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Strategic Communication: practice, ideology and dissonance

Saara Jantunen



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**STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION:
practice, ideology and dissonance**

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
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COMMUNICATION AND DISSONANCE*

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Writing this book made me happy.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation approaches the manifestations of ideology in U.S. Strategic Communication. The discussion approaches Strategic Communication by relating it to the Enlightenment narratives and suggesting these narratives maintain similar social and political functions.

This dissertation aims to address the key contents and mechanisms of Strategic Communication by covering the perspectives of (i) communication as leadership as well as (ii) communication as discourse, i.e. practice and contents. Throughout the empirical part of the dissertation, the communication theoretical discussion is supported by a methodological framework that bridges Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and functional language theory. According to the principles of CDA, Strategic Communication is treated as ideological, hegemonic discourse that impacts social order. The primary method of analysis is transitivity analysis, which is concerned with how language and its patterns construe reality. This analysis is complemented with a discussion on the rituals of production and interpretation, which can be treated as visual extensions of textual transitivity. The concept of *agency* is the key object of analysis.

From the perspective of leadership, Strategic Communication is essentially a leadership model through which the organization defines itself, its aims and legitimacy. This dissertation arrives to the conclusion that Strategic Communication is used not only as a concept for managing Public Relations and information operations. It is an essential asset in the inter-organization management of its members. The current developments indicate that the concept is developing towards even heavier measures of control.

From the perspective of language and discourse, the key narratives of Strategic Communication are advocated with the intrinsic values of democracy and technological progress as the prerequisites of ethics and justice. The transitivity patterns reveal highly polarized agency. The agency of the Self is typically outsourced to technology. Further, the transitivity patterns demonstrate how the effects-centric paradigm of warfare has created a lexicon that is ideologically exclusive. It has led to the development of two mutually exclusive sets of vocabulary, where the descriptions of legitimate action exclude Others by default. These ideological discourses have become naturalized in the official vocabulary of strategic planning and leadership. Finally, the analysis of the images of the captures and deaths of Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden and Muammar Gaddafi bring the discussion back to the themes of the Enlightenment by demonstrating how democracy is framed to serve political purposes. The images of democracy are essentially images of violence. Contrary to the official, instrumental and humanitarian narratives of Strategic Communication, it is the grammar of expressive, violent rituals that serve as the instrument of unity.

Keywords: Strategic Communication, discourse analysis, asymmetry, Grand Narrative

TIIVISTELMÄ

Tämä väitöskirja tarkastelee ideologian ilmenemismuotoja Yhdysvaltain strategisessa kommunikaatiossa. Tutkimus asettaa strategisen kommunikaation narratiivin rinnan valistusnarratiivin kanssa ja osoittaa, että niillä on samanlaiset sosiaaliset ja poliittiset funktiot.

Tämä tutkimus pyrkii vastaamaan kysymykseen strategisen kommunikaation yhdisisällöistä ja -mekanismeista lähestymällä strategista kommunikaatiota niin johtamisprosessina kuin diskurssina, eli käytäntöjen ja sisältöjen näkökulmista. Tutkimuksen empiirisessä osuudessa viestintäteoreettista diskussiota tuetaan metodologisella kehyksellä, jossa yhdistetään kriittisen diskurssianalyysin tutkimusote ja funktionaalisen kieliteorian metodologiaa. Kriittisen diskurssi-analyysin periaatteiden mukaisesti strateginen kommunikaatio ymmärretään tässä ideologiseksi, hegemoniseksi diskurssiksi, jolla on sosiaalisia vaikutuksia. Tutkimuksen ensisijainen metodi on transitiivisuusanalyysi, jonka avulla tutkimus pyrkii kuvaamaan sitä, kuinka kieli ja sen rakenteet heijastavat ja rakentavat todellisuutta. Teoriakehystä täydennetään keskustelulla viestinnän rituaaleista. Metodologia keskittyy *toimijuuden* analyysiin.

Johtamisen näkökulmasta strateginen kommunikaatio on ennen kaikkea johtamismalli, jonka avulla organisaatio määrittelee itsensä, päämääränsä ja legitimizeettinsä. Strateginen kommunikaatio ei ole vain työkalu julkissuhteiden ja informaatio-operaatioiden toimeenpanossa, vaan sillä on tärkeä rooli organisaation jäsenten hallinnassa ja kontrolloinnissa. Konseptin tämänhetkinen kehityssuunta viestii siitä, että sitä viedään kohti vielä raskaampia hallinnan keinoja.

Strategisen kommunikaation ydinnarratiivia kannatellaan demokratian ja teknologiakehityksen itseisarvojen avulla. Näiden diskurssien transitiivisuusrakenteet paljastavat hyvin polarisoituneet toimijuussuhteet. Oma toimijuus on tyypillisesti ulkoistettu teknologialle. Lisäksi transitiivisuusrakenteet osoittavat, että vaikutuskeskeinen sodankäynnin paradigma on luonut kaksi toisensa poissulkevaa sanastoa, joissa legitimiin toimijuuden kuvaukset on sidottu länsimaalaisuuteen. Nämä ideologiset diskurssit ovat sulautuneet strategisen suunnittelun ja johtamisen viralliseen sanastoon.

Viimeisenä näitä diskursseja peilataan Saddam Husseinin, Osama bin Ladenin ja Muammar Gaddafin kiinniotto- ja kuolinkuvien analyysissä. Tämä palauttaa keskustelun valistusteemoihin osoittamalla, kuinka demokratianarratiiveja kehystetään palvelemaan poliittisia tarkoituksia. Demokratian kuvat ovat väkivallan kuvia. Toisin kuin viralliset, instrumentaaliset ja humanitaariset strategisen kommunikaation narratiivit esittävät, yhteisyyden todellisia instrumentteja ovat ekspressiiviset väkivallan rituaalit.

Avainsanat: strateginen kommunikaatio, diskurssianalyysi, epäsymmetria, Grand Narrative

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INTRODUCTION

I will start with the theme that has pleased me the least during the process of writing this dissertation. Among us Finnish military scientists, there is an ongoing debate about the status of military science: what makes research military science? At first, after entering the field from another research tradition, this question seemed absurd. As a student of English and linguistics, I never asked myself what made my research part of the humanities. As a linguist, I was used to having to visit the medical school library, or that of the department of psychology, when writing standard course papers on lexical processing at the department of English. Next, we would discuss gender-stereotypes in sociolinguistics seminars, clause patterns in syntax class, and end the day with a reading of the *Canterbury Tales* or pamphlets on the French Revolution. All this served one and only purpose: to mold us into well-rounded graduates of the arts who have the resources to become experts in their chosen line of research. The same drill is happening at the National Defence University. Calculating bullet trajectories and learning leadership skills are just one aspect of studying military sciences. To me, military science provides the context, just like in the arts before this, to make my research meaningful.

In a department seminar in December 2012, I was sitting next to a fellow student Juha Jokitalo, who, in the middle of the discussion, pointed at Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) and noted that clearly military science is in the pre-paradigmatic stage. This is both problematic and liberating, but I have quite enjoyed the opportunity to get to do linguistic research from within the science and not, as I had always been doing before, from the outside. This dissertation is a compilation of approaches that all shake hands in the context of Military Science. This is precisely my outlook: this is a context and a frame, distinguished by its perspective. How can this research help us understand the phenomena of warfare and conflict? From my perspective, the study of war and military is essentially the study of humanity, which brings many traditions of humanities and social science to the field of research. This is the epiphany of the Comprehensive Approach as well: bringing together all key knowledge in order to prevail. Tactics, strategy, etc, need the contribution of the so-called civil sciences, as military (or security) policy does not develop in a vacuum outside social practice.

My personal wish is to make my contribution in the form of a framework for linguistic analysis. Without language, there is no strategy and without strategy there is little left of warfare. Perhaps it is precisely language that makes the difference between warfare and mere violence. Warfare has always needed linguistic rituals in order to be "real" - declarations of war and independence, orders, prohibitions and legitimations are just a few examples. Warfare is ideological, and ideology needs language to become actualized. Language is used not only to represent reality, but to affirm it, and this makes the research of language and communication paramount in the study of warfare.

From the very beginning of my studies at the National Defence University I have been repeating that my aim is to bring the research of language and discourse permanently to the field of military studies. This research orientation was started by Jari Rantapelkonen, whose 2006 dissertation methodology combined language, narratives, hermeneutics and phenomenology in the fields of International Relations and Military Science. Strategy and leadership are essentially language and narration, and dismissing the use of language as a window to the sense-making processes of public military discourse would seem absurd. My background in English linguistics as well as English language and culture also means that, despite the many surprised questions concerning the perceived distance of my background (language) and current research orientation (warfare and leadership), my shift from language to military studies is not, after all, a dramatic one. It has required a certain reflection on myself as a researcher. Am I a linguist or a 'military scientist', if there is such thing? The truth is that I feel I am both, but the ultimate aim is to apply the methods and perspectives of linguistics to generate perspectives within Military Science. Strategic Communication is a natural theme to grasp. It is a critical asset whose importance is demonstrated by the rapid doctrinization processes of different communication strategies. This dissertation also suggests that communication is, in fact, at the very core of all strategic, tactical and operational processes and in this sense the very infrastructure of leadership.

Strategic Communication, like many other concepts (such as the Effects Based Operations and the Comprehensive Approach) are models that are refined, processed and adopted by the international community. Because of the current nature of warfare as international cooperation, American doctrine, or at least the perception it is based on, tends to live on in the military organizations, such as NATO, that are influenced by it. This is also the answer to the question I have been asked several times: "Why do you only study American communication? Should you not be fair and also study what the terrorists say?". The aim of this dissertation is not to point fingers specifically at American military doctrine, but to understand its purpose and aims: why Strategic Communication has emerged, what are

the reasons to its current attributes, and how is it justified and rationalized as a form of social practice by its users and developers. Due to the proliferation of the doctrines and concepts of U.S. origin, moral stances must be discussed amidst the phenomena. This, I believe, does not necessarily require a discussion on how the 'enemy' communicates and represents the world. The analysis of American Strategic Communication is an analysis of the Self in the politically motivated discourses and the consequent narratives that are here understood as verbalized hegemony and social practice.

1.1 Orientation of research: Strategic Communication as an object of study

The key to every man is his thought. Sturdy and defying though he look, he has a helm which he obeys, which is the idea after which all his facts are classified. He can only be reformed by showing him a new idea which commands his own. - Ralph Waldo Emerson, Circles

In this dissertation I argue that Strategic Communication, meaning the current U.S. military communication doctrine, mirrors the American ideology of enlightened values that are perceived and represented as ecumenical and transnational. I will argue that this ideology is woven into the grammar and practices of communication in the military-political discourses. Also, I will argue that despite recognizing the modern demands for communication, it fails to be much more than a propaganda model. This dissertation addresses the essential practical and philosophical principles and paradoxes of Strategic Communication by discussing the themes of how communication is understood as a medium of power, and what kind of an understanding of the Self it is based on. This discussion is contrasted with the Western Enlightenment narrative and the practices of negotiating social Otherness. The window to this interpretation is discourse practices.

The focus is on the U.S. doctrine of Strategic Communication. As such, this dissertation contributes to the study of communication and influence at the Finnish National Defence University. The research and analysis of military communication typically approaches the concept of communication from the perspective of organization and management. This perspective is not ignored in this dissertation either, but the main focus is on the representation Strategic Communication delivers: the contents of communication rather than the form of it. Communication as a form of management is understood as an element that influences the contents of Strategic Communication and reflects a certain power position.

Before this study, the contributions to the study of communication at the Finnish National Defence University have included research and analysis of psychological operations, information operation, perception management and now that the term has emerged from the traditions of the previous, Strategic Communication. In terms of doctrine, these have all had their own forms and functions in practice, but essentially we are talking about the evolution of military communication. On the other hand, 21st century Strategic Communication draws from the world of public relations and media studies, which adds even more complexity in selecting an applicable approach to analyzing its true essence. In past research conducted at the Finnish National Defence University, communication has been discussed in the context of postmodern philosophy and as narratives observed and analyzed hermeneutically and phenomenologically (Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen, 2002; Rantapelkonen, 2006), and as a paradigm of operational art (Sirén, Huhtinen & Toivettula, 2011). Another approach has been the study of (strategic) communication as an organization process.

Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen (2002: 109) conclude that "[i]nformation warfare is image warfare", where all participating actors must be able to create an image and use it as a weapon. This essentially summarizes the principle of Strategic Communication. In Sirén, Huhtinen & Toivettula (2011) and Sirén (2013), Strategic Communication as a non-kinetic capability, the importance of which is equally, if not more, important than that of kinetic capabilities in warfare. This is a view that the Pentagon shares: Strategic Communication, as a critical capability that should be of specific emphasis, has been ordered to be integrated into all operations processes (US Joint Forces Command, 2010). These views make Strategic Communication not only the essential infrastructure of warfare, but the cognitive structure of military planning. This links it to leadership. The relationship between leadership and Strategic Communication could thus be characterized as instrumental from the perspective of strategy and tactics, but in this dissertation the relationship is also understood as interdependence. Strategic Communication is more than a tool in the chain of command and control: it is a reflection of the intertwined social, cognitive and discursive-semiotic characteristics and motivations of the organization that produces it. This "triangle" will be further addressed in the Methods Chapter, but what is worth emphasizing already at this point is the role of cognition. Cognition is what theoretically bridges language and practice. Fundamentally, this dissertation is a study of naming and labeling - a simplifying and yet enlightening outlook to Strategic Communication. Here, Strategic Communication is approached poststructurally as linguistic structure, where 'things' and phenomena are given meaning and thereby a certain identity. As argued by Hansen (2006: 18), language is both social and political: social, as it is a collection of social codes and conventions, and political as it can be seen as a system and site for producing and

reproducing certain identities and subjectivities. This means that what makes language social and political is the fact that it is always a naming and categorization process. As stated by Lakoff (1990: 5),

Categorization is not a matter to be taken lightly. There is nothing more basic than categorization to our thought, perception, action, and speech. Every time we see something as a kind of thing, for example, a tree, we are categorizing.

This is to say that naming and labeling is an innate need in order to make sense of the world. This is why it is a dangerous phenomenon to manipulate and exploit. It is also the reason why functional language theory is the method for analyzing the mechanics of language in this dissertation: it locates language "as one among a wider class of systems called "semiotic" systems - systems of meaning." (Halliday, 2009a: 60).

This dissertation aims to initiate an approach to studying communication in the field of military science by engaging in a critical analysis of multimodal representations. The empirical data in this research varies from text and (transcribed) speech about the practices of warfare to images of violence. These multimodal artifacts are a selection, however limited, of the contents of Strategic Communication. They aim to demonstrate what kinds of forms Strategic Communication may take, how it manifests differently in different contexts, and what kind of meanings it conveys to the audience. Because of its name-giving and meaning-negotiating capability, language is also a form of violence. Indeed, the concepts of violence and language are discussed as interdependent phenomena in the chapters that follow.

When I was preparing to write this dissertation, I was reading Howard Zinn's *A People's History of the United States*. His take on history-writing is that of critical observation.

My viewpoint, in telling the history of the United States, is different: that we must not accept the memory of states as our own. Nations are not communities and never have been. The history of any country, presented as the history of a family, conceals fierce conflicts of interest (sometimes exploding, most often repressed) between conquerors and the conquered, masters and slaves, capitalists and workers, dominators and dominated in race and sex. And in such a world of conflict, a world of victims and executioners, it is the job of thinking people, as Albert Camus suggested, not to be on the side of the executioners. (Zinn, 2005).

Needless to say, the approach of this dissertation is critical. Strategic Communication is an instrument of power, and it should be analyzed as such. This ties the approach to the context of critical discourse studies (CDS). According to Teun A. van Dijk (2009), the starting point to this type of analysis boils down to recognizing power and dominance:

CDS scholars are typically interested in the way discourse (re)produces social domination, that is, the power abuse of one group over others, and how dominated groups may discursively resist such abuse.

CDS is not just any social or political research, as is the case in all the social and political sciences, but is premised on the fact that some forms of text and talk may be unjust. One of the tasks of CDS is to formulate the norms that define such 'discursive injustice'. CDS aims to expose and help to combat such injustice. It is problem-oriented rather than discipline- or theory-oriented. Such a research policy presupposes an ethical assessment, implying that discourse as social interaction may be illegitimate according to some fundamental norms, for instance those of international human and social rights. At the same time, critical analysis should be aware of the fact that such norms and rights change historically, and that some definitions of 'international' may well mean 'Western'.

Fairclough (1992: 73) presents discourse as a three-dimensional model. Social practice is the framework within which he locates discursive practice (the production, distribution and consumption of discourses), which contains the element of text. This model relates discursive practices to social order. Here, discursive practices are understood as a verbal manifestation of social practice, meaning that by observing discursive practices through text, we can also analyze social practice. In this research this means that I will address both discourses and social practice and attempt to understand their dialogicality.

But American Strategic Communication is more than domestic policy or national reflection of social order. With the global war on terrorism, the audience has become increasingly diffused. Strategic Communication reaches the Helmand locals as well as the population of Finland - obviously in different forms and intensities, but the "core values" and the "key message" remain the same. A communication effort of this scale is not merely a national phenomenon, but a global effort that engages communities, societies and organizations into forming an opinion of what is being communicated. This calls for a critical approach to analyzing the language of such exercise of power - Critical Discourse Analysis. As

argued by Sirén, Huhtinen & Toivettula (2011), communication is a capability - a weapon. A weapon is an instrument of violence, even if it is non-kinetic. The non-kinetic capability of information as a weapon is based on its meaning-making and naming capability. Derrida (1997: 107-108) illustrates this with the concept of "the battle of the proper names" in his discussion on Levi-Strauss's "Writing Lesson":

The entire "Writing Lesson" is recounted in the tones of violence repressed or deferred, a violence sometimes veiled, but always oppressive and heavy. Its weight is felt in various places and various moments of the narrative: in Levi-Strauss's account as in the relationships of among individuals and among groups, cultures or within the same community. What can a relationship to writing signify in these diverse instances of violence?

According to Derrida (1997: 112), the first violence is to give a name: "such is the originary violence of language which consists in inscribing within a difference, in classifying, in suspending the vocative absolute." The violence of language is in its social and political dimension. Also Carl Schmitt considers the relationship of language and violence in the processes of naming and meaning-making:

With regard to these decisive political concepts, it depends on who interprets, defines and uses them; who concretely decides what peace is, what disarmament, what intervention, what public order and security are. One of the most important manifestations of humanity's legal and spiritual life is the fact that whoever has true power is able to determine the content of concepts and words. (Schmitt quoted in Mouffe, 2005).

It is also evident that as a multidisciplinary study, this dissertation cannot address certain themes in full depth. This is the case, for instance, with the discussion of the Enlightenment. Strategic Communication and Enlightenment rhetorics, as argued in Chapter 2, are both political projects that have much in common. Therefore, the Enlightenment is discussed from the perspective of what significance it has in the tradition of political narration. It is important to highlight the division this discussion makes between the Enlightenment as a multifaceted philosophy and the Enlightenment as social practice. As the focus of this research is on language, the discussion of the Enlightenment is limited to the themes of the Enlightenment narratives and their ideological practices. This is also consistent with the chosen analytical framework, CDA, which, as laid out in the methods chapter, requires the analyst to approach hegemonic actors from the outside. Also, it keeps the scope of the analysis on the narratives. This methodological choice obviously narrows down the general discussion

of the Enlightenment as a philosophy to what is significant about it in the interpretation of Strategic Communication as modern political narration. This is what should be understood as the theoretical focus and the contribution to the field of Military Science: the conceptualization and theoretical analysis of a specific narrative and its elements.

This is to argue that Strategic Communication should be observed from the critical perspective. However, one may ask what the link between Critical Discourse Analysis and the study of leadership in the field of Military Science is. This link is established next.

1.2 The Linguistic Turn

As laid out in the previous sections, the theoretical and especially the methodological choices and perspectives in this dissertation are fundamentally founded on linguistics and communication theory. One may question the link between linguistics as a method and leadership as the field this dissertation claims to contribute to: is this study linguistics or leadership research? The answer to this question can be found in the past decade of organization research. In Military Science, the study of leadership is essentially the study of organization and organizing. In organization studies the increasing trend has been to study organizations as discursive constructions. Like social sciences in general, organization research has been transformed by the 'linguistic' or 'discursive turn', which made discourses and narratives the object of analysis and interpretation in the organizational setting (see Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Cooren, 2004; Vaara, 2010). As Taylor & Robichaud (2004) argue, conversation and text are sites of language-organization: conversation is "the site where organizing occurs and where agency and text are generated", whereas text "reflects the sensemaking practices and habits of interpretation". According to Grand & Marshak (2011), discourse and organization dynamics are mutually implicated: "discourses are both integral to and constructive of organizational dynamics and change." Further, they argue that studying discourses in organizations are used to negotiate meaning among organization stakeholders of different views and interests. This negotiation of meaning leads to the emergence of dominant meanings that becomes accepted and privileged discourses (Grand & Marshak, 2011). Organizations are thus discursive constructions, because meanings are negotiated through language and discourse. Therefore also leadership can be studied discursively. Leadership is essentially meaning-making, which is well demonstrated by the doctrinal concept of Strategic Communication: it specifically points out its aims in sharing meaning (see Department of Defense, 2009). Discourse analysis has become standard methodology in organization studies, which is a natural development due to the

multidisciplinary nature of Critical Discourse Analysis (discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). This dissertation thus proposes a linguistic turn in Military Science as well. This turn is a realization of the constructive, inter-subjective paradigm and a response to the need for multidisciplinary methodology to serve the diverse field of Military Science.

This dissertation treats Strategic Communication as an ideology (or an ideological narrative) that is ultimately a cultural product. It will be argued that narrative leadership is an integral part of American political discourse and a fundamental component in the building of a nation. As Chapter 2 concludes, Enlightenment rhetoric served the same function in its day as Strategic Communication today. Also Jari Rantapelkonen's (2006) work on George W. Bush's narrative leadership during the 'global war on terror' indicates that when unity is needed, narratives emerge. However, the basic argument in this dissertation is that it is the concept of instrumental warfare that is given its definition in the context of morality that has created the renaissance of the Enlightenment rhetoric.

Throughout this dissertation, the term 'narrative' is often used side by side with the term 'discourse'. Discourse is understood here as speech or text or even image beyond the level of a sentence (Mesthrie, Swann, Deumert & Leap, 2000: 323) that in itself is a "set of relations" that includes the relations of communication of people who communicate with each other (Fairclough, 2010: 3):

[W]e cannot answer the question 'what is discourse' except in terms of both its 'internal' relations and its 'external' relations with other such 'objects'. Discourse is not an entity we can define independently: we can only arrive at an understanding of it by analysing sets of relations. Having said that, we can say what it is in particular that discourse brings into the complex relations which constitute social life: meaning, and making meaning.

This is obviously a very broad definition, but as stated, it allows the analysis of social reality. Narratives, instead, consist of selected discourses. Narratology uses the terms happening, story and narrative to describe the structure of the narrative model. Stories contain a selection of happenings, and the narrative in turn is the composition of linearized and reorganized segments of the stories (Schmid, 2010: 190-191). In this research narratives are seen as compilations of selected discourses, and it is precisely the selection that is the domain of power. Narratives are ideological, because they are never objective or unbiased accounts of reality. This is specifically the operational context of Critical Discourse Analysis, discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

The question is whether narratives (understood here as concatenations of discourses) can be treated as descriptions of identity, norms and values. This is the question that brings us to the debate on the so-called linguistic turn. In social sciences, the increased focus on language and its use in research, namely the analysis of the subjects from textual and linguistic perspectives as "discursively constructed ensembles of texts", is known as the linguistic turn (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000). In contrast, the 'old paradigm' would treat the cognitions and emotions of individuals as a source for studying the patterns of engaging in social interactions (Harré, 2001: 688). The methodology that defined the old paradigm was based on laboratory settings, where the individual was subjected to sets of independent variables that could be measured and categorized (Harré, 2001). The linguistic turn thus means not only the shift from laboratories to the social contexts, but the necessity to understand the complexity of social interaction and address this complexity methodologically. Obviously the linguistic turn parallels with the methodological crises in the fields of psychology and communication, which is a theme addressed in the empirical part of this study, namely the article Strategic Communication: Functions, characteristics and criticism. The linguistic turn is part of the overall shift from analyzing reactions to variables (i.e. effects) to considering the individual's behavior as an outcome of a vast array of factors that cannot be observed in isolation. In communication studies this meant that the focus turned from facts to interpretation.

As stated in the article on Strategic Communication and its principles, one of the paradoxes addressed in this dissertation is the legacy of the classical effects research in Strategic Communication. Because of the prevalent focus on effects in many theories and paradigms within military science (such as Effects Based Operations, the Comprehensive Approach as well as Strategic Communication), the approach of this dissertation is to attempt to explain the problems recognized in Strategic Communication by comparing and contrasting it to other traditions of communication research and development. This means that effects-centricness is addressed from the perspective of communication theory. As demonstrated by the methodological and paradigmatic changes in social sciences since the 1960s, many of the theoretical and practical problems of classical effects research can be generalized in the context of military science. According to Pietilä (2005: 127), the shift from classical effects research to the uses-and-gratifications approach can be summarized by the statement "where the former studies what the media do to people, the latter explores what people do to media." Many of the so-called paradoxes addressed here have to do with this realization. Communication is the domain of meaning-making rather than that of conditioning the audience to react in a desired way.

It is not a coincidence that the methodology used here to acknowledge the problemacy of communication research is functionalism. I originally applied functional language theory in my Master's thesis under the instruction of Professor Eija Ventola in 2006-2007. During those two years I went through hundreds of transcripts of the U.S. Department of Defense, looking for texts that would contain descriptions of the Self as well as the enemy. During those two years of working with the analysis and its interpretation, I understood what a theoretical challenge Halliday's functional language theory was for me. However, even if I noticed it was complex and my progress with understanding it was slow, I knew that as a theoretical framework it was highly applicable. This is exactly what Halliday (2009a: 61) himself has written:

[Systemic Functional Linguistics] tends to neutralize the boundary between (theoretical) linguistics and applied linguistics. It has been called an "applicable" theory, and its evolution has tended to be driven by the ongoing experience of its use and by its constant extension to new areas of enquiry and action. [...] Every context of application brings with it new demands on the theory; and the lessons gained from facing up to these demands feed back into the theory and enrich it.

You will often hear the complaint that SFL is too complicated: it has too much descriptive apparatus. It is complicated - because language is complicated, and there is no point in pretending that it is simple. The problem is to recognize which aspects of the theory are relevant to a given task; and that does entail having some acquaintance with the whole.

SFL was thus not selected for this dissertation, but rather, it was the dissertation that formed around the method. The point is not to make a comprehensive analysis of all linguistic phenomena within Strategic Communication, but to conduct applied research within military science in its pre-paradigmatic stage. This dissertation is not the first study that has a narrative or a discursive take on research, but it is written to reinforce the theoretical range within the science. As stated by Halliday above, it is important to recognize which aspects are relevant in a given task of analysis: this dissertation starts with the theoretical and practical significances of transitivity and agency, but hopefully in the coming years I will be able to build on and expand the theoretical foundation this dissertation provides.

The functionalist approach views language as cognitive structure that bridges the inner experience to the outer world (Halliday, 2004). This is also the paradigm of this study: language is a system of representation that can be interpreted from several different perspectives, and every

perspective provides a new "truth". This is also my answer to the question whether language, as a representation, truthfully represents reality. To apply the poststructuralist approach to foreign policy in the context of Strategic Communication, the assumption here is that the representations of identity, in this case those both of the 'Self' and the 'Other', are linked to discursive, political, relational and social conceptualizations of identity: "The conceptualization of identity as discursive, political, relational, and social implies that foreign policy discourse always articulates a Self and a series of Others." (Hansen, 2006: 6). The analysis here will approach these conceptualizations of identity through the action and being descriptions of the Self and the Other, but the aim is not merely to understand the differences of these binaries, but to see how the binaries influence and construct the narrative itself, and what the narrative reveals about the conceptual dynamics of the society - in this case the American one.

The problem that poststructuralism sees with language is that it never means what it says (Derrida, 1997). 'Facts' and 'words' do not form a narrative. Writers and speakers do, and by arguing for the validity and legitimacy of these 'facts' they participate in the process of shaping reality. Language is never a neutral medium - not in this dissertation nor in the data used - and eventually the analysis of texts and discourses leads to several layers of interpretation. This dissertation obviously cannot address all of those layers, but it will start by recognizing the experiential dimension, which is essentially the dimension of representation, namely human experience, relationships and the modeling of knowledge (Halliday & Matthiessen, 1999; Halliday, 2004; Halliday, 2009b). Language is a medium between the subjective self and the outside world, which leaves language little chance to be objective. The language-as-mirror logic, despite having a certain pragmatic function in our everyday lives (usually a yes means yes and a no means no, but only usually), it is problematic in the social context (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000). According to Alvesson & Kärreman "efforts to say something definite, to establish how things are, rely on shaky foundations and ought to be deconstructed." This idea of deconstruction introduced by Derrida (1997) is founded on the principle that words do not have set meanings, as demonstrated by the use of metaphors and symbols.

According to Alvesson & Kärreman (2000), language has gone from "a simple tool for theorizing and measuring to becoming the crucial issue in social research." Taking into account the problem of representation and interpretation leads to the social semiotic approach to understanding language:

A social semiotic theory of truth cannot claim to establish the absolute truth or untruth of representations. It can only show

whether a given 'proposition' (visual, verbal or otherwise) is represented as true or not. From the point of view of social semiotics, truth is a construct of semiosis, and as such the truth of a particular social group, arising from the values and beliefs of that group. (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006: 154).

Language and society cannot be observed separately, and this is why social semiotics understands the grammar in terms of its three metafunctions - interpersonal, ideational and textual - which are, according to the approach, encoded into language (Halliday 2004, 2009a, 2009b). A clause can be understood as a representation, as can action and image. This position on language and communication will be further discussed in the Methods Chapter.

1.3 Research questions

This study does not claim to be a full, objective description of how Strategic Communication and its realizations in the media and elsewhere should be understood. Instead, it provides an analysis, which should be understood as one possible perspective to understanding, interpreting, and maybe experiencing it. However, the aim is not to merely observe and understand, but to reach a critical interpretation of Strategic Communication as a form of social practice, to recognize its paradoxes and to address its defects. This means that the dissertation also has emancipatory motivations. It is not merely descriptive, but takes a stand, as suggested by its framework of critical theory, on the exercise of social power, i.e. the communication and application of hegemonic ideology by the U.S. government and military organization.

This dissertation aims to develop a perspective to Strategic Communication as a model of discourse without dismissing the reality of warfare, the experience of leadership or the actuality of the soldier. Communication strategies are not in the hands of the individual fighters, which means that the individual soldier remains in the margins of these strategies. What I hope is that the discussion sheds light on the problemacy of the 'agency of soldiership' in an age when soldiership is going through what I would call an identity crisis - or why has it become increasingly difficult to define what a soldier is and what a soldier does, let alone to define war? Warfare and its reality or motivations are hardly the domain for rational interpretations. Rather, this research approaches the question through communicative practices and treats communication as symbolic action - physical, verbal and visual - that represent the experiential domain.

The research questions indicate that this dissertation treats Strategic Communication as ideological language that manifests itself in different genres: text (strategy papers and other texts generated by the organization), discourse (i.e. press briefings) and visual elements (news, commercials, and other multimodal documents). The hypothesis is that there is a Grand Narrative that underpins these products of different genres. This Grand Narrative may be either overt (politically motivated, a representation of an identity that is either accepted or considered appropriate) or covert (tacit, suggestive or possibly subconscious).

There are three research questions. The primary question seeks to address the factors that determine the ways in which Strategic Communication is manifested in theory on one hand, and in practice on the other:

1) What are the key contents and mechanisms Strategic Communication in terms of practice and ideology?

To further specify and narrow down the orientation of the research, this question is supplemented with two sub-questions that aim to address the processes of communication and narration and the relevance of the contents of Strategic Communication as representations of social order:

a) What kind of a perception of communication does Strategic Communication enforce?

b) What kind of representations of Agency do the practices of Strategic Communication result in?

These questions aim to address both the theoretical (official and managed) concept of Strategic Communication as well as the practical (unofficial and uncontrollable) realization of the narratives, meanings and ideologies within Strategic Communication. The concepts of theory and practice are essential in understanding the inner conflict of Strategic Communication, as well as the paradoxes it subsequently projects.

1.4 Structure of the dissertation

Because this dissertation is a contribution to the study of leadership within Military Science, discusses Strategic Communication in the context of communication and language theory and applies linguistic methodology, it is clear that it cannot structurally follow the conventions of any specific field of research.

The term *narrative* is important in this research for two reasons. First, it is the object of research. Strategic Communication consists of narratives that together form the Grand Narrative addressed in the empirical part of the study: the narrative (that consists of discourses) contains descriptions of actions and happenings that construct the narrative arch. The second significance has to do with the structure of this thesis: it starts as a narrative. This is, essentially, the nature of reporting qualitative research:

There is no question that quantitative researchers also try to build stories in their manuscripts, but story is the very essence of qualitative research. Quantitative articles generally follow a well-defined structure: introduction, literature review, hypotheses, methods, results and discussion. Accounts of the data are spliced between accounts of theory; data and theory appear almost episodic. Qualitative researchers, on the other hand, attempt to create narratives through these accounts. (Bansal & Corley, 2012).

Bansal & Corley see qualitative research as two narratives, the data and theory, which have intertwined.

[The data and theory narratives] create tension through a provocative question, build plot through a data narrative, and provide an interesting and even provocative explanation and conclusion through a theory narrative. [...] The data are needed to give the theory context, and the theory is needed to give the data meaning. (Bansal & Corley, 2012).

The dissertation begins with a Background Chapter that discusses one approach to understanding modern Strategic Communication, namely its roots in the Enlightenment rhetoric. This discussion contains the roles of the soldier, weapon and discourse as symbols of their time and age. The themes of technology and instrumentalism as well as values and ideology are introduced into the discussion. This is also the chapter that starts the narration of the research. The narration is put aside during the discussion on methods, but it will eventually be returned to. The conclusion will wrap up the narrative by considering the significance of the data in the light of the themes the discussion started with.

Chapter 3 is the Methods Chapter, which starts the empirical part of the dissertation. It argues that Strategic Communication is ideological discourse and constructs the theoretical and methodological framework for analyzing it from the critical perspective. First, it introduces the key concepts of Van Dijk's social-cognitive-textual triangle in order to argue the relations of the social world, cognition, language and ideology. Then, it

connects the social-cognitive-textual triangle to the metafunctions of Halliday's systemic language theory in order to specify the methodology.

Chapter 4 is a literary review of some of the debate, discussion and criticism of Strategic Communication in the U.S. military community and in the field of military research. It outlines the main themes of discussion during the 21st century and serves as a platform for the article that follows it. After Chapter 4 the case studies follow.

The first article is a follow-up to Chapter 4. *Strategic Communication: Functions, characteristics and criticism* analyzes the U.S. military concept of Strategic Communication and how it explains the essence of communication and sharing of meaning. By arguing that military communication still aspires to classical effects research, this article reveals the inner theoretical crisis of military communication, namely that of the conflict of the 'old' and 'new' paradigms. The concept of Strategic Communication renounces manipulation and refers to communication as influence - which leads to the discussion whether military communication really can rid itself from unethical practices of persuasion. This article is not an empirical, but a theoretical discussion of U.S. communication doctrine. It was written after the empirical articles, as it appeared that in order to understand the data, it was necessary to approach the actual theoretical foundation (and its problems) of U.S. military communication.

The second article *The hidden grand narrative of Western military policy: A linguistic analysis of American strategic communication* was published in *the Journal of Military Studies* (Vol 2, No 1) in 2011. This article discusses the role of technology descriptions in Strategic Communication, namely the briefing on Effects Based Operations in March 2003. The empirical study is conducted with the methodology of transitivity analysis. This article covers the aspect of technology as an ideology, which, as will be argued, is paramount in the framework of humanitarian, "neo-Enlightenment" narratives. This article was co-authored by Professor Aki-Mauri Huhtinen, who contributed insights for the background discussion. This article was also the first one to be published, and greatly influenced my perspective to Strategic Communication as a narration that contains the same ideological glorification of technology that marked the Age of Reason.

The third article, *Kill, capture.. or what? How operational planning changes the language of communicating strategy in war* is a case study on the term 'neutralize'. When introducing the concept of Effects Based Operations, Colonel Crowder (chief of strategy, concepts and doctrine) paid specific attention to explaining the meaning of this word. In his briefing, neutralizing is presented as an alternative to destroying, which is a

similar attempt to negotiate meaning as the manipulation/persuasion negotiation discussed in the first article. This article can also be seen as a bridge between the thematics of the Enlightenment, namely those of agency, technology and instrumentalism, and their emergence in the very language structures of Strategic Communication.

The fourth article, *From power to a puddle of blood: Rituals and evaluation in the images of capture and death of Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden and Muammar Gaddafi*, published originally in Finnish (*Kosmopolis*, vol 2-3/2012) takes transitivity analysis a step further to visual agency. The article on Saddam Hussein's, Osama bin Laden's and Muammar Gaddafi's images of capture and death addresses the representation of enmity in the visual narratives of both the authorities and the public media. This article started to develop during a "Media and Rituals" web-course I took at the Department of Communication in the University of Helsinki in the spring of 2012. The article is a classic analysis of the 'us' vs. 'them' dichotomy, but integrates rituals theory as an extension of transitivity to address the representation of agency. I see this article not only as a theoretical bridge between linguistics, communication studies as well as aspects of sociology, but also as a link to the thematic framework of Strategic Communication: the renaissance of the Enlightenment narrative that locates violence in the framework of democracy.

These four articles present four different case studies of Strategic Communication. They are followed by the Conclusion that discusses and reviews the data by taking it back to the framework of Van Dijk's triangle-approach (introduced in Chapter 3) that is the theoretical starting point of the methodology and provides a perspective to the social, cognitive and textual dimensions of Strategic Communication.

BACKGROUND: ON THE ORIGINS OF THE NARRATIVE

Society never advances. It recedes as fast on one side as it gains on the other. It undergoes continual changes; it is barbarous, it is civilized, it is christianized, it is rich, it is scientific; but this change is not amelioration. For every thing that is given, something is taken. - Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-reliance

The story starts in the 18th century Paris, the symbol of the social, political and intellectual ferment that marked the Age of Reason. This age permanently planted the ideas of *liberté, égalité, fraternité* into the collective minds of people. The rights and privileges we have, we owe the 18th century martyrs who rose against the might of the elites on both sides of the Atlantic. The democracy built on this foundation is what led to the concept of human rights, abolition of slavery and the victory of democracy. This is what my school books taught me when I was 15 years old.

Throughout this dissertation I will argue for a critical stand toward the 'official Western narrative of the Enlightenment'. The aim is to explore its ideological foundations as well as its implications on the modern understanding of who 'we' are. The 'we' here refers to the American Self, but because the context of this dissertation is warfare and its communication, it is, at times, difficult to draw the line between American and simply Western, as modern warfare implies multinational cooperation where several nations unite efforts under a single stated aim and objective - be it democracy or stability. However, the process of the legitimacy and primacy of the Enlightenment narrative, discussed in the following sections, is what sets the boundaries of the acceptable in the political argumentation of today. The claim here is that with the Enlightenment, the West has claimed democracy and made it their image. The narratives of the Enlightenment have become our shared history that still guide our practices in social policy and political thought.

The Enlightenment values are the signifiers of the overt Grand Narrative of Western identity - although the representations and interpretations of those may vary. The Grand Narrative approached in this dissertation is Strategic

Communication, the official U.S. military communication doctrine defined by the 2009 Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept. In this research Strategic Communication is treated as the practice of communication that defines force and agency: it assigns roles to those who speak and those who are spoken of. Also, it specifies the perception of what non-kinetic, in this case communicative, influence entails: the context of legitimacy, acts of persuasion and the state of agency.

Strategic Communication is thus a window to the modern application of the Enlightenment ideology. This chapter presents one approach to understanding the communication doctrine: the following sections advance as a narrative that comment on the underlying perceptions of identity and the Self, warfare, soldiership and their ties to both the recognized and the denied "enlightenment ideals". All this is the background discussion that eventually leads to one understanding of Strategic Communication. The themes taken up in this chapter are those that I will return to in the end of this dissertation.

This chapter attempts to bridge between the past and the present. It brings out a number of key themes in the narratives of the Age of Reason and links them to the 21st century narratives of Strategic Communication. This chapter also defines the perspectives and key concepts for the discussion and analysis of this research. As stated in Chapter 1, the orientation of this dissertation is critical, and in order to position oneself outside the hegemonic, political narratives and evaluate them, one must explore their use and contents. The Enlightenment narratives and the narrative identity of the United States are reflected on by means of analogies, which help relate the similarities and differences of the past and present narratives.

2.1 Panem et circenses

This ball of liberty, I believe most piously, is now so well in motion that it will roll round the globe, at least the enlightened part of it, for light & liberty go together. - Thomas Jefferson

The writing of this dissertation started when the global banking crisis began. In Greece, the homeland of democracy, the problems were perhaps the greatest. When the problems were brought to light, the newspapers all over the world knew to tell the rest of the world about the Greeks' overspending habits and gigantic, corrupted public sector, irresponsible, tax evading corporations and general fiscal absurdity. As the case of Greece illustrates, democracy does not seem to grant legitimacy or ensure validity any more than authoritarian leaders. Greece, Europe's Madame Deficit, may be followed by a number of heirs. Time will tell. Monarchy or democracy, 18th century or the 21st, history keeps repeating itself.

The Madame Deficit of the 18th century France was guillotined at what is now a popular tourist sight, Place de la Concorde. On one side, you have the high-end shops of the Champs-Élysées, on the other side the hotspot of high culture, the Louvre. The opposite axis is and has been reserved for political functions: the U.S. embassy, Hôtel de Crillon (occupied by the Nazis during WWII) and across from them, the National Assembly (the commissioner of the Guillotine) and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This historic resonance is constructed around the stage of the Reign of Terror - a site which, in 2012, is claimed by heavy traffic, an Egyptian obelisk that has replaced the guillotine, and young entrepreneurs who, just meters away from Marie Antoinette's death place, rent luxury cars: a twenty-minute joyride and a chauffeur in a car of your choice (a Lamborghini or a Ferrari), all for 89 euros. Revolution did indeed come. Democracy grants us all the right to be Madame Deficits now.

But the age of revolution and reason does not resonate with only the fiscal crisis of the 2000s. Since the 18th century numerous revolutions have taken place. The industrial revolution gave birth to the revolution of communication technology and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). As the result of the asymmetry brought about by the RMA, the first decades of the 2000s witnessed first the death of the Absolute Evil, Saddam Hussein, followed by the revolution in Libya that led to the death of Muammar Gaddafi. The outcome was broadcast around the world, almost real time, as pictures of dying Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were broadcast by mobile phones and social media. This revolution took place both in the real world and in the virtual, while the happenings were applauded both in Europe and the United States. Gaddafi's death "marks the start of a New era", stated Hillary Clinton. "People in Libya today have an even greater chance, after this news, of building themselves a strong and democratic future," declared David Cameron, announcing his pride on Britain's role in the death of the dictator (The Independent, 2011). "For the region, today's events prove once more that the rule of an iron fist inevitably comes to an end," hailed President Obama (Spetalnick & MacInnis, 2011). In the Western media, the lynching of the Absolute Evil was presented in the logical frame of the Enlightenment, where revolutions lead to progress and democracy brings death to authoritarian rulers. The images presented the Libyan uprising as a miniature version of its French predecessor - as a bloody and vile reminder of the 'The Terror', which finally ended in the victory of the oppressed nation in quest for freedom, equality and rights.

Far away from the body bags of Libya, in modern Paris the bones and memories of the mass graves of the Revolution have long since been removed and brought to the vast darkness of the catacombs, where the

headless martyrs intermingle with the remains of the millions of other deceased. Where the mass graves laid now stand apartment buildings, restaurants and *pâtisseries*, so we can forget about the skeletons in our closets and focus on being horrified by the brutality of the Other in the Middle East and beyond. We maintain the narrative of the victory of the Enlightenment, the Western Self and the consequent rights of man, while being aware of the bloodshed it caused. At the same time, images of mass graves in Syria are published as evidence of human rights violations (Hosenball, 2012). The bond between *violence* and *sacred* is a pivotal part of understanding the enlightened Western being.



Image 1: *The memorial plague of the Errancis cemetery, the non-final resting place of the "1119 people guillotined at Place de la Revolution".*



Image 2: *The site of the Errancis cemetery memorial plague*



Image 3: *"Dream on board, drive me for 89€" at Place de la Concorde.*

But, this research is not a lament of the mistakes of the past. Instead, it is a description of the two intertwined aspects of Western discourse: the one of the virtuous ideology, and the other of legitimized violence. The next three sections will continue the discussion of the role of virtue in the Actors of warfare: the weapon, the soldier and the nation. These themes are discussed in the context of military science - in which they are transformed into the agents of Strategic Communication.

2.2 The weapon - a symbol of social order

A man hardly knows how much he is a machine, until he begins to make telegraph, loom, press, and locomotive, in his own image. But in these, he is forced to leave out follies and hindrances, So that when we go to the mill, the machine is more moral than we. Let man dare go to a loom, and see if he be equal to it. Let machine confront machine, and see how they come out.

- Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Power*

In France, the Revolution brought about new ideas and, consequently, demands. The uprising against old authorities, such as monarchy, aristocrats and religion, and the introduction of the concepts such as equality and citizenship and citizen's rights led to the deaths of tens of thousands. The roles had changed, as the great were mocked and the criminals were celebrated heroes, writes Foucault (2011). The rights that are now considered an irrefutable part of the Western moral landscape, are often seen as the result of unavoidable sacrifice and ideological battle. In the modern, Western discourse, the Revolution was the violence needed to realize the ideals of the Enlightenment. The execution of the Sovereign symbolized the dawn of the individual. What was used as the instrument of justice and equality, was the guillotine.

In October 1789, only a few months after the declaration of the Rights of Man, Dr. Guillotin visited the National Assembly to introduce his ideas on the use of guillotine. As recorded by Chambers & Chambers (1844: 219), Guillotin proposed that

1. *Crimes of the same kind shall be punished by the same kind of punishment, whatever be the rank of the criminal.*
2. *In all cases (whatever be the crime) of capital punishment, it shall be of the same kind - that is, beheading - and it shall be executed by means of a machine [l'effet d'un simple mécanisme].*

The guillotine was thus, ironically, to execute the Rights of Man, as its purpose was to grant equality in the face of death, while the Rights of Man granted equality in the face of life. According to the Chambers, the debate at the National Assembly led to Dr. Guillotin's famous words, which, according to the witnesses, "produced a general laugh": "Avec ma machine, je vous fais sauter la tête d'un coup-d'ceil, et vous ne souffrez point!" (*With my machine, I cut off your head in the twinkling of an eye, and you never feel it!*) (1844: 219). The revolution revolutionized not only the life, but also the death. In an enlightened society, even death should be quick and painless.

The study of history has always been interested in the way societies inflict death. It is the method of killing that symbolizes the state of the society, especially in retrospect. The guillotine ended what used to be a physical contest of the executioner (to kill) and the executed (to endure) and soon this physical struggle would appear as disturbing and provoking in the eyes of the public (Foucault, 2011: 101). Foucault argues that after the Revolution, the guillotines would eventually be moved away from public places and mechanical killing became the norm. Much like the 18th century attitudes towards torture changed, in the 21st century the use of "dumb bombs" is criticized, because unlike precision weapons, they kill people rather indiscriminately. Legitimate killing requires a certain standard of technology.

Instrumentalism has become the norm of humanity. Since the Enlightenment, the ideology of progress has meant asymmetry and violence against the "Other" (Lawrence, 1999). Technological progress has meant that the means of war "were supplemented by the continual invention of ever more destructive technologies", making modernity an era of "extreme violence" (Lawrence, 1999). This pursuit of technological reason is, according to Lawrence, the core feature of modernity and its culture. 'Progress' has been one of the key words also in the global war on terror. Rantapelkonen (2006: 291-292) questions the logic of the word by

asking what is the content and perspective this "progress" is measured from: When President Bush announced that progress has been made, how had this progress realized? The paradox was that progress was the code for increased level of destruction caused on life and property, and that militarism has in fact "progressed" to areas of life considered civilian before (Rantapelkonen, 2006).

It seems that the Enlightenment and its narratives produced two realities: the one of asymmetrical, hegemonic practice, and the one of the universalist narratives of the Revolution. In Kant's view, revolution is a means to end despotism and oppression only, but he doubted that a revolution would ever truly reform ways of thinking: new prejudices would replace the old ones to control the "unthinking mass" (Kant, 1996). Citizens have risen against the authorities time and time again, and will continue to do so, whether they were subjects of dictatorship or citizens of liberal democracies. Revolutions will always be called for. These revolutions are defined by their use of violence, and the weapon of the revolution becomes the symbol of the time: the guillotine of France, the precision weapon of the RMA, and the mobile phone of the Arab Spring. These weapons are the metaphors of their time, and the collective power of the revolution is channeled through these instruments of force. The Reign of Terror advanced the enlightened world view of reason and progress by cutting off heads infested with elitist thought. During the high-tech war against terrorism - or *for* "the universal values of the human spirit", as expressed by Tony Blair (BBC, 2003) - democracy and other "universal values" are implemented in the form of lethal accuracy that revolutionized the role of the soldier, making distance both value and a necessity. During the Arab Spring and the capture of Muammar Gaddafi, two revolutions merged - RMA, in the form of Western weapons technology, put the dictator on the move, and the revolution of communication technology broadcasted the rise of the collective will of the oppressed and the death of the dictator, making mobile phones an information weapon.

In his discussion on scientific thought and technology, Max Horkheimer (2013) suggests that what is crucial in the development of instrumental reason that dominates Western culture and its discourses of power is the positivist philosophy of science. Horkheimer's criticism, originally written in 1947, describes the ethical paradox of warfare and technology as accurately now as it did after the Holocaust:

According to the positivists, what we need is abundant confidence in science. Of course they are not blind to the destructive uses to which science is put; but they claim that such uses of science are perverted. Is this really so? The objective progress of science and its application, technology, do not justify

the current idea that science is destructive only when perverted and necessarily constructive when adequately understood. (Horkheimer, 2013: 41).

The positivist argument of the "right" kind of application of science and technology is central in the instrumental rhetorics of 21st century warfare. Concepts such as unintended damage or humanitarian warfare demonstrate that as the product of enlightened culture, technology is on the side of morality. Technology is good and pure by default. The context of Western weapons technology is therefore natural for the moral evaluation of technological progress. This brings technocracy to the core of not only morality, but the practices of social order:

Positivist philosophy, which regards the tool 'science' as the automatic champion of progress, is as fallacious as other glorifications of technology. Economic technocracy expects everything from the emancipation of the material means of production. Plato wanted to make philosophers the masters; the technocrats want to make engineers the board of directors of society. Positivism is philosophical technocracy. It specifies as the prerequisite for membership in the councils of society an exclusive faith in mathematics. Plato, a eulogist of mathematics, conceived of rulers as administrative experts, engineers of the abstract. Similarly, the positivists consider engineers to be philosophers of the concrete, since they apply science, of which philosophy - in so far as it is tolerated at all - is merely a derivate. Despite all their differences, both Plato and the positivists think that the way to save humanity is to subject it to rules and methods of scientific reasoning. The positivists, however, adapt philosophy to science, i.e., to the requirements of practice instead of adapting practice to philosophy. For them thought, in the very act of functioning as ancilla administrationis, becomes the rector mundi. (Horkheimer, 2013: 42).

It can now be asked whether it is the requirements of philosophy that the development of the technologies of warfare adapt to, or is it the requirements of practice that dictate the direction of technological progress.

The symbolic role of technology considered, technology is a self-evident theme in the military discourses of today. On the first day of Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Colonel Gary L. Crowder, chief of strategy, concepts and doctrine, introduced the new doctrine, Effects Based Operations, to the media:

But the point here is, is that we don't have to attack everything,

nor do you have to destroy everything. If we understood what the effect we desired on the battlefield, we could then figure out ways of creating that effect more efficiently, more effectively, striking less targets, using less weapons and, quite frankly, mitigating or easing potential concerns for collateral damage and civilian casualties. (Department of Defense, 2003a).

The new, humanitarian 'grammar of violence' determines the discourses of military policy. As demonstrated by the above citation, the emphasis is not on the destructive force of the weapon, but on its selectivity. For example, the ability to be selective was one of the arguments used to legitimize the war in Iraq: press briefings discussed only the use of precision weapons (Department of Defense 2003a; 2003b; 2003c). Technology is now beyond its role as a tool, as today we are willing to give technology an agency of its own. The moral of technology appeals to the 18th century sentiment. Today, much of this attitude remains, or even becomes enforced: technological failures are easier to accept than human error. Technological failure is accepted, because it is something that is beyond our control and therefore beyond ethical judgment:

A bomb comes off an airplane, and there are a number of both electrical and mechanical things (that) have to happen in order for that bomb to go where it is designed. And you could have a power failure on a guidance unit, you could have a fin lock up, and that bomb will go somewhere we know not. And so it's important to understand that collateral damage can occur not because you struck the wrong target, but because a bomb just flat didn't go. And that's -- that is not uncommon in 8 to 10 percent of the time. (Department of Defense, 2003d).

This is something Paul Virilio might address as an "artificial accident"; a possible, or even probable outcome of innovations and technology. The issue, according to Virilio, is not the failure of the innovation, but how these innovations are used. "The issue is the building of an 'unsinkable' ocean liner or the setting up of an atomic station close to residential zones" (Virilio, 2008: 9, 15). Much the same way precision weapons are used in densely built urban areas. Accidents become probable, and eventually they become expected, accepted, and normalized into our everyday discourse. The acceptance of accidents becomes part of the instrumentalist approach to warfare. "Amidst all the enthusiasm for techno-solutions, no-one seemed to be looking at the endpoint of the trajectory: a battlefield in which networks, systems, robots, and smart weapons target each other, all damage measured in flesh and blood becomes "collateral"', writes Der Derian (2009).

The argument of 'unavoidable accident' started to appear in the Pentagon press briefings when the semantic transition from warfare to humanitarian operations took place. *Collateral damage* has been one of the major public relations issues during the use of the effects-centric doctrines, carefully addressed by the experts of doctrine in press briefings. In the Effects Based Operations Briefing, the concept of collateral damage was contrasted to *unintended damage*, an accident that results from a mistake. Collateral damage, instead, is expected (see Department of Defense, 2003d). With the term, the idea of unavoidable accidents is naturalized in the discourse of military planning otherwise characterized by confidence in the performance and capability of technology.

These narratives of weapons technologies (further addressed in the empirical part of this dissertation) suggest that in the Western philosophy of warfare, the logic in the use of technology is that it guarantees an impartial and just treatment with little chance for error. Techno-faith resonates with the culture we know as the Enlightenment: "[T]he machine is more moral than we" (Emerson, 2006). Hence, in the American Grand Narrative of warfare the narratives of moral and technology are intertwined. Technology is not only employed to execute the acts that seem inhumane and therefore difficult to do in person, but to shelter our lifestyle. Technological solutions have alienated us from certain forms of sacrifice, the attribute traditionally associated with war and warriorship, redundant. The attitude towards technology is thus ambivalent. On one hand, it is the essence of virtue that serves the function of "enabling" the mankind. On the other hand, our attitudes have taken technology well beyond enabling, giving it agency of its own. In a sense, technology has turned into a vehicle and made people passengers: we no longer expect to be able to be in total control of our environment, but accept the fact that technological failures are unavoidable and the damages are the price to pay for the lifestyle we lead. This attitude is highly ideological and as such, exclusive. If we consider the social layout of this design in the context of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is evident that risk has been outsourced to those who have no other choice, who have no say in setting the standards of acceptable risks, and who eventually suffer the consequences of the risk. In the Western concept of asymmetry, risk rarely threatens the risk taker. In the adversary's doctrine, there is no risk, only decisions to sacrifice. This may well be the most significant factor in the power-balances of warfare: what kind of asymmetric sacrifice is more effective - that of the Self or the Other?

2.3 The soldier - a moral agent?

The characteristic of genuine heroism, is its persistency. All men have wandering impulses, fits and starts of generosity. But when you have resolved to be great, abide by yourself, and do not weakly try to reconcile yourself with the world. The heroic cannot be the common, nor the common the heroic. - Ralph Waldo Emerson, Heroism

Self-incurred immaturity, addressed by Kant as the state that the public needs to overcome in the process of enlightening themselves, is tied to the alluring comfort that being patronized allows. Kant's thesis is that in order to enlighten themselves and reach maturity, the public should be given the right to practice public use of reason in all circumstances, even if it may conflict with the existing norms. The element of publicity is paramount in the questioning of dogmas and formulas which Kant considers as "the ball and chain of his permanent immaturity". Publicity empowers enlightenment and spreads understanding, a process that the sovereign, despite the risk of criticism, should accept. Therefore, Kant's demand that people "freely and publicly submit to the judgment of the world their verdicts and opinions, even if these deviate here and there from orthodox doctrine" was a courageous, if not revolutionary sentiment in his time. Demanding that all people from clergy to soldier practice their right to public reasoning made it clear that what was expected of them was a new kind of public courage. People were expected to emerge as individuals from the tradition of the collective. Emerson echoes this encouragement: "Heroism works in contradiction to the voice of mankind and in contradiction, for a time, to the voice of the great and good" (2007a). The Enlightenment philosophy obligated people to intellectual independence. "Self-trust is the essence of heroism" (Emerson, 2007a).

The empowerment of the individual left its mark on soldiership too. Soldiers became moral agents, concerned with not only the consequences of their actions, but "with the acting selves that the action expressed" (Coker, 2002: 51). With the emergence of human agency as well as individuality and morale, victory was no longer dependent on God's will, but result of determination and human ingenuity. In addition, it was recognized that soldiers who were ideologically engaged in the fight would fight harder (Coker, 2005: 48-49). Agency became an inseparable feature of what was considered proper soldiership: soldiers' actions became symbolic of their morals and motivation.

But let us return to the concepts of heroism and courage. In warrior's reality, courage has traditionally been understood as the will to embrace

sacrifice. Sacrifice is not seen as the denial of the individual self in preference for conformity. Instead, sacrifice is the extension of the Self, a means to break away from covenant and effectuate personal choice as a professional (Coker, 2007:93). No soldier could be forced, demanded or legislated to be heroic, but, according to Coker, heroism is the result of the soldier being esteemed by himself and his fellows, and the will to give more than asked (2007: 94). This outlook means that the level of heroism depends on the character of the soldier, his moral and self-trust. A soldier could be heroic impulsively, according to his capability. Soldiership is contractual, but a heroism cannot be dictated from the outside (Coker, 2007: 94).

However, in Emerson's (2007a) understanding of heroism the essential element is not only the retaining of self-trust and balance, but the contempt of comfort. The "rudest form" of heroism "is the contempt for safety and ease, which makes the attractiveness of war." This is where the contradiction between *then* and *now* starts: safety and ease are the guiding principles of modern military policy.

There is not much left of the Emersonian ideal of heroism in the modern trends of engagement in the battle. Modern weapons technology gives alternatives to self-sacrifice and hence makes courage redundant. The practices of force protection are in the way of actual operations. If Emersonian heroism meant the acceptance of risk, what is the essence of heroes when they are armored, locked away in base camps, and reluctant to operate without helicopters hovering above to provide security? (see Coker, 2002: 64-65). Risk aversion has become the norm: in Kosovo, sorties were flown at 15 000 feet to avoid being shot down, despite the errors in targeting and the advantage that the consequent imprecision gave the enemy (Coker, 2001, 58). This is what Coker calls "redundancy of courage". Virilio (2002:43) remarks:

Unprecedentedly, during the Kosovo conflict, the two officially declared enemies were never to meet physically anywhere, thus marking the disappearance of a real battlefield of a kind which still existed, in a latent state, during the Falklands/Malvinas and Gulf conflicts.

The distance between the soldier and his adversary has grown, and the asymmetry of warfare demands less and less physical sacrifice from the Western soldier. The purpose of technological progress is to take the soldier out of the actual battle field. This trend is often demonstrated in the images and videos released by the Pentagon, where distance is presented as something synonymous to safety. Yet, during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the courage and morale of U.S. soldiers was repeatedly highlighted in the

media. "Courageous men and women in uniform", perform difficult tasks courageously, tirelessly and successfully and attack the enemy "with incredible courage and skill and dedication" (Department of Defense, 2003e-g). Without questioning the psychological strains and the individual commitment of the soldier, this illustrates the strategic importance of the modern soldier's moral Agency, without which humanitarian battles would prove impossible to fight. However, the modern soldier can be courageous with a much smaller risk of having to eventually self-sacrifice. In this agency, the commitment to hypothetical sacrifice, i.e. joining the ranks voluntarily, is accepted as a sign of virtuousness and courage. "Indeed, the modern hero is the soldier whose ingenuity, toughness, competitiveness and efficiency help him survive. In surviving he becomes a hero." (Coker, 2001, 34). Paradoxically, the soldier's sacrifice is not the body, but often the mind, as demonstrated by the statistics of soldiers impaired by post-traumatic stress disorder, which, according to studies, is linked to violent behavior, work disability and depression, among other things (Pearrow & Cosgrove, 2006).

Despite the instrumental nature of the modern wars, warfare may reveal its expressive dimension to the soldier involved in its actual reality. One of the complex questions of the wars of the 21st century is that expressive violence is getting increasingly difficult to justify, which eventually culminates in the criticism of the soldier and the military organization they represent. When wars are systematically represented as instrumental, sterile and calculated operations that rid the world of evils such as terrorism and tyranny, the public image of the operation becomes sensitive to the representations of reality of warfare as experienced by those who witness it. When images such as those of the Abu Ghraib scandal reach the media, the soldiers become highly expressive agents. In order to control the public image of the organization, the military must make sure the actions and behavior of its representatives remain synchronized in signaling instrumental distance on one hand, and virtuous ideals on the other. It is no coincidence that weapons technology aims to increase the soldiers' distance to their enemies, and now even to the actual battlefield. Technology, human worth and the Western tradition of instrumental violence make up the "*grammar of killing*" we witness today (Coker, 2007: 70). In a sense, moral agency has shifted from the soldiers to the technology they use. Technology is claiming agency on social production, as the distinction between the organic and the machine has collapsed (Coker, 2002: 191).

Most importantly, machines have not only changed the way soldiers see and experience the war, but the way they experience themselves. Paradoxically, without technology their humanity would be impossible to realize. Without technology, they would have to regress back to those

warriors who physically face their enemies and inflict violence without the comfort of distance. The horror and brutality of physical combat is now pictured in war movie scenes where the soldiers are ordered to attach the bayonets to their rifles. In cinema, this symbolizes not only the gravity of the situation and imminent death, but awakens the audience to the terror of the reality of battle. Whether war or crime, death inflicted with a knife is always considered brutal beyond the boundaries of humanity, whereas gunshots from a distance render comfortable, impersonal passivity. The same applies to precision warfare, where distance denotes certain indifference. Missiles kill groups of anonymous enemy soldiers and sometimes women and children, whose deaths are indifferently referred to as "undesired effects" in the Pentagon Press briefings. Personal encounters are reserved for the special, symbolic enemies, the most evil of the evil. Saddam Hussein and bin Laden were prime examples of icons wicked enough to be punished personally. They were encountered face to face, and for those brief moments, instrumentalism gave way to expressive violence.

The faith in Reason, Science and Progress, the intrinsic values of the Enlightenment, changed the Western world view for good and paved way for the next revolution, the Industrial Age. Emerson illustrates the sentiment of the time by contrasting the difference between machines and the human agency. He sees technology as an improved version of humanity: technology is without follies and constraints of humanity (Emerson, 2006). Technology does not discriminate or let emotions get in its way. Guillotines were replaced by electric chairs and lethal injections, rifles with machine guns, tanks, and finally laser guided precision weapons. In the attempt to outperform the previous in efficiency also instrumentalism increased. The question is whether this has made warfare more humanitarian.

2.4 The nation and its narrative

A technological rationale is the rationale of domination itself. It is the coercive nature of society alienated from itself. Automobiles, bombs, and movies keep the whole thing together until their leveling element shows its strength in the very wrong which it furthered. (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979: 121).

The first days of the war in Iraq are remembered as the days of the *Shock and Awe*.

First is, to go back in shock and awe as a concept, the idea is very precise, and some people I think misinterpreted shock and awe for a wave of fire and huge destruction. In fact, in an effects-

based campaign, as this was, we can achieve much shock and awe by hitting just critical points. In fact, a perfect shock and awe would hit as few as possible to create those effects. (Department of Defense, 2003b).

In the spirit of virtuous war, the above description of strategy and doctrine is presented from the perspective of morality. Kinetic doctrine is characterized as an effort to limit destruction instead of inflicting it. This demonstrates how in Strategic Communication efficiency is synonymous to the smallest possible kinetic effects. What this means semantically, is that discourses such as these couple increased lethality of modern weapons with efforts to minimize destruction. Semantically, force equals to virtue.

This ideological landscape of virtuous force has made its way into the names of the operations: *Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Iraq), *Operation Enduring Freedom* (Afghanistan), and *Operation Unified Protector* (Libya). Arjun Appadurai's (1990) concept of "ideoscape" well explains the naming process of 'Western action'. He uses the term to explain the concatenation of politically influenced ideas, images and terms that represent the Enlightenment world-view. According to Appadurai, these terms, such as 'freedom', 'rights' and 'representation' form the master-narrative of the 'enlightened societies'. The narrative was "constructed with a certain internal logic" and organized the political culture around a number of keywords. In the West this keyword is democracy - the term through which we understand both war and peace. Appadurai notes that with the "diaspora" of these key words their semantic and pragmatic meanings demand careful interpretation: the semantic meanings depend on the context, whereas the pragmatic meanings require an understanding of the political actors and their audiences and the contextual conventions that translate the terms into public politics (Appadurai, 1990). The values protected by the Western soldier (*freedom, democracy and security* in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example) are the key terms of the Grand Narrative, the heir of the Enlightenment ideology. With this narrative, the terms become the mythologized blueprint of the shared ideology. "Ideoscapes" contain a certain internal, power-oriented logic: they "frequently have to do with the ideologies of states and the counter ideologies of movements explicitly oriented to capturing state power or a piece of it" (Appadurai, 1990). Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment cosmopolitanism are, according to Venn (2002), "intrinsic to the discourse of modernity." However, the Enlightenment was a universal project that turned from the revolution of reason and equality to the practices of ideology and hegemony. The claim here is that the role of the Enlightenment master-narrative, in the form it exists today, is still to maintain a certain social order. It conveys representations of agency and activity and thereby determines the actor's role in the framework of ideology.

What is essential in the discussion of Strategic Communication is the narrative legacy of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment narrative has a significant role in the making of the American nation. As the United States became "the first nation in the world to base its nationhood solely on Enlightenment values" (Wood 2011: 274-275), these values became to characterize what a true American should be like. On one hand, there was individuality, and on the other, there was the need to become a nation. What this led to was that individualism became a defining characteristic of being an American. In the European tradition people were members of their family first, with little chances of true social mobility, whereas in the 18th century America, man was thought to be in control of his own destiny. As the citizens of this new state were of modest origin, it was natural for them to abandon the tradition of "family and blood" and promote "the new enlightened standards of gentility and learning" instead. These self-made men were "natural aristocrats" because of yielding to the right values (reason, tolerance, honesty, virtue and candidness) rather than family tradition. (Wood, 2011: 277).

Ideologically motivated rhetoric came to establish the America we now know. The tradition of defining the Self in terms of virtue and universal verity is deeply rooted in the American culture. America has been the product of verbalized ideology from the very beginning, and therefore the verbalization of values is a form of communication that can be perceived as an integral part of maintaining the national identity. In addition to being a unifying narrative that distinguished Americans as a nation of their own, Enlightenment philosophy was easily converted into propaganda. According to Taylor (2003, 138-142), Washington had Paine's writings read out for his troops, believing it would improve his their morale, while Adams and Jefferson focused on influencing the American public opinion. "John Adams maintained that the American Revolution was essentially a struggle for the hearts and minds of the people even before the war began", and as the war established, the Revolution demonstrated that ideology, in addition to nationalism and patriotism, was an important factor in maintaining the loyalty of the people (Taylor, 2003: 143-144).

Paradoxically, the philosophy of individualism was also what would make Americans a collective: "Since the Enlightenment emphasized the value of homogeneity and of being a single people, by describing themselves as the most enlightened people in the world Americans assumed that they would thereby be a nation" (Wood, 2011: 274-275). The Enlightenment in the very core of 'American being' not only emphasized cohesion and unity as a nation, but identified with the "universal and ecumenical" principles (Wood, 2011: 275-278). *Democracy* and *representation*, as argued by Appadurai above, have driven political discourses ever since. Today, the

moral responsibility based on ecumenical values still continues to determine the discourses of American foreign policy. These values have become universal to the extent Smith (2006: 13) writes, that "'Reason" and the Enlightenment are typically associated, after all, with political commitments - to liberty, equality, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech - that are widely accepted and that few of us would wish to oppose." Even the wish to discuss alternative values is understood as criticism of the very foundations of society. Smith (2006) argues for a "modern ideal" of the Enlightenment, which means inverting the interpretations of classical Enlightenment values such as commitment to truth, preference for reason over culture, the consensus ideal and the common worldview.

Garrard (2006) summarizes the criticism of the Enlightenment concept of reason into three categories, labeling them as "the Enlightenment perversion of reason": The exaggerated power of reason, its instrumental conception reason unable to provide insight into objective truths about moral or justice, and suggesting that a view of reason could be "pure". According to Smith (2006: 16), the commitment to truth is based on the presupposition that a specific moral and political truth exists, but ignores how truth is in fact embedded in culture - that the philosophy attempts to renounce. Living by this truth was linked to the practice of reason that would eventually lead to (moral and political) consensus. This chain of ideals may describe the legitimation process of Western ideology, but it also reveals its deeply subjective essence, the very sin the commitment to truth rose to oppose. What it comes to show is the recipe for universalizing one truth. In his criticism, Smith (2006: 28) inverts the ideal of truth:

Indeed, it would be at most a slight exaggeration to say that whereas in the classical Enlightenment the purpose of reason was to orient discourse towards the Truth, under the modern ideal the purpose of "public reason" is precisely to prevent claims about Truth from entering into public discourse.

In other words, public reasoning should promote pluralism instead of hegemony. When scrutinizing the practices of Strategic Communication, it is obvious that discourses to produce "one truth" are its ultimate ambition. The parallel between classical Enlightenment and Strategic Communication may be what Smith (2006: 32) calls "complacent endorsement of the ideals and values of the culture that in our self-satisfaction we happen to inhabit." Associating the "self" with the truth is something every culture is guilty of. In Strategic Communication we can observe the modern application of the truth-reason-consensus chain that is fundamentally instrumentalist in its purpose. This classical Enlightenment world view is still used as a rhetorical device in political argumentation and in the implementation of social order. Historian Howard Zinn (2001: 57-

58) states in *A People's History of the United States* that

Those upper classes, to rule, needed to make concessions to the middle class, without damage to their own wealth or power, at the expense of slaves, Indians and poor whites. This bought loyalty. And to bind that loyalty with something more powerful even than material advantage, the ruling group found, in the 1760s and 1770s, a wonderfully useful device. That device was the language of liberty and equality, which could unite just enough whites to fight a Revolution against England, without ending either slavery or inequality.

The "language of liberty and equality" coexisted side by side with slavery and mass executions in the 18th century just like the mantras of democracy and freedom mark the political discourses of 21st century military policy. Above, Zinn suggests that in politics, equality and pluralism were not more than rhetorical tools. In fact, many members of the elites, despite of promoting the enlightenment philosophy, never wanted a pluralist society. Thomas Jefferson, himself a slave owner and yet considered one of the abolitionists, had a political program for the freed slaves. As he did not want to see the formation of a social class of liberated slaves, he demanded slave children be deported to Africa or West-India, without the liberation of their parents (Helo, 1999). The talk about equality was instrumental rhetoric, which may find its modern equivalent in Afghanistan, where war against terror must be waged as the rural Afghans must be liberated to allow them to go to school. Both in the history books teaching us about the French Revolution and in the Pentagon press briefings about the military operations in Afghanistan, violence is presented as an unavoidable sacrifice for universal values - precision weapons have simply replaced the guillotine.

It will be argued that this perceived moral agency based on the universal "truth" of the Enlightenment is the foundation for the instrumental Grand Narrative underlying Strategic Communication. The Enlightenment rhetoric of the 18th century with its political motivations was strategic communication of its time, as it aimed at the very same objectives as the concept of Strategic Communication of today: to unite the audience under one ideology. In the 18th century it was Franklin who spoke in America's interest as the American Ambassador in Paris, but in the 21st century the division of rhetorical responsibility, as discussed in the upcoming chapters, is far more complex. However, the themes of the revolutionary era have prevailed: the rhetoric of liberty, democracy and unity keep characterizing the discourses of Strategic Communication. Today, these ecumenical narratives have evolved from national to international, as they attempt to convince not only the home front, but the entire global audience.

2.5 Conclusions of the Chapter

The significance of the Enlightenment in the context of this research is in its narrative. The themes discussed here - technology as the symbol of progress, the culture of morality and ecumenical democracy - are intertwined themes that have preserved their social and cultural status in the narratives of American identity. This narrative identity contains the shared values and meanings that also form the foundation for Strategic Communication. The Enlightenment was largely narrative. As argued in this chapter, the social practices during this Age included multiple interpretations of this narrative: who is entitled to equality and liberty, and how should the enlightened ideals be pursued?

The Age of Reason produced several texts that reflect and narrate the political aspirations of the era. Documents of the era, such as the Declaration of Independence, echo the visions of the prominent political figures. In a sense, these visions were a certain type of a utopia of happiness. "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" as the motto of the era established satisfaction and contentment as profound rights as the right to live one's life as a free citizen.

The paradox between the idealization of equality, democracy and liberty and their application in the social reality is another echo of the Enlightenment that can still be heard in the 21st century discourses of warfare. Giving birth to the enlightened nation required unpleasant actions such as the genocide of the indigenous people and slavery, although the ultimate objectives were good. Now, establishing a democratic and peaceful society in Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya requires certain sacrifice too. The tragedy of becoming enlightened is that it forces the objects of the project into long stretches of painful interim; to endure, wait and persist, while the enlightenment is brought upon them in the form of violence. To many, the enlightenment projects of the West have meant hegemony of the elites, contrary to the discourses of equality and freedom. In Afghanistan, the villagers are told that if they cooperate and endure a little while longer, happiness will follow: Even if it means losing everything, one day their suffering and sacrifices will be rewarded. These narratives educate the public and turn them into students, but in the enlightenment projects the role of the student is always agonizing, because the world can be made a better place only at their expense. In order to persuade the public into accepting their role as the ones being sacrificed on one hand and educated on the other, the elites need a narrative to explain the interim suffering. The practices of enlightening have manifested as political exorcism: the victim must suffer in the process.

This chapter has provided background for the empirical research of the dissertation. It has discussed the role of the Enlightenment in the making of the American Grand Narrative, and drawn the conclusions that the Age of the Enlightenment is a pivotal factor in many aspects of modern warfare. It turned soldiers into moral agents, drew the attention to the rights of man, and embraced the tradition of uniting people ideologically. The critical claim of this chapter is that the ideals and practice never met. The paradoxes between the rhetoric and practice mean that the Enlightenment appears as a rather superficial ideal that never abolished the conflict between cultures, but aimed at harmonizing the society in the elites' terms without being able to recognize its own subjectivity in the face of Truth and Reason. This ultimately means that the Enlightenment was a convention for a new kind of power use that started with the introduction of the concept of democracy and realizes today as rhetorical humanitarianism. Violence is still practiced against the 'Other', but in discourses these practices are discussed in the context of the Enlightenment, as was done in Iraq, Afghanistan as well as Libya. The legitimations and descriptions of political action never cease to draw their meaning from the Grand Narrative and its themes of democracy, freedom, humanitarianism and efficiency.

The discussion thus far has now arrived to the point where the take on the research topic must be reflected in the light of the background discussion. The awareness of the role of interpretation is crucial in the framework of this research: not only in the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA, introduced in Chapter 3) but also demanded by the critics of CDA (see Billig, 2002). The different contexts of analysis determine the interpretations: in this case the underlying political needs and motivations of Strategic Communication on one hand, and the rights and the needs of those being impacted by it on the other. Interpreting the discourses demands understanding of the different perspectives of the different actors. These perspectives, such as the political need for hegemony or its social implications such as domination, are the contexts of interpretation.

The contexts of interpretation are tied to the ideologies of the actors and targets of discourses. As argued in Chapters 1 and 2, language and ideology are intertwined elements that spell out, legitimize and actualize social practice. The key argument here is that social practice is always based on some ideological conception of the "legitimate" roles of social actors. Much of what constitutes these roles is negotiated verbally and textually. This applies to the framework of this dissertation too: as stated in Chapter 1, warfare is ideological, which needs language to become actualized. This means that politics and ideology are the very context of this research. Considering the criticism leveled at CDA and its pursuit of political and ideological analysis (discussed in Chapter 3), this interpretation of context must be made explicit.

One aspect of ideology and attitude is the stand this dissertation takes towards the role of the Enlightenment. As the discussion thus far has focused on the critique of the Enlightenment, it may appear as an attempt to nihilistically deny the significance and value of the Enlightenment in modern Western society and its history. This is why it is important to point out that the criticism presented here is not criticism of the Enlightenment per se. Instead, what is being criticized is the use of the Enlightenment as a political vehicle for ideology and morality that lead to practices that contradict the rhetoric. Also, this dissertation is critical towards the persistent and uncritical use of Enlightenment themes and argumentation in today's political discourses. It is ethically problematic to maintain discourses that are known to have been used to legitimize violent and hegemonic purposes, and demonstrates a certain kind of indifference towards those who were subject to the Enlightenment very different from the triumph of rights and liberty. The use of such discourses in the political project of democratizing Afghanistan while aware of the social injustices associated with the original political project in the 18th and 19th century illustrates the paradox and subjectivity of the Western concepts of rights and justice, as well as the ideology of "us" and "them".

This dissertation approaches the Enlightenment as a narrative of political and social change rather than a philosophy, and due to this approach the discussion of the Enlightenment is limited to the themes that define its contents as a narrative. This obviously leads to leaving out a number of perspectives to the Enlightenment as a philosophical movement. This should not be interpreted as a claim that the Enlightenment is dismissed as a failed project. Such suggestion is by no means the purpose, but rather the consequence of limiting the research topic. In fact, despite the critical approach to the Enlightenment as a political narrative, the theoretical as well as the methodological framework of the analysis pay tribute to this historical project.

This dissertation proposes that the parallel between the Enlightenment and Strategic Communication as narratives is their political function. The problem of these narratives is that as soon as ideology (i.e. the Enlightenment) becomes politicized, the controversial social practices begin. These social practices were legitimized with the narratives of the Enlightenment, which became the linguistic pattern of hegemony: the narratives were discourses that not only advocated changes in social practice, but maintained social order. This is to say that the Enlightenment as generally understood manifests very differently than the political practices of its time. The praise of science, progress or the ideal of liberty were not problematic, but their political application often turned against their original purpose. The ideals of democracy, progress and human rights

have introduced the guillotine or precision weapons. As a theater of advancing one's interests, politics is a poor stage for the philosophy of equality. This dissertation attempts to point out this difference between the practice and the official narrative.

It is, however, the philosophical legacy of the Enlightenment that not only allows but encourages us to practice critical research. Kant's advocacy of the practice of "public reason" as presented in *What is Enlightenment* (1996) and his argumentation for the rational analysis in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1964) promote critical analysis of social phenomena. Further, it is important to notice the methodological relevance of the empiricism introduced in Kant's approach: the roles of *a priori* and *a posteriori* could be interpreted as the division of analysis to *experience* and *context* (a priori knowledge) and *empiricism* (a posteriori knowledge) (see Kant, 1964) and *a priori* knowledge would therefore be influenced by ideology. Dialectical philosophy since Kant's day, according to Horkheimer, is based on the principle that "the fundamental traits and categories of our understanding of the world depend on subjective factors" (2013: 65). However, the awareness of tracing the subjective origins of these concepts must be part of defining the object (Horkheimer, 2013: 65). This means that *a priori* knowledge is an elementary concept in the critical philosophy attributed to Kant. As such, it addresses the questions of context and subjectivity, the challenges of which in terms of critical analysis are essential in this discussion. The value of these concepts can be examined in the light of the debate on CDA methodology, for instance. As elaborated in the following chapter more thoroughly, critical discourse analysts have been accused of analyzing discourse patterns in isolation of their context (see Breeze, 2011; Jones, 2007; Van Dijk, 2008b). Further, it has been argued that despite determining their approach as "critical", critical discourse analysts do not associate themselves with Kant's critical philosophy:

The critical approaches that emerged in the 1990s do not claim to be the inheritors of all previously self-labelled critical approaches. Critical discourse analysts do not tend to position themselves as Kantians or Popperians. (Billig, 2002).

Regardless of whether this understanding of the critical discourse scholars' preferences in terms of the philosophy of science is accurate or not, this dissertation in fact entertains the idea of recognizing the paradigmatic legacy of Kant's "criticism" as one approach to practicing Critical Discourse Analysis. In the context of this dissertation it not only honors Enlightenment philosophy of science, but complements the theoretical framework of CDA by defining the role and function of context and experience in the analysis.

The criticism of CDA theory and methodology will be discussed later in Chapter 3. However, considering the points made above, one question regarding the disputed political and ideological motivations of CDA should be addressed here. Despite the earlier critique of the Enlightenment as a political project, the motivations for the criticism stem, unsurprisingly, from the moral standpoint determined by the Enlightenment tradition: the commitment to rights and the practice of critical reason. Considering the discussion here, it appears that CDA, in fact, resonates with the ideological context and the Enlightenment-spirit of public, critical reasoning. This means that the essential philosophical and scientific legacy of the Enlightenment is the ability to criticize and analyze social order from within. This also applies to the declared emancipatory reading of this research. The emancipatory motives of CDA to take a stand rather than just describe practices of hegemony and domination (Van Dijk, 1993: 252; Wodak & Weiss, 2003) can be seen as one type of a renaissance of the Enlightenment. This discussion on the role of the Enlightenment in the philosophy of science functions as an introduction to the methodological framework: it recognizes the theoretical parallels between the context discussed thus far and the method discussed in the following chapter and bridges between Critical Discourse Analysis and critical theory, and thereby links the methodological choices to the discussion on the role of the Enlightenment in scientific thought.

This chapter has kept referring to a number of ideals that define the Grand Narrative. In this narrative the essential concept is agency. Ideological being is manifested in the descriptions of *being* and *doing*: the identity of an individual, collective or a nation is always represented by the activities they participate in and the actions they take. Virtue and morality are coded in very different action descriptions than the lack of them. What should be noted here is the content of these descriptions: What are the things "we" do, and how are they evaluated? What is the role of these narratives of action? The following chapter will introduce the theoretical and methodological framework for analyzing this agency. It will be argued that these descriptions of 'enlightened practices' and 'being', as well as the descriptions of immorality, nonvirtuousness and heterogeneity of the adversary, are the window to understanding American 21st century Strategic Communication.

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to analyze narratives as hegemonic, political discourses that reflect social reality, one needs a method that treats language as a system that represents social relations. With the context of the research provided in the previous chapter, this chapter will construct a methodological framework that provides the tools for the critical analysis of power relations. The key term in this chapter is agency: as argued in Chapter 2 and as will be argued in the chapters that follow, agency is the most profound manifestation of being. The themes of instrumentalism discussed in Chapter 2 as well as social, textual and visual exclusion (discussed in the empirical part of the dissertation as well as in the conclusion) are both fundamental in the discourses of Strategic Communication. Both of these phenomena are based on the perception and operation of agency. This chapter links agency to the methodological choice of transitivity analysis and evaluation of action.

As concluded in Chapter 2, what brings Strategic Communication to the thematic context of action is its origin in the narratives of politicized virtue. The themes of the Enlightenment have always been the key words of the military operations the U.S. has engaged in. Warfare is an action based business, and as the *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy* (US Joint Forces Command, 2010) determines, Strategic Communication emerged to address the challenges of "unified action", linking communication to action. Throughout the document action is presented as one form of communication, side by side with "themes, messages, images and action" (p. xi). This means that Strategic Communication can be approached as a method for doctrinizing ideals and converting these ideals into action. This means that it is the concept of action that is critical in the analysis of Strategic Communication.

This chapter introduces the methodological framework of the articles that follow. The discussion is divided in three parts. The first section locates the methodological approach in the domain of Critical Discourse Analysis, which should be understood as the 'umbrella theory' of the methodology. The second section links the analysis of action descriptions to Critical Discourse Analysis by introducing the specific methods for analysis within the systemic functional language theory, namely the analysis of the

experiential function in communication, which is further combined to the Appraisal theory. The third section of the chapter deals with rituals theory. This theory supports the analysis of the experiential functional in both text and image and links language theory and media practice: both the experiential meaning and rituals theory deal with the representations of *action* in communication, which makes rituals theory a perspective to analyzing mediatized Strategic Communication.

In an attempt to generate knowledge to address the research questions of this research, the methodological framework combines, as stated, approaches to deal with the syntactic and semantic dimensions of discourses. In addition, it discusses Strategic Communication in light of a number of concepts central to communication research. These methods are used to approach the underlying communicative resources of Strategic Communication.

3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

The tradition of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is well established and extensive, which means that for the sake of clarity and conciseness, only a number of theorists' contributions can be taken into account here. The following sections will discuss the approaches of Teun A. Van Dijk and Norman Fairclough, whose theoretical contributions to the study of discourse are applicable in the analysis of the structural and syntactic properties of language.

According to Van Dijk, CDA is not a method, but something that could be understood as a *perspective, position* or *attitude* towards analyzing discourse, which characterizes the scholar engaging in the analysis rather than the method (Van Dijk, 2009: 62-63). It should result in detailed descriptions, explanations and critiques of dominant discourses and the way they influence and possibly shape socially shared knowledge, attitudes and ideologies (Van Dijk, 1993: 258-259). Further, CDA deals with discursive power abuse and its consequences (Van Dijk, 1993: 252) as CDA scholars are interested in how discourses (re)produce social power abuse of one group over another, and also how these dominated groups may (discursively) resist this abuse (Van Dijk, 1993; 2009).

CDA as a multidisciplinary approach to the study of language and communication, which means that, unlike other discourse analysts, critical discourse analysts should venture to take an explicit sociopolitical stance: "they spell out their point of view, perspective, principles and aims, both within their discipline and within society at large" (Van Dijk, 1993: 252; also Wodak & Weiss, 2003). According to Van Dijk, the position of critical

scholars should engage in the debate on power use and do it critically by focusing on the perspectives of those who are being dominated (1993: 253). The purpose of Critical Discourse Analysis is therefore to produce interpretations and encourage to take a stand, not merely state "facts" that fail to analyze the implications of power relations and hegemony on the quality of discourses. "[A]ny critique by definition presupposes an applied ethics" (Van Dijk, 1993: 253). The critical, multidisciplinary nature of CDA is demanding, as it challenges the scholar not only to act as a scientist, but as a social critic who should be capable of taking into account the several perspectives to social phenomena:

One conclusion of this discussion of the criteria applied in the choice of the discourse structures studied in CDS projects is that any 'method' or 'approach' that limits itself to some genre or dimension of discourse only can by definition only provide a very partial analysis. Trivially, grammarians usually study grammar, conversation analysts conversations, and narratologists stories and their structures. Now, if some CDS researcher, for the double contextual reasons explained above, precisely needs to study some aspects of grammar, conversation or narration, it is obviously in these more specific areas of research that one looks for relevant structures. But as soon as the critical aims of the research project require a broader approach, those scholars who limit themselves to the study of a single genre or types of structure are often unable to fully deploy their expertise. Hence also my oft-repeated criticism of the exclusive membership of one school, approach or scholarly sect, and my plea for diversity, flexibility and multidisciplinary as general criteria for CDS.
(Van Dijk, 2009: 73)

Military Science is a multi-disciplinary field of research that does not in itself have a clearly defined research tradition. Although it appears as a genre of International Relations in the popular context of discussion, it contains areas of research that call for the paradigms of social sciences. Military science is an arena for analyzing political and ideological discourses, addressed here as strategic communication, the purpose of which is to persuade and serve power and dominance. This makes CDA a natural approach, or attitude, to engaging in its theoretical and practical implementations. Because Strategic Communication is essentially a communication model and realizes discourses of different kinds, it cannot be analyzed in the context of military policy alone.

The following sections will continue the discussion on CDA. Van Dijk's (2008a: 213) approach to discourse analysis is triangular and understands discourse as a social, cognitive and discursive-semiotic phenomenon. The

following section discusses the social dimension as it addresses manipulation, i.e. the discursive dynamics and (im)balances between social actors. After this a discussion on the cognitive dimension of discourse will take place, discussing Van Dijk's theory for conceptualizing the cognitive processes in attempts to influence. Finally, the discursive-semiotic phenomena refers to the exercise of manipulation in the form of text, image and speech. According to Van Dijk, all of these three approaches are required in order to establish "explicit links between the different dimensions of manipulation" (Van Dijk, (2008a: 213). This triangular model advocates a multidisciplinary approach that recognizes the social, cognitive, and discursive dimensions of influence. This approach to discourse analysis is able to bridge language and social experience, which is crucial in the context of this research. Also, it is applicable to the further analysis of micro structures of language and discourse (grammar and semantics) - which is not always the case with all politically oriented discourse theories.

The triangular (society/cognition/discourse) approach is further supported by a discussion on ideological discourse analysis as a subtype of CDA that particularly addresses the research interests of Military Science and provide context for the further discussion on methodology. Warfare is essentially the context of ideology and power, and Van Dijk's theoretical principles on the social, cognitive, and discursive phenomena provide a clear theoretical framework for analyzing the discourses that have always been the object of multidisciplinary research. However, the obvious benefit of Van Dijk's approach is that the gap between discourse as linguistic practice and discourse as social practice has been accounted for.

3.1.1 Discourse as social practice: manipulation and persuasion

The strategic objective of Strategic Communication is to influence the perceptions of the "key audiences" to "create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments" (Department of Defense, 2009). This implies the objective of social and cognitive engagement that would result in asymmetry of power.

Whereas military doctrines typically speak mainly of influence, Van Dijk (2008a: 212) differentiates between manipulation and persuasion by defining manipulation as "illegitimate influence" that is used to serve the interests of the manipulator against the interests of the manipulated. Persuasion, instead, is defined as legitimate attempts to present information, which leaves the participants free to accept or reject the

arguments of the persuader. This leaves us with the question about the boundaries between manipulation and persuasion. What makes manipulation illegitimate is that it violates social norms (Van Dijk (2008a: 212), which gives manipulation its permanently covert nature. The question remains: can communication rid itself of the objective to persuade or manipulate? Can communication labeled as "strategic" be much else other than manipulation? According to Marková (2008) "there would be hardly any reason to communicate if there were no tensions, asymmetries or conflicts between interacting parties." Instead of manipulation, Marková uses the term "propaganda" as the counterpart for persuasion. Marková's thesis is that the underlying difference between propaganda and persuasion is that in propaganda, the Ego and the Alter fuse their mutual positions, that is, engage in a negotiation in order to be mutually involved. Propaganda aims at monologue as the propagandist aims to merge the Ego and the Alter into one being. Persuasion is understood as a dialogical action that manifests in a struggle for social recognition and demands constant monitoring of the relationship between the Ego and the Alter.

In this theoretical framework, the boundary between persuasion and manipulation may at times appear unclear, but to apply Van Dijk's definition, persuasion turns into manipulation when it stops applying adequate information and uses distorted facts to produce legitimacy. This goes against the aforementioned social norms, as "*manipulation is illegitimate in a democratic society, because it reproduces, or may reproduce, inequality*" (Van Dijk, 2008a: 216). The failure to provide adequate information and the use of distorted information may be best illustrated by the hunt for the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, which now can be given as an example of how manipulation was practiced instead of persuasion. The problem of manipulation undermines the practices of a democratic society. This means the analysis of manipulative practices always operates in the macro/social dimension.

To summarize: In this section the social dimension of discourse is discussed in the framework of power dynamics. Influence can be understood either as persuasion or manipulation, the first referring to a more dialogical negotiation process, and the second to what could be characterized as propaganda or deception.

3.1.2 Discourse and cognition

After discussing the discourse as a social phenomenon, it is time to turn to the second approach to discourse - its cognitive dimension. This section therefore introduces the concepts of *mental models* and *social cognition*, which are some of the key terms in Van Dijk's theory on discourse and

power.

Van Dijk argues that because the long-term memory is where the *episodic* memories are stored, *episodic manipulation* is geared towards ideology, knowledge and attitudes (Van Dijk, 2008a: 218). The memories of our communicative events are stored in the episodic memory as mental models. Telling a story means that the storyteller constitutes a mental model of the subjective experience - and the recipient constitutes a mental model when the story is understood and interpreted (Van Dijk, 2008a: 218). This is not mere interpretation and association of words: "It is this mental model that is the basis of our future memories, as well as the basis of further learning, such as the acquisition of experience-based knowledge, attitudes and ideologies" (Van Dijk, 2008a: 220). This obviously means that it is the mental models that must be targeted in order to manipulate, persuade, or influence the individual.

Van Dijk (2009) makes a pronounced point of the fact that we do not have access to the emotions and mindsets of the communicators and their audiences. In order to study the phenomena of social cognition, one has to find some common ground between social psychology, language and communication theories, and political science. Van Dijk (2006a; 2006b; 2009) advocates an integrated, multidisciplinary approach to discourse to address the relations between cognitions and discourses, namely the understanding of the concept of *social cognition*. He argues that social cognition is the "missing link" and the theoretical interface between discourse and dominance, the neglect of which has been a major shortcoming in many critical analyses of language and discourse (Van Dijk, 1993: 251).

Social cognition and mental models are the key to understanding the infrastructure of discursive and therefore social power and dominance, seen by Van Dijk as "the influence of knowledge, beliefs, understanding, plans, attitudes, ideologies, norms and values" (van Dijk, 1993: 254, 257). He argues that the main resource of power is cognitive, enacted by strategies of persuasion and manipulation among others, in attempts to "*change the mind of others in one's own interests*" (van Dijk, 1993: 254, 257). These cognitive models are characterized as "[s]ocially shared representations of societal arrangements, groups and relations, as well as mental operations such as interpretation, thinking and arguing, inferencing and learning" realized by text and talk (Van Dijk, 1993). This means that social cognitions transmit knowledge between the micro level (words, syntax) and the macro level (social cognitions, currents, and collectivities) as well as between discourse and action and the individual and the group (Van Dijk, 1993; 2009). In brief, "social cognitions allow us to link dominance and discourse" (Van Dijk, 1993: 257).

In addition to mental models, the cognitive structures essential in the socially shared representations and perceptions of social reality also include *context models*. Van Dijk presents these as a partially overlapping models complementary of each other. Mental models are "*subjective, and possibly biased* representations of 'reality'", and may feature personal and/or socio-cultural evaluations (opinions and emotions) of events or situations, which means to say they are the starting point of discourse as well as what discourses should, in order to make sense and meaning, result in (Van Dijk, 2006b). Context models, in turn, are mental models that are the starting point to engaging in discourse and the basis of 'pragmatic' interpretation (Van Dijk, 2006b). Context models determine the genre and style of communicating mental models and thus control the verbal/textual realization of experience and perception. Context models mediate the relation between discourse and society and make sure "language users adapt their discourse to the social environment, so that it is socially *appropriate*" (Van Dijk, 2009: 73).

The basic composition of context models contains the *spatiotemporal setting*, participants, identities, roles and relationships, goals, knowledge, ideologies and the ongoing social action (Van Dijk, 2009: 74), i.e. the shared knowledge of the components that make up the social reality. These models determine all the variable aspects of discourse, including intonation, syntax and lexicon (Van Dijk, 2009: 74). This establishes the link between grammar and cognition that is essential in the empirical analysis of discourse. Also, what is relevant in the focus of this dissertation is the link between language structure and power, when power is understood as established and shared social knowledge of roles, identities, relationships, and goals. The power of different groups is measured in their access to discourses (Van Dijk, 1993: 257), which means that power essentially means the opportunity to participate in and influence public discourses. The parallelism of power and discourse access is evident: "the more discourse genres, contexts, participants, audience, scope and text characteristics they (may) actively control or influence, the more powerful social groups, institutions or elites are" (Van Dijk, 1993: 256). The implications of power and dominance over groups is thus not merely the access to discourse in terms of control (context or content), but the opportunity to influence and manipulate social representations and thereby the minds of other people (Van Dijk, 1993: 257, 260, 262). As context models determine the appropriate manner to engage in social practice (discourse), the apparent implication is that those who possess power are also able to break the rules of normative discourse, (i.e. who gets to be heard and who not, and in what circumstances) which is how social cognitions are influenced in the political sphere.

The cognitive and emotional values and belief systems are deeply embedded in both culture and the individual, which makes them fairly enduring, if not permanent, and therefore contribute to the preservation of the status quo (Wodak, 2006). According to Van Dijk, the most influential form of manipulation focuses on creating not only specific mental models, but more general abstract knowledge, attitudes and ideologies (Van Dijk, 2008a, 221). Therefore, manipulation should focus on more general, shared representations instead of the individual mental models in order to be most effective.

Whereas manipulation may concretely affect the formation or change of unique personal mental models, the general goals of manipulative discourse are the control of the shared social representations of groups of people because these social beliefs in turn control what people do and say in many situations and over a relatively long period. (Van Dijk, 2008a: 222-223).

To summarize: This section has discussed Van Dijk's theory on the cognitive dimension of discourse and its contribution to the analysis of persuasion and manipulation. It has introduced mental and context models that embody the personal history, attitudes, opinions and experiences of the individual and determine one's communicative behavior in social situations. In addition, there are more general, shared social cognitions, which control the social behavior of groups and collectives. According to this approach, effective influence attempts should focus primarily on the social cognition rather than individual mental models (Van Dijk, 2008a: 222-223).

3.1.3 Approaching ideological discourse

As postulated in Chapter 2, in this research Strategic Communication is treated as ideological discourse. This approach can be supported by Fairclough's regard of social institutions as ensembles of ideological-discursive formations, which are essentially their own 'speech communities' that each have their own 'ideological norms' (Fairclough, 2010: 30). According to Fairclough, it is the ideologies naturalized in the organization's discourse that determine the order of interaction. He calls this the "orderliness" of discourse: ideas of how things are expected to be. Naturalized ideologies begin to appear as 'common sense' and non-ideological, which, in turn, means that a critical, micro/macro approach is needed to denaturalize them (Fairclough, 2010: 30-31). This is the approach to the analysis of Strategic Communication here as well. As it is recognized as ideological, asymmetric discourse, the methods applied in its analysis aim to its denaturalization. An aspect that should be taken into account in terms of ideological discourse is the fact that it is typically

generated from within a position: no institution or organization produces discourses, but the members of those structures produce defences and legitimations of that position, organization or institution in order to either challenge or sustain one's position (Van Dijk, 1995a).

The aim of ideological discourse analysis is specifically to link structures of discourse to structures of ideologies, which has shown to form patterns such as systematic, negative other-presentation:

Since ideologies are the basis of our social judgments, and ideologically controlled propositions are opinion statements, expressions of such opinions, e.g., those about 'Others', will often indicate what ideological constraints are involved. Lexical items chosen to describe others, as in the case of the well-known pair of freedom fighter and terrorist, when applied to the Contras and the Sandinistas by ex-president Ronald Reagan, are an example in kind. (Van Dijk, 1995a).

The assumed *general schema* of ideological discourse (ideology being a system "at the basis of socio-political cognitions of groups") consists of categories such as membership devices, typical acts, aims, relations with other groups and resources that result in different kinds of self-identity, being and activity, goal, norm and value, position and relation and resource descriptions that determine the semantic representations of both 'self' and the 'other' on both micro and macro levels of discourse (Van Dijk, 1995a; 1995b; 2009). The micro/macro link also means ideological discourses are cognitive representations, as the association of certain actors with specific actions, goals, and other properties require existing mental and context models. Ideologies are social cognition: they organize group attitudes, the development and structure of sociocultural knowledge and, essentially, evaluative beliefs, ultimately leading to the polarizing applications of ideological discourses (Van Dijk, 1995b: 19).

Ideologies in our perspective are not merely systems of ideas, let alone properties of the individual minds of persons. Neither are they vaguely defined as forms of consciousness, let alone as false consciousness. Rather, they are very specific basic frameworks of social cognition, with specific internal structures, and specific cognitive and social functions (Van Dijk, 1995b: 21).

Because ideologies are defined as social cognition mediated by discourses, this discussion must be extended to its discursive-semiotic phenomena. As stated, Strategic Communication is treated as ideological discourse in this analysis. It is characterized by self-presentation, which means constant evaluative practices that are incorporated into its social, cognitive and

discursive (syntactic and semantic) practices. This self-presentation is continuous and at times covert, whereas the other aspect of ideological discourse, the other-presentation, is typically periodic and overt. The structures of ideological discourse reflect this (re)presentation process. Van Dijk (2008a) summarizes the typical strategies:

<i>Overall interaction strategies</i>	(self-presentation, other-presentation)
<i>Macro speech-acts</i>	(accusation, defense)
<i>Semantic macrostructures: topic selection</i>	(emphasize negative/positive topics about Us/Them)
<i>Local speech acts implementing and sustaining the global ones, e.g. statements that prove accusations</i>	
<i>Local meanings: Our/Their positive/negative action</i>	(vague/precise, general/specific descriptions)
<i>Lexicon: Select positive words for Us, negative words for Them</i>	
<i>Local syntax</i>	(passives, nominalizations, agency)
<i>Rhetorical figures</i>	(metonyms and metaphors)
<i>Expressions: sounds and visuals</i>	(modality, order of presentation)

Table 1: *Discursive strategies of manipulation according to Van Dijk (2008a, 227)*

As demonstrated by the chart above, processes of presentation (and representation) are thus in the very core of ideological discourse. This is to say that ideology can be traced in the (re)presentations of being, acting, and behaving. This will be addressed in the next section.

To summarize: The mental models that mediate social cognitions are essential in understanding how ideologies form and function. CDA expects ideology to have a micro level structure and a macro level reflection. Ideology is perhaps best reflected, both in the micro structures and in the macro reflections of discourse, by self- and other-presentation. This principle is, in essence, the social-cognitive-discursive triangular approach to understanding discourse. Each dimension has an impact on the other two, which means all three must be considered in the analysis. The following section builds on these assumptions. To bring the discussion from theory to practice, it builds a method that can be applied in the micro level analysis of Strategic Communication, as well as in the discussion on the macro level impacts of this ideological structure.

3.2 The criticism of Critical Discourse Analysis

After outlining the framework of CDA and before moving onto the more detailed methodological choices, the discussion will now turn to the criticism leveled at CDA as a research tradition. This discussion will bring forth criticism aimed at both paradigmatic and methodological principles of CDA, which are then addressed from the perspective of the methodological framework of this dissertation.

The first theme of criticism aimed at CDA and its practitioners has to do with the very name of the tradition. The term "critical" and the claim to "the" critical analysis has irritated non-CDA scholars, who argue that the claim to the term suggests discourse analysis other than CDA could not be critical. Billig (2002) argues that CDA analysts are likely to consider traditional linguistics non-critical, whereas Jones (2007) claims that all language use is critical. Jones makes examples of situations and contexts where language users know to be critical and aware of the nuances of the conversation without any discourse analytical practice - like when a teenager asks to borrow the parents' car. This approach, or attitude, does however ignore that Fairclough (1992, 9) has specifically stated that "critical" means "showing connections and causes that are hidden" and therefore not explicit in verbal or textual interaction.

Breeze (2011) interprets the claim to criticality as an implication of the politicized and ideological context of CDA. She argues that CDA claims monopoly over critical analysis and, by doing that, suggests that critical discourse analysts discredit analysis other than CDA as uncritical. This, she claims, is perceived by critical discourse analysts as siding with the hegemonic actor and supporting the status quo:

Non-critical approaches are not simply another option: By not taking a critical stance, they are taking side with the existing hegemonies, guilty of precluding the necessary social critique, and thereby of collusion or of furthering the reproduction of an unjust social order.

As suggested by Billig (2002), what constitutes the essence of CDA is the linking of language and power. The critics argue that the political context of CDA is problematic, as the political/ideological approach to analysis by the CDA practitioners may mean the analysis has a political reading. CDA tends to "assume their own left-wing political standpoint uncritically" despite the Frankfurt school principle of self-criticism, accuses Breeze (2011). This suggests that CDA is not merely a framework for the analysis of political and ideological discourses, but has integrated a certain emancipatory agenda in its methodology. Like other descendants of the

Frankfurt school critical theory, CDA is associated with certain elements of Marxist tradition, but, according to Breeze (2011), CDA has stepped away from the Frankfurt school heritage in terms of the word "critical". According to Slembrouck (2001) "CDA continues to be unclear about its exact preferences for a particular social theory", but does this not suggest it is in fact not committed to any specific political preference?

The second problem with the politicized nature of CDA, as raised by the critics, is the question of context (see Harris, 1981). Jones (2007) criticizes CDA for suggesting that the ideological orientation of text can be analyzed outside its political interpretation, as if semantic and grammatical elements alone would reflect the ideological orientation of the text. This would make CDA a system for certain preferences in interpretation and presenting it as something objective:

In reality, the 'method of analysis' in question is simply a way of cloaking particular interpretative preferences – including particular assumptions and opinions about politics, ideology and the role and functions of discourse in society – with a spurious objectivity stemming from an appeal to the (segregationist's) 'facts' of linguistic structure and function. (Jones, 2007).

According to this argument, ideology has no specific linguistic structure. This is the reason that creates tension between CDA and its critics: if the correlation of language structure and ideology is denied (as in Harris, 1981), the methods of CDA will appear artificial by default.

Jones & Collins (2006) argue that political and linguistic analysis should not be combined, but this view dismisses the role of politics and ideology as the contexts of analysis. However, this dissertation argues that politics and ideology are, above all, linguistic phenomena, which require discourses to be actualized. By denying the legitimacy of these contexts in the analysis of these actual discourses undermines the legitimacy of all interdisciplinary research. This means that the critics cannot accuse CDA both for its politicized nature as well as lack of contextualization, as these two things are often the one and the same thing.

Whether CDA is practiced for political purposes is another case. If the analysis is anything more than descriptive, it can be interpreted as "political". However, the inter-disciplinary nature of CDA means that critical analysis not only describes discourses, but addresses the parallels and paradoxes of the discourse and ideologies that come to contact with it. Mere descriptions of discourse have little social significance, but significance can be achieved by applying this knowledge in different social contexts - such as politics and power. Politicized analysis is not the right of social and political research only. If the legitimacy of the combination of

political and linguistic analysis is denied, one may ask whether any interdisciplinary approach is, in fact, appropriate. Rather, the ethical requirements for the ideological and political analysis in CDA are in the transparency of the data and argumentation of the analysis, which must be available for scrutiny. As long as this transparency is realized, the analysis exists for its own right. Again, this is a question of research ethics in general, rather than a built-in problem of CDA alone. Excluding the social and political dimensions of discourse analysis would mean there is no actual analysis, but mere data.

Jones (2007) extends his criticism to the methodology of CDA. His criticism is interesting in the framework of this dissertation, as it is leveled specifically at systemic functional language theory, the methodological framework introduced later in this chapter. Jones attempts to demonstrate the redundancy of the SFL approach with an example of a mountaineer and a linguist offering a systemic-functional analysis of the mountaineer's discourse. This is a typical example of criticism that is used to demonstrate the incapability of CDA, or in this case SFL as a rule-based linguistic framework, to provide relevant or interesting knowledge about social interaction. However, examples such as these ignore power, ideology and politics as the operational environment of CDA. Mountaineering is a context CDA was never designed for, as there obviously is no negotiation of power or hegemony. However, this example, according to Jones (2007), is an example of the "language myth". This is a reference to Harris's (1981) integrationist theory, according to which people refuse to or are unable to recognize the integration of social processes and communicative practices. This argument undermines rule-based linguistics, not only CDA and SFL, in general. One of the key criticisms here deals with context, which, in the integrationist approach promoted by Harris, is what determines the meanings in language and interaction. However, as argued thus far, context is an integral element taken into account, for instance, in van Dijk's triangular model as the prerequisite for the cognitive processing of discourse. Further, the integrationist approach undermines much of what is fundamental to the linguistic turn in social science, namely the methodological choice of treating language as a window to the human cognition. This paradigmatic discussion, unfortunately, is beyond the scope of this dissertation. As framed in Chapter 1 and further elaborated in this chapter, the paradigm of language and communication research underlying this dissertation establishes that language and communication can only be interpreted.

Much of the critique leveled at CDA originates from the paradigmatic clash of CDA as a rule-based framework, which means that also certain methods applied in CDA have received criticism. As Breeze (2011) points out, methods such as the analysis of nominalizations have been criticized by the critics of CDA (see Fowler, 1996; Widdowson 1998). In 2008, a debate

about the role of nominalizations in CDA sparked in a *Discourse & Society* edition, where Billig argued that critical discourse scholars use nominalizations while being critical of their use in political texts. Billig demanded CDA scholars start practicing what they preach:

If critical analysts take seriously their own ideological warnings about nominalization and passivization, they need to change the standard ways of writing critical analysis. We need to use simpler, less technical prose that clearly ascribes actions to human agents. (Billig, 2008).

This received responses from Fairclough, Van Dijk and Martin, who pointed out that CDA does not analyze nominalizations in isolation, but always pays attention to the context (Van Dijk, 2008b). Martin (2008), in turn, pointed out that Billig's own text was full of nominalizations Billig himself demanded should not be used in linguistic analysis. Fairclough's (2008) response was that in addition to writing to the general public, it is necessary for the CDA scholars to develop theory and methodology, which makes the use of technical jargon and abstraction necessary in the academic context. Martin (2008) points out that the challenge with interdisciplinary research is the merging of different knowledge structures. Martin cites Bernstein (1996), who sees hierarchical, vertical knowledge structures (science) and horizontal knowledge structures (humanities) at the opposite ends of the cline:

For Bernstein, a feature of both social science and humanities knowledge structures is that they comprise a set of competing languages of description (various linguistic theories for example, or kinds of history – traditional, Marxist, feminist, post-colonial, etc.). Were I to arrange SFL, CDA and Billig along this cline, I would place SFL closer to the science end of the scale and Billig closer to the humanities end than CDA. (Martin, 2008).

This perspective points out that the debate is mostly a question about the paradigmatic differences between disciplines.

CDA criticism thus focuses on CDA's claim to the "critical" approach in the "ideological" context using a rule-based framework and methodology. This dissertation relies on Van Dijk's approach to criticality (as explained in the previous sections) as a necessary step towards recognizing hegemony. Even if deemed methodologically possible by some linguists, it appears problematic to analyze hegemonic organizations unless their hegemonic status is not first recognized and questioned. As stated, hegemonic aspirations create specific needs for the hegemonic actor (i.e. capabilities to

persuade, manipulate and control), and dismissing this would equal to dismissing the context of the analysis. Further, judging discourse as "ideological", a practice criticized by Jones (2007; also Jones & Collins, 2006) is not in this dissertation done merely in the tradition of CDA, but it is a perspective argued already in the contextualization of the research: in Chapter 2, this claim is based on a much wider philosophical notion of language as "violence". In this case the foundations of the "Grand Narrative" is compared and contrasted to the political practices in both history and present day in attempt to find correlations between language and practice.

As this discussion on CDA criticism demonstrates, the dispute appears to stem from the paradigmatic conflict of not only CDA, but all rule-based linguistic frameworks and their critics. All in all, the points of criticism leveled at CDA are valid when CDA is done badly, which is exactly the case that applies to other traditions of linguistic analysis as well. Like in any other tradition of linguists, critical discourse analysts are and should be evaluated only for the research they produce. What comes to providing an unambiguous, simple and comprehensive analysis of the intertwined linguistic, social and cognitive phenomena, it should be asked whether *any* school of discourse analysis is capable of providing such thing. However, this should not discourage the attempts to do so and from developing theory and methods in this pursuit. The next sections will construct a methodological framework, where special attention has been paid to context: the method is based on the concept of transitivity, but this concept is understood as an experiential manifestation that actualizes multimodally. The framework attempts to enable diverse approaches to the core methodological concept of agency, although the focus here is on the textual and visual aspects.

3.3 From Action descriptions to analysis

Thus far the discussion has focused on the theoretical framework of the methodology. CDA, as stated, functions as the umbrella theory in the analysis of Strategic Communication as ideological discourse and a communication model. Attention has also been paid to the discursive micro/macro apposition, as it is important that the methodological set-up recognizes the interplay of both levels - the micro structures of language and the social cognitions.

Language use, discourse, verbal interaction, and communication belong to the microlevel of the social order. Power, dominance, and inequality between social groups are typically terms that belong to a macrolevel of analysis. This means that CDA has to

theoretically bridge the well-known "gap" between micro and macro approaches [...]. (Van Dijk, 2001).

What bridges the micro- and macrolevels in the upcoming analysis is the concept of *action*. Strategic Communication is characterized as 80% action and 20% words (Murphy, 2008). Further, one of the core principles of Strategic Communication is the synchronization of words and actions. This implies that this communication model attempts to doctrinize the transforming of discourse (micro) into social behavior (macro). It determines the discursive themes and messages as the blueprint of the "Battle of the Narrative" and then proceeds to laying out the methods for aligning speech and behavior to avoid the "say-do gap" (see US Joint Forces Command, 2010: III-10). The result of this is a model of communication that dictates the process of communication from discourse to physical action, i.e. from microlevel to macrolevel.

A methodological framework that addresses the significance of action is hereby essential. This brings us to Halliday's functional language theory, in which action and being descriptions, referred to as Processes, are treated as the core of language and communication. The following two sections discuss the methodology of treating action descriptions as the primary object of analysis.

3.3.1 Systemic functional language theory and the metafunctions

The link between language structure and the social dimension of interaction is what ties CDA to the method, functional language theory, introduced in the next section. The functional language theory treats syntax not only as a system of rules, but as a resource for social interaction (Van Leeuwen, 2005: 69). The understanding of language as a social and cognitive structure is thus the common field between the theoretical frameworks of Critical Discourse Analysis, social semiotics, and functional language theory.

The micro/macro division underlies the functional language theory: language has a function in structure, and a function in society (Halliday, 2004; Van Leeuwen 2005). Butt et al. (2003) captures these functions into three categories:

- ♣ to express past, present and future happenings
- ♣ to interact and express a point of view
- ♣ to make the output of expression and interactions a coherent whole

In Halliday's systemic functional grammar these functions are labeled as

ideational, interpersonal and textual metafunctions. The ideational metafunction contains the experiential and logical meanings: the first encodes experience, whereas the second shows the relationships between them (Butt et al., 2003). In this research the experiential meaning is in focus. It expresses the "landscape of human experience" as it contains the answer to the question "who does what to whom under what circumstance" (Butt et al., 2003: 46). Further, it contains the information about the participants, actions, and the objects of actions - elements that may appear as mere clause constituents, but that participate, as will be argued, in the formation and mediation of persuasion, manipulation and ideological discourses.

The interpersonal metafunction encodes interaction and ideas and expresses attitudes and approaches language as exchange (Butt et al. 2003: Halliday, 2004). It looks beyond the information provided through language use, and deals with the relationship between the participants engaged in interaction. "What someone says may look like demanding or giving information but could be an oblique way of demanding goods and services" (Butt et al., 2003: 86). The interpersonal metafunction emerges textually in grammatical functions such as Subject and the Finite (tense or modality of the verb) and the Mood (imperative, declarative, interrogative) they form together - which may be manipulated by the speaker to indicate whether they give or demand information, goods, or services (Butt et al., 2003: 86).

The textual metafunction of language organizes the above meanings into a coherent written or spoken whole. This metafunction is realized by signposts that inform readers/listeners about where the writer/speaker is and is headed to (Butt et al., 2003: 134). Textual meanings include the Theme and the Rheme of the clause, indicating the focus of the message.

The scope of the analysis emphasizes the experiential function of communication, namely the action descriptions. The experiential metafunction deals with the representational systems of language. Encoded action represents the experience, perception and communication-strategic aims of the interlocutor, which can be used as a window to understanding and discursive processes such as persuasion and manipulation in the context of ideology.

3.3.2 Action and transitivity

"[O]ur discourses, our knowledge about the world, ultimately derive from what we do" (Van Leeuwen, 2005: 102). This characterization of the experiential metaphor well defines the function of the experiential meaning in general: it establishes a link between discourse and social practice (Van

Leeuwen, 2005: 102). Experience consists of a flow of events, happenings or 'goings-on', which means it realizes as grammatical figures of happening, doing, sensing, saying, being, or having (Halliday, 2004: 170). These figures are Processes, which bring together the Participant and the possible Target and Circumstance in the grammar of the clause: the clause is a "mode of reflection, of imposing order on the endless variation and flow of events" (Halliday, 2004: 170). The fundamental claim here is that the Process, here often referred to as an *action* (or *being*) *description*, is a window to the world of experience - the core of experience. Halliday (2004: 170) makes the main distinction between the Process types of the 'inner' and 'outer' experience:

There is a basic difference, that we become aware of at a very early age (three to four months), between inner and outer experience: between what we experience as going on inside ourselves, in the world of consciousness (including perception, emotion and imagination). The prototypical form of the 'outer' experience is that of actions and events: things happen, and people and other actors do things, or make them happen. The 'inner' experience is harder to sort out; but it is partly a kind of replay of the outer, recording it, reacting to it, reflecting on it, and a separate awareness of our states of being. The grammar sets up a discontinuity between these two: it distinguishes rather clearly between outer experience, the processes of the external world, and inner experience, the processes of the consciousness.

Structure and system are the primary concepts for organizing language (Halliday, 2004; 2009a).

In language as in other semiotic systems, meaning is the product of the interplay of system and structure - of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations. (Halliday, 2009a: 64).

Further, Halliday (2009a: 64) notes that in systemic functional linguistics, structure is thought of as something that derives from the system. System and structure are, according to Martin & White (2005) "complementary faces of meaning potential", which means neither face can be dismissed. The system is realized in structure, but the aim of systemic functional linguistics is not to describe the structure itself, but to represent the "meaning potential" of the language without fixating on patterns and syntax (Halliday, 2009a: 65). Such systems include the system of *transitivity, polarity, voice, mood, and modality, theme and information*. Polarity will be discussed in the next section as a part of the theory on evaluation, but transitivity is essentially tied to the context of *action*.

Activity descriptions are what leads us to the transitivity system. This system is not language specific, but it should be understood as a system of organization. It is a system in which the interplay of the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations (structure and outlook) are especially marked. The transitivity system construes the activity descriptions into a set of Process types, the main types of which, according to Halliday (2004: 171) are the material, mental, and relational Process types. The transitivity system contains the information of what is happening or being done, by whom and to whom: the Participant (nominal groups: actor, agent, goal, carrier, sayer, depending on the Process type), the Process (verbal groups: relational, verbal, mental, behavioral, material or existential) and the Circumstance (adverbial groups and prepositional phrases: time, place, etc.) (Halliday, 2005). These elements are also the structural elements of narratives, especially the Process. If a narrative is seen as a flow of events, its very blueprint consists of Processes. The transitivity system can be seen as a mirror to the social world. Van Leeuwen (2005: 104) postulates that

In short, I believe that all discourses are modelled on social practices and that our understandings always derive from our doings. But discourses transform these practices in ways which safeguard the interests at stake in a given social context.

This further illustrates the significant role of action in the analysis of both discourse and social practice. Action carries both symbolic and practical functions: it represents both the ideological and physical world, and organizes relationships in the social world and transmits information.

Process type	Participant		Sample clauses
Material	Actor		<i>we strike only military targets</i>
Behavioural	Behaver		<i>Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, flaunts the laws of war</i>
Mental	Senser		<i>we continue to believe [...] that maintaining the ability for a country to grow and flourish and have an economy after any military operation is important</i>
Verbal	Sayer		<i>we talked in here about</i>

			<i>countertargeting</i>
Relational	Attributive	Carrier, Attribute	<i>our intent is to have a process that not only looks to determine the target's validity</i>
	Identifying	Token, Value	<i>These are not tactics of war, they're crimes of war.</i>
Existential	Existent		<i>there is a very good way to try to keep the number of casualties and the damage to the minimum</i>

Table 2: Process types, Participants and sample clauses (Background Briefing On Targeting / Department of Defense, 2003d).

Because of the variation the transitivity system allows the language user to express certain experiences from many different perspectives. As the following chart illustrates, Process types allow the projection of values in the reports of the experiential world:

A: Verbal	<i>They suggested it's a job that they've got to do. They claim it's a job that they've got to do.</i>
B: Mental (cognition)	<i>They know it's a job that they've got to do. They think it's a job that they've got to do.</i>
C: Relational (identifying)	<i>They are the ones who have got a job to do. They are not the ones who have got a job to do.</i>

Table 3: Processes contrasted

Each Process has its own specific emphasizing character. Some emphasize the 'inner' world, some the 'outer'. The choice of Process makes the tone of the clause; it is not irrelevant whether a speaker reports the 'enemy' to claim, think, or simply to be something. In general, the projection of another entity's inner experience is always a strong statement. At the same time, reports of one's own actions evaluate action accordingly: the Self is identified with positive properties and legitimate, acceptable action. This means that linguistic evaluation, i.e. ideology, is present in the action description (Process) regardless of the genre of the text or speech. Process

types are thus an example of micro structures of discourse that should be of a particular interest to critical discourse analysts. When dealing with Strategic Communication, this is even more so. Military (political) discourses are organized around the expectation of action, and, in a sense, only action counts militarily. This means military (political) discourses are a naturally descriptions of action. However, the evaluation contained by the Process can be discussed further than this.

3.3.3 Evaluation and Polarity

With the transitivity system introduced, it is time to turn to the other relevant system of language - *polarity*. Polarity is discussed here as an introduction to the Appraisal theory, in which polarity plays a very apparent role. Again, being a system of language, polarity is not tied to any specific language structure, but it is reflected by a number of them, one being evaluative patterns.

Polarity can, according to Halliday (2009a: 65) be considered "the prototype of all grammatical systems", which carries the meanings of *positive* and *negative*: "it is the name of the choice between the two." Polarity is thus the system of yes and no, plus and minus, realized in language as claims, denials, affirmations and evaluations, for instance. This means that when we analyze glorification or demonizing, the system we are dealing with is polarity that realizes in an ensemble of syntagmatic and lexical choices. We will here focus on the polarization in evaluation, or more precicely, polarization in the evaluation signified by action.

The method for analyzing evaluation, the Appraisal theory, strongly links social experience to language. If the transitivity system is concerned with constructing experience, the Appraisal theory explains the interpersonal function of discourse and negotiates social relations. It is concerned with the subjective stances of the speaker/writer toward the outer world. The theory deals with how speakers/writers "approve and disapprove, enthuse and abhor, applaud and criticise, and with how they position their readers/listeners to do likewise" (Martin & White, 2005: 1). Further, it analyzes the system of sharing emotions and assessments, construction of personae and aligning as well as disaligning oneself with respondents (Martin & White, 2005: 1): everything that evaluation does.

Martin & White's (2005) Appraisal theory recognizes three resources of evaluation: Attitude, which is a framework for mapping feelings and emotions in text/speech, Engagement, which outlines the social perspective of stance-taking, and Graduation, which is concerned with adjusting and modulating intensity and degree of "force". The first two are discussed here

as part of the methodological framework. The role of Graduation is recognized but however not included in the final framework due to the need to keep the framework manageable.

Attitude

The semantic regions that cover Attitude include Affect, Judgment and Appreciation. For the sake of clarity and conciseness, these are summarised in the table below, as presented in Martin & White (2005):

Affect	Emotions: reactions to behavior, text, process, phenomena (un/happiness, dis/satisfaction, in/security)	Quality: describing participants/processes, attributes of participants/processes	<i>helpless men, women and children,</i> <i>talented individuals,</i> <i>we work very carefully with the intelligence community</i>
		Process: descriptions of mental and behavioral processes	<i>to strike,</i> <i>to believe,</i> <i>to flaunt</i>
		Comment: i.e. modal adjuncts	<i>unfortunately</i>
Judgment	Ethics: evaluating behavior	Social esteem: normality, capacity, tenacity	<i>have improved ability, precise, advanced, radically different, fortuitous</i>
		Social sanction: veracity, propriety	<i>innocent, prudent</i>
Appreciation	Aesthetics: evaluating "things" such as text, process, natural phenomena	Reaction (interpersonal)	<i>impressive</i>
		Composition (textual)	<i>efficient</i>
		Valuation (ideational)	<i>adequate</i>

Table 4: *Types of Attitude (Martin & White, 2005)*

As the above table demonstrates, Attitude covers both the 'inner' and 'outer' experience as well as the aspects of personal and social behavior. Polarity plays an important role in the categorization of the above evaluations: typically evaluations are either positive or critical. The obvious way of evaluating, assigning attributes to Participants (*wonderful men and*

women), is an element of Attitude. But, what is more important to notice, is that Affect, Judgment and Appreciation evaluate especially *being*, *doing* and *behavior*, which makes Attitude the primary evaluative category in the methodological framework here. The focus shall thus remain on the action descriptions (Processes) and the evaluation they convey.

Engagement

As stated, the Appraisal theory operates in the intersubjective domain of discourse. Martin & White's (2005: 95) framework deals with the effects of this intersubjectivity:

1. Role played by the speaker/writer in the meaning-making process when negotiating the relationships of alignment (or disalignment), as well as the socially constituted shared attitudes and beliefs that are associated with the positions and relationships negotiated.
2. The way the resources (mass communicative text or speech) and the negotiation of alignment (or disalignment) engages the audience and possibly makes the readers/listeners feel as if they were the very target and the "ideal" audience to be "won over".

Alignment and disalignment are thus the central concept of Engagement, which Martin & White (2005: 96-98) discuss as taxonomy of categories, summarised in the table below:

Disclaim	The voice is at odds with a certain position	<i>These are not tactics of war, they're crimes of war.</i>
Proclaim	The voice rules out alternative positions	<i>These are not tactics of war, they're crimes of war.</i>
Entertain	The voice presents a position as one of the many alternatives	<i>Now, there is no doubt that in those -- in this particular example that civilian housing area, you'll probably blow out some windows.</i>
Attribute	The voice represents an external voice to present a proposition as one of the many alternatives	<i>International law draws a clear distinction between civilians and combatants. The principle that civilians must be protected lies at the heart of international law of armed conflict. It is the distinction between combatants and innocent civilians that terrorism and practices like the use of human shields so directly assaults.</i>

Table 5: *Taxonomy of Engagement*

Again, polarity has the key function in determining alignment and

disalignment.

What should be noted now that the main categories of evaluation according to the Appraisal theory have been discussed, is the parallel between ideological discourse and evaluation. The (interpersonal) evaluative patterns and taxonomies discussed here share the social-cognitive constitution as ideological discourse, addressed in the sections on Critical Discourse Analysis. The evaluation contained and conveyed by the realizations of Attitude and Engagement are therefore understood as ideological, and the patterns presented in the above tables are treated as vehicles of ideology.

3.3.4 Voice

Finally, the system of *voice* takes us closer to transitivity again. The use of the passive voice, for instance, affects the set up of the clause: whereas the passive voice removes the active Participant, only clauses in active voice can fully utilize the meaning-making potential of all clause constituents: the Actor, Senser, Behaver, etc., the Process, and the Circumstance. This obviously affects the interpretation of the clause: in the case of passive voice, is the actor hidden, irrelevant, obvious and therefore omitted, or is the omission of the actor a way to highlight some other element of the clause (Circumstance, Process)? Voice typically determines the Theme of the clause. In active voice, the theme is typically the Actor/Senser/Behaver etc. and in passive voice the Goal/Range/Recipient/Receiver, etc. This is a means of emphasis: the speakers of English typically use the first position of the clause for signalling what the clause is about - in other words, the Theme (Butt et al., 2003; Halliday 2004). This means that in addition to having a function in the Experiential domain, it also has a Textual function.

	<i>We</i>	<i>are not bombing Baghdad.</i>
Experiential	Actor	Process (material, negative polarity), Goal
Textual	Theme	Rheme

Table 6: *Theme in active voice*

	<i>And</i>	<i>the military targets in there</i>	<i>are being hit</i>
Experiential		Goal	Process (material, positive polarity)
Textual	textual Theme	topical Theme	

Table 7: *Theme in passive voice*

It can be concluded that the configurations of Voice intertwine with the configurations of Transitivity, which means the experiential and textual metafunctions share some common ground that is eventually manifested in the forms and functions of the Process.

Processes have now been approached textually as well as in the experiential and interpersonal context of analysis. The final sections of this chapter extend the discussion to the multimodal dimension by bringing in the concept of *rituals*. Rituals are an object of the study of communication and in this dissertation the study of rituals as communication is brought into the framework because of its connection to the study of Action.

3.4 Rituals: multimodal processes

Next, the methodological framework is extended to the discussion on rituals. The purpose of this is to tie together the textual/visual, social and cognitive dimensions of discourses. Rituals are a way to study agency and transitivity in the physical world: they can be seen as acted-out transitivity, which can be analyzed as a counterpart of textual transitivity. The purpose of the discussion on rituals is to offer a window to analyzing the physical, real world behavior that reflects the social relations of different actors. If we go back to the definition of discourse used in this dissertation (discourse as a "set of relations" between communicators (Fairclough, 2010: 3)) we see that rituals are, in fact, one mode of discourse. Their study is always study of social practice and power relations.

Whereas Processes represent action in the discourse analytical methodology in this chapter, rituals communicate on two different levels. First, rituals are closely connected to action and can be seen as systems of representing action and being. Second, they are communicative action: ritualization is behavior that attempts to label action descriptions. The discussion on the rituals of communication is added to the framework in order to be able to approach ideological discourse from a multimodal perspective that allows the analysis of what happens to action descriptions in the media. The information environment mediatizes communication, which eventually ritualizes it.

The significance of action as communication ties rituals to the study of communicating (military) political action. The following sections focus on the symbolic, visual rituals of the media, who, as I will argue, are heavily influenced by information operations of the Pentagon and the White House.

3.4.1 Rituals and media

According to Èmile Durkheim (Sumiala, 2010: 47), symbolic communication is a force that creates unity in society. These symbols are the key to understanding rituals, with which society constructs a shared understanding and experience of social reality (Sumiala, 2010: 49). This chapter will make use of Eric Rothenbuhler's (1998) definition of ritual as a repetitive action that is communicative, performative and regulated by certain rules and norms. Rituals thus make sense of the world and organize social life (Sumiala, 2010).

Sumiala (2010) divides rituals into three categories: rituals of reception, journalism and media performances. This discussion will focus on the last two, namely press rituals (the way to report news of a social significance), strategic rituals (that maintain the idea of the journalist's objectivity and independence) and different rituals of media and mediatization. These categories will be illustrated with case examples next.

3.4.2 Press rituals and the problem of invisible enemies

The visual landscape of the war in Afghanistan has been one-sided. In the media, American soldiers and their international allies are portrayed as humanitarian, inviolable bodies, whereas the local public is presented as the "colonialized Other" (Kotilainen, 2011). In these visual representations of warfare, one central actor is absent. The strategic communication imagery of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan does not portray insurgents or terrorists, only the soldiers fighting them, and the public, represented as the victims and the citizens saved by the protectors, the ISAF soldiers (Kotilainen, 2011). Kotilainen argues that this is a reflection of the lack of face-to-face encounters between the ISAF forces and the 'enemy', a consequence of the high-tech war. The humanitarian soldiers are pictured in encounters with the local public - playing with the children, handing out toys and humanitarian aid, and patrolling and thereby creating security among the populace (Kotilainen, 2011). When there is need to refer to the enemy, the media, who has no access to the hidden, invisible enemies, have to be creative with their visual narratives. The focus is on the victims of the "terrorists" and "insurgents". The imagery of enemy violence contains everything from bloody victims, scenery of bloody pavements and wrecked cars, and possible weapons and explosives the terrorists have either intended or managed to use (Kotilainen, 2011).

During the war in Afghanistan, the media has repeated the broadcast of these images. One specific photo genre of the war is pictures of shoes lying on the street, often next to bloodied pavement. Why this image? A shoe is a

representation of its wearer. Consider a pair of Louboutins, sandals, cowboy or army boots - and it is easy to determine the cultural background and possibly even the social class of their owner. In the pictures of the bloodied shoes, the size of the shoe tells the age of the victim, the sandal refers to the Arab and Middle-Eastern culture and the military boot to the Western sacrifice - to soldiers as the martyrs of humanitarianism. The shoes featured in the photos represent the average citizen, the worker, and soldiers among them. In the ISAF imagery, Kotilainen (2011) notes, shoes denote humanitarian aid: in one of the pictures a little girl, in her broken, dirty shoes, is waiting to get new shoes from the ISAF soldiers. Kotilainen understands this exchange of the old and broken to the new and functional as a symbolic narrative of Western influence. The humanitarian West brings modernization and development to the colonized Other (Kotilainen, 2011: 59).

From the perspective of press and strategic rituals, the shoes photos have the reading of reporting a happening rather than an action. An action is difficult to narrate visually without an actor. Now that the actor, the terrorist, is a taboo, the journalist is left with the *happening* and the *consequence* - the inevitable outcome of someone's actions that are outside the scope of the picture. Still, what makes these pictures effective is the narrative behind them. The journalist gets to present the consequence instead of making claims of the action. A visual description of the consequence is a fact, whereas a description of action is always an interpretation. This way, the journalist gets to maintain his professional integrity as a sensor that objectively transmits information from the scene to the public - either by personally capturing a picture of the shoe, or by borrowing an ISAF sponsored photo free of charge from the photo databank of Flickr. The shoe photos reduce the interpretative role of the journalist and highlights the narrative behind the picture, and so makes the viewer responsible for making an interpretation and forming of the narrative. A shoe on the ground is a shoe on the ground - not a claim or an opinion. Ehrlich (1996) argues that news organizations use objective, strategic rituals to protect themselves from knowing they are intertwined and built into the power structure. Strategic rituals are thus attempts to keep the journalists and media professionals as outsiders and observers. This adds to the matrix of persuasion. When the journalists and media are specifically targeted by strategic communication and the government's "truth" is one of the few resources the media has access to, the media is bound to have an imbalanced perception of the reality of war at some point - and attempt to report it as something else.

According to Sumiala (2010: 107), press rituals are a ritualistic form of narration and their analysis should focus on answering the questions who are the heroes, villains and victims of the story, who are the 'us' who are

being threatened, and by whom. The shoe photos manage to give out all this information without visually showing a single person. Rituals are repetitive, standardized, institutionalized, and express sacred values (Ehrlich, 1996; Sumiala, 2010). They are not personal interpretations, but shared and institutionalized ways of communicating even abstract phenomena. The rituals of picturing terrorism focus on the consequences of 'absolute evil' by the repetitive, symbolic use of shoes, which have come to personify violence against shared values such as the right to life and freedom from fear. Rituals are evaluation of what is good (ingroup) and what is not (outgroup) and in this process, media are the mediators of the shared values and social experience (Sumiala, 2010).

Whereas visualizing the bodies and wounded has become problematic in the Western media, there is no such problem with the shoe pictures. By representing the victims with their shoes, the media determine the way we perceive not only the war, but the invisible enemy. The victim can be anyone, a woman, child or a soldier, in environments they cannot avoid, meaning the enemy is present everywhere, about to inflict death and destruction indiscriminately, leaving no space for peace, security and stability. The shoes have become a grammar of victimhood produced by the media, which influence the way we attach significance to the happenings in Afghanistan.

3.4.3 The rituals of hide and seek and the historic captures

Another way to approach rituals is to analyze mediated rituals and mediatized rituals. Sumiala (2010) recognizes the overlap and problemacy of the discussion on the definitions, but states that in mediation process the focus is on the transmission of communication by the means of the media, whereas mediatized rituals require mediation, but emphasize the role of the media as a modifier of rituals and thereby as a participant in the process of representation and interpretation. The mediatization process thus attaches meaning to public events and rituals and creates structures to their representation by choices such as what to mediate and what not (Sumiala, 2010: 115-116; also Cottle, 2006). The mediatization of rituals may realize as media spectacles or media events.

One of the legitimizing aims of the 'war on terror' (understood here not only as terrorism, but as terror and horror) has been to capture the representatives of absolute evil - Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden and finally, Muammar Gaddafi - who, in the Western media, have been represented as violent, malicious and dangerous leaders. The captures have followed more or less the same pattern: the evil, suppressing leaders have been found and captured by their enemies (and citizens) all in a state of

dishonor. One found in a "spiderhole", another in a dirty and less than luxurious house described as a primitive compound, and the third conveniently in a sewer, like a "rat". These places of capture were illustrated by highly descriptive drawings that elaborated the course of events and the final panic of the toppled leaders. These caves and holes have become paramount in the process of denouncing the 'profane other', and have thereby become the setting of the ritual of capture as well as a press ritual. As a press ritual, the publishing of the place of capture once again allows the audience to discover the facts of the event. However, as a mediatized ritual, the imagery of the setting is combined to the narratives of capture: how Saddam Hussein begged for mercy, how Bin Laden tried to hide behind his wife, and how Gaddafi begged not to get shot. All this as instructed by the Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy (US Joint Forces Command, 2010: IV-22): portraying the "terrorists" as "cowardly". The captures were *media events* that were presented as the change of history: the end of oppression, the beginning of a democratic era, and the victory of justice. These media events engaged the whole world, as everyone was able to witness these mediated events. The capture of Muammar Gaddafi may have been the best example of a media event. It combined the elements of live broadcasting, the interruption of daily routines, a massive, global audience and ceremonious nuance of the event (see Dayan & Katz, 1992). The function of the media event was to unite the global audience (also an element of the media events, according to Dayan and Katz).

Mediatized rituals, I argue, are more productively conceptualized as an identifiable and variegated class of performative media enactments in which solidarities are summoned and moral ideas of the 'social good' are unleashed and exert agency in the public life of societies. (Cottle, 2006).

The communicative power of these captures is based on their ritualistic nature. The collapse of the glory is symbolised by the final days of the formerly great leaders spent "underground" and in dirty, primitive surroundings. The place of capture becomes the evaluation of the captive and as this ritual builds, in the future this is what we will expect from the capture of the the absolute evil: dirty, toppled and powerless men in the surroundings that are the absolute opposite to their former glory. The captures were highly symbolic and were mediatized ritualistically, leaving no space for second guesses on whether the captures were 'good' and the captured 'bad'. From the Western perspective, the captures were presented as media spectacles - as triumph of justice and democracy. From the American perspective, the captures were a good realization of strategic communication objectives: they showed the cause and effect in a very concrete way.

Strategic communication, or more precisely the Battle of Narrative and its delegitimizing discourses, mythologize the enemy. This provides resources to the ritualization process. Strategic communication and the mass media are symbiotic in the sense that the media needs the 'official story', and strategic communication needs the media to produce the rituals and thereby narratives in their full form. In Hussein's and Bin Laden's case, the media had to rely on the Pentagon and the White House in order to receive visual material of the events of the capture. In Gaddafi's case, the visual material was produced by both the Libyan public, but broadcasted according to the ritualistic rules set by the previous captures. Photos and illustrations of the sewage pipe emerged. A point to notice here is that the pictures of the place of capture enable the Pentagon to tell the story of the end of 'evil' without visually engaging in overt violence. Gaddafi's case was different: he was lynched by his fellow citizens, which allowed the role of the international community in the capture to remain in the background.

3.4.4 Conclusions on rituals of communication

War and conflict are natural environments for death and mourning. Sumiala (2010) and Pantti & Sumiala (2009) argue that rituals have an essential function in the context of death. Death and rituals that relate to it join people together and, even though they alone cannot construct unity out of nothing, rituals are factors in the sense of togetherness and solidarity: "ritual activities remain critical, not despite but because of increasing social disintegration" (Pantti & Sumiala, 2009). This chapter demonstrates that death can be treated as a public trauma or a public celebration, and in both cases the mediation of these media events happens through extensive use of media rituals.

What connects the rituals of the media to strategic communication? As discussed in the previous chapter, the different organizations of the U.S. government are one of the primary sources of war-related information and materials. Also, the ties between the government and the media in some cases prevent journalists from broadcasting unauthorized material (Snow & Taylor, 2006). The discussion on the use of rituals demonstrates how strategic communication does not limit itself to public affairs and information operations, but specifically targets journalists to make them tell the stories of warfare. The media is one of the key audiences of strategic communication efforts - in fact, the Commander's Handbook on Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy names media as one of three significant characteristics that have an impact on the information environment during military operations. The other two are populace and communication structure (US Joint Forces Command, 2010: p. IV-14).

According to Cioppa (2009) after taking command, General David Petraeus stressed that 60% of the fight is information and that in order to operate effectively, the mission leadership have to be the ones who first get the information to the media.

What rituals do is construct a different kind of an experience of warfare compared to the official Pentagon briefings. Rituals engage the audience both emotionally and cognitively, participate in the evaluation processes of legitimation and delegitimation and establish clear causal connections between the 'illegitimate' and defeat. Rituals are a means to evaluate both 'self' and the 'other'. They are a natural phenomenon during the age of publicity, where your chances of influence depend on how you are perceived by the global audience. These processes of legitimation and delegitimation are what link rituals to strategic communication. This should remind us that these forms of communication are powerful in the manufacturing of consent. "[I]t is important to look at rituals from the point of view of what kind of social centres they construct and what kind of social order they naturalize" (Pantti & Sumiala, 2009).

Rituals are social structure and are therefore essential in the sensemaking of war: in the words of the Strategic communication Joint Integrating Concept and the Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication strategy, the presentations of cause and effect are vital in the Battle of Narrative. The "holistic" understanding of strategic communication is the fact that "actions speak louder than words" (US Joint Forces Command, 2010). Rituals are action and the heavy emphasis on the meaning of action makes media rituals a natural context of communication. However, it is not the Pentagon or the White House that 'produce' rituals. The communicative patterns of rituals in the media are an outcome of the interaction between the government representatives and the media. The most essential function of strategic communication, generating legitimacy and illegitimacy, is fulfilled by media rituals to a great extent. It is important to understand that these rituals are not entirely controlled by the Pentagon, even though they may be influenced by the Pentagon's information hegemony and practices of handling the media. Also an important notice is that the expressive violence of the enemy is never ritualized by the enemy themselves, but by the mediatization of the Western media. This, in addition to the taboo-enforcing practices of the Pentagon, contributes to a highly stereotypical visual and semantic landscape of the adversary and their ideology.

Rituals are the domain where the ideology of strategic communication and the Batailleian notions of the homogenous and heterogenous merge. Whereas the strategic manuals instruct to construct separate realities of 'us' and 'them', rituals are the practice that carry out this process.

3.5 Summary of methods

The discussion of the methodological framework thus far started from the CDA demand for a multidisciplinary approach to analyzing discourse. The argumentation started from Van Dijk's triangular (social-cognitive-textual) approach that supported the line of argument that i) discourse is determined by the interplay of the social, cognitive and textual domains, ii) discourse is influenced by ideology (cognitive and social structure), and iii) this ideology has textual manifestations. This argumentation was continued by a discussion of the experiential, interpersonal and textual metafunctions of the systemic functional language theory, which were developed into a method for analyzing discourse as ideological structure. The core claim here is that action descriptions (Processes) encapsulate the communicative aim of ideological discourse. It was stated that while the main emphasis is on the experiential and interpersonal meaning (transitivity and evaluations), the three metafunctions (experiential, interpersonal and textual) are all at play in the production of ideological discourse. In order to keep the theoretical framework concise, the articles that follow will focus on transitivity and appraisal analysis, while it is recognized that there are approaches and theoretical discussion that would contribute to the analysis, were it possible to include them. Finally, the theory on the rituals of communication provides theoretical background to the discussion on the empirical findings of the case studies that follow.




Image 4: *Discourse and methods for analyzing the representations of Action*

The Experiential, Interpersonal, and Textual metafunctions are parallel with Van Dijk's social-cognitive-textual triangle. Therefore, ideology can be approached as a discourse through the methodological framework set up in this chapter: the systems of transitivity, voice and polarity, which are

realized in the Processes of clauses and the evaluation they contain. Be it the case of text, speech or image, the different representations of Action encapsulate the meanings and evaluations of what is being communicated.

Excerpt from <i>Secretary Rumsfeld Interview-Bob Schieffer and David Martin, CBS Face The Nation</i> (Department of Defense, 2002)	Analysis
<i>We're not bombing Baghdad.</i>	Voice: active Polarity: negative Transitivity: material Evaluation: Judgment (social sanction/propriety)
<i>That is a precise attack on the regime of Saddam Hussein --</i>	Voice: active Polarity: positive Transitivity: material Evaluation: Judgment (social sanction/propriety)
<i>that's what's being targeted, and that is what's being hit, and they know it.</i>	Voice: passive Polarity: positive Transitivity: material ('us'), mental ('them') Evaluation: Judgment (Social sanction /propriety) ('us'), social esteem/capacity, Affect (insecurity) ('them')
<i>And the military targets in there are being hit, the communications targets are being hit, and they know that's what's happening.</i>	Voice: passive ('us'), active ('them') Polarity: positive Transitivity: material ('us'), mental ('them') Evaluation: Judgment (social sanction/propriety, social esteem/capacity) ('us'), Affect (insecurity) ('them')
<i>Units are calling up and saying, "We want to surrender,"</i>	Voice: active Polarity: positive Transitivity: verbal, behavioral Evaluation: Affect (insecurity)
<i>and we're communicating with them and finding ways to do that.</i>	Voice: active Polarity: positive Transitivity: verbal, mental Evaluation: Judgment (social esteem/propriety)

Table 8: Means of analysis

In the first two clauses the voice is active, and the material Process is evaluated positively: by bombing Saddam Hussein's regime instead of Baghdad, the speaker claims propriety, in this case legitimacy. In the third line the voice changes from active to passive and the second material Process evaluates as capacity - a description of effective use of force. The 'enemy' action is verbalized as a mental Process, which demonstrates the wish to describe the 'inner' experience (insecurity) of those under attack. The same patterns continue in the fourth line, further emphasizing the roles of dominator and underdog, until in the fifth line the 'inner' experience of the 'enemy' is expressed with a verbal Process, giving the 'enemy' a voice. Obviously here the interpretation of the Other's inner experience is a strong claim, which further illustrates the evaluative element of the experiential metafunction. In this excerpt the actions of 'self' are typically descriptions of the use of force (material Processes), which are typically coupled with passive voice, whereas the 'enemy' action is reported in active voice and with mental and behavioral Process types. The 'self' is thus dynamic, but the action (Processes) are "muted" into happenings. The 'enemy', instead, is not represented as an actor, but as a 'senser' or 'behavior' in addition to being a Goal, an object of someone else's action. The above table thus summarizes the main ideas of the experiential and interpersonal domain presented in this chapter: the systems of voice, polarity, and above all, transitivity and the resource of appraisal, which can be traced in both image and text.

The above excerpt also illustrates how configurations of clauses show systemacy in representing identities in certain ways and patterns. Similar systemacy can be observed in the rituals of communication and how they construct identities: in fact, the very systemacy makes the act a ritual. This is to say that there are also parallels between visual and verbal communication that could be characterized as ritualistic. The theoretical framework for approaching the rituals of communication can be applied to text just as well as images, and the processes of appraisal are equally present in images as in texts. Therefore, discourse analysis and the theory on rituals should not be treated as separate methods, but here the function of the discussion on the application of rituals theory here is to approach the ideological evaluation processes in the context of media and thereby complement the framework.

A REVIEW OF THE DISCUSSION AND CRITIQUE ON STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Before the empirical part of this dissertation, it is necessary to engage in the theoretical discussion on Strategic Communication. This is done in these following two chapters (4 and 5). This chapter is a literary review of the discussion as well as critique on the development and application of communication strategy and practices. It summarizes the contents and themes of some of the key documents that address the development and execution of Strategic Communication. This chapter also lays the background for Chapter 5, which contains the contribution this dissertation makes for the critical, theoretical discussion on Strategic Communication from the perspective of communication theory. By addressing the aims, practices and shortcomings of Strategic Communication, these two chapters provide theoretical background and context for the empiricism that follows. They illustrate the way Strategic Communication as a leadership model differs from the actual practices of communication.

The ways and means of how warfare and military operations are communicated about are not subject to so-called civilian critique only. However, whereas the critics who represent the civilian world tend to focus on the ethics of military communication in the U.S. military community and organizations close to it, the criticism has revolved around the questions of effective implementation. The following review addresses a number of reports and documents in chronological order. It starts from the pre-doctrinal development phase of Strategic Communication and finishes with the commentary on the abolition of the term and revision of the concept.

4.1 Towards doctrinization

The term Strategic Communication has been around for the entire 21st century. The development of Strategic Communication we know now started under President Bush and continued until its doctrinization in 2009.

One of the first more comprehensive accounts on how Strategic Communication should be understood and applied is the Department of Defense's (DoD) 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review: Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication* (QDR). It states that national interests depend on the "accuracy, consistency, veracity, timeliness, and transparency in words and deeds". During the years that followed, the above attributes of consistency and transparency have also been the guiding principle of all criticism towards Strategic Communication, but from two different perspectives. The military community has called for better and more effective synchronization of communications, whereas it is the transparency of "words and deeds" that can be seen as one of the ethical starting points of the Public Affairs (PA) and Public Relations (PR) professionals as well as the civil society.

However, the QDR discusses the implementation of Strategic Communication from the perspective of the military leadership and attempts to establish a hierarchy of personnel and responsibilities rather than a communication model. As a consequence of the responsibility-orientation, it identifies "gaps" between Public Affairs, aspects of Information Operations (IO), Psychological Operations (PO), Military Diplomacy (MD) and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD). Strategic Communication has been about the mechanisms and hierarchies of responsibility. This can be seen in the three objectives the 2006 QDR sets:

- 1) Institutionalizing a DoD process that incorporates the principles of Strategic Communication into the development of strategy, policy formulation, planning and execution.
- 2) Define roles, responsibilities and relationships in terms of Public Affairs, Information Operations, Psychological Operations, Visual Information, Military Diplomacy and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy.
- 3) Organize, train and equip DoD's communication support capabilities.

All the above objectives focus on *how* and *who* rather than *what* in terms of communication. Strategic Communication is seen as a model for (re)organization.

4.2 Determining the guiding principles

In 2008, the Department of Defense published a guide for the *Principles of Strategic Communication*. The guide lists nine principles "in no order of precedence". However, leadership is placed clearly topmost. In Strategic Communication, "leaders must lead communication process": in other words, Strategic Communication is a top-down, one-way process of

transferring meaning. According to the document, communication must be at the very core of everything leaders do to ensure actions, words and images produced are integrated and coherent. Like the 2006 QDR, this document thus continues to highlight synchronization (or consistency, as phrased in the QDR) as the key element of successful Strategic Communication.

The rest of the nine key principles include credibility (truthfulness and respect), dialogue and exchange of ideas, unity of effort (integration and coordination), responsiveness, the understanding of others, pervasiveness of actions, results-based pursuit of desired effects, and continuous analysis, planning, execution and assessment. Many of these principles and their execution have been addressed by critics since the publication of the document and have remained in the focus of debate ever since.

4.3 Doctrine criticism at a pre-doctrinal phase

Before the official concept was even published, it already attracted criticism. Murphy's (2008) *The Trouble with Strategic Communication(s)*, published a year before the final Strategic Communication doctrine, criticizes the long process of drafting the concept on one hand, and the confusion that the failure to finalize the concept and "flying the plane while we're building it" on the other. This, according to Murphy, resulted in confusion about what Strategic Communication is and is not, leaving the definition and the process for the leaders as well as warfighters to interpret. He points out that the 2007 *The National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* does not define Strategic Communication, but distinguishes between it and Public Diplomacy. Instead, the 2006 QDR defined Strategic Communication as "focused USG (United States Government) processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs and actions synchronized with other elements of national power" but, as Murphy notes and as mentioned above, lists Public Affairs, Information Operations, Psychological Operations (PsyOps), Visual Information (VI), Military Diplomacy and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy as elements of Strategic Communication. This, according to Murphy, is a problem, because it limits the means (capabilities such as PA, IO and PsyOps) that are needed to achieve the ends: "Strategic communication employs multiple "means" and these means should be restricted only by the requirement to achieve the desired information effect on the target audience."

Murphy continues the discussion on the failure to define what Strategic

Communication is. Is it simply PR (which would "limit the synergistic support of military operations") or is it something else? He highlights his view that the key to successful Strategic Communication is "an organizational unit culture that values, understands, and thus considers strategic communication means as important capabilities (limited only by imagination) to be integrated within established planning processes." This is to say that Strategic Communication should be understood as "a way" and not as "a means". Understanding Strategic Communication as a way to create information effects "using any means available" takes, according to Murphy, "the mystery out of the concept." Murphy's critique is an example of the boundary between military and civil/commercial communication. In the light of this article it appears that the development of Strategic Communication in the military community, in isolation from the academic world, has created a rather artificial concept that addresses only the questions of organizational hierarchy, responsibilities and leadership, but fails to address the problems of actual communication.

In Murphy's article, the final criticism is based on the difference between Strategic Communication and Information Operations. Whereas Strategic Communication is the more general concept that targets key audiences, Information Operations target the adversary's decision making capability. According to Murphy, achieving a military objective will automatically create an information effect, which means that the messages sent by both actions (kinetic and non-kinetic) and communications contribute to and shape the ultimate effects. This reflects the effects-centric paradigm in military planning.

Strategic Communication is simply a way to affect perceptions, attitudes and beliefs of key audiences in support of objectives. Certainly communications means are very important in ultimately achieving those desired information effects. But how military operations are conducted is also a key component of strategic communication, since actions send very loud and clear messages. (Murphy, 2008).

In conclusion, Murphy's arguments about the say-do gap and the synchronization of words and actions resonate with the finalized doctrine and its practical guidance presented in the *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept* (Department of Defense, 2009) and the *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy* (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2010).

4.4 Reacting to the "crisis" of Strategic Communication

Countless studies, articles, and opinion pieces have announced that U.S. strategic communication and public diplomacy are in crisis and are inadequate to meet current demand. (Paul, 2009: v).

In 2009, the RAND Corporation published a report that was the first to review and summarize several sources on the Strategic Communication development and debate thus far. Claiming Strategic Communication was in a crisis the year the official concept was published means that it argued Strategic Communication was in a crisis before it was officially born. The report does much to map out the multifaceted topic. It recognizes four areas of disagreement in the debate (Paul, 2009: 3):

- ▲ demonstrating and projecting American values vs. sharing values and respect
- ▲ disagreements in reputation and image management
- ▲ disagreement on communication models and the mechanisms of communication
- ▲ disagreement between the advocates of "black" (propaganda) and "white" (trustworthy and credible) communication

The official doctrine, as argued in the next sections as well as the next chapter, highlights the first two debates. The specific aim of sharing values and meaning is an element of the official concept, however this is understood as projection of values rather than dialogue. At the same time, public diplomacy is, as Murphy's criticism above demonstrated, understood as an element of the concept. The report supports Murphy's critique by recognizing the terminological overlap: "Some experts use *strategic communication* and *public diplomacy* as synonyms, while some subordinate *strategic communication* to *public diplomacy* and others vice versa" (Paul, 2009: 2). Strategic Communication and public diplomacy are, according to the report, more or less the same phenomenon, simply delivered in different contexts. When the organization producing communication is the Department of Defense, the product is Strategic Communication. When the organization is the Department of State, the product is Public Affairs. Either way, the aim of both forms of communication is to manage the reputation and image of the state.

The third disagreement takes place between the military and the academic communities. This dissertation is an example of the criticism Strategic Communication attracts due to its outlook on the models and mechanisms of communication. An example of this is Robert D. Deutsch's (2010) *Ambassadors to the world: A new paradigm for Public Diplomacy and*

Strategic Communication. As the title demonstrates, the conceptual overlap of public diplomacy and Strategic Communication is recognized also in the academic community. More importantly, Deutsch's contribution to the Strategic Communication debate addresses the problems that have largely been ignored by the military community. He argues that the "'push-down' theories of persuasion - public diplomacy strategies that rely on logic and facts, and even the concept of 'winning hearts and minds' - are all obsolete models of communication. People cannot be persuaded of something they do not instinctively believe." This line of argumentation is continued in the theoretical discussion of the next chapter.

The fourth and last disagreement, in turn, is also characteristic for the academic as well as public debate. As Strategic Communication contains the element of perception management in addition to Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy, the ethics of communication, namely who can be manipulated, by what means and to which extent, remains controversial. As Taylor & Snow (2006) argue, the relationship between the "democratic ideals and principles toward openness" and "military needs of operational security and to secure public support in a 'war' that has been declared on global terrorism" is problematic. Taylor & Snow (2006) refer to the current practices as the "democratic propaganda model", in which the enemy practices propaganda, while democracies "tell the truth" and take the moral high ground by reflecting democratic ideals. This lexical and semantic difference of propaganda and truth-telling is in fact incorporated in the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Department of Defense, 2006/2009) as well as the *Commander's Handbook on Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy* (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2010), which associate propaganda with adversary communication. However, the Handbook does instruct the use of counter-propaganda.

Winseck (2008) criticizes the "blowback" effect of information operations. According to Winseck, due to combination of the "full-spectrum dominance" U.S. communication doctrine, military-information-media-entertainment complex and the global media, the information operations conducted abroad in Muslim-majority countries eventually have an impact at home. The blowback takes place when the line between black and white propaganda is crossed. In the Iraqi media, for instance, the contents have been heavily manipulated and yet available globally, making the audience much broader than necessary. This means that black propaganda has been directed globally rather than locally. And, it is not only the foreign media that are being influenced. According to Winseck (2008), "US military's heavy reliance on the Internet and other public communication networks means that cyberspace is being retooled to meet national security, surveillance, propaganda and cyberwarfare needs."

These four perspectives listed by the RAND report demonstrate that Strategic Communication is subject to debates and criticism both within the military community and outside it. The report presents the reoccurring themes of recommendations (Paul, 2009: 4-16):

- ⤴ A call for "leadership": Many of the sources used for the RAND report call for presidential leadership and/or coordinating authority across agencies and departments. Also, responsibility as well as "good choices" regarding organizing for strategic communication and creating policies are called for.
- ⤴ Demand for increased resources for strategic communication and public diplomacy (personnel and funding).
- ⤴ A call for a clear definition of an overall strategy: the purpose and aim of the government and how it communicates these messages. Such would be "a clear foreign policy strategy that strategic communication can support" (p. 8).
- ⤴ The need for better coordination and organizational changes or additions: creation, reorganization and rebalancing government and independent agencies to improve coordination of SC.

Overall, three out of four of these recommendations are explicitly leadership-oriented. These recommendations date back to the time the drafting of the concept first began. The 2004 *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication* (Department of Defense, 2004: 1-3) calls for presidential leadership, synchronization of policies, improvement of America's "negative image" as well as government-private sector partnership, all proposed five years later in the RAND report. As argued in the next chapters, many of these challenges have remained to this day. This suggests that despite the constant research and reporting, the concept has failed to address and incorporate the demands of the community that is directly involved with developing the communication policy.

4.5 Bridging theory and practice: the launch and the first overhaul

In 2009, the *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept* was published. The document, discussed in detail in the following chapter, presents the basic principles of the communication model. The concept is designed to solve "the military problem", described as follows (Department of Defense, 2009: 3):

How could a future joint force commander plan and execute joint operations to affect the behaviors of selected populations,

governments or other decision-making groups to achieve the mission and promote broader national interests in a socially complex and globally interconnected information environment?

The operational solution to the problem follows (Department of Defense, 2009: 9):

- 1. identify, segment, study and listen to potential audiences;*
- 2. conceive, produce and coordinate signals through both information and actions designed to affect the perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and thus the behaviors of selected audiences in ways that support the accomplishment of the mission and promote broader national interests;*
- 3. monitor, measure and assess the effects of these signals; and*
- 4. iteratively modify actions and information products based on feedback on the effects of the signals.*

The mechanism of the communication process contain the concepts of messages, themes and narratives and their synchronization.

In 2010, *The Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy* followed. As the name of the Handbook implies, this document, published only nine months after the official concept, already questions the term Strategic Communication. It uses it side by side with Communication Strategy and states that "[i]n order to eliminate the confusion caused by the currently broad SC definition, and intellectual baggage that comes with the term "strategic," we may want to consider using the term "Communication Strategy" for the overall construct, leaving specific terms intact that describe efforts at the different levels of command." Further, it highlights the importance of a synchronized communication strategy in operations and further elaborates the synchronization process of messages, themes and narratives.

These two documents are relevant in the discussion on the Strategic Communication debate for two reasons. First, the timing. The official concept was published five years after the *2004 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication* (Department of Defense, 2004) that concludes by stating that "U.S. strategic communication must be transformed". Between 2004 and 2009 the term Strategic Communication was in use although the official doctrine was not yet published, and the time period, as suggested by the review here, was marked by criticism and debate on the approach and practices of the concept. The slow doctrinization process resulted in uncertainty and thereby fueled criticism, questions, and multiple interpretations of the term and its interpretation. Second, the years of debate and uncertainty followed

by the publication of the concept meant that the process of running down the term started almost immediately. The term, as suggested by the 2010 *Commander's Handbook on Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy*, has been problematic from the beginning.

4.6 Killing the term

Crowley's (2012) short article *The Pentagon Drops Strategic Communication: Behind the Name Change* sums up many of the sore points of military communication understood as Strategic Communication. First, again, is the overlapping terminology. The use of the basic terms such as propaganda, persuasion and information largely depend on the target audience: "For example, by law, the United States government cannot 'propagandize' its own people, but is permitted to try to 'persuade' others around the world to support U.S. interests and actions. It can 'inform' anyone about U.S. policies, actions, history, culture and opportunities." Persuasion and informing are both key themes in Strategic Communication, but Crowley suggests the terms and the distinctions drawn between them are artificial: communication practices that may be called either Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Information Operations and global engagement - again depending on the audience - have simply been referred to as Strategic Communication when practiced by the Department of Defense. He argues that it is irrelevant what these practices are called, but what should be carefully considered is the practice itself, which should focus on the synchronization of communication. Crowley (2012) notes that consistent communication does not guarantee success or far reaching political consequences: the U.S. "must recognize how consistent words and actions translate into effective and sustainable policies, regardless of what you call it."

Crowley's article is a reaction to the Department of Defense's (2012) memorandum that addresses the questions about the status of Strategic Communication and Public Affairs. According to the document, the original purpose of Strategic Communication was to "synchronize communication across the department", which eventually created confusion in terms of the roles and functions of the staff. Also, the document notes that Strategic Communication was mostly public affairs, which is not the responsibility of the Department of Defense. Due to these conclusions, Strategic Communication is replaced with communication synchronization. This means that as a concept, Strategic Communication only lived for three years, most of which it was criticized for being unclear and confusing both terminologically and in roles of responsibility.

But is "communication synchronization" different than Strategic Communication? According to Crowley, it is not. Rosa Brooks (2012), who served as a counselor to the U.S. defense undersecretary and participated in the drafting of the 2009 concept of Strategic Communication, argues that with communication synchronization nothing changes:

"Communications synchronization"? To me, the term has a rather fascistic ring. Though I'm sure this was not the intent, it suggests a rigid determination to make all utterances hew to a narrow party line. Mostly, though, it just misses the point, which is that strategic communication isn't about "communications." Little's memo could have been written in 2002 or 2006. It hearkens back to the days when DOD leadership imagined that disciplined use of the right "messaging" would "win the war of ideas," and ignores a decade of accumulated wisdom.

The year 2012 was thus marked by the conclusion that the name of the policy is of less importance than the success of synchronizing not only communication, but words and deeds. This is obviously a difficult task, as the success depends on the interpretations of the audience, which are beyond control.

4.7 Discussion

The fate of Strategic Communication is similar to that of Effects Based Operations: it is modeled after effects-centric planning, found to be blurry, misleading and confusing, and finally replaced with a version that draws from the previous concept that carries a different name. This is the reason why the concepts have never overcome their core problem: the focus is never on the problemacy of effects-centricity and its historic failure in communication efforts other than military.

The question arises whether all current concepts are essentially the one and the same thing, as they have been intended to serve a common purpose, influence. As Murphy (2008) argued, SC should have been applied the same way as operational planning: to consider the desired informational and cognitive effects in the model of "ends, ways and means" of military strategy. The importance of action (other than verbal and visual communication) is another element that links communication to other forms of military action suggests that in fact, synchronization emerges not only in the communication strategy, but between kinetic and non-kinetic doctrines.

The concept of synchronization also reveals the absurdity of warfare. In order to communicate sustainably, one must also act ethically. When the principles of consistency and synchronization are brought into the focus, it is leadership that has to be addressed. This was the case with the original concept of Strategic Communication, as it is with communication synchronization. Throughout the 21st century, it is the leadership and management of communication that has received most attention.

The increasing focus on leadership means that communication will be subject to increasing amounts of control and management. On one hand, this promotes discussion on the ways and means to improve transparency and ethical practices. On the other hand, the shift towards comprehensive synchronization efforts may encourage the opposite. Messages that do not support the master narrative must be done away with, and as demonstrated by the several WikiLeaks scandals and materials of events and deeds made public by the soldiers, up to now censorship and denying the problem has been easier than engaging in a transparent dialogue.

The Strategic Communication debate has fragmented into different themes and isolated communities that do not communicate with each other well. Whereas government organizations have engaged in the practical issues such as leadership and the implementation of the concept, the academic and non-military communities criticize the problematic perceptions of Strategic Communication from the perspective of theory and research. All these communities have a very different conception of the ethics of communication. From the perspective of Public Relations, persuasion that does not adhere to the rules and norms of the 'marketplace of ideas' is unethical: whereas attempting to appear legitimate and make oneself heard is every actor's right, the attempts to silence other actors, which usually is the case in warfare, is not. This creates profound tension between the military and academic viewpoints. These tensions may force the military community to address and attempt to overcome the controversies, but at the same time they may force the military community to isolate itself from the general field of communication - which, as argued in the following chapter, has been the case this far. As stated in the RAND report (Paul, 2009), the use of research in Strategic Communication has been insufficient this far.

In the next chapter, this conclusion is followed by a discussion of the theoretical dead-end of military communication, which is consequence of the challenge the military community would face if they were to adopt transparent communication models and abandon the control-oriented operations model.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION: FUNCTIONS, CHARACTERISTICS AND CRITICISM (ARTICLE I)

All successful men have agreed on one thing - they were causationists. They believed that things went not by luck, but by law; that there was not a weak or a cracked link in the chain that joins the first and last of things. - Ralph Waldo Emerson, Power

This article consists of two parts. The first part will take a look at the 2009 *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept* (Department of Defense, 2009, hereafter SC JIC) and the 2010 *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy* (US Joint Forces Command, 2010, hereafter CHSCCS) and introduces its aims. Also, it will discuss the elements that the concept specifies as its basic building blocks. This discussion aims to conceptualize the core function and constitution of the communication model that is labeled as "strategic". For the sake of clarity, Strategic Communication (upper case) refers to the doctrine, and strategic communication (lower case) to communication of strategic importance in general.

The SC JIC, as the title states, is a concept, whereas the CHSCCS is a pre-doctrinal document that aims to serve "as a bridge between current practices in the field and the migration into doctrine" (p. i). These two documents thus cover the aspects of both theory and practice. The SC JIC determines the strategic function and objective of the doctrine, as well as the understanding of what communication is about, whereas the CHSCCS presents a much more detailed account of the previous with an emphasis on the practical implementation of communication.

The second part of the article analyzes the concept of Strategic Communication as a communication model and compares and contrasts it to the tradition of Mass Communication Research (MCR). This discussion is relevant in the analysis of Strategic Communication, because it reveals the strong theoretical parallels between Strategic Communication and MCR in terms of the outlook on the mechanics of the communication process. The history and challenges of MCR explicates the problems and

complexities in the Strategic Communication processes of the 21st century.

2. Purpose and aims of Strategic Communication: legitimacy and persuasion

The SC JIV starts with a mission statement that underlines the aim of the concept in the very first paragraph: "to understand and engage key audiences". The "understanding" is presented as a practice that should involve the audience and thereby *make them do something* - a textbook case of persuasion. Despite the aim to *understand*, which could be understood as commitment to interactive and dialogical communication, the purpose and function of the concept is made clear by the specific goals the concept sets for Joint Force Strategic Communication:

- ▲ *Improve US credibility and legitimacy*
- ▲ *Weaken an adversary's credibility and legitimacy*
- ▲ *Convince selected audiences to take specific actions that support U.S. or international actions*
- ▲ *Cause a competitor or adversary to take (or refrain from taking) specific actions*

These aims specifically state the objective to influence the audience's way of thinking and acting: improve, weaken, convince and cause are all action descriptions that refer to creating effects rather than dialogue. The methods for pursuing these objectives, according to the concept, are:

- 1. Identify, segment, study and listen to potential audiences;*
- 2. conceive, produce and coordinate signals through both information and actions designed to affect perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and thus the behaviors of selected audiences in ways that support the accomplishment of the mission and promote broader national and international interests;*
- 3. Monitor, measure and assess the effects of these signals; and*
- 4. Iteratively modify actions and information products based on feedback on the effects of the signals.*

In other words, communication is seen as an instrument for creating desired, measurable effects. This approach to communication parallels with the effects-centric doctrines of the 21st century, meaning that Strategic Communication is the non-kinetic extension of doctrines such as Effects Based Operations and the Comprehensive Approach. The key notion here is that the SC JIC states its key function is to generate legitimacy, which makes legitimation the key effect of (strategic/military) communication. It is this purpose that determines the context and contents of Strategic Communication: the design of Strategic Communication is created to

generate narratives of what is legitimate, fixating the discourses of warfare permanently onto the themes of right, wrong, good and evil.

2.1 The elements of Strategic Communication: Theme, message and narrative

The CHSCCS notes that the term *strategic communication* is problematic and suggests *communication strategy* should be used instead:

In order to eliminate the confusion caused by the currently broad SC definition, and intellectual baggage that comes with the term “strategic,” we may want to consider using the term “Communication Strategy” for the overall construct, leaving specific terms intact that describe efforts at the different levels of war. (p. II-11)

This can be seen as a response to the problematic redefinition and renaming processes of different communication strategies (from information operations to perception management and now Strategic Communication) and as an effort to make sense of the variety of concepts that overlap and create confusion on different operational levels. The use of *communication strategy* to address all communication-related concepts would not disrupt the already existing terms related to communication efforts. *Communication strategy* is intended to cover the tactical, operational and strategic levels. It is defined as

A joint force commander’s strategy for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, and actions to support national level strategic communication related objectives and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level. (p. II-11)

According to this definition, the overarching communication strategy consists of *themes, messages, images* and *actions*. In other words, communication is understood as a multimodal process that draws from resources such as speech, text, image, physical/kinetic action and behavior. The emphasis of action and its significance as a message receives attention throughout the Handbook. Action, as well as verbal and visual signals, should be synchronized in order for them to "inform and influence selected audiences".

In terms of text, speech, image and action, the terms *theme* and *message* are crucial in understanding the communication process (p. II-10):

▲ *Theme: an overarching concept or intention, designed for*

broad application to achieve specific objectives.

- ▲ *Message: a narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience to create a specific effect while supporting a theme.*

The third key term in the process of producing strategic communication is *narrative*, defined as

- ▲ *Narrative: enduring strategic communication with context, reason/motive, and goal/end state.*

Strategic documents, according to the Handbook, produce narratives. Messages, instead, should support the themes, "themes should support [...] the next higher level themes, and themes at all levels should support strategic themes and the enduring national narrative" (p. xiii). This results in "consistent communications to global audiences" (p. xiii). Synchronization is seen as the key requirement of all communication efforts. The failure to produce synchronized, unified and harmonized narratives undermines all communication efforts. Cioppa (2009) illustrates the synchronized use of themes in the production of strategic communication during the Operation Iraqi Freedom:

On a daily basis, key quotes were captured from MNF-I and GoI leaders. On a weekly basis, the best quotes for each of MNF-I and GoI were placed in a theme category (e.g. political progress, security, troop reduction). These best quotes were quite selective and limited to no more than one page each for MNF-I and GoI. The intent of these one-page documents was to frame events and highlight specifically the key messages that should be reinforced in media engagements based upon guidance from General Petraeus, the MNF-I STRATEFF Director (US Army general officer), and MNF-I STRATEFF Communication Division Director (US Navy flag officer). [...] This is a good example of mutually supportive and synchronized messaging. [...] These key messages, especially for MNF-I, were integrated into the press conferences and enabled the shaping and reinforcement strategic communication.

In short, the concept of Strategic Communication is based on the principle that themes and messages are the building blocks of the desired narrative of the military operation. The narrative has a legitimacy purpose, which is presented as the primary objective of strategic (military) communication.

2.2 "The Battle of the Narrative"

If messages and themes are needed to establish narratives, then how are these narratives used in the context of Strategic Communication?

The battle of the narrative is a full-blown battle in the cognitive dimension of the information environment, just as traditional warfare is fought in the physical domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace). One of the foundational struggles, in warfare in the physical domains, is to shape the environment such that the contest of arms will be fought on terms that are to your advantage. Likewise, a key component of the "Battle of the Narrative" is to succeed in establishing the reasons for and potential outcomes of the conflict, on terms favorable to your efforts. Upon our winning the battle of the narrative, the enemy narrative doesn't just diminish in appeal or followership, it becomes irrelevant. The entire struggle is completely redefined in a different setting and purpose. (p. xiii-xiv)

This definition announces the form and function of the narrative: the narrative should be consistent and it should, again, serve a legitimatory function.

The first principle, consistency, correlates with the rationalist idea of cognitive tendency, i.e. the intrinsic tendency to avoid cognitive dissonance (Pietilä, 2005: 116; Festinger, 1962). The "Battle of the Narrative" is based on the idea of an overarching narrative that appears more rewarding than the old beliefs, feelings and actions - a model proposed already by the Yale school of neo-behaviorists (see Pietilä, 2005: 113-114). This narrative should not be understood as a simple story, but as a socio-cultural product that is used as a non-kinetic weapon to target the cognition of its audience. The 'narrative' should be, in this case, treated as an ideology.

The attempt to establish a consistent narrative is an element in the effort to establish patterns that convey evaluation in the discourses of Strategic Communication. "[T]he efficiency of discourse and its capability to influence or convince people, lies, to a large extent, in its ability to convey evaluations" (Malrieu, 2002: 30). According to Malrieu, the processes of evaluation and differentiation are not "regulated by mechanical learning algorithms", but consistency does, indeed, play a role in the communication process. He argues (Malrieu, 2002: 31) that there are three ways to guarantee the consistency of ideological narration. First, the narrative should actualize as logical and consistent with the earlier narratives. The second way may be to define the 'ideological language' and so intervene in the production of discourses. The last and the most arduous way would be

to set up specific institutions to monitor and control the use of language. Arduous or not, such institutions exist. In terms of strategic communication, it is clear that the first two means are actively used: the CHSCCS does make recommendations for appropriate and effective word choice in the communication efforts in the field. In this context these recommendations are treated as doctrinization of ideological language and its application.

To convey evaluation, the overarching narrative thus demands 'ideological patterns':

It would be disturbing indeed if 'grand' actors for example, performed more 'small' actions than 'small' actors. It would be puzzling if 'good' policies had 'bad' consequences, or if 'good' phenomena systematically entailed 'bad' ones. (Malrieu, 2002: 49)

In addition to consistency, the second key principle of the 'Battle of the Narrative' is its actualization of legitimacy. Legitimation (or delegitimation, if addressing the actions of the adversary) is not only the overt aim of Strategic Communication, but also its tacit structure. The fact that a Strategic Communication narrative should, by definition, contain the context, motive, as well as produce the desired goal/end state for the intervention, legitimation is a built-in feature of strategic communication. The SC JIC (p. M-3-M-4) does not provide instructions for the legitimation process, but the Commander's Handbook presents examples:

a. Never assume you are on the moral high ground, and that you therefore don't need to message. (Perceptions of moral authority/legitimacy)

b. An intervening armed state tends to be seen as "Goliath", while non-state actors that resist are often cast as "David." (Perceptions of moral authority/ legitimacy)

[...]

g. When it comes to rumors of war-fighting gone wrong, the first stories onto the wire stick. Even if these stories prove to be exaggerated or false, the damage to your reputation, and moral legitimacy, is hard to erase. (Information sequel: perceptions of moral authority)

h. Humanitarian action undertaken to limit civilian casualties should be documented and communicated before, during and after action. (Informational sequel and prequel: perceptions of legitimacy; preempting and dispelling rumors)

i. Even if you don't trust certain media, engage them. Restricting media gives an informational advantage to your adversary.

(Information management: perceptions of legitimacy)

j. Western democracies have low tolerance for the moral ambiguities of kinetic action. This is especially so when, in the heat of battle, mistakes or civilian casualties occur. Kinetic action that violates the law of war creates informational effects that decrease domestic and Western support. (Informational effects: perceptions of legitimacy)

[...]

l. Cohesive all-of-government coordination can yield synchronization of the message, but not necessarily the effects. (Informational effects: perceptions of legitimacy/perception management)

These guidelines, presented as "informational effects takeaways" from the Israeli- Palestinian case studies, remain on a fairly abstract level. The instructions get more concrete in the discussion surrounding delegitimation, addressed as "Engaging in a Dialogue of Ideas" (p. IV-22):

If the exchange is to be a dialogue that influences, instead of a debate, it has to be in a context of respect, transparency, and honesty. There should be the appearance of active listening, consideration for the other viewpoint, and a perceived benefit for changing perspective (such as peace, prosperity, dignity etc.)

1. One strategy to delegitimize terrorism could be to show it inconsistent with moral, religious, or social standards. Another strategy could be to show it as unattractive, such as portraying its practitioners as "desperate," "cowardly," "impotent," or "inept."

Here, the Handbook goes into such detail that it specifically instructs the key words for debating ideological issues. These are strategic definitions of the 'self' and the 'other': as proposed by Malrieu (2002: 30) the second way to create ideological narration is the ideological definition of language. By officially determining the evaluations that the organization is obliged to convey, the CHSCCS institutionalizes the ideology. This means that ideological evaluations are not only a matter of rhetoric, but they have become doctrinized: the enemy is "'desperate', 'cowardly', 'impotent', or 'inept'" (CHSCCS, p. IV-22) and thus evaluated in the context of judgment, namely that of social esteem or sanction (see Martin & White, 2005).

The concept of Strategic Communication treats legitimacy as the key informational resource, and rightly so. Strategic Communication is a paramount weapon in irregular warfare and is critical across the range of all military operations, which means it should be integrated into all planning

on all operational levels (p. I-1, II-8). This 'information as a weapon' approach culminates in the doctrinization of legitimation and delegitimation. The Handbook encourages the analysis of adversary communication in order to determine the inconsistencies and weaknesses of their "propaganda". Indeed, propaganda is now reserved exclusively for referring to adversary communication: The 2010 Joint Publication 3-13.2 on Psychological Operations defines propaganda as "[a]ny form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly." As summarized by Snow & Taylor (2006),

Democratic enemies are usually non-democracies – a dictatorship or an authoritarian regime that does not conform to international laws or norms. Hence, the 'enemy' conducts propaganda, whereas democracies 'tell the truth', or at least as much of the truth as can be told to achieve victory while preserving those fundamental democratic values so cherished in normal times.

But how can *legitimation* be conceptualized? Van Leeuwen's (2007) four categories of legitimation present one framework:

- ⤴ *authorization*, meaning references to tradition, custom, law and status
- ⤴ *moral evaluation*, meaning references to value systems
- ⤴ *rationalization*, meaning references to goals and uses of social action, references to cognitive validity
- ⤴ *mythopoesis*, meaning legitimation through narratives, the outcomes of which either reward legitimate action or punish non-legitimate action

Considering the strategy documents discussed in this article, it appears that the above types of legitimation are all applied in Strategic Communication. In terms of Strategic Communication, authorization is an integral part of it: it is obvious that much of the impact of press briefings, for instance, is dependent on the authority of the person who delivers the information. In the armed forces, authority is so overt that it has become naturalized: titles, insignia, and other explicit signs of hierarchy are all expected of a military official. Moral evaluation, in turn, is present in both discourses and actions of all members of the U.S. armed forces - as the instructions on the use of legitimatory and delegitimatory language in the CHSCCS illustrates. Rationalization actualizes in the cognitive dimension, namely in the efforts to avoid dissonance and inconsistency. Mythopoesis, the "educative tales of right and wrong", tend to surface as media spectacles aimed at the global

audience. The ultimatum that Saddam Hussein leave Iraq to avoid war and its consequence, the highly mediatized display of shock and awe show, the symbolic celebration of the arrival of the Americans in Iraq, and finally the capture of the former dictator and the broadcast of the downhill of his once glorious dictator's life were all examples of an enduring, continuous narrative that contained not only moral evaluation, but a moral lesson.

3. Strategic Communication as a communication model

This far the discussion has focused on what could be understood as the "contents" and purpose of Strategic Communication. Next, the focus is on understanding the communication process itself. When we turn from the objectives of legitimacy and coherence to the process of producing them through themes, messages and narratives, what does the communication process proposed by the concept of Strategic Communication look like?

The following sections address the representation of communication that the doctrine of Strategic Communication bases its operational model on. This representation is addressed in terms of a number of basic terms and notions used to conceptualize differences between different models in communication studies. This helps conceptualize Strategic Communication in terms of analysis. The discussion is further illustrated with some of the practical guidelines for the communication process, assigned by the CHSCCS.

3.1 The mechanics of Communication

An interesting aspect of the 2009 SC JIV is its argumentation on the nature of influence it seeks to practice. While it treats communication as a vehicle to the hearts, minds and behavioral choices of the audience, it also recognizes the negative connotation of the term 'influence' and makes, in fact, an effort to renegotiate its definition (p. iii):

The term influence sometimes carries negative connotations because the term is often associated with deceptive manipulation or exploitation. Influence will not have that connotation in this concept. Influence is a pervasive and fundamental form of any social interaction, as essential to cooperation as it is to competition or conflict.

This statement positions itself at odds with what is further stated about communication in the doctrine. By renouncing the attempts to practice negative influence, the concept attempts to approach the idea of sharing meaning. Still, influence is defined as actions of *informing, educating, persuading, inducing* and *coercing* (CHSCCS, p III-18). The term

manipulation has officially been removed from doctrine (p. v):




Figure 1: *The influence spectrum according to the 2009 Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept*

The question is whether urging, advocating, inducing or coercing can be practiced without manipulation. This leads us to the question of legitimacy: how to differentiate between persuasion (legitimate) and manipulation (illegitimate)? According to Van Dijk (2008: 212), manipulation is "illegitimate influence" that produces inequality and that is used to serve the interests of the manipulator against the interests of the manipulated. Strategic Communication, in turn, aims at communicative asymmetry, where competing narratives become irrelevant. Herein lies a paradox. The influence spectrum presented in the above image suggests that influence is synonymous with one-way flow of communication. Communication is practiced for the sole reason of influence. Not simply to inform or teach, but to create a desired effect in the audience: to make the audience think and behave in a desired way. This obviously links Strategic Communication to the tradition of effects-centric kinetic doctrines such as Effects Based Operations and the Comprehensive Approach. To make a comparison it could thus be said that much like there are no kinetic operations for the sake of "just operating", there are no communication operations for the sake of "just communicating". Strategic Communication should be understood as a non-kinetic equivalent of effects-based strategy and tactics.

The core problem of Strategic Communication is the perception of communication as transfer rather than sharing of meaning. Communication is defined as "the act of sharing meaning by sending and receiving messages" (p. 5), but considering what has already been discussed about influence and the absence of dialogicality in the model, is "sharing" realistic or even possible? Seeing communication as sharing of meaning would demand two-way flow of communication, forcing the organization to engage in a dialogue.

The problem here is that the organization cannot escape its purpose - influence. Instead, the SC JIC states that communication is the vehicle for "reception, comprehension and acceptance of a message". This line of reasoning specifically abandons the notion of sharing. "In fact, the fundamental purpose of all purposeful communication is to influence - to cause some intended effect" (p5). The source? David K. Perlo's *The*

Process of Communication: An Introduction to Theory and Practice from 1960. This is followed by a description that leaves little room for speculation:

Communication works this way: A source puts out a signal intended to convey a meaning. The receiver recognizes and selects the signal, if he chooses, from among the various signals available to him: he interprets the signal based on his own frame of reference and interests to create meaning. While the source may have an intended meaning in mind, it is the receiver who actually provides the ultimate meaning, which may or may not be the meaning the source intended. The challenge in effective communication is to anticipate what signal will trigger the desired interpretation. (p. 5-6).

This outlook considered, it is easy to position Strategic Communication in the field of communication research. The 1960s were marked by efforts to establish a theoretical framework for the field of mass communication research (Pietilä, 2005: 105-109). Part of these efforts was Lasswell's model, which presented communication as a transmission process. In Lasswell's theory the central analytical concepts were the contents, channels and effects of communication (Pietilä, 2005: 108; Lasswell & Blumenstock, 1939/1970; Lasswell, 1960). It was the effects that were intended to be measurable and to generate the much needed empiricism in the new field of research. What was in focus was the behavior of the audience: "in effects analysis the characteristics of media content were seen as causal factors that may produce specific behavioral consequences" (Pietilä, 2005: 109). Lasswell (1946a: 80) classified audience responses as attention, comprehension, enjoyment, evaluation and action, where all responses above the level of attention are effects (1946b: 97).

This causal-quantitative methodology of the behavioral research tradition is best characterized by the S>R model that developed into the neo-behaviorist S>O>R model, where the reaction (R) is dependent on the organism (O) that is subject to the stimuli (S) (Pietilä, 2005: 109). This model of the 1950s demonstrates the process of communication (see Hovland, Janis & Kelley, 1953). The audience's exposure to communication creates effects, although the effects are not always entirely controllable or predictable due to the audience's organic and therefore heterogeneous quality.

For the sake of clarity and conciseness, three key parallels between MRC and SC are considered here:

1) Focus on causing and measuring effects

The first key parallel relates the effects-centricness of Strategic Communication to the Lasswellian theory on the effects of communication. Strategic Communication is a "continuous function" that integrates Joint Force actions "to maximize the desired effect on selected audiences" (SC JIC p. ii). Lasswell (1946a: 80) categorized the effects of communication into the categories of *comprehension, enjoyment, evaluation* and *action*, and, according to the SC JIC, the range of influence correspondingly includes *informing* and *educating, persuading, inducing* and *coercing*, which clearly resonate with Lasswell's categories (education lead to comprehension, etc.). The effects-centric doctrines refer to effects like these as "desired effects". This effects-centricness does not only define Strategic Communication, but is the underlying principle in the 21st century doctrines, such as the Effects Based Operations and the Comprehensive Approach. In practice, this means that what unites Strategic Communication and MCR is a similar methodological approach to communication: communication is seen as a causal process that results in measurable effects. However, MCR underwent a methodological crisis during the 1960s, which led to the abandoning of, for instance, the linear S>O>R model, later replaced by the idea of 'communication as interpretation' rather than transmission (Pietilä, 2005: 126). Interestingly, the so-called Lasswellian magic bullet theory and the emphasis of the significance of measurable effects are still what the American doctrine writers aspire to.

2) Cognitive persuasion

The commitment to the behaviorist tradition of conceptualizing communication leads us to the second parallel between MCR and the concept of Strategic Communication. The Yale school of neo-behaviorists treated the effects of communication as learning much like the SC JIC refers to the influence of communication as "education". Further, the Yale school researchers (see Hovland, Janis & Kelley, 1953) argued that the individual may be persuaded by offering a more rewarding experience to replace the old one:

We assume that opinions, like other habits, will tend to persist unless the individual undergoes some new learning experiences. Exposure to a persuasive communication which successfully induces the individual to accept a new opinion constitutes a learning experience in which a new verbal habit is acquired. That is to say, when presented with a given question, the individual now thinks of and prefers the new answer suggested by the communication to the old one held prior to exposure to the communication.

(Hovland, Janis & Kelley, 1953: 10)

If we return to the CHSCCS, the parallel is clear:

The Battle of the Narrative is often thought of as a battle for the local audience to “buy” our “story” and push out the enemy’s “story,” such as “we are the good guys, we are here to help you and bring you a better quality of life.” This perspective on the “Battle of the Narrative” is incorrect. The battle is not merely to push aside, defeat or gain superiority over the enemy’s narrative; it is to completely supplant it. In fact, upon our winning the battle of the narrative, the enemy narrative doesn’t just diminish in appeal or followership, it becomes irrelevant. (p. II-13)

The Battle of the Narrative is thus a battle over persuasion: as postulated by Hovland, Janis & Kelley (1953), the best story wins.

This approach to the persuasion process understands communication as a cognitive process rather than conditioning. Echoing the problemacy of measuring the effects of communication, the SC JIC states that “[a]ssessing the cognitive impact of a signal is much more difficult, for example, than assessing the physical impact of an air strike on a target” (p. 6). This analogy is another example of the methodological problems of reducing communication research to the study of cause and effect. The problem arises when the organic society is subjugated to causal theory. As the analogy above demonstrates, this has been experienced not only by MCR scholars, but by the Pentagon as well as the U.S. Joint Forces Command. The difference between the theorists here is that the veterans of MCR admitted the methodological crisis in the 1960s (see Pietilä, 2005: 126; Kunelius, 2010: 141-142), whereas Strategic Communication keeps aspiring to the past. Also, it was the cognitive theory of learning that challenged the behaviorist learning theory and established the theory of cognitive consistency (Pietilä, 2005: 116). While the two theories are mutually exclusive - influence cannot be both a conditioning process and a cognitive process at the same time - the concept of Strategic Communication continues to draw from both behaviorist and cognitive frameworks at the same time.

3) Communication is transmission

The third parallel is the understanding of communication as a transmission process. Clearly, there is a paradox between both the theoretical definition and the practical implementation of Strategic Communication. Whereas the doctrine defines the communication process in terms of stimulus and response, the very objective it sets is “shared meaning”:

Strategic communication essentially means sharing meaning (i.e., communicating) in support of national objectives (i.e., strategically). This involves listening as much as transmitting and applies not only to information, but also physical communication - action that conveys meaning. (SC JIC p. ii)

The stated method is the transmission of information, while the objective appears to be the confirmation of shared meaning. Repeated and specific references to communication as "signals" and "transmission" link Strategic Communication to the tradition of propaganda models, where the targets tend to be seen as individuals rather than an audience (Kunelius, 2010: 153). At the same time, the doctrine clearly indicates that it aims to influence collectives.

Ultimately, what Strategic Communication and the MRC tradition have in common is their emergence as the result of fear and anxiety. Whereas Mass Communication Research developed during an age when the media were seen as a factor that may change and possibly even threaten the social order of society, Strategic Communication is modeled to serve the purpose of maintaining and legitimizing a certain global order.

3.2 Symmetry and asymmetry of communication

As argued this far, despite its attempts to renounce negative manipulation, Strategic Communication fails to define itself in terms other than propaganda and behaviorism. Ultimately, Strategic Communication appears as a top-down propaganda model that aims to inform, persuade, and therefore legitimize. However, this does not mean that it lacks the efforts to build oneness and create shared experience.

In addition to being a communication model, the concept of Strategic Communication also contains elements of Public Affairs, as its function is to ensure "conditions favorable" for the national interest of the U.S. government. Therefore it is worth considering Strategic Communication as doctrine of Public Relations.

The first obvious problem brings us back to the question of dialogicality and interactiveness.

Dialogue requires listening. Listening represents the "two" in two-way communication while "one" is simply sending a message via one-way communication. (Coombs & Holladay, 2007: 31)

At least in theory, the SC JIC includes "listening" and "sharing" in its operative model. As discussed this far, the practical application of listening

and sharing may prove difficult. The paradox of listening and persuading culminates in the question of dialogue. In order to persuade, a certain attentiveness to the audience's reactions (i.e. the effects of communication) is necessary. However, does this type of listening count as dialogue? According to Coombs & Holladay (2007), it does not. In the case of Strategic Communication, listening is a matter of persuasion rather than aiming at a communicative balance between the organization and the audience. This two-way asymmetric model of public relations has been defended as an organization's way to look after its interests and is characterized as "advocacy" (see Grunig, 2001; also Grunig, 1992). A PR-strategy may appear as naturally asymmetrical and to favor either the interests of the organization or the public, but according to Grunig (2001: 25), the middle of the continuum of these interests contains "a symmetrical win-win zone" where both the organization and the public can "engage in mixed-motive communication". Unlike the original symmetrical model, the mixed-motive model would not force the organization to sacrifice its interests, and would ideally lead to practices of collaboration instead of advocacy (Grunig, 2001).

Obviously, collaboration is an unrealistic request to an organization that specifically aims at asymmetry. However, the public and stakeholders have the tendency to communicate, whether their input was called for or not. The asymmetric methods force the counterparty to engage in respectively asymmetric activities in order to pursue its interests. This turns us to the question of audiences. The problem with Strategic Communication is its undefined audiences and the matrix of their interests. It is practically impossible to predict their expectations, which makes proactive communication strategies virtually impossible. In the asymmetric model, stakeholders can force the organization into dialogue (Coombs & Holladay, 2007: 54), which has also been the case with the ongoing military operations. The Abu Ghraib and WikiLeaks scandals have forced the organization to comment and evaluate its practices in public. In these cases the strategic stakeholders have included U.S. soldiers who have been able, intentionally or not, to reveal something about the practices from within the organization - something that is difficult for an outside stakeholder to do. In this sense WikiLeaks has been a significant element of asymmetry, and in fact a dire consequence of the asymmetric nature of U.S. Strategic Communication. As the scandals prove, without symmetry and mutual influence, communication becomes unpredictable and uncontrollable. This means that communication will turn from flows into bursts, each causing the organization significant damage and further undermining their credibility and legitimacy.

Further, it seems that one of the major shortcomings of Strategic Communication is its failure to recognize its stakeholders. The CHSCCS

makes numerous references to the importance of analysis and maintenance of stakeholder relations, but keeps referring to governmental and non-governmental organizations, interagency representatives, intergovernmental and international organization representatives, media, etc. Considering the recent scandals and their impact on public opinion, the focus should perhaps be on the global audience and the individual soldier. Failing to treat the soldiers as stakeholders has in this case led to major reputational damage. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, most PR scandals have been caused by individual soldiers. These "strategic corporals" have had different motivations to communicate their perspective, some by leaking information on purpose, as was the case with Bradley Manning and the WikiLeaks scandals, and some by recording their war experience in photos and videos, never intending the outside world to see them, as happened with the photos taken in Abu Ghraib and the video of U.S. soldiers urinating on dead Taleban fighters. When the soldier's experience in the field does not correspond with the official Strategic Communication, they will continue to produce micronarratives that undermine the Grand Narrative. These narratives will be produced regardless of the outlet. What the concept of Strategic Communication ignores is the need for a feedback channel that would ensure that in addition to making the individual soldier responsible for generating "synchronized messages" where words correspond with actions, there should be a way for the soldiers to engage in a bottom-up dialogue with their organization. However, the concept of Strategic Communication recognizes communication as a top-down process. While the doctrine of Strategic Communication focuses the practices of persuasive influence only on the outside stakeholders and the adversary, the approach to the needs of the inside stakeholders, i.e. the soldiers, is underdeveloped. This will continue to pose a threat to the U.S. communication policy.

But stakeholders and audiences will continue to communicate. Ultimately this means that the organization faces the options of either evading transparency, or engaging in a dialogue with its members and stakeholders. This dialogue, or the lack of it, determines both the ethics and the efficiency of communication: the absence of it maintains distrust both in the minds of the soldiers participating in the operation, and in the minds of the global audiences and other stakeholders. This, in turn, complicates the legitimacy function that is the very objective of the organization.

3.3 Implementation of SC: practice in the field as instructed

The previous section introduced the theoretical principles and contradictions of Strategic Communication. This section will focus on a practical application of the doctrine as instructed by the CHSCCS, the so-called themes and messages card.

As stated, the CHSCCS, which aims to provide practical information and guidance to the execution of Strategic Communication, goes as far as providing examples of themes and words that should be used to influence the perceptions about the enemy (p. IV-22). The purpose of these cards is to prevent the "say-do gap". The inconsistencies between the words and deeds of the military force trouble the organization not only on the level of decision making, but at the grass-roots level of individual soldiers.

[W]ith actions at all levels sends conflicting messages and significantly inhibits the creation of desired outcomes. Many refer to this as a "say-do gap." To help solve this problem in the CENTCOM and OUTHCOM AORs, units issued each soldier a card with key themes and messages to carry with them at all times. This approach was designed to synchronize words and activities all the way down to the individual level. This card helped soldiers and activity participants consistently communicate the desired message and guided their actions during unanticipated circumstances. (CHSCCS, p. III-10)

The themes and messages card presents an understanding of the practical implementation of Strategic Communication: how strategic level objectives should be transformed into dialogue. Individual soldiers are seen as operators who negotiate with the stakeholders, and in order to equip them for these exchanges, the card consists of lists of themes and messages that should be enforced:

SC Standing Themes and Messages	Themes to Stress (through actions and/or words)
Related Themes and Messages	Themes to Avoid

Figure 2: *The outline of the themes and messages card (CHSCCS, p. K-1)*

Here, it is the individual soldier who is eventually made responsible for the generating of strategically applicable verbal and physical communication. Unlike the culture smart card that provides the basic information about the cultural environment, the themes and messages card is not intended to inform and educate, but to instruct the individual soldier on the correct way to practice conditioning. This means that Strategic Communication is not

truly a model for communication, but a means of internal organizational control. It determines the roles within the organization and the correct usage of language. The instructions on the practical application of SC emphasize dialogue (CHSCCS, p. A-2): "Effective communication requires a multi-faceted dialogue among parties. It involves active listening, engagement, and the pursuit of mutual understanding, which leads to trust." This instruction would be in favor of symmetrical communication, but the themes and messages card does little to promote deep understanding or dialogue. Instead, it models communication as an asymmetrical process that aims at persuasion rather than dialogue and mutual attunement. Moral agency may be manuscripted into the smart cards that promote democracy and partnership, but instead of treating soldiers as moral agents, the doctrine reduces the soldier into an instrument of asymmetric capability. With the themes and messages of the official Grand Narrative determined in the smart card, there is little space for "multifaceted exchange of ideas" or "deep comprehension of others". The objectives and methods of Strategic Communication are once again in dissonance.

4. Discussion

This article has discussed a number of problems and paradoxes that the concept of Strategic Communication is subject to in terms of theory and practice. In conclusion, the communication doctrine that aspires to the early propaganda model will face increasing difficulties in the operational environment that Strategic Communication is intended to cover. A model that is based on the methodology of one-way influence and control rather than interaction is not suited for the global cultural landscape of modern communication, which values uninterrupted communication, feedback, interaction and individualism. However, the perception of communication as a transfer process and conditioning is inseparable from the tradition of military communication. Strategic Communication is a parallel, non-kinetic doctrine to the kinetic doctrines of the 21st century, all of which are based on the principle of measurability of effects. This keeps it tied to the theoretical framework of Mass Communication Research. Abandoning the behaviorist approach and adopting a more collaborative approach to communication would require a dramatic reform in the doctrinal repertoire. The nature of the organization complicates the adoption of symmetric communication, because from the perspective of strategy and tactics, communication is seen as an asymmetric capacity. This keeps it tied to the problematic tradition of costly and burdensome management, which essentially makes Strategic Communication a control model. Its function is not merely to produce narratives, but to provide control within the organization.

The question remains: is it possible for military communication to escape

its purpose? If symmetry and transparency are unrealistic methods of communication, Strategic Communication will remain essentially a propaganda model. As long as it aspires to its current framework, it will have to wrestle with the methodological problems that resulted in the weaning of the research tradition of Mass Communication Research.

Finally, soldiers are agents and stakeholders. They react, make mistakes, and generate communication that expresses their experience. During the age where communication practices are based on the principle of access, Strategic Communication as a hierarchy cannot legitimately control the flows of information. This has led to the concept of information age 'strategic corporals', who may either support the efforts of the military operation - or undermine them. In fact, the communicative actions of the soldiers, voluntary or involuntary, may just be the true 'strategic communication'. Political, strategic level statements made from the Pentagon press room or the politically motivated key words memorized from a smart card are easily challenged by the depictions of the soldiers' reality. Compared to the official strategic narrative, the information value of the unofficial micronarratives is far greater. What makes the soldiers' narratives strategic is their truthfulness and authenticity - which is something Strategic Communication cannot offer. The problem may thus be that the Department of Defense fails to recognize one of its key groups of stakeholders: the soldiers, those actors that live the reality of strategic decisions but whose experience the doctrine effectively attempts to silence.

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THE HIDDEN GRAND NARRATIVE OF WESTERN MILITARY POLICY: A LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION (ARTICLE II)

ABSTRACT

Strategic communication has replaced information warfare. As Art of War has been replaced by science, the representations of war and the role of the military have changed. Both war and military forces are now associated with binary roles: destruction vs. humanity, killing vs. liberating. The logic behind 'bombing for peace' is encoded in the Grand Military Narrative. This narrative is hidden in American (and NATO) strategies such as Effects Based Operations, which rely heavily on technology. As people aim to rationalize the world with technology, they fail to take into account the uncertainty it brings. In warfare, that uncertainty is verbalized as "friendly fire", "collateral damage" or simply as "accident". Success and failure are up to technology. Technology is no longer a tool, but an ideology and an actor that not only 'enables' the military to take action, but legitimizes it. This article aims to contribute to military studies by analyzing, in the spirit of critical discourse analysis, American 'Grand Military Narrative' and the standard and trends of rhetoric it creates. The article focuses on pinpointing some of the linguistic choices and discourses that define the so-called 'techno-speak', the product of modern techno-ideology. These discourses result in representations of techno-centered binary values, which steer military strategy and foreign policy.

Keywords

Revolution in Military Affairs, Effects Based Operations, critical discourse analysis, military technology

1. Introduction

On August 23, 2010, Reuters reported that missiles fired from a U.S. drone killed 13 militants and 7 civilians in Pakistan. Combat drones such as the Predator and Reaper usually carry precision weapons such as Hellfire variations, designed to kill tanks and bust bunkers (Defense News,

31.5.2010). Now a smaller, lighter and more accurate missiles are developed. "You want to hit only the guy you want, not the school bus three cars back", says Steve Felix of the Naval Air Warfare Center (Matthews, 2010). According to Steve Martin, the representative of Lockheed Martin, the aim is to reduce collateral damage: "The bad guys are figuring out how to hide out in homes and near schools. We can't go in and drop large bombs - that just doesn't work any more" (ibid.) One of these new, smaller and lighter missile types is Raytheon's Griffin, currently deployed in Predator drones. "The Griffin's maneuverability and accuracy reduce the risk of "collateral damage"" says an Army representative. "When you can start producing a lower ratio of collateral damage, that's how you win this kind of war", notes Anthony Cordesman from Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. (Wichner, 2010). No more 'enemy', but virtuous precision to rid the world of the "bad guys". A glance at the press briefing transcripts from the past years reveals that the Pentagon increasingly refers to the enemy as "the bad guys". The concept of the absolute enemy (see Mouffe, 2005) is particularly obvious in modern military (political) discourse, where 'they' no longer are an adversary, but an absolute evil. The lack of legitimacy of the enemy is demonstrated by titles such as 'bad guys' - they are not recognized as military or as anything the military represents. Instead, they are faceless and in want of status. The enemy is fully visualized only in computer games, where the player is free to shoot.

In July 2010, the Army Experience Center (AEC) in a Philadelphia mall was getting ready to close its door after a successful project. The Center offered visitors information on military careers as well as video games and simulators (some of which are used to train the troops). The youth, wandering the malls, are the perfect target for recruiters. The traditional images of depressing boot camp physical training disappear once the teenagers (13 and older, according to the AEC) get to show with combat simulators what they have been practicing most of their lives. Because they know gaming, warfare has to become game-like. Now, the entertainment industry is replacing boot camps. Being good at war is made easy. Being good at war is about pressing a button: in the Army Experience Center, the teenagers can "touch and feel and experience what the army is all about", explains one of the Center's recruiters (thearmyexperience, 2008). High-tech weapons to kill the "bad guys" from a comfortable distance and virtual simulation create combat experience: what ever the problem, the answer lies in technology. This is the Grand Military Narrative.

2. Background

The military-industrial complex gave birth to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The future of the military is computers, information

networks, and precision-guided munitions (Toffler, 1981; 1993). Technological advances are used to solve the military and strategic challenges of the U.S. (Shimko, 2010: 213). This revolution, or evolution, is depicted by the Grand Military Narrative. RMA's focus on technology has led to technology-centered strategies and doctrines. Technology offers the option of unmanned war, to “bring knowledge forward” for the people whose observation is limited (Rantapelkonen, 2006:72). “Maximizing output” and “minimizing input” (citing Lyotard, 1984 in Rantapelkonen, 2006:73) match the American ideal of “easy living”. Lyotard argues that technology is “good” because it is efficient, not because it is “true”, “just” or “beautiful”. According to Rantapelkonen (2006), 'war on terror' is technologically driven. However, the binary image of war contains the idea of not only destroying and devastating, but also avoiding risk, threat and death by liberating, helping and building. Der Derian (2008) calls this "virtuous war". He argues that the military-industrial complex needs binary rhetoric such as 'bombing for peace' and 'killing to live' in order to operate and make profit: technology is in service of virtue. As death and destruction are no longer accepted, technology steps in. By replacing the soldier with a precision (fire-and-forget) weapon, 'targets can be hit' and 'operations conducted' without causing protests on the home front.

The doctrines of Effects Based Operations and Comprehensive Approach are built around the promise of technology. These doctrines are characterized by the term *precision*. Colonel Crowder (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003), much quoted in the upcoming analysis, elaborated on the concept:

Crowder: With the development of the laser-guided bombs, and specifically the laser-guided bombs on aircraft such as the F-111 and the F-117 in Allied -- or, in Desert Storm, we were able to hit two independent targets very precisely with about 10-meter CEP or 10-foot CEP from a single aircraft. When we added additional aircraft, such as the B-2, that capability is now to the point where we can hit multiple targets on a single pass.

[...]

Q: What does CEP stand for?

Crowder: Oh, pardon me. Circular error probable. It is the probability that that weapon will -- that 50 percent of the weapons will land inside that line. So, if what I say basically is -- if I say the CEP of a B-17 in World War II was 3,300 feet, that means there was a high likelihood that 50 percent of the bombs dropped landed with inside 3,300 feet. So not very --

Surely new 21st century missiles are precise. But at the same time, a weapon with a 50% error margin can still be labeled as a 'precision

weapon'. Obviously this is a mere reflection of strategic communication. *Precision* is now equal to humanity, and legitimizes the Western way of war.

The evolution of warfare demands science is in the service of war. Technology “enables us to do a lot more stuff” and to “more effectively prosecute those operations” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003). Because of its efficiency and speed, strategies, doctrines and even foreign policy rely on the sole use of technology. The Powell Doctrine aimed to solve problems by overwhelming force in the form of superior weapons technology. Shock and Awe in 2003 worked much the same way. However, the modern narratives and threat descriptions do not, after all, change much. President Obama no longer uses the term "war on terrorism", but this choice of term did not change the warfare in Afghanistan or Iraq. The US, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea are still developing nuclear weapons. The new threat descriptions have not removed the old threats. Despite precision munitions, B52 bombers are still in use. The real change first takes place in discourse, but lags behind in realization. The Grand Military Narrative contains a techno-ideology, which is encoded in language. In this Narrative war has two aspects: the "how" and "why". How wars are conducted is a matter of technology descriptions. Why wars are fought is a matter of value systems. The merge of these two aspects create what is now known as strategic communication.

Not only has the language of the press-briefings, but also soldier-to-soldier communication has changed. In the battlefield and combat, propaganda has been replaced by strategic and psychological influence. The global and social media create an increasing influence and new technology solutions create an opportunity to make an impact. Strategic communication exploits all these. The new generation's war, the Gulf War, was a catalyst to public discussion on the new wave of Information Operations. The Kosovo War and 9/11 sped up the discussion. A whole new narrative was created during the 'War Against Terrorism'.

According to Taylor (2003), the concepts of political, psychological or information warfare are outdated. Instead, we use the concept of 'strategic communication'. Taylor recognizes three types of it. First is “public diplomacy”, referring to state and political level. Second is “public affairs”, which contains the global media. The third type, Information operations (Info Ops), deals with military capability. Strategic communication has abandoned the Cold War era categories of propaganda: the so called “black” (covert), “white” (overt) and “grey” (unknown) propaganda. Today, the speed of communication is enough to disturb our perception management capability. The 24/7 model takes advantage of our values and understanding of democracy: we say no to censorship and want all

information to be available at all times, everywhere. Strategic communication is a child of the complex world. Instead of rational knowledge, we have information flow. Planning and execution are parallel processes; Speed dictates the operational modes, and strategic communication is an attempt to control all this.

3. Empirical analysis

3.1 The Language of Effects Based Operations

Effects Based Operations (EBO), is a US military concept and doctrine that stands for "operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of select instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims". On the day of "Shock and Awe" in 2003, Colonel Gary L. Crowder, chief of strategy, concepts and doctrine, elaborated the concept in layperson's terms in a press briefing dedicated for EBO alone (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003). Before proceeding to explaining any further, the concepts of technology-based approach and doctrine step in. Crowder explains that the new approach was "more than just people, it was the combination of a fortuitous development of different capabilities and technologies [...] that enabled us to do that." The phrases that follow this capture the very essence of the discourse that characterized the American public relations during the beginning of the war:

Instead of a traditional attritional approach in terms of listing a bunch of targets and then go bombing targets, or finding where the enemy is and killing all the enemy, we really determined that what we wanted to do was in fact to achieve some sort of policy objective, and that you could, in fact, craft military operations to better achieve those policy operations in a more efficient and effective manner.

The key words here are "efficient" and "effective". EBO was, according to Crowder, a way to mitigate collateral damage. In order to explain the concepts of "collateral damage" and "unintended damage", Crowder had to discuss risk-taking as part of doctrine. Crowder explains that even if collateral and unintended damage happen, and "both of these types of damage will take place", they "still went through a methodical process". This precisely is the problem with strategy that relies almost solely on the performance of technology. Technology fails, and when it does, the responsibility of that failure lies on technology itself. According to the strategy, both collateral and unintended damage are unavoidable, technology has its fail-ratio, and these are facts that just have to be

accepted. In Virilio's (1989: 8-9) terms, Art of War has turned into Science of the Accident.

Technology is complex and when techno-speak enters press briefings such as Crowder's, a new kind of language is created. Žižek (2009) argues that public communication increasingly applies expert and scientific jargon that no longer translates to the 'common speak' of the society. The 'expert speak', despite its abstract nature, still shapes our thinking, especially when it is labeled with adjectives such as 'precision', 'smart' and 'efficiency'. With examples of virtuous warring (*liberating*) and precise and efficient operating models (*avoiding collateral damage*), it complies with the modern imperative of clean and safe, effective and lethal, and yet moral and humane war fighting. The kind of war that we will accept.

Although EBO as it was first created and intended is already abandoned by the American Department of Defense, it created a new narrative tradition of virtue and the superiority of technology and binary values. This tradition continues to influence Western military discourses. In order to pinpoint the Grand Military Narrative of strategic communication, we have to look at the theme and structures of the strategists' language. The United States has an irrefutable position as the military trend-setter and the creator of new military concepts. This makes American strategy papers and press briefings on strategy and doctrine a good resource for analyzing the evolution of strategic communication. The upcoming analysis continues the discussion on strategy, doctrine and Effects Based Operations and their influence on discourse. The Joint Operating Environment 2010 (JOE10) (United States Joint Forces Command, 2010) provides the framework for our analysis and aims to predict and forecast the future of American warfare. It argues and elaborates on what *should* be prepared for. The narrative starts from the recognition of the human limitations in the complex world, created by the clash of different ideologies and cultures, and further supplemented by advances in technology and changes in the economy. The complex world affects, according to the report, the "battle of narratives". If winning the battle is important, winning the battle of narratives is "absolutely crucial". The report makes the conclusion that

Dominating the narrative of any operation, whether military or otherwise, pays enormous dividends. [...] In the battle of narratives, the United States must not ignore its ability to bring its considerable soft power to bear in order to reinforce the positive aspects of Joint Force operations. Humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, securing the safety of local populations, military-to-military exercises, health care, and disaster relief are just a few examples of the positive measures that we offer.

This statement is interesting, as we have witnessed the emergence of operations 'other than war'. In the narrative of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military leadership put much focus on the humanitarian aspect of the operation. But, the "battle of narratives" manifested itself not only in word choices such as *liberate* and *humanitarian aid*, but also as words such as *precision-guided weapons*. The emphasis of the use of precision guided munitions can be seen as semantic tactics. Technology is part of the narrative. JOE10 mentions the words *deter* and *deterrence* several times, and finally concludes that deterrence will be the "primary purpose" of the military forces. This explains the threat discourse: the only way to deter is to excel over the rest in skill, capacity and resources. Deterrence will be created by absorbing education and science: "The Services should draw from a breadth and depth of education in a range of relevant disciplines to include history, anthropology, economics, geopolitics, cultural studies, the 'hard' sciences, law, and strategic communication", the report states. It also stresses that in future, asymmetric and irregular warfare will be more likely than conventional warfare, and that the U.S. military should be prepared for this:

Irregular wars are more likely, and winning such conflicts will prove just as important to the protection of America's vital interests and the maintenance of global stability.

To summarize the report, we make the following conclusions: in strategy, techno-speak

1. is part of the "battle of narratives" and Strategic Communication
2. is based on threat discourse
3. serves the function of deterrence on one hand, and legitimation on the other.

The analysis uses these conclusions as the starting point for the linguistic part of the analysis.

3.2 Methods and data

The methodology of the analysis builds on the concept of action as a reference to identity and evaluation. It contains three levels of approach: the application of the transitivity system and the process of nominalization. The transitivity system contains the information on *who does what to whom* (Butt et al, 2001) and "constrains the world of experience into a manageable set off process types" (Halliday, 170). Clause structures typically contain an actor, a process, and a goal or a target (and, of course, much else). The variations in the combination of these elements are significant. In the context of war and conflict, they are a medium for expressing an

experience or ideology. For example, Lukin (2005) refers to "doing without doing to" by pointing out that in clause structures such as 'The operation began on the 19th of March', 'Our forces are operating throughout Iraq' or 'A particularly successful operation occurred last night', there is an actor and a process, but no target or goal: the entity impacted by the process is excluded (Lukin, 2005: 6).

The target of the action may also be an abstract of an inanimate entity when referring to 'own' action. The clause structures of enemy action may look very different: the entities impacted are human and far from abstract: women, children and civilians. We will compare the data to a number of nominal constructions found in the text. The analysis of nominalizations is a methodological tradition in Critical Discourse Analysis. It refers to the grammatical process of turning a verb into a noun or a nominal construction: *quit - quitter, fail - failure*, etc. Nominalization brings grammatical metaphors into discourse. As Martin (2011: 803) writes,

[N]ominalization (and derivation in general) is a resource for extending the lexical resources of a language. Grammatical metaphor, by contrast, is a resource for scrambling, within limits, the realization relationship between semantics and grammar and so indefinitely extending a language's meaning potential. This is much more than a vocabulary-building exercise. It allows writers, and people who learn to speak writing, to mean more than one thing at once.

In the framework of this article, nominalizations are thus an extension of the very action descriptions first discussed. The data of the analysis comes from a press briefing transcript that aired on the same day when the coalition forces started the Operation Iraqi Freedom by bombing Baghdad. In this briefing, Colonel Gary Crowder (the division chief at Air Combat Command and the plans director for Strategy, Concepts and Doctrine) introduces the concept of Effects Based Operations (EBO) to the press and the public. It can be found online in the US Department of Defense transcript archive with the title *Effects Based Operations Briefing*.

3.3 Results

	ACTOR	PROCESS (material)	BENEF ICIARY	
1	these analytical tools	enable	us [...]	to find <u>alternative methodologies</u>
2	[PGM] [...]	give	us	<u>the ability</u> for a large number of other aircraft besides just stealth aircraft to hit multiple weapons per targets.
3	its stealth qualities	enable	us	to do a large number of <u>things</u>
4	[the stealth]	enables	us	to do a lot more <u>stuff</u>
5	the stealth	does give	us	<u>some capabilities</u> in addition to the precision

Table 1: *Technology as a Doer*

The analysis consists of two categories of action descriptions: of those, where the 'doer' is technology, and of those, where the 'doer' is 'us' (the US, Coalition Forces, etc). When looking at the clauses where technology is the Actor, the main observations are that in these descriptions the typical process is a description of 'enabling', and the object of action (Goal or Range, often in a projected clause) is abstract or ambiguous as seen in the table above.

In action descriptions where the Actor is human or animate, there are two main types. The first type are the descriptions of dynamic military action and capability:

	ACTOR/ CARRIER	PROCESS (material relational)	or GOAL/RANGE/ POSSESSED	
6	we	were able to take down	to <u>the air defense system</u>	
7	we	were able to neutralize	those <u>towers</u>	
8	we	can hit	multiple <u>targets</u>	
9	we	have	much more dual- use <u>capability</u>	in each of the Air Force's, Navy's and Marines' fighter aircraft as well as our bomber aircraft
10	we	have	an improved <u>ability</u>	to go after adversary's systems

Table 2: *Human as a Doer*

The action descriptions refer to the use of weapons and technology. In descriptions of military action, the process is typically material (physical) and the object of the action is inanimate and often abstract. The data also contains a number of possessive attributive action descriptions (*having something*), where the entity possessed is typically *capability* or *ability*, both abstract. The evaluation of the first ten sample clauses is positive. The Process (often combined with the Goal/Range) signal social esteem in the form of capacity; Technology and Self are described as competent, expert and powerful. The objects of action are inanimate, which signals Social Sanction: the one acting is good, moral and ethical by attacking non-human targets.

The second type consists of action descriptions that are somewhere between material and mental processes:

#	SENSER	PROCESS (mental)	PHENOMENON
11	I	would prioritize [...]	those <u>targets</u>
12	we	look	at the desired <u>effects</u> we want to create on the battle space,
13	we	evaluate	<u>the target sets</u> that we need to do, that -- those effects that we need to create on the battle space
14	we	bring	<u>those</u> together into a integrated <u>plan</u>
15	we literally	come up	with a <u>high heaven objective</u>

Table 3: *Human as a Doer*

These descriptions highlight the analytical part of waging war: the planning and the creating of strategy. In this context we will analyze them as mental processes, because they are strongly contrastive to the material processes of *attacking* and *neutralizing*, and their purpose is to emphasize the role of the scientific and creative planning process in warfare. The evaluation in the above clauses is, just like in the first ten, positive. Capacity is signaled with descriptions of observation, consideration and learnedness. These Process types can further be characterized as perceptive and cognitive (Halliday, 2004: 210). To put it briefly, the source text emphasizes Capacity that is realized by descriptions of having both inner (ability, cognitive skills) and outer (material, technological) resources. Of all action, the emphasis is on

inner experience: weapons are of course used, but after a planning process that is described as highly scientific.

In addition to action descriptions, the briefing contained a number of nominal constructions that are worth notice:

Nominal constructions: technology
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• the combination of a fortuitous development of different capabilities and technologies• the development of the laser-guided bombs• the capability of a Joint Direct Attack Munition• the evolution of about the last 20 years• the evolution of both the Air Force and the Navy and Marine Corps' combat• our ability to go after targets

Table 4: *Nominalizations*

The above nominalizations capture the semantic content of the action descriptions: *development*, *capability*, *evolution*, *ability*. The order of these nominalizations create a narrative of evolving and developing capability that finally is utilized as an ability. This narrative creates a concept of advancement and technological omnipotence.

4. Discussion

There are two major players in the Grand Narrative of War: technology is the *enabler*, and 'we' are the *able*. The ability technology creates is to wage war effectively, precisely and securely and so save lives by avoiding casualties and collateral damage. Technology is the prerequisite for humanity in warfare. In this narrative, war has evolved into "Effects Based Operations" on one hand, and into humanitarian operations on the other. The result is war's new image, which is slowly drifting further and further away from the killing, and closer and closer to implementing humanity. This is the source of the binary rhetoric of 'bombing for peace' and 'destroying the village to save it'.

The frequently occurring words *capacity* and *capability* are abstract and subordinate terms that may mean anything from having financial or human resources to operate to meaning the quality of weapons systems, planning, or the mass of the actual weapons. These are everyday terms in strategy and operations discussed in public and allow the speaker to carry out the tactic of neutrality through vagueness.

The technology descriptions in American war-speak execute the function of

deterrence. As Joint Operational Environment 2010 (United States Joint Forces Command, 2010) concludes, the task of deterrence will be increasingly important. This, although, evokes the question whether the asymmetric and irregular enemy the report described can be deterred and if so, whether technology as a deterrence will work. Insurgents use inexpensive and asymmetric forms of combat, to which the U.S. responds with expensive counter measures. According to 2008 National Defense Strategy, deterrence must include both military and non-military tools, and that "changes in capabilities, especially new technologies" help to create a credible deterrence. Metz (2007: 65) elaborates on the logic of fighting insurgency with technology:

Counterinsurgency experts long have argued that technology is unimportant in this type of conflict. While it is certainly correct that technology designed to find and destroy a conventional enemy military force had limited application, other types such as nonlethal weapons and robotics do hold promise for difficult tasks such as securing populated areas, preventing infiltration, and avoiding civilian casualties.

While the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy emphasizes the integration of military and non-military means, the military still turns to technology for answers. EBO, once justified with the promise of new technologies, has been abandoned and replaced with the 'Comprehensive Approach' (CA). These new strategies are justified as they promise 'even less' collateral damage and 'even better' precision - enabled by technology. The name of the applied strategies change, but the discourses (and the weapons used) remain the same. The deterrence the West imposes means smaller and smaller missiles (yet more lethal than ever), satellites and stealth drones (that both observe us and guide missiles) and cyberspace. Virilio (2009) calls this "aesthetics of disappearance". The collective Western outlook no longer tolerates alternatives that would make war visible. At the same time, we fear the unseen. The Joint Operating Environment 2010 (ibid.) also remarks that individual soldiers are increasingly "global communication producers". According to the report, in the "battle of narratives" the role of the "strategic corporal whose acts might have strategic consequences if widely reported" is big. By press-briefing the media and embedding journalists in 'liberation operations', the military leadership is creating strategic communication that is convincing enough to appeal not only to the public, but also to the soldier that has to be supervised and controlled by the system and as part of the system - not as an individual. In the words of the COIN Field Manual: "Information operations (IO) must be aggressively employed" to "obtain local, regional, and international support for COIN operations" and "discredit insurgent propaganda and provide a more compelling alternative to the insurgent ideology and narrative".

5. Conclusion

The Revolution in Military Affairs presents the new identity of war as a system of technologies, an ideology which manifests itself in military discourse. In addition, system thinking, such as EBO, has created the demand for both internal and external control in the Western military force. This combination of strategically significant military contractors, techno-faith and the need to dominate and control have led to strategic communication, which contains the Grand Military Narrative. According to this Grand Narrative, technology executes, with precision, reliability and from a distance, the duties determined by analytical, rational and morally virtuous humans. The public role of the military is to 'do good'. In this narrative, war is removed from the battle fields into the virtual.

The binary roles of the military result in binary rhetoric, and this is very visible in the analysis introduced in this article. Whereas the adversary, the insurgents, conduct hands-on warfare based on the assumption that the insurgent will die in the process, the West distances itself from the discomfort both physically (drones and missiles) and mentally (distance and simulation) and tolerate no losses. 'We' cling onto everything we have, whereas 'they' have little to lose. 'We' fight the enemy with the exact opposite way than they fight 'us': the US is portrayed as evolved and scientific, while the majority of the militaries in the rest of the world employ very different methods of warfare. This makes the discourse on the threats of asymmetric enemies interesting. Is it not the RMA that distanced 'us' from the enemy and created asymmetry, the Frankenstein we are now terrified of?

The Grand Military Narrative is full of paradoxes. Rhetoric, strategy and reality do not meet. The result is that we are deterring an asymmetric enemy (that cannot be deterred) with weapons (that cannot be seen) and pay more than we can afford to in order to do so (while the enemy pays close to nothing). The paradox here is that in an arms race against asymmetric enemies, the winner is not the one who has the highest technology, but the one who tolerates the biggest losses.

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KILL, CAPTURE... OR WHAT? HOW OPERATIONAL PLANNING CHANGES THE LANGUAGE OF COMMUNICATING STRATEGY IN WAR (*ARTICLE III*)

ABSTRACT

The doctrine of warfare influences the way language is used. The reporting of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that the Effects-centric doctrines have started to transform the grammatical and lexical patterning of discourse. During the war in Iraq, both military experts and linguists have criticized the language of the Effects Based Operations as complex and confusing. This article provides a cross-disciplinary perspective to the study of war discourses by discussing the linguistic characteristics of the 21st century Strategic Communication as a reflection of current military doctrine and operation planning. The analysis suggests that the perceived complexity is a consequence of Effects-thinking, which has introduced the taxonomy of Effects into discourse, where they have begun to replace Action descriptions in clauses. This results in abstract descriptions of strategy, operational art, and tactics, where the information value of the clause becomes impaired. The analysis also suggests that this marks the birth of a new genre in war discourse. In addition to the traditional good/bad and legitimate/illegitimate parameters of war discourse, evaluation can be expressed covertly. The inclusive/exclusive parameter defines action descriptions that, unlike the previous parameters, appear virtually neutral. However, it has a culture-ideological basis: a certain lexicon is associated with certain actors only, which will eventually lead to two separate lexicons to describe and contrast 'our' and 'their' strategy, operational art, and tactics. This means that we are witnessing a shift from the tradition of reporting events to the tradition of reporting identity. Also, this ideological change has penetrated the language used in operation planning and inter-organization discourses.

Keywords

military discourse, warfare, Strategic Communication, evaluation, strategic planning

1. Introduction

This article aims to introduce a military scientific perspective in the linguistic discussion of war discourse. Understanding the doctrinal developments of communication helps us to explain the linguistic

phenomena of American Strategic Communication. War is one of the most widely discussed contexts of discourse analysis, but from the perspective of military science, the problem is often the same: too often language is discussed in isolation from the actual doctrine that greatly influences the way language manifests. Therefore, this article attempts to bridge the gap between the strongly established discourse analysis tradition and the critical discussion of strategy and doctrine in the field of military science. After discussing the aims and objectives of military communication in general, the discussion will build on the research conducted in the field of systemic functional linguistics and explain the grammatical and lexical patterns that linguists have identified in the discourses of modern warfare. These include technical terms, abstraction of action, and object-less clause configurations. Then, these findings are considered in the framework of the modern military doctrines. Finally, the empirical analysis of the article approaches the term 'neutralize' as a lexical representative of the discourses of Strategic Communication. The aim is to understand the current discourses of war as the doctrinal consequence of Strategic Communication.

2. The evaluative dichotomies then and now

Propaganda, information warfare, information operations, perception management and strategic communication are all communication doctrines, past and present, which have been designed to win support and legitimacy for military strategy, policy, and operations. The names of the communication doctrines have been under constant change in the past decades, but the ultimate aim, legitimation, has remained the same. Lasswell (1938: 195) defined propaganda as attempts

(1) To mobilize hatred against the enemy; (2) To preserve the friendship of allies; (3) To preserve the friendship and, if possible, to procure the co-operation of neutrals; (4) To demoralize the enemy.

This classic demonization/glorification dichotomy is alive and well. The 2010 *Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy* (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2010: III-18) introduced a number of practical guidelines for reinforcing the legitimacy of national strategic objectives and operational practices, while instructing practices by which the illegitimacy of the adversary can be emphasized:

*(1) Improve US credibility and legitimacy.
(2) Weaken an adversary's credibility and legitimacy.
(3) Convince selected audiences to take specific actions that support US or international objectives.
(4) Cause a competitor or adversary to take (or refrain from*

taking) specific actions.

Legitimacy is thus inarguably still the core business of military (political) communication. The comparison of the aims of Strategic Communication and Lasswell's definition of propaganda suggests that these forms of communication would both lead to similar discourse patterns: demonization (to de-legitimize) and glorification (to legitimize). But have the strategies of legitimation really not evolved since the World Wars? This article approaches this question by arguing that Operation Iraqi Freedom as well as the war in Afghanistan are characterized by a genre of war discourse that has emerged to implement an ideological function of legitimation by means of exclusion. The feature that differentiates this genre from the "classic" demonization and glorification is its virtual lack of persuasive appraisal. This, however, does not mean that it would not convey significances of ideological nature. Instead, it counts as discursive abuse of power and is therefore significant in the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (see Van Dijk, 2006).

Lasswellian, overtly evaluative propaganda (Lasswell, 1938; Smith, Lasswell & Casey, 1946) "to mobilize hatred" and "to preserve the friendship of allies" is typical during the early stages of conflict, when the legitimacy of engagement in the operation is the primary objective of communication efforts. For instance, in his speech after 9/11, President Bush reported the enemy as an actor that kills, represses and brutalizes all people, its own citizens, and Afghanistan's people (Butt, Lukin & Matthiessen, 2004). A form of self-glorification and legitimation, in turn, is the systematic presentation of one's own actions as legitimate and less aggressive, violent, or destructive; in the 2003 CentCom briefings reports of human-to-human (American to enemy) action were scarce, suggesting that it was mainly the buildings and infrastructure that were impacted by the military operation (Lukin, 2005; 2006).

Whereas the discourses of war have retained many of their original conventions, it is the conventions of warfare that have evolved more dramatically since Lasswell's day. Since the 1990s, the Kosovo campaign and the first Gulf war being the prime examples, stability operations, civil support, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations have been the most pronounced types of military operations. These operations are conducted in urban areas in the presence of the civilian population, which means they require sophisticated precision-weaponry. The Kosovo campaign, for instance, was essentially precision warfare. During the 21st century, precision warfare capabilities, meaning sophisticated targeting processes and weapons technology, have become the prerequisite for legitimate warfare. It is the exhibition of these capabilities that is one of the primary themes in the media presentations of the U.S. Department of Defense.

When Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched in March, 2003, the Pentagon made sure that the doctrine, technological resources, and targeting were introduced to the media and public in layman's terms (Department of Defense 2003a; 2003b). The verbal negotiation of warfare is strategically as important as its effective execution. This is why Strategic Communication exists. It determines the key themes and messages that together form the official narrative of each war and operation (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2010).

3. Strategic Communication and the three levels of warfare

What remains significant throughout this discussion is the definition of Strategic Communication. Strategic Communication as defined in the concept is understood as

Focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (Department of Defense, 2009).

In order to establish an understanding of the strategic dimension of the concept, it is necessary to consider the hierarchy of the three levels of warfare:




Figure 1. *Levels of war according to Field Manual 100-5 (Department of the Army, 1993)*

According to the U.S. Field Manual 100-5, the *strategic level* of war is concerned with the national, alliance, or coalition objectives. It is the level of applying the instruments and resources of national power. The *operational level* functions as the link between strategic objectives and tactical employment: at this level, the military forces "attain strategic objectives through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations." Finally, the *tactical level* consists of battles and engagements that are fought to achieve the goals and results determined by the operational level. When the definition of Strategic Communication is compared to this hierarchy, it becomes evident that the definition reaches from the strategic level to the tactical: the *interests* and policies of the U.S. Government (strategic level) are used to *engage* key audiences (tactical level) through coordinated *programs* and plans, themes, and messages (operational level). The realization of the Strategic Communication objectives thus requires efforts on all three levels of war.

Another key term in understanding the doctrine is *synchronization*. The doctrine highlights the significance of coordination and synchronization of the themes and messages. According to the Joint Integrating Concept (Department of Defense, 2009), Strategic Communication is "a continuous function that occurs across the full range of military operations" and is used to communicate strategically "with friends, adversaries and others alike". Synchronized and harmonized Strategic Communication would allow the use of the same narrative patterns (themes and messages) across all audiences, which would diminish the role of specific audiences, meaning, and eventually enable the broadcast of one global narrative. This is more or less the direct implication of modern information society, where it is no longer possible to direct different information to different audiences, and where access to flows of information challenges all strategic planning.

To summarize, Strategic Communication should be understood as an ongoing narrative that engages the global audiences and that consists of themes and messages. The aim and function of Strategic Communication (and the communication strategies that precede it) to generate legitimacy and persuasion have been widely studied and analyzed by linguists. Here the focus will be on the work of a number of linguists who have approached the 21st century discourses of war from the perspective of systemic functional grammar. Butt, Lukin & Matthiessen (2004), Lukin (2005) and Lukin (2006) have illustrated how lexical and grammatical patterns are constructed to persuade the audience. According to these analyses, legitimacy manifests itself as the primary parameter in the discourses produced during the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Some of the significant grammatical and lexical properties that characterize the discourses of war will be discussed next. These properties are then discussed within the theoretical framework of current (U.S.) military

doctrine.

4. Grammatical and lexical patterns of war discourses

As Butt, Lukin & Matthiessen sum up, "[i]t is not that language can be used ideologically, it is that the very use of language is ideological." In their analysis of the speeches of President Bush and British Lieutenant Colonel Tim Collins, they found that the discrimination between 'us', the moral, and 'they', the adversary, is coded in the grammar of the discourse. This "moral asymmetry" is expressed in the "consistent allocation of grammatical roles" and results in demonization of the history, culture, and religion of the enemy (Butt, Lukin & Matthiessen, 2004). Lukin (2005) suggests that the grammatical patterns of representing 'self' include configurations where 'our' action either has no Range (i.e. *conduct strikes*), or where the second entity impacted by 'our' action (i.e. *attack*) is either abstract or inanimate (i.e. *combat systems*). Lukin refers to these transitivity configurations as "muted action", which have served the purpose of persuading the audiences into interpreting the events in Iraq from the perspective of the Coalition. Other such grammatical resources are agent-less passive constructions, as well as nominalizations of the actions of war (Lukin, 2006). Grammatical patterning, according to Lukin (2005), "is a central strategic resource in the process of 'dominating the information environment.'" This type of transitivity concordances are what link extralinguistic experience (feelings, thoughts and perceptions) and linguistic, cognitive content of discourse (Halliday, 2009: 55).

As stated above, demonization can be considered as a traditional characteristic of the discourses of war. Western war discourses represent the enemy in the moral context rather than that of adversariality (Mouffe, 2005). According to Mouffe, this is the result of politics "played out in the register of morality" and therefore the 'us' versus 'them' opposition is construed around the categories of 'good' versus 'evil' (2005: 75-76). The analysis of Coalition press briefings supports this view. In Lukin's (2006) analysis of the press briefings from the first week of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the grammatical and lexical patterns of the press briefings feature very few instances of human-to-human action and instead prefer abstract or specifically downgraded Goals, such as 'capacity' or 'the enemy'. In addition to demonizing evaluations of action, such as 'terrorizing', 'killing' and 'brutalizing', the register of morality may manifest itself in much subtler ways, such as distancing oneself from the enemy not only in terms of lexicon and semantics, but also grammatically.

The moral register is demonstrated by the shift from the descriptions of 'us' taking action against the rival to the description of the 'self' as an analytical subject, where the focus is on how 'we' act and behave in the course of war.

The enemy does not have to be mentioned. References to the enemy are often replaced by descriptions of inanimate, legitimate targets such as "systems":

You have to kind of work it and look at each element of that system and figure out what its vulnerable points are. And if you had the ability to do stealth and precision to give you a higher volume of fire, then you could go and attack this system as a system. But again, air defenses aren't the targets, if you had targets. Targets are the targets, or the effects you want to create. (Department of Defense, 2003a)

5. The impact of military doctrine on the discourses of war

As demonstrated in the previous citation, the U.S. military concepts and doctrines of the 1990s and the 2000s have revolved around the concept of Effects. The ones that may be considered as the most notable ones in the framework of this analysis are Warden's Five Rings, Effects Based Operations and its follower, the Comprehensive Approach. The common denominator to these is their focus on the causal effects of action.

the Five Rings model presents the enemy as a system: the key target in the middle of the rings is the leadership, then organic essentials such as raw materials and resources, infrastructure, population and finally fielded military. The more central the ring, the more focal its significance (Warden, 1995). In other words, the system attempts to predict the effects of the strike. The lexicon of the Effects Based Operations and the Comprehensive Approach has incorporated the term 'center of gravity', which stands for the focal points that should be influenced in order to create effects: the center of gravity is "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act" (Department of Defense Dictionary, 2012). In Warden's (1995) view, the centers of gravity are organizational concepts and an organizational model of the enemy helps reveal which ones of them are the most likely to cause the desired effects: "The best place to start is normally at the center for if we can prevent the system's leadership from gathering, processing, and using information we don't want him to have, we have effectively paralyzed the system at a strategic level."

A question that was raised by military analysts was whether the center of gravity should be understood as something physical or cognitive (Davis, 2001: 13-14). As noted by Davis, the metaphor contains the assumption that the center of gravity is physical (for instance a critical node, command headquarters, army formation, etc.) and when these physical targets cease to exist, "the metaphor has completely failed, and it is surely better to just

talk directly about attacking the will and cohesion of the enemy" (2001: 13-14). In 2010, General Petraeus stated that it is the people that are the center of gravity: "Only by providing them security and earning their trust and confidence can the Afghan government and ISAF prevail" (Petraeus, 2010). This statement did not kill the metaphor of the center of gravity as a physical target, but explicitly and successfully brought the human element into systems-thinking. Targeting the center of gravity now meant communicating:

Walk. Stop by, don't drive by. Patrol on foot whenever possible and engage the population. Take off your sunglasses. Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass or Oakleys. (Petraeus, 2010)

In other words, the methodology of creating effects officially contains the means of affecting the will and cohesion of not only the enemy, but all key audiences. Strategic Communication is therefore an element in effects-centric warfare.




Figure 2. *Warden's (1995) five rings*

The result of effects-centric modeling is a lexical taxonomy of effects, which differentiates, for instance, between the terms 'neutralize' and 'destroy'. According to the model, Action (concrete execution) is always differentiated from the Effect (caused influence). This is demonstrated in the Comprehensive Approach operational design model:




Figure 3. *The NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Process (after Salar, 2012)*

Thus, what is relevant is the Effect of the Action, while the action itself simply serves the purpose of creating a desired effect. What this means in terms of grammatical patterning is that it is the Effect that takes the place of the Process - such as is the case with the term 'neutralize'. Grammatically, it is used as a Process, but in the campaign design model, such as demonstrated above, it is an Effect that can be created not by a single action, but a variety of them. This explains the use of abstract action descriptions. As found in Lukin's (2005) analysis of Central Command press briefings, the descriptions of actions and events are abstract and "highly general processes which cover for, and background, a broad range of more specific actions." The lexical implication of the use of Effects to refer to action is the increasing use of abstract hypernyms, and so the lexical and structural properties of war discourse can be seen as a reflection of the current effects-centric doctrine.

In addition to the lexical properties such as abstraction of action, a significant characteristic in terms of grammatical patterning in the press briefings is the small number of references to humans acting on humans and the preference for inanimate objects of action (Lukin, 2006; also Jantunen & Huhtinen, 2011). Like abstraction, this is the consequence of doctrinal developments. Effects-centric doctrines emphasize the significance of controlling critical (enemy) infrastructure, which means the adversary is increasingly understood as a "system" - obviously another abstraction. Systems thinking, the analysis of causal connections and the continuous assessment of effects are characteristic of effects-centric doctrines such as Effects Based Operations (EBO) and Comprehensive Approach (CA). This is, according to critics, also the flaw that makes the doctrines vulnerable (Vego, 2006). In General Crowder's words, there will be intelligence failure which leads to less than perfect information, and there will be technical failures (Department of Defense, 2003a). The terms that are needed to differentiate between the failure of systems thinking and the challenges of the operational environment are *unintended* and *collateral damage*. The failure of systems thinking is always unintended:

If, however, in the course of dropping that bomb, a laser-guided bomb, for example, a fin breaks off the laser-guided bomb and the thing goes spiraling 3,000 feet away from the target, there was really no practical way for me to plan for that. That is not collateral damage; that is unintended damage, and if there are civilians killed, they are unintended civilian casualties. I don't mean to kind of draw a fine legal line between the two, but it's important to understand that as we plan these things, there are a great deal of things we can do to mitigate collateral damage and in fact have potential to mitigate some unintended damage, but these things, again, are mechanical devices and some will fail. And so if somebody has a hope that we're going to go into a conflict and nothing is going to happen in terms of collateral damage, unintended damage or civilian casualties, I think you should absolve yourself of that hope because that probably is not a realistic expectation. (Department of Defense, 20031)

EBO has since been criticized for the complexity of the planning model: the challenge of predicting the effects, their duration and intensity, and the impossibility to measure them (as required by the concept), the "insertion of effects between the objective and what they call actions" instead of predicting effects after the accomplishment of objective are all paradoxes that have been recognized (Vego, 2006). The very terminology of EBO is problematic: "Operational terms are used as ornaments rather than in ways that articulate their true meaning. Worse, various well understood and commonly accepted terms are redefined to emphasize effects in lieu of objectives and tasks" (Ibid.). Mattis (2008) characterizes EBO terminology simply as "confusing".

The consequent problem of the model, according to Vego, is that as it is difficult to predict the effects on the tactical level, the more difficult the predictions become on the strategic level of war. Further, Mattis (2008) criticizes EBO for assuming an unachievable level of predictability and simplifying complex, organic systems such as leadership and imagination. Despite the criticism and rejection of the term EBO in the Joint Forces Command in 2008, the operational design model of the Comprehensive Approach is still essentially the same as that of EBO.

In the light of this discussion on the taxonomy of actions and effects according to the effects-centric doctrines, it is evident that the discourses of warfare have undergone a lexical shift from classic demonizing to calculated, doctrine-driven description that mutes action and the its impact on the adversary. Next, it will be argued that the very taxonomy of effects is determined by not only the doctrines discussed here, but by the techno-

ideological approach to waging war the Western way. Effects-centric doctrines have created a genre of discourse that allows the discussion of war and violence in its own code, which offers not only an abstract, but also a dichotomizing description of the action as it is unfolding in the theater of war.

6. Neutralize as a symbol of Effects-centric doctrines

If the terminology of Effects Based Operations indeed appears as "ornamental" rather than articulate of their "true meaning", how does the language of the briefings appear to the media and public, who have to infer the meanings of the terminology by the context provided by the narrator? Considering the criticisms that label the terminology as ambiguous (Lukin, 2005; 2006) and confusing (Vego, 2006; Mattis, 2008; Van Riper, 2009), the target audience, namely the media and the public, face a challenge in interpreting the narration of doctrine and subsequent action in the theater of war.

To address this question, it is necessary to examine the use of a term specific to the EBO and/or CA taxonomy. One such term is 'neutralize', which was a term that was explained in great detail at the very early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 (see Department of Defense, 2003a). The 2012 Department of Defense dictionary definition for the term 'neutralize' is

1. *As pertains to military operations, to render ineffective or unusable.*
2. *To render enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation.*
3. *To render safe mines, bombs, missiles, and booby traps.*
4. *To make harmless anything contaminated with a chemical agent.*

The term is often used concurrently with the term 'destroy', a term that cannot be found in the DoD dictionary. However, *destroyed* is defined as a "condition of a target so damaged that it can neither function as intended nor be restored to a usable condition. In the case of a building, all vertical supports and spanning members are damaged to such an extent that nothing is salvageable. In the case of bridges, all spans must have dropped and all piers must require replacement." The definitions come relatively close to each other, although the end states they create are dramatically different. In Crowder's press briefing (Department of Defense, 2003a) both of the terms were used, but as Crowder explained the EBO planning process to the media, the emphasis was on the non-lethal options, such as neutralizing electrical power or buildings and systems. To emphasize the option of non-

lethal influence, Crowder jokes about the choice between neutralizing and destroying, where neutralizing equals to making everybody "go to sleep":

And so we look at that target and we say, what do we want to do to that target? I want to neutralize or I want to destroy this bunker. And then I examine what munitions I might use to destroy that bunker. Ideally, if you could turn the lights off and make everybody go to sleep, that would be really nice. Unfortunately, some of our capabilities are not quite that advanced, and in many cases, we have to resort to physical destruction. (Department of Defense, 2003a)

These two examples of the use of the term 'neutralize' illustrate the ambiguity of the term that is yet central in the terminology of the specific doctrine being introduced. Therefore the analysis focuses on the use of the term: who neutralizes and who is being neutralized? What kind of meanings does it convey in terms of Actions and Effects: is it an action comparable to shooting missiles or dropping bombs, or is it really used to denote an Effect?

7. Analysis

The data of the analysis consist of news and press briefing transcripts in the DoD transcript archive. According to an archive search (<http://www.defense.gov/transcripts>), there are 43 documents that contain the term 'neutralize'. These documents are all included in the analysis. Only the references made by military personnel are considered and the references uttered by press representatives are excluded. Only the verb form 'neutralize' is included.

The analysis shows that the corpus consists of 56 references to neutralizing, the earliest from 1997. As the graphic demonstrates, there was a peak in the use of the term in both 2003 and 2006.




Figure 4. *The use of 'neutralize' in Pentagon press briefings during the 2000s*

This figure demonstrates that 'neutralize' is a term that is used during active combat operations. In 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom began, and 2006 marked the beginning of the transition from U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom to NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation. Both instances activated the insurgents, causing them to engage the U.S./NATO forces in battle. The graphic suggests that 'neutralize' is used to report about combat, linking it to operational and tactical rather than strategic contexts.

Further, out of 56 uses of 'neutralize', 53 referred to actions performed by the U.S. or their friendlies and allies. Only three accounts referred to the 'Other', out of which two were accounts where both the Actor and Goal are abstract and inanimate:

Actor	Process	Goal
Iranian and North Korean missiles	neutralize	the advantages the U.S. military has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War
potential adversaries	neutralize	our advantages
technical development	neutralize	our qualitative advantages

Table 1. *Actors and Goals in accounts of the adversary*

In the accounts of U.S. (and friendlies/allies) actions, the uses of 'neutralize' can be categorized into three sets: human, abstract, and inanimate Goal. Abstract Goals are ambiguous in whether the Goal is human or not. The

category of inanimate Goals contains accounts of (sometimes abstract) concepts that are understood as non-human.

Out of all 53 references, 17 have a human Goal, 14 an inanimate Goal and 22 an abstract Goal. Human Goals are typically negatively evaluative descriptions of the enemy:

Actor	Process	Goal
U.S. Forces	neutralize	terrorists
we	neutralize	insurgent forces
we	neutralize	those people that are preying on these innocent Iraqi civilians

Table 2. *Human Goal*

Inanimate Goals include references to buildings, vehicles and explosives:

Actor	Process	Goal
-	neutralize	air defenses
I	neutralize	electrical power
explosive ordnance disposal teams	neutralize	IEDs

Table 3. *Inanimate Goal*

Clauses with an abstract Goal are the largest category. It contains several particularly vague references that could be interpreted as human, but that are nominalized into concepts:

Actor	Process	Goal
we	neutralize	insurgency
I	neutralize	the threat
operations	neutralize	the forward accelerants

Table 4. *Abstract Goal*

To summarize, the data contains several references to human-to-human action. Equally common are the descriptions of action on inanimate Goals. The legitimacy of the human Goals is realized by lexical choice that emphasizes the illegitimacy of the enemy as "insurgents" and "terrorists". However, the emergence of abstract Goals and especially the repetitive

phrasing such as "neutralize insurgency" and "neutralize threats" is noteworthy. The category of abstract Goals is moderately larger than the other two discussed here, but more importantly, this is the category where both the Process and the Goal of the clause are abstract. This means that the typical clause configuration containing the term 'neutralize' does not indicate *what exactly* is done to *who/what exactly*, as an abstract Process has an abstract Target.

To address the interchangeability of 'neutralize' as an action and 'neutralize' as an Effect, it is necessary to look at the contexts where these descriptions appear:

Extract 1

Our mission is to find, kill or capture. In this case, we had an enemy that was defending, it was barricaded, and we had to take the measures that were necessary in order to neutralize the target. (Department of Defense, 2003c)

Extract 2

You go on him, you fight him, you kill him, or you neutralize him, but then you think, in effect, and ask the question: What influence does this individual have, and what will be the outcome if I do that or that or that? (Department of Defense, 2006a)

Often 'neutralize' is used rather interchangeably with descriptions of Action (*fight, kill, capture*). In addition, the actual Process in the production of the Effect remains unclear. At the same time, 'neutralize' may appear in strategy discourses that clearly refer to the execution of economic and security policy rather than the context of combat:

Extract 3

But military means alone cannot neutralize the insurgency and stop the sectarian violence. Political and economic interests are also critical to this effort. (Department of Defense, 2006b)

In terms of the Action/Effect paradox from the lexical and grammatical perspectives, the vagueness of Process/Goal patterning and the contextual blurriness of the use of 'neutralize' use to describe Processes on the three levels of warfare, the abstract nature of the Process 'neutralize' makes it applicable for the genre of Strategic Communication. Because it signifies Processes associated with the Western doctrine, it is rarely applied in the descriptions of enemy action. Despite its seemingly neutral and conventional sound, the term has become symbolic of Western (high-tech, counter-insurgency, anti-terrorist, and pro-democracy) way of warfare. Its use has become ideological rather than descriptive. It often does not

describe *what has been done*, but that *something has been done*.

This discussion has essentially centered on the self-evaluative patterns of Strategic Communication, where evaluation is directly linked to legitimacy purposes. Van Leeuwen (2007) recognizes three types of moral evaluation that are applied to create legitimacy. Naturalization encourages the audience to ignore the signals of illegitimacy or of something being "not right", and to accept what is presented as 'normal' or 'natural'. Abstraction expresses moral evaluations in a manner that 'moralizes' them "by distilling from them a quality that links them to discourses of moral values". Third, analogies, according to Van Leeuwen, always tend to have a legitimacy or a de-legitimacy function:

Here the implicit answer to the question 'Why must I do this?' or 'Why must I do this in this way?' is not, 'because it is good', but 'because it is like another activity which is associated with positive values' (or, in the case of negative comparison, 'because it is not like another activity which is associated with negative values'). Sometimes the comparison is implicit. An activity that belongs to one social practice is described by a term which, literally, refers to an activity belonging to another social practice, and the positive or negative values which, in the given socio-cultural context, are attached to that other activity, are then transferred to the original activity. (Van Leeuwen, 2007)

It is clear that practices of naturalization, abstraction, and analogization are all dimensions in the descriptions of 'neutralizing'. 'Neutralizing' is associated with the social practice of instrumental warfare, which is the only politically correct attitude towards war: military operations must produce 'effects' that serve military objectives. The vagueness of the term 'neutralize' and its presentation as a morally acceptable "Effect" is an example of the "moral asymmetry" in discourses of war and adversariality. According to these discourses, neutralizing denotes situational consideration: 'neutralizing' is an analytical process, which realizes as the least invasive method of use of force. The function of this type of terminology is to naturalize the descriptions of the use of force and to abstract them. Neutralizing is the lesser of the two evils (neutralizing vs. destruction) and therefore an integral, legitimate, and natural part of the doctrine that focuses much of the efforts in the announcements about avoiding "damage" - both unintended and collateral.

8. Discussion

This article has discussed a number of lexical and grammatical characteristics of the discourses of war. Some discourses can be understood

as "classic", overt legitimation such as the demonization of the enemy and the glorification of the 'self'. In addition, this article has argued that there is a genre of war discourse that has evolved side by side with effects-centric military doctrines. This genre contains covert legitimation much subtler in its evaluation and, as done here, requires some discussion of the theoretical background of strategic communication and current military doctrine in order to be understood. What defines this type of communication is its conventions of legitimation: they allow the speaker to report the strategic aims as well as the tactical decision without getting into their specifics.

In this article, the term 'neutralize' represents this type of legitimatory discourses. From the perspective of strategic planning, it is one of the Effects in the taxonomy of the effects-centric doctrines. From the perspective of discourse analysis, it is an abstract Process. This term demonstrates how social change is "discourse-led" (Fairclough, 2010: 77). It shows how the ideological need to differentiate between 'our' and 'their' actions has penetrated the strategic planning process, and how this dichotomy has resulted in the construction of vocabularies and hierarchies that encode actor-specific experience or action. Social change takes place, when these doctrinal conventions become naturalized in the vocabulary of talking about war. In the 2010 documentary film *Armadillo*, "neutralize" was the specific term used by the Danish soldiers when they engaged a number of Taleban fighters in close combat and killed them in an irrigation ditch with a grenade. The scene appeared sarcastic precisely because of this word choice. The use of this abstract word to describe what was essentially a firefight followed by the soldiers' scornful inspection of the bodies. Despite the original significance that derives from the taxonomy of the doctrine, the word has become to symbolize Western/American dominance. It always excludes the "Other". Exclusive taxonomies construct a hierarchy of meaning where actions, effects and outcomes are in a linear relationship, which means that only actors who share that specific ideology and its objectives can participate in this specific action. This is where abstraction turns into asymmetry: "neutralize" has no counterpart in our taxonomy, in the sense that "attack" has "defense". Perhaps "Jihad" is equally exclusive in terms of purpose and practice?

The analysis suggests that in addition to the good/bad and legitimate/illegitimate parameters that are often used to make evaluations of the 'self' and the enemy (as in Lukin, 2005; Lukin, 2006; Butt, Lukin & Matthiessen, 2004), the third parameter of legitimation is exclusion. It often operates covertly: it does not automatically reveal itself as 'good', 'bad', 'legitimate' or 'illegitimate', but its exclusive meaning may be coded in the patterns instead of the semantics of the word. The transitivity analysis shows that the references to neutralizing contained several reports of human-on-human use of force, which is typically not perceived as 'good' or

'legitimate' - quite the contrary. However, the term is characterized by covert evaluative power, which stems from its ideological use: the seemingly dispassionate 'neutralize' is a term that is associated with 'our' actions and behaviors. As the Western military doctrines evolve and become more and more technologically asymmetric compared to the enemy, the bigger the semantic difference is between 'our' actions and 'theirs'. The outcome is that what 'we' do can no longer be described by the same words as 'they'. Attacking is no longer attacking, but aiming at a strategically defined 'end state', which can only be reached on our terms. With the linguistic strategies of distancing and abstraction, Strategic Communication demonstrates that "[e]very order is political and based on some form of exclusion" (Mouffe, 2005: 18). Strategic Communication is a design for the linguistic exclusion of the 'other'. This third parameter is another linguistic method to reinforce the order of moral asymmetry.

The irony of effects-centric thinking is that the enemy is presented as a system, but the variety of enemy action descriptions tends to be limited and repetitive. Instead, Strategic Communication is focused on analytical assessments and representations of the actions and effects of the Self. The criticism of Effects Based Operations as a complex and confusing model speaks to the fact that it is the actions and behaviors of the self that seem to absorb most of the analytical resources. The structures and semantics of Strategic Communication are a mere reflection of this.

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FROM POWER TO A PUDDLE OF BLOOD: RITUALS AND EVALUATION IN THE IMAGES OF CAPTURE AND DEATH OF SADDAM HUSSEIN, OSAMA BIN LADEN AND MUAMMAR GADDAFI (*ARTICLE IV*)

ABSTRACT

This article approaches the interplay of the representations of expressive and instrumental violence, rituals and ideological evaluation in the imagery that was produced when the 21st century archenemies, Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden and Muammar Gaddafi, were captured and killed. The discussion draws from the linguistic tradition of agency and transitivity analysis and thereby aims to approach the communicative parallels between the theory of media rituals and the American Grand Narrative of humanitarian agency. This multimodal take on media representations of the archenemies is used to argue that despite the instrumental rhetoric of conflict and warfare, it is expressive violence that forms the core of the narratives that eventually create unity and reason among the Western audiences. Although open participation in violent political acts is problematic and typically illegitimate in the Western cultures that emphasize the humanitarian nature of conflict management, the media images of the violent deaths of Hussein, bin Laden and Gaddafi resulted in the celebration and ritualization of expressive violence.

1. Introduction

The pictures of capture and death of the 21st century archenemies were media spectacles. Typically, significant enemies are portrayed in images that are used to illustrate news articles and to prove the reality of the capture. This was the case also with Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden and Muammar Gaddafi. Each of them represented absolute evil, and each of them served as the face of the absolute enemy. The war in Iraq was justified with Hussein's refusal to co-operate with the United Nations inspections, which led to the launch of the operation, as Hussein refused to comply with President Bush's ultimatum to leave the country (American Forces Press Service, 17.3.2003). In the war in Afghanistan, the face of the enemy was Osama bin Laden, whose search operations were prominent in the media representations of the war. The Libya operation centered upon the hunt for Muammar Gaddafi, whose death was announced as the start of a "new era" (The Telegraph, 21 October, 2011).

The extensive military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya have been demonstrations of the Western concept of humanitarian warfare. In the official argumentation they were given a humanitarian objective. The political objectives, such as the human rights, the restoration or reinforcement of democracy in Islamic dictatorships, the civil rights of the citizens and the toppling of the dictators and oligarchy, have been the key themes in the discourses about the operation. It is therefore possible to observe the mediatized captures and deaths of each iconic enemy as the victory of the Western narrative of justice - or as its representations. In these narratives the dictators and terrorists slip from the heights of their authority to a puddle of blood - a process that the Western nations refer to as the dawn of democracy.

The following section will discuss the role division of instrumental and expressive violence during the 21st century. It will be argued that this division influences the conventions used to represent war in the media. After this, the images of Hussein's, bin Laden's and Gaddafi's capture and death will be scrutinized from the perspective of media rituals. These captures and deaths are media events and spectacles that consist of rituals. These rituals help make sense of the world and relate it to one's political ideology. The rituals discussion will be followed by an analysis of agency as a means of evaluation. Finally, rituals and evaluations are compared to and contrasted with the Western master term, democracy (see Appadurai, 1990). The aim is to understand the conventions of representing enmity both as a political process as well as a means of communication.

2. Instrumentalism as the prerequisite of virtue

Virtue and evil as the basic parameters of security are visible in the weapons technology as well as media discourses. In the media, these parameters foster spectacles. The Shock and Awe doctrine was based on impressive and highly visual use of force, which, however, was presented as a careful and conscientious method to minimize both human and material losses. The possible losses were unavoidable, unintended and yet necessary side effects in the quest for achieving the strategic objectives. In these discourses the technological use of force leaves the context of warfare and violence and becomes part of the virtuous, humanitarian action, the objectives of which are everything but solely military. In the narratives of humanitarian action the primary objectives contain the concepts of freedom, peace and human rights, not the annihilation of the enemy. This is the rhetorical hook of the Western Grand Narrative: more force means less destruction, as problems become efficiently and precisely erased (see Department of Defense, 2003a; 2003b). General McChrystal took time to explain to the media that *Shock and Awe* has falsely been understood as enormous firepower and capacity to generate physical destruction. It aims,

instead, to result in the least possible amount of damage by influencing carefully selected critical targets: "In fact, a perfect shock and awe would hit as few as possible to create those effects" (Department of Defense, 2003c). The context of the precision weapon discussion at the beginning of the war in Iraq was thus paradoxical. It highlighted the sophistication, efficiency and precision of weaponry, but argued that casualties and damages are an unavoidable part of even virtuous warfare where violence does not manifest as violence, but as a necessary sacrifice.

Violence as a sacrifice for the sake of progress is a theme that joins 21st century Strategic Communication to the tradition the Enlightenment rhetoric. As McChrystal's interpretation of the nature of the Shock and Awe campaign suggests, use of force as a sign of power and dominance is problematic. Asymmetric capabilities, in this case the demonstration of firepower, is still one of the basic methods of psychological influence. However, the Western interpretation of these demonstrations is unpredictable, making the communicative impact of expressive violence difficult to manage. Contrary to the practices of Shock and Awe, the Western concept of just war recognizes the principle of proportionate cause (Gutherie & Quinlan; 2007: 20).

The demand for instrumental ideology and practices results in the demand for distance. The lack of distance would suggest the kind of intimacy between the soldier and the enemy that violence would automatically receive an expressive nuance. In instances like these, warfare stops being a collective and therefore legitimate effort, and becomes something personal and violent. In the West, legitimacy is easier to achieve when actions and efforts can be represented as physically and emotionally distant practices, which reduces its expressive signification. This results in the demand for technologization: war must be precision warfare not only because of its precision and consequent ethicalness, but because it allows a rational, impersonal experience of warfare (Andersen, 2007: 260). The precision weapon can be seen as a 21st century guillotine that executes its duty according to the instrumental norms of society. Whereas the guillotine as a method of quick and therefore egalitarian slaughter symbolizes the downturn of torture and revenge, the precision weapon presents warfare as a conscientious and well-advised process, where there is no place for affect (see Foucault, 2011: 101).

The names of military operations reflect this Enlightenment ideology: *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, *Operation New Dawn* (Iraq), *Operation Enduring Freedom* (Afghanistan), as well as *Operation Odyssey Dawn* and *Operation Unified Protector* (Libya) do not signify offensives, but the ideological landscape of progress and humanitarian ideals. Appadurai uses the term "ideoscape" to refer to ideological concatenations that comprise

the Enlightenment world view: these are manifested by terms such as "freedom", "welfare", "rights", "representation" and the master term "democracy" (Appadurai, 1990). According to Appadurai, the Grand Narrative of the Enlightenment was based on a certain internal logic and still structures around certain key words, although their conceptualizations depend on the interpreter as well as the context. The captures of Hussein, bin Laden and Gaddafi were part of the Western Grand Narrative, where the roles of agency as representations of good and evil are paramount. Unlike "us", "they" are never represented in the context of democracy, and the average attributes of humanity are never applicable to "them". Instead, the domain of humanity belongs to "us" who operate in the name of democracy (Mouffe, 2005: 78). The images of capture get their meaning in the context of this ideology: who is who, what is one entitled to do and to whom, and with what justification or consequence. The agency in the images embodies not only power relations but propriety. What is proper and what is right? The evaluation of action and agency is the domain of comparison, subjectivity and social sanction (Thompson & Hunston, 2003: 13). In the narratives of war, agency and action are the basic elements of identity, which makes the evaluation of action the mechanism for categorization and evaluation of the actor. In this article the narrative-visual representations of the evil, the toppled and killed men, are approached through the evaluations of action. In this discussion the concepts of ideology and narrative have central roles: here the actors' identity is defined as an actoral state and permanence of mood (see Tarasti, 2004: 173). Identity determines the representation of our actions: "good" people engage in "good" actions and "evil" entities engage in "evil" actions (Malrieu, 2002: 48). This means that the conceptions of identity are the resource for both evaluations and rituals.

3. Media rituals and the production of cultural imagery

In the captures and deaths of Hussein, bin Laden and Gaddafi, and in the media representations that followed, it is possible to observe the reflections of both expressive and instrumental violence as well as the significances they produce. Because of the instrumental narratives, Western warfare has not only lost much of its communication resources, but it has been forced to generate narratives that do not communicate the actual experience of war. Expressive violence is a taboo, but still present in the actuality of warfare. When the Abu Ghraib photos (Wired, 28.2.2008) and the video of U.S. soldiers urinating on dead Taleban fighters (Huffington Post, 15.2.2011) became public, the U.S. military's image suffered a blow. These media representations contains the symbolic type of expressive violence that the U.S. Public Relations machinery has always denounced. Posing for the camera amidst prisoners and corpses has developed into a ritual of war, although on the political level actions like these are officially condemned.

It can still be argued that the fact that these practices happen repeatedly has come to show that there is a fundamental need or a reason for expressive hostility. Such expressive violence is present also in Hussein's, bin Laden's and Gaddafi's images of capture and death. This speaks for their ritual function in the construction of unity.

In communication research ritual is a concept the definition of which has been subject to much debate (see Ehrlich, 1996; Couldry and Rothenbuhler, 1990). According to Sumiala, the simplest way to define ritual is to see it as recurrent, symbolic behavior that has to do with constructing a community, either an imaginary or an actual one (Sumiala, 2010: 97). In the images of Hussein, bin Laden and Gaddafi, the concepts of sacred, profane, homogeneous and heterogeneous have an essential role, as rituals construct and construe unity through the conception of the forbidden and the taboo (see Sumiala, 2010; Heinämäki, 2008). Official strategic communication focuses on reputation management, where identity and ideology are founded on the Enlightenment values such as democracy and human rights, while the unofficial imagery of warfare contradicts the core narrative with its fascination with the homogeneous Otherness. In Bataille's understanding the world of shock, vigor and power are the forces that create cohesion within society (Heinäpäki, 2008: 54-63). This world is represented by not only the profane, but by the origin of the heterogeneous sacred that gains its momentum from the representations of Otherness. According to Heinämäki, Bataille understands the origin of the sacred as a communally shared, ambivalent taboo that both repulses and yet attracts the public, and which the public constantly keeps renegotiating its relationship to. For instance, a corpse becomes the proper kind of deceased through the practices of certain rituals that bring the heterogeneous notion of death to the sacred core of the public and sanctifies the death into heroism, martyrdom or sacrifice (Heinäpäki, 2008: 61-62). Sacredness can thus emerge from the homogeneous, "light" and commensurate world, or be born within the heterogeneous, "dark" and unmanageable world. This means that these two worlds and the experiences that are associated with them are not exclusive, but essentially related. According to Heinämäki (2005: 62), Bataille is interested specifically in the transformations of the sacred, and the different means of harnessing the heterogeneous in the service of the community.

This article brings out the tension between the official, "light" and sacred strategic narrative and the unofficial, heterogeneous, "dark" and sacred narrative. For instance, the scandalous Abu Ghraib photos can be interpreted as a ritual that reinforces and maintains unity and togetherness within the community of the soldiers (Sumiala, 2010; 68). These pictures narrate the experience of war and adversariality, which are narratives that deviate from the official, humanitarian narrative. The "light" as well as the

"dark" world both have their sacred core that is essentially the center of all behavior, and to which all behavior is in relation to. This polarity is manifested in the official imagery of the sacred core, while the unofficial narrative construes sacredness within the negative core.

We shall here observe rituals that have been constructed over the media. Sumiala (2010) approaches rituals from the perspectives of consumption and production. Hussein's, bin Laden's and Gaddafi's images of capture and death are treated here as rituals of production and more specifically as news rituals, which are established conventions of communication that influence the audience's interpretation and understanding of the media event (Sumiala, 2010: 106; Elliot 1982). It is the news rituals that are used to build narratives of "us" and "them" (Sumiala, 2010: 107). News rituals thus contribute to the dichotomy of the "dark" and "light". As they typically participate in the production of unity and togetherness by bringing the private to publicity and enabling a certain type of voyeurism, the role of the rituals in the production of the images of capture and death is clear (see Sumiala, 2010: 109-110).

4. Agency, ideology and evaluation

In media images and discourses rituals and evaluation share a common purpose, i.e. to define the boundary between the Self and the Other. Rituals are essentially behavior and action, and therefore a means of transmitting evaluation. The representations of agency convey the ideology of the narrator: this is essentially the argument that functional language theory makes (see Halliday, 2004; Martin & White, 2005).

The core function of political narratives is to transmit information about the agency of the Self and the Other. Narratives need heroes, villains and people to be rescued (Castells, 2009: 202). A narrative always requires an actor and an initiator, who induces the actions and events that make up the narrative arc. This brings us to the concept of transitivity, which is fundamental not only in terms of grammar, but in terms of narration: it defines the actor and the object and how much the object is impacted. In language the structures and grammar of discourse reflect this process and thereby expose the relationship between the actor and the object. (Halliday, 2004: 170-171; Butt & al., 2000: 46-47). Hopper and Thompson captured this in their descriptions of the parameters of transitivity, which can be applied to the analysis of images as well as text (Haddington & Kärkkäinen, 2010: 134):

	High level of transitivity	Low level of transitivity
A. How many participants does the clause contain?	two or more	one
B. Does the clause represent action?	action	non-action
C. Has the action ended?	yes (finite)	no (infinite)
D. Does the action have a clear beginning and end point?	yes	no
E. Is the action volitional?	yes	no
F. Is the clause positive or negative?	positive	negative
G. Modus of the clause	real	unreal
H. Agency	high impact	low impact
I. Impact on the object of action	high impact	low impact
J. Individualization of the object of action	explicitly set out	not set out

Table 1: *The parameters of transitivity (Haddington & Kärkkäinen, 2010: 134)*

In Critical Discourse Analysis, the starting point to analysis is recognizing the relationship between ideology and communication. According to Van Dijk, ideologies are the underlying systems of socio-political cognition (Van Dijk, 1995: 138). In Van Dijk's (Ibid.) discourse analysis ideology can be seen to consist of descriptions of identity, action, aims and objectives, norms and values, position, status and resources. Ideology, narratives and evaluation cannot thus be treated as separate concepts: if a narrative contains no evaluation, it is only a report (Cortazzi & Jin, 2003: 108). In the narratives of war and conflict, the identity of an actor is typically evaluated through descriptions of action. This makes agency the most central concept in the analysis of ideology. What the actor does or does not do defines the actor's role either as a subject or an object. The images of capture of death discussed here are an example of this. They form a narrative of agency, both as individual images and as a series of images. Each image is interconnected to the other: each image evaluates and endorses the previous and, finally, this chain of evaluation forms an overarching narrative (Cortazzi & Jin, 2003: 108). In this article the captures and deaths are understood as narratives of enmity that together form the overarching narrative, referred to as the Grand Narrative.

This function of this narrative framework is to make the story coherent and logical. Ideological claims are met with ideological interpretations, according to which the claim either is or is not consistent with the interpreter's ideology (Malrieu, 2002: 29). According to Malrieu, the efficiency of discourse is entirely dependent on its capacity to influence and persuade, which means that the claims of the narrative must be internally coherent. What the roles of agency and their ritual representation do is produce this coherence.

5. Narratives as evaluations

In discourse analysis, the types of evaluation can be divided into three main categories: *Judgment* evaluates the actions and behaviors of the actor, *Appreciation* the appearance, and *Affect* emotional reactions (Martin & White, 2005). These parameters make up *Attitude*, which describes what kind of attitudes the text or image conveys. How are events and behaviors represented? What kind of actors and objects participate in the actions and behaviors and how? What kind of roles have they been given?

Thompson & Hunston (2003: 5) define evaluation as the attitude, perception or emotion expressed by the writer or speaker toward an entity or an event. Evaluation can be treated in two different ways. It may mean the process of evaluation within the narrative, or, as is the case in this article, evaluation can be evaluated. (Cortazzi & Jin, 2003: 104). Cortazzi and Jin refer to the three layers of evaluation, the *in*, *of* and *through*, where both the narrator's as well as the audience's interpretation of the narrative is significant. Strategic and political communication typically produce direct evaluation, as the adversary is rarely given the turn to speak. When this happens, it is possible to select those messages for presentation that support the narrative framework. For instance the videos of bin Laden criticizing the United States or Europe do not have much information value, but they are used to reinforce the overarching narrative in order to evaluate the speaker and his socio-political ideology.

Evaluation has an important role in creating cohesion. By answering the question "why?" it reflects the values and attitudes of the narrator or the community, constructs and maintains the relationship between the narrator and the audience, and organizes discourse (Thompson & Hunston, 2003: 6). Evaluation that both organizes discourse and indicates its significance, also determines the center of the discourse (Thompson & Hunston, 2003: 12). Failing to create meaning destroys the narrative, as the purpose of the narrative is to make the question "so what?" redundant. Therefore evaluations include descriptions of causes and effects and a certain logic of justification. We are willing to accept even unlawful actions as long as the

paradoxes are dispelled with evaluation: killing is wrong, but sometimes we have to "destroy the village to save it". This mechanism results in concepts such as securitization. When an entity can be associated with enough negative evaluation, we will accept extraordinary measures such as censorship (see Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998). Evaluation is thus the key mechanism of legitimation.

The parameters that regulate evaluation are goodness/badness, certainty, expectedness and importance. According to Thompson & Hunston (2003: 24) the first two are real world-oriented and express the evaluator's perception of the situation. These parameters have been developed for text analysis, but can be applied to the analysis of images: it is not unclear whether Hussein's, bin Laden's or Gaddafi's appearance is evaluated negatively or not. The images of capture and death contain all of the parameters mentioned here, and are therefore an important element of both news reports and Strategic Communication.

The ability to exercise power and dominance depends on the actor's ability to network and share common objectives, resources and do strategic collaboration (Castells, 2009: 45). An example of this is NATO alliance. Dominance and hegemony allow the merge of political, religious and cultural identities, which means that the core values can be presented as global, legitimate and just. Without this framing process there are no shared meanings: in order for globalization to actualize, it must be able to create a discourse to frame that specific culture (Castells, 2009: 52). In order to present the Western way of warfare as an effort for democracy, it must create a discourse to frame the practices of warfare. This is precisely what the Grand Narrative does, as it frames the ritual practices of violence. Next, evaluation will be discussed in the context of media rituals. Who do media rituals present as the subject or the object? How does one create a distinction between the two? What kind of a narrative frame do the images of capture and death produce?

6. The images of capture and death in the media

It is important to note that not all images of Hussein's, bin Laden's and Gaddafi's capture and death are official U.S. Strategic Communication. Images of Saddam Hussein at the location of capture, the "spider hole", as well as the pictures of Hussein's medical examination were taken and published by U.S. military officials. However, the Department of Defense has denounced all material that was produced at the moment of Hussein's execution (CNN, 29.12.2006). Also the first images of bin Laden's capture, i.e. the pictures of bin Laden's secret hideaway and the room where he was allegedly captured, have been taken and published by the U.S. officials. However, the images and videos of Gaddafi's capture and death were, at

least according to general knowledge, produced and published by the Libyan rebels. In these images the West had a side role as the supporters of the uprising: Gaddafi's capture was the peak of a long campaign against Gaddafi that was realized by the means of information and kinetic warfare, and which made the West an essential audience of the military campaign. The claim here is that the images and videos of Gaddafi were integrated in the official U.S. Strategic Communication. However, instead of analyzing this official Strategic Communication only, the purpose is to discuss the tradition of the creation, publication and consumption of violence which the Western liberal democracies have participated in.

Saddam Hussein's capture was an event in the operation that was long and important for the United States. When the capture finally happened, it was the physical realization of George W. Bush's announcement "We're going to smoke them out" at the very beginning of the Iraqi war. The roles of agency in the images are very traditional. The U.S. soldiers who acted as the capturers represented Western ideology of democracy: the images show Hussein pushed on the ground, as a dirty and physically subjugated former dictator (see *International Business Times*, 22.10.2011). He is surrounded by a number of soldiers who look down on him, while one of the soldiers is posing next to him as a lion hunter would pose next to his prey. The power relations are very clear and the transitivity of the image is high: there are several capturers and Hussein is placed in the middle as the target of the soldier's deliberate actions. The culmination and end point of the roles of agency are clearly visible: the roles of agency emphasize the finality of the circumstance. Here evaluation tells the story of the actors. The image is an image to finality: it represents the end of the U.S. armed forces' search efforts as well as that of Hussein's might and flight. His hanging, instead, announced the beginning of a new era (Department of Defense, 2003d).

After the first images of capture, pictures of Hussein undergoing a medical examination followed (*Chicago Tribune*). The publication of these images served the purpose of ideological rather than political needs. In the images Hussein has opened his mouth for the doctor, who is inspecting his mouth with a light. This is another metaphor for subjugation. The doctor represents the American/Western ideal of moral and progress, where even dictators receive medical care before their death sentence. Hussein has to submit to the inspection of his body cavity and allow a member of his enemy to illuminate his mouth from within - a direct reference to the Enlightenment? The images point out that the dictator is now himself in need of help, while the U.S. authorities appear as gracious and just benefactors who, despite past hostilities, are ready to respect their prisoner's human rights. The West "saves" Hussein before his death in the hands of his own people. In the news article on Hussein's hanging, CNN (29.12.2006) included a specific quote saying that Americans were not

"even in the building" at the time of Hussein's execution. These official images and narratives are very different than the unofficial ones from Abu Ghraib.

In Osama bin Laden's case, there were no images of the capture or death. These events were demonstrated with images of empty space, namely the building and the room where bin Laden was hiding at the moment of his capture (see *The Guardian*, 4.5.2011). The only published image of bin Laden was a still image taken from a video that was found in his hideout. In this image bin Laden was alive (see *The Guardian*, 3.5.2012). The capturers muted their agency by publishing an image of the victim still alive. As such, the images are different than those of Saddam Hussein. They present bin Laden as an old, strange man who was simply removed from existence. This follows the pattern of terrorism reporting. Terrorists are not physically portrayed in the Western media imagery, but their presence is narrated with images of the consequences of their action, such as blood stains on the streets, severely injured children and signs of explosion (Kotilainen, 2011). Images of Bin Laden's capture follow this same tradition and appear even sardonic. Politicians do not negotiate with terrorists and terrorists are not given a voice in the media, because according to the media rituals, the media defines the actor's visibility, i.e. significance or exclusion (see Sumiala, 2012: 57). The man who caused the puddles of blood on the streets of Kabul was himself a victim of the same destiny, leaving behind only a bloodied room for the world to see. Removing agency from the images of bin Laden's capture was a political choice, and yet the images appear strongly ideological. In this narrative, the agency was reserved for the U.S. forces, but only in the verbal narrative of the event. The visualization of the capture was considered too provocative due to its expressive reading, and so President Obama announced that there would be no image of the body to prove bin Laden's death (*The Wall Street Journal*, 4.5.2011).

Images of Muammar Gaddafi's capture continue the established tradition of dirty "rats" who have slipped from the height of their might to misery. There are both parallels and differences to Hussein's and bin Laden's images. Instead of being strategically selected, the images and videos of the dying Gaddafi flooded the media, broadcasting the last moments of the feared dictator. In the videos, Gaddafi is being escorted to a pick-up truck, bleeding and surrounded by a large, aggressive crowd. The still-images focus on Gaddafi's gunshot wound. Many images of the event show celebrating citizens and especially a young boy who showcases Gaddafi's notorious golden pistol. The third category of Gaddafi images consists of the pictures taken in the cold room of the slaughterhouse where the body was kept on display. In the images people are gathering and celebrating around Gaddafi, taking pictures of the body with their mobile phones. *The*

Daily Mail (21.10.2011) published a comprehensive compilation of these images on their website, presenting the capture as a visual narrative.

The roles of agency in Gaddafi's images of capture denote, again, a high level of transitivity. The captured is shown in the middle of a crowd, but only this time the crowd consists of Libyan citizens. This is an essential difference compared to the images of Saddam Hussein. The West's absence from the visual narrative shifts the agency from the U.S. and NATO to the citizens of Libya. The air operation that led to the capture received relatively little attention in the narrative. In the media the attention was on the images of bloody Gaddafi and the celebrating nation, often placed side by side on the page (see *The Daily Mail*, 21.10.2011). Placing the picture of Gaddafi's golden pistol next to an image of the gunshot wound in his head creates an analogy to the death of King Midas. The weapon that symbolized the dictator's status and power turned into a symbol of his misfortune. His death was celebrated by displaying the body, and so the public was able to come and "take a shot" at the mighty man turned miserable. Only the body was shot with the cameras in their mobile phones. The mobile phones became the other symbolic weapon of the capture, allowing the masses to broadcast their victory to the rest of the world. During the Arab Spring, the mobile phone turned into an information weapon that enabled the uprising in Egypt and Tunisia (Van Niekerk, Pillay & Maharaj, 2011) and which was of equal, or even more, importance in Libya. The images of the Libyans taking pictures of Gaddafi's battered body signaled collective approval, and the media was filled with narratives of the dawn of democracy.

While President Obama argued that the images of dead bin Laden were too provocative and graphic for publication, most mainstream media published the videos and images of Gaddafi's bloody and violent death. The difference between the photos is production: Gaddafi was not photographed by the Pentagon or the Western soldiers, but by the Libyans themselves. The death turned from a piece of news to a description of culture. It is worth noticing that this time expressive violence was not censored. In the U.S., publishing images of dying or dead people is generally frowned upon, as demonstrated by the scandal surrounding publishing a photograph of the American coffins with U.S. flags, on the way home from Iraq. The propriety of the images depends not on the explicitness of death itself, but on the representations of agency, the killer and the victim. This can be seen as a Western tradition of portraying death. The dead Western soldier is typically not visually represented before the funeral, and even then not as deceased. In the funeral the violent, heterogeneous concept of death is sanctified to celebrated heroism. The enemy, however, never undergoes this process. In wars waged in the name of the humanitarian ideals, the enemy does not have a role in the sanctifying rituals of death. The enemy's role in

the narrative of the sacred is to serve the role of a sacrificial victim.

Western portrayals of violence have become ritualized around the concept of instrumental humanitarianism, but the captures and deaths of the 21st century archenemies emerge from the expressive ritualization of Otherness. The biggest difference between the captures of the three evil enemies discussed here is the agency in the narratives of their capture. Hussein's capturers were explicitly American, bin Laden's implicitly American, and Gaddafi's Libyans. This forms an overarching narrative where the role of the punisher is visually removed from the instrumentalists. In Gaddafi's case, outsourcing the agency to the citizens of Libya was a strategic bargain for the U.S. armed forces. As a narrative, it was a narrative continuation for the demonization efforts that the U.S. and NATO had maintained during the Libya operation. This narrative supported the objectives of official American Strategic Communication without compromising American reputation.

7. Rituals in the images of capture

As stated earlier, ideology in discourse consists of descriptions of identity, action, aims and objectives, norms and values, position, status and resources (Van Dijk, 1995: 138). These very descriptions become ritualized in media events of an ideological nature. As media events, the captures and deaths of the evil dictators and terrorists contain recurrent and symbolic representation, which the identity, actions, objectives, norms, values and resources become ritualized: it is these descriptions that receive special attention in the images and narratives of capture as well. These narratives make sure the audience knows the evil deeds and motivations of the adversary and explicitly demonstrates their diminishing resources: after years of living in luxury and killing women and children with chemical weapons, Saddam found himself in a dirty "spider hole". Bin Laden's and Gaddafi's stories were very similar. These are examples of ritualized and mediatized meaning-making.

In the media narratives of war and conflict the actor's identity is typically demonstrated by means of action descriptions: in the images, it is what "we" do and what "they" do what is ritualized. This definition process is obviously ideological and produced by means of rituals of production. News rituals determine the significance of the actions described from their perspective: violence, uprisings and lynchings can be, as argued here, presented as a revolution of democracy, because that makes sense in our ideological landscape (Appadurai, 1990). Rituals emphasize unity and community. This is visually explicit in the images, where the captured enemy is surrounded by groups and crowds of people: Hussein in the middle of U.S. soldiers and then on the gallows surrounded by the cheering

crowd, Gaddafi in the hands of the rebels and later photographed by crowds of triumphant Libyans.

Hussein's, bin Laden's and Gaddafi's images of capture and death contain a number of recurrent, symbolic elements due to which the individual captures and deaths become a coherent narrative. The most significant ones of them take a stance on the physical representation of evil, as well as the ideological nature of the Self.

The place of capture

Without exception, the place of capture is explicitly described in every visual or verbal media narrative. In Hussein's case, the place of capture was depicted by the authorities and the media published images and illustrations of it (Department of Defense, 2003e; BBC, 15.12.2003). Bin Laden's images of capture were censored except for the images of the location where he was found and killed. Gaddafi's place of capture, the drain pipe, was also depicted in photographs and illustrations (The Daily Mail, 21.10.2011). What these images have in common is the theme of dirt, garbage and life underground - quite literally. Each "monster" was portrayed as a "rat", toppled from power to blight and from spotlight to sewage. In these narratives, the physical places of capture always have symbolic value that establish, through recurrent representations, an evaluative ritual.

The roles of agency

The roles of agency are central in the forming of rituals. In the images of Saddam and Gaddafi, the overt and dynamic agency is reserved mainly for the crowds, whereas the U.S. is portrayed as the initiators and the background force that enabled the uprising. The archenemies are represented as objects: they are held still and pointed at with weapons. As stated, bin Laden's images are an exception here. He was not a leader of a nation, so there was no angry mob to celebrate his death. The agency of the U.S. soldiers is entirely muted and the object of their action is equally absent. This demonstrates the tendency of agency to become the site of ritualization. Recurrent, symbolic and expressive agency is reserved for the victims of the demonized archenemies, while the Western actor remain in their instrumental roles.

The objectives and purpose of action

In the media, the captures and deaths of Hussein and Gaddafi are narrated not only as justified revenge, but as steps towards progress and democracy. In the Western media the imagery of violence and the victory speeches of the dawn of the new age appear starkly paradoxical. For the "enlightened" Western audience violence is a ritual of democracy, through which politics is conceptualized and mythologized. Appadurai (1990) argues that

interpretations of democracy are suggestive and pragmatic: democracy is both an intrinsic value and yet a concept that is flexible, subjective and relative enough to function as the narrative frame for Strategic Communication. Like democracy, also violence is relative. "Our" violence is different from "their" violence, and yet the only difference between them is the way their justification is represented. The framing of democracy is thus largely dependent on the representations of agency, which has made the imagery of violence part of the imagery of democracy. The Western agency is represented as striving for virtue, and this striving is always defined in terms of its virtuous objectives. Action and agency are struggle for a virtuous cause and therefore instrumental.

The purpose of these recurrent methods is to illustrate the cause and effects of evilness. They construct a rational narrative, where repetition both ritualizes and ideologizes events and action. The fate of the archenemy is always the same: to face his nation and enemy face to face. In Hussein's, bin Laden's and Gaddafi's images of capture and death, evaluations and rituals intertwine into a whole, where individual narratives receive new meanings and reinforcement from each other and eventually form a strategic gallery of enmity.

8. Discussion

In this article I have argued that the roles of agency in the images of Hussein's, bin Laden's and Gaddafi's capture and death can be treated as ritualized evaluation, which represents the physical end of the enemy and reflects the West's paradoxical relationship to violence. The Western instrumental thought is founded on the kind of sacred that is unattainable without violence and sacrifice.

The archenemies of the 21st century have represented absolute evil, which means that the narratives about them do not allow their representation as adversaries, but only as antagonists. This is the consequence of practicing politics in the moral register: the definition of adversariality is dependent on moral questions (Mouffe, 2005: 75-76). As the result of "moral register politics", the concepts of humanitarianism, humanism, as well as democracy become redefined. The conceptual highjacking of humanism means, according to Carl Schmitt (2007: 45), the denial of peace, justice, progress and civilization from the enemy. In other words, humane and humanitarian arguments result in inhumane practices: the enemy is excluded from the domain of humanity, and treated accordingly (Mouffe, 2005: 78).

When the narratives of the so-called Strategic Communication are observed, it is easy to argue that the enlightened rhetorics of the moral

register are the norm. Although official Strategic Communication has rejected expressive violence, it still has a function in the construction of the narratives of war and conflict. Expressive violence is part of the experience and practices of war regardless of the actor's ideology, and these experiences and practices continue to leak into the media. The effort to maintain the narratives of the "light" sacred is apparent in the publication of the images of Hussein's and bin Laden's capture. The representations of instrumental physical and emotional distance are displayed side by side with representations of othering. Although the violence of the Self is often muted and denied, the consumption of violence and hostility in their visual form is still in a significant role in the Western experience and practice of war. Hussein, bin Laden and Gaddafi were portrayed as the agents of pure profanity, who were subjects to such expressive violence that would otherwise have no legitimate social function. As argued by Bataille, the foundation for social unity and community is the "damned" and "dark" part of humaneness that does not integrate in the commensurate, efficient, composed and controlled ideal, but represents the world of shock, force and chaos (see Arppe, 2000; Heinämäki, 2005: 62). The visual degradation of the enemy in the media, such as urinating on enemy bodies or posing next to prisoners of war, or mediatized participation in bloody lynching, such as Gaddafi's death, and the participation in the consumption of expressive violence can be seen as bursts of the "heterogeneous social" (see Sumiala, 2010: 68). The images discussed here are primarily images of profanation and humiliation, through which the society constructs itself internally. The role of repulsive and emotional categories is significant in this process. In media rituals this manifests in the recurrent images of dirt, blood and violence, which are eventually associated with the concepts of the sacred and homogeneous narrative of democracy. This is also Bataille's understanding of the role of crime in society: the sacred may appear as the site of committing a crime, as order, norms and "light" sacred cannot exist without the crime that serves the homogeneous society (Heinämäki, 2008: 62).

Arppe (2000: 16) characterizes Bataille's understanding of culture as bipolar movement. At one end there is the breakdown that represents the profane, which brings in the nature and culture of "the Other": the repulsive and unattainable domain of death. At the other end there is the culture that rejects the chaotic and uncontrollable (Arppe, 2000: 16). This is precisely the set up in the narratives of capture discussed here. The roles of agency are represented in terms of bipolar movement, where the West has adopted the role of the controlled and composed who have to commit the crime of sacrifice to maintain the internal coherence of the society. The images of capture and death brought death and violence to the Western media for everyone to see and participate in, which integrated the images to the Western narrative of democracy and justice. Polar opposites such as "us"

and "them" are typical for mythologies. They are used to explicate the inner structures of the myth, and the distinctions between nature and culture. According to Kunelius (2010: 169), what is placed within the category of culture is what represents "us", whereas the category of nature denotes "Otherness". Hussein's, bin Laden's and Gaddafi's images of capture the representations of agency comply to this tradition. It can be said that with Hussein and Gaddafi, the U.S. and their allies made a bargain in terms of reputation and Public Relations, as agency was outsourced to Iraqis and Libyans. When the victims of the archenemies appeared as the executors and killers, the moral lesson continued without the West having to participate in the violence. Due to mythologization and the right type of framing, violence finds its place in the cause and effects of the democracy narrative. "[T]he official (Christian, democratic) discourse is accompanied and sustained by a whole nest of obscene, brutal, racist, sexist fantasies, which can only be admitted in a censored form", Žižek (2009: 86) argues. All these forms of fantasy are present in the imagery of antagonism discussed here.

The demonization of the enemy is a classic process that takes place in every discourse of war or conflict. Hussein's, bin Laden's and Gaddafi's captures were significant because of their symbolic value. This symbolic value brings the captures to the domain of ritual. In the media, the deaths of these people symbolize the beginning of a new era, although in reality war and violence continue like the captures never happened. The killing of the evil is not only symbolic, but also a simplification. The broadcast and publication of the archenemy's death is one of the media rituals that legitimize the practices and finalize the narrative: without images of death there is no victory or power. An image of capture is a symbol, even if it only depicts a blood stain on the floor. Even if death is not depicted explicitly, it is present in the narrative tradition of these images. An image of capture has become a symbol that predicts death and its ideological representation - and their subsequent approval. In the images of capture and death discussed here, the enemy is forced to "confess" their vulnerability and weakness. If necessary, they are forced to appear as fearful, cowardly and in all possible ways contrary to their identity, thus limited by their humanity despite their monstrousness. This ritual dismantles the cult the antagonists have constructed around themselves.

For the Western audience the rituals of the captures appear as a part of the Enlightenment ideology. This ideology manifests primarily in the values reflected by the media and the authorities. The conventions of representation give out that expressive violence is a taboo in the Western Grand Narrative, but also an integral part of mediatized experience of war and conflict in which the soldiers, the victims of the dictators and terrorists, as well as the Western audiences participate in. The images of capture and

death are not important because of their information value, but because they have invited the audience to share meaning before the representations of violence. After the publication of the images nobody asked "So what?", as it is obvious that by abandoning the ideological norms of proper being, acting and behaving, the killed or executed antagonists have wished for their own death. The narrative put forth by the images pushes the boundaries of our ideology as a foreign and violent and yet inviting and familiar volition to annihilate Otherness.

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CONCLUSIONS

In this dissertation emancipation is understood as not only observing the state of social order represented in the discourses of Strategic Communication, but as discussing its implications. As a military concept, Strategic Communication is the blueprint of leadership, which ties it to the context of dominance and hegemony. In order to understand the implications of this dominance and hegemony, the analysis must take into account the perspective of the dominated. Critical Discourse Analysis is one approach to the asymmetry of power, and it is based on the principle that when a hegemonic actor enjoys a hegemonic status, it is the duty of science and research be the watchdogs of its practices much like it is the duty of the media to be the watchdogs of democracy. This dissertation argues that critical research, be it CDA or any other approach that takes into account the asymmetry of power, should provide counterbalance to the discussion that is otherwise dominated by the hegemonic actor, and that this is what makes critical analysis "critical". CDA as a form of social and political analysis means that the analysis of this research also evaluates the discourses: mere descriptions would appear as discourse analysis without analysis.

This is the stance from which this dissertation has approached Strategic Communication as a theory of persuasion, as linguistic manifestations and as visual implications of hegemonic discourses, which all are dimensions of dominance. This criticality is methodologically addressed with the triangular model (discussed in Chapter 3), which takes the social, cognitive and discursive-semiotic manifestations into account. This is a way to provide context for the analysis, but also pursue the aim of Critical Discourse Analysis: the information provided by the analysis is applied in the context of power and dominance. Therefore, this final chapter contains a section for the discussion of each of the three perspectives.

This dissertation consists of several rather independent units. Chapter 1 introduced the paradigmatic choices and established the theoretical framework for the research. The key question was how to combine discourse analysis as a method of analyzing leadership in the methodological selection of Military Science, where discourse analysis does not yet have an established role. This question was addressed with the

discussion on the linguistic/discursive turn in social science, which arguably contains many aspects of military scientific research, such as the study of leadership as organization research, concluding Critical Discourse Analysis is a natural approach to study hegemonic organizations such as the U.S. military force.

Chapter 2 provided background and context for the empirical discussion. It argued that the tradition of political narration, of which Strategic Communication is an example of, stems from the Enlightenment narratives. The Enlightenment narratives as well as the Grand Narrative of modern military policy maintain many of the same key themes, which are visible in the discourses of Strategic Communication - as further argued in the empirical part of the research. The most important of these themes is democracy, which has been the mantra of all of the 21st century military operations.

Chapter 3 provided the methodology to support the theoretical framework. This chapter put together a framework that approaches discourse from the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis and uses the concept of transitivity to map the social relations represented in discourse. Transitivity analysis makes the concept of agency especially central. In order to expand agency from the textual to the visual setting and allow the analysis of visual representations of action, the theoretical discussion is expanded to rituals and their significance in the analysis of social practice.

The methods discussion is followed by five independent essays and articles. These five texts provide two types of discussion: Chapter 4 reviews the discussion and debate on Strategic Communication in the U.S. military community. This review is integral for Chapter 5, which is a theoretical discussion on the communication theoretical aspects of the military doctrine. Chapter 5 is not empirical, but instead attempts to understand the foundations of Strategic Communication from the perspective of communication research outside the military community. This is done by addressing some of the basic concepts of communication research, such as (a)symmetry of communication and the debate on transfer vs. sharing of meaning. This theoretical discussion helps us observe, understand and analyze the problems and paradoxes of the practices of Strategic Communication in the empirical articles that follow.

The empirical part of the research reveals that there are recurring ideological mechanisms in the discourses of Strategic Communication. Next, the sections that follow will combine these three key mechanisms (the discourses of instrumentalism and exclusion) of the Grand Narrative of Strategic Communication to the three levels of discourse (discourse as social, cognitive and discursive-semiotic phenomena), although the lines

between the three modes are obviously blurry at times. Combining these perspectives is an attempt to track down the correlations of theory discussed in the Methods Chapter and the theory and empiricism that springs from the case studies on Strategic Communication, namely the discussion on the theoretical basis of the concept (Chapters 4 and 5) and the empirical analysis of the discursive practices of Strategic Communication.

In this chapter we will return to the concepts of agency, exclusion and instrumentalism. These are the key concepts of this dissertation, as they are central both in terms of both contents and structures of the discourses of Strategic Communication. In the data agency operates textually, visually and socially, which has implications on the representations of the Self. Exclusion and instrumentalism are thus the ideological manifestations of agency in the social and cognitive domains of discourse. Textual agency codes this social reality.

9.1 The social implications of Strategic Communication

In the context of the analysis, the social significances of discourse are clearly the most pronounced. The basic concepts of the analysis, discourse and narrative, have a clear social function in construing and expressing meaning. This level of discourse is the domain of social power. As argued in Chapter 1, in this dissertation discourse is understood in its broad meaning as the domain of internal and external relations between objects (Fairclough, 2010: 3) and provides a window to observing the dynamics of the social reality of a given society or culture. It is precisely this definition of discourse that highlights the social dimension of the analysis. Discourses are used to the social practices of negotiating, confirming and sharing meaning. In terms of the narrative, it has been argued that it merges ideology and language for the exercise of social power. Narratives as concatenations of discourses are political tools, as the discussions on the Enlightenment as a narrative and the Grand Narrative of Strategic Communication suggest.

From the perspective of Military Science, a pivotal discursive phenomenon of a social significance is the definition process of Strategic Communication. The argumentation of the key documents, the *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept* and the *Commander's Handbook on Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy* as well as much of the literature discussed in Chapter 4, demonstrate that the focus of the development efforts of Strategic Communication revolve around the concept of leadership. These documents suggest that for the military community, it is not the messages, themes and narratives of Strategic Communication that are of great concern, but the hierarchies and

responsibilities within the organization. This means that the concept, as well as the discussion that concerns it, focus less on what is being said than it does on the organizational, operational model. At the same time, what is explicitly stated about the agenda of the organization is vague and abstract. Official objectives such as 'supporting democracy' and 'fighting terror' are something that most Western liberal democracies claim to do. But what is strategic about communicating something this self-evident?

The so-called "unity of action" means, according to the *Commander's Handbook on Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy* (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2010: I-1-2), the synchronization, coordination and integration of activities of different actors, governmental and non-governmental, to achieve "unity of effort". According to the Handbook, this is one of the major challenges of Strategic Communication: "The key activities that contribute to unified action are assignment of responsibilities, organizing, establishing relationships, and collaboration. Unified action is a comprehensive approach to achieve unity of effort" (p. I-2). The heavy emphasis on organization and responsibilities suggests that the genuine purpose of Strategic Communication is not as much to enable effective communication, but to restrict it. This is especially apparent in the discussion on the importance of synchronization. Synchronization, in this contexts, implies more control and censorship than getting a certain message out there. The fact that the concept of Strategic Communication was abandoned in favor of "communication synchronization" suggests that the focus of communication is shifting more and more towards transmission of messages instead of symmetrical, two-way flow of communication. This means that military communication is actually moving to the opposite direction than communication outside the military community, where the imperative has been to improve dialogue and interaction with the stakeholders. If the effects-centric ideology does not get alternatives, communication strategies are destined to be troubled by the question what *not* to communicate, when the question should be the opposite: what *should* we do and say? The claim that this dissertation makes is that if the focus was brought to the questions of content instead of organization, military communication would have a better chance at developing past the problems that have plagued it this far. This would, however, require dialogue on the core values of the society, which is a process that is traditionally alien to any organization whose core function has been to advance (national) political interests. It is therefore not surprising that instead of dialogue, Strategic Communication has started to move towards standardized, official narratives, meaning the "synchronization" of communication.

The challenge of synchronization in terms of the social dimension of discourse is the human need to communicate ambivalently and self-

contradictorily. This can be seen as a reflection of Bataille's notions of the dark sacred, the domain of a profound social significance. While the ideoscapes of warfare are supported by the manifestations of the commensurate, homogenous world, the realities of warfare are everything but. The official Grand Narrative conveys verification of the homogenous ideals of justice, democracy and end of all things evil, but in the hands of the real actors, the soldiers, the ideals are executed with heterogeneous, asymmetrical action. The practice and the narrative diverge. This is a process that turns Strategic Communication into a censorship model. Its sole function is to maintain the impersonal, instrumental facade, behind which the reality of a private, intimate experience unfolds. As a result, the narratives of humanitarian action and human rights do not result in "social openness, social solidarity, and harmonious practices resulting from respect for the heterogeneity of cultures and social groups" as Alkopher (2007) suggests could be the result of embedding human rights in the international social structure. Instead, the asymmetrical narratives of morality produce a very different world view.

The emergence of expressive violence despite the commitment to reason and consideration indicates, in Bataille's terms, the existence of two separate social realms, the heterogeneous and the homogenous (Bataille, 1992; 2008). Expressive violence belongs in the domain of the heterogeneous, which is the dark side of the sacred (Heinämäki, 2008). As the images of capture and death of Hussein, bin Laden and Gaddafi demonstrate, the "enlightened" audience, which demands virtuous warfare and respect of human rights, is captivated by the violence. At the same time, it is the humiliation of the enemy that attracts celebration both among the soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the audiences in the home front. What thus happens in the interface of the heterogeneous and homogenous is transcendence in the form of a ritual. The homogenous social is the site of the instrumental reason that forms the framework of appropriate, acceptable social reality. Grabbing the adversary with the pinchers of virtue, i.e. letting technology "neutralize" it from a distance and sacrificing it in the altar of democracy, allows us to make heterogeneity serve sacredness and confirm our righteousness. In terms of communication we may call this framing, but in terms of behavior it is known as rituals and sacrifice.

In his discussion on the sacrifice of animals, Bataille argues that only "what is useful" is sacrificed (1992: 49). Before sacrifice, however, the animal must be made a "thing" before it is eaten, alter it by killing, cutting and cooking (Bataille, 1992: 39). Death reduces the body to "thinghood" and it is the "things" that are sacrificed (Bataille, 1992: 50). In the verbal and visual processes of demonization, marginalization and delegitimatization, the adversary is reduced to a thing and then sacrificed. The display of the

heterogeneous, the blood and violence and intimacy, is part of the sacrifice. "Intimacy is violence", writes Bataille, and it is intimacy that cannot be expressed discursively alone (Bataille, 1992: 50-51):

The swelling of the bursting point, the malice that breaks out with clenched teeth and weeps; the sinking feeling that doesn't know where it comes from or what it's about; the fear that sings its head off in the dark; the white-eyed pallor, the sweet sadness, the rage and the vomiting... are so many evasions.

The difficulty of expressing heterogeneous intimacy may explain the fascination with the imagery of expressive violence. In the images of Abu Ghraib, a captured Saddam Hussein, the blood stains of bin Laden, the death of Muammar Gaddafi and the dead Taleban fighters being urinated on, the enemy is made a "thing" and his intimacy is revealed. There is no other way to convey the experience but capture it in images which later represent the center of the dark sacred. The origin of the sacred is thus in the forbidden taboo, the shared conception of something horrible that both repulses and attracts us (Heinämäki, 2008). It is this reality that the Grand Narrative denies and represses. The Grand Narrative, the core of the narratives of Strategic Communication, are the communally shared domain of the appropriate sacred, which are designed to maintain the dichotomy of the good and the evil, the homogeneous and the heterogeneous. The representations of the profane become absorbed into the domain of the dark sacred, fueling and intensifying the experience of the shared social reality. At the same time, despite the ideals promoted by the Grand Narrative, there is little that separates the Western civilization from the lynchers of Gaddafi:

Western civilization has never had a strong hold on the oppressed masses. Indeed, recent events demonstrate that when a crisis occurs, culture can count on few of its self-proclaimed devotees to stand out for its ideals. For one man who is able to differentiate between truth and reality, as the chief religious and philosophical systems have always done, there are thousands who have never been able to overcome the tendency to regress to their mimetic and atavistic urges. (Horkheimer, 2013: 84).

The repression of the dark sacred is part of Western culture, but this repression results in bursts that contradict the official, light sacred social realm.

The doctrinization of legitimacy and virtue means that the soldier no longer is a moral agent by default. The need for doctrinization reveals that the concept of "natural aristocracy" no longer exists: virtue is no longer a natural characteristic of the Self, so it has to be specifically commanded. At

the same time, doctrinization forces the soldier into conformity, where the soldier no longer needs to evaluate between right and wrong or good and evil, but only execute as instructed. This model takes the agency out of the agent and prevents the soldiers from making choices - from using "reason". Strategic corporals such as Bradley Manning who act out their moral and, in Kantian terms, practice "public reason", are condemned by the system. These strategic corporals are the moral agents of the information age, only their moral or agency is not welcome. As argued by Andén-Papadopoulos (2009), the first-hand testimonials of soldiers who share their war experience provide the public insights of the uncensored and violent face of warfare and thereby provide a basis for the critical perspectives necessary for an open, democratic debate of the practices and execution of warfare. The problem is that the soldiers break the boundaries of taboos, and expose myths by portraying warfare as excessive violence and showing what the highly technological, "virtuous" weaponry can do - or rather, destroy (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2009). The soldiers live the reality of expressive violence while they should be broadcasting instrumental agency. This 'propagandistic dissonance' as phrased by Christensen (2008) is of strategic significance, but simply too truthful.

The second important element of social significance is directly connected to the concepts of homogeneous and heterogeneous. Social exclusion manifests textually and visually in the data of this research, and some of its aspects will be discussed later in the context of the discursive-semiotic level of discourse analysis. However, exclusion is also of social significance. As a social phenomenon, it is part of the Enlightenment legacy to the Grand Narrative of U.S. military policy, much contrary to the rhetoric of rights and equality.

The Enlightenment legacy to Strategic Communication are the discourses of democracy and progress. This means to say that Strategic Communication is an ideoscape: it fuses images, narratives and ideology for purposes of power and politics. However, this process of meaning-making contradicts the basic objective of the Enlightenment. As argued in Chapter 2, the Enlightenment narratives emphasized a certain ideal of free, objective reason and reasoning that would be refined into right kind of moral and justice. This in turn would lead to the separation of reason and culture. However, as Smith (2006) addresses in his criticism, truth is embedded in culture. The empiricism of this dissertation indicates namely this. "Truth" is treated specifically as a product of a certain culture. Obviously this culture, according to the rules of classic self-glorification, is associated inclusively with the Self. This matter is however deeper than a mere question of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. The contradictions between the discursive practices and the physical realization of warfare and conflict (i.e. textual and social agency) imply the use of

Enlightenment values as a core narration for a political agenda. The Enlightenment, as a thematic framework, is a rhetorical device that allows the practice of politics in a moral register. This is the very practice that the Enlightenment, in its preference for reason over culture, rose to oppose. This contradiction may be used as an introduction to the final discussion on the interpretation of the research and analysis in this dissertation. As will be argued, it is the concepts of paradox and contradiction in terms of agency that rise to define the mechanisms of Strategic Communication.

These contradictions may lead to the constructivist interpretation that in Strategic Communication the overt and topmost narrative is not the most sincere one. Strategic Communication is strategic in the sense that it conveys covert meanings in its overt manifestations. However, as will be argued, this covertness is not always synonymous to being hidden or even suppressed, but rather to being subliminal. Its interpretation is a matter of recognizing and reading the different layers of narratives. From the structuralist perspective, these narratives are products of the social and cultural history of individual and collective identities. The emergence of paradoxes in the analysis is a natural result for a critical approach, and leads to the "inversion" of the themes that make up the core structure of the narrative. This inversion does not change the narrative, but opens it for interpretation in different contexts. What essentially constitutes the tension in the interpretation of practice and presentation is their emergence as binaries: violence narrated as democracy and firepower as progress.

In this dissertation, the critical approach means analysis by means of functional language theory, leading to the empirical analysis of *action*. This has led to the observation that in Strategic Communication, action manifests itself in terms of binaries. The actions associated with the Self typically carry the opposite significance compared to the actions of the Other. The moral register of these discourses forces the Self to associate its actions with the themes of virtue, progress, reason and rationality, leading to the denial and renouncement of contradictory motives. The problem with the moral register is that it limits the leeway of expression, as the expression of the Self becomes limited to the undynamic themes that resonate with the given virtuous representation of the Self. This is exactly what creates the tension between representation and practice in the discourses analyzed in this dissertation. The tension starts to build when the negotiation of meaning unfolds in the semantic context of legitimacy. The semantics of practice simply do not resonate with the given context: warfare is the context of violence, and narrating it as an endeavor for democracy will result in contradictory themes, messages and narratives. It appears that the practical manifestation of many concepts is exactly contrary to how the concept is generally understood. This is not a new phenomenon in the discourses of war: the famous statement of the

necessity "to destroy the town to save it" is only one example. As repeatedly stated, the most significant themes that define Strategic Communication can be seen as themes that get their paradoxical dimension from the tension between their conceptual and practical realizations. The historic and modern conceptualizations of the Enlightenment and virtue and their outcome in violence; the narratives of natural legitimacy and freedom and their execution by means of artificial control, management and hierarchy; the claim of moral, humanitarian responsibility and agency on one hand, the shift of agency away from the human actors on the other; the narrative identification of propriety and sacredness as the epicenter of culture and community, while the transmission of meaning becomes paralyzed without the dark and the profane. The problem of Strategic Communication may just be that it has evolved to limit itself in terms of what is perceived as appropriate and legitimate (democracy, humanitarian action, etc.), while it is clear that these values cannot explain the practical execution of warfare (violence, control and censorship). Ideals and reality simply do not meet. This tension ultimately leads to the binary narratives of warfare: the official narratives of democracy and liberation, and the unofficial, or even unintentional narratives of violence and profane. Most importantly, it can be explained as the clash of the instrumental objectives and the expressive needs of the actor.

The emergence of binary manifestations as the result of critical analysis is what I call inversion. Basically this means the critical approach to the discourses and narratives of Strategic Communication that led to the discovery of the paradox between the conceptual and practical realizations of warfare. Here, inversion means applying the opposite reading to a given message. In practice this could mean asking how the use of a binary value would change the practice: when the claim is that the sacrifice leads to democracy, could the claim also be that democracy calls for sacrifice? Are our objectives procurable without the application of their anti-value? Is rationality separable from emotion? Can villages be saved without destroying them?

This approach could be understood in the context of reconstruction. In Derrida's reconstruction the claim is that people tend to categorize and define their experience in terms of binary opposites. The data of this research suggest that identity is always narrated in terms of opposites: inclusion and exclusion, morality and immorality, progress and primitivism. As Hansen (2006: 6) states,

Poststructuralism's relational conception of identity implies that identity is always given through reference to something it is not. To speak of the 'American', 'European', 'barbaric' or 'underdeveloped' is to constitute another identity or set of

identities as non-American, non-European, civilized or developed.

This is clear in the semantics of Strategic Communication too. With the action descriptions understood as identity descriptions, the emphasis on rational, instrumental, moral and progressed Self implies the adversary's opposite existence. As stated before, delegitimatory practices have been doctrinized, meaning that the commitment to the human rights is announced contemporaneously with the antagonist's perceived immorality, i.e. the killing of civilians.

You've heard us say many times that we strike only military targets while taking extraordinary care to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties and to minimize collateral damage. Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, flaunts the laws of war and collocates military and civilian facilities, and employs human shields. (Department of Defense, 2003d).

Derrida states that the general strategy of deconstruction should avoid the neutralization of these binaries or movement "beyond" them, but attempt to remain within them (1988: 48). The meaning is given by the absent attributes, by "what is not". Derrida argues that the dichotomies of binaries are always asymmetrical and violent: the juxtaposition of terms, such as democracy/terrorism, implies that one is the dominant and the other the subordinate concept, and the deconstruction of this juxtapositioning requires the inversion of this violent hierarchy (Derrida, 1988). Inversion, as used in this research, refers thus to the deconstruction of a meaning, significance, or myth in terms other than the given hierarchy. In Derrida's terms, the subordinate concept is placed above the dominant one to see how it changes the interpretation. In the framework of the American ideoscape, this has meant the inversion of the significances of the Grand Narrative, i.e. the textual and visual representations of agency.

9.2 The cognitive implications of strategic communication

The Methods Chapter referred to the role of cognition in Critical Discourse Analysis. Mental models are, according to Van Dijk (2008a: 220) "the basis of our future memories, as well as the basis of further learning". Human cognition generates experiential cognitive models even if the mind was empty to start with, and as these cognitions become structured and organized, the process of conceptualization can begin in the social and abstract dimensions of cognition. This means that language becomes an essential part of the process as soon as the experiential cognitions have become structured. (Larjavaara 2007, 30). Lakoff's example of the

categorization process that result in idealized cognitive models illustrates the role of cognitive models in semantics: *Tuesday* is a word relative to an idealized model that posits the understanding of time as a seven-day cycle (a week), organized in a linear sequence of 24-hour time periods, the third of which is Tuesday. Lakoff calls this model idealized: "Seven-day weeks do not exist in nature. They are created by human beings." (Lakoff, 1990: 68-69). This means to say that any given "thing" can be turned into an idealized model, which eventually appears as a self-evident, natural fact that we fail to recognize as a cultural product. Yet, (cognitive) mental models feature large amounts of sociocultural knowledge (Van Dijk, 2006b).

In Strategic Communication, the narratives contain idealized cognitive models (ICMs) that are or are in the process of becoming conceptualized. An example of such model may be *democracy*. As argued by Appadurai (1990), presented in Chapter 2 and suggested by the data of this research, this "master term" is elementary in the Western narratives being, doing and behaving, and can therefore serve as an example of a politically exploitable concept. Treated as an intrinsic value and a legitimatory concept, it contains the idealized understanding of a certain social order. Democracy is a term that has become basic strategic vocabulary: it is a military (political) objective of Western warfare. At the same time, it appears to be in a constant semantic change. Democracy in Libya means something very different than democracy in the United States or Europe. Despite its status as a symbol of rights, welfare and representation, in political argumentation it is constantly represented in the context of violence.

Democracy has been a key concept in the core of American (and Western) narratives of identity, and its multifaceted significance has evolved parallel to the political turbulences in history. The pragmatic nature of democracy makes it difficult to define: like pragmatic meanings, democracy as a concept is contextual (Castells, 2009: 296). When the context affects the meaning of the word, its semantic representation becomes complicated. What is its signified concept? This has made democracy the resilient key word of legitimatory discourses. It is also an example of an idealized cognitive model in the sense that its meaning is culturally coded and based on an agreement, but also a graded category: an ICM may fit one's understanding of, for instance, democracy perfectly, very well, somewhat, very poorly or not at all (see Lakoff, 1990: 70). In light of this, the use of abstract notions and concepts is convenient in strategic narratives, as they allow the pragmatic redefinition of meaning and interpretation. In fact, all of the key concepts Appadurai (1997: 36) lists as elementary in ideoscapes, all are abstract: *freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty, representation*. According to Appadurai, these ideoscapes are directly political and they are oriented toward capturing state power. Ideoscapes are not limited to verbal

entities, but may also take the form of a visual image, as suggested in the analysis of the images of the capture of Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein earlier. In these images, it is the context that determined the interpretation of action: the context of violence was used to frame violent actions, which dramatically influenced their interpretation. Instead of delegitimatory discourses, the context was framed, which proved a powerful tactic.

However, pragmatic redefinition of meaning may lead to conceptual paradoxes, if not misrepresentation:

The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington were the first strikes on continental America since the British razed Washington to the ground in 1812. The insecurity that this new attack generated prompted an isolationist-inclined Bush Jr administration to declare a new doctrine that marked a fundamental change in US foreign policy. This so-called Bush Doctrine had three essential strands – to hunt down terrorists wherever they are, including in those rogue states now dubbed an 'axis of evil', to wage pre-emptive war to prevent further strikes or to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into terrorist hands, and the aggressive promotion of democracy, US-style (Bush, 2002). Despite NATO's historic invocation of Article V of its Charter on 12 September, the fear was that the US would pursue these goals unilaterally without recourse to its traditional allies or the United Nations. The problem was that the first two doctrinal strands jeopardized, and perhaps even contradicted, the third. (Snow & Taylor, 2006).

Due to its pragmatic representation, democracy has no prototype, as prototype theory cannot offer a model that could induce complex meanings from more simple meanings, such as elections or (see Rusanen, 2010: 232). Without prototype, the semantic meanings (signifier, signified) become difficult, if not impossible to determine. However, knowing 'what's going on' in interaction is more than merely understanding the semantic meanings of discourse (Van Dijk, 2006b). In the framework of Strategic Communication, its use for asymmetric influence and the nature of the modern information environment, it is clear that pragmatism has its benefits: the pragmatic interpretations are impacted by their context, which obviously is easier to influence than cognition processes. We do not have direct access to the cognition process, or "states of mind" as Van Dijk (2006b) argues. However, in this process it may be possible to use context as a medium.

The problem with the concept of Strategic Communication is its practical

and theoretical incoherence. It presents communication as a cognitive process, but yet understands communication as sending out signals that "trigger the desired interpretation" (Department of Defense, 2009: 6). This view suggests that the "desired interpretations" are mental models coded in the minds of the audience, waiting for retrieval by a triggering stimulus. As stated in the concept (Department of Defense, 2009: 6), "it is the receiver who actually provides the ultimate meaning, which may or may not be the meaning the source intended." In other words, the approach is such that the focus should be on message and audience selection rather than contextualization. However, interpretation is precisely the domain of context: as stated in the Methods Chapter, context models are the basis of knowing how to engage in discourse in a socially acceptable way, how to interpret messages and relate their meaning in specific environments (Van Dijk, 2006b; 2009). Instead of influencing interpretation, the concept of Strategic Communication focuses on mere messaging. If context is not provided, this type of communicative practice easily results in aimless shooting. With limited capacity (or tolerance) for feedback and therefore limited stakeholder and key audience knowledge, it becomes impossible to predict which messages may be accepted by the heterogeneous, global audiences.

One step towards more engaging communication is Key Leader Engagement, where the so-called "key leaders" engage each other on the leadership level. According to Hirvelä, Huhtinen & Kangasmaa (Forthcoming), the prerequisite for successful engagement is that mutual respect is established between the key leaders. This calls for reputation management and synchronization of messages, which, again, is an issue of leadership and management.

Clearly, the communicative function of the legitimacy practices such as the "Battle of the Narrative" is to contextualize the communication process. The concept explicitly introduces themes and narratives as essential elements, but fails to model this process much further than the practice and challenges of messaging. The hierarchy of messages supporting themes and themes supporting messages fails short when the understanding of the messaging process is unrealistic and based on simplified, behaviorist stimulus-response modeling and audience selection. It fails to address the process of interpretation as an essential dimension of cognitive influence despite the fact that themes and narratives are explicit elements of the communication model. If the understanding of messaging as a process is insufficient or even distorted, it is unlikely that it will provide a functional basis for the construction of themes and narratives. Contextualization takes more than repetitive catchphrases and key words, but the concept fails to provide much else. As stated, the Grand Narrative and its Enlightenment themes form the themes and narratives for Strategic Communication, but

the problem described here is that the theoretical understanding of communication as mechanical transmission of messages is in dissonance with the need for interactive, two-way communication that recognizes the importance of interpretation over mere acceptance of messages. As de la Ville & Mounoud (2010: 185) state, storytelling is a powerful and deep social activity and in order to be efficient, it must include the interpretations of its audience.

The problem identified thus far in terms of the cognitive dimension of discourse is the lack of focus in the contextualization of Strategic Communication, despite the existing method for cognitive influence, "the Battle of the Narrative". It is obvious that the understanding of communication as mechanical message transmission is in profound dissonance with the view that communication is interpretation. In practice, the messages become redundant if there is no context (narrative) within which its interpretation can take place. The focus should shift from effects (acceptance of message) to interpretation, but this would obviously contradict the doctrinal congruence of effects-centricness. This is however a development that took place in communication research during the 1960s, but is still waiting for actualization in Military Science.

The claim here is that as the concept of Strategic Communication clearly suffers from the same symptoms as the behaviorist communication research in the 1960s, the paradigmatic shift from transmission of messages to a narrative-based doctrine would solve at least some of the problems. However, this would mean that the behaviorist conception of influence is abandoned in favor of a more interactional, contextualizing approach. As Schramm (1963: 7) postulated upon replacing the concept of linear transmission with active interpretation, communication is a relationship and an act of sharing, not "something someone does to someone else." One methodological option for this is narrativity. Stories and narratives organize events and actors into an acceptable and comprehensive framework (de la Ville & Mounoud, 2010: 185). According to de la Ville & Mounoud, stories contribute to the preserving and continuity of actions:

Leaders need to be good storytellers, i.e. be able to tell good stories which must be coherent to gain credibility and stimulating to facilitate its perception and implementation. In a functionalist view, the construction of a good story supposes an overall intentionality, meaning total control of the plot through to its final outcome. (2010: 185).

As stated, the concept of Strategic Communication needs to further develop the concepts of themes and narratives as the domains of contextualization and interpretation. The focus on messages at the expense of the narrative

makes the "Battle of the Narrative" redundant. In the framework of leadership this is problematic. Contextualization can be seen as the link between leadership and constructing reality: controlling the context, defining the situation and finally interpretation and response are the basic steps of framing (Fairhurst, 2011: 2-9). From the perspective of leadership, it is precisely the contexts that are significant. According to Fairhurst (2011: 2) "[l]eaders often cannot control events, but they can control the context under which events are seen if they recognize a framing opportunity." In other words, the development of contextualization would provide resilience for communication and reputation management for the communicator in case of uncontrollable, negative asymmetries in communication. The focus on the resilience of communication would be advisable, considering the impossibility of information management and control. Contextualization would provide a bumper and leverage against the asymmetries of communication. The obvious benefit of this type of practice would be that it would not demand efforts unnatural for a military organization, i.e. excessive transparency, such as is demanded from civilian organizations.

9.3 The discursive-semiotic manifestations of Strategic Communication (and the visual paradox)

Language is cognitive structure. The methodological approach of this dissertation has been that of functional language theory, based on the view that language is a higher-order semiotic system that is stratified into content (semantics and lexicogrammar) and expression (phonology and phonetics) (Matthiessen, 2009: 23-24). The contents of language have been approached as a social semiotic, as both a system and behavior. According to Matthiessen (2009: 19) this perspective "complements that of cognitive science, providing an account of the social construction of meaning." This is to say that since the social and cognitive perspectives to the discourses of Strategic Communication have been addressed, this section will address their textual manifestations and attempt to close the circle, or rather the triangle, of the social/cognitive/discursive-semiotic dimensions and their intertwining in the discourses addressed in this dissertation.

The focus in the empirical part of this dissertation has been on the analysis of agency through action descriptions. These descriptions are textual action and behavior, which give an identity to the entity being described. Agency in discourse has been mapped with transitivity analysis, which is one way of observing and explaining participant roles in language structures. Here these structures are understood as reflections of certain social order. As Thompson argues, the analysis of transitivity choices "is one of the most effective ways of exploring the ideological assumptions that inform and are

construed by the texts" (2010: 17). Halliday (2009: 55) relates transitivity to cognition, arguing that in essence, it is "the set of options relating to cognitive content, the linguistic representation extralinguistic experience", i.e. the external, physical world, or the inner world of feelings, thoughts and perceptions. This was the argument for applying functional language theory in the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis. In the triangular approach to discourse in this analysis, the line of argument presented in the Methods Chapter was that

- i) discourse is determined by the interplay of the social, cognitive and discursive-semiotic domains,
- ii) discourse is influenced by ideology (cognitive and social structure) and
- iii) this ideology has textual manifestations.

This approach ties together textual/visual, cognitive and social structure, which are all manifested, as stated, in the transitivity patterns of discourse. The empirical case studies approached a number of phenomena through the analysis of transitivity. The transitivity patterns revealed that social order really is coded in the structures of language. This means to say that agency in discourse is always politically motivated and ideological and this manifests not only in the semantics of discourse, but also in its structures. Ideology in language is not only a matter of semantics:

Transitivity concordances, especially when derived from a group of texts of the same type, allow generalizations to be drawn about the ways in which significance entities are represented in a particular register or genre. (Thompson, 2010: 19).

Further, according to Thompson (2010: 19), upon bringing together these concordances:

[...] it is possible to identify transitivity templates, i.e. schematic representations of transitivity structures in which there are recurrent patterns of one or more of the entities appearing in complementary distribution, in particular participant roles or circumstances.

This has been the practice in the case studies of this dissertation. The studies that apply the method of transitivity analysis contain data from a number of transcribed texts. As a conclusion, these concordances are now abstracted into transitivity templates, which allow us to analyze these experiential representations as a social construction of meaning. According to Thompson (2010: 39), the dynamics attributed to the entities in discourse can provide insight into the values that are embedded in the discourse. We are thus not interested in the configurations of language structure in

isolation, but as a representation of social reality and its cognitive interpretation.

The transitivity analysis in the case studies have shown different concordances that, when put together, manifest as patterns of legitimacy and Otherness. These include transitivity templates such as

- ✦ action of the Self without any target
- ✦ action of the Self with an inanimate/abstract (i.e. legitimate) target
- ✦ action of the Other with an animate/human (i.e. illegitimate) target

It is obviously difficult, at times, to differentiate between legitimation and othering, but these can be understood as parallel manifestations: the demand for legitimacy actualizes in different patterns of inclusion and exclusion that the transitivity analysis reveals. If these patterns are interpreted as a representation of social reality, it appears that the Self,

- ✦ acts strategically: the Self takes abstract action which is typically reported in subordinate terms
- ✦ is addressed in the context of positive social esteem: evaluation focuses on ethics, which is reported terms of behavior (capacity, tenacity)
- ✦ kills and influences legitimate targets: the targets of the Self are typically inanimate, abstract objects, i.e. air defenses, systems, IEDs, etc.
- ✦ kills and influences legitimate adversaries: human targets are evaluated negatively and therefore legitimate (insurgents, terrorists, etc.)
- ✦ is often replaced, as an actor, by technology: in the action descriptions of the Self, technology is given agency and the Self muted as an actor

The Other, however,

- ✦ is described in the context of negative social sanction and affect (veracity, propriety and negative attributes of the actor)
- ✦ is the target of collective action both textually and visually
- ✦ is represented as individuals and small groups
- ✦ kills and influences illegitimate targets

The conclusions on the data here demonstrate that Strategic Communication is a site of exclusion. This exclusion manifests not only thematically in the visualizations and semantic patterning of discourse, but on the very clause level. The first layer of meaning is the social dimension discussed in the previous section. However, this level resonates with the second layer. This structural layer of meaning appears to be in concordance

with the instrumental representation of warfare and strategy: systems and infrastructure are being neutralized and human targets of action, apart from "insurgency" and "terrorists", are excluded from the transitivity patterns of discourse. This exclusion is best demonstrated in the analysis of the term 'neutralize', which was used as an example of the the language patterns of Strategic Communication. New terminology emerges around the conceptions of the Self and the Other, leading to mutually exclusive patterns: the enemy does not neutralize, but kills and destroys. This type of patterning may further contribute to the formation of mental and contextual models which associate neutralizing with certain types of actors and certain types of contexts: the Self with virtuous war and technological (i.e. instrumental) agency, and the Other with terror and other forms of illegitimate, expressive action.

As this chapter illustrates, exclusion can be traced in all three dimensions of analysis. It is evident that these three modes are all interdependent. It is difficult to imagine social exclusion would appear without textual or visual (discursive-semiotic) such, and vice versa. The fact that exclusion manifests textually suggests that exclusion also has cognitive as well as social modes. Further, the traceability of exclusion and Otherness in all of these three dimensions shows that methodologically, the triangle of social, cognitive and discursive-semiotic modes is well suited for the critical analysis of hegemonic discourses.

Obviously, the exclusion of the Other is what one expects from the discourses of war. What is however significant in this, is the formation of a new kind of a taxonomy for strategic, tactical and operational action that builds around the instrumental conception of warfare that the Other can have no part in. In other words, the ideology of exclusion has penetrated all layers of strategic planning, leading into a new vocabulary that can rarely be applied to the adversary. Warfare can no longer be described in terms of attack and defense, but these concepts have received new subordinate labels that contain the information on who defends and who attacks, which determines whether the description should have a reading of legitimacy or illegitimacy. This new vocabulary contains the American experience of instrumental warfare. It is also the vocabulary that the media will broadcast, as the messages of the "terrorists" and "insurgents" are rarely given publicity. This is why the construction of a new lexicon of instrumental warfare is significant not only as a textual phenomenon of discourse, but demonstrates how the social, cognitive and discursive-semiotic dimensions are interdependent. 'Neutralize', for instance, suggests not only physical action, but contains a cognitive model that associates the action of neutralizing with the domain of the Self, which automatically excludes the Other and reinforces the interpretation of the action as something legitimate.

According to Fairclough, in contemporary life social transformations are 'discourse-led': "it is discourses which change first" (Fairclough, 2005: 77). In this case Strategic Communication has started to transmit the discourses of strategic planning and doctrine. By controlling the strategic planning and leadership process, the organization in question also has control over strategic communication - the language of strategic leadership. In the press briefings, this language turns into descriptions of the reality of warfare and provides the vocabulary for conceptualizing it: in other words, attempts to lead the discourse.

However, there is a paradox between the official discourses and the practices of exclusion. Whereas the discourses transmit instrumental representations of distance, such as the prerequisite of high-technological, humanitarian warfare where the use of weaponry is well planned and assessed, the unofficial and visual narratives convey an image of the war that is expressive in its violence. It seems that the narratives of expressive violence are particularly visual: this dissertation has referred to the imagery of torture and physical abuse in Abu Ghraib, YouTube- and WikiLeaks-videos that reveal the hostile and antagonistic face of the Self. This is the face that Strategic Communication is intended to hide, and which has forced the military leadership to develop Strategic Communication to the direction of comprehensive synchronization of communication. Communication synchronization is thus an instrumental reaction to the expressive communication behavior within the organization.

Just like in the 18th century political discourse, Strategic Communication has invoked the ideoscapes of the Enlightenment to denote a certain moral superiority. This type of moral register has, however, proved more restrictive than restorative. It has led to the need for denial and suppression: to deny the violent, expressive reality of war and to attempt to mask the heterogeneous force of warfare. In discourse this shows in the manifestations of agency in the discourse structure, which are essential, ideological references to the dynamics of action in the social realm where collectives fight the fallen individuals. It also surfaces in the negotiation of meaning, for instance in the renouncement of manipulation and in the doctrinization of key themes and terms that represent moral and legitimacy: cooperation, stability and democracy (see US Joint Forces Command, 2010). At the same time, also adversariality is doctrinized as "inconsistent with moral, religious, or social standards" or as "unattractive [...] "desperate," "cowardly," "impotent," or "inept." (US Joint Forces Command, 2010). This type of marginalization and delegitimation both manifest not only in the semantics of Strategic Communication, but in its transitivity templates that resonate in the dynamic, instrumentally distanced agency of the Self.

9.4 The "end state"

A politically relevant perspective introduced in Chapter 2 is the role of future in the strategic narratives of ideology and warfare. The legacy of the Enlightenment is the attitude towards interim suffering, waiting for the world to undergo changes for the better. In these narratives, familiar to us in the narratives of Iraq and Afghanistan also, the focus is on the future: the future of the nation, the future of the civilized world, and the future only democracy can bring. These narratives of the interim proclaim sacrifices, such as tolerating temporary violence and the loss of basic rights due to surveillance and measures of security, until the enemy, often an invisible such, has been defeated (see Rantapelkonen, 2006: 185). Eventually each interim underlays the next, making security policy an eternal wait. The concept of "pre-emptive war" resonates with this future-orientation. As Rantapelkonen (2006: 205) argues, the United States "is not only waging "war on terror" but preparing now and forever for future wars", which is dubious: usually leaders do not focus on improvisation and ignorance - which is obviously the only options when planning pre-emption. The narratives of pre-emption and liberation, which call for warfare "based on virtual reality or dreaming of the future" (Rantapelkonen, 2006: 310). This exactly is the business of narrative leadership, which is called forth by the narrative identity. Narrative identity, as argued in Chapter 2, is the product of the discourses intended to lead and manage the perceptions and identities of the audience. This is to say that narrative leadership and narrative identity are essentially counterparts. The characteristic of American narrative identity has been its emphasis of what Americans are going to become and how this is going to be achieved by means of democracy and technology. These themes have remained, although the means have been redefined. To contrast this with Finland, for instance, the difference is clear. Upon determining its national narratives, Finland, as with many other nations, looks back to its history.

Throughout this dissertation, the concept of agency has been an important element of the discussion. Especially in the analysis of the social and discursive-semiotic levels of discourse, agency has been an important conceptual tool: it mediates between the two levels. Social agency becomes coded in the textual and visual discourses of Strategic Communication, and textual and visual agency empowers social agency by recording and preserving norms and representations. Textual agency participates in producing a 'certain kind' of social agency.

The concept of agency has also been addressed in the context of ideologies, namely those of instrumental and expressive violence. Agency cannot be differentiated from responsibility in warfare: moral control extends to all actions over which the actor has influence or control, making control and

consent the precondition of the attribution of moral responsibility (Fisher, 2012). Fisher concludes that the moral responsibility of the combatants extends only to how the war is conducted, which is something they have influence or control over, whereas the strategic and political responsibility lies elsewhere. Moral responsibility is an inherent concept in the Western notion of "just war" that sets a number of preconditions to warfare: warfare has to have a just as well as a sufficient and proportionate cause, the right intention, the right authority, it must have a reasonable prospect of success and it has to be the last resort (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007). The moral responsibility does not end here. Since the Middle Ages, the just conduct of war has been thought to require virtues: practical wisdom, courage, self-control and justice (Fisher, 2012). Now, after discussing the theoretical and practical implications of Strategic Communication, it has become apparent that the aim of all attempts to influence is to reinforce the concept of legitimacy from precisely this point of view. The Enlightenment themes are particularly applicable for this purpose, as democracy, equality and liberty are perceived as unquestionable values. As Evans (2011) notes, since 9/11, the concept of 'just war' has been "intimately or even exclusively related in some way to 'democracy'." As manifested in the semantics and grammar of the data in this dissertation, the consequence is that legitimation typically addresses these four themes. The virtues of practical wisdom and courage appear in the discourses that are self-glorifying, but self-control and justice are virtues that are outsourced to technology. One may however ask whether practical wisdom and courage can be genuine, if self-control and justice are outsourced to technology and instrumental ideology. When it is technology whose moral judgment we trust more than that of the soldier to deliver justice with the right amount of force, and when this is done from the distance, how much courage is necessary? Maybe it is precisely technology that keeps war from being "just" or soldiers from acting "morally" - quite contrary to how the neo-Enlightenment narratives perceive the role of mechanized justice. Despite this, during the age of instrumental ideology, there are few alternatives to waging war in a moral way without technology, and this is precisely what we see in the discourses of Strategic Communication.

Because of their moral agency, soldiers are the weakest link. Their experience produces the incoherence of the narrative and the say-do gap. Those who express hostility cause scandals like that of Abu Ghraib: those who judge the reality of warfare as immoral cause other kinds of scandals. Such moral agent was Bradley Manning, who claimed that by leaking secret documents, he was "revealing the true nature of 21st century asymmetrical warfare" (Goodman, 2011). Because the soldiers are the weakest link due to their moral, the role and development of technology must strive to replace them. The problem this far has been that it takes a human to do the targeting, watch the target and launch the missile. The

2012 Pentagon directive (Department of Defense, 2012b) established a policy "for the development and use of autonomous and semi-autonomous functions in weapon systems, including manned and unmanned platforms", which reduces the role of the human to that of a "supervisor". This comes to show that it is not the mere distance that we need in order to feel adequately detached from the violence we produce, but it is the agency that is deeply frustrating in the framework of morality. Unmanned platforms solved the problem of distance years ago, but next they will also carry some of the responsibility in decision making. This is why one must be aware of the social reality that language reflects. The manifestations of today's technologization in the transitivity patterns of language discussed in this research would not even change dramatically if the weapon launched itself rather than having a human launcher. Technology already is an actor and an "enabler" in the instrumental discourses of Strategic Communication. As Conor Friedersdorf (2012) comments in his Atlantic article:

It's no wonder that some military leaders are so eager for the advent of autonomous weapons. At present, if WikiLeaks gets a hold of a video that shows innocents being fired upon, the incident in question can be traced back to an individual triggerman, an officer who gave him orders, and perhaps particular people who provided them with faulty intelligence. But an innocent who dies at the handlessness of an automated killing machine? How easy to phrase the obligatory apology in the passive voice! How implausible that any individual would be held culpable for the failure!

In light of this, it seems expressive violence appears more moral than instrumental such. It allows transparent agency and a real choice between participation and refraining from it. Strategic Communication, as it is, is a system that maintains the mechanisms of denial and suppression. It displays the light, virtuous side of the Self, but fails to recognize that it is the violence, not virtue, that generates our vigor. In Bataille's terms, it is that violence that we merge to virtue.

Is technological progress the only possible course of advancement for human kind? After seeing how the ambitions of the Enlightenment failed to transform the humankind into the new standard of morality and goodness, is the only conceivable kind of progress now a question of creating more means and capabilities to assist the execution of virtue?

All in all, the problem of communication cannot be solved with leadership alone. The military community will have to do what is unpleasant and evaluate its means and motivations. Language is always violence:

[L]anguage, not primitive egoistic interest, is the first and greatest divider, it is because of language that we and our neighbours (can) 'live in different worlds' even if we live on the same street. What this means is that verbal violence is not a secondary distortion, but the ultimate resort of every specifically human violence. (Žižek, 2009: 56-57).

This is a strange paradox with the idea of communicating one's way into peace and mutual understanding. Žižek (2009: 52) notes that "maybe humans exceed animals in their capability for violence precisely because they speak". Communicating one's thought always means conflict. "Peace is made only in a certain silence", argues Derrida (1978: 185), "which is determined and protected by the violence of speech." This is why the 'trinity' of language, the Enlightenment narratives and military discourse should be studied thoroughly. Language is, after all, a weapon. It can be used to liberate, bless, and attack injustices, but it can also be tied to an ideology that is used to carry out an agenda, either overtly or covertly. The study of the language and discourses of war has long been polarized: military organizations have always looked for ways to harness language in the service of warfare, while the responsibility to interpret and reclaim it has fallen on the outsiders of the military (political) communities. Because Critical Discourse Analysis approaches discourses from the outside and takes an explicit position to expose and resist hegemonic power and control (Van Dijk, 2001), a hegemonic organization cannot review and develop its communication unless it is ready to critically question the actions, ethics, values and motivations its communication is based on. This is one of the most crucial reasons to integrate the critical study of language and discourses into the core of Military Science.

The Enlightenment with its positivist ideology is central in the study of domination as the instrument of social order. In the narratives of the Enlightenment, science and reason emancipated the human beings, but at the same time, they created new means for their oppression. "The history of man's efforts to subjugate nature is also the history of man's subjugation by man", writes Horkheimer (2013: 74): "The principle of domination has become the idol to which everything is sacrificed" (2013:74). The domination of the nature extended to the domination of the structures of society: imperialism was enabled by technological innovation that made the world smaller, but this innovation was a mere instrument in the pursuit of political power. Seafaring and geographic exploration quickly became to signify new forms of social domination rather than science. Science was politicized. Horkheimer argues that the development of the concept of the ego reflects this "twofold history" of domination and that it is this growth of the ego that created the principle of domination: it manifests as

hierarchical arrangements of social concepts.

French sociology has taught that the hierarchical arrangement of primitive general concepts reflected the organization of the tribe and its power over the individual. It has shown that the whole logical order, the ranking of concepts according to priority and posteriority, inferiority and superiority, and the marking out of their respective domains and boundaries, mirror social relations and the division of labor" (Horkheimer, 2013: 75).

This argument explains the logic of the Strategic Communication narratives in terms of the agency and categorization of the Self and the Other. It explains the motivations behind the representations of technological agency and the ritualistic representations of enmity in the images of the archenemies. And not only is this, but the positivist philosophy that has developed into full-blown instrumentalist ideology what underlies the logic of not only the verbal and visual grammar of domination, but the naturalization of control. Concepts such as *communication synchronization* are an example of what Horkheimer refers to as the "transformation of the world into a world of means rather than of ends" (see Horkheimer, 2013:72). Emancipation turns into the opposite means once it becomes politicized. In this light the union of Strategic Communication and the representations of sacred violence is natural. What should however be remembered is that this violence does not extend to the enemy only. Strategic Communication is a means to naturalize power not only in order to reject Otherness, but to dominate the people it claims to represent

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There are no moral phenomena at all, but only moral interpretation of phenomena.

– Friedrich Nietzsche





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