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Cleavages in Contemporary Finland

A Study on Party-Voter Ties

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Förord

År 2006 deltog jag som andraårsstuderande på ett seminarium vid Tammerfors universitet, där det lottades ut vem som skulle få skriva sin uppsats om partival i riksdagsval. Som tur var, drog kursens hållare Sami Borg mitt namn ur hatten. Kursens andra hållare, Heikki Paloheimo, introducerade senare skiljelinjernas fascinerande värld för mig i egenskap av handledare för min avhandling pro gradu. Den vägen, som har tagit mig från Tammerfors till Åbo, har jag fått fortsätta längs så här långt.

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*Elämän etapeilla
Hengähdät hetken
Katsot taakse
Ja katsot eteen
Vuosien läpi
näet elämän saaren
Tajuat heti
vaistoat heti
Kantaa ystävyys
pitkän kaaren*

Tammerfors, den 3 september 2015
Jussi Westinen

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Abstract

Cleavages have been central in understanding the relationship between political parties and voters but the credibility of cleavage approach has been increasingly debated. This is because of decreasing party loyalty, fewer ideological differences between the parties and general social structural change amongst other factors. By definition, cleavages arise when social structural groups recognize their clashing interests, which are reflected in common values and attitudes, and vote for parties that are dedicated to defend the interests of the groups concerned. This study assesses relevance of cleavage approach in the Finnish context. The research problem in this study is “what kind of a cleavage structure exists in Finland at the beginning of the 21st century? Finland represents a case that has traditionally been characterized by a strong and diverse cleavage structure, notable ideological fragmentation in the electorate and an ideologically diverse party system. Nevertheless, the picture of the party-voter ties in Finland still remains incomplete with regard to a thorough analysis of cleavages. In addition, despite the vast amount of literature on cleavages in political science, studies that thoroughly analyze national cleavage structures by assessing the relationship between social structural position, values and attitudes and party choice have been rare.

The research questions are approached by deploying statistical analyses, and using Finnish National Election Studies from 2003, 2007 and 2011 as data. In this study, seven different social structural cleavage bases are analyzed: native language, type of residential area, occupational class, education, denomination, gender and age cohorts. Four different value/attitudinal dimensions were identified in this study: economic right and authority, regional and socioeconomic equality, sociocultural and European Union dimensions. This study shows that despite the weak overall effect of social structural positions on values and attitudes, a few rather strong connections between them were identified. The overall impact of social structural position and values and attitudes on party choice varies significantly between parties.

Cleavages still exist in Finland and the cleavage structure partly reflects the old basis in the Finnish party system. The cleavage that is based on the type of residential area and reflected in regional and socioeconomic equality dimensions concerns primarily the voters of the Centre Party and the Coalition Party. The linguistic cleavage concerns mostly the voters of the Swedish People's Party. The classic class cleavage reflected in the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension concerns in turn first and foremost the blue-collar voters of the Left Alliance and the Social Democratic Party, the agricultural entrepreneur voters of the Centre Party and higher professional and manager voters of the Coalition Party. The conflict with the most potential as a cleavage is the one based on social status (occupational class and education) and it is reflected in sociocultural and EU dimensions. It sets the voters of the True Finns against the voters of the Green League and the Coalition Party. The study underlines the challenges the old parties have met after the volatile election in 2011, which shook the cleavage structure. It also describes the complexity involved in the Finnish conflict structure and the multidimensionality in the electoral competition between the parties.

Abstrakt

Skiljelinjer är centrala när det gäller att förstå relationer mellan politiska partier och väljare, men man har debatterat om huruvida de fortfarande kan bidra till förståelsen om vad val handlar om idag. Skiljelinjer uppstår när socialstrukturella grupper identifierar gemensamma intressen. Dessa återspeglas i värderingar och attityder, och leder till att man röstar på ett parti som representerar de gemensamma intressena. På grund av sjunkande partiloyalitet, minskande ideologiska skillnader mellan partier och en generell socialstrukturell förändring, har relevansen av skiljelinjer emellertid blivit ifrågasatt. Det centrala forskningsproblemet i denna studie är således: "hurdan är skiljelinjestrukturen i Finland i början av 2000-talet?". Finland representerar ett fall som traditionellt har haft en stark skiljelinjestruktur, och vars partisystem uppvisar flera ideologiska dimensioner. Trots detta råder det en brist på studier i vilka man systematiskt undersöker skiljelinjestrukturen och där man använder en definition av skiljelinjer som består av tre element: social struktur, värderingar/attityder och partival.

Undersökningens data utgörs av nationella valundersökningar från åren 2003 till 2011, och de statistiska analyserna består av principalkomponentanalys samt linjär och logistisk regression. I studien analyseras sju olika socialstrukturella grunder till skiljelinjer: språk, typ av boningsort, samhällsklass, utbildning, religion, kön och generation. Fyra olika värde- och attityddimensioner kan identifieras i den finska väljarkåren: ekonomisk höger och respekt för auktoritet, regional och socioekonomisk jämlikhet, den sociokulturella dimensionen och EU-dimensionen. Studien visar att det finns enskilda starka samband mellan socialstrukturella positioner, värderingar och attityder och partival. Trots detta förklarar alla socialstrukturella variabler bara en tiodel av variationen i värderingar och attityder. Den sociala strukturens, värderingarnas och attitydernas förklaringskraft beträffande partival varierar mycket mellan finländska partier.

Skiljelinjer existerar fortfarande i Finland. Skiljelinjestrukturen återspeglar den gamla basen i det finska partisystemet. Den skiljelinje som grundar sig på typen av boningsort och som reflekteras i dimensionen av regional och socioekonomisk jämlikhet, sätter främst Centerpartiets och Samlingspartiets väljare mot varandra. Denna skiljelinje är speciellt karakteristisk för Finland i jämförelse med andra länder. Språkskiljelinjen berör främst väljarna av Svenska Folkpartiet. Den gamla skiljelinjen baserad på samhällsklass uppstår mellan arbetare som röstar på vänsterpartier, jordbruksföretagare som röstar på Centerpartiet och högre tjänstemän som röstar på Samlingspartiet. Denna skiljelinje återspeglar olika intressen gällande omfördelning och decentralisering. Studien identifierar också konflikter som kan ha potential att utvecklas till skiljelinjer. Mest förklaringspotential finns det i konflikten som baserar sig på social status, både när det gäller samhällsklass och utbildning. Denna konflikt ställer lågutbildade mot högutbildade på den sociokulturella dimensionen och EU-dimensionen. Studien lyfter fram de utmaningar som de gamla stora partierna har mött efter det volatila valet 2011. Därtill beskriver studien också komplexiteten i den finländska konfliktstrukturen och mångdimensionaliteten i tävlingen mellan partier.

1. Introduction

In political science there is an ongoing discussion on the credibility of cleavage approach in grasping what party politics is about and what elections are fought over nowadays. Simply put, cleavages arise when social structural groups recognize their clashing interests and vote for parties, which are dedicated to defend the interests of the groups concerned. It is of little doubt that the classic cleavages, based on social class, religion, land-industry-tension and ethnicity, played a major role in the establishment and stability of West European party systems. The ties between parties and social structural groups were close, which was manifested in a high degree of party loyalty.

In the last few decades, there has been a clear reduction in the significance of cleavages, due to a decrease in voter loyalty deriving from a social structural position, a decrease in ideological disputes between political parties, and due to social structural transformation at large. The credibility of the cleavage approach in political science has been further eroded due to the notions of parties becoming more similar ideologically and no longer representing the interests of certain social structural groups, instead seeking votes wherever they are to be found, as well as the notions of voters becoming more individualized in their electoral behavior, being less attached to parties and being increasingly affected by short-term effects.

In light of the above, the current state of affairs appears to be ill-fitted for analyzing the present party-voter ties in cleavage terms. However, despite the individualization of electoral behavior and parties broadening their electoral appeal, the idea of parties having the ability to reflect institutionalized, group-based conflicts in the electorate still has importance; the question being whether cleavages still capture the dynamics in the relationship between parties and voters.

The aim of this study is to evaluate the continued value of the cleavage approach when focusing on contemporary Finland. Finland represents a case that has traditionally been characterized by having, *inter alia*, a strong and diverse cleavage structure (see Lijphart 1984; Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005), reflecting

several issue dimensions, having notable ideological fragmentation in the electorate (Paloheimo 2008) and having an ideologically diverse party system (Bengtsson et al. 2013). Finland matches the general West European pattern in the sense that its party system was anchored to major cleavages and conventional party families by the 1920s. In Finland, however, social structural transformation and modernization took place in a later stage, rapidly so in the 1950s and 1960s (Karvonen 2000; 2014), which accentuates the peculiarity of Finland in the long run.

The stability of the party system continued with some exceptions until the 1960s. However, from the 1970s onwards, voters became especially more mobile, ideological grievances became less pronounced and new parties emerged to challenge the old ones (ibid.). While the old basis of the party system that was established already at the beginning of the 20th century still remains at the beginning of the 21st century, totally new parties have also emerged, which appear to have stabilized their position in the party system. Nevertheless, the picture of the party-voter ties still remains incomplete with regard to a thorough analysis of cleavages. Hence, this study focuses on answering the following question: *What kind of a cleavage structure exists in Finland at the beginning of the 21st century?* With the more detailed research questions, this study explores the relationships between the three central cleavage elements: social structural position, values and attitudes and party choice. Thus, its aim is to enlighten the understanding of the Finnish electorate and its political preferences.

The contribution of the study lies in adding to the present analyses, which have a restricted focus on single cleavages, by assessing both old and new social structural bases simultaneously and exploring how they are reflected in the values and attitudes in the electorate. Furthermore, the study explicates how social structural positions and values and attitudes are manifested in party choice. It is as well discovered which social structural positions and values/attitudes that are linked to each other have both an effect on voting for a particular party. Therefore, the analytical approach model applied in this study could also serve in detecting the cleavage structure in other political contexts than Finland.

The study shows, that following the threefold cleavage definition, cleavages still exist in contemporary Finland. The results do not, however, indicate for particularly strong overall connection between social structural positions, values

and attitudes and vote for a party that represents the common interests, which indicates that there is also much else intervening between the cleavage elements. The cleavage structure partly still reflects the old basis of the Finnish party system and the old sources of conflict between parties and voters. More importantly, this study identifies a few potentially emerging cleavages that go well along with the change in the party system that has taken place in recent decades. Moreover, this study challenges the dichotomization of old parties being anchored to social structure and of new parties being anchored to values and attitudes.

The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the research design and how it is set within the context of previous studies. Specifically, the chapter first discusses the concept of cleavage, i.e. how the term ‘cleavage’ is understood in this study. Then, the research problem and research questions are introduced. Finally, Finland is placed in a comparative perspective to further motivate the chosen case. Chapter 3 is divided into three sections. The first section contextualizes the cleavage approach by presenting the different schools in the field of electoral research, by exploring the influential Lipset-Rokkan-model (1967) in detail and by analyzing the legacy of the model in West European party systems. The second section focuses on the development of the cleavage approach and discusses the social structural positions behind the traditional cleavage approach, party-voter-ties from a social structural perspective, the move towards values and attitudes in explaining party choice and finally the suggestions for new cleavages. The third section presents an overview of the interpretations of the Finnish cleavage structure.

The empirical analysis begins in Chapter 4. This chapter introduces first the data and discusses the limitations of the study. It proceeds by analyzing the social structural basis of cleavages and detecting the value/attitudinal dimensions in the electorate. Then, the effect of social structural groups on value/attitudinal dimensions is analyzed in the last subchapter in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 brings party choice along to the analyses. After briefly assessing the political context in the 2003–2011 Finnish parliamentary elections, the analysis proceeds by analyzing the relationship between social structural positions and party choice and the relationship between values and attitudes and party choice. Social structural positions and values and attitudes are finally brought together in the same statistical model to address cleavage-based voting behavior. Building on the

previous analyses, the conflicts are finally categorized as established cleavages and as conflicts that have potential to emerge as cleavages. The last main chapter summarizes the major findings and discusses the implications and the contribution of the study.

2. Research design

2.1. The concept of cleavage

Much of the legacy for cleavage research in political science was set in *Party systems and voter alignments*, edited by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967), wherein their article on cleavages, party systems and voter alignments became highly influential. This article highlighted the prerequisites of cleavage formation in historical contexts; the central thesis of the ‘Lipset-Rokkan-model’ was that the basic blocks of party support were formed by social identities. Peculiarly enough, Lipset and Rokkan did not provide a precise definition of the term ‘cleavage’ in their seminal article. Since then, cleavage has become one of the most used and one of the most imprecise concepts in the field of electoral research. Many other concepts, such as ‘conflict dimension’ and ‘opposition’, have been used alongside the term cleavage without conceptualizing the term cleavage properly. Moreover, the concept of cleavage has been accompanied with additional terms. The use of terms ‘social cleavage’, ‘political cleavage’, ‘cultural cleavage’, ‘ideological cleavage’, ‘segmental cleavage’ and ‘structural cleavage’, to name a few, has added to the confusion in the research field. (Aardal 1994, 218.)

The term cleavage has been deployed to reflect long-standing and broad social divisions within society, as is the case also in this study. Moreover, the definition of the term cleavage in this study is firmly based on one of the most thorough efforts to provide a precise cleavage definition (Bartolini & Mair 1990, 41–46, 215; Knutsen & Scarbrough 1995, 494–495). This definition consists of three dominant elements; 1. structural/empirical, 2. psychological/normative, and 3. organizational. In this study, these are called the *structural, value/attitudinal and organizational* elements of a cleavage. It is important to note that a cleavage cannot exist if it does not have all the three elements at the same time. This concept of a cleavage is handled in detail in the following section, where it is contrasted with other suggestions to aid in grasping the concept of cleavage.

First, cleavages are primarily rooted in a relatively permanent social division, which gives rise to objectively identifiable groups within society. These groups can be identified and distinguished empirically by *social structural* characteristics such as language or religion. The first prerequisite for a cleavage is thus a dividing

line between objectively identifiable social structural groups. People are born with certain social structural characteristics, like ethnicity, while other characteristics, such as occupational class, are partly affected by family background and acquired later in life. Moreover, while religion and native language, for example, are not extremely likely to change during one's lifetime, occupational class and type of residential area are more prone to change. In any case, there should be a long-lasting conflict between the social structural groups involved in order to establish a stable cleavage base.

Second, the group members should have a set of *common values and attitudes* for which they are ready to act and which provides them with a sense of identity. This set of common values and attitudes forms an element, which has been called psychological as it consists of group identity, group consciousness and common values and attitudes. This study focuses on the last-mentioned aspect. Group identity refers to a sense of belonging: i.e. whether individuals think of themselves as belonging to a certain social structural group. Group consciousness consists of the perceptions of group members regarding whether the intergroup relationship is characterized by conflict as well as their evaluations concerning their own, and the opposing group's positions, in the conflict (Tajfel 1978, 28; Stubager 2009, 208).

Although group identity and collective group consciousness are vital and could serve as such to form the second cleavage element (see Bartolini & Mair 1990), they tell little about the values and attitudes that the members of a social structural group have in common. In addition, elements of cleavage politics less often crystallize into self-conscious oppositions nowadays (Enyedi 2008, 300)¹. As the study at hand focuses on cleavages in the 21st century, it is more enlightening to focus on *common values and attitudes*, which are reflected in opinions on political issues. In this respect, group-based values and attitudes are the most concrete and accessible way to understand the substance of the common interests.

¹ When talking about group consciousness, Bartolini and Mair (1990, 202) talk about the external closure in social relationships. This kind of social closure, admittedly, was more likely to be found in times when social mobility was not yet on the rise, when educational opportunities were more restricted and internal migration was lower etc.

As mentioned above, values and attitudes provide the actual political substance to the differing group-based interests and can constitute solid dimensions in the electorate (see Thomassen 2005a, 17; Enyedi 2008, 288). However, these attitudes and values should be fairly stable in order to suffice for cleavage explanations – i.e. they should form long-term predispositions (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005). The following section will elucidate what is meant by values and attitudes and explain why they are used side by side as the second element of cleavages, i.e. the value/attitudinal element.

The concept of value is used with varying content in the disciplines of social sciences. An early and often cited definition was put forward by Kluckhohn (1951, 395): “A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable, which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action”. Rokeach (1969), a pioneer in value and survey research, defined values in terms of enduring beliefs on preferable modes of conduct. As a supplementary addition to these views, van Deth and Scarbrough (1995, 28) have stated that values are not directly observable and they engage moral considerations and conceptions of what is desirable. Also the inter-subjective, social and contextual nature of values has been emphasized (ibid. 33–37), which fits the cleavage approach of social groups sharing values.

Political values, in turn, can be defined as “prescriptive beliefs, which individuals would like to see implemented in the political system” (Knutsen & Kumlin 2005, 125). Moreover, political values have been considered to stem strongly from pre-adulthood experiences (see e.g. Rose & McAllister 1990) and from social positions in society (e.g. van Deth 1995, 6). The latter aspect is especially important in this study.

Despite the debate on the nature of *attitudes*, it can be stated that attitudes generally involve a predisposition to respond in a specific way, positively or negatively, towards some object (Tourangeau & Galesic 2008, 141–142). However, it is worth noting that values are traditionally conceived to be more ground-breaking, stable and general than attitudes. Values are underlying orientations, relevant for the formation of attitudes, which capture the relationship towards a specific object, for example a political issue. (van Deth & Scarbrough 1995, 31–32.) The idea of values causally preceding attitudes, which

are in turn reflected in positions on political issues, is an acknowledged and shared view (Aardal and van Wijnen 2005, 195). Nevertheless, it has still been pointed out that the causal relationship can be the other way around (van Deth & Scarbrough 1995, 33). Individuals also mold their values when they are influenced by the attitudes of other people, for example. Miller and Shanks (1996) argue that attitudes towards election-specific issues, and subsequent opinions on them, can affect or activate latent values.

Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock (1991, 269–270) conclude that the relationship between values and attitudes should be considered as the most important aspect of values because it enables individuals to deal with an infinite number of specific policies. Values are shortcuts for a voter who wants to save costs in voting: values generate consistency to electoral choices whereas attitudes can fluctuate more. According to them:

“It would be hard to explain how average person keeps a myriad of specific opinions about particular policies...given how little attention he or she tends to pay attention to political issues; it is considerably easier to give an account of how the average person could keep track of a small number of general values, which in turn give him direction on how to respond to a large number of specific issues.”

It is still dubious whether opinions on redistribution from the rich to the poor, for example, reflect value orientation or whether they tell more about one's attitudes (cf. Knutsen & Kumlin 2005, 132). As such, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between value orientations and attitudinal orientations, especially empirically (see van Deth & Scarbrough 1995, 31-2; cf. Thomassen 2005a). Both values and attitudes are reflected in *political issues*. Opinions on political issues can thus be regarded as more specific manifestations of broader underlying attitudes and values (Tourangeau & Galesic 2008, 142).

A classic and still very useful definition to political issue was given by Sjöblom (1968, 123):

“Issue...refers to a matter of dispute between the parties in the electoral arena. Normally, one also reads into the concept that an “issue” must not be too insignificant matter of dispute, which only appears sporadically or incidentally in the election debate”.

Hence a political issue can be defined as follows; 1. a target of conflict 2. a politicized topic and 3. essential to the political system (Lane & Ersson 1991, 269; cf. Berelson et al. 1954, 182). When opinions on political issues are the political reflections of underlying value/attitudinal orientations, the issues at hand are far beyond idiosyncratic, singular questions (Aardal & van Wijnen 2005, 195).

The discussion shows that as values and attitudes affect one another and are closely entangled, it would be too restrictive to speak only about either value dimensions or attitudinal dimensions in the scope of cleavages. Many studies, especially those focusing on new cleavages, have taken the stance towards value orientations (see Inglehart 1984; Flanagan & Lee 1987; Knutsen & Kumlin 2005), but by doing so they disregard the potential the constant attitudes have as regards to the cleavage approach. When political values and attitudes are coherent, it is justified to treat them simultaneously and to speak of values and attitudes of constituting dimensions (cf. Enyedi 2008, 288).

Third, cleavages must be expressed in *organizational* terms, such as political parties, labor unions or churches. As political parties give institutional expression to the political interests of a specific group through elections, they are the most important organizations concerned. The role of labor unions should not, however, be undermined. They are essential in reinforcing the ties between voters and parties. Indeed labor unions were a source of common identity and group cohesion among social classes and they paved the way for cleavages before political parties were established (see Rokkan 1970, Karvonen 2014).

As such, it is however essential for cleavages to be revolved around stable party-voter ties in the electoral arena. The members of social structural groups, who are opposed to other social structural groups, should vote for the party that articulates their common interests in the political arena. As Franklin (2010, 651),

puts it, we are talking about cleavages when “*social groups recognize their political differences and vote for different parties because those parties are dedicated to defending the interests of the groups concerned*”. It is not enough that a party seeks to represent certain group-based interests if the group does not vote for it. The members of a social structural group should also trust this party as the representative of these interests by voting for it. Moreover, it is argued in this study that in order for a cleavage to be politically relevant, the social structural element and value/attitudinal element should jointly contribute towards voting for a party that represents the common interests of a social structural group. If a cleavage is not manifested in voting for the party that is dedicated to defending the group-based common interests, it should be called a latent cleavage².

Political parties thus transform social divisions into cleavages by giving coherent political expression to what would otherwise be inchoate beliefs and fragmentary values and attitudes among members of some social group (Knutsen & Scarbrough 1995, 494). As Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 26) formulated, “*cleavages do not translate themselves into party oppositions as a matter of course*”. As such, parties have an active role in pushing certain social divisions and issues forward while dampening others. Once cleavages become organizationally institutionalized, they develop much of their own autonomous strength. (Bartolini & Mair 1990, 202; Enyedi 2005.) This is in line with the interpretation of cleavages that puts emphasis on the role of political elites in shaping or creating cleavages from above. Political parties do not just wait for group identities and common value basis to develop: they can set interests against one another in order to mobilize their potential electorate. They try to push certain issues forward while putting non-favorable issues to the back and influence the opinion formation in the electorate (see Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003; Enyedi 2005.)

On the other hand, the parties aim to reflect the interests of certain voter groups as they are well updated by the public opinion and the value and attitudinal changes of their potential voters. As a result, the parties can appeal to certain social structural groups, conceived as their target electorate, and place

² Also Lane and Ersson (1987), for instance, use the term latent cleavage when describing a cleavage that is not manifested. However, their loose conception of a cleavage differs a lot from the threefold cleavage.

themselves in political issues accordingly. That said, people's preferences are also influenced by how parties act in government and opposition; which policy alternatives they present (Karvonen 2014, 2). The task in this thesis is not, however, to dig out the extent of proactivity and reactivity of political parties.

It can hence be debated whether the relationship between parties and voters is more demand-driven (parties adapt to changes in the electorate) or supply-centered (people's view of politics is guided by parties). The mechanisms here can be diverse. For example Rydgren (2003, 60–61) has noted that the existence of an anti-immigrant party (and the politicization of immigration as a political issue) might lead to a change in attitudinal atmosphere in the electorate towards immigration. This in turn can lead to other parties changing their electoral strategies concerning immigration. Furthermore, the mechanisms are country-bound: in some countries there might be a prominent anti-immigrant party while in others there is not, despite similar attitudinal atmosphere (see Kestilä 2007). This study is more demand-driven while it pays some attention to the supply side by analyzing the political alternatives that the parties represent.

The three cleavage attributes help to grasp how certain cleavages persist or fade away. The prerequisites for cleavages must be demanding in order to distinguish cleavages from divisions in society. The threefold notion of what constitutes a cleavage makes the analyses of cleavage structure extremely challenging yet analytically powerful. Cleavages are more extensive and exclusive than social and political divisions that might have some of the cleavage elements but not all three. If the term cleavage would be used to describe any kind of social or political division, then the concept would lose its analytical power as a plethora of divisions would qualify as cleavages with loose qualifications (Bartolini & Mair 1990, 216; Knutsen & Scarbrough 1995, 494).

This concept of cleavage stands in contrast to the definitions that have loosely defined cleavage. For example Rae and Taylor (1970, 1) defined cleavage as "*the criteria which divides the members of a community or sub-community into groups with important political differences at specific times and places*". Lane and Ersson (1987, 39) in turn defined it as "*a division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups or organizations among whom conflict may arise*". These definitions leave much room for interpretation and leave cleavage as a concept which is capable of embracing almost every conceivable type of political conflict,

as Bartolini and Mair (1990, 200) note. Moreover, they would probably be a warning example of what Knutsen & Scarbrough (1995), Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2005) and Bartolini (2005) referred to when they discussed a loose definition of a cleavage that misses the nature of cleavage politics. In addition, the definition misses the prerequisite of longevity as conflicts may come and go between different groups.

Cleavages should impart the sort of durability that Lipset and Rokkan were trying to explain. In this regard, the only such source of durability ever demonstrated within this sphere deals with socialization processes. Social structural groups develop their persisting group identities largely as a result of the socializing mechanisms in their surroundings. In addition to 'socialization agents', such as family members, friends and co-workers, the role of strong institutional/organizational forces such as party associations and trade unions is particularly important for forming durability. (see e.g. Franklin et al. 1992, 2009; Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 1999, 32–33; Evans & de Graaf 2013.) Later on, Bartolini (2005) suggested different concepts for divisions that combine only two of the three cleavage elements. This was in order to maintain the high analytical requirements for a cleavage and to depict divides that do not fully meet the cleavage criteria. These divides should either be designated as 'corporate divides' (divisions that combine structural and organizational elements), 'political divides' (value/attitudinal and organizational elements), or 'social divides' (structural and value/attitudinal elements).

Although these are examples of what can be 'something less than a full cleavage', Deegan-Krause (2007, 538–541) has noted that major works in the field of cleavage research often accept only the strict prerequisite of the three elements. He notes that identifying cleavages as (a) self-conscious demographic groups (b) a common mind-set for a group of people (c) a distinct political organization and stable group-based electoral support for it, do not lead to fruitful results in every political context. Figure 2.1 offers a suggestion as to how the interaction between the three attributes can lead to cases that are something less than cleavages.

The figure has been modified from the study of Deegan-Krause (2007, 540) and resembles the classification of Bartolini. However, the given labels for the divides better capture the relationships between the three cleavage elements. Moreover, Figure 2.1 is useful in the scope of this study as it provides an analytic

tool with which to evaluate the cases that can be regarded as cleavages and the cases that are more debatable.




Figure 2.1. Model of divide and cleavage (cf. Deegan-Krause 2007, 540)

A cleavage consists of all three elements. When two elements are combined they constitute a divide. Three alternatives are possible here:

1. Structure + attitudes = position divide. The alignment of structural and attitudinal differences without a political alignment leads to a position divide.
2. Structure + organizations = structural divide. The concept of structural divide leads to what Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995) label as purely structural voting. Here, attitudes or values do not play a role: the party-voter ties are close merely on a structural basis, which is why voting is mostly habitual.
3. Attitudes + organizations = issue divide. This relationship has crossed the researchers' minds the most as studies on new cleavages have built heavily on the attitudinal/value dimensions (Deegan-Krause 2007). When attitudes contribute to voting for a party that represents this attitudinal orientation without an apparent link to social structure, it leads to an issue divide.

The importance of issue divides has increased in politics in recent years especially at the cost of structure-based politics. As such, there have been a number of attempts to provide comprehensive sets of issue divides (Deegan-Krause 2007, 541), which were aimed towards proving that potential cleavages are no longer found from the structural realms. By and large, this tendency describes the shift from social structure to values and attitudes. As social location has become less important than value orientations in shaping party choice, it has been argued that new post-Lipset-Rokkan-cleavages are actually value cleavages (Knutsen & Scarbrough 495–496). As these proposed value cleavages are borderline cases

between issue divides and cleavages, much debate has focused on whether the nature of cleavages is changing (Kriesi 1998, Kriesi et al. 2006; Enyedi 2008).³

According to Enyedi (2008, 288), the applicability of the concept of cleavage has narrowed because there has been a lack of acknowledgement concerning societal change in Western Europe. He suggests that values, instead of social categories, can also dominate the identity of deep-seated, enduring and comprehensive political conflicts. Kriesi (2010, 673-674) has even suggested that new cleavages are difficult to find because researchers are stuck to the traditional conceptions of structural basis.

There has also been debate on whether one should use the terms social or political (or cultural, structural or ideological) when handling cleavages (see e.g. Valen 1981; Kitschelt 2004; van der Brug & van Spanje 2009). Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Bartolini (2004, 3, 2005) argue that no such attributes are needed. The term social cleavage often fails to indicate anything more than traditional divisions implied by social stratification (Bartolini & Mair 1990, 198). It has been argued that although social cleavages are always there, they may be latent or they may be politicized. Politicization of structural conflicts is a key aspect for political cleavages. Scholars have, however, struggled to define political cleavages in unequivocal and distinctive terms (see e.g. Dahl 1971, Zuckerman 1982). Bartolini and Mair argue that in this case cleavages are primarily defined in terms of political attitudes in order to free the concept from an emphasis on structural variables.

It creates thus more confusion than clarity to make a distinction between social cleavages and political cleavages as the qualification of the concept still lacks a clear-cut definition. The same logic applies, for example, to ideological cleavages (see Valen 1981) as it is impossible to determine the extent to which a cleavage reflects ideologies (Aardal 1994, 229). Hence, in this study the term cleavage is used without qualifications such as 'social', 'political' or 'ideological'.

To summarize, the analysis of cleavages in this study is based on the threefold elements that the cleavages are characterized by: structural element, value/attitudinal element and organizational element. By choosing such a frame with distinguishable elements, the encompassing nature of cleavages is captured

³ This debate is handled in detail in chapter 3. 2.

without getting stuck in conceptual complexities. Based on the discussion in the chapter, the concept of cleavage is conceived as follows in this study:

Cleavages are rooted in relatively permanent social divisions, which give rise to identifiable social structural groups whose members share common interests, reflected in values and attitudes, for which they are willing to stand for. These interests are primarily reflected in voting for a political party that represents and advocates these interests.

2.2. Background, research problem and research questions

Despite the vast amount of literature on cleavages in political science, studies that thoroughly analyze national cleavage structures by deploying the afore-defined threefold cleavage are lacking. One field in cleavage research has analyzed the existence and strength of (social) cleavages mainly in terms of social structural voting, i.e. linkages between ‘old’ social structural positions and party choice, while leaving the linkage between social structural groups and values/attitudes imprecise (see e.g. Franklin et al. 1992, 2009⁴; Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 1999; Brooks et al. 2006; Evans & de Graaf 2013). As this field of study has measured the impact of social class, religion, place of residence, ethnicity etc. on party choice, the studies have built on the assumption that the social structural groups do have a sense of collective identity. In the case of social classes and denominational groups, this could be confirmed empirically. In the era of strong cleavage politics, it could be stated that blue-collar workers voted for the political left because they identified themselves with the working class: they had built a common identity and group consciousness (see Franklin et al. 1992).

What remained unclear in these analyses was how class identity and class consciousness were reflected in attitudes and values – the actual political interests of social structural groups were, empirically, taken largely for granted. Hence, the linkage between social structural groups and attitudes and values has not been explored thoroughly. This has of course partly been due to the limited possibilities available regarding the data and partly due to the restricted way of treating cleavages. The number of studies which primarily investigate the structural element of cleavages is vast (see e.g. Rose & Urwin 1970; Franklin et al. 1992, 2009; Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 1999; Jansen 2011; Evans & de Graaf 2013). In this respect, since the decreasing patterns of class voting and religious voting have been so well documented in Europe, there is no longer much to explore from this perspective, from a comparative perspective at least.

The other field in cleavage research has been keen on finding evidence for the emergence of new cleavages beyond the Lipset-Rokkan-model, i.e. beyond

⁴ The studies of Franklin and his colleagues also included some value and attitudinal elements, such as left-right-orientation and religious values, but the focus was on the effect of social structural position on party choice.

traditional cleavages based on occupational class, religion, urban-rural-division and ethnicity (see e.g. Inglehart 1977; Dunleavy 1979; Dalton et al. 1984; Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi et al. 2006; van der Brug & van Spanje 2009; Kriesi 2010; Stubager 2010). While some of these proposals have focused on finding an alternative structural base for cleavages, others have claimed that the new basis of cleavages is in values and attitudes. This view propagates the idea of conceiving values and attitudes as having an independent role in defining group identities and voting behavior: i.e. they have begun to cement partisan loyalties more efficiently than social structure (Enyedi 2008, 293).⁵

Thus, it has been challenging to obtain a precise view of the whole cleavage structure in West European countries upon which the bulk of (comparative) cleavage research has focused. While comparative studies are merited in bringing on the differences and similarities in structural voting and party competition (see Dalton et al. 1984; Evans 2000; Franklin et al. 1992; Thomassen ed. 2005b; Evans & De Graaf 2013) they are still lacking thorough empirical analysis of the interaction between all three cleavage elements. Compact case studies suit this purpose well, since the political context can be kept constant and the scope of the study remains limited. As Kriesi (1998, 131) notes, the core in cleavage research is to identify the theoretically and empirically relevant social divisions and explore how they are manifested in the value/attitudinal sphere and in party alignments.

In light of the above, this study seeks to explore the significance of cleavage elements in structuring the relationship between voters and political parties in Finland at the beginning of the 21st century. By doing so, the study makes two main contributions to research on cleavages. First, it adds to the present analyses, which have a restricted focus on single cleavages, by assessing both old and new social structural bases simultaneously and exploring how they are reflected in the values and attitudes in the electorate. The old structural cleavage bases stem from the Lipset-Rokkan model (1967), while the new ones rise from studies that have aimed to complete and challenge the model (see e.g. Inglehart 1977; Dalton et al. 1984; Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi et al. 2006; van der Brug & van Spanje 2009). Although certain efforts have previously been made to detect *single* cleavages

⁵ A closer assessment of the research tradition and traits in analyzing cleavages is presented in Chapter 3.

with all three elements in a national context, to the knowledge of the author, such studies have been rare (see Stubager 2010).

Second, the study makes a contribution in terms of analyzing how social structural positions and values and attitudes are manifested in party choice as well as in discovering whether the social structural positions and values/attitudes, which are linked to each other, both have an effect on voting for a particular party. The rationale behind this empirical design is to build linkages between the three central cleavage elements: social structure, values/attitudes and party choice. As Kriesi (1998, 167) reminds us, if structure, values/attitudes and party representation of collective interests jointly determine the existence of cleavages, then it will not suffice to look at any one of these aspects independently of the other two. Also Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995, 495) have stated that voting a party out of group-based interests without sharing common values does not constitute cleavage politics; nor does voting for a party out of shared values without being a member of the associated social structural group. Structural variables or value orientations may yield intelligible accounts of voting, but they do not amount to accounts of 'cleavage politics'.

The cleavage structure of Finland has been described and analyzed since the 1960s. The earlier analyses were based on the development of a party system and on the conceived conflicts between social groups (see Allardt 1961; Allardt & Pesonen 1967; Pesonen & Sänkiäho 1979; Pesonen et al. 1993; for political-historical analysis see also Karvonen 2000, 2014; Pesonen & Riihinen 2002). Later accounts have focused more on the value/attitudinal element of cleavages (Paloheimo 2005, 2008; Grönlund & Westinen 2012). However, there are no studies that would empirically scrutinize the whole cleavage structure in Finland by building linkages between the three cleavage elements. An indication that the conventional cleavage perspective is unsatisfactory in identifying the dynamics in the electorate and party sphere, at least in the Finnish case, is if cleavages are not detected at the beginning of the 21st century and if social structural positions and values/attitudes do not both have a major impact on party choice.

Following the previous discussion, the research problem in this doctoral thesis is:

What kind of a cleavage structure exists in Finland at the beginning of the 21st century?

The specific research questions are derived from the research problem.

1. *Which are the relevant social structural cleavage bases in Finland?*
2. *Which are the value/attitudinal dimensions in the Finnish electorate?*
3. *What is the effect of social structural position on the values and attitudes in the electorate?*
4.
 - a) *What is the effect of social structural position on voters' party choice?*
 - b) *Do those social structural positions and values and attitudes that are linked to each other, have an effect on voting for a particular party?*
5. *Which conflicts can be regarded as cleavages and which are the parties associated with them?*

The research questions are illustrated in Figure 2.2, which presents the theoretical approach model of the study. The first research question (RQ1) focuses on exploring the relevant old and new social structural cleavage bases in Finland. As such, an analysis is made to discover whether the social structural positions function as a source of identity and whether the social structural groups at hand are relevant for the Finnish party sphere. Even though the parties are more cautious in making restricted appeals to certain social groups and they propagate

more for the value/attitudinal basis, the representation of social structural groups have not vanished (see Oskarson 2005, 85; Paloheimo 2006; Enyedi 2008). In other words, the more distinctively the interests are represented by certain parties, the stronger they should also affect party choice. (cf. Franklin & Page 1984, 527; Belanger & Meguid 2008, 480, 489.)




Figure 2.2 *The theoretical approach model of the study*

The second research question (RQ2) focuses on the value/attitudinal element of cleavages. The value/attitudinal dimensions in the Finnish electorate are detected by analyzing whether voters' values and attitudes, manifested in opinions on political issues, form clusters that are thematically consistent throughout the time-period of the study. These clusters would then be treated as stable and solid dimensions (see Thomassen 2005a, 17; Enyedi 2008, 288). The most suited method for this is the principal component analysis which sorts the issues measuring values/attitudes into principal components that can be interpreted as value/attitudinal dimensions. The second research questions concentrates on the most relevant political values and attitudes of the Finnish society, which derives from the definition of the cleavage in this study. Thus, it does not seek to describe exhaustively all possible value/attitudinal differences that may arise in the Finnish context (see e.g. Suhonen 1988).

The third research question (RQ3) handles the relationship between the structural and value/attitudinal elements of cleavages. In order to fulfil the first two elements of cleavages, the politically relevant social structural groups have to be identified and they should hold differing sets of values and attitudes. In this study, the structural element is treated by taking into account classic objective⁶ social structural characteristics, native language, type of residential area and occupational social class, as well as other social structural characteristics that have been suggested to form new bases for emerging cleavages (see e.g. Inglehart 1984; Kriesi 1998, Manza & Brooks 1998; Kriesi et al. 2008; Stubager 2009). The latter consist of gender, education and age cohorts. Denomination falls between these categories as a cleavage base in Finland. The analysis of how social structural position affects values and attitudes is done with a linear regression analysis, which compares the effects of group membership on the value/attitudinal dimensions.

The fourth research question finally determines the existence and relevance of cleavages: they handle the effect of objective social structural positions and values/attitudes on voters' party choice. In this respect, an analysis is made to discover the effect of social structural position on voters' party choice in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections (RQ4a) and to discover whether those social structural positions and values and attitudes that are linked to each other have an effect on voting for a particular party (RQ4b). The answer to the latter research question obviously builds on the connections found between social structural positions and dimensions in RQ3.

If the members of a social structural group loyally support a particular party, then stability is shown in party-voter ties along social structural lines (RQ4a). If, moreover, values and attitudes that are linked to that social structural group, have an effect on voting for this particular party (RQ4b), then the values and attitudes reinforce the effect of social structural position on party choice. Following Franklin (2010), it is not enough to merely show the effect of social structural positions and values/attitudes on party choice. The party at hand should also be dedicated to advocating these group-based values/attitudes in the long run.

⁶ This means that social structural position is based on objectively identifiable groups. Class identification, for instance, would not be a structural measure.

Previous research has shown that the overall effect of social structure on party choice has weakened; the shift in the electorate from structures to values and attitudes has been evident for a long time (e.g. Knutsen & Scarbrough 1995; van der Eijk et al. 2009, 412–413.) Nevertheless, the general trend may conceal some interesting patterns especially concerning the relative importance of the cleavage elements in adding the likelihood of voting for a certain party. By assessing the different social structural characteristics and value/attitudinal dimensions, it is possible to detect whether some ties between group-based interests and parties are so persistent that they do not verify the general pattern of weakened party-voter-ties, discovered in the literature. The popularity of some parties may be strongly anchored to cleavages, while the popularity of other parties may be more dependent on other factors.

In addition, the overall effect of social structural positions and values and attitudes on party choice is analyzed. It has been regarded a theoretically important aspect that the cleavage elements should explain a considerable amount of party support in order to be regarded as evidence of cleavage-based party support (see Franklin 2010). The ability of cleavage elements to explain party support has declined over the decades in Western European countries (Franklin et al. 2009), which is why it is interesting to see whether Finland fits the pattern of party support being based weakly on cleavage elements.

The analysis of party choice is conducted by means of binary logistic regression to explore the strength of social structural positions and value/attitudinal dimensions as determinants of party choice in the 2003–2011 parliamentary elections. The effects are detected by building first a model, which includes only the social structural variables, and then adding each of the value/attitudinal dimensions separately in the subsequent models (RQs 4a and 4b). Moreover, a pseudo R^2 , Nagelkerke's R^2 , is used to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of the model that includes only the social structural variables and the model that includes the social structural variables and the dimensions. The purpose of this is to evaluate the overall impact of the variables in explaining the electoral support of parties.

To sum up, in the light of Figure 2.2, a cleavage can be regarded to exist

1. If there are objectively identifiable and politically relevant social structural groups that share common values/attitudes (RQ's 1, 2 and 3) AND
2. If being a member of a particular social structural group leads to shared values and attitudes and if these both have an effect on voting for a particular party (RQ's 4a & 4b).

The requirements stemming from the threefold cleavage are demanding, as discussed earlier. It may be so that although value/attitudinal dimensions affect party choice, they do not have strong structural linkages. Vice versa, it may be also that social structural group membership affects party choice but is not connected to any of the dimensions. These cases would not be regarded as cleavages. The last research question focuses on the categorization of the political conflicts in contemporary Finland. Based on the analyses that have answered the previous research questions, an evaluation is made as to which of the conflicts can be categorized as cleavages (RQ5). By answering the last research question, this thesis draws a picture of the whole set of conflicts between the voters of different parties. Hence, it can be illustrated which parties are set against one another on *both* a structural *and* dimensional basis. An evaluation is also made concerning whether the conflicts that do not fulfil the cleavage requirements have the potential of evolving into cleavages.

2.3. Placing Finland in a comparative perspective – a brief overview

This study focuses on analyzing contemporary Finland in cleavage terms. Finland has traditionally had a strong and diverse cleavage structure (see Lijphart 1984; Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005) with complex dimensionality and ideological fragmentation in the electorate (Paloheimo 2008) as well as a diverse party system (Bengtsson et al. 2013). Traditionally, the parties in Finland have been tightly anchored to cleavages (Karvonen 2000) and the country has had one of the highest rates in class voting among Western countries (Nieuwbeerta 1995; Bengtsson et al. 2013). As such, Finnish politics has been considered as still being cleavage-based (Sundberg 1999; Paloheimo 2009; Arter 2012a).

Furthermore, the societal development in Finland has affected the strength of cleavage politics. In comparison to the neighboring countries, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, (social) structural transformation and modernization took place at a later stage in Finland and the pace of change was exceptionally rapid. Finland remained for a long time a predominantly agrarian society. Still in the 1950s, the share of workforce employed in the agricultural sector was as high as 46 per cent. The industrial sector never dominated employment in the same way it did in other West European countries. With a minor simplification it can be said that Finland went from a pre-industrial society directly to a post-industrial economic structure with a large service sector and a diminished agricultural sector. (Karvonen 2014, 30.) The share of the workforce employed in the agricultural sector fell by roughly 64 per cent in Finland between 1920 and 2004. The corresponding figure for the other ten West European states was around 27 per cent. During the same time-period, employment in the service sector rose by more than 51 per cent in Finland while the corresponding share was 38 per cent in the other West European states (ibid, 29–30). This development accentuates the long history of traditional, sector-based cleavage politics, which came under enormous pressure as parties had to react to social structural change, especially from the 1960s onwards (Karvonen 2000; 2014).

In addition, Finland's special position in international politics, between Russia and the Western World, has affected electoral loyalties and party politics in Finland. This special position has explained many anomalies in Finnish party

politics (Ware 1996, 213; Karvonen 2000, 133; Pesonen 2001, 122; Karvonen 2014, 31–37). Despite these intriguing features, Finland represents a case that has not been explored thoroughly in cleavage research.

In some countries, such as in Sweden and in Norway, national election studies have been conducted in a systematic way enabling comparisons over time. Thus, it has been possible to build consistent longitudinal analyses on the importance of cleavages. In Finland, on the contrary, the tradition for national election studies is thin and research on cleavages sporadic. The first large-scale post-election study that can be labeled as national election study was performed as late as in 1991, in the aftermath of the parliamentary election (see Pesonen, Sänkiäho, Borg 1993; cf. Sänkiäho 1983, 1987). Since 2003, national election studies have been conducted on a regular basis in Finland (see Paloheimo ed. 2005; Paloheimo & Borg ed. 2009; Borg ed. 2012a).

Cleavages have been analyzed sporadically with limited focus and limited methodological elaborations, partly due to data qualities (see Allardt 1961; Allardt & Pesonen 1967; Pesonen & Sänkiäho 1979; Paloheimo 1988; Pesonen et al. 1993; Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005; Paloheimo 2008). Previous studies have not explored the Finnish cleavage structure from a perspective that would look for social structural groups sharing political values and attitudes, with those interests being reflected in party-voter ties. Rather, the studies have focused either on the effect of social structural positions on party choice or on the effect of values/attitudes on party choice. Hence, they have not built up the whole picture of mechanisms between cleavage elements.

To conclude, despite being a favorable case for studying the importance of cleavages, Finland represents a case that has not been looked thoroughly into in cleavage research. Finland has been considered by experts to have once been the epitome of a cleavage-based political system and by many to still be a country in which party support can be understood in cleavage terms. Because of Finland's archetypical status, the results could be of interest beyond Finland. If cleavages are not detected at the beginning of the 21st century in Finland and they have no major impact on party choice, then the indication is that the threefold-cleavage might be unsatisfactory in identifying the dynamics in the electorate and party sphere also in other national political contexts.

Analyzing the party-voter ties from a cleavage-point-of-view has nevertheless been a major challenge regarding the candidate-orientated electoral system in Finland. The Finnish electoral system combines a proportional list system with mandatory candidate voting. Voters write the number of the candidate they choose on the ballot paper and there is no possibility to cast a mere party vote. Thus, voters get to decide the ranking inside of the party, which has contributed to intra-party competition among parties and to an equal emphasis on the candidate as on the party when voters make their voting decisions (Karvonen 2012; 2014, 16). However, in the 2011 parliamentary election, only 9 per cent of the voters would have voted for their candidate irrespective of political party (Borg 2012a). The political parties are strong and stable actors in Finland; they have a fairly strong cohesion in parliamentary work and parliamentary life is very much party-centered which is why Finland should not be compared with countries where both electoral and political systems are highly personalized. As such, political parties matter much in Finland (for more, see Ruostetsaari & Mattila 2002; Arter 2014.)

Even though the time-period for the analysis of the Finnish cleavage structure and its effects on voting behavior is 2003–2011, the historical perspective is also inherent in the analysis since the cleavages are based on long-lasting disagreements in the electorate and party system. The main focus of the thesis lies, however, in detecting the previously unexplored, present cleavage structure. Cleavages are analyzed in the context of parliamentary elections, as party choice in these elections is the most meaningful expression of party-voter alignments. The stabilization of the Finnish party system, in the sense of same eight parties having candidates elected to parliament in 2003–2011, also motivates the time-period. In contrast to the 1990s, new parties were not elected to the parliament during 2003–2011, which makes the analysis of cleavages in Finland more compact.

At the beginning of the 21st century the political environment in Finland had stabilized after the turbulent 1990s. Finland had become a member of the European Union in 1995 and in the European Monetary Union in 1999 and it had taken a significant step towards the Western Alliance compared to the times of close *Ostropolitik* with the Soviet Union, the neighboring superpower. The gradual collapse of the Soviet Union that began already in the 1980s meant that

the ideological struggle between socialists and non-socialists lost ground (see Pesonen & Riihinen 2002). In addition, Finland survived a severe economic recession in the beginning of the 1990s. The time-period for analyzing contemporary cleavage structure does not include such major structural or geopolitical shocks, which brings some stability to the analysis. However, even though the beginning of the 21st century seemed like a period of stability, the worldwide economic crisis and the Euro crisis began to affect Finland at the turn of the 2000s and 2010s. The Euro crisis, especially the aid packages to the EMU-members in crisis, was topical in the 2011 election, where the True Finns⁷ (Perussuomalaiset) received the unforeseen landslide victory, by gaining 15.0 percentage points in comparison to the 2007 election where it got 4.1 percent of the popular vote (see Arter 2011). This electoral victory obviously eroded many old loyalties in the electorate, which has significance in cleavage terms. The success of the True Finns was not ephemeral since it became the second biggest party in the 2015 parliamentary election with 17.7 percent of the popular vote.

The Finnish electorate and party system in a West European comparison

In order to gain a more detailed picture of how Finland relates to other West European countries, the chapter at hand places Finland in a wider context to highlight the nature of competition for votes between the political parties. The comparison is restricted to 18 West European countries as these countries have gone through much of the same historical phases affecting the formation of party systems and cleavages as Finland. The chosen countries are represented in Table 2.1, which is based on data in the 21st century parliamentary elections. The longitudinal comparison is not essential here due to the research task, so the figures are averages for 2000–2013, which ensures that the different electoral cycles of countries come close to the Finnish parliamentary elections in 2003–2011.

The first column represents aggregate volatility, which indicates the overall change in party support from one election to another. It has been hypothesized

⁷ Throughout this study Perussuomalaiset is referred to as the True Finns. It is a more distinctive, clear-cut and internationally known party label than “The Finns”, which the party adopted to replace the “True Finns” as the party’s official name in English in 2011.

that there is a pervasive linkage between volatility and cleavages. Bartolini and Mair (1990, 212) have stated that high or increasing volatility reflects a decrease in traditional linkages and close attachments between parties and voters. They have listed six factors affecting volatility and one of these is the closure of the cleavage system: if the cleavages do not produce a full closure, voters have more capacity to become electorally mobile (*ibid.* 38-41).⁸ The stronger and more persistent the strength of the cleavage system is, the more unlikely switches between parties are; hence volatility will be lower.

Although the stability of party systems in Western Europe has thus relied on the loyalty of certain voter segments to certain parties, loyalties have been eroding with growing volatility, taking place especially from the 1990s onwards (Mair 2002, 131; Gallagher et al. 2011). In other words, switches between parties and fluctuation between voting and non-voting have become more common (for country-specific patterns see e.g. Holmberg 2000, 19; Borg 2012b, 131).

Table 2.1 shows that Finland belongs to a group of countries with a fairly low volatility rate in the parliamentary elections at the beginning of the 21st century. Without the landslide victory of the True Finns in the 2011 election (+15.0 percentage points), the volatility would be as low as in the United Kingdom, whose electoral system (indicated in the last column) and party system deviate drastically from Finland. A relatively low aggregate volatility does not reveal how attached voters are to their own parties as it conceals the mutually excluding shifts between parties. However, the low volatility in Finland indicates that something has kept the party-voter ties rather stable up until 2011. One explanation is the stabilizing effect of cleavages (see Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005).

⁸ The other five are the policy distances of the parties, party-system format, changes in electoral institutions, changes in electoral participation and short-term issues such as specific issues, candidates and exceptional political events.

Table 2.1 *The party system and electoral system features in 19 West European countries in 2000–2013*⁹ (Source: Gallagher et al. 2011, 310; Gallagher 2013; IDEA 2013; NSD 2013)

Country	Aggregate electoral volatility (a)	Average turnout (b)	Effective number of parties (c)	Average number of parties in government (d)	Blocs in government formation (e)	Electoral system (f)
FINLAND	9,8	69,4	6,0	4,3		PR
Austria	15,5	81,5	3,8	2,0		PR
Belgium	14,5	90,6*	9,3	5,0		PR
Denmark	10,7	86,5	5,4	2,2	x	PR
France	16,0	58,6	4,9	1,8	x	MRO
Germany	10,1	75,9	4,7	2,0		MMPR
Greece	15,8	70,7*	4,3	1,7		PR
Iceland	17,1	84,5	4,2	2,0		PR
Rep. of Ireland	14,4	66,5	4,2	2,3	x	PR
Italy	19,6	80,2	5,3	4,8		MS/MMPL
Luxemburg	6,8	91,3*	4,4	2,0		PR
Malta	3,0	94,0*	2,1	1,0	x	PR
the Netherlands	20,9	77,9	5,9	2,5		PR
Norway	13,7	76,4	5,3	2,3	x	PR
Portugal	10,8	61,2	3,4	1,8		PR
Spain	10,1	72,3	3,1	1,0	x	PR
Sweden	13,8	82,2	4,7	3,0	x	PR
Switzerland	8,6	47,5	5,8	4,3		PR
United Kingdom	6,4	62,2	3,5	1,3	x	SMP
All	12,5	75,2	4,8	2,5		

On the other hand, low volatility is accompanied with a relatively low turnout in Finland. Hence, Finland represents a rather stable case in terms of party-voter ties but also a case where a rather large number of voters abstain from voting. For example, in other Nordic countries turnout is higher. Despite having a highly educated electorate with considerable political knowledge and growing interest in politics, there are many factors that do not encourage voters to use their right to

⁹ Notes: (a) The average aggregate volatility in the parliamentary elections has been calculated by summing all the percentage vote gains of all the winning parties from one election to the next, (b) Countries marked with * have mandatory voting that is enforced (c) is calculated with the Laakso & Taagepera measure (1979) in Gallagher (2013), (d) takes into account the parties that have had ministerial positions in the government i.e. parties giving support to a minority government have not been included, (e) takes place in a given country if the same dimension (left vs. right, with the exception of the Republic of Ireland) has not been crossed when governments have been formed. (f) PR=Proportional representation, MRO=Majority run-off, MMPR=Mixed Member proportional system, MS=Mixed system, MMPL=Mixed Member Plurality, SMP=Single Member Plurality.

vote. From previous research we know that low turnout is partly entangled with the erosion of old loyalties with lowered internal political efficacy: citizens have felt that it is too difficult to get a grasp what is going on in politics and what the differences between parties are (Karvonen & Paloheimo 2005, 296–299). Finnish politics is demanding for the voter: the electoral campaigns are often vague and there is a lack of concrete and definite policy promises. The political alternatives remain to be blurred and the assignment of responsibility is difficult due to the reshuffle of heterogeneous multi-party coalitions (Karvonen 2014, 150).

The Finnish party system represents many alternatives for the voters. In column (c) in Table 2.1, Finland ranks second in the effective number of parties, which takes into account both the number of parties and their relative size. Actually Finland could be ranked number one, as the rate of Belgium consists of two party systems: one in Flanders and the other in Wallonia (see also Dalton et al. 2000, 58; Bengtsson et al. 2013, 30). Nevertheless, the high number of parties has not been accompanied by competition between two party blocs like in Sweden and Denmark, as indicated by the second last column in Table 2.1. These party blocs that are based on a left-right-continuum affect government formation as the ideological divide between competing blocs cannot be crossed (Oscarsson & Holmberg 2013, 261–264). Bloc politics also requires that the coalitions are closed in the dominating ideological dimension in the sense that no party that belongs in this dimension in-between parties A and B is left in the opposition (cf. Laver & Budge 1992, 3). Many countries with multi-party systems have moved towards bipolar competition. However, Finland, along with the Benelux-countries, is the only West European country which is characterized by multiparty contests without a dominant party and with governments being formed through a reshuffling of coalitions (Gallagher et al. 2011, 232–233). In those countries, where bloc politics dominates the political competition, the average number of parties in government (column d in Table 2.1) is not high.

Finland ranks third in the number of parties in government. As such, there is a long tradition of oversized government coalitions in Finland. In addition to the institutional (legislation) reasons, oversized cabinets have been favored because of the consensual way of handling politics, i.e. the need to have broad political forces behind political decisions has dominated politics in Finland (Karvonen 2014, 79–81). Furthermore, the government coalitions have not merely been

oversized; they have also been ideologically highly unorthodox. Especially during the 1990s and the 21st century, there have been few ideological differences that would have been too difficult to overcome when forming cabinet coalitions. Most importantly, socialism and conservatism are not any longer dictating which parties can co-operate and which cannot. Since 1995 there have been three government coalitions in Finland that have included the most right-wing party and the most left-wing party in socioeconomic terms. Jungar (2002, 78) characterizes the general pattern as an expression of political culture in which compromise and cooperation are deemed as virtues. Indeed, there has even been a will for the inclusion of more extreme or elite-criticizing parties, such as the Communists, the populist Finnish Rural Party (see Karvonen 2014, 74–75) and most recently, the True Finns.

Hence Finland is a reminiscent of what Lijphart (1968) labelled as consociational democracies. For these political systems the emphasis has been on conflict resolution and on the need to bring the parties together instead of increasing the polarization further. This does not mean that cleavages would not be strong when parties compete over votes of social structural groups. It indicates that the parties have been willing to overcome the ideological lines in government. Furthermore, the Finnish parties have represented many different party families, which have different ideological features. This aspect is dealt with in the next chapter in the context of the Lipset-Rokkan-model.

3. Cleavage approach in electoral research

3.1. The contextualization of the cleavage approach

3.1.1. Models in the field of electoral research

Three research paths have been dominant in explaining party choice in political science. First, in sociological or social structural models the voter is seen primarily as a part of the surrounding social environment. In this approach social characteristics and belonging to a group explain party choice. Second, socio-psychological or psychological models derive from the concept of party identification. A durable attachment to a particular party is the strongest factor that conditions party choice. Third, rational choice models, which originate from economic theories and a political-rational approach, emphasize the unique individual choices of voters who share the aim of rational behavior. The cleavage approach, which is applied in this study, belongs to the first research tradition.

1) *Social structural models*

The interest in the social structural approach is not in single voters, *per se*, as it emphasizes that people vote according to their social groups. Parties seek to represent the interests of their core clienteles that are based, for example, on class, religion, ethnicity and region (Dalton 2006, 146.) The early studies using a social structural approach were aggregate-level studies, which set the path for political ecology (see Siegfried 1913; Tingsten 1937). Analyses at the micro-level, i.e. handling individual voters, were first introduced in Columbia (N.Y.) voting studies. They marked an enhancement in the way of analyzing voting behavior as it is not possible to draw conclusions at an individual level from aggregate level data.¹⁰ *People's Choice* (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944) and *Voting* (Berelson et al. 1954)

¹⁰ The concept “ecological fallacy” means that even though the vote share for a socialist party is high in an area where there is a large proportion of working-class voters, we cannot say for sure that the working-class is voting for the socialist party (Robinson 1950, 351-357).

highlighted that voting preferences remained stable, especially when social environment was mutually reinforcing, which was in accordance with Tingsten's findings. The Columbia school presented an approach that Sartori (1997) called the sociology of politics. He meant that these analyses overemphasized politics as reflections of social structure. Political sociology, on the other hand, shows how politics and political systems should be seen as translations of social structure. This concern was addressed by subsequent works that analyzed the structure of European party systems and party-voter ties (Arzheimer & Evans 2008).

The most influential of the political sociology studies was *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, edited by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), which set the basis for the formalization and systematization of cleavages in political science and as a way of explaining party-voter ties. It was primarily a theory of how cleavage structures, party systems and attachments to parties were developed. Lipset and Rokkan's fundamental thesis was that the stability and patterns in party systems and voting behavior could be traced back to historical events, which set different social groups in opposition to one another, leading to enduring cleavage systems. The legacy of the model is presented in more detail in sub-chapter 3.1.2 as the cleavage approach stems largely from the Lipset-Rokkan-model. The study led to an ever larger interest in studying voting along social structural lines using different class-voting indexes, which initiated a still on-going debate on how much class-voting has declined.

Social structural contributions have been criticized for not taking the societal change enough into account and leaning on group cohesion and consciousness that have decreased importance in postmodern societies; a result of that fact that social structure has changed dramatically and social mobility and individualism has grown (Arzheimer & Evans 2008, xxii). As societal development is paced by different modernization processes, many researchers, from time to time, have come to the conclusion that voters have become alienated from the traditional social divisions and will not realign with new alliances. This means that voters will neither choose on the basis of social group cues nor develop long-lasting attachments to a particular party (Nie, Verba & Petrocik 1976; Popkin 1991). The proponents of social structural models (e.g. Franklin et al. 1992; Karvonen & Kuhnle ed. 2001) have argued that these kinds of judgments may have been hastily made.

2) *Socio-psychological models*

Whereas the social structural models became the dominant research tradition in Europe, socio-psychological models have been more dominant in the USA (see e.g. Cantril & Harding 1943, Belknap & Campbell 1951). The central concept of party identification became well-established in the seminal work *American Voter* by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960). This Michigan school developed the full model of voting, which was formed around party identification. Formally, party identification is defined as a form of psychological group membership and was regarded as a truly central and consistent attitude that could form a whole system of political beliefs (see Converse 1964). Whereas the party loyalties of voters in social structural models stem from a social structural position, in socio-psychological models they stem from processes that lead to a close and enduring emotional attachment to a party.

There has been much debate on the concept itself, especially among European researchers. Voters tend to change their party identification according to how they intend to vote or have voted. Moreover, voters may have several party identifications and may vote for the party they identify with, and they identify with that party because they have voted for it – leading to a tautology. Hence, the applicability of the concept itself decreases. (Budge et al. 1976; Thomassen 1976; Schmitt 2009.)

3) *Political-rational models*

Rational choice theories differ from the aforementioned approaches in emphasizing the individual as a conscious and deliberate actor who acts on the basis of her own unique preferences by weighing-up the costs and benefits of voting. These theories state that besides voters, parties also try to maximize their utility, as each potential outcome has its benefits and costs. Rational choice models grasp voting as a purely instrumental action.

The classic work in the field of rational choice theories in electoral studies is *An economic theory of democracy* (1957) by Downs. Inspiration for the rational calculations was derived from economic theories and the burden of the voter is to

be able to rank his preferences by evaluating past politics and the policy positions of parties and candidates (see Key, 1966). In the Downsian view, group appeals are merely a means of gathering support and ideologies are instrumental tools. Downs' idea of spatial voting has given inspiration to proximity and directional voting; both of which are interested in the distances between voters and parties in various issues (see e.g. Rabinowitz and McDonald 1989; Listhaug et al. 1994).

The rational choice models have had their pitfalls in political reality. A sense of duty to vote and willingness or habit to show support for a certain party have outweighed the rational calculations that would lead to abstention or a thorough comparison of parties and candidates (Riker & Ordershook 1968, 28; Evans 2004, 97-98).

The funnel of causality and the present study

As it has become evident, the sociological and socio-psychological models emphasize the long-term determinants of party choice, whereas rational choice models emphasize the more short-term influences of party choice. The funnel of causality, presented by the Michigan school, highlights the differences between the schools in relation to voting in Figure 3.1.




Figure 3.1 *The funnel of causality (Campbell et al. 1960, presented in Jakobsen 2013)*

The axis of the funnel represents a time aspect; the closer the factors are to the final voting decision, the more immediate their effects should be. Social structural models represent underlying and fundamental factors behind party choice: social divisions, group loyalties and value orientations are located at the left end of the funnel.

Rational voting models are based on factors that have a more immediate effect on party choice at the right end of the funnel. From a funnel perspective, the present study analyses the significance of social divisions (labelled as social structural positions in this study) and how value orientations (labelled as values/attitudes in this study) are attached to them, affecting the vote. Hence, this study does not analyze, *inter alia*, the significance of economic structure, family influence, media influence, candidate evaluations, candidate images, campaigning strategies and economic conditions. To understand the origins and implications of the cleavage approach, a closer review of the Lipset-Rokkan-model is needed next.

3.1.2. The Lipset-Rokkan-model

The Lipset-Rokkan-model was built to explain the birth and stability of party systems and the loyalties of social structural groups in their voting behavior. It showed that once modern party systems were established and parties had formed their core voter groups along social structural lines, it was difficult for new parties to emerge and it was unlikely for big upheavals to take place in elections, albeit in exceptional crisis circumstances. Some divisions in the political sphere became politicized and others did not, and parties in Western Europe gathered their support from core social groups on the basis of the cleavages. The model also explained how voting behavior contributed to the stability of the cleavage structures and party systems.

According to Lipset and Rokkan, party competition derives from tensions that were formed as a result of historical phases. The mechanism of conflict solving and its transformation into party systems is of essential importance in Lipset and Rokkan's way of analyzing the cleavage structure. They (1967, 26) famously formulated that "*cleavages do not translate themselves into party oppositions as a matter of course*" as this requires the active role of the parties to politicize the

social divisions. They argued that critical junctures resulted in the formation of four pervasive cleavages:

1. Central nation building culture vs. ethnically and linguistically distinct populations in the peripheries
2. Standardizing nation-state vs. historical privileges of the church
3. Landed interests vs. urban-industrial interests
4. Owners vs. employees

The first two of the cleavages stem from the critical juncture of National Revolution (the process of state building). The two latter are products of the Industrial Revolution, although the conflict between owners and employees was sharpened further by the Communist revolution. The National Revolution forced the population to choose a side in conflicts over values and cultural identities. The industrial revolution on the other hand forced citizenry to choose a side in terms of their economic interests. (Lipset & Rokkan 1967, 18–19.)

These historical cleavages can be divided into the same categories also in another sense. They suggest that horizontal conflicts (3&4), which deal with economy reforms, share of income and labor market issues, are easier to solve than vertical conflicts (1&2) centered on religion, ethnicity and language.¹¹ The vertical conflicts cannot be traced back down to conflicts stemming from socioeconomic structure (cf. Zuckermann 1975, 234–235). There is also a varying hierarchy in the political weight of cleavages in each political system.

The innovative aspect in Lipset and Rokkan's approach was that it showed the similarities and dissimilarities in cleavage structure in Western European countries. The first cleavage between dominant national culture and populations in the peripheries emerged primarily when those at the country's socio-political 'center' sought to standardize laws and cultures within the state's boundaries in

¹¹ Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 6–14) also speak of territorial and functional dimensions in analyzing the critical cleavages. The basis for this was the A-G-I-L-scheme, invented by Talcott Parsons (1953). Conflicts between the center and periphery and nation-state and church produced ideological opposition and handled integration at the i-end of the scheme. Rural vs. urban and owner vs. worker -conflicts produced interest-specific oppositions and handled economy (adaptive subsystem) at the a-end of the scheme. Still, it can be argued that the latter cleavages also included strong ideological oppositions. In the scope of this study, it is not reasonable to go further into this highly abstract scheme.

the name of state building. Ethno-linguistically distinct populations resisted this and tried to retain their autonomy. This cleavage has been present only in a handful of European democracies where small and persistent ethnic, linguistic and other cultural minorities have established themselves in party systems to protect their minority rights. (Gallagher et al. 2005, 265–266.)

The process of state-building created also another cleavage – between state-builders and the church. Both the state and the church fought for the control of education, public morality and norms. In Catholic and religiously split countries this cleavage proved to be divisive. The Catholic Church tried to avoid the spread of secularizing tendencies and ensure the persistence of Catholic values. The parties of religious defense established themselves as broad mass movements. In Protestant countries, the churches were essentially national churches and they became the agents of the state after reformation. (Lipset & Rokkan 1967, 15, 38; Gallagher et al. 2005, 265.)

The third cleavage evolved around the conflict between rural/landed interests and the urban commercial and industrial interests brought on by the Industrial Revolution. The commercial and industrial sectors favoured the free market, which was opposed to the protected agricultural sector. In a way, this was a class cleavage too, as it was an economic conflict between people employed in different sectors (Knutsen 2007, 459). However, when treated as a broader rural-urban-cleavage, it was also about deeper cultural conflicts between the countryside and cities. In most parts of Western Europe this conflict did not develop into a long-lasting cleavage as mere conflicts in the commodity market could be channelled, for example, through interest organizations. The tension proved to be important in the Nordic countries where peasants were opposed to the urban elite in both cultural-ideological and economical terms. This led to the formation of Agrarian parties, while Conservative and Liberal parties represented the expanding bourgeoisie and owners of enterprises. (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 19–21; Arter 2001 162–165.)

The most important and universal cleavage to emerge was the one between the working class and owners of capital (4). This cleavage between the poor workers and rich capitalists was intensified by workers feeling themselves economically and culturally alienated from the privileged elite and employers. The growing number of unsatisfied wage earners paved the way for trade unions

and political parties to enhance the workers' living conditions. The variation in the representation of workers' interests in different countries dates largely back to the effects of the Russian revolution. It was then that the Communist parties sought a revolt into the whole political systems, while Social Democrats adopted pragmatic mechanisms to incorporate the ideals of socialism. Hence, the Communist Revolution did not generate new cleavages but accentuated the division between the bourgeois elite and the proletariat, which split into two camps – a socialist one and a communist one. In Scandinavia and Britain, the political elite integrated both workers and communist forces into political systems while in Southern European countries, such as France, Italy and Spain, the workers adopted a more radical agenda with anti-system segments. (Lipset & Rokkan 1967, 21–22, 49; Gallagher et al. 2005, 268–269.)

As the clash between the workers and bourgeoisie was a comprehensive and universal phenomenon, class cleavage has become the most common and standardizing cleavage in Western societies. It has therefore also been the most analyzed cleavage in comparative studies (Bartolini & Mair 1990, 42; Evans ed. 1999). According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the crucial differences among party systems ultimately reflect differences in the national histories of conflict and compromises across three cleavage lines – center-periphery, state-church and land-urban. The cleavages, critical events, conflicts and party families attached to the cleavages are presented in Table 3.1. The Finnish parties attached with these cleavages are dealt with in detail in Chapter 3.3.

Although the conflicts emerged between social structural groups, it is also important to point out the often forgotten view that the shaping of party systems was influenced by political issues linked to the interests of a certain social structural group. Liberal parties wanted to promote individual freedom and remove old privileges in societies, while Conservative parties wanted to promote the church and the military establishment. The breakthrough of the Socialists was based on promising better working and social conditions for the workers. Agrarian parties, in turn, prioritized agricultural issues. (Borre 2001, 9–11.)

Table 3.1. *The background of cleavages and their transformation into party families (modified from Klingemann et al. 1994)*

Cleavage	Critical juncture	Conflict	Party family	Party representative in Finland
Center - Periphery	Reformation - Counter-Reformation 16 th -17 th centuries	National vs. supra-national religion; linguistic confrontations	Ethnically and linguistically based parties	The Swedish People's Party
State-Church	National Revolution 1789 and after	Secular vs. religious control of mass Education	Religious parties	
Land - Industry	Industrial Revolution 19 th century	Tariff levels for agricultural products; control vs. freedom for Enterprise	Agrarian parties; Conservative and Liberal parties	The Agrarian League The National Coalition Party The Liberals
Owner-Worker	The Russian Revolution 1917	Integration into national polity vs. commitment to international revolutionary Movement	Socialist and Communist parties	The Social Democrats The Communist Party

The most famous conclusion that Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 50) came to, was the freezing of the party systems. According to them, *'the party systems of the 1960s reflected, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structure of the 1920s'*. This indicated that both party systems and cleavage structures had stabilized. Cleavages persisted because they concerned interests, which remained relevant for the groups involved. For example, the cleavage between capitalists and workers remains essential as long as the sides felt that they have common interests worth fighting for. For example, when the distinctiveness of being a worker, a Catholic or a farmer becomes blurred, or when the division to different groups is no longer politically relevant, the significance of the cleavage at hand should decrease. (Dalton 2002; Gallagher et al. 2005, 273–274)

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) emphasized that the parties which were able to establish mass organizations and gain power before the final wave of mass voter mobilization have been most enduring and successful. Through social groups,

political parties were able to institutionalize a firm support base. In each election, parties automatically turned on to their own core groups, which voted somewhat ritually for the same party, thus narrowing the support potential for newcomers. Finally, electoral rules also tended to protect the established interests. Proportional representation electoral systems were adopted in certain countries to protect the minorities and they encouraged competition to be developed along several cleavage lines (Switzerland, Finland), while in other countries majority systems often squeezed the competition around one salient cleavage (e.g. Great Britain).

Party politics and ideological conflicts seemed to have stabilized after the Second World War. Lipset and Rokkan indeed had a firm backing from the 1950s and 1960s, when changes were modest in elections and party systems, to support their analysis of stable party systems and cleavages. Kircheimer (1966) named it as the era of waning opposition and Bell (1965) even anticipated an end of ideology as he claimed that political ideas had reached a saturation point. This political consensus was accompanied by an increase in wealth and prosperity in rebuilt Europe. The validity of the straight-forward relationship between social structure and party preferences was thoroughly examined by both Rose & Urwin (1969) and Rose (1974), who found support for stable voting behavior along cleavage lines (for a critique of these early studies, see Knutsen 2004a, 6–9). But the claimed stability soon became challenged.

Already at the beginning of 1970s, political scientists started to talk about major societal and electoral change in Western Europe (and at large in the Western World) that set into question the applicability of the cleavage approach.¹² The modernization processes, expansion of education, social mobility, secularization and urbanization, inter alia, eroded the base for stability. The number of mobile voters increased, which led to an increase in electoral volatility and a reshuffle in party-voter ties.

Next, it is highlighted how the Lipset-Rokkan-model of stable party systems with the members of old party families dominating the party scene has prevailed in contemporary West European party systems. The point is hence to indicate the

¹² In fact Lipset and Rokkan anticipated that change might be just around the corner at the end of the 1960s due to growing citizen activism and radicalism.

extent to which old, historically class-based parties are supported in relation to new ones and compare the Finnish party system to other party systems.

3.1.3 The legacy of the Lipset-Rokkan-model in West European party systems

Table 3.2 represents the electoral support of parties belonging to the same party family, i.e. representing a certain ideological orientation, at the beginning of the 21st century. The party families to the left of the table, Ethnic-regional, Christian Democrat, Centre-Agrarian, Liberal, Conservative and Social Democrat party families are old ones, which belong to the Lipset-Rokkan-model. Obviously, there is heterogeneity in the historical background of the parties belonging to a certain party family. However, the same underlying ideological orientation bundles them together. The Christian Democratic party family is a special case in the sense that in Catholic and religiously mixed countries it has stemmed from the historical church-state cleavage, whereas the Christian parties were established in Nordic protestant countries much later as a counter-reaction to the secularization and disrespect of traditional moral values (Freston 2004; Hanley 2008: 86). The party family located furthest to the left entails both Communist and New Left parties, since it was impossible to separate the support for these parties in some countries (see Appendix). Two party families are genuinely new, namely the Nationalist-Populist party family and the Green party family.

Ethnic-regionalist parties are represented in the parliament only in Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Switzerland, Italy¹³ and Finland. Finland is the sole country, where a representative of this party family, the Swedish People's Party, a historical language party, has constantly received governmental power at the national level. Hence, solely in terms of party representation, the ethno-linguistic cleavage is of little importance in contemporary West European party systems. Instead, ethno-linguistic cleavages

¹³ The support of the Faroese and Greenlandic parties in Denmark, Ticino League in Switzerland and Südtiroler Volkspartei in Italy are not included in Table 3.2 as their support has not exceeded an average of 1 per cent of the national vote in parliamentary elections in 2000–2013. Lega Nord is not regarded as an ethnic-regionalist but as a nationalist-populist party with the nationalism being in this case explicated in the conceived superiority of the Padania region. The ethnic-regionalist parties in the French parliament come from overseas departments.

have been of increasing scholarly interest in rising democracies outside Europe (see e.g. Mozarraf, Scarrit & Calagh 2003; Raymond 2015).

Table 3.2 *The mean electoral support for parties in different party families in 19 West European countries in 2000-2013¹⁴ (Source: NSD 2013)*

Country	Party family								
	ETH- REG	CD	AGR- CENT	LIB	CONS	SD	COM/ NEW LEFT	NAT- POP	GRE
FINLAND	4.5	4.7	21.2	-	20.4	21.7	8.9	8.3	7.9
Austria	-	34.2	-	-	-	33.7	-	17.8	10.3
Belgium	9.9	16.8	-	23.0	-	24.0	-	13.9	7.9
Denmark	-	1.4	28.3	9.2	8.7	26.3	12.4	12.9	-
France	-	-	-	7.4	33.3	26.1	5.3	11.2	4.4
Germany	-	35.8	-	10.6	-	31.9	8.2	-	9.1
Greece	-	-	-	-	35.3	34.0	16.1	5.7	-
Iceland	-	-	16.7	6.2	32.0	24.3	14.1	-	-
Ireland	-	28.6	-	2.2	33.5	13.5	-	-	3.5
Italy	-	4.4	-	5.7	34.6	26.6	5.3	5.1	-
Luxemburg	-	37.1	-	15.5	9.0	22.5	2.6	-	11.7
Malta	-	48.2	-	-	-	50.4	-	-	-
the Netherlands	-	24.0	-	24.2	-	21.6	9.7	10.8	5.1
Norway	-	8.2	6.1	4.6	17.5	30.8	9.2	19.9	-
Portugal	-	-	-	-	43.7	36.9	13.6	-	-
Spain	6.5	-	-	-	41.2	35.2	5.3	-	-
Sweden	-	7.1	6.9	9.3	23.9	35.2	6.6	3.4	5.7
Switzerland	-	16.0	-	18.5	1.8	20.5	-	27.4	8.5
United Kingdom	1.7	-	-	21.1	33.4	35.0	-	-	-
All	1.1	14.2	4.1	7.9	19.2	29.0	6.2	6.8	3.9

¹⁴ETH-REG=Ethnic-regional, CD=Christian Democratic, AGR-CENT=Centre-Agrarian, LIB=Liberal, CONS=Conservative, SD=Social Democratic, COM/NEW LEFT=Communist/New Left, NAT-POP=Nationalist-Populist, GRE=Green. Only those parties that can be placed in one of the party families and which have been represented in the parliament in the 21st century and whose average electoral support in parliamentary elections exceeds 1 % in the time period have been taken into account. Thus, the Cinque Stelle Movimento, for example, with 25.6 % of the vote in the Italian parliamentary election in 2013 would have been taken into account in terms of electoral success but it could not be placed in any of the party families. The categorization of individual parties into the party families (see Appendix) has been made on the basis of the historical-ideological basis of the parties, current ideological profile and the Euro parliament-group to which they belong to, as the Euro-parties are grouped largely in terms of party families (see Hanley 2004; Gallagher et al. 2011).

The Christian Democratic party family is the party family that is most attached to the old cleavage between church and state. Nowadays, conflicts between the church and state are more settled and Christian parties are mainstream parties in the centre-right-position of the political spectrum, emphasizing social and moral concerns. Religiosity can be seen in reactions to family policies and moral questions (Gallagher et al. 2005 241–244; Hanley 2008: 86). Strong and old Christian Democrat parties occur only in Catholic or religiously mixed countries (such as those in Austria and Germany), whereas the parties that have been established later, (such as those in Finland and Sweden) have remained more marginal in the parliament.

There are only a few parties that have their roots in the land-industry-cleavage: the parliamentary representation of Centre-Agrarian parties is restricted to the Nordic countries in Western Europe. In many other countries, tensions between rural and urban interests are no longer present in the party system. Comparatively, the strong support of the agrarian-based Centre Party is the peculiarity of Finland. The other strong agrarian-based Centre Party is in Denmark. However, the Danish *Venstre* has moved far beyond agricultural and rural interests as its emphasis nowadays is on economic liberalism and a free market ideology, as it has extended its appeal, to a growing extent, towards urban voters (Gallagher et al. 2011, 286; Bengtsson et al. 2013, 163, 206).

The Liberal party family is contrary to the Ethnic-Regionalist and Centre-Agrarian party families represented in the majority of West European party systems at the beginning of the 21st century. However, the average electoral support of Liberal parties in West European countries is not high (roughly 8 per cent). The liberal party family is the only old party family, which is not any longer represented in the Finnish parliament, which is one of the biggest changes in the Finnish party system in the long run.

It is common that there is one strong conservative party in each party system, which represents either the Christian Democratic or the Conservative party family. From a class cleavage perspective, Conservative parties have been the most important counterforce to left-wing parties (Gallagher et al. 2011, 257). The electoral support for this party family has been the second highest after the Social Democrats. The Social Democratic party family has had by far the highest support in Western Europe in 2000–2013. However, the support for Social

Democrats has been in a steady and slow decline, with the pattern continuing in the elections in the 21st century (see Gallagher et al. 2011, 241). This pattern is also matched in Finland, where the Social Democratic Party has lost its once dominant position. The Finnish Social Democrats had an average electoral support slightly above 20 per cent in 2000–2013, similar to the representatives of the Conservative and the Centre-Agrarian party family.

The most left-wing party family contains a split to old parties that have been traditionally anchored in class cleavage and to new parties representing new kinds of political conflicts. In some countries the Communist parties have continued to exist while in others, like in Finland, New Left parties have been built on the ruins of old Communist parties. In addition, some New Left parties have been formed on a new value basis independently from Communist tradition. In 2000–2013 the Finnish Left Alliance has had an 8.9 per cent average electoral support while the average support for the parties belonging to the party families furthest to the left is roughly six per cent.

Hence, it can be stated that the old party families continue to thrive in West European countries even at the beginning of the 21st century, even though their electoral support has been declining. The Green party family, and especially the Nationalist-Populist party family, have represented a challenge for the members of the old party families. Nationalist-Populist parties have their ideological core in the populist way of emphasizing the divide between the elite and people, nativism and the homogenous nation-state, and in seeing external influences as a threat to the traditional national way of life and to the ordinary, indigenous people (see e.g. Taggart 2000; Rydgren 2005; Mudde 2007).¹⁵

The Nationalist-Populist party family has been the dominating party family in Switzerland and has fared well also in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Norway; and recently also in Finland. The success of nationalist-populist parties has been regarded as a sign of new conflicts taking place in the electoral competition (see e.g. Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt 1995; Mudde 2007). The success of the Green parties has been more modest than the one of nationalist-

¹⁵ Contrary to many other studies, this party family is not labelled Radical Right Populist since there are some important centrist populist parties with a nationalist agenda (see for example the borderline case of the True Finns in Paloheimo & Raunio 2008, 213 cf. Arter 2010). The label Nationalist-Populist party family is more inclusive.

populist parties. The origin of the Green party family is in the ecological awakening in the 1970s, when ecological concerns challenged material well-being and economic growth. There are only a few West European countries where the Greens have polled better than in Finland in the 21st century. The Green parties have established themselves in the West European party systems by emphasizing postmaterialist concerns (Gallagher et al. 2011, 251–252)

Table 3.3 concludes the results of Table 3.2 by summing up the number of party families represented in each West European party system. The criterion for representation is mean electoral support exceeding four percentage points.¹⁶ Whereas the Social Democrats are represented in each party system, the Liberals, Conservatives, Christian Democrats, Communist/New Left parties, Nationalist-Populist parties and Green parties are represented in ten to thirteen countries. The Centre-Agrarian parties are represented in five party systems and Ethnic-Regionalist parties exceed the 4 per cent threshold only in Finland and Spain.

Finland is the only West European country where eight out of nine party families are represented, with only Sweden coming close to that. The recent success of the Nationalist-Populist Swedish Democrats in the 2014 parliamentary election also means that Sweden should be considered as a party system where eight party families are represented in a stable manner. The eight represented party families in Finland include both the old parties, which have their basis in historical cleavages and in the Lipset-Rokkan-model, and the members of new party families, which have accentuated other kinds of conflicts and challenged the old parties. This points to the possibility of a diverse cleavage structure and accentuates the need of evaluating the old and new cleavage bases and the connections between cleavage elements. In the next chapter, the focus is shifted to the interplay between social structural positions, values and attitudes and party choice.

¹⁶ As the legal/formal thresholds in parliamentary elections is set at the highest on 4 or 5 percentage points in West European countries that have one, the limit here is set on 4 percentage points (see Banducci & Karp 2009). It is sufficiently high to exclude the party families that do not have much influence on the party system in a given country.

Table 3.3 *The summary of the existence of party families in 19 West European countries in 2000-2013*

Country	Party family							COM/			Altogether
	ETH-		AGR-			NEW	NAT-				
	REG	CD	CENT	LIB	CONS	SD	LEFT	POP	GRE		
FINLAND	x	x	x	-	x	x	x	x	x	8	
Austria	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	x	4	
Belgium	-	x	-	x	-	x	-	x	x	5	
Denmark	-	-	x	x	x	x	-	x	-	5	
France	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	x	x	6	
Germany	-	x	-	x	-	x	x	-	x	5	
Greece	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	-	4	
Iceland	-	-	x	x	x	x	x	-	-	5	
Ireland	-	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	-	3	
Italy	-	x	-	x	x	x	x	x	-	6	
Luxemburg	-	x	-	x	x	x	-	-	x	5	
Malta	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	2	
the Netherlands	-	x	-	x	-	x	x	x	x	6	
Norway	-	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	-	7	
Portugal	-	-	-	-	x	x	x	-	-	3	
Spain	x	-	-	-	x	x	x	-	-	4	
Sweden	-	x	x	x	x	x	x	-	x	7	
Switzerland	-	x	-	x	-	x	-	x	x	5	
United Kingdom	-	-	-	x	x	x	-	-	-	3	
All	2	12	5	12	13	19	11	10	10	3.9	

3.2. Erosion or update of cleavages?

In the following, an overview of the metamorphosis of the West European cleavage structure will be given. Thus, the wider framework of cleavages is discussed before analyzing the Finnish case more in detail. In regards to the cleavage approach, it can be said that a) social structure and identities/cohesion based on social structural position have changed; b) old political parties have needed to adapt, update their electoral strategies, while new parties that politicized new issues have emerged and taken their place in the party systems; c) values and attitudes have started to play a larger role in electoral choices and a shift has occurred in people's value basis; d) the cleavage structure, on the whole, has been challenged.

All of these aspects, which represent a challenge to the validity of the classic cleavage model, are looked into thoroughly in the subsequent chapters. By doing so, the need of and voids in cleavage research become more apparent. The critical guiding question for the following subchapters is then 'why should we care about cleavages and why is the cleavage approach relevant even at the beginning of the 21st century? The emphasis here is on analyzing the cleavage approach from four perspectives: a) social structural position and group-based identity; b) party-voter ties from a social structural perspective; c) the move towards values and attitudes; d) the search for new cleavages.

3.2.1. Social structural position and group identity

The rapid change in social structure, economic structure and surrounding societal environment that took place in Western societies, especially during the latter half of the 20th century, changed the structural basis of cleavages. First, the service sector grew immensely at the cost of agriculture and heavy industry after the Second World War in Western Europe, especially from the 1960s onwards (see Gallagher et al. 2005, 277). The gradual shift into post-industrialist societies meant, first and foremost, that the composition and size of occupational social classes changed dramatically. The group stratifications derived from the

industrial revolution became evermore outdated (Bell 1973).¹⁷ Second, the declining agricultural sector and the shrinking number of rural residents were due to a changed economic structure and urbanization, leading eventually to the weakening of rural interests. Third, secularization processes eroded the base for religious cleavages in Western Europe. The ethno-linguistic cleavage has been the only one not affected by such turbulence: the share of politically relevant ethno-linguistic minorities has remained stable. The change in social structural positions that are a part of the Lipset-Rokkan-model is handled in more detail in the next section.

Social class

As regards to social classes, the change in economic structure decreased the share of the working class and a large service sector emerged. As this was in interaction with the rise in educational levels, it meant the well-known expansion of a better-educated middle class at the expense of the working class (see e.g. Dogan 2001; Mair et al. 2004; Gallagher et al. 2011). The new middle-class did not become that interested in economic conflicts and was so broad that there was no longer any firm ground to support any common middle-class interests (Eriksson & Goldthorpe 1992; Dalton 2008, 151.). The class consciousness of the working class weakened when the need to push class struggle further decreased. When many central goals of the working class were achieved, there was less demand for class propaganda: the unionized workers in key industries achieved a comfortable income level, which was not anymore a direct reflection of one's class. Hence, inequalities in societies became more distantly related to social class than before. Furthermore, the decline in labor union strength affected the potentials of the working class as a political actor (Dalton et al. 1984, 15–17; Dogan 2001, 109–111; Trigilia 2011, 271–275).

As the coherence of classes weakened, the concept of a social class also needed updating. Old class concepts based on the Marxian class struggle were replaced by conceiving class as a combination of skills and the degree of autonomy related

¹⁷ Furthermore, events such as the breakdown of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union furthered the decay of solid class images (Dogan 2001, 96).

to work (Eriksson & Goldthorpe 1992; cf. Olin Wright 1985).¹⁸ Further elaborations have aimed to recognize changes associated with post-industrialism and differentiate post-industrial categories from the more traditional categories (Esping-Andersen 1993).¹⁹ In comparison to the heydays of class politics, when social class determined political identity and behavior (see Franklin et al. 1992, 386), it is difficult to redefine social classes in a way that the constituted classes would be particularly self-aware of their class positions. People are no longer that integrated into class networks and the barriers between social groups have lowered significantly (Dalton 2008, 151–152). Hence, the concrete common interests of people belonging to different classes are even more crucial to be detected in the form of values and attitudes, as group identity and consciousness have weakened.

Religion

The structural basis for the religious cleavage has been eroding as both church membership and religious identities have lost ground in Western Europe when coming into the 21st century. Secularization has meant a decreasing importance of authority and religious practices. The historically strong antagonism between the church and state has largely vanished and institutions that once had religious affiliations are becoming more secular. Moreover, the public sphere and moral norms today have a less distinctive religious character and there has been an obvious decrease in church-going and in a lifestyle sustaining traditional Christianity. (Sommerville 1998, 250–251.)

Religion has lost much of its relevance, especially among the youngest generations in Western Europe. As such, although people still express a formal belief in God, the vitality of religion has eroded steadily (Norris & Inglehart 2004, 3–4; cf. Kaufmann et al. 2012).²⁰ In Catholic countries, the church-state-cleavage

¹⁸ This in fact reminds somewhat of the Weberian view of conceiving social classes (see Trigilia 2011, 271).

¹⁹ The class categorizations are looked more into detail in Chapter 4.2.1 when occupational class is operationalized for the analysis.

²⁰ Yet, a new uprising of religious confrontations and religious fundamentalism is found in third-world countries, especially, as well as in the USA. Thus, Norris and Inglehart (2004) remind that it is misleading to talk about secularization as an all-encompassing concept. Religion appears to be an

has eroded partly because of the weakened role of the Catholic Church and less frequent church attendance, even though church membership is still at a high level. In Protestant Northern Europe, although the church-state-cleavage was not established in the same way, there has been a further decrease in the belief in God as well as a decrease in Church membership (Norris & Inglehart 2004, 74, 90). Nevertheless, the rise of secularization in the Nordic countries has not been without any counter-reactions: revivalist movements have remained strong and active church-goers have stood in opposition to the diminishing role of religion in society (Freston 2004, 33–34; Nykänen 2012).

Rural-urban/land-industry

The change in economic structure and community structure meant that the basis for the cleavage between landed and urban industrial-commercial interests became eroded. Urbanization was initially driven by decreasing employment opportunities in the agricultural sector, furthered by the increased life opportunities that the cities had to offer. Today, tensions revolve less around landed and industrial-commercial interests.²¹ Also the broader tensions between rural and urban interests have become less topical, due to internal migration from countryside to cities, which has left rural interests increasingly unnoticed. Nevertheless, despite being pushed to the margin, rural interests are still represented in some party systems, such as in Finland. In these cases, however, the differing interests also deal with other issues than landed interests linked to agriculture. One such issue deals with an encompassing confrontation that has developed between people living in remote areas and cities. This issue, concerning the life opportunities in every part of the country, provides the rural population, especially, with a sense of identity that is worth fighting for in the political arena (see Knutsen 2004a, 132–133; Ruostetsaari 2011). Hence in a modern form, a rural-urban-cleavage should be more about the type of

increasingly important component of public culture and there is an ever-extending debate on political religions and religious nationalism (Turner 2011).

²¹ When these clashing interests are raised in EU-countries nowadays, they mostly deal with clashes concerning subsidies for the agricultural sector, albeit without any obvious linkages to the representation of farmers' interests in the party system (Gallagher et al. 2005, 268).

residential area, irrespective of sector interests (agriculture vs. commercial-industrial).

Ethnic background and language

Of the Lipset-Rokkan cleavages, the cleavage between center and ethno-linguistic peripheries has had a firm structural basis in members of ethnic and linguistic minorities²². The main reason is that ethnic background and native language are persistent: they are descended from one generation to another more naturally than class, religiosity or residence (Mair 2001, 29–30). Moreover, ethnic background and language provide people with a distinctive, self-aware identity. Recently, ethnic and linguistic identities have even experienced a reincarnation of sorts, as they have been placed more upfront as a result of increasing demands on regional autonomy and extended cultural rights (Türsan 1998, 1–4). In other words, the revival of ‘new localism’ has meant the resurgence of ethno-regional identity (Tossutti 2002, 53).

3.2.2. Party-voter ties from a social structural perspective

The change in the composition and cohesion of social structural groups resulted in changes in party-voter ties, of which two major trends have been documented. First, the loyalty of social structural groups to their ‘own’ party has decreased. As a result, cleavage lines have become more blurred in voting behavior. Second, the parties have realized that they can no longer appeal merely to their core group; they have had to broaden their electoral appeal. Thus, tendencies both in the electorate and in the party sphere side loosened the ties between voters and parties that were found to be strong in the Lipset-Rokkan-model.

²² Minority Rights Group (1997) has named three main categories of minorities: a. indigenous peoples, b. historical minorities and c. new minorities. Three examples of categories are a. Sami people in Lapland. b. Swedish-speaking Finns c. Kosovars who have settled in a new country after fleeing from their home due to the Yugoslavian war. In this study, the historical minorities (b) are of interest from the cleavage perspective.

Social class and party choice

The decline in class voting is one of the most documented patterns in cleavage studies (see e.g. Franklin et al. 1992; Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 1999; Brooks et al. 2006; Evans & De Graaf 2013). Franklin and colleagues (1992; 2009) found that even though the timing in the decline varied between West European countries, it was eventually steep everywhere by the 1990s. Voters had released themselves from the 'straight-jacket of class voting' (van der Eijk et al. 1992, 409). Although people did not become unaware of class cues, they became more irrelevant to them. In other words, classes no longer voted in such unified patterns as before. However, despite, the downward trend in class consciousness and class voting, certain parties still have their support basis in the lower classes, as do certain parties in the upper classes.

The ties between working-class and left-wing parties have eroded the most over time. Irrespective of the measure for class voting²³, the results have tended to point to the same direction: the ability of social class to predict a vote for a left-wing party has decreased. The electoral ties between other occupational classes and parties also loosened, but to a lesser extent (see e.g. Dogan 1995; Nieuwbeerta 1995; Benoit & Laver 2006; Knutsen 2006; Dalton 2008, 153; Gallagher et al. 2011). Cross-national studies have showed that although class is still related to vote choice in 21st century Western Europe, the relationship is relatively modest (e.g. Dalton 2008 153–154; Oskarson 2005, 93–96; Franklin 2009). Knutsen (2007, 476) anticipates that class voting is unlikely to experience a new rise in the future, unless there emerges a sharper polarization in the political issues that class is attached to.

²³ The most simplified and common measure has been the Alford-index (Alford 1963), which measures the extent to which support for the left is greater among the working class than among the middle class. However, this index does not take into account the general shifts in party popularity, which can lead to mix correlations between class and vote with changes in party popularity (Oskarson 2005, 93). The shifts in electoral support from a party's 'own' group tend to overemphasize the decrease in class voting as the size occupational groups have changed dramatically (Pesonen et al. 1993, 106). Thomsen-index in turn examines for instance the likelihood of a working class voter to vote for a Socialist party. One of the most recent methods in research focused on class voting has been to use kappa index with more complex class categorizations. (Oskarson 2005, 93.)

Religion and party choice

Early studies found that religion, alongside social class, had a major impact on party choice.²⁴ However, the explanatory power of denomination on party choice has decreased: the fact that many voters habitually belong to the church has no political manifestation (Knutsen 2004a, 59, 102). Nevertheless, the decrease in denominational voting is more country-specific than the universal decrease in class-voting (see Knutsen 1995; Esmer & Pettersson 2007, 499; Dalton 2008, 156).²⁵ As such, even though there are fewer denominational or religious voters, those voters have maintained largely distinct voting patterns, which explains why religious voting has proved to be more persistent than class voting (Oskarson 2005, 94–95). Religious denomination has been an important factor when explaining the dichotomous socialist/non-socialist party choice, due to the old anti-clerical background of socialist parties and the religious nature of Christian Democrat/Conservative parties. Moreover, the growing number of secular voters might even have strengthened the need to preserve Christianity in politics. But the overall ability of religious characteristics to explain party choice is weakening. (Knutsen 2004b.) Thus, although religion constitutes a cleavage base that strongly affects niche voters, it is irrelevant to the majority of voters.

Rural-urban-residence and party choice

The connection between rural-urban residence and party choice has not been particularly high in many West European countries. Since the 1970s, the predictive value of rural-urban residence for party choice has been decreasing further, although not in a unified manner (Knutsen 2004a, 133–136). In their wide comparison of Western countries from the 1960s to the late 1980s, Franklin and colleagues (1992) discovered that rural-urban residence was not a strong

²⁴ Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Rokkan (1960) concluded that class is the most important cleavage basis as the electoral support of parties was primarily based on either lower classes or the middle and upper classes. Rose and Urwin (1969, 12; see also Rose 1974) argued that religious divisions, not class, were the main social basis of parties.

²⁵ The religious cleavage has also been analyzed in the light of church attendance and party choice. Remarkably persistent voting patterns have been found despite secularization, especially in Catholic and religiously mixed countries (see e.g. Dalton 2008, Knutsen 2004a). However, as church attendance is not a structural quality, but a manifestation of religiosity, it is not analyzed here further.

predictor of socialist/non-socialist party choice. The exceptions, however, are found in the Nordic countries, especially in Finland, where the rural-urban cleavage was politicized already at the beginning of the 20th century, with farmers finding their political home in a Centre-Agrarian Party. Outside the Nordic countries, the rural-urban basis is hence seldom brought up in Western Europe as a cleavage basis affecting party choice, whereas in parts of Eastern Europe it is more relevant (see Berglund, Ekman & Aarebrot ed. 2004).

Ethnic background and language and party choice

The effect of the ethno-linguistic social structural position on party choice can be examined in two different ways. One option is to examine how uniformly people living in a particular region tend to vote for a certain party (e.g. Caramani 2004, Knutsen 2010a). The other option is to explore the effect of belonging to an ethnic/linguistic minority on party choice (e.g. De Winter 1998, Bengtsson 2011). The problem with the first approach is that it stems from the idea that the socio-political center is set against a culturally and ethnically distinct population. However, the fact that the support of a party is regionally skewed does not necessarily mean that it represents the kind of autonomous interests that are attached to the cleavage.²⁶ From a cleavage perspective, only the regions, which represent culturally distinct minorities, are relevant.

Despite previous research that has showed a general decline in the effect of a social structural position on party choice (e.g. Franklin et al. 1992; Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 1999; Knutsen 2006; Evans & De Graaf 2013), ethnicity and language have remained robust as dividing lines in voting behavior. It has been argued that many ethno-linguistic minorities in Western Europe have strong incentives to concentrate their votes to a party that represents minority interests (Deegan-Krause 2007, 549; Bengtsson 2011). Moreover, when ethno-linguistic minorities are geographically concentrated it is easier to maintain a common identity and interests. This, in turn, can be reflected in loyalty for a

²⁶ To take an example, the support of Centre-Agrarian parties tends to lean towards regions that are geographically peripheral and agrarian. These parties do not represent the autonomous demands of regions or the interests of ethnic minorities.

certain party, which has been the case in countries, such as Finland and Spain, with politically prominent ethno-linguistic minorities (see Caramani 2004, 89).²⁷

The transformation of political parties

As we have witnessed, the previously close ties between social structural groups and political parties, that used to stabilize party support, have eroded by a notable extent. Partly, this was the result of the weakened incentives for choosing a party merely on the grounds of group interests; and partly the result of parties choosing to appeal to a larger electorate than their core clientele. As such, parties have been forced to rethink their electoral strategies.

The Socialist parties have sought to attract votes beyond the working class, the Agrarian parties beyond farmers, and the Religious parties beyond strongly religious voters. As a result, parties are no longer so uniformly class-based: working class voters constitute a smaller share of the electorate of a Socialist party than before, for example. Only small parties with a special clientele, such as ethno-linguistic and regional parties, could stick to their familiar but restricted target groups (Mair 2001, 26). Kircheimer (1966) argued in his article “*The transformation of the Western European Party Systems*” that major parties were forced to transform from class-based mass parties to so-called catch-all parties in order to succeed, which would eventually lead to a transformation of West European party systems. This strategy meant a drastic reduction in ideological profile, a strengthening of leadership and a decreasing importance of loyal party members (Krouwel 2003, 28). When parties have focused on seeking votes from where the majority of the electorate is situated ideologically, they have tended to become more moderate, more centrist and more similar to each other – except in the countries where there have been deeply rooted controversies between different segments in society, such as in Belgium where the party system is characterized by a deep linguistic divide (Puhle 2002, 60–69).²⁸

²⁷ Furthermore, in Great Britain and Italy there has been some trend towards reterritorialization of voting behavior. In the former, both the Scottish National Party and the Welsh, Plaid Cymru, have gathered votes from their own territories, and in the latter, Lega Nord in Northern Italy has succeeded by demanding more autonomy to the wealthy Northern regions.

²⁸ The ideal typologies of Kircheimer have never fully fitted the real-life political parties. The extent to which they resembled the catch-all party that Kircheimer described depends on the country and party system at hand, historical legacies, salient cleavages, electoral system, etc.

A further development in the nature of political parties has taken place from the 1980s onwards, as the linkages between political parties and their allied organizations, such as labor unions, religious groups or agricultural producers' center unions have loosened. Parties have begun to emphasize more short-term programmatic and electoral appeals with a reduced capacity for social integration and have been labelled as electoral-professional parties. (Panebianco 1988, 263; Katz 1990; Puhle 2002, 60–69.)²⁹

The characterizations mentioned above do not seem to fit to a cleavage-based approach. If the modern parties do not seek to establish stable electoral linkages by appealing to specific social structural groups, then traditional cleavage-politics is on a weak basis (see Katz & Mair 2002, 132). However, as Gunther and Diamond (2003, 191–192) point out, for example, different types of parties have different strategies to mobilize voters. Therefore, it is beneficial for the parties to have some ideologically distinctive features that appeal to their most loyal supporters, even though the parties have begun to shy away from having a too restrictive appeal to certain social groups – to a greater extent, they seek to politicize value bases by taking positions on political issues (see Enyedi 2008; Oskarson 2005, 85).

Dealignment and realignment are processes that have indicated the erosion of persistent party-voter ties. Put briefly, dealignment occurs when voters no longer feel as close to the political parties as they used to and the parties are not able to respond to new concerns arising in post-industrialist societies. Recently, voters have become increasingly disengaged from conventional party politics, old cleavage politics and the interests that the old parties represent. The fact that voters no longer feel that parties and elections matter so much can be seen in both decrease in party loyalty and turnout (Dalton et al. 1984; Mair 2002, 133,138; Gallagher et al. 2005). The realignment thesis, however, suggests that voters have de-aligned from the structural basis of old cleavage-based politics and realigned with new kinds of identities and values instead (handled in more detail in the next chapter). Moreover, the realignment thesis neglects the scenario that

²⁹ Also the concept of cartel party has been brought up. Cartel parties have ceased to operate as a mediator between civil society and the state and have instead become agents of the state. They are orientated towards protecting the acquired benefits and sharing power with other established parties since they realize that there are common interests among the “political class” (Katz & Mair 1995 8–18; Detterbeck 2005, 173–175; cf. Wolinetz 2002, 148–149).

dealignment would be a permanent state of affairs. (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984, 455–456; cf. Aardal 1994, 228.)

As voters turned their backs on the older parties, new parties such as nationalist-populist, New Left and Green parties appear to appeal to a substantial part of the electorate in Western Europe. However Mair, Müller and Plasser (2004, 4) have argued that the support for new parties has not meant a realignment in the sense that there would have been *major* shifts to new party families. Rather, it seems more appropriate to talk about a limited realignment, as the basis of the party systems has not been changed in general. Only when new patterns of party support become stabilized, can we speak of realignment; if the patterns remain fluctuating and unpredictable, it is more suitable to talk about dealignment.

Evidently, the new parties have challenged the stability of the party systems to some extent. As such, the ties between social structural groups and parties have been eroding partly because the supply of party alternatives has grown. Party-voter ties have become much more complicated as a consequence of new parties attracting voters from the old parties. Of the biggest new party families, the New Left parties, nationalist-populist parties and Green parties have established themselves in many West European countries since the 1970s onwards (Gallagher et al. 2011). The number of relevant parties has risen in most West European countries since the 1970s (e.g. Dalton et al. 2000, 58); and support for new political parties³⁰ has grown rapidly. In the 1980s, new political parties gained a mean electoral support of 14.4 % in 16 West European countries. In the 1990s, the rate was 22.4 % and in the 1st decade of 21st century it was 29.3 % (Gallagher et al. 2011, 308). However, these parties have not taken over the dominance of party systems, as shown in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3.1.3. In this respect, the old party families have persisted quite well. One explanation for this is that the parties belonging to old party families have accustomed their electoral appeal to match the shift from social structure to values and attitudes

³⁰ New parties were defined as those that first began to contest elections no earlier than 1960 and that have polled at least 1 per cent in a parliamentary election (Gallagher et al. 2011, 308).

3.2.3. Moving towards values and attitudes

When Franklin and colleagues (1992) analyzed the effect of social structural cleavage elements and the effect of ideological orientation (left vs. right) on party choice in West European countries, they concluded that there is a mismatch in timing between changes in social structure and changes in electoral behavior. There was something other than structural factors explaining both the persistence of old parties and also the upsurge of new parties. Voters were no longer voting all that dominantly on the basis of group loyalties – especially from the 1980s onwards. Particularly the voting behavior of the post-war generation could no longer be explained with social structural factors to any great extent. Earlier, when social structure was still a strong determinant of party choice, changes in party strength could be largely predicted upon changes in the size of social groups. (Franklin 1992; van der Eijk et al. 1992.)

Van der Eijk et al. (1992) concluded that if all the issues of importance to voters had been measured and given their due weight, the issues would have compensated quite accurately for the decline in the explanatory power of social structural factors on party choice. Thus they argued for a view that the cleavage approach was still valid but that the attention should be shifted from the structural element to the value/attitudinal element of cleavages. Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995) supplemented this notion by stating that, already between 1973 and 1990, political values and attitudes explained party choice better than social structural positions in West European countries.

Although many other studies have also concluded that, since the 1980s and 1990s, political issues have truly started molding electoral behavior (see e.g. Dalton, Flanagan & Beck 1984, Dalton 2008; von der Brug 2010), it is worth noting Borre (2001, 9–11), who has argued that issues have been the catalyst of politics ever since elections were arranged in Western Europe. Without survey technique it was, however, impossible to evaluate how much the issues shaped voting decisions. It is undoubtable, for example, that issues on working conditions and welfare were strongly attached to social class, thus reinforcing the influence of cleavage politics.

In any case, the shift from a social structural position to values/attitudes has been quite uncontested and it has certainly been a much discussed topic in

literature especially from the 1990s onwards (see e.g. Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi 1998; Kriesi et al. 2006; Enyedi 2008; Franklin 2010). It is worth noting that since social structural cues no longer determine party choice so strongly, there is now a certain degree of individualization in terms of voting choice (Dalton 2000, 337). Keeping this in mind, it is important to realize that if this individualization takes place in such a way that the linkages between social structural positions and values and attitudes become almost non-existent, and voters' opinions on political issues have a totally independent effect on party choice, then we are no longer talking about cleavage politics in the traditional sense. The threefold cleavage definition requires that social structural groups have common values and attitudes.

The connection between old social structural bases and values and attitudes

As the importance of value and attitudinal dimensions has increased at the same time as the importance of classic social structural characteristics has decreased (Franklin 1992; van der Eijk et al. 2005), the following section discusses which values and attitudes have united the social structural groups deriving from the Lipset-Rokkan-model, and can be hence understood as a dimensional reflection of the common group-based interests.

First, the left-right dimension³¹ has a special historical importance in terms of social class since left-right values have been conceived as the most important value orientation that emerged from the class conflict (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005, 125). This dimension has continued to be commonly understood as a direct political reflection of the social structural conflicts between classes or the ideological orientation connected to social class (Thomassen 2005a, 17). Franklin (2009) argued that one of the major reasons for the relative stability in party support, despite the turbulence in social structure, has been that the rise of left-

³¹ The dichotomy to left and right was an essential part of democratic parliamentarism as it placed the working-class parties on the left side and upper-class parties on the right side of the seating order in parliament. The dimension got a new and more distinct political substance when the Socialists began to use the left-right metaphor to distinguish the benefits of the working-class from the ruling class (Oscarsson 1998, 10). Both left and right have become labels for the major poles of political conflict in almost every West European country (Huber and Inglehart 1995, 81).

right issues has given new reasons for the same people to continue to support the same parties as before (see also van der Eijk et al. 2005).

There has been controversy on whether ideological left-right orientation is a reflection of people's social position. For example, van der Eijk & Niemöller (1992) already found at the beginning of the 1990s that the correlation between them was close to non-existent, while Oscarsson (1998) found that voters' positions in the left-right scale have followed their occupational status and class identification quite accurately. Some researchers, for instance Knutsen (1988, 349) and Holman (2006, 311), have interpreted the left-right dimension as an independent ideological cleavage, which has transformed from a purely structural class or status cleavage to represent left-wing or right-wing values and opinions (cf. Franklin 2009, 435). This conception, lacking any structural linkages, is not in line with the threefold cleavage concept, as it frees itself from structural linkages.

When interpreted from a socio-economic perspective, the left-right dimension has been reflected, for example, in questions over market economy, distribution of income, taxation, regulation and control of economy, social services, unemployment and entrepreneurship (Bartolini & Mair 1990, 198; Dalton 2002, 191). However, some researchers have suggested that the left-right dimension actually constitutes a super dimension that absorbs various issues, thus replacing the old structure-based cleavages (Knutsen 1999, 1; van der Eijk et al. 2005, 167). In addition to the traditional socioeconomic themes, questions concerning military policies, law and order, moral issues, and even postmaterialist topics have been related to and allegedly absorbed by the left-right dimension (see e.g. Budge & Farlie 1983, 50; Dalton 2002).

The religious cleavage has been primarily reflected in values deriving from the role of religion and the church and in views on moral issues (Thomassen 2005a, 13). As the significance of religion and the church in public life has decreased, and as they matter to a smaller number of the electorate than before, the moral issues have received an increasing amount of attention. The contemporary issues linked to the structural basis have handled social relationships, moral standards and authorities (Dalton 2008, 153; Knutsen 2010b). There has also been a shift to re-valuing traditional ethics and traditional moral values (Lambert 2004, 42-43). The values concerning moral and sexual norms have put the liberal and permitting voters against the moral conservatives; this clash has become the most

apparent in advanced post-industrial societies (see Inglehart & Welzel 2005). The value orientations connected to these views are reflected in the distinction between libertarian³² and traditionalist value orientations (Thomassen 2005a, 13).

The value/attitudinal element of the rural-urban cleavage has received skewed attention in literature. This is because the focus has been on rural values, leaving urban values largely ignored. Traditionally, when the Agrarian parties flourished, rural political interests concentrated on agricultural issues; the interests of rural citizens in contemporary societies go beyond narrow agricultural issues. Today, the party interests are more about the decentralization of agencies of the state, transferring economic means to smaller and peripheral municipalities and concentrating on efforts that make living in the countryside and geographically peripheral areas possible (Knutzen 2004a 132–133; Paloheimo 2008 44–45). The skewed attention to the rural side of the cleavage may reflect that the rural interests have been constantly under threat and ever diminishing. Thus, they have had to be actively brought up and guarded. It can be argued that the original urban-industrial-commercial interests have been replaced by emphasizing the various benefits of urbanity: the need of centralization in the search of scale benefits (see e.g. Moisio 2012). However, since the social modernization in most West European countries has largely reduced the gap between rural and urban political interests and values (Dalton 2008, 160) the political significance of the value element has been relatively small. Moreover, in many contexts, the rural-urban division is superimposed by the religious cleavage, as people living in the countryside tend to be more religious than the urban population (see Kriesi 1998, 178; Knutzen 2004a).

The dividing lines of the ethno-linguistic cleavage are typically apparent already on a structural basis. If one belongs to an ethno-linguistic minority one is very likely to develop positive attitudes towards the protection of the minority status or value, for example, bilingualism/multilingualism. The opposite pole of the value/attitudinal dimension is seeing the rights of a politically prominent historical ethno-linguistic minority in a negative light.³³ Since there are only a few

³²In terms of value orientations, the term 'libertarian' is often used to refer individual freedom and freedom from authorities. Hence, when discussing libertarian values in this study, economic libertarianism is left outside.

³³ This aspect has received much attention in East European countries. Ethno-linguistic cleavages have been politicized to be able to present minority groups as a threat to state loyalty and national culture. This has occurred, for example, in the Baltic States (Steen 1997, 5).

countries where a substantial ethno-linguistic minority is represented in the parliament, and since the value-attitudinal element is partly trivial, there is no systematic knowledge on the topic.

Although the issues attached to the cleavages from the Lipset–Rokkan -model have been gaining explanatory power, the most prominent reason for the shift towards values and attitudes is found in issues reflecting the value and attitudinal dimensions of potential new cleavages, which are handled next.

3.2.4. In search of new cleavages

Whereas the dynamics of old cleavage politics are rooted in social structural positions, it has been suggested that new cleavages should be searched first and foremost in enduring value orientations. Although many of these suggestions have had a social structural basis, the emphasis has been on the value/attitudinal element. (Knutsen & Scarbrough 1995, 496; Enyedi 2008.)

Already at the time of the Lipset-Rokkan scheme, cleavage politics was beginning to change and it was anticipated that people would engage into new types of policy alternatives and form conflicts around new issues, partly as a result of generation change. Most prominently, Inglehart (1971, 992) proposed that old cleavages would pave the way for cleavages that would be polarized according to differences in new kinds of value priorities, which were not captured by the Lipset–Rokkan scheme. Inglehart (1977, 182–183) argued that there were two opposite value orientations deriving from the conflict: the materialist orientation and the postmaterialist orientation.³⁴ This distinction was based directly on age cohorts and indirectly on educational differences between age cohorts. There was thus a social structural element, albeit the decisive element was the value base. Inglehart argued that values could be deep-rooted and long-lasting enough to be considered as stable predictors of voting behavior and eventually to be comparable to social structural factors.

According to Inglehart (1977), the critical juncture for the new cleavage was *the silent revolution*: it acted as a catalyst in the transformation of political

³⁴ In Inglehart's (1971) original measure, postmaterialism was reflected in the priority of people having more say in important political decisions and protection of freedom of speech. Materialism was reflected in the priority of fighting against rising prices and maintaining order in the nation.

conflicts from class-based conflicts to value conflicts. Unlike national or Communist revolutions, it was difficult to capture and less concrete, although some events such as large demonstrations and protests towards the politics of the old establishment were indicating a new phase more explicitly. Inglehart (ibid, see also 2007) stated that after the Second World War, Western societies were moving towards a phase where an increasing proportion of people began to *value* other things than safety, economic security and economic growth. Especially the higher-educated generation that was born after the war began to foster immaterial priorities, such as individual autonomy, self-expression, quality of life and environmental protection. These tendencies have a background in the scarcity and socialization hypotheses. Under conditions of prosperity, people can afford to think in postmaterialist terms and this way of thinking is bound to be incorporated, depending on the living conditions of one's pre-adult years. This tendency sets the more postmaterialist young generations, who have lived under prosperity, against the older materialist generations who have suffered from insecurity. Inglehart (1971; 1977; 1984) found strong evidence for this pattern, accentuated by education. The well-educated young people were far more likely to prioritize postmaterialist values ahead of the materialist ones than the low-educated young people.

Proponents of the so-called New Politics approach believe that there is a new value cleavage rooted in the opposition between materialist and postmaterialist orientations, and that it is taking room from the old, traditional cleavages and 'Old Politics', which lays an emphasis on ground-breaking conflicts stemming from old social structure. (Kriesi 1998, 166; Inglehart & Baker 2000.)

While some scholars have been ready to accept the proposal of a new value cleavage between materialists and postmaterialists to contemplate the old, more structure-based cleavages (see Klingemann et al. 1994; Kriesi et al. 2006), others have questioned the validity of the proposal. For example, Franklin (2010) has maintained that the decline in the structuring capacities of traditional cleavages is not balanced by an increase in the structuring capacities of new cleavages. Van der Eijk and colleagues (2009, 397–411) have stated that postmaterialism cannot be reduced to differences in objective social positions and suggested that Inglehart (1977) oversimplified the connection between social position and values by labelling the pre-war generation as class-based materialists and the

post-war generation as postmaterialists (see also Flanagan 1987).³⁵ The assumption about younger people acquiring a whole new social identity in the form of postmaterialism was said to undermine the multiplicity of political identities. In this regard, Aardal (1994, 236) has criticized the inbuilt logic in suggestions for a postmaterialist cleavage: i.e. that new conflicts and value cleavages are inevitably centered on issues that have no economic linkages.

The discussion on the new conflict tended to be centered on the notion of how the libertarian-postmaterialist values would replace the authoritarian ones. Materialism, tradition and belief in the authorities were conceived as something that was withering away. Although Flanagan (1987) and Kitschelt (1988), for example, discussed the authoritarian values opposing the post-materialist-libertarian ideas, Ignazi (1992) pointed out more explicitly that the post-modernization³⁶ thesis entailed a failed assumption of an ever-growing post-modernization of societies. Post-modernization awakened a counter-reaction, which Ignazi named as the *silent counter-revolution*. It questioned the priority of liberal values, minority protection, environmentalism and internationalism and pointed out the need to restore hierarchy, law and order, traditional moral and family conceptions, monoculture and a strong state that takes care of citizens and economic security. The common denominator for these aspects was thus conservatism in its various forms (Mudde 2007). In addition, there was a growing pessimism about the fates of ordinary people and a lack of confidence in the party system and politicians (Ignazi 1992, 22). While silent revolution built on the ideas adopted by the New Left and ecologist movements, the silent counter-revolution

³⁵ Even though Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1984) found a combined effect of young age and high education in postmaterialist attitudes, the key structural base was age.

³⁶ In political science, postmodernization has been understood as a phenomenon that contains at least three different perspectives (Inglehart 1997, 23). First, postmodernization can be understood as a counterbalance to tradition and as a rise to new lifestyles and values. Especially traditional family norms and ethnocentricity have been questioned from the way of greater tolerance towards ethnic, cultural and sexual diversity, individualism and gender equality. Secondly, postmodernization can be understood as scepticism towards blind faith in the growth of production, which had been the corner stone of modernization. Third, the contrasting value systems are vivid also in the de-emphasis of authorities: postmodernists are reluctant to hierarchic systems and emphasize active engagement in civil society. Furthermore, postmodernists are open-minded towards new exotic things and accustomed to follow loose rules instead of rigid ethics.

focused on the Radical Right Populist (RRP) parties³⁷, which managed to politicize the previously latent mixture of attitudes and sentiments that were not treated by the established parties. These RRP parties emerged throughout Western Europe especially since the 1980s (see Gallagher et al. 2011, 267).

There is, however, disagreement on what the new value-based conflict should be called and which topics it concerns. The first established label was materialism vs. postmaterialism (Inglehart 1977). Postmaterialism can be understood as one aspect or part of a broader process of cultural change from modernization to postmodernization taking place in Western societies. For example, Gibbins and Reimer (1995) have suggested that the materialism-postmaterialism -dimension should handle the different grades of postmodernism.³⁸

Flanagan (1987; see also Flanagan & Lee 2003; cf. Nas 1995; Palmer 1995; Scarbrough 1995; Dalton 2008) suggested that the conflict handles two separate dimensions deriving from 'New Politics': a materialist–non-materialist dimension reflecting economic-industrial and environmental issues and an authoritarian–libertarian dimension reflecting issues on moral values and minorities (see also Inglehart 1971; Knutsen & Kumlin 2005, 126). Kitschelt (1995) and Betz (1994) have combined the poles into libertarian-postmaterialist values vs. authoritarian-materialist values. Finally, the nationalist aspect has been added to the latter pole. Protecting national sovereignty and rejecting multiculturalism has been linked to traditional and authoritarian values. This has led to a suggestion of an extended dimension that calls the one end green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) and the other traditionalist-authoritarian-

³⁷ There is hardly agreement on what the parties stemming from the silent counter-revolution should be called, as the parties often state they are neither left-wing nor right-wing. They have also varying historical backgrounds and they have been also called radical right, populist right or new right parties. The term Radical Right Populist Party captures at least the combination of nationalism, anti-immigration, cultural conservatism, exclusionism and populism. (see Eatwell 2000; Kestilä 2007; Mudde 2007.)

³⁸ Postmaterialism and postmodernism have often been used as overlapping concepts. From the perspective of this study, it is enough to point out that both postmaterialism and postmodernism explain shifts in value change, detect emergence of new values and axes of conflict. In brief, postmaterialism is an important factor in the postmodernist culture (Inglehart 1989, 251; Gibbins & Reimer 1995, 302). There have also been thorough discussions on the specific nuances when the terms are perceived as competing approaches. But this approach is not so fertile from a cleavage perspective: it would cause more conceptual problems than it would clarify the discussion on cleavages. (see *ibid.* 302–303.)

nationalist (TAN) (see e.g. Marks et al. 2006; Hooghe et al. 2010, Rovny & Edwards 2012). This dimension has also been called the (socio)cultural dimension, to differentiate it from the economic left-right-dimension. It has been suggested that the electoral competition has mainly revolved around these two dimensions in contemporary West European countries. Today, the old socioeconomic left-right dimension continues to have importance, but it is accompanied by a new (socio)cultural dimension (van der Brug & van Spanje 2009; Bornschieer 2010).

Table 3.4 *The elements of the proposals for a new value cleavage*

	Postmaterialist- Libertarian- Cosmopolitan	Materialist- Authoritarian- Nationalist
Social structural base	Young Women High education High socio-economic position	Old Men Low education Low socio-economic position
Norms and principles in society	Loose rules, No hierarchies, Citizen activism, Equality between people, Liberal moral values	Strong leaders, Law & order, Listening to ordinary people, Traditional gender roles, Traditional moral values
The nation and its people	Anti-nationalism Pro-multiculturalism Pro-integration	Nationalism, Nativism National sovereignty
Environmental concerns	Environmental protection and activism	Protecting industrial interests Freedom from environmental norms
Political parties representing interests	Green and New Left parties	Radical Right Populist parties

Table 3.4 presents the different forms in which the new value conflict expresses itself. When the different suggestions are summarized, it can be said that the conflict handles materialist, authoritarian and nationalist and their opposites – postmaterialist, libertarian and cosmopolitan values.

As we have seen, the cleavage status of the new value conflict is highly debatable. Therefore, the three different cleavage elements, social structural base, common values/attitudes and organizational representation, are now analyzed in the light of previous studies.

Social structural base

The social structural base of the new value cleavage has been in age cohorts, education, gender, occupational status and income level. These social structural positions have explained materialist, authoritarian and nationalist attitudes and their opposites. In this regard, age cohorts, gender and education have constituted suggestions for new structural cleavage elements, while occupational status belongs to the world of old cleavage politics. Table 3.4 illustrates that postmaterialist, libertarian and cosmopolitan values have been supported especially by the young, women, those with a high education and those with a high position in the labor market. Materialist, traditionalist and nationalist values, on the other hand, are supported especially by the old, men, those with a low education and those with unsecure and low positions in the labor market (see Inglehart 1997; Knutsen 2004a; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Dalton 2006).

Age constitutes a potential cleavage base if horizontal political socialization and generational key experiences constitute politically relevant age cohorts. This is because key experiences are based on the assumption that people acquire certain norms and ways of relating to politics in their early adulthood (see Andrews 2002), which in turn cause a long-lasting propensity to prioritize and value certain things (Inglehart 1977). However, it has not often been presented that age cohorts could solely form the basis of a new cleavage, although there is a general generational divide in terms of values and party preferences (Inglehart 2007; van der Brug 2010). In this regard, Franklin and van der Eijk (2009) argue that age cohorts do not fit into cleavage politics of mutually exclusive worlds: they suggest that cleavages change because of generational replacement. In any case,

those belonging to older generations have developed loyalties to old parties, while the younger generations have voted, to a greater extent, for the newer parties – whether New Left/Green parties or Radical Right Populist parties, which represent the opposites of the new value cleavage.

The expansion of education accompanied with generational replacement meant that the less educated group diminishes in size and the more highly-educated group grows, thus contributing to a larger political relevance of the highly educated (Stubager 2010). Educational level has now become a potential cleavage base. This is because high education has reflected openness for certain ideas, values and trends and is attached to different communications networks, lifestyles and job environments and grades of status (Inglehart 1977, 72–84; Knutsen 2004a, 160–161), which have been reflected in libertarian-postmaterialist values (Weakliem 2002; van de Werfhorst & De Graaf 2004; Brooks 2006; van der Waal et al. 2007). In contrast to educational level/length of education, the value clashes deriving from different fields of education have not been regarded in cleavage context (see van de Werfhorst & De Graaf, 2004).

Whereas the coherence among the members of different age cohorts is supposed to follow from generational experiences, the coherence among members of educational groups is supposed to follow from the educational milieus in which the individuals spend their early adulthood. Furthermore, the self-aware identity has been evident especially among the highly-educated (see Stubager 2009.) Political parties, particularly the bourgeois parties and Green and New Left parties, have had growing incentives to represent the interests of the highly-educated segment of society (Stubager 2010, 509). As a counter-reaction to this, the RRP parties have appealed to the interests of the less-educated (Mudde 2007, 111–112).

Gender, as a social structural element, gained political prominence when gender-related issues were put on the political agenda as a result of the emancipation of women. In turn, values associated with feminism become more topical due to the increase in women's education, the transformation of traditional gender roles and movements towards equality in the labor market (Manza & Brooks 1998, 1239–1243; Inglehart & Norris 2000). It has been difficult, however, to present gender as a social structural cleavage basis without linking it to other social structural characteristics. According to Turner (2011,

294–295), as men become more marginalized within the occupational structure and women acquire higher levels of education in advanced Western societies, resentment grows especially among the blue-collar male workers who see feminism, gay rights, racial equality and the decline of the family as a threat to their own social standing and masculinity. This resentment fuels a conservative response to cultural liberalism and multiculturalism. As such, the electoral gender gap has continued to prevail after women’s emancipation, albeit differently. Traditionally women voted more for conservative parties than men, since themes such as religion and family were more important for women. However, the articulation of feminist values subsequently shifted alignments towards the New Left and Green parties. (Dalton 2002, 198; Knutsen 2004b; Giger 2009.) Men, accordingly, have begun to vote for the RRP parties, which have even been labelled as “*Männerparteien*” (Men’s parties) (Mudde 2007, 111–112).³⁹

Lastly, the position in the labor market has a connection with the new value dimension, mainly due to changes in economic structure. This base can actually be seen as the updated conception of how the interests of occupational classes are reflected. The position of the traditional working-class occupations in industry and construction has been destabilized and the feeling of vulnerability and insecurity has become constant (see Harvey 2010, 150; Walter 2010). Companies shut down factories and relocate to more advantageous places in a globalizing world or recruit a cheaper foreign workforce in certain branches. This has meant that the blue-collar workers may feel that the old, ruling parties have betrayed them (Gill 2008; Hooghe & Marks 2009). The proletarian protest has subsequently become channeled through RRP parties in many West European countries (Arzheimer & Carter 2006, 422; Oesch 2008, 349–350; Goodwin 2012, 21–25; cf. McGann & Kitschelt 2005). These findings are in contrast with those of Betz (1994), Kitschelt (1988, 1995) and Moreno (1999), who have stated that libertarian-postmaterialist attitudes go hand in hand with redistributionist

³⁹ Nevertheless, successful parties formed around gender interests have been rare. Feminist parties have found it difficult to get into the national parliaments (Dalton 2002, 198; Knutsen 2004a, 198–201, 222).

attitudes, and authoritarian-materialist attitudes go hand in hand with pro-market attitudes.⁴⁰

The proposed cleavage between a postmaterialist–libertarian–cosmopolitan orientation and a materialist-traditionalist-nationalist orientation is reflected in different attitudes and ways of relating to society. In Table 3.4, I have separated these into three categories. The first concerns the conceptions on norms and principles in society regarding authorities and differences in moral, family and gender norms. The second category deals with nationalism, multiculturalism and pro-integration and anti-integration orientations. The third one concerns the differences in the relationship between the environment and industrial-economic growth.

Norms and principles in society

First, there is profound disagreement between the two orientations on the basic ruling principles in society. People with liberal values believe in individual autonomy and expressional freedom, freedom from paternalism, equality between citizens and active citizen involvement in a control-free society. This results in situational ethics, loose hierarchies and a disregard of strong authorities (Kitschelt 1988, 195; Inglehart 1997; Kriesi 1998, 169). The libertarian orientation also includes an emphasis of tolerance; open-mindedness and individuality (see Hanley 2008, 117). Authoritarians on the other hand believe in a strictly ordered society, in which law and order and punitive conventional moralism are respected and infringements of authority are to be punished severely (Mudde 2007, 23). However, these represent the archetypes of orientations: individual can have a combination of liberal and authoritarian values.

Furthermore, ideologically conservative and authoritarian forces have despised liberal stands towards the family, marriage and sexuality. In these questions, it is a matter of tradition and what is the morally right and decent way

⁴⁰ In the 1980s the latter pattern may have indeed been valid because moral-cultural conservatism was linked with economic neo-conservatism, which criticized the overloading burden of the state provision and welfare system and favoured the laissez faire principles of the free market and privatization (Ignazi 1992, 18–19). But as the economic environment became more challenging in the turmoil of the 1990s and onwards, those with insecure manual occupations have had better incentives to combine authoritarian-materialist attitudes with left-wing socioeconomic values that emphasize state-centred solutions instead of market solutions (Mudde 2007, 119–121).

of living (Heywood 2003, 81). The dispute between libertarians and authoritarians has then revived the value base of the religious cleavage and reinterpreted it in another form (see Kriesi 2010, 682). Individualism and denial of traditional authorities are in line with secular or atheist views, while longing for traditions and respect of institutions go along well with religious views.

Differences are also explicit in terms of conceiving equality between people. Libertarians hold the view that men and women are equal and that people should be free to express their sexual identity. Those who think in authoritarian terms conceive politics concerning women in a patriarchal way and defend natural gender differences in opposition to feminists. Furthermore, they conceive more permissive (sexual) relations between people as a threat to the natural order (Mudde 2007, 92–93; Kofman 1998, 93; Rydgren 2005, 11–13). The paternalist and authoritarian features also include a longing for strong leadership, whereas libertarians perceive that such leadership weakens citizen participation and liberties (Heywood 2003, 87).

Self-expression has been present in the libertarian/postmaterialist orientation also in the sense that people should be able to influence decision making and that their opinions should be better taken into account. Theories on postmaterialism have not considered that the demand on ‘people having more say’ (Inglehart 1971) could also come from those who oppose postmaterialist-libertarian New Politics (see Ignazi 1992). Voters drawn towards the themes of the silent counter-revolution have felt resentment and suspicion towards the political elite in general, and politicians and the established parties in particular. Moreover, they have felt that their appeals and interests have not been taken into account and that they have been pushed aside; i.e. these are voters from the same groups which have demanded more authoritarianism and rejected postmaterialist ideas. (see e.g. Kestilä 2006, 186; van der Brug & Mughan 2007; Albertazzi 2008, 113–114; Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008, 222.)

The nation and its people

One of the cornerstones in the materialist, traditionalist and nationalist side of the proposed value cleavage is holding nationalism and nativism as guiding lines. The emphasis on nationalism includes two aspects. Ethnic nationalism portrays an image of an ideal homogenous society where multiculturalism is not welcomed; state nationalism defends independence and the national sovereignty of the nation state against external threats and political integration (Greenfield 2001). Ethnic nationalism is closely related to nativism – an ideology which presupposes that nations should be inhabited exclusively by the members of the native group: the nonnative elements are seen as fundamentally threatening the homogeneity of the people. For ethnic nationalists, the state belongs to one ethnic group and other ethnic groups can only live there if they accept this group's dominance. (Michaels 1995, 67; Mudde 2007, 22, 144.) This is in strong contrast to views that emphasize the equality between people regardless of their ethnic background and who see multiculturalism as an inspiring and exciting ingredient in societies. These views have insisted on a future with a global citizenship, where the significance of borders and an ethnic background diminishes. (Inglehart 1997; Mudde 2007; 63, 189; Kymlicka 2011, 129–130.) The multicultural-nativist tension has received increasing attention due to growing global immigration. In the 1980s and 1990s, nativist ideas re-emerged when RRP parties began to cherish ethnic unity within a nation's borders, while ecological parties and other pro-minority parties opposed such ideas (*ibid.*).

While immigration has been the major catalyst behind the revival of nativism in Europe, further integration inside the European Union has fueled the tensions in state nationalism between those who deemphasize national interests and those who are worried about national sovereignty. Although European integration was close to a nonissue in the electorates for decades, after the Maastricht Treaty (1992) steps have been taken towards a more integrated Union accompanied with federalist features, which has awakened political debate (Raunio 2002). This is because political integration has drawn decision-making power away from nation states to the EU; economic integration especially inside the European Monetary Area (EMU) has led to economic codependence between states, thus undermining economic sovereignty.

Whereas political and economic integration are important from the perspective of state nationalism, cultural integration in the EU has furthered multiculturalism-nativism tensions. Common asylum policies and the free movement of citizens have been seen as threats to national identity and culture. (Oskarson 2010, 84.) Hence, the EU has become an influential vehicle of different kinds of integration processes, supranational power and standardization, which constitute a potential threat to defending national interests.⁴¹

It can be argued that the Eurozone Crisis, which has accelerated since 2009, is having a major impact on accentuating integration-sovereignty tensions; an issue that has already evolved from a sleeping giant to a highly polarizing question (de Vries 2007; Verney & Bosco 2013; cf. Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004, 37–38). Although anti-European positions, claiming that integration has gone way too far, did not have much of an impact on inter-party competition for a long time, they had been apparent at the voter level (see Hix & Høyland 2011, 105–129, 138–140; Raunio 2008a, 190; 2008b).⁴²

Hooghe and Marks (2009) have found that green-alternative-libertarian vs. traditionalist-authoritarian-nationalist dimension correlates with issues arising from European integration in the West European party space. This relationship is not, however, unequivocal. Although authoritarian and nationalist forces tend to oppose European integration, the libertarian ones have not supported integration strongly. Integration threatens to intensify market-led solutions, weaken democracy, and disempower public interest groups, even though it offers vehicles for environmental regulation and mobility between countries and cultures. The furthering of European integration has been a common project for the big parties, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Conservatives (Hanley 2008). A big question is whether the question over EU-integration and national sovereignty divides the *electorate* along the postmaterialist-materialist- and libertarian-authoritarian-lines. For example, Oskarson (2010) has found that

⁴¹ Hix (1999, 73) has even argued that the EU-integration question has given rebirth to Lipset and Rokkan's cleavage between standardizing centres and distinct peripheries. Brussels is the new centre and the member states are the new peripheries trying to preserve their autonomy. Especially the identities and interests of the peripheral countries are more threatened than the ones of influential and central member states.

⁴² The ruling parties have been willing to downplay the conflict basis of EU-issues, as there has been a wide consensus that the 'integration train' has to be kept on the right track and moving (de Vries 2007, 364).

negative attitudes towards multiculturalism are intertwined with anti-integration attitudes.

Hooghe and Marks (2009) and Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008) have noticed that the European integration–national sovereignty-tension overlaps with a divide between de-nationalized and national interests. It pits the winners, who benefit from the increasing integration against the losers, who are desperate to keep on to the national borders, identities and restrictions in the labor market.⁴³ This is related to the human capital hypothesis: the well-educated and those in high positions in the labor market are more likely to benefit from integration than those with a low education and low/vulnerable professional position (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998). However, it is not just the social periphery that has been against integration, since anti-integration attitudes are usually pursued by those who are in disadvantaged positions in society. In this respect, the rural population has been afraid that it will be further marginalized and that no one will guard their interests in Brussels. Globalization and integration have influenced the perspectives of central government in a way that less value is given to sparsely-populated areas and small villages. As such, the well-off urban population can better enjoy the benefits of integration and mobility. (Bjørklund 1994; Raunio 2008a, 190; Oskarson 2010.)

Environmental concern

Environmental concern was one of the main sources for the growth of postmaterialism from the 1960s and 1970s onwards. From a materialist-postmaterialist perspective, environmental questions have been crucial as they set economic-industrial growth and non-profit views against each other. In times of subjective safety and material welfare, people began to think the limits of continued growth, since it had been achieved at the cost of the environment. As a consequence, environment and nature were lifted to the political agenda (Inglehart 1977, 77, 1997, 35).

The ecological awakening happened largely outside the party system: individual movements, organizations and citizens had an influential role, and the

⁴³ A doubt has nevertheless been laid upon how sharply the distinction between winners and losers can remain in altering economic circumstances (Gallagher et al. 2011, 304).

action for protecting nature was done in unconventional means. The bulk of the old parties, which had a mission to build safety and welfare, could not respond to the task as they believed in material growth and unlimited prosperity. (Heywood 2003, 276.) The growth of environmental awareness and the acuteness of global warming and climate change have nevertheless meant that the traditional parties have taken environmental protection increasingly seriously (cf. Doyle & MacEachern 1998, 34). Although there has been fairly little disagreement on the importance of environmental protection in itself (Dobson 2000, 236), there is less consensus on how it should be protected. As the opposite pole of environmental protection has been economic-industrial interests, it has been debated whether environmental protection is actually primarily a part of a socioeconomic or a sociocultural question (Kriesi et al. 2006; van der Brug & van Spanje 2009). In this respect, the primacy of environmental protection has been closely related to libertarian attitudes in some studies (see e.g. Kitschelt & Rehm 2004; Dolezal 2010), while the combination of authoritarian-nativist attitudes and de-emphasis on environmental protection has also received some support (e.g. Kitschelt 1995).

Strict environmental norms weaken economic life and competitiveness (Doyle & MacEachern 1998, 32–33), which affects traditional industrial branches especially. As a consequence, blue-collar workers, who are at risk of becoming the losers of the labor market, may develop negative attitudes towards environmental protection. Anti-environmentalist issues have not, however, been politicized that much in comparison to issues on moral values, immigration and integration – the areas which the RRP parties have mostly focused on (see Mudde 2007).

To conclude, the conflict between the postmaterialist-libertarian-international orientation and the materialist-authoritarian-nationalist orientation has several aspects, which have underlined its importance as a source of conflict between voter segments and between parties. However, more evidence is needed on whether the conflict or some part of the conflict could serve as a cleavage. The more recent nature of the bipolarized conflicts and the up-and-down electoral fortunes of the RRP parties, especially, underscore the need to assess these conflicts in a long perspective. Moreover, the social structural base of the conflict is multifaceted, as even some ‘old’ social structural bases such as occupational class or place of residence might explain the value/attitudinal orientations at hand. Furthermore, there is disagreement as to which issues are actually bundled

together, forming a value orientation. However, the organizational element is rather clear-cut in the sense that the New Left parties and Green parties, especially, have given an organizational form for postmaterialist-libertarian-cosmopolitan values, and right-wing populist parties have given an organizational form for materialist-authoritarian-nationalist values.

Suggestions for new cleavages outside the presented frame have not established themselves in the same manner. However, the distinction between public sector and private sector employment and dependency on public services has been brought up from time to time since the 1970s (see Dunleavy 1979). The private/public employment aspect acts basically as a supplementary element to occupational class, while public service/welfare state dependency reflects the position in the labor market and an individual's income level. It was expected that voters would develop different kinds of attitudes towards socioeconomic issues according to their working sector and their dependency on the welfare state. (Franklin et al. 2009, 60–61.) However, the distinction between the sectors has not led to the formation of collective identities: working in a public or private sector has not been regarded as a source for group cohesion. The more pronounced differences in the party sphere, at least in the Nordic context with an extensive welfare state, handle the promotion of private or public services in health-care, which has not got so much to do with the working sector (Bengtsson et al. 2013). This is why it has been debated whether public-private questions are actually a part of socioeconomic left-right logics (Aardal 1994, 235). Moreover, the public-private distinction has not been able to replace occupational class as a cleavage base (see e.g. Aardal 1994, 234, 2007). In order to keep the number of analyzed social status -based social structural positions limited, the focus is restricted to occupational class and education.

As both the classic cleavages and suggestions for new cleavages have now been discussed, the following chapter will focus the cleavage perspective more closely on the Finnish case. A historical perspective will serve to highlight the different interpretations of cleavage formation and cleavage structure. The subchapter will also link the Finnish case more closely to the general discussion on cleavages presented in this chapter.

3.3. The path to the present – interpretations of cleavages in Finland

The foundations of the cleavage structure and contemporary party system of Finland can be traced back to the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Of the current eight parliamentary parties, four have been formed around central cleavages, described by the Lipset-Rokkan-model; one has its roots in the old cleavage structure and three have grown from newer tensions in the political sphere.

The first encompassing political division which grew into a cleavage was the one between Finnish-speaking Finns and Swedish-speaking Finns. Finland was an integral part of Sweden for six and a half centuries up to 1809 and the historical legacy of Sweden accounts for most of the fundamental features of Finnish society and culture (Karvonen 2014, 11). Finnish-speaking Finns and Swedish-speaking Finns formed their own parties, which controlled the estates of the Diet at the end of the 19th century. The Finnish Party aimed to promote the status of Finnish in society as Swedish, for a long time, had been the only official language in Finland. The Swedish party tried to retain the privileged status of Swedish in society. (Saukkonen 2008.) Despite the decreasing proportion of the Swedish-speaking Finns, for a long time they remained over-represented among the most influential groups in society. Swedish was an elite language, used by the higher bourgeoisie and civil servants (Karvonen 2000, 132), which served to pit the ordinary Finns against the Swedish-speaking population.

Though the antagonisms towards Swedish-speaking Finns have eased since the beginning phase of the modern party system, with the last fierce language disputes in the 1930s, the Swedish People's Party (successor to Swedish Party in 1906) has continued to keep the linguistic lines in voting behavior sharp. The geographical concentration of the Swedish-speaking population on the south and west coasts has helped to maintain a distinct culture and identity. When this has been accompanied by the relentless representation of linguistic interests by the Swedish People's Party, the conflict between Swedish-speaking and Finnish-speaking voters has been regarded as a stubborn cleavage. (Karvonen 2000, 132.)

Social class has been a major source of conflict in the Finnish party system. The class cleavage rose in Finland, on the one hand, from the inability of the economy and legislature to improve the poor social conditions of ordinary people and, on the other hand, from the rapid diffusion of socialist ideology (Pesonen & Riihinen 2002, 73). The Social Democratic Party (SDP) was formed in 1899 to enhance the living conditions of the working class and to raise class consciousness in order to resist the ruling class and capitalism. The middle class and upper classes had their defenders in the conservative Old Finnish Party, which was transformed into the National Coalition Party (COA) in 1918 and in the liberal Young Finnish Party/National Progressive Party.

The clash between the classes culminated in the 1918 Civil War, which set the Whites against the Reds. The upper class, entrepreneurs and independent farmers constituted the White side while the proletariat constituted the Red side. The Civil War and the Russian revolution subsequently led to the formation of the Finnish Communist Party, which polarized the class cleavage further. The victory of the White side united the center-right parties against Communism and the Soviet Union. It is important to note here that the conflicts were not only based on the management of the economy; they entailed also setting the whole working-class culture against the bourgeois culture. (Karvonen 2000, 133; Mickelsson 2007, 61–64, 83.) Although the divide between socialists and non-socialists was sharp at the beginning phase of the modern party system, it became diluted in the 1940s and 1950s, illustrated by governmental co-operation between the Agrarian League and the Social Democrats.

Finland's relations to Russia have had an important impact on party formation. Finland was an autonomous part of the Russian empire from 1809 until the declaration of independence in 1917 and the independence was put into test in the two wars fought against the Soviet Union in the Second World War. The question of Russia was the basis for the early party system before the introduction of universal suffrage in 1906 and the arrival of modern parties. Allardt and Pesonen (1967) and Karvonen (2000, 133) have hence regarded the relationship with Russia as a major cleavage before Finnish independence. Furthermore, as noted with regard to class cleavage, eastern relations gave rise of a far-left party in the Finnish party system, as the Moscow-bound Communist Party was formed in 1918. All other parties adopted anti-Soviet attitudes.

(Karvonen 2014, 32.) Allardt and Pesonen (1967) argued that Soviet-relations constituted a non-structural cleavage that built on a stable division in attitudinal atmosphere. Although the Communists had loyalties to the Soviet Union, the center-right parties, especially, as well as the Social Democrats had a skeptical attitude towards the powerful neighbor. Eventually, the majority of the political elite supported pragmatic and realistic policies, although suspicion towards the Soviet Union dominated the attitudinal atmosphere (for the politics of Finlandization see Karvonen 2014, 35–36). From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Soviet-relations also affected government formation, as the National Coalition Party was excluded from government irrespective of election results (Nousiainen 1998, 27). The importance of this conflict ceased when the Soviet Union collapsed. The relationship to post-Soviet Russia today is still highly relevant in Finland's international relations, although the same kind of party blocs have not been built up as before (see Karvonen 2014, 152).

As Finland was an overwhelmingly rural society until the 1950s, the cleavage between landed interests and urban-industrial interests developed little by little. Originally, the clashes evolved between people in different positions in the labor market: large landowners, independent small farmers and the landless rural proletariat (Karvonen 2014, 25–30). For the evolution of a rural-urban cleavage it was crucial that the Agrarian League was formed in 1906 to defend rural interests and especially the interests of independent (small and medium-sized) farmers. Ideologically, the Agrarian League set the rural way of living against the urban way of living (*ibid*; Arter 2001a, 61–66). The urban city bourgeoisie was defended especially by the Liberal and Conservative parties, and proletariat by the left-wing parties (Ruostetsaari 2006, 34), although all of the parties had to reach out to the rural population in the early decades of Finnish representative democracy (Karvonen 2014, 25).

The Agrarian League could retain its position as a large party relying extensively on farmers' support until the number of farmers in Finland declined sharply along with the change in social structure, especially from the 1950s and 1960s onwards. Hence, the Agrarian League found it necessary to broaden its appeal beyond farmers. This was reflected in the change of the party's name to the Centre Party in 1965 (see Arter 2001a).

The triangular model in Figure 3.2 explicates how the class cleavage and the cleavage between landed and urban-industrial interests have dominated the relations between the electorate, parties and interest organizations. The model illustrates first, how the working class is defended by labor unions, Social Democrats and Communists (Pole L)⁴⁴; second, how the upper classes and business life are defended by employers' organizations and the National Coalition Party (Pole B); and third, how the farmers are defended by the Central Union of Agricultural Producers and a Centre-Agrarian party (Pole F).




Figure 3.2 *The ties between interest groups and political parties in Finland (modified from Nousiainen 1970; see also Rokkan 1987, 85).*

For a long time, conflicts between workers, farmers and business life structured voting behavior and party politics. The linkages between social structural groups and parties were strengthened by the role of the interest groups. The interest groups in Figure 3.2 have influenced decision-making via parties and socialized the union members to vote for the party that best represented their interests.

⁴⁴ Social Democrats and Communists fought fiercely over control of trade unions in Finland, with the former, which represented moderate socialism, emerging as the winner of these battles in the end (Pesonen & Riihinen 2001, 61).

Furthermore, the major political compromises have been found along the lines of the triangular model. (Sundberg 2008, 76–77.)

The class cleavage mainly set poles L and B against each other, while the cleavage between landed and urban-industrial interests revolved around the different interests between the poles F and B. Despite having also conflicting interests, poles L and F found compromises between labor concern and farmer concern, especially after the Second World War, when the welfare state took its first steps. Regional equality, important for Agrarians, and social equality, important for Social Democrats, were enhanced intensively (Moisio 2012).

The historical-political development of Finnish society, the stability of the party system, ideological party-voter ties and aggregate level voting behavior left little doubt over the existence of a class-conscious electorate and a party system based on cleavages in Finland at the time when Lipset and Rokkan formulated their thesis. The Finnish party system of the 1960s indeed reflected largely the cleavage structure of the 1920s, as Lipset and Rokkan formulated.

The stability in party support during that period is remarkable as can be seen from Figure 3.3, which shows the average support per decade in parliamentary elections for each party since 1907, when the first election was held. Only those parties, which have had parliamentary representation on at least four different decades, have been taken into account. The party system could be classified until the 1970s as a 4+2 model (Arter 1999, 62–65), in which there were four non-socialist parties – the Agrarian League/Centre Party (AGR/CENT), the Liberals (LIB), the Swedish People’s Party (SWE) and the National Coalition Party (COA) – and two socialist parties – the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Communist Party (COM). The Social Democratic Party, the Agrarian League, the Coalition Party and the Communists were the major parties, while the Swedish People’s Party and Liberals were smaller parties. The only upheavals in party support between 1920s and 1960s had to do with the ban of the Communists to field candidates in elections in the 1930s and the re-legalization of the Communist Party in 1944. The Communist tradition (COM) was represented by The Finnish Communist Party, which operated behind different front organizations in the parliament. Most notably the Finnish People’s Democratic League represented the Communist ideology in the parliament from 1945 to 1990.

Until the 1960s, the socialist parties gathered roughly half of the votes and the non-socialist parties the other half. The parties that had the strongest mass party organizations to mobilize the rural population succeeded the best. This favored particularly the Social Democratic Party and the Agrarian League/Centre Party.

However, the conventional Lipset-Rokkan-paradigm was unable to explain the instability in the Western electorates that had begun in the 1970s (Franklin & Mackie 2009); the same problem also applied to Finland. First, the support for the Communists, which was distinctively high in Finland, comparatively (see Gallagher et al. 2011, 245), began to shrink from the 1970s onwards. Also, class voting started to decrease at approximately the same time (Pesonen et al. 1993). Second, a step towards a more fragmented party system was taken at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1970 election, the Finnish Rural Party (FRP), a splinter from the Agrarian League that was formed in 1966, gained 10.4 per cent of the popular vote. The FRP⁴⁵ had been formed as a counter-reaction to the rapid change in the economic structure and it had a distinctive populist character. The agricultural sector was no longer providing employment the way it used to, which meant that people were forced to leave the countryside and search for jobs in towns. In this light, the party emerged to defend regional and social peripheries; it accentuated the rural-urban divide by splitting the rural camp into two. (Nousiainen 2000, 265; Mickelsson 2007, 150.)

⁴⁵ Originally it was named as the Finnish Peasants' Party in 1958. However from 1966 onwards (when it entered the parliament) it was called the Finnish Rural Party.




Figure 3.3 *The average electoral support of Finnish parliamentary parties per decade in 1907-2015 (%)*⁴⁶

⁴⁶ The party abbreviations are as following: SDP=Social Democratic Party, AGR/CENT=Agrarian League/Centre Party, COA=National Coalition Party, SWE=Swedish People's Party, LIB=Liberals, COM/LEFT=Communist Party/Finnish People's Democratic League/Left Alliance, FCL/CD=Finnish Christian League/Christian Democrats, FRP/TF=Finnish Rural Party/True Finns, GREENS=Green League.

Paloheimo (1988, 2008) has suggested that the rise of the FRP contributed to a birth of a new cleavage between the elite and the people since the party indeed leaned on animosity towards the political elite and bureaucrats. The success of FRP can be understood well in channeling resentment towards politics and politicians. However, this suggestion for a cleavage lacks a social structural base as it vaguely places the common people (or *forgotten people* as the party founder Veikko Vennamo formulated it) against corrupted interests and the elite. It also lacks evident bipolarity since obviously no party has interests to explicitly defend the benefits of the elite against the common people. Nevertheless, this did not prevent the FRP from constituting a setting whereby all the old parties were equaled in terms of their disregard of the common people (Paloheimo 2008). In this vein, rather than representing new kinds of value politics, the rise of the FRP can be seen as a protest against the handling of politics.⁴⁷

The electoral support of the FRP weakened the alignments of rural population to the Agrarian League. The thrive of the Centre Party to become more of a catch-all party for the population outside city-centers instead of being solely the vanguard of farmers seemed to backfire in the 1970s as Figure 3.3 shows. However, the strategy of the Centre Party to accentuate the tensions between densely-populated Finland and sparsely-populated Finland and to promote regional politics, paid off in the long run. (Nousiainen 1998, 27–28; Arter 2001a, 2001b; Paloheimo 2008, 44.) The electoral support of the Centre Party revived in the 1990s and 2000s, as Figure 3.3 shows. Paloheimo (2008) regards this as a sign of an explicit cleavage between geographical centers and periphery.

The second new party, which emerged in the 1960s in the parliament and proved to be persistent, was the Christian League⁴⁸. The party was formed as a counter-reaction to the waning of Christian values and to the erosion of traditional norms and traditional lifestyle. These changing norms and values had to do with cultural and social radicalism, which had been rising in Finland as a part of the general ‘revolt of the young’. The new student generation rejected the legitimacy of the authorities and engaged in civil activism. (Paloheimo 2008.)

⁴⁷ Furthermore, as Arter (1999, 151) notes, the rise of the FRP was also influenced by anti-Kekkonen sentiments, i.e. protest against the incumbent president Urho Kekkonen who had a hegemonic power base.

⁴⁸ The party was renamed as the Christian Democrats in 2001.

Although a minor force, the persistence of a Christian party in the parliament can be thus seen as a counterforce to the rise of liberal forces in Finland. Although the electoral support of the party has come, to a large extent, from members of revivalist groups and other small Christian communities (Freston 2004), it has not been suggested that religion would constitute a cleavage in Finland. A Lipset-Rokkan kind of church-state cleavage could not emerge when the modern party system was launched for two reasons. First, there was no major dispute between the state and the Evangelic-Lutheran church. Second, Lutheranism had long and widespread traditions. (Allardt & Pesonen 1967, 344; Karvonen 2000, 136.)

It was not until the 1980s that postmaterialist issues were channeled through a new parliamentary party. The environmental movement managed to gain two seats in the 1983 parliamentary election. These interests were organized into the form of a political party four years later. The Green League (GREENS) has had representatives in the parliament ever since 1987: it gained representation by criticizing material growth and the exhaustion of natural resources and by promoting sustainable development. Further themes have been equality between people; liberal orientation in moral issues; multiculturalism and the increase of immigration (see Mickelsson 2007, 277). Scholars have interpreted that the value change towards postmaterialism and the rise of the Greens has brought about new value dimensions into the Finnish electorate and party sphere (Pesonen et al. 1993; Zilliacus 2001; Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005; Paloheimo 2008).

The Left Alliance was formed on the ruins of the communist Finnish People's Democratic League in 1990. Although it has continued to thrive and support the concerns of the working class, it has endeavored to rid itself from its Communist past and has positioned itself as a liberal red-green or New Left party promoting postmaterialist concerns. (Zilliacus 1995, 2001, 219–223; Karvonen 2014, 38, 46.) Hence, it represents an intriguing case between old and new issues.

The True Finns (Perussuomalaiset, TF) has so far been the last major inclusion into the Finnish party sphere. It entered the parliamentary scene with one MP in 1995 as a successor party for the Finnish Rural Party. Little by little, the party had gained increasing support, before making a final breakthrough with an unexpected landslide victory in the 2011 parliamentary election (+15.0 percentage points). This was the biggest upset in Finnish electoral history since the return of the Communists to parliament with overwhelming numbers in

1945. Even though the True Finns continued with the populist heritage of the FRP, the ideological nature of the True Finns is different from its predecessor. To some extent the True Finns can be called a Radical Right Populist Party (Arter 2010), although it has still some features of a center-based populist party (Paloheimo 2012). Arter (2012) and Ruostetsaari (2011) argue that the True Finns has revived patriotism with an explicitly nativist vision, taken an anti-integration stance towards the EU, accentuated authoritarian features on moral issues and spoken for the common working man and his access to material well-being. Thus the True Finns has adopted the themes typical for RRP parties, namely nationalism, anti-immigration, law and order, welfare chauvinism and traditional ethics (see Mudde 2007, 21). In any case, the party has provided an alternative through which the materialist-authoritarian nationalist values of the electorate can be channeled.

Nevertheless, it has not been explored whether cleavages based on age cohorts, gender or education and reflected in new kinds of values and attitudes have emerged in Finland. In any case, the rise of new kinds of values into the political life has brought about a challenge for the old parties. It has not either been systematically studied how 'old' social structural positions, based on native language, occupational class and the type of residential area, are reflected in values and attitudes and whether the social structural and value/attitudinal elements co-contribute to voting for a certain party.

With regard to the analyses of the whole cleavage structure, Allardt and Pesonen (1967) (see also Allardt 1961; Pesonen & Sänkiäho 1979) based their analysis of the 1960s cleavage structure on the evolution of the party system and on the loyalty of certain social structural groups. They argued that class, native language and place of residence had been the most enduring social structural bases for cleavages in Finland. The Social Democrats and the Communists were the parties of the working class, the National Coalition Party and the Liberals of the middle class and upper classes and of the urban population. The Agrarian League, in turn, was the party of the independent farmers and rural population and lastly the Swedish People's Party was the representative of the Swedish-speaking minority.

On a structural basis, the old class cleavage and the cleavage between landed and urban-industrial interests have lost much of their original resonance. Of the old parties, the Social Democratic Party has not been able to rely on blue-collar workers and the Centre Party on farmers to the extent that they used to. The proportion of the working class vote for the Communists/Left Alliance and for the Social Democrats has decreased when coming to the 21st century. Alongside with the third old major party, the Coalition Party, they have all made appeals to the broad middle class, which has made the triangular model less encompassing in party-voter ties (Pesonen et al. 1993, 108; Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005, 173–175). There has hence occurred a clear decline in the extent to which class dictates party choice.

It is important to note that both the party membership and the membership in trade unions have decreased severely especially from the 1990s onwards. For instance, at the end of the 1970s, the Centre Party had 300 000, the SDP 100 000, the National Coalition Party 80 000 and the Finnish People's Democratic League 55 000 members. In 1995, the respective figures were 260 000, 70 000, 47 000 and 16 000 (for the successor party Left Alliance). The decline has continued in the 21st century. In 2011 the Centre Party had 150 000, the SDP 45 000, the National Coalition Party 40 000 and the Left Alliance 9 000 members. Hence, the party membership in the largest parties has decreased by half in three decades. (see Sundberg 1996; 2008; Westinen 2015.)

The parties have not thus been able to lean on a broad core electorate and they have lost much of their influence at the local level. The trade unions, on the other hand, have had less relevance in socializing their members to support a certain political party. Even though the ties between interest organizations and parties still persist the parties have been less willing to be presented as having close ties to labor unions for example, for fear of losing votes. (see Sundberg 2008; Borg & Paloheimo 2009, 16.) In this regard, Mickelsson (2007) has discussed the breakdown of “political camps” in Finland. The political camps can be understood as ideological multi-layer constructions that divide society in overlapping ways. In the Finnish context, they divided society in terms of parties, labor organizations, economic life (for example bank sector and foundations) and in terms of social classes. The socialist camp (especially the communists) suffered from internal grievances, the breakdown of “red capital” and the gradual collapse

of the Soviet Union. This meant that the ideological struggle between classes lost much of its resonance in the party system. The communist Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) ran candidates for the last time in parliamentary elections in 1987. Its successor, the Left Alliance resigned from communism. The agrarian camp obviously had to go through a major transformation due to the transformation in Finland from an agricultural society to a more urban post-industrial society. The bourgeois camp suffered the most from the disappearance of the Liberal People's Party, which had its base in the upper middle-class. This accentuated the disappearance of old dividing lines. However, for the National Coalition Party the breakdown of political camps was easier than for the socialist parties or Agrarian League since the vast middle class was growing and since "bourgeois capital" behind the Coalition Party has been rather persistent. (Mickelsson 2007; Paloheimo 2007; Karvonen 2014.)

Rural-urban and linguistic cleavages have been interpreted to persist on a structural basis although the rural-urban cleavage no longer pits farmers against commercial-industrial interests; instead it has been interpreted as handling the tensions between the rural population and the urban population at large. The farmers today have concentrated their votes more strongly on the Centre Party and the Swedish-speaking voters have remained loyal to the Swedish People's Party. (Pesonen et al. 1993, 108; Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005, 173–175.)

Paloheimo (2007) argues that when the significance of social class weakened, the socioeconomic left-right-dimension took on a more independent role in affecting party choice and conditioning the party sphere in socioeconomic questions. The interpretations of the updated cleavage structure have indeed been primarily based on analyzing merely the dimensional element of cleavages.

Paloheimo (1988) suggested that there were four *old* cleavages: left–right, center–periphery (geographical), linguistic and nationalist–international (Fenno-Soviet relations). These were accompanied by elite-people, conservative vs. liberal moral values and materialism-postmaterialism cleavages.⁴⁹ These divisions have

⁴⁹ In addition, Pesonen, Sänkiäho and Borg (1993) identified a class cleavage, environmental cleavage and potential for new cleavages (gender, employment, elite vs. people). Nevertheless, their analysis was not based on identifying objective social structural groups and their conflicting values bases. Besides, they approached the existence of cleavages in terms of perceived conflicts. For example, it was asked whether a person perceives whether there exists a conflict between the rich and the poor, employers and employees and politicians and people.

continued to be relevant with the exception of Fenno-Soviet relations, which has been replaced by an EU-dimension (see Paloheimo 2005, 2008; Grönlund & Westinen 2012). These studies found that left-wing voters have the closest ties to the Left Alliance and the Social Democrats, right-wing voters to the National Coalition Party, the defenders of peripheries to the Centre Party and the Swedish-speaking Finns to the Swedish People's Party. In addition, the EU and elite critics have found their home in the True Finns; moral conservatives in the Christian Democrats; and postmaterialists in the Green League.

To summarize, four of the present Finnish parliamentary parties were formed at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries or at the beginning of the 20th century. The Social Democratic Party was formed in 1899 to defend the vast and underprivileged working class, the Agrarian League (later on Centre Party) was formed in 1906 to defend the farmer population in the countryside and the Coalition Party was formed in 1918 to defend to the bourgeois, employers and owning class in Finland. The Swedish People's Party was formed in 1906 as a continuation for the language disputes in Finland. These parties have continued to be influential in the 21st century despite the challenges presented by newer parties. The Left Alliance (formed in 1990) has resisted income disparity and promoted postmaterialist concerns and the Green League (founded in 1988) has accentuated liberal politics and especially environmental concerns. On the conservative side, the Christian Democrats was founded in 1958 to defend traditional moral values and the Finnish Rural Party in 1959 to defend the cause of small peasants. Later on it became a channel of protest against and dissent on the old parties. The successor party, True Finns (founded in 1995), has accentuated nationalism, conservatism and the needs of common (native) people.

Despite the fact that the attention in cleavage research has largely shifted to *the dimensional element* of cleavages, the linkage between social structural positions and values and attitudes has been mostly ignored by academics analyzing the Finnish parties and their electorates. To summarize, Finnish cleavage structure has not been explored from a perspective that would both seek out socio-structural groups sharing political values and attitudes and that would try to determine how these interests are reflected in the party sphere. However, before moving into analyzing the Finnish cleavage structure, the choice of data, the methodological approach and the limitations of the study need to be assessed.

4. Detecting cleavage elements in Finland in the 21st century

4.1. Data and limitations of the study

The choice of the data in this study is conditioned by the requirement to combine individual-level social structural characteristics with a vast array of opinions on political issues and party choice in parliamentary elections. The Finnish National Election Studies (FNES) 2003, 2007 and 2011 (see Karvonen & Paloheimo 2003; Paloheimo 2007; Borg & Grönlund 2011) meet this requirement. They provide a systematic set of social structural variables over time and a broad range of thematically set questions on political issues, which reflect the value/attitudinal element of cleavages. Party choice in the parliamentary elections is best detected using National Election Studies in comparison to other domestic or international data since the closeness of elections is crucial factor when asking the respondent's choice of a party. The variety of issue questions proposed in the FNES studies is better than in European Social Surveys (ESS) and European Value Studies (EVS), for example, since the FNES studies better grasp the content of Finnish party politics. ESS and EVS, obviously serving the common framework in Europe, do not entail for example questions on regional politics or Swedish language. In addition, also the sociodemographic variables in the FNES-studies serve the research task better than the ones in international surveys.

These post-election surveys were conducted after each parliamentary election in mainland Finland⁵⁰ and were two-staged. The first stage was a face-to-face interview, which was executed in 2003 with multistage stratified sampling⁵¹ and in 2007 and 2011 with quota sampling, in which the quotas were based on age,

⁵⁰ As the sample concerned mainland Finland, the *Åland Islands* (with roughly 30 000 inhabitants and broad autonomy) were excluded. This is a common procedure when conducting surveys in Finland.

⁵¹ At the first stage, the primary sampling units were based on type of region, degree of urbanization and at later stages on postal codes.

gender and province of residence of the respondents.⁵² The second stage involved a self-administered drop-off questionnaire, which the respondents were asked to return by mail. The total number of respondents in the 2003 data was 1270, while the 2007 data had 1421 respondents and the 2011 data 1297 respondents. The structural variables are in the face-to-face interviews while the questions on political issues are in the drop-off questionnaire that was filled by 59 per cent of the respondents in 2003; 73 per cent of the respondents in 2007; and 61 per cent of the respondents in 2011.

One obvious downfall of the data in analyzing cleavages is that the same respondents are not analyzed in different years. Such panel data would certainly have been optimal in comparison to the cross-sectional data at hand since then the effect of social structural positions and values and attitudes on party choice could have been analyzed regarding the same respondents. With panel data from a long time-span it would be even possible to detect socialization processes that lead to certain values and attitudes, as well as to certain party choice. As panel data is not available for Finnish voters, the cross-sectional FNES-data from 2003, 2007 and 2011 is the best possible alternative, although it has its limitations.

As the analyses combine social structural variables and values and attitudes that are measured with issue variables (questions on political issues), the respondents who did not answer the drop-off-questionnaire have to be excluded from the analyses that contain questions on political issues. This is done in order to have the same respondents in each statistical model. However, for descriptive analyses (crosstabs) that include only social structural variable(s), the face-to-face interview is used.

There are two obvious downsides with the analyses that are done with the drop-off-questionnaire. First, the number of respondents included in the analyses drops considerably. Nevertheless, the N is still high enough to conduct most of the analyses reliably. Notwithstanding, caution is required when dealing with small group sizes. To address this problem, the final regression analyses are done by merging the three separate FNES studies into a single pooled dataset. The pooled dataset with a bigger N increases the reliability in the statistical analyses.

⁵² In the interviews of the Swedish-speaking respondents, the quotas were not based on province; instead, they were based on constituency, because the interviews were only conducted in the constituencies where the number of Swedish-speaking people entitled to vote was significant

Second, the problem of self-selection cannot be totally avoided. Self-selection arises when the respondents select themselves into a group that is analyzed and when the qualities of the self-selected respondents correlate strongly with the object of study. Those who are politically more active and more interested in politics are more willing to answer the drop-off questionnaire. As will be clarified later on, the sociodemographic features of the respondents who answered the drop-off questionnaire in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 studies are slightly skewed in terms of age and education.

The relevant background variables include each respondent's native language, municipality (coded according to the type of municipality), occupation (recoded to constitute occupational classes), denomination, age, gender and education. Table 4.1 summarizes the share of different social structural groups in FNES-studies in 2003–2011 (based on face-to-face interviews)⁵³. Appendix Table 1 shows the respective shares in the drop-off-questionnaire.⁵⁴ The motivations for these categorizations for social structural groups are discussed in subchapters 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. The social structural variables have remained same in the FNES-studies in 2003–2011, which enables good comparability in the analyses. Table 4.2, in turn, represents the share of the same social structural groups in the Finnish population. The samples in FNES 2003, 2007 and 2011 are well-balanced in terms of native language (when the oversample of Swedish-speaking respondents is balanced out), gender and church membership in comparison to the population. Place of residence has a slight bias as respondents from towns outside the Helsinki metropolitan area are underrepresented in the data. There is no systematic bias regarding occupational class.

However, the data contains a bias in terms of age cohorts and education. The oldest age cohort (born before 1945) is overrepresented in the data. Moreover, the highly educated (university level education) are overrepresented in the data

⁵³ The following social structural groups were excluded from analyses: respondents with other native language than Finnish or Swedish (N=11 in 2003, N=8 in 2007 and N=6 in 2011), respondents with some other occupation or with no current occupation, such as unemployed, on parent leave etc. (N=177 in 2003, N=138 in 2007 and N=214 in 2011) and also respondents with some other denomination than Evangelic-Lutheran (N=73 in 2003, N=69 in 2007 and N=46 in 2011).

⁵⁴ In these descriptive tables a language weight is used in order to balance out the deliberate oversample of Swedish-speaking voters in each year.

although comparisons to other educational groups are less straight-forward as regards to population.

Table 4.1 *The social structural characteristics (%) of Finnish voters in the face-to-face interviews of FNES-studies.*

	2003	(N)	2007	(N)	2011	(N)
<i>Mother language</i>						
Finnish	95	(1196)	95	(1338)	95	(1220)
Swedish	5	(63)	5	(72)	5	(65)
<i>Type of residential area</i>						
Rural municipality	19	(244)	19	(275)	16	(211)
Small municipality	17	(207)	18	(251)	17	(221)
Town	42	(524)	43	(606)	48	(619)
Helsinki metropolitan area	23	(284)	20	(289)	18	(234)
<i>Occupational class</i>						
Blue-collar workers	31	(335)	30	(388)	27	(277)
Lower grade white-collar workers	23	(247)	23	(292)	27	(280)
Entrepreneurs (incl. agricultural)	12	(132)	10	(123)	6	(59)
Lower professionals	14	(156)	15	(200)	18	(188)
Higher professionals and managers	20	(219)	23	(294)	23	(235)
<i>Denomination</i>						
Evangelic-Lutheran	87	(1034)	82	(1118)	78	(970)
Does not belong to church	13	(154)	18	(240)	22	(270)
<i>Gender</i>						
Male	50	(630)	49	(700)	50	(641)
Female	50	(629)	51	(721)	50	(643)
<i>Age cohorts</i>						
-1944	27	(342)	29	(414)	22	(282)
1945-1959	28	(353)	27	(386)	28	(365)
1960-1975	26	(328)	23	(320)	24	(308)
1976-	19	(234)	21	(301)	26	(329)
<i>Education</i>						
Primary	30	(375)	26	(374)	22	(277)
Vocational	27	(339)	33	(465)	29	(372)
Upper Secondary	27	(344)	22	(306)	24	(311)
Polytechnic	7	(88)	6	(88)	9	(114)
University	9	(111)	13	(178)	16	(210)
All	100	(1259)	100	(1421)	100	(1284)

Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011

Table 4.2 *The social structural characteristics (%) in the Finnish population in 2003, 2007 and 2011.*⁵⁵

	2003	2007	2011
<i>Native language</i>			
Finnish	95	95	95
Swedish	5	5	5
<i>Type of residential area</i>			
Rural municipality	17	16	15
Small municipality	17	17	16
Town	47	48	49
Helsinki metropolitan area	19	19	20
<i>Occupational class</i>			
Blue-collar workers	29	28	25
Lower grade white-collar workers	22	22	25
Entrepreneurs (incl. agricultural)	12	10	11
Lower professionals	15	16	17
Higher professionals and managers	21	25	23
<i>Denomination</i>			
Evangelic-Lutheran	86	84	79
Does not belong to church	14	16	21
<i>Gender</i>			
Male	49	49	49
Female	51	51	51
<i>Age cohorts</i>			
-1944	28	24	19
1945-1959	29	28	27
1960-1975	27	26	26
1976-	16	22	28
<i>Education</i>			
No degree after comprehensive school	34	31	28
Graduate, upper secondary school, vocational school	39	41	41
Vocational examination in an institute level	13	12	11
Polytechnic degree, studies in polytechnic/university	6	8	10
University degree	7	8	9
All	100	100	100

Source: Statistics Finland 2015a

⁵⁵ Statistics regarding educational level concern those citizens who are 20 years or older due to the way educational statistics are conducted in terms of age groups.

The drop-off-questionnaire has the same pitfalls as the face-to-face-interview in terms of representativeness. The oldest age cohort is even more overrepresented in the drop-off-questionnaire in comparison to the population. Moreover, those with university-level education are overrepresented also in the drop-off-questionnaire. These biases are entangled with elderly people and high-educated having a higher political interest and being more engaged in politics (see Elo & Rapeli 2012) and hence being more interested to answer questions on politics. Cautiousness is essential when considering the results of the analyses due to the low N of some analyzed voter groups and due to the self-selection problem.

The choice of relevant questions on political issues, measuring political values and attitudes, is based on the political and theoretical relevance and nature of the questions and their applicability. The questions in the election surveys, and in other surveys measuring political attitudes and values, tend to change from one survey to another. Therefore, as Knutsen and Kumlin (2005, 131) remind us, it is rather complicated to find measurements that can be compared over time. The FNES-data indeed has such pitfalls: many questions measuring the respondents' values and attitudes have changed over time. In other words, there are only a few questions on political issues that have been proposed in exactly the same form in each survey in 2003, 2007 and 2011.

Hence, the questions that are formulated in a different manner but handle the same theme have to be treated as measuring only roughly the same thing. However, this is not a major problem because the focus of the study is on analyzing which issues covariate and form value/attitudinal dimensions and not to compare the development of issue opinions over time. The fluctuation in the themes that the questions cover and the low number of issue questions, nevertheless, inevitably makes the analyses less robust than would be ideal.

In order to construct analyses of issues that have been subject to dispute, politically charged and relevant from a cleavage perspective, certain issues are excluded. As such, the first set of questions included in the analyses handles contended issues of importance, while excluding questions that are not subject to any major dispute since almost everyone considers them important. Such issues excluded, for instance, are the importance of health care, elderly care and crime reduction. These issues reminisce thus of valence issues, brought upfront by Stokes (1963). In this regard, valence issues refer to policy goals that are shared

almost unanimously and are considered commonly important. Moreover, valence issues cannot be framed in terms of disagreement over policy choices: public controversy handles the priority in solving each acute problem, such as reducing crime (van Wijnen 2001).

The second set of questions used to analyze values and attitudes is derived from the statements the respondents agree or disagree with. These questions reflect position issues, which measure, as the terms suggest, the different political positions the voters take or they measure the policy alternatives they prefer. An example of a position issue is whether or not the scope of the welfare state should be more limited. Position issues, especially, have been considered to reflect underlying political orientations instead of being considered as short-term factors, in the sense of issues of the day. (Thomassen 2005a, 17; de Sio 2010.) The more detailed presentation of the issue questions used is presented in subchapter 4.3, where the questions on political issues are analyzed with the means of a principal component analysis.

Party choice was investigated by asking the following question in the FNES-studies; “*The candidate of which party did you vote for in these parliamentary elections?*”. Since there is obviously always some imbalance in samples in terms of party support, an election result weight has to be deployed in the analyses. This is important because the voters of the Centre Party and the National Coalition Party have been constantly underrepresented and the voters of the Social Democratic Party have been constantly overrepresented in the FNES-data in 2003–2011. As the samples contained also a deliberate oversample of Swedish-speaking voters, the most suitable option for analyses, in which party choice is included, is to deploy a combined weight that allows the share of Swedish-speaking voters to correspond to the share of the population and which corrects party popularity so that it will correspond to the election results in 2003–2011.

The research questions in the study are approached using quantitative methods, deploying an array of statistical analyses. In this respect, the detailed methodological choices are presented in accordance with each statistical analysis as this solution enables us to contextualize the methodological choices better. Therefore, the empirical analysis proceeds in the following way. First, in subchapter 4.2, RQ1 “*which are the relevant social structural cleavage bases in Finland?*” is assessed by analyzing the group identity of social structurally defined

groups and by assessing the political importance of different social structural groups. This is done by comparing both the group identity (measured with questions on identity) of the social structural groups involved when they are accessible with available data and by analyzing the party profiles: whether the social structural groups involved have importance for the political parties or whether they have political potential in the party sphere.

Second, in subchapter 4.3, RQ2 *‘which are the value/attitudinal dimensions in the Finnish electorate?’* is assessed with the means of principal component analysis. It is analyzed which opinions on political issues (measuring either salience or agreement) vary in the same manner, load to the same principal component and constitute value/attitudinal dimensions. The aim is thus to identify latent underlying variables, in this case value/attitudinal dimensions.

Third, in subchapter 4.4, RQ3 *‘what is the effect of social structural position on the values and attitudes in the electorate?’* is assessed by running a linear regression analysis (OLS), which compares the effects of social structural positions, coded as dummy variables, on the earlier-identified value/attitudinal dimensions. The dependent, continuous variables are hence the principal component scores based on the principal component analyses.

Fourth, RQ4a *‘What is the effect of social structural position on voters’ party choice?’* and RQ4b *“Do those social structural positions and values and attitudes that are linked to each other, have an effect on voting for a particular party?”* are assessed in subchapters 5.2 and 5.3. The effect of social structural positions and values and attitudes on party choice is detected by deploying binary logistic regression. The dependent variable is dummy-coded: 1 indicates voting for a certain party and 0 stands for voting for any other parliamentary party. In this respect, six statistical models are built. The first model includes only social structural variables, while in the subsequent models each of the value/attitudinal dimensions is added separately.

Subsequently, analyses are made to discover the overall impact of social structural positions and values/attitudes in explaining the electoral support of parties. In this regard, the idea is to determine the goodness-of-the-fit of the model that includes only social structural variables as explanatory variables and of the model that includes also all value/attitudinal dimensions as explanatory variables of party choice.

Finally, the answer to RQ5 “*Which conflicts can be regarded as cleavages and which are the parties associated with them?*” is based on the previous analyses that have answered research questions 1–4. The categorization of the conflicts is made in subchapter 5.3.3.

4.2 Social structural basis of cleavages

This subchapter deals with the first research question “*which are the relevant social structural cleavage bases in Finland?*” by assessing the group identity of social structurally defined groups and by assessing the political importance of different social structural locations. The focus is on analyzing whether a social structural position functions as a source for a group-based identity and whether the social structural groups discussed have special importance for the political parties.

Kriesi (1998, 131) has argued that the crux in cleavage research is to identify the theoretically and empirically relevant social divisions and to study their political formation. The ‘old’ social structural positions stemming from the Lipset-Rokkan-model, which are discussed, are native language, type of residential area and occupational class. The new potential cleavage bases suggested in the literature, which are discussed, are age, gender and education. In addition, denomination is handled as an old structural base that has only recently become politicized in Finland.

The potential for conflicts between social structural groups is assessed, when possible, in terms of group identity, using primarily the FNES-face-to-face interviews as the data. By group identity it is referred to an individual’s sense of belonging to a certain social group, i.e. whether he/she has developed an identity that is based on social structural characteristics or whether there exists collective consciousness (Bartolini & Mair 1990). Group identity can be empirically measured for the ‘old’ social structural characteristics. However, this is not possible for the ‘new’ social structural characteristics. Group consciousness – the perceptions on whether the intergroup relationship is characterized by conflict and evaluations on the socio-political stance of one’s own and the opposing group – is disregarded due to the absence of questions measuring these phenomena (see Tajfel 1978; Stubager 2009).

In addition, how the parliamentary parties have represented the group-based interests over the years is analyzed. It has been found that even though explicit group-based appeals have decreased and Finnish parties have become less selective on their targeted voter groups (Enyedi 2005, Paloheimo 2007), the

representation of social structural groups has not vanished (see Paloheimo 2006; Mickelsson 2007).

4.2.1. Old cleavage bases in social structure

Native language

The empirical measurement and treatment of the social structural base as regards to the old ethno-linguistic cleavage is a quite straight-forward task. The most prominent ethno-linguistic minority are the Swedish-speaking Finns, who constitute roughly 5 per cent of the population (291 000 in 2011). The Finnish-speaking Finns constitute 90 per cent of the population (4 863 000 in 2011). There is an obvious ethno-linguistic dichotomy between Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking people. The other linguistic groups are excluded from the analyses since they are small in numbers. In 2011, roughly 5 per cent of the Finnish population (245 000 inhabitants) had other native language than Finnish or Swedish. The largest of these groups were Russians (58 000), Estonians (33 000) and Somalis (14 000). (Statistics Finland 2011a.)⁵⁶

Table 4.3 shows that the common identity deriving from native language is especially important for the Finnish-Swedes. In the 2003 National Election Study, 82 per cent of the Swedish-speaking respondents identified themselves primarily as Swedish-speaking Finns in contrast to Finns in general. In the 2007 study, the proportion decreased to 78 per cent and in the 2011 study, the proportion was 73 per cent. When these figures are compared to the proportion of Finnish-speaking Finns who identify themselves primarily as Finnish-speaking Finns in contrast to Finns in general, there is a striking difference. In the 2003 National Election Study, 21 per cent of the Finnish-speaking respondents identified themselves primarily as Finnish-speaking Finns. In 2007, the respective share was 27 and in 2011, the proportion was 28 per cent. The results indicate that when compared to the Finnish-speaking people, language is a far more important source of

⁵⁶ Ethnic minorities have been so far rarely represented in Finnish politics. In the 2011 election, however, a candidate with a Kenyan background (Green League) was chosen to the parliament. After the 2015 election, Finland has one MP with an Afghan background (SDP) and one MP with a Turkish background (Green League).

identification for the Swedish-speaking people as it is their most distinguishable feature.

Table 4.3 *Linguistic identity by native language in 2003–2011*⁵⁷

		Identity					
Native language	Year	Finnish-speaking	Finns in general	Swedish-speaking	Other	All	(N)
Finnish	2003	21	77	1	1	100	(1073)
	2007	27	72	1	1	100	(1101)
	2011	28	70	1	1	100	(1178)
Swedish	2003	1	17	82	0	100	(186)
	2007	0	22	78	0	100	(313)
	2011	3	23	73	2	100	(114)
All	2003	20	74	5	1	100	(1259)
	2007	26	70	4	1	100	(1414)
	2011	27	68	4	1	100	(1292)

Note: In this table, in contrast to all other tables, the language weight was not deployed since other social structural variables are not assessed simultaneously. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011

It is interesting to note that the importance of having a Swedish-speaking identity has somewhat decreased from 2003 to 2011, while the importance of having a Finnish-speaking identity has somewhat increased. The increased importance of a Finnish-speaking identity instead of a Finnish identity may be the result of a nativist reaction since the debate on the effects of immigration has intensified in recent years (see Borg 2012c). However, it may also reflect the fact that an ever-growing number of Finnish-speaking people has seen the Swedish-speaking population as a privileged group (Grönlund 2011, 7–8). This may accentuate the need to emphasize the Finnish-speaking identity. Indeed, because Swedish-speaking people are portrayed as being fortunate, well-off and socially better

⁵⁷ The respondents were asked “Which of the following groups would you say you belong to?”. The answer alternatives were *Finns in general*, *Finnish-speaking Finns*, *Swedish-speaking Finns* and *other ethnic or linguistic group*.

integrated than their Finnish-speaking counterparts, the Finnish-Swedes have been called “the better people”. (Tandefelt 2000, 71; Heikkilä 2011, 21.)

Furthermore, when taking into account the language used at home, the sharp dividing lines persist. Very few Finnish-speaking Finns use both Finnish and Swedish at home, while less than a third of Swedish-speaking Finns use both Finnish and Swedish at home (data from FNES studies in 2003, 2007 and 2011). This indicates the social homogeneity of interaction in the Swedish-speaking community.

The core of the politicized tension between the Finnish-Swedes and the Finnish-speaking majority has focused on the privileged nature of the Finnish-Swedes. The position of Swedish is guaranteed as an official language in the Constitution and the Language Act assures the right to use Swedish in any state authority and in local authority, depending on the linguistic status of the municipality. Furthermore, as Bengtsson (2011, 35) notes, the Finnish-Swedes have been fostered by their strong position in political, economic and societal spheres.

The position of Finnish-Swedes has been in a striking contrast to the other West European minorities, most of which have been more or less peripheral either politically, culturally or socioeconomically (see Birnir 2007, 21). In Lipset and Rokkan’s classification, ethno-linguistic minorities were indeed equaled with periphery. But Finnish-Swedes have been far from peripheral in Finland, as they indeed were the ruling class for a long time (see Karvonen 2014).

Language has been the social structural base for one of the clearest divisions of the Finnish party system. The Swedish-speaking people are still explicitly represented by the Swedish People’s Party to the extent that Swedish interests are the *raison d’être* of the party. Disputes over other issues have been overcome in order to represent the whole Swedish-speaking population; the Swedish People’s Party has always managed to negotiate satisfying arrangements for the party by setting language at the top of its agenda. (Bengtsson 2005, 135–137; Sundberg 2006a, 45; Paloheimo 2008, 48.) In addition, the representation of Swedish-speaking interests has benefitted from the electoral system since the Swedish-speaking population is packed to the coastal areas in the electoral districts of Helsingfors (Helsinki), Nyland (Uusimaa), Egentliga-Finland (Varsinais-Suomi) and Vasa (Vaasa).

In addition, the significance of the division to Finnish- and Swedish-speaking people has not been solely based on the assembling force of the Swedish People's Party. Although the SFP has been and still is a major force, the societal interests of Swedish-speaking population has been furthered especially by the wealthy Finnish-Swedish cultural life and foundations, which have also been involved in advocating financial support in elections (see Sundberg 1985; Venho 2009).

While the Swedish People's Party has a non-negotiable position in representing the Swedish-speaking people, the linguistic division has remained quite irrelevant for the Finnish-speaking parties. Since Finnish-speaking voters constitute over 90 per cent of the electorate, there would be little sense in trying to represent the 'interests of all Finnish-speaking people'. However, the True Finns has represented arguments against Swedish language on anti-elitist bases and on the grounds that people should not be obliged to study mandatory Swedish in school. This has clearly further bipolarized the language-based conflicts with the Swedish People's Party and the True Finns being the opposite poles (see Grönlund 2011; Grönlund & Westinen 2012, 169).⁵⁸

Type of residential area

The treatment of the social structural base in the old rural-urban cleavage is trickier. The traditional dichotomy of people living in the countryside and in urban environments may miss some of the present dynamics. Instead, in this study a categorization is proposed that takes into account both the density of the population/urbanization degree and the size of the municipality the voters live in. This categorization builds on the categorizations of Statistics Finland (2015b). A distinction is made between people living in rural municipalities, small municipalities, towns and in the metropolitan area of Helsinki. Rural municipalities include those municipalities in which less than 60 per cent of the population lives in urban settlements (and in which the population of the largest urban settlement is less than 15 000). Small municipalities are municipalities in which at least 60 per cent, but less than 90 per cent, of the population lives in

⁵⁸ The grievance of the True Finns towards Finnish-Swedes in fact fulfils the three conditions that are likely to make an ethnic (linguistic) minority a target for a populist force (Mudde 2007, 71). (1) Finnish-Swedes have extensive minority rights and they are well-organized; (2) they are linked to the majority ethnicity of the bordering state; (3) they used to be the dominating group in Finland.

urban settlements and in which the population of the largest urban settlement is at least 4,000 but less than 15 000. Towns include those municipalities in which at least 90 per cent of the population lives in urban settlements, or in which the population of the largest urban settlement is at least 15 000. The metropolitan area of Helsinki consists of the capital Helsinki and its surrounding cities Espoo, Grankulla/Kauniainen and Vantaa.

One fifth of the respondents live in rural municipalities and one fifth in small municipalities, where a larger share of residents live in the center of the municipality. About two fifths live in urban environments outside the Helsinki metropolitan area and one fifth in the Helsinki metropolitan area.

In the 21st century, the interests between people living in the metropolitan area and the rest of Finland have become increasingly conflicted. As Moisio (2012, 22) argues, the metropolitan area of Helsinki has been seen as a key factor in Finland's global competitiveness when scale benefits and tendency towards bigger units have become key aspects in governmental strategies. Moisio calls this developmental phase, which has intensified in recent years, *the metropolitan state phase*. Especially in times of a *decentralized welfare state*, the clash still revolved mainly around the classic dichotomy between rural and urban interests.

When emphasis on competitiveness and centralization increases, particularly those living in rural municipalities and other small municipalities may feel that they have been left on their own (see Uusitalo 2003). At the same time, however, people living in urban environments, especially in the metropolitan area, may argue that the concentration of resources has not gone far enough and that peripheral communities are being held up artificially with an ineffective allocation of resources (see Moisio 2012). The distinction between rural and small municipalities is needed because the rural municipalities can be conceived as being in an even more peripheral and vulnerable position: they have lost population in the 21st century and the prospects for rural municipalities are not especially bright (Uusitalo 2003; Moisio 2006). Moreover, given the long tradition and the special vanguard of rural interests in Finnish politics (see Karvonen 2014), it is important to distinguish between people living in the most rural environments and those living in small communities that are not considered as being primarily rural.

Admittedly, the category of urban residents outside the metropolitan area is large and heterogeneous as it includes citizens living in small towns and citizens living in towns with 200 000 inhabitants. However, the category of residents living in larger towns (for example in towns with over 100 000 inhabitants) would also be problematic because there are no clear common interests for people living in a northern town like Oulu and a southern town like Tampere, not to speak of a common “larger town identity”. Instead, urban interests have persisted in Finnish politics (see Paloheimo 2008; Moisio 2012) and urbanity unites people living in urban environments despite the differences in the size of the urban community (Hellström 2011).

How much people identify themselves in rural or urban terms cannot be assessed from the FNES data. However, according to a survey conducted in 2011 by The Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra, roughly 40 per cent of the Finnish population has an urban identity and roughly 20 per cent have a rural identity. Slightly below 40 per cent feel that they are both urban and rural (ibid.). Even though the mixed identity represents a challenge from a cleavage perspective, it is likely that one of the identities is stronger, whereas the other may exist simultaneously. As there has been far more migration from the countryside to towns than the other way around, many people living in towns have roots in the countryside and can pertain towards having a rural identity, at least partly (ibid; Statistics Finland 2015b). Moreover, the rural-urban-dichotomy is crude in terms of identity and does not leave room for interpretations as to whether the people in the metropolitan area have a distinctively different kind of urban identity in comparison to people living in other urban environments. In addition, it must be highlighted that living environments differ drastically from each other inside the Helsinki metropolitan area; from rich neighborhoods to socially peripheral suburbs. However, distinction inside towns/municipalities cannot be made with available data.

Even though the rural-urban divide is closely attached with the antagonisms of the past (see Gallagher et al. 2011, 283), the rural-urban identity is still felt quite strongly in the Finnish electorate. Only one fourth of the people feel that rural-urban identity is not at all important for them. However, those living in rural environments consider this identity to be far more important than those living in urban environments (Hellström 2011.) Hence, rural identity seems to be

stronger embedded than urban identity. Moreover, the continuing deterioration of the countryside may have stimulated the importance of defending the countryside. All of these aspects explain why the type of residential area where people live could have an importance from a cleavage perspective.

The interests of rural and urban residents have been represented quite explicitly since many of the Finnish parties have had stable support areas in either rural or urban environments (see Rantala 1970; Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005; Westinen 2014). The Centre Party has traditionally represented the interests of the rural population and sparsely populated areas due to its Agrarian roots, while the National Coalition Party and the Green League have been the main representatives of the southern population centers, and hence the metropolitan area. The Social Democrats and the Left Alliance have been the representatives of residents in urban-industrial environments. (Ruostetsaari 2006, Paloheimo 2008; Westinen 2011.)⁵⁹ Moreover, the Left Alliance has attached spatial interests to workers' interests by arguing that market forces should not dictate the living conditions of the regions. The Swedish People's Party has approached the spatial representation of interests from a linguistic perspective: it has defended the interests of both the rural and urban Swedish-speaking people. The True Finns and the Christian Democrats have neither profiled themselves as the representatives of groups defined in terms of type of residential area (*ibid.*). Hence, the conflicts have mainly put the Centre Party against the Coalition Party, Green League and Social Democrats.

Occupational class

The empirical treatment of occupational class needs a more nuanced approach than was given to the other cleavage bases. This is due to the complex nature of the concept of class itself. The measurement of class has changed dramatically over the years. For Karl Marx, the crucial element in defining classes was the control of production. For Max Weber, class relations were the outcome of the distribution of property and other resources in capital and labor markets. Class divisions arise from the (lack of) possession of property and the nature of

⁵⁹However, the Left Alliance is still, to some extent, the representative of peripheral areas that stem from the Communist Party (so-called backwoods Communism) (see Laulajainen 1979).

employment relations. (Scott 2002.) Although modified later on, the most prominent class categorizations have followed the Weberian ideas. Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979, see also Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992) constructed the most widely-used class scheme (EG/EGP-scheme) that divides people into several classes according to their skills and the degree of autonomy related to their work. Following the footsteps of Lockwood (1958), class situation was broken down into market situation and work situation. The market situation handles the conditions of employment – income, economic advancement etc. The work situation indicates how the work is located in systems of authority and control (Goldthorpe 1987, 40). Classes became thus perceived as groups that 1) are based on employment relations, which indicate the position within the labor market and 2) reflect the degree of autonomy related to the work (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992, 37). The nature of the work has been underlined also in later accounts (see e.g. Kitschelt & Rehm 2014).

There are several versions of the EG/EGP class-schema which vary as to the number of classes. For instance, the most detailed version distinguishes between 1) Higher-grade professionals, managers etc. 2) Lower-grade professionals, administrators etc. 3) Routine non-manual employees (higher grade) 4) Routine non-manual employees, (lower grade) 5) Small proprietors with employees 6) Small proprietors without employees 7) Farmers and other self-employed workers in primary production 8) Lower-grade technicians 9) Skilled manual workers 10) Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers and 11) Agricultural and other workers in primary production.

In modern social science, three further categorizations have been widely used and discussed. Olin-Wright's (1985) schema emphasizes more the ownership relations and distinguishes between capitalists, workers and the 'petty bourgeoisie'. This was an attempt to retain a Marxist approach in class analyses. Esping-Andersen (1993) sought to recognize employment changes associated with post-industrialism and differentiate post-industrial categories from the more traditional categories. In one of the most recent alternative categorizations for the EGP-scheme, Oesch (2006) has suggested a categorization that is based on a new "horizontal", structural conflict in the labor market. He suggests that there is a conflict between people whose work follows technical, organizational, interpersonal service or independent 'work logic'.

The categorization of occupations in the Finnish National Election studies is based on the UN-verified International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88 from 1988 and ISCO-08 from 2008), where occupations are grouped according to the tasks and duties they entail and status in employment. Hence, it contains elements from the EG/EGP-scheme but also from the European Socio-Economic Classification (ESEC) as proposed by Rose and Harrison (2007, see also 2010). It is not possible to constitute a class schema with eight or eleven categories with the FNES data (cf. Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992) since the number of respondents belonging to each category would not be large enough. Moreover, the occupation categories in the FNES data do not contain as precise details as some other surveys on parliamentary elections (cf. Oskarson 2007). The Oesch's (2006) class schema would require that the hierarchical construct of occupations would be at least on three different levels inside each class. In the FNES 2007 and 2011, the occupations are coded only to two different levels, while in the FNES 2003 they were still on four levels (the most detailed level in ISCO-88 and -08).

The categorization of occupation is for the most part correspondent between ISCO-88 and ISCO-08. Only minor changes have taken place (see International Labour Organization 2013) and they do not affect this study since the occupational classes are coded only to two different levels. For example, Oesch's (2006) class of 'interpersonal service work logic' would require identifying journalists and shop sales assistants but this is not possible with the data available from FNES 2007 and 2011. Hence, the classification in this study is theoretically anchored to the EG/EGP-scheme and empirically anchored to the European Socio-Economic Classification (ESEC) and International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88 and ISCO-08).

First, the *higher professionals and managers* constitute the 'highest' occupational class. Higher professionals and most managers have typically acquired the highest education although this is not a definite prerequisite. They have a high degree of autonomy and high specificity of skills. Sometimes they are referred to with the term 'higher salariat'. About one fifth of the analyzed respondents in the FNES-studies are categorized to this group.

The second class consists of associate professionals and technicians, which corresponds largely to the label 'intermediate' occupations (Rose and Harrison 2007, 2010). In these occupations, university level education is not required and

the work is more monitored than the work of the highest class. Most importantly, occupations that belong to this class do not require a high specificity of skills. This occupational class is hence called *lower professionals*. That said, the lower professionals, i.e. for example nurses and engineers, nevertheless have a higher education, less monitored occupations and a higher specificity of skills than the 'lower' classes. Lower professionals comprise approximately 15 per cent of the analyzed respondents in the FNES studies.

Self-employed people are difficult to categorize from a class perspective. Historically, they have not been involved in class conflicts in the same way as the working class or upper classes. Since the self-employed people have a varied specificity of competence and a varied level of education, they do not fit into a uniform category. The shared attribute of the self-employed is a high degree of autonomy. Scholars have divided them to small employers/petty bourgeoisie and agricultural entrepreneurs (see e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Agricultural entrepreneurs have been distinguished as a separate group than other entrepreneurs, as agriculture is a specific branch. Already the Lipset-Rokkan-model (1967) emphasized the special nature of landed interests.

Due to the small N of both agricultural entrepreneurs and small employers⁶⁰ in the FNES's, the analyses would not be reliable if they were treated as their own groups in each election. This is unfortunate since farmers have been an important group for the Finnish party system with their interests being protected first by the Agrarian League and later by the Centre Party. However, pooling of the data of 2003, 2007 and 2011 increases the N of both *agricultural entrepreneurs* and *small employers*, and they can be thus treated as their own categories in analyses covering all the three elections. When combined, agricultural entrepreneurs and small employers, labelled under the category *entrepreneurs*, form 10 per cent of the respondents in the FNES surveys.

The fourth group is labelled as *routine non-manual employees* who are bound by labor contracts, whose work is monitored and who do not have a high occupational competence. Clerical support workers and service and sales workers are examples of this occupational group. The size of this group, which comprises

⁶⁰ Small employers have been separated from large employers in class categorizations as large employers have a higher status and more power than those who have small-scale business.

roughly one fourth of the analyzed respondents, owes much to the expansion of the service sector.

The traditional class schemes differentiate between different kinds of blue-collar workers. Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) distinguished between skilled manual workers and semi/non-skilled manual workers. The former often have a vocational education, including a formal competence. The occupations of the semi/non-skilled manual workers have usually no educational requirements and the work requires less specified skills. However, in terms of class interests, this categorization can be criticized. As also semi/non-skilled workers have an interest in belonging to trade unions that guard the 'workers' interests', it is not all that fruitful to differentiate between the different types of blue-collar workers. In political life, it is more common to talk about the interests of the 'working man' or workers than to specify between skilled and less skilled blue-collar workers (Mudde 2007; Ruostetsaari 2011). Hence the last category, which comprises roughly 30 per cent of the analyzed respondents, is named *blue-collar workers*.

Scholars have found it difficult to place unemployed people in the class schemas (Oskarson 2007) since people outside working life and people currently without work constitute a diverse group, although for example the ESEC includes the unemployed as their own class. In this study the unemployed are not included in the class categorization due to the inner heterogeneity. Also students and respondents on parental-leave are left outside of the categorization for the same reasons. Students' field of education cannot be differentiated and since different studies lead to different occupations, students cannot be treated as an enough homogenous group.

Subjective class identification is used for evaluating the coherence of class identity and class consciousness; whether individuals feel that they are a part of a social class. It is important to notice that subjective class identification can stem from family background (family's social status) to a high degree. Hence, it is a reflection of a sense of belonging and it might be in conflict with the individual's objective occupational position (Oskarson 1994, 112–113). The (social) class identification here is measured with the traditional categories, which differentiate between the working class, different grades of middle class and the upper class. Table 4.4 shows that class identity still persists within the Finnish electorate, even though the strength of the identity may have weakened.

Blue-collar workers have the most coherent identity of the occupational classes, with approximately 60 per cent identifying with their ‘own’ traditional class, the working-class. Blue-collar workers are often organized in and strongly backed by trade unions in Finland (Pesonen & Riihinen 2002), thus providing the workers with a more unified identity through socialization mechanisms.

Table 4.4 *The class identification of objective occupational groups in 2003–2011.*
*Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011.*⁶¹

Objective occupational class	Class identity Year	Working class	Lower middle class	Middle class	Upper middle class or upper class	No class identification	All	(N)
Blue-collar workers	2003	57	13	23	2	5	100	(338)
	2007	62	10	24	1	3	100	(362)
	2011	67	10	17	1	4	100	(274)
Routine non-manual employees	2003	44	13	29	3	11	100	(247)
	2007	31	17	43	3	6	100	(279)
	2011	37	19	34	3	7	100	(282)
Small employers (including agriculture)	2003	12	20	46	4	18	100	(84)
	2007	22	16	46	7	10	100	(122)
	2011	21	15	41	11	12	100	(61)
Lower professionals	2003	18	15	51	10	5	100	(154)
	2007	18	15	52	11	4	100	(199)
	2011	17	12	53	11	7	100	(189)
Higher professionals and managers	2003	8	13	48	23	8	100	(275)
	2007	3	7	53	33	4	100	(322)
	2011	6	7	48	33	7	100	(238)
All	2003	33	14	36	9	8	100	(1088)
	2007	32	13	40	10	5	100	(1297)
	2011	33	13	37	11	6	100	(1039)

More than a third of routine non-manual employees identify with the working class, with roughly the same share identifying with the middle class. The non-manual nature of their jobs is the most likely explanation as to why members of this group do not identify with the traditional working class to the extent that the blue-collar workers do. The lower middle-class, which would theoretically correspond to the routine non-manual employees, is not a strong object of

⁶¹ The coding of the objective occupational class was based on the categorization in ISCO-88 and ISCO-08 (see International Labour Organization 2013). Class identity was asked with the following question: *Which social class would you say you belong to? Working class, lower middle class, middle class, upper middle class, upper class or not to any class?*

identification. It should be noted that the term 'lower' may also have a psychological effect on respondents: since people strive for positive self-esteem in the intergroup context, i.e. they want to identify with a 'better' alternative. In this case, they are either proud to be a part of the working class or willing to be a part of the vast middle class. (cf. Stubager 2009, 215.)

Roughly half of all the entrepreneurs have identified with the middle class: they are far less working class -minded than the routine non-manual employees. Agricultural entrepreneurs and small employers are not represented separately in the table above due to the small N. However, it can be noted that the agricultural entrepreneurs have the most vague class identification and they are the most reluctant to identify with any of the classes. In comparison to the agricultural entrepreneurs, the small employers more often feel that they are a part of the upper class, whereas agricultural entrepreneurs seemingly simply find it difficult to identify with any of the classes. This result challenges the widely accepted categorization of Goldthorpe and colleagues (1992), which ranks the routine non-manual employees/lower white-collar workers 'higher' than the small employers and agricultural entrepreneurs (see e.g. Oskarson 1994; Nieuwbeerta 1995; Evans ed. 1999; Evans & de Graaf 2013). The results regarding the identification are rather logical, however, since the job of the routine non-manual workers is controlled to a great extent. Furthermore, routine non-manual employees are in occupations which are more likely to be defended by traditionally left-wing trade unions that propagate for the workers' interests.

The class identification of lower professionals does not differ much from the entrepreneurs. As such, a third of lower professionals identify either with the working class or lower middle class, while half identify with the middle class. The major difference is that lower professionals find their class more easily. However, in contrast to entrepreneurs having special interests, for example, in keeping taxation low (small employers) or subsidies high (agricultural entrepreneurs), it is doubtful whether the lower professionals, who identify most with the middle class, have special common interests. Lastly, higher professionals and managers differ distinctively from the other groups. Approximately one third of this group identifies with either the upper middle class or upper class.⁶² Very few identify

⁶² As extremely few of all respondents identify with the upper class, it was unified with the category upper middle-class in Table 4.3.

with the working class or even with the lower middle class. High occupational status results in identification with higher classes.

On the basis of Table 4.4, the polarization of class identities has been growing rather than shrinking, although the time-period (2003–2011) is short. A growing number of blue-collar workers identify with the working-class and a growing number of higher professionals and managers identify with upper middle class or upper class. Hence, it seems that many members of the occupational groups recognize that there is something with their occupational status that differentiates them from the others.

The clashes between occupational classes in contemporary Finland have obviously changed their shape. Like elsewhere in Western Europe, class conflicts originally arose over ownership of the means of production and the basic rights of the underprivileged classes. Nowadays, tensions revolve more around economic policies that are considered to treat different occupational groups in different ways. Furthermore, clashes arise today over job security, as some workers may become the more or less permanent losers of a globalized economy, which disfavors the traditional industrial branches. While the workers in these branches tend to be blue-collar workers, those in higher professions tend to have more resources to find new jobs or alternative careers. Moreover, workers in insecure positions tend to see external factors, such as immigration and further EU-integration, to blame for their worsening future prospects. (Kriesi et al. 2006; 2008; Walter 2010; cf. Hooghe & Marks 2009.) In addition, as Finland has been characterized as one of the most corporatist societies in Europe with a high degree of labor union membership, the labor unions still play a prominent role in guarding the occupational interests. However, labor unions in Finland have also lost ground due to the weakening sense of collectiveness among young employees. They are united more by their insecure position in the job market rather than through former communitarian solidarity. (Pesonen & Riihinen 2002, 89, 95.)

The explicit party representation of occupational groups decreased when the social structure and industrial structure changed in Finland. As mentioned in Chapter 3.3, the old parties used to have their 'own' occupational groups to which they turned to and appealed on. This class base still exists to some extent, although every party has taken into account the expanding service sector. The

Left Alliance (with a Communist heritage) and the Social Democrats have still spoken on behalf of blue-collar workers' interests and the Centre Party has still spoken on behalf of farmers' interests in the 21st century. That being said, their appeal to the broad middle class has been even more important. Moreover, the composition of the electorates of the left-wing parties and the Centre Party hardly resembles those of the 1970s when class voting still flourished (see e.g. Pesonen & Sänkiahho 1979). The National Coalition Party in turn has been the most prominent representative of entrepreneurs, managers and higher professionals, while the Swedish People's Party has appealed more to the Swedish-speaking entrepreneurs and upper classes than to the lower classes (Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005, 171–174; Westinen 2011, 41.)

Of the newer parties, the True Finns has appealed to the lower occupational classes, while the Green League and the Christian Democrats have been more reluctant to make class-based appeals or commitments (*ibid.*). Paloheimo (2008, 36–37) has argued that the formation of these three parties has been based on promoting certain issues and values without occupational attachments. However, it is at least clear that the party profile of the True Finns is more proletarian than the one of its predecessor, the Finnish Rural Party (Ruostetsaari 2011). Indeed, the profile of the True Finns electorate resembles that of many West European Radical Right Populist (RRP) parties (see Arter 2012b; Arzheimer & Carter 2006, 422; Oesch 2008, 349–350; Goodwin 2012, 21–25), although its profile cannot be reduced to that of the 'party of the working man' (see Suhonen 2011; Paloheimo 2012).

Workers in traditional working-class occupations feel that their jobs and wages are threatened when labor unions and the left-wing parties have had it difficult to be able to guard their interests. This picture matches to Finland also. Hence, the appeal of a nationalist populist party on workers has grown and workers have found a new political channel to express their resentment. (see Arter 2010, 495; Harvey 2010, 150; Paloheimo 2012, 327.) While the traditional representation of the interests of (agricultural) entrepreneurs and the upper classes has not faced a major challenger, the fight over the true representative of the lower classes and particularly the blue-collar workers has intensified. Moreover, the representation of the interests of lower professionals has not been clearly defined in the party sphere. This most likely reflects the fact that all the

parties want to appeal to the broad middle class (see Paloheimo 2006), which is the primary source of identification for the lower professionals.

Denomination

Religion⁶³ did not constitute a cleavage base in Finland due to the non-existence of major disputes between the state and the church, on the one hand, and due to the monopoly position of the Evangelic-Lutheran church on the other. Nevertheless, the decreasing importance of the church and its principles in everyday-life has made the dichotomy over confessional and non-confessional voters more interesting from a cleavage perspective. While religion has continued to be important for some segments of society, Finns have by and large become increasingly secular. However, large-scale resignation from the church occurred first in the 2000s and 2010s. This had much to do with the citizens' dissatisfaction with the Evangelic-Lutheran church's stands on moral and family values. In particular, there have been fierce debates on same sex marriages and the right for the same sex couples to adopt, as well as the right of women to become priests. (Mykkänen 2012, 293; Karvonen 2014, 23.) Hence, in the case of Finland, denomination is a borderline case, where old and new social structural bases meet.

Empirically, the religious cleavage can be detected from two perspectives. On the one hand, there is the separation between those who belong to a church and those who do not. On the other hand, the members of a church are separated by their religious activity (Esmer & Petterson 2007, 496.) The religious activity is often measured as church attendance. While church membership reflects the structural side of the religious cleavage, church attendance reflects the manifestation of the structural base. Some people may belong to a church out of a custom while others incorporate religion into everyday life by attending church regularly. Since, however, church attendance is not a structural characteristic, church membership (i.e. denomination) is the only plausible measure for a social

⁶³ In this chapter, a difference is made between religion and denomination. An example of a religion is Christianity, while denomination refers to a recognized autonomous branch of the Christian Church, such as the Evangelic-Lutheran Church. In literature on cleavages, the term religion is often used. However, in the Finnish context it is a matter of the division between those who belong to the Evangelic-Lutheran Church and those who do not belong to any church.

structural base. While some studies have used religious attendance as a measure of a religious cleavage (see e.g. Franklin et al. 2009), the existence of a denominational cleavage between the religiously affiliated voters and the non-denominational voters has been primarily discussed in countries with a Catholic influence, such as in Austria or Belgium (see e.g. Plasser & Ulram 2008; de Winter et al. 2006).

The dichotomy in this study is made between those who belong to the main church, the Evangelic-Lutheran church, and those who do not belong to any church. The share of those belonging to the main church has decreased below 80 per cent in 2003–2011, and the share of people with no religious affiliations has risen to roughly 20 per cent. Other respondents are excluded from the analyses: they belong either to the Orthodox Church or the Catholic Church or to some other Christian or non-Christian church/community.⁶⁴ Unfortunately, in the FNES data it is not asked whether one belongs to a revivalist movement inside the Evangelic-Lutheran church. Nevertheless, it has been estimated that roughly 5 per cent of Finnish citizens belong to some type of revivalist movement. The members of these movements attend church regularly and they form tight communities with strict norms. Their moral concepts, concerning sexual life and abortion for instance, have deviated drastically from those who belong to the main church out of a custom (Salomäki 2010.)

The secularization process has meant that the mainstream church members have, by and large, become less religious over the decades. However, Table 4.5 suggests that about 60 per cent of Evangelic-Lutherans still consider themselves to be very religious or somewhat religious; this share has slightly risen in 2003–2011. At the same time, those not belonging to the church have become less and less religious. In 2011, 79 per cent of the respondents with no religious affiliation stated that they are not at all or not very religious.⁶⁵ In 2003, the corresponding

⁶⁴ The Orthodox Church has an institutionalized status alongside the Evangelic-Lutheran Church in Finland due to historical reasons. In 2011, roughly 59 000 people belonged to the Orthodox Church in Finland. Other noteworthy groups are those who belong to the Jehova's witnesses (19 000), the Evangelical Free Church of Finland (15 000), the Catholic Church (11 000), Islamic churches (10 000) and the Pentecostal Church (7000).

⁶⁵ As a substantial share of non-confessional voters still consider themselves to be religious, church membership cannot be regarded, therefore, as something needed in order to keep one's faith. Resignation from the church can be a protest to the values the church represents; even though one can still have certain religious aspects (see Mykkänen 2012).

rate was still 59 per cent. This means that polarization has increased in terms of religious identity. Much of this tendency has to do with generational replacement. The younger voters are more secular than the older ones and they constitute a growing share among those who do not belong to any church.

It can be asserted that those belonging to the Evangelic-Lutheran church are likely to believe that the church represents a respectable institution and that membership of this institution reflects certain important values in life. On the other hand, those not belonging to the church are likely to have more liberal values and are more likely to believe that the church is an institution that should neither have any say nor have any control over the moral norms in society. (Salomäki 2014; Sorsa 2015; cf. Mykkänen 2012.)

Table 4.5 *Religious identity by denomination in 2003–2011*⁶⁶

Denomination	Year	Religiosity				All	(N)
		Not at all religious	Not very religious	Somewhat religious	Very religious		
Does not belong to any church	2003	37	22	28	10	100	(154)
	2007	48	19	28	5	100	(239)
	2011	58	21	19	2	100	(270)
Evangelic-Lutheran	2003	11	32	45	11	100	(1034)
	2007	9	26	52	13	100	(1118)
	2011	11	23	52	13	100	(970)
All	2003	14	31	43	11	100	(1188)
	2007	16	25	48	12	100	(1357)
	2011	22	23	45	11	100	(1240)

Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011

Anti-religiousness was kept at the back in party politics after the clerical disputes between atheist socialists and the church were solved after the first decades in the 20th century. However, the interests of denominational (Evangelic-Lutheran) voters continued to be kept up front by the center-right parties, the Centre Party

⁶⁶ Religiosity was approached with the following question in the FNES-studies: Would you describe yourself as not all religious, not very religious, somewhat religious or very religious?

and the National Coalition Party. The rise of the Christian Democrats in turn was a protest against the secularization and decreasing importance of religion. However, despite the fact that the Christian Democrats has continued to fight against secularization, the other center-right parties no longer represent the denominational voters all that explicitly. However, the True Finns has stated that its value basis revolves around the doctrines of Christianity (Westinen 2011, 68). Non-denominational interests have been best represented by the Green League and the Left Alliance. Their recent strategy has been to challenge the conventional and close relationship between the church and state and present religion as something that should not affect politics. Moreover, they have been against the discrimination of those who do not belong to the church (Westinen 2011). Thus, the interests based on denomination have increasingly divided the Finnish party system.

To conclude, the group-based identities in the 'old' social structure seem to be somewhat persistent. The linguistic identity of the Swedish-speaking people is still strong, and the Finnish-speaking identity is rising. Class identity has become more polarized: blue-collar workers and higher professionals/managers stand further apart from each other than before. The rural-urban identity is especially important for those living in sparsely-populated areas. And finally, anti-religiousness has increased and polarized the division between those belonging to the main church and those not belonging to any church. Still, we do not know whether these polarizing patterns are reflected in sharper value differences between the groups that are in turn reflected in party-voter alignments. This is explored in detail in the next main chapter. Before that, however, an assessment needs to be made of the suggested social structural characteristics forming the new cleavage bases.

4.2.2. Emerging new cleavage bases in social structure

Gender

Regarding occupational class, language, place of residence and denomination, the members of different groups are willing to identify with a certain group or class. However, recently proposed new cleavage bases, such as gender, age and

education, have proved to be more problematic. For instance, Franklin (2010, 651–652) criticizes the fact that scholars do not concretely specify what the common interests of the group are, or which parties stand for those interests. The crucial question concerns whether the voters on each side of an objective divide recognize this divide and their position in it.

The first new suggestion for a structural cleavage base that is handled here is gender. Obviously, gender is a structural conflict due to societal inequalities between men and women. The movements for women's rights have fought amongst other things for universal suffrage but gender has rarely been a basis for party formation (see Inglehart & Norris 2003). That being said, gender has had relevance in the voters' voting decisions.

In a comparative perspective, the position of women in Finnish politics has historically been influential since the share of elected female MP's has been quite high (Holli & Wass 2009, 126). Gender-related issues became increasingly politicized in the 1960s and 1970s and women started to make increasingly independent voting decisions. Especially women in high social positions began to emphasize the feminist perspective when the cultural atmosphere regarding gender roles was changing and career prospects for women were on the rise. (Haavio-Mannila 1970, 1979.)⁶⁷

The proposed gender-based conflict has concerned more recently even more distinctively the status of both women and men in the labor market. Traditionally, the position of women in the labor market has been weaker than the position of men. However, due to educational emancipation, these differences have become more moderate. On the other hand, the conflict has concerned the way of grasping gender roles. While feminists have pursued equality in all its forms and advocated for women to become emancipated from their traditional gender roles, the opposite view has defended the natural differences between the sexes and patriarchal family values, and denied positive discrimination. Hence, there have been some elements of a 'class struggle between the sexes'. (Kofman 1998; Mudde 2007, 92–93.)

⁶⁷ However, the party preferences of men and women were not identical in Finland in the 1950s either. For example working class urban women were more inclined to support bourgeois parties and less inclined to support communists than men (Allardt 1961, 7).

The extent to which such a phenomenon describes Finland and whether gender could function as a new cleavage base, has not been studied thoroughly. Instead, it is known that in the 21st century parliamentary elections roughly 70 per cent of men have voted for male candidates while roughly 55 per cent of women have voted for female candidates. The differences have however levelled partly due to parties fielding an increasing number of female candidates. (Holli & Wass 2009.)

Of the Finnish parties, Green League has promoted explicitly feminist interests and wanted to build a society that is gender neutral – having no prejudices on genders and their roles. In addition, women supporting Green League have been inclined to choose a female candidate (ibid. 142; Westinen 2011, 70). The True Finns (2011), by comparison, has had patriarchal and anti-emancipation features in its ideological profile (see also Ruostetsaari 2011). It has also been the only parliamentary party where male dominance has clearly prevailed in the party organization (see Arter & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014). These have been typical features for the Radical Right Populist parties (Mudde 2007, 93). The other parties have been more cautious in representing gender-related interests as it is beneficial to keep the target electorate as large as possible.

Age cohorts

As regards to age as a potential cleavage base, the assumption of horizontal political socialization and generational key experiences constituting politically relevant age cohorts is crucial. People are deeply affected by their formative years (usually regarded as the age between 17 and 25) and that specific experiences during that life period can have a profound effect on the whole cohort depending on the socio-historical environment. Horizontal socialization is hence based on 'key experiences' causing a long-lasting propensity to prioritize certain values, norms and ways of relating to politics. (Delli Carpini 1986, 8–9; Wass 2008.) Due to this common background, the members of a certain generation are expected to also develop a generational consciousness which persists in the course of a life-cycle. Especially Inglehart (1971, 1977) brought the generational explanations to contemplate or replace the old class explanations in electoral behavior and in debate on values and attitudes. As already mentioned, the younger generations

were expected to acquire more postmaterialist values and replace their class loyalties with value orientations in electoral behavior.

In terms of party-voter ties, Butler and Stokes (1974) suggested that the differences that were due to differing formative experiences are manifested in party choice. Generations become political generations when they become socialized to vote for a certain party that they feel close to. The behavior of voters is thus supposedly formed by the party landscape and ideological concerns of their formative years, especially concerning the older generations who grew up when the mass parties were flourishing and when electoral participation and party loyalty were on a high level (Tilley & Evans 2011; Wagner & Kritzingner 2012). In contrast, class structure theories are based on vertical socialization. This model argues that lifestyle, values and attitudes are transformed within the same family inside each social class. (see e.g. Dudley & Gitelson 2002.)

The categorization of different age cohorts in this study contains elements of generational key experiences in the Finnish context (see Roos 1987; Purhonen 2002; Purhonen et al. 2008). The oldest generation consists of those born before 1945, whose key experience is related to the Second World War (Edmunds & Turner 2002 ed.), and in particular to the insecurity, scarcity and hard work related to the war and post-war period.⁶⁸ The second generation entails both 'baby boomers' (born in 1945–1950) and those born later in the 1950s. They are unified by major transitions in the surrounding environment. They have been able to take advantage of rising living standards, industrialization and the expansion of education in their early adolescence. Both age cohorts have played a major role in constructing the Finnish welfare state and they have been 'obligation-driven' citizens in terms of work and various life choices, including voting. (see Paloheimo 2007; Tuohinen 2010).

In Finland, those born in the 1960s have been labeled as the 'generation of suburbs' due to the increased migration from countryside to towns. They have been contrasted to those born in the 1970s (and shortly after it) who have been labeled as the 'generation of individual choice'. (Purhonen 2002; see also

⁶⁸ Although it would be theoretically sound to distinguish between those who were adolescents during the Second World War and to those whose formative years were not during the war, there are really few respondents from the oldest categories (born in the 1920s or before) in the FNES studies in 2003–2011.

Grönlund et al. 2005a; Wass 2008.) Nevertheless, in terms of key experiences, both of these cohorts experienced a severe recession at young age in the beginning of the 1990s in Finland. Thus, contrary to previous accounts, I argue that the key factor in distinguishing between the newest generations should be whether an age class was likely to have entered the job market during the recession or not, as it deeply affected the prospects in life. The generation that was hit hard by recession as young adults consists thus of those who were born in between 1960 and 1975. They were forced to deal with more uncertainties in working life than the previous generations and the recession should be regarded as their most important key experience.

Those born after 1975 entered the job market when the Finnish economy was recovering. In 1994 the GDP began to rise again and furthermore, Finland made a decision to join the EU. Thus this youngest generation did not have to deal with such severe economic insecurity and it has grown up in a more international environment. Even though this generation has had many opportunities, it has also been challenged by increased competition and increasing requirements in the labor market. Furthermore, they have been seen to bear more individual-centered values. (see Purhonen 2002.)

Labels, such as ‘portfolio generation’, have been used to depict the generation that was born in the mid/late-1980s and later on. The portfolio generation has been characterized by an increasing pressure to make the right choices (to gather a portfolio) in an increasingly competitive and hectic society and simultaneously by a way of relating to life in a more individual-centered way. Traditionally respected features such as high societal status and building a stable and safeguarded life are less relevant since the young feel that nothing stable can be built with increasingly insecure life prospects. Instead, the youngest generation orientates in experiencing things and making the most of life as individuals. (Hoikkala et al. 2006; Myllyniemi 2008.)

However, in a study with eight years’ time-span, starting from 2003, a ‘portfolio generation’ cannot be separated since many members of this generation were not eligible voters in 2003 or even in 2007. The categorization with four age cohorts is admittedly problematic, because the youngest cohort includes those born in 1976 as well as those born in 1993. Their generational experiences differ understandably drastically from one another.

In comparison to the other generations, the post 1975-generation has not been surrounded by politics in everyday life. In the FNES 2003 data, only every seventh respondent from this generation felt that politics played a major role or a quite substantial role when they were young adults. In the other generations, roughly every fourth respondent felt this way. The same question was not asked in FNES 2007 or FNES 2011, which could have provided further evidence of the apolitical character of youngest voters.

Although generational consciousness is difficult to measure, it has been shown that certain cohesion exists among the generations in Finland (Purhonen 2002; Purhonen et al. 2008). It is, however, difficult to determine which age classes should be included in which age cohorts. Nevertheless, group-based interests attached to certain age cohorts might be based on quite practical concerns. The oldest generations are bound to be most worried about pensions and elderly care, while the concerns of the recession generation and generation of individualistic choice are bound to be more concerned about their career prospects and how much they should contribute toward maintaining the welfare state. It is not certain whether there is a generational gap in Finland that would be reflected in differentiating value orientations and a vote for a party that represents the interests of a generation, thus eventually contributing to cleavage politics. In this respect, we must bear in mind the alternative proposition suggesting that age cohorts do not serve as cleavage basis; that cleavages rather change *because of* generational replacement (Franklin & van der Eijk 2009).

Furthermore, it is difficult to explicate how social structural interests based on age cohorts are represented in the party sphere. It can be assumed that the old parties have more incentives to represent the interests of the older generations while the newer parties, which are entangled in with the ideas of silent revolution and silent counter-revolution, have more incentives to represent the interests that appeal to the younger generations. The Social Democratic Party, the Centre Party and the National Coalition Party belong primarily to the first group, while the Green League and the True Finns belong most clearly to the latter group.

Education

Education is the last social structural base that is assessed. The interests that the different educational groups have in common have been seen to follow from the educational milieu where the individuals spend their early adulthood. Education offers thus an alternative explanation to class explanations: for example, when an individual is in an occupation that does not correspond to his/her education, the identity stems from the educational milieu instead of a professional identity. (see Weakliem 2002; Van de Werfhorst & De Graaf 2004; Van der Waal et al. 2007.) Both occupational class and education can be seen to indicate person's social status.

As the fields of education and educational milieu vary much, especially among those who acquire a high education, it is debatable as to which are the educational groups that should have common interests. Some have argued for a more precise division to educational groups. For example, sociocultural professionals with an education from human or social sciences have been more inclined to have postmaterialist attitudes than managers and engineers who have studied hard sciences (Kriesi 1989; 1998). However, this approach runs the risk of constituting a mosaic of educational groups, which is not even possible to execute with the FNES-data since educational field has not been included in the questions.

The five educational groups that are analyzed are based on the type and length of education (cf. Stubager 2010). These groups are composed of those with primary education (elementary school), vocational school, upper secondary school, polytechnics-level education and university-level education. Even though there are several alternatives for constituting categories, a plain dichotomy to low- and highly educated (see Stubager 2009) would not correspond to the thought of educational milieu. Instead, *primary* and *vocational schools*, *upper-secondary schools*, *polytechnics* and *universities* act as differentiating educational milieu and constitute the potential for specific education-based identities to be formed.

Although education-based identity cannot be detected from the FNES-data, Stubager (2009) has shown that such an identity and also a group consciousness exist to some extent in Denmark – especially the lower-educated conceived that

there is a conflict between the educational groups. Nevertheless, half of the Danish electorate, especially the lower-educated, did not feel attached to educational-based groups. Admittedly, universities have been used as the prime example of an educational milieu, which can pave the way for an education-based identity, whereas upper-secondary school, for example, is less likely to do so (see *ibid*).

Educational and occupational groups are admittedly overlapping. For example vocational education leads often to a blue-collar job, while university-level education leads often to a job of a higher professional. However, manager positions do not always require higher education. More importantly, due to the vast expansion of education, many highly educated do not find jobs that would correspond to their level of education. In such situations, the education-based identity may outweigh the occupation-based identity. Hence, also political preferences deriving from education may well deviate from political preferences deriving from occupational class.

The level of education has not been seen as a cleavage in the Finnish context, although there has been a clear electoral divide among educational groups (see Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005; Grönlund & Westinen 2012). However, the early Finnish (electoral) studies explored how the field of education of university students affected their political preferences (see e.g. Pesonen 1958, Allardt & Tomasson 1967, Lammi & Sänkiaho 1970; Suhonen 1975).

Despite the rise in the general level of education, the lifestyles and milieus have begun to differentiate more and more among the young according to their education. For example, young people with vocational education have differentiated from the higher educated young in having more negative attitudes towards minorities and immigration. Accordingly, young people in vocational schools feel distrust towards politics and are more prone to support the populist True Finns Party (Kauppinen 2011). Accordingly, the universities have been a milieu for liberal, postmaterialists thoughts to be spread, which most likely benefits Green parties (Stubager 2008). Hence, the potential for group-based conflicts in terms of the length and type of education may be increasing.

The party representation of educational groups, however, has been far less explicit than the representation of the occupational classes. The True Finns (2011) is an exception in the sense that it has demanded more appreciation for

those with a vocational education and stated that higher education should not be overvalued. It is more difficult to represent the interests of educational groups than the interests of occupational groups, since people are organized into unions to a greater extent according to their occupation than according to their education, albeit many unions are actually a mix of the two.

Social structural cleavage bases in Finland – a brief summary

To summarize the answer to RQ1, “*which are the relevant social structural cleavage bases in Finland?*”, it can be concluded that there are several relevant social structural cleavage bases. Native language, type of residential area and occupational class have formed the most solid cleavage bases. The social structural groups involved in these cleavage bases, such as the Swedish-speaking population, residents in rural areas and blue-collar workers, were the core groups of the Finnish parties when the modern party system was launched at the beginning of the 20th century. Furthermore, parties have still sought to represent these group-based interests. For example, the Swedish People’s Party has been working explicitly for the Swedish-speaking population, the Centre Party for rural residents and agricultural entrepreneurs, the Coalition Party for higher professionals and managers and the left-wing parties and the True Finns for blue-collar workers. Moreover, the linguistic identity, rural/urban-identity and class identity are still extractable in the Finnish electorate. Simultaneously, all the parties want to reach out to the vast and unspecified middle class.

Denomination is a special case as a cleavage base since, despite being an “old” social structural cleavage base, it has not yet been fully politicized. A religious cleavage has not at least yet emerged in Finland between two religions; rather, a denominational cleavage is at the moment being more likely to emerge between those belonging to the main church and those not belonging to any church. Although Finland has been uniformly Evangelic-Lutheran, during the 21st century the number of resignations from the church has accelerated. The resignations have been largely based on having differing moral values. Some parties, such as the Christian Democrats and the True Finns have advocated Christianity as a part of their party identity – Christian values lie of course at the heart of the Christian Democrats. However, the representation of those not

belonging to the church has been less distinct, even though the Left Alliance and the Green League have as parties toned down the importance of religion in society. Hence, although denomination is a relevant cleavage base, its potential in the Finnish context has not yet been fully explored.

Gender, education and age cohorts are social structural bases of a more recent nature when talking about cleavages. In contrast to the aforementioned social structural bases, the group identity that is attached to these bases cannot be detected with existing data. Furthermore, gender, education and age cohorts have not been the basis for the birth of any established party in the Finnish party system and it has been rare also elsewhere although a feminist party is rising in importance for example in Sweden. Due to the emancipation of women, both in terms of gender roles and the job market, gender could have more potential as a cleavage base also in Finland through already existing parties. The Green League has advocated feminist interests (Westinen 2011, 70) while the True Finns (2011) has suggested that men have become more marginal and that their interests are in need of defense. Hence, gender has been politicized into some extent.

The expansion of education and the potential significance of educational milieus in forming the identities of educational groups are the primary reasons why education may be regarded as challenging occupational class as a status-based cleavage base. However, the interests of educational groups have not yet been incorporated into the logics of political parties to a large extent.

The most debatable case is the one of age cohorts. Inglehart (1977) and his followers suggest that people belonging to a certain generation acquire certain norms, which in turn cause a long-lasting propensity to prioritize and value certain things, while Franklin and van der Eijk (2009, 100), for example, suggest that generational replacement can merely shift the focus in the issues that are politicized: cleavages cannot be built on generations. Generational experiences have proved to be important in Finland, which might pave the way for some common political interests. Since some of the Finnish parties were formed at the beginning of the 20th century and others at the end of the 20th century, in order to advocate differing societal concerns, it is possible that they also reflect the interests of different generations.

Hence, also denomination, gender, education and age cohorts can be regarded as relevant cleavage bases, albeit their importance is less established than the

importance of native language, type of residential area and occupational class, whose relevance as cleavage bases in the Finnish context has hardly been questioned. Before it is possible to analyze whether all of the afore-analyzed potential cleavage bases are reflected in common values and attitudes, the value/attitudinal dimensions in the electorate need to be identified first.

4.3. Value/attitudinal dimensions in the electorate

This subchapter deals with the second research question (RQ2) in this thesis – *‘which are the value/attitudinal dimensions in the Finnish electorate?’*. It does this by detecting the dimensions by means of principal component analysis, in order to explore which opinions on political issues, reflecting the values and attitudes of the voters, covary together and form value/attitudinal dimensions.

The dimensionality in the electorate is more rarely discussed and explored topic than dimensionality in the party system. Analyzing the dimensionality, i.e. value/attitudinal dimensions, is not a simple task as an array of interpretations is possible. The socioeconomic left-right dimension has gained the position of being the most influential and stable attitudinal/value dimension in West European electorates. Although there has been a tendency to present the left-right -dimension as a super dimension that absorbs a variety of values and attitudes, many studies, not least the Nordic ones, have shown that there is a multiplicity of dimensions in the electorate (see Borre 1995; Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004; Aardal 2011; Grönlund and Westinen 2012; Oscarsson and Holmberg 2013; Hansen & Goul Andersen 2013). Despite detecting the dimensions solely on the basis of values and attitudes in the electorate, it is important that the following analyses include also a party perspective: how the Finnish parties match to the detected dimensions. Such an aspect helps to crystallize how the different ideals attached to the dimensions in the electorate have been represented politically.

Obviously, by building solely on data in the FNES-studies, the dimensional solution is by no means a definite one. The research setting and research questions in this study nevertheless force to use same data sources throughout the study, which the FNES-data in 2003, 2007 and 2011 provide with. The FNES-

questionnaires, like many other questionnaires, cover only a limited number of politically relevant issues measuring the values and attitudes in the electorate. Some critical political issues may be covered only partly.

According to Paloheimo (2005, 2008) there are seven dimensions based mostly on values and attitudes in the Finnish electorate. These are: 1. Socioeconomic left-right-dimension 2. Geographical centers vs. peripheries 3. Interests of the Swedish-speaking vs. Finnish-speaking population 4. Elite vs. people⁶⁹ 5. EU-integration vs. national sovereignty 6. Conservative vs. liberal moral-cultural values 7. Environmental protection vs. industrial-economic growth. Although it has been shown that the issues reflecting the dimensions correlate with each other inside the dimensions (see Grönlund & Westinen 2012), it has not been analyzed whether the dimensions overlap or whether the issues could be structured into dimensions in a completely different way.⁷⁰

By means of principal component analysis it is possible to explore which opinions on political issues (measuring either salience or agreement) vary in the same manner and constitute the value/attitudinal dimensions. The analysis sorts the questions into principal components and the aim is thus to identify latent underlying variables, in this case the value/attitudinal dimensions. In social science research, factor analysis (FA) and principal component analysis (PCA) are often confused, as observed by Fabrigar et al. (1999) and Bandalos & Boehm-Kaufman (2009). Van der Eijk and Rose (2015) remind that FA and PCA are different models with different epistemological foundations that lead often to different conclusions (cf. Velicer et al. 1990). Factor analysis entails an

⁶⁹ It can be argued that the dimension between elite and people, which has handled anti-politics and anti-politician attitudes, is actually a matter of political (dis)trust. It measures trust in the actors, that is politicians, and trust in the institutions, that is political parties and party system – whether they act according to the interests of the (common) people. Most importantly, as a certain grade of suspicion towards politicians and the elite in itself is a feature for a functioning democracy and as the overwhelming majority of the electorate has felt that the reality of politicians, i.e. the political elite, is somewhat withered from everyday lives, the elite-people divide is not bound to build bipolar tensions. The elite-people tension can be understood as a beneficial factor for the success of populist parties in the same way as the charisma of the party leader, but it should not be combined with cleavage politics. (cf. Paloheimo 2008.)

⁷⁰ In addition, the dimensionality has been also analyzed in terms of candidates' and MPs' views on political issues by applying voting advice application data. Reunanen and Suhonen (2009) identified a left-right dimension and a dimension that sets national interests and decentralization against cosmopolitanism and centralization.

assumption that an underlying causal model exists and the analysis seeks to verify this model whereas PCA aims to reduce the variables into components without a causal model although also the analyses with PCA shall of course be theoretically motivated.

Alternatively, the dimensions could have indeed been identified with a confirmatory factor analysis based on the pre-assumptions of the composition and the number of factors. However, even though this is a good option as such, it would have required a path analysis, where the causal relationships between all the variables are explored. This, in turn, would have led to highly complex settings due to the broad variety of social structural and dimensional variables. Moreover, as party choice is analyzed with eight parties, it cannot be squeezed into one dichotomous outcome variable such as non-socialist vs. socialist, which would be required in order to keep the analyses interpretable enough (cf. Oscarsson & Holmberg 2013). Confirmatory factor analysis and path analysis could function better if the scope of the study is narrowed to finding a certain cleavage in the electorate. Moreover, detecting the dimensions with confirmatory factor analysis using Likert-scale items is not without severe problems, such as tendency of overdimensionalization (van der Eijk & Rose 2015).

The analysis is based on the covariance between the analyzed items; in this case the opinions on political issues. The principal components are based on a correlation matrix and the number of principal components can be determined by different criteria. As the purpose is not to detect a fixed number of principal components, i.e. value/attitudinal dimensions, the extraction is based on those components that have Eigenvalues over 1.0 (the so called Kaiser's criterion, see Field 2009). The point of inflexion indicated that a larger number of principal components would not be informative.

The method for calculating the principal component scores is the regression method. The component loadings are adjusted to take into account the initial correlations between variables. Hence the differences in units of measurement and variable variances are stabilized (Field 2009, 634). Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) emphasize that the regression method should be preferred in most circumstances since it is the easiest to interpret (in comparison to the Bartlett and Anderson-Rubin methods). In order to maximize the dispersion of loadings within principal components and to load a smaller number of variables highly

onto each principal component, orthogonal rotation (Varimax) is chosen as the rotation method. This results in more interpretable clusters of principal components.⁷¹ The standardized principal component scores, which are continuous variables, have a mean of 0, standard deviation of 1 and they do not correlate with each other. These qualities enable the use of them as dependent variables in further ordinal least squares (OLS) regression analyses in the next chapter.

The questions that are included in the analyses entail three types of answer categories. Most of the questions on political issues have a five-stepped scale from 1 to 5. They are ordinal variables, as we can put the answer alternatives ‘strongly disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘can’t say’, ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ into an order.⁷² The same logic applies to questions measuring the importance of issues with answer alternatives ‘not at all important’, ‘not very important’, ‘can’t say’, ‘fairly important’ and ‘very important’. In addition, the questions in the 2011 FNES-data on propositions, which handle the direction to which Finland should be developed, are dealt with as having an ordinal scale. In these questions, the answer alternatives vary from 0=very bad proposition to 10=very good proposition.⁷³

The variety in the type of questions that were included in the analysis is due to the discontinuity in the FNES-data. It is worth noting that the question formulations and question types have varied between years and there have not unfortunately been so many questions on political issues in the FNES-data in comparison to other Nordic countries for instance (see e.g. Aardal 2007b; Oscarsson & Holmberg 2013). This explains why the results of the analyses are less reliable than they would have been if there had been a large number of

⁷¹ There is, however, no theoretical requirement that the dimensions should be orthogonal to one-another, which is a condition in Varimax rotation.

⁷² There are two practices concerning the treatment of ‘can’t say’ answers. The first strategy is to ignore them as there is much uncertainty in whether the answer indicates a neutral position or ignorance. However, as the respondents are forced to take a stand or have an opinion in one direction or another in most of the questions used, an offered ‘can’t say’ answer can, on many occasions, indicate a true middle position. Inclusion of this response ensures that the N in the analyses is not unnecessarily lowered although it can be debated, whether the ordinal nature of the variables suffers. For a broader discussion, see, for example, Gilljam & Granberg (1993).

⁷³ The answer alternatives are recoded to the scale from 1 to 5 in order to have the same scale for all of the questions.

questions formulated the same way and with the same answer alternatives each year.

The number of issue questions included in the analyses is not fixed: it varies between years. Through several phases of analyses, which excluded the issues that did not eventually fit into any principal component, 14 questions were included from the 2003 data. Ten of these questions measure importance and four measure agreement. Correspondingly, 15 questions were included from the 2007 data: eight of which measure issues importance and seven measure agreement. Lastly, 14 questions were included from the 2011 data: fourteen of which measure agreement (10 questions on how good/bad the political propositions at hand are and 4 questions on agreement/disagreement) and one importance. The questions which did not load strongly to any of the principal components, or were loaded equally strongly to several principal components, were removed and the principal component analyses were rerun without these questions.

The principal component analysis leads eventually into four principal components in each year. This solution enables comparability over time in the value/attitudinal dimensions. Table 4.6 shows the empirical support for a solution of four principal components.

As mentioned, the extraction of principal components was based on those components that had Eigenvalues over 1.0. On each year, four components had Eigenvalues over 1.0 and explained a satisfying share of variance. Furthermore, the table shows that the solution is not dominated by one or two components, explaining an overwhelming share of variance. The principal component solution remained the same even with alternative rotation methods. When Promax and Quartimax were chosen instead of Varimax, the strongest component loadings remained essentially the same. These operations served best to test the robustness of the principal components/dimensions.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ If sum variables would have been constructed of the items that loaded the strongest to each principal component in each year then Cronbach's alpha would have been a good measure to test the robustness. The analyses in this study are based on principal component scores because they can be treated as continuous variables. Sum variables could not have been treated as continuous variables due to the low amount of questions per dimension. This would have led to violation of the assumptions in regression analyses.

Table 4.6 *Principal component analysis. Eigenvalues and the total variance explained by the principal components*

Year	Component	Initial Eigenvalues	
		Total	% of Cumulative Variance
2003	1	3.45	24.7
	2	2.00	39.0
	3	1.46	49.4
	4	1.15	57.6
	5	0.89	64.0
	6	0.85	70.1
2007	1	2.95	19.7
	2	2.03	33.2
	3	1.72	44.7
	4	1.05	51.6
	5	0.96	58.0
	6	0.87	63.8
2011	1	2.81	20.1
	2	2.24	36.1
	3	1.65	47.9
	4	1.16	56.2
	5	0.88	62.5
	6	0.81	68.3

Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011

The factors in the 2003 FNES-data are constituted from three to four issues and in the 2007 and 2011 data from two to five issues. Although the questions, which formed four factors on each occasion, were formulated in different ways in different years, the political themes that the questions covered were fairly similar. Thus, although the dimensions over years are not fully comparable but representative proxies of the same underlying dimension, the analysis shows that certain issues have been bundled together in the Finnish electorate at the beginning of the 21st century. Tables 4.7–4.9 show the results from principal

component analysis on each data. Component loadings under 0.4 are not shown in the tables.

In table 4.7, a principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted on the 14 items with orthogonal rotation (varimax). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis, $KMO=0.73$. Since the KMO measure meets the minimum criteria, there is not a problem that would require examining the Anti-Image Correlation Matrix. Bartlett's test of sphericity tested whether the correlations in the data-set were appropriate for principal component analysis. Chi-square ($df=91$)= 2421 , $p<0.000$, indicated that correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA. The same procedure was applied for the 2007 and 2011 data. The KMO-measures met the criteria and Bartlett's test of sphericity indicated that the correlations were sufficiently large for PCA.

Table 4.7 *Principal component analysis of opinions on political issues in the 2003 Finnish parliamentary election*⁷⁵

Principal component	1	2	3	4
Increasing law and order in society ^a	0.74			
Strengthening traditional values and morals ^a	0.72			
Promoting entrepreneurship ^a	0.59			
Lowering taxes ^a	0.56			
Reducing regional disparity ^a		0.70		
Improving the circumstances of the poor ^a		0.66		
The whole area of Finland should be kept populated even if it meant great financial sacrifices to society ^b		0.63		
Controlling market forces ^a		0.57		
Not controlling the entry of refugees ^a			-0.80	
Not controlling the entry of foreign labor ^a			-0.76	
Studying Swedish should be obligatory at all levels of the education system ^b			-0.66	
EU membership is a good thing for Finland ^b				0.85
Finland should leave the European Union ^b				-0.78
Strengthening the integration of the European Union ^a				0.63

Note: Variables and their loadings on principal components are presented in columns. The question formulations for the questions deployed in the principal component analysis are as follows: a. How important are the following issues to you? (Scale from 1 to 5, 1='not at all important', 2='not very important', 3='can't say', 4='fairly important', 5='very important'). b. Do you agree or disagree? (Scale from 1 to 5, 1='strongly disagree', 2='disagree', 3='can't say', 4='agree' and 5='strongly agree'). Source: FNES 2003. The direction of the questions concerning the entry of refugees and foreign labor and the Swedish language was reversed from the original.

⁷⁵ An initial analysis was run to obtain Eigenvalues for each component in the data. Four components had Eigenvalues over 1.0 (Kaiser's criterion) and in combination they explained 58 % of the variance. The scree plot showed inflexions that justify retaining the four components. Given the N (735) and the convergence of the scree plot as well as Kaiser's criterion on four components, this is the number of components that were retained in the final analysis. There were similar grounds for retaining four components also in the principal component analyses with the 2007 and 2011 data.

Table 4.8 *Principal component analysis of opinions on political issues in the 2007 Finnish parliamentary election*

Principal component	1	2	3	4
Promoting entrepreneurship ^a	0.71			
Lowering income taxes should be put ahead of improving public services ^b	0.64			
Strengthening traditional values and morals ^a	0.59	0.40		
What Finland needs are strong leaders who can restore law and order ^b	0.59			
Income differences should be reduced because they lead to inequality ^b		0.69		
The state should have a much bigger role in directing the economy than it has now ^b		0.65		
To reduce internal migration to the metropolitan area we must transfer more government jobs to other regions in Finland ^b		0.57		
Reducing regional disparity ^a		0.52		
Improving the circumstances of the poor ^a		0.50	0.43	
Improving the circumstances of ethnic minorities ^a			0.84	
Improving the circumstances of sexual minorities ^a			0.79	
Refugees and immigrants should be entitled to the same social security benefits as the Finns even when they do not have Finnish citizenship ^b			0.58	
Protecting the environment ^a			0.48	
EU membership is a good thing for Finland ^b				0.83
Promoting European integration ^a				0.68

Note: Variables and their loadings on principal components are presented in columns. The question formulations for the questions deployed in the principal component analysis are as follows: a. How important are the following issues to you? (Scale from 1 to 5, 1='not at all important', 2='not very important, 3='can't say', 4='fairly important', 5='very important'). b. Do you agree or disagree? (Scale from 1 to 5, 1='strongly disagree', 2= 'disagree', 3='can't say', 4='agree' and 5='strongly agree'). A principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted on the 15 items with orthogonal rotation (N=953). KMO=0.73. Chi-square (df=105) =2429, p<0.000. Four components had Eigenvalues over 1.0 and in combination they explained 52 % of the variance. Source: FNES 2007.

Table 4.9 *Principal component analysis of opinions on political issues in the 2011 Finnish parliamentary election*

Principal component	1	2	3	4
More law and order ^a	0.72			
Increasing entrepreneurship and market economy ^a	0.66			
Strengthening traditional values and morals ^a	0.64			
Lower taxation level ^a	0.59			
Smaller differences in regional development ^a		0.73		
Promoting regional policy ^b		0.71		
Diminishing income disparities ^a		0.59		
The status of sexual minorities should be reinforced ^a			0.74	
A more eco-friendly Finland, even if it means low economic growth or no growth at all ^a			0.71	
Increase immigration to Finland ^a			0.69	
Refugees and immigrants should be entitled to the same social security benefits as the Finns even when they do not have Finnish citizenship ^c			0.63	
Having two strong national languages, Finnish and Swedish ^a			0.48	
All in all, EU membership has been a good thing for Finland ^c				0.86
Finland should leave the European Union ^c				-0.86

Note: Variables and their loadings on principal components are presented in columns. The question formulations for the questions deployed in the principal component analysis are as follows: a. On a scale of 0 to 10 (where 0=very bad, 10=very good,, 5=neither good nor bad), how would you rate the following propositions about what Finland should focus on. The answer alternatives were recoded to a scale from 1 to 5. b. How important are the following issues to you: (Scale from 1 to 5. 1='not important at all', 2='somewhat unimportant', 3='can't say', 4='fairly important', 5='very important'). c. Do you agree or disagree? (Scale from 1 to 5. 1='strongly disagree', 2='disagree', 3='can't say', 4='agree' and 5='strongly agree'). A principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted on the 14 items with orthogonal rotation (N=731). KMO=0.70. Chi-square (df=91) = 2100. p<0.000. Four components had Eigenvalues over 1.0 and in combination they explained 56 % of the variance. Source: FNES 2011.

Economic right and authority dimension

The first principal component that can be identified from Tables 4.7–4.9 is a combination of right-wing economic issues (pro-enterprise, pro-market and pro-tax cuts) and of issues reflecting moral conservatism and belief in authority. In the 2003 data, the questions that loaded the strongest on this principal component were about strengthening traditional values and moral conceptions, increasing law and order in society, promoting enterprise and cutting taxes. In the 2007 data, the questions were about promoting enterprise, cutting taxes instead of improving public services, strengthening traditional values and moral conceptions and restoring law and order in society. Lastly, in the 2011 data, the questions that loaded the strongest were about increasing law and order, increasing entrepreneurship and market economy, strengthening traditional values and moral conceptions and lowering taxation. The questions that load the strongest on this principal component are fairly similar between years. In 2003 and 2011 data, the questions on moral values load slightly stronger to the principal component, while in 2007 the principal component emphasizes slightly more the economic issues.

The principal component's emphasis on traditional values and authority reflects respect for the traditional pillars in society. Indeed, authority, law and order and hierarchies have been strongly respected in Finnish society. The cultural tradition in Finland has emphasized humble in front of and belief in authority (Karvonen & Paloheimo 2005, 299). Citizens have had a high trust in institutions that maintain law and order (Pesonen & Riihinen 2002, 131; Mattila & Sänkiaho 2005 79–80). The entrepreneurial spirit or support for the classic economic right issues has, in turn, manifested itself, inter alia, in appreciating small-scale entrepreneurship. This has characterized especially the voters and parties at the political center and political right. (Paloheimo 2006, 2008). Tax cuts and the promotion of the market economy have largely characterized the forces on the political right. The right-wing parties have been seen to 'own' these themes (see Budge & Farlie 1983). Ideologically, the first principal component combines the bourgeois stands on economic issues, conservative and traditionalist values and respect for authority. Hence, the first identified principal component that forms a value/attitudinal dimension can be called the *economic right and*

authority dimension. In the FNES-data, the voters' left-right-self-placement correlates the strongest with the economic right and authority dimension of all the dimensions in each year. This dimension clearly captures some of the general left-right orientation. Indeed, the general left-right orientation is often understood as a combination of socioeconomic issues and moral conservatism vs. liberalism issues.

Such a dimension has not been identified before in Finland as socioeconomic questions have been grouped together and moral-cultural questions have been grouped together (Paloheimo 2005; Paloheimo 2008; Grönlund & Westinen 2012). Nevertheless, these analyses have not shown that there exists great consistency in socioeconomic questions, which have been grouped together; that they would uniformly measure a single latent dimension.

The respect of authority and traditional values and morals (see Karvonen & Paloheimo 2005, 299) combined with entrepreneurial spirit and being economically on the right side of the spectrum comes close to what Kitschelt (1995) called the 'winning formula' that the Radical Right Populist (RRP) parties could use to appeal to the electorate (see also Moreno 1999). In other words, this formula combines right-wing values/attitudes both in the economic and moral spheres (cf. Kitschelt 2004). In Finland, right-wing stands on economic and moral issues have been combined only to a limited extent.

The Christian Democrats and the True Finns have represented conservative moral stands. However, they have not been characterized by promoting market economy and tax cuts. As a party, the Christian Democrats has identified itself with Christian values and conservative moral concepts while also paying attention to maintaining a tough attitude regarding law and order themes. The same applies to the True Finns, which has feared that too market economy-driven solutions hamper the 'common man'. (Paloheimo 2006, 2008; Ruostetsaari 2011; Westinen 2011). The True Finns does not thus ideologically match the 'winning formula' of RRP parties, as suggested by Kitschelt (1995).

The Coalition Party has traditionally been the primary representative of right-wing economic stands. However, although the party used to also embrace conservative moral stands, it has nowadays partly withered away from its 'home, religion, and fatherland' -roots. (Paloheimo 2006, 2008; Westinen 2011.) The Swedish People's Party, on the other hand, has combined a de-emphasis of

conservative moral values with a position on the economic right, which reflects its liberal-bourgeois ideological tradition (Borg 2006, 27; Paloheimo 2007, 304). Lastly, the Centre Party represents the ideals of this dimension quite well. It has been characterized by supporting an entrepreneurship spirit and moral conservatism (see Jutila 2003, 279–280; Paloheimo 2006).

The Left Alliance, the Social Democrats and the Green League have, in turn, represented the non-authoritarian, anti-tradition stands while neglecting the classic right-wing/bourgeois stands in economic issues. Thus, the other end of the dimension is represented more coherently. The Left Alliance rejects traditional values, authority and has been explicitly against market-economy driven solutions. The SDP and the Green League have also been for market regulation and have shown little support for economic-right issues (Paloheimo 2000, 53–54, 2007, 303–304, 2008; Westinen 2011, 35.) Furthermore, the Green League has questioned the authority-driven way of thinking, with its encouragement of civil disobedience, for example (Westinen 2011, 68–70).

Regional and socioeconomic equality dimension

The second principal component comprises issues promoting both regional and socioeconomic equality. In the 2003 data, the questions that loaded the strongest to this principal component were about reducing regional disparity, improving the circumstances of the poor, keeping the whole area of Finland populated and controlling market forces. In 2007, the issues were about reducing income differences, having a bigger role for the state in directing the economy, reducing internal migration to the metropolitan area by regionalizing governance, reducing regional disparity and improving the circumstances of the poor. Lastly, in the 2011 data, the questions that loaded the strongest to this principal component were about reducing differences in regional development, promoting regional politics and diminishing income disparities.

Ideologically, the second dimension deals with giving support to such socioeconomic issues that have traditionally been considered to be owned by the left-wing parties (Budge & Farlie 1983), while the emphasis on regional equality issues has been considered as a specific feature of Finnish politics (Paloheimo 2005; Grönlund & Westinen 2012). All of the issues in the dimension can be

characterized by a requirement for a strong and active state that uses its resources for decentralizing and redistributing politics. The promotion of such politics eventually enhances regional and socioeconomic equality. Hence, this dimension can be named the *regional and socioeconomic equality dimension*.

Alongside the economic right and authority dimension, the regional and socioeconomic dimension has not either been identified before in Finland. Questions on regional politics and (de-)centralization have been previously grouped together into their own dimension (Paloheimo 2005; Paloheimo 2008; Grönlund & Westinen 2012). The dimensional solution through the principal component analysis raises the question as to how it is possible that the classic socioeconomic issues did not form a dimension on their own, on a left-right -continuum. The left-right -dimension has been regarded as the most important dimension in practically all West European countries, including Finland (Thomassen 2005a; Paloheimo 2005, 2008; Knutsen & Kumlin 2005; Franklin et al. 2009). However, the (socio)economic questions that loaded strongly on the first dimension did not load strongly on the second dimension; and the same pattern applies also the other way around. The socioeconomic questions simply do not measure the same thing in the light of the FNES-data although for example with data from the European Value Survey, a socioeconomic dimension has been formed through principal component analysis (see Kestilä 2005, 361–362).

A conventional socioeconomic left-right -dimension, which would entail all of the socioeconomic issues, could not be detected since many voters relate positively towards equal income distribution, state interventions and improving the position of the poor while they do not oppose entrepreneurship friendly solutions, tax cuts and market solutions – i.e. going against left-right-logics. This may happen partly because of a relatively low left–right polarization in Finland. The left- and right-wing voters are not as far apart from each other as they are in some other West European countries (see Bengtsson et al. 2013, 30–32).

Historically, regional and socioeconomic equality have been promoted hand in hand as a result of political compromises in the government. Moreover, regional equality has traditionally been important for those living in peripheral areas and socioeconomic equality has been important for the working class. The Finnish welfare state was built with a regionally decentralized model, with the

Centre Party and Social Democrats as its main architects pursuing the active role of state and government in social, economic and regional policy (Karvonen 2014, 19–20). However, the former primarily promoted rural interests and decentralization while the latter promoted working class interests and redistribution (Moisio 2012). Both regional and socioeconomic equality are pursued fairly eagerly in the Finnish electorate, which means that the longing for a strong state that takes cares of its citizens through decentralizing and redistributing policies remains strong.

As such, the issues actually echo the times when Finland's most powerful president of all times, Urho Kekkonen, was in office. Kekkonen advocated industrial-regionalist policies benefitting the social and spatial peripheries in Finland (see Karvonen 2014, 77, 91). Tervo (2003) and Moisio (2012) have maintained that the conflict between centers and peripheries has intensified since the beginning of the 21st century. Those who hold a centralized society as the ideal argue that regional policy actions collide with macroeconomic effectiveness; conversely, those who hold a decentralized society as the ideal argue that keeping the peripheries vital is a value in itself and requires an active role from the state. Hence, the contemporary tensions have revolved around centralization and decentralization (see Grönlund & Westinen 2012).

Improving the circumstances of the poor and the reduction of income differences can be seen in the context of an encompassing welfare state. However, economically challenging times have made it increasingly important to prioritize between the means with which the state can help socioeconomically disadvantaged citizens, as there have been pressures to limit the scope of the welfare state. The view that the welfare state has made citizens passive with income transfers and that citizens should take more responsibility themselves has appealed especially to those on the political right (see Nygård 2003). The political right has thus emphasized the equality of opportunities while the left-wing and also centrist parties have called for more solidarity and a more active role for the state in reducing income differences and helping the disadvantaged (Paloheimo 2006, 2007; Westinen 2011). However, it would be an exaggeration to claim that the political right, especially the National Coalition Party, would have been hostile towards a universal welfare state (Paloheimo 2007; Karvonen 2014, 20). It has sought for a centrist party profile in welfare issues and it has talked about

responsible market economy that takes also care of the disadvantaged (National Coalition Party 2011).

Socioeconomic equality has been at the heart of the Left Alliance and the Social Democrats. They have advocated it by building an encompassing welfare state, which redistributes wealth and makes large scale income transfers. However, the Social Democratic Party does not have regional equality or decentralization as its main concerns and nor does the Left Alliance, despite its historical heritage of ‘backwater communism’. (Paloheimo 2008; Left Alliance 2010; Social Democratic Party 2011.) The Green League has disregarded decentralization, supporting instead a dense community structure while promoting socioeconomic equality (Mickelsson 2006, 245, 252; Paloheimo 2008, 41; Westinen 2011, 36–37, 43). Also the True Finns has been for a strong state that actively redistributes wealth, albeit regional equality has not been its major concern (ibid; Ruostetsaari 2006, 2011).

The Centre Party has promoted both socioeconomic and regional equality. The living conditions of the disadvantaged and spreading welfare have been important topics as the ‘cause of the poor’ has been a central point in the party’s heritage (Ruostetsaari 2006; cf. Bengtsson et al. 2013, 163). But even more importantly, keeping the whole country populated and promoting regional and local vitality has been the backbone of the Centre Party (see e.g. Centre Party 2011). The party has contrasted the emptying parts of the country with the parts of Finland where investments, services and people are concentrated. Neutral positions in the dimension regarding both regional and socioeconomic equality have been acquired by the Swedish People’s Party and the Christian Democrats. (Westinen 2011, 42–43.)

The Coalition Party is the only party that has been against decentralization and the redistribution of wealth to the poor. It has traditionally been less positive towards a broad public sector and narrowing income differences than the other parties while leaning on a principle that people are masters of their own destinies. Moreover, it has had the perspective that the state should not take an active role in regional politics or promote decentralized solutions. Hence, the Coalition Party is ideologically the opposite of the Centre Party in this dimension. (Nygård 2003, 284; Paloheimo 2007, 306; Westinen 2011, 36–37.)

Sociocultural dimension

The third consistent principal component is formed around tensions between those who are in favor and those who are against sexual, ethnic and linguistic minorities, immigration and environmental protection. To be more precise, the questions that loaded the strongest to this principal component were in the 2003 data about controlling the entry of refugees and foreign labor to Finland and about the position of Swedish language as a school subject. In the 2007 data, the main questions concerned improving the circumstances of ethnic minorities and sexual minorities, having the same rights for refugees and immigrants as for Finnish citizens and protecting the environment. Finally, the questions that loaded the strongest to this principal component in the 2011 data were about strengthening the status of sexual minorities, promoting environmentalism despite low economic growth, having more immigrants, having the same rights for refugees and immigrants as for Finnish citizens and promoting bilingualism.

The composition of the third dimension varies thematically more than the two first dimensions and some imbalance can be observed. In comparison to 2007 and 2011, the principal component in the 2003 data was more restricted in focus: no questions on sexual minorities and environmental protection loaded to that component. This imbalance is due to the nature of questions in the 2003 data. The questions on sexual minorities were extremely specific and did not load strongly on any principal component. Also the general question on environmental protection had to be removed as it did not fit into the principal components.⁷⁶

Despite the variety of questions loaded into this dimension, the questions form a dimension that has been widely recognized in literature on cleavages: issues on immigration, ethnic and sexual minorities and environmental protection have been seen to form a (socio)cultural dimension, as discussed previously in this study. For instance, Kriesi and colleagues (2006) and van der Brug and van Spanje (2009) have suggested that electoral competition revolves evermore strongly around two dimensions – a socioeconomic one and a

⁷⁶ The questions were hence either questions on which practically everybody agreed on and were hence excluded or questions that were so specific that they were excluded (questions on artificial dissemination regarding sexual minorities).

sociocultural one. While in the former the main source of conflict is economic resources, the main source of conflict in the latter one is identity. Questions on immigration and ethnic minorities are about cultural identity, while questions on sexual minorities bring about conflicts regarding social relationships. It has been debated whether environmental protection is primarily a part of a socioeconomic dimension as it is often set against economic growth, or a part of the cultural dimension reflecting the deeper values a person has (Kriesi et al. 2006; van der Brug & van Spanje (2009). The results in the principal component analyses suggest that environmental protection issue covariates the strongest with sociocultural issues. Furthermore, as linguistic issues are at the heart of culture, there are good grounds to name the principal component as the *sociocultural dimension*.

Curiously, unlike in previous studies, moral values and sexual minority issues do not load to the same principal component. Despite the statistically significant negative correlation between supporting the rights of sexual minorities and emphasizing conservative moral values, they did not fall onto the same principal component on any year. Hence, contrary to the expectations, both socioeconomic issues and issues concerning ground-breaking values are split into separate dimensions. Since the number of questions in the FNES-data is restricted, some questions may have a stronger influence on the dimension variable than others affecting the dimensional solution.

In the light of previous domestic literature on dimensions in the electorate, this dimension combines the elements of three previously suggested dimensions: monolingualism vs. bilingualism, moral-cultural conservatism vs. liberalism and industrial and economic growth vs. environmental protection. The connection between issues belonging to these categories has been left unnoticed so far and the existence of a gathering sociocultural dimension has not been thoroughly discussed. (see Paloheimo 2005, 2008; Grönlund & Westinen 2012.) As a special feature of the Finnish case, the results show that attitudes on Swedish language, reflecting the attitudes towards bilingualism and the rights of the Swedish-speaking minority, covary to some extent with issues that handle other minorities.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ In the 2007 data, there was unfortunately no question on bilingualism/the position of the Swedish language.

With the exception of the language issue, this dimension depicts the shift in the value conflicts in the Finnish electorate. Environmental problems, increasing immigration and extensive debate on the rights of ethnic and sexual minorities have meant that the sociocultural issues have become increasingly fiercely debated in the party sphere. While the newer parties have been willing to keep these issues in the political agenda the old parties have been more forced to take a stand on the issues. As a result, the sociocultural dimension has structured party competition to an increasing amount. (Westinen 2011; Grönlund & Westinen 2012.)

The liberal and permissive ideals of the sociocultural dimension have been represented quite coherently, especially by the Green League and also by the Swedish People's Party. The Green League has insisted for a long time on equal opportunities, irrespective of sexual identity and its expression. Moreover, it has propagated the notion of seeing immigration and multiculturalism as assets instead of threats for the Finnish monoculture. Commitment to an ecological lifestyle in all forms has separated the Green League most distinctively from other parties. (Paloheimo 2006, 2008; Westinen 2011, 70.) The Swedish People's Party, in turn, has taken steps towards developing a more multicultural image instead of a pure bilingual image (Paloheimo 2006, 51). As a language minority party, it has also had to be sensitive to other minorities' needs while accentuating its broad-minded party image (Westinen 2011, 69; Törnudd 2006, 222).

Also the Left Alliance has had emphasis in sociocultural issues: it has related positively to multiculturalism, sexual minorities and environmental protection. Thus it has positioned itself as a red-green party, emphasizing postmaterialist causes. This is in contrast with the communist heritage of the party (see Zilliacus 1995, 219–223; Gallagher et al. 2005, 237; Westinen 2011, 75). The Social Democratic Party, in turn, has had to balance more between the interests of traditional industrial segments and a postmaterialist approach. The SDP as well as the other two old major parties, the Coalition Party and the Centre Party, have been careful in not taking too explicit stands on different minorities or immigration. (Westinen 2011, 75.)

The major exception to the bundling of the issues in the dimension is the Christian Democrats. It has taken liberal stands on immigration and ethnic minorities and promoted environmental protection, but it has taken an

unreservedly conservative stand on sexual minorities. (Paloheimo 2006; Westinen 2011; Christian Democrats 2011). The True Finns is thus the sole representative of the materialist monoculture end of the dimension. It has cherished patriotism as one of its main political topics with nativism and traditional communality as the ideals. The True Finns has seen accelerated individualism, accelerated immigration⁷⁸ and increasing multiculturalism in Western countries (ibid. 68; Harvey 2006, 61; see also Turner 2011, 180–181) as threats. The longing for a monoculture has also been accompanied with the defense of materialist values: environmental norms hamper industry and the everyday life of the common people (Ruostetsaari 2011, 125). Moreover, none of the parliamentary parties have treated Swedish in a negative light before the arrival of the True Finns, which has been openly against Swedish language due to its perceived privileged position in society. This political position can be seen as a part of the True Finns' monotonic idea of national culture. In this sense, the linguistic issues also suit well the sociocultural dimension in the party sphere. (Grönlund 2011; Westinen 2011, 63.) Hence, the sociocultural dimension primarily sets the liberal-postmaterialist Green League and Swedish People's Party against the most nationalist-conservative party, the True Finns and the conservative Christian Democrats.

European Union dimension

The last identified principal component handles issues concerning the European Union. Both the general approval of EU-membership and specific views on the benefits of European integration are entangled with each other. The questions loading the strongest into this principal component were formulated the same way in different years, albeit not all the EU-questions were proposed each year. In the 2003 data, the principal component consisted of questions on whether Finland should leave the EU, whether EU-membership is a good thing for Finland and whether European integration should be promoted. The principal

⁷⁸ Although the amount of immigrants in Finland has been exceptionally low in comparison to other West European countries (see Arter 2010, 499), Finland has become a part of the all-European debate on how to relate to immigrants and their habits. Disagreement among political parties has concerned the amount of immigrants, the type of preferred immigration and conceptions regarding national cultural coherence and unity vs. multiculturalism (Westinen 2011).

component in the 2007 data consisted of the two latter questions, while in the 2011 data, it consisted of the first two questions. Thus, given the limitations of the data, the principal component in 2011 measures only general approval of EU-membership and not attitudes towards European integration.

The questions on whether EU-membership is a good thing for Finland and on whether Finland should leave the EU are similar and load quite naturally to the same principal component. However, one could argue that also the questions concerning regional policies are very similar. Nevertheless, the analysis did not lead to a separate regional politics principal component. Even when the analyses were run with just one EU-issue, it did not covariate strongly with other issues or fit neatly into any of the principal components. In some studies, attitudes towards immigration have been intertwined with EU-attitudes (see e.g. Oskarson 2010), but here they do not fall into the same principal component with EU-issues.

The attitudes towards the EU can reflect different kinds of Euroscepticism (see Fuchs et. al ed. 2009; Leconte 2010). Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) have made a distinction between political Euroscepticism handling the conceptions on the level where decisions should be made, and instrumental Euroscepticism that is about whether the EU has been a positive and beneficial thing for one's country. Ekman (2010) has presented a corresponding division between general support for the EU and specific, performance-based support for the EU. The general support for EU-membership is indeed at a higher level in Finland in comparison to support for further integration. Despite this, the EU-issues covary to the extent that the last principal component can be named *the European Union dimension*.

The European Union dimension is a more recent dimension since Finland only joined the EU in 1995. Also the issues in the sociocultural dimension have only been quite recently politicized with the exception of the linguistic issue. Distinctive anti EU- and pro EU-camps were formed already at the time of the EU-referendum in 1994. The anti-EU camp was opposed to the removal of decision-making power to Brussels, as well as further political and economic integration, while the pro EU-camp saw the EU-membership and further integration inside the EU in a positive light. (Paloheimo 2000.) Although there are differences in the aspects in which the EU has been conceived as beneficial or harmful, the party representation regarding EU-stands has been quite coherent.

The True Finns is explicitly a eurosceptic party and has taken advantage of the overlapping division between the elite and the people as well as pro-integration and anti-integration attitudes. The pragmatic consensus-spirit of Finnish EU-politics has only accentuated the opportunities of the True Finns to present a distinctive anti-EU alternative (Raunio 2011, 197–199, 205; Westinen 2011, 47). The True Finns stresses the elitist and bureaucratic nature of the EU, the lack of a common identity and the remoteness of the EU since decisions are made far away from ordinary people (see Vogt 2007, 100).

The Christian Democrats and the Left Alliance have regarded some parts of integration as especially negative. The Christian Democrats has been cautious of the expansion of the European Union, since its aim is to protect the Christian heritage of the EU. The Left Alliance has insisted on that the EU spreads unbeneficial neoliberal practices and has a market-orientated tendency that aims towards less regulation. (Paloheimo 2000, 57; Westinen 2011, 47.) The Centre Party has taken on a more positive attitude toward European integration than it had in the 1990s. At the same time, its position is ambivalent as there is still a strong anti-EU sentiment inside the party questioning the EU-policy of pragmatic adjustment. (see Raunio 2006, 47; Paloheimo 2008, 47; Westinen 2011, 47–49.)

There are four parties that have been largely positive toward EU-membership and integration throughout the membership period. The Green League and the SDP have been pro-EU but they have voiced occasional skepticism towards integration. The Swedish People's Party and the National Coalition Party have in turn been almost unconditionally pro-EU. The SDP has emphasized the benefits of integration in the framework of employment and social well-being and also promoted the solidary nature of the EU (Raunio 2011, 200). And even though the Green League sees the EU as an apparatus that does not strengthen environmental and democratic values enough, it has been a supporter of further integration (Mickelsson 2006, 248). The Coalition Party has backed the pro-market spirit of integration and has emphasized especially the significance of the Economy and Monetary Union. (Raunio 2006 48; Westinen 2011, 47–48.) The Euro Crisis that erupted in 2009 has increased the polarization in and salience of EU-issues as there has been room for questioning the benefits of EU (Raunio

2011, 216–217). Hence the most distinctive opposite poles in this dimension are the Eurosceptic True Finns and the Europhile Coalition Party.

Alternative principal component solutions

With regards to the results of the principal component analysis, the solutions with fewer or more dimensions did not lead to more consistent patterns. When the number of dimensions was forced to three, the communalities, i.e. the shared variance between variables were low and the three components could explain only a low share of variance in each year. Moreover, the dimensions became more inconsistent thematically and several issues no longer fitted so distinctively into one of the principal components. Moreover, the solution became fuzzier when the number of principal components was forced to five. Moreover, the scree plots, which show how many principal components give the most compact solution, reveal that after the fourth principal component, adding principal components does not add much to the explained variance. As Table 4.6 showed, the Eigenvalues are pretty much the same for the fifth and sixth (and also further) components.

Value/attitudinal dimensions in the Finnish electorate – a brief summary

To summarize the answer to the second research question (RQ2) “*which are the value/attitudinal dimensions in the Finnish electorate?*”, four similar value/attitudinal dimensions were identified in each year through principal component analysis. They are 1. Economic right and authority dimension 2. Regional and socioeconomic equality dimension 3. Sociocultural dimension 4. European Union dimension. Hence, there seems to be certain stability in the identified value/attitudinal dimensions in the electorate with the FNES-data, although the composition of the dimensions varied between the years: questions on some political issues were not proposed in every year.

Some uncertainty rises also from the fact that the questions were formulated in different ways in different years with different scales. Due to the qualities of the FNES-data, however, this problem could not be escaped. Even though the respondents answered the questions measuring salience and the questions measuring agreement with different logics, previous studies with the FNES-data

have shown that they can nevertheless covary to a decent extent (see Bengtsson 2012). Additionally, there is not great consistency in the questions posed in the FNES-studies. For example, there was no question on Swedish language in 2007. Although the dimensions over years are not hence fully comparable but representative proxies of the same underlying dimension, the analysis shows nevertheless that certain issues have seemed to be bundled together in the Finnish electorate since the beginning of the 21st century.

While the sociocultural and EU-dimensions confirm our knowledge and expectations on the dimensionality in the broader West European context (see e.g. Hooghe & Marks 2009), the economic right and authority and regional and socioeconomic equality dimensions contradict the conventional wisdom. It has been typical to point out that the West European democracies have been dominated by a (socioeconomic) left-right-dimension that has been accompanied by a sociocultural dimension and possibly by an emerging EU-dimension. But these analyses have either been based either on assumptions on two-dimensionality in the electorate or they have been based on the conceived dimensionality in the party system (see e.g. van der Brug & van Spanje 2009; Hooghe & Marks 2009). The dimensionality in the Finnish electorate proves to be more complex. The principal component analysis showed however that the dimensions can be reduced to four instead of seven, as has been suggested before (see Paloheimo 1988, 2005, 2008).

It can be evaluated that economic right and authority and regional and socioeconomic equality dimensions reflect rather well the pillars Finnish society has been built on (cf. Paloheimo 2008). On the one hand, Finnish politics has had a value base in traditional moral values and respect for authority, partly deriving from the Lutheran tradition. (see Pesonen & Riihinen 2002). As mentioned, regional and socioeconomic equality have also been basic values in Finnish politics when building the welfare state. The sociocultural and EU-dimensions, on the other hand, represent the newly politicized issues that have become increasingly conflictual in the 21st century in Finland (see Grönlund & Westinen 2012).

Finally, as the dimensions in this study are called value/attitudinal dimensions, it should be evaluated how this label fits the formed dimensions. It can be said that the economic issues in the economic right and authority

dimension primarily reflect attitudes (taxation), while the issues that handle moral and authority primarily reflect profound values. The regional and socioeconomic equality dimension could be regarded as more attitudinal as the issues in the dimension handle the allocation of resources. However, Ruostetsaari (2006) for example, has pointed out that the tensions that have revolved around (de)centralization, partly reflect the rural and urban value basis. The sociocultural dimension is perhaps the most clear-cut example of a dimension reflecting values, although it can be debated whether bilingualism, for example, is a value or whether one develops attitudes towards the Swedish language. The EU-dimension, in turn, can be understood as primarily reflecting attitudes towards EU-membership and EU-integration, albeit there can be a strong nationalist value base beneath the anti-EU attitudes in the anti-EU camp (see Raunio 2008b). Hence, there are not enough good grounds to separate between the value dimensions and attitudinal dimensions.

So far, the structural element and the value/attitudinal element of cleavages have been captured. The next task then is to explore the linkage between these two. Cleavages exist only if the different social structural groups have differing value/attitudinal orientations, and eventually if these group-based interests are manifested in voting for a political party advocating these group-based interests.

4.4 The effect of social structural position on values and attitudes

This subchapter focuses on answering the third research question (RQ3) in this thesis: *‘What is the effect of social structural position on the values and attitudes in the electorate?’* The most suitable way to detect this is to run a linear regression analysis (Ordinary Least Squares, OLS), which compares the effects of social structural positions, coded as dummy variables, on the earlier-identified principal components, i.e. value/attitudinal dimensions. The dependent variables are hence the principal component scores based on the principal component analyses. The mean of the scores is zero and standard deviation one in each dimension.

Expectations for the analysis

From a cleavage perspective, it is important not only to find out whether social structural positions affect values and attitudes but to also explore between which social structural groups the value/attitudinal conflict arises. Hence, theoretical expectations are needed on which social structural groups are in key positions in terms of the conflicts. When the voters can be divided into two groups, as is the case in native language, denomination and gender, the reference group in statistical analyses is inevitably one of the two categories.

The Finnish-speaking-voters and Evangelic-Lutherans are chosen as reference groups because of analytical purposes: they constitute a clear majority of the respondents and are hence statistically sound as reference groups. In addition, men are chosen as the reference group as regards to gender.

Traditionally, the Swedish-speaking minority has had a distinctive need to protect the status of Swedish in society. With regard to native language, it is expected that the Swedish-speaking voters not only regard bilingualism as more important, but also have a more liberal orientation in the sociocultural dimension than the Finnish-speaking voters. The Swedish-speaking voters have been grasped as being more sensitive to minority protection and more permissive at large, although this has not been thoroughly explored statistically (see Törnudd 2006. 222; see also Paloheimo 2006. 51).

Following Inglehart & Welzel (2005), the non-confessional voters should emphasize more secular-rational values in comparison to those belonging to the Evangelic-Lutheran church. Traditional moral norms and respect for authority in the economic right and authority dimension are hence expected to be neglected by the non-confessional voters. As one can see, the expectations can be derived only for some themes regarding the economic right and authority dimension. It is not expected that denomination affects the attitudes concerning economic right issues. Denomination might also have some effect on the sociocultural dimension because of the gay rights issue: church resignations have been deeply affected by the fact that the church has had reserved attitudes towards same sex partnerships (see Niemelä 2006). However, the other themes covered by the sociocultural principal component are not such themes that are bound to be affected by denomination.

Even though the voting behavior and value basis of women became of scholarly interest especially with the rise of New Politics and postmaterialist values, the notion of some men developing a counter-reaction to the ideals of New Politics and postmaterialist ideas, such as feminism, has balanced the research interest on gender as a cleavage base (see Inglehart & Norris 2004; cf. Mudde 2007). Gender should affect the value orientations, especially in the sociocultural dimension: women have often shown more concern for minority questions and environmental protection than men. (see e.g. Inglehart 1997; Knutsen 2004b; Inglehart & Welzel 2005. Dalton 2006). Thus women are expected to be more libertarian-postmaterialist in the sociocultural dimension.

With regards to place of residence, occupational class, education and age cohorts, it can be expected that some social structural groups are more likely to have distinctive values and attitudes than others. Since there is a lack of cleavage research on the rural-urban cleavage in terms of the relationship between the type of residential area and value/attitudinal dimensions, the present literature does not provide with any clear theoretical expectations. Hence, the assumptions are derived from the national context. Historically, the division into rural residents and residents in urban/industrial environments has been important (see Allardt & Pesonen 1967). However, over the last few decades the interests between people living in the metropolitan area and the rest of Finland have become increasingly conflicted, as noticed previously. Regional equality and

decentralization is often beneficial for people living in rural municipalities and other small peripheral municipalities, while people living in the metropolitan area of Helsinki benefit the least from regional equality. It is not in their interests to support a decentralized model where resources are allocated more evenly. These attributes make the residents in the Helsinki metropolitan area the most interesting reference group for the analyses. Residents in rural and small municipalities are expected to have a more decentralist orientation than metropolitans in the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension.

Place of residence is also expected to affect attitudes in the EU dimension. As Batory and Sitter (2004, 529) note, the voice of sparsely-populated areas is even more unlikely to be heard in a supranational organ, such as the EU, than in a nation-state. In this light, the EU membership means that the rural areas become a double-layer periphery: they are a periphery inside the nation's borders and Finland is peripheral from a Brussels perspective. Especially residents in rural municipalities thus have a common interest in being against further EU-integration, as the integration might marginalize them further (see Uusitalo 2003, 28) whereas residents in urban environments have seen integration in a more positive light (Pichler 2009). Hence, residents in rural municipalities are expected to have sharper anti-EU-attitudes than residents in the Helsinki metropolitan area in the EU-dimension.

Pertaining to occupational class, the blue-collar workers and higher professionals/managers have been most analyzed classes in previous research. Of these groups, the higher professionals and managers are chosen as the reference group.

The lower occupational classes, blue-collar workers and routine non-manual employees, are bound to support the equal ideals in the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension due to their interests toward retaining a strong state that promotes redistribution and job opportunities. Furthermore, blue-collar workers, especially, and routine non-manual employees are expected to have less libertarian/postmaterialist values in the sociocultural dimension and to have sharper anti-EU-attitudes in the EU-dimension than the other classes. They may feel that they are in a position to become the potential victims of globalization, integration and free mobility as companies can recruit cheap foreign labor force more easily. This, in turn, can result in negative attitudes

towards immigration, multiculturalism and international influences at large. In this light, blue-collar workers, in particular, can regard the protection of national interests, i.e. the national economy and industry, as an area that should be put ahead of the primacy of EU-integration, recruitment of a foreign workforce and aiding immigrants and refugees. (see Kriesi et al. 2006. 2008; Hooghe & Marks 2009; Teney et al. 2015.)

The resources and abilities of the higher professionals/managers are, in turn, expected to have opposite interests, especially to blue-collar workers, but possibly also to routine non-manual employees in these three dimensions. They are expected to see growing immigration and integration in a positive light as free mobility of people, for example, is professionally beneficial for them (ibid.). Moreover, due to their high position in the labor market, they are not so dependent on a strong welfare state and are more likely to be less supportive of a redistributing state.

With regard to education, the group with the highest level of education is chosen as the reference group. Those with a university-level education are bound to spend their time in such environments that socialize into a value base that deviates most from those with lower education. Furthermore, the highest educated have been the most likely to identify themselves with their educational group, which contributes toward differentiating them from other educational groups (Stubager 2009, 213–215). In line with authors analyzing the effect of education on values and attitudes, the highly educated, in comparison to the least educated groups, should hold more tolerant and liberal attitudes towards minorities and immigration and address environmental concerns (see e.g. Weakliem 2002; Brooks 2006; Stubager 2010).

Moreover, highly educated are more likely to take pro-EU positions as they have seen further integration as an asset (Pichler 2009). Hence, education is expected to have an effect on the value orientations in the sociocultural and EU dimensions: those with a university-level education are assumed to be more libertarian-postmaterialist and pro-EU than those with primary or vocational education. It is worth noting that no previous research has been made on the values and attitudes of those with an upper-secondary level of education or polytechnic-level education. Hence, it is interesting to see whether they have specific group-based interests.

The choice of the reference group is far from obvious in the case of age cohorts. The members of the youngest generation are, however, interesting in the sense that they have not been a part in the building up of a welfare society, contrary to the two oldest generations, and they have not experienced the economic recession (at the beginning of the 1990s and in mid-1990s) as severely as the second youngest generation. Hence, those born after 1975 are chosen as the reference group. In addition, postmaterialist and liberal attitudes and optimism towards globalization and integration should increase generation by generation (van Deth & Scarborough 1995; Inglehart 1997; Wagner & Kritizinger 2012). Hence, the youngest generation is expected to show less support to the ideals the welfare society: they are expected to neglect especially the traditional moral norms and authority in the economic right and authority dimension and the state-led ideals of decentralization and redistribution in the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension. In addition, the youngest age cohorts should hold more postmaterialist-libertarian attitudes in the sociocultural dimension and be less Eurosceptic than the older generations in the EU-dimension.

The effect of social structural positions on value/attitudinal dimensions

Tables 4.10–4.13 and Appendix Tables 2–5 illustrate a multiple linear regression analysis⁷⁹ which compares the effect of social structural positions, coded as dummy variables, on the earlier-identified principal components, i.e. value/attitudinal dimensions. The dependent variables are hence the principal component scores. The method of regression deployed is forced entry in which all the predictors are forced to the model simultaneously. This method relies on having sound theoretical reasons for including the chosen predictor variables. For example, Studenmund and Cassidy (1987) argue that the entry method is the only appropriate method for theory testing because stepwise regressions are influenced by random variation in the data and thus seldom provide replicable results.

The reported regression coefficients in Tables 4.10–4.13 and Appendix Tables 2–5 indicate how much the social structural location of a voter has affected her

⁷⁹ All of the linear regression analyses are run with language weight to correct the oversample of Swedish-speaking respondents.

values and attitudes in 2003–2011.⁸⁰ Putting the two status variables, i.e. occupational class and educational level, simultaneously in the model leads to multicollinearity (Variation inflation factor exceeded 3.0 and tolerance is below 0.35. This is especially evident in the case of those with vocational education). Hence, separate regressions were run in order not to violate the models. Tables 4.10–4.13 include occupational class as the social status variable and Appendix Tables 2–5 include education as the social status variable. The regression coefficients of other social structural variables are stable irrespective of whether education or class is included in the models. The R squared values indicate that the extent to which social structural positions explain values and attitudes in different dimensions does not depend much on whether one includes occupational class or education. As there is a different amount of categories in each social structural variable, the coefficients cannot be directly compared with each other. Instead, the dimension(s) to which each social structural position is connected to the strongest can be detected.⁸¹

⁸⁰ The values for the dimensions are principal component scores. Their mean is zero and the standard deviation is one in each dimension. The correlation between the dimensions is zero.

⁸¹ A number of assumptions should not be violated in multiple regression analysis in order to be able to generalize the findings beyond the used sample: First, the distributions of residuals should be normal at every value of the outcome. This was checked with histograms and P-P-plots and with outlier detection statistics. Secondly, the variance of the residuals for every set of values for the predictors should be equal. The residuals should hence be homoscedastic, not heteroscedastic. The scatterplots where studentized (standardized) residuals were plotted with predicted values showed homoscedasticity. There was a slight pattern of heteroscedasticity when analyzing the effect of social structural variables on regional and socioeconomic equality in the 2007 data. The skew was not, however, severe. Third, the error term should be additive; effects should not multiply together. Multiplying effects were not diagnosed in the analyses, Fourth the independence assumption (lack of autocorrelation) is not a big problem as it arises mainly with time-series analyses and in clusters of cases. The lack of autocorrelation was tested with a Durbin-Watson test: adjacent residuals were not correlated. Fifth, independent variables must not be linear functions of one another, i.e. there should not be perfect multicollinearity. As already mentioned, some, although not drastic, multicollinearity would occur if occupational class and education were put in the same statistical model. However, they are treated in separate models. The sixth assumption that all predictor variables are uncorrelated with the error term and the seventh assumption that the expected value of the residuals is zero at every value of outcome did not constitute a problem in the following analyses. (see Bowerman & O'Connell 1990; Myers 1990; Menard 1995; Allison 1999).

Table 4.10 *The impact of social structural groups on the economic right and authority dimension with occupational class included as a social status variable. OLS regression. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011*

	Pro economic right and authority					
	2003	std.er.	2007	std.er.	2011	std.er.
Constant	-0.53***		-0.40***		-0.35***	
<i>Native language</i> ^a						
Swedish	0.55**	.16	0.10	.15	0.29	.16
<i>Type of residential area</i> ^b						
Rural municipality	0.09	.12	0.08	.11	0.21	.13
Small municipality	0.08	.12	0.09	.11	0.17	.13
Town	0.06	.09	0.07	.09	0.12	.10
<i>Occupational class</i> ^c						
Blue-collar workers	0.43***	.10	0.15	.09	0.20*	.10
Routine non-manual employees	0.15	.11	0.10	.10	0.28**	.10
Entrepreneurs (incl. agriculture)	0.53***	.14	0.57***	.13	0.26	.19
Lower professionals	0.34**	.12	-0.01	.10	0.20	.11
<i>Denomination</i> ^d						
Does not belong to any church	-0.46***	.11	-0.40***	.09	-0.44***	.09
<i>Gender</i> ^e						
Female	0.26**	.08	0.04	.07	-0.06	.07
<i>Age cohorts</i> ^f						
-1944	0.27**	.12	0.53***	.10	0.59***	.11
1945-1959	0.16	.12	0.27**	.10	0.21*	.11
1960-1975	-0.02	.12	0.18	.10	0.06	.10
<i>R</i> ²	<i>0.11</i>		<i>0.10</i>		<i>0.12</i>	
<i>Adjusted R</i> ²	<i>0.09</i>		<i>0.09</i>		<i>0.11</i>	
N	700		908		710	

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. higher professionals and managers, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975

Table 4.11 *The impact of social structural groups on the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension with occupational class included as a social status variable. OLS regression. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011*

	Pro regional and socioeconomic equality					
	2003	std.er.	2007	std.er.	2011	std.er.
Constant	-0.70***		-0.96***		-0.87***	
<i>Native language</i> ^a						
Swedish	0.00	.16	-0.43**	.14	0.13	.17
<i>Type of residential area</i> ^b						
Rural municipality	0.64***	.12	0.63***	.10	0.53***	.13
Small municipality	0.47***	.12	0.45***	.10	0.54***	.13
Town	0.25**	.09	0.43***	.08	0.32**	.10
<i>Occupational class</i> ^c						
Blue-collar workers	0.24*	.10	0.61***	.09	0.14	.10
Routine non-manual employees	0.16	.11	0.49***	.09	0.16	.10
Entrepreneurs (incl. agriculture)	0.21	.14	0.14	.12	0.09	.19
Lower professionals	-0.02	.12	0.36***	.10	0.17	.11
<i>Denomination</i> ^d						
Does not belong to any church	0.03	.11	0.01	.08	0.07	.09
<i>Gender</i> ^e						
Female	0.05	.08	0.13	.07	0.11	.08
<i>Age cohorts</i> ^f						
-1944	0.51***	.11	0.47***	.09	0.60***	.11
1945-1959	0.39***	.11	0.32***	.09	0.54***	.10
1960-1975	0.04	.12	-0.05	.10	0.23*	.11
R²	0.13		0.19		0.11	
Adjusted R²	0.11		0.18		0.09	
N	700		908		710	

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. higher professionals and managers, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975

Table 4.12 *The impact of social structural groups on the sociocultural dimension with occupational class included as a social status variable. OLS regression. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011*

	Pro cultural diversity and postmaterialism (sociocultural dimension)					
	2003	std.er.	2007	std.er.	2011	std.er.
Constant	0.31**		-0.12		0.12	
<i>Native language</i> ^a						
Swedish	0.62***	.16	0.34*	.15	0.66***	.17
<i>Type of residential area</i> ^b						
Rural municipality	-0.05	.12	-0.08	.11	-0.22	.13
Small municipality	-0.21	.12	-0.25*	.11	-0.33**	.13
Town	-0.04	.09	-0.10	.09	-0.27**	.10
<i>Occupational class</i> ^c						
Blue-collar workers	-0.63***	.10	0.01	.09	-0.22*	.10
Routine non-manual employees	-0.39***	.11	0.03	.10	-0.24*	.10
Entrepreneurs (incl. agriculture)	-0.32*	.14	0.01	.13	-0.45*	.19
Lower professionals	-0.10	.12	-0.02	.10	-0.16	.11
<i>Denomination</i> ^d						
Does not belong to any church	-0.02	.11	0.13	.09	-0.03	.09
<i>Gender</i> ^e						
Female	0.20*	.08	0.39***	.07	0.46***	.08
<i>Age cohorts</i> ^f						
-1944	-0.21	.11	0.09	.10	0.17	.11
1945-1959	-0.16	.11	-0.07	.10	-0.07	.10
1960-1975	-0.09	.12	-0.19	.10	-0.09	.11
R ²	0.12		0.07		0.11	
Adjusted R ²	0.10		0.05		0.10	
N	700		908		710	

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. higher professionals and managers, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975.

Table 4.13 *The impact of social structural groups on the European Union dimension with occupational class included as a social status variable. OLS regression. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011*

Pro European Union						
	2003	std.er.	2007	std.er.	2011	std.er.
Constant	0.43***		0.23*		0.31*	
<i>Native language</i> ^a						
Swedish	0.24	.16	0.16	.16	0.35*	.16
<i>Type of residential area</i> ^b						
Rural municipality	-0.45***	.12	-0.35**	.12	-0.23	.13
Small municipality	-0.15	.12	-0.33**	.12	0.02	.13
Town	-0.22*	.09	-0.23**	.09	0.06	.10
<i>Occupational class</i> ^c						
Blue-collar workers	-0.20*	.10	-0.32***	.10	-0.68***	.10
Routine non-manual employees	-0.17	.11	-0.04	.11	-0.41***	.10
Entrepreneurs (incl. agriculture)	-0.29*	.14	-0.16	.14	-0.19	.19
Lower professionals	-0.28*	.12	0.03	.12	-0.13	.11
<i>Denomination</i> ^d						
Does not belong to any church	-0.05	.11	-0.17*	.11	-0.22*	.09
<i>Gender</i> ^e						
Female	-0.29***	.08	-0.22**	.08	-0.15*	.08
<i>Age cohorts</i> ^f						
-1944	0.21	.12	0.54***	.12	0.10	.11
1945-1959	0.01	.12	0.16	.12	0.17	.10
1960-1975	0.07	.12	0.14	.12	0.01	.11
R²	0.07		0.09		0.11	
Adjusted R²	0.05		0.08		0.09	
N	700		908		710	

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. higher professionals and managers, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975.

The tables confirm that there is a connection between native language and sociocultural dimension, as anticipated. It is the only dimension where the Swedish-speaking people have strong group-based interests. However, the effect was smaller in 2007 in comparison to 2003 and 2011. The major explanatory factor behind the result is that there was not a question on bilingualism in 2007. Although the Swedish-speaking population has been more positive toward immigration, sexual minorities and environmental protection than the Finnish-speaking population, the language issue rises above other issues.

Unsurprisingly, the place of residence also confirms the assumptions. It has the strongest effect on values in the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension. In this dimension, the interests of residents both in rural and small municipalities are set against the interests of metropolitans. The effect is strong and statistically significant in these cases ($p < 0.001$). The strong effect is especially due to the conflicting views concerning decentralization and regional politics in the dimension, which is why it can be said that the conflict revolves around the tension between centralizing and decentralizing interests, as also Tervo (2003) and Moision (2012) have maintained. The residents in rural and small municipalities favor regional equality, while metropolitans prefer centralization. Interestingly, metropolitan voters differentiate also slightly from voters living in towns outside the metropolitan area, but here the effect is far smaller.

In correspondence with the expectations, the rural and metropolitan voters have differing interests also in the EU-dimension, with the 2011 election being an exception. The skepticism toward the benefits that the EU delivers is significantly higher among people living in the rural areas. The result confirms that the dividing lines that were formed in the EU-referendum in 1994 are still valid: people in the countryside opposed the membership strongly, while yes-votes for the EU formed an overwhelming majority in the metropolitan area (see Paloheimo 2000). The type of residential area does not affect the economic right and authority dimension and has just a slight effect on the sociocultural dimension, despite some studies suggesting that rural residents respect more traditional moral values (Knutson 2010b) and perceive international influences, such as immigration, threatening (Batory & Sitter 2004, 529).

The status-based conflicts rise mainly between blue-collar workers and higher professionals and between those with a primary/vocational education and

university-level education. However, the effect of class and education on the dimensions is less consistent than that of native language or type of residential area as some of the effects are found in one election while in another they are not. First, blue-collar workers and those with primary, vocational or upper-secondary level education are both more traditionalist and authoritarian and for economic ideals associated with the political right, as indicated in Table 4.10 and Appendix Table 2. The same pattern applies to entrepreneurs. The authoritarianism and conservatism of those with a lower social status is in accordance with previous accounts (see e.g. Kriesi et al. 2006; Mudde 2007).

As regards to the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension, the blue-collar workers seem to have the most interests in common although the effect fluctuates between the years, which is mainly due to regional politics questions dominating the dimension in 2011 instead of questions on socioeconomic equality. The blue-collar workers are for a strong state that takes care of its citizens by means of redistribution and decentralization, which is in line with the expectations. Moreover, since being an entrepreneur has no effect on this dimension, it should be questioned whether this result would change if the agricultural entrepreneurs and small employers were treated as separate categories. The analysis with merged data clarifies this aspect as the N is then large enough to split the entrepreneur category in two.

The most pervasive opposite interests between occupational classes and educational groups are found in the sociocultural and EU dimensions in Tables 4.12 and 4.13 and Appendix Tables 4 and 5. However, this tendency was not present in 2007 when the question on improving the circumstances of the poor loaded quite strongly also to this dimension. Blue-collar workers, routine non-manual employees and those with a primary or occupational education are anti-minority and materialist, while the higher professionals or managers and those with a university-level education are pro-minority and postmaterialist. In addition, the conflict between anti-EU blue-collar voters and pro-EU higher professionals and managers is strong. The conflict revolves also around anti-EU voters who have a primary, occupational or upper-secondary level education and those pro-EU voters who have a university level education. The results confirm the previous findings (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008; van der Brug & van Spanje 2009), which point out that those with lower resources in the job market or those

with lower education, perceive growing sociocultural liberalism and EU-integration as a threat. The conflict in the EU-dimension was especially evident in the 2011 election. The EU-issues became extremely politicized in the 2011 election due to the Euro Crisis (Borg 2012d, 2012e), which may explain the result.

A sharp conflict between the voters who belong to the main church and voters who are not affiliated to any church arises only in the economic right and authority dimension due to the moral and law and order issues. Unsurprisingly, the members of the main church show more respect for authority and conservative moral values than those who do not belong to the church.

Gender has a distinctive and consistent effect only on the sociocultural dimension. As expected, women relate more positively towards sexual and ethnic minorities, immigration and environmental protection (see e.g. Inglehart & Norris 2000). With regards to other gender effects on values and attitudes, women are more EU-sceptic than men. This is rather surprising since the Finnish women relate more positively to other international influences such as increasing immigration and multiculturalism in the sociocultural dimension. There is no consistent pattern as to the gender effects on the two other dimensions.

Lastly, the differences between age cohorts mainly arise between the two oldest and the two youngest generations in the first two dimensions. The pre-war generation (born before 1945) and the generation of the great transition (born in 1945–1959) support more issues associated with the economic right and authority as well as regional and socioeconomic equality. These were the generations that built up the welfare society. The generation that suffered from the 1990s recession as young adults (born in 1960–1975) and especially the youngest generation (born after 1975), which entered the job market when Finland had joined the EU and when opportunities for individuals were on the rise, do not have a first-hand concern for the afore-mentioned dimensions. The society where they have been brought up is not filled with such a belief in a decentralized welfare state and authority. Curiously enough, there are not any generational conflicts in the sociocultural dimension, although Inglehart (1977) and his followers would suggest that the oldest generation (born before 1945) should be less postmaterialist than the younger ones. Moreover, the youngest generation has *not* been more positive towards the European Union than the

oldest one, despite the fact that the members of the youngest generation have been EU-citizens for their whole adulthood.

As we have witnessed, the effect of social structural positions on the value/attitudinal dimensions fluctuates in some cases between elections. As the coefficients that were statistically significant did not, however, point to *opposite* directions in analyses in different years, and as the structural variables are the same in each year, the data sets can be merged into a single data. This solution also evens out the differences in the composition of the value/attitudinal dimensions in each year. As the number of cases increases in the analyses, the conclusions based on the regression coefficients become more reliable. Hence, it can be confirmed as to which of the patterns in Tables 4.10–4.13 and Appendix tables 2–5 are the most stable and strongest. Yet again, it is not possible to compare which social structural variable has the strongest effect on certain dimensions in absolute terms. This is because some structural variables contain only two categories while others contain five.

The next section is based on an analysis with merged data and deals with RQ3: “*what is the effect of social structural position on the values and attitudes in the electorate?*”. Tables 4.14–4.17 indicate the effect with merged data. A language weight was deployed in order to guarantee that the share of the Swedish- and Finnish-speaking respondents is in accordance with their share in the population as the samples contained an oversample of Swedish-speaking voters. The two social status variables, occupational class and education, could not either here be put in the same model due to multicollinearity. Hence, Tables 4.14 and 4.15 include occupational class and Tables 4.16 and 4.17 education as a social status variable. In addition election year dummy variables were included in re-runs of the models to test to robustness of the effects.⁸²

We can confirm that native language has the strongest effect on the sociocultural dimension of the four dimensions: the Swedish-speaking voters are more liberal than the Finnish-speaking ones. The type of residential area has unarguably the strongest effect on the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension in comparison to other dimensions. Residents in rural and small municipalities are more in favor of a decentralizing and redistributing state than

⁸² In three dimensions the election year dummies were insignificant and in the economic right and authority dimension they changed just slightly some of the regression coefficients.

those living in the Helsinki metropolitan area. There is also a striking difference between EU-sceptic voters in rural municipalities and pro-EU voters in the Helsinki metropolitan area in the EU dimension.

Tables 4.14 and 4.15 show that blue-collar voters are more in favor of redistribution and decentralization and more EU-sceptic than the higher professionals and managers. More limited effects are found in the two other dimensions. Nevertheless, blue-collar workers are also both more in favor of entrepreneurship, tax cuts, traditional moral values, strong authority, and they are less postmaterialist than higher professionals and managers. These patterns apply also to the routine non-manual employees although into a lesser extent.

As anticipated, the agricultural entrepreneurs and small employers (other entrepreneurs) have deviating interests, which cancelled each other out when these groups were treated as one group in the. Table 4.14 shows that agricultural entrepreneurs are for a strong decentralizing state in the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension, while this does not apply to small employers. This is obviously due to the fact that decentralization keeps the countryside more alive. Moreover, the agricultural entrepreneurs are against the EU, while the small employers are not. This has to do with the loss of income that EU-membership has caused for the farmers, due to the Common Agricultural Policy (Laurila 2006 111–115.) Small employers are clearly the most in favor of tax cuts and market economy in the economic right and authority dimension.

The effect of education on the value/attitudinal dimensions in Tables 4.16 and 4.17 reveals that those with a primary or vocational education have very similar interests, while also those with an upper secondary level education share fairly similar values and attitudes. Those with a polytechnic education and those with a university education do not differentiate much from each other in terms of values and attitudes. The only difference is that those with university education are more liberal in the sociocultural dimension.

The low-educated and the highly educated differ from each other in the same manner as the blue-collar workers and higher professionals/managers differ from each other. The low-educated are more EU-sceptic and less postmaterialist than the highly educated. The low-educated are also more in favor of entrepreneurship, tax cuts, traditional moral values, strong authority and slightly more in favor of redistribution and decentralization than the highly educated.

Table 4.14 *The impact of social structural groups on the economic right and authority and regional and socioeconomic equality dimensions in 2003–2011. Merged data solution with occupational class included as a social status variable. OLS regression.*⁸³

	Economic right and authority dimension	Std. error	Regional and socio- economic equality dimension	Std. error
Constant	-0.43***		-0.86***	
<i>Native language</i> ^a				
Swedish	0.28**	.09	-0.09	.09
<i>Type of residential area</i> ^b				
Rural municipality	0.14*	.07	0.59***	.07
Small municipality	0.12	.07	0.49***	.07
Town	0.09	.05	0.36***	.05
<i>Occupational class</i> ^c				
Blue-collar workers	0.24***	.06	0.36***	.05
Routine non-manual employees	0.18**	.06	0.29***	.06
Agricultural entrepreneurs	0.36***	.10	0.41***	.10
Small employers	0.67***	.12	-0.24	.12
Lower professionals	0.17**	.06	0.19**	.06
<i>Denomination</i> ^d				
Does not belong to the church	-0.44***	.05	0.05	.05
<i>Gender</i> ^e				
Female	0.07	.04	0.09*	.04
<i>Age cohorts</i> ^f				
-1944	0.46***	.06	0.52***	.06
1945-1959	0.22***	.06	0.41***	.06
1960-1975	0.08	.06	0.07	.06
R²	0.10		0.14	
Adjusted R²	0.09		0.13	
F	17.9		26.0	
N	2316		2316	

⁸³ Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The reference groups in the dummy variables are as follows: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. higher professionals and managers, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011.

Table 4.15 *The impact of social structural groups on the sociocultural and European Union dimensions in 2003–2011. Merged data solution with occupational class included as a social status variable. OLS regression.*⁸⁴

	Sociocultural dimension	Std. error	EU- dimension	Std. error
Constant	0.08		0.33***	
<i>Native language</i> ^a				
Swedish	0.52***	.09	0.22*	.09
<i>Type of residential area</i> ^b				
Rural municipality	-0.10	.07	-0.31***	.07
Small municipality	-0.26***	.07	-0.16*	.07
Town	-0.11*	.05	-0.13*	.05
<i>Occupational class</i> ^c				
Blue-collar workers	-0.26***	.06	-0.41***	.06
Routine non-manual employees	-0.19**	.06	-0.22***	.06
Agricultural entrepreneurs	-0.24*	.10	-0.42***	.10
Small employers	-0.10	.12	0.02	.12
Lower professionals	-0.11	.06	-0.12	.06
<i>Denomination</i> ^d				
Does not belong to the church	0.03	.05	-0.18**	.05
<i>Gender</i> ^e				
Female	0.36***	.04	-0.21***	.04
<i>Age cohorts</i> ^f				
-1944	-0.01	.06	0.32***	.06
1945-1959	-0.10	.06	0.12	.06
1960-1975	-0.14*	.06	0.07	.06
R²	0.08		0.07	
Adjusted R²	0.07		0.07	
F	15.1		12.6	
N	2316		2316	

⁸⁴ Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The reference groups in the dummy variables are as follows: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. higher professionals and managers, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011.

Table 4.16 *The impact of social structural groups on the economic right and authority and regional and socioeconomic equality dimensions in 2003–2011. Merged data solution with education included as a social status variable. OLS regression.*⁸⁵

	Economic right and authority dimension	Std. error	Regional and socio- economic equality dimension	Std. error
Constant	-0.60***		-0.92***	
<i>Native language</i> ^a				
Swedish	0.31**	.09	-0.14	.09
<i>Type of residential area</i> ^b				
Rural municipality	0.13	.07	0.62***	.07
Small municipality	0.12	.07	0.52***	.07
Town	0.06	.05	0.37***	.05
<i>Education</i> ^c				
Primary	0.35***	.07	0.16*	.07
Vocational	0.39***	.07	0.28**	.07
Upper Secondary	0.32***	.07	0.16*	.07
Polytechnic	0.17	.09	0.05	.09
<i>Denomination</i> ^d				
Does not belong to the church	-0.43***	.05	0.04	.05
<i>Gender</i> ^e				
Female	0.07	.04	0.12**	.04
<i>Age cohorts</i> ^f				
-1944	0.51***	.06	0.54***	.06
1945-1959	0.26***	.06	0.44***	.06
1960-1975	0.15*	.06	0.10	.06
R²	0.10		0.12	
Adjusted R²	0.09		0.12	
F	18.7		24.2	
N	2316		2316	

⁸⁵ Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The reference groups in the dummy variables are as follows: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. university, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011.

Table 4.17 *The impact of social structural groups on the sociocultural and European Union dimensions in 2003–2011. Merged data solution with education included as a social status variable. OLS regression.*⁸⁶

	Sociocultural dimension	Std. error	EU- dimension	Std. error
Constant	0.22**		0.49***	
<i>Native language</i> ^a				
Swedish	0.52***	.09	0.25**	.09
<i>Type of residential area</i> ^b				
Rural municipality	-0.07	.07	-0.33***	.07
Small municipality	-0.24***	.07	-0.17*	.07
Town	-0.09	.05	-0.12*	.05
<i>Education</i> ^c				
Primary	-0.37***	.07	-0.49***	.07
Vocational	-0.35***	.07	-0.42***	.07
Upper Secondary	-0.14*	.07	-0.30***	.07
Polytechnic	-0.23**	.09	-0.01	.09
<i>Denomination</i> ^d				
Does not belong to the church	0.03	.05	-0.18**	.05
<i>Gender</i> ^e				
Female	0.35***	.04	-0.20***	.04
<i>Age cohorts</i> ^f				
-1944	-0.03	.06	0.31***	.06
1945-1959	-0.15*	.06	0.09	.06
1960-1975	-0.22**	.06	-0.01	.06
R ²	0.08		0.07	
Adjusted R ²	0.07		0.07	
F	15.2		14.2	
N	2316		2316	

⁸⁶ Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The reference groups in the dummy variables are as follows: a. Finnish-speaking, b. metropolitan area, c. university, d. Evangelic-Lutheran, e. male, f. born after 1975. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011.

As regards to the effects of denomination, the members of main church members hold more authoritarian and traditionalist values than those who do not belong to the church. Gender has a substantial effect only on the values concerning the sociocultural dimension: women are more postmaterialist than men. Moreover, in the merged data set, the effect of denomination and gender on the EU dimension becomes statistically significant, but the coefficient is not particularly high. Finally, the results show that the two oldest age cohorts (born before 1945 or 1945–1959) differ from the two younger age cohorts (born in 1960–1975 or after 1975) especially in supporting the ideals of the economic right and authority and regional and socioeconomic equality.

The goodness-of-the-fit of the linear regression models (adjusted R^2) in Tables 4.14–4.17 indicates that social structural variables explain only around ten per cent of the variance in values and attitudes. This is a very modest overall level: values and attitudes of a respondent are not determined to a great extent by social structural location. Admittedly, several other factors, like family members and friends, topical events and media, may affect one's attitudes and values. They are, however, beyond the scope of this study. Despite the weak overall effect, there are a few rather strong connections between structural positions and value/attitudinal dimensions. Following the idea of a threefold-cleavage, the structural and value/attitudinal cleavage elements should be manifested in voting behavior. In order to suffice for a cleavage, the group-based values and attitudes have to be reflected in voting for a party that advocates the interests at hand.

5. Bringing party choice in – detecting the cleavage structure in Finland

5.1. The political context in the Finnish parliamentary elections in 2003, 2007 and 2011

This chapter briefly assesses the political context of parliamentary elections before analyzing the effect of social structural positions and values and attitudes on party choice. The political context explicates what the elections have been fought over. Some topical issues may be entangled into cleavage explanations of party choice while others may not. For example, the Prime Minister question has become a topical issue since the 2003 election: the amendment of the Constitution in 2000 led to a Prime Minister being chosen solely by the parliament. Especially the biggest parties have had elements of more personalized Prime Minister campaigns in their electoral campaigns (for more, see Karvonen 2010).

The 2003 parliamentary election

Prior to the 2003 Finnish parliamentary election, a broad ‘rainbow’ coalition had been in power for two terms. Led by the Social Democrats, the government included the National Coalition Party, the Swedish People’s Party, the Green League⁸⁷ and the Left Alliance. This coalition included socioeconomically the most right-wing party (the Coalition Party) and the most left-wing party in the parliament (the Left Alliance). Despite the ideological diversity, the coalition managed to find common guidelines in EU-politics and centralizing politics (Westinen 2011). The Centre Party, the Christian Democrats and the True Finns (with only one seat) were in the opposition. The electoral competition in the 2003 election revolved around the two main competitors – the Social Democrats and the leading opposition party, the Centre Party. The topical questions handled public services, regional politics and employment. In addition, security politics

⁸⁷ The Greens left the government in 2002 due to the permit decision of a new nuclear plant.

and military alliances rose surprisingly to the agenda, due to the Iraqi War (Borg & Moring 2005; Pesonen & Borg 2005.)

The electoral support of the parties in the 2003 is shown in Table 5.1. The Centre Party became the largest party in the election, leaving the Social Democrats second. The National Coalition Party lost the most support of all parties (2.5 percentage points). The aggregate volatility was low, 6.4 percentage points, which indicates that the power relations did not change dramatically. The share of floating voters⁸⁸ in the electorate was 25 per cent – roughly in the same level as in the parliamentary elections in the 1990s (Borg 2012b, 131).

Table 5.1 *The Finnish Parliamentary Election Result in 2003. Source: Statistics Finland 2011b.*

Party	2003	± change between 1999 and 2003 elections
Centre Party	24.7	+2.3
Social Democratic Party	24.5	+1.6
National Coalition Party	18.6	-2.5
Left Alliance	9.9	-1.0
Green League	8.0	+0.7
Christian Democrats	5.3	+1.2
Swedish People's Party	4.6	-0.5
True Finns	1.6	+0.6
Non-parliamentary parties	2.8	-2.4
All	100	

The major change was that a government coalition led by the Centre Party and backed by the Social Democrats and the Swedish People’s Party was formed after the election. The coalition was formed despite the grievances between the SDP and the Centre Party, which emphasizes the pragmatism among the Finnish parties. On the other hand, the Centre Party and the SDP have often found

⁸⁸ The concept ‘floating voter’ refers to voters who switched party, voters who were mobilized or who were first-time voters.

common ground in strengthening tax-financed social security (Karvonen 2014, 91).

The 2007 parliamentary election

The 2007 parliamentary election debate largely revolved around the extent of the welfare state and around labor market solutions: the socioeconomic left-right-dichotomy was strongly present. This time, though, the electoral battle was centered more on the three main parties: the SDP, the Centre Party and the Coalition Party (Borg & Paloheimo 2009). The electoral outcome was even and there were no major shifts in party support as Table 5.2 indicates. The Centre Party retained the position of the largest party, while the Coalition Party was the biggest winner of the election. The Social Democrats lost 3 percentage points of its support and was left outside the government coalition. The True Finns gained 2.5 percentage points. The aggregate volatility was again low (6.7 percentage points) and the share of floating voters in the electorate was 25 percent (Borg 2012b, 131).

Table 5.2 *The Finnish Parliamentary Election Result in 2007. Source: Statistics Finland 2011b.*

Party	2007	± change between 2003 and 2007 elections
Centre Party	23.1	-1.6
National Coalition Party	22.3	+3.7
Social Democratic Party	21.4	-3.1
Left Alliance	8.8	-1.1
Green League	8.5	+0.5
Christian Democrats	4.9	-0.4
Swedish People's Party	4.6	0.0
True Finns	4.1	+2.5
Non-parliamentary parties	2.5	-0.3
All	100	

The major change was again the change of the coalition base. The Centre Party formed the new coalition with the Coalition Party, the Green League and the Swedish People's Party. Both of the main center-right forces, the Centre Party and the Coalition Party, were hence included while no left-wing parties were taken to the coalition, which was in accordance with the sharp left-right-polarization during the campaign.

The 2011 election

The 2011 parliamentary election had a political context that differentiated significantly from previous elections. Turbulence has characterized many parliamentary elections in Western Europe during the time of the Euro Crisis (2009–) and the first election that was distinctively dominated by the Eurozone crisis was held in Finland in April 2011. Especially the bailout packages for Greece and Portugal that became extremely topical only a couple of weeks before the election influenced the voters to great extent. The Euro Crisis became the most important political question in the election. (Borg 2012e, 201–202.) Moreover, the economic turndown had set the government parties in an uncomfortable position as productivity was decreasing and unemployment was rising (Perna 2012). Furthermore, the election finance scandal had preceded the election (2009–2011) and eroded the trust especially to the Prime Minister party (the Centre Party) but also to the other major parties, which had received financing from business life and/or trade unions (Mattila & Sundberg 2012).

All these factors favored the nationalist-populist True Finns Party, which took a leap from being the smallest party in the parliament to becoming the third largest party. It gained 15 percentage points under the leadership of the increasingly popular party leader Timo Soini. Table 5.3 shows that the True Finns was the only parliamentary party to gain support and the volatility in the 2011 election was the highest since 1945 when the Communists were allowed to run candidates again in elections.

The 2003 and 2007 elections continued largely on the track set in the elections in the 1990s with the SDP, the Centre Party and the Coalition Party dominating. In contrast, the 2011 election was a 'big bang election'. The Centre Party lost almost a third of its electoral support in 2011 and also other main parties suffered

electoral losses. It has been estimated that the share of floating voters rose by 12 percentage points from the 2007 election (Borg 2012b, 131).

Table 5.3 *The Finnish Parliamentary Election Result in 2011. Source Statistics Finland 2011b.*

Party	2011	± change between 2007 and 2011 Elections
National Coalition Party	20.4	-1.9
Social Democratic Party	19.1	-2.3
True Finns	19.1	+15.0
Centre Party	15.8	-7.3
Left Alliance	8.1	-0.7
Green League	7.3	-1.2
Swedish People's Party	4.3	-0.3
Christian Democrats	4.0	-0.9
Non-parliamentary parties	2.0	-0.5
All	100	

Due to the shocking electoral result, the formation of government was difficult. As there did not emerge a solution where the True Finns could have entered the government, a compromise was found between six losers of the 2011 election. The Coalition Party (as the Prime Minister party), the Social Democratic Party, the Left Alliance, the Green League, the Swedish People's Party and the Christian Democrats formed a coalition that was unseen in terms of ideological distances between the parties (Grönlund & Westinen 2012). Only the Centre Party and the True Finns were left in the opposition. Due to the difficulties in governmental cooperation the Left Alliance and the Greens left the government in 2014. It is highly possible that the electoral breakthrough of the True Finns Party has changed dynamics in the Finnish cleavage structure since it gathered a substantial amount of votes from the Social Democrats, the Centre Party as well as from the National Coalition Party (see Suhonen 2011).

5.2. Social structural position, values and attitudes and party choice

The following subchapters deal with the fourth research question: ‘*What is the effect of social structural position on voters’ party choice?*’ (RQ4a) and ‘*Do those social structural positions and values and attitudes that are linked to each other, have an effect on voting for a particular party?*’ (RQ4b). Subchapters 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 are more descriptive and focus on the relationship between social structural positions, values and attitudes and party choice separately in each election. Subchapter 5.3 extracts the party choice effects with merged data by deploying logistic regression.

5.2.1 Social structural position and party choice

The chapter at hand focuses on the relationship between social structural position and party choice and assesses the three parliamentary elections in 2003–2011 separately. The purpose is to find out whether the relationship has been steady or whether there have been major fluctuations in the party loyalties of social structural groups in 2003–2011. An important requirement of a stable cleavage is that the exchange of votes across social structural groups should be low i.e. the ties between a social structural group and its party preferences should be solid (e.g. Bartolini & Mair 1990; Franklin 2010). Group-party-linkages can be extracted when a certain social group concentrates votes for a certain party. However, if the loyalty of this social structural group fluctuates between several parties in over time it puts into question whether the social structural base can serve as a *steady* cleavage base (ibid. 652; cf. Evans ed. 1999). On the other hand, we cannot be sure whether a shift in support to another party in highly volatile elections is just a short-term ‘earthquake’ effect or whether it is the starting point of a more long-lasting realignment, which builds new party loyalties along social structural lines. This is especially relevant in this study since the 2011 election was the most volatile in the Finnish electoral history after 1945. The enormous electoral win (+15.0 percentage points) of the True Finns in 2011 caused an almost unseen shift in votes.

Tables 5.4–5.6 illustrate the electoral support of the Finnish parliamentary parties among social structural groups in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections. Voters who voted a non-parliamentary party are excluded from the analyses (N=24 in 2003, N=13 in 2007, N=17 in 2011). Pearson’s Chi square test indicates whether the observed differences in voting patterns between social structural groups are statistically significant (see Appendix Table 6). For the purposes of the analysis, the data is weighted with language weight (according to the proportion of Finnish- and Swedish-speaking respondents) and with election result weight (according to the popularity of the parliamentary parties in each parliamentary election).⁸⁹ These weights were combined into one weight.

Table 5.4 shows how the votes have been distributed to different parties among social structural groups that form the old cleavage bases. These groups are based on native language, the type of residential area and occupational class. First, the relationship between native language and party choice is accompanied by overwhelmingly the biggest Chi square -value in each year (see Appendix Table 6). Few Swedish-speaking voters vote for the Finnish-speaking parties and even fewer Finnish-speaking voters vote for the sole Swedish-speaking party, the Swedish People’s Party. The party receives roughly 70 per cent of the votes of the Swedish-speaking voters, which shows that the tie between the linguistic minority and the party that represents first and foremost the interests of the linguistic minority is extremely strong. The Social Democratic Party has been the second most popular choice among Finnish-Swedes: it has represented a non-bourgeois alternative to the Swedish People’s Party. Other than that, the Finnish-speaking parties have had a restricted appeal among Swedish-speaking voters although the Coalition Party has been a threat for the Swedish People’s Party in the bilingual urban areas in Southern Finland and the Christian Democrats has challenged the Swedish People’s Party in the conservative and religious Ostrobothnia-region. (see Bengtsson et al. 2005, 105; Sundberg 2006b, 83, 92; Westinen 2011, 168.)

⁸⁹ As the samples in 2003 and 2007 contained an oversample of Swedish-speaking people, language weight was crucial to be deployed instead of using other weights on sociodemographic variables. With multiple (>2) variables in a combined weight, there is a risk of having extremely large case weights.

Table 5.4. *The electoral support of Finnish parties among social structural groups based on native language, type of residential area and occupational class in the 2003–2011 parliamentary elections (1). Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011.*

Year	Social structural position	Party choice									
	<i>Native language</i>	SDP	CENT	COA	LEFT	TF	GREENS	CD	SWE	All	(N)
2003	Finnish	26	27	20	10	2	9	6	1	100	(821)
2007		23	25	24	10	4	9	5	1	100	(992)
2011		20	17	22	9	20	8	4	1	100	(954)
2003	Swedish	11	6	6	4	0	2	4	67	100	(49)
2007		8	3	5	2	1	5	3	73	100	(60)
2011		12	0	4	6	4	4	2	68	100	(50)
	<i>Type of residential area</i>	SDP	CENT	COA	LEFT	TF	GREENS	CD	SWE	All	(N)
2003	Rural municipality	17	47	14	7	1	4	3	7	100	(154)
2007		16	41	13	9	4	6	6	4	100	(207)
2011		12	36	12	8	19	1	5	7	100	(154)
2003	Small municipality	26	35	10	13	1	4	5	5	100	(148)
2007		24	35	14	8	6	3	4	6	100	(182)
2011		20	21	16	6	23	4	3	7	100	(181)
2003	Town	29	19	22	11	1	8	6	4	100	(358)
2007		25	19	23	11	5	9	5	4	100	(431)
2011		24	12	24	9	18	7	4	2	100	(472)
2003	Metropolitan area	24	13	24	9	4	14	6	5	100	(225)
2007		19	9	37	7	3	16	3	6	100	(234)
2011		13	6	25	10	18	16	6	6	100	(196)
	<i>Occupational class</i>	SDP	CENT	COA	LEFT	TF	GREENS	CD	SWE	All	(N)
2003	Blue-collar workers	36	24	12	16	2	4	5	1	100	(211)
2007		36	24	7	16	6	4	4	3	100	(257)
2011		32	13	8	12	28	3	2	2	100	(190)
2003	Routine non-manual	29	20	14	12	3	8	9	4	100	(161)
2007	Employees	25	21	21	9	5	8	9	4	100	(199)
2011		24	15	14	10	24	4	7	3	100	(220)
2003	Entrepreneurs	9	63	14	1	2	1	4	5	100	(97)
2007	(incl. agricultural)	8	52	22	5	4	4	2	3	100	(99)
2011		11	50	11	5	9	4	5	5	100	(56)

Table 5.4 *The electoral support of Finnish parties among social structural groups based on native language, type of residential area and occupational class in the 2003–2011 parliamentary elections (2). Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011.*

Year	Social structural position	Party choice									
	<i>Occupational class</i>	SDP	CENT	COA	LEFT	TF	GREENS	CD	SWE	All	(N)
2003	Lower professionals	31	13	21	10	2	12	5	7	100	(121)
2007		20	27	27	6	3	7	5	5	100	(155)
2011		16	21	22	7	16	9	5	5	100	(153)
2003	Higher professionals	20	18	33	8	0	10	4	7	100	(186)
2007	and managers	13	15	39	7	3	13	3	7	100	(262)
2011		11	14	33	9	12	10	5	6	100	(211)
2003	All	25	26	19	10	2	8	6	5	100	(885)
2007	All	22	24	23	9	4	9	5	5	100	(1052)
2011	All	19	16	21	8	19	7	4	4	100	(1002)

Appendix Tables 7–9 shows that the electorates of all the Finnish-speaking parties are almost entirely Finnish-speaking. In turn, the Swedish-speaking voters constitute over 80 per cent of the electorate of the Swedish People’s Party. The remaining voters of the Swedish People’s Party have almost always a close linkage to Swedish-speaking community, i.e. they have Finnish as native language but they are bilingual and/or have a spouse whose native language is Swedish. All Finnish-speaking parties, with the exception of True Finns, have a Swedish-speaking party organization and some attempts have been made to get votes from the Finnish-Swedes. Also the Swedish People’s Party has tried to appeal to the Finnish-speaking majority by trying to reach all voters who are for bilingual Finland (Paloheimo 2008.) Both the attempts have been without significant results as the results show in Table 5.4.

The party support is unevenly distributed also along the two other old social structural cleavage bases, namely the type of residential area and occupational class, indicated by the fairly high Chi Square -values in Appendix Table 6. The Centre Party has the most skewed support in terms of the type of residential area. Following its agrarian roots, the Centre Party has been by far the most popular party in rural municipalities. However, the 2011 election marked a decrease

especially in the loyalty of residents in small municipalities towards the Centre Party. The support of the Centre Party is especially low in the Helsinki metropolitan area.

The electorates of the Coalition Party and the Green League follow the opposite pattern: their electoral support is the higher the more urban/densely populated the living environment is. This pattern dates long back in the case of the Coalition Party (see e.g. Rantala 1970 on the formation of the Finnish electoral geography in 1907–1958). The relatively young party Green League (formed in 1987) has had an especially urban electorate. Furthermore, it is particularly strong in the metropolitan area. In a similar vein, the Social Democrats have higher support in urban environments than in rural ones whereas the True Finns, the Left Alliance, the Christian Democrats and the Swedish People's Party have an evenly distributed support in different types of residential areas.

The distinctiveness of the Centre Party's electorate becomes even more apparent in Appendix Table 7–9. Roughly every third voter of the Centre Party lives in a rural municipality. Voters in the Helsinki metropolitan area, in turn, constitute a large part of the electorates of the Green League and the Coalition Party.

Occupational class divides the electorates of different parties into four categories. First, the two left-wing parties, the Social Democrats and Left Alliance, as well as the True Finns, have their highest support among blue-collar workers. Notably, the traditional popularity of the SDP among blue-collar workers, which constitutes one of the pillars in the triangular model (Nousiainen 1970), has not eroded drastically in 2003–2011. Rather, the support of the Social Democrats has decreased more among the upper classes: the lower professionals and higher professionals and managers. The case of the True Finns, in turn, follows a general pattern in Western Europe: workers have become the core clientele of nationalist-populist parties in many West European countries (Arzheimer & Carter 2006, 422; Oesch 2008, 349–350; Goodwin 2012, 21–25). Workers in traditional industries have felt that their jobs and wages are threatened and when, for instance, the labor unions have not been able to guard the interests of the working class, the appeal of nationalist-populist parties has grown (see Harvey 2010, 150; Paloheimo 2012, 327).

However, the True Finns became popular not only among blue-collar workers in 2011, but also among the routine non-manual employees. Among these voters, the SDP is somewhat less popular than it is among blue-collar workers, while the right-wing Coalition Party finds higher support than among blue-collar workers. The Christian Democrats is the only party that has higher support among routine non-manual employees than among any other occupational class. However, the N is small in the case of Christian Democrats. At any case, it is not a strongly class-based party.

The party preferences of blue-collar workers and routine non-manual employees are hence somewhat similar but not identical. The results are in line with the results found on class identification. As such, blue-collar workers identify themselves to a greater extent with the working-class and vote for left-wing parties to a greater extent than routine non-manual employees. In addition, Appendix Tables 7–9 show that the Left Alliance relied heavily on the support of blue-collar workers in the 2003 and 2007 elections, while the share of blue collar workers in the 2011 election decreased. The party has indeed taken steps toward a profile of a red-green party instead of a proletarian working-class party (see Westinen 2011; Grönlund & Westinen 2012).

Due to small N problems, the agricultural entrepreneurs and small employers had to be merged to a combined group of entrepreneurs in Table 5.4. In the upcoming chapter 5.3 where the effect of cleavage elements on party choice is analyzed with logistic regression, the agricultural entrepreneurs and small employers form their own categories as the merging of 2003, 2007 and 2011 datasets leads to larger N and larger group sizes allow treating them as separate groups. Unsurprisingly, the agricultural entrepreneurs tend to support the Centre Party, which is why the Centre Party is by far the most popular party among agricultural entrepreneurs and small employers in Table 5.4. The farmer heritage of the Centre Party is hence still strongly present, following the logics of the triangular model (Nousiainen 1970). Otherwise, the Centre Party is supported quite evenly in the occupational classes. The second most popular party among entrepreneurs is the National Coalition Party, which has traditionally had entrepreneurship as one of its main topics (Westinen 2011, 35).

Lower professionals, i.e. for example nurses and technicians, cannot be defined as any party's core electoral group. Moreover, the support of main

parties, such as the SDP and the Centre Party, has fluctuated much in this particular class, which implies that there is a high number of floating voters among lower professionals. The patterns in the party preferences of the lower professionals also reflect the fact that the lower professionals have identified themselves the most with the vast middle class, which has no clear trustee party over other parties. Thus, it seems that there is no particular 'party of the middle class' in the Finnish party system.

In contrast, the voting patterns of higher professionals and managers are more stable, predictable and distinctive. They support to a great extent the National Coalition Party, which has traditionally been the representative of the upper classes and business life, and has advocated the interests of well-off people (Paloheimo 2008). These ties represent the third corner of the triangular model. Moreover, the Green League also receives higher support among higher professionals and managers than among any other occupational class. This pattern also applies to the Swedish People's Party, albeit to a lesser extent. Appendix Tables 7–9 indicate that the Coalition Party, especially, leans heavily on the support of higher professionals and managers.

The electoral ties between occupational classes and parties are in line with the theoretical frame. Each corner of the triangular model is still valid in terms of party-voter ties, although since the amount of agricultural entrepreneurs and blue-collar workers has decreased, so too has their political importance. The success of the True Finns has meant that the dominant position of the Social Democrats among blue-collar workers and also routine non-manual employees has become challenged. The Centre Party has not faced such a challenge over the loyalties of agricultural entrepreneurs, nor has the Coalition Party among higher professionals and managers. Moreover, especially due to the farmers' special position, the class conflict cannot be simplified into a bipolar setting between blue-collar workers and higher professionals. However, due to their share in the electorate, the most notable clash evolves between blue-collar workers voting for a left-wing party or the True Finns and higher professionals and managers voting especially for the major right-wing party, the National Coalition Party.

Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show how the votes have been distributed to different parties among groups that are based on denomination, gender, age cohorts and education and that form potentially new cleavages. Denomination does not cause

particularly much variation in party choice. Nevertheless, the differences in party choice between Evangelic Lutherans and those who do not belong to church are statistically significant, as indicated in Appendix Table 6.

The electorates of the parties can be divided into three groups. First, the Centre Party, the Coalition Party, the Christian Democrats and the Swedish People's Party have higher support among those who belong to the main church than among those who are not church members. These parties have been regarded as bourgeois or center-right parties (Paloheimo 2007). However, denomination would cause more variation in party choice, if the members of revivalist movements could be detected from the data. Despite the diversity of revivalist movements, their members generally tend to back either the Centre Party or the Christian Democrats. The Centre Party has an especially strong, conservatively-orientated Laestadian voter segment. (Juttila 2003.) Christian Democrats on the other hand relies relatively speaking more on other Christian churches, such as the Evangelical Free Church of Finland and the Pentecostal Church (Salomäki 2010). However, the N of these groups, for example, does not allow treating them as their own category even though they are a clear target group for the Christian Democrats.

Second, the Social Democrats and the True Finns (in 2011) have had higher support among non-church members than among the members of the main church. However, the differences are not striking. Third, the electoral support of the Green League and especially the Left Alliance is substantially higher among non-denominational voters than among main church members. Both of these parties have been openly critical about the status of religion in society (Westinen 2011, 69–70). Appendix Tables 7–9 show that over 40 percent of the analyzed Left Alliance voters do not belong to the church.

Thus, the division has not gone that far away from the early days of Finnish democracy when clerical disputes revolved between non-socialists, who valued religiosity, and atheist socialists. Nevertheless, the importance of religion in society has decreased a lot and the nature of clerical disputes has changed. Nowadays, the disputes revolve more around the value basis that the church represents (Paastela 2006; Mykkänen 2012). However, the case of the True Finns does not fit to the traditionalist bourgeois versus secular red-green divide. The party has propagated for the traditional pillars in Finnish society with religion

being one of them and it has stated that its value basis revolves around the doctrines of Christianity (Westinen 2011, 68). Despite this, the vote share of the True Finns has been greater among non-confessional voters than among main church members, in contrast to the Centre Party, Coalition Party, Swedish People's Party and Christian Democrats, as indicated by Table 5.5.

Table 5.5 *The electoral support of Finnish parties among social structural groups based on denomination and gender in the 2003–2011 parliamentary elections. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011.*

<i>Denomination</i>		SDP	CENT	COA	LEFT	TF	GREENS	CD	SWE	All	(N)
2003	Evangelic-Lutheran	24	28	21	8	2	8	4	5	100	(738)
2007		22	27	24	7	4	8	5	5	100	(838)
2011		19	19	23	6	17	7	4	5	100	(773)
2003	Does not belong	35	9	11	30	0	13	1	2	100	(101)
2007	to any church	26	11	19	22	4	12	2	3	100	(175)
2011		21	7	14	19	25	12	1	1	100	(194)
<i>Gender</i>		SDP	CENT	COA	LEFT	TF	GREENS	CD	SWE	All	(N)
2003	Male	26	26	21	11	1	8	4	4	100	(427)
2007		24	24	24	11	5	6	3	4	100	(522)
2011		21	17	21	7	23	5	3	4	100	(506)
2003	Female	25	25	18	10	2	9	7	5	100	(453)
2007		20	24	22	8	3	12	7	5	100	(532)
2011		18	16	20	10	16	10	6	5	100	(496)
2003	All	25	25	19	10	2	8	6	5	100	(880)
2007	All	22	24	23	9	4	9	5	5	100	(1052)
2011	All	19	16	21	8	19	7	4	4	100	(1002)

The social structural variable causing the smallest differences in party support is gender. In the 2003 election the differences in gender-based voting behavior were so small that they were statistically insignificant. In the 2007 and 2011 elections, however, they are statistically significant (see Appendix Table 6). Table 5.5 shows that some parties have constantly had a higher support among men than among women or vice versa. The Green League is the most striking case in 2007 and

2011. It had twice as much support from women than among men; women constitute two thirds of the electorate of the Greens (see Appendix Tables 7–9). The same patterns apply to the Christian Democrats, which in terms of feminist interests represents the opposite of the Greens. It can be argued that the case of the Christian Democrats resembles the gender-based voting behavior that dominated the past when women were more likely to vote for the conservative forces than men (Knutsen 2004b). The Green League, on the other hand, is an example of things turning around: the women’s support for green or red-green parties has been seen in the light of emancipation; gaining a more equal status for women in society (Giger 2009; Barisione 2014). The Left Alliance has not however, despite the exception in the 2011 election, been able to appeal to women in any greater extent than to men despite feminist nuances in its party platform (see Westinen 2011, 69).

The True Finns is the only party that shows signs of being clearly more popular among men than among women. This evidence lies of course only to the 2011 election, where the N of True Finns voters is large enough. More importantly, the True Finns has been male-dominated as a party, as regards to the party elite (see Arter & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014) and it has advocated patriarchal views of society (Ruostetsaari 2011). Men have also voted for the Social Democrats to a slightly greater extent than women, but the difference is not dramatic. The Centre Party, the National Coalition Party and the Swedish People’s Party have received almost equal electoral support from men and women over time. Hence, the electoral gender gap seems to concern mainly the female-dominated electorates of the Greens and the Christian Democrats and the male-dominated True Finns (in 2011).

Of the other new suggestions for cleavage bases, age cohorts and education are related with more unevenly distributed party support in comparison to gender. However, there are only two parties whose electoral support either increases or decreases systematically when moving from one age cohort to another. Table 5.6 shows that the Social Democratic Party has been roughly twice as popular among the oldest generation (born before 1945) than among the youngest generation (born after 1975).

Table 5.6 *The electoral support of Finnish parties among social structural groups based on age cohorts and education in the 2003–2011 parliamentary elections.*

Age cohorts		SDP	CENT	COA	LEFT	TF	GREENS	CD	SWE	All	(N)
2003	-1944	33	25	20	10	1	2	6	5	100	(241)
2007		30	23	27	8	1	2	4	5	100	(333)
2011		25	19	26	5	16	1	3	6	100	(232)
2003	1945-1959	28	26	17	14	1	5	5	5	100	(261)
2007		24	24	19	14	2	6	7	4	100	(306)
2011		20	16	20	11	20	3	6	4	100	(301)
2003	1960-1975	21	25	19	10	3	13	6	4	100	(232)
2007		15	27	23	6	8	13	5	4	100	(230)
2011		19	13	18	8	23	10	5	4	100	(249)
2003	1976-	12	25	24	6	3	16	7	6	100	(148)
2007		14	22	22	8	8	19	3	5	100	(186)
2011		14	17	19	9	19	17	1	4	100	(222)
Education		SDP	CENT	COA	LEFT	TF	GREENS	CD	SWE	All	(N)
2003	Primary	33	30	10	14	3	2	6	3	100	(228)
2007		28	20	18	10	6	11	3	5	100	(253)
2011		22	15	17	9	21	7	3	6	100	(198)
2003	Vocational	30	30	12	11	3	6	5	2	100	(218)
2007		26	30	14	13	4	5	7	3	100	(325)
2011		21	18	13	12	25	3	6	3	100	(266)
2003	Upper Secondary	21	20	25	8	1	13	6	6	100	(264)
2007		20	24	30	4	6	6	5	5	100	(242)
2011		24	15	20	7	21	7	3	4	100	(257)
2003	Polytechnic	14	13	44	7	0	10	4	7	100	(70)
2007		16	21	33	5	4	13	3	7	100	(77)
2011		14	23	32	4	12	10	2	4	100	(104)
2003	University	16	27	26	5	0	12	5	9	100	(98)
2007		11	18	33	10	1	15	5	8	100	(158)
2011		12	11	34	8	11	15	6	5	100	(179)
2003	All	25	25	19	10	2	8	6	5	100	(880)
2007	All	22	24	23	9	4	9	5	5	100	(1052)
2011	All	19	16	21	8	19	7	4	4	100	(1002)

Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011.

The Greens, in contrast to the SDP, has marginal support in the oldest generation, whereas it has been among the most popular parties in the youngest generation. It can be evaluated that these patterns have partly to do with socialization effects. When the members of the oldest generation became eligible to vote, the Social Democratic Party was the main driving political force in Finland (along with the Agrarian League). Older generations, therefore, have found it difficult to identify with the Greens. The Green League (that has existed for less than 30 years) has promoted new kinds of interests reflecting the postmaterialist ideals, which have only entered the political sphere rather late in Finland.

Besides the SDP, the Coalition Party has also had the highest support in the oldest age cohort. The electoral support of the Centre Party, the True Finns, the Left Alliance, the Swedish People's Party and the Christian Democrats has fluctuated more within the different generations – their support is not systematically skewed to any generation.

Lastly, the differences in the party choice of educational groups are smaller than those of occupational class, which is the other status variable. Those with a primary or vocational education have similar voting patterns. They tend to vote more for the Social Democrats and the True Finns (in 2011); both these parties have more limited support among those with higher education (polytechnic or university level). None of the parties dominates among those with an upper-secondary level education, likewise as none of the parties dominates among lower professionals. Those with a higher education (polytechnic or university level education) deviate from the other educational groups in voting for the Coalition Party and the Green League to a greater extent. However, even though the Green parties have been regarded as the parties of the highly educated (see Stubager 2009) the Green League has had substantial support in single elections among those with the lowest level of education or a middle-level education. As such, the support of the party is not raised according to the level of a respondent's education.

The support of the Centre Party, the Left Alliance, the Christian Democrats and the Swedish People's Party is not strongly skewed to either low-educated or highly educated groups. It is notable, however, that the electorates of all these four parties had more distinctive features in terms of occupational class. To

conclude, education does not lead to as clear-cut settings between voter groups and their trustee parties as occupational class. It does however pit the lower-educated, who support the True Finns and the Social Democrats, against the higher educated, who support the Coalition Party especially and also the Green League.

To conclude, the groups that are based on the old social structural bases, native language, type of residential area and occupational class, seem to have more distinct voting patterns than the groups that are based on potential new cleavage bases. There are clear-lined patterns in voting behavior based on social structural positions. However, it is important to detect the relative impact of a social structural position on party choice when all the social structural variables and value/attitudinal dimensions are put in the same model as explanatory variables of party choice. This is done in subchapter 5.3. Before moving on to that, the next subchapter explores how the voters of different parties are positioned in the value/attitudinal dimensions.

5.2.2 Value/attitudinal dimensions and party choice

In this subchapter the focus is shifted from social structural positions and party choice to value/attitudinal dimensions and party choice. It is discovered how and how much the electorates of the parties differentiate from each other in the four identified value/attitudinal dimensions in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections. The identified dimensions include the economic right and authority, regional and socioeconomic equality, sociocultural and European Union dimensions. It is important to extract how stable the value/attitudinal orientations are within the electorates of each party. The aim is to characterize the value/attitudinal differences between the voters at a more descriptive level before treating both social structural positions and values and attitudes in logistic regression models.

Table 5.7 indicates the mean positions for the voters of each parliamentary party in the dimensions (principal component scores) and the related standard error. In addition, a one-way variance analysis is deployed.

Table 5.7 *The mean positions of the voters by party choice in the value/attitudinal dimensions in 2003–2011. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011.*

Year	Dimension	Party choice									
		SDP	CENT	COA	LEFT	TF	GREENS	CD	SWE	All	F
2003	Economic right and authority	-0.10	0.04	0.44	-0.71	0.09	-0.66	0.34	0.41	-0.02	13.7***
		(.08)	(.07)	(.08)	(.12)	(.23)	(.18)	(.14)	(.18)	(.04)	
2007		-0.38	0.33	0.51	-0.58	-0.06	-0.76	-0.10	0.12	-0.01	26.8***
		(.08)	(.06)	(.06)	(.12)	(.13)	(.13)	(.14)	(.16)	(.04)	
2011		-0.28	0.29	0.36	-0.80	0.13	-0.57	0.63	0.44	0.02	16.8***
		(.10)	(.08)	(.08)	(.14)	(.09)	(.13)	(.12)	(.18)	(.04)	
2003	Regional and socio- economic equality	0.04	0.35	-0.62	0.23	-0.09	-0.11	0.09	-0.11	-0.01	10.4***
		(.08)	(.08)	(.10)	(.12)	(.37)	(.14)	(.12)	(.20)	(.04)	
2007		0.29	0.28	-0.77	0.49	0.23	-0.44	0.22	-0.47	-0.04	27.6***
		(.06)	(.06)	(.08)	(.10)	(.14)	(.14)	(.16)	(.16)	(.04)	
2011		0.26	0.33	-0.31	0.22	-0.14	-0.34	0.14	0.09	0.02	6.0***
		(.08)	(.11)	(.09)	(.16)	(.10)	(.13)	(.18)	(.22)	(.04)	
2003	Socio- cultural	-0.23	0.03	0.02	-0.17	-0.35	0.49	0.46	0.65	0.02	6.0***
		(.07)	(.08)	(.09)	(.14)	(.32)	(.15)	(.19)	(.20)	(.04)	
2007		0.08	-0.13	-0.35	-0.04	-0.49	0.55	0.12	0.20	-0.05	7.7***
		(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.14)	(.18)	(.13)	(.15)	(.15)	(.04)	
2011		0.08	-0.14	-0.07	0.33	-0.65	0.89	0.08	0.59	-0.02	16.1***
		(.09)	(.09)	(.08)	(.15)	(.09)	(.12)	(.19)	(.22)	(.04)	
2003	European Union	0.29	-0.25	0.33	0.01	-0.79	-0.06	-0.50	0.38	0.05	8.0***
		(.07)	(.08)	(.09)	(.12)	(.47)	(.14)	(.20)	(.18)	(.04)	
2007		0.30	-0.09	0.49	-0.21	-0.74	-0.11	-0.38	0.39	0.09	13.2***
		(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.14)	(.18)	(.13)	(.16)	(.15)	(.04)	
2011		0.15	0.17	0.65	-0.33	-0.69	0.17	-0.57	0.60	0.05	22.5***
		(.08)	(.10)	(.08)	(.12)	(.10)	(.13)	(.21)	(.20)	(.04)	
2003	(N)	(149)	(150)	(113)	(60)	(7)	(49)	(32)	(28)	(588)	
2007	(N)	(156)	(177)	(170)	(69)	(31)	(65)	(37)	(35)	(739)	
2011	(N)	(116)	(100)	(123)	(50)	(104)	(45)	(26)	(21)	(600)	

Note: The bold figures indicate the mean positions and the figures in the parentheses represent the standard error of the mean. The mean score for each principal components (column “All”) is not exactly 0 as the respondents who voted for a non-parliamentary party or did not vote at all are excluded from these analyses (in contrast to the principal component analysis in chapter 4.3).

The F-test shows whether the group means are equal or not, that is, whether there are statistically significant differences in the positions of voters in the dimension at hand. The F-values are not totally comparable inside each dimension or between dimensions due to the different amount of questions and different kinds of questions in the dimensions. However, Table 5.7 shows that the differences between the parties' electorates became more distinctive in the sociocultural and European Union dimensions in the 2011 election. Indeed, the EU-issues and minority and immigration issues were highly politicized in the 2011 election (see Borg 2012d, Grönlund & Westinen 2012). As the Table 5.7 includes plenty of information, Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the mean positions of the voters of each party in each dimension in 2003–2011.

First, the economic right and authority dimension pits the voters of the Left Alliance, the Green League and the SDP against the Coalition Party, the Christian Democrats, the Centre Party and the Swedish People's Party. The True Finns is the only party whose voters are not positioned on either side in the economic right and authority dimension, as illustrated by Figure 5.1. This division indicates basically a red-green vs. center-right divide. The voters of the True Finns do not fit into this division because they are not strongly in favor of entrepreneurship, a market economy and lower taxation, although they show support for the respect of authority and traditional moral values (cf. Kitschelt 1995). These attributes cancel each other out in this dimension.

The voters of the Green League and the Left Alliance show the steadiest and strongest patterns regarding anti-authority and anti-economic right attitudes. The Social Democrats are a milder version of this value/attitudinal location. The ideals of the economic right and respect for authority and tradition are, in turn, the strongest in the electorate of the National Coalition Party. Also the voters of the Swedish People's Party, the Christian Democrats and the Centre Party have been somewhat right-wing minded in this dimension.




Figure 5.1 *The mean positions of the voters of different parties in the economic right and authority and the regional and socioeconomic equality dimensions (principal components). Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011*

The regional and socioeconomic equality dimension in turn sets the voters against each other in another manner, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The voters of the Centre Party and the Left Alliance (and to a lesser extent also the voters of the SDP and the Christian Democrats) defend regional and socioeconomic equality, while the voters of the National Coalition Party and the Green League do not promote them eagerly. The positions of the voters of the Coalition Party, Centre Party and Left Alliance are the most distinctive in this dimension. The voters of the True Finns and the Swedish People’s Party (with the clear exception in 2007) do not have a clear stand in issues attached to regional and socioeconomic equality.

Hence, unlike the economic right and authority dimension, this dimension does not set the voters of red-green parties and center-right parties against each other. Rather, those voters who want to eagerly promote regional and socioeconomic equality vote for the parties that have defended social and geographical peripheries. Concerns over socioeconomic issues have been especially important for the voters of the Left Alliance and the SDP, while concern over decentralization issues have been important for the voters of the Centre Party (Mickelsson 2006; Paloheimo 2008). The other end is represented by the voters of the National Coalition Party and the Green League. The voters of these parties are primarily urban and often have a high social status, as noted in subchapter 5.2.1. Hence, it makes sense that they do not have a first-hand concern for regional and socioeconomic equality.

The positions of the parties' voters in the two first dimensions also relates to the traditional polarization in left-right terms. The voters of the Left Alliance and the SDP more systematically oppose the issues associated with the political right and promote the issues associated with the political left; the voters of the Coalition Party more systematically oppose the issues associated with the political left and promote the issues associated with the political right.

The sociocultural dimension, in turn, sets the voters of the Green League and the Swedish People's Party who are for the rights of the sexual and ethnic minorities, immigration, and environmental protection against the voters of the True Finns who are anti-minority, anti-immigration and anti-environmentalist. This is illustrated distinctively in Figure 5.2. The voters of these three parties have had the most clear-cut positions in the dimension in 2003–2011, while the positions of the voters of other parties have fluctuated more. It should be noticed that the voters of the three biggest parties in the 21st century, the SDP, the Centre Party and the Coalition Party, are largely outside the sociocultural conflicts. These old parties have been either internally split or they have avoided emphasizing the issues that are attached to the sociocultural dimension (Jutila 2003; Paloheimo 2006; Westinen 2011). Therefore, it is not surprising that their voters do not have distinctive positions in the sociocultural dimension (with the exception of the voters of the Coalition Party being against postmaterialist values in 2007, see Table 5.7).




Figure 5.2 *The mean positions of the voters of different parties in the sociocultural and the European Union dimensions (principal components). Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011*

Furthermore, the positions of the Left Alliance -voters and Christian Democrats have fluctuated in the sociocultural dimension throughout the period. One reason for this might be that in 2003 the dimension did not include a question on sexual minorities, on which the Christian Democrats has had a conservative position (see Table 5.7). The electorate of the Left Alliance was more postmaterialist in 2011 than before, which matches the party’s nuanced red-green profile (see Westinen 2011).

In light of the above, the sociocultural dimension sets the voters of the most liberal parties (the Greens and the Swedish People’s Party) against the voters of a nationalist-populist party (the True Finns). The tension between the voters of the

Green League and the True Finns is the most prominent with regard to sexual minorities, immigration and environmental protection. In turn, the disputes between the voters of the Swedish People's Party and the True Finns voters revolve mainly around minority issues at large, and more specifically around the position of the Swedish language in Finnish society.

In the European Union dimension, the dividing lines of the 1994 referendum on EU membership can still be seen in the electorate. Figure 5.2 shows that the most pro-EU electorates are the ones of the Coalition Party, the Swedish People's Party and the Social Democratic Party (with the slight exception of 2011), while the most anti-EU electorates are the ones of the True Finns and the Christian Democrats.

The electorates that were most split on EU-membership in the referendum in 1994 are still split. However, the voters of the Centre Party have seemingly shifted toward a more pro-EU position, as indicated in Table 5.7, which might be entangled with the fact that the Centre Party was a Prime Minister party in 2003–2011 and had to take a more positive approach toward EU integration (Paloheimo 2008). The voters of the Left Alliance, in turn, have become more critical toward the EU in 2007 and 2011. The voters of the Green League have not been strongly positioned at either end of the dimension, which also reflects the conflicting views inside the party over the benefits of the EU and EU-integration (Paloheimo 2000; Westinen 2011).

The EU dimension deviates from the other dimensions in terms of which voters it sets against each other. This is the only dimension where the voters of the Coalition Party and the Social Democratic Party are clearly on the same side. Furthermore, the electoral supremacy of the pro-EU parties has been clear in relation to the anti-EU parties before the 2011 election. Accordingly, there has been room for a party to gather the anti-EU votes. In the 2011 election, on which Euro Crisis had much impact on, the True Finns managed to take advantage of the open party space at the anti-EU side (Borg 2012d; 2012e). There has also been room for a party in the Finnish party sphere to gather the anti-minority, anti-immigration and nationalist voters (see Kestilä 2006). The True Finns managed to take advantage of this demand in the 2011 election, where sociocultural issues became increasingly politicized (Grönlund & Westinen 2012).

In general, the economic right and authority and regional and socioeconomic equality dimensions reflect the 'old' issues, and the sociocultural and EU dimensions reflect the 'new' issues. The analysis on the positions of the voters in these dimensions has shown that division to the voters of old parties (founded at the beginning of the 20th century) and to the voters of newer parties follows this pattern to some extent.

The voters of the Centre Party have more distinct positions in the 'old' dimensions. They are pro-authority and traditional moral values and for the issues associated with the economic right and they support regional and socioeconomic equality. However, they hold middle positions in the sociocultural and EU dimensions. In similar vein, the voters of the SDP do not have distinctive values and attitudes in the two new dimensions. They are against traditional authority and issues associated with the economic right, while simultaneously they are for regional and socioeconomic equality. The voters of the third large old party, the Coalition Party, have a distinctive profile. They are for the issues associated with the economic right and they do not show great support for regional and socioeconomic equality. In addition, they are the most Euro-optimist voters and have hence acquired a clear position also in a new dimension.

The voters of the Left Alliance (which has its roots in the defunct Communist Party but which was founded only in 1990) have also more distinctive profile in the old dimensions. However, the 2011 election indicated that they might be on the move to become more orientated into the issues such as the rights of sexual and ethnic minorities due to their more distinctive position in the sociocultural dimension. Lastly, the voters of the Swedish People's Party have the most distinctive profile in the sociocultural dimension mainly due to the sole 'old' issue in the dimension, namely the language issue. However, they are also liberally orientated more generally and they are also strongly for EU-integration.

The voters of the True Finns are extremely distinctive in the sociocultural and EU dimensions, while the old dimensions leave them close to the neutral middle positions. Hence, it can be said that that despite being founded as a successor party to the Finnish Rural Party the True Finns does not have that clear electoral profile in those issues that are attached to the old dimensions. In addition, the voters of the Green League are the most distinctive in the sociocultural dimension. In addition, they reject both the importance of promoting economic

right issues and the support of traditional authority; they also reject the importance of regional and socioeconomic equality. The voters of the Christian Democrats are an exception in the sense that they support both the economic right and authority issues and profile themselves in opposing the EU.

So far, the connection between voters' social structural positions and party choice and voters' values and attitudes and party choice have been analyzed at a descriptive level. These analyses have crystallized how a membership in a social structural group is associated with party choice and how the value/attitudinal profiles of the electorates of each party can be characterized. In addition, these analyses have illustrated which parties are set against each other on the basis of the structural positions and values/attitudes of the voters. These analyses have not, however, yet revealed the effect that social structural positions and values and attitudes have on party choice. For that purpose, the social structural positions and value/attitudinal dimensions are treated simultaneously as explanatory variables of party choice in logistic regression models in the next subchapter. On the basis of this analysis, it is concluded which conflicts can be treated as cleavages.

5.3 Bringing it together – cleavage-based voting

5.3.1 The impact of social structural positions and value/attitudinal dimensions on party choice.

The effect of social structural positions and values and attitudes on party choice is detected by binary logistic regression. The odds ratios indicate whether belonging to a certain social structural group and whether having a certain value/attitudinal orientation increased or decreased the likelihood of voting for a certain party in the 2003–2011 parliamentary elections. The dependent variable is dummy-coded: 1 indicates voting for a certain party and 0 stands for voting for any other parliamentary party. A pseudo R^2 , Nagelkerke's R^2 , is used to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of the models.

As the relationship between social structural positions and party choice and value/attitudinal dimensions and party choice showed quite consistent patterns in the two previous subchapters, the following analyses are conducted by merging the FNES-data from 2003, 2007 and 2011 into single data. The analyses with merged/pooled data serve the goal of arriving at more general conclusions on the importance of social structural positions and values and attitudes in conditioning party choice in contemporary Finland. This also improves the reliability of the analyses, since the small-N problem for minor parties is less serious.

The analysis consists of six statistical models. Model 1 captures only the social structural variables without controlling for values and attitudes. In Models 2 to 5, each of the four value/attitudinal dimensions is added separately to the model that includes only social structural variables. These models indicate the effect of values and attitudes on party choice.

The main interest lies in a) detecting whether the members of a social structural group, with common values and attitudes, support a certain party and b) detecting whether these patterns constitute bipolar conflicts. If the social structural position and values/attitudes at hand have an effect on voting for a certain party and if there was a connection between the social structural position and values and attitudes in the linear regression analysis, then the effect of group membership on party choice is reinforced through common values and attitudes. An example of this would be that being an EU-sceptic and a resident in a rural

municipality would increase the likelihood of voting for a party advocating the interests at hand and in turn, being a resident in the Helsinki metropolitan area and being a supporter of the EU integration would increase the likelihood of voting for a party that advocates these interests (as relationship between the type of residential area and the EU dimension was found in chapter 4.4).

Model 6 finally brings all the variables into the same model and the focus is exclusively on the goodness-of-fit of the model (measured by Nagelkerke's R^2). The goodness-of-fit in Model 6 is compared to the goodness-of-fit in Model 1. The Nagelkerke's R^2 value in Model 1 shows how well party choice can be explained with a model that includes social structural variables before the insertion of dimension variables in Models 2–5. Model 6 in turn shows how well party choice can be explained when all the variables are included. It indicates how much extra value values/attitudes add when explaining the likelihood of voting for a certain party over the others. In other words, their independent total effect is explored. Finally, it is concluded which political conflicts in Finland can be categorized as cleavages or possibly emerging cleavages.

The inclusion of both occupational class and educational level to same statistical models leads again to multicollinearity. Occupational class is more significant in explaining party choice. Hence, Table 5.8 shows the results of the logistic regression with occupational class included as a social status variable while Table 5.9 shows the impact of education on party choice with education included as a social status variable alongside the other variables. The effects of other social structural variables and values and attitudes on party choice stayed similar irrespective of which one of the social status variables was included in the models. Moreover, language had to be excluded as an explanatory factor (notwithstanding the Swedish People's Party) as inclusion of it led to too large standard errors concerning the Finnish-speaking parties. As shown in Appendix Tables 7–9, the Swedish-speaking voters constituted roughly only 1 percent of the electorates of many parties. This means of course that the following models are not fully comparable between the Swedish People's Party and other parties.

First, it is explored which social structural positions affect party choice the most in the electorate of each party when the value/attitudinal dimensions are not introduced. Table 5.8 contains the odds ratios associated with Model 1 (social structural variables). Also the odds ratios associated with the value/attitudinal

dimensions (Models 2–5) are shown in the table. This table clarifies the impact of social structural positions and value/attitudinal dimensions on party choice. Odds ratios larger than 1 indicate that having a certain social structural position or values/attitudes, increase the likelihood of voting for the party at hand instead of the others; odd ratios smaller than 1 indicate that having a certain social structural position or values/attitudes, decrease the likelihood of voting for the party at hand instead of the others, given that they are statistically significant. The parties are presented in party pairs in the following tables: the electorates of each pair are fairly similar in terms of social structural positions and/or values and attitudes affecting party choice.

Being a blue-collar worker or a routine non-manual employee, having an upper secondary level education and belonging to the second oldest generation all double the likelihood of voting for the Social Democratic Party rather than any other party. Moreover, having a primary or vocational level education and belonging to the oldest generation almost triple the likelihood of voting for the SDP. Being a blue-collar worker or routine non-manual employee also doubles the likelihood of voting for the True Finns rather than any other party and even stronger effects are found among educational groups in Table 5.9. Those with primary, vocational or upper secondary level education are much more likely to vote for the True Finns than those with university-level education. However, the True Finns deviates structurally from the SDP in the sense that the True Finns is largely neglected in the oldest age cohort: a voter born before 1945 is four times less (OR=0.27) likely to vote for the True Finns in comparison to all other parties. These patterns match with the party profiles: the SDP is an old party whose relatively old voters have been socialized into voting for the traditional socialist alternative, while the True Finns presents a new proletarian alternative.

Being a blue-collar worker increases the likelihood of voting for the Left Alliance in a similar fashion to the SDP and the True Finns (OR=2.21). However, the specialty in the social structural factors explaining a vote for the Left Alliance is the effect of denomination. The odds of a voter who does not belong to any church to vote for the Left Alliance are four times higher than of a voter who does belong to the main church (OR=4.07). Not being a church-member also makes the odds of voting for the Green League two times higher in comparison to the members of the main church.

Table 5.8 *The impact of social structural positions and value/attitudinal dimensions on party choice. Odds ratios. Binomial logistic regression (1)*

	Left Alliance	Green League	Social Dem. Party	True Finns	Centre Party	Christian Democrats	National Coalition Party	Swedish People's Party
Native language (ref. group: Finnish-speaking)								
Swedish								430.3*** (194.4–952.4)
95 % CI for odds ratio								
<i>Type of residential area (metropolitan. area)</i>								
Rural municipality	0.94 (0.52–1.67)	0.34** (0.18–0.64)	0.78 (0.49–1.20)	0.62 (0.31–1.25)	5.41*** (3.56–8.22)	1.12 (0.51–2.49)	0.39*** (0.25–0.60)	2.00 (0.56–7.15)
Small municipality	1.02 (0.59–1.78)	0.23*** (0.12–0.47)	1.41 (0.95–2.11)	1.01 (0.56–1.82)	2.98*** (1.95–4.55)	0.85 (0.38–1.91)	0.50** (0.33–0.75)	0.80 (0.24–2.61)
Town	1.03 (0.66–1.59)	0.42*** (0.29–0.62)	1.37* (1.00–1.86)	1.19 (0.75–1.89)	1.68** (1.15–2.46)	1.09 (0.59–2.00)	0.83 (0.63–1.10)	0.96 (0.35–2.63)
<i>Occupational class (higher profs. /managers.)</i>								
Blue-collar workers	2.21*** (1.43–3.40)	0.47* (0.26–0.84)	2.37*** (1.73–3.24)	2.19** (1.33–3.60)	1.31 (0.94–1.84)	0.88 (0.42–1.83)	0.21*** (0.14–0.31)	0.32 (0.07–1.14)
Routine non-manual employees	1.53 (0.96–2.46)	0.56* (0.34–0.92)	1.87*** (1.34–2.62)	2.21** (1.32–3.72)	1.08 (0.76–1.55)	1.48 (0.80–2.74)	0.43*** (0.30–0.60)	0.77 (0.24–2.35)
Agricultural entrepreneurs	0.67 (0.22–2.02)	0.19 (0.03–1.51)	0.29** (0.11–0.73)	0.85 (0.23–3.12)	6.45*** (3.84–10.84)	0.23 (0.03–1.80)	0.37** (0.19–0.72)	0.34 (0.04–3.44)

Note: Entries are odds ratios with 95 % confidence intervals in the parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011.

Table 5.8 *The impact of social structural positions and value/attitudinal dimensions on party choice. Odds ratios. Binomial logistic regression (2)*

	Left		Green	Social Dem.		True	Centre	Christian	National	Swedish People's
	Alliance	League	League	Party	Party	Finns	Party	Democrats	Coalition	Party
<i>Occupational class (higher profs./managers.)</i>										
Small employers	0.38 (0.08–1.89)	1.00 (0.33–3.03)		0.63 (0.27–1.50)	2.67* (1.03–6.94)		0.84 (0.39–1.86)	0.35 (0.03–4.23)	1.56 (0.86–2.84)	0.33 (0.05–1.92)
Lower professionals	0.72 (0.40–1.30)	0.81 (0.49–1.33)		1.58* (1.11–2.25)	1.39 (0.76–2.52)		1.48* (1.02–2.14)	1.23 (0.61–2.46)	0.58** (0.42–0.82)	1.03 (0.35–3.22)
<i>Denomination (Evangelic-Lutheran)</i>										
Does not belong to any church	4.07*** (2.88–5.75)	1.84** (1.21–2.78)		1.16 (0.87–1.56)	1.45 (0.95–2.22)		0.39*** (0.26–0.59)	0.39* (0.16–0.93)	0.48*** (0.34–0.69)	0.31 (0.09–1.00)
<i>Gender (male)</i>										
Female	1.09 (0.76–1.55)	2.05*** (1.40–3.02)		0.85 (0.67–1.09)	0.74 (0.51–1.10)		1.00 (0.78–1.29)	1.84* (1.07–3.13)	0.82 (0.64–1.05)	1.25 (0.56–2.86)
<i>Age cohorts (1976-)</i>										
-1944	1.21 (0.69–2.14)	0.10*** (0.05–0.21)		2.78*** (1.88–4.13)	0.27*** (0.15–0.50)		0.70 (0.49–1.01)	1.40 (0.62–3.21)	1.76** (1.24–2.49)	1.73 (0.45–5.09)
1945-1959	1.98* (1.17–3.36)	0.25*** (0.15–0.41)		2.27*** (1.53–3.37)	0.52* (0.32–0.87)		0.76 (0.53–1.09)	1.99 (0.90–4.37)	1.10 (0.77–1.59)	1.76 (0.50–5.62)
1960-1975	1.31 (0.74–2.32)	0.71 (0.47–1.08)		1.43 (0.94–2.18)	0.92 (0.57–1.49)		0.78 (0.54–1.13)	1.83 (0.81–4.12)	1.02 (0.70–1.49)	2.46 (0.70–8.67)

Note: Entries are odds ratios with 95 % confidence intervals in the parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011.

Table 5.8 *The impact of social structural positions and value/attitudinal dimensions on party choice. Odds ratios. Binomial logistic regression (3)*

<i>Dimensions</i>	Left Alliance		Green League	Social Dem. Party		True Finns	Centre Party	Christian Democrats	National Coalition Party	Swedish People's Party
	Moral and economic right (from Model 2)	0.49*** (0.41-0.59)	0.58*** (0.48-0.69)		0.63*** (0.56-0.72)	1.27* (1.05-1.55)		1.29*** (1.13-1.47)	1.23 (0.95-1.60)	2.02*** (1.75-2.33)
95 % CI for odds ratio										
Regional and socioeconomic equality (Model 3)	1.46*** (1.21-1.76)	1.03 (0.86-1.23)		1.22** (1.07-1.38)	0.98 (0.82-1.18)		1.38*** (1.20-1.58)	1.20 (0.92-1.57)	0.51*** (0.44-0.58)	0.90 (0.61-1.32)
Pro cultural diversity and postmaterialism (Model 4)	1.15 (0.97-1.36)	1.82*** (1.51-2.19)		1.06 (0.94-1.19)	0.57*** (0.47-0.69)		0.98 (0.86-1.11)	1.16 (0.91-1.48)	0.72*** (0.64-0.82)	0.96 (0.66-1.39)
Pro European union (Model 5)	0.81* (0.69-0.96)	0.92 (0.77-1.11)		1.31*** (1.16-1.48)	0.44*** (0.36-0.53)		0.88 (0.78-1.00)	0.60*** (0.47-0.77)	1.57*** (1.37-2.79)	1.41 (0.94-2.11)
(N)	(1883)	(1883)		(1883)	(1883)		(1883)	(1883)	(1883)	(1883)
(N) (voters of the party)	(171)	(153)		(403)	(136)		(409)	(74)	(396)	(83)

Note: Entries are odds ratios with 95 % confidence intervals in the parentheses. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011.

Table 5.9 *The impact of education on party choice. Odds ratios. Binomial logistic regression.*

	Left Alliance	Green League	Social Dem. Party	True Finns	Centre Party	Christian Democrats	Nat. Coalition Party	Swedish People's Party
<i>Education (reference group: university)</i>								
Primary	1.39	0.64	2.75***	3.20**	0.94	0.48	0.43***	0.73
95 % CI for odds ratio	(0.81–2.39)	(0.36–1.13)	(1.79–4.24)	(1.55–6.60)	(0.63–1.40)	(0.21–1.13)	(0.30–0.63)	(0.21–2.52)
Vocational	1.78*	0.57*	2.64***	2.51*	0.97	0.93	0.36***	0.54
	(1.07–2.95)	(0.33–1.00)	(1.74–4.01)	(1.24–5.09)	(0.66–1.42)	(0.46–1.88)	(0.25–0.53)	(0.15–1.92)
Upper Secondary	0.70	0.66	2.15**	2.69**	0.85	0.89	0.73	1.29
	(0.40–1.22)	(0.41–1.08)	(1.42–3.26)	(1.36–5.36)	(0.58–1.25)	(0.45–1.73)	(0.52–1.01)	(0.44–3.77)
Polytechnic	0.46	0.76	1.99*	1.19	0.75	0.63	1.29	1.31
	(0.19–1.15)	(0.41–1.41)	(1.15–3.47)	(0.46–3.06)	(0.45–1.27)	(0.22–1.80)	(0.84–1.99)	(0.29–5.98)

Note: Entries are odds ratios with 95 % confidence intervals in the parentheses. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011.

The odds ratios are from a logistic regression model where occupational class was replaced with education with other variables being identical to those presented in Table 5.8, similar hence to Model 1. The odds ratios of the other social structural variables are not reported here since their effect on party choice was similar to that when occupational class was in the model instead of education.

In other areas than denomination, however, the factors explaining a vote for the Greens do not match with those explaining a vote for the Left Alliance. Voting for the Greens is best explained by the type of residential area, occupational class, gender, age cohort and education. Being a metropolitan, higher professional, woman, having a university-level education and belonging to the youngest generation, increase the likelihood of voting for the Greens.

Living in a rural municipality (OR=5.41) or a small municipality (2.98) and being an agricultural entrepreneur (OR=6.45) strongly increase the likelihood of voting for the Centre Party over other parties. Furthermore, these factors do not increase the likelihood of voting for any other party. The first two decrease the likelihood of voting for the Green League or the Coalition Party and the last decreases the likelihood of voting for the SDP or the Coalition Party. Moreover, being a member of the Evangelic-Lutheran church increases the likelihood of voting for the Centre Party.

Only two social structural factors, gender and denomination, contribute to voting for the Christian Democrats in a statistically significant way. Even more so, their effect is modest. Being a woman and a main church member slightly increases the likelihood for voting for the Christian Democrats. Therefore, already at this point it can be said that the social structural positions that could be derived from the data function the worst for the Christian Democrats. However, although it cannot be reliably derived from the existing data, it is worth considering that being a member in a revivalist Christian church would surely increase drastically the likelihood of voting for the CD.

Living in a metropolitan area and being a higher professional or manager and having a university-level education increase the likelihood of voting for the National Coalition Party the most. Moreover, the effects of belonging to the main church and belonging to the oldest generation are statistically significant. The Coalition Party is the most popular party among small employers. However, being a small employer does not add to the likelihood of voting for the Coalition Party, as it is also the most popular party among the reference group (higher professionals and managers). Hence, the category of small employers is redundant in the logistic regression analyses as it has statistically significant effect only in the electorate of the True Finns. However, the confidence intervals are so large in this case due to low N that the result is not robust. Furthermore,

being a lower professional – in contrast to being a higher professional/manager – only slightly increases the likelihood of voting for the Social Democrats or the Centre Party. Hence, it can be confirmed that neither small employers nor lower professionals constitute a special clientele for the Finnish parties. Moreover, the effect of belonging to the second youngest age cohort (born in 1960-1975) is totally out of statistically significant effects: it does not increase or decrease the likelihood of voting for any party.

The impact of being a Swedish-speaking Finn on voting for the Swedish People's Party is overwhelming as odds ratio (430.3) indicates in Table 5.8: in fact, it outweighs all other social structural variables. As mentioned, in all other cases language had to be excluded as an explanatory factor due to large standard errors that the inclusion of the variable would have caused. Being a Swedish-speaking Finn explains which party you vote for whereas being a Finnish-speaking Finn explains primarily which party you do not vote for.

When the value/attitudinal dimensions are added in separate stages (in Models 2–5) to the regression model that contains only social structural variables (Model 1), the following conflicts arise between the voters of different parties. Supporting the issues that are related to the economic right and authority (market economy, entrepreneurship, law and order and traditional moral values) explain a vote for the Coalition Party, the Centre Party and also narrowly for the True Finns. Opposing these issues explain a vote for the Left Alliance, the Green League and the Social Democrats. Supporting the issues associated with socioeconomic and regional equality (e.g. decentralization and narrowing income differences) explains a vote for the Left Alliance and the Centre Party and to a lesser extent for the Social Democrats. Opposing these issues increases the likelihood of voting for the Coalition Party.

Having values that support sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism (relating positively to ethnic and sexual minorities, immigration and enhancing environmental protection) increases the likelihood of voting for the Green League. They are set against the voters of the True Finns who oppose sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism (and to a lesser extent the voters of the Coalition Party solely due to the effect of the position of the Coalition Party voters in the 2007). Lastly, those with pro-EU attitudes are most inclined to vote for the Coalition Party or the Social Democrats and those with anti-EU-attitudes

are most inclined to vote for the True Finns or the Christian Democrats (or the Left Alliance).

That none of the dimensions explain a vote for the Swedish People's Party is explained by the fact that the effect of language is so overwhelming that it outweighs the impact of values and attitudes. However, as shown in Figure 5.2 in subchapter 5.2.2, which positioned the voters of the parties in the value/attitudinal dimensions, the clear majority of Swedish People's Party -voters is for sociocultural diversity and clearly pro-EU.

Table 5.10 summarizes the social structural positions and values/attitudes that add the likelihood of voting for a certain party the most (on the basis of the odds ratios in Tables 5.8 and 5.9). It also highlights how voters of different parties are set against each other. Native language sets the Finnish-speaking voters of the Finnish-speaking parties against the Swedish-speaking voters of the Swedish People's Party. The type of residential area sets the residents in rural and small municipalities voting for the Centre Party against those living in the Helsinki metropolitan area voting for the Coalition Party or the Green League.

The picture regarding occupational class is more complex. On the one hand, blue-collar workers voting for the SDP, the Left Alliance or the True Finns are set against the higher professionals/managers voting for the Coalition Party or the Green League. The same pattern applies to the conflict between routine non-manual employees and higher professionals/managers, with the exception being that a routine non-manual employee does not explain a vote for the Left Alliance. Moreover, agricultural entrepreneurs voting for the Centre Party complement the picture of conflicts deriving from occupational class.

Education sets the voters of Social Democrats and True Finns with primary, occupational or upper secondary level education primarily against the highly educated (university-level) voters of the Coalition Party but also against the voters of the Greens. Hence it follows partly the setting based on occupational class. However, education does not have any effect on voting for the Centre Party and a slight effect on voting for the Left Alliance. Occupational class is still at the beginning of the 21st century a better variable in explaining party choice than education. Class conflicts concern the voters of several parties and they are hence more extensive.

Table 5.10. *Social structural positions and dimensions contributing the most to party choice in the electorate of each party (1)*

Social structural base	Party choice
<i>Native language</i>	
Swedish	SWE
Finnish	(Finnish-speaking parties)
<i>Type of residential area</i>	
Rural municipality	CENT
Small municipality	CENT
Town	-
Metropolitan area	COA, GREENS
<i>Occupational class</i>	
Blue-collar workers	SDP, LEFT, TF
Routine non-manual employees	TF, SDP
Agricultural entrepreneurs	CENT
Small employers	-
Lower professionals	-
Higher professionals	COA, GREENS
<i>Education</i>	
Primary	TF, SDP
Vocational	SDP, TF, LEFT
Upper Secondary	TF, SDP
Polytechnic	-
University	COA, GREENS
<i>Denomination</i>	
Does not belong to any church	LEFT, GREENS
Evangelic-Lutheran	CENT, COA, CD
<i>Gender</i>	
Female	GREENS, CD
Male	-
<i>Age cohorts</i>	
-1944	SDP, COA
1945-1959	SDP
1960-1975	-
1976-	GREENS

Table 5.10. *Social structural positions and dimensions contributing the most to party choice in the electorate of each party (2)*

Dimensions	Party Choice
<i>Moral and economic right +</i>	COA, CENT
<i>Moral and economic right -</i>	LEFT, GREENS, SDP
<i>Regional and socioeconomic equality +</i>	LEFT, CENT, SDP
<i>Regional and socioeconomic equality -</i>	COA
<i>Sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism +</i>	GREENS
<i>Sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism -</i>	TF
<i>European Union +</i>	COA, SDP
<i>European Union -</i>	TF, LEFT, CD

The main church members voting for the Centre Party, the Coalition Party (and to a lesser extent the voters of the Christian Democrats) are set against non-church members voting for the Left Alliance or the Green League. Gender does not actually set the voters of the different parties against each other, as being a man does not increase the likelihood of voting for any party. Instead, being a woman does contribute toward voting for either the Green League or, to a lesser extent, the Christian Democrats. In the descriptive chapter 5.2.1 it was found that the True Finns is the only party that has showed the most clear-cut patterns of being a party that men favor. Some recent studies, such as that of Arter and Kestilä-Kekkonen (2014) which was conducted with data from 2006-2013 (the Finnish Business and Policy Forum, EVA) shows that the electorate of the True Finns is clearly male-dominated and men are more likely to choose the True Finns than women. However, with the FNES-data from 2003–2011 no such effects could be detected.

Age cohorts set the voters who belong to either of the two oldest generations and who vote for the Social Democrats against the younger voters of the Green League (born after 1975). Belonging to the oldest generation (born before 1945) also seems to add to the likelihood of voting for the Coalition Party. However, other datasets, such as the European Social Survey (2012) and national surveys actually show a fairly even support among different generations for the Coalition

Party at the beginning of the 21st century (see e.g. Arter & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014). The result concerning the National Coalition Party might be explained by skewed data. The oldest age cohort has been overrepresented in the drop-off-questionnaire and there have been constant challenges in getting enough of the voters of the National Coalition Party to the sample (hence probably giving a misleading picture of the age composition of the electorate of the party). Belonging to the oldest age cohort does not most likely add much likelihood of voting for the Coalition Party when compared to the youngest age cohort in reality. Furthermore, the True Finns otherwise has quite an even support among the four generations, albeit belonging to the oldest age cohort has a distinctive negative effect on the likelihood of voting for the True Finns.

5.3.2 The overall impact of social structural positions and values and attitudes on party choice

As the last aspect of cleavage explanations of party choice, the overall goodness-of-fit of the models explaining party choice is assessed. Franklin (2010), for example, maintains that the social structural positions should explain party support to a considerable extent in order to suffice for evidence of cleavage-based party support. Nagelkerke's R^2 in Model 1 in Table 5.11 is a measure for the goodness-of-fit for a model that includes social structural variables before the insertion of dimension variables in Models 2–5. Nagelkerke's R^2 in Model 6 in Table 5.11 shows the goodness-of-fit when all the variables (social structural variables and value/attitudinal dimensions) are included. Figure 5.3 illustrates the goodness-of-fit graphically.

Social structure has little significance in explaining a vote for three parties, namely the Social Democrats, the True Finns and the Christian Democrats. The first two of these parties compete for the votes of the blue-collar workers and routine non-manual employees. When the loyalties of blue-collar voters are currently more split than they used to be, the effect of social structure on voting for a traditional left-wing party is not that strong anymore. The explanatory ability of social structure is not either high in the case of another left-wing party, the Left Alliance.

Table 5.11 Overall goodness-of-fit of the models explaining party choice

	LEFT	GREENS	SDP	TF	CENT	CD	COA	SWE
Nagelkerke's R ² Model 1 (Social structural positions)	0.12	0.20	0.10	0.07	0.19	0.05	0.14	0.66
Nagelkerke's R ² Model 6 (Full model= social structural positions + all dimensions)	0.22	0.29	0.16	0.23	0.22	0.09	0.35	0.67

Note: The Nagelkerke's R²s are from the models that include occupational class as the status variable instead of education as the social status variable. This is because the goodness-of-fit of the model that included occupational class was better in comparison to the model that included education.

Despite similarities in social structure in the electorates of the Social Democrats and the True Finns, the ability of value/attitudinal dimensions to distinguish the parties is rather prominent. Values and attitudes explain better the support for the True Finns, the 'new party of the proletariat' than for the SDP, the 'old party of the proletariat'. Social structural variables have very little significance in explaining a vote for the True Finns, whereas adding the value/attitudinal dimensions to the model increases the goodness-of-fit significantly (from 0.07 to 0.23 as highlighted also in Figure 5.3). This can be seen as an indicator of how a newer party with a blue-collar voter appeal has succeeded in politicizing the value/attitudinal base in the electorate. It also indicates that despite the appeal of the True Finns among blue-collar workers and also routine non-manual employees, the electoral support of the True Finns is not rooted strongly to social structure. The role of values and attitudes in conditioning a vote for the True Finns is significant.

The success of the True Finns relies much on the ability to keep on politicizing EU and sociocultural issues, in which it has succeeded in 2010s. In the light of the 2015 election result with the True Finns being the second largest party, the party seems to have stabilized its position as the propagator of anti-EU and anti-immigration and anti-minority interests. Hence, values and attitudes may cement partisan loyalties towards the True Finns more efficiently than social structure (see Enyedi 2008. 293) In turn; an important reason why the Nagelkerke's R²

reaches even 0.10 in Model 1 for the SDP is the reliance of the SDP on the two oldest age cohorts.




Figure 5.3 *The overall impact of social structural positions and value/attitudinal dimensions on Finnish party choice. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011*

The case of the Christian Democrats shows the problems related to the threefold cleavage definition. It also shows the problems involved in not having enough specific answering categories in social structural questions. Social structure has little significance in explaining a vote for the party, since membership in smaller Christian Churches could not be included in the analyses due to small N problems. Furthermore, religiosity was not included in the analyses as it is a subjective identification measure, not based on objective social structural groups.

The electorate of the Christian Democrats is obviously the most religious of all the parties.

Nagelkerke's R^2 reaches 0.20 in Model 1 for the Green League, 0.19 for the Centre Party and 0.14 for the Coalition Party. For the Centre Party, adding values and attitudes to the model does not add much to the goodness-of-fit – Nagelkerke's R^2 reaches 0.22 in Model 6. Hence, the support of the Centre Party is strongly anchored in social structure – mainly due to the effect of type of residential area. In terms of the value/attitudinal dimensions, the voters of the Centre Party were somewhat distinctive only in supporting a decentralizing and redistributive state.

As practically all social structural positions affected voting for the Green League, i.e. those based on type of residential area, occupational class, education, gender, denomination and age, it can be said that the electorate of the Green League is distinctive in social structural terms. Therefore, the results complete the perception of the Green League as a value-based party (see Paloheimo 2008): it is both structure- and value-based party. That said, values and attitudes make the model significantly better in explaining a vote for the Greens: they have also a significant independent effect on voting for the Green League.

Nagelkerke's R^2 in Model 6 increases the most in comparison to Model 1 in the case of the Coalition Party. The voters of the party have distinctive positions in the dimensions. The electoral support of the Coalition Party is by no means weakly anchored to social structure but values/attitudes play also a significant independent role in comparison to the Centre Party, for example.

The Swedish People's Party is an extreme case of a structure-based party. The model receives an extremely high level of goodness-of-the-fit in Model 1 due to the effect of native language (Nagelkerke's $R^2=0.66$). As Figure 5.3 illustrates, adding values and attitudes to the model gives almost none additional explanatory value precisely because of the overwhelming effect of native language.

Social structure has not predicted party choice to a great extent in most West European at the end of 20th century (see Franklin et al. 2009). In this regard, many Finnish parties seem to be quite standard cases. The Swedish People's Party is an obvious exception as a language party. Moreover, there is evidence that social structural cleavage elements explain relatively well voting for the Centre

Party, Green League and to a lesser extent the Coalition Party. In addition, the models explaining the vote for the Left Alliance, reach an in-between goodness-of-fit. However, the social structure had even less significance in explaining vote for the Social Democrats, True Finns and Christian Democrats. This underlines the problems of the SDP: it relies too much on old voters and has not been able to renew its profile in a successful way as it did in the 1990s.

The social structural positions that affect party choice the most and the value/attitudinal dimensions that affect party choice the most are partly overlapping in setting parties against each other. Next, it is dealt with whether they can be regarded as cleavages that fulfil all the requirements of a definition of cleavage presented earlier. As discussed, a cleavage can be regarded to exist if there are objectively identifiable and politically relevant social structural groups that share common values and attitudes and if being a member of the respective social structural group and having the shared values/attitudes contribute both to voting for a party that represents the interests at hand.

5.3.3 The categorization of the conflicts

This chapter provides with an answer to the last research question “*Which conflicts can be regarded as cleavages and which are the parties associated with them?*” (RQ5). The cleavage bases are handled one at a time in order to categorize and define the conflicts as either established cleavages or as having the potential to emerge as cleavages. The tables below follow the subsequent logic. The first column represents the social structural cleavage base and the second column represents the social structural groups in between which the conflict rises. The third column represents the dimension on which the social structural position has an effect (see Tables 4.14–4.17 for the effects in the linear regression analysis) and this dimension affects party choice in the same way as the social structural position. The fourth column finally represents which are the parties that are involved in the conflict.

First, Table 5.12 illustrates that the conflict that is based on the type of residential area sets the residents in rural and small municipalities who support decentralization and regional equality and vote for the Centre Party against residents in the Helsinki metropolitan area who have common interests in

opposing regional equality and who primarily support the National Coalition Party. The conflict, deriving from these patterns, is encompassing, has political-historical roots and is attached to the current debate on (de)centralization (see e.g. Moisio 2012). As noticed earlier, the Centre Party and the Coalition Party have represented these interests as political parties. Hence, *the conflict that is based on the type of residential area and reflected in the regional and socioeconomic dimension meets the requirements of a cleavage.*

Table 5.12 *Cleavage based on the type of residential area*

Cleavage base	The social structural groups between which the conflict rises	Dimension	Party choice
Type of residential area	Rural municipality vs. Metropolitan area	Regional and socioeconomic equality +	Centre Party
	Small municipality vs. Metropolitan area	Regional and socioeconomic equality -	Coalition Party, (Green League)
	Small municipality vs. Metropolitan area	Regional and socioeconomic equality +	Centre Party
	Small municipality vs. Metropolitan area	Regional and socioeconomic equality -	Coalition Party, (Green League)

Moreover, since the conflict has long political-historical roots and concerns the voters of two major parties, it is also an influential cleavage. It also emphasizes the peculiarity of Finland given that the Agrarian-based Centre Party has managed to stay as one of the main parties, partly because of its ability to represent decentralizing interests (Paloheimo 2008). As Moisio (2012) has argued, the conflicts do not arise merely along the rural-urban -division as the Helsinki metropolitan area (instead of urban areas at large) has become increasingly important economically while the peripheral areas have increasingly been left to cope on their own. In this sense, the cleavage at hand can be interpreted as a modern version of the old rural-urban cleavage (see Allardt & Pesonen 1967; Paloheimo 1988). Also the Green League represents an opposite for the Centre Party voters in this cleavage in the sense that living in the Helsinki metropolitan area increases the likelihood of voting for the Green League more than voting for the Coalition Party. However, opposing regional and

socioeconomic equality did not increase the likelihood of voting for the Green League. The Green League’s voters are not as much against socioeconomic and regional equality as are the Coalition Party voters although they were located at the end of not favoring regional and socioeconomic equality in Figure 5.1.

The residential area also had an effect on the EU-dimension: rural residents are more EU-sceptic than the metropolitan voters. However, the party choice effect of living in a rural municipality and the party choice effect of having anti-EU attitudes are not overlapping. Anti-EU attitudes do not have an impact on voting for the Centre Party, and living in a rural municipality does not have an effect on voting for the True Finns, the Left Alliance or the Christian Democrats although their support is explained by anti-EU attitudes.

With regard to native language, the Swedish-speaking voters are more liberal-minded and more in favor of minority protection than the Finnish-speaking voters. This pattern in the sociocultural dimension is especially due to the issue concerning the rights of the Swedish-speaking minority. The sociocultural dimension, however, has no effect on choosing the Swedish People’s Party. In subchapter 5.2.2 it was noticed that the voters of the Swedish People’s Party are strongly in favor of sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism. This orientation just does not add to the likelihood of voting for the Swedish People’s Party, since native language absorbs all of the party choice effect as an immensely strong factor for voting for the Swedish People’s Party. When considering these aspects, it can be stated that *language constitutes an immensely rigid and one-sided cleavage*, as illustrated by Table 5.13.

Table 5.13 *Cleavage based on native language*

Cleavage base	The social structural groups between which the cleavage rises	Value/attitudinal dimension	Party choice
Native language	Swedish-speaking	Sociocult. diversity and postmaterialism +	Swedish People’s Party
	Finnish-speaking	Sociocult. diversity and postmaterialism –	(Finnish-speaking parties)

The language cleavage sets the Swedish-speaking people who have common interests in minority protection and who vote for the Swedish People's Party against the Finnish-speaking people who do not cherish that much minority protection and who vote for one of the Finnish-speaking parties. The Finnish-speaking parties are in parentheses since having Finnish as a native language is not in itself a good explanatory variable for which party one votes for. Instead, it is a good explanatory variable for which party one *does not* vote for (the Swedish People's Party).

This cleavage has been an inseparable part of the Finnish party system since its birth because language has conditioned party choice to a great extent in the Swedish-speaking population. The Finnish-Swedes have a clear language-based identity, which produces a loyalty to vote for the Swedish People's Party that has been the propagator of these language-based interests. Furthermore, from a historical perspective, this loyalty has been immune to big turbulences in the Finnish parliamentary elections, such as in 1945, 1970 and 2011 (see Sundberg 1985; Westinen 2014). Although the Swedish-speaking interests and the Swedish People's Party do not have a clear single opposite here, the True Finns has been the party which has revived anti-Swedish attitudes in recent years (Grönlund & Westinen 2012, 176). Its voters are the only ones who have clearly negative attitudes toward the language issue and other issues that concern minority protection.

Occupational class results in several bipolar conflicts along social structural and value/attitudinal lines that can be characterized either as cleavages or potentially emerging cleavages. There is evidence for the continued existence of a *traditional class cleavage* that is reflected in the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension, as illustrated by Table 5.14. First, it sets blue-collar voters who have common interests in supporting socioeconomic equality and who vote for the Left Alliance or Social Democrats against the higher professionals and managers who have common interests in opposing socioeconomic equality and who vote for the Coalition Party. All of these parties have represented the interests at hand (Paloheimo 2008; Westinen 2011). Second, it almost identically sets routine non-manual employees who have common interests in supporting socioeconomic equality and who vote for the Social Democrats against the higher professionals and managers who have common interests in opposing

socioeconomic equality and who vote for the Coalition Party. However, this conflict is not as strong as the one separating blue-collar workers and higher professionals/managers since being a routine non-manual employee has weaker effect on supporting equality and since it has also a weaker party choice effect.

Table 5.14 *Traditional class cleavage*

Cleavage base	The social structural groups between which the conflict rises	Dimension	Party choice
Occupational class	Blue-collar workers	Regional and socioecon. equality +	Left Alliance Social Democratic Party
	Higher professionals/managers	Regional and socioecon. equality -	Coalition Party
	Routine non-manual employees	Regional and socioecon. equality +	Social Democratic Party
	Higher professionals/managers	Regional and socioecon. equality -	Coalition Party
	Agricultural entrepreneurs	Regional and socioecon. equality +	Centre Party
	Higher professionals/managers	Regional and socioecon. equality -	Coalition Party

The same clash persists also between lower-educated who vote for the Social Democrats and who support socioeconomic equality and highly educated who vote for the National Coalition Party and who do not emphasize socioeconomic equality. The overlap of occupational education and blue-collar jobs and university level education and higher professional jobs is evident here. However, education explained a vote for both the SDP and the Coalition Party to a lesser extent than occupational class and the parties at hand have first and foremost represented the interests of occupational groups. Hence, the cleavage is treated as primarily based on class but it is a cleavage that is also partly strengthened by educational opposites.

The clash between the opposite sides in the traditional class cleavage dates from long back in time. From the beginning, the SDP and the Communists were the parties of the working class and the Coalition Party, in turn, was a party of the upper strata of society. This division to the socialist workers' parties and the upper-class party was one of the cornerstones of the modern Finnish party system at the beginning of the 20th century (Paloheimo 2007). The analyses

suggest that blue-collar voters still propagate for a strong state that has redistributing policies, whereas the more well-off higher professionals and managers have not shown that strong support to a state that redistributes wealth. Hence, this cleavage reflects a classic division between the political left and political right. The expansion of the service sector has meant that the number of routine non-manual employees has grown, which in turn represents a more recent conflict base than that of blue-collar workers. Also the routine non-manual employees support a redistributive state and trust that the Social Democrats advocate their cause.

Furthermore, the traditional class cleavage is supplemented by agricultural entrepreneurs supporting a state which promotes redistribution and decentralization, and vote for the Centre Party. Being an agricultural entrepreneur decreased the likelihood of voting for the SDP and the Coalition Party, which emphasizes the triangular nature of the traditional class cleavage. Also this aspect of the cleavage dates back to the birth of the modern party system, as the Agrarian League, the predecessor of the Centre Party, was formed to advocate farmers' interests. As we have noticed, the Centre Party has continued on promoting the farmers' interests in the 21st century.

When these forms of traditional class cleavage are combined it can be said that the pattern matches the triangular model between different classes (Nousiainen 1970). The conflict between routine non-manual employees and higher professionals/managers and the educational base in the conflict between the SDP and the Coalition Party update the model. Moreover, the blue-collar voters and routine non-manual employees emphasize more socioeconomic equality than the agricultural entrepreneurs, whose main concern is regional equality. This emphasizes the partly split nature of the issues in the dimensions.

Hence, all three old main parties, the Social Democrats, the Centre Party and the Coalition Party, are set against each other on a structural base in the class cleavage to which they are still anchored. Moreover, despite the party's recent red-green, postmaterialist profile, the blue-collar voters of the Left Alliance are still anchored to the traditional class cleavage, reflecting the Communist working-class heritage. So far, evidence has been found that all three classic Lipset-Rokkan -cleavages exist in Finland at the beginning of the 21st century, even though they exist in an updated form.

The results show that a modern version of class cleavage would be reflected in the new sociocultural and EU-dimensions. Table 5.15 illustrates how postmaterialist-liberal higher professionals are set against the anti-postmaterialist, anti-minority blue-collar voters. The former support the Greens and the latter the True Finns. The dimension involved handles issues (immigration, ethnic and sexual minorities, environmental protection) that have been politicized rather recently in Finland (see Paloheimo 2008; Westinen 2011) and concern the voters of parties that have been represented in the parliament only from 1980s and 1990s onwards. In accordance with the wider West European framework (see e.g. Kriesi et al. 2006; van der Brug & van Spanje 2009), the Green League has propagated for the promotion of minority rights, increased immigration and environmental protection while the True Finns has represented the opposite stands in these issues (see Mickelsson 2006, Westinen 2011; Ruotetsaari 2012).

Table 5.15 *Possibly emerging cleavage based on social status*

Cleavage base	The social structural groups btw. which the conflict rises	Dimension	Party choice
Occupational class	Blue-collar workers	Sociocult. diversity and postmaterialism –	True Finns
	Higher professionals	Sociocult. diversity and postmaterialism +	Green League
	Blue-collar workers	European Union –	True Finns
	Higher professionals	European Union +	Coalition Party

Although the clash at hand fulfils the cleavage criteria rather well, due to the recent nature of the conflict (the True Finns gaining substantial support for the first time in parliamentary elections in 2011) it cannot be regarded at least yet as an established cleavage. Rather, it is classified as a possibly emerging cleavage, where the modern proletarian frustration is reflected in opposing sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism and channeled into voting for a nationalist-populist party, and where the upper strata defends diversity and postmaterialism and votes for a liberal and ecological party. Moreover, it should be emphasized that the effect of being a higher professional or a manager on voting for the

Green League was rather weak. Hence, the social structural base of this conflict is far from cemented.

Table 5.15 also illustrates how pro-EU managers and higher professionals who vote for the Coalition Party are set against anti-EU blue-collar workers who vote for the True Finns. The Coalition Party has represented pro-EU stands throughout the 1990s and the 21st century. Anti-EU stands and defense of national sovereignty have been the cornerstones of the True Finns' policies. (Paloheimo 2000; Westinen 2011, 46–48.) The conflict has a theoretical anchoring, since free mobility of labor has been considered as disadvantageous for blue-collar workers who fear of losing their jobs. Moreover, the blue-collar voters have fewer resources available to benefit from the globalization and integration in comparison to higher professionals and managers, who cope better in the ever-changing and integrating labor market. (see Kriesi et al. 2008; Kriesi et al. 2012.) However, also in this case it is too soon to evaluate whether this conflict has the longevity of evolving into an established cleavage. The True Finns may develop a stable voter base with a strong anti-EU blue-collar worker segment in the long run. It should be noted that in comparison to the class conflict reflected in the sociocultural dimension, the one reflected in the EU dimension is more strongly rooted in social structure: being a higher professional/manager is a stronger explanatory factor for voting for the Coalition Party in comparison to the Green League.

The possibly emerging class cleavage that is reflected in the sociocultural and EU dimensions can be treated as a possibly emerging cleavage based on social status since the same patterns are present even when occupational class was switched to education in the party choice models. This does not apply as a whole to the old class cleavage. For example, the common interests of the Centre Party voting farmers are purely entangled to their occupational position, not to their education.

The emerging class cleavage not only sets the True Finns blue-collar workers voting against the higher professionals and managers voting for the Green League or the Coalition Party. They also set those with a primary or vocational level education against those with university-level education, since the lower-educated are anti-postmaterialist in the sociocultural dimension and anti-EU in the EU dimension in contrast to the highly educated. Moreover, the party preferences of

these educational groups were indeed identical to the respective occupational groups (blue collar workers & higher professionals and managers). Although, yet again, the effect of having a university level on voting for the Greens is modest. Hence, these conflicts can be considered as social status-based in general. This is in accordance with the theories that emphasize the importance of education in new types of conflicts (Stubager 2010).

So far, it has been showed that there is evidence for the continued existence of the three traditional cleavages, i.e. the three pillars in the Finnish party system (see Karvonen 2014). They are accompanied by possibly emerging social status - based cleavage that is reflected in new types of issues and dimensions. The following section will present an analysis regarding how other conflicts can be classified.

Denomination is an old source of conflict that has been politicized recently in Finland as a result of resignations from the church. Table 5.16 illustrates how the conflict sets the main church members, whose common interests are reflected in showing respect for authority and traditional moral values and who vote for the Centre Party, the Coalition Party or the Christian Democrats against the non-church members, who neglect the importance of authority and traditional moral values and who vote for the Left Alliance or the Green League.

Table 5.16 *Possibly emerging cleavage based on denomination*

Cleavage base	The social structural groups between which the conflict rises	Dimension	Party choice
Denomination	Evangelic-Lutherans	Economic right and authority +	Centre Party (CENT) Coalition Party (COA) Christian Democrats (CD)
	Non church-members	Economic right and authority -	Green League (GREENS) Left Alliance (LEFT)

The values and attitudes do not contribute to voting for the Christian Democrats despite the fact that the CD-voters support traditional moral values and strong authorities. This is largely because the values and attitudes can hardly have an effect on voting since it is absorbed by denomination. There are hardly any voters

who do not belong to any church or religious community and who would vote for the Christian Democrats. Furthermore, it is problematic that the dimensional effect is due to only some issues: economic right issues are not entangled to denomination.

The major parties concerned in the traditionalist church member side, the Centre Party and the Coalition Party, are center-right parties, which have historically valued religion as one of the basic pillars in Finnish society. For the Centre Party, religion and moral values have had continued importance in the 21st century, while the Coalition Party has toned down the role of religion and traditional values in its party profile (Jutala 2003; Lahtinen 2006; Westinen 2011, 65). The party profile of the Christian Democrats obviously builds on these themes. However, the target group of the Christian Democrats is religious voters at large (Westinen 2011, 67). The parties on the anti-clerical side of the conflict, the Left Alliance and the Green League, have wanted to decrease the importance of church and traditional values in society (Westinen 2011, 69–70).

However, further evidence is needed on whether the conflict between the Evangelic-Lutheran and non-confessional voters is of stable nature. Cleavages should arise from some durable feature. Such durability, strengthened by socialization mechanisms, cannot have occurred yet, since the divide into confessional and non-confessional voters has sharpened in structural terms only recently (Mykkänen 2012; cf. Niemelä 2006): resignation from church has accelerated only in the 2010s. Moreover, the resignation has been affected by the debate on moral values and authority (Mykkänen 2012). Thus, *the denominational conflict can be categorized as a possibly emerging cleavage*. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that applying the threefold cleavage definition with the available data does not fully reveal the dynamics involved. The denominational conflict might be more relevant between deeply religious members of revivalist movements and those non-religious voters who are not members in any church. Other studies have deployed religiosity or church-going activity as the basis for a religious cleavage (see e.g. Knutsen 2006; Franklin et al. 2009), but these are not social structural measures. It is unlikely that conflicts would rise in the electoral arena any time soon between two religions since Finland is at the time being overwhelmingly Christian.

Gender had a clear effect only on the sociocultural dimension, as women are more sensitive for minority interests and environmental protection and towards immigrants than men. However, the gender effect on party choice remains one-sided. Gender has an effect on party choice only in the electorates of the Green League and the Christian Democrats, which are both dominated by women. The electorate of the True Finns is slightly dominated by men, but being a man does not increase the likelihood of voting for the True Finns. Having liberal and postmaterialist values explains voting for the Green League and opposing them explains voting for the True Finns, as highlighted in Table 5.17.

Table 5.17 Possibly emerging cleavage based on gender

Cleavage base	The social structural groups between which the conflict rises	Dimension	Party choice
Gender	Women vs.	Sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism +	Green League (GREENS)
	Men	Sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism -	(True Finns, TF)

However, recent studies, such as that of Arter and Kestilä-Kekkonen (2014) using newer data from 2013, have showed that the electorate of the True Finns would actually be more male-dominated than the FNES-studies in 2003–2011 suggest. Hence, a gender-based conflict that sets the Green League-voters and True Finns-voters against each other both on a structural and value/attitudinal basis might establish itself in the future. This potential is underlined by the fact that the party profiles of the Green League and the True Finns suggest that there could be potential for an emerging gender-based cleavage. Parties on the populist radical right have been labelled as men’s parties (see Mudde 2007, 90–92) and Green parties have been advocating feminism (Inglehart & Norris 2000), which also applies to the party profile of the True Finns and the Green League. In addition, women have been overrepresented in the parliamentary group of the Green League and men have been overrepresented in the parliamentary group of the True Finns (Mickelsson 2007; Arter & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014). Future evidence is needed on whether the electorate of the True Finns becomes more distinctively

male-dominated. As the bipolarized politicization of gender-based conflict is rather new, the requirement of durability makes the *gender conflict reflected in the sociocultural dimension a possibly emerging cleavage*.

It is also noteworthy that the sociocultural dimension sets the voters of the Greens and the True Finns against each other on the basis of occupational/educational status. Gender differences in party popularity have not just been fully established on the basis of the FNES-data in comparison to social status differences in party popularity. Hence, both of these patterns are in accordance with the theoretical frame of new cleavages that was presented in subchapter 3.2.4. The frame presupposed that men and those with a low occupational/educational status are less postmaterialist and liberal than women and those with high occupational/educational status, and that they turn to new parties in fulfilling their opposite interests.

Age cohorts, in turn, had the strongest effect on values and attitudes in the economic right and authority and regional and socioeconomic equality dimensions. However, the party choice patterns were overlapping in social structural terms and in terms of values/attitudes only in one case. Those who belong to the oldest generation (born before 1945), who support the issues associated with the economic right and authority and vote for the Coalition Party, are set against the members of the youngest generation (born after 1975), who neglect the importance of these issues and vote for the Green League. However, the result concerning the Coalition Party is likely to be misleading due since other datasets, such as those from European Social Survey or EVA (Finnish Business and Policy Forum), indicate that no such pattern exists – that the Coalition Party does not have an especially strong position among the oldest generation in comparison to the other generations. Moreover, the Coalition Party is not dedicated to taking care of the interests of the oldest generation, while it can be argued that the Green League has its core clientele in the youngest generation (Mickelsson 2006). Hence, there is no convincing evidence for a cleavage based on age cohorts. Nevertheless, there is a structural divide between the young voters voting for the Green League and the old voters (born before 1945 or 1945–1959) voting for the Social Democrats.

Age does not constitute cleavage-like conflicts in Finland, which gives support to Franklin and Van der Eijk's (2009) standpoint of cleavages potentially

changing when generations replace one another. Instead, age cohorts are best understood as structural divides in the electorate. It is obvious that the Social Democratic Party, especially, is a party of elderly generations, while the Green League is a party of the young. Generational replacement may first and foremost lead to changes in party popularity. If the SDP continues to struggle among younger generations and if the members of the younger generations continue to support the Green League to a great extent, even when they get older, the SDP is bound to lose its position as a main party and the Green League is bound to grow its support steadily. Moreover, generational replacement is likely to shift the focus in the values and attitudes that are considered important. The youngest generation does not give much value to issues associated with the economic right and authority and socioeconomic and regional equality.

5.3.4. The Finnish cleavage structure at the beginning of the 21st century

Previous chapters have dealt with the interaction between the three cleavage elements – social structural position, values/attitudes and party choice. Thus, the answer to the last research question (RQ5) “*Which conflicts can be regarded as cleavages and which are the parties associated with them?*” can be now summarized.

On the basis of the results it can be argued that three old cleavages exist even at the beginning of the 21st century, namely a language cleavage, a cleavage based on the type of residential area and a class cleavage. As Table 5.18 illustrates, the parties that are attached to the old cleavages are all old parties or have their ideological heritage in an old party (the Left Alliance). Furthermore, the existence of the old cleavages has been based on strong political socialization. For example, the Swedish-speaking population has been socialized to vote for the Swedish-speaking party and the rural residents have been socialized to vote for the Agrarian-based Centre Party. Moreover, the parties concerned in the established cleavages have propagated for the common interests of the social structural groups concerned.

First, the language cleavage concerns the Swedish People’s Party the most and even though the interests of the Swedish-speaking population are reflected in a ‘new’ dimension, the sociocultural dimension, the language issue is an old one. It

was disputed heatedly in the 19th century, before the arrival of the modern party system, and the most fierce language disputes during the modern party system were fought during the 1930s. Second, the old rural-urban cleavage has evolved into a cleavage that sets the residents in rural and small municipalities against the residents in the Helsinki metropolitan area. It is present in the socioeconomic and regional equality, which reflects the old issues of redistribution and decentralization. Moreover, the two main parties concerned, the Centre Party and the Coalition Party, are old parties. However, also a new party, the Green League, is somewhat involved in the cleavage and it has an even more crucial support base in the metropolitan area than the Coalition Party in relative terms.

The third conflict that is categorized as a cleavage is the traditional occupational cleavage that is also reflected in the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension. This cleavage sets blue-collar voters and routine non-manual employees who vote for the Social Democrats or the Left Alliance, who demand a bigger role for the state in promoting socioeconomic equality, against higher professionals/managers who vote for the Coalition Party and support solutions that do not even out welfare. Moreover, the triangular cleavage is accompanied by agricultural entrepreneurs who vote for the Centre Party and support decentralization. Originally, when over two thirds of the population worked in agriculture at the beginning of the 20th century (see Karvonen 2014, 30), the last aspect reflected the tensions inside primary production and between primary production and commercial interests. Nowadays, its importance has weakened in the sense that farmers constitute less than five percent of the economically active population and since farmers constitute only ten percent of the Centre Party's electorate (*ibid.*).

Table 5.18 indicates that four further cases are categorized as possibly emerging cleavages. The one based on the occupational/educational status of the voters has the most potential while the ones based on denomination and gender have a more limited potential to emerge as cleavages. Next, it is argued why these cases do not yet qualify as cleavages and why they have some potential of becoming cleavages. The conflict that has the most potential to emerge as a cleavage is based on occupational/educational status and it is reflected in the sociocultural and EU dimensions.

Table 5.18 *Summary of old, established cleavages and possibly emerging cleavages in Finland (1)*

Cleavage	Social structural element	Value/attitudinal element	Organizational element
OLD, ESTABLISHED	Native language	Sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism +	Swedish People's Party
CLEAVAGES	Finnish-speaking	Sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism –	(Finnish-speaking parties)
Type of residential area (residents in)	Rural municipalities	Regional and socioeconomic equality +	Centre Party
	Metropolitan area	Regional and socioeconomic equality –	Coalition Party, (Green League)
	Small municipalities	Regional and socioeconomic equality +	Centre Party
	Metropolitan area	Regional and socioeconomic equality –	Coalition Party, (Green League)
Occupational class	Blue-collar workers	Regional and socioeconomic equality +	Social Democratic Party, Left Alliance
	Higher professionals	Regional and socioeconomic equality –	Coalition Party
	Routine non-manual employees	Regional and socioeconomic equality +	Social Democratic Party
	Higher professionals	Regional and socioeconomic equality –	Coalition Party
	Agricultural entrepreneurs	Regional and socioeconomic equality +	Centre Party
	Higher professionals	Regional and socioeconomic equality –	Coalition Party

Table 5.18 *Summary of of old, established cleavages and possibly emerging cleavages in Finland (2)*

Cleavage	Social structural element	Value/attitudinal element	Organizational element
THE MOST POTENTIAL	Occupational	Sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism –	True Finns
AS EMERGING	class	Sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism +	Green League
CLEAVAGE	& educational level	European Union –	True Finns
	Higher professionals	European Union +	Coalition Party
LIMITED POTENTIAL	Denomination	Economic right and authority +	Centre Party, Coalition Party
AS EMERGING	Evangelic Lutherans		Christian Democrats
CLEAVAGE	Non church-members	Economic right and authority –	Green League
	Women		Left Alliance
Gender	Men	Sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism +	Green League
		Sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism –	(True Finns)

The blue-collar voters and low-educated (with primary or vocational education) who have common interests in opposing sociocultural diversity are set against higher professionals and managers and the highly educated (university-level education) who have common interests in supporting sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism. The first-mentioned have supported the True Finns, especially, while the latter have supported the Green League, which have ideologically represented group-based interests. However, the party choice effect of social structural positions is not particularly strong or established. Even though the three cleavage elements are fairly well fulfilled, the recent nature of the conflict raises doubts on its durability, i.e. whether the conflict is more than ephemeral. The conflict between Greens and True Finns gained substantial importance first in the 2011 election where the True Finns managed to politicize anti-immigrant and nationalist-conservative attitudes to become the third largest party in the parliament. The Green League, on the other hand, seems to have somewhat stabilized itself as a popular party among the liberal-postmaterialist voters with high social status (class or education) (see Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005; Paloheimo 2008).

The anti-EU blue-collar voters and low-educated are set against pro-EU higher professionals and managers and the highly educated. The first-mentioned have supported the True Finns, especially, and the latter have supported the Coalition Party, which have ideologically represented these group-based interests ever since the EU-issues became topical in the Finish party system in the 1990s (see Paloheimo 2000). However, the problem of durability also applies here, as the 2011 election was the first election which was fought intensively over EU-issues and when the True Finns managed to break the consensus over the management of EU-policies (Borg 2012e).

The new social status-based conflict with two dimensional reflections (sociocultural and the EU) has more potential to evolve into a cleavage in comparison to conflicts that are based on gender and denomination. The connections between cleavage elements were more solid in the social status - based conflict, and the interests attached to the conflict were represented by the parties at hand in more explicit terms than in the conflicts based on denomination and gender.

Denomination is categorized as a possibly emerging cleavage since the conservative voters who belong to the main church and vote for the Centre Party, Coalition Party and Christian Democrats are set against the anti-authority and anti-tradition voters of the Left Alliance and Green League. Its potential for a cleavage is even more recent than in the emerging social status -based cleavage since the structural base became more topical in the 2010s, due to the increased number of resignations from the Evangelic-Lutheran church. Moreover, the nature of the cleavage based on denomination remained imprecise with the available data. However, denominational conflict needs more verification in future elections. Moreover, the recent debate around the Evangelic-Lutheran church and the resignation from the church has been much affected by the way church relates to sexual minorities. However, questions on sexual minorities belong to the sociocultural dimension on which denomination had no effect since also questions on immigration and environmental protection belong to the dimension. Hence, the dynamics behind the denomination-based conflicts are not fully revealed by applying the threefold cleavage definition in this study.

Conflict based on gender does not fulfil all three criteria of cleavage. The liberal-postmaterialist orientation was represented by women voting for the Green League. However, even though the electorate of the True Finns was dominated by men, gender did not have a statistically significant effect on voting for the True Finns. Opposing liberal and postmaterialist values has instead a clear effect on voting for the True Finns. Hence, it remains to be seen whether the structural element becomes fulfilled on both sides of the gender-based conflict. However, gender has the potential to become a cleavage since the True Finns has had increasing electoral appeal among men (see Arter & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014) and since the sociocultural issues have not yet been fully politicized (see Grönlund & Westinen 2012, 183–184). Even though the Green League and the True Finns are not parties based on gender, such as the Feminist Initiative in Sweden, the Green League has articulated feminist interests and the True Finns has promoted patriarchal views of society.

Figure 5.4 concludes the answer to the *main research problem* of this thesis “*What kind of a cleavage structure does there exist in Finland at the beginning of the 21st century*”? The results suggest that there is a 3+1+2-model of cleavages in the country. This model, illustrated in Figure 5.4, means that there are three old

and established cleavages, one conflict that is reflected in two different dimensions and has the most potential to develop into a cleavage, and two conflicts that have more limited potential to develop into cleavages.




Figure 5.4 *The Finnish cleavage structure at the beginning of the 21st century*

The three old, established cleavages, based on occupational class (reflected in the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension), type of residential area and native language, partly explain the persistence of the old parties in the Finnish party system and crystallize how the tensions are revolved over “old” issues. These established cleavages are conflicts in which the parties concerned are most dedicated to defend the interests of the groups concerned. The conflict that has the most potential to develop into a cleavage combines an old social structural cleavage base (class) with a new one (education) and is reflected in two new value/attitudinal dimensions (sociocultural and the EU). Two other conflicts based on gender and denomination, on the other hand, are conflicts that are less clear-lined. There is less empirical support for them and they have not been incorporated into party profiles to the extent that the aforementioned status-based conflict has, not to mention the three established cleavages.

6. Conclusions

This study has analyzed the present cleavage structure in Finland by examining the connections between the different cleavage elements. This chapter summarizes the major findings, discusses their implications and concludes what this study has revealed about cleavages in Finland.

6.1. Major findings of the study

This study focused extracting the effect of social structural positions on values and attitudes and detecting how they have affected the party choice of the Finnish voters in the parliamentary elections in the 21st century. Thereby the Finnish cleavage structure was detected. The analysis was done by applying a threefold definition of a cleavage and by examining the effects between different variables with statistical analyses. According to the cleavage definition, cleavages arise when members of social structurally-defined groups disagree on certain matters with other groups and share a set of political values and attitudes, which is primarily reflected in voting for a party that represents these group-based interests (Bartolini & Mair 1990, Knutsen & Scarbrough 1995). This study entailed five research questions. Table 6.1 and the following discussion summarize the answers to those questions.

First, this study identified the relevant social structural cleavage bases in Finland. Native language, type of residential area and occupational class form the most solid cleavage bases. The linguistic identity, rural/urban identity and class identity are still relevant in the Finnish electorate in the 21st century. Denomination, gender, education and age cohorts were regarded as more recent relevant cleavage bases but their importance is less established.

Second, four similar value/attitudinal dimensions were identified in 2003, 2007 and 2011 through principal component analysis: 1. Economic right and authority dimension 2. Regional and socioeconomic equality dimension 3. Sociocultural dimension 4. European Union dimension. The first two dimensions reflect the old issues in Finnish politics while the sociocultural and EU-

dimensions, reflect primarily the newly politicized issues that have become increasingly conflictual in the 21st century in Finland.

Third, the overall effect of social structural positions on the values and attitudes of the electorate is rather modest. Social structural variables explain only around one tenth of the variance. Despite this, several social positions have a clear-lined effect on some of the value/attitudinal dimensions.

Fourth, the effect of social structural position and values and attitudes on voters' party choice was diverse. The impact of being a Swedish-speaking Finn on voting for the Swedish People's Party is overwhelming. Living in a small municipality, especially in a rural one, being an agricultural entrepreneur and supporting regional and socioeconomic equality strongly explain voting for the Centre Party. Living in a metropolitan area, being a higher professional or a manager, having a university level education and having economic right and pro-EU attitudes are the most important determinants for voting for the National Coalition Party. Being a blue-collar worker or a routine non-manual employee, having a low educational level, belonging to the oldest age cohort and supporting socioeconomic equality explain strongly a vote for the Social Democrats. Voting for the Left Alliance is explained by being a blue-collar worker, not belonging to the church and by de-emphasizing economic right and authority –related values and supporting socioeconomic equality.

Vote for the True Finns is explained by being by being a blue-collar worker or a routine non-manual employee, having a low education and by opposing the EU and liberal sociocultural values. Living in the Helsinki metropolitan area, being a woman, having a high social status and belonging to the youngest age cohort and having liberal sociocultural values explain a vote for the Green League. Belonging to the main church and being a woman and supporting economic right and authority values and opposing the EU are the strongest explanatory factors for voting the Christian Democrats.

Fifth, building on the previous findings some of the conflicts were categorized as cleavages and some as possibly emerging cleavages. Three conflicts are regarded as old, established cleavages, namely the language cleavage, the cleavage based on the type of residential area and the traditional class cleavage.

The first of these established cleavages concerns primarily the voters of Swedish People's Party while the second concerns the voters of Centre Party, Coalition Party and partly the Green League. The classic class cleavage reflected in the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension concerns in turns the blue-collar voters of the Left Alliance and the Social Democratic Party, the agricultural entrepreneur voters of the Centre Party and higher professional and manager voters of the Coalition Party. The conflict with the most potential as a cleavage is the one based on social status (occupational class and education) and it is reflected in sociocultural and EU dimensions. It concerns the voters of the True Finns, Green League and Coalition Party. Conflicts based on denomination and gender have a more limited potential as possibly emerging cleavages.

Table 6.1 *Summary of major findings (1)*

Research question	Major findings
1. Which are the relevant social structural cleavage bases in Finland?	<p>Native language, type of residential area and occupational class form the most solid cleavage bases.</p> <p>Denomination, gender, education and age cohorts have potential to be relevant new social structural cleavage bases</p>
2. Which are the value/attitudinal dimensions in the Finnish electorate?	<p>Four similar value/attitudinal dimensions were identified in 2003, 2007 and 2011: 1. Economic right and authority dimension</p> <p>2. Regional and socioeconomic equality dimension 3. Sociocultural dimension 4. European Union dimension</p>
3. What is the effect of social structural position on the values and attitudes in the electorate?	<p>Social structural variables explain only around ten percent of the variance in values and attitudes. Despite the weak overall effect, a few rather strong connections between structural positions and value/attitudinal dimensions were identified.</p>
4a. What is the effect of social structural position on voters' party choice? AND 4b. Do those social structural positions and values and attitudes that are linked to each other have an effect on voting for a particular party?	<p>Those social structural positions and values that are linked to each other have in many cases a similar party choice effect.</p> <p>Language has a strong impact on party choice that is accompanied by common values/attitudes in the sociocultural dimension</p> <p>The party choice effect of the type of residential area is accompanied by common values/attitudes regarding decentralization</p> <p>The party choice effect of occupational class is accompanied by three dimensions: 1. regional and socioeconomic equality dimension and 2. sociocultural dimension and 3. EU dimension. The same dividing lines hold in cases 2 and 3 with education.</p> <p>The party choice effect denotation is accompanied by common values/attitudes in the economic right and authority dimension</p> <p>Such combined party choice effects are not found into same extent regarding conflicts based on gender and age cohorts.</p> <p>The overall impact of social structural position and values and attitudes on party choice varies between parties. The overall impact is the strongest in the case of the Swedish People's Party. Also the electoral support of the CENT is strongly bound to social structure.</p> <p>True Finns is an example of a party whose voter support is explained overwhelmingly by values and attitudes instead of social structure.</p>

Table 6.1 *Summary of major findings (2)*

<p>Research question</p> <p>5. Which conflicts can be regarded as cleavages and which are the parties associated with them?</p>	<p>Major findings</p> <p>Old established cleavages are based on language (party concerned: SWE), type of residential area (CENT, COA and partly GREENS). The old established class cleavage is reflected in regional and socioeconomic equality (CENT, COA, SDP, LEFT). The conflict with the most potential as an emerging cleavage is based on social status (class and education) and it is reflected in the sociocultural and EU dimensions. The parties concerned are TF, GREENS and COA.</p>
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6.2 Implications and contribution of the study

The results of the study show that cleavages, following the threefold cleavage definition, still exist in contemporary Finland. The cleavage structure still partly reflects the old basis of the Finnish party system and the old sources of conflict between parties and voters. More importantly, this study has identified a few potentially emerging cleavages that go well along with the change in the party system that has taken place in recent decades. Hence, this study challenges the conception that potential, new cleavages are no longer based on social structure (see Deegan-Krause 2007, 541).

The threefold cleavage á la Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995) is a heavy apparatus to analyze cleavage structure since there has to be steady and strong linkages between all three cleavage elements. Moreover, socialization processes should also maintain the cleavages over time. When the concrete common interests of social structural groups, explicated in the form of values and attitudes, are taken into account, the approach can, however, reveal, which group-based conflicts are more penetrating in society than others.

Whereas the previous Finnish studies have not analyzed the connection between social structural positions and values/attitudes when analyzing party choice (see Pesonen et al. 1993; Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005; Paloheimo 2005, 2008; Grönlund & Westinen 2012), this study explored the connections between all these cleavage elements. Moreover, by treating both old and new cleavage bases simultaneously and by also including a whole spectrum of value/attitudinal dimensions in the analysis, the study explored mechanisms that have largely been largely ignored also in comparative literature on cleavages. The previous studies have mainly focused on verifying the strength of single cleavages or treated cleavages empirically almost merely in terms of social structural positions and party choice. (e.g. Franklin et al. 1992, 2009; Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 1999; Kitschelt 1995; Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi 2010; Stubager 2010; Evans & de Graaf 2013).

The general contribution of this study is as follows. The study reveals that single strong connections can be found between the cleavage elements, namely social structural positions, values and attitudes and vote for a party that

represents the common interests. Indeed, some linkages between group-based interests and parties proved to be so persistent that they do not verify the general pattern of weakened party-voter ties, discovered in the literature. However, the overall effect of social structural positions on the identified value/attitudinal dimensions was not impressive and there is much else affecting party choice than social structural positions and values and attitudes. Franklin and colleagues (1992, 2009) stated that when coming to the 1990s, the voters had released themselves from the straightjacket of social structure, thus resulting in more unpredictable voting behavior. In the same vein, it can be argued that the voters' interests, reflected in their values and attitudes, are *not*, at least in Finland, dictated by their social structural characteristics.

The results also show the diversity in the values and attitudes of voters belonging to a certain social structural group. Nevertheless, some patterns were sufficiently strong to form a basis for group-based interests that were also present in party choice. It was also confirmed, according to the expectations, that social structural positions deriving from old cleavage bases were also reflected more visibly in the old dimensions (economic right and authority and regional and socioeconomic equality), whereas social structural positions stemming from new cleavage bases were reflected more in the new dimensions (sociocultural and EU).

It is important not to undermine the fact that the parties' electorates are internally diverse. Due to the research setting in this study, the focus has been on finding those social structural characteristics and values and attitudes that are common for the voters of each party. A study on the 2011 parliamentary election (Westinen & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2015) reveals, however, that the voter profile of each party is not that homogenous. Certain blocs that divide the electorates of the parties also internally can be identified when also the second party preference is taken into account ⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Moreover, the parties in the parliament are internally split in ideological terms. Paloheimo, Reunanen and Suhonen (2005) discovered in the context of the 2003 parliamentary election that the MP's could be reshuffled into new parties based on their answers in a voting advice application. Some MP's deviated significantly from the average opinions on political issues inside their own parliamentary group. This phenomenon is fueled by the Finnish electoral system, which encourages to intra-party competition and which allows political diversity inside the candidate lists (see Ruostetsaari & Mattila 2002; Arter 2014).

The results show that some parties, most prominently the Swedish People's Party and the Centre Party, are still strongly rooted to social structure. Despite these two examples, the dichotomy to old parties that are anchored to social structure and to new parties that are anchored to values and attitudes does not get empirical evidence. This would be in accordance with the shift from social structure to values and attitudes (Thomassen 2005a; Dalton 2008), which has enabled the emergence of new parties in political systems.

Furthermore, this study contradicted for example Paloheimo's (2008) dichotomy to structure-based parties and value-based parties in Finland. For example, the electoral support of the Green League, a party founded in 1987, was anchored to practically all social structural bases while values and attitudes also play an important role in the electorate of the Green League. The Coalition Party, which is an old established party, could be categorized as a party that has an even more distinctive profile in terms of values and attitudes. They had a major independent role in explaining a vote for the Coalition Party.

Moreover, this study showed that the left-wing parties are not anchored to social structural groups to the same extent as the parties in the center-right. The populist True Finns Party fights partly for the same social structural voter groups as the traditional left-wing parties but this study shows how the blue-collar voters of the True Finns are realigned with new kinds of values, channeling their voice through sociocultural and EU-issues. The limited importance of social structure in explaining a vote for the traditional left-wing parties, which have historically been strongly anchored to social structure, matches also the wider West European context (see Franklin et al. 2009). In contrast, the independent effect of values and attitudes on choosing the True Finns is striking. The value basis of the voters of a populist party has proved to be much more important than the structural base in general (see Mudde 2007), which matches also the True Finns despite having a voter base among those with 'lower' social status which has common interests in the sociocultural and European Union dimensions.

What is then the contribution of this study regarding the identified established cleavages and possibly emerging cleavages? First, by building on three parliamentary elections in 2003–2011, this study identified which established cleavages seem most stable, which are under pressure and which conflicts the volatile 2011 election brought upfront. Since the True Finns is involved in the

new social status -based conflict that has the most potential to emerge as a cleavage, the significance of the 2011 landslide victory cannot be underestimated in the scope of cleavage structure. The success of the True Finns has continued even after the 2011 election: the party gained the second most seats in the 2015 parliamentary election. The True Finns at the same time challenged old cleavage stability (most notably, the loyalty of blue-collar voters) and brought upfront new conflicts that either supplement or partly replace the old cleavages.

Second, one could argue that detecting cleavages based on native language, the type of residential area and occupational class does not bring an added value to the things we already know of cleavages in Finland (see e.g. Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005). However, each of the old cleavages has some aspects that have not been noticed in previous studies. Most importantly, they deal with the research strategy chosen here. As language has been classified as an obvious and straight-forward social structural base affecting party choice, the values and attitudes of the Swedish- and Finnish-speaking voters have been left without attention. This study shows that the Swedish-speaking people not only develop more positive attitudes toward the language issue but they are also more sensitive to minority interests (sexual minorities and immigrants) in general. This is why it can be considered as a sound party strategy from the Swedish People's Party to promote all kinds of minority issues (see Swedish People's Party 2011). It was also shown that since native language plays such an immense role in the electoral support of the Swedish People's Party, adding values and attitudes gives almost no extra value in terms of explaining a vote for the party. Obviously, the linguistic cleavage concerns a small part of the electorate, although it is of utmost importance for the voters of the Swedish People's Party.

Third, the identification of a threefold cleavage based on residential area implies that tensions no longer revolve around rural and urban residents. Rather, the interests of the residents in rural and small municipalities are in conflict with the interests of residents in the Helsinki metropolitan area. This tension revolves around centralization and decentralization, which has become a major topic in Finland, and sets the Centre Party and Coalition Party against each other. In addition, the metropolitans differ in this regard also from the residents in urban environments outside the metropolitan area. Accordingly, the Centre Party has indeed significant support also in large towns outside Southern Finland. Hence,

this study argues that a rural-urban division is too crude in cleavage terms. The presence of such a cleavage can also be regarded as an important explanation of why the Centre Party has remained as one of the main parties. It has been able to rely on residents in rural and small municipalities and politicize the issues concerning regional politics. The cleavage is fairly pervasive, as the voters of two big parties, the Centre Party and the Coalition Party, are involved in it.

Fourth, the concrete interests in the class cleavage have also largely either been taken for granted or they have not been considered at all. By deploying the threefold cleavage definition, this study showed that it is not obvious what the interests of the different occupational classes are. An illustrative example is the case of blue-collar workers. The interests of the blue-collar workers voting for the traditional left-wing parties, the Social Democrats or Left Alliance, are reflected first and foremost in supporting a redistributive state, while the interests of blue-collar voters of the True Finns are primarily reflected both in opposing sociocultural diversity and postmaterialist values as well as in opposing the EU and further integration inside the EU. Hence, this study identified a classic class cleavage that revolves around 'old issues' that have to do with the role of the welfare state and a possibly emerging class cleavage that revolves around issues belonging to the newly politicized dimensions (cf. van der Brug & van Spanje 2009; Bornschieer 2010). It is then justified to talk about the 'old proletariat' and 'new proletariat' in the Finnish electorate, with differing interests and differing party preferences.

In addition, the continued unity of agricultural entrepreneurs in their common interests and in their loyalty toward the Centre Party emphasizes the historical perspective since the triangular model that revolves around the tensions between blue-collar workers, farmers and higher professionals/managers (upper class), with their traditional party loyalties could still be detected. The routine non-manual employees update the model by belonging to the same corner as blue-collar workers and they are set against the higher professionals/managers. It is then interesting to note that the voters of the parties that built the welfare state, the SDP and the Centre Party, continue to support a state that takes care of its citizens through redistributive and decentralizing politics. They stand in opposition to the higher professionals and managers voting for the Coalition Party. This is in accordance with the present ideology of

the Coalition Party, that emphasizes a more efficient and competitive way of handling the economy as a whole, and the public sector in particular. It has also spoken for scale benefits instead of decentralized solutions (see e.g. National Coalition Party 2011).

In terms of relative weight, the old class cleavage is still quite substantial since the Left Alliance and the SDP still rely on the blue-collar voters and the Coalition Party on higher professionals and managers and since the share of blue-collar SDP-voters and higher professional voters of the Coalition Party is quite high. However, the electoral support of the Centre Party does not rely on agricultural entrepreneurs to any great extent even though they still comprise a large proportion of party members (see Jutila 2003). Furthermore, the traditional class cleavage is not as pervasive as it used to be, as the share of blue-collar voters, and especially farmers, has decreased in the population and as the party loyalty of blue-collar voters has become more split (cf. Paloheimo & Sundberg 2005). In addition, the emerging status-based cleavage is at the time being significant in terms of relative weight since the opposites in the EU-dimension, the Coalition Party and the True Finns are both large parties. Due to generational replacement, the significance of liberal-postmaterialist Green League-voters with social status is not likely to decrease in the sociocultural dimension where they are set against the True Finns.

This study has also contributed to the discussion on education replacing class in the cleavage structure. Education and class explain values and attitudes in quite the same manner, since there was coherence between the 'lower' classes and the low-educated and 'upper' classes and the highly educated. Actually, education explains the values and attitudes of the electorate slightly better than occupational class. However, education has not taken over class in party choice explanations. The triangular class-based model is still valid since the class-based interests are reflected in the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension that handles mostly the role of state in redistributing wealth. The new conflicts are based more unequivocally in both class and education and they are reflected in sociocultural and EU dimensions. Here it is not just a question of wealth; it is also a question about sociocultural identity and what is also conceived as a cultural threat or identity threat to those with low social status and as a possibility to those with high social status. (cf. Stubager 2010).

Fifth, it has not been previously widely discussed whether a denominational cleavage could emerge in Finland. This study has shed light on the clear value gap between the members of the Evangelic Lutheran church and those who do not belong to any church or religious community. This gap concerns traditional moral values and authority and it is furthermore manifested in deviating party preferences. However, there is a severe problem in illustrating a possibly emerging cleavage by applying the threefold cleavage definition with the available data. The share of people belonging to the main church is overwhelming in the electorates of the Centre Party and Coalition Party and the shares do not deviate that much from the total share of main church members in the whole electorate. Moreover, these parties do not build on their party profiles on denomination. Instead, the existence of the Christian Democrats can be argued to be based on a niche conflict between extremely religious voters and non-believers.

Sixth, even though the gender gap in voting behavior has been studied previously in Finland, it has not been analyzed whether gender has potential as a cleavage base. Gender is not as important a base for political conflict in Finland as it is, for example, in Sweden (see Oscarsson & Holmberg 2013), but it has some potential to become a cleavage that is reflected in the sociocultural dimension. However, neither the electoral support of the Green League or the True Finns is extremely skewed to women or men.

Seventh, in terms of age cohorts, this study primarily sheds light on how generational replacement is likely to change the focus in the dimensionality in the electorate. It has not been previously explicated that younger generations put less emphasis on redistributive and decentralizing the welfare state or that they also cherish less the ideals associated with economic right and authority. At the same time, the issues associated with the sociocultural dimension are neither cherished more by the younger generations than by the older ones. In single issues, such as gay rights, the youngest generation is more liberal, but the youngest generation does not have a postmaterialist orientation that would differentiate significantly from other generations. Moreover, despite the expectations of younger generations being more open to EU integration than the older ones, this study does not show such pattern. This may imply that the EU has not been able to deliver the benefits it was supposed to deliver for the young EU-citizens.

In addition, in terms of electoral research in Finland, this study has also underlined the problematics concerning data. The National Election Studies have been conducted in Finland only from 2003 onwards and the questions included have been only partly consistent in time. The questions on political issues, measuring values and attitudes, have been included in the drop-off questionnaires, which unfortunately lowers the N significantly in studies deploying these questions. Pooled data solution was used to mitigate the low N problem in this study. Based on the experiences, the 2015 National Election Study placed some of the questions pertaining to values and attitudes in the face-to-face mode.

Implications of the results for the Finnish party system

The study implicates that the nature of the Finnish party system cannot be understood without cleavages despite the documented general downward trend in the significance of social structure in explaining party choice. As Karvonen (2014, 23) reminds us, parties are institutionalized conflicts: parties bring people together to steadily defend their interests and viewpoints against other groups of people that have the opposite interests. This traditional thought still applies to Finland where parties do not come and go depending on single scandals and depending on their political leaders, for example.

The continued presence of institutionalized cleavages partly explains why the old large parties, the Centre Party, the Coalition Party and the Social Democratic Party, continue to thrive, albeit admittedly to a lesser extent than during their golden era. Class and residential area cleavages have the biggest importance for these parties. Also the Left Alliance, with Communist roots, leans partly on the traditional class cleavage. Moreover, the linguistic cleavage explains the persistency of the Swedish People's Party.

The emergence of potential new cleavages is in accordance with the change in the Finnish party system. When electoral competition revolves around new social structural positions or value/attitudinal dimensions and when also the 'old' social structural positions, such as occupational class, are reflected in more recently politicized political issues resulting in a possible realignment in the electorate, it gives space for new parties to challenge the old ones. This was witnessed

strikingly in the 2011 earthquake election. This study illustrates how the two newest parties, the True Finns and the Green League are each other's opposites, both in terms of social structure and in terms of values and attitudes. Lastly, the Christian Democrats can be argued to be stabilized around moral conservative voters, albeit its significance in the Finnish party system is rather limited.

On the basis of electoral results, there seems to be certain saturation in terms of the amount of relevant parties that are represented in the parliament. The representatives of the same eight parties have been chosen to the parliament from 2003 to 2015. The variety of social structural groups and values and attitudes represented by the contemporary parties in the parliament explains why Finland remains a system with eight parliamentary parties rather than four parties, for instance. Some parties have their electoral support more strongly rooted in social structure than others, but each party has its core clientele and each party has its own nuances in its ideological profile, which can be seen in the values and attitudes in the electorate. There is hence a clear structure- and value-based demand for eight parties in the present political context.

Moreover, in the long run, the Finnish parties have been capable of handling several conflictual issues without falling into permanent internal fractions that would change the basic character of the party system (Karvonen 2014). Of the eight parliamentary parties, four parties were already represented in the parliament in the 1920s. The Christian Democrats has been presented continuously since the 1970s, the Green League entered the parliament in 1987 election, the Left Alliance in 1991 election and the True Finns in 1995. The last two were founded as successor parties.

A unique Finnish cleavage structure?

As studies containing all the relevant social structural bases and value/attitudinal dimensions have been rare in the cleavage literature, direct comparisons cannot be made between Finland and other West European countries on the basis of this study. However, the results point out some patterns, which have been found in other West European countries and other patterns, which illustrate the speciality of the Finnish case.

This study implicates that there is a diverse cleavage structure in Finland: there are three old and established cleavages, one emerging cleavage with notable potential and two conflicts with limited cleavage potential. Especially in terms of value/attitudinal orientations, the voters of certain parties can be on the same side in some dimension, while in others they can be on the opposite sides. This tendency affects the co-operation between parties. Historically, compromises have been sought between the socialists (the SDP and the Communists), agrarians (the Agrarian League) and the commercial-urban side (the Coalition Party). Nowadays, the relations are even more complex since there are more parties thriving on new kinds of conflicts and since the True Finns has become a major force. This pattern matches the wider frame since ecological and especially the nationalist-populist parties have changed the nature of co-operation in the West European party systems (see Gallagher et al. 2011).

On the ground of cleavage structure in Finland, the prerequisites for two opposite party blocs to be formed are weak. Moreover, the dimensionality in the values and attitudes in the electorate does not revolve around any single super dimension, such as the left-right dimension (see Thomassen 2005a) or even around socioeconomic and sociocultural dimensions (see e.g. van der Brug & van Spanje 2009; Hooghe et al. 2010). Despite the multiplicity of conflicts, the Finnish parties have been able to co-operate in government and they have had the will to overcome cleavage-based differences. This has led to political compromises in government that may be difficult for the voters to understand (see Karvonen & Paloheimo 2005; Karvonen 2014).

The eccentricity of the Finnish party system is that even though the ideological differences between voters are rather clear-cut, the parties have been extremely willing to enter into almost any government coalition (with some exceptions, like the True Finns in 2011). The government coalition that was formed in 2011 included eventually the most left-wing party, the Left Alliance and the most right-wing party, the Coalition Party. In addition, the coalition entailed the Green League and the Christian Democrats, whose electorates have almost nothing in common in ideological terms. Eventually the Left Alliance and the Green League left the government in 2014 and the government period 2011–2015 was extremely difficult due to the ideological differences. In 2015, mutual

agreement of a government coalition was found between the Centre Party, the National Coalition Party and the True Finns.

The strong presence of a cleavage based on the type of residential area is a particularly striking feature of the Finnish case. In many other West European countries, the rural-urban cleavage had a small importance to the voters and parties to begin with or its significance has decreased drastically (Gallagher et al. 2011, 283–284). In Finland it has evolved from a cleavage between mainly agricultural interests and urban-commercial interests into a cleavage that sets the voters in small communities against those living in the Helsinki metropolitan area. Furthermore, as a reminiscence of the old cleavage structure, the tension between agricultural entrepreneurs, loyal to the Centre Party and higher professionals and managers voting for the Coalition Party, overlaps with the cleavage based on the type of residential area. As noted, these tensions have not prevented the parties from co-operating in government.

The tension in regional equality and decentralization is present in Norway (see e.g. Aardal 2007b) but not in other Nordic countries (see Bengtsson et al. 2013, 149–177). In contrast to Norway, there is a major party in Finland (the Centre Party), whose ideological core is in a decentralized society. The Finnish Centre Party has consciously and actively propagated for a strategy in which the thought of decentralization is central (see Kääriäinen 2002). As regards to the linguistic cleavage, the exceptionality lies in the extremely homogenous voting behavior of the Swedish-speaking Finns in voting for the Swedish People's Party and in the power which the Swedish People's Party has had since it was in every government between 1976 and 2015.

Another distinctive feature in the Finnish cleavage structure is the appearing absence of a sharp left-right polarization in issue opinions. A socioeconomic left-right dimension could not be detected based on the voters' opinions on political issues. The voters can place themselves in a consistent way to the general left-right scale but the peculiarity lies in the pattern that many voters support both issues associated with the political right and issues associated with the political left. At the same time, one can support a broader public sector, a more even distribution of wealth, bigger tax cuts and stand for entrepreneurship and market-driven solutions in economy. Simply put, a share of the voters want to eat their cake and still have it left since in surveys they are not obliged to make a

choice between tax cuts and encompassing welfare services. The prospects of a classic socioeconomic left-right-dimension to occur on the basis of data would undoubtedly be better if the voters had to make a choice between the aforementioned policies.

However, it would be an overstatement to regard Finland as exceptional in cleavage terms. The class cleavage pits blue-collar voters voting for left-wing parties against upper class voters voting for the major right-wing party. The sociocultural and EU dimensions are found also elsewhere in Europe and the social structural groups and parties associated with promoting and opposing sociocultural diversity and postmaterialism and further integration inside the EU are the usual suspects. The politicization of these dimensions explains why the Greens has established itself in the party system in the long run and why the nationalist-populist True Finns was able to make such a rapid rise from being a small party to the third biggest party in parliament in 2011

The new sources of political conflict in the sociocultural and EU dimensions indicate how issues, such as immigration, ethnic and sexual minorities and EU-integration, which are debated all around Western Europe, concern also Finland. The continued crisis inside the EU and the asylum seeker floods from outside of the EU underline the common topics of political debate in different parts of the continent. The diffusion of conflictual topics is a prime example of how Finland is more and more influenced by external determinants. Globalization can also be seen as a threat to the Nordic model of social welfare or the future of Finnish agriculture (Karvonen 2014, 151) thus unbalancing the old class cleavage. It is difficult to evaluate whether comparatively the most distinctive cleavage, the cleavage based on the type of residential area, persists when new type of political topics gain salience.

The prospects of the Finnish cleavage structure

The cleavage structure is obviously of a dynamic nature. Even though cleavages have longevity as their essential feature, societal and political circumstances change in time's course. Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2011) state that a change in cleavage structure can occur as a result of change in social structure, of change in collective value basis or as a result of change in organizational structure.

As regards to the future prospects of cleavage structure, the societal change (rise of educational levels, change in economic structure, migration to urban areas, increasing resignation from the church) and looming change in values and attitudes (first and foremost in the de-emphasis of regional and socioeconomic equality due to generational replacement) means that the parties have to adapt their party strategies accordingly. In the long run, the Finnish parties have showed ability to update their ideological profile and electoral strategies.

The internal migration from rural and small municipalities to urban areas, especially to the Helsinki metropolitan area means that the cleavage based on the type of residential continues to be a highly debated topic in Finnish politics. The Centre Party aims at keeping the whole country populated, while the Coalition Party and also the Green League have been for a more dense community structure. For the Centre Party, the internal migration represents a challenge as the voters from small communities often have to deal with cross pressures (see Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Campbell et al. 1960) when moving to urban environments: their loyalty towards the Centre Party is put into test. The Centre Party has gone through a major, successful transformation from a farmers' party into a centrist party that appeals to people in sparsely populated Finland. At times, such as in 2011 election, the electoral loyalty of these people has decreased. The continued politicization of the issues in regional and socioeconomic equality dimension is of utmost importance for the Centre Party. On the other hand, keeping decentralization issues upfront limits the party's growing potential in the most populated cities in Southern Finland.

On the other hand, the share of Swedish-speaking voters has sunk only marginally in recent years and the linguistic identity of the Swedish-speaking voters and their loyalty toward the Swedish People's Party are hardly threatened. The Swedish People's Party has little reason to change its electoral strategies

drastically even though it aims to represent itself as the representative of all minorities (the party has *inter alia* recently recruited indigenous Sami people to be candidates for the Swedish People's Party in Lapland).

Of the old cleavages, the traditional class cleavage seems to be under the most pressure to change. The share of agricultural entrepreneurs continues to decrease, which undermines their importance as the Centre Party's clientele in numbers. However, due to the party's agrarian roots and due to the special importance of agriculture for keeping the countryside alive, the agricultural interest is most likely to retain as an important aspect of the Centre Party's party profile.

Due to the turbulence in industry and the economy, the blue-collar workers may channel their resentment by opposing increasingly integration, immigration and specific minority interests. The SDP and the Left Alliance have to balance with their electoral appeal. They have to decide to which extent they either continue to hold on to their traditional workers' party images with close ties to labor unions or widen it to a more centrist (the SDP) or a red-green image (the Left Alliance). The parties on the political left have indeed been at pain to crystallize their strategies. The SDP has long had a downward electoral trend (with the exception of the 1990s) and it has lost its appeal both among blue-collar workers and professionals. The attempts to transform the SDP into a broadly appealing middle-class party while still holding on its close ties with the labor union have not succeeded in the 21st century. The biggest challenge deals with the aging electorate and the fact that the SDP-voters are holding onto a strong redistributing state, which is under pressures in economically hard times. The electorate of the Left Alliance seems to be a mix of old and new; of old voters and blue-collar workers holding onto a strong redistributing state and of younger voters who emphasize for example minority issues. The long-term plan might be to have an even more underlined red-green party image while appealing to the 'new, disadvantaged proletariat' (see Left Alliance 2011).

An obvious threat to these parties is the True Finns, which may lift the importance of the potential new class cleavage, reflected in sociocultural and EU dimensions. Moreover, as older generations value a strong decentralizing and redistributing state, it is likely that on a long time-span the traditional regional and socioeconomic equality issues become less important in class-based conflicts. They may be replaced by themes that underline the insecure nature of present

working life and by different conceptions that the younger generations have concerning the relationship between employers and employees (Hoikkala et al. 2006).

It is too soon to evaluate whether the recent volatility in the Finnish electorate is a sign of dealignment or realignment. However, the results concerning the possibly emerging cleavages in this study show that there is at least clear potential for enduring party-voter alignments to be forged along new cleavage lines (thus speaking for realignment). This in turn could lead to a long-lasting change in the party system. The success of the True Finns, which continued in the 2015 parliamentary election, might *not* be of temporary nature. There is potential for it to be anchored on occupational and educational groups, (possibly on gender) and on the issues in the sociocultural and EU dimensions. Hence, future studies are needed to verify the realignment thesis.

Without the upsurge of the True Finns, the Finnish cleavage structure could indeed be considered as extremely stable, reflecting the old conflicts and the heritage of the Lipset-Rokkan-model. The volatile 2011 election showed that there has been a pervasive linkage between high volatility and cleavage change Bartolini and Mair (1990, 212) in Finland in the 21st century. Even though party membership and party loyalty have been decreasing in the biggest old parties (SDP, Centre Party and Coalition Party), they were fairly successful in blocking the electoral challenges from other parties until the 2010s. In the 2011 election, the cleavage system did not any longer produce a 'full closure' (see *ibid.* 38–41).

In the 2011 election, the True Finns managed to build up a stable and encompassing party organization with full candidate lists in each electoral district with capacity to reach to larger voter segments (Arter & Kestilä-Kekkonen 2014). The politicization of new issues, such as EU-integration, immigration and minority questions and the longing for 'good old times' when the nation could take care of its citizens has enabled the True Finns to present such alternatives in these issues that deviate much from the alternatives the other parties propose. Attitudinally, there has been demand for a conservative, nationalist, anti-immigrant party already before the 2010s but there was no credible party alternative on the supply side by then (see Kestilä 2005, 2006). The old cleavage structure could persist as long as the old left-wing parties could satisfy the blue-collar voters and routine non-manual employees with their political agenda.

Pertaining the challenges that globalization has brought upfront in the labor market and for the nationalist ideals, the True Finns has managed to attract the disappointed blue-collar voters and routine non-manual employees with their anti-immigration and anti-EU policies. The True Finns has simultaneously managed to channel the disappointment to the welfare state that according to the party (The True Finns 2011) is incapable of solving present problems while it still makes possible the abuse of social welfare services.

While the Centre Party and the Social Democrats have built on the “redistributing and decentralizing state” –themes, the third old major party, the Coalition Party (and its voters) has aimed towards a more dynamic, competitive and market-orientated state. Furthermore, as a pro-EU party, the Coalition Party is involved more intensively in a new conflict over the direction the EU than the other old parties. The major threat for the Coalition Party is that it may be considered as being solely the representative of well-off, high social status urban people benefitting from EU-integration and market economy. Indeed, the electoral strategy of the Coalition Party has been to tone down class conflicts and ideological conflicts in order to appeal on a broader electoral base (see National Coalition Party 2007, 2011).

The Green League as well as the True Finns would undoubtedly benefit if the potentially emerging new cleavages would establish themselves. They are each other’s opposites in occupational class/education-based and gender-based conflicts, both of which are reflected in the sociocultural dimension. The continued debate on both sexual and ethnic minorities and especially immigration, which has remained intensive also after the 2011 election, means that much of the public attention is owed to new issues. Traditional issues, such as economy, continue to be important but nowadays also immigration belongs to the topics that have been given much attention in the media (see Välimäki 2012). The number of immigrants and the numbers of asylum seekers in Finland is in absolute terms low in European comparison but their number is increasing (The Finnish Immigration Service 2015), which has increased also the political importance of immigration. The ability of the True Finns to politicize minority issues may have to do only partly with what the current situation is in Finland and more with the conceived potential threat that immigration outside from

Western world presents for those who cherish nativism. The Green League on the other hand has been a prominent propagator for a multicultural Finland.

In addition, the Green League and the Left Alliance could benefit if the resignation from the Evangelic-Lutheran church continues to grow as a protest to the conservative stands of the church, since non-church members tend to back these parties. In turn, the Christian Democrats could mobilize religious voters by propagating for a counter reaction for the decay in respect for traditional moral values, just as it did in its early phases as a counter-reaction to cultural radicalism.

Even though age cohorts were not identified as a cleavage base, generational replacement affects party popularity and value/attitudinal climate in the electorate. The effect of generational replacement is built-in in many other changes, such as urbanization and rise in educational level. Perhaps the biggest change deals with attachment to political parties. The two oldest age cohorts in this study (born before 1960) have been socialized into voting and to acquire a party identity to a greater extent than the younger generations (see Grönlund et al. 2005a; 2005b). This tendency represents the biggest threat to those parties that lean in their support on older generations, especially the SDP.

To conclude, cleavages have undergone big changes during the modern party system. However, there is not a revolution in cleavages. They are just more modern versions of the old cleavages since the occupational structure has changed, the degree of urbanization has increased and the concrete interests that the social structural groups possess have changed (see Karvonen 2014, 23–29).

Evidently also political agenda and media may act as catalysts of cleavage change (cf. Gallagher et al. 2011). The political parties try to affect and control the political agenda in their favor in terms of topical issue questions. However, also other institutions and factors, such as trade unions, non-governmental organizations, media and international relations affect the agenda. In the 2011 parliamentary election, the EU-issues clearly rose on the top of agenda. It seems that the media is more and more interested in handling the new conflictual issues, such as immigration, sexual and ethnic minorities and the EU because they seem to evoke the most intense party political conflicts in the 2010s in Finland (see Pernaa 2012; Välimäki 2012). Hence, the power of media in affecting what is on top of political agenda may in the long run lift upon certain conflicts

while toning down others (see Herkman 2011). The old parties, such as SDP and the Centre Party, whose core is in the old cleavages, may have it difficult to cope with the 'new' agenda which often handles issues, such as immigration and the EU, that they do not have a clear stand on.

Exploring the connections between social structural positions, values and party choice is becoming more and more intriguing since volatility and sudden upheavals in party support are becoming more and more common, such as in Finland in 2011 and elsewhere in Western Europe in the 2010s. Whether reshuffles in the West European electorates form patterns that re-emerge in subsequent elections and whether these patterns can be described as cleavages is one task for future cleavage research.

Furthermore, regarding the Finnish case, interesting shifts in party support continued in the 2015 parliamentary election. The Centre Party, which was the Prime Minister Party in 2003–2011, had record low support after the 2011 election in the polls (13.2 percent). In 2011, many loyal voters punished the party for unsuccessful politics and the trust toward the Centre Party seemed to have eroded (Mattila & Sundberg 2012; Westinen 2012). However, in the 2015 parliamentary election, the Centre Party regained position as the largest party from opposition, with 21.1 per cent of the vote. Moreover, the SDP obtained a record low support in parliamentary elections – gaining merely 16.5 per cent of the vote. The same pattern applies for the other left-wing party, the Left Alliance, which got all-time low result with 7.1 per cent of the vote. The True Finns proved that its success in the 2011 earthquake election was not merely a one-off protest against the old parties. The True Finns became the second largest party in number of seats in the parliament in 2015 with 17.7 per cent of the vote and it seems to have stabilized itself in the party system to some extent. Although the 2015 parliamentary election has not been included in this study, the success of the True Finns gives reason to assume that the identified emerging cleavages in this study indeed have potential to evolve as stable cleavages. That the True Finns also entered the government coalition after the 2015 election for the first time in its history should be seen as a sign of a further institutionalization of the party that has grown remarkably quickly.

Hence, many significant things are happening in party support in the 2010s in Finland. The conventional pattern that the incumbent Prime Minister party is

punished is apparent. When the voters are disappointed at the Prime Minister party, they are alert to seek alternatives and turn to a major party that is the most trusted in running the economy, improving employment and bringing hope to the voters. This is an especially important factor in economically hard times: the need for big reforms in Finnish society concerning the public sector and the economy might only accentuate the shifts in power every fourth year since there is no easy way out of solving the problems in a way that would satisfy the voters.

6.3. Concluding remarks

Franklin (2009, 649, 654) has argued that cleavage research has ended up in examining the niches in electoral behavior: that cleavage research is unable to take into account the dynamics in present electoral behavior and party systems. He claims that scholars in the world of cleavage politics research appear strangely alienated from real-world and the divisions that are the subjects of their enquiry. He claims that the tragedy of cleavage research is that its practitioners do not appear much interested in explaining why the world is the way it is.

This study has analyzed the contemporary cleavage structure in Finland and paid attention to the political context. It has contributed toward explaining which cleavages and possibly emerging cleavages condition the ties between voters and parties. By doing this, it has partly explained why the contemporary Finnish parties have a quite stable place in the party system, why and how the old parties have been challenged by new parties and which conflicts are behind the emergence of newer parties. Despite having a limited impact in terms of explaining party support with social structural positions and values and attitudes, cleavages help to understand how parties fight for the votes and how the voters structure their loyalties. In this sense, cleavage research is still a relevant area of study. That being said, it must be remembered that there is much else affecting the voting behavior than social structural positions and values and attitudes. Evidently, the cleavage approach cannot capture for example the last-minute dynamics that have to do with campaigning effects and topics in the political agenda that have nothing to do with issues attached to cleavages. Issues, such as election

finance scandal (see Mattila & Sundberg 2012), may affect the electoral fortunes of a party dramatically.

The applicability of the threefold cleavage definition in empirical analyses can be questioned. The definition is partly unsatisfactory in explaining the dynamics in the electorate and party sphere, at least in the Finnish case. The demands that the threefold cleavage have to fulfill in the strong and steady linkages between social structure, values and attitudes and a vote for a party that represents the group-based interests at hand, not to mention the aspect of socialization, are demanding especially in times when party loyalty is decreasing. One could feel tempted to take cleavage theories further with less rigid requirements, reinterpret them and find new ones in value orientations, as Enyedi (2008) suggests. However, one of the merits of cleavage as an analytical tool has been precisely that not every conflict in the electoral arena is treated as a cleavage (Bartolini & Mair 1990; Deegan-Krause 2007). If stable value orientations without any structural basis sufficed as cleavages, then the distinction to Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) theorem would be clear-cut. If the significance of social structure keeps on decreasing, such strategy may be better to analyze the party-voter ties. Moreover, in party systems, where the electoral volatility is extremely high and where the whole basis of the party system is shaken by a severe disappointment to those who hold the power, the whole cleavage approach may not be so fertile. Elections that have been affected by the Euro crisis and mismanagement of economy in the respective country (especially in Southern Europe) might demand another kind of an approach (see e.g. Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou 2013).

The obvious challenge in *categorizing* conflicts as cleavages is at any case the aspect of longevity and the preconditions of this longevity. When the cleavages are understood in the conventional sense, they should arise from some feature that sustains the sort of durability in party support that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were trying to explain. Socialization processes are the only such source of durability ever demonstrated in this sphere. Admittedly, the socialization processes, where individuals grow into a certain way of thinking via their milieus and via members of the same social structural group, are increasingly challenging to extract. Hence, cleavage studies run the risk of not having an explicit logic of how conflicts evolve as enduring cleavages. In a society characterized by increasing social mobility, migration and interaction and multiplicity of

identities, there are weaker grounds for people to become involved in cleavage politics in such a way that was still predominant at the time when Lipset and Rokkan published their theorem. During that time of mass parties, class society still flourished and the ties between voter groups, parties and interest organizations were strong, into the extent that this era could be called the era of political camps (see Mickelsson 2007). Nowadays, the camps do not exist in this sense. Nevertheless, this study has shown that certain structural barriers in voting behavior are still more rigid than others.

One task for future cleavage research, applicable in any political context, would be to track down who are the voters that punish their parties in power and who are those who turn to an opposition party. Are those who punish the party in power, the members of a key social structural group of this party, ready to give up their traditional loyalties? Are those who turn to support the major opposition party unified more by social structural characteristics or by values and attitudes, as the notion of the shift from social structure to issues would suggest? Or are the members of social structural groups with common attitudes and values moving more permanently from party to another, hence contributing to realignment and new cleavage-like constellations? It is also possible that these voter groups are not unified at all by certain social structural characteristics or values and attitudes and that they switch party from election to another if they bother to vote; they just want political change towards better times. The last scenario would speak for a dealignment pattern instead of voters realigning to new parties.

This study focused on the common interests of social structural groups in the form of values and attitudes. Hence, group-based identity and especially group consciousness were not much considered. In terms of cleavage research it would be intriguing to be able to analyze the relative strength of social structural position and values and attitudes in dominating one's political identity. To what extent do citizens think of themselves as belonging to certain social structural group? To what extent do they feel a sense of belonging because of values irrespective of social their background? Or does social identity from childhood home sustain with having effects on voting behavior even if the current social structural position is different from family background? A crucial aspect in more nuanced research on cleavages is hence high-quality data, which enables analyses that dig deep to the electorate. This study showed the need for a more

comprehensive set of social structural variables and especially the need for a broader set of questions reflecting the values and attitudes in the electorate. With an extensive set of relevant variables, the analyses reach a more nuanced and a more robust picture of the party-voter ties. The national election studies obviously play here a big role since they are conducted in accordance with the parliamentary elections.

Furthermore, future studies on cleavages could combine social structural characteristics and focus on analyzing to which extent political conflicts are overlapping in social structural positions. For example, the values and attitudes of young, highly educated women and young low-educated men, as well as their party preferences, could be contrasted with each other. This study treated the social structural positions separately in order to detect the effect of single social structural positions on values/attitudes and party choice while keeping the scope of the study limited enough. Critical for future studies is, to invent theoretical frameworks and methodological choices that further contribute toward capturing what is going on in the electorate and party system.

Appendix

List of the parties representing different party families in Table 2.3

SD: Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (AUT), Parti Socialiste, Socialistische Partij Anders (BEL), Socialdemokraterne (DEN), Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue, (FIN), Parti Socialiste (France), Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (GER), Panhellenic Socialist Movement, Dimokratiki Aristera (GRE), Alþýðuflokkurinn, Samfylkingin (ICE), Labour Party (IRL), Democratici di Sinistra, Partito Democratico (ITA), Lëtzebuurger Sozialistesche Aarbechterpartei (LUX), Partit Laburista (MLT), Partij van de Arbeid (NED), Arbeiderpartiet (NOR), Partido Socialista (POR), Partido Socialista Obrero Español (SPA), Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti (SWE), Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz/Parti socialiste suisse (SUI), Labour Party (UK).

CONS: Konservative Folkeparti (DEN), Kansallinen Kokoomus (FIN), Union pour un mouvement populaire (FRA), New Democracy (GRE), Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn (ICE), Fianna Fáil (IRL), Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, Il Popolo della Libertà (ITA), Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (LUX), Høyre (NOR), Partido Social Democrata, Centro Democrático e Social – Partido Popular (POR), Partido Popular (SPA), Moderaterna (SWE), Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei Schweiz/Parti bourgeois démocratique suisse (SUI), Conservatives (UK).

CD: Österreichische Volkspartei (AUT), Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams, Centre démocrate humaniste (BEL), Kristendemokraterne (DEN), Kristillisdemokraatit (FIN), Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands /Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (GER), Fine Gael (IRL), Centro Cristiano Democratico, Cristiani Democratici Uniti, Unione di Centro (ITA), Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei (LUX), Partit Nazzjonalista (MLT), Christen-Democratisch Appèl, ChristenUnie (NED), Kristelig Folkeparti (NOR), Kristdemokraterna KD (SWE), Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz/ Parti Démocrate-Chrétien (SUI).

LIB: Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten, Mouvement Réformateur (BEL), Radikale Venstre, Ny Alliance (DEN), Union pour la Démocratie Française, Mouvement démocrate, Nouveau Centre (FRA), Freie Demokratische Partei (GER), Frjálslyndi flokkurinn, Björt framtíð (ICE), Progressive Democrats (IRL), Democrazia è Libertà – La Margherita (ITA), Demokratesch Partei (LUX), Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, Democraten 66 (NED), Venstre (NOR), Folkpartiet (SWE), Die Liberalen./Les Libéraux-Radicaux, Grünliberale Partei der Schweiz/Parti vertlibéral (SUI), Liberal Democrats (UK).

NAT-POP: Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (AUT), Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, Vlaams Belang, bertair, Direct, Democratisch, Front national (BEL), Dansk Folkeparti (DEN), Perussuomalaiset (FIN), Front national, Mouvement pour la France (FRA), Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós, Anexartitói Ellines (GRE), Lega Nord (ITA), Lijst Pim Fortuyn, Partij voor de Vrijheid (NED), Fremskrittspartiet (NOR), Sverigedemokraterna (SWE), Schweizerische Volkspartei/ Union démocratique du centre (SUI), UK Independence Party, British National Party (UK).

COM & NEW LEFT: Enhedslisten, Socialistisk Folkeparti (DEN), Vasemmistoliitto (FIN), Parti communiste français, Front de gauche (FRA), Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus, Die Linke (GER), Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas, Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás (GRE), Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð (ICE), Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, Partito dei Comunisti Italiani, La Sinistra – L'Arcobaleno, Sinistra Ecologia Libertà, (ITA), Lénk (LUX), Socialistische Partij (NED), Sosialistisk Venstreparti, (NOR), Bloco de Esquerda, Coligação Democrática Unitária (POR), Izquierda Unida (SPA), Vänsterpartiet (SWE).

GREENS: Die Grünen (AUT), Groen, Ecolo (BEL), Vihreä Liitto (FIN), LV, Europe Écologie – Les Verts (FRA), Bündnis 90/die Grünen (GER), Green Party (IRL), Déi Gréng (LUX), GroenLinks (NED), Miljöpartiet (SWE), Grüne Partei der Schweiz/ Les verts – Parti écologiste suisse (SUI).

CENT: Venstre (DEN), Suomen Keskusta (FIN), Framsóknarflokkurinn (ICE), Senterpartiet (NOR), Centerpartiet (SWE).

ETH-REG: Svenska folkpartiet i Finland (FIN), Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Convergència i Unió (SPA), Scottish National Party (UK).

Appendix Table 1. *The social structural characteristics (%) of Finnish voters in the self-administered questionnaire of FNES-studies. Source: FNES 2003. 2007. 2011*

	2003	(N)	2007	(N)	2011	(N)
<i>Native language</i>						
Finnish	95	(709)	95	(979)	95	(763)
Swedish	5	(37)	5	(51)	5	(40)
<i>Type of residential area</i>						
Rural municipality	17	(128)	18	(182)	16	(125)
Small municipality	16	(121)	16	(169)	17	(134)
Town	42	(213)	45	(462)	51	(409)
Metropolitan area	25	(184)	21	(218)	17	(135)
<i>Occupational class</i>						
Blue-collar workers	28	(182)	28	(263)	25	(161)
Routine non-manual employees	23	(151)	23	(215)	27	(126)
Entrepreneurs (incl. agricultural)	7	(48)	9	(83)	5	(36)
Lower professionals	15	(102)	16	(156)	19	(178)
Higher professionals and managers	27	(178)	24	(231)	24	(161)
<i>Denomination</i>						
Evangelic-Lutheran	81	(609)	82	(814)	77	(601)
Does not belong to any church	13	(91)	18	(178)	23	(179)
<i>Gender</i>						
Male	48	(360)	47	(485)	49	(394)
Female	52	(386)	53	(545)	51	(409)
<i>Age cohorts</i>						
-1944	29	(213)	31	(315)	23	(181)
1945-1959	30	(221)	29	(298)	32	(254)
1960-1975	25	(188)	22	(225)	24	(193)
1976-	17	(123)	19	(192)	22	(175)
<i>Education</i>						
Primary	26	(196)	24	(246)	19	(152)
Vocational	28	(207)	32	(327)	28	(227)
Upper Secondary	28	(211)	25	(257)	26	(206)
Polytechnic	8	(56)	6	(66)	10	(79)
University	10	(74)	13	(135)	17	(138)
All	100	(746)	100	(1030)	100	(803)

Appendix Table 2 *The impact of social structural groups on the economic right and authority dimension with education included as a social status variable. OLS regression. Source: FNES 2003. 2007. 2011*

	Pro economic right and authority					
	2003	std.er.	2007	std.er.	2011	std.er.
Constant	-0.62***		-0.61***		-0.51***	
<i>Native language</i> ^a						
Swedish	0.55**	.17	0.12	.15	0.27	.16
<i>Type of residential area</i> ^b						
Rural municipality	0.10	.12	0.12	.11	0.15	.13
Small municipality	0.11	.12	0.09	.11	0.13	.13
Town	0.03	.10	0.04	.09	0.06	.10
<i>Education</i> ^c						
Primary	0.34*	.14	0.34**	.11	0.44***	.12
Vocational	0.37**	.14	0.38**	.11	0.33**	.11
Upper Secondary	0.22	.14	0.35**	.11	0.36***	.11
Polytechnic	0.13	.18	0.16	.16	0.20	.14
<i>Denomination</i> ^d						
Does not belong to any church	-0.47***	.11	-0.39***	.09	-0.46***	.09
<i>Gender</i> ^e						
Female	0.21**	.08	0.04	.07	-0.01	.07
<i>Age cohorts</i> ^f						
-1944	0.36**	.12	0.57***	.10	0.61***	.11
1945-1959	0.28*	.12	0.28**	.10	0.22*	.10
1960-1975	0.09	.12	0.22*	.10	0.12	.11
<i>R</i> ²	0.09		0.09		0.13	
<i>Adjusted R</i> ²	0.07		0.08		0.12	
N	700		908		710	

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking. b. metropolitan area. c. university. d. Evangelic-Lutheran. e. male. f. born after 1975.

Appendix Table 3 *The impact of social structural groups on the regional and socioeconomic equality dimension with education included as a social status variable. OLS regression. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011*

	Pro regional and socioeconomic equality					
	2003	std.er.	2007	std.er.	2011	std.er.
Constant	-0.82***		-1.08***		-0.85***	
<i>Native language</i> ^a						
Swedish	0.01	.16	-0.45**	.14	0.13	.17
<i>Type of residential area</i> ^b						
Rural municipality	0.64***	.12	0.65***	.10	0.54***	.13
Small municipality	0.46***	.12	0.50***	.11	0.56***	.13
Town	0.23**	.09	0.47***	.08	0.33**	.10
<i>Education</i> ^c						
Primary	0.31*	.14	0.31**	.11	0.03	.12
Vocational	0.30*	.14	0.59***	.11	0.06	.12
Upper Secondary	0.22	.14	0.39***	.11	-0.02	.11
Polytechnic	-0.14	.18	0.25	.15	0.08	.15
<i>Denomination</i> ^d						
Does not belong to any church	0.01	.11	0.05	.08	0.07	.09
<i>Gender</i> ^e						
Female	0.04	.08	0.17**	.06	0.12	.07
<i>Age cohorts</i> ^f						
-1944	0.54***	.11	0.45**	.09	0.64***	.11
1945-1959	0.42***	.11	0.32***	.09	0.58***	.10
1960-1975	0.10	.12	-0.01	.10	0.26*	.11
R²	0.13		0.17		0.11	
Adjusted R²	0.11		0.15		0.09	
N	700		908		710	

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking. b. metropolitan area. c. university. d. Evangelic-Lutheran. e. male. f. born after 1975.

Appendix Table 4 *The impact of social structural groups on the sociocultural dimension with education included as a social status variable. OLS regression.*
 Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011

	Pro cultural diversity and postmaterialism (sociocultural dimension)				
	2003	std.er.	2007	std.er.	2011
Constant	0.46**		-0.11		0.29*
<i>Native language</i> ^a					
Swedish	0.55***	.15	0.34*	.15	0.66***
<i>Type of residential area</i> ^b					
Rural municipality	0.07	.11	-0.10	.11	-0.19
Small municipality	-0.07	.11	-0.27*	.11	-0.31*
Town	0.03	.09	-0.10	.09	-0.21*
<i>Education</i> ^c					
Primary	-0.84***	.13	0.06	.12	-0.39**
Vocational	-0.87***	.13	0.04	.11	-0.38**
Upper Secondary	-0.10	.13	-0.09	.11	-0.30**
Polytechnic	-0.15	.16	-0.15	.16	-0.36*
<i>Denomination</i> ^d					
Does not belong to any church	0.03	.10	0.13	.09	-0.01
<i>Gender</i> ^e					
Female	0.20**	.07	0.41***	.07	0.44***
<i>Age cohorts</i> ^f					
-1944	-0.15	.11	0.08	.10	0.10
1945-1959	-0.16	.11	-0.06	.10	-0.12
1960-1975	-0.18	.11	-0.18	.11	-0.17
<i>R</i> ²	0.20		0.07		0.12
<i>Adjusted R</i> ²	0.18		0.06		0.10
N	700		908		710

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking. b. metropolitan area. c. university. d. Evangelic-Lutheran. e. male. f. born after 1975.

Appendix Table 5 *The impact of social structural groups on the European Union dimension with education included as a social status variable. OLS regression. Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011*

Pro European Union						
	2003	std.er.	2007	std.er.	2011	std.er.
Constant	0.37***		0.47**		0.44**	
<i>Native language</i> ^a						
Swedish	0.23	.16	0.16	.15	0.43**	.16
<i>Type of residential area</i> ^b						
Rural municipality	-0.44***	.12	-0.33**	.11	-0.15	.13
Small municipality	-0.14	.12	-0.32**	.11	0.03	.13
Town	-0.19*	.09	-0.22*	.09	0.12	.10
<i>Education</i> ^c						
Primary	-0.21	.14	-0.49***	.11	-0.62***	.12
Vocational	-0.08	.14	-0.41***	.11	-0.68***	.11
Upper Secondary	0.01	.14	-0.31**	.11	-0.54***	.11
Polytechnic	0.09	.17	-0.07	.14	0.03	.14
<i>Denomination</i> ^d						
Does not belong to any church	-0.06	.11	-0.22*	.09	-0.20*	.09
<i>Gender</i> ^e						
Female	-0.31***	.07	-0.17**	.06	-0.17*	.07
<i>Age cohorts</i> ^f						
-1944	0.20	.12	0.50***	.10	0.18	.11
1945-1959	-0.04	.11	0.12	.10	0.22*	.10
1960-1975	-0.02	.12	0.06	.10	-0.08	.11
R²	0.07		0.10		0.12	
Adjusted R²	0.05		0.08		0.10	
N	700		908		710	

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with their respective standard errors. $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. The references groups in the dummy variables are following: a. Finnish-speaking. b. metropolitan area. c. university. d. Evangelic-Lutheran. e. male. f. born after 1975.

Appendix Table 6 *The connection between social structural position and party choice. Chi²-values.*

Year	Social structural base	Chi ²
2003	Native language	480.1***
2007		662.8***
2011		511.2***
2003	Type of residential area	101.5***
2007		140.4***
2011		132.5***
2003	Occupational class	164.8***
2007		190.6***
2011		152.3***
2003	Denomination	71.7***
2007		60.8***
2011		70.5***
2003	Gender	7.9
2007		20.5**
2011		23.8**
2003	Age cohorts	70.8**
2007		117.7***
2011		86.3***
2003	Education	119.1***
2007		117.7***
2011		97.4***

Source: FNES 2003, 2007, 2011

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Appendix Table 7. *The share of social structural groups in the electorates of Finnish parties in the 2003 parliamentary election (%). Source: FNES 2003. (1)*

Social structural position	Party choice							
	SDP	CENT	COA	LEFT	GREENS	CD	SWE	All
<i>Native language</i>								
Finnish	98	99	99	98	100	98	11	95
Swedish	2	1	1	2	0	2	89	5
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Type of residential area</i>								
Rural municipality	13	34	10	6	9	6	20	16
Small municipality	17	23	11	20	9	14	23	17
Town	46	30	43	47	39	52	35	41
Metropolitan area	23	13	35	27	43	29	23	25
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Occupational class</i>								
Blue-collar workers	35	24	16	44	12	28	5	26
Lower grade white-collar workers	20	16	14	27	29	39	27	21
Small employers (incl. agricultural)	4	29	9	0	2	4	14	11
Lower professionals	20	9	19	11	24	15	27	16
Higher professionals and managers	22	22	42	18	33	13	27	25
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Denomination</i>								
Evangelic-Lutheran	83	96	92	61	79	100	96	87
Does not belong to any church	17	4	8	39	21	0	4	13
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Gender</i>								
Male	51	49	54	53	39	30	44	48
Female	49	51	46	47	61	70	56	52
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Age cohorts</i>								
-1944	38	25	30	26	9	30	33	29
1945-1959	32	34	23	36	17	26	30	30
1960-1975	21	25	26	28	43	23	22	26
1976-	9	16	20	10	30	21	15	16
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Appendix Table 7. *The share of social structural groups in the electorates of Finnish parties in the 2003 parliamentary election (%). Source FNES 2007. (2).*

Social structural position	Party choice							
	SDP	CENT	COA	LEFT	GREENS	CD	SWE	All
<i>Education</i>								
Primary	31	27	14	29	6	26	19	24
Vocational	31	29	16	35	22	25	15	26
Upper Secondary	24	24	37	25	46	30	33	30
Polytechnic	7	4	19	2	11	9	11	9
University	8	15	13	8	15	9	22	12
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Appendix Table 8. *The share of social structural groups in the electorates of Finnish parties in the 2007 parliamentary election (%). Source FNES 2007 (1).*

Social structural position	Party choice								
	SDP	CENT	COA	LEFT	TF	GREENS	CD	SWE	All
<i>Native language</i>									
Finnish	98	99	99	99	100	96	97	16	95
Swedish	2	1	1	1	0	4	3	84	5
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Type of residential area</i>									
Rural municipality	12	36	8	16	9	11	23	16	17
Small municipality	19	21	12	16	21	7	13	18	16
Town	49	35	45	50	53	37	48	37	44
Metropolitan area	20	8	35	18	18	45	18	29	23
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Occupational class</i>									
Blue-collar workers	41	27	7	48	36	13	19	15	26
Lower grade white-collar workers	24	17	18	20	23	23	33	18	20
Small employers (incl. agricultural)	4	20	11	6	13	5	6	6	10
Lower professionals	17	20	15	7	10	16	22	18	16
Higher professionals and managers	15	17	49	20	19	44	19	44	28
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Denomination</i>									
Evangelic-Lutheran	81	91	87	56	77	74	89	85	82
Does not belong to any church	19	9	13	44	23	26	11	15	18
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Gender</i>									
Male	51	48	51	56	55	31	35	47	48
Female	49	52	49	44	45	69	65	53	52
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Age cohorts</i>									
-1944	43	32	42	30	12	8	25	40	33
1945-1959	33	28	23	45	18	23	42	26	29
1960-1975	14	24	21	14	36	34	23	18	21
1976-	10	17	15	11	33	35	10	16	16
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Appendix Table 8. *The share of social structural groups in the electorates of Finnish parties in the 2007 parliamentary election (%). Source FNES 2007. (2)*

Social structural position	Party choice								
	SDP	CENT	COA	LEFT	TF	GREENS	CD	SWE	All
<i>Education</i>									
Primary	28	20	16	26	29	27	10	21	22
Vocational	37	37	19	47	27	17	40	18	31
Upper Secondary	24	23	32	8	32	19	30	26	24
Polytechnic	5	7	10	3	9	11	5	8	7
University	6	14	24	16	3	26	15	26	16
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Appendix Table 9. *The share of social structural groups in the electorates of Finnish parties in the 2011 parliamentary election (%). Source: FNES 2011. (1).*

Social structural position	Party choice								
	SDP	CENT	COA	LEFT	TF	GREENS	CD	SWE	All
<i>Native language</i>									
Finnish	96	100	99	96	99	100	96	19	95
Swedish	4	0	1	4	1	0	4	81	5
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Type of residential area</i>									
Rural municipality	8	36	8	18	14	4	15	23	14
Small municipality	20	23	10	15	18	9	15	19	17
Town	61	34	57	47	50	50	44	35	50
Metropolitan area	11	8	25	20	19	38	26	23	19
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Occupational class</i>									
Blue-collar workers	34	19	8	27	34	13	8	5	23
Lower grade white-collar workers	29	26	17	25	31	21	35	19	26
Small employers (incl. agricultural)	3	16	6	3	4	3	8	5	6
Lower professionals	17	25	21	17	18	21	15	24	19
Higher professionals and managers	17	15	49	27	12	42	35	48	26
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Denomination</i>									
Evangelic-Lutheran	75	90	88	55	71	64	91	96	77
Does not belong to any church	25	10	12	45	29	36	9	4	23
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Gender</i>									
Male	55	54	45	44	59	29	33	46	49
Female	45	46	55	56	41	71	67	54	51
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Age cohorts</i>									
-1944	32	28	32	15	19	2	19	19	24
1945-1959	35	32	32	42	31	11	44	27	32
1960-1975	23	17	18	29	30	31	30	35	24
1976-	10	23	19	14	20	56	7	19	20
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Appendix Table 9. *The share of social structural groups in the electorates of Finnish parties in the 2011 parliamentary election (%). Source: FNES 2011. (2).*

Social structural position	Party choice								
	SDP	CENT	COA	LEFT	TF	GREENS	CD	SWE	All
<i>Education</i>									
Primary	19	19	14	20	21	18	7	11	24
Vocational	28	31	17	38	35	9	26	12	32
Upper Secondary	33	24	21	20	31	16	22	46	24
Polytechnic	7	16	15	5	5	16	7	8	7
University	12	10	33	18	8	40	37	23	16
<i>All</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

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Jussi Westinen

Cleavages in Contemporary Finland

A Study on Party-Voter Ties

What kind of a cleavage structure is there in Finland? How are party choice, social structural positions and values and attitudes of the voters entangled with each other? The author examines these questions in this study by analyzing data from the 2003, 2007 and 2011 Finnish National Election Studies. The results indicate that the overall effect of social structural positions on values and attitudes is rather weak. Despite this, a few rather strong connections between these two cleavage elements were identified and they were also linked to voters' choice of a party. The study implies that old cleavages, those based on native language, type of residential area and occupational class, still exist. The political parties involved in these cleavages are largely the old ones. The volatile parliamentary election in 2011 not only destabilized the party system but also renewed the Finnish cleavage structure. The conflict that is based on both occupational class and education and that is reflected in the sociocultural and EU dimensions has the most potential to evolve as a cleavage.

By assessing the contemporary cleavages in Finland, the study highlights the similarities and dissimilarities in the conflict structure between Finland and other West European countries. The cleavages based on native language and the type of residential area accentuate the specialty of the Finnish case while the potentially emerging cleavages accentuate the more common sources of conflict.

