Anssi Halmesvirta

The British conception of the Finnish 'race', nation and culture, 1760—1918
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Preface

This study has arisen out of the need to understand how the British envisaged an alien 'race', the Finns, and of the urge to gain a new historical perspective from which to reassess the rise of the Finns from a province to independence. The idea of this kind of research was first conceived as I worked for a project investigating foreign attitudes to and notions of the Finnish 'race'. Professor Aira Kemiläinen at the University of Jyväskylä asked me to join in and she has ever since encouraged me to go on.

Having completed my basic studies in Finland, I was generously given a grant by the Oskari Huttunen foundation, the British Council and Finnish Academy for further studies at the University of Sussex. In the years 1984–87 I worked there with the guidance of my supervisor, Professor J.W. Burrow, who constantly gave me valuable criticism. The courses in intellectual history at Sussex provided me with the basic understanding of the methods of the history of ideas without which this study could not have been written. The source material was mainly deposited at the British Library and Sussex University Library but I have also consulted the Public Record Office and Åbo Academi’s Library in Turku, Finland — to all these institutions I express my gratitude. The English language was carefully corrected by Anthony Melville and Steven Saletta, to whom I am indebted. My thanks go also to the Institute of History at the University of Jyväskylä where I found a work-place to complete the final version. With the aid of Teppo Vihola and Ilkka Nummela the printer ran smoothly. After the process of study, it is an honour to have my study included in the publications of the Historiallinen Seura.

Anssi Halmesvirta
Introduction

I

The main task of this thesis is to examine the British conception and perceptions of the Finnish 'race', nation and culture from the end of the eighteenth century to 1918, the year the Finns waged a Civil War. Only recently have historians of ideas begun to study racist, nationalist and organicist notions concerning the evolution of man and society in their proper politico-historical and cultural contexts. The notorious concept of race in its more recent political and cultural uses in particular seems to have been remote from their interests; even if its theoretical foundations have been thoroughly studied and its nationalist associations shown, the complex connections between the racist, political and cultural arguments that were, in their day, generally presented as scientifically based, have not been the subject of close scrutiny. Certainly this is the case with the image of the Finns and their society as perceived by British observers.

The perceptions of the Finns by the British intellectual aristocracy and its reading public in the Enlightenment, and the Victorian and Edwardian eras would not make sense without reference to race and its discourse, so deeply did it permeate the British notions of the Finn. The purpose here is to clarify the manifold meanings of race in political language and in evolutionary and progressive thought in general, and to analyze the political and historical insights the British gained and the lessons they learned. A detailed account of the development, interconnections and variations of the key concepts the British used in describing the Finns is attempted by studying the various
contexts where these concepts play a significant role.

The key concepts of the title of this thesis need definition. In modern scientific discourse 'race' is a biological concept, referring to the frequencies of certain hereditary factors (genes) which mark human population difference. Cultural and social anthropologists have abandoned the term altogether because no conclusions concerning culture can be drawn from such biological propensities, preferring the term 'ethnic group' since the 1930s. Before the invention of the Mendelian concept of population the term 'race', although vague, was quite indiscriminately and forcefully used. In anthropology it was typically deployed in postulating theories about racial hierarchies; in amateur and political circles it was called on to identify cultural and intellectual differences between peoples and in trying to explain conflicts and rivalries between social classes, nationalities, and even empires. The explanatory force of race appeared tempting and able to answer many questions. 'Racism' that developed from the 1850s onwards, was a theory based on the assumption that populations could be divided into distinct "higher" and "lower" stocks, the "higher" being capable of "high" cultural achievements, the "lower" lagging behind. Under the concept of racialism one can gather together arguments, attitudes and stereotypes that exploited the concept of 'race' either without specifying it in a very elaborate way or by giving it a specific historical and political meaning.

The second key term, 'nation', is more complex than that of 'race'. By 'nation', one generally means a large community of people living within a particular territory, speaking the same


language, having a common religion, history and some common political aspirations. The creation of 'nation' in the early half of the nineteenth century involved a process of historical 'reconstruction' in which intellectuals (historians, anthropologists, archaeologists and folklorists) sought to 'rediscover' their communal past by presenting it as an organic historical reality. Following the model of natural science, they imposed the trajectory of growth, decline and rebirth on history. What emerged was an idealized past ('golden age', 'poetic space') to which a people should "return" in order to be born again. This imagery was widely used by the intellectuals of small Eastern European (especially Slavic) nationalities and it was also adopted by Finnish scholars to invigorate the Finnish national revival, first, under the pressures of Swedish-speaking culture, and later, against the threat of Russification.

In contrast, in Britain where national cohesion had already been achieved, nationalism developed in two directions. Studies of Anglo-Saxon — Norman antagonism in particular, and of British origins in general were pursued in the spirit of Whiggish nationalism which prevailed since the collapse of Napoleon. Later on, in the imperialist era, the expansionist and racialist nationalism (originated in studies of German history) hardened, and enchanted even the lower social classes. It developed into an ideology that attempted to create consciousness and adulation of the British nation by studying the origins and propagating a mission for the Empire. Racialist ideas were powerfully associated with ideas of the nation and the Empire, and they were defined mainly by their racial composition, not only by their linguistic, religious, ethnic or other characteristics. 'Nation' sometimes became subordinate to 'race', although usually it was the ideas of national unity and cohesion that were emphasized. One version of

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liberal racialism was represented, for example, by E.A. Freeman, who defended the autonomy of Finland\(^6\). In this thesis the development of nationalism is central to the argument as the British tried to evaluate the Finnish race and nation. Here, a serious problem for the British in understanding Finland was that it was divided into two 'races', the awakening Finnish-speaking majority and the Swedish-speaking ruling minority, and, at the same time (1809—1917), was a part of the multiracial Russian Empire.

As for the definition of 'culture', there is no prevailing consensus among anthropologists. For the purposes of this thesis, the term refers to an integrated system of beliefs and meanings (knowledge, belief, art, work, morals, law and custom) and their products in a society adapted to its environment. Again, this does not coincide with the nineteenth-century definitions and differences must be noted. A common nineteenth-century assumption was that civilization had arisen in stages of culture from simple "primitive" communities to complex industrial societies. Many intellectuals connected the concept of comparative cultural anthropology with racial arguments. Culture was made dependent on hereditary racial capabilities. The "superior White" races were attributed with greater intellect and cultural powers than, for instance, the Negro, Mongol or Finn. Darwin's theory of evolution did not contradict the racial hierarchies; rather Darwin's ideas were adopted by anthropologists and even politicians for their own purposes. In this thesis, particular attention is paid to how this feature determined the perception of British observers of the Finns.

II

The methodological approach used here is that of the history of ideas. Dominick LaCapra has shown that the historian's dialogue with texts is a complicated and many-faceted business, as the historian has to penetrate all the relations (intentions and

motivations of the author, the norms of society and culture, the corpus of the author, discourse) pertinent to the text. Here, a less demanding version of LaCapra’s method is applied, as the ideal source material concerning various authors is not available. For this reason, the main concern here is to study the relation between the mode of discourse and the text. Any secondary information available has been taken into account.

In order to preserve the immediacy of the texts and to give the reader an opportunity to face them as they are, frequent use has been made of quotations. They speak for themselves and bring the variety of thought into view. In the analysis of the texts, the purpose has been to clarify the content and mode of discourse as it refers to the Finns. One of the approaches has been to identify the assumptions underlying the discourse. The key concepts used by the British observers are located in the contexts of current scientific and political languages, and of debates concerning, for instance, the state of the Russian Empire. Each observer carried with him a unique perspective, although his language was usually intimately tied in with the evolutionary scheme. Various forms of evolutionary ideas from Romantic impressions of a British angler on the shores of Lake Saimaa to the sophisticated legalist arguments of a Professor of International Law, from a feminist-socialist point of view to the wide-ranging historical reflections of a remarkable Liberal historian, will be encountered. In all these ideas common ground can be recognized. By pointing out the manifold contexts, reformulations and variations of the British idea of the Finn, it will be seen how Finnish culture was encompassed by Western categories of thought.

III

Very little has been written about Anglo-Finnish contacts and none of this has been purely from the point of view of the history of

ideas. The political ideas of the British observers and policymakers assessing the position of Finland in the years 1850-1914 have been studied by George Maude in his *Finland and Britain, 1854—1914*; British foreign policy in relation to the recognition of Finland and to the Baltic constellation during and after the First World War has been studied by Eino Lyytinen and Olavi Hovi. Sven Hirn and Erkki Markkanen have written on tourism in Finland and have touched on some British comments. The author of this thesis has given a rough survey of the evolutionary anthropology in Britain and of its nineteenth-century concept of the Finn in *Mongoleja vai Germaaneja?* (Mongols or Germans?), a collection of articles concerning the ideas of Finnish racial origins. However, an overall synthesis has not been attempted. Important clues to sources have been found both in Maude's work and in William R. Mead's books and numerous articles on Anglo-Finnish relations. To cover a wider spectrum of ideas than merely official political ones a great variety of sources ranging from travellers' descriptions and anthropological treatises to some diplomatic and private correspondence, from memoirs to authoritative comments of some leading British politicians and intellectuals on Finnish affairs, and from descriptive and political periodical articles to racialist poetry has been used. To pursue a fruitful dialogue with the totality of British perceptions it is necessary to analyze the general scientific concept of the Finn as well as the political one.

The source material is diverse and unequal in historical value. Diplomatic correspondence has already been covered by Maude and Lyytinen and here only a few extracts which relate to the main themes have been used. Private correspondence (especially Julio Reuter's) is valuable in revealing the stands taken by the British to the Finno-Russian dispute of 1899—1910. Anthropological and ethnological treatises relate to the formation of British evolutionary sociology; some of them were classics of their genre and thus very influential in the shaping of opinion.

As for periodical sources in general, they are the most coherent and informative part of the material. The nineteenth century was the "great age of periodical literature", and it only declined after 1914. For instance, the *Edinburgh Review* and *The Quarterly Review*, the two best-selling periodicals in Britain, sold 14,000 copies each in 1818. These two actually shared the reading public until the 1830s. It can be argued that it was through the periodical
article that the British came to know about the Finns and it is clear that the reviewers (for example, of the *Kalevala*) were conscious of performing a cultural function. Famous, mainly Liberal politicians and cultural personalities wrote about Finland in radical Liberal periodicals and, as the reading public increased towards the end of the century and the "tiny new intellectual aristocracy" recruited increasingly from the middle-classes, knowledge of Finland was slowly but surely spreading. Many a new periodical appeared and there was a considerable increase in writing about Finland from about 1880. At the turn of the century, British newspapers also gave room to leaders on Finland.

British travel literature about Finland experienced three peaks of success. It was very popular reading from the later decades of the eighteenth century until about 1810. During the early Victorian era it declined somewhat but rose again in the 1850s. At the end of the nineteenth century there occurred another period of popularity of travel literature which made Finland well-known to the British reading public. For reasons to be discussed later, travel descriptions sometimes made remarkable contributions to knowledge about foreign peoples. Yet, much of it was of poor quality, impressionistic or meant to serve tourist purposes. Here, a selection of the most influential of these works has been used. For instance, E.D. Clarke's *Travels* was widely read and continuously referred to in the nineteenth century. To take another exceptional work, Ms Rosalind Travers's *Letters from Finland* are an account of a well-informed observer who spent a long enough time in Finland to be able to report perceptively. Her letters have an original touch. The nearer the travel literature comes to our times, the more the travellers approached their writing in a spirit of scientific enquiry. In the 1920s—30s their books became small histories with political commentary.

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Before discussing the structure of the thesis, it would be appropriate to give a synopsis of Finnish political and cultural developments from the mid-eighteenth century to the Finnish Civil War of 1918 and its aftermath.

In the middle of the eighteenth century Finland belonged, as a province, to the weakened northern power of Sweden-Finland. After the final defeat of Charles XII in the Great Northern War, Sweden had to sign the Peace of Uusikaupunki (1721) and cede southeastern Finland along with Ingria, Livonia and Estonia to Russia (see map 1). With access to the Baltic and the establishment of St Petersburg, Russia further strengthened its power in the Baltic. Even the internal affairs of Sweden, which came to be ruled by the Estates (1720—1771), were greatly influenced by Russian intentions. Finns soon started to realize that Finland was no longer sheltered from Russian expansion, and they tried to assume a conciliatory policy towards Russia. After further territorial losses in the Peace of Turku (1743) they became even more assured of Sweden’s inability to resist Russian expansion into Finland.

As the position of Sweden in the Baltic had declined, the alienation of the Finns from Swedish-speaking culture and administration started. As early as the 1720—30s, the Finnish peasant representatives in the Riksdag in Stockholm reacted against the dominance of Swedish cultural values amongst the Finnish upper classes. The yeoman Finns and the Swedish-speaking administrators in Finland were gradually drawn apart, culturally and linguistically, a fact observed by British travellers at the end of the century. The alienation of the Finns from the party politics of Sweden showed itself in the coup of Gustavus III in 1772; some Finnish officers, led by Colonel Georg Magnus Sprengtporten, helped Gustavus to reinstate monarchial power. The new Form of Government of 1772 and the later Act of Union and Security (1792) gave the monarch full executive powers with the four Estates convened only when new taxes were planned. These two acts were destined to have far-reaching significance for

MAP 1: Finland after the Peace Treaty of Uusikaupunki, 1721 with place-names mentioned by Joseph Marshall in 1769 ("Torna, Wassay, Salo, Nyslott, Wybourg")

The boundaries are reproduced from Jutikkala with Pirinen, *A History of Finland*, p. 131, map.
Finland. Until 1917 Finnish, Swedish, Russian and even British experts sought to interpret them in an effort to clarify the extent of Finnish autonomy within the Russian Empire.

Soon after Gustavus III's revolution, it became clear that the Swedish government had neglected the defence of Finland. In the 1780s Finnish discontent developed into a separatist movement that reached its climax just before Gustavus III's war against Russia. Finnish officers were tired of waging yet another war and started a mutiny because they believed that war could lead only to the annexation of Finland by Russia. The rebellion was soon suppressed and the defence of Finland strengthened by building the fortress of Sveaborg (Viapori) commanding the searoads of the Gulf of Finland. International power politics intervened. It was during the great European wars after the French Revolution, after Gustavus III had been assassinated (1792) and his son, Gustavus IV Adolphus, had become king, that the foundations for the coming cultural and national awakening were laid in Finland. Interest in the Finnish race, language and history grew particularly at the University of Turku where the "father of Finnish history", Professor Henrik Gabriel Porthan (1738—1804), started systematic research in these fields in the spirit of Herderian Romanticism. Although Finland's high culture was still predominantly expressed in Swedish (Porthan wrote in Latin and in Swedish), the educated Finn became conscious of his Finnish background. Porthan's initiative did not have any purposes of a nationalist kind as yet; and indeed the Finns remained loyal to the Swedish throne, although they had begun to cherish strong sentiments specifically associated with Finland as distinct from Sweden-Finland.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, power politics were to decide the fate of Finland. Napoleon urged Tsar Alexander I to force Sweden to abandon its relations with Britain and to join the continental blockade. Reluctantly Alexander agreed but finally, after a short war in 1808—09, he conquered Finland. As relations between Alexander and Napoleon cooled, he decided to keep Finland and to annex it to Russia as an autonomous Grand Duchy. A conciliatory proclamation was issued which specified that the

Tsar would honor the native Lutheran faith and the privileges of the various estates as well as convene the Landtag. The act pacified the Finns who realized that Alexander was summoning them (the Estates, Land) to join in an act of union. The officials of the Land accepted the offer as well as the Tsar as their legitimate sovereign at Porvoo where the provincial assembly was summoned in March, 180912. The Finns pledged loyalty to the Russian Tsar, and the Tsar affirmed the above mentioned "Fundamental Laws" as well as the rights and privileges of the Estates. In his closing speech, Alexander magnanimously invited the Finns to join "the family of nations", using the term 'nation' in the political sense and referring to Finland as a separate entity13. The restoration of "Old Finland" (see map 1) to Finland proper in 1812 was in keeping with this idea. In the Peace Treaty of Hamina (1809), Sweden had already transferred Finland, including the Åland Islands, to Russia. Thus, the basis of Finnish autonomy in the nineteenth century was laid.

The autonomy of the Finns consisted in their right to manage their internal affairs and take part in legislation; without the consent of the Diet the Tsar could not create new laws or amend old ones, nor could he raise new taxes, although he had the right to issue decrees concerning matters not specified in the laws. Actually, the Tsar held wide executive powers. For practical administration a Senate (1816) and a Committee for Finnish Affairs (in St Petersburg) were soon established. Through these bodies the Finns presented their proposals to the sovereign, who could either accept or reject them. A Governor-General was appointed to Helsinki and allowed to express his own opinion about Finnish affairs directly to the Tsar. The union of Finland with Russia was peculiar in character and did not easily lend itself to comparison with other dualistic relations in Europe, though some British observers were quick to find possible parallels.

Finnish-Russian relations, thanks to the conciliatory attitude of the Tsar and the loyalty of the Finns, enjoyed a good standing of mutual confidence for a long time. Under the firm rule of Nicholas

12. Osmo Jussila, Maakunnasta Valtioksi (From a Province to a State) (Juva, 1987), pp. 35—41.
I (1825—55) the public temper remained calm; Finnish soldiers had taken part in crushing the Polish rebellion in 1830 and dutifully defended the Finnish coasts against British intruders during the Crimean War. The bureaucratic regime tolerated and encouraged the awakening Finnish nationalist movement which aimed at advancing the use of the Finnish language and Finnish culture. But if the nationalists dared to criticize the government, censorship was applied.

The Finnish Romantic nationalists (Fennomans) acquired their ideas from Germany and Scandinavia. In the early part of the century their most vehement advocate was Adolf Ivar Arwidsson (1791—1858) who found the spirit of a nation in its mother tongue. Languages appeared to him as unique and distinct entities, one endowed to each people — there was no way that the Finns could have become Swedes or Russians without totally losing their identity. Arwidsson’s ideas will be discussed more fully later; here it suffices to note that after having been dismissed from his post at the university, he continued writing about Finnish affairs from his self-exile in Sweden, and that some of his writing was known to the British reading public. Other Finnish nationalists founded the Finnish Literature Society in 1831 and launched a series of studies into language, literature and folklore. They wanted the educated, Swedish-speaking intelligentsia to learn the vernacular, they demanded wider use for the Finnish language at a time when Swedish was the official language. The early Finnish nationalist movement culminated in the publication of the first edition of the epic *Kalevala* (1835) by Elias Lönnrot (1802—84). In the preface Lönnrot concluded that although the songs contained in the epic were not on a par with those of the ancient Greeks and Romans they showed that the forefathers of the Finns had not been unenlightened in their intellectual efforts. In the second edition (1849) Lönnrot was able to locate "the original home" of the Finns in "Permia", in northwest Russia, providing a historical image for the Finnish nationalists to legitimize their aspirations to form a nation-state. In the 1840s the leading Finnish nationalists, especially the Hegelian philosopher-politician Johan Wilhelm

Snellman (1806—81), had disseminated the idea that such small nations as Finland could survive only by developing a vehement national spirit embodied in a future nation-state. The *Kalevala* seemed to provide a true historical source for the original Finnish national spirit. Its peculiar character attracted the attention of scholars in Germany, France and Britain. It became manifest that a people (race) in possession of so much "ancient wisdom" could create a culture of its own.

To resuscitate the consciousness of the Swedish-speakers, the so-called Svecomans developed a movement among the academic youth in the 1860s, called upon educated Swedish-speakers to form a common Swedish nationality with the Swedish-speaking population. Some of them adopted the doctrine of racial inequality; relations between the Swedish-speakers and the Finnish-speakers came to be interpreted in terms of a struggle between the superior ("Aryan") and the inferior ("Turanian") race. Racialist arguments also appeared in the writings of the Scandinavianists, who propagated the idea that the Finnish race could not survive without Swedish culture and should be reincorporated into Sweden. The long-lasting battle between the Fennomans and Svecomans was largely fought later in the nineteenth century with linguistic and cultural weapons in Finland, but in Britain it was sometimes one-sidedly conceived of as a racial confrontation.

Little by little the Finnish-speakers permeated the ruling, Swedish-speaking élite; obstacles to Finnish education were removed, and, in 1863, Finnish gained full equality as one of the official languages of Finland.

In spite of the bureaucratic regime and mercantilist economic policy, evolutionary and liberal ideas also took root in Finland in the 1860s. For Finnish Liberals, many of whom were also nationalist in outlook, language was not the main issue although it could be a useful vehicle of culture and social reform. Usually they regarded both Swedish and Finnish as worthy of cultivation, but their chief concern was to have the Diet developed into a progressive institution. They wanted its regular convocation, a free

press and the liberalization of the economy. They would, when in an extremist mood, speculate about Finnish neutrality, castigate the Russian government as despotic and regard Russia as a backward giant. In line with continental liberal political theory, they put forward a freer interpretation of the Finnish constitution — for them Finland was not only a nation but a state.

During the reign of Alexander II (1855—81) many of the objectives of the Liberals and Fennomans came true. Alexander convoked the Diet in 1863 for the first time since 1809 and constitutional and economic reform followed. The Tsar granted a regular Diet (convocation every five years) and gave it a limited right to initiate legislation. Other reforms included a language edict which gave Finnish equal rights with Swedish in administration and law, the liberalization of trade, maritime commerce and industry, a Church Act (1869), the establishment of an independent Finnish monetary system, a national army, and the right to vote in the elections of burghers' Estates was made dependent on income. Having gained this much, the Liberals had spent their energies, and the language conflict, looming more ominously than ever, made their position untenable. Their representatives in the Diet joined either the Svecomans or the "young Finns" of the Fennoman party. In the 1880—1890s they concentrated on formulating a constitutional argument that would save the Finnish constitution from Russian encroachments. Their leader, Leo Mechelin (1839—1914) became rather well-known to some British Liberals.

In the 1880—1890s the language conflict advanced towards a fierce power struggle within the ruling classes. The Finnish-speakers gained equal strength in the Diet, and appeared soon to be able to dictate Finnish politics. The Svecomans were forced into a defensive position and resisted all changes that would threaten their interests and privileges. A deadlock developed in which the language conflict, aggravated by the power conflict, largely hindered the solution of other, more grave problems of the country, such as the lot of poor tenants, the landless and the destitute.

For many a Finn, Alexander II had been a benefactor and liberator, but as the industrial and educated classes of Finland became drawn to the West economically and culturally and as they waged a struggle for power at home, they soon found themselves alienated from Russia. Not only did the Finns sometimes speak derogatively of the Russians, the Russians had begun to cherish Panslavist and imperialist ideas which did not tolerate non-Russian nationalism. They propagated the concept of an integrated Russian Empire wherein all provincial constitutions would be subordinate to Imperial legislation. The Finnish Liberal, to take the most uncompromising Finnish stance, regarded Finland as a model for Russian constitutional evolution. It has been argued that the Finns did not fully understand the tenets of Slavophilism and the nature of the juxtaposition: when the danger of Russification was at the door they still quarrelled about language and culture without any sense of national solidarity. It should be added that, in a strict sense, Finland was not yet a culturally unified nation in the 1880s. Only the threat of Russification brought the fighting factions together, a matter readily perceived by the British observers who were greatly interested in the development of the relations between the Fennomans and Svecomans.

Many of the Russification plans had already been drafted and made known to Alexander III (1881—1894) but only the so-called Postal Manifesto (1890) designed to unify the Finnish and Russian postal systems was brought into effect. It was during Nicholas II's reign, at the turn of the century, that Russification fell most heavily on the Finns. But proposals for unification did not catch Finns unprepared. From the 1890s onwards the national consciousness of the Finns, supported and informed by historical and ethnological studies into a 'heroic Finnish past' and elevated to a higher cultural plane in the arts and culture in general, formed a powerful ideological weapon uniting the various classes to resist the Russian onslaught. The work of such eminent figures of this revival as the composer Jean Sibelius, the poet Eino Leino and the

painter Akseli Gallen-Kallela, all of whom drew inspiration from the Kalevala and Finnish oral poetry, testified to this development. The rise of the resistance coincided with and was enhanced by the boom in timber-based industries and the birth and organization of the labour movement.

In 1898 Nicholas II agreed to full-scale Russification measures. He nominated a new Governor-General, N. Bobrikoff who was to ensure that the Finns complied with the Russian demands. A new conscription act was issued allowing Finnish soldiers to be used in defence of the Empire outside Finnish territory. The Finns rejected this measure. This gave the Tsar the opportunity to assert his powers. On 15 February 1899 an Imperial Manifesto bluntly stated that the Finnish Diet was relegated to a consultative body. The Finnish Diet declared the Manifesto invalid but the Finnish Senate decided to publish it. Finnish political leaders believed that the Tsar had been misled by his advisers and organized petitions and addresses to inform the Tsar of this breach of the Finnish constitution. A Pro Finlandia address, signed by more than a thousand internationally famous scholars, scientists, writers, artists and jurists, among them a few British, was presented to the Tsar but he refused to change his position.

The Finns themselves were divided into two main groups by the dispute. There were the Legalists (Constitutionalists), judges and jurists with international connections, who argued that the only way to save Finland was to refuse to obey illegally imposed "laws". They firmly believed that justice would eventually win if only the nation passively resisted and the officials left their posts. The Socialists usually agreed with them, although their own ideas were developing into a form of revolutionary Marxism. The main opposition group were the Compliants (recruited from the older Fennomans), usually historians — they believed that a compromise was possible. In their view the Finnish constitution could be so changed that the Finnish and Imperial interests would again be reconciled.

The brunt of Russian oppression fell when the Compliants took office. The Tsar issued decrees dismissing recalcitrant officials, mounted police was called in to disperse peaceful demonstrations,

censorship was tightened, Russian was declared the language of Senate plenary sessions, Bobrikoff was given dictatorial powers (1903) but assassinated (1904), Legalists were exiled. This dramatic period of Finnish history attracted the attention of many British Liberals, and some of them, with their German and French friends, tried to help the Finns as much as they could.

Russification came to a sudden halt in 1905 when Russia was defeated by the Japanese; internal opposition also threatened to bring disorder to the Empire. The Finnish labour movement went on strike over the constitution, demanding thorough constitutional reform. Nicholas II had to give in: he declared the February Manifesto null and void, and gave the Senate the task of proposing changes in the composition of the Diet. In 1906 a democratic constitution was drafted and passed by the Estates. The Estates were replaced by a single-chamber Diet (Eduskunta) to be elected by universal and equal suffrage. This radical reform was boosted by powerful pressure from the political Left, although it also expressed the will of the large majority of the Finns to allow every citizen to take part in the defence of the constitution. What alarmed the conservative Finns, and many international observers, was that in the first general election in 1907 the Social Democrats won 80 out of the 200 seats. The traditional bourgeois parties were not able to collaborate in this wholly unexpected situation. The work of Eduskunta was difficult, and it was not made any easier by the Tsar who dissolved it on several occasions. The previously contemplated and planned social and political reforms were seriously delayed — to the great embarrassment of the Social Democrats who had expected so much from the Eduskunta.

In the meantime, the Russian governmental system had changed. The Tsar was no longer the autocrat the Finns had long trusted in the nineteenth century; his decisions became increasingly influenced by the nationalist Duma and the Imperial Council. A second wave of Russification ensued; in 1908 it was decreed that all matters relating to Finnish-Russian affairs were to be handed over to the relevant Russian ministers for scrutiny. This brought the personal union of the Tsar and the Finns to an end. In 1910 a bill was passed in the Russian assembly that removed from

the Finnish Parliament the powers to legislate in any matters which might be interpreted as "imperial". From the Finnish point of view, the autonomy of Finland was in ruins. The dissenting parties, even the Compliants, realized that the Russians were earnest about unification. At the outset of the First World War it became publicly known to the Finns that a programme of total Russification had been accepted by the Tsar and that it was only a question of time and finding an appropriate occasion to accomplish it. During the war, in which the Finns did not take part, various Finnish groups set about achieving Finland's independence. Some activists sent Finnish volunteers, later called Jaegers, to Germany for military training, in order to prepare themselves for a possible fight for freedom.

While the Finns were preparing for secession, powerful forces intervened. Heavy war losses, famine, social agitation, and finally the revolution of March 1917, brought the provisional government of Kerensky to power and the Tsarist regime to its final collapse. Kerensky revoked the 1910 law of Imperial legislation but retained sovereignty over Finland. In the election which was held in Finland, the Social Democrats gained a majority (103 seats out of 200) in the Eduskunta and enacted the "Power Act" intended to give Finns complete control in their internal affairs. Kerensky reacted and dissolved the Eduskunta; in the next elections the Socialists lost eleven seats. Moved by revolutionary agitation, they soon left the Eduskunta altogether and started to prepare their own solution. Economic distress, famine, unemployment and social unrest, caused largely by the war, seemed to create a revolutionary situation in Finland. The Finnish bourgeoisie drew closer together and established security guards to restore law and order, heading towards the realization of their own version of an independent Finland. After the Bolshevik revolution, the socialists and bourgeoisie had their own paramilitary guards ("Red Guards" and "White Guards") ready, and the situation became critical. A peaceful internal solution between the Finns became impossible as the strikers resorted to violent action in the autumn of 1917 and the new bourgeois government, led by P.E. Svinhufvud, decided to

23. For the British reading public they were listed by Arthur Reade in his Finland and the Finns (London, 1915), pp. 296—97.
maintain order by force.

The government that had declared Finland independent on 6 December had to solve two problems: how to remove the Russian troops from Finland and gain recognition of independence. After some pressure from Germany, the Finnish government turned to the Russian government. The Council of People's Commissars accepted the request of the Finns, in keeping with Lenin's principle of self-determination of nations. Finland and Poland were clearly ready, as distinct nationalities, to go their own way. After Soviet recognition, France, Germany and Sweden soon followed but others, for instance, the British government, wanted to wait and see in which direction Finnish affairs would develop. The situation in Finland was so unstable that real democratic rule seemed inconceivable\textsuperscript{24}.

In Finland the internal crisis came to a head in 1918. Svinhufvud's government invited Lieutenant-General Gustaf Mannerheim, an officer who had served in the Russian army but had returned to his homeland after the revolution, to organize the Finnish army to disarm the remaining Russian garrisons. In January 1918 the "Red Guards" declared their own revolution in Helsinki and started to disband the "White Guards" with the aid of Russian forces. A Civil War between the bourgeoisie ("Whites"), who occupied northern Finland, and the Socialists ("Reds") in the south, broke out. Rural Finland took up arms against industrial Finland. In the course of the war, the military training and discipline of the "Reds" proved insufficient to combat the army of Mannerheim supported by a large German force, and in a few months, the "Whites" won. The "Reds" were imprisoned in camps, treated as rebels and accused of treason. Thousands were sentenced to death, and more died in the camps from illness and starvation.

The Republic of Finland was forged from national tragedy. The losers were, for a long time, regarded as potential enemies of the nation, although the official policy of the bourgeois republic was to try and reintegrate them as full citizens. Finnish culture was highly national and Finnish politics were directed against the

\textsuperscript{24} Eino Lyytinen, \textit{Finland in British Politics in the First World War}. Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, Ser. B, tom. 207 (Helsinki, 1980), p. 188.
arch-enemy, Russia. The British were delighted to see how the "Whites" had stopped the spread of the "Bolshevik menace" westward, but, in the 1920—30s, they preferred to see a democratic Finland that also provided milk for the workers’ children and stood aloof from German influence.

V

The thesis falls into three main parts. First, the way British historians, naturalists and travellers in the period of the Enlightenment assessed the level of "civilization" of the Finns is considered (ch. 1). Secondly, the nineteenth-century conception of race is discussed with reference to how the British began to emphasize the racial distinctiveness and nationality of the Finns in the Russian Empire is discussed (chs. 2—5). Thirdly, the arguments with which the British, mostly Liberals, defended or opposed the autonomous position of the Finns in the Russian Empire are analyzed (ch. 6). With the exception of the first chapter, the order of exposition is from scientific ideas (chs. 2.1.—2.3. and chs. 3—4) to political ones (chs. 2.4.—2.5. and chs. 5—6).
1. The eighteenth-century image of the Finn

1.1. Some precedents

Because of its peripheral geographical location and its relative lack of importance to people in Western Europe Finland remained largely unknown to the great majority of the British until the end of the sixteenth century. Those who read such classics as Tacitus’s Germania and Ptolemy’s works might have come across the terms Fenni or Phinnoi, denoting respectively the poor, primitive people north of the ancient Germans who did not care for agriculture and its toil and did not lead a settled social life¹, and the hyperboreans, the dwellers of the far North.

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¹ According to an eighteenth-century translation of Tacitus’s description: "The picture of the Fenni, on the contrary (compared with the ancient Germans), is that of mere rudeness. They have no horses, no arms, no religion. They clothed themselves in the skins of beasts, fed, at times, of herbage, and slept on the earth. Their chief dependence was on their arrows; and having no iron, they pointed them with bones. The women accompanied men to the chase, and demanded a share of the prey. A covering, inwrought with boughs, was all the shelter which defended their infants from the rigours of seasons and the ferocity of animals. To this miserable dwelling their young men returned; and here their old men found refuge. These courses of barbarousness, this melancholy sadness, they preferred to the fatigue of cultivating the earth and of building houses, to the agitation of hope and fear attendant on a care of their fortunes, and on a connection with those of others. Unapprehensive of any
In the middle-ages, these peculiar and unknown peoples were associated with supernatural abilities such as raising winds, casting spells and other sorts of magic. This image of a nomadic and spell-casting "Finn" (Lapp) was connected to a wider context of ideas about the biblical genealogy of ancient nations. Heavenly and natural causes were imagined to have made the northern Finns what they were; either severe cold had shrunk them to dwarfs or they had been giants from the very beginning, since the dispersion of the peoples from the Near-East. Fable mingled with fact as the Swedish Renaissance apologists, whose works became known to British scholars, tried to lift the forgotten northerners to unparalleled significance. Olaus Magnus in his Historia de Gentibus Septentrionalibus (1555, English edition in 1658) argued a glorious Sveo-Gothic ancestry. He held that some descendants of the sons of Noah had migrated to the North, eager to fulfil the heavenly demand to replenish the earth. Hence they sent Gothic chiefs to conquer the Roman Empire and rule over 37 kingdoms.

Out of this notion also arose the picture of a fertile and populous Finland. There dwelled the Scritifinni who glided swiftly over the vast snows on their skis and disappeared into the forests as they ran away from their Moscovite enemies. The continuous wars danger from men, and awed by no terror of the Gods, they had reached a state which is nearly unattainable to all human endeavours — the being entirely without a wish". Gilbert Stuart, A View of Society in Europe (Edinburgh, 1778), p. 10. Stuart himself denounced the vicious medieval life-style and condemned priests for their licentious habits; he wanted to rehabilitate the ancient German virtues. In Finland it has been a moot question whom Tacitus really meant. A common view has been that he could not have meant Finns but Lapps because there is evidence that the Finns were an agricultural people before Tacitus’s times (98 AD.). One, more cautious judgement implies that there is no conclusive proof on the issue because it is not certain what areas Tacitus’s description covered. Yet another, plausible suggestion is that Tacitus, knowing the location of the Finns, really meant them though he, by way of hyperbole, exaggerated their savagery to revive Roman civic virtues. Cf. Tuomo Pekkanen’s and Eino Jutikkala’s articles in Suomen väestön esihistorialliset juuret. Bidrag till kännedomen av Finlands Natur och Folk, 131 (Helsinki, 1984) and R.E. Burnham, Who are the Finns (London, 1946), p. 85.


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waged between Sweden-Finland and Russia towards the end of the sixteenth century left their mark in Olaus’s work when he, as if to encourage the defenders, attributed to the Finns the gift of raising winds and waves against the eastern intruders. The description of the Finnish way of life is the most reliable part of his conception of the Finns. When pointing out the importance of the Reformation in subduing the laws of nature, Olaus compared the occupations of the Lapps and Finns:

The people (Lapps) live on fishing and hunting and by barter-trade with Moscovites. Finns dedicate themselves to agriculture, fishing and timmercutting.  

They lived, in contrast to Tacitus’s description, in villages under the rule of village-laws, paid their tithes regularly and kept the churches very well, and it was only in Lapland that idolatry and witchcraft persisted. These reformed Finns were well on their way out of rude barbarism.

The picture of the Finns painted by Olaus was all too happy to be wholly true. Along with some other Renaissance humanists from the North, he seems to have despised European town civilization and idealized the independent peasantry of Scandinavia. He was greatly concerned about the differentiation of Swedish society, and denounced the activities of the barter-traders who deceived ignorant Lapps in Tornio. The static, “blessed bee-hive” of the North attracted German, Dutch and also some British mercantile traders after the collapse of the great Hanseatic League.

II

Finnish-British relations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were maritime in character. There were only a few informants on Finland in Britain, namely the seafarers who

5. Johan Granlund, ‘Efterskrift’. Historia om de nordiska folk, II.
frequented "Wybourg" (Viipuri), "Abo" (Turku) or "Tornea" (Tornio), the best known seaports to them, or those who sailed the northern route to Archangel, and the cartographers who put names to the land and made Finland take shape. In 1639 John Story translated a Dutch description of Sweden and its provinces into English. Although it repeated Olaus's version, it contained some valuable information concerning Finland. The British traders not only needed more detailed knowledge of the routes to and places in Finland but also a preliminary idea of its resources and of the manners of the people. Story mentioned the dangerous coastal fringe, all the important coastal ports, enumerated the provinces ("Cajania, Savolaxia, Nylandia, Carlia and Tavastia"), and stressed the recently established importance of Viipuri as the liveliest port and as a fortress against the East. The soil of Southern Finland was fertile and its forests abounded with game. Again the Finns appeared to live in plenty and "were laborious and able to endure hardship". The fierce and sturdy Finnish soldiers in the cavalry of Gustaf II Adolf had also left a trace of fear on the continent which was reported to Britain.

There were obvious drawbacks in the quality of information concerning the Finns during the seventeenth century. Even if Moses Pitt's English Atlas (1680) included one of the most accurate maps of Sweden-Finland of the period, the writer on Sweden, Dr Hugh Todd, had collected pieces of fact and fable from diverse sources in order to convey a moral lesson. Diverting from Olaus's happy image of the Finns, he placed them on a low level in the advancement of reason because they did not seem to possess even

6. Other informants were those writers who characterized the Finn in their novels. W.R. Mead has studied the English literary image of the Finn and reached the conclusion that besides his skills in magic, warfare and hard-drinking the Finn belonged "to the lower order of artistic effectiveness". "The Image of the Finn in English and American Literature". Neue Philologische Mitteilungen, lxiv, 3 (Helsinki, 1963), p. 261.

7. John Story, A Short Survey of the Kingdom of Sweden (London, 1639), pp. 26, 29—31. A similar view was presented by John Robinson who visited Sweden in 1688. In his opinion, Swedish nobles and clergy were not as refined and learned as the English, and the Swedish merchants were not as skillful as the British traders. As for the "Finlanders" they had the same laws, customs, government and dispositions as the Swedes with the difference that they were "more hardy and laborious, more clownish, ignorant, and superstitious". John Robinson, An Account of Sweden as it was in the year 1688 (London, 1738), p. 207.
the rudiments of learning. Following Johannes Schefferus’s *Lapponia* (1673) and mistaking the Lapps for the Finns, he wrote:

By reason of their living in woods among the wild beasts, and of their want of correspondence, as well among themselves as with other nations, they are very superstitious, fearful and mean, and above all thing dreading war...⁸

Schefferus’s description had, in Todd’s hands, changed in moral tone from a hesitant appreciation of the unlimited freedom of savagery to an explicit denunciation of it:

They are also noted to be of a censorious and detracting humour, covetous and lazy withal, so that where the soul might be improv’d, they often through idleness let it lye barren and uncultivated. They seldom take pains so much as to hunt or fish, till pinch’d by want and necessity.⁹

Seen from the Protestant point of view these ”Finns” had not overcome the passions that lurked in sinful ease usually associated with nomadic and savage peoples. In reality, just before the time of Todd’s description, Finland had suffered from incessant wars; and the people had to provide men, food and lodgings for the Swedish armies. This incongruity tells something about the validity of a description based on compilation. It was a common misconception in the seventeenth century that either the picture of the ancient *Fenni* or of Lapp savagery was considered as representing the state of civilization in Finland¹⁰. It seems likely that Todd’s misleading message was more widely read than that of Story, and it was also more congenial to the British at a time when Britain itself was susceptible to outbursts of unrest and rebellion.

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⁸. Moses Pitt, *English Atlas* (London, 1680), vol. I, q. p. 4. Cf. John Scheffer, *The History of Lapland* (London, 1751), pp. 5, 11. For Schefferus as well as for Thomson (*The Seasons*, 1730) the Lapps were the happy ones because they did not know of war. Schefferus stated that the Finns could be differentiated from the Lapps by their fatness and agricultural way of life though he noted that they might be of the same origin and spoke related languages.


The political situation in the Baltic changed in Russia's favour during the early decades of the eighteenth century. Peter the Great erected St Petersburg in the swamps and the Neva estuary, and broke Swedish supremacy in the Baltic. As a result of the Great Northern War Russia gained access to the sea, occupied Finland and engulfed eastern parts of it following the peace treaty of Uusikaupunki. Henceforth Russia had to be taken into account in European power politics. In times of war the British had to provide convoys for their mercantile fleets heading for Viipuri to "keep the Russians in awe". Voltaire had regarded these tides of historical change as sheer manifestations of ruling passions in the minds of great rulers. Charles XII of Sweden had been corrupted by ambition; Peter rose to the occasion and finally established himself as the leading enlightened despot. Daniel Defoe, also an apologist for Peter's achievements, had called these constellations and changing power positions fluctuations in "the Ballance of Nations". The vicissitudes of the Eastern frontier of Sweden-Finland played a part in its restoration.

The expansion of Russia so near to the Finnish border could not but affect Defoe's image of Finland. He conceived of its possibilities, "a province of itself, large enough to be called a Kingdom", and of the Finlanders, some of them being "the best, the boldest, and the most hardy men of all the King of Sweden's Dominions, '...' now the Csar's proper subjects". Somewhat later, in an article assigned to him, Defoe combined, in an enlightened fashion, accuracy and optimism. We read of Finland:

This country, however cold, and by situation seemingly incapable of much improvement, being extended from the latitude of 60 to the Arctic circle, in 67 1/2, yet is not wholly useless to the rest of the world.

As the first description of Finland in English which combined scientific information with observations on people’s manners, it deserves quoting at length:

It is remarkable, that in the summer the People are, like prisoners, confin’d at home, or near home, there being no travelling for the Rivers and Lakes, which are innumerable, and some very large and unpassable for want of bridges and boats: besides, the soil is soft and miry, and unpassable, the Heat not being sufficient, at the hottest, to dry up the Sloughs and low, wet Grounds: so that the people keep home, and tend to Plow and Harvest; but in the winter ‘...’ then the inhabitants look abroad, begin to travel, and carry their needful affairs ‘...’ 16

Together with reliable data, Defoe’s account contained a hope of progress, a belief in betterment by human activity which had not yet achieved much in Finland. Defoe’s scheme for “miry” Finland was nothing less than that of a canal through to the White Sea. This would have shortened the route to Archangel considerably. If undertaken and completed, this huge project would have made Finland one of the main arteries of British commerce.

Somewhat before Defoe’s description, “primitive” and exotic Lapland had aroused more curiosity than Finland proper. In The Spectator (no. 366, 1722) one correspondent who had found a Lapp poem in Schefferus’s Lapponia, wondered how it was possible that Lapland, where cold tended to stupefy the passion to propagate, could be an environment for tenderness and affection at all. As in the upsurge of interest in other unknown peoples like American Indians, Tartars, Hottentots and the like, curiosity was accelerated by the thought that their condition was a reminder of the dawn of reason in the great chain of being. Furthermore, it was supposed that their living close to the state of nature might provide clues to the beginning of man’s sociability. Thus the foremost incentive to explore the North was scientific. The learned British could follow M. de Maupertuis on his expedition to the Polar circle (1736—37) by reading their Gentleman’s Magazine, a periodical which was one of the main sources about the condition

of exotic regions of the earth. Maupertuis proved right Newton's hypothesis that the earth flattened towards the poles. The Lapps they met with appeared quite savage, sometimes even stupid but the robust Finns steered their boats down the rapids of Lapland showing great skill, and in Tornio they already had 70 houses, 14 streets and stoves to keep warm in the terrible winter cold. For one who was accustomed to a milder climate and a busy social life, it was so cold that brandy froze in the bottle and "the solitude of the streets was no less than if the inhabitants had all been dead." 18.

It seems that Finland, from being an asylum of mythical semi-humans of whimsical creation, became a distinctly conceived country where a people of hardy physique and disposition struggled under the pressures of a severe climate and obstinate environment. Knowledge about the Lapps and Finns added to the widening of the British world view; the Finns were separated from the Lapps and they now appeared to inhabit their own specific territory. Although the data is scanty, it was as if out of these germs the image of the Finn began to emerge to be ready for completion and revision during the last decades of the eighteenth century.

1.2. The naturalists' view

Before the attitudes of the British to the Finns at the end of the eighteenth century can be appropriately assessed it is necessary to trace the development of the dualism of man versus nature and man's reason versus his animal, instinctive being. These problems were faced by enlightened zoologists; their solutions shaped the Enlightenment perception of the Finn. The ideas of plenitude, continuity and gradation of nature and societies constituted a part of the intellectual heritage passed on to the Enlightenment from

Plato and Aristotle but these ideas were challenged in the light of the new evidence acquired of fossils, microscopic beings and of new species and foreign peoples\textsuperscript{19}. The scientific discourse of the Enlightenment, even if it still drew on medieval and antique categories (fabulous beasts and semi-humans) took on classification, a supposedly reliable method of ordering nature. Curious varieties of man, found on the verges of the earth by explorers and travellers, undermined the old conception of the fixity of human types.

Among either positive or negative proof for the continuity of the human scale stood the Lapps and the Finns whose place in the chain of being demanded reappraisal. The hinge on which the naturalists' arguments turned was the principle of the prime mover in nature: God or its deistic concomitant, a Lamarckian hereditary fluid of life, the bearer of vitality. All movement in nature was regarded, according to the model of physics, as having been caused by "force" which, in its turn, was governed by the laws of nature, discussed by Newton and Harvey. The hierarchical order of things and beings, crowned by the emergence of man as God's image, was teleological, heading for perfection both on the physical and intellectual levels. Since the philosophers of the Enlightenment emphasized man's ability to reason, they encouraged man to imitate God's ways, read his plans in nature and try to apply them to the organization of civil society. In spite of his fallibility, man appeared to have overcome his animal nature, he seemed to strive towards goodness, although he was, by definition, lower than God\textsuperscript{20}. Morally and physically between apes and angels, man was destined to develop with the aid of his faculties but development was unequal in various parts of the world, in different environments and societies.

The diverse savage, barbarous and semi-civilized peoples, Lapps and Finns included, were usually considered to be retarded or degenerate forms of human existence. When they deviated from European man as clearly as the "sturdy" Finns and "tawny" Lapps did, the explanation was sought in their physical structure, mental

\textsuperscript{20} Lovejoy, \textit{The Great Chain of Being}, p. 190.
state and environmental causation. Both physical and moral causes were called on to account for their backwardness.

The great authorities of eighteenth-century zoology and biology, Linnaeus and Buffon, had begun systematic classification and had found how miraculously God seemed to have placed the multitude of animal species and the varieties of man in their proper climates and environments. Both of them believed in monogenesis, the propagation of all races of man from the primaeval pair of Adam and Eve. The great variety seen in nature was due to the dispersion of races subsequent to the great flood and to their adaptation to different climes.

Linnaeus's classification distinguished four main races, the white European, brown American, yellow Asiatic and black African. The consanguinity of peoples was based on skin, eye and hair colour. The Lapps were low of stature, dark-haired and dark-eyed, the Finns were taller, more robust and yellow-haired. Although Linnaeus originally put both Lapps and Finns in the European class, he recognized that although they were linguistically related, Lapps had degenerated to the Mongol race whereas the Finns retained their European features. Culturally, the Lapps seemed to live in Ovid's Golden Age — they led a nomadic life. The Finns, whom Linnaeus had the opportunity to observe in Tornio, were a colonizing people tilling the soil. However, even if the Finns seemed progressive in this sense, Linnaeus complained of their stupidity. They had not built chimneys in their smoke-cabins but let the smoke stay in. The smoke spoiled their complexion, and made them clumsy and phlegmatic. To inaugurate advance from this misery Linnaeus suggested that the Finns should be compelled to build chimneys and that their barter-trade with the Lapps should be converted into a freer trade for the benefit of both foreign traders and the consumers of the North. These reforms were designed to have a beneficial impact on the social life of the Lapps and Finns.

Count Buffon had categorically included all Northern peoples

from Scandinavian Swedes to Siberian Samoyedes in the same low-statured race. Finns and Lapps, because of the severe environment and climate, approached the tawny appearance of the Samoyed. This was a sign of degeneration from the fair European, living in the mild zone. Buffon had worked out that the races living far from the equatorial sun did not acquire enough sun-energy and could not progress\(^{24}\).

Johan F. Blumenbach, a German protoanthropologist whose work some British scholars knew fairly well, had classified a few human skulls into a hierarchy according to their "beauty". As a yardstick he used the Caucasian oval skull and straight facial angle. The two Lapp skulls and one Finnish he had seen were placed in the Mongol class, being less beautiful and less intelligent than the Caucasian but superior to the Negro skull that projected backwards. More exactly, the yellow-haired and dark-eyed Finns had their place between the white-haired and blue-eyed Swedes and the black-haired and dark-eyed Lapps\(^{25}\). Yet another zoologist well known to British popularizers of natural history, Georges Cuvier, went so far as to assert that a deviation from the fair European type indicated a static civilization. This seemed to be the case with the Asiatic races and their offshoots in Northern Europe, Northern Russia and Siberia\(^{26}\).

In Britain it was understood that if nature had been "niggard" in the Northern regions, it had been most liberal in the South while the mild, temperate zone was most suitable for white man's civilization\(^{27}\). Vitality was thought to reside in the blood, and logically, the cold emitted by the snow and ice was assumed to freeze it and stunt life. Tropical heat, on the contrary, made it flow over and excite excessive passions. The national character was sometimes explained by these natural forces; David Hume allowed


brandy to be the stimulant of frozen passions in the North but was
careful to add that in the long run drinking would degrade the
human mind and morality. Physical causation was considered
more stubborn at lower stages of civilization. The small amount of
reason and the concomitant low level of the development of
language were considered to be the main obstacles that hindered
savages from rising to the level of abstract thought. Not only that,
they seemed to cling to their customs, prejudices and supposedly
dull life, conforming to the ways of their ancestors and knew
nothing of technical progress. The educated British, in spite of
Rousseau’s fantasies of the happiness of the simple life, began to
realize how little the “savages” had achieved.

Arguments from both Linnaeus and Buffon were coupled
together by Oliver Goldsmith (1730—74) in his popularization of
natural history. He had cultivated an interest in the Asiatic Tartars
and Mongols in whose history he imagined some secrets of
civilization had been buried. However, even if these pastoral
peoples possessed martial virtues, skills in war, plunder and
murder, they did not, in Goldsmith’s view, contemplate as
Westerners did, but instead satisfied their needs “mechanically”
and violently like animals. Europeans had a greater capacity for
reason, so much so that they were able to choose between good and
evil without resorting to violence. Having reviewed contemporary
racial classifications Goldsmith concluded that although the
peripheral races, like the Lapps and Malayans, were quite different
in their physique and manner, man had sprung from one common
origin and the varieties had been caused by different
environments. In this vein, the variety of skin- and eye-colour told
of the adaptive powers of different races.

For Goldsmith the Enlightenment marked a revolution in racial
history. The tendencies of human migrations seemed to be
bringing about a reunion of the primordial unity of mankind. The
Ostyaks were wandering to the south as if trying to mingle with the
more civilized Russians, and the Norwegians and the ”Finlanders”
were pushing to the northern extremities amongst the Lapps

29. ‘Publisher’s Advertisement’. In Oliver Goldsmith, A History of the Earth and
whose dwarfish figure and savage manners received an influx of conquering civilization, of "larger stature and completer figure". The ways of expanding civilization were both physical and moral, and their effect was quite readily observable.

II

Associated with the naturalist argument was the linguistic strain of thought which was freely used as auxiliary proof when formulating ideas about the origins and relations of the European and other races. For some thinkers, especially for those who were searching for the rudiments of social life, a common language was the surest test of a common origin. If there was a physical affinity between two or more peoples speaking the same kind of language the case was more certain. Lord Kames (1696—1782), a Scottish philosopher, had held that English was on a higher level of development than Gaelic or Lapp, because it descended from German, a language that had developed hand in hand with the progressive culture of the Western peoples. Similarly, Lord Monboddo (1714—99) ranked the languages of the world in a hierarchy in which the Northern languages were to be found at the bottom. Leon Poliakov claims Kames was a universalist humanist on account of his generosity in ascribing human faculties to higher animals (for example, "Orang-Utans"). Yet, this did not seem to mean that all human beings were on the same level of intellect but that some of them still remained close to the level of the higher apes. If Kames was ready to admit some civilization to all races, it was the agricultural stage of civilization that provided the conditions and means (property) to open the way to higher cultural achievements.

In Kames's studies the naturalist and historical methods

coalesced. He directed his arguments against Buffon’s monogenism by questioning the assumption that different climates and environments produced variations in man and animals. The camel of Africa and the reindeer of Lapland appeared to prove polygenesis because they were instances of optimum adaptation to the environment and had not developed since their appearance on the earth. The same seemed to hold true of the various races of man. Kames was inclined to the conclusion that the variation in stature between races had not been caused by severe climate but was rather an inborn feature. This was seen in the Finns and Norwegians, the representatives of the European race. Despite the heavy pressure of their clime they had not diminished an inch. In addition to this physical persistency, the Lapp disposition to timidity was unique. In contrast, on the latitude of Turku, the progressive Finns cultivated the land and seemed to know the basic dictum of possessive civilization: “this is mine, this is yours” whereas the Lapps had no idea of the way from the wandering life to “self-government”.

In a lecture for the Manchester Philosophical and Literary Society in 1796 surgeon Charles White (1728—1813) followed Kames’s inferences and carried them a step further. He opposed the slave-trade and slavery in general and did not want to assign superiority to any race, “except that which naturally arises from superior bodily strength, mental powers and industry or from the consequence attendant upon living in a society”. The physique of the Finns supported the tenets of polygenism: in the same way as the skins of the white Europeans had not turned black under the tropical sun so that even their children remained fair, the Finns had not been turned black by the cold of their climate. Opposing the prevalent theory of environmental adaptation, both Kames and White used the evidence of the Finns to support their opinion that there were permanent types of man, and that the white race could not degenerate to a lower one. The whites were the best, but the

Finns who had also retained their physical characteristics not very different from those of their civilizers, and who led an agricultural life were sufficiently fit a race to travel the road to civilization.

1.3. The historians' view

The neo-classical historians' contribution to the debate concerning alien races was not based on physical or structural evidence about man. Philosophically oriented as they were, they usually held to the ideals of Greek and especially of Roman civic virtues; they admired the achievements of Greek and Roman republican governments in the light of their present mixed government which appeared towards the end of the eighteenth century to be in a process of corruption by political faction and quarrel. The Roman ideal of patriotism seemed to have been spoiled by the commercial spirit and self-interest.

The doctrines of Montesquieu which had gained much ground in Britain, especially in Scotland, had emphasized justice as the aim for all forms of government, though each suited to its particular setting. The history of the laws together with the peculiar manners of peoples moulded by respective environments created the spirit of a nation. Yet, freedom had its origins only in exceptional surroundings. To Montesquieu the Northern peoples had carried the message of freedom to the South as they broke the borders of the corrupted Roman Empire thus generating the chivalrous spirit of the Middle-Ages. In his view, the Northern "mountains" protected Europe against the extreme polar cold, and it was on the latitudes of Stockholm and Turku, the abodes of Goths, where this vigorous spirit of European culture had had its seeding ground.37

While not fully agreeing with Montesquieu's Gothicism, the British Romantics might dream of a free North which sometimes could be a remedy to the discontent and ennui of refinement and luxury. The Lapps, though ignorant and lazy, seemed, according to Schefferus's description, to live in ease, plenty and peace. However, it was refinement which suppressed violent outbursts of passions. And the evils of civilization had to be tolerated in order to maintain progress. So, even the romantically minded eventually preferred their progressive society, and the state of nature was regarded as an obstacle to man's conquering efforts. In the face of a more sociological approach the Romantic ideal retreated. Reason could only be developed in a proper society, not in the midst of the darkness of Lapland. As Goldsmith once put it: all the Northern peoples had "virtues of simplicity and vices of ignorance."

Civilization at home was always better than the barbarism of foreign lands irrespective of how pure and simple the barbarians' way of life was. Much as the Lapps were friendly and hospitable, the sailors of the Arctic seas felt homesick when they stumbled upon a solitary, coastal Lapp village. One's experiences of lively social life at home determined one's attitudes towards the dull atmosphere of Lapland and Finland, and the more rudimentary the form of a foreign social life, the less one could make of its virtues.

Even if many historians still clung to the old biblical hierarchies and genealogies of the nations, some of them had acquired an historical-philosophical vision of the four-stage development of civil society from primeval hunting and fishing communities through pastoral and agricultural stages to commercial society. The progress from nomadic life, exposed to the forces of the wilderness, to order and secure freedom under just authority was a parallel to the progress from savage superstition to scientific perceptions of reality. The variety of morals, manners, dress and amusements of contemporary savages were regarded as belonging to the past, to an earlier and "lower" stage of social organization and moral refinement. The Scottish philosopher-historians, such

40. See T.P. Peardon, _The Transition in English Historical Writing, 1760—1830_ (New York, 1966); Ronald L. Meek, _Social Science and the Ignoble Savage_ (C.U.P., 1976), introduction.
as Adam Ferguson, who studied travel descriptions, found savagery in them and became confirmed in his belief in the superiority of Western civilization. In their turn, the travellers, prejudiced in favour of their own culture, usually depicted the "primitives" as irrational. Their polygamy, polytheism and idolatry suggested stupidity, indolence and immorality. The great majority of alien peoples seemed to live in darkness, under the despotic rule of their native rulers and superstitions.

The question that haunted the rationalist historians was man's tendency to revert to barbarism and degeneration caused by the folly so clearly manifested in the fortunes of past empires, especially that of the Romans. For all its institutions, laws and civic virtues the Roman Empire had declined and fallen. This might also happen to Britain if its rulers became corrupted. Prevention lay in a struggle for moral perfection. It was necessary for man to develop firmness, freedom from the instincts and unsocial passions which seemed to govern the behaviour of children and savages. 41

In the atmosphere of rational morality and with the interest in "primitive" mentality grew the quest for the beginnings of social evolution. While the naturalists had attacked the notion of eternal species, the historians commenced studies into the development of reason at different stages of civilization. At about the same time, in the 1760s, when studies into the manners of the Northern peoples began to take shape, some British historians shifted from pure party and family history to consider sources relating to the origins and rise of the European peoples. Some collections of the fragments of national histories were being published in order to make claims for a glorious ancestry. When trying to weigh the originality and contribution of British history to civilization, some historians happened also to bring to light some hidden clues to the history of the Finns.

The controversy over Gaelic ancestry was brought about by James Macpherson (1736—96), a self-taught Scottish historian. He had translated a collection of old Caledonian ballads (Ossian) into English which he claimed to have written down from sources that told of the grandeur of the Scottish highlands and the melancholy heroism of Gaelic clan-chiefs. Although Macpherson was accused of forgery by some critical British (for example, Samuel Johnson), the collection was widely read and praised on the continent (also in Finland) where the Romantic mood with its tendency to seek purity in the morals of the past confronted the rationalist morality. In a later work Macpherson enlarged the vision to cover all European peoples. As an antiquarian, he traced the ancestry of the Celts with the guidance of ancient and medieval authors, and went as far back as Herodotus to come up with his three European stocks; the Sarmatians and Slavic peoples of the North and the East and the Celtic peoples of the West. The Celts had descended from the Gauls and Scythians and had withdrawn to the British Isles to preserve their pure and pious life. On his map of Europe, intended to reveal the truth about movements and locations of both civilized and barbarous peoples, the Finns were ambiguously situated between the barbarous Sarmatians and the

42. The main figure of these poems, Ossian, was cast in a nostalgic, melancholy fashion to express the purity of past Caledonian morality at a time when the Roman morality was already on decline (c. 300 AD.). Apart from containing Romantic reverberations of the artless innocence of fields and woods, Macpherson's "rough poetry" pictured rocky, stormy and windy North where the last hero groaned over the fate of his kin. B. Saunders (Ed.), Life and Letters of James Macpherson (London, 1894), pp. 3—4, 15—16. Saunders tried to rescue Macpherson for posterity from a devastating English criticism that had doomed him in oblivion. He lamented that although the collection was, to a great degree, a product of Macpherson's compilation and construction, it saved a lot of original material, too. To increase the value of the Ossian, Saunders made it comparable to Lönnrot's Kalevala and the Niebelungenlied. Some Finnish scholars read it as a source for their efforts to collect folksongs and poetry. For a recent reappraisal of Macpherson's work of turning ballads to epics, see Derick S. Thomson, 'Macpherson's Ossian: Ballads to Epics'. The Heroic Process. Eds. Bo Almqvist, Seamas O'Cathain, P. O'Healai (Dublin, 1987), esp. pp. 255—57, 260—62.


virtuous Germans. As in Tacitus’s description, the Finns seemed to have a closer connection with the Sarmatians; they were "tinctured with the loose manners and characteristic laziness" of them.\textsuperscript{45}

Macpherson had relied on a collection of names and descriptions of peoples in ancient sources to prove his point of Celtic purity. This attribute was contrasted with Finnish wretchedness. The Scottish antiquary and historian John Pinkerton (1758—1826) could not accept Macpherson’s tendentiously selective method and attacked his conclusions. He mocked Macpherson’s basic "scientific" misconception citing the confusion of the Goths with the Sarmatians and the Scythians with the Celts. Pinkerton went on to present his own map of Europe. Drawing from both Greek and Roman historians and citing some recent travel descriptions and histories he enumerated Celts, Iberians, Sarmatians and Scythians as European peoples. The Scythians had entered Europe from Persia, had continued to Greece and Italy and finally reached Scandinavia. Hence they had, as Goths, begun to spread a civilizing influence all over Europe. As for the Celts, they were peoples of unparalleled savagery. To British ears their language sounded like a muddled jargon and could not be related to any other, more refined European language.\textsuperscript{46} Cunningly directing his main thesis against Macpherson’s glorification of the Celtic heritage, Pinkerton hinted at the possible origins of and analogies to Gaelic social life. In his opinion, the Arabs of Mauritania ‘...’

are divided into clans as the Finns, Laplanders, Celts and other radical savages, who are incapable of progress in society, and vanish at the first ray of industry and civilization.\textsuperscript{47}

The valour of the Celts was no more than lawless warfare and slaughter in comparison with the organized freedom of the sociable British. To Pinkerton, the rule of clans was a remnant of despotism belonging to the past. The peaceable Finns and Lapps

\textsuperscript{45} Macpherson, An Introduction, p. 286.

\textsuperscript{46} John Pinkerton, A Dissertation on the Origin of the Scythians or Goths ‘...’ (London, 1787), pp. 17—18, 102.

\textsuperscript{47} Pinkerton, A Dissertation, q. p. 121.
were not any nobler than the Celts.

However, there was a grain of truth in Pinkerton’s conception of the Finns. In advance of Victorian ethno-historical geography he drew a map of Europe on which he located Tacitus’s Germans and the results of his own findings. *Getae* (Goths) in Sweden represented Scythian civilization in Scandinavia, east of them resided the *Finni*, distinct from Tacitus’s *Fenni*. Pinkerton associated the *Finni* with the Goths and thus differentiated the Western, somewhat civilized Finns from their ”primitive” eastern relatives. He had (as Lönnrot later did) picked up the story of the fabulous ancient Permian (Biarmian) ”kingdoms” of north-eastern Russia that had supposedly declined under the pressure of encroaching Russians. The descendants of the Permian people, the *Finni*, in contrast to the *Fenni*, were able, with the assistance of their superior physique and a more refined language, to civilize the Lapps in the same way as the Goths had civilized them⁴⁸. Just as the Gothic Danes had taught the Anglo-Saxons the rudiments of freedom, and the Swedes had introduced Christianity to Finland, the Finns were poised to be the harbingers of civilization in the extreme North so that all corners of Europe could become civilized.

For Edward Gibbon (1737—94), who approved of Macpherson’s efforts to unravel the hidden sources of European ancestry, the problem of the origin of the northern Finns was of secondary interest. There was not much to write about the ”radical” savages about whom the sources gave only second-hand references. However, he found it necessary to refute Olaus Rudbeck (1630—1702), a historian esteemed in Sweden for finding a glorious but imaginary past for his people, for the baseless assumption of the past excellence and wide distribution of the northern Goths⁴⁹. Although the ancient Germans had resided around the Baltic, they had not been the progenitors of all the northern peoples. Gibbon inferred from French, German and Russian sources that some other tribes had also existed. In the northeast had lived the ”Fennic”

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⁴⁸ Pinkerton, *A Dissertation*, map (loose); Modern Geography (London, 1802), pp. 8, 310—11, 524.
⁴⁹ Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (New ed., London, 1838), I, pp. 280—81. Rudbeck had argued that the fertility and vigour of the Swedes had been caused by the cold of the North.
peoples, and they had been, before the crusades in the East, like other savages because of their total separation from the mainstreams of the great historical process, the struggle between savagism and civilization. Only one group had moved south as if to show where they really belonged. They were the Hungarians, who provided excellent proof of the power of natural causes over men and their temperament:

The consanguinity of the Hungarians and Laplanders would display the powerful energy of climate on the children of a common parent; the lively contrast between the bold adventurers who are intoxicated with the wines of the Danube, and the wretched fugitives who are immersed beneath the snows of the polar circle.\footnote{Gibbon, \textit{The History}, VII, q. p. 167. Gibbon duly rejected the idea that the Finns and the Hungarians could understand each other even though their languages were related.}

The vigorous Hungarians had taken to the sword to free themselves but the Lapps had remained imprisoned by the chains of nature. The other "Fennic" peoples who had remained stationary from time immemorial showed no more evidence of civilization than the Lapps. They had just existed somewhere beyond the ancient Germans and Scythians and nothing had been heard or written of them. In the Viking age, the Varangians, whose history Gibbon read in Nestor's chronicle, had passed by the silent Baltic coasts on their way to Russia. The first rays of civilization had reached the "Fennic" tribes as the Swedes gradually proselytized the Finns of Finland into Christianity\footnote{Gibbon, \textit{The History}, VII, p. 196.}. Also according to John Adams, this had been the first "rational" moment in Swedish history since the year 850 when they themselves had received the Christian faith\footnote{John Adams, \textit{A View of Universal History from Creation to the Present Time} (London, 1795), p. 252.}. These missions had not yet touched the scattered Siberian and northeast Russian Finns, whom the academicians of the Imperial Academy of Sciences of St Petersburg had begun scientifically to survey. "The tortuous etymological art of linguistics"\footnote{Gibbon, \textit{The History}, VII, p. 167. Gibbon did not hesitate to criticise German and French scholars who had sought common roots of the languages of Russia. Concerning the Finns, he could not find the terms \textit{vogul} and \textit{ugur} as conclusive evidence of a common origin of the Uralian and Ugrian Finns.} had already
laid the foundations for establishing the family relations of the Finnish peoples.

During the last decades of the eighteenth century the old Gothic image of the North was shaken but not wholly discarded. It led to the differentiation of the Finns from the Fenni and the Goths as the information found in the classical sources could not sufficiently explain their origin. They appeared to have descended from more eastern roots whose origins were to be sought in Russian history. A few British scholars familiarized themselves with the sources and dissertations available in St Petersburg and were ready to incorporate some speculations concerning the Finns into their otherwise classical themes. The Finns, from being merely rude savages were regarded as slightly civilized by Christianity but as the fragments discussed above imply, it remained for travellers to Scandinavia and Russia to supply the scientists and historians with fresh material.

1.4. Travel accounts

I

Although it was the travellers who extended the limits of knowledge of other peoples, until the eighteenth century most of them did not bother to collect their own material concerning foreign countries but largely relied on second-hand sources even when they could have recorded their own experiences on the spot. As Francis Bacon once complained, travel accounts had mostly been written in the form of a memoir during the passage back home from a foreign land. If someone cared to publish his diary, he did it with the aim of sensation-seeking. A more serious traveller should be selective and critical:

Let it appear that the traveller doth not change his country manners for those of foreign parts, but only pick some flowers of that he hath learned abroad into the customs of his own country.\

In this way, travelling and diary-keeping might instruct and advance the learning of a young nobleman. However, to a European it was hardly worthwhile to register the manners and superstitions of foreigners. At most, some curiosities which repelled the Western mind were recorded in order to make it clear where a heathen way of life might lead.

In the eighteenth century all this changed. The new philosophic mood of the Enlightenment assured the West of the superiority of its civilization. What was in Asia, Africa, North-America, or Siberia was either darkness or barbarism. However, the new philosophic spirit stimulated a scientific approach, a curiosity about the history and the development of reason itself. Following Montesquieu's doctrines, the manners of peoples came to be seen in the context of the historical moment they had reached in the progressive development of social organization. The travellers applied the method: they began to explore and use their own judgment and ...

...try to open the internal springs of action by which the inhabitants of different nations are actuated, exhibit to us a natural and striking picture of human manners, under the various stages of barbarity and refinement.55

The travellers' descriptions produced evidence relevant to the Scottish social theory, and the travellers themselves used the Scottish theory as a framework for their own observations. As for the more remote and unknowable past and for the lacuna between the cultural stages, they could be "conjectured". In all, travel literature was becoming more serious and respectable, and perception replaced imagination56.

Many a traveller who visited Scandinavia or Russia drew on the classificatory hierarchy of races suggested by the eighteenth-century naturalists. Sometimes they found much to criticize in them. The picture of the racial history of the North took on a new shape as the migrations of the Slavic, Mongol and Finnish peoples were traced back to their supposed 'cradles'. Their location

56. For a definition of this kind of approach, see Peardon, The Transition in English Historical Writing, p. 13.
depended not only on the sources of information available to the
collectors but also on the collectors' readiness for the perception of
human variety. The seeds of national histories were assembled
from fragments of ancient and medieval authors sometimes
amended by more recent studies of the origins and relations of the
northern and eastern peoples. One cannot say that these histories
were "national" in the nineteenth-century sense of the term but
they laid the foundations and provided valuable clues for the
subsequent, more consciously nationalist efforts to reconstruct
histories which traced the emergence of the "national spirit" back
to its first expressions in folktales and sagas.

Traditionally, the sons of the British nobility had indulged a
taste for cultured travelling and completed their education with a
tour to Italy, the country whose history offered much to reflect on,
at least for their tutors. However, after the outbreak of the French
Revolution, the travellers changed their routes to go along the more
secure verges of the continent, and Greece and the Levant became
favoured destinations. When heading for Scandinavia and
Russia, they usually sailed to Holland, continued to Denmark,
Norway and Sweden, crossed the Baltic via the Åland Islands and
had a look at the Finns on their way to St Petersburg. An
alternative route took them straight through Germany, Poland and
the Russian Baltic provinces. From there they might, especially in
winter, travel through Finland to Stockholm on their way back to
Britain. These travellers reported on the fast and comfortable post-
route service and on the tolerable inns dispersed in Southern
Finland.

There were many reasons for travelling to the North. As in the
case of Defoe, there had been considerable interest in Russian
affairs. Towards the end of the century this interest was on the
increase and travel literature became fashionable. The best travel
books on Russia went through many editions and appeared in

järven maat. Suomen matkailun historia (A Land of a Thousand Lakes, A
History of Tourism in Finland) (Jyväskylä, 1987), pp. 22—23. These tours were
not always satisfactory from the educational point of view because they
"frequently degenerated from a quest after the fruits of a superior civilization
(French) to a compound of sightseeing and dissipation". Peter Putnam (ed.),
Seven Britons in Imperial Russia (New Jersey, University of Princeton Press,
many languages, and their circulation was wide among the international culture of the Enlightenment. What were the innumerable races of Russia like? Was Russia still so deep in barbarism? What had been accomplished by the "enlightened despots"? The travellers, among whom is here included the historian William Tooke who spent much time in Russia, attempted to answer these questions. Those who visited both Russia and Sweden-Finland had the opportunity to compare the relative value of the accomplishments of different forms of government.

Apart from the Russian pull, there was the fascination of Lapland: the midnight-sun lured Matthew Consett, Edward Clarke, and even Joseph Marshall, who was a self-taught economist-traveller. Only one of them was a pure adventurer, namely John Ledyard, who just happened to cross Finland as a preliminary to his ambitious plan to cross Siberia.

Very often travellers' accounts contained information on political, economic and religious affairs, the state of civilization and manners, on the ranks of society, and on the relations of the rulers and their subjects. Especially the historically oriented were eager to teach pragmatic lessons. They aimed at enlightenment of the country visited by giving advice on how to conduct reforms. Many accounts were dedicated to the ruler of the country visited and the travellers dared to express plans for improving the lot of a foreign people. Moreover, some of them seemed to remain subservient to the demands of their noble patrons, and directed the message at them in order to widen their understanding when tackling the problems encountered with their subjects at home.

II

A more independent traveller like Joseph Marshall who went North in the hope of finding "a new world", had the freedom to censure and admire. He blamed his youth for the fact that he had not been able to gather any "things of solidity and use" on an earlier journey to Southern Europe58. He had decided to fix his

58. Joseph Marshall, *Travels through Holland, Flanders, Germany, Denmark,*
eyes on the Northern economy, and keenly observe all phenomena of trade, industry, mining, and most of all, of agriculture. He sought to gather information about the products of the land, the state of the fields and the morality of the landlords and peasants. Following the teachings of the physiocrats he regarded agriculture as the basis of all civilization. Referring to Montesquieu he attributed the happiness, sturdiness and general progressive disposition of the peasants of Sweden-Finland to free ownership of their holdings, to free enjoyment of the products of land and cattle, and to free use of the wilderness and uncultivated land. In Sweden-Finland the form of government favoured the small peasantry, the laws of the country promoted their freedom, and the king, Gustavus III, was supported by the peasants against the nobles in the Diet\textsuperscript{59}.

In spite of the happiness of the Northern peasant, Marshall was not altogether satisfied with the static state of the Swedish economy. Coming down on the side of large-scale land-ownership, he wanted to see an expansion of enclosure. This applied especially to the under-developed areas of the far north. When reaching the borders of Finland the lack of civilized conditions became evident. The main hindrance to development in the Tornio district was the small population. Marshall was anxious to note how the peasants who owned their land lived at subsistence level without adding anything to the Swedish national wealth. There was an economic standstill and the remedy should have been the same as in Britain: the independent small holdings should have given way to large enclosures based on a money economy:

'... if all these peasants lived in cottages, without any land, and the country was cultivated by great farmers, who would afford to pay

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\textit{Lapland, Russia, the Ukraine and Poland in the years 1768, 1769, and 1770} (London, 1772), I, pp. ii—iv.

59. Marshall, \textit{Travels}, II, p. 368; III, pp. 83, 91, 94—96. The nobles were the most civilized, the middle-ranks were trying to be, and the peasants or serfs were the uncivilized. When it came to the civilization of the Swedish and Finnish nobility the British travellers realized that it was mostly an imitation of the Western manners of refinement and lacked the learned basis the British nobles could rely on. However, although the relative poverty of the northern peoples rendered their civilization very partial, the most crude despotism and anarchy had been overcome. See Mary Wollstonecraft, \textit{Letters written during a Short Residence in Sweden, Norway and Denmark} (London, 1796), appendix.
the money for their labour, the farmers would grow ten times the produce which is now produced.\textsuperscript{60}

The traditionally free peasantry of Bothnia should have been converted into agricultural labourers according to the British model. Without great expansion in agricultural production there would be no progress, markets or demand. The primitive economy of the few bartering and wandering Lapps and of a few Finnish colonists could not have produced it. A more settled way of life, organized labour, money payments and contract-based trade had to be introduced.

Another, and graver, obstacle lay in the way of progress. The Finns and the Lapps did not seem to master the elements of moral culture, they were "less informed, less intelligent and less comprehensive" than the British.\textsuperscript{61} For instance, the Lapps could easily be deceived in trade because they did not know the real value of the furs, skins and fish they brought to market. Such bargaining could not be the basis for systematic trade. Trade required elementary acceptance of a rational moral code: only proper industry, skill and some economic calculation would promote moral betterment. The Finns and Lapps of Tornio exemplified the opposite: they exchanged their articles of trade for salt and wasted the rest of their earnings on brandy and tobacco.

In Vaasa the prospects were gloomy, too. The staple-merchants complained to Marshall of the stagnant state of their business:

\begin{quote}
The trade is shackled and destroyed by the regulations, prohibition and laws ...\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

They referred to the regulation of trade in the Gulf of Bothnia which prohibited them from exporting goods further than to Stockholm. Marshall understood their difficulty, and his own

\textsuperscript{60} Marshall, \textit{Travels}, III, q. p. 43. Adam Smith had not found a trace of betterment in Northern Russia and Asia although he knew that some peoples lived there. The preconditions of civilization, the means of transport, fertile soil and rudiments of agriculture, sufficient amount of population and exchange of goods were almost totally lacking; no civilized needs, no trade, only minimal wants met. The only exception was the trade carried by the British Moscow Co. via Archangel. Adam Smith, \textit{The Wealth of Nations}. Ed. A. Skinner (London, 1983), pp. 125, 220.
considerations demanded that the conditions for material progress should be created by relaxing the regulations hampering exports from the Bothnian ports. In general, there were some products in Finland that the British needed more urgently as the century drew to a close. Freer trade could have promoted the export of planks, tar, pitch and hemp for British ships.

In Salo, a town in Southern Finland, Marshall met a Swedish baron who had made considerable profits from trading with the products of his tenants and had brought new lands under cultivation. In Marshall's eyes he seemed to be a great improver, a mixture of a merchant and a country gentleman. Together they envisaged the immeasurable opportunities of inner Finland: canals and lots of timber drifting to the coasts. They disagreed with the old belief that "Savolaxia" was unsuitable for agriculture and destitute of resources; there were endless forests to be cut, and there was plenty of land for vast clearings for agricultural expansion. There were already some neat cottages and cultivated patches. Nature seemed to abound by itself without too much effort from man:

The new enclosures around the cottage were a proof of this: for although the peasant did not seem to be one of the most industrious; yet he had very good crops of barley and oats, and of turnips, and he had a herd of cows which fed upon the waste, with a parcel of young cattle, none of which seemed in their looks to complain in their pasture.63

Basically, the transformation of the peripheral, semi-civilized mode of life into an agricultural and commercial society would take place according to the naturally self-determining process of social evolution:

63. Marshall, Travels, III, q. p. 69. Cf. pp. 74—75. An 'enclosure movement' was well on its way in Finland in the end of the century. By the so-called Big Deal, the freehold peasant farmers were allowed to concentrate their patches into larger fields and a lot of leaseholdings were established. At the same time new methods of agriculture and the potato were introduced. The loosening of the regulations on trade was originally the idea of Anders Chydenius, a Finnish representative at the Swedish Riksdag and an advocate of freer, commercial society.
'... and indeed, it is generally found that agriculture, well pursued, must increase the people very much; manufactures will next arise; to satisfy their greatest needs, and then comes commerce, to supply the rest. This is the natural chain, and it is vain to think of reversing it. 64

This first, slight touch of British progressive ideas came to Finland via the North, through the Gulf of Bothnia. More often the British approached Finland directly either from Stockholm or St Petersburg. Those who arrived via the latter route usually took a view of the innumerable peoples of the Russian Empire seen on the streets of the capital before setting off for a tour of Finland.

III

When pondering the state of Russia British observers commonly conceded that Peter the Great and Catharine II had tried their best to root out some of the most barbarous manners of their citizens-souls by means of despotic but enlightened ordinances. The Russians were struggling to free themselves from barbarism while Asia, from Hellespontos to the China Sea, remained static 65. Yet, Archdeacon William Coxe (1747—1828), as one of the first Englishmen to have a closer look at the interior of the Russian Baltic provinces, realized how little had been achieved in such a vast country where serfdom, obscurantism, and despotism hindered individual initiative and any social change 66. In principle, freedom presupposed exemption from villeinage and

64. Marshall, Travels, III, q. p. 44—45.
65. For the pertinacity of this kind of approach to Russian affairs, see M.S. Anderson, Britain’s Discovery of Russia, 1553—1815 (London, 1953).
66. William Coxe, Travels into Poland, Russia, Sweden and Denmark (London, 1784), II, pp. 62, 94—95. Coxe the historian became a travelling tutor to the son of the Earl Pembroke in 1773. These travellers were men of wealth and leisure. The tour was carefully planned and they had recommendations to all courts. As a historian Coxe was not on the level of Gibbon. He did not show the grasp of historical forces and wrote only the history of great men, diplomacy and wars, and respected the requests of his Whig patrons but was an accurate transcriber and industrious collector of valuable private papers. Cf. Peardon, The Transition of English Historical Writing, p. 193; John Kenyon, The History Men (London, 1983), p. 66.
servitude although they might be appropriate to a despotic form of
government and for a people so ignorant. In consequence, Coxe
could not agree with Voltaire's favourable view of the future
government of Russia; nothing real could be achieved by an order
to civilize, only liberation of the powers of the individual could set
the moral forces for social progress free. It was important for a
conservative clergyman like Coxe to emphasize one point: because
the majority of the Russians still lived in mental indifference,
drastic measures from above might endanger the whole cause of
civilization.

In Old Finland everything appeared different. On arrival in
Viipuri on 3 February 1779 he reminded his readers:

This province retains its ancient privileges and laws, the Lutheran
priests have reasonable incomes because of the small progress
luxury has made in this country. 67

Coxe readily recognized the benefits of the old Swedish
constitution. It was a remarkable deviation from the Russian
dullness of despotic rule. It made a big difference to him and he
was delighted to encounter some true signs of civilization in
Finland. One of the touchstones of its presence was security of the
person and private property: nobody seemed to have any intention
of stealing his suitcase. This had not been the case in Russia where
one had to look after one's belongings all the time. When passing
from Old Finland to Sweden-Finland Coxe admitted how the
Russian landscape changed to a more joyful and varying Finnish
one:

The country through which we passed was a succession of hill and
dale, abounding with forests of fir and beech, interspersed with
numerous lakes and thickly overspread with scattered fragments of
granite which looked like wrecks of mountains. 68

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67. Coxe, Travels, II, q. p. 307. Coxe had collected some statistics from Viipuri: the
population of the province had been 117,988 in 1778, and out of 99 ships
arriving 66 had been British, the articles imported had been wines, salt and
spices, and the articles of export tar, planks, tallow and pitch.

68. Coxe, Travels, II, q. p. 309. Cf. Nathanael Wraxall, A Tour through the
Northern Part of Europe (London, 1776), pp. 190—92.
The freedom of the Finnish peasantry and their Christian morality appeared to Coxe to have enhanced the effects of civilization. The striking contrast between the Russians and Finns was visible in their physical appearance as well. The tawny, dirty and indolent-looking Russian serfs contrasted with the fair, red- or flaxen-haired Finns who appeared happier and "were more civilized than Russians". Even in the smallest villages Coxe was able to find much better accommodation than he had usually met with in the largest towns of Russia. Moreover, the West coast Finns had neat houses, chimneys (true indicators of civilization), beds and often more furniture than the Russians. They could make all their tools and implements themselves and seemed self-sufficient because they had cows of their own and food in store. There was an aura of freedom around them. The parallel to the British type of freedom was evident; it bore the same aspect of taking delight in work, and its main stimulus had been the impact of Christian morality and its urge for enterprise. Contrary to the Russian orthodoxy and dogma which tied initiative down, freedom seemed to have a beneficial influence on Finnish civilization and on its bearers. Some of the grossest superstitions and prejudices had been overcome, and in a historical sense, the Finns were about to leave the barbarous age behind while still retaining some relics of it.

IV

Travellers were amazed by the disposition of the Northern peoples. Persuaded of the beneficial tendency of reason to control primitive passions, they found the races of the North, on the one hand, innocent and simple and, on the other, ignorant and indecent. The virtues did not match the vices, and so the Finns, but the Lapps in particular, appeared like they were living at the dawn of reason. The Lapps seemed to live as if they had been created a moment ago. The Finns were just stepping into the light of reason out of the darkness of insensible and purely natural history. They seemed to advance more rapidly than the Lapps.

John Ledyard (1751—1788) who travelled through Finland in winter, 1787, adduced some proof of Finnish primitive virtues. He attributed the philanthropy which had induced the "rude and churlish" Finns to help him through cold, wet, hunger and illness to the oriental disposition of unselfishness and hospitality. This was not the case with the spoiled southerners who were civilized but selfish. Their manner of gulping the sweets given to them could not be seen among the "Finlanders":

'...’ give a cake to a Swedish Finlander or a Northern Tartar and he eats it leisurely.

This Romantic notion of the noble northerner applied more readily to the nomadic Lapps than to the agricultural Finns. Lapps seemed to be the children of nature living in symbiosis with their reindeer. To Matthew Consett, whose travel description was also translated into German and Dutch, some of them were "rich", and all of them were afraid of war, which was one of the civilized vices. The Lapps were uncorrupted, and ignorant of civilized vices, the inevitable consequences of the leisured and boring life of high society. Although the Lapps had had occasion to taste "the legal plunder and rapacious power" of tax-collectors, traders and missionaries, they had not yet fallen into the cardinal sin of the West, unlimited self-interest:

No fake desires, no pride-created wants
Disturb the peaceful current of their time,
And thro' the restless, evertortured maze,
Of pleasure or ambition, bid it rage.

70. This traveller and adventurer had sailed with Captain Cook on the coasts of America, Alaska and Kamtschatka in 1776—80 and was now heading, on his own, through Finland to St Petersburg.
71. John Ledyard's Journey through Russia and Siberia, 1787—88. The Journal and Selected Letters. Ed. S.D. Watrous (London, 1966), q. p. 170. Ledyard noticed something African in the Finnish visage: "large mouth, the thick lip, the broad flat nose". He believed that physical affinity was the key to racial origins.
72. Matthew Consett, A Tour through Sweden, Swedish-Lapland, Finland and Denmark (London, 1789), p. 94.
73. Consett, A Tour, q. p. 82.
However, this state of morals could not last forever. The Romantic notion of Lapps and Finns, derived mainly from some older authors like Schefferus and Magnus was no longer relevant to the circumstances of a more modern mode of life. The negative strain of savage morality counted much with Consett. The Lapps and Finns held on to their past and "many superstitions still remain to proclaim the darkness of their minds". Consett censured augury, shamanism, idolatry, supposed witchcraft and other forms of non-Christian religion. Out of the erroneous interpretation and understanding of the causes of natural phenomena had originated the wicked, superstitious way of life which tempted people into indolence and kept them in ignorance, and finally led to poverty and misery. The Lapps would soon degenerate and become extinct. There was only one way out of this situation. The Finns of Tornio had already been baptized and almost immediately change had occurred; they had become more receptive to civilization. They were industrious and occupied with worldly affairs with a sincerity which approached that of a British protestant. The Lapps seemed ready for the same kind of moral reform; they were "gentle" enough to allow the inculcation of Christian belief.

Ultimately, the hierarchy of moralities was rooted in the Christian interpretation of the sacred history of ancient peoples which was still alive at the end of the eighteenth century. Even if all peoples had known something of civilization before the Flood, in its aftermath the Western peoples were given the privilege of civilizing energy and mission. They enjoyed the higher forms of culture, while all the others lagged behind. In the light of this historical vision and the values supporting it, it is no wonder that the British censured Lapp shamanism, a kind of "nervous paroxysm" which testified how little the Lapps had advanced in understanding the idea of God. More importantly, the degenerate morality was reflected in the social sphere. Compared with British institutions, the nomadic Lapps had no proper priests, no judges,

75. Consett, _A Tour_, pp. 52, 90. Consett brought one Lapp family from Sweden to London for display. It was admitted by the public that the Lapp women were not beautiful but conceded that Lapps and Negroes, in their turn, might not adore the alabaster white European lady.
no disputes over property, no police\textsuperscript{76}. But again, the Finns fared better:

They live in towns and villages, have schools and academies. They profess Lutheran faith, and use the Christian era in their chronology. They carry on commerce, and exercise most of the common trades. The boors are chiefly engaged in agriculture, hunting and fishing. They are great eaters, making five meals a day and are immoderately fond of brandy. They enjoy a considerable degree of freedom, as the Russian government has continued to them the enjoyment of the privileges which they formerly had under the crown of Sweden.\textsuperscript{77}

The writer, William Guthrie, whose "grammar" was widely read and successful, had picked up fragments from various sources and continued to cite some fabulous customs, but mainly he concentrated on those features which somehow resembled the Western way of life and were curious or congenial to British readers. The Protestant faith and commerce, exercised together under a rudimentary but free constitution preserved by a moderate autocrat, guaranteed that the Finns of Old Finland would not revert to Oriental customs and superstitions. Owing to the beneficial influence of Western civilization the Finns did not degenerate but advanced along the historical paths traversed by the Western peoples. It was only the Lapps who "rather than relinquish the brutality of heathenism" had stuck to savagery\textsuperscript{78}. Also the Finns of Sweden-Finland who had been "as savage as the inhabitants of Terra del Fuego" in the past, did not fit the imagery of savagery any longer, and were being civilized by their superior neighbours:

\textsuperscript{76} Guthrie, A New Geographical, Historical and Commercial Grammar, p. 99. Guthrie supported the view that Lapps and Finns were of Asiatic origin and thought that Finns had driven the Lapps ("exiles") out of Finland.
\textsuperscript{77} Guthrie, A Grammar, q. p. 127.
\textsuperscript{78} Pennant, Arctic Zoology, p. lxii. Pennant used Linnaeus, Magnus, Tacitus and contemporary Swedish authors, Retzius and Anderson. He confused Finns and Lapps suggesting that the Finns had domesticated the reindeer. This error did not turn up in Wood’s Zoography (London, 1807). Pennant was an esteemed travelling naturalist, mostly because he had made dry and technical matter interesting.
In consequence of which cultivation and civilization have so well succeeded in the southern parts that many deserts are peopled ‘...’ morasses drained, and the reason of the natives so greatly improved that they have united with the Swedes and even sent their representatives to the House of Peasants in the national diet. But they were at all times the most cultivated of this distinct race.\textsuperscript{79}

V

Besides the observations that the Finns had been civilized by the Swedes, allusions to the superiority of the Swedish race began to appear in travel literature in the late eighteenth century. Writers did not systematize racial differences by any pseudo-scientific criteria, but made them correspond to the respective cultural stages of the peoples. The low stature and blackness of the Lapps, and the whiteness and hardiness of the Finns had something to do with their way of life. Furthermore, the great ensemble of peoples in Russia undoubtedly left an ineradicable impression on the British travellers and made them ponder the causes of the great variety. Some writers speculated as to what sort of environmental factors might have caused a peculiar skin-colour and what might have been their effect on cultural and moral propensities although the writers did not specify the effect of physical causes on morality. The moral causes were usually regarded as more important. Variety demanded explanation not so much in terms of blood relations, as in the anthropological speculations, but rather in terms of common manners and morals conditioned by environmental adaptation.

Considering the manifold Finnish peoples and tribes, many of them still "in the lowest state of civilization", Andrew Swinton searched for the primary cause of their differences. Eventually he inclined to a polygenetic solution but at first modified it with environmental causation. For instance, the same cause would produce the same effect, namely the affinity of manners:

\textsuperscript{79}. Pennant, \textit{Arctic Zoology}, q. p. lxi—lxii.
Their manners have a nearer resemblance, as must happen to tribes and nations whether they may be of the same origin or not, dwelling in the same climate, and under the same circumstances. 80

The other factors seemed more unreliable:

The difference of language is not always, however, a certain proof of different origin; nor on the contrary is the similarity of customs proof of the same origin. 81

These arguments proved Swinton Buffon's notion of the six uniformly dwarfish northern nations to be false. The Danes, the Swedes and the Russians, the descendants of the ancient Scythians and brothers to the British, were apparently tall and "handsome" and had customs in common. The Russians had encroached on the aboriginal, low-statured Finnic race which had manners entirely of its own. Religion proved the point further. Most of the Russian Finns still clung to sun-worship whereas the Russians believed in the same God as the more Western Scythians 82. The Baltic Finns, in particular those who lived in the vicinity of St Petersburg, had distinctive manners. Because of the cold, they had built huge stoves, the heat from which had made their skin brownish and dirty. Swinton used this "scientific" argument to contrast these Finns and the clean English, who were, in his opinion, warmed by liberty, commerce, wealth and luxury. As a nicety, Swinton stressed the point that it was luxury that had given the English "an amorous complexion", and it was as if freedom could be read on their skin 83. A comfortable environment had produced a refined character and hue, a smoky and dirty one had dimmed the minds of the Baltic Finns.

Sometimes the arguments of racial superiority were derived from physico-aesthetic standards based on the supposition that

80. Andrew Swinton, Travels into Norway, Denmark, and Russia in the years 1788, 1790, and 1791 (London, 1792), I, q. p. 262. Cf. William Thomson, Letters from Scandinavia on the Past and Present State of the Northern Nations of Europe (London, 1796), I, p. 119. Thomson's work was a plagiarism of Swinton's. Swinton was an unknown author who condemned the anti-Russian policies of Pitt.
81. Swinton, Travels, I, q. p. 264.
one's own race lived in the best conditions on the earth. The ideal of life was to live a leisured existence in comfort and ease like the ancient Greek or Roman nobles had done. The environment which had produced the classical fairness was preferred to the northern climate which tended to produce dark skin. For Swinton the differences between the races were so striking that when accounting for them he chose, giving up environmentalism, to support the idea of the fixity of racial types. The Baltic Finns living in the same country as the Russians had such a totally different moral disposition that it could not be explained in any other way than by putting it down to primeval racial division. Much as both the Russians and the Finns, especially the Karelians of Old Finland, and the Ingrians and the Votes, were indolent, the Russians were lively and active whereas the Finns did not give vent to their passions because their human nature had been stifled by the heat of their huge stoves. So much so that the Finns had become naturally morose and taciturn:

I do not recollect to have seen a Finlander in a passion; low murmurs are the utmost stretch of their feelings.\(^{84}\)

The heated air, a natural cause similar to phlogiston, had brought the character of the Finnish race to the fore. The stifled disposition of the Finns "proves that there is a difference in the very nature of men, which neither local situation nor climate is wholly able to eradicate" so long as the Finns held on to their peculiar way of living\(^ {85}\). Only a thorough change of environment and of the Finnish way of life could possibly transform and reform them.

As a scientific traveller, Swinton did not stop at natural causes but advanced some auxiliary, historical and moral proof. The Finnish peoples had not been kept under Russian oppression as long as the Russians themselves had been serfs and submitted to fate. There was a fresh reason for the melancholy of the recently (in 1721 and 1743) suppressed Baltic Finns. The Russian serfs seemed to have forgotten their misery and were even able to express their natural joy and sorrow more passionately than the Finns who had been accustomed to relative freedom under Swedish rule. But even

the Finns who lived in the areas where they had not become the property of a Russian landlord could not boast a heroic history. They had been the prey and booty of more valiant and conquering neighbours since the dawn of civilization in the North. Without glorifying the part the Finns had played in the making of Swedish history, Swinton summarized the condition of some of the northern nations in 1799:

The Dane, the former lord of Scandinavia, is sullen, from reflection of his former power, the Swede, proud of having shaken off the Danish yoke, is proud too of the chains of his native sovereign. The Finlander never had a native sovereign; he can show no register of war and murder; no list of heroic plunderers; no standards taken from the enemy in the battle; he contents himself with wearing at second hand the shackles which surrounding nations have manufactured for themselves under the direction of their princes. 86

Frequently, as the history of the Finnish peoples implied, they had been the moulded mass, usually dying while fighting under the command of a foreign lord for other peoples’ causes. Swinton honestly regretted the lot of the Finns, a people abused to promote the intrigues of sovereigns against each other. The positive side of the matter was only that the Finns had not so far been entirely brought under control and some remote Finnish tribes still lived in a kind of primitive freedom in the east. At this juncture, Swinton directed his message to all landlords and kings who, in his opinion, had a duty to take care of their subjects. Turning his thoughts back home he argued that the English agricultural labourer, driven out of his cottage, fared almost as badly as a Russian serf or an oppressed Finn. Swinton recalled medieval security and paternal care which were both vanishing; a chaotic scene of disorder and squalor prevailed in British towns. Passions flowed over and Swinton’s conscience was moved by this horrifying and anarchic spectacle. As a pragmatic traveller, Swinton suggested instant reforms to tie the crumbling base of British society together again: ”Every landholder should be obliged to furnish a small house for every labourer employed”87.

Swinton seemed to oppose unrestricted expansion of trade and industry. In his view, Adam Smith had shown how to accumulate wealth but had forgotten to consider its distribution. Equalization could be achieved not only by loosening trade regulations but by establishing new and sensible ones, such as an obligatory, small wage for agricultural labourers, laws to limit the accumulation of private property, and the protection of agriculture in general. Although Swinton supported a progressive economy in principle, he wanted to slow down the process of progress because it seemed to bring on evils experienced only in Russia where the powerful oppressed the weak.88

The beneficial repercussions of a relatively free economy could be seen in the morality of the Finns of Finland which had recently improved on that of the other Finns who were under Russian dominion. The few seaports of Finland and their increasing trade encouraged the spirit of enterprise "which had made people richer, and in consequence more cleanly and healthy."89 The commercial class of Finland embodied the civilizing power of the enterprising mood and industry.

Progress of the same kind might be expected from the Finns living in Russia were they transplanted to the Ukraine black earth region to exercise their natural talent, agriculture. This colonization would also prove politically advantageous. The Finns who had been torn away from the Swedish rule which they had always preferred, in Swinton's opinion, to the Russian one, might now finally forget their longing, and the Swedes could cease planning a revanche against Russia. Russia could ensure a safer western border and the unfair lot of the Baltic Finns would be mended.90 Swinton entrusted the civilising task to agriculture and its benign influence on human nature. From agricultural toil arose the morals of sociable and dutiful existence, and the passion for wandering would be overcome.

The method of civilization was that of example. It had an unfailing effect on the imitative human mind. According to Swinton's recommendation, the Finns should try out a fancy-dress version of the civilizing method on the Lapps:

For instance, let the colonists build themselves commodious huts and villages of timber, as in Finland, with stoves and chimneys; let them be dressed after the manner of Laplanders, which is best suited for the culture, but let this dress be clean; let a skirt of linen be added, and ablutions in water frequently performed, as well as strict observance of cleanliness in every particular.\textsuperscript{91}

Here is expressed the way of learning civilization. With the same certainty as the chain of cause and effect held true in nature, the civilizing stimuli affected the human mind. Swinton found the Finns of Old Finland living just on the verge of rising to the next rung of the ladder of civilization, agriculture, some still leading a nomadic life. As a stimulus to the progress of civilization he suggested ways of directing them to the agricultural stage. The crux of the problem was easily solved for him. The backward tribes should be persuaded to give up their more or less restless disposition and way of life and settle as the pioneering Finns of Finland had done.

VI

Another, and a more prominent observer of the Russian Empire and its peoples, William Tooke (1744—1820), admired the mixture of agricultural and commercial civilization. He was, in the last years of the century, one of the best informed British on Russian affairs. Like most British interested in Russia, Tooke regarded the autocrat as the only civilizing, and morally and politically unifying force in Russia (Tooke favoured Catherine II in his writings). Notwithstanding a few enlightened nobles, merchants and westernized manufacturers, the Russians appeared altogether barbarous to Tooke.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{91} Thomson, \textit{Letters}, I, q. p. 470.

\textsuperscript{92} William Tooke, \textit{View of the Russian Empire} (Repr. from the 1799—1800 ed., New York, 1970), I, pp. 260—1, 511. Since 1771 Tooke had been chaplain to the British merchants and manufacturers in Kronstadt and St Petersburg. He was a member of the Imperial Academy of Science and of the Free Economic Society. He translated Georgi’s description of the Russian peoples and could not accept Tacitus’s notion of the Finns because he noticed that they had greatly improved in civilization and did not themselves know the Teutonic name Fenni. He also knew that some Finns still lived in Asiatic Russia, and
In the amalgam of the Russian peoples Tooke found the order of things: all stages of civilization were apparent. In spite of serfdom, common prejudice and superstition, a ray of reason's light was penetrating the Russian darkness, and improvement and gradual progress could be discerned in the midst of chaos, stupidity and cruelty. Russian reality could be classified according to the Scottish method: there were the hunters and fishers ("indifferent to basic needs, no conception of property"), the pastoralists ("no money, no letters"), the agriculturalists ("living in villages"), and there was some commerce and industry in the biggest towns ("where diligence collects the products of different parts of the world for traffic")93. Analogous to this scale of secular things was the hierarchy of religious ideas "from monstrous polytheism to the total unacquaintance with any idea of the supreme intelligence", and the physical hierarchy from white to yellow races. The Russian Empire displayed the variety of human achievement at all stages of civilization from primitive implements to modern "arts":

What a distance from the earth-holes of the Samoyedes to the palaces of residence, from the needle-work of fishbones and sinews to the weaving tapestry, from the sling and arrows to the fire-arms of the modern art of war in Europe.94

As it had been for Swinton, the step from nomadic to agricultural life was also crucial for Tooke. Binding the pastoralists to the soil marked the transition "from a rude, and laborious to a milder and more commodious way of life"95. Sedate and civil life under any authority would bring about comfort and ease, but in the end, the final goal seemed to be business and industry of a British type.

Judging by the scales of civilization the lot of the Finns was not too bad at all. Aided by various French and German authors Tooke felt safe in concluding that the "Finnic" peoples did not have a history of their own and that it should be gleaned from the annals of other nations. They had migrated from beyond the Ural that the original Finns could not have been very closely connected with the ancient Germans. Tooke returned to England in 1792. His work was used by various later writers, see e.g. Rees's Cyclopaedia, 14 (1819), "Russia".

93. Tooke, View, I, p. 509.
94. Tooke, View, I, q. p. 511.
95. Tooke, View, I, p. 85; III, p. 129.
mountains, the Asiatic steppes, and had later been pushed north by Slavs and Tartars. In Tooke’s times the Finns living in Viipuri were the most progressive of all Finnic tribes. As Tooke regarded them, they appeared to have improved from “the pigmy, dirty and sallow-complexioned” Lapp to “a blond, large and well-made” Finlander, and had become superior to all their relatives in the east. In this way Tooke believed that gradual physical change could be caused by the environment. He implied that when a ”Finlander” happened to go to Lapland he would turn into a Lapp again.

There were both natural and moral causes for the Finnish improvement. Their happier outlook proceeded from their freedom. Some of the ”Finlanders” of Viipuri were free in as much as the landlord could not sell their souls without the estate. Some of them had remained free-holders or cottagers. Tooke, being sensitive to current cultural variety, was surprised by the peculiarity of the pioneering method of the Finnish peasant:

The Russian boor generally labours only his old arable lands, whereas the Finnish peasant strives to lessen his work at the expense of the forests.

This mobile kind of agriculture required a semi-settled mode of life and minimal social co-operation:

Even in their dwellings a great difference is already apparent, as the Russians live together in villages, but the Finns singly, or by families in what are called scattered crews.

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96. Tooke, View, I, pp. 326—27. In Tooke’s view the the Finns were the other original people of Russia — the Tartars had been intruders. He divided Finns into 13 tribes: Lapps, Proper Finns, Estonians, Livonians, Cheremiss, Chuvash, Mordvins, Votyaks, Permians, Zyrrians, Voguls, Ostyaks and Hungarians. He did not include the Samoyedes whom Castrén and others later investigated and established the grammatical affinities needed to prove the family relationship. Tooke’s sources consisted of Slavic chronicles and modern dissertations published in St Petersburg. Tooke attacked A.L. Schlözer (Allgemeine Nordische Geschichte, 1771) who had held that Finns were the aboriginal people of Europe. Tooke hinted at Herodotus’s Scythia as their possible cradle.


98. Tooke, View, III, q. p. 155.

These men of the woods with their peculiar manners were seen in the context of the simplicity and lightness of their social and cultural achievements. They were adapted to their environment and mode of life down to the last detail; their agricultural implements consisted, for example, of fork-ploughs and brand-harrows suitable for burn-beat cultivation. These implements were, of course, less effective in comparison to the British ones but in one small respect the Finns had superseded British agricultural methods. They seemed to have invented an ingenious method of drying rye, the threshing-house. However, in the long run, the Finnish way of beating and burning the woods to conquer the soil for seed was perilous to the trade so important to British interests. Seen from this angle, the Finnish way did not appear rational enough to compete with modern agriculture which tended to concentrate the dispersed patches of arable land into a few bigger, permanent fields. What is more, the Finnish method prevented the exploitation of forests for any other purposes. Evidently, the Finns had chosen the wrong way to happiness though it was not so wrong as the bushfire of the Australian aborigines.

VII

From the lowest organisms to the most highly developed human beings, the various forms of life and its cultural and human manifestations were organized within the hierarchical gradation by the travellers. Some of them believed that God had created nature and its beings and still directed their motions. The laws of motion could be scientifically comprehended by human reason. The method of the natural sciences was applied to the moral sciences, history included. Hence there arose the notion of historical development, progress and zeal for perfection in civilization. In this manner, the gradation in nature corresponded to that in civilization.

The constructive model of the natural sciences was taken up by Edward Clarke (1769—1822), mineralogist, naturalist and a

100. Tooke, View, III, pp. 139—40, 156—57.
famous traveller. He had been a great admirer of the Newtonian system since his youth. As a student Clarke had been overwhelmed by the all-embracing revelation of the Newtonian "truth" about the secrets and beauty of the universal, astronomical mechanism and the knowledge unveiled by it. For him, Newton had brought light to the earth like a priest dispensing the message. Copying Alexander Pope's lines Clarke had written:

To cheer and light the darkness of mankind
Immortal sage! illumined Nature hails
The heaven-taught soul that made creation glow
And Sol's meridian glory beam anew

'...

Nature, and Nature's laws lay hid in night,
God said — Let Newton be! and all was light

And later, recalling that his travels had undoubtedly cast some doubts on his faith, Clarke rid himself of them with the firmness of a scientist:

Dost thou still doubt
The first great cause, the will of supreme.

It was the very will of God that had dispersed the multifarious modifications of plants, animals and men to their proper environs and circumstances. The motion of matter and the drive of passion endemic to the life-principle in all organisms had been originated by an order from above. The vestiges of these divine "acts" were also visible all over the north.

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102. Clarke toured the Northern nations in 1799—1800 with his sponsor Mr J. Cripps. He collected plants, minerals and artefacts for Cambridge University where he became the first professor of mineralogy in 1808.

103. William Otter, The Life and Remains of the Rev. Edward Daniel Clarke, LL.D. (London, 1824), I, q. p. 49. The compliments to Newton were quite usual in those times when the model for scientific study and metaphor for writing was to be found in his works. See James Sambrook, The Eighteenth Century. The Intellectual and Cultural Context of English Literature, 1700—1789 (London, 1986), ch. I.

104. Otter, The Life, I, q. p. 50. Cf. pp. 385—86. In the same vein Clarke had given a lecture on plants at the Åbo Academi; paying homage to Linnaeus he explained the growth of plants by light lit by God.
In less self-confident ages, Lapland had been described in terms of wilderness, peace, joy and innocence, but Clarke, much as he respected the achievements of Linnaeus in the field of northern zoology and biology, was struck by the dullness of the landscape and people. As an Englishman striding into "unwounded nature" and wandering among the nomadic Lapps he, at first, felt like an intruder. The nature of Lapland, mostly left to itself, did not bear the easily recognizable characteristics of a "gardened Surrey". It was too uncultivated and uncivilized in appearance. Nevertheless there was a distinction between scientific observation and romantic intuition. Nature itself could be sensed as raw, unspoiled and free of human intrusion, full of various species of plants and animals to contemplate: there was the delight of seeing everything as a whole, and in its pristine state. That was one of the main motives to go to Lapland in the first place:

That of beholding the face of Nature undisguised; of traversing a strange and almost untrodden territory; of pursuing inquiries which relate to the connexion and origin of nations; of viewing man as he existed in the primaenal state; of gratifying the taste for Natural History, by the sight of rare animals, plants and minerals; of contemplating the various phenomena caused by the difference of climate and latitude, and to sum up all, the delight which travelling itself affords "...

However, nature destitute of any culture seemed disagreeable. The Lapps were to be blamed for leaving it alone. Pleasant impressions faded away as the traveller took his first scientific glance at creatures whose place in the chain of being was ambivalent. Their appearance also explained why they had not exerted any influence on pure nature. The Lapps encountered were obviously too natural themselves, too near to nature itself, and they did not suit Clarke’s standards of whiteness and cleanliness for a cultured man:

Their faces are smeared with bear's grease; and they come as near to the human as any animal except the natives of Olyuwhee.

They were as civilized as "folks at the alms-house". In this vein, the travellers sometimes identified domestic and foreign savages, although it is hard to believe that Clarke seriously meant what he wrote because, even if the Lapps were as miserable as the English poor, they should have differed from them in other respects. This Clarke had many an occasion to learn later on, and having looked at them more closely, he realized that they did not belong to the same race and they were even lower on the animal scale than the lower orders of the English race:

They have high cheek-bones, little sore eyes, a wide mouth, and a flat nose ... Indeed, both man and woman, if exhibited in a menagerie of wild beasts, might be considered as the long-lost link between man and ape.

For some time Clarke could not decide whether to choose African or Mongol characteristics to denote the Lapp and finally leaned to the Mongol due to the evidence he had been able to gather during his stays in Turku and St Petersburg. The alluring affinity to Oriental nomadic manners and physique appealed more. The Lapps and Finns prepared sour milk ("pima") like the Calmuks did. In the same way, the Lapps appeared to live under the rule of typically Asiatic vices: drinking, numerous superstitions and a

Lapps generally used bear grease and tar to protect themselves from the attacks of mosquitos. Clarke soon adopted the method.

110. Clarke, *Travels* (1819), part III, section 1, p. 486; (1824), 10, pp. 24—25. Clarke rejected biblical genealogies and the Gothic image of the history of the North, and he was informed by the Finnish scholars Porthan and Franzén who supported the hypothesis of Finnish eastern origins. Clarke's specimens of Finnish folkpoems and Lapp songs, and his evidence on relations of Lapp and Finnish to the Finnish languages led him to the same idea. In St Petersburg he was informed by French and German (e.g. von Buch) authors and he mocked Voltaire's pragmatic notion of history. Voltaire had tried to preserve "only what was worthy of posterity" but Clarke wanted to present the truth however ugly it was. When writing that Voltaire "knew of the Finns as much as of the inhabitants of the moon" he rejected his polygenist notion that the Lapps had not been driven out of Finland by the Finns but had been as natural a product of Lapland as the reindeer. Cf. also *The Modern Part of the Universal History*, XXXV (1762), pp. 10—11.
general, reindeer-like meekness of character. For instance, the Lapps Clarke engaged as guides and bearers became wholly unbearable after having taken a good many tots of brandy which were offered to them in order to see the effect.

On his way up and down the rivers of Lapland Clarke occasionally stumbled upon a Finnish colonist’s cottage. He felt relief and delight. At Enontekiö (see map) he found a smoke-cabin, the dwellers preparing glue out of reindeer skin and possessing a few cows and sheep. It was “a manufacture of a people in such an incipient state” which was “little worth notice”. Somewhat to the south, at Kolari, there was a house painted white with glazed windows, a clean interior and painted tables. Clarke slept quite comfortably between clean sheets. Still further to the south, Tornio appeared nice with its fagot-stacks and timber-piles although its commercial hum was not on the same level as the bustle of the British towns. By and large, Tornio was more refined than the towns on the Swedish side, and the disposition of the people was becoming more tolerable. The Finns of Tornio had “a greater vivacity of spirit, a more irascible disposition, and propensity to criminal actions”.

The final transition from the rule of unpleasant manners to polished society took place in Oulu where the wealthy tar-merchants had acquired a taste for luxury which seemed amazingly familiar to Clarke:

We had changed the wilderness of Lapland for the luxuries of polished society; brilliant lustres, supporting English patent-lamps, being substituted for burning splinters; a magnificent saloon for a narrow, contracted and smoky cabin; French confectionery for bread made of birch-bark and chipped straw; the most costly dainties, for raw and dried fish and flesh; beauty and wit and wine, for ugliness and stupidity and pima.

This was not only a transition but rather a striking contrast

111. Clarke, Travels (1819), part III, section 1, pp. 279, 418, 476.
112. Clarke, Travels (1819), part III, section 1, p. 270.
between the lowest and so far the highest point in civilization in Finland. For Clarke the argument was self-evident and was based on the dichotomy of withdrawal and return where return inevitably strengthened one's certainty of the superiority of a civilized way of life.

The basic virtues of labour were to be seen in Ostrobothnia. The Finns had a stamina comparable to the idealized Arcadian way of life; they were "a healthy and athletic race of men, inured to labour, and by nature active and fitted to undergo the severest trials of bodily strength."\(^{114}\) They had become a comely and healthy race who were constantly engaged in the wholesome occupations and labours of an agricultural way of life. This rather sudden betterment could not be attributed to the rise of the Finnic race itself but to a racial mixture. With the aid of the "noble Swedish race" the Finns had shaken off the prevalent Asiatic features. Neither the Swedish nor the Finnish population of Ostrobothnia had anything of "the flexibility of the Asiatic, nor any resemblance of that Orient complexion and form of countenance which assimilates the Laplander to the natives of Japan."\(^{115}\)

It became clear that the change for the better in Finnish civilization was determined by racial and cultural contact. The reader of Clarke's work is given the idea that even the potatoes that now gave health to the Finns brought the influence of Swedish civilization forward\(^{116}\). Yet, the infiltration of Swedish culture was far from complete. Clarke was surprised by the obstinacy of Finnish racio-cultural characteristics as he reconsidered the manners of the Finns of Savo and Häme. The interior, in contrast to the coastal area of Swedish-speaking civilization, remained a mysterious refuge for the "swarthy and smoke-dried" and really primitive proto-Finns. In Clarke's opinion, this almost impenetrable asylum was an abode of savagery maintained by the remnants of the original colony of the Finns who had migrated from their Asiatic cradle so long ago. Not the slightest touch of civilization had reached their primeval state. They were the rudest but hardiest of all the northern races and "more barbarous even

\(^{114}\) Clarke, *Travels* (1824), 10, pp. 47—48.

\(^{115}\) Clarke, *Travels* (1819), part III, section 1, p. 541.

\(^{116}\) Clarke, *Travels* (1824), 10, pp. 72, 75—77.
than the Laplanders; they held in sovereign contempt all the comports and luxuries of more refined nations." Even if Clarke, facing direct evidence, rejected the age-old myth of the hibernating Finns, his description came close to that of Tacitus with the distinction that Clarke emphasized how the Finns, already having dwellings and leading an agricultural mode of life, still clung to their otherwise disgusting barbarism:

It seems as if the natives of the dreary district between Abo and Petersburg had exerted their utmost ingenuity, and with fatal success, to banish from their dwellings everything that bore any relationship to comport and cleanliness. They lie down themselves upon dirty boards, filthy with grease and smoke; in dark hovels, stinking with putrid fish '..."118

Their manners were extremely revolting; they spat on the floor, they lived with animals, drank out of dirty cups and seemed sexually licentious. The more Clarke looked at them the more they began to look like their Asiatic cousins:

'...' the Finns, with their shorn features, long, dark, unbending hair, and sallow countenances, eyes extended lengthways, and half-closed; a peaked nose, frequently inclining upwards, but always pointed, sharp and square chin; elevated cheek-bones, and pinched mouth; plainly shewed the life they led; add to this, large, high, and prominent ears, turned upwards at their extremities, like those of the Chinese; high shoulders; short and small fingers, knees bent and projecting forwards '..."119

117. Clarke, *Travels* (1824), 11, pp. 231—32. This idea of Clarke's resembles that of the Finnish historian Porthan who had held that the early history of the Finns was hidden in the Finnish magic art which reflected the primitive mind. Accordingly, in Finland there were two nations, the rude and simple Finns and the civilized Swedes. Cf. Matti Klinge, *Kaksi Suomea* (Two Finlands) (Keuruu, 1982), pp. 72—73, 82—83.
119. Clarke, *Travels* (1824), 11, q. p. 331—32. Some of these monstrosities were genuine Finnish manners; spitting was connected with the habit of chewing tobacco, the cowhouse was usually (in the eastern Finland) adjacent to the main building, and many generations might live under the same roof. Cf. Samuel Johnson's description of the Highland Scots and their primitive manners in his *A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland and the Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides* (1775). Ed. with an introduction and notes by Peter Levi (Suffolk, 1984), pp. 63—64, 105, 114.
Not that the Finns were really so similar to the Chinese. The similarity suggested by Clarke is clearly exaggerated, partly because he tended to see in Finns what he had already seen in Asiatic peoples, partly because Finnish scholars imposed on him the 'eastern' interpretation of the history of the Finnish race. All the same, it was in them that the various racial and cultural denominators coalesced in a way which made Clarke long to get back home:

Oh England! decent abode of comfort and cleanliness and decorum. Oh blessed asylum of all that is worthy having upon earth. Oh sanctuary of religion, and of Liberty, for the whole civilized world! The cradle of sages, the temple of law, the altar of Faith, the asylum of innocence, the bulwark of private security and public honour.120

VIII

In 1799, two travellers, Clarke and Joseph (Guisepppe) Acerbi, met in Oulu. The Italian, a disappointed nobleman who had come to the north for recreation, contemplation and refreshment, played the violin and sang for the amusement of the British and some local officials. The occasion was unique in those latitudes. Acerbi, who tried to enliven the formal and static pomposity of the Oulu élite, caused enthusiasm. Acerbi himself felt disillusioned. Contrary to the self-confident British belief in the moral betterment of the North by means of the expanding material and spiritual influence of commercial culture, the Italian felt a deep consciousness of the corrupt morality hidden behind the new way of life that seemed to him to threaten northern simplicity:

Our narrow minds which are filled with notions of what is called refinement, are at loss to conceive how these people, who appear so poor and low in our eyes, merely because they have not coat cut after the model of ours, should refuse money, and submit to so much toil only for the pleasure of being useful to others, and for the insipid satisfaction of doing good. Such examples are but too rare

120. Clarke, Travels (1824), 11, q. p. 259.
and too little known in the polished circles of great towns, are not so in these places which are far removed from a metropolis, where morals have become a victim of selfish and corrupt passions. 121

A tour of exotic Lapland, and of semi-civilized Finland could give a traveller temporary relief from the corruptions and ennui of civilization so sensitively depicted by Rousseau. For a romantic mind like Acerbi there was the pure soul of a Laplander to be intuitively understood. However, there was no way of completely reliving it either for a Westerner or for a Southerner. Acerbi needed Lapland for his own purposes; he tried, in his travel description, to persuade the nobleman who had left the sunny countryside for cities of luxury and corruption to return to perform his duties to his peasants.

For the Romantics, it was the agricultural stage of civilization that provided a living for all ranks: there was toil for the common people, there was meaning to life for a nobleman, and also room for a progressive country gentleman. It provided sufficient wealth, leisure and a peaceful social life. Disconcerted by the prospect of the decline of their rural culture, some travellers hoped for a restoration of the morals and stability of the feudal order. These proponents of a less progressive morality regarded the growing commercial competition and dominance of the moneyed interests as an earthly embodiment of malevolent moral forces that should be thwarted by re-establishing the old moral code of paternal care. In contrast, those who wanted the landed interest to keep pace with the new spirit of the age urged a new morality of industry and commerce.

In Finland progressive morality was slowly but surely becoming established. For example, to Clarke, who on his travels to Asia and Africa had met races more savage than the Finns there was progress in coastal towns where Swedish culture dominated. In commercially flourishing coastal towns Clarke was welcomed by the local nobles and leading merchants. The Finns who had already absorbed Swedish culture showed, as it were, skill in combining the Western and Eastern ways. Almost all travellers

were optimistic about Finland’s prospects, irrespective of their denunciation of the still remaining barbaric manners of the 'pure' Finns. They appreciated the impact of Western values and way of life on Finnish barbarism but also recognized that the Finns, although of eastern origin, were able to learn civilization.

The image of the slightly civilized Finn was spreading in Europe. At the end of the eighteenth century travel literature was booming and the reading public had become wide enough to ensure that an informative and amusing travel description became a success. The best selling British ones were translated into other European languages so that the new world of curious races and manners also reached continental city salons and learned societies. Not only the philosophers enjoyed this widening of the world view, the universal culture of the Enlightenment carried the message to all the leisured classes of Europe. In this way, Finland became familiar to the educated European, not least because British travellers were among the first to visit the northern periphery of Europe.
2. On the north-eastern frontier of civilization: the evolution of the Finns

2.1. The science of race

When turning our attention from the eighteenth-century notion of the Finn to the nineteenth-century one, a change due to the development of the philosophical foundations of anthropology, ethnology, philology, and other related moral sciences can be recognized. The Platonic concept of human nature, the dualism of mind and body, continued but the cultural achievements of the mind were being deduced from and explained by the physical conformation of man, especially of brain structure. If the eighteenth-century zoologists had laid the basis of the classification of varieties of man, in the nineteenth century the classifications became detailed hierarchies of races, in which, according to the Victorian beau ideal, the white man was assigned the highest position.

As the anthropologist of the first half of the nineteenth century, usually a surgeon, tried to reconstruct and systematize the human scale, he was amazed by the newly found varieties of "primitive"
and "barbarous" peoples. He made them live on a lower level of cultural evolution and tried to account for their backwardness by referring to their supposed structural deficiencies when compared with the ideal type, the white man. Some anthropologists cut the upper layers of the chain of being into parts, identifying separate racial units, the formation of which was based on value judgements of what kind of man was the best. At the same time, they tried to assess how the mixtures of different races influenced the harmony of the order of being, either preordained by God or conforming to the insurmountable limits set by the laws of nature. In these schemes the status and value of the Finns was also reconsidered, and their civilization measured by their physical appearance as well as by other traits.

At first, in the cautiously conservative mood following the Napoleonic wars, the new human sciences, like physical anthropology, encountered strong opposition from the spiritual authorities who tried to preserve the dignity of the spiritual man. However, in the 1830—40s, there was a turn of the tide in favour of utilitarian and radically oriented, more empirical and rationalist study. The traditional values and assumptions underlying classical and theological studies seemed to crumble. Middle-class radicalism, utilitarianism and individualism, the renewed demands of reason and progress attacked the basic tenets of faith. Grave doubts set in. Rapid industrialization and the reform movements augmented the formation of a consciousness of historical change and evolution. The theory of history worked out by Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson had already shown how societies changed through stages corresponding to the development of the human mind, and even if some anthropologists appeared to resist the attraction to adopt the evolutionary notion, it found its way gradually into scientific thought.

The demands of emancipation from traditional hierarchies of man either in civilization or within a particular society resulted in the building of new hierarchies to justify the change and include newcomers. In the wake of this reorganization, a racial history impregnated with the idea of the gradation of races which seemed to have their own higher or lesser civilizing missions to perform, was beginning to emerge.

Current with developments in anthropology was the accumulation of knowledge of "primitive" and "barbarous"
peoples. Their circumstances provided a mirror to reflect the idea of one's own past. Some stages of the early history of European peoples could be read in the descriptions concerning the present "lower" races. Some races appeared to make efforts to achieve civilization, others lagged behind. The Finns, already recognized on the Northern frontier of European civilization as a sufficiently civilized people, seemed to be living in a period of transition which was bringing them closer to a civilized way of life. In British observations on the Finns the racial and cultural arguments usually mingled, supporting each other to the effect that the Finns were considered, in one way or another, to achieve distinct culture.

As the racial conception gained scientific respectability it was used to form views of cultural progress. Racial thought permeated history, politics and caught the literary imagination. Aryanism, Teutonism and Anglo-Saxonism all contributed to the shaping of a racist perspective. The efforts to trace the beginnings of European civilization back to the Asiatic highlands, where the "Aryan" ancestors of the Indo-German peoples were supposed to have initiated civilization in its agricultural form, or to the Teutonic Urgemeinschaft, the germ of democracy of freemen, or to the primeval, supposedly democratic society of the Anglo-Saxons in Germany which had sent a vigorous offshoot to England, all opened racist visions of the past. Moreover, some scholars collected historical records and literary specimens to support a kind of Scandinavianism, where the martial spirit of the northern peoples (the Goths) was believed to have passed into the British blood and instilled in the British an enterprising, adventure-seeking disposition. Within these speculations the origins of other peoples were not seen in very favourable a light, and it was in this context that the question of the origins and rise of the Finns were debated.

The racist view of history was becoming current in the 1840—50s but it did not happen unchallenged. Even though some leading intellectuals of the period approved of the metaphysics of race,
those who sought after more realistic solutions to the enigmas of human ancestry and development of reason, usually avoided speculations about racial propensities and relied on, for example, basic psychological dispositions of man for the primary factors of human behaviour. Yet, the well-meaning search for the spirit and essence of race seemed to replace the culture-oriented Scottish method and Burkean type of historical organicism for a naturalistic and organicist-structuralist approach. The overall ideological importance of the change of outlook is not the main task of this study but it can be noted that racial theories tended to provide a legitimation for the use of power against some alien and aboriginal races within the British Empire, and added strength to the phobias, idealizations and stereotypes of European races. It also explains why the Finns became objects of Victorian Russophobia.

The western position of the Finns between the Swedes and the Slavs was a matter of fact that gave some trouble to the British when locating Finns on the racial map of Europe and in measuring their value for civilization. The Finns featured sometimes obscurely in racial classifications, histories and periodical articles. They were not attributed with any leading part in the main waves of migration from the East but with a minor role on the frontiers. In their northern backwood they were allowed to enter Europe from wherever their 'cradle' had been.

As faith in God as the prime mover of the racial migrations declined, and the degeneration or progress of the "lower" races came to be explained by natural causes, faith in a science that could explain the diverse directions and identify the vestigial evidence of their wanderings began to flourish. The belief in the power of natural laws to shape the characteristics of races, in the


5. Having studied the racial theories concerning the Lapps, R.T. Anderson has concluded that Finns were usually classified with them as Mongols. Banton has written that the Mongol-theory attests the brutality of racialism. It may said that the problem of Finnish origins was more complex and caused serious cracks in ready-made classifications. Cf. R.T. Anderson, 'Lapp Racial Classifications as Scientific Myths'. *The Concept of Race*. Ed. A. Montagu (New York, 1964), p. 62; Michael Banton, *The Idea of Race* (London, 1977), p. 59.
instincts of races to move from and to "racial gravitation centres", was powerful. Confidence in the transmission of acquired, hereditary traits prevailed, and it was a moot question how much the environment might affect man. The emergence of several stocks of man demanded an evolutionary vision although the mechanism of evolution remained unknown before Darwin. Since men were divided into stocks, and stocks were identified by properties usually belonging to individuals, they were made to behave as entities in history, to live their own life. Peoples were united into nations by their racial spirit and force. Most of the theories were highly speculative: all sorts of evidence, from bones to literary remains, were put forward as proof of the superiority of one's own people. The humble achievements of the "lower" races were often considered as proof of their inferiority.

The great majority of early nineteenth-century anthropologists believed in the fundamental uniformity of the human mind. God was assumed to have endowed all races with some degree of reason. However, the mere diversity in visage and structure led some of them to the idea that they had been created different. The physical differences indicated intellectual differences and different types of men were attributed with different powers of mind. The human types were largely imaginary, abstract morphological forms deduced from the results of comparisons of Europeans with other peoples according to European standards. Usually, the features of the Caucasian or later, Aryan, race were regarded as the most beautiful, and its intellect the most developed. The cultural argument enhanced the impression: compared with the utilitarian standards of British social life, the savage backwardness was manifest. They appeared to live on a lower level of social evolution. For the anthropologists its causes were evident: a lack of vitality, smaller volume of brain, generally

stagnant state of life, savage "jargon", superstitions, a mistaken conception of reality, all possible indicators which made the savages deviate from the standard of a rational man. Some conservative scholars persisted in claiming that the lower races had been predestined to their lower position because they appeared degenerate in morals. For the progressive scholars, the self-image of progressive British culture was also reinforced by the sight of the Finn and by reflections on the state of civilization achieved so far in Finland.

II

In Germany the national identity was, in romantic mood, sought in the people’s early institutions, the primeval Germanic community. In Britain the debate over British nationality and race at first centred around the Anglo-Saxon — Norman controversy. Soon, in the 1830—50s, the results of physical anthropology were brought to bear on the question. Together with a general secularization of thought, the developments in comparative anatomy undermined the authority of the biblical racial hierarchy (Hamitic, Semitic and Japhetic races). New varieties of man were detected, and soon there arose a need for reclassification. The natural sciences provided the method: anthropology used zoology and geology, the former for classification and the latter for periodization, but the anthropologists continued to use historical evidence when assessing the cultural stages of the respective races 9. The history of races was naturalized according to the basic organic analogy; their culture presented as if caused by racial, physical conformation, with variations attributed to environment and historical causes. When corresponding cultural stages were compared, the evidence of comparative grammar and physical anthropology pointed towards Asia as the birth-place of agricultural civilization. Asia had to be the womb of nations because it was there that the first language to bear the signs of civilization was spoken. In the arguments between rival racial theories, it was the "Aryan" theory that seemed to win the day in the 1850s. The Finns were

incorporated in this theorizing; they had acquired western features during their migrations towards the West\textsuperscript{10}.

However rigid the racial classifications, there remained disagreement as to how far the characteristics and dispositions of racial types were permanent or mutable. This problem divided the anthropologists into two conflicting camps, monogenists and polygenists. The monogenists who traced the birth of mankind to one primeval pair, set out to find proof for the uniformity of the human mind and accounted for the visible differences by long-term and continuous environmental causation. They stressed the ability of all races to adapt to changing environments. As they were usually the more humanitarian participants in the debate, they believed that racial characteristics were flexible and progressive. They opposed the theories of racial degeneration. They also used much cultural evidence to support their view that the variations of man coexisted and developed freely without necessarily fighting for dominance\textsuperscript{11}. It was only later, in the 1850–60s when the problems with the subject races of the British Empire materialized, that the mixture of racial types was considered harmful to civilization. The confrontations of "higher" and "lower" races appeared to be a threat to Victorian culture and its self-confidence was asserted in aggressive terms of racism\textsuperscript{12}. The anthropologists became assured of the scientific reliability of the craniological measurements and the philologists of the theories of linguistic inferiority of the "lower" races.

The polygenists' argument made it possible to account for the inequality of races "scientifically". Racial traits were regarded as unique products of simultaneous creation that had destined racial

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{10} Poliakov, \textit{The Aryan Myth}, pp. 199–214. Poliakov does not find much merit in the "Aryanists" urge to locate the "womb" of nations in Central Asia. The connection of the Finns to this imaginary 'cradle' has been refuted but the roots of the Finnish language are found in Central Russia. \\
\end{flushleft}
types to their proper climatic zones. Conspicuous racial differences seemed to support this. The "progressive" character of the Europeans was seen to have emanated from inborn racial intellect which flourished in a favourable environment. The "Negro" race occupied the tropics, the Eskimo, the Lapp and the Finn the cold zone, the Anglo-Saxon the temperate; these clear-cut divisions were thought to remain as they were by the polygenists because they maintained that the structural limits of physical types were permanent and insurmountable. The racial peculiarity of the Finn, who had crossed the lands of various races, was to cause embarrassment to the racial theory of the polygenists.

2.2. The place of the Finn in evolutionary anthropology, 1820—1855

I

During the first decades of the nineteenth century the historical method still kept the comparative and naturalist one in the background. Ethnological descriptions of the peoples of the world were not as "scientific" as the rigid racial classifications of the 1850—70s but rather consisted of delineations of peoples' history and migrations and of their character as found in the works of ancient authors, mixed with descriptions of their current manners, dress and amusements. Often only the general cultural stage of the people and their social life, especially their superstitions and ceremonies, were portrayed.

By the end of the eighteenth century the Finns were known to the British through their own travellers or from French, German and Russian sources. Travellers like Clarke had divided Finland into two cultural areas, the Swedicized, civilized western and southern coast, and the barbarous, smoke-cabin inland. Finnish scholars themselves had disseminated the idea of a Finland of two nations (nationes), the Swedish-speaking population of the towns which produced lyric poetry for the ladies, and the Finnish-
speaking one which cherished superstitions and magic songs, whose language was of "Asiatic art" and might soon be eliminated. As for the Finns living in Russia, knowledge was scarce and unreliable, and was enriched by historical conjectures and legends. As the explorers found the seats of the "ancient Permians", they were connected to the Finns and Lapps (Finnas) depicted in Otter's account in King Alfred's geography. The "Finns" were said to have fought against the early medieval Scandinavian heroes.

Among the first British contributions were the ethnographical observations included in the sketches of British painters who were allowed to travel in Russia during the liberal period of the reign of Alexander I. Arthur Capell de Brooke sketched the Finns of Tornio as they returned home from divine service in their horse-sledges; their appearance was serious and their dress indicated pious simplicity in comparison to the ornamentally dressed Lapps who recklessly ran the reindeer up and down the snowy mountains. To the court-painter, Robert Ker Porter, the achievements of Peter, who had transformed a desert into a city (St Petersburg) and thus called "the perishing natives from their trackless snows to homes of plenty, comfort and civilization", were quite remarkable. The "Finlander" who lived in rude nature filled with supernatural qualities could not but appear savage. In December 1807 Porter spent some time at the Turku winter fair and painted a "Finn" peasant. In complexion this creature was fair with long hair and beardless. His brown, woollen caftan, leather mittens, loose black pantaloons and long boots revealed the essence of the type of man.

15. Arthur de Capell Brooke, Winter Sketches in Lapland (London, 1823). He also appended a map showing the areas of cultivation of different cereals, fruit-trees and vegetables in Finland.
living in the high, cold North:

A most barbarous animal, you will think, I have made of the poor Finn, but I must say, in excuse for so intolerable a likeness, that take them altogether, their appearance is ten times more savage than the grimmest Russian I ever met, wrapped like a wild beast in his hairy shrouds.\(^{16}\)

In morals they were good-natured, inquisitive like savages in general, and they could be tamed by law like the lower classes of German peasantry with whom Porter compared them.

In 1803 John Atkinson, who claimed to have served Tsar Alexander for eighteen years, painted seven watercolours of the Finns in their everyday occupations\(^ {17}\). What emerges from his explanations of his sketches is that the Finns were a lot poorer and a more sorrowful people than the Russians. Travelling long distances from the backwoods, they carried on small-scale trade with their agricultural products and game in the markets of St Petersburg. He noticed how the "Finland carts" were made without iron on the wheels and how Finnish horses had only two shoes. Evidently, this humble people could not be blamed for its lack of civilization. Atkinson deliberately tried to abstain from any "progressive" value-judgements in choosing and depicting his subjects and he accurately drew the peculiarity of dress, implements and vehicles against natural, birch-wood backgrounds. By comparison, another contemporary picture of the typical Finn, presented either killing a bear with a spear and wearing an iron cap, a sheath for his knife, and tinderbox, or blowing a bagpipe in feather cap and reddish coat, seems to have been arm-chair drawings on the information found in several

\(^{16}\) Robert Ker Porter, *Travelling Sketches in Russia and Sweden during the years 1805, 1806, 1807 and 1808* (London, 1809), II, q. p. 79. For a more enlightened traveller, Mine de Stael, Finland showed only its dull aspect: it had "no centres, no competition, there was nothing to say nor to do, only eight months of winter-sleep", and the enormous trouble to acquire subsistence hampered leisure and the cultivation of mind (1812). Quoted in Klinge, *Kaksi Suomea*, pp. 14—15.

\(^{17}\) They were: "Finland Sledge, Finn Beggar, Finn Girl Going to the Market, Finland Wood-barks, Finland Horse, Finland Charts, Finns Bringing Fish to the Market". John Atkinson, *A Picturesque Representation of the Manners, Customs and Amusements of the Russians* (London, 1812).
historical sources. According to the author this obscure people with such mixed characteristics, was one of the most barbarous under the rule of the Tsar. The Slavs, having created some kind of order in the racial heterogeneity of Russia, were "progressive, dominating and princely" and they had suppressed the old, "great race" of the Finns. This process had not yet been quite completed, and Shoberl advised the Tsar to do it. As the German masters of Estonia had disciplined the Estonians and introduced "greater love of order and more industry" among them, the rest of the Finns should be made serfs too, since, owing to their "indolence", they had only a few wealthy people and seemed to neglect their fields and cattle. Only female servants from this race employed in the Tsar's palace had learned to work properly.

At a time when the human sciences were not strictly defined and travellers and scholars felt free to use all sorts of information, their descriptions were confusing. British geographers used historical materials and inclined towards Whiggish ideals of free constitutional development. John Bigland noted how the British people had been the most fortunate of all because they happened to live in a mild climate and under the rule of a free constitution which promoted commercial enterprise. Their cousins, the fair Swedish nobles, could be put into the same category. He also noticed how the aboriginal Finnish customs gave way to the Swedish ones in Finland, and how the Lapps retained their own traits. The "more graceful appearance" of the Finn had something to do with the fact that the Swedish language had gained ground in Finland whereas in Lapland it had made very little progress.

In the early decades of the nineteenth century it was believed that the nomadic Lapps were not gregarious, remained solitary and did not know of the "progressive principle" of cultivation which had entitled Europeans to lead a settled life. They were also selfish, suicidal and avaricious; they resembled wandering, wild

20. John Bigland, A Geographical and Historical View of the World (London, 1810), pp. 491, 528, 542—43, 579. According to James Bell's A System of Geography (London, 1835) the Finns were as much given to the passions as the Irish, only the British knew the middle-way.
animals doomed to extinction\textsuperscript{21}. A potent explanation of their backwardness was available. The cold climate had stunted their physical development and never allowed them to grow to full vigour. Being weak they could not survive as civilization came to bear on them:

This is the fate of every people who set themselves against cultivation and are surrounded by a people (Finns) making progress in civilization\textsuperscript{22}.

Thus a "scientific" traveller used a scientific argument to account for what in his eyes seemed a case of natural history. The Finns had been partly civilized by the Swedes, and now the Finns were pushing the frontier of civilization further north.

On the basis of Swedish-Finnish cultural dualism it is easier to understand the divisions of civilization in Finland brought out by some ethnographical maps which served the purposes of scientific compendia. Clark’s \textit{Chart of the World} (1822) belongs to the Enlightenment tradition in its way of presenting the grades of civilization in the world; (1) savage (for example, Northern Siberia, Australia and the heart of Africa), (2) barbarous (for example, Central Asia and West Africa), (3) half-civilized (Arabic world, China and India), (4) civilized (for example, Austria-Hungary and most of Central Europe, Portugal and Norway), and (5) enlightened (the USA, Western Europe). Southern Finland was given grade (5), for it was governed by the Tsar and was Lutheran in religion. Lapland remained half-civilized because it was semi-heathen. The change from this kind of representation to a racial-anatomic approach is marked by a later map, originally German and showing the German inclination to psychologize racial science. On this map, Finland was shared by the Swedes of the superior Caucasian race, "a Gotho-Scandinavian colony", and the inferior "phlegmatic-bilious, grave, energetic, hardy, bold, pertinacious, hospitable but obstinate" Finns. Out of the whole Finnic race Hungarian aristocrats alone had learned independence and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Hugh Murray, \textit{Enquiries Historical and Moral Respecting the Character of Nations and Progress of Society} (Edinburgh, 1808), pp. 182, 190, 412, 420—24.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Leopold von Buch, \textit{Travels through Norway and Lapland}. Trans. by J. Black (London, 1814), q. p. 332.
\end{itemize}
freedom, the Finns of Finland having a Tsar who "carried out his pleasure." There were three forces in Finland, the Swedish civilizers, the recipient and learning Finns and the alien Slavonic despot. For a Westerner it was the civilized Swedish population that played the real civilizing role in Finland. Turku, the centre of the romantically oriented Swedish culture dominated, and it was only later that the neohumanist and rationalist culture of Helsinki and St Petersburg flourished and the foundations for a Finnish culture were being built.

The rather cursory and even misleading observations of the alien races did not actually satisfy the needs of the early Victorian reading public. Even well-informed travellers were hoping for a physiologist's explanation of the causes of human variety and of the secrets of the primitive mind. The physiologists, for their part, had complained that travellers had not bothered to address themselves to the savage mentality and had only listed all the curious manners that bored learned readers. It was in this context of mutual scientific curiosity that physical anthropologists tried also to define the Finnish race more exactly.

II

Working in the monogenist line of thought and closely connecting physiological and historical arguments, the surgeon William Lawrence (1783—1867) set himself to finding the answer to the enigma of human life in the human anatomy. In his extensive studies into the human body and brain he had not been able to find the soul. Hence he inferred that it was the structural gradation of the human brain itself that caused inferiority in the cultural achievements of the "lower" races. Further proof of this was that insanity, analogous to savage irrationality, seemed to be pathologically caused by deformations leading to dysfunction.

25. William Lawrence, Lectures on Physiology, Zoology and Natural History of Man (London, 1818), pp. 45—46, 91, 94—96. At one point he defended the utility of anatomy against the attacks of religious authorities by saying that even the Lapps dissected their reindeer.
When surveying Blumenbach's racial classification, Lawrence rejected his theory of degeneration and leaned towards a "progressive" view: the Caucasian skull was the ideal, the skulls of the other races being "less perfect" (i.e. not oval in form). Still, the Negro and the Mongol brain had the potential to develop towards the ideal, and a slow advance from lower forms (at this time also of eye and hair-colour, the ideals for which were blue and flaxen) to the higher one could also be recorded in the North:

Linnaeus describes in Sweden the Gothlander, with light hair and greyish blue eyes; the Fin (sic) with yellow hair and brown iris, and the Laplander with black hair and eyes\textsuperscript{26}.

Lawrence also believed that there was an unbroken, progressive continuity of the chain of brain development, and as an instance of it, the Mongolian features of the Lapps and Finns seemed to be gradually fading away. Caucasian features would thus become conspicuous in the Finnish appearance in the long run. The Hungarians had already abandoned the round Lapp skull form and their culture approached that of Europeans\textsuperscript{27}.

In putting forward his ideas of the 'progressive' Finns, Lawrence had partly been following James Cowles Prichard (1786—1848), monogenist and a far more influential humanitarian anthropologist, who in his *Researches into the Natural History of Man* (1813) had hesitantly argued for white intellectual superiority based on the higher capacity of their brains. The Negro brain had remained undeveloped because the Negro life-style promoted the growth of "ruder faculties", like sensuousness which gave way to reason in a more civilized way of life. It was up to this point that Prichard supported the idea of racial inequality and he firmly rebutted the polygenist thesis of the fixity of races, a theory which indicated that the "lower" races could not develop to the level of "white intellect"\textsuperscript{28}. Prichard, who was more history-oriented than his

\textsuperscript{26} Lawrence, *Lectures*, q. p. 278.
\textsuperscript{27} Lawrence, *Lectures*, p. 333.
successors, was not at all so firm a racial determinist that he would have asserted permanence of racial types according to any one racial feature. He considered all the available evidence, physical as well as moral, and drew conclusions from general impressions gathered from various sciences. Being interested in racial migrations, contacts and distribution, and in the institutions and the level of development of races his studies represent a curious mixture of the historical and comparative methods. His claim that in science one should trust one's own imagination and carefully detect the free play of natural laws illustrates his stance. He was more concerned with variety itself than with the formulation of "positivistic" laws of social differentiation or with rigid racial classification.

Proof of his leanings towards history was his *Eastern Origin of Celtic Nations* (1831) in which he admitted that several German authors had, on philological grounds, conclusively shown that all races had an Asiatic origin. Against John Pinkerton he stated that the Celts had also belonged to the civilized nations because their language was also derived from Sanskrit. The *Fenni* of Tacitus were an earlier race in Europe than the Germans, having migrated from "between the chain of Caucasus and the southern extremities of the Uralian mountains". He rejected the German view that the Finns had resided in the Urals by saying that one could not apply the theory of centres of fauna to humankind. The Finns were as human as all other races on the earth and their original cradle had been on the plains, not in the mountains, apparently because they had not been hiding savages but a wandering tribe.

Prichard incessantly accused the polygenists of simplification of racial history. The races of man were so many and different. When reconsidering the criteria with which to try to create order in variety, however arbitrary the task appeared, he finally gave up Blumenbach’s five-part classification in favour of Cuvier’s three-part one which classified races according to hair and skin-colour, and seemed more reliable than classifications based on human

skull gradation. There were the Melanic (dark-haired), Xanthous (fair-haired), and Albino types. The Finns resembled the Xanthous type because they had actually lived in circumstances not essentially different from the European environment, on the plains near the sea. Prichard criticized Blumenbach for relying too much on skull-form and for putting both the Finn and the Lapp skulls into the Mongol class. He had compared all possible evidence and concluded that the affinity of skulls did not imply an affinity of race.

In Prichard's view, the early history of Europe was fraught with racial migrations and struggles as the more vigorous races had encroached on the weaker ones. The Finns had been harassed first by the Gothic Swedes and finally subdued by the Slavs. Yet, signs of their efforts to survive could be found in several sources, as in the chronicles of Adam of Bremen and Paavali Juusten's chronicle of the bishops of Turku. Moreover, some recent German (e.g. P.J. Strahlenberg's research into the peoples of northern and eastern Europe) and Finnish studies into the history of the Finns had found their way into Prichard's use. He had picked up H.G. Porthan's De Bircarlis (1789) which he mistakenly thought was written by the Finnish poet and bishop, F.M. Franzén (1772–1847). In this study, it was patriotically alleged that Tacitus's Fenni had not been Finns, but that the Finns had, of old, been an agricultural people. Prichard could not accept this anachronism: the Finns had indisputably been the subject of Tacitus's description and only after Tacitus's times had they begun slowly to progress in the arts of civilization. However, even if they had been as savage as the aborigines of Africa, this was no longer the case, and although they still practised superstitions, shamanism and some customs akin to Mongolian barbarism, they were not a degenerate offshoot of the Mongolian race but had adapted themselves to their more northern and western circumstances and acquired characteristics peculiar to themselves alone. This was shown to Prichard by the German and Finnish historians and scholars whose research in the Northern region of Asiatic Russia implied that the Finns had progressed from the Lapp, Mongol-like type of man towards a fairer appearance.

To explain the betterment of the Finn there was the principle of vitality. The milder climate of Finland in comparison with Lapland had released the growth of the body:

It seems, as if the xanthous variety with a fair, florid complexion, was the result or accompaniment of great degree of vigour in physical life, and a more ample development of the body, and particularly the sanguiferous system. Perhaps this state of the constitution and bodily growth is connected with the abode of parents, and the birth of the infant in a cold climate. The adaptation of such a habit of body to a cold climate is evident. But when the cold is extreme, and nutrition is defective, this additional degree of vigour and development is not given to the bodily frame. Nature has not the power with such defective means to accomplish it33.

The short stature of the Lapps in comparison with the taller Finns was further caused by the fact that they had to bow down in order to enter their huts. On the contrary, the Finns who were as handsome and tall as the Swedes were evidence of Prichard's theory of the beneficial influence of a milder climate on men. The progress of the Finns was not due to their physical vigour alone. The nomadic Lapps had arrived in Finland straight from the northeast, but the Finns had come from the southeast where agriculture had flourished since the times of earliest historical records34. Moreover, the blood mixture with the coastal Swedes had augmented the change of the racial type, though it had not reached all of the Finns, for it was, in Prichard's view, still possible to find isolated groups of aboriginal Finns in central Finland. The originally higher cultural stage of the Finns in comparison with that of the Lapps was expressed in those pure Finnish terms that indicated a relatively highly organized social interaction, for example, vero(tax), sakko(fine), orja(slave) and seppä(smith). It could be argued against Edward Clarke's first-hand description that already before the Swedish crusades to Finland, from c. 1150

33. Prichard, *Researches* (2nd. ed.), I, q. p. 254—55. In his *Review of the Doctrine of A Vital Principle* (1829) Prichard had proposed that the key to the enigma of life lay in the stimulus on the organic structure caused by chemical processes, especially by moisture which made the seed grow. The "energy" behind this miracle was initiated by God, the final cause of all life.
onwards, the Finns had been leading a settled, not a roaming life and had taken "some steps towards a progressive civilization." Those Finns who had been under Swedish racial influence had deviated a little from the original "conservative, weary, slow, sturdy but well-faring Finlander", but it was mainly the Swedish cultural influence that had made them progress. The Swedes, accompanied by an English crusader-bishop Henry, had introduced law and order. Gradually the Finns had received better manners, some civil liberties and a self-confidence of the British kind. The history of Finland was just about to follow the route suggested by the history of Britain. The contemporary cultural prospects of Finland told of this tendency: Finns had begun to accumulate wealth, and even their women had taken to work; they dwelt in well-built houses, villages and neat towns. The only thing that disturbed Prichard was that the Catholic superstition had not yet been completely ousted.

The importance of Prichard’s notion of the Finn cannot be overrated. He connected cultural evolution with his concept of racial adaptation through which the place of the Finn in the great scheme of evolution could be more accurately defined. His work contained the main concepts that penetrated later anthropological literature. In fact, his theory made a deeper and more direct impact on nineteenth-century anthropology than the Darwinian evolutionary theory which did not stress the scientific value of any specific racial classification but was used by the anthropologists mainly to support either mono- or polygenesis. Prichard’s ideas

35. Prichard, *Researches* (3rd ed.), III, p. 286. Prichard had found these ideas in Friedrich Rühs’s *Finland och dess invånare* (Stockholm, 1811). Rühs had regarded the Finns as semibarbarians who both hunted and cultivated the land but had later been forced to respect laws. A more aggressive projection, the prevalent racialist interpretation of Finnish history by the Swedish-speakers considered the "Turanian" Finns incapable of forming an orderly society. Only the "Germanic" Swedes had created a state in which the Finns could remain subjects. Some trouble for this theory was caused by the fact that the Finns of Finland had not been taken as slaves by the Swedes (c. 1150 onwards) and that they took an active part in resisting the expansion of the Moscovites. See Eino Jutikkala, *Luentoja Suomen valtiojärjestyksen historiasta* (Lectures on the History of the Form of Government in Finland) (Hämeenlinna, 1972), pp. 14—18.


were continuously criticized and further elaborated. For instance, the *Edinburgh Review* reviewed his major work and defended his monogenism. It tried to clarify his "vital principle" by insisting that "lower" types of skulls, the Mongolic pyramidal and Negro prognathous, developed teleologically with the aid of spontaneous variation to conform to the Caucasian type. Against the permanence of racial types and for the sake of the progress of man's intellect the forms of nature could not remain immutable. An improved environment could generate structural progress; it was this that had happened to the Hungarians of Finnish stock since they had migrated down to the plains and fertile soils of the Danube:

The constant tendency of which is to smooth down the awkward prominences of the pyramidal and the prognathous skull and bring them towards the symmetry of the elliptical.\(^{38}\)

As some domesticated species of animals could deviate from the prevailing type, the Hungarians had decisively deviated from the Mongol type while remaining within the Finnish branch of languages. It should be noted that Count de Gobineau, who had been alarmed by the degeneration of the aristocratic types, could not accept Prichard's evidence and attacked the *Edinburgh Review*, pointing out that the aristocratic Hungarians had nothing in common with the Finns because they were the descendants of the noble Huns. Mistaking Finns for Lapps and Hungarians for Huns, he was sure that "a Lapp cannot have been turned into a St Stephen".\(^{39}\) These arguments carried with them a strong social aspect to the racial question. The dispute between the two opposing schools of anthropology over the racial background of their domestic ranks and races also brought the Finns into the discussion. Their degree of progress was dependent on their proximity to the European type, and by the resemblance of their cultural achievements to those of European civilization. At times

\(^{38}\) William Carpenter, "Ethnology, or the Science of Race". *The Edinburgh Review*, 88 (July—Oct., 1848), q. p. 439. Carpenter was the professor of physiology at University College in London. He firmly believed in the transmission of acquired characteristics.

the Finn resembled a progressive middle-class man, at others "aristocrats" looked down on him because of his ignoble descent.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the notion of racial progress was not the prevailing one. The breach with the biblical racial system was almost imperceptible and theories of degeneration persisted. Lawrence had publicly to give up his views but Prichard's theory of adaptation seemed to suit the religious authorities better\textsuperscript{40}. The Cuvierian system of races corresponded to the biblical racial classification, and pre-Darwinian speculation about natural causes did not necessarily offend against divine intervention. On the other hand, the system could remain intact because the newly found peoples, the Finns included, could be incorporated into it by allowing more malleability within a specific race.

III

A monogenist who brought the racial classification to its limits without harming it fatally was the Scottish publisher and popular educator in matters of science, Robert Chambers (1802—1871). He propagated the naturalist, racial history of man and wanted to discover the ways of God by studying the hereditary variations of animals and men. For him, God operated through "transmutation", the free development of the embryo within the limits of recapitulation. In the process of recapitulation some types of men might remain arrested and "lower". More outspoken than Prichard, Chambers wrote of the advantages of mild climates which produced "higher" types; the Caucasians had been favoured by God in this respect. Due to the effects of a temperate zone, they had become a race of inventors, civilizers, conquerors and industrialists. The rest represented earlier phases of development towards progressive civilization. The Mongol, whose foetal growth was checked by structural limits of their type and environmental retardation, was "an infant newly born"\textsuperscript{41}. In culture, they were an

\textsuperscript{40} See Gavin de Beer's 'Introduction' to Robert Chambers's \textit{The Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation} (1844) (New ed., Leicester, 1969).

\textsuperscript{41} Chambers, \textit{Vestiges}, p. 307.
imitating race and thanks to this capable of a rudiment of civilization. Chambers told how Prichard had in 1847 raised the question of whether there had been any inhabitants in Europe before the arrival of the Aryans. He hesitatingly suggested that the Finno-Ugrians (Northern "Jotuns") had already resided there although he did not dare to surmise the starting-point of their migrations. Being aware of the uncertainty of the hypothesis he wrote:

The Finns and Laplanders appear to be a remnant of some primitive Mongolian people, whom the Caucasians pushed to the extreme verge of the Arctic seas, and were content to leave there. The Esquimaux, as well as the people of Finland and Lapland have some physical peculiarities distinguishing them from the other Mongolians, but these seem to be the effect chiefly of local conditions\(^42\).

These peoples had long ago mingled with Celts and their influence in the North continued to spoil neighbouring, nobler races, especially the Swedes. Prichard had counted on the civilizing impact of the Swede on the Finn but Chambers reversed the issue. Contamination of the German blood by the Tartars in the North had given the Germanic Swedes their "darker hair" and "lessened their propensity to industrial cultivation"\(^43\). The Mongol disease in the bodies of the Finns was an oriental obstacle to the expansion of the conquering civilization in Scandinavia. The result of Swedish-Finnish racial contact could be assessed in two ways, as bringing either progress or regress, depending on how the cultural consequences of the mixture were seen through the British eyes. The way British looked at their own society and especially at the morals of the lesser ranks determined the final evaluation.

Charles Hamilton Smith (1776—1859), who had acquired a lot of knowledge of the abilities of the varieties of man when serving as a soldier in the West Indies, West Africa and the Americas at the turn of the century, had come to the conclusion that the lesser races were faced with extinction without assimilation to the

\(^{42}\) Chambers's Information for the People. Ed. by William and Robert Chambers (Edinburgh, 1849), II, q. p. 4.
\(^{43}\) Chambers's Information for the People, II, p. 3.
"higher" types. Smith fell back on Cuvier as his source and made the Finns separate from the ordinary beardless Mongols, nomads who did not know of "natural sympathy, pity or principle". The Finns had escaped this status and approached the Caucasian type "in the midst of Slavonian and Teutonic nations" 44.

The history of Finnish migrations was interwoven with the complex story of the origin of the nations in the northern hemisphere. It had all started after the convulsions of the earth and with the subsequent widespread dispersion of races from the highlands of the Gobi desert. Referring to Jordanes's geography Smith, receptive to authorities who furnished him with evidence of early natural history, believed that in the early days of Europe Scandinavia had been an island (Scandia) and that Finland had been under water for a long time. The Gulf of Bothnia had been connected with the White Sea and this water-barrier had originally marked the boundary between the Caucasian and Finnish races 45. Assuming also that the Finns had preserved some of the tools of civilization of the original 'cradle', Smith claimed that they had brought the arts of metallurgy, navigation, warfare, marsh-draining, letters, and observations on comets with them to the West. These fanciful remarks Smith coupled with his natural and racial history. On the way from Asia, these extraordinarily civilized Finns had totally changed their racial type from Mongol to Caucasian. It was the "Caucasian blood" that had made the Finns progress in physique as well as in their many arts. Their skulls had developed a contracted occiput that marked the way towards the Caucasian forehead, vertical facial angle and a regular dome 46. They had become tall and intellectual, showing their susceptibility to civilization. These developments coincided with the Teutonic cultural infusion into Finland. Smith pointed to the possible analogies between Finnish and Scandinavian mythologies and mentioned the first French translation by L. le Duc (1845) of the Kalevala, a compilation of Finnish oral poems.

45. Smith, Natural History, pp. 52, 56.
The Finns preserved the poetic wisdom produced by their fertile imaginations, reminiscent of the mythologies of all savages, like the Mexicans, Basques, and Central Asian peoples, of whom Smith had gleaned some evidence. However, the savage mentality had its gloomy sides. The Swedes who had extensively studied the Finnish and Lapp skulls had, according to Smith, concluded that the Finns were actually a criminal race, and that its entire betterment had been due to the Swedish racial mixture. The formerly savage Finns had become peaceful as if they had been pacified and tamed by the racially civilizing process carried out by the Swedes. This racial progress was later reported also by Fraser's Magazine. The British travellers who stumbled upon the Enontekiö cemetery in Lapland found its graves opened and the skulls stolen for "scientific" purposes. They regarded the scene as a sign of Lapp extermination and hoped that Enontekiö would rise again from the efforts of vigorous Finnish colonists who had started a new life there.

The mystery of the inner racial powers residing in the blood or skull made the anthropologists and scholars so keen to study the physical factors that they did not usually take much interest in mythology and folklore, which they dismissed as irrational products of more or less deformed skulls and brains. In the 1850s they shifted from investigations into the historical evolution of social life to studies into physical anthropology. Prichard's, Chambers's and Smith's notions of the Finn illustrate the period of transition in anthropological thought in that they still clung to historical, though mostly unreliable evidence in assessing the culture of the Finnish race while they used craniological considerations to explain the "progress" of the Finns.

IV

The 1850s marked the breakthrough of assertive racialism and racism in England. By then, the work of American anthropologists, including Samuel Morton, J.C. Nott and G.R. Gliddon, who had

47. Smith, Natural History, pp. 318—20, 325, 350.
found a justification for negro slavery in the "inferior" brain structure of the Negro, became known in England. The "Nigger" question in America appeared analogous to the problems with the subject races of the British Empire, and anthropologists and ethnologists tried to find an explanation for the domestic and foreign "racial" unrest. Experience seemed to confirm the idea that "there were no negro philosophers"\textsuperscript{49}, and to strengthen the conclusion that the European races were the ones chosen for the civilizing mission. Because there remained confusion as to what the hereditary racial traits really were, they were usually deduced from the observable behaviour, needs and uncontrolled passions of savage races whose rebellions (for example, in India and Jamaica) offended the European consciousness. The belief in the superiority of the "White" race and the need for firm control of the "lower" races were fostered in the 1850s when Victorian culture appeared to reach its peak in material and cultural progress.

The theory of the excellence of the Aryan or Caucasian race gained in popularity. The polygenists in particular believed that only these races carried the seeds of civilization in their veins. The early history of mankind lent support to this view; it was alleged that the Aryans had built the civilization of Egypt, they had been the bearers of Hellenic-Roman culture, they had been the Germans who overran the Roman Empire, and they had initiated European-American civilization. The Finns were given the role of an intermediate racial type. They testified to the blending of types but also of the obstinacy of the Mongol, barbaric element in the North. The Finnish skull in Samuel Morton's collection proved the point, but there were also alternative theories concerning Finnish origins which left much scope for contradictory arguments about the faculties of the Finnish race\textsuperscript{50}.

One polygenist who brought philology, another science paired with anthropology, to support the theory of permanent racial types


was A. Blackwell, the editor of Bishop Percy’s translation of Mallet’s *Northern Antiquities* (1847). The late Bishop Percy had already at the beginning of the century reconsidered the location of European races suggested by Tacitus and Herodotus. Percy had held that the ancient Germans had been the forefathers of the Anglo-Saxons and remarked in passing that the Finns “might have possessed much larger and better tracts of country than the Northern deserts to which they are now confined”\(^1\). Blackwell expanded on Percy’s remark, modified the Blumenbachian classification to suit the changing racial situation in the North, and added his own philological investigations to it. He bluntly stated that the classification of the Finns with the Chinese was as incongruous as that of the Caffres with the Negroes, and proposed, following Louis Agassiz’s studies on Arctic zoology, his own scheme of three races of the East. They were the Western Asiatic (Caucasian), Eastern Asiatic (Mongolian) and Arctic (Finnic). He elaborated the system with a corresponding philological classification which included the Teutonic, Celtic and Chudic (originally a Russian derogatory name for the Finns) languages. To Blackwell, the linguistic findings were as reliable as the relics of palaeontology: a fragment of language could be placed into the language where it belonged like a bone which could be located in a skeleton\(^2\).

The racial and linguistic superiority of the Teutonic race was manifest in their “fondness for independence and cautious temper” which was not “sociable on a large scale with aristocratic and conservative tendencies”\(^3\). The inferior Celts were not as adventurous as the Teutons and they were flippant towards women, and they had been, like the Finns, driven to the outskirts of Europe. However, the Finns had done something that resembled the heroic deeds of the Teutons and their civilized brothers in Central Europe:

> The Lapp consider it a honour to belong to the Finns; and both peoples call themselves Suomi, but the Finn regards the Lapp with the same contemptuous disdain as the Magyar looks on the Slovak,

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or as the Norman regarded the Anglo-Saxon, a feeling which would imply that at some remote period the Finns had conquered the Lapps\textsuperscript{54}.

In this way the concepts of conquest and racial struggle were extended to cover the old feud between the Finns and the Lapps. Within one Finnish race, the stronger branch prevailed over the weaker one. This enhanced the impression that the histories of small European peoples were parallel and that the conquering races were destined to rule the world because they possessed a dominating spirit as a permanent racial propensity.

V

At the beginning of the 1850s the themes of the European racial power-struggle caught the imagination of the British who feared that "lower" races might begin to dominate the politics of Europe. The continental upheaval of the year 1848 had not brought freedom to the small nationalities under the rule of the Restoration. The cousins of the Anglo-Saxon and Norman races groaned under oppression. British patriotism was also hardened by the prospect of a war against the eastern menace, the Russian Empire. The debate on the 'Eastern Question', about the Slavic threat that Russia cast over Turkey, the Balkans and the Baltic, and its racial repercussions, attracted full houses. It was a time of heated racial-political speculation.

One of the most arrogant racists was the notorious surgeon Robert Knox (1798–1862), a vigorous defender of free-trade and "democratic" British virtues. His concept of man was thoroughly physiological; morality was superseded by supposedly primary forces of racial character. In his lectures he put forward a theory of "transcendental anatomy" derived from the German authors Leibniz and Goethe\textsuperscript{55}. The goal of nature was the ideal type of

\textsuperscript{54} Blackwell, 'Introduction', q. p. 41.
\textsuperscript{55} Robert Knox, The Races of Men; a Fragment (London, 1850, new ed., 1969), pp. 27–30, 39–40. Knox proposed a racial monadology according to which the a priori permanent racial traits were passed on to next generation in semen by immutable monads that guaranteed permanent racial differences. Racial mixture could produce only monstrosities. Knox opposed the Aryan theory
human; for Knox, the English lady. All the other races were more or less arrested at stages between man and the apes. Racial differences were inborn, the races being as distinct as animal species. Every race had its own hereditary form of culture which determined its deeds and the quality of its achievements. For instance, the Celtic, "fanatic" blood had caused the French Revolution; and the democratic spirit and right understanding of freedom was exclusively a British possession. All in all, Knox considered race to be the primary explanation of all human culture; historical, environmental, psychological and cultural factors remained secondary, if significant at all.

The racial mode of enquiry was applied to study of the contemporary history of Europe by Knox. Mocking Prichard's conception of peaceful adaptation, Knox envisaged Europe as having been dominated by the struggle for space and preponderance between the "higher" and "lower" races. Knox also opposed William Stubbs’s and Thomas Arnold's Anglo-Saxonism, and chose the Scandinavians (Normans) as his favourites. Cultivating admiration for the Scandinavian martial virtues and war-faring spirit, he was convinced that it had been the Normans who had transmitted the stimulus for democracy and free-trade to England. On the continent the Normans had been put down by Sarmatian, Habsburg rule in 1848, although in some German states the spirit of freedom seemed to stay alive. The "Slavonians" had been still more unfortunate. In their original home, on the shores of the Danube, the "Sarmatians" (Slavs) had tried to spoil their race by mingling with them and had forced them to flee to the North. Only in Finland had the "Slavonians" retained their purity; even the Swedish (Norman) influence had not been sufficiently strong to root out their creative talents.

Knox used his bold arguments freely in political propaganda to make the politicians perceive the importance of race in power-

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because he had found that there were other races of European origin which tried to gain supremacy in Europe. See Henry Lonsdale, *A Sketch of the Life and Writings of Robert Knox* (London, 1877), pp. 244-45. Lonsdale regarded Knox as a scientist whose prognosis of the European racial-political constellation was coming true.

politics. He foresaw dramatic changes on the racial map of Europe which they should anticipate and react to. He showed them the crucial position of Finland between West and East, and he yielded to the Finns a vital mission as a buffer-race. They were given the main role in the ensuing battles between the Sarmatian (Russian, Slav) and the Norman and Scandinavian races. From his train of thought it is evident that his term "Slavonian" did not denote the Slavs of Russia but referred to the races which Knox placed between the Normans and Sarmatians. They should bar possible Russian expansion in Eastern Europe. Should the Finns be exposed to Russianization they would be lost, and Scandinavia, the heartland of the Normans, would be left without shelter. Knox remembered that one "Dr. Roussell" had in a discussion on the fate of Finland adumbrated the possibility that the Russians were the last "great race" to attempt to gain dominion after the collapse of the Scandinavian races.

The formerly friendly Anglo-Saxon and Sarmatian races were becoming antagonistic, at least in theory. Thomas Carlyle had wanted to limit the civilizing mission of the Russian Empire to the area from the Gulf of Finland to the Pacific Ocean. Thomas Arnold, who intended to lay the foundations for a national history of Britain in terms of post-Roman Anglo-Saxon dominance, gave, unlike Knox, all of Europe from the head of the Gulf of Bothnia to Sicily to the leadership of the Germanic races. The Slavic race, being a newcomer to civilization, should remain contented with the East. The Finns who inhabited the Northern border-line between the Slavic and Germanic races seemed to be engulfed by one side or the other. However, it became more significant, from the British point of view, to emphasize their occidental character in order to strengthen the cause of European freedom against Russian despotism.

In accounting for the reasons why the Finns were so important a weapon for the British against the Russian menace and why they assigned to the Finns some virtues of their own, the relations of British Scandinavian Romanticism to the literature and poetry of Sweden and Finland have to be traced. In Finland the idea of Finnish separateness from both the dominating Swedish and the threatening Russian culture was beginning to emerge in the 1820—30s\(^{62}\). The Finns were looking for a national image for themselves whereas the Swedish-speaking minority held on to their notion of Gothic cultural superiority. Yet, in a Romantic fashion, some of the Swedish-speaking scholars and poets felt their responsibility towards the uncivilized Finnish majority and in the 1830—40s launched expeditions to find the spirit of the Finnish people. There emerged Elias Lönnrot’s *Kalevala* (1835, revised ed. 1849) already noted by Charles H. Smith, and Johan Ludwig Runeberg’s poetical works, *Bonden Paavo* (1826), *Elgskytterne* (1832) and *Fänrik Ståhl’s sägner* (1848—60), of which the first in particular was regarded as providing a counterweight to the mythical substance of the *Kalevala*. It depicted a people struggling pertinaciously in poverty against the hostile forces of nature\(^{63}\). For those British who were preoccupied with Scandinavian ancestry the sudden appearance of the Finnish peasant heroes marked a healthy alteration to the worn Anglo-Saxon theme.

The joint authors of *The Literature and Romance of Northern Europe*, William and Mary Howitt (1792—1879, 1799—1888), both miscellaneous writers and translators of German and Scandinavian literature, agreed with Carlyle that it was not the Anglo-Saxon but the ”Norman”, Scandinavian blood and spirit that had meant most in the formation of the British character. It had furthered political stability, trade and conquests, it had flourished in the mission of a superior culture. Britain was not "an

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62. A Finnish revolutionary and radical emigrant A.I. Arwidsson formulated the idea in organic terms: "A Finn has to remain one, a Swede has to remain one; every mixture is a murder of the unique, individual character". There was no reason to "love" the enfeebled Goth any longer. Quoted in Klinge, *Senaatintorin sanoma*, pp. 35—36 (author’s translation).
island of Germany” as the Anglo-Saxonist historians had implied. Germany was now under continental tyranny and the memories of their ancient freedom did not count. Instead, the old Norse Allting, the assembly of free men, was the original institution where Odin’s spirit of domination had reigned. Through Christianity this very same spirit had been diluted into British “adventurous enterprise”64.

The Howitts made the poetry of the Swedish-speaking Finn Runeberg represent no less than the highest modern achievement of the Norman tradition. While Swedish poetry appeared to have been corrupted by town life, Runeberg’s Finnish descent rescued him “from the mere indulgence in that easy manufacture of lyrical and occasional poetry which is the fatality of the Swedes”65. One Swedish poet, Bellman, “a tavern-frequenting town-dweller” could not match the natural poetry that issued forth from the solitary forests of Finland, telling of the melancholy sufferings and woes of the Finnish peasant constantly under the threat of frost. It was “flesh and bone-poetry” which, for that matter, was far more original than the Swedish imitation of Greek and Roman masters66. The mythological warrior of the Kalevala, the heroes of which were usually less martial, Kullervo, was for the Howitts retrospectively reincarnated in the main figure of the poem Bonden Paavo, an obstinate and rugged Finnish backwoods pioneer. His melancholy piety, his never-ceasing trust in God’s regulation of the forces of nature to man’s favour, epitomized the regeneration of the Norman heritage. This was scarcely what Runeberg had meant by Paavo, but the Howitts felt free to unite Norman and Finnish origins.

Later, on the eve of the Crimean War, when political urgency inflamed the debates over ancestry, the same imagery was set up in a dramatic, historical background. Another figure of Runeberg’s, Fänrik Ståhl, the hero of the defence of the 1808—09 war bore “a sign of the patriotic heart mourning over his native land which has

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64. William and Mary Howitt, The Literature and Romance of Northern Europe (London, 1852), I, pp. 1, 3—5, 10.
66. Howitts, The Literature and Romance of Northern Europe, II, p. 429. It should be noted that also Runeberg cultivated classical (Homer) ideals.
been torn by brute but overwhelming force from all its old and cherished associations to become an appendage of a vast but amalgamated (Russian) Empire” 67. The son of the Finnish race, formerly so tightly attached to the Scandinavian, Gothic heritage had been violently captured by an alien race. The grief of this cultural loss felt by the British was apparently greater than that expressed in the poem Fänrik Ståhl itself and undoubtedly aggravated by the prospect of the Russian Empire approaching the Atlantic and thus becoming a real threat to the Norman tradition.

The expansion of racial speculation was felt in the history of literature and racial concepts pervaded all literary activity in the 1850s. The Howitts’ racial Scandinavianism romantically elevated them to the heights of poetic imagination. This happened with the result that Runeberg and the Kalevala were enlisted to join in the campaign against Russia. In this manner, the Eastern roots of the Finnish race and language were easy to ignore. In Finland, on the contrary, the image of the Finn presented in the Kalevala was establishing itself because Finnish studies were favoured and supported by the Russian government. For the Russians they served the political purpose of alienating the Finns from their longing towards Sweden. For the Finns it meant liberation from what had formerly been a purely Swedish culture.

2.3. Philology, folklore, ethnology and politics: the evolution of Finnish

I

The recognition and appreciation of the Finnish language as an original and cultural language coincided with the invention of the Finnish race in the 1840—50s. So many races, so many languages: each race had its own peculiarities, expressed in appearance, in

intellect and in language. The separate grammars of races belonging to different language families provided additional testimony of their separateness, and, more seriously, of their inequality, when the grammars were placed in a hierarchy corresponding to a racial one.

As, in the face of evidence of separate cultural stages, the concept of the unity of the human mind did not seem to hold up any longer, so the newly born science of philology did not allow false analogies across the boundaries of language-families. In consequence, it was crucial to find the roots of European languages and to judge their respective value in advancing civilization. Given this task, the direction in which to seek the origins of Finnish had already been pointed out by the travellers of the Enlightenment, and the research done by scholars in Finland and St Petersburg could be incorporated into it. Inquiries into man’s physiological history that had pointed to Asia as a common cradle for all European peoples preceded the European-wide wave of research into the starting-point of civilization and language itself. The studies into German cleared the way and produced the first tentative hypotheses to approach the crux of the problem. Johann Gottfried Herder (1744—1803) had opposed the use of the term 'race' because, in his opinion, races were already so extensively mixed that only separate “national forms” might be found in folklore and mythology. They were all bearers of the unique expressions of various spirits of peoples who had been sent by God to fulfill their task in culture. In this mood, the special qualities of Finnish, Norwegian, Hungarian and the Serbian languages were among the first to be unravelled. Classical studies were about to experience a vigorous rival.

At first, around the turn of the century, it seemed as if Finnish mythology was to be inextricably interwoven and confused with the Norse tradition. For instance, Southey had found in the traditional freedom of the Swedes, depicted by Olaus Magnus and further illustrated by the travellers Acerbi and Clarke, a happy conglomeration (so familiar to the Howitts) of Christian piety, love

of peace, goodwill and of the discipline, skill and daring enterprise of the Normans. These traits could also be found in the people of the forests and waters of Finland. The idea of the unity of northern mythologies, suggested by Olaus’s notion of the Gothic kings reigning over the ferocious Finns, also lingered in historical works, and the question of the early history of the Finns remained unanswered. Yet, in the light of new and indisputable information, the idea of the Finnish and the Finn was to change.

The first challenge came from an unexpected quarter. John Bowring (1792—1872), the Benthamite advocate of freetrade, co-editor of the famous radical periodical the Westminster Review and a multilingual, reviewed Gustaf Renvall’s Suomalainen Sana-Kirja (1826) and F. von Schröter’s Finnische Runen (1819) in 1827. Bowring thought it was high time to commence studies into languages other than Greek and Latin, and agreeing with Rasmus Rask, the Danish philologist, considered Finnish the key to understanding of the non-Slavic languages of North-Eastern Europe. He criticised W. Wootton for falsely connecting Finnish with Indo-Germanic languages (Lettish) and showed, by translating specimens of poetry and comparing their structures, that it was closer, for example, to Estonian. Assured of the importance of philology’s assistance in illustrating the history of human migrations, he implied the possible affinities of Finnish to Persian, Sanskrit and Hebrew.

In Bowring’s view, Finnish was filled with mythology akin to oriental wisdom. The Finnish Pantheon, the gods of which were personifications of the forces of unspoiled nature, and the still living customs of singing and playing the kantele (a five stringed, hollow instrument) among the peasants, revealed to him how little

70. S.A. Dunham, History of Denmark, Sweden and Norway (London, 1838), I, pp. 2—3; II, pp. 84, 87.
71. Already before the Cobden-treaty Bowring had tried to break the customs-barriers of Europe and expand peaceful trading relations to Eastern Europe. He was against all spiritual and secular oppression and promoted the cause of small nationalities. See Levin B. Bowring (ed.), Autobiographical Recollections of Sir John Bowring (London, 1877), pp. 124—27.
civilization had achieved in a country where even the change of masters had affected the Finns almost as little as it had affected the wolves in the forests. So much so that the main force of civilization, usually effective, had not penetrated deep:

Nor has Christianity by any means driven the ancient gods of Finland from the field. Jumala and Wäinämöinen are yet familiar to the thoughts and associated with the daily languages of the Finlanders.

Only a few words, like "street", "town", "city" and "market" had gained access to their vocabulary to mark the rudiments of civilization, and, on the whole, excepting the Swedish-speaking upper-class with whom Bowring had opportunities for discussion, the Finns appeared quite uneducated though Finland itself abounded in natural beauty and wilderness. Unlike the Howitts, for whom the poetry of Runeberg had presented the pure Finnish peasant, a patriotic pioneer or an obstinate fighter in war, Bowring remarked on the eastern mythology and lore of the Finns which hindered their reception of civilized manners and frame of mind.

Bowring's article was not well-known to later philologists but it made Sharon Turner reformulate his history of European languages and nations. His *Sacred History of the World* (1833) and the early editions of *The History of the Anglo-Saxons* (1st ed. 1799—1805) did not include the Finnish language at all but in 1852 he mentioned Finnish, a "graceful, original, melodious and regular tongue" spoken by a people who belonged to the last wave of the peoples (Huns) from the East. His 'specimens' of the Finnish languages, such as Lapp, were in fact Swedish and tended to affirm Turner's enlightened conviction that all languages somehow resembled each other, because they were given by God. The science of language was still subject to the concept of the unity of the human mind, and, in this way, it was easier for Turner to relate the Finns to the overall patterns of civilization. In Britain, where historians and certain literary people were the first to study

74. Bowring travelled from Russia to England via Finland in 1820. For details, see Yrjö Hirn, "Sir John Bowring och Finland". *Finsk Tidskrift*, 98 (Helsinki, 1925).
philology, careful study of the grammars of foreign languages was not yet common. Besides, the evidence concerning the Eastern European languages was scarce and fragmentary. It was more common to pursue such studies which described the migrations and relations of the European peoples and implied the degree to which the forces of civilization had spread76.

One conclusion was implicit in early nineteenth-century literary comments on the Finnish language. The closeness of the Finns to the Indo-Germanic peoples and the cultural superiority of the Germanic peoples made itself felt in the Germanic loans in Finnish. A higher form of social system adopted by the Finns was immediately identifiable in their vocabulary. Reviewing the *Kalevala* (1835), Jacob Grimm, the leader of the rising generation of philologists, had noticed the dualism of the Finnish folk poems. Although he regarded the German language as the most perfect, and the peoples of Finland, Scotland and Lithuania as half-civilized and even wild, he admired their harmonious languages wherein one could comprehend "a profusion of noble forms". To him the *Kalevala* was a collection of myths, pictures and expressions of the universal mythopoetic spirit encompassing all the forces of nature. Being a Herderian, Grimm cultivated an empathy with the poetical imagination of the Finns, and was ready to attribute the same kind of primitive national spirit to the Finns as to the Belgians. He was amazed by the fact that the traffic of loan-words had not been exclusively from the Germanic languages to Finnish only, and that the Finnish Pantheon was comparable to the *Jotunheimr*, both being expressions of the primitive conception of the world spirit and of its various divine manifestations which were common to all peoples of the earth. The Finns appeared to be still living in that age of mythology77. However, what the more "positivistic" successors of Grimm learned from him was that all peoples had been propelled from their eastern cradles, the Finns being the first to reach Europe and later to encounter the arriving

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Indo-Germanic peoples\textsuperscript{78}. Even though the Finns had earlier been quite beyond the reach of civilization, some of them, especially the Finns of Finland, now enjoyed the rays of the Gothic sun.

II

By the mid-nineteenth century the method of philology was changing to the comparative from the historical. As migration-routes were being more exactly outlined, there arose the opportunity for closer investigations into comparative grammars. At the same time the central scientific task was to be a more exact comparison of the cultural stages of the races. In 1847 Prichard had reported on the "Turanian" languages ("Finnic and Turkic") and compared their structure to English. They lacked inflection, formed cases with suffixes and had vowel harmony\textsuperscript{79}. Apparently, these languages were on a lower level of evolution but the precise nature of their backwardness was largely unknown to the British. An opportune moment to study the languages of the East and North arose on the eve of the Crimean War. Three days before the declaration of war, Friedrich Max Müller (1823—1900), a German but later a professor of Sanskrit at the University of Oxford, received a request from the Government to prepare a guide-book for officers to the "languages at the seat of war":

We cannot tell how far and how long this remarkable intervention of the Western Nations in Eastern affairs may lead us and I know, from my Indian experience, that a knowledge of the native languages is an indispensable preliminary to understanding and taking an interest in native races as well as to acquiring their good will and gaining influence over them\textsuperscript{80}.

\textsuperscript{78} Jacob Grimm, \textit{Geschichte den Deutschen Sprache} (Leipzig, 1852), p. 121. The Finnish Urgemeinschaft had resided beyond the Urals. For Herder the Finns had been one of those peoples (depicted by Schlözer) who had lost their "better liberty" in subjugation ("ein trauriges Blatt in der Geschichte der Menschheit") to warlike neighbours. Johann Gottfried von Herder, \textit{Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit} (1784—1791). Textausgabe (Darmstadt, 1966), pp. 428—30.
\textsuperscript{80} C.V. Trevelyan (Under-secretary of the State) to Müller, 20.3. 1854. Friedrich
In his book which came out shortly afterwards, Müller was able with relatively scant information to cover all the Turanian, Semitic and Aryan languages of the area. The Finnic branches of the "Turanian" languages were included by Müller because he anticipated that the war might expand to the Baltic. Starting from the assumption that there had always been uncivilized and civilized peoples in the East, he followed the lead of Grimm in locating the cradle of the civilized Indo-Germanic and Semitic back to the Central Asian highlands where, he supposed, they had lived "under the same roof". Having studied the grammars of Semitic and Indo-German peoples he established their connection to Sanskrit, the original language of the Aryans. The vocabulary of that language showed to Müller that in primordial times they had led an agricultural way of life and founded corresponding primaeval institutions, a germ of the Greek and Roman republican government and the starting-point in the unilinear evolution of Western civilization.

Aside from the main stream of the civilizing movement, in the North there had roamed the nomadic "Turanians" whose language was "contrasted with the Aryan and Semitic languages, which may be called state or political languages". These peoples did not have the same kind of powerful mind as the Aryans but were

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81. Müller used the term "Turanian" to denote "Finnic, Tungusic, Mongolic, Samoedic" and "Turkic" languages. Later he dropped the connection of Finnish and Samoyed with the rest and accepted the term "Finno-Ugrian" suggested by Castrén. Castrén's travels became well-known in England: what attracted the attention of the reviewers of his works was that some of the Finno-Ugrians, Lapps, Karelians and Samoyeds practised the arts of witchcraft, shamanism and magic, the miseries of the primitive mind. This "diabolic lore" performed in "mesmeric slumber" or "frenzy" was devil's work, and it was caused by "animal magnetism" and resembled "hypnotism" or the state of mind of hysterical ladies. These Finns were greatly "infected by paganism" and had a "universal mania for drunkenness" which made them "obedient and easily daunted". See Francis Egerton's review in *The Quarterly Review,* xlv (Dec., 1853—March 1854), pp. 204—05; Anon., *Dublin Review,* 46 (June 1854), p. 281; Anon., *New Monthly Magazine,* 99 (1854), p. 287. The overall conclusion was that civilization could not cure these diseases and that these people would soon be exterminated.

82. Müller, *The Languages of the Seat of War,* pp. 86—87.
stimulated to migration and assaults against more settled peoples by their innate restlessness. They did not have "a lasting nucleus of society and civilization but wilderness". They did not have laws, proper social institutions and tradition to last through generations. In short, they were unhistorical.

Müller reached these conclusions by the comparative method and rationalist mode of reasoning. As he in a later mature work explained, philology was like physics. It had its axioms from which, in the light of information gained, to deduce generalizations. In philology the axiom was "root", the base of every word, its presumed initial form, for example, an onomatopoeic sound. In the Aryan and Turanian languages the derivative grammar, the construction of words from their "roots", worked differently. The Aryan languages were inflectional, Turanian agglutinative, conveying meanings by suffixes, pre- and postpositions, conjugations, declensions, cases, and by letting pronouns mould into verbs. The Turanian languages "grew" through various "dialects" (i.e., for example, different Finnic languages) towards diversity, the Aryan, especially English, tended towards a universal form. The Turanian languages preserved the "roots" but English tended to make them disappear and was in the process of becoming more lyric, rational and scientific. So that, in comparison, the Finnic languages, expressing also the mythological, erroneous conception of the world, were not as progressive but "conservative" and "diseased" because they still carried in their structure primitive forms, especially the personification of nature. The different grammars that expressed different world-views of different stages of civilization were more permanent than racial types because the grammars retained their purity but the races mixed. The idealistic poetry of the West (esp. Wordsworth's) was the standard for the highest development in the evolution and growth of language.

Finnish was as formidable an exception in philology as the

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83. Friedrich Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language (London, 1861), I, pp. 5, 231; The Science of Language (London, 1864), II, p. 413. The African languages were on a far "lower" level of evolution than the "Finnic" ones, so much so that missionary work was impossible without appropriate preparation. The Negro languages should have been so changed that the Negroes could have received the message of a monotheistic God. See Lectures, II, p. 424.
Finns were in racial theory. When drawing on Castrén's research Müller was amazed by the development of Finnish. It had increased capacity to express abstract ideas, although its grammar retained its basic agglutinative character. The reasons for progress were the Christian ideas and economic progress in Finland. In the first place, polytheism and idolatry had given way to monotheism. The power of the *Kalevala* and its myths was declining, its primitive religion was not believed literally any more but rooting out its remnants was a troublesome task. However, the Finnish mind had advanced a lot. The vocabulary of Finnish contained many words denoting higher social organization, it was agricultural and "political". Their political system approached that of the Aryans and their literature had reached a higher level of evolution than expressed in the *Kalevala*:

If a language is once fixed by literary works of national character, change becomes difficult, nay, impossible without political convulsions. Where nomadic nations rise to this stage of civilization and political organization their language, though Turanian in grammar, may approach to the system of political languages such as Sanskrit or Hebrew. This is indeed the case with advanced members of the Turanian family, the Hungarian and Finnish.

The Finns were, on these grounds, with the Hungarians, the only other Finnic race which deserved to be called a proper *nation*,

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85. Müller, *The Languages of the Seat of War*, q. p. 94.
86. Müller, *Lectures*, I, q. p. 304 (italics added). Müller's concept of nation came close to the Hegelian one and was not ultimately very English. In Finland it was just the Hegelian notion that was used to describe the awakening of Finnish consciousness. It stemmed from the idea that Finnish should be developed as a vehicle for the national consciousness which was supposed to lay hidden in the language of the common people. According to the most fervent advocate of the programme "one nation, one language", J.W. Snellman, small nationalities like the Finns would be overwhelmed without national consciousness by world-historical forces such as the Russian and the British Empires. The Finns had already once been checked by the Swedes. Snellman's practical idea was to replace gradually the Russian bureaucratic regime by a civil society where the Finnish-speaking masses should be educated by a voluntarily Finnicized elite. See Johan Wilhelm Snellman, *Läran om Staten* (1844) (*The Doctrine of the State*). Collected Works. Ed. by Reijo Wilenius (Helsinki, 1982), I, p. 200. Cf. Klinge, 'Let us be Finns!', p. 128. An anti-
and, in consequence, had a historical status of its own. Political
development, like the preservation of the constitutional status quo
in Finland by the Tsars, enhanced the linguistic development, and
although Swedish culture dominated, the policy of the Imperial
Government to support Finnish studies was already bearing fruit
for the peculiarly Finnish culture. Finland was progressing in
poetry, in historical and language studies and in politics. The
Kalevala of 1849 had an entirely new, wider cultural meaning: in
Müller’s opinion it deserved to have a place among the great
national epics. Although “a Finn was not a Greek, Wäinämöinen
not a Homer”, the Kalevala was the fifth national epic in the world
“if we throw away our own standards of lyric poetry and allow
environment and nature to give the colours and let them tell of
themselves” 87. There was an organic unity of nature, history,
people, language and culture arising in Finland that well met the
requirements of the concept of nation.

What makes Müller’s concept of Finnish so important is that it
was the first attempt to treat Finnish in English in scientific
fashion. Although the practical conclusions from his early work
obviously suited the interests of his government in the Eastern
Question, there is no denying that Müller was later, having studied
the mythologies of the world more extensively, enchanted by the
world-view of the progressed “Turanians”. The Finns were about
to adapt to the needs of the modern age of nationalism without
entirely losing their original individuality buried in myths. The
birth of the Kalevala was the greatest manifestation of this process,
and it was to have major political implications for the future.

The British lawyer and Celtic scholar, Professor Whitley Stokes
(1830–1909) applied Müller’s concept of mythology to interpret
M.A. Castrén’s Föreläsningar i Finsk Mytologi (1853). To him the
sudden rise of Finnish literature had been like a feat of survival in
the merciless cosmic process. It had been a national necessity
nurtured by the fear that the separation of Finland from the

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progressive alternative was later pointed out by Nietzsche who hinted at the
possibility that within the Ural-Altaic family there might have emerged a
totally different world-view if it had been left alone by Christianity. Beyond
293.

Swedish heritage might lead to the complete absorption of the Finns into the Russian Empire and by the hope that there could be a Finnish rival to the Swedish culture. As Castrén's work implied, the purely mythopoetic period of sun-, sea-, water- and earth-worship, still observable among the Samoyedes, had succumbed to Christianity in Finland. The Finns had been put on the road to gradual intellectual progress, their "capacity for abstract ideas increased"\textsuperscript{88}, at first by attributing energies to various personifications, later by enunciating the idea of one divinity. The evolution of Finnish in Finland testified to the universal, "slow rise of savage mind to comprehension of a god-like spiritual entity" whereas the pagan Finno-Ugrian mythology and practices revealed the inconsistencies in the world-view of the still surviving Finns of northwest Russia.

Nevertheless, seen from the angle of the Aryan hypothesis, the evolution of the Finns and Finnish was not quite complete. They had not yet reached the civilized culmination either in physique or in language, and they clung to numerous savage myths and customs. Their political organization was an underdeveloped loan in comparison with the Aryan social system which was supposed to bear the initial features of democratic government from the very beginning. For a Victorian philologist like Müller who supported parliamentary reform in England, Finland was a nation at its first stage of political evolution.

III

The Aryan theory of Müller did not go unchallenged. There were ethnologists and philologists who could not believe that it had been the Asiatic highlands from which all the virtues of civil life had been transported to Europe. Poliakov has noted how Robert Gordon Latham (1812—1888) remained a far less known ethnologist than the "Aryanists" because he tried to cast grave doubts on the theory of Asiatic origins of the Europeans\textsuperscript{89}.

\textsuperscript{89} Poliakov, \textit{The Aryan Myth}, p. 211.
However, because Poliakov's interest in the Aryan controversy lay elsewhere, he did not go into detail and tackle the position taken by Latham. Because the Finns receive an important place in his theory it is crucial to follow Latham's train of thought here.

In the first place, Latham's view of European history deviated, like that of Thomas Arnold's, from classical models. Although he used analogies of Roman history to illustrate contemporary history, his basic standpoint was ethnological. The historians of the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries had not bothered to study the history of the races of Western Asia and Eastern Europe because the history of the cultural heritage of the Greeks and Romans had dominated the scene. The Aryanists argued that they had found an appropriate predecessor and rival to the Greek-Roman civilization, and they extended the line of descent to Asia. This clear-cut and simplistic solution did not satisfy Latham. In the 1850—60s he wrote several works of descriptive ethnology to correct this one-sided, unilinear vision. In particular, Latham attacked Müller's thesis, its inclination to assign the civilizing mission only to the migrants from Asia. It seemed to him groundless to group, for example, Scots and Jews in the same Aryan race and argue that the various races of Europe all had to confess their debt to its excellence90. Where Müller was enquiring into the structural affinities and relations of the Indo-Europeans to adduce proof of the lineage of civilization reaching back to Asia, Latham delved into the purely European prehistorical and historical sources to prove a remarkable antiquity of the Europeans themselves.

To Latham ethnology was a science that mediated between the science of racial migrations (historical description of the routes) and philology. As for the history of migrations, to be truly scientific, its logic should be geometric, deductive. The axiom was that the history of migrations and collisions of races, the consequences of racial "magnetism", provided the vantage point for all other inferences. Latham's method in explaining the history of the innumerable wanderings of peoples was inductive in Whewell's sense: it was proper to infer backwards from the effect to the cause, viz. from the present location of a race to its cradle,


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not the other way round. Although Latham had put forward his own division of races, the Atlantidae (Africans), Iapetidae (Europeans) and Mongolidae (Mongolians), his historical knowledge forced him to overstep the racial boundaries suggested by this classification. For Latham, who tried to remain a describer of racial history without far-reaching generalizations, the main task was to map out the spheres of influence of the races, for they were like magnetic poles emitting their power from their original centres. Wherever there had been a vacuum in Europe, a race had rushed to fill it, or wherever two or more peoples had met, the collision of racial "forces" compelled the weaker ones to retreat. In this way the historical clashes of peoples constituted the basis for a historical ethnology of Europe that could be drawn, for example, on a map showing the present position of the rival races (Swedes, Finns and Slavs) in Finland. Supplementary evidence could be found in the names and loan-words imposed on and passed to inferior races by the superior ones. Thus a radically different, "scientific" history of Europe could emerge. The earlier moralistic history of decline and progress was being replaced by a detailed description of the movements of peoples based on the assumption of "racial magnetism" and on the confidence in natural laws determining the fortunes of the races.

In ascertaining the history of the Finnish boundaries Latham used all available evidence. From prehistory it was known only that the oldest skulls found in the graves of Northern Germany resembled the skulls of the present Finns, the ones which the Swedish craniologists (foremosty Anders Retzius) assumed to belong to the Mongol class. The younger skulls were, like the modern German ones, long-headed. It had been taken for granted by the Aryanists that Mongol or Celtic primitives had been living in Northern Germany until the Aryan settlers threw them out. More historically, Tacitus had in fact differentiated the Germans, Sarmatians and the Fenni, whom he had placed east of the Baltic.

93. It was reproduced from the maps of the Imperial Geographical Society of St Petersburg (1852).
This provided a clue for Latham: the Aryan theory contradicted Tacitus’s description in its insistence that some primitives had lived in Europe at the time of the arrival of the Indo-Germans. In support of this, John Kemble’s archaeological evidence clearly revealed that the Finns had never resided in Central Europe, and that the aboriginal population of Europe had already been long-headed. In the times of Charlemagne, the Elbe had been a Slavic frontier, and no trace of a Finnic population had been found there. Moreover, Latham agreed with Prichard in separating the Finns from the Mongols and Caucasians: their skulls were of neither sort, although they approached the Mongol ones\(^95\). From medieval texts it could also be deduced that the frontier of the Finns had, of old, been in Livonia, and in the tenth century they had not been found living any further south than the Valdai mountains. Thus the German peoples knew the Finns only through their eastern contacts and they, as Teutons, had named them Finns. All the evidence pointed to Central and Northern Russia as their original cradle\(^96\). Having resided near the Baltic at the time of Tacitus they had later been pushed North-West where they finally came into contact with Scandinavian Swedes.

The Finns formed a separate racial type for Latham. They were their own race even if they had had contacts with various Russian races and with the Swedes. The Finn resembled a "European" in regions where he differed from a "Calmuc". According to Latham, this dual modification was not racially possible between African Negroes and the Australian aboriginal race. Here was the limit of variation\(^97\). The Finns were to be called Ugrians according to the term Müller had adopted from Castrén but Latham used it in a wider sense than Müller to denote both racial and linguistic boundaries, for instance, when saying that Lapps were


\(^{96}\) Latham, *The Germania of Tacitus*, pp. xv, xxx.

linguistically, not physically Ugrians, whereas the Finns were physically like Germans but linguistically Ugrians\textsuperscript{98}. Having studied the racial history of Russia he realized its fundamental truth: numerous peoples lived there in a melting-pot of races containing Finns, Slavs, Turks, Moslems etc. who, according to their physical strength, either claimed the best resources and lands or had to recede. Judged by this norm, in the hierarchy of the Russian races the Ugrians were the least important and powerful, having made only a relatively slight moral and political mark on Russian (ethnological) history. The Ugrians were the peoples who, in one way or another, resembled the contemporary Finnic population of Finland, the only pure remnant of the prehistoric Finns. In historic times, the dominant race, the Slavs, had partly absorbed a large section of Finns into their political body but the more vigorous section had escaped racial repression in a way not dissimilar to that of the Celts in Brittany, the Lapps in Finland, and of the Anglo-Saxons and Friesians on the continent\textsuperscript{99}. Despite their slow retreat to the West and North-West, the Finns of Finland and Estonia had held their ground remarkably well under the dual pressure of the Slavs and Teutons. At the time they still possessed the Baltic sea-board, showed signs of progress and were a steady and valuable race. Their proximity to the Swedes had led to the crusades which brought the alphabet, the Christian religion and rudiments of free institutions to pagan Finland. There was a historical parallel, a kind of classical lesson of ethno-politics, to this process of civilization:

In the way of intellectual development Finland stands to Sweden much as Spain and Gaul did to Rome\textsuperscript{100}.

So much so that they had themselves proceeded to civilize the Lapps in blood and intellect, and where they had an infusion of Slavic blood in their veins, the effect had been balanced for the better by a dose of more noble Teutonic blood. The notion of moral impact was thus integrated with a "scientific" one. Assuming also that the Finns had been a naturally distinct race, Latham argued

\textsuperscript{98} Latham, \textit{The Germania of Tacitus}, pp. 178—79.
\textsuperscript{99} Latham, \textit{The Native Races of the Russian Empire}, pp. 5—6, 15.
\textsuperscript{100} Latham, \textit{The Native Races of the Russian Empire}, q. p. 93.
that neither the Slavic nor the Teutonic impact could have vitiated the Finnic race which remained, again, at its purest in the forests of Central Finland. In spite of the influence of the Teutonic culture and Lutheranism it had kept itself free from fatal contamination: it was still marked by its peculiar "reddish fairness" which could not be found in any other race on earth.\footnote{Latham, \textit{The Nationalities of Europe}, I, pp. 165–67. Cf. M. de Custine's description of the "filthy, half-pagan, deformed swamp-dweller" Russian Finn and Charles Hennigsen's more positive view in \textit{Revelations of Russia} (London, 1844), I, pp. 6–7; II, pp. 257–59.}

When Latham made use of the term race, he tried to define it in a multidisciplinary fashion and took pains to make it match the realities of Europe. For this reason, in his later work, he preferred the term variety, because it apparently suited descriptive ethnology better, and because, in Latham's view, nine tenths of the European races were mixed anyway so that pure races did not exist any longer.\footnote{Latham, \textit{The Nationalities of Europe}, p. vii.} He consciously tried to avoid partiality in asserting the values of races and did not support any pan-racialist movement in Europe. Yet, there was no escaping the fact that some races were more populous and powerful than others. Latham's knowledge of Panslavism confirmed his view that some smaller peoples could fall victims of racial expansion. One of the lessons of political ethnology was called for: smaller varieties, well worth having on the earth, were always under the threat of stronger races as much as the strong ones were susceptible to decline. A case in point was Poland, the fate of which caused the British great concern during the reign of Nicholas I. The saying "Russia's danger is Poland's opportunity" illustrates Latham's ethno-political stance.\footnote{Latham, \textit{The Nationalities of Europe}, p. 126.}

In history, the racial "forces" had usually been perilous for the smaller peoples. Finnish Estonians lived in serfdom, and recently, since 1809, the year of the Russian annexation of Finland, it could be expected that Finland also would be engulfed by mighty Russia. To Latham, this was another injustice of history because the Finns already clearly belonged to the West. And, as if to sympathize with the Finns, he wrote that even in Tacitus's times the Finns had had a culture "though low" but not wholly unlike that of the Germans.
Their abilities in culture were shown by their vocabulary which contained indigenous concepts for "smith", "iron" and "weaver" although it had been the Teutonic impact that had made them borrow the words for "king", "judge" and "police". Owing to this social progress the Finns were superior to all of their Russian cousins and well deserved some political rights under Russian rule.

In the course of the civilizing process which had swept over Finland from the West to the East, the Finns had been converted to Christianity, and this mission had been just about to reach Ingria and Estonia too but Slavic expansion, from the heart of Russia had brought it to a halt. Finally, as the vigour of the Swedish mission weakened and its government become corrupted, the Russians rose and seized Finland in 1809, causing a serious set-back to Western civilization in the North:

Valeat quantum. The real reason for the invasion of Finland was the proximity of the Swedish frontier to the Russian capital, and according to the ordinary rules of political morality, it was a sufficient one\textsuperscript{104}.

In the twentieth century, any aggression on the part of Russia could be accounted for by this fundamental geopolitical fact, but in the mid-nineteenth century, changes in the politics of power seemed to be explicable by racial currents that underlay it. The centrifugal racial "forces" appeared to determine the fate of Finns. Still, the Finnish variety seemed to be able to survive. They had stood firm, they had preserved the treasure of the \textit{Kalevala}, dissolved the Western heritage into it and had been able to resist all onslaughts on their progressing nationality. Paradoxically enough, Russian power, abstaining from immediate Russification of the Finns, protected the newcomer. At the expense of Swedish the cultivation of the Finnish language had increased a great deal and Finnish studies had gained the approbation of the Russian authorities. Besides, "if all other steps towards similar objects were in an equally praiseworthy direction", the vigorous remnant of the ancient Ugrians could enrich itself and join the league of smaller European nations.

\textsuperscript{104} Latham, \textit{The Nationalities of Europe}, q. p. 176.
Latham's argument contained both scientific and political strains. The ethnopolitics of race, stemming from a scientific basis, taught the lesson of power. The Finns, on the periphery of civilization, emerged on the racial map of Europe as a minor "force" struggling to survive between the great powers. Changes in the relations of the superior races made the fortune of the Finns fluctuate from the utter limit of destruction to a hopeful revival. As one unknown reviewer had it, the "Hunno-Finnic variety", never a dominant one, had been thrown by centrifugal force from Russia, the home of the Slavs, to the North-West to confront the uttermost limit of cold only to rise from semi-civilization to agriculture and trade. Their distinct character, like that of their cousins, the Hungarians living under Habsburg rule, was maintained in spite of their continuous suppression:

The Northern branch of the race, before it was annexed to Russia, was under Scandinavian rule; and yet, though always acknowledging a foreign lord and faithfully serving him, they are an independent race - though servants, never servile105.

Under moderate Russian rule they had a chance to advance, they were generally prosperous, reared cattle and profited from agriculture, had some beautiful maritime towns and many comfortable villages. Although they were "a nation without a name", they were already something more than a mere tribe or a nomadic herd and not least because the Swedes had blended with them. Consequently, as a war with Russia seemed more than probable and there was a possibility that a British fleet might visit the coast of Finland, the British should take this new race seriously for they were, as possible enemies, "respectable and formidable". Their poetical recitals and primeval skills in various arts, depicted in the *Kalevala*, testified to it106.

Ultimately, the knowledge that the British were able to gather about the Finns was often put to the uses of political argument and

105. Anon., "Finland and the Finlanders". *New Monthly Magazine*, 103 (1854), q. p. 380. According to this unknown writer the Finn had "fair hair and eyes, sandy complexion, high cheek-bones, but not lofty stature, and was short and generally well-made". Morally he was "firm and brave, ambitious, industrious, devout, kind and temperate".

war-propaganda. For racialists like Latham it was essential to connect racial, political and moral judgements to scientific generalizations and political lessons. Partly the value and meaning of this science rested in its availability for the justification for power and its use or, more exactly, as the science of race was born earlier than the 'Eastern Question', it was already there waiting to be used. Not that the leading politicians themselves so much used the array of arguments elicited from racial interpretations of history, but that the propagandists and literary people who advocated war fell back on racial theories to make their expositions sound credible. With reference to the Finns, the significance of these arguments lies in this, that they provided arguments for the legitimation of the use of aggressive measures against an alien race, be it the Finns or Russians, and provoked movements which expressed collective racial-political demands.

The racial argument concerning the Finns before the Crimean War prepared the ground for the Russophobic propagandist who tendentiously surmised the prospects and possible result of the confrontation in the Baltic. Finland was rendered ethno-politically comprehensible an entity worth examining and keeping in mind when speculating about the Eastern European power balance. Knowledge was power in politics. As one reviewer aptly put it: "Next to knowing yourself it is desirable to know your enemy", and when the enemy was possibly Russia one had to know also "of what races that huge human mass of hostility is composed".107

Before studying these arguments and their implications for the situation of Finland any closer, it is necessary to survey how the British envisaged the political evolution of Finland from a province of Sweden to an autonomous part of the Russian Empire.

2.4. The political and cultural status of Finland, 1809—1856; British perceptions

I

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the political status of Finland changed drastically. In the war of 1808—09 Sweden lost Finland to Russia and a final blow was given to Swedish supremacy in the Northern Baltic. Moderate and liberally-minded, Alexander I guaranteed Finland the 1772 Swedish constitution and, with the purpose of conciliating the Finns and of securing peace on the Western frontier of Russia, gave it an autonomous position within the Empire, leaving himself large executive powers and the prerogative in foreign and imperial affairs. It is commonplace in Finnish history to cite Alexander's words uttered at the Diet of Borgå in 1809 as he elevated the people of Finland "to the rank of the family of nations". Since then, Finnish nationalist historiography has usually regarded the year 1809 as an annus mirabilis although it has been shown that Alexander's main motive for conciliation was political expediency in the midst of European turmoil. The leaders of the Finns were not truly

108. See Jutikkala with Pirinen, A History of Finland, p. 160. Alexander used the term "nation" in a political sense; he had given the Finns a political existence by preserving their constitution and by establishing a connection of the people and "land" to the sovereign. He confirmed the religion and the Fundamental Laws as well as the privileges and rights of the Finnish estates now taking the place of the Swedish Diet. The crucial point for the Finns in the constitution was that the Grand Duke could make no law nor abolish an old one without the consent of the Estates although it was in his power to convvoke the Diet and to decide whether to ratify a bill or not. The Tsar also held considerable administrative powers, gave ukases and controlled the foreign affairs. The form of state was corporative in keeping with the Enlightenment conception. It was in the 1840s that the Hegelian concept which stressed the mutuality of the rights of the sovereign and his subjects was propagated. Against this the Russian jurists held that the Tsar whose powers were "illimitable" could repeal his grant. See Osmo Jussila, "Finnish Fundamental Laws as Interpreted by Russia and Finland, 1808—1863". Suomen perustuslait venäläisten ja suomalaisten tulkintojen mukaan, 1808—1863. Historiallisia Tutkimuksia, LXXVII (Helsinki, 1969).

nationalists but showed parochial patriotism in the context of the creation of Finland although the country itself soon began to resemble a state in its institutions.

The reign of Napoleon and his efforts to control the Baltic had seriously threatened British interests in, and imports from, the North. The British government had tried to keep Sweden on its side against the treaty of Tilsit (1807) signed by Napoleon and Alexander I which was also aimed against Swedish trade with Britain. Alexander should have forced Sweden to close her ports against Britain. Only reluctantly did Alexander attack Sweden-Finland in order to achieve this goal.

British responses to the change of power balance in Russia's favour in the Baltic area were both negative and positive. Both some contemporary observers and later Russophobes considered the Tilsit pact iniquitous and disgraceful. However, this was not the prevailing attitude at the close of the Napoleonic wars. Even Jeremy Bentham had proposed to Alexander I a representative government for Russia, and some British observers appreciated the way he had restored peace and order in Europe and settled the Swedish-Russian rivalry in the North. The expansion of Russia did not yet seem to disturb the relations between Britain and Russia in the early decades of the nineteenth century, and it appeared that the Finns had only benefited from the change of masters. It could be put down to the impolitic adventures of Swedish kings begun by Charles XII, continued by Gustav III and brought to an end by the incompetent Gustavus IV Adolphus. The British constitution, always worthy of congratulation on its stability during the restless times of continental upheaval, did not allow kings to wage war at will, but Swedish kings who were not subject to that kind of limitation of power had waged numerous wars against Russia at the end of the eighteenth century and had finally fallen victim to their own folly. Gustavus IV Adolphus had forgotten the real


duties of the king and dreamed of conquests. The war of 1808-09 had been a farce; the Russians had gained Sveaborg by bribery and Alexander’s troops had found easy access to Finland. As if he had been completing a natural process in putting the political geography of the North right:

Finland has always been an object of ambition to the Russians, and from its position ought more naturally to have constituted a part of Russia than of Sweden.112

To the writer of these lines, it was lamentable but natural that a corrupted empire should collapse and a vigorous one expand, at least to its natural borders. It was also more natural for Sweden to take over Norway, a claim which had been supported by the British also.

However, ever since Alexander I turned conservative and reforms in Russia were frozen, British attitudes towards Russia and the position of Finland began to change. The despotic Russian government became subject to criticism and the danger of Russian expansion was emphasized. The British government began to steer away from European alignments and pursue a freer foreign policy. The British had to face the possibility that Russia might expand to the Mediterranean, the Balkans and the Baltic. Small European nationalities groaned under oppression and Britain seemed to offer protection. In these conditions, at least from the 1840s on, an aggressive attitude towards Russia developed, and racialist arguments found their way into political considerations.

In retrospect, the annexation of Finland came to be seen in a very different light. In the opinion of the Russophobes, Alexander I had been cunning: after the collapse of Napoleon he kept his prize, Finland, at the expense of a declining Sweden. Norway seemed poor compensation for the loss of Finland, now more usually referred to as “an agreeable country of mountains, forests, lakes, meadows and pleasant fields”113. Although it was Alexander who had defeated Napoleon, the British had their misgivings about Russian policies towards the weakened Sweden and vulnerable

Eastern Europe throughout the period 1812—1854. In addition to the previous partitions of Poland and acquisition of areas in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and in the Far East, the annexation of Finland showed to some British historians, travellers and other observers that Russia was taking big steps, possibly towards being a threat to western freedom. In areas were Russia had previously been vulnerable it now appeared menacing. One powerful man, the Tsar, could make the backward but huge Empire a means for his purposes. For all his liberal views, even Alexander remained an autocrat, in classical terms, a despot, and the implications of that form of government were fully known to the British. The image of Russia, of a barbarous land that abounded in poor peasants, ruled by a despot and declining nobility, having no powerful backbone of middle or trading classes, gained new sting. The only true force in any kind of order in Russia was its huge military machine which might easily roll over the bordering nationalities. It was this sort of Russia that seemed to oppress the Finns and undermine its "ancient" liberties cherished under the Swedish crown. It was accepted that this unfortunate battlefield of Sweden and Russia was now finally destined to be part of Russia, and the progressive Finnish race was doomed to suffer from Russification. The Russophobes would have liked to see this situation reversed.

II

Against the background of the political changes in the North and in the light of political and constitutional considerations British observers touched upon the new position of Finland in the Russian Empire. Finland had been brought under the shadow of the imperial eagle, had promptly been given the chance to preserve its Lutheran religion, laws, constitution and was subsequently launched onto a path of national progress. Although one of the commonest denominations of Finland in British sources was "province", implying a similarity between the position of Finland

and that of the Baltic provinces, various British sources knew of the special relation Finland had with the rest of the Empire. Considered from the standpoint of British constitutional history, the position of Finland was anomalous. In its fifth edition, *The Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1817) used the familiar "Duchy" to denote a country where a prince, in this case a foreign one, was the sovereign, but replaced it by a more definite but misleading "Stadholdership" in a later edition (1827—42). According to its terse phrasing: the imperial sovereign had deferred to the "ancient laws and customs" of Finland. In the eighth edition (1853—61) we find a more detailed description of the governmental apparatus; the Finns had a Diet, and there was a Russian governor general whose duties had been restricted to military affairs. It was important to note that the Finnish "military troops were not promiscuously mixed with the Russian forces”, that the Swedish judicial system had been maintained and that "none but a native Finlander can hold any office of trust in the country” 115. The constitution of Finland had remained intact and Russification had not as yet been started. More pessimistically and introducing an early racial argument, *Rees's Cyclopaedia* lamented over the dispersion of the ancient, united Finnish "race" caused by Tartars and Slavs and the recent loss of its supposedly more independent position. Some privileges of the Estates from the Swedish period and Alexander's modification of the Finnish constitution was duly reported: in the province of Viipuri, it is told, the Russian judicial procedure had replaced capital punishment by deportation to Siberia 116. According to *The Penny Cyclopaedia* “all Finns are free and many of them landholders and have leases of the crown called poertte” (sic) — this in contrast to the degrading serfdom of the Russian peasant. As a part of Russia Finland showed its 'progressive' image better than as a province of Sweden.

Some British observers understood that despite a foreign sovereign, the definition of a free citizenry governed by a just and mixed government might still be applied to the Finns. Their bills and petitions were presented directly to the Tsar by a minister secretary for Finnish affairs in St Petersburg. But still, under the

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title "Principality" there was, in comparison with British practice, a serious defect in the Finnish constitution. One person, the Tsar again, could hamper the free expression of public opinion, cherished in Britain as a check on arbitrary use of power, and it was in his power to convene the Diet. It was solely on the shoulders of the members of the Finnish Senate to try to extenuate the deficiency:

Though Finland has a constitution of its own, by which the inhabitants are classed in four orders, the diets are never convened, except on the occasion of additional taxes being contemplated by the government. The senate in fact has been found a more convenient body to manage than the diets, and it has almost superseded them.\(^{117}\)

The constitutional argument assessed the drawbacks of political life in Finland according to the standards of British freedom. British observers considered themselves as enjoying constitutional liberty, and it was perhaps the normality of that state of affairs that hindered them from seeing the benefits caused by the granting of a form of inner autonomy to Finland and by the simple change of masters there. Besides, the pro-Swedish propaganda of the Swedes and Swedish-speakers in Finland impressed on some of the British a rather one-sided view of Finnish affairs which tended to exaggerate the disadvantages of Russian rule.

Nevertheless, there were some well-informed commentators who did not assess Finnish-Russian relations purely in terms of the equilibrium achieved by the British system. Yet, none of them had become acquainted with the history of the Finnish "race" and with the discussion of the constitutional status of Finland as profoundly as the unknown writer for the *Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Review*. He did not use only the latest histories of Sweden and Finland but also inserted long quotations from pamphlets concerning the issue and its repercussions on the security and peace of Scandinavia\(^{118}\). These pamphlets,

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118. They were I. Hwasser's (ex-Finnish, prof. of Medicine at the University of Upsala) "On the Treaty of Alliance between Sweden and Russia in the year 1812" (Stockholm, 1838), Prof. Geijer's review of it in *Litteraturbladet* (Stockholm, Nov.—Dec., 1838), P. Kuoharinen's (A.I. Arwidsson), "Finland
accentuated by the nationalist and Scandinavianist mood in Sweden, pondered mainly the question of whether Finland had shared the Swedish constitution when still a part of Sweden, and if so, had this constitution later been acknowledged, preserved or changed by the Tsars. To probe the contention was important to the British pamphleteer for possible encroachments on the Finnish constitution might signal the return of despotism and thus create a danger to the freedom of "Teutonic" Europe. The racialist argument served as a backbone for his constitutional conclusions.

In introducing the Finnish question, the author dwelled for some time on the history of the "Finnish race". About 3 000—4 000 years ago, they had wandered as peaceful primitive settlers from the tablelands of Central Asia from which had "issued tribes and clans destined to rough-hew the path of future loftier civilization, chiefs trustingly led out into the wilderness by the hand of Providence to colonize, and clear and cultivate". The modern Finns, Lapps and Hungarians were their descendants. These races had differed from the latecomers, Celts, Goths and Slavs, in that they were not "robber-races" driven by "thirst of blood and conquest" but were a subdued, retiring and "mild, melancholy" race of people. They preferred "indominate patience, hardihood and industry" to "outward advantage". They had peacefully drained morasses and fire-cleared forests, singing the mythological songs of their forefathers. There seemed to be no doubt about their racial qualities and abilities for future tasks.

Citing a nationalist Swedish historian, Erik Geijer (1783—1847) the writer stated that the history of Finland since the Swedish conquest had been characterized by the Swedish-Russian contest over the possession of Finland and the Baltic. Although Sweden had been able to hold Russia back for centuries, it had had to finally concede Finland to Russia, to lose its "well-brought-up

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and Its Future Prospects" (Stockholm, 1840), O. Kekäläinen’s (A.I. Arwidsson with J.J. Nordström) "The Present Constitution of Finland" (Stockholm, 1841). Parts of Kekäläinen’s article were appended in Charles F. Hennigsen’s Revelations of Russia (London, 1844), vol. II. See also Jussila, Maakunnasta Valtioksi, pp. 77—81.

119. Anon., "The Political Constitution of Finland". The Gentleman’s Magazine and Historical Review, xlii (July, 1834), p. 4. Unfortunately, it is not known who wrote this article.
brother”. Until quite recently the Swedes had grieved over the loss in "inactive regret”.

Having thus prepared the ground, our writer went on to criticize the arguments of the Swedish and Finnish pamphleteers. Israel Hwasser’s booklet he regarded as "dangerous” because it had rendered Finland a semi-independent protectorate of Russia, and claimed that a separate peace between Russia and Finland had saved the Finnish constitution, had secured the natural border with Russia and thus created the security and peace of the North. To a far-sighted observer it was, however, extremely difficult to see how the Gulf of Bothnia could constitute a natural border for Russia better than the Atlantic Ocean. More so, since it had been the conquering passion of the "Slavic race” that had made Russia overrun Finland, a country which had a completely different religion and language, and which was inhabited by an alien race.

Neither was he satisfied with the opposite view of Kuoharinen. Kuoharinen had argued that the Russian conquest had annihilated the Finnish constitution altogether and made Finland a province where there was presently rising a "race" which was expecting the Tsar to be their moderate ruler. In this way, the Finns forgot whence their civilization really had come from. This interpretation clearly went against Finnish reality, and so he adopted the views of Kekäläinen — they provided the material he needed for his own political lessons. Kekäläinen had shown that Finland had enjoyed the very same liberties as the Swedes before the separation, and that these had been duly guaranteed by Alexander I. Having accepted this interpretation, he proceeded to put his own question: Had the Russians really kept the Finnish constitution intact and respected the letter of international law? No, they had not: in 1827 the Russian Orthodox were allowed to become Finnish citizens, in 1829 a law of censorship had been introduced, there had been some illegal convictions, ukases, and a stoppage in general economic legislation because the Tsar postponed the convocation of the Diet!21. Russification was creeping in, and all the

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121. Anon., "The Political Constitution of Finland", pp. 108—113. The proof was that Alexander I had promised to preserve the constitution, which act,
"plethorizing" economic advantages gained from Russia lulled the Finnish Finns into a deceptive dream:

Russia treats her (Finland) with all imaginable tenderness, allowing her to retain her old laws to a very considerable extent, and only slowly and silently undermining them, nominally guaranteeing her "constitution" itself, and scattering over her coasts the "barbarous gold" of her thousand lands. She knows the importance of counteracting and negativing the Swedish tendencies of the Finnish population. She will not that they shall have any longings to the free halls of the West, and therefore attempts to drown and intoxicate the higher and nobler feelings by a flood of material advantages.\footnote{Anon., "The Political Constitution of Finland", q. p. 113.}

In 1854 this was not to succeed as easily as in 1842. In the writer's opinion, the tide could be turned back. The Finns had become "too civilized and self-conscious", they were a distinct race with their own "decided" national feeling. In the writer's mind, they had been so much alienated from Russian rule, and grown so close to the Teutonic ideals, that they deserved to join the "Northern confederation", a kind of Nordic United States. For the sake of peace in Europe and the predominance of the Teutonic race a new buffer-kingdom, ruled by a Swedish monarch, should call a halt to Slavic expansion in the Baltic. The ancient settler-race of Finns could now, civilized and national as they were, join the forces of civilization against "the further encroachments of the moving, stifling, overwhelming sand-ocean of the great Cossack-winged barbarian invasion".\footnote{Anon., "The Political Constitution of Finland", p. 116.} Paradoxically enough, it was the Swedish and Finnish pamphleteers themselves who provided the material for a writer who turned their arguments against the Finns when trying to convince his readers that the Finns could be enticed to rebel against the Russian government.

\footnote{according to the experts of International Law (Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, Wolff) was called \textit{donationis reale}, a "gift" (not contract) that would bind subsequent Tsars. A breach of this principle provided a sufficient reason for a just war against Russia. See Harriet Martineau, \textit{The Westminster Review}, v, n.s. (Jan., 1854), pp. 212, 232.}

Before entering deeper into the Crimean War propaganda, and its ways of using the racial argument, it is necessary to glance at British travel literature concerning Finland, for this provides more realistic descriptions and acute impressions of the Finnish race and its affairs. Although British travellers regarded themselves as the most objective of observers\textsuperscript{124}, they could not help being informed and influenced by the Swedes and Finnish-Swedes on their way to Finland. Yet, travellers as they were, they could perceive Finland in a more distinct light than those politically biased propagandists who did not have to meet the situation on the spot. Travellers did not fix their attention exclusively on constitutional matters, their survey might encompass nature, the people and its civilization in various arts. They were as keen on recognizing the 'progressive' aspects of Finland which they saw on the move as emphasizing the evil brought down on Finland by Russia.

Sir John Bowring who organized a donation of English books to Finland with the aid of the Archbishop of Finland, Jacob Tengström in Turku, affirmed that Finland had been "crudely" conquered by Russia. The Finns seemed to be longing for and dreaming of a restoration of their "ancient" constitution:

\begin{quote}
Finland cherishes its ancient nationality, and looks back with deep affection upon the period when the representative principle existed, in however rude a form.\textsuperscript{125}
\end{quote}

Writing in defence of suppressed nationalities and many years after his actual visit to Finland Bowring painted a gloomy picture of Finland's contemporary status. He hoped for concessions from the Tsar but carefully added that the British who themselves held

\textsuperscript{124.} According to \textit{The Quarterly Review} of 1834 (vol. 51, no. 102, p. 457) a French traveller regarded his own country as the "most prolific, picturesque, most favoured by God, most ornamented by man" whereas the British, even if they "preferred" their country in "all its moral and natural aspects", they always compared and gave accurate descriptions based on inspection.

down many a nationality should abstain from any judgements on another Empire's inner affairs\textsuperscript{126}. Also to write about self-government in the Russian Empire must have appeared somewhat far-fetched at the time. The amount of freedom in the United States, a kind of model state for Bowring in reconciling local and general interests, was a utopia in Russia which was so much behind in all political evolution.

The travellers who visited Finland during the liberal period of Alexander's reign could see Finland in a more favourable light than Bowring who had already proclaimed the oncoming reaction. One of the tangible alleviations accruing from Alexander's moderation was his policy of religious toleration from about 1812 to 1820. The British and Foreign Bible Society took advantage of the chance and launched a campaign of bible distribution amongst the Finns\textsuperscript{127}. In general, in spite of the relics of Oriental heathenism, dirty smokecabins and disorderly appearance, the Finns appeared quite receptive to the message. The Finn himself might be cleaner than his home because he regularly used the sauna, and although his household was not in very good order he was diligent in husbandry\textsuperscript{128}. Still, the Swedes were far more advanced in cleanliness than the Finns:

This is especially the case to the North of Gevle, where there are no great landed proprietors to grind the faces of the poor; but it is a general characteristic of the Gothic race, among which I always felt myself quite at home.\textsuperscript{129}

To a reformed Christian and Quaker the lot of landless labourers and petty peasants could be improved by getting them to work under the guidance of progressive, "Gothic" entrepreneurs. When

\textsuperscript{126} Bowring, \textit{Autobiographical Recollections}, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{127} They began in 1811 under the permission of Alexander I and with the support of Jacob Tengström, the Archbishop of Finland. The activities lasted until 1827 when they had to leave as Nicholas I closed Russia against the influence of the West. See John Paterson, \textit{The Book for Every Land} (London, 1858), introduction. The Finns received the Word in the following amounts: "Finns proper", "Tsuavashes", "Lapps" and "Ests" 5000 bibles each, "Tseremisses" and "Mordvians" 3000, "Karelians" 1000. Figures are from Robert Pinkerton, \textit{Russia, or Miscellaneous Observations} (London, 1833).
\textsuperscript{128} Paterson, \textit{The Book for Every Land}, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{129} Paterson, \textit{The Book for Every Land}, q. pp. 276—77.
it came to the rudiments of spiritual reformation, the Finns should not have been taught as secularly as they had been. The Finnish habit of reading official announcements ("worldly trash") during the divine service was reprehensible:

'... for it greatly hurts the interest of genuine piety, and chokes the germ of Godly feeling and good resolutions, by introducing into the mind so many worldly concerns at the very season when they ought to be most excluded.'

Yet, in general, Finland testified to the influence of centuries of piety and civilization. The missionaries saw fenced fields, pastures being marked off, crops of various cereals and potato flourishing, peasants carrying hymnbooks or occupied with roadrepairs in between the sowing and harvesting. In Vaasa district, the fields appeared to be as ready for the sickle as the people for the word, not least for the reason that the impact of the Swedish ("Gothic") culture was particularly strong there. The people of this area seemed especially averse to Russian rule.

It was not only agriculture but also manufacture and commerce that accompanied the progress of the Finns. Commerce and Christian virtue went hand in hand. John Paterson himself indicated to the Scottish entrepreneur and pioneer of Finnish cottonmills, James Finlayson, the site of Tampere, later the "Manchester of Finland". Waterpower and labour abounded there, and when Paterson visited Tampere again in 1820, it had become a really progressive town. There was a school, a beautiful garden and the pious poor worked at the mill. All these good things were almost unknown to lower grades of civilization:

In uncivilized nations, very few indicators of this kind are to be seen; for the uncultivated mind is unconcerned about tomorrow.

The morality of the Finnish had not been badly affected by Russian rule. Their manners had not been Russianized and the Orthodox creed had not spread. For instance, William Rae Wilson, a liberal

130. Pinkerton, Russia, q. p. 398.
132. Pinkerton, Russia, q. p. 401.
patriot and traveller, wrote that the Finns were in all respects superior to the Russians and added a comment on their racial character to prove it:

They are remarkably fair, their hair almost resembling flax, cleanly in their habits, wear white clothes, and are marked by a striking simplicity of manners.\textsuperscript{133}

The sight of toil and bustle in Finland pleased him. Finnish women were not loiterers like the Russian peasantwomen:

Here we observed no females lolling, sauntering and chatting about the doors in groups, but most of them employed, many being occupied in knitting stockings, at the same time singing merrily, and enjoying the beauty of a brilliant sunny day.\textsuperscript{134}

Innocence and piety governed their daily cycle:

\begin{quote}
How blessed the maid whose bosom
No headstrong passion knows,
Her days in joy pass
Her nights in calm repose.\textsuperscript{135}
\end{quote}

In comparison with the scientific view of the level of progress of Finnish morality, Wilson's moral was reminiscent of the Christian conception of virtue to which some "scientific" comments on race were added.

The Christian way of seeing the Finnish landscape waking up from its natural sleep in the hands of the sturdy Finnish race differed from the utilitarian way of perceiving it. Where a utilitarian saw some mechanistically pleasing processes at work, as in the sawmill driven by waterpower, the Christian was elevated by the sight of work being done by man's own hands, for example, by the sickle at harvest time. Yet the Christian view also included

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{133} William Rae Wilson, \textit{Travels in Russia, etc., etc} (London, 1828), II, q. p. 148. John Murray's \textit{Handbook for Northern Europe} (London, 1849), part II advertised Finland and told that the Finns "are proud of their constitution and national special features" being also "kind, frank in manners, sincere and polite". In Finland a British tourist could forget being in Russia.
\textsuperscript{134} Wilson, \textit{Travels}, q. p. 152—53.
\textsuperscript{135} Wilson, \textit{Travels}, q. p. 158.
\end{quote}
the utilitarian aspect in its all-embracing teleology. The "garden-effect" produced by schools, factories, gardens, and the diligent workers of Tampere showed God's plan to which man was subservient in action on the earth. The peasant-proprietors working in their fields were seen as fulfilling an obligation, a duty to cultivate. It was their own land, and it was that very land that might become their fatherland, the concrete basis for their national consciousness and patriotism.

The British missionaries and travellers to Finland and Russia did not explicitly use the concepts of national awakening — they rather regarded Finnish Evangelism as deepening the gap between the Finnish peasant and the Russian serf, thus recognizing the Western disposition of the Finn. There could not be any proper civilization and freedom without cultivated property. In feudal Russia it was part of the essence of the Slavic race to remain servile. It was quite the opposite in Finland where the morality of Western individualism was allowed to grow relatively freely. This development seemed possible as long as the Tsar did not use his power to restrict the growth of its secular manifestations.

Alexander's moderation did not stop at constitutional admissions and religious toleration. Other aspects of moral and material progress were being equally favoured by him. The mundane and easily recognizable features of progress, for instance the building of the centre of Helsinki, the new capital, attracted the eye of liberally minded travellers. Yet it was hard for a British traveller who usually leaned towards Swedish culture in Finland to believe that the benefits to the Finns from the Russian seizure more than outweighed the losses inflicted by it. However, the Finnish-Swedish upper classes of Finland had profited a lot, there was no denying it. Russia had ceased to be just a sinister conqueror.

It was noted by J.T. James in 1813—14 that the annexation had not aroused "discontent and ill-will" as, for instance, Bowring had implied, because the commercial towns of Finland could now, at long last, trade in peace, security and in a privileged position. Taxes in Finland flowed to the benefit of Finland alone; nothing was used for purely Russian purposes. There was no army to burden the finances any longer and the open-handed Tsar had had the capital moved from Turku to Helsinki. Even more tangibly, the Tsar had granted the capital for the establishment of the first
Finnish bank. Here the specific advantages of enlightened despotism were evident. Even if, in general, despotism was a political anomaly and its tendencies to expansion and "unreasonable" conquest self-destructive, a favourable combination of determination on the part of the autocrat and free play of the constitution which entailed considerable freedom for corporate privileges in the countryside and town, might lead to considerable progress. The Finnish constitution, an exceptional device, was to be maintained and preferred to a purely despotical regime, and more so since the Russian style of government might easily gain more ground in Finland. Fortunately, for the time being, this had not happened.\textsuperscript{136}

George Jones was more optimistic than James who had been afraid of the threat to the status quo in Finland. Finns had their own magistrates, Old Finland had been restored to Finland proper and a kind of national unity had been regained. Although Russian uniforms, formalities and cupolas could be encountered in Finland, Finnish manners held their ground. The improvement on the Swedish oppressive monarchy was recognizable in a more just government:

'...' for by being incorporated with a powerful state, they are relieved from the perpetual dread of seeing their country made a seat of war, and from consequent taxation, as well as harassing personal service always attendant upon precautions of defense; add to which, all their ancient customs, liberties, privileges, and religion are guaranteed to them.\textsuperscript{137}

The balance sheet of history had begun, at last, to show some profit for the Finns. According to Colville Frankland, who visited all the courts of the North, Finland had quickly recovered from the war,


\textsuperscript{137} George Jones, \textit{Travels in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia and Turkey} (London, 1827), q. pp. 265—66. Jones was a retired Captain travelling with the purpose of collecting professional knowledge concerning the Baltic. John Barrow largely agreed with Jones whose book he used as a guide (\textit{Excursions in the North of Europe}, 1834). One Charles Elliot who had served the Crown in India did not see in Finland much else than Oriental manners and styles. He depicted the Finns as serfs who looked like "Mussulmans" or "Beoparries of Cabul". See his \textit{Letters from the North} (London, 1832). pp. 250—51.
Russia had given her an inner autonomy and a lot of money. The employers were native Finlanders, and the countryside produced enough food to satisfy the needs of the towns. There was a plan to launch a steamer line from Stockholm to Turku and Helsinki, there were sawmills and ironworks. Helsinki had been the pet of Alexander:

The Russian Emperor, the Trajan of the North, might say with the Roman that he found it a pack of wooden huts, and left it a city of palaces.  

For James too, the architecture of Helsinki did not show the typical Russian contrast between the grotesque magnificence of the Asiatic palaces there and the misery of the dwellings of the poor here, although in Viipuri it was to be seen that a Russian-style town planning had been tried.  

Finland was a country of contrasts, and the closer the travellers came to the Eastern border of Finland, the more readily they felt they were already stepping into Asia. The frontier of civilization lay somewhere between Viipuri and St Petersburg and during the reign of Nicholas I it appeared to move further West. For the British, Nicholas had brought reaction and intolerance with him, and a change in British attitudes towards the position of Finland ensued. Jones had already suspected that even Alexander might change his mind and take the constitution of Finland away.

Anticipating the arguments used in Crimean War propaganda, both Jones and Frankland speculated on the possibility that the Swedes might, in the near future, get a chance for revenge because "Finland is not yet heartily Russian" and was open to inroads from Sweden; and if the European powers were to support Sweden, it might be able to reinstate its power in Finland. At that moment a

138. C. Colville Frankland, Narrative of a Visit to the Courts of Russia and Sweden in the years 1830 and 1831 (London, 1832), q. p. 102.
139. James, Journal of a Tour, p. 391. For the Finns themselves, Helsinki symbolized the new Russian, and Turku the old Swedish regime, the former being "progressively" humanist and nationalist in its atmosphere, the latter remaining a "Sveo-Gothic" ruin. In Helsinki the new intelligentsia supported the cause of Finnish studies, tried to get rid of the Swedish associations and establish connections to "brother-languages" in Russia. See Klinge, Kaksi Suomea, pp. 12, 17, 19.
dispersion of all the Russian races could begin and the colossal but unjust Russian Empire would collapse. This idea was already quite contrary to Wilson's and Bowring's conciliatory idea of the 1810—20s that empires had enough room to live and compete peacefully\textsuperscript{141}. Russophobic attitudes had hardened, and the position of Finland seemed more precarious. Obviously, Nicholas's crude methods in repressing the Polish rebellion, his laws of censorship and the use of the police to keep criticism down, the blocking of Western ideas and display of military ambition, made many a Briton disillusioned with Tsarism. The fate of Finland, interwoven with that of Russia, did not look promising, not least because the threat of Russification hovered over it. From Finland the shadow of the Russian eagle might easily cover the whole of Scandinavia.

At the beginning of the 1850s, when a war with Russia seemed more than probable, the interest in Eastern and Northern affairs was still increasing:

\begin{quote}
Forgotten sympathies have been revived; a long history of trance is broken, and Englishmen are again animated by enthusiasm for Tartars, and pity for Finns.\textsuperscript{142}
\end{quote}

In the North it meant that the potential enemy might, sooner or later, endanger the abodes of Normans, Goths or Teutons, the home of the progenitors of freedom.

IV

In summer 1850 Charles Scott left Stockholm for Finland. At his departure he already felt a quiver as he recalled how Sweden had lost Sveaborg and the Åland Islands, and how Russian warships still sailed ominously near the Swedish coasts. He felt sorrow and fear in leaving the port of freedom, the residence of a good king and the home of loyal people. Immediately after arriving in Turku Scott realized the evil done by the Russians in severing the Finns from

\textsuperscript{141}. See Wilson, \textit{Travels}, pp. 290—93; Bowring, \textit{Autobiographical Recollections}, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{142}. Anon., \textit{The Athenaeum} (1854), q. p. 1231.
their adherence to Sweden. The Russians had transferred the capital and university to Helsinki as if "to crush the lingering attachment in the people to the birthplace of their faith, and the seat of their learning". Recently the Russians had built an Orthodox church in the town — a symbol of the Russian malaise on purely Western ground. Entering the old Gothic cathedral where the Swedish and Finnish marshals and nobles from the period of union lay in their tombs he remembered the living who would be "doomed soon to be absorbed and lost". Turku seemed deserted and melancholy because the Russians had rebuilt it after their own fashion: there was a lot of space between the buildings and the streets were wide. The surrounding countryside was uncultivated and the fences had fallen down. The damage to civilization had been done.

At first sight Helsinki, which had been beautified by its classical centre, appeared animated and lively. Yet, all this was only on the surface: the simplicity of the Finn contrasted with the grand impression, and sadness and longing prevailed at the bottom. He wrote as if there had been an independent Finnish nation in the past:

It (Helsinki) recalls none of their cherished traditions but stands boldly forward, even reminding them of the most sorrowful point in their history — the moment when their nation ceased to exist: when from children of freedom, they were changed to bondmen and slaves. 144

Assimilating the history of Finland with that of the old Gothic nations, Scott recalled their ancient freedom which had been introduced to Finland. Remembering only this, he exaggerated the Russian evil and neglected the part the Finnicized élite was taking in shaping the culture of Finland. Although Nicholas I used dictatorial methods to censor Western opinion in Finland, he welcomed the rise of a purely Finnish culture in Finland. Scott saw all Russian activities one-sidedly in a dark light: Russian officialism, the Russian garrison, Russian holidaymakers in

144. Scott, The Baltic, q. p. 11.
Helsinki and one broken-hearted Swedish admiral crying for the revival of the Swedish-Finnish connection, all symbolized the "lost liberty" and the presence of insolent and unashamed tyranny which so much irritated the British consciousness as well as the minds of the anti-Russian Swedes in Finland. One "Finno-Swede" disclosed to Scott how much the Finns actually hated the Russians who "are doing everything they possibly can do to blot out the memory of their dearest associations and traditions, by curtailing national literature and restricting education within the arbitrary limits, permitted by a scrutinizing police". If not actually undermining the constitution of Finland, Nicholas had introduced a poison into Finnish hearts and especially to those of Swedish-speakers who felt the times of censorship more bitterly. For Scott, who was mostly informed by the latter, there was only one solution to the problem. Though Europe could not have hindered Russia from taking Finland in 1809, a new European constellation was arising under which it might be possible to rectify the course of history, directing it back into its natural channels. As Russia seemed to be plotting against European civilization, Europe should support Sweden to reestablish the connection.

A more balanced survey of the position of Finland was put forward by Selina Bunbury, an author of children's books and accurate and fresh travel descriptions coloured by the Romantic mood. Like Scott she remarked on the decline of Turku and the sudden rise of Helsinki, but unlike Scott she became acquainted with the gay aspects of Finland. The Finns of Helsinki appeared, perhaps because of the wealth showered on them, to have forgotten the melancholy memories of the Russian conquest and the desire for reunion with Sweden kept alive in Scott's book. The Finns in Helsinki enjoyed balls, feasts and winter games, and the independent institutions and other advantages of a secure constitution.

Bunbury's recollections of Finnish history contradicted the Gothic view found in Scott's description. For her, the history of Finland had been an almost endless story of war, misdeeds and famine — a history of a subjugated and repressed people, not a happy story of the enjoyment of Gothic liberties under the Swedish

kings. The pagan Finns had been baptized by the sword. Under Swedish rule the Finns had always had to supply materials and men. Finally, in 1809, peace had returned — the cannons of Viipuri on the eastern frontier had fallen silent at last, telling of how the centuries of fighting on the Russian front had come to an end. Easier and freer times had dawned. Institutions had been improved and the means of commerce had been enlarged and Finnish laws and religion had been preserved.

The ideal peace which Bunbury was able to gather from the Finnish atmosphere appeared to have been sealed by God’s good will — a universal gift to all races who were able to realize its meaning. For Bunbury the Finns had done so. In the inner parts of Finland one could, in her opinion, relive the “riches of the human mind” given to a simple peasantry who were of the pure Finnish race. The poetic genius of this Urvolk, their spontaneous story-telling and singing, vivid natural symbolism and propensity to deify all in nature, was a revelation of God’s power over men:

Strange it is that wherever we look we find vestiges of the Great truth; yet nowhere plainer than in the beloved God of ancient Finland mythology.147

Romantically, and staying far away from the tendencies of evolutionary anthropology to dismiss Finnish mythology as a harmless but useless remnant from an earlier stage of the mind’s evolution, Bunbury rejoiced in the relics of pagan superstition and custom, those which had survived the Reformation. For example, in her view, it was quite prejudicial to condemn the Finns for their sauna-going. It was not a sinful pagan practice of promiscuity but an ancient and healthy habit of recreation. She also remembered the disappearing witches of Guernsey, the innocent spirits, Näkki (Finland), Näck (Sweden) and Brownie (Scotland), and warned against the current manner of being “dreadfully wise” in destroying all such things which might bring joy and variety in

147. Bunbury, A Summer Tour, q. p. 96.
life. All these spirits could remind man of the almost lost spiritual world, they could bring to mind its harmony which seemed to Bunbury to be under serious threat from commercial expansion and scientific progress.

Scott’s and Bunbury’s views on Finland displayed two basic attitudes of the British to the status of Finland and condition of the Finnish race. Scott painted the condition of Finland in dark colours implying that it would not be long before the Russians completely destroyed the traditionally Scandinavian, Gothic cultural element in Finland. Bunbury, who seems to have been a more independent observer, appreciated the survival of a purely Finnish culture which could coexist with the Swedish one under the protection of Russian authority. Both of them visited Finland in the troubled years of Nicholas I’s tightening grip and under the shadow of approaching war. Both attitudes continued during the years of war and afterwards although the one presented by Scott prevailed.

2.5. Agitation, war and aftermath

I

During the war years of 1854—55, a few articles on Finland were published in England. They all set out to inform the educated British public of the Northern enemy, of the Russians and of the Finns, and to cast some light on the prospects for the execution and results of the war. It was generally assumed that the war would be a triumph for the British, and widely believed that the Finns could be enticed to join the allied forces to defeat Russia. The political arguments put forward in these speculations were backed up with “scientific” proof provided by racial theories and evolutionary thought.

Before the war in the Baltic broke out it was presumed, thanks to the propaganda of Earl Aberdeen’s coalition government (1852—

55), that the Finns might be easily rallied behind the allied cause because they so eagerly wanted to be reunited with Sweden. *Chambers’s Journal* set out to prove it: it recorded and analyzed basic political and cultural ideas of the Finns concerning the relations of Finnish, Swedish-speaking and Russian elements in Finland relating them to their "racial" background. It conceded that the educated section of the population, a few genuine Finns and some Swedish-speaking Finns who had began to study Finnish literature and mythology, did not want the war and reunion because they perceived the situation from the Finnish angle. In summarizing their attitudes, the anonymous writer noted their ambiguous situation, which resulted from the improved condition of the country:

'... a reunion was effected with those parts of the country which had at various periods been dissevered from it by Russian conquest, and the feelings of the educated classes flattered by the more important character acquired by their country, yet deeply wounded by the separation from Sweden, now sought in the primitive source of national consciousness and mental activity of the people an incitement to national progress which they might cultivate without giving umbrage to their masters."149

There was, according to him, a certain smell of artificiality in this attempt to create a purely Finnish culture out of almost nothing. Most probably affected by embittered Svecoman attitudes, he insisted that the new Finnish-Swedish educated class was trying to accomplish something impossible because, according to the standards of evolutionary science, the Finnish language had not evolved to the stage where remarkable cultural achievements were within reach. Although the Finns had had a certain degree of civilization before Swedish colonization, it consisted only of the lower arts of agriculture and handicrafts. They lived in scattered villages without knowing anything of the higher arts or institutions later imported by the Swedes and imposed on the Finns150. The

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150. Anon., "Finnish Nationality and Literature", pp. 388—89. Similarly the Svecomans, when attacking the Finnish nationalists, used the racial argument to consolidate their still dominant but threatened position. In 1855
original "Finnic" race and the remnant of its early civilization had been able to survive only because the higher Swedish civilization had not penetrated as far as to inner Finland where stagnant barbarism still prevailed while the Swedish influence had ennobled Finnish literature.

The author stressed the separateness of the Swedish and Finnish races and tried to maintain and demonstrate the estrangement of the two sections of the people. Finnish mythology was as different from Scandinavian mythology as the forefathers of the Finns of Altai had been separate from the ancient Goths. The alienation and inequality were historical and permanent. The supposedly submissive character of the Eastern-born Finnish culture was revealed in its lore. If the Swedish ballads manifested the power of heroic activity over reality, and emancipation from locality and subjectivity, the Finnish "runes" were contemplative, subjective and parochial, they lingered on the sorrows of a unitary mind turned inwards. They were "illuminated by no historic splendour, glorying in no historic past". That was why, as the Finns did not have proper history, they could not have a realizable future. In vain they sought their way towards the light; 800 years of Swedish culture could not be outdone by 20 years study in Finnish. However they tried, they were bound to regret the loss of the Swedish element:

The nation will feel that to sacrifice a language (Swedish), bearer of many centuries of progressive civilization, for one that has hitherto been the organ of a population sunk in a state of rude barbarism, will sacrifice a reality to a dream.\textsuperscript{151}

The fear amongst the Swedish upper classes of Finland of the decline of their power was thus introduced into a British forum so

\textsuperscript{151} Anon., "Finnish Nationality and Literature", q. p. 390.
that the British might draw their own conclusions as to what was worth preserving and supporting in Finland.

A more gentle attitude towards the cultural newcomer was put forward in a review of a Danish report by C. Molbech in 1849 on the condition of "Finlandic" peoples, the descendants of the great "Huns". Even though the writer emphasized the importance of maintaining the Swedish heritage and constitution as a base for freedom, he focussed on the fate of the Finns:

Finns may be said never to have enjoyed an independent nationality, yet the people have preserved a remnant of a constitution, a mere shadow of one, of course; but they are all freemen, and many of them landowners.\footnote{Anon., "Poetry of Finland", The Eclectic Review, 102 (Oct., 1855), q. p. 386.}

Having reminded his readers of the agricultural prosperity of the people, of Runeberg's heritage inherited through national songs and expressed in some of his shorter poems, he introduced them as a distinct race which had been living in Europe before the arrival of Goths and Germans\footnote{Anon., "Poetry of Finland", pp. 387–88. The writer used the Finnish historian A.J. Sjögren as an authority.}. Unlike Chambers's Journal, the exponent of the Gothic reunion, The Eclectic Review found a lot of culture buried in the Finnish language. It carried concepts for all cereals, excluding what had been Swedish borrowings. The Finns had known of iron, copper, silver, the arts of navigation and fishing but the Swedes had given them kings, princes, magistrates and towns. In the past they had "...without being actually nomadic, yet lived in a simple state, rather communal than a republic, in village communities, governed by overseers, without hereditary or elected princes, without cities, or regular magistrates"\footnote{Anon., "Poetry of Finland", pp. 388–89.}. It was the Swedish constitution, obviously more republican, that had overcome the primitive communal order. Yet, the author was not so pessimistic about the potential of the Finnish language to become a cultured language as the one writing for Chambers's Journal. The vehicle of civilization was no longer Swedish only. Although spoken Finnish was quite primitive, the formalized and literary form of it, readable in recent grammars, dictionaries,
translations, ethnological and philological studies published by The Finnish Literature Society (founded in 1831) attested to its progressive character. As the reviewer put it:

It is beginning to emancipate itself from those artificial and complex forms which generally prevail in the languages of the rudest races. 155

Considered by the standards of prose style and idealist heroic poetry, at least the Swedish translation of the Kalevala was quite intelligible 156. The elevation of the Finns on the intellectual scale seemed to have been undertaken according to the norms of "scientific" philology which had already been set by such philologists like Müller. Here it meant that Swedish and Finnish traditions could come together to save Finland from Russification.

II

Along with the racialist, evolutionary conception of the Finnish language as a sufficiently developed vehicle of civilization, there was the organistic-evolutionary view of Russian history which was used to support the political conclusion that Finland was separable from Russia. The official, cabinet history of Russia buttressed the image of Nicholas I's reactionary empire just about to crumble into smaller national units. This was to happen because Russia had been and was still ruled by a "lack of principles of rational liberty" which also explained why Nicholas had had recourse to reaction, officialism and militarism 157. Historically estimated, coercion had been the only means of keeping the Russian political body together, and since the very beginning of Russian history it had never been successfully melted into a united whole. The linguistic, ethnological and religious conditions proved the point:

155. Anon., "Poetry of Finland", q. p. 390. One example cited by the writer was the numeral yksi (one) out of which one could derive 663 words, 94 adverbs, 141 adjectives, 323 substantives and 105 verbs.
157. Bell, History of Russia, I, pp. 52—56.

154
The languages, although corrupted, retain their generic signs, and survive; the base of religion remains unaltered; and the Finn and the Slavonian are still separately designated by their dress.\textsuperscript{158}

Russian laws had not been able to pull the incoherent amalgam of races together, and the body politic remained artificial and weak, and it was dependent on one person's ability to make it work at all. The Slavs, Russia's leading race, had bravely tried to conquer instability and establish "republics" (since tenth century Kiev) but their violent disposition and Cossack-type love of disorderly freedom counteracted this. The Finns, Hungarians and Tartars had always caused further eruptions. The Varangians, "founders of Russia", had also tried to introduce a sort of "constitution" but had failed. Finally, the Romanovs had had to force the chaos into order by violence and other despotic measures, and the possibility of bringing about a Western type of freedom was lost for good. A final attempt to introduce it had been made by Peter the Great:

The ports of Finland and Riga promised the enterprising Peter the outlets that he required to release him from Asiatic and Gothic darkness and lead him to the full light of intellectual Europe.\textsuperscript{159}

Yet, since the intrigues of Alexander I with Napoleon, and his later reactionary politics continued by Nicholas I's firm rule, the Asiatic character had returned to Russian politics and deadened the enlightening spirit.\textsuperscript{160}

This interpretation of Russian history which implicitly predicted the forthcoming dissolution of the Russian Empire into composite racial units was written in the same spirit as the remarks on Finnish history which optimistically envisaged the secession of Finland from Russia. Since Finland had always been quite loosely tied to Russia, it should either be restored to Sweden, its cultural "big-brother", or built up as a distinct nation where the Swedish and Finnish cultures could live together. The former view was prevalent: in the propaganda of the war lobby it was important

\textsuperscript{158} Bell, \textit{History of Russia}, I, q. p. 3.
\textsuperscript{159} Bell, \textit{History of Russia}, I, q. p. 12. The idea of lost Russian "republics" appeared also in Alphonse Rabbe's and John Duncan's \textit{History of Russia}, I, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{160} Bell, \textit{History of Russia}, II, pp. 327—28, 395—98.
to propagate the idea of pro-British and pro-Swedish Finland. The war lobby hoped that the Swedes and even the Finns would join the attack on Russia.

One veteran Russophile, David Urquhart, accelerated his efforts in this line on the eve of war. In the 1830s he had already set about revealing the diplomatic history of the sinister Russian interest in Eastern European affairs. By taking Finland in 1809, destroying the Polish constitution and helping to overthrow the Hungarian one, Russia seemed to be encircling Europe from the North and the East. Europe appeared to be on the brink of disaster. To thwart the Russians the European powers had done nothing much and were as divided as the Greeks had been when the Romans had taken over\(^{161}\). The Danes and the Swedes, the guardians of Norman freedom, were now toys of Russian diplomacy. To Urquhart it seemed that freedom was fleeing to the United States. Russia had violated the rights of nations by her pride and ambition. Dissecting the popular view that Alexander I had been the restorer of peace in Europe Urquhart reminded his readers how he had fooled all European cabinets:

\[
\text{Russia had allowed France to seize Denmark, and its fleet, while France allowed Russia to get Finland, on condition of Russia closing its ports against England.}\(^{162}\)
\]

With the prospect of war it was important to get the history of Russian expansion right: since the defeat of Napoleon the grateful European powers had let Alexander keep Finland, and they had, falsely in Urquhart’s mind, thought that the Norwegian compensation to Sweden for the loss of Finland would keep Scandinavia secure. To bring his points home, Urquhart appended a postscript, "a letter from Stockholm", stating that the Swedes eagerly wanted to get Finland back because Finland was a far more important economic asset to them than Norway. The sting of the argument was added by Urquhart himself:

\[\text{\underline{\hspace{1cm}}}\]

162. Anon. review in \textit{The Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review}, 4, n.s. (July—Oct., 1853), q. p. 552. This review was most probably written by Urquhart.
Norwegians hate the Swedes, Sweden suffers from the loss of Finland, and Russia, as usual, gains.163

Quite straightforwardly, Urquhart demanded the diminution of Russian territory; and there did not remain the faintest doubt about what should happen to Finland. Appealing to the British sense of justice and using the arguments about the rights of European nations, Urquhart advised the European governments to bring Russia down to its eighteenth century size by severing the Crimea, Finland, Georgia and the Danubian Principalities from it164. A concerted action strengthened by Swedish forces operating in Finland would easily dismember the excesses of an inorganically erected Empire and restore balance to Eastern European affairs.

Fraser’s Magazine put it in another way, though the conclusion was the same. Its scapegoat was the iniquitous Nicholas I who had supposedly broken the promises given by his father:

> The Finns do not forget that the Emperor Alexander guaranteed their fundamental laws, their rights and privileges in virtue of the Constitution, and more than one of these promises have not been kept. The Finns, like most half-civilized peoples have good memories, and an hereditary hatred had been handed down to them from father to son against the Russian name and nation. They do not forget that the Russians have devastated their country, and despoiled their towns, from the days of Peter.165

Although the Finnish constitution had remained legally intact during Nicholas’s reign, the constitutional argument associated with an “ethnological” remark on the good memories of the Finns, served well to suggest that the Finns might be potential allies. This

163. Urquhart, Progress of Russia, q. p. 180; The Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review, p. 554. Cf. Hennigsen, Revelations of Russia, II, pp. 263—65 in which Finland was regarded as "a ukase-governed satrapy" where Russification reigned and made Finland “an ulcerated limb” of the Empire.
165. G. Strachey in Fraser’s Magazine, 49 (1854), q. p. 218. Opposing this, the radical Liberal John Bright accused the government of an unjust and expensive war. To rebut this J.A. Langford wrote that Russian "protection" had always meant "expansion" and suppression. See Crimean War, Pro and Con. Ed. N.C. Miller (London, 1973), pp. 13—16.
time it was the pure Finnish, not the embittered Swedish race, that would join the attack:

Only the nobility had gained under Russian sway, the rest of the Finns delight in the opportunity of freeing themselves from its hated yoke.\(^\text{166}\)

Totally overlooking the rising loyalty of the Finns to Russia, the writer insisted that the Finns who had been taught by the Swedes to differentiate good and bad, would welcome the British as liberators. Their future nationality was to be defined according to this misconception:

As they cannot be independent Finns, they would be Swedish or Norwegians, Danes or anything rather than Russians.\(^\text{167}\)

The same view was expressed in the *Athenaeum* where a reviewer of Prince Galitzyn’s travel description of Finland reported that the Finns had no sympathy for the Russians but felt a fellowship in the military glory of Sweden. The estimation nearest to the real situation in Finland came from Milner; he wrote that the "Finns are not hostile to Sweden, yet not desirous of incorporation, much less cleaving to Russia but willing to be left to themselves"\(^\text{168}\). In spite of this balanced generalization, the British were ready to hear some good news from the Northern front.

### III

When the actual operations of the British Baltic fleet were undertaken in the summer of 1854, the war lobby in Britain thought that it would be easy to beat the Russian fleet and silence the forts of Sveaborg and Kronstadt\(^\text{169}\). The general war aims of the

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169. After the destruction of Bomarsund fortress *The Times* (23-24 August, 13 Sept., 1854) was sure that further victories were at hand and that the Baltic fleet should not return until it had finished off Sveaborg and Kronstadt. Cf.
British were no less than, firstly, to throw Russia back from Moldavia and Wallachia, and secondly, to free the "frontier territories" of Georgia, Circassia, the Crimea, Bessarabia, Poland and Finland in order to deter Russia from future aggression towards the West\textsuperscript{170}. Finland was to be handed back to Sweden if only the Swedes would lend their gun-boats for the operations. The fact that the Swedish turned out to be unwilling to fight to regain Finland led to a stalemate in which the British had to be content with maintaining a blockade of the Baltic, and helped the downfall of Earl Aberdeen’s cabinet and caused a reduction in the conditions for peace\textsuperscript{171}. The allied fleet bombarded Sveaborg and harassed the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, mainly destroying the property of British companies waiting to be exported to England. In the battle of Kokkola the Finns took some British who landed as prisoners of war and showed great loyalty to Russia. The war lobby was bitterly disappointed and it accused admiral Sir Charles Napier, the commander of the fleet, of incompetence, although the real reason for the poor result was that the British were not sufficiently and suitably equipped to fight against forts like Kronstadt\textsuperscript{172}.

In retrospect, in spite of the unsatisfactory result, the war on Finnish shores could be regarded as being as successful as the whole of the Crimean War. In the end, everything turned out well. For a historian of the war, E.H. Nolan, the conflict on the Baltic front had been as unavoidable as the great struggles of contending races in general, and it was a great pity that the Finns had not been on the right side. For him, and, as he thought, also for Disraeli, it was civilization itself that had strengthened "racial propensities"


\textsuperscript{171} Miller (ed.), \textit{Crimean War, Pro and Con}, pp. 9—10. It was realized by "an incometax-payer" that the Swedes did not join the war.

for war (as the English now had the best fleet and guns), and "Providence" which took good care of its favourites, and had reserved the victory for the British who had been predestined to fight for freedom. In the Baltic too, the British had been fulfilling a part of their civilizing mission:

The career of conquest has often been the career of civilization; and the sword which scattered also quelled barbarous feuds, and cut asunder the bonds of many servitudes.\textsuperscript{173}

The tyrannical Tsar and his fleet had sought, in a cowardly manner, shelter behind the batteries of Sveaborg and Kronstadt but the patriotic British had still tried to do their duty:

But our sailors never showed more constancy, skill and devotion than they have in this war especially treading the intricate and sinuous channels of the Azoff and of the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland.\textsuperscript{174}

Nolan who had agitated for a Finnish insurrection against the Russians to help the British to open the way to St Petersburg, still considered the Finns to be future friends:

We trust the day may come when the Finnish rifles will stand side by side with the British as allies and liberators, directing their skilful aim against the Moscovite oppressors.\textsuperscript{175}

Nolan was still looking forward to setting up a "Scandinavian federation", which should be allied to the British-French pact and directed against Russia. In his opinion, the Finns deserved to be either independent or become rejoined to Sweden as a member of the "federation". This concession was possible not only because the Finns had shown martial spirit equal to British courage when fighting against them but mainly because their intellectual progress had confirmed their aptitude for Western freedom.

\textsuperscript{173} E.H. Nolan, \textit{The Illustrated History of the War against Russia} (London, 1857), I, q. p. 2.
\textsuperscript{174} Nolan, \textit{The Illustrated History}, I, q. p. 3.
According to Nolan’s estimation, in spite of their “traditional fancies” ‘...

‘...' the people are not so superstitious; they do not allow them to interfere with reason and religion. They are a sensible and unostentatiously pious race; they can distinguish between the sober dictates and testimonies of Christianity, and the traditional ideas, derived from poetry and mythology.¹⁷⁶

These reasonable and civilized Finns, especially the "Finnish Finns" such as "professors and peasants" as opposed to those who cherished the traditions of Sweden ("Old Swedish Finns") but also to those who had sympathies with Russia ("Russian Finns"), were now forming a separate Finnish race, the one which had been kept down and had been living in the interior of Finland. This race that already featured in anthropological and ethnological dissertations and in Russophobic articles, was now emerging as a friendly race well deserving to be regarded as a political force of the future.

Relations of friendship between Britain and Finland reached their peak in 1856 when the British Quakers decided to collect money to recompense those Finns who had suffered losses because of the British bombardments. According to the Quakers Joseph Sturge and Thomas Harvey the mistrust in Finland of the British caused by the impolitic and misguided campaign on the Finnish shores had to be dispelled¹⁷⁷. Much of their own attachment to Finland was owed to their conviction that Finland was a country where the seeds of Evangelism were growing fast, bringing on spiritual and material progress amidst privation. Trade with Finland had prospered before the war and to them Finlayson's mills at Tampere had manifested business talent and Christian philanthropy. There the Finns worked as honestly, quietly and civilly as they had earlier done as free peasants. To encourage the reestablishment of good relations, they emphasized that Finland was "Russian neither in language, religion, institutions nor

manners” although Russia still carried on its policies of restriction especially in the Eastern parts of Finland where the products of Russification, for example, idolatry could be found. It was the Russians not the British who were the actual enemies of Finnish freedom. And, as the Quaker boat approached the Finnish shores with peaceful purposes, one poet commemorated the historical meeting of two hitherto alien races:

Sit down old men, together
Old wives, in quiet spin
Henceforth the Anglo-Saxon
Is the brother of the Finn.

IV

Unlike most other alien races, the Finns had become quite acceptable and agreeable to the British. In comparison with the Negroes, Indians, Slavs and even the Irish, they were endowed with an exceptionally high status in the hierarchy of races. To explain this, it is enough to sum up the adduced proofs: the Finns had evolved, mainly by Western stimulus but also by their own efforts, from a relatively low cultural stage to a higher one which was not so far from the ordinary Western. The Finns had begun physically to look like, and culturally approach, the fair race. This civilizing process had been carried out either by a Swedish ("Teutonic, Norman, Gothic") mediation or by the powers inherent in the aboriginal Finnish race which also had showed some symptoms of finding the clue to civilization.

The political evolution of Finland had happily coincided with the racial one. The Finnish constitution was preserved because of the benevolence of the Tsars, but also because the obstinate Finnish race, armed with "Teutonic" intellect, had demanded its continuity. Here the Western heritage of the Finnish race was at its best; on the one hand, the Finnish race could not possibly have

survived without the Swedes who generously introduced "political system" into barbarism, and, on the other hand, the Finnish race had been quick enough to learn the alphabet of civil life. The Gothic-Teutonic, Scandinavian tradition was handed to the Finns, and their freedom could have been highlighted in a liberal or monarchic federation directed against its enemy, Russia, which almost always featured in sources as an anti-type, a scourge, central in argument but morally denigrated. The Finns were seen to assist, on their own peripheral but critical border-area, the preservation of Western civilization against the eastern menace. This had been the gist of Finnish history from its very beginning and some variations of it can be encountered even today.

In the complex of British ideas, the Finns came forward in the realms of anthropology, ethnology and philology as well as in constitutional and practical politics. Just as they had been allowed the status of a relatively civilized though melancholy race, they were allotted some share of constitutional history. The racial and legalist interpretations of history tended to come together.

From the year 1809 on, the Finns fulfilled certain political requirements for a nation to exist. Alexander I had generously started constitutional development by giving Finland an inner autonomy on the basis of the "ancient" Swedish constitution. It had been guaranteed by Nicholas I who, although keeping guard on the Western influences in Finland, did not touch it. As the well-informed, Liberal foreign policy expert and editor of the Edinburgh Review, Henry Reeve (1813-95), put it; although Finland had been "reduced to furnish seamen for the Imperial fleet", the Russian government had done nothing much towards "assimilating" the Finns into the Slavic Empire. Yet, according to the current ethno-politics, a nationality composed of such races as Finns and Swedes and enjoying considerable freedom could not bear the trammels of despotism for long. To Francis Egerton (1800—57), another authority in Eastern affairs, it was foreseeable

181. Henry Reeve, "The Russian Empire". The Quarterly Review, xciv (Dec. 1853—March 1854), p. 441. For Reeve it was remarkable that of the total of 3.4 (sic) million Finns 1.5 million lived in Finland and that about 40,000 Russian soldiers were needed to keep them in order.
that with Poland and some other nations, Finland could be freed from the coercion which challenged the liberal march of European history:

Should that peace be disturbed, and the foundations of the present system of European polity be shaken by a wanton hand, some countries, Finland among them, may yet present examples of the instability of a compulsory allegiance, and events may awaken the reminiscences which do not slumber under Russian rule. It was not for the diffusion of the doctrines of the Orthodox Greek or the establishment of despotism in Europe that the blue and yellow Finnish regiments of Gustavus lay dead in their ranks at Lutzen.¹⁸²

The Finns too had their own race, religion, language and frontiers, and they cultivated the seed of constitutional government. They were not to be treated as serfs.

The British Liberals who supported the cause of suppressed nations and their struggle for freedom and unity usually conceived of their own national history as a model for the development national integrity. They were eager to see liberation take place in such continental nations that were not free but deserved to be. There was the theory that the boundaries of a state and a nation should be co-extensive and that many nationalities should be able to co-exist in a state¹⁸³. Although it was not at all clear what would happen to Finland as a dependency of Russia, whether it would progress or regress in its constitutional development, the concept of a Finnish nation was in the process of being formulated.

The history of civilization in Finland perceived as an evolutionary process was stretched to cover the forlorn history of the Finnish race. The Finnish past could be invented and transmuted in a way which made it fit for a more comprehensive political view. Even if the bearer of civilization in Finland from

about 1150 to 1830—40s had been the superior Swedish race, and even if the majority of the British observers allotted almost all of the racial and cultural power to the Swedish-speakers, the Finns themselves, in spite of the efforts of the Svecomans, had been able to initiate their own evolution in language, science and in the political sphere. The Finnish race appeared weak as yet, as weak as any young organism but all the more receptive and responsive. More optimistically, for example, for Bunbury, it was the ancient mythological element that was the only real and distinctively Finnish and creative one. If only it was left to itself, some sort of achievement might be expected from it.

The change and diversification of British attitudes towards the Finns was due also to British domestic cultural eclecticism and revaluation: there were many possible racial pasts from which to choose the one which could account for the appearance of the Finnish newcomer. It was only in the 1860—70s that the term culture, meaning that there were different races and nationalities at different stages of civilization in a country, appeared as a sub-term for civilization. In keeping with this definition, some of the British observers, having found evidence, such as the Kalevala, Runeberg's poetry and gleanings of the racial history of the Finns, could appreciate the rise of a Finnish culture alongside the dominant Swedish culture. As the Finnish vernacular was regained and the origins of the Finnish race sufficiently clarified, they could receive their own descent.
3. Aryans or Mongols? — British theories of Finnish origins

I

The place of the Finns in mid-nineteenth-century British anthropological theory was indeterminate. The ambivalence as to whether to ascribe to the Finns a Russian or European descent was already reflected in the views of its leading figures, J.C. Prichard and R.G. Latham. They both rejected the idea of a western Finn, and soon the majority of British writers inclined to the former solution, which was also endorsed by the periodical articles which concerned Finnish literature and the Finnish race. What was now clear to the reading public interested in anthropological questions was that in Finland there lived a people which had intruded into the circle of the Western civilization to which they had originally been as alien as their Russian and Asiatic cousins¹. Still, it should be underlined, there was not any agreement within anthropology about the origins of racial types, and a wide field to further hypotheses was open.

¹ The people who usually read the anthropological treatises and periodicals and who attended the meetings of ethnological and anthropological societies (founded respectively in 1843 and 1863, amalgamated since 1871) were medical men, lawyers, colonial administrators, journalists, clergymen and amateurs of geology, zoology and geography. See Michael Biddiss (ed.), Images of Race (Leicester University Press, 1979), pp. 13–14.
The 1860—70s marked an epoch of rising positivism in anthropological theory. The use of history as a source for establishing definite cultural stages declined and there arose a demand for more exact methods to distinguish various races, supposed to represent the types of people living in a particular cultural stage. The comparative method provided the tool to measure the evolution of the structure of man in physical anthropology, the evolution of culture in ethnology, and the evolution of ideas in philology. Anders Retzius's cephalic index became quite generally accepted as a standard to determine the hierarchy of races, more careful studies into the structure of "primitive" speech and religion were launched, and more accurate determinations of the cultural stages of the races according to their technical skills were pursued. The evolution of technology and art seemed to imply a cultural hierarchy.

The anthropologists who concentrated their efforts on depicting the evolution of Western ideas by mirroring the "irrational" mythology and savage or barbarous social institutions against the background of their own social experience were quite astonished to find the Finns living on the dividing line between civilization and barbarism. Their position in the chain of being, be it physical or social, was a cause of considerable trouble for the systematizers. The Finns told of a period of transition, a transition both from a mythological age to a Christian one and from a barbaric past to modernity. The terms used in describing the enigmatic Finns remained essentially the same from the 1860—70s to the 1910s: what was known of them came to be seen in the light of the cultural stages they appeared to have passed through in their history on their way to acquiring some of the features of Western races and the rudiments of Western industrial society and its rationalistic ideals. On the assumption of unilinear cultural evolution, the pattern to fit the evidence of the Finns into the themes of evolution and progress did not change until the logic behind the whole enterprise was questioned. Around the turn of the century, more evidence of the Finns was accruing to Britain from Finland and Sweden, the home-based theories of British

2. On the developments of the anthropological theory, see Harris, *The Rise of Anthropological Theory*, pp. 197—206; Stocking, *Race, Culture and Evolution*, pp. 119—120.
anthropology were undermined and a shift towards the historical-geographical method ensued, even though the racial picture of the Finns did not suffer any considerable set-backs until the 1930s.

II

The well-established division of humankind into three races, white (Caucasian, Aryan, Teuton, or Nordic), yellow (Mongol) and black (Negro) also included the Finns but not without some pains concerning the definition of their type. The demarcation line between the yellow and white had to be crossed and obscured in order to make them fit into it. *The Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1859) placed the "Finno-Ugrians" at first among the Mongols but was ready to modify its view when it came to assess their cultural status. As a tentative generalization in Latham's fashion, it toyed with the concepts available and stated that in comparison with the Mongol, the Finns had a European but in comparison with a German, a Mongol physiognomy, and the difference between the Lapps and the Finns had become wider to the degree that the "intermediary forms" had disappeared. It remained unclear whether the Finns had any peculiar features at all. Blended with other races, they burst the bounds set to human types; they had taken something from the whites, as their fair complexion and blue eyes indicated, but they still had a Mongol, flat face. Yet, it was their culture rather than their fluctuating physical type that revealed what they really were. The persisting qualities, dress and their primitive method of clearing the forests intimated the barbarism common to the Oriental races.

The very existence of the Finns could be used to endorse either the polygenist or the monogenist line of thought. What was persistent in Finns supported polygenism, what told of their long-term modification was proof of monogenesis. Although Darwin had explicitly denied polygenism, some anthropologists used his invention, natural selection, to prove how the higher races had been "selected" for their civilizing mission. Some of them used it

5. Darwin denied that human races were different species, and although he
to justify the subordination of the subject races of the colonies to permanent imperial rule. In this context, it was left largely to Thomas Huxley’s (1825—95) literary talent for mastering the "mythopoetic capabilities" of evolutionary theory to counter the political conclusions so eagerly drawn by the polygenists. For instance, he opposed the determination of political relationships by natural ones and the common idea that the Celts of Britain were inferior to the Anglo-Saxons. In his view, all the racial stocks of Europe could be proven, on historical and physical grounds, to be quite mixed and essentially on the same stage of civilization. To him even the Norman conquest, usually seen as a remarkable racial meeting, was not "worth mentioning" from an ethnological point of view. As for the non-European races, they were culturally behind, though some individuals from their ranks could be brought up to Western civilization. The future progress of civilization in the world was to remain in the hands of the Whites because of their enormous lead in culture that could not be bridged by hereditary transmissions.

Huxley divided Europe into three racial zones according to his reformulation of Blumenbach’s and Retzius’s classifications. The determinants of relatively persistent types formed the basis of

admitted that they differed in many physical respects (colour, hair, shape of skull, proportions of body etc.), they resembled each other in general bodily organisation and in mental powers. Differences in intellect were due to living on different cultural stages; at one point Darwin cautiously suggested that the Westerners had an "increased size of the brain" as a result "from greater intellectual activity". From the otherwise optimistic message of Darwin one pessimistic conclusion could be derived: many a race was destined to die out for the sake of the civilized ones in the same way as many a weak organism was wasted in selective processes. A.R. Wallace believed that all races had already escaped natural selection by their efforts in culture, and "savages" lagged behind only because of not having proper technology to conquer nature. See Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. With an Introduction by John Tyler Bonner and Robert M. May (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1981), pp. 225—33, 247; A.R. Wallace, My Life (London, 1905), pp. 17, 54, 237.

6. For Huxley evolution was basically an amoral cosmic process, a scene of strife but again it was man’s formidable reason that had saved him for higher purposes. Huxley did not regard the fittest as the best but as the strongest. Even they had "savage" hidden in their minds. See Peter Morton, The Vital Science. Biology and the Literary Imagination, 1860—1900 (London, 1984), pp. 21—23, 32, 43—46; Gillian Beer, Darwin's Plots (London, 1985).

racial distribution. Huxley took it for granted that a Xanthochroi race, with fair hair and hue as its determinants, had in prehistory lived all over Europe until the Melanochroi, brunette Mediterranean race and the Mongoloids moved in. The dominant features of the Xanthochrois could be found in Scandinavia, Germany and Russia but also in one branch of the Mongolic race, namely the Finns, who had turned fair in virtue of the mixture\(^8\). Using Retzius's concept of gradual evolution of the skull form (from brachycephalic toward dolichocephalic) and the hierarchy of skin colour as instances of the Darwinian law of modification of physical features, he noted how the longheaded Swedes had mixed with the shortheaded Finns in Finland\(^9\). Later, in a more official declaration on the issue, Huxley's notion of the Finn was taken to mean that the Finns had been "completely modified" to a Caucasian type. It was claimed that this assessment concerning the historical relations of the two principal physical types could be final and stand the test of future research\(^10\). This pointed to the way the Finns had changed during their migration from east to west. In the discussions of the *Royal Anthropological Society* it was found out what the migration had meant in terms of intellect: in the mixture of "Aryan" clarity of mind with the "gravity of Mongolic demeanour, concealment of emotions and absence of violent gesticulation" the Finnish disposition had become "apathetic and reserved". These mental changes were sometimes considered far more important than the "trivial" changes in physical type\(^11\). In similar vein, the assyriologist and comparative philologist, A.H. Sayce (1845—1933), for whom the progress of society was marked by evolution of the unity, centralization and combination (cf. Herbert Spencer's theory of social evolution) in comparison to the barbarous society of flux, regarded the physical features as more

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stable but less significant than the processes of the mind. Against those who insisted that mixtures of races could be studied in languages he argued that the testimony of language did not necessarily prove racial kinship. To prove this he argued that the Papuan, Melanesian, Lapp and Finnish languages had such basic structural affinities that they could be classified together. It was not important to know whether these languages were mutually understandable or not because the identity of the grammatical forms of "lower" languages revealed their common origin. Sayce's attempts at placing the origin of languages in the Near-East contravened Müller's Aryan hypothesis but actually Sayce was only trying to find an alternative to it.

While the existence of the Finns and Lapps apparently disturbed the harmony of the racial theory and while there were rival theories about the origin of civilization around, one way out of the confusion was to study the history of the migrations of European races more systematically. Accurate retracing of the migratory routes would show where the 'cradles' had been and what racial mixtures had happened during these migrations. Henry H. Howorth, who dedicated his efforts to the Nomadic races, differentiated the Finns both linguistically and culturally. Against Sayce he stated that Lapp and Finnish were actually mutually unintelligible, and that the Lapps, "engrained in their primitive wilderness" remained far inferior to the "energetic" Finns. He duly rejected the Turanian (European) in favour of the Ugrian origin, and drawing on Finnish scholars, Castrén and Sjögren, he held that the Lapps had been the people whom the Finns had pushed North as they had arrived in Finland. Relying on Latham and Prichard he remarked how their culture resembled that of the ancient "Norsemen". The Finns had known butter and iron which implied that their culture had been agricultural and martial like that of the Norsemen but not derived from it. This bold identification was confirmed by the Finnish archaeologist, J.R. Aspelin (1842—1915), whom Howorth had met in Stockholm during the international congress of anthropology and

prehistorical archaeology. The Finns were their own race, they had been the autochthones of Russia, but only the Finns of Finland had evolved out of the 'cradle', leaving their backward cousins, the Votyaks and Samoyedes behind. The Finns of Finland, particularly the Tavastians, were being assimilated with the Norsemen, the level of whose culture they seemed to have reached in certain aspects.

The physical anthropologists who had insisted on inventing more accurate methods to measure cultural progress were not at all satisfied with the philologists' work. They regarded their studies into affinities of language as unreliable. The Irish anthropologist, professor A.H. Keane (1833—1912) had followed the debate on Finns and Lapps and realized that they were both quite recent acquisitions to Western civilization. His interest in the Finns was aroused by the incongruity that the Finns, whose culture he, against Howorth, found essentially eastern in character, deviated strikingly from the "ordinary Mongol standard". He attacked Gustaf Retzius who had held that the light-minded Karelians might represent the national type of Finland and put forward that the "Tavasts", "always lacking the rosy tints peculiar to the Teutonic peoples" were the true Finns. Polygenistically judged, they were a "solid, broad-headed, coarse and compact" race. Assuming that Retzius was a Finn, Keane hinted at his evident prejudice in favour of the Karelian "intelligence as purely a Finnish feature". To Keane it seemed more likely that the Karelians had inherited their intellect form the Russians whereas the sullen "Tavasts" were the Finns at their purest.

In 1886 Keane, whose craniological theories could also be used as grounds for unequal treatment of races, introduced a Lapp family to Britain. It was still a zoological curiosity to observe this roaming race in London, although it was nothing new to consider the Lapps as well as their language as survivals in Europe. The

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16. Keane had thought that Negro inferiority was caused by inadequate closing of the "cranial sutures" in the age of puberty. The Lapp and Finn brains were obviously somewhat more 'closed'. Cf. Bernard Levin's note on Keane in his review of D.B. Davis's Slavery and Human Progress. In The Observer 20 Jan. 1985.
immaculate scientific observations and measurements which the Lapps had to go through brought something unexpected to light. Their hair "ought to have been invariably black" but it was sometimes even fair, their complexion "ought to show a yellowish tinge" but was actually florid. Their eyes were brown, not black as expected. Surprisingly, all this spoke for the evolution of a new type among the "Finnic" family, a type which curiously approached the Teutonic Norwegians and the Finns of Finland. Some of their new characteristics appeared to have emanated from a moist climate and fish diet, some from their way of life, but mainly caused by a racial infusion from their more cultured neighbours. It seemed probable to Keane that they would be quite "absorbed" by them. What was fortunate was that they were being treated with some justice by the Finns and Norwegians, not exterminated like the Tasmanians by the British, so that they would merge into higher races without violence. Keane allowed for this because the "vital, thrifty, happy, peaceful, hospitable though indolent" Lapps could not obviously do any harm to the physique of the Teutons and Finns. They had tried to follow the evolutionary path of the Finns but they were destined to be swallowed by the stronger racial masses surrounding them whereas the Finns, a sufficiently civilized race, were to be preserved for higher tasks.

It was by the concepts of survival and atavism that the physique and culture of the Finns and Lapps were estimated in the 1870-1880s. Like the lower classes of Britain, leading a life "as little intellectual as the life of savages" and thus maintaining a "conservative", mostly outdated element in British culture, the lower races of the world survived and carried on using the cultural relics of earlier stages of civilization in the present. To a lesser

17. The results of measurements in J.G. Garson, "On the Physical Character of the Lapps". JAI, xv (1886). For Keane's comments, see his "The Lapps: Their Origin, Ethnical Affinities, Physical and Mental Characteristics, Usages, Present Status and Future Prospects". JAI, xv (1886), pp. 219—220, 233—34. Already in 1871 Dr. Bruner-Bey had shown that Lapps were not a degenerating race because they had taken on some "Aryan" physical features whereas the Finns still had some "dark types" among them. Ronald Bonaparte had feared that the Lapps would soon be exterminated by the higher races. Dr. Bruner-Bey, "On the Human Hair as a Race Character". JAI, vi (1877), p. 318; R. Bonaparte, "Note on the Lapps of Finmark". JAI, xv (1886), p. 234.

degree than Red Indians, Negroes and the Lapps, the Finns preserved remnants of their earlier stages of culture while the substance of their culture was modernizing. The remnants were predestined to disappear, if not cast off by the Finns themselves, the reform of mind and society was to be carried out by higher cultures. To take a case in language, Swedish should have overcome Finnish in Finland in the same way as Latin had prevailed over barbaric languages, Slavic over minority languages in Russia, and English over Celtic which was pushed into the Highlands\textsuperscript{19}. The comparative method proved how the hindrances to Western expansion and "progress" could be overcome in all corners of Europe where some backwardness lingered on.

III

In the 1870—80s a doctrinal controversy developed between the competing interpretations of the racial history of Europe. Among the physical anthropologists who believed that the natural differences between races should form the basis of a science of man and to whom the comparative method was all about comparing the form of skulls, hair, and skin- and eye-colour, there was wide disagreement as to how to cope with the fact that there were numerous mixtures of races in Europe and that none of the principal races were "pure". The wholesale production of new racial types by nature seemed to threaten not only the system of science but also the condition and position of existing aristocrats who usually considered themselves to be members of the leading race. The escape from the problem was at hand: if there were not any truly "pure" races, there were still "pure" qualities which could be assigned to various racial "types" in the world. The Aryans, the supposed carriers of civilization, the inaugurators of Greek antiquity (the Semite and Egyptian influences were largely ignored) and the harbingers of civilization in the North and West, still reigned in speculations concerning the origin and bearer of civilization but as evolutionary science uncovered the great variety

\textsuperscript{19} E.B. Tylor, "Anthropology". \textit{Encyclopaedia Britannica}, (9th ed., 1895, orig. 1875), pp. 113, 119—120.
of culture on the earth and mixture of races the question of origin became more complicated and alternative, anti-Aryan theories were being invented.

The foundation for discussion of the physical and cultural connections between the Aryans and the Finns had already been laid by Prichard and Latham. The physical connection was firmly seated in the theory but the great difference in language caused problems. The difficulty was increased by the ambivalent relation of race and language. On the one hand, some historically oriented scientists, who will be discussed more fully later, questioned or even totally rejected the Aryan hypothesis. On the other hand, remains had been found remains of a European prehistoric man, Neanderthal "idiot broad-head" as Huxley called him. Furthermore, it was noticed that not all the Aryans speaking Indo-European languages were of the same race — the Europeans seemed to have lived in Europe vastly longer than was thought before. The location of the 'cradle' was again an open question.

One of those who was spurred on by the possibility of new findings in the field was Canon Isaac Taylor (1829—1901), an amateur philologist. He wanted nothing less than to find an alternative to Müller’s Aryan thesis. He took up Latham’s idea that the hive of the primitive Aryan race must have been on a "wooded northern plain near the sea". Supported by the new generation of physical anthropologists, like the Austrian K. Penka and Prussian R. Virchow, who had confirmed that the Finnish skull resembled that of the Aryans20, Taylor readily concluded that the Finns, living in an inaccessible marshy region, were the real survivors of the primitive Europeans. In Finnish Taylor also found surviving "roots" of all European languages. Trying to apply the rules of the comparative method, he found several accidental "analogies" between Finnish and English, for example "home"-"heimo" (tribe) and "daddy"-"taatto" (grandfather). In his opinion, these instances

20. Rudolf Virchow was assisted by some Finns to prove against French anthropologists who had after the Franco-German War claimed that Prussians belonged to the same "ugly" race as the Finns. Virchow went to Finland in 1874 only to find out that Finns were actually as "fair and tall" as the Germans. See Jouko I. Kilpeläinen, "Rotuteoriait länksistä suomalaisista..." (Racial Theories Concerning Western Finns...). Mongoleja vai Germaaneja?, pp. 176—77.
showed, with the testimony of skulls, the Finns "linguistically and anthropologically to be survivals of the race from which the Aryans were evolved". Consequently, the Finns were being lifted to an unprecedented status as representing the longheaded and tall forefathers of the Aryans and especially of the Celts on whom, Taylor argued, they had left marks of their descent. There were ethnologists in Britain who did not necessarily feel aversion to a Northern descent, but for the majority of them it was scandalous to make the Finns its main source. Ernst Rhys, who did not like the modernity of Ibsen and preferred the Dano-Norwegian sagas in which the "real forefathers" of the British featured, looked at the matter quite indifferently because the Finnish influence was so remote and faint. It did not matter whether to agree with Canon Taylor or not in removing the seed-ground of the English race from Asia to Finland since "the fact" that its descent went by way of Norse and Danish remained unaltered.

Yet it was naturally easier for the British to embrace also the newly-lit lights of modern Finnish poetry into the Norse tradition and forget the Eastern descent altogether. "The patriotic literature" of Finland, read in Runeberg's works, bore all the heroic elements which the Kalevala had left undeveloped and raw. In this sense, the modern Finns could be considered as inspired by noble Western impulses. This idea was also dear to Finnish nationalists who tried to invigorate the Finnish national consciousness.

Critical academic philologists castigated Taylor's hypothesis. In the first place, its analogies offended Grimm's Law; for instance, the English "cup" was not derived from the Finnish kuppi as Taylor had thought, but from the Latin cupa. Secondly and more seriously, Taylor had lifted Finnish too high in the evolution of language. The fact that the Finnish system of counting which
Taylor had not treated at all was still on a half-savage level, and that Finnish contained a vast number of loan-words from German and Swedish — they implied that Aryan speech had been in existence earlier and was more original than Finnish. Thirdly, it had already been shown that the Finns had acquired the physical features of the Aryan race comparatively late, and that there were actually two separate races in Finland, the Aryan Swedes and the "Ugrian" Finns, of whom the Finns were originally from the East. This statement was derived from Gustaf Retzius's *Finska Kranier* (1878) in which the population of Finland was divided into two races and which showed how the Finns had mixed with the Swedes. One anthropologist even went so far in the subsequent discussion as to dare to challenge both the European and Asiatic 'original cradles'. He situated the 'cradle' in Africa, in Egypt where he found a civilization much older and more significant than the Aryan and Finnish lines of descent which he thought were relatively young. In his opinion the Finns and Magyars had migrated from Nepal where there was a language which had common roots with Finnish. In spite of heavy and justified criticism, Taylor did not give up his views; on the contrary, he continued searching for additional proof for them. The idea of an Egyptian 'cradle' was dismissed as heresy and the Aryan thesis held its ground.

**IV**

Despite the philologists' firm rejection of the relevance of Finnish influence in the Aryan descent, some physical anthropologists became quite worried about the consequences of a Finnish mixture in it. The Finnish infusion might have affected the racial composition of the inhabitants of the British Isles because the Celts who had migrated from the continent to the isles could have been in contact with the broadheaded Finns and brought certain of their

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characteristics to Britain. Besides, some Swedish nationalist anthropologists had collected further skull evidence to prove that the Aryans had resided in the Baltic area where the original Finns had come into contact with them. This seemed frightening: while the "Nordic" (the term to replace the Aryan) "pure" type had been contaminated by the "Mongolic", broadheaded Finns who had been supposedly subjected to them as slaves and pushed by them to the North, the apparent degeneration of other European Aryans might also have been caused by the broadheaded, early inhabitants of the continent. This outspoken and plausible-sounding interpretation of the racial history of Europe which was directed against Prichard and Latham gained acceptance in Britain and some applied it straightaway to British present day conditions. The stamp of the presence of an inferior race seemed as lasting one in Britain as in Finland where the "blond Nordic" and Finnish races were also conspicuous in the same country:

In Finland, the blond type appears side by side with the dark brachycephalic, almost as freely as is seen for instance in Scotland and Wales.31

In the 1880—90s when studies into the racial composition of Britain were begun, Finland, with its two races provided one possible parallel by which to estimate the racial relations at home. During the formative period of British sociology, it was not only eugenics but also physical anthropology that demanded the reconstruction of the old social order at a higher level of efficiency. The 'degeneration' within the British aristocracy was partly explained by the influx of alien, inferior germs into the body of the British. Many British anthropologists drew far-reaching conclusions about the effects of this threat. For some of them it was paramount to find ways to strengthen the British. Less determinist evolutionists consoled themselves by pointing out that although the physical basis of British society might have weakened, the "higher" language and culture of the British counteracted this.32

The heritage of progressive civilization, matured in Britain, would enhance the declining British in the world. The success of the imperial mission to civilize the subject races of the Empire testified to this. Consequently, it did not matter so much if no one could prove the Aryan hypothesis, what counted was that, in any case, as a result of racial migrations, the British had settled in Britain and had developed a high culture there. This seemed a satisfactory solution to the riddle of the 'cradle' for a long time, and it consolidated its status at a time when the aristocratic European culture needed a firm line of descent in history. The Finns were also subsumed into changing structures of anthropological thought. The Finns were either denigrated as contaminators of the Celtic race or they were permitted to enjoy the products of civilization because they had gradually transformed towards the physical type of the "Nordic Aryans". In this way, more optimistic anthropologists could regard the racial mixtures as reciprocal and progressive. There was enough evidence that the Finns had something to give to European civilization.

V

Numerous migrations demonstrated to anthropologists and ethnologists how the European races had crossed each others' routes and settled in others' regions so that intermarriages had been unavoidable. Supposedly "pure races" had been diluted, leaving only the dispositions and characteristics of a preconceived "type" behind. Although the quest for the "pure" Nordic type was at its height, some prominent anthropologists confessed the impossibility of finding such an ideal type either in the present or in the past. By the turn of the century it was understood that physical characteristics were mutable, and anthropologists turned to studying psychological entities which they now deemed immutable and "racially" inherited. Another line of exploration


33. T.H. Huxley, "The Aryan Question", pp. 287—93. According to his phrasing: "the transference to some of the Fins of more or fewer of physical characteristics of the Aryans and vice versa".
was to look for relatively stable physical features which seemed, on the average, to prevail in a people. What was common to both approaches was that they seemed to cling to the idea of racial vital forces; there were races which had been endowed with "life-force" (especially in terms of germ-plasm) which gave them particular capabilities for high achievements in civilization. So called "ethno-genetic speculation" governed the minds of anthropologists until the 1920s.

John Beddoe, a leading British physical anthropologist, conceded that it was almost impossible to formulate racial types because there were so many factors to be taken into account. It seemed quite a desperate task to try to find anything "pure" in the chaos of the dirty cities of Britain but still there was some hope: "I know that the old types are represented among us at the present day". Even if they had considerably declined, the anthropologist should try to find something essential that had been derived from them.

Having first drawn an essentially Lathamian picture of Russian racial history wherein the Finns were a problematic, more or less absorbed minor race, Beddoe estimated their impact on the West. Taking the results of skull measurements from the Swedish anthropologist Gustaf Retzius he stated that the Finns of Finland, unlike their historic relatives, the Bulgars, had not entirely lost their endemic features. A "fine", old Finnish skull had been found in Denmark which had an "Ugrian" facial angle and peculiarly spherical skull-form which was an intermediate form in "progress" towards the elliptical. The Finno-Ugrians were their own type in between the Teutons and Mongols. The Finns had only a negative

relevance to the British racial situation: they did not belong to the fearful, “flexible and moving” brown-haired race of the continent which was coming up in England amongst the proletariat and tainted them. Thus the ethical question of race did not concern them.  

Another ethnologist, Alfred Haddon (1855—1940), held that it was extremely difficult to define the concept of race and describe racial differences because racial types were products of the imagination. However, he was able to classify races according to hair-type (woolly-Negro, wavy-Nordic, straight-haired, for instance, Ugrian Finns). Evidence of their mixtures could be found in the history of racial migrations. Underlining his intention to be objective in his studies, he rejected world-wide comparisons of the cultural stages of races and wanted as an ethnologist to remain a describer of contemporary races. Being interested in the causes of the formation of empires, he studied the migrations of all races in the light of their migratory impulses, overpopulation and the lack of means of subsistence. When Russia had been in the process of becoming a country dominated by the Slavs, the Finns had moved along a side-track from their 'cradle' on the Yenisey ("2000 years ago") over the Urals and finally reached Finland. On their long journey they had been influenced by the races they met so that they had lost their Mongol character, whereas the cradle-remaining tribes struggled on as survivals. The Finns of Finland were presently longskulled because of the incessant influx of the Nordic forms but they retained their "reddish" hair as if to prove the permanence of their original stock. For Keane too, the Finns formed their own "ethnic type" which told of the decay of the Mongol descent:

It would seem as if the Tavastians were the issue of a German graft on a Mongol stock, while the Karelians represented a Slavo-Mongol

mixture in which the original Mongol element was largely eliminated.\footnote{42}

Living between two mentally distinct races also involved temperamental ambiguity. The Tavastians were somewhat "sluggish, passive and enduring, at times vindictive, but honest and trustworthy"\footnote{43}. And, although the Finns still spoke an eastern language, they had almost reached the same "achievement" as the Magyars who had already cast away all remainders of their eastern descent and risen to Aryan aristocracy.

The gleanings of the late nineteenth-century anthropologists indicated that the Finnish race was emerging and its success in the world was dependent on its relations with Nordic race. But there it was, its sphere of influence was expanding and some British who had been alarmed by the speed and scope of racial migrations and mixtures were afraid that Finns might supersede the Swedish culture in Finland in a couple of generations\footnote{44}. These kinds of fears had their roots in more general racist and degenerationist hysteria but sometimes they were based on more carefully thought-out logic, and they tended to crop up in the disguise of "science" demanding full credibility, as in the case of Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855—1926), the most vehement of pre-war racialists. He detested all excessively distant ("Turanian" included) races whose mixture with the noble Teutons would cause "obliterated character"\footnote{45}. The theoretical status of his views was not radically more pseudoscientific in comparison with the theories of academic racialists but it was his application of his theory to the racial history of Europe which made him well-known and criticized even in Finland where racial questions were debated after the turn of the century. Before the Finnish Civil War

\footnote{42. A.H. Keane, \textit{Ethnology} (Cambridge, 1896), p. 307. In his theory the original man was the man of Java, out of whom the Neanderthal and Mongol types had evolved to produce the European races. To him the humankind was as variable as "dogs".}
\footnote{43. A.H. Keane, "The Finn and Laplander". \textit{The Living Races of Mankind} (London, 1905), II, p. 624. The photograph of a representative Finn featured an old, reduced, white-haired and doll-like "Wainamoinen with his harp".}
\footnote{44. "Finland", \textit{Chambers's Encyclopaedia}, iv (1908), pp. 624—25.}
\footnote{45. Chamberlain was arguing against Ernst Renan's more optimistic view. See Houston Stewart Chamberlain, \textit{The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century}. Trans. by J. Lees (London, 1912), I, pp. lxvi, 290—93.}
in 1918 the relations between the Swedish-speakers and Finnish-speakers were described in racial terms and the racial question became a political topic⁴⁶.

In the centres of science in Europe racialism expanded rapidly before the war. In the age of imperialist scramble, the power-status of the leading races of the Empires was theoretically cemented. The Nordic-Aryan theory now appealed to a wider public as the boom in periodical publications and modern newspapers coincided with the rising interest in foreign and colonial affairs. As a part of the Victorian imperialist doctrine, the imperial duties and civilizing mission of the Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon went well with the idea of the unity of all ”Aryans” and gave legitimation to world-wide expansion⁴⁷. However, as soon as the missions were exercised in practice (for instance, in the Boer War and russification of Finland) criticism revived. The Boer War experience shocked the British scientists too — the efficiency of the Empire was questioned and means to its reintegration were called for. Anthropologists turned their backs on the harsher side of territorial expansion and sought by direct observation a deeper understanding of the actual settings and life of the affected

⁴⁶. Martin Woodroffe, 'Racial Theories and Politics: The Example of Houston Stewart Chamberlain'. Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914, p. 145. Woodroffe has, in his very good article, shown how Chamberlain used horsebreeding, especially its methods to avoid indiscriminate cross-breeding, as a model for stopping "degenerating" racial mixtures and enfeeblement of the "higher" races. The Finnish philosopher Arvi Grotenfelt felt it necessary to deny the implications of Chamberlain's "racial fatalism" which appeared to exclude the lesser races from civilization. He was assured that the Finns had acquired Aryan civilization to the depth of "flesh and blood" without harming it. He was careful to add that Finns, having been tempered by the Aryan (Swedish) infusion, did not have such Mongol propensities, as would lead into mob-rule in Finland. All races were deemed capable of some sort of civilization though the racial differences could still be empirically measured in such intricacies as differences in acuteness of sense-perception. See Arvi Grotenfelt, "Sivistyshistoriallisia katsauksia vuosisadan vaihteessa" (Some Cultural Historical Overviews at the Turn of the Century), Valvoja (1900); "Nykyaikeiset rotuteoriat sielutieteen valossa" (Modern Theories of Race in the Light of Psychology), Valvoja, (1906). For Swedish-speakers' racialist ideas, see Pekka Kalevi Hämäläinen, 'Suomenruotsalaisten rotukäsityksiä vallankumouksen ja kansalaissodan aattona' (Swedish-speakers' Attitudes to Race on the Eve of Revolution and Civil War). Mongoleja vai Germaaneja?, p. 409.

"subject races". It did not seem appropriate to measure skulls any longer, it appeared more scientific to register the structures of "primitive" social life, to study their history in genealogy, to follow the diffusion of cultural forms and to work as an interpreter between colonial administration and a "subject race". Those who remained at home made their inductive "fact"-collections more comprehensive and practised cautiousness in their general conclusions. Furthermore, owing to the attraction of psychology, "lower" peoples' temperaments and racial mentalities were identified and were no longer regarded only as irrational but as products of their stage in cultural evolution. It implied the level of their racial consciousness. National characteristics were treated as hereditary psycho-social entities which transmitted culture from generation to generation.

Of all the works on the anthropology and racial history of Europe, The Races of Europe (1900) by William Z. Ripley (1867–1941), an American economist and sociologist well-known in Britain, bears a particular importance. It covered almost everything written on the subjects between 1860–1899 and became a kind of handbook. Starting from the present characteristics and situation of the main racial types, for the purpose of which he chose the well-established "Teutonic, Mediterranean and Alpine” races, he set out to unravel racial migrations and mixtures with the aid of the historical-geographical method adopted from E.A. Freeman, the British Liberal historian. He sought to explain racial variation by tradition, by environment and by nutritional and other "physical" determinants so that racial factors, hair- and eye-colour provided only subsidiary determinants of the racial diversification. The mentality of a racial type was determined by psychological as well as physical factors. Quite often Ripley’s


49. Ripley presupposed the main features of hair, eye- and skin- colour and was convinced that the dolichocephaly of the Teuton had originally come from Africa, was inherited by the Cro-Magnon-type and then passed on to the modern "Teutons" who developed their other vigorous propensities in the mild atmosphere of the Baltic area. See William Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe (London, 1900), pp. 4 note, 55, 68, 358–59; "Deniker’s Classification of the Races of Europe". Popular Science Monthly (Febr., 1898), pp. 168–70.
chain of inference proceeded from looks to the racial mentality.

The accumulated craniological, facial and photographic evidence on the Finns of western Finland made Ripley classify them as "Teutonic-Finns". He criticized Keane for putting them in the same category as the Mongols on account of their Eastern language; in his view they had for a long time been distinct from both Slavs and Mongols in language, customs and institutions deeply rooted and developed in Finland. Yet these facets of culture had not been sufficiently matured to raise them to the level of full national consciousness. However, they were physically as fit a race as the Teutons. Superficially observed the Finns might seem "Eastern" but they had all the characteristics of a Teuton; fair hair, long skulls and blue eyes. Thus it was high time to get rid of the persistent notion that there was something "ignoble" in the Finns. They differed totally from the Mongolic Lapps, they had the same racial energy, ambition, thrift and cautiousness as the typical Teuton, they had progressed further than the Russian "mujiks" who had begun a campaign of racial oppression in Finland and the Baltic Provinces. To Ripley they actually appeared so advanced that they could be used as miners in America and in that way make their contribution to the regeneration of the Teutonic race over there. The melting-pot of races could only make use of strong ingredients.

For many anthropologists Ripley's magnum opus was the bible of a new creed. Yet, though it was unsurpassable in information, its logic and its conclusions were found dubious. In his review of the book in 1899 Franz Boas (1858—1942), the American pioneer of cultural anthropology, referred to Ripley's a priorism; even if it were true that contemporary racial types were quite stable, Ripley

50. Ripley, The Races of Europe, p. 365. Cf. pp. 49, 359. It had been the Swedish G. Retzius who had disseminated the idea that the Finns were essentially a brachycephalic people though they had, in the Western and Southern coastal areas of Finland acquired some Teuton characteristics (see Retzius, Finska Kranier, p. 170). Some upset Finns, like G. Ramstedt argued that the Finns were not a "yellow" but the "whitest" race in the world. Suomi ja suomalainen sivistys (Finland and Finnish Culture) (Porvoo, 1919), pp. 43—44.
should have studied the history of the formation of the types. He had selected their present characteristics in advance and then found them also in the past. To establish a type he should have investigated all historical mixtures, contacts and wanderings with reference to the actual environmental and psychological factors in each case. Physical types based on craniological and facial criteria were quite valueless because a cranium changed in a generation and for this reason behind all "types" there had only been individuals. Thus, for instance, the Finns might happily have acquired their "type" independently\(^5\), the historical diffusion of races in the North might have been more extensive and varied than the anthropologists had ever imagined, and the prehistoric European cultures might already have been mixed.

Also the British prehistorian and archaeologist Harold Peake (1867—1946) rejected Ripley's notion of the "Teutonic Finn" because prehistoric skulls from Finland, Sweden and some other parts of Northern Europe belonged to a short-headed people which had lived in Europe before the Aryan Teutons. The Teutons, endowed with an exceptional evolutionary capacity had only later developed their superior qualities in the colder climate which was good for "quick co-ordination of sense impression and muscular contraction"\(^5\). The Finns could not genuinely be Teutonic. All the evidence available, that produced by the Finnish ethnologists and prehistorians themselves but also that procured by their Swedish colleagues concluded: "the essential Finn is Mongoloid"\(^5\). Guarding against baseless Finnish nationalist aspirations Peake declared that there was no Finnish race in Finland, only "pure" Swedes and slightly modified Mongoloid Finns. The latter had brought Eastern cultural elements to Finland with them as they had migrated from the East. As for their supposed Western culture, the Finns had received it only after the Teutons had already developed a high culture. They had taught it to the Finns. The Teutonic Western boat-axe culture had been adopted by the Finns

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\(^5\) Harold Peake, "The Finnic Question and Some Baltic Problems". *JAI*, xlix (1919), q. p. 185. The *Atlas de Finlande* and F.W. Westerlund's measurements of Finnish recruits' skulls "showed" that the dolichocephalic Swedish racial impact had only slightly affected the Finns.
from the longheaded people of Sweden and the intermarriages of the Swedes and Finns started only after the year 1155, the commencement of the conversion of Finland from heathenism to Christianity. This interpretation was bound to offend the Finns, who were at the time trying to cast off the eastern connections from their history and had begun to bring forward the idea of their Baltic descent. One Finnish archaeologist was convinced that nothing much concerning the prehistory of Northern Europe could be inferred from a couple of broadheaded skulls, and that such implements as boat-axes and pieces of comb-ceramic pottery only indicated discontinuity between the supposed Eastern origin of the Finns and their later culture on the Baltic. Even if the Finnish Suomusjärviculture and later comb-ceramic indicated Eastern contacts, they mainly proved the case for an East-Baltic race which had subsequently mixed with the Teutonic boat-axe culture. To this it was easy for Peake to respond that, leaving out the skulls, there was no denying the Eastern cultural connections of the Finns. The aversion some of the Finnish ethnologists and archaeologists felt towards the East was understandable in the light of the recently founded national identity which needed continuous reassertion and fortification in the 1900–30s. The revival of the Finnish national consciousness had been preceded by the rise of Finnish art, music and Finnish studies; it was thought that this cultivation should not be spoiled by any Eastern contagion, racial, cultural or political. Unlike for the British scholars who viewed the history of Finland from a Western European, "Teutonic" angle, for Finnish scholars as well as for Finland’s rulers the issue was a matter of national life or death. For the Finns the "Finnish race" needed integrity and inner power to stand on its own feet, whereas for the British it was only just about to be recognized as a progressing pupil of Western civilization.

59. Peake, "A Rejoinder". JAI, lii (1922), p. 44.
VI

For all the criticism of the racial typology, the main tenets of the racial theory and the racial division stayed the same in the 1910s. Some concessions were being made, in particular in respect to the racial and cultural prehistory of Europe. What seemed to provide an adequate response to Boas's criticism of the theory of racial division was to revise the problematic of "Nordic" prehistory and make it correspond to the more comprehensive view of the racial prehistory of Europe. The prehistorical racial types of North could at least be hypothetically construed by incorporating all the new geographical, anthropological, palaeontological and archaeological evidence. The emphasis gradually shifted from physiological to cultural and geopolitical studies. Cultural pluralism gained more appreciation but it was applied within larger cultural areas still dominated by "leading" cultures of "higher" races.

A special interest was developed in enquiring into racial-cultural frontiers and zones, the contacts and meeting grounds of the "weaker" and the "stronger" cultures, the regions where civilization advanced. About Finland it could be surmised that it was because the winter cold, ice and snow offered an easy access to Finland that it had been the sifting ground for the West and the East\textsuperscript{60}. Geopolitically envisaged, the neighbours of the Finns had been given an opportunity to impose their culture on them. The Finns might have been able to survive as an "ethnically distinct" group and rise to real nationality "if only climate had allowed them to develop sufficient strength to stand alone" and resist the power of Russia\textsuperscript{61}. More optimistically, it could be estimated that although the post-glacial peoples of the North had been "poor outcasts from the tribes of happier lands" they had afterwards been fostered by the threatening circumstances of ice and cold. Concerning Finland it had already been ascertained that it was "one of the most ancient lands on earth, yet the actual configuration of the country is the result of the most recent

\textsuperscript{60} C.B. Fawcett, \textit{Frontiers} (Oxford, 1918), pp. 15—16, 211.
\textsuperscript{61} H.B. George, \textit{The Relations of Geography and History} (Oxford, 1903), pp. 131, 244.
changes” following the receding of the ice-belt. The Finns, a "physically sound" and morally quite proper people, had been moulded by the marshy, rocky and rugged surface, poor soil and adverse climate into a hardy race, a worthy addition to the Western races who were now, under Russian oppression, being forced into mass-emigration. The results and political implications of the science of race appeared different from the Finnish and British points of view. Although some late nineteenth-century British anthropologists regarded the Finnish race as worthy of survival, they usually realized, perhaps more pessimistically than the Finns, the dangers of racial assimilation. The Finns wanted to fight for their independence in Finland whereas the British foresaw their conglomerateation into the Western races or into the Slavic Russian Empire. However, before a more detailed discussion of imperialist racialism and its notion of the Finns can be entered, it remains to study how and why the British actually held the Finns in such high esteem that they could be called cultured.

4. The Finns, their Kalevala and their culture

I

Despite the initial domination of physical anthropology in British anthropology from the 1860s onwards, cultural anthropology, and the theory of cultural evolution applied to foreign cultures soon stood out as an equal rival to it. It did not concern itself with the physical basis but with the content of culture, the ideas of "primitive" and "barbaric" peoples. The evolutionary scheme of civilization suggested, in accordance with the vision of a graded natural existence, a progressive gradation of religious ideas, from animism to monotheism (or agnosticism), of forms materialized in tool-making skills from simple stone implements to modern technology, of institutions appropriate to each particular cultural stage, or of morality from rude "primitiveness" to rational self-control, positive liberties and utilitarian ethics. Edward Burnett Tylor, Herbert Spencer and Henry Maine, the most prominent figures of the theory, relied on the comparative method: the stages which the utilitarian morality, in its revised Millian form, had passed in its development could be traced back to its various historical phases by reading the morality of the present "backward" cultures. Here also the culture of the Finns was made

to reveal a certain moment in the past when civilization had again progressed somewhat. At the same time, the present of the Finns could be seen as a period representing them both in history and in the present, as a transitory phase of a premodern race just about to reach modernity.

Those British who knew of the Finns through the *Kalevala*, the national epic telling of the cultural journey of the Finns from the world of myth and reckless heroic deeds to the illumination of Christianity, were prone both to mirror the contemporary Finns in it and to confuse their proper history with the *Kalevala*. Many ancient customs, myths and superstitions appeared to survive in Finland. In this sense the *Kalevala* could provide some clues to the stages which the mind had passed on its way towards its Western form. It could be used as a historical source for the "religion, moral notions, customs and domestic details of a most remarkable race" as old as the race of Achilles and Ajax, dating back to the times when the Finns had not yet left their Asiatic homes. Simultaneously, it could also tell of their particular, unique and individual achievement contained in its special message, tone and original environment.

The most prominent representative of Victorian cultural anthropology, E.B. Tylor (1832—1917) made a few remarks on Finns in his *Primitive Culture* (1871) and they show how he used their customs to support his general theory. His work marks an elaborated, systematic attempt to compare the multitude of "primitive" and "barbaric" customs and especially the religious ideas behind them. The standard was British "educated life" and the similarities of "primitive" ways of thought testified to the uniformity of the "primitive" mind. The key-concept of his theory was "survival" which referred to those remnants of "primitive" ideas which still existed, for example, in the minds of contemporary peasants. Their folk-lore as well as the Midsummer-night's Festival of the Finns were interpreted as survivals of superstition. However, Tylor did not think of them as

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3. E.B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (London, 1871), I, pp. 14, 84—36. J.G. Frazer noted how the Finns still savagely killed their dead again in their coffins so that the spirits of the dead would not come to life. Note in *JAI*, xv (1886), pp. 64—65. Basically, Tylor held that the "primitives" were on a lower (childish)
specimens of degenerate morality but as necessary preconditions to higher religious ideas. Therefore it was possible to propagate civilization to those peoples who appeared to be ready to step onto a higher level in their spiritual life. Tylor did not regard, like Müller, the rise of the Finns, as told in the Kalevala and their later cultural achievements, as a spontaneous cultural evolution, but rather emphasized the significance of the work the Swedes had done in converting them from polytheism to monotheism. Mythology had been an obstacle to their earlier progress in culture. For John Oxenford (1812—77), a dramatist, translator and evolutionist, the Finnish mythical machine Sampo which, in a manner not dissimilar to the Golden fleece, had poured goods out of itself, had been a serious shackle on Finnish cultural evolution for it had kept Finns from taking to the plough, bow and boat for a long time. He, like Tylor, accepted the assumption of association psychology that “lower” cultures only imitated the “higher” ones and suggested that the Finns were merely receptive to more civilized concepts and practices. Christianity and all that went with it had brought about their rise and established the first real social organizations in Finland.

The reformation that the British had already completed was still continuing in Finland. The body of surviving “primitive” customs and ideas there were not for Tylor, as they had been for Müller, symptoms of the “disease” of language but the much needed precursors for the awakening of the Finns to the understanding of the immaterial. Drawing from Castrén, Tylor suggested that Väinämöinen’s visit to the underworld was analogous to that of Orfeus — the primitive religion of the Finns had become moral. And when Väinämöinen had to descend from his throne as a culture-hero and give way to Christ, the evolution of the Finns was level of mental evolution because they could not exert reason to understand causality, induction (J.S. Mill’s method) and classification. Freud later said that Tylor missed the “emotional” life of the savages as well as that of children. Nowadays many anthropologists are inclined to regard all “superstition” as independent systems of meaning of their own wherein some unique expressions of human potential might be buried.


7 — The British conception...
in full flight. Henceforth the morals of the Finns was destined to develop towards the ideal of self-respect consonant with Protestant belief. Perhaps the painlessness of Finnish evolution is best captured by Oxenford in his comparison of the decline of Greek and Finnish mythology:

The Gods of Greece were stigmatised as devils by the early fathers of the Church; but the old Finland mythology is more gently treated. Wainamoinen is not allowed to ascend to the Christian heaven when the reign of Redeemer is proclaimed: but he is still raised above the earth, and his harp remains as a relic of the blessings he conferred upon his race.

It was the lapse of time and progress itself that naturally made all relics obsolete and useless but time had not quite yet done its work for the Finns. Väinämöinen survived as a symbol on whose shoulders the heroic history of the Finns largely rested — he was not to be forgotten yet. The culture of the Kalevala was useful as an "ornament" or "decoration" of nineteenth-century Finnish culture.

Tylor’s main interest was in culture but even he could not just pass over the promising results of the flourishing science of craniology. They might explain the beginnings of mental evolution. Although it was clear that the brain capacity of the "primitives" was smaller than that of the Europeans, it was large enough to enable them to learn some advanced ideas. In view of this reasoning it was feasible that the Finns, on whom the "Aryan" Swedes had encroached, had been craniologically ready to receive the message of progress. The Finns had good prospects to advance to a free trade era and to achieve the goal of individual freedom but, in Tylor’s view, this was possible only if the Finns were not as "conservative" as the British conservatives who hampered reforms in Britain.

Andrew Lang (1844—1912), Scottish scholar and man of letters, who further developed Tylor’s theory of survivals also criticised Müller’s conception of the "disease of language" and Isaac Taylor’s comparative grammar. To him myths and folktales such as those

about culture-heroes (Väinämöinen, Zeus and others) universally survived under new disguises and names. Often they were living in the mentality of the "unprogressive classes" of modern society, and for them they were not simply relics but reality. They were not degenerate forms of aristocratic poetry but reminiscent of the classical cultural dichotomy of "lower" classes and aristocracy in earlier "Aryan" societies (e.g. in Greece)\(^9\). Lang also resented the "anatomic method" of dissecting meaningful myths, names and stories into meaningless atoms (i.e. roots). Rather, he dealt with whole myths which revealed the social structure of past societies. He developed a theory of socially laden evolution in which the "primitive", medieval and modern societies represented the stages of civilization\(^10\). Seen from the perspective of Victorian culture and its poetry, the poetry of the Finns was in many respects far behind Ulysses and had more in common with the myths of Maoris, Zulus, Samoans and the Red Indians. Their cosmogony resembled that of American Indians and their magic was of the same type as practised by the Australian aborigines. What distinguished it from Ulysses and the songs of Roland and Sigurd was not only that it was not a product of one "Pisistratus" but of a redactor (Lönnrot). It was "the expression of early humanity, above all, among races isolated, remote, defected, abiding in the solitude of hills and forests, culling its songs from the plumes of the pine-trees, the winds of the woods, the music of many waters"\(^11\). Greek poetry was all about kings, aristocrats, born in a society of rank and blood, engaged in commerce, fully developed religion and slavery, whereas Finnish poetry was without wars, courts and ruling races. The leaders of the Finns were "magnified non-natural men" and "idealized magicians" who professed their enchanting sway over a race of hunters, fishermen, smiths and husbandmen\(^12\). No great

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10. Andrew Lang, "Introduction”. Domenico Comparetti, *The Traditional Poetry of the Finns*. Trans. by J.M. Anderton (London, 1898), pp. xi—xiii. This work was the first comprehensive study of Finnish folklore in English. Its Italian author shared the views of Lang, for instance, in mentioning that Finnish poetry reflected a state of society devoid of class distinctions. There was only the *populus*. See, pp. 329—332.
deeds of freemen could be recorded from their history, the pressure of idolized nature and magic pressed on their solitary minds. Whatever had been the potential for the singing of "runos" and for playing the kantele, the appeal of their melancholy music could not match the romantic tunes of the lyre of the bards. Socially, the way of life of exogamy, polytheism and nature-myths had led to a lack of concerted action for a higher purpose:

Kalevala contains the story of no united national effort '...' its heroes do not fight for the fatherland but for themselves.\textsuperscript{13}

Its merits were to be found elsewhere, in the naturalness of its own setting and time. Yet it was so obsolete and antithetical to modern tendencies that it could not survive much longer under their pressure:

This is the gift of native, untaught culture. This gives happiness and beauty and charm to a hard and poor life: this does for the people what civilization does not try to do. This culture civilization invariably destroys.\textsuperscript{14}

The expressions of creativity of the ancient Finns, singing magical songs, succumbing to "undisturbed imaginings" and all that belonged to a time worth remembering and musing over, but the ancient culture itself was bound to disappear. In fact, the Reformation had done away with most of it and it might have been totally lost without Lönnrot's efforts to collect it from the mouths of people. So, it was better after all to have it with us as a fading memory to remind us of how we had been freed from the tyranny of the pagan gods\textsuperscript{15}.

Through the comparative method of cultural anthropology it was shown how different types of poetry belonged to different stages of civilization. There were so many stages in the mental evolution of man, already studied by Giambattista Vico at the beginning of the eighteenth century. What they meant to the

\textsuperscript{13} Lang, \textit{Homer and Epic}, q. p. 413—14.
\textsuperscript{14} Lang, \textit{Homer and Epic}, q. p. 418.
\textsuperscript{15} Andrew Lang, "Kalevala, or the Finnish National Epic". \textit{Fraser's Magazine}, new ser., v (Jan—June, 1872); \textit{Custom and Myth}, p. 176.
Victorians who were not as nostalgic for the early poetical expressions of human mind as the Neapolitan master had been, was that they revealed the development of their own moral and intellectual faculties. This rather self-centred means to attain understanding of one's own past was rarely questioned. Müller, whose theory of the evolution of language had been the main target of Tylor's and Lang's criticism but whose ideas had been seminal for theirs, went against the current. He resisted the idea of regarding "primitive" ideas and customs as "lower" because in his view, for instance, the Andaman islanders were better off and a lot happier than the British workers who drudged for the progressive society. Müller defended the "elevated savage mentality" exemplified in solar myths which, according to Müller's interpretation, had already contained a monotheistic idea of a God. Religion had not been born out of fear as evolutionists believed, but out of the universal longing for a higher being. Modern religions were frustrated feelings of this urge. In the same way, the shamanism that had prevailed among ancient Finns had been derived from Buddhism and was not a starting-point but a degenerate form of religion. Thus Müller reversed the course of evolution envisaged in Tylor's scheme and, having been informed by Julius Krohn (1835–88), a Finnish evolutionary ethnologist, he realized how the Finns had not actually progressed along the unilinear lines suggested by Tylor but had quite recently, during the Viking era, developed their poetry out of the "germ cells" (e.g. Lithuanian creation-myths) dispersed by neighbouring, higher cultures. According to this organicist interpretation, their poetry was not an Eastern invention, on the contrary, it was a growth of historical times and brought forth by a contact with higher civilization:

16. See Dorson, *The British Folklorists*, pp. 166–67. In the second Folklore Congress in 1891 Lang had declared mythology universal to savages. The savages were the "less fortunate races" who obstructed the Aryans and Semites who had rid themselves of the world of myth. Müller had proposed that the Semitic influence on the Greek religion was of primary importance in comparison to the "Aryan" one which had been only physical. He was now inclined to trace the starting point of civilization to Egypt. See *The Second International Folklore Congress in 1891* (Stockholm). *Papers and Transactions*. Ed. J. Jacobs and A. Nutt (London. 1892), pp. 6–7; F.M. Müller, "Comparative Mythology" (1868). *Selected Essays on Language, Mythology and Religion* (London, 1881), I, pp. 314–15.
'... it must have been when the Finns migrated into their present seats and came into contact for the first time with an entirely new civilization, the Scandinavian, that the growth of their epic poetry took place.17

The change had affected Väinämöinen's personality by transforming it from that of a "wise and brave prophet" to the temperament of a typical, warlike Western culture-hero. Eventually, the Kalevala could be transformed to present the qualities of a respectable ancestry and its birth could be dated to times when the martial and conquering spirit of the North was in the making. For the Finns themselves this striking identification meant much; it admirably served the purposes of discovering a vigorous past and a resting-place for cultural ideals as well as a point of contact with the history of Europe18. This was all the more important because in the 1860—1880s there had been promising reforms in the representation at the Finnish Diet in favour of the bourgeoisie which coincided with the upsurge of Liberalism in Finland. A "progressive" nation needed a vigorous past.

The new past of the Finns was made known to the British readers but they did not always take part in the glorification of Finnish history. Although there appeared astonished comments on the progress of the Finns in reviews of the Kalevala, the imaginary past suggested in it was not as unique for the British as it was for the Finns. For instance, for Colonel A. Lane Fox the matter was only of the dispersion of higher cultural forms among "lower" cultures: this was to be seen in the development of the means of transport and weapons in Finland. Only the Lapps still used the traditional "pulcas" and boats stitched with reindeer-sinews, whereas in Finland excavations had brought into light coins and weapons from the Viking age which indicated the influence of the "Xanthous" race of Huxley19. Thus the early cultural and physical

18. W.A. Wilson, Folklore and Nationalism in Modern Finland (Indiana University Press, Ontario, 1976), pp. 51, 54—56.
19. A. Lane Fox, "On Early Modes of Navigation". JAI, iv (1875), pp. 419—420;
evolution of the Finns was mainly caused by their contact with the Western, Aryan-descended civilization, not prepared by the heritage of the Kalevala.

There appeared to be three distinct phases in the development of Finnish culture. The first had occurred when the Finns had made early contacts with the West, the second when the Swedes had carried out their crusades to Finland, the third was just about to come about if only the leaders of the Finnish 'state', both Swedish- and Finnish-speakers, understood their common mission as nation-builders. The propagation of civilization in Finland had always reached only a small proportion of the Finns and the education of the Finns had taken time. As the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1879) put it, the Finns who had earlier lived "in separate, free communities and villages" without "governmental organization" like their distant, eastern relatives, had been given laws, civil rights, agricultural methods and other "beneficial arts" by the Swedes. Owing to the same source of betterment, they had evolved from the "Mongol-Negro" racial type towards the European one, yet remaining Mongol at the bottom. Contrary to the Liberal interpretation of Finnish history which largely forgot the eastern connection of the Finns, the Encyclopaedia Britannica emphasized it, and referred to Fennoman historians who considered eastern descent to have been of paramount importance in the development of Finnish culture.

II

The evolutionary conception had its applications in all areas of Finnish culture. The Kalevala, due to its nature as a repository of magic and shamanism, was particularly illuminating to British evolutionists who were anxious to fill in gaps in the evolution of religious ideas. Müller, Lang and Tylor had already recognized its value but it was W.F. Kirby, the translator of the Kalevala into

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20. J. Scott Keltie, "Finland". Encyclopaedia Britannica (1879 ed.) ix, pp. 218—19. This "Friend of Finland" had used Yrjö Koskinen's History of Finland as his source.
English, who found in it the initial stages in the evolution of religious ideas. He did not find totemism, but unveiled fetishism, nature-worship, the transition from paganism to Christianity and Medieval Christianity. The moral development of the Finns paralleled this continuum. Even the lowest stage in Kirby's scheme, fetishism, was still, in Kirby's opinion, practised in Finland in a peculiarly proto-Finnish way. Usually the savages believed that living creatures could be made out of inanimate materials and their magic was based on this "assumption" whereas the Finns believed that all animals and man had originally been created of various materials (man of clay, the elk of rotten timber, the pike of flax, etc.), and to wield power over them one had to call "the words of origin", the words which named the appropriate material and its use in the making. The Finnish magic consisted of incantations calling up the "words of origin", and both the Kalevala and a later collection by Lönnrot, Loitsurunot (Incantations) connected the Finns with the universal mythological past. Yet, fortunately the Finns had been able to rid themselves of this "Asiatic art", and the remnants of it which still might be found in the deep forests would soon perish and find their way to the museums of mankind.

21. Kalevala. The Land of Heroes. Everyman's Library (London, 1909). Kirby's notes have a tendency towards worldwide comparisons of mythological content. Long before publication, there was an argument whether it should be a scientific (E. Gosse, J. Abercromby, G.A. Schrumpf) or a popular edition (Kirby himself), see The Athenaeum, 3144—3149 (Jan. 28—March 3, 1888). In the meanwhile the American J.W. Crawford published the first English translation of the Kalevala (New York, 1888—1889). He defended the idea of Finnish Eastern descent and of an ancient connection between the Aryans and the Finns. To him, as many others, the epos was a treasure of irrational ideas and only after Western contact had the Finns become civilized (pp. vi, vii—viii, xii).


23. Kirby, "On Fetishism", p. 42. C.J. Billson advanced the idea that the Finns had a Babylonic origin in virtue of the linguistic similarities of Finnish and Akkad. See his "Folk-songs Comprised in the Finnish Kalevala". Folklore, vi (Dec. 1895), pp. 318—21; The Popular Poetry of the Finns (London, 1900), pp. 7—8.

24. According to the Handbook to the Ethnological Collections of the British Museum (Oxford, 1910) there was nothing in the Museum from Finland. J. Jacobs had launched a program to collect materials concerning the customs and ideas of all "primitives" into tabularies for comparison, and later it was
The language of the *Kalevala* was, for the British, a vehicle of "primitive" ideas slowly evolving towards a higher stage of artistic expression. Notwithstanding a few Aryan borrowings and structural affinities, it was still in a "florid and unsettled condition". On closer inspection, however, it was, in spite of its Finno-Ugrian "inconsistencies", essentially a progressing language as shown in late nineteenth century Finnish translations of the literature of the world into Finnish and their own tiny but growing literature. The slowness of its evolution could be conveyed in the "artificial" way in which the modern ideas (e.g. the modern institutions of the state) were being translated. Yet, because Finnish was "non-Aryan material cast in Aryan mould", there was no structural barrier to stop the development of Finnish into a modern language. It gained ground from the Swedish language and at the same time it was forced to change from a poetical language to a vehicle of modern ideas albeit the process was painful because the European, "complicated forms of thought" were not easy to twist into Finnish. Obviously most of the obstacles were overcome by the numerous inventions made by Finnish scholars by way of modernizing the "primitive" language. This was also politically important — it strengthened the position of Finns within the administration, in the university and education in general. According to John Abercromby, another "friend of Finland", two generations of Finnish studies had already brought Finnish almost to equality with the civilized languages. He also hoped for a closer union of the Finnish and Swedish races who should face the brunt of Russian oppression together and settle the language question in Finland that had made them quarrel instead of engaging in fair competition. Behind this idea of a settlement of the Fennoman-Svecoman quarrel about cultural supremacy in Finland and the integration of the Finnish nation, Abercromby had his evolutionary view of Finnish history to fall back on. The national fulfilment was a natural continuation of the creation of

J.G. Frazer who used the shamanism of Lapps and sacrificial customs of the Finns as material for his studies into the depths of savage "imagination"; see for Frazer his 'The Native Races of Asia and Europe'. *Notebook Selections*. Ed. R.A. Downie (London, 1939), book vii.

bonds between an Eastern and a Western cultural type. He had already extensively studied the early phases of contact. As he had declared:

I have tried with the combined aid of craniology, archaeology, ethnography and philology, '...' to sketch the pre- and protohistoric history of the Eastern and Western Finns, showing the various stages of civilization to which they successively advanced after contact with higher civilizations, at different periods of their evolution from neolithic time to the middle-ages.\textsuperscript{28}

Abercromby brought together various themes of evolution already stemming from earlier works on the Finns. Within their own race, the Finns were craniologically almost uniform in type but the Western Finns especially had been influenced by the Swedes and Slavs. Thanks to a European racial infusion which had enhanced the Finnish dolichocephaly, the Finns were now a race which could "hold its field" in the struggle of existence. The best Finnish type was the robust Tavastian\textsuperscript{29}. Apart from the craniological evidence, the results of other sciences pointed to the real cultural origin of the Finns. Abercromby went against those who had stressed the genius of the Finns in remoulding Aryan material, for instance, the style of imported stone-implements (boat-axes), and referred to the many findings of Ugrian cultural impact, i.e. pottery and sockets, and to the importance of the \textit{Kalevala} in depicting a uniquely Eastern way of life. There could remain no doubt as to the Eastern cradle of the Finns, even though it could not have been situated any further East than the Ural mountains\textsuperscript{30}. The evolution of Finns from prehistory to the present was a dual process of

\textsuperscript{28} John Abercromby, \textit{The Pre- and Protohistoric Finns} (London, 1898), I, q. p. vi. He had used Finnish (Donner, Setälä, Mikkola, Castrén and Aspelin), Swedish, German and Russian sources. Later he explained to Finnish readers how he had on a visit to America spotted a "racial difference" between the Negroes and Red Indians. Negroes chatted all the time at work whereas the American Indians kept quiet. \textit{Valvoja} (1909), p. 566.

\textsuperscript{29} Abercromby, \textit{The Pre- and Protohistoric Finns}, I, pp. 18, 20.

\textsuperscript{30} Abercromby, \textit{The Pre- and Protohistoric Finns}, I, pp. 54—57, 87—89. F.C. Jevons had suggested that Finns and Aryans might have shared "pro-ethnic" customs like marriage by capture and some wedding customs. See his 'Testimony of Folklore to the European or Asiatic Origin of Aryans'. \textit{The Second International Folklore Congress}, pp. 322—47.
gradually adapting themselves to Western circumstances and cultural pressure and of gradually leaving behind the Eastern characteristics. At first they had reached the "relatively high cultural stage" on which the production of the culture of *Kalevala* had been possible and, at long last, equipped with this attainment, they had been able to reach as high as the Swedish-speakers of Finland. The turning point had been nothing less than the introduction of Christianity and since then the Western Finns had begun to use their *Kalevala* only as a source of metaphor and a decoration for language. It was the Eastern Finns who still lived in the *Kalevala-age* and uttered spells, incantations and exorcising formulas in a manner not dissimilar to the aborigines of Australia.\(^{31}\)

For Abercromby the cultural evolution of the Finns was largely independent of their physical (craniological) development though it supported his overall generalization. Unlike Ripley who had argued that Finns, aboriginally Europeans, had been civilized by the Teutons, Abercromby subscribed to the theory that the Finnish origin was in the East. This was attested by the cultural evidence collected by H. Peake. As soon as the evidence which supported the conclusions of the Swedish authorities in craniology was questioned, the line of argument also changed. The Finns could be viewed as slightly dolichocephalic and capable of progress in culture. It was not only purely physical traits which made the Finns susceptible to higher culture but also the undeniably original Eastern, Ugrian culture had prepared them for it. Now also the Swedish impact came to be seen more historically, culturally and linguistically as the dispersed cultural forms of the West were being adopted and moulded by the Finns. What seemed to be emerging in Finland was a Baltic-based culture of Ugrian origin resuscitated by Western ideas. Later acquisitions from the West had been used by the Finns to good effect in initiating further progress on their own ground. This conclusion of British

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31. Abercromby, *The Pre- and Protohistoric Finns*, I, pp. 104, 256—58; "Magic Songs of the Finns". *Folklore*, I (March, 1890), p. 17. Abercromby's method of folklore-studies was historical-geographical according to the model of zoology in studying, for example, the sets of Finnish origin-stories by dissecting them into germs. See his "An Analysis of Certain Finnish Origins". *Folklore* (1892), pp. 308—335.
anthropologists provided a starting-point for many later, also politically laden, argument concerning the advancement of the Finns.

III

The picture painted of the history of Finland had a family resemblance with the descriptions of Finland in the period of the flourishing of evolutionary theory. The dichotomy of two races, the civilized Swedes and the "primitive" Finns prevailed until the turn of the century. It was usual to draw this demarcation line according to the conception that the "primitives" lagged behind the leisured classes in culture because they did not have time for it, but sometimes it was enough to refer to their laziness as the chief cause of their misery. In the anthropological and ethnographical literature the Finns had not, however, emerged as a lazy race, on the contrary, they were usually regarded as industrious and thrifty though simple. When comparing this image with the impressions of those observers who actually saw the Finns of Finland in the progressive times of recovery and industrial take-off of Finland since the 1860s, we can understand why the Finns were yielded such a higher ranking.

To a British consul posted to Helsinki, the progress of Finland appeared arrested after the Crimean War. There was the discrepancy between the demands of industrial progress and the impediments of general backwardness, particularly of the purely Finnish-speaking part of the country. Of the two races of Finland the "Swedes" were the enlightened and progressive, the Finns were mostly "illiterate" and phlegmatic living in miserable material and moral conditions. They diligently cultivated their small patches of land in their traditional ways ("no progress") and lived in what we may today call extended households. To the consul, who obtained his moral statistics from the Swedish-speaking officials, their cabins were barbaric hovels of incest:

The sexes sleep indiscriminately in these which accounts for the large proportion of illegitimate children born in this country.\(^\text{32}\)

\(^{32}\) H.W. Crowe to the British Embassy in St Petersburg 27.12. 1858. "A General
Within a few years this sort of description disappeared from the reports. Although Finland was poor and sparsely populated, its climate and nature unfriendly, the resource of timber was inexhaustible, and the Finnish constitution still intact and reviving. Also the Finnish language appeared to gain equal footing with Swedish. When the industrial expansion was started by the openhanded subsidies from the government, of which the British got their share in providing, for instance, the first rails, locomotives and railway-bridges for the railways in Finland, conditions got gradually better in spite of intermitting years of famine and poor harvest. The British also brought considerable capital to Finland as they understood very well that the foundation of wealth in Finland was to be timber and its related industries. It only remained to liberate trade and enterprise from regulations and to reform institutions and their normative code to suit the market economy. The Liberal, 

*laissez-faire* ideas imported from Britain proved useful in the power struggle between the rising businessmen and those who benefited from mercantilism. The British consuls anticipated good trading prospects for the British entrepreneurs and large-scale exploitation of the timber resources.\(^ {33}\)

On a more spiritual level, the establishment of forest management in Finland could sometimes be seen from a peculiarly evolutionary, Christian standpoint. Botanist and minister J.C. Brown appealed to God for the legitimation of the oncoming exploitation of the Finnish forests that had previously been regarded as a sin against his will and tantamount to their disappearance from the face of earth. A more careful reading of the Bible proved quite the reverse: the traditional Finnish way of burning the woods for clearances, comparable to Indian *koomaree*,

could not have been God’s ultimate aim in creation. Rather, his intention had been the double benefit of scientific cutting to provide both wealth and room for arable land. It also cleared the climate and dried the marshes. The process had already cleared Europe anyway and there was always the opportunity for afforestation to which end forest management was now about to be established. The industrial production of planks, paper, and later, of pulp in conjunction with the plantation of fruit-trees and initiation of gardening was to lift the Finns into the scientific, modern age. In due time the "primitive" forms of agriculture would give way to the use of more advanced methods. Like Müller and others, Brown was assured that the Christian ingredients of the Kalevala would also create the needed spiritual foundation for national unity. Since it had been proven by craniology that the Finns and the Aryans were basically relatives, it seemed quite natural to Brown that it was the Gothic (Swedish) section of the population of Finland that was the uniting force. They should complete the extirpation of paganism and savagery in Finland and introduce a new culture.

In twenty years, after the British had established stable trading relations with the Finnish timber-industry and when the business was still booming, the mood had changed considerably and there no longer remained the faintest excuse for the exploitation of the forests. And, it was just in these years, from about 1890 to 1910 that a phenomenal "progress" of the Finns really took place: in those years the Finns seemed, to the British commentators, to have fulfilled all the physiological, cultural and economic requirements set for a people to rise to a national existence.

One and the most important requirement was, however, underdeveloped, and that was the Finnish constitution which, of course, was not complete when compared with the British practice. The political history of Finland, touched only in passing in cultural anthropology, came to the fore in Britain more prominently in the 1860—80s as the Finnish Diet was regularly

convoked and legislation was modernized. In this context, 'Finnish politics', a discussion about the relations of Finland and Russia, gained room in Britain and the arguments concerning Finnish origins was left to the background. British views of the position of the Grand Duchy of Finland in the Russian Empire are the subject of the remaining chapters.
5. Comparative politics and British perceptions of the progress of the Finns, 1860—1899

I

Leaving behind the scientific arguments which the British used in describing the physical and cultural status of the Finnish race, it is time to address the political ones that evaluated the position of Finland in the Russian Empire and assessed Finnish political life. Not only did the British try to throw light on interesting constitutional developments but they also surveyed the spectrum of culture in Finland in a peculiar historical-political and progressive light. In times when the merits and defects of the actions of foreign governments were gauged according to the high standards of British constitutional rule, Finland, with its mixed regime of autocracy and relative autonomy, provided a good barometer of the fluctuations either towards reaction or reform in Russia. The development of "Finnish Home Rule" was an apposite parallel also to the British who had their own imperial problems of the subject races.

Most British contributions to the debate came from the Gladstonian Liberals who had since the 1848 revolutions supported continental national movements by defending the principles of humanity, morality, freedom and nationality. They
still held that free England had a duty to help them. It was Gladstone, the great Liberal leader, above all who formulated, for the sake of British political morality, the liberal principle when he attacked, in 1879, Disraeli and his Tory government for its politics of mere national interest in relation to the Eastern Question. As long as Russia appeared to be on the side of freedom for small Balkan nationalities and the Christians of Turkey against the Turkish yoke, the Liberals should support it. There was a lot of talk about "progress" and "freedom" in the 1860-80s as Alexander II freed Bulgaria and reformed the Polish and the Finnish constitutions. To a Liberal optimist, these were omens of the realization of a federation of European nations — a Liberal dream which was to suffer serious setbacks as the turn of the century drew closer. The politics of imperialism became the main target for the Liberals who still hoped for a democratization of Russia along the lines suggested by the representative institutions of the British Empire.

Casting their eyes over Eastern Europe, some of the academic Gladstonians, like E.A. Freeman, John Westlake and some others whose contributions will be discussed in detail later, perceived that there, as previously in Italy and Germany, were emerging new "forces", oppressed nationalities and races seeking for the maintenance and extension of their inner autonomy and longing for more freedom. The argument for their freedom was often based on racialist assumptions of the disappearing and rising conglomerations of the principal races, implying which nationalities appeared racially or linguistically ready for civic liberties. Circumstantial as the evidence of the Russian subject races was, the estimations concerning the strength of Russia in terms of its racial composition involved many immeasurable propensities and left much room for speculation and propagandist conclusions. Sometimes the Finns were regarded as a source of strength, sometimes as a cause of trouble and weakness, and their prospects for freedom varied according to the writer's political

leanings and attitude to Russia. However, the doctrine of freedom itself, either in the form of Millian-Gladstonian principles or within Lord Acton's concept of national pluralism and its derivative notion of multiracial empires, was most important when it came to reviewing the position of Finland in despotic Russia.

Although the Berlin Congress of 1878 settled some of the Eastern problems, the situation in Turkey, the fate of the Poles, Finns and Hungarians, and the general prospects of Russia and its minorities continued to occupy the Liberal mind. As early as 1863, one commentator had already connected the future of the buffer-nationalities of Eastern Europe with the question of introducing institutions restricting autocracy in Russia. The change appeared to him indispensable in order to maintain the stability of Russia. There had been lessons pointing in this direction and even some liberal-minded Russians, looking at their liberal Tsar, fully realized their importance:

Another reason in favour of constitutional government in Russia is plausibly adduced by the Russian free press in citing the state of Poland and Finland to which countries they consider that Diets must inevitably be conceded, and they argue that, in these days of railroads and steam communication, a popular assembly (in Finland) cannot sit next door to the capital of an absolute sovereign without undermining that absolutism.³

And so it happened that the prediction came true in the very same year, for Alexander convoked the Finnish Diet for the first time in 54 years in 1863. In these circumstances, the haunting idea of reuniting Finland to Sweden, so much cherished before the Crimean War, began to look anachronistic because Sweden had lost its power, Russia had become enlightened again and the reform policies of Alexander seemed to be the first "appearance of despotism in its decline" in the North that reached "even Finland"⁴. The British consul on the spot saw the triumph of Finnish nationalism in gaining equality in language, noted the loyalty of the Finns to the Tsar and remarked how their energies

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were prompted to set afoot long-awaited economic reforms and some extension in the powers of the Diet. The Finns even dared to demand their own flag. Even the British ambassador, Lord Napier, cautiously remarked to his Russian friend, whose "Muscovite feelings" he did not want to offend, how the Finnish people, however poor and simple they were, appeared somehow more civilized and industrious than the Russians because of their Protestantism and "comparative freedom". It seems, as George Maude's study also suggests, that the British ambassadors, though they held that Finland was a province of Russia, realized that the Finns were a separate nationality from the Russians. Finland was entering the industrial and commercial liberal era, followed by further economic and cultural developments, expansion of foreign trade and intellectual contacts. When "Finnish business" was born, its peaceful progress presupposed an image of a popular and beneficent Tsar and his loyal, steady people, and gradually the continuity of autonomy and of its reformed institutions, of

5. Vice-Consul Crowe to Lord Napier in St Petersburg, 30.5, 13.7., 10.8., 18.9. and 22.10. 1863. Embassy and Consular Reports. Russia. F.O. 181, 420. In the beginning of the 1860s M. Bachunin had planned a Scandinavian federation to which Finland should join as an autonomous state. These ideas were firmly rejected by the leading Finnish nationalist, J.W. Snellman who gained from the Tsar the so called language rescript which guaranteed that Finnish should become the second official language in Finland. It was a peculiar feature of Finnish nationalism that the leaders of the movement were from the highest category of the professional groups which were accessible to the Finnish section of the population, and that national integration was gained without revolution. The upsurge of the forces of bourgeois practical liberalism coincided with the critical moments of reform in the 1860s, and later they grouped around the periodical Valvoja (1880 onwards) and recruited many of the legalistic and Young Finns who started the passive resistance movement during the first period of Russian oppression after 1899. Cf. Patrick Bruun, 'Freedom Fighters at Close Quarters'. Nationality and Nationalism in Italy and Finland, pp. 35—38; Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. Transl. by B. Fowkes (C.U.P., 1985), p. 181; Klinge, Senaatintorin Sanoma, p. 248.


Finland's own civil law and culture, developed from and connected with Western traditions, became the mainstays of the argument in favour of Finnish autonomous political existence. Finland was regarded as a model for Russia's political development. The days of Nicholas I's bureaucratic and restrictive regime were over and an era of "progress and freedom" loomed. The progressive idea of Finnish history was enhanced on a "scientific" basis. Alongside the Hegelian idea of a nation becoming conscious of its tasks, there grew the Liberal-legalist interpretation that defended, on documentary evidence, the inviolability of the 1809 constitution, and its evolution out of the 1772 Swedish one. It was to be the firm foundation of Finland's rights as a nation. The form in which it became known to the British alleged that the racial barrier which had originally separated the Finns and Swedes had been gradually discarded since medieval times as the Finns took on Western religion, laws and institutions, and that national unity had since been accomplished. The Tsar was regarded as an instrument in the constitutional development — his duty was to attach himself to the people, cast off the remaining "imperfections" in the constitution and bring about a gradual reform towards constitutional monarchy. These arguments were later developed for use in defence of autonomy: its establishment in 1809 came to be interpreted as an irrevocable contract between the Tsar and the people — an interpretation which the Russians could never accept. Here, the Finns wanted to be treated as citizens, not as subjects only, and for the British they turned out to have acquired the necessary characteristics. They belonged to the "unassimilated" races of the Baltic, and although they appeared "more manageable" than the troublesome Poles, they could, in spite of deviating from the original character, resist attempts at suppression:

A Finn is simply a Hungarian whose progenitors somehow strayed to the farther shores of Baltic; and who, beneath the grey skies of the North has lost much of the Magyar lightness of heart, and

gained instead an obstinate tenacity of purpose in life like that of the Breton.\textsuperscript{10}

The Finns seemed to have their own, British-like strong national life, the basis of which was the heritage of Western freedom. However, the revival was just beginning. The constitution of 1809, reformed only since 1863, had actually brought to them the principal, modern liberties which made their culture progress. Progress presupposed freedom. As Edmund Gosse (1849—1928), poet, critic and expert in Scandinavian literature remarked, the current Finnish patriotic zeal was an outcome of the enthusiasm for free inquiry into Finnish origins and of Runeberg’s belles lettres which had flourished in spiritual freedom. The resurrection of Finnish studies and literature was made possible by the restoration of the constitution. The Finns were again as free as they had been "under the Wasas", they enjoyed freedom of thought and they were educated. Comparatively, they were also a lot happier than the Poles for the tone of their national literature did not speak "of smothered insurrection" or of the "dull discontent" heard from Estonia and Courland\textsuperscript{11}. A liberal era in Finnish history had begun.

\textbf{II}

For a British Liberal observer, the happy situation in Finland in the 1860—80s could last only as long as the basic liberties were preserved and developed. All depended on the Tsar’s will and in what direction it was guided by the Russian and the less influential Finnish pressure groups. In addition to the imperial interests, there were also other, domestic dangers, the dangers of mass-democracy and the disputes of the Finns and Swedes which could harm the common cause of the nation. These rising issues were reflected in Antonio Gallenga’s (1810—95) observations on Finland. This historian and journalist who had taken British nationality in 1843, and become a correspondent for The Times reported that the Finns had in 1881 already gained the right to

\textsuperscript{10} Anon., "Russia". \textit{All the Year Round}, n.s., xx (Jan.-June, 1878), q. p. 355.
\textsuperscript{11} Gosse, \textit{Northern Studies}, p. 138.

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petition and now they were trying to obtain the right to initiate legislation, a further extension of the franchise and a Diet elected every fourth year. These were signs of progressive ideas in action but their enactment was hindered by the renewal of censorship by Alexander III and by a nationality dispute splitting the Finns into two camps. In Gallenga’s opinion, it had been all very well to modernize the constitution, but as long as the Finns themselves remained divided into two races and languages and as long as the Fennomans (“nationalists and liberals”) tried to benefit at the expense of the Swedish-speakers, by the ukases bringing Finnish and Swedish to an equal level, it was a dangerous game which played into the hands of Tsarist reactionaries. Sympathizing with the Svecoman attitudes, Gallenga referred to historical experience that showed what would happen to a nation not united in the defence of its constitution. In Britain there had been first national unity and only after that were attained liberal institutions. The lesson for a small nation without this historical experience of gradual achievement was clear:

The constitution, clumsy and antiquated as it may seem, is so great and marvellous a phenomenon, existing as it does, under the upas shadow of Russian autocracy that it would be madness to run the risk of marring in any harsh attempt to mend it.

Since the French Revolution there had been enough continental lessons of "democracy allowed to run mad". The Finnish demand to extend the franchise to gain a majority in the Diet over the Swedish-speakers was too much too soon. It also contradicted the principle of Estates which suited better a country like Finland where the education of the people was incomplete and where the various interests within the nation could not otherwise be taken into account.

Although it seems that Gallenga’s gradualism was reinforced by Svecoman information during his visit in Finland, and although he was misguided in a few points concerning Finnish constitutional affairs, his overall view of the threat of Russian reaction was

14. In 1882 Valvoja, trying to bring about a peace between the quarelling
justified. Although Gallenga held that an enlightened despot could maintain peace, educate and give some freedom and reconcile the interests in the Empire, it was the responsibility of liberal opinion in Russia and in the subdued border nationalities to resist reaction and Russification. In an age of "agglomeration of small states into great Empires", this was Finland's only chance. Despite the hostile attitudes of the Russian reactionary press towards "Scandinavian" Finland, Russia still needed to keep the doors to the West open. However, it was not sound policy to tease the sleeping bear, still less so as it was of the Slavic race:

'...' the conquered peoples, though not very warmly attached to their conquerors have yet common interests with them of sufficient importance to make them cling to the union for their very existence. None of them are sufficiently powerful in themselves for independence; none could hope to better their condition by transferring their allegiance to any of Russia's neighbours.¹⁵

And if for any, it was for the Finns that the union with Russia was temporarily profitable as several British observers were quick to notice in the 1880—1890s. The Diet of 1888, for instance, which carried through many bills (e.g. the extension of railways, the formation of native cavalry, a dissenting law) marked yet another achievement in the way Finnish autonomy and Russian autocracy worked together for the future progress of the Finns. In this situation, the Swedish-speakers were to suffer, and possibly, as the progressivist British Vice-Consul in Helsinki, Charles J. Cooke reported, to lose their leading role in Finnish politics and social

Fennomans and Svecomans, referred to Retzius's craniology to prove against Gallenga that the Finns had become one race so that there was no deep dividing-line between the Finns and the Swedish-speaking Finns. It also remarked that Finnish was not yet de facto the other official language, that the Tsar had so far done nothing against the constitution and that Gallenga had been misled by his Russophobia (pp. 307—08). Peter Kropotkin, in a contribution to the debate, held that the Finns fulfilled E. Renan's preconditions for a nation to exist and stressed that they were a distinctive ethnical type with national cohesion. For him, the struggle in Finland was not of races but that of classes, as the Swedish-speakers tried to maintain their class privileges against the Finnish peasants whom Kropotkin regarded as the class that had fought for Finland's freedom. See "Finland, the Rising Nationality". The Nineteenth Century, xvii (March, 1885).

life to the Finns. He feared also that the Russians would use the ensuing situation to their favour and insist on the Finns "adopting the Russian language and institutions". This would mean, as Gallenga also had pointed out, an inevitable and total absorption of Finland by Russia. For the time being, the best policy for the Finns was to wait, see and not to demand too radical reforms.

While the British were nursing their ideas of promoting representative institutions for Russia, Russia itself was changing in the opposite direction in the 1880—1890s. The Empire expanded to the Far-East and its security and unity became the main end of the administration. Plans for unification and Russification were laid out and they were backed up by Pan-slavist and Old-Russian parties who seemed to have direct access to the Tsar's decision making. A concept of superior imperial interest over the constitutions of dependencies was asserted, and a codification of the Finnish laws was started though not accomplished. Sometimes the Russians used the example of the British Empire to describe how the central power held the prerogative in general matters though more usually German centralism served the purpose. The inner unrest, assassinations, revolutionary and anarchist agitation led to the tightening up of governmental control both in Russia and Finland. Furthermore, while the Russian administrators had sometimes to admit that the "poor Chud" (Finn) had advanced and demanded to be addressed in his own language, they were sometimes offended by the way Finns considered the Russians backward. They were more offended, when the Russian controversialists found that the Finnish interpretation of the Finnish constitution presented Finland as a state and not only as an ordinary, locally self-governing province. Some admin-


18. Osmo Jussila, 'Finland's Progress to National Statehood within the Russian Administrative System'. Nationality and Nationalism in Italy and Finland, p.
istrative action had already been taken. As one gentleman angler noticed during his stay in Finland: the "Panslavists" desired to establish "more summary proceedings for domiciliary visits and for imprisonment" in Finland "than the Finnish laws permit"19. The freedom of the individual seemed to be under threat and the measures had already aroused the indignation of the law-abiding Finns.

III

The attitudes of British Liberals towards the "reactionary" turn in Russian affairs and its influence in Finland were divided and determined by British domestic as well as imperial issues. In 1886 a number of academic Liberals defected over Gladstone's proposal for Irish Home Rule and became supporters of the conservative Salisbury (Prime Minister in 1886—1892, 1895—1902) who promoted imperial integration and sought the friendship of Russia as a potential ally in spite of the confrontation of the British and Russians in Asia. This policy was opposed by Russophobic Tories and by the Gladstonian and radical Liberals who despised imperialism and pseudo-Caesars, defended small nations against Empires and raged against growing militarism20. These Liberals were usually the same people who later protested against Boer-War "jingoism" and did not find any other reason in Russia's policy of Russifying Finland than the same imperialist creed that had blighted the British, the Americans, the Germans and the French.

One group of Liberals, interested in Russian affairs from the comparative angle, speculated as to where Russia would stand if there was a war in Europe and whether it could be considered a

99. Jussila points out that Finland fulfilled the requirements of a de facto state though it had no sovereignty over its affairs. This was largely the Finnish point of view at the turn of the century, by no means shared by the British experts on international law.
rival of the British Empire. There was a certain aura of Realpolitik in these calculations and sometimes they were backed up with racialist arguments about Russian racial composition and cohesion. One observer had it that had Russia been a real imperial power it would already have capitalized on its extensive conquests. The ultimate limit had come and further expansion would cause pathological damage in the centre. Even Poland was now only a "nuisance", an increase of territory towards Sweden would be "madness", and Finland was reduced to the status of a "fortress to protect St Petersburg". The Finns, the other "non-Aryan" nation besides the Hungarians in Europe were incongruous with the Empire. There was no reason to be afraid of Russia and to adopt aggressive politics against it.

However, the Tory Russophobic attitudes were no less kept alive by scientific, racialist formulations, and the arguments raised were directed against Liberals. Aggressive-looking Russia could be pinned down to its foundations. An allegation was put forward by the Quarterly Review that the progress of the Finns facilitated the decomposition of the Russian Empire. The premises of racialist logic were called on: the historians of Russia had, according to the anonymous reviewer, forgotten that the Finns and other non-Slavic races of Russia with their own inherent troubles, added up to a grave heterogenuity in the Empire. All "unassimilated" Finns, the tiny "Tseremisses" included, could prove a weakness for Russia but the real disease in the body of the Empire lay nearer to home:

'... it is only when we turn to the West that we meet with really compact and civilized non-Russian nationalities of such natural force that their prosperity and distress, satisfaction or discontent, from day to day, seriously influence the fortunes of the Empire."

A special case in point were the Finns of Finland who had under Russia’s protection developed a nationalist creed of their own

21. A.J. Hare, Studies in Russia (London, 1885), p. 5, 160—61. Hare’s details on Finland were highly misleading. A more accurate description coloured with the romantic imagery of the Kalevala was the anonymous “The Country of a Thousand Lakes”. Chambers’s Journal, 66 (April 20, 1889).
which appeared to have united the Swedish and Finnish races behind the task of achieving the largest possible independence. The position of Finland being what it was, the Finns, however, possessed a great deal of good sense not to spoil their cause by untimely action. Hitherto they had not, wisely enough, yet shown their "contempt for the Russians as a race" and wisely tolerated "the Tschinovniks". They remained loyal for as long as their privileges and Protestant religion remained intact, and as long as their peculiar customs and their property were not affected by Russian foreign policy or inner upheaval. To the writer the Finns appeared very proud and self-interested, and he overstated in saying that the Finns would rebel if the aforementioned conditions failed to exist. He lifted the Finnish race so high in the human scale that even the Russian owed to them their "endurance and stolidity". They were the indigenous race of Russia:

It never was correct to say, 'Scratch a Russian, and you will find a Tartar', but it would be fairly correct to say, 'Scratch a Great Russian, and you will find a Finn'.

In times of peace, in order to control the Finns, the Russians needed their army, and in times of war the Russian Empire would not stand all the pressures from inside and outside and could easily collapse. From the opposite angle, the radical Liberal Charles Dilke (1843—1913), under-secretary for foreign affairs (1880—82) in Gladstone's cabinet and fervent advocate of imperial integrity, considered Russia a powerful menace for the British Empire. It had the largest "homogenous" population in Europe, the Great Russians, and its alien races were proportionately only a tiny group which could not cause much harm to the whole. The Finns

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23. Anon., "Russia", p. 228. Sometimes a Russian conception of the Finns appeared in British comments. For the Russians the Finns were "morose, sly, distrustful and silent" but as the Russians did not elaborate theories of race, they just depicted the Finnish way of life and surmised that the mixture of Finns with Russians could not bring out anything intellectual in them. The Finns seemed addicted to German ways and lacked great moral ideas. See e.g. D. MacKenzie Wallace, Russia (new ed. London, 1912); cf. Timo Vihavainen's article in Germaaneja vai Mongoleja?, pp. 281—83.
were not a weakness because they were loyal and because Sweden, weak as it was, could no longer attack Russia via Finland if Russia happened to threaten British interests in the East\textsuperscript{26}. Gladstone himself, again defending the cause of the Irish in the 1889—1890 election campaign, referred to Finland as an example of the proper "Home Rule". "Peaceful and loyal" Finland was neither a weakness nor a particular strength but showed the capacity of the Russian government for righteous rule which did not necessarily lead to the entire separation of Finland. It had been otherwise with Turkey, it had lost most of its dependencies. Only recently had the Russian government taken the wrong course adopted by British Tories of arbitrarily trying to integrate the Empire\textsuperscript{27}. Finland was a particularly good example for "Irish Home Rule", it proved that limited self-government did not necessarily lead to imperial disintegration. Gladstone's proposal was defeated by the Conservative-Liberal-Unionist majority but the attention given to Finland in the debate over the Irish Question brought its position to the British political consciousness.

It seems that Gladstone had referred to Finland before 1889 because his argument about the suitability of Finland as a model for the solution of the Irish problem was challenged in 1888. Compared more accurately, if not in racialist terms, it was argued that the Finnish-Irish parallel was not appropriate simply because the Russians were less civilized than the Finns whereas the British were more civilized than the Irish\textsuperscript{28}. The Finns deserved to remain

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\textsuperscript{26}. Charles Dilke, \textit{The Present Condition of European Politics} (London, 1887), pp. 74—75, 121—23. In his \textit{Greater Britain} (new ed., London, 1885) Dilke had regarded the Anglo-Saxons as the only "extirpating" race. Although he on many occasions defended native rights against imperialist-capitalist monopolies he envisaged their extinction unless they adopted Anglo-Saxon civilization. See Porter, \textit{Critics of Empire}, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{27}. Gladstone's speech in Plymouth, July 14 and in Glasgow, October 25, 1890. Quoted in Hyvämäki, \textit{Suomalaiset ja suurpolitiikka}, pp. 307—08. Gladstone had been given Mechelin's \textit{Precis} to read. In Finland his speeches were received with gratitude; he was hailed in a Finnish poem (Kasimir Leino in the \textit{Päivälehti} 1.4. 1890) as a defender of suppressed nations and brotherhood of man in times when "might was right". In \textit{Valvoja} (1905) K. Grotenfelt remembered him as a "humanist" of an era when science was abused in militarism.
\textsuperscript{28}. Anon., "Finland and the Finlanders". \textit{The Westminster Review}, 130 (1888), p. 659. Statistics showed that in Russia only 4% of the people could read whereas in Finland 91% were literate.
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free, the Irish did not deserve to become free. The anonymous writer "felt" the blood connection of the British with the Scandinavian, Swedish-speaking element in Finland and detested the backward Russians who "envied" Finns. He was, as Gallenga had been, assured that Finnish-speakers and Swedish-speakers would unite, even though the originally "Turanian" Finns were now the more vigorous section of the nation: they had invaded the middle-class, their language was equal to the Swedish-speakers and they had their own schools. It was only to be regretted that they, in their thirst for constitutional reform, used their newly-acquired power against their compatriots and forgot that the history of a common fight for freedom clearly pointed to the way they should together resist Russia. All in all, it was clear that the cases of Ireland and Finland were different historically and politically. A racially "united" Finland was to fight against something unjust whereas the Irish were not even ready to gain their freedom.

IV

It can be seen that the racialist argument played a crucial role in assessing the position of Finland in the Russian Empire. It was not an insignificant undercurrent but gave to the political argument its scientific colouring. The legacy and dominance of the Swedish-speakers in Finland seemed in times of Russification, and of prospective expansion of the Finnish race, to be radically undermined. The Finns were taking the political lead and their power to do that seemed to be dependent on their "racial" power and on their favourable relation to the Tsar.

On the assumption that "race" was a useful political concept, even though its foundations remained vague, the value of "races" in Empires could be estimated. As the Liberal historian Edward Augustus Freeman (1823—92) had nicely put it, the racial argument "may have a kind of practical truth for its rougher purposes" in creating and keeping up racial sympathies and antipathies which were rooted deeper in language and its use than


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in any real historical relations between races. If science (anthropology, ethnology) had shown that one had to be careful when talking about "pure" or "original" races, one fact remained clear. Since the dawn of history, there had been racial conglomerations such as the conciliation of the Norman and Anglo-Saxon descents into England. History should discover the background of present "assimilations". In these processes, some races had remained "purer" and more powerful than the others, and they still had a sort of practical racial and political existence. For Freeman, the Teutons (a sub-group of the "Aryans") who were the progenitors of "popular power" and who had erected the foundations of an assembly of freemen in ancient Germany, a kind of prototype of Parliament, were the civilizing force in the West. The primus motor in history was the expansion of freedom as spread by the Teutonic race. The subject matter of history was the rise of democracy, parliamentary power and concomitant unification of a nation such as Britain around the Parliament to express its general will.

In Freeman's geographical-historical method, the evolutionary

30. E.A. Freeman, "Race and Language", pp. 186, 191, 194—95. Freeman argued against Müller's "Aryanism" that it was based on imaginary notions of ancient racial "families" which had never existed, and that it was because of the credibility of the idea of a family connection as a blood-connection that the concept of "race" was so useful and popular. Freeman himself was criticised for holding on to "nominalism" for he popularized the idea that the Teutons carried a love of freedom with them. See W.D. Babington, *Fallacies of Race Theories Applied to the National Character* (London, 1895), pp. 6—9.


32. E.A. Freeman, "The Continuity of English History" (1860). *Historical Essays* (2nd ed., London, 1872), i, pp. 40—48, 50—51. Prof. John Burrow has studied Freeman's view of history which he has found entirely political and leaving aside all economic and social factors. It seems that Freeman's politics was directed to promoting a pluralist ideal for future Europe, a Liberal federation of nations. His vision of the future of the British Empire excluded those colonies which did not have any historical or racial connections to the centre (the British colonies were not as friendly as the Greek ones had been to their motherland). These projections featured in his analysis of the Finno-Russian relations although the Gladstonian principle that "freedom" is the primary consideration in foreign policy was Freeman's initial stance towards the "Eastern Question": the sending of the British fleet to harrass Finnish coasts in the Crimean War had only helped the unjust rule of Turks over the Balkans and Christians. See Burrow, *A Liberal Descent*, p. 220—23; James Bryce, *Studies in Contemporary Biography* (London, 1903), pp. 272—74: *The Life and Letters of E.A. Freeman*. Ed. W.R.W. Stephens (London, 1895), i, pp. 121—22.
and progressive theme of the education of a nation varied according to changing circumstances in other European countries, and in Eastern and Central Europe old liberties and rights of peoples had sunk into regressive oblivion. In many countries they were deliberately held in abeyance by despotic governments and only recently had attempts towards their restoration been resumed. This especially applied to those parts of Europe where old races that had been ethnologically dispersed lingered on and could not become politically influential. In the 1870s, of the old Finnish peoples only the Hungarians, having changed their race to become Europeans and the Bulgarians, having changed their race to become Slavs, had some sort of historicity and meaning in European history.

Later, having studied, by a method not much dissimilar to that of Latham, the traces of European races more carefully, a more comprehensive picture of the history of the Finnish race began to take shape. Since the eighth century the Teutonic and Slavic invasions had sent them on their migrations towards the North and already in the twelfth century Finland had been brought into the Teutonic sphere of influence. The "Oceanic", Teutonic culture had made inroads into the Baltic and Scandinavia, a cultural area based rather on inland connections and Baltic dominance than on long-distance seafaring. The Teutonic incursions in the midst of pagan "Turanians" (Finns) had resulted in the erection of a cultural-racial frontier against Russia. Here, the processes of racial assimilation had been much slower than in Western Europe and the building up of national types was delayed. In Eastern and North-Eastern Europe nation-building was at its beginnings, religion and language being the indicators to identify a nationality. Of Finland, there was nothing specific yet to be told.

When discussing Gladstone's "Home Rule for Ireland"-proposal Freeman reminded his readers of the complexity and danger of imprecise parallels. To him "Home Rule" meant simply that a

33. E.A. Freeman, "Comparative Politics" (1873). Lectures, p. 234.
34. E.A. Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe (London 1881), I, pp. 13, 114, 128, 131, 463—67; II, maps i, xv, li and lii. In Freeman's opinion Russia itself had grown from the tiny Scandinavian, Varangian ("Rus") offshoot, the first Russian "republics" of Novgorod and Kiev.
country had the management of its internal affairs in its hands leaving foreign affairs and other general matters to the sovereign power. Examples of this were the relations between Britain and Canada, Poland and Russia (1815—30) and Russia and Finland. Supporting Gladstone, Freeman stressed that these kinds of relations did not mean imperial disintegration, and added that they were not federations in the proper sense of the term. From the Polish-Russian relation the British could learn how to fail, from the Finnish-Russian how to succeed in running "Home Rule." The unique history of the Finnish-Russian union taught how to restore, preserve and reform the constitution once given to a people. Yet, the really historical moment for the Finns of Finland could be dated in the distant past. Comparatively speaking, they had been lucky for they had migrated and arrived so near to the fountain of civilization:

'...' once so widely spread, (the Finnish race) has in some parts given way to Aryan settlement, in others it has made its way by conquest into lands already Aryan (Hungary), while in one it has stayed at home and grown its growth, under Aryan rule certainly, but under a rule which did not carry with it either displacement, bondage or assimilation.

The other landmark in their history was the restoration of their "Aryan"-imposed Swedish constitution by Alexander I in 1809. He had given them a national being in the memorable meeting of the Finns and their conqueror which resembled the early medieval gathering of Vandals and Goths around their king in Sweden. The impression of popular rule was emphasized by Freeman — he respected the Finnish Diet because of the presence of the peasants who had never been serfs and who represented the true people. By the single act of guaranteeing the constitution Alexander had created a nation, and restored and resuscitated its life-cycle. This climax was nothing less than freedom regained.

37. Freeman, "Finland", q. p. 322.
38. Freeman, "Finland", pp. 322—23. The Finnish sociologist and Liberal Edvard Westermarck (1862—1939) provided Freeman with the needed information. He
How had the Finns themselves taken part in their evolutionary process from a wandering tribe to a nation? Freeman’s answer was that the evolution was inherent in them; it was essentially intellectual, an evolution of the idea of national independence coeval with the reception of Western ideas in Finnish minds. In view of this, what Alexander did was a natural fulfilment of it. First, the Finns had for centuries defended themselves against the Russian attacks, secondly towards the end of the sixteenth century they had already been granted the status of a "Grand Duchy" by John III of Sweden, and thirdly, there had been a separatist movement in Finland at the end of the eighteenth century. This logical chain did not end with Alexander’s guarantees. Further restorations of Finnish liberties had followed which amounted almost to a full repossession: in 1811 "Old Finland" was reunited to Finland proper, in 1863 there was the Finnish "Reform Bill", and in 1869 the Finnish Diet was made regular and the franchise was extended. All the contradictions of interests and the bitter realities of late nineteenth-century Finland were forgotten for the sake of national evolution. The Finnish-speakers, though not quite as civilized as the Swedish-speakers, had gained an equal standing in the acceptance of the Finnish language, the racial antagonism between them appeared to have been resolved and the language struggle had come to an end as both parties had realized their common, national interest.

As well as being a repository of constitutional freedom, history could also be a source of unexpected regression and malice. The

had sent the Old-Finn J. Danielson-Kalmari’s Finland’s Unification to Russia which interpreted the Diet of 1809 as a mutual contract, with some information on the representation of the Estates. Freeman was amazed by how the old Swedish constitution had been revived. See Freeman to Westermarck 29.11. and 20.12. 1891. Westermarck MSS, x, 1519 and 1520a. Åbo Academi Library, Turku, Finland. Freeman did not live to receive Westermarck’s thanks — Westermarck regarded Freeman’s article as the most important in the West though it can be doubted whether Freeman had much influence because the opinion of the academic Liberals had been on the downgrade in England even if their articles still stirred the political conscience of the reading intellectuals. Cf. The Life and Letters of E.A. Freeman, II, p. 459; Harvie, The Lights of Liberalism, p. 13. For the early British contacts of the Finnish propagandists, see Edward Westermarck, Minnen ur Mit Liv (Helsingfors, 1927), pp. 76—9; Adolf Törngren, På Utländsk Botten (Helsingfors, 1930), pp. 11—12.

Russian government, urged on by growing Russian nationalism and the claim that Finland was only a "province", had decided to put unification into effect. Freeman was well informed about these measures, about the codification of Finnish laws, about the plans to make Russian-Orthodoxy the second official religion in Finland, about making offices open to Russians, and about the Postal Manifesto (1890) which unified the Finnish postal service with the Russian one. Freeman lamented:

It would surely have been a nobler work to make Russia as Finland than to make Finland as Russia.40

It would have been nobler to make Russia a constitutional monarchy but it was as if Alexander III tried to turn the wheel of history backwards by going against the pledges of his predecessors. The right policy would have been to "do nothing". Alexander should not have listened to the voices of reaction which Liberal opinion in Russia seemed unable to thwart any longer. The "Home Rule" of Finland, the most admirable expression of autocratic statesmanship, much admired by Gladstone, was at stake. Finland was not alone, the harvest of repression in Europe had already begun:

What Bohemia has been robbed of, what Ireland yearns for, Finland still keeps.41

There always remained, for a liberal optimist like Freeman, a hope for better times because regression in history was only temporary as the forces of enlightenment would soon recover. Yet, the next phase of Finnish history could not, in Freeman's vision, be the era of mass-democracy42. The natural aristocracy in Finland, the combined forces of Teutonic Swedish-speakers and awakened Finns should continue their task of educating the masses as well as their efforts in defending the constitution, the cornerstone of

40. Freeman, "Finland", q. p. 327.
which was the shaky promises of the Tsars.

The constitutionalists both in Britain and Finland became, in the 1890s, well aware that the times were changing for the worse for the small nationalities of Europe. British Liberals, who were in a position to compare the tendencies of imperialism more widely than the Finns, still saw the future prospects of Finland as encouraging and hopeful. In the same way as there were hopes that Austria would relax its grip on Hungary, Russia would let the Finns go their own way. Although the omens of Russification told against this wishful thinking, the Liberal proselytising relied on the good influence of their optimistic messages, and as Finland now appeared united, they also counted on the impact of their opinion on the Tsar. Whether Finland was a weakness or a stronghold to Russia, the Finns had at least made themselves known as a vigorous race which should be taken seriously. The racial dimension in British Liberal politics had come to stay since the 1870s, and it was largely by studying the various types of races of the Russian Empire that its strength could be compared with that of the British Empire. Here, the Finns were an exceptionally well-governed and fit race to survive on its own if only given an opportunity to do so.

V

At first sight, British writing on Finland in the 1880-90s appears as panoramic snap-shots in which unprecedented views and attitudes are thrown into view. The variety was largely caused by the contradicting political objectives of the Conservatives and the Liberals but also by the eclectic character of the sources British writers used (mostly Finnish and Swedish but also German, French and Russian) but the general lines of argument stayed within the bounds of racialist and constitutionalist interpretations coloured by the personal style and stance of the individual writer. Here, the evolution of Finland and the Finns could be seen from many angles.

For some tourists the land itself was subsiding fast, a process the beginning of which could be dated back to glacial times. This impression of a continual process reminiscent of the early stages of geological formation; the rising coast-line, protruding rocks, erratic
blocks ("looking like broken ramparts of ancestral castles"⁴³) and watery marshlands fitted well with the one gained of people struggling with obstinate nature; draining the swamps, clearing the forests for new "colonies", lowering the lakes, damming the streams, felling timber, and most recently, starting the main timber industries. Nature itself had forced the Finns to work hard for their progress.

In contrast, the simple and weary everyday life of the Finnish countryside might seem arrested but not entirely backward because the main communications, especially the telephone and the railways which the British so much appreciated, reached there. What disturbed some visitors was the lack of historical continuity. Even if the landscape in the summer was bright, green and lake-blue promising some lively impressions, for a Briton who did not find all levels of progressive civilization in the backward-looking agricultural inland, there was, because of the adolescence of the Finnish culture, "absolutely nothing to remind you of the history of humankind, no ancient monuments or hallowed ruins, no footsteps of an extinct race or faint traces of a forgotten civilization"⁴⁴. As if the Finns, having arrived in Finland, had started to build their country right from the beginning. Yet another way to relate the ("Mongolian") Finns to their "silent and lonely" surroundings was to make them look peaceful and passionless, sometimes to such a degree that the legislation (prohibition laws) used to deter people from such "passions" as hard-drinking seemed redundant:

It may be true that the sober moral virtues of this primitive people are thus forced upon them, just as it is true that in this cold and pulseless land whose very configuration seldom rises above the level of its tree tops, passion and emotion, the usual incentives to crime, are thus conspicuously absent; but it is at least creditable to their vitality that, as a nation, the Finns have survived the centuries during which their country has served as the bloody shield and themselves as the sword of Sweden, and now in these last years, are raising to themselves, in their town-centers of civilization, monuments of peace, art and culture.⁴⁵

⁴⁵. M.A. Stobart, "In the Land of Thousand Lakes". Pall Mall Magazine, xii (1897), q. p. 481.
The cultural manifestations of the inner life-force which had kept
the Finns alive but silent for so long now poured from the national
organism. In towns, the recently established schools, industries,
new trading connections and communications told of the progress
in them, and especially in the cosmopolitan atmosphere of
Helsinki, British tourists felt at home even if some fishermen, adventurers and repose-seeking English ladies could enjoy the
loneliness and wilderness of the countryside for purifying
recreation. And yet even they wandered along the well-provided
cart-routes, spent their nights in well-equipped inns and ate food
which did not cause any trouble for the stomach. Consequently, it
is no wonder that most of the Finland-goers concentrated on
describing and estimating the "modern" phenomena which, in
Finnish settings, appeared so fresh, unspoiled and not decadent.
They could also meet the "Finnish" and "Swedish" types mixed
producing the modern "Young Finn" in towns, the resourceful
race of the future. As observed by an English lady, out of the union
of the "melancholy, cautious and conservative" Finn with the
"enterprising Swede-Finn" was born not a "socialist or anarchist"
but a law-abiding and common-sensical Finn who did not resort to
revolutionary actions but stayed on the safe constitutional path of
gradual reform and progress. Often the Finn looked like a
bettered Mongol. The women of the race were not as beautiful as
the "Caucasian" (Aryan) women, the men were physically
"Mongolic" but morally almost Western (industrious, sober,
obstinate, proud, independent, honest, peaceful etc.), a propensity
which marked them off from the Russians. Their culture was that
of telephones, factories, saw-mills, clean post-stations, railways,
canals, parks and spacious towns, most of the paraphernalia of
"modernism" which in Finland assumed a peculiar character of

46. F.J. Whishaw, "Finnish Fish and Fishermen". Outing, 27 (1895) was one of
them.
47. A.M. Clive-Bayley, Vignettes from Finland (London, 1895), pp. 55, 58—59,
295—96.
677—79, 701, 703. Cf. Stobart, "In the Land of Thousand Lakes", p. 471;
Whishaw, "Finnish Fish and Fishermen", p. 57; E.B. Tweedie, Through
Finland in Carts (London, 1897), pp. 7, 11, 219 (The books by this feminist
writer were very popular in England); C.E. de la Boer Beresford, "Finland and
Her Soldiers". The United Service Magazine (1878), p. 526.
striving adaptation to rough settings. And it was just this feature of modernism that materially and morally distinguished Finland from slow-going Russia. Yet, at the heart of the matter, the constitution of Finland and its by-products, free thinking and a free press, had engendered the ways of thinking without which "progress" could not have been possible. Only very rarely was it seen as having any disadvantageous consequences:

The extremely democratic nature of thought in Finland, which contrasts so curiously with the ideas of the masses in Russia, has, perhaps, acted unfavourably on the discipline of the Finns as compared with the Russian soldier.49

Finnish freedom, in contrast with Russian submissiveness, could be traced back to the original liberty of the Finnish peasant restored by the Swedish law or to the supposed freedom of the freemen of the Kalevala revived by the same "Aryan" infusion. Whichever the source, since the reforms of 1860—80s the Finns had entered a period of renaissance in their history:

'...' of its own gigantic tenacity of soul prompted with a knowledge of its destiny, though sneered at, and threatened on all sides by famine, contempt and absorption Finland is like a man who has slept long and suddenly wakes up refreshed, with renewed vigour to work.50

A young growth could not feel the discontents of degenerate civilization yet and if only Russia let the Finnish culture "grow" freely it might reach far. However, as the British and the Finns themselves knew, there was no room within the boundaries of the Russian Empire for a vigorous but alien race to expand its territory. For this reason, it was widely confessed that it was only in domestic culture that the Finns could do their best.

49. Beresford, "Finland and Her Soldiers", q. p. 530.
50. Tweedie, q. p. 124. To her the Young-Finns, the Liberal Finnish-Swedish party was the motor of Finland's progress.
One of the criteria by which the "progress" of Finns could be measured was the condition of their higher education and its ends in comparison to British standards. According to a Scottish academic the financing of the Finnish university was extremely "liberal" at least as regards the fees, scholarships and subsidies from the government. In these terms the Finns were almost as advanced as the Germans, whose efficient higher education caused both worry and admiration in Britain. In Finland the lack of talent of the "semi-Turanian" people and scarcity of scientific resources was balanced in their favour by a patriotic zeal in national (ethnological and philological) studies. In their enthusiasm they testified to the "stern and rugged energy of Wainamoinen". Swedish culture in Finland had done its service by preserving the vernacular Finnish and welcoming the Finns as younger brothers in culture, whereas in Russia the Finnish languages had been "swallowed and lost". After the Russian conquest and under their mild rule the hidden powers of Finnish had been released and the first generation of native scholars had laid the foundations for further research. And here was the difference between Finnish and British scholars: the Finns were no individualists but had taken up the tasks left by their forerunners, Porthan, Lönnrot and Castrén. They pursued national ideals — this did not happen in Edinburgh. The Finnish keenness to know and to spread knowledge among the common people was confirmed by the habits of the peasants in reading newspapers and periodicals and not only their Bible and hymnbooks in their smoke-cabins during the weary winter evenings. The education of the people was a part of the national programme and it seemed that the Finns believed, more than the British, in the latent powers of the common people to civilize themselves. The only obstacle to this was the Russian censorship that restricted the contents of the message.

Cf. E.B. Butler’s notes to V. Vasenius’s Outlines of the History of Printing in Finland (London, 1892), e.g. on page 32.
Some of the conjecture concerning the ultimate cause of the Finnish renaissance involved inevitable idealization of the Finnish race. Assuming that there was enough evidence to prove the affinity of Akkadian and Finnish languages, E.J. Dillon (1854—1933), comparative philologist and journalist (correspondent for the *Daily Telegraph* in Russia 1887—1914), inferred that Finns had been "active and civilized" before the Greeks and the Aryans, they had cleared forests, composed epics, worked mines and moulded metals before migrating from their original seat of Babylon through Russia to Finland. There these "quiet" and "peaceful" Finns had struggled for life and developed a strong democratic spirit. In the Finnish climate and conditions, apparently more demanding than the British, "all species of the human butterfly and parasite" had died out, and now the Finnish schools and laws kept their young from "drifting into vice, crime and drunkenness" which obviously damaged the living organism of British society, and made them useful members of the Finnish society.

The modern Finns were in no way behind their glorious ancestors. Dillon enumerated the progressive aspects of Finnish culture: the Diet's openhanded support for national education and other institutions, its loans to peasants to buy land, its financial support for industry, and the equal position of women (an Akkadian atavism) and found the protective customs-duties the only ones that hampered free trade and "fair play". The people able to accomplish all this were, in Dillon's view, capable of defending themselves against the Russians. The Tsar was not the head of a "superhuman race" on whose order the Finns should change their soul, religion and traditions. Instead, what the Finns were justified in expecting from him was that he would keep the terms of the contract of 1809. W.T. Stead (1849—1912), the sensational journalist and radical Liberal editor of the *Review of Reviews* agreed but accused Dillon of picking up the best of Finland and of ignoring how Finland had to be grateful to Russia.

54. Dillon, "Finland", p. 291—93. One of the "proofs" was that "Suomi" (Finland) was akin to "Sumeri".
56. Dillon, "Finland", pp. 293, 308.
and its benign autocrat for its national existence in the first place. A Russophile defended Russia against a Russophobe defending Finland but both basically agreed that Finland deserved to remain intact because of its relatively high level of civilization.

For many a Briton Finland had been a refuge for a homeless race desperately seeking to give birth to a culture. For this, according to one unknown British reviewer who used mainly Finnish sources in her description, Finland was well-prepared as it was "sheltered by wilderness and yet attainable by seas". Predestined by God and urged on by their inner vitality toward nation-building, the Finns had, after purposeless wanderings in the East, come into proximity with the West. The fact that they did not have written records of their past glories was compensated for by the Kalevala which at least seemed to provide an anchor in the past for the Finnish nationalists. For Dempster, who at this point departed from her Finnish authors, the Kalevala revealed the core of Finnish culture; it nourished the essence of the Finnish race and told of the differences between the Finnish and Aryan morality on which the differences between their cultures rested. The Aryans had conquered the world by the sword, the Finns by the word. The peace-loving Finns had tried to avoid all the violence of the mainstream of civilization and had, for the purpose of remaining "free", escaped to the North while the Latin and Norman peoples had been subjected to "feudalism and military dictatorship". The Middle-ages had been a night also for the Finns but the particular racial propensity which invigorated them smouldered underneath. It was this resource which had lately transformed itself into a

58. Charlotte Dempster, "Finland". Edinburgh Review, 183 (1896), p. 78. She used Sakari Topelius's (a Finnish writer and historian) image of the birth of Finland: it had been dashed off by God from the left-overs of creation. This was the starting-point of a providential story where the Finns featured, if not as a chosen people of a promised land, as still favoured and capable of a distinct culture. In another publication, specially prepared for the British, Topelius stated that the Swedish-Finnish racial disjunction had been historically overcome by "community of faith, of government, of laws and of society" and only useless disputes remained to disturb their solidarity. See, Finland in the Nineteenth Century. Ed. L. Mechelin (Helsingfors, 1894), pp. 51—52.
59. Dempster, "Finland", p. 82.
feeling of superiority in civilization that would keep them alive under the threatening Russian onslaught:

They would fight for their country, but never for aggrandisement; and who knows whether in the difference '...' we may not find an explanation for the incompatibility of the Finns with their masters? Theirs is an antipathy more deep-seated than can be accounted for by political reasons only.\(^6^0\)

However, to be able to shake off the yoke of their mighty master, the Finnish race had to become even stronger. As it was optimistically believed that mixtures of neighbouring and compatible races usually produced vigorous offspring, it seemed that "the great river" of Finnish descent was, in the 1890s, receiving a last dose of strength from a close "Swede-Finn" contact. Russification necessitated a concentrated counter-effort of the Finnish race:

It (Finnish race) is fed by affluents, by streams that have issue at different levels and that have run through different soils, but whose combination secures strength, volume and impetus. The solidarity of all these racial elements which might otherwise be contending and incommensurable, is gained when men have learnt that union is strength.\(^6^1\)

At this critical moment the Aryan infiltration could rescue the Finns. In culture it meant simply modernization. The Finns had already translated Darwin and Scott into Finnish, and the Finnish mythology was compatible with the Aryan\(^6^2\). In the social sphere, rarely touched on by the racialist writers, the same process of educating the Finns, carried out by the Aryan, Swedish landowners went on smoothly:

Around such landlords live the native Finns, hewers of wood and drawers of water, cleaners of forests, and above all, makers of

\(^6^0\) Dempster, "Finland", q. p. 83.
\(^6^1\) Dempster, "Finland", q. p. 84.
\(^6^2\) Dempster, "Finland", pp. 84—86, 88—89. Here the smith Ilmarinen of the *Kalevala* was comparable with Thor. In general the *Kalevala* reflected the rising of the ethical level of Finnish morality.
butter. They speak their native speech; they are poor, frugal, and hard-working, if prone to hard-drinking. These peasants breed horses, weave and spin, work in the sawmills and dairies and are all the time capable of a great amount of training and culture. 63

These people were not serfs and they were able to understand modern civilization. In Finland, unlike Britain, the labourers on the land seemed agreeable and industrious and the Swedish-speaking "landlords" could now racially tolerate their existence. A British observer was sometimes susceptible to making too much of the union of the Finns and their former masters — the harmony envisaged by racialist logic could be fragile in reality. The reconciliation of the Fennoman and Svecoman could easily be projected on to the people and the only friction was detected within the ruling élite alone. The harmony was broken only by those gentlemen who worked for the Russian government 64. The archetype of the progressive Finn was a nationalist, enterprising aristocrat or a mill-owner who made the people work in modern factories, mills or dairies and who in doing this brought to their knowledge the advantages of modern civilization, literacy and a utilitarian work-ethic. He was a personification of the new cultural hero of the united West and East, composed of the qualities of strength and contemplativeness which were urgently needed in times of threatening national disaster. It was not the time to speak out about rising social unrest, or socialist agitation in Finland, or of the widening gap between the tenants, landless and beggars and the wealthy classes, when the social organism of the country needed vital sustenance and its freedom a strong guardian.

VII

The notion of 'freedom' developed within the long tradition of Whiggish historical writing was an indispensable concept for the British to grasp the position of the Finns. The Finnish Liberals and

63. Dempster, "Finland", q. pp. 94—95.
64. Dempster, "Finland", pp. 95—96.
constitutionalists also relied on it when defending the autonomy of Finland at the turn of the century. For the constitutionalist Liberals in England as well as for legalists in Finland, 'freedom' grew into an ideology not deduced from the study of how matters stood in society but "from what individual men hope and fear."65. For the Liberals, either in Finland or in England, the rights of the individual mattered most. In writing on the future of Finland, there was more fear on the part of the Finns and more hope on the part of the British as the latter sympathized with the struggle of the former in trying to preserve the newly-gained rights. In the first place, British observers understood that the special relationship of Finland to Russia was under revision, and a substantial one, after 1899, but they did not always regard this as a cause for great alarm. The concern aroused by the leader of Finnish passive resistance against Russification and chief Finnish propagandist in England, Julio N. Reuter (1863—1937)66 was not welcomed by the Liberal friends of Russia and has to be understood against the background of the experiences of the Swedish-Finnish educated élite, especially the academic Liberals. It was their ideas of 'freedom', law and enterprise that had inaugurated the progressive era of culture now fostered by common effort, and it was their rights that had been extended since 1863 and were now about to be curtailed67.

To the British observers there were many other perspectives open to Finnish-Russian relations and their span of ideas was wider and more international. They could approach the Finnish-Russian contention from various historical standpoints, they could assign to 'Finnish freedom' a shorter or longer continuity and give to the Finns different pasts, from Akkadian descent to a history of

66. Reuter who turned from a legalist to an activist during the first period of Russification and who established a Finnish press-bureau in London had proposed to the British Secretary of War in 1904 that if the British invaded Finland the Finns would rebel against Russia. His opinions were extreme but they reveal the mood of the Finns who felt themselves independent and ready to leave Russia.
67. Reuter himself held that the cultured classes of Finland descended from mixed Swedish-Finnish origins; the Swedes had given their activity and pluck to them, the Finns had tempered the Scandinavian spirit with their meditative and persevering character. See his "Russia and Finland". Nineteenth Century, xlx (May, 1899), p. 702.
Ugrian-Aryan co-operation. Alongside with the constitutional interpretation, the imperialist and racialist argument was persuasively deployed. The bright side of British racialism amounted to arguing that in the multiplicity of races the great majority were capable of learning, and thus the British might rejoice in the outbursts of vitality of the Finnish nation, whatever its root. On one hand, what mattered was that they were free and taking to "parliamentarism" when compared with the semi-feudal and backward Russia where uniformity, bureaucracy, censorship reigned. On the other hand, to balance the scales in favour of Russia, there remained the basic fact that Russia, like Britain, was an Empire which had its superior interests. The limits of argument against Russia were thus theoretically bound up with the rules of British imperial legislation but also directed by practical Liberal politics. The pragmatic Liberals understood the realities of Russia on the basis of common imperial historical experience, and when they supported the rapprochement of Russia and Britain in international politics, they did not find it easy to defend Finland without irritating Russia. These restrictions have to be kept in mind when analysing the British arguments on behalf of the Finns.

6. British responses to the Finnish-Russian constitutional contention, 1899—1918

6.1. Immediate reactions

The fears of Finns over their constitution did not prove groundless. Tsar Nicholas II approved of the plans for an administrative unification of the Empire, and the first measure to put it into effect in Finland was to call on the Finns to share in the burden of imperial defence. The hitherto practically nonexistent Finnish army was to be reinstated and incorporated into the Russian army. What upset the Finns were the clauses according to which its language of command should be Russian, it could be used outside Finland and its officers could be Russian. The scheme divided Finnish political opinion between those who wanted to co-operate with Russia (Compliants) and the legalists who treated the matter as a severe breach of the Finnish constitution: in the drafting of the military law, the opinion of the Finnish Diet had not been heard.

and it had been illegally imposed on the Finns. The Finnish Diet protested but later, the so called February Manifesto of 1899 by the Tsar clearly specified that he had the prerogative over imperial matters such as defence. The Finnish Senate, led by the conciliatory Compliants grudgingly bent but the Diet dissolved itself in protest. The legalists, among them Julio Reuter, Edward Westermarck, Yrjö Hirn and Adolf Törngren all of whom had connections with England, considered that the door for a wholesale Russification was left open. They adopted a policy of passive resistance, organized conscription-strikes, national and international petitions and addresses, left their posts and launched a propaganda-campaign abroad for the freedom of Finland. The crisis was aggravated by the nomination of a new Governor General, Nikolai Bobrikoff who was given dictatorial powers to control Finland which seemed to the Russian government as having become a hotbed of socialist and other anti-government agitation.

The immediate response of the British to the February Manifesto varied widely even within one political party, and there were positions taken which were outside the political map. To begin with, there was a disagreement within the Conservative Party. Those Conservatives who nourished longstanding misgivings about Russian foreign policy motives and who opposed Prime Minister Salisbury’s rapprochement with Russia in Far-Eastern matters sometimes raised their voices in Parliament. It was asked in Parliament whether the Government had notified Russia of the possible infringement of the Finnish constitution. Also the radical Liberal L.A. Atherley-Jones who was worried about the expansion of Russian influence in the Baltic area asked the Government whether there was not a contradiction between the Tsar’s military law and his peace-proposals. The government replied that it did not interfere with another Empire’s internal affairs. This dictum became the guiding-line of the official British attitude to Finland in the years 1899—1917 and remained quite firm especially during the Liberal-Unionist governments of H. Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith although a powerful radical Liberal pressure group increased its efforts to educate Russia in Finnish affairs. Of the British ambassadors to Russia, Sir Charles Scott (1899—1904), Charles Hardinge (1904—06), Sir Arthur Nicolson (1906—10) and George Buchanan (1910—18), Scott, Nicolson and Buchanan had
sympathies with the tenacious resistance of the Finns but they, following the instructions of the government and Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary in 1905—16, did not let the Finnish question disturb the development of friendly relations between Russia and Britain. The aim to keep an eye on German pretensions was of paramount importance. The pro-Finnish reports of the Finnophile Consul Cooke, recalled to his post in Helsinki in 1901, continued to irritate the Foreign Office throughout the period of Russification. However, there was no official source of information in Finland when the crisis broke out in 1899, and knowledge about Finland both in the Foreign Office and in the Liberal party was at the time dependent on second-hand Finnish or Russian sources and on the knowledge and notions of Finland already available in Britain.²

The Conservative Sidney Low attacked the Liberal-Imperialists who supported Salisbury’s policy of detente with Russia. In hoping for the coming of peaceful relations they had forgotten the principles of Palmerston and Canning and the duties the British Empire had to sustain against Russia. The Liberals had hypocritically welcomed the Tsar’s peace-proposals, overlooking how small nations and minorities, Jews, Armenians, Catholics, Protestants, Poles and Finns were being “hammered into the undistinguished mass” of the Russian Empire. The real motive behind the Russification of Finland was found in Russia’s need for its “conglomeration.”³ Low doubted whether it was worthwhile to negotiate with this sort of Russia. Here Low agreed with radical Liberals but in contrast with their policy, he would rather have seen the old isolationist foreign policy continued and British imperial efficiency strengthened.

*The Times*, regarded as a pro-government paper, published pro-Finnish leaders, largely initiated by Reuter who informed one of

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the editors, E.J.D. Wilson. The levelling of Finland to the status of a "province" was regarded as an insult to the higher civilization of Finland. Once *The Times* even allowed the racialist statement that Mr Pobedonostseff, the man behind the Russification plans, was trying to eradicate all "natural racial differences" for the sake of unity. If Russia had to be unified, the Russians should have followed the British way which was gradually to extend colonial self-government to the point where only a tie of imperial sentiment would remain⁴. This tone was apparently possible because the editor, Valentin Chirol opposed Salisbury's treaty with Russia over China⁵. However, after the outbreak of the Boer War, it was no longer easy to get arguments like that into *The Times*, and it seems that the British Conservatives and Liberals who supported the war did not want to discuss the issue of Finland at all⁶. In fact, there was an agreement between the British and Russian governments that if the Russians kept silent on the Boer War, the British would not raise a fuss about Finland⁷. So, although *The Times* continuously reported on Finland, its message was smoothed down to emphasize what damage the Russification of Finland would do to Russia if the traditionally loyal and law-abiding Finns were coerced by the non-Western dictatorial measures of Bobrikoff⁸. Instead, some jingoist comments had already been put forward elsewhere in the press. For instance, Fred T. Jane, a naval historian, wrote against pro-Finnish articles in the radical Liberal *Daily Chronicle* that it was, for the sake of imperial security, necessary for Russia to annihilate the constitution of Finland.

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7. Paasivirta, *Suomi ja Eurooppa*, pp. 340—41. When the Vice-consul for Britain in Viipuri, the Swedish-speaking Finn Eugene Wolff, made a powerful public speech against the Tsar's refusal to give audience to the international deputation for Finland in 1899, Russian government protested and Wolff was dismissed.
Although he admitted that coercion was "an Assyrian" method to initiate change in imperial matters, he warned against sentimentalism. Imperial integration might be fatal to some Finns but "of course this has its brutal side; the survival of the fittest always has". Jane had already argued against the decay of the British by ultracivilization which damaged the enterprising ("pirate") morality of the Anglo-Saxon race. Because the Russians now seemed to possess it, and because there was enough room in the world for both Slavic and Anglo-Saxon Empires, the Finns should not stand in Russia's way. Jane pointed out that the Anglo-Saxon and Slavic races did not feel any antipathy against each other. Embarrassed, "Two Finlanders" retorted that usually the Finns had been "psychologically" congenial to the British and wondered why this friendly feeling had eroded. This was what the majority of the British commentators could have accepted but many of them did not find the argument very useful in international politics. To convince Russia of its need to withdraw the Manifesto it was more sensible to emphasize that forced Russification only alienated Finland from Russia and thus jeopardized imperial security and harmed the Russian economy rather than to spur the Russians to even harsher measures by arrogant criticism. These arguments were used until the outbreak of the Russian revolution.

II

Liberal opinion on the Finnish question was broken into several factions. Some isolationists still supported the policy of not meddling with the continent and its 'mechanical' unification processes. Those who had already left the Liberal party to become Liberal Imperialists and opponents of Irish Home Rule and supporters of government's imperial and foreign policy evaded

public announcements in favour of Finland. One extreme view was that "the vanity of nations", nationalism, had also enchanted the small nations; even the Finns had claimed the ability to rule others, an entirely fallacious idea in times when big Empires decided the affairs of the world. Liberal Imperialists did not want the tiny Finnish question to aggravate the split in the Liberal party caused by the strengthening of the radical Liberal section. Having been requested to comment on Finland, Charles Dilke referred only to the economic losses the British might face and did not mention the constitutional struggle at all. The Liberal-Unionist, and professor of law at Oxford until 1909, A.V. Dicey (1835—1922) refused to sign the international address for Finland's autonomy because he thought it might only do harm to Finland. Privately he confessed to Reuter that there was no real power behind the good intentions of the Liberals and that they could not actually help. Besides, petitions, addresses, newspaper and periodical articles did not make a good impression on the Tsar. It seems that the Liberal-Unionists and Imperialists, apart from fearing that the Finnish question would further disturb the friendly relations of Britain and Russia and thus play into German hands, wanted no longer to use the Finnish-Irish parallel in the way Gladstone had done because they quite consistently supported the policy of imperial integration. Lord Rosebery (1847—1929), a Liberal Imperialist, who had since 1895 held aloof from party politics but continued eloquent addresses on the problems of the Empire, considered in 1902 that none of the dual governments in Europe (Russia and Finland, Austria and Hungary, Norway and Sweden) could provide a model for Irish Home Rule. Ireland was so near to the centre of the Empire, and its Parliament could become hostile towards Britain and cause serious trouble in case of war. Quite the opposite, a defender of Irish Home Rule saw the Finns and the Irish as "fellow-sufferers" since their histories, Finnish being an alternation of war, decline and temporary progress, the Irish one of continual extermination, had obvious parallels. Both deserved

Home Rule. Another leader of the Liberal-Unionists, James Bryce, did not see any point in blaming Russia while the British were doing wrong in the Transvaal. He eagerly wanted to keep the Liberal party undisturbed by the Finnish-Russian dispute but suggested that the best way to defend the Finnish cause was to organize an international cultural address to the Tsar.

The firmest "Friends of Finland" were the Liberals who defended the rights of the nations and believed in moral influence on governments in general. They wanted representative institutions and liberal constitution for Russia but avoided insulting the Tsar and Russians and preferred rational persuasion for they believed that the Finnish cause could not be helped by nagging the Russian leaders. However, there were radical campaigns against Russian as well as British imperialism for the sake of a more democratic government of the Empire. The Gladstonian Liberals did not like earning the title of promoters of the division of Persia or destruction of the autonomy of Finland. It would have meant a betrayal of Liberal political principles. After the failures of the peace initiatives and restrictions on armaments, a few famous scientists, among them A.R. Wallace, who signed the International Address of 1899 for Finland with pleasure, joined the forces of pacifism in the name of peaceful and rational social evolution against growing militarism and imperialism which gnawed at the freedom of the individual. The moral drawn from this for conducting the affairs of large Empires was that the subject races, such as the Philippines were for the USA and the Finns were for the Russians, should be taught imperial sentiment and affection by a lenient hand, not with coercion. The Tsar's "military despotism" would only alienate the Finns. Their situation after the military law was even more "pathetic" than that of the Boers because the constitutional development of a highly civilized people had been forcibly brought to an end.

While the British Liberals were drawing world-wide parallels,

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the Finnish propagandists tried to convince the British that the Finns really were highly civilized and deserved to enjoy their constitution untouched. Assisted by some British Liberals, they started a journal, *Finland*²¹. It was edited by a “Friend of Finland”, C.H. Perrott, and it was directed to leading British politicians and circulated to the British press. From June 1899 to May 1900 eleven issues came out but because it was not such a success it was followed by a less ambitious *Finland Bulletin* (until 1905) which was edited by the Finns only. The first issue of *Finland* provided a historical background for the discussion of the position of the Finns in the Russian Empire. The gist of the argument was that the Finns had been granted Scandinavian laws, institutions and rights since the Swedish crusades, that these rights had been progressively extended, and that the Finns did not have any “racial” attraction to the East, their original home, but towards the West. It was from there that the necessary impulse towards national unity had come:

The great majority of the population of Finland were not of the same race as their Western neighbours. The distinction, however, does not seem to have been an obstacle to the growth of a political solidity between the two parts of the Kingdom (Sweden-Finland), and the existence of Swedish colonies on the West coast of Finland contributed much to the completion of this cohesion.²²

Even if the “racial distinction” had remained, especially by the preservation of the Finnish language and by the Finnish separatism at the end of the eighteenth century, the tendency of the Swedish-speakers to “finnicize” had overcome it, and, according to this racialist interpretation, Finland had been a ready-made nation in racial respects already in 1809 when Alexander I found it only to release its potential for a national life²³. Picking up this national theme from Finnish history and removing the moment of the birth of the nation to the Middle-ages made the history of Finland look like the history of Britain. The Finnish writers knew

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²¹ *Finland* was financed from Finland and the Finnish propagandists provided most of the information on Finland.
²³ “Historical Introduction”, p. 6.
that racial "distinctions" between Anglo-Saxons and Normans in Britain had been reconciled a long time ago. In this way, the Finns could be regarded in Britain as a racially cohesive nation firmly facing Russification. This point was persistently pressed home to the British. The concept that the Finns had an inner racial capacity for freedom enhanced by the Swedish-speakers occurred in almost every issue of *Finland* in one form or another.

*Finland* took considerable pains to prove the capacity of the Finnish race to achieve high level of civilization. They were considered as a possible vigorous colonizing race for the USA if they were forced to the point of large-scale emigration by further oppression24, the Finnish "peasant" was given a democratic consciousness when rejecting the Tsar's offer of land intended to entice them against their Finnish lords25, the heroes of the war of 1808—09 were associated with Byron's Greek heroes26, and, at one point, the estrangement of the Finns from the Russians explained why the Governor General Bobrikoff was murdered. Murder was not the right way to oppose Russification although it was the expected one27. The desperation of the Finns under Russian rule showed how little justice there was in the world. The hopelessness of the Finnish case was reflected in a poem in the last issue of *Finland* where the poet prayed for help which he anticipated would not come for the dying nation28. It was also regretted that the British seemed to have lost their interest in the question by 1900. New hope dawned only after Russia lost the war against Japan in 1905 and the strikes in Russia and Finland forced the Tsar to withdraw the February Manifesto. The tone of the Finnish constitutionalists, some of whom had in the years 1899—1905 adopted the line of activism aiming at the final separation of Finland from Russia became more aggressive. And soon the writings of their British sympathizers became more hopeful in asserting the strength of the Finnish nation that had decided the first battle in Finland's favour.

26. *Finland*, 3 (Sept., 1899); 6 (Dec., 1899).
28. A. Browne, "From the North". *Finland*, 11 (May, 1900).
Apart from the short British pronouncements on the Finnish-Russian dispute, there were a few more serious British attempts to prove the Finnish case against Russia. A wide array of historical considerations came into use in defence of Finland and in evaluations of the real character of the relation of Finland to Russian. Experts of international law, in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, sought legal-historical grounds for the preservation of the Finnish constitution within the Russian Empire, even though according to international law Finland was clearly under Russian sovereignty. These 'scientifically' historical arguments will be discussed separately later\textsuperscript{29}, here it suffices to point out that the history of the British Empire and its dependencies served as a mirror to evaluate the position of Finland.

The fate of small nationalities within Empires was envisaged through the same Liberal idea of federation which had come up during the Crimean War. But at the turn of the century and towards the First World War it became resuscitated by the current notions of imperial efficiency and the organic unity of the Empire, not only material but also spiritual. As the British Empire seemed, for the first time in its history, to be really threatened not only outwardly but also inwardly (the Boer War, though won, showed British vulnerability tantamount to "decay"), the disease had to be diagnosed and cured. The Liberal Imperialists considered the expansion and integration of empires a natural process essential for their survival. The radical Liberals opposed this imperialism as irrational, immoral, militarist, emotional, jingoist and as a capitalist plot to benefit from its expansion\textsuperscript{30}. The idea of the Anglo-Saxon civilizing mission could be more liberally embodied in a future Empire governed by a feeling of belonging to a "commonwealth" rather to an Empire which was a despoticallyruled military bastion in rivalry and possibly at war, with other empires. Looming disintegration was to be prevented by allowing more self-government to its parts and by gradually granting the educated subject-races a share in government.

\textsuperscript{29} chapter 6.2.1.

\textsuperscript{30} See Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists, ch. v; Porter, The Critics of Empire, ch. 3.
The idea of federation was a kind of Liberal-idealistic extension of the concept of the organic society for it was thought by some leading political theorists that the evolution of national states tended towards formation of larger, multinational units in the future in which various nations represented enlarged "individuals" of the liberal political body. The structure of this monster-state did not exactly correspond to an organic structure though it metaphorically resembled it, being rather a "spiritual" network animated by a central parliament. The centralized German and the wavering Russian Empires appeared antithetical to the British one and seemed to be drifting away from the course the British Liberals imagined. The continental "higher ideals" of closer unity and power could crush local autonomies and endanger the peaceful evolution of each nationality by uniformity. The radical Liberals proposed to resolve the tensions within and between Empires by gradually extending "freedom" to their composite nationalities and races and by teaching them imperial sentiment and responsibility.

The Russian Empire, usually regarded as being in danger of dissolution because of its incoherence and "backwardness", was the realm of the Slavic civilizing mission. The Liberals who took a particularly racialist stance towards Russian history and politics speculated on whether the Slavic race had succeeded in consolidating its dominion, in stamping out the subterranean racial distinctions and tensions, and whether there was a real imperial sentiment called forth in Russia. For many, even the Duma of 1906 had not been able to cure the organic pathological handicap which provided the ultimate 'scientific' explanation of

31. See Ernst Parker, *Political Thought in England from 1848 to 1914* (C.U.P., 1915) which develops this concept.

32. A sympathetic interpretation of Liberal federalism says that the Liberals ineffectually opposed the "totalitarianism" of the prewar period whereas a far more critical view considers the ideas of federation as a logical extension of the "individualism" which, when derived from ontological subjectivism, ignored the contrasting interests of class and pressure groups in society, and was thus doomed to failure and decline as a political creed in England. This ignores the fact that in accordance with their naturalist belief in curing and strengthening of the political body, the Liberals did initiate many social reforms in Edwardian times. Cf. K. D. Bracher, *The Age of Ideologies* (London, 1985), pp. 14—15; Anthony Arblaster, *The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism* (Oxford, 1984).
Russia's decline. Forced cohesion, as tried in the case of the Russification of Finland, damaged the political body. To a British radical Liberal, commenting on Finnish-Russian relations, the Finns formed either a "centrifugal force", racially alien and culturally Western or, conversely, a valuable and strong addition to the future Russian federation of nations.

The February Manifesto had pointed in the direction the Russian government was taking in its own imperialism. For Robert Nisbet Bain (1854—1909), a historian of Scandinavia and Russia, the Manifesto was a great injustice because Finland was politically and culturally superior to Russia. The Russian civilizing mission could not find ground there. Russia should grow towards Central Asia and the Far-East. The Russians should leave Finland, "a tender shoot of exotic liberty on the trunk of an ancient autocracy" to evolve freely\(^{33}\). This would have been a natural continuation of constitutional development towards wider autonomy, inherent in Gustavus III's constitutional monarchy, revived by Alexander I and developed towards a more "democratic" form of government by Alexenders II and III. These amendments had been in the right line but the February Manifesto was a coup d'état. Thanks to the "natural phlegm" of the "shrewd, cautious and long-headed" Finns that they had not yet risen against the Tsar who had been pushed to the act of mechanical unification by his "reactionary camarilla"\(^{34}\). The evolutionary process had come to a halt by decrees of "Oriental Despotism" which again revealed its true character. It worked against Western principles of government lately used in Finland. The aim of the regime of the dictator Bobrikoff was to try all sorts of illegalities which seriously infringed the liberty of a free Finnish citizen. At the heart of the matter lay the fundamental difference of governmental systems in England and Russia. Russia was becoming a corrupt autocracy. Power had slipped from the hands of the Tsar to bureaucrats and favourites whose disastrous goal was to unify Russia at all costs.

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33. R.N. Bain, "Finland and the Tsar", *Fortnightly Review*, 65 (May, 1899), pp. 735—36. For Bain the annexation of Finland to Russia had been a natural outcome of the decline of the Swedish power but at the present the union was "artificially kept" and was not based on common sentiment or interest any longer. Cf. R.N. Bain, *Scandinavia* (Cambridge, 1905), pp. vi—vii, 41, 118—19, 136—38; *Slavonic Europe* (C.U.P., 1908), pp. 296—97.

34. Bain, "Finland and the Tsar", pp. 741—44.
According to the Unionist Liberal periodical, the Spectator, this was to build a Russia of an "unbroken mass of power, obeying everywhere the same impulse", the Tsar's ukases actually drafted by the bureaucrats themselves. If this continued, the Finns would soon be "lost forever in the Russian morass". The anonymous writer observed accurately that the majority of the Finns did not actually object to autocracy in principle, only to the new, dubious way in using it against the Finnish constitution. Autocracy was, according to him, taking the circumstances and the level of civilization of Russia into account, as necessary for it as Parliament was for the British Empire. In Finland the powers of the Tsar were limited, but now, in a new historical situation in which all Empires needed integration, the terms of autonomy apparently needed revision. But the Russian methods were all too harsh. The writer appealed to Russian statesmanship to understand that differences in language and in religion did no harm to Empires as the union of Wales and England proved. The Russians should have known that uniformity "paralyses", reduces an Empire to a sea of sand, chaos without strength and germs of spontaneous development. In uniformity, in the levelling of all to the same value and power, there lurked the dangers of revolution and entire dissolution. Therefore a word of warning was not amiss:

We admit that the British policy, which leaves all outside subjects their own ways, is more troublesome, but is it so certain that it is not the safer of the two? Which perishes first and more completely, the colossus or the forest of statues?

The prospect of decline which frightened the British should have frightened the Tsar, too. He should have retreated and left Finland alone. Otherwise it was bound to drift apart from Russia and all the advantages of peaceful and common evolution would be lost. Certainly, the motives of unification were quite comprehensible to the British but the realization of such an ideal in relation to

Finland was being "purchased at too great sacrifice to human happiness". Everything seemed to speak for the preservation of the Finns: they had not done anything wrong, they had not abused their privileges, they had been loyal. It was the Russians who had broken the contract. In this pessimistic light, the situation of the Finns before the 1905 restoration seemed quite desperate, and as a survival-kit they were, once again, urged towards mass emigration to North America, the land where the Anglo-Saxons were looking for a new life. And actually there was a record wave of Finnish emigrants to America at the turn of the century although its background was not as simply political as the Finnish constitutionalists and British radicals made it appear. In any case, for the contemporary British, the messages from Finland could be interpreted in keeping with the notion of evolution. A vigorous nation, built up from the best ingredients and reared by the guidance of the best of traditions, could not die but was destined to withstand and survive in one way or another.

The British, who compared the British and Russian Empires in strength by calculating the relative value of their composite nationalities and races, conceived of Finland either as a stronghold of a Western type of culture and a potential danger to the unity of Russia or as a possible member of the Slavic Empire. Later, after the initial responses of the British to the 1899 Russification, these arguments found more 'scientific' (historical-legalist or racialist) formulations. Having surveyed the ramifications of the arguments we must now turn to the exposition of their main variants, some of which were being used as proofs during the second period of Russification (c. 1910—1917) when the Finnish-Russian contention once again reached the limelight of international debate.

38. Anon., "Russia and Finland". The Spectator (May, 1899), pp. 741—42. The writer argued in defense of Bain against Stead who had written that the new military law was not too heavy for the Finns. He stated, in agreement with the Finnish legalists, that it was the principle that really mattered: the way the law had been made was unconstitutional.
6.2. The Finnish question: variations on a liberal theme

6.2.1. The constitutionalist argument

I

Soon after the publication of the February Manifesto the majority of British Liberal commentators on Finnish-Russian relations had become convinced that Russia was to blame for the crisis because it had, seemingly without any good reasons other than pure Realpolitik and for the sake of imperial, pan-Slavic unity, demolished the foundation of the Finnish constitution, the right of the Finnish Diet to take part in legislation. The Tsar and the Russian Government had acted wrongly. It seemed to the British, and not only through Finnish sources of information, that the Tsar had been misled by his advisers who had mischievously laid out a scheme for the Russification of Finland backed up by an invented notion that Finland had been since the days of Alexander I only another province of the Empire. The Finns appeared to have kept the terms of what they and most of the British regarded as a 'contract'. The policy of Nicholas II was certainly a violation of a well-established tradition in the treatment of Finland and its constitution.

However, conclusive evidence in favour of the case of the Finns was missing. To bring the facts to light, J.R. Fisher, a former editor of the Northern Whig was sent, after the publication of the February Manifesto, to Finland by The Times to collect material concerning the contention and investigate the Finnish constitution. He had left the Liberal party over Irish Home Rule. He had strongly defended the Protestant religion in Ireland and it is arguable that he considered that Finland, unlike Ireland, deserved its Home Rule not only because of its historic rights but also because it was wholly Protestant39. In autumn 1899 he published

his findings in a book which was, in spite of its technical subject matter, quite widely used as a standard work on the legal aspect of the Finnish-Russian dispute. Fisher set forth the historical background of the Finnish constitutional development and concentrated on the documents which testified that all the previous Tsars had respected the letter of the constitution and had even initiated many reforms to it. Going back to the times of Swedish conquest of Finland in the twelfth century, he at first recorded the "fact" that the tribal Finns had not themselves been able to create a state, which had been a Swedish implant on Finnish soil, and then emphasized that since their separation from Sweden it had been the "endurance, undaunted energy and perseverance of the Finns themselves" that had contributed most to the rapid evolution of the constitution. Fisher's arguments made Tsar Alexander I little more than a tool in restoring the Finnish constitution in 1809 which year marked the starting-point of a progressive departure of Finnish history away from the stagnant "backwardness" of Russia. Once joined, Russia and Finland were predestined to different futures. In the 1860—80s Finland was a testing-ground for reforms possibly extended to Russia, but since Alexander II turned "reactionary" Finland went its own way. In Fisher's view, this state of affairs had irritated the Russian nationalist controversialists who tried to reinterpret the history of the Finnish-Russian connection. To Fisher the February Manifesto was a logical conclusion of their systematic distortion of the terms of the 'contract'. The Russians had been looking for an interpretation of the relation which would give Russification the stamp of legality. For example, the Russian jurist K. Ordin had alleged in the 1890s that

40. See anon., "Review of 'Finland and the Tsars'". The Athenaeum, 3765 (Dec., 23, 1899) in which its arguments were found "watertight". Valvoja (1908) expressed its gratitude in conjunction with the publication of Fisher's letter of 1905 where he had congratulated the Finns on the restoration of the status quo ante 1899. Fisher had warned the Finns against racial hatred which had haunted the Irish question and now could spoil the cause of Finland. Earlier on he had already hoped for two chambers to the Finnish Eduskunta; the "Lords" would balance the legislation by delaying too hasty reforms. Fisher feared that racial, language and class troubles might lead to a revolution in Finland if the Finns were not cautious enough in this respect. See Fisher to Reuter 10.3. and 26.8. 1899. Reuter MSS, v.
Alexander I had not granted any constitution but only affirmed local "constitutions" thus identifying them with Russian provincial constitutions. Fisher's textual criticism showed that Alexander had in fact used the singular form ("constitution"), and he supported this also by showing that Alexander had referred to Finns as "inhabitants" not as Russian "subjects" in the text. Here Fisher reminded Nicholas II, to whom his book was addressed, that there had been also in Britain some kings who had not been able to read historical documents and still the documents had remained valid. The former Tsars had understood this; Alexander I had kept his pledges and separated the government of Finland from that of Russia, Nicholas I had revered his father's words and kept the constitution intact and Alexander II had guaranteed and even reformed the constitution constitutionally. All this had augmented the "progress" of Finland. Only during the reign of Alexander III had "reaction" set in; the Postal Manifesto and codification of Finnish laws told of its deeds.

Up to this point Fisher had acquiesced in the arguments of his Finnish legalist authors (Mechelin et al.) but when it came to the root of the contention, the question of sovereignty, Fisher drew his own conclusions from the documents. Where the Finns had stressed that the Tsar could not create any new laws without the consent of the Diet, Fisher emphasized that it was the Tsar who had the right to convoke Diets, initiate new laws, veto them and give ukases. He was, after all, the sovereign. Where Nicholas II had gone astray was in this: in drafting the military law and especially the February Manifesto he had not realized that these issues involved consultation with the Finnish Diet. The Tsar was the sovereign but not an autocrat in Finland, and yet because the nice difference between these two denominations had not been clearly defined in the "incompletely evolved" Finnish constitution, it left the Tsar a "hole" to be an autocrat.

It was this 'hole', the obscure area of imperial interest personified in the will of the Tsar which was considerably widened during the second period of Russification in 1910—1914, when almost every conceivable matter was interpreted as belonging to it.

42. Fisher, Finland and the Tsars, pp. 14—16, 43—45.
43. Fisher, Finland and the Tsars, pp. 67, 83—85, 88—89.
44. Fisher, Finland and the Tsars, pp. 145—46, 152—55.
Anticipating this possibility, Fisher warned the activist and legalist Finns. They had unwisely refused to allow room for compromise and thus tempted Russians to a one-sided action. He warned against relying on "paper constitutions" and looked forward to seeing concessions from the Finnish side. Fully understanding the need for readjustment in the terms of autonomy, Fisher also directed his words to the Tsar, whom he exhorted to carry legislation through together with the representatives of the Finns. He should not have listened to the nationalist voices which insisted that the authority of the Tsar was illimitable to the degree that he could even break his and his predecessor's promises to the Finns. On the whole, Fisher's standpoint came close to the conciliatory policy of the Old-Finnish Compliants who held that the Finnish constitution could be changed in co-operation with the Russian authorities to suit the new circumstances and demands of the Empire.

II

The reason for the constitutional crisis in Finland lay hidden in the jungle of legalist detail. The defect dug out by Fisher expressed exactly the incompleteness of the evolution of the Finnish constitution: as it lay open to autocratic inroads the spectre for the Finns in times of 'reaction' was as gloomy as ever. The position of the Finns was not made any easier by the fact that even if they sat in the commissions to discuss the limits of imperial legislation they were overruled by a Russian majority.

But how, in fact, had the Finnish constitution become so vulnerable? Fisher had pointed to its incompletely evolved structure, Augustine Birrell (1850—1933), Liberal politician and

45. Fisher, Finland and the Tsars, pp. 200—02, 267—69. Cf. "Finland". Encyclopaedia Britannica, x (11th ed., 1910), pp. 384—86. In 23.5. 1899 a correspondent of The Times from Vienna reported that even though the Finnish constitution was incomplete because it did not include the responsibility of the cabinet ministers, budgetary control by the Parliament and regular Diets, and even though there was no free press in Finland at the moment, it could be said that the Finns were free in the same way the British had been free in the seventeenth century. Besides, there were many countries in Europe were freedom was extensive on the paper but curtailed in practice.
professor of law at Cambridge, found the explanation in history itself. The constitution was handed down from the age of revived absolutism, the times of Gustavus III, and its clauses suited very well the purposes of unification in the new historical context. Russian imperialism and its motives were familiar to Birrell: although, in fact, the "Russians were as much Finns as Finns were Slavs" the Russians had been caught by the idea of Slavic cohesion which the science of ethnology had not been able to keep out of the politics of power. In view of this 'scientifically' grounded task, no legalist evidence could have prevented the Russians from having a bigger army, in which also the Finns should serve the imperial defence. And actually, the Finnish constitution itself failed to provide any real obstacles to it:

It gives no control over the executive which is left in the hands of an autocrat. In fact, the fundamental laws of 1772 and 1789 were protests against what in England we should call the Whiggish inroads upon the authority of the Crown.

The Finns themselves had supported Gustavus III in gaining power over the Swedish Diet and Gustavus had become free to declare wars and regard the army as his own. There had not been any organized opposition to stop him. Now, in 1899, the Finns had to pay for their own policies. Birrell could only hope that the Tsar would reconsider and repeal his Manifesto but the signs of the times did not seem very promising. In Russia as well as in Britain, the demands of imperial defence outweighed the demands of 'Home Rule'. In Britain the matter was even more serious in times when Britain was at war against the Boers and the efficiency of imperial defence was at stake.

46. Augustine Birrell was an anti-imperialist Liberal man of letters who followed James Bryce as the chief secretary for Ireland (1907—1916) and has since been credited with pacifying and governing Ireland so well that it ceased to be a disturbing political topic in British politics. Even so, he was criticized for promoting the Irish Home Rule — it was retorted against Birrell that the analogy of Finland and Ireland suited Ulster better than the nationalist Ireland. Cf. A.J.P. Taylor, 'Prologue, the Year 1906'. Edwardian England. Ed. Donald Read (London, 1982), p. 8; "Russia and Finland". The Times 9.8. 1913.
47. Augustine Birrell, "Finland and Russia". Contemporary Review, 78 (July, 1900), pp. 17, 26.
48. Birrell, "Finland and Russia", q. p. 27.
Birrell exposed a serious weakness inherent in the Finnish constitution, so serious that it could question the credibility of the Finnish legalists' interpretation that the 'contract' of 1809 was mutually binding in all respects. The Tsar appeared to have been a free agent when reviving the 1772 constitution and his pledges to the Finns had not involved a change in the constitution at all. The carefully constructed argument of the Finns was revealed as a reflection of their own ideal of a free mutual contract. Their attempts to convince the Russians could be deemed futile, firstly, because the Russians had an altogether different conception of the relation and of justice in general, and second because Alexander I's acts could be interpreted in the context of eighteenth-century power-politics. Even though Alexander I had been a moderate autocrat he had been an autocrat. It was quite obvious to Birrell that the Russians would not subject their imperial interest to any checks imposed by a local 'constitution' generated in such circumstances. From the British point of view the matter could not look very promising for the Finns, and what became prominent in their writing on Finnish-Russian relations after they understood the matter more deeply was the hope of the Tsar's reconsideration and possible repeal of the Manifesto or of history's power to reverse itself.

One of the powers able to make history go backwards was the Finns themselves and their firm belief in their own interpretation of the constitution. This was what some of the British also counted on. It was thought that the Finns had been schooled by the Swedish government to "freedom", that they were now "an intelligent and prosperous race of Sueco-Finnic Finlanders", and that it was they who had "accepted" Alexander I as their ruler, and that it was to their Diet that Nicholas II should have turned before implementing unification\(^49\). However, as things stood, there was nothing much else to be done than to wait, see, and hope that the Tsar would come to his senses under the pressure of the Russian Liberals. And when the moment of restoration came in 1905 and a Finnish constitutionalist Leo Mechelin became the head of the Finnish government, and when the Tsar himself seemed to become

\(^{49}\) J.T. Bealby, "The Downfall of Finland; an Object-lesson in Russian Aggression". *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, clxvi (1899), p. 10.

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the initiator of reform in Finland and in all Russia in 1906\textsuperscript{50}, the British Liberals rejoiced in the regained liberties of Finland for they assumed that a new, liberal era in Russian history had dawned.

III

The years following the reforms of 1906 (most conspicuous for the British in Finland were the introduction of a one-chamber parliament and of universal suffrage) were to show that though the Finnish constitution, for all its defects, appeared unconquerable and sound, its nature had become antagonistic to the changing historical circumstances and demands of the Russian Empire. A cul-de-sac was foreseeable sooner or later. This was admitted by the ambassador in St Petersburg, Sir Arthur Nicolson, who in his reports informed London about P.A. Stolypin's (the Prime Minister of Russia in 1906—1911) Russification plans. He noted the fears of the Finns of Russification, their attempts to create a "state" within a state, and referred to Russian sources which regarded Finland as just another "province" of the Empire. Assessing the failure of the negotiations between the Finnish and Russian authorities in 1909 and the possible imposition of imperial legislation, he foresaw that "there will be a distinct diminution and restriction of the autonomy" but stressed that the Russians had legitimate imperial interests such as naval and military defence, telegraphs, railways etc. which the Finns, had they been realistic, should have understood their local government could not decide\textsuperscript{51}.

The critical phase in Finnish-Russian relations was also evaluated by John Westlake (1828—1913), a Gladstonian Liberal and professor of international law at Cambridge until 1908. Although he had, in an article in 1900, vigorously defended the

\textsuperscript{50} For a well-balanced description of the complicated Russian-Finnish relations of the period, see J.H. Hodgson, "Finland's Position in the Russian Empire, 1905—1910". \textit{Journal of Central European Affairs}, xv, 2 (1960).

constitution of Finland along Fisher’s lines, stressing the point that the Finns had been educated by a Western Church and State (“a circumstance which must have greatly helped towards the cohesion between the different races in Finland”) and by pointing out that the Tsar should have, in order to act constitutionally, negotiated with the Finns on military law\(^{52}\), he had already in 1900 privately concluded that the Tsar had a prerogative in imperial matters. The compulsory use of a foreign language and living under the rule of an alien race in general were surely serious infringements of freedom of the Finns but the Finnish Senate had officially approved the February Manifesto and thus created a precedent and given the Russians an antecedent and excuse which justified further Russification. The Finnish legalists would have had the constitutional status quo ante of 1899 restored, but for Westlake the question of the future of Finland was no longer ”legal but political” and the wheel of history was not to be turned back. Were the Finns and Russians to sit in a joint commission or in any conciliatory body, Westlake did not see the Russians giving up their imperial interest in favour of the Finnish constitution\(^{53}\). The Finns had some historical rights and local liberties within the Russian Empire but their constitution could not be superior to the Russian one, and if the Russian constitution was to develop the Finnish one should be brought into line with it. In the management of the British Empire, it would have been unthinkable for Westminster single-handedly to overrule the Canadian Act of Confederation, and it appeared to Westlake that the Finns tried to interpret their union with Russia in the same sense. Yet this was not the way the Russians saw the issue; their ”principles” of imperial government were different from those of the British. Admittedly they were ”bad” but it was not appropriate for the British to criticize. They had neither the power nor the right to interfere with another Empire’s business\(^{54}\). There was no helping

\(^{52}\) John Westlake, ”The Case of Finland”. National Review, 35 (1900), p. 112. Westlake worked for a peaceful settlement of disputes between nations and was a member of the Hague International Court in 1900—06.


\(^{54}\) Westlake, ”The Case of Finland: a Comment”. The Law Quarterly Review, lxii (July, 1900), p. 227. Cf. Westlake to Reuter 9.12. 1909. Reuter MSS, xx. In a lecture during the Boer War Westlake defended the rights of Finland and
it: the British Empire encouraged healthy rivalry of nationalities and races, Russian imperialism was a policy of integration for alleged reasons of imperial necessity.

Westlake returned to the Finnish question in 1910 when the Russian Duma accepted the imperial legislation for Finland. The Russian Government, led by the 'Finland-eater' Stolypin, had found a host of matters on which the Finns themselves had formerly legislated but which now were to be subjected to the decision of Russian ministers. Under nineteen headings, they ranged from such minutiae as navigation, and pilot and lighthouse services to an enlargement of the share of Finland in the general expenditure of the Empire. For the Finns it meant a total demolition of their constitution and a great injustice; for the Russians it meant "Finis Finlandiae" (a cry of the reactionary representative of the Duma, Mr Purishkevich), a triumph of unification. And, although Russification was implemented in such a mood of victorious nationalism, the British Foreign Office accepted the Russian interpretation of the relation of Finland and Russia and did not make a move to criticize the Russian government. The British Embassy in St Petersburg and the Foreign Office were continuously informed by the Russian officials who provided, for example, a memorandum in which the autonomy of Finland was proved to be "provincial". Correspondence between Alexander I and Napoleon in 1808 was cited in which Alexander and Napoleon had referred to Finland as a conquered province. This convinced the British Foreign Office about the legitimation of

Transvaal. Both should have been left to develop freely because in the world "there should be a fair field for every race and every language accompanied by a humane treatment of the native races". Westlake's was a Liberal ideal — pluralism and tolerance would create a situation of fair struggle and competition for the talented. See 'The Transvaal War' (1899). The Collected Papers of John Westlake on Public and International Law. Ed. L. Oppenheim (Cambridge, 1914).


Russification although it later turned out that wholesale Russification could not be practically enforced.

For Westlake, who also knew the Russian sources, the 1910 imperial legislation marked a decisive turn in Finnish-Russian relations. The Russians had openly revealed their real motives. In The Times which had given space to Russian points of view, he publicly denounced Russification for it meant "break ing the continuity of the national life in its members" to the Finns and destructive uniformity to the Russian Empire. Now the rights of the Finns appeared as historic as those of Canada\textsuperscript{57}, and they were worth defending against a single Russian minister who had accused the Finns of separatism and of attempts to create a state within a state\textsuperscript{58}. Initiated by Mechelin and urged on by Reuter, Westlake also organized the meeting of some famous experts of international law who gathered to announce their judgment on the contention. Together these authorities concluded that Finland was an autonomous country and had the right to follow its own constitution even if it was true that the Tsar was the sovereign. The imperial guarantees and pledges bound the Tsar and made him liable to co-operation with the Finns in constitutional matters. Finland's was an exceptional case because its constitution existed on the verge of international law which itself was in the process of being reformed to protect the rights of small nationalities against imperialist policies. Finland obviously had its own history and national character to give a definite form to the Finnish kind of "freedom". On this ground the Finns could call themselves a nation. That the Finns had evolved to such a status also internationally should have restricted the use of \textit{salus imperii suprema lex}\textsuperscript{59} in Finland. Therefore the recommendation was that Russia and Finland should set up a joint body to define "imperial

\textsuperscript{57} Westlake in The Times 18.8. 1909; "Finland and Russia". The Times 1.11. 1910. For Russian arguments, see anon., "Russia and Finland". The Times 31.10. 1909.

\textsuperscript{58} Westlake to Korevo in The Times 20.1. 1911.

\textsuperscript{59} Lontoon kansainvälinen neuvottelu (International Consultation on the Finnish-Russian Dispute; available also in English) 26.2.—1.3. 1910 (Helsinki, 1910), pp. 90—92, 97—98. British signatures were by John Westlake, Frederick Pollock and Sir Edward Fry.
matters" so that Finnish opinion would not be totally ignored. Now also *The Times* shared this opinion and urged the contestants to reach a compromise. The experts did not lay down how Finnish opinion would become really effective in the decisions as the Russians had a majority in the commission.

Some private letters give us a clue as to what else was in Westlake’s mind for the Finns. Again the case of Ireland provided a model. Westlake absolutely rejected Irish Home Rule because independent parliaments under one sovereign were quite impossible. Canada and Australia had already caused enough trouble. Seen from this angle, the only hope left to the Finns was to seek co-operation with the Russian Liberals in the Duma. Practically, the Finns with their six seats in it, should have availed themselves of the opportunity of partaking in the constitutional reforms in Russia and sacrificed their local autonomy to the future of the Empire. Finnish "freedom" was ultimately bound up with the Russian "freedom" and the relation of Finland to Russia ought to resemble the relations of colonies to the central government of the British Empire. According to Westlake, it had been demonstrated that the Duma had the right to legislate over Finland, and it may well have been that Westlake’s objections to Reuter’s requests to initiate petitions to the Tsar were due to this fundamental stance. Westlake had already suggested to Reuter

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60. *Lontoon kansainvälinen neuvottelu*, p. 112. Also a Parliamentary Committee emphasized the historical incongruence of Finland and Russia. The gist of the argument was as follows: it was mischievous on the part of the Russians to russify a country which was more civilized than Russia itself. It was not because of some racial faculties that the Finns had advanced, for the Finns who lived in Russia were on the same cultural level as the Russians, but because of the impact of Western "freedom". The text had been revised by radical Liberal Henry Nevinson. Because there had been quite a few socialists in the committee it was criticized for defending the Finnish constitution while plotting against the British one. *The Crisis in Finland*. Parliamentary Committee (London, 1909); A. Ward to Reuter 9.5. 1910. *Reuter MSS*, xx, 5530. For the preparation of the consultation, see J.N. Reuter, *Från Brytningstider. Minnen och Erfarenheter* (Helsingfors, 1921), pp. 219—47.


63. Reuter insisted that Westlake’s authority, the German Jellinek, had actually denied this but Westlake did not change his mind and became reluctant to give indirect advice to the Tsar. Reuter tried to draw Westlake's attention to the fact that in the Duma the Finns could not do anything and even if there
other means for Finland to survive. The history of Finland should be rewritten in English for the international reading public along the main lines of the history of "freedom". It should not be burdened with dreary legal arguments and documentary quotations, it should not be begun with the description of the obscure Diet of Porvoo in 1809 where Alexander I guaranteed the Finnish constitution, because this might have given the impression that the constitution was not "self-originated". It should be opened with a description of the heroic war of 1808—09, and continued with the progress of Finland "tracing it so far as possible to its source in the freedom of the country". The disabilities of Russians in Finland ought not to be omitted but it seemed wise not to stress their importance to the freedom of the Finns. Westlake did not see, as the Finns did, any difference between the 'freedom' of Russians in Finland and the 'freedom' of the Finns in Russia.

IV

It has been seen that the British jurists were between two fires and that eventually they understood the Russians better. The way the Russians had started to reform their government had raised their hopes. As a gradualist and an opponent of radical ("Benthamite") reform Westlake was convinced that "the perseverance of heredity" worked against "reason and learning" and, owing to this retarding condition, rapid changes invited chaos and anarchy in society. Within this conception, Westlake could revere the Finnish constitution but when the Duma was established it created

were some defenders of Finland there, they were powerless against the panslavist majority. See Westlake to Reuter 6.2. 1913, Westlake to Fry 24.2. 1913, Reuter to Westlake 10.2. 1913. Reuter MSS, xx, 5739, 5741b, 5747.
64. Westlake to Reuter 25.11. 1911. Reuter MSS, xx, 5738a. Finnish "freedom" was sometimes defined negatively by citing what the Russians could not do in Finland: the Russian officials did not seem to have much power in Finland, its taxes could not be used for Russia, Finnish officials could not be deprived of their offices, Finns could not be arrested and deported to Siberia by the Russians, and home-search was not permitted (Annual Register, 1899).
an avenue for piecemeal reforms to which Finnish local autonomy should have adjusted itself. It had been a Russian Tsar who had inaugurated the evolution of the Finnish constitution and it would need a Russian sovereign to make it suit the changes in the Russian Empire. What the Finns could look forward to was the gradual 'liberalization' of the Empire itself by its own liberal forces, and it was in the struggle for the liberation of Russia that they should have made their tenacious national character count.

It has been suggested that the sad episode of imperial legislation for Finland could have been avoided if the Russians had been more compromising. There seemed to be no real reason to be so severe with the Finns. However, the reactionary Russians had decided to unite their troubled Empire at all costs and some of them, on the day of victory, delighted in demolishing the Finnish constitution. The Tsar, surprisingly ignorant of the Finnish situation and of the Finnish point of view, still had the main strings of power in his hands and he accepted the Russification policy. Too liberal reforms were being barred in Russia by the Duma itself and the ground was being sown for the revolutionary movement. The great majority of the Finns became convinced that nothing much could be gained from that direction. The Tsar was no longer their bulwark. They experienced a great injustice of history: they thought they had the right but not the power whereas Russia had the power but not the right. There was no impartial judge to decide between the contradicting principles of government in Finland and Russia. The British jurists believed that the final solution would grow out of history; they foresaw the times when the Russian autocratic government would be replaced by a representative one. Then, they still imagined on the eve of the Russian Revolution, the Finns would fulfil their destiny to "freedom" naturally, in concordance with the rhythm of the political evolution of Russia.

6.2.2. A compromise

I

Right from the beginning of the Russification of Finland in 1899, there had been a handful of Liberals who did not assess it purely either from the Finnish or the Russian standpoint. Wider considerations with personal emphasis entered the dispute. W. T. Stead (1849—1912), the sensationalist editor of the *Review of Reviews* and peace optimist had been interested in the affairs of Russian minorities ("nonconformists") since the early 1890s. He had been alarmed, as had been E.J. Dillon, by the onslaughts on the rights of the Jews, Christians and the small nationalities of the Baltic provinces and Finland. The "reaction" and Russification was on its way. At first Stead thought that it was better for the Finns to keep silent and wait for better times⁶⁸, though he had eventually agreed with Dillon that a kind of "demoralization" of government was going on in Russia. However, the pan-Slavic policy had been aggravated by the dissenting nationalities themselves; for instance, the Baltic Germans had always regarded Russians as stupid and now they appeared as their enemies, and the Finns had grown hostile towards Russia and ungrateful to the Tsar who had actually given them their freedom. The Finns who actually "had the power in Finland" had so many "privileges" and the Russians so many disabilities there that there was no question who had always benefitted from the union⁶⁹. Behind these statements was Stead's Russophilia. He had denounced David Urquhart's notions of the "devil" Russia; for him Russia was a potential peacekeeper which in its "indestructibility" might become a worthy friend of Britain. At least the British should try to

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⁶⁹. W.T. Stead, *The Review of Reviews*, 4 (1891), p. 374; *The MP for Russia*, p. 277. Stead had reprinted Mme Novikoff's statement of the Finnish "privileges" from an article requested by Gladstone to bring out the Russian point of view in Finnish "Home Rule". They were: their own customs-system, Russian was not an official language in Finland, and the Governor General did not have any power. Mme Novikoff had been irritated because the Finnish officials considered themselves beyond the reach of the Russian authorities and because "anti-orthodox" propaganda was being disseminated in Finland against the Russian-Orthodox religion.
direct the "forces" of Russia at first by extending trade-relations also to Finland whose trade appeared to him to be in German hands. Stead was an ardent pacifist who thought that free-trade and world-peace went hand in hand. As an arbitrator he tried to get Russia and Britain around the same table to curb the armaments-race and to diminish the possibility of a war. This would have been the first step towards a federation of Europe based on the model of the United States. He strongly supported Nicholas II's peace proposals, and in this context it seemed annoying and useless to criticize the Russian government over the military law for Finland which was only a minor "modification" when compared with Lord Salisbury's dreadnoughts. The radical Liberal propaganda, with its "holy horror" of Russia and the preaching of freedom and constitutions for Russian minorities would necessarily be without effect in an age when the realities of imperialism and prospects of war could be resisted only by straightforward attempts to restore friendly relations between nations and create international understanding.

In his articles on Finland Stead made it quite clear how hypocritical the reactions of the "Friends of Finland" were. They had lamented over the loss of freedom in Finland and forgotten how little they had done to further Home Rule of Ireland or the rights of Transvaal. Stead reminded his colleagues in the Liberal party how their principles of conducting an Empire did not actually differ from those of the Russians. They had always wanted to adjust the concession of liberties to the changing needs of the Empire. This, Stead argued, had been Gladstone's solution in leaving the prerogative to Westminster in his proposal for Irish Home Rule. The Russians applied it, too:

It was necessary in the interests of the Empire that the Finn should bear a fair share of the burdens of Imperial defence.

The British Liberals would have done the same; if a dependency should refuse to obey, as the Finns had almost done, its assembly would be relegated to the status of a consultative body. Nothing of the kind had been done in Finland by the February Manifesto. The articles by Bain, Westermarck and Reuter in British periodicals had, in Stead’s opinion, misrepresented the whole affair. In the first place, the Finnish constitution was not a contract of two sovereign powers but rather an invention of Alexander I’s, and moreover, autonomy in purely local, internal matters of Finland had not been impaired by the Manifesto. The overruling of the Finnish Diet by the Tsar had been natural because in imperial affairs a part of an Empire could not decide what was best for the whole. Unless this fundamental truth were observed, there would be no way to manage an Empire. Stead repeatedly made his point against those who had accused him of white-washing Russia on an international platform.

Later, having acquainted himself with the conditions in Finland Stead suddenly changed his mind. On the pages of Finland he, for the first time, differentiated the Finnish and Irish questions. Ireland was asking for "what it did not have", Finland wanted only to keep "what it already had". Finland was no longer simply a case of Russian imperial affairs in which the British should not intervene.

What appears to have made Stead reconsider the position of Finland was his detestation of the bureaucratic and coercive methods of Governor General Bobrikoff to Russify and control Finland. Earlier in the nineteenth century the freedom of Finland and Tsarism had not been incompatible and the Russians and Finns had understood each other. Bobrikoff ruined all. His governmental machine worked automatically, grinding down the liberties of the Finns without much other effort than publication of new restrictive laws. In an open letter to M. de Plehve, the Russian Minister of the Interior, Stead cautiously brought to Plehve’s

75. W.T. Stead, "What has been done in Finland". The Review of Reviews, xix (1899), pp. 454—55; "Finland; an Impeachment", The Review of Reviews, xx (1899), pp. 42—43.
attention the fact that the conscriptions and other coercive measures in Finland forced many Finns to emigration, a circumstance that would enfeeble the Empire\textsuperscript{77}. Plehve denied everything: he reiterated the pith of the Russian argument that the imperial interest was paramount in the Russian governmental system and even if Finns had some civil rights which the Russians did not have (a Russian subject had only the right to have his basic needs provided for), the Finnish laws could not hamper imperial legislation. As for the military law, it was not particularly severe, in Plehve's opinion. Certainly it had not caused the emigration, which was a response to economic pressures. Contradicting both the usual British and Finnish notions of the causes of the progress of Finland, Plehve trusted that the Finns "know that it is the Russian Government which has resuscitated the Finnish race, systematically crushed down as it had been in the days of Swedish power"\textsuperscript{78}. At least from now on it was apparent to Stead that the Russian bureaucrats had concocted a theory of government which implied that the power of the Tsar could not be limited by any other power, and that all promises could be broken and frontiers removed in its name (Stead knew that the Russians planned to incorporate two Finnish villages into Russia). To Stead this was nothing less than an abuse of weak autocracy and resembled a state of moral bankruptcy in which the Russians one day might just refuse to pay back the loans they had taken from the West\textsuperscript{79}. This was not a very persuasive argument but it met the purposes of hitting the Russian bureaucrats now that they had revealed their real intentions.

In 1905 Stead headed for Russia in the hope of influencing the Tsar in the midst of the internal crisis. He assumed that he could prevent the "catastrophe" and still regarding himself as a friend of the Tsar aimed at reuniting him with his people in a constitutional monarchy. In Finland where Stead stayed before going to meet Nicholas II there had occurred a "glorious revolution" of restoration. The Tsar had been forced to withdraw the Russification measures. Bobrikoff had been assassinated and a new Governor General, Count Obolensky had been nominated — there were rumours in Helsinki that the dictatorship might be abolished. The Finnish Social Democrats, who had been on strike and brought about the revocation of the Manifesto, demanded full restoration of the pre-manifesto status of Finland. Stead tried to mediate between the Social Democrats and Obolensky. Both sides stuck to their previous arguments, the Finns demanding the status quo ante of 1899 and Obolensky demanding a full share of imperial defence from the Finns but for Stead the negotiations implied the return of peaceful revolution and constitutionalism in the relations of Russia and Finland.

In St Petersburg Stead had an audience with the imperial family and on a couple of occasions the position of Finland was touched upon. In Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna’s opinion, Bobrikoff had been "rough and brutal" but she added that these dispositions were needed in a country where anarchism and socialism were growing. Stead considered these phenomena "the natural crops of oppression" and expressed his hope that the Duma could clear them out of the way and start a period of representative government and of public discussion and assembly in Russia. In his interview with the Tsar Stead asked him how matters stood in Finland; the Tsar replied that he "did not know so much about

82. Interview with the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna, Aug., 28, 1905. In Baylen, "Tsar’s Lecturer General", p. 32. For The Times (2.1. 1908) it later appeared that as Russia now was without a firm central power the bureaucrats could easily russify Finland.
that" and said that Bobrikoff had been an honest man. Stead reiterated his liberal view of the Russian future by urging the Tsar to co-operate with the Duma. These discussions did not in any way affect the situation in Finland but they show how Stead thought things should turn out in Russia and how he connected the situation in Finland with promising omens in Russia. He still had confidence in a liberal current in Russian affairs.

In 1910, when the news of the second wave of Russification came out, Stead regretted its extreme character but hoped that the "dour race of Finns", not at all easy "to coerce and cajole", could battle on. He recalled the times of reform under Count Witte and Witte's argument that Finland could not be assimilated by force and constraint but by peaceful means. However, the Russians had missed their opportunity, the ties between Finland and Russia were being cut asunder and Finland was becoming a serious threat to the unity of the Empire. Seen from the point of view of the future "world state" (an unarmed federation of all nations) the disintegration of the Russian Empire was ominous, and the decision taken by the experts of international law for Finland also pointed to its formation. The Finns as well as other civilized nations would earn their complete "freedom" in it, and thus get rid of all coercion and oppression.

In 1912 Stead died on the Titanic but the Review of Reviews continued to write about Finnish affairs. The outbreak of the war seemed to bring some relief to Finland but soon it was realized how the drifting Finns, obviously wanting any master but Russia, and inherently incapable of creating their own state, had turned towards Germany. This was quite unexpected and embarrassing. The editor of the Review of Reviews and British public opinion had been misled by the Finnish and British pro-Finnish propaganda that had tried to convince the British of the democratic character of the Finns. Now, it was better for Russia to get rid of this

84. W.T. Stead, The Review of Reviews, 41 (Febr.—June, 1910), pp. 111, 507—08, 544; 42 (July—Dec., 1910), pp. 9—10; Daily Chronicle, 22.3. 1910. There was also a political cartoon "The Little Father" in which Nicholas II lighted his pipe with the Finnish constitution holding the virgin-Finland under his boot and asking "Why do you want a constitution my child? Afganistan has none".
"unhealthy", non-Slavic companion, though it was appalling that the enemy of the British, the Germans, benefitted from Russian disorder. The pro-German Finns seemed to nourish hopes of possible independence or of a Germanized monarchy for Finland, but for the Review of Reviews, as for an anonymous writer for the Spectator, this could only make for the establishment of a German "protectorate". In this way some of the liberal illusions as regards the future of Finland in the Russian Empire began to fade away as the Finns who appeared to be betraying their liberal ideals steered clear of the collapsing Empire. The events in Russia as well as in Finland had began to go against liberal expectations.

6.2.3. Racialist interpretations of relations between the Russians and the Finns

I

In conjunction with the merely constitutional and political insights into Russian developments, the British observers began to envisage deeper and more far-reaching movements in the Empire in the 1900-1910s. The concept of race, the idea of racial change and movement as the fundamental forces under the surface of political life, developed within nineteenth-century racial theory, came into play when the British Liberals tried to understand what was going on in Russia and in relations between Russia and Finland. The Liberal observers we meet here were not of the type who would have tried to detect the causes of Russian upheaval in its social structure or economic crisis. We will rather meet Liberals of the Freemanian style who searched for a far 'deeper' explanation of it. They looked at the various nationalities of Russia which seemed to be motivated by racial and linguistic sentiments. They

86. Anon., The Review of Reviews, 58 (July—Dec., 1918), pp. 160, 179, 186. The Spectator, 119(Oct., 20, 1917) feared that the Germans might entice the Finns to attack St Peters burg as their influence was clearly increasing amongst them. Cf. L.B. Namier, Germany and Eastern Europe (London, 1915) in which Germany was called an "octopus" spreading its arms to the Gulf of Finland.
were forces of either integration or dissolution of the Empire. On one hand, they saw a "centralized, land-type" Russian Empire with its peculiar characteristics contrasted with the "freely expanding" British one. On the other hand, and more pessimistically, the "heterogenous" British Empire could be compared with the commercially, geographically and politically more compact Russian one, even though the latter appeared, during the war, to be losing its cohesion. Insights gained from these comparisons could teach many a lesson for a Liberal Imperialist who was interested in promoting harmonious development in the relations of the 'backward' and 'advanced' races. The Finns, whose position in the Russian Empire was becoming more unsteady year after year, were frequently included in these speculations and their future within Russia was envisioned with liberal undertones.

One way to look at the estrangement of Finland from Russia was to reflect on the history of the racial relations of the Finn, Teuton and Slav. For an optimistic Liberal Imperialist the world was made up of Empires all destined to contribute to the progress of civilization. The late expansions of Russia, the largest and the most unstable of Empires, did not yet appear to pose any danger to Britain. Historically, the expansions of the Slavic race, egged on by the same colonial "instinct" and "population pressures" as the British, had flown to the West, East and South from the centre. In the West the Slavs had run into "more developed racial types", for example, the Lithuanians and the Finns. The Finns, educated by the "Teutonic" civilization and institutions out of their hunting and fishing stage, arose to resist the Slavic encroachment, the latest of which was the Russian oppression of the Teutonic culture in Finland and the Baltic. What was at stake in Finland was the life of a vigorous culture materially "30 years ahead of Russia". Here, the Russification of Finland was to be regretted, and yet, when it came to the question of whether the Russians ultimately had the


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right to its implementation or not, it was accepted on the same grounds by which the British claimed sovereignty over the "Indian feodatory states". The Finns should have yielded to the unification because the *salus populi* of the Slavic race demanded it. What was more, the Finns had showed pride and ingratitude towards Russia, its benefactor. To this "A Finlander", defending the Finnish right of national existence, contended that the Finns were not subject to any other but their own *salus populi* which was being stifled by the Russians. The Finns, owing to their close connection with the Teutonic civilization, had a right to a separate nationality even if the Russian Tsar was sovereign. Appealing to the British conscience, he asked whether the British, as a nation, could have tolerated a Bobrikoff-regime. Obviously, this plea did not have much effect because the majority of the British experts viewed the Finnish problem from an imperial point of view and were not ready to take up a moralist attitude. In times of Anglo-Russian rapprochement and rising Anglo-German antagonism this was impractical and undesirable. To defend Finnish separatism would have meant to criticize the Liberal imperial doctrine itself. The Finns who had developed their own interpretation of their national history may have realized after 1910 that the possibility to get it accepted in any wider political circles than radical Liberal and Labour in Britain had diminished.

Even to those Liberal Imperialists, like Henry Norman, a member of Parliament who visited Finland and became convinced that the Finns really were as civilized as they were claimed to be and cultivated "the Spartan virtues of original New England", it was impossible to argue against the "imperative national interest" which was the motive of Russification. There was no getting away from the facts of the times: for the sake of national interest

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92. Henry Norman, *All the Russias* (London, 1902), pp. 64, 69, 72–73, 90. Norman who had been one the ideologues of Far-Eastern imperialism was enchanted by the small farms and healthy conditions in Finland. The towns did not contain any "slums, rookeries, criminals or dirt", but mostly gardens, parks and spacious streets. The forced abstinence of the Finns seemed conducive to their progress which contrasted with the decadence of the British.
the Germans had attacked Denmark, France had broken its "contract" with Madagascar, the British still governed in Egypt and the USA stayed in Cuba. Russia was only following suit. Even though Norman wrote that he did not actually like these phenomena of imperialism, he was accused of immoral surrendering to these "facts". It was true that he felt only pity for the Finns because, in his opinion, it was up to Russia to decide what was best for itself as a whole and, in any case, it had the power. As one Russian administrator had told him, the Russians could easily crush Finland if they only wanted to. Furthermore, it was Nature itself that demanded Russia to expand by its "own impetus", which was as unquenchable as the motive for expansion of Empires in general. The deterministic forces, 'scientifically' labelled as racial instincts, exercised their power in the realm of politics. Attempts at stopping inter-imperial conflicts could be resisted in their name. Also Finland was destined to be engulfed by Russia, a semi-civilized Empire with an urge for further conquest and unification.

II

A serious and influential effort to conceptualize the racial movements and relations of the world was made by James Bryce (1838—1922), a Liberal-Unionist and theorist of democracy. Like so many other scholars in the field, he adduced mainly climatic, geographical, environmental and racio-physiological factors as causes to explain the politics of the imperialist era. Having studied historical and contemporary sources, he named three modes of racial "assimilation": (1) transference, (2) dispersion and (3) permeation. Referring to the results of anthropology that showed


94. James Bryce, "The Migrations of the Races of Men Considered Historically". *Contemporary Review*, lxii (1899), pp. 128—29. The cause of migration was commensurate with the stage of civilization: the migrations of "savages" were caused by scarcity of food, "nomadic" and "semi-civilized" migrations were caused by wars and the "civilized" by the need of labour force. Here Bryce legitimized the needs of the capitalist economy by ideas of efficiency regained by free racial mixture.
that the highest races were advantageously mixed in a process of transformation and that no new races were in the process of cropping up. He optimistically assumed that "assimilation" was the trend of the future and as such eventually a beneficial one to those who took part in it. During the war this was an encouraging prospect to a Liberal federalist. Only on those abstract levels of physical and political evolution in which the racial struggles and antagonisms were assumed to cease, could the highest ideals of progress come true. In this utopia only individuals competed, invented and co-operated in a way that the most talented, skilled and industrious won. In this respect the British Empire came nearest to the ideal because it permitted the small nationalities and various subject races to exist for the sake of "freedom" and "justice". The German and to a lesser degree the Russian Empire were not guided by these "moral laws". They professed forced "assimilation" instead of natural. Appropriately, Bryce and some other Liberals advised the political leaders that they should see to the formation of neutral "buffer-states" with international guarantees to pre-empt future coercion. A new world of guaranteed peace and 'freedom' created on these noble principles should emerge from the dust of the First World War and the Russian Revolution.

In a closer look at pre-war Europe, Bryce had actually found only one force, that of racial permeation (the blood or civilization of a "higher" race permeates peacefully on the areas of "lower" ones) operative. It had worked also on the Finns. With the same effect as the British governing class exercised its influence in India, the Russians Russianized the Finns. In Northern Russia they had made them almost indistinguishable from themselves. This

96. James Bryce, "Neutral Nations and the War". Essays and Addresses in War Time, pp. 7—14. Bryce called in Darwin against the German Trietschke who had emphasized the necessity of war in promoting the survival of the fittest. For Bryce, social evolution did not need war, because it killed the best, not the feeblest and did not speed up human evolution.
was an instance of the way the Darwinian principle of natural selection worked in political practice: by assimilating the declining races the leading ones invigorated themselves.

Fortunately for the Western Finns, the union of Finland with Russia had not meant total "absorption". As in Poland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, India, Cape Colony, Cochin China and Annam, the conquering race had not transferred large populations to merge into the natives. The Finns were not like the tropical races, "not fitted to play a great part" in the world and capable of survival only with the aid of Western science and government; the Finns were not like the "weaker" types of Europe which migrated to the USA to "melt like sugar in a cup of tea"99, but they testified to the extraordinary powers of nature:

The Finnish peoples of Northern Europe have blent easily and naturally with the Teutonic Swedes and Slavonic Russians though the ethnographer would place them far from both these races.100

These unions had been quite exceptional. They proved the "attraction in difference" quite alien to the British when they governed their subject races, and they appeared to have been mutually beneficial in producing a "good" hybrid101. One "progressive" outcome of the mixture was evident. The Finns had become conscious of their national cohesion, and on the ideological level, they had acquired national consciousness. Here the natural and political evolutions met. With the power of their achievement they still "refused" to be Russified and their studies

101. Bryce, "The Relations", pp. 17—18, 23, 25. For Bryce "good" here meant not born with confused (anarchic) dispositions but with "democratic". However, because nature produced also "bad" types and the masses were uneducated, the franchise could not be extended outside the civilized, propertied classes. "We cannot leave the locomotive to be driven by a boy" he wrote. As to the Empire, Bryce was optimistic among the pessimists who were worried about the deteriorated physical fitness of the British soldier-race after the Boer War. Bryce wanted to break down the class-barriers to help human selection in England. Cf. Porter, "The Edwardians and Their Empire"; R.H. Murray, Studies in the English Social and Political Thinkers of the 19th Century, II (Cambridge, 1929), p. 15.
into their own language, history and folklore added to their strength. This emergence of a new national type in the midst of general "reduction of the stocks" in the World was a small miracle. The Finns had developed "a feeling of unity of corporate life" contained in their language, religion, literature, traditions and common history and enhanced by the backbone of a tough "fibre of race".

These naturalistic elaborations had enormous consequences for Bryce’s vision of post-war Russia. Separate in race, language and religion, the Finns appeared ready to leave Russia and live their own national life. In comparison, for instance, with the Ukraine, which did not possess its own democratic institutions and did not form a distinctive moral or intellectual entity, Finland could be separated from Russia after one disturbing factor had been eliminated:

The Finns of Finland, an educated and intelligent race, are of course, in a different position. They might well be left, when the German intruder has been expelled, to form an independent government, probably republican, perhaps a member of a Federation which should include Estonians, Letts, and Lithuanians, all three of these apparently anxious to be independent both of Russia and of Germany.

Referring to his essay, cited above, Bryce suggested to his old friend, Theodore Roosevelt, that Finland could become one of the independent nations to "choose and decide" its own fate. In this the Finns would better succeed if only they could see their way to "federate" with the Estonians, Letts and Lithuanians.

103. James Bryce, "The Principle of Nationality and Its Applications". Essays and Addresses in War Time, pp. 129—30. In Finland, the idea that racial mixtures are one way how Nature furthers evolution, reached the form of social lesson for the ruling elite. In them the "brotherhood of races" was strengthened by "giving and taking" in order to create a vigorous aristocracy for the young nation. Gunnar Suolahti, "Kansallisuus ja Ihmisyys" (Nationality and Humanity), Aika (1907), pp. 444—47.
In this way, the Finns had passed the test of ethnology as well as of modern Liberal political theory to form their own national state in Europe. In post-war Europe, the great principle of "Freedom and Nationality", if only accepted by all allied when gathering for the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, would be the principle according to which the boundaries of Europe should be drawn.

III

Those British who believed that the Slavic race could retain its dominions would not have agreed with the 'progressive' racial theory of Bryce. E.J. Dillon saw the relation of Russians and Finns in terms of degeneration. Initially he had thought that Russia would not lose anything by letting the Finns loose but since the Tsar had lost his authority to the Duma and the government of Russia had become representative Dillon would have allowed the Russians, if Finland was separated, to reconquer it in imperial self-defence. Against Reuter and the "Friends of Finland" he argued that Britain would not tolerate a hostile "Finland" as close to its own capital as Finland was to St Petersburg. The laws of the Duma to unify Finland were not misguided because they expressed the Russian general will, though the methods to put them in force may have been insensitive. In Dillon's view, it was not necessary to claim control over the appointment of porters at the University of Helsinki but it was quite reasonable and legitimate to control the railways, education, postal service and defence. 'Mechanistic' unification and bureaucratic squabbles over its details should have been differentiated from real issues of imperial interest.

Dillon's account of the causes of the Russian Revolution included neither social nor economic factors. Only natural causes

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106. Dillon in The Contemporary Review, 94 (Oct. 1908), p. 508; The Contemporary Review, 97 (May, 1910), pp. 626—28. The Times had reported in 15.8. 1906 how the "Reds" and "Whites" of Finland had, during the general strike of 1905, exacerbated the old "racial and social feuds". The Finns were against the Swedes, the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, and the Russians seemed to take all available measures to stop the unrest.
were 'scientific' enough to explain such a major eruption. As the Finnish-Russian schism had already suggested, the primary cause of Revolution was "the blending of widely different races". A pessimistic polygenetic theory of race accounted for the tendencies of Russia to decomposition. Democracy, which the revolutionary Russians now threatened, had been a gift of nature to the Anglo-Saxons. The Russians could not reach to it "for great racial differences in the elements of an ethnic blend necessarily beget degeneration". The Slavs of the Leninist and Trotskyist "republics" had become "soft and pliant", because "52%" of the Russian population consisted of alien races and mostly because the Finns of Russia had enfeebled them physically, mentally and politically. Only the Finns of Finland had acquired Teutonic orderliness and had reached "onto a higher political stage" by their own efforts. In their case, Russification by force engendered strong defiance of the Russian authority and accentuated the sentiments of nationality. The Finns did not, in Dillon's view, want to join a federation of nations in which Russia would remain the predominant partner. What they wanted was to develop their own nationality and state. However, this process had been somewhat retarded by the socialist fermentation and by the slow Finnicization of the Swedish-speakers in Finland. As the "Young Finns" and the Swedish-speakers were uniting against Russia and the socialists gained further support among the people, the political situation in Finland during the Russian revolution seemed quite unstable. The only thing that could be predicted was that Finland might abandon Russia which appeared to be approaching disaster.

What was the end of all things Russian for Dillon, was a fresh start for H.W. Williams. To Dillon Russia had been dying, for Williams it was like a pregnant young woman. Concerning the Finns Williams and Dillon agreed that in spite of Russification only the Finns of Finland had retained their national characteristics. Disagreement came in when the results of Russian

107. E.J. Dillon, *The Eclipse of Russia* (London, 1918), pp. 13, 18. In a manner not so different from Chamberlain's Dillon polygenetically separated races according to "psychological abysses" (pp. 1, 6—11).

racial mixtures had to be assessed; for Dillon they had been disastrous and degrading but for Williams they were like family relations, painful but in the end joyful. In upheavals and revolutions, all races of Russia united "to create new types of rich human lives". The lesser breeds might get eliminated and give way to the "new" Russian race the appearance of which could already be seen in the Duma, the meeting place of all races in Russia. The Finns of Finland, who had evaded this scene, had evolved to take their own direction in the nineteenth century and could no more be taken into account:

Amongst the nationalities of the Empire the Finns occupy a very peculiar and so far distinct place, and as to their assimilation by the Russians or any other people in the world there is no question whatsoever, because there is no people in the world so tenacious of their nationality as the stubborn, hardheaded Finns.

Here, as in Bryce's statements on Finnish separateness, the Finns were, in accordance with Liberal racialism, given a unique place in the history of the Russian Empire. The Finns, having gathered "strength" in the nineteenth century, were allowed to cut the historical bondage and become an independent force in European history. The agency of their separation was racial for they had, due to Teutonic infusion, adopted Western institutions and taken on Western freedom. It remained to be seen what would become of them after the Russian Revolution and the World War were over.


6.2.4. Liberal impressions of the Finnish race and culture at home

I

Those British who visited Finland and obtained some intimate knowledge of Finland, used the concepts of race, nation and culture in keeping with the prevalent theory of anthropology and ethnology but added to their descriptions a peculiarity and personal flavour derived from their individual predilections, experiences and sources of knowledge. The talk about 'freedom and progress' filled their accounts as there did not seem to be much to blame in Finland. It was part of their message to describe Finland in a favourable light to make it agreeable to the British reading public. Simultaneously they professed to give a reliable general view supported by suitable instances from the cultural past and day-to-day political life in Finland.

In the 1900—1910s there was frequently the "brave little nation" with "innate love of progress" reclaiming its "freedom" and liberties inherited from the Swedish period and restored by successive Tsars until the 1899 coup d'état, the breach in the constitutional tradition. Finland's enormous material progress was, for the British, mostly due to nineteenth-century constitutionalism which had opened it at least from c. 1860 onwards to a comparatively free but not wholly laissez-faire economy and greatly encouraged the incentives to enterprise, mainly in the timber industries. The great jump forward caused mixed feelings in the British about the ultramodern character of Finnish culture. Economically Finland appeared most progressive, but, at the same time, they were oriented towards the past, to finding a historical affirmation for their national growth.

Some post-romantically-minded British, like George Renwick, did not wholeheartedly enjoy the fuss of the business-life of the new saw-mill centres, for example, Kotka. This irritated him, and these towns themselves, devoid of monuments of the past, appeared too modern, busy and restless. The break from the past

seemed too drastic and made Renwick seek the peaceful atmosphere of old historic towns like Porvoo, Turku, Savonlinna and even Kajaani which reminded him of a calmer but a heroic past.\textsuperscript{112} Aesthetically too, for instance, Finnish modern painting, sometimes using the images of young, naked boys as symbols for the Finnish renaissance, presented "an orgy of licence and morbidity" that haunted the modern cities and offended the ideals of the "Gothic". The "Gothic", medieval Scandinavian influence, now on the decline in Finland had virtually been the very backbone of the Finnish culture in the past. Its stronghold, the medieval cathedral of Turku, recalled its past glories:

It is the very birthplace of Finland, its builders were the architects of a nation, fastening with every blow the firm foundations of that Western influence to which the Finnish nation owes its existence.\textsuperscript{113}

There one could remember that in the vanguard of Western civilization had arrived the English-born bishops of Finland, St Henry and St Thomas, followed by Scottish and British families who had helped Finland "to hew its way through history". In spite of repeated Russian insults against the sanctuary, it had remained unconquerable in a spiritual sense. Without citing his sources of information Renwick also idealized the pre-Swedish Finnish past to make it prepared to receive the Western impact. The ancient Finns had already had "a primitive form of parliament", where custom had been the law, and the patriarchs had ruled the family-groups. Although they had worshipped the sun they had not been savages because they had envisaged "free spirits" in it\textsuperscript{114}. But without the Swedish invasion the Finns would not have evolved. The Swedes, our writer assumed, brought with them advanced agricultural methods and industries. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, it was the Finnish race that was taking the lead:

When the Finns and Swedes marry, it is the former that stamps his own personality and language on the family, the wonderful race is

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advancing all along the line, strengthening its position in the world, and already forcing the world to take it into account in human progress.\textsuperscript{115}

The mixture was ideal: all active but not too passionate elements interlocked, as seen in the leading figures of the Finnish "Renaissance", Topelius, Snellman, Runeberg and Cygnaeus whom Renwick introduced in turn\textsuperscript{116}. In so far as the Finnish race was still in the process of rebirth and growth, the Finnish culture was also in a somewhat uncontrolled creative period. It was new life itself bursting its limits, not yet fully grown, and immature. Finnish architecture used hard materials such as rough granite to anticipate future strength, and its masculine, massive grandeur expressed power at the expense of the beauty and refinement characteristic of matured cultures. Because the architecture in Finland reflected also the response to Russification, a sudden recrudescence of a new culture produced overstatements and exaggerations in form, but in the future when it would settle down to its peculiar ways, a lot of high achievements could be awaited from it.

The Finnish race appeared more mature politically than culturally. The Finns had already learned loyalty under Russian rule, and if only the Russians could understand the need to give up coercion, it would be only a matter of time to teach the Finns imperial sentiment\textsuperscript{117}. Another Liberal also recommended the Russians to use more considerate methods than "steel and iron" to draw the Finns closer, though for him there was already a cultural abyss between Russia and Finland\textsuperscript{118}. Radical Liberal, philan-

\textsuperscript{115} Renwick, \textit{Finland To-Day}, q. p. 219. For another traveller and writer, Ernst Young, the Swedish infusion had been the "best thing that could have happened" to the Finns. It meant regeneration of the Finnish people in a process of providential education to nationhood. He felt pity towards the landless and poor tenants but considered the tenant-system of Finland desirable because it provided the landlords with the work-force otherwise difficult to come by. \textit{The Land of a Thousand Lakes} (London, 1912).

\textsuperscript{116} Renwick, \textit{Finland To-Day}, pp. 220, 244, 300.

\textsuperscript{117} Renwick, \textit{Finland To-Day}, pp. 322, 330—31.

\textsuperscript{118} J.D. Wilson, "Russia". \textit{The War and Democracy}. Eds. R.W. Seton-Watson, J.D. Wilson, A.E. Zimmern and A. Greenwood (London, 1914), pp. 201—02. Wilson worked as an English teacher at the University of Helsinki in 1906—09; for details, see his \textit{Milestones of the Dover Road} (London, 1969). Often Russia's troubles with its national minorities were explained by its
thropist and journalist writing for the Nation, Henry W. Nevinson (1856—1941) had this in mind but he put the case of the Finnish nation forward more vigorously and with nicety. He warned the Russians of the wayward capacity of the Finnish race; they were the "most democratic in the world, a high cheek-boned, heavy-browed race, not easily suppressed, capable of unexpected passion, undemonstrative but determined". He had sensed the tension between the Russians and Finns at the opening of the Finnish Diet in 1910. The Speaker P.E. Svinhufvud, a Swedish-speaking Finn, looked like "massive granite" in front of the Russians who carried all the symbols of violence (military uniforms) to the occasion, thus insulting the essence of a representative institution. They brought with them a proposal that the Finns should be represented in the Duma and that their Diet should be confined to deciding purely local matters. The confrontation was between "violence and justice, despotism and democracy, imperialism and nationality, might and right". Unlike Renwick and Wilson, for Nevinson Finland belonged rather to a European Federation than to a Russian one because its destiny was exceptional and the normal apologies for imperialism would not do there:

Here is no 'white man's burden', no need to talk of governing for the good of the governed, or labouring for the cause of humanity, or promoting the mission of civilization.

incapability to adjust its races to the imperial whole. In times of internal crisis the "irrational forces of racial instinct" in alien races made Russia an unstable empire. See J. Holland Rose, Nationality as a Factor in Modern History (London, 1916), pp. 12, 99, 137, 144—45, 207—08.


120. Nevinson, 'Preface', p. 2. For the historian G.P. Gooch, the Russian methods were those of a "corrupt and reactionary bureaucracy" which caused "paralysis" in Finland and a total alienation of the Finns from Russia. History of Our Times (London, 1911). For the background of radical Liberal criticism of the government, see Richard Shannon, Crisis of Imperialism 1865—1915 (Bungay, Suffolk, 1976), pp. 408—12, 417—18, 432.

As regards the strategical point of imperial security so often used by Russians and mentioned by the Liberal Imperialists and *The Times* against the Finnish legalists, Nevinson simply rejected it because its realization would have brought Russia nearer to the Atlantic Ocean in Scandinavia. On the pages of the *Nation*, a leading radical Liberal paper attempting to criticize the foreign policy of the Liberal government towards Russia, Nevinson had already, just before the introduction of the Imperial Legislation, regarded the fate of Finland as a national tragedy. The Finns, who belonged to the Western world as did "no other race in the Russian Empire, not even the Poles" faced destruction. The Tsar applied to Finland a policy of base and unnatural coercion. The Russians did not seem to care that the civilization of Finland was not "Oriental", that its religion was Lutheran, that the Finns had a representative constitution and that they were obedient to law and order and cherished democratic ideals, and that a section of the people spoke Swedish, a civilized language. The situation of Finland resembled that of the Christian minority in Turkey in the 1870s in that that the British did not have any rights to intervene on their behalf. As had been with the Sultan, it was quite the same with the Tsar. His word could not be trusted in any *entente cordiale* because he had broken his promises to the Finns. No nation which respected itself and the moral basis of foreign policy should ally with Russia.\(^{122}\)

Here the racialist argument was subordinate to the political but served well the purpose of lessons in foreign policy. Those who did not fear Russian influence in the West could allow Finland's incorporation into the Russian Empire but those who were caught by the idea that Russia would take over the whole of Scandinavia and endanger the base of Western civilization were worried about its future. Sir Edward Grey should have kept Britain out of the highly doubtful alliance with Russia.

Only very few British who claimed to have an intimate knowledge of Finnish affairs conceived of the racial question in Finland in conciliatory and peaceful terms. This approach did not apply only to the relations of the Finns and Russians. Arthur Reade, another English teacher in Finland, saw the history of Finland as a continuous racial tension between the Finns and the Swedes. Its primary cause was the alienation of the Finns from the Swedes, begun in the sixteenth century when the Finns alone defended their country against Russian attacks, aggravated by the Swedish neglect of the defence of Finland in the war of 1808—09, and culminated in the nineteenth century when the Finns learned to claim their separateness and dominance. The desperate fighting of Finns in the war of 1808—09 loomed large in the memory of the Finns and had spurred them on to crave for historical distinctiveness. Alexander I had created the opportunity for the Finnish to rise, and however mixed the Finns and Swedes had become, the Finns had their language on which to ground a national culture. In the nineteenth century the racial strife had been embittered by the concomitant class-struggle between the Swedish-speaking upper-class and the Finnish lower classes, for the Swedes still held on to their privileges and looked down on the Finns as unworthy of political equality. The Finns, for their part, having at last obtained the full franchise and a share in the prosperity caused by economic progress, demanded full power to which they seemed to have a justifiable claim:

Thus both political and economic power are changing hands. Even racially fortune seems to favour the Finns, for investigations into the birth-rate show that the rate of increase among them is slightly higher than that among the Swedes.

123. Reade, Finland and the Finns, pp. 3—4, 14, 20—24, 48. Following Castrén Reade wrote that the Finns had originally come from the Volga area to Finland in the eigth century. The racialist theme in British descriptions of Finland was carried on by A. MacCallum Scott, Frank Fox and T.W. Atchley in the 1920—30s and brought to an end by J. Hampden Jackson in his Finland (London, 1938).

For all its negative effect for the Swedish-speakers, the struggle brought out general advantages. It had stimulated both races to competition, especially in education, and made them soon realize the importance of reintegration and co-operation against the main threat, Russification.

At the turn of the century the repercussions from the racial struggle could be sensed in the tentative character of Finnish culture. The Finnish servants in Reade's service were no "socialists" and in general the average "Swede" and Finn had the same progressive values, but the Finns, leaning heavily towards nationalist idealism and national pride had suffered from the loss of religious faith. Excesses of modernism had tinctured the aspirations of this "demonstrative and less-constrained" race which sounded in its literature and art. The leap in the dark, the universal suffrage and proportional representation of 1906, told of its undaunted progressivism. The neglect of the lot of the lowest classes, tenants, landless and beggars, also testified to the greed of the Finnish middle-class. And what was more grave, and had to do with the social inequalities and the consequent rise of the Social Democratic party in Finland, the reforms, even if they had somewhat pacified the old racial feuds, had brought to the fore new economic and political problems which counteracted the aspirations of the people to unite to resist Russification:

The violence of party feeling between the Fennomans and Svecomans in the past caused both of them somewhat to neglect the material well-being of the people, while their preaching of hate against each other paved the way to the preaching of hate between class and class.

The situation in Finland was quite "unsettled"; Social Democrats had gained almost half of the seats in the new Eduskunta, social upheavals could be foreseen and the constitutional conflict between Finland and Russia was coming to a head. In this context, Reade feared that a total Russification of Finland could create a danger to Scandinavian independence and hoped that the sort of evolution that was taking place in Finland could expand to Russia.

126. Reade, Finland and the Finns, q. p. 233.
His utopia for the Russian Empire was a "democratic", British-type of Empire wherein independent "peasant-republics" might form the structure maintained by a rising middle-class, disciplined in self-preservation, to counteract all possible "centrifugal forces". The Finns should have joined this Empire to fulfil the ideal of a new imperial citizenship\textsuperscript{127}. In essence, the future envisaged for Finland by Reade was the same he imagined for the British Empire in which the democratic idea of an Empire would be embodied in an imperial federation.

III

The British prognosis of the future position of Finland in Russia varied not only according to the party alignment of a particular writer but also according to basic differences in theoretical standpoints to explain change in societies. To the left of the Liberals, among the Socialists, a co-operative commonwealth was presumed to replace the Russian Empire, an outdated semifeudal colossus. Among the British Labour Party, the leaders Keir Hardie and H.M. Hyndman had become pro-Finnish as they had come to know of the fight of the Finnish Socialists opposing Russification. Mme Aino Malmberg, a Finnish Socialist, lectured in Britain in 1908—1914 on Finnish-Russian relations from the point of view of radical, socialist reform. Because of her connections with Russian revolutionaries, her activities were not supported by the Finnish legalist propagandists who were suspicious of the possibility of a Finnish revolution\textsuperscript{128}. However, her friend, the Fabian and feminist writer, Ms Rosalind Travers, who later leaned towards Socialism, became interested in Finland also because there were 19 female Social Democratic representatives in the Finnish Eduskunta. She studied the position of women during the eight


\textsuperscript{128} For Labour views, see "Manifesto on Finnish Affairs". \textit{Labour Leader} 6.5. 1910; Lyytinen, \textit{Finland in British Politics in the First World War}, pp. 52—53.
months she stayed in Finland where she had family relations. Yet there were for her more general reasons to come to the North. What attracted her was the openness, wilderness and unhistoricity of Finland in contrast to the South, especially Italy, with its ruins and its civilization "wrought of time and tears" of which Travers had had enough. Finland was the "timeless" land of tomorrow, its future "free of sorrow"129, not weighed down by memories of a glorious past but vitalized with rural simplicity and modern cleanliness and cosmopolitan outlook in the towns.

The cultural and political awakening of Finland was accounted for by Travers by the racial relations of the Finnish and Swedish-speakers ("Swedes"). Although the modern Finn was of a highly "mixed" type, even the political parties appeared to have lined up along the old racial cleavage. The Finns had overwhelmed the Swedish-speakers to the degree that only "some remnant of the ancient Swedish customs still hold their own against the inroads of Finnish simplicity and cosmopolitism". Her "Swede-Finn" informant had impressed on her the 'fact' that Finns had originally been "Ugrians" and relatives of the "Mongols" whose arrival in Finland and subsequent mixture with and subjection to the Swedes was the root of all racial difficulties in Finland. During the Swedish period the Finnish race had been kept down but recently it had fought its way to life:

The real Finnish character has emerged, and a most confusing bundle of contradictions it seems to me, so far. On the one hand, I hear that they are slow, sullen, and pious creatures of barbaric simplicity and resignation, with a touch of Mongolian fatalism; on the other, they appear to be poetic, musical, keenly progressive, and most hospitable to ideas.130

129. Rosalind Travers, *Letters from Finland*. Aug. 1908—March 1909 (London, 1911), letter II and the appended poem. Miss Travers became the secretary of the Anglo-Finnish Society in 1911. In Finland she attended the meetings of the female Social Democrats. In one of them she met Hilja Raunio who explained that the Finns were divided into two races, "Tavasts" and "Carelians". Observing this Karelian member of the *Eduskunta*, Travers thought that a Slav and a Karelian might mix advantageously. See *Letters from Finland*, letter IV, p. 58. See also Lyytinen, *Finland in British Politics in the First World War*, pp. 52, n. 88.


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In Helsinki, the capital, this was quite conspicuous. There the country-Finn had mixed with the "Swede" and the results were striking. In a woman the "Mongolic" features still dominated but were "relieved" by "broad, Teutonic" forehead and by an expression of great "earnestness". Travers found it hard to believe that a race, originally so far from civilized looks could get civilized, and sometimes she had difficulties in creating contacts with the original Finns because she felt the interference of the same "race-barrier" which separated the British from the natives of India. Yet, occasionally Travers was able to overstep it, partly because her Swedish-speaking aristocratic acquaintances seemed to have distanced themselves from the nerve of life in Finland and fallen to "gravity" and isolation, and partly because the Finns in fact appeared cultured enough.

For Travers the decline of the Swedish-speaking aristocracy was a pathetic sight. Its "living force" seemed to be exhausted in providing energy to Finnish business, trade and Finnish intellectual pursuits, while the majority of the Finnish race educated itself by government grants in their own schools. Those cultured figures of Swedish origin who had studied abroad and looked forward to becoming the new aristocracy of Finland could not, in Travers opinion, achieve their objectives except by learning Finnish, and because many of them obviously did not want to do that, they remained drifting and "homeless" semi-converts.

In the democratization-process the Finns had taken the leading role in the nation. They had brought about freedom for women and occupied the industrial and intellectual élites. The "Swedes" appeared as outsiders. Even the Finnish workers had learned some civilized methods to forward their interests; they were not violent and had taken the stand of parliamentary social reform. These

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The informant also brought to Travers's attention the fact that both the Swedes and the Finns claimed to have populated Finland first as if to legitimize their claims to power. The racial aversion between the Finns and Swedish-speakers could sometimes be seen within one family when the cousins, one a Finn, the other a Swedish-speaker could not tolerate each other.

Cf. *Manchester Guardian* 11.10. 1910 where the racial division was, in all its irregularities, considered the fundamental fact of Finnish political life.
Socialists were not unpatriotic like their British comrades; they fought with the legalists against Russification\textsuperscript{133}. The Social Democratic women had, in physique and intellect, overcome the racial obstacles to civilization. They were unlike their British colleagues who still believed in individualism, they were the advocates of more collectivist ideals, they talked of self-sacrifice, the brotherhood of man and woman, and of strength and endurance in work for the home country. All races living in Finland had united to form a Finnish nation to fight against the sinister Russia\textsuperscript{134}. These people appeared to be the saviour of Finland in times when the Russification measures had been resumed with full force. The Finnish race with its "collectivist" spirit appeared to stand out of the forests to tackle the problems of politics and culture faced by the nation at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Finns were becoming the new aristocracy for Finland and surpassing the Swedish-speaking aristocracy in strength, efficiency and in social, political and cultural value.

To a British observer like Travers, it remained to be seen whether the Finns would succeed in preserving their freedom. In 1917 when Travers returned to the subject, she had learned the wider implications of the rise of the Finns and took a more serious approach to it. Since the 1910 Imperial Legislation the Finns had been "alienated" from Russia and the internal tensions in Finland were reaching a breaking-point. Contrary to Travers's expectations of peaceful development, the parliamentary reform of 1906 had not inaugurated gradual betterment for all the people. The radicalization of the Social Democrats, the lack of a second chamber in the Eduskunta, and deep disloyalty to Russia, all indicated that in Finland "the mental conditions are quite ready for a true social revolution and the foundation of a co-operative commonwealth, while the economic conditions are still several stages behind"\textsuperscript{135}. Travers surmised that a revolution in Finland

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could not come to a head if the truly antagonistic forces were not ripe, and she hoped that the change would take place "peacefully" as a transformation to a co-operative society. This forecast appeared to be confirmed by a racial consideration; the character of the "Mongolic" Finnish race was ultimately "passive, patient and unfathomable"\textsuperscript{136} so that it would not resort to aggressive measures.

IV

However, it so happened that after the outbreak of the Russian October Revolution the Finns, now led by a bourgeois and legalist majority, declared independence (6.12. 1917) only to find themselves in the midst of a civil war between themselves ("Whites") and the Socialists ("Reds") in January 1918.

In recognizing the new state V.I. Lenin had been true to his principle that those nationalities (Finland and Poland) which were historically separate from Russia would be allowed to go, but later Stalin had pointed out to the Finnish Socialists that they could in the future join the Soviets and the great liberation of all nations\textsuperscript{137}. The Finnish "Red Guards" were soon overwhelmed by revolutionary Socialists, and counting on the support of Russian Bolshevists they took over the government and declared a people's republic. Later in the spring of 1918 the "Whites", led by General C.G. Mannerheim, invited the Germans to cut the civil war short.

In British news the "Red" insurrection featured as an outburst of "anarchism", as a rebellion of "madmen and criminals" caused by the infiltration of Bolshevist propaganda which had managed to misguide the otherwise sober Finnish worker\textsuperscript{138}. Both "Marxism" and "Prussianism" had invaded the formerly democratic Finland,

\textsuperscript{136} Travers-Hyndman, "The Emancipation of Finland", p. 106.

\textsuperscript{137} See V.I. Uljanov's statement, quoted by Jussila in Nationalities and Nationalism in Italy and in Finland, p. 100; for Stalin's address in 1917, see Isaac Deutscher, Stalin. A Political Biography, (2nd ed., London, 1967), pp. 181—82.

\textsuperscript{138} The Times 4.3. 1918; "Nomad" in The Spectator, 120 (March 9 and 23, 1918). More generally, the two forces in operation in Finland were "Prussianism" and "Marxism", the principal enemies of a British Liberal. Cf. Freeden, Liberalism Divided, p. 30.
and although Finnish propaganda tried to convince the British that the Bolshevist uprising had been halted and that German help did not mean a loss of Finland’s independence and that it would not become another German dependency in the war, the keen-sighted British anxiously noticed the growth of antidemocratic tendencies and dreams of expansion of Finland. The Germans threatened the British interests in the Murmansk area and the Finns, now being "ethnically akin to Germans", aspired to Eastern Karelia and Estonia. Seeing these developments, Prime Minister Arthur Balfour wanted to "give the Finns time to reflect on the mutability of human affairs and the doubtful glories of being ruled by a German prince". The British government did not want a Germanized but a democratic Finland, and delayed its recognition of Finnish independence until these requirements appeared fulfilled after the German collapse.

To Mrs Travers-Hyndman also, Finland had gone "mad". The crisis had been aggravated by the discrepancy between the accumulation of profits of the Finnish capitalists during the war and the radicalization of the Socialists who had hoped for a land reform which had been delayed. Embitterment and disillusion on the Left and optimistic feeling and an urge for independence on the Right increased after the autumn of 1917. To Travers the crux of the problem had been the lot of poor tenants and the landless, the forgotten souls, and it was over its solution that the Finns had been fighting against each other:

Social Democrats and bourgeois alike were unable to deal fundamentally with production; the latter because the large farmers and land holders opposed even peasant proprietorship. The former because they could accept nothing less than nationalization of the land.

139. The Times (Stockholm’s corr.) 4., 9., 17.4. 1918. Balfour’s judgement, q. in Lyytinen, Finland in British Politics in the First World War, p. 188. In its humble petition for recognition the Finnish government did not stress the separateness of the Finns from the Germans but emphasized that the union of Finland and Russia “has as little foundation in any political and cultural affinity as in any racial kinship”. Undated copy in Reuter MSS, xxii, 6184a.

140. R. Travers-Hyndman, "Politics in Finland, I". The New Europe, viii (25 July, 1918), q. p. 33. Cf. Manchester Guardian 8.1. 1918 where the political cleavage between socialist masses leaning towards Russia and a powerful bourgeoisie promoting separation from it was seen as the reason for not regarding Finland as a single political entity.
Here Travers stumbled upon the weakness of the constitutionalist-legalist argument. It had depicted all the country-Finns, for the British, as peasants or happy tenants, but Travers also was prone to exaggeration, for land-reform had already been put forward in the *Eduskunta* even though it was held over because of the war and further crisis. Yet Travers’s account of the causes of the failure of the revolution in Finland was more accurate. The Social Democrats had themselves to blame for their disaster; revolutionary consciousness and a theory of change had been there, but the necessary conditions for a revolution had been missing. The necessary factors for success, like the management of the food resources and of food distribution had got out of hand, mostly because the small-farmers did not join the ranks of the revolutionaries and because the production of food had decreased severely. Furthermore, the revolution had been short of unanimous support of all Social Democrats right from the start, and because of their poor organization the "Reds" could not prevent the formation of a White front, and were not able to recruit a proper army of citizens to carry it through. All had ended up with "savagery" as both the "Whites" and the "Reds" had committed excesses of terror — a sure sign of the return of the "Mongolian" savagism.

The dialectically dramatic phase of Finnish history, the time of war and inner crisis, and the interplay of economic and political factors in it, brought out the real character of the Finnish race which the civilization-process should have kept under. As diversified and complex as Finnish modern history appeared to a British observer, its main forces could, however, be detected either by a straightforward racialist Liberal approach or by a racialist Socialist explanatory concept which took the basic economic factors into account. However, the concept of race, so tempting as a scientific tool, remained for the British, were they Liberals or Socialists, the determinant of the Finnish political life and disorder, ultimately inexplicable by any other means.

From the February Manifesto of 1899 to the outbreak of the Russian revolution, the British conception of the Finns included a pervasive racialist strain of thought. As an underlying strand of argument it provided a theoretical basis for a British view of Finland’s progress and constitutional development. The position of Finland in the Russian Empire was assessed from the point of view of subject races and their relation to the Empire. The conceptual apparatus for the discussion of "freedom" for the Finns emanated from the fundamental notion of separate racial descent, which was interpreted to yield rights to self-government and independent national life. The concept of a Finnish nation was born as the Finnish and Swedish origins appeared to have come together and the Finnish national culture entered a phase of 'revival' usually in virtue of the vitality of the Finnish partner in the marriage. This conception had been developed in the age of imperialism to explain power-politics, and some of the commentators who looked forward to seeing a new type of man and society grow in Russia, subjected the Finns to this 'higher', evolutionary ideal the realization of which the Finns were supposed to partake.

Almost as important as the dominating racialist theme was the constitutionalist argument that focussed its attention on historical documents and valued them as true evidence for Finnish freedom. The Whig interpretation of history was applied to Finnish history. In their progress from barbarism to modern civilization the Finns faced up to the last phase of the contest in the 1900—1910s between reaction and progress, between oppression and reform, a period of anarchy in politics. Documentary evidence fought the fight of national existence against Russian controversialists as if the contention had not been of minds but of papers, not over power but over freedom. This kind of 'Macaulay-theme' in Finnish history covered the years 1899—1917 when the Finns went through all the history that had taken the British centuries. In this version of the idea of progress the concept of race played a secondary role in providing auxiliary and specific grounds for the distinctness of the Finns: in the idea of national liberation the Swedish-speakers and Finns were merged into one political body for a common cause to preserve the restored liberties.
In most British arguments the documents of the *Landtag* of 1809 formed a Finnish Magna Carta but on a closer inspection some well-informed British eventually had great reservations about its weight as testimony when it came to the point whether the Tsar had retained his sovereignty. Even if the Finnish cause was morally and commonsensically defensible, the proof, for anything else than a legitimate claim for co-operation in deciding the Imperial interest in Finland, was missing. The Liberals in Britain and the Legalists in Finland learned in the heyday of imperialism how little arguments, words and documents actually counted in power-politics. The British tried, if they ever had the opportunity, personally to exercise influence on the decision-makers and prevent the Finnish-Russian crisis by rational persuasion. And actually, when history took its own course, they achieved less than they had expected.

In envisioning the future of the Finns the British Liberals had two alternatives in 1899—1917; either the Finns should be allowed to develop freely in their own direction as an independent nation or they should unite with Russia. However, as the Russian Empire took the road of Socialist revolution and no Liberal imperial sentiment but chaos seemed to develop there, only the former alternative seemed feasible. The Finns should stay apart. In 1918 it was clear what had happened: "we have seen the apparent unity of Russia dissolved, and Poland, Finland, and the Ukraine disengaged". The lesson, mirroring the more democratic conditions of the British Empire, was that Russia should not have gone to war to expend its "energies" which would have been put to better use in building the inner "cohesion" of the nation. The cause of Russian dissolution was "chemical" decomposition caused by bureaucracy, lack of free peasantry, lack of local autonomy, and lack of a strong middle-class, the traditional causes of Russian backwardness. As the prospect of a liberal federation for

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142. See Ernst Parker, 'Introduction'. *Russia from the Varangians to the Bolsheviks*. Ed. N. Forbes, G.A. Birkett (Oxford, 1918), pp. xi—xvi. The general conclusion of the book was that Russia had dissolved to its tenth century foundations, and everything gained between c. 900—1917 had been lost.

143. The other mirror for the British Empire had traditionally been the Roman Empire. Cf. A. Dwight Culler, *The Victorian Mirror of History* (London, 1985).
Russia seemed not to materialize, it was hard for British Liberals to come to terms with the idea that the Bolshevists might get Russia going. Likewise, it was hard for them to tolerate the idea that Germany, the other enemy of liberal freedom, would gain a foothold in that progressive Finland which had barely escaped from the Russian chaos. Before the armistice of November 1918, the British foreign policy aimed at decreasing German influence in Finland and in the Baltic area, and although nationalist aspirations in these countries were supported, the question of what should be their future status was deferred\textsuperscript{144}. Of course, the Finnish question was not as big as that of Russia the solution of which determined the final evaluations concerning Finland but, as in the past, events in Finland could be highly significant for understanding what was happening to civilization in the North.

Conclusion

I

In the age of Enlightenment the British notion of the Finn began to take shape on a more scientific basis. The fanciful elements of Finnish history were gradually being laid aside by some naturalists and historians but especially by the travellers who visited Russia and Sweden-Finland and made observations about the supposed origins, characteristics and customs of the Finns. Observations and reflections that connected the idea of race with the grand scheme of progress of civilization put the Finns both in their proper place in history and in human classification.

These new ideas did not originate in a vacuum. The British lived in an expanding commercial society and their concept of civilization was generally in keeping with its values and ideals. The aristocracy wanted to preserve the values of agricultural society whereas the spokesmen of commerce exalted a progressive and expansive economy together with its morals of enterprise. A new moral code gained ground from older ones and the meaning of the term "civilization" was now "derived less from chivalry and aristocratic sense of honour than from the common life of men in towns". This dichotomy of moralities affected also the way the British perceived the Finns; this perception was conditioned by the idea that alien peoples or "races" lived on a "lower" stage of civilization. The term 'nation' with reference to the Finns was rarely used.

When commenting on Finnish culture the historians and travellers compared the culture of the Finns with their own and with that of the Swedish-speakers in Finland. The progress in agriculture and commerce in eighteenth-century Finland enhanced the belief in the superiority of 'Swedish' culture in Finland. However, even if the nature of the Finn was regarded as semi-civilized and the living conditions of the Finns as a lot poorer than those of the Swedish-speakers, the Finnish race appeared quite docile and ready for further civilization. Although the Finns lived far away from the centres of civilization, Swedish culture in Finland had performed the task of civilizing the Finns for six hundred years so that the Finns, who had originated from the East had settled down to cultivation of the land and to life under comparatively just rule. As the Finns of Finland appeared to have evolved from a stage of "primitive" agriculture towards commercial society and to have acquired a taste for higher civilization, they were considered by the British fortunate half-civilized newcomers in Europe. Those sections of the Finnish race which lived under Russian rule had remained on a lower level of civilization because the Russian government had both suppressed and assimilated parts of them. In spite of this, the Finns who lived near St Petersburg, seemed more civilized than Russian serfs because of their racial propensities for more advanced agricultural methods.

II

In the nineteenth century, contemporary with new thinking in anthropological theory, ideas concerning human nature were being reformulated by the empiricism which took over in racial theory. The accumulating testimony of "savage" inability to high intellectual achievements tended to confirm that the "lower" races lived on no higher intellectual level than children. But since the 1840—50s this idea was challenged by the new theories of cultural evolution which judged the "barbaric" and "primitive" cultures to be necessary and interesting phases in the cultural process. Here the Finns, having been in contact with the West both racially and culturally were a problematic and interesting case as the reception of the Kalevala in Britain shows. Their racial characteristics had
either changed from the Mongol to resemble those of the Aryan or the Finns constituted their own, peculiar race. The racial classification proved flexible enough to allow them a worthy place in it. The Finnish race had its own peculiar culture brought from the East and developed in conjunction with Western values.

The concept of race provided not only an opportune paradigmatic framework but assumed also a metaphoric role for the assessment of the quality of Finnish race, nation, culture and politics. Since the 1840s, the Finns appeared to be growing racially ripe for higher culture and a distinct nationality, and later, for constitutional political life. The reorientation in classifying nature and human races and the tendency to politicize racial issues affected the ideas of hierarchy in society too, and novel ideas were invigorated by the travellers’ descriptions which usually found three races of unequal cultural capabilities in Finland. In his ethnological studies into the European races, Robert Latham formulated a racial theory in which the power struggles of weaker and stronger could be scientifically analyzed. On the eve of the Crimean War the British government had a clear idea of the potential of the Finnish race and on this basis they estimated its contribution to the war against Russia.

It can be seen that the process of producing a scientific text was being structured by cultural assumptions and preconceptions as to the nature of the Finns and by each author’s concern for the needs and interests of particular audiences. Images of the Finn were cultural constructs, expressing not the whole of empirical reality itself but a particular relationship between a section (race and culture) of that reality and a scientific observer. British travellers to Finland took their opportunity to enforce this selective method of observation, and the Finns themselves continuously, from the 1840s to 1920s, provided the needed information.

Since the 1850s, linguistic and cultural cleavages in Finland could be explained by racial division between the Swedish-speakers, the Finns and their Russian rulers. Anthropologists and ethnologists legitimized these divisions with their craniological and other physical measurements. Victorian philologists and scholars developed a notion of the Finn based on the assessment of the level of the evolution of the Finnish language. As a result of approaches of this kind the Finns became classified, for the first time, as a ‘nation’. Racial, linguistic and political evolution all lent
their support. It did not take long for these conclusions to find their way into both cultural and political arguments in those Liberal periodicals which were defending the constitutional development of the small continental nationalities. In Liberal political theory, the racialist argument supported the idea that in Finland there were two races which were in a process of uniting into one 'nation'.

Edward Freeman's historical-geographical method alongside the traditional Millian constitutional approach provided a basis for comparative political theory within British Liberal ideology. The development of a germ of a popular government in Finland since the 'restoration' of the Finnish liberties in 1809 by Alexander I, and their further extension since the 1860s by Alexander II, showed that Finland, civilized by the "Teutonic" culture, had not assimilated into the Russian Empire but was being allowed to develop freely. In comparison to many suppressed European nationalities, the status of the Finns in the Russian Empire seemed encouraging, although indications of the Russification of Finland were beginning to reach Britain already as early as the 1880s. The Liberal racialist point of view of Finnish affairs continued to dominate British comment on Finland until the 1920s. Even the constitutionalist argument defending the autonomy of Finland within the Russian Empire used it as an auxiliary scientific proof for Finnish distinctness. It was in the 1920—30s that the racialist view was pushed into the background in British comment and the emphasis shifted to social and economic considerations.

III

Although Charles Darwin's discoveries removed teleology from natural evolution, many ethnologists and anthropologists reintroduced it in the disguise of vitalism, creative evolution and organicism. In the construction of theories of social evolution the "struggle for existence" was supposed to prevail between "lower" and "higher" classes and races. In the imperialist context, from the 1880s onwards, "the white man's burden" was regarded either as optimistically or pessimistically, depending on how harmful or beneficial the mixtures of the "whites" with the "lower" races were estimated. The effects of the mixtures of the Finns with their
neighbours and their situation in a multiracial Russian Empire were being reassessed through the mirror of the experience of the "subject races" within the British Empire. Politically critical parallels were drawn between the positions of Ireland and Finland; those Liberals who supported Irish Home Rule used the autonomy of Finland as a model, while those who opposed it did not find the comparison useful. During the period of Russification of Finland, 1899—1917, the Finnish question emerged as a sufficiently distinct issue in British politics, in which a wider approach to compare the governmental systems of the British and Russian Empires could be used. A theory of Liberal, more democratic Empire (imperial federation) was applied to grasp the situation of Finland in the Russian Empire.

Finnish legalists had propagated a constitutionalist interpretation of the Finnish-Russian connection in Britain but British politicians, journalists and men of letters reconsidered it in their own ways. Understanding that the prerogative of the Tsar over Finland was as legitimate as the prerogative of Westminster over the British Empire, it was not easy for the British to support the autonomy of Finland in a way which would not impair the Russian imperial interest. What counted in favour of the Finns was their highly developed political life and national culture. As the Finns had undeniably reached a higher rung on the ladder of physical development, they also, mostly because of their own cultural, national and political awakening, seemed to have grown politically mature. The Finns had emerged on the map of Eastern Europe as a potential political force, a racially coherent nationality with their own national consciousness. Thus the political position of the Finns in the Russian Empire was exceptional in terms of any imperial government. The Finns now had their own 'parliament', Eduskunta. Its demands for the preservation of the autonomy in the face of the Russian plans to consolidate the Empire aroused conflicting arguments in Britain. In 1910, the official Foreign Office opinion, though regarding Finland as a distinct entity and in keeping with the Russian interpretation of the union, held that Finland was still a province of Russia, albeit with some local autonomy. If the Russians wanted to strengthen and integrate their Empire, a legitimate claim in times of international rivalry, they should consult the Finns.

Liberal Imperialists supported the Unionist policy of imperial
integration, the radical Liberals opposed it. As with the British Empire, so for Russia too a process of building up a more democratic Empire was envisaged. This state of affairs appeared to come closer to achievement when the Duma was established. Liberal observers were divided as to the future of the Finns in the Russian Empire; some called on the Finns to make their contribution to Russia’s political development and to participate in Russia’s process of democratization. The Finns should be assimilated into the vast Empire in order to give their ‘progressive’ racial impact. On the contrary, in radical arguments defending Finnish autonomy and separateness, racialist ideas served not only the purpose of justifying the claims for complete Finnish freedom — the separate existence of the Finns from the Russians — but also the purpose of promoting national integration, the closer union of Finnish- and the Swedish-speakers in Finland, and their introduction to the “free” West as a free nation able to survive and manage on its own. This conclusion was reached not only by the British who visited Finland or lived there for some time but also by some leading British Liberal politicians who had developed a theory of nationality on the basis of which it could be recommended to victors in the First World War that the Finns were ready for independence in respect of race, language, religion and politics. The Finnish Civil War in 1918 did nothing much to change this conclusion, and the British government recognized Finland as an independent republic soon after the German intervention in Finland was over. For the British, the evolution of the Finns appeared to culminate in the 1920—30s with the completion of the political evolution of Finland and the stabilization of the Finnish political system. But there was also a socialist interpretation which paid more attention to the social and economic conditions in Finland and placed less stress on the constitutional aspects of the Finnish-Russian dispute.

IV

It has been seen that British understanding of race relations dominated the discussion about the position of Finland in Europe and in the Russian Empire. The British Empire, reaching its climax at the end of the nineteenth century, faced a new era of
international rivalry culminating in the First World War. The German Empire especially had become a threat since the 1880s. From the 1890s the British government sought ways out of isolation and tried to create friendlier relations with France and Russia. In this context the discussion about Finnish autonomy appeared futile from a governmental point of view. Both the British and the Russian Empires needed internal integration, and the question of Finland was deemed entirely an internal affair of Russia.

However, when the Liberals took office in 1902, and as the Finns battled on against centralist imperial legislation, the Finnish question did not disappear in Britain between 1902—1917. During the Russian Revolutions of 1917, the Finns kept to themselves and did not take sides as the dissolution of the 'semi-feudal colossus' began to loom. For British radical Liberals observers, Finland was like a self-determining unit where no further civilizing was needed to enable the Finns create their own nation-state. In general, the idea of freedom for small European nationalities, even for the Irish, was winning the day, though not in all parts of the British Empire. James Bryce, a leading authority on imperial affairs and racial problems (Bryce had studied both American and South-African racial relations), offered a new concept which embraced the situation prevalent in Empires worldwide, that of Russia included. The reconstruction of post-war Europe was to be carried out along the lines derived from the new concept of nationality arising out of the federalist Liberal thinking. Even if Liberalism was a declining ideology in British politics, its categories of political thought survived and were used in wider applications as Europe encountered the totalitarian upsurge of the 1920s and 1930s.
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