Duncombe to Lord Nottingham 25/9/1689, S.P., For. 95/13.

[3] Samuel Åkerhielm's memorandum, etc., 1689 (transcript), Engeström Coll., B:IV, 2,9 (cf. p. 40) Duncombe to Lord Nottingham 5/3, 12/3, 19/3, 22/3, 26/3, 5/4, 19/4/1689, S.P., For. 95/13.

[4] Cf. Robinson to Lord Shrewsbury 30/3/1695, S.P., For., 95/14.

[5] Cf. below, p. 118.

[6] Leijonbergh to K. of Sw. 29/8/1690, Dipl.Angl.

the Swedish point of view, therefore, it was a great gain when this treaty was recognised by England in March 1693 as still valid. In his final report, Duncombe was able to ascribe the changed attitude towards the question of the validity of this treaty to such people as Baron Fabian Wrede, Lord High Chamberlain and President of the Swedish Board of Trade,[1] incidentally a Finn, one of the most zealous advocates of a resolute and active Swedish trade and shipping policy.

IV

During the next few years, not the slightest interest in trade negotiations was shown at the highest levels of the foreign departments of either Sweden or England.[2] In 1695, John Robinson, England's permanent chargé d'affaires in Stockholm, could therefore sum up the situation and the course of events as follows:[3]

"The Commerce between the two Nations is founded upon the Treaty made at London anno 1661, which for a time was superseeded by that of $166^4/_5$, but upon its expiration took place again & has been declared by both sides to be a subsisting Treaty. In the year 1680 a Project of a new Treaty of Commerce was sent from England to Mr Warwick with a Commission & Instructions to treat here. Little progress was then made. It was also intended Mr Duncombe should make a Treaty of Commerce, but that of Allyance not succeeding, that designe was deferr'd. So that the Treaty of 1661 is still the rule of Trade between the two Nations".

Some months later, however, Robinson was approached by the Swedes about the possibilities for a trade agreement. He was able to report that what had been Sweden's standpoint in 1681 was now England's. A treaty of alliance must first be concluded, and then a trade agreement could be built up on that basis.[4]

It is possible that Sweden's readiness to begin fresh negotiations was connected with disquieting items of news which were coming in from London. Johan Leijonberg's successor, Christoffer Leijoncrona, gave warning in his dispatches of an Act for the encouragement of privateering which was being prepared. In conjunction with the English Eastland merchants, Leijoncrona worked against this new Bill. He made propaganda

[1] President in *Kammar- och kommerskollegiet.*
[2] Chance, *William Duncombe,* 582—583.
[3] Robinson to Trumbull 29/5/1695, S.P., For. 95/14.
[4] Robinson to Lord Shrewsbury 11/3/1695, S.P., For. 95/14.

against it both by disseminating leaflets and by trying to influence members of both Houses by word of mouth. One argument in the propaganda against it was that it conflicted with England's treaties. It was passed by the Commons in 1695, but rejected by the Lords. In 1696 the Bill was reintroduced, and this time it was also passed by the Lords, though in a moderated form.[1]

The same year saw the reorganisation of the Council of Trade and Plantations, now called the Board of Trade. This became a permanent department of the Civil Service, a body with salaried members and employees. One of its first assignments was the preparation of a trade agreement with Sweden. The war in Europe was drawing to a close and it was time to prepare for peace. The English and Dutch factors in Sweden were at this time being hard pressed by the authorities as a reprisal for the attacks on Swedish shipping.[2] At the same time, some Swedish circles had again become anxious to renew the trade treaty with England. The Swedish point of view was epitomised in an account of the work of the Chancery drawn up in April 1697, shortly after the death of Charles XI and with the end of the war in Europe in view. The war had shown the need for a treaty of trade and navigation. The treaty of 1661 had been declared valid, but it was imperative that a better one be brought into being. A defensive alliance with England would also be advantageous. Privateering on the one hand, and the English complaints about the treatment of her commercial agents and about the increases in Customs charges on cloth on the other, were straining relations between England and Sweden. It was disquieting to learn that England was making arrangements to obtain her import requirements of goods normally bought in Sweden from elsewhere, particularly Denmark.[3] In August of the same year Bengt Oxenstierna was able to make a statement in the Swedish Council to the effect that Robinson had conveyed the information that his sovereign was not only willing to enter into an alliance on behalf of England and Holland but was also interested in trade talks. The news were favourably received by the Council. It was stated that friendship with England was important for the sake of trade. England's

[1] G. N. Clark, *The Dutch Alliance*, 57—59. Leijoncrona to K. of Sw. 19/2 (enclosing the pamphlet 'Reasons humbly offered . . . in relating the Privateers Bill') 26/2, 2/4, 23/5, 3/5/1695, 28/1, 4/2, 24/4/1696, Dipl.Angl.

[2] Cf. below, p. 65 ff.

[3] 'Relation om Sweriges Rikes tillstånd, i anseende til det utrikes werket, upsatt den 30 April 1697' [An account of the state of the Kingdom of Sweden in regard to foreign affairs, drawn up on the 30th April, 1697] printed in S. Loenbom, *Handlingar till Konung Carl XI:s Historia* [Documents for a history of Charles XI], vol. 7, Stockholm 1766, 103—110.

major role in Sweden's export trade must have been clear to the councillors, in spite of all the Francophile tendencies that were again becoming evident.

In the autumn of the same year, when the peace treaties had been concluded, Leijoncrona discussed the treaty question with the Secretary of State Sir William Trumbull, who pointed out that the time to conclude this had now come.[1] Trumbull said that he had in his keeping Warwick's plan for a trade treaty. But it was not Warwick's plan in its original form that the Board of Trade eventually received in December of that year from Trumbull's successor, James Vernon, to be submitted as the basis for preliminary discussions.[2] John Robinson in Stockholm had revised it. For example, the clauses referring to the staples in Gothenburg and Plymouth have been struck out in the copy which is now in the Board of Trade's archives.[3]

But the plan was not to be presented even in the form that Robinson had now given it. The Board of Trade also subjected it to a thorough scrutiny. At the beginning of its career this new branch of the Civil Service was zealous and effective.[4] The Baltic and North Sea merchants were consulted, likewise the Customs authorities. The Eastland Company was particularly worried about the high import duties on English cloth which Swedish protectionism in respect of textiles had forced into being. Eventually, on the 1st of June 1698, the Board of Trade was able to send to the Secretary of State, James Vernon, the first draft of a trade agreement, containing 44 clauses.[5]

[1] Leijoncrona to K. of Sw. 19/11/1697, Dipl.Angl. Rådsprotokoll [Proceedings of the Swedish Council] 19/8/1697 (Bergenhielm), RA.

[2] James Vernon to B. of T. 15/12/1697. *Cal.S.P., Dom.* 1697, 514. B. of T, Journals 16/12/1697, C. O. 391/10.

[3] C.O. 390/1 (Drafts of Commercial Treaties 1654—1713) contains two drafts for a trade agreement with Sweden of very similar content. The first (undated) contains 45 articles, and begins with a preface giving some information about previous treaties. This may be connected with Warwick's (or Duncombe's) embassy. The second (with contemporary dating 1698) contains 44 articles (after paragraphs 24—27 giving the regulations about the staples in Gothenburg and Plymouth had been struck out by Robinson) and is the one mentioned in the text. The draft in question is, in its revised form, of similar wording to a draft entered in the Board of Trade's Entry Book, 1698—1700 (C.O. 389/16, f. 60 ff.).

[4] On the Board of Trade's sphere of activity, cf. O. M. Dickerson, *American Colonial Government 1696—1765. A Study of the British Board of Trade, its Relation to the American Colonies* etc., Cleveland, Ohio, 1912, 20 ff., 61 ff. A. H. Basye, *The Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, 1748—1782.* Yale Hist.Publ. Misc. XIV, New Haven, 1925, 24 ff. G.A. Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt,* Yale Hist.Publ.Misc. XXI, New Haven, 1932, 296 ff., 330 ff.

[5] For the Board of Trade's handling of this question, see C.O. 389/16, p. 29 ff., 37 ff., 52 ff., 58—59, 60 ff., C.O. 391/10, p. 373 and C.O. 391/11, p. 67, 70, 74, 78, 85, 91—94, 101—102, 107, 115, 132.

This digging up of the old proposals was no good omen for success. Warwick's negotiations had not come to grief merely because the other side insisted on coupling the trade agreement with a treaty of alliance: certain points in his draft treaty had aroused hostility in Sweden.

Preparations for negotiations were also going on in Sweden. The shipowners of Stockholm submitted far-reaching requests. In the name of reciprocity they demanded that English ships should be forbidden to import into Sweden the products of countries other than their own — in other words, the application of the English Navigation Acts to Swedish circumstances. In Gothenburg, they appealed to the same principle over the question of bonded goods. If the English wanted to renew their bond privileges in Gothenburg, this was good reason to ask for similar privileges in London in return. Also, the principle that 'free ships make free goods' should be recognised, privateering should be suppressed, and the war-time increase in customs charges on Swedish ships and goods in England should be abolished.[1] The attitude of the Swedish Board of Trade was of even greater consequence. The Board's report is one long complaint about the treatment of Swedish merchants and seamen in England. Its requirements as to the draft of the treaty are summarised under these four main points.[2] The rule that 'free ships make free goods' should be recognised. The English colonies should be opened to Swedish shipping. The wartime customs increases (introduced in 1690) should be abolished. Ships owned in Sweden but built abroad should be given the right to carry Swedish goods to England. This was what the Swedes wanted to understand by 'reciprocity'. Taken together, these expressions of Swedish opinion are clear evidence of the feeling that English protectionism in trade and shipping was oppressive to active Swedish shipping, which had enjoyed a period of great success during the war. Nor did they bode well for the success of the negotiations which were about to start.

V

The centre of diplomatic activity in 1698 was at The Hague, where the Swedish ambassadors Nils Lillieroot and Carl Bonde had been authorised to conclude an alliance and a trade treaty with England and Holland. In

[1] 'Memorial av Stockholms redare' [Memorandum by the shipowners of Stockholm] (undated), Handel och sjöfart 1 [Trade and Shipping 1], Kammararkivet. Supplement to the memorandum of the Commissioner Uthfall, concerning the advantages to Gothenburg of a trade treaty with England, 1700. [Trade and Shipping 9], RA.

[2] Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 15/9/1698, RA.

March 1699, the English ambassador, Sir Joseph Williamson, was able to announce his sovereign's assent to a Swedish proposal (§ 6 in Lillieroot's instructions) to move the trade talks to Stockholm.[1] The negotiations for the alliance at first made slow progress at The Hague. The old antipathy towards joining a league directed against France once more began to reappear in Swedish policy. Bengt Oxenstierna, who had aimed at forming connections with the anti-French camp, had been pushed aside under the new régime. However, the Holstein question and the threatened encirclement of Sweden by Denmark, Poland and Russia forced the Swedish negotiators to come to a decision. In January 1700, a defensive alliance was concluded between Sweden and the Maritime Powers.[2]

But what became of the trade negotiations? The responsibility for these now rested with John Robinson in Stockholm.[3] Through his long diplomatic service in Sweden he had acquired an unrivalled knowledge of Swedish affairs, and in 1696 had been promoted to Resident Minister.[4] It is evident, however, that Robinson had his doubts when faced with this difficult task. He wished he had detailed instructions from Whitehall, of the kind that Warwick had been given for his guidance. It was difficult to decide where English diplomacy in Stockholm should stand firm, and where it should give way. The modern principle that 'free ships make free goods', which was part of the Swedish treaty plans, gave Robinson much food for thought. In a letter to Secretary of State Vernon (27th May, 1699) he pointed out the advantages this would give to a neutral Sweden in the event of a new large-scale war. The Board of Trade, who were consulted on this matter, took a more liberal-minded attitude. The old system of inspections and

[1] Nils Lillieroot to K. of Sw. 25th Febr./7th March, 1699. Letters from the Ambassadors Lillieroot and Bonde to K. of Sw., Dipl.Holl. James Vernon to Ambassador Sir Joseph Williamson in The Hague, 13/1, 7/3/1699. *Cal.S.P.,Dom.* 1699–1700, 18, 85.

[2] J. Rosén, *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia* [History of Swedish foreign policy] II:1, *1697–1721*, Stockholm 1952, 38–70. J. Milne, "The Diplomacy of Dr. John Robinson at the Court of Charles XII of Sweden, 1697–1709", *Trans. R.Hist. Soc.* 4th Ser. vol. XXX (1948), 76–78, Nils Lillieroot's authorisation to negotiate the renewal of previous trade treaties between Sweden and England 15/8/1698. Originals of Treaties, England N:o 13. Instructions to Extraordinary Ambassador Count Nils Lillieroot 15/8/1698, K. of Sw. to Lillieroot. Letters from K. of Sw. to Lillieroot, 1698–1699, Dipl.Holl. Lillieroot to K. of Sw. 25th Febr. /7th March, 1699. Letters of Ambassadors Bonde and Lillieroot to K. of Sw., Dipl. Holl. Christoffer Leijoncrona to Lillieroot 13/1, 21/4, 1699, Leijoncrona's letters to Lillieroot, Dipl.Holl., all in RA.

[3] Robinson to Ambassador Williamson, 1/2/1699, S.P., For., 95/15.

[4] On Robinson's career and activities, see *Hatton* (and literature cited therein).

sea-passes of the 1661 treaty had led to gross fraud on the part of the Swedes during the late war. In principle, the Board of Trade preferred the more modern rule, but admitted that Robinson should fall back on the regulations of 1661 if the need arose.[1] In July 1699, Robinson handed over to the Swedish government the English proposals for the trade treaty.[2]

When the Great Northern War broke out in March 1700, the Maritime Powers proved loyal allies to begin with. Their warships policed the Sound. Sweden was provided with cloth and gunpowder for her army requirements. Naturally, the Maritime Powers hoped at the same time to look after their own interests. The outbreak of hostilities led the English to believe that this was the golden opportunity to conclude the coveted treaty which they had been haggling over for more than twenty years.[3] In March 1700, the Board of Trade had informed the Commons that the proposals for a trade agreement were ready and were intended "Not only to preserve the trade and vent of our Northern Draperies in that Country, but also to remove the many difficulties that His Majesties Subjects trading into those parts have of late years lain under".[4] But there was to be yet another hitch. Robinson's appraisal of the situation in the autumn of 1697 turned out to be right. At that time he had written in a letter to the English delegates to the Hague Conference:[5]

"In point of commerce both Nations are very uneasy, the Suedes on acc^{t} of the great hardships they think to have suffer'd by the bringing up & confiscation of so many of their Ships & Goods, & our Merch^{ts} on acc^{t} of the Laws that have been made to restrain their stay & trade in this country to 4 months in a year, full satisfaction of all damages sustain'd in the former case, being the condition of relief in the latter. These difficulties stand in the way of a new Treaty of Commerce, of which there is otherwise great occasion, & I think inclination enough on both sides."

Robinson's dispatches during the following period show the obstinate attitude of the Swedes. The Swedish demand for reciprocity could not be brought into line with the system established by the Navigation Acts.[6] On the whole, it was difficult to compare the English system with the Swedish system of

[1] Cf. above, p. 30. Correspondence on this subject is found in C.O. 389/16, p. 302 ff., 372 ff. See also Vernon to Ambassador Williamson 21/4, 25/4/1699, the same to B. of T. 25/5/1699 and *Cal.S.P.,Dom.* 1699—1700, 118, 141, 144, 193.

[2] Robinson to William Blathwayth 26/6/1700, BM, Add. MSS 35106.

[3] *Rosén*, 82. Cf. *Cal. Treasury Papers* 1696—1701/02, 499.

[4] B. of T. to the Commons, 22/3/1700, C.O. 389/17, p. 29.

[5] Robinson to Ambassador Williamson 4/12/1697, S.P., For. 95/15.

[6] E.g. Robinson to Sir Charles Hedges, together with letter from Hedges to B. of T. 18/7/1701, B. of T. to Hedges 24/7/1701, C.O. 389/17, p. 209—213.

whole and half customs indemnity, which had been re-introduced after 1684. In spite of the fact that Leijoncrona in London believed that he could demonstrate to his government that there was a greater difference between customs charges for domestic and foreign shipping under the Swedish system than under the English one, the Swedes stood firm in their demands.[1] Robinson had been instructed by Whitehall to ask for recompense for England's services in the form of a favourable trade agreement, but this claim fell on deaf ears.[2] To the Swedes, the English proposals still contained two tough nuts to be cracked: one was the English demand that in the matter of customs' dues they should receive most favoured nation treatment in the Baltic provinces, thus obtaining full parity with the Dutch; the other was the complicated problem of the English merchants' residence in Sweden.[3] It is true that limitations on their period of stay were suspended after the outbreak of war, but this was only for the time being. In 1702, a new attempt was made by the English for an agreement concerning trade during the war.[4] Negotiations were, however, complicated by two factors: after the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession the English and the Dutch were exerting pressure in order to blockade French supplies of Swedish products; and the Swedes were demanding compensation for the privateering which had taken place during the previous war.[5] When Robinson left Sweden early in 1703 to join the Swedish headquarters in Poland the negotiations were *de facto* broken off for many years.

VI

It was not until after the closing of the Sound by Denmark's re-entry into the war that the Swedish attitude towards the English proposals gradually underwent a change.[6] Sweden's military reverses at the hands of Russia, and her distress at home, had softened her attitude by 1719, when Ambassador

[1] Leijoncrona to K. of Sw. 23/8, 13/12/1700, with enclosed memoranda, Dipl. Angl.

[2] Cf. orders to Robinson in Chance, *British Diplomatic Instructions* I, Sweden, 20 ff., 24 ff.

[3] See further p. 71.

[4] See S.P., For., 95/15, f. 129 ff. and memorandum from Eastland Company and Russia Company C.O. 389/17, p. 398—404, C.O. 388/8, D 42, E 10, E 11 and C.O. 391/14, p. 116, 118, 321, 363—364, 383, 410—411.

[5] *Milne*, 79, 83—84. *Ekegård*, 172—176.

[6] *Ekegård*, 177. The English agent Robert Jackson to Henry St. John 10/2/1711, reported in *Journal of Board of Trade and Plantations* 1708/9— 1714/15, 362. Also in C.O. 388/15, M 15.

Lord Carteret arrived in Sweden in the capacity of peace mediator. The price paid by Sweden for England's helping hand was the Anglo-Swedish Alliance of 1720. Article XII in this gave England the position of 'most favoured nation' and at the same time gave the English factors an unlimited period of residence. The country's desperate situation — a Russian invasion of the main provinces of the Kingdom was imminent — had forced concessions from this major Northern power, now clearly disintegrating. The new alliance resuscitated the confederations of 1700. But it had significant additions, commercial advantages which the English had not succeeded in stipulating on previous occasions. On the other hand, the question of renewing the trade treaty was once more postponed, in spite of the fact that during the negotiations it had been laid down that Article XII should be expanded into a separate commercial treaty.[1]

[1] *Rosén*, 161 ff. J. F. Chance, *George I and the Northern War*, London 1909, 333—359, 377 ff. Chance, *British Diplomatic Instructions* I, Sweden, 105 ff. *Ekegård*, 181 ff., 421 ff. E. F. Heckscher, "Produktplakatet och dess förutsättningar" [The Edict on Production and its postulates], *Hist. stud. tillägn. Harald Hjärne* [Historical studies presented to Harald Hjärne], Uppsala 1908, 723, 731, 739, 764.

The Baltic Staple Products in Anglo-Swedish Relations

1. *The Position of the English Purchasers of Iron in Sweden*

> 'Altså til at här effter hindra och förekomma sådant, Hafwa Wij godt funnit, såsom Wij och här med stadge, thet ingen fremmande, begynnandes til at räkna ifrån näst fölliande åhr 1674, skal hafwa mackt at sig uthi wåra Städer til den ändan uppehålla, öfwer theras rätta liggedagar, theras Gods och Waror ther igenom at uthbringa. Hwilka liggedagar Wij, effter Handels-Ordonantien, hafwa welat determinera til twå Månader om åhret, och intet ther öfwer, med mindre the sedan willia afläggia Borgare Edh och draga Stadrens tunga.'
>
> Handels Ordonantien (1673).[1]

During the period examined English commercial politics in Sweden were partly devoted to treaty negotiations. They also comprised a series of attempts to make the Swedish administration facilitate the work of the English trading agents. The representatives of English commercial houses operated in Stockholm, Gothenburg, Riga and Narva. These factors and residents functioned as buyers of Swedish export products, and sold English cloth and other commodities to the citizens of the towns. English merchants were a social and economic force in the Swedish community, in that they subsidised Swedish heavy industry by providing the working capital. In 1695, the English diplomat John Robinson gave the following account of the English merchant colonies in Stockholm and other towns, "There are at Stockholm at present about 10 or 12 English Factors. They yearly import into Sweden English Manufactures to the value of about 20 or 25000 £. They export Iron to the summe of near 70000 £, Pitch and Tarr about 25000 £, Copper, Wire, Dealboards etc about 10000 £. In all they deal to the summe of about 120000 £ p annum . . . There are also in Gottenburg two or three English

[1] "And so, in order to hinder and prevent this hereafter, We have deemed good, as is hereby stated, that with effect from the next following year, 1674, no foreigner will be empowered to reside in our towns, with the object of exporting his goods and products, over and above his legitimate period of residence. This period of residence We have decided in accordance with the Trade Ordinance to determine as two months per year and no more, unless he is then prepared to swear the Oath of Citizenship and take up his share of the Town's burdens." Trade Ordinance (1673).

Merchants and no more in the Dominium of Sweden besides those at Riga and Narva."[1]

The English were unfavourably regarded by the local bourgeoisie in the main staple ports, who would themselves have been glad to act as agents for the firms in London, Hull and Newcastle. As they were not Swedish subjects, these foreigners were exempt from local and national taxation — a circumstance which increased their ability to compete, but not their popularity. But the foreigners were also handicapped by orders and regulations concerning their trade.

Following the continental pattern, Sweden's internal commercial policy drew a sharp distinction between staple towns and non-staple towns *(uppstäder)*.[2] As is well known, the right to trade and shipping with foreign countries was to be restricted to the former. The foremost place in the programme was given to Stockholm, the capital of the Kingdom. The citizens of non-staple towns, as well as country producers and consumers, were barred from direct contact with the foreign merchants who visited Sweden, though exception was made for specially privileged groups such as the nobility. The position of the foreign merchants was made the subject of detailed regulations, the object of which was to give the citizens of staple towns the advantage over the foreign residents. At the beginning of the 17th century their period of residence was fixed at eight weeks per year. Their goods had to be kept in warehouses rented from the town. Goods sold by weight had to be weighed on the town's scales. Retail sales were forbidden. They were not allowed to own house property, but had to lodge with local citizens under the supervision of their landlords. If they died, one third of their property went to the state and the town; if they left, one sixth. The laws concerning staples and aliens were complementary to one another. Their object was to protect domestic commerce and industry by ensuring that all the profits of the intermediary trade with the foreign agents went to the citizens of the staple towns. The Aliens' Laws were of ancient origin in the Swedish towns, but they began to be intensified when in the 17th century official commercial policy was aimed at increasing Sweden's active trade.[3]

[1] Robinson to Whitehall 28/12/1695 (extract), C.O. 389/15, p. 12.

[2] For the nearest continental prototypes, see H.Rachel, "Die Handelsverfassung der norddeutschen Städte im 15. bis 18. Jahrhundert", *Jahrb. für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkwirtschaft* XXXIV, 105 ff.

[3] E. F. Heckscher, *Mercantilism*, vol. II, 2nd ed., London 1955, 73 ff. E. F. Heckscher, *An Economic History of Sweden*, Cambridge, Mass. 1954, 109 ff. In greater detail in Heckscher, *Sveriges ekonomiska historia* I:1 [Economic history of Sweden], Stockholm 1935, 246 ff.; I:2, 674—675 and Heckscher, *Produktplakatet*

The system had also existed for a long time in Sweden's possessions on the South coast of the Baltic. But whereas it was uniformly applied in Sweden proper and in Finland, there were local variants of Alien's laws in the Baltic provinces. The restrictions went furthest in Riga, where the citizens kept the intermediary trade in their own hands. The least rigorous Aliens' laws were in Narva, where — as has been noted — the western residents had the right to direct trade with the Russians in all important products.

As one might expect, the law was one thing and the carrying out of its provisions was something else. Time after time it was found necessary to insist on the application of the regulations concerning aliens in the trade ordinances of 1617 and 1636, but this had no practical results worth mentioning.[1] There were powerful forces behind the foreigners. The citizens of the Finnish non-staple towns, who supplied tar and timber to the staple towns and bought their salt there, had nothing against direct contacts with the foreigners. An even more powerful group was to be found in the iron-masters of Central Sweden, who were closely connected and to some extent identical with the nobility and the bureaucracy.

I

In the Swedish Diet of 1672, the burgesses had banded together to attack the flourishing anomaly that foreign residents were allowed to remain in Swedish towns for years without taking the oath of citizenship or assuming its responsibilities.[2] The result of this complaint appeared in

[The Production Edict], 708—709. An earlier account in E. G. Palmén, *Historisk framställning af den svensk-finska handelslagstiftningens utveckling från Gustaf Wasas regering till 1766* [A historical presentation of the development of Swedish-Finnish commercial legislation from the reign of Gustavus Vasa to 1766], Helsingfors 1876, 65 ff.

[1] For example, in Stockholm the Burgomaster and Town Council published the regulations again and again (10/5/1661, 6/10/1671, 1/10/1685 and 9/11/1720). The decree that the foreigners should report on arrival to the Palace Chancellery and the Depantment of Commerce was posted on 8/3/1671, and renewed on 27/5/1674, 3/5/1680 and 30/1/1695. Cf. M. Lagerström, Junior, (Ed.) *Stockholms Stadsordinantier* etc. I [Ordinances, etc. of the City of Stockholm], Stockholm 1731, 67, 142, 205, 254; II, Stockholm 1734, 1, 60, 98, 103, 114, 137.

[2] *Borgarståndets riksdagsprotokoll före frihetstiden* [Parliamentary Proceedings of the Burgesses before the Age of Liberty], published by the Institute for Urban History, Uppsala 1933, 105. 'Utskåttets af Borgerskapet betänkande och Swar till K.M:ts författning af een handelsordinantie till åhr 1672', Sekreta Utskottet ['Report of the Committee of Burgesses, and answer to His Majesty's formulation of a Trade Ordinance for the year 1672', Secret Committee], Parliamentary Documents of 1672, RA.

the following year in the form of a Trade Ordinance (21st March, 1673), which was partly directed at the trading activities of the foreigners. In this ordinance all the old regulations in the Aliens' Laws were enforced. Furthermore, native residents were forbidden to act as figureheads for foreign residents. It was very typical of the strong economic position of the foreigners that this ordinance was preceded, one week earlier, by a royal decree which gave both the citizens of non-staple towns and country-dwellers the right to purchase grain from foreigners during the emergency caused by the failure of the harvest.[1]

The publication of this trade ordinance naturally received considerable attention from the foreign factors. Sir Edward Wood, who had been sent to Stockholm in 1672 as English envoy extraordinary, had been given the task of protecting those English subjects who were trading in Sweden.[2] In September 1673 he was able to give his principals in London the calm assurance that the edict was aimed chiefly at the Dutch in Sweden. They came there, amassed a fortune, and left, taking their capital with them. Sir Edward thought that the edict would never be put into effect. That would be contrary to Swedish interests. He also reported that the English factors were taking it calmly. Nevertheless, during the course of that autumn he called on Councillor Johan Gyllenstierna, who promised to take the matter up in the Council.[3] But the time was approaching for the edict to come into effect. On November 10th, 1673, Wood submitted a memorandum to the Swedish government. In this he asked for a postponement of the enforcement of the edict, which had been fixed for the beginning of 1674. At the same time Wood asked for a more precise ruling on the clauses relating to the period of residence, and for assistance to enable the factors to get their assets out of the country within the prescribed time.[4] The matter was referred to the Swedish Board of Trade for its opinion.

The Board thought that the Trade Ordinance did not forbid the foreigners to stay in Sweden, but was merely a directive to the effect that they could not export their goods for more than the residence period of two months. This should be reckoned from the time they arrived and began to do their trading for the season. The Board was against postponing the application of the edict until the Englishmen had managed to collect the money that

[1] von Stiernman, *Kongl. Bref* etc. IV, 3, 6 ff., 45, 80.

[2] Sir Edward Wood's instructions 8/7/1672, *Cal.S.P.,Dom.* 1672, 321.

[3] Wood to Coventry 17/9, 24/9, 1/10, 11/10, 8/11/1673, Coventry Papers LXVI.

[4] Wood's memorandum 19/11/1673, Memoranda and notes of English embassies 1591—1692, Dipl.Angl. (Copy in Trade and Shipping 31, RA, also in Coventry Papers LXVI).

was owing to them. On the 30th December, 1673, Wood was given an answer on these lines. He refused to accept it. The subject came up for new discussion in the Council in the spring of the following year. The Swedish Board of Trade had its spokesman in the person of its president, Baron Knut Kurck, who was a member of the Council. The latter pointed out that the ordinance had been decreed during the last Diet as a result of pressure from the burgesses. It did not affect only the English. He personally thought that the new Trade Ordinance was undesiderable. The Swedish merchants could more easily be kept in check without it, and be forced to keep their prices down. In maintaining an attitude so favourable to the consumer, Kurck had in mind the maxims of the great Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna. On the other hand, he felt it would be impossible to repeal the edict on the grounds of pressure exerted by a foreign power.[1]

Kurck's negative attitude was shared by the Swedish resident in London, Johan Leijonbergh, who learned from his local contacts that feeling in London had gradually become uneasy. Wood had alarmed Whitehall, which at this time was carrying on negotiations with the newly-arrived Swedish ambassador, Pehr Sparre, over extending the alliance of 1672. The Secretary of State, Sir Henry Coventry, was at the same time being worked upon by two leading 'Sweden merchants', Urban Hall (Senior) in London, and Sir William Blackett in Newcastle. It was hoped that it would be possible to delay the implementation of the edict, which would obviously seriously restrict the radius of action of the English factors in the big towns of central Sweden. During the course of the negotiations, Conventry also declared emphatically that this new Trade Ordinance was a stumbling-block in the way of the alliance between the two Kingdoms. Sparre showed complete ignorance of its contents, and, as appears from Leijonbergh's dispatches, this ignorance was genuine and not feigned. His mission in London was purely political.[2] The English *démarche* therefore came as a surprise. Sparre asked for instructions from home, and these were sent in April, 1674. He was instructed to point out that the new trade ordinance was just a resuscitation of old decrees, and was based on Swedish law. He was to meet the English threat that they would confiscate Swedish ships and goods by referring to Sweden's services in the concluding of the most recent armistice between England and Holland. When Sparre at last got hold of a copy of the Trade Ordinance, the pressure exerted by Coventry inclined him to

[1] Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 22/12/1673. Proceedings of the Swedish Council 21/5/1674 (Lillieflycht), RA.

[2] Cf. above, p. 31 ff.

recommend a retreat. Under the influence of the Board of Trade, the Swedish government declared its willingness to be liberal-minded in the application of the ordinance, provided that during the current negotiations in London the English government guaranteed advantages to Swedish commerce. Implementation of the edict had already been postponed until May 1674 by the resolution of December 1673, and it was now put off indefinitely.[1]

In Stockholm, nevertheless, during the spring of 1674, the authorities had already begun to put the new ordinance into effect. On the 20th of March the foreign residents were summoned to the city's Department of Commerce and informed of the new regulations concerning their period of residence. John Cooper answered on behalf of the English factors that on the 20th of December of the previous year H. M. the King of Sweden had extended the period of residence, and that they were now awaiting a new resolution. Those summoned amounted to 28 Germans, 22 Englishmen and Scots, 9 Dutchmen and 1 Frenchman. In the autumn, the Stockholm magistrates decreed that the foreigners' warehouses were to be cut down, and at the same time the supervision of newly-arrived foreign merchants was intensified.[2]

In any case, these actions against the English residents in Stockholm had no great immediate effect. During the war of 1675—79, in which Sweden was involved, the shipping of the neutral English helped Sweden considerably. During these difficult years the English managed to appropriate to themselves several commercial advantages, e. g. reduced customs dues on cheap cloth and salt.[3] But when the war ended, the attacks against English and other foreign factors became more violent. In 1680 Stockholm's representatives protested in the Diet about the foreigners, and pointed out that the clauses in the

[1] Wood to Coventry 20/12/1673, 18/4, 23/5, 27/5, 3/6/1674, Coventry Papers LXVI. Leijonbergh to K. of Sw. 1/5/1674, Leijonbergh's letterbook, Dipl.Angl. (Also in Trade and Shipping 31, RA.). K. of Sw. to Sparre 8/4/1674 (enclosing Wood's note and the King's resolution of 20/12/1673) and 10/6/1674. Sparre to K. of Sw. 8/5, 7/7/1674, Dipl.Angl. 'Hwad som widh den Engelske Commissio ähr passerat A:° 1674' [What happened during my mission to England in 1674], Pehr Sparre's memoranda on his embassies 1672—76, Dipl.Angl. (Cf. also extract from letter from Sparre to K. of Sw. 28/4/1674, Trade and Shipping 31, RA.). Sw. B. of T. to Leijonbergh 9/5/1674, RA.

[2] Proceedings of City of Stockholm magistrates, Dep. of Commerce *(Handelskollegiet)* 20/3, 7/11, 10/11/1674, 3/6/1675, 19/6/1679, Stockholm City Arch.

[3] It is true that in 1678 the question of the foreigners had been taken up in the Diet which met at Halmstad on behalf of the towns. Nevertheless, it was only in the most general terms that the King, in his reply, pointed out the importance of observing the regulations (A. A. von Stiernman, *Alla riksdagars och mötens besluth* etc. II [Decisions etc. of all the Diets and Assemblies II], Stockholm 1729, 1791—1792.

ordinances of 1617 and 1673 restricting their period of residence had not been put into effect. Then, as previously, the petitioners found no backing in the Swedish Board of Trade, which defended the foreigners. The motives behind this are interesting. Any form of coercion in trade was held to be harmful. This was the typical official standpoint of that period. The foreigners were said to swell revenues and give employment to the poor. In times of war they were very advantageous to the country, and restrictions on their trade would cause enmity abroad. It was stated that the Swedish merchants had not recovered from the war and were not in a position to carry out foreign trade on a large scale. A little before this, the Board had been equally unsympathetic towards the citizens of the little town of Nyen, who wanted to force the foreigners there to apply for citizenship.[1] In the King's reply to Stockholm's appeal, the settlement of the question was postponed indefinitely, and at the same time it was emphatically pointed out that the trade ordinances of 1617 and 1673 could not be enforced "out of regard for the flourishing of commerce and other public benefits . . .".[2]

The continual complaints from the citizens of Swedish staple towns did, however, have some results. The ordinance which, in the interests of shipping protectionism, re-introduced in 1684 the system of whole and half exemption from customs dues, at the same time gave new directives for the treatment of foreign residents. It is true that the Swedish government felt that the time had not yet come for carrying out to the letter the trade ordinances. But those foreign merchants who had overstayed their period of residence and had set up house in Sweden instead of lodging with local citizens were now made to pay a contribution to the town. Journeys to the mining districts and trading there were now forbidden, and were liable to a fine of 100 silver dollars. When they left Sweden, foreign residents were requested to pay the sums of money perscribed by the trade ordinance of 1673. Naturally enough, both the re-introduction of the differences in customs dues between Swedish and foreign shipping and the decision to impose taxation on foreign factors caused displeasure in English circles.[3] The intention behind

[1] Ruling of Sw. B. of T. Dec. 1680 (dated 7/1 in Trade and Shipping 31, RA.). Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 9/7/1679, RA.

[2] 'i anseende till commerciens flor och andre publique nyttigheter . . .' von Stiernman, *Kongl. Bref.* etc. [Royal letters, etc.] IV, 320.

[3] von Stiernman, *Kongl. Bref* etc. [Royal letters, etc.] IV, 592 (A similarly worded letter addressed to the Governor-General of Stockholm in K. Hildebrand & A. Bratt (Eds.), *Stockholms stads privilegiebref. Urkunder rörande Stockholms historia* [Letters-patent of the City of Stockholm. Documents concerning the history of Stockholm] I, Stockholm 1900—1913, 476—477). John Robinson's memorandum (copy) S.P., For., 104/153, f. 47 ff.

these measures was, of course, to protect the competitive ability of Swedish shipping and trading during the period of recovery.

But the Swedish attitude was to become much harsher before this long period of peace came to an end. Edmund Poley, the newly-arrived English envoy, in 1687 came in for the next attack. His mission was really that of an observer, and he was there to follow the crisis between Denmark and Holstein as seen from Stockholm. But from the beginning he became principally involved in the question of the position of the English commercial agents, both in Stockholm and, as we shall see, also in Narva.[1] The indirect cause of the Swedish measures was given by the foreign residents themselves, who referred to their freedom from taxes and complained that the Stockholm city administration had demanded a contribution in connection with the revenue duty imposed by the Diet. By a Royal Mandate of the 28th April 1687, the foreign residents were exempted from this tax. But at the same time, all the interim resolutions which had delayed the inplementation of the trade ordinances of 1617 and 1673 were cancelled.[2] The foreign merchants and factors were out of the frying-pan and into the fire. The Stockholm city administration hastened to publish the new decree at the beginning of the navigation season. The warehouses of the English residents were closed down. This was followed by prosecutions and fines for the refractory. Both Poley and his Dutch colleague protested.[3] As usual, the foreign interests were also backed up by the Swedish Board of Trade. As givers of credit, the foreigners had an important function in Sweden's export industry, especially the iron trade, which, in default of capital, was dependent on the advance-payment system. This was why the Board recommended an extension of the period of residence to a total of four months. At the same time, they pointed out that there was no basis at all for the assertions of the foreign diplomats that the prescriptions on the period of residence were contrary to the treaties. The Board's recommendation was accepted by the King in a decree issued on October 4th of the same year. The warehouses were re-opened.[4]

[1] *Hatton*, 135. Edmund Poley's instructions 19/5/1687, S.P.,For., Letterbooks of Secretary of State 104/153. Poley to Lord Middleton 3/8, 10/8, 24/8/1687, "Letters from Stockholm to y[e] Secretary of State from August 1687 to December 1688", KB. Ruben Eriksson gives an account of Poley's reports home as shown in this letterbook in *Hist.Tidskr.* 1946, 55—56.

[2] von Stiernman, *Kongl. bref* etc. [Royal letters, etc.] IV, 855.

[3] Edmund Poley's memorandum 23/8/1687, Memoranda and notes of English embassies 1591—1692, Dipl.Angl. Poley to Lord Middleton 31/8/1687, KB.

[4] *Lagerström II*, 60 ff. *Almqvist II*, 313—314. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 5/9/1687, RA. Samuel Åkerhielm's memorandum Sept. 1687, with draft of reply to the foreign ambassadors' letters, Memoranda and Reports on Foreign Affairs

These measures taken in Stockholm were in the first place meant as a warning shot. According to Poley, the war of nerves was intended by the leading burghers of the town to force the English to become citizens and so help bear the burden which the state was imposing through its demands for loans and taxes. This, he argued, was a misconception, as the Englishmen in Stockholm were only agents, operating with the capital of their principals. Debate on these issues continued up to 1688. Its only result was an increase in the duty on cloth, intended to counterbalance the effects of the freedom of movement of the foreign residents, which had again been made legal. The rivalry between the foreign middlemen and the citizens of the staple towns continued to exist. The problem could not be solved by administrative methods.[1] In the highest quarters there was neither the will nor the means for a high-handed treatment of the representatives of foreign capital.

II

So long as peace prevailed between the great Maritime Powers, neither Sweden's shipping nor her trading could assert itself in the international field. But the outbreak of the new war in 1689 gave fresh impetus to Swedish trading and shipping interests. In May 1690, when the Swedish Chancellery *(kanslikollegiet)* was discussing an appeal submitted by two Englishmen concerning their grievances, even Bengt Oxenstierna, the cautious and pro-English President of Chancellery, spoke about the advantageousness and necessity of letting the laws take their course. In the following year, the foreign residents in Stockholm were summoned before the city's magistrates. They were informed that from then on no-one would be allowed to maintain premises in the Customs warehouses for longer than three years. The embargo on business-trips was enforced. Those who had been long resident in the city were urged to apply for citizenship.[2] The situation was aggravated by the growing bitterness over the privateering of the Eng-

1684—87, RA. (Cf. also Transcript in the Engeström Coll. B IV, 2, 9). Poley to Lord Middleton 7/9, 21/9, 28/9, 19/10, 26/10, 2/11/1687, KB. Proc. of Stockholm Magistrates, Dep. of Commerce 25/10/1687, Stockholm City Arch.

[1] Poley to Lord Middleton 21/9, 23/11/1687, 21/3, 28/3, 11/4/1688, KB. Cf. *Robinson*, 66—67. E. G. Palmén, *Politiska skrifter af Anders Chydenius* etc. [Political writings of Anders Chydenius, etc.], Helsingfors 1880, 148—149.

[2] Proc. of Sw. B. of Chancellery 8/5/1690 (extract in Trade and Shipping 31, RA.). Proc. of Stockholm Magistrates, Dep. of Commerce 17/11/1691, Stockholm City Arch.

lish and the Dutch and their attempts to obstruct the trade and shipping of the neutral Swedes. The prevailing war-time conditions seemed to have presented a suitable opportunity for getting rid of the foreigners.

The witch-hunt against the foreigners in the large staple towns was begun in the autumn of 1694.[1] The Swedish Board of Trade said that it could now recommend the implementation of the edict of 1687, which had never been applied for reasons unknown to them (sic!). Both the Swedish merchants and the iron producers were now in a position to free themselves from foreign middlemen. In general, the Board expected no great immediate effects from this implementation other than an application for citizenship from many of the foreign residents. On the 26th October, 1694, the Governor-General and City administration of Stockholm were ordered to put the seven years old edict into effect. This meant, among other things, that the legal period of residence of the factors was again reduced to two months per year, in accordance with the trade ordinance. There is no doubt that this action was connected with Swedish demands for restitution of, or compensation for, confiscated ships and cargoes. This time, those in charge of Swedish foreign policy had as their opponent John Robinson, the English resident in Stockholm, whose outstanding diplomatic abilities and contacts with the leading Court officials were now brought into play. In conjunction with the Dutch minister in Stockholm, Robinson submitted a memorandum in protest. The answer was a promise to look into the matter.[2]

A Royal Commission led by Bengt Oxenstierna was now appointed to sort out this tangle. On their recommendation, the King granted a prolongation of the residence period to four months. Things were back to where they had been. The report of the commissioners is an interesting document. The legality of the Swedish measures was pointed out and their time-honoured precedents invoked. From the economic point of view, the regulations were intended to enable their own merchants to compete, as these did not enjoy the tax immunity of the foreigners. There was no desire in the minds of the commissioners to exclude the latter from Swedish staple towns. But the intermediary trade should be secured for the native merchants, who could work as commission agents for the foreigners during their annual

[1] For further material on this, see p. 67, note 1.

[2] von Stiernman, *Kongl. Bref* etc. [Royal letters, etc.] V, Stockholm 1766, 494 ff. Robinson to Lord Shrewsbury 14/11/1694, 2/3, 14/12/1695, Robinson to James Vernon 6/2, 20/2/1695, S.P.,For., 95/14. Robinson's memorandum 24/2/1695, Memoranda and notes of English embassies 1693—1730, Dipl.Angl.

absence.[1] The commissioners were undoubtedly influenced by the leading citizens of Stockholm on this point. In a memorandum from the Burgomaster and City Council of Stockholm, which was read out to the commissioners, it was pointed out that the time was now ripe for emancipation. It was thought that the reduction in the rate of interest would make it less difficult to help the mining area by giving credit. But the Board of Mines *(bergskollegiet)* was less optimistic. Because of the way in which they financed the Swedish mining industry, the foreign residents found staunch supporters there. The foreigners were defended both in that Board's discussions and in the report which it submitted to the King on the 30th of May.[2]

The extension of the residence period which had been granted by the King on the 4th December 1695 by no means placated the representatives of the Maritime Powers in Sweden. Preliminary measures were also taken in Stockholm to let the law take its course. The landlords of the foreigners were ordered to hand in the names of those residents who were lodging with them.[3]

Robinson tried to frighten the Swedish authorities by maintaining that the factors' principals had seats in Parliament, and would be able to harm Sweden by means of countermeasures. In England there were forges 'in great abundance', flax and hemp could be grown in Ireland, 'naval provisions' could be obtained from America.[4] If the Navigation Acts were to be strictly applied to ships which were Swedish-owned but not Swedish-built, half the Swedish tonnage which was engaged on the traffic with England would be confiscated. From Whitehall came the order to take a firm stand.[5] Nevertheless, on the 24th March 1696, Robinson received a negative answer to his recent note. On the same day a similar refusal was handed to the Dutch envoy, van Heeckeren, and the resident, Rumpf. The English factors now turned to the King himself with a petition for an extra respite to enable them to put their affairs in order. But on the 17th April came

[1] Commission on the trading of foreign merchants and their residence in the Kingdom 1695, RA. (Formerly in Trade and Shipping 31, *ibid.*). Commissioners' report 2/12/1695 printed in von Stiernman, *Kongl. Bref* etc. [Royal letters, etc.] IV, 544 ff. K. of Sw.'s letter 4/12/1695 printed in *Hildebrand & Bratt*, 519 ff.

[2] Proc. of Sw. B. of Mines 23/5, 24/5, 5/6/1695. Arch. of Sw. B. of Mines, RA. Sw. B. of Mines to K. of Sw. 30/5/1695, RA.

[3] *Lagerström II*, 98, 114. Proc. of Stockholm Magistrates, Dep. of Commerce 20/2, 19/12/1695, 28/1/1696, Stockholm City Arch.

[4] Cf. above, p. 17.

[5] Trumbull to Robinson 11/2, 21/4/1696, S.P., For. 104/153.

the unambiguous answer: "The petitioners must abide by the rules read out to them in December last . . ."[1]

However, during that same month Robinson managed to arrange for three commissioners to be appointed by the Swedes in order to enter into negotiations with him. The three negotiators were the Councillor of Commerce Johan Stiernhöök, the Chancellery Secretary, Samuel Åkerhielm, and the Director-in-Chief of Customs, Johan Filip Sölfvercrona. Of these, Stiernhöök and Sölfvercrona were commissioners for commercial matters in the amalgamated Treasury and Board of Trade *(kammar- och kommerskollegiet)*. Sölfvercrona had also been dealing with questions arising out of the privateering of the Allies. Robinson principally wanted to know which categories of British subjects would be affected by the edicts. In order to emphasize Anglo-Dutch unity, Robinson wanted to read out at the first conference a letter from van Heeckeren, the Dutch minister. This was, however, refused him by the Swedish commissioners. At the next conference, on the 4th of May of that year, Robinson was informed that the edicts applied to all foreigners who had not become citizens but were residing in Sweden in order to carry on business. Robinson now appealed to the President of the Chancellery, Bengt Oxenstierna. On the 26th of May, he, together with van Heeckeren and Rumpf, had a new discussion with Oxenstierna and Count Gyldenstolpe, Councillor to the King.

At this conference between the Swedish representatives and the allied

[1] 'Suplicanterne hafwa att rätta sig effter dhet för dhem in Decembri förledne upläste reglemente . . .' Royal mandate 17/4/1696 (Transcript in 'Handlingar hörande till historien om Englands handel med Sverige' [Documents relating to England's trade with Sweden], Engeström Coll. C:X, 1, 9, KB). This volume contains copies of memoranda, resolutions, conference-minutes, etc. concerning the English factors 1695—96. The handling of this question can further be followed in the K. of Sw.'s letters to Leijoncrona, Dipl.Angl. (especially those of 18/12/1695, 25/3, 20/5, 30/5/1696 with their numerous enclosures). On the other hand, the two collections 'Memoranda and notes of English embassies 1591—1692' and 'Negotiations 1680—1700' (Dipl.Angl.) are very reticent on this subject. Robinson's dispatches in S.P., For. 95/14 (especially to Trumbull 1/1, 22/4, 6/5, 30/5/1696) give a good picture of the main outlines of the course of events, but should be used in conjunction with the Swedish material. Extracts from some of the Robinson dispatches appear in C.O. 389/15. Cf. also BM Add. MSS 35105, which, however, contains nothing of importance over and above the material already mentioned. In the literature of the period, the actions against the English factors during the 1690's are touched on by Clark, *The Dutch Alliance*, 101, *Ekegård*, 173 ff., *Almqvist II*, 314 ff. Heckscher, *Produktplakatet* [The Production Edict], 709—711, F. F. Carlson, *Sveriges historia under konungarne af Pfalziska huset* [History of Sweden under the Kings of the Palatine House] V, Stockholm 1879, 391—393.

diplomats, Robinson was able to tell the former that the English residents had obtained their travel permits but had not yet left Sweden. Robinson now made a last attempt to get their departure postponed, but to no avail. The King of Sweden did not deviate from the course he had set. The only concession he granted was the right for the English Admiralty to maintain a purchaser of 'naval stores' in Stockholm. Leijoncrona was instructed to inform the English court of this royal favour. The English factors were also given permission to settle their affairs, but after that, the moment of departure was to come inexorably. Robinson obtained the right to retain two of the Stockholm English in his personal service. One of them was Robert Jackson, who in 1694 was commissioned to act as representative of the English Admiralty, with the title of Commissary.[1] William Joye, of a London merchant family, was also saved from a compulsory departure by this strategem of Robinson's. Philip Forster and Henry Moxton (Moxon) were also allowed to remain in Sweden, the former on grounds of ill-health.[2] Robinson finally managed to arrange an extended residence permit for one of the most important of the factors, Thomas Cutler, who had acted as English consul in Stockholm since 1686.[3] A total of nine English subjects had set out by the end of May and beginning of June. According to Robinson, only one Scot and a few financially embarrassed Englishmen were willing to swear the oath of citizenship and stay on as Swedish subjects. There is evidence that this was done by Jeffrey Little of Essex and Robert Forrest of Scotland. In September it was discovered that two Englishmen were still staying with their host, Thomas Black. One of these was the tar factor William Sykes ('Wilhelm Seyx'), who had already applied for a travel permit in May.[4] The other Englishmen took refuge in Helsingör (Elsinore) after their expulsion.[5]

The Swedish action failed because of the reluctance of the factors to become Swedish citizens. John Robinson in Stockholm and the 'Swedish merchants' in London each gave their own explanation of the reason for this.[6] Robinson

[1] Robinson to Vernon 12/12/1694, S.P., For. 95/14.

[2] Proc. of Stockholm Magistrates, Dep. of Commerce 6/2, 21/4, 5/5, 8/5, 29/5/1696, Stockholm City Arch.

[3] Cutler's letter of appointment 12/5/1686, renewed 24/5/1689, S.P., For. 104/153. Leijonbergh to K. of Sw. 24/12/1686, Dipl.Angl.

[4] Proc. of Stockholm Magistrates, Dep. of Commerce 8/5, 29/5, 3/9/1696, Stockholm City Arch.

[5] For the reaction in Narva, see below, p. 78.

[6] Robinson's memorandum to the Swedish Government 28/12/1695, Engeström Coll. C:X, 1, 9, KB. Memorandum from the 'Swedish merchants' in London to B. of T. 9/10/1696, C.O. 389/15.

pointed in the first place to one's natural unwillingness to change King and Country. The compulsion to adopt the Lutheran religion, or at least to bring up one's children in that faith, was thought to be one of the most important reasons. There were many other things which all added up — things such as the heavy burden of taxation and inadequate property rights in Sweden, the compulsory surrender of part of one's property if one left Sweden either temporarily or permanently, or if one died and one's heirs did not happen to be Swedish subjects. Finally, both Robinson and the London merchants who were dealing with Sweden pointed to a factor which is most important from the economic point of view. As Swedish subjects by naturalisation, they would encounter great difficulties in their business with England. Robinson stresses weakened credit abroad as a natural consequence of a change of nationality.

The nature of the credit system makes it possible for us to ask whether this action had ever had any chances of success, even if it could have been carried out. As both Poley and Robinson maintained, the factors in Stockholm were only commission agents, acting on behalf of their principals in England and operating with foreign capital.[1] If the action had succeeded, Sweden might possibly have acquired their expert mercantile knowledge for the export industry of the country, but it would not have been freed from dependence on foreign credit.

Nor did any break in the trade between England and Sweden follow. It is true that Robinson had prophesied to Trumbull that the carrying out of the edicts would be fatal to England's trade with Sweden.[2] But by May 1697 two Englishmen had already returned, the recently-mentioned Sykes and John Middlecott ('Middelcott'). They were given strict injuctions not to exceed the permitted period of residence. In the following summer no Englishmen, only Scots, appear in the records of the permit department, and in the summer of 1699 there was only one. Trade was evidently flourishing, but it was being carried on by figureheads, or by those English who were staying on.[3]

From the Swedish point of view, however, the situation began to be disagreeable. It was not only the English and the Dutch who were grumbling. In December 1696, Robinson referred to the great disquietude in the mining districts, and to the fact that petitions were streaming in to the Board

[1] Cf. p. 56. Poley to Lord Middleton 23/11/1687, KB.

[2] Robinson to Trumbull 30/5/1696, S.P., For. 95/14.

[3] Proc. of Stockholm Magistrates, Dep. of Commerce 27/5/1697, 7/9/1699, Stockholm City Arch.

of Mines.[1] Of greater significance, probably, was the undiminished pressure from outside. In October 1697 — the autumn after the King's death — a protracted discussion arose in the Government. The attitude was now cautious, and the fear of running foul of the Maritime Powers was evident. But outwardly the Swedes were still just as inflexible as they had been during the closing years of the reign of Charles XI.[2] During 1699, the Treasury and the Boards of Trade and Mines together worked out, on the King's orders, a joint draft for a proclamation forbidding industrialists (both noblemen and commoners) from having direct dealings with the foreigners. The proclamation, which had come into being as a result of pressure from the merchant classes during the most recent Diet, was published on the 25th November, 1699. This shows how difficult it must have been to sever connections between the foreign providers of working capital and the producers of Sweden's foremost export commodity, iron.[3]

By 1696 the question had already acquired a much more political tone. About this time, peace-feelers were being put out in Holland, with Sweden as the mediator. The Swedish diplomatic representatives, Lillieroot in The Hague and Leijoncrona in London, were able to report that there was a feeling of distrust both in Holland and in England towards the Swedish peace mediators.[4] This had been aggravated by the action against the foreign commercial agents in Sweden. Whether by accident or design, this action had happened to coincide with measures aimed at restricting the practice of the Reformed Religion within the Kingdom of Sweden. Consequently, instructions went out to London and The Hague that the Swedish diplomats were to try to efface the bad impression which had been created by the arro-

[1] Robinson to Trumbull 2/12/1696. It has not been possible to investigate the truth of this statement by going through the large volumes of 'Incoming Documents' in the Archives of the Sw. B. of Mines, RA.

[2] Proc. of the Swedish Council 5/10, 25/10/1697, RA. Robinson to Ambassador Williamson 28/9, 19/10/1698, S.P., For. 95/15. Robinson's memorandum 7/10/1698, Memoranda and notes of English embassies 1591—1692, Dipl.Angl.

[3] von Stiernman, *Kongl. Bref* etc. [Royal letters, etc.] V, 769, 782. A. A. von Stiernman, *Bihang utaf åtskillige almenna handlingar ifrån 1529 intil år 1698 . . . hörande til . . . Riksdagars och Mötens beslut etc.* [Appendix containing various public documents of the years 1529 to 1698 . . . relating to . . . decisions of Diets and Meetings, etc.). Stockholm 1743, 470 (the burgesses' appeal to the Diet 1698, § 17). *Ekegård*, 174. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 15/11/1699, RA.

[4] Leijoncrona, who had a moderate and reasoned view of Anglo-Swedish trade and shipping relations, thought that the English businessmen in Sweden did more good than harm to the country. (Leijoncrona to K. of Sw. 23/8/1700, with enclosed memorandum, Dipl.Angl.).

gant Swedish attitude towards both the religious question and the position of the foreign factors.

The matter was again raised to the level of international politics during the alliance negotiations with the Maritime Powers at The Hague in 1698—99, and the unhappy position of the factors was used as an argument by the English. Count Lillieroot, the Swedish ambassador and negotiator, reported the fuss that was still being made about this in England. He was instructed to inform the negotiators on the other side that the edicts were old and well-established, and that they had been applied without stringency or animosity. At the same time, Lillieroot was instructed to remind the English of the way in which they had obstructed Sweden's merchant shipping during the war and had given no compensation for their acts of privateering.[1] This brings to light the power politics which lay behind the Swedish action; its essential nature was that of reprisals against the warring parties and a protest against their methods of dealing with neutral shipping.

The action also had international repercussions to the extent that it undoubtedly stimulated the English trade talks with Denmark, Brandenburg and Russia. These took place after 1695, and were clearly intended to replace the strategically important Swedish commodities with the products of other Baltic countries. For example, in the summer of 1696, the Danes promised the exiled commercial agents who had taken refuge in Helsingör the same privileges in Denmark and Norway as they had lost in Sweden.[2]

In the end, the problem was temporarily disposed of by international politics — by the outbreak of the Great Northern War. On the 30th of March, 1700, the edicts limiting the period of residence were declared suspended until further notice. On the other hand, during the treaty negotiations which were going on at the same time, the English failed to induce the Swedes to include the right to unrestricted residence in the trade agreement which was being planned.[3] The English did not achieve their object until Sweden had been brought to her knees at the end of the war. The position of the English factors was guaranted by Article XII in the 1720 Treaty of Alliance between England and Sweden, inasmuch as they, in contrast to other foreigners, were now granted an unrestricted period of residence.

[1] Lillieroot to K. of Sw. 19/29 Nov. 1698, 14/24 Jan. 1699, Ambassadors Bonde's and Lillieroot's letters to K. of Sw. K. of Sw. to Lillieroot 7/12/1698, Letters from K. of Sw. to Lillieroot 1698—1699, Dipl.Holl.

[2] Cf. below, p. 91. Pauly (Danish Minister in England) to Whitehall 14/7/1698, copy of letter with extract from memorandum by Dutch Resident in Copenhagen. Documents read to the [English] B. of T. 3/8/1698 (C.O. 388/6, A 2).

[3] Conference Minutes 29/7/1700, Negotiations 1700—1728, Dipl.Angl.

It is furthermore the regional aspects of Swedish policy towards foreigners which are interesting. Whereas the English factors in Stockholm were at least at times hard pressed by the authorities, their position in the Baltic provinces, especially in Narva, was never threatened. In the next chapter we shall look for the key to this remarkable difference in attitude towards the English and other trade agents in the different parts of the Kingdom of Sweden. Sweden's policy towards foreigners also forms part of her staple policy, but economic conditions and political objectives were not the same in the Baltic provinces and in the mother-country.

2. *England and Swedish Transit Policy in the Baltic Flax and Hemp Ports*

> 'Så är och Sveriges Crono i sig själv välsignat och ymnig giord af Gud och naturen med många begärlige varur, som här födas och växa, erkannerligen af allehanda Metall: och de Provincier, som nu inkräktade äre, således belägne, att Livland, Estland och Ingermanland, sompt av naturen, sompt genom gode och försiktige råd, och invånarnes medverkan, drage, och mera kunde draga alle, eller ju de tyngste och mäste varurne till sig uthur Muskou och Littowen . . .'
>
> Kommerskollegii Instruktioner (1651).[1]

Swedish staple policy in the latter part of the 17th century was guided by two interesting basic principles. The first was the traditional one: to concentrate the Gulf of Bothnia's foreign trade in the staple towns, and chiefly in Stockholm.[2] The second was to attract both the Russian trade with Western Europe away from Archangel and the Polish and Lithuanian trade away from the Prussian and Courland coastal cities and divert them to Stockholm or one of the other Swedish ports on the Baltic.[3]

[1] "Thus the Swedish realm is in itself abundantly blessed by God and by Nature with desirable commodities which grow or are found here, especially metals of all kinds: and the provinces she now occupies are so situated that Livonia, Estonia and Ingria, partly by Nature and partly because of good and prudent counsel and the co-operation of their inhabitants, are attracting, and, what is more, could attract all or at least the major part of the heavier products from Moscow and Lithuania . . ." Instructions of the Sw. B. of T. (1651).

[2] Heckscher, *Sveriges ekonomiska historia I:2* [Sweden's economic history I:2], 535, 665, 674–675.

[3] P. Nyström, "Mercatura Ruthenica", *Scandia* X (1937), 257–288. *S. Gerentz, Kommerskollegium och näringslivet*, Stockholm 1951, [The Board of Trade and the economic life], 21, 34, 48–49. *Ekegård*, 78–87, C. von Bonsdorff, *Nyen och Nyenskans* [Nyen and Nyenskans]. Acta Soc. Scient. Fenn. XVIII, Helsingfors 1891, 421 ff.

Those in power completely approved of Stockholm as the staple for both the northern and eastern parts of the mother country and for the provinces. The Bothnian trade monopoly prevented foreigners from trading in the Gulf of Bothnia north of a line drawn between Stockholm and Åbo. The policy was furthered by the right to store certain essential imports (such as salt) from Western Europe on the one hand and from the Baltic region, with its access to the Russo-Polish area of supply, on the other. Stockholm was granted this in the 17th century. It is true that the right of free storage for Western and Eastern imports in Stockholm was abolished in the 1680's, but it was again revived in the 1690's when the old aggressive spirit of commercial policy was reawakened during the Nine Year's War. Steps were taken at the same time to eliminate the double payment of local duties (excise in Stockholm, portorium etc. in Riga) on the re-exports which passed through the two principal Swedish trading cities. Salt was put in store in Stockholm to be later transported to Livonia, but there was a lack of re-exports in the opposite direction. Despite all efforts, Stockholm did not become an important trading centre between Western and Eastern Europe. Flax and hemp were not attracted to Stockholm; instead, the Stockholm ships sometimes took on board a ballast of iron in their home port and then filled the holds with flax, hemp and other Baltic goods in Riga.[1] Economic factors weighed more heavily than administrative ones.

The favouritism shown towards Stockholm by Swedish commercial policy met opposition amongst the other trading nations. The English merchants in the Baltic, for instance, expressed their disapproval of the Bothnian trade monopoly to the Council of Trade and Plantations.[2] The monopoly held by the Swedish tar company, which was run by Stockholm merchants, was also regarded as an attempt to make Stockholm into a staple town for tar coming from other regions than those Bothnian ones which were forbidden to foreigners. Amongst other grievances complained of by Philip Warwick during his embassy to Sweden in 1680—83 is the accusation that Englishmen were not allowed to get tar from Viborg and Kalmar, these being the two natural export harbours for the tar-producing areas of East Finland and South Sweden.[3]

[1] *Ekegård*, 83—84. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 15/3, 6/7/1694, RA. Sw. B. of T. and Treasury to the Sw. General Customs Administrator 5/4, 21/8/1694. Alphabetically arranged extracts, etc. from correspondence and resolutions 1577—1700, Archives of the Sw. General Customs Board, Stockholm (letter 5/4/1684, printed by von Stiernman, *Kongl. Bref* etc. V, 459).

[2] Council of Trade and Plantations, minutes 21/11/1676, C.O. 391/1.

[3] Memorandum to Warwick from English merchants in Stockholm 5/1/1681, S.P., For. 95/11. Cf. below, p. 81 ff.

I

The attempt to make Stockholm a staple for the whole of the Baltic basin and to force out foreign capital failed through its own inherent absurdity. There were, however, good economic and geographical reasons for concentrating the export of Sweden's and Finland's main exports, iron and tar, in Stockholm. The city was near the iron ore district of Central Sweden, and, even after the trade monopoly ended (1765), many tar ships from East Bothnia still called at the capital.[1] Products from the Russo-Polish market, however, could not be routed through Stockholm to Western Europe. A more realistic attempt was made instead to send them via Sweden's Baltic ports.

Riga, Narva and Nyen were the most likely for this purpose, and in their interests Reval, Dorpat and the Courland ports were consistently and ruthlessly set aside. Riga's monopoly of the surrounding trade area was fixed by the Swedish government through an agreement with the Duke of Courland. According to this treaty, exports from Courland were concentrated in the poorly situated ports of Mitau and Libau. All other shipping-ports in Courland territory were declared illegal and the Swedish Governor General in Riga clamped down on the traffic in these 'blacklisted' ports.[2]

These plans were furthered by treaties with Russia in Vallisaari and Kardis (1658 and 1661 respectively), according to which Russian trade with the West was concentrated in Stockholm, Reval, Narva and Riga. The Russian merchants obtained the right to keep factors there and carry on their trade, though of course under Swedish supervision.[3] Stockholm's actual inadequacy as a centre for the Russian market has already been mentioned. The Russian goods which were exported to Stockholm came chiefly from the area around Lake Ladoga. From there they were transported by small boats past Nyen, along the south coast of Finland, to the capital of Sweden. From the point of view of transit-trade, the volume was insignificant.[4] Reval's transit-

[1] A. J. Alanen, *Der Aussenhandel und die Schiffahrt Finnlands im 18. Jahrhundert.* Ann.Acad.Scient.Fenn. B, 103, Helsinki 1957, 132 ff., 266 ff., 413 ff.

[2] W. Eckert, *Kurland unter dem Einfluss des Merkantilismus. Zum Beiträge zur Staats- und Wirtschaftspolitik Herzog Jakobs von Kurland* (1642—1682). Riga 1927 194 ff. E. Dunsdorf, "Merchant Shipping in the Baltic during the 17th Century", *Contributions of the Baltic University* 40, Pinneberg 1947, 25 ff.

[3] *Soom*, 27—72, 254. G. Jens, "Rivalry between Riga and Tartu for the Trade with Pskov in the XVI and XVII Centuries", *Baltic and Scandinavian Countries* IV (1938), 153—154. G. Ens (Jens), "Moskovskoe torgovoe podvor'e v Rige v XVII veke", *Voprocki Istorii* 11 (1947), 74—79.

[4] A great deal of illuminating material on Russian shipping in Stockholm is kept in Stockholm's City archives (minutes of the Magistrates, Dep. of Commerce, customs accounts, etc.).

trade, too, fell to one of secondary importance. Changes in economic and geographical conditions and in commercial policy made Reval's Russian trade but a dim reflection of what it had been in the city's heyday, the time of the Hanseatic League. Narva held a trump card over Reval in that nature had given her good water communications with Pskov via the Narova and Lake Peipus, and in that she was on the whole nearer to the Russian hemp and flax district. In the end Narva had only one rival — the old city of Riga. At that time Riga's trade area stretched beyond Poland to the Russian-governed province of Smolensk and on to Vilna in Lithuania.

In Narva and Riga there were Englishmen who had come to trade with the Swedish Baltic provinces.[1] But was this just because they were the easiest places to which the goods they sought could be transported? It seems that Swedish commercial policy also had a hand in linking English trade with these two ports, or at least with Narva. Undoubtedly the most important instrument of the new staple policy was the policy towards foreigners and tariff policy. The laws on foreigners in Narva in particular were instituted with regard to the English interest in the transit trade with Russia.

There is in fact a crucial difference in the policy towards foreigners between the young town of Narva and the old Estonian and Livonian cities. Both in Reval and Riga the English factors had to fight against severe local restrictions on foreigners. In 1679, for instance, Englishmen in Riga and Reval complained that they were not allowed to spend the winter there.[2] The ancient regulations for trade in Riga restricted foreigners to trade with the burghers. The renewed regulations for 1690 reads as follows: "Alle Frembde, so entweder See oder Landwerts mit Ihren Wahren zu Stadt kommen, sollen dieselbe an Burger und keine Frembde verkaufen, auch Ihre retour Wahren von keinen andern als Burgern erhandeln . . .". The great merchants of Riga — about 400 members of the 'Grosse Gilde' — jealously guarded their position as middlemen, the 'jus emporii', both against their own Swedish authorities and against foreign nations. It is true that Riga's trade with the West was inactive and that therefore both the presence of Western agents and their capital were necessary to the town's trade;[3] nevertheless, everything possible was done to exclude the foreigners from contact with the nobles and peasants of the vast trade area.

[1] See *Hinton*, 106—107.

[2] 'Additional grievances' (Riga, Reval, Narva) 1679, C.O. 388/1.

[3] G. Jensch (Jens), *Der Handel Rigas im 17. Jahrhundert. Ein Beitrag zur livländischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte in schwedischer Zeit.* Mitteilungen aus der Livländischer Geschichte 24:2, Riga 1930, 63—105, 130. von Stiernman, *Kongl. Bref*, etc. V, 142—144.

The situation was different in Narva. By the middle of the 17th century, the laws regarding visitors had been relaxed, owing to the consistent policy of the authorities. The trade of all goods between the Westerners and the Russians could take place freely in a broker's presence in the Russian trade depot. The special position of Englishmen in Narva was due to the treaty of 1665 between England and Sweden, which secured them the unhindered transit of goods and the right to hold a commercial court. The Narva burghers, however, who were mainly German in origin, were not content with this situation. They stubbornly continued to exert pressure on the central authorities with the object of preventing trade between foreigners from different nations. In 1673 the Burgrave of Narva, Liliendahl, handed in a memorandum on the possibility of attracting the Archangel trade to the Baltic. He was of the opinion that the Narva burghers were capable of acting as middlemen between the Russians and the Western merchants in the city. The Englishmen in Narva had at the same time inquired uneasily about the application of the new trade regulations. These, published on March 21st, 1673, did indeed aim at limiting the time during which foreign factors might stay in the Swedish cities to two months a year.[1] The Swedish Board of Trade in Stockholm, however, recommended that Narva should continue to occupy a special position, "Emedan Eders Kongl: Mij:t såsom och dess högloffl: Antecessorer för detta, altidh Hafwa uthi en helt annan Consideration tagit Narfwa och dhe andre städer i Lijf- och Ingermanlandh, för dhen Ryska handellen och Archangelske fahrtens diversions skull, i thet thersammanstädes icke allenast een helt lindrigh tull är, uthan och tillåtet (:hwilket ell'iest här i Swerige intet skeer, såsom löpandes emot Lagh och ordinantier:) gäst handla medh gäst, opå wisse wilkor och sätt."[2] But attempts to deprive the foreigners of their advantageous position continued from the side of Narvas burghers.

As has been pointed out, the 1673 regulation on foreigners was never applied in Sweden proper. On October 4th, 1687, their stay was again fixed at four months; at the same time they were forbidden to stay the winter in

[1] Cf. above, p. 59.

[2] "As both Your Royal Majesty and His most honourable Concillors in these matters have always adopted quite a different attitude towards Narva and the other towns in Livonia and Ingria for the sake of diverting Russian trade and the traffic over Archangel, in that in these same towns there is not only a very much lower rate of Customs charges but also permission (which is not granted elsewhere in Sweden, as it is contrary to Law and Ordinances) for foreigners to trade with foreigners, on certain terms and in certain ways. "Burgrave Liliendahl's memorandum (1673), (Trade and Shipping 1), RA. See also Nordin Coll., vol. 415 (Narvas desideria, 1673), UUB. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. (undated) 1674, RA.

the country.[1] But the right of West European merchants in Narva to trade with the Russians was confirmed on the same day. The burghers of Narva did indeed try to seize the opportunity and were supported by the Ingrian frontier commission; but the central authorities in Stockholm were agreed on the importance of foreigners retaining the right to trade with each other in Narva. The Governor General of Ingria, Count Jöran Sperling, was nevertheless informed by the government that neither the Westerners nor the Russians were to regard this as a perpetual privilege. The foreigners ought to be made to realise this so that they might be induced to obtain citizenship of the town. The Royal Chancellery had therefore considered it extremely important that nothing should be given in writing to the English envoy, who had been alarmed by his uneasy countrymen in Narva.[2]

The real Swedish motives can be seen more clearly from the internal correspondence between the central authorities in Stockholm and the local administrative bodies. For instance, we get an interesting glimpse of the attitude towards free trade between the Russians and other foreigners in Narva from the Swedish Board of Trade's pronouncement quoted above. Sperling, the Governor General, had been present when the question came up before the Board: consequently, the burghers' interests in the prohibition had been put forward. He also pointed out that the terms of the Kardis peace treaty allowed the Russians free trade in Stockholm, Riga, Reval and Narva (article X) but that no express mention was made of the right to trade with other foreigners. As Count Sperling was an authority on the matter, the Board agreed that it was possible to forbid mutual trade between visitors; but this was to happen only after the number of burghers in Narva had increased and the shipping position had become more stable. It was to be feared that the Russians would protest and this was reason enough to proceed cautiously. Progress was described as promising: the trade turnover had considerably increased since the 1670's. Later in the same year, Sperling emphasized that the Narva burghers still lacked the capital to run the transit traffic themselves. According to him, even the burghers themselves admitted that to finance it lay beyond their resources both of capital and credit.

[1] Cf. above, p. 63.

[2] von Stiernman, *Kongl. Bref*, etc. IV, 899. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 21/7/1687, RA. The Governor General of Ingria, Count Jöran Sperling, to K. of Sw. 16/11/1687, Livonica II, 187, ibid. The English envoy Edmund Poley's memorandum on the 'grievances' of Englishmen in Narva, Memoranda and Notes of English Embassies, 1591—1692, Dipl.Angl. "Påminnelser vid Engelska envoyéns memorial etc." ['Remarks on the English envoy's memorandum, etc.'] in Memoranda and reports on foreign affairs 1684—87, RA. Poley to Lord Middleton 30/11/1687, 25/1, 21/3/1688, KB.

By the time the action against foreign trade agents culminated in Stockholm and Gothenburg in 1695–96, the burghers of Narva tried to act likewise.[1] But the Board of Trade opposed all measures against the foreigners there; in the prevailing circumstances an attack on the important foreign merchants in Narva would be most inopportune. The Board was always anxious to point out, however, that the lenient law for foreigners in Narva was not a perpetual privilege. Freedom of trade was only granted at a suitable time. Any Russian attempts to attain the same status in Riga should be opposed since, according to the pacts, Russian trade rights in the Swedish cities were confined to trade between the merchants of those two countries and did not apply to a third party. Thus the Board's attitude was the same as before. It its obvious, however, that it was precisely this lenient law for foreigners which was one of the reasons for the yearly increase of Narva's and Nyen's transit-trade. The other reason was the tariff policy.[2]

II

The basis for the system of tariffs in the Estonian and Ingrian area during the latter half of the 17th century was the 1648 regulation concerning the transitduty and transit-trade in Reval, Narva and Nyen. The tariff on goods in transit, with the exception of salt and wine, was then lowered to 2 % of their value. The duty on Russian goods in Narva and Nyen had already been abolished five years earlier. At the same time, free trade for foreigners from east and west was established (article VI). Neither of these privileges were extended to Reval. From a technical aspect the regulation contained a simplification of the method of collecting duties, and from an economic aspect a lowering of the transit-duty. Foreigners must have gained enormously from this, even though it was naturally not always easy to apply the new system.[3] Complaints about annoyances during customs inspections could not be avoided. In 1694 Count Sperling pointed out that from the foreigners' point of view the duties in Narva were as large as those in Archangel. In Narva, however, the West European factors complained that their goods were opened, which did not happen in Archangel. Sperling therefore recommended that there should

[1] Cf. above, p. 65 ff.

[2] Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 18/3/1697, 6/12/1698, RA.

[3] von Stiernman, *Kongl. Bref.* etc., II, Stockholm 1750, 532 ff. *Soom*, 79–164, 255. For the tariff system in Livonia, Estonia and Ingria at the end of the Swedish period, see, e.g., P. J. Marperger, *Schwedischer Kauffman, in sich haltende eine kurze geographische und historische Beschreibung des Königreichs Schweden etc.*, Wismar-Leipzig 1706, 293 ff.

be no inspection at customs examinations.[1] New kinds of transit goods also caused difficulties at the customs. In 1698 Czar Peter granted an English merchant syndicate the monopoly of tobacco imports into Russia.[2] Tobacco had earlier been forbidden in Russia. Part of the first consignment was sent via Narva, where, according to the tariff regulations, the same duty was required for the consignment as for tobacco destined for Ingria. John Robinson, England's representative in Stockholm, appealed to the Swedish Government, but his request for the customary tariff on tobacco in transit was refused. On the other hand, the government agreed both to free transit-tobacco from the municipal harbour dues claimed by the Narva authorities and also not to rank ordinary cut tobacco in the same category as fine Virginia tobacco. It was typical that at the same time Leijoncrona, the Swedish resident in London, was instructed to watch whether after this Englishmen would instead send the tobacco via Archangel — so much anxiety was there to keep and enlarge Narva's English trade.[3]

From England's point of view, Narva was the only important city in Estonia and Ingria. Despite the efforts of Swedish commercial politicians, Nyen was not able to assert herself, probably because both the visits of West Europeans to Archangel and the Russian direct traffic to Stockholm hindered the town's development. It was only when Russian commercial policy in the next century did all in its power to make St. Petersburg the great port and trading city of the Russian realm that the geographical advantages of Nyen's position could be utilized. English ships *en route* to Narva only occasionally unloaded part of their cargo in Nyen and Reval. English complaints about difficulties of trade in Nyen and Reval, therefore, chiefly concerned the customs examinations of these small consignments of goods; the Swedish authorities opposed, for instance, English petitions in 1689 to be allowed to pay the duty on tobacco unloaded in Reval and Nyen in those towns, but to wait until Narva for payment on the rest of the cargo.[4] The authorities considered this would only lead to fraud, and refused the petitions.

[1] *Soom*, 153—156, The Governor General of Ingria to K. of Sw. 3/4/1694, Livonica II, 186, RA.

[2] See below, p. 95.

[3] von Stiernman, *Kongl. Bref*, etc. V, 765. John Robinson's memorandum 14th Oct. 1698 and K. of Sw.'s reply, Memoranda and notes of Eng. Embassies 1591—1692. K. of Sw. to Leijonbergh 15/2/1699 with enclosures, Dipl.Angl. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 13/12/1698, 25/5, 7/9/1699, RA.

[4] Narva Magistrates to K. of Sw. 29/6/1683, Livonica II, 206, RA. Edmund Poley's memorandum on the 'grievances' of the English in Narva, Memoranda and notes of Eng. Embassies 1591—1692, Dipl.Angl. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 17/1/1689, RA.

In this way, too, English trade within the Gulf of Finland was concentrated on Narva.

From the tariff point of view, Riga was slower than the Estonian and Ingrian staple towns in enjoying the benefits of the favourable Swedish tariff policy towards transit-goods. It was only after 1676, when the Russian trade became the monopoly of Lüders and Wesseling, native Riga merchants, that the transit-duty on Russian goods was put as low as 1½ % of their value. The object of this low duty was to attract back to Riga the goods from the Smolensk area, which had recently been ceded to Russia by the Poles. It is true that the transit-duty was raised in 1691, when the Russian trade was opened to all the Riga burghers, but only to 2½ %.

The real trade area served by Riga was however that of Polish Lithuania. It was not transit-duty but dues on goods transported by sea which affected the supply to and from this area. In the middle of the 1680's, the English factors in Riga asked for the high tariff to be lowered by a sixth, a benefit already enjoyed by the Dutch and Swedes.[1]

In 1688 the state export duty (the *licent*) on timber was finally lowered to 4 %, but it was raised for other goods. For instance, three times as much duty was paid in Riga on a shippund ('*skeppund*') of pure hemp as in Narva.[2] At the end of the century there were complaints in Riga that the port charges for a ship with a tonnage of 150 lasts came to almost a quarter of the *licent* duty.[3] It was therefore obvious that the customs policy made Riga a less inviting town than Narva, from which no complaints had been received about the customs duty either from the English or the native burghers.

[1] The latter paid certain customs duties in the current coinage, while the English were compelled to make the same payments in Albert thalers. U. Handrack, *Der Handel der Stadt Riga im 18. Jahrhundert*, Jena 1932, 60. J. Kleintjes, "Relations between Latvia and Holland: XIII—XIX Centuries", *Baltic and Scandinavian Countries* IV (1938), 312.

[2] For *licent* tariffs, see especially Extract aff den Rijgischke Licent Taxan etc. (Excerpt of the Riga duty tariffs etc.), Customs and tariff account of the Baltic Provinces 33, Kammararkivet.

[3] Jensch, *Der Handel Rigas*, 119 ff. G. Wittrock, *Karl XI's förmyndares finanspolitik* etc. 1668—1672 [The Finance policy etc. of Charles XI's guardians]. Skr. utg. K. Hum. Vet. Samf. Upps. 19:1, Uppsala 1917, 81 ff. Marperger, *Swedischer Kauffmann* etc., 313 ff. von Stiernman, *Kongl. Bref* etc., IV, 158, 643, 1036; V, 288. English merchants in Riga to the Governor General of Livonia, Krister Horn (undated), Baltic committees 1684—86, Livonica II, 497. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 10/2/1674, 24/5/1676, RA. Sw. B. of T. and Treasury to the Sw. General Customs Administrator 3/2, 16/3, 1/7/1684, Alphabetically arranged extracts, etc., from correspondence and resolutions 1577—1700, Arch. of the Sw. General Customs Board.

III

Finally, Narva had yet another advantage highly valued by the English there; they enjoyed the right of free religious worship which the Dutch, in a similar position, had at first vainly sought in Riga. The English in Narva were granted this right on December 16th, 1684. This step was the more remarkable as the question of religious worship of foreigners was discussed in Sweden proper at the same time. Sperling had eagerly recommended the granting of this privilege, pointing out to the Swedish government the importance of the English to the city's Russian trade. According to him, every Swedish patriot should long to destroy the Archangel traffic. Nor should the Englishmen's religious worship cause annoyance, since it would be in English and for Englishmen only. In a long statement, the Lutheran superintendent in Narva, Johannes Gezelius, also supported these special privileges. The English colony called upon Charles Thirlby, who was appointed by the Bishop of London, to be their preacher. The services took place in a private house called 'the English Church'.[1] One is struck by the commercial policy behind this departure from the official and strictly Lutheran church policy within the confines of the Swedish Church. When John Robinson, the English minister in Stockholm, protested against the attempt to drive English factors out of Gothenburg and Stockholm, the Swedish government was able to point to the fact that the English in Narva enjoyed greater freedom of trade and worship than any other nation. From this point of view the brisk English trade in Narva has a very special interest.

3. *The English Tar Supply and the Swedish Monopolistic Policy*

> 'The reason is that now and for several years last part there is a [Tar] company erected at Stockholm, who in consideration of a certain summe of money to the King have the sole power of buying & selling that Commodity as also of Pitch, whereas formerly before this Company, we had the freedom of an open market and bought it for less than half the present price.'
>
> Gilbert Heathcote to the Board of Trade, Sept. 30th, 1700.

To the English, perhaps the most irritating aspect of Swedish commercial policy was the concentration of tar and pitch, Finland's most important

[1] Gov. Gen. of Ingria to K. of Sw. 14/11/1684, 24/9/1685, Livonica II, 186; 9/8/1688, Livonica II, 188, Note to Leijoncrona, the resident in London, Robinson's memorandum 21/2/1695. Memoranda and notes of Engl. Embassies 1693—1730 with Negotiations 1680—1700, Dipl.Angl.

exports, in the hands of a monopoly company. This had happened in 1648, when a newly-formed joint-stock company had been entrusted with the export of these forest products, which came from the area north of a line between Stockholm and Nyen. The existence of the tar company was a permanent thorn in in the flesh to English interests: the company's price policy aimed at limiting the quantity, with the object of keeping the price level as high as possible. The fight between the company's directors in Stockholm and the English factors there finally amounted to a question of agent's profits. The company had previously had its own agent in London, and the object of its export policy was to transport the tar and pitch to English harbours in its own ships and to arrange the sale there through its own agent. The company's internal strength was originally based on having amongst its shareholders a combination of Stockholm merchants and courtiers. At the beginning of the 1670's, Joseph Verden, the English envoy, described the Tar Company as the counterpart of the English East India Company. The shares, he says, were divided between merchants who knew trade methods and nobles who had the ear of the King.[1] Externally, the company's position rested on the fact that Sweden had a greater production monopoly on tar and pitch than on any other goods. Attempts were made to exploit this production monopoly both by the Swedish merchants with an eye to profit and by the Swedish politicians in the game of power politics.[2]

In the 1650's Englishmen in Stockholm began to appear as tar buyers. This was in marked contrast to the export to Holland, which was entirely administered by the company's directors. Conflict between the English buyers and the Stockholm directors was therefore likely. The English Government resolutely supported its own merchants; the supply of pitch and tar for the needs of the Navy was a state concern. The Swedish Government's attitude wavered. On several occasions the Tar Company advanced large sums to the exchequer; it had influential friends at court, but the discon-

[1] Undated memorandum on the tar trade received 1/4/1672, Coventry Papers LXVIII. Cf. *Cal.S.P.,Dom.*, 1672, 263. The memorandum (or rather a copy of it) has obviously been used by J. Williams, *A Discourse relating to the trade* etc., 87 ff. (in *A General Treatise of Money-exchanges* etc., London 1707), which gives the same views and information concerning the Swedish tar monopoly.

[2] For the tar monopoly, see O. Fyhrvall, *Bidrag till svenska handelslagstiftningens historia* I. *Tjärhandelskompanierna.* [A contribution to the history of Swedish commercial legislation I: The Tar Companies]. Hist.Bibl. 7, Stockholm 1880; and A. Hallberg, "Tjärexport och tjärhandelskompanierna under stormaktstiden" [Tar export and the tar companies during Sweden's great power period]. *Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier* 34, Helsingfors 1959, 86—190 (and other sources in the above).

tent felt amongst the producers — the peasants of Finland and Norrland — and amongst the intermediary agents — the burghers in Finnish and Norrland towns who were compelled to deliver the tar to Stockholm — could not always be appeased. In addition, the tar trade was of great importance in foreign policy. It was true that there was no further risk of Amsterdam's replacing Stockholm as a staple town for tar — the English had themselves seen to this by prohibiting the import of pitch and tar from Holland (Act of Frauds, 1662). But it was difficult to set aside the English petitions that the Admiralty purveyors should be allowed to make purchases in Stockholm through its own agents.[1] The Swedish attitude to the monopoly question therefore varied according to market conditions, as the English diplomats and merchants were to learn by bitter experience.

In the trade negotiations of the 1660's, the English demanded the abolition of the monopoly. This certainly originated from the merchants but fell on good soil amongst the statesmen.[2] The latter did, it is true, understand the Swedish monopoly policy better. The Secretary of State, Henry Coventry, for instance, who was very familiar with Swedish affairs, pointed out to his colleague, Lord Arlington, that it was necessary to control tar-distillation in Sweden: otherwise the forests would be destroyed, there would be overproduction of tar and prices would fall. Coventry had learnt the Swedish arguments for monopolizing the tar trade when he was in Sweden.[3] Yet it was neither the work of the diplomats nor the effect of opinion at home which brought the Tar Company to its knees in 1672: financial troubles compelled its liquidization.[4] But from the ashes of the old there at once rose a new company, which had to some extent the same interests and directors.

I

While the old Tar Company was in its death-throes in the spring of 1672, the English envoy Joseph Verden was staying in Stockholm. One of Verden's tasks was to buy 1000 lasts of pitch and tar on behalf of the English Crown.

[1] See above, p. 68.

[2] See p. 31 note 1. Complaints by the Eastland Company about the Swedish tar monopoly: S.P.,For. 95/12, f. 91—92 and C.O. 389/1, f. 30 ff. The Swedish reply reported by *Gerentz*, 48.

[3] Coventry to Lord Arlington 14/2/1672, Coventry Papers LXV.

[4] *Hallberg*, 120 ff. Unsigned memorandum "Concerning the Trade of Pitch & Tarr in Sweden 1672", S.P.,For. 95/8, p. 147 ff. For the memorandum's origin, see Sir Edward Wood's secretary, William Allestree, to Joseph Williamson 19/10/1672, S.P.,For. 95/8. The memorandum is not in Allestree's writing.

There was a good precedent in the Scottish burgher James Tempel's (Timpel) tar contract with the Swedish Government. In payment for a loan, Tempel had been given royal permission to ship out 1000 lasts a year for three years. In May, Jacob Magnus de la Gardie, the Chancellor, promised Verden the desired amount in exchange for a quick conclusion of the bargain.[1] At the same time a daring plan was hatched in England: to try to turn the Swedish tar monopoly into an English one. This was just before the conflict with Holland, and the intention was to cut the Dutch off from the tar supply. Verden, however, advised against all such measures: the Tar Company's annual exports amounted to 6000 lasts, of which 4/5 were tar and 1/5 pitch; it would cost the English about £ 40.000 to buy up this quantity. It would, in addition, be necessary to oust the tar from South Sweden, Norway and Russia: the Dutch imported 1000 lasts from Archangel and also kept 10000 lasts in store. The Swedish monopoly policy over the last decades, with its constant rise in prices, had increased the production of tar in areas which were not controlled by the Tar Company.[2]

After the outbreak of the Dutch war, Verden was succeeded in Stockholm by Sir Edward Wood.[3] His task was to continue where Coventry and Verden had left off. Sir Edward's instructions contained, amongst other things, an order to procure the 1000 lasts which Verden had been commissioned to arrange.[4] The matter was undertaken by the merchant Samuel Sowton and by Johan Strother, his partner. They contracted for an annual delivery of 1200 lasts of tar and 200 of pitch for 1673—75.[5] At the same time, they obtained from the Tar Company the sole right to supply the English market. Payment was to be made by bills of exchange on Amsterdam, to be cashed by Philip Botte, the company's agent there. Smooth co-operation thus seemed to be developing between the English and the Swedish monopolists. But there was no corresponding confidence on the Swedish side. Messrs. Sowton & Strother had given credit to their business friends in the Tar Company and in 1677 they still had important claims on it. The English Privy Council therefore ordered Sir Edward to intervene with the Swedish Government.[6]

[1] J. Verden to Lord Arlington, May, 1672, S.P.,For. 95/8, Henry Coventry to Lord Arlington 1/5, 8/5/1672, Coventry Papers LXV.

[2] Undated memorandum on the tar trade, received 1/4/1672, Coventry Papers LXVIII.

[3] See above, p. 59.

[4] *Cal.S.P.,Dom.*, May 18th to September 30th 1672, 321.

[5] For 1674 all 1400 lasts were of tar.

[6] *Hallberg*, 125. Civil Acts 89/1678, Stockholms City Arch. P.C. 2/66, p. 9. 'Some Reflexions upon England's Trade with Sweden. Anno 1677', S.P.,For. 95/11, f. 17 ff., 20 (William Allestree's writing). *Cal.S.P., Dom.*, 1677—1678, 108, 462.

The envoy had other reasons for taking up the tar question. During the winter, the Tar Company had offered to sell tar to the English factors in Stockholm, but these — amongst whom is mentioned Urban Hall, Junior — lacked both the capital and the authority from their employers in England. They were therefore unable immediately to accept the consignment, with the result that it went instead to the Dutch for £ 5.000. When the shipping season began, the English ships that came to Stockholm were unable to get a cargo of tar in return. Instead, the Tar Company tried themselves to sell tar and pitch on the English market through a cover in London, the merchant Jacob Davies. This was arranged through Botte, the Company's agent in Amsterdam, so it is probable that there was Dutch capital behind the idea. Sir Edward now complained to the highest authority. The Swedish Board of Trade recommended his request, pointing out how important it was to have a counterweight to the Dutch. The Government's resolution also took the same line: Englishmen should be given the right to buy and ship out tar. When the Councillors justified their point of view to the King, who was absent on campaign, they found it desirable to point out what a great advantage the English trade was to the kingdom and its inhabitants. According to Sir Edward, the Tar Company and the Dutch put up a hard struggle, but the attitude taken by the President of the Swedish Board of Trade, Councillor Kurck, decided the outcome. If the Tar Company had not been browbeaten, he adds in his report to Henry Coventry, the sugar and tobacco companies would have followed in its footsteps. The following year Sir Edward was nevertheless again having the same trouble with the Tar Company. In the spring the English factors were able to buy up tar and pitch, but when the Dutch ships came in this came to a halt.[1] The powerful position held by the Dutch in the tar market was probably because of their financial superiority. In giving generous credit they had an excellent instrument for ensuring continued delivery.

The Swedish monopoly policy was most successful during the complications caused by war, with its great demand for naval stores and its high prices.[2] With the coming of the 1680's and general peace, the monopolization of the exports did not help to keep up the price level. Instead of still stricter reg-

[1] *Hallberg*, 125—126. Wood to Joseph Williamson 22/7, 21/8/1677, S.P., For. 95/10. Wood to Henry Coventry 17/7, 10/8, 21/8, 31/8, 20/9/1677, 20/10/1678, Coventry Papers LXVI. Wood's memorandum 25/7, 26/7/1677, Memoranda and notes of Eng. Embassies 1591—1692, Dipl.Angl. (the latter one also in Trade and Shipping 1, Kammararkivet). Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 11/8/1677, RA. Government to K. of Sw. 18/8/1677, RA.

[2] For prices of tar and pitch in England, see W. Beveridge, *Prices and Wages in England from the twelfth to the nineteenth century*, London (Oxford) 1939.

ulations so as to survive the crisis caused by peace, the Swedish Government completely altered course. In 1682 the Tar Company's charter was not renewed. Politics also contributed to the company's downfall. The monopoly companies had been one of the subjects at issue between Holland and Sweden in the peace-talks of 1679 at Nijmegen.[1] At the ratification of the peace and trade treaty, Sweden had to promise, besides other commercial concessions, to abolish the privileges of the companies;[2] and the following year pressure was also brought to bear in the same direction by Warwick, the English envoy.[3] The actions of the foreign powers were accompanied by the grumbling dissatisfaction of the provinces with the hated Stockholm-directed company.

II

Plans for a new tar company were again stimulated by the outbreak of the war in 1688. The 'Tar Trade Association' was formed the following year on almost the same principles as its predecessors. Its organisation was even better, since the tar from the south, which accounted for 1/4 to 1/5 of the total exports from Sweden, was now covered by the privileges. The company was obliged to purchase 8000 lasts of tar annually. The big Stockholm wholesalers saw a chance of lining their pockets at the expense of those engaged in the war, but this was nevertheless to prove unexpectedly difficult, owing to the ruthlessness with which the trade war was waged.[4]

The proclamation by the Maritime Powers forbidding trade with France was coupled with other English measures. The old English plan to buy up ship-building materials, chiefly tar, reared its head again. Sweden would be allowed free trade with France in exchange for allowing the allies, England and Holland, first right to buy naval stores. In 1690, Duncombe, the new English envoy, concluded a contract with the tar directors for the delivery of a total of 5000 lasts of pitch and tar. At the same time, the Tar Trade Association engaged not to sell tar and pitch to other buyers before June 1st; but as they nevertheless made some minor sales before the end of the period, the English revoked the contract, accusing the tar directors of having broken it.[5]

[1] See above, p. 34.

[2] Landberg, *Den svenska utrikespolitiken* [Swedish foreign policy], 219. *Hoffstedt*, 377 ff.

[3] See p. 38, note 3.

[4] *Hallberg*, 130 ff.

[5] Clark, *The Dutch Alliance*, 153. Duncombe to Lord Nottingham 5/3, 12/3, 19/3, 22/3, 26/3, 2/4, 5/4, 19/4, 19/11/1690, S.P.,For. 95/13. Nottingham to Duncombe 15/4/1690, S.P.,For. 104/153.

The directors in turn accused the English of not daring to take the great risks involved in this giant operation. There is reason to doubt whether the English offer was seriously meant. It was perhaps only a move in the campaign to hinder and delay deliveries to France. Nottingham's letter certainly indicates that the royal hand was behind the suggestion. The Swedish authorities were irresolute for quite different reasons: if the contract were fulfilled, there would be a great risk of antagonizing France, on whom Sweden depended for supplies of salt and wine. From various points of view, the most acceptable solution seemed to be an active Swedish trade in tar and pitch. But the government discussions showed how fear of war-time privateers put a damper on the plans for the Swedes to transport the tar to the buyers' ports. In addition, the English threatened to treat the tar as contraband.[1]

The English purchase of tar, unlike the Dutch, was overwhelmingly confined to Sweden, especially to Stockholm.[2] According to contemporary sources, England's annual import of tar and pitch amounted to 3000 lasts between 1693—95, of which 3/4 came from Sweden. In such circumstances the Swedish Tar Company could continue to try and exploit its position in the English market as long as the war lasted. In the spring of 1695, for instance, the tar directors employed the old tactics of refusing to sell to the English buyers in Stockholm.[3]

This was probably due to an attempt to push up prices. Even at the beginning of the war the prices of tar and pitch were high — they almost doubled after the outbreak of war. The increase in both Swedish and English duties contributed to the rise, but it was certainly chiefly due to the increased demand, increased transport risks, and fewer offers on account of the war and the renewed Swedish monopoly of the tar trade. After the peace of 1697 it immediately became a buyer's market, but the consequences of the Great Northern War again altered the market situation.[4] The Russian and American. tar then made its entrance into the markets of Western Europe.

[1] *Thyrén*, 109 ff. Proceedings of the Swedish Council 22/3, 8/4, 25/11/1690, Proceedings of the Swedish Council, (miscellaneous minutes) 1689—92, RA.

[2] The Dutch were already buying tar in Archangel. *Hallberg*, 93—94, 137 ff. Lindhielm, Governor of the province of Viborg, to K. of Sw. 3/4/1699. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 23/1/1700, RA.

[3] John Robinson to Lord Shrewsbury 6/4/1695, S.P.,For. 95/14.

[4] *Hallberg*, 137 ff. *Ehrman*, 64, 485. Navy Board to Admiralty 12/7/1704, Adm. 1/3599. Price alterations 1697—1700 (the Navy Board's buying prices) can be followed in Table 5.

4. *Brandenburg and Denmark—Norway as Commercial Alternatives to Sweden*

> 'These are most of them such gross & brute wares as employ many thousands of our people to convert them into Manufactures for the use of our Shipping & other occasions . . . If the projects for getting Pitch & Tarr from New England, setting up Iron works in Norway & being supplyd with Hemp & Flax from Ireland were brought to perfection, we might then do with the Swedish Commoditys as we would, but till that be, I see not how we can that way come to rights with them.'
>
> John Robinson to Whitehall, Nov. 19th, 1698.

The great Brandenburg port of Königsberg was flanked by Danzig and Riga. It was therefore a dangerous rival from the point of view of both cities, and its potential trade area covered their own traditional trading district. Despite the fact that the three towns chiefly based their inland communications on their individual river systems — the Niemen, the Dvina and the Vistula —, there was still competition for the marginal belts between the river areas. Since 1651, for instance, Brandenburg's tariff policy had stopped, by means of high duties, Danzig's supply from Lithuania of heavy goods which had gone by sea via the Niemen and the Pregel. The purpose behind the electoral policy was to make Königsberg the centre for the whole area lying behind it. Its shafts were therefore directed both against its own non-staple towns, such as Memel, and against its mighty foreign rivals, Riga and Danzig. In 1681, for instance, Riga sent a warning to Stockholm about Brandenburg plans for forming a hemp company directed against the hemp trade in Danzig and Riga.[1]

I

The official trade relations between England and Brandenburg were settled by a ten-year treaty in 1661. This gave the English the position of 'the most favoured nation' from the point of view of duties.[2] Otherwise, their freedom of movement in Königsberg was curtailed by similar restrictions to those in the other Baltic staple towns, i.e. they were forbidden to stay the winter or to trade with other foreigners.[3] The electoral com-

[1] Jensch, *Der Handel Rigas*, 118. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 25/2/1681, RA.

[2] Th. von Moerner (ed.), *Kurbrandenburgs Staatsverträge von 1601 bis 1700*, Berlin 1867, 254—255. *Brinckmann*, 251.

[3] The English agent in Danzig, Francis Sanderson, to Williamson 25/5/1675, S.P., For., 88/4, ditto S.P., For., 88/15, 11/9/1677. Council of Trade and Plantations, minutes 17/8/1676, C.O. 391/1.

mercial policy was friendly to foreigners in principle, but its application was as subject to whims and as dependent on the conjunctures as in the other Baltic ports. The Elector's plans to provide a place of refuge in his ports for English nonconformist merchants and interlopers from London and Bristol produced few concrete results. His efforts to improve the position of foreigners where trading privileges were concerned always met with opposition from his own merchant corporations. Frederick William's death in 1688 only led to an intensification of the burghers' attitude towards the application of the laws. In 1692 the old laws about length of stay and trade between foreigners were revived. The next year the English and Scottish factors complained that whereas previously they had in fact been able to buy goods from others besides the burghers, now they were compelled to buy from them and to sell to them. Thus the authorities' policy, favourable to foreigners in principle, was neutralised by the egoism of the burghers.[1] There were also economic factors working against the plans cherished by the town's ruler for out-distancing Danzig and Riga; Danzig had long been securely established on the import side as an entrepôt for the great Polish market and, on the export side, Riga could offer high-class naval stores. 'Riga hemp' and 'Riga masts' were already well-known trademarks. From a transport point of view, too, Königsberg was in a worse position than her rivals in the east. It was only when the Friedrichsgraben canal was built in 1696 that the town's water communications with her main artery, the Niemen, were improved. Königsberg could thus provide no serious threat to Riga's and Danzig's domination of the export and import trade. But its possibilities as a market drew a disquieting amount of trade and foreign capital there.

In 1690, the long-expired trade treaty between England and Brandenburg was renewed by a treaty of alliance,[2] which ushered in a new era of political activity in the relations between the two. England attempted to free herself

[1] Rachel, *Die Handels-, Zoll- und Akzisepolitik*, 365 ff. 373 ff., 428 ff., 795. H. Rachel, "Handel und Handelsrecht von Königsberg in Preussen im 16.—18. Jahrhundert". *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte* 22 (1909), 99—126. *Urkunden und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Kurfürsten Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg*, 21. Band, herausgegeben von F. Hirsch, Berlin 1915, 339 ff. K.-H. Ruffman, "Engländer und Schotten in den Seestädten Ost- und Westpreussens". *Zeitschr. für Ostforschung* 7 (1958), 21—22, *Brinckmann*, 465. Resolutions of the Elector concerning the English in Königsberg 31/12/1680, 28/3/1681, 6/1 1682, 12/22 March 1693, Etats—Ministerium, Abt. 74, Pakete 2298, Staatliches Archivlager, Göttingen.

[2] The treaties of 1661 and 1690, published in *von Moerner*.

from her extreme dependence on ports in Swedish territory for her increasingly vital imports of naval stores. The crisis in Anglo-Swedish commercial relations became acute in 1696—97, when the English factors' freedom of movement was threatened in ports in Sweden proper.[1]

II

In 1696 the problem of naval stores was one of the first problems to be dealt with by the recently formed Board of Trade. The result of the Swedish restrictions was that the English began seriously to look round for other ports and production districts from which to get iron, copper, hemp, flax, pitch and tar. In 1696 'the Swedish Merchants' recommended "That Weyer and Copper may be had from Hamburgh, Pitch and Tarr from Norway which may with care be there made as good as that from Sweden".[2] The merchants were uneasy and desired parliamentary intervention and reprisals against Sweden.[3] A memorandum from this group of merchants sums up as follows, showing what they regarded as being the intention behind the Swedish policy:" . . . that the English will be altogether deprived of their Trade into Sweden, which will be driven by the Sweeds themselves, who being once become the sole Importers of Naval Stores, — may impose upon the Nation as they shall so fitt, especially in time of Wars."[4] Yet, according to Leijoncrona, some people wished for an amicable settlement with Sweden and a new trade treaty, whereas the eyes of others were turned towards Ireland and the Colonies as potential suppliers. William Blathwayt, the influential Secretary, even had hopes of the West Indies' power to produce naval stores, "which will make the Northern Crowns more reasonable to us . . ."[5] As we have seen, it was just at this time that there were great expectations from the American colonies and to a certain extent from Ireland, and a number of attempts were made to start production.[6]

But people's eyes were at the same time turned towards the other Baltic powers — to Sweden's political enemies and commercial rivals. In 1692 the Brandenburg envoy in London, von Dankelmann, had already succeeded in concluding a hemp contract with the English Admiralty, and the same

[1] See above, p. 66.

[2] B. of T., Journals, 1696, C.O. 391/9 (pp. 14, 35, 37, 44, 112, 163). The 'Swedish Merchants' memorandum 9/10/1696, C.O. 389/15, pp. 34—37.

[3] Leijoncrona to K. of Sw. 3/12/1697, Dipl.Angl.

[4] The 'Swedish Merchants" memorandum 21/6/1698, C.O. 389/16, pp. 37—47.

[5] *Jacobsen*, 329—330.

[6] Cf. above, p. 17 ff.

year three ships with samples of hemp left Königsberg. It was typical that the English Admiralty requested that the hemp should be of the same quality as that from Riga. It was on this account that the control *(brack)* in Königsberg was reorganised. Despite this, the English trade agents in the town considered that the contracted consignment could only be delivered on the condition that a trade organisation was built up in Königsberg similar to that in Riga. This dealt with travelling agents, advance payment and delivery agreements. The Brandenburg government made a still more far-reaching proposal after the English factors' position in the Swedish cities seemed in 1696 to have become untenable; Königsberg was offered as a place of residence for the English in Riga. The Brandenburg envoy promised Trumbull deliveries of hemp and tar from Prussian territory. This trade negotiation was chiefly levelled at the Swedish city of Riga and its flourishing English trade. The Board of Trade, however, acted in a very reserved manner towards the Brandenburg plan. Had they perhaps come up against certain vested interests?[1]

III

Denmark, too, scented a chance of profiting from the deteriorating relations between England and Sweden. The Danish government, through its London representative, offered those Englishmen who had been driven out of Sweden the same privileges in Denmark and Norway as those they had lost in Sweden. The offer included religious toleration and also the duty-free export of iron for a number of years. In return for this concession, the merchants were to put the Norwegian iron mines in working order at their own expense. After the expiration of the concession period, the mines would be handed over to Denmark, but the export duty should continue to be kept at such a low level as would enable Norwegian iron to be sold in the English market at a price lower than, or the same as, the Swedish. There were also negotiations between the two governments in 1696 over deliveries of hemp, flax, masts, oak-planks and tar. The Baltic merchants in London seemed interested, but they wished to know what quantities might be involved and what privileges the agents would receive: free import of woollen goods seemed desirable to them. There was an optimistic attitude towards the possibilities; "As our trade to Swedeland hath increased within the Memory of some yet living, in Iron from so small a Beginning as 3 to 400 Tuns p Ann. — to 10

[1] Rachel, *Die Handels-, Zoll- und Akzisepolitik*, 439—441. B. of T., Journals 24/12, 28/12/1696, C.O. 391/9. B. of T. to Trumbull 28/12/1696, C.O. 389/15, p. 38.

or 12000 Tuns as now of late imported annually, and in other goods proportionable to the great advantage of that Kingdom so if Encouragen[t] bee given by the King of Denmark that a Beginning bee made to this trade, it is possible that in a course of a year the like encraze may happen . . .''[1]

The English negotiations between both Brandenburg and Denmark could not escape notice in Sweden. Leijoncrona in London was extremely well informed and was able to send detailed information to his government. He was also able to report to Stockholm on the experiment with synthetic tar and on the attempt to get naval stores from the American mainland and the West Indies.[2] There was indeed no reason for the English to make a secret of these matters. On the contrary, both the negotiations with the Baltic powers and the eager attempts to start the production of important naval stores at home and in the colonies could be used as weapons in the lengthy discussions with Sweden over the position of the factors and the renewal of the trade treaty.[3] Concrete results did not, however, come from the attempt to play the small resources of Brandenburg and Denmark-Norway against those of the Swedish realm. On the other hand, the intensified trade connections between England and Russia in her 'Transition period' were of greater importance from a long-term point of view.

5. *Russia Comes into the Foreground*

> 'And for as much yo[r] Ma[tie] during y[e] wars w[th] the Dutch hath been put to great Straites, for want of Navall Stores, w[ch] have been then bought at vast Rates. That yo[r] Ma[tie] may be pleased to cause Inspection to be made of what Quantity of Tarr Hemp & Cable-yarne, may be sufficient for y[e] supply of yo[r] Ma[ts] Navy; And to contract w[th] y[e] sd Emperor that all such Tarr Hemp & Cable-yarne may be delivered to yo[r] Ma[ts] Agents there yearly and every yeare at a constant and certaine Rate'.
>
> John Hebdon to Whitehall, 1676.

One of the key figures in English policy in the Baltic sphere around 1670 was Henry Coventry, who was twice envoy to Sweden and later Secretary of State for the North. Material is preserved amongst his papers on the

[1] M. Lane, "The relations between England and the Northern Powers, 1689—1697. Part I. Denmark." *Trans.R.Hist.Soc.* 3rd ser., vol. V, London 1911, 183. B. of T., Journals 3/8, 27/11/1696, C.O. 391/9. The correspondence relating to this in C.O. 389/15, pp. 1—11, and C.O. 388/6, A 2, A 7, A 16.

[2] Leijoncrona to K. of Sw. 19/2, 3/12/1697, Dipl.Angl.

[3] See above, p. 49, 71.

Russian trade and the Anglo-Swedish relations.[1] The author of 'As for drawing the Archangel trade into the Baltic' lists the English terms for co-operation with Sweden over this: Sweden should fix lower duties for them and they should have preference over other nations in the Baltic ports; through Swedish and Polish pressure in Russia, the English should be given the same special privileges for traffic through the Baltic as in Archangel. In addition, the English demanded guarantees of freedom of worship in the Baltic ports. The author of another memorandum, however, is suspicious of the Swedish plan to direct the Russian trade to the Baltic, chiefly to Narva. England, he says, should negotiate with the Russians herself; it seems dangerous for her to tie herself to Sweden, who can bring trade in the Baltic to a standstill. If the privileges possessed by the Muscovy or Eastland Companies prevent direct contact with the Russian market, then Parliament can change or annul them. Each memorandum illustrates a particular line of English commercial policy with regard to the Baltic market, and chiefly to the Russian sector of it.

I

The increasing activity of English commercial policy in the middle of the 1670's in East Europe was conditioned by the war situation. English policy tried to take advantage of the chance offered to English trade in Baltic waters during the war-time market conditions of 1675—79. Ambassadors were sent to both Russia and Poland. The envoy to Russia, John Hebdon Junior, went by the direct route to Moscow via the Swedish city of Riga. But nothing was gained by Hebdon's journey. He was, moreover, travelling as much on his own private affairs as the Government's; his father had been an important Russia Merchant and Hebdon was anxious for the Russians to give him a state import contract for tobacco and an export contract for naval stores.[2]

Laurence Hyde, Master of the Robes and Ambassador to Poland, was instructed to assist in rectifying the 'grievances' of the English in Danzig. When he had investigated the situation, however, Hyde was able to report that the English trade agents were well treated and had *de facto*, if not *de jure*, greater privilegies in the city than any other nation. Thus, for different reasons, there was little that could be done to further English trade interests

[1] Coventry Papers LXVIII (memoranda unsigned and undated).

[2] *Lubimenko*, 247 ff. John Hebdon's memoranda, instructions and dispatches in S.P., For. 91/3 and 104/118.

in either Russia or Poland prior to the great upheavals in Eastern Europe around 1700.[1]

II

There had been some sporadic attempts after Hebdon's mission to encourage relations with Russia, but without result. The well-known Russian trade regulations of 1667 sharply curtailed the opportunities foreigners had to trade. By it the English were deprived of the right to settle in Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov and other trade centres. Attempts were made in 1681, in connection with Prince Potemkin's embassy to England, to regain the territory lost by English trade in Russia. The English merchants wished to get back their privileges of free trade.[2] From the war years in the 1690's onwards, there was a really serious interest in Russia's potentialities as a source of supply for England's strategically important naval stores. Those who favoured such trade were stimulated by the 1696 crisis in relations with Sweden.

English policy now began to follow along lines which had already been exposed. Inherent in it was an opposition to Sweden and an attempt to break the impending Swedish monopoly of naval stores. Thomas Cletscher, the Swedish metallurgist, who wrote about his journey to England in 1696, gave an account of the propaganda in Parliament for increasing Anglo-Russian trade. He described how Russia was well provided with forests, rivers and iron ore. The iron industry had good prospects. Pitch and tar could be produced in abundance. It would be an advantage for England to be supplied with these goods from a country other than Sweden. It would,

[1] *Cal.S.P.,Dom.* 1676—77, 219—220. P.C. 2/65, p. 284. Laurence Hyde's memoranda, instructions and dispatches in S.P.,For. 88/14 (especially Hyde to Whitehall 1/11 Aug. 1676) and in S.P.,For. 114/18. Cf. also petition of merchants in Danzig, 1676, C.O. 389/3, p. 89 ff.) and Council of Trade and Plantations, minutes 10/7, 17/8/1676, C.O. 391/1. It was not until 1706 that the English succeeded in exploiting the situation created by the Great Northern War and definitely legalized their favourable position in Danzig through a trade treaty. But the ancient English demand for the right to trade with other foreigners and for freedom of movement on the roads and rivers in Danzig's trading area was categorically refused. On the other hand, they now officially secured the right of religious worship (Art. IX). H. Fiedler, "Danzig und England". *Zeitschr. des Westpreussischen Geschichtsvereins* 68 (1928), 122—124. J. Papritz, "Dietrich Lilie und das Englische Haus", ibid. 182. H. Bauer, W. Millack, and others, *Danzigs Handel in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, Danzig 1925, 157—158.

[2] *Lubimenko*, 251. William Blathwayt to the Governor of the Muscovy Company 29/11/1681. Charles II to Czar Feodor 12/4/1682, S.P.,For., 104/119.

according to the propaganda, be dangerous if England were obliged to limit herself to imports from Swedish harbours.[1]

At the same time, the Russia Company was attacked in Parliament for monopolizing trade in Russia. The Company of those days was a small and exclusive group of merchants who monopolized the trade to Archangel and who sold licences to the Eastland merchants trading in Narva. In 1694 there was an unsuccessful opening attack by the Eastland Company to throw the company open at a low admission fee. The House of Commons rejected the bill by 120 votes to 100. The attack was renewed three years later.[2] Nathanael Tench, the Governor of the Eastland Company, pointed out in Parliament, "That Russia abounds with store of Masts, Timber, Firrplank, Hemp, Pitch, Tarr and other Naval and useful commodities, which we might be from thence cheaper supplyd than from Prussia, Denmark, Sweden and Norway".[3] Tench described Russia, who could not engage in a sea war, as an ideal source of supply compared with the other countries mentioned. In addition, the freight would go to England, as Russia was without a merchant fleet. At the same time another useful argument was brought into the discussion; the inaction of the Russia Company had left the trade open to the Dutch, who had contracted for the whole of the Russian exports of masts and tar. During Czar Peter's visit to London in 1698, a syndicate headed by Gilbert Heathcote had succeeded in obtaining a contract for the import of tobacco into Russia.[4] This time the Eastland Company was seconded by another city group — the Virginia merchants — who were interested in the tobacco trade. The holders of the tobacco contract, who represented at the same time the chief importers of naval stores, pointed out, "If this trade encouraged, we shall bring the great-

[1] T. Cletscher, 'Berättelse om de Europäiske Bergwerken år 1696' [An account of the European mines in 1696], 274—277, Arch. of the Board of Mines, RA. Cf. S. Rydberg, *Svenska studieresor till England under frihetstiden* [Swedish study tours to England during the Age of Liberty], Uppsala 1951, 149—150. *Several grievances of the English Merchants in their Trade into the Dominions of the King of Sweden* etc., BM, Tracts on commerce 816. m. 11.

[2] W. R. Scott, *The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720 II*, Cambridge 1912, 68—69.

[3] Eastland Merchants to B. of T. 26/11/1697, C.O. 389/15.

[4] E. Donnan, "Eighteenth-century English Merchants, Micajah Perry". *Journ. Econ. Bus.Hist.* IV (1931—32), 87—88. *Lipson*, 332—333. Micajah Perry and others to Board of Trade 11/8 etc., 1697, C.O. 391/10, p. 193, 417. *Reasons for Enlarging and Regulating the Trade to Russia and the Narve* (pamphlet), presented to Board of Trade by Micajah Perry and other Virginia Merchants, 4/2/1698, C.O. 388/6, B 69.

est part of our Naval stores from Russia in our own shipping when as now, we have almost all these Stores brought us from Sweden and in Sweeds Ships by w:[ch] this Nation suffers, Several ways . . ."[1] This united onslaught succeeded and the Russian trade was thrown open by a parliamentary resolution in 1699. The price of admission into the Russia Company was lowered. The combination of state and business interests had been too powerful for the little clique of Russia Merchants.

III

The English now had the choice between the American colonies and Russia as alternatives to Sweden. The Board of Trade's treatment of the problem in 1699 is indicative; "Their Lordships being informed, that two ships lately arrived from Russia with some Quantities of Pitch and Tar, Which Commodity has not usually been brought from thither. They resolved to suspend a while their Report upon the Earl of Bellmont's Proposals for bringing Naval Stores from New York, (which were Yesterday under consideration) untill they may be better informed, concerning this Trade of Pitch and Tar from Russia".[2] The outbreak of the Great Northern War in the early spring the following year to some extent dashed the hopes aroused by the new direct contacts with Russia via Archangel. In 1702, for instance, only 4 barrels of tar were received from Russia, but on the other hand the quantities of hemp and flax continually increased.[3] That year Whitehall was much disturbed by Swedish attempts to disrupt the promising trade with Archangel, "which being of great importance to the naval stores wee bring from there".[4]

There was no immediate fulfilment of the hopes entertained in particular of the Russian tar. England continued to depend on the Swedish deliveries of Stockholm tar for some years to come. Despite this, in 1703—1705 the

[1] Owners of the tobacco contract to B. of T., 1698 (C.O. 389/16, p. 138).

[2] B. of T., Journals 7/1, 10/1, 10/10/1699, 23/4, 27/5, 23/7/1700, C.O. 391/11, 391/12, 391/13.

[3] See below, p. 123, and also B. of T., Journals (C.O. 391/16, pp. 7, 64). Entry-books (C.O. 389/18, pp. 29, 36—37) and Correspondence (C.O. 388/9, F. 3/.) Cf. *House of Lords' Manuscripts.* New Series IV (1699—1707), London 1908, 83—85, 430—436.

[4] *Cal.S.P.,Dom.* 1702—1703, 33, 116. Hedges to Robinson 16/6/1702, S.P.,For., 104/153. Cf. N. F. Holm, "Kampen om ryska ishavsvägen på Karl XII:s tid" [The fight for the Russian arctic route in the time of Charles XII], *Forum Navale* 9, Uppsala 1948, 15 ff.

English Navy regarded their supply situation as extremely critical. The Swedes had a more complete monopoly of pitch and tar than they had of other naval stores. It was "the great tar crisis" which finallybrought forth rigorous measures to benefit deliveries from the colonies. For decades — and especially in wartime — the English buyers had been tyrannised by the great Swedish monopolists, the tar companies. But the downfall of the Swedish tar monopoly was not only brought about by the colonial tar but equally by the appearance in the market of a new European rival — Russia.[1]

[1] The importance of the import possibilites of tar and pitch from Russia in breaking the Swedish monopoly is discussed in Appendix II.

England and Sweden: Some Conclusions

I

The main European districts producing those bulk goods which were important to the English — such as iron, hemp, flax, tar, pitch and potash — lay in the vast areas which stretched from the Arctic Ocean in the north, through the Scandinavian forest belt, to the Russo-Polish plateau in the south. The production areas of Russia, Poland, Lithuania and Sweden's Baltic provinces were connected with the coastal towns — the transit ports — by river and sea routes. The Swedish conquests along the Baltic coast during the period of expansion between the 16th century and the middle of the 17th century put Sweden commercially in an excellent strategic position on the eastern arteries for traffic with the trade area; the tributaries of the Dvina, Lake Peipus and the Narova, the Neva and Lake Ladoga. Swedish commercial policy began to exploit this situation, as we have seen, after the conquest of the new provinces.

The rapid geographical expansion of England's direct trade in the Baltic after 1650 brought her into close contact with Sweden, at that time the leading Baltic power. One of the reasons for this was the combination of England's fast increasing economic potentialities and Sweden's coveted export articles — chiefly bar iron, but also tar and pitch from Finland. The second reason was Sweden's domination of the important Baltic hemp and flax ports of Riga and Narva. Thus the great Swedish plans for altering the course of Russian trade away from Archangel to the Baltic ports tallied with the perpetually increasing English demand for Baltic goods: hemp and flax from Russia and Poland, iron from Sweden and tar from Finland. The political importance of these kinds of goods was greater than their mere value: it was the strategically important naval stores, indispensable to the great sea powers, which were chiefly concerned. If we analyse the part played by bulk goods in English imports from the Baltic area, we therefore find a marked disproportion between the mere monetary value of England's trade with the whole of Northern Europe and its political and strategic importance.

The summary given below reminds us of how English imports of strategic bulk goods were distributed amongst the various areas of origin. At the same time it shows in concentrated form the share of each area in the total English imports from Northern Europe.

Total English imports from Northern Europe of iron, hemp, flax, potash, pitch and tar during 1699/1700 (average).[1]

	% distribution of total imports of iron, hemp, flax, potash, pitch and tar, amongst areas of origin:
'Sweden'	48.0
'Russia'	26.4
'East Country'	24.1
'Denmark-Norway'	1.5
Northern Europe	100.0

Thus 'Sweden', from a monetary aspect, answered for almost half of the imports of the five bulky staple goods, so that it was the most important import area from the English point of view. But only when we consider that part of the imports appearing in the trade statistics under 'East Country' went via Riga and those appearing under 'Russia' via Narva — both Swedish cities — do we realize Sweden's real share. Only then can one fully appreciate the part played by the commercial element in the official Anglo-Swedish relations during the 17th century.

II

Anyone who attempts to penetrate further into the early history of Anglo-Swedish trade relations is struck by obviously paradoxical facts. Official feelers were put out concerning trade almost a hundred years before there was direct trade of any importance between the two countries. It was only in the middle of the 17th century that middlemen were eliminated and that active English trade in Sweden got under way. It was at this time that the first really important trade treaties were concluded. But after 1674 nothing came of the continued attempts to conclude a treaty which would mutually control for decades to come the ever-increasing mercantile relations between the two countries.

The problem is presented in a nutshell by the preliminaries to the Anglo-Swedish trade relations.[2] When the official Anglo-Swedish contacts were

[1] For sources and exact figures, see Table 1.

[2] The oldest Anglo-Swedish political relations are described in I. Andersson, *Erik XIV:s engelska underhandlingar. Studier i svensk diplomati och handelspolitik.* [Erik XIV's negotiations with England. Studies in Swedish diplomacy and trade policy], publ. by Vet.-Soc. Lund 17, Lund 1935, 93 ff., 108 ff., 118 ff. Anglo-Swedish trade negotiations after 1650 can be followed, e.g., in S. Grauers's "Sverige och den

made in the middle of the 16th century on Sweden's initiative, commercial policy lay behind it. Gustav Vasa's intention was to by-pass the Hanseatic middlemen for West European goods, particularly those of Lübeck, by means of direct trade with England. Another aim was gradually added: to direct goods from the Russo-Polish market to the Swedish Baltic ports. Sweden, who lacked capital, thought that in the new sea and trade power of England she had found a partner who would help to control the stream of goods flowing to and from the Russian and Polish markets. Denmark's powerful position at that time in the Sound gave his successor, Erik XIV, the idea of developing Sweden's only western port — Elfsborg, at the mouth of the Göta river. Elfsborg was to become the staple town for Russian trade. Gothenburg, built on the site of Elfsborg, was still allotted this task well into the 17th century. English passiveness and Dutch progress in both the Arctic Ocean and the Baltic hindered these bold plans from the start. But throughout the new century Swedish statesmen still dreamt of turning the utilization of the Russo-Polish market into a source of Swedish wealth. Lübeck's place as a 'middleman' was taken by Holland, and it seemed vital that Sweden should make herself independent of Holland as a transit country for both her imports and exports. After 1648, the political centre of gravity undoubtedly slowly shifted westwards. Sweden at this time acquired a fast-growing direct export trade to England and thus adapted herself to the new conditions.

III

England's commercial interest in the Swedish part of the Baltic is after this chiefly reflected in her intensive diplomatic activity during the last decades of the 17th century with the object of bringing about a trade treaty

första engelska navigationsakten" [Sweden and the first English Navigation Act]. *Hist. stud. tillägn. Ludvig Stavenow* [Historical studies dedicated to Ludvig Stavenow], Stockholm 1924, 202 ff.; *Olofsson*, 253 ff., 315 f., 484 ff.; A. Heimer, *De diplomatiska förbindelserna mellan Sverige och England* 1633—1654 [Diplomatic relations between Sweden and England, 1633—1654], Lund 1893, 84 ff., 91, 97 ff., 109 f., 111 f., 121 ff., 146 ff.; J. L. Carlbom, *Sverige och England* 1655— aug. 1657 [Sweden and England, 1655 to Aug. 1657], Gothenburg 1900, 2 ff., 42 ff., 64 ff., 100 ff., 120 ff.; T. Gihl, *Sverige och västmakterna under Karl X Gustafs andra krig med Danmark* [Sweden and the Western Powers during Karl X Gustaf's second war with Denmark], Uppsala 1913, 74 ff; M. Prestwich, "Diplomacy and trade in the Protectorate". *Journ.Mod.Hist.* XXII (1950), 112 ff. M. B. Ashley, *Financial and Commercial policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate*, Oxford 1934, 126—127, 170—171. *Hinton*, 126 ff.

with Sweden. Sweden could offer vital necessities and was also to some extent a market for the classical English export, cloth. Nevertheless the connection between England and Sweden was in the main dictated by power politics. The Swedish Empire was geographically scattered and hence insecure; alliances with England could strengthen its position in the Baltic. Thus England's main interest was in the sphere of commerce, Sweden's in power politics. The result of this was that all further diplomatic contacts disclosed clear opposing interests involved in the apparent community of interests between the two countries. As we have seen, England's price for political alliances with Sweden was commercial concessions. The rôles were accidentally reversed when England became involved in war with France in 1689—97 and was hard pressed, though it should be noted that Sweden's main concern was her shipping policy.

England was the active partner in trade questions as a result of her vast trade in Sweden and the Swedish Baltic possessions. In contrast to England, Sweden was an undeveloped country which lacked capital for a trade offensive in the west. The Swedish heads of state were not insensitive to economic arguments and aims, but their hands were tied by the limited opportunities the Kingdom had for carrying on an active trade policy. Only in wartime conditions could the Swedish government intervene to support the neutral Swedish shipping and foreign trade. Otherwise its attitude to trade matters was defensive and watchful.

Where Sweden proper was concerned, one of the most crucial questions for English commercial policy in the last decades of the 17th century was *de facto* that of the legal position of the English iron factors in Sweden. The eternal theme of the complaints was the curtailment of the foreign factors' freedom of movement and trade: the prohibitions on travel in the country, restraints on the storage of imports, the prohibitions on owning and living on their own property, the loss of part of possessions on dying or leaving the country, prohibitions against trading with anyone but the burghers in the staple towns, etc. These regulations, however, were international and they were also closely connected with local Swedish laws on foreigners and staples. There was therefore little chance of altering the principle of this system, which had the weight and custom of centuries behind it. But, as we have seen, its application varied according to conjunctures.

Chronologically, activities against the foreigners came to a head during periods when Sweden was neutral (1672—73, 1694—96) or when peaceful conditions gave prospects of a revival of Swedish trading activities (1687—88). On the other hand, Sweden gave in to the foreigners when she was at war (1676—79, 1700—1720). The rhythm of the attacks against foreign

mercantile elements and foreign capital is clearly connected with periods of peace and war, that is to say, with the market conditions for Sweden's shipping and foreign trade.

The vacillations of the official Swedish attitude can also be explained in another way, as has been pointed out by Heckscher.[1] The tendency towards strict control was connected with the fear that the Swedish iron industry would become economically dependent on foreign capital. On the other hand, the freedom of movement of the foreigners was to the advantage of the iron industry. People with interests in metals had everything to gain from a free competition for iron between foreign and domestic buyers.

Swedish attemps at emancipation in the last decade of the 17th century went so far as an endeavour to free themselves not only from foreign enterprise but also from the foreign capital supplied by the factors from other nations. But here the new severe policy towards foreigners collided with the legitimate interests of certain groups and branches of economic life, chiefly that of the iron works. This was also the cause of the struggle between the interests of those who worked the forges and of the staple burghers, between the interests of the consumers and the distributors. Despite this internal conflict between different sectors of the economy, the policy was increasingly conducted along lines which must be interpreted as a sharpening of the attitude towards foreigners. The driving force behind these actions, which were conditioned by the economic situation, is clearly the desire to be free from dependence on foreign enterprise and loans.

Apart from this problem of residence, English trade and shipping met other difficulties which Whitehall sought in vain to resolve during the lengthy Anglo-Swedish trade negotiations. Throughout these, the English strove to reach the Dutch position of 'the most favoured nation' as far as customs duties were concerned. They did momentarily gain special privileges which *de facto* gave English shipping the favoured position in the Swedish realm. This was in the dangerous war years of 1675—79, when England was also able to enjoy the advantages of neutrality in Scandinavian waters. But after the reorganization of the Swedish Baltic empire by Charles XI and his advisers, the English mercantile view not only of the Swedish policy towards strangers but also of the regulations governing shipping, customs and manufactures is one long lamentation.[2] The dissatisfaction came to a head in the

[1] Heckscher, *Produktplakatet* [The Production Edict], 708.

[2] Eastland Company, representations 13/11/1660, C.O. 388/1 (a copy also in C.O. 389/1 and in BM Add. MSS 25115). Memoranda from English merchants in Sweden from the 1670's (?), Coventry Papers LXVI, 603 ff. 'Concerning the English Trade with Sweden', 1675, S.P.,For. 95/9, f. 168. Undated memorandum in French about

1690's and the tension was to return in the great tar crisis of 1703—04. The following extract from a pamphlet of 1697 illustrates the anti-Swedish feeling and propaganda at the turn of the century:[1]

"Tis evident that Sweden seeks to Ingrosse to itself the Northern Navigation. . . This appears from the *Customes* laid upon Merchandize in Sweden which are high, and exacted with rigour, but with all so laid wth favour to their own shipping, that it is almost impossible for foreign Ships to be Employed either for importation or exportation . . .

I might also speak of the ways they have in Sweden to Monopolize Trade by their *Tarr* and other Companies, and their large Priviledges to the setters up of Manufacturies; but I think it will be enough for a paper of few lines to hint here, that the Consumption of the English wollen and other Manufacturies in Sweden which formerly was considerable, and good profit got by it, is now quite lost, except only a little *fine Cloath* and some Serges . . ."

In many respects the Swedish policy towards shipping, customs, manufactures and the monopolizing of the distribution and sale of certain imports and exports proved to be of superficial value. The protection of shipping had no deep effect. Conditions in the Swedish shipping industry were not determined by royal decree but by alternations in the cycle of peace and war. Smuggling and the lack of opportunities to build up Swedish manufactures combined to make the effect of the manufacturing policy less than was expected.[2] It seems likely, on the other hand, that English exports of coarse cloth to Sweden were affected by the duty policy and that the

English difficulties in trade with Sweden, S.P., For. 95/11, f. 48. The same volume includes a memorandum to Warwick from English merchants in Stockholm 5/1/1681. There is a pro memoria from Warwick and one from the Eastland Company from the same period, C.O. 388/1. The latter volume, which contains original correspondence, etc., from the archives of the Council of Trade and Plantations, also contains a version of the French memorandum mentioned above (with original notes in English) read before the Council of Trade and Plantations 2/7/1679. An undated pamphlet from the end of the 1690's, *Several Grievances of the English Merchants in their Trade into the Dominions of the King of Sweden etc.*, BM, 816 m. 11 (121) has been reprinted by *Hinton*, 120—121. This undoubtedly originated in connection with the anti-Swedish campaign in Parliament and City circles (see p. 49). Another list from a Board of Trade report (1710) has been printed with comments by J. F. Chance in "England and Sweden in the Time of William III and Anne." *Eng.Hist.Rev.* XVI (1901), the original of which found in S.P.,For. 95/15 f. 149—150.

[1] Patrick Lyell, 'The Northern Ingrosser and Encroacher upon Navigation' (1697), C.O. 389/15, p. 311 ff.

[2] See my article "The English Navigation Laws and the Baltic Trade, 1660—1700," *Scand.Econ.Hist.Rev.* VIII (1960), 12 ff.

price of Swedish tar was driven up and kept steadier on the English market by preventing competition.[1] Oscar Bjurling has also maintained that the method of collecting import duties in the more valuable rix-dollars and export duties merely in silver dollars may have impeded imports and encouraged exports.[2] English complaints of difficulties in their trade with Sweden would appear to have more foundation when seen against this background.

But there were other valid reasons, quite apart from Swedish economic policy, for the increasing difficulty in coming to agreement over commercial questions. The envy and fear of Holland at first united the anti-Dutch politicians in London and Sweden. English and Swedish interests had merged during the Protectorate through the common desire to force the Dutch out of the Baltic trade. There was new enthusiasm for this plan after 1660 and during the 1675—79 war between Denmark and Sweden, but afterwards we hear no more about it. Both politically and commercially, Anglo-Dutch relations enter a new and friendlier phase. Both the Maritime Powers had earlier, if temporarily, been united by a desire to maintain 'free trade' in the Baltic in opposition to those countries which owned its coast line. Towards the end of the century, Swedish mercantile ambitions were increasingly directed towards an active Swedish trade, and therefore the opposition both to London and Amsterdam became equally pronounced. Thus even in the 1680's the severe treatment of foreign trade agents in Sweden united English and Dutch diplomacy. Seen against the background of the strict Swedish policy towards foreigners, and the customs and shipping regulations in Sweden proper, the danger of a Swedish monopoly of naval stores and Swedish control of West European trade with the Russo-Polish market must have seemed very real to *both* the Maritime Powers. During the naval war between England and Holland, it already became evident that Sweden might become a commercial and maritime power both east and west of the Sound. The dream that Sweden might gain the upper hand in Baltic trade was, however, shattered by her collapse as a great power in the Great Northern War.

It is true that after the 1670's we hear no more of Anglo-Swedish discussions with a view to sharing the profit from the lucrative and strategically important transit-trade of goods from the Russo-Polish market to Western Europe.[3] In practice, however, Narva in particular remained one of the transit-ports favoured by the Swedish government for the traffic

[1] Cf. Heckscher, *Sveriges ekonomiska historia* [Sweden's economic history] I:2, 435, 509.

[2] O. Bjurling, *Skånes utrikessjöfart 1660—1720* [Skåne's foreign shipping 1660—1720], Lund 1945, 186 ff., 243, 265.

[3] Cf. above, p. 25, 93.

between Russia and England. During the years immediately before the outbreak of the Great Northern War in 1700, plans were put into operation to increase Narva's West European Trade.[1] But by then England had already renewed her direct contacts, both diplomatic and economic, with the Russian authorities and with the Russian market, and had by-passed the Swedish middlemen.

[1] Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 18/3/1697, RA.

From Stockholm to St. Petersburg

The Russian and Polish attack on Sweden in 1700 was directed precisely at the Baltic transit-ports for Russo-Polish trade, Narva and Riga.[1] The siege of these two towns was not successful, it is true, and the Swedish Baltic provinces were purged of their enemies; but the relations of both towns to their trading areas were disturbed, and this, as we have seen, could only have a detrimental effect on English trade in the Baltic. England itself was drawn into the European war in 1702 and the need for naval stores was again accentuated. Relations with Sweden were not of the best; Russian deliveries were late in starting. It was in this situation that the American colonies' potential as a source of supply was actively encouraged. The English Naval Stores Act of 1705, which put premiums on the import of naval stores from the colonies, was, however, not able to remedy the notorious lack of shipbuilding material in wartime. The Act was only of importance for supplies of tar and pitch, particularly for the merchant navy. The Baltic market, which came to be increasingly synonymous with the Russian one, continued to play an important part in English commercial policy and power politics after the political and economic changes in the Baltic world in the first half of the 18th century. Both economic and political relations with Sweden became correspondingly less important. Sweden no longer barred the way to the Russian market. After 1720 an increasing amount of products which had hitherto been almost entirely Swedish monopolies — iron, tar and pitch — could be fetched directly from Russia. Soon Russia began to seem to the English as dangerous a Baltic power as Sweden had been in the latter half of the 17th century: dangerous both to commercial policy and to power politics through its newly-won control of certain naval stores and their ports of export.

[1] For the agreement of opinion amongst Swedish, German and Russian historians over the economic motives behind the Russian attack, see S. Svensson, "Czar Peters motiv för kriget med Sverige" [Czar Peter's motives for the War with Sweden], *Hist.Tidskr.* 1931, 457 ff; R. Wittram, "Peter der Grosse und Livland. Zur Kernfrage des Nordischen Krieges". *Deutschland und Europa. Festschrift für Hans Rothfels*, Düsseldorf 1951, 233 ff. L. N. Nikiforov, *Russisch-Englische Beziehungen unter Peter I*, Weimar 1954, 8 ff. Cf. *Rosén*, 82 ff.

I

Sir Thomas Roe, the English diplomat and intermediary in the Altmark armistice of 1629, had once pointed to the risks of the Baltic becoming a Swedish inland sea and of Sweden dominating Baltic imports. Like his contemporaries, he regarded this sector of English foreign trade as the basis of other trade routes. His well-known statement in the House of Commons in 1640 shows this, "The most principal trades ... are the Northerne trades, which are the rooth of all other, because the Material brought ... from (Sweden), Muscowy, Norway, Prussia, and Livony are fundamentall and of absolute necessity for from these trades wee get the Materials of Shipping ... which inable us to all the southern Trades ... By those Trades wee sayle to the East Indies, and may creat a company for the West Indies for the Golden Fleace ...".

After 1700, the misgivings were over Russia's growing potential politically and economically. In 1721, Sir Gilbert Heathcote, the financier and leading merchant in the City of London, spoke in the following terms to the House of Commons: "That, besides, while we fetch'd our naval stores from Russia it was in the power of the Czar, not only to set what price he pleas'd upon them, but even to prevent our having them at all ... For whereas we now paid for the naval stores from Russia mostly in ready money, we might have them from New England, and other English plantations in America, in exchange for our own manufactures: whereby we should not only encourage His Majesty's subjects abroad, and divert them from setting up and carrying on manufactures which directly interfere with those of Great Britain, ... but also employ our poor at home ..."[1]

In the eighty years which elapsed between Thomas Roe's statement in Parliament about the importance of the Baltic market as a supplier of naval stores and that on the same topic by Sir Gilbert Heathcote, the situation had not changed except in *one respect* — but that one was important enough. Instead of Sweden, it was Russia who was the chief trading partner in the Baltic. Both Sir Thomas and Sir Gilbert knew what they were talking about. The eyes of the former had been opened to 'the Swedish danger' while he was an English emissary accredited to Gustavus Adolphus. As a leading Baltic merchant, Sir Gilbert Heathcote had a thorough knowledge of the north-eastern European market. He helped to bring about the Naval Stores Act of 1705 and now he rose to defend its extension. The Russian expansion in the Baltic after 1700 seemed as dangerous to the English as had the Swedish

[1] *Stock*, III, 1702—1727, Carn.Inst.Publ. 338:III, Baltimore 1930, 87, 446. Gilbert Heathcote's biography can be found in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

hegemony in the previous century. The English misgivings were fanned by Swedish propaganda. A political pamphlet of Swedish origin stressed that 3/4 of the world's tar was controlled by the Czar.[1]

After the tar crisis had been settled, uneasiness arose over the supply of hemp, since the Russians had gained the monopoly of hemp through their conquest of the Swedish Baltic ports.[2] Apart from this, Russia had of old, as we have seen, a prominent position as a supplier of potash. The Board of Trade therefore received many proposals for the promotion of potash production in the American colonies. Postletwayt, too, whose trade dictionary was known throughout the English-speaking world, tried to promote the Russian method of producing potash, which he describes in detail and recommends to his American readers.[3] Colonial resources and the possibilities of home production thus seemed of equal importance after Sweden had been brought down to second rank as a political and economic power.[4]

Support for the import of strategic bulk goods from the colonies therefore continued in the form of import premiums and preference tariffs. The tug-of-war between home producers and importers also continued over the one important Baltic imports which England could produce herself: iron. It is characteristic that iron from North America, like the home iron industry, was principally promoted when the Baltic supply threatened to dry up or increase in price owing to restrictions imposed by war or by the trade and tariff policy of the Northern powers.[5] In such situations the last resort — imports from Holland — remained as repugnant as always, despite the fact that the origin of Dutch tar was the Baltic.

[1] S.-G. Havering, "Huvuddrag i svensk och antisvensk propaganda i Västeuropa på 1710-talet," [The main features of Swedish and anti-Swedish propaganda in Western Europe during the 1710's]. *Karol.Förb.Årsb.* 1952, 90 ff.

[2] See below, Appendix II. Murray, *Baltic Commerce*, 302 ff. Cf. also W. Byrd's memorandum to the Board of Trade 1717 (C.O. 323/7, K 79).

[3] T. J. Kreps, "Vicissitudes of the American Potash Industry," *Journ.Econ.Bus. Hist.* III (1930—31), 634 ff. *Journals of the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations. January 1728/29 to December 1734*, London 1928, 55. Ibid., *January 1734/35* to *December 1741*, London 1930, 403. M. Postlethwayt, *The Universal Dictionary of Commerce* (I.ed.), London 1751, 532—535.

[4] Chance, *George* I, 177, 185. D. K. Reading, *The Anglo-Russian commercial treaty of 1734*. Yale Hist. Publ. Misc. XXXII, New Haven 1938,21 ff., 61 ff., 73 ff. D. Gerhard, *England und der Aufstieg Russlands*, München—Berlin 1933, 7 ff., 38, 45 ff, *Wittram*, 264 ff.

[5] Cf. Board of Trade's reaction to the rise in Swedish duties and the restriction on exports to England, *Journals of the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations. January 1728/29 to December 1734*, 331 ff; Ibid., *January 1734/35 to December 1741*, 19, 24, 29, 37, 41, 45—46, 63.

The purpose of the Naval Stores Act of 1705 and the extensions of it in 1721, 1729 and later years was not only to create an alternative to imports from Northern Europe. Gilbert Heathcote's statement in 1721 proves this.[1] It was also part of the plan to prevent the development of industries in the Colonies so that they should continue to provide a market for English products. The Colonies must be trained to produce raw goods so as to be in a position to buy home industrial products. The laws, however, were also established and renewed with an eye to the situation in Northern Europe, either during the period of crisis or taking into consideration experience gained from such crises. The exemption from duty which American iron was given when imported into London must be seen against a background of uneasiness over Sweden's favourable policy towards France.[2]

II

How successful were the attempts made after 1700 to find a substitute for the imports of bulky staple goods from Northern Europe in the Colonies, Ireland and even Scotland? We shall try to answer this by studying, commodity by commodity, the trends in the development of imports from 1700 to the middle of the 18th century. Owing to the differences in quality and price of the same commodity coming from different production areas (e.g. Spanish as opposed to Russian iron, Swedish as opposed to Russian tar), the percentage distribution according to areas has been calculated by means of the value of imports and not according to their quantity.[3]

[1] The parliamentary debate over the naval stores question is most easily followed in *Stock* (besides vols. II and III) also I and IV, Baltimore 1924 and 1937 (Carn.Inst.Publ. 338:I and 338:IV), see Index: Naval Stores.

[2] Cf. Ashton, *Iron and Steel*, 105—125, *Nettels*, 247 ff., Rees, *Mercantilism* 587 and J. F. Rees, "The Phases of British Commercial Policy in the Eighteenth Century," *Economica* V (1925), 136—142. *Osgood*, 311 ff., 321. Joshua Gee's writings give important information about the arguments for, and attitude towards, the Colonies' potentialities (e.g. the memoranda drawn up by him in 1718, 1721 and 1728 on behalf of the Board of Trade, C.O. 324/10, pp. 212—219, and Josuah Gee MSS, London Univ.Lib.)

[3] From a market aspect, the years chosen (1699—1700, 1725—26, 1746—47) are on the same level: they represent the start of a slump after a boom. See *Scott* I, Cambridge 1910, 361—365, 467. T. S. Ashton, *Economic Fluctuations in England 1700—1800*, Oxford 1959, 59—60, 93, 95, 121—122, 123, 140, 144, 148, 172.

The distribution of English imports of bar-iron into import areas from 1699—1747.[1]

Import area	1699 %	1700 %	1725 %	1726 %	1746 %	1747 %
'Eastland'* ..	86.0	82.8	76.4	79.9	81.5	84.0
'Spain'	9.8	14.1	11.5	10.1	0.4	—
'Russia'	0.4	0.7	3.3	1.2	15.3	13.4
'Germany'....	0.7	0.2	2.2	1.5	1.1	2.2
'Holland'	1.8	1.7	6.3	6.9	1.0	0.4
'Ireland'	1.0	—	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.0
'Plantations'..	0.0	—	—	—	0.6	—
Other areas ..	0.3	0.5	—	0.0	—	—
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The distribution of English imports of hemp into import areas from 1699—1747.[1]

Import area	1699 %	1700 %	1725 %	1726 %	1746 %	1747 %
'Eastland'* ..	71.4	41.1	45.3	35.5	31.3	25.0
'Russia'	25.4	58.7	52.5	62.5	68.3	74.4
'Germany'....	—	—	—	0.3	0.2	—
'Holland'	3.0	0.1	1.8	1.6	0.0	0.6
'Scotland' ..	0.2	—	—	—	—	—
'Ireland'	—	—	0.1	0.1	0.2	—
Other areas ..	—	0.1	0.3	—	—	—
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The distribution of English imports of flax into import areas from 1699—1747.[1]

Import area	1699 %	1700 %	1725 %	1726 %	1746 %	1747 %
'Eastland'* ..	60.2	44.8	51.4	30.1	60.4	48.6
'Russia'	36.0	50.6	36.5	57.6	9.9	31.2
'Germany'....	—	—	0.2	0.3	—	5.9
'Holland'	3.3	3.9	5.7	11.7	24.9	14.3
'Scotland' ..	0.1	0.6	—	—	—	—
'Ireland'	—	0.1	6.2	0.3	0.0	0.0
Other areas ..	0.4	0.0	—	—	4.8	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Note. 'Eastland' equals 'Denmark-Norway' and 'Sweden' and 'East Country'.

[1] For sources and exact figures, see Table 2.

The distribution of English imports of tar and pitch into import areas from 1699—1747.[1]

Import area	1699 %	1700 %	1725 %	1726 %	1746 %	1747 %
'Eastland'* ..	98.3	94.3	23.8	34.0	26.5	43.2
'Russia'	0.0	4.2	3.0	2.2	—	0.0
'Germany'....	—	—	0.1	—	—	0.2
'Holland'	0.0	0.1	—	0.0	—	0.0
'Ireland'	1.0	1.0	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.1
'Plantations'..	0.5	0.2	72.1	62.5	73.1	54.6
Other areas ..	0.2	0.2	0.5	1.0	—	1.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The distribution of English imports of potash into import areas from 1699—1747.[1]

Import area	1699 %	1700 %	1725 %	1726 %	1746 %	1747 %
'Eastland'* ..	41.1	15.0	66.7	64.1	2.9	43.1
'Russia'	58.9	85.0	33.1	35.0	96.6	56.3
Other areas ..	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.9	0.5	0.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Note. 'Eastland' equals 'Denmark-Norway' and 'Sweden and 'East Country',

A marked alteration in development can only be traced where tar and pitch are concerned. By the end of the period under review the Northern tar's hegemony had disappeared: in 1747 it amounted to only 1/4—1/3 of the value of all tar imports, even though Russian tar also began to come on the market a little before the American tar. It is difficult to draw any more general conclusions from the tables above than these, especially when one considers that the years chosen, despite similarities in their economic settings, represent different political situations and combinations. War or peace could alter the rhythm and balance of trade from one year to the next: in wartime trade was taken over by neutral ports and ships.[2]

Up to 1750 there were thus no significant results from the policy of finding substitutes for, or supplements to, the import of the important bulk goods from Northern Europe. To form a just appreciation of Whitehall's policy and its effects it should, however, be remembered that the premium

[1] For sources and exact figures, see Table 2.

[2] From an English point of view the years 1699—1700 and 1725—26 were ones of peace. In 1746—47 England was engaged in war with France.

and preference system for the benefit of American or Irish products was incomplete and continually opposed: the owners of iron-works, for instance, formed a group whose interests were hostile to the scheme; the Navy Board did not value the colonial raw material, their poor quality and high cost were frequently criticized.[1]

The policy of self-support was also doomed to failure until new technical discoveries had made substitutes for the North European goods possible. A technical revolution of this kind was, for instance, the replacement of charcoal by pit-coal. Only then was England freed from her dependence on North European iron. Later, experiments to make synthetic tar from coal and to replace potash by soda were to be successful. The former began in the 17th century but only obtained practical results in the 19th century. The method of extracting soda from salt, coal and chalk was a French discovery which was only exploited commercially after 1800. It was more difficult to find a substitute for plants used for spinning rope.[2] In the Napoleonic wars a frenzied search went on in distant places for something to replace the Northern hemp and flax. There was an attempt as early as in the 1790's to make the cultivation of flax and hemp take root in India. A comparison between samples of Russian and Indian hemp was made at the Navy Board's expence.[3]

III

At the beginning of the 18th century a development began which shifted the centre of gravity for English imports of Baltic bulk goods away from Swedish-owned ports to Russian ports. The conservative trade statistics give no indication of this. It should also be remembered that, initially, the change was chiefly political in character and not economic. The tables given here therefore show, despite profound political changes, a remarkable stability where the distribution of imports into different areas is concerned. Riga was classed under 'East Country' during Swedish period as well as during the Russian in the English trade statistics. Narva had always been classed

[1] *Albion*, 240 ff. Williams, *English Mercantilism*, 181 ff. *Lord*, 38—39, 58, 66—67. *Nettels*, 256—260, *Knittle*, 116 ff., 226. *Reading*, 29 ff. Ashton, *Economic Fluctuations*, 107 ff., 116 ff. The fluctuating English attitude to the colonial iron industry has been thoroughly dealt with by *Bining*.

[2] J. U. Nef, *The Rise of the British Coal Industries II*, 331 ff. *Kreps*, 231, 245, 249 ff. A. Clow & N. L. Clow, *The Chemical Revolution*, London 1952, 65—115, 389—423.

[3] Home Misc. 374, 375, Commonwealth Relations Office, East India Company Records.

under 'Russia', even during the Swedish rule. But Narva, and in part also Archangel, lost its importance after 1700.

It was the new trade metropolis of St. Petersburg, Narva's successor in the export of hemp and flax, which became the great port of export for iron and took its place as one of the leading ports in the Baltic. The growth of Russia's share in the statistics below is mainly due to this development.

Total English imports of iron, hemp, flax, tar and pitch, and potash distributed into import areas from 1699—1747.[1]

	Import area	1699 %	1700 %	1725 %	1726 %	1746 %	1747 %
	'Russia'	17.2	32.1	23.8	28.9	33.2	36.8
East-land	'Sweden'	46.5	41.5	26.6	29.8	29.2	26.5
East-land	'East Country' ..	27.4	16.7	27.5	20.8	21.7	21.7
East-land	'Denmark-Norway'	1.4	1.4	1.3	2.3	2.5	2.9
	Other areas (including the colonies) ..	7.5	8.3	20.8	18.2	13.4	12.1
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The real turning-point must have occurred only after the middle of the 18th century, when the *major share* in the total English imports of iron, hemp, flax, pitch and tar, and potash came from Russian-owned ports. The change, not visible in the official trade figures, could have first taken place when Russian iron succeeded in reaching the level of the Swedish amongst English imports. The first time this happened as far as quantity was concerned was in 1750; in the 1760's it become a general rule.[2] At the same time the volume of Anglo-Russian trade increased enormously. From 1700 to 1750 there had only been a slow growth in the 'Russian' section of England's total imports from the Baltic.[3]

[1] For sources and exact figures, see Table 3.

[2] K.-G. Hildebrand, "Foreign Markets for Swedish Iron in the 18th Century." *Scand. Econ.Hist.Rev.* VI (1958), 1—15.

[3] *Total English imports from the Baltic from 1699—1747.*

Import area	1699 %	1700 %	1725 %	1726 %	1746 %	1747 %
'Sweden'	43.1	38.9	26.0	31.0	27.4	24.4
'East Country'	39.4	26.5	33.7	27.6	32.2	31.4
'Russia'	17.5	34.6	40.3	41.4	40.4	44.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

For sources and exact figures, see Table 3.

The political development which began when direct trade between England and Russia was stimulated at the turn of the 17th century was economically completed only after the middle of the 18th. Stockholm was not only superseded as the capital of a Swedish Baltic empire but also as a staple for the most valuable Baltic commodity, both in its strategic and monetary aspect, during the 17th and 18th centuries: iron.

This tendency for Russia to outdistance Sweden in all Baltic exports was, it is true, momentarily halted when Swedish tar reconquered the English market during the American War of Independence in 1775—83. Tar and pitch again took its old place amongst imports from Sweden-Finland into the harbours of the English realm.[1] From a monetary point of view, however, these cheap forest products represented far too small a share in England's Baltic trade to be able to put the clock back. It was only when large-scale timber exports to England from the Baltic began in the middle of the 19th century that Sweden's and Finland's huge forest resources could be more effectively exploited. This brought a new stimulus to English trade connections with the old iron and tar export areas — but a new bulk commodity was the agent of change. For Baltic timber had slowly worked itself forwards, against strong competition from the Norwegian timber and then from the Canadian, into the position of a major bulk commodity in English trade with the Baltic area.

The roots of this development lie far back in time. Different kinds of hard timber (besides oak planks, '*Wagenschoss*', '*Pipenstäbe*', '*Klappholz*', etc.) had already played an important part in Danzig's exports to England towards the end of the 17th century.[2] But it was about 1750 that Russian and Prussian Baltic timber ports first began to outdistance the Norwegian ones in respect of soft timber. Prior to this, the Baltic had only been important to the English as a main source of supply of large masts (Riga and Gothenburg) and heavy oak planks (Danzig). Otherwise, the Baltic ports were a supplementary market for the purchase of timber in years when supplies were difficult to come by, or when there was an exceptional demand. In 1737 the Board of Trade still considered that Norway was irreplacable as an area for the purchase of deals.[3]

Furthermore, corn, the bulk commodity which in some respects can be

[1] Heckscher, *Sveriges ekonomiska historia* [The economic history of Sweden] II:1, 330 ff.

[2] W. Vogel, "Beiträge zur Statistik der deutschen Seeschiffahrt im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert II. Danzig", *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 57 (1932), 104 ff., 116, 131, 150.

[3] H. S. K. Kent, "The Anglo-Norwegian Timber Trade in the Eighteenth Century", *Econ.Hist.Rev.* 2nd ser. VIII, 62—65.

said to have been the most typical of the Baltic's exports to Western Europe up to 1650, was conspicuous by its almost complete absence from exports to England at this time.[1] Corn was to return only at the end of the 18th century. It is this fact, too, which gives uniformity to the period 1670—1750 in trade relations of the Baltic area with England. During this time the English imports from the area were dominated by the five bulk commodities: iron, hemp, flax, potash, and tar-pitch. Their position on the English market remained practically unaltered — despite all plans to break the Baltic monopoly. Thus the trade pattern which, from the English point of view, arose in the Baltic after the middle of the 17th century remained relatively unchanged in its economic and geographic structure for a whole century, despite the growth in importance of the Russian market around 1700. But the transition from a Swedish dominated Baltic to a Russian one did not happen abruptly and without an intermediary link where trade was concerned. The link was Narva — not Nyen at the mouth of the Neva, nor Archangel on the Arctic Ocean. From about 1670, Narva was the place of residence for a colony of English merchants who were actively engaged in a growing trade with Russia. The Swedish government favoured the Englishmen in the town as well as the town's increasingly flourishing Russia trade. Narva's 'second period of greatness' is a striking episode in the history of Baltic trade in the latter part of the 17th century. It is impossible to understand the rise in Narva's foreign trade without taking into consideration the Swedish policy towards Narva and especially the trade privileges enjoyed by the English colony there. It is significant that Narva later declined as a trading city when the new situation caused by the Great Northern War became stabilized and St. Petersburg became the favoured port of Russian commercial policy.

IV

From another point of view, the political one, we can divide the period from the 1670's to the middle of the 18th century into two phases. The turning-point coincides with the Great Northern War, after which Russia succeeds Sweden in English eyes as the 'monopolist' of Baltic bulk goods. The centre of gravity of English commercial interest began a parallel swing away from Stockholm towards St. Petersburg. Here the English diplomats and trade agents met similar problems that had occupied them in Stockholm a

[1] T. S. Ashton, *An Economic History of England: The 18th Century*, London 1955, 50.

generation earlier. But they were more successful in Russia. One result was that their position as 'the most favoured nation' was true not only in the narrow theoretical sense of a treaty but was actually so in economic fact. The insignia of success were tariff privileges for the English, a secure position and freedom of movement for the trade factors in Russia, an assured supply of naval stores and a giant market for English industrial products.

The first phase in England's successful commercial policy in Russia, culminating in the 1734 trade agreement, was succeeded by a new situation about the middle of the 18th century. The Russian statesmen then began to make skilful use of England's increasing dependence on the Russian market for her supplies. The 1766 trade agreement between the two powers is the first Russian attempt to exploit her position in England's foreign trade, which began to resemble the one that Sweden had possessed before the Great Northern War.[1]

The importance which English trade policy in the late 17th century attached to being equal to 'the most favoured nation' should be seen in the Baltic against the background of the rivalry between the English and the Dutch. But there is another, more general factor involved in the English efforts. The formula about a position as 'equally favoured' as the 'most favoured' became the rule in the English trade treaties made with powers who were commercially passive and industrially less developed than England (e.g. Turkey, Portugal and Russia) and who had given special privileges in older treaties made with other commercial and maritime great powers (e.g. Holland and France).[2] Sweden belonged to the first group, but English efforts at gaining an equal footing nevertheless met stiff opposition there. The clause concerning treatment as 'the most favoured nation' was put into the 1654 Anglo-Swedish treaty and remained in that of 1661 (article IV).[3] Its retention, however, became one of the stumbling-blocks which prevented agreement in the later trade negotiations, as we have seen. It was then that the danger was seen of the effects of the clause, since it would automatically extend to the English concessions which Sweden had been forced to give to the Dutch in 1679.

[1] *Gerhard*, 41 ff. K. Rahbek-Schmidt, "The Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and Russia 1766", *Scando-Slavica I*, Copenhagen 1954, 115—134.

[2] *Ekegård*, 15—17. The development of the 'most favoured nation' clause and the double meaning of the term is analysed by F. Borchardt, *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Meistbegünstigung im Handelssystem*, Königsberg 1906, especially 35 ff., and by J. Kulischer, "Les traités de commerce et la clause de la nation la plus favorisée du XVI[e] siècle", *Rev.Hist.Mod.* 6 (1931), 3—29.

[3] ". . the People, Subjects, and Inhabitants of both Confederates shall have and enjoy in other's Kingdoms, Countries, Lands and Dominions, as large and ample Privileges, relaxations, liberties, and immunities as any other Foreigner at present doth, or hereafter shall enjoy there."

But Sweden was later able to defend herself. Swedish diplomacy and commercial and industrial life at the end of the 17th century had already reached such a pitch of maturity and development that Sweden was in a position to oppose any intrusive commercial penetration from a trade partner who was superior economically and politically. Some differences appear in treaty policy between the Sweden of the late 17th century and the Russia of the early 18th. The Anglo-Russian treaty of 1734 gave both treaty partners the position of as 'equally favoured' as 'the most favoured nation' in their respective countries. This was a position of extreme importance to English trade, although completely valueless to her inactive Russian trade partner, and it was defined and applied in nine different articles of the treaty.[1] The Anglo-Russian relations offer an interesting comparison to the Anglo-Swedish ones with their opposing elements of English mercantile penetration and the Swedish policy of alliance and a balance of power. The pattern already emerges, even though in a rough form, in the first Anglo-Russian contacts in the 16th century. The English at that time were anxious for mercantile treaties and benefits, the Russian for an alliance and the purchase of arms.[2] This was repeated after 1700, when Anglo-Russian relations became more active. The 1734 trade treaty between England and Russian really contains everything England had desired in her proposals for a trade treaty with Sweden. The total effect of the treaty was in fact that England became 'more favoured' than any other nation trading in Russia. It was only later that the Russian diplomats succeeded in bringing about the political complement to this — a treaty of alliance.[3]

When she was a great power, Sweden gave her statesmen more trump cards than the young Imperial Russian diplomacy held at the start. This was due to Sweden's more highly-developed political and economic structure despite her poor economic resources and shaky political foundations. Up to 1700 England, too, was a less important partner in political negotiations than she was after the turn of the century. These factors explain the limited opportunities which we found open to English trade diplomacy in Sweden in the last decades of the 17th century. The economic functions of the Eng-

[1] *Reading*, 156 ff. (Valuable analysis of the 1734 treaty).

[2] *Willan*, 17—18, 91—128, 161—165.

[3] The opportunity for this came five years later on England's initiative. The fear of an increase of French influence in Sweden after the rise to power of the 'Hat' (aristocratic) party made England anxious for closer political contact with Russia in order to keep 'the balance of power in Scandinavia'. In 1748 the tension between England and Sweden finally came to a head with the severing of diplomatic relations between the two countries. See R. Lodge, "The first Anglo-Russian Treaty, 1739—42", *Eng.Hist.Rev.* XLIII (1928), 354—375. *Gerhard*, 11.

lish trade agents in Swedish foreign trade, particularly exports, were, however, of such vital importance to Sweden that the situation foreshadows the position the English were to occupy in the export sector of Russian economy after the 1730's. England nevertheless failed to secure her position by a treaty in Sweden.

One obvious reason for the difficulties in confirming the position of English trade in Sweden was the merchant fleet with which the Swedes equipped themselves, particularly in the 1690's. They tried to make use of it in the struggle to build up their direct trade with the countries to which their exports went and from which their imports came.[1] This problem did not arise in relation to Russia before the 19th century, when the Finnish merchant fleet sailed under the Russian flag and thus Russia in theory possessed a merchant navy. The Russian consul in London pointed out in 1814, five years after Finland's union with the Russian realm, that it would now be possible to transfer an important part of Russian foreign trade from English to Finnish ships.[2]

The fact that trade talks between England and Sweden had come to a standstill in the 1720's had very different consequences for the two parties in the years to come. For Sweden, it was to lead to serious complications during the late eighteenth century wars in Europe. Sweden's role as an exporter of 'naval stores' and a neutral sea power during the era of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was made more difficult by the narrow English interpretation of the contraband clauses concerning 'naval stores' in the old agreement of 1661, still the only treaty in operation between the two countries.[3]

For England, the course of events took a very different form. Since trade with the Kingdom of Sweden had declined, England had not so pressing a peace-time need for a commercial treaty with this rather unimportant trading partner. In war-time, of course, the 1661 treaty, which was still

[1] *Gerentz*, 145—155, 162 ff. *Bjurling*, 175 ff.

[2] J. R. Danielson-Kalmari, *Tien varrelta kansalliseen ja valtiolliseen itsenäisyyteen* II, [On the way to national and political independence], Porvoo 1929, 88—89.

[3] The concept 'contraband' had given rise to serious conflicts of opinion. The English interpreted the term *commeatus* (provisions) in the text of the treaty so widely that it was held to include naval stores. Major Swedish export goods, such as iron, tar, hemp and timber, were thereby classified as contraband. Furthermore, on the subject of war-time trading, the treaties did not adopt the modern standpoint, so advantageous to Sweden, that "free ships make free goods" — a concept that was gaining ground at that time. Therein too lay one of the seeds of the dissension between England and Sweden during the European crisis of the 1690's, when the Swedes were trying to maintain their direct trading with France.

considered to be in force, was purely advantageous to England. It was not until 1803, when a Franco-Russian rapprochement was imminent and a threat appeared to the 'freedom of trade' in the Baltic, that the English were willing to allow a revision of the narrow contraband rules in this almost one hundred and fifty year old trade treaty.[1] At this time, Sweden, though momentarily, enjoyed so strong a position in a Europe under the Continental System, that the English did not stipulate any advantages in the sphere of power politics in return for this concession.

[1] S. Johnson, *Sverige och stormakterna 1800—1804* [Sweden and the Great Powers, 1800—1804], Göteborg 1957, 6 ff., 119—147. Cf. also P. Hultqvist's review of this thesis in *Hist. Tidskr.* 1959, 122—123, where emphasis is laid on the importance of the trade agreement as the aim of Sweden's negotiations.

APPENDIX I

The Import of Copper and Brass into the English Market

The best known and most worked copper deposits in 17th century Europe lay in Sweden. It was obviously of economic interest for Sweden to try and control the price on the export market and to export as much as possible of materials refined from copper, such as brass.[1] England was by no means cut off from the imports of Asiatic copper into Europe made by the Dutch East India Company, but the Asiatic copper had not yet gained a foothold in England. The English copper and brass market was therefore to a high degree dependent on supplies from 'Eastland' — i.e. chiefly from Sweden — until a new source of the raw material was found.

Before 1700, 'outports' played an insignificant part as import harbours for these metals. There is no evidence of imports of copper or brass into them on any large scale in the decades before the turn of the century. The development of import of copper and brass from the 1660's onwards can therefore be read from the London figures.

Imports of refined copper and copper sheeting into London 1663—1747, distributed into import areas.[2]

Imported from	1663 %	1669 %	1699 %	1700 %	1725 %	1726 %	1746 %	1747 %
'Eastland'	4.7	13.0	22.0	—	1.1	—	0.5	—
'Germany'.....	45.2	85.2	31.2	26.9	—	—	—	—
'Holland'	43.9	—	14.9	1.4	0.9	5.9	—	—
'East India'	5.4	—	4.8	33.5	—	—	—	—
'Africa'*	0.8	1.8	27.1	37.0	82.9	86.5	96.3	100.0
Other areas	—	—	—	1.2	15.1	7.6	3.2	—
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* labelled 'Barbary' in 1663 and 1669.

In the 1660's the majority of the copper still came from Germany and Holland. It is impossible to judge whether the Dutch copper was Asiatic or Swedish in origin; it may be regarded as certain that the Eastland copper was principally Swedish.[3] The same should be true of the German copper (from Hamburg). The situation alters around 1700, when copper is chiefly imported directly from East India or from Africa. European copper is from then onwards only represented by the stamped Swedish copper sheeting (*kopparplåtar*) from Germany (Hamburg). Later in the century, African copper completely dominates the imports.

[1] E. F. Heckscher, "Den europeiska kopparmarknaden under 1600-talet" [The European copper market in the 17th century], *Scandia* XI (1938), 220 ff. The arguments concerning the position of Swedish copper in the European market are summed up in K. Glamann, "The Dutch East India Company's Trade in Japanese Copper, 1645—1736", *Scand.Econ.Hist.Rev.* I (1953), 41—43 and F. C. Spooner, *L'economie Mondiale et les Frappes Monétaires en France 1493—1680*, Paris 1956, 38—43.

[2] For sources and exact figures, see Table 4.

[3] Norwegian copper played an insignificant part quantitatively speaking.

Imports of brass wire into London 1663–1747, distributed into import areas.[1]

Imported from	1663 %	1669 %	1699 %	1700 %	1725 %	1726 %	1746 %	1747 %
'Eastland'	16.0	48.3	75.9	75.0	9.6	39.0	—	—
'Germany'.....	84.0	51.7	21.8	23.0	90.4	60.5	100.0	100.0
Other areas	—	—	2.3	2.0	—	0.5	—	—
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The development in respect of brass wire is different. In 1669 the imports of brass from Germany were still somewhat higher than those from Sweden. Ten years later, Johan Leijonbergh was able to state that Sweden had beaten Aachen on the English market.[2] But later brass imports on the whole sharply decreased — this was true of brass wire from both Sweden and Germany. It is obvious that the chief reason for this was the renewed expansion of home production.[3]

The large demand encouraged the English copper industry, which had attained a certain amount of prosperity at the end of the 16th century. It had since declined under pressure from the foreign raw material.[4] Exports were therefore prohibited in order to guarantee its supply. In the 1670's and 1680's a proposal was even discussed that money of small denominations, which was made from Swedish copper, should be replaced by a native metal: tin.[5] Tin was regarded as "a metall of the produce of this Kingdom, whose Price His Maj[te] can gouerne, whereas Copper is a Metall, always lyable to the Enchancemt. of a forrein Prince, as experience hath already made appear. . .".[6]

In the 1680's a new period of activity began for English copper and brass production. Coal was used in smelting to bring down the fuel costs. New deposits were found. A whole series of active companies were formed to utilize them in the war years of the 1690's after the old privileged Copper and Brass Company had been deprived of its monopoly in 1689.[7] The price of Swedish copper sank sharply in 1694–97, but it was still used by the Royal Mint. In 1694, however, the Mint bought English copper for the first time, and in the same year the export prohibition on copper and brass was abolished. Behind all these measures a definite policy emerges with the object of encouraging home production. When Eric Odhelius, a young Swedish expert on mining and metals, travelled around England at the beginning of the 1690's, he was still able to state that the majority of copper imports were Swedish. He saw no threat from the home production of copper. His country-

[1] For sources and exact figures, see Table 4.
[2] "Should be enquired into", Wachtmeister to K. of Sw. 1679, Dipl.Angl.
[3] H. Hamilton, *The English Brass & Copper Industries to 1800*, London (Norwich) 1926, 66, 108 ff., 137, 285 ff.
[4] *Hamilton*, 1–64, 130, 276.
[5] *Hamilton*, 64 ff., 101 ff., 277 ff. R. Jenkins, "Coppersmelting in England: Revival at the End of the Seventeenth Century". *Trans. Newcomen.Soc.* XXIV (1943–45), London 1949, 73 ff. *Scott* II, 430–439.
[6] See the discussion on the minting of tin and copper in C.O. 389/3, p. 83–85; C.O. 391/1, p. 146, 177, 181, 182, 188 ff. and also *Cal.S.P., Dom.* 1676–1677,passim.
[7] Council of Trade and Plantations, Journals 19/6/1676 (C.O. 391/1).

man, Thomas Cletscher, came to the same optimistic conclusion a little later on in the 1690's. The Swedish copper usually came in sheets directly from Stockholm or via Hamburg. It was re-exported to Holland, Hamburg and the the West Indies, according to Odhelius, when the state of the market demanded or permitted it.[1] In the light of the import statistics, it seems as if both Swedes visited England just b e f o r e the turning-point, when European copper was definitely ousted by the native, the African and the Asiatic. After 1700 there was a sharp decline in imports of copper and brass from Europe, not least from Sweden. Instead, it was chiefly African copper which entered the field, and this was refined in England.

Copper and brass played an unimportant part in English imports, both as to quantity and value. This, and the fact that the growth of home production and imports from Africa gradually completely ousted the copper and brass from 'Eastland', has made it unnecessary to pay the same attention to these metals in this study as has been given to iron, flax, hemp, tar and pitch, and potash. The metals in question did not go directly to England from the Baltic in the latter half of the 17th century but went via German and Dutch middlemen.

At the turn of the 17th century, bar-iron from Sweden therefore remained the only important metal import from the Baltic to England. In the absence of any reliable production figures in England, it is extremely difficult to evaluate the position of the Swedish iron on the English market in relation to the home product, so that unfortunately we cannot deal with it here.[2]

APPENDIX II

The 'Great Tar Crisis', Russian Tar and the End of the Swedish Tar Monopoly

Sweden's position as the supplier of an important strategic bulk product is seen most clearly and drastically where pitch and tar are concerned. In the latter half of the 17th century the Swedes had tried to exploit the

[1] E. Odhelius, 'Reseberättelser' [Travel reports]; T. Cletscher, 'Berättelse om de europäiska bergwerken' 1696 [An account of the European mines in 1696], Arch. of the Swedish Board of Mines, RA. Cf. *Rydberg*, 141—142, 149—150.

[2] See K.-G. Hildebrand, *Sexton- och sjuttonhundratalen* [The 17th and 18th Centuries]. *Fagersta brukens historia* [The History of the Fagersta Iron Works] I, Uppsala 1957, 45. Flinn has recently pointed out that, contrary to the prevailing opinion, the English iron industry did not stagnate or deteriorate after 1660. It was slowly expanding (M. W. Flinn, "The Growth of the English Iron Industry 1660—1760," *Econ.Hist.Rev.* 2nd Ser., XI (1958—59), 144—153). This growth of the home iron industry I would interpret as a regional expansion in areas most favourable to iron production (the inner districts of Western England.) Swedish iron was perhaps not such a strong competitor there, because of transport costs, as on the East Coast. The development of home production was possibly also helped by the customs policy. Though not deliberately protectionist, this policy did bring a rise in the duties on iron from the 1670's onwards. Finally, a contributory cause may have been the fact that English bar-iron was of a different type to the Swedish because of its softness. It is known that on this account it did not always compete with the Swedish as it could not be used for the same purposes.

economic situation, with the object of raising prices, by means of their export monopolies. The Tar Trade Association continued this policy: to act as a direct seller in the English market. There seemed to be an opportunity of finally attaining this for a few years after 1700. But though the circumstances seemed more favourable that at any previous time, the efforts were frustrated. The entry of the American colonial tar on the market has been regarded as having destroyed the conditions necessary for a Swedish monopoly of tar in England.[1] This is, in the present author's submission, too simple an explanation. The situation offers an excellent example for a study of the new conditions in the Baltic after the opening of the Russian market and of the English use of the changed circumstances.

I

The time for the Tar Trade Association's offensive was well chosen. In 1702 England had been drawn into the War of the Spanish Succession. The Navy had been refitted. At the beginning of 1703, John Robinson travelled on his peace mission to Poland, both to the Swedish royal headquarters and to King Augustus of Saxony-Poland. England wished to restore peace in Scandinavia to free the Northern Crowns and the German princes for participation in the war against France. His secretary, the factor Robert Jackson, who specialised in the purchase of tar, was therefore appointed English commissioner in Stockholm with, amongst other things, the task of watching over the navy's purchase of pitch and tar there.[2] Robinson had already asked for a personal letter from Queen Anne to the Swedish King, Charles XII, in connection with his warning of 1702, to ensure regular supply of tar-pitch. He continued his efforts at the Swedish royal camp and in March, 1703, succeeded in obtaining a royal letter addressed to the Swedish Board of Trade ordering the necessary assistance to be given to the English agents in Stockholm. But the Tar Directors refused to deliver the pitch and tar to them.[3] These directors saw that the moment was at hand to attain the old goal — the sale of tar in London on their own account. The Tar Directors had their own agents working there, Messrs. Behrens and Nieman, who called upon the Navy Board in the late summer and autumn of 1703, offering over 700 lasts of tar and almost 200 of pitch. But in this tender the price of tar, which the previous year had been somewhere around £ 11—12, was raised to £ 17.5.0 a last.[4] After long negotiations the Navy Board had to give in. Urban Hall and Nathaniel Gould, with whom the Navy Board had contracted, were not able to offer any pitch and tar, since the Company had sold nothing to Sykes and Welch, their agents in Stockholm. The Russia Merchants, on the other hand, had sold theirs to Holland.

[1] E. g. *Lord*, passim.
[2] Sir Charles Hedges to Robert Jackson 20/2/1703, S.P., For. 104/153.
[3] J. Robinson to Hedges 13/24 April, 22/9/1703, S.P., For. 95/15. Robinson to Hedges 4/8/1703, S.P., For. 85/15. Hedges to Robinson 7/5, 6/7, 26/8, 19/10 1703, S.P., For. 104/153.
[4] The purchase of tar and pitch by the Navy Board 1696—1727 (price and origin of the goods) can be seen in Table 5.

The Admiralty was thus completely at the mercy of the Swedish Tar Company.[1]

The Swedish minister in London, Leijoncrona, attempted to ward off official English complaints by blaming the tendency of the English purveyors to the Crown to sell the tar which was reserved for the Navy to private firms. In order to appease the English authorities and show that there was Swedish tar on the market, Leijoncrona put forward various offers from the merchants Jonathan Ellis and John Oriot. The Tar Company, attacked by the Swedish authorities more for its daring price policy than for its insubordination, exculpated itself for its part before the Swedish Board of Trade. The high prices the Tar Trade Association obtained for its goods in London were only apparently higher than the Amsterdam price, the directors argued, indeed they calculated that they gained less in London than in Amsterdam. The reasons for this were the higher freight from London to Stockholm, higher duties, and other expenses.[2]

To the English, the situation was alarming. Nevertheless, the Navy Board, for its part, stuck firmly to its old source of supply, the Baltic. To begin with, therefore, the Navy Board favoured a proposal to get tar from Königsberg. Norwegian tar, on the other hand, was regarded as being of poor quality. The Navy Board also recommended emergency imports from Hamburg and Holland, where the Russian tar had gone.[3] But the Board of Trade, who examined the situation from other aspects, preferred the colonies. This was a natural attitude for a department whose task it was to supervise colonial administration. In its annual report to the House of Lords in 1704, the Board of Trade therefore requested premiums and customs exemption for American naval stores, 'more especially Pitch and Tar'.[4] Robinson had already made a similar proposal from the Swedish headquarters in Warsaw.

At this same time the Brandenburg and Prussian tar again came into the picture. In 1704 Lord Raby, the English envoy — afterwards ambassador — in Berlin, was instructed to investigate the possibilities of importing Prussian tar. The Prussian authorities proved extremely interested and ready to do business. Plans were made for deliveries via Hamburg of 300 lasts of tar and 7—800 of pitch during the first year of a contract to be made. The English remained, however, sceptical of success; the Prussian demand for a long-term contract, cash payment and transport at the English crown's risk did not appeal to the Navy Board. Samples delivered to Dept-

[1] Navy Board to Admiralty 26/4/1703, Adm. 1/3595; 7/6, 30/6, 28/7, 13/8, 18/8, 30/8/1703, Adm. 1/3596, 6/10, 8/10, 11/10, 13/10, 20/10/1703, Adm. 1/3597.

[2] Leijoncrona to K. of Sw. 2/8, 8/8, 13/8, 20/8, 24/8, 31/8, 7/9/1703, Dipl.Angl. Sw. B. of T. and Treasary to Leijoncrona 28/5, 15/9, 10/12/1703. To Leijoncrona from the Authorities 1, 1689—1710, Dipl.Angl. Declarations of the Tar Trade Association, 1703, with numerous appendices, in Public Authorities Corr. 800, The Tar Company, 1650—1713, and in Trade and Shipping 65, Trading Companies, the Tar Trade Assocition 1689—1715, all in RA.

[3] Navy Board to Admiralty 23/10, 14/12/1703, Adm. 1/3597, 5/1, 21/1, 10/3/1703, Adm. 1/3598, 28/4, 9/5, 30/5/1704, Adm. 1/3599, 23/10/1704, Adm. 1/3600.

[4] See B. of T., representations 16/12/1703, 27/11/1704, C.O. 389/18, 137—140, 254 ff.

ford dockyard did, it is true, show that the Prussian tar was of the same quality as the Stockholm product which came from Finland and Norrland, but everything else augured against purchase from the Prussians. And there the matter rested.[1]

But there was yet another European source of supply — the Russian one. In the years before the turn of the century great hopes were, as we have seen, entertained.[2] Robinson, however, pointed out in 1702 what little prospect there was of getting tar from Russia on account of the war. The trade statistics show that he had estimated the situation correctly.[3] After the outbreak of war only insignificant amounts were received from Russia, a score or so of lasts. Yet the Dutch had bought a great deal on the Russian market in recent years. It was at this point that the English Government in 1704 sent Charles Whitworth as envoy to the Czar.

Whitworth's mission, which inaugurated the firm diplomatic relations between the two powers, had above all a commercial purpose — to conclude a trade treaty. Whitworth therefore introduced the subject of trade at his first meeting with the Czar's favourite, Prince Golowin. The two Crowns might come together over commercial matters by removing obstacles to trade, "allowing her Majesties subjects to export the Products of the Czars dominions, particularly Pitch and Tar, and other naval stores". Thus England's immediate needs coloured Whitworth's first contact with a Russian statesman. In the months following, Whitworth received many promises over the tar question. It was found, however, that the sale was also monopolistically organised in the Russian market, although not in the same way as in the Swedish one.[4] Whitworth's mission therefore proved a very difficult one and the efforts to obtain tar and pitch finally failed.

The export of certain Russian wares was a State monopoly. An agreement was generally made with a foreigner in favour in high places for their purchase and export.[5] In 1705 the tar monopoly, which had long belonged to Dutch merchants, was possessed by Stiles, an Englishman. Stiles, however, exported the tar to Holland. Whitworth tried to put pressure on Golowin to abolish the monopoly and allow all English merchants in Russia to export tar and pitch. "I then particularly recommended to Count Golowin the procuring a free liberty to all English here to export Pitch and Tar, and endeavour'd to show what advantages the Czar and his subjects would find in having that Trade laid open, which being now monopolized by one person, was kept down at so low a rate in this Country that the people had no encouragement to work on that Commodity."[6] Frightened by Whithworth's mission, Stiles

[1] *Cal.S.P.,Dom.* 1702—1703, 623; 1703—1704, 573. Harley to Admiralty 25/5, 3/7/1704, 17/1, 14/4, 13/7, 6/9, 11/9/1705, 16/5, 24/5, 10/11/1706, Adm. 1/4089, 1/4090, 1/4091. Navy Board to Admiralty 30/5/1704, 25/4, 16/7, 18/9/1705, 14/6, 28/11/1706, Adm. 1/3599, 1/3602, 1/3603, 1/3606.

[2] See above, p. 96.

[3] See Table 6.

[4] *Reading*, 63 ff.

[5] See e.g. J. Kulischer, *Russische Wirtschaftsgeschichte I. (Handbuch der Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 10). Jena 1925, 347 ff., 443. *Reading*, 42 ff., C. Whitworth, *An Account of Russia*, Strawberry Hill 1758, 88.

[6] C. Whitworth to Robert Harley 7/18th March, 1705, S.P., For. 91/4.

promised to sell to England, too, despite the fact that he received, according to Whitworth, £ 16 for a last of tar in Holland, while the Navy Board only offered £ 13. To begin with Mr. Stiles was the stronger in the tug-of-war over the monopoly. He stood at this moment high in the Czar's favour. Finally tar, however, but not pitch, was released by cancelling Stiles' monopoly contract. But the state monopoly of purchases continued and each year the Czar auctioned it to the highest bidder.

Thus there was still a monopoly in the new system. In 1706 a Russian-Dutch syndicate succeeded in seizing control of the Archangel tar by means of a generous tender. Whitworth, however, all the same obtained permission to export the tar needed by the Royal Navy and to transport it on the returning tobacco ships put at his disposal by Stiles.[1] The Russians were extremely anxious that the tar trade should go via the newly-built St. Petersburg and for that reason agreed to Whitworth's and Stiles' arrangements. It proved difficult, however, to run the Swedish blockade in the Baltic. The English trade statistics therefore do not show that unusually large quantities of Russian tar were imported into England in 1706. Imports from Russia the previous year had shown a rise to over 200 lasts of tar and pitch. They now fell again.[2] Whitworth had in the end not succeeded. He himself admitted this six years later, when the question of Russian tar came to the fore.

At the same time as Whitworth had been sent on his mission to Russia, enormous efforts had been made to encourage imports from the colonies. In January 1705 both Houses passed an act putting premiums on imports of naval stores from the American colonies. The intention was to compensate in this way for the higher production and freight costs. The measure was not immediately successful.[3] When attempts in Russia came to nothing and there was a delay in shipping the pitch across the Atlantic, matters were back at the starting-point. From 1703 to 1710 imports from Sweden still dominated the English market. Warned by experience, however, the Swedes kept the prices lower than before.[4] The conservative Navy Board pointed out on various occasions that their instructions were to buy the best and cheapest wares. The situation was complicated by the fact that the premiums were payed in credit notes (Navy Bills) which did not accrue interest.[5] In addition, there was as great a need of convoys across the At-

[1] C. Whitworth to Robert Harley 7th/18th March, 28th Feb./11th March, 14th/25th March, 21st March/1 st April, 11th/22nd April, 25th April/6th May, 2nd/13th May, 16th/17th May, 23rd May/3rd June, 6th/17th June, 20th June/1st July. 1705, 18th/29th April, 1706, S.P., For. 91/4, 13th/24th March, 1706 (copies in S.P., For 91/7, the original in S.P., For. 91/4. W's dispatches are printed, nearly in full, in *Sbornik Russkogo Istoricheskogi Obshchestovo*, vol. 39). Navy Board to Admiralty 16/4/1705, Adm. 1/3601, 3/8/1705, Adm. 1/3602. Harley to Admiralty 7/7/1704, Adm. 1/4089, 25/5, 7/7/1705, Adm. 1/4090.

[2] See Table 6.

[3] *Lord*, 63 ff.

[4] See Table 5. *Hallberg*, 147—148. *Manuscripts of the House of Lords*, New Ser. IX, London 1949, 115.

[5] *Lord*, 67. Navy Board to Admiralty 1/8, 4/8/1704, Adm. 1/3599, 21/12/1704, Adm. 1/3600, 2/3, 14/3, 23/3/1705, Adm. 1/3601, 24/7, 13/8/1705, Adm. 1/3602. See also copies of the Navy Board's correspondence with the Admiralty 15/9, 22/5/1703, 12/5/1705, 12/2/1706 in S.P., For 42/7 as well as reports on correspondence with the Board of Trade 18/12/1706 in *Journal of Board of Trade and Plantations 1704/09*, pp. 303—304, 521.

lantic, owing to the danger from privateers and pirates, as there was in North European waters.[1] From 1707 to 1710, therefore, Swedish ships, neutral in the War of the Spanish Succession, took an even greater part than before in transporting tar.[2]

II

The turning-point came in 1710. It had nothing directly to do with the English premium system. After the Swedes had been defeated at Poltava in 1709, Denmark re-entered the war. Swedish transit through the Sound was thus once more threatened and tar ships from Stockholm loaded with 1000 lasts of tar and pitch on board did not dare enter the Sound.[3] There was an additional obstacle which became increasingly serious as time went by: the loss of Eastern Finland (1710) and then the rest of the country (1713—14). The Russian occupation of the eastern part of the realm paralysed production in Finland and severed Stockholm from its chief production area.

It is true that the English envoy in Copenhagen, Pulteney, succeeded in negotiating with the Danish Government for a free passage for the Swedish tar ships from Stockholm in 1709, but the English were warned to use their own shipping in future.[4] The greatest difficulties over transport were thus removed. Production, however, was threatened by the course of the war in Finland, from where most of the tar and pitch came. In June 1710, the Swedish Board of Trade stated that they were uncertain to what extent they could fulfil the year's contract for deliveries to both Holland and England. The tar directors resigned in December and made no application for the prolongation of the charter of the Tar Trade Association.[5]

The drama of the 1703 tar crisis was now repeated. The Navy Board stuck to the Swedish production area for as long as possible. When the offer of Russian tar came from the English consul in Archangel, Goodfellow, and his partner, Meaux, in 1711, the Navy Board decided to "write to Mr Joy (a leading "Swedish Merchant" in London) to let us know what may be expected from Stockholm".[6] The Board of Trade continued to push its suggestion of American tar, but the directors of English foreign policy had

[1] Navy Board to Admiralty 18/3/1707, Adm. 1/3606. Cf. J. D. Doty, *The British Admiralty Board as a Factor in Colonial Administration*, Philadelphia 1930, 67 ff., 89 and *Nettels*, 256 ff.

[2] Exactly how unchanged the situation still was in 1709 appears from Robert Jackson's expert opinion printed by J. J. Murray, "Robert Jackson's 'Memoir on the Swedish Tar Company', Dec. 29th, 1709." *Huntington Libr. Quart.* X (1946—47), 421—428.

[3] Cf. *Journal of Board of Trade and Plantations, 1709/10 to 1714/15*, p. 125.

[4] Henry Boyle to Admiralty 9/11/1709, 34/1/1710, Adm. 1/4093, 5/4, 12/4, 24/5/1710, Adm. 1/4094. Admiralty to Boyle 4/4, 10/4/1710, S.P., For. 42/8.

[5] *Hallberg*, 148—149. Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 21/6/1710, RA.

[6] Navy Board, minutes 18/11/1711, Adm. 106/2889.

the better solution.[1] Their interest in Russian tar now bore fruit. It was this and not the American tar which for a while entered the picture.

When the difficulties accumulated in the Baltic market, eyes were again turned towards distant Archangel. In the matter of tar, Russian and English state interests were again opposed, as were English private interests. The official English policy continued to be that of allowing English merchants to purchase freely in Russia. There now began a tug-of-war between the English factors over the tar contract. In 1711—12 it was obtained by Goodfellow and Meaux, but their rivals accused the partners of trying to send all the tar to Holland and of ignoring the English Navy.[2]

Despite such disturbing intrigues, which Whitworth attempted to suppress, the miracle did in fact occur: in 1710 Russian tar for the first time arrived in large amounts in England.[3] The amounts the following year were equally satisfactory — almost 1000 lasts. On the other hand, the attempts to ship tar to England from St. Petersburg were again unsuccessful owing to Swedish privateers.[4] After 1715 privateering by both the Swedes and Danes increased, and direct imports from Sweden also sank to an insignificant amount. In 1717 a witness pointed out to the Board of Trade "that there is not at present two hundred barrels of Swedish tar to be bought in London . . .".[5] Maister, a Hull merchant who was still selling Swedish tar to his customers in 1714, had stopped by 1718.[6] The vacuum left by the North European tar was now quickly filled by the American. It is from this point onwards that colonial tar really takes first place among English imports of this material. While the Swedes and Russians were tiring each other out, the colonial importers replaced them on the market. They kept this position until the North American colonies revolted and gained independence.

What has been said concerns the English market as a whole. The Russian tar nevertheless dominated the Navy's purchase of tar in 1718—20. After 1710 the Navy did have several permanent contracts with colonial suppliers of tar and pitch. In 1715 and 1717 in particular, the Navy, obviously compelled by necessity, bought up large quantities of American tar. But even later than this it preferred to supply the shipyards with European; Russian

[1] The attitude of the Navy Board and the Board of Trade to the tar question in C.O. 389/21, p. 28—38 (memorandum from Jackson, the tar commissioner in Stockholm 29/12/1709), 51, 59, 61, 71 (the Board of Trade's memorandum on the question 14/2/1710), 95—96, 98—103 (the Navy Board's disapproval of expensive convoys from America). Cf. *Journal of Board of Trade and Plantations 1709/10 to 1714/15*, p. 119, 120, 123, 125, 126, 135, 138.

[2] Whitworth to Henry St.John, 26th Feb./8th March, 26th March/6th, Apr., 6th/17th May, 8th/19th June, 17th/28th June, 18th/19th Nov., 1712, S.P., For. 91/7 (also printed in *Sbornik*, etc., 41). Admiralty to St. John 8/12/1711, 12/3, 20/3, 5/5, 17/7/1712, S.P., For. 42/11. St.John to Admiralty 3/4, 8/5, 12/7/1712, Adm. 1/4096. Material illuminating the conflict of interests between different groups of merchants can be found amongst Whitworth's papers, Vol. XII (BM Add. MSS 37359, f. 289—379) as well as in S.P., For. 44/218, p. 17 ff., 3, 5, 17, 28—34, 39—46, 53—54 (partly copies of the letters mentioned above).

[3] See Table 6. *Manuscripts of the House of Lords*, New Ser. IX, 13, 173, 343, 363.

[4] See, e.g. Lord Bolingbroke to Admiralty 16/7/1714, S.P., For. 44/218. Admiralty to St. John 3/4/1712, S.P., For. 42/11, 20/7, 11/8/1714, S.P., For. 42/13. Admiralty to Lord Townshend 28/4/1714, S.P., For. 42/58.

[5] *Journal of Board of Trade and Plantations 1714/15 to 1718*, 213.

[6] Maister's account book, Hull University Library.

and Swedish, tar.[1] In 1720 the Navy Board bought more European than Colonial tar, despite the fact that the latter was half as cheap at that time.[2]

There is thus an interesting discrepancy between the civil and military consumption which is not shown by the trade statistics.[3] The Navy used comparatively small quantities of pitch, whereas it needed tar for its rope-yards. The American tar was regarded as too hot for making rope and it burnt the cordage. It was because of this that the Navy Board later in the century, in 1777, was able to say of the bounty system, "... The benefit the Navy has received has been inconsiderable compared with that of the Commerce of the Kingdom at large, as but a small Quantity of Tar of American Growth upon which article the highest Bounty is given is used in making Cordage for His Ma:ts service, that imported from Sweden being preferred on account of its superior Quality."[4] By then, the American War of Independence had begun and the English market returned to its former complete dependence on supplies from the Baltic area.

III

Thus it was not the appearance of large quantities of American tar on the market after the premium system had been put into practise that alone destroyed the Swedish tar monopoly. This already happened earlier owing to the disappearance of the unique production conditions. After 1710 Sweden was no longer the sole supplier in Northern Europe of large quantities of tar and pitch. The new supplier was Russia. The trade statistics show, however, that when conditions were stabilized after the Great Northern War Swedish tar again surpassed supplies from Russia. Swedish exports were given a new chance when the premiums were temporarily removed in 1725—29. Strangely enough, tar from Sweden remained on the market after 1729. Its power of resistance lay in price and quality. Imports from Sweden had, however, sunk considerably — from 2000—2500 lasts of tar and pitch to a paltry 300—700 lasts, almost all of which was tar, the cheaper product.[5]

The new situation on the West European market had important consequences for the Swedes. It was no longer profitable to maintain a monopoly to control the price of tar when the market had three alternative production areas: America, Sweden and Russia. The Swedes realised this, and so did their Russian competitors in the 1730's, when Swedish plans for a new monopoly company were definitely relinquished and the Russian tar trade was thrown

[1] See contracts for colonial tar and pitch 1711—1715 (C.O. 5/866, V 145) and total purchases 1715—1720 (C.O. 327/7, K 121; Adm. 49/119). The figures from 1717 onwards are as follows, in 1717: From Russia 216 lasts, Norway 75, Virginia 63, Carolina 387, in 1718: Russia 101, Norway 4, Carolina 19, Sweden 20, in 1719: Russia 275, Carolina 79, 'Wyburgh' (Viborg in Finland) 25, in 1720: Russia 311, Bergen 8, Carolina 104, Sweden 67, New England 35, East Country 2 (Adm. 49/119).

[2] Corbett MSS, Naval Stores, p. 26, Admiralty Library. For the Navy Board's purchasing prices 1717—1728 see Table 5.

[3] See Table 5 and 6.

[4] Navy Board to Admiralty 17/4/1777, Adm. 106/2204.

[5] See Table 6.

open.[1] The Russian capacity for production had a great share in the course of events. The Swedes feared the Russian products more than the American ones, which all remained in England.[2] For the Russian tar flowed into the Dutch market, still an important one, and ruined it, too, for the Swedes. There was over-production and a fall in the prices of both pitch and tar which culminated at the end of the 1730's.[3] An account of Sweden's trade which the Board of Trade had sent to them from Sweden at that time gives, after first dealing with the Swedish gun trade, a discouraging picture of the situation of the tar trade.[4]

The setting for the "decline" of Swedish tar exports can have been no other than the appearance of the new European competitor in the two main consumers' markets in Europe — the English and the Dutch. This happened at a critical period for Swedish exports. Despite the fact that Russian tar did not succeed in continuing on the English market, it nevertheless contributed to the serious disturbance of the position of Swedish tar on the English market as a whole and thus also to toppling the centralized Swedish export organisation. It was something which the English premium policy, whose effect only extended to the English market and to a small degree to its chief consumer, the Navy, could hardly have managed alone. The prayer of the English merchants and statesmen had been answered, but in a manner which was unexpected and not altogether pleasant. The situation in the European tar market in the 1710's was one of many symptoms which indicated that there was a threat that the Swedish supremacy in the Baltic would be superseded by the Russian.

[1] *Hallberg*, 155—156. *Alanen*, 106 ff.
[2] Sw. B. of T. to K. of Sw. 14/1/1724, RA.
[3] N. W. Posthumus, *Inquiry into the History of Prices in Holland*, Leiden 1946, 473 ff.
[4] Harrington to B. of T. 20/7/1731, C.O. 388/30, V 78.

ABBREVIATIONS

Abt.	Abteilung
Acta Soc. Scient. Fenn.	Acta Societatis Scientiarum Fennicae
Add. MSS.	Additional Manuscripts
Ann. Acad. Scient. Fenn.	Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae
Arch.	Archives
B. of T.	Board of Trade
BM	British Museum
Bull. Inst. Hist. Res.	Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research
C. O.	Colonial Office
Cal. S. P., Dom.	Calendar of State Papers, Domestic
Cal. Treasury Papers	Calendar of Treasury Papers
Carn. Inst. Publ.	Carnegie Institute Publications
Coll.	Collection
Customs	Custom House Reports
Dipl. Angl.	Diplomatica Anglica
Dipl. Holl.	Diplomatica Hollandica
Econ. Hist. Rev.	Economic History Review
Eng. Hist. Rev.	English Historical Review
Gov. Gen.	Governor General
Harv. Econ. Stud.	Harvard Economic Studies
Hist. Bibl.	Historiskt Bibliotek
Hist. ser.	Historical series
Hist. stud. tillägn.	Historiska studier tillägnade
Hist. Tidskr.	Historisk Tidskrift
Huntington Libr. Quart.	Huntington Library Quarterly
Jahrb.	Jahrbuch
John Hopkins Univ. Stud. Hist. Pol. Sc.	John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Sciences
Journ. Econ. Bus. Hist.	Journal of Economic and Business History
Journ. Mod. Hist.	Journal of Modern History
Journ. South. Hist.	Journal of Southern History
K. of Sw.	King of Sweden
K. Vitt. Hist. Ant. Akad. handl.	Kungliga Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademiens handlingar
KB	Kungliga Biblioteket
K. M:t	Kunglig Majestät
Karol. Förb. Årsb.	Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok
Lunds Univ. Årsskr.	Lunds Universitets Årsskrift
New Engl. Quart.	New England Quarterly
P. C.	Privy Council
PRO	Public Record Office
Proc.	Proceedings
R. Hist. Soc.	Royal Historical Society
RA	Riksarkivet
Rev. Hist. Mod.	Revue d'histoire moderne

S. P., For.	State Papers, Foreign
Sc. Hist. Philol.	Sciences Historiques et Philologiques
Scand. Econ. Hist. Rev.	Scandinavian Economic History Review
Skr. utg. K. Hum. Vet. Samf.	Skrifter utgivna av Kungliga Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet
Soc.	Society
Sw. B. of Mines	Swedish Board of Mines
Sw. B. of T.	Swedish Board of Trade
Trans.	Transactions
Ulster Journ. Arch.	Ulster Journal of Archaelogy
Univ. Lib.	University Library
Univ. Manch. Publ.	University of Manchester Publications
Uppsala Univ. Årsskr.	Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift
UUB	Uppsala Universitets Bibliotek
Vet. Soc.	Vetenskapssocieteten
Viert. Soz. Wirtsch. Gesch.	Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte
Yale Hist. Publ. Misc.	Yale Historical Publications Miscellany
Zeitschr.	Zeitschrift

MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

A list of archives and principal series utilized is given below; for detailed references, see footnotes in the text. A few very rare printed sources are included. Abbreviations are given in brackets, Swedish names in square brackets.

Public Record Office, London (PRO).
State Papers, Foreign (S.P., For.), mainly Sweden.
Colonial Office (C.O.), mainly Council of Trade and Plantations, later Board of Trade Papers.
Admiralty Papers (Adm.), mainly correspondence of Navy Board.
Custom House Reports (Customs), Ledgers of imports and exports.
Exchequer (E.), King's Remembrancer, Port Books.
Privy Council Register (P.C.).

British Museum, London (BM).
Additional Manuscripts (Add. Mss.) 25115, 35105, 35106, 36755, 37359.
Tracts on Commerce 816 m. 11, 816 m. 13.

Admiralty Library, London.
Corbett Manuscripts, Naval Stores.

Goldsmith's Library, London.
Broadsides.

London University Library, London.
Memorials by Josuah Gee.

Commonwealth Relations Office, London.
East India Company Records, Home Misc. 374, 375.

Bodleian Library, Oxford.
Rawlinson Manuscripts A. 256, A. 292.

Hull University Library, Hull.
Maister's Account Book.

Longleat, Warminster.
Coventry Papers, microfilms in Swedish Military Record Office [Krigsarkivet], Stockholm.

Swedish National Archives [Riksarkivet], Stockholm (RA).
Diplomatica (Dipl.), mainly Anglica (Angl.).
Royal letters, copied in the Letterbook of King's Orders in Council [Riksregistraturet].
Letters to the King [Brev till K. Majestät], classed according to dispatching offices.
Council's letters to the King of Sweden [Rådets brev till konungen].

Proceedings of the Swedish Council [Rådsprotokoll].
Parliamentary Documents of 1672 [Riksdagsacta 1672].
Originals of treaties with England [Originaltraktater, England].
Memoranda, reports and relations concerning foreign affairs, 1680—83 [Memorialer, betänkanden och relationer i utrikesärenden 1680—83].
Memoranda and reports on foreign affairs, 1684—87 [Memorialer och relationer i utrikesärenden 1684—87].
Drafts made by and communications received by Chancellery officials in the reign of Charles XI [Kanslitjänstemäns koncept och mottagna skrivelser, Karl XI:s tid].
Archives of the Swedish Board of Trade [Kommerskollegii arkiv].
Letterbook, mainly copies of letters to the King, partly used in original versions among the above-mentioned Letters to the King.
Registers, copies and notes concerning Trade Treaties, 1641—1815 [Liggare, avskrifter och anteckningar rörande handelstraktater 1641—1815].
Archives of the Swedish Board of Mines [Bergskollegii arkiv].
Proceedings.
Reports on foreign mines [Utländska bergverksrelationer].
Trade and Shipping [Handel och sjöfart].
Commission on the trading of foreign merchants and their residence in the Kingdom, 1695 [Kommission angående främmande köpmäns handel och vistande i riket 1695].
Livonica II.
Olivekrans Collection [Olivekranska samlingen].
Oxenstierna Collection [Oxenstiernska samlingen], vol. 12.

Swedish Treasury Archives [Kammararkivet], Stockholm.
Customs accounts of the Baltic Provinces [Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och licenträkenskaper].
Trade and Shipping [Handel och sjöfart].

Archives of the Swedish General Customs Board [Generaltullstyrelsens arkiv], Stockholm.
Alphabetically arranged extracts, etc. from correspondence and resolutions, 1577—1700 [Alfabetiskt ordnade utdrag etc. af bref och resolutioner 1577—1700].

Swedish Royal Library [Kungliga Biblioteket], Stockholm (KB).
Engeström Collection [Engeströmska samlingen].
E. Poley's letterbook, "Letters from Stockholme to ye Secretary of State from August 1687 to December 1688".

Stockholm City Archives [Stockholms Stadsarkiv], Stockholm.
Civil Acts [Civilakter].
Proceedings of Stockholm Magistrates, Department of Commerce [Handelskollegii protokoll].

Uppsala University Library [Uppsala Universitetsbibliotek], Uppsala (UUB).
Nordin Collection [Nordinska samlingen].

Staatliches Archivlager, Göttingen.
Etats-Ministerium, Abt. 74.

AUTHOR INDEX

A list of authors referred to in the footnotes is given below; for bibliographical details, see pages mentioned. In further references the short titles below are used as abbreviations where the author's name is not sufficient.

Table 1.

Value of England's total imports of iron, hemp, flax, potash and tar/pitch for 1699 and 1700 (average) distributed according to place of origin. (£)

Import area	Iron	Hemp	Flax	Potash	Tar/pitch	Total	(Total imports of all commodities)
'Sweden'	148.257	4.925	13.699	5	25.160	192.046	(222.323)
'East Country'	1.341	53.087	31.884	9.911	287	96.510	(179.941)
'Russia'	1.071	36.554	40.922	26.717	517	105.781	(138.232)
'Denmark-Norway'	3.159	209	—	—	2.416	5.784	(79.751)
Northern Europe, Total	153.828	94.775	86.505	36.633	28.380	400.121	(620.247)
'Holland'	3.166	2.232	3.397	—	14	8.809	(519.834)
Other areas	24.161[1]	162	506	3	458	25.290	(4.698.838)
Total	£ 181.155	£ 97.169	£ 90.408	£ 36.636	£ 28.852	£ 434.220	(£ 5.838.919)

[1] including 'Spain' 21.476
'Ireland' 1.040

Sources: PRO, Customs 3/2, 3/4

Table 2.

Value of imports of iron, hemp, flax, potash and tar/pitch to London, Outports, and all England, 1699—1747. (£)

Iron:

Imports of iron to London, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland' ..	126.797	95.963	77.100	96.678	91.716	66.673
'Russia'	165	890	5.346	789	24.049	17.787
'Spain'	9.805	11.258	4.854	5.614	780	—
'Germany'....	59	65	499	389	154	508
'Holland'	121	—	2.517	3.310	329	135
Other areas ..	—	—	18	199	273	—
Total	£ 136.947	£ 108.176	£ 90.334	£ 106.979	£ 117.301	£ 85.103

Imports of iron to Outports, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland' ..	39.346	43.947	61.176	72.408	86.039	97.092
'Russia'	797	291	674	1.729	9.156	8.384
'Spain'	9.336	12.554	15.848	15.705	—	—
'Germany'....	1.309	333	3.348	2.852	2.221	3.710
'Holland'	3.380	2.833	9.327	11.198	1.749	679
Other areas ..	2.718	885	362	663	1.389	73
Total	£ 56.886	£ 60.843	£ 90.735	£ 104.555	£ 100.554	£ 109.938

Imports of iron to all England, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland' ..	166.143	139.910	138.276	169.086	177.755	163.765
'Russia'	962	1.181	6.020	2.518	33.205	26.171
'Spain'	19.141	23.812	20.702	21.319	780	—
'Germany'....	1.368	398	3.847	3.241	2.375	4.218
'Holland'	3.501	2.833	11.844	14.508	2.078	814
'Plantations'..	37	—	—	—	1.353	—
'Ireland'	2.070	10	362[1]	800[2]	309[3]	73
Other areas ..	611	875	18	62	—	—
Total	£ 193.833	£ 169.019	£ 181.069	£ 211.534	£ 217.855	£ 195.041

[1] of Spanish origin
[2] ,, 415, of Swedish origin 385
[3] of Swedish origin

Hemp:

Imports of hemp to London, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland' ..	81.797	20.276	40.821	38.096	12.826	28.938
'Russia'	24.549	33.866	58.979	68.530	93.292	108.769
'Germany'....	4	—	—	—	—	—
'Holland'	1.311	—	1.178	333	—	—
Other areas ..	—	57	361	—	3	—
Total	£ 107.661	£ 54.199	£ 101.339	£ 106.959	£ 106.121	£ 137.707

Imports of hemp to Outports, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland' ..	6.633	8.138	19.952	11.474	43.415	21.467
'Russia'	6.913	7.780	11.474	18.886	29.557	41.469
'Germany'....	—	—	—	468	294	—
'Holland'	2.396	758	1.350	1.916	71	1.187
Other areas ..	263	—	33	41	405	—
Total	£ 16.205	£ 16.676	£ 32.809	£ 32.785	£ 73.742	£ 64.123

Imports of hemp to all England, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland' ..	88.430	28.414	60.773	49.570	56.241	50.405
'Russia'	31.462	41.646	70.453	87.416	122.849	150.238
'Germany'....	4	—	—	468	294	—
'Holland'	3.707	758	2.528	2.249	71	1.187
'Scotland' ..	263	—	—	—	—	—
'Ireland'	—	—	33	41	405	—
Other areas ..	—	57	361	—	3	—
Total	£ 123.866	£ 70.875	£ 134.148	£ 139.744	£ 179.863	£ 201.830

Flax:

Imports of flax to London, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland' ..	7.006	18.954	5.028	13.787	19.853	43.323
'Russia'	9.273	35.903	11.698	26.924	4.425	19.105
'Germany'....	—	—	—	327	—	9.509
'Holland'	1.282	2.532	1.714	1.983	1.526	2.380
Other areas ..	112	5	3	—	—	2
Total	£ 17.673	£ 57.394	£ 18.443	£ 43.021	£ 25.804	£ 74.319

Imports of flax to Outports, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland' ..	36.996	30.211	40.346	17.340	46.730	39.808
'Russia'	17.048	19.621	20.547	32.741	6.435	34.193
'Ge many'....	—	—	154	—	—	568
'Holland'	1.148	1.833	3.321	10.157	25.949	22.028
Other areas ..	236	660	5.436	268	5.307	18
Total	£ 55.428	£ 52.325	£ 69.804	£ 60.506	£ 84.421	£ 96.615

Imports of flax to all England, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland' ..	44.002	49.165	45.374	31.127	66.583	83.131
'Russia'	26.321	55.524	32.245	59.665	10.860	53.298
'Germany'....	—	—	154	327	—	10.077
'Holland'	2.430	4.365	5.035	12.140	27.475	24.408
'Scotland' ..	56	598	—	—	—	—
'Ireland'	—	62	5.439	268	57	18
Other areas ..	292	5	—	—	5.250	2
Total	£ 73.101	£ 109.719	£ 88.247	£ 103.527	£ 110.225	£ 170.934

Potash:

Imports of potash to London, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland' ..	13.910	5.918	31.507	25.722	846	8.672
'Russia'	19.897	33.537	16.713	14.655	29.084	11.898
Other areas ..	1	—	39	369	130	—
Total	£ 33.808	£ 39.455	£ 48.259	£ 40.746	£ 30.060	£ 20.570

Imports of potash to Outports, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland' ..	—	6	1.854	1.191	50	456
'Russia'	—	—	—	65	—	—
Other areas ..	—	4	—	—	10	124
Total	—	£ 10	£ 1.854	£ 1.256	£ 60	£ 580

Imports of potash to all England, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland' ..	13.910	5.924	33.361	26.913	896	9.128
'Russia'	19.897	33.537	16.713	14.720	29.084	11.898
Other areas ..	1	4	39	369	140	124
Total	£ 33.808	£ 39.465	£ 50.113	£ 42.002	£ 30.120	£ 21.150

Tar/pitch:

Imports of tar/pitch to London, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland' ..	23.838	12.586	12.649	17.452	5.767	18.249
'Russia'	11	799	—	682	—	—
'Germany'....	—	—	—	—	—	108
'Holland'	—	—	—	—	—	—
'Plantations'..	105	28	37.966	32.976	24.117	17.876
'Ireland'	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other areas ..	—	32	359	752	—	13
Total	£ 23.954	£ 13.445	£ 50.974	£ 51.862	£ 29.884	£ 36.246

Imports of tar/pitch to Outports, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland' ..	8.975	10.331	7.260	9.708	8.309	10.906
'Russia'	—	225	2.503	1.080	—	21
'Germany'....	—	—	81	—	—	—
'Holland'	4	24	—	28	—	9
'Plantations'..	41	25	22.353	16.902	14.808	18.918
'Ireland'	345	232	415	265	235	54
Other areas ..	64	31	95	18	—	1.298
Total	£ 9.429	£ 10.868	£ 32.707	£ 28.001	£ 23.352	£ 31.206

Imports of tar/pitch to all England, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland' ..	32.813	22.917	19.909	27.160	14.076	29.155
'Russia'	11	1.024	2.503	1.762	—	21
'Germany'....	—	—	81	—	—	108
'Holland'	4	24	—	28	—	9
'Plantations'..	146	53	60.319	49.878	38.925	36.784
'Ireland'	345	232	415	265	235	54
Other areas ..	64	63	454	770	—	1.311
Total	£ 33.383	£ 24.313	£ 83.681	£ 79.863	£ 53.236	£ 67.452

Sources: 1699 PRO, Customs 3/2
1700 ,, ,, 3/4
1725 ,, ,, 3/27
1726 ,, ,, 3/28 A
1746 ,, ,, 3/46
1747 ,, ,, 3/47

Table 3.

Value of England's total imports of iron, hemp, flax, potash, and tar/pitch, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Russia'	78.653	132.912	127.934	166.081	195.998	241.626
'Sweden'	213.056	171.580	142.760	171.172	172.684	173.917
'East Country'	125.836	69.186	147.799	119.739	128.163	142.177
'Denm.-Norway'	6.406	5.564	7.123	12.945	14.704	19.490
Other areas ..	34.303	34.149	111.477	106.733	78.970	79.197
Total	£ 458.254	£ 413.391	£ 537.093	£ 576.670	£ 590.519	£ 656.407

Value of England's total imports of all commodities from the Baltic, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Russia'	99.845	176.620	250.315	235.869	261.575	321.015
'Sweden'	245.802	198.825	161.884	177.093	177.486	176.912
'East Country'	224.546	135.338	209.149	157.154	208.156	228.131
Total	£ 570.193	£ 510.783	£ 621.348	£ 570.116	£ 647.217	£ 726.058

Sources: see Table 2.

Table 4.

Value of imports of copper and brass wire to London, 1663—1747, and to Outports and all England, 1699—1747 (£).

Copper:

Imports of 'unwrought copper' to London, 1663—1747. (£)

Import area	1663	1669	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland'	2.485	4.132	795	—	211	—	70	—
'Germany'	15.401[1]	19.533[2]	—[3]	—[4]	—	—	—	—
'Holland'	23.461	—	540	84	190	779	—	—
'East India'	2.886	—	173	2.092	—	—	—	—
'Africa, Barbary'	423	565	982	2.311	16.441	11.482	12.949	11
Other areas[5]	—	—	—	77	2.990	1.012	431	—
Total	44.656	24.230	2.490	4.564	£ 19.832	£ 13.273	£ 13.450	£ 11
	8.739	7.586	1.128	1.681				
	£ 53.395	£ 31.816	£ 3.618	£ 6.245				

[1] plus 'double' and 'single' plates 8.739
[2] ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, 7.586
[3] 'thin copper plates' 1.128
[4] ,, ,, ,, 1.681
[5] mainly from Spain

Imports of unwrought copper to Outports, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland'	—	18[1]	43	—	10	2
'Germany'.....	32	—	143	—	64	447
'Holland'	—	—	14	14	10	50
'Africa'	—	—	—	141	—	—
Other areas	—	—	64	2.257[2]	—	—
Total	£ 32	£ 18	£ 264	£ 2.412	£ 84	£ 499

[1] plus copper plates 18
[2] from Ireland

Imports of 'unwrought copper' to all England, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland'	795	18	254	—	80	2
'Germany'.....	32	—	143	—	64	447
'Holland'	540	84	204	793	10	50
'East India' ..	173	2.092	—	—	—	—
'Africa, Barbary'	982	2.311	16.441	11.623	12.949	11
Other areas	—	77	3.054	3.269	431	—
Total	£ 2.522	£ 4.582	£ 20.096	£ 15.685	£ 13.534	£ 510

Brass wire:

Imports of brass wire to London, 1663—1747. (£)

Import area	1663	1669	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland'	2.558	3.364	12.748	7.499	117	576	—	—
'Germany'	13.409	3.607	3.658	2.295	1.097	894	884	719
Other areas	—	—	380	210	—	7	—	—
Total	£ 15.967	£ 6.971	£ 16.786	£ 10.004	£ 1.214	£ 1.477	£ 884	£ 719

Imports of brass wire to Outports, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland'	1.463	650	241	408	—	—
'Germany'.....	603	1.330	227	252	—	—
Other areas	—	3	52	34	—	—
Total	£ 2.066	£ 1.983	£ 520	694	—	—

Imports of brass wire to all England, 1699—1747. (£)

Import area	1699	1700	1725	1726	1746	1747
'Eastland'	14.211	8.149	358	984	—	—
'Germany'.....	4.261	3.625	1.324	1.146	884	719
Other areas	380	213	52	41	—	—
Total	£ 18.852	£ 11.987	£ 1.734	£ 2.171	£ 884	£ 719

Sources: BM, Add. MSS 36755 (1663, 1669)
PRO, Customs 3/2, 3/4, 3/27, 3/28 A, 3/46, 3/47 (1699, 1700, 1725, 1726, 1746, 1747)

Table 5.

Navy Board purchases of pitch and tar, 1697–1727.

(Source of supply and prices in Pounds and Shillings)

	1697	1698	1699	1700	1701	1702	1703	1704	1705	1706	1707	1708	1709	1710	1711	1712	1713	1714	1715	1716	1717	1718	1719	1720	1721	1722	1723	1724	1725	1726	1727
Pitch **(per ton)**																															
'Stockholm'	12/5	9/15			10/10	10/—	16/10		(14/—)	(11/10)	(12/—)	10/—	10/—	12/—																	
'Gothenburg'										(11/—)	(11/—)	(10/—)																			
'Sweden'																					(11/—)		(6/10)				4/17	5/5	3/17	4/5	4/14
'Finland & Courland'									12/—		11/—																				
'Russia'											11/—	(11/—)					(9/7)		(10/10)												
'Poland'									11/—																						
'Carolina'									(12/—)		11/—	(10/—)	(10/—)						9/—		6/16	5/10	5/—	(4/—)							
'New England'											(10/—)	(10/—)	(10/—)			(9/10)			10/—	(11/—)	(7/5)			(4/15)							
'New York'										(10/10)																					
'Virginia'											(11/10)										6/16										
'Plantations'																						(6/5)									
Tar **(per last)**																															
'Stockholm'	14/5	11/15				15/—	14/—	(18/—)	15/—	(14/15)	12/—	11/10	11/10	16/—																	
'Gothenburg'					11/15	11/15					(12/—)									(14/—)											
'Sweden'																						(18/—)		(13/—)							
'Viborg'						(22/—)																	(15/—)		14/17						
'Bergen'																								(14/10)							
'Norway'																					(15/10)	(15/10)									
'Russia'									(15/—)		10/10	(11/—)			(16/—)	10/—	8/—		12/—	12/—	14/—	12/—	13/15	13/—							
'Russia & Norway'																												9/5	9/17	8/19	8/—
'East Country'																								(12/—)							
'Carolina'									(15/—)		10/—									(12/—)	9/—	(11/10)	6/10	(4/—)							
'New England'										14/—	9/10	10/10			(16/—)				11/—	(12/—)				(5/8)							
'Virginia'																					11/5										
'Plantations'																									8/—		5/2	7/5	8/—	7/5	7 17

Sources: PRO, CO 323/9, L 89; CO 388/19, O 159; Adm. 49/119. If no figures can be found for the Home Yards (Deptford, Woolwich and Chatham) those for Portsmouth and Plymouth are given in brackets. Cf. Navy Board to Admiralty 2/6/1704 (Adm. 1/3598). The Home Yards prices were always lower.

Table 6.

The distribution of English imports of tar and pitch according to exporting areas, 1697—1739. (lasts)

from: —	1697	1698	1699	1700	1701	1702	1703	1704	1705	1706	1707	1708	1709	1710	1711	1712	1713	1714	1715	1716	1717	1718	1719	1720	1721	1722	1723	1724	1725	1726	1727	1728	1729	1730	1731	1732	1733	1734	1735	1736	1737	1738	1739
'Sweden'	4420	906	3605	2171	2510	908	3369	3572	2730	2114	2006	2221	2050	1949	1806	1808	1778	1568	215	260	1	2	103	183	62	207	139	90	884	813	442	793	1379	1117	290	690	299	602	657	510	232	363	543
'Denmark-Norway' ..	159	83	303	331	309	(209)*	271	602	464	353	271	261	326	576	243	409	685	724	766	1031	1092	685	422	346	278	307	226	297	540	898	275	355	741	455	331	357	645	394	231	373	286	221	262
'East Country'	1231	3	20	45	33	(1)*	97	207	83	32	8	118	2	3	3	36	66	8	85	6	76	185	46	22	1	—	—	1	866	1306	58	—	—	55	—	7	—	—	1	1	—	—	—
'Russia'	18	42	13	114	—	14	1	18	213	11	298	44	2	338	857	901	195	44	1056	1398	462	457	23	361	553	260	410	—	278	196	26	21	3	2	33	112	256	153	—	70	—	1	—
'Germany'	24	—	—	—	—	1	—	116	106	46	—	—	2	1	—	—	2	1	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
'Holland'	—	—	1	3	—	10	6	358	258	164	—	—	1	2	11	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	4	—	1	—	29	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
'Ireland' & 'Scotland'	—	31	40	26	11	17	38	160	83	214	24	84	113	66	154	71	104	64	35	92	20	32	44	31	10	—	6	35	46	29	40	45	35	15	4	2	2	11	13	6	10	—	4
'American colonies' ..	3	—	16	6	15	16	39	73	196	485	741	512	591	457	370	439	402	975	2107	4755	6017	6489	5741	3905	2937	4198	5444	6923	6753	5556	2859	1031	1775	2745	3995	5887	6125	8532	6205	10835	5409	4871	3162
Other areas	—	—	12	5	—	—	—	—	1	—	14	—	—	—	—	10	9	—	—	13	1	1	—	—	22	—	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	5855	1065	4010	2701	2878	(1176)	3821	5106	4134	3419	3362	3240	3087	3392	3444	3674	3241	3384	4265	7561	7669	7851	6380	4843	3863	4972	6225	7358	9376	8798	3701	2249	3935	4390	4653	7084	7327	9692	7107	11795	5937	5457	3971

* The volume for 1702 is damaged.

The distribution of English imports of tar and pitch according to exporting areas, 1697—1739. (%)

from: —	1697 %	1698 %	1699 %	1700 %	1701 %	1702 %	1703 %	1704 %	1705 %	1706 %	1707 %	1708 %	1709 %	1710 %	1711 %	1712 %	1713 %	1714 %	1715 %	1716 %	1717 %	1718 %	1719 %	1720 %	1721 %	1722 %	1723 %	1724 %	1725 %	1726 %	1727 %	1728 %	1729 %	1730 %	1731 %	1732 %	1733 %	1734 %	1735 %	1736 %	1737 %	1738 %	1739 %
'Sweden'	**75.5**	**85.1**	**89.9**	**80.5**	**87.2**	**(77.2)**	**88.2**	**70.0**	**66.0**	**61.8**	**59.7**	**68.5**	**66.4**	**57.5**	**52.4**	**49.2**	**54.9**	**46.3**	5.0	3.4	0.0	0.0	1.6	3.8	1.6	4.2	2.2	1.2	9.4	9.2	11.9	**35.3**	**35.0**	**25.4**	6.2	9.7	4.1	6.2	9.2	4.3	3.9	6.7	13.7
'Denmark-Norway' ..	2.7	7.8	7.6	12.3	10.8	(17.8)	7.1	11.7	11.2	10.4	8.1	8.1	10.6	17.0	7.1	11.2	**21.1**	**21.5**	18.0	13.6	14.2	8.7	6.6	7.1	7.3	6.2	3.6	4.0	5.8	10.2	**7.4**	15.8	18.8	10.4	7.1	5.0	8.8	4.1	3.3	3.2	4.8	4.0	6.6
'East Country'	**21.0**	0.3	0.5	1.7	1.1	(0.0)	2.5	4.1	2.0	0.9	0.2	3.6	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.8	2.0	0.2	2.0	0.1	1.0	2.4	0.7	0.5	0.0	—	—	0.0	9.2	14.9	1.6	—	—	1.3	—	0.1	—	—	0.0	0.0	—	—	—
'Russia'	0.3	3.9	0.3	4.2	—	(1.2)	0.0	0.4	5.2	0.3	8.9	1.4	0.1	10.0	**24.9**	**24.6**	6.0	1.3	**24.8**	18.5	6.0	5.8	0.4	7.4	14.3	5.2	6.6	—	3.0	2.2	0.7	0.9	0.1	0.1	0.7	1.6	3.5	1.6	—	0.6	—	0.0	—
'Germany'	0.4	—	—	—	—	(0.0)	—	2.3	2.6	1.3	—	—	0.1	0.0	—	—	0.1	0.0	0.0	—	—	—	0.0	—	—	—	—	—	0.1	—	—	—	0.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
'Holland'	—	—	0.0	0.1	—	(0.9)	0.2	7.0	6.2	4.8	—	—	0.0	0.0	0.3	—	—	—	—	0.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.0	0.2	—	0.0	—	0.4	—	—	—	—	—	0.0	—
'Ireland' & 'Scotland'	—	2.9	1.0	1.0	0.4	(1.5)	1.0	3.1	2.0	6.3	0.7	2.6	3.7	1.9	4.5	1.9	3.2	1.9	0.8	1.2	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.6	0.3	—	0.1	0.5	0.5	0.3	1.1	2.0	0.9	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	—	0.1
American colonies	0.1	—	0.4	0.2	0.5	(1.4)	1.0	1.4	4.8	14.2	**22.0**	15.8	19.0	13.5	10.7	12.0	12.4	**28.8**	**49.4**	**62.9**	**78.5**	**82.7**	**90.0**	**80.6**	**76.0**	**84.4**	**87.5**	**94.1**	**72.0**	**63.2**	**77.3**	**45.8**	**45.1**	**62.5**	**85.9**	**83.2**	**83.6**	**88.0**	**87.3**	**91.8**	**91.1**	**89.3**	**79.6**
Other areas	—	—	0.3	—	—	—	—	—	0.0	—	0.4	—	—	—	—	0.3	0.3	—	—	0.2	0.0	0.0	—	—	0.5	—	—	0.2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	(100.0)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: PRO, Customs 3/1—39 (1697—1704, 1706—1711, 1713—1726, 1728—39)
C.O. 390/6 (1705, 1712), C.O. 390/7 (1727)