THE RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC FUTURE OF EUROPE
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Based on papers presented at the conference arranged by the Donner Institute for Research in Religious and Cultural History, The Migration Institute of Finland and Åbo Akademi University, Turku/Åbo, Finland, on 12-13 June 2017

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# Table of contents

*Ruth Illman, Tuomas Martikainen and Peter Nynäs*
The ethnic and religious future of Europe 7

*Conrad Hackett and Michael Lipka*
The demographic factors that make Islam the world’s fastest-growing major religious group 11

*Matti Kamppinen*
The NPW framework in future-oriented studies of cultural agency 15

*Fredrik Portin*
Legitimacy for some: right-wing populist rationality and antagonistic politics 30

*René Dausner*
Humanity and hospitality: An approach to theology in the times of migration 51

*Didem Doganyilmaz Duman*
Islam’s increased visibility in the European public sphere: A real crisis? 68

*Joanna Kratofil and Dominika Motak*
A critical discourse analysis of the media coverage of the migration crisis in Poland: The Polish Catholic Church’s perception of the ‘migration crisis’ 92

*Wardah Alkatiri*
Reconsidering the modern nation state in the Anthropocene: A Muslim’s perspective 116
Mercédesz Czimbalmos
From Yidishe *khasene* to civil marriage:
The history of intermarriages in the Jewish Community of Helsinki  159

Jose Navarro and Vegard Skirbekk
Income inequality and religion globally 1970–2050  175
The ethnic and religious future of Europe

EDITORIAL

The current volume of Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis is based on a symposium arranged by the Donner Institute together with the Migration Institute of Finland and the CoE at Åbo Akademi University ‘Young Adults and Religion in a Global Perspective’ in June 2017, holding the title ‘The Religious and Ethnic Future of Europe’.

Europe is currently undergoing significant demographic changes due to an aging population and increased immigration. The demographics of religion constitute a new research field that has developed alongside growing xenophobia and Islamophobia worldwide. Fear of the demographic change in Europe is one of the ideological motors behind several xenophobic social and political movements of our time. Academic research has lagged behind this development and not taken seriously enough popular concern for growing multi-ethnicity and religious diversity. Today, however, there is an emerging body of relevant scholarship on this controversial topic, addressing several of the timely research questions that arise in the intersection of religion and demographic developments. These include issues related to demographic projections and statistics on religion and ethnicity but also the use and misuse of such data in policy-making and public discourse. For instance, the ways contemporary religious identities and belongings challenge assumed religious categories also feeds into the latter dilemma. Current liquid, multiple or rapidly changing identities make predictions more hazardous and open to misuse.

The current volume of *Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis* discusses the cultural, ethnic and religious aspects of this ongoing demographic shift towards multi-ethnicity and religious diversity, presenting the latest research findings as well as methodological and theoretical questions concerning the cultural and societal implications of demographic trajectories. The volume is based on a conference arranged in Turku, Finland in June 2017, by the Donner Institute for Research in Religion and Culture, the Migration Institute of Finland and the ‘Young Adults and Religion in a Global Perspective’.
Perspective’ Åbo Akademi University Centre of Excellence in Research. The aim of the conference was to bring together world-leading demographers in the field of religion and ethnicity with researchers from the humanities and social sciences, who address issues of religious change, migration and intercultural relations from their respective perspectives. In this way, the larger implications of demographic changes for the research on multicultural societies, interreligious encounters and diversity can be evaluated and enhanced.

The volume opens with a review article by Conrad Hackett and Michael Lipka from the Pew Research Institute in Washington DC, USA, outlining and discussing the demographic factors that currently make Islam the world’s fastest-growing major religious group and making projections into the future, stretching to the year 2060. The article section opens with three texts focusing on different theoretical contributions to the research field. Firstly, Matti Kamppinen introduces a theoretical framework for future-oriented studies of religious agency applicable to the ethnographic research discussed in the volume at large. Thereafter, Fredrik Portin examines the disruptive character of right-wing populism in relation to issues of democracy and public legitimacy, basing his arguments on the political philosophy of, for example, Laclau, Mouffe and Latour. Issues of demographic change and diversity are given a theological illumination by René Dausner in his article on humanity and hospitality.

These theoretical contributions are followed by a number of ethnographically driven investigations. Didem Doganyilmaz Duman analyses the political atmosphere in Europe today in relation to the increased visibility of Muslim refugees and Islamic symbols in the public sphere. Thereafter, the media sphere is given a closer examination in Joanna Krotofil’s and Dominika Motak’s critical discourse analytical assessment of the media coverage of the ‘migration crisis’, especially in Poland. In Wardah Alkatiri’s contribution, broader perspective is applied to current ethnic conflicts, offering a critical postcolonial analysis of the modern conception of nation-states and nationalism with regard Indonesia as a pertinent example. After these articles focusing primarily on Islam and Muslim perspectives in their ethnography, Mercédesz Czimbalmos concludes the series of ethnographic articles with an analysis pertaining to Jewish perspectives on intermarriage in contemporary multicultural Finland. Finally, the volume ends where it started, with a demographic analysis. In their substantial contribution to the volume, Jose Navarro and Vegard Skirbekk present a global overview of
income inequality in relation to religion, estimating the development from current times to the year 2050. Understanding income inequality within and across religions is important in order to develop policies that reduce such tensions, they argue, helping to decrease tensions among religious groups and preventing conflict.

Accurate and transparent statistics form the basis for scientific inquiry and understanding on many phenomena, including religious and ethnic developments. Path-breaking global statistics developed by international research organisations have made it possible to provide reliable analysis of both contemporary and future religious developments that take into account the changing global demography. Obviously, the quality of elementary data varies between countries, but already current data sets allow us to discuss many issues with some certainty. This is a fundamental prerequisite for debating potential future scenarios. We believe that the potential of global religious statistics is still to be explored in numerous ways and hope that this volume can provide inspiration for that endeavour. However, it is obvious from this special issue and the observations made during the conference that reliable and valid statistical analyses are growing even more dependent on nuanced qualitative global studies providing us with increasingly sensitive measures of religious, cultural and ethnic belonging as well as deeper insights into the contemporary complex dynamics between forms of belonging and agencies.

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Ruth Illman, Tuomas Martikainen and Peter Nynäš
Among the world’s major religious groups, Muslims have the lowest median age and the highest fertility rates. Due to these demographic factors, Muslims are expected to increase in number faster than any other major group in the period between 2015 and 2060, growing at more than twice the pace of global population growth.

In the next half century or so, Christianity’s long reign as the world’s largest religion may come to an end, according to a new report (Hackett et al. 2017) that builds on Pew Research Center’s original population growth projections for religious groups (Hackett et al. 2015). Indeed, Muslim populations will grow more than twice as fast as the overall world population between 2015 and 2060 and, in the second half of this century, will likely surpass Christians as the world’s largest religious group.

While the world’s population is projected to grow 32 per cent in the coming decades, the number of Muslims is expected to increase by 70 per cent – from 1.8 billion in 2015 to nearly 3 billion in 2060. In 2015, Muslims made up 24.1 per cent of the global population. Forty-five years later, they are expected to make up more than three-in-ten of the world’s people (31.1%).

![Fig. 1.](image-url)
The main reasons for Islam’s growth ultimately involve simple demographics. To begin with, Muslims have more children than members of the seven other major religious groups analysed in the study. Muslim women have an average of 2.9 children, significantly higher than the next-highest group (Christians at 2.6) and the average of all non-Muslims (2.2). In all major regions where there is a sizeable Muslim population, Muslim fertility exceeds non-Muslim fertility.

The growth of the Muslim population also is helped by the fact that Muslims have the youngest median age (24 in 2015) of all major religious groups, more than seven years younger than the median age of non-Muslims (32).

A greater proportion of Muslims will soon be at the point in their lives when people begin having children. This, combined with high fertility rates, will accelerate Muslim population growth.

More than a third of Muslims are concentrated in Africa and the Middle East, regions that are projected to have the biggest population increases. But even within these high-growth regions – as well as others – Muslim populations are projected to grow faster than members of other groups. For example, Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa, on average, are younger and have a higher fertility rate than the overall population of the region. In fact, Muslim populations are expected to grow as a percentage of every region except Latin America and the Caribbean, where relatively few Muslims live.

The same dynamics hold true in many countries where Muslims live in large numbers alongside other religious groups. For example, the number of Muslims in India is growing at a faster rate than the country’s majority.
Hindu population, and is projected to rise from 14.9 per cent of India’s 2015 population to 19.4 per cent (or 333 million people) in 2060. And while there were similar numbers of Muslims and Christians in Nigeria as of 2015, Muslims have higher fertility rates there and are expected to grow to a solid majority of Nigeria’s population (60.5%) in 2060.

Meanwhile, religious switching – which is expected to hinder the growth of Christians by an estimated 72 million between 2015 and 2060 – is not expected to have a negative net impact on Muslim population growth.


Michael Lipka is a senior editor focusing on religion at Pew Research Center, where he regularly writes about public opinion in the United States and internationally as well as demographic research on topics related to secularization and religious change. Lipka specializes in finding new and innovative ways to explain quantitative research findings to informed audiences. He has served as a primary editor on recent reports about Muslims in America (Pew Research Center, 26.7.2017), Muslims in Europe (Pew Research Center, 29.11.2017), global religious demography (Pew Research Center, 5.4.2017), religious
divisions in Israel (Pew Research Center, 8.3.2016), and religion and politics across Central and Eastern Europe (Pew Research Center, 10.5.2017), and has written more than 100 blog posts about Pew Research Center findings.

References


The NPW framework in future-oriented studies of cultural agency

MATTI KAMPPINEN

The network of possible worlds, or NPW for short, offers a theoretical framework where cultural agency can be systematically linked with such central concepts of future-oriented studies as future path, scenario, actor, vision, trend, weak signal, future awareness and foresight development. Time is embedded in a NPW in two ways: the NPW itself is temporally structured, and the actors navigating within the NPW are equipped with cognitive models of time. The framework can be applied not only in the study of theoretical and empirical aspects of cultural agency, but also in the political management of human societies, including the forecasting of religious and ethnic dynamics. It provides tools for capturing the special characteristics of cultural agency. Therefore, it is an essential tool in understanding the religious and ethnic futures of Europe.

Introduction

Our commonsense theory of human action takes time and temporality for granted: we form intentions and act them out in order to have an impact on the world of the future. Temporality pervades our existence, as we experience ourselves, and the world we know, to be existing in the present, future and past.

Let us look at a story, not so fictitious: One morning a young Iraqi man packed his bags and started his journey to Northern Europe. He packed all the cash he had been able to raise in order to prepare for the journey. He had a cognitive model of a possible world in which he would pay for his boat trip or train ticket. He pictured himself in various situations and chose to prepare himself for the coming circumstances. He expected to get to Northern Europe in six months. He planned beforehand and was capable of pursuing

1 The NPW framework presented here is based on a book on risk theory (Kamppinen et al. 1995) and especially on a textbook chapter I wrote together with Pentti Malaska and Osmo Kuusi (Kamppinen et al. 2003). Sections here dealing with intentional systems theory draw on Kamppinen 2010.
a possible world of better living. Had he not been born in Iraq, or had recent history been otherwise, the future for him would have looked quite different. The choices he and others had made in the past had impacted on the present situation and on the diversity of possible worlds that he could picture as he looked to the future. If this particular Iraqi man had not had the model of possible worlds in his mind, he would not have left in the first place, and the future of Europe would be easier to predict. Thinking and acting in terms of possible worlds is what makes us human; it is in the very essence of human existence.

Past, present and future worlds are arranged in a temporal order and most of the time we can tell quite confidently how they are organized. On the other hand, our current experience takes place in the present moment (or the actual world), from which vantage point we look at past and future possibilities. The future events travel in time towards us, pervade the actual world, and transform into past events. Our commonsense theory of human action encapsulates the core idea of NPW, the network of possible worlds, in which we are situated in a temporally ordered (directed) framework – the actual world being painted in more intense colours:

NPW is a theoretical framework that can be applied to cultural studies, especially in understanding agency and the future dynamics of religious and ethnic actors.
Initially, possible worlds semantics was developed for epistemic and deontic logics as well as for action theory (von Wright 1951, Hintikka 1975, Copeland 2002), but the general idea has been applied in various fields of research (Dolezel 2010, Ejerhed and Lindström 2012). I do not intend to apply the various axioms of modal logic to cultural studies, but rather hope to utilize the idea of possible worlds in cultural studies in order to highlight how time and human action are connected. Furthermore, I am not the first to propose that the concept of agency can be fruitfully understood within the framework of possible worlds. Especially scholars in futures research such as Pentti Malaska and Mika Mannermaa (Malaska and Mannermaa 1985), Osmo Kuusi (1999), Nicholas Rescher (1997), Wendell Bell (1997), Richard Slaughter (2012) and many others have developed a future-oriented framework that has the commonsense theory of human action at its foundation. In cultural and religious studies, Thomas Lawson (2001), Laura Leming (2007) and especially Jörg Rüpke (2015) have theorized about agency.

My principal claim is that in order to be able to discuss the religious and ethnic futures of Europe we need to employ the NPW framework, or something like it, because what it means to talk about futures is to talk about possible worlds, their accessibility, the future paths leading from one world to another, and constraints affecting the future paths as well as the accessibility of possible worlds (Carmon 2016). Hence, the NPW framework provides us with the tools to understand the world as a dynamic and systemic whole with different future options. Moreover, the religious and ethnic actors planning their future paths (where to stay, where to go, what to hope for) have their respective NPW models in their minds and cultures, by means of which they navigate in the world of uncertainty. My related claim is that the essential constituents in the NPW framework are the cognitive models of risk, time and superhuman agency.

Agency in terms of intentional systems theory

One may ask how relevant is the commonsense theory of human action and the theory of time which is embedded in it? For cultural studies, commonsense theory is extremely relevant. There are fields of research where commonsense theories do not have much bearing, such as physics, cosmology or chemistry, but in those areas of research where humans are treated as agents or intentional systems, commonsense theories do provide important theoretical insights.
I will briefly illustrate the concept of an intentional system by means of how we talk about sports. The game of soccer (European football) is a cultural scene where there are actors following rules, publicly articulated roles for players, shared cognitive models for all players and for spectators, and the typical venue at which the game takes place. There are elements that are required for that process to be a game of soccer, and there are elements that can be exchanged for others without the game losing its individual character. The venue, for example, could be a soccer stadium or a playing field, the goal posts could be made of steel or wood, or the goals could be marked out with rocks or tin cans. The players can use high-end soccer shoes or play barefoot.

The set of required elements of the game includes that the actors are playing with the distinctive cognitive models of soccer, as well as the associated beliefs and desires that enable them to identify the ball, the players, the goal, and to act accordingly: to keep the ball, kick it and score goals when the opportunity arises. If the actors had no clue as to what they were doing, the activity would not be a game of soccer, even though they might be moving themselves and the ball according to the rules of soccer. The beliefs and desires of the players constitute the game, and we can successfully describe, explain and predict their behaviour on the basis of these beliefs.

Our intuition concerning the soccer players is solid. What it means to play soccer is to have players with the appropriate beliefs and desires. We treat the players as intentional systems, to use a term introduced by the philosopher Daniel C. Dennett, in his article ‘Intentional systems’ (reprinted in Dennett 1981). An intentional system is a system that can be understood (described, explained and predicted) by means of ascribing beliefs, desires, intentions and other representations to it. The notion of an intentional system articulates the commonsense theory of human action, and captures the hard core of how we construe human action in futures research as well: actors navigating a network of possible worlds (Herman 2008, Slors 2007).

Navigating the network of possible worlds

The universe as we know it contains a number of possible courses of events in the sense that things could have gone otherwise. As events unfold, it may happen that we are lucky in trying to affect them, or some other time, it may turn out that we run out of luck, despite of our efforts to change the course of events (Rescher 2001).
Courses of events are causally dependent upon various things: upon ourselves and our capabilities, our fellow human beings, the laws of nature, economics, complex hybrid situations of natural laws and social commitments and so on. Some causal factors in our lives are more predictable than others, some are even known to scientific research, whereas some are just assumed to exist and have causal power. Some of these assumed causal factors are interpreted in terms of superior beings, anthropomorphic agents whose causal powers are greater than ours. In certain cultural settings, these superior beings are elements of religions; they are revered and ritually manipulated, whereas in certain other cultural settings the superior beings are feared and taken into account as necessary features of technological progress. What is common to the superior beings of religions and the risks of modern societies is that they provide challenging antagonists in the games of life, in the various projects of navigating a world of uncertainty.

Intentional systems face uncertainty. We experience ourselves as beings situated in the network of possible worlds. Some possible worlds are behind us, some lie in the future; some of them are accessible to us, and some are beyond our reach for one reason or another. We scholars believe all this. In addition, we believe that the people we study and facilitate are very much like us. They, the study objects, are cognitively competent, culturally-groomed actors finding their way in the networks of possible worlds. Navigating a world of uncertainty encapsulates the dynamics of intentional systems. The very reason for building internal representations and beliefs or desires is to cope with uncertainty, the possible future worlds. Intentional systems utilize cultural resources for the purposes of navigating in the world of uncertainty. Let us explicate the elements of decision making any intentional system uses in the network of possible worlds.

The central concept is the possible world. It refers to the state of affairs that could obtain or not. It is a conceivable state of affairs, in the sense in which the Austrian philosopher Alexius von Meinong used the term *Gegenstand* – anything that can be thought about (Sajama and Kamppinen 1987). A world in which the majority of Europeans are Muslims is a possible world.

A possible world, ‘pw’, can be defined as a collection of those states of affairs that obtain in that world. If, for example, we have a world were the states of affairs ‘p’, ‘q’ and ‘r’ obtain, it can be denoted as

\[
pw = \{p, q, r\}
\]
The possible world ‘pw*’ where only ‘p’ and ‘q’ obtain and ‘r’ does not obtain, is partially similar to ‘pw’, sharing some features with it

\[ pw* = \{p, q, \text{not } r\} \]

The possible world is an ontological partner of a cognitive model: it is a collection of those states of affairs that would actualize the corresponding cognitive model. Therefore, it includes those topics or issues that are specified by cognitive models which, in turn, motivate and guide human action. For example, if the actor is acting with a conscious intention to settle permanently in Northern Europe, then the possible world that figures in his NPW contains the state of affairs being settled in Northern Europe. We must understand possible worlds at least partly in relation to those mental states that constitute them. As we include, for example scientific facts in possible worlds, these facts are in turn knowable through theories by means of which we are able to grasp them.

Just as cognitive models can be based on anything, so possible worlds can contain any states of affairs. I can imagine a world where an omnipotent god rules the world, but that world is hardly accessible from the world we know. In interesting ethnographic contexts, possible worlds are sensibly connected. The possible world where the god communicates with human beings is linked with the possible world where one can ask god to protect one during one’s travel to Europe.

That is, possible worlds are connected to each other by means of two links, constraints and accessibility. Different constraints such as biological, economic, moral, psychological or physical aspects control the future paths, the connections between possible worlds. For example, the possible world where all humans are free to travel can be reached by means of various future paths, but most of these paths are constrained by political, economic or psychological barriers. The possible world where the Christian God is seen as being identical with the Allah of Islam and Krishna of Hinduism, is conceptually possible but, from the viewpoint of some adherents, not morally or culturally possible. Constraints can be viewed as one-step relations between possible worlds.

The accessibility of possible worlds is a multi-step relation that sums up the pertinent constraints: a possible world may be accessible politically and biologically, but not theologically, for instance. The world where Islam
is critically studied by the majority of Islamic theologians, is not accessible culturally or ideologically from the current possible world.

Times change, as the saying goes, and this means that the constraints and accessibility relating to possible worlds change. In most of Europe, for example, it was not imaginable a hundred years ago that churches and other buildings central to Christianity could be used for profane purposes. Now the possible world where churches are rented out as performance venues or marketplaces has become the actual world. Economic, political, cultural and ideological constraints have changed and this change has brought about the world that was once deemed inaccessible.

Possible worlds form networks, where they are linked by temporally-ordered paths. Future paths, for example, that spring from our current actual world, are constrained by natural and social boundary conditions that, in turn, affect the accessibility of the future worlds awaiting at the ends of future paths, as illustrated in the figure below:

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The network of possible worlds is temporally ordered: that is, the possible worlds are organized in strict, partial ordering ‘\( T \)’ so that ‘\( T \)’ is anti-symmetric, anti-reflexive and transitive. So, for example, if the event ‘\( x \)’ is earlier than the event ‘\( y \)’, then ‘\( y \)’ is not earlier than ‘\( x \)’. Or, if ‘\( x \)’ is earlier than ‘\( y \)’ and ‘\( y \)’ is earlier than ‘\( z \)’, then ‘\( x \)’ is earlier than ‘\( z \)’.
The temporal skeleton of the network of possible worlds defines what it means to talk about the future in the first place. When navigating a world of uncertainty, intentional systems have several more specific cognitive tools for the purposes of decision making and risk management.

In the above figure, we have some further concepts of futures research in the NPW framework (drawn from Kamppinen et al. 2003). Weak signals are properties attributed to future possible worlds, and they are assumed to indicate themselves in the actual world. A weak signal is thus a relation that links possible worlds together so that the feature indicated by the signal grows more salient as we travel into the future. Therefore, weak signals travel back in time, metaphorically, as they are assumed to provide information from the future possible worlds. Trends are properties of possible worlds; possible worlds are ordered in time and connected by future paths, and a trend is strengthened when its presence in a chain of possible worlds is greater, and weakened when its presence is less. An actor’s competence relates to the actor’s properties; how he or she is able to move along the future paths, construct novel possible worlds, manage the constraints and have access to different possible worlds. Actors have different competencies, the central resources being their cognitive models, to which we will return below.

We can also add further concepts into the NPW for the purpose of illustrating how the NPW framework organizes the central concepts of
future-oriented religious studies. The following concepts are common stock in futures research (see, for example, Bell 1997 and Slaughter 2012), but my aim here is to illustrate how they can be systematically captured in terms of the NPW framework (as articulated in Kamppinen et al. 2003).

Scenario is a chain of possible worlds, a relevant future path. What makes it relevant is that there are possible worlds along the road or at the other end that have high levels of positive or negative utility for some actor operating with the NPW in question. Vision is a model of a particular possible world nested in the NPW where highly positive utilities become actual, and mission is a model of an actor's part in realizing the vision: what choices to make when future paths offer alternative ways to proceed. Strategy is a collection of norms that indicate how to apply decision criteria in various situations, at junctures where there are several alternative future paths. Future maps, as well as the pictures or images of the future, are partial models of the NPW, models that highlight some aspects and hide others. The notion of future awareness (or future consciousness) is also explicable by means of a NPW. Future awareness is a cognitive model or experience in which the actor situates himself in the NPW, thus seeing himself in a temporally-ordered framework. To activate future awareness, or to facilitate foresight, is to co-construct models where participants situate themselves in different NPWs. Another related concept is risk. It can be thought of as the expected negative utility of any possible world and it will also be tackled below. Wild cards and black swans are features of possible worlds initially thought impossible or extremely improbable, yet which have impacts on relevant issues when they materialize. Alternative pasts are networks of past possible worlds, where the alternative courses of events are described alongside the course that actually took place.

Thus, the NPW framework enables us to systematize and highlight the central concepts of futures research.

Networks of possible worlds have a twofold presence: on one hand, the reality (independent of what we may think about it) seems to be a process, a network of possible worlds; on the other hand, we and other actors construct cognitive models of NPWs, by means of which we try to navigate what we take to be the real NPW. The cognitive component is therefore essential.
Cognitive models of risk, time and superhuman agency

Cultural agency implies the existence of cognitive models. Our imaginary Iraqi man, described above, was equipped with cognitive models by means of which he went on to construct and implement his future plans and his future. In the NPW framework, cognitive models are tools for navigating the network of possible worlds. They portray simplified worlds, in which relationships bind entities together into systemic networks. Cognitive models are composed of concepts that enable people to have beliefs, desires and other mental states. These models concern not only the physical world and its material aspects, but also abstract entities such as social relationships, moral obligations, and superhuman agents (Johnson-Laird 1983 and 2005, Morgan et al. 2001, Halford 2014). Models of risk provide maps with which to navigate the world of uncertainty (Saarinen and Kamppinen 2009, Vihervaara and Kamppinen 2009).

Cognitive models of risk provide tools for navigating the world of uncertainty in the sense that they provide us with information concerning relevant features of the situation. These features include, for example, the causal structure of the world, its ontological furniture and, most importantly, information on the other agents to be taken into account. Cognitive models of risk thus specify the game in which we find ourselves. Our Iraqi man estimates the probabilities of getting into Europe alive, and charts the main scenarios of what will happen after he has got there. He trusts his countrymen and is naturally suspicious of police and customs officers. The total risk landscape he foresees is based on the particular cognitive models that specify the possible harms and probabilities inherent in each area of life (Kamppinen and Wilenius 2001). Risks are culturally constructed not only in the sense that their existence and properties are conceptually specified, but also in the sense that material culture or technology is utilized in the processes of risk management and containment. Technological structures, together with other cultural systems, not only help to manage risks, but they create risks as well.

Risks reside in the networks of possible worlds. As we argued earlier, the network is temporally ordered. Cognitive models of time are the central tools of navigation (Hall 1983, Bluedorn 2002, Eriksen 2001).

Why does time matter? In social life, timing is everything. Beginnings, ends, cycles, waiting, pasts and futures are the essence of human life. We
humans have various ways of telling the right time, and the most complicated set of time-telling tools is our culture.

Our Iraqi man is used to waiting. The smuggler’s boat navigating a short distance will not leave according to a set timetable, but will leave when it is time for it to leave, when there are enough passengers. His whole journey is filled with relative time, the temporal order in which time is dependent upon the processes themselves. In relative temporal order, time is generated by human actions, not superimposed by an external timetable (Levine 1997).

Absolute time is the time of schedules: it is ticking on and on, and we try to hurry up in order to meet the appointed times. Absolute time feels like it exists outside of us, and quite independently of us. It is the time of shared activities, carried out in accordance with a tight and unforgiving timetable. Train schedules, school schedules, as well as the yearly calendar of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland have absolute temporal orders, at least for those who submit themselves to them.

Different societies possess different degrees of relative and absolute temporality – a society or a culture cannot be described as absolute or relative, but rather as consisting of various subsystems that are predominantly either absolute or relative. There are areas of life where the absolute temporal order prevails, and there are areas where the relative order prevails. During our daily lives, for example, we pass through areas of absolute order (e.g., a wake-up call, taking a bus to school or work) and areas of relative order (e.g., waiting for the kids to finish their breakfast, thinking first and then writing). In Northern Europe, our Iraqi man will face a society dominated by absolute temporality, timetables and punctuality, some of which will challenge his own cognitive models of time, dominated by relative views.

Another cultural distinction is the one between linear and cyclical temporal orders. In linear order, events are unique, and they can be plotted on a line that is strictly ordered in a before–after relation. The timeline has its beginning and also an end. Our historical imaginations as well as our perceptions of our life projects have a linear order: we start from one point in time and end up at another point. The cyclical order is one in which events recur and return. The weekly cycle, so strongly permeating our society is an apt example: Mondays come around again and again. As was the case with absolute and relative orders, so do the linear and cyclical orders co-exist and compete with each other (Eriksen 2001, Zerubavel 2003). Our Iraqi man will encounter different cycles (the working week, calendar rituals) in
Northern Europe, as he compares the Islamic calendar with the ‘standard’ one.

Religious models of superhuman agents are prominent in those contexts where religious cultural resources tell people how to use their time, where the times have come from, and whether there are other temporal orders in the universe. Religions have a special interest in telling the right time. The times of our lives, the ritual calendar, the end of time, as well as eternity are all temporal constructions prevalent in religions.

Religions also transform relative times into absolute times, when the temporal order created by a superhuman agent is transformed and canonized into a calendar, for example.

Some religions describe human time as transient, changing, and decaying, whereas the temporal order of superhuman agents or forces is characterized as permanent, changeless or immutable. The eternal existence of the Christian or Islamic God, for example, represents everything that the human life is not.

In vernacular religions where the notion of eternity has no significant role, the realm of superhuman agents is characterized as permanent, slowly changing, larger than human life, but certainly not eternal. This feature of vernacular religions that have not been subjected to too much theological sophistication is interesting: one reason for the fact there are religions at all is definitely their capability to provide permanent configurations, superhuman agents that constitute systems that outlast human lives. Even in Christianity and Islam there are several human-like supernatural agents sharing the power of God: Jesus, the Virgin Mary, Mohammed, angels and saints, all of whom function as mediators between the human world and the realm of the supreme superhuman agent.

Conclusion

The commonsense theory of human action implies that human actors are intentional systems navigating in the network of possible worlds, or NPW. This provides a framework for integrating central concepts of future-oriented cultural studies as well as for articulating how cognitive models of risk and time figure in the study of agency: firstly, the NPW itself is temporally ordered, and secondly, actors are using cognitive models of time as they proceed along the future paths provided by NPWs. Therefore, the NPW framework provides a tool that captures the future-oriented action of
the human being and enables us to talk about different futures in the first place. In addition, it helps us to understand situations when our model of the NPW differs from the models used by actors we wish to study or facilitate in navigating the NPW. Furthermore, it points out how the models of NPWs are constructed and sustained, and therefore collectively negotiated.

The NPW framework assumes that human action can be situated in various integral contexts; that is, it can be looked at from multiple perspectives (Bouhana and Wikström 2011, Wikström 2014). Suppose that, finally, our young Iraqi man has managed to travel to Finland and has applied for asylum. His action can be described in various ways, and all descriptions are equally true: (1) he has followed his vision; (2) he will provide Finland with a much-needed new member of the workforce; (3) he will have added to the burden of European border control officers; (4) he will have become a suitable potential target for terrorist recruitment.

Each description situates the action in an integral context of possible worlds. If we are to assess the action, its nature, moral value, costs and benefits, the assessment depends on into which context the action is incorporated. The economic, social and political relevance of the action can be identified only after the context has been identified. It can be said that human action in the NPW framework is context dependent. In order to find out what an action is, we need to determine the context within which the action should be considered.

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The purpose of this article is to examine under what conditions the disruptive character of right-wing populism can be perceived as a positive element within a functioning democracy. Using the thinking of philosophers Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe I argue that the disruptive character of right-wing populism gives the marginalised concerns of ‘the people’ public legitimacy. However, right-wing populism is also criticised for excluding, in a similar fashion, certain social actors from the public sphere. Instead of enabling a more inclusive society, I therefore argue that right-wing populism enables a society that is distinguished by antagonism. To make it possible for all social actors’ concerns to gain public legitimacy without promoting antagonism, I argue that a new political reality needs to be imagined. In conclusion I therefore offer a theoretical framework for such a reality through the political philosophy of Bruno Latour.

In this article, I will examine under which conditions the disruptive character of right-wing populism towards the established political order can be perceived as a positive element within a functioning democracy. I will, however, also challenge right-wing populism for facilitating the creation of a public that is in conflict with the same pursuits for wider political participation that right-wing populists claim to value. Specifically, I will argue that right-wing populism is based on a paradox – at the same time as it enables marginalised concerns to gain public legitimacy, it also marginalises the public legitimacy of the concerns of certain social actors. In addition, I will problematise the antagonistic political stance that derives from such marginalisation and argue that it limits the ability of different social actors to publically confront conflicting concerns.

The theoretical point of departure for discussing the conditions of populism is taken from the philosophers Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Both are of interest because they develop an attitude towards right-wing populism and populism in general that doesn’t reject their disruptive character. Mouffe’s thinking is also interesting because it offers a criticism of the antagonistic politics of right-wing populism and also clarifies what I claim
is the biggest deficiency in right-wing populism – its relationship to the stranger.

In order to further confront these deficiencies in right-wing populism, as well as offer an alternative political attitude towards the stranger, I will conclude by giving a brief presentation of the political philosophy of the philosopher Bruno Latour. The goal is to offer, through his thinking, part of a theoretical framework that can assist contemporary political actors in confronting the challenge of creating a more inclusive public in a pluralistic age.

The logic of populist rationality

Populism is an essentially contested concept, and depending on the context in which the term is being used, it will be understood in different ways (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017: 2–5). It is also impossible to give any conclusive definition of right-wing populism, as it is also expressed in a variety of forms depending on the context (Norris 2005: 43–4).¹ Through Ernesto Laclau’s thinking it is, however, possible to argue that one purpose of right-wing populism is to give public legitimacy to the concerns of a marginalised social group.

In Laclau’s book *On Populist Reason* (2005) he opposes attempts to downplay populism by understanding it as a distortion of what is perceived as the established political practice in society. Laclau asserts that politicians and academics sometimes tend to argue that populism has its origins in irrationalism and emphasises overly simplistic solutions to pressing societal challenges. He furthermore argues that such a critique serves as a defence of the established political order. However, Laclau also maintains that this critique fails to realise that populism doesn’t work according to the same rational conditions as the established political order. Instead, populism has its own political rationality – its own ‘logic of articulation,’ as Laclau writes (2005b: 33) – and one of the purposes of the book is, consequently, to describe the logic of populist rationality (Laclau 2005a: 16–20).

As populism, according to Laclau, cannot be given any substantive definition – it is not possible to determine any criteria that encompass all forms of populism (Laclau 2005a: 9) – he argues that populist rationality can be

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¹ Without making any normative claims, in this article I will with the term right-wing populism be referring to the growing visibility of such political movements that combine ethnocentrism and anti-elitism.
understood primarily through an analysis of the political practices that are expressed in populist movements. Based on such an analysis, Laclau believes that certain features appear that are shared by all populist movements, regardless of whether they are identified as left- or right-leaning movements (Laclau 2005b: 33).

Laclau explains that all populist movements are characterised by the formation of a new social body – ‘the people’ – that arises from a general frustration towards the political ‘elite’ for not recognising their concerns. If only one citizen’s concern isn’t recognised, this will not express a populist attitude in itself. A populist movement only emerges when citizens unite around a generally experienced frustration that the political elite is not recognising their various concerns. Thus, when several social actors express a common dissatisfaction, even though the causes of their dissatisfaction may be very different, and then organise themselves in opposition to the political elite, then, Laclau argues, a populist movement can be identified (Laclau 2005a: 73–4, 2005b: 36–8).

Due to a disjuncture between the people’s concerns and the system’s ability to recognise them, populism will have an anti-institutional character. Or expressed in another way: populism directs its political commitment towards an enemy – in this case a political elite who cannot meet the demands of the people (Laclau 2005b: 39).

Since populism has a polemical character many will, according to Laclau, be critical of the rhetoric that populist leaders will tend to use. But unlike its critics, Laclau wants to highlight and appreciate the disruptive character of populism. In particular, Laclau believes that the disruptive character of populist rationality should be valued because it makes it possible to imagine an alternative to the dominant political establishment. And according to Laclau, it is specifically because such distinctions can be made that politics is at all possible: ‘We only have politics through the gesture that embraces the existing state of affairs as a system and presents an alternative to it’ (Laclau 2005b: 47).

Laclau’s argument can be elaborated with the help of the thinking of Chantal Mouffe, someone that Laclau has worked closely with.² Her ideas also provide an argument for who the elite is that right-wing populism takes its aim at.

² In addition to being married, they have written the much-discussed book *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (1985).
Hegemony at the end of history

Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama argued, in his much-discussed article ‘The end of history?’ (1989), that Western capitalist democratic liberalism after the Cold War had triumphed over other political ideologies. He didn’t maintain that all the nation states in the world after the Cold War had automatically become liberal democracies, but that the political development in the world will inevitably be based on liberal principles because no ideological alternatives to liberalism exist any longer. Hence, the history of humanity, which, according to Fukuyama, up until then had been characterised by ideological conflicts, had come to an end.

From Mouffe’s perspective, Fukuyama expresses a general hope among liberal theorists – that the world will one day be freed from conflict and hostility; a world where rational deliberation replaces power struggles and the pursuit of consensus is prioritised. Mouffe, on the other hand, wants to challenge such an optimistic vision because, in her opinion, it is based on an insufficient conception of the political that creates a condition where social actors aren’t provided with any public resources for peacefully confronting their conflicting concerns (Mouffe 2005a: 1–2, 31–2).

Mouffe explains that what is lacking in the liberal understanding of the political is the realisation that conflict is a fundamental aspect of the political. Based on the liberal narrative, conflicts are something that no longer play a role in the history of humanity. Instead, liberal democracies have succeeded in creating such institutions and structures that allow and encourage different social actors in conflict to seek consensus through rational debate. Liberal theorists thus acknowledge that conflicts exist, but argue that their disruptive capacity can be mitigated as long as all parties which are in conflict are willing to act rationally and suppress their ‘passions’ (Mouffe 2005a: 11–12, 29, 31).3

While such a peaceful pursuit of consensus is appealing in many ways, such an endeavour also marginalises the passions of social actors. Based on Mouffe’s thinking, passions characterise different social actors’ utmost concerns, and, as I will show, that is why their continuing marginalisation cannot be sustained. However, the primary reason why these passions need to

3 When referring to ‘passions’, Mouffe means such ‘various affective forces which are at the origin of collective forms of identifications’ (Mouffe 2005a: 24).
be valued in the public sphere, according to Mouffe, is because they are able to create political distinctions between social actors – a prerequisite for politics according to Mouffe. She draws support for this line of thinking from the political theorist Carl Schmitt, who she believes offers a concept of the political that not only recognises passion, but also enables these passions to be valued and directed productively.

Carl Schmitt believes that politics essentially consists of a division into friends and enemies, which entails that the basic political act is to identify the group that deserves one’s loyalty and to identify the boundaries of one’s loyalty. According to Schmitt, conflicts between friends and enemies consequently become the true essence of politics, and if it were possible to develop a conflict-free world, it would lack politics (Schmitt 2007: 26–8).

Similarly, Mouffe believes that it is by identifying what one opposes that it is possible to identify one’s own political position. And to the extent that this position is regarded as an important concern, it will give rise to passion. Conflicts between opponents will therefore be a prerequisite for the political to be political.

Because liberal theorists condemn and marginalise passion, their concept of the political is, according to Mouffe, insufficient. Furthermore, because liberalism doesn’t offer any outlet for these passions – because they are not recognised in an effort to reach consensus on the basis of a general rationality – the people’s utmost concerns will never be given any public legitimacy.4 Therefore, according to Mouffe’s thinking, political life will be reduced to a technical-bureaucratic application of certain economic and legal conditions, where all political expressions that call into question the political order are understood as archaic, non-rational or even dangerous (Mouffe 2005a: 1–3, 10–12).

If such a liberal order constituted a position among many others, its ability to marginalise passion might be limited. Mouffe argues, on the other hand, that liberalism in its consensus-making role has gained a hegemonic position in the Western world following World War II, which means that liberalism has more or less been accepted as the only viable political option. This is all the more evident, according to Mouffe, in its neoliberal form, where all parties, including the traditional left-wing ones, have accepted free-market capitalism as a given and created the structural conditions for

4 Schmitt has also criticised liberalism for marginalising the role of conflict in the political (Schmitt 2007: 78–9).
a free-market economy (Mouffe 2000: 14–15, 2005a: 56–63). This makes it possible to argue that humanity has reached an end of history, as no alternatives to the dominant liberal politics are seen as viable.

Based on Mouffe’s thinking, the idea that conflict doesn’t constitute an essential part of the political will therefore be publically encouraged within liberal democracies. This furthermore entails a situation where many concerns are never given any public legitimacy, as they are marginalised or reduced to the level of private concerns. As conflicts between different social actors, according to liberal logic, can be resolved by organising citizens according to certain economic and legal criteria, the need, according to Mouffe’s thinking, of creating arenas where conflicting passions can be peacefully confronted, is limited (Mouffe 2005a: 29–30). And because right-wing populist movements are increasingly emerging in public life, the absence of such arenas will present particular challenges for liberal societies.

Mouffe stresses that unless the passions appearing within a society are given a peaceful outlet, they will eventually discharge themselves in other ways. She believes that this explains the emergence of right-wing populist movements. According to Mouffe’s thinking, the emergence of right-wing populism is a response to the marginalisation of passions as a consequence of the establishment of a hegemonic liberal order. Right-wing populism is accordingly appealing to many social actors, as it offers an alternative to the hegemonic order. It can also offer an outlet for their passions, something that the dominant political order has denied them. Therefore Mouffe believes that it isn’t only understandable that right-wing populism is growing in influence. It is also natural, as the people’s passions cannot be subdued forever and will find an outlet anywhere it is provided (Mouffe 2005b: 55–6, 2005a: 66–76).

**An antagonistic clash between civilisations**

In light of Laclau’s and Mouffe’s thinking, right-wing populism can be perceived in a new way. While critics of right-wing populism want to condemn the disruptive character of right-wing populism, Laclau and Mouffe show that an excessively critical attitude obscures the fact that its disruptiveness necessitates the conditions for a truly political society (at least if you accept Schmitt’s conceptual position), and makes it possible for marginalised concerns to gain public legitimacy. Neither Laclau (Laermans and Laclau 2011) nor Mouffe (2005b: 56) supports right-wing populism.
However, from Laclau’s and Mouffe’s perspective, the disruptive character of right-wing populist movements contribute to the creation of a society that recognises the people’s concerns – a society where passion is not perceived as a vice.

Their perspective, on the other hand, also offers the possibility of a more nuanced critique of right-wing populism. If the purpose of right-wing populism is to enable a more inclusive society, then all attempts to limit inclusivity should be subject to critical review. As a starting point for this criticism, I would like to present a general description of how right-wing populists rhetorically represent the stranger, especially the Muslim immigrant. To exemplify this rhetoric, I will highlight some statements made by Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders.

A feature of right-wing populist rhetoric is an imagining of an immediate threat. Sometimes the rhetoric even takes the form of such expressions that it is possible to be deceived into believing that a foreign power is occupying the Western world. Take for example this now infamous statement about Mexicans by Trump in his presidential announcement address:

> When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best…. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems to us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. (Time 2015)

Trump furthermore has applied the same rhetoric towards Muslims, who, according to his thinking, constitute the ultimate threat to Western civilisation. Trump has often, as a candidate for president and later as president, marginalised Muslims\(^5\) and stressed that they represent a threat. He has even gone as far as to claim: ‘I think Islam hates us’ (Schleifer 2016).

Le Pen, too, has in a similar fashion expressed the belief that Muslims are a threat. In her announcement address for the French presidential election of 2017, she did not merely assert that mass immigration has meant that the French people no longer feel that they have the right to their own country. She also argued that globalisation has made it possible for Islamic

\(^5\) Not least through what has been described as Trump’s pursuit of introducing a ‘Muslim ban’, the purpose of which is to ban the entry into USA from certain nationalities with a Muslim majority.
fundamentalism, in her mind an enemy of France, to gain a foothold in the country. According to her, Islamic fundamentalism threatens the French people, as these fundamentalists, as she emphasised, are looking to impose on us gender discrimination in public places, full body veils or not, prayer rooms in the workplace, prayers in the streets, huge mosques, or the submission of women, forbidden to wear skirts, have a job or go to the bar’ (Farand 2017).

Geert Wilders has also expressed concern over the spread of Islam in the Netherlands. In an interview for the newspaper De Pers, he emphasised the ways in which Islam is radically changing society, as follows:

“Take a walk down the street and see where this is going. You no longer feel like you are living in your own country. There is a battle going on and we have to defend ourselves. Before you know it there will be more mosques than churches!” (De Pers 2007)

Overall, Trump, Le Pen and Wilders emphasise a widely-accepted perception among many right-wing populists that immigration is a threat to the Western world, and the resonance that this rhetoric has had among many citizens shows that these right-wing populists are able to express an experience that many Westerners share. Many experience immigrants as a cultural and economic threat, and especially Muslims are often understood as the ultimate threat to Western values. Muslims are not only perceived as strangers. They are also often perceived as violent fanatics, with a general lack of tolerance for divergent opinions and practices (Pew Research Center 2017).

Right-wing populists like Trump, Le Pen and Wilders thus argue that the Western world hasn’t been freed from conflict. On the contrary, they argue that conflicts are a palpable contemporary trend. Instead of embracing Fukuyama’s triumphal declaration of the end of history, it is possible to argue that right-wing populists instead embrace Samuel Huntington’s thesis concerning the ‘clash of civilizations’ which he developed in the much-discussed article “The clash of civilizations?” (Huntington 1993). According to Huntington’s thesis, conflicts will not cease after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as Fukuyama argues. Instead, they will change in character from conflicts between nation-states into conflicts between different civilisations. While nation-states will play a significant role in the future, he argues that conflicts
will to a greater extent be caused by the cultural differences that distinguish one civilisation from another (Huntington 1993).6

Accordingly, a distinctive feature of the right-wing populism that is expressed by Trump, Le Pen and Wilders is that their critique is not directed solely towards an elite that marginalises the people’s concerns. It is also directed towards a perceived threat emanating from those who do not share the national and cultural legacy with the people. Instead, they claim that immigrants challenge the national stability, corrupt the national culture, and eradicate the national economy. The anti-elitist position of right-wing populism is thus combined with ethnocentrism and anti-immigration.

Based on Schmitt’s thinking, such an attitude can be perceived as the expression of a true political stance. According to him, a fundamental feature of the political is the ability to identify friend from enemy. Thus, by identifying the immigrant as an enemy, right-wing populists make a political judgment, which means that their position cannot be criticised based on the political criteria that Schmitt proposes.

In addition to the fact that it is problematic to assume that the immigrant is an enemy and not a potential friend, it is worth pointing out that this right-wing attitude towards the stranger highlights some shortcomings in how Schmitt conceptually understands the political. By emphasising that politics requires a division between friend and enemy, it is possible to argue that there exists an antagonistic tension in the political relationship formed between social actors from different sides of the political spectrum – an antagonism that makes it difficult to find common ground.

Although Mouffe claims that Schmitt recognises an important aspect of the political by highlighting the necessity of friend–enemy relations, she wants to develop Schmitt’s thinking so that it becomes more applicable within a pluralist age (Mouffe 2005a: 14–15). One aspect that therefore needs to be addressed in Schmitt’s thinking is above all the antagonistic foundation that his conceptual description of the political presupposes: we

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6 The philosopher Slavoj Žižek believes that this shift in emphasis gives rise to a tendency among right-wing populists that he describes as ‘Huntington’s disease’. This ‘disease’ begins as ‘random acts of excessive violence against immigrants, outbursts which lack coordination and merely express a general unease and restlessness apropos of “foreign intruders”’. After a while, he believes that this general xenophobic attitude allows a group of people to be organised and work for the marginalisation of immigrants in public life (Žižek 2017).
cannot live in a pluralist society if we perceive of each other as enemies. Instead of emphasising that politics is based on the distinction between friend and enemy, Mouffe consequently emphasises that politics is based on the distinction between friends and opponents. While a relationship with an enemy, conceptually speaking, entails some degree of hostility, an opponent, Mouffe argues, is someone whose perspective you do not share but that you still consider as a legitimate political actor in public life (ibid. 19–21).

According to Mouffe, the recognition that all social actors, even one’s political opponents, are legitimate political actors, constitutes a prerequisite for civil discourse between political opponents. However, among right-wing populists such as Trump, Le Pen and Wilders, such a quest for civility is accordingly limited. Based on Mouffe’s thinking, it is possible to argue that they relate to their opponents antagonistically. Instead of confronting their opponents constructively, they instead offer a clash of civilisation. For that reason, the right-wing populist attitude towards the stranger is expressed as hostility and generally as an attempt to limit or completely deny the public influence of the stranger.

Beyond hegemony and antagonism

If you sum up right-wing populism (as it has been presented in this article) its logical foundations seem rather paradoxical. The paradox is that the people are not only imagined in relation to those who want to marginalise the people’s passions. They also find their identity by distancing themselves from those who, from a global perspective, belong among the most marginalised groups in the world – the immigrant who often has lost everything in the struggle for a better life. One reason for criticising right-wing populism is therefore that, in a similar manner as the elite that it criticises, it wants to limit which concerns are to be given public legitimacy. Populism may offer a way to break up the elite’s control of the public sphere, but the new society that is created becomes antagonistic – a society where the stranger cannot be perceived as an opponent, only an enemy.

According to Mouffe’s thinking, a fundamental problem in liberalism as a political philosophy is that it removes itself from confrontations between different passionate political positions. But it is also worth pointing out that the reason given as to why passions need to be marginalised is laudable. A fundamental purpose of liberalism is to enable peaceful coexistence between different social actors with differing life-views (Heywood 2002: 43–5). Such
a goal is desirable in a pluralist age, and although right-wing populism challenges the shortcomings of liberalism, it also challenges the liberal pursuit of peace. For this reason, it is reasonable to assume that the society that right-wing populism promotes is one that, contrary to liberalism, values passions, but at the same time cannot offer an arena where conflicting passions can be peacefully confronted. Thus, the danger to a society influenced by right-wing populist logic is the creation of a society filled with a lot of enemies without any public resources for bridging the divide that exists between them.

In order to get past the shortcomings of liberalism and right-wing populism, another political reality needs to be imagined. Based on the points made in this article, this alternative should challenge the marginalisation of passions and antagonism between different social actors. Mouffe’s agonistic politics offers an interesting alternative for such a project. In this article, however, I will highlight Bruno Latour’s political-philosophical thinking. In addition to offering an interesting alternative to liberal and right-wing politics, it has not to any great extent so far been the subject of academic reflection. His thinking, then, constitutes an untapped resource for imagining a new political reality. However, his entire political philosophy cannot be presented within the confines of this article, so I will only make a brief presentation of it.

7 It should be noted that Mouffe is not critical of all aspects of liberalism. As she argues, her critique of liberalism stems from a desire for it to be more compatible with the democratic ideals it claims to value (Mouffe 2005a: 32).

8 According to Mouffe, an agonistic politics recognises the need for the people’s passions to be channelled and not suppressed, while also recognising all social actors as legitimate political actors. Mouffe believes that the only way to create a common space to peacefully confront social conflicts is if everybody gives each other such recognition. This in turn becomes a prerequisite for the creation of a true pluralist democracy (Mouffe 2013: 1–18).


10 One aspect of Latour’s political philosophy that I will not describe is how actor-network theory, the theory that has made him a well-known name within, above all, the social sciences, is related to his understanding of politics. Latour’s description of actor-network theory offers good insights into how different actors form a society together, and how the network they establish is maintained through negotiation. It is unfortunately not possible to present how actor-network theory relates to politics within the parameters of this article. However, I have previously dealt with this issue in the book Hopp om en okänd framtid (see Portin 2016: 184–96).
Latour’s critique of the elite

Summarising Latour’s political philosophy is not an easy endeavour. He does not offer any coherent summary of his political philosophy and therefore it must be obtained by piecing together his more or less fragmented thoughts about the political into such a one. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that on the basis of such an analysis, an idea of the political emerges that challenges those rational and practical structures that limit which social actors have public legitimacy.

The pursuit of a more inclusive public is evident throughout Latour’s writings. The main example of this, however, appears in his most famous book, *We Have Never Been Modern* (1991), where he challenges what he describes as modern rationality. According to Latour, modern rationality is characterised by the belief that a paradigm shift has made it possible for humanity to break away from an archaic past. ‘The moderns’ are consequently those who have managed to break away from a ‘premodern’ world, which in turn makes the moderns believe that they are ‘modern’ (Latour 1993: 10).

In short, Latour believes that modern rationality is based on the idea that there exists a separation between the natural and the social. Modernity, consequently, can be said to have begun when humanity discovered a separation between a non-human reality – in the sense that it functions independently from human influence – and a human reality – in the sense that a human is able to independently shape her reality according to her own preferences. According to Latour, this logical division has given rise to two public institutions that refer to each of the realities respectively – the laboratory and the political system. The laboratory thus investigates natural phenomena, while the political is responsible for socialising human commitments (Latour 1993: 10–11, 13–31; Latour 2013: 8–9).

Latour explains that it is specifically that the moderns have managed to make a separation between the natural and the social that makes them modern. The pre-moderns, by that reckoning, are definitively those who have failed to make the same separation. However, combinations of the natural and the social do occur in modern times. And according to the moderns, religion usually confuses the natural and the social by, for example, creating ‘hybrids’ of science and politics. To counteract such non-rational developments, a modern pursuit is to purify public life of pre-modern expressions, or at least to significantly restrict their influence in the public sphere. If pre-modern expressions are not granted public legitimacy, moderns believe
that society can strive towards a more modern reality. Latour explains that the solution is thus to privatise these hybrids, ensuring that the pre-moderns have a limited influence over public concerns (Latour 1993: 10–11, 37–9).

Latour opposes modern rationality mainly because it claims to break away from the past in a way that he doesn’t believe is consistent with the lived experience of modern life. He is also critical of the moderns, however, for limiting what concerns are given public legitimacy.

Latour’s critique of the moderns shares some similarities with populist rationality. Although Latour generally avoids referencing ‘the elite’, it is more or less evident that he, like the rationale of populism, is being critical of a dominant elite that maintains a hegemonic order in public life. Just as right-wing populists do, Latour wants to challenge such an order. Latour, however, differs from right-wing populists since he wants to challenge all attempts to limit public legitimacy – he doesn’t want to replace one elite with another.

It is possible to argue that an underlying theme in Latour’s writings is to challenge public actors who attempt to limit the public legitimacy of certain actors – for example, the moderns in relation to pre-moderns, social scientists in relation to the actors they study (Latour 2005) and humanity in relation to the planet (Latour 2017). Based on the same logic, right-wing populists may also be subject to criticism, as they want to limit the public legitimacy of the stranger.

Latour’s criticism can be clarified with an analysis of how he conceptually describes the political. It should be noted that his understanding of politics differs from that of Schmitt and Mouffe.

11 He even goes as far as to claim that the moderns have never been modern (Latour 1993: 46–7; Latour 2013: 14, 104–5).

12 It is worth pointing out that an actor, according to Latour, doesn’t necessarily have to be human. An actor can also be a non-human (Latour 2005: 71–8). Just as he criticises those who want to marginalise some people’s public legitimacy, he therefore also criticises humanity’s marginalisation of the planet’s public legitimacy.

13 Interestingly, on the basis of Latour’s understanding of the political, it is possible to argue that right-wing populism is based on a limited concept of the political. According to Latour’s thinking it is thus possible to direct a conceptual critique at right-wing populism which is similar to Mouffe’s critique of liberalism. Latour, however, differs from Mouffe’s thinking on the political by not perceiving the identification of friend and opponent as the essence of politics. As I will soon make clear, he points out that the essence of the political is re-presentation.
Political re-presentation

Latour emphasises that to the extent that it is possible to speak of politics, it needs to be possible to conceptually represent politics in a way that differs from other practices. For that reason, it must be possible to designate something as politics which at the same time cannot be understood to be, for example, religion, economics or science, as these constitute different ‘modes of existence’ according to Latour (2013: 17–18). Latour therefore examines what constitutes the essence of politics by proposing the specific criteria for judging between true and false in politics. All modes of existence have, as Latour describes it, different ‘felicity conditions’. If it is possible to distinguish one set of felicity conditions from another, it will consequently be possible to distinguish the different modes of existences (Latour 2003: 145–6; Latour 2013: 18, 21).

According to Latour, the essence of politics is re-presentation. Notice that re-presentation should not be confused with representative politics – the system of choosing politicians that serve within a political system. Instead he argues that politics is the act of publicly presenting the pluralism of concerns of the public – a re-presentation. The main task of a politician – if he or she is truly political – will therefore not be to enact policies within a political system. The task of the politician will rather be to listen and take in the diversity of concerns in society, with the purpose of responsibly presenting these concerns publicly (Latour 2003: 149–56).

Latour furthermore emphasises that the politician’s task, if he or she is engaged in politics, does not end after the public has been presented to. As the public domain is constantly shifting due to a continual change in the configuration of public actors, the politician will need to return to the public to listen and take on board its changing concerns. He or she will then be able to again present these concerns to the public. Politics isn’t therefore only presentation. It is re-presentation. Latour writes:

The truthful [politician] is not the one who is right while others are wrong, who is obeyed more than others, who sees further than others;

A more in-depth comparative analysis of Latour’s and Mouffe’s understanding of the political would therefore be an interesting topic. However, since such an investigation goes beyond the parameters of this article, I will leave that analysis for another time.
it is the one who decides to tell the truth because, without fearing the cost, s/he travels the entire route again from the multitude to the unit and back, checking twice, both ways, that there is no *direct* relation between the multitude and its unity. (Latour 2003: 153)

This back and forth is consequently essential to the political process. Insofar as a politician, according to Latour’s thinking, can be perceived of as engaged in ‘true’ politics, he or she will therefore not move along a straight, rational line. Instead, the politician moves along a ‘curved’ path – never able to settle along any given route towards a known goal, only able to again and again present the ever-changing multitude of concerns in a society.14 Politics is consequently understood as a practice that orientates between many different concerns and not just a practice of faithfully representing a single concern (Latour 2003: 146; Latour 2013: 337, 344). Thus, politics assumes its own basic criteria for truth when it is allowed to transpire without being halted.

If right-wing populism is compared with the characterisation of politics that Latour develops, it becomes evident that re-presentation is an important concern for right-wing populists. As already mentioned, right-wing populism emphasises that a dominant elite has marginalised the people’s concerns, and therefore populist movements can be understood to be a pursuit for a fuller re-presentation of the people’s concerns. But at the same time right-wing populists don’t emphasise re-presentation for all, only for some. It is only the people as they are imagined by right-wing populists who have any public legitimacy. From a Latourian perspective, right-wing populism consequently needs to be criticised for only allowing a re-presentation of certain concerns while others are condemned and rejected.

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14 Instead of a straight and rational line, Latour thus argues that politics has a circular movement. In this political circle, the multitude of concerns is gathered around a political actor – the politician – who presents their concerns to the public. The process is then continued when this politician returns to the multitude to re-engage with their concerns. Re-presentation thus takes the form of a circle – it has no beginning and no end and it constantly moves along a curved path. And as soon as someone interrupts this movement – when the circle is broken – politics ends as a consequence (Latour 2003: 149–54; Latour 2013: 338–42).
Legitimacy for all

If you reflect on what kind of vision for society Latour’s thinking about the political imagines, it is possible to argue that it is a society that strives towards effectively re-presenting all existing concerns within a society, in the sense of giving all of these concerns public legitimacy.

Basically, Latour imagines a society that does not give any group of people or rationality a privileged position. Instead, he imagines a society where all people exist ‘on the same level’ (Latour 2005: 165–72). Thus, in such a society, no social actor is given any privileged position; this is a prerequisite for re-presentative politics. Because, to paraphrase Latour, as long as anyone can deny re-presentation, then no politics is possible (Latour 2005: 250).

In many ways, what Latour suggests is an ideal that is also emphasised in liberal democracies. Liberal democracies want to be democratic in the sense that they do not want to give anyone a privileged position in society. Instead, everyone is perceived of as equal, as long as all are equally privileged in, and conforming to, the same economic and legal conditions. The crucial difference in what Latour suggests is, on the other hand, that he believes that all concerns should be given public legitimacy. This is accordingly a prerequisite for actors to be equal within a society. As already noted with Mouffe’s thinking, passions, in particular, are marginalised in liberal democracies, as it is assumed that they challenge a society’s ability to seek consensus through rational deliberation. On the basis of Latour’s work, however, it is possible to argue that passions must also be given public legitimacy, as they are important concerns for a society’s actors. Therefore, if one wishes to develop a truly political society, these passions also need to be re-presented.

The society that can be imagined from Latour’s thinking will undeniably experience practical challenges. Is it, for example, reasonable that all concerns are given public legitimacy? Should some social actors, for instance, be allowed to develop their own judicial practices based on the legal resources of their own tradition? Could it be acceptable to discriminate against certain people for, for example, religious reasons? Is it really a complete relativism that Latour advocates, in which no fundamental values, rules or norms have any greater validity than others?

That kind of relativistic stance would be an unfair representation of Latour’s thinking: ‘If there is a mistake that, for our own salvation, we must not commit, it is that of confusing respect for the various alterations … with the resources of critical thought’ (Latour 2013: 157). He even points out that
all the concerns within public life are not necessarily appropriate and to the extent that they are harmful they should be rejected: ‘Yes, there are things to discuss … there are beings that do not deserve to exist … we have to judge and decide’ (ibid. 142–3). Although to some extent he acknowledges that he is a relativist, he consequently doesn’t believe that no judgments should be allowed in public life. Instead, he is a relativist in the sense that he believes that it is not possible to determine in advance which concerns have greater legitimacy than others (Latour 1993: 111–14; Latour 2005: 23–4).

For this reason, it is politically valid, from a Latourian perspective, that the issues raised by right-wing populists are given public legitimacy. But it is also politically valid that the concerns of the immigrant – their need for protection, food, work, respect and justice – are given the same legitimacy. When equality is obtained in this manner – when all concerns are placed on the same level – it is possible to compare and value the different concerns. Only then is it possible to confront these concerns and pursue some kind of resolution: ‘It’s time, perhaps, to speak of democracy again’ (Latour 1993: 142).

Latour’s purpose is therefore not to assert that all concerns are equally valuable or important. Instead, he wants to establish the theoretical criteria that are required for the different concerns to be publically compared and valued. Then all concerns can be taken seriously, although without assurances that all concerns will be valued equally after they have been re-presented.

Concluding remarks

In this article, through Laclau’s and Mouffe’s thinking, I have argued that the disruptive character of right-wing populism creates the conditions for a more inclusive public sphere by giving the peoples’ concerns public legitimacy. Criticising right-wing populism for this quality therefore seems unreasonable or serves to preserve the current power structure within a society. However, as I further argued, with the same logic it is also possible to criticise right-wing populism for marginalising the concerns of some social actors. Right-wing populism tends to turn the stranger into an enemy that needs to be actively opposed. At the same time as right-wing populists emphasise the right to express their utmost concerns – the things they are passionate about – they consequently also marginalise others, especially the Muslim immigrant. Through Mouffe’s thinking I argued that the result is
an antagonistic politics that limits the possibility for creating arenas where conflicts between different political positions can be peacefully confronted.

In conclusion, I argue that an alternative political reality needs to be imagined that does not marginalise passion, or encourage antagonism between different social actors. For this alternative I turned to the political philosophy of Latour. The basic principle of his political philosophy is that no people or no rationality should be given any privileged position in public life. If that happens, the concerns of some social actors will not be recognised. Therefore, those social actors who actively marginalise certain issues should be questioned and their dominant position in society challenged.

According to Latour’s thinking an inclusive public sphere requires that politics is understood as re-presentation. The purpose of politics is to repeatedly present all the concerns that exist within a society, and to the extent that such a presentation does not occur, the equality between different social actors will be threatened. This equality is also a prerequisite for peacefully confronting conflicts between social actors – it is only when everyone is on the same level that the process of comparing and valuing different concerns can begin.

An area of lack in Latour’s thinking is that he does not offer any suggestions on how different social actors can confront each other’s concerns in a constructive and peaceful way. For example, he does not offer any suggestions as to which institutions are needed to maintain peaceful confrontations between different social actors. What is valuable in his thinking, however, is that he offers a theoretical framework that identifies the basic criteria for a society that appreciates passions without encouraging antagonism between different social actors – a society that opposes hegemony by not giving any matter of concern any privileged position. Such a society is able to counteract both the hegemonic position of liberalism – as it gives all concerns and even passions public legitimacy – and criticise the antagonistic politics of right-wing populism – as politics is perceived of as an effort to adequately present all concerns in the public sphere without ridicule, threat or marginalisation.

Finally, it should be asked why the concerns of the immigrant should be granted equal public legitimacy to the host nation’s citizen’s concerns. Should not the people’s concerns, as right-wing populists argue, be given a privileged position in public life, as they have a historical connection to the society? There is undeniably ethical reason why a marginalisation of
immigrants’ concerns is problematic. However, I also think it possible to argue that their marginalisation is unsustainable in the long-term according to Latour’s thinking.

I have not, to any great extent, developed this line of thinking above, but it is worth asking if the endeavour of right-wing populists to exclude certain social actors – namely the stranger – from public life can have any long-term success. As Latour explains, not even have the moderns succeeded in purifying the public sphere of hybridity. In the private sphere the hybrids have grown stronger and more competent, and after a while they have become unsatisfied with limiting themselves to a private sphere of existence. Consequently, they have spread, according to Latour, out into the world and actively begun challenging the hegemony that the moderns have been aspiring to (Latour 1993: 49–50).

Based on the history of modernity, it is possible to question the right-wing populist project. Right-wing populists may possibly win short-term victories – they may build walls, deport unwanted social actors and establish laws restricting the mobility of the stranger and their ability to publicly express themselves. But can such a marginalisation of the stranger be sustained in the long run? Especially today, when refugees are pouring over the borders, when refugee services are at breaking point, when we see pictures of lifeless bodies on Europe’s beaches and so forth, is it really reasonable to assume that it is possible to ignore these people? Is it really possible to overlook their pressing concerns? Based on Latour’s works, the answer is no.

In order to confront the challenges that the immigrants’ concerns raise, a new political reality needs to be pursued that makes their concerns into public concerns. Latour’s political philosophy provides part of a theoretical framework which will facilitate that project. And it should be clear that right-wing populism is only able to offer a limited contribution to such a framework.

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List of references


In contrast to discourses on the relation between religion and violence, this project focuses on the biblical commitment that God can be understood as the one who ‘loves the stranger’ (Deut. 10:18). With regard to this central passage it will be asked what are the implications that this image of God can offer? In what way can monotheism be interpreted as ‘a school of xenophilia’ (E. Levinas)? What does the inclination of God to the stranger mean for the understanding of humanity, metaphysics, and migration? Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) has suggested that we understand metaphysics, in the context of the thinking of Levinas, as ‘an experience of hospitality’ (Derrida 1999a: 46). With regard to this idea, I would like to ask what role can (the question of) God play within the political, sociological, ethical, etc. discourses of diversity and migration?

Introduction

In the following contribution, I will not discuss the negative effects of religion (cf. Assmann 2003, 2015; Schieder 2014); instead, I will ask what one can – positively – learn from the biblical narratives concerning God with regard to the wide field of the issue of migration – and the other way around. Migration is, without any doubt, one of the most urgent issues of a common and coming society of Europe. In Germany, as well as in other European countries such as the Netherlands, Hungary, Austria, and Finland, we can observe a tendency towards an acceptance of nationalist and right-wing parties. Xenophobia, that is, the fear, and sometimes even hatred, of strangers, is the expression of a politics of national self-isolation and what one refers to, with a German term, as Angst. The opposite conception, that is xenophilia (Deecke and Drost 2010),1 seems to be the word for a utopia beyond recall. Therefore, a new interest in the concept of hospitality that is taking place in very recent philosophical debates might be astonishing

1 The German term Liebe zum Fremden is ambivalent and means ‘love to the stranger’ as well as ‘love to the strange or: strangeness’.
(cf. Burkhard 2016, Balch 2016, Bulley 2016). Regarding the situation of migration, I want to ask if hospitality has to be seen as the condition of the possibility to be, or to behave as, a human? Do there still remain limits to hospitality? (cf. Friese 2014). These questions lead to a debate that shows two different sides of the same coin: these two sides will be identified in what follows in texts by Jacques Derrida and Richard Kearney which are concerned with the question of conditional and unconditional hospitality or, in other words, with the possibility and impossibility of hospitality.

1) In the first step, I will outline the argumentation of Jacques Derrida, who has worked explicitly on political and ethical questions of justice, responsibility, and hospitality since at least the 1990s (Bischof 2004). As the aporias between conditional and unconditional hospitality constitute the meaning of hospitality itself, the focus of Derrida's argumentation is to deconstruct the laws and rules of hospitality in order to get a new, and indeed better, understanding of what hospitality means.

2) This tension leads to the differentiation between a possible and an impossible hospitality, that I will reconstruct in a second step. Richard Kearney attends to Derrida's position and tries himself to develop a hermeneutical approach to hospitality. Therefore, he takes into account not only philosophical arguments but also the biblical tradition of hospitality.

3) In a third and last step, I will concentrate on these two approaches and try to demonstrate that theology can contribute a new perspective to this debate. Important, from a theological point of view, is the biblical background, as well as the philosophical interpretation. My overall question in this article is, if the deconstruction of the conditions of hospitality (Derrida) and the concentration on the hermeneutics of hospitality (Kearney) imply innovative ways of speaking about God.

‘Pas d’hospitalité’ (Jacques Derrida)

As Jacques Derrida’s text ‘A Europe of hope’ (2006) was published posthumously in December 2004, this testimony for Europe can also be read as a testament. Derrida speaks not only about a coming Europe of hope but also about his hope for a coming Europe. What he is interested in is ‘a creed or

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2 This article appeared under the title ‘Une Europe de l’espoir’ in the December 2004 issue of the monthly Le Monde diplomatique.
act of faith for an ethics, law and justice, for a politics of our time and for the future of our world’ (408) and his statement is clear when he writes:

… I believe that, without Eurocentric illusions and pretensions, without the slightest pro-European nationalism, without even much trust in Europe as it is or in the direction it is taking, we must fight for what this name represents today, with the memory of the Enlightenment, of course, but also with a guilty conscience for and a responsible awareness of the totalitarian, genocidal, and colonialist crimes of the past. Thus we must fight for what Europe remains irreplaceable for the world to come, for it to become more than a market or a single currency, more than a neo-nationalist conglomerate, more than a new armed force. (Derrida 2006: 410)

It would be a step too far to presume to analyse the meaning of this statement for our time, more than ten years later; but we can readily note its great relevance. Europe, or more precisely what it represents today, still has to be defended against Eurocentric illusions and pretensions as well as against pro-European nationalism. And we have to ask what Europe stands for. Europe is, as Derrida puts it, rooted in the memory of the Enlightenment and in the guilty conscience for, and a responsible awareness of, the totalitarian, genocidal, and colonialist crimes of the past. Both aspects have to be considered when we think of a coming Europe. Migration, that is to say the movement of people who have lost nearly everything except their bare life and who come to Europe in the hope of improvement, is one of the biggest ethical, political, and sociological challenges today. We as Europeans have to ask ourselves in which Europe do we want to live in in the future? One cannot be surprised that the philosophical debate concerning hospitality is absolutely important. But what does the concept of hospitality mean? And what are implications it has for contemporary society?

Jacques Derrida devoted himself to the philosophical idea of hospitality very intensively (Derrida 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2000, 2002, 2005; cf. Kakolirnis 2015). Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to say that ‘[m]uch current philosophical and theological interest in the phenomenon of hospitality … stems from the work of Jacques Derrida’ (Meskin 2011: 55) But where does Derrida’s interest in hospitality stem from? In an interview Richard Kearney asked Derrida about the relationship between his studies on the gift and on hospitality, and Derrida answered:
In fact it is the same logic which is at work in both cases. How could we relate briefly the gift and hospitality? Of course, it is obvious that hospitality is supposed to consist in giving something, offering something. In the conventional scene [sense?] of hospitality, the guest gives something in gratitude. (Derrida 1999b: 69)

As in his considerations of the gift – that ‘supposes a break with reciprocity, exchange, economy and circular movement’ – Derrida tries to show that hospitality, too, ‘implies such a break’ (Derrida 1999b: 69). Derrida distinguishes between a conditional and an unconditional form of hospitality. **Conditional hospitality** that is in some way a ‘normal’ way of thinking and practising hospitality accepts and reaffirms the roles of the participants. The host remains the host, the guest remains the guest. Derrida: ‘The host remains the master in the house, the country, the nation, he controls the threshold, he controls the borders, and when he welcomes the guest he wants to keep the mastery’.

This understanding of a conditional hospitality has, as Derrida admits, several examples in our cultural tradition. His own interest focuses on Immanuel Kant and his work *Perpetual Peace* (*Zum ewigen Frieden*, 1795), where Kant entitles the ‘Third Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace’ as follows: ‘Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality’ (‘Das Weltbürgerrecht soll auf Bedingungen der allgemeinen Hospitalität eingeschränkt sein’) (Derrida 2000: 3). Derrida summarises the idea of the ‘Conditions of Universal Hospitality’ as the ‘condition of perpetual peace’ (Derrida 1999b: 70). Without several conditions – ‘first, being a citizen of another nation-state or country, he must behave peaceably in our country; second, he is not granted the right to stay, but only the right to visit’ (*ibid.*) and so forth – peace cannot be guaranteed. In 2017, after the very recent and still ongoing experiences with refugees that are coming to Europe we clearly see what Derrida is speaking of. The new nationalisms in many European states and countries are rooted in this conditional mode of hospitality.

But Derrida does not stop his deliberations at this point; he asks furthermore, if there is, or can, or must be another, an **unconditional form of hospitality**. Very similar to his thoughts on the gift, he speaks about the ‘condition of unconditional hospitality’ that is not to ‘ask the other, the newcomer, the guest, to give anything back, or even to identify himself or herself’ (Derrida...
Derrida of course knows that this unconditional hospitality cannot be controlled anymore; he is aware of the risk that is combined with the unconditional hospitality: ‘For unconditional hospitality to take place you have to accept the risk of the other coming and destroying the place, initiating a revolution, stealing everything, or killing everyone’ (Derrida 1999b: 71). And he adds the question:

Why did Kant insist on conditional hospitality? Because he knew that without these conditions hospitality could turn into wild war, terrible aggression. Those are the risks involved in pure hospitality, if there is such a thing and I am not sure that there is. (Derrida 1999b: 71)

In addition to these thoughts one can of course ask, why then did Derrida insist on the distinction of conditional and unconditional hospitality? What is the purpose and the benefit of unconditional hospitality? In sum, Derrida pleads for unconditional hospitality in order to save hospitality, or, to put it the other way around, without unconditional hospitality there is no hospitality at all. To better understand this thought we have to reflect on at least two more texts by Derrida, where he explains his thinking on hospitality.

Jacques Derrida opened his fifth seminar, on 17 January 1996, with the words: ‘Pas d’hospitalité’; to save the ambiguousness of this French expression these words are translated thus: ‘no hospitality; step of hospitality’ (Derrida 2000: 75). To speak about hospitality means in Derrida’s eyes to proceed in thinking – even if we do not know if there is such a thing as hospitality. If we were to know for sure it would mean not to risk anything; hospitality then would be merely an idea among others. Only if we do not know, if hospitality is not a question of knowledge can we try to find ways of understanding and realising what hospitality could mean. This exactly is the reason why hospitality – or more precisely – unconditional hospitality is impossible.

It is as though hospitality were the impossible: as though the law of hospitality defined this very impossibility, as if it were only possible to transgress it, as though the law of absolute, unconditional, hyperbolical hospitality, as though the categorical imperative of hospitality commanded that we transgress all the laws (in the plural) of hospitality, namely, the conditions, the norms, the rights and the duties that are
imposed on hosts and hostesses, on the men or women who give a welcome as well as the men or women who receive it. And vice versa, it is as though the laws (plural) of hospitality, in marking limits, powers, rights, and duties, consisted in challenging and transgressing the law of hospitality, the one that would command that the ‘new arrivals’ be offered an unconditional welcome. (Derrida 2000: 75–6)

Hospitality that deserves to be called hospitality has to be unconditional and even more: impossible. Impossibility is being defined by hospitality because hospitality is more and different to just rule, law and order. Hospitality has to be impossible and this impossibility has to be performed in order to seek for hospitality. Hospitality, as Jacques Derrida argues, can be traced back to an immediate and non-dispensable obligation. We are obliged to be hospitable even if we do not know – and perhaps never will know – what hospitality is. Hospitality in this sense has to be impossible because if it were possible we would have nothing to decide. A possible hospitality would mean that we would follow to the rights and politics of hospitality as a machine, not as a human being. Derrida is convinced that only the impossibility of hospitality could open a space for the other. The impossibility does not simply mean a non-possibility but rather the search for an unknown, necessarily innovative form of hospitality that is open to a new world to come.

These considerations show very clearly that hospitality in this unconditional and therefore impossible way is a question of decidability and responsibility. It seems not to be too narrow to define it as follows: *Hospitality is a question of humanity; only human beings can overtake the responsibility of something that might be irresponsible and thus realize the impossibility.*

A hermeneutical approach to hospitality (Richard Kearney)

One of the most famous recipients and critics of Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of hospitality is Richard Kearney, who is the Charles Seelig Professor in Philosophy at Boston College, Massachusetts. Kearney has published several studies of the phenomenon of the stranger and of hospitality (Kearney and Zimmermann 2016, Kearney and Semonovitch 2011, Kearney and Taylor 2011, Kearney 2014). Derrida’s deconstruction of hospitality is an important reference for Kearney who has not only discussed this phenomenon (Derrida 1999b), but who has also edited contributions
written by Derrida (1997). The main point of disagreement is Derrida's differentiation between conditional and unconditional hospitality and between the possibility and impossibility of hospitality. At the very end of his *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness* Derrida says:

> It is a question of knowing how to transform and improve the law, and of knowing if this improvement is possible within an historical space which takes place between the Law of an unconditional hospitality, offered *a priori* to every other, to all newcomers, *whoever they may be*, and the conditional laws of a right to hospitality, without which The unconditional Law of hospitality would be in danger of remaining a pious and irresponsible desire, without form and without potency, and of even being perverted at any moment. (Derrida 1997: 22–3, italics in the original)

Derrida clearly distinguishes between ‘the conditional laws of a right to hospitality’ that, as we have seen, keeps the difference between the host and the guest and the mastery of the one about the other on the one hand, and ‘The unconditional Law of hospitality’ that is necessary even if impossible to enable at all the possibility of hospitality. Impossibility does not just mean a non-possibility; the impossibility is not only the negative form of the possibility to be hospitable, because in this case there would be no possibility to be hospitable at all. Hospitality would always remain within the conditions of laws. But hospitality, as Derrida wants to show, opens space to the other without asking who he or she is. Hospitality in this sense would be hospitality without the hierarchy between the one who is at home and the other who may stay – for a while. Of course, Derrida is aware of the danger of this unconditional and impossible hospitality; there is no guarantee that that the guest would be thankful in any way or – even worse – that the guest would not do any harm to the host.

It is this impossibility of hospitality and the implications of a risk that Kearney criticises. The starting point, however, seems to be similar or even the same: ‘My wager’, Kearney says, ‘is the wager between hospitality and hostility’ (Kearney 2015: 173). Kearney refers to Derrida’s position and summarises it thus:
If you truly welcome a stranger, you don’t ask where he or she comes from or for what purpose. You don’t ask for an ID or passport. Pure hospitality, this argument goes, is not about a contract or conversation; it’s about radical receptivity and exposure to the other, a welcome without why. When there is a knock on the door, you don’t know whether the person is a monster or a messiah. (Kearney 2015: 174)

Kearney acknowledges this argument of a risk, but in the same time he wants to stick to ethical rules. Derrida’s idea of a pure hospitality that tends towards, or is rooted or originated in, an impossibility of hospitality does not convince Kearney. Therefore, he asks – and here we see his main critique – how hospitality could be understood as a contribution to a better world. ‘… if one seeks to pursue pure hospitality to its hyperbolic “impossible” limit, how can one avoid the perils of extremism’ (Kearney 2015: 174)? In other words: does not hospitality as unconditional, pure and therefore impossible hospitality tend to become inhuman instead of being the condition for humanity, as we have reconstructed Derrida’s argumentation?

With regards to ethics Kearney asks for another understanding of hospitality; he pleads – referring to Paul Ricœur – for a ‘hermeneutical’ or ‘linguistic hospitality’. Kearney inscribes hospitality in a thinkable form of hospitality that remains possible. If someone asks you for your help, this argument goes, you must have the choice to decide whether or not you want to be hospitable. Kearney puts it like this:

If the foreigner knocks on your door, you have a right to say: ‘If I invite you into my host language are we both going to benefit or are you going to destroy me?’ The ethical conditions of hospitality require that sometimes you have to say ‘no’. (Kearney 2015: 177)

This quotation clearly shows a difference with Derrida: Kearney speaks about the right that you have if someone asks you for your help. The host has to be protected against possible attack; the difference between the one who is at home and the other who seeks for help has to be preserved in order to preserve law and order. Of course, hospitality is ambivalent. ‘It is always a risk’ – as Kearney admits. But the question remains how ethics – or humanity – can be guaranteed. Derrida hints that true humanity would mean that there is no guarantee. Of course not. Kearney speaks about the
ethical conditions of hospitality; ethics seems to require rules and conditions in order to be reasonable and responsible. Derrida, on the other hand, argues that there is no hospitality and no ethics at all if we only stick to ethical conditions. Describing the conditions would mean to clearly know what to do. Hospitality would then be a question of knowledge, not of a decision. Only if the decision is im-possible, only if there is an ‘undecidability’ would there be given the chance to act ethically. ‘Of course, we have to know as much as possible, but when we make a decision – if we make a decision – we don’t know and we shouldn’t know. If we know there would be no decision’ (Derrida 1999b: 68).

Beside this first difference between a possible and an impossible hospitality there is another – second – aspect that seems to be an implication of Kearney’s hermeneutical approach. While trying to better understand the ethical conditions of hospitality Kearney refers to biblical narratives. Whereas Derrida mainly discusses his thinking concerning hospitality in terms of philosophical texts, Kearney brings biblical stories of hospitality to mind. I want to refer to only one, very well-known story of Abraham and Sarah in Mamre (cf. Gen. 18), where both are welcoming three strangers. Interesting is Kearney’s summary, which I quote:

This is how the story goes: it is a hot dry day in the desert and Abraham is sitting under the shade of an oak tree at Mamre. His wife Sarah is inside the family tent sheltering from the mid-day sun. She is not happy. She is over 100 years old and she is barren. Her servant woman Hagar is younger and more attractive than she and more fertile. Abraham is brooding about his unhappy wife and the future of Israel when suddenly a shadow flits across the sunlit ground in front of him. He looks up to see three foreigners standing before him and he is filled with fear. Why have they come? he wonders. To kill him and his family? There are, after all, three of them and he has two women to protect, his wife and his servant girl. Should he fight the strangers? But instead of reaching for a weapon or closing his tent, Abraham finds himself running towards the visitors. He greets them, bows to the ground and invites them to a meal. He asks Sarah to knead three measures of the best flour for loaves while he catches a calf and prepares it with curds and milk. Then Abraham stands under the oak tree and watches his guests eat. When they have finished the strangers
announce that when they will return in a year Sarah will be with child. The barren Sarah, standing inside the entrance to the tent laughs when she hears this; for it is quite impossible for her to be with child.

But the visitors repeat the promise – nothing is impossible to God. (Kearney 2015: 179)

Even though it would be interesting to compare this short summary with the original text in the Bible in order to consider the differences (e.g. direct and indirect speech, interior monologue, characterisation of the protagonists) I want to focus only on two aspects.

1) Kearney emphasises Abraham’s thoughts that show his trembling and fear and the possibility of ‘hostility’ which ‘is never far off’ (Kearney 2015: 180). Within this story remains a rest of an un-ethical and irresponsible decision, because Abraham and Sarah do not know anything of the strangers. Without referring to Derrida, Kearney interprets the warm welcome of the strangers by Abraham and Sarah as an ‘ethic of absolute hospitality’ (179).

2) The last sentence of the above quotation is: ‘… nothing is impossible to God’. It is interesting that both the promise as the reaction and the treatment of the strangers is situated in a context of God. Can Abraham trust the strangers because they promise God’s will even if it seems to be impossible? Is the impossibility only an impossibility in our eyes whereas we should or even could know that nothing is impossible to God. Kearney does not pay attention to these thoughts but in the light of Derrida’s deconstruction of hospitality they could be helpful.

Nothing is impossible to God – we know this phrase of course from Luke 1:37; in contrast to Gen. 18:14 it is not reformulated as a question. And in Luke 18:17 we even hear: ‘What is impossible with man is possible with God.’ But one can ask: Is this promise just as simple as it seems? Is theology, that is, speaking about God, nothing but the transgression of human boundaries? And is the impossibility only a negative form of God’s possibilities? What would this theological answer mean for ethics and humanity in the times of migration?
Hospitality as a question of metaphysics: theological consequences

The distinction between conditional and unconditional hospitality led to the difference between the possibilities and the impossibility of hospitality. Whereas Derrida demonstrates that the conditional laws of a right to hospitality necessarily presume – a priori – the unconditional Law of hospitality – even if he definitely does not know if there is such a thing. Kearney critiques this unconditional and impossible hospitality for the sake of ethics; but while summarising the story of Abraham he transforms the question as to whether anything could be too hard for God (cf. Gen. 18:14) into the statement that nothing is impossible to God. This return to the question of impossibility implies – as one can assume – a turn to a theological phrase. The question then is if the impossibility is just a possibility to God? What would be the consequences of this insight for an understanding of humanity? Why does the impossibility return? What have ethics and hospitality to do with impossibility and what is possible? Does the story about the possible impossibility of Abraham and Sarah becoming parents reaffirm that there is no such thing?

The story about Abraham and Sarah welcoming the three strangers has been interpreted in the context of the theory of virtues (Moyaert 2011). Like Kearney, Marianne Moyaert refers to Paul Ricœur and the hermeneutics of narrative hospitality. In the line of this interpretation, hospitality is regarded ‘as an ethical and theological virtue’ (99) and God appears as an actor who plays a special role. God is – like Abraham and Sarah – ‘one of the main characters’ (97). But would this appearance not be too much for the humiliation of God and too little for God as the creator of the world?

To get an adequate theological understanding of hospitality I want to proceed along two major steps: 1) we have to take into account another passage and another background to Derrida’s thinking concerning unconditional hospitality; 2) we will have to ask what might hospitality mean in a biblical-theological context?

1) To start with the first point, we have to consider that Derrida refers again and again to Emmanuel Levinas when speaking about hospitality. Levinas presents a radical interpretation of the other and focuses on ethics in his works. In one of his lectures on Levinas – ‘A word of welcome’ – Derrida called Levinas’s first major work Totality and Infinity ‘an immense treatise of hospitality’ (Derrida 1999a: 21) and he gives an interesting and convincing approach to the work of Levinas: ‘Has anyone ever noticed?
Although the word is neither frequently used nor emphasized within it, *Totality and Infinity* bequeaths to us an immense treatise of hospitality (21). Derrida explains in very detailed re-readings of Levinas the difference between politics and the law of hospitality on the one hand and an eschatological or messianic ethics of hospitality. To get the fundamental meaning of hospitality, Derrida works out that for Levinas hospitality and rationality are linked, insofar as rationality and understanding signify reception: ‘Reason itself is a welcome inasmuch as it welcomes the idea of infinity – and the welcome is rational’ (26). The understanding of hospitality in the context of rationality and cognitive reception goes hand in hand with the ethical dimension. Hospitality, asylum, and the inn belong together; all three terms are called ‘the place offered to the stranger’ (68) by Levinas and even more: they constitute a ‘figural scheme’ that gathers three concepts together: fraternity, humanity, and hospitality: ‘the welcome of the other or of the face as neighbor and as stranger, as neighbor insofar as he is a stranger, man and brother’ (68).

Hospitality is not merely a concept or an idea among others. Derrida, who is re-reading Levinas, interprets hospitality in the context of ethics and shows that hospitality is an experience of the alterity of the other; and this understanding implies that metaphysics – not understood as ontology or onto-theo-logy – means nothing but ethics or first philosophy.

Hospitality assumes ‘radical separation’ as experience of the alterity of the other, as relation to the other, in the sense that Levinas emphasizes and works with in the word ‘relation’, that is, in its ferential, referential or, as he sometimes notes, deferential bearing [portée]. The relation to the other is deference. Such separation signifies the very thing that Levinas re-names ‘metaphysics’: ethics or first philosophy, as opposed to ontology. Because it opens itself to – so as to welcome – the irruption of the idea of infinity in the finite, this metaphysics is an experience of hospitality. (Derrida 1999a: 46)

This irruption of the idea of infinity in the finite is one of the main ideas of Levinas’s thinking. Within our reconstruction of a radical thinking of hospitality, it not only reminds us of the break that Derrida mentions according to gift and hospitality; the irruption of the idea of infinity in the finite also throws light on the understanding of the impossibility of hospitality.
Impossible – that means an irruption of the impossible in the possible. Impossibility appears – like the strangers in the desert. This might be an appropriate approach not only to a radical interpretation of hospitality, but perhaps also to theo-logy.

2) We can deepen this approach to theology: the English term ‘hospitality’ stems from the Latin and has its Greek counterpart in the word ‘philoxenia’. Christoph Theobald has reminded us of this linguistic background of hospitality in the sense of philoxenia (Theobald 2015: 216; Theobald 2008). If one does not want to misinterpret holiness as sacrality, as Theobald puts it, and if we want to emphasise the humanitarian ground of a Christian lifestyle one has to combine and to confront the term of holiness with the biblical thinking of hospitality. In the texts of the Second Vatican Council, this combination has been realised only once: in Presbyterorum ordinis, No. 8., hospitality is understood in this context as philoxenia and therefore the text refers back to Hebrews 13:2.

‘Do not neglect to show hospitality to strangers, for thereby some have entertained angels unawares’ (Hebr. 13:2). Obviously, this phrase alludes to the abovementioned text about Abraham and the three strangers (Gen. 18). Philoxenia, hospitality in this sense, is nothing else but love to the stranger. If we now ask in which way the Bible presents an understanding of God, it is no wonder that we find exactly this definition for God. In the last of the five books of Moses, the book Deuteronomy, God is called a God ‘who loves the stranger’ (Deut. 10:18). Hospitality, philoxenia is not just an ethical exhortation; we as human beings are supposed to be hospitable because God himself has to be understood as hospitable. Hospitality means God’s love to the stranger, means to give the stranger ‘bread and clothing’ (Deut. 10:18). From this perspective, the ethical exhortation in Matthew 25 comes to be understood as an imitation of God.3

For I was hungry and you gave me food; I was thirsty and you gave me drink; I was a stranger and you took me in; I was naked and you clothed me; I was sick and you visited me; I was in prison and you came to me… Assuredly, I say to you, inasmuch as you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me. (Matt. 25:35–36, 40)

If this theological interpretation of hospitality is convincing, it implies something else. In the radical understanding of hospitality mentioned here it would not only be a virtue among others, but also be a step towards God or God’s step towards us. *Pas d’hospitalité* – as Derrida put it – in the double meaning of no hospitality, and a step of hospitality. We can approach God – step by step.

**Conclusion**

One may ask, of course, about what theology can contribute to the socio-political discussions concerning migration. In what way would it be helpful to think about migration in theological terms? Does not religion, and especially monotheism, play a tragic role in a worldwide setting of violence, hatred, and terrorism? In other words, is the belief in God not part of a problem that should be solved by tracing back to this belief in God? Would it be less harmful to avoid speaking about God than doing so? On the other hand, one may ask, if it is not a first and necessary step to talk about God because of the differences within especially the monotheistic religions? Is it not unavoidable to speak about the different approaches to God in whose name murder and crimes are being performed?

Perhaps Derrida’s thinking and Kearney’s critique of it are regarded as a consequence of theological deliberations; there are, of course, interpretations that suggest we are speaking about a religious turn in phenomenology. But perhaps, and I would prefer this interpretation, it is just the other way around: theology would then be a consequence of the insights into human being that Derrida, Levinas, Kearney among others have worked out. The contributions may have shown that to speak about God cannot be avoided. Especially if we want to consider the question of humanity. Even if it sounds paradoxical, the discourse on hospitality has shown that in order to be, or to become, human we must do the impossible.

Humanity and hospitality are linked to each other, as we have seen. And they have theological implications insofar as they recall the ‘Word of God’. In an analysis of a talmudic text Levinas wrote:

Fraternity (but what does it mean? Is it not, according to the Bible, a synonym of humanity?) and hospitality: are these not stronger than the horror a man may feel for the other who denies him in his alterity? Do
they not already bring back a memory of the ‘Word of God?’ (Derrida 1999a: 69)

The theo-political discourse that is opened up by this thinking has not ended yet. Furthermore, the theological perspective is the approach to an understanding of the Biblical God who is presented as ‘God who loves the stranger’ (Deut. 10:18). Derrida, who quotes this Biblical verse, which is important for Levinas, adds the following thought:

‘God loves the stranger’, rather than shows himself – is this not, beyond being and the phenomenon, beyond being and nothingness, a God who, although he literally is not, not ‘contaminated by being’, would destine the à-Dieu, the salutation and the holy separation to desire as ‘love of the stranger?’ … The Saying à-Dieu would signify hospitality. This is not some abstraction that one would call, as I have just hastily done, ‘love of the stranger’, but (God) ‘who loves the stranger.’ (Derrida 1999a: 104f.)

What I have wanted to demonstrate is that a radical thinking about hospitality gives a glimpse of humanity and offers the chance for a new approach in theology in times of migration.


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Islam’s increased visibility in the European public sphere
A real crisis?

DIDEM DOGANYILMAZ DUMAN

It is believed that the massive flow of refugees and dramatically increased asylum applications from Muslim societies to member countries of the European Union will cause significant change in the demographic characteristics of those countries. Although the presence of Muslims is not a recent phenomenon in Europe, their increased visibility has become once again a dominant political discourse for right-wing political parties. The important question is whether the Muslim presence has become a component of the post-truth politics of the political leaders of these parties, or whether it constitutes a real threat to European society. Does the European Union, then, face a real crisis? If so, what is the nature of the crisis - is it a refugee crisis, an identity crisis, or even worse, is it a crisis of tolerance? This paper analyses the political atmosphere and its effects on society in terms of an increased visibility of Muslims and Islamic symbols in the European public sphere in order to answer those questions.

The massive flow of refugees and dramatically increased numbers of asylum applications from Muslim societies to member countries of the European Union (EU) have attracted attention, with utmost ascendancy being given to Muslim–Christian relations involving certain debates which already have a long history. Already existing Muslim populations have been the focus of conspiracy theories concerning significant changes in the demographic characteristics of European societies, and recently negative perceptions of Muslims in Europe have been re-awakened. However, neither the existence of the negative perceptions, nor of Muslims in Europe, are recent phenomena. Muslims have been coming in to Europe from various countries since the second half of the twentieth century. The numbers of Muslims in the EU countries and the ratios of the Muslim population overall for each country are shown in Chart 1. By December 2015, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) declared that almost a million people had crossed the Mediterranean Sea; they are predominantly Syrian, most of the rest are Iraqis and Afghans, but in total, they are all Muslims (Clayton and Holland 2015). The numbers and ratios in the figures have
increased; but, is it just recent events that have led to this population growth or is there anything that has changed since the second half of the twentieth century, when the first immigrants arrived?

During the first decades following their immigration, Muslims had lived within their own isolated settlements, alongside other Muslim immigrants, working in designated jobs. Their presence was certain; however, they were not fully integrated into the local culture. They had led invisible lives outside of certain areas of the public sphere. In subsequent generations, they began to become more visible as they started to integrate and enjoy the same public services as their neighbouring communities. They started to go beyond the boundaries that had been drawn for their parents. The younger generation became more visible in schools in various areas of the education system and as a consequence of an avowed equality of education, the younger generation of immigrants also started to take on the same jobs as their neighbours. Equal education and shared work spaces led to increased interaction between the two groups; hence, the public sphere has become one that is shared among immigrant Muslims and locals. The public sphere possesses significance since it provides an opportunity for reflective discussions in the local culture. Hence, the visibility of Islamic symbols, along with Muslims’ presence, has changed the local communities in that whilst they occupy the same place they do so with different sets of values. As quoted by Nilüfer Göle (2015: 97), the real concern does not coincide with the presence of Muslims, which after all dates further back in history; it begins at the point where Muslims become involved in the local culture. Those living in the suburbs were considered to be out of the system; but Muslims who present their cultural and religious differences personally in the public sphere by speaking the local language and working as colleagues with the locals cause uneasiness. These fully integrated Muslims are conscious of their rights to live according to their own religion and have the confidence to demand these rights. Sharing the same era in the same sphere with Muslims has particularly affected Europeans (Göle 2010: 15). With visible involvement of Muslims in local cultures in Europe, the transformation of the European public sphere becomes a subject of debate since the change can clearly be seen (Soliman 2017). Within this context of interaction, Islam is becoming more and more involved in the European public sphere and consciousness (Göle 2010: 66).
With the separation of Church and state and encouragement of gender equality, the European public sphere possesses secular characteristics; hence the involvement of new religious symbols has brought about negative results in terms of Christian–Muslim relations. The Islamic form of dress, for instance, is considered to be antagonistic to modern values, since modernity has been thought to be synonymous with Western values (Göle 2010: 107). Consequently, in a secular public sphere, the presence of veiled women has brought about uneasiness. Since the late 1980s, Islam and its symbols have brought about controversy in European countries where they are seen to be undermining the order, and due to its unwelcome presence the involvement of Islam in the European public sphere has been perceived to be constrained (Göle 2015: 36–7).

The reaction to this situation among locals, which has been unfavourable, to the aforementioned constrained involvement of Islam in the secular European public sphere has become a political tool which right-wing populism has started to focus on. There have been various labels to highlight these populist moments that, with references to the extreme right or populist right, form one single family (Muis and Immerzeel 2017: 910). This family has wielded its political influence, in addition to its descriptive characteristics – which have been introduced by Jens Rydgren (2005: 32–7, 58–69) as ethno-nationalist with reference to xenophobia and exclusionist in favouring its own people for certain examples – in order to mobilise societies in various European countries. Within this context, it is also important to highlight the Eurosceptic characteristics of this family. The term has been defined by Paul Taggart (1998: 366) as ‘the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’. Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak (2002: 7) have categorised Euroscepticism, and introduced ‘hard Euroscepticism’, as opposition to the EU as well as the whole project of European integration and support for withdrawal from membership in contrast to ‘soft Euroscepticism’ which was not a principled objection to European integration while possessing concerns about one or a number of policy areas in terms of conflict with national interests. With various critics of hard and soft Euroscepticism, Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde (2002) have suggested a different classification in terms of support for European integration and the EU itself. They have introduced four concepts, which are: Euroenthusiasts (EU-optimist and Europhile), Europragmatists (EU-optimist but Europhobe), Eurosceptics
Islam’s increased visibility in the European public sphere

As far back as the involvement of Islam in the European public sphere and unfavourable interactions between newcomer Muslims and local Christians date, so far back do the existence of right-wing populist parties date as well (Mudde 2012). However, the debate has gained importance recently as a result of new so-called ‘threats’. While the massive flow of refugees heading to the European countries as a consequence of the Arab Spring and ensuing Syrian Civil War has brought about concerns in terms of identity, attacks carried out by the Islamist terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) have brought about concerns in terms of security. Eventually the EU has applied certain new rules including asylum applications, Schengen Area trespass regulations, and the reintroduction of border patrols (Rankin 2016, Nielsen 2017). In addition to these applications, the EU-Turkey statement was agreed on 18 March 2016 in order to end irregularities in the flow and to keep refugees within Turkey; in other words outside the EU borders (European Commission 2016). Not only has the disbursement of three billion euros to Turkey in return for keeping them within its borders (European Commission 2016) been criticized strongly, but so also has the context of the statement alongside recent applications within the frame of human rights; however, they have perfectly matched the anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic discourses of the right-wing populist parties’ representatives among EU member states. They have brought about an increase in their support by highlighting recent developments as being favourable to their ideology, which focuses on repatriating migrants in order to maintain homogeneous structures free from a supranational sovereignty – that is to say, the EU – and newcomer refugees.

This paper analyses the political atmosphere in the EU with specific examples of right-wing populist parties which have gained power in member countries within the context of the presence of Muslims. Alongside many other discourses, the ones based on anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic policies and the consequent support that they attract will be taken into consideration in comparison with the values of the EU itself. As a background,
a short overview is provided of the core concepts that the research questions are based on and, to complete the analysis, the instant reaction of the society has been analysed. To facilitate this, in addition to scholarly papers, newspaper articles have been taken into consideration. Instead of suggesting a solution to the process of social polarisation occurring as a consequence of the interaction between local Christians and newcomer Muslims, this paper attempts to answer the following questions: Do these concerns, related to the presence of Muslims, highlight a real threat to the EU, as repeatedly mentioned, or is it simply another aspect of the post-truth politics that right-wing populist parties follow? If there is a real threat to the EU, what is it exactly?

**Theoretical background**

The roots of Islam in continental Europe have two different provenances: immigration, and historical settlement policies. Immigration is a recent phenomenon beginning in the twentieth century and mostly directed towards western and northern European countries. Muslim presence in certain countries such as Germany, France, Belgium the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries is mostly related to immigration. Chart 1 demonstrates the ratio of the Muslim population overall. On the other hand, historical settlement policies play a significant role in terms of Muslim presence in eastern European, most specifically in the Balkan countries. As a result of the settlement policy of the Ottoman Empire, which was applied from the very beginning of the fifteenth century with the conquest of Thrace, Islam became a component of religious diversity in eastern countries (Doganyilmaz Duman 2016). As the presence of Islam was maintained for centuries, Muslims have become localized in certain eastern European countries.

In contrast to already existing Muslim populations in eastern European countries, immigration of Muslims to western European countries since the second half of the twentieth century has brought about uneasiness among local Christians, as aforementioned. With significant increases in the Muslim populations, and their involvement in the public sphere, a new debate was opened in terms of a demographic shift within European societies. The debate was concerned with the effects of Islam on European identity, which would be undermined due to the presence of Muslims; eventually, Europe would be Islamized. Bat Ye’or (2005) introduced a conspiracy theory
Islam’s increased visibility in the European public sphere

called Eurabia within the framework of an Islamization of Europe. She used the terms Islamization and Arabization synonymously (Ye’or 2005, 2011), since the process would be the result of Muslim immigration from Arab countries. Within the current conjuncture, Eurabia perfectly matches with the concerns of local Christians regarding the potential risk of mass Muslim immigration to European identity.

In terms of the religious leanings of European societies, it has been Judeo-Christian characteristics that have shaped their cultural codes (Göle 2015: 58). The issues that Muslims have faced in terms of religious freedom have been overcome before by a different religious group. In Germany, for instance, issues such as the building of synagogues, wearing kippah in courthouses and not being able to fulfil requirements of Sabbath have been referred as worrying in similar ways as today’s issues (ibid. 241). However, the reason why the cultural codes have been shaped around Judeo-Christian characteristics, in addition to its Greco-Roman roots, is a moral agreement that Europe had managed to come to with Judaism, as stated by Göle (ibid.}

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**Chart 1.**

Muslim populations in the EU countries with overall ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chart has been prepared by the author with the data collected from Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project, 2016.
The third monotheistic religion, Islam, on the other hand, has become the one that is possessed by newcomers, and with the manifest differences of Muslims in terms of dress and/or religious practices, their existence has been considered to be incompatible with already-existing cultural codes. Within this debate concerning difference in cultural codes, Tariq Madood (2007) indicates a cultural racism, which focuses on both cultural and ethnic differences, in order to analyse the anti-Muslim approach. Hence, the term racism is being evolved into a term for the action of offensively supporting superiority, not only of colour, race or ethnic difference, but also cultural codes. Claudia Winkler (2014) highlights the same issue with the term neo-racism, which similarly focuses on cultural differences, and adds that in terms of neo-racism Islam is not considered a religious faith, but it is reduced to a set of cultural codes which cannot be compatible with human rights that the enlightened European culture adopts itself. John Esposito (2011), as well, claims that anti-Islamic attitudes come close to racism.

Islamophobia is defined as negative attitudes and/or feelings about Islam and Muslims, which can be gathered as anti-Islamic attitudes. The term's outstanding definition in the Runnymede Trust’s report entitled *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All* (1997) highlights its unfairness and the fear and hatred which targets the entire, or majority, Muslim population. In contrast with scholars who highlight the term's closeness to racism, Vincent Geisser (2003) claims that it should be considered as different from racism, identifying it as a phobia of religion. He expresses this distinction from racism in terms of its target group. While the victim tends to be the group which differs from the majority, it is the majority within this context. Instead of Muslims, who have been seen as *others* in the society, it is the Europeans who are victims here, as they feel attacked in terms of own identity due to Islamization resulting from an *invasion* of Muslims. Erik Bleich (2011: 1593), similarly, focuses on the consequences of mass immigration which have brought about and/or deepened Islamophobic sentiments towards Muslim immigrants within a cause and effect relationship. Hence, Islamophobia becomes a marker in terms of identity between those who fear becoming a minority in terms of the emergence of Eurabia and the consequences of Muslim invasion, and those who possess religious differences.

Muslims, who are ‘the other’ in the context of European society, possess and demonstrate significant differences in terms of religious and/or cultural codes, including, for example, the building of mosques and minarets, the
demand for halal meat, and the wearing of headscarves. Identity is a collection of responses to the question that asks ‘who am I?’ and these responses position one in relation to the other. Sometimes one positions oneself as an individual, while at certain times the need to be a part of a society occurs and social identity has dominance over individual identity. In other words, individuals tend to engage in self-description with respect to membership of a social structure (Mlicki and Ellemer 1996: 98). Social Identity Theory analyses one’s social identity in terms of group dynamics and inter-group relations. In accordance with the inter-group relations, each in-group, to which individuals bind themselves, has out-groups, and they position themselves in order to compete, to possess dominance over these out-groups, and ultimately to increase their self-respect (Turner 1982: 33).

Margaret Hogg (1993: 107) highlights two particular causes why individuals tend to bind themselves to a social category; there should either be discrimination or a significant threat coming from an out-group. It is certain that the EU members on which this paper focuses compose a wide target group and every one of these countries has various historical processes in terms of their interaction with Islam. However, with respect to the current dynamics of the interaction, newcomer Muslims generate one out-group for one unique in-group which is composed of local Christians from various countries and different national identities. Hence, within this inter-group conflict there are two social identities which have inner diversity in themselves, and both of the groups have their own complaints, even if they are not entirely hostile (Göle 2015: 22–3). Certain local groups fear to lose social dominance in their homeland and become minorities in their own culture. On the other hand, newcomer Muslims complain about increasing Islamophobia, being questioned in terms of their religious and cultural possessions and positions, alongside not sharing the same cultural components with locals. Besides, in accordance with the theory, in-group members tend to exalt their social category by using stereotypes which give them dominance over out-groups, and it is not rare to use exaggerated stereotypes (Demirtaş 2003: 131–4). Islamophobia, within this context, paves the way for encouragement of this inter-group conflict with exaggerated anti-Muslim components.

Oxford Dictionaries annually announce a word of the year which reflects a global trend, and it will vary significantly in terms of its meaning. For instance whilst in 2015 it was the emoji ‘face with tears of joy’, for 2016, the
chosen word, *post-truth*, was by contrast strongly political, a consequence of a globally polarised world politics. The word ‘post-truth’ was not a new word, however, but it was perfectly suited to the political atmosphere of the international system. Its meaning has been defined by Oxford Dictionaries (2016) as follows: ‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’. The term has been adopted by political commentators and ‘post-truth politics’ has found a significant base in political analysis. Its exaggerated negative outcomes have started to be used by right-wing populist parties as a political tool in order to shape public opinion. Post-truth political discourses composed of anti-Islamic and anti-immigrant approaches have gathered significant support, as has been visible in poll results, and this has paved the way for consciousness of differences between these two sections of society.

The distinction between the *other* and *us* can be applied in various ways. For the purpose of the present study, religious difference plays a significant role. Resistance to progressive cultural change can explain the importance of religious difference, which applies in not only religious but also cultural components, as mentioned above. However, in terms of a rise of populism there are various effects that should be focused on. Economic insecurity and social deprivation have salient effects on the electoral behaviour of those left behind, a group composed of low-waged, unskilled workers, long-term unemployed, and poorer white populations living in suburban areas within, or close to, settlements of immigrants (Inglehart and Norris 2016). Populist movements’ representatives use the evidence of inequality to blame *others* for a decrease in public services and job opportunities for *us*. Their discourses, stressing both cultural and economic conditions, easily find a home within aforementioned composition of inter-group relations since societies become vulnerable to reactionary populist references and support them due to negligence of their privileges.

**The political atmosphere and recent elections in the EU**

As in the global context, the political order in the EU has become polarised in recent years. In various EU countries, populist parties have gained more power over the past decade. In order to demonstrate the rise of populism in the EU within the context of the presence of Muslims, anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic discourses – among all the other Eurosceptic ones
will be focused on before examining the support the voters have given to those parties.

In Germany, the populist movement is led by the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) and headed by Frauke Petry, a former businesswoman. Petry’s and other AfD representatives’ current declarations mostly focus on fears of terrorism and the problems of refugees integrating into German society, and they are characterised by an extreme anti-immigrant approach. In January 2016, she was criticised strongly for her suggestion that the German police should shoot immigrants who cross the border illegally. Despite criticisms, the party manifesto concerning relations with Muslims, stressed another topic; ‘Islam is not a part of Germany’ (Robins-Early 2017). In the political arena, in addition to AfD, there is an anti-Islamic movement called Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA), formed in Dresden in 2014. It has carried out protests against the arrival of migrants not only in Germany but in several cities in Europe which are concerned about rising Muslim populations, to which 1.1 million refugees were added in 2015, due to increased numbers of asylum applications (Reuters 2016).

In Austria, where the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) leads the populist movement, this far-right political movement is still linked with racism in connection with neo-Nazis. FPÖ representatives’ declarations have been criticised strongly due to its hostility towards Jews; however, with the leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache the target of the hatred was shifted from Jews to Muslims. Strache referred to political Islam as a new form of fascism, with which he believes it is necessary to fight (Shuster 2016). Norbert Hofer, a member of the party, ran for the presidency in the Austrian presidential election of 2016 and became a very competitive candidate in the election process. His promises demonstrated significant similarity with entire populist right-wing representatives’ discourses in various countries; he campaigned on border controls in order to secure the country from immigrants, limiting benefits that immigrants enjoy, and favouring Austrians in terms of employment. As a proof of its Eurosceptic approach, the motto of the FPÖ is ‘Austria first’ (The New York Times 2016).

In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders is notorious for his visible opposition to the presence of Muslims and unsympathetic approach to Islam. His opposition is systematised in Dutch politics in the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV). PVV is not merely opposed to Islam, since its
policies are composed of further arguments of a Eurosceptic character. He has publicly stated that his intention is to ban the Quran, exclude Muslim Dutch people from dual citizenship in cases of having a criminal record and to ban mosques and Islamic schools (Robins-Early 2017). The support that he has gained for his anti-immigrant, Islamophobic and anti-EU discourses has increased markedly throughout the decade.

In France, Marine Le Pen is a public figure whose statements reflect a strong nationalist tendency composed of Eurosceptic and anti-Muslim contents. During her French presidential election campaign of 2017, she promoted ideas such as border controls to secure the country against Islamist terrorism and Muslim immigrants, a return to the national currency and full exit from the EU (Robins-Early 2017). The party that she leads, the National Front (Front National, FN), had run a very competitive campaign in terms of opposing Islam and immigration and received significant support from voters, since it promised to reduce the number of immigrants entering into the country as well as to implement a protectionist approach to economic policies, for example, limiting government expenditure on immigrants, including healthcare (The New York Times 2016).

In Greece, the Golden Dawn, a far-right populist party, has played a significant role in terms of rising populism in the country. Representatives of the Golden Dawn remained silent during debates concerning the possible expulsion of the country from the Schengen Area for being the first country in which illegal entry to the EU was happening; however, they marched in protest at the presence of newcomers in places where refugee camps were being settled. Golden Dawn’s most salient practice was referring to Donald Trump’s election as the president of the USA as a victory against ‘illegal immigration’ in favour of ‘ethnically clean states’ (The New York Times 2016).

In Hungary, Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom) represents a right-wing populist movement in the political arena. The Jobbik Movement’s arguments, composed of anti-Muslim and Eurosceptic discourses including economically protectionist policies, have been salient in national politics (The New York Times 2016). Additionally, Victor Orbán, the Prime Minister and leader of the national conservative political party, Fidesz, also represents populist ideas in support of the Jobbik movement (BBC News 2016).
In Sweden, the Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) is the representative party of right-wing populist ideas. It refers to mass immigration as an issue in economic and social affairs (Sharman 2017) and supports white supremacism as well as promoting a referendum on Sweden’s membership of the EU (The New York Times 2016).

Representatives of right-wing populist movements are not limited to the aforementioned parties: there is also Flemish Block (Vlaams Blok, VB) in Belgium, the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) in Denmark, the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset) in Finland and Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia (L’udova strana Naše Slovensko) in Slovakia. These parties similarly support anti-Muslim and Eurosceptic discourses. Alongside mobilised political and social movements, there have been individual declarations that encourage a polarisation of Muslims and local communities. Discriminatory speeches by prominent political figures possess significant importance in terms of social tendencies on a particular topic due to the power of shaping public opinion they can have. One such unfortunate declaration was made by Robert Fico, the Slovakian Prime Minister, in 2016, in which he mentioned that ‘Islam has no place in Slovakia’, causing significant controversy (Boccato 2016). His statement was supported by Victor Orbán. In addition to Orbán’s strong nationalist approach in domestic and foreign policies, he, like Robert Fico, has highlighted the necessity of defending Christian culture against not only Muslims but also all foreigners in the country (Foster 2016). As another example, Robert Winnicki, leader of the National Movement (Ruch Narodowy) in Poland, addressed demonstrators with following statement: ‘We’re demonstrating against the Islamization of Europe, we’re demonstrating against immigration, against an invasion’ and encouraged protests against Muslims (Reuters 2016).

In certain cases, anti-immigrant discourses have descended to the level of anti-Islamic ones. For instance, Robert Fico offered to take 200 Syrian refugees, but only those who are Christian, citing a lack of mosques in the country. However, his policy was criticised strongly for its religion-based discriminatory approach as officials started to mark asylum seekers with numbers on their arms. This action’s defence was that it was a means to facilitate the process of identification of those who did not speak any common language; nevertheless, this explanation failed to calm the critics down. In the end, they ended the application (Lebor 2015). Estonia, Bulgaria and Poland responded to EU directive pressure to share refugees among...
member countries on one condition; they declared that they would allow only Christian asylum seekers to enter the country, or they would not let in any (Shuster 2016).

The polarised atmosphere has been even more visible during the campaigns of recent elections. Since 2016, there have been four elections in four EU member states and leaders of the right-wing parties have attracted significant attention with significant anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic statements.

Norbert Hofer, a member of the Austrian FPÖ, ran for presidency in the 2016 presidential elections. As shown in Chart 2, he narrowly lost the election, winning 48.3 per cent of the vote (Oliphant and Csekő 2016).

In 2017, the Dutch PVV gained 13.1 per cent of the vote, whilst Geertz Wilders increased the share of power he had gained in previous elections. As shown in Chart 3, the PVV is currently represented by 20 seats in parliament (Henley 2017).

Chart 2. Austrian presidential elections 2016

The chart has been prepared by the author using official election results.

Chart 3. Number of seats in Dutch general elections 2017

The chart has been prepared by the author using official election results.
Islam’s increased visibility in the European public sphere

Later in 2017, French presidential elections were held and Le Pen ran for office. The leader of the FN lost the elections with 33.9 per cent of the votes as shown in Chart 4 (Eleftheriou-Smith 2017).

The results of the aforementioned elections were monitored with significant anxiety within the European political scene since each populist movement within the EU asserts Eurosceptic discourses which call for a return to national identity, which is said to have been damaged by the rise of a common-European understanding of identity. After each election, European leaders have publicly stated their concerns about the future of the EU (Paterson 2016, Rosemain and Blamont 2017, Henley 2017).

The latest elections to be held which are within the focus of this research were the German federal elections of September 2017. Far-right ideology here has barely had any supporters since the era of the National Socialist Party; however, there was a significant rise in support for the AfD during these elections. The rise of AfD had been foreseen for the federal elections,
since it had already gained salient support from voters in the local elections of September 2016. Even more than expected, however, AfD gained 12.6 per cent of the vote and as shown in Chart 5, it is currently being represented by 94 seats in the German Parliament, Bundestag (Der Bundeswahlleiter 2017). This is the first time since the era of the National Socialist Party that a far-right political party has been represented in the Bundestag.

The failure of parties vs. millions of votes

The results of the recent elections have been described above, and as can be seen all four representatives of populist movements in four countries have failed to win the elections despite their increased share of the votes. If the period of time under examination is taken back to 2014, the year when massive flows of refugees began to head towards the EU countries, the picture will not change.

Since 2014, there have been seven elections in seven different EU member countries. The reason why 2014 has been selected as the starting point is because anti-immigrant discourses have found their place on the political agenda since then, in addition to already-existing anti-Islamic ones. When the elections results are considered, taking into consideration differences in election systems, it is clear that none of these parties have become a party in power, nor have any of the party’s leaders become the president. However, there are millions of votes which these parties have gained as a consequence of their anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic discourses.

Chart 6 has been prepared with respect to official election results. In 2014 in Hungary the Jobbik Movement gained 1.02 million votes in the parliamentary elections (Mudde 2014), and the Swedish Democrats gained 0.8 million votes in the general election (New York Times 2016). A year later, the Danish People’s Party gained 0.74 million votes in the general election (BBC News 2015), True Finns gained 0.52 million votes in the Finnish parliamentary elections (Statistics Finland 2015), and Golden Dawn gained 0.39 million votes in the Greek legislative elections (The Economist 2015). In 2016, the leader of the Freedom Party in Austria gained 2.1 million votes in presidential elections (Oliphant and Csekö 2016); and in Slovakia, Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia gained 0.21 million votes in the parliamentary election (Mesežnikov 2016). In 2017, the Party for Freedom gained 1.37 million votes in the Dutch general election (Henley 2017), the leader of the National Front gained 10.64 million votes in the French presidential
Islam’s increased visibility in the European public sphere

Elections (Eleftheriou-Smith 2017) and Alternative for Germany gained 5.88 million votes in the German federal elections (Der Bundeswahlleiter 2017). The listed parties have gained millions of votes in total around the EU and in addition to the salient numbers of votes, demonstrating the support of voters, in parliamentary elections these parties have won seats. It means that the discriminatory politics of these parties will be represented at different levels of national politics, including the executive order, with respect to the political system of each country.

**Reality vs. perception**

The anti-Muslim discourses, alongside Eurosceptic statements, of the party representatives of the right-wing populist parties have provided them with a significant share of the vote in various member states of the EU. Despite the actual failure of these parties – they could not get sufficient votes to get into power or presidency – their approaches have formed a base among their voters. The most important question for the purpose of this research is whether this threat is as real as it is advertised to be by representatives of these parties, or not?

During a campaign event in Berlin, run by AfD in September 2016, Georg Pazderski, a party member, answered the question as to why the Germans fear the massive influx of immigrants, even if the immigrants are
not causing an increased crime rate, as follows: ‘Perception is reality… What people feel is what they perceive as reality. And at the moment, our citizens feel unwell, insecure’ (Shuster 2016). His statement demonstrates an important link between the characteristics of current politics and the general emotional status of the social context. Perceptions have more power than the reality since they deeply affect voters’ choices during elections. Party representatives have the ability to manipulate the reality and shape public opinion according to the tendency that political interests would like to create. This is what Georg Pazderski mentioned in his statement. Even though there is no increase in recorded crimes involving immigrants, representatives of political parties have the power to suggest that there is such an increase.

In terms of perception, research has been carried out by IPSOS in which people were asked their opinions concerning the population of Muslims in their own country. The research was carried out in 40 countries in 2016 and member countries of the EU are shown in Chart 7. There is a significant discrepancy between the actual numbers and the perceptions. The subjects of the research made their own guesses with respect to their perceived understanding concerning the presence of Muslims in their respective countries. Their guesses were exaggerated the numbers, since they had been hearing about the problems that Muslims have been said to be the cause of, and had
Islam’s increased visibility in the European public sphere

been seeing them more often in the news. With the power of the media and politics, it is not difficult to shape public opinion. Once it is believed that there is a significant number of Muslims in the country, locals start to believe, for example, that newcomers may cause more problems and locals may lose their own identities. Europe may be Islamized due to increasing numbers of Muslim newcomers. Unavoidably, this fear would lead locals to become more distant from reality; in other words, that fear would cause a feedback loop concerning the relationship between a perceived presence of Muslims in contrast to the reality and the fears concerning Muslim presence.

Conclusion

The EU has been structured on the basis of proper values, both at domestic and international levels. The constituted European identity, which was stated officially in the Declaration of European Identity in 1973 by nine members of the European Community, has been composed with respect for the rule of law, social justice, human rights and democracy for its citizens and according to the responsibilities of its members and the rest of the world. These values and characteristics united the societies under one European identity (Kostakopoulou 2016).

In terms of identity, the notion of ‘Eurabia’ as part of a conspiracy theory, has become a very significant challenge for European societies since they have felt under attack due to increased numbers of Muslims within their own societies. Not only recent massive flows of refugees but also the further integration of earlier generations of Muslims who arrived during the second half of the twentieth century have brought the debate to the table once again. Beginning with the New York attacks of 11 September 2001 and currently with the attacks of the ISIL, collective consciousness has focused on security issues relating to Islamist movements and, as an unfortunate fact, with Muslims. These threats concerning both security and identity related issues have empowered the spread of Islamophobia among certain parts of European society. The reaction was consolidated in terms of opposition towards Muslims, in addition to the perception that Islam was not coeval with European values. Consequently, the said reaction has caused local Christians to bind their group identity and within the context of inter-group conflicts Islamophobia has provided them with inflated arguments concerning the presence of Muslims.
Perception possesses the power to get beyond the bounds of reality at certain times. As discussed in earlier sections of this research summary, post-truth political tools have gained significant importance in world politics, creating perceptions which differ from the reality and with the power of populist discourses and the vulnerability of certain sections of the society, people tend to support these political movements. The fact of an increasing number of Muslims in the society is a reality; however, the risks that they are said to represent are the components of perception. Alongside various other components, including economic and social ones, the presence of Muslims is represented as a real threat, and these anti-Muslim discourses have been used for the political ends of right-wing populist parties, to support their strong nationalist and Eurosceptic approaches. The support that they have gained has become concretised in increased shares of the vote, as has been illustrated above in various elections in member states of the EU.

The EU is an active international actor in the international system not only because of its political power, but also because of its values. However, the rise of populism, with the support of strong anti-Muslim and Eurosceptic discourses, have brought about worries in terms of these aforementioned European values and identity. Reaction to the surge in refugees and a consequent ‘turn inwards’ (Kostakopoulou 2016) of the EU in terms of international problems, and the way that the EU has handled the massive flows of refugees, which was referred as clumsy by Federica Mogherini, the EU’s Foreign Policy Chief, have been degrading its effectiveness in the international system (Paterson and Cendrowicz 2015). The then head of the UNHCR and current Secretary General of the United Nations, António Guterres, criticised the rise of anti-immigrant discourses:

As anti-foreigner sentiments escalate in some quarters, it is important to recognize the positive contributions that refugees and migrants make to the societies in which they live and also honour core European values: protecting lives, upholding human rights and promoting tolerance and diversity. (UNHCR 2015)

The way that the EU has gone in terms of handling the issue of refugees has been considered to be a collective weakness (Lehne 2016).

As can be seen in the ways information is perceived in these social contexts, public opinion has been shaped by post-truth political tools which
Islam’s increased visibility in the European public sphere

bring about illusory scenarios of crisis which are encouraged by right-wing political party representatives. This false perception has led EU politics into a general tendency which is characterised by a shift towards right-wing populism. This populist tendency started to gain momentum not only within national politics but also at the level of European politics, since the movement is represented by MEPs in the European Parliament. The rise of populism goes alongside Euroscepticism, and if this rise keeps on, Euroscepticism will strengthen. This would bring about nothing but a real crisis for the EU itself.

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A critical discourse analysis of the media coverage of the migration crisis in Poland

The Polish Catholic Church’s perception of the ‘migration crisis’

JOANNA KROTOFIL and DOMINIKA MOTAK

This paper discusses the Polish Catholic Church’s perception of the recent European migration crisis by examining its discursive practices through the lens of critical discourse analysis. We focus on two of the official communication channels of the Church: the website of the Polish Episcopate Conference (PEC) and the weekly magazine ekai.pl, published by the PEC-owned Catholic Information Agency (CIA). We demonstrate that despite the official appeal of the Polish Episcopate for Christian hospitality, views of bishops participating in the public debate on the migration crisis are not unanimous, but polarised. These internal divisions on the issue parallel the ambivalent stance of the Polish Church on Poland’s place in the European Union. The negative attitude of the majority of Poles to migrants, resulting in the refusal to participate in the European relocation programme, is sanctioned not only by the ruling political party but also by some representatives of religious authorities.

Introduction

This paper focuses on the representations of the recent so-called migration crisis by the Polish Catholic Church and its responses to this situation. We explore the links between religion and socially shaped perceptions and attitudes towards migrants and refugees and we demonstrate that the stance of the Church with regard to the migration crisis is not unanimous. The discursive practices analysed here have a long tradition and draw heavily on historically sanctioned constructions of Polish national identity and the relationship between Poland and the rest of Europe. In our discussion we consider the socio-political and historical contexts in which the representations and responses to the migration crisis are shaped. We argue that the exclusion of migrants is sanctioned by the ruling political party and by some representatives of religious authorities, despite the official appeal of the Church for Christian hospitality.
The number of refugees increased dramatically in 2015, mainly as a result of ongoing and new conflicts in Africa and Asia, with 65.3 million people forcibly displaced due to persecution, conflict, generalised violence, or human rights violations (UNHCR 2016: 2). This situation is constructed and experienced as a ‘crisis’ and it is broadly covered in the media. This ‘crisis’ denotes a time of uncertainty and ‘shifting material, social, political and symbolic ground’ (Holmes and Castañeda 2016: 13). It occupies a central place in international and domestic politics and produces diverse and contradictory discourses and responses. Some argue that the crisis has been exacerbated by the EU leaders’ failure to formulate joint, coherent responses, a ‘lack of political will’ and the shifts in many member states towards increasingly restrictive migration policies and exclusionary rhetoric (Berry et al. 2016: 4).

European leaders unwilling to take a more decisive and coherent approach to the migration crisis are becoming easy prey for nationalist and populist sentiments. The polarisation of views on the crisis among political elites is reflective of, and contributes to, high levels of public anxiety about immigration and asylum across Europe. Results of a recent survey reveal that the vast majority of Poles (74%) are against the settlement of refugees from Muslim countries in Poland (CBOS 2017). A shift towards more negative attitudes towards migrants and refugees in Europe, and in Poland in particular, is apparent.

Although some social actors have greater influence than others, there is no single agent to whom this shift can be attributed. One of the societal sources of power in influencing social perceptions is a privileged access to media and communication (van Dijk 1993: 255). The media however not only shapes the perceptions, knowledge and opinions of its audience but also draws on widespread opinions and collective ‘common sense’, by using arguments that have a long history and have proved to be persuasive for readers and listeners (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 111). Therefore, as Nick Lynn and Susan Lea (2003: 426) argue, ‘making sense of the attitudes that currently prevail requires an awareness and understanding of the wider discursive context within which refugees and those regarded as asylum seekers are situated’. The construction and representation of the so-called migration crisis is culturally and historically specific. There is a growing volume of literature applying a critical approach to the media coverage of migration (Lynn and Lea 2003, KhosraviNik 2010, Teo 2000, van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999), including the current refugee crisis in different national
contexts (Berry et al. 2016, Colombo 2017, Kallius et al. 2016, Goodman et al. 2016, Bertram et al. 2017, Holmes and Castaneda 2016). We aim to add to this body of work by looking at the representation of the refugee crisis in Poland, as it is shaped by the Catholic Church.

The power of the Catholic Church in contemporary Poland is largely enhanced and realised through its access to the media (Ramet 2006, Velikonja 2003, Zuba 2010). The ‘voice of the Church’ in Poland is heard through a number of established, traditional Catholic media, as well as the relatively new internet-based media. Some of the Catholic media in Poland, such as the nationally broadcasted ‘Radio Maryja’ reach large audiences and are capable of gathering listeners into a social interest group with a very strong identity: ‘The family of Radio Maryja’. The supporters of Radio Maryja have been involved in organising religious, social and political actions providing strong support and a platform for the voicing of nationalist, xenophobic and Euro-sceptical views (Filas and Planeta 2009). The status of the radio station as the ‘voice of the Catholic Church in Poland’ is, however, questionable. Although it was funded by Fr Tadeusz Rydzyk of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer and is owned by that religious order, it remains independent from the Polish Church hierarchy. Despite the initiative of the Polish Episcopate to set up a special commission to monitor the actions of Radio Maryja and curb its political involvement, the Episcopate remains divided with regard to Fr Rydzyk’s actions and the station enjoys the strong support of some Polish bishops (Napieralski 2017).

In a previous study we have analysed how migration discourses are shaped and reproduced by large-circulation Catholic weekly magazines. We discussed how the views presented by the two Catholic magazines differ radically, depending on the broader ideological stances of these outlets (Krotofil and Motak 2018). Similar to Radio Maryja, the assertion that these weekly magazines represent the stance of the Catholic Church in Poland is debatable, as they remain independent of the Episcopate. In this paper therefore we will focus on two official communication channels of the Catholic Church: the website of the Polish Episcopate Conference (PEC) and publications produced by the Catholic Information Agency (CIA), owned by the Polish Episcopate. The latter was established in 1993, as an internet-based information agency producing press bulletins and magazines currently accessible through websites, Twitter and Facebook. In our analysis we will focus on the free-access CIA magazine, ekai.pl. The texts published
by the CIA and on the PEC website potentially reach wide audiences, as they are reprinted by different mainstream media outlets and, in the case of sermons or official statements issued by the Episcopate, communicated directly to people attending mass in their parish churches. At the same time we assume that the Church exercises greater institutional control over the content of the PEC website and material produced by the CIA, as compared to the weekly magazines we have analysed in the previous study (Krotofil and Motak 2018).

Data collection and analysis method

The primary data used in this study comprises of statements, notes, reports, sermons and interviews with Polish bishops published on the PEC website and by the internet weekly magazine ekai.pl, published by the CIA. We searched the website and the magazine for texts on migrants, refugees and the migration crisis published between August 2015 and December 2016. All texts containing references to these topics were screened for relevance, retrieved in a full version and entered into a database. All retrieved texts were analysed individually in relation to their function, structure, themes, and rhetorical strategies. The texts were also considered together in order to identify the recurrent themes and discourses and ideological differences within the main themes (see appendix for the table summarising emergent themes and categories). In our analysis we focused on the language choices made by Church authorities and their communicative aims. We have assumed that language is a form of social practice; it is through language that certain practices, ideas, values and identities are constructed and naturalised (Machin and Mayr 2012: 3). Discourse is shaped by situational, institutional and social contexts and at the same time it influences socio-political reality. Social roles, identities, interpersonal reactions and social conditions are constituted through discourse. Some of these are communicated but remain implicit and unjust for certain groups (e.g. migrants, or asylum seekers).

By using critical discourse analysis (CDA) methods we aimed to draw out ‘invisible’ practices related to the migration crisis, to look beneath the level of explicit argumentation into the realm of linguistic practices and reveal their political and ideological bases. We chose this method in order to be able to uncover discursive practices which are reproducing and legitimising social injustice and to demonstrate a continuity between current discourses on migration and past realisations of exclusivist ideologies. From the range
of critical approaches classified as CDA, we applied the principles of the discourse-historical approach (Wodak 2001: 64–94). A discourse-historical approach aims to consider a range of different genres of discourse referring to a particular political issue and to integrate a historical dimension into the analysis (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 91). In the analysis we used the background and contextual knowledge and aimed to embed the analysis in a wider frame of social and political relations. Therefore in our discussion we draw on our primary data, as well as on the previous analysis of religious media coverage of the migration crisis, public speeches of religious authorities and literature describing the broader context of the Polish relationship with the European Union and implications of this relationship in relation to migration and religion.

Poland and migration crisis

The sociohistorical context of the Polish response to the migration crisis is influenced by a number of factors, including well-established discourses of ethnic nationalism and religious homogeneity, a strong association between Polish ethnic and religious identities and a national mythology which positions Poland as the last bastion of Christianity in Europe. There is an inherent paradox in the dominant discourses on the Polish past and present. The image of a multicultural, tolerant Poland of the past is constructed alongside the ‘historically’ sanctioned notion of a country of one religion (Catholicism) and one truly Polish ethnicity. The ethnic and religious ‘homogeneity’ of Poland is however a relatively recent phenomenon which resulted from very violent events and a political process during the post-war period¹ (Zubrzycki 2016). The memory of diversity was suppressed, the notion of an ethno-national and denominational homogeneity was naturalised by the state and the Church and was used to legitimise the privileged position of the Catholic Church.

A strong alliance between Polish national and Catholic identities was reinforced in the post-war period through a discourse of a struggle against alien forces, represented by other religions (Jews), or political

¹ Ethnic Poles comprised 65 per cent of the population of Poland just before the Second World War; by the late 1940s they accounted for about 95 per cent of the People’s Republic. The religious makeup of the population also changed dramatically in the same period (Zubrzycki 2016).
ideologies (communism, liberalism), which were constructed as the enemies of Christianity. In line with this, Poland was called upon to defend Christianity, thus fulfilling the country’s most important destiny and becoming a bastion of Christianity (*antemurale christianitatis*). The Church managed to maintain its monopolistic position as a religious institution, as well as its political influence after the transformation of 1989, but faced a new challenge (Demereth 2000, Velikonja 2003). The collapse of communism opened up the prospect of Polish entry into the European Union. This prospect seemed threatening to Polish bishops who feared secularisation, the undermining of traditional values, an exposure to pluralistic worldviews and a consequent weakening of the religious dimension of national identity (Ramet 2006: 137–43; Szumigalska 2015: 351).

In the construction of Polish identity in relation to the European Union the idea of pluralism has also been vigorously contested by intellectuals and politicians on the right. A populist conservative party, the Law and Justice Party (PiS), as for 2018 holding a majority in the Parliament, has absorbed a big portion of the radical nationalist ideology and cadres in recent years (Pankowski 2012). The party won the majority of seats in the parliamentary elections of October 2015; the victory was marked by a turn towards more socially conservative policies. Among other significant shifts in policy, PiS took a more antagonistic stance towards responses to the refugee crisis proposed by the European Union, compared to the previous centre-right Civic Platform government. In March 2016, the Law and Justice government announced that Poland would not participate in the European relocation programme, or accept any refugees under the scheme. Populist sentiments were evoked to harness public support for this decision. In the speech given during the party convention in June 2016, the leader of Law and Justice, Jaroslaw Kaczyński, stated that Poland is under pressure to ‘create a multicultural society, a new identity’, adding that ‘everyone who knows the situation in Western Europe also knows that this means a deterioration in the quality of life’ (Kaczyński 2016). Some observers argue that the Polish Catholic Church formed a political partnership with the ruling party and has become intertwined with Euroscepticism and the promotion of ‘national values’ (Guerra 2016), which might have significant implications for the Church representation of the ‘migration crisis’.

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2 This national myth was first developed when Polish armies confronted the Ottomans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Porter-Szucs 2011).
The findings presented in this section describe the dominant discourses and related ideological positions taken by Church leaders. We will look at ‘who does what and to whom’ in Church authorities’ narratives, and discuss rhetorical strategies used to construct a particular version of reality: social identities, events and resulting social interactions. The Polish Catholic Church actively participates in the debates on the refugee crisis; the texts published by the CIA and on the PEC website include interviews with bishops, their sermons and statements, reports from Polish Episcopate Conference meetings and official notes. There is a high degree of thematic convergence across these different genres; in our primary data we identified the following main themes: 1) who is coming to Europe; 2) the causes of and current responses to the migration crisis, including mistakes made; 3) the proposed solutions; 4) the responses of the Church in Poland to the crisis; and 5) the future of Europe. Although the themes are convergent, ideological tensions can be identified within the Church. The bishops’ position towards migrants and refugees is ambivalent, marked by internal divisions and lacking coherence. In the following section we discuss each theme in more detail. To exemplify the internal differences within the Church we present extracts from the Statement of the Presidium of the Polish Episcopate Conference on Refugees which arguably reflects the official stance of the Catholic Church in Poland, and excerpts from interviews with, and sermons by, individual members of the PEC.

Who is coming to Europe? The representation of migrants and refugees

Representations of migrants and refugees differ significantly within the Church. The leaders of the Polish Church, including the president of the PEC and the primate of Poland, tend to use the language of compassion and describe migrants and refugees as ‘sufferers’ (CIA 2016a). Those who died tragically while trying to come to Europe are individualised and humanised in bishops’ prayers and sermons when names, dates and circumstances of death are stated (PEC 2016b). Bishops also often evoke the notion of a shared humanity and refer to migrants and refugees coming to Europe as ‘brothers and sisters’ (CIA 2016a, PEC 2016c), as illustrated in a quote from the head of the PEC Council for the Migration, Tourism and Pilgrimage, Bishop Krzysztof Zadarko, who states that ‘… human being coming to us
is a challenge to each Christian, they are a brother and a sister. Even if they are not a Catholic, or a Christian, we have to look at them through these categories’ (PEC 2016c).

A closer look at the language choices reveals, however, a degree of ambivalence in this affirmative statement. The bishop adopts a compassionate stance towards migrants and refugees, but by saying that they should be looked at as brothers and sisters ‘even if they are not Catholic, or Christian’, he constructs the divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and reproduces the discourse of a religious other. This quote illustrates how the implications constructed within discourse, might be direct contradictions of explicit messages. Similar ambivalence in the representation of migrants and refugees is evident in another statement, where the same bishop criticises ‘the protest against migrants, refugees, Islamists and the Islamisation of Europe’ (PEC 2016c). While he explicitly expresses critical views of those who are hostile towards migrants and ‘do not wish to see strangers’ in Poland, by placing the categories of ‘refugee’ and ‘Islamist’ together, he is blurring the boundaries between them.

The conflation of nouns used to represent migrants is apparent also in discourses produced by Church leaders who represent more negative attitudes towards migrants. In an interview with Archbishop Henryk Hoser of Warsaw (Petrowa-Wasilewicz 2015) the terms ‘refugee’, ‘emigrant’, ‘migrant’ and ‘follower of Islam’ are used interchangeably without any attempts to distinguish or define them. The tendency to collapse the terms used to denote people crossing national borders has been widespread in international media and political discourses (Berry et al. 2016: 15) and with time has entered everyday discourses (Goodman et al. 2016). The terminology becomes even more confusing as the ‘lines are increasingly blurred between the categories of “refugee”, “terrorist” and “Muslim”’ (Mavelli and Wilson 2016: 2).

An important aspect in the representation of social actors is the motives which are being attributed to them. The motives of those coming to Europe are scrutinised by the Church leaders. While the bishops say that some of these people have been forced to flee their countries (PEC 2016b), they also foreground an economic motivation by stating that ‘some run away because of war and religious prosecution, others come in search of a better life’ (PEC 2016b).

3 Elsewhere the same bishop explicitly opposes the use of race, language or religion as criteria in deciding who should receive help in another interview (Królak 2015).
Some bishops argue that those coming to take advantage of the social welfare system do so because they live in extreme poverty (Królak 2015), and admit that ‘the issue of accepting refugees and dividing them into economic or war-victims by default is a political matter’ (CIA 2015a). Others take a more antagonistic stance by implying that those coming to Europe have primarily an economic motivation, yet once they reach Europe, they do not want to work, but rely on the social welfare system of the destination country: ‘many emigrants in the West are not willing to work at all, as is the case in Switzerland, where 80–90 per cent are on the dole’ (Petrowa-Wasilewicz 2015). In this quote the bishop uses generalisation and aggregation to create an impression of scientific objectivity; however he does not name the source of the quoted ‘statistics’. Thus people coming to Europe are morally divided into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ migrants (Mavelli and Wilson 2016: 5), the ‘deserving’ refugee and the ‘undeserving’ migrant (Holmes and Castañeda 2016: 13), ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ asylum seekers (Berry et al. 2016: 15).

Polish bishops engage also with the widespread discourses representing migrants as a security threat; some by reproducing and legitimising these discourses, others by contesting them. The head of the PEC Council for the Migration, Tourism and Pilgrimage belongs to the latter group, repeatedly
stating that in relation to migrants and security threats, the media present ‘a distorted picture of reality and shut us away from another human being’ (PEC 2016c). He challenges the basis of the popular rhetoric by asking questions: ‘What does it mean to say Muslims will threaten us? Are we assuming in advance that they will poison or murder us?’ (Królak 2015).

On the other hand, a stark example of the reproduction of a discourse of threat can be found in the interview with Archbishop Hoser. He comments on migrants’ ‘excellent techniques of moving across land and sea’ and mentions ‘a hypothesis’ that the influx of migrants might be seen as ‘a movement controlled by jihadis, who benefit from refugees and put refugees’ money into the accounts of their organisation – for purchase of weapons and continuation of war’ (Petrowa-Wasilewicz 2015). According to this ‘hypothesis’ migrants are being used; they are not themselves jihadis. However, a strong association between migrants and jihadis is being constructed in this assertion. By presenting this view as a hypothesis, the bishop uses a hedging strategy; he hides behind ‘a hypothesis’ and avoids taking responsibility for the statement. Later on in this interview he reinforces the association between migration and security threats by stating that:

As for today’s refugees, 75–80 per cent of them are young men. Television shows women with children, but these pictures are not representative – the self-assured men are approaching Europe, and when they settle here, they will bring their families. But they will also constitute a perfect breeding ground for recruitment of fanatics. And there is no way to control this. (Petrowa-Wasilewicz 2015)

In this statement the bishop uses the discursive strategies of aggregation and generalisation to present refugees as a uniform group, sharing similar characteristics and intentions, consisting predominantly of strong, resourceful and potentially dangerous men. The reference to families in this quote is ambivalent, as on the one hand it evokes the positive image of a family that is very prominent in the broader discourse of the Catholic Church. On the other hand it suggests that the number of people coming to Europe will be infinitely larger than the current estimates, predicting a situation getting out of control.
Causes and responses to the migration crisis

Polish bishops talk about the migration crisis as a challenge for Europe (PEC 2016a, 2016c) and a problem to be solved (PEC 2016d) and engage in the debate on the most appropriate responses to the crisis. They acknowledge that the crisis has provoked some polarisation of views among political elites and laypersons (PEC 2016a). In the statement of the Presidium of the Polish Episcopate Conference, Church leaders point to military conflicts as the main cause of the current crisis (PEC 2015). Exploring further the nature of these conflicts, bishops assert the interference of superpowers and their role in fuelling these conflicts (PEC 2016a, 2016b; Petrowa-Wasilewicz 2015; Królak 2015).

The more conservative leaders make explicit connections between the crisis and the perceived decay of ‘Western civilisation’. In the interview quoted above, Archbishop Hoser links the migration from outside of Europe with low birth rates in European countries. He uses this assertion as a starting point to describe the ‘biological and demographical void’ in Europe which is the consequence of a moral void. In his view Europe is in the grasp of relativism, nihilism, neo-Marxism, atheism and subjectivism. It has lost its soul and identity, rejected its Christian roots and negated human nature (Petrowa-Wasilewicz 2015). In line with this perception of European elites, Hoser criticises current responses to the migration crisis in other European countries and advocates the selection of migrants to be allowed into Europe on the basis of confessional criteria:

In Sweden, in refugee camps, they do not separate Christians from Muslims, although they [Muslims] torment the followers of Jesus. In the name of the principle that nobody should be segregated on the basis of confession. Pure ideology and ignorance of the reality. (Petrowa-Wasilewicz 2015)

The bishop reinforces the notion of a religious other with a very strong, one-sided valuation; the religious other is the perpetrator who ‘torments’ Christians for no apparent reason. Discourses of the ‘bad’ refugee and the ‘good’ refugee intersect with religious discourses and a hierarchy of worthiness is constructed with potentially fatal consequences. In this process religion, and religious otherness in particular, plays an increasingly important role (Mavelli and Wilson 2017: 3).
Concerns expressing great degree of pessimism and anxiety can be seen as a response to the processes in which centres where meaning and values are negotiated have become exterritorial, and disconnected from the local. The leaders of the European Union symbolise the centre where the problems related to the migration crisis are assessed and solutions proposed with a degree of disregard to individual state members and their local problems. As such they are represented as hostile, immoral and anti-Christian. Spatial segregation, separation, exclusion and fundamentalist tendencies are imminent aspects of this experience (Bauman 1998), readily embraced by those who advocate against allowing migrants to settle in Poland. More moderate representatives of the Church see an opportunity to learn from past experiences in Western Europe where migration is not a new phenomenon (Królak 2015). They also cast some doubt on the European Union’s integrity and capability to find solutions, but highlight that by crossing religious boundaries Christians earn the esteem of those receiving their help and promote a favourable image of Christianity among Muslims (Królak 2015).

Proposed solutions to the ‘problem’

According to the Statement of the Presidium of the Polish Episcopate Conference on Refugees (PEC 2015) all Christians are ‘called upon to help’ those in need and demonstrate Christian hospitality. In the same document however the bishops use discursive tools to distance themselves and Polish Catholics from migrants and refugees. In the bishops’ view, the most appropriate way to help refugees is to help them ‘where they are’. The organisation delegated to represent Polish Catholics in humanitarian aid efforts in the conflict zones is Pomoc Kościolowi w Potrzebie – ‘Aid to the Church in Need’ (PEC 2015). Catholics are encouraged to remember refugees in their prayers. Nevertheless, bishops stress that ‘our prayer should be accompanied by active involvement’ and go on to describe this involvement as ‘an effort to extinguish conflicts which force people to save themselves by running away from their country’ (PEC 2015). This assertion accomplishes the complex ideological task of absolving laypersons from responsibility. It allows readers to come to the simple conclusion that there is not much they can do about international conflicts. Financial donations are also mentioned as a way of helping, but any spontaneous grassroots activities are implicitly discouraged by the assertion that a single organisation (Caritas) should be responsible for
overseeing any actions and any help initiatives should be centrally controlled ‘to avoid mistakes’.

The document structure highlights the tension between an evangelical duty to help those in need and the concerns that come with accepting responsibility for active engagement. The issue of inviting migrants and refugees to come to live in Poland is addressed only indirectly by pointing out that the state and its secular institutions should be responsible for organising help. The bishops claim that the state and Polish government are the stakeholders who invite migrants and as such have to guarantee security, and the material means to support refugees. In other documents Polish bishops address the issue of inviting refugees to settle in Poland in a more direct way. Church leaders attempt to embrace the Pope’s appeal for each parish to welcome a refugee family and explicitly state that ‘we must not put up fences’ (PEC 2016b). Some bishops believe that Polish parishes are able to respond to this challenge (Królak 2015) and advocate a balanced strategy, as expressed by the president of the PEC: ‘We need to prepare an action plan; we cannot say that we will accept everyone, nor that we will throw everyone out’ (PEC 2016b).

From a critical-discourse-analysis point of view it could however be argued that the action to be taken is represented in the abstract: the bishop does not elaborate on the action plan, and does not propose any tangible solutions to the immediate problem. Where processes are replaced by generalisations and abstractions, some ideological goals are achieved (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999), and in this example the Church appears to be committed to welcoming refugees, but no details are given on what it actually does in that respect. A more practical approach to this issue is apparent in the interview with Bishop Zadarko, who tries to reassure people that Poland is capable of accepting refugees and has past experiences to build upon. He discusses the practicalities of the process and foresees that refugees will go to refugee camps first, as their arrival will be regulated by law. There will be an adjustment period; refugees will be educated and prepared to start a new life in Poland. The bishops believe that practical issues can be resolved by parishes cooperating with local government (Królak 2015). In contrast, some Church leaders openly state that they see no solutions to the migration crisis (Petrowa-Wasilewicz 2015). Archbishop Hoser implies that accepting refugees in Polish parishes is not feasible due to practical problems and asks ‘what are the parishes supposed to do with a family that
does not know the language, doesn't have work, financial means?’ (Petrowa-
Wasilewicz 2015). He also evokes the populist agenda to ‘help our own’ first, 
by pointing out that Caritas in Poland is struggling to help all hungry Poles.
To reinforce the notion that welcoming migrants into local parishes is a bad 
idea, he gives an example of a Syrian family who ‘rejected’ the hospitality 
offered by one of the parishes: ‘They had everything, but they ran away at 
night, because they had better earnings prospects in Germany. They were 
offered a gift which they did not want to receive.’ Although he does not 
support the idea of welcoming refugees in parishes, he adds that it would be 
more rational to accept Christian refugees, reproducing again the discourse 
of the religious other.

These examples demonstrate how the Church is divided with respect 
to welcoming migrants and refugees from outside of Europe. Individual 
bishops voice diametrically different views. Collectively Church authorities 
present the Church as active in supporting migrants and refugees coming to 
Europe, but distance themselves from this idea by glossing over the practical 
steps that need to be taken.

Refugees in Poland: how the Church in Poland responds to the crisis

In the context of the migration crisis, Church leaders highlight the role 
of the Church in awakening people’s consciences (PEC 2016b) and shap-
ing people’s hearts (PEC 2016a). They articulate their goal as an effort to 
change perceptions and open people up towards migrants (CIA 2015b). In 
the bishops’ views the attitudes Polish Catholics display towards migrants 
and refugees are of great importance, a matter of identity (PEC 2016a). In 
line with this assertion, the initiatives of the Catholic Church in Poland in 
response to the refugee crisis are described in number of documents released 
by the CIA. According to a report published in 2016 (Przeciszewski 2016), 
the Catholic Church in Poland prays for refugees, and offers various forms 
of direct, practical support. The Church has been helping refugees for many 
years, mainly through the Polish branch of Caritas (Caritas Polska). This 
organisation coordinates money collections, and sends money and parcels 
to the regions of conflict (e.g. Syria), and neighbouring countries, where 
large numbers of refugees are staying (e.g. Lebanon). Caritas also main-
tains help centres for migrants and refugees in Poland and declares that 
it is ready to welcome refugees should Poland open its borders to refugees 
from Africa and the Middle East. The document also describes the initiative
'To die of hope: prayer vigil for those who died during their journey to Europe'. A poster published by Caritas Polska and distributed in parishes organizing prayers for refugees and reproduced in Catholic media, including the PEC website.
called ‘family for the family’, organised by Caritas, where Polish families, groups or organisations declare that they will be helping and supporting a particular refugee family in Aleppo or Lebanon, or a Lebanese family stricken by poverty.

Other forms of help listed in the report include actions of the Polish branch of Aid to the Church in Need, focused mainly on helping Christians in the Middle East. The report describes the efforts of PEC to establish cooperation with the Polish government and mentions dioceses which have declared their readiness to welcome refugee families. Figures are quoted foregrounding the large sums of money donated by the Church to support these initiatives and detailing the number of people who have benefited from them. By constructing the image of the Church as heavily involved and active in helping refugees, and accountable for its actions, the report addresses some of the critical voices accusing the Church in Poland of a passive and evasive attitude and diverging from the stance of the universal Church. The report concludes that ‘Pope Francis and the president of the PEC, Archbishop Stanislaw Gądecki, speak with one voice with regards to refugees’ (Przeciszewski 2016).

The positive image of the Catholic Church in Poland is extended to lay Catholics. Some of the bishops defend those who express fear and mistrust of refugees (CIA 2016b), present it as a consequence of a negative portrayal of migrants and refugees being spread by the media and a lack of direct contacts with Muslims (Królak 2015). For example, the statement by Bishop Zadarko, the head of the PEC Council for Migration, Tourism and Pilgrimage, highlights the potential for change towards more positive attitudes and expresses a degree of optimism with regards to interactions between refugees coming to Poland and the host society:

First of all, we have to realise that the both sides – that is, the receiving one, as well as they who are to be received – have to accept one very important thing: that we have to get to know each other, to accept our culture, our identity, our legislation, also to learn the language. Because these are the main barriers, these are the places, where immigrants come across difficulties and then inevitably close themselves and create ghettos. (PEC 2016d)
In this statement, Bishop Zadarko goes beyond describing how much Poles are helping in the areas of conflict, or in other locations outside of Poland and asserts that they are also capable of becoming hosts, accepting newcomers into their country, and open to learning about different cultures and customs. In this way the bishop protects and reinforces the positive identity of his own group. Simultaneously he sets boundaries of hospitality, requiring the same levels of openness and willingness to learn new ways of life from the newcomers.

What the future holds

From the point of view of Church leaders, the construction of the migration crisis as a challenge is not based on secularist assumptions. It is not a question of how to integrate Muslim refugees into laicised societies, but a question of how to tolerate Muslim migrants in a Europe which has been, and should remain, Christian. While some bishops remain relatively optimistic about the future, others are forecasting major disaster as a consequence of mass migration.

Liberal circles in the Church ascribe to a relatively optimistic vision of the future. The head of the PEC Council for Migration, Tourism and Pilgrimage in the interview quoted earlier admits that ‘the situation is dynamic’ and ‘nobody can say anything for certain’ (Królak 2015). Given these caveats however he challenges the widespread notion of a huge wave of refugees rapidly coming into Poland and its overwhelming consequences. In his opinion the process will be well organised and controlled, with safety measures in place. He believes that with a degree of goodwill creative solutions can be found and that there is no reason to panic: ‘nowadays we are not dealing with any kind of military conquest, or pre-planned strategy that would lead armed Islamists to exterminate the population of Europe. These [beliefs] are emotionally laden shortcuts and oversimplifications’ (Królak 2015). Here he is making reference to the rhetoric used by far-right nationalists based on comparisons between current migration and the Ottoman expansion into Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He asserts that Christianity can co-exist peacefully with Islam and engages in polemics with the populist opinions that migrants coming to Poland from outside of Europe pose a threat. He opposes the views of those who are concerned with ghettoization and suggests that this can be avoided (PEC 2016d).
By contrast, Archbishop Hoser precludes the possibility of European societies being religiously diverse. In his view the religious other appearing at the gates of Europe signifies the imminent ‘clash of civilisations’ (see Huntington 1993: 22–49). He states that ‘if the Europeans do not return to the Christian identity, they will not solve the problem of emigrants storming their continent’. Hoser presents the ‘migration problem’ as an apocalyptic ‘sign of the times’ and a virtually deadly threat to Europe undergoing cultural ‘mutation’ by the negation of its Christian identity. In his view, Europe is abandoning its ‘metaphysical foundations’ and, consequently, is moving towards the brink of extinction. The bishop sees no human means of ‘overcoming that impasse’ and foresees a Europe in ‘ashes and rubble’. By means of references to damaged foundations, ashes and rubble, the Bishop evokes fear and moral panic. He reinforces this apocalyptic vision by stating that he ‘fears an outbreak of the third world war’. The bishop constructs Europe's future and present as a very precarious state of affairs where biological, political and spiritual continuity is at stake. His apocalyptic vision of the future and the notion of crisis represent an ideological continuity. The ‘crisis’ implies a rare event challenging the existing order (Goodman et al. 2016: 105), what comes next, according to his narrative, is constructed as a disaster.

Conclusion

The media constitutes a major source of prejudicial views among people who do not have personal experience with regard to particular groups (van Dijk 1987). For that reason the Catholic Church in Poland with its privileged access to media and ability to articulate opinions and shape the views of society and political parties has a particularly important role to play. Local faith communities can ‘keep alive the imagination of an alternative future for forced migrants and our response to their circumstances’ (Ager and Ager 2017: 51), and use cultural capital to influence political processes in relation to the crisis. Their role is, however, shaped by the particular socio-cultural and political context in which they operate. In Poland, the long history of a dominance of the Catholic Church and widespread, historically-sanctioned ideologies of Polish national identity, as well as concerns about the nation’s place in Europe influence the Church leaders’ discourses on the migration crisis.

In this paper, we have analysed the official stance of the Polish Catholic Church towards the migration crisis. The leaders of the Church actively
participate in the debate on the crisis through the media channels that they control, but their views are not unanimous. The key document published by the Catholic Church in Poland on the issue of the migration crisis is the Statement of the Presidium of the Polish Episcopate Conference on Refugees (PEC 2015). While this statement presents a relatively moderate stance, the views of individual bishops are much more polarised, as is evident in their interviews, statements and sermons. We demonstrated that discursive practices and underlying ideologies evade simple classifications along the lines of positive vs. negative stances towards migrants and refugees. Even the most eager supporters and advocates of the displaced people at times reproduce the othering discourses, whereas those who seem to be very hostile towards migrants and refugees occasionally take a more moderate stance. There is a consensus that Europe is facing a crisis challenging the existing order, but different discursive practices within the Church either emphasise or alleviate the moral panic. The bishops protect the image of the Catholic Church as holding the values of Christian compassion and hospitality at its core, but at the same time fear for its privileged position in Christian Europe and in Catholic Poland in particular.

The discursive practices observed in the face of the migration crisis bear many similarities to discourses on European integration and Poland’s place in the European Union. In 2004 Poland, along with nine other states, became a member of the European Union. The changes in its economy and politics, as well as its cultural norms and values, that started with the political transformation of 1989 have been stimulated and become more rapid and drastic following the accession. The expansion of the European Union and work on the European constitution has posed questions regarding European identity and the role of religion in the formation of that identity. One of the prominent themes debated in Poland in the pre-accession period was that of ‘Catholic Poland integrating into secular Europe’ and the potential implications of that process (Szumigalska 2015, Guerra 2012; Ramet 2006). For the Church leaders European integration was associated with the potential risk of laicization and dismantling of tradition (Zuba 2006). However, some bishops ‘accepted enthusiastically the papal apostolic assignment’ and agreed that the mission of Poland is ‘to restore Europe to Christianity’ (Casanova 2003). The attitudes of Church officials have evolved over time and became more pro-European at the turn of the century. Nevertheless, the Church has remained internally divided on the issue (Szumigalska 2015: 344). The
reaffirmation of national identity and the revival of the ‘place’ became prominent in Polish debates during the process of EU accession and recently gained further momentum at the beginning of the current migration crisis. It seems that, faced with the migration crisis, the Church leaders identify similar risks and challenges for Polish Catholics, and remain similarly divided with regards to the potential consequences of the changing socio-political reality.

The ambivalence of the Catholic Church in Poland and internal divisions with regard to the migration crisis have significant potential implications. As Luca Mavelli and Erin Wilson (2017: 15) notice, ‘the moral resources available in different religious traditions and communities may be harnessed – and indeed, are already being deployed – not only to challenge the egoism of a state-centric neo-liberal world, but also to promote a vision of solidarity beyond the limits of secularism.’ Poland continues to refuse to participate in the relocation programme and none of the broader migration ‘challenges’ discussed in this paper have been solved. It remains to be seen if the Church in Poland will speak in truly one voice and mobilise its symbolic capital to challenge the existing power relations and government policies, and advocate for the displaced, or will become one of the major forces reinforcing the status quo.

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Reconsidering the modern nation state in the Anthropocene
A Muslim’s perspective

WARDAH ALKATIRI

This article presents the nature of conflicts in postcolonial societies as the consequence of being under external control and economic exploitation. Drawing on empirical cases from Indonesia and a comparative literature review of African states, this article reveals a huge dilemma within the desire to build a solid nation state in a deeply pluralistic society. The nature of the modern nation state, which from the start requires the forcible subjugation of the population, has become one of the greatest paradoxes. That is to say, the very idea of unity for the pursuance of equity contradicts the premise of democracy, because forcing unity onto diversity implies denouncing differences and thus violating universal individual rights to be different. On that account, Indonesia’s struggle with diversity has falsified Huntington’s thesis, according to which cultural differences necessarily tend to lead to conflict. On the contrary, Indonesia demonstrates that conflicts have stemmed from nationalism and political-economic ideologies rather than cultural differences. This article highlights two issues of global relevance. Firstly, the inherent problems of coexistence that arise from the legacy of the Christian missionary tradition advocating the separation of the state and religion in the colonies, whereas Islam is a religion of politics and of law. Secondly, the concept of al-din is hardly compatible with the Western concept of religion. In contemporary globalization, the modern nation state and nationalism are increasingly contrasted with the ‘cosmic’ nature of religion, which claims allegiances transcending differences of race and nationality. On the bright side, a case study of a Muslim ‘intentional community’ offers a pragmatic solution whereby an implementation of Islamic jurisprudence as a response to ecological issues by an individual Muslim group is doable within the constraints of a nation state. Thus the thesis moves beyond the rigidity of state system and promotes a ‘people to people’ approach.

Introduction

What I am presenting in this article is a serendipitous finding within my doctoral research (Alkatiri 2016). It was an interdisciplinary work on environmental studies and development studies with a close examination of nationalism and post-colonial issues alongside ethnic and religious conflicts, globalization issues and Islamic movements in Indonesian society. Broadly, my thesis contends with the problem of sustainability and environmental degradation against two main challenges. On the one hand is the
Reconsidering the modern nation state in the Anthropocene

economic-growth paradigm and the concomitant consumption levels of the consumer-capitalist societies which have now become a global phenomenon, including in developing countries like Indonesia. On the other hand there are the poverty and development projects taking place in underdeveloped and developing countries. Both imply an exploitation of natural resources. Historicizing the social construction of insensitive attitudes towards the environment among either policy or opinion makers required me to look into the education system and an investigation of the symbolic function of nationalism as a source of ideas and meaning.

Nationalism can be a powerful force for good. It evidently underpinned a vibrant movement for independence from colonial rule. It was also used as instrument for social and political control in attempts to unify all of a nation’s potential towards development programmes. However, an education imbued with nationalism and developmentalism may have become the main culprit in cultivating sustainability ‘illiteracy’. All nations are exclusive projects with respect to who they are not, so cultivating a desire for competition in progress and economic growth\(^1\) hinders students’ self-reflection and the conscience needed to comprehend sustainability in the context of a finite earth. It inhibits the ‘whole-earth, one-world family’ vision and the spirit of global cooperation which is needed to tackle the ecological crises which have reached a global scale. Moreover, the combined power of nationalism, science, technology, economic growth and modernization may well be the case that has overshadowed traditional connections to nature which are to be found in the religions. With a pragmatic research paradigm that aims to seek solutions, I was inspired by the networks of local sustainable community in the ‘relocalisation’\(^2\) literature, namely the Global Ecovillage Network

\(^1\) Under the capitalist-development paradigm, education induces acquisitive materialism and carries the promise of material happiness that entails lust and a sense of greed which results in ever greater demands upon the environment. For more, see Orr 1991 and Trainer 2012.

\(^2\) ‘Relocalisation’ aims to reweave the fabric of communities, rebuilding them into sustainable, largely self-sufficient communities, and establishing local self-governance. As the effects of economic policies that ignore the needs of people and the planet become blindingly obvious, in post-industrial societies there are groups of people trying to create what they believe would be a sustainable and just society. They often aim to achieve this by turning to the local economy, putting the means of production under social control (instead of market forces and profit), and instituting self-governance. These movements try to create room for social, ecological and spiritual values (Norberg 2002, Dawson 2006).
and the Transition Network (2017), and I turned my research focus to an investigation of the potential of Muslim groups and their learning communities to advance similar movements grounded in ‘Islamic environmentalism’, discussed by Richard Foltz et al. (2003), Seyyed Hossein Nasr (1996), Tony Watling (2009), David Johnston (2010), and others. By doing so, the research was pragmatically looking for an alternative model for an environmental movement that potentially has more chance of being heeded by a wider reach of the population in Muslim-majority countries like Indonesia, and has the potential to be networked globally as well, given that ‘religions are the largest NGOs (non-governmental organizations) in the world’ (Grim and Tucker 2014).

Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim population. Despite being a majority in quantity, it is worth highlighting that Muslims in Indonesia have been marginalized in terms of political access and economic prosperity. This predicament has historic roots. The Dutch colonial government did not deliver widespread educational opportunities to others besides classes of indigenous peoples loyal to it (Ricklefs et al. 2010, Pringle 2010). Ewout Frankema (2014: 2) argues that this inequality was a consequence of the Dutch metropolitan commitment to secular rule in an overwhelmingly
Islamic society. Consequently, following independence, when the development programme began, the majority of Muslims were ‘uneducated’ in the modern sense of the term and therefore, unable to supply manpower to meet the demand for ‘qualified’ human resources to participate. Henceforth, the political and economic arena was dominated by actors who came from secular-nationalist, Christian and socialist backgrounds. They were even holding important positions within the circles of Suharto’s New Order elites, and hence the Muslim circles came to the conclusion that the government had been hijacked by anti-Muslim alliances of Chinese, Catholics, former socialists, and armed officers. This situation led to a psychology of ‘defeat’, where, as a majority, they had to face the reality that in fact they were weak in power. They were a majority in numbers, but a minority in quality. Hence, the Muslim majority turned out to be a minority in mentality (Hasbullah 2002), as implied by Adam Schwarz (1997: 129): ‘Muslim leaders often sound and act like members of a persecuted minority’, which is clearly an anomaly. Despite these facts, my research finding reveals the present-day largest homegrown Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, has rejected the idea of an Islamic environmental movement with a ‘relocalisation’ approach, as mentioned above, due to especially, the notion of self-governance which might have appeared to the top-level leadership of the organization, which engages closely with the Indonesian central government, to be inciting secession and promoting an antithesis to the ideal of the unity of the NKRI (the Negara Kesatuan Republic of Indonesia) nation state. Indeed, an investigation of the potential of Muslim groups to advance ‘relocalisation’ must be confronted with the reality of religious conflicts that have nowadays become more frequent. The most recent one erupted with the nomination of a Chinese and Christian governor candidate for the capital, Jakarta.3

Many have written on the rise of conflicts motivated by religion and ethnicity in all quarters of the globe. Amy Chua (2004) shows that it is free-market democracy that has triggered ethnic violence in Southeast Asia, the former Yugoslavia, Latin America, South Africa, East Africa, West Africa and post-communist Russia. Apart from political-economic issues, my investigation of Indonesia’s national history has uncovered a ‘social construction of intolerance’ alongside firstly, a ‘violent’ passion for nationalism,
and secondly, a ‘violent’ passion for the separation of religion and politics. In fact, this recalls Max Weber’s classic definition of the modern state:

The modern state is a compulsory association which organizes domination. It has been successful in seeking to monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a territory. (Weber 1921: 5)

It also recalls Karen Armstrong’s *Fields of Blood* (2014) in which she reminds us not to point our fingers only at religion and fail to remember the nationalistic motives underlying violence in Europe and older civilizations. The explanation for this follows.

There have been ongoing debates in the last few decades that the experience of modernity has not been the same for the West as for the rest of the world. For colonized societies, modernity – which was once a largely descriptive account of the social and cognitive transformations that first occurred in the West – came to be regarded as a largely ‘normative account’ (Featherstone 1991: 6), hence, the imperative of colonized societies to follow modernization at the expense of the conditions in local contexts. This article shows further that neither does the experience of Western democracy apply similarly in the multi-ethnic colonized societies as in the West. It isn’t until we arrive at post-modernity that such a critique of modern ideas is possible.

Postmodernism runs counter to modernism, which adheres to a realist doctrine. While modernism is characterized by an acceptance that general laws and truths may be attained by way of reason, science, and technology, and thus progress is possible, postmodernism in many ways opposes such ideas. Postmodernism only accepts the relative as a meaningful category, banning the very category of truth from intellectual discourse, and thus, it rejects the idea of progress itself in favour of local, unique, personal, contextualized ‘truths’. From that perspective, the rise of conflicts in multi-ethnic societies in post-colonial countries substantiates the inadequacy of the modern nation-state model and nation building as a means to achieve equality and social justice. This article presents African states and Indonesia as cases in point.
Desperately seeking unity

Despite the heavy centralization of nation-building processes that the African states have undertaken, Solomon Dersso (2012) writes elaborately on how ethnically-based claims for substantive equality, justice, and equitable political inclusion and socio-economic order continue to result in communal rivalries in Africa. In his analysis, Dersso examines the nature of the basic structure of the post-colonial African states as it was inherited from the colonial states. He seeks to explain why most African states have failed to gain the approval of members of all the constituent ethno-cultural groups. He further examines why the nation-building process has engendered conflicts, instead of serving as a basis for social co-operation and national integration. A correspondence between the experiences of the African states and that of Indonesia is presented in the rest of the article with the following summary in a nutshell:

1) Ethno-cultural diversity in Africa is comparable to religious diversity in Indonesia.

2) The issue of ‘tribal remains’ of the primitive past as the main targets of nation-building projects in Africa is comparable to Islam being the main target of the nation-building project in Indonesia through secularization of the religion.

Furthermore, alongside Dersso (2012) in Africa, Hikmat (2014) presents historical records of the Indonesian government’s policies on religion and culture which are used to explain the epistemological background of the social construction of ‘intolerance’ in the society at large. Thus, while in Africa ‘the separation of state and ethnicity’ as Will Kymlicka (1995: 4) puts it, ‘precludes any legal or governmental recognition of ethnic groups or any use of ethnic criteria in the distribution of rights, resources, and duties’ (Dersso 2012: 82), this article highlights the historical events of suppression of political Islam in Indonesia, in favour of ‘the separation of the state and the church’ as a Christian missionary’s tradition (Barnett 2011, Armstrong 2014b).
The legacy of the missionaries

Secularism as a notion denoting the separation of religion and the state emerged in pre-colonial and pre-capitalist Europe as a protest movement for individual freedom against a theocratic state. However, as capitalism and trade progressively expanded, it was largely the bourgeoisie and merchant capitalists who championed secularism and henceforth, secularism evolved to be primarily an offshoot of market morality:

It was premised on the necessity of individual freedom required for manoeuvre in the market, that would not be hampered by one’s religion, nor would religion obstruct the functioning of the market (Roy 2006: 158).

What is interesting is that secularism in the European colonies was propagated by the Christian missionary to inculcate loyalty to colonial administrations in the local populations (Barnett 2011). Colonialism was central to the spread of Christianity; ‘the native populations were defined by what they lacked – beginning with Jesus Christ and continuing through a long list of items that they associated with the civilized, Christian West’ such as hygiene, self-control and discipline, chastity, sobriety, and hard work, which were viewed as essential for a Christian character’ (Barnett 2011: 67). Colonial administrators and foreign trades found such missionary projects highly desirable, because if successful, the local populations would become more compliant, easier to control, and develop tastes and values that were consistent with the interests of the West. To the missionaries, colonial power makes possible a Christian world order by providing unprecedented opportunities for spreading ‘the word’. Hence, colonialism was good for Christianity, and Christianity was good for colonialism. Consequently, various rules were set up to avoid conflict and to teach the local populations to respect colonial administrations. Following the maxim of ‘rendering unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s’ (Matthew 22:21), the missionaries attempted to maintain a line between themselves and politics: ‘Matters of governance were the domain of the state, matters of religion were the domain of the church, and both the government and the church needed to recognize each other’s sphere of authority’ (Barnett 2011: 72).
Against that background of a ‘missionaries–colonial government’ alliance, my article offers a sociological explanation for the rising tensions between Indonesian Muslim and Christian groups in present-day Indonesia. From that vantage point, a thesis of Indonesian religious conflicts can be suggested in contrast to the received wisdom. Instead of religion being the main obstacle to the attainment of a peaceful society, it is the concept of the modern nation state and its state-centric nation-building process that should be held responsible for the development of intolerant attitudes in society.

The imperative of nation building

One of the most arduous tasks that post-colonial states were faced with at the time of independence was how to address the demands of their diverse communities who were incorporated – often by force – into large nation states under arbitrarily contrived colonial boundaries and structures (Bodley 1990, S. V. R. Nasr 2001, Ricklefs et al. 2010, Pringle 2010, Dersso 2012). As for Indonesia, when independence was finally achieved, the people were not sure who they were – whether they belonged to their regional (Southeast Asian), or ethnic, or religious, or ideological identities. It was pretty much the same with the Africans, as Dersso explains:

What made this problem particularly formidable is that almost all African states, as the product of the colonial process and its system of divide and rule, lack national cohesion. Not only did their populations lack any shared consciousness of belonging to one country, but they were also ethno-culturally divided and socio-economically and politically unequal. The fragility of the post-colonial states was further compounded by the weak institutional foundation and capacity of the independent governments (Rothchild & Olorunsola 1983), a situation exacerbated by extremely underdeveloped and fragmented economies (Nwabueze 1973). (Dersso 2012: 61–2)

Given that, nation building became the most plausible top priority on the agenda of the post-colonial states. Dersso (2012: 62) notes that the independent governments had two options. The first was based on the dominant model of the nation state that had been popular at that time. The other was what may be referred to as a ‘multicultural model’ of nation building exemplified by Switzerland and India. However, given the following
conditions and arguments concerning Africa (ibid. 65), the wholesale adoption of the dominant model of nation state was chosen by all African states:

1) There was deep ethno-cultural division in the population.
2) There was a lack of shared political history among diverse ethnicities.
3) It was widely held at that time that African ethnicity, dubbed as tribalism, was an impediment to modernization and national unity.

Against that background, African post-colonial states undertook the ‘assimilationist’ and ‘integrationist’ approach of state-centered nation-building processes. For the particular context of Africa – which I argue to be comparable with Indonesia – the following political paradigms were dominant in the newly-born states.

Firstly, the possession of a single, homogenous, national identity was seen as a condition necessary to the generation of the ‘sense of common purpose’ required for democratic government. Dersso notes further:

For influential 19th-century liberals such as John Stuart Mill, a democratic system of government is possible only where the people of a country share a common sense of nationhood. Mill put it thus: ‘Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist’. According to him, therefore, it is ‘a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of nationalities’. (Dersso 2012: 63)

Along this line, the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who strongly influenced the French Revolution and whose ideas have been powerful forces in the creation of nationalism within and outside Europe, expounded a more powerful argument on the need for homogeneity. It is believed that homogeneity is a necessary condition for popular sovereignty, or the ‘general will’, which is the basis for the legitimacy of the modern nation state. According to Rousseau, it will be difficult to form a ‘general will’ in a society where ‘factions arise and partial associations are formed’. Thus, he saw the cohesion and homogeneity of citizens as a necessary condition
for the formation of the ‘general will’ as an expression of popular sovereignty. He puts it thus:

The more concert reigns in the assemblies, that is, the nearer opinion approaches unanimity, the greater is the dominance of the general will. On the other hand, long debates, dissensions and tumult proclaim the ascendancy of particular interests and the decline of the State. (Rousseau 1762: 83)

Rousseau even went as far as saying that a state needs a ‘religion’. That is, ‘the religion of the citizen’, which is:

codified in a single country, gives it its gods, its own tutelary patrons; it has its dogmas, its rites, and its external cult prescribed by law; outside the single nation that follows it, all the world is in its sight infidel, foreign and barbarous; the duties and rights of man extend for it only as far as its own altars. … [M]aking country the object of the citizens’ adoration, teaches them that service done to the State is service done to its tutelary god. … To die for one’s country then becomes martyrdom; violation of its laws, impiety; and to subject one who is guilty to public execration is to condemn him to the anger of the gods: Sacer est od. (Rousseau 1762: 107)

Dersso comments that Rousseau’s paradigm favours not only a majoritarian system of government but insists on the necessity for a state of achieving socio-cultural and linguistic homogeneity. In France, it offered the philosophical basis for the pursuance of a homogenizing nation-building process that turned peasants and distinct communities in the country into ‘French men and women’ (Dersso 2012: 64), but apparently, in post-colonial states it did not work that well.

Secondly, for the unity and political stability of a modern constitutional state, the possession of a commonly ‘shared identity’ by a state and its nationals was seen to be necessary. Thus a ‘nation’ was needed as the basis of the state. This is because, as Ernest Barker argued:

There must be a general social cohesion which serves, as it were, as a matrix, before the seal of legal association can be effectively imposed on a population. If the seal of the State is stamped on a population
which is not held together in the matrix of a common tradition and sentiment, there is likely to be a cracking and splitting, as there was in Austria-Hungary. (Barker 1951: 42)

Thirdly, the nation state serves the functional requirement of the modern society. Gellner (1983) argues that the modern state requires a culturally homogenous society for its effective running, given that members of society must conduct transactions with each other, run the bureaucracy, operate the same court system and the like. Consequently, it necessitates a standardized language and common cultural attributes and historical symbols which are shared by all the people. Thus, Taylor (1998) noted further, that the constitutional state must enforce a kind of homogeneity of language and culture through the education system as well as media.

With the above-mentioned rationales, the nation-state model appeared to be the only legitimate form of political organization, and henceforth, in nearly all post-colonial African states:
1) National unity was pursued through homogenization. National unity in terms of homogeneity and unity was praised highly, whereas an ethno-cultural diversity was seen as a weakness and antithetical to the process of nation building.

2) Heavy centralization and restrictions of political and ethno-cultural pluralism were prevalent. The constitutions, laws and development policies of these states have all been used as instruments in a highly centralized, unitarist and homogenizing nation-building process. The former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed: ‘too often, the necessity of building national unity was pursued through the heavy centralization of political and economic power and the suppression of political pluralism’ (Annan 1998).

These paradigms were fully appropriated by the African elites. Francis Deng notes:

After independence Africans were eager to disavow tribalism as divisive. Unity was postulated in a way that assumed a mythical homogeneity amidst diversity. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana outlawed parties organized on tribal or ethnic bases. Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire coopted ethnic groups through shrewd distribution of ministerial posts, civil service jobs, social services, and development projects. Julius Nyerere, a scion of tribal chieftaincy, stamped out tribalism by fostering nationalistic pride in Tanganyika and later, Tanzania, born out of the union with Zanzibar. Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya forged a delicate alliance of ethnic groups behind the dominance of his Kenyan African National Union party. (Deng 1997: 28–9)

In comparison, the following section highlights a similar nation-building process in Indonesia.

Separating the state and religion

From the sixteenth century onwards, the history of Southeast Asia has been marked by colonial aggression and exploitation carried out by almost all the great imperial powers (United Kingdom, France, Holland, Portugal, Spain and the USA). Indonesia was a Dutch colony. It was formed from the
nationalized colony of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC), which came under the administration of the Dutch government in 1800. Most Indonesians believe that they were under the Dutch for nearly 350 years with the arrival of the VOC in 1609 as its starting point. The archipelago was one of the most valuable European colonies and contributed to the Dutch’s prominence in spice and cash crops trades. Even if some would disagree with the association of the Christian missionary activities as part and parcel of Western colonialism, historically it is true that much of Christian missionary activity happened during the heyday of the colonial enterprise (Evers 2014). To deal with the plurality of the populations in the archipelago, a politics of segregation was imposed. Hikmat Budiman (2014) highlights the historical events in pre-independence Indonesia which I argue have contributed to the social construction of intolerance by engendering vigilance against difference.

The colonial government divided the population into groups that were strictly monitored and was extremely discriminatory. The Dutch colonial law known as the Algemene Baplingen van Wetgeving (General Regulation on Legislature Principles) divided the population of the East Indies into two categories based on religious orientations, namely, Europeans who embraced Christianity; and natives, for that of all non-Europeans. In 1885, the colonial government divided the population, not based on religion but on race, into three groups: European, In-lander, and Foreign Orientals (Indian, Arab, Chinese). Perhaps at the missionaries’ request, the colonial power in general (Barnett 2011), and the Dutch in Indonesia (Pringle 2010: 47–9), were particularly hostile to Islam.

On 17 August 1945, Indonesia proclaimed its independence. The archipelago became a country of cultural diversity. Migration, trade, colonization, diffusion and adaptation have given rise to some 300 ethnic or cultural groups. The country consists of a large archipelago of more than 17,000

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4 The World Missionary Conference (WMC) in Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1910, ‘was particularly worried about “Mohammedism,” as missionaries reported their lack of acceptance in Islamic societies and noted that Christianity was losing ground to Islam for the souls of non-monotheistic peoples in places like sub-Saharan Africa. Registering alarm and anxiety, the conference highlighted the urgent need to confront Islam, limit its gains, and, if at all possible, send it back to Arabia’ (Barnett 2011: 70–1). The conference was attended by some of the period’s most important religious, political, and economic figures.
Reconsidering the modern nation state in the Anthropocene

islands straddling the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The largest islands are Java, Kalimantan, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Papua (formerly Irian, which is the western part of New Guinea). Indonesia’s total land area measures 1.9 million square kilometres (750,000 square miles). This is three times the area of Texas, almost eight times the area of the United Kingdom and roughly fifty times the area of the Netherlands. Apart from fertile land suitable for agriculture, at the time of its independence in 1945, Indonesia was rich in a range of natural resources, ranging from petroleum, natural gas, and coal, to metals such as tin, bauxite, nickel, copper, gold, and silver. It is important to note that the country has also been characterized by cohabitation of both Muslims as the majority (slightly more than 87% in 2009) and Christians (less than 10% in 2009), together with two other significant minorities, that is Hindus (2%) and Buddhists (1%). Both Indonesian Muslims and Christians equally claimed a role in the nation building. Notably, each one’s version was at odds with the other’s.

Forcing unity onto diversity

After independence, the multicultural setting and all kinds of diversity were seen as a threat to national stability. Sukarno, the first President of Indonesia, seemed to be preoccupied by the idea of ‘nationhood’ and came up with the notions of Natie and Nationale Staat, according to which the nation of Indonesia embraces entire individuals who according to the geopolitics decreed by Allah coexists in the union of all islands across Indonesia from the Northern tip of Sumatera to the farthest end of Irian (Budiman 2014: 192).

By referring to the decree of God, Sukarno strove to formulate, in his passion for unity, a platform that could mediate the pre-Indonesian nation. In fact, his reflection invoked what Deng observed of the African states already mentioned: ‘unity was postulated in a way that assumed a mythical homogeneity amidst diversity’ (Deng 1997: 28).

It is interesting to note that Sukarno’s doctrine of Natie and Nationale Staat might appear to be the veracities of Benedict Anderson’s (1983) imagined community in the literal sense of the term. This too, should invoke Ernest Renan (1882: 892) who said that ‘nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist’.
Towards that end, Sukarno established *Pancasila*\(^5\) (Sanskrit ‘five principles’) as a state ideology that was hoped to become a foundation for national identity. It was hoped that it would be a guide in creating a harmonious society based on religious tolerance, humanism, nationalism, democracy and social justice. Pancasila seemed to be prescribed to serve the function of a ‘religion of the citizen’ as conceptualized by Rousseau (1762). Subsequently, as in post-colonial India (Roy 2006), the secularism adopted by Indonesia acquired a changed meaning; namely all religions should be treated equally under the dictate of nationalism.

Nationalism was the dominant force of Sukarno’s regime with Sukarno as its chief commander. In 1957 Sukarno declared the institution of Guided Democracy, a non-system of personal, authoritarian rule. He assumed, and many Indonesians agreed, that he alone could achieve national unity (Pringle 2010: 67). Thus, his famous statement:

> I have made myself the meeting place of all trends and ideologies.  
> I have blended, blended, and blended them until finally they became the present Sukarno (Latif 2008: 306).

In the same vein, the following remarks of African leaders are worth noting:

> In three or four years, no one will remember the tribal, ethnic or religious rivalries which, in the recent past, caused so much damage to our country and its population (Touré 1959: 34).

> We must insist that in Ghana, in the higher reaches of our national life, there should be no reference to Fantis, Ashantis, Ewes, Gas, Dagombas, ‘strangers’, and so forth, but that we should call ourselves Ghanaians – all brothers and sisters, members of the same community – the state of Ghana (Nkrumah 1961: 168).

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\(^5\) The five principles of Pancasila are: 1) belief in one supreme God; 2) a just and civilized humanity; 3) national unity; 4) Indonesian-style democracy; and 5) social justice.
Nevertheless, Sukarno was fully aware of the incompatibility between Islam and the idea of a nation state. In one of his speeches, he rhetorically asked:

> … can the Nationalist movement be joined with the Islamic movement, which essentially denies the nation? … With full conviction, I answer: ‘Yes!’ (Sukarno 1970: 38–9, in Burhanudin and Dijk 2013)

It is worth mentioning, like the other infant post-colonial states, the history of the new Indonesian Republic was replete with civil war, social upheaval and horrific events. One of the five most significant is the Darul Islam uprising (1948–62). The Darul Islam rebellion proved that some Muslims put religion before national unity. It is worth noticing that Hidayatullah, the subject of the case study in section ‘The khilafah reinterpreted’ is allegedly associated with the Darul Islam rebellion. On account of the tension between Islam and the state, the Sukarno government banned and eliminated Islamic political power and in the 1960s also began to restrict the political activities of Muslim politicians (Hasbullah 2002). Many activists were put into jail. People became aware that his Guided Democracy was tyrannical, and therefore had to be overthrown (Noer 1987: 415, in Hasbullah 2002: 7). Moeflich Hasbullah notes further that Muslim hatred of Sukarno and his chief supporters, the communist party (PKI) was great, and perhaps this was why Muslims were active in helping the New Order demolish the Old Order.

After Sukarno, the second president, Suharto and his New Order, was also widely known for an emphasis on ‘unity’. Because the Javanese ethnicity was dominant, the government attempted to homogenize the nation and create a common culture with symbols and values based on Javanese cultural style and values, thus inciting bitter indignation on the part of the Outer Islanders. For them nationalism was merely Javanization as part of the hegemonization policy of the ruler in Jakarta. Beginning in 1978, a national indoctrination programme, P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila) was undertaken to inculcate the values of Pancasila into all citizens, especially schoolchildren and civil servants. Pancasila as an expression of nationalism was now used as an instrument of social and political control. Further, the regime stipulated an azas tunggal (a ‘single ideological foundation’) policy which obliged all associations (including the Ulama Council,
Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) to be based on Pancasila and nothing else (see Bruinessen 2013). Budiman (2014: 194–8) shows that the concept of a unitary state, which implies that the government prioritises the preservation of political sovereignty, often advanced at the expense of diversity of language, ethnic, local differences, indigenous normative ordering, and religious law. He also highlights three political instruments that the government invented, which, in my view, planted the seeds for the legitimation of intolerance in dealing with diversity in the future. They are:

1) Forcing unity onto diversity, whereby a homogenization policy was accompanied by rhetoric and practices that restricted diversity in terms of both political and ethno-cultural pluralism.

2) The standardization of ethno-cultural diversity, whereby diversity was encouraged, not as recognition of differences, but as a means of promoting economics of the state’s tourism project.

3) The stipulation of ‘official religions’ whereby only five were acknowledged by the state (Islam, Catholic, Protestant, Hinduism, Buddhism). For Indonesia at the time, ‘Islam’ referred only to Sunni orthodoxy.6

When fixed features are adopted as defining features of the nation, a potential problem of hierarchy emerges. Conflicts between the Sunni majority and the nascent presence of Ahmadi and Shi’ite minority groups emanated from those.

Down to this day, Indonesian political figures continued to claim that Indonesia is a microcosm of the world’s diversity (Alles 2016: 140): ‘If, and when Indonesians will succeed as a nation, we will have to be optimistic on the fact that peace and harmony can be possible in every corner of the world’, and Pancasila has always been glorified as the ‘secret recipe’ of its success story:

Pancasila and Bhineka Tunggal Ika ['Unity in Diversity', Indonesia’s national motto] can be a model for future relations between various religions and civilizations. Our experience with Pancasila demonstrates that it was the right choice (Alles 2016: 140).

6 The Shafi’i school remains dominant throughout Southeast Asia today.
Moreover, Pancasila is believed to be the solution that provides rooms for interreligious dialogue between Islam and Christianity:

Pancasila is the only viable alternative if Indonesia is to maintain its unity and its diversity. In dealing with the two conflicting ideologies, the solution offered by Pancasila is that Indonesia would be neither a secular state, where religion is absolutely separated by the state, nor a religious one, where the state is organized based on particular faith. In short, both Pancasila and ‘secularization as differentiation’ allow us to avoid choosing between a secular and a narrowly religious state. (Intan 2006: 18)

Nevertheless, this article would like to point out that in reality the history of Indonesia is characterized by religious warfare, interreligious conflicts, and political-religious divergences (see, e.g., Pringle 2010, Ricklefs et al. 2010, Bruinessen 2013). Beginning from the end of the twentieth century, Indonesia has been afflicted by massive ethnic and religious conflicts – generally motivated by religious hatred between Muslims and Christians. My investigation of the roots of the hatred suggests three main causal events:

Firstly, the legacy of the colonial system produced largely marginalized, pious Muslim groups, already mentioned.

Secondly, as the country had constantly been threatened by internal clashes along both ideological and regional fault lines, a fear of disintegration was nurtured. With the history of the tensions between Islam and secular nationalism that continued to plague the nation, Islam was identified as an ‘internal enemy’.

Thirdly, bitter indignation was connected to a dispute over ‘seven words’ which were dropped from the first principle of Pancasila. This incident suggests an inherent problem of coexistence between Christians and Muslims in ex-colonized societies, inferred from previous discussion about secularization and the missionaries in the colonies. More elaborate discussion is provided in section ‘Celebrating diversity’. To highlight the point of disputes, the following section presents a chronological outline of the events concerned with nation building and the development of Pancasila from two opposing viewpoints – of the Muslims and of the Christians respectively.
The 'seven words' that never went away

Pancasila was developed in the final days of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia (1942–5), forged by nationalists to create a social contract among the citizens of the future nation of Indonesia. A federation of Muslims, Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia; the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), was established with sponsorship from the Japanese military authorities and was explicitly created to support the Japanese in World War 2. On March 1, 1945, the Japanese established an Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) in order to draft a constitution. The representatives of Masyumi were present on the committee alongside secular and Christian nationalists. A draft version of the future state ideology, Pancasila, was signed on 22 June 1945, as the Jakarta Charter by the future president, Sukarno, the future vice president, Hatta, and others, including seven Muslim politicians as the representatives of Masyumi. On August 17, 1945, the independence of Indonesia was declared by Sukarno and Hatta in Jakarta. One day after the proclamation, seven of the words on the first principle (sila) of Pancasila stipulated in the Jakarta Charter (signed two months earlier), disappeared. In the charter it was specified as ‘belief in God with obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Sharia (Islamic Law)’, but in the constitution proclaimed on 18 August 1945 it was altered to the simple ‘belief in God’. The intrigues operating behind the incident were complex.

From the Christians’ viewpoint, the original *sila* seemed to imply that the state would be responsible for implementing this provision, and would thus be some sort of quasi-Islamic state:

From the beginning the Christians took part fully in the process of formulating the Pancasila or the Five Principles of statehood. It was primarily a result of Christian insistence that there should be no discriminatory treatment of any group that seven words in the original draft of the preamble of the constitution, which would have made it imperative for Muslims to abide by the Shariah, were dropped a few hours before the ratification of the constitution on 18 August 1945. Without much theological reflection, the Christians in Indonesia from 1945 on were protagonists of equal rights for all citizens, irrespective of creed, race and ethnic origin, as expressed in the Pancasila.

(Simatupang 1985: 81)
They [Christians] insisted on a revision of the Jakarta Charter by deleting the seven words that gave advantage to Islam; without this they would stand outside of the Republic of Indonesia. Ngelow argues that the removal of the seven words of Jakarta Charter was the Christian contribution defending the nation’s unity and constituted an ahistorical moment in which Christians played an important role in the political arena. (Setyawan 2014: 101)

When the second term of the BPUPKI plenary sessions was held in mid July 1945, some of the members, including Johannes Latuharhary from the Christian faction, expressed their objection to the seven-word clause. He warned that the clause would place the other religions in serious danger and would bring disorder to the people’s customs in regions such as Minangkabau and Maluku; meanwhile the Islamic faction argued that it would not cause any danger or disorder. After an endless debate the sessions were closed without any clear agreement or consensus. Sukarno closed the debate by recalling that the controversial clause was a compromise between the Islamic and the nationalist factions. On this basis he appealed that the main points in the Preamble be accepted. … Soekarno once again appealed … ‘I know that this means an enormous sacrifice, very especially from the patriotic brothers Latuharhary and Maramis who are not Muslim. I beg with a weeping heart that you are willing to make this offer to our country and nation, a sacrifice for our desire that we can solve this quickly so that the independent Indonesia can be quickly in peace’. (Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008: 189)

It was reported that one day after the proclamation of independence, on 17 August 1945, the Japanese Navy intervened, claiming that Christians in its area of responsibility, eastern Indonesia, would separate themselves if the seven words were not deleted (Pringle 2010: 69; Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008: 189).

As a matter of fact, the seven words do not mention an ‘Islamic state’. They merely say that Muslims, not anyone else, would be bound by the tenets of Sharia law. This situation in particular, recalls Karen Armstrong’s opinion about secularization and the colonized people. Armstrong points out that in Europe, secularization emerged at a time when Europe was beginning
to colonize, and because of that, that came to exert considerable influence on the way the West viewed what it had colonized. Accordingly, the secular ideology cultivated by European colonizers—which, in Indonesia’s case was adopted by the Christians and the secular nationalists—‘perceives Muslim societies that seem incapable of separating faith from politics to be irredeemably flawed’ (Armstrong 2014b). Finally, the ‘seven words’ were aborted in response to objections by Indonesian Christians. For Indonesian Muslims, on the other hand, the loss of those seven words has stripped Pancasila bare of its spiritual meaning. The incident has been and continues to be a definitive sore point in the memory of conservative Muslims concerning secular and Christian groups altogether. Down the years, as the country’s development has only brought about a wider gap between the well-off Christian minority and the deprived Muslim majority (see, e.g., The Guardian 2017), Pancasila has once again become a bone of contention and the dispute over the ‘seven words’ has resurfaced. The state’s inability to bring about prosperity has put Pancasila into competition with religious ideologies (Sulaiman 2011). Above all, from the conservative Muslims’ viewpoint (as of Islamists generally), an obedience to a purely secular Pancasila is always an act of going into partnership with God (shirk) – the greatest sin in Islam. Thus, Pancasila is regarded as a taghut.7 In the light of this incident, Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s statement (March 2014: 293) is pertinent. Qaradawi contends that secularism could be more easily accepted in a Christian society due to the fact that ‘Christianity is devoid of a shari’a or a comprehensive system of life to which its adherents should be committed’. He says further:

The New Testament itself divides life into two parts, one for God, or religion, the other for Caesar, or the state: ‘Render unto Caesar things which belong to Caesar, and render unto God things which belong to God (Matthew 22:21). As such, a Christian could accept secularism without any qualms of conscience’. (March 2014: 293)

The ‘seven words’ continued to be a painful reminder of Muslim’s defeat. From that time on, Muslim–Christian relations turned from bad to worse.

7 Taghut refers to idolatry or to the worship of anything other than Allah.
Perplexed and assured

Despite all attempts to achieve a ‘unity’ at the national level, ethnic and religious conflicts continued to recur in Indonesia. Contemporary Indonesian society, after all, is characterized by a pervasive fragmentation that Edward Aspinall (2013) argues is associated with neoliberalism. According to his observation, fragmentation is visible virtually everywhere, with new or revivified local identities based on ethnicity and religion and with various forms of cultural revival. Additionally, Aspinall (2010) and Peter Blunt et al. (2012) show that contemporary Indonesia remains a society of patronage and patronage remains systemic within the government. Notably, money politics and corrupt practices continue to constitute and sustain this patronage (Blunt et al. 2012). In a study of environmental governance, Paruedee Nguitragool (2012) found a lack of large-scale social cohesion between civil society organizations in Indonesia and the public, in conjunction with a fragmentation along the axis of class inequality and identity politics. My own observation captured two dissimilar opinions widely pervading Indonesian minds these days:

1) In remembrance of the past, people believe that in fact Indonesia needs strong authoritarian governments that can keep any kinds of conflicts and disunities under control.

2) Many Indonesian leaders have continued to maintain a confidence that Indonesia is an excellent example of a peaceful society, albeit a diverse one, which deserves international recognition and admiration. These leaders claim, and their political supporters agree, that Pancasila is the secret of its success.

With the key findings of this research, my analysis disproves the first belief. The investigation shows, on the contrary, that today’s problems in many cases are the legacy of an abusive past. The analysis also disproves the second belief, for the findings demonstrate the flawed assumption that a state-centric nation building will engender a harmonious society by imposing unity onto diversity.
Celebrating diversity: a Quranic perspective

The normative discussion of Islam and secularism in this section and the pragmatic approach adopted to deal with the contemporary challenges rest on my theoretical and empirical work (Alkatiri 2014, 2016). Being critical of secularism and the nation state, I beg to differ with many scholars from Muslim-majority countries who are ‘frequently called upon to publicly proclaim endorsement of Western liberal, democratic institutions’ (March 2014).

It is well known that among the world religions, ‘Islam has perhaps the most unequivocal claim to a public political vision’ (March 2014: 2828). In my opinion, that cannot be fully understood without a hermeneutical understanding of the differing concepts of ‘religion’ referred to by the Quran and the one understood in the Western tradition. Based on Ibn Manzur’s standard classic, the Lisan al-Arab (1968), Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas (2013) elucidates the concept of religion couched in the term al-din. The word din derived from the Arabic root DYN (‘debt’). The primary significations of the term din can be reduced to four: 1) indebtedness; 2) submissiveness; 3) judicious power; 4) natural inclination or tendency (ibid. 2). Man is indebted to God for bringing him/her into existence and maintaining him/her in his/her existence. Being indebted, one is under obligations which naturally involve submission. The moment one is created and given existence, he/she is in a state of utter loss, for everything in him/her is what the Creator owns. Being ‘owned’ by the Creator consequently means he/she is the slave (abd) of God and should direct his/her true loyalty to God alone. As a result, Al-Attas argues that

The man of Islam is not bound by the social contract, nor does he espouse the doctrine of the Social Contract…for he has, nevertheless an individual contract reflecting the Covenant his soul has sealed with God. (Al-Attas 2013: 25)

The act of doing service to God is called ibadah, which refers to ‘all conscious and willing acts of service for the sake of God alone and approved by Him, including such as are prescribed worship’ (Al-Attas 2013: 11). Thereby, the meaning of din is closely associated with ibadah or worship in the manner ‘approved by God’. The latter, in Islam, refers to ‘words and deeds of Prophet Muhammad’ termed as the Sunna.
In contrast, the term ‘religion’ comes from the Latin *religare* with the root meaning ‘to tie’ or ‘to bind’ – it is what binds humans to God. That word suggests a private domain of relationship, devoid of juridical details. For that reason, secularism might be embraced more easily within the Western mentality, whereas Muslims are bound to struggle with cognitive dissonance, as al-Qaradawi argues above. As a comprehensive system of thought and social order, Islam, as it is claimed in traditional Islamic lore, consistently supports religious diversity, and Muslim societies in the Islamic golden age were largely tolerant. This confidence is often proffered by conservative Muslims to repudiate liberal justifications of secularism as the most appropriate constitutional framework for a complex and morally diverse society.

Being the youngest of the Abrahamic faiths, Islam has been faced with religious diversity since its inception in the seventh century, and thereby has a theological basis in relations with other religions. The concept of a cycle of prophecy (*dairat nubuwah*) according to which the Prophet Muhammad is believed to be the last Messenger of God, implies acknowledgement of the pre-Islamic religions, and a point of view of diversity as a natural phenomenon in the historical development of religions. Even though Islam evaluated pre-Islamic religious traditions critically it never rejected them as false (Aydin 2001, Sachedina 2001). Based on the Islamic belief that all communities have been visited by a ‘warner’ (Quran 35:24), the recognition of legitimate religion is not limited to Judaism and Christianity but extends to other major pre-Islamic religions.8 Concerning Christianity and Judaism, the Quran states that each represents an authentic religious tradition revealed by God (Quran 5:46, 5:48) and it even confirms salvific efficacy within the wider boundaries of monotheism (2:62). Additionally, the mention of churches and synagogues along with mosques in the Quran is significant in analysing the Islamic view regarding religious diversity (Zia-Ul-Haq 2010):

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8 Sabianism is mentioned in the Quran (5:69, 2:62), and Magianism as well (22:17). According to Manazir Ahsan Gilani (Hamidullah 1999: 203), the followers of Buddha unanimously believe that Buddha received *nirvana* for the first time under a wild fig tree. Hamidullah considers the mentioning of ‘Fig’ at the start of surah Tin (Quran 95) to be a subtle way of mentioning Buddhism in the Quran.
Had not Allah repulsed the people from one another, ruin would have befallen the monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques in which Allah’s Name is mentioned greatly. (Quran 22:40)

In fact, Islam affirms that the core teaching of the communications of all prophets and messengers are submission to God (Allah) in the light of divine guidance communicated by the prophets. Therefore, all prophets are ‘Muslims’ (ones who submit to God), and God has repeatedly prohibited making a distinction between them (Quran 2:136, 2:285, 3:84).

The prophet Muhammad himself established in Medina the political space that gave freedom to practise one’s own faith and pursue social justice as well as enjoy equality, brotherhood and the preservation of human dignity. This model has historically paved the way for maintaining balance and harmony among followers of different faiths in the Islamic world. Consequently, religious pluralism in Islam is not simply a matter of accommodating competing claims of religious truth in the private domain of individual faith, but a matter of public policy in which an Islamic government must acknowledge and protect the divinely-ordained right of each person to determine his/her spiritual destiny without coercion. The Quran declares explicitly that there is no compulsion in religion (Quran 2:256). From this verse, it can be inferred that Islam considers religious diversity as a concomitant of God’s bestowal of free will and choice on human beings (Zia-Ul-Haq 2010). The rationale is buttressed further by a thought-provoking verse: ‘And if your Lord had willed, He could have made mankind one community; but they will not cease to differ’ (Quran 11:118).

Correspondingly, if God himself did not force people to embrace a ‘unity’, it is difficult to argue that it might be permissible for human beings to do so. Even to the extent of the *kufr* (‘those who disbelieve Allah and Prophet Muhammad’), Islam teaches to let it go: ‘(say) to you your religion and to me mine’ (Quran 109:6) which implies respect for the human right to have different opinions.

By contrast, historically, as soon as the Portuguese and Spaniards arrived in the Indonesian archipelago in 1511, Christianity was propagated aggressively (Ricklefs *et al.* 2010). On the other hand, encounters with Islam since the seventh century have notably not been followed by conversion. Professor A. H. Johns (see *ibid.* 78–9) attempted to explain why the local people only began converting to Islam several centuries after traders had been travelling through Southeast Asia. He speculated that it was not until the emergence
of Sufism as a dominant stream of Islamic faith throughout the Muslim world from the thirteenth century that the locals, whose religions before the coming of Islam were characterized by the mystical doctrines of Hinduism and Buddhism, might have been attracted to this new faith if it, too, was presented in a mystical form. Likewise, Richard K. Khuri (2001) reminds us that it took six centuries for the population in the Near East to shift from its Christian majority to one that is Muslim. These examples show that Muslims by and large did not resort to forced conversions.

Inventing the future with popular participation

In view of what has been presented concerning Indonesia, grouping and the creation of multiplicity seem to be intrinsic to human nature, and thus, seeking unity in diversity might be a chimerical dream. In the light of this, the act of forcing unity onto diversity – even for the pursuance of equality – can be paradoxical, for it necessarily denounces differences and hence the promotion of intolerance. Correspondingly, this article debunks Samuel P. Huntington’s (1996) premise that diversity necessarily tends to lead to conflict. Indonesia reveals that culture and religion did not appear as a single factor in the conflicts; it is the ‘desire to control’ that manifested in ‘forcing unity onto diversity’ which was the major cause. Accordingly, from this perspective, Huntington’s proposition appears as a ‘power-trip’ – namely, an expression of ‘fear of losing control’. Along this line of argument, the state-centric nation-building process should be held responsible for widespread intolerance in present-day Indonesia, for it has cultivated vigilance against differences between people in the population. Besides, the history of Christianity as the ‘religious arm’ of colonial power in Indonesia and the West’s continued domination of the Muslim world subsequently have tainted the Muslims’ sociological dimension of an ‘Islamic’ knowledge, meaning, action, and reality (Alkatiri 2014) concerning the ‘Christian West’. That being the case,

9 Drawing on Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s (1966) symbolic universe premise, I developed (2014) a theoretical framework to distinguish the ‘sociological’ from the ‘philosophical’ dimensions of religious knowledge, meaning, action, and reality. The former refers to the shared ideas, meanings, values, perceptions, and motivations stemming from religious doctrines that have been interpreted through the lens of histories of particular human collective interactions with ‘the others’, whereas the latter is the ‘purely’ intellectual and spiritual dimension of the religion.
history accounts for the devastation of Muslim-Christian relations despite the Quranic injunctions on the matter. Moreover, in the period we are living in, postmodernism confirms the general Muslim sense of feeling oppressed by a Western-led, neoliberal, corporate-run globalization process (Johnston 2010). Postmodernism as a hodge-podge of social movements and currents of thought in revolt against the certainties of the Western Enlightenment project dampens modernity’s optimism and radically questions (even rejects) the Enlightenment’s view of history as a unitary human march toward progress. It also rejects Enlightenment rationalism, which raises afresh the fundamental questions of epistemology, ontology, and hermeneutics. Notably, postmodernism often takes on radical political stances, as with Foucault’s denouncement of the power dimension behind knowledge/discourse. These premises are central in my thesis (Alkatiri 2016), which concerns the relationship between science, technology, economic growth and ‘power’ in the post-colonial world and the Muslim’s context.

The die was cast and the old cleavages have inevitably often justified mistrust and violence. Against this long-standing ‘West-Islam divide’ and the backdrop of the global ecological crisis that ironically calls for a global collaboration to tackle the problems, David Joseph Wellman (2004) contends that what is needed is a ‘sustainable diplomacy’ through a ‘people-to-people’ approach that moves beyond the rigidity of a state system. In environmental studies generally, the concept of the nation state has been critically revisited, since national sovereignty consistently stands in the way of creating an international framework for collective actions (e.g. Speth 2002, Park et al. 2008, Stern 2006, Alkatiri 2014). This recalls Arnold Toynbee’s (1976) prediction:

The present-day global set of local sovereign states is … not capable of saving the biosphere from man-made pollution or of conserving the biosphere’s non-replaceable natural resources. … Will mankind murder Mother Earth or will he redeem her? This is the enigmatic question which now confronts Man. (Toynbee 1976: 593–6)

Wellman’s ‘sustainable diplomacy’ values the role of popular religions alongside ecological histories and the consumption-waste pattern in the society. I analyse the potential to capitalize on the Islamic ‘symbolic universe’ to instigate sweeping socio-ecological actions in the Muslim world (Alkatiri
Reconsidering the modern nation state in the Anthropocene

2014). In a similar vein, Johnston (2010) seeks to construct a Muslim- Christian theological discourse on creation and humanity that could help adherents of both faiths work together to preserve our planet.

To you be your way, and to me mine

Against the background of complex developmental/environmental problems and widespread poverty in Indonesia, my thesis (Alkatiri 2016) analyses the ‘centralist vs. decentralist’ debates in ecological politics (e.g. Radcliffe 2000). The centralists propose ‘centralized expert government’ and a largely authoritarian society including intellectual controls over citizens and oligarchical systems, for they do not see the present democratic institutions and economic structure as being able to cope with the ecological crisis. Conversely, the decentralists hold that the more severe the problem the more difficult it would be for a centralist and authoritarian group to manage, and hence decentralization is inevitable. The political organization along decentralist lines is increasingly perceived to be ‘practical and desirable by activists in areas of politics which may not have as their original aim an ecological society’ (Allaby 1977: 244). The ‘relocalisation’ model mentioned in the introduction of this article is a decentralist approach which I found to be practical and operable for Indonesian Muslim groups to espouse. ‘Relocalisation’ is a non-state-centric community movement in response to dominant economic policies that ignore the needs of people and the planet. Its primary aim is to reduce local un-sustainability as much as possible and enhance local resilience, rather than engage in much wider political projects (Barry 2012).

Relocalisation ideals are inspired by a Western thinker, E. F. Schumacher, who himself was inspired by local Asian communities in his well-known Small is Beautiful (1973). The Gandhian ideal of ‘no affluence no poverty’ has been one of the movement’s fundamental principles. The movements believe that these smaller-scale communities nurture more intimate relations among people and ensure that everyone is seen, heard and recognized – thus providing a sense of individual identity that is lacking in the anonymity and isolation of mass society (Maser 1997, Norberg-Hodge 2002). Norberg argues further that when people live in smaller-scale social and economic units, where mutual support is necessary, the human capacity for caring and kindness is enhanced. In the relocalisation discourse, ecovillages provide models for living close to the land and in community with one
another – a vision that is inspiring for the increasing numbers of people who long to live in a way that is spiritually rewarding as well as ecologically sustainable. The relocalisation activists believe that all good intentions and sophisticated analyses of global problems and solutions by academics, politicians, think tanks and concerned lay people mean nothing until, and unless, individual citizens take personal action to change their lifestyles.

Under the circumstances of the changing global environment, this article aims to further the call for popular participation and collaborative action, hence, the need for social arrangements that could best serve the intrinsic nature of humans characterized by diversity, whereby grouping and creating multiplicities are deemed inevitable. Accordingly, it came up with a faith-based ‘relocalisation’ model for the Islamic community movement that allows Muslims from diverse forms of Islam to maintain their differences, implement what they ‘believe’, and exercise their visions of ‘Islamic’ societies within their own communities’ jurisdictions. Neither secular nation states, nor ‘Islamic states’ in the modern sense of the term, could serve the diversity, self-sufficiency, self-local governance, and genuine creativities that such a scheme needs. Therefore, I contend the ‘minimal’ or ‘night-watchman’ states to be the most apposite.

A minimal or night-watchman state is a form of government in political philosophy where the state’s legitimate function is only the protection of the individual from assault, theft, breach of contract, or fraud. Citizens are free to choose any social arrangements (see, e.g., Nozick 2013). The advocates of this school are called minarchists. They argue that the state has no rights to use its force to interfere with transactions between people. The only legitimate governmental institutions are the military, police and courts. In the light of pressing socio-ecological issues and the ‘relocalisation’ model as a possible and operable solution at community levels, and secondly, the potential of faith-based environmental movements (see, e.g., Alkatiri 2014, 2016), the minimal or night-watchman state is the most suitable type of state in the Anthropocene epoch, for it allows a life of creativity that liberates people to freely choose their own social arrangements without the need to abide by a single-state ideology for the whole nation. My proposition corresponds with Wael B. Hallaq’s (2012) *The Impossible State*. According to Hallaq, the modern state is incompatible with, if not altogether contradictory to, the

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10 The period in which human activities became the primary driver of global ecological change.
concept of the state in Islam. Given that the state in the Islamic sense should be organized organically around the centre of God’s sovereignty, the weaker or more minimal the state, the more compatible it is with Islam. The following section provides an example of an intentional community model already undertaken endogenously by the Hidayatullah group in Indonesia that is worth considering in contemplating ‘relocalisation’ within a minimal state.

The khilafah reinterpreted: a case study

What follows is a brief ethnographic account of the Hidayatullah pesantren11 learning community network in Indonesia. The fieldwork was conducted in the mother pesantren in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, having two ‘campuses’. A ‘campus’, for the Hidayatullah, is an enclave composed of schools, a mosque, a housing complex and a student dormitory. The first one in Balikpapan has been extended to include a reforested wood, a community garden, a large pond, a self-managed water facility and pasar umi (‘mum’s market’), selling household groceries. Campus 1 is located in Gunung Tembak, East Balikpapan, with an area of 200 hectares and a little more than a fifteen hundred inhabitants. When I visited, for this research, Campus 2, within sight of the gate of Campus 1, was under construction. Balikpapan is a seaport city on the east coast island of Kalimantan (Borneo). It is a resource-rich region known for timber and petroleum export products, and was once famous as Indonesia’s ‘oil city’.

The Hidayatullah community evokes a reinterpretation of the khilafah.12 In fact, by subscribing to the ideals of the khilafah, the community has not been burdened by the demands of ‘nationalism’ and the nation-state system, hence, they have been able to gain greater control over their members’ destinies through the community development enterprise. The ‘clash of a symbolic universe’ (see Alkatiri 2016)13 and the Islamic utopia of the Medina society that had plagued the state-Muslim relations appeared as the main

11 Pesantren is a home-grown traditional Islamic institute in Indonesia.
12 The caliphate, the first system of governance established in Islam. It is believed to be the perfect way of ruling the Islamic Ummah. It is worth noting that khilafah was not intended to be a religious authority, as Islam emphasizes a direct link between man and God (ittisal).
13 My thesis provides a historical narrative behind the formation of the community and ethnographic accounts that illustrate the meaning of the community for the leaders and the recruits.
themes behind the formation of Hidayatullah. In contrast to green intentional communities in the West, it is worth highlighting that Hidayatullah was not designed on the basis of ecological utopian principles and techniques embraced by, for instance, the ‘ecovillages’ discussed earlier. They did not intend to develop ‘closed-loop, symbiotic, self-sustaining human habitats and production systems that do not result in ecological degradation and social injustice’ (Lockyer and Veteto 2013). Nonetheless, as the community members reduce their dependence on the global economy and replace it with household and local economies, they have reduced the demand that drives current inequities. After all, it should be borne in mind that the ecological-utopian principles and techniques seek, essentially, to enable people to become more self-reliant, and in the process, relieve the social injustices and ecological degradation created by the global political economy. In a broader sense, Hidayatullah was developed upon the basis of a combination of the following:

1) The search for similarity and like-mindedness outside the Indonesian mainstream Islamic communities represented by Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah;

2) A yearning for close-knit ties of village communities, security, and the camaraderie of a large family;

3) Parents’ concerns over their children’s encounters with un-Islamic influences;

4) The leaders’ political instincts to circumvent those hardships through the creation of their own space for self-governance, and by doing so, ignoring the state and the dominant political-economic order that it encompasses.

The Hidayatullah community in Balikpapan attracts people to join their activities although they do not necessarily become active members, or cadre, to be assigned to assume tasks in other branches. I came to know a lady, Rahima (whose name has been changed), who, together with her husband, joined Hidayatullah’s activities for a number of years. Rahima’s husband was a professional in an oil company in Balikpapan, and he had recently passed away when she was being interviewed.
I decided to live inside the Hidayatullah campus in order to give my two sons a good Islamic neighbourhood and to have a ‘village’ for myself to settle down in for the rest of my life. It’s really hard to raise children in the cities as you know the influences are so bad. My big son has been studying in another pesantren outside Balikpapan and my late husband wanted our little son to be a hafiz (a person who memorizes the Quran completely), he seems able to do so, so we put him here.

While all properties in Campus 1 were owned by the organization, Campus 2, which was under construction was intended to be purchased by the members on condition that it may not be transferred to anyone without the prior consent of the Hidayatullah. The condition was made in order to keep the campus inhabited by the members only. The price of the land was quite low. Rahima bought a plot of land, more or less 300m², and built a house with a vegetable garden at the back.

Fieldwork was also conducted at the Depok campus near Jakarta. It was built in 1991. Here the organization was not able to obtain a larger plot of land than the existing three hectares. Therefore, not every member was given a chance to live inside the enclave. There were some individuals who could afford to buy a piece of land adjacent to it and it was intended that the complex would expand gradually. It was a very troublesome journey negotiating traffic and tricky roads to the location which was on the farthest outskirts of Jakarta city. Shodiq, a member, had been living in the complex for fifteen years. He came from a nominal Muslim family farming background in Central Java. Both Shodiq and his wife had worked full-time to serve the schools and the students’ dormitory and receive in-kind remuneration instead of salary.

We live within a very small economy. We trust in God though, that His hand will always be extended to us whenever we need help. As you see we don’t live like people out there; we don’t have to have a TV and luxury stuff like them. We feel secure because we know that our children will be taken care of. In our network we have schools from kindergarten to university. For anyone who has tasted the life of being anonymous out there they will agree that it is a lot easier to manage your family if you live in a community where everyone helps and exhorts one another, like us here.
And, Ikhwan:

The feeling of being in a large family is wonderful here, considering we’re not related familially. Let me give you one example; my friends will give you more. My wife was advised by the doctor to give birth by caesarian. I was so shocked, how could I afford the surgery? [titter]. But it was done in the end, paid jointly by everyone. So, there’s no shortage in here, insyaAllah.

Because we perform prayer in the congregation, the sense of togetherness is maintained. If we have a problem, we share it with one another.

Because we are like-minded, we can let our children play and make friends freely without being worried.

One of Hidayatullah’s values is an insistence on the five-times-a-day prayer being conducted in the congregation (jama’ah) for those males who at the time of prayer happen to be around the campus. They believe it to be the most effective method of maintaining social capital among them.

Male and female focus group discussions gave identical answers to Shodiq and Ikhwan’s reasoning for living in the Hidayatullah communities. It is interesting to note that among members living in the Depok campus were men who worked in government offices, and their wives served the Hidayatullah schools. Clearly all the people of Hidayatullah rank community living at the highest level of importance. They see small-scale communities like the ones they have established and networked, as a manifestation of the khilafah. Syaikhul at the Jakarta head office said:

> We’re not the ones who got frustrated because khilafah Islamiyah is not there, we still can have it by ourselves, on a small scale.

> The members can make a living outside the Hidayatullah, but when they are going home they are going to the community.

And, Suharsono in Jakarta head office:

> What we are doing is in accordance with the Prophet’s saying, that every collectivity must have a leader, ‘When three men travel together, they should make one of them a leader’. 
Reconsidering the modern nation state in the Anthropocene

Hidayatullah has stated explicitly that rebuilding Islamic civilization is its vision. In its notary act of establishment, the organization was officially defined as a mass organization and referred to as an Islamic movement. Further, it was meant to be a medium for the holy struggle (jihad) and taking jihad as an injunction for all Muslims on board, individually (infiradi) and collectively (jama‘i). The Hidayatullah members’ families were proud to be families of mujahid (those who are engaged in jihad). Slogans such as ‘Indahnya menjadi keluarga mujahid’ (‘it’s great to be mujahid family’) are commonplace in this community.

The alumni of Hidayatullah rapidly produced a network. While initially the members were mainly from the Bugis ethnic diaspora, over the years they have become increasingly diverse. The network is managed by means of a system of organization with clearly defined criteria of zones, regions and areas for its branches. The male members in a focus group recalled the vision of Abdullah Said, the founder, for a model of Islamic society in Indonesia.

He said we wanted to make a place so that when people come to visit and observe, they can tell what Islam is like, that Islam is beautiful [mutter] – that sounds like the title of Trans TV programme by Ustadz Maulana, Islam is Beautiful.

Zainuddin Musaddad, the head of pesantren, quipped: ‘beautiful in story!’ and the rest of them laughed,

Well, yes, that’s how the Muslim attitude is today, they only tell about Islam, that Islam is beautiful – but only in story, ‘No-Action-Talk-Only’.

They articulated the bitter feelings they experienced as a consequence of the state’s persistent attempts to discourage Muslim organizations from engaging in politics and to stick to purely religious pursuits. Due to perceived ties with the Darul Islam rebellion, Hidayatullah continued to be counted as a potential threat. The ICG (International Crisis Group) report (2003) on terrorism in Indonesia, and Solahudin (2013), identified Darul Islam as the origin of the Jamaah Islamiyah terrorist underground network in Southeast Asia. According to John T. Sidel (2007), in order to appreciate the broader context of Islamist activities and influence in Southeast Asia,
it is essential to understand the ways in which European and American colonial rule created lasting obstacles to the promotion of Islamist politics in Southeast Asia. Sidel argues that coverage of terrorist events in Southeast Asia focuses on description, rather than explanation, events, rather than causes. Furthermore, scholarship on Southeast Asian terrorism relies too much on official sources from the security services, which could have a professional interest in exaggerating the danger. Also, several individuals in Southeast Asian security apparatuses have personal and ideological reasons for not telling the truth.

In sum, I found two social phenomena in the Hidayatullah community in Balikpapan that made it seem like an appropriate medium for change towards sustainability principles. One is an image taken from a vision of Erich Fromm’s ‘community of being’ rather than a ‘community of having’ in the context of debates over sustainable lifestyle. The other is Hannah Arendt’s *vita activa* (de Geus 2009: 91). Erich Fromm’s work on ‘having and being’ as two fundamental human orientations toward the self and the world posits that

... in a less high-level consumption society the overall emphasis will not be on the outward characteristics of status and success, but on the inward aspect of human well-being. One can think of relaxation, balance, a focus on and attention for our fellow-beings (human and non-human), the enjoyment of pleasant and meaningful work, contributing to the community, but also the importance of the spiritual, just to be and exist in a dignified, relaxed and elegant way, instead of constantly being eager to accumulate possessions of whatever kind. (De Geus 2009: 91)

The Hidayatullah community also displayed a balanced configuration of Hannah Arendt’s *vita activa* as described in her work entitled *The Human Condition* (Arendt 1985).

The premise of *vita activa* provides explanations for the formation, development and stability of community despite challenges on all fronts. Hannah Arendt argues that there are three fundamental human activities: *labour*, *work* and *action*. *Labour* is the activity that is linked to the biological process of the human body and the satisfaction of direct physical needs, like the provision of food and drink. *Work* is the activity that creates an artificial world of enduring objects, to provide a stable living environment for humans.
Reconsidering the modern nation state in the Anthropocene

*Action* corresponds to the fundamental human condition of plurality and is directed at the creation of a public sphere in which people can enjoy political freedom (Arendt 1985: 7, 50–4). Arendt contends that while *action* was of the highest significance in ranking in the Greek ‘polis’ (followed by *work* and finally *labour*), in modern times the hierarchy has been completely reversed. Political changes resulting in the systematic loss of so-called spaces of political action and the loss of distinction between the private and public realms have contributed to this reversal. Nowadays, the value of *labour* and the production of consumption goods are consistently overrated, whereas the value of the more meaningful activities of acting in the public realm and creating lasting products have almost disappeared *(ibid. 294–305).* Arendt argues that in our era the goal of human activity (*vita activa*) is no longer to be found in sustaining a public sphere of political action or in creative work, but in routine labour, growing economic welfare, abundance and mass consumption. Nowadays, increasing wealth and the greatest consumer happiness of the greatest number are the basic aims of social and political life *(ibid. 133).*

In fact, unlike lay people in Indonesian society at large, Hidayatullah members have managed to undertake not only *labour* and *work* according to Arendt’s definitions, but also *action* in terms of more meaningful activities in the public realm. By doing so, they have been living, indeed, in the ‘imagined Darul Islam’ which has then been reified. Even though they, too, have had to contend with growing problems in the Indonesian society at large, my observation of the two communities in Balikpapan and Depok, Jakarta, suggests that the institution is remarkably well and alive. In general, the communities have greater control over their own destinies compared to the larger society of Indonesia. In that respect, it is worth mentioning that in the focus group discussion with the male leaders in Jakarta, a flippant, jocular answer to my question regarding what their opinion about the multi-dimensional crisis in Indonesia was: ‘That’s true, but that’s Indonesia, our neighbour [laughter].’ As they created their own space for self-governance they felt they did not need to concern themselves too much with the state and the dominant political-economic order that circumscribes it. In addition, due to the fact that they were in a position of having to provide nearly everything by themselves with very limited funding, I observed everyone, men and women including the youth, always engaged in providing various kinds of public services to the community such as cleaning, gardening, building work, cutting wood for construction, maintenance and so forth, besides managing schools and the everyday needs of the students living in the dormitories.
Also, regular *balqah* (learning circles) were being conducted in which some of the leaders were the *murabbi*\(^\text{14}\) educators. A sense of connection with the other Hidayatullah members in different places seemed to have been well maintained by means of regular meetings held regionally or nationally, ranging from every three months to yearly, then to five-yearly, depending on the scope of the assembly.

Within its women’s division, Mushida (Muslimah Hidayatullah), the women enjoyed equal opportunities for being active in public life as well as maintaining connections through the equally regular women’s meetings. Besides being a school provider, Hidayatullah has been active in humanitarian work as well. They engage with other Muslim groups, national and international, in disaster relief activities. There are two sources of funding indicated by the leaders, namely, economic activities and *zakat*. Baitul Maal Hidayatullah (see their website) is the financial institution they founded to manage their funds. Economic activities of the organization include charitable businesses such as schools, and profit-making businesses such as a palm-oil plantation, a supermarket and many small-scale entrepreneurial undertakings.

It is all too easy to ridicule the Islamists and their utopian movement as ‘dangerous’. Their movement often evokes negative associations with irrationality and a futile adherence to the past. In my research for realistic and practical solutions, I consider the Islamic utopia of the Medina society to be comparable to any other utopian imaginary that has inspired green intentional community movements in the West. Instead of seeing it as a daydream, a romantic and unattainable fantasy, it is the inspirational side of utopias that needs to be justly considered. The Medina society, aforementioned in the discussion about religious diversity in section ‘Celebrating diversity’, is believed by Muslims to be the most perfect Islamic society, a society according to which all other Islamic societies are ‘judged’. Medina, the city where the Prophet Muhammad established the first Islamic political entity, recognizes religious, social, and cultural plurality among its citizens. This has been taken as a model set by the Prophet to reify Islam as a complete system governing all religious, social, political, cultural and economic orders, and encompassing all things material, spiritual, societal, individual, and personal. Interest in the Medina society has continuously revived among

\(^{14}\) Trainer in personalized education.
Muslim communities whenever they face issues of a plurality of religion, Islamic politics and governance, and justice.

Nonetheless, apropos of the night-watchman state and ‘relocalisation’, which have been propounded as a possible scheme for the future, it is necessary to recognize the downside of the ‘exclusive’ nature of the like-minded intentional community. With that in mind, it is important to explore in what ways dialogical attitudes can be cultivated among the members to nurture intercultural communications between Islam and other groups in diverse societies. It is also important to explore under what circumstances such utopian movements may resort to violent action which may harm innocent others and damage the prospects for realizing the ‘Medina society’ exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad.

Conclusion

This article demonstrates the impossibility of pursuing unity, either for a distinct nation state or a monolithic Islam. Against the need for popular participation in dealing with converging socio-ecological crises in Muslim-majority countries, this article offers a faith-based ‘relocalisation’ model for an Islamic sustainable community movement that allows Muslims from diverse interpretations of Islam to maintain their differences, implement what they ‘believe’, and exercise their visions of ‘Islamic’ societies within their own communities’ jurisdictions. Neither secular nation states, nor ‘Islamic states’ in the modern sense of the word, could serve the diversity, self-sufficiency, local self-governance, and genuine creativity that such a scheme needs. Therefore, ‘minimal’ or ‘night-watchman’ states might be the most apposite for the Anthropocene era.

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The aim of this article is to present marriage patterns in the Jewish Community of Helsinki in the period 1919-80 in light of textual records partly preserved in public archives, but partly also in the community itself. The latter corpus of data has not been used previously as source material for ethnographic research. While introducing the legislation of civil marriages in Finland, the goal of this study is to reflect on the patterns of intermarriage in the congregation in the 1900s and to present some preliminary findings pertaining to their impact on congregational policies.

The topic of marriages between Jews and non-Jews has been widely discussed both in scientific and in religious communities. Debates over the subject consider various aspects of Jewish life, touching upon the question of ‘Who is a Jew?’ and leading to discussions on religious practices or Jewish identity (Glenn and Sokoloff 2010; Dencik 1993, 2003, 2006; Dieming and Ray 2016). Until the early-modern period, most Jews lived isolated lives: marriages between them and people of other faiths were limited. Historical events, such as the Industrial Revolution, the Enlightenment, or the French Revolution resulted in social and economic changes in Europe. These changes also affected the Jewish communities, where the number of intermarriages between Jews and non-Jews started to grow rapidly (Bleich 2015: 3).

The changes in social processes have not left Finland unaffected either. When the country became independent in 1917 and its Jewish residents earned the right to become Finnish citizens, they were also allowed to marry non-Jews without converting to Christianity (Kaila 1923, UVL267/122, Reijonen 1980). Social changes in modern-day Judaism happened more rapidly in Finland than in other countries where the emancipation of Jews happened earlier. Due to these changes and to the small size of the local Jewish congregations, the question of the growing number of intermarriages became very pressing in the contemporary Finnish-Jewish situation and affected most policies of the local Jewish communities (Torvinen 1980, Muir 2004, Weintraub 2017; NA: Kii, Vih).
A short history of Finnish Jews

The first Jews arrived in Finland when the country was still part of the Swedish Kingdom (1362–1809). The Swedish Church Law of 1686 (Swe. *Kyrkio-Lag och Ordning*) declared Evangelical Lutheranism as the state religion: Jews and people of other faiths had the right to gain residence in the country only if they converted to Christianity (Harviainen and Illman 2002: 273). Due to Jewish statutes in the Swedish constitution, Jews who did not convert to Christianity were not allowed to settle in Finland during the period of Swedish rule (Jacobsson 1951: 87).1

As a consequence of the Finnish War (1808–9) between Sweden and Russia, the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland was established in the Russian Empire in 1809. Despite this political change, the prohibition of the settlement of Jews remained in force. Finland considered the Swedish constitution as its privilege and regarded tampering with the laws as an offence against its rights. When Czar Nicholas I issued a statute concerning Jewish conscription in 1827, the first Jews arrived in Finland. The statute of 1858 guaranteed all former Russian soldiers – including Jews – the right to settle in Finland. In 1889, the Finnish Senate issued a letter to the governors, which guaranteed permission to Jews and their families – who were mentioned by their names – to reside in Finland in specific towns.2 These permits were granted to them for six months at a time (Harviainen and Illman 2002: 274–7).

According to the Yiddishist Simo Muir, the entire Jewish existence in the nineteenth century was characterized by temporariness, the threat of deportations back to Russia, and poverty due to the statutes which restricted the Jewish sources of livelihood to selling small commodities and old clothes (Muir 2004: 2–3). The decree of 1889 was in force until 1918 when Jews were granted civil rights and could become Finnish nationals (Harviainen and Illman 2002: 274–7), after which the economic status of the Jews improved rapidly, and they became one of Finland’s most well-integrated minorities (Jacobsson 1951: 327–8; Torvinen 1998: 112).3

1 For further reading on the history of Swedish Jewry, see Valentin 1964.
2 These towns were Helsinki, Turku, Tampere, Vyborg, Hamina, Sortavala, Suistamo, Impilahti, Kuopio and Vaasa.
Civil marriage and freedom of religion in Finland

In Finland, before the turn of the century, the Evangelical Lutheran Church played a central role in the state judiciary. The role of the Church was so significant that only people who had received the Eucharist and had been confirmed could become state officials. After the turn of the century, the attempts to broaden Finland’s legislation regarding the freedom of religion were repeatedly obstructed by the Russian regime. The Russian Revolution of March 1917 created possibilities for the enforcement of long-awaited legislative reforms. A committee was set up to deal with issues regarding the freedom of religion, aiming at providing full freedom of religious practice and equality of religious communities, with the separation of church and state in mind (Reijonen 1980, Kaila 1923).

The institution of civil marriage had already been legislated for in Norway in 1845, in Denmark in 1851 and Sweden in 1908 (Pylkkänen 2012: 53). In the case of Finland, the Civil Marriage Act (CMA 1917) was prepared in the early twentieth century, accepted by the Finnish Parliament in 1911 and took effect in 1917 (ibid. 48). The law permits governmental officials (e.g., a judge, the president of a district court, the chairman of the magistrate, etc.) to perform, record and recognize a marriage. The law also states that the person who officiates the marriage is obliged to report the officiation of the marriage to the religious congregations – if applicable – concerned and to the civil registry.

Shortly after the Civil Marriage Act took effect, the constitutional right to the freedom of religion was implemented by the Freedom of Religion Act of 1922 (UVL267/122). In addition to the right to practise religion in public and private, the law also granted, for the first time in Finland, the right not to belong to any religious community. It also addressed the question of children whose parents belonged to different religious congregations or were not members of any at all. In the case of children whose parents were not registered in any religious community, neither was their child: both the child and his/her parents were entered on to the Civil Register. Should the parents be members of different religious congregations, the child became a member of the one that his/her father belonged to. If the couple was not married, the religion of the child was the same as the religion of the father, unless the parents signed a written agreement that the religion of the child’s mother be the one to be followed by the child (UVL267/122).
The civil register of persons who did not belong to any religious community was kept between 1919 and 1970. All officiated marriages and events of birth and death had to be reported to the congregational and civil registers the concerned individuals belonged to (Population Registry Centre). To avoid the problems occurring in the double and decentralized system of the population registries over the centuries, the Population Register Centre (Fi. Väestörekisterikeskus), set up a central register of the population (the present Population Information System, Fi. väestötietojärjestelmä) in 1969. In 1971, a computer-based register was introduced.

**Terminology**

Before starting the analysis of the marriage patterns of the Jewish Community of Helsinki I would like to clarify the terminology used in this article. As the demographer Sergio Della Pergola indicates in his paper entitled ‘Jewish out-marriage: a global perspective’, appropriate terminology may reflect whether an observation is being carried out from a general and neutral perspective or the more specific perspective of a given group (Della Pergola 2003: 6–7). Taking the nature of the studied data into consideration, I decided to use the terminology used by Della Pergola. Hence, when talking about intermarriages – by which I mean a marriage in which the spouses belong(ed) to two different religious communities of any sort (or one of them did not belong to any religious community at all) – I will distinguish between mixed marriages, conversionary in-marriages, and conversionary out-marriages. I will refer to mixed marriages in cases where both spouses remain members of their original religious congregations. Conversionary in-marriage applies to partnerships in which the non-Jewish spouse converts to Judaism before or after the marriage. Conversionary out-marriage indicates partnerships in which the Jewish spouse joins the group of his/her spouse. The term civil marriage applies to marriages that were officiated by a state officer in Finland or abroad. I consider all marriages officiated in the state of Israel to be marriages according to the Jewish Law.
Marriage patterns and their consequences in the Jewish Community of Helsinki between 1919–80

The data presented in this chapter is based on various primary sources, such as textual records of the Finnish Jewry. Most of this material is part of the Finnish Jewish Archive (Fi. Suomen juutalaisten arkisto) and is stored in the National Archives of Finland (NA: Syn, Vih, Kii, Muu), and some of it is being stored at the Jewish Community of Helsinki. These sources are however often inconsistent and show signs of incomplete administration. The data collected from the archive material was complemented by formerly implemented research and written studies of Finnish Jewry and the Jewish Community of Helsinki. It has to be emphasized that the data presented in this paper is preliminary, and could be modified upon the assessment of new sources.4

Before the institution of civil marriage was put into legislation, the registers of the Jewish Community of Helsinki naturally did not include intermarriages registered in the congregation (NA: Syn, Muu). After the institution of marriage legislation both endogamous and non-endogamous couples started to marry without any religious entity performing their ceremonies. According to the marriage register for the period of 1919–80 of the Jewish Community of Helsinki (NA: Vih), the first mixed marriage of a community member was officiated by the Registry Office of Helsinki (Swe. Magistratens i Helsingfors) and was recorded in the community in 1921. From this point onwards, both the number of intermarriages and the number of civil marriages started to increase in the congregation. The growing number of non-religious ceremonies proves that the congregation went through significant secularization.

As graph 1 indicates,5 the number of civil marriages gradually started to increase, and in the late 1950s, they exceeded the number of religious marriages almost every year until the 1970s. At the end of the 1970s – more specifically in 1977 – fifteen records were made, all of them endogamous. In

4 Some of the administrative documents of the Jewish Community of Helsinki are under organization. The assessment of all the textual records therefore is not entirely possible.

5 The graphs indicated in this study were created by the author based on information derived from the Registry of the Jewish Congregation of Helsinki (HrJCH) and the Archive of the Jewish Community in Finland stored at the National Archives of Finland (NA: Syn, Vih, Kii, Muu).
twenty-one cases – out of which eleven are endogamous relationships – the officiator of the marriages is not indicated in the register, nor have they been found elsewhere in the so-far assessed documentation and material.

Graph 2 shows the numbers of intermarriages compared to civil marriages recorded in the Jewish Community of Helsinki. The aim of this study is not to question the halakhic status of the studied congregational members. Therefore, in cases where the individuals’ congregation was marked as being elsewhere than a Jewish community, I considered the person non-Jewish: despite having a halakhically Jewish background, belonging to a non-Jewish religious community – or not belonging to a religious congregation at all – is often a clear marker of a person’s religious belonging in terms of their own self-identification or the community’s regulations. Moreover, due to

6 According to Halakhab (the Jewish Law) a person is Jewish if his/her mother is Jewish or if he/she converted to Judaism. For further reading, see Finkelstein 2003.

7 It is possible that one thinks of oneself as a Jew but is not being accepted as one in certain congregations that have strict requirements in terms of ancestry or conversions. For further reading on Jewish identity and intermarriages, see Cohen 2011; Dencik 1993, 2003, 2006; Fishman and Cohen 2017; Bleich 2013; Glenn and Sokoloff 2010; Graham 2004.
the contradictions between Finnish laws and *Halakhah* concerning the religious status of children, certain individuals registered in the congregational membership and marriage registers are not Jewish according to *Halakhah*. Nevertheless, I considered them Jewish if according to the marriage register (NA: Vih) they belonged to a Jewish community.8

According to graph 2, the majority of the civil marriages marked in the congregational marriage register of the Jewish Community of Helsinki were mixed marriages. The first congregational in-marriage appears in the community in 1950. Most of the conversional in-marriages were formerly officiated as a civil marriage, in most cases before the Jewish religious ceremony.

In 1977, there were fifteen marriages registered in the congregation, out of which ten were conversionary in-marriages. Interestingly, eleven of the records of 1977 were made on the same day. On every occasion, the non-Jewish spouse who converted to Judaism was the woman. As opposed to this trend, all the five members who were conversionarily out-married during the studied period were men. The vast majority of these intermarriages

8 In cases, when no membership to such congregations – or belonging only to the civil register – was found I decided not to include them on the graphs.
were officiated by members of Evangelical Lutheran – often traditionally Swedish-speaking – congregations. According to the currently assessed data, there were approximately seventy female members of the Jewish community marrying a non-Jewish man, and approximately more than hundred and seventy men, who married non-Jewish women. According to the currently available material, none of these men converted to Judaism, and only a very small percentage of the women ‘took on the yoke of the Torah’.9

When looking at the rates of endogamous10 marriages in relation to the rates of intermarriages (including mixed, congregational in- and congregational out-marriages) we can see that between 1955 and 1971, the number of intermarriages exceeded the number of endogamous marriages every year. Taking the aforementioned changes in the population registry policies into consideration, it is safe to assume that even in the 1970s, the numbers of

9 It is important to mention that the data presented in this study are results of preliminary doctoral research. As the congregation’s documentation is often inconsistent the information presented here may also change upon the assessment of new archival data or information.

10 Both religious and civil marriages of Jewish couples.
civil and intermarriages were higher in the community, but the leadership of the congregation did not consider recording the intermarriages (with the exception of the conversionary in-marriages) in its registers.

**Changes in congregational policies**

Several sources state that the Jewish community in Helsinki was already on its way to assimilation by the beginning of the 1900s. Finnish Jews identified themselves as ‘half Europeans’ and had drifted away from Jewish nationalism. The Jewish Community of Helsinki was (and still is) officially Orthodox; its members, however, did not (do not) always follow the standards of Orthodox Judaism in their daily lives (Muir 2004: 3). Herman Morath, a Yiddish writer from Latvia, gave an insight into the life of the Helsinki Jewish community during the 1920s. He mentioned that the congregation was characterized by assimilation, mixed marriages, and secularization. Rabbi Simon Federbusch 11 confined the rights of those who are married to non-Jews in a rabbinical statute of *takone*, which was later invalidated (Muir 2004: 5).

According to Orthodox *Halakhah*, Jewish religion and ‘Jewishness’ is based on either matrilineal descent (a person born to a Jewish mother is Jewish), or on conversion to Judaism accepted by a *bet din* – a rabbinical court (Finkelstein 2003). 12 The high number of intermarriages mostly officiated between Jewish men and non-Jewish women resulted in a growing number of *halakhically* non-Jewish children in the community. This forced the congregation to introduce new policies. As mentioned before, according to Finnish legislation, the religion of the child follows the religion of the father – unless the parents have a different agreement. Due to the contradictions between the Finnish and Jewish laws, several inconsistencies appeared in the administrative processes of the congregation. On 20 February 1947,

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11 He was the rabbi of the Jewish Community of Helsinki in 1931–40.
12 Nevertheless, it is important to point out, that Halakhah is not unified, and different denominations of Judaism interpret the Jewish law differently. The more traditional a denomination, the less likely it will be to accept conversions issued by less traditional movements. Moreover, the Reform Jewish Movement accepted the principle of patrilineal descent in 1983, and several denominations followed its example. For further reading see Haas 2016 and Rayner 1998.
two members of the Jewish Community of Helsinki\textsuperscript{13} sent a letter to the Attorney General of Finland in which they asked the Attorney General to include their children on the membership register of the community (NA: Kii). They based their request on paragraph 23§ of the Freedom of Religion Act, 1922.

As the paragraph of the Act states, the board of any religious community is obliged to keep a list of community members and their children. Such administration was also compulsory even in cases where children were not members of the community themselves. The two members’ letters to the General Attorney state that their wives are recorded in the marriage registers of the congregation, although they are not Jewish according to Halakhah. As they conclude, ‘Keeping the record of the marriages and children is strictly compulsory, it does not have anything to do with religion; it is only to be regarded as population registry, a task given to the congregations by the state’ (NA: Kii). As a response, the Attorney General requested both the Magistrate of Helsinki and the board of the community to comply with the legal regulations concerned and record the children into their registers. The Jewish Community of Helsinki nonetheless saw the issue from a different perspective. According to their interpretation, parents who belong to different religions have the right to register their child into the civil lists, without deciding on the child’s religion and allowing him/her to choose which congregation he/she would like to belong to as an adult – if he/she wishes to belong to any congregation at all. The board of the community was concerned that if they recorded the children in their registers, the record would ultimately indicate a non-Jewish child as belonging to the congregation and he/she would consequently be considered Jewish according to the standards of the community. As they stated, according to the religious code that the congregation follows, children receive their religion from their mother, therefore if the mother of the child is not Jewish, the child cannot become a member of the congregation. As the records of the congregational membership books prove, the Jewish Community of Helsinki did comply with the regulations and record \textit{halakhically} non-Jewish children in their membership registers (HrJCH).

\textsuperscript{13} Due to the small size of the local Jewish community and for the sake of the individuals’ privacy, I decided not to disclose the names of those concerned.
In the case of *halakhically* non-Jewish children of intermarried couples, the congregation asked different rabbis to suggest a solution to the contradictory Finnish-Jewish situation. The responses concluded that if the parents of such children agree to raise the minors according to the Jewish law (observing the circumcision of boy children), moreover that they agree to convert them to Judaism at the appropriate age (13 years for boys, and 12 for girls), the children can be recorded in the congregation’s registers, whilst indicating that they are not Jewish (*icke jude/icke judinna*) until their conversion. According to the sources, however, in certain cases, the rabbi of the congregation between 1945–51, Rabbi Elieser Berlinger, agreed to the *tevilah* – full-body immersion in a ritual bath, of children between the ages of 4–7 – after which ‘the children were considered to be definitively Jewish’ (NA: Kii).

Due to the increasing numbers of *halakhically* non-Jewish children and non-Jewish spouses of the members of the congregation, in 1971 the community created a separate list for children of non-Jewish mothers, who were born between 1946 and 1970. The list included 91 children of 53 families concerned. Moreover, in 1973, the congregation issued a paper that defined the congregational protocol for accepting children of intermarried couples whose mothers are not Jewish. According to the document, a child whose mother is Jewish is entitled to become a congregational member at any time. *Halakhically* non-Jewish under-aged children of intermarried couples may become members of the congregation if their parents agree to raise them as Jews and agree to their childhood conversion. In such a case, the mother of the child is not obliged to convert to Judaism. Adults who decide to convert to Judaism can be registered as members of the congregation after their conversion to Judaism (NA: Kii).

The current situation in the Jewish Community of Helsinki is very similar to that of the period studied in this paper. Numerous textual studies and sources concerning the Jewish Community of Helsinki mention that the number of intermarriages in the congregation is exceptionally high, and despite being members of an officially Orthodox Jewish congregation, Finnish Jews approach the *Halakhah* leniently and maintain a distinctive Finnish-Jewish identity (Franklin-Rahkonen 1991, Kotel 2000, Lundgren 2002, Kahan 2008, Larsson 2014, Czimbalmos 2016, Weintraub 2017). This often results in conversionary in-marriages into the community. The congregation still operates with very similar regulations to those defined in 1973.
Children born to Jewish mothers are accepted into the community if they are circumcised, and children of non-Jewish mothers but Jewish fathers can be accepted into the congregation if their parents agree to their conversion at the age defined by Rabbi Eleasar Berlinger (NA: Kii).

On 1 August 2003, the current Freedom of Religion Act (UVL2003/453) came into force, replacing the Act of 1922. As opposed to the former act, the new law states that the religious upbringing of children should be based on the agreement of the parents. If a person decides to join a religious congregation of any sort, he/she is responsible for notifying the local registry offices about this choice (UVL2003/453). Due to the new legislation and to the more consistent system the congregation follows, the situation of children of intermarried couples is significantly easier – at least at the administrative levels.

Conclusions

The aim of this article has been to present marriage patterns in the Jewish Community of Helsinki in the period 1919–80, while focusing on intermarriages and their consequences in the congregation.

As the studied data shows, the first mixed marriage in the community was registered in 1921. In the second half of the twentieth century, the numbers of civil marriages and intermarriages started to grow, and between 1955 and 1971 their numbers exceeded the number of Jewish religious marriages almost every year. Most possibly, due to the changes in the administration system of the Population Register Centre of Finland, the congregation stopped indicating the non-endogamous weddings (except of the conversionary in-marriages) in its registers. Numerous earlier textual studies and research findings indicate that the number of intermarriages within the community is still exceptionally high in the Jewish Community of Helsinki. To the best of my knowledge, the primary sources used when writing this study – most of them being deposited in the National Archives of Finland (NA: Syn, Vih, Kii, Muu) and some of them stored at the Jewish Community of Helsinki (HrJCH) – have never been used when researching Finnish Jewry. As the results of this paper show, these documents not only confirm, but also enrich the findings of former research written about Finnish Jewry.

The increasing number of intermarriages, and the birth of a growing number of halakhically non-Jewish children have strongly affected the
policies of the community when defining its boundaries at the administrative level. The policies of the congregation that were decided upon in the second half of the 1900s remain in practice. Due to the Freedom of Religion Act of 2003 (UVL2003/453), the potential religious upbringing of the children is decided upon the agreement of their parents: interreligious families face fewer issues regarding the local administration. Nevertheless, the acceptance of children of certain intermarriages as Jews in other parts of the Jewish world may not be free of barriers. As the different denominations and authorities of Judaism have various policies concerning the subject of intermarriages and their issue, Finnish Jewish children may face rejection. Hence, further research on both the current and on the historical situation of Finnish-Jewish intermarriages is a necessity.

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From Yidishe khasene to civil marriage

**From Yidishe khasene to civil marriage**


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Muir, Simo, and Hana Worthen (eds.), 2013. *Finland’s Holocaust: Silences of History* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan)


Economic inequality is a paramount issue for the future of global affairs and interreligious relations. This study contributes to the field by providing the first ever estimates of global inequality by religion. We combine estimations and projections of religious compositions and distribution of income by age and sex across the world between 1970 and 2050. Understanding economic inequality from a religious dimension can contribute to decreasing tension, creating targeted policies and reducing the risks of social upheaval and conflict.

We find that in societies with higher proportions of religiously unaffiliated populations, income distribution is more equal than in religious ones. We also describe the inequality of distribution of income within religious groups and find that Christian and Jewish societies tend to be the most unequal, while inequality has risen substantially across all societies, concomitant with strong economic growth. Societies formed of Muslim, Hindu and unaffiliated populations are among the more equal ones. Muslim societies have experienced the highest rise in income inequality of all religions since 1990.

When it is a question of money, everybody is of the same religion.
(Voltaire)

Introduction

Background

The 2015 PEW-ACC estimates of religious populations have opened a wide avenue for research on the religious development of world populations: ACC and PEW produced the first global dataset of affiliation by age and sex, covering 199 nations and more than 99 per cent of the global population, based on a large database of more than 2,500 surveys, registers and censuses (Skirbekk et al. 2010, 2015). We combine these with the UNU-WIDER income distribution survey data from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) (UNU-WIDER 2017) and the World Bank World Development Indicators data (WDI) (World Bank 2017) to provide a global picture of the global income distribution by religion.
Objective and value added

We aim to shed light on the economic weight of religious groups in the global economy and the distribution of income within them. This should be a helpful tool in further analysing the inconclusive relationship between religion and income inequality.

Methods

We combine religious distribution data from the World Religion Database and PEW-ACC with income distribution data from UNU-WIDER and gross national income data from the World Bank WDI database. From this combined data we extrapolate distributions of income among the world’s religious groups per country. We use also OECD projections and their methodology to produce global projections for economic growth and its distribution among religious groups until 2050.

Results

We show how income inequality has developed within and across religious groups since 1970. Consistent with the global observations of recent decades (Davies et al. 2015, Piketty 2015, Milanovic 2017), we observe an increase in economic inequality both across and within religious groups, but with marked differences between religions. Whereas Christians and Jews start at a high level of inequality and this rises only moderately, Muslims and the unaffiliated rise markedly, especially in the period between 1990 and 2010. Buddhists are the only group experiencing a fall in inequality among its followers.

Conclusions

Christian and Jewish societies tend have the highest levels of economic inequality, while inequality has risen substantially across all societies, concomitant with strong economic growth since the 1970s. Muslims, Hindus and the unaffiliated are among the more equal societies. Yet Muslim societies have experienced the greatest rise in inequality in the period between 1990 and 2010. Research to obtain more granularity on the relationship between inequality and religion is warranted.
Methods and data

Religious affiliation data

PEW-ACC religious projections were the first ever global estimates of religion that took into account global religious demographic detail. They incorporated age–sex variation and took into account more than 2,500 demographic databases. The project was based on funding from Vegard Skirbekk’s European Research Council grant (Grant Agreement 241003-COHORT) and a Templeton funding grant provided to the PEW foundation. All projections were carried out by a model setup led by Marcin Stonawski who was deputy leader in Vegard Skirbekk’s ACC (Age and Cohort Change group) and released as various PEW reports.

The 2015 PEW-ACC estimates of religious populations have opened a wide avenue for research on the religious development of world populations: ACC and PEW produced the first global dataset on affiliation by age and sex, covering 199 nations and more than 99 per cent of the global population, based on a large database of more than 2,500 surveys, registers and censuses (Skirbekk et al. 2010, 2015).

Data on religious affiliation was taken from a separate, unique project that estimated global religious affiliation by age and sex globally. Religious affiliation information from more than 2,500 data sources, including censuses, demographic surveys, general population surveys, and other studies were analysed – the largest project of its kind to date. These data were used to produce country-specific estimates on religious affiliation by five-year age groups separately for men and women. Census, survey, focus-group and other demographic data collection methods were used to identify belief

1 Details regarding the data sources, the procedures used in gathering the data, carrying out the estimations and harmonizing the data are presented in several technical reports and methodological articles (Stonawski et al. 2015).

2 Censuses were the primary source in 90 nations, which together cover 45% of all people in the world. Large-scale demographic surveys were the primary sources for 43 countries. General population surveys were the primary source of data for an additional 42 countries, representing 37% of the global population. Together, censuses or surveys provided estimates for 175 countries representing 95% of the world’s population. In the remaining 57 countries, representing 5% of the world’s population, the primary sources for the religious-composition estimates include population registers and institutional membership statistics reported in the World Religion Database and other sources.
systems as they relate to the demographic makeup of society, age and sex distribution, and geographic factors. Eighty-three per cent of the world’s population had a religion in 2010 according to our estimates, and this proportion is projected to increase to 87 per cent by 2050 (Hackett et al. 2015). Our unique global collection of data on religious belief allows us to investigate variations in religious belief.

A limitation of our study is that our dependent variables are associated with countries, and countries are composed of numerous religious groups. As a simplifying approach, we analysed countries by majority religion, but ideally we would have all of our indicators broken out by religious group. Furthermore, our data have other biases in common with studies that use countries as units of analysis.

Gross national income and inequality data

The global estimation of gross national income and its distribution was made using an augmented Solow model (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2009), combining the World Bank Development Indicators database with forecasts produced by the OECD and using the OECD methodology (OECD 2017) to produce forecasts for the non-OECD member countries in our sample. 3 We then combined these with

3 GDP growth projections used are from March 2017. They are expressed in real per capita terms PPP, and are drawn following the methodology used in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2017). Where OECD projections are not available, we use our own growth projections which are based on an augmented Solow model of economic production, using a Cobb-Douglas function: where A represents productivity, K is capital, and L is labour. We assume that technology will evolve across countries as a process of catching up with the most developed economies, as has been the case in the period 1950–2010. Convergence depends on gross national income per capita, and the basic assumption is that as developing economies get closer to income-per-capita levels of more developed economies, their productivity growth rate will slow down. By 2050, the end of our forecasting horizon, we assume the output gap will have closed and there will be no difference between PPP and real exchange rates. The rate at which they catch up depends on technology transfer and on the initial productivity gap with more developed economies.

The Bayesian modelling approach (Marin et al. 2005, Jones and Schneider 2005) allows for probability statements to be made directly about the unknown parameters, prior or expert opinion to be included in the analysis, and hier-
the UNU-World Income Inequality Database data to produce a distribution of income for the different religious groups globally to 2050.

Consistent with the methodology in our religious database (Stonawski et al. 2015), we use a macro-level approach, ignoring within-country variation in economic levels. In some countries, this clearly plays an important role, as economic variations between economic groups can differ greatly. However, many countries are completely dominated by one religion and within-country variation in income by religious groups is often smaller than variation between countries. We also correct for countries without a majority religion to keep this effect contained.

As the figure for income, we use gross national income (GNI) in purchase power parity (PPP) adjusted 2011 constant International USD (World Bank 2017).

GNI is a measure of income similar to the widely-used gross domestic product, but it adds to the GDP the rents earned by domestic residents of factor income (land, labour and capital) from abroad and subtracts rents and factor income of non-residents earned from the country.

The purchase power parity adjustment for income means that income figures between two countries are adjusted to show the price differences between the two countries. Prices vary considerably between industrialized and developing nations for both tradeable and non-tradeable goods; for example, an income of 1,000 USD per month in rural India affords a comfortable life for a family of four, while the same income in the US would barely cover the basic necessities of one person.

The use of constant dollars 2011 USD means that the price level of 2011 is kept as the reference for the duration of the time series, enabling us to compare the purchasing power of income across time, as well as countries.

Hierarchical descriptions of both local-scale and global features of the model. In this case we perform growth regressions with possible paths for all possible combinations of outcomes possible for the factors in our model (capital, labour and technology). Similar to the approach used by the UN Population fund in their estimations of world population, we produce a median forecast for income for each country that we estimate to be probable within a probability of 80%.
Theory and background

Religious affiliation is associated with economic growth (including differences in economic level and economic inequality) as well as demographic change (including differences in fertility). This paper aims to contribute to the literature on the socioeconomic determinants and consequences of religion and religiosity started by Max Weber (1905) and continued in contributions on religion and inequality including (Barro and McCleary 2003, McCleary and Barro 2006, Guiso et al. 2006, Glaeser and Sacerdote 2008, Becker and Woessmann 2010), who emphasize the relationship from religion to growth through the accumulation of human and physical capital.

Identifying, describing and understanding the effects of religious dimensions on economic development dimensions remains a challenge. Most research has been focused on smaller samples, usually from one region or nation, while there has been a lack of research focusing on global relationships.

As exposed in the excellent survey by Matthias Basedau, Simone Gobien and Sebastian Prediger (2017), some economic studies on religion have focused on income and its distribution. Several studies consider religion as the independent variable and consistently report a positive correlation with income inequality, suggesting that religion may cause inequality (Solt et al. 2011, Solt 2014). However, the direction of causality could go the other way, where economic inequality leads more people to turn to religion.

Significant evidence suggests that people who are religious differ from their secular counterparts in their preferences concerning economic redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano 2011, Benabou and Tirole 2005, Guiso et al. 2003, Scheve and Stasavage 2006, Stegmueller 2013). Frequent churchgoers in Western democracies are less likely to support public spending which could reduce economic inequalities (Scheve and Stasavage 2006) or to vote for parties with redistribution on their agendas (Stegmüller 2013) than less frequent churchgoers. Political parties with conservative agendas are found to not prioritize redistribution (Hoffmann 2013, Saroglou et al. 2004). One argument is that religiously-inspired ideas and values focus people’s attention away from material and economic interests in favour of ideology, values and belief-based policies. Elaborating on this line of argument, Ana De La O and Jonathan Rodden (2008) show, that in economically advanced democracies, poor religious people’s preferences for morals appear to dominate over their preferences for redistribution, particularly in countries with large Catholic populations.
There are also other mechanisms through which religious ideas may affect preferences and attitudes and, by extension, inequality. For example, religious individuals may derive psychological benefits from religion that reduce the perceived burden of health and economic insecurities and provide a sense of meaning, see also Dehejia et al. (2005), or may oppose welfare spending on the basis that it decouples work from reward (Benabou and Tirole 2005).

Moreover, religious organizations provide material resources to poor members (Hungerman 2005) that may substitute for social welfare spending and reduce the need for state-provided social insurance (Dehejia et al. 2005). Huber and Stanig (2011) further propose that church–state financial separation and voter coalitions among rich and poor religious people counteract religious individuals’ demand for welfare spending. Accordingly, rich and poor religious individuals form electoral coalitions in favour of lower taxation (and hence state redistribution), where the religious poor are compensated by the rich via charitable donations to the churches. These donations tend to benefit the religious poor – but to a lesser extent the secular poor (Huber and Stanig 2011).

However, empirical evidence on the relationship between religious dimensions and redistribution preferences, voting behaviour, and attitudes towards the welfare state has so far been correlational, not causal, and has come almost exclusively from advanced economies.

As our figures show, religion and religiosity play a much bigger role in developing countries, where lower levels of societal development leave more room for religions to provide social and health services (Paldam and Gundlach 2013).

**Income distribution by religions**

Over the next two decades the structure of the world population as well as income levels are projected to undergo profound changes. Rapid demographic growth in Africa has been forecast to coincide with strong economic growth. Christians and Muslims will remain the largest religious groups, where Muslims will see a strong increase, while the religiously unaffiliated, Buddhists, and folk religionists are likely to experience a decline. See figure 1 which shows estimates and projections of religious affiliations from 1970 to 2050.
As highlighted in Stonawski et al. (2015) and Johnson and Grim (2008), the stalling of population growth of the more secular East Asian and Western societies in the decades since 1970 has been followed by growth in more religious parts of South Asia and Africa. The religiously unaffiliated, which in 1970 made up close to 20 per cent of the global population, have been in decline ever since. China’s stalling population growth, where an estimated 51 per cent of the world’s unaffiliated lived in 2010, is the main reason for the decline in the size of this group. Hinduism will reach a plateau around 2025, and will thereafter experience stagnation in terms of its world population share. The economic rise of countries with these religions dominant will be quite significant, especially in the context of the big emerging markets. Buddhists and folk religionists will continue their slow decline as a proportion of world affiliated following low fertility for the Buddhists and conversion to other religions in the case of folk religionists.

Figure 2a shows the period between 1970 to 2010, where we can observe growth that occurred within a forty-year period, where Hindus more than quadrupled in size and Muslims grew two and a half times. From 2010 to 2050 we see slower relative growth, see figure 2b, where the most important change is the Muslim population almost doubling from its 2010 level. From
2010 onwards we are likely to observe a decline in numbers of Buddhists and the unaffiliated.

Having calculated the income distribution for all countries, we can now plot how inequality fares according to religion. From figure 3, consistent with the global rise in inequality, we find that all religious groups, except Buddhists, exhibit rises in the inequality of income distribution among their members. One has to take into account the lack of comparable survey data.

for the period before 1990, the number of observations is restricted to 38 countries for the period between 1970 and 1980. For 1990 to 2000 we have 78 observations and for 2000–2010 we have 174.

The Gini coefficient is a widely-used measure of the dispersion of a distribution in the social sciences. It was created by Italian statistician Corrado Gini as a measure for the dispersion of income and wealth within a population (Gini 1921). It gives a numeric value to how far from a totally equal distribution of income the present distribution is. The higher the value, the more unequal the distribution is, and the more income or wealth is concentrated among fewer people. Here we have displayed the values as between 0 (total equality) and 100 (total inequality). Values taken from the WIID database for the Gini index for OECD countries range between 24.5 for Slovenia and 50.4 for Chile. Scandinavian countries range between 27.4 for Denmark, 25.2 for Finland, 23.9 for Norway and 25.2 for Sweden, while Anglo-Saxon countries exhibit higher values, with 32.4 for the UK and 48 for the USA. African and Latin American countries are among the most unequal, with values of 60.8 for South Africa and 51.2 for Brazil.
We find that Jews and Christian populations have the greatest inequality regarding income among the faiths, with Gini-coefficients rising in this period from the low 20s in 1970 to more than 40 in 2010 for both religions. Hindus had the highest level of equality in 2010 at 37. The unaffiliated groups also ranked highly in terms of equality of income distribution, at 38, but have experienced a very pronounced rise in inequality, mainly due to China’s increase in inequality from the late 1990s.

By regions, Christians in Europe are more equal, but Christian populations in Africa and the Americas contribute to a wider dispersion. Muslim societies in Asia Pacific exhibit distributions of income closer to their neighbouring societies, dampening the wider disparities of Muslim societies in the Middle East and Africa.

As per figure 4, we now plot the income distribution by religion by quintiles, or divided into five groups that account for 20 per cent of income receivers each. Here we plot the 20/20 ratio, or the ratio of the top 20 per cent of earners to the 20 per cent least well off among the population (see Forbes 2000 for a list of measures of inequality and explanation of 20/20 ratio). The 20/20 ratio helps to give a more nuanced view of the distribution.

Figure 4. Economic inequality based on the 20/20 ratio (UNU-WIID 2017, Stonawski et al. 2015, and our own calculations).
of income, especially when we have distributions with similar Gini coefficients (as is the case with Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists in our sample). It gives better information than the Gini on the crucial aspect of how redistribution of gross national income works (or does not) in a society between its richest and poorest members.

Consistent with the observation that income among Christians and Jews is more unequally distributed, we find both religions at the top of the scale. The top 20 per cent of Jewish income earners receive 12 times the income of the poorest 20 per cent whilst the figure is 8.7 for Christians respectively. We find declines in these ratios for Buddhists in the period from 1970 to 2010.

If we look at the significant increase in inequality between 2000 and 2010 exhibited by Jews (increasing from 8.28 to 10.55) and Christians (from 7.18 to 8.5), we find that in both cases it is the increase in inequality of the US residents of both faiths that explains most of this increase. In this 10-year period, the income accruing to the top 20 per cent of earners increased from 46.9 to 51.1 per cent. Of the 5.7 million Jews in the US, the wealthiest 20 per cent increased their average income from 160,000 USD to 191,000 USD.

In our projections we assume inequality to remain constant from 2010 or the latest available survey date onwards.

All USD data are given in 2011 constant prices, and at purchase power parity, or adjusted for differences in prices of common goods, to make the international comparison easier and more meaningful. Keeping the prices constant also enables us to compare income across the timespan of our study (1970 to 2050), taking account of inflation. In figures 5a and b we find the economic weight by religious group. In figure 5a, in 2010 Christians agglomerate the highest proportion of global income at 40 trillion USD, more than the combined share of the unaffiliated (19 trillion USD), Muslims (14 trillion USD) or the Buddhists (6 trillion USD). In terms of growth, Hindus, Muslims and the unaffiliated have grown considerably since the 1970s, but it is remarkable that in 2010 both the unaffiliated and Muslims surpass the income of Christians in 1970, on the back of the fast pace of economic and population growth the world has experienced in this time frame. This has given rise to a shifting of economic weight away from the traditional centres of growth in the West and towards emerging markets.
Figures 5a and b. Income distribution by world religions; a tale of two periods (World Bank 2017, Stonawski et al. 2015, and our own calculations).
Some religions weigh more in terms of contribution to global GDP. On the basis of the assumption that within-national variation in GDP by religion is equal\(^4\) the following global distribution of belief is given: see figure 5a. Christians, although accounting for only 31.4 per cent of the world’s population, account for 49.3 per cent of global GDP. The unaffiliated were only 16.4 per cent of the population, but represented 22.2 per cent of GDP. Muslims accounted for 23.2 per cent of the world population in 2010, but represented only 12.3 per cent of global GDP. Hindus were 15 per cent of the population, but their GDP was only 4.9 per cent.

If we now focus on figure 5b, we can see the probable paths of development for the economic weight of religious groups. The global estimation of gross national income using an augmented Solow model, combining the World Bank Development Indicators database with ACC-PEW forecasts for population growth and religious affiliation. We then combine these with UNU-World Income Inequality Database data to produce a distribution of income for the different religious groups globally to 2050.\(^5\)

Based on this forecast methodology, we expect a growth in income of Christians to reach 87 trillion USD by 2050. The unaffiliated would reach close to 60 trillion USD, Muslims 52 trillion USD and Hindus close to 30 trillion USD.

The relative income difference between Christians and all other religious groups will most probably continue to converge, as it did in the period 1970–2010. Our projections show that by 2050 both Muslims and the unaffiliated could well be surpassing the income levels of Christians in 2010 by some margin. In the period we forecast, 2010–2050, Hindus will experience the highest growth in income, and will surpass in 2050 the level of income

\(^4\) Clearly, GDP-group variation within countries may differ between religions, yet since many countries are dominated by one religion (Stonawski et al. 2015), these changes are often relatively modest.

\(^5\) GDP growth projections used are from March 2017. They are expressed in real per capita terms PPP, and are drawn following the methodology used in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report ‘Looking to 2060’ (OECD 2017). Consistent with the methodology used in this study, we use a macro-level approach ignoring within-country variations in economic levels. In some countries this clearly plays an important role, as economic variations between economic groups can be great. However, many countries are completely dominated by one religion and within-country variations in income by religious groups are often smaller than variations between countries. We also correct for countries without a majority religion to keep this effect contained.
of Christians in 1990. As remarkable as that growth may seem, it actually represents a lower rate of convergence between richer and poorer than that experienced in the period between 1970 and 2010, as population growth decelerates globally.

As per figures 6 and 7, we can see the evolution of income per capita in these two periods. In per capita terms, we can observe how the average
income has evolved in this time frame for the different religious groups. Christians and Jews dominated in the 1970s, and we have seen a process of catch-up by all religious groups, and even more by the unaffiliated, who on the back of China’s remarkable economic performance, rise five-fold to almost close the gap on Christians.

If we now take the mid-point projections for our forecasts for growth to 2050, we find that the unaffiliated and Hindus are projected to make the greatest improvements, propelled by different factors. Whereas Hindus enjoy the demographic benefit that a rising working-age population provides, the unaffiliated are propelled by China’s transition to a consumer society, which according to OECD forecasts will in 2050 have the average per capita income of the average Eurozone member in 2015 of close to 35,000 USD. Of note are also the projected growth rates of Muslim societies, which by 2050 will have on average the per capita income of Christian societies in 2010 of close to 18,000 USD.

**Beyond the averages, the inequality aspects of religions**

So far we have been describing the average income of religious groups. In this section we disaggregate and look at the relative income of the population, broken down into 20 per cent income brackets (quintiles).

In figure 8 we show the world income for the top quintile. Supposing we have constant inequality distribution in the time frame between 2010 to 2050, we find that the top 20% of income earners are dominated by Christians, with all groups experiencing high growth, especially the wealthier Hindus. At 40 trillion USD, the share of income of the wealthiest 20 per cent of Christians in 2050 will be as big as that for the overall population in 2010, in the case of Hindus, which are projected to grow much faster, that share would be four times higher at 13.5 trillion USD.

In figure 9 we study the middle classes. The ‘middle classes’ are defined as the 60 per cent of the population comprised between the top 80th percentile and the lowest 20th percentile. Their combined income is around the same as the top 20 per cent for most religious groups. Only in the case of the unaffiliated does it represent a bigger share.

As per figure 10, the lowest 20 per cent of income earners represent less than a 20th of the overall economic weight, with wide variations among religions. This is where the comparison with the 20/20 ratio can be seen in detail. Whereas the least well-off Christians earn nine times less than the
Figure 8. World income by religion by quintiles, 2010–2050; the top 20 per cent (World Bank 2017, UNU-WIDER 2017, Stonawski et al. 2015, and our own calculations).

Figure 9. World income by religion; the middle classes (20%-80% of population) (World Bank 2017, UNU-WIDER 2017, Stonawski et al. 2015, and our own calculations).
wealthiest 20 per cent, Muslim and Hindus have closer gaps between rich and poor.

In figure 11 we can see the average income per capita for each of the religions, and then the income of each 20 per cent section (quintile) of the population. For example, for Christians within the first quintile (ChristiansQ1, i.e. the lowest 20% of income earners), the average income in 2010 is 5,124 USD. ChristiansQ5 represents the fifth quintile (the highest earning 20%) – the average income of 43,595; ChristiansQ2-4 represents the average income of the middle three quintiles (between 20 and 80% of income earners), with an average income per capita of 14,859 USD.

Here we only present the data, and leave it for future research projects to look into the very interesting questions raised by displaying how the lowest 20 per cent of income receivers fare within the respective religions. The fact that the unaffiliated lowest quintile earns more than the equivalent Christians (5,325 USD to 5,124 USD respectively) while the highest quintile of Christians earns 43,595 USD compared to the unaffiliated’s 35,706 USD. This points to stark differences in redistributive policies that have been remarked on in the literature (Solt et al. 2011, Solt 2014), and that our data may provide global proof of.

![World Income by religion by Quintiles 2010-50, the poor (low 20%)](image)
Figure 11. Income distribution per capita by quintiles and religions in 2010 (World Bank 2017, UNU-WIDER 2017, Stonawski et al. 2015, and our own calculations).

Figure 12. Income distribution per capita by quintiles and religions in 2050 (World Bank 2017, UNU-WIDER 2017, Stonawski et al. 2015, and our own calculations).
The sources of economic growth, a brief look at emerging markets

The growth in income described above has been especially remarkable in emerging markets; here we take a brief look at the developments in the two periods we focus on.

As per figure 13, if we look in detail at the seven populous emerging market economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, Nigeria, Indonesia and South Africa), we find between 1970–2010 the startling growth that has increased the economic prominence of the unaffiliated, Hindus and Muslims.

The increase in income in this period was of a factor of seven for both Christians and the unaffiliated and of more than ten for Hindus, Buddhists and Muslims.

These big seven economies contributed close to 50 per cent of all growth in the period between 1970 and 2010. As per figure 14, our projections forecast that the contribution of this group may well exceed that proportion to around 66 per cent of overall growth.

Conclusion

To conclude, this study has shown results of our estimations and projections of religious compositions by age and sex for populations across the world. The ACC-PEW project was the first to attempt to provide harmonized and reliable estimates concerning religious groups globally by demographic detail. Availability of this kind of data is crucial for improving the quality of future scientific work.

In terms of the economic weight and the inequality of distribution of income, we find that Christians are, and will remain by 2050, the most economically influential group, with a total GNI at PPP of over 87 trillion 2011 USD. The unaffiliated will remain as the second largest group. Despite unaffiliated numbers globally stagnating, they will still grow in economic influence. Demographic dividends propel Hindus, Muslims and Christians in that order.

In the BRIC-NIS context, the unaffiliated and Hindus will rise to become the two most important economic groups. Especially remarkable is the rise of the Hindus since 1970.

We find that in societies with greater shares of religiously unaffiliated populations, income distribution is more equal than religious ones. We adjust for income levels, but this may be due to the ‘Kuznets effect’, whereby
Figure 13. The sources of economic growth; the view from emerging markets 1970–2010 (World Bank 2017, UNU-WIDER 2017, Stonawski et al. 2015, and our own calculations).

Figure 14. The future of economic growth; the view from emerging markets 2010–2050 (World Bank 2017, UNU-WIID 2017, Stonawski et al. 2015, and our own calculations).
societies in the early stages of development experience periods of high inequality in a capital accumulation phase. China is the big outlier in terms of this observation. We assume constant inequality from 2010, and inequality has risen sharply within China since 1970. Its transition to a more developed society would actually reinforce the observation in the coming decades.

In terms of religions, Christian and Jewish societies tend to be the most unequal, while inequality has risen substantially across all societies, concomitant with strong economic growth. Muslims, Hindus and the unaffiliated are among the more equal societies. Muslim societies have experienced the highest rise in income inequality of all religions since 1990.

Economic inequality is a paramount issue in the future of global affairs and interreligious relations. This study contributes by providing the first ever estimates on global inequality by religion. Understanding religious inequality can contribute to decreasing tension, creating targeted policies and reducing the risks of social upheaval and conflict.

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