

National Defence Academy of Latvia
Center for Security and Strategic Research

The Evolution of the Concept of Russian New Generation Warfare: Implications for European Security

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The background of the slide features a large, faint watermark of the NAA 1992 logo. The logo consists of a shield with a red field, a white vertical stripe, and a white banner across the middle containing three yellow stars. Above the shield is a white banner with the text 'NAA 1992'.

Hybrid Warfare

- Terminology debate
 - Hybrid Warfare (Hoffman/NATO)
 - Non-Linear Warfare (Galeotti from Surkov)
 - 4th Generation Warfare (Lind)
 - New Generation Warfare (Russia)





Hybrid Warfare

Hybrid Warfare (**Hoffman**):

Hybrid wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.

(Hoffman, FG (2007). *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.)

The background of the slide features a large, faint watermark of the NAA 1992 logo. The logo consists of a shield with a red background and a white border. Inside the shield, there is a white hand holding a white torch with a yellow flame. Above the hand, there are three yellow stars. The shield is topped with a white banner that contains the text "NAA 1992" in a stylized font. The shield is flanked by two white scroll-like elements.

Hybrid Warfare

It is a combination of:

- Conventional Military Operations
- Guerilla Warfare
- Terrorism

The background features a large, faint watermark of a shield-shaped logo. At the top of the shield, the letters 'NAA' are on the left and '1992' is on the right. The shield is divided vertically by a central element that resembles a hand holding a banner with three yellow stars. The shield's background is a light red or maroon color.

Hybrid Warfare

- It's still necessary to apply kinetic force:
 - No direct offensive involvement of an outside power
 - No political pressure
 - No economic tools
 - Limited role of media




Non-Linear Warfare

- Vladislav Surkov
- Fifth World War, the one where all fight against all.
- Kremlin plays with economic interests



4th Generation Warfare

- William S. Lind
- War of cultures, including non-state actors
- State loses the monopoly of violence





Russian Hybrid Warfare

“It is a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. It ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments.”

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CLIC PAPERS

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
OVERVIEW, DEFINITIONS, AND
POLICY CONCERNS

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Russian New Generation Warfare



- Low-Intensity Conflict
- Sixth Generation Warfare
- Network Centric Warfare
- Asymmetric Warfare

The background of the slide features a large, faint watermark of the National Association of Academies (NAA) logo. The logo is a shield-shaped emblem with a red background. At the top, a banner contains the text "NAA" on the left and "1992" on the right. The central part of the shield depicts a white hand holding a white scroll. On the scroll, there are three yellow stars. The shield is framed by a white border with decorative scrollwork at the top and bottom.

Low-Intensity Conflict

- Three main definitions
- LIC is a combination of various military and non-military concepts, often not precisely defined

Low-Intensity Conflict

Most theoreticians on LIC:

- 1) LIC is an integrated political-economic-military approach, supplemented by psychological, social and diplomatic devices. Conceptually it is primarily a political oriented and integrated policy approach containing military elements and not first military matter.
- 2) Relatively little military input. The aim is not military conquest, but social control...military may be employed as an element of struggle; Military is a tactical element of a strategic program; use of diplomatic and political means may be unlimited.
- 3) Most appropriate to the Third World.

Low-Intensity Conflict – 2nd Definition

LIC is a political-military confrontation, ranging from propaganda and subversion to the actual use of armed forces, between contending states or groups below the level of conventional war and above the level of routine, peaceful competition. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies (The Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military, 2001)

Low-Intensity Conflict – 2nd Definition

This definition reveals two important elements:

- 1) Civilian aspects are also being stressed
- 2) LIC is a term embracing many types of conflict

Low-Intensity Conflict - 3rd Definition


Main characteristics of low-intensity conflicts:

- 1) They tend to unfold in less developed parts of the world
- 2) Very rarely do they involve regular armies on both sides
- 3) Most LICs do not rely primarily on the high-technology weapons (Martin van Creveld, Transformation of War)



LIC in Ukraine

- Green men
- “Legitimate” Separatists
- Political referendum
- Psyops against security services (police, etc)
- Eastern Ukraine as consolidation operation for Crimea
- International infops to legitimize Russia’s interests



6th Generation Warfare

- General V. Slipchenko



6th Generation Warfare

First Generation of Modern War (1648-1860)

- Line and column tactics
- Formal and orderly battlefield
- Separation between “military” and “civilian”.

Second Generation

- To address the contradiction between the military culture and the disorderliness of the battlefield.
- Centrally-controlled firepower in synchrony with the infantry: the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.

6th Generation Warfare



Third Generation

- Blitzkrieg

Fourth Generation

- Cultures in conflict.
- The state loses the monopoly of violence and war
- Non-state adversaries (Lind 2004)



6th Generation Warfare

For the Russians

Fourth Generation

- Dispersion and communications that remove the battle front entirely (cultural/media attack and coordinated violent actions to and paralyze or collapse the enemy's political will, rather than seeking decisive combat)

5. Thermonuclear



6th Generation Warfare

"Informatization" of conventional warfare and the development of precision strike systems. High technology.

- Operation Desert Storm and Yugoslavia are the base
- Advanced conventional systems, which approach nuclear effects, blurring the line on nuclear deterrence.
- Non-contact Warfare
- High-Technology Non-Nuclear Weapons

6th Generation Warfare

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- Using precision strike weapons systems to make the massing of large forces as in a conventional war obsolete

Network-Centric Warfare

Network-centric warfare is a war in which the combat strength of a troop (force) grouping is increased thanks to the creation of an information-communication network that would link information (intelligence) sources, control bodies and means of destruction (suppression). This can be done by giving the participants in operations reliable and complete information about the situation practically in real time.

(Dulnev, Kovalyov, Ilyin, 2011)

Network-Centric Warfare




Fig. 2. Modular Structure of a Network-Centric Organization

Col. A. V. RASKIN, Doctor of Military Sciences, Col. V. S. PELYAK. ON NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE, 2005.

From divisions of between 15,000 and 20,000 men to basic combat elements of 3,000 - 5,000 men. Each brigade like this is in fact an autonomous combat module that can independently conduct combat operations.

Network-Centric Warfare



- First, the waging of a NCW requires forces organized on the networking principle, not the classical hierarchical principle, implying a high degree of their autonomy.
- Second, NCW is global. As a rule it will not be waged in a definite military-geographic area. Thanks to a network- centric organization of forces, it can be launched at any point on the globe where the clashing interests of conflicting parties reached the stage of armed struggle.

Network-Centric Warfare



- Third, the notions of battlefield and battle space are different in the NCW context. They come to include, in addition to traditional targets engaged by conventional weapons, targets found in the virtual sphere: emotions, figurative perception of reality, the adversary's state of mind, etc.

Network-Centric Warfare



- Fourth, it is impossible to conduct NCW in the absence of global communications links between forces that are geographically dispersed but which form a single network that makes it possible to dispose of the hierarchically organized command and control system
- Fifth, there is a change in the moral bounds of waging military operations. NCW may have no distinct state and national limits. At the same time, there is a dramatic growth in the proportion of nonmilitary tools of coercion: political, diplomatic, technological, informational, psychological and so on.

Network-Centric Warfare



- Sixth, the waging of NCW presupposes the abandonment of the classical hierarchical command and control system so long as horizontal links between elements of a network play a much greater role than the vertical in networking.

Network-Centric Warfare




Fig. 4. Stratified Model of Destructive Controlling the Enemy Network-Centric Organization

Asymmetric Warfare



We are to keep our eyes open on the plans and development trends of other countries' armed forces, and to know about their future developments. Quantity is not the end however. ... Our responses are to be based on intellectual superiority. They will be asymmetrical, and less cost.

V.V. Putin, 2006.





Asymmetric Warfare

Therefore...

War is deception. Best of all is to vanquish a foreign army without a fight.

Sun Tzu

Russia and Asymmetric Warfare

- Measures making the opponent apprehensive of the Russian Federation's intentions and responses
- Demonstration of the readiness and potentialities of the Russian Federation's groups of troops (forces) in a strategic area to repel an invasion with consequences unacceptable to the aggressor
- Actions by the troops (forces) to deter a potential enemy by guaranteed destruction of his most vulnerable military and other strategically important and potentially dangerous targets in order to persuade him that his attack is a hopeless case.

Russia and Asymmetric Warfare

- Impact of state-of-the-art highly effective weapons systems, including those based on new physical principles (remote versus contact)
- Widespread employment of indirect force, non-contact forms of commitment of troops (forces) and methods
- Seizing and holding enemy territory are not always needed, and are only undertaken if the benefits are greater than the “combat costs,” or if the end goals of a war cannot be achieved in any other way.

Russia and Asymmetric Warfare

- Information warfare is an independent form of struggle along with economic, political, ideological, diplomatic, and other forms.
- Information and psychological operations to weaken the enemy's military potential by other than armed force, by affecting his information flow processes, and by misleading and demoralizing the population and armed forces personnel

Russia and Asymmetric Warfare



- Significant damage to the enemy's economic potential, with its effect showing up at a later time
- A clear understanding by a potential adversary that military operations may turn into an environmental and sociopolitical catastrophe.

Traditional Military Methods

- Military action starts after strategic deployment (Declaration of War).
- Frontal clashes between large units consisting mostly of ground units.
- Defeat manpower, firepower, taking control of regions and borders to gain territorial control.
- Destruction of economic power and territorial annexation.
- Combat operations on land, air and sea.
- Management of troops by rigid hierarchy and governance.

New Military Methods

- Military action starts by groups of troops during peacetime (war is not declared at all).
- Non-contact clashes between highly maneuverable interspecific fighting groups.
- Annihilation of the enemy's military and economic power by short-time precise strikes in strategic military and civilian infrastructure.
- Massive use of high-precision weapons and special operations, robotics, and weapons that use new physical principles (direct-energy weapons – lasers, shortwave radiation, etc).
- Use of armed civilians.
- Simultaneous strike on the enemy's units and facilities in all territory.
- Simultaneous battle on land, air, sea, and in the informational space.
- Use of asymmetric and indirect methods.
- Management of troops in a unified informational sphere

Russia's View of Warfare

- i. From direct destruction to direct influence;
- ii. from direct annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay;
- iii. from a war with weapons and technology to a culture war;
- iv. from a war with conventional forces to especially prepared forces and commercial irregular groupings;
- v. from the traditional (3D) battleground to information/psychological warfare and war of perceptions;

Russia's View of Warfare

- vi. from direct clash to contactless war;
- vii. from a superficial and compartmented war to a total war, including the enemy's internal side and base;
- viii. from war in the physical environment to a war in human consciousness and in the cyberspace;
- ix. from symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns;

Russia's View of Warfare



x. From war in a defined period of time to a **state of permanent war as the natural condition in the national life.**

Russia's New Generation Warfare

First Phase: non-military asymmetric warfare (encompassing information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures as part of a plan to establish a favorable political, economic, and military setup).

Second Phase: special operations to mislead political and military leaders by coordinated measures carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies by leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions.

Russia's New Generation Warfare

Third Phase: intimidation, deceiving, and bribing government and military officers, with the objective of making them abandon their service duties.

Fourth Phase: destabilizing propaganda to increase discontent among the population, boosted by the arrival of Russian bands of militants, escalating subversion.

Fifth Phase: establishment of no-fly zones over the country to be attacked, imposition of blockades, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units.

Russia's New Generation Warfare

Sixth Phase: commencement of military action, immediately preceded by large-scale reconnaissance and subversive missions. All types, forms, methods, and forces, including special operations forces, space, radio, radio engineering, electronic, diplomatic, and secret service intelligence, and industrial espionage.

Seventh Phase: combination of targeted information operation, electronic warfare operation, aerospace operation, continuous air force harassment, combined with the use of high-precision weapons launched from various platforms (long-range artillery, and weapons based on new physical principles, including microwaves, radiation, non-lethal biological weapons).

Russia's New Generation Warfare

Eighth Phase: roll over the remaining points of resistance and destroy surviving enemy units by special operations conducted by reconnaissance units to spot which enemy units have survived and transmit their coordinates to the attacker's missile and artillery units; fire barrages to annihilate the defender's resisting army units by effective advanced weapons; airdrop operations to surround points of resistance; and territory mopping-up operations by ground troops.



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