EXPLODING WILDERNESS

Guerrilla-type activities in the Finnish art of war

Marko Palokangas
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Guerrilla-type activities as an area of study in the history of the art of war

Study of the art of war, taking all its aspects into consideration, leads us to the conclusion that it is a phenomenon that has emerged over hundreds of years, possibly even thousands. The same is true of tactics in equal measure. Guerrilla warfare and the use of guerrilla-type activities did not emerge in modern times or during the two world wars. The history of warfare demonstrates that belligerents have made good use of the methods of guerrilla warfare in countless wars. On occasion, guerrilla-type activities have been less important, lending warfare a character of true guerrilla warfare. At other times, guerrilla-type methods have played a lesser role, principally providing only direct support to regular military operations. Most examples of the methods of guerrilla warfare addressed by military historians focus on cases in which the population of an occupied country has fought the occupier. The history of guerrilla warfare is essentially a history of a weaker party fighting a stronger adversary. Thus, from the viewpoint of the art of war, guerrilla warfare has acquired its present form through a process of trial and error over the course of thousands of years.

The military history of Antiquity and the Middle Ages offers several examples of guerrilla tactics. Gauls and Germans fighting Roman invaders, and ambushes staged by mountain tribesmen against Hannibal’s troops can well be likened to guerrilla-type warfare. It is naturally debatable whether fighting at that time should be regarded as organised guerrilla warfare or as the only means available to the underdog to take on an adversary. From the viewpoint of the history of the art of war and its study, both interpretations can be construed equally correct or equally incorrect. The study of the methods and art of warfare always depends on the period in which is conducted and on the viewpoint taken. If the examples offered by military history are interpreted from the viewpoint of the victorious party with superior resources, the conclusion will differ in most cases from those drawn by the defeated party with fewer resources.2

Over the course of the modern period, guerrilla warfare became more prevalent and assumed more organised forms. In The Thirty Years' War between 1618 and 1648 commanders of bands formed of adventurers were called guerrillas. Such bands offered their services and their military skills to both warring parties. International military history attests to guerrillas in the 18th century in wars such as the War of the

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1 Marko Palokangas (b. 1973) Lieutenant Colonel, Adjunct Professor (DScMil) works at National Defence University as the Head of Research Team of the Department of Warfare.

2 See, for example, Ilmola, Paavo: Sissisota, sen edellytykset ja sodankäynnin suunnatavat (“Guerrilla war, its prerequisites and guidelines”), a separate study conducted at the National General Staff College in 1958, Helsinki 3 April 1959, pp. 1–4, T 26965/F 20 sal, KA. Adaridi, Karl: Sissitoininta (“Guerrilla-type activities”) Helsinki 1925(a), pp. 9–29.
Austrian Succession, fought between 1740 and 1748, in which the troops of Frederick the Great had to abandon southern Bohemia due to incessant harassment by units of guerrillas. Military historians also refer to guerrilla units and their action on several occasions in the context of the late 18th century and the French Revolutionary Wars. Both belligerents resorted to guerrilla tactics so frequently that this sparked a change in French tactics and the way troops were deployed. However, it was not until General Napoleon Bonaparte with his tactical solutions and competence in the art of war had arrived on the scene, so argue military historians, that a popular uprising based on guerrilla tactics was finally put down.3

The history of the art of war offers similar examples of guerrilla warfare set in a global context during the 19th and 20th centuries. With regard to developments in the art of war during the modern period, the wars that Napoleon waged in Europe between 1803 and 1815 stand out justifiably. These wars sparked popular uprisings during which the French were confronted with guerrilla warfare in Spain, Austria and other areas. The emergence of mass armies extended theatre of war even further. War was also extended further to areas that were located behind front lines where military, political, social, economic and mental factors contributed to more frequent eruptions of popular resistance and occurrences of uprisings.4

Studies of the contemporary writings on guerrilla warfare by notable soldiers of the 18th and 19th centuries indicate that this kind of warfare appears to have caused problems to many of them. Theorists of the time found it clearly disconcerting that partisans and other civilians who had taken up arms and who could be juxtaposed with guerrillas had emerged on the scene to disrupt the regular tactics of the time, which basically resembled an elaborate geometrical game. Against this background it is no wonder that many of the contemporary generals – Napoleon included – were reluctant to give any credit to the achievements of guerrilla warfare or to the fighting skills of armed citizens and partisans. However, other interpretations of guerrilla warfare were also proposed. General Carl von Clausewitz, who later earned renown as a theorist of war, argued that the emergence of popular uprisings and the more frequent employment of guerrilla warfare from the 18th century onwards was a historical breakthrough that pushed the boundaries of and expanded the methods of waging war that by the time had become artificial and outdated.5

In Finland, guerrilla-like methods and guerrilla warfare itself have a long history as part of the art of war, and have even taken on strategic aspects – sometimes more visibly, other times less so. In Finnish romantic nationalism, guerrilla warfare manifests itself in numerous stories, including literature. For example, in the 16th century, Olaus Magnus Gothus wrote in his History of the Northern Peoples, among other things, about Finns on skis in woods, employing combat tactics that closely

resembled those of guerrilla-style activities. Stories and writings about guerrilla unit leaders of the 16th and 17th century, such as Pietari Niilonpoika Kylliäinen and Juho Antinpoika Vesainen or guerrilla units known as ‘Kivekkäät’ (so named after their leader, Antti Kivekäs) that operated in the Russian-occupied Finland during the Great Northern War, or the legendary Jacob Johan Roth, Karl Johan Spoof and Olli Tiainen who engaged in guerrilla-type activities during the Finnish War from 1808 to 1809, have contributed to the heroic glory of guerrilla fighters.

As manifestations of the Finnish art of war as practised in the modern era and in more recent times, guerrilla-type operations can justifiably be said to have been part of military operations at least in the Finnish War between 1808 and 1809, in the Finnish War of Independence in 1918, and in the Winter and Continuation Wars between 1939 and 1944. However, all of the wars listed above have one thing in common: guerrilla-type operations were not systematic and followed no larger plan. It was not until the period between the 1950s and the 1970s, following changes to the Finnish defence doctrine and the lengthy development process of the territorial defence system, that guerrilla-type tactics became an established part of the Finnish art of war.

Finland’s defence solution and land warfare tactics were vividly presented in a training package published in the late 1960s, tasked with the central objective of providing society at large with an understanding of the principles underpinning the territorial defence system. ‘Superiority in firepower of a great power can be counterbalanced even in regular military operations by dispersing troops and by enabling them to take advantage of the cover offered by the terrain, thereby denying the enemy advantageous targets, and by bringing the enemy under our own fire through the deployment of land mines and guerrilla-type tactics. With regard to movement, we must take the maximum advantage of the opportunities offered by our terrain in order to slow down the enemy and to speed up our own movement. Our battle disposition must be deep along the enemy's probable routes of advance and flexible and active on his flanks. There must be hedegogs lying in the enemy’s way and Karelian bear dogs must be biting into his sides! In order to enable mobile military operations, aimed to actively slow down the enemy’s advance and to deliver decisive strikes, mobile general forces with a maximum firepower must be formed of the younger age classes, while older age classes can be armed and kitted out to form local forces for local defence purposes. The local forces are tasked with containing landings of airborne troops, slowing down advancing enemy attack formations, protecting targets in the rear, and tying up enemy forces by waiting un-

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7 Pietari Niilonpoika Kylliäinen († approx. 1510), was the first known castellan of Olavinlinna Castle who, with the castle’s garrison and by enlisting the aid of common people was able to repel a Russian attack in 1495.

8 According to Finnish folklore, Juho Antinpoika Vesainen, or Juho Pekka Antinpoika Vesainen (ca. 1540 – ca. 1627), was a Finnish freedom fighter and guerrilla leader who, during the Great Northern War, fought with his troops for the sovereignty of the Finnish people. See for example Ivalo, Santeri: Juho Vesainen, Porvoo 1925.

til they have passed over and then launching guerrilla-type operations in the enemy’s rear. Everywhere the enemy must be forced to face ‘the exploding wilderness.’

The preceding paragraph sums up the functional core of the territorial defence system as well as the key principles of using guerrilla-type tactics. But how did the methods of guerrilla warfare become incorporated into the Finnish art of war? In what ways have such tactics been developed and formulated into a theory that makes use of tactical methods and means available to the operational level of war? Of what elements have guerrilla-type tactics with a decidedly Finnish character been constructed over time; and what key components does the Finnish guerrilla tactics consist of? This study will discuss the evolution and historical trajectory of guerrilla-type tactics from the viewpoint of the art of war, placing the emphasis on the Finnish territorial defence system put in place during the Cold War. If I am looking for an inspiration for this study, I might find it in the pseudonym ‘Viljami Korpi’, or Veikko Koppinen, who completed a manuscript for a novel entitled Räjähtävä tyhyyys (‘Exploding Wilderness’) in the mid-1950s. ‘Räjähtävä tyhyyys – exploding wilderness’ is also a concept launched by Veikko Koppinen. It denotes Finnish guerrilla-type tactics, intended to be employed in the enemy’s rear as part of regular military operations or conducted alongside such operations. Although these two words are rather abstract, when regarded in a broader sense they capture the objectives of guerrilla-type tactics, which form part of the principal deterrent that the territorial defence system, introduced in the 1950s, seeks to provide.

What makes this context and subject particularly interesting is Veikko Koppinen’s personal profile and strongly felt convictions about guerrilla warfare, which are revealed in his writings via his two alter egos, author Viljami Korpi and the protagonist of his novel, Colonel Savukorpi. His manuscript12 that was completed in the late 1950s but never saw publication describes the exploding wilderness in Chapter 17, ‘Tyhyyttä vastaan ei voi taistella’ (‘It is impossible to fight a void’), as follows: ‘The exploding wilderness was Colonel Savukorpi’s favourite phrase, which he used with great success when giving tactical instructions to his subordinate guerrilla district commanders at the time when leaders of guerrilla warfare, ranging from patrol leaders to regional commanders, were receiving refresher training. It is impossible to fight a void; you cannot shell it with artillery fire; you cannot fire at it using automatic weapons; and you cannot rake it with rockets launched from the air. To the enemy, the exploding wilderness spells deception and playing by the wrong rules...’

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10 Maaanpuolustuksen perusteet, Puolustusvoimain tehtävät ja mahdollisuudet rauhan ja turvallisuuden ylläpitämisessä, puoluetonnunnaisen suojamisessa ja asellisen hyökkäyksen torjumisessa (‘The foundations of national defence, The tasks of the Defence Forces and the opportunities available to them in the maintenance of peace and security, protection of neutrality and repulsion of an armed attack’), Helsinki 1968, Part: Reserviupseerikoulutus (‘Reserve officer training’), p. 11.
11 Korpi, Viljami (Koppinen, Veikko): Räjähtävä tyhyyys (‘Exploding wilderness’), an unpublished manuscript from the 1950s, kept at the National Defence University. 882417. See also Koppinen, Veikko: Räjähtävä tyhyyys (‘Exploding wilderness’), edited by Marko Palokangas from an unpublished manuscript dating back to the 1950s, Tampere 2012.
12 At the time, the manuscript was left unpublished due to its politically sensitive nature. See, for example, Visuri, Pekka: Idän ja lännän välissä (‘Between east and west’), Saarijärvi 2010, p. 53.
13 Koppinen (2012), pp. 120–121.
The wilderness may or may not be exploding, but guerrilla-type tactics forming part
of the Finnish art of war are a topic worth studying. The study of guerrilla-type tac-
tics and their development over time can explain several changes that have occurred
in the Finnish art of war and provide grounds for many decisions that were taken.
There has clearly been a demand for this research topic in the Finnish Defence
Forces for a long time.14

While studies have increasingly focused on the history of and developments in Fin-
land’s defensive capabilities during the Cold War, operative military plans and tac-
tical principles with associated contemporary concepts have almost exclusively re-
mained confined to archives, being kept there untouched. It was not until the early
2000s, by which time the regulations governing the publicity of information enabled
the release of certain material related to the Finnish military history, that the Opera-
tions Division of the General Headquarters and other departments released a large
body of information, making it available to researchers, finally providing an oppor-
tunity to form an exhaustive picture of the operative and tactical elements of the ter-
ritorial defence system, at least to a certain degree.15 The principal objective of this
study is to achieve an overall picture of and provide an analysis of the development
of guerrilla-type methods as they were intended to be used as part of the Finnish art
of war.

1.2. On concepts

The concepts used in the Finnish language related to guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-
type operations are many in number, ambiguous in meaning and difficult to under-
stand. The intelligibility of the concepts is hampered by numerous changes to their
content and explanations that have occurred over the course of time, as well as by
their varying definitions. From an international perspective, they appear inconsistent
in many cases, or may even have completely opposite meanings. When comparing
concepts related to guerrilla warfare in an international context, it is impossible to

14 In the autumn of 1999, Vesa Tynkkynen, then head of a research group at the Department of
Tactics of the National Defence University proposed to Suomen Marsalkka Mannerheimin Sotatieteel-
linen Rahasto (‘Marshall Mannerheim’s Foundation for the Promotion of Study of Military Science’) that
a research project be launched to study tactics used in Finnish land warfare, the third subpro-
ject of which in the order of priority was entitled ‘Guerrilla-style tactics in the Finnish art of war.’ This
large and exhaustive study of the development of tactics was never begun due to lack of support
and policy adopted by the Foundation. Karjalainen, Mikko: Marskin salattu rahasto – Suomen Marsalk-
ka Mannerheimin Sotatieteellinen Rahasto 1937–2012 (‘Mannerheim’s secret foundation – Marshall
Mannerheim’s Foundation for the promotion of study of Military Science 1937–2012’), Porvoo
15 After the Operations Division of the General Headquarters released, between 2000 and 2002, a
large portion of their original post-WWII documents for archival at the Military Archives (known
under the name ‘the National Archives’ after 2008), it became possible for researches to undertake
comprehensive research on the subject matter of this study. Jouko, Petteri: a presentation on 23
November 2005. Tynkkynen, Vesa: Puolustusjärjestelyt (‘Defence arrangements’), an article in a work
434–465.
reach a complete and unambiguous consensus. During the Cold War era, the content of such concepts and their definitions were changed on several occasions.

The root words lying behind the concepts play an important role in many languages. Particularly the meanings of root words, denoting the word that in Finnish is *sissi* (not to be confused with ‘sissy’), in languages other than Finnish, may in part explain the conceptual changes that were made to military terminology during the Cold War, and clarify the national nuances in meanings regarding guerrilla-type operations. The origin of the word *sissi*, with a definition that would be understandable in an international context, is woven deeply into the fabric of the research topic of this study when viewed from the perspective of actions made legal or illegal by the rules of war.

*Sissi*, the key term of the study area in Finnish, has become an established word in Finnish by the 18th or 19th century. The available sources indicate that this word emerged in Finnish as early as in the 17th century, at which time it denoted *one who commits petty theft*. However, we know with certainty that the word also denoted at least a *snooper*, a *spy*, a *bandit*, or a *patrolman* in the 18th century literature.16

Today, many languages have the word *guerrilla*, which both in standard language and in military parlance refers to a soldier operating in the enemy’s rear. The concepts used in the various languages clearly have one thing on common: the influence exercised by Latin. The Latin word *pars*, in plural, *partis*, denotes ‘side, direction, party, role of an actor, office, function, duty’. The word *gerere* refers to warfare and combat.17

The German language translates *sissi* as *Partisan* and *Guerrilla*. *Partisan* is defined as a combatant of an armed group that operates in the rear18 and fights an enemy that has invaded a country or, in the case of an internal conflict, against the legal government of a country. *Guerrilla*, in turn, is defined as a member of group engaged in

16 The word ‘sissi’ occurred in spoken Finnish in the lore of the Forest Finns in Sweden’s Värmland, denoting ‘one who commits petty theft.’ Forest Finns (in Swedish, skogsfinnar or svedjefinnar, and in Finnish, kaskisuomalaiset) were Finns who emigrated, from the late 1580s onwards, from the Finnish provinces Savo and North Häme to various parts of Sweden and other areas, to start a life as homesteaders. Russians referred to Finnish peasants prowling in forests using the word ‘šiši’ (snooper); according to Elias Lönnrot, in Finland ‘sissi’ also denoted a ‘snooper’ working for the customs officials. According to linguist Jalo Kalima, Forest Finns living in Östmark in Värmland used the word ‘sissi’, as early as in the early 17th century, to refer to an individual who stole game or fish from traps. See, among other things: Kalima, Jalo: *Uudelleen Sisso ja sissi (oikaisu)* (‘Sisso and sissi revisited (a rectification’), Virittäjä 47/1943, pp. 108–109. In literary Finnish, ‘sissi’ is first attested, as far as is known, in the manuscript for Kristfrid Ganander’s dictionary dated 1787, denoting both a bandit and a patrolman. Ganander, Kristfrid: *Nytt Finskt Lexicon*, edited by Liisa Nuutinen, 1997, p. 884. See also Häkkinen, Kaisa: *Nykysuomen etymologinen sanakirja* (‘Etymological dictionary of modern Finnish’), WSOY, Helsinki 2004 (3. painos, Juva 2005), subvoce sissi, p. 1163.


18 In this connection, ‘rear’ denotes hidden, camouflaged, invisible.
guerrilla warfare. In connection with this, the various dictionaries also refer to the definition of the word *Partisan*.19

The English language also explains the concept of *sissi* using the words *partisan* and *guer(r)illa*. *Guer(r)illa* refers to a member of a small military unit that is not part of the regular army and that, in fact, fights the regular army in most cases to instigate a revolution. The word *partisan* in turn, may have two meanings. The first meaning refers to an individual who is an ardent supporter of a particular leader, group or idea. The second meaning has more to do with guerrilla warfare and refers to a member of an armed group that remains in hiding while fighting the solders of an enemy that has invaded the country. In Swedish, the words *partisan* and *gerilla* have taken on meanings that are very similar to those of the English and German languages.20

From the perspective of scholarly study, the relevant point is that the meaning of ‘*sissi*’ in literary Finnish changed as the 18th century gave way to the 19th century, with the new meaning taking on predominantly military aspects. The written Finnish history of war attest to guerrilla units being formed at least in a war known as the Finnish War which was fought between 1808 and 1809. Among others, Paavo Ilmola write in his study *Sissisota, sen edellytykset ja sodankäynnin suunnittelu* (‘Guerrilla warfare, its prerequisites and the outline of warfare’) that guerrilla-type activities played a major role in the Finnish War. In 1808, guerrilla bands were formed of peasants included in the Swedish army deployed in Finland; such bands fought the Russians with success in some places although it was recognised that such guerrilla operations were extremely uncoordinated.21 By the early 1900s, ‘*sissi*’ units were incorporated into Finland’s legal armed forces, of which an example is provided by the fact that the General Headquarters of independent Finland renamed a guerrilla unit in 1918, designating it as22 an honourable military unit with no references made to an outlaw status. In modern Finnish, *sissi* refers to a soldier who belongs to regular army and operates in the enemy’s rear, bearing legal insignia.23

In Finnish, the word *sissi* has been associated over the course of time with several additional concepts; all of them had association with action or war. This word has a national meaning in Finnish which differs from the universally used concept. In the military parlance of independent Finland, *sissi* is defined, as a general rule, as a legal soldier of the regular armed forces who operates in enemy-occupied territory car-

21 Ilmola (1958), pp. 5–6, T 26965/F 20 sal, KA.
22 For example, Jaeger Battalion 3 (*Jääkäripataljoona 3*) was renamed Kajaani Guerrilla Battalion (*Kajaanin Sissipataljoona*) on 23 August 1918. Renaming was motivated by the fact that Civil Guard members in Kainuu formed a unit called ‘Kajaani Guerrilla Regiment’ (*Kajaanin-Sissi-Ryksmentti*) in January – thereby making a reference to the province’s history. This unit was known under this name until May 1918, although it, by then, had already been incorporated into a Civil Guard regiment. *Suomen puolustusvaikutus 1918–1939*, Puolustusvoimien ranan ajan historia osa 1, (‘The Finnish Defence Forces 1918–1939, the peacetime history of the Defence Forces, part 1’), edited by. Jarl Kronlund, Porvoo 1988, Chapter *Puolustusjärjestelmän luodaan* (‘A defence system is created’), p. 143.
rying out a wide range of tasks. On occasion, the long-range patrolmen of the Continuation War, who operated behind the enemy lines, wore a uniform and carried out reconnaissance and demolition tasks, were also called a ‘sissi’.\textsuperscript{24}

The word \textit{sissi}, which is now an establish word in Finnish, is difficult to translate into other languages while retaining its unambiguous meaning. The translations that perhaps come closest in meaning to the Finnish word ‘sissi’ and provide the most descriptive definition, are the English \textit{ranger} or \textit{guerrilla jaeger}. Ranger, however, refers more clearly to long-range patrol or long-range reconnaissance activities, being derived from the American root word \textit{range}. Long range patrol, the translation of the Finnish ‘\textit{kaukopartio}’, has also been derived from ‘\textit{range}’.\textsuperscript{25} Althouth \textit{guerrilla jaeger} is better equated with a jaeger that has been trained in guerrilla-type operations, it is also a poor translation for the Finnish ‘\textit{sissi}’. It should be pointed out that in languages other than Finnish, \textit{guerrilla} does not always denote a ‘\textit{sissi}’; rather, it is associated almost as often with a revolutionary combatant or even with an individual who commits crimes against the state and does not belong to the armed forces. Even the Finnish phrase \textit{guerrilla-type activity} may be received with some scepticism in modern society, due to a certain lack of terminology which hampers Finnish military parlance, leading to linguistic problems with regard to the translations of numerous concepts used outside the Finnish language. Although the military community would perceive the root word \textit{sissi} as a conventional combatant of the armed forces, the Finnish language is lacking in the means of expression in this respect. For this reason, the key concepts of the study area, ‘\textit{guerrilla war}’, ‘\textit{guerrilla warfare}’ and ‘\textit{guerrilla-type activities}’ will be analysed in the conclusion of this study.\textsuperscript{26}

\textit{Guerrilla-type activities} in Finnish military parlance refer to the employment of unconventional methods by troops generally limited in number and normally carrying light equipment, operating in enemy-held territory and fighting as part of a conventional military operation or battle. The ability of troops to supply themselves independently and their capability to engage in prolonged independent combat as part of a larger military operation constitute the basic requisites for guerrilla-type operations. Finnish guerrilla-type activities are characterised by unconventional warfare, the avoidance of decisive battles, keeping in hiding, and preparedness for surprise. However, the major difference between Finnish guerrilla tactics and guerrilla warfare as it is understood in the international context is the Finnish practice of asso-


\textsuperscript{26} Turunen, Ismo: Correspondence by e-mail between September and October of 2010; a more comprehensive presentation of the general concepts of military defence can be found in the contemporary manuals / regulations, guidebooks and handbooks of the various periods. The Cold War era military terminology can be found in a summarised form in ‘\textit{Strategian käsikirja}’ (‘Strategy Handbook’), edited by Pekka Uutaniemi, Helsinki 1983.
ciating guerrilla-type activities with battles and operations conducted by conventional forces.\(^{27}\)

In this study, the phrase *guerrilla-type activities* refer, with a somewhat sweeping generalisation, to all regular military operations in the course of which almost all wartime troops engage in guerrilla-type activities, supplementing and intensifying the combat carried out by general forces. The key objective of such activities is to wear down, hinder and harass the enemy, and to tie up enemy troops in continued combat. In order to achieve such objectives, guerrilla-type activities normally comprise demolition and harassment, holding of a target or a swath of territory for a specified length of time, and continuous reconnaissance. In army regulations, *guerrilla-type activities* normally refer to combat operations conducted in the enemy’s rear or in enemy-held territory, relying on preparations made in advance and continuing them over long periods of time. A more detailed analysis of guerrilla-type activities associated with specific periods, including a conceptual analysis, will provided in every chapter of this study.

*Guerrilla warfare* refers to military or paramilitary operations carried out by unconventional, mostly local troops in enemy-held or hostile territory. In the United States of the 1960s, for example, *guerrilla warfare* was defined as a subcategory of unconventional warfare. Terrorism is also characterised as a prestage of guerrilla warfare by many commentators.\(^{28}\) In the terminology of the 2000s that is used universally, guerrilla warfare refers to combat operations carried out by small separate units in the enemy’s rear or in enemy-occupied territory using unconventional means such as strikes and surprise raids. Units engaged in guerrilla warfare operate in a highly independent way under a command structure that is often dispersed.\(^{29}\)

The definition given above differs from the Finnish concept of *guerrilla warfare*, which refers to operations carried out by regular army units alongside other military operations or extending the scope of such operation while observing the laws of war and legal norms.\(^{30}\) In a 1971 draft for the *Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa* (‘General Section of the 1971 Field Regulation’), guerrilla warfare was defined as ‘warfare conducted in order to continue regular military operations or carried out alongside such operations in enemy-held territory. To continue military operations in the form of guerrilla warfare is a viable solution in


situations where the prerequisites to carry out regular military operations have been lost in some part or a major section of the Finnish territory.

The draft for the Field Regulation defined the objectives of guerrilla warfare to be the creation of prerequisites for defeating the enemy and achieving a political solution that would ensure the continued existence of the Finnish nation and to seek to find an overall solution. It is highly interesting that the Field Regulation did not specifically define guerrilla-type activities or discuss the concept in any detail. The chapter on definitions in Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa, confirmed in 1972 and adopted in 1973, defines guerrilla warfare in terms that were largely similar to those in the draft. Only the word order has been slightly changed.

On the other hand, guerrilla warfare could be viewed in the Finnish art of war as an all-out state, one to which Finland was prepared to resort as a last-ditch effort or as the last option in order to preserve the nation’s independence. This notwithstanding, it can be argued with justification, that guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare were equated, to a degree at least, in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, the paradox lies exactly in the fact that the definition of Finnish guerrilla-type activities covers almost all means available to guerrilla warfare including its basic tactics, constituting, from the national point of view, the key concept in tactical thinking and in the art of war.

In situations where the means of guerrilla warfare are used to topple a social order, it refers to revolutionary warfare. However, revolutionary warfare is a broader concept than guerrilla warfare as it normally covers aspects such as political indoctrination, terrorism and sabotage and other ‘low-profile activities’, in addition to incorporating the methods of guerrilla warfare. Thus, revolutionary warfare can be defined as an organised movement seeking to oust a legal government by means of subversive activities and an armed conflict. As early as in the 19th century, Carl von Clausewitz touched upon popular war in his texts which have clear points of resemblance to guerrilla warfare.

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31 Kenttäohjesääntö Yleinen osa, luonnos (KO yl) (‘General Section of the Field Regulation’), 1971, p. 71 and Attachment 1, p. 1.
32 Kenttäohjesääntö Yleinen osa (KO yl) (‘General Section of the Field Regulation’), Mikkeli 1973, p. 74 and 168.
33 Low profile may refer to overlapping aspects of covert and secret operations.
35 Texts by von Clausewitz have also been translated in Finland; in some cases, the translators have resorted to simplifications that are, in fact, errors of interpretation. As an example of such, a translation and abridgement, completed by the German translation group of the National General Staff College, of the chapter Volksbewaffnung in Carl von Clausewitz’s work Vom Kriege can be mentioned: ‘Ellei siis haluta rakennella tuulentupia, on sisissota ajateltava liitetyseen väkivallan suhteisiin ja molemmat sodankäynnin muodot on yhdistettävä kokonaissuunnitelmaan.’ A translation and abridgement, completed by the German translation group of the National General Staff College, of the chapter Volksbewaffnung (guerrilla war) in Carl von Clausewitz’ work Vom Kriege, document page 2. The research database of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, ID Tak008, folder 158. See also von Clausewitz (1918), pp. 492–499.
1.3. International historical background and the legal status of guerrilla warfare

From the viewpoint of the methods of warfare, the roots of guerrilla warfare run deep in history. Making use of simple methods, its characteristics go back in time hundreds and possibly thousands of years. As it is understood today, and as it is frequently portrayed in publicity, guerrilla warfare with its subcategories makes use of ancient methods but resorts to tactics and equipment that are considerably more sophisticated. The art of war closely follows developments in military technology, and this is something that can be perceived in changes to guerrilla warfare. Traps have been replaced with land mines, and scattered sabotage has given way to operations that are conducted under a more organised command structure.

The emergence of guerrilla warfare, as it is understood in modern terms, can roughly be dated to the post-WWII era and its gradual dismantling of colonial rule. Entire empires fell following both bloodless revolutions as and savage colonial wars. In the latter case, many nations aspiring to independent nationhood employed all possible manifestations of the art of war while attempting to obtain freedom. As the capabilities of the various colonial liberation movements to wage conventional war against colonial powers was, as a rule, limited, they frequently resorted to the unconventional and indirect methods of warfare, ranging from the strategic level to tactical principles. Many colonies chose guerrilla warfare as their method of waging war, or even total guerrilla war, which could be successfully waged under varying conditions using simple and cost-efficient methods.36

In the post-WWII era, the methods and tactics of guerrilla warfare underwent significant developments. The backdrop for such developments was provided by a tripartite view of the world, prevalent during the Cold War era37. The opposing ideologies were represented by the East and the West. However, the mutual balance of terror, a product of a conscious construction process, and the threat presented by nuclear weapons, never escalated to a third world war. The struggle for influence was also conducted through indirect means. The great powers began to provide systematic support to each others’ enemies, particularly in the former colonies and in developing countries. Nations aspiring to achieve independence were provided with

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37 The tripartite view of the world refers to a setup in which two super powers – the United States of America and Soviet Union – dominated the world politics, and exerted influence, either directly or indirectly, on developments that led to numerous wars in third countries. Due to the nuclear threat, the great powers were engaged in continuous combat in several unstable developing states, in which the East and West, as ideological opponents, provided support to the objectives of their adversaries, enabling a subversive guerrilla war through the provision of, for example, armed assistance. See also Kesseli (2002), p. 72.
armed assistance and military advice, thereby promoting armed operations by groups that employed the methods of guerrilla warfare harmful to the adversary.38

In civilised countries, governed by the rule of law, the laws of war have exerted influence over the use of the methods of warfare, particularly in modern times. According to the humanitarian concept of justice, the key objective lying behind the laws of war seeks to limit the means available to the warring parties, with the purpose of avoiding excessive human suffering. Laws, however, were not adopted to ease warfare but, rather, to mitigate collateral damage and to avoid arbitrary violence. This is why guerrilla warfare and its methods have presented, over more than two centuries, a considerable problem to the Western principles governing the laws of war and to the rights that combatants can be expected to have. The unilateral advantage that guerrilla fighters enjoyed by virtue of regulations protecting civilian populations was well understood by the time the French revolution was followed by an eruption of wars in the early 19th century. Consequently, there was a desire to classify guerrilla combatants as outlaws who did not necessarily deserve to be treated in accordance with the laws of war when encountered in combat. This view gained strength from the nature of guerrilla warfare, understood as a means available to the weaker party, which threatened to narrow the military might of the leading colonial powers.39

In the next century, guerrilla warfare became more frequent in Western countries, to an extent that led the participants of the Hague Peace Conferences held in 1899 and 1907 to sign a treaty, albeit reluctantly, that conceded guerrillas combatants the status of an official belligerent. However, the states that ratified the treaty ensured that ‘justified guerrilla warfare’ became burdened with restrictions that guerrilla combatants found impossible to follow in practice. Guerrilla combatants had to be clearly distinguishable as a belligerent party by wearing clear, external military insignia and by openly carrying their arms. Both requirements constricted the opportunities available to guerrilla fighters to hide, in other words, to avoid a direct confrontation with a superior enemy.40

In an annex to the General Convention of the Hague Peace Conference, Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed in 1907, an article on the belligerents and their characteristic was formulated. According to this Article, ‘the laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps if they fulfil the following conditions: that they are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; that they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; that they carry arms openly; and that they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under the

40 Ibid.
denomination ‘army.’ It should be mentioned that he above-mentioned extracts of laws governing land warfare were annexed to Finnish Field Regulations from the 1920s onwards.

The legal status of guerrillas and guerrilla warfare was taken up at The Hague IV International Convention, according to which a population may take up arms if they meet the following stipulations: that the population is commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; that they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; that they carry arms openly; and that they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

The rules of war and the status of guerrillas was discussed again in the late 20th century, in a period when the great powers heated up by the Cold War encountered guerrilla fighters with their allies in local wars waged in various parts of the world. Both for ideological reasons and for the sake of being able to secure a wider sphere of influence, local guerrilla wars in third countries were particularly taxing for the United States. As the Soviet Union took advantage of the situation, assuming a positive attitude towards guerrilla movements, the United States was ultimately compelled to give in to international pressure and to accept the strengthening of guerrilla fighters’ rights.

In the Additional Protocols to the 1977 Geneva Convention, which amended the rules governing warfare encoded in the Charter of the United Nations, guerrilla combatants were equated, with certain restrictions, with legal combatants, and were conceded largely similar rights to those that legal combatants enjoyed. Part III of the first Additional Protocol to the Convention, signed on 8 June in 1977 in Geneva, addressed the methods of waging war and the status of combatants and prisoners of war. Article 43 of this document defines the armed forces as follows: ‘The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognised by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities. Whenever a "army."
Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to the conflict.\textsuperscript{45}

The most significant change to the previous interpretation of the status of combatants related to guerrilla combatants, who were now required to carry their weapons openly only in combat. The supporters of guerrilla movements interpreted this to mean that arms could be carried concealed until fire was opened with them. Thus, guerrilla fighters would have been given the right to mingle with the civilian population until the last moment, thereby making it impossible to distinguish them from civilians or to target them in advance. The United States was opposed to this interpretation, declining to ratify the Additional 1977 Protocol to the Convention. In practice, the authority and rights of guerrilla fighters received increased global recognition.\textsuperscript{46}

As the international legal status of guerrilla combatants improved, military operations became ever more difficult. After the Vietnam War, the U.S. Armed Forces embarked on a process to make their doctrine of guerrilla warfare, which had proved insufficient, more effective. Improved intelligence, provision of special training to soldiers, and highlighting the political and social dimensions enabled effective counter-guerrilla operations using fewer personnel but not necessarily a a lesser financial cost. On the other hand, towards the end of the Cold War era, the United States increasingly began to arm and train guerrilla movements operating in the adversary’s territory.\textsuperscript{47}

Guerrilla warfare and the ensuing counter-guerrilla tactics developed interactively through a process of trial and error within the art of war. The methods of counter-guerrilla warfare often developed to be similar to those employed by the opposing guerrilla fighters. The methods of counter-revolutionary warfare developed along similar lines, assuming a principal objective of preserving the social order of the country involved in a war. As experiences accumulated, political, economic and psychological methods were introduced, including those used in civilian crisis management, to supplement military and paramilitary counter operations. Thus, since 1945, the various forms of guerrilla warfare have led to a whole range of reactions, which,


\textsuperscript{46} Ibid. The fourth Geneva Convention, held in 1949, sought to improve the status of the sick and wounded belonging to land forces (Convention I, the status of the sick, wounded or shipwrecked belonging to the navy (Convention II), the status of war prisoner (Convention III), and the status of civilians in wartime (Convention IV). To extend the protection offered by the Conventions, two supplementary instruments were approved of in 1977; an Additional Protocol relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), and another Protocol relating to the protection of victims of non-International armed conflicts (Protocol II). Combined, these Conventions and Protocols constitute the framework for written international humanitarian justice. Finland has ratified all six Conventions. See also Marjomaa, (2004), pp. 2–3. \textit{Sodan historia} (‘A history of war’), edited by Janne Malkki et.al., Keuruu 2008, p. 241.

\textsuperscript{47} Marjomaa (2004), pp. 2–3.
however, often failed to recognise the associated wider social and military implications.\(^{48}\)

2. GUERRILLA-TYPE ACTIVITIES AS A FOURTH METHOD OF COMBAT

2.1. Development of the Finnish military system and the art of war during the early years of independent Finland

The history of the defence forces of independent Finland dates back to the events of 1918 following Finland’s declaration of independence, to a period when the Committee of Internal Affairs of the Senate declared, on 25 January 1918, the Civil Guards to be the troops of the legal government. The newly founded military immediately saw action in the War of Independence, which had just started. With the war still underway from January to May 1918, plans were already being drafted for the consolidation of the military’s position and its composition. After the war, the White Army was demobilised, and work was begun to establish a military organisation for the country.\(^{49}\)

Outlines for the establishment of a peacetime army and its units were issued in June 1918. The first army order made no reference to the areas of responsibility of the various divisions, only to their locations.\(^{50}\) In connection with the units being established, some of them were given historical names that dated back to the 18th and 19th centuries, with regional connections being part of the name in some cases. The Uusimaa Dragoon Regiment and the Karelia Guard Regiment are examples of such names. By late 1918, the military organisation had found its form, being modelled on the German system. The organisation was built around a framework of three divisions and one brigade, including the units under them, as well as military schools, various military establishments, conscription districts, frontier guard districts and the aviation force. The navy and coastal defences were placed directly under the Finnish High Command.\(^{51}\) Despite the fact that the military had an organisation, the chain of command was initially confusing, clearly lacking defined areas of responsibility.

In March 1919, changes were made to the organisation and chain of command of the military, including the division of the country into 29 conscription districts, as the temporary conscription act was being put into effect. In the same year, the posi-


\(^{50}\) _Armeijakäskey_ (‘Army order’) no. 1/8.6.1918, _pääväkäskyysarja_ (in the series of orders of the day), KA.

tion and powers of the military authorities were established in legislation, and new units were founded. Most peacetime units were located in population centres, where garrison structures and buildings dating back to period of the Russian rule were available. The first formative years of the Finnish military were a period of change and unestablished practices. The organisation and operations of the Finnish military slowly matured in the period between 1919 and 1924, when the Finnish military system was being created. The name of the Finnish military system was changed by a law passed in 1922; military system (‘military system’ - the literal translation from Finnish is ‘war system’ – was replaced by ‘defence system’.) In practice, it was this reform that gave an established form to the arrangements of the defence of Finland by military means.52

With regard to the inception period of the Finnish army, closely following Finland becoming an independent nation, it can be safely said that the newly formed armed forces had few tactical traditions, let alone a homogeneous approach to the art of war. After all, prior to her independence, Finland had not had any military force between 1904 and 1917. Following the issuance of the declaration of independence, the country needed credible defence forces. While the army was being formed, a great deal of conflicts occurred. Disagreement between the military and political leadership, as well as internal conflicts among the army officer corps, hampered, in part, the development of the armed forces. The fact that the Finnish officer corps were split into three fractions, reflecting their background and training, was one of the principal factors hampering the development of the Finnish art of war. Officers trained at the military academies of Russia, Germany and Finland found it extremely difficult to reach a consensus with regard to tactics or the art of war.53

During the first years of independent Finland, society at large and, consequently, the newly founded army, focused on the stabilisation of the country. Under such circumstances, it is quite understandable that the foundation process of the army was based on foreign models and on experiences gained from past wars. In this respect, the prevalent theories concerning the art of war, experiences gained from the First World War, and lessons learned from military history provided the foundation for the teaching of tactics and its development. On one hand, the experiences gained from the First World War provided the general grounds for the development of tactics as part of the art of war. On the other hand, officers who had participated in the War of Independence provided views founded on personal experience of the significance of Finnish conditions and on the characteristics of Finnish terrain in the development of the Finnish art of war.

However, Vesa Tynkkynen states in his doctoral dissertation that the War of Independence can be regarded as an inconsistent event with regard to experiences that might have proven useful for the development of tactics. The tactics employed in the War of Independence were, after all, more or less subject to individual decisions,

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caused by the lack of previous battlefield experience, by the diverse background of
the officer corps, and by the poor training of the troops. The brief duration of the
war also left little time for tactical reflection. The War of Independence left only a
superficial mark on the Finnish art of war in the 1920s, due to the fact that the tacti-
cal lessons learned from this war were not recorded as a result of its short duration.
Although a great number of books were published of the war, they mostly focused
on some of the individual events of the conflict. It was not until the 1930s that re-
search reports on tactics and the art of war, based on the experiences gained from
the War of Independence, began to be published.54

However, various theories and texts focusing on the art of war published by theo-
rists were used as inspiration for national thinking. Of the foreign theorists, the
views of Englishmen J. F. C. Fuller55 and B. H. Liddell Hart56 on the use of mecha-
nised troops were particularly subjected to study. It should be noted that, at the
time, their views found no widespread resonance in Britain and France. In Germany
and the Soviet Union, in contrast, Fuller’s and Liddel Hart’s ideas found an atten-
tive audience. Despite Finland’s strong pro-German orientation, Fuller’s and Liddell
Hart’s ideas arouse little interest here, as the mechanisation of troops hinted at the
introduction of a professional army, which conflicted with the deeply-rooted Finn-

ish idea of having the army founded on universal conscription and the traditions of
using infantry. The views put forth by Fuller and Liddell Hart were regarded in Fin-
land as worthy of further refinement, although they, as such, were unsuited to the
Finnish terrain which, with its multitude of small-scale geographical features, clearly
deviated from the terrain prevalent in Central Europe.57

During the early years of independent Finland, the development of the Army was
led by officers who had received their training in Russia. Starting from the mid-
1920s, Jaeger officers, trained in Germany, were appointed to positions of influence,
strengthening the German orientation even further. According to Vesa Tynkkynen,
the First World War, the experiences gained from it, and the German orientation es-
tablished two main methods of combat in Finnish tactics. The principal methods of
combat – attack and defence – constituted the framework of tactical thinking that
was observed until the wars waged between 1939 and 1944. Rather than focusing on
the wide-spread theatres of war of the First World War, characterised by the defen-
sive war of attrition, Finnish tacticians set their sights on more mobile means of
waging war, leading to a situation where the offensive tactics, brought to Finland by
the Jaegers, came to dominate tactical thinking, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s.
The reasons behind avoiding a defensive war of attrition were chiefly related to ef-
forts to minimise materiel and human losses. Thus, the tactics and the art of war of
the period were characterised by efforts to make use of offensive tactics and opera-
tions that were expected to bring with them a solution, as opposed to lengthy, de-

55 John Frederick Charles Fuller (1878–1966) was an English officer, military historian and military
56 Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1895–1970) was an English officer, military historian and military
57 Tynkkynen (1996), p. 23. See also Talvela, Paavo: Konearmeija, a presentation held at the General
Headquarters in an English book entitled ‘The Remarkings of modern Armies’, Sotilasaikakauslehti
defensive battles of attrition. The enemy’s freedom of action was to be denied by employing ruthless, mobile and rapid attacks. The existence of delaying tactics was also recognised, and such tactics were perceived as being at their most successful when used as a part of an offensive or a defensive operation, adapted to the local situations and circumstances. However, it was only shortly before the outbreak of the Winter War that they achieved the status of a full-blown tactical combat method in Finnish tactics. Vesa Tynkkynen also states in his dissertation, albeit with some exaggeration, that in the period between the two world wars guerrilla-type activities became, in a way, the fourth form of fighting in Finnish tactics.58

Finnish tactical thinking in the 1920s was based on two-pronged thinking – formal and applied tactics. In line with theorists, on a more general level, tactics were understood to be a doctrine on how to win battles. Formal tactics were based on the regulations of each branch of the army, defining the forms of movement and combat that each branch was to use in war. Formal tactics, therefore, can be regarded as synonymous with the tactics employed by the various Army branches. Applied tactics differed from formal tactics in that they referred to the collaboration between two or more Army branches in combat or preparing for combat. Contemporary sources suggest that applied tactics were also referred to as ‘tactics of combined branches.’59

The significance of and opportunities for guerrilla-type activities arose in discussions shortly after Finland became independent. Ideas for and discussions about opportunities offered by guerrilla-type activities were largely founded on examples sourced from military history as well as on experiences obtained from the Finnish conditions. For centuries, Finland had been a stage for a struggle between East and West, providing a wealth of examples of war in which untouched swaths of wilderness had proved, almost without exception, advantageous for guerrillas.60 National foundations of guerrilla-type activities clearly existed, there was an awareness of them, and they were already known by the early years of Finnish independence.

Russian Lieutenant General Karl Adaridi61 highlights the importance of guerrilla-type activities in a book entitled *Suomi sotanäyttämönä* (‘Finland as a theatre of war’), published in 1923, emphasising the point that Finnish conditions favour the defender. While the experiences gained during the First World War provided a valuable addition to the art of war, they were unsuitable for Finnish conditions as such. Tac-

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58 Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 52–64.
59 Olkkonen, Hannes: *Taktiikan perusteet* (‘The basics of tactics’), Helsinki 1928, p. 29.
60 Guerrilla-type activities occur in many folktales. For example, Juho Vesainen and Stefan Löfving occurred in the Finnish folklore by the end of the 19th century. See, among others, Ivalo (1925). Karl XII:s spion – Stefan Löfvings Dagbok, Margareta Beckman (bearbetad av), Tyskland 2010.
61 Avgust Karl Mihajlovič Adaridi, Russian Lieutenant General, lived between 1859 and 1940. After retiring from the Russian Army in 1915 and relocating to Finland in 1919, Adaridi, theorised on the various forms of warfare and the history of the art of war in several texts, taking a Finnish point of view. His texts were also translated into Finnish, particularly during the early years of independent Finland, of which an example is provided in the books on the history of the art of war and guerrilla activities.
tical experiments conducted in the 1920s and 1930s and adapted to Finnish conditions and terrain provided additional support to this view.62

In 1923, the army units were requested to submit statements on the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare. In order to be able to respond to this request, the units organised several tests in connection with their manoeuvres in the winter, spring and summer of 1924, focusing on guerrilla warfare and its methods, seen from the viewpoint of forming a special form of warfare and providing an opportunity to the Finnish art of warfare. ‘With regard to the general pre-requisites for guerrilla warfare in Finland, they conditions must be assessed to be rather good; after all, our terrain and sparse road network create advantageous conditions for waging guerrilla warfare, with the added benefit offered by winter, which greatly improves the rapid mobility of troops. The experiences gained last winter of the enhancement of the mobility of such troops is to be regarded to be of high value, providing us with valuable opportunities if developed further.’63 Such experiments led to discussions on the suitability of guerrilla-type activities for the various branches of the Army. ‘Based on the experiences gained from manoeuvres, the importance of guerrilla warfare for Finland is highlighted, with the cavalry and ski troops being those branches of the Army that will engage in guerrilla-type activities, due to the fact that they are the only branches with sufficient mobility, even in terrain with no roads.’64 Such statements provided by the units represent not only an interesting but also important indication of the fact the true potential of guerrilla-type activities was being mapped and evaluated. Although the statements submitted by the various units indicated weaknesses relating to the competence of troops with regard to guerrilla-type activities and realistic experimentation with them, such experiments were clearly important as fuel for theoretical thinking.

After the First World War, tactical thinking related to guerrilla-type activities and a serious attitude regarding it made significant progress, particularly in the 1930s. Guerrilla-type activities were seen as being well suited for the Finnish terrain and conditions. This theory provides a strong background for the analysis of the development of Finnish tactics in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as for the application of guerrilla-type activities to operations in the wars fought between 1939 and 1944. Theorising and experimentation regarding the fourth form of fighting, guerrilla-type activities, were established in Finnish thinking regarding the art of war in the early decades of Finnish independence.65

63 All of the statements submitted by the units on the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare are available in the archives of the General Headquarters. See, for example, a statement on guerrilla-type activities, JPr no. 319/461/1.sal./30.9.1924, R 70/72 (86), KA.
64 A statement on guerrilla warfare, K-SR no. 2901/5593/24/19.9.1924, R 70/72 (86), KA. Note. In the original document, the following note had been added in the margin at the General Headquarters: ‘infantry and troops on bicycles, yes!’: According to the General Headquarters, cavalry was believed to be tied to the road network, particularly in winters with a heavy snowfall. Therefore, guerrilla-type activities were seen to be more suitable for the infantry than for the cavalry.
Guerrilla-type activities in the army regulations in the early years of Finland’s independence

Initially, the training instructions and regulations applied by the army of independent Finland were based on foreign models. German influences, brought largely by the Jaegers, manifested themselves in the manuals Suomalainen sotilaskäsikirja (‘Finnish military handbook’), Harjoituskirja, (‘Training manual’), Voima-opas (‘Power manual’) and Vapaajoukkojen ohjesääntö (‘Regulation for irregular troops’), which made up the body of key regulations. Furthermore, a three-volume work by Swedish Lieutenant General Lars Tingsten, Taktikens grunder (‘Basics of tactics’), achieved an influential position, particularly in teaching tactics. Although an extensive production of regulations and guidebooks was started after the War of Independence, their numbers remained insufficient to cover the needs of the troops. This lack of instructions was compensated by circular orders issued by the Ministry of War and other instructions regulating the functioning of the defence system.

The compilation of Suomalainen sotilaskäsikirja was a collaborative effort accomplished by the Jaegers in Germany. This work was originally published in Berlin in 1917, comprising five volumes, and in Finland between 1918 and 1920, consisting of eight volumes. The work was largely based on German field regulations, and was designed for use by Finnish officers, NCOs and men as a handbook. Although this multi-volume guidebook was the most extensive work in Finnish available at the time, and was officially approved for use as a regulation, it was, on the whole, uneven with regard to quality. Voima-opas, modest in size and content, was published by a number of Jaegers and businessmen in the autumn of 1917. As far as is known, Voima-opas was based on Suomalainen sotilaskäsikirja I osa and on Handbok för landstormbefäl, printed in Sweden. It should be noted that Voima-opas included a separate chapter that discussed guerrilla-type activities, albeit superficially. Vapaajoukkojen ohjesääntö, published in early 1918, was also a compilation of a number of German regulations, physically the size of a notebook. This regulation, drafted and compiled by Paul von Gerich, also included a chapter on guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities. In contrast to other guidebooks, Harjoituskirja was modelled on

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69 Voima-opas (‘Power manual’), 1917, chapter 4. See also Kaila, E. E.: Vapaussodan valmistelut kotimaassa, Suomen vapaussota, fysiikka (‘Preparations for the War of Independence in Finland; the Finnish War of Independence’), 1921, pp. 336–337.
Russian regulations. The above-mentioned guide and instruction books contained several references to guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare.70

However, the concepts of guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare used in the manuals were not entirely unambiguous in the Finnish context. In the translations of German field manuals and the first Finnish military manuals of the early years of Finnish independence, published from 1917 onwards, guerrilla-type activities were defined as falling under the concept of the ‘little war’. ‘Little war’, in turn, was defined as warfare conducted by small, independent units or, alternatively, as a method of combat resorted to by a party with inferior resources, aimed to harass and cause damage to the enemy, possibly supported by a popular rising in order to enhance its chances of success. Irrespective of whether combat involved small units of the regular army or a full-scale popular uprising, ‘little war’ had to follow a coherent plan.71

Suomalainen Sotilaskäsikirja described guerrilla-type activities as part of ‘little war’. From the tactical viewpoint, this form of warfare provided a highly advantageous basis for guerrilla-type activities. ‘Being waged behind the invader’s lines, “little war” offers a number of advantageous opportunities for guerrilla-type activities, including cutting off railway lines, waterways and telegraph lines, destroying railway stations and bridges, and launching attacks on baggage trains, control posts, small units and sentries. Constant and rapid mobility, the sudden appearance and disappearance of guerrillas, taking advantage of spies and trusted helpers, cunning and courage are the prerequisites for success.’ According to the instructions put forth in this handbook, support given by the population and a landscape characterised by forests, swamplands, a multitude of lakes and varied soils created a powerful deterrent against the enemy.72

The tactical descriptions of ‘little war’ emphasised the offensive. According to Sotilaskäsikirja, zest and a strong hatred towards the adversary were the key elements for success. Attacks were based on a surprise element and rapid action in the enemy’s rear and on its flanks. ‘When the target is specifically set on the liberation of a country, success absolutely requires rapid offensive operations; remaining on the defensive results in nothing and only provides the adversary with an opportunity to regroup its troops for the suppression of the insurrection.’ According to this handbook, attacks should be carried out at night whenever possible, in a landscape that the defenders were familiar with and had reconnoitred before they launched any operations. Within the scope of ‘little war’, Sotilaskäsikirja equates attack, as a method of waging war, with ambush. Guerrillas had to seek locations and situations suitable for ambush, taking advantage of them in such a manner that the enemy could be encircled.73

The description of the success of ‘little war’ presented in Suomalainen sotilaskäsikirja, when supported by a popular rising, is particularly interesting. ‘When combined, a well organised popular uprising and a “little war” have the chances of pushing the enemy into a highly

70 Fabritius (1918). Gerich (1918b).
72 Ibid, pp. 530–531.
73 Ibid, pp. 532–533.
precarious and even desperate position. The preparation and organisation of a popular uprising, so that it really leads to success, requires great skill and ability.' Suomalainen sotilaskäsikirja justifies the effectiveness of guerrilla-type activities and ‘little war’ with examples taken from military history, putting forth cases in which guerrilla-type activities had proven successful. The historical examples highlight guerrilla-type activities conducted by Roth and Spoof, the combat operations on the Åland islands, and the operations carried out by irregulars led by peasant leader Olli Tiainen during the Finnish War, fought between 1808 and 1809.74 As far as is known, the chapter on ‘little war’ was written by Erkki Hannula. These examples and descriptions of ‘little war’ also show that the committee working on the manuscript had access to more than just German military literature. It is quite evident that the committee also resorted to works on military history published in Sweden.75

There are also many similarities between the descriptions of ‘little war’, found in Vapaajoukkojen ohjesääntö (‘A regulation for irregular troops’), drafted in the autumn of 1917 and published in early 1918. The fourth chapter of this regulation, Sotatoimet (‘Military operations’), opens with a general description of guerrilla warfare, according to which guerrilla warfare aims to disturb enemy communications and hamper its operations. It can therefore be concluded that the key principles of guerrilla warfare, with regard to both dispersed and concerted operations, were available to the officer corps of the Civil Guards for study before the start of the War of Independence. Paralleling Sotilaskäsikirja, Vapaajoukkojen ohjesääntö argues that guerrilla warfare tactics must be based on offensive operations against the enemy’s rear communications. ‘Cunning and surprise are among the key aids in guerrilla warfare.’ Attacks aimed at encircling the enemy, concentrating the forces committed to an attack in a surprise operation against the enemy launched from several directions. Using ambushes and traps, the enemy could be tied up, engaging it in fighting in such areas that were disadvantageous to it and ushering it to the terrain that the irregular troops had prepared for combat in advance. The importance of intelligence, patrolling and the assistance offered by the general population was also highlighted. ‘In guerrilla warfare, the assistance of the country’s citizens is normally of great importance with regard to obtaining intelligence, delivering official notices, providing guidance, throwing the enemy off the scent and similar operations.’76 It is noteworthy that guerrilla warfare was construed to be waged in the defender’s own area, behind the lines, not in the rear of the enemy’s support area in a foreign country.

Guerrilla warfare was also discussed in writings published outside the military sphere, in publications with a content that resembled that of army regulations. Suomalaisen Kommunistisen Puolueen Sotilasjärjestö (‘The military organisation of the Finnish Communist Party’) published a series of publications entitled Sotilaskirjasia (‘Military booklets’) between 1918 and 1919. A total of 12 booklets in this series, discussing

74 Ibid, pp. 533–537.
various topics, were printed in St. Petersburg, of which Number 3, *ohjeita sissisodankäynnistä* (‘instructions on guerrilla warfare’), provided Finnish communists and the fighting proletariat with guidelines on guerrilla warfare. According to this booklet, ‘The purpose of guerrilla warfare is to undermine the enemy’s war movements and its operations in general, by specifically disrupting its communications including railway connections, telegraph lines, telephones lines and baggage trains. Cunning and surprise are among the key elements in guerrilla warfare. Small mobile units, which can appear suddenly and disappear just as quickly, are best suited for such operations.’ This guidebook, intended for communists, defined guerrilla warfare in almost identical terms to those presented in *Suomalainen Sotilaskäsikirja* and *Vapaajoukkojen ohjesääntö*. This is a good indication of the principles of the art of war prevalent at the time, which were not always linked to nationality or ideology.

On the basis of the regulations and military manuals in use at the time it can be concluded that guerrilla tactics as a form of warfare were well known in Finland as early as in the formative years of the country’s independence. However, to find guerrilla-type activities included in key military regulations was more of an exception than a rule. In spite of this, guerrilla-type activities were taught both to the regular army and to civil guard units, but the extent of such training can be regarded rather superficial or, at the least, fairly formal. From the viewpoint of the art of war, the characteristics of guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities presented in the regulations were based on German and Russian tactics, and adapted to Finnish conditions.

Reflection on the art of war and the drafting of regulations were complemented by experiences taken from military history, which highlighted the importance of characteristically Finnish guerrilla-type activities.

**Reflection on guerrilla-type activities from the viewpoint of the art of war complementing the prevalent Jaeger tactics**

The examination of the Finnish art of war reveals that there is evidence supporting the view that guerrilla tactics and guerrilla-type activities were nothing new to the Finns after the end of the First World War. The effectiveness of guerrilla-type activities in particular was discussed among the officer corps as early as in the early 1920s, when it was found to be the age-old way by which the weaker party defends itself against a stronger adversary. Of those who reflected and wrote on the Finnish art of war and guerrilla-type activities, the most influential were Major General Paul von Gerich and Lieutenant General Karl Adaridi, both of whom had served in the Imperial Russian Army.

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77 *Ohjeita sissisodankäynnissä, sotilaskirjas no. 3*, (‘Instructions on guerrilla warfare, military booklet no. 3’) St. Petersburg 1918.


Gerich (1918b), pp. 46–54.

Major General Paul Bruno von Gerich, who was a descendant of a Baltic German noble family, served as a divisional commander in the Finnish War of Independence and who is also credited with the foundation of the Military School of Vimpeli. He was also one of the most renowned military writers of independent Finland. Paul von Gerich graduated from Hamina Cadet School in 1895. During his military career, he served in the Russian Guards units as a company and battalion commander. The key military regulations used in the training of Russian troops in the early 1900s were written by Paul von Gerich. In the First World War, Paul von Gerich served on the Eastern Front in Poland, Lithuania and Belarus, holding battalion commander posts and similar and being wounded on several occasions. After the February Revolution, von Gerich resigned from the Russian Army, having been found unfit for military service, and relocated permanently to Finland in late 1917.

After settling in Finland, Paul von Gerich was involved in the founding of civil guards in South Ostrobothnia, leading the disarming of the Russian troops in Lapua, Seinäjoki and other locations during the early phases of the War of Independence. During the War of Independence, von Gerich was entered, on 18 February 1918, in the roll of senior military officers of the Finnish Army. After the War of Independence, he served as the commander of f 2nd Division, holding other posts as well, and, after resigning from military service on 19 April 1921, he continued his career as commander of the Helsinki Civil Guard District. Paul von Gerich was a prolific writer. His literary production focused particularly on the art of war and military tactics. His most well-known works include *Tre år i fält I–II* (‘Three years in the field I–II’), *Päätä ja toimi* (‘Make a decision and act’), *Komppanian taistelukouluutus* (‘A company in combat training’), *Vapajoukkkojen ohjesääntö* (‘A regulation for irregular troops’), and *Taktiikan oppikirja I–II* (‘A textbook in tactics I–II’), which was published both in Finnish and Swedish. The three latter books in particular discuss guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities.

For *Komppanian taistelukouluutus*, which was part of the *Upseerin käsikirjasto* series (‘An officer’s reference library’), Paul von Gerich wrote a chapter on guerrilla warfare. According to von Gerich, ‘guerrilla warfare can either be waged independently, in which case it will replace more extensive manoeuvres, or, alternatively, it can be combined with such manoeuvres, providing support to them.’ A similar description of guerrilla warfare, almost to the word, can be found in the second volume of *Taktiikan oppikirja*. In that manual, Paul von Gerich describes guerrilla warfare as an independent form of warfare that ‘super-
sedges larger manoeuvres, or is related to them in a supportive role.’ Thus, von Gerich underlines that guerrilla warfare is just one of the methods of combat in which regular troops may engage.85

With regard to the concepts, it is interesting to note that Chapter 9 of the Swedish version is entitled *Lilla kriget* (‘Little war’), while in the Finnish version this chapter bears the title *Sissisota* (‘Guerrilla warfare’). On the basis of this, it can be concluded that while the military literature published in the early years of Finnish independence treated the phrases *little war* and *guerrilla war* as synonymous, the way these phrases were used varied from one writer to another. In any case, von Gerich argues that guerrilla warfare has a chance of success when waged in large swaths of forest and swampland in the defender’s own territory. In his textbook on tactics, von Gerich refers to units engaged in guerrilla war as *flying columns* and as *patrol, guerrilla* and *irregular troops*. Flying columns were in most cases units formed of regular units for temporary tasks and guerrilla-type activities. Patrol, guerrilla and irregular troops were permanent troops or combinations of troops, engaged in a long-term guerrilla warfare with a joint task of inflicting harm to the enemy. Both works refer to surprise attacks and staging ambushes in connection with guerrilla-type activities. The principal method of combat was the offensive, in accordance with the military philosophy of the period, combined with guerrilla-type activities.86

Born into a noble family in the Vyborg province, Karl Adaridi87 served for the whole of his military career in the Imperial Russian Army, achieving the rank of Lieutenant General. During his career, Adaridi held several command and staff positions, which gave him a thorough knowledge of the art and history of war. He gained war and frontline experience in campaigns such as the Russo-Japanese War and World War I. Karl Adaridi resigned from the Russian Army in 1915, and relocated to Finland in 1919. Adaridi’s sojourn in Finland was short-lived, as in late 1926 he relocated permanently to France, where he died in 1940. However, after his resignation from active service, he continued to be a prolific writer, publishing texts on the art of war and military history. Karl Adaridi was a prolific writer, translator and visionary who studied the art of war with a critical eye.88

Adaridi’s theoretical thinking led him to conclude that guerrilla-type activities were particularly well suited for the Finnish terrain and the resolute national character. Karl Adaridi’s texts treat guerrilla-type activities as part of military history, starting from the early Middle Ages. The examination of Karl Adaridi’s literary production reveals that he was well versed in the effectiveness of guerrilla-type activities and, in particular, its applicability to the Finnish terrain, conditions and art of war. Of Ada-

86 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
Adaridi’s large literary production, those works and articles in which he discussed guerrilla-type activities as a mode of combat especially suitable for the Finnish art of war are worth highlighting.

Between 1919 and 1921, Adaridi wrote a four-volume Sotataidon historia (‘A history of warfare’) which, as its title suggests, discusses the development of the art of war using examples taken from military history. Adaridi’s experience and views on the art of war were held in high esteem in Finland, particularly by those officers who had served in the Imperial Russian Army. After relocating to Finland Adaridi was encouraged and provided with practical help by his émigré colleague Paul von Gerich, among others. The work of this military writer did indeed require a great deal of practical support, as Adaridi had spent his entire military career in Russia before settling in Finland, and as he apparently wrote either in Russian or German, from which languages his works were translated either into Finnish or Swedish for publication.

In a work published in 1923, Suomi sotanäyttämönä (‘Finland as a theatre of war’), Adaridi gave an extensive discussion of Finland’s special conditions and terrain. Taking an overall view of Finland’s military geography, Adaridi draws a weighty conclusion: ‘The Finnish conditions generally favour the defender and disfavour the invader. It is as if the Finnish terrain was created for guerrilla warfare. What poorly organised or even unorganised guerrilla troops with no single command structure can accomplish was demonstrated by the 1808–1809 war. Undoubtedly guerrilla-type activities would have been a great deal more effective if the troops had been properly trained and had fought under a single command. This is how it should be in the future.’ In the final words of his book, Adaridi repeats his message, emphasising that guerrilla-type activities should be developed further and incorporated into the Finnish art of war: ‘Taking advantage of Finnish geography, it is possible to hold off even a greatly superior enemy, in particular as the terrain offers the best conditions for waging guerrilla warfare. The above-mentioned tactics are all the more valuable for the defence of the country, as they can be used in a similar manner in few other countries. The evaluation and determined use of such means of defence are the most important aspects of Finland’s effective defence.’

According to contemporary assessment, Finland was extremely well suited for guerrilla-type activities with regard to its terrain and conditions.

Karl Adaridi’s writings provide many interesting and significant details of guerrilla-type activities, as well as references to directions in which guerrilla-type activities should be developed. All the evidence suggests that as a military historian, Adaridi was well versed in the history of a great number of wars and guerrilla-type activities applied in them. He examined wars, attempting to find characteristics of guerrilla tactics seen both from the viewpoint of failed and successful operations. It was perhaps due to his broad knowledge of military history and his own experiences that

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90 The original annotated manuscript of ‘Sotataidon historia’ in German, Geschichte der Kriegskunst I–IV, from which Oiva Linturi has translated it into Finnish, is available in the National Archives. Karl Adaridi’s private collection Pk 534, KA.
91 Adaridi (1923b), p. 44.
Adaridi was encouraged to examine such forms of warfare in which the defender with fewer resources would stand a good chance of opposing an adversary with superior resources. According to Adaridi, scrutiny of military history shows that guerrilla-type activities have proved particularly effective when combined with a popular rising. In spite of this, guerrilla units could, and should, according to Adaridi’s conclusions, be formed as part of the regular armed forces and combat, in other words, without the direct support of the civilian population. The most apt description of guerrilla tactics, as applied by a weaker party against a stronger adversary, can be found in Adaridi’s book *Sissitoiminta* (‘Guerrilla-type activities’), published in 1925: ‘This method can be likened to mosquito bites which, according to the famous folk tale, weakened and harassed the animal king to the point where it finally died. The easiest way for guerrillas to achieve their objectives is to coordinate their operations with those of the army; of this, military history provides ample evidence.’

Guerrilla-type activities played a particularly important role as a deterrent. Adaridi describes how the materiel losses inflicted by guerrilla fighters on the enemy will be smaller in size when compared with psychological damage, provided that the guerrillas manage to arouse alarm and insecurity among the adversary by their action and exaggerated rumours. ‘Rumours of losses, even if proven wrong, will deteriorate an army’s morale, to a degree at least.’ The operational opportunities available to guerrillas were, according to Adaridi, always to be seen in relation to ‘the attitude assumed by the population in a particular area towards the guerrillas, the type of local terrain, the directions in which the enemy’s army was advancing, the condition of the army and the order behind the lines, as well as to the weather and season.’

On account of Finland’s special features regarding the terrain and conditions, Adaridi saw Finland as if created for guerrilla-type activities. ‘Thus, there are two fundamental factors present in Finland that facilitate the operations of the guerrillas: the terrain that is as if created for guerrillas, and a patriotic population. Therefore, guerrilla-type activities must be developed to their full potential. When organising Finland’s defence, the operations of guerrilla units should receive serious attention, to the degree that such attention would result in guerrilla war. Such activities would be a powerful weapon in the hands of the weaker party in combat against a superior adversary. It would be unforgivable if the weaker party did not resort to these means when the advantageous conditions favoured it.’

At about the same time as *Sissitoiminta* was published, Karl Adaridi published a book in Germany, entitled *Freischaren und Freikorps*, which discusses irregular troops and the ‘little war’. In practice, this book introduces Finnish guerrilla-type activities to a German readership. The book includes several parallels with the content of *Sissitoi-

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94 Adaridi (1925a), p. 25 and 45. It should be mentioned that this book was published as early as in 1924 in Swedish, and the foreword of the book indicates that it was written in 1923. Adaridi, Karl: *Partigängarverksamhet*, Helsingfors 1924, p. 5.
95 Ibid, p. 47 and 61.
minta and Adaridi’s thinking on the art of war. Adaridi’s mark on the international stage is represented by an article published by Russian émigrés in a Yugoslavian journal of military science in 1930, entitled *Partisaanit ja tuleva sota* (‘Partisans and the next war’). In this article, Adaridi gives reasons for emphasising the effectiveness of partisan warfare in light of war experiences and by providing examples taken from military history, arguing that guerrilla-type activities will have a great deal of opportunities, even in future wars.

With regard to the Finnish art of war and, in particular, guerrilla-type activities, the texts published by Paul von Gerich and Karl Adaridi were extremely influential during the early years of Finland’s independence. This is even more so because while the credibility of the ‘ryssänupseerit’ (‘Russian officers’) was usually downplayed (in Finnish, the word ‘ryssä’ – Russian – has a pejorative meaning), von Gerich and Adaridia were somehow understood to be exceptions. The works of these two authors were used as textbooks in military schools, and, as far as is known, they were also studied. For example, *Taktiikan oppikirjat I–II* (‘Textbooks on tactics I–II’) by Paul von Gerich remained the only textbooks on tactics available in Finnish for a long time, used at military schools, although they were criticised for paying too little attention to Finnish conditions and too much attention to German military regulations. The question of which individual or individuals chose works von Gerich and Adaridi to be used as textbooks at military schools and to be included in the officer’s reference library cannot be satisfactorily answered on the basis of the available source material.

Despite their Russian background, the texts by von Gerich and Adaridi were held in high esteem, perhaps due to the fact that both writers had gained war experience and had made first-hand observations of the effectiveness of guerrilla-type activities in warfare. Von Gerich and Adaridi also cooperated with each other, proposing initiatives on the study of military history. In this way, their writings provided the development of the Finnish art of war and guerrilla-type activities with grounds that were better than nothing. Lieutenant General Karl Adaridi in particular, due to his

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98 Adaridi, K (Adaridi): *Партитаны и будущая война*, Въстникъ военныхъ знанй 6/1930, Сараево, Югославія 1930, pp. 17–22. The publication in question was a journal of military science, published by Russian émigrés in Sarajevo (*Sotatiedon aikakauskirja – sotatieteellisen ajattelun äänenkannattaja* in a Finnish translation); Adaridi was a member of the editorial staff of this journal.

99 For more information on the different roles of the Jaeger officers and those who had received their training in Russia, see, for example, Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 27–31.


101 Adaridi, Karl: 53 esimerkkeä sotabistoriasta (‘53 examples of the history of war’), Helsinki 1923(a). In the foreword to this book, Adaridi writes as follows: ‘This collection of examples, taken from military history, is published on the initiative of General Paul v. Gerich, and is intended to be appended to a textbook on tactics authored by him.’ Paul von Gerich thanks Adaridi in the foreword to the four-volume *Sotataidon historia* (‘A history of the art of war’) for encouragement and assistance, using almost identical words. Adaridi, Karl: *Sotataidon historia, osa I*, (‘A history of the art of war, part I’), Helsinki 1920, pp. 5–6.
weighty message, can be said to have been something of a visionary and a trailblazer of tactical thinking when regarded from the viewpoint of decisions taken in Finland in the 1950s and 1960s. Regarding how important Karl Adaridi’s reflections were in the development of the Finnish art of war and guerrilla-type activities, they cannot be dismissed. It can be concluded, therefore, that in the development of the Finnish art of war and in serious thinking about Finnish tactics in the 1920s and the 1930s, guerrilla-type activities had not been forgotten – quite the contrary.

Guerrilla warfare and irregular troops in the basics of tactics

In the late 1920s, with the publication of a textbook entitled *Taktiikan perusteet* ("The basics of tactics") in 1928, in which the methods of guerrilla warfare were discussed in one chapter, the methods of guerrilla warfare were officially incorporated into the basics of Finnish tactics.102 This textbook on tactics was written by Lieutenant Colonel Hannes Olkkonen, who was a Jaeger officer trained in Germany. In the First World War, Olkkonen saw action in the ranks of the German army, and in the War of Independence, he served as the adjutant of the VIII Jaeger Battalion which was part of Jaeger Regiment 4. After the War of Independence, Olkkonen participated in the work of the Regulation Committee from 1918 to 1919. Hannes Olkkonen received his general staff training in Berlin between 1923 and 1925, after which he served as a teacher of tactics and military history at the Finnish Military Academy and as a teacher of military history on a special course arranged at the National General Staff College between 1925 and 1927. While he was writing the book *Taktiikan perusteet* ("The basics of tactics"), Olkkonen acted as the director of the newly founded the Army Combat School, between 1927 and 1931.103

According to the foreword to the book *Taktiikan perusteet* that Olkkonen wrote, this work was based on existing regulations and experiences. The book aimed principally to clarify difficult-to-understand regulations and to fill in the gaps found in them. According to Olkkonen, his textbook addressed, above all, changes that had occurred in military terminology and ‘...the rapid developments in tactics following experiences obtained from the various wars waged in the world’104. The sixteenth chapter of the book was entitled ‘Vapajoukot ja sissisota’ (‘Irregular troops and guerrilla warfare’), which discussed the character of guerrilla warfare and the compositions of guerrilla troops as part of the basics of Finnish tactics. This work describes guerrilla warfare as harassing in character, thus avoiding a decisive battle, carried out by irregular troops through guerrilla-type activities.105

While from the perspective of the contemporary art of war, the prerequisite was the commitment of the armed forces to combat, the tactical thinking also saw, in theory at least, a possibility of engaging a patriotic population in military operations. The principal rule was that the troops to be engaged in guerrilla warfare should be largely formed of the regular army. On the basis of the book it can be stated that Finnish

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102 Olkkonen (1928), p. 320.
103 Olkkonen, Matti Juho (Hannes), an extract from personal details no. 40651, KA.
104 Olkkonen (1928), pp. 5–6.
guerrilla-type activities in the late 1920s were not solely based on the use of military force in a possible guerrilla war. It was also possible to engage Finnish citizens in guerrilla warfare by using ‘voluntary elements with a will to defend the country’; that is, irregular troops. Lieutenant Colonel Hannes Olkkonen states in the book that combat carried out in the enemy’s rear by a military force should be supported, where possible, by guerrilla-type activities by irregular troops, aimed to support the manoeuvres by the regular army seeking to achieve a decisive outcome, instead of waging a guerrilla war supported by a large-scale popular rising. Olkkonen sums up his point as follows: ‘...if the will of the nation to defend its country remains unbroken, defeated and dispersed units, joined by volunteers and irregular troops, will start a desperate guerrilla war in order to hamper the operations of the enemy that is possibly adding new territory to that already under its occupation. However, in an era such as ours, with its roads, firearms and opportunities for mobility, the chances of a material success of such a popular rising will be practically nil, although it must be regarded as a manifestation of a nation’s strong will to defend its country. Therefore, this book will principally discuss such guerrilla-type activities that aim at providing support for the manoeuvres by the regular army seeking to achieve a decisive outcome.’

According to Olkkonen, guerrilla warfare was ideally suited for contemporary theoretical thinking, which emphasised the offensive and maintained that ‘surprise and misleading the enemy were at the core of the tactics applied by a guerrilla unit. Guerrillas use the former method when attacking the enemy, and the latter when creating opportunities for an attack which, in the form of an ambush, might immediately follow the attack.’ Attacks were to be carried out in the form of rapid attacks, followed by equally rapid detachment from combat, without engaging guerrilla units in prolonged fighting. A prerequisite was an absolute concealment of the battle plan, without divulging any unnecessary details of it to their own troops or the local population. Evidently, the idea was to take advantage of the confusion reigning on the battle field and mislead the enemy by revealing disinformation to the local population. Criteria were also set for troops engaged in guerrilla-type activities with regard to their competence. ‘Generally speaking, guerrilla warfare can be regarded to require courageous and determined leaders who are familiar with the wilderness, and troops that have a strong will to defend their country, even to the point where they are willing to sacrifice themselves and who follow their leaders voluntarily rather than because they are ordered to do so.’

In a similar way to Adaridi and many of his contemporaries, Olkkonen emphasises the importance of taking advantage of the Finnish conditions and terrain. The results of guerrilla-type activities could be intensified by staging nocturnal attacks. The conditions imposed by winter and the deep swaths of the Finnish wilderness also played a role in Finnish guerrilla-type activities. ‘In addition to this, the counter measures resorted to by the enemy that is unprepared for surprises are further hampered by the cold, the lack of roads and the difficulties of finding accommodation for the troops.’ As a novel feature to the contemporary art of war, Olkkonen introduces anti-aircraft capability as a means to protect the Finnish rear and to provide cover for the guerrilla-type activities. ‘Preventing enemy aerial operations which harass rear communications is becoming increasingly im-

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The book *Taktiikan perusteet* (‘Basics of tactics’), published by Lieutenant Colonel Olkkonen, in 1928, was regarded as a well thought-out and comprehensive work on Finnish tactics. After its publication, this book superseded *Taktiikan oppikirjat I–II* (‘Textbooks on tactics I–II’), written by Paul von Gerich. This textbook by Olkkonen was distributed to the Finnish units and military schools, to be used in teaching. As a textbook, it was regarded as being especially well suited for the National General Staff College, Reserve Officer School and Finnish Military Academy. On the whole, *Taktiikan perusteet* is a contemporary testimony to the fact that changes in warfare, tactics and the art of war had been taken into account in Finland. One of the principal objectives of the book was to put into practice, via the teaching provided by military schools, new developments in the art of war that had reached Finland from abroad.

**Instructions for guerrilla-type activities and the guerrilla manual before the Winter War**

The publication of regulations that had begun in the early years of Finland’s independence continued in the 1920s, becoming more extensive in scope. In particular, a series of field regulations, published from 1927 onwards, filled a wide gap, presenting the principles of Finnish military doctrine in a form that was more organised than the existing presentations. These field regulations also provided guidelines for the training given at military schools and units. The first reference to guerrilla-type activities can be found in *Kenttäohjesääntö II* (‘Field Regulation II’), published in 1929, which stated that combat in wilderness areas and in rugged terrain in particular force the defender to assume active and flexible tactics. ‘*Attacks against enemy flanks and guerrilla-type activities targeting the enemy’s rear communications characterise such operations. Combat operations in wilderness areas require that leaders and troops are highly active and keep their nerves under control.*’

In addition to the field regulations, officers representing the various arms and branches compiled manuals and regulations modelled on the field regulations, with the purpose of supplementing these regulations. From the viewpoint of guerrilla-type activities, the most important manuals were infantry regulations. Instructions that supplemented infantry tactics and touched on guerrilla-type activities, included a number of confidential special manuals, such as

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110 Ibid, pp. 325–326.

111 This book was favourably reviewed by the Directors of the National Defence College, Finnish Military Academy and the Reserve Officer School, among others. The General Staff placed an advance order of 500 copies of Olkkonen’s book before it was published. TaistK no. 209/1/a/21.3.1928, liitteineen, T 14792/22, KA. YE no. 384/X/28./13.4.1928, T 14792/22, KA. See also Tynkkynen (1996), p. 31.


113 *Kenttäohjesääntö II (KO),* (‘Field Regulation II (KO II)’), Helsinki 1929, pp. 15–16.

Conceptually, in the 1920s, guerrilla-type activities developed into a combat method intended for areas with a dense tree and shrub cover, a sparse road network and a multitude of lakes and rivers. At the time, combat by guerrillas was regarded as concerted operations whereby a guerrilla unit, while still on the friendly side of the front line, would be assigned a task to destroy a hostile target. After being issued orders, it would move over into enemy territory in a unified unit, carrying out its task there before detaching from engagement and returning to friendly territory. In the 1920s, conceptual reflection on Finnish tactics, including military regulations, made no clear distinction between guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities; instead, both were seen as sharing a common theoretical objective of harassing enemy traffic and supply lines, as well as tying up enemy troops in the enemy’s rear areas.

It should be borne in mind that one guerrilla jaeger battalion was added to the peacetime composition of the Finnish armed forces soon after the country’s declaration of independence. An order issued by the General Headquarters on 28 August 1918 renamed Jaeger Battalion 3 as the Kajaani Guerrilla Battalion. The Kajaani Guerrilla Battalion can be found in the army composition in the late 1920s, but an examination of its composition reveals that it was fully identical to any other jaeger battalion.

Theoretical thinking on guerrilla-type activities and their practicability took on a new aspect over the course of the 1930s. While initially, in the 1920s, guerrilla-type activities were understood to refer to the destruction of individual targets, carried out by troops holding a section of a front line on their own initiative, this view changed somewhat over the course of the 1930s. The concepts of guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare took on new, more comprehensive forms that sought to achieve greater efficiency. Forays and guerrilla raids that had characterised the period following the War of Independence waned in theoretical thinking. Guerrilla-type activities which had by now become more systematic in character were seen to be combat conduct in the enemy’s rear rather than guerrilla raids. The aim was to disrupt the enemy in its own rear areas and along its flanks, forcing it to commit troops to tasks that were secondary from the viewpoint of the combat and inflicting maximum losses to it. Guerrilla-type activities were also conceptually linked to operational plans in which operations in the enemy’s rear areas took on increasingly systematic forms. The area assigned to a guerrilla unit was divided into an operational area, in

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which the unit carried out its combat operations, and a support area, in which the unit rested and resupplied, preparing for the next operation.\textsuperscript{118}

By the end of the 1930s, in theory at least, guerrilla-type activities as a method of combat took on a clearly systematic and established form north of Lake Ladoga where they were supposed to be closely linked to the operations of the troops holding the front line. In addition, there were signs of developments indicating that it could have been possible to make guerrilla-type activities a more integral part of army corps operations. On these topics, two theses were written at the National General Staff College in 1935 and 1937.\textsuperscript{119} In spite of planning and pondering, preparations for guerrilla-type activities were not made in any real sense before the Winter War. Measures seeking to take advantage of guerrilla-type activities and to provide guidelines for them were taken only a few weeks before the war broke out.\textsuperscript{120}

Detailed orders on guerrilla-type activities were issued to the army corps of the field army, established in mid-October in 1939, and to the various Frontier Guard units. These directives consisted of a seven-page document that discussed guerrilla-type activities rather superficially but provided, nevertheless, practical examples. Although the document was written in the form of an instruction, it directly ordered all troops to take account of the requirements of guerrilla-type activities in their training and operations. The commanders of army corps, separate divisions and similar leaders were obligated, ‘for a possible outbreak of war’; to plan and organise guerrilla-type activities in those areas for which they were responsible. As a solution, it was proposed that a specific commander for guerrilla-type activities be appointed to the army staffs of army formations, charged with the responsibility for presenting issues related to guerrilla-type activities and for organising guerrilla units, providing them with arms, communicating with them and ensuring that they were well-supplied. The directives for guerrilla-type activities were, evidently, intended to be used as guidelines not only by the commanders for guerrilla-type activities but also as general guidelines for the army troops.\textsuperscript{121}

According to the directions, guerrilla-type activities should ‘\textquoteleft disrupt the enemy’s operations in its rear and along its flanks, thereby tying up as much as possible of its combat strength in guard, escort and similar secondary duties while wreaking maximum material havoc on the enemy.\textquoteright’ A prerequisite for successful guerrilla-type activities was the ability of a guerrilla unit to remain in hiding and to engage in organised and controlled operations as part of

\textsuperscript{118} Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 63–64. See also Karanko, Väinö: Meikäläisen sissitoiminnan edellytykset ja tehtävät Laatokan ja Saaristomeren välillä (‘Prerequisites for and the tasks of Finnish-style guerrilla-type activities between Lake Ladoga and the Archipelago Sea,’) a thesis written at the National General Staff College in 1935, pp. 3–15, SKK 1/223, KA.

\textsuperscript{119} Karanko (1935), SKK 1/223, KA. Pietarinen, Aarne: Divisioonan ja armeijakunnan selustaminen (‘Safeguarding the rear areas of a division and an army corps.’) A thesis written at the National General Staff College in 1937, SKK 1/250, KA.


\textsuperscript{121} Sissitoimintaohjeet (‘Directives for guerrilla-type activities’), issued by P-KRE (without any document number) on 16 October 1939, P 1727/8, KA. See also Sissitoimintaohjeet (‘Directions for guerrilla-type activities, an extract from a letter sent by the Ministry of Defence’), issued IVAK/E, no. Kl 682/sal/16 October 1939, P 494/2, KA, As far as is known, ‘Directions for guerrilla-type activities’ were issued at least to IVAK, 11.D, 12.D and the North Karelia Frontier Guard.
other combat operations. The major topics addressed by the directions were the following: the purpose of guerrilla-type activities and the tasks assigned to guerrilla units; the composition, strength, armament and other equipment of guerrilla units; the commitment of guerrilla units to operations and the nature or such operations; the communications, supplies and return of a guerrilla unit from an operation; guerrilla-type activities under exceptional conditions and anti-guerrilla operations targeting enemy guerrilla operations.122

According to the direction, guerrilla-type activities were to be used under exceptional conditions in particular. After local breakthroughs by enemy tanks, the encircled troops were expected to be overcome by hopelessness. As such situations were more than likely, troops, after having been encircled, were expected to engage in guerrilla-type activities, taking advantage of the terrain, in the view that enemy tanks avoided wooded areas. Directives emphasised the importance of rapid action when forming guerrilla jaeger units operating under leadership, as well as the need to train troops for guerrilla-type activities even in the face of being encircled. ‘Troops must be absolutely trained not to be afraid of being encircled by tanks. The most senior officer on the scene shall take command, assembling the scattered troops irrespective of their original units, and forms a guerrilla jaeger unit from them.’123 The tasks and mode of operation of the units that are formed as a result of the circumstances are similar to the guerrilla jaeger units formed in advance.

Directions on guerrilla-type activities were issued to the units of the field army on 16 October 1939, after the extra refresher training of the reservists124 was already under way (in Finnish history, ‘extra refresher training’ refers to the partial mobilisation of the field army in the autumn of 1939, disguised as refresher training.) However, the directives were delivered to the army formations in the form of documents, which were then forwarded to the lower echelons of command. The first directives on guerrilla-type activities, more official in nature than the documents issued in October and intended for use by troops, were only issued in mid-November 1939, as the a batch of 1,000 copies of Sissiopas (‘Guerrilla handbook’) was distributed to the troops. Military operations conducted in the enemy’s rear area were evidently considered important, because as soon as by early December, a new batch of

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122 Ibid. See also Timonen, Janne: Kolaaan sissipataljoonat talvisodassa (‘Guerrilla jaeger battalions at the Kollaa section of the front during the Winter War’), a pro gradu thesis, Joensuun yliopisto 2000, p. 2.
123 Ibid.
124 The extra refresher training of the reservists, abbreviated to ‘YH’ in Finnish, were carried out in two stages before the Winter War. During the first stage, from 9 October 1939 onwards, a covering force and a number of divisions to be formed from reservists near the eastern border were formed. In the second phase, starting from 14 October 1939, the remainder of the Field Army units were formed and concentrated to their intended area of use. The majority of the troops were in a defensive grouping by 20 October. Klefström, Kalevi: YH – ylimääräiset harjoitukset (‘YH – Extra refresher training of the reservists’), Porvoo 1999, pp. 72–74. See also Suomen puolustusvoimien ranban ajast historia (‘The Finnish Armed Forces 1918–1939; the peacetime history of the Armed Forces’), edited by Jarl Kronlund, Porvoo 1988, pp. 550–552.
5,000 copies of the manual was printed.125 This handbook refers to guerrilla warfare as a higher level concept in the art of war, although the manual is best described as a cursory tactical directive, issued to the troops with the purpose of encouraging them to employ unconventional methods in combat against the enemy. ‘In guerrilla warfare, situations and conditions are manifold and the action is highly varied and eventful. Therefore, guerrillas must possess nerves of steel, they must be quick in thought, they must be physically hardy, and, above all, they must be highly courageous and brave.’126

A comparison of Sissitoimintaohjeet (‘Directives for guerrilla-type activities’), issued to troops in October 1939, with Sissiopas (‘Guerrilla handbook’), published by the Training Division of the Ministry of Defence in November 1939 and declared to be confidential, reveals that their contents were practically identical. The only difference between the content of the two documents lies in Section ‘A. Yleistä’ (‘A. General’). This section in Sissitoimintaohjeet highlighted the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities and their effectiveness, particularly in the Karelian operational theatre and in the areas to its north, as well as the need for appointing a commander to coordinate guerrilla-type activities. The ‘General’ section in Sissiopas, which was published around one month later, no longer focused on particular operational areas; rather, in it the applicability of guerrilla-type activities was expanded to include all areas covered by woods and broken by numerous swamps – in practice, to all sections of the front. With regard to officers leading guerrilla-type activities, Sissiopas assumes a more commanding tone, stating that the headquarters forming part of the high command must include a specific commander for guerrilla-type activities, one who would organise guerrilla-type activities in the operational area of the formation in question.127

In view of the above, it can be concluded that the field army formations had provided feedback on Sissitoimintaohjeet during the extra refresher training of the troops or, alternatively, incomplete directions were supplemented in Sissiopas in such a manner that this manual set no practical restrictions for the formations that were preparing for a war. After all, the troops were insufficiently prepared and trained and field fortifications were still incomplete, as were many other aspects of military preparations, when the Winter War broke out on 30 November 1939.

The Soviet partisan movement and its ability to counter Finnish guerrilla-type activities

The threat assessment conducted by the Finns regarding their potential enemy had become clearer over the course of the 1920s and 1930s. Soviet Russia was regarded as the real threat during the whole of the interwar period. As the Bolsheviks, who

125 MaaVE no. 188/XIV/25/40 sal./29.4.1940, T 17649/9, KA. Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 232–233. Sissiopas (‘Guerrilla handbook’), Helsinki 1939. It remains unclear whether the reprint in 5,000 copies of Sissiopas was distributed to all troops or only to the five guerrilla jaeger battalion that had been formed (SissiP:t 1–5 (Guerrilla Battalions 1–5)).


127 Sissitoimintaohjeet (‘Directives for guerrilla-type activities’), issued by P-KRE (without any document number) on 16 October 1939, P 1727/8, KA. Cf. Sissiopas, Helsinki 1939.
had gained power in the Soviet Union, strengthened their position, the power of the assumed enemy also increased. Finland’s defensive plans for the period 1920 to 1939 proved to be fundamentally correct when the Winter War broke out, although the offensive power of the Soviet Union and the number of Soviet troops for one, particularly in the area north of Lake Ladoga, caught the Finns by surprise. Detailed information on the enemy’s capabilities was missing in many areas of the art of war. For example, the capability of the Soviet Union to carry out partisan and anti-guerrilla operations was quite obviously unknown.128

In the 1920s, the Russians were almost as familiar with partisan activities as the Finns were with guerrilla-type activities. New thoughts and aspects of the possibilities available to partisan warfare were put forth at the inception stage of the Soviet state, at a time when the Bolsheviks were seeking the roots of their ideology in the various theories regarding revolution. Carl von Clausewitz’s writings and theories on war129 from the 19th century encouraged renowned theorists of the working class, including Friedrich Engels, to familiarise themselves with questions relating to guerrilla warfare. Along with another social philosopher, Karl Marx, Engels studied the practicability of guerrilla warfare as a means of revolution.130 Engels in particular saw the strategic importance of guerrilla warfare as being greater than that put forth by von Clausewitz in his theories. References to guerrilla warfare in Marx’s and Engels’ writings were closely related to 19th century wars which exhibited features of guerrilla warfare. Apparently, both Marx and Engels were familiar with examples of guerrilla warfare, ranging from Napoleon’s Spanish campaign to the American Civil War and the events of the Franco-Prussian War. However, despite their revolutionary writings, they did not formulate an actual theory for partisan warfare, although this interpretation has been proposed later.131

In Russia, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin132, who had emerged as the central character of the revolution, took interest in Marx’s Engels’ and von Clausewitz’s thought. According to him, military factors played a key role in the revolution of the proletariat. Lenin studied military questions both in theory and in practice. During the first Russian revolution, Lenin wrote a work, published in 1906 and entitled Partizanskaja

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129 Clausewitz (1918), pp. 492–499.


132 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870–1924) was a Russian revolutionary, leader of the Bolshevik party and founder of the Leninist ideology. Seppälä (1971), pp. 11–12.
Vojna\textsuperscript{133}, in which he argued that partisan warfare had potential in Russian conditions.\textsuperscript{134} Despite the various theories, guerrilla warfare took a backseat in Russia during the First World War. It was not until the Russian Revolution had broken out that partisan and guerrilla warfare developed into a significant method; after all, the armed forces the parties involved in the revolution were still undergoing a formation process. Exceptionally large theatres of war and unstable front lines also favoured the use of partisans. Partisan warfare also presented problems. Poorly led irregular troops could turn against theirs masters, leading to situations in which the course of battles was no longer under control.\textsuperscript{135}

Despite reservations, the development of the partisan movement was continued after the Russian Civil War in the 1920s, with partisan warfare being incorporated into the military doctrine of the Red Army under the leadership of the leading military theorists, Mikhail Frunze, Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Felix Dzerzhinsky.\textsuperscript{136} This issue was put into practice by establishing partisan schools in Moscow, in which the tactics and methods of partisan warfare were taught. Preparations for partisan warfare were led by the political governing bodies of the Red Army and the various military districts. At least part of the Red Army and Frontier Guard cadres of commanders were trained over the course of the 1930s to conduct partisan activities, violent reconnaissance and harassment raids. A number of works on partisan warfare were also published in the Soviet Union in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{137}

Apparently, as late as in the mid-1930s, the Soviet armed forces were exceptionally well prepared to conduct guerrilla and partisan war in the enemy’s rear areas, but, following Stalin’s purges, significant changes took place in this capability. Stalin’s scepticism towards partisans and his regarding partisan warfare as being in conflict with the new Soviet military doctrine ultimately lead to the discontinuation of the partisan training system, the destocking of storages and the liquidation of the leaders. Few developers and leaders of partisan activities survived Stalin’s purges.\textsuperscript{138} The rapid development of the Red Army and its material growth and mechanisation led to the underestimation of guerrilla warfare in the Soviet Union.

While the developments in the Russian art of war were well known in Finland, detailed plans or opportunities for partisan activities in the future war were quite evidently not regarded as a major threat when compared with a conventional invasion. Although the preparations and plans required by guerrilla warfare had been neglected and discontinued in part in the Soviet Union, the country possessed theoretical capability to conduct partisan war even at the onset of the Winter War. However, in the Winter War, partisan operations were restricted to sending individual desants – a

\textsuperscript{133} Ленин В. И. (Lenin): Партизанская война (‘Partisan warfare’), Полное собрание сочинений, Том 14, Сентябрь 1906 ~ Февраль 1907, Москва 1972, pp. 1–12.

\textsuperscript{134} Grenkevich (1999), pp. 45–59.


\textsuperscript{137} Turjanmaa (2013), p. 36.

Russian word denoting spies and saboteurs dropped by parachute – behind Finnish lines. The interesting thing is that the contents of the Finnish directives for guerrilla-type activities, *Sissiopas*, were quite evidently known in the Soviet Union by the onset of the Winter War. The archives of Voroshilov, People’s Commissar for Defence, include a document dated 1 January 1940, in which a certain G. Rylkin analyses the Finnish partisan handbook, *Sissiopas*, labelling it ‘banditology, or a handbook for bandits.’ This indicates that attempts by Finns to keep *Sissiopas* confidential had failed, as the enemy gained possession of the book in the early stages of the war, in December 1939. No information on how and where the Finnish guerrilla handbook came into the hands of the Soviets is available.

2.2. Summary of the development of guerrilla-type activities from 1918 to 1939

Finland’s independence and the following decades were a period during which the Finnish military was looking for new models and best practices to apply to national needs. The country had practically no tactical traditions; instead, tactics needed to be created from scratch or, alternatively, by taking advantage of the basics of the existing art of war. Although modern literature may present a synthesis suggesting that the War of Independence played a major role in the development of a characteristically Finnish art of war, that war can be said, with justification, to have been lacking in tactical variation with the tactics employed being rather outdated. In spite of this, the First World War, experiences gained from it and the strong German orientations assumed by the newly founded Finnish Army contributed to the fact that three major forms of fighting were established in Finnish tactics, in which offensive tactics were particularly pronounced in the 1920s and 1930s following the influences brought to Finland by the Jaegers. For many reasons, guerrilla-type activities became, in a way, the ‘fourth method of combat’ in Finnish tactics during the interwar years.

These forms of fighting were, in a way, the keystone of Finnish tactics in the 1920s. Although military thinking in this period favoured the offensive, the defensive and delaying tactics were also important, reflecting the doctrines applied in the world war. There was also room for thinking based on experience, as guerrilla-type activities as applied to the Finnish conditions were regarded, in a way, as equal to the classic form of fighting. There might have been several reasons for this but, from the viewpoint of the Finnish art of war, guerrilla-type activities had shown their mettle in the Finnish context over the centuries. Thus, while developing the Finnish art of war in the early years of independent Finland, the military found it, in a way, easy to rely on guerrilla-type activities. Not only were theories formed on guerrilla-type activities; they was also studied. Writings by Adaridi and many other contem-

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140 Fondi 33987 (‘The archives of Voroshilov, People’s Commissar for Defence’), opis 3 delo 1301 ll, 1–4, G. The document drafted by Rylkin is dated 1 January 1940, the Russian State Military Archive, RGVA Cf. Sissiopas (1939).
porary writers on the possibilities and practicability of guerrilla-type activities pro-
vided the impetus for research and experimentation. Experiments targeting condi-
tions and operational areas were conducted from the early 1920s onwards as exper-
iments on winter warfare and similar topics. The Finnish terrain in particular with its
varied characteristics and conditions created the potential for guerrilla-type activities.
It was considered worthwhile to examine and experiment with the possibilities that
areas with a dense tree and shrub cover, broken by swamps, offered small guerrilla
units, enabling them to infiltrate into the enemy’s rear area.

In the early decades of the Finnish independence, guerrilla-type activities developed
in forested areas broken up by lakes and rivers and having few roads into a form of
fighting worth consideration from the viewpoint of tactics and operational art.
However, at that time, combat by guerrilla units was considered as something that
should be conducted in a concerted form. Theoretical thinking on the concept of
guerrilla-type activities took on new aspects over the course of the 1930s. The focus
shifted from the destruction of individual targets and voluntary operations carried
out by troops to more comprehensive forms seeking greater effectiveness. The era
known as the period of guerrilla raids was over in tactical thinking. By the end of the
1930s, guerrilla-type activities as a method of combat, took – at least in theory – on
an evidently systematic and established shape, forming part of the operations of
troops holding a particular section of the front line. In addition, there were signs of
developments indicating that it could have been possible to make guerrilla-type ac-
tivities a more integral part of army corps operations. Guerrilla-type activities were
principally developed by the Defence Forces and the Civil Guards, which also pro-
vided training guerrilla tactics which were fairly minimal in their extent. No unam-
biguous evidence is available of the role of the Frontier Guard in the development
of guerrilla-type activities or in the provision of training over the course of the
1920s and 1930s, indicating that the Frontier Guard played a very minor role during
this period.

In the 1930s in particular, guerrilla-type activities were regarded as being well suited
for the Finnish terrain and conditions. It was because of their potential for applica-
tion to Finnish conditions that guerrilla-type activities gained weight in Finnish mili-
tary thinking. While guerrilla-type activities can be said to have several theorists in
the 1920s and 1930s, the most influential of them by far was Karl Adaridi. Com-
pared with his contemporaries, he was something of a visionary and a trailblazer in
the development in tactical thinking. Due to Adaridi, guerrilla-type activities gained
added importance in serious thinking and in the development of a characteristically
Finnish art of war. This pattern is clearly discernible in the analysis of the develop-
ment of Finnish tactics in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as in the application of guer-
rilla-type activities to operations in the wars that Finland fought between 1939 and
1944.
3. GUERRILLA-TYPE ACTIVITIES AND RECONNAISSANCE IN THE ENEMY’S REAR

3.1. Guerrilla-type activities in the Winter War and during the Interim Peace in 1939–1941

The tactical guidelines adopted by the Finnish Field Army before the 1939–1944 wars had been defined in the field regulations and infantry regulations, published in most cases between 1927–1932. The tactical training of the troops formed for wartime operations was normally carried out in line these regulations. In the Winter War, the qualities required for a leader emphasised his ability to take flexible action adapted to individual situations – in other words, mission-type tactics. This was a factor that, in part, helped Finnish tactics to develop in a direction where it could depart from rigidity and excessive theory and become an art based on common sense. Regulations were therefore used in the 1939–1944 wars principally as a mnemonic device that standardised concepts and definitions and promoted collaboration between the various army branches.

In the absence of peacetime special training and confirmed wartime organisations, guerrilla-type activities were not implemented in practice, and troops were not systematically trained by the end of the 1930s. However, guerrilla-type activities had become widely accepted as an efficient method of combat that was ideally suited to Finnish conditions. The principles and the concept of guerrilla-type activities had established in the Finnish art of war before the Winter War, although the training had remained mainly on the formal level. Initiatives to organise special training had been taken, as during the extra refresher training of the reservists, at least one ‘guerrilla leader course’ was arranged in Rautakorpi, in Vyborg province. A course disguised as a winter sports course was aimed at giving guerrilla jaeger unit leaders a crash course on guerrilla-type activities and tactics. The fact that this course was arranged reflects the directive on guerrilla-type activities issued during the extra refresher training of the reservists which stated that leaders in particular must be trained in guerrilla-type activities.141

Miscellaneous guerrilla troops and directives for guerrilla-type activities at the onset of the Winter War

The composition of the army prescribed by the 1933 Decree on the Armed Forces remained practically unchanged until 1939, with the exceptions of certain alterations to the chain of command. The armed forces were transformed into a wartime organisation during the extra refresher training of the reservists in October 1939, when the functions of the territorial organisation were also wound down in practice.

141 Järvinen, Y. A.: Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka talvisodassa (‘Finnish and Russian tactics in the Winter War’), Porvoo 1948, p. 19 and 242. Sisitoinintahojet (‘Directives for guerrilla-type activities’), issued by P-KRE (without any document number) on 16 October 1939, P 1727/8, KA.
At the onset of the Winter War, the covering force (that is, troops intended to win time and to provide protection for the deployment of the field army along the defensive line), formed from troops of the standing army – conscripts performing their military service – and the field army units formed from reservists were in most cases assigned numbers; for example, 1st Brigade. In connection with this, unit designations with a reference to Finnish province names were abandoned. Only a few units remained without a numeric designations; such units were given names with a reference to a province or their arm.142

At the onset of the Winter War, the Finnish field army possessed no real competence in guerrilla-type activities, although instructions had been issued and formal training – on some level at least – had been provided in the years preceding the war. No proper guerrilla organisation existed, although plans for founding one had been drafted. While the mobilisation plans of the general staff listed five wartime guerrilla jaeger battalions, it was only after the Winter Ware was under way that they were formed.143

The first battles of the war in December 1939 showed the Finns that the Russian operations in all sections of the front were heavily dependent on the road network and, in particular, the trunk roads. The thoughts on the practicability of guerrilla-type activities put forth by Väinö Karanko in his thesis in 1959 were now seen in a new light: ‘In view of the disruptions and disturbances in traffic which, particularly in winter, will be common in East Karelia, it is easy to see the extent of disruption that active guerrilla-type activities may cause in the enemy’s supply lines.’144 Following the first experiences gained from battles, the General Headquarters took measures to put theories on guerrilla-type activities into practice. As early as on 3 December, the Tactical Office of the General Headquarters issued an order to establish ‘squad of expert skiers’ in each infantry battalion, capable of undertaking nocturnal guerrilla and harassment raids.145

Lieutenant Colonel Valo Nihtilä Chief of the Ground Forces Office of the Operations Division at the General Headquarters, sent, a circular on 8 December in his own name with a limited number of recipients on the intensification of guerrilla-type activities. Nihtilä’s confidential message encouraged troops in combat to engage in guerrilla-type activities: ‘Is it now time to put guerrilla-type activities on the right track by extending them to enemy supply lines deep in the enemy-held territory, causing hunger and feelings of insecurity among the Russians (Nihtilä used the pejorative word ‘ryssä’ for Russians). In addition to this, Russian flanks should be constantly harassed with bold patrol activity. Such raids

143 Sovijärvi, E.-V.: Johtopäätökset sisitätömnäsiin vuoteen 1944 asti (‘Conclusions from guerrilla-type activities in the 1939–1944 wars’), a memorandum with no doc.no. North Karelia Frontier Guard, refresher training/1962, the copy in possession of the author of this thesis.
144 Karanko (1935), p. 9, SKK 1/223, KA. See also Tynkkynen (1996), p. 233. Cf. also the conclusions drawn by Karanko with those of Simelius, Sakari: Venäläinen taktiikka sovellettuna suomalaiseen maastoon ja olosuhteisiin – arvosteluva tarkastelu soveltavuusmerkein valaistuna, ‘Russian tactics as applied to the Finnish terrain and conditions – a critical analysis illuminated by examples of the application of such tactics’), a thesis written at the National General Staff College in 1939, SKK 1/298, KA.
145 Order by the General Headquarters no. 253/Koul.2/39.sal/3.12.1939, P 1727/7, KA.
would be our artillery barrage. After carrying on such operations for a time, it would be time to go to attack as the Russian should be ripe after such softening. Operations should naturally be concentrating on the most important directions. These are my personal opinions; I have not obtained my superior’s approval for them.”

On one hand, this circular was an indication of Valo Nihtilä’s familiarity with Soviet tactics and with the chances of the Finnish troops to engage in delaying action, particularly in the sections of the front lying north of Lake Ladoga. On the other hand, such an unofficial exhortation in the midst of the Winter War, with its already chaotic situation, shows that Nihtilä had the courage to bypass his superiors for the good of greater objectives.

In addition to the above-mentioned directions, General Headquarters issued separate directions for the implementation of guerrilla-type activities and patrolling on the Karelian Isthmus and on the sections of the front lying north of Lake Ladoga. As there was no time to establish troops intended for guerrilla-type activities during the extra refresher training of the reservists, units responsible for holding specific sections of the front line formed troops, intended for guerrilla-type activities and for the harassment of the enemy, as best they could, depending on the activity of their commanders. ‘Divisions have been issued orders to form units in each battalion from the troops under their command, comprising 40–50 expert skiers, intended for future guerrilla operations.’

In some operational formations, guerrilla jaeger units were mostly formed of volunteer men who were skilled in skiing. Due to the lack of training in guerrilla-type activities and the shortage of special materiel, the effects of guerrilla-type activities in the early phases of the war were highly varied. Consequently, General Headquarters began to establish guerrilla units listed in the mobilisation plans, issuing orders for the establishment of five guerrilla jaeger battalions (Guerrilla Battalions 1 and 2) on 10 December 1939 and (Guerrilla Battalions 3, 4 and 5) on 23 December 1939.

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146 According to the distribution list, Nihtilä’s circular was sent to the Chiefs of Staff of North Finland Group, Group Talvela, and the IV Army Corps but, based on the receipt markings, it was also sent to the Frontier Guard Headquarters. An exhortation to take up guerrilla-type activities, a personal circular by Lieutenant Colonel Valo Nihtilä, PM:n no. 675/Op.1 S/8.12.1939, SArk 1588/2(6), KA.

147 It should be mentioned that Valo Nihtilä had written a comparative study in 1929 on the operational opportunities available to Russians on the Karelian Isthmus and in the areas north of Lake Ladoga and on the chances open to the Finns to engage in delaying action. Valo Nihtilä’s private collection Pk 1969/1, KA.

148 A Creed discussion between Colonel Nihtilä and Major Teno on 16 December 1939 ca. 13:00, the General Headquarters war diary, 30 November–31 January 1940, pp. 86–88, Department of Military History, National Defence University.

149 For example, for the area falling under the responsibility of Talvela Group, a guerrilla jaeger company designated as Sissikomppania Pössi, or 1.Er.SissiK, was formed from Er.P 10 (“Separate Battalion 10”), tasked with carrying operations guerrilla operations in the enemy’s rear. For information on the operations of Guerrilla Company Pössi, see RTE:n no. 18/III/2/40/L.47/ 5.1.1940, P 1719/2, KA.

Guerrilla Battalion 1 (Sissipataljoona 1) was formed in Riihimäki soon after General Headquarters had issued its first order, after which it was subordinated to North Finland Group. Similarly, Guerrilla Battalion 2 (Sissipataljoona 2) was quickly formed in Mikkeli, after which it was subordinated to Group Talvela, to be sent for deployment in the Tolvajärvi area north of Lake Ladoga.  

Guerrilla Battalions 3 and 4 (Sissipataljoona 3 and 4) of Detachment Wahren were formed in Lappeenranta from the reservists of the cavalry, but due to numerous shortcomings in their equipment, their subordination to the divisions and army corps was delayed from the original order. It was not until mid-January that the 3rd and 4th Battalions were fully formed, after which Guerrilla Battalion 3 was subordinated to Group Talvela and Guerrilla Battalion to IV Army Corps. The founding of Guerrilla Battalion 5 in Kemi did not go according to the plans either. It was only not until on 5 February 1940 that Guerrilla Battalion 5, formed from the Karelian volunteers of Hämäläinen Detachment, was subordinated to the 9. Division, on account of a training period that took longer than planned. The organisation of the Winter War field army includes at least one separate guerrilla jaeger company. The guerrilla jaeger battalions were approximately 520 men in strength, while a separate guerrilla jaeger company comprised around 200 men.

Despite their name, the training of the guerrilla jaeger battalions was similar to that of infantry battalions. However, with regard to their compositions and planned special equipment, guerrilla jaeger battalions deviated markedly from ordinary infantry battalions. A guerrilla jaeger battalion, for one thing, had a larger staff than an infantry battalion, but it mostly resembled the composition of an infantry battalion staff. The staff was made up by a command, and supply offices, as well as of the signal and supportive platoon. The striking power of a guerrilla jaeger battalion comprised three rifle companies or squadrons, the composition and equipment of which was tailored for guerrilla-type activities where possible. In addition to the three-way composition, each rifle company also included a pulk squad. To meet the requirements of guerrilla-type activities, each rifle company or squadron also included a light machine gun, a signal and a supportive platoon. Otherwise, the weaponry was similar to that used by an infantry battalion. The planned composition and the special equipment of guerrilla jaeger battalions, such as pulks and communication

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153 Guerrilla Company Pössi, the official abbreviation of which was 1.Er.SissiK. See, for example, Timonen (2000), Lichte 1.
equipment, emphasised their capability to engage in independent operations over large areas in the enemy’s rear.154

Based on existing sources, many interpretations can be presented on the deployment of guerrilla jaeger battalions specifically in guerrilla-type activities in the Winter War, harassing the enemy’s rear. For example, the guerrilla jaeger battalions operating north of Lake Ladoga during the Winter War were assigned tasks that were in line with guerrilla-type activities. Individual platoons detached from battalions, and even larger units, were dispatched to the enemy’s rear area to harass and destroy. The most important tasks assigned to guerrilla jaeger battalions were related to the protection of the Finnish troops’ open flanks north of Lake Ladoga in Northern Finland. The IV Army Corps and Group Talvela were the most active in engaging guerrilla-type activities in their areas, in which the borderline between the guerrilla jaeger units and their points of contact were agreed in collaboration between the various formations.155

The General Headquarters war diary refers to guerrilla and patrol activities dozens of times. Both Finnish and Russian troops were engaged in guerrilla-type activities in all sections of the front. Perhaps the most frequent entries related to guerrilla-type activities in the situational reports sent to General Headquarters by the troops were the following: ‘high level of patrol and guerrilla activity’ or ‘intense cold hampers patrol and guerrilla activity’.156 The General Headquarters war diary made 35 references to guerrilla-type operations carried out by front line troops between 31 November 1939 and 13 March 1940. Similarly, the war diaries made 50 references to patrol activity.157 This is an indication of the fact that guerrilla and patrol activity was quite frequent, conducted almost on a daily basis. However, the actual guerrilla-type activities was characterised by disconnected operations by carried out by individual units or patrols in order to harass the enemy.158

It is evident that General Headquarters quickly realised that the guerrilla jaeger battalions at the front were not used in ways that their names suggested. These guerrilla jaeger units had not received any kind of basic or advanced training in guerrilla-type activities. Apparently, although the plan had been to train guerrilla jaeger battalions specifically for guerrilla-type activities before the war, they were mostly used during the Winter War, after they had been rapidly formed, just like any other infantry troops, to repel enemy attacks and to carry out limited counter-attack operations.

156 The General Headquarters war diaries between 30 November 1939–31 January 1940 and 1 February–13 March, Department of Military History, National Defence University.
157 Ibid.
158 See, for example, Myllyniemi, Urho: Antti Pennanen – Petsamon, Lapin ja rajan kenraali, (‘Antti Pennanen – General in Petsamo, Lapland and along the border’), Keuruu 2003, pp. 118–125.
Thus, the only training that these battalions had for war was the training that the soldiers had received during their military service and refresher training. On these grounds, it can be said that the troops received their training for guerrilla-type activities and their knowledge of guerrilla tactics by engaging in combat during the Winter War.

General instructions concerning guerrilla-type activities issued by the General Headquarters during the Winter War

Over the course of the Winter War, the Tactical Office of the Training Division of the General Headquarters gathered information and published booklets entitled Taktillinen opas (‘Tactical Guidebook’), aimed to provide the troops with instructions based on tactical experiences gained during the war. While these guidebooks were confidential, the General Headquarters instructed them to be delivered to the troops as soon as possible, ‘to be taken into consideration in combat and training’. During the war, a total of 11 tactical guidebooks were published, three of which addressed guerrilla-type activities. Starting with the second Taktinen opas, a note was added to the end of each booklet, encouraging the troops to gather and submit their war experiences for the benefit of the entire army. ‘Promptly send any information on the experiences you have gained from battles, on combat methods you have found to be effective, on enemy tactics and weapons, as well as on any innovations in combat materials you have made, to the Tactical Office of the Training Division at the General Headquarters, to enable such information to be forwarded to all our troops.’

Taktillinen opas II, published on 16 December 1939, emphasised the importance of guerrilla-type and patrol activities in areas where the enemy supply lines were long. Enemy supply lines should be disturbed by sending units formed of expert skiers, acting under detailed orders issued by experienced front-line commanders, to harass them. Advantage should also be taken of nocturnal conditions, especially when the enemy were forced to find accommodation in the open due to the lack of suitable equipment. According to the instruction, patrols formed for guerrilla-type activities should be equipped with submachine guns, hand grenades and necessary demolition material. According the guidebook, guerrilla jaeger units assigned to demolition tasks should receive material termed ‘sisirkipinä’ in Finnish wartime jargon – literally, ‘guerrilla sparks’. They referred to lumps of thermite explosives, 300g in weight, which, when burning, created sufficient heat in order to burn through the armour of enemy tanks. The guidebook also encourages troops to instill the fear of guerrillas in

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159 A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities dated 29 January 1941, PöPE:n koulutusosaston sal. kirjeistöä 1941 (‘Confidential correspondence of the Training Division of the General Headquarters from 1941’), T 17631/6, KA. See also Sovijärvi, E.-V.: Johtopäätökset sisä- ja tiiminmukaan viime sivien kokemukseen mukaan (‘Conclusions from guerrilla-type activities in the 1939–1944 wars’), a memorandum with no doc.no., North Karelia Frontier Guard, refresher training/1962, the copy in possession of the author of this thesis.


the enemy: ‘In addition to direct casualties, patrols will cause feelings of insecurity among the enemy, leading to unnecessary action.’\textsuperscript{162}

\textit{Taktillinen opas V}, published only two weeks later, states that guerrilla-type activities by Finnish troops had led to excellent results: ‘As the accumulating snow cover constantly adds to the enemy’s difficulties with mobility, opportunities for our guerrilla-type activities improve.’ The guidebook instructed troops to pay particular attention to ensuring a safe return of guerrilla jaeger units sent to the enemy’s rear. The troops holding a particular section of the front line had to agree carefully with the commander of a guerrilla jaeger unit on the signals that the commander would use to signal his intention to cross over to the enemy-held territory. The signals to be used upon a patrol’s return were also to be agreed upon and communicated to the front-line posts, so as to prevent them from firing at returning patrols. Quite evidently, small guerrilla jaeger units had been subjected to friendly fire at the front on occasion. The same guidebook also provided instructions for preparing and putting together a daily ration for a guerrilla soldier.\textsuperscript{163}

\textit{Taktillinen opas VI}, published on the last day of December 1939, also contained guidelines for guerrilla-type activities. According to this guidebook, guerrilla-type activities had proved effective as the war unfolded, particularly in the operational areas north of Lake Ladoga. In the more northerly areas, guerrilla jaeger units were advised to reserve reindeer for the transport of demolition and other material. This guidebook also emphasises the importance of making careful preparations, especially regarding longer patrols and demolition raids. ‘Guerrilla-type activities have proved highly effective everywhere. Well-prepared longer patrols will make such activities even more effective. However, organising longer patrols (50 to 60km), feasible mostly north of Lake Ladoga, should not prevent carrying out guerrilla raids and patrols in areas closer to the front line.’\textsuperscript{164}

\textit{Taktillinen opas IX}, published in mid-January 1940, put forth information obtained from anti-guerrilla activities conducted by the enemy. ‘On account of the activities carried out by our guerrilla troops, the Chief Directorate of Border Troops of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs has issued instructions on anti-guerrilla (‘anti-diversant’) activities (in Russian, ‘diversant’ refers to an enemy agent or saboteur).’ According to the intelligence received by the General Headquarters, the Russian anti-guerrilla instructions described the tactics used by Finnish guerrillas and the composition of Finnish guerrilla jaeger units. Russian Border Troops regiments were ordered to form ‘destruction groups’, around one company in strength, and set them against Finnish guerrilla jaeger units. \textit{Taktillinen opas IX} described the Russian anti-guerrilla instructions as verbose, vague and theoretical. Russian instructions made repeated references to the swift movement of Finnish guerrillas, their ambush tactics and the annoyance they caused.

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid, \textit{kohta B. Sissi- ja partioiminta} (‘section B. Guerrilla and patrol activities’), pp. 3–4.


'Everything gives the impression that our enemy finds the activities of our guerrillas to be extremely annoying, requiring systematic covering and clearing of large areas.'\textsuperscript{165}

After the onset of the Winter War, the results of the guerrilla-type activities by Finns proved promising, even according to the information obtained from Russian prisoners of war. The experiences gained from the Winter War proved beyond doubt that guerrilla-type activities, although quite limited in scope, carried out under winter conditions and in a difficult terrain, had proved their tactical efficiency in some operational formations. Although the Red Army invasion in the winter of 1939–1940 was highly dependent on the road network, thereby enabling guerrilla and patrol operations in a substantially larger scale, systematic guerrilla-type activities, as carried out by the Finnish front-line formations, remained relatively modest in scope. In spite of the directives and encouragement issued by the General Headquarters, guerrilla-type activities remained improvised to a high degree, depending on the activity of local front-line commanders. While there were probably several reasons behind this, the small number of Finnish troops and their lack of training in guerrilla-type activities must be mentioned in this context.

The lack of systematic training in guerrilla-type activities was also evident in the guidebooks drafted by the Tactical Office of the Training Division of the General Headquarters. According to these guidebooks, more active measures must be taken to train troops in guerrilla-type activities. The course of the war, the shortage of equipment and the continuous casualties provided no opportunity for training the troops further while battles were being fought, let alone training them in guerrilla-type activities. Repelling enemy attacks under harsh conditions while only an insufficient number of troops was available, particularly on the Karelian Isthmus, did not exactly contribute positively to implementing the instructions put forth in the guidebooks. However, it is noteworthy that guerrilla-type activities by Finnish troops gave rise to concern among the Russian troops, leading to counter measures.

While the organisation of the Finnish Field Army included several guerrilla jaeger battalions, they often had to be assigned to a reserve duty or used as replacement troops to fill in gaps created by a war of attrition on the Finnish defences. From the perspective of the art of war, in the Winter War, which broke out after a relatively short period of time, the implementation of guerrilla-type activities was, on the whole, rather fragmented, despite the best efforts of the troops. During the Winter War, the difficult conditions such as material shortages, the fact that the Finnish army was reduced to fighting a defensive war, the necessity of the troops to contain enemy breakthroughs, the relatively short duration of the war, and the superiority in material and numbers of the Red Army, all contributed to the fact that the implementation of guerrilla-type activities that in themselves were theoretically sound but rather lame in their planning were rendered impossible in practice.

\textsuperscript{165} Taktillinen opas IX, Päämajako. (‘Tactical guidebook XI’, General Headquarters Training Division.) 2/40, 16.1.1940, kohta B. Vihollisen ohjeet sisittämisantamme ekäsenisese (‘item B. Directions issued by the enemy for defeating our units engaged in guerrilla-type activities’) pp. 8–9.
Training in guerrilla-type activities and experiences gained during the Winter War

The commanders of guerrilla jaeger battalions during the Winter War played the key role both in organising training in guerrilla-type activities and in gathering experiences gained from combat. From the examination of the memoranda compiled by the commanding officers of the Guerrilla Battalions 1 and 3 during the Winter War, it can be concluded that they had been tasked by the General Headquarters, upper command echelons, and the staffs of formations with gathering war experiences, and, based on such experiences, compiling instructions for guerrilla-type activities. General instructions on gathering experiences obtainable from combat and on taking advantage of them were issued by the Operations Section of the General Headquarters to the Army Command Finland as late as July 1940.166

The content of the memoranda found in archives of the various battalions and the General Headquarters differed from each other considerably. Reflecting the order and any additional instructions issued to the commander in question, war experiences were discussed either in great detail or by providing cursory statements. For example, while the Winter War was still in progress, the commander of Guerrilla Battalion 3, Captain Y. E. Saarelainen, drafted a report, evidently for use by the General Headquarters, on observations and experiences obtained from guerrilla-type activities. Captain Saarelainen’s report discusses guerrilla-type activities almost exclusively from the perspective of combat techniques. In any event, the General Headquarters expected to receive information on guerrilla-type activities during the Winter War in order to be able to draft new instructions.167

In addition to instructions gathered and compiled by the Tactical Office of the Training Division at the General Headquarters, training in guerrilla-type activities was also provided by arranging a separate course for instructors in guerrilla-type activities. While the original sources include several references to this course, its precise content and programme remain unclear due to cuts having been made to archive contents. In any event, a course aimed at instructors in guerrilla-type activities was arranged during the Winter War, in January 1940. The General Headquarters war diaries contain an order for arranging this course. ‘This is to notify the Headquarters of the Civil Guards that the Training Division of the General Headquarters will arrange a special 12-day course on guerrilla-type activities in Eastern Karelia. The Home Troops HQ is ordered to appoint 29 individuals to participate in the course. This course will begin on 8 January 1940.’168

As far as is known, other courses specialised in guerrilla-type activities were not organised due to the brief duration of the Winter War.

166 General HQ no. 1544/Op.1/IX/sal./19.7.1940, the Ground Forces Office of the General Headquarters, correspondence in 1940, T 2868/1, KA.
167 Y. E. Saarelainen: Sissitoimintaan liittyviä havaintoja ja kokemuksia (‘Observations and experiences related to guerrilla-type activities’), RTE no. 168/III/2/40/L. 785, 7.2.1940, the Ground Forces Office of the General Headquarters, correspondence in 1940, T 2868/1, KA.
A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities dated 29 January 1941, PrPE:n koulutusosaston sal. kirjeistöä 1941 (‘Confidential correspondence of the Training Division of the General Headquarters from 1941’), T 17651/6, KA.
According to documentation, Reserve Lieutenant Väinö Volanen\textsuperscript{169} who commanded Light Detachment 9 (Kevyt Osasto 9) during the Winter War, holding other posts as well, was one of the students who participated in the course aimed at instructors in guerrilla-type activities, organised by the General Headquarters between 8 and 23 January 1940. Väinö Volanen’s own notes also indicate that the courses on guerrilla-type activities were arranged at the initiative of the General Headquarters: ‘Immediately after the Winter War had broken out, the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters began training guerrilla jaeger units for the purpose of reconnaissance patrols and demolition raids to be carried out in the enemy’s rear in the spring, when crusty snow easily supported skiers.’\textsuperscript{170} After the instructor course, Väinö Volanen was ordered to report to the General Headquarters, in order to establish a ‘Guerrilla Manual Committee’, tasked with drafting a training programme for guerrilla-type activities and preparing a specific manual covering guerrilla-type activities.\textsuperscript{171}

It is quite obvious that the ‘Guerrilla Manual Committee members’ did not complete their work – due to the outcome of the war – as it was as late as in January 1941 that Väinö Volanen’s name reappears in the documentation, in connection with the objectives set for committee.\textsuperscript{172} After the Winter War, evidently during the Interim Peace, the commander of Guerrilla Battalion 1, Major Sulo Häkkinen, was ordered by Major Erkki Tara and Major Tauno Viljanen to gather all experiences gained from guerrilla-type activities and compile a summary for submittal to the Training Division of the General Headquarters.\textsuperscript{173} This is also attested by Väinö Volanen’s personal notes from 1942: ‘After the Winter War had ended, any experiences gained from guerrilla-type activities during the war were gathered and taken into account in the planning for future operations, including the training of guerrilla troops for a future war.’\textsuperscript{174}

The summary compiled by Sulo Häkkinen provides an excellent overview of the experiences gained from guerrilla-type activities during the Winter War, and of the observations made of the training in guerrilla warfare, the volume of which had remained rather modest. In his summary, Häkkinen summed up observations made of guerrilla-type activities during the Winter War, on the basis of which he suggested,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{169} Väinö Ilmari Volanen (1908–1963) acted as the intelligence officer of Siilasvuok Group and as the commander of Light Detachment 9 (‘Kevyt Osasto 9’), part of the organisation of the 9th Division, during the Winter War, among other posts. Volanen, Väinö Ilmari, an extract from personal details no. 21770, KA.
\item \textsuperscript{170} Ibid. See also Sissitoiminnalle asetettavat vaatimukset (‘Requirements to be set for guerrilla-type activities’), an undated memorandum and a handout used on the 1942 guerrilla course. Väinö Volanen’s private collection Pk 1401/2, KA.
\item \textsuperscript{171} Volanen, Väinö Ilmari, an extract from personal details no. 21770, KA.
\item \textsuperscript{172} A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities dated 29 January 1941, confidential correspondence of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces from 1941, T 17651/6, KA.
\item \textsuperscript{173} The importance attached to guerrilla-type activities and the experiences gained from them is clearly demonstrated by the fact that it was specifically from the commander of the Regulation Office of the General Headquarters (Major E. Tara) and from the commander of the Ground Forces Office (Major T. V. Viljanen) that Major S. Häkkinen received his further orders. See Tynkkynen (1996), p. 235.
\item \textsuperscript{174} Sissitoiminnalle asetettavat vaatimukset (‘Requirements to be set for guerrilla-type activities’), an undated memorandum and a handout used on the 1942 guerrilla course, Väinö Volanen’s private collection Pk 1401/2, KA.
\end{itemize}
among other things, that changes be made to the composition of guerrilla troops; he
proposed a syllabus for courses on guerrilla tactics; he drafted an organisation for
the guerrilla handbook that was being prepared; and he also listed special equipment
suitable for guerrilla-type activities. Häkkinen also rather openly criticised the use of
guerrilla jaeger battalions for the wrong purposes during the Winter War. ‘The tactical
use of guerrilla formations which had already been formed left much to be desired. Such small and
light guerrilla jaeger units without heavy weapons were assigned to similar tasks as infantry units
with heavy weapons in frontline combat, in which they often wore down or at least became unfit for
their intended role in a short period of time. Considering the fact that the number of our troops were
always insufficient when compared with the enemy, and always fatigued, commanders were forced to
use guerrilla formations in tasks for which they were basically not intended.’

A summary addressing enemy tactics and Finnish counter measures in the war
1939–1940, compiled by Lieutenant Colonel Valter Nordgren, represents experien-
ces of the war gathered immediately after the Winter War. The notes in this docu-
ment suggest that it was as late as in spring 1941 that Nordgren that drafted his
summary. While Nordgren’s summary makes only one reference to guerrilla-type ac-
tivities during the Winter War, it emphasises the importance of combat reconnais-
sance by small units. ‘Furthermore, they can be used to cut off road and other com-
munications between enemy units at suitable locations, thereby isolating such units from each other
and paving way for an attack. Such preparations include continuous guerrilla-type activities against
the enemy’s rear communications.’ Other documents on war experiences related to
guerrilla-type activities can also be found, but they tend to discuss experiences from
the viewpoint of equipment or combat techniques.

A book entitled Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka talvisodassa (‘Finnish and Russian
tactics in the Winter War’), published in 1948 by Colonel Yrjö Aleksis Järvinen, rep-
resents post-WWII scholarly research on the experiences gained from the Winter
War. Y. A. Järvinen’s book presents a summary of the Finnish and Russian tactics
before the Winter War. He describes, in realistic and substantiated terms, the
strengths and weaknesses that characterised the belligerent parties. Colonel Järvinen
pays particular attention to the disproportionate relative strengths of the parties:
‘Whichever way you look at the relative strengths of the belligerents, you have to conclude that the
Winter War was a dual between David and Goliath, one in which Russian masses and technology
crashed with Finnish grit and perseverance.’ Järvinen also raised the issue of guerrilla-type
activities, which, according to his analysis, had been concentrated in the areas north
of Lake Ladoga. According to Järvinen, guerrilla-type activities were feasible in large

175 A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities dated 29 January 1941, con-
fidential correspondence of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces from 1941, T
17651/6, KA.
176 Vihollisen taktiikasta ja omista vastainmenetelmissä (‘On enemy tactics and Finnish counter meas-
ures’), compiled in spring 1941 by Lieutenant Colonel Nordgren, a letter received by the Training
Division of the General Headquarters, 1941, T 18003/3, KA.
177 Erämaataistelu ja sissisota (‘Battle in a wilderness and guerrilla war’), an undated memorandum
from 1940 discussing war experiences gained from the Winter War, found in the research data base
of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, a folder entitled ‘Talviso-
ta 1939–1940 – strategia, operaatiot, taktiikka’ (‘The Winter War 1939–1940 – strategy, operations and
tactics’).
wilderness areas in which it was possible to deliver decisive strikes against the enemy’s rear and flanks without any risk to the flanks and rear of the Finnish forces. Järvinen argued that active guerrilla-type activities helped to deter enemy activity. ‘While the divisional staff normally attempted to maintain extremely close control over patrol and guerrilla activities, in the boundless northern wilderness guerrilla jaeger units could operate with considerable independence.’

In the closing chapter of his book, Järvinen states that the experiences gained from the Winter War suggest that guerrilla-type activities were extensively used in the areas between Lake Ladoga and the Arctic Ocean in particular, and that they became more frequent towards the end of the war. ‘While it is often difficult to draw a line between guerrilla-type activities and ordinary combat operations, it can be said that both belligerents engaged in clear-cut guerrilla operations and that such activities became more common towards the end of the war. On the part of the Finns, guerrilla operations were especially frequent, aiming principally to hamper enemy supply lines and forcing the enemy command to tie up forces to protect their long communication lines in order to lessen the pressure on the front. The most important result of guerrilla-type activities has been the paralysing of enemy activity.’

Everything suggests that Järvinen was very much in line with the other officers who had made observations of guerrilla-type activities during the Winter War.

Of other narratives on war experiences with a focus on guerrilla-type activities as carried out during the Winter War, a treatise written by Raimo Heiskanen in 1960, entitled Talvisodan taistelut Pielisjärvellä (‘Battles in Pielisjärvi during the Winter War’) deserves a mention. This memorandum, based on experiences gained from the war, is a highly detailed study of the operations carried out at a single section of the front, in which guerrilla-type activities played a significant role in affecting enemy operations. Heiskanen provides a thorough presentation of the background of guerrilla-type activities in the Winter War, analysing it from the viewpoint of the art of war and also taking account of the mental aspects. According to Heiskanen, by that time a sufficiently long period had passed since the end of the war, enabling the compilation of a satisfactorily conclusive picture of the narratives of war, instructions and war diaries representing various levels.

Raimo Heiskanen approaches the prerequisites for guerrilla-type activities in the Winter War from three key elements: Finnish geography favouring the defender; officers and NCOs well-versed in fieldcraft; and leaders capable of taking decisions which were both innovative and adapted to the requirements of the situation. Heiskanen also offers harsh criticism in his treatise, particularly with regard to inadequate training and instructions. ‘The training of the personnel did not cover actual guerrilla-type activities. No training regarding leadership and combat practices in guerrilla-type activities was provided before the Winter War, either in the form of map exercises or other practical exercises. Quite evidently, the facts on which such activity is dependent were not recognised; neither were some of the means available to guerrilla-type activities. Neither did the military regulations and guide-

180 Talvisodan taistelut Pielisjärvellä (‘Battles in Pielisjärvi during the Winter War’) by Major Raimo Heiskanen, pp. 103–126, StietNK 1/16, KA.
books in effect at the time require this. Regulations did not refer to guerrilla-type activities. Guerrilla-type activities were not mentioned in guidebooks for winter conditions, other handbooks or magazines. At the outset of the war, the General Headquarters did not issue any general instructions or guidelines regarding guerrilla-type activities. The tactical instructions issued by the General Headquarters after the war had broken out were based on experiences gained from battles. The quality of the instructions regarding guerrilla-type activities is an indication of the scant attention paid to the issue before the war.\textsuperscript{181} The criticism offered by Heiskanen regarding the defects in the guidebooks is understandable but somewhat contradictory. After all, the General Headquarters had published \textit{Sissiopas} (‘Guerrilla handbook’) only two weeks before the Winter War broke out, although its content was rather modest and, due to the lack of time, had little effect on training.

One other analytical text on guerrilla-type activities, a compilation of war experiences, is available. In 1962, Captain Eljas-Veli Sovijärvi compiled an interesting albeit highly concise narrative entitled \textit{Johtopäätökset sisätoiminnasta viime sotien kokemusten mukaan} (‘Conclusions to be drawn from the guerrilla-type activities during Finland’s last wars’) After examining the war diaries kept and the combat and situational reports submitted by the Finnish formations of the Winter War, Sovijärvi drew a critical conclusion according to which ‘...action, to a high degree, was combat patrolling in the enemy’s rear areas located close to the front, although there is also some evidence of pure guerrilla-type activities.’ According to Sovijärvi, the army that Finland fielded for the Winter War had no guerrilla organisation to speak of, let alone training in guerrilla tactics.

Although the mobilisation plans of the General Headquarters included five guerrilla jaeger battalions, their designations reflected more historical traditions than action or their real use. The guerrilla jaeger battalions were used during the Winter War for defensive duties just like any infantry battalions. \textit{At the outset of the Winter War, the Finnish troops had no basic training for guerrilla-type activities almost without exception, let alone advanced training. Completing one’s military service in the standing army and refresher training, service in the Frontier Guard, dexterity, cleverness and a high mental capability, physical fitness and an ability to improvise were passed as special training for guerrilla-type activities’}, Sovijärvi writes, summing up his point.\textsuperscript{182} Criticism offered by Sovijärvi addresses, in a way, exactly the very same issues that the earlier authors had discussed, as his conclusions were quite in line with those put forth by Y. A. Järvinen and Major Sulo Häkkinen.

Aside from various memoranda, experiences of the war were also gathered after the Second World War by conducting interviews. On a course arranged by the National General Staff College in 1969, students on the course interviewed, as part of their course work, Winter War commanders regarding their experiences of the war. The interviews prepared by the students included several questions on guerrilla-type activities during the Winter War, which the officers answered from the viewpoint of

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid, p. 104 and 106.

\textsuperscript{182} Sovijärvi, E.-V.: \textit{Johtopäätökset sisätoiminnasta viime sotien kokemusten mukaan} (‘Conclusions from guerrilla-type activities in the 1939–1944 wars’), a memorandum with no doc.no. North Karelia Frontier Guard, refresher training/1962, the copy in possession of the author of this thesis.
their war experiences. Of the several officers interviewed, Major A. O. Väänänen\(^{183}\), Lieutenant Colonel Y. E. Saarelainen\(^{184}\), Colonel V. Karanko\(^{185}\) and Major General V. Karhunen\(^{186}\) deserve a mention.

The answers given by the interviewees were very conflicting. For example, Olli Väänänen relates that training in guerrilla-type activities was provided before the Winter War, including a great number of exercises. However, compared with other sources, Väänänen’s interview can be questions in part, even more so as he, as a source, refers to an article entitled ‘Porojen käyttö huoltotehtäviin’ (‘Using reindeer in supply tasks’) that he himself had published in the 12/1967 issue of Sotilasaikakauslehti. In contrast, Väinö Karanko pointed out in his interview that the Frontier Guard paid more attention to guerrilla-type activities than the Defence Forces before the Winter War.\(^{187}\) It should be remembered that Karanko had written his thesis at the National General Staff College on the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities north of Lake Ladoga, making him familiar with the question before the Winter War.\(^{188}\)

The above-mentioned war experiences and narratives of guerrilla-type activities during the Winter War have insufficient training and equipment of the guerrilla troops in common, as well as their use in secondary purposes. The instructions for guerrilla-type activities, issued before and during the Winter War, were also perceived to be clearly insufficient. Such experiences and justified observations gave rise to the development of guerrilla-type activities in a more systematic fashion after peace was achieved.

\(^{183}\) Akseli Olli Väänänen (1900–1987), acted as the commander of 1./Er.P 17 and the commander of Er.P 17 in the Winter War. See also the interview with Major (Retd) O. A. Väänänen, conducted on 29 March 1969, found in the research data base of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, identifier xe131, folder 55.

\(^{184}\) Yrjö Erkki Saarelainen (1905–1987) acted as the commander of 1./Er.P 10, II/JR 16 and SissiP 2. See the interview with Lieutenant Colonel Y. E. Saarelainen, conducted on 10 January 1969, found in the research data base of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, identifier xe133, folder 55.

\(^{185}\) Väinö Karanko (previously Savolainen, 1901–1983), acted as the chief of the Operations Office of the Lapland Group and as the chief of staff of Villamo Detachment Villamo during the Winter War. See the interview with Colonel V. Karanko, conducted on 4 April 1969, found in the research data base of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, identifier xe135, folder 55.

\(^{186}\) Veikko Evert Karhunen (1905–1986), acted as the adjutant of the Kainuu Group and Er.P 15, and as the commander of IV/KTPr and Er.P 15. Karhunen, Veikko Evert, an extract from personal details, no. 37447, KA. See also the interview with Major General V. Karhunen, conducted on 22 May 1969, found in the research data base of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, identifier xe138, folder 55.

\(^{187}\) The interview with Major (Retd) A. O. Väänänen, conducted on 29 March 1969, found in the research data base of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, identifier xe131, folder 55. Väänänen, A. O.: Porojen käyttö huoltotehtäviin (‘Using reindeer in supply tasks’), Sotilasaikakauslehti 12/1967, pp. 523–527. Väänänen mentions in his article that in 1930 and 1936 the Lapland Frontier Guard organised two guerrilla jaeger unit exercises, involving experiments with a guerrilla jaeger patrol using reindeer. Two exercises do not amount to much.

\(^{188}\) The interview with Colonel V. Karanko, conducted on 4 April 1969, found in the research data base of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, identifier xe135, folder 55. See also Karanko (1935), SKK 1/223, KA.
Developing guerrilla-type activities after the Winter War

After the Winter War, the Defence Forces were reorganised for peacetime. The Ground Forces were grouped into five army corps along the eastern border; these were in turn divided into 13 brigades that were stationed in what were referred to as wilderness garrisons. The Navy comprised five coastal artillery regiments, a coastal fleet and a separate naval division. The Air Force consisted of four flying regiments and one anti-aircraft brigade. These arrangements sought to facilitate rapid readiness for war. Following a full-scale mobilisation, the Defence Forces returned to a wartime organisation on 17 June 1941.189

After the Winter War, the world war continued in Europe. The situation in the north remained tense, despite the fact that Finland had signed the Moscow Peace Treaty with the Soviet Union. During the Interim Peace, from the spring of 1940 to summer 1941, Finns were living in uncertainty. With the Soviet Union being allied with Germany, Finland feared an invasion by its eastern neighbour. This situation required prompt arrangements and changes, aimed at enhancing Finland’s national defence capabilities. Development were extended to the fundamentals of the art of war, whereby the role of guerrilla-type activities as a method of combat was subjected to serious discussion against the background of experiences obtained from the war. Intelligence measures regarding the areas behind the border were also continued during the Interim Peace on the basis of experiences gained from the war. The Statistics Office (Counterintelligence Office) operating at the General Headquarters, including the offices under it, were principally tasked with obtaining intelligence about the Soviet Union and training long-range patrollers. During the Interim Peace, secret reconnaissance patrols, including those trained for guerrilla-type activities, were used for obtaining intelligence.190

Between soldiers, experiences gained from the war were naturally discussed during the Interim Peace, but the surviving number of reports or memoranda of any length representing this short period is small. With regard to guerrilla-type activities, records on experiences gained from the war were in most cases limited to individual notes or brief analyses. However, a number of documents addressing guerrilla tactics can be found in päälystön kotitehtävät (‘homework for officers’ – spring and summer 1940), suojeluskuntapäälystön keskustelutilaisuudet (‘discussion events for Civil Guard officers’ – 1940–1941) and upseerien varuskuntaseminaarin esitelmät (‘presentations given by officers at garrisons’ – 1940–1948), and similar documents.191 All the discussion forums mentioned above played an important role in developing a characteristically Finnish art of war, also with regard to guerrilla-type activities. As far as is known, there was no time to organise training specifically addressing guerrilla-type activities

190 Saressalo, Lassi: Kaukopartiot tiedustelutehtävissä, (‘Long-range patrols in reconnaissance duties’), an article in a book entitled Salaisen sodan sivut (‘The pages of a secret war’), edited by Mikko Karjalainen, Helsinki 2003, pp. 45–60. See also Kosonen, Matti: Suomen salainen tiedustelu Neuvostoliitossa ennen jatkosotaa (‘Finland’s secret intelligence activities in the Soviet Union before the Continuation War’), ibid., pp. 111–127.
191 Tuunainen, Pasi: Communication in writing, and a meeting held on 9 November 2009.
during the Interim Peace, although plans for arranging training courses in guerrilla-type activities had been drafted. However, evidently one of the Frontier Guards organised a course for instructors in guerrilla tactics in early 1941; of around two weeks in duration.192

Perhaps the most significant memorandum – referred to above – on guerrilla-type activities compiled during the Interim Peace is the summary drafted by Major Sulo Häkkinen on the experiences gained of guerrilla-type activities during the Winter War and on the instructions issued for the provision of training in guerrilla tactics. Häkkinen saw such instructions as being highly important, and he thought that particularly the grounds given for such instructions were an indication of a need for a more systematic development. ‘During the last winter’s war, a great deal of experiences of the forming and organisation, as well as of the use of guerrilla jaeger units, guerrilla jaeger companies and guerrilla jaeger battalions for actual guerrilla-type activities were gained; such experiences should be used to enhance the defensive capabilities of our country. For example, neglect during peacetime concerning the forming and arrangements of guerrilla jaeger battalions was found to be impossible to compensate for after the war had broken out.’193

An interesting detail in this memorandum is the emphasis placed on the need for a specific guerrilla handbook, which, due to the short duration of the Interim Peace, was not fulfilled. When compiling his summary, Sulo Häkkinen essentially based his worked on his own experiences as the commander of the Guerrilla Battalion 1 during the Winter War. In compiling the experiences gained of the war and drafting the programme for guerrilla courses, Häkkinen was aided, as he mentions in his memorandum, by Major Juho Aho Väinö Volanen, captain in the reserve army, who, as Häkkinen suggests in his memorandum, could become the drafters of a possible guerrilla handbook.194 ‘When undertaking to provide training in guerrilla-type activities on a more extensive basis in the Defence Forces, the Civil Guard and the Frontier Guard, a ‘Sissiopas’ (Guerrilla handbook’) with more detailed and versatile contents should be made available to the instructors. This confidential handbook would naturally be modified over time, reflecting new experiences, necessitating its reissues. However, it is necessary to publish a new Sissiopas immediately, as the one used previously does not meet the requirements to be set for such a handbook.’ Thus, it was already during the Interim Peace that criticism was directed at the guerrilla handbook predating the Winter War, deemed to be incomplete in content.195

192 A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities dated 29 January 1941, confidential correspondence of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces from 1941, T 17651/6, KA. See also Sissitoiminnasta (‘On guerrilla-type activities’), a memorandum compiled by Captain U. K. Korhonen, dated 18 November 1946, Eino Penttilä’s private collection Pk 2109/3, KA.
193 A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities dated 29 January 1941, confidential correspondence of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces from 1941, T 17651/6, KA.
194 Ibid. Häkkinen’s memorandum also makes reference to a course for instructors in guerrilla-type activities which ended on 18 January 1941. In addition to a course for instructors in guerrilla-type activities, arranged during the Winter War (8–23 January 1940), Väinö Volanen participated as a student in another course for instructors in guerrilla-type activities, arranged 8–18 January 1941. In addition to the courses mentioned above, he acted as the head of two guerrilla courses in spring 1942. Volanen, Väinö Ilmari, an extract from personal details no. 21770, KA.
195 Ibid.; note the underlined and emphasised words in the original document. Cf. also Sissiopas (1939).
This criticism can be interpreted to be directed both at the content and availability of the *Sissiopas* used during the Winter War. Of the 15-page *Sissiopas* handbook that had been issued to troops at the outset of the Winter War, 3,950 copies remained in the store of the Regulation Office of the General Headquarters in January 1941. By June 1941, additional copies of *Sissiopas* had been issued to the troops, as the inventory accounting indicates that the number of guidebooks in store had decreased by 100 copies. Such numbers indicate that of an edition of 6,000 copies of the guidebook dating back to the Winter War, a number considerably smaller than originally intended had been issued to the troops. The reason that this guidebook had remained unissued must be attributable to the fact that it had been classified as confidential, causing it to be distributed to the troops and used in training in a considerably more limited number than other regulations.

In his proposal, Heikkinen also comments on the responsibilities regarding training in guerrilla-type activities. According to it, the primary responsibility for providing training in guerrilla-type activities should be given to those infantry and light units that in peacetime are stationed near the eastern border. In line with their duty to form troops, the military provinces were tasked with ensuring that Civil Guard members and conscripts who reported to the military service and who were deemed suitable for guerrilla training were assigned to these units. Häkkinen’s plan was based on the notion that the army units would arrange a guerrilla course for conscripts suited for guerrilla duties after they had completed their basic training period. The guerrilla course was divided into two phases: a basic guerrilla course, which was supplemented by an advanced and a refresher course providing further skills in accordance with the season in question. According to the proposal, the duration of the basic guerrilla course was to be five weeks, comprising 225 hours of instruction, followed by a two-week advanced course with 90 hours of instruction. According to Häkkinen, it was necessary that every guerrilla officer, NCO and private be provided with training in guerrilla-type activities both in winter and summer. In the military passports of officers, NCOs and privates who had received training in guerrilla-type activities, the word *sissi* (‘guerrilla jaeger’) was entered in the section indicating the passport holders special training. On the basis of this entry, the relevant Civil Guard district would assign them to guerrilla formations to be formed during mobilisation.

The Winter War had proved a reality check, providing a perspective on the number of troops required and the necessity of having such troops as part of the Field Army. Although several proposals for improvement regarding the principles of guerrilla-type activities were submitted, very little was accomplished with regard to such principles on account of the brevity of the Interim Peace period. The most important achievements immediately following the Winter War were the drafting of a

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196 An order for military literature placed by the V Army Corps, PvPE no. 20/1/13/9.1.1941, T 17651/10, KA.
197 The stock list of military literature of the Training Division of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces, PM no. 1033/Koul.2/sal./12.6.1941, T 17651/6, KA. In the stock list, *Sissiopas* had been listed under the heading ‘II Sisainen kirjallisuus’ (‘II Confidential literature’).
198 A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities, dated 29 January 1941, attachment 1, (‘Confidential correspondence of the Training Division of the General Headquarters from 1941’), T 17651/6, KA.
syllabus for guerrilla courses, the addition of details to the instructions on guerrilla-type activities, and a proposal for the compilation of a military regulation for guerrilla-type activities. However, gathering experiences was part of an important development effort which was later continued and the results of which were put to good use during the Continuation War.

On the basis of the experiences gained from the Winter War, training on long-range reconnaissance and actual long-range reconnaissance activity in the Soviet area were increased in spring 1941. Information was gathered on the disposition and movements of enemy troops, particularly on the Karelian Isthmus, for the eventuality of a new war. Secret reconnaissance and long-range patrol activity on the Karelian Isthmus at the time were principally the responsibility of the Vyborg Sub-Office, Detachment Vehniäinen. The objective was to constantly have patrols, capable of guerrilla-type activities, in the field. However, such activities had to be kept secret; consequently, patrolmen of the secret reconnaissance units, recruited from among those who, before the Winter War, had lived in the areas that Finland had ceded to the Soviet Union following the Moscow Peace Treaty, operated in Soviet territory wearing civilian clothing.

3.2. Guerrilla-type activities and long-range patrolling during the Continuation War

The experiences gained from the Winter War and the reorganisation of troops during the Interim Peace laid the foundations for guerrilla-type activities conducted during the Continuation War. Guerrilla-type activities and the principles governing them had achieved an established position in the Finnish art of war by the Interim Peace, when, during the spring of 1940, the five guerrilla jaeger battalions formed for the Winter War were reorganised to form three guerrilla jaeger battalions in the peacetime organisation. These guerrilla jaeger battalions were subordinated to the IV and V Army Corps, stationed north of Lake Ladoga, as well as to the 11th Division.199 The plans for an eventual war also included three guerrilla jaeger battalions, intended to be formed for placement under the command of the Army Corps operating north of Lake Ladoga. The guerrilla-type activities conducted by individual divisions continued to be the responsibility of temporary guerrilla task forces formed separately for individual operations. On the basis of the experiences gained from the Winter War, and taking account of the mistakes already made once, the operational plans drafted for guerrilla-type activities were anticipatory to a somewhat higher degree. Especially in the planning conducted by the brigades of the covering force and the Army Corps stationed north of Lake Ladoga for wartime operations, guerrilla-type activities and the opportunities offered by them to the Field Army gained greatly increased attention.200

199 Guerrilla Battalion 1 (Vii니järvi) and Guerrilla Battalion 2 (Kemi–Kajaani) were assigned to the IV Army Corps, and Guerrilla Battalion 3 to the V Army Corps. See also MaavE:n no. 1766/V/23/sal./6.6.1940, T 2868/1, KA. Talvisodan historia 4 (‘A history of the Winter War 4’), Porvoo 1991, p. 386.
During the mobilisation in summer 1941, efforts were made to assign necessary personnel to Guerrilla Battalions 1, 2 and 3, in order to make their composition to meet the requirements set for wartime formations. The strength of each guerrilla jaeger battalion was around 450 men, divided into three guerrilla jaeger companies, and each company was divided into three guerrilla jaeger platoons. Because the guerrilla jaeger battalions were primarily intended for use in mobile guerrilla operations, their organisation did not include — sensibly enough — heavy infantry weapons and major supply formations. However, due to insufficient training, every guerrilla jaeger battalion lacked the special skills required by guerrilla-type activities. The personnel of the battalions were also a motley crew, both with regard to their age and experience. Only the personnel of Guerrilla Battalion 3 had any familiarity with operating in a wilderness. With regard to guerrilla-type activities, the plans drafted during the Interim Peace for the guerrilla units were related in most cases to defensive military operations. In practice, the order to attack given to the Field Army entirely changed the planned use of the guerrilla jaeger battalions north of Lake Ladoga. Because of such factors, during the invasion phase of the Continuation War, the three guerrilla jaeger battalions were used in the role of ordinary infantry battalions in tasks involving attacks with limited objectives.\(^{201}\)

The mobilisation in June 1941 showed that the Interim Peace had been too short a period for implementing all the plans drafted for guerrilla-type activities. Although three guerrilla jaeger battalions were formed in the Field Army in June 1941, in line with the mobilisation plans, almost all other formations lacked guerrilla jaeger units, which they should have had as prescribed by the plans. This would indicate that the responsibility for guerrilla-type activities was assigned to the jaeger units of each regiment, to the light troops of each division, and to the units of the Frontier Guard. This is why the General Headquarters issued an order, during the first weeks of the war, to the brigades and divisions to form guerrilla jaeger units from those troops under their command.\(^{202}\) Under several formations, following the orders issued by the General Headquarters, units referred to as ‘long-range units’ or ‘guerrilla jaeger units’, were formed. This was the case, for example, in the 14th Division, which formed three guerrilla jaeger units of approximately 50 men. These units were subordinated to the regiments and battalions forming the divisions. However, even after their subordination to the regiments and battalions, these guerrilla jaeger units remained under the command of the Operations Department of the Divisional Headquarters. This was regarded as a flawed decision, as during the Finnish army invasion phase of the Continuation War, the battalions used the guerrilla jaeger units independently, without obtaining permission from the Divisional Headquarters. On those occasions when the division would have had a need to dispatch guerrilla jaeger units to carry out guerrilla tasks in the enemy’s rear, the units were either so fatigued or had suffered such a number of casualties that they were unfit for the task that the upper level HQ was planning. The special training of the units was also deemed to

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\(^{201}\) Sissitoiminnasta (‘On guerrilla-type activities’), Captain U. K. Korhonen, dated 18 November 1946, Eino Penttilä’s private collection Pk 2109/3, KA. Tynkkynen (1996), p. 235. See also Penttilä, Eino Valfrid, an extract from personal details, no. 33097, KA.

\(^{202}\) Ibid.
be gravely insufficient, let alone the special material that had not been issued to the troops.\textsuperscript{203}

In spring 1941, time was found to arrange a number of basic training courses in guerrilla-type activities for the newly formed guerrilla jaeger units, the syllabi of which were based on the instructions submitted by Major Sulo Hänkinen to the General Headquarters of the Finnish Defence Forces in January 1941. In accordance with Hänkinen’s proposal, guerrilla courses were divided into five-week basic courses and two-week refresher courses. The emphasis of training in guerrilla-type activities during the Continuation War invasion phase was laid on refresher training, as detaching troops from combat for a training period for a month would have been practically impossible.\textsuperscript{204} Evidently, the training period prescribed by the syllabus was, despite good intentions, all too brief, considering the requirement set for the quality of training. This is why the training provided on the courses mostly focused on demolition task and such guerrilla operations that could be carried out during marches typical of the Finnish Army invasion phase of the Continuation War. However, course instructors were unable to take full advantage of the experiences of guerrilla-type activities gained during the Winter War, as the memoranda drafted of war experiences continued to be labelled as confidential information. Only some of the course instructors had served in guerrilla jaeger battalions or the guerrilla jaeger units of various formations during the Winter War. These factors contributed to the fact that guerrilla-type activities did not deliver the expected and planned results during the Continuation War invasion phase.\textsuperscript{205}

The rapid advancement of the Finnish Army during the Continuation War invasion phase alongside the Germans, including successfully fought battles and local superiority in numbers, were factors that were disadvantageous for guerrilla-type activities, as in the Finnish art of war, guerrilla-type activities were primarily seen as an opportunity to balance the relative strengths of the belligerents. In autumn 1941, there was little need to balance the relative strengths. Consequently, orders seeking to step up guerrilla-type activities and to put the guerrilla jaeger units already formed to more effective use were not implemented during the Finnish army invasion phase of the Continuation War. While individual episodes of the effects of guerrilla-type activities were recorded, they remained modest compared with the Winter War. It should also be borne in mind that the plans drafted during the Interim Peace were based on the use of guerrilla-type activities in defensive battles. Because the early phases of the Continuation War were characterised by a large-scale offensive military operation,

\textsuperscript{203} Kokemuksia sotiemme aikaisesta sissitoiminnasta (‘Experiences gained from guerrilla-type activities during the wars that Finland waged 1939–1944’); a memorandum by Captain Eino Penttilä, dated 30 January 1947, Eino Penttilä’s private collection, Pk 2109/3, KA.

\textsuperscript{204} A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities dated 29 January 1941, confidential correspondence of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces from 1941, T 17651/6, KA.

\textsuperscript{205} Sissitoiminnasta (‘On guerrilla-type activities’), Captain U. K. Korhonen, dated 18 November 1946, Eino Penttilä’s private collection Pk 2109/3, KA. See also Roiba, Risto: Sissi- ja kaukopartio- toiminta Suomen sodassa 1941–1944 (‘Guerrilla-type activities and long-range patrols the wars that Finland waged between 1941 and 1944’); a thesis written at the National General Staff College in 1973, pp. 39–44, SKK 1/1118, KA.
theories of guerrilla-type activities and their functionality from the viewpoint of the art of remained untested.

Long-range patrolling and other forms of reconnaissance required training in guerrilla-type activities

Long-range patrols, long-range reconnaissance, patrol reconnaissance, combat reconnaissance and violent reconnaissance were closely related concepts during the wars between 1939 and 1944. Although these concepts were partly contradictory, they shared the fact that they fell into the wide field of reconnaissance. The concepts mentioned above had been defined in the 1927 Kenttäohjesääntö (‘Field regulation’), in the 1932 Jalkaväen ohjesääntö (‘Infantry regulation’), and in the handbook dating to 1927 entitled Taktiikan perusteet (‘The basics of tactics’). In the 1927 Field regulation, violent reconnaissance refers to a limited attack, aimed at forcing the enemy to disclose its forces or reveal its intentions. Depending on the objectives of the operation and the distance to the area to be subjected to reconnaissance, this method was also referred to as long-range, short-range or combat reconnaissance. However, according to the Field regulation, ‘a clear line between them is impossible to draw.’

Long-range reconnaissance serves the objectives of the High Command. Through long-range reconnaissance, enemy plans, measures, the concentration of forces and troop movements can be clarified. Long-range reconnaissance referred to overland patrols in the enemy’s rear to areas that were further than a day’s march away from the Finnish front line. Short-range reconnaissance was used to find more detailed information on enemy activities and on the disposition of the enemy branch troops closer to the positions of the Finnish troops. After battle breaks out, short-range reconnaissance transforms into combat reconnaissance, aimed at clarifying, by engaging the enemy in combat, enemy activities and any surprise manoeuvres, particularly along the flanks. According to the 1927 Infantry Field Regulation, the reconnaissance conducted by infantry was primarily short-range and combat reconnaissance in nature. When necessary, combat reconnaissance can also be extended to the enemy’s rear, in order to capture a prisoner, document or other sources of information. For ground reconnaissance, infantry patrols or reconnaissance units are used.

206 Combat reconnaissance refers to ‘close-range reconnaissance, the nature of which changes after combat begins.’ The objective is to achieve clarity, during combat, of the measures that the enemy has taken. Reconnaissance will still take place in the vicinity of the front. The points connecting short and long-range reconnaissance were related to ‘small-scale circumstances’, which, in practice, referred to situations in which the distances between troops became shorter. Long-range reconnaissance was reconnaissance that extended deep in enemy-held territory. The difference between long-range reconnaissance, short-range reconnaissance and combat reconnaissance is specifically related to the distance to the sites subjected to reconnaissance. Kenttäohjesääntö I (K.O.) (‘Field regulation I’) (K.O.), Helsinki 1927, pp. 60–62 and 217. Jalkaväen taisteluhohjesääntö II½ (J.O. II½), (‘Combat regulation for the infantry II½’), Helsinki 1932, p. 397. Ollkonen (1928), pp. 62–65. Olkkonen (1928), pp. 62–65.

207 Kenttäohjesääntö I (K.O.) (‘Field regulation I’) (K.O.), Helsinki 1927, pp. 81–82.
Long-range patrols and patrol reconnaissance in the enemy’s rear were one of the most tightly kept secrets of the wars that Finland waged between 1939 and 1944. Long-range patrolling was patrolling deep in the enemy’s rear territory, led or ordered by the General Headquarters and supported by air transport or by material supplies dropped from the air. Patrols formed by the divisions and other formations were also used in patrolling. Long-range patrols operating in the enemy’s rear were mostly tasked with reconnaissance tasks, but, particularly during the Continuation War, patrolling was also supplemented by demolition and harassment tasks. From this perspective, such patrols in part resembled combat patrolling. This meant that patrols destroyed targets important to the enemy such as supply centres, command posts and necessary communications including supply lines and communication links. Of the guerrilla-type activities associated with combat reconnaissance, laying landmines and setting up traps were used in particular. In postwar texts, long-range patrolling was often equated with guerrilla-type activities. Although both had similarities, they were conceptually separate and tactically different.

Training in long-range patrolling, initiated during the Interim Peace with a focus on guerrilla-type activities and long-range patrolling, produced approximately 150 to 160 long-range patrolmen by the onset of the Continuation War. From these men, four units capable of long-range patrolling were formed; these units were placed under the Intelligence Office of the Intelligence Division, which in turn, was placed under the Intelligence Section of Section 2 of the General Headquarters. It was as late as in 1943 that an established form was given to the long-range patrol units, when Separate Battalion 4 (Erillinen Pataljoona 4) – a unit divided into four sub-units – was established. While further training was, above all, based on experienced gained from war, separate guerrilla courses were also arranged. In autumn 1941, a training centre was established in Savukoski, tasked with arranging courses in guerrilla-type activities and long-range patrolling for the officers and men. Tactical teaching was given both in long-range patrolling and guerrilla-type activities and anti-guerrilla activities.

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209 Combat reconnaissance, as a concept, has recently gained new currency with reference to guerrilla-type activities. Vesa Tynkkynen, among others, has remarked that he would prefer to refer to guerrilla-type activities using the term combat patrolling, which is a more appropriate expression within the context of international terminology. However, it should be noted that this concept was already used to refer to guerrilla-type activities in the military regulations predating the Winter War, as well as in postwar literature on the art of war. Cf., among others, Grünn, K. V.: Kenttäpalveluksen opas kuvin ja sanoin I, (‘An illustrated guidebook for service in the field I’), Helsinki 1931, p. 37. Kenttäohjesääntö I (K.O.) (‘Field regulation I’) (K.O.), Helsinki 1929, pp. 60–62. Foertsch, Hermann: Nykyaikainen ja tuleva sotataito (Finnish translation), (‘The modern and future art of war’), Porvoo 1939, pp. 171–172. StietNK 1/16, Talvisodan taistelut Pielisjärvellä (‘Battles in Pielisjärvi during the Winter War’), written by Major Raimo Heiskanen, p. 106. See also Sovijärvi, E.-V.: Johdatusoksest sisotoinnasta viime sovien kokemuksen mukaan (‘Conclusions from guerrilla-type activities in the 1939–1944 wars’), a memorandum with no doc.no., North Karelia Frontier Guard, refresher training/1962, the copy in possession of the author of this thesis.

210 Sovijärvi, E.-V.: (‘Conclusions from guerrilla-type activities in the 1939–1944 wars’), a memorandum with no doc.no., North Karelia Frontier Guard, refresher training exercise/1962, the copy in possession of the author of this thesis, p. 6.
During the period of static warfare, in 1942 and 1943, course-based training in guerilla warfare was also arranged. Two guerrilla courses were arranged over the course of spring 1942, intended at least for the troops of the Maanselkä Group and the Ääninen Coastal Brigade, the content and training of which was based on the memorandum drafted by Major Sulo Hänkinen in 1941. These courses were primarily intended for the personnel of the guerrilla jaeger units formed by the Maanselkä Group and the Ääninen Coastal Brigade, but personnel stationed in long-range patrol formations also participated in them.\(^{211}\) The syllabi of these courses comprised lectures and exercises in the terrain. According to the weekly programmes of the courses, the topics of the lectures included a review of the experiences gained from guerrilla-type activities, the composition of guerrilla jaeger units and their special equipment, reconnaissance in the enemy’s rear areas and submittal of gained information, demolition and destruction tasks, collaboration with the Air Force units, and theoretical foundations of supply and medical services. The lectures also addressed up-to-date information on the organisational developments, weapons, tactics and troop dispositions regarding the Red Army. The exercises focused on shooting, map reading, finding one’s way using a map and compass, arranging ambushes and setting up traps, as well as the practical implementation of the various combat methods of guerrilla-type activities.\(^{212}\)

On 1 July 1943, during the Continuation War, patrol reconnaissance was organised and put on a permanent footing by establishing a unit specialising in long-range patrolling, Separate Battalion 4 (Er.P 4 – Erillinen Pataljoona 4), under the General Headquarters. This battalion comprised a headquarters and supportive elements, as well as four companies, all of which were assigned a separate operational area along different sections of the front. This ensured that reconnaissance directed at the enemy rear areas could take on more systematic and methodical forms.\(^{213}\)

The operational areas of the long-range patrols and unit were extremely wide, with the range of operations extending at their longest as far as 500 kilometres behind the front line. Operations deep in the enemy’s rear required the patrols to be able to supply themselves independently, had well-functioning communications and that they had a sufficient level of mobility. Operations also required that patrolemen were able to keep their nerves under control, as the risk of patrols being discovered was extremely high. Despite the risks, long-range patrolling played an important role in gathering intelligence for the General Headquarters and the troops stationed at the front. The reconnaissance of the directions in which the enemy was moving, its troop disposition and the preparations it had made, had a direct impact on the deci-

\(^{211}\) The first guerrilla course was arranged at the premises of the Maanselkä Group Staff between 11 and 24 February 1942, and the second course between 22 May and 6 June 1942. Volanen, Väinö Ilmari, an extract from personal details no. 21770, KA. See also the handouts used on the guerrilla course in spring 1942, Väinö Volanen’s private collection Pk 1401/2, KA. A summary by Major Hänninen concerning guerrilla-type activities, dated 29 January 1941, (‘Confidential correspondence of the Training Division of the General Headquarters from 1941’), T 17651/6, KA, attachment 3.

\(^{212}\) The handouts used on the guerrilla course in spring 1942; see, for example, the daily programme for the guerrilla leader course arranged between 26 May and 1 June 1942, Väinö Volanen’s private collection Pk 1401/2, KA.

\(^{213}\) Saressalo (1987), pp. 16–19.
sions that many Finnish units holding the front line took and on possible changes to their battle plans. Reconnaissance combined with demolition is thought to have tied up a substantial number of enemy troops for safeguarding their rear areas, as demolition and harassment raids did cause the desired disturbance in the enemy rear areas.\textsuperscript{214}

Experiences gained from long-range patrolling, reconnaissance and guerrilla-type activities during the early phases of the Continuation War were put to good use on guerrilla courses arranged in 1942–1943, the training topics of which were based on examples such as the patrol experiences described above. Training paid particular attention to demolition and guerrilla-type activities in the enemy’s rear areas, capturing prisoners and obtaining interrogation information.\textsuperscript{215}

**Guerrilla-type and partisan activities during the period of static warfare**

After the Continuation War invasion phase, completed during autumn 1941, the General Headquarters set out to prepare the reorganisation of the Defence Forces along the lines of a covering force organisation. The planned changes also concerned guerrilla formations and guerrilla jaeger battalions formed within the Field Army. In early February 1942, the General Headquarters issued orders to disband Guerrilla Battalions 1 and 2, assigning the younger age classes released from these battalions to Frontier Guard companies. Personnel from the older age classes were intended to be placed in units that were to be discharged from the army later. The order issued by the General Headquarters regarding the disbanding and reorganisation was not applied to Guerrilla Battalion 3, as it was attached to the III Army Corps which operated under German command. After the battles took on the character of static warfare during 1942, the guerrilla jaeger battalions under Finnish command were disbanded according to the order issued by the General Headquarters.\textsuperscript{216}

As the war gradually turned into static warfare, with the troops occupying permanent positions, opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities also changed significantly. Both the Finnish and Russian troops strengthened their defences by fortifying their positions and improving the guarding of the front line. While long-range patrols were regularly sent to operate in areas located further away in the enemy’s rear, guerrilla jaeger units were hindered in their operations in the vicinity of the front line. The guerrilla jaeger units of the formations occupying the front line found it increasingly difficult to penetrate enemy position. Furthermore, the troops of the Finnish Field Army – relatively few in number – had to be tied up to defend the rear areas, as the Russians had become more active and made considerable progress since the Winter War in enhancing their own partisan operations. By 1942, the

\textsuperscript{214} Ibid, pp. 302–303.

\textsuperscript{215} Cf. handouts used on the guerrilla course in spring 1942, Väinö Volanen’s private collection Pk 1401/2, KA.

\textsuperscript{216} Tynkkynen (1996), p. 236. See also Karjalainen, Mikko: *Ajatuksista operaatioiksi – Suomen armeijan hyökkäysoperaatioiden suunnittelu jakkosodassa (diss.),* (‘Reflections on operations – the planning of the Finnish army attack operations during the Continuation War’) 2009, p. 150.
Russians had adopted the fundamentals of Finnish guerrilla-type activities, commitment of guerrilla jaeger units against the enemy’s supply lines, flanks and targets in the rear areas. This forced the Finns to develop their guerrilla-type activities and to change their operational concepts which dated back to the Winter War.217

The Russians had made some attempts to reorganise their partisan operations during 1940, but it was only in summer 1941 that they managed to take real measures to reorganise the partisan movement. Approximately a week after the German Army had launched its attack in summer 1941, a crucial change took place in partisan activities. The rapid advancement of the Germans on the western front of the Soviet Union made Stalin realise that all available means should be used. An order issued by the Council of People's Commissars in late June 1941 and a proclamation made by Stalin in a speech on the radio in early June rehabilitated partisan warfare. The central message was a call to mobilise all resources in combat against the fascists. In order to step up total resistance, an order was issued to form partisan units.218

In accordance with an order issued by the Soviet military command, the Russians set to establish partisan units on the Finnish front. Work began to form units and to organise partisan activities in early July 1941, at the time when the Finnish army was only about to begin its attack. In the absence of a ready organisation and cadres, the work had to be started from scratch. Initially, the issuance of instructions for the establishment of partisan units was the responsibility of an executive organ with representatives from the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Republic of Karelia (Politburo), the Council of People's Commissars of the Republic (SSR), and the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). In August, a permanent headquarters was established, charged with organising partisan activities, the leadership of which was given to the representatives of the Council of People's Commissars of the Republic, NKVD and the military command. Liaison with partisan units was coordinated via NKDV district units. The headquarters also established a special partisan school, tasked with training the officers and the rank and file of partisan units. However, in October 1941 the headquarters were disbanded, and the responsibility for organising partisan activities was assigned directly to the 4th department of the NKVD of the Karelian Republic. The objectives for partisan activities were laid down by the Red Army. The NKVD department had been tasked with establishing destruction battalions, partisan units and saboteur groups, as well as with organising reconnaissance activities in their operational areas. Destruction battalions were an integral part of NKVD's organisation, and were used for defending the Russian rear areas.219

The directions issued by the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 29 June 1941 stated, among other things, the following: ‘Partisan units and saboteur groups must

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217 Handouts used on the guerrilla course in spring 1942, Väinö Volanen’s private collection Pk 1401/2, KA.
219 Kulagin, Олег (Kulagin): Партизанское движение в КAREЛии и Мурманской области — объективные и субъективные факторы (1941–1944 гг.), Петрозаводск 2005, pp. 78–79 and 85.
be formed in the enemy-occupied territory to combat the enemy troops, to foment partisan warfare everywhere, to blow up bridges and roads, to damage telephone and telegraph lines, and to set fire to stores. In the occupied regions conditions must be made unbearable for the enemy and all his accomplices. They must be bounded and annihilated at every step and all their measures frustrated.\footnote{Seppälä (1971), pp. 37–38.}

It can be concluded from the directions that while partisans were issued fairly traditional instructions regarding guerrilla-type activities, the directions said nothing about the organisation of collaboration with the army. Instructions that the Russian issued during the early phases of the Continuation War concerning partisan war were also fairly cursory in other respects. In those areas of the Karelo-Finnish SSR that the Finnish army had occupied, no opportunities were available to organise partisan activities on the basis of underground networks – in line with instructions – as most people had been evacuated or were under the control of the Finns. Unlike the German-occupied territories, the Russians had no opportunities to launch partisan war supported by the civilian population.\footnote{Kulagin (Kulagin 2005), p. 67, 74 and 77–78.} With regard to the partisan war in Karelia, this meant in practise that the Russians were forced to resort to a form of partisan warfare in which partisans carried out tasks of short duration, using the Russian rear a their support area. However, it was only in August 1942, at a conference held in Moscow, that partisan activities carried out in various areas were standardised and given detailed guidelines.\footnote{Savunen, A.: Sisissota Neuvostoliitossa 2. maailmansodan aikana (‘Guerrilla warfare in the Soviet Union during the First World War’), Sotilasaikakauslehti 8/1955, pp. 325–328.}

Postwar Russian studies and interpretations on partisan and guerrilla activity during the Continuation War on the Finnish front must be read with a critical eye, as they give a highly unbalanced view of the effectiveness of activities – on both sides. Although the Russian archives contain a great number of records covering the activities of both Finnish and Russian guerrilla jaeger patrols, the credibility of such reports is debatable at best. This is further complicated by the fact that it is difficult to make a distinction between the objectives set for the activities of Russian partisans during the Continuation War, and the actual results of such activities. Yet another complication for research is posed by the fact that the archives were compiled by numerous organisational actors, as well as by the unofficial and unconfirmed position of the partisan organisation – which, furthermore, was in a constant state of change – among the troops that waged war.\footnote{See, for example, Hakala, Ilmari: Kommentteja kirjan sisällöstä (‘Comments on the content of the book’), a commentary article in the book Partisaaneja, desantteja, sisşöjä rintaman molemmilla puolilla (‘Partisans, desants and guerrillas on both sides of the front’), Viktor Stepakov – Sergey Konov – Pavel Petrov – Dimitry Frolov, Helsinki 2005, pp. 301–304.}

According to Soviet research and archive sources, 14,000 soldiers were killed in partisan strikes on the Finnish front, 100 officers and men were taken prisoners, 52 garrisons were destroyed, 31 trains were derailed, approximately 150 bridges and 10 kilometres of railways were blown up, and so on. The same sources argue that partisans permanently tied up 18 and temporarily 27 Finnish battalions in combat during
the period of static warfare. According to the most recent research, Soviet partisans suffered 1,700 casualties – either mortally wounded, lost or perished for other reasons – out of around 5,000 partisans who participated in fighting.

Finnish estimates and studies of casualties inflicted by the partisans are in blatant conflict with Russian research. According to calculations conducted by Veikko Karhunen, based on war diaries, considerably fewer Finnish troops were tied up in fighting. ‘Due to partisan activity along the Finnish flanks and rear areas, Finnish battalions, amounting to the strength of nearly one infantry division, were tied up at various sections of the front line.’ With the strength of one division, Karhunen refers to nine or ten infantry battalions, but he does not specify the troops in his calculation in any detail.

In any event, Russian partisan activity against Finnish troops and targets in the Finnish rear was intensified during 1942, particularly in the areas north of Lake Ladoga. The nature of the period of static warfare created favourable conditions for partisan activity, particularly in the Finnish-occupied territory in Eastern Karelia and along the border regions in the north. While partisan raids undoubtedly also had moral repercussions, particularly among the home front and rear area civil population, it is difficult to see that such raids would have had any significant strategic importance. Partisans increasingly tied up Finnish troops in the defence of the rear areas, indicating that partisan activity had operational significance. Furthermore, as part of the Finnish troops were such that they could possibly have played an active role in Finnish guerrilla-type activities, something had to be done.

Operation Forest Felling (‘Metsähakkuri’) – guerrilla-type activities led by the General Headquarters

The Training Office of the General Headquarters gathered information on experiences gained from war and distributed it to divisions, similar to the tactical guidebooks distributed during the Winter War. The General Headquarters published its first tactical directions during the Continuation War on 10 July 1941, entitled Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta (‘Tactical information, etc., on the enemy’). The fact that the Russians intensified their partisan activities during 1942 and 1942 can be confirmed by studying the above-mentioned directive. Separate articles on the activities

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225 Kulagin (Kulagin 2005), pp. 117–118.
228 Reports and investigation protocols drafted by rural police chiefs on partisan activity in their districts. A volume compiled of the copies of original documents, the Department of Military History, the National Defence University.
230 During the Continuation War, at least 86 issues of Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta were published, including a total of 600 articles. The original series can be found in the archives of the General Headquarters Training Division, T 17654/14, KA, and in the reference library of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University.
carried out by partisan units, on anti-partisan operations and on directives can be found in issues of 6, 11, 16, 33, 52, 57, 71 and 78 of the tactical directions. In addition, at least issues 32 and 37 make a reference to enemy desant and reconnaissance activities ('desant' is Russian and refers to saboteurs and spies dropped by parachute behind the enemy’s lines).\textsuperscript{231}

_Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta_ issue 57, published in November 1942, was a kind of expanded thematic issue on the Soviet partisan movement and on its intensified operations on the Finnish front. In particular, this directive highlighted the attempt in June 1942 by the 1st Russian Partisan Brigade to destroy the railway between Suojärvi and Äänislinna, to reconnoitre and destroy Finnish headquarters and to set fire to the village of Porajärvi. Although this unlucky partisan brigade was practically annihilated in late July, it alerted the General Headquarters to consider more active anti-partisan activities. The General Headquarters concluded the following: ‘As stated above, as is evident that the enemy’s partisan activities principally aim at harassing and wearing down our troops, rear echelon formations and the civilian population, it is probable that such patrolling will continue in its current extent, despite casualties.’\textsuperscript{232}

A compendium published in this directive set in motion Finnish anti-partisan activities. In connection with this, the General Headquarters assumed the leadership of all activities aimed at intensifying Finnish guerrilla-type activities. On 29 December 1942, the Operations Division of the General Headquarters issued an order to the Aunus Group, the Maanselkä Group, as well as to the 3rd and 14th Divisions, to engage in intensive guerrilla-type activities on that section of the front that extended from the mid-section of Äänisjärvi to Tuoppajärvi. The objective was to launch a two-part operation, the first phase of which in February 1942 aimed at destroying the support areas of the Russian guerrilla-type activities. The second phase, to be carried out in mid-March, aimed to ‘...to destroy, as extensively and thoroughly as possible,'
enemy command posts, supply centres and road and other communications...’. This operation was to extend to the Murmansk railway as far as to the section between Sorokka and Maanselkä.233

According to this order, each division was ordered to form a unit of around 500 men for the task, with the exception of the Aunus Group, for which a smaller force was deemed sufficient. In addition to the divisions ordered to engage in guerrilla-type activities, the major part of the operations of the long-range patrols were directed to the target area of the operation, following orders issued by the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters. If necessary, the Finnish Air Force was also to be available to support the operation, based on proposals submitted by the divisions. The divisions were ordered to send their proposals for the first phase of the guerrilla-type activities to the Operations Department of the General Headquarters by 31 January 1943. The operation was given the code name Forest Felling (‘Metsäsähakkut’).234

Each division assigned to the task made their preparations in an individual manner. Units were formed in various ways, as the order issued by the General Headquarters gave the divisions a great deal of leeway. Therefore, the divisions ordered to form units for guerrilla-type activities did so, in practice, in two ways. Units were formed either from existing platoons and companies or, alternatively, completely new units were formed from volunteers men suitable for guerrilla-type activities. Despite vague instructions, the leadership of the operation was kept under tight control of the General Headquarters. The fact that the General Headquarters retained leadership was probably founded on its desire to create optimal conditions for the operations by attaching troops to the operation serving its overall goal. For this purpose, the neighbouring troops of a division ordered to take up guerrilla-type activities were issued orders by General Headquarters to tie up the enemy when the operation was launched.235

As an example of the operational plan and the tight control assumed by General Headquarters with regard to it, the solution taken by the 14th Division can be reviewed. In a plan submitted to the Operational Division of General Headquarters, entitled ‘On destruction of the bases of guerrilla-type activities in the sector of the 14th Division’, the following detailed description of the implementation of the ordered task was given: ‘With the exception of the southern flank of the section held by the division, the disposition of the enemy troops engaged in guerrilla-type activities is along the road from Koivuniemi to Lehto, with the principal guerrilla jaeger units units ‘Punaiset Äänisjärveläiset’ (‘The Reds from Äänisjärvi’) and Eteenpäin (‘Forward’) using the village of Lehto as their base. Our own guerrilla jaeger unit is tasked with attacking the main base of the enemy guerrilla-type activities, the village of Lehto, destroying it and annihilating the enemy stationed there.’ This plan was altered at the Operational Division of General Headquarters on 5 February.
1943, followed by a decision, according to which ‘This plan has been cancelled due to its risky nature. For example, the return of the unit might prove difficult, as the enemy would be able to take advantage of the Tunkua–Lehto road.’

After the plans had been completed in the divisions, and after the plans had been approved with modifications by General Headquarters, Operation Forest Felling began in February 1943 according to the original schedule. It is worth noting that the authorisation for this operation was personally given by the Commander-in-Chief. ‘The divisions are to submit their presentations on limited attacks to the Operational Division of General Headquarters, identifying the objectives, targets, time and strength committed. Such attacks can be carried out only under authorisation issued by the Commander-in-Chief.’ During the first phase, the operation aimed at destroying guerrilla bases located around Seesjärvi in an area where partisan units and destruction battalions were prepared for their tasks. Evidently, General Headquarters did not issue a separate written order for launching the second phase of the operations, and it continued in line with the plans that the divisions had submitted and that had been approved, targeting the enemy’s supply centres.

In February 1943, several attacks against targets that had been reconnoitred in advance were carried out, with mixed results. For example, in the sector of the Maanselkä Group, a total of five guerrilla raids were carried out against enemy bases, of which only two were assessed to have resulted in the desired outcome. A comment by the commander of the Maanselkä Group, Lieutenant General Taavetti Laatikainen, provided an excellent indication of the challenges that Operation Forest Felling posed: ‘On the positive side, the experiences gained from mistakes and failures can be mentioned.’ In other words, guerrilla-type activities resulted only in satisfactory results in some sections of the front.

The partial failure of Operation Forest Felling was largely foreseeable, in spite of its thorough planning and objectives. The divisions planned their operations, selected the targets and formed the units as ordered, in 1943, but the provision of training for the units, necessary for guerrilla-type activities, posed great challenges from the very beginning. Both officers and men of the units that had been formed exhibited deficiencies in their training with regard to guerrilla-type activities. Vesa Tynkkynen’s study indicates that the experiences gained from war were taken into account in the guerrilla training given to the units in January, but it failed to raise the skill level to a level required by the operations. The attacks carried out also inflicted substantial casualties for the Finns, contributing to the poor or at best satisfactory outcome of the operations. Mikko Karjalainen argues in his dissertation that the close

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237 PM:n no. 45/Op.1/sal./12.1.1943, the war diary of General Headquarters, 1 January –30 June 1943, p. 878 and attachments to the war diary of General Headquarters 551–600, 26 September 1942–24 March 1943, the Department of Military History, the National Defence University. See also Karjalainen (2009), p. 246.


239 MaaRE:n no. 717/III/5 sal./2.3.1943, T 9074/4, KA. See also Karjalainen (2009), p. 246 and Tynkkynen (1996), p. 239.
control exercised by the operational leadership of General Headquarters also played a role in the outcome. After all, in assuming the leadership of the operations, General Headquarters also assumed responsibility for their outcome. It is easy to agree with the conclusions of both Tynkkynen and Karjalainen.

On these grounds, Operation Forest Felling, the only guerrilla operation led by General Headquarters, produced modest results. With regard to tactics, the enemy proved more sophisticated and a great deal more active. The basic idea – that the Finnish soldier is a natural born guerrilla fighter – also proved to be unfounded. This operation also showed that, in spite of excellent planning, guerrilla-type activities carried out on the divisional level require thorough specialised training. In any event, this operation provided valuable experiences that were taken into accounts in the decades following the Continuation War. In a similar manner to the large-scale divisional level guerrilla-type activities, General Headquarters also exercised tight control over combat reconnaissance and long-range patrolling in the enemy’s rear.

Guerrilla-type activities and lessons learned during the Continuation War

Compared with the enemy, Finnish guerrilla-type activities were more passive during the Continuation War. Nonetheless, experiences gained from the Continuation War provided support for the conclusions drawn from the Winter War, which found that using guerrilla-type activities, even on a modest scale and in one way or another, had in most cases contributed positively to the outcome of battles. However, there were other experiences, as evidenced by Operation Forest Felling. However, the key lesson learned during the Continuation War was the fact that officers and NCOs in particular must be provided with training in peacetime, without forgetting the functional basic training of the men. Only in this way would the standardisation of guerrilla-type activities, their integration into all combat operations and their management be feasible. The conclusions drawn from experiences gained from guerrilla-type activities during the Continuation War were perfectly in line with those obtained from the Winter War and presented as early as spring 1941.

During the period of static warfare, the purpose of guerrilla-type activities was no longer to defeat the enemy at an appropriate moment; rather, their objective was to solidify Finnish defences and to carry out anti-partisan operations. The Finns, in their turn, were now operating in a terrain that they were unfamiliar with, particularly in the areas lying north of Lake Ladoga. However, guerrilla-type activities, carried out on a modest scale as they were, clearly had an impact on the enemy. Over the course of the Continuation War, attempts were made to integrate guerrilla-type activities into other military operations and to concentrate their leadership on

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241 Katso esim. Taktillisia ym. tietoja vihollisesta no.1–86 (“Tactical information, etc., on the enemy, no. 1–86”), the General Headquarters Training Division, T 17654/14, KA.
242 See, among others, Käynnissä olevan sodan positiivisia kokemuksia sisätoiminnasta (“On positive experiences gained from the war in progress”), an undated memorandum, Väinö Volanen’s private collection, Pk 1401/2, KA. This private collection focusing on guerrilla-type activities and long-range patrolling also contains dozens of other reports of experiences gained from the Continuation War, used as training material on guerrilla courses arranged in 1942 and 1943.
the General Headquarters. Although the objective was to make guerrilla-type activities part of other combat operations, the measures taken by the various divisions were found to be incoherent, in terms of both tactics and planning. The reasons behind the change and development in thinking regarding the art of war during the static period of the Continuation War were the experiences gained by then, but, from a wider perspective, a change in the nature of the defensive battle, brought about by the static warfare, also played a role.

During the Continuation War, guerrilla-type activities were limited mainly to operations carried out by long-range patrol units directly under the leadership of General Headquarters, although patrols primarily carried out long-range reconnaissance missions in the enemy rear. However, there were exceptions. They included the destroying of the Petrovskij-Jam supply centre, carried out in December 1942 in accordance with the principles of guerrilla-type activities under the leadership of Ilmari Honkanen, attacks on Mai Guba and the Murmansk railroad, carried out in February 1942 by Majewski Detachment, an attack on the Jeljärvi supply centre in March 1943 by Puustinen Detachment, and an attempt to intensify guerrilla-type activities in front line sections located north of Lake Ladoga in spring 1943. However, the impact and outcome of such attacks during the Continuation War remained rather insignificant when viewed from the perspective of the art of war. The experiences gained showed that only a unit specifically trained for the task could succeed in the challenging tasks involving guerrilla-type activities. In light of all of the above, one might presume that the fundamentals of guerrilla-type activities and the art of guerrilla war had been used to a far greater extent than was actually the case in the defensive battles in summer 1944; however, this was not the case in the divisions and the Frontier Guard units, due to the quick pace of the retreat.

During the war, attempts were also made to gather experiences gained from battles and to capture lessons learned. Lieutenant Colonel Y. A. Järvinen, Chief of the Operations Division of the Maanselkä Group, set an example in this respect in leading the gathering of experiences gained from the war. In accordance with an initiative announced in July 1942, the Headquarters of the Maanselkä Group ordered the divisions and troops under its command to respond to questions presented to them and to submit associated reports, in order to enable the gathering of experiences of war as soon as they became available. In the summaries sent by the troops, statements similar to the following can be found: ‘The statements submitted by the divisions reveal that the experiences gained from the same issue, even from its details, were conflicting in many cases. Without tackling the reasons behind this, it can be stated that this summary takes a certain position with regard to such issues without presenting any grounds.’ On the basis of this, Lieutenant Colonel Y. A. Järvinen, the officer in charge of the summaries and their

243 Ibid.
244 Roiha (1973), pp. 22-24, SKK 1/1118, KA.
246 Sotakokemukseja (‘Experiences of the war’), MaaRE:n no. 3192/III/7 sal./20.7.1942, a volume compiled of the copies of original documents, Department of Military History, National Defence University.
247 Ibid. Liite 1, Jalkaväen taistelutoiminnan alalta saatuja sotakokemukseja, (‘Attachment 1, Experiences of war gained from infantry combat activity’), p. 1.
analyses, realised that there was an inherent risk in interpreting superficial experiences, easily resulting in sweeping generalisations.

While the experiences gathered by the Maanselkä Group did not underline guerrilla-type activities, they were referred to – from viewpoint of the art of war – in connection with reconnaissance activity. The summary did discuss patrolling activity conducted by both the Finnish army and the enemy, but only cursorily, without making any connection between it and guerrilla operations. The most important observations and experiences highlighted the importance of taking advantage of the terrain when operating in the enemy’s rear. ‘It is most advantageous to cross over the enemy lines under the cover of darkness. Then, the patrol can carry out its task in daylight in the enemy positions. After the patrol has carried out its task, it may return the following night, for example. When coming back, the patrol must not use the same route that they used when crossing over. Violent reconnaissance conducted using a force insufficient in strength for the purpose has produced poor results. Apparently, this can be attributed to the fact that leaders at all levels wanted to avoid unnecessary casualties.’\(^{248}\)

On one hand, guerrilla and reconnaissance operations carried out in the enemy’s rear were regarded as an efficient way of waging war. On the other hand, they were also thought to entail a high risk, leading to a situation where units were formed of volunteers of men who understood the risks associated with such tasks.

In addition to gathering experiences from Finnish troops, observations and lessons were also obtained from other theatres of war during the Continuation War. A summary drafted in 1942, used as training material on guerrilla courses held at least in spring 1942, indicates that the Finns gathered experiences of the art of war, as viewed from the perspective of guerrilla-type activities, at least from the German, Soviet and Estonian fronts. When examining guerrilla-type activities carried out outside Finland, this memorandum focuses – for reasons that remain unclear – on Estonia, where officers and men that had fled the Russians and taken refuge in forests, had launched successful guerrilla raids against the occupier. ‘In forests and swampland, guerrilla camps emerged, which – while the Russians (the pejorative word ‘ryssä’ is used here) still occupied the country – controlled the adjoining areas and inflicted great harm and bloody losses on the Bolsheviks through their repeated attacks. When viewing the operations of the Estonian guerrillas, we must bear in mind the difficult conditions under which the operations took place. The activities of Estonian guerrillas should not be overrated – the country was liberated by the Germans after all – but the scope of such activities was significant enough to deserve wider recognition.’\(^{249}\) While this memorandum, used as lecture material, is steeped in a kind of guerrilla ethos and pronounced defiance, it is nevertheless an indication of the fact that developments in the art of war and guerrilla-type activities were followed in Finland. It cannot be said conclusively whether this was a systematic activity, ordered by General Headquarters, or just the addition of information obtained via foreign intelligence contacts to the collection of war experiences.

\(^{248}\) Ibid, pp. 10–11.

\(^{249}\) Käynnissä olevan sodan positiivisia kokemuksia sisätoiminnasta (‘On positive experiences gained from the war in progress’), an undated memorandum, and the daily programme for the guerrilla leader course, arranged between 26 May and 1 June 1942, Väinö Volanen’s private collection, Pk 1401/2, KA.
The various archives offered a wealth of war experiences, as did the many bodies that had compiled archives, but it is difficult to make a difference between records that had been drafted during the war and those that had been put together only after the war. While a portion of the records had quite evidently been gathered and written while the war was still going on, most of them had obviously been written and synthesised after the war. During the Continuation War, no records were compiled of war experiences of pure guerrilla-type activities. However, individual observations and memoranda of guerrilla-type activities dating back to the Continuation War can be found. Perhaps the largest collection of war experiences that were compiled after the war can be found in the archives of the Training Division of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces. This data set is based on an initiative put forth by Lieutenant Colonel Y. A. Järvinen Järvinen in January 1945, proposing that the experiences of war be gathered and synthesised by division, thereby forming a basis for training and the work on drafting regulations, as well as for the development of organisations, tactics, weaponry and other equipment.

The experiences gained from the war were gathered and compiled in accordance with Järvinen’s initiative during spring 1945. Material submitted by all units includes individual documents focused solely on guerrilla-type activities. All the memoranda mentioned above were brief, only a few pages in length, and quite cursory accounts of guerrilla-type activities carried out during the Continuation War. An examination of the material reveals the troops and staffs had left the editing and synthesising of the data unfinished. The memoranda contained few comments on the content of the war experiences gathered and on the views put forth in them. Furthermore, the war experiences also contained a great number of conflicting views. Therefore, as early as in spring 1945, discussion events were arranged for officers at garrisons, enabling commanders from the divisional level downward, who had

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250 See, for example, Väinö Volanen’s private collection, Pk 1401/2, KA, and Eino Penttilä’s private collection, Pk 2109/3, KA.
251 See the collection compiled PnP (‘the General Headquarters of the Finnish Defence Forces’) of the experiences of war in 1945, T 18002/8–13, KA.
252 PnP:n no. 256/Jv./43/22.1.1945, T 17655/13, KA. At the time Järvinen proposed his initiative, he held the post of the head of the office of the inspector of the infantry. Järvinen, Y. A., an extract from personal details, no. 25164, KA.
253 The collection compiled PnP (‘the General Headquarters of the Finnish Defence Forces’) of the experiences of war in 1945, T 18002/8–13, KA.
254 See, for example Sisitoiminta (by Captain Erkki Pajukoski) (‘Guerrilla-type activities’), Sunnen sisio- sastoon marskilevon järjestaminen (‘Organising a rest for a large guerrilla jaeger unit on a march’), and Venäläisten käyttämä tapa selustassa toimivan sisioasaston paluumarssin kalttakaisemiseksi (‘The method that the Russians use to cut off the return march of a guerrilla jaeger unit operating in their rear’) (by Major T.J.Paustinen), the Training Division of the General Headquarters, 1945 collected experiences of the war, 1st Division, T 18002/8, KA. Sisitoiminta (‘Guerrilla-type activities’) (by Lieutenant Matti Pentti), the Training Division of the General Headquarters, 1945 collected experiences of the war, 2 Division, T 18002/9, KA. Guerrilla-type activities (Major O. Waris and Captain G. E. Susiaho), Vakinaiset vai tilapäisesti kokoonpanut sisioasusto? (‘Permanent or temporary guerrilla jaeger units?’), the Training Division of the General Headquarters, 1945 collected experiences of the war, 3rd Division, T 18002/10, KA. Sisitoiminta (‘Guerrilla-type activities’) (Lieutenant Colonel G. Blomqvist), the Training Division of the General Headquarters, 1945 collected experiences of the war, the Helsinki Military Province, T 18002/11, KA. The material gathered also includes several experiences related to long-range reconnaissance and patrolling with references to guerrilla-type activities.
served on the front, to put forth and justify their views on experiences gained from war. At each event, minutes were kept in which comments on the presentation of the introducer, any dissenting opinions and conclusions were entered.

The benefits and lessons learned from the experiences gained from war, gathered immediately after the Continuation War, can be summed up by the following fundamental questions: should guerrilla-type activities be carried out using small or large units? Should guerrilla-type activities be led by General Headquarters or by the staff a division or a unit below it responsible for a specific area? Should guerrilla-type activities be integrated into other combat or should they be a separate operation? Should guerrilla-type activities be geared towards reconnaissance and secondarily towards demolition, or vice versa? While these questions were given some thought immediately after the war, they were pondered in a more serious way in the early 1950s, when the groundwork for the regional defence principle was laid.

Experiences transformed into guidebooks

A wealth of experiences was accumulated of patrolling during the wars between 1939 and 1944, but a uniform and detailed regulation on long-range patrolling was slow in coming. Major Paul Marttina, who had been engaged in reconnaissance and patrolling tasks during the Winter War, wanted to compile war experiences into a guidebook, in order to create a homogeneous foundation for the training of long-range patrolmen. The first draft for the guidebook on long-range patrolling was finally completed in spring 1944, and was adopted for training on 1 June 1944. In the foreword, Marttina justifies the need for the guidebook as follows: ‘When we are considering a form of activity that is undergoing such a rapid transformation, certain caution must be exercised when issuing permanent instruction for it. On the other hand, entirely ignoring them cannot be justified; we have gained, after all, considerable experience of this activity.’

The writer of the guidebook, Major Paul (Pauli) Marttina, was an experienced long-range patrolman, and had proposed many of the ideas that had been put in practice. In addition to the ‘kinship wars’—Finnish military expeditions to Eastern Karelia around 1920—he had gained war experience related to reconnaissance from the Winter War, during which served at the Kajaani suboffice, or Detachment Marttina, which was part of the intelligence organisation of General Headquarters. It was, therefore, no coincidence that Captain Paul Marttina had drafted a letter, addressed to the chief of the Intelligence Division of General Headquarters and dated 25 November 1939, in which he proposed that a unit with special training in guerrilla-type activities and reconnaissance be formed. Marttina was promoted to the rank of

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256 Alustukset ja ups. keskustelutilaisuuksien päätäkirjat 1945 (‘Introductions and minutes of the discussion events arranged for the officers in 1945’), the Training Division of the General Headquarters, T 18002/6–7, KA.
257 Kaukopartio-opas (KapO) (‘Guidebook for long-range patrols’), ErP 4:n no. 1509/II/Sal. (Puolustusvoimat, 9457), T 5973/8, KA.
major in 1942. From 1943 onwards, he acted as the commander of the third company of the Separate Battalion 4 (Er.P 4). A total of 75 patrols deep into the enemy’s rear, organised and led during the Continuation War, are a testimony to Paul Marttina’s expertise in reconnaissance and demolition. Based on his experience, Major Marttina probably had the best expertise to compile and write a guide book on long-range patrolling.

Labelled confidential and intended for use only by long-range patrol units, the 41-page *Kaukopartio-opas* (*KaPO*) (‘Guidebook on long-range patrolling’) was organised into seven chapters, in addition to the foreword and introduction. Appended to the book was a chapter on how patrols should arrange their radio communications. While the guidebook is written in a simple and unpretentious style, there are some more prosaic passages. At the beginning of the guidebook, Marttina highlights the value of the book in a serious tone: ‘*All new content included in this guidebook must be treated with respect, as it is based on experiences bought with the sweat and blood of courageous long-range patrolmen.*’ In other sections of the guidebook Marttina also underlines the importance of training and experience. This is well in line with his own expertise on long-range patrolling.

The fact that the Continuation War had ended in the late summer 1944 in victory in a defensive battle taught the practitioners of the Finnish art of war an important lesson. Success factors of warfare include, as an essential part, the active control of the battlefield, the importance of reconnaissance, guerrilla-type activities in the enemy’s rear, the willingness to fight even when the enemy is superior in strength, and the effectiveness of unconventional methods. From this perspective, *Kaukopartio-opas* is a highly interesting contemporary document, the influence of which extended far into the postwar years. The manuscript of the guidebook was supplemented, and it was introduced for course material on officers’ intelligence courses after the war under the name *Näkökohtia kaukopartioinnista* (‘Viewpoints on long-range patrolling’).

Finnish expertise on long-range patrolling was also put to good use outside Finland after the war. As an example of this, it is worth mentioning the contribution to the development of the skills of the US army to fight under winter conditions in the 1940s and 1950s made by Finnish officers such as Alpo Marttinen, Antero Aakkula and many others who had been involved in what is known as the Weapons Cache Case in Finnish history and who had emigrated to the United States and enrolled in the US armed forces. One of the ways that the U.S. Army tapped into the expertise of the Finnish soldiers was to take advantage of their skills in winter warfare and the experience that they had gained from long-range patrolling. According to docent Pasi Tuunanen, Staff Sergeant Alpo Marttinen drafted, together with Sergeant Antero Aakkula and Sergeant Sulo Uitto, confidential instructions for the US Army on

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260 *Kaukopartio-opas* (*KaPO*) (‘Guidebook for long-range patrols’), p.1, ErP 4:n no. 1509/II/Sal. (Puolustusvoimat, 9457), T 5973/8, KA.

261 *Näkökohtia kaukopartioinnista* (‘Viewpoints on long-range patrolling’), (a draft for a regulations, based on KapO:sta with supplementing material added), Eino Penttilä’s private collection Pk 2109/3–4, KA.
long-range patrolling, based on Finnish experiences of war, naming the instructions *Long Distance Patrolling Under Subarctic Conditions: experiences in Russo-Finnish War 1939–1944*. These instructions, drafted under Marttinen’s direction, were used in the training of US special troops in the 1950s, because the provided models were based on practical experience and guidelines for operating in the enemy’s rear.262 It should be noted that these instructions compiled by Alpo Marttinen in 1949 had several parallels to *Kaukopartio-opas*, written by Paul Marttina in 1944.263

During Finland’s wars, long-range patrolling entailed, to a large degree, reconnaissance carried out behind the enemy’s front line, but it also included features typical of guerrilla-type activities. Even before the Winter War, guerrilla-type activities had been regarded as an efficient fighting method, and this notion was reinforced during the Continuation War. Long-range reconnaissance and associated guerrilla-type activities, as part of future wars, were also given consideration. Long-range reconnaissance and guerrilla-type activities gained increased appreciation as soldiers were fully aware that in view of postwar Finland and its shortage of materiel, the country would be inferior to the invader with regard to strength. Using unconventional methods such as long-range patrolling and systematic guerrilla-type activities, it was thought possible to balance the relative strengths and to create a deterrent what would send a message to the invader that Finland would be defended with all available means.

### 3.3. Dispersed storage of weapons – the last major guerrilla operation of the Continuation War

From a national perspective, the experiences gained from Finland’s wars exercised major influence later, promoting the integration of guerrilla-type activities into conventional warfare. During the final days of the Continuation War, preparations initiated for the worst-case scenario – an attempt by the Soviet Union to occupy Finland that was in the process of detaching itself from the war – led to the dispersed stor-

263 Ibid. Cf. *Kaukopartio-opas* (KapO), ErP 4:e no. 1509/II/Sal. (Puolustusvoimat, 9457), T 5973/8, KA.
age of weapons and to a train of events that today is better known by the name of the Weapons Cache Case.264

The retreat of the Finnish army would have led to a situation where battles were fought in the interior of Finland or to the complete occupation of the country. In such circumstances, the evacuation of the civilian population, out of the way of combat, would have been impossible. The only option was to prepare for guerrilla-type activities or even guerrilla war, both of which required the large-scale storage of materiel in the interior of Finland. Such activities would require high-quality commanders who were familiar with local conditions and who were to create their support areas and a force committed to resistance out of local inhabitants. Usko Sakari Haahti told Matti Lukkari later, during an interview, that even armed support by the civilian population was brought up in discussions, although the officers involved basically believed in guerrilla-type activities rather than in a total guerrilla war. If the field army had been unable to mount a defence in fixed positions, materiel stores would have enabled entire units to stay behind in the enemy’s rear, continuing fighting by taking advantage of bases and the terrain but not attempting to hold a particular position.265

264 The name *asekätkentä* (the caching of weapons) was coined by journalist considerably later, at a time when this operation had already come to light. The original term was *hajavarastointi*, (‘the dispersed storage of weapons’). See, among others, Lukkari, Matti: *Asekätkentä* (‘the caching of weapons’), Helsinki 1984, pp. 19–22. See also Ahtokari, Reijo: *Asekätkentäjuttu* (‘the Weapons Cache Case’), Porvoo 1971, pp. 21–33. See also Keskitalo, Martti: *Suomen puolustusvoimain vuoden 1944 asekätkentätoiminnan tausta, organisaatio, suunnitelmat ja niiden toteuttaminen sekä toiminnan paljastumiseen johtaneet tekijät* (‘The background, organisation, plans and implementation of the caching of weapons by the Finnish Defence Forces in 1944, including the factors that led to the detection of this operation’), a thesis written at the National General Staff College in 1967, including the related interviews. Department of Military History, National Defence University.

Finland’s military situation was also closely followed beyond the Finnish borders in summer 1944. Particularly in Sweden, the ability of the Finnish field army to fend off the enemy and the measures taken by General Headquarters were kept under close scrutiny. After having received an invitation to give a presentation on the military developments occurring in the early summer 1944 to the Swedish government, Carl August Ehrensvärd, Chief of Staff of the Swedish Defence Forces, made an interesting journal entry on 26 June 1944, which hints at the possibility of guerrilla warfare: ‘Before I set out for the government meeting, I talked to Stewen, who told me that the Russians had broken through a few kilometres away from Tali. He did not believe that the assistance given by Germany would make any difference. Exactly so; I also thought that this would only prolong the course of events while achieving nothing more. Assistance from Germany and a powerful resistance in the form of guerrilla warfare would make sense, if a political turn for the better were in sight. However, nothing of the sort is in sight. Finis Finlandiae, and Sweden in a very difficult position.’

Without going into the details of the implementation, detection and failure of weapons caching, it can be stated that this ‘secret operation’ was proof of the widespread utilisation of the core competence of General Headquarters, the art of war. The complex arrangements devised by the key personnel of the Operational Division of the wartime General Headquarters can, therefore in hindsight, be regarded as preparations made for guerrilla-type activities by 30–35 000 to in the face of a possible occupation.

In light of the facts stated above, and as the history that Finland had shared with Russia was looming large in the background, Finland resorted to or rather, was forced to resort to, the dispersed storage of weapons, and if necessary, methods of guerrilla warfare. When looking at the structure of this operation and the assumptions behind the preparations, weapons caching can be said to have aimed at taking up guerrilla-type activities on a large scale, or even at a limited guerrilla war. When the foundations of the operations are compared with theories of guerrilla warfare which were known at the time, the international connection becomes evident. Matti Lukkari also draws similar conclusions in his study on weapons caching.

The threat of imminent occupation dissipated during the winter of 1944–1945, but the weapons caching organisation continued its work until its operations gradually became public. It is crucial to recognise that the preparations made for reconnaissance and guerrilla-type activities were kept secret. Such preparations were not directly prohibited by the Moscow Armistice, or even restricted by later treaties, alt-

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267 The recollections of Colonel Nihtilä between 12 March and 16 May 1972, gathered by Pertti Kilikki, Valo Nihtilä’s private collection, Pk 1969, KA.

268 Lukkari (1984), pp. 19–20. Matti Lukkari writes as follows: ‘Although the guiding principle was based on Finnish starting points, it was supported by examples gained from outside Finland. While we had gained experience of Russian partisan activities on our fronts but, as there was no civilian population present, we did not obtain any examples of how the army and the population could collaborate. On the other hand, information from the German eastern front indicated that the collaboration of combat troops and the population, particularly in a terrain covered by trees and shrub, produced excellent results. Information received from Yugoslavia pointed in the same direction.’
ough in the same connection, work on the development of a secret military intelligence network spanning the entire country began.²⁶⁹ The secretive nature of the weapons caching operation and the serious and doubtful attitude that the officers who participated in it harboured towards the Soviet Union, even after decades after the fact are well illustrated by the accompanying note that Valo Nihtilä addressed to his son Rainer Nihtilä and enclosed in his own notes. ‘Rainer, these notes must be kept for later days. At an appropriate moment, they should be made public. Such a moment would be when the Russians (the pejorative word ‘ryssa’ is used here) no longer have the upper hand. This may take a long time; in other words, I will leave discretion to you.’²⁷⁰

The Weapons Cache Case may also have had direct consequences on the development of guerrilla-type activities. Although the development work on guerrilla warfare, conducted during Finland’s wars, had produced a number of experiences, it had nevertheless remained quite incomplete. Therefore, the drafters of the new field regulation, then under revision, intended to write a chapter dedicated to guerrilla-type activities as early as in 1945, at a time when the plans behind weapons caching were coming to light. An assignment, calling for the compilation of a separate guidebook on guerrilla-type activities, can also be dated to the same year.²⁷¹ However, this work was left unfinished when the organisation formed by those involved in the caching of weapons was revealed, and the officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sulo Susi, who had been ordered to write the guidebook and who had participated in caching, resigned his commission.²⁷²

Taken together, the Weapons Cache Case was an example of operational work conducted by staff in its purest form. Preparations for the worst-case scenario were made, using all available means. However, it is difficult give an unambiguous assessment of the caching of weapons. The personal sacrifice of the officers who participated in the caching of weapons were significant, as many of them lost their career, health and even their families, in addition to being sentenced to prison. However, it is evident that the caching of weapons tempered intentions to change the Finnish social order by violent means. If such preparations had been left undone in autumn 1944, the officers at General Headquarters would have neglected their duties. The weapons caching operation was a warning to the enemy and, simultaneously, a manifestation of the art of war as applied to guerrilla-type activities. The

²⁶⁹ Kertomus aseiden ja sotamateriaalin hajavarastoinnista eli asokätkennästä ja sen loppuselvittelystä (‘An account of the dispersed storage of weapons and military materiel, in other word, the weapons caching case and its final settlement’), Helsinki 12.4.1970, Valo Nihtilä’s private collection, Pk 1969/3–4, KA. See also Visuri, Pekka: Suomi kylmässä sodassa (‘Finland in the Cold War’), Keuruu 2006, pp. 61–62.
²⁷⁰ A hand-written cover letter by Valo Nihtilä, addressed to his son; Valo Nihtilä’s private collection Pk 1969/3–4, KA.
²⁷¹ In the preliminary content of the field regulation, guerrilla-type activities and anti-guerrilla operations were listed under headings of their own; the chief of the Operations Division of General Headquarters, Valo Nihtilä, appointed Lieutenant Colonel Sulo Susi as the author of this chapter. See Tiedoituksia objesiäntöyöihin osallistuville (‘Notifications for those participating in the work on field regulations’), PPe:n no. 2060/Koul.2/21/25.5.1945, and Attachments 1 and 2, T 18751, KA.
chain of events and its aftermath marked the development of and lent experiences to guerrilla-type activities.

3.4. Summary of the development of guerrilla-type activities from 1939 to 1944

After theoretical thinking in literature during the first decades of independent Finland had translated into guerrilla-type activities in the Winter War, such activities also gained a foothold in instructions and training. Guerrilla-type activities – with their innovations, carried out in the early phase of the Winter War – proved that the opportunities they offered by such activities were assessed in the right way. Although patrolling and guerrilla-type activities, viewed from the perspective of contemporary tactics, cannot be regarded as having had a homogeneous form, they had great local significance on the Winter War. The concepts regarding guerrilla-type activities, with all its definitions, also developed along independent lines. Although the definitions were based on facts tested in practice, characterisations of guerrilla-type activities labelling them as the most efficient method of fighting in Finnish conditions began to emerge during the Winter War. With regard to the terrain, guerrilla-type activities were found to be best suited to Ladoga Karelia and the areas even further north. However, it should be noted that there were practically no examples of the impact of guerrilla-type activities on an enemy deploying armoured troops. In hindsight, it is also possible to find evidence of a change in the character of guerrilla-type activities towards the end of the Winter War when guerrilla-type activities increasingly took on the characteristics of patrolling. Although in light of contemporary tactics patrolling did not represent a guerrilla-type activities in their purest form, they nevertheless had a certain significance in obtaining reconnaissance information.

During the Interim Peace, the development of the capacity of the field army was extended to the reorganisation and training of the troops, whereby guerrilla-type activities as a method of fighting, in light of experiences gained from the war, were given increasingly serious thought. The Winter War, after all, had been a reality check, showing that guerrilla-type activities required a certain number of troops and that they needed to be part of the standing army. Although a great number of proposals for improvement regarding general tactical principles were made, the foundations of guerrilla-type activities were not changed in any appreciable manner, due to the short period of time. However, gathering experiences of the war in particular was part of an important development effort, which was later continued and the results of which were put to good use during the Continuation War.

During the Continuation War, long-range patrolling in the rear area of the Soviet troops in particular became more systematic and better planned when compared with the Winter War. Although long-range patrolling during the Continuation War was efficient, it cannot be equated with the concept of guerrilla-type activities. Guerrilla-type activities were the responsibility of the divisions, which carried out such activities in varying ways, as part of their other operations. This is why the guerrilla-type activities related to the fighting of front-line troops never assumed really organised forms during the Continuation War. An attempt by General Headquarters to intensify guerrilla-type activities by the divisions, under its own leadership in the
form of Operation Forest Felling, never produced the results set for them. In places, casualties were all too severe in regard to the objectives. The adversary learned lessons about the Finnish art of war, enabling the Soviets to organise and intensify their partisan activities, which in turn forced the Finns to change the principles of guerrilla-type activities. During the closing weeks of the Continuation War and during the Lapland War, guerrilla-type activities played a very minor role. There were attempts to resort to guerrilla tactics and there were individual instances, but, from a wider perspective, they remained quite insignificant. The general progress of the war dictated the way guerrilla-type activities could be used.

Over the course of the Continuation War, perhaps the most important practical measure towards preparing for a guerrilla war was the gathering of experiences gained from the war and their systematic analysis. In calculations based on experiences and theories, the effectiveness of unconventional methods and the opportunities that they offered for Finnish tactics were also recognised. The attention of military experts was focused on the results and methods of guerrilla-type activities, including their influence on the combat against the enemy, when the defender was inferior in strength. Even before the Winter War, guerrilla-type activities had been regarded as an efficient fighting method, and this notion was reinforced during the Continuation War. Guerrilla-type activities also required skills and planning. Troops intended for guerrilla-type activities needed to receive specialised training and undergo exercises before experiencing real action. Training given to guerrilla jaeger units formed of volunteers after the war had already broken out proved insufficient.

While the results of guerrilla-type activities during the Continuation War remained limited, they nevertheless provided valuable experiences. Along the sections of the front line north of Lake Ladoga, guerrilla-type activities carried out during the static period of the warfare were later assessed, to have been, a tactical viewpoint, more combat patrolling or combat reconnoitring than guerrilla-type activities, necessitated by the thin manning of the defence line. The conditions led to this change in the nature or operations. In the north in particular, guerrilla jaeger patrols simply failed to penetrate the line that the enemy had set up to secure their positions, let alone reach areas located deeper to the enemy’s rear. True, the means to penetrate such secure lines without casualties, as the war wore on, had become available but, as the course of the war turned into a retreat for the Finns in summer 1944, there were no opportunities to test them in practice. As an example of such means, the use of an escort unit in support or a unit about to engage in combat reconnaissance can be mentioned.

It was not until the Weapons Cache Affair, carried out in the aftermath of the Continuation War, that it became strategically and theoretically evident from the viewpoint of the art of war that Finland was making preparations for guerrilla-type activities and, if necessary, for guerrilla warfare. However, from the viewpoint of the art of war, the focus of guerrilla-type activities during the Continuation War can be said have to been on long-range patrolling, conducted under the leadership of General Headquarters. Furthermore, the intensification of guerrilla-type activities north of Lake Ladoga, carried out during the static phase of warfare, known as Operation Forest Felling, was planned and led by General Headquarters. Long-range patrolling was largely confined to long-range reconnaissance activities conducted in the ene-
my’s rear, as operations seeking to inflict destruction on the enemy were deemed, by the General Headquarters, to jeopardise the continuation of all the long-range patrolling operations due to casualties that they could possibly inflict. Crash training was no substitute for replacing experienced long-range patrolmen. In hindsight, it can be estimated that Finnish long-range patrols tied up as many as 10,000 Soviet troops to secure their rear areas. In other words, training in guerrilla tactics and putting such tactics to good use played a significant role in long-range patrol activities during the Continuation War.

According to an old adage, there is no single formula for tactics, and a successful solution to one tactic is no recipe for another. In view of the endlessly versatile opportunities offered by guerrilla-type activities in particular, there was no readily available panacea or a general solution, if the experiences of Finland’s wars are to be believed. Guerrilla-type activities, conducted during the wars that Finland had waged, provided important guidelines for the formulation of the general principles of the Finnish art of war, which were put to good use after the wars, especially when the principles of the territorial defence system were being devised.
4. GUERRILLA-TYPE ACTIVITIES AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

4.1. The difficult aftermath of the wars and the preparations made between 1944 and 1946 for the worst-case scenario

In late summer 1944 Finland had managed, but just barely, to repel a large-scale attack by the Soviet Union, aimed to detach Finland from the war and to force the country to accept an unconditional surrender. Harsh battles on the Karelian Isthmus, the army’s retreat to a defensive line located further behind in the rear, the bending of the defensive line, and the large-scale battle waged at Tali–Ihantala had consumed the resources of the field army. However, from the perspective of the art of war, the hard experiences of the war that the Finnish army had gained had significantly improved its tactical and operational skills.\(^{273}\) Such experiences can justifiably be regarded as one of the guarantees of the quality of the Finnish art of war. However, these experiences were not commensurable as manifestations of the art of war, as the terrain and circumstances greatly influenced the way experiences could be used.\(^{274}\)

Politically, the final days of the war were difficult. As the Finnish defences were on the brink of collapsing in June 1944 after the Soviet Union had launched its offensive, Risto Ryti, the President of Finland, signed an agreement known as the Ryti–Ribbentrop agreement, in order to secure continued German military aid for Finland. In order to secure the supplies of arms and war materiel from Germany, Ryti also agreed not to sign a separate peace agreement with the Soviet Union. It was only after the Soviet offensive had waned on the Karelian Isthmus that Finland’s leadership saw the military situation take a turn for the better, enabling them to take the decision to seek peace, to detach from the war and to quit the alliance with Germany.\(^{275}\)

August 1944 saw the Finnish army carry out its last major operation during the Continuation War as it launched a major operation in Ilomantsi, resorting in part to guerrilla-type activities and applying the means of the Finnish art of war, that is tactical theory, its practical implementation and innovative methods. This operation, along with the defensive victory achieved on the Karelian Isthmus, laid the foundations for a better negotiating position when Finland attempted to detach itself from


the war. After all, the Finnish army managed to destroy almost two entire enemy divisions over the course of a battle waged in the wilderness of Ilomantsi, applying the tactics that an inferior party must apply.276 After the military situation had stabilised in August 1944, the Ribbentrop agreement became unnecessary, and President Ryti stepped down. Mannerheim was appointed president on 6 August 1944 after parliament had passed an emergency law regarding the issue. In his capacity as president, Mannerheim was now in a position in which he could dissociate himself from an agreement that his predecessor had signed, one forbidding Finland to sign a separate peace agreement and to accept an armistice with the Soviet Union. The trust that Mannerheim enjoyed was also expected to ensure that the negotiations with the Soviet Union would not be regarded as a betrayal.277 Mannerheim’s presidency was also believed to guarantee that the Finnish Defence Forces would comply with the Peace Treaty. Ostensibly this was the case, but the dispersed storage of weapons – the Weapons Cache Case – indicates that the safeguarding of Finland’s independence by all available means was not solely dependent on Mannerheim’s persona.278

After bitter battles, the armistice that Finland desperately needed was signed on 5 September, and hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union were officially terminated. Finland’s representatives were invited to the Moscow peace talks, over the course of which the Soviet Union in practice unilaterally dictated the terms of peace to Finland. The Allies had demanded that a comprehensive peace treaty be drafted between all the belligerents at a common peace conference, but Finland and the Soviet Union signed a separate Interim Peace Treaty on 19 September 1944.279 Despite the fact that the war had ended, the Interim Peace Treaty placed Finland’s defence capabilities, compared with the battles, in a completely new and difficult situation. In addition to the internment of German forces in Finland, the claims for reparations and the cession of Finnish territory to the Soviet Union, the terms of the Interim Peace Treaty stipulated that the Finnish Defence Forces must be demobilised under an accelerated schedule by 5 December 1944. Despite proposals made by the Finns, the Allied Control Commission that had arrived in Finland demanded that the organisation and composition of the Finnish Defence Forces be returned to that of the Finnish army before the Winter War. According to the requirements set for Finland, the total strength of the Finnish Defence Force should not exceed 37,000 men. The manpower of the army was set at 26,000 men, with the combined strength of the coastal defences, the navy and the air force being only 11,000 men.280

Problems and challenges abounded. Among other things, the Civil Guard organisation was disbanded on 3 November 1944, and the organisation of the Defence Forces was restored in a general outline to the divisional organisation they had had in 1939 by early 1945. The organisation of the Finnish Defence Forces, formed im-

278 Keskitalo (1967), including the associated interview material, the Department of Military History, the National Defence University.
mediately after the war, still reflected in part the wartime organisation, consisting of three divisions and a reserve formation, of separate arms, and of an organisation required by mobilisation. The army comprised three divisions and a light brigade, all under the command of an army corps. The air force comprised four flying regiments, two anti-aircraft regiments and a signal battalion. The navy consisted of the naval units proper, a coastal artillery regiment, three fortification areas, and two naval bases. For mobilisation and conscription purposes, the territorial organisation that had been in place in the 1930s was reintroduced. In a speech broadcast on radio on the Day of Independence in 1944, Prime Minister J.K. Paasikivi painted a bleak picture of Finland being at the bottom of a dark valley, in a position in which it had ended up as a result of a war that it had lost. This simile provides a grim snapshot of the predominant sentiment among the Finnish people and the Defence Forces alike.

To ensure that Finland comply with the terms of the Interim Peace Treaty, an Allied Control Commission (or LVK, being the Finnish abbreviation for the Commission) was set up for the country. In addition to the terms of the Interim Peace treaty, the Control Commission issued numerous orders which put restrictions on the Defence Forces, although the Treaty did not, at the time, contain any detailed restrictions on the quality or number of weapons. From the perspective of the Finnish defence capability, the execution of the terms of the Interim Peace Treaty brought three key issues into consideration: the dispersed storage of weapons in order to ensure that a mobilisation could be carried out; the interpretation of the order issued by the General Headquarters in 1945, prohibiting any preparations for a mobilisation; and the ultimate fate and storage of the surplus military materiel checked in for storage by the demobilised field army. Examining such issues now, points can be found that link them to the development of the territorial defence system, the ensuing adoption of the methods of guerrilla warfare, the development of guerrilla-type activities, and their inclusion in Finland’s defence doctrine.

The chief of the Ground Forces Office of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Usko Sakari Haathi, drafted in August 1944, by order of Lieutenant General A.F. Airo, a memorandum on the measures that should have been taken if the invasion of the Soviet Union had broken through the Finnish defences and the Soviet troops had advanced into the interior of Finland. The conclusions of the memorandum were based on an operating model under which guerrilla-type activities would be launched in areas occupied by the enemy. In other words, plans existed for organised guerrilla-type activities and preparations for mo-

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281 Saressalo, Jussi: Maaavoimien rauhanajan joukko-osastojen perustamiset, siirrot ja lakkauttamiset itsenäisyyden aikana (‘The establishment of army units, their relocations and disbandments during Finland’s independence’), a thesis written at the National General Staff College in 1981, pp. 2–12, the Finnish Military Academy. Terä – Tervasmäki (1973), pp. 47–78.
bilibisation, but their details were confined to a limited circle of officers. The dispersed storage of weapons was part of this plan.\footnote{Keskitalo (1967), p. 4, The Department of Military History, the National Defence University. See also Asekätkentää koskeva muistio (‘A memorandum on the caching of weapons’), Paris, 20 August, Valo Nihtilä’s private collection, Pk 1969/3–4, KA. The recollections of Colonel Nihtilä, gathered by Pertti Kilkki between 12 March and 16 May 1972, Valo Nihtilä’s private collection, Pk 1969, KA. Koppinen, Veikko: Asekätkennän merkitys 1944–45 (‘The significance of the weapons caching operation 1944–45’), an undated memorandum, Veikko Koppinen’s private collection; the original document in the possession of the author of this thesis.}

While the confidential weapons caching operation was still in progress, the Operations Division of the General Headquarters began to consider adapting its mobilisation plans to the current situation. With regard to materiel, this plan was in part based on dispersed weapon and munition caches. The three-phase plan was divided into the covering of mobilisation, the reinforcement of troops in a training composition up to the level of light infantry brigades, and the establishment of the principal parts of the field army using materiel in the central stores. From the perspective of guerrilla-type activities, the important aspect of the plan was the fact that it was prepared to use battalions equipped with cached materiel in guerrilla-type activities.\footnote{Asekätkentää koskeva muistio, Pariisi 20.8.1953 (‘A memorandum on the caching of weapons, Paris, 20 August 1953’), and Kertomus aseiden ja sotamateriaalin hajavarastoinnista eli asekätkennästä ja sen loppuselvityystä (‘An account of the dispersed storage of weapons and military materiel, in other words, the weapons caching case and its final settlement’), Helsinki 12 April 1970, Valo Nihtilä’s private collection, Pk 1969/3–4, KA. See also Tynkkynen (2006), pp. 434–435.} Although the Operations Division was just drafting plans and not making any practical preparations, the situation can be said to have been quite peculiar, to say the least. Simultaneously with the clandestine caching of weapons, the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces issued an order that stopped any further preparations for a mobilisation and the drafting of operational plans.\footnote{PvPE:n no. 170/Järj.2/5/9.1.1945, T 22520/Hh 47, KA.} This was partly due to pressure exerted by the Control Commission and the active inspections that it carried out at various headquarters and garrisons.

After the direct threat of occupation was over in winter 1945, the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces began investigating possibilities for destocking the dispersed weapons caches and transporting the materiel to the depots of the Defence Forces. A decision was taken to postpone destocking to summer 1945, but, as the caching operation gradually became public following an information leak in Oulu in May, a train of events was set in motion that sought to cover up the clandestine preparations and destock the caches before the entire affair came to light in full. However, the entire weapons caching organisation, some caches and a portion of the plans were revealed in investigations carried out by the Control Commission and the Finnish Security Police which at the time was controlled by communists. This train of events was liable to lead to a deterioration of the attitude of the Soviet Union towards Finland and its Defence Forces. The investigation of the case, accompanied by high-profile detentions and officers being sentenced to prison or forced to resign their commission, lasted for approximately three years.\footnote{Visuri (1994), pp. 31–34.}
While it is difficult to estimate all the effects of the Weapons Cache Case, it can be said that its repercussions were felt long after the war in that it, on the one hand, labelled the Defence Forces as untrustworthy in the eyes of Finland’s political leadership and, on the other, proved that Finland was a nation that put stock in its independence, even in the face of the Soviet might, and was prepared to fight occupation with every available means. In any event, the case served as a reminder to the Soviet Union that the Finnish art of war went beyond ordinary tactics and operational skills. If necessary, Finland was prepared to resort to large-scale guerrilla-type activities. Finland’s transition period from war to peacetime and the difficult post-war situation lasted several years. After the Lapland War ended in April, the Defence Forces were definitively detached from the war by summer 1945. However, the real problems were only beginning.

The Defence Forces had to give in under political pressure and change their threat scenarios. While, as late as autumn 1944 and spring 1945, the plans drafted under the direction of Colonel Valo Nihtilä were geared towards repelling a Soviet invasion, the defensive doctrine became almost completely reversed, as evidenced by a memorandum drawn up in summer 1945. The new chief of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, Colonel Olavi Huhtala, drafted a detailed memorandum on Finland’s military position for the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. In his memorandum, based on the prevailing circumstances, Huhtala discussed Finland’s position as the Soviet Union’s neighbour and the requirements that this fact set for adapting the country’s defence to comply with the new situation. In order to preserve its independence, Huhtala argued, Finland had to be prepared to defend its territory in a way that, if necessary, took account of the interest of the Soviet Union. In a war between the Allied countries, Finland needed to be prepared to defend its territory in a way that took account of the interests of the Soviet Union. In terms of threat scenarios and Finland’s defensive doctrine, the Defence Forces began to see the threat in the West – ostensibly at least.\footnote{PvPE:n op-os:n muistio sotilaallisesta asemastamme ja armeijan tehtävistä nykyoloissa 14.7.1945 (‘A memorandum by the Operations Division of the General Headquarters on our military position and the tasks of the army in the current conditions, 14 July 1945’), Olavi Huhtala’s private collection, Pk 1366/3a., KA. See also Tynkkynen (1996), p. 291 and Tynkkynen (2006), p. 435.}

\section*{The Defence Revision Committee and the discussions around the perceived need to change the defensive doctrine}

In May 1945, Finland’s Council of State set up a parliamentary-military committee to investigate the appropriateness of national defence under the prevailing circumstances and to propose possible measures for its reorganisation.\footnote{A letter by the Ministry of Defence regarding the setting up of the committee, dated on 24 May 1945, T 19572/376, KA. See also Visuri, Pekka: Totaalisesta sodasta kriisinhallintaan (‘From a total war to crisis management, a diss.’), Keuruu 1989, pp. 177–181.} The committee, named the Defence Revision Committee\footnote{A.k.a ‘Defence Revision’.}, began its work under difficult conditions, having been tasked to investigate the premises for the Peace Treaty negotiations that were about to begin, and the threat of a possible defence alliance with the...
Soviet Union. Over the course of the spring of 1945, the leadership of the Defence Forces became increasingly conscious of the fact that Finland’s defence doctrine needed development. Although the General Headquarters in its own work focused on creating a peacetime organisation for the Defence Forces and executing the requirements set by the Allied Control Committee, it nevertheless set up several committees for the gathering of experiences gained from the war and to look into the development needs brought about by the changed world situation.292

A committee set up on 1 November 1945 to develop the organisation drafted, under the direction of Major General Heiskanen, almost all the proposals that were submitted to the Defence Revision Committee for the composition of the Defence Forces.293 Within the Defence Revision Committee, the views of the Defence Forces were presented by Major General K. A. Tapola, who was a member of the Committee. Tapola also presented the memoranda drawn up by the committees that the Defence Forces set up. Over the course of autumn 1945, the most relevant proposals for the future of the defence system were submitted to Tapola before he forwarded them to the Defence Revision Committee. In the views of the Defence Forces, Finland would continue to need a good defence capability, principally by maintaining a covering force. According to these views, which suggested that battles would break out simultaneously across large areas, the most advantageous solution would be the introduction of a territorial defence system, coupled with combining the various branches of the defence within the framework of the country’s administrative division into provinces.294 The view presented by Tapola to the Defence Revision Committee was evidently based at least in part on the memorandum drafted by Olavi Huhtala in summer 1945, the basic premise of which was a structural change in Finland’s independent defence capability in the direction of acquiescence – ostensibly at least.

The proposal drafted by Tapola and Heiskanen for the principles of a territorial defence system was favourably received by the Defence Revision Committee. However, the reassessment of the tasks that had been the responsibility of the Civil Guard organisation – which was disbanded in November 1945 – and, particularly, one of its sections, the territorial organisation – calling up conscripts for service, mobilisation and the securing of the rear areas – aroused more controversy. While the Committee was still engaged in active work in the spring of 1945, it received the first draft of the Paris Peace Treaty for review from the Paris Peace Conference that had begun its work. However, the General Headquarters and the Defence Revision Committee remained in the dark regarding the interpretation of the content of the Peace Treaty.295

The Paris Peace Treaty, signed in February 1947, dictated restrictions on the weaponry that the Finnish Defence Forces could have, which forced Finnish defence thinking to assume a completely new direction. From the perspective of national defence, the most problematic chapter of the Treaty was related to the total strength of the Finnish Defence Forces, which were limited to 41,900 men, including those serving in the Frontier Guard. The Treaty also required that the amount of materiel and weaponry be dimensioned to match the limited manpower. Finland was obligated to surrender surplus war materiel immediately to the Allies or, alternatively, to destroy it within a year of the signing of the Treaty.\(^{296}\) After relations between the Allies cooled, the Finnish surplus materiel and its later destination had an obvious effect on Finland’s defence system and on the Finnish art of war, which was being increasingly developed in the direction of a territorial defence system.

The Defence Revision Committee submitted its report to the Counsel of State on 10 March 1949 The key conclusion of this detailed and well-argued report summed up Finland’s defence capability, defining it as a pre-emptive defence capability and a struggle for neutrality in the face of possible proposals regarding a military alliance. A cadre system based on universal conscription was deemed to be the best way to organise the Defence Forces. According to the report, the peacetime organisation should enable sufficiently prompt and reliable mobilisation and other such preparations. In its proposal for the organisation, the Defence Control Committee suggested that the administrative division of the country and the military be closely connected. With regard to warfare that had become increasingly total in nature, the wartime army would have to be able to measure up to the developments challenging, in particular, its mobility, striking force and technical capabilities. To quote the report verbatim, this meant ‘the necessity of having a territorial national defence’. In particular, the reports listed the requirements imposed by the nature and conditions of the modern war, preparations required by the national defence, and the necessity of maintaining defence preparedness as justifications for a territorial defence system.\(^{297}\) Thus, a

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\(^{296}\) Rauhansopimus Suomen kanssa (Pariisin rauhansopimus) (‘Peace Treaty with Finland – the Paris Peace Treaty’), Finlex 20/1947, http://www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sopsteksti/1947/19470020/194700-20_2, read on 22 July 2013. See also Suomen solmimien kansainvälisten sopimusten sotilaalliset velvoitteet ja oikeudet (‘The military obligations and rights stipulated by the international agreements that Finland has signed’), Defence Council, 11 October 1958, sal, UKA 21/19.

\(^{297}\) Valtioneuvoston 24.5.1945 asettaman Puolustusrevisiokomitean mietintö valtionneuvostolle 10.3.1949, osat Puolustuslaitoksen mukulienjärjestelyyn vaikuttavat tekijät, Puolustuslaitojärjestelmä: konflikti, Puolustusvoimain järjestely: yleistä, ylin johtoa (‘The report by the Defence Revision Committee dated 10 March 1949, set by the Council of State on 24 May 1945, sections entitled The Factors Affecting the Reorganisation of the Defence Forces, the Military System: training, the Organisation of the Defence Forces: general, top leadership, the library of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, pp. 46–66 and 146–150’) Valtioneuvoston 24.5.1945 asettaman Puolustusrevisiokomitean mietintö valtionneuvostolle 10.6.1949, osat Puolustusvoimain järjestely lukuun ottamatta asia: yleistä ja ylin johtoa, kantakuntoinen (‘The report by the Defence Revision Committee dated 10 March 1949, set by the Council of State on 24 May 1945, the sections entitled the Organisation of the Defence Forces with the exception of general and top leadership, professional officers and NCOs, the library of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, pp. 46–66 and 146–150’) See also Penttilä, Risto E. J.: Puolustuslinjat – Puolustuspolitiikka Suomen kansainvälisen aseman vakauttamisessa 1944–67 (‘The defensive lines – the role of the defensive policy in the stabilisation of Finland’s international position 1944–67’), Keuruu 1988, p. 167.
change in the art of war towards territorial defensive thinking had been initiated and had received official support.

The ultimate fate of surplus weapons laid the foundation for equipping the field army

It was not until the Paris Peace Treaty had been signed that Finland’s position appreciably clarified, after the nearly three-year Interim Peace period, which was prone to interpretations and was characterised by constant meddling by the Allied Control Commission. However, the huge supply of surplus weapons caused problems, with Chapters 13 and 10 of the Peace Treaty determining the fate of military materiel.298 Despite the definitions for and lists of war materiel provided in Annex 3 to the Treaty, it remained unclear to the Finns exactly what the surplus of weaponry referred to, and the whole issue seemed open to interpretation. Was anything beyond the weapons required by the peacetime troops to be regarded as surplus? With regard to the difficulties in interpretation, it should be underlined that the Peace Treaty did not make a single reference to reserves, although they constituted the key element in a defence system based on universal conscription. Under a strict interpretation of the Peace Treaty, Finland would have been allowed to retain weaponry for equipping a Defence Force of only 41,900 men. While the question of why Finland was able to retain the surplus weaponry – war booty weapons in fact, including other materiel left behind by the war – has not been fully studied, a number of studies have put forth several hypotheses. In particular, Markku Palokangas – first a researcher at and then leader of the Military Museum of Finland – and Pekka Visuri, a docent specialising in defensive policy, have proposed interpretations of the surplus weapons which run along parallel lines.299

Chapter 19 of the Paris Peace Treaty obligated Finland to make surplus materiel originating in a particular Allied country available to the Allied power in question, in accordance with instructions issued by the Power in question. Finland was obligated to make the surplus war materiel in Finland available to the governments of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Finland had to give up all its rights to this materiel. However, the Allied Control Commission did not assume responsibility for the supervision of the execution of the Peace Treaty, as the Commission left Finland immediately after the Peace Treaty had been ratified on 29 September 1947. Finland dutifully awaited more detailed instructions on the ultimate fate of the surplus weaponry and on similar issues from the Soviet Union and the UK.300

In reality, the number of rifle-calibre weapons in Finland’s possession was around fifteen-fold compared to the number permitted under the Peace Treaty, which was the basis on which the General Headquarters was making calculations for the num-

298 Sotamateriaalin myynti (‘The sales of war materiel’), PvPE:n no. 1071/Stal.1/7/ 2.9.1947, T 19222/24 b, KA.
300 Ibid.
ber of weapons required by the peacetime army (41,900 men). The need for hand weapons was calculated to be 157,353 rifles, 144,313 submachine guns, 9,080 light machine guns and 6,477 machine guns. This calculation was based on a formula according to which the number of weapons required by an individual soldier must be multiplied by two for the needs of a ten-year period: one for training, one for exercises and one for combat use. While the real need was around 150,000 weapons, the General Headquarters doubled this number, justifying it by considerable wear and tear. In addition to these calculations, Finland announced that the number of rifles in Finnish stores was around 350,000. These calculations were submitted not only to the representatives of the UK but also to the embassy of the Soviet Union, where the calculations prompted the embassy to request whether they also represented the views of the Finnish government. However, the note and request for additional information, presented by Savonenkov, the Soviet ambassador, in a polite tone, did not lead to further clarifications or restrictions regarding the weapons.

On what kind of materiel, then, did the issue focus? During the years that Finland was waiting, the General Headquarters maintained a detailed record of the quantity of materiel, but it was not until August 1951 that it finally ordered a more extensive survey to be carried out of the number of light infantry weapons. According to this exceptionally accurate calculation, the various units, central depots, the Frontier Guard, and the police administration had a total of 557,427 rifles, 67,196 sub-machine guns, 16,178 light machine guns, 5,162 machine guns, 1,689 anti-tank rifles, and 23,493 pistols. The above-mentioned materiel was sufficient to equip approximately 15 divisions. It should be noted that these numbers included a large number of weapons that Germany had either given to Finland during the war or that Finland had purchased from Germany, as well as war booty weapons from Soviet troops.

Initially, the surrendering to the Allies of weapons and war materiel, or destroying it, was not regarded as an urgent issue, but, in the autumn of 1948, the military attaché to the Soviet Union was requested, on several occasions, to provide instructions on the issue. No response was received, and the final date set by the Soviet Union itself

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301 Sotamateriaalin luovuttamistoimenpiteitä varten laadittavat materiaalimäärävahvumet (The nominal strengths of materiel to be drawn up for the surrendering of war materiel), PvPE:n no. 1953/järj 1/5osal./10.12.1947, T 20214/F 9 sal, KA. Also cf. Aseistuksen ja vara-aseistuksen tarve verrattuna maassaan olevan aseistuksen määrään (The need for weaponry and backup weapons, compared with the number of weapons present in the country), PvPE:n no. tsa 25.5.1948, taulukko 1, T 19222/29, KA. See also Aseistuksen ja vara-aseistuksen tarve verrattuna maassaan olevan aseistuksen määrään (The need for weaponry and backup weapons, compared with the number of weapons present in the country), PvPE:n no. tsa 25.5.1948, taulukko 1, T 19222/29, KA.

302 A letter from the Soviet ambassador to Enckell, Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 25 September, T 20362/1, KA. See also Blinnikka (1969), p. 169.

303 PvPE:tväl-os:n asetilanneilmoitus 31.8.1951 (laadittu 11.5.1951) (a situational report by the Ordnance Division of the General Headquarters on weaponry dated 31 August 1951 and drafted on 11 May 1951), T 20207/F 16, KA. See also Palokangas (1991), pp. 280–285. When the calculation from 1951 is compared to the report submitted by the General Headquarters to the supervisors of the Peace Treaty in July 1948, it can be stated that the amount of materiel had in part increased. The increase in the number of weapons can be explained by the weapons returned to the Police Administration and, particularly, by the destocking of the weapons caches established during the dispersed weapons caching operation and the returning to the central depots of the cached weapons. See a situational report on materials by PvPE, dated 1 July 1948, unnumbered, T 19222/29, KA.

expired. This unclear issue was even reported on in one newspaper article.305 The passivity exhibited by the Soviet Union in the issue – immediately following the period of the Allied Control Commission – was something that the Finnish military authorities found highly peculiar and definitively being at odds with normal Soviet style. The Soviet Union, however, had its reasons to assume a passive stance.306

In April 1948, Finland and the Soviet Union had signed an agreement known under the name of the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, the first chapter of which also obligated Finland to defend her territory against an attack against Finland, or against the Soviet Union through Finland, with ‘all available means’.307 From the Soviet perspective, therefore, it was advantageous that the means available to Finland included a large trained reserve, for which the number of weapons in question was dimensioned. The Soviet leadership may have expected Finland to drift politically into its sphere of influence and to become an increasingly integral part of it, in which context allowing Finland to retain its weapons was a rational anticipatory measure. Another obvious reason can be found in a conflict of prestige that had developed between the Soviet Union and the UK. With regard to the requirements to surrender or destroy surplus weapons, set for Finland, the British were stricter than the Russians. The British military leadership evidently feared that the materiel that Finland was obligated to surrender to the Allies would only be used to further the Soviets’ ambitions to expand their power further westward. So, little Finland, with its surplus weapons, was drawn into a game between great powers.308

However, with regard to the Peace Treaty and the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, extensive studies into them were commissioned particularly of jurists, the most notable of whom were probably Professor Erik Castrén, who submitted his statement in April 1948, and Doctor Tauno Suontausta, who gave his report in February 1951. Both experts boldly settled on interpreting the treaties in Finland’s favour, referring, in particular, to the wording of ‘with all available means’ in the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. While both saw that Finland should abide by the Paris Peace Treaty, they gave an interpretation of the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance that entitled the Finnish Defence Forces to make necessary preparations for a mobi-

305 Suomen sotamateriaalin liikkomäärien luovuttaminen tai tuhoaminen vielä toimittamatta, voittavajallat eivät ole vielä ilmoittaneet kantaansa (‘The surrendering or destroying of Finland’s surplus war materiel still uncompleted; the victorious powers have not yet communicated their view’), an article in Aamulehti 19/1948, 30 August 1948, Pääesikunnan tiedotusosaston lehtileikkeet 1941–1989 (‘The press clips of the Information Division of the General Headquarters 1941–1989’), KA.


307 ‘In the eventuality that Finland, or the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, becoming the object of an armed attack by Germany or any State allied with the latter, Finland will, true to its obligations as an independent State, fight to repel the attack. Finland in such cases will use all its available forces for defending its territorial integrity by land, sea and air, and will do so within the frontiers of Finland in accordance with obligations defined in the present Agreement and, if necessary, with the assistance of, or jointly with the Soviet Union. In the cases aforementioned the Soviet Union will give Finland the help required, the giving of which will be subject to mutual agreement between the Contracting Parties.’ For the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the Republic of Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, see Finlex 17/1948, http://www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sopsteksti/1948/19480017, read on 23 July 2013.

lisation and to take advantage of the surplus weapons as a precaution for a possible invasion.\textsuperscript{309} The statements unequivocally lent support to a consent granted by President Paasikivi on 13 March 1948 for the initiation of operational and mobilisation planning. The preparations embraced not only the maximum strength permitted under the Paris Peace Treaty (41,900) but also the field army.\textsuperscript{310}

The entire weaponry, defined as surplus under the Paris Peace Treaty, was stored at central depots and retained there practically untouched until the early 1950s, when the Finns began to be increasingly concerned about the ultimate fate of the weapons. The storage of weapons from one year to another, with no knowledge of their intended use, was not only impractical but also extremely expensive, considering the resources available to the Defence Forces at the time. In late August 1951, the Defence Forces carried out a new stocktaking of the weapons in temporary storage.\textsuperscript{311} In January 1952, the defence administration considered it necessary to take up the question of weapon storage; consequently, a plan on the reorganisation of the depots was presented to President Paasikivi via Prime Minister Kekkonen. After discussing the issue with Kekkonen, Paasikivi announced that it was impossible to transfer the weapons without first obtaining consent from the Russians. It should be mentioned that, in connection with this, Kekkonen and Paasikivi also discussed the desire expressed by the leadership of the Defence Forces to execute parts of the mobilisation plan.\textsuperscript{312} The question of the depots and the fate of the surplus weapons remained unsolved.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, Aarne Sihvo, was requested by Minister of Defence, Emil Skog in early 1952 to find out the view of the Soviet Union regarding the storage and fate of the surplus weapons. The response was long in coming, as it was in November 1952 that the military attaché to the Soviet Union, Colonel Rybakov announced to Sihvo that there were no obstacles to the Defence Force selling or scrapping the surplus materiel. According to the memorandum drafted by Sihvo, Rybakov had added ‘that there was no need to pay any attention to what the communists would write or say, as it would have absolutely no bearing.’\textsuperscript{313} After Sihvo communicated this information to President Paasikivi, the President said that he

\textsuperscript{309} The statement by Professor Castrén, given at the Constitutional Law Committee on 20 April 1948, and the statement by Doctor Tauno Suontausta, given on 15 February 1951, on the interpretations of the Paris Peace Treaty and the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, UKA 21/19.

\textsuperscript{310} The memorandum by Aarne Sihvo, 3 March 1948, UKA 21/15. Presidential presentation on 13 March, T 23828/Fa 12, KA. See also the memorandum presenting justification for the presentation, PyPE:n no. 148/Järj.2/sal/13.3.1948, T 26965/F 1 sal, KA.

\textsuperscript{311} Palokangas (1991), p. 259. See also Ratinen, Juha: Suomen liikekannallepanokyky sodan jälkeisinä vuosina (‘Finland’s capability for mobilisation during the postwar years’), a pro gradu thesis written on a cadet course in 2009, pp. 45–48, Department of Military History, National Defence University.


\textsuperscript{313} A memorandum by Aarne Sihvo, dated 16 November 1952, on the discussion with Colonel Rybakov, the military attaché to the Soviet Union, held on 14 November 1952, Commander of the Defence Force 1946–1961, confidential and general memoranda etc., from the term of General Sihvo, T 21645/1, KA.
welcomed this information but that he also wished to receive written confirmation and to discuss the issue with Kekkonen and Skog.314

Later estimates have also suggested that the 1952 Olympics held in Helsinki had played a role in the Soviet Union accepting that the surplus weapons remained under Finnish discretion. In summer 1952, Finland, as the host of the Olympics, was in the spotlight of the entire world, leading to the conclusion that a disagreement on this level between two countries would inevitably have made headlines around the world. It is difficult to determine this with certainty, but forcing Finland, a country in the spotlight of the entire world in an Olympic year, to transfer a huge number of weapons to another country or to destroy them, would not necessarily have reflected well on the policies pursued by a peace-loving Soviet Union.

In breach of the express terms of the 1944 Interim Peace Treaty and the Paris Peace Treaty, Finland, evidently as the only country of those that had fought on Germany’s side in the Second World War, was able retain the war booty weapons that it had taken from the victor. Although other war booty such as vehicles, vessels, means of production, cultural artefacts and similar were returned to the Soviet Union in 1944–1946, weapons remained in Finland’s possession. In other words, this materiel was not surrendered to the Allies, as the relations between the great powers cooled, and this enabled Finland in a way to ensure the materiel performance of its Defence Forces. The fact that the issue was resolved was historically highly significant for Finland’s defence, as Finland was now able to equip its reserve forces using the wartime weapons destocked from the stores. Although part of the light weapons were scrapped or sold,315 Finland retained materiel for an army of approximately 600,000 men. Another consequence was that Russian-made weapons retained their dominant position during the postwar decades. Over the course of the 1950s, the condition of the weapons and other defence materiel, munitions in particular, deteriorated, reaching catastrophic proportions in some cases. Furthermore, considering that outdated equipment was also in active training use, the situation required prompt corrective measures by the end of the 1950s. The situation was largely similar to all war equipment specific to the various branches.316

The Night Frost Crisis in 1958 and the note that the Soviet Union sent to Finland three years later alerted the country to consider questions regarding its defence solution. How should Finland defend the country using outdated materiel and what methods should be used? From the perspective of the Defence Forces, the Note Crisis also had, in a way, positive aspects, as it finally caused the Finnish leadership, including the president of the republic, to commit itself to the acquisition of new materiel.

315 ‘As the military stipulations of the Peace Treaty, restricting the rights of a sovereign state if the normal principles for interpretation are applied, must be interpreted strictly, and, therefore, not to go beyond the express wording of the Treaty, it appears evident that in this respect Finland must be regarded to have complete freedom to determine by itself the course it shall take to execute Chapter 18 of the Peace Treaty. In this respect, there should be no obstacles to changing the surplus to money.’ See an undated memorandum for justification by government counsellor Heikki Aarnio for the ownership and sale of the surplus weaponry from 1952, PLM kirjeistö, T 21402/F 119, KA.
316 PEn no.tta 6.5.1957, T 24727/Da 1 sal, KA. See also PIm:n no. 790/97/30.12.1957, a list of combat materiel to be sold, T 22220/F 254, KA.
defence materiel. After all, this is what the soldiers had wanted ever since the mid-1940s. If Finland had been obligated to destroy the surplus of weapons stipulated by the Peace Treaty, or surrender it to the Soviet Union, the country would probably never have had a chance to form a territorial defence system based on universal conscription. The amount of materiel quite evidently had an impact on the discussions on cost-effective ways to wage guerrilla war during the 1950s.

The beginnings of territorial defence thinking

It is often said that the territorial defence system was born and developed as late as the 1960s, but recent studies and source materiel on the Cold War indicate that the groundwork for the development of this defence system was laid during the postwar years, in the early 1950s in particular. After the war, requirements made by the Allied Control Commission set for Finland, regarding the composition of the Finnish Defence Forces and the restrictions set on the country’s mobilisation arrangements and weapons, led Finland’s defence capability to hang in the balance. The ban on operational preparations and the weapon caching operation that came to light in the spring of 1945 led to the conclusion that something needed to be done.

The above-mentioned memorandum, drafted by Olavi Huhtala, on Finland’s military position and the tasks of the army under the prevailing conditions was the first step towards a territorial defence system. K.A. Tapola, who was the inspector of the military schools and who, in addition to this post, acted as the head of the National General Staff College between 1945 and 1947, drafted – in collaboration with K.A. Heiskanen, the head of the Command Staff – a proposal for the reorganisation of Finland’s national defence for submittal to the Defence Revision Committee, basing this proposal on a memorandum drafted by a committee chaired by Heiskanen. Tapola’s and Heiskanen’s proposal was based, at least in part, on the content of Olavi Huhtala’s memorandum, which argued that Finnish independence would have to be guaranteed, if necessary, by having in place a sufficient and politically correct defensive capacity. The important aspect of the background memorandum presented by Tapola for the Defence Revision Committee was its wording regarding the principles of the defensive solution. ‘...proposes for consideration a scenario under which this would lead to some sort of assessment of regional importance, with a responsible commander being appointed for each region to make preparations and to assume responsibility for his area. Troops ready for each region and the regional importance must be assessed.’ Tapola’s proposal combined the various branches of national defence within a framework of

317 Salminen, Pertti: In the name of neutrality (diss.), Helsinki 1995, p. 129.
318 PvPE:n op-os:n muistio sotilaallisesta asemastamme ja armeijan tehtävistä nykyoloissa 14.7.1945 (‘A memorandum by the Operations Division of the General Headquarters on our military position and the tasks of the army under the current conditions, 14 July 1945’), Olavi Huhtala’s private collection, Pk 1366/3 a., KA. See also Sotalaitosmuodot (‘The forms of the military system’), a memorandum dated on 27 July 1945, drafted by Colonel Olavi Huhtala for the Defence Revision Committee, the minutes of the Defence Revision Committee for 27 July 1945 including the attachments, T 19572/376, KA. After the memoranda had been discussed, Huhtala was ordered to take the post of the secretary of the Defence Revision Committee on a provisional basis between 3 August 1945 and 1 June 1946. See, for example, Huhtala, Vilho Olavi, extract from personal details, no. 33380, KA.
provinces, for example. This memorandum, which quite evidently was heavily influenced by Tapola and Heiskanen, can be regarded as the first of its kind and one in which the territorial defence system was officially introduced.

Strong-willed Kustaa Tapola, as a representative of the Defence Revision Committee, appears to have played a major role, as he was even said to have dictated some sections of the memorandum that the Committee prepared. As an example for a territorial system, the principles applied by Switzerland and Sweden, among others, were put forth. Additional strength to Tapola’s role as an advocate and proponent of the territorial defence system resulted from his participation on a committee known as the Territorial Division Committee between 1946 and 1953. When scrutinising the factors that the thinking around a territorial defence system was based on, a clear connection between Tapola’s role and the principles of a territorial division of the country can be discerned after all, as he spoke on several occasions at the meetings of the Defence Revision Committee in the capacity of an expert. Kustaa Tapola, while still participating in the work of the Defence Revision Committee, made an initiative for the standardisation of nationwide territorial arrangements. Following Tapola’s initiative, the Ministry of Finance set up a committee on 11 April 1946, tasking it with conducting a study on the geographical division of the country under the various forms of the administration – including the defence administration – and providing proposals for modifications in order to put in place more uniform arrangements. By virtue of his stature, Tapola participated in the work of the committee. The work of the Territorial Division Committee and the preliminary results of its survey were presented to the Defence Revision Committee, specifically by Tapola.

The report of the Defence Revision Committee came out in 1949 in two volumes. The first volume, published in March 1949, contained, among other things, assessments of the factors that would have an impact on the reorganisation of the Defence Forces, including proposals for the arrangements for the defence system and administration during war and peace 1939–1978 – the history of the Ministry of Defence, Part II), Hameenlinna 1978, p. 267. See also Visuri (1989), pp. 179–180 and Visuri (1994), pp. 60–61. Tapola, Paivi: Ajan paino – jalkaväenkenraali K. A. Tapolan elämä (The weight of time – the life of General K.A.Tapola’), Jyväskylä 2004, pp. 291–300. Tapola, Kustaa Anders, an extract from personal details, no. 20739, KA. 321 Tapola (2004), p. 293 and pp. 299–301. See also Ainejakokomitean mietintö vuodelta 1953 (‘The report by the Territorial Division Committee’ from 1953), K. A. Tapola’s private collection Pk 1664/29, 30 and 31, KA. Tapola, Kustaa Anders, an extract from personal details, no. 20739, KA. 322 The minutes of the Defence Revision Committee recorded in April 1949 include the following entry: ‘Tapola gave an account of the work that the committee tasked with the territorial division of the country.’ See the minutes of the Defence Revision Committee, dated 5 April 1949, T 19572/377, KA.
the training of the troops.\textsuperscript{323} The second volume was published in June 1949, giving a detailed account of the organisation of the Defence Forces.\textsuperscript{324} The latter volume repeatedly puts the focus on the territorial organisation of the national defence. Above all, the territorial principle was justified by the heightened readiness it offered for Finland’s mobilisation and defence capacity. ‘Using peacetime units as a framework, troops could be formed in each military province during mobilisation. The Defence Revision Committee had placed particular emphasis on the maximum defence and protection capabilities of each province, even in the case of surprise attacks. Therefore, the Defence Revision Committee states that, in principle, the number of military provinces should be equal to that of the administrative provinces, and that both should overlap in so far as the military aspects do not require otherwise.’\textsuperscript{325} The influence that K. A. Tapola exerted and his connections to the Territorial Division Committee clearly come across in the report submitted by the Defence Revision Committee.

It must be remembered that towards the end of the Defence Revision Committee’s work, President of the Republic Juho Kusti Paasikivi authorised the military to begin secret operational planning and the preparation of mobilisation plans in March 1948.\textsuperscript{326} When considering starting points for operational planning, developments in tactical thinking constitute an integral part of the work to be completed. Experiences gained from the war were not the only factor forming Finnish tactical and operational skills; in the new situation, Finland needed to take account of the peace treaties it had signed and the restrictions and obligations that the Soviet Union had unilaterally imposed on the country. The question of adapting the organisations to meet the requirements set by an effective mobilisation also arose. After an analysis and drafting phase lasting approximately eighteen months, the Defensive Forces took a principal decision to adopt a brigade organisation. Drafts covering operational planning clearly indicated that the threat of a war between East and West and the obligations set out for Finland in the treaties made a division too cumbersome a unit for mobile operations. This is why mobilisation was based on a field army based on a brigade organisation.\textsuperscript{327}

\textsuperscript{323} Valtioneuvoston 24.5.1945 asettaman Puolustusrevisiokomitean mietintö valtioneuvostolle 10.3.1949, osat Puolustuslaitoksen noudellenjärjestelyyn vaikuttavat tekijät, Puolustuslaitojärjestely: koulutus, Puolustusvoimain järjestely: yleistä, ylin johto (‘The report by the Defence Revision Committee dated 10 March 1949, set by the Council of State on 24 May 1945, the sections entitled the Factors impacting the reorganisation of the Defence Forces; the Military system: training, the Organisation of the Defence Forces, general, top leadership’), the library of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University.

\textsuperscript{324} Valtioneuvoston 24.5.1945 asettaman Puolustusrevisiokomitean mietintö valtioneuvostolle 10.6.1949, osat Puolustusvoimain järjestely lukuun ottamatta osia: yleistä ja ylin johto, kantahenkilöstö (‘The report by the Defence Revision Committee dated 10 March 1949, set by the Council of State on 24 May 1945, the sections entitled the Organisation of the Defence Forces with the exception of general and top leadership, professional officers and NCOs’), the library of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, pp. 46–66 and 146–150.

\textsuperscript{325} Ibid, p. 1 and 56.

\textsuperscript{326} The memorandum by Aarne Sihvo, 3 March 1948, UKA 21/15. Presidential presentation on 13 March, T 23828/Fa 12, KA. See also the memorandum presenting justification for the presentation, PvPEn no. 148/Järj.2/sal/13.3.1948, T 26965/F 1 sal, KA. Tynkkynen, Vesa: Alueellisen puolustuksen kehittymisen suojen jälkeen (‘The development of territorial defence after the war’), a lecture given at the National Defence University on 8 December 1999, pp. 1–2.

With regard to guerrilla troops, it should be mentioned that the plans—principally, the establishment charts (PTL)—drafted by the Defence Forces in 1950 for the wartime composition of the field army included a total of six guerrilla jaeger battalions. While the target set for the strength of each guerrilla jaeger battalion was approximately 600 men, it was exactly 488 men when entered in the establishment chart. Three of the battalions were to be formed during the phase in which cover was being provided for a mobilisation, with the remaining three battalions being formed during the full-scale mobilisation. In other words, the combined strength of the six guerrilla jaeger battalions in a wartime field army would have been around 3,600 men. No separate guerrilla jaeger companies were itemised in the establishment charts of the early 1950s, but the combined strength of separate infantry units is indicated to be 40,570 men. The total wartime strength of the Defence Forces after a full-scale mobilisation was calculated to be 481,194 men.328

The teaching, training and research of guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare in 1945–1950

The work by the Defence Revision Committee and the General Headquarters for clarification of the grounds the defence system gave rise to a whole host of additional questions, most of which were related to the application of operational skills and tactics in a situation in which possible reforms were to be put into effect. With regard to the methods of waging war and the fighting method, one of the questions of the art of war was related to the possibility of using guerrilla-type activities which had proved efficient in the previous wars. For this reason, the General Headquarters evidently tasked the National General Staff College and the Army Combat School with surveying the issue with the aid of officer candidates. Starting from 1946, guerrilla-type activities were included in the curriculum of general tactics taught at the National General Staff College329 and in the topics taken up in discussions on courses for the achievement of a captain’s rank at the Army Combat School330.

328 The number of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces is missing, Sodanajan puolustusvoimat, vuoden 1950 perustamistehdystävielsettelon luonnos (PTL) (“The wartime Defensive Forces, a draft for the 1950 establishment chart”) 22 December 1950/sal, T 26842/Bb 2 sal, KA. The number of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces is missing, Laskelma reservin riittävyydestä Op.osn laatimia sodanajan puolustusvoimia silmälläpitäen (“A calculation of the sufficiency of the reserves with regard to the wartime Defence Forces drafted by the Operations Division”) 14.12.1950/sal, T 26842/Bb 2 sal, KA. Cf. also – The number of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces is missing – Laskelma aselajeittain puolustusvoimain henkilövahvuudesta su- ja tsa-kokoonpanoissa (“A calculation of the personnel strength of the Defence Forces during the covering phase and in the wartime composition, broken down by branch of the army”), 2.1.1952/sal, T 26842/Ha 2 sal, KA.

329 A total of 10 hours of classroom instruction was reserved for guerrilla-type activities during the first year of study; on the second, 26 hours. Y17/The curriculum for 1947 at the National General Staff College, appendix 6: the curriculum for general tactics, p. 1, and the curriculum of the general department of the National General Staff College (second-year students), appendix 6: the curriculum for general tactics, the National General Staff College, 24 October 1947. See also Yleinen taktikka, Liite no. 5 (“General Tactics, Attachment no. 5”) MaaSL/YO18, 1949, p. 2. T 21369/Db 5, KA.

330 Discussion topic: Sissitoiminnasta (“On guerrilla-type activities, drafted by Captain U. K. Korhonen, 18 November 1946, the Army Combat School, Captain Course 17, Eino Penttilä’s private collection, Pk 2109/3, KA.
Guerrilla-type activities were also simulated and used in map exercises as part of other military operations. Therefore, the first reflections in the postwar years on the use of guerrilla warfare and the means of guerrilla-type activities tended to be preparatory studies produced in most cases at military schools or by the operational branch. The common denominator of these studies and the teaching given at the National General Staff College were the experiences gained from the war, against which the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities were compared. A total of five theses or dissertations on guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities were completed at military schools between 1945 and 1950.

A survey of a relatively narrow sector such as articles written by officers and theses and studies completed at the various military schools indicate that they include several bold analyses of future wars and warfare. In addition to a courageous and innovative approach, they shared the fact that they were based on previous experiences and on the strengths derived from them. The authors were also conscious of national resources, limitations and strengths. The Second World War in particular and the postwar period had inspired several officers to write about the future on the basis of existing knowledge.

While guerrilla training was not a regular or official part of conscripts’ or instructors’ training, some attempts to address the issue had been made as early as early 1946. Between 10 February and 3 March 1946 ‘Guerrilla training days’, were arranged in Hamina; a training film of this event focusing on guerrilla skills was produced for use by the Defence Forces. This film was a brief training package focusing on the combat techniques of guerrilla-type activities and on specific guerrilla skills. On the basis of this film, a conclusion can be drawn that the objective of this training event was to discuss guerrilla training to be given to conscripts and NCOs. Another objective was probably to prepare training plans and to draft training materiel in support of training. The film is an interesting contemporary document and proof of the fact that training in guerrilla tactics was not downplayed due to experiences gained from the war.

However, an interesting fresh approach to the description of future wars was provided by Markus P. Kato, an alias of Professor Arvi Korhionen, in his book *Sodan uudet kasvot* (*The new face of war*), published in 1944. Pseudonym Kato reports that while he is writing in a dispassionate manner, he also bases all his views of the future on causality, which characterises the history of war. Referring to a certain

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331 See, for example, *Karttabarjoitus (Sissitoiminta)* (‘Map exercise (Guerrilla-type activities’), drafted by Colonel E. N. Hämäläinen 26 August 1946, SKK Y 16, T 21369/Dg 111, KA) A document related to the first postwar course arranged at the National General Staff College (Y16/1946) indicates that the officer candidates were given a task – in connection with a tactical map exercise – to clarify a proposal submitted by the Chief of the Operations Department of II Army Corps to the Chief of Staff of the Army Corps on the general arrangements and objectives of guerrilla-type activities.

332 See the bibliography of this thesis. The various theses, studies, articles and books are presented in chronological order.

333 *Sissikoulutuspäivät Haminaassa 18.2.–2.3.1946* (‘Guerrilla training days in Hamina, held between 18 February and 2 March 1946’, a training film’) P 437, KAVA. Cf. also Penttilä, Eino Valfri, an extract from personal details no. 33097, KA, according to whom guerrilla training days were arranged in Hamina between 10 February and 3 March 1946.
formula for events, he seeks to vindicate an old adage stating that 'a war cannot be planned beyond the first battle.' According to this author, it is more important to achieve clarity on the new objectives and characteristics of war, including situational awareness, which will ultimately dictate the outcome of a war. Kato describes the development of tactics and technology, invoking and forecasting – among other things – the ease of misunderstanding theorists of war and interpreting them in a manner that is all too narrow, the unscrupulous use of unconventional weapons such as gas, attributable to the inferior position of one of the belligerents, and the unending cycle of competition between a weapon and its counter-weapon. According to him, ‘tactics, due to countless factors, are in a constant process of transformation, both in a controlled and uncontrolled manner.’

With regard to the future, Kato, despite all his criticism and eloquent reasoning, emphasises one particular factor: Finland’s ability to field hundreds of thousands of soldiers. He quotes a statement made by a foreign military expert in 1943 on Finland’s qualitative capability of fielding an army that, while being large, was also inferior with regard to its numbers compared with its adversary and that it could not be regarded as a ‘quantité négligeable’ by a prospective invader.

After the Continuation War had ended, the national possibilities of resorting to guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities were brought into the public spotlight as Lieutenant General Reino Aaltonen published an article discussing the topic in Sotilaasaikakausilehti (a Finnish trade magazine on military issues) in 1946. Aaltonen discussed the total nature of war and the change in warfare that had taken place over the course of the Second World War, presenting his own theories regarding the issue. The article was clearly aimed at stirring discussion in Finland regarding the applicability of the means of guerrilla warfare to Finnish defensive thinking. This article defined guerrilla warfare as sabotage, reconnaissance and espionage conducted in an area under the control of the adversary and that were, at least in part, under the control of Finnish military leadership. Aaltonen also discussed the twofold nature of the examples of guerrilla warfare gained from the Second World War: ‘However, with regard to its nature and means, guerrilla warfare manifested itself in different ways, depending basically on whether it was a question of guerrilla-type activities in an enemy-occupied country, something that the defender had organised in the areas that it had lost, or, alternatively, whether guerrilla-type activities referred to operations that were closely related to operations that the invader had organised and that were conducted among a foreign and mostly hostile population.’

While nobody directly commented on or responded to the initiative proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Reino Aaltonen, a series of three articles appeared, all of which

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334 Kato, Markus P.: Sodan uudet kasvot (‘The new face of war’), Helsinki 1944, p. 13 and 34.
336 Aaltonen, Reino: Huomionoitetava sodankäynnin piirre (‘A feature of warfare that deserves attention’), Sotilaasaikakauslehti 1/1946, pp. 7–8. By training, Lieutenant Colonel Reino Aaltonen was a coastal artillery and general staff officer whose interest in guerrilla warfare was related to his interest in the literature on military history. See also Aaltonen, Reino Olavi, an extract from personal details no. 36703, KA.
bore a relationship to Aaltonen’s article. Lieutenant Niilo Nurmi337 published two articles in Sotilasaikakauslehti in 1949 on the development of Finnish guerrilla-type activities and their development during the wars waged between 1939 and 1944. In both articles, Nurmi discussed guerrilla-type activities purely from the perspective of war experiences, drawing a handful of conclusions from them in the form of recommendations. ‘Experience showed that even small guerrilla jaeger units had a good chance of succeeding, as long as the men had undergone first-rate training and, above all, knew how to handle themselves in woods. However, even for this form of warfare, there should be some sort of regulation, a book that would provide the bare minimum for training. What about new wars? They will be hardly avoidable, or any better than the previous wars. What kind of role will guerrillas play in them? I am hardly mistaken if I forecast that guerrillas will work wonders behind the front lines.’338 In addition to the previous articles, Nurmi published an article in early 1950 on the future of guerrilla-type activities. According to him, in the field of guerrilla-type activities, future wars will bring about completely new methods such as territorial guerrilla-type activities, airborne guerrillas and special equipment.339 In light of later developments, it can be said that Nurmi’s views were spot on.

In addition to articles published in trade magazines, guerrilla-type activities were also examined in a number of theses produced by students at the National General Staff College and the Army Combat School. In 1948, two theses were produced at the National General Staff College, both of which discussed repelling a great power using guerrilla warfare. In the above-mentioned theses, Captain Unto Matikainen discussed the issue from the perspective of possible guerrilla warfare, while Captain Björn Kontiopää examined the possibilities of a resistance movement resorting to guerrilla-type activities. In the introduction to his thesis, Captain Unto Matikainen provided justifications for the need to pursue further studies on the issue, particularly in view of drafting new operational plans: ‘When preparing new plans for the national defence, the need to pay attention to this issue has also become topical, and even more so as we need to identify all the means that could aid us in balancing our inferior strength resulting from our a small population and limited resources, particularly if we prepare ourselves for warding off an invasion by a great power.’340 Matikainen also extensively discussed the opportunities for guerrilla warfare availa-

337 Lieutenant Niilo Nurmi was an officer known as ‘kakkosupseeri’ (’officer 2nd class’), that is, a reserve officer who held an commission in the Defence Forces normally reserved for a career officer. See Vakinaisen väen upseeriluettelo 1.1.1947 (’The roll of officers of the regular army 1 January 1947’), Helsinki 1947, p. 3 and 165.
340 Matikainen, Unto: Sissitoiminta sodankäytännötä vastaan Suomen olosuhteissa sekä sen organisointi, varastaminen, suoritukset ja johtamisen periaatteet (’Guerrilla warfare as a form of warfare against a great power under Finnish conditions, including its organisation, the equipment of troops and the principles for the conduct and leadership of war’), a thesis produced at the National General Staff College in 1948, p. 2, SKK 1/353, KA. See also a summary of this thesis, available at Sotatieteen neuvoiluun menetettu tutkimustyöskentelma (’Study collection of the Advisory Board for the Military Science’), StietNK 1/39, KA.
ble to Finland, using factors such as the applicability of tactics, the country’s materi-
el preparedness and geographical aspects. He also discussed the role that the general population could play in possible guerrilla warfare. The most interesting aspect of the study can be found in its conclusions, in which Matikainen sums up the opportunities available to guerrilla warfare as follows: ‘Modern war, which is becoming increasingly total in nature, results in a necessity to mobilise all a nation’s all resources. The opportunities to wage a successful defensive war alone against a great power using conventional methods of warfare will always be uncertain, due to the superior human and materiel resources that the great power will be able to commit to combat.’

The question of why this issue was examined in such detail in a thesis produced at the National General Staff College remains unanswered, but judging from the way the study problem was presented and organised, thesis may have been a preparatory study commissioned by the General Headquarters, or, alternatively, it may have been inspired by a desire of the teaching staff of the National General Staff College to shake up operational thinking that was prevalent at the time.

A study completed by Captain Björn Kontionpää approached the means available to guerrilla warfare using the resistance movements of the Second World War as an example. According to Kontiopää, the means of guerrilla warfare could play a significant role, provided that guerrilla operations were conducted under proper leadership. Lone wolves among the ranks of a resistance movement taking up isolated terrorist acts would generally be caught and executed, but well-led operations that were closely linked to other military operations would, as a general rule, be more successful. Kontiopää’s conclusions were fairly consistent with those presented by Matikainen. The reason behind this was probably the fact that both officers working on their theses were students at the same time on a course arranged for staff officers, and both of them were students at the course’s general department.

theses authored by both Matikainen and Kontiopää were not without influence, with their findings and conclusions seeing serious application in teaching given at the National General Staff College in the early 1950s. After completing his own general staff officer course, Unto Matikainen remained in service at the National

341 Ibid, pp. 48–49.
342 Kontiopää, Björn: Vastarintaliikkeet toisessa maailmansodassa ja tulevaisuudessa (edellytykset, organisaatio, varustaminen, toiminta ja johtaminen (‘Resistance movements in the Second World War and in the future (their prerequisites, organisation, equipment, operations and leadership’), a thesis produced at the National General Staff College in 1948, SKK 1/362, KA.
343 Tynkkynen, Vesa: Officers who have obtained a diploma at the National General Staff College between 1924 and 1993 (appendix 3), a list included in the book Sotakorkeakoulusta Maanpuolustuskeskukseen – seitsemän vuosikymmentä 1924–1994 (‘From a National General Staff College to the National Defence University – seven decades between 1924 and 1994’), Jyväskylä 1994, p. 144.
344 See, for example, the teaching material used at the National General Staff College Sisäinen sodankäynnimuotona Suomessa (‘Guerrilla warfare as a form of warfare in Finland’), drafted by Captain U. Matikainen, Helsinki 28 February 1951. Yleisen taktiikan karttarajoitus no. 5/52, tuntien käyttösuunnitelma (‘A map exercise in general tactics no. 5/52’, the plan for using the hours’), Helsinki 1 September 1952, and a proposal by the chief of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters for the general arrangements regarding guerrilla warfare, Helsinki 3 September 1952. Vastarintaliikkeet toisessa maailmansodassa ja tulevaisuudessa (‘Resistance movements in the Second World War’), Helsinki 31 August 1952. Jorma Järventaus’ private collection, Kansio II: yleistaktiikka (‘Folder II, general tactics’), KA.
General Staff College, teaching general tactics between 1949 and 1958.\textsuperscript{345} In autumn 1952, Major Unto Matikainen planned and led, among other things, an extensive map exercise in tactics, which focused on guerrilla warfare in Northern Finland, the participants of which were the students of the ground warfare training programme of the Staff Officer Course 19 (MSL 19).\textsuperscript{346} The proportion of guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities in tactical teaching appears to have been quite significant, as a similar map exercise in guerrilla warfare with practically unchanged content remained on the curriculum for second-year students of the staff officer course until at least 1966.\textsuperscript{347} Unto Matikainen’s activity on the issue is a testimony to the fact that individual officers played an important and influential role in promoting the various aspects of guerrilla warfare, irrespective of whether the issue involved teaching, the development of tactics or the drafting of operational plans.

One who deserves a mention is Leevi Välimaa, who, while a student at the National General Staff College, studied future developments. In his thesis, entitled \textit{Tuleva sota} (‘The future war’) completed in 1948, Välimaa paints an almost Orwellian picture of future war. The recently concluded Second World War, new technology, the total nature of war, and Finland’s limited resources troubled this officer. Välimaa argued that atomic weapons would enable unchecked terror warfare. According to him, this could even be likely, commenting, \textquote{the absolutely last vestiges of humanitarian military ideology were shattered in Hiroshima.\textquote} This bleak picture of world affairs was accentuated by an attachment to his thesis, in which Välimaa categorically placed Finland in the Soviet sphere of influence. He also expected the battlefield to deepen even further. Fighting in three dimensions – vertical envelopment in effect, or strategic landings, will be part of the future war. What chance will a small country have in future war? Välimaa reasons that \textquote{defence is never hopeless; it just needs to be closely adapted to the idea to which the great powers generally adhere when making preparations for the future war.}\textsuperscript{348}

Leevi Välimaa emphasises a nation’s will to defend itself, and views this will as a qualitative factor. As the area in which battles will be fought will be deep, a territorial defence organisation must be created in peacetime, one under which the country is divided into strategic areas where the defensive battles will be fought. Further-

\textsuperscript{345} Matikainen, Unto Osvald, an extract from personal details, no. 51481, KA. \textit{Itsenäisen Suomen Kenraalikunta 1918–1996}, (‘Officers with the rank of General of independent Finland between 1918 and 1995’), bibliographies, edited by Rauno Lipponen, Porvoo 1997, pp. 262–263.

\textsuperscript{346} \textit{Yleisen taktiikan karttaharjoitus no. 5/52 opetusaineisto ja pelitilanteet liitteineen, Majuri U. Matikainen/ no.ta/ syyskuu 1952, Jorma Järventauksen yksityiskokoelma, Kansio II: yleistaktiikka, KA Yleisen taktiikan karttaharjoitus no. 5/52 opetusaineisto ja pelitilanteet liitteineen, Majuri U. Matikainen/ no.ta/ syyskuu 1952, Jorma Järventauksen yksityiskokoelma, Kansio II: yleistaktiikka, KA. A map exercise in general tactics no. 5/52, the teaching materiel and the various situations in the game, Major U. Matikainen/no no./September 1952, Jorma Järventaus private collection, Folder II: general tactics, National Archives.}

\textsuperscript{347} See also Jouko, Petteri: \textit{Sotakokenmusten hyödyntäminen kylmän sodan alussa – kohti alueellista puolustusta, artikkeli kirjassa Sotakorkeakoulun suomalainen sotakauten kehittäjänä (‘Putting the experienced gained from the war to good use at the beginning of the Cold War – towards a territorial defence system, an article in the book The National General Staff College as a developer of the Finnish art of war’) edited by Arto Kotro, Juva 2009, p. 237.}

\textsuperscript{348} Välimaa, L. K.: \textit{Tuleva sota} (‘The future war’), a thesis written at the National General Staff College in 1948, SKK 1/354, KA. See also Välimaa, Leevi Kalervo, an extract from personal details no. 46511, KA.
more, preparations must be put in place to wage a guerrilla war. In hindsight, Välimaa’s conclusions were highly interesting, considering that they date back to 1948. Välimaa encourages his readers to participate in innovative thinking along the lines suggested by the title of his thesis, justifying his arguments by reference to the state of the world in the aftermath of the Second World War and seeking to provide a picture of the future war on the basis of principles governed by causality.349 Välimaa’s bleakest predictions never materialised. A total war between the two great power blocs never broke out. Plain common sense and an awareness of the fact that both belligerents would be annihilated prevented war from breaking out. Nevertheless, the Finnish defence system continued to be developed exactly along the lines that Välimaa drafted in his thesis. The territorial defence system and territorial combat, coupled with foreign policy, created a successful formula.

In addition to the National General Staff College, guerrilla-type activities were also examined on general commander courses arranged by the Army Combat School.350. Between 1947 and 1950, three separate theses were prepared on such courses, all of them addressing guerrilla-type activities. While they paid special attention to guerrilla-type activities, they did not discuss guerrilla war or guerrilla warfare in any depth.351 From this it can be concluded that, with regard to issue related to guerrilla war, the division of labour between the National General Staff College and the Army Combat School reflected the basic division of labour in research, in which the National General Staff College focused on tactics and operational skills from the brigade and divisional level upwards, while the Army Combat School largely concentrated on tactics on the level of the battalion.

When curricula and research subjects are examined, it becomes evident that guerrilla-type activities had not been forgotten after the war. Under critical scrutiny, the content of classes and the conclusions drawn in the studies, the difficult conditions which characterised the years of the late 1940s, the changes made to the national defence, and heterogeneity caused by the lack of tactical directions are clearly highlighted. In 1949, in order to avoid the pitfalls of misunderstandings, the Infantry Office of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces drafted training instructions for the inspector of the infantry which sought to delineate more precisely individual research and experimentation tasks conducted within the infantry. Such experimentation and research highlighted not only experiences gained from Finland’s wars but also foreign examples and observations made of the training of Finnish troops. What is interesting is the fact that the very same instructions tasked the First Division (1.D) with looking into any special requirements that tactics set for warfare in

349 Ibid.
350 The Army Combat School arranged general commander courses from 1947 to 1957, after which the name was changed to the general staff officer course. The objective of these courses was to train wartime unit commanders, office chiefs of army basic formations and officers holding similar posts in peacetime, who were also capable of working as staff officers. See, for example, Taistelukoju 1927–1977 (“the Army Combat Schools”), Joensuu 1977, p. 176 and 299–301.
351 Honkaniemi, U.: Sissitoiminta ja sen torjuminen, yleisen komentajakurssin oppilastutkielma vuodelta 1948 (“Guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activities, a study written on a general commander course in 1948”), T 26077/1/i/1, KA. Seitamo, A.: Sissi- ja partisaanitoiminta, yleisen komentajakurssin oppilastutkielma vuodelta 1949 (“Guerrilla and partisan activities, a coursework produced on a general commander course in 1949”), T 26077/1/i/2, KA.
Northern Finland over the four seasons of the year. The instruction stated, by way of providing detail, that ‘in this context, special attention should be paid to guerrilla-type activities conducted by a large force under a concerted leadership.’

In the next year, training instruction 1/1950, issued by the inspector of the infantry, provided additional details on this issue and on training in general, referring to guidelines formulated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces which ordered units ‘to shift the focus of training to thinly manned defence lines and to guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare.’ According to the instructions, training in guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare was to be initiated by issuing research tasks to professional officers and NCOs, accompanied by presentations and discussions linked to the tasks in question. After providing the trainees with a basic training and giving them an overall picture of the field, instructors were to arrange map exercises, followed by experimental exercises, terrain exercises and combat exercises. The training instructions issued for 1949 and 1950 provide a partial explanation for the fact that research subjects and map exercises at military schools were geared towards guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare.

An interesting aspect regarding research is related to the gathering of war experiences and using the conclusions drawn from them in experimentation. The Defence Forces wanted to take advantage of the know-how of Major General Erkki Raappana, particularly in questions related to wilderness warfare; during the final phases of the Continuation War Raappana had, after all, gained a reputation of being a master of encirclement battles conducted in a wilderness setting. In March 1948, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces ordered Erkki Raappana to report to the inspector of the infantry in order to take up special tasks under him. Raappana was ordered to gather war experiences gained in wilderness warfare, to be used particularly in the drafting of regulations and in experimentation in particular. According to Raappana’s orders, he had to concentrate on a number of issues, one of which was to look into the way guerrilla-type activities were to be organised and implemented under varying seasons. The orders issued to Raappana were clearly linked to the plans made by the Training Division of the General Headquarters to prepare a handbook on guerrilla-type activities, part of the reform of other military

352 Jalkaväen tarkastajan koulutusohje 7/49, Ohjeita jalkaväen kehittämistä tarkoittavasta tutkimus- ja kokeilutoiminnasta (‘Training instruction issued by the inspector of the infantry 7/49. Instructions for research and experimentation which seek to develop the infantry’), PvPE:n no. 1172/Jv.tsto/ 5a/14.7.1949, T 19468/F 37, KA.
353 Jalkaväen tarkastajan koulutusohje 1/1950 (‘Training instructions issued by the inspector of the infantry 1/1950’), PvPE:n no. 649/Jv.tsto/5b1/10.3.1950, T 19468/F 52a, KA. See also PvPE:n no. 646/Jv.tsto/5b1/10.3.1950, T 22834/F 48. KA.
354 Korpisotakokemusten kerääminen, Jalkaväen tarkastajan kirjelmä Erkki Raappanalle (‘The gathering of experiences gained from wilderness warfare, a letter sent by the inspector of the infantry to Erkki Raappana’), PvPE:n no. 201/Jv.tsto/2b/16.3.1948, Raappana, Erkki Johannes, an extract from personal details no. 32877, KA.
regulations. Unfortunately it appears that Raappana failed to complete his task as he reported in October 1948, when specifically asked, that he was in the process of laying the groundwork for his survey in order to be able to start the actual work on it. The Weapons Cache Case and its aftermath ultimately led to Erkki Raappana being discharged from his commission by the President of the Republic on 30 April 1949. This decision was motivated by the public interest, and it meant that Raappana was transferred to the reserves on 5 May 1949, and his task remained uncompleted.

In order to facilitate the drafting of training instructions and the implementation of experiments on the basis of war experiences in army units, the Training Division of the General Headquarters gathered, in 1949, texts on guerrilla-type activities in order to provide background material for the drafting of training instructions. However, these writings were never made public or used by the units, as, for reason which remained unclear, they were first sent by the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters in 1950 for review. The texts on guerrilla-type activities in question comprised a number of memoranda drafted by the officers of three infantry regiments (JR 2, JR 6 and JR8), one military province (EHäm.sl.E), and one military district (Kem.Sp), discussing the question in detail and proposing examples applicable to the current conditions, albeit – again – against the background of the experiences gained from Finland’s wars. While it is impossible to say with full certainty why the texts were never published, it is evident that their use was restricted due to their sensitive content, following recommendations by the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters – after all, they categorically referred to Russia as being the enemy. In any event, the content of studies and preparatory reports on guerrilla warfare was already at the time considered to be sensitive, because they were archived, starting from the early 1950s, as documents which were labelled as a general rule as secret (sal) or secret on account of being operational in nature or discussing operational readiness (OT-sal).

The handbook on guerrilla-type activities is referred to on line 27 in the plan put forth by the Training Division of the General Headquarters. This handbook was scheduled for printing over the course of 1948, with the edition numbering 3,000 copies and the cost of printing at Sanoma Oy around 150,000 markka. See the letter by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces to the Minister of Defence, including the attachments, PvPE:n no. 987/Koul.2/25/1.3.1948, T 19467/F 21, KA.

Jaalkaväkiassaston tiedustelu liittyen erikoistehtävään (‘Reconnaissance by an infantry unit in connection with a special task’), PvPE:n no. 776/Jv.tsto/2a/12.10.1948. Erkki Raappana’s response to an enquiry by Colonel B. Ikonen on 26 October, Raappana, Erkki Johannes, an extract from personal details no. 32877, KA.


Eight in number, the texts discussed guerrilla-type activities, the composition of guerrilla jaeger units, anti-partisan operations, reconnaissance and the methods of the enemy (Russians) in deploying guerrilla jaeger units. The covering letter with attachments by the Training Division of the General Headquarters, addressed to Lieutenant General U. Kähkönen, regarding the writings on guerrilla-type activities, PvPE:n no. 814/Koul.2/8d/17.2.1950, T 19469/F 63, KA.

‘The retention of results gained from experiments conducted in connection with training in guerrilla-type activities must follow the rules set for confidential issues. The content of the reference studies can be used in the further training of officers, provided that they are linked in a proper manner to training in guerrilla war.’ PE:n no. 48/Koulsto/5 sal/7.3.1955, T 21442/F 5–6 sal, KA.
The new policy issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, and the training instruction devised by the inspector of the infantry in 1950 were observed not only by the military schools but also the divisions and the various units. As an example, K.A Heiskanen, the commander of the Second Division (2.D), ordered three of his units to arrange a war game involving three guerrilla jaeger battalions over the course of 1950. The order obligated the units to specifically address ‘techniques related to guerrilla-type activities (in a guerrilla war)’. The reasons behind K. A. Heiskanen’s enthusiasm to arrange extra war games were not only the new policy by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, as Heiskanen had already led at least two war games in his division (in 1949 and 1950), the subject of which had been guerrilla warfare, involving five guerrilla jaeger battalions.

The period between 1944 and 1952 has often been referred to as the planning period for peacetime activities. With regard to the army, the composition and territorial disposition of the Defence Forces comprised the division and brigade organisation, as well as the territorial organisation with its nine military provinces and 27 military districts, which operated in parallel to each other. This arrangement caused a whole host of problems, principally in the command chain of the various branches and arms. This is why the nominal strengths of the units were cut by making a transition to a configuration known as the training composition in 1948. The arrangement also caused several units to be merged with each other or relocated. Entire units were also disbanded.

The postwar years, up to the early 1950s, were a period of change in the Finnish art of war, characterised by developments under which new features were added to the trends that had already been in the making before the war. In this setup, reflections on the usability of guerrilla warfare or guerrilla-type activities were no exception. The soldiers were tasked with applying current trends, experiences gained from the previous wars and available resources to tactical thinking, ensuring that the chapters of the Paris Peace Treaty and the spirit of the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance were honoured, using all available means in this process. However, the postwar years played an important role in theoretical thinking on the art of war, and this was the period when the groundwork for the future defence system was laid. A shift towards territorial thinking began to take shape, and the means available to guerrilla warfare and its practicability were highlighted.

The intensive development of the territorial defence system in the 1950s

The Defence Forces, saddled with a polarised defensive obligation, forced them to devise operational plans for two completely opposed scenarios – an invasion from the east and from the west. Without going into detail regarding such threat scenari-
os, which have already been discussed in a number of works,\textsuperscript{363} it can be stated that Finland’s strategic thinking was based on the idea that Finland would commit to the defence of its territory should an invasion be directed at Finland or at the Soviet Union through Finland. This threat scenario, which was in line with the spirit of the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, theoretically meant that operative planning was aimed at repelling an attack from the West, although, in practice, the real threat scenario, kept in secrecy, was completely the opposite. A memorandum drafted by the Operations Division of the General Headquarters in 1950 expressed this idea in terms of territorial thinking as follows: ‘As warfare is becoming increasingly total in nature, and as military operations would be fought in an area that extends deep into the interior of the Finnish territory, a system known as territorial defence has been selected to form the basis of wartime leadership.’\textsuperscript{364} Initially, the principle of territorial defence was not applied to the tactical level, and defence was based on fighting on a conventional front line with associated counter-attacks. During the 1950s, requests for territorial thinking were gradually extended to cover fighting operations as well, as observations made of the difficulties of initiating battles and defending the rear area provided strong support for this.\textsuperscript{365}

In September 1951, the General Headquarters issued an order to one peacetime division and some military provinces and units to draft defensive plans.\textsuperscript{366} From autumn 1951 until spring 1952, the arrangements and operational principles of the territorial defence system were debated within the Defence Forces. This debate was not confined to the General Headquarters; the grounds for territorial defence were discussed at a monthly meeting of the Finnish Society of Military Sciences and at other similar meetings. A discussion event aimed at general staff officers, arranged in February 1952, had a theme linked to territorial defence. Chief of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters Leo Sauramo, spoke before the audience on ‘the principles of territorial defence.’\textsuperscript{367}

Sauramo’s introduction fuelled intense debate among the audience, drawing comments such as the following: ‘Even under a territorial system, there is no need to abandon a static defence line, as long as such a line is necessary from a wider perspective. Actually, this is how the issue has been approached. As a matter of fact, territorial defence requires that the defenders stay put even more doggedly than before, as not even deep breakthroughs or landings of airborne troops in our rear areas should normally be a cause for a large-scale retreat or a major straightening


\textsuperscript{364} Ibid. See also PvPE:n no.11/Op-os/ .3.1950 (Yleissuunnitelma puolustusvalmistojen käynnistämisestä varten (‘A general plan for defence preparations’)), T 21622/4, KA.


\textsuperscript{366} PvPE:n no. 152/Op.1/11 b sal/17.9.1951, T 26862/D1 OT-sal, KA.

\textsuperscript{367} The minutes of the monthly meeting of the Finnish Society of Military Sciences, held on 5 February 1952, Pk 2610/8, KA.
of the front line. Combat is not a question of holding territory but of annihilating the enemy’s human resources. We should engage in combat in a terrain that favours us, using the Finnish method of fighting. In an open terrain, we would only meet defeat in the face of the enemy’s superior strength.’ Furthermore, there was a concern that ‘under the proposed territorial defence system, areas would tie up too many troops in advance, which would limit their free use and lead to the dispersal of forces and shortage of troops.’ Sauramo responded to this comments, stating, ‘that this would be a misunderstanding. While the principles governing the use of troops would not change, efforts would be taken to create an unambiguous leadership organisation within the framework of responsibility areas. This is the core issue.’

A territorial approach which represented a novel thinking in the art of war aroused emotions, as it, as such, had not yet evolved into a clear-cut, readily understandable and immediately adoptable principle.

In addition to a discussion event arranged by the Finnish Society of Military Sciences, debate surged back and forth, apparently going on for months, particularly between two colonels at the General Headquarters, Lauri Haanterä and Sauramo. As the debate showed no signs of abating, the new chief of the Operations Division, Colonel T. V. Viljanen, drafted a memorandum in 1952 for the chief of the Training Division, T. V. Viljanen. This memorandum provided a clear-cut description of the military chain of command, on the basis of which ‘territorial defence’ was proposed to form the foundation for Finland’s defence arrangements. Territorial defence sought, above all, to make the chain of command expedient, and to form a system under which the country was divided into areas which were under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief and which took account of the strategic and operational considerations. The commander of each area – the commander of an army or an independent army corps – would lead all the defensive preparations and military operations in his area.

The need for a territorial defence system was justified by the technical development and deployment on a massive scale of great powers’ air forces, by improved and modern performance of landing equipment, by the increased speed and power brought about by the development and motorisation of armoured units, and by the changes in warfare. These trends increasingly pointed towards abandoning conventional front lines. The memorandum emphasised that territorial national defence by no means entailed a passive approach to actual operations. The objective was ‘to destroy the enemy that had invaded the country.’ According to Viljanen, a territorial defence system with its clear-cut chains of command ‘will enable the concentration of all available forces within a single, fairly large area for the achievement of the set target.’ In forming responsibility areas, certain operational, economic and administrative requirements, as well as requirements set by the civil defence, must be taken into consideration. Should an area of responsibility face a situation in which all communication between it and the

368 Ibid.
369 PvPE:n no. 165/Op.1/11 a/15.4.1952 (Alueellisen maanpuolustuksen järjestely- ja toimintaperiaatteita) (‘Principles of arranging territorial defence and putting it to good use’), T 20169/F 90, KA See also Viljanen, Tauno Viktor, an extract from personal details no. 48713, KA. Sauramo, Leo, an extract from personal details no. 24328, KA.
370 Ibid.
High Command is lost, the military organisation responsible for the area is obligated to continue its tasks using all available means.371

The most important conclusion drawn from Viljanen’s presentation was the fact that a territorial defence system in itself would not change the basic principles of the Finnish way of waging war. By dividing the Finnish territory into responsibility areas and by organising a chain of command, prerequisites for a flexible defensive battle waged across the entire area, the effective protection of the rear areas, and ‘operations carried out by small separate units — even guerrilla jaeger units — under a single leadership’ could be created. In this context, according to Viljanen, military operations will turn ‘in certain areas into warfare that will have the nature of guerrilla-type activities and that will culminate in a resistance movement that will resort to all available means.’372 Behind this principle of combat, a new notion of warfare can be discerned, one in which war has become even more total in nature and that no longer makes any distinction between battlefield and home front. Not even deep breakthroughs by the enemy should be a cause for a large-scale retreat or to the straightening of front lines, as yielding large swaths of territory would only mean losing the space that the operational freedom of Finnish troops and the supply chain required.

After a short and intensive planning period, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, General Aarne Sihvo, approved the plans in June 1952. When the operative plan was turned into operational order no. 8, it was given the code name of ‘Polttoainehankinta’ (‘The acquisition of fuel’). With regard to the principles of the territorial defence system, the operational order reflected fairly faithfully the content of T. V. Viljanen’s memorandum. Poltttoainehankinta also provided homogeneous principles for the use of troops and their composition, which were the peacetime composition (RA-kokoonpano), reinforcement composition (T-kokoonpano), covering troop composition (SU-kokoonpano), and the full wartime composition (TSA-composition).373 The principles of use and tasks of the troops were largely in line with their composition names. For the maintenance of internal security, the peacetime composition (RA-kokoonpano) would be used, in so far as a transition to the composition in which troops were reinforced from the army reserves (T-kokoonpano) was not deemed necessary. Troops reinforced to meet the requirements set for T-kokoonpano were aimed at maintaining internal order and protecting Finland’s neutrality. Safeguarding Finland’s neutrality — the local defence of Finland’s borders — was a task intended for the SU-kokoonpano. A transition to the full wartime composition would have meant in practice the reinforcement of the army to the level of its maximum nominal strength, something that was planned to be achieved either directly from the peacetime composition (RA-kokoonpano), or, alternatively, via the route of other compositions.374

371 Ibid.
372 Ibid.
374 Ibid.
A more detailed establishment chart was completed over the course of 1953. With regard to guerrilla troops, the plans from 1954 for the wartime composition – the establishment chart (PTL) – the troops of the first priority class of the High Command, the covering composition, no longer contained guerrilla jaeger battalions. Quite evidently, the idea was to cut the number of guerrilla troops placed directly under the High Command, in line with the new operation order, from the six guerrilla jaeger battalions in the 1950 establishment chart to the three battalions in the 1951 chart and further down to two battalions in the 1954 PTL. However, this planning did not reflect the real situation, as the six Frontier Guards were tasked with establishing a large number of unspecified troops, named after the peacetime names of the Frontier Guards, which included guerrilla jaeger battalions and other elements of the covering force intended for guerrilla-type activities.

This new model for defence received a more official approval in 1953, as the third volume of *Upseerin käsikirja* (‘Officer’s handbook’) dedicated one subchapter to it. In the definition of the model, Finland was divided into areas, the command echelons of which were tasked to make and implement all preparations related to national defence in their areas and to lead military operations in accordance with instructions issued by the government and the General Headquarters. *Polttoaineenbankinta* (‘The acquisition of fuel’) was the first operational plan based on the principle of territorial defence; this plan was revised in 1957 and 1958.

In late 1952, the Finnish military system underwent a reorganisation which sought to bring all the troops and the various branches under a more homogeneous territorial command structure. In practical terms, this reform entailed significant changes to the peacetime organisation of the Finnish Defence Forces. Divisions were turned into regional echelons of command, with the brigade being confirmed to be the army’s basic formation. The practical implementation of the reform retained a framework of three divisions and the troops directly under them, supplemented by one armoured brigade, which had also been in the previous organisational chart. The territorial organisation was changed to comprise seven military provinces and 27 military districts. In connection with this, the anti-aircraft artillery branch was detached from the air force and the coastal artillery from the navy, and these were included in the army. At the beginning of 1957, the names of units of the Defence

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375 PE:n no.77, Su-kokoonpannon kuuluvat I kiireellisyysluokan joukot 31.7.1954 (‘The troops of the first priority category in the covering troop composition, 31, July 1954’), T 26842/Bb 3 sal, KA. See also PE:n no. 79/Lkptsto/OT/10 e 2 sal/24.2.1955, T 26843/F 6 OT-sal, KA.
377 *Upseerin käsikirja III*, (‘Officer’s handbook III’), Helsinki 1953, pp. 6–8.
379 *Aseis puolustuslaitoksesta, Suomen Asetuskokoelma* (‘Decree on the Military System, The Statute Book of Finland’) no. 358/30.10.1952, KA.
380 The name of *Kevyt prikaati* (‘Light Brigade’) was changed to *Panssariprikaati* (‘Armoured Brigade’) in 1952.
381 Salminen, Pekka: *Puolustussivumien rauhanajan organisointuun kehittyminen 5.9.1944–1.7.1966,* (‘The development of the peacetime organisation of the Defence Forces between 5 September 1944 and 1 July 1966, a separate study, the research data base of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University’), no identifier, Helsinki 1988, pp. 129–130.
Forces reflecting the provincial names were reintroduced. The principal objective of the reintroduction of regional names was to bring the Defence Forces closer to the population of the recruiting area and, simultaneously, the entire nation. While old traditional names were used in most cases, new names with a link to a particular unit’s province were also used, in order to strengthen the units’ regional identity.382

Experiences gained from the war, a time characterised by shortage of goods, and a need to modernise defence solutions led to the adoption of territorial responsibility areas. Reflecting the total nature of war, the Defence Forces wanted to create military provinces that would be better suited for collaboration with the civil society in a crisis situation. The military provinces were required to be capable of engaging independently in combat. Reorganisation was based on the principle of territorial defence, the gradual introduction of which led to significant changes in the military command and control system from the 1950s onwards. Although territorial defence emerged as a concept as far back as in the early 1950s, its wider significance was not understood at the time in the same sense as it came to be understood in the late 1960s. However, many parts of the Defence Forces were involved in furthering the development work. A map exercise arranged for a general commander course of the Army Combat School in 1956 provided valuable information on the shortcomings of a defence system based on the traditional front line. Calculations carried out by the National General Staff College between 1956 and 1958 also indicated that no defensive position or line could withstand an attack by an adversary using strong firepower, armoured units and airborne troops. The main weaknesses of the defender were inferior firepower, lack of operational mobility and vulnerable rear areas. To compensate for such weaknesses, a territorial combat model was adopted, under which guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare were seen to play a major role.383

An assessment prepared by the Operations Division of the General Headquarters in February 1956 stated that operational circumstances set a number of requirements for the development of the tactics of the various branches, equipment and methods. The overarching objective was to repel the attacks of an invading enemy on land, in the air and at sea. The enemy was always found to be superior in numbers, materiel and firepower on land, in the air and at sea, across the entire theatre of war. When assessing the enemy’s operating methods, its possibility to deploy the atomic weapons had to be taken into account as a new factor. With regard to combat operations carried out by the covering force, the mobility of the troops should be improved, and the troops should take advantage of surprise action everywhere where opportunities to such action became available. Surprise action could be supported by blowing up bridges, by conducting large-scale countermobility activities in considerable depth, and by resorting to guerrilla-type activities. ‘However, the superior strength of the enemy may prevent our troops from engaging in regular delaying action in certain areas. Should this

382 PE:n käskyylehti 5/12.12.1956 (‘Circular order issued by the General Headquarters), käskyylettikokoelma (‘The collection of circular orders’), KA.
be the case, the defender must resort to guerrilla warfare, conducted possibly across a very large area, thereby enabling the defender to carry out its tasks that would otherwise be impossible to accomplish.384 Against this background, considering probable circumstances, the conclusions drawn by the General Headquarters become intelligible.

In light of the above, the early years of the 1950s represented the first steps towards the development of a territorial defence system, the significance of which, in hindsight, was the reform of the strategic-level reform of the defence system. Although many aspects of the military threat scenario were given more detail during the late 1950s, the means available to guerrilla warfare had been integrated into a new kind of defensive thinking and the art of war.385 The methods of guerrilla warfare and the opportunities available to their utilisation aroused increased interest among Finnish officers. A surprise attack began to displace the prospect of a large-scale nuclear war.

Discussion and reflection on, and influences gained from, the opportunities open to guerrilla warfare

Postwar discussion on war experiences was not confined to the late 1940s; as a matter of fact, it continued into the 1950s. Perhaps the most extensive collection of war experiences that was compiled after the war can be found in the archives of the Training Division of the General Headquarters of the Defence Forces.386 Although memoranda on war experiences can be found in the various archives, broken down by the body that compiled the archive, war experiences were discussed at units, at military schools and at training events for officers. One of the forums of this kind of discussion was the monthly meetings of the Finnish Society of Military Sciences, at which officers discussed and debated, often using a critical tone, questions related to the art of war and war experiences.387

An indication of the significance of such meetings was the fact that officers who had participated in the Winter and Continuation War, representing both generals and less senior officers, participated in them on a fairly regular basis. Such meeting sought to provide a forum for general staff officers, enabling them to discuss trends of the contemporary art of war and to discuss — from a variety of perspectives — the changes that were taking place in the postwar Defence Forces. However, discussion topics were often related to experiences gained from Finland’s wars and their applicability to the art of war when solving future problems. Events were well prepared and well organised. A specifically appointed officer introduced the topic of the meeting to the participants, after which participants took the floor, providing their comments in the order determined by the chair of the meeting. Until 1955, 384 PE:n no. 20/Opstto/OT 11 e sal/10.2.1956, no entry number /OT 10 b 1 sal, KA.
386 See the collection compiled by PvPE (‘The General Headquarters of the Finnish Defence Forces’) of the experiences of war in 1945, T 18002/8–13, KA.
387 Karjalainen, Mikko: ‘Sotiemme kokemukset osittavat’ – Sotatieteilinen Seura yleissikuntapseekseiden keskusteluyöyminen (‘The experiences gained from Finland’s wars indicate that... – the Finnish Society of Military Sciences as a discussion forum for general staff officers’), an article in Tiede ja Ase 70, Helsinki 2012, pp. 165–174.
meetings were chaired by General Erik Heinrichs. His successor in this role was Lieutenant General Uolevi Poppius. Detailed minutes were kept of each meeting, recording the names of the participants and their comments. The minutes also recorded all dissenting opinions and comments, an indication of the fact that in a close circle, discussion was fairly free and did not depend on the rank of participants. The material used at discussion meetings – presentations and minutes – were archived for later use. The presentations and recorded discussions of monthly meetings evidently reached – indirectly – a substantial number of other soldiers, as the general staff officers who participated in such meetings propagated the ideas put forth at meetings to a wider audience within the Defence Forces. The impact of the meetings was also accentuated by the fact that the participation rate was high. The topics discussed at the monthly meeting included, among other things, the experiences gained from guerrilla warfare, guerrilla-type activities, and opportunities available to the application of guerrilla warfare tactics. Of the total of 77 monthly meetings, two exclusively addressed guerrilla warfare or guerrilla-type activities. However, many introductions and comments to them at meetings indirectly addressed guerrilla war-related issues.

At a monthly meeting in December 1950, an introduction given by Major Björn Kontiopää addressed the operations of resistance movements during the Second World War; he also speculated on the success of similar movements in the future. A total of 60 general staff officers participated in this event, with Lieutenant General Harald Öhquist, among others, taking the floor and commenting in introduction. Kontiopää discussed the various resistance movements and their methods, basing his presentation on experiences gained from wars and arguing that such movements could play a role in future wars as well.

In March 1951, the first meeting focusing solely on guerrilla warfare was arranged, with Captain Unto Matikainen giving an introduction entitled ‘Guerrilla warfare as a form of warfare in Finland’. General Heinrichs, who chaired the meeting, addressed the meeting after Matikainen’s introduction, summing up the issue and drawing attention to the extreme nature of guerrilla warfare. ‘Guerrilla warfare can be resorted to only as a last-ditch effort, in a situation in which the regular forces are no longer capable of affecting the fate of our nation. Guerrilla warfare is a double-edged sword, as the casualties inflicted on the enemy may also lead to a situation in which the Finnish population would be subjected to suffering. Further details are provided in the following notes:
However, it should be noted that maintaining stable leadership over guerrilla war operations would be very difficult. Once started, the High Command might lose control over guerrilla war. As for the international law regarding guerrilla warfare, we should note that while guerrilla warfare under certain conditions may meet the criteria of the international law, it is the outcome that would be decisive. The victorious party would interpret the legal aspects as it pleased. 393

Guerrilla-type activities were discussed at a meeting in November 1956, with Major Olavi Kaakinen giving an introduction on ‘the possibilities and tasks of guerrilla-type activities in current Finnish conditions.’ In the discussion following the presentation, Colonel Valo Nihtilä commented on experiences gained from guerrilla-type activities in a critical tone ‘if we had had a functional guerrilla organisation that the introducer referred to in his presentation in our previous wars, we would undoubtedly have fared a great deal better, both in the Winter and the Continuation War. It is another matter whether we would be in a position to perform mobilisation any longer, as politicians will leave all such measures to the last possible moment. In this context, we must also take into consideration all the surprises that the enemy might attempt to utilise, regarding both time and methods. Therefore, we should perhaps study guerrilla warfare and think of it as the second form of fighting. Particularly encouraging examples of this have been gained from battles in Indochina and North Africa. One of the key prerequisites for such operations would be the availability of first-rate communications equipment, something that should be the priority in materiel procurement.’ 394 A particularly noteworthy point in Nihtilä’s comments was his references to foreign examples of guerrilla-type activities, which, apparently, were closely scrutinised by Finnish officers.

Another commentator to Olavi Kaakinen’s introduction drew attention to the importance of guerrilla-type activities and, in particular, the inadequate arrangements for the training in guerrilla-type activities. Major General Erkki Kukkonen brought up Valo Nihtilä’s role as an advocate of guerrilla-type activities and tactics. ‘Colonel Nihtilä, while working as a teacher of general tactics at the National General Staff College, strongly advocated the idea of guerrilla-type activities and also stood by his convictions during the war. Today, we can say that his work has come to fruition.’ Lieutenant Colonel Kauko Pöyhönen emphasised the significance of training in his commentary. With regard to training in guerrilla-type activities, what is particularly important is the training provided for leaders. Also, it should be considered that training in guerrilla-type activities be provided on the largest possible scale.’ Sakari Simelius, concluding the meeting, commented that ‘while we must see the opportunities available to us in guerrilla-type activities in the right light, we also must to avoid exaggerating our own capabilities. The objective, albeit a distant one, is nevertheless clear – each and every one must be capable of taking up guerrilla activities.’ 395 This concluding statement by Simelius is in particular is interesting, as it suggests that, evidently, preliminary objectives for the role of guerrilla-type activities had already been set.

It should be mentioned that all officers giving presentations at the meetings of the Finnish Society of Military Sciences were well versed in their respective topics, not only by virtue of their war experiences but also by their research interests, as themes

393 The minutes of the monthly meeting of the Finnish Society of Military Sciences, held on 6 March 1951, Pk 2610/7, KA.
394 The minutes of the monthly meeting of the Finnish Society of Military Sciences, held on 6 November 1956, Pk 2610/13, KA.
395 Ibid.
or their presentations reflected almost without exception the subject matter of their theses that they had completed at the National General Staff College or on general commander courses.\footnote{Kontiopää (1948), SKK 1/362, KA. Matikainen (1948), SKK 1/353, KA. Kaakinen, Olavi: Vihollisen sissiosastojen takaa-ajo kesällä ja talvella viivyttävän AK:n kaistalla kun vallanosa on surmatun, yleisen komentajakurssin oppilaanoppisertutkimus vuodelta 1955 (“The pursuit of enemy guerrilla jaeger units in summer and winter in the sector of an Army Corps that is engaged in delaying action in a situation in which the adversary is a great power; a thesis prepared by a student officer on a general commander course in 1955”), T 26077/1/i/22, KA. See also Olavi Aleksander, an extract from personal details no. 55644, KA.}

Texts and studies on guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities between 1951 and 1960

The military threat scenario that had changed and that was in a constant state of flux brought guerrilla warfare, in a novel way and in a fashion that was more convincing than ever before, into public debate. Public comments and invitations to discussion by officers between 1951 and 1960 were a case apart, embracing conflicts in opinions regarding guerrilla-type activities. However, public discussion on guerrilla warfare on a broader scale was considered to be too sensitive in terms of Finland’s foreign policy, leading to a situation in which the content of texts was cautious, general in tone or only comprised summaries of reflections reduced to their bare bones. However, a small number of articles were published as it became evident that Finland’s defence doctrine needed reforming over the course of the 1950s. Such texts were not confined to \textit{Sotilasaikakauslehti} alone.

Lieutenant Niilo Nurmi, who had written on guerrilla warfare in the late 1940s, published an article in 1951 in \textit{Sotilasaikakauslehti} on the pursuit and annihilation of guerrilla and partisan troops. While Nurmi – again – discussed guerrilla-type activities in light of the experiences that Finland had gained from its wars, his lengthy article was surprisingly future-orientated considering themes of his previous texts. Nurmi also referred to examples of guerrilla-type activities gained from the Korean War that was in progress at the time. While expressing his strong opinion on the effects of the Paris Peace Treaty on Finland’s defence capability and on the deplorable state of guerrilla training, using language that was exceptionally bold against the general background of the era, Nurmi assumed a softer tone in his final statement. “The description that I have attempted to conjure up is cursory only, but I do not feel that I am in a position where I could provide a more detailed account. Many details that need further clarification must be kept from the public, at least until we have managed to take all the advantage that they offer. Other small states have formed security troops and similar to ensure their safety. Why have we not? We do not need them because...!!!”\footnote{Nurmi, Niilo: \textit{Sissi- ja partisaanjoukkojen takaa-ajo ja tuhoaminen} (“The pursuit and annihilation of guerrilla and partisan troops”), Sotilasaikakauslehti 3/1951, pp. 93–101.} While the meaning of Nurmi’s last elliptic sentence is anybody’s guess, it clearly communicated the frustration felt by an officer with regard to the credibility of Finland’s defensive capabilities and to the fate of a small country becoming a casualty in a competition between great powers.
The article by Niilo Nurmi was followed by a few years’ silence, and it was not until 1955 that guerrilla-related issues were brought up for discussion again. That year, Captain Aatos Savunen autored two articles on guerrilla warfare, both of which discussed guerrilla warfare in a global context. The first article, *Sissisodasta* (‘On guerrilla warfare’), opened with a high-quality discussion on the differences and internal relationship between guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities. According to Savunen, guerrilla-type activities were one aspect of regular warfare. With regard to guerrilla warfare, Savunen regarded it as a special form of warfare in which guerrilla-type activities took the most important role. As an example of guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities, Savunen took up guerrilla wars fought in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Indochina, as the experiences gained from them were most recent and, therefore, provided the best picture of modern fighting methods. Compared to Nurmi, Savunen employs a style that is considerably more restrained and cautious, although he concluded his article by stating that the opportunities offered by guerrilla warfare were worth considering.\(^398\) The other article by Savunen focused on guerrilla warfare in the Soviet Union during the Second World War.\(^399\) Judging from his article, Savunen was well versed in the Soviet art of war and, in particular, in the partisan movement during the Second World War. While Savunen continued to explore questions related to guerrilla warfare\(^400\), public writing on the issue ended with the publication of this article.

However, the theses and coursework prepared at the military schools provide a rich debate on guerrilla-related issues. Over the course of the 1950s, a total of eight theses were prepared in Finland, all of which had a direct bearing on guerrilla-related issues. Of these, the most central were the studies conducted by Martti Vinari, Georg Ahonen, Eero Naapuri, Urho Leskinen, and Paavo Ilmola, who drafted a separate study entitled *Sissisota, sen edellytykset ja sodankäynnin suuntaviivat* (‘Guerrilla warfare, its prerequisites and the guidelines for warfare’).\(^401\) All the above-mentioned studies shared the fact that their objectives and research problems — to discuss the possibilities of using guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities in Finland — had clearly been defined either by the General Headquarters or the teacher staff of the National General Staff College. These studies exhibited interesting details concerning the definition of concepts. According to Martti Viinari, ‘guerrilla-type activities are understood to


\(^400\) Savunen, Aatos: *Sissisota – tulevaisuuden sota?* (‘Guerrilla warfare – a war of the future?’), a study prepared for the Finnish Society of Military Sciences in 1959, StietNK 1/53, KA. See also Savunen, Aatos Päiviö, an extract from personal details no: 46375, KA.

\(^401\) Vinari, Martti: *Sissitoiminta, sen suoritusmahdollisuudet ja järjestely saastoisamme sovellustavoitteiden vahvistusa* (‘Guerrilla-type activities, opportunities to them and their arrangement in our archipelago illustrated with examples of applications’), a thesis produced at the National General Staff College in 1952, SKK 1/548, KA. Ahonen, Georg: *Miten sissikohtaus olisi järjestettävä rauhan aikanan* (‘How should training in guerrilla activities be organised in peacetime?’), a thesis produced at the National General Staff College in 1954, SKK 1/582 KA. Naapuri, Eero: *Sissijoukkojen huolto meidän olosuhteissa* (‘The supply of guerrilla troops in our conditions’), a thesis produced at the National General Staff College in 1956, SKK 1/653 KA. Leskinen, Urho: *Armeijakunnan ja prikaatin sisitoiminta* (‘Guerrilla-type activities within the framework of an army corps and a brigade’), a thesis produced at the National General Staff College in 1958, SKK 1/693 KA. Ilmola (1958), T 26965/F 20 sal, KA. See also Ilmola, Paavo, an extract from personal details no:45233, KA.
constitute a form of fighting that is linked to regular military operations and that is carried out within the general framework of our defence arrangements.' Paavo Ilmola took the issue even further in his definition of concepts. ‘Guerrilla-type activities are a form of fighting in which armed guerrilla troops engage. They typically comprise different combat, demolition and reconnaissance tasks and often the spreading of propaganda and the provision of information.’ Comparison of the two definitions reveals that that of Ilmola’s in particular expanded on the dimensions of the art of war and the versatility of tactical means.

However, between 1951 and 1960, most studies related to guerrilla warfare were produced on general commander courses, infantry captain courses and officers’ intelligence courses at the Army Combat School. An examination of the list of theses reveals that the Army Combat School was a veritable ‘research centre of guerrilla-type activities’, with a total of 49 studies with a link to guerrillas having been prepared in the 1950s. As a general rule, theses were brief – approximately 20 to 40 pages in length – the quality of which varied greatly from one author to another. However, a number of high-quality studies can be found, of which those authored by Martti Avela, Toivo Hannila, Olavi Kaakinen, Unto Korhonen and Viktor Platan deserve a mention. The emphasis placed on the study of guerrilla-type activities can easily be linked to the enthusiasm and ideas of Veikko Koppinen, who was the deputy leader of the Army Combat School at the time.

With regard to other studies, a number of separate studies prepared with the support of the Finnish Society of Military Sciences deserve a mention, with several of them exhibiting high quality and meeting the criteria to be set for scholarly work. As a general rule, these studies were archived in the collection of studies of the Advisory Board for the Military Science (StietNK), kept at the National Archives.

Captain Unto Matikainen authored a study entitled Sissisota sodankäyntimuotona Suomessa, (‘Guerrilla warfare as a form of warfare in Finland’) which was presented at a monthly meeting of the Society in 1951. Matikainen’s study was based on theses he completed as a student officer on a general commander course in 1951. An extensive and meritorious study by Major Aatos Savunen dating back to 1958, entitled Sissisota – tulevaisuudenka sota? (‘Guerrilla war – a war of the future?’), provided an exhaustive

402 Vinari (1952), p. 2, SKK 1/548, KA. See also Vinari, Martti Johannes, an extract from personal details no. 20679, KA.
403 Ilmola (1958), p. 6, T 26965/F 20 sal, KA.
404 Avela, Martti: Sisiiominta ja -sota erikoisesti maamme etelä- ja keskiosassa, (‘Guerrilla-type activities and warfare, especially in the southern part and in the interior of Finland, a study prepared by a student officer on a general commander course in 1951’), T 26077/1/i/4, KA. Hannila, Toivo: Sisiiominta – sissisota, (‘Guerrilla-type activities – guerrilla warfare, a study prepared by a student officer on a general commander course in 1953’), T 26077/1/i/8, KA. Kaakinen (1955), T 26077/1/1/22, KA. Korhonen, Unto: Sisiiomintaan tukentava puolustus, (‘A defence based on guerrilla-type activities, a study prepared by a student officer on a general commander course in 1957’), T 26077/1/i/28, KA. Platan, Viktor: Mahdollisuutemme sisissotaan, (‘Our opportunities for waging a guerrilla war, a study prepared by a student officer on a staff officer course in 1958’), T 26077/1/i/40, KA.
405 See, for example, StietNK 1/39, 42 and 63, KA.
406 Matikainen, Unto: Sissisota sodankäyntimuotona Suomessa (‘Guerrilla warfare as a form of warfare in Finland’), StietNK 1/39, KA. Cf. also Matikainen (1948), SKK 1/353, KA. The minutes of the monthly meeting of the Finnish Society of Military Sciences, held on 06/03/1951, Pk 2610/7, KA.
discussion of guerrilla warfare in the international context and its possible application under Finnish conditions. This 134-page study demonstrated Savunen’s serious attitude towards his subject and his scholarly familiarity with the topic. In this context, Savunen’s thoughts concerning the impact of atomic weapons on the means available to guerrilla warfare deserve attention. ‘It appears that atomic weapons force even those countries that possess no such weapons to adopt and apply the forms of fighting that characterise guerrilla warfare. As for small nations that do not possess the latest military technology, principally the means of transport that facilitate mobility, let alone atomic weapons, the adoption of the means of guerrilla warfare is nothing less than mandatory if they really intend to put up resistance.’ Again, this study, like so many others, referred to the Soviet Union’s invasion capability and Finland’s actual chances of defending itself against a great power. The conclusions drawn by Aatos Savunen and Paavo Ilmola—who was mentioned above—in the late 1950s on guerrilla warfare were noteworthy in the national context, and they were later put to good use in many ways, including their use as background material for the Guerrilla Tactics Committee that functioned from 1961 to 1963.

4.2. Guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare

Wartime needs lent vigour to training in guerrilla-type activities

By the early 1950s, the Defence Forces realised that, in addition to discussing guerrilla warfare and clarifying the concepts related to it, practical measures were also required. A particular problem—recognised during the war—was created by a lack of personnel with training in guerrilla-type activities and an understanding of its basic principles. Although units formed of volunteers were put through crash courses on guerrilla-type activities while battles were already raging, the results achieved were not promising. After operational planning was restarted in the late 1940s, the problems related to the provision of training in guerrilla tactics and the principles governing the use of guerrilla troops remained unsolved.

Aarne Sihvo, Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, issued an order at the end of 1949 on the major training themes for 1950, listing a thinly manned defence, guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare as such themes. The first phase of this training order addressed the need to improve the professional skills of the professional officers and NCOs in unconventional forms of fighting. Thereby, the skills acquired by the regular staff would be transferred for use in the training of conscripts.  

407 Savunen, Aatos: Sissiota – tulevaisuudenka sota? (‘Guerrilla warfare – a war of the future?’), a study prepared for the Finnish Society of Military Sciences in 1959, StietNK 1/53, KA, p. 134. See also Savunen, Aatos Päiviö, an extract from personal details no.46375, KA. Cf. the general tactical policy adopted by the General Headquarters regarding the relevance of the atomic weapon. PE:n no. 136/Ohjeststo/8b sal/16.5.1957, T 25094/F 5 sal, KA. PE:n no. 80/Ohjeststo/8b sal/11.4.1956, T 21442/F 7 sal, KA.  
409 The addition of guerrilla-type activities to the training of conscripts in the late 1940s was regarded as next to impossible if the other training objectives were to be achieved. Tynkkynen (1996), p. 341.
scripts of all units. The inspector of the infantry also commented on the training instructions issued for guerrilla-type activities, ordering that that practical training intended for regular personnel must be initiated at the operational level of each brigade. What is peculiar in this setup is the fact that, in reality, guerrilla-type activities, guerrilla warfare and guerrilla war had not yet been examined from the perspective of the art of war, let alone that a distinction would have been made between them. Theoretical reflection was still in its infancy when the order on the initiation of training in guerrilla-type activities was issued.

However, the order issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces was quite cursory, providing mostly general guidelines for the topics of which training was to be provided. Detailed instructions for the organisation of training in guerrilla-type activities were still missing. For this reason, the Operations Division of the General Headquarters submitted a request to the chief of the Training Division, requesting the Training Division to provide clarifying details on the orders by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, as the Frontier Guard organisation had been tasked with transforming the frontier guards into frontier guard battalions and assigning the cadre to guerrilla jaeger battalions formed by the Defence Forces on a territorial basis. In other words, guerrilla jaeger battalions were to be formed of reservists trained by the Frontier Guard. In order to enable the Frontier Guards to gear the training that they provided towards wartime requirements, urgent instructions regarding the content of the guerrilla training were requested. The Operations Division of the General Headquarters was also concerned about the content of training in guerrilla-type activities, noting that it should not be confined to operations carried out in the wilderness alone but also take account of large-scale guerrilla warfare conducted in populated areas under concerted leadership. The importance of collaboration between the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard in the training was also highlighted: ‘It is also desirable that the further training of the professional officers and NCOs of the Defence Forces should be developed and, if possible, carried out in close operation with the Frontier Guard.’

The Training Division of the General Headquarters reacted quickly to the request, with the chief of the section sending, in April 1951, a covering letter and a ten-page memorandum for review by the Infantry Division of the General Headquarters. The memorandum was divided into the requirements set for personnel engaging in guerrilla-type activities, the objectives to be achieved by training and its implementation, broken down by personnel group, and the time needed for training and the possibilities for its implementation. According to the memorandum, the provision of guerrilla training to officer candidates, students on cadet courses, company officers, as well as to captains and majors should begin in autumn 1951, and to the professional

410 Jalkaväen tarkastajan koulutusohje 1/1950 (‘Training instructions issued by the inspector of the infantry 1/1950’), PwPE no. 649/Jv.ts/to/5b1/10.3.1950, T 19468/F 52a, KA. See also PwPE no. 646/Jv.ts/to/5b1/10.3.1950, T 22834/F 48, KA.
411 Rajavartiostojen koulutus, PwPE Operatiivisen osaston kirje koulutusosaston päällikölle 15.2.1951 (‘Training at the Frontier Guards, a letter by the Operations Division to the chief of the Training Division, dated 15 February 1951’), T 20239/F 1sal, KA. See also Iskanius, Markku: Kainuun Prikaatin historia 1626–2012 – Nelivuosisaamin taival Savon rykmentistä nykyaikaistettä taloustryhmäksi (‘The history of the Kainuu Brigade 1626–2012 – a period of four hundred years from the Savo Regiment to a modern army readiness formation’), Kajaani 2012, pp. 266–267.
NCOs in spring 1952. The Frontier Guard saw it as possible to begin training in autumn 1951. What is noteworthy is that the inspector of the infantry, K. A. Tapola, entered his comments in the documents a couple of days later, adding the following detail to the proposal: ‘In addition to the actual training and the topics covered, the training locations and calculations regarding the number of students and instructors must be taken into consideration.’

Simultaneously with the guidelines issued to the Defence Forces regarding training, the Operations Department of the General Headquarters took a decision in 1950 to transfer part of the responsibility regarding the forming and training of guerrilla troops from the Defence Forces to the Frontier Guard. In a situation where Finland’s neutrality needed to be protected, the borders of the country were to be guarded by using Frontier Guard companies reinforced with reservists, in addition to which the Defence Forces needed to be prepared to form and use guerrilla troops if the threat of war was imminent. Under this arrangement, during a phase when Finland was increasing its level of preparedness, the Frontier Guard was tasked with forming border jaeger battalions capable of adopting guerrilla-type activities. In addition, military province were to form guerrilla jaeger battalions of reservists the training of which was largely the responsibility of the Frontier Guard. This division of responsibilities and the methods used ensured that the troops intended to be committed to guerrilla-type activities would have better skills, something that the Frontier Guard had to take into consideration in its training.

The Frontier Guard did not waste time. In late 1951, the staff of the Frontier Guard issued instructions for the commencement of training in guerrilla-type activities for the Frontier Guards over the course of 1952. Training on a broader scale in the planned manner began with the Frontier Guards, based on hourly calculations which had been performed by Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen and which were, in 1951, in trial use at the Kaunuu Frontier Guard. In early spring 1951, the commander of the Kainuu Frontier Guard (KR), Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen, drafted a memorandum, around 30 pages in length, on guerrilla-type activities and training, which was sent to the Infantry Division of the General Headquarters for the purpose of being put to use by the Defence Forces. Karhunen based his views on solid experience; after all, he had been the commander of Guerrilla Battalion 3 and Border Jaeger Battalion 3 during the Continuation War.

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412 PE:n no. 197/Koultsto/5 sal./5.4.1951, T 21442/F 5–6 sal, KA. PvPE:n no. 64/Koul.1/5/sal./21.4.1951 ja liite: muistio sissikoulutuksesta 5.4.1951 (‘and an attachment regarding training in guerrilla-type activities dated 5 April 1951’), T 20239/F 1 sal, KA.

413 Ibid., see particularly the comments added by KAT (Kustaa Anders Tapola), dated 23 April 1953.


Karhunen’s memorandum was very useful for the General Headquarters, as it not only presented a description of guerrilla warfare from the perspective of the art of war but also provided precise calculations on the number of hours required for the training of operational and tactical leaders in guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities.416

In addition to discussing the training instructions in use by the Frontier Guards, Karhunen’s memorandum also proposed several measures for the reorganisation of guerrilla training. Among other things, Karhunen proposed that the basic training of guerrilla troops be broken down by topic. According to him, training should be divided into 1) theoretical basics, 2) combat training, 3) territorial guerrilla activities, 4) counter mobility operations and mine laying, 5) communications, 6) training in crossing waterways, 7) training in collaborating with the air force, 8) reconnaissance, 9) skills required by service in the field and fieldcraft, 10) training in the use of weapons and shooting training, 11) physical education, and 12) supply-related issues. A total of 1,481 hours were to be reserved for training, out of which theoretical and classroom training comprised only 128 hours. Karhunen justified his proposal by comparing his figures to those that had actually been used in training at the Kainuu Frontier Guard in 1951. Guerrilla training provided to the various groups of personnel amounted approximately to 500 to 1,000 hours, which translated into a training level that was good but still insufficient.417 Thus, the main difference between the current practice was an emphasis put on practical training and a significant increase in the number of training hours. It should be mentioned that several theses prepared at the National General Staff College referred to Karhunen’s memorandum, an indication of its significance at the time.418

In 1952, the Frontier Guard achieved a degree of preparedness that enabled it to establish six frontier guards and six guerrilla jaeger companies capable of being engaged in guerrilla-type activities and intended to be used as a covering force when if necessary. In addition to the units mentioned above, the Frontier Guard was responsible for training six understrength guerrilla jaeger battalions, the personnel of

416 Guerrilla-type activities in Finnish conditions; the organisation and equipment of guerrilla troops; the principles of conducting and leading guerrilla-type activities; and the achievement of targets set for the training of the leadership of the Frontier Guard on the basis of the above-mentioned factors; sections and attachments of a memorandum drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen in 1951, no identifier, T 20239/F 1 sal, KA. See also Karhunen, Veikko Evert, an extract from personal details, no. 37447, KA.

417 A memorandum with attachments by Lieutenant General Veikko Karhunen, prepared in 1951, no identifier, T 20239/F 1 sal, KA.

418 See, for example, Vinari (1952), SKK 1/548, KA. Ahonen (1954), SKK 1/582, KA. Juurikko, Joon: Sisijoukkojen käyttöön soveltuavat välineet ja keinot vihollisen varastojen, kuljetusvälineiden ja muun so-tavarastuksen tuhoamiseksi, (‘The equipment and means available to guerrilla troops in the destruction of the enemy’s stores, means of transport and other war materiel’), a thesis prepared at the National General Staff College in 1955, SKK 1/643, KA. Naapuri (1956), SKK 1/653, KA. Setälä, Erkki: Rajavartiotustojen alipäällystön ja miehistön koulutustavoitteet ottaen huomioon rajavartiostolle sekä rauman että so-dan aikana annettavat tehtävät, (‘The objectives for the training of the Frontier Guard NCOs and men, with special reference to the tasks set for the Frontier Guards in peacetime and at war’), a thesis prepared at the National General Staff College in 1956, SKK 1/658, KA. Leskinen (1958), SKK 1/693, KA. Naapuri, Eero Johannes, an extract from personal details no. 55699, KA. See also Tynkkynen (1996), pp. 341–342.
which – fully trained reservists – were to be transferred to the responsibility of military provinces tasked with keeping track of and forming units of this reserve. In practice, this meant that the previous orders issued in 1950 on the responsibility of establishing border jaeger battalions were revoked. All planning was carried out in collaboration with the responsibility area in question and the headquarters of the territorial organisation.\footnote{PvPE:n no. 202/Järj.2/OT 10 b 1 sal./11.9.1952, PvPE:n no. 111/Op.1/11 b/OT sal/13.9.1952, RvE:n no. 87/III/OT 28 a sal./17.10.1952, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970, (‘a confidential document and a confidential archive’) identifier F 2–6 OT-sal (research permit obtained).} The first results of training, including an exercise on the establishment of a guerrilla jaeger unit, were inspected after two years, when the Southeast Finland Frontier Guard arranged a war game involving guerrilla-type activities by a guerrilla jaeger battalion.\footnote{Kosonen – Pohjonen (1994), p. 393. Kirjavainen, Ilmari: Rajavartiolaitos 1944–1969, artikkelit kirjassa Rajavartiolaitos 1919–1969, (‘The Frontier Guard in 1944–1969, an article in the book The Frontier Guard in 1919–1969’), Mikkeli 1969, pp. 418–419. Tynkkynen (1996), p. 341.} Unlike the Frontier Guard, the Defence Forces failed to find an immediate solution to the initiation and organisation of training in guerrilla-type activities. The inspector of the infantry was concerned – justifiably so – about the cursory nature and questionable suitability of the training instructions issued for guerrilla-type activities. This prompted him to send a letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces about the issue, in which he requested the establishment of a unit dedicated to the provision of training in guerrilla-type activities at the Army Combat School. Thus, the lack of systematic training in guerrilla-type activities led to General Aarne Siivio, Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, being involved in decision-making. Although not unheard of, escalating issues on this level, or at this level of detail, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces were rarely undertaken. In his own words, Tapola had familiarised himself with ’memoranda drafted by certain officers, demonstrating a laudable interest in the issue.’\footnote{Sissikoulutuksen järjestely ja TaistK:n harjoitusjoukk o, Jalkaväen tarkastajan kirje Puolustusvoimain komentajalle 27.10.1951, (‘Organisation of training in guerrilla-type activities and the training unit of the Army Combat School; a letter by the inspector of the infantry addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces dated 27 October 1951’), T 20239/F 1 sal, KA.} Indeed, the archives of the Infantry Division contain a number of highly detailed accounts on guerrilla warfare, of which the memoranda drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen and Major Into Kuismanen deserve a mention.\footnote{A memorandum by Major Into Kuismanen regarding the tasks and organisation of a guerrilla jaeger battalion, Tuusula 28 February 1951, no identifier, T 20239/F 3 sal, KA. Guerrilla-type activities under Finnish conditions; the organisation and equipment of guerrilla troops; the principles of conducting and leading guerrilla-type activities; and the achievement of targets set for the training of the leadership of the Frontier Guard on the basis of the above-mentioned factors; sections and attachments of a memorandum drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen in 1951, no identifier, T 20239/F 1 sal, KA.}

The memorandum prepared by Major Into Kuismanen – he had participated in the weapons caching operation – on the tasks and organisation of a guerrilla jaeger battalion was very explicit and of great interest. Kuismanen clearly matched guerrilla tactics against his personal experiences of the wars, in which he had acted as the commander of the Separate Detachment Kuismanen (Erillinen Osasto Kuismanen

\footnote{\textit{Sissikoulutuksen järjestely ja TaistK:n harjoitusjoukk o, Jalkaväen tarkastajan kirje Puolustusvoimain komentajalle 27.10.1951, (‘Organisation of training in guerrilla-type activities and the training unit of the Army Combat School; a letter by the inspector of the infantry addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces dated 27 October 1951’), T 20239/F 1 sal, KA.}
ErOs Kuismanen) in Eastern Karelia. According to Kuismanen, Finnish tactics should be developed increasingly towards the adoption of systematic and ruthless guerrilla-type activities, which should be linked to the operations of the field army in its all forms of fighting. ‘Battles in which the enemy’s numerical and technical superiority comes to its best advantage must absolutely be avoided. To balance this disparity, the defender is required to be extremely active.’

All the evidence suggests that the General Headquarters found it difficult to put training in guerrilla-type activities on the right track, as foreign sources were resorted to for guidelines in addition to Finnish experiences. In 1950, the Foreign Affairs Division of the General Headquarters distributed, using a large distribution list, a memorandum entitled Amerikkalaisia sotakokemuksia, (‘American war experiences’), one chapter of which was dedicated to American guerrilla troops and their training. This memorandum solely discussed war experiences that the Americans had gained from the Korean War, which began in the summer of 1950. There was an apparent need for guerrilla-style troops as, as the Americans put it, guerrilla troops operating in a limited area and in a difficult terrain should be “given the credit that they deserve.”

According to this memorandum, training in guerrilla-type activities at some of the largest training centres of the U.S. Army had already been started while the war was still in its early stages. The training was principally aimed at providing guerrilla troops with an ability to perform long marches across terrain. The equipment of guerrilla troops needed be light in order to enable the troops to maintain their ability to function; consequently, its suitability was carefully examined and tested during training. The final words and phrases give verbal expression to realism, well known to the Finns: ‘The Americans recognise the fact that the practice of forming elite guerrilla jaeger units is something completely new, and cannot be accomplished in an instant.’ According to the comments added to the margin of the cover letter of the memorandum, the inspector of the infantry, Kustaa Tapola, carefully went over the memorandum, adding his comments to the cover letter on issues that needed addressing in the Finnish art of war: ‘training and the time required by training, war experiences, guerrilla-type activities, and helicopters.’

This proves the General Headquarters closely followed developments in guerrilla tactics outside Finland.

The Defence Forces took a decision to start systematic training in guerrilla-type activities by arranging what they termed sissitöimintakursit (‘courses in guerrilla-type activities’) for infantry officer candidates at the Army Combat School from 1952 onwards. The curricula and content of the courses were largely based on the memorandum drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen in 1951. In other words, the syllabus reflected almost verbatim the training plan and training package used by

423 A memorandum by Major Into Kuismanen regarding the tasks and organisation of a guerrilla jaeger battalion, Tuusula 28 February 1951, no identifier, T 20239/F 3 sal, KA. Into Kuismanen had prepared his memorandum while being a student on the general commander course 6 at the Army Combat School. See also Kuismanen, Into Ensio, an extract from personal details, no. 26447, KA.

424 Amerikkalaisia sotakokemuksia (‘American war experiences’), PvPE:n no. 72/50/17.11.1950, T 20239/F 1 sal, KA.

425 The cover letter for Amerikkalaisia sotakokemuksia (‘American war experiences’), PvPE no. 116/Ulk.2/De/Sal./17.11.1950, T 20239/F 1 sal, KA.
the Frontier Guard.\textsuperscript{426} A separate guerrilla jaeger unit, established at the Army Combat School on the initiative of K.A. Tapola, assisted in the training by, among other things, assuming the role of the Red Team in exercises. The composition of this unit was similar to that of a guerrilla jaeger platoon of a guerrilla jaeger battalion. As the Defence Forces did not have their own instructors, the personnel of the Frontier Guard served as course instructors until 1954. Although such courses were initially intended for infantry officer candidates, professional NCOs, starting from 1952, and officers, from 1953, also participated.\textsuperscript{427}

The content and duration of training in guerrilla tactics varied from one course to another. On courses termed \textit{jalkaväen sissitoimintakurssit} (‘Guerrilla courses for the infantry’), initiated in 1952, training was provided not only to officer candidates but also to professional NCOs and officers. Such courses, approximately 20 days in length, were arranged three times a year at the Tuusula Army Combat School. In connection with guerrilla courses, another type of training event, \textit{jalkaväen sissitoimintakoulutustilaisuudet}, (‘training events in guerrilla-type activities’), 20 days in duration, were arranged from 1953 onwards, intended principally for professional NCOs and junior officers.\textsuperscript{428} Such three-week courses sought to provide the commanders of guerrilla jaeger battalions and army corps staff personnel, as well as peacetime instructors, with a uniform understanding of guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare. From 1954 onwards, training provided by the Army Combat School was expanded to include \textit{sissipataljoonan komentajien opetustilaisuudet} (‘training events for guerrilla jaeger battalion commanders’).\textsuperscript{429} From 1954 onwards, the teaching staff of all of the above-mentioned courses was composed by the regular teachers of the Army Combat School as well as officers and NCOs from army units and Frontier Guards appointed to teach fieldcraft and guerrilla-type activities. All of the above courses sought to standardise guerrilla-type activities and develop a uniform basis for their continued study and development ‘\textit{when operating within a large framework}’.\textsuperscript{430} In practice, this translated into training in guerrilla-type activities that was carried out by the units of the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard and that, over

\textsuperscript{426} PvPE:n no. 2671/Koul.1/5a4/16.9.1952, T 20169/F 85, KA. PvPE:n no. 1693/ Koul.1/ 5b6/21.5.1952, T 20169/F 86, KA. Compare the course curricula with the memorandum with attachments, drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen in 1951, no identifier, T 20239/F 1 sal, KA.


\textsuperscript{428} PvPE:n no. 3184/Koul.1/5a/6.11.1952, T 20169/F 83, KA.


time, would gradually produce a cadre of professional officers and NCOs familiar with guerrilla-type activities.431

One-month intelligence courses for officers, arranged at the National General Staff College starting from 1952, also provided training in guerrilla-style issues. Most students ordered to attend such courses were younger officers serving as staff or general staff officers at their units. As the name of these courses suggests, they were training events focused on intelligence, but, in spite of this, their content mostly comprised introductions, lectures and coursework produced by the students, all of which was related to guerrilla warfare.432

From 1953 onwards, month-long intelligence courses for staff officers were arranged in secret under the leadership of the Foreign Affairs Division of the General Headquarters; only officers who had graduated from the National General Staff College and held the rank of captain or major were ordered to attend these courses. Courses were arranged at premises in Santahamina (a military island off Helsinki) reserved by the Finnish Military Academy for this purpose, protected from the prying eyes of outsiders, and all the teaching material and coursework produced by the students was declared classified information after the training ended. However, it is interesting that part of the syllabus of even these courses related to the use of guerrilla jæger troops in reconnaissance duties or generally in guerrilla-type activities conducted in connection with regular military operations. An example of this is provided by a case study presented on intelligence course no. 1 for staff officers, bearing the title ‘Opportunities and means available to carry out reconnaissance by a battalion ordered to take up guerrilla-style operations.’433 This can be explained in part by the fact that guerrilla-type activities and long-range patrolling were understood to be very similar with regard to their methods. One of the factors which might explain this is that at least some of the instructors on the intelligence courses were veterans of the wartime Separate Battalion 4 (ErP. 4), in other words, long-range patrolmen.

In spring 1953, the Infantry Division of the General Headquarters determined, while assessing the arrangements in place for guerrilla-type activities that it was off to a good start but took up too much of the time of the personnel of the Army Combat School, preventing them from teaching other courses. The General Headquarters further saw that the curricula in use at the time were in the process of being adopted into wide-spread use. However, experiences gained from the courses were

431 For example, courses on guerrilla-type activities were arranged by three units of the Defence Forces, of which the Pohjois-Savo Brigade, starting from 1955, was one to the units responsible for arranging courses on guerrilla-type activities. Iskanius (2012), p. 267.
432 Upseerien tiedustelukurssi 2, tutkielmat ja alustukset (‘Intelligence course 2 for officers, coursework and introductions’), 16 July 1952, T 26890/Hla 5 sal, KA, (a research permit granted by the National Defence University). Upseerien tiedustelukurssi 3, tutkielmat ja alustukset 1953 (‘Intelligence course 3 for officers, coursework and introductions’), 1953, T 26890/Hla 6 sal, KA, (a research permit granted by the National Defence University). Upseerien tiedustelukurssi 4, tutkielmat ja alustukset 1953 (‘Intelligence course 4 for officers, coursework and introductions’), 1953, T 26890/Hla 6 sal, KA, (a research permit granted by the National Defence University). Upseerien tiedustelukurssi 5, kurssin luennot ja oppilastyöt 1954 (‘Intelligence course 5 for officers, coursework and by the students’), 1954, T 26890/Hla 6 sal, KA, (a research permit granted by the National Defence University).
433 PE:n no. 31/Ulkmtsto/5/sal./10.3.1953 (with attachments), T 21442/F 5–6 sal, KA.
to be used as before. In connection with this, the Mobilisation Division of the General Headquarters compiled a calculation of training needs, according to which the six guerrilla jaeger battalions in the list of planned wartime units (PTL) required a trained reserve amounting to 3,723 men. Considering that the training arrangements at the time enabled the Frontier Guard and the Defence Forces to train 200 to 300 men each year, training clearly required intensification.\(^{434}\) In other words, there was work to do, although training was off to a good start.

The quality of training and its numerical outcome were also assessed by the Frontier Guard in spring 1953. The Frontier Guard Headquarters requested that the Frontier Guards under its command submit the number of men who had undergone guerrilla jaeger training in order to enable the Headquarters to make modifications to the training plans. Each Frontier Guard was expected to provide answers to the following questions: ‘How many men are serving at your Frontier Guard who were engaged in guerrilla-type activities during the war? How many of such men can be deemed to be suited for guerrilla-type activities at the moment? How many of those in service at the moment (nominal strength) can be deemed to be capable of guerrilla-type activities? How many of those who resigned from service between 1948 and 1953 can be assessed to have received (good – satisfactory) guerrilla training and to be suited for guerrilla-type activities (broken down by year)?’\(^{435}\)

The Training Division of the General Headquarters had calculated in 1951 that a total of around 60 officer cadets out of each intake could be trained each year on a two- or three-week guerrilla course, the arranging of which would be the responsibility of a unit designated by each division.\(^{436}\) The Training Division distributed, using a large distribution list, a summary of the material to the units, military schools and the headquarters of the military provinces, seeking to provide additional information for the guidelines presented in a standing order issued in November 1954 on the arrangement of further guerrilla training at army units.\(^{437}\) By 1955, a sufficient body of material had been gathered from guerrilla courses representing a variety of training levels, enabling its use in the training of conscripts and regular army personnel alike. The material started with a description of the main features of guerrilla-type activities, emphasising the importance of international treaties and the rules of war, using the following formulation: ‘Current international treaties legalise guerrilla-type activities, provided that guerrilla fighters wear the uniform or other distinctive insignia of their own country, wearing their weapons in a visible manner and meeting a number of other requirements.’ In addition to providing the basics, the material also described various situations accompanied by their solutions, intended to be applied to training. In a follow-up situation, the commander of an imaginary guerrilla jaeger battalion gave an order to one of his company commanders as follows: ‘You must take hostages. Act honourably and with pure arms!’ The model solution to the problem reopened the issue: ‘We will take

\(^{434}\) PE:n no. 65/Jvistto/5 sal./14.9.1953, T 20239/F 2 sal, KA. Compare also PE:n no. K 24/Lkptsto/Da sal/26.5.1956, T 26965/F 11 sal, KA.


\(^{436}\) PvPE:n no. 64/Koul.1/5/sal./21.4.1951 and an attachment on training in guerrilla-type activities dated 5 April 1951, T 20239/F 1 sal, KA. See also Iskanius (2012), p. 267.

\(^{437}\) PE:n no. 35/Koulstto/5a sal./15.2.1955, T 21442/F 5–6 sal, KA. See also See also Koulutuksen pysyväiskäsky (Kpk) (‘Permanent order on training’), PE:n no. 332 C 1/13.11.1954, T 21442/F 5–6 sal, KA.
hostages, in order to be able to exchange them for our own prisoners of war. Right from the beginning, capture many prisoners. We will need them.’ Another section of the training material described the commander of an imaginary guerrilla jaeger battalion communicating with the enemy by letter, in order to arrange for an exchange of prisoners: ‘The prisoners, 23 men in total, were left behind at the scene of annihilation, with the exception of eight hostages. I left a letter with them, to be delivered to their leader.’ These sections in the training material, related to prisoners of war and keeping in contact with the enemy, received a highly polarised reception among the troops that had received this ‘training material’.

In the 3rd division (3.D), the standing orders regarding training and the teaching material were applied as above. According to the training instructions prepared by the headquarters of the division, the development of guerrilla-type activities was based on the guidelines issued by the General Headquarters. Guerrilla-type activities were to be studied theoretically in further training before they could be applied to practical exercises. In addition to the support material provided by the General Headquarters, Upseerin käsikirjan III osa, (‘The officer’s handbook, part III’) was to be used as teaching material in training. According to the training instructions issued by the division itself, the objectives of guerrilla warfare could be achieved through guerrilla-style operations conducted by individual guerrilla jaegers, guerrilla jaeger patrols, Platoons and battalions in the enemy’s rear. The tasks of a guerrilla jaeger patrol included ‘the capturing, interrogation and guarding of prisoners.’ As of 1955, guerrilla-type activities needed to be linked to all manoeuvres ‘in some form or another.’ The 2nd Division (2.D), while following the instructions, issued, completely ignored the section concerning the capture of prisoners of war in its map exercises.

The view of the 1st Division (1.D) is diametrically opposite to the previous one. The commander of the Division, General Lieutenant V. J. Oinonen, sent an incendiary query to the Training Division of the Defence Command, expressing his disbelief regarding the methods proposed by the material for the taking of hostages and maintaining communication with the enemy. ‘As I need to issue training instructions to my troops regarding, among other things, training in guerrilla-type activities, I have to ask you whether you really mean that the commanders of guerrilla jaeger units attempt to complete tasks such as exchanging prisoners or making contact with the enemy leadership, which, in practice, are impossible to accomplish in reality, and if so, what are these kinds of activities based on?’ Breaking the rules of war and the rapid emergence of unconventional means of waging war, including guerrilla operations taken to their extremes, clearly failed to follow the traditions of the Finnish art of war. The General Headquarters sent a polite response, admitting that part of material was unsuited for training purposes. ‘The example of hostage is undoubtedly off the mark, and the whole notion of hostages is too questionable to be used in training. The practice mentioned in the example – leaving a letter in terrain addressed to the enemy leadership – may be successful on occasion.’ The response of the Training Division of the General Headquarters emphasised that the material that they had sent should be re-

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438 PE:n no. 35/Koulsto/5a sal./15.2.1955 (with attachments), T 21442/F 5–6 sal, KA.
439 3.DE:n no. 1400/Yl koulsto/5 a/21.12.1954, T 20171/F 109, KA.
440 2.DE:n no. 1413/Koul/5 c1/21.11.1955 (with attachments), T 20172/F 120, KA.
441 1.DE:n no. 5/Koulsto/5 c sal./30.3.1955, T 21442/F 5–6 sal, KA.
This episode provides an excellent example of the sensitive nature of guerrilla warfare and its position in the grey zone between the art of war and the rules of war. Not even in guerrilla warfare was there a reason to undermine the high morale and ethics that had traditionally characterised the Finnish art of war. On the other hand, this incident provided a demonstration of a change in the art of war that had started in the 1950s, one in which the creation of models for guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities were still very much in their infancy. The major reason behind this was probably the fact that there was no handbook or military regulation covering training in guerrilla-type activities.

Although training in guerrilla-type activities, provided by the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard, began to assume increasingly established forms, units continued to provide proposals for improving training arrangements. According to a memorandum drafted by the Frontier Guard Headquarters in summer 1955, training provided by the Frontier Guard was increasingly geared towards guerrilla training, and training was also increasingly intensified. "This requires a great number of instructors. The relatively limited instructor resources of the Frontier Guard are committed to such a degree that the Frontier Guard companies, which carry out the actual border surveillance and which are dispersed across long sections of the border, need to get on as best they can, having available only the company commander and a maximum of two junior officers." In order to alleviate the problem created by the lack of instructors, the Frontier Guard proposed that the responsibility for the provision of training in guerrilla-type activities be increasingly divided between the Frontier Guard and the Defence Forces.

In early January 1956, the Headquarters of the Joensuu Military District submitted a proposal to the General Headquarters regarding the arrangements of training in guerrilla-type activities and other details of guerrilla tactics. According to the proposal, the Defence Forces still had an insufficient number of skilled instructors to be able to provide training in guerrilla tactics, which had led to a situation in which the Joensuu Military District, part of the organisation of the 3rd Division, required that the Frontier Guard provide them with instructors with skills in guerrilla warfare. The General Headquarters responded to the proposal, stating that as necessary as the reorganisation of training might be, no measures would be taken to address it, as the issue was being clarified. With this, the General Headquarters referred to Sissikoulutusopas ("Handbook in guerrilla training") and to a thesis prepared by Major Erkki Setälä for the attainment of his diploma.
By 1956, the Frontier Guard had made training in guerrilla-type activities an established form of training, the guidelines of which were being elaborated upon on the basis of gathered experiences. Major Erkki Setälä, who at the time was a student at the National General Staff College, actively participated in the reorganisation of the guerrilla training provided by the Frontier Guard while working on his thesis. The guidelines for the training in guerrilla-type activities provided by the Frontier Guard were discussed, as an issue requiring urgent attention, at a meeting of the Frontier Guard commanders held in February 1956. As a result of this meeting, the provision of training in guerrilla-type activities was to be standardised and extended to all troops. The modifications to training in guerrilla-type activities were based on a task given to the Frontier Guard to train a total of five guerrilla jaeger battalions over a period of four to six years for the wartime needs of the Defence Forces.446

The guidelines for and content of the training in guerrilla-type activities provided by the Frontier Guard were further defined by breaking them down by training programmes for senior officers, junior officers, professional NCOs, border jaegers and conscripts. Senior officers were given guerrilla training at training events for the commanders of guerrilla jaeger battalions arranged by the General Headquarters, at events organised by the Frontier Guard Headquarters, and at events coordinated by the various Frontier Guards. The training of junior officers consisted of training events for intelligence officers, guerrilla courses organised by the Frontier Guard Headquarters, advanced courses arranged by the Frontier Guards, homework, and work as an instructor. Professional NCOs received their training on guerrilla courses organised by the Frontier Guard Headquarters, on training courses and training exercises arranged by the various Frontier Guards, and by serving as instructors. The guerrilla training of border jaegers comprised three-week guerrilla training exercises, advanced guerrilla training provided in connection with other training, refresher training, and service as a co-instructor in the training of conscripts. The training of conscripts was divided into training given to officer candidates, NCOs and men during their basic, specialisation and refresher training periods as well as military exercises.447

The organisation of training described above was based on one of the conclusions drawn by Major Erkki Setälä in his unfinished thesis. Setälä had participated in the meeting of the Frontier Guard Commanders held in February 1956, and his study was deemed to be of high quality after he completed it. The commander of the Frontier Guards, Lieutenant General Kaarlo Vaala, added the following comments to a detailed statement on the Setälä’s thesis: ‘By way of summary, it can be stated that Major Setälä specifies the training objectives in his thesis with expertise, demonstrating the right spirit. The training objectives that he sets for guerrilla-type activities also appear to be sound, providing a firm foundation for further development on the basis of experiences that are likely to be gained in the future. Provision of training within the framework that the author presents can be

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deemed completely feasible. Taken as a whole, Setälä’s thesis provides an exhaustive discussion of its topic, taking a solid and factual approach.’\textsuperscript{448}

Foreign models also appear to have played a certain role in Finnish guerrilla training in the late 1950s. Major Holger Krogerus (UudPr) and Major Leo Rantanen (RvE) made a study trip to Armèns Jägerskola (the Jaeger School of the Swedish army), located in Kiruna, between 19 and 22 March 1957. In particular, the Finnish visitors sought to gain insight into the Swedish model of guerrilla-type activities, in operations carried out in the enemy’s rear, and in guerrilla training provided by the school. At the beginning of their report, Krogerus and Rantanen stated the following: ‘...as such, the concept of our guerrilla-type activities is not equivalent to the Swedish notion of the way infantry operates in the enemy’s rear. However, as the Swedes have already finalised most of their notions on the issue, and as we have not yet made any final decisions, the best approach here probably is to avoid any comparisons and just present the observations we made of the Jaeger School.’ According to Krogerus and Rantanen’s report, Swedish guerrilla tactics combined Finnish long-range patrolling with guerrilla-type activities as, under the Swedish model, the objective of warfare was to push military operations and reconnaissance as deep into the enemy’s rear as possible by using air transport and jaeger troops that had received special training for such operations, known as Fallskärmsjägartrupper or Kårjägartrupper. In other words, such activities did not represent pure paratrooper operations for which the Swedes provided training at a dedicated school, Fallskärmsjägerskola. Jaeger troops that had undergone guerrilla training were intended for operations in areas of enemy-held territory, approximately 40 to 80 kilometres away from the Swedish front line, while paratroopers with guerrilla training were used in the enemy’s rear, more than 80 kilometres away from the front.\textsuperscript{449}

Finnish wartime long-range reconnaissance and guerrilla-type activities and the Swedish troops shared the fact that paratroopers were placed under High Command, while jaegers with guerrilla training were attached to army corps and brigades. Taken together, the Finnish officers perceived Swedish guerrilla-type activities to have more of a character of long-range offensive reconnaissance tasks rather than operations in which troops stayed behind enemy lines in order to carry out defensive missions. The two Finnish majors were particularly interested in Swedish training programmes, in the number of hours of instruction allocated to guerrilla tactics, and in the way various topics were emphasised in training. During their visit, Krogerus and Rantanen also carefully examined the special equipment used by the Swedish troops. Sketches and illustrations accompanying the report lent support to their detailed report. The most important lesson learned and the most noteworthy observation in Krogerus and Rantanen’s conclusion were the way the Swedes used


\textsuperscript{449} RvE:n no. 57/II/sal/8.4.1957 and a report on the visit by Major Krogerus and Major Rantanen to the Swedish Army Jaeger School, 8 April, 8.4.1957, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential document and a confidential archive’) identifier F 8–9 sal (a research permit gained).
helicopters in support of their guerrilla-type activities, ensuring the continuity of their troops’ supply and the evacuation of their wounded.450

Judging by the comments added to the margins of the report, it aroused considerable interest at the Frontier Guard Headquarters but led to no immediate modifications to the guerrilla training provided by the Frontier Guard and the Defence Forces. In any event, the report gives a glimpse into the period at a time when the Defence Forces were systematically searching for new guidelines, by also looking to countries where conditions were comparable to those in Finland. On the other hand, the issue involved a mutual interest shared by Sweden and Finland. The Swedes also wanted to keep track of the developments in the Finnish art of war by engaging in bilateral activity of this kind. In this respect, Finland was a natural choice for Sweden if that country wanted to obtain up-to-date information on defensive capabilities and on new theories on the art of war, among which guerrilla-type activities, developed on the basis of experiences gained from Finland’s war, was only one of many. The Swedes also put a high premium on the Finnish art of war, an indication of which was the fact that the Swedes used battles fought by the Finnish army both in the Winter War and the Continuation War as examples of innovativeness demonstrated by a party with an inferior quantitative strength at their military schools.451

In addition to various training courses on guerrilla-type activities arranged by the Frontier Guard, and the provision of guerrilla training to conscripts in the army and frontier guard units, training in guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare was also arranged, from the mid-1950s onwards, at the Non-Commissioned Officers School, at the Finnish Military Academy, at the Army Combat School, and at the National General Staff College, as part of the courses that these schools arranged.452 However, what is noteworthy is the fact that it was not until the early 1960s that the evaluation of terrain reconnaissance operations conducted by the National General Staff College were complemented by a separate plan on guerrilla-type activities.453

Various map and military exercises conducted between 1949 and 1960 were used to bring variation to the methods of guerrilla warfare and to examine the guidelines set for training and the results it had achieved. While most of these exercises, arranged by the Defence Forces or the Frontier Guard, were carried out in unpopulated areas in Northern Finland or in the wilds of Lapland, some exercises were executed in the south of the country, in areas with a denser population and occupied by an imaginary enemy. For example, in summer 1957, a refresher course was arranged at all

450 Ibid.
Frontier Guards for reserve officers who were given training in acting as commanders of guerrilla jaeger units. This three-week training course was carried out at all Frontier Guards in accordance with a programme and framework plan drafted by the General Headquarters. The emphasis of the subjects to be trained was placed in line with the instructions laid down by the General Headquarters – on the tactical leadership of a guerrilla jaeger platoon and on collaboration between the various branches of the defence. This training course also provided an opportunity to familiarise the reserve officers with challenging wilderness conditions. It was also noteworthy that this training was the first refresher training event for reservists organised by the Frontier Guard after the war. The Southeast Finland Frontier Guard summed up the importance of the training event by stating the following: ‘Refresher training for reserve officers arranged in 1957 turned out to be a versatile and successful event for the Frontier Guard, giving rise to many ideas.’ Regarding the refresher training for Frontier Guard reserve officers, a sizeable body of material on the Southeast Finland Frontier Guard still remains, containing not only customary training reports but several suggestions for further development and a number of memoranda on guerrilla jaeger training. The instructors who had served at the refresher training also received an extensive query.455

The numerous war, combat and refresher exercises played a key role in helping to gather a body of practical experiences related to guerrilla warfare. However, the most active training period was the 1960s, a decade when several war and combat exercises, termed guerrilla exercises, were organised.456

By the early 1960s, the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard had arrangements in place for guerrilla training that were considerably more established in nature than those used in the 1950s. In his order on the organisation of training for 1960, K. A. Heiskanen, Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, emphasised more than ever before the importance of troops’ mobility, their capability to operate under the cover of darkness, and their ability to infiltrate into the enemy’s rear. Heiskanen’s order regarded guerrilla-type activities as one of the most fundamental parts of defensive tactics, emphasising them accordingly. Furthermore, the Frontier Guard still had the capacity for intensifying its training in guerrilla-type activities, particularly when such training was arranged as part of military exercises. In particular, the order emphasised the Frontier Guard’s own responsibility for achieving their training objectives as well as its close collaboration with the staff responsible for training at the Defence Forces, especially when military exercises were being prepared.457

The reason behind this was probably the fact that the major part of the responsibility for forming wartime guerrilla jaeger battalions was transferred from the Defence Forces to the Frontier Guard in 1956. In 1956, in connection with a reform of the army unit reinforcement system, among other things the following was stated: ‘...each Frontier Guard could form a guerrilla jaeger battalion that would be the first unit to take up guerrilla-type action along the border area.’ Modifi
cations to responsibilities regarding unit establishment and the fact that the Frontier Guards had been ordered to transfer 229 trained staff members to the various military districts caused a great deal of extra planning work for the Frontier Guards, as the cadre required for establishing units was hopelessly insufficient compared with the requirements set by the Defence Forces. The Frontier Guard Headquarters sent the Mobilisation Division of the General Headquarters a sharply-worded letter on the issue, stating that: ‘After the above-mentioned transfers have been completed, the cadre that the Frontier Guards have available for establishing guerrilla jaeger battalions will be so limited that the forming of battalions for the needs of a covering force cannot be seriously considered. This being the case, if the plans require that the Frontier Guards form wartime guerrilla battalions, the personnel transfers ordered by a General Headquarters letter should be reconsidered.’

The General Headquarters understood the concerns put forth by the Frontier Guard regarding the sufficiency of their personnel, reducing the number of staff to be transferred to the Defence Forces from 229 to 30. However, the individual Frontier Guards, under the control of the Frontier Guard organisation, were still charged with establishing the original five guerrilla jaeger battalions as stipulated by the original plan. The new arrangements for forming Guerrilla Battalions 6, 7, 10, and 15 took effect on 1 March 1957.

In the 1957 and 1958 establishment chart of the wartime covering force, four Frontier Guards – the Southeast Finland Frontier Guard (K-SR), the North Karelia Frontier Guard (P-KR), the Kainuu Frontier Guard (KR) and the Lapland Frontier Guard – were all tasked with establishing one guerrilla jaeger battalion each, with a strength of 488 men. The Defence Forces – in this case, the Kemi Military District (KemSp) – were responsible for establishing the fifth guerrilla jaeger battalion. In other words, the plans required that five guerrilla jaeger battalions be established, to be used as a covering force along the eastern border from Miehikkälä up to the

level of Kemijärvi in the north; such battalions were to be designated as guerrilla jaeger battalions 6, 7, 10, 12 and 15.462

The quality and quantity of the covering force troops played a critical role at the onset of possible hostilities. In order to drive home this point regarding, for example, the guerrilla jaeger battalions, the Frontier Guard Headquarters compiled separate guidelines for training to be followed, if necessary. These guidelines stated that: ‘Should hostilities break out, the Frontier Guards, including any other troops established for the protection of Finland’s neutrality, will be regarded as a covering force, irrespective of their composition at the time.’463 In 1957, the Frontier Guards and the military districts of the Defence Forces initiated in-depth collaboration regarding training in Finland’s operational readiness by organising negotiations between the two organisations on a regional basis. In these negotiations, the military districts and Frontier Guards drew up collaborative agreements which covered both training and operational issues in a way that served the interests of the two parties to the greatest possible extent.464

Apparently, the Frontier Guard took the task assigned to it seriously — training reservists for guerrilla jaeger battalions in peacetime and making preparations for their role in wartime — when this organisation was drawing up peacetime training guidelines and wartime operational plans. All of this represents close collaboration between the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard in the development of the Finnish art of war and the defence of Finland by military means.

Another testimony to the closeness of collaboration on guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla jaeger training between the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard was provided by the training films related to the art of guerrilla warfare which were provided at the time. Over the course of 1959, a total of four training films were prepared by the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard with the purpose of supporting the training efforts, all of which were released for use by troops in May 1960. The films were prepared by the Southeast Finland Frontier Guard in Immola during 1959. The first three films, Sissitaitoja kesällä (‘Guerrilla jaeger skills in the summer’), Sissitaitoja talvella (‘Guerrilla jaeger skills in the winter’), and Hiihtosissit (‘Guerrilla

462 PE:n no. K 38/Lkptsto/OT D b sal/3.10.1957, T 26842/Ha 3 sal, KA. According to the plan, the following division of responsibility was to be applied to the guerrilla jaeger battalions which were to be established for a covering force duty: SissiP 6 (K-SR), SissiP 7 (P-KR), SissiP 10 (KR), SissiP 12 (LR) and SissiP 15 (KemSp). Compare the previous with the plans devised for 1953 and 1956, according to which the number of guerrilla jaeger battalions in the establishment chart was 6: PE:n no. K 24/Lkptsto/Da sal/26.5.1956, T 26965/F 11 sal, KA. PE:n no. 29/Optsto/OT/10 sal/14.12.1953, T 26862/E 4 OT sal, KA. See also Partanen, Tapio: Liikekannallepanojärjestelmämme syntymien ja kehityksen aikana sekä suoritetut liikekannallepanot (‘The inception and development of Finland’s mobilisation system during the country’s independence, including all mobilisations carried out’), a thesis for the achievement of a diploma produced at the National General Staff College in 1975, p. 60, and attachment 4.12., SKK 1/1212, KA.

463 RvE:n no. 43/Järj/OT/g sal/25.2.1957 ja RvE:n no. 46/Järj/OT/g sal/5.3.1957, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential document and a confidential archive’) identifier F 7–8 OT-sal (research permit obtained).

jaegers on skis’) gave a detailed presentation of guerrilla jaeger skills throughout the year. The fourth training film, *Sissit iskevät* (‘Guerrilla jaegers strike’), addressed the operations of a squad and a platoon engaged in guerrilla-type activities in the enemy’s rear. Experts for all of the above-mentioned films came from the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard. Responsibility for the planning and implementation of the films was split between the representative of the Training Division of the General Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Erkki Setälä, and Colonel Osmo Karhunen and Lieutenant Colonel Martti Avela of the Frontier Guard Headquarters. As all these officers had gained familiarity with guerrilla-type activities and cut an image of being experts in the field, the four films were of high quality and provided a valuable contribution to training in guerrilla tactics. These films were used in training until the 1970s, when *Sissitoimintaopas* (‘Handbook on guerrilla-type activities’), published in 1979, replaced them.

In early 1959, serious consideration was given to the composition and equipment of the guerrilla jaeger battalions in the establishment chart (PTL). In January 1959, the Frontier Guard Headquarters requested proposals for possible modifications to the composition, to be submitted over the course of February. The Frontier Guards submitted their proposals with justifications to the Frontier Guard Headquarters, which, on the basis of the proposals it had received, took a decision to develop a completely new type of troops to replace guerrilla jaeger battalions. The review of the composition and tasks of guerrilla jaeger battalions apparently led to the establishment of frontier brigades.

In 1959, a major modification was made to the composition and tasks of troops which were to be established by the Frontier Guard. The order issued in spring 1957, which obligated each Frontier Guard to establish a guerrilla jaeger battalion, was revoked, with more challenging tasks being assigned to the Frontier Guard. The Operations Divisions justified the additional tasks and responsibilities with ‘the comprehensive protection of Finland’s borders in accordance with the country’s neutrality principle. This plan implies no military policy; its sector is only 360 degrees, reflecting the above-mentioned policy.’ In connection with the presentation of the plan and reorganisation, the importance of the provision of guerrilla training in collaboration between the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard was emphasised: ‘Although part of the training may be given out-

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465 Sisitätaitoja kesällä (‘Guerrilla jaeger skills in the summer’), the date of completion 1 May 1960, P 513, KAVA. Sisitätaitoja talvella (‘Guerrilla jaeger skills in the winter’), the date of completion 11 May 1960, P 511, KAVA. Hiihtosissit (‘Guerrillas jaegers on skis’) 1960, P 512, KAVA. Sisit iskevät (‘Guerrillas jaegers strike’), the date of completion 1 May 1960, P 514, KAVA.
466 Setälä, Erkki Vilhelm, an extract from personal details, no. 53560, KA. Karhunen, Osmo Eino, an extract from personal details, no.46324, KA. Avela, Martti, an extract from personal details, no. 30515, KA.
side the Frontier Guard, men can be ordered to participate in guerrilla-style exercises with the troops of their own Frontier Guard if necessary.\textsuperscript{469}

In a presentation to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, held on 6 April, the new composition of troops that the Frontier Guards were to establish upon mobilisation was specified as the frontier brigade. Each frontier brigade comprised its headquarters and a command company, the units carrying out the actual surveillance tasks of the border – companies and battalions – as well as separate units and border jaeger troops, such as companies and battalions combined into a task force to carry out a task assigned to them on a territorial basis.\textsuperscript{470} However, the tasks assigned to the Frontier Guard troops remained unchanged, being the following: a) the surveillance of the border, b) combat tasks assigned to the covering force, and c) guerrilla-type activities. In each frontier brigade, the previous reserve company was to be replaced by one border jaeger company the composition of which was equivalent to the company of a guerrilla jaeger battalion. In practical terms, this change meant that one guerrilla jaeger battalion was removed from the establishment chart of four Frontier Guards (K-SR, P-KR, KR and LR) – Sissip 6 from K-SR, Sissip 7 from P-KR 7, KR:Ita Sissip 10 from KR, and Sissip 12 from LR – with this reduction being compensated for by adding twice as many border jaeger battalions and other special units to the wartime organisation.\textsuperscript{471} Reservists who had received their guerrilla training before this change were to be placed in the one surviving guerrilla jaeger battalion (Sissip15) – which was to be formed by the Lapland Frontier Guard – and in other reconnaissance companies and in the reserve platoons of frontier guard companies.\textsuperscript{472}

The Frontier Guard Headquarters informed the General Headquarters that the reorganisation could only be implemented if the number of personnel that the Frontier Guards were to transfer to the Defence Forces was reduced and if the method of calling reservists to service in the municipalities located along the border was developed further. The Defence Forces regarded the proposal as an absolute prerequisite, taking the view that it could be solved simply by issuing orders and making the proper arrangements. In late April 1959, the Frontier Guard received a preliminary order to change its wartime unit compositions and responsibilities regarding unit establishment.\textsuperscript{473} Thus, this arrangement concerned Finland’s entire wartime field army and its troops, causing the issue to be taken up by the Defence Council during the spring and summer of 1959. The Defence Council made a proposal on 18 June

\textsuperscript{469} PE:n no.tta 25.3.1959, Rajavartioston perustamistävän undelennonjärjestelyn esittely (‘Presentation of the reorganisation of troop establishment tasks which are the responsibility of the Frontier Guard, held on 25 March 1959 at 9:00 a.m. at the Operations Division of the General Headquarters’), RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential document and a confidential archive’) identifier F 10 OT-sal (research permit obtained).

\textsuperscript{470} PE:n no. 75/Optsto/OT/10 sal/6.4.1959, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential document and a confidential archive’) identifier F 10 OT-sal (research permit obtained).

\textsuperscript{471} PE:n no. 57/Optsto/OT/10 sal/11.3.1959, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential document and a confidential archive’) identifier F 10 OT-sal (research permit obtained).


\textsuperscript{473} RvE:n no. 34/järj/OT/a/28.4.1959, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential document and a confidential archive’) identifier F 10 OT-sal (research permit obtained).
1959, according to which ‘the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard be ordered to make all the necessary preparations for the implementation of the plan without delay.’ The President of the Republic approved the issue at a presentation held on 3 September 1959.474

The reorganisations were implemented during 1960. The most far-reaching consequence of the reform was the fact the Frontier Guards were to have – in addition to their peacetime composition (frame formation) – only one wartime composition, formed in a flexible manner that best met the requirements set by each situation.475 At least between 1960 and 1962, in addition to forming frontier brigades, the Frontier Guard was tasked with establishing a total of 13 border jaeger battalions which, regarding their training and equipment, were expected to be on a level of covering force troops, capable of conducting guerrilla-style operations.476

Policy definitions and arrangements implemented in the 1950s laid the foundation for providing systematic training in guerrilla-type activities, something which gained an established position in the basic and specialisation training of all conscript classes over the course of the 1960s and 1970s and which was continued until the 1980s.477 It is important to understand that all the above-mentioned measures and arrangements were based on wartime needs and that they could only be implemented through close cooperation between the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard, in spite of all the visible and invisible borderlines between the ministries involved.

A change in the thinking regarding the art of war required that regulations and handbooks be renewed

Although guerrilla-type activities, guerrilla warfare and a total guerrilla war were topics that officers had discussed since 1945, in the early 1950s, the practical foundations were still in their infancy. Problems were caused by the confusion around the concepts regarding guerrilla warfare and the lack of a guerrilla regulation and training handbook, which, had they been available, would have had standardised training.

The key handbooks and regulations were deemed to be outdated already at the outset of the Winter War or were regarded as obsolete during Finland’s wars, but the war put their renewal process on hold. After the Continuation War ended, the issue became topical again, prompting the General Headquarters to take a decision on the updating or complete rewriting of the regulations and handbooks. In December 1944, the Defence Forces set up a Regulation Committee to address the issue.478 In February 1945, a more detailed plan for the updating of the key regulations was

476 RV:E:n harjoitusperustamistehtävälivelto, liite (‘Establsihment chart (draft), an attachment’) PE:n no. 155/Lkptsto/OT 10 e 2 sal/7.3.1960, T 26842/Bb 8 sal, KA. PE:n no.tta, PTL:n mukaan perustetut jalkaväkijoukot (‘Infantry troops to be established in accordance with the establishment chart’), (vast) 15.11.1960, T 26842/Bb 8 sal, KA.
478 PnP:E:n no. 255/Koul.2/30.12.1944, T 17651/11, KA.
drawn up, according to which not only field regulations but also handbooks and the regulations of the infantry should be revised. However, the updating of regulations for the various branches of the defence were also made part of these objectives. In early May 1945, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces approved a total of 54 different handbooks and regulations to be produced. This work was started, but the compilation of regulations and the background work necessary for the writing process was disturbed by the Weapons Cache Case which had come to light. Some officers who had been appointed to the writing task had participated in the weapons caching operation, and, as they were being interrogated or sentenced to prison, their contribution was unavailable for the regulation work. For example, Colonel Valo Nihtilä, chief of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, who had been appointed the principal author of the field regulations, was arrested for interrogation on 9 June 1945.479

The fact that the field regulation aimed to address entirely new topics can be regarded as a notable manifestation of a change that had taken place in the art of war. Among other things, the field regulation was intended to contain a chapter on guerrilla-type activities and anti-guerrilla operations, with Lieutenant Colonel Sulo Susi having being appointed by Nihtilä to write this chapter. In addition to this, Susi was ordered to write a separate guidebook on guerrilla-type activities.480 Susi failed to complete his assignment as he, as many others, had to resign his commission due to the Weapons Cache Case in spring 1945. Susi’s resignation was a major setback for the regulation project, meaning in practice that a handbook on guerrilla-type activities continued to be unavailable as nobody was appointed to replace him despite the fact that the guerrilla handbook remained on the list of regulations to be written.481

The completion of the field regulation was slowed down, not only by the many changes among its authors but also the discussions that were going on in the Defence Forces in 1948–1949 regarding the transfer to a brigade organisation.482 However, guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare appeared to have been part of the planning process since Nihtilä’s plans, as both concepts can be found in a draft handout for the Field Regulation, which had been used by the troops between 1947 and 1948. A handout of the draft for the Field Regulation was prepared, and the library of the General Staff let anyone who needed it borrow it. One of the chapters in the draft was entitled Guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities. The draft defined

479 PvPE:n no. 1060/Koul.2/21/2.3.1945, T 17655/10, KA. A sekätkentää koskeva muistio, Pariisi 20.8.1953 (A memorandum on the caching of weapons, Paris, 20 August 1953), and Kerto maa uuden ja sotamateriaalin hajavastoinnista eli asekätkänästä ja senloppeuvittelyistä (= An account of the dispersed storage of weapons and military materiel, in other words, the Weapons Caching Case and its final settlement”), Helsinki 12 April 1970, Valo Nihtilä’s private collection, Pk 1969/3–4, KA.

480 PvPE:n no. 2060/Koul.2/21/25.5.1945, T 18751/ KOn laatimisen liitetyä asiakirjaa 1945–1947 (=Documents related to the writing of the field regulation (KO) 1945–1947”), KA PvPE:n no. 3500/Koul.2/25b/31.7.1947, T 19466/F 16, KA. PvPE:n no. 987/Koul.2/25/1.3.1948, T 19467/F 34, KA. 481 The approval of Lieutenant Colonel Sulo Susi’s resignation was dated 3 July 1945; the date of his resignation was 5 August 1945. Susi, Sulo Vilho, an extract from personal details, no. 44859, KA. Note. The extract of Susi’s personal details also contains a note ‘Participated in the writing of Upseerin käsi kirja (‘The officer’s handbook’) along with Colonels Roos and Ekman’. See also Tynkkynen (1996), p. 307 and 338–339.

guerrilla-type activities as ‘harassment carried out in the enemy’s rear or in an area occupied by the enemy, linked to regular military operations or guerrilla warfare.’ By this point it was made clear that guerrilla-type activities, if ever resorted to, were part of planned, conventional and regular warfare. The draft introduced a new concept in the realm of the art of war, the concept of guerrilla war, which was mentioned as the second item. It was defined as ‘warfare conducted in an area occupied by the enemy in place of regular military operations.’ It can be concluded from the definitions of the concepts and their internal relationships that guerrilla war was understood to be the opposite of conventional warfare, which also left the door open for guerrilla-type activities.483

After taking a circuitous route, two separate regulations, *Kenttäohjesääntö I* and *II* (‘Field Regulation I and II’), were published in summer 1954. The first volume of the Field Regulation484 made no reference to guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities, as it only discussed grounds for the deployment of troops and operational instructions for other special fields. The second volume of the Field Regulation focused on the combat conducted by an army wartime formation, the brigade, by discussing its different forms and methods of fighting. The second volume of the regulation also contained a main chapter of its own on guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare.485

In the second volume of the Field Regulation, a 17-page chapter dedicated to guerrilla-type activities discussed the topic in somewhat greater depth. The introduction to Chapter 8 of the Field Regulation, entitled *Sissitoiminta ja sissisota* (‘Guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare’) justified the need for two different methods of fighting, including their internal relationship, by referring to the changes in the nature of war and the art of war that had taken place. ‘The more mechanised armies have become with the introduction of motorisation, with the growing proportion of armoured units and with the developments in armament, the more dependent they have become on the road network, on rapid and unimpeded opportunities to troop movements and supply shipments. The more wooded the terrain is, the more sparsely populated the area is, the sparser the road network is, and the more discontinuous the front lines are, the better the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities are. In large swathes of wilderness, they may even be the only operational method. Well-planned, carefully prepared and skillfully executed guerrilla operations may, when linked to other operations, be of great significance, and in any event cause the enemy trouble and inflict casualties upon it. In the worst-case scenario, after regular operations have become impossible, expanding the scale of guerrilla-type activities so that the entire warfare scenario turns into guerrilla warfare can be considered.’486 Changes in the art of war were emphasised by the fact that unconventional methods of warfare were combined with conventional tactics, and that under certain circumstances war would turn total in nature, necessitating the use of all available means in order to safeguard the country’s independence.

483 See the handout at the library of the General Staff: Concepts found in the new Field Regulation, Chapter XI, Guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities; sections of the Field Regulation, KO II 1947, a handout, Vesa Tynkkynen’s private collection (a copy of the handout is in the possession of the author of this thesis).
484 *Kenttäohjesääntö I osa* (KO I) (‘The Field Regulation Part I’), Helsinki 1954.
486 Ibid, pp. 231–232.
However, the Field Regulation, completed in 1954, was not the first handbook to address guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare. *Upseerin käsikirja* ("The officer’s handbook"), published in three volumes in 1950–1953, can be regarded as having provided the fundamental general guidelines and a summary of the Finnish art of war during the postwar years. The principles behind this handbook reflected in part pre-war thinking. At that time, a handbook entitled *Upseerin muistiopas* ("The officer’s memory refresher guidebook"), and an amended edition of *Upseerin käsikirja* ("The officer’s handbook") had been published, the former in 1935 and the latter in 1936, to be used alongside with *Kenttäohjesääntö*. Both handbooks, prepared by the National General Staff College, were aimed to supplement the regulations in effect at the time and to be used in officer training, at military schools, on courses, and in units.

Due to the lack of regulations adapted to the postwar world, the National General Staff College proposed in 1949 that a new version of *Upseerin käsikirja* ("The officer’s handbook") be drafted in compliance with principles behind the pre-war handbooks. The teaching staff of the National General Staff College also announced that they would be available for the writing job.

An evident need for this handbook existed as soon as the decision to write it had been taken – work on it began began at the National General Staff College in early 1950. The first volumes, *Upseerin käsikirja I* and *II*, were completed in June 1950. From the perspective of guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare, the most important volume was the third one, *Upseerin käsikirja III*, which was completed only after the decisions regarding the wartime composition had been taken in late 1953. The first two volumes of *Upseerin käsikirja* addressed the wartime field army and its basic formations, or divisions and brigades. Upon its completion, the third volume was the first presentation of its kind that resembled a military regulation, which was based on new thinking on the art of war and that limited its discussion to the basic wartime formation – the brigade. This handbook was regarded highly successful as it provided an in-depth and comprehensive discussion on national defence from a broad perspective.

The third volume of *Upseerin käsikirja* defined national defence as being based on ‘the concepts of total warfare and territorial defence’. The description of total warfare as presented by the selected officers of the National General Staff College speaks volumes of the need to change the Finnish art of war and adapt it to the contemporary nature of war. With warfare and tactics being subject to continuous development, the nature of combat has changed, especially due to the developments that have taken place in technology, turning combat into an activity that involves all the possible as-
pects of battle. Warfare turned modern set a whole host of requirements for national defence, something which had to be countered with ‘a total defence’. ‘A nation that defends itself with consistency, basing its defence on facts, also accepts the principle of total defence which requires that a nation under attack also attempts to repel the attack by committing all its resources and by taking sufficient measures for such eventualities in peacetime’.

This handbook refers to territorial defence as a phenomenon closely related to developments in contemporary warfare. The reasons behind the introduction of a territorial defence system are, according to this manual, ‘the altered nature of war, involving principally a threat posed by a surprise attack at an early stage of hostilities, the increasingly total nature of war, the possibility of internal unrest, the mobile nature of operations which involve breakthroughs deep into the defender’s territory, landings by airborne troops and putting troops ashore in the defender’s coastal areas.’ Instead of a war waged along continuous front lines, conflict is described to have turned into territorial combat which can only be countered by introducing a territorial defence system. This referred to the division of the country into areas, the command structure of which was responsible for making all preparations for national defence in their areas, ensuring their implementation and leading military operations in accordance with orders and instructions issued by the High Command. With regard to the entire country, the advantages provided by such a system, from the viewpoint of military operations, were its high level of preparedness and the opportunities it offered to committing forces as the situation required. This description of the territorial defence system can be compared to a memorandum entitled ‘Alueellisen maanpuolustuksen järjestely- ja toimintaperiaatteet’ (‘The principles for arranging and organising territorial defence’), which was perfectly in line with the introduction to *Upseerin käsikirja.*

While the Finnish art of war continued to rely on conventional warfare, a key chapter at the beginning of this handbook hinted at a major policy change towards the adoption of unconventional methods of war. Should the mobilisation fail, or should the regular front lines collapse, the objective of the area of responsibility was to harass and slow down the enemy attack, thereby gaining time for preparations carried out elsewhere in the country and aiming at defeating the enemy. ‘In such a situation, defence will be based on active and flexible operations carried out by separate and often understrength troops and even by the general population – operations which in the areas occupied by the enemy may turn into ruthless guerrilla warfare, culminating in the birth of a resistance movement that will resort to all means available to it.’ Although this handbook justified the means of guerrilla warfare by experiences gained from Norway, Denmark, the Soviet Union and France, the fact that it highlighted the possible emergence of a resistance movement represents new and radical thinking by the officers at the National General Staff College in the field of the art of war. However, the handbook made an attempt to tone down this view by suggesting that a guerrilla war and a resistance movement would always be based on decisions and measures taken by a legal gov-

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494 PvPE:n no. 165/Op.1/11 a./15.4.1952, T 20169/F 90, KA. This memorandum was drafted at the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, evidently in collaboration between Colonel T.V. Viiljanen and the chief of Op.1, Lieutenant Colonel A. Maunula.
ernment, which, in turn, would be based on the nation’s will to maintain its independence. ‘Crucial to success is that operations are conducted under a unified leadership and that those who participate in them submit themselves to a discipline and order equal to the regular forces.’ In light of all this, the change that had taken place in warfare had a profound effect on the authors’ thinking on the art of war, as the total nature of war waged by the invader could only be countered by a war equally total in nature by the defender.

What is interesting in this handbook is the fact that although it opens up with a main chapter stating that the means available to guerrilla warfare are the culmination of total warfare, it nevertheless dedicates a whole main chapter of ten pages to guerrilla-type activities, entitled Tietoja sissitoiminnasta (‘On guerrilla-type activities’). This chapter discusses the objectives and opportunities available to it as follows: ‘Guerrilla-type activities are linked to regular military operations; they are carried out by troops of the field army; and they target the enemy’s rear areas and areas occupied by the enemy. Such operations seek to tie up enemy troops to protect their stores, communication lines and traffic in the rear areas, forcing the enemy to commit its most mobile reserves to hunt down guerrilla troops. One of the objectives of guerrilla-type activities may be collaboration with the population that has stayed in the enemy’s rear or that was left there. In such a situation, the main tasks of our guerrilla troops is to support the objectives of the civilian population, as long as they are in line with the objectives of our own warfare.’ The objective of such operations, from the viewpoint of the art of war, was very exceptional, as, according to it, guerrilla-type activities also included the participation of the civilian population in military operations and in activities that supported such operations.

In connection to this, the discussion on the art of war presented in Upseerin käsikirja III should be compared to theories on and means available to a total guerrilla war advocated by Mao Zedong. During what is known as the Long March, from South China to the provinces of North China in 1934–1935, and during his resistance against the Japanese in 1937–1945, Mao formulated a number of tenets which, in a way, can be said to express the fundamental elements of a guerrilla war that has political overtones. According to Mao, one of the key factors was support given to the civilian population, which ensured that guerrillas had support areas which enabled them to carry out their operations. In other words, guerrilla warfare was total and savage in nature, and in which adhering to the rules of war would be nigh on impossible as it would be difficult to distinguish soldiers from civilians. Thus, while the definition that Upseerin käsikirja III presented came close to Mao Zedong’s theories, it was also quite outlandish against the framework of the Finnish art of war and the humanitarian principles that were prevalent at the time.

It is difficult to identify a single reason behind the policy change relating to the art of war expressed by Upseerin käsikirja. It is equally difficult to pinpoint any individuals behind the inclusion of guerrilla warfare and the resistance movement in the
handbook. However, behind the developments in the art of war lay, above all, the experiences that Finland had gained from the wars it had fought, the orders issued in the late 1940s on the initiation of training in guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare, and discussions among the officers and students at the National General Staff College focusing on changes in warfare. However, the effect of certain individuals on the change in military thinking and on the direction that the art of war took becomes clear when one examines the authors of Upseerin käsikirja and the revised Kenttäohjesääntö, for example. Among the authors, several individuals who had gained familiarity with questions related to guerrilla warfare and who had participated in discussions around the issue can be found. For example, the introduction to Upseerin käsikirja lists among its authors Lieutenant General Veikko Koppinen, Major Unto Matikainen and Captain Helge Seppälä, all of whom later gained renown as being experts in guerrilla-type activities, guerrilla warfare and resistance movements. Of the authors of the Field Regulation, Colonel Valo Nihtilä, Colonel Alpo Marttinen, Lieutenant Colonel Usko Sakari Haathi, and Lieutenant Colonel Sulo Susi had a background in guerrilla issues. All of them had participated either in the dispersed storage of weapons or had engaged in guerrilla or long-range patrolling during Finland’s wars.

The presentation of guerrilla warfare as the most extreme form of fighting in the postwar context with the Finnish defence arrangements undergoing a development process appears to have been based partly on foreign views and experiences. The experiences that the Germans had gained from their fight against the French resistance and the Soviet partisans provided background material for the Finnish analysis of guerrilla warfare as early as during the Continuation War. Reflections on the operations of the Norwegian and Danish resistance movements, published in 1941–1955 in Sweden and Germany, also gained prominence in Finnish analysis. After 1945, Finnish researchers had obtained a large body of literature discussing fighting and guerrilla-type activities in the German-occupied areas.

When attempting to formulate a Finnish defensive solution and opportunities open to guerrilla-type activities, the Defence Forces also looked to countries outside Scandinavia for inspiration, countries that had resorted to unconventional methods. In addition to the Russian-style partisan war, the Defence Forces also analysed the methods employed in the Yugoslavian revolutionary war and the tactics used by the French and Belgian resistance movements during the Second World War. So, while a wealth of examples abounded, their application as such to the Finnish way of thinking ran counter to reality. The situation of the population in a guerrilla war, possible shortcomings in preparations, the role played by the infrastructure in military operations, the difficulties faced by the medical care organisation when attempting to operate in a dispersed manner, as well as the factors imposed by the Finnish terrain and geography, were identified as possible problems. In examining the popu-

499 Upseerin käsikirja III ("The officer’s handbook III") 1953, Johdanto ("Introduction") See also Matikainen, Unto Osvald, an extract from personal details, no. 51481, KA.
lation density and its effects on guerrilla warfare in Finland, detailed criteria were applied.503

Partisan wars, as the guerrilla wars fought by Germany in the territory of European small states were customarily called, were characterised from the very beginning by features of revolutionary warfare. Partisans fought for a completely new kind of state. German counter-operations, such as large-scale cleansings carried out in the support areas of guerrilla fighters, were often extremely brutal. By applying scorched earth tactics, the Germans attempted to make the chronic shortage of weapons and provisions experienced by the guerrillas intolerable. For this reason, the hard-to-traverse mountains in Yugoslavia were deemed to be the guerrillas’s best ally, but the Finns also paid attention to the partisans’ chain of supply and, in particular, to their hidden hospitals. Ensuring a well-functioning supply network in a guerrilla war requires a hefty dose of imagination and a great deal of sweat. With no preparations in place, setting the operations in motion required a long time. According to Finnish estimates, imagination is the sole limiting factor. The extent and duration of guerrilla operations, the number of troops committed, and the results they achieved meant that guerrilla warfare during the Second World War even had strategic significance.504

In the late 1950s and the early 1960s in particular, a number of foreign military regulations were translated into Finnish in order to provide reference material for the formulation of a genuinely Finnish defence solution, and Finnish delegates visited foreign military schools in order to gain new insights.505 Via the Foreign Affairs Office of the General Headquarters, the Operations Division received, for example, translations of US Army regulations, some of which discussed guerrilla warfare. In 1956, the Infantry Division received a translation of the US 1954 Kenttäohjesääntö (‘Field Regulation’), one of the sections of which entitled Sotatoimet (‘Military operations’) discussed guerrilla warfare under a heading of its own. According to this regulation, guerrilla warfare should be conducted by troops specially trained for such operations, or by other combat units. 506 In 1960, the Finnish military attaché in Washington sent a partial translation of the US regulation FM 31–21/1958 ‘Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations’ to Helsinki. The translation was forwarded to

506 PE:n no. 211/B sal/1956 (FM 100-5/29.9.1954), T 25094/F 4 sal, KA.

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the Infantry Division, the Training Division and the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, as well as to the National General Staff College, where it, judging by the notes added to the margins of the translation, was used in the development of a Finnish method of waging a guerrilla war.\textsuperscript{507}

The translation into Finnish of foreign regulations was not confined to the Western art of war; with regard to guerrilla-type activities in particular, regulations were gathered from and information gained on the Soviet Union. A translation of a Soviet field regulation, sent to Finland apparently by one of the Finnish military attachés posted in Moscow, provides an excellent example of intelligence targeting the East. Neuvostoliiton aseellisten voimien kenttäohjesääntö, Divisioona – Armeijakunta (‘Field Regulation of the Soviet Armed Forces, Division – Army group’) from 1959 discussed the principles of modern war and the role of the various branches of the defence, the air force and special troops in different military operations under various conditions.\textsuperscript{508}

From the viewpoint of the development of Finnish guerrilla-type activities, the capability of the Soviet army to mount anti-guerrilla operations interested Finnish officers in particular.

An assessment of the ultimate applicability of foreign influences reveals that the compatibility of the writings on guerrilla-type activities originating from foreign sources with each other was questionable at best. It is obvious that only the tactical characteristics of guerrilla-type activities, combat techniques, the similarity of circumstances, and geographical aspects available in the foreign source literature were factors that could be used in the development of the Finnish art of war at different times.

Counter arguments against total guerrilla warfare also received support. As early as 1948, Unto Matikainen drew a conclusion in his thesis at the National General Staff College which stated that ‘...by only preparing for guerrilla warfare, the invader will be offered an opportunity to occupy the country quickly without making any major sacrifices.’ Although Matikainen regarded guerrilla warfare as an efficient method of fighting, he argued that it would be impossible to stockpile sufficient materiel in advance for a prolonged guerrilla war. According to Matikainen, any strategy for the defence of Finland should be based on conventional warfare, with guerrilla warfare being resorted to only as a last-ditch effort.\textsuperscript{509}

Against the background described above, it becomes understandable that guerrilla warfare was relegated to a form of extreme warfare in Finland as well. Considering the wars that Finland had fought, it no longer appeared impossible that the entire country or some parts of it would be occupied, all the more so as the changes in the nature of war had made war take on increasingly total aspects. Small countries caught in the crossfire in a conflict between great powers had fought successfully by resorting to guerrilla warfare, and had found in it an efficient method in their fight against a superior enemy. The extreme methods of guerrilla warfare, and its nature

\textsuperscript{507} PE:n no. 211/Ulkomtsto/Dd/sal/8.6.1960, T 25094/F 8 sal, KA. Sede also Liite 1 PE:n no. 211/Ulkomtsto/Dd/sal/8.6.1960, T 25094/H 15 sal, KA.

\textsuperscript{508} PE:n no. 955/0063/sal/8.11.1961, T 25094/H 16 sal, KA.

in general, polarised the opinions of Finnish officers. Opinions for and against regarding a total guerrilla war were expressed in public discussion and in confidential memoranda alike. An examination of the threat scenario that had changed since the Second World War makes it understandable that a full-scale guerrilla war also found its supporters, as a certain number of officers holding views that were very realistic in nature argued that any conventional defence would collapse under an attack launched by a great power. According to them, it would only be a question of time until conventional Finnish defences would collapse under vastly superior numbers.

A handbook in guerrilla training and a regulation regarding guerrilla-type activities were drafted to support training

The internal multiformity of the Finnish art of war was characterised by confusion regarding concepts, typical of the early 1950s. In Sotilaskielen sanakirja (‘A dictionary of military terminology’), published in 1953, Väinö Oinonen sought to clarify the meaning of terms used in military jargon. Oinonen also gave his own interpretation of guerrilla-type activities: ‘Harassment carried out in the enemy’s rear or in areas occupied by the enemy, either linked to regular military operations or carried out independently of such operations.’ This definition of guerrilla-type activities is not entirely in line with the regulations in effect at the time, as it gives the idea that guerrilla-type activities would have been possible to carry out in connection with regular military operations, or independently of such activities. Oinonen’s interpretation of guerrilla warfare is equally different and equally interesting: ‘Guerrilla war; guerrilla-type activities that, with regard to their effects, comes close to regular warfare.’ This definition is very idiosyncratic, differing as it does from the other definitions put forth at the time by drawing a parallel between guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities in which the intensity of operations is the decisive factor.

Through concept definition, attempts were made to clarify the strategic position and content of guerrilla war in the second volume of 1954’s Kenttäohjesääntö (‘Field Regulation’), and Jalkavien taisteluhohjesääntö II (‘Combat Regulation for the Infantry, Part II’) from 1955, which continued the development of tactics and the art of war based on experiences gained from Finland’s wars. These regulations emphasised the significance of terrain from the defender’s perspective and stressed the role of guerrilla-type activities in the defensive battle. With the publication of the Field Regulation, the concept of guerrilla warfare was established in the Finnish regulations for years to come, which, almost without an exception, included the key concepts and formulations of ‘in addition to regular military operations or in their place’ and ‘in the enemy-occupied territory.’ However, it was recognised that instructions on guerrilla warfare that was more extensive in scope and a separate regulation for guerrilla-type activities were still lacking.

It was not until 1954 that the compilation of regulations addressing guerrilla-type activities was properly initiated. Via the Foreign Affairs Division, a report on training in guerrilla tactics provided by the Swedish army had been sent to the Training Division and the Infantry Office of the General Headquarters, the Army Combat School and the Frontier Guard Headquarters, and this report obviously played a role in a decision taken to draft a handbook and regulation on training in guerrilla-style operations for use by the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard. The fact that the fourth chapter of the memorandum discussed the role of guerrilla warfare in the Swedish military regulations is worthy of a mention.\footnote{PE:n no. 54/Ulkmtsto/14c/sal./24.3.1954 sekä lähetteen liite Sissikoulutus Ruotsissa (‘including an attachment to the covering letter entitled Guerrilla training in Sweden’), Stockholm 18 March 1954, T 20239/F 3 sal, KA.} An order issued by the Training Division, signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, noted that significant gaps remained in the set of army regulations, although one of the objectives set for the postwar work on regulations had been achieved with the completion of Parts I and II of the Field Regulation: ‘Regulations for the signal branch, reconnaissance, guerrilla-type activities and staff work are also missing.’ In order to address the most serious shortcomings, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces issued an order tasking the Defence Forces to prepare, by the end of June 1956, drafts for the general section of the field regulation, as well as for the military operations and combat conducted by the various arms. In addition to this, the order required the Defence Forces to prepare a draft, by the end of December 1955, for a regulation regarding guerrilla-type activities, under the direction of the chief or the Training Division. The principal content of each new regulation, and each regulation requiring substantial revisions, were to be presented to the General Regulation Committee by the end of 1954, before the writing process commenced.\footnote{PE:n no. 17/Ohjeststo/8b/sal./16.11.1954, T 20239/F 3 sal, KA.}

In connection with the previous order, Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Koppinen, deputy chief of the Army Combat School at the time, was ordered to write a handbook on guerrilla training and a separate regulation for guerrilla-type activities. While it remains unclear exactly why it was Koppinen who was tasked with writing the guerrilla handbooks, it may be surmised that his participation in the drafting of Upseerin käsikirja (‘The officer’s handbook’), published previously, and his serving as the leader of courses on guerrilla-type activities for the infantry played a role in the selection process.\footnote{TaistK:n no. 1300/II/5c/14.9.1953, T 20170/F 95, KA. TaistK:n no. 1383/II/Db1/29.11.1954, T 20171/F 106, KA. \footnote{Polttopöytäkirja (‘Deletion diary notes’) PE:n no. 1/Ohjeststo/C/11.6.1958, with a reference to a presentation on the Sissiohjesääntö, PE:n no. 181/Ohjeststo/8b/29.12.1954, T 21464/F 14–15 sal, KA.}} Koppinen embraced his task with obvious enthusiasm and a serious attitude as by late 1954 – in other words, barely one month after receiving his orders – he submitted his proposal for the organisation of ‘the guerrilla regulation’ to the Regulation Committee.\footnote{Polttopöytäkirja (‘Deletion diary notes’) PE:n no. 1/Ohjeststo/C/11.6.1958, with a reference to a presentation on the Sissiohjesääntö, PE:n no. 181/Ohjeststo/8b/29.12.1954, T 21464/F 14–15 sal, KA.} Although the presentation only refers to the regulation for guerrilla-type activities, both Sissikouluttajan opas (‘Handbook for the instructor in guerrilla-type activities’) and Sissiohjesääntö (‘Regulation for guerrilla-type activities’) were approved to be written under temporary working names so that the manuscript for Sissikouluttajan opas would be completed during 1955, to be submit-
ted for use by troops in early 1955, and *Sissiohjesääntö* during 1956, to be sent to troops either in 1956 or 1957. The responsibility for writing both handbooks was assigned to Veikko Kopponen. Koppinen kept his schedule, as by January 1956, *Sissikoulutusopas* had been published, after having first been approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, and was immediately put into training use. *Sissiohjesääntö* (‘Regulation for guerrilla-type activities’) was competed in June 1957, and was delivered to the troops in the autumn of the same year.

An interesting assessment of the situation, and one which was almost identical to that made by the Defence Forces, was carried out around at the same time by the Frontier Guard, which, in the early 1950s, recognised that the lack of military regulations for guerrilla-type activities and training instructions seriously hampered training in guerrilla tactics. In a memorandum he drafted in 1955 and in a separate document in December 1955, the commander of the Kainuu Frontier Guard (KR), Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen, raised the question of the lack of military regulations on guerrilla-type activities and the ensuing problems in training. Although the archival material of the Frontier Guard contains no actual assignment or order in support of writing a separate regulation, Major Georg Ahonen, who served as an aide to Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen and wrote – either being aware of the work on regulation under way at the Defence Forces at the time or not conscious of it – a draft for *Sissikouluttajan opas* (‘The handbook for the instructor for in guerrilla-type activities’), the name of which was almost identical to that of Veikko Kopponen’s draft. Like Ahonen, he had written his thesis at the National General Staff College on training in 1954 on guerrilla-type activities, and he had a solid understanding of the subject. Georg Ahonen highlighted in his thesis the importance of having a guidebook for instructors in guerrilla-type activities in order to ensure the quality of peacetime training and its quality. The Frontier Guard Headquarters considered Ahonen’s study as being of high quality, which was well reflected in the statement of thesis: ‘Taken as a whole, Captain A’s thesis is thorough, well-

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516 PE:n no. 2860/Ohjeststo/8b/12.10.1955. PE:n no. 1/7a/26.1.1956, liite 2, T 20173/F 138, KA.
518 Guerrilla-type activities under Finnish conditions; the organisation and equipment of guerrilla troops; the principles of conducting and leading guerrilla-type activities; and the achievement of targets set for the training of the leadership of the Frontier Guard on the basis of the above-mentioned factors; sections and attachments of a memorandum drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen in 1951, no identifier, T 20239/F 1 sal, KA. KRE:n no. 2530/II/16.a/5.12.1955, T 22755/F 7, KA. PE:n no. 2395/ohjeststo/8b/19.6.1957, T 22780/F 148, KA. PE:n no. 3338/ohjeststo/7a/26.9.1957, T 22780/F 149, KA. Kopponen, Veikko William, an extract from personal details, no. 55645, KA.
519 Between 1947 and 1961 Major Georg Ahonen held various posts at the Kainuu Frontier Guard, dealing with training and development related to guerrilla-type activities. Together with Veikko Karhunen, his commanding officer and – reportedly – his close friend, Ahonen developed training in guerrilla-type activities at the Kainuu Frontier Guard between 1951 and 1956. Setälä, Erkki: An interview on 13 June 2006. See also Ahonen, Georg Aleksanteri, an extract from personal details, no. 55635, KA.
520 Ahonen (1954), SKK 1/582, KA.
In April 1956, Major Georg Ahonen completed – only slightly later than Koppinen – a draft for *Sissikouluttajan opas* which was delivered in May to the other Frontier Guards for familiarisation. In June 1956, Ahonen also completed a draft for *Sissi- joukkojen taisteluhohjesääntö* (‘Combat regulation for guerrilla troops’). A comparison of the content of these handbooks reveals that the methods presented in them were very similar but they were entirely different in spirit. Koppinen’s handbook emphasises the right guerrilla spirit imbued with traditions that should be part of training considerably more than the draft authored by Ahonen. However, the core subject matter – general arrangements regarding training and topics for which training was to be provided – was similar in both drafts. Due to the cuts made to the archives, it remains unexplained as to why Koppinen’s regulation and handbook gained an officially sanctioned status and not Ahonen’s.

An examination of *Sissikoulutusopas*, with a label ‘For official use only’ reveals that it is quite thorough and practical in its approach. It was exactly this kind of handbook that the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard needed for the training that they provided in guerrilla style tactics. The organisation of the handbook reflected general arrangements for conscripts’ training at the time, being divided into general training in guerrilla-style tactics and fieldcraft, in combat training, and in specialisation training. The general section on training gave a detailed discussion and examples of a variety of topics, including tracking, deception, bivouacking, the transport of equipment and supplies, techniques for crossing waterways, the measures that each soldier needed to take in order to maintain his physical and mental and fighting capability, and the use of confirmed signs in guerrilla operations. With regard to combat training, the handbook provided basics for combat conducted by an individual soldier, by a pair of soldiers, and by a guerrilla jaeger unit. The chapter on special training addressed signalling, engineering, driving vehicles, and medical care, all as applied to guerrilla style operations. Although the handbook presented no detailed plans for lessons and exercises, it nevertheless provided sufficient grounds for training troops in guerrilla-type activities, particularly at units training wartime guerrilla troops.

*Sissikoulutusopas* provides a very interesting description of the objectives of guerrilla-type activities. According to it, guerrilla-type activities entail a large number of special situations, which can be dealt with only by giving the troops proper training for

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523 The ‘For official use only’ classification indicated that while the regulation in question was a public and official document, it was limited for internal use by the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard. However, as it was not a confidential document, it could also be used in the training of conscripts, in addition to training the professional personnel.
them. ‘Guerrilla-type activities aim at throwing the enemy’s rear areas and operations into chaos. Guerrilla-type activities entail such a variety of special cases and technical problems that, in order to achieve good results, leaders and men must receive special training. In particular, training helps to reduce the number of casualties and boosts the confidence of the troops.’\textsuperscript{525} All in all, while this handbook was much-needed upon its completion, it was also very much like its author. All the evidence suggests that Veikko Koppinen, while drafting his handbook, had thoroughly familiarised himself with his subject matter, as, if hearsay is to be believed, he subjected his ideas to practical testing. Kaiju Kallio, Veikko Koppinen’s daughter, recounted when interviewed numerous details of the experiments that her father had conducted based on his war experiences and that he took to great lengths with his immediate family. Among other things, she said that she had spent a night at the request of his father in an experimental sleeping bag made of paper, termed a ‘guerrilla-style sleeping bag’, on the shores of Tuusulanjärvi in the mid-1950s. Numerous details and lofty ideas presented in the handbook, such as the use of makeshift equipment, were incorporated into the training of professional staff and conscripts.\textsuperscript{526}

After \textit{Sissikouluutusopas} was completed in spring 1956, the Regulations Office of the General Headquarters compiled a document entitled \textit{Yleistaktillisia suuntaviivoja} (‘Guidelines for general tactics’). The general section of this handbook emphasised the significance of guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities in the art of war, basing this view on premises under which the enemy in a possible war would always have superiority in numbers, materiel and firepower. ‘As there would not be continuous front lines, and for other reasons, a guerrilla war might ensue. We have to regard guerrilla-type activities as being an integral part of all combat operations.’\textsuperscript{527} The General Headquarters requested the arms commanders and the inspectors of the various branches to provide statements on the guidelines for general tactics and submit them by the middle of May 1956. Counted by the number of pages, such statements constituted an impressive collection of information, including statements addressing questions related to guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities viewed from the perspective of the art of war.\textsuperscript{528}

A statement submitted by the Staff Duties Office of the General Headquarters, which was responsible for the peacetime composition of troops and the nominal strength of wartime troops, drew attention to problems related to the requirements which required the intensification of guerrilla-type activities and the establishment of new units. ‘Guerrilla-type activities and our possibilities to wage guerrilla war cannot probably be intensified by establishing new special formations for guerrilla-style warfare, as this would lead to

\textsuperscript{525} Ibid, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{526} Kaiju, Kaiju: An interview on 29 August 2007. See also Norkola, Kari: \textit{Poikakirja aikamiehille} (‘Boys’ own adventure book for grownup men’), a review of \textit{Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä}, Sotilasaikakauslehti 10/2012, p. 55. ‘I enjoyed the book, as it brought vivid memories to me of my own company officer course in 1959, during which Koppinen made an experiment on the ice cover of Tuusulanjärvi to find out whether a guerrilla jaeger would be able to stay warm being just wrapped in potato bags made of paper and burrowed in snow. He received support from the duty officer of our course, who checked once every hour at night whether or not he was still alive. Well, he reported that he wasn’t cold!’

\textsuperscript{527} PE:n no. 80/Ohjeststo/8b sal/11.4.1956, T 21442/F 7 sal, KA.

\textsuperscript{528} Statements can be founded in the archives of the Infantry Division of the General Headquarters, kept at the National Archives under the identifier T 25094/F 1 sal, KA.
a reduction in the number of troops available to other units. Instead, as the need for committing troops to guerrilla-type activities may suddenly emerge, special guerrilla activity compositions should be defined for infantry troops and, possibly, for units representing other branches as well — compositions to which such troops could quickly be transferred from their normal order of battle.’ This statement by the Staff Duties Office evidently affected Sissiohjesääntö (‘Regulation for guerrilla-type activities’), which, at the time, was still in the process of being drawn up and according to which guerrilla troops proper were part of the composition of infantry troops. Troops representing other branches and arms needed to be prepared to engage in guerrilla-type activities.529 The Navy also needed to be able to carry out guerrilla-type activities, especially in the archipelago.530 After the arms and branches had submitted their statements, Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, K.A. Heiskanen, approved the tactical guidelines in May 1957, confirming that guerrilla-type activities were an integral part of all combat operations.531 From the perspective of the art of war, this represented a clear departure from the practice of the army during its previous wars of forming temporary units for guerrilla-type activities and putting them through a crash course before sending them into action.

The publication of the 1957 Sissiohjesääntö, authored by Veikko Koppinen, supplemented Sissikoulutusopas. Sissiohjesääntö was also the labelled ‘for official use only’, indicating that it was intended for training use only. With regard to its content, this regulation focused solely on guerrilla tactics and fighting methods. This was the reason behind the fact that the handbook discussed the operations carried out by guerrilla troops, their leadership, the preparations they made for operations and any operations conducted under special conditions in a fairly comprehensive manner.532 Subsection C1 of Chapter 5 of this handbook provides a highly important discussion of combat operations, dividing guerrilla-type activities into concerted and dispersed operations. According to this regulation, a guerrilla jaeger unit is engaged in a concerted operation when it targets its efforts against a clearly delineated area in the terrain. Concerted operations are aimed at providing support to the troops holding the front line and engaged in a decisive battle. Dispersed operations referred to tying up enemy forces in their rear areas, harassing them and carrying out reconnaissance. Guerrilla jaeger units in dispersed operations operated independently in their target areas under the command of their own leaders.533 The regulation for guerrilla-type activities was adopted for training use in 1957 by all Frontier Guards, with instructions issues to quietly comply with it despite its unconfirmed status: ‘For this reason, the draft has been classified confidential and remains so at the moment.’534

Sissiohjesääntö geared the concept of guerrilla-type activities, with its internationally recognised meaning, towards a notion that was more Finnish in nature. ‘Guerrilla-type activities refer to combat, harassment and reconnaissance operations in an enemy-held area. They

529 PE:n no. 24/Järjasto/8 sal/14.5.1956, T 25094/E 1 sal, KA. Cf. with Sissiohjesääntö (SissiO), Helsinki 1957, p. 12.
531 PE:n no. 136/Ohjeststo/8b sal/16.5.1957, T 25094/F 5 sal, KA.
532 Sissiohjesääntö (SissiO) (‘Regulation for Guerrilla-type Activities’), Helsinki 1957, pp. 5–6.
533 Ibid, pp. 120–122.
are always linked to operations carried out at the front line, providing support to them in an optimal manner, and are the most effective means available to a guerrilla war.’ Although this regulation principally addressed guerrilla-type activities, it also made frequent references to guerrilla war, a concept which was receiving attention during the era. It is interesting to note that the definition of guerrilla war contains one sentence which hints at the possibility of using the civilian population in the achievement of the goals set for a war. ‘Guerrilla war is a form of warfare carried out using guerrilla troops, often with the aid of the general population, alongside regular military operations or in their place in certain areas or in the entire area of a country in a situation in which the relative strengths of the belligerents are so unbalanced that the defender’s quick defeat is imminent and regular operations on the front line appear impossible or even self-defeating, but a decision is nevertheless taken to continue resistance while giving up continuous front lines.’535 Both definitions presented above were quite clearly formulated by Veikko Koppinen, with the description of guerrilla war in particular being clearly linked to his novel manuscript Räjähtävä tyhjyys (‘Exploding wilderness’).536

While Koppinen sought to standardise the terminology on guerrilla-type activities in general use at the time, using the regulation for guerrilla-type activities in particular, it was Paavo Ilmola, who in his 1958 separate study of high quality, entitled Sissiota, sen edellytykset ja sodankäynnin suuntaviivat (‘Guerrilla warfare, its prerequisites and guidelines for warfare’) raised the question that had hampered the concepts of guerrilla warfare in the Finnish art of war during the 1950s. ‘Texts and discussions on the use of guerrilla troops are characterised by terminological richness. Such terminology includes guerrilla-type activities, resistance movements, sabotage, passive and active resistance, popular risings and even insurgencies. Depending on the predominant type of activity adopted by guerrilla fighters at any given time, or on the objectives that such fighters had set for themselves, their warfare might have come to be called by a name reflecting this situation in common parlance. Not even our own regulations are entirely blameless with regard to the proliferation of terminology, having drawn a parallel between guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities. On the other hand, this error was corrected in Sissohjesääntö (‘Regulation for guerrilla-type activities), which was published later.’ Ilmola regarded guerrilla war as an umbrella term which, according to him, was divided into two major forms of operations which were related – guerrilla-type activities and resistance movements.537

While the criticism presented by Paavo Ilmola regarding the equation of guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities in the Field Regulation was a step in the right direction, guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities were not clearly differentiated until Sissohjesääntö came out in 1957. This regulation defined guerrilla-type activities to be just one of the forms of guerrilla war when viewed from the Finnish perspective. However, the regulation for guerrilla-type activities paints a different picture of guerrilla war compared with the 1954 Kenttäohjesääntö, (‘Field Regulation’), in which guerrilla war was to involve the general population if necessary. ‘Guerrilla war is a form

535 Ibid, pp. 7–8.
536 ‘To the enemy, the exploding wilderness spells deception and playing with the wrong cards, something which deprives him of confidence and courage and renders years of training worthless, which has always been based on five words: enemy over there, engage him! In a guerrilla war, this premise is missing.’ Koppinen (2012), pp. 120–121.
537 Ilmola (1958), pp. 5–6, T 26965/F 20 sal, KA.
of warfare carried out using guerrilla jaeger troops and, often, with the aid of the general population, alongside regular military operations or in their place in certain areas or in the entire area of a country, when the relative strengths of the belligerents are so unbalanced that the defender’s quick defeat is imminent and regular front line operations appear impossible or even self-defeating, but when a decision is nevertheless taken to continue resistance while giving up continuous front lines."\textsuperscript{538}

Soon after the handbooks authored by Koppinen had been published, a revised version of \textit{Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa}, (‘The General Section of the Field Regulation’) was published in 1958, in which guerrilla war was relegated to a subchapter of its own under a main chapter addressing military operations. The commander of the Frontier Guards paid personal attention to the definition of guerrilla war, after the regulation had been submitted for comments: ‘In common parlance, guerrilla war may also refer to warfare that ignores all the international conventions, leading to a situation in which the political background of such a war is somewhat different compared with regular military operations. This, naturally, does not prevent the adoption of a definition of guerrilla war that is precise in military terms and, as I see it, this is exactly what we should do. The author, who evidently wanted to avoid drawing a borderline between guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla war, settled – due to the organisation of his draft – on a solution that paralleled defensive battle with strategic defence and guerrilla-type activities with guerrilla warfare, something that we think was less than successful.’\textsuperscript{539}

In the final confirmed regulation, guerrilla-type activities were described as ‘warfare carried out alongside regular military operations or in their place in enemy-held territory, the more important forms of which are continuous operations conducted by regular or temporarily formed guerrilla jaeger troops.’\textsuperscript{540} The description provided by this regulation of guerrilla warfare and its definition can be regarded as a kind of synthesis of the discussions on guerrilla war, guerrilla-type activities and their adoption to the Finnish art of war that had been going on between 1944 and 1957.

In the late 1950s, the connection between guerrilla-type activities and reconnaissance was growing increasingly stronger. Completed in April 1958 and distributed to the troops in the summer of the same year, \textit{Tiedusteluohjesääntö} (‘Regulation for Reconnaissance’) was the first document to provide official grounds for reconnaissance carried out in connection with guerrilla-type activities. According to the regulation, ‘reconnaissance is one of the tasks of guerrilla jaeger units and detachments, aimed at furthering their own operations as well as intensifying the combat operations led by the various command echelons.’\textsuperscript{541} The forms and principles of reconnaissance presented in this regulation reflected, to a high degree, experiences that the Finnish army had gained from the wars that it had waged, in which context long-range patrolling, as well as shorter patrolling tasks, were described as incorporating the skills and methods needed in guerrilla-type activities.

\textsuperscript{538} \textit{Sissiohjesääntö (SissiO)} (‘Regulation for Guerrilla-type Activities’), Helsinki 1957, pp. 7–8. Cf. \textit{Kenttäohjesääntö II (KO II)} (‘Field Regulation II (KO II)’), Helsinki 1954, p. 254.
\textsuperscript{539} RvE:n no. 81/II/sal/11.9.1957, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (‘a confidential document and a confidential archive’) identifier F 8–9 sal (research permit obtained).
\textsuperscript{540} Kenttäohjesääntö (‘Field Regulation, General Section’), 1958, p. 94 and 215.
\textsuperscript{541} \textit{Tiedusteluohjesääntö (TiedO)} (‘Regulation for Reconnaissance’), Mikkeli 1958, pp. 162–165.
In the 1950s, the Army Combat School in particular had the major responsibility for the guerrilla training of the Frontier Guard’s personnel and officer candidates. By 1958, the Army Combat School had arranged a total of two courses for guerrilla jaeger unit commanders and 13 infantry guerrilla courses, with the number of participants amounting to 396 men. The courses for guerrilla jaeger unit commanders standardised the training provided by the various formations, schools and military schools. Courses were intended to qualify officers and professional NCOs to act as instructors in guerrilla-type activities in their units.\footnote{TaistK:n no. 238/Koultsto/5 c/2.3.1960, T 25991/F 1, KA.} In 1950, a break occurred both in guerrilla jaeger unit commanders and infantry guerrilla courses. The break was caused by a standing order issued in 1958 to transfer the responsibility for such courses from the Army Combat School to the Headquarters of the 2nd Division. The General Headquarters considered that guerrilla courses used up too many of the resources of the Army Combat School, necessitating the distribution of the responsibility to the headquarters of the formations. Due to certain problems, the headquarters of the 2nd division failed to arrange the courses planned for 1959.\footnote{PE:n jvtston kirj. 13.2.1960, T 25991/F 1, KA.}

This break in training prompted the Infantry Office of the General Headquarters to propose that the responsibility be redistributed so that the responsibility for courses for guerrilla commanders or, to use the official designation, ‘The training event for commanders and deputy commanders of guerrilla jaeger battalions’ be transferred to the Army Combat School. The Infantry Office also proposed that the name of the course be changed to the officers’ training event and that its objectives be changed to match officers’ wartime duties. Similarly, the responsibility for courses in guerrilla-type activities and intelligence courses was transferred to the army formations. The Infantry Division had also drafted course objectives, according to which the students were to be given an orientation in guerrilla-type activities conducted on the level of army corps, brigades and basic formations.\footnote{Ibid.} Thus, the problems associated with training responsibilities were closely linked to the dual nature of guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare and to ambiguous definitions.

In response to the proposal by the General Headquarters, the Army Combat School prepared a statement noting that especially Sissikoulutusopas (1956) and Sissiohjesääntö (1957), as well as the training provided on the various courses, had put training back on track. ‘On the basis of the above, it can be stated that issues related to guerrilla-type activities, after some initial difficulties, have been put back on the rails and that normality has been restored, even in this field.’ By early 1969, the Finnish Military Academy had in place a curriculum that provided rigorous training in guerrilla-type activities. Junior officers were found to have had fairly good training in guerrilla-type activities, regarding both personal skills and training competence. At the Army Combat School and the National General Staff College, guerrilla-type activities had been seamlessly integrated into general tactics.\footnote{TaistK:n no. 238/Koultsto/5 c/2.3.1960, T 25991/F 1, KA.}
The response of the Army Combat School highlighted the relationship between guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare and the fuzzy border between the two concepts. A review of the situation indicated that the National General Staff College and the Army Combat School provided training, within the subject of general tactics, in leadership for guerrilla operations conducted by wartime army corps and brigades. Teaching provided by the Finnish Military Academy provided junior officers with skills in guerrilla-style combat, which they brought with them to army units. The performance of guerrilla jaeger troops, opportunities for their use, and the general arrangements for training in guerrilla-type activities would be best managed, in the view of the Army Combat School, via regulations and by resorting to the experience of senior officers. By contrast, the Army Combat School saw that the order issued by the General Headquarters, requiring the Army Combat School instructors ‘to orientate their students in guerrilla warfare conducted within the framework of a basic formation’, led to problems.\(^{546}\)

The position of the Army Combat School was clear. Although the regulations referred to guerrilla warfare as an option, the Defence Forces were poorly prepared to provide training in it, thereby making it a completely new training objective. The provision of training in guerrilla-type activities on the various levels, alongside other training, was, according to the Army Combat School, in good shape. The various branches of the defence had been issued clear instructions covering the topics on which training was to be provided and the number of hours of instruction to be given, all of which had been integrated into military exercises and even applied to the live ordnance exercises of artillery units in Rovajärvi. ‘If the intention really is to expand the scope of training in guerrilla-type activities, that is, to include guerrilla war waged in Finland, the Army Combat School will naturally contribute to such training. However, considering the significance of the issue, the General Headquarters should provide the instructors of the schools involved with orientation on the issue, thereby ensuring that the training provided follows general guidelines laid down in advance.’\(^{547}\) This is a clear indication of the fact that in 1960, the Defence Forces had insufficient resources for providing training in guerrilla-type activities or a large-scale guerrilla war.

From the viewpoint of the arrangements in place for the national defence, the functioning of the Defence Forces and the Finnish art of war, the late 1940s and the early 1950s were a period during which guerrilla-type activities – in theory at least – stabilised their position in the military operations that formations conducted. On the other hand, guerrilla war was regarded in discussions as an extreme form of warfare and as an option for fighting under desperate conditions. The key content of Sisäikoulutusopas and Sissiohjesääntö, both authored by Veikko Koppinen, directed training, the objective of which was to take combat to the enemy-held territory, thereby furthering the operations of the Finnish forces. Although guerrilla-type activities proper were divided into two types of operations – concerted and dispersed – concerted guerrilla tactics continued to be regarded as the principal mode of fighting in the

\(^{546}\) Ibid.

\(^{547}\) Ibid.
early 1960s. With a systematic training system for guerrilla-type activities in place, concerted guerrilla-type activities achieved an almost established position in the late 1950s, with especially the Frontier Guard paying serious attention to it until they were superseded by more dispersed tactics in the mid-1960s. By contrast, guerrilla war still required a great deal of study with regard to both training and the art of war.

**Parachute training in long-range reconnaissance and guerrilla-type activities**

The change that took place in the Finnish art of war in the late 1950s was characterised by solutions and lessons obtained from abroad and the adoption of international influences. The ‘paratrooper guerrilla jaegers’ training, for which ideas were presented between 1958 and 1960; can be seen as an example of such influences. Such ideas led to the initiation of parachute courses in 1961 and the establishment of the Parachute Jaeger School in 1962. The training of Finnish paratroopers included guerrilla-type activities from the very beginning; unlike foreign examples, the Finnish paratrooper was not a soldier of airborne troops but a patrolman with special training in long-range reconnaissance and guerrilla-type activities. This is why the badge depicting a spruce twig was adopted in 1962 as the training branch em-
blem of the paratroopers – a spruce twig being an obvious reference to forests, the operational area of Finnish guerrilla jaeger.551

Large airborne operations in the European theatre during the Second World War, such as Operation ‘Market Garden’ in the Netherlands in September 1944, demonstrated the efficiency of paratroopers in warfare and in the transportation of large number of troops from one area to another.552 Paratrooper training became increasingly common in many armies after the Second World War. Airborne troops were also more frequently used in wars waged throughout the 1950s.553 During the Continuation War, Finnish long-range patrol units under the direct control of General Headquarters had experimented with parachute drops but, for several reasons, the number of such drops had remained limited. Captain Keijo Ilkama, who served at the Air Force Headquarters, prepared a study while a student on intelligence course 5 for officers in 1954, in which he proposed that ‘a guerrilla training centre’ be established in the Air Force. This study by Captain Ilkama is an extremely interesting and highly detailed description of the methods by which training in parachute drops and guerrilla tactics could be arranged through close cooperation between the Air Force and the infantry.554 The study also bore surprising resemblance to the organisation, operations and training of the Parachute Jaeger School, which was founded in 1962.

Ilkama’s proposal for combining guerrilla-type activities with parachute training, both necessary for long-range reconnaissance operations, was not the first of its kind. Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen had made a proposal in a memorandum submitted in 1951, which was practically identical to that of Ilkama’s and which contained an attachment entitled ‘a proposal for the arrangement of training in guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare for tactical guerrilla leaders’. Section VII of attachment 8 to Karhunen’s memorandum discussed training carried out in collaboration with the Air Force. It provided detailed calculations presented in hours for transport by air,

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554 Ilkama, Keijo: Sisäisimmiltäkohtuuta lentuojaissa, upseerien tiedustelulakarnis 5:n tutkijana vuodelta 1954 (‘Guerrilla-type activities in the Air Force, a study prepared on intelligence course 5 for officers in 1954’), the research data base of the Department of Military History, a folder without an identifier, the Department of Military History at the National Defence University.
for parachute training, for communication with the Air Force, and for organising a chain of supply with the aid of the Air Force. From this it can be concluded that Captain Keijo Ilkama had used the 1951 memorandum by Veikko Karhunen as background material for his study.

In any event, Ilkama’s study can be directly linked to the fact that the Air Force Headquarters made a proposal in a confidential document dated 11 May 1955 to the Training Division of the General Headquarters that ‘provision of parachute training for conscripts be initiated’. The Training Division sent the Air Force’s proposal to the Infantry Division, Mobilisation Division and Operations of the General Headquarters for comments. Comments received suggested that the provision of parachute training for conscripts was worth considering and merited further investigation. The Air Force Headquarters took advantage of the positive tone of the statements, sending a ‘cursory calculation of the costs that parachute training would incur’, dated 11 December 1955, to the General Headquarters. In addition to a detailed calculation, the memorandum proposed that ‘in order to ensure that training would be put on track from the very beginning, at least one officer should be sent to Sweden to attend the instructors’ course at the Swedish paratrooper school or, alternatively, Sweden should be requested to send an instructor to provide training here.’ All of this indicates that not only was there considerable interest in parachute operations combined with guerrilla tactics in the mid-1950s but also a clear need for such training.

However, as the experience of paratrooper training in Finland of the 1950s was insufficient for the initiation of a systematic parachute training, Finland looked abroad for lessons and examples. France provided the most natural opportunity to gain new influences, as it was a country that had specialised in airborne troops and had military schools with which Finland had good relations. Another natural choice was Sweden, which had established a school specialising in paratrooper training known as Arméns Fallskärmsjägarskola (FJS) in 1952. The Finnish officers sent to France and Sweden, one to each country, brought back information on which Finnish paratrooper training was founded. However, not until 1957 did that paratrooper training in Finland gain real impetus. That year Colonel Jorma Järventaus, adjutant general and chief of training and education at the General Headquarters, visited FJS while visiting the Swedish Armed Forces. Järventaus was evidently familiar with the content of the documents and proposals drafted in 1955, as he asked the commander of the Swedish Armed Forces whether Finland could send officers to attend par-

555 Everstiluutnantti Veikko Karhusen muistio vuodelta 1951, liite 8, n:ttä (‘A memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Veikko Karhunen from 1951, attachment 8, no identifier’), T 20239/F 1 sal, KA.


558 Sihvo, Sami: An interview conducted on 23 October 2013.
chute courses arranged by FJS. The Swedes responded officially by inviting two officers or, alternatively, one officer and one NCO, to attend a course to be arranged in 1958.559

Captain Kaj Hagelberg, Commander of the 3rd Company, Jaeger Battalion 2, had repeatedly told to his colleagues over the years about his interest in attending a parachute course and, as no such courses were available in Finland, had on many occasions raised the question of the need to have such training in Finland. The Infantry Division of the General Headquarters was clearly aware of Hagelberg’s interest and his proposals.560 The invitation from Sweden, Hagelberg’s interest, and the curiosity of the deputy of the Inspector of the infantry, Major General Arvi Kurenmaa led to Hagelberg being asked whether he was willing to attend a course in Sweden. Lieutenant Colonel Martti Hannila, Deputy of the Chief of the Training Division of the General Headquarters, asked Hagelberg about the issue as follows: ‘Since you have repeatedly talked about your interest in initiating parachute training in Finland, would you be prepared to go to Sweden, in order to attend a parachute course, if we decided to send somebody there?’ Apparently Hagelberg’s response left little room for interpretation, as he was sent to Sweden in May 1958, deemed to be the Finn who was best suited for attending a parachute course. Hagelberg spent a total of five weeks on various courses, gaining familiarity with parachute training at Arméns Fallskärmsjägarskola and attending such training. Hagelberg gathered a sizeable body of information on Swedish parachute training, preparing a detailed report on his experiences and compiling a memorandum on the basis of his report that discussed the guidelines for corresponding training in Finland.561

At about the same time, in 1957–1958, 1st Lieutenant Sami Sihvo had received orders to attend an infantry course for officers arranged in France. This course began in autumn 1957 and was scheduled for completion in August 1958. The programme and teaching of this course was heavily influenced by the Algerian Crisis, which began in 1958 and which is why the training it provided was focused on anti-guerrilla operations. In 1958, Sami Sihvo had requested his commanding officers on the course about the possibility to complete a parachute training course in France. This is why Sihvo underwent a medical check-up, along with Frenchmen seeking admission to the parachute troops, including a fitness test in May 1958. Around the mid-summer of 1958, the French officers on the course were sent to Algeria in order to participate in the war that was in progress there, which led to the termination of the course. As more than two months of the original course period remained, the non-French officers were given an opportunity to complete their training at a French training centre of their choice. A French colleague of 1st Lieutenant Sihvo suggested that he take a parachute course at the Pau military base, schedules to be arranged between 7 June and 27 August 1958, a suggestion that was ideal with regard to the duration of Sihvo’s secondment in France. Sihvo contacted Finland on the issue, ap-

plying to the General Headquarters for a permission to participate, which was granted only one day before the commencement of the course.562

In practice, the course that Sihvo attended was a basic course for paratrooper officers, arranged at the Pau training base for airborne troops, the French name of which was Base École des Troupes Aéroportées. The content of the course was focused, according to Sihvo, on ‘tactical issues’; in other words, tactical combat training and jump instruction constituted the main portion of the programme. With regard to training in guerrilla tactics, the course focused on anti-guerrilla operations, in which training was given during the course. Sami Sihvo prepared a two-part, detailed memorandum on his secondment to France, emphasising the influences gained from abroad and their use in Finland. According to Sihvo, France was an interesting and useful country for Finland for a variety of reasons. With regarding to the Finnish art of war, the key aspects, in Sihvo’s assessment, were France’s Western orientation and the experiences that this country at war had accumulated. ‘France is a country at war and in a position in which it needs to solve practical problems forced upon it. The French Army is not an army of a rich country, and cannot ignore the problems regarding training, supply, tactics and technology that we also face. French tactics, in the small scale at least, are very similar to ours.’563

By the end of 1958, two Finnish officers, Captain Kaj Hagelberg and 1st Lieutenant Sami Sihvo, had, as if by chance, simultaneously received parachute training outside Finland, bringing home a host of valuable experiences. The General Headquarters took a deep interest in the detailed information and experiences in Hagelberg's and Sihvo’s reports, prompting the Infantry Division to plan the initiation of paratrooper training in Finland. Captain Jukka Suvinimi, posted at the Infantry Division of the General Headquarters, was ordered to draft guidelines for Finnish paratrooper training. Suvinimi prepared his proposal in collaboration with Captain Kaj Hagelberg, leading to the organisation of Suvinimi’s proposal to be heavily influenced by Hagelberg’s memorandum entitled ‘Thoughts on initiating paratrooper training in Finland’.564

On 31 December 1959, the issue was presented to Lieutenant General Sakari Simelius, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, who ordered a special Paratrooper Training Committee to be set up to examine the issue. The objective set for the


563 Selvitys komennukselta Ranskaan ajalta 1.8.57–31.9.58 ja Selvitys komennuksesta laskuvarjojoukkueen koulutukseen ajalta 8.7.–31.9.58 (‘Account of my secondment in France between 1 August 1957 and 31 September 1958, including my secondment at the paratrooper school between 8 July and 31 August 1958’), Sami Sihvo, copies of documents from Sihvo’s private collections in the possession of the author of this thesis. Sihvo, Sami: An interview conducted on 23 October 2013.

committee was to formulate guidelines and foundations for the initiation of paratrooper training in Finland as soon as possible. The committee was tasked to submit its report to the General Headquarters by 1 April 1960. Lieutenant Colonel Simo Sirkkanen (PE jv-os) was ordered to chair the committee; with Captain Jukka Suviniemel (PE jv-os) functioning as its secretary and Colonel Olavi Valonen (PE huolto-os), Lieutenant Colonel Martti Avela (RvE); Lieutenant Colonel Erkki Setälä (PE koul-os); Major Ernie Kanninen (PE op-os); Major Raimo Heiskanen (PE tarktsto); Captain Martti Suhonen (PE järj-os); and Captain Veli-Matti Siiskonen (IlmavE) being its ordinary members. Captain Kaj Hagelberg (UudjP) was ordered to act as an expert to the committee, without actually being one of its official members. The committee held frequent meetings in early 1960, enabling it to complete its report by 21 March 1960.565

The memorandum by the Parachute Training Committee and the proposals presented by it focused on a plan which aimed at giving a selected group of conscripts parachute jaeger training adapted to Finnish conditions, enabling them to be placed in wartime reconnaissance and guerrilla jaeger units. The training also aimed at maintaining the operational preparedness of personnel who had undergone parachute training and had been placed in the reserve, by providing them with refresher training and by developing collaboration between the various arms of the defence through putting in place fire support and flight task capability related to guerrilla-type activities and reconnaissance operations. However, the committee saw no opportunities for training actual airborne troops. The report submitted by the committee stated that ‘the designation to be applied to soldiers who had undergone paratrooper training be paratrooper jaeger’, which in itself is an apt description of Finnish training in long-range reconnaissance tasks. Infantry tactics in the 1960s did not recognise actual special troops, with jaeger training being regarded as basic infantry training. For this reason, some commentators suggested that parachute training should only be regarded as a supplement to other basic training. The key proposal by the committee was the establishment of a paratrooper unit or school with a fixed operational model. Better than separate courses, such a unit would create the necessary prerequisites for the development of collaboration between the army and the air force – a necessity for guerrilla-type activities – ‘which require increased consideration as the scope of guerrilla-type activities is expanding’. The report also highlighted the need for creating a combat regulation for parachute troops, especially if parachute training was to be continued or extended. The committee noted that before a paratrooper school could be operational, its personnel should first be trained, all special equipment acquired and a location suitable for training identified.566

Following the proposal by the Parachute Training Committee, the first experimental parachute course in Finland was arranged in Utti between 11 July and 13 August 1960, in collaboration between the Air Force Headquarters and the Karelia Air Command. Captain Kaj Hagelberg acted as the commander of the course, with 1st Lieutenant Sami Siikavo being his deputy. From among 300 applicants, a total of 12

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565 PE:n no. 12/21.3.1960, Suunnitelma laskuvarjokoulutuksen toimeenpanosta, Laskuvarjokoulutustoimikunnan mietintö (‘A plan for the implementation of parachute training, a memorandum by the Parachute Training Committee’), UtJR:n perinnearkisto. See also Solasaari (2004), pp. 23–33.
566 Ibid.
officers and NCOs representing the Defence Forces and three NCO the Frontier Guard were selected. As two individuals who had been selected for the course failed to attend the course, a total of 13 individuals completed the course successfully. In the autumn of 1960, between 3 and 4 October, a refresher course was arranged for the same personnel in Utti. By 1961, Finnish parachute training was already in full swing. The first course for parachute training instructors was arranged in summer 1961, followed by the second parachute course for professional officers and NCOs between 26 and 29 July, a training event for Air Force cadets held between 3 July and 8 July, and the first parachute course for conscripts between 31 July and 2 September 1961 and the second between 4 September and 7 October 1961.567

While the experiences gained from the courses arranged for career personnel and conscripts in 1960 and 1961 were positive, the objectives to be set for the training and their link to wartime operations were still in their infancy. However, no factors speaking against the establishment of a paratrooper school were identified on the experimental courses. At around the same time, with the General Headquarters drafting the principles for territorial defence which included training in guerrilla-type activities, the planners also regarded paratrooper training as necessary for ensuring the reconnaissance and long-range patrolling capabilities of guerrilla troops which were directly under control of the High Command. This aspect was highlighted not only by the members of the Parachute Training Committee but also Major Kaj Hagelberg and Captain Sami Sihvo, who had participated in the planning.568 After a circuitous process, following planning and experimentation spanning several years, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces approved at a presentation held on 26 October 1961 that the Parachute Jaeger School be established in an experimental composition in Utti under the command of the 3rd Division, initiating its operations as of 1 February 1962.569

Training provided to conscripts at the Parachute Jaeger School (LjK) was divided from the very beginning into a basic training period, an NCO and jump training period, and a specialisation period. The training programme also included two live ammunition exercises and, from 1963 onwards, a two-week exercise in Lapland aimed at providing conscripts with experience in jumping and guerrilla-type activities under wintry conditions. As its name suggests, the focus of training was on paratrooper training, comprising jump, guerrilla tactics and reconnaissance training. Although guerrilla-type and reconnaissance activities followed fairly established patterns in the Defence Forces and Frontier Guard in the early 1960s, the guerrilla-style aspects of the newly-established paratrooper training were still undergoing their formation processes. Practical training was also hampered by the partially outdated content of infantry regulations on combat, reconnaissance and guerrilla training in effect at the time. This is why the personnel at LjK were forced to create ope-

567 Ibid. See also Varumiisten laskunvarjohyppykurssi 1 (‘Parachute course for conscripts number 1’), 31.7.–2.9.1961, Orivesi 2011, pp. 8–15.
569 PE:n no. 1746/Jvst0/12 h/26.10.1961, T 25094/F 9 sal, KA. Note. Kaj Hagelberg was promoted to the rank of Major in 1960, and Sami Sihvo to Captain in 1961.
rational models for guerrilla and reconnaissance activities by themselves or shape such models on the basis of experimentation.  

Sami Sihvo confirmed in his interview that the training given in guerrilla-type activities at LjK between 1962 and 1964 was based to a high degree on instructors’ personal experiences and views on guerrilla-type activities. Neither was any appreciable advantage taken of the skills and experience of the Frontier Guard personnel in guerrilla training, although small-scale collaboration with the Frontier Guards located closest to Utti was practised on occasion, especially in connection with manoeuvres. Sihvo also said that one factor that might have contributed to the foundation of LjK was the army leadership’s desire to establish a separate unit, dedicated to guerrilla-style and reconnaissance activities, within the Defence Forces. However, LjK was increasingly providing and developing training in guerrilla-type activities. For example, the training plan for 1963 included approximately 200 hours of training in guerrilla-style activities, which represents less than 10 per cent of the total hours dedicated to training. Although several hours had been reserved for theory and practice of guerrilla-type activities, their number was regarded as too small from the very beginning, compared with the targets set for training. By comparison, in the 1970s, LjK dedicated more than 400 hours to training in guerrilla-type activities, which corresponded to around 25 per cent of the total of training hours. Training on the first paratrooper course was initiated at short notice and with limited resources, causing instruction to be characterised by improvisation.

Insufficient guidelines for guerrilla and reconnaissance activities in particular led to a situation in which paratroopers were used just as any airborne troops in manoeuvres and combat exercises arranged in 1963 and 1964. The Operations and Training Divisions of the General Headquarters believed that this trend was attributable to unconfirmed training instructions and the unclear wartime role of paratroopers, prompting them to address the issue as soon as possible. At a presentation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, held in November 1964, the wartime duties of paratroopers and the operational concepts derived from such duties were confirmed to be ‘long-range patrolling and special reconnaissance operations deep in the enemy’s rear, special tasks and the provision of support to general guerrilla operations and, in exceptional cases, actual guerrilla-type activities’. The justifications for the presentation emphasised the fact that the ‘usage doctrine’ of paratroopers at wartime could possibly not follow the principles of use applied by great powers to their paratroopers. At the same presentation, two guidelines were confirmed. The first was ‘permanent tactical training guidelines’ for paratrooper training, according to which the emphasis of training should be placed on paratroopers’ wartime functions in the order of importance stated above; while the second guideline concerned general guidelines for the use of LjK’s troops in war exercises. Conscripts undergone paratrooper training were to be


\[571\] Sihvo, Sami: An interview conducted on 23 October 2013.

\[572\] Ibid. Reiman (2004), pp. 78–79. See also Kajosmaa (2011), p. 22, SK/1249, the Department of Military History at the National Defence University.
placed primarily in the reconnaissance battalion which was under the direct control of the High Command, and, secondly, in the case of surplus men, in guerrilla jaeger units directly under the High Command.573

A pronounced change in the guerrilla training provided by the Parachute Jaeger School took place over the course of 1967 when Captain Olavi Jokela acted as the Commander of the Paratrooper Company. Acting in collaboration with the leadership of the School, Captain Jokela harmonised the School’s training plans with the policy statements issued by the General Headquarters, effectively giving guerrilla training a more central role in the training plan. In practical terms, this translated into a reduction in the number of hours dedicated to close combat skills in favour of guerrilla and reconnaissance training to be carried out during conscripts’ NCO and jump training and specialisation periods.574

Paratroopers’ training can be said, with justification, to have been one of the links in the development of Finnish guerrilla-type activities. On the one hand, Finnish officers looked abroad for models; on the other hand, they tapped into strong national traditions in guerrilla-type activities. The experiences that Kaj Hagelberg and Sami Sihvo had gathered abroad played a key role in the planning and initiation of Finnish parachute training. The establishment of the Parachute Jaeger School in 1962 and the ensuing period were characterised by continuous interaction between experimentation and development in the field of guerrilla training and guerrilla-type activities. Although the training programmes, training plans and the focus of training varied, training in guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla skills made slow progress as LjK was gaining experience. By the late 1960s, the Parachute Jaeger School had overcome the most difficult problems, bringing training in guerrilla-type activities to a high standard.

Veikko Koppinen – a man with ideas for guerrilla-type activities and the father of ‘Exploding Wilderness’

Veikko Koppinen is frequently referred to as a man with ideas for guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare and an innovative developer of such tactics. However, Koppinen’s career and persona tell us about his involvement in Finnish guerrilla-type activities a great deal more than mere articles or preparatory documents could do. This is why Koppinen’s personal history deserves a discussion that goes deeper than that of most of the other individuals referred to in this context.

Veikko William Koppinen was born to a merchant family on 31 March 1910 in Multia, which is a municipality located in central Finland, at the southern tip of Suomenselkä, a drainage divide crossing western Finland, 60 kilometres from Jyväskylä. Koppinen initiated his involvement with Finland’s national defence while he was still a student at the Haapamäki co-educational school, enrolling in the school’s Civil

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573 PE:n no. 709/Optsto/11 sal/2.11.1964 (esittely puolustusvoimain komentajalle) (‘A proposal for the commander of the Defence Forces’), T 26965/F 32 sal, KA.
Guard which provided him with a modicum of military training and experience during his formative years between 1924 and 1929.575

After reaching conscription age, Veikko Koppinen started his military service in the Finnish White Guard in 1929. Evidently the experiences that Koppinen had gained in the ranks of the Civil Guard and his personal inclination towards being a woodsman caused him to take a decision to apply for a study place at the Finnish Military Academy, located at the time in Munkkiniemi, Helsinki. Between 1930 and 1932, Koppinen was a student on a cadet course, after which he initiated his career serving for the Second Machine Gun Company of the Karelia Guard Regiment in his capacity as junior officer. Koppinen’s competence and skills accelerated his career to more demanding tasks in the office of inspector of the infantry at the General Staff between 1935 and 1939.576

During the extra refresher training of the troops arranged before the outbreak of the Winter War (Finnish literature normally refers to the extra refresher training by its Finnish abbreviation ‘YH’; this exercise, in effect, was a covert mobilisation), Koppinen acted as the commander of a mortar company in the organisation of Infantry Regiment 33 placed under the 11th Division.577 After the Winter War, during what is known as the Interim Peace, Koppinen remained in the services, first acting as the adjutant of the Infantry Regiment 6 and then as the commander of the mortar company in the 2nd brigade. In the early stages of the Continuation War, Koppinen continued in his post as the commander of a mortar company at the Infantry Regiment 23 of the 5th Division in the VI Army Corps of the Karelian Army. In February 1942, he was transferred to the 11th Division under the VI Army Corps, where he became the chief of the Operations office of the Division Headquarters. During the period of static warfare between 1942 and 1944, Koppinen acted as the chief of the Intelligence Office of the Division Headquarters of the 11th Division of the VI Army Corps, and as a desk officer at the Staff of the Senior Inspector of War Schools. In the summer of 1944, during a phase when the Finnish army was fighting defensive battles, Koppinen temporarily held the post of the chief of staff in the 11th Division during the days when the massive Tali-Ihantala battle was being waged, and as the chief of staff of Group Puroma in the Lapland War between 1944 and 1945.578 Against this background it can be safely said that Veikko Koppinen gained a wealth of versatile and colourful, albeit burdensome, experiences during the

576 Ibid. While the inspector or the infantry and his office were under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, they were part of the organisation of the General Staff. The office of the inspector of the infantry was tasked with assisting the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces and to develop the activities, training and organisation of the infantry. See, for example, Virkki, Eino: Sotalaitosoppi II osa (‘A doctrine regarding the military system, Part II’), Helsinki 1936, pp. 178–179.
577 As of 1 January 1940, the 2nd Division.
war, which certainly played a role in the descriptions of the events that he presented in ‘Exploding Wilderness’.

During his postwar years, from 1945 onwards, Koppinen served at the office of the inspector of the infantry, working with tasks related to infantry technology and studying later at the National General Staff College. After graduating, Koppinen taught operational skills and tactics at the National General Staff College until 1949. He obtained his first commander post at the II Battalion of Infantry Regiment 6, a position which he held between 1949 and 1950. Between 1950 and 1952, Koppinen acted as the chief of staff in the military province of south-western Finland.579

Between 1 December and 8 November 1957, Koppinen acted as an aide to the chief of the Army Combat School. *Sissikoulutusopas, Sissiohjesääntö* (‘Handbook in guerrilla training and Regulation for guerrilla-type activities’, respectively), several articles and, most likely, the manuscript for a novel bearing the title *Räjähtävä tyhjyys* (‘Exploding wilderness’) – the circumstances around its coming into being will probably remain unclear for ever – date back to this period that Koppinen spent on the shores Tuusulanjärvi. After his stint at the Army Combat School, he was appointed deputy of the National General Staff College. After his stint as an assistant to the chief of the National General Staff College, Koppinen took up a post as the deputy chief of the General Staff, after which he became aide to the chief of the Frontier Guards in 1965.580 After holding the assistant’s post for a year, Veikko Koppinen was appointed chief of the Frontier Guards, which, at the time, was the highest position in the Frontier Guard. Koppinen resigned his post as the chief of the Frontier Guards after reaching the statutory age on 31 March 1970.581 Veikko Koppinen achieved the rank of Lieutenant General, which is an indication of high personal capabilities as an officer.

Vaikko Koppinen was later called – humorously – ‘Finland’s Che Guevara’.582 However, Koppinen was no theorist for a revolutionary struggle for freedom; rather, he was an open-minded and dyed-in-the-wool advocate of unconventional forms of fighting, tactics and methods of combat.583 His contemporaries nicknamed him *Abma-Koppinen* (‘Koppinen the Wolverine Man’), *Sissi-Koppinen* (‘Koppinen the Guerrilla

579 Ibid.
580 Kopininen’s appointment to the position of the assistant of the chief of the Frontier Guards was backed by the Commander -in-Chief of the Defence Forces, General Sakari Simelius. He refers to the issue in his memoirs: ‘With regard to the plans on general appointments at the armed at the end of year (1964), it should be mentioned that as the assistant to the chief of the Frontier Guards, Lieutenant General Veikko Karhunan, was approaching the statutory retirement age, I proposed to the President of the Republic at the next cabinet presentations that Lieutenant General Veikko Koppinen be appointed Karhunan’s successor. Koppinen could later be appointed the chief of the Frontier Guards, succeeding Lieutenant General Antti Pennanen in this post. With regard to his character and interests, I found him highly suited for this post. This plan was effected later, in the way I had proposed.’ Simelius (1983), pp. 225–226.
582 Palmén, Niilo: An interview on 19 March 2007.
Jaeger’) and *Raja-Koppinen* (‘Koppinen the Border Patroller’). Such nicknames provide an apt description of the various phases of Koppinen’s life, interests and career. Koppinen also made himself a guinea pig for his ideas. Starting in the early 1950s and continuing well into his retirement, Koppinen spent every spring on the trail on skis in Lapland, bringing elements of guerrilla-style fieldcraft and survivalism to his trips. In the early years of his trips, when the hunting of predators was still legal, Koppinen often brought home wolverine pelts from Lapland; these pelts then made a bed for his dog that accompanied him on his trips. *Sissi-Koppinen* developed guerrilla tactics and warfare, *Raja-Koppinen* was the chief of the Frontier Guard, and *Alma-Koppinen* hunted and explored the outdoors. Whenever possible, he sought to combine business with pleasure, conducting his inspections of Frontier Guard stations by skiing.584

Koppinen was a nature enthusiast, heart and soul. At his holiday cottage in Multia, he was free to hone his fieldcraft skills, and to fish and hike in the outdoors. In Multia he also developed prototypes for simple equipment, suitable for guerrilla-style activities. Such equipment included a tarp made of plastic, capable of being turned at a moment’s notice into a boat carrying one man; a pyramid-shaped tarp – ‘nippa’ – made of impermeable fabric, capable of being pitched by tying its top part to the top of a young bent birch tree; a sleeping bag made of kraft paper; experiments with snow caves, and so on.585 Koppinen argued that a paper sleeping bag was ideally suited for guerrilla-type activities, as the occupant could always escape, even if the bag caught fire in a campfire. He also experimented with issues related to food supply and surviving in the field. Koppinen’s normal experiments included air-curing roach strung on a cord, and various methods of cooking in the field. Koppinen’s daughter often rowed his boat, accompanied him on overnight trips to some island, or sat in a sledge in wintertime to provide ballast when Koppinen was training his dog to pull a sled.586

Despite his image of being a craggy-faced professional officer, Koppinen was a loving father and a sensitive poet. Among other things, he kept in close contact with his family by letter during the war. His letters were characterised by an optimistic tone; they were openly sensitive, and many of them were concluded by a brief poem or a stanza.587 Looking back to his father, Kaiju Kallio, Veikko Koppinen’s daug-

584 Kallio, Kaiju: An interview on 29 August 2007.
585 See, for example, *Lumimaja ja sen rakentaminisohjet* (‘A snow cave and how to build one’), an undated memorandum by Veikko Koppinen, Veikko Koppinen’s private collection; a copy of the memorandum is in the possession of the author of this thesis. SKK:n no. 1.9.1959 (maajituskokeilu) (‘An experiment with accommodation in the field’), Veikko Koppinen’s private collection; a copy is in the possession of the author of this thesis. SKK:n no. 371/8.5.1960 (lumimajakokeilu) (‘An experiment with a snow cave’), T 25991/Ea 1, KA. K-SRE:n no. 864/II/8/13.4.1960, T 25991/Ea 1, KA. LR:n no. 845/II/8 b/17.3.1960, T 25991/Ea 1, KA. RVLE:n no. 13/X/sal/22.1.1960 (kuuntelutietoustuwilaiden käyttö sissikoulutuksessa) (‘Listening equipment in the training of guerrilla-type activities’), RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970 (a confidential document and a confidential archive) identifier F 11 sal (research permit obtained).
586 Kallio, Kaiju: An interview on 29 August 2007.
ter, said: ‘While other fathers, returning home from army exercises in Rovajärvi, brought their daughters dolls wearing the traditional dress of the indigenous Sami people, my father brought me a traditional Sami knife, and I didn’t see anything odd in this. Indeed, returning home with a bouquet in his hand would definitely not have been Koppinen’s style. Instead, he would cheer up his nearest and dearest by composing poems which he was able to write for just about any occasion. There are countless numbers of them: poems dating back to the war years, written for his wife to alleviate the feelings of longing; poems for his newly-born daughter; poems taking on a narrative form; poems written by way of thanking a hostess of a party; brief poems for Christmas cards, and so forth. Even today it is possible to find a piece of paper, stuck between the pages of a book, on which Koppinen had jotted down a number of rhyming lines. For his grandchildren Koppinen wrote fairy tales with motifs taken from the animal kingdom. For festive occasions, he rerehymed songs which he then proceeded to perform himself — after he first had taught the accompanist the melody of the song.’

Poems written by Veikko Koppinen can still be found at many of the Frontier Guard wilderness cabins. For example, the following poem had been carved with a knife into the wooden covers of a guest book, found in the headquarters hut in the Hiienvaara exercise area in North Karelia: Rajalle polku vie, majalle vie sen tie, rannalle lampareen, välkkyvän veen. Vieritse vaarojen, ylitse jänkien. Sinne käy rajamies, sinne se polku vie.

“The path leads to the border,
To the hut to carry out his order,
To the edge of the pond
Its waters and beyond.
Over tree-covered hills and swamps.
Patrolling the landscape that’s broader’
(Translation by Robin Maylett)

Koppinen was an active writer and a skilled penman. He wrote all his life. In the 1950s, he contributed to Metsästys ja kalastus — a Finnish magazine specialising in sport fishing and hunting — almost on an annual basis. Later, he shifted his attention to articles published in trade magazines and, after he retired from active service, even to letters to the editor. For Koppinen, maintaining his physical condition was a matter of honour. When he turned 50, his colleagues presented him with an archery bow. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a better present for a guerrilla commander. Archery turned into a beloved hobby for him, and he even became a competitive archer. When his near vision began to fail him, he had to shift to a class based on instinctive aiming. In the late 1960s, he supplemented skiing with walking. He spent his retirement in Tapiola, Espoo A couple of hours after the first snow had fallen in Espoo, a lone man would appear on a meadow in Otsoalahti, opening a track with his long skis in the newly-fallen snow.

588 Kallio, Kaiju: An interview on 29 August 2007.
589 The guest book at Hiienvaara, with a poem by V. Koppinen carved into its cover; an observation made by the author of this thesis.
590 Kallio, Kaiju: An interview on 29 August 2007.
Veikko Koppinen’s thoughts on the utilisation of the methods of guerrilla warfare were largely based on his personal views regarding the means available to Finland to defend itself in a cost-effective manner, although, from a military point of view – availability and quality of materiel – Finland had increasingly limited resources to defend its territory against an enemy with superior strength. The issue can be presented by drawing a simple conclusion: Veikko Koppinen had an unprejudiced belief in the methods of guerrilla warfare and their applicability under Finnish conditions, without getting stuck in old patterns. However, handbooks and regulations needed to be, after they had been confirmed, sufficiently clear and simple, enabling the examples in them, when applied to practice to be presented in the form of a simple list of instructions. It is very likely that Koppinen’s need to vent his ideas in the form of a manuscript for a novel was guided by his orders to write a handbook covering training in guerrilla-type activities and a separate regulation for guerrilla-type activities. These were the premises for the novel Räjähtävä tyhjyys, authored by Koppinen.

The period when Räjähtävä tyhjyys was written and the circumstances around its coming into existence can be regarded as yet an unsolved mystery, as the original manuscript, written under the pseudonym of Viljami Korpi, is undated and bears no signature. Many interpretations of this book’s coming into being conclude that Koppinen wrote his book in 1960 or perhaps even later.591 As Koppinen’s novel is known to have been reviewed by the General Headquarters in 1960592 and 1961593, for this reason alone the manuscript, in excess of 200 pages, must have been at an advance stage by 1960.

An examination and comparison of Räjähtävä tyhjyys, Veikko Koppinen’s career, his personal profile, literary production and articles on guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities unequivocally suggest that the book was written during the 1950s. Although the exact time of the writing of the book will probably remain a mystery for ever, it can be concluded that Veikko Koppinen began his novel as a kind of background process while he was working on Sissikoulutusopas (1956) and Sissiohjesääntö (1957), and had completed it after the handbooks and regulations were finished by the end of the 1950s. Both handbooks contain almost identical sentences and phrases as Räjähtävä tyhjyys, and both books emphasise the same issues as Koppinen’s novel.594

592 The Chief of the General Staff of the General Headquarters, T. V. Viljanen, entered a note in the margin of his memorandum dated 1 June 1960, referring to Veikko Koppinen’s proposal regarding the adoption of the methods of guerrilla warfare and, indirectly, to Räjähtävä tyhjyys. ‘Discussed the issue with Col. Koppinen on 7 September.’ A hand-written memorandum by T. V. Viljanen, dated 1 June 1960, T 21622/4, KA. See also Sissitutkustelmu (‘A method for waging guerrilla war’) (a proposal), Helsinki 1.6.1960, SKK:n kirjeistö 1958–60, T 23101/F 3 sal, KA ja T 26965/F 22 sal, KA (‘a research permit granted by the National Defence University’).
593 During his term as the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, General Sakari Simelus entered the following note in his journal on 25 November 1961: ‘Koppinen’s guerrilla war novel’. See Sakari Simelius’ journal, including its attachments from 1961, T 23601/2, KA.
Fairly irrefutable proof of the fact that *Räjähtävä tyhjyys* was written in the early 1950s can be found in Veikko Koppinen’s private collection. While holding the post of assistant to the chief of the Army Combat School, Koppinen prepared a memorandum in 1956 in which he described guerrilla-type activities and the opportunities for them in connection with the various forms of fighting. This four-page memorandum is a summary of the key ideas in *Räjähtävä tyhjyys*. In his memorandum, Koppinen discussed clandestine, brief and lengthy guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare in exactly the same way as he does in *Räjähtävä tyhjyys*. ‘As the future war will be more difficult than the previous one, all available means must be committed to fighting in order to improve our efficiency. In guerrilla-type activities, an individual soldier represents efficiency that is superior by a huge factor compared to that of a fighter on the front line.’

What were the objectives that *Räjähtävä tyhjyys* sought to achieve, and what was its target audience? Over the course of the 1950s, a great number of books known as boys’ adventure books were published. In such books, boys, who were generally scouts, cracked cases involving crime and espionage. A strong patriotic spirit, strict adherence to the ethical principles of warfare, chivalrous treatment of the enemy, and a happy ending suggest that *Räjähtävä tyhjyys* was intended for a young readership who, in addition to enjoying an adventure story, would also learn useful skills. The fairly pedagogical approach of the book lends credibility to this interpretation. Koppinen’s boyish character, prone to engaging in adventure – coupled with his wartime experiences – enabled him to write instructions that were strategic in nature, while on other occasions they provided highly detailed instructions for digging a foxhole or clearing a mine field.

The author of the novel, supposedly a certain 'Viljami Korpi', also reflected the charismatic character of the real author, Veikko Koppinen. By resorting to a pseudonym and by making the protagonist of the book, Colonel Savukorpi, his mouthpiece, Koppinen, using colourful language, puts forth his thoughts on the opportunities open to guerrilla war. ‘The exploding wilderness was Colonel Savukorpi’s favourite phrase, which he used with great success when giving tactical instructions to his subordinate guerrilla district commanders at the time when leaders of guerrilla warfare, ranging from patrol leaders to regional commanders, were receiving refresher training. It is impossible to fight a void; you cannot shell it with artillery fire; you cannot fire at it using automatic weapons; and you cannot launch rockets on it from the air. ‘To the enemy, the exploding wilderness spells deception and playing with the wrong cards, something which deprives him of confidence and courage and renders years of training worthless which has always been based on five words: enemy over there, engage him! In a guerrilla war, this foundation would be missing.’ It will be displaced by a completely new situation, which is: The enemy will see you; just try it — if you take ten steps in any direction, you will be killed; so, stay put, wondering if you will live on for the duration of just one more cigarette. Talking like this and writing like this, Colonel Savukorpi made the eyes of his trainees shine with enthusiasm and the number of volunteers reporting for service grow exponentially. Around a nucleus formed by three hundred officers and seven thousand patrol leaders, he gathered a guerrilla army of

595 Koppinen, Veikko: *Sisätoiminta ja sen suoritusmahdollisuudet eri taistelulajien yhteydessä* (‘Guerrilla-type activities and the opportunities available to them in connection with the various forms of fighting’), Tuusula 10 December 1956, Veikko Koppinen’s private collection; a copy is in the possession of the author of this thesis.

596 Koppinen (2012), p. 16.
nearly 30,000, comprising under-age and over-age volunteers, who, on a certain September day, rallied at 150 places of assembly, received their weapons and equipment, cached them, and, on the next day, turned hundreds of square kilometres of Finnish countryside into an exploding wilderness. The first enemy unit to get a taste of this was an airborne division that had invaded an area near Mikkeli.597

Koppinen’s novel was never published as its publication was strictly forbidden by the top military leadership.598 Over the years, a whole host of interpretations and theories have been proposed for the publication ban. Pekka Visuri, among others, has argued that the ban was laid down by the General Headquarters. According to Visuri, Lieutenant General T.V. Viljanen had, in a review that he had written in the summer of 1960 of a document entitled Siissisotamenetelmä, (‘A method for waging guerrilla war’) written by Koppinen, put forth a dissenting opinion; however, Viljanen probably referred to the novel manuscript entitled Räjähtävä tyhjyys. It is true that Veikko Koppinen drafted a document entitled Siissisotamenetelmä, (‘A method for waging guerrilla war’), dated 1 June 1960, but, as it was labelled confidential, its publication would have been impossible for that reason alone. Heikki Tiilikainen and Ermei Kanninen have also commented on the reasons behind the publication ban. According to Heikki Tiilikainen, the publication ban was motivated by a desire to avoid any references to and any provocations against the Soviet Union, a behaviour typical of the era or, alternatively, by the fact that the idea that Koppinen had presented was too brilliant, prompting the Defence Forces to investigate it in peace without drawing attention to it. ‘It is also possible that the oyster contained a pearl – and they wanted to keep quiet about it.’599 Ermei Kanninen, who had acted as the secretary of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee and who was well familiar with Räjähtävä tyhjyys, commented on the publication ban in similar terms. ‘Being a high-ranking officer, he (Koppinen) must have understood why his book was banned. He naturally felt sorry for having hit too close to the target. Thus, there was no actual need to ban the book. However, the decision was unambiguous: the book could not be published.’600

The Chief of the General Staff of the General Headquarters, T.V. Viljanen, entered a review-like statement regarding Räjähtävä tyhjyys in a memorandum dated 1 June 1960. ‘The novel by Colonel Koppinen is based on the presumption that the adversary would act in a highly chivalrous manner, that a vast supply of provisions could be cached, etc. He assumes the war would last only a few months (around nine). In reality, the adversary may displace the entire population, burn the houses, and shoot the men in order to pacify the Finnish territory over the course of one to two years. Would that be the right policy for Finland under the current circumstances? Instead of a guerrilla war, I recommend the deployment of guerrilla troops in support of the

597 Koppinen (2012), pp. 120–121.
field army, not as its substitute.'

Quite evidently T.V. Viljanen proposed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, Sakari Simelius, that the book remained unpublished, prompting Simelius to take a decision on the awkward issue in spring 1961 and even enter a note on it in his journal.

Deemed to be too politically sensitive, running counter to the political climate of the time, and constituting a provocation against the Soviet Union, the manuscript of Colonel Koppiinen’s manuscript was locked away in archives for decades. In any event, the book is interesting and provides, through its examples, an in-depth insight into the contemporary guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities. *Räjähtävä tyhjyys* constituted a bold proposal and a catalyst that summed up the needs for a change that many sections of the Defence Forces felt to be necessary, including the associated fragmental ideas, and encapsulated them in a crystal-clear doctrine.

Koppiinen was an eternal optimist and was steadfastly loyal. He did not worry about anything beforehand and did not let setbacks discourage him. Loyalty is reflected in his firm belief in the grounds for national defence. He was always loyal to his superiors, one indication of which is the fact that he submitted *Räjähtävä tyhjyys* to the General Headquarters for review. After receiving a refusal of publication permission, he – the loyal officer that he was – left his manuscript to gather dust on a shelf for more than 50 years, with not even his children being aware of it.

Guerrilla tactics, fieldcraft and life in the field were more than just part of a soldier’s work for Koppiinen; for him, they were his mission in life. An analysis of the internal connection between facts reveals that Koppiinen’s enormous contribution to the creation, development and establishment of Finnish-style guerrilla tactics cannot be overlooked. Veikko Koppiinen was an officer with ideas well ahead of his time and one who stood by his moral compass in a manner that sets an example for many people of our time.

However, other interpretations were also proposed. According to contemporary testimonies, Koppiinen was also criticised, especially in the early 1950s, with harsh words for putting forth ‘fooleries of backwoodsmen at the expense of the common people.’ Lieutenant General Erkki Setälä, who had known Veikko Koppiinen well, told the author of this thesis in an interview that he frequently heard certain officers at the General Headquarters – whose names are to be left unmentioned – openly laughing at Koppiinen’s ideas regarding guerrilla-type activities, and directing harsh criticism at his plans and far-reaching experiments. Juhani Ruutu, who had served at the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, also confirmed this.

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601 A hand-written memorandum by T. V. Viljanen, dated 1 June 1960, T 21622/4, KA. See also *Sisissotamonetelmän (ehdotus)* (’A method for waging guerrilla war’) (a proposal), Helsinki 1.6.1960, SKK:n kirjeistö 1958–60 (’Correspondence by the National Defence College’) T 23101/F 3 sal, KA ja T 26965/F 22 sal, KA (’a research permit granted by the National Defence University’).

602 On 23 February 1961, Sakari Simelius made an entry in his journal, referring to the handling of Koppiinen’s *Räjähtävä tyhjyys*: ‘Viljanen: With regard to the issue around Koppiinen book, he attempts to make me ban the publication (I don’t want to get involved in this issue unless I absolutely have to; I have no time to familiarise myself with it.).’ See Sakari Simelius’ journal, including its attachments from 1961, T 23601/2, KA.

603 Kallio, Kaiju: An interview on 29 August 2007.

The General Headquarters issued guidelines with the aim of suppressing and even avoiding the public use of the concept of ‘exploding wilderness’, which Koppinen had introduced in his novel. ‘Exploding wilderness’, set in the Tuohikotti wilderness area in the northern part of present-day Kouvola, was in the General Headquarters’ view excessively provocative, as it presented a train of events that hinted all too openly at a military threat from the Soviet Union. While Koppinen’s ideas were initially regarded as grotesque myth-making based on chivalrous stories – a form of wilderness romance in fact – his theoretical ideas nevertheless resonated with the planners of Finnish defence and were integrated into the territorial defence system and, in particular, the local defence system.605

Scholarly examination of the issue unquestionably shows that Veikko Koppinen was one of the strongest contributors to and leading theorists of guerrilla-style tactics as well as a key innovator in the early stages of the development of such tactics in Finland; indeed, issues related to guerrilla activities appeared to have been a sort of philosophy of life to him. On the other hand, Koppinen’s colleagues gave credit to him for his open-mindedness and courage, a testimony to which is his long and successful career. The younger officer generation in Finland in particular quickly adopted his ideas, showing less prejudice than their senior colleagues. Despite the publishing ban, Räjähtävä tyhjyys circulated within the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard in the form of a scanned handout, being a kind of public secret, and as such it has survived to our day. Even unpublished, Räjähtävä tyhjyys can be said to have exerted strong influence, as based on it and a proposal by Koppinen, entitled Sissisotamenetelmä (‘A method for waging guerrilla war’), a specific committee was established to look into methods available to guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities.

A Guerrilla Tactics Committee is set up to investigate the proposals made by Koppinen and his Räjähtävä tyhjyys

By the early 1960s, high-flying ideas for the methods of guerrilla warfare, theoretical thinking, published texts increasingly open in tone, completed regulations, and the provision of training in guerrilla tactics that were in the process of becoming an established form of warfare, had all grown into a complex system that required more systematic measures in order to be manageable. At the time, the highest-ranking officers of the Defence Forces were paying increased attention to the teaching and training of the methods of guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities.

While holding the post of aide to the chief of the National General Staff College, Colonel Veikko Koppinen drafted a secret report on guerrilla warfare, entitled Sissisotamenetelmä (‘A method for waging guerrilla war’), in which he made a number of proposals for consideration by the General Headquarters. Well aware of the current circumstances and the shortage in materiel that plagued the Defence Forces, Koppinen justified his proposal by the efficiency of guerrilla war as a form of national defence. In his memorandum, Koppinen stated that his proposal addressed a method of guerrilla warfare which was suitable for Finland in view of its scant resources.

of manpower and poor materiel standard, and was based on a field army, accompanied by the deployment of a separate guerrilla army. An army of guerrilla jaegers would cover the entire country, with the field army operating on top it, after a fashion. The memorandum described the troops of the guerrilla army as using stationary tactics at the onset of the hostilities, only changing their defensive tactics to offensive operations when the moment of decisive battle arrived. Where possible, battles were to be waged in areas evacuated of the civilian population. Koppinen proposed that the principle form of fighting be ‘defensive ambush’ in which pairs of guerrilla jaegers, guerrilla jaeger patrols and individual guerrilla jaegers engage the enemy using Claymore-type mines and bursts of fire. According to Koppinen’s calculations, defensive ambush is superior to all other forms of fighting with regard to the casualty ratio.\(^{606}\)

Koppinen’s proposal discussed the need for a completely new and serious way of thinking in the art of war. ‘It is probably unnecessary to exhibit proof for the efficiency for guerrilla war in national defence, as the leadership of the Defence Forces has recently — emphatically — drawn the attention of the army units and military schools to the provision of training and practice in guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities.’\(^{607}\) Veikko Koppinen’s memorandum stirred the high command of the Defence Forces, and the proposal was submitted to the Operations Division of the Defence Forces for further review. Head of Office of the Operations Division, Lieutenant Colonel Taisto Olavi Lehti, entered the following note in the margin of Koppinen’s proposal: ‘Col. Ilmola is requested to familiarise himself with this memorandum and to discuss it with Col. Koppinen (this was requested of me by Col. Koppinen.) 7 June 1960, TOL.’\(^{608}\) After Colonel Paavo Ilmola, Head of the Operations Division, had familiarised himself with Koppinen’s proposal, discussions were initiated between the leadership of the General Headquarters and the Operations Division, leading to the setting up of a specific committee in spring 1961 tasked with looking into Veikko Koppinen’s proposals and thoughts on guerrilla warfare.\(^{609}\)

Over the course of the discussions, the Operations Division of the General Headquarters paid serious attention to a number of scenarios in a situation in which Finland was invaded. Guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities were also highlighted, probably on account of the proposal by Koppinen. One highly interesting document dating to 1960 and linked to this issue is a confidential memorandum drafted by the Operations Division, entitled Operatiiviset olosuhteemme Suomen mahdollisesti joutuessa sotaan lähivuosina (‘Finland’s operational circumstances should the country be drawn into a war in the next few years’). This 65-page memorandum discusses the preparedness of the Defence Forces and its many shortcomings in a tone that is almost sickeningly realistic, providing a view held by the army leadership held at the time.\(^{610}\)


\(^{607}\) Ibid.

\(^{608}\) Sissisotamenetelmä (‘A method for waging guerrilla war’) (a draft), Helsinki 1 June 1960, Ermei Kanninen’s private collection, the original with attachments in the possession of the author to this thesis.

\(^{609}\) Kanninen, Ermei: An interview on 15 May 2013.

\(^{610}\) PE:n no. 1/Opos/sal/11.11.1960, T 26843/Hh 10 sal, KA.
With regard to guerrilla-type activities, preparedness was assessed to be satisfactory at best, despite the fact that the amount of training of conscripts in guerrilla-style combat had increased in relative terms. The training provided at the time did not fully meet the requirements set for guerrilla-type activities under Finnish conditions. Taken as a whole, however, the memorandum recognised that there were increasingly better prerequisites for waging battles with a successful outcome, as the army’s insufficient capacity for long-distance fire and poor opportunities for conducting air reconnaissance could in part be compensated by guerrilla-type activities. The guiding principle of the memorandum linked guerrilla-type activities to all other military operations carried out by ground forces. Guerrilla-type activities were divided into operations that provided direct support to ground operations carried out by an army or an army corps, and operations that were conducted under the direct control of General Headquarters deep in the enemy’s rear. If the enemy’s invasion resulted in the occupation of the entire country, General Headquarters needed to be prepared to launch a guerrilla war. The starting point of a full-scale guerrilla war was twofold: a guerrilla war would ensue if the field army was defeated after its mobilisation, in which case it would adopt at least in part guerrilla tactics using all its weaponry and equipment; or if the country was caught by a surprise occupation, a guerrilla war would ensue carried out by a resistance movement. It follows from this memorandum that while the significance of guerrilla-type activities were recognised and the challenges that they posed to training were well understood, no decision to address such issues in the art of war were taken. From the perspective of the art of war, guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare continued to receive only theoretical attention in discussions at the General Headquarters. No detailed calculations or experiments on the effectiveness of guerrilla-style operations were available.

In April 1961, Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General T.V. Viljanen, issued an order for the establishment of a committee named the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, to be set up at the Operations Divisions of the General Headquarters, basing his decision on the proposal and assessment of the operational situation put forth by Köppinen. During the establishment phase of the committee, the content of guerrilla-type activities and the art of guerrilla war were put under critical scrutiny for the first time, something which comes across in the task assigned to the committee. ‘On several occasions, Colonel V. V. Köppinen has proposed a model for guerrilla-type activities under which patrols of two to three men are left in enemy-occupied territory, divided into sectors for such patrols, and in larger areas, patrols of two to three men are left; such patrols then form guerrilla areas and guerrilla jaeger units which operate under a unified leadership. Such units would use deep forest areas as their support area, operating against enemy troops moving along roads, using wire-operated bounding and anti-tank mines and small arms.’ The Guerrilla Tactics Committee was tasked with looking into the methods of guerrilla warfare and tactics, followed by proposals for further action. The exact wording of the task was the following: ‘To look into the general practicability of the method as a means of waging war in the form of a guerrilla war alongside normal warfare, to examine its practicability in guerrilla-type activities, and to present the necessary proposals.’

611 Ibid.
612 PE:n no. 226/Optsto/11 sal/12.4.1961 (Sissisodankäynnin menettelytavat) (‘Methods of guerrilla warfare’), T 26965/F 24 sal, KA.
The initial composition of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, set up in 1961, was the following: Chair, Colonel Toivo Kytölä (PE op-os), Secretary, Major Ermei Kanninen (PE op-os), and members, Colonel Veikko Koppinen (SKK), Colonel Risto Kare (PE viesti-os), Colonel Aatto Sal mio (PE pion-os) and Lieutenant Colonel Simo Sirkkanen (PE jv-os). The member listed last was probably commissioned to the committee by virtue of his study that discussed the conditions of Northern Finland from the perspective of their suitability for military operations. Initially, the Guerrilla Tactics Committee was placed under the Operations Division of the General Headquarters.613

The Guerrilla Tactics Committee began its work by convening in spring 1961, preparing a plan on time management, research and experimentation related to the assignment of the committee, and the responsibilities of the individual members to draft preliminary reports in accordance with the committee’s objectives. The committee members worked on their assignments alongside their regular duties, except when the committee convened to discuss conclusions or participate in experimental exercises in the role of an observer.614

In autumn 1961, the committee worked intensively. During this time, the committee convened seven times. The committee reviewed the novel by Veikko Koppinen, ‘Räjähätävä tyhjyys’, and his other production. In addition to conducting theoretical research and drafting preparatory reports, the committee also decided to arrange experimental exercises, within the scope of its authorisation, with themes related to guerrilla warfare. The Operations Department of the General Headquarters drafted framework plans and operational grounds for exercises in line with the guidelines provided by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee. The General Headquarters issued an order with an accompanying letter which obligated the committee to arrange exercises in varied terrain in order to obtain the most comprehensive results.615

A total of two experimental exercises proposed by the committee were arranged in autumn 1961. The first exercise was arranged between 19 and 11 September north of Tuohikotti, in other words – the setting of Exploding wilderness – with theme of this exercise being a rifle company advancing through the operational area of a guerrilla jaeger platoon. The unit deployed in the exercise was formed of the professional officers and NCOs from the Karelia Brigade with no previous skills or training in guerrilla-type activities.616 After receiving brief training in guerrilla tactics, the unit – with insufficient skills – was assigned the task of acting as the Red Team in a situation in which an enemy company was staging an attack. The results obtained and the conclusions drawn from the exercise pointed in two different directions. On the one hand, guerrilla jaegers were found to learn the use of Claymore-type mines relatively quickly, but on the other hand, they exhibited varying abilities at making independent tactical decisions. Rifle infantry advancing through the area held by guerrilla jaegers were forced into a terrain in which their marching speed was reduced to less

613 Ibid.
615 Ibid. See also PE:n no. 32/Opsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained).
than two kilometres per hour. With its marching speed through the guerrilla-held territory being significantly reduced, coupled with a high casualty rate, the enemy was forced to halt its advance. A detailed 15-page report produced on the exercise included an assessment by the referees, according to which the casualties suffered by the guerrillas would have been minimal. However, no definitive conclusion could be drawn without further experimentation. The casualties suffered by the guerrillas equipped with light weapons were generally attributable to the fact that they opened fire too early. The exercise offered no insight into the extent of dread that Claymore mines possibly instilled in the enemy; nor could an assessment on the impact of combat or the fact that guerrilla jaeger patrols fought separately from each other be given. Therefore, the decision was taken to continue experimentation, combining it with investigation into the impact of winter conditions on the success or failure of guerrilla warfare.617

Another experimental exercise, arranged between 28 and 30 November 1961 in the Hätilä exercise area, sought to investigate a situation in which a jaeger company reinforced with a tank platoon and an engineering platoon advanced through the operational area of a guerrilla jaeger platoon. While no report on this exercise survives in the archives, the final report submitted by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee stated that guerrilla-type activities had significantly slowed down the advance of the attacking company. The enemy was forced to fine-comb the area defended by the guerrilla jaegers before the tanks were able to advance. The enemy detachment was forced to make outflanking manoeuvres two to three kilometres in depth. The invader also remained in the dark regarding the operational methods of the guerrillas up to the point when the leadership of the exercise provided it with information on the guerrillas jaegers’ tactics.618

In addition to the above exercises, the committee participated as observers in a leadership exercise arranged by the National General Staff College in Tammela on 10 and 11 August 1961. In this exercise, the method under investigation was experimented within a brigade framework. The committee also devised experiments with equipment, implemented by the Engineering Division of the General Headquarters at various locations, and arranged an experiment with Claymore-type anti-tank mines on 1 January 1961. The conclusions drawn from the mine experiments indicated that fragmentation mines that could be attached to tree trunks, bounding mines, and anti-tank mines with a shaped charge effect were best suited for use as manually operated mines.619

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617 Kertomus kokeiluharjoituksesta Tuohikotissa 20.–21.9.61, laatinut Veikko Koppinen (‘A report on an experimental exercise, arranged at Tuohikotti between 20 and 21 September, drafted by Veikko Koppinen’), Ermei Kanninen’s private collection; the original document is in the possession of the author of this thesis.
618 PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained).
Intensive work and experiments in 1961 led to the preparation of a preliminary report, which was presented to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces on 29 December 1961. The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, General Sakari Simelius, was reportedly impressed by the committee’s work and its preliminary results, prompting him to order that the committee’s assignment be extended to include guerrilla-type activities as a whole. This order also obligated the Guerrilla Tactics Committee to include a proposal in their final report for guerrilla tactics methods suitable for Finnish conditions, including their organisation and any preparations.620

At the end of December 1961, the committee was expanded and moved under the direction of the Chief of Training and Education. To facilitate experiments in wintertime and to provide information on maintenance and medical issues, Lieutenant Colonel Olavi Salonen (PE talh-os) and Medical Lieutenant Colonel Ahti Poikolainen (PE lääk-os) were appointed as new members to the committee, representing expertise in their respective fields.621

The Guerrilla Tactics Committee continued its work in a new composition in the winter and spring of 1962, convening six times and arranging experimental exercises, which were already on a good track. Winter exercises began in February when an exceptionally daring guerrilla exercise involving unconventional arrangements was arranged in Suomunjärvi between 19 and February and 3 March 1962. Theme of the exercise was a guerrilla jaeger platoon engaged in a prolonged operation under winter conditions with no direct access to supplies, the other theme being the assessment of the opportunities available to the adversary to destroy the platoon.622

This exercise was arranged in Suomujärvi, North Karelia, approximately 40 kilometres south-east of Lieksa, in collaboration between the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard. What made this exercise special was that guerrilla jaeger patrols included conscripts who had been in service for only a few days. Conscripts joined the exercise practically immediately after reporting to their unit for service; they were provided with equipment and put through a brief crash course in guerrilla tactics. Each patrol was led by a senior NCO from the Frontier Guard, the co-leader being a border jaeger from the previous age class of conscripts or a reservist. Experiences...
The report on the exercise found that guerrilla jaegers were able to function for two weeks depending solely on their cached supplies, but needed a rest of equal length after the exercise. A four-man patrol was found to be too small, as the continuous chores to keep the patrol functional, such as warming up the *kota* – a sort of large conical tent, constructed around wooden poles, with an opening at the top for smoke extraction – which the patrols used for accommodation, and cooking, took up a great deal of time, as did skiing in order to leave behind a network of tracks for diversion. It was concluded that a guerrilla jaeger patrol should have the strength of a squad. Another conclusion was that *kota* accommodation could only be used in an emergency, the real accommodation being in soil pits, dugouts and tents. This exercise provided invaluable experiences, aiding the Defence Forces to develop guerrilla combat tactics for Finnish conditions. Lieutenant General Jorma Järventaus, Commander of the 3rd Division, Lieutenant Colonel Erkki Setälä, commander of the Karelia Jaeger Battalion, and the unit that had formed the troops used in the exercise, expressed their opinion that guerrilla-type activities should be developed in a more mobile direction. Both officers regarded passivity as a drawback. 623 The records indicate that the arrangements of the exercise were based on Veikko Koppi nen’s ideas, something that seems indisputable. 624

In spring 1962, the Guerrilla Tactics Committee needed to supplement itself again, as the Chair, Colonel Toivo Kytölä, fell ill, Lieutenant Colonel Atto Salmio resigned his commission and the scope of committee’s task was expanded, necessitating changes in its composition. The new composition, confirmed in spring 1962, comprised the following officers: Paavo Ilmola (PE op-os and secretary of the Defence Council); secretary Ermei Kanninen (PE op-os); members Major General Veikko Koppi nen (PE), Lieutenant Colonel Väinö Salmela (PE järj-os), Lieutenant Colonel Otto Nuutilainen (PE koul-os), Colonel Vilho Tiainen (PE pion-os), Colonel Risto Kare (PE viesti-os), Lieutenant Colonel Simo Sirkkanen (PE jv-os) and expert members, Lieutenant Colonel Olavi Salonen (PE talh-os) and Medical Lieutenant Colonel Ahti Poikolainen (PE lääk-os). 625

The appointment of Colonel Paavo Ilmola to chair the committee was justified by his extensive familiarity with the entire field of guerrilla-type activities, which he had acquired through a scholarship, and by a proposal he had made according to which area-based guerrilla-type activities should be integrated into the defensive system that was undergoing a change at the time. 626

During summer 1962, while the Guerrilla Tactics Committee continued its work, the General Headquarters also had other irons in the fire. One of them was the launch of a programme known as the K programme, which referred to the development of the materiel of the Defence Forces. 627 Although the development of the
defensive system had been integrated into the materiel improvements and building efforts by the early 1960s, the target-oriented development of various war materiel projects continued, and was completed by the mid-1960s. The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, General Sakari Simelius, had to throw all his prestige on the table in order to ensure sufficient resources for the development of the Defence Forces, meeting with great difficulties when attempting to carry the issue through political decision-making. Among other things, the distribution of a booklet on the K programme was banned.628

As a contemporary document, Puolustuslaitoksen kehittäminen 1960-luvulla (‘The development of the Defence Forces in the 1960s’) is a valuable source document, particularly from the perspective of the art of war. In 1962, the K programme focused the army’s materiel and operational development on three major forms of fighting. Of these, third in order of priority were guerrilla-type activities, conducted as part of regular military operations. Guerrilla-type activities were justified by their cost-effectiveness in combat and by certain aspects of materiel shortage. ‘As combat has become increasingly mobile in nature, better opportunities have opened to guerrilla-type activities. Our insufficient capacity to deliver effective fire at long distances and our poor opportunities for conducting air reconnaissance can be, in part, compensated by guerrilla-type activities.’629

The fundamental idea behind the territorial defensive system and new trends in the Finnish art of war were also justified, in unambiguous terms, by the changes that had occurred in the world situation. ‘Although the continued international tension can be attributed, at least in part, to the constant threat created by the nuclear capacity of the alliances grouped around great powers, older forms of warfare will also be used to resolve conflicts between states by violent means. Furthermore, a technically unsophisticated belligerent may achieve substantial results in combat against an enemy that, while technologically sophisticated, possesses insufficient means for anti-insurgency operations. The party that emerges victoriously from such a battle will win the war. Guerrilla-type activities will be an integral part of all operations carried out by the Finnish army. Such activities will be divided into combat that provides direct support to conventional operations, and activities that will be carried out deeper in the enemy’s rear. The latter form of combat will be resorted to after sections of the Finnish territory have been yielded to the enemy.’630

Finland’s geographical factors in particular were deemed to provide opportunities to guerrilla-type activities, and which are hard to find anywhere else.

628 ‘On the same day (4 June 1962), the K programme was published in the form of a booklet edited by the General Headquarters. The booklet covered the grounds for the development of the national defence, the factors affecting the development of the Defence Forces, the development of the army, maritime defence and the air force, the materiel needs of the functional areas shared by all branches of the armed forces, the development of preparedness for production, and the cost of the development programme. The booklet was intended to be distributed to members of parliament and administrative bodies. Later, the Council of State prohibited the distribution of the booklet. It was buried in the archives, to be distributed later to certain people for information in strict confidence. This decision taken by the Karjalainen Government is difficult to understand.’ Simelius (1983), pp. 197–213.
At a meeting held on 20 September 1962, the committee took a decision to split into two working groups, one of which was tasked with looking into guerrilla methods and tactics and preparing a draft for training instructions, while the other was responsible for examining the requirements for a training organisation. The first working group comprised Major General Veikko Koppinen, Colonel Vilho Tiainen, Lieutenant Colonel Simo Sirkkanen, Lieutenant Colonel Otto Nuutilainen and Captain Stig Roudasmaa from the Engineering Division of the General Headquarters, who had been ordered to join the committee as its secretary. The other working group consisted of Lieutenant Colonel Väinö Salmela and Major Ermei Kanninen, who acted as the secretary of this mini working group.631

Keinonen trips up Koppinen

The last experimental exercise was arranged in late autumn 1962. Between 7 and 10 November 1962, an experimental exercise was arranged at the training area of the Pori Brigade in Raasi, with guerrilla-type activities as its topic. The theme of the Raasi exercise was the advancing of a tank platoon and a rifle company through the operational area of a guerrilla jaeger platoon, including stops in this area. The guerrilla jaeger troop in this exercise was formed, following instructions issued by Veikko Koppinen, of the students of the Pori Brigade NCO School, with one of the Pori Brigade rifle companies forming the Red Team and professional officers acting as the Red Team company commander and platoon leaders.632

Terho Vallimies, company commander of the Red Team, informed Stig Roudasmaa decades later that the exercise failed on account of foul play having taken part in it. Roudasmaa had witnessed the exercise, and had discussed it after it had ended with Veikko Koppinen, who had been completely puzzled by the outcome, wondering why the guerrilla jaeger troop had been detected so easily.634 What, then, happened at Raasi?

Colonel Yrjö Keinonen, who was the commander of the Pori Brigade at the time, had actively participated in the planning and instruction phase of the exercise, which of course was natural as he was he ‘owner’ of the troops committed to the exercise. According to Vallimies and Roudasmaa, Yrjö Keinonen had arrived at the barracks the evening before the ‘show phase’ of the exercise, ordering all of the officers and NCOs of the Red Team to assemble. Keinonen had revealed the course of the following day’s exercise to the officers of the Red Team, pinpointing the locations of the guerrilla jaeger troops which he, while addressing the

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631 PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Siisitoinikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained).
633 The compositions of the troops deployed in the exercise can be found in the preparatory documents, kept in the archive of the Pori Brigade Headquarters under identifier T 23519/F 36, KA. See, for example, PorPrE:n no. 2735/Kouljarjisto/591/1.11.1962, T 23519/F 36, KA. In 1962, Captain Terho Vallimies acted as the commander of the 1st Rifle Company of the Pori Brigade. Vallimies, Terho Edvin, an extract from personal details, no. 53241, KA.
634 Roudasmaa, Stig: An interview on 6 February 2008.
troops, had copied from the map hanging on the wall of the Raasti training area canteen. Furthermore, he had listed the action to be taken in order to ensure that ‘Koppinen’s guerrilla jaegers could be eliminated in a spectacular fashion’. What is truly unpleasant about this is the fact that the demonstration on the following day, arranged for the benefit of the highest-ranking officers of the General Headquarters — generals and senior colonels — followed exactly Keinonen’s manuscript. In no time, the guerrilla jaeger troop was brought in as prisoners of war to the prestigious observers, while the commander of the Pori Brigade loudly praised the fighting skills of his men and their elite soldier’s qualities. The fact that the Pori Brigade NCO School students failed and were taken prisoners was not attributable, in Keinonen’s view, to their lack of skills; rather, the whole episode reflected the ineffectiveness of the guerrilla warfare model and its inapplicability to conventional war. According to Roudasmaa, Koppinen was visibly disappointed and greatly puzzled by the outcome of the exercise.635

Veikko Koppinen, who had planned the Raasi exercise and acted as the representative of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee at it, suffered a severe blow to his ideas, which the exercise had proved as impracticable. Yrjö Keinonen probably wanted to emphasise his superiority, skills and leadership in the eyes of the senior officers of the General Headquarters by demonstrating that the training level of his units was better than expected — in a fraudulent manner.636 If this is a correct conclusion, it may have had strategic consequences. Experimental exercises were carried out in order to develop the defence of the whole of Finland, rather than highlight the excellence of an individual officer. Luckily, experimental exercises geared towards guerrilla-type activities were continued, despite this episode. However, the incident was embarrassing for Koppinen and, for the entire Guerrilla Tactics Committee; after all, it involved an assignment and extensive research that the committee had been ordered to perform by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces in their capacity as holders of an officer’s commission, and that aimed at developing the Finnish art of war.

Ermei Kanninen, secretary of the Guerrilla Commission, provides a description of the details and content of the experimental exercises in his later texts that paints a different picture to the report submitted by the Commission and the actual events. First of all, Kanninen writes that both parties of the exercise arranged by the Pori Brigade — guerrilla jaegers and the Red Team — were formed of conscripts who had not received any prior training in guerrilla or anti-guerrilla tactics. ‘The results were positive, and it took a long time, especially for the leaders of the target units, to realise what was going on — in other words, figure out the operating methods of the guerrilla jaegers.’ Secondly, he says that Yrjö Keinonen, commander of the Pori Brigade, gained personal familiarity with guerrilla-type activities, helping him later to grasp their significance for the territorial defence system, which he approved for adoption in 1968 while functioning as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. Kanninen was not able to recall

635 Ibid.
that anything dishonest had taken place at Raasi. Thirdly, Kanninen says that the reports on both the Suomunjärvi and Raasi exercises had been lost due to cuts to archives.637 This is not the whole truth, as at least the report on the exercise arranged by the Karelia Jaeger Battalion can be found in full – including all attachments – in the archives of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters.638 However, what is conspicuous is that the report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee does not contain a single word about the Raasi experimental exercise.639 Antero Pärssinen, who had also served in the Pori Brigade at the time of the exercise, did not recall it or its details when specifically asked about them.640

Who was right and whose view of the train of events is closest to the truth? Kanninen, Roudasmaa, the original documents or other parties? This question will probably remain a mystery for ever. If anything, this episode paints a bleak picture of the impact of human traits on the development of national defence. When seeking a historical and truthful interpretation after the fact, the conclusion is that opportunities for further research remain.

The Guerrilla Tactics Committee completes its assignment and submits its report

The Guerrilla Tactics Committee continued its work in accordance with its instructions, despite the setback at Raasi. In late 1962 and early 1963, the committee convened a total of four times. However, by then, the focus of the Committee’s work had shifted to analysing the results and drawing conclusions for inclusion in the Committee’s final report. Experimental exercises played a particularly significant role in the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’s work as it sought to develop guerrilla-type activities and bring clarity to the concepts around the issue. The committee recorded a great number of observations and drafted memoranda of varying quality while completing its work.

The work of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee was labelled confidential from the very beginning641, although its existence became known to the senior officers of the troops who participated in experimental exercises. The secret nature of the work is reflected by the fact that even extracts from the personal details of the committee members contain few or no references to their membership in the Guerrilla Tactics

639 PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained).
641 ‘I ordered the preparations to be made in secrecy, as the coming to light of the fundamental principle was undesirable.’ Simelius (1983), p. 256.
Yet more proof of the clandestine nature of the committee exists. In November 1962, Lieutenant Colonel Ensio Siilasvuo, chief of the General Staff Bureau of Division Headquarters of the 3rd Division (3.DE), drafted a study which was in almost perfect accordance with the task assigned to the Guerrilla Tactics Committee. The study entitled ‘Sissisota ja sen torjunta suurvaltojen ja meidän näkökulmastamme’ ('Guerrilla warfare and anti-guerrilla operations from the perspective of great powers and Finland') discussed guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities in line with Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa ('General Section of the Field Regulation') in effect at the time and, obviously with a draft for Kenttäohjesäännön I osa from 1963 ('the 1963 Field Regulation Part I') that was still out for comments. In his conclusion, Siilasvuo recommends that training in guerrilla-type activities be developed further and that research and experimentation in guerrilla tactics be initiated. ‘Research and experimentation efforts should be intensified in order to develop new methods and equipment.’ Siilasvuo proposed conclusions and recommendations for further action clearly without any knowledge of Veikko Koppinen's Sissisotamenetelmä-ehdotus ('A proposal for a method for waging guerrilla war'), let alone research that by then spanned almost two years. While Siilasvuo’s study was well-timed, it was belated considering the work that had been carried out by the Operations Division of the General Headquarters in all secrecy.

In early January 1963, Ermei Kanninen, who had been posted to the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, prepared a memorandum on the development of local defence forces and their link to guerrilla-type activities, which, while related to the work of the Guerrilla Commission, was not directly connected to it. This memorandum, among other things, calculated the increase in the reserves over the course of the 1960s, with the ensuing effects on the materiel acquisition programmes. In connection with this, the first proposal for forming regional guerrilla jaeger troops was made, justified primarily by the opportunities brought along by the increase in the size of the reserve. In his memorandum, Kanninen proposed, referring to local defence forces, that ‘the real opportunities for their establishment be clarified, broken down by military district and taking account of the fact that the increase in the size of the reserve will take place principally in Southern and South-western Finland at the expense of the rest of the country.’ Furthermore, Kanninen proposed that a principal decision be taken, one which would resolve ‘whether the local defence forces would be trained along the lines proposed by Kanninen – in other words, the Defence Forces would train local troops which could take

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642 See for example Ilmola, Paavo an extract from personal details, no. 45233, KA and Koppinen, Veikko William, an extract from personal details, no. 55645, KA and Kare, Risto Ilmari, an extract from personal details, no. 37799. The only piece of information on the participation in the committee’s work by its key members can be found in the personal details of the committee’s secretary. Kanninen, Ermei (Ermei), an extract from personal details, no. 58557, KA.


up local guerrilla-type activities when necessary – or, alternatively, whether the Defensive Forces would train guerrilla troops that could perhaps be committed to other operations only in a very limited fashion.\footnote{Paikallispuolustusjoukkojen kehittäminen ja liittyminen sisätoimintaan (‘The development of local defence forces and their commitment to guerrilla-type activities’), PE:n muistio no.tta Op-os/sal/9.1.1963, Ermei Kanninen’s private collection; a copy in the possession of the author of this thesis.} The memorandum by Kanninen was the first study of its kind, analysing the ratio of manpower to weaponry and attempting to resolve it through the development of local defence by establishing local troops capable of engaging in guerrilla-type activities.

By the time the Guerrilla Tactics Committee had almost completed its work, a decision was taken to link its last experiment to winter manoeuvres schedule to be arranged in Northern Finland between 27 January and 2 February 1963 and to which one guerrilla jaeger platoon would be committed, operating in a dispersed manner. The committee received a report on the experiences obtained from the manoeuvres These manoeuvres, arranged by the 1st Division, provided positive feedback on the action of guerrilla jaegers engaged in combat using dispersed tactics in wintry conditions. In particular, the report emphasised the effectiveness of guerrilla-type activities in the conditions typical of Northern Finland. \footnote{1.DE:n no. 16/Koultsto/5 sal/15.3.1963 (kertomus Pohjois-Suomen talvisotaharjoituksesta) (‘Report on the winter manoeuvres arranged in Northern Finland’), T 24075/F 1 sal, KA.} The Guerrilla Tactics Committee continued its work until June 1963, completing, among other things, several sub-studies on the various branches of the defence related to guerrilla-type activities, as well as experimental exercises. The committee convened a total of 17 times.\footnote{PE:n no. 32/Opsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained).} The Guerrilla Tactics Committee continued its work until June 1963, completing, among other things, several sub-studies on the various branches of the defence related to guerrilla-type activities, as well as experimental exercises. The committee convened a total of 17 times.\footnote{Känninen, Ermei: An interview on 15 May 2013.} The military schools also carried out experimentation and development on a corresponding level, including exercises and coursework prepared by students, assigned to them by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee via the staff of the National General Staff College.\footnote{Känninen, Ermei: An interview on 15 May 2013.} It should be mentioned that at least some members of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee had either been involved in issues related to guerrilla warfare or guerrilla-type activities, or would be involved in such issues later on their careers.

The committee finished its report in early summer 1963. The report provided a highly detailed and comprehensive account which, by and large, was in line with the task assigned to the committee by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. The memorandum emphasised the need to use methods of guerrilla warfare, particularly when viewed from the perspective of developments that had occurred in the art of war in the years following the Second World War and that, by the 1960s, clearly showed the significance of guerrilla warfare and insurgency movements, and, on the other hand, that of guerrilla-type activities. According to the committee, the only effective method to battle guerrilla jaeger troops was to launch anti-guerrilla operations – in other words, to commit guerrilla jaeger troops. By way of example
of the developments that took place during the period, the committee raised the training in guerrilla and anti-guerrilla tactics that the United States Army provided and that it had intensified. According to the report submitted by the committee, developments in the art of war favoured great powers, especially by improving the mobility of troops and enhancing the reach and effectiveness of fire. Consequently, countries such as Finland, considered to be ‘backward’ with regard to the art of war, were forced to counterbalance the discrepancy by relying on their national and geographical conditions. Guerrilla-type activities were regarded as an opportunity, something that should be resorted to using all available means.\(^{649}\) *Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa* (*The Field Regulation, General Section*) from 1958, and *Sissiohjesääntö*, (*The regulation for guerrilla-type activities*), confirmed in 1957, also required this operational method to be applied.\(^{650}\)

According to the committee, the goals of guerrilla-type activities were wide-ranging. They aimed at slowing down the enemy’s movement, everywhere and at any time, as the Finnish army would never be as mobile in easy terrain as any potential enemy. Insufficient reach of fire could be compensated for by deploying guerrilla troops in the enemy’s rear. Tying down the enemy forces was regarded as crucial everywhere, even in secondary sectors and in rear areas, as this would weaken the enemy in those sectors to which it would commit the bulk of its forces and where it would normally be superior in strength compared to the defender. The impact of enemy’s fire needed to be diminished, coupled with the development of a form of fighting impervious to the effects of nuclear weapons. In line with the objectives set above, the committee drew the conclusion that a critical need for guerrilla-type activities existed, that such activities would decrease the pressure on the troops holding the front line, and that they would also balance any possible superiority in strength of the adversary. A guerrilla war also needed be taken into consideration, as it would offer the defender their ‘the last means of defence’ in a situation in which the country or its part were occupied.\(^{651}\) In other words, guerrilla-type activities were prioritised over a total guerrilla war, which was regarded as the defender’s last stand.

The committee had made a realistic and detailed analysis of the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities in the Finnish art of war. The committee’s report divided the guerrilla jaeger force into units that were either part of the local military organisation or detachments formed for a specific task, either left behind enemy lines or transported to their operational area. Operations were defined as being offensive in nature, carried out using massed troops, or dispersed, conducted in order to distract the adversary. The report did not mention actual territorial tasks beyond territorial harassment operations, which were intended to be carried out in a dispersed manner by deploying guerrilla jaeger platoons or patrols. According to the

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\(^{649}\) PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (*Sissitoimikunnan mietintö*) (*Report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee*), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained).


\(^{651}\) PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (*Sissitoimikunnan mietintö*) (*Report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee*), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained).
committee, the regulations in effect provided the necessary theoretical foundation.652

However, the number of guerrilla troops was not in line with the requirements and objectives set for guerrilla-type activities. The committee had counted the number of guerrilla jaeger troops included in the various guerrilla jaeger organisations and listed in the establishment chart (PTL) for 1963, finding them to amount to 3,000 men, divided into two guerrilla jaeger battalions placed directly under the High Command (SissiP 5 and SissiP 15), six guerrilla jaeger companies under the Frontier Guard brigades, and 41 separate guerrilla jaeger platoons. The committee found the number of the above-mentioned troops to be all too small. The decision taken during Finland’s wars to order each formation to hold a section of the front line to form a separate guerrilla jaeger unit, at the expense of a reconnaissance company or another battalion, was deemed ill-judged. Such temporary troops, disrupting the structure of brigade organisations did not, according to the committee, achieve any appreciable increase in efficiency, as the performance of temporary troops in guerrilla-type activities remained poor, and committing the best men to special duties also lowered standards in the main force.653

The committee took a strong stance on the proposal for a method for guerrilla warfare by drafted by Veikko Koppinen. The report noted that Koppinen’s proposal for guerrilla warfare could be approached either from the perspective of overall arrangements for guerrilla-type activities or guerrilla warfare or from the viewpoint of guerrilla tactics and methods. Increasing the impact of fire by using mines, Claymore-type mines and traps as proposed by Koppinen was regarded as feasible. With regard to defensive ambush, some members thought that it would be impossible on a long-term basis. However, the mental and physical endurance of Finnish soldiers when they were operating in a dispersed fashion and depended on supplies that they themselves had cached still remained untested. Prolonged operations, pursued by the enemy, with insufficient supplies and exposed to the vagaries of the weather, would reduce the effectiveness of guerrilla jaeger troops. Although the committee commented on active operations by a guerrilla jaeger army alongside the field army in positive terms, the committee also considered that transition to a guerrilla war should not be the only objective of the method.654

The committee highlighted two fundamental solutions in the proposals put forth by Koppinen, which in his solution were merged into one but were a prerequisite for the success of both parts. One was territorial guerrilla-type activities; the other was defensive ambush using Claymore-type mines, with the guerrilla jaegers operating in a dispersed formation. The committee concluded that a transfer to an overall solution based on a single system was impossible to implement without first having thorough preparations in place for training and the development of equipment. Ter-

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652 Ibid.
654 PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitaktikanava mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained).
Koppinen’s proposal also included clear strengths that the committee considered feasible. The ever increasing costs prevented the building of large and modern ground forces; instead, in their place, a guerrilla jaeger army proposed by Koppinen could be used, equipped with materiel that was clearly more affordable than that of regular formations. The adversary would not be able to break the defence put up by the guerrilla jaeger army proposed by Koppinen by directing strikes against Finnish industries, power generation and the home front. According to the committee, guerrillas would be unbeatable, and the continuation of combat would be guaranteed. A guerrilla jaeger army would play the most important role in that it would enable directing the weight of local operations at certain areas. ‘The enemy will be battled, and its forces will be tied down everywhere and at any time, thereby enabling the field army to mass troops and direct the weight of operations at a certain area.’

The committee noted that dispersed guerrilla-type activities with associated defensive ambushes, coupled with the use of Claymore-type mines, were a feasible form of fighting, constituting one of the methods available to guerrilla jaegers and being one which guerrilla jaegers could resort to not only in territorial combat but also in other combat activities, depending on the circumstances. Dispersed operations meant that guerrilla jaegers operated in patrols of either two or six men – formed of pairs or half-squads of men – in designated areas closely linked to each other, in a configuration under which the organisational level immediately above the individual jaeger – platoon, company or battalion – ensured that nobody was caught by surprise. In the dispersed operation of small units, a unit might either disperse in order to hide, avoid casualties, or hold a specific point of terrain, a track suitable for vehicles or a specific length of a road.

However, the investigations of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee left several questions unanswered. Most concerns were raised by what is known as mental factors. The committee noted that particular attention must be paid to the physical and mental endurance of men committed to guerrilla-type activities. While this was nothing new as such, the fact that national Finnish traits were taken into account was an important indication of the distinctively Finnish nature of the Finnish art of war, particularly in discussions regarding the practicability of guerrilla-type activities. According to the committee, a task cannot be accomplished in a tactically correct way by simply issuing an order for the application of a particular tactic; rather, the tactics needed to be understood and rehearsed. Although the Finnish soldier is prone to criticise his commanding officer, and even assume a negative attitude, he will need support from his commander when the going gets tough. ‘Passive waiting is highly taxing and may weaken soldiers’ spirits. Deep down, the Finn is melancholy and with-
The Finnish soldier wants to know, even when fighting as a guerrilla soldier, the overall situation and the fate of his nearest and dearest. Fieldcraft and familiarity with the outdoor life were no longer something that characterised Finns, although the committee thought that the Finns’ adaptability to harsh conditions was probably still fairly good.658

The summary of committee’s report provided two important conclusions. On the one hand, guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities were particularly pronounced for a country the national defence of which was based on a simple fact: to defend the country’s territory and the living conditions of its population while fighting an enemy with vastly superior human and materiel resources. Under such conditions, the defender was forced to use its own territory as a support area, depending on the resources available in that area. Thus, the needs were greater than the organisations and plans in place that the time enabled. Consequently, the Defence Forces needed to increase the number of guerrilla jaegers, to intensify the means available to guerrilla-type activities, and to improve preparedness. On the other hand, the organisations of guerrilla jaeger troops and their operational methods were still practicable, and particularly suitable for guerrilla jaeger troops proper in a situation in which they were concentrated in a specific area to carry out an operation there. Temporary guerrilla jaeger units formed of formations and separate units were also deemed able to use such organisations and methods successfully. The Guerrilla Tactics committee saw no reason to address in detail such methods or the internal organisation of guerrilla jaeger troops.659

A comparison of the report submitted by the committee with a bulletin of the K programme660 of the Defence Forces, published one year previously, reveals that the Committee had been consulted or had at least been requested to specify the content of guerrilla war in more detail, as parallels between the two sources are obvious. The book entitled Puolustuslaitoksen kehittäminen 1960-luvulla (‘The development of the Defence Forces in the 1960s’) made a clear distinction between guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities, when viewed from the perspective of the art of war. ‘Crucial to this form of warfare (guerrilla war) is ensuring the support of large sections of the population. The party that emerges victoriously from such a conflict will win the war. Guerrilla-type activities will be an integral part of all operations carried out by the ground forces. Such activities will be divided into combat that provides direct support to conventional army operations, and activities that will be carried out deep in the enemy’s rear.’661

658 Ibid.
659 Ibid.
660 A development programme scheduled for implementation between 1964 and 1967. As the K programme was implemented insufficiently, the PV programme, initiated in 1968, can be regarded as the point when it was terminated. Kesseli (2005a), pp. 104–105.
Recommendations by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee for further action

The Guerrilla Tactics Committee completed its work in a presentation held in September 1963; at this meeting, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces approved the general principles for guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare, as well as their tactical guidelines. ‘It is proposed that on the basis of the report submitted by the Guerrilla Commission, taking account of the general principles of guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla war...’ In the preparatory document for the report’s presentation, the following measures were proposed to be taken by the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard: the number of guerrilla jaeger troops in the establishment chart to be revised; measures to be taken to create a territorial guerrilla jaeger organisation; the use of a dispersed troop disposition and Claymore-type mines to be approved; training in guerrilla-type activities to be intensified; and an officer at the General Headquarters to be appointed to deal with guerrilla activities on a full-time basis. 662 Simelius added the following comment to the margin of this list: ‘provided a suitable officer is available for such an assignment.’ To the bottom of the document, a preliminary plan of a suitable officer had been added in the form of the name ‘Lopmeri.’ 663 The report with attachments 664 was submitted to the chief of training and education and the members of the committee. The materiel generated during the working of the committee was delivered to the Operations Division of the General Headquarters. 665

In practice, the first item in the list of the methods for further action proposed by the committee, the one addressing the revision of the number of guerrilla jaeger troops in the establishment chart, translated into the forming of a territorial guerrilla jaeger organisation covering the entire country in such a manner that the gradual development of the system would be possible as the number of men in the reserve gradually increased and more materiel became available. Such an organisation was intended to be engaged in anti-guerrilla activities in Finland’s home territory and in

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662 PE:n no. 34/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietinnön saate) (‘Cover letter of the report of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained). Note: the following note had been entered on the back of the cover letter: ‘Why wasn’t there a single representative from the Frontier Guard, even though training in guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla-type activities has been their principal responsibility for the past 15 years?’ (T. V. Viljanen). See also PE:n no. 487/Optsto/11 sal/23.9.1963 (Esittely Puolustusvoimain komentajalle sissitoimikunnan mietinnön pohjalta) (‘Presentation to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces on the basis of the report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), T 26965/F 30 sal, KA.

663 PE:n no. 487/Optsto/11 sal/23.9.1963 (Esittely Puolustusvoimain komentajalle sissitoimikunnan mietinnön pohjalta) (‘Presentation to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces on the basis of the report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), T 26965/F 30 sal, KA.

664 A draft for a training instruction, prepared for us by the inspector of the infantry and attached to the committee’s report, contained a total of 11 sub-attachments with the principal content of illustrated examples of foxholes, the impact of different mines, booby traps, and demolition packs used by guerrilla jaegers, among other things. PE:n no.trs /Jvtsto/5 a 3/25.6.1963 (Jalkaviinan tarkastajan koulutusohjeen luonnos, liite sissitoimikunnan mietintöön 25.6.1963) (‘A draft for a training instruction, prepared for us by the inspector of the infantry, an attachment to the report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, 25 June 1963’), Ermei Kanninen’s private collection, the original document in the possession of the author of this treatise.

665 PE:n no. 34/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietinnön saate) (‘Cover letter of the report of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained).
the rear areas of the army’s formations, taking account of the fact that it also might have to launch a full-scale guerrilla war. All work on troop composition were submitted to the Operations and Mobilisation Divisions of the General Headquarters. The committee saw that the creation of the organisation and the revision of the troops in the establishment chart needed to be followed by the revision of the number of men trained for various tasks and the materiel acquisition plans.\textsuperscript{666}

Much of this proposal was based on a work plan drafted by the Operations Division of the General Headquarters in spring 1963, which stated that, from the perspective of operational planning, the most far-reaching work concerned the development of local territorial defence troops. ‘In the current decade, our human resources will increase faster than the means available to the procurement of materiel for our field army. In this situation, the Defence Forces will have an opportunity to and, in a way, must, begin to develop what is known as local forces, as the appropriation will not enable the establishment of new formations. This being the case, one option would be to create a territorial guerrilla jaeger organisation equipped with light weapons. Work on this option has progressed to the point where it can soon be presented to the decision makers for a policy decision.’\textsuperscript{667}

The use of a dispersed troop disposition and Claymore-type mines, and their adoption in training meant in practice that the training instructions drafted by the committee needed to be approved and distributed, the arrangements for the training of instructors needed to be put in place, and the training material had to be planned, acquired and distributed. Practical arrangements were proposed to be implemented by the Infantry, Training and Engineering Divisions of the General Headquarters.\textsuperscript{668}

The intensification of guerrilla training referred to the intensification of collaboration between the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard. In practice, this referred to experimentation with and training in local guerrilla-type activities with the focus being on leadership and supply, while paying attention to the intelligence obtained by the local troops. Practice in the use of dispersed troop disposition and Claymore-type mines was to be extended to all arms and branches and applied to the training of leaders, instructors and men. In addition, separately designated units were to provide special training to conscripts in guerrilla tactics under special conditions, such as those in Lapland and the Finnish archipelago, as a supplement to their general training.\textsuperscript{669} In October 1963, based on the report drawn up by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, the General Headquarters issued a standing order on training the main theme of which was territorial guerrilla-type activities.\textsuperscript{670}

\textsuperscript{666} PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoinikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained).

\textsuperscript{667} PE:n no tta 10.4.1963 (Esittely tarkastajistolle operatiivisen osaston lähipajan tyyssunnitelmista) (‘Presentation to the inspectors regarding the short term work plans’), T 26965/F 30 sal, KA.

\textsuperscript{668} PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoinikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained).

\textsuperscript{669} Ibid. The Coastal Jaeger Battalion, the Pohjanmaa Jaeger Battalion and the Parachute Jaeger School – a unit specialised in operations in the enemy-held territory – were proposed to be the units providing special training.

\textsuperscript{670} Koulutuksen pysyväiskäsky (‘Standing order on training’), no. 586 A 1/12.10.1963 (OIKE alluellisesta sissitoinimuista) (‘Guidelines for territorial guerrilla-type activities’), Ermei Kanninen’s private collection, the original document in the possession of the author of this thesis.
Assigning an officer to the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, tasked with dealing with issues related to guerrilla-type activities, meant in practice the intensification of guerrilla-related issues and the coordination of the various activities. According to the proposition of the committee, this officer was to participate in the organisation of territorial guerrilla-type activities as part of the work carried out by the Operations and Mobilisation Divisions of the General Headquarters, including work related to training and experimentation, ensuring that any experiences gained from such activities were to be taken into consideration when drafting operational and acquisition plans. Temporary in nature, this work was expected to require approximately two years’ contribution, by which time it was expected that the issue would have been set in motion. After that, according to the committee, further work would take place in the form of normal staff work, in collaboration between the various departments.671

The solid work of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee had been completed, and, by all accounts, had played a significant role in the development of guerrilla-type activities and their integration into the territorial defence system. Perhaps the most important conclusion drawn by the committee was the proposal to integrate guerrilla-type activities into territorial combat, there relegating a large-scale guerrilla war to a role of the last-ditch effort in Finland’s defence. The dilemma that had bedevilled all attempts during the postwar years to draw a conceptual line between a guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities, including the decision of which one to use in the Finnish art of war, was finally resolved. Guerrilla-type activities were deemed to be a method that were best suited for the Finnish art of war and Finnish conditions. A guerrilla war, very much like a drowning man clutching at straws and a form of honourable suicide, began to give way to guerrilla-type activities, now undergoing a development process. However, the committee wanted to retain the possibility of resorting to a guerrilla war.

The committee worked systematically, exhibiting an approach to research that can be regarded as exemplary, even after decades and providing a testimony to a serious attitude towards the development of national defence, operational skills and tactics. Exercises, which had been well organised and taken to great lengths, had created particular added value, contributed towards the understanding of the impact that Finnish guerrilla-type activities could have, and clarified their special characteristics in the view of the future. The results obtained from exercises sparked discussion among officers and engendered a great number of new ideas regarding the details of the art of war and possible problems. Knowledge of the committee’s work and the results that it had achieved were kept confidential for decades, something that was understandable during the Cold War. Not until 1979 did knowledge of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’s work come to the knowledge of a larger audience, as a significant portion of it was published in Sissipas (‘Guerrilla handbook’), albeit under the classification not to be revealed to outsiders (the Finnish abbreviation for this classification being ‘ETS’). Therefore, it can be concluded that the Guerrilla Tactics Committee accomplished its tasks well, to say the least. However, the committee’s work

671 PE:n no. 32/Optsto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoinikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained).
needed to be continued, which is why the General Headquarters appointed an officer tasked with looking into guerrilla warfare-related issues on a full-time basis.

Further research by Olavi Lopmeri and by the research group for guerrilla tactics

According to the decision taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces at the presentation held on 23 September 1963, the Operations Division of the General Headquarters was ordered to continue their investigations into guerrilla-type activities, based on the premises and proposals for further action proposed by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’s report. Major Olavi Lopmeri, was transferred to the Operations Division of the General Headquarters from the National General Staff College in autumn 1963, and was ordered to continue further examination into guerrilla-type activities. Lopmeri began his work by familiarising himself with the Guerrilla Tactics Commission’s report and by gathering the necessary information, including the number of troops and their composition from the various divisions of the General Headquarters. In his research, Lopmeri aimed to focus on such grounds and opportunities that would enable the setting up a territorial guerrilla organisation.672

Over the course of spring and summer 1964, based on his investigations, Lopmeri drafted three lengthy memoranda, the organisation of which reflected the proposals for further action that the Guerrilla Commission had recommended in its report. The first memorandum was presented to the chief of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters on 26 May 1964.673 In this memorandum, Lopmeri, among other things, refined the calculations of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee on the number of guerrilla jaeger troop proper in the establishment chart, including troops regarded as guerrilla jaeger troops in other contexts. While the report by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee set the number of wartime guerrilla jaeger troops for 1963 at 3,000 men, Lopmeri went through the establishment chart on a line-by-line basis in order to find the exact numbers. According Lopmeri’s calculations, the two guerrilla jaeger battalions placed under direct control of the High Command numbered 1,224 men, the six reconnaissance companies of the Frontier Brigades 1,014 men, and the 40 reserve platoons of the frontier guard companies 1,560 men, with the total strength amounting to 3,798. On the basis of this, it can be concluded that Lopmeri

672 PE:n no. 487/Optsto/11 sal/23.9.1963 (Esittely Puolustusvoimain komentajalle sissitoimikunnan mietinnön pohjalta) (‘Presentation to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces on the basis of the report submitted by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), T 26965/F 30 sal, KA. In 1963, Lopmeri was, among other things, a member of the Regulation Committee for the Infantry, making him ideal for his assignment. PE:n no. 155/Jvtsto/8 d/26.1.1963, T 25991/F 10, KA. PE:n no. 594/Jvtsto/8 e/18.4.1963, T 25991/F 10, KA. See also Lopmeri (formerly Meri), Arvi Olavi, an extract from personal details, no. 39725, KA. Kanninen, Ermei: An interview on 15 May 2013.

673 Olavi Lopmeren muistio niistä perusteista, jotka liittyvät työhön alueellisen sissiorganisaation aikansaamiseksi, (‘A memorandum drafted by Olavi Lopmeri on the grounds related to the work for setting up a territorial guerrilla organisation,’), PE:n no. 26.5.1964, 11/F 12, PE (research permit obtained).
saw the number of guerrilla jaeger troops to be clearly insufficient for large-scale guerrilla-type activities.\textsuperscript{674}

According to Lopmeri, the requirements for a wider application of territorial guerrilla-type activities were first introduced in the 1958 in a chapter on guerrilla warfare in Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa (‘General Section of the 1958 Field Regulation’). According to this regulation, territorial application of guerrilla-type activities seek to ensure that the preparations for guerrilla warfare – particularly those regarding supply – are clear-cut and feasible; that troops scattered after a battle can be brought under control within a specific area and turned into guerrilla jaeger troops; that no overlaps occur in guerrilla-type activities; and that there will be leadership in place capable of formulating long-term objectives and issuing instructions.\textsuperscript{675}

When discussing the method for guerrilla warfare proposed by Koppinen, Lopmeri treated it largely as a general guideline for guerrilla tactics, one that could be applied to guerrilla warfare, consistent with the spirit of the Field Regulation. According to Lopmeri, Koppinen’s method not only provided possibilities for a decisive improvement in efficiency, but also enabled guerrilla jaegers to protect themselves so that they could not be defeated, while keeping the requirements for the quality of men, materiel and their training within reasonable limits. According to Lopmeri, the method could not be implemented without sufficiently large guerrilla jaeger troops.\textsuperscript{676}

In a way, the territorial defence system, under development at the time, brought its own line to the creation of a territorial guerrilla jaeger organisation. On the other hand, this line could not, according to Lopmeri, provide independent grounds for a territorial guerrilla jaeger organisation; rather, it only applied the ground stated above.

The preliminary conclusions drawn by Lopmeri were clear-cut. If guerrilla warfare was to provide a decisively helpful contribution to the successful conclusion of a combat in which the field army with offensive capability were engaged, and if the continuity of guerrilla-type activities were to be simultaneously ensured in a situation in which Finland was forced to launch a full-scale guerrilla war, the solution based on Koppinen’s method would be the only feasible one. This, in turn, would necessarily require the creation of a territorial organisation with the associated troops, in


\textsuperscript{675} Olavi Lopmeren muistio niistä perusteista, jotka liittyivät työön alueellisen sissiorganisaation aikaansaamiseksi, (‘A memorandum drafted by Olavi Lopmeri on the grounds related to the work for setting up a territorial guerrilla organisation,’), PE:n no.tta 26.5.1964, 11/F 12, PE (research permit obtained). Cf. Kenttäohjesääntö, yleinen osa (KO yl) (‘Field Regulation, General Section’), (1958, pp. 94–101.

\textsuperscript{676} Olavi Lopmeren muistio niistä perusteista, jotka liittyivät työön alueellisen sissiorganisaation aikaansaamiseksi, (‘A memorandum drafted by Olavi Lopmeri on the grounds related to the work for setting up a territorial guerrilla organisation,’), PE:n no.tta 26.5.1964, 11/F 12, PE (research permit obtained).
which case the guerrilla jaeger organisation would largely form the basis for the organisation of territorial defence.

However, if the idea was to ensure that a transfer to guerrilla war could take place by replacing regular military operations across the entire country or in one of its large – and separate – parts, there was no need to have a separate territorial guerrilla jaeger organisation in place, according to Lopmeri’s calculations, although having one in place, being a leadership organisation between the High Command and the mid-level district levels, would facilitate to the transfer to guerrilla war. Lopmeri saw on the other hand that if a guerrilla war, fought alongside operations waged on the front line or to support such operations, using troops made available by the local forces, a territorial guerrilla jaeger organisation had to be established. In principle, a local defensive organisation was well suited for this purpose, as long as it was capable of engaging in continuous guerrilla-type activities and providing leadership for them.\footnote{Ibid.}

Olavi Lopmeri’s second memorandum was presented to the Operations Division on 1 June 1964. This memorandum was largely focused on the needs of a territorial guerrilla jaeger organisation and on the possibilities of creating one. At the beginning of his memorandum, Lopmeri noted that the heads of the Defence Command had deemed the proposal made by the Guerrilla Commission for establishing a territorial guerrilla organisation as unrealistic as such. The required manpower, if well equipped with the requisite weaponry, could simply not be detached from the reserve for the purposes of territorial guerrilla-type activities without compromising the effectiveness of the field army. Lopmeri also argued that there was no sufficient evidence for the relevance of dispersed guerrilla-type activities as a basic method.\footnote{Olavi Lopmerin muistio niistä perusteista, jotka liittyvät työhön alueellisen sisiiorganisaation aikaansaamiseksi (‘A memorandum drafted by Olavi Lopmeri on the grounds related to the work for setting up a territorial guerrilla organisation’), PE:n no.tta 2 June 1964, 11/F 12, PE (research permit obtained).}

Building on this, Lopmeri proposed the setting up of a guerrilla organisation that would provide maximum support for combat conducted by the field army without compromising the number of its men and the efficiency of its weaponry. Furthermore, a guerrilla jaeger organisation was to ensure transition to a full-scale guerrilla war across the entire country or one of its large sections, under varying conditions, ensuring that a method of guerrilla tactics most appropriate for each situation would be used\footnote{Ibid.}

Lopmeri’s third memorandum was completed and presented on 1 July 1964. According to the memorandum, the intensification of guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare required additional research by the Mobilisation Division of the General Headquarters and the planning team of the quartermaster. According to Lopmeri, Koppinen’s method for guerrilla-type activities, based on war experiences and encoded in Sissiohjesääntö (‘Regulation for Guerrilla-type Activities’), had by then been supplemented in training by ‘territorial guerrilla-type activities based on research on methodology.’ According to Lopmeri, the application of methods which varied accord-
ing to circumstances, ‘had set in motion a process that would generate a completely new breed of guerrilla tactics.’

Lopmeri was justifiably concerned, as it was clear that only after careful scrutiny of the fundamentals of tactics and the mobility of the troops that a great power could field, including a thorough investigation of anti-guerrilla methods, a final decision on the adoption of guerrilla organisations and their tasks could be taken. Lopmeri also proposed that the needs emerging over the course of the 1960s to revise the military regulations on guerrilla warfare could be solved by setting up ‘a Research Group on Guerrilla Tactics.’ According to Lopmeri’s proposal, such a group should be tasked with conducting basic research on guerrilla tactics in order to bring them up to date and with drafting a regulation that would meet contemporary requirements. Lopmeri proposed that the Research Group on Guerrilla Tactics include one or two officers from the Frontier Guard Headquarters, one representative from the Infantry Division and one from the Operations Division of the General Headquarters.

With regard to guerrilla organisations, Lopmeri noted that guerrilla jaeger troops proper listed in the establishment chart, including all units formed by the Frontier Guard regarded as guerrilla jaeger troops, and all temporary guerrilla jaeger troops were intended to be engaged in tactical support tasks directly linked to the combat conducted by military formations. Therefore, the setting up of a territorial guerrilla organisation required that the need and tasks of guerrilla troops listed in the establishment chart should be revised only after the territorial principle had been approved. According to Lopmeri, keeping the civilian population out of anything related to guerrilla warfare as far as possible was a principle that was of the highest national interest. Lopmeri ‘If no opportunities to isolate the civilian population from combat – something that would be inevitable in the course of a lengthy guerrilla war – remained, the people should only be enrolled in the role of a provider of supplies and accommodation to the Finnish troops, while limiting this kind collaboration to just this. This being the case, it does not seem relevant, even initially, to mix civilian organisations with military ones (formed of uniform-wearing fighters).’

According to Lopmeri’s calculations, the number of territorial troops available for local defence duties in 1964, measured in ‘troops comparable to local defence forces’ amounted to approximately 150,000 men, of which the number that could be placed in the basic organisation of local defence amounted only to around 84,000. On the basis of this, Lopmeri outlined a territorial defence organisation that was divided into military provinces, military districts and military areas, arguing that such a division of responsibility would be ideally suited for territorial guerrilla-type activities. In practice, such a system meant that each military province needed to be prepared to launch guerrilla war, with military districts being responsible for turning into guerrilla districts and military areas into guerrilla areas. According to Lopmeri, integrating

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680 Olavi Lopmeren muistio niistä perusteista ja mahdollisuksista, jotka liittyivät työön alueellisen sissiorganisa- 

tion aikaansaamiseksi (‘A memorandum drafted by Olavi Lopmeri on the grounds and opportunities related to the work for setting up a territorial guerrilla organisation’), PE:n no.tta 2 June 1964, 

11/F 12, PE (research permit obtained).

681 Ibid.

682 Ibid.
frontier guard troops into the territorial guerrilla organisation was particularly practical, in view of their nature. Lopmeri proposed that work on organisation be divided into different phases, the first one of them addressing the arrangements for available troops, their inspections and allocation to rear area defensive tasks within the framework of the territorial system. The first phase was completed by 1967. The second phase would comprise increasing the number of such local defence troops that would be reserved for direct or supportive front-line duties. According to Lopmeri’s proposal, this phase would be completed by 1970.683

In autumn 1963, work to put the observations made by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee and the Operations Department in practice began where applicable. Major Ermei Kanninen, who had acted as the secretary of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, was appointed deputy battalion commander of the Häme Cavalry Battalion on 1 April 1963, and was ordered by the General Headquarters to organise a teaching event on territorial guerrilla activities in Lahti in November. The event was intended for mid-level leaders, principally for officers holding different positions at the headquarters of divisions, military districts and army units. This training event was chaired by Kanninen, who also gave all the key presentations by virtue of his familiarity with the subject matter. The teaching material and lectures of the event provides a valuable contemporary document, enabling on the one hand the assessment of the development phase that territorial guerrilla-type activities were undergoing at the time and, on the other hand, the evaluation of the changes that had already taken place in the methods available to guerrilla warfare and their impact on the thinking of the art of war.684

Kanninen introduced the training event, giving a broad-based presentation of the issues related to guerrilla warfare. In his presentation, Kanninen discussed the issue from the perspective of the opportunities available to the Finnish art of war, pre-requisites for guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare, the assessment of the effectiveness of guerrilla-type activities, mental endurance, and the provision of supplies to guerrilla troops.685 While apparently the only one in its kind, this event opened the way to providing information to troops hungry for knowledge and tasked with the responsibility of implementing guerrilla-type activities and providing training in them.

On 8 July 1964, Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, General Sakari Simelius, approved on proposal by Olavi Lopmeri that a research group be set up, chaired by Colonel Leevi Välimaa (PE op-os) and having Colonel Otto Ylirisku (PE jv-os), Lieutenant Colonel Leo Rantanen (RvE), Lieutenant Colonel Kauko Räsänen (HuoltoK) and Major Olavi Lopmeri (PE op-os) as its members. Lopmeri also acted

683 Ibid.
684 Kanninen, Ermei: Sisituloiminta ja -sota, niiden tarve, mahdollisuudet sekä toimintaehdoltyykset Suomessa, (‘Guerrilla-type activities, guerrilla warfare, the need for them, opportunities available to them and their operational preconditions in Finland’), lecture and training material for a training event on territorial guerrilla-type activities, held on 18 November 1963, Ermei Kanninen private collection, the original documents in the possession of the author of this thesis.
685 Ibid.
as secretary to the group. Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces at the time, Sakari Simelius, recalls the issue as follows: “The committee that I had set up had looked into the issue for several years, conducting even practical experiments. Over time, the method took proper shape, and was brought into line with the requirements set for it. In a presentation held in early July 1964, I approved the principles for territorial guerrilla-type activities.”

Participation by the Frontier Guard in the development of guerrilla tactics was particularly welcomed, as it was considered to provide opportunities to link the Coast Guard organisation to guerrilla-type activities. With regard to guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago and the training of guerrillas for that area, standing orders were issued in late 1965, aimed at familiarising the personnel of the Coast Guards with guerrilla-type activities, reconnaissance and surveillance in sections of the Finnish archipelago and coastal areas that the enemy had occupied.

The Research Group on Guerrilla Tactics was tasked with preparing a proposal, using primarily theoretical research as well as map and experimental exercises, for the objectives to be set for Finnish guerrilla-type activities, general tasks of guerrilla jaeger troops and tactics suitable for local defensive forces. The objective was set at drafting a proposal on the basis of which a final and detailed guerrilla organisation and its wartime equipment could be defined, training instructions written and a new guerrilla regulation formulated. In practice, the key to achieving this objective was to look into the methods of guerrilla warfare in effect at the time, as well as methods that could be theoretically envisaged, including their applicability to the operations of territorial guerrilla troops. The final proposal was to be presented to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces in spring 1965.

The work of the Research Group on Guerrilla Tactics was divided into five phases scheduled for 1964 and 1965. The first phase consisted of preparatory studies and the gathering of information, carried out in October and November 1964. During the second phase, spanning the period from November 1964 to February 1965, map examinations, including five map exercises, were arranged. The third phase comprised two experimental exercises. During the fourth phase, the troops of the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard were assigned various experimental tasks. The fifth, and the final, phase of the work comprised combining the results of the work and drawing conclusions from them, on the basis of which a proposal for guerrilla tactics was drafted in early spring 1965. Unfortunately, the final report of the Research Group on Guerrilla Tactics cannot be found in the archives of the General Headquarters, as it was evidently scrapped due to cuts to archives.

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686 PE:n no. 66/Optsto/11 henksal/9.9.1964, 11/F 12, PE (research permit obtained). See also Simelius (1983), p. 256. See also Lopmeri (former Meri), Arvi Olavi, an extract from personal details, no.39725, KA.

687 In July 1964, the combined research results and the conclusions drawn from them were presented to Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, in which connection Simelius approved the principles for territorial guerrilla-type activities and the setting up of a research group, tasked with looking into guerrilla tactics. Simelius (1983), p. 256.


689 PE:n no. 66/Optsto/11 henksal/9.9.1964, 11/F 12, PE (research permit obtained).

690 Ibid.
In every case, a characteristically Finnish model for guerrilla-type activities and its tactical foundations in broad outline were completed by early 1965. Investigation into the issue continued from 1965 onwards, along the lines proposed by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, in the form of normal operational and other headquarters work, carried out largely by the various branch and other departments of the General Headquarters and the Frontier Guard Headquarters. By that point, after the foundations for a characteristically Finnish art of war and the arrangements for a defensive system had been formulated, a more solid basis existed for examining and developing opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities. In practice, this meant that the work needed to be expanded to the other sectors — chiefly the navy — in order to engage them in guerrilla-type activities.

The principles of territorial combat also needed to be fully harmonised and distributed to the units in a comprehensible form to be used in training. Throughout the 1950s, defence preparations had been hampered by the fact that collaboration between the Defence Forces and society at large had been limited to the minimum. After Finland’s situation with regard to foreign and domestic affairs had stabilised in the late 1950s, it was possible to reactivate attempts to warm up collaboration. One indication of this was the establishment of a system of national defence courses in 1961. Such courses provided individuals in leading positions, representing the different fields of society, making proposals for and taking decisions on issues related directly or indirectly to the national defence, with an overall picture of Finland’s national defence.

Perhaps the most significant peacetime reform regarding the leadership and management system of the Defence Forces was implemented in 1966, as the old divisional system was abandoned and the country was divided into seven operational military provinces, each with territorial responsibility. Fitting together the civilian and military administrative areas was the key argument in the reform of the peacetime organisation of the Defence Forces. Starting from 1966, the military provinces under the High Command were assigned territorial responsibilities regarding leadership. A total of 27 military districts and a number of military units and establishments were brought under the seven military provinces. This arrangement was also aimed at serving national defence through a territorial division which was aligned with that of the civilian administration. The organisational reform was followed by a revision of the establishment chart, including the associated reallocation of military equipment.

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692 Tervasmäki, Vilho: Maanpuolustuksen johto ja yleisjärjestelyt ('The leadership of the national defence and its general arrangements'), and article in the book Tietoja maanpuolustuksesta ('Information on national defence'), Mikkel 1969, pp. 16–17.
693 Asetus maan jakamisesta sotilaslääneihin ja sotilaspireihin ('Decree on the division of Finland into military provinces and districts'), the Statute Book of Finland, no. 145/1966, KA.
694 Saressalo (1981), pp. 78–81, SKK 1/1465, KA.
As the 1966 organisational reform of the Defence Forces created independent military provinces, under which the brigades of the general forces and local forces were placed, the key term was territorial responsibility. Only such local units that had undergone uniform training and were equipped with sophisticated equipment could be expected in a real situation to engage simultaneously in combat, in line with their territorial responsibility and tasks. In 1966, the Frontier Guard also carried out a thorough assessment of the preparedness of its wartime frontier brigades and other units capable of engaging in guerrilla-type activities. In the same year, the Frontier Guard Headquarters launched, evidently prompted by the organisational reform of the Defence Forces, a revision of the wartime frontier guard brigades, including a separate investigation into the suitability of troops for guerrilla-type activities. Peace-time organisational reforms had a direct impact on the arrangements of the conscription districts and troop establishment, with the indirect consequences also affecting wartime troop compositions: ‘From the perspective of troop establishment, this means that frontier guard battalions – depending on the nature of the decision that the organisation reaches – are either disbanded with their personnel and materiel being allocated to reorganised frontier brigades, or are assigned as such and as an integral part to one of the frontier brigades.’

During the first phase, the Frontier Guards submitted proposals to the Frontier Guards Headquarters regarding the wartime troop compositions. After the first phase was completed, the issue was negotiated by Frontier Guard commanders, on 2 and 3 November 1966, during which the issue of the suitability of the organisation of a guerrilla jaeger battalion for guerrilla-type activities in particular was raised. The second phase comprised the examination of experimental troop compositions formed on the basis of proposals submitted by the Frontier Guards, principally in the form of map and operational preparedness exercises. The final date for the submittal of drafts for troop compositions was set for 1 April 1967. The preliminary studies found that the Frontier Guards must be capable of engaging in guerrilla-type activities under all conditions, both in their peacetime and wartime compositions. The Frontier Guards Headquarters sent the individual Guards a covering letter, which was intended to prompt them to begin the revision work, according to which: ‘changing the wartime composition of the Frontier Guards aims to enhance the safeguarding of Finland’s neutrality when the country is neutral, and improve the fighting capability of frontier guard units while they are engaged in combat in the role of a covering force.’

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Between 1966 and 1968, Finnish officers made several visits abroad for the purpose of gaining new insights and ideas, with excellent results. Major Maunu Rautonen, Finland deputy military attaché in Stockholm, visited the Jaeger School in Kiruna on at least three occasions in March 1966. According to his report, Rautonen also visited the Jaeger School training areas for live ammunition exercises in Rautas and Abiesko. While Rautonen’s visit was otherwise fairly ordinary, he paid special attention to the main training objectives of the Swedish troops which were reconnaissance and guerrilla warfare.\(^{699}\) Arto Lavento, 1st Lieutenant at the Frontier Guard, attended a guerrilla course in Bombäst between 15 and 27 August, arranged by the Norwegian Home Guard, Heimevernet. Lieutenant Colonel Pauli Kaskeala, Finland’s military attaché in Oslo, also visited this course, held in Bombäst between 23 and 27 August 1966, observing its final exercise.\(^{700}\)

First Lieutenant Arto Lavento compiled a detailed and exhaustive report on his visit, submitting it to the Frontier Guard commanders and the chief of the Frontier Guard Academy. Lavento’s report sums up his views and experiences for the benefit of training in Finnish guerrilla-type activities. According to Lavento, Norwegian guerrilla-type activities were based on broad operational freedom of specially trained units and on operations for which arrangements had been made in advance. ‘Contact persons’ among the local population had also been trained, tasked with supplying guerrilla jaeger units with information and materiel in wartime and, if necessary, arranging for the care of wounded guerrilla jaegers in civilian accommodation if their evacuation from the area proved impossible. The training provided on the course comprised classroom lessons, practical exercises in guerrilla tactics and a final exercise. An interesting detail regarding the training material was the fact that the Norwegians used two Finnish training films, ‘Sissitaitoja kesällä’ (‘Guerrilla jaeger skills in the summer’) and ‘Sissit iskevät’ (‘Guerrilla jaegers strike’).\(^{701}\)

The focus of training provided by the course was placed on preparing a base, setting up lookouts, patrolling, personal camouflage, and the preparation of various explosive charges. Training paid practically no attention to countermeasures that the enemy might launch. Lavento was extremely satisfied with the attitude shown by the Norwegians and their willingness to collaborate, as well as with the fact that ‘the Norwegians harbour absolutely no misconceptions about Finland’s political status.’ The report submitted by Finland’s military attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Pauli Kaskeala, confirmed almost all of the observations made by 1st Lieutenant Arto Lavento, while


also highlighting the use of ‘civilian contact persons’ as part of territorial guerrilla-type activities. Kaskeala regarded this arrangement as interesting and highly important. 702

In spring 1968, yet another visit was paid to Sweden by eight officers from the Defence Forces and one from the Frontier Guard. Once again, the Finnish officers visited the Kiruna Jaeger School, located in the Upper Norrland military area, where they familiarised themselves with the Swedish training in guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla jaegers’ special equipment. Captain Raimo Piirainen from the Frontier Guard Academy, who participated in the visit, drafted a detailed report on it, highlighting the importance of Finno-Swedish collaboration and the exchange of information and experiences related to guerrilla-type activities. The report was appended with detailed curricula and training programmes for the Swedish training in guerrilla-type activities. In his summary Piirainen noted that ‘on several occasions the Swedes pointed out that it had been the Finnish army that had taught them the most lessons, setting an example for how even a small country is worth defending.’ 703

The visits to Sweden and Norway, conducted for the purpose of obtaining intelligence and for study, indicate that the Finnish Defence Forces retained their interest in foreign models and guerrilla-type activities throughout the 1960s. It is also noteworthy that the Finnish military sought to obtain information on guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare from Finland’s neighbours in the West – from countries where the conditions and resources were practically identical to those in Finland. Corresponding information on Finnish experiences were handed over to Finland’s partners, particularly to the Swedes and Norwegians. It can be concluded from the above discussion that such visits conducted for the purpose of obtaining intelligence in a legal way produced useful information that was put to good use, at least in part, in Finnish guerrilla training and in the development of tactical issues related to guerrilla warfare.

**Guerrilla warfare as a topic in the training events of the top leadership between 1961 and 1965**

Training events for the highest-ranking officers were initiated in the Defence Forces in 1961. Such training events, arranged at intervals of a few years, consisted of courses approximately three weeks in length providing, as their name suggested, the highest ranking officers of the Defence Forces with up-to-date information on operational issues and trends in the art of war. 704 Course programmes and content were prepared in most cases by the Operations Division, with the chief of the General Headquarters acting, with some exceptions, as the leader of the courses. Course

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704 PE:n no. 33/Koultsto/5 a 1/sal/20.3.1965, T 25086/F 1sal, KA.
programmes focused on key issues in the national defence on the level of the top leadership. Courses were normally arranged at the premises of the National General Staff College. In 1961, 1962, 1964 and 1966, training events for the top leadership 1–4 (YPO:s 1–4) were arranged.

At the first training event for the top leadership (YPO 1, 1961), Lieutenant Colonel Väinö Salmela, then chief of the Staff Duties Office of the General Headquarters, gave an introductory presentation on the foundations and wartime arrangements of the Finnish Defence Forces. Salmela’s introduction made indirect references to the state and quality of training in guerrilla-type activities. ‘The mobility of the reconnaissance, guerrilla, coastal and coastal jaeger battalions – all part of our special infantry – has been improved. Reconnaissance and guerrilla jaeger troops are provided with paratrooper training.’ As the role of guerrilla-type activities at the time was still unclear, Salmela discussed the issue only cursorily.

The second training event (YPO 2, 1962) touched on guerrilla-type activities by presenting the content of a draft for the new Kenttäohjesääntö (‘Field Regulation’) to the course participants. The inspector of the infantry introduced the participants to ‘Yleistaktiikan suuntaviivoja’ (‘Guidelines for general tactics’), noting, among other things, that ‘...we have been forced to revise our tactical methods in the various forms of fighting. This revision has taken place in connection with the revision of the Field Regulation, Part II. We have attempted to identify means for eliminating the mobility and superiority in firepower available to the enemy.’ This is a direct reference to Chapter VIII, Sissitoiminta (‘Guerrilla-type activities’) in the Field Regulation and, with regard to the forms of fighting, to its subchapters which discussed guerrilla-type activities under defence and delaying action.

At the third training event (YPO 3, 1964), guerrilla warfare was introduced to the participants under its own theme. Major Olavi Lopmeri, who was investigating guerrilla warfare related issues on a full-time basis at the Operations Department at the time, gave a presentation entitled ‘Guerrilla warfare’. Lopmeri opened his presentation, with the General Staff of the Defence Forces as his audience, somewhat provocatively. ‘My presentation, which has an introductory nature, has been deliberately entitled ‘guerrilla warfare’, a concept that is undefined in our regulations and that in other respects is rather vague. This is because we wanted to ensure sufficiently strong grounds and an objective starting point

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705 Wennström, Finn-Göran: Ylemmän päällystön kurssit (‘Courses for the General Staff’), an article in the book Sotakorkeakoulun sotamaisen sotataidon kehittäjänä (‘The National General Staff College as a developer of the Finnish art of war’), edited by Arto Kotro, Juva 2009, p. 314.
706 T 26965/Dk 1 sal – Dk 4 sal, KA.
707 PE:n no. K11/Lkptsto/Da sal/28.2.1961, T 26965/Dk 1 sal, KA. One of the students on YPO 1 was Jorma Järventaus, who had worked with guerrilla-related issues.
708 Yleistaktiikan suuntaviivoja (‘Guidelines for general tactics’), a lecture on YPO 2: on 2 May 1962, T 26965/Dk 2 sal, KA. Students of YPO 2 included Veikko Koppinen, Veikko Karhunan and Leevi Välimaa, all of whom had dealt with issues related to guerrilla tactics. Karhunan, Veikko Evert, an extract from personal details, no. 37447, KA. Koppinen, Veikko William, an extract from personal details, no. 55645, KA. Välimaa, Leevi Kalervo, an extract from personal details, no. 46511, KA.
709 Cf. the previous Kenttäohjesääntö I (KO I) (‘Field Regulation Part i’), Mikkeli 1963, pp. 103–113, 140, 190–191 and 231.
for discussing all such issues that everyone understands to be included in guerrilla warfare – without any definitions.' Lopmeri also noted that, from the perspective of developments in the art of war, new ideas for and foreign trends in guerrilla warfare require extensive research and adaptive measures to be taken, in order for them to fit, ‘particularly, into the national defence system undergoing a transformation in a territorial direction’.\textsuperscript{710}

Lopmeri’s introduction was extensive, focusing, above all, on the opportunities available to a characteristically Finnish art of war and guerrilla warfare, including their strengths and weaknesses. Lopmeri presented guerrilla warfare and its applicability to Finnish conditions in 1964, giving credit to Veikko Koppinen and ‘his impressive command for attention’ issued in order to draw awareness to issues related to guerrilla warfare, thereby helping to arouse considerable interest in guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare in Finland. Lopmeri ended his introduction by presenting an outline of a national system for waging guerrilla warfare, based on his own investigations. ‘We, if anybody, undoubtedly need one. I believe that just as well as in Algeria, Cuba, Korea and Indochina, the requisite spirit can be found in our country.’\textsuperscript{711} A reference to Algeria was well in line with the trend of the time, as the General Headquarters kept close watch on the training given to the French ground forces during the 1960s, particularly with regard to anti-guerrilla tactics.\textsuperscript{712}

The fourth training event (YPO 4, 1966) touched only cursorily on issues related to guerrilla warfare. Chief of the National General Staff College, Major General Mikko Soste, noted in his introduction with regard to the importance of reconnaissance that ‘advantage must be taken of guerrilla-type activities and preparations for them must be made in good time’.\textsuperscript{713} Sisto had personal experiences of and views on guerrilla-type activities, as he reportedly strongly supported the official view of the National General Staff College concerning the opportunities available to guerrilla warfare in Lapland.\textsuperscript{714} It should be mentioned that in early 1966 the General Headquarters had taken a decision, according to which the training of the reconnaissance troops of the wartime Supreme Headquarters – the reconnaissance battalion of the High Command – should be supplemented with skills in guerrilla-type activities and parachute jumping.\textsuperscript{715}

\textsuperscript{710} Sissisodankäynti (‘Guerrilla warfare’), a lecture given at YPO 3’s on 20 March 1964, T 26965/Dk 3 sal, KA. Students of YPO 3 included Martti Avela, Björn Kontiopää and Unto Matikainen, all of whom had worked on issues related to guerrilla tactics. Avela, Martti, an extract from personal details, no. 30515, KA. Kontiopää, Björn Harald Wilhelm, an extract from personal details, no. 40903, KA. Matikainen, Unto Osvald, an extract from personal details, no. 51481, KA.

\textsuperscript{711} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{712} See, for example, a memorandum submitted by Finland’s military attaché to France, dated 18 July 1962, T 25991/F 8, KA. Memorandum by Finland’s military attaché no. 57/14/sal/Parisi/17.11.1965, T 25094/F 13 sal, KA. PE:n no. 386/Tarktsto/14 a/sal/1.12.1965, T 25094/F 13 sal, KA.

\textsuperscript{713} Näkökohtia suurten joukkojen johtamisesta nykyaikaisessa nykytaikaisessa sodassa (‘Aspects of the leadership of large troops under Finnish conditions in the modern war’), a lecture given on YPO 4 on 15 September 1966, T 26965/Dk 4 sal, KA. The students on YPO 4 included Erkki Setälä, who had worked with issues related to guerrilla war.


\textsuperscript{715} PE:n no. 1/Tarktsto/5 sal/17.1.1966, T 25094/F 14 sal, KA.
All in all, the training events for the highest ranking officers in the 1960s provided an important forum through which the latest developments in the art of war could be relayed via the key decision-makers in the Defence Forces in up-to-date form to all troops. In this respect, the transfer of plans related to guerrilla-type activities, including general situational awareness, from the Operations Division of the General Headquarters to the military provinces and the military units via the army’s highest-ranking officers was of vital importance. During the training events, many confidential discussions, including general commentary on the issues covered, took place between the participants. Such discussion may have played a crucial role in the further development of guerrilla-type activities, helping to put them on a permanent footing in the Finnish art of war.

A summary of investigations, texts and discussions related to guerrilla war between 1961 and 1966

According to different sources, the definition of concepts related to guerrilla warfare was twofold in nature in the early 1960s. Although attempts were made to distinguish guerrilla-type activities from guerrilla warfare, no clear conceptual separation was made between the methods of guerrilla-type activities and the operational principles of a resistance movement. On the other hand, drawing such a line is still extremely difficult. Attempts to make a distinction in terms of concepts and content in the 1960s were influenced by personal opinions and by the fact that the definitions in regulations reflected the thinking of at least two tactical approaches and schools. The basic idea and general tactical principles of guerrilla-type activities were defined in the regulations written in the 1960s in terms that were considerably more moderate in tone than the texts from the 1950s. It can be said with certainty that behind this lay the systematic research and experimentation carried out by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee in the early 1960s; the 1950s had been characterised, after all, by fragmental discussion conducted by a number of individuals.

Public discussion in the press and magazines, as well as among officers, was divided into two groups – pro and con. Discussion by officers on the art of war was mostly conducted in the form of opinionated articles on guerrilla related issues, sometime with a strong emotional charge. Between 1961 and 1966, a total of eight articles on guerrilla-type activities or guerrilla warfare was published in the press and three in magazines. During the same period, the issue was addressed in five theses prepared at the National General Staff College. In addition to the National General Staff College, guerrilla-type activities were examined in 16 studies prepared by the staff officer courses and infantry captain courses arranged by the Army Combat School.716

The authors that discussed guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare included Taisto Olavi Lehti, Aatos Savunen, Veikko Koppinen, Esa Seppänen, and two au-

716 With regard to the number of articles published, Sotilasaikakauslehti (a Finnish trade magazine on military issues) published most articles on guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare between 1961 and 1968. Ruotuväki and Suomen Sotilas – both Finnish trade magazines on military issues – as well as several branch papers and magazines published articles that touched on guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare; these articles have been omitted in the above calculation due to the scant space devoted to them. See the bibliography of this thesis.
In 1961, Lieutenant Colonel Taisto Olavi Lehti published an article on revolutionary warfare in Sotilasaikakauslehti, discussing it laudably from an international perspective. In his article, Lehti focused mostly on revolutionary wars in which guerrilla warfare had been used, according to him, to great effect throughout the entire 20th century. ‘The 20th century has given rise to a new type of war, the revolutionary war, which may be called semi-military, because in it the political means of warfare play an equally important role as military power with its tanks, artillery and aircraft.’

It should be mentioned that the article authored by Taisto Olavi Lehti exhibits a remarkable conformity with the background material that had been at the disposal of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, and with the articles published by the pseudonym ‘Tarkkailija’ (‘Observer’) in Helsingin Sanomat in September 1958.

In 1961 Sotilasaikakauslehti published an offprint of the magazine entitled Maanpuolustuksemme (‘Our national defence’). Lieutenant General Aatos Maunula authored and article on the military aspects of the national defence for the offprint. In his article, Maunula discussed Finland’s response to possible hostilities from the viewpoint of the art of war. ‘The Second World War and many of the smaller wars that have erupted after it have also convincingly demonstrated the importance of being prepared for guerrilla warfare waged under special conditions. After all, guerrilla war represents a fairly rudimentary but, by the same token, a modern form of warfare.’

Authors who developed theme of guerrilla warfare along international lines in their articles published between 1963 and 1966 included Lieutenant Colonel Aatos Savunen, Lieutenant Touko Rissanen and two authors who wrote under a pseudonym who wrote under a pseudonym and remained anonymous. While it is difficult to find a uniform definition for guerrilla-type activities in the articles referred to above, they generally refer to guerrilla-type activities as combat and harassment operations that guerrilla troops carry out in the enemy’s rear or in areas that the enemy has occupied. The articles also often referred to tactical experiences gained of guerrilla-type activities during the Winter War and the Continuation War.
donym.720 Above all, these articles were an indication that the officer corps kept an eye on guerrilla warfare by examining foreign examples and developments. On the one hand, two of the authors who wrote under a pseudonym, noted that anything touching on guerrilla warfare was still so sensitive in the 1960s that the authors did not wish to be labelled as advocates of revolutionary ideas, although the issues mostly concerned the discussion of various theorises within the scope of the art of war.

With regard to addressing the purely Finnish art of war, one magazine article was published in 1965 and three press articles in 1966. In 1965, Major General Veikko Koppinen published a long article in Jalkaväen vuosikirja (an annual trade publication dedicated to infantry-related issues), in which he discussed the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities in support of territorial national defence. In his article, Koppinen approached his topic by dividing guerrilla-type activities into operations carried out by local guerrilla jaeger and elite troops, and guerrilla-type activities conducted by the guerrilla jaeger troops of the field army itself. According to Koppinen, ‘The chances of a small nation waging a successful defensive battle are based on heavy reliance on guerrilla jaeger troops, and the support that guerrilla-type activities can lend to the armed national defence is directly proportional to the number of guerrilla jaegers’.721 This bold and fairly open article provides, in a way, a synthesis of his Sissisotamenetelmä (‘A method for waging a guerrilla war’), published in 1960, and the conclusions drawn by the Guerrilla Tactics Commission.722 The article published by Koppinen prompted Lieutenant Colonel Aatos Savunen to comment on the issues presented by Koppinen in issue 5/1966 of Sotilasaikakauslehti. In particular, Savunen was critical of the possibilities of establishing the guerrilla jaeger organisations described by Koppinen and of the arrangements that they would require. Savunen notes, among other things that ‘if we really intend to resort to large-scale guerrilla activities, considerably more time must be allocated to training.’723

Naturally enough, Koppinen wrote a rejoinder to Savunen’s constructive criticism, publishing it in issue 8/1966 of Sotilasaikakauslehti. In his article, Koppinen responded to the issues raised by Savunen, noting that his article was purely theoretical in nature. ‘My article sought only to present theory of a method of national defence, withb-


722 Cf. the previous with, among other things, Sissisotamenetelmä (‘A method for guerrilla warfare’) (a draft), Helsinki 1 June 1960, PE Op-os kirjeistö 1960, T 26965/F 20 sal, KA. PE:n no. 32/Opisto/11 henksal/25.6.1963 (Sissitoimikunnan mietintö) (‘Report by the Guerrilla Tactics Commission’), 11/F 9, PE (research permit obtained).

out making any attempt to apply it to Finnish conditions. Most questions related to it cannot be openly discussed, let alone be expected to receive answers to them in a public forum. Any applications of the method fall within the scope of public documents.\textsuperscript{724} This is an indication of the fact that Koppinen knew more about the developments in guerrilla-type activities and the situation regarding the art of war than he could write about in public. After all, the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, Olavi Lopmeri and the Research Group on Guerrilla Tactics had already completed their work under the oversight of the General Headquarters, submitting their reports for the purpose of prompt implementation of the measures proposed in them.

In late 1966, one more article was published in which guerrilla warfare was discussed on a strategic level. Captain Esa Seppänen, who had studied the issue in his own thesis, opened his article by noting that \textit{‘the Second World War, and the ensuing period of Cold War, have brought a new element to the art of war, the guerrilla war.’}\textsuperscript{725} Seppänen was definitively right in noting that guerrilla warfare could be regarded as a phenomenon in its own right within the art of war, even in the mid-1960s and even in Finland.

While a total of 21 studies on guerrilla-related issues were produced at the different course levels at the military schools between 1951 and 1966, only a few of them discussed the issue from the perspective of the Finnish art of war. Among theses produced at the National General Staff College, those authored by Captain Klaus Saarenheimo, Captain Paavali Turpeenniemi and Captain Jukka Karvinen deserve a mention, all of them critically discussing the role of guerrilla-type activities in national defence. The thesis prepared by Captain Saarenheimo, completed in 1962, provides an excellent description of the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities within the framework of a brigade and army corps, shedding light on the thinking prevalent at the time. Saarenheimo noted that if anything, the importance of guerrilla-type activities has increased. \textit{‘Something of a paradox has taken place in military development over the past few decades; alongside the rapid technological and scientific development in military equipment, the outdated and rudimentary guerrilla warfare has gained increased importance.’}\textsuperscript{726} Saarenheimo’s thesis was reportedly used by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee as background material, an indication of its high quality.\textsuperscript{727}

Captain Paavali Turpeenniemi and Captain Jukka Karvinen looked into the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities in operations conducted in Lapland and in the Finnish archipelago. Turpeenniemi discussed the obscure distinction between a guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities, something that was characteristic of the period. \textit{‘In Lapland, under certain conditions and during certain phases of combat, it is difficult to...}
draw a clear line between guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare.”

With regard to its subject matter and discussion, thesis prepared by Jukka Karvinen, a coastal artillery officer, appears to be linked to a point in time when the Frontier Guard issued standing orders on guerrilla-type activities in the Finnish archipelago and the training of guerrilla jaegers for archipelago conditions. The results of Karvinen’s study and the conclusions that he drew were apparently one of the inspirations behind the establishment of a committee in 1968, known as the Coastal Guerrilla Tactics Committee, an indication of the fact that this thesis also contributed to the development of Finnish guerrilla tactics.

However, between 1961 and 1966, the largest number of studies related to guerrilla warfare were produced on staff officer courses and on the infantry captain courses arranged by the Army Combat School. An examination of the list of studies completed reveal that the Army Combat School was focused on investigating guerrilla tactics, as a total of 16 studies with a guerrilla-related theme were completed at the School. As a general rule, theses were brief texts – approximately 20 to 40 pages in length, the quality of which varied considerably from one author to another. However, they include a number of excellent theses, of which those produced by Captain Sami Sihvo, 1st Lieutenant Ilpo Hietavalkama, 1st Lieutenant Gustav Hägglund and 1st Lieutenant Jussi Henttinen deserve a mention.

Although the views expressed by individual officers and schools clashed, it should be noted that the tone of the texts, for all their criticism, was openly constructive. By the 2000s, this kind of culture appears to have disappeared altogether from the Finnish military community and discussions on the art of war. Open and constructive discussion has always played an important role in the development of the Finnish art of war, provided that care is taken that all details are kept confidential in line with the instructions in effect. Therefore, the current tendency is highly deplorable and possibly even disastrous from the perspective of tactical thinking. On the basis of the above, it can be stated that guerrilla warfare, guerrilla war and guerrilla-type

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728 Turpeenniemi, Paavali: Rauhan ajan valmistelut suurinkin voimin Latin alueella suoritettavaa sissitoimintaa varten (toimittaessa nykykäsiksen välinein varustettua vihollista vastaan) (“Peacetime preparations for guerrilla-type activities in Lapland, possibly involving a large number of troops (while operating against an enemy equipped with modern technology)”), a thesis prepared at the National General Staff College in 1963, SKK 1/812 KA.

729 Karvinen, Jukka: Sissitoiminnan mahdollisuudet, menetelmät ja välineet saaristoisamme sekä sen vaatimat valmistelut erityisesti merivartiostojemme kannalta katsoen (“Opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities in the Finnish archipelago and the methods and preparations of such activities, with special attention paid to the role of the Coast Guards”), a thesis prepared at the National General Staff College in 1965, SKK 1/842 KA. See also Kosonen – Pohjonen (1994), pp. 435–437.

730 Sihvo, Sami: Sissijoukkojen yhteistoimintapyynnöt ilma- ja merivoimille (Kuljetusten valmistelu) (“Calls to the air force and navy by guerrilla troops, requesting collaboration (Preparations for transport)”), a thesis prepared on a staff officer course in 1961, T 26077/1/1/55, KA. Hietavalkama, Ilpo: Heli- kopterien käyttö sissitoiminnassa (“The use of helicopters in guerrilla-type activities”), a thesis prepared on an infantry captain course in 1964, T 26077/1/43, KA. Hägglund, Gustav: Kivääripataljo- nan varustaminen sissitoimintaa varten (“Equipping a rifle battalion for guerrilla-type activities”), a thesis prepared on an infantry captain course in 1964, T 26077/1/52, KA. Henttinen, Jussi: Viikon ke- tävän kaksipuolisen sissitoimintabarjoituksen järjestäminen (“Organising a one-week-long war game with the focus on guerrilla-type activities”), a thesis prepared on an infantry captain course in 1965, T 26077/1/92, KA.
activities were increasingly studied at Finnish military schools in the early 1960s. However, providing definitions for concepts falling under the art of war, let alone guerrilla-related concepts, was anything but easy. Although there was general awareness in the 1960s of the problems related to theoretical and conceptual definition of guerrilla warfare, including its content, discussions nevertheless played a role in further development.

A summary of the developments in guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities between 1945 and 1966

After the war, Finland’s position was difficult. The demobilisation of the wartime field army and the activities of the Control Commission that the Allies had set up for Finland greatly hampered the development of the Defence Forces. In materiel terms, Finland’s defensive capability was good, but the treaties that Finland had signed with the Soviet Union gave rise to significant problems in interpreting the issues related to the defence of the country. Preparations for mobilisation and operational planning remained in a static state for years, and Finland was forced to await a solution to the question of the surplus weapons for years. However, these difficulties were overcome on the strength of a policy of acquiescence – at least ostensibly – and plans that the military drafted in all secrecy, enabling the country to pull through, somehow, until the early 1950 and the somewhat easier times. The question of the surplus weapons was resolved in a way that was advantageous for Finland, but operational planning, preparations for mobilisation, and a whole host of other factors such as a change in the nature of war, needs for improved mobility, and the structural change affecting the Defence Forces brought about such radical changes to the foundations of the national defence that the entire military system needed to be reformed in order to make it compatible with the requirements of the prevalent situation. In this change, guerrilla-type activities and taking advantage of the means available to guerrilla warfare played an important role.

Although the Finnish Defence Forces were aware of guerrilla-type activities as early as in the 1920s and 1930s, it was only during the postwar period that new kind of attention was being paid to identifying the opportunities available to guerrilla warfare in Finland. During this period, guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare were incorporated into the Finnish art of war, and were encoded in the draft for the 1947 Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa (‘The General Section of the Field Regulation’). Guerrilla warfare was also discussed in the 1950s, and then it was expected to be part of future wars. Guerrilla-type activities, that had been regarded as an effective form of combat before the Winter War, were increasingly being displaced in theoretical thinking during the early stages of the Cold War by a fully-fledged guerrilla war – the most extreme way of defending a country – following the experiences gained from various wars. Many articles in Sotilasaikakauslehti and officers’ discussion events also compared experiences gained from the pursuit and annihilation of guerrilla and partisan troops during the Second World War. According to such articles and discussions, combat against guerrillas was extremely difficult, particularly in the summer. Theoretical thinking predating the Winter War was supplemented by new aspects based on war experiences and novel thinking on the art of war. Although the post-
war principles governing guerrilla-type activities remained largely unchanged in the late 1950s, a clear conceptual difference between practice and theory can be discerned, one leaning towards a guerrilla war that was more total in nature.

Guerrilla-type activities were generally regarded as having increased in importance, with helicopters and air transport enabling the extension of the guerrilla jaegers’ operating area to the most important targets, not to mention large rear areas. In Finland, guerrilla warfare was examined largely on the basis of experiences gained from Norway, Yugoslavia and China. From a wider perspective, guerrilla war was understood to be a form of warfare that would displace regular military operations in areas occupied by the enemy, although the entire country, or substantial portions of its territory, had been occupied by the enemy, and all operations by the regular army had become impossible. Against such a background, it was understandable that guerrilla war was regarded as feasible in Finnish conditions but, simultaneously, as something that needed to be linked to other operations by the Finnish ground forces. After all, the wars that Finland had waged had shown that it was perfectly possible that the entire country or portions of it could come under the threat of occupation. Fighting an enemy with a superior strength was possible using conventional means but, should Finland’s defences collapse, the fight was to be continued using the methods of a guerrilla war.

Guerrilla methods began to receive increased appreciation as the military understood that a Finland of the late 1950s and early 1960s, suffering from material shortages, would always be inferior in strength compared to the invader. Using unconventional methods such as systematic guerrilla war, it was thought possible to balance the relative strengths and to create a pre-emptive deterrent what would send a message to the invader that Finland would defended itself with all available means. The continuous development of guerrilla warfare was regarded as necessary, as it would otherwise remain a dead letter and a deterrent on paper only. Great importance was also placed on training, because only through training could all formations transition to guerrilla-type activities in practice, which was the requirement set by the Field Regulation. Every soldier needed to be versed in the basic skills of the guerrilla jaeger – getting by in the field, taking advantage of the terrain and applying the requisite engineering skills. All Finnish conscripts needed to be trained in such basic guerrilla jaeger skills that would enable them to get by in a guerrilla war should the country face a surprise attack. Guerrilla-type activities also needed to be linked to other operations conducted by the army. This thinking exhibits clear parallels to experiences gained both from China and Vietnam. The previous notion of assembling and training guerrilla troops and units after the onset of the war had become past history.

The change in the art of war that took place between 1945 and 1966 regarding guerrilla-type activities can be viewed from a number of perspectives. The period from 1945 until around the mid-1960s was characterised, above all, by confusion over the principles of the art of war, the arrangement of training in guerrilla-type activities and the twofold nature of definitions. Especially during the 1950s and 1960s, the objectives and content of theoretical concept of guerrilla-type activities and their functional principles changed considerably. Furthermore, one must bear in mind that during the postwar decades, practically the entire Finnish defence system was
reformed. Although the first steps of the territorial defence system from its inception to becoming a recognised defensive doctrine and the keystone of the strategic defence are often – and erroneously – associated with articles published in the press over the course of the 1960s, the foundation for territorial combat and for the entire defensive system in general were largely laid in the 1950s. This development work was also interwoven with the utilisation of the methods of guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities, including their integration into the national defence system. The development of the defence system was related to a large number of problems and challenges, the most serious of which culminated in the definition of tactical concepts and their content prior to their practical implementation.

From the perspective of the art of war, guerrilla war was defined as a large scale popular war, with guerrilla-type activities being defined as harassment directed at the enemy’s rear or the territory occupied by the enemy, related to regular military operations or guerrilla warfare. Both definitions, dating to the 1950s, were quite apt with regard to the threat scenarios and other developments prevalent at the time. The educational level of the population was seen as playing a major role in a guerrilla war. The significance of psychological warfare and the population’s will to defend the country were emphasised, based on experiences gained by the Norwegian resistance movement during the Second World War. Technical developments were regarded as being a factor that improved opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities and even guerrilla warfare.

However, the grounds for guerrilla warfare and the operational methods used by guerrilla jaegers that Veikko Koppinen presented in the early 1960s gave rise to a large number of questions and concerns. The gravest concerns about Koppinen’s ideas were related to the ability of small operational groups to fight in isolation, including their mental stamina, physical endurance and challenges to their supply. The effectiveness of mines was also questioned, as the Defence Forces had insufficient experience of Claymore-type mines. The dispersed form of fighting and leadership of operations without radio equipment was justifiably regarded as a key problem. The practicability of guerrilla methods in an open terrain, particularly in winter, and the risk of guerrilla jaegers being discovered, received critical comments. By 1966, the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, which had functioned between 1961 and 1963, and the Research Group on Guerrilla Tactics, which had operated between 1964 and 1965, had completed their work and submitted their reports on the grounds for territorial guerrilla-type activities. After the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces had approved the grounds for territorial guerrilla-type activities, adjustments were made to the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities, reflecting the perspective of the art of war, in summer 1964. By 1966 the Defence Forces had adopted an organisation based on military provinces, and the principle of guerrilla-type activities had more or less been integrated into the territorial defensive thinking. This was the beginning of a new period during which the art of war of territorial guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare were developed towards a true adoption of a territorial defence system. While there was a general desire to retain the option of guerrilla war, the focus of development efforts began to shift increasingly towards integrating truly Finnish guerrilla-type activities into the Finnish art of war.
All in all, it can be seen that by the 1960s, the guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare had become an increasingly important part of the planning of national defence, operational skills, tactics and training. However, conflicts in the tactical definitions and content in the published regulations were a particular source of problems during these years. Based on contemporary source material, it can be said that in the years between 1945 and 1966 and particularly immediately after the wars, attempts were made to separate the content of guerrilla war with all its tactical variations from guerrilla-type activities. What is noteworthy is that the content of guerrilla war was given a fairly broad definition which largely referred to warfare in the enemy-held territory, conducted alongside regular operations or in their place. Guerrilla warfare was regarded as a broad umbrella term under which guerrilla-type activities fell as an essential method. The fact that guerrilla war was chosen, over the course of the 1950s, as the ultimate method of war indicates that behind the thinking on national operational skills and tactics – even strategic in part – lay the idea to continue combat despite the fact that the country or a portion of it had been occupied.

On the other hand, the content of the concepts of the art of war had changed, and their definitions were modified, on several occasions particularly in the 1960s. It can be concluded that depending on the source and author, thinking on the art of war varied, in an often conflicting and confusing manner. The decisions made and measures taken between 1945 and 1966 integrated the methods of guerrilla warfare into the Finnish art of war. Whether the term used was guerrilla war, guerrilla warfare or guerrilla-type activities, the methods of guerrilla warfare were here to stay, and were integrated into territorial defensive thinking and the system.
5. MAKING GUERRILLA-TYPE ACTIVITIES PART OF TERRITORIAL COMBAT

5.1. From a threat scenario based on an attack designed to capture Finland to repelling a surprise invasion

The Guerrilla Tactics Committee, in operation between 1961 and 1963, and the Research Group on Guerrilla Tactics, functioning between 1964 and 1965 and examining the issue, further had taken a number of initiatives and prepared some proposals for the use of local forces in guerrilla-type activities. However, no final decisions on the role that local defence would play in the territorial defence system had been taken. This issue was raised in March 1967 when the tasks laid down in a revised operational basic order, ‘Kymppi’, issued by the General Headquarters were assessed in the military provinces created under the new army composition. (In Finnish military jargon, an operational basic order was referred to as a ‘Kymppi’ (literally, ‘a tenner’, with no reference to a bank note with a face value of 10). Concerning the preparations, the operational basic order (opkky 10) commanded the following: ‘Preparations for a guerrilla war must be performed alongside other defensive preparations so that a framework for territorial guerrilla-type activities, using the various methods of guerrilla-type activities, will be in place across the entire territory of the country, based on the local defensive forces in the first phase and supplemented by troops of the field army should the situation so require.’ The headquarters of the Southern Finland Military Province drafted a proposal on the issue for submittal to the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, requesting an order on and instructions for the initiation of training in guerrilla-type activities for local defence troops.731

At a negotiation event for the Defence Forces mobilisation personnel, commanders of wartime army corps and coastal areas, as well as chiefs of the various military districts, held in Hämeenlinna between 16 and 17 March 1967, put forth views on the peacetime planning of guerrilla-type activities and the training needs of and possibilities available to the personnel. Many of the participants expressed concerns regarding the training in guerrilla-type activities given by the Defence Forces, noting that such training was mostly focused on providing professional officers, NCOs and conscripts with fieldcraft skills needed in regular military operations. In accordance with the guidelines issued by the General Headquarters, the updating of the operational plans from 1964 onwards required that some parts of the field army and local defence troops were used in guerrilla-type activities or guerrilla war under certain circumstances. The proposal, signed by Lieutenant General Paavi Ilmola, the Commander of the Southern Finland Military Province, noted that ‘training as a concept should be expanded to cover issues related to territorial guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla war-

731 The revised ‘operatiivinen peruskäsky no. 10 eli kymppi’ (‘operational basic order no.10, known as ‘kymppi’) became effective on 25 May 1966, and referred to the fundamentals of military national defence laid down in the operational basic order no. 15, which had been revised in the same connection. ESSI:n no. 111/Opstto/11 sal/19.4.1967, T 25094/F 15 sal, KA. See also Puolustusvalmistuemme (‘Our defence preparedness’), a memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Ermei Känninen, 23 August, T 26965/Hh 10 sal, KA.
This is an excellent indication of the fact that the internal relationship of guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities in the drafting of defence plans continued to be unclear, despite the fact that the General Headquarters had, from 1963 onwards, made attempts to clarify both the concepts of and the operational role of guerrilla warfare as part of the territorial defence system by ordering studies and by issuing guidelines. It should be remembered that the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces had issued an order several years before, in 1963, on the establishment of a territorial guerrilla organisation, on modification of the establishment chart and on the guidelines to be applied in guerrilla training.

The Infantry Office of the General Headquarters responded to the proposal submitted by the Military Province of Southern Finland, stating that the build-up of the prerequisites referred to in the proposal would take two to three years. To bring training to the requisite level would have required significant measures before the level of training at the units would be high enough in to enable the provision of effective refresher training. Reallocation of key personnel in the establishment chart alone would have to be completed before any practical measures, such as refresher training or the provision of special training to local defence forces, could be arranged. However, the General Headquarters promised to draft framework programmes for guerrilla training over the course of 1968, and to extend training to the refresher training of local defence forces during 1969.

In early 1968, the Operations Division of the General Headquarters clarified the situation of the defence preparations in order to gain a realistic picture. In March, preparedness was estimated to be on a satisfactory level with regard to the operational basic order no. 15, as all military provinces and arms had managed to keep their plans and orders up to date. However, a great deal of work still remained to be done regarding the planning required by the operational basic order no. 10. These uncompleted plans were particularly related to the preparations of local defence based on guerrilla-type activities. The fact that the preparations of territorial guerrilla-type activities and local troops lagged behind had nothing to do with incompetence of the military provinces or areas but mostly with the General Headquarters drafting parallel plans. Over the course of 1968, the General Headquarters drafted plans for the reorganisation of local defence forces. Although the military provinces were

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732 Ibid.
733 Ibid. Cf. Vertaa Sissinodankäynti, Paikallispuolustusjoukkojen kehittäminen ja liittyminen sisistoihintaan (‘On guerrilla warfare, the development of local defence forces and linking them to guerrilla-type activities’), PE:n no.tta Op-os/sal/9.1.1963 and Kanninen, Ermei: Sissitoiminta ja -sota, niiden tarve, mahdollisuudet sekä toimintaedellytykset Suomessa, (‘Guerrilla-type activities, guerrilla warfare, the need for them, opportunities available to them and their operational preconditions in Finland’), lecture and training material for a training event on territorial guerrilla-type activities, held on 18 November 1963, and PE:n no.tta /Jvtsto/5 a 3/25.6.1963 (A draft for a training instruction by the inspector of the infantry, an appendix to the report submitted by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee on 25 June 1963), Ermei Kanninen private collection, the original documents in the possession of the author of this thesis. See also a lecture given on YPO 3 on 30 March 1964, T 26965/Dk 3 sal, KA.
734 PE:n no. 487/Opstro/11 sal/23.9.1963 (Esittely Paalutusvoimain komentajalle sisistoinimikunnan mieltäminä pohjalta) (‘Presentation to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces on the basis of the report submitted by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee’), T 26965/F 30 sal, KA.
735 PE:n no. 47/Jvtsto/5 sal/ 3.5.1967, T 25094/F 15 sal, KA.
aware of this simultaneous and parallel planning phase, it resulted in a time lag, hampering them from continuing their own preparations.\textsuperscript{736}

With the situation being somewhat disorganised, the General Headquarters emphasised that the operational plans drafted by the military provinces also needed to address surprise situations. An amendment addressing this would be found, according to the General Headquarters, in the final section of operational order no. 10, ‘Käskyn asettamat velvoitteet’ (‘Obligations imposed by this order’). The prerequisite was that each military province drafted an independent territorial defence plan for the troops to be formed in its territory which, in addition to addressing the troop formation, also included a ‘terrestrial guerrilla activity plan.’ This guerrilla activity plan was to be organised around local defensive troops, supplemented by general forces in certain areas, to be committed to guerrilla war immediately after they had been formed.\textsuperscript{737}

The strongly felt need to develop local defences in 1967 and 1968 was also closely related to mounting tensions in Europe. The dominant and most likely threat scenario taking shape at the time, particularly in the thinking of the military, focused on a surprise attack – a limited strategic invasion in fact – aimed at capturing part or all of Finnish territory and supported by means of revolutionary warfare by internal elements subversive to Finland’s independence. Aside from terror attacks, a large-scale surprise invasion, launched on a broad front, was regarded as another, albeit unlikely, possibility. Colonel L.K. Välimaa, Chief of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, drafted a memorandum in 1966 in which he discussed in detail the various options for the threat scenario to which Finland was subject. According to Välimaa, a surprise attack would be implemented in the form of what was referred to as a limited war, in which the invader would penetrate Finnish territory using considerable force in order to capture Finland’s vital areas. Therefore, preparation for a quick opening of hostilities by the enemy needed to be made the basis of operational planning and preparations.\textsuperscript{738} Everything suggests that Välimaa’s views were based on the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the tightening grip of the Soviet Union on its satellites in Europe during the 1960s.

The possibility of a strategic attack aimed at capturing the country came to the fore in operational planning and development work in the mid-1960s and later. The nature of an attack seeking to capture the country was presented in more official terms in a training package aimed at the Defence Forces personnel, entitled Maanpuolustuksen perusteet (‘The fundamentals of national defence’). According to the dominant, official threat scenario, an attack against Finland would materialise in the form of ‘an attack designed to capture the country or a large-scale invasion’. A surprise attack was not specifically defined, but was illustrated with the operations that Germany had launched during the Second World War to occupy Norway and Denmark. By contrast, as surprise invasion was defined to be ‘a large-scale attack with massed forces

\textsuperscript{736} Puolustusvalmisteemme (‘Our defence preparedness’), a memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Ermei Kanninen, 23 August 1968, T 26965/Hh 10 sal, KA.

\textsuperscript{737} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{738} Kataus nykyiseen operatiiviseen puolustusvalmisteemme ja eriäitä johtopäätöksiä (‘Survey of our current operational defence capability, including certain conclusions drawn from it’), a memorandum by Colonel L. K. Välimaa dated 5 October 1966, T 26965/Hh 10 sal, KA.
under a considerable fire support, carried out in order to break a country’s defensive capability and to occupy its territory.”  

Juhani Ruutu, who had participated in the development of territorial defence since the early 1960s, summed up the change that had taken place in the art of war in the late 1960s as follows: ‘The possibility of a surprise attack, known as an attack designed to capture the country, emerged. The air superiority of a great power enabled a simultaneous attack against all major targets in Finland, whether communications or transport connections, state administration or the Defence Forces. All vulnerable targets are susceptible to simultaneous attacks—that is, a surprise attack designed to capture them. For these reasons, we should create a defence system that would enable us to be prepared for the worst-case scenario everywhere in Finland.’ In practice, this referred to guerrilla warfare, initiated, in part, by local forces at the border, aimed at slowing down and causing attrition to the enemy and conducted as part of territorial combat.  

Deliberation on the possibility of a capture-style attack continued along similar lines at the Operations Division of the General Headquarters in the subsequent years. In March 1968, Ermei Kanninen, acting deputy division chief, drafted a memorandum on Finland’s defence capability, in which he extensively discussed the possibility and probability of an attack designed to capture the country. According to Kanninen, an attack aimed at capturing Finland might be launched during a global and, particularly, European crisis. Such an attack would be directed against strategic targets in one of Finland’s vital areas, using considerable forces. According to Kanninen, military intelligence would be able to obtain an early warning of a capture-style attack directed against Finland two days before it was launched, enabling the Defence Forces to raise the preparedness of peacetime troops. Such a two-day warning would enable the Defence Forces to raise the preparedness of cadre troops and put them on a wartime footing.  

It was not until tensions began to mount in Czechoslovakia in spring 1968, leading to the country’s occupation in August 1968, that Finland felt that there was sufficient reason to take measures in accordance with the threat scenario. When the Czechoslovakian crisis was at its most intense, Finnish military intelligence obtained precise and detailed information on the direction in which the situation was developing. This information enabled intelligence to compile accurate memoranda for the president of the republic, the Defence Council and the leadership of the Defence Forces. The Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters presented its first situational reports on developments in Czechoslovakia to President Urho Kekkonen on 22 August, or around one day after the Warsaw Pact occupation operation had been launched. The reports put forth a bold assessment on the objectives of Soviet policy, the tactics deployed by the occupying force, and on the progress and success

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739 Maanpuolustuksen perustiet, osa (‘The fundamentals of national defence’): Puolustusvoimien tehtävät ja mahdollisuudet rauhan ja turvallisuuden ylläpitämiseksi, puolueettomuuden suojaamiseksi ja asellisen hyökkäyksen torjumiseksi (‘The tasks and possibilities of the Defence Forces in the maintenance of peace and security and in the repulsion of an armed attack’), Helsinki 1968, p. 10.  
740 Ruutu, Juhani: An interview on 8 June 2006.  
741 Puolustusvalmintoemme (‘Our defence preparedness’), a memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Ermei Kanninen, 23 August, T 26965/Hh 10 sal, KA.
of the operation. ‘It is quite obvious that we are to live in a world where the law of the jungle reigns. The events in Czechoslovakia are yet another reminder of the lessons that the past few decades have taught us but that are often ignored in rhetoric – the lessons stating that friendship between small and large nations is just a matter of convenience.’ It was concluded from the situational information obtained that the occupying force was under orders to use minimum violence. The occupation operation was regarded as being based on mobility and superior numbers. Above all, the Soviet Union had placed great importance on media warfare, attempting to present the operation to the international media as a justified measure from the very beginning.\textsuperscript{742}

It was not until 2 September, or around 11 days after the intervention was launched, that the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters had formed an accurate picture of the political developments in Czechoslovakia and the implementation of the occupation. This information was also presented to the Defence Council chaired by the president. According to the information gathered by military intelligence, the Warsaw Pact troops began to prepare for the capture of Czechoslovakia in March, possibly earlier. The Intelligence Division was not able to pinpoint the exact date on which the decision of the invasion was taken. According to the information received by the Intelligence Division, the most surprising aspect of the operation, from the perspective of the occupying force, was the fact that they had not been received as heroes and liberators, contrary to what they had been told in advance. Instead, according to the information, the Czechs had significantly hampered the supply of the Soviet troops through unarmed resistance. This was one of the reasons why the Soviet troops were forced to carry out their task for almost a week without a single hot meal.\textsuperscript{743}

It would probably have been impossible to compile such memoranda without the help of direct Western contacts and well-informed military attachés posted abroad. This notion receives support from the fact that on a memorandum prepared by the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters for the Defence Council, discussing, among other things, the date on which the decision of the invasion had been taken, the words ‘according to the view of the Americans’ had been crossed out and replaced with ‘perhaps is’.\textsuperscript{744} An American assessment of the situation that the General Headquarters had received and any knowledge of the contacts of the Finnish mili-

\textsuperscript{742} See for example Katsaus Tshekkoslovakiaan 22.8.1968 (‘An overview of Czechoslovakia on 22 August 1968’), a memorandum drafted by the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters dated 22 August 1968, 21/117, UKA. Tšhekkoslovakia ja Neuvostoliiton poliittiset päämäärit 22.8.1968 (‘Czechoslovakia and the political objectives of the Soviet Union’), a memorandum drafted by the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters dated 22 August 1968, 21/117, UKA. Katsaus Tshekkoslovakian tapahtumiin (‘An overview of the events in Czechoslovakia’), a memorandum drafted by the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters dated 2 September 1968, 21/117, UKA.

\textsuperscript{743} Katsaus Tshekkoslovakian tapahtumiin (‘An overview of the events in Czechoslovakia’), a memorandum drafted by the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters dated 2 September 1968, 21/117, UKA.

\textsuperscript{744} Tšhekkoslovakian kríisi (poliittinen katsaus) (‘The crisis in Czechoslovakia (a political overview)’), a memorandum drafted by the Intelligence Division of the General Headquarters dated 2 September 1968, 21/117, UKA.
tary with western military intelligence services were extremely sensitive issues, knowledge of which should be limited to as few individuals as possible.

The most senior Finnish decision-makers closely followed the deteriorated situation in Europe but, unlike Sweden, for example, no official decision was taken to raise the preparedness of the Defence Forces. This gave rise to concern and even dangerous situations at some Finnish garrisons. For example, unofficial measures were taken to raise preparedness to the degree possible under the territorial defence principle. It was probably no coincidence that the top military leadership in Finland were being trained in repelling an attack designed to capture the country as early as May 1968, at the time when the Warsaw Pact had large-scale manoeuvres under way in the eastern part of Central Europe. As it was, it was at this time that a course was arranged for the top military leadership at the National General Staff College, which was concluded by arranging a war game focusing on a threat scenario involving an attack aimed at capturing Finland. In the imaginary situation of this war game, the enemy launched a surprise attack on Finland, in the course of which it landed troops ashore at several locations along the southern coast and brought in airborne troops, justifying this by the deteriorated political situation in Europe. The enemy began its operations by jamming Finnish air and maritime radars, dropping paratroopers on a large scale, bringing in airborne troops by helicopter and landing troops ashore at the ports of Helsinki and Hanko and along the coast at Kirkkonummi and Upinniemi. Within the context of the war game, Finland received early warning of increased traffic at the Baltic area airfields and seaports three days before the attack was launched.

The military did not waste any time; on 12 July 1968, in other words, only a few days after the Warsaw Pact had begun its large headquarters and communications exercise, the Military Province of Southern Finland issued an order on the initiation of defence preparations in Helsinki. Planning was based on a scenario under which the Finnish capital was being defended against an operation that had the character of an attack launched in order to capture it. The planners were tasked with identifying the kind of troops that should be deployed for the defence of the capital, including the organisation of their chain of command.

The final version of the memorandum on the defence of Helsinki was completed in late October. In a situation in which an attack aimed at capturing Finland was expected to occur, the Defence Forces were, according to the memorandum, either in a state of basic or raised preparedness. The enemy was expected to begin its capture operation by bringing in troops amounting to two to four battalions to Helsinki ports by cargo ships, being able to carry out this activity undetected. By contrast, the enemy was expected to deploy larger forces to capture Helsinki-Vantaa and Malmi.

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745 Ibid.
746 See, for example, Tiilikainen, Heikki: *Kylmän sodan kujanjuoksu* (‘Running the Cold War Gauntlet’), Jyväskylä 2003, p. 7 and pp. 93–117.
747 An account of Course 1 for the top leadership, dated 11 June 1968, attachment 3d, T 26965/Dk 6 sal, KA.
airports. Provided that the enemy succeeded in occupying the two airfields, it was expected to bring in two to three airborne divisions during the first 24 hours. The invader was expected to support its airborne operations with the aid of ‘tourist groups’, which would move to the vicinity of landing areas only moments before zero hour in order to provide guidance and communications to the airborne troops. At zero hour, the enemy was expected to begin hostilities by launching airborne landings simultaneously with the operation that aimed at occupying the Helsinki ports. Before bringing in the occupying force proper by sea, the enemy was expected to make attempts to occupy the coastal artillery installations off Helsinki. Surprise operations targeting Santahamina (a military island off Helsinki), the General Headquarters and the National General Staff College were also regarded as plausible. Throughout the attack, the enemy’s air activity was expected to be intensive but directed largely at military targets.\textsuperscript{749}

A decision was taken to repel an attack designed to capture Helsinki area by using local troops capable of guerrilla-type activities. Such troops were to be formed in their planned operational areas.\textsuperscript{750} A condition for a successful defensive battle was a successful repulsion of airborne operations and guerrilla-type activities, for which a force amounting to three to four battalions was thought to needed in the first phase. By way of other measures designed to slow down the occupation of the airports, the memorandum proposed that weapons be distributed to the air traffic controllers while the army was still in a state of basic preparedness, and that airport personnel be instructed to block the runways with vehicles and aircraft available at the airports. Such measures were expected to at least slow down the occupation of the airports.\textsuperscript{751}

According to a threat analysis compiled by the Operations Division of the General Headquarters on 2 September, an attack aimed to capture targets along the coast would be the most likely threat scenario, targeting principally the shoreline delineated by Porkkala, Helsinki and Porvoo. It was also speculated that an operation launched for the occupation of the Finnish capital could be accompanied by a separate operation for landing troops either in Hankoniemi or the Åland Islands. Such an operation was thought to be aimed at blocking entry to and from the Gulf of Finland, thereby denying the Finnish Navy any operational opportunities. The memorandum also speculated that the enemy could attempt to tie up Finnish troops by launching a troop-landing operation. The other option proposed by the memorandum, a large-scale invasion, was also expected to be accompanied by a troop-

\textsuperscript{749} ESSlE:n no. 254/Optsto/11 sal/30.10.1968, T 26965/F 43 sal, KA.

\textsuperscript{750} Yleisesikunnan operatiivisen osaston muistio eräistä Helsingin puolustamisen liittyyistä seikoista (‘A memorandum by the General Headquarters on a number of aspects related to the defence of Helsinki’), dated 10 December 1968, T 25044/F 3 sal, KA. See also PE:n no. R 3/Optsto/11 henksal/28.6.1968, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA.

\textsuperscript{751} ESSlE:n no. 254/Optsto/11 sal/30.10.1968, T 26965/F 43 sal, KA. See also Palokangas, Marko – Säämänen, Juuso: Kaappaushyökkäyksestä strategiseen iskaan – osa 2 (‘From an attack designed to capture Finland to a strategic strike – volume I’), Sotilasaikakauslehti 10/2007, pp. 43-48.
landing and airborne operation against Helsinki, although the focus of the attack was thought to be on Finland’s land border.\(^{752}\)

The Czechoslovakian example demonstrated that a surprise attack aimed at capturing the country, when directed at Finland, would most likely begin with airborne troops being brought in, initially tasked with occupying the Helsinki airports and other key targets. By an order issued on 3 September, the Headquarters of the Military Province of Southern Finland tasked the Helsinki Air Defence Regiment with the initiation of the planning of the defence of Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, including anti-aircraft emplacements, coupled with preparations for guerrilla-type activities to be carried out in collaboration with the Military District of Southern Finland. According to the order, defensive positions were to be dimensioned for the anti-aircraft cannons of the cadre troop of the Air Defence Regiment that was responsible for forming the unit defending the airport, as well as for the guard company to be formed by the military district. The order obligated the Air Defence Regiment to draft its plan by 20 September, as the construction of fortifications were to begin during the same year.\(^{753}\)

After the train of events described above, Ermei Kanninen gave a presentation entitled ‘*Puolustusvoimien kehittämisen periaatteet*’ (‘The principles for the development of the Defensive Forces’) at a negotiating event for the personnel of the Mobilisation Division of the General Headquarters in November 1968. According to the situational assessment by the General Headquarters, only the Soviet Union and its allies possessed a capability to launch surprise operations similar to those seen in Czechoslovakia; in other words, capture the entire country. According to the General Headquarters, the first significant step towards repelling such a surprise attack would be prompt development of Finland’s military preparedness. Cadre troops, rapidly deployable for first operational tasks, were seen as a solution. Such tasks would include the protection of targets that were of vital importance to the entire country – in other words, the key targets of an attack aimed at capturing the country. Cadre troops were to be in full operational readiness in their frame formation within six hours of receiving an order, and within 36 hours after having being reinforced with reservists. Furthermore, work needed to be initiated on the development of a local defensive system that would be capable of carrying out guerrilla-type activities and could not be paralysed by a surprise attack.\(^{754}\) This solution was a poor man’s deterrent and as such in line with the Finnish art of war – one against which

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\(^{753}\) ESSlE:n no. 154/Optsto/11 sal/3.9.1968, T 25044/F 3 sal, KA. See also PE:n no. 38/R/10/14.11.1967, T 26965/H 8–9 sal, KA.

\(^{754}\) PE:n no. 486/Optsto/1 sal/14.11.1968 (*Puolustusvoimien kehittämisen periaatteista* (‘On the principles for the development of the Defence Forces’), T 23920/F 2 sal, KA. The capabilities of the Soviet Union, and a threat scenario resembling a surprise attack aimed at capturing the country were first introduced in late 1960 in a document entitled *Operatiiviset olosuhteemme Suomen maahdollessa joutumessa sotaan lähi- ja ulkomailla* (‘Finland’s operational circumstances, should the country be drawn in a war in the next few years’), PE:n no. 1/Op-os/11.11.1960, T 26965/Hh 10 sal, KA.
the invader would have to commit considerable resources in order to subdue the country.

One of conclusions drawn from the Czechoslovakian crisis stated that all European nations needed to take into consideration public opinion, both in their political and military operations, out of consideration to their international relations and due to intensified communications. This had, according to Kanninen, led to a situation in which military measures could no longer be launched without efficient and visible preparations. Discretion was to be exercised if threat scenario was to be made public. Kanninen also argued that the enemy would not be able to launch a surprise attack designed to capture Finland relying solely on troops in their peacetime disposition near the Finnish border.755

The autumn of 1968 was a watershed period in the development of the Defence Forces and, particularly, the territorial defence system. By autumn 1968, development work had been carried out in many sectors. Practical measures had been initiated under the oversight of the General Headquarters, an indication of which was the fact that the key solutions for the further development and implementation of the territorial defence system were presented to General Yrjö Keinonen, Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, on 6 August 1968. On the basis of the operational tasks of the troops, the wartime army was divided into general forces, local forces and supportive forces. The wartime field army was to be built around general forces, which referred formations and units capable of mobile operations and committed to operations to achieve a decisive outcome. Local forces were, as their name suggests, units principally suited for combat duties – including guerrilla-type activities – in a specific area. With regard to troop types, this referred to, for example, troops intended for repelling the enemy, performing guard duty, or acting as separate units. Supportive forces referred to troops that were not directly engaged in combat; rather, they provided support to the general and local forces. Supportive forces included construction and supply units.756

The operations and use of the local forces sought to provide the general forces with operational freedom by relieving them, wherever possible, from the protection of their rear areas and by extending the reach of fire of the general forces through guerrilla-type activities, which also sought to provide intelligence on the enemy’s activities in its rear area. For the eventuality that local troops were engaged in a guerrilla war, which of course was part of their combat duties and operational obligations, the General Headquarters proposed, related to such tasks, that the compositions of local forces be clarified in detail by conducting further investigations, supplemented by the organisational survey that had already been initiated. According to the proposal, local battalions were required, with regard to their organisation, to have equipment and men capable of maintaining law and order, protecting the forming of

756 PE:n no. 30/Opstso/11 henksal/6.8.1968 (Eszközy alueellisen puolustusjärjestelmän kehittämisestä) (‘A presentation on the development of the territorial defence system’), 11/F 22, PE (research permit obtained). Cf. PE:n no. 444/Lkptssto/10 sal/22.9.1967, T 26842/F 25 sal, KA.
troops, acting as a regional reserve for the military district, and conducting anti-guerrilla and guerrilla-type activities. The General Headquarters had previously taken the target strength of different troops types under scrutiny and calculation under the direction of Olavi Lopmeri and others. For example, the target strength of the largest troop type the general forces, was set at 350,000 men in June 1967.

With regard to infantry troops, the 1968 presentation assigned local battalions, local guard companies, block battalions and separate block companies and platoons to the local forces. The entire force of the Frontier Guard was also included in local troops. While the guiding principle was to form a local battalion in each military district, the number of guard troops was based on proposals made by the military province and on the maximum strengths ordered by the General Headquarters. The reorganisation of the wartime Frontier Guards was reported to be based on transforming frontier companies to frontier jaeger battalions. As an addition to the establishment chart revised in 1966, the proposal suggested that four guerrilla jaeger battalions be added to the establishment chart to complement the existing two. The proposal was justified by the generally recognised threat scenario known as 'a surprise attack designed to capture Finland.' More precise grounds and detailed clarifications were put forth in an appendix to the memorandum.

However, not until 1969 was it deemed to be the right time for a more official publication of this threat scenario. In that year, Ruotuväki (a Finnish trade magazine for career officers, NCOs and conscripts) published an article on a surprise attack designed to capture Finland, authored by Lieutenant Colonel Juhani Ruutu, accompanied by a cover photo that certainly stopped the readers in their tracks. In his article, Ruutu analysed the objectives and implementation of such a surprise attack. According to Ruutu, the invader sought a decisive outcome by resorting primarily to the mobility of its troops, airborne operations and landings along the coastline, as well as to motorised marches directly to targets. By using cargo ships and commercial airliners, the invader sought a surprise outcome. The invader would use firepower only if its surprise action failed to paralyse the defender. Ruutu’s article at first created confusion, as the term ‘a surprise attack designed to capture Finland’ was thought to refer all too openly to the operation carried out by the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia.

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758 PE:n no. 266/Lkptsto/10 sal/30.6.1967, T 26842/F 25 sal, KA.
759 PE:n no. 30/Optsto/11 henksal/6.8.1968 (Esittely alueellisen puolustusjärjestelmän kehittämisestä) (‘A presentation on the development of the territorial defence system’), 11/F 22, PE (research permit obtained).
760 Ibid.
761 Ruutu, Juhani: Kaatpanoshyökkäys (‘A surprise attack to capture Finland’), Ruotuväki 4/1969(a).
The Czechoslovakian crisis was reflected in the teaching at military schools. For example, one of the exercises conducted by the National General Staff College, and a number of the student assignments addressed a surprise attack launched to capture Finland unfolding in the Helsinki metropolitan area and along the southern coastal areas. Several war and map exercises also addressed guerrilla warfare and territorial guerrilla-type activities. This setup is clearly discernible in the observations made by the Operations Office of the General Headquarters on a leadership exercise conducted at the National General Staff College between March and April. While observations indicated that the National General Staff College had taken on board the doctrine of territorial combat and territorial defence in effect at the time, applying it to its teaching, they also showed that the staff discussed very critically the implementation of theory in practice.

The Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard also collaborated when training to repulse a capture attack. Under the direction of the commander of the Northern Finland Military Province, an operational war game with theme of repelling a capture attack was arranged between 7 and 21 January 1970, using the troops of the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard. In the context of this war game, the troops of the Lapland and Kainuu Frontier Guards transitioned from surveillance of the border to full-scale scale guerrilla-type activities, aimed at gaining time for the forming of the general forces. Several officers from the Frontier Guards Headquarters participated in the game, in which they used their expertise in making and implementing preparations for rapid guerrilla-type activities.

Regarding developments in the art of war, the changes that had occurred and the decisions that had been taken during 1968 were significant and a sign of the times. The General Headquarters decided to adapt the Finnish art of war to the operational requirements laid down by the threat scenario of a new era. One of these decisions was to approve the use of unconventional methods in the repulsion of both a surprise attack designed to capture the country and a large-scale invasion. Unconventional methods referred to ‘tactics that differ from the conventional thinking and conditions under which combat is conducted against an adversary that is almost equal to the defender in terms of mobility.’ According to the principle guidelines, Finnish troops, in order to bring the art of war up to date and to conceal and secure their movements, needed to resort to tactics that increasingly took advantage of darkness and terrain, as well as ‘deployed guerrilla jaeger and other units sent to the enemy’s rear in order to enhance our own’

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763 See for example Sotakorkeakoulun opetussuunnitelmat (‘Curricula of the National General Staff College’) (MSL 30, MeSL 9 ja STL), T 24043/Db 14, KA. Sotakorkeakoulun opetussuunnitelmat (‘Curricula of the National General Staff College’) (MSL 31and ISL 9), T 24043/Db 15, KA. Sotakorkeakoulun yleisen taktiikan luennot ja harjoitukset no. 1 (‘Lectures and exercises on general tactics at the National General Staff College no. 1’), v. 1967–1972, T 24043/Dg 203, KA.

764 PE:n no. R 25/2.4.1969 (‘bavaintoja SKK:n johtamisharjoituksesta’) (‘observations on a leadership exercise arranged at the National General Staff College’), T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA. See also PE:n no. 90/Tiedstso/14 d sal/12.3.1969, T 26890/Hla 10 sal, KA (A decision by the National General Staff College regarding research permit obtained).

firepower (using mines and other forms of anti-tank defence) and to slow down the enemy’s advance.  

Finnish military leaders and troops needed to be trained and made accustomed to fight under conditions in which the enemy’s superior mobility, based on a road network and an easily traversed terrain, firepower and air supremacy lead to a situation in which the use of unconventional methods must be accepted. The ultimate goal was to avoid any disadvantages brought about by the factors listed above. By the end of the 1960s, the Finnish art of war had changed from war of attrition, characterised by the repulsion of mass attacks, in a more flexible direction, one in which the utilisation of the methods of guerrilla warfare, integrated into territorial combat, played a significant role.

Developing the local defence and territorial guerrilla-type activities

In autumn 1968, immediately after the events in Czechoslovakia, Captain Ari-Ilmari Isakkala, staff officer at the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, drafted an extensive memorandum on the implementation of a local defence system. The memorandum presented the objectives to be set for local defence within the framework of a local defence system and a strategic defence doctrine. In his memorandum Isakkala outlined the guidelines for more detailed plans regarding local defence. Preparations for guerrilla-type activities in an area that had come under enemy attack were focused on building a support system under which one of the sub-units of a local battalion was to be detached to carry out preparations in collaboration with the military district or the military area headquarters, while the major part of the battalion slowed down the enemy’s advance or was engaged in other tasks. The detached unit was to be built around the headquarters and logistics company of the local battalion, including the supply platoons of individual companies. In the case of a large-scale invasion, local forces were to focus on the defence of rear areas and, in the areas under immediate threat, on preparing for guerrilla-type activities, while engaging in them in those areas that the enemy had already occupied.

Captain Isakkala also noted that the basic form of fighting of local forces, ‘combat through ambush’ called for a large number of mines. According to the Engineering Division of the General Headquarters, countermobility materiel from the existing stores and manufacturing plants could be distributed to the troops as follows: teller mines, 40,000 pieces, fragmentation mines, 40,000 pieces, and high explosives, 12,000 kilos. Plans for guerrilla-type activities increasingly focused on mine warfare, exactly as Veikko Koppen had proposed in his 1960 memorandum.

766 PE:n (A memorandum by the quartermaster on the development of war exercises to meet the operational requirements) no.tta 6.2.1968, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA.

767 PE:n no. 49/Optsto/D henksal/ 22.9.1969, D/D 1 henksal, PE (research permit obtained).

768 Ibid.

769 Cf. Sissisotamenetelmä (‘A method for waging guerrilla war’) (a draft), Helsinki 1 June 1960, SKK:n kirjeistö 1958–60 (‘Correspondence by the National Defence College 1958–60’) T 23101/F 3 sal, KA (a research permit granted by the National Defence University).
Captain Iisakkala’s memorandum set a schedule and targets for the planned measures. According to Iisakkala, this system would be in an acceptable operational state by the time the new establishment chart became effective in late 1969, in a satisfactory state by the end of 1972, and fully operational by the end of 1974.\textsuperscript{770}

After theoretical foundations of the local defence system and territorial guerrilla-type activities had been completed, practical measures proceeded with speed in the military provinces and the districts under them. Due to the sheer size of the archived material, it is impracticable to present here all the plans and measures drafted by the seven military provinces and 27 military districts for territorial guerrilla-type activities and local defence; consequently, only a number of them have been included here.

In autumn 1968, the chief of the Staff Duties Office of the Hämeenlinna Military District, Major Pentti Lyly, carried out an extensive investigation into the options available to an organisation based on military districts in the defence of rear areas and territorial guerrilla-type activities. This investigation, spanning more than one hundred pages, is an excellent indication of the adoption of the principles of territorial defence by the military provinces and the districts under them. In his study, Lyly discussed the defence of rear areas and guerrilla-type activities in light of prevailing perceptions and the regulations in effect at the time. In Lyly’s study, territorial guerrilla-type activities referred to guerrilla-type activities conducted under a concerted leadership, built around troops under a military organisation and a military chain of command, and supported by the civilian population and organisations.\textsuperscript{771} Viewed from this perspective, Lyly’s study was more of a discussion on territorial guerrilla warfare than guerrilla-type activities.

Lyly drew several conclusions in his study, some of which were clearly different from the guidelines for local defence in effect at the time. According to Lyly, guerrilla jaegers, in order to be successful, needed to possess excellent local knowledge. In order to achieve the best possible results, he recommended that local guerrilla jaeger troops be formed of local men operating under the leadership of the military district. According to Lyly, the guard battalions in the establishment chart were suitable for guerrilla-type activities, as for their organisation, but the average age of their men was too high. Territorial guerrilla-type activities required younger reservists with at least a minimum training in guerrilla-type activities. While the headquarters of a military district were ideally suited for providing leadership for local combat operations, the support organisation, according to Lyly, needed to be formed of the local population. ‘Without a positive attitude of the general population and, in particular, its strong support, guerrilla-type activities will be hard pressed to be sustained for months, let alone years. Guerrilla-type activities involving a relatively small number of stationary troops, while the numerical strength of the civilian organisations supporting such activities is required to be large makes for a difficult equation to solve.’\textsuperscript{772}

\textsuperscript{770} PE:n no. 49/Opsto/D henksal/ 22.9.1969, D/D 1 henksal, PE (research permit obtained).
\textsuperscript{771} Lyly, Pentti: Sotilaspäinen käyttömahdollisuudet selustan puolustamisessa ja alueellisessa sisäisissä sissitoiminnassa, (‘Options available to military districts in the defence of rear areas and in territorial guerrilla-type activities’), a study report dated 18 September 1968, T 25044/F 3 sal, KA.
\textsuperscript{772} Ibid.
It should be mentioned that Major Olavi Lopmeri, who had worked with issues related to guerrilla tactics at the Operations Division of the General Headquarters and led a research group focused on such questions, had drawn conclusions in 1964 that were diametrically opposite to those of Lyly’s. Lyly was also conscious of this, supplementing his conclusions by noting that there was a moral issue involved with engaging the civilian population in combat: ‘From a moral perspective, this does not paint a pretty picture but, then, when does war do that in any of its forms?’

While the idea of engaging civilians in guerrilla-type activities was nothing new as such, it was all the more controversial. While Lyly’s proposal clearly reflected the spirit of the regulations and texts drafted in the 1950s, the explanation behind his thinking might have been of a later date. In summer 1966, a booklet on Finland’s security policy entitled *Maanpuolustuksen signaatit* (‘Guidelines for our national defence’), presented a very broad perspective on the development of the Defence Forces. According to this booklet, the repulsion of a surprise attack required that the troops had a high level of peacetime preparedness and that, in particular, they were able to spring quickly into action. Any plans and arrangement for defence needed to enable automated action to repel the invader. ‘Preparations for a lengthy war in turn require that the prerequisites for the forming of a field army and the commitment of all our resources for combat, including guerrilla war, are in place.’ High level of preparedness, rapid commitment of the covering force, the forming of a field army and preparedness for guerrilla war were the official objectives for the development of Finland’s armed defence.

A booklet entitled *Puolustuskysymyksen materiaalinen perusta* (‘The materiel foundation of our defence capability’), published in late 1968, continued the discussion along the same lines, quoting verbatim the above-mentioned publication. However, the perspective was made more detailed regarding the development of the Defence Forces. The principal targets set for the development of the Defence Forces in 1968 included the capability to repel territorial violations, intercept airspace incursions in peacetime and during a conflict between other states, and to repel a surprise attack carried out with limited forces. The secondary target was to develop the capability of the Defence Forces to fight a defensive battle with all available resources. Against the background of such an official policy and the events in Czechoslovakia, Lyly’s proposal to commit all available resources – including the civilian ones – in support of military activities and combat was in a way in line with the spirit of the time and the prevailing security policy, although, it was naturally unethical from the perspective of the Finnish art of war. Looking at the concepts of security policy from various

773 Olavi Lopmeren muistio niistä perusteista ja mahdollisuuksista, jotka liittyvät työhön aikaansaamiseksi (‘A memorandum drafted by Olavi Lopmeri on the grounds and opportunities related to the work for setting up a territorial guerrilla organisation’), no PE, 2 June 1964, 11/F 12, PE (research permit obtained).
774 Lyly (1968), T 25044/F 3 sal, KA.
775 *Maanpuolustuksen signaatit* (‘Signposts for our national defence’), Helsinki 1967 (a book without page numbers).
776 *Puolustuskysymyksen materiaalinen perusta* (‘The materiel foundation of our defence capability’), Helsinki 1968, pp. 4–6.
angles and using rhetoric that supported all possible forms of warfare were closely related to the military threat scenario of the era.

In addition to the formulation of concepts that were either official or related to security policy and the reforms that had been carried out in the late 1960s, the establishment charts and the basic regulations needed to be brought up to date. While the establishment chart was to be revised by mid-1970, the General section of the Field regulation needed to be made available to the troops before that.\(^{777}\) In 1967, a decision was taken to renew the General section of the 1958 Field regulation in order to make it compatible with the peacetime organisation and training provided by the Defence Forces, as well as with wartime operations. In contrast to past practice, the responsibility for and oversight of the drafting of the regulation was transferred from the National General Staff College to the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, as the work involved a great deal of confidential or top secret background material, access to which was limited to a small number of the Operations Division staff.\(^{778}\) The responsibility for the drafting of the regulation was delegated to Lieutenant Colonel Juhani Ruutu, who at the time was Head of Office at the Operations Division of the General Headquarters.\(^{779}\)

In early 1969, a draft for the General Section of the Field Regulation was completed. In contrast to the normal practice, it was not distributed to the troops; instead, it was principally used in the development of tactics by the highest ranking officers of the General Headquarters and the operational officers posted at the headquarters of the military provinces.\(^{780}\) Even in its draft stage, the General Section of the Field Regulation from 1969 is an interesting contemporary document, providing an excellent snapshot of the change that had taken place in the military threat scenario, theories on local defensive battle and guerrilla warfare. According to the regulation, local defence, as part of a territorial defence system, aimed to create prerequisites for ‘large-scale guerrilla-type activities and, if necessary, guerrilla warfare.’ For the purposes of local defence, including any associated preparations, all the troops in a responsibility area were subordinated the commander of the formation. Principally, local forces proper, such as frontier guard troops, guard troops and other special troops, were to

\(^{777}\) PE:n no.tta sal/6.11.1968, T 25086/F 2 sal, KA; PE:n no. 510/optststo/11 sal/29.11.1968, T 25086/F 2 sal, KA.


\(^{779}\) Ruutu, Juhani: An interview on 8 June 2006. See also Ruutu, Kaarle Juhani, an extract from personal details, no. 55857, KA.

be used for such tasks. In addition to local forces, supportive forces and, if necessary, the reserves of the High Command stationed in the rear area, could be assigned to such tasks in special situations. A support system, taking advantage of civilian establishments and the local population, was required in order to enable the local forces to fight battles.781

The response to a surprise attack designed to capture the country, defined as ‘a military operation based on a strategic surprise, launched in order to rapidly occupy the entire country, certain sections of the country with strategic significance or certain targets, and carried out in a manner that leaves the defender with no opportunities to mobilise its troops, concentrate them, or conduct any other systematic counter operations’ should be, above all, ‘strategic defence.’ Part of strategic defence was composed of guerrilla warfare, which constituted a deterrent to the invader. Guerrilla warfare was defined as ‘warfare conducted across a large swath of enemy-occupied territory (for example, the size of a military province) in place of regular military operation, using all available resources permitted by international conventions. Guerrilla warfare seeks to wear down the enemy while holding a support area gradually growing in size, with the ultimate goal being to commit the entire guerrilla jaeger force to decisive operations in order to defeat the enemy. Guerrilla warfare conducted alongside regular military operations lends direct or indirect support to front-line operations, and the guerrilla-type activities linked to such operations are also closely linked to operations carried out by the troops engaged in guerrilla warfare.’782

Juhani Ruutu, who had participated in the drafting of the regulation, reported that the formulation of definitions and descriptions of concepts was a real headache. Statements submitted during the drafting process drew attention to the effects of guerrilla warfare on the civilian population left behind in areas where guerrilla warfare was waged. ‘When discussing guerrilla warfare, special attention should be paid to the situation of the civilian population that, for varying reasons, has stayed behind or has been left behind and the effect of such population on military operations; attention should also be paid to the general aspects regarding the treatment of the population, and to the resistance movement that would emerge spontaneously among the population, viewed from a national perspective and from the perspective of the military provinces.’783 Colonel Niilo Simojoki, who taught tactics at the National General Staff College, drafted a statement on guerrilla warfare related to the General section of the Field regulation. While Simojoki’s statement was personal in nature, it also demonstrated that the staff of the National General Staff College were familiar with the problems associated with the concept of guerrilla warfare. In his statement, Simojoki noted that the concept of guerrilla war was one of the most fundamental questions of the Field Regulation. ‘This issue touches on the civilian population and its fate so deeply that, in my opinion, unrealistic exercises in guerrilla-type activities, based on the premise that Helsinki, Turku and large sections of Uusimaa (a southern coastal province in Finland) have been evacuated, should be discontinued.’ In some parts of Finland, such prerequisites were available,

781 Kenttäohjesääntö Yleinen osa, luonnos (‘General Section of the Field Regulation, a draft’), (KO yl), 1969, pp. 82–88.

782 Ibid. pp. 88–89 and attachment 1, pp. 1–2.

783 Ruutu, Juhani: An interview on 8 June 2006. SKK:n no.tta 30.5.1967, Lausunto kenttäohjesäännön yleisen osan jäsentelyhdonksesta (‘Statement on the organisation of the general section of the field regulation’) T 24043/F 87, KA.
and advantage needed be taken of them, while in other parts, no such prerequisites existed. The field regulation should not fail to address this issue which is highly important.\(^7\)

In his memorandum, Simojoki also discussed the problems associated with the jurisdictional rules governing guerrilla warfare: “The question on the status of the guerrilla soldier under international law continues to remain open, and a mistake will probably be committed if its worst consequences, when fighting alone and in an inferior position with regard to resources, are not faced. A small nation will always be treated differently from a big nation. Keeping this in mind, the undersigned finds it difficult to take the concepts of ‘guerrilla’ and ‘guerrilla warfare’ at their face value. Could it not be imagined that guerrilla-type activities are always part of regular military operations? They are simply part of the doctrine.” According to Simojoki, it would be sufficient, with regard to concepts, that the field regulation only addressed local defence and the troops on varying levels under it, including their operational methods.\(^5\)

It should be noted that for all confusion regarding the draft of the 1969 Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa (‘General Section of the Field Regulation’), guerrilla war did not refer to the guerrilla war as it was defined in the international context. A large-scale guerrilla war was not seen as feasible in Finnish conditions. A sparsely populated country, occupied by a great power, would simply not have chances for a prolonged a guerrilla war, considering that any opportunities for supplying the population would collapse with the prolongation of the war. A total guerrilla war would have required a large country with a large population and a self-sufficient administrative structure, which would enable continued functioning of agriculture and administration even under occupation. According to assessments made by the General Headquarters and, in part, by the country’s political leadership, Finland’s continued national existence, in the worst-case scenario, would be best ensured through a policy of acquiescence. According to Ruutu, ‘an honourable suicide was out of the question.’ Certain international principles of a guerrilla warfare were regarded as inapplicable to Finnish conditions. Although Finland kept close tabs on the wars being waged outside Finland, the events in Indochina and Vietnam, viewed from the perspective of guerrilla warfare, could not be used as a model if such a war was to be waged under Finnish conditions. On the one hand, Finland needed to fight for some areas of its territory ‘by tooth and nail’, but, on the other hand, there were areas that could have been yielded in order to ensure its sovereignty and in which the invader would face continuous guerrilla-type activities by local forces.\(^6\)

After the draft for the regulation was completed, the work continued in two directions: The National General Staff College was tasked with the updating of Kenttäohjesäännön I osa (‘The I Section of the Field Regulation’) and Jalkaväen taisteluohjesääntö (‘Combat Regulation for the Infantry’) to comply with the doctrine specified in the General Section of the Field Regulation.\(^7\) With regard to the updating of other regulations, a memorandum drafted at the National General Staff College

\(^7\) SKK:n no.tta 1.6.1967, KO yleisen osan uusiminen, (“Revision of the general part”) T 24043/F 87, KA.
\(^5\) Ibid.
\(^6\) Ruutu, Juhani: An interview on 8 June 2006. See also SKK:n no. 620/8/12.6.1967, KO yleisen osan uusiminen (“Renewal of the general section”), T 24043/F 87, KA.
\(^7\) PE:n no. 2274/Ohjelmosto/8 b/24.9.1969, T 24043/F 97, KA.
noted that the draft of the General Section of the Field Regulation still needed work. The views presented by the inspection work group, formed of the staff of the National General Staff College, deviated in any significant way only from the content of Chapter V, which addressed military operations. ‘Therefore, the inspection work group proposes that the most important point of inspection is the fifth chapter of the regulation, which will decisively impact the other field regulations.’ It is noteworthy that section F of the very same chapter addressed guerrilla warfare, commenting on the concept of guerrilla warfare ‘In the handout, guerrilla warfare is only discussed as a form of warfare in which soldiers fight soldiers. When attempting to achieve real results, the total nature of the guerrilla war should be understood from the very beginning; in other words, it should be understood that such war would involve the entire nation and that even in the most lenient of cases, a resistance movement emerging among the civilian population would be necessary, including support by civilians who would provide intelligence and supplies. This requires that the definition of guerrilla war and the section addressing it in the regulation needs to be revised. At the same time, the borderline between guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities should be clarified.’

The National General Staff College proposed that the General Headquarters obtain extensive statements on the memorandum prepared by the Army Combat School from the representatives of the arms and branches and from the commander who held real operational responsibility in the field, in order to enable its further processing. After receiving the statements, the National General Staff College and the Army Combat School would be able to take advantage of tactical exercises and seminars in order to clarify problems related to regulation work. The target date was set at 1973, by which time it would be possible to formulate the general section of the field regulation to match the threat scenario of the era, Finland’s real defensive capacity and the art of war, by taking advantage of the work of the inspection group and experiments carried out in connection with exercises. This statement appears to be the fundamental reason behind the fact that the drafts from 1969 and 1971 for the General Section of the Field Regulation resulted in the General Section of the Field Regulation, confirmed in 1973.

In addition to bringing regulations up to date and revising them, other measures were taken. Under the direction of the General Headquarters, work was initiated to update the establishment chart and train troops for placement in the reserves. At the Infantry Office of the General Headquarters, a plan was drafted to implement an order issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces in 1968 on the revision of the establishment chart to make it compatible with the requirements set for local defence and the reserves of the High Command. The 1966 establishment chart stated that the Military Province of Southern Finland and the Frontier Guard

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788 SKK:n no. 82/7/28.1.1970, Tarkistusesitys Kenttäohjesäännön yleiseen osaan (moniste) (‘Proposal for the inspection of the General Section of the Field Proposal (a handout)’), T 24043/F 97, KA. Cf. Kenttäohjesääntö Yleinen osa, luonnos (‘Field Regulation, General Section, a draft’) (KO yl), 1969, section 312, p. 94.
789 SKK:n no. 88/7/28.1.1970, Muistio prikaatin ja sitä suuremmman yhtymän taistelua käsittelevän kenttäohjesäännön uusimisesta (‘Memorandum on the renewal of the field regulation on battle by a brigade and larger formations’), T 24043/F 97, KA.
790 PE:n kirjelmä no.tta 25.2.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA. See also PE:n no. 30/Opstto/11 henksal/6.8.1968 (Esittely alueellisen puolustusjärjestelmän kehittämisestä) (‘Presentation on the development of the territorial defence system’), 11/F 22, PE (research permit obtained).
were to establish two guerrilla jaeger battalions to form a reserve for the High Command. According to the plan, a new establishment chart entered force in 1970\textsuperscript{791}, with four new battalions being added to it in addition to the existing two. Responsibility for the forming of all six battalions was transformed from the Frontier Guard to designated military provinces under the Defence Forces. The Military Province of Southern Finland (E-SS1) was tasked with forming Guerrilla Jaeger Battalions 1 and 5; the Military Province of Northern Finland (P-SS1), Guerrilla Jaeger Battalions 7 and 15; the Military Province of Savo-Karelia (S-KS1), Guerrilla Jaeger Battalion 4; and the Military Province of Inner Finland (S-SS1), Guerrilla Jaeger Battalion 2.\textsuperscript{792}

In January 1969, the Frontier Guard Headquarters also issued an order to the individual Guards on the reorganisation of troop establishment. According to investigations carried out and accounts produced in 1968, related to the overall revision of the establishment chart of the Frontier Guard, the revision sought to bring the tasks and operational principles of the Frontier Guards into line with the establishment tasks. The key change was the replacement of the wartime frontier brigades in the establishment chart with frontier guards; in the establishment chart, the frontier guard were referred to using their peacetime names. From four to six frontier jaeger battalions were added to the wartime frontier guards, in addition to the existing headquarters and special units. Orders on the new establishment chart entered into force over the course of 1970.\textsuperscript{793} According to the revised establishment chart, the headquarters and reconnaissance companies of the frontier guards belonged to cadre troops while the reminder of the troops to be formed were part of the covering force. Frontier guard troops were part of the covering force – part of the local forces – which meant that their establishment probably needed to be made possible even in a situation under which Finland was subjected to a surprise attack.\textsuperscript{794}

These reforms and detailed arrangements for troop establishment also influenced the content of training provided by the frontier guards – refresher training in particular. The Frontier Guard leadership made a decision to arrange four to seven refresher training exercises in the area of responsibility of each individual Frontier Guard in collaboration with the military provinces of the Defence Forces between 1971 and 1977. Refresher training sought to train professional officers and NCOs placed in frontier jaeger battalions and special units, as well as reservists, in their various duties as leaders of troop establishment and ‘to teach tactical leadership of guerrilla warfare, including its conduct using the materiel available to such combat.’ Such teaching aimed to refresh the guerrilla skills that reservists had learned while doing their military service and to teach

\textsuperscript{791} PE:n no.tta 18.9.1969/sal (Evertti Ermei Kanninen esitys ylimmän päällystön informatiotilaisuudessa 18.9.1969 Pääesikunnassa (‘Proposal by Colonel Ermei Kanninen at an information event for the top leadership, arranged on 18 September 1969 at the General Headquarters’): PTL:n uudistamistyö ja paikallisuus) (‘Update of the establishment chart and local defence’), Ermei Kanninen’s private collection, the original document in the possession of the author of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{792} PE:n kirjelmä no.tta 25.2.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA.


them the methods of guerrilla-type activities as applied by frontier guard troops and the principles for
use of such troops, thereby ensuring that each individual unit will be capable of long-term, independent
guerrilla-style combat, can plan such combat and provide leadership.' The duration of re-
resher training in guerrilla-type activities for officers and NCOs was set at 47 hours. Training in guerrilla-type activities for men and specially trained personnel focused,
on the use of improvised equipment and Claymore-type mines, on storing and caching materiel and on dispersed and concerted operation by a guerrilla jaeger platoon and squad, among other things.\footnote{RvE:n no. 117/II/sal/14.9.1970, RVLE, OT-sal- ja sal-arkisto 1950–1970, (‘a confidential document and a confidential archive’) identifier F 21 sal (research permit obtained).}

Guerrilla jaeger battalions intended to be placed under direct control of the wartime High Command – the Supreme Headquarters – (‘General Headquarters’) imposed stricter requirements for their personnel. According to the view held by the General Headquarters, training in guerrilla-type activities that had found an established form in the 1960s did not provide sufficient skills, particularly with regard to conscripts, for their placement in guerrilla jaeger battalions that were intended for special operations. Based on this calculation, the General Headquarters concluded that by training one guerrilla jaeger battalion from the conscripts of each age class over six years, the need would be satisfied. The proposed solution was that the training of wartime battalions be concentrated on the Defence Forces. The units providing training needed to be located in areas where the terrain enabled training in guerrilla-type activities and exercises in a way that corresponded to the wartime duties of guerrilla jaeger battalions. The battalions under direct control of the High Command were not intended to be used as local forces or guerrilla-type activities in the Finnish archipelago or on the coast; rather, they were troops of the second priority class in mobilisation. The Coastal Guerrilla Tactics Committee was tasked with looking into the need for such troops, submitting its proposal for measures to be taken to the General Headquarters.\footnote{PE:n kirjelmä no.tta 25.2.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA.}

According to the proposal, the units providing training for the personnel of guerrilla jaeger battalions would be the Lapland Jaeger Battalion (LapJP), the Kainuu Brigade (KaiPr), the Karelia Jaeger Battalion (KarJP), the Karelia Brigade (KarPr), and, as a backup, the Savo Brigade (SavPr). This proposal was justified by terrain suitable for guerrilla training and the preparedness of the units to provide such training. Another option put forth by the Infantry Office of the General Headquarters proposed that a separate centre for the provision of training in guerrilla-type activities be established at one of the units listed above or at the Parachute Jaeger School. The easiest and least expensive solution would be to train guerrilla jaeger battalions for the reserves in several units. In the nominal strength ledger of the wartime troops, the strength of a guerrilla jaeger battalion was $43 + 156 + 413 = 612$ men, with an estimated need for training being $6,486$ men when a compensation for an expected loss of 30 per cent during training was included.\footnote{Ibid. See also Kalpamaa, Heikki: Varsinaisten sissijoukkojen tarve, niiden organisointi ja käyttöperiaatteet sekä koulutus (‘Need for guerrilla troops proper, their organisation, principles for use and training’), a thesis produced at the National General Staff College in 1975, appendix 3.1., SKK 1/1186/sal, KA ja T 25767/Hj 2 sal, KA.}
Requirements for training set for guerrilla jaeger battalions specified that the personnel must be carefully selected from among volunteers, using tests if necessary. As the training in guerrilla-type activities provided by the Frontier Guard (RvL) had for years had a higher standard than that given by the Defence Forces, a decision was taken to use the training programmes and targets drafted by RvL. Training for men, NCOs and officers needed to be such that it improved the personnel’s physical condition, map reading skills and initiative, and accustomed them to challenging conditions. Conscripts undergoing training in guerrilla-type activities should only be used for such activities in combat training and war exercises. The Defence Forces made reservists with guerrilla training eligible for placement in guerrilla jaeger battalions until they were 26 or 27 years old, after which they were to be placed in local forces or in the reconnaissance units of general forces. Guerrilla jaeger battalions were to be called up for refresher training every three or four years.798

On the basis of a memorandum drafted by the Infantry Division, a presentation was prepared for the chief of training and education in which the principles described above, with some modifications, were presented for approval and implementation starting from 1970. A decision was made to include training in guerrilla-type activities in the training programme of one of the units of the Reserve Officers School, as well as training the officer candidates of the Frontier Guard in the same unit. The Savo Brigade, one of the units originally planned to provide training in guerrilla-type activities, was dropped from the plan, and the others were equipped with materiel required by such training – mines and radio equipment – as well as extra financial resources for the implementation of training.799 On the basis of the presentation, the inspector of the infantry requested statements and proposals for the practical arrangement of training to be submitted by 14 June 1969.800

The first statement on this issue was submitted by the War Economy Division of the General Headquarters, which immediately announced that no appropriation dedicated to guerrilla jaeger training was available. Neither were any opportunities available for procuring additional materiel in 1970.801 The statements submitted by the other Divisions of the General Headquarters did not deviate from the presentation, with the exception of a number of minor practical points.802 Among other things, the Operations Division reported that, despite the plans to the contrary, two guerrilla jaeger battalions possibly needed to be dropped from the establishment chart.803 The statements submitted by the headquarters of the military provinces, the Frontier Guard and the Reserve Officer School ran along similar lines.804

798 PE:n kirjelmä no. tta 25.2.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA.
799 PE:n no. 41/Jvtsto/5 sal/12.4.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA.
800 PE:n no. 42/Jvtsto/5 sal/14.4.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA.
801 PE:n no. 46/Staltsto/5 sal/30.4.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA.
803 YE:n 192/Optsto/5 sal/11.6.1969, T 25094/F 17 sal, KA.
This was an indication of the fact that the provision of training in guerrilla-type activities by the Defence Forces and the troop establishment plans both for the guerrilla jaeger battalions under the High Command and those included in the local forces urgently needed to be brought to order. This would ensure that the art of war, resting on an increasingly strong theoretical foundation, could be extended to practical training. The Defence Forces had set an ambitious target for themselves to create a reserve for the general forces and the guerrilla troops of the Frontier Guards of conscripts that had undergone efficient training while doing their military service, and this was a target that the army evidently wanted to achieve. While the training in guerrilla-type activities to be given to the local forces was still under development in the Defence Forces over the course of the 1960s, the training of the separate battalions needed to be limited to minimum training supported by refresher training. Opinions even differed regarding the composition of separate battalions. For example, the Frontier Guard proposed that the companies making up a separate battalion should comprise four platoons, in order to improve the prerequisites for guerrilla-type activities. 805 Despite their best efforts, the introduction of local defence lagged behind, remaining still to be implemented in the 1970s.

Opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities in the Finnish archipelago in the repulsion of an attack aimed at capturing the country

Positive experiences gained from the work of the Guerrilla Tactics Committee, in operation between 1961 and 1963, coupled with a need to look into guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago and along the coast in more detail, prompted the chief of the General Headquarters to issue an order on the setting up of a committee under the name of Committee for the investigation of guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago. The idea of carrying out guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago was not a novel one – after all, delaying action and guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago had been part of the training programme of the Coastal Jaeger Battalion in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. 806 The Coast Guards of the Frontier Guard had also experimented and investigated guerrilla-type activities under wintry condition in the archipelago in late winter 1966. 807

The committee was tasked with looking into and investigating the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago as part of local combat operations, including their organisation, operational areas, troops and their composition, leadership, equipment, as well as requisite preparations and the associated training issues. Efforts were made to ensure a broad-based representation in the committee. Lieutenant Colonel Jukka Pajula (PE: jvtsto) was ordered to chair the committee, with the members being Majors Lauri Autti (PE: op-os), Jorma Pullinen (PE: järj-os),

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805 Iisakkala, Ari-Ilmari: An interview on 8 December 2010. See also PE: n no. R 42/Optsto/10 sal/ 5.12.1969 (muistio paikallispataljoonan kokoonpanosta) (‘Memorandum on the composition of a local force battalion’), T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA.
Pentti Aulaskari (PE rttsto), and Captain Reijo Kuusisto (PE koul-os). Lieutenant Commander Frans Bergholm (MerivE) was assigned to the committee to represent the navy, and Lieutenant SG Paavo Hiltula to provide the viewpoint of the Fronteer Guard (RVE). Thereby, all the significant stakeholders from the General Headquarters, as well as from the Navy and the Frontier Guard had representation on the committee.\(^808\)

The composition of the committee changed on two occasions: Major Lauri Autti was transferred from the General Headquarters in November 1968 and Lieutenant Commander Frans Berholm died unexpectedly in February 1969. Their replacements in the committee were Captain Ari-Ilmari Iisakala (PE op-os), who replaced Autti, and Lieutenant Commander Aarno Koivisto (MerivE), who substituted Bergholm.\(^809\)

The committee convened a total of eight times at the General Headquarters over the course of summer 1968 and spring 1969, making several excursions to the coastal military provinces and strategic industrial plants. The work of the committee was based on the general guidelines for local defence issued in 1968, as well as on the details on local defence approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces.\(^810\) In practical terms, this referred to the capability of the Defence Forces to repel landings in coastal areas should Finland be subjected to a surprise attack seeking to capture the country, including the capability to contain landings by enemy airborne troops and the maintenance of high preparedness for combat in coastal areas through means of guerrilla-type activities.

In its final report, the committee provided justification for the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities, taking the perspective of the Finnish art of war and the prevailing image of war. The most important objective of guerrilla-type activities was defined to be the obtaining of information on the enemy, in other words, intelligence, and ‘the instilling of fear for guerrilla jaegers and any form of harassment directed at the enemy’, including tying up enemy forces and inflicting casualties on the enemy. In other words, the objectives set for guerrilla-type activities were best met by carrying out reconnaissance, harassment and demolition operations. With regard to terrain, the Finnish outer archipelago was best suited for reconnaissance; for harassment and demolition, in the inner archipelago. For such tasks, combat divers with special Navy-provided training were proposed. With regard to conditions, summer was considered to be the best season for guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago and in the

\(^{808}\) Saaristossa suoritettavan sissitoiminnan mahdollisuksia, organisointia, valmisteluita ja koulutusta koskeva mietintö (‘Memorandum on the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago, including their organisation, preparations and the required training’), dated 20 May 1969, T 26965/F 44 sal, KA.

\(^{809}\) Ibid.

\(^{810}\) Ibid. See also PE:n no. R 3/Optsto/11 henksal/28.6.1968, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA. PE:n no. 30/Optsto/11 henksal/6.8.1968 (Esittely alueellisen puolustusjärjestelmän kehittämisestä) (‘A presentation on the development of the territorial defence system’), 11/F 22, PE (research permit obtained).
coastal areas, as accommodation, camouflage and covering one’s tracks would be easiest.\textsuperscript{811}

Guerrilla-type activities were regarded to be part of a defensive battle, in which the planning of operations was understood to be the responsibility of the headquarters of the military province, in line with the territorial defence principle. In its detailed final report, the committee put forth a multi-point list of measures, the implementation of which was proposed to be initiated in 1970 with the purpose of having operational arrangements for guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago and coastal areas in place by 1973. Coastal areas were to be defined as areas for guerrilla-type activities, with the principal implementation organisation being guerrilla jaeger platoons and maritime surveillance companies reinforced with requisite materiel. The military provinces under direct control of the Defence Forces and the individual Coast Guards under the command of the Frontier Guards were expected to engage in even closer collaboration. The purpose was to raise the bar for preparedness in order to enable the initiation of battles by maritime surveillance companies which were still in their peacetime composition. Principal responsibility for the provision of training in guerrilla-type activities was proposed to be transferred to the Frontier Guard. The report prepared by the committee was initially submitted to the chief of the General Headquarters and the members of the committee.\textsuperscript{812}

A lengthy article on guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago was also published in Sotilasaikakauslehti’s issue 10/1969. An article authored by Captain Reino Laajaniemi was based solely on the report drafted by the committee for the investigation of guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago, although the biography of the article made no reference to it.\textsuperscript{813} The fact that the article was published before the committee submitted its report was extraordinary. However, this allows one to conclude that the fact that a landing in the Finnish archipelago or in the coastal areas – part of the threat scenario of the era – prepared to be repelled through guerrilla-type activities, was something that the Defence Forces wanted to communicate to the potential ‘enemy,’ On the other hand, any discussion in this era on the variations that territorial combat could take was prone to arouse discussion and gave rise to headlines.

The conclusion drawn from the objectives set for the committee state that the measures to reorganise and arrange guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago sought to increase preparedness of the army to repel a landing under a threat scenario of a sudden attack launched in order to capture the country. Improving preparedness was one of the changes in the Finnish art of war. Efforts were taken to meet the threat scenario with the deterrent constituted by guerrilla-type activities.

\textsuperscript{811} Saaristossa suoritettavan sissitoiminnan mahdollisuuksia, organisointia, valmisteluita ja koulutusta koskeva mietintö (‘Memorandum on the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago, including their organisation, preparations and the required training’), dated 20 May 1969, T 26965/F 44 sal, KA.

\textsuperscript{812} Ibid. See also PE:n no. 159/Meriptsto/Daa sal/7.4.1970, T 26965/D 1 sal, KA.

\textsuperscript{813} Laajaniemi, Reino: Sissijoukkojen toimintosalaisuutta meren saaristossa ja rannikolla (‘On the conditions under which guerrilla troops would have to operate in the archipelago and the coastal area’), Sotilasaikakauslehti 10/1969, pp. 458–464.
In November 1969, after having spent a number of months perusing the report, the Maritime Defence Office of the General Headquarters sent the committee’s report for a review round to the headquarters of the various coastal military provinces (K-SSIE, E-SSIE, L-SSIE ja PohmSSIE), the Navy Headquarters (MerivE), the Frontier Guards Headquarters (RvE), the National General Staff College (SKK), and the various Divisions of the General Headquarters. All statements on the report and the proposals for further action were to be submitted by 1 February 1970, with special attention being paid to the needs of guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago, the viability of implementation of such activities, and training issues.814

While the statements were mostly in line with each other, the one submitted by the Frontier Guard clearly deviated from the others. While all military provinces agreed with the need expressed by the committee’s report for guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago, all statements also expressed concerns about the equipment and training required by guerrilla-type activities. In particular, the statements called for communications equipment, much in need in the wide and rugged archipelago.815

The statement of the Navy Headquarters echoed those of the military provinces while emphasising the importance of training combat divers for guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago. The navy was also concerned about the adequacy of resources available to special training which needed to be increased if responsibility for the training of guerrillas was to be assigned to all units responsible for the defence of the coast.816 The statement submitted by the National General Staff College was analytical, focusing on operational skills. The National General Staff College proposed that the arrangements for guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago be implemented gradually and on a smaller scale compared with those proposed by the committee. Although the proposed activities were regarded as necessary in light of the threat scenario, the training of instructors alone would, according to the National General Staff College, require so much time that it, if implemented, would no longer meet the requirements set for repelling a modern invader.817

While the Frontier Guard Headquarters endorsed the ideas proposed for guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago, it also regarded the assessments put forth in the committee’s report on the chances both of the enemy and the defender as being founded on shaky grounds. According to the Frontier Guard, a great deal more investigation and detailed research would be required in order to uncover all the strengths and weaknesses related to defensive battles. The Frontier Guard regarded the concentration of training in the Coast Guards – which were directly under the control of the Frontier Guard – as unrealistic, as well as the use of maritime surveillance companies for guerrilla-type activities in the Finnish archipelago. On these grounds, the Frontier Guard in effect shot down the committee’s proposal, while at the same time welcoming its ideas.818

814 PE:n no. 548/Meripsto/12 sal/25.11.1969, T 26965/F 44 sal, KA.
816 MerivE:n no. 74/Opsto/12 sal/29.1.1970, T 26965/F 45 sal, KA.
817 SKK:n no. 23/12 sal/30.1.1970, T 26965/F 45 sal, KA.
818 RvE:n no. 22/IV/sal/30.1.1970, T 26965/F 45 sal, KA.
The major reason for guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago remaining on theoretical level, as late as 1970, were concerns regarding the speed at which coastal jaeger battalions could be formed and the problems with equipping them. The Navy and Frontier Guard in particular believed that no time would be available during mobilisation to form coastal jaeger battalions capable of guerrilla-type activities should Finland be subjected to a surprise attack seeking to capture the country. In practice, the archipelago would be vacant, although maritime surveillance companies with a high level of preparedness would be stationed there, as proposed by the committee.819 The Coastal Jaeger Battalion as a wartime unit was dropped from the establishment chart of the Defence Forces in early spring 1970.820

A very interesting aspect regarding guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago was the fact that as late as late 1971 it was publicly claimed that coastal jaeger battalions would form the nucleus of the defence of the archipelago and coastal areas, although the Coastal Jaeger Battalion as a unit had already been dropped from the establishment chart. In 1971, Lieutenant Colonel Niilo Lappalainen published an article on collaboration between coastal jaeger battalions and the coastal artillery Rannikon Puolustaja (‘Defender of the Coast’). According to Lappalainen ‘in wartime, coastal jaeger battalions will be principally intended for combat in the focal points of defence in the archipelago and coastal areas. Requirements set for training specified that a coastal jaeger battalion operating on the coast is capable of successfully participating in defensive battles and in guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago.’821 The release of a wrong or false piece of information made public was possibly related to the rhetoric on defence policy prevalent at the time, according to which a potential invader was to be presented with an image of the strength and credibility of Finland’s defensive capability by emphasising, among other things, the role of guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare in all areas.

Despite critical statements, the investigations into guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago were not a wasted effort as they produced a wealth of information and views that could be put to good use in the development of local defence arrangements and territorial combat. From 1970 onwards, systematic work on the issue was continued under the direction of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters.822 After all, the target was to introduce a credible territorial defence system with versatile content for use as quickly as possible.

819 Ibid.
822 See, for example, PE:n no. 328/Meriptstso/Cb sal/6.6.1972, liite 1, T 26965/E 4 sal, KA. Ranikkopuolustuksen työryhmän mietintö (‘Report by the committee on the defence of the coast’) (RPT-72), 2.11.1973, T 26965/D 2 sal, KA. PE:n no. 6/Meriptstso/IV sal/28.1.1975, T 25767/Hhka 3 sal, KA.
Conflicts regarding the meaning of concepts and modifications to the threat scenario

As stated above, the 1968 events in Europe on the one hand played a role in changing the threat scenario in the thinking of Finnish officers and, on the other hand, modified the Finnish art of war in the face of prevalent military threats. While the events of 1968 were still unfolding, a small group of officers at the National General Staff College drafted a memorandum which discussed the development of the Finnish organisation and tactics in almost sickeningly realistic – even pessimistic – terms. This memorandum with the related documents comprised what was to become sarcastically referred to as ‘the holy script of pessimism’ at the National General Staff College. According to the drafters of this memorandum, it was based on a great number of observations gained from map and terrain exercises focusing on the chances of Finnish formations fighting against a modern enemy. 823

This highly analytical memorandum in excess of 170 pages makes for grim reading. The officers at the National General Staff College concluded, providing a wealth of evidence, that ‘we will not stand a chance on the battlefield if we adhere to our current tactical principles and use the troops that our current organisation expects us to use.’ The discrepancy with regard to mobility, firepower and the protection of troops has such proportions that it cannot be caught up. Therefore, other means need to be found. 824

The staff at the National General Staff College quite evidently wanted to shake up prevalent thinking and direct the development of the territorial defence system in a more credible direction. It was not a question of political credibility but, rather, credibility regarding battles and their successful outcome. In addition to strong realism and pessimistic conclusions, the memorandum also provided a great deal of analysis on the strengths of the Finnish defence. However, the memorandum was founded on a justified concern about the capability that a great power enemy – the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact – had demonstrated in carrying out a surprise attack designed to capture an entire country, Finland not excluded. In a memorandum, Colonel Paavo Junttila, the Chief of the General Staff Division of the National General Staff College, discusses the difficulty of the problem. ‘After all, it is a question of changing the method of waging war, including the related attitudes. Therefore, changes may appear difficult and even impossible to implement. The counter-question to be asked is what the outcome will be if we continue along our present path, retaining our present attitudes’. Judging by the comments added to the margins of the original memoranda by Colonel Ermei Kanninen, Chief of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, he had familiarised himself with the conclusions drawn by the memoranda. 825

823 SKK:n no.tta 4.1.1969/ets (Taktiikkamme ja organisaatiomme kehittäminen, PM) (‘The development of our tactics and organisation’), Document collection: ‘Pessimismin pyhä kirja m/1969, SKK’ (‘The holy script of pessimism’), a folder with no identifier, the research database of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University.


825 SKK:n no.tta 19.3.1969 (Taktiikkamme ja organisaatiomme kehittäminen, II osa), (‘The development of our tactics and organisation, Part II’), Document collection: ‘Pessimismin pyhä kirja m/1969, SKK’ (‘The holy script of pessimism’), a folder with no identifier, the research database of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University.
Approximately one month after the date of the memorandum, Colonel Kanninen introduced the top leadership of the General Headquarters to the factors affecting Finland’s defence capability, using sharp language. In the first part of his introduction, Kanninen outlined the background of his presentation, making direct references both to publicly expressed misgivings and indirect allusions to pessimism that had set in in some quarters. According to Kanninen, while the most pessimistic views could be ignored, he was worried about people’s trust in Finland’s defence capabilities. By way of evidence for this, he referred to assertions according to which Finland would not be able to defend itself against a great power. In the margin of the original memorandum, Kanninen had added ‘the notion of guerrilla war – the leadership of the Defence Forces and the government under fire.’

Judging by the sharp tone of his presentation, Kanninen wanted to respond both to publicly expressed assertions and the criticism put forth by the officers at the National General Staff College regarding the credibility of Finland’s defence, while the issue was still fresh.

The conclusions drawn at the National General Staff College were presented to a small circle at a seminar on tactics held in June 1969. The key theme of the seminar realistically addressed the grounds for the territorial defence system from the perspectives of its appropriateness, troop foundation, the method of waging war, tactics and striking force. General staff officers with familiarity with the above-mentioned issues had been appointed to act as introducers at the seminar. Captain Teo Haapajärvi gave an extensive introduction to the tactics of local forces and their method of waging war, in which he focused on the realistic opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare and their effectiveness as a deterrent in local defence.

In his introduction, Lieutenant Colonel Raimo Viita also took a highly critical view on the role of guerrilla warfare in strategic defence. ‘The method of fighting includes large-scale guerrilla-type activities, which the army must be prepared to continue for an undefined length of time in the form of guerrilla war in the case the combat-effective parts of the local forces are no longer capable of performing the tasks assigned to them. In other words, in the worst-case scenario, the ultimate goal – the restoration of Finland’s independence and sovereignty – will be achieved through’

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826 PE:n no.tta 21.4.1969 (Eversti Ermei Kannisen alustus Pääesikunnan sotilasjohdon informaatiotilaisuudessa (‘An introduction by Colonel Ermei Kanninen at an information meeting of the military leadership’): Suomen puolustuskyvyn vaikutteita tekijöitä (‘Factors affecting Finland’s defence capability’), Ermei Kanninen’s private collection, the original document in the possession of the author of this thesis.

827 SKK:n no.tta 2.5.1969 (Taktiikkamme ja organisaatiomme kehittäminen, II osa, 1. lisäys) (‘The development of our tactics and organisation, Part II, 1st amendment’), Document collection: ‘Pessimismin pylvä kirja m/1969, SKK’ (‘The holy script of pessimism’), a folder with no identifier, the research database of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University, The teaching staff at the National General Staff College, Lieutenant Colonel Raimo Viita and Lieutenant Colonel Ilkka Seppälä, Major Ilkka Halonen and Captain Teo Haapajärvi gave introductory presentations at the seminar on tactics held between 6 and 9 June 1969. Of these officers, Haapajärvi in particular had familiarised himself with guerrilla-type activities in his studies. See Haapajärvi, Teo: Prikaatin ja armeijakunnan sisätoiminnan tarve ja järjestelymehdellisuuksid sekä tästä tehtävät johtopäätökset koulutuksen ja organisation osalta (‘The need for guerrilla-type activities by a brigade and army corps, including the associated arrangements and conclusions to be drawn with regard to training and organisation’), a thesis produced at the National General Staff College in 1967, SKK 1/886 KA.
The ultimate means for achieving the goals is a total guerrilla war.' According to Viita, this model could only be approved in use if Finland could deploy tactics suitable for territorial warfare, had reserves with a proper striking and operational capability trained for guerrilla warfare and equipped with proper materiel and had in place an organisation that was thoroughly prepared for such warfare. It was exactly such shortcomings that the seminar on tactics arranged at the National General Staff College addressed. Such misgivings and arguments were understandable considering the era in which they were expressed. After all, the tactics of territorial combat, the implementation of the arrangements for local defence, and the updating the Field Regulation were still very much uncompleted, not to mention the establishment chart and the allocation of equipment to troops.

At the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, a clandestine meeting was held in July 1970, the participants of which were Lieutenant General Paavo Ilmola (Chief of the General Headquarters), Lieutenant General Lauri Sutela (Chief of the General Staff), Lieutenant General Paavo Junnila (Quartermaster) and Colonel Ermei Kanninen (Chief of the Operations Department.) The meeting focused on ‘fundamental strategic and operational questions.’ Colonel Kanninen, who had had taken the initiative for the negotiation, drafted a memorandum in which he included topics for discussion and proposals for various issues. Behind Kanninen’s initiative was the fact that a draft for the 1969 Field Regulation had been distributed for comments and that the operational orders and plans under revision needed to be confirmed. Kanninen wanted to obtain the approval by key decision-makers and top leadership regarding the fundamental strategic and operational questions and, above all, the concepts to be used. Kanninen sought to obtain policy statements that would be credible both from the internal perspective of defence policy and from the external viewpoint of military credibility.

The first point that Kanninen raised in the discussion was the various options concerning war and their discussion in public life and public documents. According to him, the division of war into ‘a phase of neutrality’ and ‘a surprise attack’ in the reports drafted for the political leadership of the country required a more detailed discussion. In his memorandum Kanninen also noted that ‘an attack by NATO (West Ger-

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828 SKK:n no.tta 31.5.1969 (Alueellisen puolustuksen joukkoihin ja iskukykyisiin joukkoihin suoritetun jaon tarkoituksenmukaisuus ja siinä erityisesti huomioon otettavia näkökohtia) (‘The appropriateness of the division of troops in local forces and combat-effective troops, including any relevant aspects’), an introduction no. 1 by Lieutenant Colonel Raimo Viita at the seminar on tactics and organisation arranged by the teaching staff of the National General Staff College between 6 and 9 June 1969, Document collection: ‘Pessimismin pyhä kirja m/1969, SKK’ (‘The holy script of pessimism’), a folder with no identifier, the research database of the Department of Military History at the National Defence University.

829 PE:n no.109/Optsto/R 0 sal/20.7.1970, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA.

830 Kanninen, Ermei: An interview, 3 January 2006. PE:n no.tta 18.9.1969/sal (Ezersti Ermei Kannisen esitys ylimmän päällystön informaatioihin sisältävän 18.9.1969 Pääesikunnassa (‘Proposal by Colonel Ermei Kanninen at an information event for the top leadership, arranged on 18 September 1969 at the General Headquarters’): PTL:n uudistamistyö ja paikallispulatuus) (‘Update of the establishment chart and local defence’), Ermei Kanninen’s private collection, the original document in the possession of the author of this thesis. SKK:n no. 88/7/28.1.1970, Muistio prikaatin ja sitä suurenman yhtymän taistelua käsittelyyn kenttäohjeäänin muusinesta, (‘Memorandum on the updating of the field regulation on battle by a brigade and larger formations’) T 24043/F 97, KA.
many) could not be a surprise attack in the sense that it would involve the concept of the capture of the country and that ‘a surprise could only be launched by the Warsaw Pact, but the direction from which such an attack would be launched is always left open in public discussion.’ What had developed into a problem was a discrepancy between the draft for the General Section of the Field Regulation and the concepts used in public life, as an attack designed to capture a country, for all its descriptive power, was too incorrect politically to be applied to the prevailing conditions.831 If a surprise attack launched to capture Finland failed, the Warsaw Pact was expected to launch a large-scale invasion in order to achieve its targets. Therefore, Kanninen proposed that the concepts of ‘a surprise attack’ and ‘a full-scale invasion’ be retained in the Field Regulation, accompanied with detailed explanations, as well as in the operational order. In line with this, the term ‘attack designed to capture the country’ as a concept was abandoned and replaced with the more neutral term ‘surprise attack.’ Kanninen also proposed that the operational order under drafting be rewritten to take account of a surprise attack, with due attention being paid to the protection of neutrality.832

As a second issue, Kanninen took up military operations and their implementation. According to Kanninen, strategic defence was based on territorial combat, the planning, arrangements and training of which were based on local forces assigned to carried out local combat, and on mobile warfare conducted by general forces. Planning was based on the notion that both troops types would constitute a coherent framework under which the commander responsible for the situation or the area could use certain local troops as if they were troops of the general forces, and vice versa. As such, arrangements were finally being resolved, and Kanninen saw no reason for making changes to the principles already confirmed. Kanninen proposed to the top military leadership that the two complementary operating principles of local and general forces should be retained within the framework of a local defensive plan. As a decision had already been taken to retain the concept of ‘covering force’, Kanninen also proposed that ‘covering force battles’ should be retained in the plans although the National General Staff College had proposed in their statement that they be changed to ‘initiation of battle’.833

833 Ibid. For additional information on the concept of ‘covering force’, see PE:n no.tta 30.4.1961 (Operatiiviset olutsette ja niiden asettamat vaatimukset maavoimien eri puolustusbaareijen ja aselajien (vast) tak-tiikan, kaluston ja menettelytaojen kehittämiseksi) (‘Operational conditions and the requirements that they set for the development of tactics, equipment and operational procedures of the arms and branches of the army (equivalent)’), T 26965/F 22 sal, KA.
According to Kanninen, one critical issue was related to situations in which the war had continued for some time along with the concept of guerrilla war. Conceptual confusion clouding the thinking in the Finnish art of war also caused trouble, and not only at the General Headquarters. The significance of guerrilla war and, above all, the real opportunities available to waging guerrilla war in Finland had been discussed throughout the 1960s. An example of this was provided by an article by Major Esa Seppänen, published in Sotilasaikakauslehti in 1969. Being the first of its kind, Seppänen’s article publicly criticised the confusion characterising concepts and the potential for misunderstanding. Seppänen noted in his articles that ‘as only scant material is available in Finnish, and as its content is limited, information is largely obtained from foreign sources. This requires a good command of foreign terminology and an ability to translate such terminology into one’s native language. The key is that the basic idea of a foreign term is identified and translated. A verbatim translation is not always sufficient. Otherwise, misunderstanding the meaning of a foreign term could lead the reader to form an incorrect understanding of the issue, and incorrect understanding of the meaning of words could lead to incorrect theories and, worst of all, to incorrect practical applications. Such repercussions might then be reflected in the teaching of military schools, research and general discussion.’ Seppänen’s concerns were justified and correct in the sense that in the research conducted by military schools in particular the concept of guerrilla war was understood in several ways.

While several orders and instructions issued by the General Headquarters had attempted to address this conflict, the concept of guerrilla war was still included in the operational basic order from 1966 (opky 10) and in the draft for the General Section of the Field Regulation from 1969. However, all directives regarding training and practice referred to guerrilla-type activities. According to Kanninen, the crucial issue was to approach the basic question from the perspective of two options. ‘Either the country is occupied so rapidly that only sporadic resistance can be organised, or armed resistance by regular troops is broken after the materiel resources are exhausted (over a course of one month).’ This fundamental question regarding the art of war could be addressed in two ways under the prevailing view: ‘either well-prepared resistance under unified leadership is abandoned, or the war will be continued in the form of guerrilla war.’ Kanninen emphasised in his memorandum that the current operational plans followed the latter scenario, regarding it as the only option both from the perspective of Finns’ willingness to defend their country and the prevention of war.

Although the military leadership would have to consent to giving up resistance in the interest of the nation, this could not, according to Kanninen, constitute the basis for planning; rather, it should be a decision to be taken should the situation so require. Therefore, continuing to procure materiel for consumption for a period in excess of one month was a prerequisite for the continuation of combat. Because the strength of the troops that would continue fighting was difficult to assess, the previous operational plans had set the figure at approximately half the strength of the ground forces. The issue had been brought up at the beginning of the 1960s,

834 Ibid.
836 PE:n no. 109/Optsto/R 0 sal/20.7.1970, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA.
837 Ibid.
when the following note was made of the deployment of the covering force for delaying battles. ‘The covering force is tasked with gaining time for the initiation of counter measures ... the delaying action must be supported by guerrilla-type activities. However, the superior strength of the enemy may prevent our troops from engaging in regular delaying action in certain areas. Should this be the case, the defender must resort to guerrilla warfare, conducted possibly across a very large area, thereby enabling the defender to carry out its tasks that would otherwise be impossible to accomplish.’ In line with this view, Kanninen proposed that ‘the option of guerrilla war be retained, and its significance be emphasised both in planning and training.’ In other words, the calculations on attrition carried out in the 1960s and a secret operational decision taken at the same time indicated that Finland had prepared to wage guerrilla war engaging as many as 250,000 men.

A similar model of guerrilla warfare had been presented to the students of the National General Staff College – future general staff officers – in 1968. The section on university-level education in the book entitled *Maanpuolustuksen perusteet* ("The fundamentals of national defence") justifies the issue with similar grounds. ‘Training human resources on the basis of universal conscription continues to be necessary if we want to show that our nation cannot be conquered by simply defeating our limited covering force and that we will be capable of more extensive military operations, with guerrilla war waged by very large forces as our last resort. Recent experiences gained from guerrilla war are obviously a deterrent even to a strong invader.’

In addition to the fundamental issues mentioned above, the leadership of the navy and the issue regarding the commander of the air defence were also discussed at the meeting. On the front page of an original memorandum on the event, the following hand-written note had been added: ‘all proposals were unanimously supported.’ Judging from the handwriting, the note had been entered by Ermei Kanninen himself. This event can be regarded as highly important from the perspective of Finland’s defensive strategy. Kanninen’s principal goal was apparently to obtain the approval of the top leadership of the Defence Forces for the credibility of the defence policy and military credibility presented outside. Kanninen’s model was heavily based on his own ideas about the direction that the development of the territorial defence system should take and his own role in this work. According to him, the extremely difficult

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838 PE:n no. 304.4.1961 *Operatiiviset olosuhteet ja niiden asettamat vaatimukset maavoimien eri puolustuspuolijoiden ja aselajien (vast) takkiikan, kaluston ja menettelytapojen kehittämiseksi* (*Operational conditions and the requirements that they set for the development of tactics, equipment and operational procedures of the arms and branches of the army (equivalent)*) ' T 26965/F 22 sal, KA.
839 PE:n no. 109/Opstso/R 0 sal/20.7.1970, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA.
840 The strength of the wartime army at the beginning of the 1970s was calculated to be around 500,000 men, comprising general, local and supportive forces, including reserve and replacement troops. PE:n no. 18.1.1971 (‘A memorandum drafted by Ermei Kanninen’: *Puolustusvoimille asetettavat suorituskykyvaatimukset, jotka koskevat kykyä torjua Suomen alueelle kohdistuvia hyökkäyksiä*) (‘Requirements set for the Defence Forces, regarding their capability to repel attacks against the Finnish territory.’), Ermei Kanninen’s private collection; the original document in the possession of the author of this thesis.
841 *Maanpuolustuksen perusteet* ("The fundamentals of national defence"), Helsinki 1968, Osa: *Sotilaallisen voiman osuus kokonaismaanpuolustuksessa* (‘Part: The role of military force in the total national defence’), p. 3
842 PE:n no. 109/Opstso/R 0 sal/20.7.1970, T 26965/Hh 8–9 sal, KA.
problems following a large-scale invasion should be acknowledged without giving up hope ‘as long as we adhere to the principles of territorial defence that we have recently adopted.’ Since the late 1960s, Kanninen had asserted on several occasions that the objective of the revised territorial doctrine was to defend Finland’s vital areas even if they fought in isolation, to slow down the enemy’s advance, and to hamper its possibilities to use fire through guerrilla-type activities and by taking advantage of Finnish terrain and climate.843

Similar rhetoric on territorial defence was used on national defence courses. For example, the content of lectures for the 1969 course is unambiguous. ‘The preventive effect of sufficiently strong and readily operational troops is of paramount importance in the safeguarding of Finland’s neutrality and territorial integrity. Already in peacetime and especially during a conflict between outside powers we must be prepared to demonstrate that we are capable of preventing the violations of our territorial integrity.’844 This rhetoric was two-pronged as it sought to demonstrate, especially to the Soviet Union, that Finland possessed a strong defensive capability, the extension of which to costly guerrilla war if necessary provided a strong demonstration of Finland’s credible defensive capability.

On the basis of the discussion event held at the General Headquarters, a fundamental conclusion on the Finnish art of war and guerrilla-type activities can be drawn. For reasons related to defence policy, the military leadership wanted to retain guerrilla war in the concepts of national defence although all practical measures in the Defence Forces starting from the late 1960s – such as the introduction of local defence and training – had put the emphasis on guerrilla-type activities and tactics. Referred to as a last-ditch effort in documents, guerrilla war was retained as a concept in the General section of the Field regulation which at the time was undergoing updating, and in a similar document, for its possible deterrent effect. The decision to retain guerrilla war as the last theoretical option to defend Finland was peculiar from the perspective of the Finnish art of war – after all, even the teaching staff at the National General Staff College had questioned the deterrent effect of theoretical guerrilla war when presenting their conclusions at a seminar on tactics held in 1969, assessing it to be practically non-existent. Therefore, the question can be raised as to whether the option of guerrilla war was only a political factor related to the credibility of defence, or whether it truly reflected the general realism of the military with


regard to the art of war. In any event, the concept of guerrilla war and the option of resorting to it remained in official regulations and operational plans.

By the early 1970s, the key issue was that a consensus of sorts had been reached on the fact that confusion over concepts did exist, and an important conclusion from this state of affairs had been drawn. A clearer distinction between guerrilla war, guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities needed to be made in the concepts and content of the Finnish art war, and comprehensible and unambiguous general definitions of them needed to be included in regulations. Although the public rhetoric on defence policy was another thing, the concepts needed to be in line with each other. In any event, the confusion regarding concepts in the late 1960s hampered development which needed to be addressed. Otherwise, reform encompassing the entire defence system and its implementation, especially in the planning regarding the operational level, would have faced grave problems.

**Tactical guidelines for local defence**

Despite the many controversies, the implementation of the territorial defence system was in full swing. However, in late 1970, feedback of the lack on tactical guidelines began to mount. In particular, this lack revolved around local defence and the tactics of local defence forces.845 As an example of this, notes recorded and observations made by Major Ari-Ilmari Iisakkala on a war game arranged by the Military Province of Savo-Karelia between 24 and 25 November 1970 can be considered. ‘Regarding local defence, one cannot help noticing that the troops still do not fully understand what the control of an entire area of responsibility entails within the framework of modern combat. While the focus is on battles on the front line, the biggest surprises will take place in the rear.’ Iisakkala considered that a sufficient number of war games should be arranged in peacetime in each operational area in order to ensure that the basic principles of the art of war and military operations could be developed in a realistic direction with regard to the prevailing threat scenarios. Iisakkala also put forth the urgent need for operational guidelines addressing collaboration between the local and general forces.846 The use of local forces in a situation involving a surprise attack was also discussed in a war game arranged at a training event for the top leadership (YPO 6) in November 1970.847

When presenting his observations to the chief of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, Iisakkala received a personal order from him to compile a clarifying directive covering the tactics to be used in local defence, seeking to avoid any misunderstandings.848 By March 1971, Iisakkala had completed his directive, which was distributed to the troops under the title *(Taktillinen ohje alueellisessa puolustuksessa)* (*A tactical directive for local defence.*) This detailed directive in excess of one hundred pages provided grounds for the development and preparations of the revised defence system, including training to be provided under it. It was

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845 Iisakkala, Ari-Ilmari: An interview on 8 December 2010.
846 PE:n no. R 56/Optsto/11 henksal/1.12.1970, T 26965/Hh 8–9, sal, KA.
847 PE:n no. 36/Optsto/Da sal/25.1.1971, T 26965/D 1 sal, KA.
848 Iisakkala, Ari-Ilmari: An interview on 8 December 2010.
clearly intended to be used alongside the *Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa* (‘General Section of the Field Regulation’) which had been completed in spring 1971. However, by the time it was completed, the Tactical directive was already partly insufficient in light of the whole field of local defence. It focused on the battle conducted by the various command echelons of the local defence and the local forces, while, in the case of combat conducted by the general forces and their command echelons, the regulations in effect at the time were applied.\(^849\)

The document noted that the tactical viewpoints and solutions put forward in it were only indicative, and were to be developed and applied as the situation, area and current conditions demanded. While the concepts related to guerrilla activities were presented in a way that was in line with the revised field regulation, the tactical descriptions and definitions continued to be confusing in part. This was liable to cause confusion in the training, teaching and understanding of tactical issues throughout the Defence Forces. The military schools in particular found this embarrassing.\(^850\)

Plans for local defence drafted by the military districts also exhibited clear conceptual confusion.\(^851\)

Initially, *Taktillinen ohje alueellisessa puolustuksessa* (‘A tactical directive for local defence’), provided the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard with sufficient general tactical principles both in local combat and guerrilla-type activities. According to this directive, the local defence system was based on independent battles conducted by the military provinces in accordance with their tasks, on the local defence covering the entire country in close collaboration with the military provinces, and on the general forces committed to decisive military operations. From the perspective of tactics, the directive described the nature of territorial combat as a form of warfare which sought to slow down and cause attrition to enemy forces, to cut enemy attack formations into smaller sections, to halt and prevent their advance, to defeat them, and to maintain control over vital areas of the country using a variety of means. ‘Territorial combat begins at the border, and involves operations that slow down and cause attrition to the enemy using even small troops which rely on guerrilla-type activities if necessary.’ Troops engaged in territorial combat were divided into general, local and support forces, reflecting their operational use in the territorial defence system. Local forces, responsible for local defence, were principally tasked with immediate combat using the methods of guerrilla warfare, particularly in surprise situations. A particularly interesting aspect of the directive was its sixth main chapter, entitled ‘Guerrilla war.’ The way the directive referred to the concept of guerrilla war was perfectly in line with the 1971 draft for *Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa* (‘General Section of the Field

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\(^{849}\) PE:n no. 861/Ohjessto/8 B ets/30.3.1971 (*Taktillinen ohje alueellisessa puolustuksessa*) (‘A tactical directive for local defence’), T 23204/F 291, KA. See also *Kenttäohjesääntö yleinen osa* (KO yl), luonnos (‘General Section of the Field Regulation, a draft’) 1971.

\(^{850}\) Ibid. Juhani Ruutu noted that the confusion regarding tactical concepts caused trouble for teaching given by the National General Staff College. Ruutu, Juhani: An interview on 8 June 2006. See also Visuri (1989), pp. 213–214.

\(^{851}\) See, for example, HämSpEn no.tta /Lkp D I sal/ .10.1971 (4. *Sotilasalueen paikallispohjustus-suunnitelma*) (‘Local defence plan of the military area’), T 24195/H 1 sal, KA. HämSpEn no. 4/Järjsto/Lkp D III sal/8.9.1972, (3./ErP 63:n maahanlaskun torjunta- ja sisissäistämis-suunnitelma) (‘The plan of 3./ErP 63 for repelling airborne landings and guerrilla-type activities’), T 24195/H 4 sal, KA.
Regulation’) and the conceptual hierarchy of the 1973 *Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa* (‘General Section of the Field Regulation’) which was confirmed later.852

To continue military operations in the form of guerrilla warfare was a viable solution in situations where the prerequisites to carry out regular military operations had been lost in some part or a major section of Finnish territory. A military province was to continue combat in the form of guerrilla war in a situation where the task assigned to it using regular operations was impossible considering the number of available troops. In the initial phase, the target of guerrilla war was to support the military provinces engaged in regular operations, with the ultimate target being the defeat of the enemy through guerrilla-type activities. Troops engaged in guerrilla war were to use areas designated by the military province as their support areas.853

The spirit of the 1971 draft for the *Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa* (‘General Section of the Field Regulation’), updated by Colonel Ermei Kanninen, was discernible in the 1971 tactical directive for territorial defence. In the 1971 draft for the *Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa*, guerrilla warfare was defined to be, from the tactical perspective, ‘warfare conducted in order to continue regular military operations, or carried out alongside such operations, in the enemy-held territory.’ To continue military operations in the form of guerrilla warfare is a viable solution in situations where the prerequisites to carry out regular military operations have been lost in some part or a major section of the Finnish territory.’ In the chapter on definitions in the 1973 *Kenttäohjesäännön yleinen osa*, guerrilla war was defined in almost equal terms to the previous draft. Only the word order was changed slightly.854

With regard to guerrilla-type activities, the first clear definitions for territorial combat from the 1970s that agreed with each other can be found in the 1971 *Jalkaväen taisteluohjesääntö* (‘Combat Regulation for the Infantry’) and in *Ohje perusyhtymän taistelua varten* ‘Guidelines for combat conducted by a basic formation’). The first one defines guerrilla-type activities as ‘combat operations conducted in the enemy’s rear or in enemy-held territory, relying on preparations made in advance and continuing them normally over long periods of time, aimed at slowing down and causing attrition to the enemy, harassing it and tying its forces in combat.’ While the combat guidelines defined guerrilla-type activities in almost equal terms, they added further detail. ‘Guerrilla-type activities refer to combat operations conducted in the enemy’s rear or in enemy-held territory, relying on preparations made in advance and continuing them over long periods of time, aimed at slowing down and causing attrition to the enemy, harassing it and tying its forces in combat. Guerrilla-type activities conducted across

852 PE:n no. 861/Ohjessto/8 B ets/30.3.1971 (Taktillinen ohje alueellisessa puolustuksessa) (‘A tactical directive for local defence’), pp. 10, 96–102, T 23204/F 291, KA. See also *Kenttäohjesääntö yleinen osa* (KO yl) (‘General Section of the Field Regulation’), a draft from 1971, pp. 71–76 and attachment 1, p. 1. *Kenttäohjesääntö yleinen osa* (KO yl), (‘General Section of the Field Regulation’), (KO yl), Mikkeli 1973, pp. 74–79 and 168.

853 PE:n no. 861/Ohjessto/8 B ets/30.3.1971 (Taktillinen ohje alueellisessa puolustuksessa) (‘A tactical directive for local defence’), pp. 10, 96–102, T 23204/F 291, KA.

an area that is large both in width and depth and directed in a manner that seeks to make them the most effective in the decisive phase of the operations.855

Persyhtymän taisteluohje (‘Guidelines for combat conducted by a basic formation’) from 1977 summed up the principles of combat conducted by a brigade, including its collaboration with local forces. The most significant tactical change to the 1963 regulation was the fact that the regulation no longer made a reference to a brigade’s second defensive position further back, for which a sufficient number of troops were not considered to be available. Responsibility was increasingly being transferred to local forces, the defensive principles of a brigade were reinforced in other ways, and the focus of its operations within a framework of the various methods of combat were given a more precise focus, all of which was based on the decreasing probability that nuclear weapons would be used. Starting from the 1970s, the defensive combat and tactics of a brigade increasingly took on features of local defence. Areas that battalions were ordered to defend, and the points of terrain that they were ordered to hold, including other areas that were to be held even when encircled, were part of the development of tactics. Commanders had a considerable degree of liberty to choose a method of combat that best suited a particular situation, including the repertoire of guerrilla-type activities. However, active offensive tactics played a key role in the battle doctrine, as passive defensive combat was not expected to produce the desired results.856

All of the above-mentioned documents and handbooks define guerrilla war as combat conducted in order to continue regular military operations, or carried out alongside such operations, in enemy-held territory. To continue combat in the form of guerrilla warfare was a viable solution in situations where the prerequisites to carry out regular military operations had been lost in some parts or a major section of Finnish territory. While the general principles of guerrilla tactics such as the description of contents, variations, territorial division, the use of troops and the chain of command were logically defined in the guidelines, the concepts were in some cases highly misleading or even conflicting. With regard to the art of war, the definition given to the method of war reflected the nature of guerrilla war, current objectives for such a war, and the situation, task and operational opportunities. Guerrilla-type activities were divided into dispersed and concerted operations. No clear borderline between the various modes of operations was drawn as the guidelines stated that both dispersed and concerted tactics were to be carried out simultaneously, with the focus between them varying according to the situation.

All in all, it can be said that with regard to its doctrine and strategy, the territorial defence system was sufficiently complete by the early 1970s, but work remained to be done, particularly regarding local combat operations and the related guerrilla-type

856 Visuri, Pekka: Puolustusperiaatteiden kehitys Keski-Euroopassa toisen maailmansodan jälkeen vertailuna vastaavaan kehitykseen Suomessa (‘The development of defensive principles in Central Europe after the Second World War, compared to corresponding developments in Finland’), a separate study produced at the National General Staff College, Helsinki 1985, pp. 194–196.
activities. While the training of career officers, NCOs and conscripts had at least satisfactorily been set in motion on these grounds, training in guerrilla-type activities in particular would have required more detailed instructions in the early 1970s. After all, the only regulations in effect directly addressing guerrilla-type activities and related training dated back to 1956 and 1957. Clearly, something needed to be done. Evidently as early as 1972, the General Headquarters decided to start work on drafting a separate guidebook in the tactics of guerrilla-type activities. While it certainly was possibly to begin this process at a short notice, the necessary background work required a great deal of effort, particularly from the military schools of the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard, which were assigned objectives and tied to the work. The commitment of the political leadership and decision-makers of the country to the set targets and the means of guerrilla war in the territorial defence system was also considered important.857

Texts, research and reflections on guerrilla-type activities between 1967 and 1983

Between 1967 and 1983, a total of 25 articles on guerrilla-type activities or guerrilla warfare were published in the press and six in books. In the same period, 19 theses produced at the National General Staff College addressed this topic. In addition to the National General Staff College, guerrilla-type activities were examined in 72 studies prepared by the staff officer courses and infantry captain courses arranged by the Army Combat School.858 From the perspective of guerrilla-type activities, these years of the research period were clearly the most prolific.

Among others, Esa Seppänen, Jurkka Viljamaa, Juhani Paakkinen, Veikko Koppi nen, Reino Laajaniemi and Helge Seppälä discussed guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla warfare and the associated concepts in their press articles. However, the culmination of such texts was an exchange of words between only two authors. Juhani Paakkinen and Veikko Koppen dominated Sotilasaikakauslehti in particular, contributing articles which discussed guerrilla-type activities not only from the practical point of view but also put forth theoretical aspects.

In autumn 1967, Captain Esa Seppänen published an extensive three-piece article on the changing nature of war. In his Yhteiskunnallinen sota – totalisen sodan laajentunut sisältö (‘Social war – the expanded content of total war’), he discusses the changing nature of the art of war and war itself, not only in Finland but around the world. Seppänen’s perspective was twofold: political – that is, revolutionary – and military, in other words, guerrilla warfare. Seppänen’s focus was on revolutionary war, which he regarded as a manifestation of the change, and on guerrilla war, which he also thought was applicable to Finnish conditions. Seppänen sums up the issue as follows: ‘In Finland, total guerrilla war may constitute the last resort for our defence. Under disadvantageous conditions, it may also be the first and last means available to us to repel the enemy.’ According to Seppänen, guerrilla war required that both military and civilian research resources be concentrated to the planning and preparation work in all sectors

857 Mikkonen, Matti: An interview on 1 November 2013.
858 See the bibliography of this thesis.
of total national defence.\textsuperscript{859} As Esa Seppänen’s article was awarded first place in Series A\textsuperscript{860} of the magazine’s writing competition, it can be said to have influenced the thinking of the Finnish military.

In an article published in autumn 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Jurkka Viljamaa discussed the actual possibilities available to troops to make the transition to guerrilla tactics. According to Viljamaa, prerequisites for successful guerrilla-type activities are created by changing attitudes, making organisations more functional, providing appropriate equipment, and arranging training and exercises that simulate real conditions.\textsuperscript{861} While Viljamaa did not present anything new as such in his article, he evidently wanted to stir discussion on the various forms of territorial combat.

Starting in 1970, as a series of provocative articles on guerrilla-type activities written by a young 1st Lieutenant were published in Sotilasaikakauslehti. The author was Juhani Paakkinen, an officer at the Frontier Guard, whose articles challenged the prevailing thinking regarding both guerrilla-type activities and the changes that the Finnish art of war was undergoing in the era of the Cold War. Paakkinen’s first article addressed the state of guerrilla-type training in 1970. Paakkinen considered the regulations for guerrilla-type activities in use at the time to be outdated, which had led to a whole host of problems in training. ‘Where can our instructors for guerrilla training acquire their information if our regulations are insufficient or in part outdated? Wilderness romance, lore that is passed on from one instructor to another, continues to be the essence of Finnish training in guerrilla-type activities; that this is so was clearly demonstrated when the author of this article sampled the student officers on JvKaptK 42 for their opinions on the training provided by our infantry units.’ Paakkinen criticised with harsh words the erroneous image of the enemy prevalent at the time and the overestimation of the performance of the Finnish soldier. ‘This is the last moment to give up the notion according to which a Finnish man is a natural born guerrilla fighter and, by virtue of this fact, needs no training.’\textsuperscript{862} While Paakkinen’s article was topical, tackled real problems, and the views put forth were based on strong arguments, it nevertheless ruffled the feathers of many, especially at the General Headquarters.


\textsuperscript{861} Viljamaa, Jurkka: \textit{Ajatuksiat joukkojen sisitoinimistaan siirtymisestä} (‘Thoughts on troops adopting guerrilla-type activities’), Sotilasaikakauslehti 8/1969, pp. 365–367.

\textsuperscript{862} Paakkinen, Juhani: \textit{Ajatuksiat sisikoulutuksenestämme} (‘Thoughts on our training in guerrilla-type activities’), Sotilasaikakauslehti 9/1970, pp. 445–446. See also Paakkinen, Aarre Juhani, an extract from personal details, no. 82260, KA.
Paakkinen continued his writing on guerrilla-type activities in 1971, inspiring Lieutenant Colonel Helge Seppälä, who taught military history at the National General Staff College, to write about the same issue.\textsuperscript{863} Seppälä discussed the opportunities open to guerrilla war in Finland mostly against the background of Soviet partisan warfare during the Second World War. Like Paakkinen, Seppälä strongly questioned the thinking and the art of war that characterised the era. Although Seppälä defended guerrilla war, he also argued that Finland had chosen a slippery course by preparing for guerrilla war at the expense of regular warfare. ‘A small nation must develop side by side general preparedness for national defence and readiness to adopt guerrilla tactics. It cannot be assumed that an expensive defence capability, albeit a good one, would automatically require the capability to launch effective guerrilla war, should the situation so require.’\textsuperscript{864}

Seppälä’s article woke up the sleeping bear; publicly questioning the established principles of national defence using such strong language was definitively not appropriate, least of all for a general staff officer. Lieutenant General Veikko Koppinen, who had already retired, felt compelled to respond both to Juhani Paakkinen’s and Helge Seppälä’s views, defending the solutions taken in the Finnish art of war. In spring 1972, Koppinen wrote a rejoinder to Paakkinen and Seppälä, publishing it in Sotilasaikakauslehti under the title of \textit{Sissit – julumureitako!} ('Guerrilla jaegers – brutes? Really!'), in which he corrected the erroneous public image that the readers of the magazine might have formed of Finnish guerrilla-type activities. Koppinen was particularly indignant about Seppälä drawing a parallel between the methods of Finnish guerrilla-type activities and brutish guerrillas who broke the rules of war.\textsuperscript{865}

The texts analysing guerrilla-type activities in the mid-1970s underwent a temporary phase during which particularly Juhani Paakkinen criticised the various forms of guerrilla-type activities without drawing major criticism.\textsuperscript{866} However, one article by Paakkinen from 1977 inspired Veikko Koppinen to put pen to paper again and respond to the views put forth in the article. Paakkinen expressed his concerns about the meaning of concepts of the Finnish art of war and the relationship between concerted and dispersed guerrilla-type activities. ‘Depending on the country, a variety of definitions for guerrilla-type activities are put forth. The definition generally accepted in Finland

\textsuperscript{863} See, for example, Paakkinen, Juhani: \textit{Sissitoiminta pienekästä autuskeskuksessa} ('Guerrilla war in a small population centre'), Sotilasaikakauslehti 4/1971, pp. 183–185.

\textsuperscript{864} Seppälä, Helge: \textit{Kokemuksia ja mielteitä neuvostopartisaanien toiminnasta} ('Experiences from and reflections on the Soviet partisan war'), Sotilasaikakauslehti 2/1972, pp. 75–78.

\textsuperscript{865} Koppinen, Veikko: \textit{Sissit – julumureitako!} ('Guerrilla jaegers – brutes? Really!'), Sotilasaikakauslehti 4/1972, pp. 203–205. See also Koppinen, Veikko William, an extract from personal details, no. 55645, KA.

emphasises the significance of advance preparations, which is a justified view against the background of modern war. Coordinated collaboration between general and local forces is regarded as vital.\textsuperscript{867}

Paakkinen thought that dispersed guerrilla-type activities had come to play a disproportionately large role in the 1960s and 1970s in territorial combat. He argued that concerted guerrilla operations would be equally effective and would warrant more attention. ‘The relationship between dispersed and concerted operations is essentially dependent on the adopted concept of war. Guerrilla-type activities need to be linked to the different phases of territorial battle. However, the defence has always been the most vulnerable aspect of guerrilla warfare.’\textsuperscript{868} In other words, Paakkinen questioned the dispersed defensive battle by means of guerrilla-type activities, as advocated by Veikko Koppinen.

As mentioned above, Veikko Koppinen felt compelled to respond to the views put forth by Paakkinen, as Paakkinen was advocating an almost diametrically opposite form of operations compared to what Koppinen’s exploding wilderness was understood to mean. Koppinen was clearly annoyed at Paakkinen’s assertions, noting that ‘this kind of text really forces the reader to ask himself a fundamental question – what has happened to guerrilla-type activities?’ Koppinen gave Paakkinen both barrels, shooting down his arguments item by item, showing that Paakkinen had fallen into false interpretations by merely referring to military history.\textsuperscript{869} Koppinen’s article was very interesting and provides an excellent contemporary testimony to a clash between two generations and the opinions put forth regarding the broad field of territorial combat.

This heated exchange of opinions quite evidently affected the editorial staff of Sotilasaikakauslehti, as Juha Paakkinen was given an exceptional opportunity to respond to Koppinen’s rejoinder in the very same issue of the magazine. Paakkinen struck back verbally, noting that ‘Koppinen’s thinking is based on the notion that a Claymore-type mine is everything and nothing else matters. Without getting involved in a prolonged discussion on the effectiveness of guerrilla troops, I just want to point out that battles fought by guerrillas will probably never surpass in effectiveness those fought by regular forces. After having built up the courage to give up wilderness romance in our training, we also need the courage to discuss guerrilla-type activities without emotions and prejudices.’ Paakkinen was also concerned about the conceptual inconsistencies that continued to plague guerrilla-type activities. ‘Concepts – including those of guerrilla-type activities – take centre stage in the teaching of the art of war. It is inconceivable that the concepts of tactics and operational skills are chosen on the basis of terms that men are willing to use.’\textsuperscript{870} Predictably, Veikko Koppinen felt compelled to respond to the verbal fireworks of Paakkinen.\textsuperscript{871} Koppinen used the authority of his advanced age and experience, exercising his seniority, but he failed to silence Paakkinen, although the debate between the two experts on guerrilla tactics ended. Both authors

\textsuperscript{868} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{871} Koppinen, Veikko: \textit{Sissitoiminnan muodoista vieläkin} (‘The forms of guerrilla-type activities revisited’), Sotilasaikakauslehti 6–7/1977, pp. 419–420.
continued to publish articles on guerrilla-related issues, without taking confrontational positions.872

Like trade magazines, guerrilla-type activities were discussed in several articles in literature. In addition to many creditable contributions, for example, by Major Niilo Palmén and Lieutenant General Ermei Kanninen, articles published by Major Teo Haapajärvi, Lieutenant Colonel Juhani Ruutu, Major Ilkka Ilmola and Major Heikki Kalpamaa deserve a special mention.873

In 1969, Lieutenant Colonel Juhani Ruutu published an article on territorial defence in Jalkaväen vuosikirja, which was written in plain language and was very fundamental in tone. In a sub-chapter entitled Sissisodankäynnistä alueellisen puolustuksen osana (‘On the role of guerrilla war in local defence’), Ruutu provided an excellent account of the Finnish view of the nature and targets of guerrilla war. Ruutu referred to an article entitled Sissitoiminnasta ja sissikoulutuksesta (‘On guerrilla-type activities and training’), published by Major Teo Haapajärvi a year before in the same publication, with a focus on guerrilla tactics. Both articles sought to clarify the means available to guerrilla-type activities from the perspective of the art of war. However, the key observation and message made by the authors were directed not only at the general public but also the leadership of the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard. While guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities were playing an increasingly important role in local defence, their development and the necessary skills required that substantial resources were channelled to the training of the reserves. The focus in training needed to be immediately shifted from fieldcraft to tactics, the method of fighting and the use of available equipment.874 Major Ilkka Ilmola addressed the same issue in an article that was published in 1977 in a book. When assessing (the capacity of the Finnish defence system), the effect of local force guerrilla activities on the combat of a brigade


should not be forgotten. A strong local defence supported by guerrilla troops would open up opportu-
nities to even insufficiently equipped general forces.  

Published in 1977, the 50-year history of the Army Combat School was the first
publication to introduce the content of the *Sissitoimintaopas* (‘Guidebook on guerrilla-
type activities’), published in 1979, to a wider audience. The author of the article,
Major Heikki Kalpamaa, had acquainted himself with the guerrilla-type activities
conducted by a company and a platoon over a period of several years, and had led
the background research into and the writing of the guerrilla handbook while serv-
ing in the Karelia Brigade and the Army Combat School. Kalpamaa’s article miti-
gates the conflict between Paakkinen and Koppinen regarding the relationship be-
tween the dispersed and concerted method of fighting.  

In line with the principles of ter-
ritorial combat, the guerrilla-type activities of general and local forces are closely linked to all the
phases of a battle. The dispersed and concerted method of fighting are not mutually exclusive; ra-
ther, using both appropriately, the maximum benefit can be reaped out of the combat of a platoon
or a company. Being the officer responsible for the compilation of the Guidebook
for guerrilla-type activities, Kalpamaa played an important role in dispelling and re-
moving misunderstanding about guerrilla-type activities and territorial combat.

Dozens of studies produced at the military schools also addressed the problems as-
sociated with guerrilla-type activities in guerrilla warfare and territorial combat. Per-
haps the most analytical synthesis of the many and diverse strategic aspects of guer-
illa warfare was thesis prepared by Captain Esa Seppänen at the National General
Staff College, which he expanded to a book and published under the title of *Sissisota
– aikamme sota* (‘Guerrilla war – the war of our time’) in 1971. Another study that
critically analysed the suitability of guerrilla warfare for Finnish conditions was im-
portant from a Finnish perspective. Captain Arto Eronen argued in his study, pre-
pared on a staff officer course, that the experiences from guerrilla wars across the
globe in the 1960s and 1970s were important for Finns, even though no plans were
made to engage civilians in resistance.

Eronen focused on those aspects of guerrilla-type activities that addressed the prac-
ticability of the art of war from the Finnish perspective.  

*Under our territorial defence system, we will be prepared to slow down and cause attrition to the enemy through guerrilla opera-
tions carried out by the local forces left behind in the enemy’s rear, to stabilise the situation, defeat the enemy and annihilate the invader through the delaying, defensive and offensive operations of the general forces. The supply of local forces engaged in guerrilla-type activities will need to be initially*

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876 Kalpamaa (1977), pp. 261–274. See also Kalpamaa, Jarmo Heikki Artturi, an extract from per-
sonal details, no 67474, KA.
877 Ibid.
878 Seppänen (1971). Seppänen, Esa: *Indokiinan ja Algerian sissisodat ja niistä saadut kokonukset* (‘Guer-
rilla wars in Indochina and Algeria and the experiences gained from them’), a thesis prepared at the
National General Staff College in 1965, SKK 1/862, KA.
879 Eronen (1978), 1/1270, pp. 21–22, T 26077/Hi 83, KA.
based on caches created during the preparatory phase. The role of civilians in the support system, as I see it, remains undefined.' In other words, Eronen directed bold criticism at the practical implementation of the concept, which was undoubtedly one of the fundamental questions of guerrilla war – the status of the civilian population both in guerrilla warfare and in guerrilla-type activities. Aside from the studies published by Seppänänen and Eronen, very few of the studies representing the different course levels of the military schools addressed total guerrilla war over the course of the 1970s; instead, they largely focused on guerrilla-type activities.

Confusion regarding tactical concepts typical of the era may explain in part why the military schools made their students increasingly prepare studies focused on guerrilla-type activities. Thus, research led by the military schools from the late 1960s until the early 1980s can be said to have had a clear effect on the concepts of and descriptions regarding guerrilla-type activities. Especially students on the courses of the Army Combat School prepared a great number of studies on guerrilla-type activities. What was interesting was that most study subjects related to guerrilla-type activities between 1966 and 1970 were directly assigned to the military schools by then chief of the Frontier Guard, Lieutenant General Veikko Koppinen. He also participated in the direction and assessment of several studies. Timewise, most studies addressing the issue were prepared between 1967 and 1979, which was a period when practically all staff officer or infantry captain courses produced studies related to guerrilla-type activities. It can also be assumed that theses produced by students during those years were used in the updating process of the guidebook on guerrilla-type activities.

As the number of studies on guerrilla-type activities produced was strikingly large compared with the previous years, from the mid-1970s onwards in particular, the question can be raised as to who proposed such topics to the Army Combat School. The colourful metaphors and headings used also raise a similar question. It would appear that the ideas and research topics that were hidden in a drawer which were proposed by Veikko Koppinen, who had served at the school in the 1950s, had seen the light of day and had been assigned to student officers. As the connection is rather obvious, this riddle was possible to solve by studying the list of teachers who had served the Army Combat School. Major Risto Koppinen, Veikko Koppinen's son, served at the school between 1974 and 1978. After Veikko Koppinen had retired from the chief's post at the Frontier Guard in 1970, systematic research on guerrilla-type activities was continued in part by his son Risto Koppinen, particularly between 1974 and 1978. Once again, although indirectly, Veikko Koppinen exerted influence on research and development on guerrilla-type activities. What is particularly striking is that on captain course 49, arranged in 1976, guerrilla-type activities were an independent topic alongside tactics, leadership and history. This can also be explained in part by the fact that Risto Koppinen served at the Army Combat School. Risto Koppinen also confirmed in a telephone interview that his father had suggested a number of ideas and topics for student work. All of this confirms

881 See, for example, a list of studies prepared on captain course 49, T 26077/Hi66–Hi68, KA.
that Veikko Koppinen played a major role in the development of Finnish guerrilla tactics as late as the 1970s and 1980s.\footnote{See the lists of studies prepared on the staff officer and captain courses arranged by the Army Combat School between 1967 and 1979, T 26077, KA. Risto Koppinen, Veikko Koppinen’s son, taught at the Army Combat School between 1974 and 1978, guiding the preparations of several studies on guerrilla-type activities. Koppinen, Risto: a telephone interview on 2 March 2009.}

Judged by the studies produced by the above mentioned student officers, operations by special troops were included in guerrilla-type activities and large-scale guerrilla warfare. Paralysing utilities vital to belligerents, such as electricity and tap water using the means of guerrilla tactics was one of the key objectives of special troops. Propaganda and psychological operations were considered to be a time-honoured part of guerrilla-type activities and special troops alike. Partly for these reasons, operations targeting special troops were defined in Finland to be the foundation of anti-guerrilla operations.\footnote{Liikola, Juha-Pekka: Urban Guerrilla Warfare, Guerrilla Warfare An Asymmetric Option, Helsinki 2002, pp. 206–207. Eronen (1978), 1/1270, p. 5, T 26077/Hi 83, KA.} The use of helicopters as a basic requirement for successful guerrilla-type activities was also discussed. For Finland, this meant that there was a concrete need for creating sufficient airborne capacity for special troops.\footnote{Hietavalkama (1964), T 26077/1/43, Hi22, KA. Puolustuslaatoksen kehittäminen 1960-luvulla (‘The development of the Defence Forces in the 1960s’), (1962), p. 31.}

According to student officers and others who had familiarised themselves with the issue, Finland prepared both for guerrilla warfare waged alongside regular operations and for real guerrilla war in the 1950s and 1960s. The conclusions drawn over the course of the 1970s, guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities waged in support of conventional operations were regarded to have an indisputable significance, one whose deterrent effect could not or would not be denied even in the face of technological development. Studies carried out at the military schools did not accept a full-blown guerrilla war to be the Finnish solution to the defence problem; rather, there was an understanding, slowly gaining ground at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s, stating that guerrilla-type activities were the preferred solution that guided decision-making towards integrating guerrilla-type activities into territorial combat.\footnote{However, this did exclude developing guerrilla-type activities as part of territorial defence. Ruutu, Juhani: An interview on 8 June 2006. Eronen (1978), 1/1270, T 26077/Hi 83, KA.} Although such a decision referred, realistically speaking, to what was termed a poor man’s doctrine, studies also found that guerrilla-type activities were practically the only way to respond to the prevalent threat scenarios using the resources available to defending Finland. The Finns hoped that this conclusion – which resembled a decision – would be noticed on a general level, particularly in the Soviet Union, conveying a message that Finland possessed a capacity, albeit a limited one because the country was inferior in technology and materiel, to defend itself against an invader using all available means.

Studies prepared at the National General Staff College argued that any potential invader would avoid being tied up by guerrilla-type activities launched by the defender. Thus, guerrilla-type activities were seen to be practically the only means available to Finland to ensure continued dogged resistance, even if vital areas of the country had been lost due to the country having been subjected to a large-scale invasion or
a capture attack. By the 1970s, mechanised troops of great powers, small in numerical strength and undergoing constant modernisation, possessed limited opportunities to launch large-scale counter measures or anti-guerrilla operations. On the other hand, excellent protection, mobility, firepower including that provided by helicopters, and a night-vision capability were assets against guerrilla-type activities.886

Guerrilla troops and practical training in guerrilla tactics at units in the late 1970s

By the late 1970s, it was evident that the Defence Forces needed to react on the problems brought about by continuous development. The size of the age classes of conscripts, each smaller than the previous one, caused problems in the maintenance of the establishment chart and wartime placement of men. Following changes in the military capability of great powers, the treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the stationing of cruise missiles in Europe, Finland needed to draw its own conclusions. The accelerated development of military technology in particular was understood to cause unavoidable changes to Finnish the art of war and, through it, operational skills tactics. Keeping pace with the changes was an issue that needed urgent attention in order to avoid problems related to the maintenance of defensive capability from becoming untenable. Impacts extended in real time to the delicate equilibrium between national sovereignty and credible defence.887

The altered situation had a direct impact on the peacetime training of guerrilla jaeger troops and the principles of the use of such troops at war. According to a policy definition issued by the General Headquarters, guerrilla troops were divided into guerrilla jaeger battalions of the general forces and into special units with a guerrilla training that were part of the local forces. Guerrilla jaeger battalions were to be used in wartime along the enemy’s principle routes of advance, as well as deep in the enemy’s rear – dozens of kilometres behind enemy lines. In normal cases, guerrilla jaeger battalions in the reserve of the High Command were to be used under direct control of the military province or, alternatively, under the command of an army corps for concerted guerrilla-type activities aimed at destroying important targets in the enemy’s rear and for occupying a certain road or a point of terrain for a specific period of time to provide support to battles conducted on the ‘front line’. In more unusual situations, a guerrilla jaeger battalion could be split into smaller units which were then to operate under the headquarters of the military district in the enemy’s rear.888

888 PE:n no. 169/Optsto/Daa sal/1.3.1974 liitteenen, T 25767/Da 1 sal, KA.
Gerrilla jaeger troops that were part of the local forces — guerrilla jaeger battalions and the companies of special battalions — were to be used principally for dispersed guerrilla operations along the enemy’s routes of advance, ensuring that such operations would cover the entire country. In practice, large areas in sparsely populated regions remained in which only an insufficient number of guerrilla jaeger troops could be formed. When the planners considered the fact that at certain stages of guerrilla-type activities specific points of terrain needed to be designated at which the weight of the operations would be directed, it became clear that some troops intended for guerrilla operations were unsuitable for inclusion in the local forces. Troops that could be transported when necessary from one area to another were also needed. The average age of the local troops, even in units with the best performance, was approximately 30 to 35 years, which was considered too high for guerrilla-type activities. By the 1980s, calculations showed, according to the General Headquarters, that the decreasing proportion of the younger age classes in the reserve also decreased the proportion of troops with the best performance. Therefore, lowering the average age of the local forces, or even some portions of their reserve, was impossible in practice. \(^889\)

As there was no direct way to affect the decreasing trend in the size of the age classes, the General Headquarters proposed that the Defence Forces needed to improve the materiel performance and preparedness for forming troops. In September 1975, Major General Aapo Savolainen, the quartermaster, drafted an expert opinion on the current situation for the second Parliamentary Defence Committee (PPK II), summing up the wide-reaching recuperations of the issue. ‘Our performance will be gauged by the number of troops that we are able to form and their level of equipment, but even more than that, it will be gauged by the assessments that exist of our defensive capability. Our conditions and our defence system do not require us to have the most expensive military technology; the Defence Forces will be able to fulfil their duties using moderately priced equipment. Our problem is to lead outside powers to believe that our capability to defend our territory is an economic problem, not a military one. However, being economic, this problem can be solved. The Defence Forces believe that this problem can be solved, thereby making our capability to prevent war an increasingly realistic factor.’ \(^890\)

By the 1970s, the peacetime training of troops suitable for guerrilla-type activities was at a satisfactory or better level both at the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard. By the early 1970s, the Frontier Guards had a well-established training system which produced around 900 men each year for placement in the reserve of guerrilla jaeger battalions. The number of conscripts annually trained by the Frontier Guards had settled at somewhat less than 1,000 men by the early 1970s. The number trained by the Defence Forces was approximately at the same level, around 1,000 men. The General Headquarters calculated that the guerrilla jaeger battalions in the reserve would achieve their nominal strengths by 1975. However, what caused problems was the training of reservists for the special troops in the organisation of the local forces, as their number in the establishment chart was considerably larger. ‘The guiding principle is that men trained for placement in certain units should be called up

\(^{889}\) Ibid.
\(^{890}\) PE:n no. 542/Opstto/Daa sal/25.9.1975, T 25767/Da 1 sal, KA.
for service from the area of the military province that will form the unit in question. ‘This, however, has proved to be a difficult requirement to meet at the units providing training.’

In the 1970s, the Lapland Jaeger Battalion (LapJP), the Kainuu Brigade (KaiPr), the Karelia Jaeger Battalion (KarJP) and the Karelia Brigade (KarPr) provided basic training in guerrilla-type activities. All of the above-mentioned units had one company specialising in training in guerrilla-type activities, and at least the reserve NCO schools at KaiPr, KarPr and KarJP had one similar platoon. Furthermore, one of the units at the Reserve Officer School trained guerrilla officers, including officer candidates from the Frontier Guard. Matti Mikkonen, who served at the Karelia Brigade between 1971 and 1984, recalled the training provided in guerrilla-type activities in the 1970s. Mikkonen reported that such training at the Karelia Brigade began in 1970. Training principles for guerrilla-type activities were created under the direction of 1st Lieutenant Heikki Kalpamaa, commander of the 3rd company, who had joined the brigade after having served at the Parachute Jaeger School. Kalpamaa, who was promoted to captain in 1971, drafted customised training instructions for guerrilla-type activities in collaboration with the instructors of his company. Kalpamaa and his staff used the 1956 *Sissikoulutusopas* (‘Handbook in guerrilla training’), but as its content was already outdated, the foundations of guerrilla training were largely based on the training plans that Heikki Kalpamaa had taken with him from the Parachute Jaeger School.

Mikkonen recalls that training in the skills necessary for a guerrilla jaeger was initiated by providing individual fighters with personal skills. During the special training period, the skills of the trainees were provided with personal survival skills in nature, special equipment, working with mines, traversing the terrain in summer and winter, and deception. During the troop training period, the focus was on training guerrilla jaegers to operate as a squad, providing them with skills in traversing terrain as a squad under different conditions, preparing a battle position, using Claymore-type mines, acting properly in a battle position and in an area designated for deception operations, and acting appropriately in the area designated for accommodation and resupply. In other words, approximately 60 per cent of guerrilla training was focused on dispersed activities, and 40 per cent on concerted operations. Mikkonen’s unit voluntarily developed training, without any direction from the outside. All in all, the training provided was efficient and held in high esteem, not only at the Karelia Brigade but also outside. Between 1971 and 1983, a large number of delegations visited the Karelia Brigade, where guerrilla-type activities and the special training of guerrilla jaegers was demonstrated to both Finnish and foreign visitors. In the 1970s, peacetime training in guerrilla-type activities were provided along similar lines at the Kainuu Brigade, where the level of training was brought to a high level between 1971 and 1976.

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891 PE:n no. 169/Optsto/Daa sal/1.3.1974 liitteineen, T 25767/Da 1 sal, KA.
893 Mikkonen, Matti: An interview 1 November 2013. See also Kalpamaa, Jarmo Heikki Artturi, an extract from personal details, no. 67474, KA.
894 Mikkonen, Matti: An interview 1 November 2013.
The training system of the Defence Forces in the mid-1970s enabled the training of practically all guerrilla jaeger troops. Only the training of guerrilla jaegers for the archipelago was considered a problem. The number of conscripts trained each year was considered sufficient in principle, as it covered the need for the reserve of the local troops to be trained for guerrilla-type activities. By contrast, the calculations indicated that the annual number of conscripts trained by the Frontier Guard was insufficient to enable the forming of the troops in the establishment chart, necessitating the covering of the shortfall with the reservists trained by the Defence Forces. Therefore, it was concluded in 1975 that there were no grounds for changing the guerrilla jaeger training system of the Defence Forces to produce reservists solely for guerrilla jaeger battalions or to train troops for guerrilla-type activities in the archipelago. For this reason, the development efforts were directed at stepping up the effectiveness of the existing system. In practical terms this translated into making the selection process of conscripts assigned to guerrilla training more effective, assigning the Parachute Jaeger School a role of a unifier of practices in guerrilla training, and increasing collaboration between the guerrilla jaeger companies and echelons of command at the Frontier Guard. This was accompanied by the drafting of the guidebooks and regulations on which guerrilla jaeger training was based and regulations and delivering them to the units.896

Surveys indicated that the regulations on which training at the guerrilla jaeger units of the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard was based did not exist or had become outdated by the mid-1970s. Captain Heikki Kalpamaa, who had gained a profound familiarity with this issue, wrote as follows in his thesis regarding the lack of manuals and regulations: ‘A guerrilla training manual that covers the basic skills and combat techniques of an individual guerrilla jaeger, a squad and a platoon is seen as the most important handbook. In addition, a regulation or tactical guidelines covering the operating principles and tactics of a guerrilla jaeger battalion and company engaged in combat within the framework of a military province and formations are probably also needed.’897

Matti Mikkonen, who served at the Karelia Brigade, also considered the requirements set for guerrilla training to be relatively exacting, as a great number of conscripts did not meet the requirements for being placed in guerrilla jaeger troops of the army reserve. The biggest problem was the poor physical condition of many conscripts, which necessitated separate selection of conscripts from each age group for guerrilla training. With regard to the attrition during training and the continued decrease in the size of the age groups, the focus needed to be shifted from quantity to quality. According to Mikkonen, not even the commander of the 3rd company participated in the placement of conscripts in their wartime units; instead, this was performed by the mobilisation staff at the brigade headquarters. Therefore, the staff of the training unit did not know with full certainty the percentage of conscripts that were ultimately placed in wartime units or their units, although there was a great deal of guessing going on among the instructors.898

896 Kalpamaa (1975), pp. 66–68, SKK 1/1186/sal, KA.
897 Ibid, pp. 65–66. See also KaiPr:n no.tta Havainnot kantabenkilökunnan sissikoulutuksen opetus-tilaisuudesta Kajaanissa 21.–23.4.1975 (‘Observations on a training event arranged for professional officers and NCOs in Kajaani between 21 and 23 April 1975’); Ermei Kanninen, copies of and original documents in the possession of the author of this thesis.
898 Mikkonen, Matti: An interview on 1 November 2013.
Although the equipment of the units providing training in guerrilla-type activities was generally good, that of the wartime troops had serious shortcomings. In practical terms this meant that many guerrilla jaeger battalions or special companies of the local forces lacked radio equipment, ammunition, disposable grenade launchers and means of transport. Attack rifles, Claymore-type mines, skis and pulks alone did not provide the defensive capability required by long-term guerrilla-type activities.\(^9^n\)

The General Headquarters recognised the extent of the problem in 1975, attempting to make the political decision-makers understand the gravity of the issue. \textit{In repelling an attack, the ground forces play a major role. Despite materiel shortages, the ground forces have the prerequisites for repelling a surprise attack, as concentrating materiel and operations enable combat within a limited period of time. However, our current defence capacity does not enable defensive battles of several months in duration, which would be necessary should a surprise attack develop into a large-scale invasion. In such situations we might be caught in a guerrilla war for which we have limited resources and which, by virtue of its very nature, would cause untold suffering to the entire population.}\(^9^n\)

One attempt to solve the problem of increasingly smaller age groups and the shortage of wartime materiel was a programme drafted by the General Headquarters between 1976 and 1977, entitled \textit{the programme for the development of the army peacetime organisation}, better known by its abbreviation MARO in Finnish military jargon. While the most significant changes brought about by MARO touched on the organisation of the Defence Forces, it was also affected by many other aspects of the defence, including training and operational and tactical issues. In particular, continuous development and the renewal of war equipment required changes to be made to guidelines covering tactics and combat techniques. According to MARO, the need for reforms was also driven by the increase in the number of refresher exercises, the need to strengthen the defence of Lapland, reforms affecting the civilian educational system, the need to train conscripts instead of assigning them to various details, changes to legislation governing working hours at the Defence Forces, the increased training needs of the professional officers and NCOs, the shortage of personnel in Finland partially caused by UN peacekeeping missions, and arrangements for barracks premises and exercise areas at garrisons. The order to implement MARO at the Defence Forces was issued on 23 November 1977.\(^9^n\)

In practice, this order became effective on 1 October 1979, after a delay of two years, at which date the names of infantry and jaeger companies at units were changed to\textit{ guerrilla jaeger companies}.\(^9^n\)

It was hardly a coincidence that Major Ilkka Ilmola published a highly analytical article in the annual book entitled \textit{Tiede ja Ase} at a time when MARO was published. Ilmola’s article, entitled \textit{Operaatiotaidon ja taktiikan kehitysnäkökulmat 1980-luvulle} (‘The trends in the operational skills and tactics in the 1980s’) provided several guidelines and ideas for development regarding the above-mentioned issues, without ignoring


\(^{900}\) PE:n no. 542/Optsto/Daa sal/25.9.1975, T 25767/Da 1 sal, KA.


\(^{902}\) For example, the name of the 3rd Company of the Karelia Brigade and the 2nd Company of the Kainuu Brigade was changed to be Guerrilla Company as of 1 October 1979. Mikkonen, Matti: An interview on 1 November 2013. See also Iskanius (2012), p. 269.
guerrilla-type activities. The proper order of priority in all development work, and particularly in changes that pervade the entire defence system, must always be observed to prevent any ill-advised decisions to be taken. In the first phase, a doctrine is developed, followed by tactics and the organisation as the last piece of the puzzle. Rapid technical development at a time when MARO was being implemented created a risk of ruining the tried and tested order in which development was being carried out. With regard to the prospects of guerrilla-type activities, Ilmola had the following to say: ‘No country has designated guerrilla-type activities as the primary means of combat for their local forces. The direction in which our operational skills and tactics should be developed within the scope of the territorial defence system is largely based on the performance of our brigades. When assessing the performance, the impact of guerrilla-type activities on the combat carried out by the brigade should not be forgotten.’

While all of this was clear in theory, the practical implementation of the measures required sizeable action. Changing the instructions for conscripts’ tactical training and the content of the operational skills of the military schools alone required large-scale and long-term projects. In addition, any changes would have required extensive modifications to regulations and guidebooks or, at least, necessitated their partial renewal. The concepts and the basic principals of guerrilla-type activities evolved slowly, gaining an established position in the Finnish defensive principles, at a theoretical level at least, over the course of the 1970s. Thus, the prevalent thinking during the Cold War on the use of guerrilla-type activities served the most important purpose of such activities; that is, to create a deterrent to a possible invader.

5.2. Guidebook clarifies theory and practice of guerrilla-type activities

For the reasons listed above, *Sissitoimintaopas* (‘Guidebook on guerrilla-type activities’), completed in 1979, can be regarded as the definite breakthrough or, rather, a culmination of the Finnish guerrilla tactics and method of fighting. Originally, the drafting of the guidebook was intended to begin in the early 1970s, as the first indications of this date back to 1972 and 1973. For reasons that remain unclear, the writing and compilation of this handbook was protracted over several years. Due to regulations and limitations governing confidentiality, some of the details relating to the delay are as yet unclear. Some explanations behind this were perhaps partial or large shortcomings in the principles of territorial combat, and the impact of Brigade 80 and other experimental compositions under development at the time on the regulations being rewritten. On the other hand, the writing process itself, problems associated with guerrilla-type activities and Finland’s difficult political position may have had an impact on the drawn-out process and the prudent content content of the guidebook. After all, this guidebook was to replace the 1956 *Sisikoulutusopas*.

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904 Paakkinen, Juhani: An interview via correspondence in March and April 2007.
905 Mikkonen, Matti: An interview on 1 November 2013.
Following an order issued by the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, a writing work group for *Sisustointoimintatapases* was set up in early 1976. Major Heikki Kalpamaa, who at the time served as the mobilisation officer at the Karelia Brigade, was ordered to assume responsibility for the writing and compilation of the guidebook. Kalpamaa was well-suited for the task, as he had gained profound familiarity with guerrilla-style activities having served at the Parachute Jaeger School between 1965 and 1970 and at the Karelia Brigade as the commander of the 3rd company between 1970 and 1972. At the National General Staff College he had written his thesis on guerrilla-type activities. Major Kalpamaa (KarPr and TaistK) invited Captain Eero Hattunen (KaiPr), Captain Pertti Keränen (KarJP) and 1st Lieutenant Matti Mikkonen (KarPr) to join the work groups as its other members. All members of the groups had either served or were serving at the time of the writing of the guidebook at their units in tasks related to training in guerrilla-type activities.

In addition to training instructions used by army units, material for the guidebook was obtained from the Frontier Guard, the National General Staff College, the Army Combat School and the Parachute Jaeger School. The work group worked on the guidebook alongside their regular duties between 1976 and 1978. The group convened at review and writing meetings which were normally held in Helsinki every two months or so. At the meetings of the work group, its chair Major Kalpamaa assigned group members tasks to experiment with the guerrilla activity plans that the group had drafted in connection with conscript training and combat exercises in the group members’ units. This enabled the practical testing of the tactical solutions to be included in the guidebook, regarding both dispersed and concerted guerrilla operations, before the guidebook was published. The troops of the Kainuu Brigade conducted experimental exercises in 1976 and 1977 at the Vuosanka training area. The themes of the exercises, approximately 8 to 10 days in duration, were "combat techniques in dispersed and concerted operations and shooting exercises with live ammunition in a situation that simulated a guerrilla operation."
Parallel to the compilation of the guidebook, an extensive survey on the requirements to be set for medical care in guerrilla operations was carried out. On 13 February 1978, the chief of the General Headquarters had set up a separate work group tasked with defining the need for medical care in guerrilla-type activities, principles for its use and the way medical personnel should be within the framework of a frontier guard battalion or a battalion assigned to a guerrilla operation. The work group was also to prepare a proposal for medical equipment and material for use by guerrilla troops. This work group was chaired by Medical Lieutenant Colonel Seppo Tikka (PE), its secretary was Major Kari Suvanto (HKoulK), and members Major Heikki Kalpamaa (PE Op-os), Medical major Matti Aro (PE), 1st Lieutenant Matti Mikkonen (KarPr), with Major Juhani Paakkinen (RvLE) serving as an external expert. The work groups completed its report on 7 June 1979, in other words, after Sissiopas has already been published. The survey found that ‘the most important troops under the control of a military province must include hidden military hospitals that are used as hospital-like medical care units by those military districts that are immediately engaged in combat.’ The work group proposed that medical platoons be included in the organisation of military districts. Another proposal by the work group recommended that the preparedness of separate battalions and frontier guard troops to provide first aid should be enhanced by introducing extra medical NCOs and by providing men with additional first-aid training. In practice, the draft for the survey translated into chapter IV, entitled ‘Sissitoiminnan lääkintähuolto’ (‘Medical care in guerrilla-type activities’), in the Guidebook on guerrilla-type activities.

After the work group for the guidebook on guerrilla-type activities had completed its work in summer 1978, it fell on Kalpamaa to compile and write the final version of the guidebook. Sissitoimintaopas was completed in November 1978, and was approved, after a review round, by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces for use by the troops on 2 May 1979. The key objective of Sissitoimintaopas was to link theory of guerrilla tactics to practical training and strengthen the position and significance of guerrilla-type activities in territorial combat. While the foreword of this guidebook stated that local forces are principally used for guerrilla-type activities, general forces must also be capable of engaging in this method of fighting. According to this guidebook, the various methods and techniques of fighting used in guerrilla-type activities aimed to inflict casualties to the enemy forces, destroy their materiel and hamper their opportunities to use specific areas. Training in guerrilla tactics was to be provided to all conscripts so that they would be able to handle themselves in basic situations, both as individual fighters and as members of a squad. Thus, Sissitoimintaopas can be said to have influenced Finland’s entire defence system, permeating the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard irrespective of the branch.

914 Sissitoimintaopas, (Sissit-opas) (‘Guidebook on guerrilla-type activities’) (‘Guerrilla jaegers guidebook’), Helsinki 1979, p. 11.
As *Sissitoimintaopas* was organised in a manner that enabled detailed discussion of tactics and as it was very thorough – as most regulations are – it also consolidated the concepts related to guerrilla-type activities. It clearly described all tactical and other details related to combat techniques, including any interfaces to the broad field of warfare. The language that the book used to explain tactics, the concepts it employed and the definitions that it drew from such concepts were exceptionally detailed. Thus, it can be concluded that a great number of hours had been spent on the book. The key concept, naturally, was guerrilla-type activities, which this guidebook defined as follows: ‘Guerrilla-type activities play a key role in and they have a vital significance for territorial combat. While local forces are principally committed to guerrilla-type activities, the units, or parts of units, of the general forces must also be capable of engaging in such operations. Often based on preparations made in advance, guerrilla-type activities largely comprise dispersed operations or combat operations carried out by small units of the local forces in areas penetrated by the enemy. In such areas, other units of the local and general forces also operate, tasked with continuing fighting in specified locations or holding certain points of terrain. Supporting this kind of fighting, guerrilla-type activities are linked to the various phases of territorial combat and the duration and scope of battle. The various methods and techniques of fighting used in guerrilla-type activities inflict casualties on the enemy forces, destroy their materiel and hamper their opportunities to use specific areas. The methods used must be varied and an unexpected, cunning and active approach must be emphasised.’

*Sissitoimintaopas* clarified the concepts related to tactics and the method of fighting, while making a clear distinction between concerted and dispersed combat.

Putting the territorial guerrilla-type activities and their methods of fighting to use as prescribed by *Sissitoimintaopas* was a long-term process and presented challenges in many fields. The decisions in principle regarding the defence system, the revised family of regulations and the training instructions sought to ensure that the training system would give every conscript at least the basic knowledge and skills in guerrilla-type activities. According to plans, the actual training for reservists’ duties in their wartime units, including further training in guerrilla tactics, was intended to be given at refresher training. This approach engendered wide-spread enthusiasm for guerrilla-type activities among many peacetime troops. Ermei Kanninen has noted that it was easy to motivate men for guerrilla training as it aroused interest especially among reservists, including further development, based on imagination, on the tactical level and in combat techniques. Among reservists, this wide-spread enthusiasm led to voluntary training, which, before the annulment of the chapters of the 1947 peace treaty which limited Finland’s armament, was illegal. This indicates that guerrilla-type activities had become generally accepted and that engaging in activities with a link to guerrilla tactics had even become a hobby of sorts among reservists of the field army.

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915 Ibid.
Experimental exercises in guerrilla-type activities within the scope of military areas in the early 1980s

An interesting, highly significant and, at the same time, the last experiment during Finland’s independence regarding the suitability of guerrilla-type activities for territorial combat was carried out in 1980 and 1982 when two exercises intertwined with each other were arranged. The Infantry Division and Operations Division of the General Headquarters had been planning experimental exercised within the framework of a military area since January 1979. According to the proposal put forth by the General Headquarters, the focus of experimental exercises were to be shifted to one major exercise scheduled for late summer 1980. One of the reasons for the rescheduling of the experimental exercise for 1980 was the study on medical care in guerrilla-type activities, unfinished at the time, which had been assigned to a specific work group.

The chief of the General Headquarters approved the general outline of the first exercise and its principal objectives on 16 January 1979. After this, the chief of General Headquarters approved the exercise, following the proposal of the chief of training and education the exercise, which was to be arranged in August 1980. The exercise was primarily justified by the need to test the tactics prescribed by the 1979 Guidebook on guerrilla-type activities in practice. According to the order issued for the implementation of the exercise named *Elokuu-80* (‘August 80’), this exercise sought to examine the tactics and combat techniques of guerrilla-type activities used in local defence within the framework of a military area. This was achieved by testing ‘the functionality of the Guidebook on guerrilla-type activities, and the principles, orders and instructions prescribed by the draft for the Local Defence Instruction in practice.’ The principal target of experimentation was to examine the provision of supplies to the military area, with the secondary target being the use of horses and improvised means of transport for/material and for evacuating the wounded and the overall arrangements for medical care from the point of wounding to a concealed hospital. The exercises also sought to test the functioning of concealed hospitals and medical equipment intended for guerrilla-type activities in practice. A draft for a guidebook entitled *Luonnnonmuonaohjeen luonnos* (‘Draft for a guidebook on foods available in nature’) and its methods for survival in nature on wild plants and game. Behind all of this there was also a need to familiarise professional officers, NCOs and conscripts

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with guerrilla and anti-guerrilla operations. It should be mentioned that *Sotilaspiirin paikallispulastusohje* (*Instruction for local defence by a military area*) had been sent in a draft stage for a review round in February 1980; consequently, the General Headquarters wanted to include its principles in the test objectives of the exercise. Within the scope of the exercise, operations launched by a military area were divided into three methods of combat: battle against the enemy’s spearhead, harassment of traffic on roads, and ambushes and attacks. Major General Reimo Viita, the inspector of the infantry, was appointed the leader of the *Elokuu-80* exercise. He was also tasked with producing comprehensive reports and analysing the results. Lieutenant Colonel Heikki Koskelo, the chief of the Infantry Division of the General Headquarters, acted as the deputy of the exerciser's leader. Furthermore, the deputy commander and logistics commander of the Karelia Jaeger Battalion, as well as officers from the Central Finland Signal Battalion and the Karelia Air Command, were appointed as leaders of the exercise. The troops proper in the exercise were gathered from the Savo-Karelia Military Province, the Logistics School, the Central Finland Signal Battalion, the Reconnaissance Air Squadron, the Transport Squadron, and the North Karelia Frontier Guard. The total strength of the troops participating in the exercise was 827, along with 107 vehicles and other equipment. The exercise itself was arranged following considerable preparations between 11 and 23 August 1980 in North Karelia, in an area limited by Rautavaara–Hankamäki–Säyneinen–Luikonlahti–Juua–Valtimo.

According to the report drafted on *Elokuu-80*, an exercise conducted under summer conditions, it progressed by and large as planned. The basic arrangements for guerrilla-type activities within the framework of a military area were found to be up to date, functional, well-suited for Finnish conditions and generally accepted by the personnel. However, the report found that guerrilla-type activities conducted under the command of a military area were not efficient enough, even under the most favourable conditions – this was the key problem. In this context, efficiency referred to a capability to inflict losses on the enemy’s personnel and materiel that were substantial enough in order to force it to slow down its advance significantly, tie up its troops in the rear areas and, possibly, change its method of fighting. Another key problem identified by the report was the fact that the number of troops available compared to the tasks of the military area, as prescribed by regulations, was insufficient, particularly in view of the sheer size of the operational area. The concerted use of the troops under the control of a military area even using units the size of a platoon also proved non-functional.

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920 PE:n no. 1010/Hn/ETS/28.7.1980 (*Sotilasalueen sisätoimintaharjoitus Elokuu-80, toimenpanokäsky*) (*Elokuu-80, an exercise in guerrilla-type activities within the framework of a military area, an order for the implementation of the exercise*), T 25993/Hn 2, KA. See also *Sotilaspiirin paikallispulastusohjeen luonnos* (*A draft for the instruction for local defence by a military area*), 1980. *Luonnonomoijen luonnos* (*Guidebook on foods available in nature*), 1980.

921 PE:n no. 725/Ddc/21.2.1980 (A request for statements: *Sotilaspiirin paikallispulastusohjeen luonnos* (*A draft for the instruction for local defence by a military area*), T 25993/Hn 2 es, KA.


923 Ibid.
The summary of the guerrilla-type activities conducted under the leadership of a military area presented the challenges and strengths of the era. The impact on the invader of guerrilla-type activities employed in the exercise did not meet all the requirements set for them. This problem was particularly pronounced in combat against the invader’s spearhead. Using a dispersed method of fighting, the exercise troops of the military area managed to slow down the advance of the enemy’s forward elements along major roads only to a degree. By contrast, the basic arrangements of the military area provided fairly good opportunities for harassing traffic on roads. Yet another problem was the fact that the arrangements available at the time did not provide adequate opportunities for repelling counter-guerrilla activities launched by the enemy. A general observation was that the operational principles, including various measurements and timelines prescribed by the guidebook on guerrilla-type activities, held true in most cases. These very same principles were replicated in a draft for the instruction for local defence, which was proposed to become a tactical overall regulation for the military areas.924

After the first experimental exercise in late 1980, all the material on the exercise was submitted to the Infantry Office of the General Headquarters. A very thorough account of the exercise was compiled and presented not only to the Operations Division of the General Headquarters but also to the top military leadership, including the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. He also visited the Elokuu-80 exercise, taking a decision during his visit that a corresponding exercise needed to be arranged under winter conditions. The experiences gained from this large-scale experimental exercise were positive, providing more results than originally expected and leading to a decision to begin without delay preparations for a similar exercise under winter conditions.925 On 4 March 1981, the chief of the General Headquarters approved, on proposal by the chief of training and education, a plan to rearrange the exercise using identical targets, arrangements and operational areas. This exercise was scheduled for the period 1 to 13 March 1982.926

On the basis of the Elokuu-80 exercise and on other experiences gained from the operations of local forces, research was launched by the General Staff for developing grounds for the Maaliskuu-82 (‘March 82’) exercise. In connection with the development of local forces, conducted under the leadership of the General Staff, an order was issued in 1981 on additional grounds for the forthcoming experimental exercise, the most important of which were experimental troop compositions and new training situations. In the same connection, the first phase of the exercise was prolonged by one day.927 A preliminary order regarding the exercise was issued in

924 Ibid. See also PE:n no. 1699/Daa/ETS/19.12.1980 (Lausunto Sotilaspiirin paikallispalautustoimen luoressa) (‘A statement regarding the draft for the instruction for a local defence by a military area’), T 25993/Hn 2, KA.
925 PE:n no. 151/Optsto/Daa sal/13.2.1981, T 25767/Da 3 sal, KA.
March 1981,\footnote{928} Major General Raimo Katona, the new inspector of the infantry, received orders to act as the leader of \textit{Maaliskuu-82} (‘March 82’), while Lieutenant Colonel Heikki Koskelo, the chief of the Infantry Office of the General Headquarters, acted again as the deputy leader of the exercise. The total strength of the troops participating in the exercise was 1,200, with 180 vehicles and other equipment.\footnote{929}

While the experimental objectives of the \textit{Maaliskuu-82} exercise, carried out in winter conditions, were identical to those of the previous exercise, the special area of interest constituted the challenging weather conditions. The report prepared on the exercise noted that guerrilla-type activities carried out by the military area had developed following the experiences gained from the \textit{Elokuu-80} exercise. The key development areas were the need to simplify and clarify the tasks that guerrilla-type activities involved and to organise the troops of a military area in compositions required by their tasks. According to the conclusions drawn, the military area was capable of fulfilling its guerrilla-type activities. When battling the enemy’s spearhead, the troops of the military area managed to inflict substantial casualties on the enemy and slow down its advance. Initially, substantial losses were inflicted on the enemy when harassing traffic on roads. After the enemy launched anti-guerrilla operations, harassment became less effective. The military area was able to step up its operations through ambushes and attacks. Like the \textit{Elokuu-80} exercise, the \textit{Maaliskuu-82} exercises also confirmed that the operational principles presented by \textit{Sissitoimintaopas} were well suited for winter conditions. Results from experimentation and conclusions drawn from them provided important guidelines for the development for future needs. The prerequisites created for the \textit{Maaliskuu-82} exercise and experiences gained from it provided a solid foundation for the process in which the draft of \textit{Soti-laspiirin paikallispolustustoehjeen luonnos} (‘Draft for the Local Defence Instruction’) was given its final form as a regulation.\footnote{930}

Thus, it can be said with justification that the exercises described above, coupled with research and experimentation, played a major role in the development of guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla tactics as late as the first few years of the 1980s. While the accounts, research reports conclusions regarding the two exercises found a number of development areas, they also noted many strengths. The exercises also gave rise to several proposals for further development in tactics, the method of fighting, combat techniques, troop compositions, and equipment.\footnote{931}

Research and development around the concept of ‘Battalion 80’, and the revision of the organisation of the local forces, related to the revision of the organisation of the wartime ground forces scheduled for completion by 1985, lay in part behind the tar-
gets set for the Elokuu-80 and Maaliskuu-82 exercises. This background was partly inspired by close collaboration between the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard, which was related to the maintenance and development of the defence capability, as well as the capability of the Frontier Guards to take up large-scale guerrilla-type activities when necessary.932 Research and development sought to remove the most pressing shortcomings regarding the equipment of Battalion 80 and address any flaws detected in the experimental organisation. The major issues regarding tactics addressed by R&D were the following: battalion in attack and defence; its capability to mount counter-attacks; troops’ resilience under fire; reconnaissance; operations under the cover of darkness; ability to traverse terrain; ability to take advantage of the cover offered by terrain; ability to conceal operations; anti-tank capability; and any needs to revise the organisation and its war materiel. In connections with this, the development needs regarding the brigade and Battalion 90 were raised, with special attention being paid to delaying tactics.933 In autumn 1981, a memorandum drafted by the Operations Division of the General Headquarters noted that 'Our current doctrine had been found to be sound and will remain unchanged in broad outline. However, the changing nature of war requires that any developments in combat techniques are taken into consideration. Our troops must be capable of mounting active operations even under changed conditions. Our tactics and operational skills are already on a par with this, but our organisation and war materiel are not."934

Most importantly, many of the initiatives for development were implemented – yet always in an insufficient or incomplete form due to insufficient resources. Perhaps the most important of these were related to the composition of troops, their equipment and tactical principles. Thus, the pattern of experimentation established by the Guerrilla Tactics Committee was continued along tried and tested lines. Although the simulation of combat and war has always been difficult, experimental exercises pushed to the limit were regarded as highly important in the Finland of the 1980s.

5.3. A summary of the developments in guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities between 1967 and 1983

From the very beginning, the Frontier Guard adopted Sissitoimintaopas (‘Guidebook on guerrilla-type activities’), using it as a basic guideline for training. Although the training in guerrilla-type activities provided to their regular personnel and conscripts by the different Frontier Guards and, particularly, the Frontier Guard Academy, was based on several internal directives, they nevertheless followed the concepts, tactics and spirit presented by Sissitoimintaopas. After all, the Frontier Guard was charged with the task of training 25,000 men for the needs of the wartime cadre troops and the covering force. In the 1980s, joint exercises between the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard were continued, albeit on a smaller scale. Being based on wartime troop compositions, such exercises also helped to standardise guerrilla-type activities

932 PE:n no. 158/Dbc sal/11.2.1980, T 25767/Dbc 1 sal, KA.
after all, the troops trained by the Frontier Guard for the wartime reserve would have been committed, in a real situation, to guerrilla-type activities under the command of the various military areas. Such tactics depended on the fact that guerrilla jaegers were well trained and possessed a very good command of local conditions. Young men living in the border regions provided natural material for such training, and, at least in the early 1980s such men needed no motivation to join up.935

The significance of a territorial defence system in the defence of the entire country had become generally understood by the 1980s, following long and systematic work. Following experiences gained from many sources and developments in warfare, the art of war, military techniques, operational skills and tactics, the Finnish defence system achieved national approval. However, the practical implementation of this system took a long time. The fundamental principle was to divide the country into areas representing varying levels of responsibility, each with their operational tasks and plans. This development was driven by the clarity of the *Sissitoinmintaopas* guidebook and the training instructions for tactics, which were completely revised. The faith in a fighting method based on guerrilla-type activities was increased by the possibility of using older war material alongside inexpensive but efficient mines. The additional efficiency of guerrilla-type activities was lent by a developmental process, which began in the 1970s and made light anti-tank weapons and shoulder-to-air missiles an everyman’s weapon. The importance of the above-mentioned weapon systems increased in guerrilla-type activities in early 1980s. The opportunities to use light anti-aircraft weapons, particularly against helicopters and reconnaissance drones, contributed to the relevance of guerrilla-type activities.936

The third Parliamentary Defence Committee, which functioned between 1980 and 1981, noted in its report that the international situation had deteriorated since the 1970s and that the threat of nuclear weapons being used had increased somewhat. The report of the committee focused on the importance of having arrangements in place for a period when the threat of war was imminent, the materiel situation of the ground forces, and the fact that the gaps in the preparedness of the Defence Forces needed addressing in order to bring the national defence onto a par with the requirements set by modern war. With regard to the military doctrine, the report also exhibited interesting trends. The report also took a position in the crisis management mechanism of the Defence Forces, long debated and long under developed, proposing that the composition of and the principles of use of the covering force be altered. Inevitably, such changes brought at least indirect repercussions for guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla tactics. Particularly the development of territorial defence regarding the structure of the ground forces, their equipment and tactics caused guerrilla-type activities to adopt an increasingly modern battle doctrine. The emphasis on flexible preparedness and fighting capability, prevention of a surprise attack and denial of the use of Finnish territory, steadfast defensive battle, and the development of combat by operational (mobile) formations were all directly linked to the


936 Paakkinen, Juhani: An interview through correspondence in March and April 2007.
operational and tactical role of guerrilla-type activities within the framework of territorial defence.\textsuperscript{937}

Following changes to the threat scenario, guerrilla-type activities were increasingly viewed from a new kind of angle. Following increasingly determined development work, the key issues concerning the kind of guerrilla-type activities to be carried out and identifying the areas in Finland where such actions should be carried out were brought to the forefront. Would the tactical goals of guerrilla-type activities have been better realised in the forests of remote regions, in population centres, or in areas designated to be the strategically important areas? In a crisis situation, urban centres were expected to be devoid of civilian population, which gave rise to reconsidering guerrilla war as an option supported by the people. It was also realised that as the army would initiate combat at the border, maintaining the fighting capacity of the guerrilla troops which slowed down the enemy’s spearhead for later combat would present challenges. Where conventional troops had enough time to receive the enemy’s assault, guerrilla troops needed to be spared for the harassment of the enemy’s supply lines, thereby ensuring the continuity of combat.\textsuperscript{938}

With regard to guerrilla-type activities, developments in the military doctrine and its interfaces with the operational skills and tactics were well in accordance with the internal and external requirements in the early 1980s, but their implementation lagged behind due to insufficient appropriation. Increased requirements to have the capability to prevent limited attacks inevitably led to needs to develop the Defence Forces in a more flexible direction that put the emphasis on the operational ability. As the defence of Northern Finland received more importance, several formations capable of mobile operations were needed, in addition to troops capable of guerrilla-type activities. Work began to develop the training and equipment of such formations in a direction that brought them closer to modern requirements. Despite the increasing importance of technology, a decision was taken to develop the defensive doctrine around continued universal conscription. Only a system based on universal conscription was judged to be able to produce a sufficient number of troops to defend the entire Finnish territory.\textsuperscript{939} Maintenance of defensive capacity dimensioned for the prevalent situation and preparedness to repel a full-scale invasion using all available means became the guiding principle of national defence in the early 1980s. On an operational level, guerrilla-type activities, being an unconventional

\textsuperscript{937} Kolmannen parlamentaarisen puolustuskomitean mietintö, Komitean mietintö (‘Report by the third Parliamentary Defence Committee, the Report by the Committee’), 1981:1. See also Visuri (1985), pp. 198–207.


\textsuperscript{939} PE:n no. 438/Op-os/Daa sal/15.5.1980, liitteineen, T 25767/Da 3 sal, KA. As an example of the continued development work, an operational study prepared by the Jaeger Brigade in the early 1980 can be mentioned. This study was entitled ‘The future war and its nature in Lapland the operational and tactical principles and methods to be used in Lapland under the region’s special conditions when applying the various methods of fighting (including guerrilla-type activities), broken down by operation, tactics, and the impact of Lapland’s special conditions on troop composition and equipment.’ See JPr:n no. 116/Da sal/1.6.1984, T 25767/Hj 1 sal, KA.
method of fighting but part of conventional warfare, continued to be perfectly in line with this principal decision.940

Changes in the Finnish model for conducting guerrilla-type activities and their justifications can also be viewed from an international perspective. From a global perspective, modern guerrilla-type activities can be said to be a result of a process that lasted 150 to 200 years and that transformed to its current form, starting in the 1800s, largely under the influence of major developments in weapons technology. Developments in guerrilla-type activities, including concious efforts to develop it, are a sum total of the human self-preservation instinct, imagination and deft use of opportunities and the technology available. However, the basic principles of modern guerrilla warfare and its methods can be derived, almost without exception, from Mao’s thoughts on the war that he waged against the Japanese between 1937 and 1945. Mao’s principles for guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla tactics can be reduced to offensive guerrilla tactics, necessary for defensive warfare in which taking and holding the initiative was the key. From a Finnish perspective, it is understandable that guerrilla-type activities, as they were applied in Finland, began to be developed largely in the direction of a dispersed method of fighting in an effort to bring them into line with the modern developments. Dispersed across a large area and operating in unison, even small units from the local forces had the potential of tying up an enemy force larger than their own strength.941

However, the dispersed method of fighting used by the local forces does have, in a way, points of contact with the concerted method of using troops. Dispersed guerrilla jaeger troops, formed of the local forces, could be concentrated in important areas in order to provide support to a battle conducted by the general forces. After a concerted attack, guerrilla jaeger troops would have been committed to dispersed operations in order to slow down the enemy and to cause attrition. By the 1980s, guerrilla-type activities were not thought of as being a foolhardy endeavour by definition, one in which the defender, without the blink of an eye, engaged in confrontations with an enemy that was superior in strength with complete disregard of casualties. Finnish guerrilla-type activities began to be increasingly characterised by caution typical of guerrilla warfare in the international context, in which self-preservation and caution derived from the realisation that one was inferior in strength played a major role. It should be emphasised in this context that this attitude had nothing to do with cowardice; rather, it just took realistic account of the unavoidable facts, such as the defender being inferior in strength against mechanised enemy units.942

Colonel Juhani Paakkinen, whose views were more cynical than those of most other officers of the era, recalled that while the developments in the 1980s were rich in ideas, they were also passive in their implementation.  ‘Due to scant appropriation, the tactical implementation of guerrilla-type activities became increasingly a dispersed activity in which

940 See, for example, Visuri (1985), pp. 226–229.
942 Paakkinen, Juhani: An interview conducted via correspondence in March and April 2007.
individual fighters were laying in ambush, holding a wire to trigger a Claymore-type mine in their hands. While this perhaps represented a versatile theory, its practical representation was rather rigid and, often, passive,’ Paakkinen argued that that imagination and a struggle for surprise effect in Finnish guerrilla-type activities had begun to disappear from Finnish thinking in the 1980s, compared to the golden age of the era between the 1950s and 1970s. Despite well-meant plans, requirements and development programmes, the real nature of Finnish guerrilla-type activities were in the process of being ousted by other developments in military technology and techniques.943

943 Ibid.
6. THE WANING OF GUERRILLA-TYPE ACTIVITIES IN THE FINNISH ART OF WAR

By the 2000s, guerrilla-type activities had been abandoned.

Work on the development of national defence continued over the course of the 1980s based on the principle of territorial defence, with particular attention being paid to the capability to repel a surprise attack directed at Southern Finland. By the 1980s, the territorial defence system, being based on long and systematic work, had become regarded as generally well-functioning. Following experiences gained from many sources and developments in warfare, the art of war, military techniques, operational skills and tactics, the Finnish defence system achieved national approval. However, it took a long time before it was implemented on the level of operational plans. Finland’s principles regarding the country’s strategic defence and its operational planning had, since the introduction of territorial defence, been based on a threat scenario which covered both a surprise attack and a large-scale invasion. Starting from the 1980s, the threat scenario in which nuclear weapons were used against Finland was gradually phased out, based on reasons that such a scenario was regarded as unlikely and, in any event, impossible to ward off by military means.

Starting from the 1980s, requirements to develop the troop composition of the local forces, their equipment and tactics contributed to the adoption of a more modern battle doctrine. An emphasis placed on flexible preparedness, fighting capacity, prevention of a surprise attack, capability to deny the enemy the use of Finnish territory, concerted defensive battle, and the development of combat conducted by operational formations were all reflected in the needs that sought to change the principles of territorial defence. For counter-attack operations, an armoured brigade and jaeger brigades transported by off-road vehicles were developed; provisions were made to use these formations across the entire Finnish territory in areas where the concentration of forces was deemed necessary. However, with military technology becoming increasingly expensive, the Defence Forces only had the resources to equip part of the large reserve of the ground forces with means of transport that offered true mobility. The lack of mobile troops accentuated the capability to adjust the level of preparedness in a flexible manner and to concentrate troops in specific areas if defence preparedness needed to be raised.

In the early 1990s, major changes took place in the world. As the world order of the Cold War era began to dissolve, and as the negotiations on German unification made progress over the course of spring 1990, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to assess the relevance of the military restrictions stipulated by the Paris Peace Treaty (1947) and the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. In particular, the restrictions on military national defence, dictated by the Soviet Union, and the regulations imposed on Finland in the aftermath of the Second World War were no longer in line with the altered situation. When the German Unification Agreement was signed, the Finnish national leadership took a bold but necessary decision to reassess the military chapters of the Paris Peace Treaty, annulling them unilaterally. When Mikhail Gorbachev, the President of the Soviet Union, resigned...
on 25 December 1991, announcing that the Soviet Union had been dissolved, a portion of the bilateral agreements and, by extension, their military restrictions imposed on Finland, were also annulled.

The dependence of modern warfare on technology had reached such proportions by the mid-1990s that armies worldwide needed to make choices regarding performance and the development of the art of war. An examination of the approaches to foreign and defence policy adopted by Finland in the 1990s, and an investigation into the Finnish security and defence policy reports, the first of which had been prepared in 1995, reveal that adapting Finland’s defence to the new conditions was regarded as a key target. When the threat scenario based on a surprise attack was abandoned and replaced by a model founded on repelling a strategic strike, clear repercussions were felt in the Finnish art of war. At the same time; Finland gained the opportunity to take advantage of the surplus materiel of the dissolved Warsaw Pact by acquiring a large number of second-hand weapons. The purchase of defence materiel from the former East Germany significantly enhanced the performance of the ground forces, particularly in view of the diminished threat of a military invasion.

Following developments in military technology and changes in the threat scenario, theoretical and practical development of guerrilla-type activities were slowly being displaced by other developments. The most visible evidence of the waning of guerrilla-type activities is the fact that guerrilla-type activities as a concept and a method of fighting began to play an increasingly minor role in Finnish tactics at the turn of the millennium, to be phased out completely from the regulations between 2003 and 2006. While the phasing out of guerrilla-type activities and tactics from the Finnish art of war was associated with a number of practical factors, justifications that appear somewhat emotional were also involved. The basic reason behind the abandonment of guerrilla-type activities was the gradual removal of guerrilla jaeger troops, guerrilla jaeger companies and separate battalions in most cases, from the establishment chart. By the 2010s, Finland’s altered international status, the dissolution of the Soviet Union followed by a drastically changed notion of Finland’s neutrality, and some other factors contributed to the emergence of a situation in which national defence did not need to be similar to that of the decades from the 1950s to the 1970s. Starting from early 1990, the responsibility for training troops in guerrilla-type activities, as a form of fighting, had been increasingly shifted to the peacetime Frontier Guard organisation.

According to the Finnish security and defence policy reports, prepared at three to four year intervals starting from 1995, Finland’s national defence continues to be based on a territorial defence system, even in the 2010s. It should also be borne in mind that Finnish society has radically changed over the past few decades. The decrease in the size of certain age groups, working careers becoming longer, increased international contacts and the marginalisation of some people, to name just a few factors, have also played a role, albeit an indirect one, in national defence. The Defence Forces constitute part of society, and they need to reflect the changes and adapt to new phenomena.
The Defence Revision Committee, Parliamentary Defence Committees, and Finnish security and defence policy reports have played a key role in the formulation of Finland’s defence doctrine and the art of war. By issuing policy statements regarding the defence policy, the president of the republic has also affected the content Finland’s defence doctrine. The top leadership of the Defence Forces have acted in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief. By contrast, the sub-level of the doctrine – the combat doctrine of troops – was developed almost solely within the Defence Forces. Public debate on its grounds and options has been minimal compared to that in Central Europe and Sweden, for example. While the Finnish battle doctrine of the ground forces has largely met the requirements set for it by developments outside Finland and Finland’s own strategic doctrine, the lack of public discussion and political interest may have played a role in the granting of appropriation.

A prerequisite for the development of the defence system and its evolution, including the associated art of war, is the fact that the issues are generally recognised as being worthy of examination. The Finnish art of war and tactics are known for their versatility, dynamism and distinctively Finnish nature. Historically, the predominant feature of the Finnish art of war has been its flexibility and capability to meet the requirements of the prevailing conditions. The trajectory of the Finnish art of war indicates that the operational skills and tactics of each era were adapted to the approved doctrine on defence policy and the defence system. The same is true of guerrilla-type activities and their being part of the Finnish art of war.

The territorial defence system with its special features regarding the art of war has proved functional, effective and adaptable. This governing principle continues to be valid for the arrangements in place for national defence in the 2010s, although the thinking on the nature of territorial defence is undergoing a change. The dispersed and concerted method of fighting, part of the tradition of guerrilla-type activities, also continues to play an important role in this reform. The method of fighting of the ground forces for the 2010s requires that increased attention be paid to the opportunities available to coordination in training and the principles of use of operational, territorial and local troops.

The extensive development of the territorial defence system that Finland adopted during the Cold War includes those features which largely explain the direction in which the Defence Forces and the ground forces are being developed. Guerrilla-type activities and unconventional forms of fighting, as areas of study, continue to be highly topical in the 2010s, despite their long historical perspective. For example, the recently revised fighting method of the ground forces – which is part of the Finnish art of war undergoing constant change – contains a great many elements taken from the repertoire of combat methods of guerrilla jaegers. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the territorial defence system in its full extent is a result of a long development process and, as such, it will never be fully completed. Therefore, the large defence reform and other reforms undertaken in the 2010s can be regarded as a natural continuum, an evolutionary phase in the development of the territorial defence system.
Terrorism, which made its entrance on the international scene over the course of the 2000s has increasingly come to be associated with the methods and tactics of guerrilla warfare. Although this involves two separate issues, from the perspective of the art of war, their set of available resources is identical. As terror strikes have grown in strength and sophistication, the imaginative innovations they have exhibited have superseded the rigid thinking patterns of anti-terrorism authorities. As a new phenomenon and threat scenario, global cyber warfare – attacks against communications and energy networks and the protections in place to counter such attacks – have emerged and have been equated with the use of armed force within the context of the art of war. Using simple means, cyber warfare can be used to cause serious damage to the entire infrastructure of information society, possibly leading to substantial economic damage and even loss of human life. It appears that the modern cyber guerrillas have surpassed the pain threshold of the world. They are being attacked on all fronts. The time has come for action rather than words, unlike the Cold War era. In this war, the doctrine of traditional anti-guerrilla operations stands supreme: isolate the enemy, cut his supply lines, relentlessly hunt him down, and destroy him. The important goal is to cut funding to guerrillas and block their access to weapons of mass destruction. In theory, this is a simple issue, but as long as guerrillas, cyber guerrillas and the resistance remain hidden, battling them will be difficult.

Although guerrilla-type activities and tactics have disappeared almost completely from magazine articles, regulations and the art of war, Finnish guerrilla-type activities and the experiences gained from them continue to play a certain role. While guerrilla-type activities no longer belong to the Finnish military doctrine in the 2010s, at least research and analytical examination on the issue should continue. Our tactics are lacking in activity and should be more unpredictable. The dispersed method of fighting continues to be based on a capability to create a sufficient impact and to deliver destructive firepower. The revised dispersed method of fighting that the ground forces recently put in place is well-suited for a territorial defence system. Geography and the Finnish national character are factors that contribute positively to this issue. Therefore, considering Finland’s conditions, research on the development of guerrilla-type activities can be presumed to continue to play a role in Finland. As long as the dispersed method of fighting raises the threshold to invade Finland, it not only significantly serves Finland’s national defence but also the country’s total security. No enemy wants to be bogged down in an unresolvable situation resembling that of Afghanistan in the 2010s.

In light of the above, while continued developments in the art of war can be approached from a number of angles, such research should be carried out exercising great care. After all, the means of guerrilla-type activities have been relegated to the category of undesirable concepts. When developing the Finnish art of war, careful consideration should first be given to the concepts used and the definition of the content of tactics encapsulated in such concepts. The key would be to concentrate on developing a descriptive content and operational procedures for the concepts undergoing a revision. Research on the art of war must, above all, be subject to systematic research methods. Research and experimentation must be carried out in a target-oriented way, and the results thus obtained must be subjected to analyses that
are comparable to similar analyses. Wartime organisation must be developed in line with the predicted nature of the future war and threat scenario. Training should be developed and geared towards forming a systematic whole which will produce a sufficient reserve for those areas where dispersed combat operations are deemed likely and possible. Although the work described above, with regard to research, has made good progress under the direction of the Land Combat Centre, work remains to be done for years to come.

From the perspective of the results and conclusions of this study, the obvious areas of further research on Finnish guerrilla-type activities relate to the period after the 1980s. As the regulations regarding the confidentiality of documents and source material dating from the more recent era are lifted, the overall picture formed by research can be complemented in many other respects. As broader research into the practical operating methods of guerrilla-type activities would make the synthesis provided by this study more accurate, a justified proposal can be made that such research be made the subject of further study at Finnish military schools, carried out in the form of thesis preparation by student officers. Another area for further research is the impact that external influences and the exchange of information has exerted on the Finnish art of war. In particular, the influences from neighbouring Sweden should be scrutinised more carefully. However, this will only be possible after the archives of the military intelligence become available to broader research use. Due to issues related to confidentiality, this may take several decades. Efforts must be taken to search for existing information, examine it, use it, and apply it when taking decisions that adapt the solutions available to national defence to Finnish conditions. If anything, this outlook is vital to the Finnish art of war. In short, research indicates that the Finnish art of war and considerable experience provided sufficient grounds for developing guerrilla-type activities.

The synthesis – guerrilla-type activities in the Finnish art of war

The key research problem of this study – how did guerrilla-type activities develop over time as part of the Finnish art of war – cannot be answered with a single word or sentence. With regard to the research problem of this study, a multi-faceted field of research is involved, the examination and deepening of which will require a great deal of longitudinal, cross-sectional and thematic research. The principal question can be answered by examining the cases that are associated with the review of the issue from a broader perspective. In equal measure, the role of guerrilla-type activities and their initial association with the Finnish art of war and, later, their development and becoming part of it, can be proved through investigation that takes the passage of time into account. However, the depth of study will depend on factors other than the events and phenomena related to the period under examination. The Finnish art of war and, by extension, Finnish guerrilla tactics – the means of guerrilla war – have often pivoted on a limited number of individuals, in most cases officers or other broad-minded soldiers with strongly-held personal convictions. With regard to the Finnish art of war, its developments have undoubtedly been influenced by the international art of war, threat scenarios, trends in tactics, theories in the art of war, developments in military technology and firepower, mobility and the human capability to learn through training. In addition to the qualitative factors listed above, quantita-
tive aspects have also played a role. On these grounds, we can attempt to answer the principal research problem of this study by forming a synthesis.

What was the history of guerrilla-type activities like before Finland became independent? Finland’s independence in 1917 and the following years and decades constitute the first research result of the research period. Over the centuries, guerrillas took a prominent position in Finnish lore. For example, the History of the Northern Peoples, authored by Olaus Magnus in the 16th century, contains many descriptions of the fighting methods employed by the Finns, with guerrilla-type activities taking a prominent position. Retaliatory raids into White Sea Karelia (‘Viena’ in Finnish), carried out by Ostrobothnian parties led by Pekka Antinpoika ‘Juho’ Vesainen in the 16th century, and similar stories are etched into Finnish collective memory. For centuries, Finland has set the stage for a struggle between East and West, providing a wealth of examples of war in which untouched swathes of wilderness have proved, almost without exception, advantageous for guerrillas. Thus, by the 20th century, there was an awareness in Finland of the Finnish foundations of guerrilla-type activities, and they were already known methods.

What kind of theories on guerrilla-type activities were formulated and what kind of form did they take in the Finnish art of war in the 1920s and 1930s? Research suggests that the War of Independence played only a minor role in the Finnish art of war. During the First World War, the art of war was heavily based on war of attrition in which artillery fire on a massive scale and fortification played a major role. The small size of the Finnish nation and its numerical inferiority forced theorists to emphasise mobility. Attack in particular was regarded as a means of shifting the balance of power in relation to the enemy superior in strength. In a way, the issue focused on the art of war of the inferior party, something that was ideally supplemented by guerrilla tactics, historically well-known in Finland with its many variations. The Finnish art of war was created in a situation where practically now indigenous traditions existed. Therefore, Finns were compelled to use the existing foundations for the art of war. The vacuum regarding the art of war was filled with influences and trends obtained from abroad.

The most influential was the strong German orientation, brought to Finland by the Jaegers, which contributed to the fact that three major forms of fighting were established in Finnish tactics. With the emphasis being based on offensive tactics and under the influence of other theories on the art of war, guerrilla-type activities became, in a way, a fourth form of fighting in Finnish tactics over the course of the 1920s and 1930s. Guerrilla-type activities adapted to Finnish conditions, capable of balancing the superiority in strength of the enemy, were regarded, in theory at least, equal to the classic forms of fighting. On the basis of this, theorists found it easy to base their views on guerrilla-type activities and theoretical opportunities available to their use.

Although the art of war regarding guerrilla-type activities was heavily based on theory, Finnish theorists understood, from the very beginning, that factors other than purely theoretical ones also played a role in their credibility. Therefore, the opportunities and practicability of guerrilla-type activities were tested in practice. Experiments involving Finnish conditions and terrain arranged over the course of the
1920s were the first steps on the path towards a modern art of war. The varied Finnish terrain, large wilderness areas, a landscape dominated by a dense tree and shrub cover, interspersed by waterways and swampland, was as if created for the various means of guerrilla tactics. Traps, ambushes, sabotage and hiding made Finland a difficult theatre of war for an enemy that was superior in strength.

Following theoretical analysis and practical experimentation during the first decades of Finnish independence, guerrilla-type activities in forested areas broken up by lakes and rivers and having few roads were developed into a form of fighting worth consideration in the art of war founded on Finnish traditions. Theoretical thinking on guerrilla-type activities changed over the course of the 1930s, developing along increasingly national lines and taking on new aspects. From being focused on destroying individual targets by troops operating in a concerted fashion, tactical thinking began to emphasise forms that were more comprehensive in nature and sought increased efficiency. By the end of the 1930s, guerrilla-type activities as a method of combat, took on – at least in theory – more systematic and established forms as an integral part of other operations. The trend was towards integrating guerrilla-type activities into operations conducted by an army corps or another formation.

How were guerrilla-type activities used in the wars between 1939 and 1944 and what kind of impact did the experiences gained from the wars have on the development of guerrilla-type activities during the postwar years? While theories developed during the first decades of Finland’s independence were realised to a varying degree in the Winter War, the considerable opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities and their place in the art of war became increasingly better understood. The most striking observation related to the importance of systematic training and clear instructions. During the war, there was no time to give troops a crash course in guerrilla-type activities, let alone form troops for demanding guerrilla operations, in particular when the drafting of uniform guidelines, despite solid theories, was still in its infancy. However, guerrilla-style activities carried out in the early phase of the Winter War on a limited scale proved the efficiency of such tactics. Where the shortage of troops and weapons was at its most severe, guerrilla-type activities provided an opportunity for success. Although patrolling and guerrilla-type activities carried out during the Winter War were not homogeneous in form, if viewed from the perspective of guidelines, they had great local significance. The concepts regarding guerrilla-type activities, with all their definitions, also developed along independent lines. Although such definitions were based on facts tested in practice, opinions about guerrilla-type activities characterising them as the most efficient method of fighting in Finnish conditions began to emerge during the Winter War. With regard to the terrain, guerrilla-type activities were found to be best suited to Ladoga Karelia and the areas further north.

However, from the perspective of the Finnish art of war, it should be noted that there were practically no examples of the impact of guerrilla-type activities on an enemy deploying armoured troops. Partly for this reason, the experiences gained from guerrilla-type activities were also very valuable in an international context. During the Interim Peace, development in guerrilla-type activities were extended to the reorganisation and training of troops. Reflections on guerrilla-type activities based on experiences gained from the war stepped up development efforts, directing them to priority areas. Therefore, experiences gained from the war were given an
importance that was at least equal to that of theory on warfare. Thus, development efforts in guerrilla-type activities had been given a more systematic foundation on which further development work could be built and the results of which were put to good use during the Continuation War.

In the early stages of the Continuation War, the Finnish army had no time, capability or desire to integrate guerrilla-type activities into its attack operations. As the frontal attack progressed at a rapid pace and as the planning of operations aimed at defeating the enemy using conventional tactics, guerrilla-type activities, which represented more defensive methods, were less suited for the field army’s tasks and targets. According to the assessment made at the time, the strengths of guerrilla-type activities were best served by sending long-range patrols to the rear area of the Soviet troops. Although long-range patrolling during the Continuation War was efficient, it cannot be equated with the concept of guerrilla-type activities. Long-range patrols were principally tasked with carrying out reconnaissance missions in the enemy’s rear and only secondarily with harassment and demolition, using the methods of guerrilla warfare. Long-range patrols were also under the direct control of the General Headquarters.

Guerrilla-type activities were the responsibility of the divisions. Army corps and other formations had free rein to conduct operations and make independent tactical decisions, leading to a varied deployment of guerrilla-style activities. For this reason, guerrilla-type activities linked to the operations of front-line units never developed into a systematic form of fighting during the Continuation War. An attempt by General Headquarters to intensify guerrilla-type activities by the divisions and to bring them under unified command under the code name Operation Forest Felling (‘Operaatio Metsänhakkuut’) failed. In places, the casualties of guerrilla operations were all too severe with regard to their objectives. The adversary also learned lessons about the Finnish art of war, enabling the Soviets to organise and intensify their partisan activities, which in turn forced the Finns to change the principles of their guerrilla-type activities. During the final phases of the Continuation War and in the Lapland War, guerrilla-type activities played a very minor role as the war operations progressed rapidly and as the Finnish army had lost initiative to the enemy, whereby opportunities for guerrilla tactics were practically nil.

The fact that the Continuation War had ended in late summer 1944 in victorious defensive battles taught the practitioners of the Finnish art of war an important lesson. Success factors of warfare include, as an essential part, the active control of the battlefield, the willingness to fight even when the enemy is superior in strength, and the effectiveness of unconventional methods. From the perspective of guerrilla-type activities, the key benefit gained from the Continuation War – as from the Winter War – was war and combat experience. However, as such, without an analysis, such experience was useless. This is why the lessons learned from war experiences were put to use only after careful analysis. It was only after the war, in discussions and in analysis of the war experiences, that efficiency of unconventional methods and opportunities available to their use in the Finnish art of war were confirmed. The attention of military experts was focused on the results and methods of guerrilla-type activities, including their influence on the combat against the enemy in a situation in
which the defender was inferior in strength. The summary of the conclusions is un-
ambiguous. Even before the Winter War, guerrilla-type activities had been regarded
as an efficient fighting method, and this notion was reinforced during the Continua-
tion War. Success in guerrilla-type activities in both wars was not based on opera-
tions carried out by guerrilla jaeger troops formed of volunteers, put through crash
training and issued with poor equipment. Experience had shown that successful
guerrilla-type activities, if they were to be integrated into other combat operations,
required systematic peacetime training, proper organisation, preparations, planning,
and unambiguous instructions.

Despite the fact that the war had ended and Finland had signed an interim peace
treaty, many in Finland, especially among the military leadership, were fearful of a
possibility of a renewed strategic strike by the Soviet Union. On the other hand,
measures to prepare for a repulsion of an attack, even hastily taken action, might
take on strategic aspects and constitute a preventive threat to the enemy. Dispersed
storage of weapons, carried out after the Continuation War had ended, known as
the weapons caching operation, demonstrated on the one hand the high level of the
Finnish art of war and, on the other, preparedness for guerrilla-type activities and
even guerrilla war if necessary. The weapons caching operation must be seen as a
preparatory measure for a guerrilla war which, if prolonged, would have instilled at
least momentary hope in a war-weary nation for avoiding a total occupation. After
the operation came to light in its full extent, the fast pace at which it had been car-
rried out and its highly systematic nature was widely marvelled at, although not open-
ly at the time. In other words, Finnish guerrilla-type activities were not just dead let-
ters on a piece of paper; they were a harsh reality for a great power enemy. Combin-
ing guerrilla-type activities with a resolute national character and a determination to
fight with all available means for the country’s independence, even under occupa-
tion, had delivered a strategic warning to the invader. There was a determination to
fight tooth and nail for Finland using all available means, including a guerrilla war
and even armed resistance by ordinary citizens.

Why was guerrilla warfare juxtaposed against guerrilla-type activities in the 1950s and why was
the option of guerrilla war gradually abandoned by the 1970s? After the war, Finland had
drifted into a difficult situation. The demobilisation of the wartime field army of half
a million men and the activities of the Control Commission that the Allies had set
up for Finland greatly hampered the development of the Defence Forces. In materi-
el terms, Finland’s defensive capability was good, but the treaties that Finland had
signed with the Soviet Union in the late 1940s gave rise to significant problems of
interpretation concerning the issue of the defence of the country. Preparations for
mobilisation and operational planning remained in a static state, and Finland was
forced to await a solution to the question of the surplus weapons for years. Howev-
er, these difficulties were overcome on the strength of a policy of acquiescence – at
least ostensibly – and plans that the military drafted in all secrecy. The question of
surplus weapons was resolved in a way that was advantageous for Finland. Opera-
tional planning, preparations for mobilisation and a number of other issues were
reinitiated in the early 1950s. However, the world had changed as the general notion
of war had changed, becoming more total in nature. With relations between the
great powers cooling, with the face of war changing from one fought on front lines
to something without definite fronts, with the mobility of troops improving at a rap-
id pace, and with the Finnish Defence Forces facing necessary structural changes, there was a definite need to transform the entire military foundation of the Finnish defences in order to enable Finnish defences to meet the prevalent conditions. With this change, guerrilla-type activities and taking advantage of the means available to guerrilla warfare were regarded as playing a major role.

In postwar Finland, a new kind of discussion about the opportunities available to guerrilla warfare began, shaking the very foundations of Finnish lore. Although guerrilla-type activities had proved to be an effective form of fighting, they were not sufficient to create a deterrent to mechanised troops and a great power enemy with a considerable firepower. Therefore, guerrilla war began to attract increased serious attention as an option for future wars. While guerrilla-type activities, which had been found effective, were not abandoned, the emphasis within the art of war was gradually shifting towards guerrilla war – the extreme form of national defence – over the course of the early years of the Cold War. Although the postwar principles governing guerrilla-type activities remained largely unchanged in the late 1950s, a conceptual shift towards guerrilla war that was more total in nature was clearly discernible.

Another reason behind the increased appreciation of guerrilla war was the realisation that Finland of the late 1950s and early 1960s, suffering from a shortage of materiel, would always be inferior in strength to the invader. Using unconventional methods such as systematic guerrilla war, it was thought possible to balance the relative strengths and to create a pre-emptive deterrent that would send a message to the invader that Finland would be defended with all available means. The ancient myth of David and Goliath had been resurrected. Continuous and credible development of guerrilla warfare was regarded as necessary, as otherwise it would remain a dead letter and a deterrent on paper only. Great importance was also placed on training, because it was only through training that the requirement set by the defence principle for all formations to adopt guerrilla-type activities would have been possible in practice. Every soldier needed to have the basic skills of the guerrilla jager – getting by in the field, taking advantage of the terrain and applying the requisite engineering skills. All Finnish conscripts needed to be trained in such basic guerrilla jager skills that would enable them to get by in a guerrilla war should the country face a surprise attack. Guerrilla-type activities also needed to be linked to other operations conducted by the army. This thinking exhibits clear parallels to experiences gained from China and Vietnam. The previous notion of assembling and training guerrilla jager troops and units after the onset of the war had finally, following failures, become history. However, the reform of the Finnish defence system and territorial defence were not solely based on guerrilla warfare or guerrilla-type activities. The development of the defence system was associated with a large number of challenges, the most notable of which culminated in the definition of tactical concepts and their content before their practical implementation.

The confusion regarding concepts, typical of the period, was also extended to drawing an unambiguous line between guerrilla war and guerrilla-type activities. However, concepts have never won wars, and there were other problems to solve. Although many had great faith in guerrilla war as a form of fighting, others were considerably less confident about its implementation. The educational level of the population was seen to play a major role in a guerrilla war. The significance of psy-
psychological warfare and the population’s will to defend the country were emphasised, based on experiences gained from Norway and its resistance movement during the Second World War.

Just like in the 1920s, thinking on guerrilla war was supported by strong personalities in the 1960s. The grounds for guerrilla warfare and an operational model for guerrilla jaegers proposed by Colonel Veikko Koppinen in the early 1960s were ahead of his time, to a degree that they gave rise more to doubts than approval. The gravest concerns about Koppinen’s ideas were related to the ability of small operational groups to fight in isolation, including their mental stamina, physical endurance and challenges to their chain of supply. The effectiveness of mine weaponry was also questioned, as there was only insufficient experience of Claymore-type mines available. The dispersed form of fighting and leadership of operations without radio equipment was justifiably raised as a key problem. Although Koppinen’s ideas were laughed at, they had enough substance to warrant a more detailed analysis.

How did the guerrilla-type activities with a decidedly Finnish character develop as part of a territorial defence solution during the Cold War period? The Guerrilla Tactics Committee, which functioned between 1961 and 1963, and the Research Group on Guerrilla Tactics, which was operational between 1964 and 1965, not forgetting several other workgroups that delved into the issue, formulated a solid foundation for territorial guerrilla activities, building on ideas put forth by Koppinen and engaging in systematic research and experimentation. By 1966 the Defence Forces had adopted an organisation based on military provinces, and the principle of guerrilla warfare and territorial combat had more or less been integrated into territorial defensive thinking. Guerrilla-type activities by local forces formed the backbone of territorial combat in a situation where guerrilla war was seen as the last resort to be taken up by all troops. However, it was only in the 1970s that the option of guerrilla war was abandoned and the focus shifted to developing guerrilla-type activities.

If the impact and content of the methods of guerrilla warfare and the Finnish art of war are to be summed up, it can be stated that despite the fact that the definitions varied, often down to the level of details, the core of guerrilla methods remained largely unchanged during the Cold War era. Guerrilla war, using military units, aimed to support, supplant or continue conventional military operations in enemy-held areas. Under the Finnish definition, soldiers, not civilians, were responsible for combat and armed operations. If the evacuation of civilians from the war zone proved impossible, guerrilla war would be reduced to unarmed resistance, particularly in population centres. Like guerrilla war, guerrilla-type activities aimed to support, supplant or continue conventional military operations. Starting from the 1960s, understanding territorial defence solely as a way of preparing for guerrilla war was also increasingly a misunderstanding based on false simplifications. The discrepancy between Finnish guerrilla-type activities and guerrilla war as it was understood in the international context was significant.

What was the history of concepts related to guerrilla-type activities and how did the Finnish concepts change during Finland’s independence? During the last millennium, as probably today, territorial combat and the principles of guerrilla-type activities in national defence referred to operations that cause attrition to the enemy, starting from the border us-
ing the various forms of guerrilla activities carried out by small guerrilla jaeger troops engaged in active combat. In the Finnish territorial defence system, the Finnish art of war would have manifested itself in part in the form of territorial combat using, among other things, guerrilla-type activities. This refers to combat conducted simultaneously in depth in order to slow down the enemy’s advance, to cause attrition to it, to stop its attack and, ultimately, to defeat or destroy it. The operational methods of territorial combat enable the disposition of troops in a relatively dispersed manner across most parts of the country taking advantage of prevailing conditions.

How did the development work on guerrilla-type activities influence the training in guerrilla-type activities given by the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard? The decisions taken by the end of the Cold War era integrated the methods of guerrilla warfare into the Finnish art of war. Whether termed guerrilla war, guerrilla warfare or guerrilla-type activities, the methods of guerrilla warfare were here to stay, and were integrated into the territorial defensive thinking and system. This was evidenced by the training plans drafted over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, training provided by the units of the Defence Forces and the Frontier Guard, and, in particular, guerrilla courses arranged by the Army Combat School. The role of the Frontier Guard in the development of guerrilla-type activities in the 1950s and the 1960s can be regarded as significant, and with justification. The culmination of guerrilla-type activities was the large-scale experimental exercises arranged in the early 1980s, in which guerrilla-type activities conducted within the framework of a military area and the arrangements of guerrilla training played the key role. The other piece of evidence is more pragmatic in nature. *Sissiopas* (‘Guidebook on guerrilla-type activities’), published in 1979, is still in force in the 2010s and is used in day-to-day training by the Defence Forces. This manual alone is evidence enough of the significance of guerrilla-type activities in the Finnish art of war.

How have theories proposed by individuals affected the development of Finnish guerrilla-type activities? During the early years of independent Finland, theoretical thinking on guerrilla-type activities and their development depended on the activity and vision of a handful of individuals. The first person to step into the shoes of a guerrilla war theoretician was General Karl Adaridi. A visionary and a trailblazer in theoretical thinking on the art of war, Adaridi brought the opportunities available to guerrilla-type activities to the attention of Finnish officers. While other authors active during the time can be singled out, Adaridi’s texts on guerrilla-type activities found a permanent place in the history of the Finnish art of war. During Finland’s wars, Colonel Valo Nihtilä, the chief of the Operations Division of the General Headquarters, emerged as an advocate of guerrilla-type activities. The analysis of war experiences vindicated his views and proposals highlighting the efficiency of guerrilla-type activities. Veikko Koppinen has often been characterised as a pioneer of Finnish guerrilla warfare during the postwar years. He was this, but principally in the role of one who proposed new ideas and acted as an innovative developer. Although the role of Finnish theoretician on guerrilla warfare during the Cold War years can be given to Veikko Koppinen, with justification, other individuals were also involved. Of them, Juhani Ruutu, Ermei Kanninen, Olavi Lopmeri, Paavo Ilmola, Väinö Volanen, Veikko Karhunen, Georg Ahonen, Juhani Paakkinen, Heikki Kalpamaa and Ari-Ilmaris Isakkala deserve a special mention, in equal manner. They, and numerous others, played an
important role in the development of the Finnish art of war, particularly in the area of guerrilla warfare and guerrilla-type activities.

**How have international trends influenced the development of the Finnish art of war?** In the art of war, examples gained from outside Finland further accentuated the significance of guerrillas. On the one hand, guerrilla operations in Indochina, Korea and Vietnam had proved their efficiency. On the other hand, helicopters and other operations by air had enabled the expansion of anti-guerrilla activities. However, what is noteworthy is that Vietnam appears to have been largely ignored in Finland. The sources available to this study suggest that the guerrilla war waged by the Vietnamese Liberation Movement and the People's Liberation Armed Forces of South Vietnam was not publicly noted to any appreciable extent in Finnish military planning. It is rather surprising that a popular revolutionary war and guerrilla war waged in the 1960s and 1970s that is most widely referred to in the international context did not play a more prominent role in discussions on guerrilla-type activities by the Defence Forces.

With regard to the pillars of the art of war, both the reach and rapidness of operations favoured guerrilla-type activities. Against the background described above, it was quite understandable that while guerrilla war was viewed as being feasible in Finnish conditions, it needed to be linked to other operations conducted by the Finnish ground forces. After all, the wars that Finland had waged had shown that it was perfectly possible that the entire country or portions of it could come under the threat of occupation. Fighting an enemy with a superior strength was possible using conventional means but, should Finland's defences collapse, the fight was to be continued using the methods of a guerrilla war.

During the Cold War years, the nature of the Finnish art of war was heavily based on activities tested in practice. The enemy had its own way of acting, and the Finns developed their national defence in their own way, adapting it to Finnish conditions. Military history had shown that the simulation of the methods of the superior party was all too frequently a recipe for disaster. This piece of wisdom also encapsulates the core of Finnish guerrilla-type activities and their scope of application. Despite
the numerous advantages granted by modern military technology, the guerrilla jaeger was required to possess excellent physical and mental stamina and a great deal of imagination, cunning and ingenuity.

The relative strengths will affect the duration and phases of a war. Prolongation is not an end in itself. Western countries that had been occupied had not fought a widespread popular war as the populations had not been prepared for it. In the West, war continues to be regarded as the business of the military, with attempts being made to protect the population from it. With the armed forces becoming increasingly professional, guerrilla war has become – and continues to be – a solution that is not an option for an industrialised nation. The Finnish art of war did not come to an end when the Cold War ended. Foresighted decision-makers and officers let the art of war live on by developing it in an innovative and target-oriented fashion towards the set objectives. Well-grounded planning based on research was preferred over stopgap solutions.
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Extracts from personal details, curricula vitae (KA)

Aaltonen, Reino Olavi, no. 36703.
Ahonen, Georg Aleksanteri, no. 55635.
Avela, Martti, no. 30515.
Huhtala, Vilho Olavi, no. 33380.
Ilmola, Paavo, no. 45233.
Järvinen, Y. A., no. 25164, KA.
Kaakinen, Olavi Aleksander, no. 55644.
Kalpamaa, Jarmo Heikki Artturi, no. 67474.
Kanninen, Ermi (Ermei), no. 58557.
Kare, Risto Ilmari, no. 37799.
Karhunen, Osmo Eino, no. 46324.
Karhunen, Veikko Evert, no. 37447.
Kontiopää, Björn Harald Wilhelm, no. 40903.
Koppinen, Veikko William, no. 55645.
Kuismanen, Ento Ensio, no. 26447.
Kytölä, Toivo Armas, no. 44471.
Lopmeri (former Meri), Arvi Olavi, no. 39725.
Matikainen, Ento Osvald, no. 51481.
Naapuri, Eero Johannes, no. 55699.
Olkkonen, Matti Juho (Hannes), no. 40651.
Paakkinen, Aarre Juhani, no. 82260.
Raappana, Erkki Johannes, no. 32877.
Ruutu, Kaarle Juhani, no. 55857.
Sauramo, Leo, no. 24328.
Savunen, Aatos Päiviö, no. 46375.
Setälä, Erkki Vilhelm, no. 53560.
Sihvo, Sami Seppo Ilmari, no. 71936.
Susi, Sulo Vilho, no. 44859.
Tapola, Kustaa Anders, no. 20739.
Vallimies, Terho Edvin, no. 53241.
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Sami Sihvo, copies of the collection in the possession of the author of this thesis.

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