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STATE AGENT, IDENTITY AND THE “NEW WORLD ORDER”

**Reconstructing Polish Defence Identity
after the Cold War Era**

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To all who wonder and doubt

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Abbreviations

AK	<i>Armia Krajowa</i> (the Home Army)
AL	<i>Armia Ludowa</i> (the People's Army)
AWS	<i>Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność</i> (Solidarity Electoral Action)
BG	Battlegroup (EU)
CBOS	<i>Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej</i> (Public Opinion Research Center)
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CR	Critical Realism
EDA	European Defence Agency (EU)
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESS	European Security Strategy (EU)
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
GS	General Staff (<i>Stab Generalnego</i>)
IGC	The Intergovernmental Conference (EU)
IPP	Individual Partnership Programme (NATO-PfP)
KLD	<i>Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny</i> (The Liberal Democratic Congress)
Kresy	(<i>Kresy Wschodnie</i> ; Mythical eastern borderlands of the former Poland)
MN	<i>Mniejszość Niemiecka</i> (German Minority)
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF	NATO Response Force
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PC	<i>Porozumienie Centrum</i> (The Centre Party)
PiS	<i>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</i> (Law and Justice)
PCC	Prague Capabilities Commitment (NATO)
PfP	The Partnership for Peace programme (NATO)
PO	<i>Platforma Obywatelska</i> (The Civic Platform)
POW	Prisoner of War
PSC	Political and Security Committee (EU)
PSL	<i>Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe</i> (The Polish People's Party)
RM	<i>Radio Maryja</i> (Primary media-channel of ultraconservative Catholics)

RS AWS	<i>Ruch Społeczny Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność</i> (The Social Movement for Solidarity Electoral Action)
SDPL	<i>Socjaldemokracja Polska</i> (The Social Democracy of Poland)
SdRP	<i>Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej</i> (Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland)
SLD	<i>Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej</i> (The Polish Social Democratic Party; in 1999 mostly from the SdRP)
UD	<i>Unia Demokratyczna</i> (The Democratic Union)
UP	<i>Unia Pracy</i> (Union of Labour)
WEU	Western European Union
WP	<i>Wojsko Polskiej</i> (The Armed Forces of Poland)
WP	Warsaw Pact
WTO	The World Trade Organization

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1

INTRODUCTION

*“Poland is a repository of ideas and values, which can outlast any number of military and political catastrophes.”*¹

Since the late 1980s Poland has been ‘returning to Europe’, which was the central slogan of the anti-Communist “refolutions” (mixture of evolution and revolution) in Hungary and Czechoslovakia as well.² Before the admission of Poland into the EU, in 2004, there were high expectations of a constructive Polish attitude towards the Union.³ However, Poland turned out to be an ‘arrogant East-European’, or Other who did not ‘show gratitude’ for being granted EU membership. Poland’s ‘strange’ behaviour culminated on two occasions. First, members of the Polish delegation, participating in the EU’s Legislative Convention, in 2003, tried to include a statement about a Christian God (*Invocatio Dei*) among the basic values of the EU, even though they realized that Western Europe had already moved beyond the era and idea of a Christian Europe. The issue of religion was debated during the process, but eventually *Invocatio Dei* was not included in the draft Constitution of Europe.⁴ Second, in June 2007, the then Prime Minister of Poland, Jarosław Kaczyński, and his twin brother, Lech Kaczyński, the President of Poland, tried to increase Poland’s voting weight in the European Council of Ministers by arguing that Poland’s population would now have been 66 million instead of the current 38 million, if Germany had not invaded Poland and committed terrible crimes against Poland and the Poles between 1939 and 1945. These comments caused some confusion amongst the other members of the Council. Even in Poland there was concern that this would irritate the other EU-member countries, which in fact was indeed the case.⁵

¹ Davies (2005b), p. 523.

² Ash (1989), p.12. See also Sztompka (2000), p. 2; Mach (2000a), p. 1.

³ Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), p. 1009.

⁴ The European Convention (2003), Suggestion for amendment of Article 2. The “*Invocatio Dei*”, proposed by the Polish delegation, was analogous to one the articles of the 1997 Constitution of Poland: “The Union’s values include the values of those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty as well as those who do not share such a belief but respect these universal values from other sources.”

⁵ Kause (2007), p. B1; *New Europe – The European Weekly* (2007). During WWII about 6,5 million Poles were killed (including 3 million Polish Jews). See also Tuohinen (2007), p. B1. In the Finnish media, Poland was categorized as a ‘bully’, whose opinions would no longer be valued very highly.

Alongside her project of ‘returning to Europe’, Poland has also become one of the United States’ closest allies, even the USA’s protégé in Central Europe. Poles today consider the United States as the security guarantor that they have been waiting for since the late eighteenth century. In the USA, Poland has gradually gained the status of a loyal ally or “new European” since the end of the Cold War,⁶ mostly due to the political support Poland gave the USA after the events of 9/11 and Poland’s contribution of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq.⁷

These examples of Poland’s behaviour in the EU suggest that Poland is somehow ‘exceptional’ among the other EU-members. Poland’s close relations with the USA lead to the same conclusion. I was drawn to this research not only by the notion of Poland’s ‘exceptionalism’, but also by an assumption that Poland’s foreign and defence policy behaviour has direct effects on the world order, not least because of her geographic position on the rim of the Huntingtonian border of Western and Eastern Christianity, but also due to her geostrategic position at the heart of traditional interests of power politics. Poland may be considered as reflecting the attitudes and overall political atmosphere between the USA-led West and the Russian Federation. Poland’s foreign and defence policy behaviour may be superficially explained by leaning on anthropomorphized and rational state agency, but as an ‘identity scholar’ I will try to make clear in the following pages that the ‘story is much deeper’; desires and rational calculations in interstate relations always lean on identities, consisting of beliefs and self-images that have been narrated throughout history, and which may even become partly reified and impenetrable dogmas, but which may also be partly subject to change through contextual discursive interactions.

To some extent Poland’s Atlanticism may be explained by the traditional Realist paradigm of International Relations theory (IR) in that the external threat to Poland represented before by the USSR and now by the Russian Federation together with Poland’s geographic location between Russia and Germany, is responsible for Poland’s Atlanticist orientation. At the same time this Realist paradigm, which leans philosophically on *Humean em-*

⁶ The end of the Cold War has been understood here generally as the time since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. See, for examples Russett, Starr and Kinsella (2006), p. 5. In November 1988, Margaret Thatcher, the then British Prime Minister, stated that “The Cold War is over.” The basic values of the West – liberal democracy and free-market economics – triumphed, which was confirmed even by the leader of the ‘losing’ state, the president of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev. See also Booth (1998), p. 29. According to Ken Booth, the Cold War is not over, since the experiences, lessons, remembrances and forgettings of over sixty years since 1945 are still important factors in international relations today.

⁷ Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), pp. 1009–1010. France and Germany, who opposed the Iraq War in 2003, have been described as “the old Europeans” in the USA. See also Zaborowski (2004), pp. 13–14.

*piricism*⁸ (see Chapter 2.1.2), would suggest that Poland sought to enhance her external power and security by seeking EU membership simultaneously with her Atlanticist orientation. But the Realist paradigm is not interested in, or is incapable of explaining, why Poles have been ‘returning to Europe’ since the late 1980s, even though Polish national identity construction includes such elements as Western Europe’s unreliability, due to the Great Britain’s and France’s ‘betrayal’ of Poland in 1939 by ignoring their promises to help Poland if she was attacked by Germany⁹. Would not that have been rational to avoid ‘unreliable’ Western Europe then?

Constructivism, as basically supplementing the Realist paradigm, allows one to understand Poland’s simultaneous Atlanticism and ‘return to Europe’ more deeply. While not totally ignoring causality in international relations, Constructivism, which leans philosophically on *pragmatism*¹⁰ (see Chapter 2.1.3), prefers ideational factors to material ones and suggests that to some extent the significance of material factors, like a state’s geographic location, is a matter of discursive practices. In Poland’s case this means that while her Atlanticism may be explained by her geographic location between Russia and Germany, the ‘root cause’ of her ‘return to Europe’ after the Cold War was not her problematic geographic location, but rather her fundamental underlying ‘Western’¹¹ or European identity that has survived both the ‘betrayal’ of Poland by Western Europe in 1939, and efforts of the USSR to ‘Stalinize’ Polishness (*Polkość*) for over 50 years. Poles felt they belonged to ‘Western civilization’. Being Western constituted and still constitutes Poland’s self-image and gives meaning to Poland’s foreign and defence policy interests and actions, despite the occasionally controversial foreign policy behaviour of the Polish political elite in the EU-context.

⁸ See, for example, Patomäki (2002), p. 48. Humean empiricism has usually been connected to mechanical causality. This is also the way the Realist paradigm treats Humean empiricism. However, Humean empiricism is only superficially positivistic in its nature, since it includes element of doubt (*‘what is, may not be’*) in its agenda, as does its continental counterpart, Cartesian rationalism.

⁹ Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, anyhow.

¹⁰ The Classical Western philosophies of rationalism and empiricism were incapable of expressing doubt to a wider audience (*‘what is, may not be’*). Pragmatism managed to do that, but went even further by claiming that all ‘truths’ are socially constructed (*‘what ever is, may be because we have agreed upon it being so’*).

¹¹ See, for example, Fukuyama (1992), pp. 43–44. West is of course the opposite of East as a point on a compass, but more scientifically speaking the West is a political concept. It refers to values, norms and practices shared by certain groups of states. The West means Western liberal democracy (free elections as well as fundamental *civil (non-political) rights, religious rights, political rights* (rights in matters that do not affect the welfare of the whole community) including *the right of press freedom*. The West, in this context, also means transparency – the opportunity for citizens to see inside the power structure and the outcomes produced by that power structure.

Throughout human history many nations have considered themselves as Western, in contrast to the East or Eastern, which was regarded as a periphery, as the Other. For example, many Germans believed that they were the Eastern bulwark of European civilization until at least 1945.¹² The West then was analogous to Europe, whereas the East, consisting at least of Russia and Poland, was the Other for Germans. In much the same way, Poles, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, considered themselves as a Christian rampart (“*Antemurale Christianitatis*”) against the East (Russia and Turks), and to some extent they still believe this today.¹³

During the Cold War, Poland, although geographically Central European, was defined as belonging to the East. Poland was the Other to Western Europe, but not voluntarily; the Polish people felt *de jure* that they belonged culturally to the West. All this changed with the Central European ‘Velvet Revolution’ of 1989. The collapse of the Eastern bloc can be compared to the year of European revolutions of 1848 (“*Spring of Nations*”), when many European nation-states were born.¹⁴ After the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact on 1 July 1991, Poland was to choose her way ahead and recreate her national sovereignty anew.¹⁵ The ‘reborn nation’ of Poland and her national sovereignty were signified and made meaningful by the identity narratives and myths of the past that were derived from Polish history, ethnicity, religion and language. The former Communist regime and the Soviet Union had tried to suppress these narratives and myths, but they had been preserved ‘behind the iron curtain’, waiting for a time when they could be openly expressed again. National identity construction, based on constructed past narratives and ongoing societal discourses, is assumed here to be a rather stable, even somewhat impenetrable a process. But together with increasing international contextual interactions, national identity construction may change, at least partly.¹⁶

Constructivism, as one of the main social theoretical orientations of this thesis, does not adequately meet the global normative need to construct a ‘better world’ without enemy images¹⁷ and borders of Otherness, which are considered here as being integral parts of national identity construction.¹⁸

¹² Gray (1999), p. 58.

¹³ Davies (2005a), pp. 357–370.

¹⁴ Ash (1989), p. 11.

¹⁵ Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej Biuro Prasy i Informacji (1995), p. 11.

¹⁶ See, for example, Szporluk (1991), p. 471; Hobsbawm (2000), pp. 59–68.

¹⁷ See, for example, Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995), p. 428. In addition to an enemy image, the Other may have at least the following stereotypical images: an ally, imperialistic, or as colonial actor. The images we have vis-à-vis the Other dictate our expectations of the Other’s behaviour and consequently affects our behaviour towards the Other.

¹⁸ Borders of Otherness has been understood here as mental boundaries between ‘Self’ and Other. It has been noticed here that sustaining enemy images and borders of Other-

However, Constructivism has managed to pave the way by stating that a communitarian and even cosmopolitan world society may be teleologically possible through a “*struggle for [positive] recognition*” between states and other actors.¹⁹ In order to be a truly avantgardist and holistic approach in IR, Constructivism has to be amended using other IR approaches. In the Polish case this means that in order to be fully equipped to answer the main question of this thesis (*How does Poland constitute herself as a nation and a state agent in the current world order and to what extent have contextual foreign and defence policy interactions changed the Polish defence identity during the post-Cold War era?*) I have had to amend my Constructivist orientation with reflective theories of IR, namely, the English School theory and Critical Realism (CR), both of which stress the need for a communitarian international society and even a cosmopolitan world society (the English School theory), as well as emancipation from restrictive forms of cultural habituation and national egoism (CR).

The normative part of this thesis refers to the assumption that *national ideas and world views always collide with other ideas and worldviews, as well as with the external restraints of the material world, but without ideas there is no hope for a better world, the normative basis of which would be shareable by all states and nations*. Liberal democratic states²⁰ tend mainly to promote the general good of their own citizens. But they may also intend to promote wider normative, empathic and inclusive identities, which could help us to avoid future ‘clashes of civilizations’ between states and nations. In the Polish case this means that since the international system is not based merely on human ideas, the Polish pursuit of the general good always collides with restraints such as her need for energy, and global climate change. The pursuit of the general good may be a horizontally wide cultural phenomenon (e.g. the norm- and value-structure shared to a point by the EU-countries), but it can be divergent as well; for example, Polish understanding vis-à-vis the normative good may differ from the Russian one.

ness may be important to national strategic communities (political and military) for legitimizing their own existence. However, it has been assumed here that in order to construct ‘a better world’ to live in, there is a global need for tolerance without enemy images and borders of Otherness.

¹⁹ See, for example, Fukuyama (1992), p. 135; Wendt (2005), p. 590 and p. 596.

²⁰ See, for example, Fukuyama (1992), pp. 43–44. Democracy is only about the right of all citizens to vote and participate in politics. Promoting the general good requires political liberalism, which can be defined as “a rule of law that recognizes certain individual rights or freedoms from government control.” Thus, a country is democratic, if it grants people the right to choose their government through elections, but it is not a liberal democracy if it does not guarantee freedom of speech or religion, for example. Thus, Islamic Iran is a democracy, but not a liberal democracy since there are no guarantees for freedom of speech or religion.

The main concepts of this thesis are *state agent*, *identity* and the “*new world order*”. In traditional IR research, states have traditionally been approached using methods and terminologies that consider states as given, *a priori* actors, or as homogeneous ‘speaking billiard balls’. By adopting a more holistic approach, the state may be considered as a ‘decentred subject’ consisting of individuals, many sub-groups, organizational structure, institutions and especially identity structure, which has been purposefully constructed throughout the history, and which is under constant reconstruction through domestic and international discursive interactions. Normally, there are several domestic ‘sub-identity holders’, which may discursively compete with each other by trying to “impose cultural forms on other groups, manipulate them, or convince other sub-cultures that these dominant cultural forms are in fact their own forms.”²¹

In Polish academic and societal discourse at least three ‘sub-identity holders’ having discursive, identity related power of their own, can be found, namely, the *Polish State* itself, the *Catholic Church* and the *Armed Forces of Poland*. Even though the Armed Forces of Poland is an integral part of the Polish State it has the role of a symbolic ‘identity carrier’ of its own as well. The Catholic Church of Poland is not officially the State Church, but the Polish State and the Catholic Church form ‘*a union of two hearts*’ through the “*Concordat between the [Papal] Holy See and the Republic of Poland*.” Furthermore, most Poles (95%) are Catholic and a majority of them (63%) not only believe, but also claim to follow, the teachings of the Church. The Catholic Church has played an important, even crucial role, in the Polish identity structure ever since the first Polish State was established in 966.²²

National identity informs us about who we are as a nation and what our intersubjectively shared symbols (especially ideas) are? National identity has generally been considered as a synonym for *corporate identity* (‘*the State as a group Self*’), which unites type identity (type of government/governance) and various role identities of the state and national identity, but sometimes national identity may be understood as a *nation’s identity* that differs from the role identities that the state occupies in international contextual interactions. Even though I have treated national identity generally as a rather stable construction, it is also context-dependent and dynamic in nature. While discursive interactions in various international contexts do not necessarily mobilize national identity, contextual interac-

²¹ Johnston (1995), p. 44.

²² *Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Poland* (1993/1998); Hannan (2004), p. 1; CBOS (2006f), pp. 2–3; Puhl (2007).

tions may nevertheless impact on it.²³ In the Polish case, I have chosen three contexts that have the power to mobilize the Polish identity structure through discursive interactions: the Global meta-context (world order); EU-integration and the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), as well as NATO-cooperation. Polish identity construction and these contexts have been understood as mutually constitutive, meaning that without Poland these contexts would surely exist, but they might be different and vice versa.

Defence identity has been understood here as a core of national identity and as a dependent variable of the whole thesis. While national identity may be understood merely as a self-image of a nation (who are we?), defence identity refers to issues that have been considered worth defending. It also refers to the borders of Otherness included in a nation's self-image; The 'Self' does not exist without Others. In other words, it informs us how open and tolerant national identity is towards various other world views. Defence identity is close to the concept of culture, which generally answers the question: How do we do things and express ourselves through our symbolic forms (especially ideas). In the Polish case this means that one needs to clarify at least four things in order to be able to make arguments concerning changes in Polish defence identity since the Cold War: (1) the genealogy and content of Polish identity narratives, (2) the nature of the 'sub-identity holders' and the context-related attitudes of the Polish people (public opinion), (3) the 'empirical realities' of Poland, and (4) the contextual defence and foreign policy decisions and actions of Poland since the Cold War.

The "new world order" (with double quotation marks) refers to the normative world society, which has not actualized yet. It has been presented with quotation marks, since what it truly means, is probably not the message George Bush (Sr.) meant when addressing the U.S. Congress on September 11, 1990 in the wake of Iraq's conquest of Kuwait. The 'true' content of "the new world order" is about equality among individuals, nations and states. The content of the "new world order" may be closer to what President Woodrow Wilson meant in 1915 when he called for the establishment of a League of Nations, which would prevent future wars.²⁴ But I argue that even President Wilson would not have been ready to lead his nation if it meant lower living standards due to an equal sharing of global material resources that is the 'true' content the "new world order" necessitates. However, even though the "new world order" may sound like a utopian idea now, the mental development of humankind may lead in the course of sev-

²³ For example, a political elite that participates in international meetings and summits may impose the ideas that have been produced during those meetings and summits into domestic discourses.

²⁴ See, for example, Judis (1990).

eral centuries (*“longue durée”*) to communitarian or even cosmopolitan ‘whoeverism’, without the borders of Otherness that the “new world order” necessitates as well.²⁵

1.1. Purpose of the Thesis

The purpose and main research question of this thesis is: *How does Poland constitute herself as a nation and a state agent in the current world order and to what extent have contextual foreign and defence policy interactions changed the Polish defence identity during the post-Cold War era?* As the thesis relies extensively on Constructivism, I am operating with an interpretative tradition (*Verstehen*) of IR, meaning that more than trying to explain and find deductive-nomological and law-like causations, I prefer holistic understanding.²⁶ The core philosophical idea of the thesis is to build up a sound and ‘scientific’ presentation around the dialogue between social ontology and empirical realities (brute facts).²⁷

With this thesis I am trying to answer at least three calls. The first call was presented by Emanuel Adler in 1997: *“constructivists have yet to develop research projects that can show how enemies and military threats are socially constructed by both material and ideational factors.”*²⁸ The material and ideational world is engaged in a constant duel in this thesis (even though generally it is social discursive practices that have the power to define the significance of the material world’s phenomena), and the origins of threat perceptions have been included in the agenda of the thesis.

The second and third calls deal basically with the same issue. The second call was presented by Henrikki Heikka in 1999: *“both neorealism and con-*

²⁵ See, for example, Cox (2001), pp. 3–9.

²⁶ See, for example, Winch (2008 [1958]), p. 33 and pp. 104–106. See also Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (2001), p. 5. *Verstehen*, originally used by Max Weber, refers to sociological understanding. What Weber meant by this was simply to put oneself into the other’s position when trying to interpret (interpretative understanding; *deutend verstehen*) the meaning (*Sinn*) of behaviour. I am not trying to offer (G)rand causal explanations for Poland’s foreign and defence policy behaviour, but neither am I giving up causality altogether.

²⁷ Eco (1990), pp. 43–46. The single quotation marks around scientific refer here to the philosophical debate over the differences between natural science and social sciences. According to Eco, research is scientific, when it fulfils the following requirements: (1) The research subject should be precise and defined so that others can easily recognize it, (2) The research has to present something new about the research object; something that has not been said before, or it has to present the research object using a new perspective, (3) The research is useful for others and (4) The research has to offer facts that can be used to establish either the falseness or correctness of the presented hypothesis.

²⁸ Adler (1997), p. 347.

*structivism commit the same sin: they ignore the relation between “decentered subjectivity” and the origins of nationalism and threat perceptions.”*²⁹ The third call was presented by James Fearon and Alexander Wendt in 2002 who claimed that Constructivism was concerned with identity-formation, but had really focused “*on the construction of variation within a given actor class (type or role identities), rather than on explaining how organizational actors come into being in the first place (corporate identities).*”³⁰ “Decentered subjectivity” is one of the key issues of this thesis. The origins of corporate identity, threat perceptions, enemies and enemy images have been analyzed here as cultural patterns of national and defence identity, which have been narrated into existence, upheld by national ‘sub-identity holders’ (and the nation), and which are under a constant process of modification, but which can also be narrated away to some extent.³¹

In terms of social theory, my aim is to continue in the Constructivist ‘socializing’ tradition of the state agency by focusing on national identity construction as a signifier of the interests and foreign and defence policy behaviour of the state.³² My aim is also to enrich ‘thin’ Social Constructivism (Alexander Wendt; Wendtian Constructivism) in its efforts to underline the significance of contextual discursive interactions (*the interactionist perspective*) as modifiers of the state’s behaviour and identity construction. I will ‘enrich’ the ‘thin’ Social Constructivism in three ways. First, the national identities of all states are constructed in the course of history through the purposive efforts of elites (*the endogenous perspective*) before these states interact with other actors. Second, these identity-constructions may, at least partially, be impenetrable to interactionist efforts, because of cultural habituation and reification (*the cultural perspective*). Third, states and nations may cognitively try to pursue the goal of a more tolerant communi-

²⁹ Quoted by Hopf (ed.) (1999), p. 7. See also Schmitt (1996 [1932]), pp. 29–30 and p. 51; Bloom (1999 [1990]), p. 27. In defining decentered subjectivity one usually refers to Freudian psychoanalysis and its notion that the unconscious motivates and affects conscious thought and behaviour. While this has been accepted as such, decentered subjectivity has been understood here in a much more general way: it is about the State as a convention between nation as an imagined community and the State itself as the rational side of a nation’s desire for recognition and its need for collective security. Decentered subjectivity argues then at least against Carl Schmitt, who considered the State as an only “political” that can define public enemies. I argue that it may be done by the nation as well (see, for example, Fukuyama (1992), p. 331).

³⁰ Fearon and Wendt (2002), p. 63.

³¹ See, for example, Swidler (1986), pp. 273–274. According to Ann Swidler, culture can be seen as “publicly available symbolic forms through which people experience and express meaning.” Culture can also be seen as a ““tool kit” of symbols, stories, rituals and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems.”

³² See, for example, Wendt (1992), (1999).

tarian international society and even cosmopolitan world society, as well as emancipation from restrictive forms of cultural habituation and national egoism (*the normative perspective*).

I take it for granted that states are still the core actors of the international structure, but not the monolithic, faceless and power-prone units portrayed by ‘traditionalists’. In some cases the state may be considered as a corporate state agent, but in line with Francis Fukuyama, I assume that there is no complete contextual correspondence between the state and the nation in their attitudes vis-à-vis, for example, the enemy perceptions.³³ I will also discuss whether the state precedes the nation or vice versa, but generally I assume that the nation has to be constructed or narrated into existence by someone before the nation can create a state.

This thesis is a case-study in nature, which generally means that the *empirical findings of this research are not generalizable as such, but may stimulate further investigations and theory-building*.³⁴ The case-study approach here also has three other implications. First, it means *path-dependent historicity*, that is, in different circumstances and with a different variation of complex causal relations another outcome may have been possible in the late 1980s and early 1990s; it is not evident at all that Poland deterministically had no other choice but to seek NATO membership, or a close alliance with the USA. With a different variation of complex causal relations, Poland might have decided to stay militarily non-aligned. Second, it is about *context-dependent changes in Polish defence identity* (as a dependent variable), meaning that while contextual interactions between states necessitates norms of behaviour, interactions may also change actors’ identities through adaptation and learning. Third, it means that I am trying to *falsify*, more than verify, previous arguments concerning Poland’s foreign and defence policy orientation, or at least trying to make them more precise. For example, it is not so evident that Poland has turned from being an “instinctive Atlanticist into a constructive European” as Marcin Zaborowski and Kerry Longhurst, for example, have argued.³⁵ It may only seem to be so, and it may be that only the Polish nation has turned to be more constructive European, while the Polish State still leans ‘instinctively’ on the USA. This means that the value of case-studies lies precisely on their narrow scope or focus, which helps to make deeper interpretations regarding the research subject.³⁶

³³ Fukuyama (1992), p. 212.

³⁴ Flyvbjerg (2004), p. 77.

³⁵ Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), pp. 1009–1010.

³⁶ Flyvbjerg (2004), p. 83; George and Bennett (2005), pp. 17–23 and p. 79 and pp. 212–213; Kratochwil (2006), p. 13. See also Yin (2003), p. 1. According to Yin, “In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are be-

1.2. Previous research

This thesis has some reference points with so-called European integration studies, that is, a research orientation that focuses on the impact of the European Union on the identities, domestic institutions and political cultures of the member states. Maria Cowles, James Caporoso and Thomas Risse as editors and writers of the book *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*³⁷ may be mentioned at this point. Especially Thomas Risse's research question: "How much space there is for "Europe" or "world" in collective nation-state identities?" is highly relevant vis-à-vis this thesis.³⁸ Even though Poland has been well represented in 'traditional' post-Cold War security studies³⁹ and Constructivist research and articles,⁴⁰ Poland and Polish identity construction has not usually been presented as an empirical case in European integration studies, which tend to focus on 'old' EU member states, such as Great Britain, France and Germany. Furthermore, even though European integration studies have not ignored already existing identity structures of the mentioned 'old' EU member states, or cultural habituation into past national identity narratives, they have, nevertheless, tended to ignore how and by whom national identities have been narrated into existence prior to current contextual interactions.

There are six authors above all, albeit not all of Polish origin, whom I consider to have provided the most relevant points of departure vis-à-vis the purposes of my thesis; namely, Iver Neumann, Ilya Prizel, Norman Davies, Kerry Longhurst, Marcin Zaborowski and Deborah Schneider. Iver Neumann has analyzed European identity formation in relation to Turkish and Russian Others in his monograph *Uses of the Other – "The East" in European Identity Formation*. His main focus has not been on Polish identity construction as such, but on Turkish and Russian Otherness as part of European identity construction (if one even exists).⁴¹ Neumann presents the

ing posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context."

³⁷ Cowles, Caporoso and Risse (2001).

³⁸ Risse (2001), p. 199.

³⁹ By 'traditional' security studies I mean here research that has been informed by the Realist paradigm of IR. See, for example, Kornacki (1995); Kupiecki (2001); Kuźniar (2001b). In Finland, academic research has not focused on Poland's national identity structure to any great extent. Some master theses and diploma works have been written at the Finnish National Defence University on security policy issues of the Baltic Sea region, thus including Poland as well (Sirén (1996); Welling (1997); Sirén (1998); Lehtonen (2004)), but only one focuses on Poland alone (Sirén (1998)), and even that totally ignores the concept of identity.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003); Kosicki (2003); Zaborowski (2004).

⁴¹ Neumann (1998).

whole idea of the concept of Otherness as follows: “otherness begins at home with our [significant] others. We become egos ... via the internalization of significant others’ objectification of ourselves.”⁴²

Ilya Prizel has analyzed the important concept of *ressentiment*, in his monograph *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine*. Originally *ressentiment* was introduced by Friedrich Nietzsche in his monograph *Ecce Homo*. *Ressentiment* may generally be understood as an enmity that derives from weakness (“And nothing burns one up quicker than the affects of resentment. ... incapacity for revenge, the desire, the thirst for revenge, poison-brewing in any sense”) and relates to identity in the sense that one may take one’s identity “from the postulation of a negative other.”⁴³ Ilya Prizel has noted that the collapse of communism generally resulted not in the immediate triumph of tolerant, liberal democracy, but in a clear victory for nationalism over a universalistic ideology. Thus, there is probably a tendency to miss opportunities for creating a more tolerant world, since people tend to seek new enemies on purpose.⁴⁴

In addition to Neumann and Prizel, one can notice at least four other researchers who have focused on Polish national identity; namely, Norman Davies, Kerry Longhurst, Marcin Zaborowski and Deborah Schneider. Norman Davies is a historian and he brings out the historical elements of the ‘Polish soul’ (e.g. religion, the three Partitions of Poland in the late eighteenth century and the deep emotions related to the historical eastern borderlands of Poland) in his outstanding two-volume publication *God’s Playground* and in his earlier publication *Heart of Europe – the Past in Poland’s present*. All of them are worth noting.⁴⁵

While following Neumann, Prizel and Davies to a considerably extent, I have some reservations about Marcin Zaborowski’s and Kerry Longhurst’s treatment of Poland as an ‘instinctive Atlanticist’ and ‘constructive European’. However, this does not mean that I wish to dissociate myself totally from their arguments, but simply to amend them with my own adjustments.

⁴² Ibid., p. 5.

⁴³ Nietzsche (1992 [1888]), pp. 15–16; Neumann (1998), p. 12.

⁴⁴ Neumann (1998), p. 12; Prizel (1998), pp. 5–7. According to Ilya Prizel: “Even among polities that share the mythology of a common ethos, such as the Arab world, the past thirty years have seen a constant drift away from the universalist pan-Arab ideologies of Ba’thism and Nasserism toward regional nationalism.” Furthermore: “the battle cry of the French Revolution – “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité” – quickly became an ethnocentric and nationalist slogan.”

⁴⁵ Davies (2001), (2005a), (2005b).

Longhurst and Zaborowski use the concept of “security culture” in their publication *The New Atlanticist – Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy Priorities* as a concept “that stresses the defining role played by history and collective memory in the formulation of national security policy.” They have stated that the USA represents an “instinctive Atlanticism” in Polish identity construction, which rests mainly on the experiences of Polish (geo)political history and the strategic culture of the Polish security policy elite.⁴⁶ According to Longhurst and Zaborowski, identity, sovereignty and geopolitics constitute the Polish foreign and security policy practices as Polish “security culture.”⁴⁷ In that respect I am a ‘security culturist’ as well, but being a Constructivist my purpose is also to analyze how (defence) identity may change through contextual foreign and defence policy interactions with other agents. This means that I am not operating merely with one-way causal arrow, but with a two-way interactionist one.

Deborah Schneider has researched the so-called “*Góral identity*” of Poles living in the *Żywiec* region of Poland’s southern Tatra Mountains. The Polish word (*Góral*) means mountainous in English. For foreigners, like myself, *Żywiec* is especially known for its beer brewery, but for Poles the community of *Żywiec* is special for its distinct sub-national “*Góral identity*.” There are several different groups of *Góral*s, all living in the mountains bordering Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, but as a whole “*Góral identity*” is accepted as a distinct regional-ethnic identity. Schneider came the following on a much debated aspect of globalization that I have found interesting and useful: “*Góral regional-ethnic identity provides a sense of local autonomy from outside forces, and a sense of identity that gives weight of arguments to avoid global capital and focus instead on regional economic ties.*”⁴⁸ Schneider’s conclusions are very similar to those of Manuel Castells who argues that as a consequence of globalization people tend to withdraw into smaller identity collectives, into functional and proactive movements, such as feminism and environmentalism, but also into “reactive movements that build trenches of resistance on behalf of God, nation, ethnicity, family, [and] locality.”⁴⁹

1.3. Research Questions, Outline of the Thesis and Sources

The thesis is divided into *three parts and eight chapters*, including an introduction (*Chapter one*) and discussion, in accordance with the normal

⁴⁶ Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), pp. 1009–1010.

⁴⁷ Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), p. 2. Look also Zaborowski (1998); Zaborowski and Dunn (eds.) (2003); Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003); Zaborowski (2004).

⁴⁸ Schneider (2006), p. 4 [my Italics].

⁴⁹ Castells (1997), pp. 2–3.

IMRD-classification: Introduction, Method (-ology), Results and Discussion.⁵⁰ As was said earlier, the main question of the thesis is as follows:

How does Poland constitute herself as a nation and a state agent in the current world order and to what extent have contextual foreign and defence policy interactions changed the Polish defence identity during the post-Cold War era?

In the first part of the thesis ('Methodology') I will specify my methodological approach. The core of the philosophical and methodological sources used consist of the writings of René Descartes, John Locke, David Hume, Giambattista Vico, Charles Sanders Peirce and William James, John Dewey, Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Kimberly Neuendorf, Bent Flyvbjerg, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Ruth Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia, as well as Martin Reisigl and Karin Liebhart.

Chapter two focuses on methodology (metatheory and method). In Chapter 2.1, I will try to show how difficult it is to judge what 'truth' is and how the classical Western philosophies of rationalism and empiricism are actually both about doubt vis-à-vis the ontology of our collective *Dasein* ("being-in-the world")⁵¹ and about the relativity of knowledge in general. I will try to construct 'via media' between empiricism and rationalism through pragmatism by claiming that despite realist ontology and epistemological relativism we may study social phenomena in 'scientific' ways because most of our time we are 'empirical animals' who mostly experience the world collectively in similar ways, whilst at the same time stressing that our collective experiences are cultural phenomena. This chapter also deals explicitly with the significance of God and religion in our lives, because of the importance of the Catholic Church and religion as an ontological basis of Polish identity construction.⁵²

In Chapter 2.2, I will briefly discuss the relationship between identity and the problem of causation in the social sciences by stating that identity should be understood as a 'root cause' of behaviour, and as a signifier of interests. After this I will focus first on judgements and evaluations vis-à-vis the validity of various IR-theory approaches in conducting research on national identity. I have not adopted a reductive technique by 'dropping' one theory after another. Instead, I will try to find valid elements from each

⁵⁰ Alasuutari (1994), p. 255.

⁵¹ Heidegger (2006 [1926]), p. 65.

⁵² See, for example, Giddens (1986), p. xvii. In order to speak about the social theory of international politics, one has to include into the analysis issues, which "spill over into philosophy, but it is not primarily a philosophical endeavour. The social sciences are lost if they are not directly related to philosophical problems by those who practice them."

of them to be used in commensurable ways for grasping as holistic a picture of the research subject as possible. However, in my view three theoretical orientations appear to be the most valid, namely Constructivism, the English School theory and CR, which in my view supplement each other and can be considered together as ‘vanguard theories’ in IR. The essence and validity of these IR theories with regard to my research subject are dealt with more thoroughly in Chapter 3.

The essence of Chapter 2.2 concerns the significance of language and discourse analysis as basic methodological elements for researching national identity and foreign policy actions. I have treated national identity as part of the state’s domestic structure, which gives meaning to the state’s interests and foreign and defence policy actions in various contexts of the international structure (see Chapter 2.2.8). I have considered both structures, domestic and international, as mutually constitutive, in the sense that without domestic structures there would not be an international structure and vice versa. Foreign and defence policy actions take place in various contexts, and both can be researched by combining CR’s methodology with the sociological structuration theorem of Anthony Giddens. The basic idea then is that the world order can be considered as a processual meta-context that involves various other sub-contexts and ‘socialized actors’ who are capable of producing events, episodes and tendencies, regulative and constitutive rules, resources as competencies and facilities, relational and positioned practices, and meaningful action.

In order to understand the Polish collective *Dasein*, I have identified the Polish State, the Catholic Church of Poland, and the Armed Forces of Poland as valid national ‘sub-identity holders’, whose identity discourses may be congruent or divergent. In order to judge to what extent those discourses are congruent I have chosen the following themes as ‘windows’ that reveal the priorities Poles consider worth defending: sub-identity holders’ world view, narratives and discourses about Others, and the discourses about and priorities of the following contexts: the global meta-context (world order), European integration and the CFSP, and NATO-cooperation.

In *Chapter three* I will analyze various Schools of Constructivism starting with Alexander Wendt’s ‘thin’, interaction-based version (Social Constructivism) and ending with a ‘thick’ version of Constructivism by merging an interactionist perspective with endogenous and cultural perspectives. This means that it is not only discursive interactions between states that affects national identity; one also has to focus on the sources of national identity (*the endogenous perspective*), as well as on the notion that human societies tend to habituate themselves into certain beliefs, values and modes of action that change very slowly over the course of history (*the cultural perspective*), despite increasing interactions (*the interactionist perspective*).

The validity of the English School theory is related to its normative effort (*the normative perspective*) to establish a more tolerant world order through mutually approved modes of institutionalized behaviour. This means that we may have the opportunity to adopt some kind of international society that puts the emphasis on non-violent competition, or even a world society, based on (perhaps utopian) friendship between nations and/or individual human beings. Critical Realism supplements the English School theory by stating, for example, that if something is thinkable it can become a reality as well. Thus, even though a world society may be merely a utopian vision now, it might become a reality (concrete utopia) over the several centuries (*“longue durée”*).⁵³

The literature used concerning identity theories in IR (Chapter 3) is too vast to be mentioned in detail here. However the core writings of, for example, Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein, Friedrich Kratochwill, John Gerard Ruggie, Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Krasner, Martha Finnemore, Inis Claude, Thomas Risse-Kappen, David Dessler, Ernst Haas, Nina Tannenwald, Elizabeth Kier, Michael Barnett, Alastair Johnston, Roy Bhaskar and Heikki Patomäki have been used here as primary sources with various other publications and articles of critical or otherwise illuminating content.

The second part (‘Structuring the State, Collective Identity and World Order’) of the thesis consists of Chapters four and five. The overall purpose of this part is to ‘go deeper’ into the concepts of identity and world order. Since the research of collective identity is not possible without sociological notions, I have used some sociological publications, such as George Herbert Mead’s *Mind, Self, and Society – From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, Anthony Giddens’s production, and the classic works of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (*The Social Construction of Reality*), Steve Fenton (*Ethnicity*), Ferdinand Tönnies (*Community and Society [Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, 1887]*), Benedict Anderson (*Imagined Communities*) and William Paden (*Interpreting the Sacred*).

In *Chapter four*, I will try to answer the question: *How does national identity develop and how permanent can it be?* Since national identity is a more complicated concept than it might at first appear, I will try to show that for analyzing it one needs to adopt an interdisciplinary approach and use sociology as a starting point or even psychology or social psychology. My purpose is not to abandon the anthropomorphised usage of the state (e.g. ‘Poland thinks that...’, or ‘According to Poland,...’), but to open up ‘the black box’ of the state and national identity and to ask also: *To what extent may the state, state identity and national identity be considered as one phenomenon?*

⁵³ Sinclair (2001), p. 4.

I will try to show that we may still speak about a state's behaviour, since it increases our understanding of the world, but we have to realize that all states are different; they are not as we tend to think when analyzing them similar 'speaking billiard balls'. In some cases there may be a state and a state identity without a nation or a national identity and in some cases there may be a nation and a national identity without a state.

In *Chapter five*, I will try to answer the question: *What does the "new world order" mean, and what are the limits for the normative world society of world order model?* My task is then three-fold: first, to concentrate on the international system, international society and world society by analyzing various world order models (which can exist simultaneously, at least to some extent) through the writings of Thomas Hobbes (international system), John Locke (international society), as well as Immanuel Kant and Hugo Grotius (world society). After this first phase, I will don my 'realist trousers' and analyze why the good intentions of states always collide with the unexpectedness of the material world of nature. In the third phase, I will sceptically and briefly address the three most probable future world order models. Sceptically in the sense that normative tolerance, even though it should be the guiding dynamic (master institution) in my view, will probably not get globally institutionalized, at least in the foreseeable future.

The third part of the thesis ('The Polish Case') is the empirical part of the thesis, consisting of Chapters 6–8. The overall purpose of the third part is to make the Polish world view and foreign and defence policy behaviour meaningful by analyzing the genealogy of Polish national identity, its 'inherited' identity narratives, as well as the internal and external restraints and enablers affecting the development of Polish defence identity. I will try to map out whom the Poles consider as the Others, and to what extent EU-integration, NATO-cooperation and the global meta-context have changed Polish borders of Otherness. In this part, I will deal also with the question as to whether the Poles have promoted a world society kind of communitarianism or cosmopolitanism voluntarily by themselves.

In this part, Polish official documents, the speeches of politicians, churchmen and military personnel, as well as Polish public opinion polls conducted by the CBOS (*Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej*/Public Opinion Research Centre) between 1997-2008 have been used as primary sources. *Interviews have been considered as implausible sources, because I have assumed that people tend to lie or express euphemized opinions when discussing a highly emotional and discrete issue like national identity with a foreigner.* Opinion polls are an extremely important way to verify the legitimacy of official identity discourses, since the respondents of opinion polls cover many sub-identity fields of a nation, and people can express

their opinions anonymously, even though usually the questionnaires are structured in such a way that it is possible to answer only in certain ways.

The political developments that led Poland to adopt the ‘Western path’ have been characterized and analyzed by using literature that focuses on the time of political transition in Europe of late 1980s and early 1990s. Polish literature and newspapers as well as Timothy Garton Ash’s publication *European kumous [We the People – The Revolution of ‘89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague]*, Richard Smoke’s publication *Perceptions of Security - Public opinion and expert assessments in Europe’s new democracies* and Norman Davies’s publications *Heart of Europe – the Past in Poland’s present* and *God’s Playground* have been used as the main sources in this context.

In *Chapter six*, I will try to answer the following two questions: (1) *What made Poland adopt a Western-orientated identification rather than an Eastern-orientated one?* (2) *What is the genealogy of the Polish national identity structure?* The question about genealogy refers to the endogenous perspective, in that I have considered the construction of Polish national identity as having been the result of a purposeful effort, or series of purposeful efforts, by elites, basing their efforts on mythologies and historical events, which they have used to legitimate their own existence and that of the Polish people.

In *Chapter seven*, I will try to answer the question: *How does internal constitutive habituation restrain and/or enable the development of Polish defence identity?* This chapter also answers the question: *What are the Poles discursively defending?* In this chapter I will occupy a cultural perspective and will deal first with the contents of national grand-narratives inherited from the past. After that I will turn my focus on the nature of national ‘sub-identity holders’ as the sources of cultural habituation and reification, and on official identity expressions of Poland, such as the Constitution and national security doctrines and strategies. In this chapter I will also deal with Poland’s national and ethnic minorities in order to clarify the internal borders of Otherness, which informs us at some point about the overall tolerance-level of Polish society.

In *Chapter eight*, I will try to answer the question: *To what extent have contextual interactions changed Polish collective perceptions of Otherness?* In this chapter I will occupy an interactionist perspective, which assumes that national identities develop mainly through discursive (as well as non-discursive) interactions with other actors in various contexts. I have used the English School theory’s three models of world order, namely, the international system, international society and world society, in order to try to categorize both the elements of Polish defence identity that have not

been changed and those elements that have been changed in contextual interactions. I will also explore Polish discursive messages upon normative communitarianism and cosmopolitanism.

1.4. Methodological and Empirical Arguments

This thesis leans on the following five metatheoretical and social theoretical assumptions. The first of them is *scientific realism/realist ontology*, meaning that the world is real, but relative since the real world is independent of our knowledge and perceptions.⁵⁴ However, scientific realism is not sufficient in itself, since if one claims that the world is real, one then has to provide some proof that this is indeed so. The answer then is *social ontology*, in that even though there is a world independent of our knowledge and perceptions, we may consider some elements as socially and culturally real.⁵⁵

The second one is *epistemological relativism*, which relates closely to social ontology. This asserts that in the social sciences all beliefs and all knowledge are socially constructed, contextual and fallible. There are no ultimate truths available to us, only partial and relative ones.⁵⁶

The third one is *judgmental rationalism*, meaning that despite epistemological relativism we may not judge all beliefs to be equally valid. Relativism (not extreme ‘whateverism’) is a condition for rational research and discussion. The choice between judgements, theories and models is a matter of culturally and geo-historically situated human judgement.⁵⁷

The fourth one is *the habituation thesis*, meaning that human beings and human societies are habituated to think and act culturally in some particular ways and our habituated beliefs about ourselves and about the Others are basically the reason for action.

The fifth one is *the incommensurability thesis*, meaning that there are competing research traditions in IR, which assume that they alone know the ‘truth’ of the world that they have created (ontological incommensurability), but the basic proposal of this thesis is that those competing research traditions should be dealt with in *commensurable and holistic ways on an analytical level*. In other words our constructed and shared beliefs and ideas that we have habituated ourselves to (Constructivism), are not sufficient for developing a better world to live in (Idealism, the English School

⁵⁴ Morgan (2005).

⁵⁵ Patomäki and Wight (2000), p. 224. Look also Patomäki (2002), p. 77.

⁵⁶ Patomäki (2002), p. 8.

⁵⁷ Bhaskar (1979), p. 73.

theory and Critical Realism (CR)), since our ideas usually (perhaps always) collide with the material restraints (Classical Realism and Structural Realism/Neorealism) and ideas of other actors. But neither can it be said that material restraints alone are the causes of the behaviour of human societies. We can probably never reach a comprehensive grand social theory of everything, but a dynamic synthesis can be achieved if the relativity and partial nature of all perspectives are recognized.⁵⁸

The main empirical argument of the thesis, which has been dealt more thoroughly in the Chapter 8, is as follows:

Poland is a narrated idea of a Christian Catholic nation-state, which the Polish State, the Catholic Church of Poland, the Armed Forces of Poland as well as a majority of the Polish nation share. Polish defence identity has been almost impenetrable to contextual foreign and defence policy interactions during the post-Cold War era. While Christian religious ontology binds corporate Poland together, allowing her to survive any number of military and political catastrophes, it simultaneously brings her closer to the USA, raises tensions in the ‘infidel’ EU-context, and restrains corporate Poland’s pursuit of communitarian, or even cosmopolitan, global equality and tolerance. It is not the case that corporate Poland’s foreign and defence policy orientation is ‘instinctively Atlanticist’ by nature, as has been argued. Rather, it has been the State’s rational project to overcome a habituated and reified fear of becoming geopolitically ‘sandwiched’ between Russian and German Others by leaning on the USA; among the Polish nation, support for the USA has been declining since 2004. It is not corporate Poland either that has turned into a ‘constructive European’, as has been argued, but rather the Polish nation that has, at least partly, managed to emancipate itself from its habituation to a ‘betrayal by Europe’ narrative, since it favours the EU as much as it favours NATO. It seems that in the Polish case a truly ‘common’ European CFSP vis-à-vis Russia may offer a solution that will emancipate the Polish State from its habituated EU-sceptic role identity and corporate Poland from its narrated borders of Otherness towards Russia and Germany, but even then one cannot be sure whether any other perspective than the Polish one on a common stand towards Russia would satisfy the Poles themselves.

⁵⁸ Patomäki and Wight (2000), p. 227.

PART I

Methodology

2

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND METHOD

Every theory of knowledge must logically presuppose a *philosophical outlook on the world* (a philosophy of science/metatheory), an idea of what the world is like (an ontology) for knowledge (epistemology) to be possible.¹ *Methodology consists of a philosophical outlook on the world and a method* (answering the question: how to conduct your research task; see chapter 2.2). Thus, a researcher always needs to clarify his or her ontological and epistemological assumptions before it's possible to justify and rationalize the relevance of any chosen theory and method vis-à-vis the research problem(s). The following 'philosophical journey' is an effort of defining my own philosophical stand for being able to construct the valid social theoretical frame of reference and research frame.

2.1. From Beliefs to Realist Ontology and Epistemological Relativism

"I do not believe in one God only, nor do I believe in the everlasting triumph of science either. What I do believe in, is magic." (Sanni Sirén, 10 years old, 1 April 2006)

At first, saying that 'I know' seems simple and makes sense in a common-sense world, but actually one is dealing with a difficult issue. One person may say that s/he knows that the world is 6,000 years old, since the Bible says so; another may say this is nonsense, since science has proved that the world has been in existence for millions of years; and a third person may say that magicians created the world and life is based on magic. Are these three perspectives all wrong, all correct, or does only one of them occupy the big (T)ruth? According to the classical Western philosophies, knowledge can be based on experience (empiricism), thinking (rationalism) or a shared belief that something may be considered true on purely practical grounds (pragmatism).

Ontology and epistemology probably not can be totally separated, since one always has some tacit interpretation or pre- or pseudo-knowledge about the world or one's reality. It's always possible to claim that one's life-experience unconsciously or consciously defines the way one experiences, or wants to experience the world out there. So, we may occupy, for example, a religion-based (Creationism), rationalist-positivist-based (Darwinism) or magic-based ontological understanding of reality, which defines

¹ Patomäki and Wight (2000), p. 223.

our epistemological ways of getting information and knowledge of the world.² We also may consider the world in more holistic ways, meaning that one thinks that many partial truths, illusions or beliefs of reality exist simultaneously, which is closer to my own understanding of the world.

According to common-sense realism, the world is tough and bad place to live in, from which it follows that we can do nothing but adapt ourselves to this situation. But according to idealist thinking we should then change the prevailing circumstances, if these do not meet our needs.³ Thinking scientifically (*scientific realism; seeing is believing – not knowledge*), reality may be considered as a totality that does not depend on the sense perceptions of the observer.⁴ Thus, according to scientific realism (*realist ontology*⁵), everything that we consider as real is based solely on subjective perceptions, which are built on our cultural background, physical qualities and on our subjective experiences. However, many external matters of our sensible world appears to us as impacts and as objectively considered experiences (*intersubjective experiences*); You can not see a state, for example, but we all agree that such things as states exist with all kinds of rules, norms and structures that do have many kinds of impacts on our lives (for example, you will probably be punished by a fine, if you park your car on the wrong place).⁶

We may understand ‘the realities’ of the world in many ways, but the failure to distinguish between reality and our conception of it is an epistemic

² Pearsall (ed.) (2001), p. 430. According to Judy Pearsall, Creationism can be understood as the “belief that the universe and living organisms originate from specific acts of divine creation, as in the biblical account, rather than by natural processes such as evolution.”

³ See, for example, Hollis and Smith (2003), p. 11. In IR, *Realism* refers to a school of thinking opposed to ‘Idealism’. In philosophy, realism (with a small *r*) means the view that “there are truths about the past, which are distinct from all present evidence and may remain unknown to us.” Correspondingly, in philosophy, idealism (with a small *i*) refers to theories, which work in terms of experience, conceived as ‘ideas’ in the mind. Sometimes idealism is called ideationalism. *Idealism* in IR refers to a normative approach that is concerned with the human will and institutional progress. There is an affinity between Idealism, idealism (ideationalism) and an interpretative approach, just as there is an affinity between Realism, realism and explanation (scientific approach).

⁴ Wittgenstein (1972 [1949–51]), p. 25e and p. 37e. In a ‘Wittgensteinian’ sense this can be stated as ‘knowing is believing’: “what I know, I believe”, or “what we believe depends on what we learn.”

⁵ See, for example, Geertz (2000), p. 111. According to Clifford Geertz, “simple acceptance of the world, its [empirical] objects and its processes as being just what they seem to be - what is sometimes called as naïve realism.” In scientific perspective this givenness disappears through the realist ontology.

⁶ Searle (1995), p. 25; Adler (1997), p. 327. Intersubjectivity does not assume a collective mind. Individuals have purposes and intentions, but even though each of us thinks his/her own thoughts, we may share our concepts with our “fellow-men.”

fallacy. Reality is structured and *layered*, meaning that there are *many levels of reality* (such as the emergence of life, natural life etc.), and structures themselves are *manifested differently at different times*. Reality consists of three different layers: empirical (observable by human beings), actual (existing in time and space), and real (transfactual and more enduring than our perceptions of it). Thus, social phenomena, for example, emerge from deep underlying structures, become actual and then empirical. However, our understanding of such social phenomena happens in reverse (from empirical to actual and then to real), which makes understanding them a very difficult task.⁷

Epistemological relativism means that all beliefs and knowledge are socially constructed, contextual and fallible. Since social sciences cannot conduct experiments in laboratories like the natural sciences, information and knowledge gathered from empirical evidence is subject to criticism. CR tries to understand the layered meanings of knowledge. We have been capable of researching new phenomena as our knowledge has increased. Earlier science lacked the capability that we possess now and so forth.⁸

2.1.1. Religion and Magic – ‘What Is, Is’

Both religion and magic rest essentially on *a priori knowledge*: believing that something is known or postulated before it has been proven.⁹ On the other hand, religion and magic represent ‘opposite sides of the coin’. Both of them are more or less based on an ontological belief in something, but epistemologically you cannot obtain proof of God’s existence or non-existence.¹⁰ Magic beliefs are never certain either, but they do not unite people into one group in the way religions do (in this context, for example, the Caribbean Voodoo cult has been considered a religion). Magicians may form a community among themselves, whereas “a Church is not simply a priestly brotherhood; it is a moral community made up of all the faithful, both laity and priests.” Religion is inseparable from the idea of a Church,

⁷ Kaboub (2001).

⁸ Bhaskar (2005).

⁹ Locke (1979 [1689]); Hume (1993 [1779/1757]). See also Hume (1985 [1739–40]); Hume (1995 [1758]); Pompa (ed.) (1982), p. 22 and p. 81. It was not until the Enlightenment, in the eighteenth century, that philosophers critical of monotheistic religions began to be free to express their doubts without having to be afraid of being hanged or accused of witchcraft and burnt. Compare the era of the Enlightenment and our current era. Is it possible now to doubt the existence of God, or say, for example, that all religions are pure magic? Maybe, maybe not, but in any case it depends on the tolerance of each society. Probably we have not progressed intellectually as far from the Enlightenment’s religion vs. magic debate as we think in our current technology- and rationality-driven euphoria.

¹⁰ Hume (1985 [1739–40]), p. 81.

even though we may have our personal relationship with something transcendental, like God. Thus, we may define our personal God ourselves, but even then we are affected by the dogmatic attitudes of our particular Church and religion.¹¹ Religion is also an integral part of identities and cultures, since without religion it is “arguable that nations and nationalism, as we know them, could never have existed.”¹²

My thirteen-year-old daughter’s belief in magic represents basically the same idea that polytheism occupied among ancient tribes and clans. Being ignorant of scientific efforts and models for understanding and/or explaining the world, my daughter, probably like all children her age, understands the unknown through belief rather than knowledge. I am not saying that these beliefs are exogenously granted. On the contrary, some of our children’s beliefs mirror the narratives and perceptions of their parents and are mediated and adopted by language during the primary socialization process; some of our children’s beliefs are adopted during the secondary socialization process from the external environment, their friends, the media etc.

Magic is a different phenomena epistemologically than religion, since you can proof that all ‘tricks’ are false using scientific methods. Religion and God’s existence/non-existence remains on the belief side of the coin and is based on uncertainty, maybe fear even, of one’s salvation: If God does not exist, a believer won’t lose anything when (s)he dies, but a non-believer will lose everything if God exists. But in my little daughter’s mind magic relates probably to apparent miracles that she can’t explain. A miracle is as an idea of an event or a phenomenon, which shocks the structure of her previous experience, thinking and beliefs. In this context, these so-called miracles may be considered a violation of the laws of nature, or previous experience, in my daughter’s experience of them.

When trying to defend God’s existence as an *a priori* truth, John Locke offers a very convincing defence of the Almighty’s existence when he says:

*There is no truth more evident, than that something must be from eternity. I never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or that could suppose so manifest a contradiction, as a time, wherein there was perfectly nothing. This being of all absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation and absence of all beings, should ever produce any real existence.*¹³

¹¹ Durkheim (1995), p. 42.

¹² Hastings (2006 [1997]), p. 4.

¹³ Locke (1979 [1689]), p. 622.

From that it follows that there might be something cognitive that has existed from eternity, since scientifically it may be impossible to prove that nothing can produce something (*ex nihilo nihil fit/nothing may come from nothing*). That cognitive being, we call God, Allah, etc., capable of creating the universe, planets, human beings, etc., out of nothing (*ex nihilo/out of nothing*). So far so good, I can swallow Locke's reasoning, even though there are the natural sciences and the 'Big Bang theory' as well which might be more convincing an explanation for our being here on this planet and at this time.

But why should we believe in the qualities of the holy sovereign that all churches teach us? All children are curious by nature and wonder about the unknown or inexplicable due to their lack of education and experience. When encountering the unknown for the first time they base their conceptions of it on their senses (sensation) and fix this sensation into a primitive idea or ideas. Thus, when seeing, for example, a rainbow for the first time children can not explain the phenomena. Churches may teach, in scholastic ways, that a rainbow is a holy link between God and human beings, without mentioning that this phenomena can also be explained in scientific ways, with experiments and proofs. The way many churches teach or 'enlighten' us is though the use of one-sided 'truths' that you just have to believe without question if you want to be 'one of us'.

If human beings have some universal principle or innate *a priori* idea, it may be the search for happiness and security, but even these are relative principles since one's happiness and security may have been reached by reducing the security of another (man or nation).¹⁴ Almost all principles like morality, law and justice, are actually more or less relative in nature, even though we might expect them to be universal in nature. They are socially constructed and intersubjective perceptions, and vary just like the content of religions or concepts of God.¹⁵ There are no two countries that share the same codex of law, and even justice and morality are experienced in various ways. The difficult question then is whether we should experience and define them universally and approve of them unanimously? Probably so,

¹⁴ See, for example, Aristotle (1992), pp. 427–428. According to Aristotle, all the constitutions should strive for happiness (*eudaimonia*) as guiding principle of "virtue" (*aretē*) and all the legislators should promote educational programmes based in ethics and "complete utilization of virtue." Look also Seneca (1964), p. 28 and pp. 76–77. As a Stoic philosopher, Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Jr.), stressed that individual happiness is based on undisturbed calmness and freedom (of mind). Freedom, for Seneca, was a mental state where mind raises above all the insults and where human being realizes only him-/herself for being the source of all the joy.

¹⁵ Or as Locke put it (Locke (1979 [1689]), p. 81): "that *Doctrines*, that have been derived from no better original, than the Superstition of a Nurse, or the Authority of an old Woman; may, by length of time, and consent of neighbours, *grow up to the dignity of Principles in Religion or Morality.*" [Locke's italics]

but who or what might be the authority for doing so, if we do not agree upon the existence of God, his/her goodness or badness, or even the way our existence was initiated?¹⁶

2.1.2. Empiricism and Rationalism – ‘What Is, May not Be’

“That in order to examine into the truth, it is necessary once in one’s life to doubt of all things, so far as this is possible.”¹⁷

The disagreement between empiricists and rationalists primarily concerns epistemology, the sources and limits of our knowledge (how can we gain knowledge?). When seeking knowledge, empiricism operates perhaps more on the *a posteriori* (knowledge is dependent upon sense experience) principle, whereas rationalism operates on the *a priori* principle (knowledge can be gained independently of sense experience through intuition and deduction).¹⁸

A posteriori knowledge is based on observation (that is, empirical knowledge), meaning that something can be said to be known after conclusive proof has been presented. Empiricism seeks to acquire knowledge through senses and experience,¹⁹ whereas rationalism holds that our senses are incapable of offering any proof regarding the world surrounding us. However, empiricists hold the same epistemological suspicions vis-à-vis our sense-perceptions as rationalists, even though empiricists held to the view that the senses were a primary source of our knowledge.²⁰ Within the Western philosophical tradition empiricism and rationalism have their roots in the thoughts of Greek philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle.²¹ During the Enlightenment representatives of empiricism (English philosophers like John Locke and David Hume) and rationalism (continental philosophers, like the Frenchman René Descartes and Dutchman Benedict de Spinoza)

¹⁶ See, for example, Paden (2003), p. 25. There are always those for whom religion is simply a vehicle of intolerance and fanaticism. Thus, religion can be connected to the catastrophic crusades and ‘holy wars’ of both past and present that put “the will of God on one’s own side, Satan on the other.”

¹⁷ Descartes (1997b [1644]), p. 277.

¹⁸ See, for example, Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (2001), p. 23. In IR, Rationalism refers generally to an assumption that states are self-interested and goal-seeking actors whose behaviour can be accounted for in terms of maximization of individual utility.

¹⁹ Kant (2007 [1781]), p. 127. Immanuel Kant argued that, “Nevertheless it [experience] is far from the only field to which our understanding can be restricted. It tells us, to be sure, what is, but never that it must necessarily be thus and not otherwise.”

²⁰ Hume(1985 [1739–40]), pp. 96–99.

²¹ Pompa (1982), p. 81. According to Aristotle, there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses.

had ontological and epistemological debates on, for example, the existence of God and the ways by which we can acquire knowledge overall. However, if the original ideas of, for example, Hume, Locke, Descartes and Spinoza are studied more closely and thoroughly, one can notice that both epistemologies share some of the same elements, such as doubt in our sensations, even though we still tend to categorize them in ‘separate boxes’.

Knowledge is not the same thing as truth. For example, ideas like statehood, national identity, defence identity, world order, etc., have many meanings varying from man to man and nation to nation. We know, or we are habituated to act and think in certain ways about these ideas, depending on, for example, our memories, culture, education, and the status of our life-experience.²² While we may agree that we know something in that we share the same views about it, for example, that the sun will rise tomorrow, which seems to be true, based on our experience of previous sunrises, there is still a hypothetical possibility that the sun will not rise tomorrow. In this case our view of the daily sunrise is based only on habitual knowledge, based on our memory of earlier sunrises.²³ There can be no absolute certainty at least in the social sciences, perhaps not even in the natural sciences. David Hume presented such thought with the words “*What is, may not be*”,²⁴ referring then to proof and probability. Proofs are those arguments which are totally free from doubt and uncertainty. Even though we do not know that the sun will rise tomorrow, it would be ridiculous to say that this is only a possibility. The proof then lies in our experience of the sun rising today and on previous mornings, even though it can also be considered as only a probability.²⁵

In its broadest sense, rationalism means “commitment to reason, the willingness to follow the use of the reasoning mind wherever it might lead.”²⁶ In its common sense meaning, rationalism may also be understood as “a theory or practice of guiding one’s actions and opinions solely by what seems reasonable”,²⁷ and in philosophy as “a theory that reason rather than experience is the foundation of certainty in knowledge.”²⁸ In Cartesian rationalism the main issue is doubt. Everything is and should be doubted, even the existence of God, if one wishes to increase the general level of knowledge.

²² Locke (1979 [1689]), pp. 525–538.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 525–538. See also Winch (2008 [1958]), p. 15.

²⁴ Hume (1985 [1739–40]), pp. 281–282.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

²⁶ Pettman (2000), pp. 4–9.

²⁷ *Webster’s New Encyclopedic Dictionary* (1994), p. 841.

²⁸ Pearsall (ed.) (2001), p. 1539.

The Cartesian method of doubt may be described as the use of reason with the power of forming a good judgement and distinguishing the true from the false. Descartes questions systemically all preconceived views open to the smallest doubt, until he encounters an absolute certainty: “*Cogito ergo sum*” – (I think, therefore I exist), which is the first principle of Cartesian philosophy. *However, this does not mean that thinking would prove our existence, but only that we are conscious²⁹ of our possible existence by being able to doubt it.*³⁰

The problem with rationalism in its strict sense is that it makes us distant from the empirical world and thus from our societies.³¹ What if everyone is thought to be rational in a Cartesian way, and thought to be solely rational? There might no longer be societies at all. Even Descartes was not then a rationalist in the strict sense of rationalism (the use of the reasoning mind wherever it might lead), since he accepted that belief in God (perhaps because the belief in God *a priori* was a culturally inherent phenomenon then, not to be doubted, at least publicly, without fear of one’s live) was as an *a priori* truth, not to be doubted.³²

Later philosophers, like Giambattista Vico rejected Cartesian *Cogito* on the ground that, although there can be no better evidence of one’s own existence than one’s consciousness of thinking, simple consciousness is not knowledge. Thought is a sign, but not a cause, of existence; therefore certainty about our thoughts does not provide knowledge. Man can doubt whether s/he feels or is alive or even whether s/he exists, but it is impossible from this consciousness to deduce with certainty that s/he exists. The least certain area of knowledge is human affairs and the most certain area of human affairs is history. Vico discovered that, at a certain level, changes in human affairs are governed by causes within human nature, which are so conditioned by their historical and social context that they can be subject to scientific analyses.³³

²⁹ Gadamer (2004), p. 61. According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, “*for the Cartesian characterization of consciousness as self-consciousness continued to provide the background for all of modern thought. This unshakable foundation of all certainty, the most certain of all facts, that I know myself, became the standard for everything that could meet the requirements of scientific knowledge in the thought of the modern period.*”

³⁰ Descartes (1997b [1644]), p. 279. René Descartes argued that “we cannot doubt our existence without existing while we doubt; and this is the first knowledge that we obtain when we philosophise in an orderly way.”

³¹ Pettman (2000), pp. 4–9 and p. 89.

³² Descartes (1997a [1641]), p. 149. René Descartes argued that “I have no reason to believe that there is a God who is a deceiver, and as I have not yet satisfied myself that there is a God at all, the reason for doubt which depends on this opinion alone is very slight, and so to speak metaphysical.”

³³ Pompa (ed.) (1982), pp. 8–9.

A two-sided human being (mind and body) is comparatively free, in so far as we are dealing with freedom of thought, but at the same time not free, in so far as we conceive ourselves as organisms responding to physical forces in the environment. In relation to a human being's freedom of thought, Spinoza postulated that belief could not be enforced on us, and that the state's only function is to be responsible for the protection and maintenance of public order. The majority of citizens, ignorant of philosophy, will always be restrained by the prospect of divine rewards and punishments rather than by their perception of rational self-interest. *It is a principle of statecraft, then, not to weaken the superstitious beliefs of established religions when religious scepticism is likely to lead to disorder and violence.*³⁴

All in all, there might not be such a wide difference between empiricism and rationalism. It could be argued that all possible knowledge can be deductively derived by reason. But this means that even rationalists have to have initial or innate knowledge on which to base all their other efforts in reasoning to acquire or establish all other possible knowledge. How to obtain this initial knowledge then is the crucial question. René Descartes solved this problem by noting that if one can think (doubt) one definitely must exist. From this perspective, Descartes is dealing not only with ontology but also epistemology, since if a human being can think (and doubt) and thus judge his/her very existence by mere reason, s/he could also reason all other possible knowledge. It seems at first sight that Lockean and Humean empiricism offer a more mature solution, but it might actually be the reverse, since our senses can provide only images, not certain knowledge.

2.1.3. Pragmatism and Social Ontology – ‘What Is, May Only Be Because We Have Agreed Upon It Being So’

*“Be a philosopher, but amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.”*³⁵

The term pragmatism is derived from the Greek word *pragma*, meaning action, from which come the words ‘practice’ and ‘practical’. According to an empiricist, like David Hume, we should as human beings remember that there exist at least two realities in human life: academic and the practical. This relates to common sense pragmatism, which basically may be understood as “a practical approach to problems and affairs”,³⁶ or as “a prag-

³⁴ Spinoza (1996 [1677]), pp. xiv–xv. See also p. 108: “*sadness follows absolutely all those acts which from custom are called wrong, and joy, those which are called right. For from what has been said above we easily understand that this depends chiefly on education.*”

³⁵ Hume (1995 [1758]), p. 18.

³⁶ *Webster’s New Encyclopedic Dictionary* (1994), p. 791.

matic attitude or policy.”³⁷ In philosophy the content of pragmatism may be understood as “a doctrine holding that the meaning of an idea is to be sought in its practical bearings, that the function of thought is to guide action, and that truth is to be tested by the practical consequences of belief”³⁸, or as “an approach that assesses the truth of meaning of theories or beliefs in terms of success of their practical application.”³⁹

Without claiming that there was something new in the pragmatic philosophical attitude, it did harmonize previous philosophical traditions, like empiricism and rationalism. Pragmatism could be also understood as just a method for “settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable.” Thus it may be understood as “civilized common-sense thinking” as well. Pragmatism is not primarily interested in the origin of knowledge, but it is interested in constructing and developing our ‘knowledge’ further. Pragmatism does not consider the origin of ‘facts’ as important as their logic or consistency.⁴⁰ The underlying ontology of pragmatism is scientific realism.⁴¹ According to Charles Sanders Peirce, this is a “fundamental hypothesis” of science: “it is stated that we understand precisely the effect of force, but what force itself is we do not understand!”⁴²

The paradox of the whole of Western philosophy is that we try to seek truth(s), but the truth should be universal and eternal. When we notice that nature contains nothing which is stable, we have to admit that only particular truths are accessible to us and even these become false with the passing of time (relativism). This world of ours has been made by men, where there are no ultimate truths available to us, only partial or relative ones, and even those are more or less culturally and historically constructed: “*Verum est ipsum factum*” (The truth is what has been made as such). Those who seek knowledge try, at least implicitly, to trace a single cause to explain many effects (positivism), but those who seek practical wisdom try to trace as many causes as possible for a single effect, in order to reach the truth by induction.⁴³

According to pragmatists, like Peirce, the sole motive, idea and function of our thoughts is to produce beliefs. But these beliefs have to be consistent or

³⁷ Pearsall (ed.) (2001), p. 1456.

³⁸ *Webster’s New Encyclopedic Dictionary* (1994), p. 791.

³⁹ Pearsall (ed.) (2001), p. 1456.

⁴⁰ Peirce (1955), p. 35. Pragmatism was first introduced into philosophy by Charles Sanders Peirce in 1878, in the article “*How to make Our Ideas Clear*”, pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action.

⁴¹ Buchler (ed.) (1955), pp. ix–xii.

⁴² Peirce (1955), p. 35.

⁴³ Pompa (ed.) (1982), p. 42 and p. 206. I have leaned here on Giambattista Vico’s *Scienza Nuova* [New Science], which was Vico’s main publication, published originally in 1730 and in a revised edition in 1744.

logical, since belief establishes a rule for our action. The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit, meaning that *we think and act according to our habituated beliefs*. If these beliefs do not satisfy us, for example, in situations where we no longer consider them to be logical, we are irritated by doubt, which is then the motive for further thought. Our thinking becomes more settled when we arrive at a new, amalgamated, belief. In short, Peirce seemed to say that we should consider our reality ontologically, in more holistic ways than we mostly do, since *our reality is based on many colliding beliefs that are cultural constructions and experiences of 'truths' and 'true knowledge'*. Truth and true knowledge is probably never to be reached, but we may get close to them slowly during the future.⁴⁴

For initiating any action, our beliefs have to be logical. Thus we may believe, for example, that the sacraments, like the wine and wafer of the Protestant and Catholic churches represent the blood and flesh of Christ, which may be true for us and a truth according to which we go about our lives. But a human being who has not received any religious teaching may have doubts and hold a position that this is only senseless jargon, since wine just is not the same thing as blood. This shows that it is difficult, even impossible, to have an idea in our minds which relates to anything but conceived sensory effects of things. According to Peirce, "Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves."⁴⁵

Most of the time we are 'common sense animals', religious, agnostics or secular in our nature and habituated to think and act in certain ways defined by the culture and social environment in which we live. We do not have to be philosophers at all, or all the time, but it may be useful for all of us to notice at least that the very essence of our 'truths' and 'knowledge', is actually based on socially constructed ideas, or beliefs, of the world around us. A secular world view is not the only way to obtain 'truth', but neither is the religious one. An agnostic and pragmatic way is safe middle way, for me. Scientifically you cannot prove God's existence, or non-existence, but God is still the main signifier of the social reality of many cultures.

John Searle has tried to find avenues for us to construct an objective social reality in a real world that is independent of our thoughts and language.⁴⁶ Searle refers to the correspondence conception of 'truth', meaning that to some extent we make the world that exists independently of our thought and language, but which we make true by our language; we speak it "out

⁴⁴ Peirce (1955), pp. 28–29.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 30–31.

⁴⁶ Searle (1995), pp. xii–xiii.

from there” as being then a socially constructed and culturally shared understanding. That is what pragmatism is trying to express as well.

Thus, there are things that exist only because we believe them to exist (e.g. God, money, governments, property, marriage, identity etc.); we have agreed that they exist. These conventions may be kept as ‘objective’ facts, since it is not in our hands as individuals to decide whether these “institutional facts” do exist or not. They do exist, but their content and meaning is culture dependent. Institutional facts may require human institutions for their existence, whereas brute facts do not need human institutions for their existence (e.g. a rock is a rock, even if we claim it does not exist). However, brute facts may require language for us to be able to state the facts, but brute facts in themselves exist independently of language.⁴⁷

In this thesis pragmatism is understood as a philosophical ‘via media’ between traditional Western philosophies (empiricism and rationalism) and social theories like Constructivism and CR. Constructivism and CR is based on a pragmatic philosophy of science that “turns interpretation into an intrinsic part of a scientific enterprise that seeks to explain the social construction of reality.” Pragmatism dismisses the Cartesian notion that we must choose between objectivism and relativism/subjectivism.⁴⁸ Pragmatism shares the same philosophical elements as Constructivism and CR (such as scientific realism, epistemological relativism and the habituation thesis – “*our beliefs are basically the rules for action*”⁴⁹), but differs from those, at least in its extreme form, by adopting the utilitarian element, whereby everything which is evaluated as valuable and useful for us to enhance our feeling of happiness is acceptable.


To conclude the philosophical part of this thesis, it may be said that there are no absolute truths (*‘what is, is’*) out there; we human beings perceive, judge and reason what we sense around us, but our perceptions may often be false, our judgements rash and our reasoning defective (*‘what is, may not be’*). We may believe in anything as our ontological basis, for example, God, Voodoo, magic, science, etc., but all in all none of these alone can offer us a route to ultimate knowledge and truth. We desperately seek truth and facts in social sciences, for example, through empirical testing or reasoning, but social facts are always cultural and theory-dependent and only a partial understanding is open to us. That applies even to the natural sciences, since its methods and tools, such as mathematics are human con-

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 1–2 and p. 27. See also Ruggie (1998), p. 856.

⁴⁸ Adler (1997), p. 328.

⁴⁹ Peirce (1955), pp. 26–27. See also James (2007 [1904]); Adler (1997), p. 348. According to Emanuel Adler, the objective facts of world politics are facts only by virtue of human agreements.

structions and conventions ('what ever is, may only be because we have agreed upon it being so').⁵⁰



Picture 1: Metatheoretical assumptions

What is left then to me, is scientific realism, social ontology and relativist epistemology with a pragmatic flavour, meaning that there are many ways to obtain partial knowledge (e.g. inductive and deductive ways), but since ultimate knowledge is unattainable, the best possible and useful knowledge basis is sufficient for us. In order to avoid extreme relativist 'whateverism', it is the empirical community or society then which has the power to define the conditions under which I may say of a proposition that something is true. In this case it is the task of Poles and various Polish communities to define their 'truths', whereas my task is try to understand and re-interpret the meaning of the elements, processes and conditions on which these 'truths' have been socially constructed: "*Verum est ipsum factum.*"⁵¹

⁵⁰ Modified from Giambattista Vico's "*Verum est ipsum factum*" (the truth is what has been made as such) statement.

⁵¹ Pompa (ed.) (1982), p. 206. See also Adler (1997), p. 348.

2.2. Method

The methods of natural science (“normal science”) have been and still tend to be, to some extent, the ideal model for research into human affairs.⁵² Paradigms⁵³ may be overlapping until its contradictions can be explained more credibly by using a new paradigm, even though: “the successive transition from one paradigm to another via revolution is the usual developmental pattern of mature science [normal science]... To be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.”⁵⁴

The social sciences do not progress through scientific revolutions and in evolutionary ways as natural science may do, but periodically. In the social sciences many approaches and theories, which tend to explain or understand complex human undertakings from various perspectives, exist simultaneously. Trying to transfer the Kuhnian idea of a paradigm to the social sciences, it may be stated that the researcher’s work in the social sciences takes the form of ‘puzzle solving’ within the framework of a common, accepted and even stylish or fashionable paradigm. Following this idea, change leads to a new paradigm and the old paradigm becomes superfluous, when anomalies and contradictions can be explained in better ways within a new paradigm. The problem here is that in the social sciences only foundationalist theories that try to explain human efforts in positivist ways may claim to be strictly scientific/paradigmatic ones (e.g. the Realist tradition in IR). In this way one could say that Constructivism and non-foundationalist theories of IR would be pre-scientific theories, because they do not rely on pure objectivism and positivism. Taking a stand vis-à-vis this debate, I claim that Constructivism and non-foundationalist theories

⁵² Kuhn (1996), p. 10 and p. 176. See also Winch (2008 [1958]), pp. 1–2. According to P. Winch, “above all, it is urged, we must follow the methods of natural science rather than those of philosophy, if we are to make any significant progress. I propose ... to attack such a conception of the relation between the social studies, philosophy and the natural sciences.” See also, for example, Mahdi (2006), pp. 138–139. The methods of natural science belong to the Aristotelian theoretical sciences (*epistēmē*), which aim at knowledge that is certain and explanatory. The practical sciences (*phronēsis*), like ethics and politics, present that their objects are capable of being otherwise. The productive sciences (*technē*) also deal with “things that come into being, change, and perish; but their end is the perfection of things made, e.g., a house or a poem.”

⁵³ Kuhn (1996), p. 176. A paradigm can be understood in two ways. *First*, it may be understood as a scientific theory based on explanation. *Second*, a paradigm may be understood as a general ideational orientation that “the members of a scientific community share, and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm.” See also Pocock (1989), p. 13. According to J.G.A. Pocock, “Scientific revolutions occur when the paradigms cease to function satisfactorily.”

⁵⁴ Kuhn (1996), pp. 12–18.

are scientific as well, because ‘knowledge’ and ‘facts’ are socially constructed and science itself is “a social process that develops, refines, and rejects ideas.”⁵⁵ All human inquiry is subjective, but nevertheless we can strive for consistency (logic) in our inquiries. *The focal point then is not to ask ‘is this true?’, but rather, ‘do we agree this is true?’*⁵⁶

2.2.1. Identity and the Problem of Causation in the Social Sciences

Prior to experience, anything can be the cause of anything in open systems of human affairs, and whatever we can imagine is possible. The main elements of ‘causation’ in open systems consist of experience, custom (habits), emotions (sentiments), and probability.⁵⁷ It is difficult to define what variables ultimately cause the effects, for example, in systemic change processes. On the ground of past experience we reason from cause and effect in customary ways. But even history, or past experience, does not tell us much of the future, even though we may suppose it does.

The general proposition that human affairs must be understood from within does not require an assumption that the beliefs and desires of individuals alone (e.g. key political figures) construct the history. This ‘inside story’ has to be widened by telling it in terms which subordinate individuals to some larger social construction (e.g. the nation), and which generate an individual’s beliefs, desires and interests. The beliefs, desires, and interests of individual actors are also generated by external factors. External factors can be called independent or intervening factors. The broad idea of the ‘outside story’ (scientific explanation) is that external intervening factors explain human or human society’s behaviour every time in the same way in similar conditions. But this is not so in human societies, which means that we cannot use strictly positivist rules of causality derived from natural science when researching, for example, identity.⁵⁸

There are external and internal material restraints on or causes of states’ behaviour, for example, a state’s geographical location or the amount and quality of its natural resources), but those ‘brute material facts’ do not necessarily dictate a state’s behaviour solely or at all; to some extent a state’s

⁵⁵ Katzenstein (ed.) (1996), p. xiv.

⁵⁶ Chalmers (1999), p. 108; Flyvbjerg (2004), pp. 25–37; Neuendorf (2002), p. 11.

⁵⁷ Hume (1985 [1739–40]), p. 20.

⁵⁸ Hollis and Smith (2003), pp. 1–3. See also Hume (1985 [1739–40]), pp. 121–122 and p. 223. According to David Hume, strict causality has to fulfil at least the following principles: “(1) The cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time, (2) The cause must be prior to the effect, (3) There must be a constant union between the cause and effect, and (4) The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause.”

geographical location, for example, can be narrated away (de-securitized).⁵⁹ Almost no-one denies the significance of brute facts as motives for actions, but after all these motives may be based on our intersubjective ideas. Allegorically, ideas may be considered as the mind of a human body and brute facts as the human body, meaning that the mind or ideas has or have a significant influence on how and why we move our bodies. Thus, we have *desire* to do something that is based on some *belief* about the significance of a certain *interest* for us. This process initiates *action* that has some consequences.

Interests and the desire for action require a *deeper reason* or ‘*root-cause*’ for initiating action. This missing link or ‘*root-cause*’ may be a *belief-system*, *identity* or *identity structure*, meaning some sort of deeper understanding of ourselves (*ego*) and Others (*alter*). The social construction of identities is prior to interests. The collective ‘we’ needs to be established before collective interests can be articulated.⁶⁰ Our growth milieu affects how we, as individuals and collectives, comprehend ourselves and the Others.⁶¹ We may consider other individuals, groups and nations as enemies, competitors or friends, all of which depends considerably on our belief-system. We may approve the existence of the Others and their particularities (*internalized Otherness based on friendship or competition*) or consider them as disgusting or wish them even to die (*externalized Otherness*).


It’s the identity/identities constructed and construed throughout history and interactions (interactionist cycles; see Picture 2) that have been considered here as the more important basis for a state’s current and possible future behaviour than material restraints and enablers alone (e.g. you do not have to go to war or try to acquire more power and international prestige even though you know you are superior to everyone else). Thus, the simple and traditional ‘cause and effect’ model has been substituted here with a ‘reason (root cause) and cause and effect’ model; “reason is cause”, or “Identities are the basis of interests [and desires].”⁶²

⁵⁹ See, for example, Waeber (1999), p. 334.

⁶⁰ Adler (1997), p. 337.

⁶¹ In this context, significant Others would be parents, and generalized Others would be sisters, brothers, friends and all the other people.

⁶² Wendt (1992), p. 398. See also Heikka (1999), p. 76. According to Henrikki Heikka, “the main claim of Wendtian [C]onstructivism – that social constructions of identity precede interests – is misleading, if not totally false, because it neglects the tension between corporeal desires and the covenant of representation in the process of the formation of the self and leads [C]onstructivists to ignore the split in subjectivity.” In my view, Heikka condemns Constructivism too strongly. I take a more modest stand and argue that in some areas of social activity the state may be a corporeal (corporate) agent (for example, in situations of external military threat), whereas in some other areas subjectivity may split (for example, in situations of military aggression against another state; see, for example, Fukuyama (1992), p. 331; Fukuyama (2007 [2006]), p. 100).



Picture 2: Identity and causality in IR

The identity structure of a particular state agent may change during contextual interactions (learning), but the state agent may change its contextual behaviour without affecting its identity structure as well (adaptation). State agents enter into new interactionist cycle (e.g. post-Cold War era) with the identity-structure modified/non-modified during the previous cycles (e.g. Cold War era). But even if state agents have learned from previous and current interactionist cycles in becoming more tolerant towards the Others, we cannot be sure that these state agents would behave in accordance with these new ‘more tolerant identity structures’ during future structural changes. Thus, global warming (natural disaster) may cause a major war between civilizations, even though it seems that previous interactionist cycles have ‘calmed’ the nationalist ethos and the significance of national identity narratives, which may in any event be there, just to be mobilized in new circumstances.

2.2.2. Social theoretical orientation

“No theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but any one of them may from some point of view be useful.”⁶³

Philosophically the social sciences can be divided into at least two intellectual traditions. The first tradition is founded on the traditions of natural sci-

⁶³ James (2007 [1904]).

ence (*positivism*) and the second on the ideas of history (*post-positivism*). The natural scientific tradition may be considered as an outsider's view on international relations and the social world, and tries to *explain* human behaviour as part of nature. The history-based (hermeneutical) tradition tries to *understand* human behaviour (realist ontology and epistemological relativism – see Chapter 2.1) in a sense distinct from the laws of nature.⁶⁴

IR-theories in the positivist tradition, such as Classical Realism, Neorealism, Neoliberalism and Marxism, are epistemologically *foundationalist*. They operate with a *materialist world-view*, drawing their philosophical assumptions from *empiricism* and *rationalism*. Rationalism in this context means that even though there is a possibility for doubt, foundationalists mainly focus on empirical 'truths' ('what is, is'). The materialism of foundationalist theories holds that "ideas do not construct and structure social reality, but only reflect the material world and serve to justify material causes."⁶⁵ Foundationalist theories try to *explain* the regularities and causes of our external social world in much the same way as a natural scientist might explain the physical world, in that all claims to truth can be judged true or false. Foundationalist theories are also *non-reflective* in their nature; they hold that the empirical (material) realities offer the impetus for our ideas, not vice versa.⁶⁶


IR-theories in the post-positivist tradition, such as Idealism (Utopian liberalism), the English School theory and CR, are epistemologically *non-foundationalist*; they hold that claims to truth cannot be judged true or false since there are never neutral grounds for doing so in the social sciences. They operate with an ideationalist world view. Philosophically these theories rely on moderate *pragmatism* (without utility statements) and realist ontology, referring then to relativity and doubt ('what is, may not be', and 'what is, may only be because we have agreed upon it being so'). Non-foundationalist theories are *constitutive* and *reflective* in their nature. They are constitutive, since they hold that our ideas help us to define what we see as the external world, and they are reflective, since they hold that our theories not only define what we see as the external world, but also construct social reality as well.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Hollis and Smith (2003), p. 1 and pp. 11–12. Positivism as a term in the social sciences refers to any approach which applies natural scientific method to human affairs. The research method of the natural sciences is based on experience (observation and testing) as the only way to obtain knowledge of the world. Defined in this way, positivism is just the opposite of the tenets of philosophical realism (realist ontology). Positivism has also been used as a synonym for Positive science, meaning that if the scientific method did not give us certainty and truths, it can at least give us probabilities.

⁶⁵ Adler (1997), p. 324. See also Jackson and Sørensen (2007), p. 307.

⁶⁶ Smith (2001), pp. 225–249.

⁶⁷ Smith (2001), pp. 225–249.



Picture 3: Social theoretical orientation of the thesis

Promises of Foundationalism - From Realist Paradigm to Neo-Marxism

The research tradition of *the Realist paradigm*, is based on three basic tenets, all to be found in the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli⁶⁸ and Edward Hallet Carr.⁶⁹ First, history is a sequence of cause and effect, the course of which is to be grasped not by the imagination, but by intellectual effort. Second, theory does not create practice. Third, politics is not a function of ethics, but rather, ethics is a function of politics, and morality is the product of power.⁷⁰

However important figures like Machiavelli and Carr have been vis-à-vis the development of the Realist paradigm, it was Hans Morgenthau who popularized the approach of Realism (*Political Realism*). He used six main principles, which summarize the essentials of Political Realism. First, to

⁶⁸ See, for example, Machiavelli (1995 [1514]).

⁶⁹ See, for example, Carr (2001).

⁷⁰ Hollis and Smith (2003), p. 22. See also Carr (2001), pp. 63–64; Machiavelli (1995 [1514]), p. 48. According to Niccolo Macchiavelli, “Many have dreamed up republics and principalities which have never in truth been known to exist; the gulf between how one should live and how one does live is so wide that a man who neglects what is actually done for what should be done learns the way to self-destruction rather than self-preservation.”

explain international relations it is important to work with the inherent forces of *evil human nature*; human nature should be taken as it is and not as it ought to be.⁷¹ Second, to find our way ahead we need to adopt the concept of interest in terms of the concept of *power*. Third, the form and nature of power is fluid and vary with the environment in which power is exercised. Fourth, political acts have moral significance, but only in a sense which relates to the interests of the political agent. Fifth, there is no shared moral code approved by all states; states formulate their policies in a moral language only when it suits them. Sixth, power must be subordinated into all IR analyses by asking: “How does this policy affect the power of the nation?”⁷²

Neorealism (Structural Realism) as another representative of the Realist paradigm, assumes that it is the anarchic nature of the international system that forces states into mutual power struggles. Kenneth Waltz, the founding father of Neorealism, used three “images” in describing the causes of wars in an anarchic international system. The “first image” is about the evil nature and stupid, selfish and aggressive behaviour of man (the individual-level approach). The “second image” (the state-level approach) assumes that the causes of war can be found in the internal structure of states. The “third image” (the international-level or systemic approach) can be derived from the *anarchic international system* in that states lack a shared system of law. The “third image” is the “framework of state action”, but “explaining international outcomes requires one [also] to examine the situations of the states, as well as their individual characteristics.”⁷³

Both theories of the Realist paradigm base their ontological assumptions on material forces (e.g. natural resources, geography, forces of production and forces of destruction), which explain the behaviour of states (the struggle for power and influence). In my view, the Realist paradigm operates in too simplified a social world. However, the Realist paradigm can still be used for analyzing the material restraints on and enablers of state behaviour. For example, oil and other natural resources are still vital for states and this need cannot be narrated away.

Neoliberalism shares earlier Liberal approach’s ideas about the possibility of progress, cooperation and change through international governmental

⁷¹ The classical issue in IR has been the quality of human nature; whether it has been considered as evil (Hobbesian tradition) or good (Rousseau). What is problematic here is that if one states that human nature is evil, one is implicitly saying that there is no hope for a better future; an evil human nature would ruin the hope for a better future, anyhow. If one considers human nature to be good, then one has to ask why wars and violence exist worldwide.

⁷² Morgenthau (1993 [1948]), pp. 4–16; Hollis and Smith (2003), pp. 25–27.

⁷³ Waltz (2000 [1959]), pp. vii–xi.

organizations (IGOs), but it also shares the Neorealist notion that states are still the key actors in international relations. As distinct from Liberalism's overwhelming idealist flavour, Neoliberalism operates on human rationality and stresses that "human [material] well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets and free trade." The role of the state as a rational actor is to guarantee the institutional framework for these practices.⁷⁴

The interest areas of Neoliberalism are integration, functional cross-border activities (e.g. trade and investment) and interdependency, but also common values and norms, caused by interconnecting activities. Four main variations in that tradition may be identified, namely, Sociological Liberalism, Interdependence Liberalism, Institutional Liberalism and Republican Liberalism. *Sociological Liberalism* stresses that interactions between states help to create common values and norms that pave the way "for peaceful, cooperative relations by making war increasingly costly and thus more unlikely."⁷⁵ *Interdependence Liberalism* points out that the complex interdependence of the current world is radically different to Realists' assumptions, since there are other actors in addition to states, "and violent conflict clearly is not on their international agenda."⁷⁶ According to this approach, networks of rules, norms and procedures regularize behaviour and control interdependence's effects.⁷⁷ *Institutional Liberalism* stresses that the higher the degree of interdependence, the more willingly will states set up international institutions and regimes to deal with their common problems, or deal with those under the auspices of IGOs like the UN and the EU. *Republican Liberalism* argues that liberal democracies do not wage war against each other. This liberal approach may also be called *the democratic peace approach*, which is based on three pillars: (1) peaceful conflict resolution, (2) common values, and (3) economic cooperation.⁷⁸

Neoliberalism offers some valid points of departure vis-à-vis this thesis. For example, growing interdependence between states may increase the amount of regulatory rules, norms and regimes between states, which consequently may lead to a more tolerant world. However, at the same time, Neoliberalism's emphasis on (economic) rationality and its material world view reduces its validity as a key theory in this thesis.

Marxism is more holistic in nature than the Realist paradigm and Neoliberalism, since it *informs us explicitly about such issues as social conscious-*

⁷⁴ Harvey (2007), p. 22.

⁷⁵ Jackson and Sørensen (2007), p. 43.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁷⁷ Keohane and Nye (1977), p. 19.

⁷⁸ Jackson and Sørensen (2007), pp. 42–45 and p. 310.

ness and the historicity of societal development. However, social consciousness is based on material conditions in Marxist thinking, since “*The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appears at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour.*”⁷⁹

While Realists explain competition and conflict between states in terms of man’s evil nature and the lack of binding international rules, Marxists point to the social forces (social classes) that sustain conflicts between states.⁸⁰ In this way Marxism has some similarities with cultural habituation, but Marxism is an irrelevant approach, due to its seemingly flawed ideology. In other words, Marxists argue that the whole history of humankind can be interpreted through class struggle, even though it can be noted that class solidarity has not had any significant relevance in international affairs; national loyalties have been much more powerful than class solidarity at least in the wars of the twentieth century. Enemy nationals of all social classes have been killed with enthusiasm by other nationals regardless of their social class.⁸¹

Critical theory (Neo-Marxism) as a deviation of Marxism has helped me considerably analyzing the concept of “world order” in Chapter 5. Even though I consider Critical theory to be a more reflective orientation than Marxism, it still has, like Marxism, a materialist ontology. What distinguishes Critical theory from Marxism, is its *emancipatory sociological perspective*; it seeks to liberate humanity from the ‘oppressive’ structures of world politics and world economics, which are controlled by hegemonic powers, particularly the USA. Critical theory is closely related to the concept of world order through one of its main theorist, Robert Cox, who “sees the production of the material basis of life as a fundamental activity for all human groups.” Cox assumes that although the major driving forces of world order change, they do so slowly. Cox’s focus is on forms of the state, which may “change under pressure from forces above (world order) and from below (civil society).” Thus, there will be an opportunity in the future “to break with the structures of the past and ... the potential to escape the structure that bind human potential.” Cox’s potentiality for changing the world order is based on a never ending historical cycles, meaning day-to-day changes, “conjunctural” time trends of 10–50 years and very long time cycles (“*longue durée*”) that cover several centuries. In this thesis, as in most IR studies, the focus is on “conjunctural” time trends.⁸²

⁷⁹ Marx (2007 [1845]).

⁸⁰ Jackson and Sørensen (2007), p. 189.

⁸¹ See, for example, Searle (1995), p. 93; Gellner (2007), p. 12.

⁸² Sinclair (2001), pp. 3–9. See also Jackson and Sørensen (2007), pp. 292–294; Gilpin (1987). Critical theory has some reference points to the global political economy, which

Give normativity a chance - From Utopian Liberalism to CR

Social sciences in general, including IR, have conventionally focused on studying the past and present. Of all the prevailing approaches, normative theories of IR (here the English School theory and CR) may be the closest to also being interested in something other than contemporaneity and the past. Normative theories try to answer the question: *how should/could things be?* Reality then is not based on what actually exists, but what should (*utopianism*), or could (*concrete-utopianism*) be possible. This may be expressed by the following model:

$Dr (=real/reality) > Da (=actual) > De (=empirical).$ ⁸³

Empirical reality is that, for example, car and a nuclear bomb do both exist (De). The capability of the car to reach a speed of 200 km/h won't get actualized (Da), if the car remains parked in its parking place, but it could get actualized (Dr). The same logic applies to the nuclear bomb: its destructive power won't get actualized if it stays in its launch silo, but it could get actualized, and the bomb could destroy a major city or more. Thus the real/reality is more than the actual, which is sequentially more than the empirical. Thus, we should not see the world only in empiricist or actualized terms.⁸⁴

The 'roots' of normative IR theories can be found in *Utopian Liberalism*. The utopianism of Liberalism stresses the idea that international organizations (The League of Nations in Liberalism's heyday in the 1920s – 1930s; and currently, the United Nations) play a key role in bringing perpetual peace to the world. Perpetual peace was originally Immanuel Kant's idea, but was also presented by the President of the USA, Woodrow Wilson, in 1917, when he asked the U.S. Congress to declare war on Germany to liberate the peoples of the world from the suffering of war (German people included) and to make the world safe for democracy.⁸⁵ Basically normativity of the Utopian Liberalism is nothing to blame of, but I have judged Utopian Liberalism to be too narrow an approach in researching Polish identity structures.

has sometimes been treated as a separate IR paradigm. However, I have considered the global political economy as a variable that is included in all IR paradigms and approaches in one way or another.

⁸³ Patomäki (2004).

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Kratochwil (2005), p. 107. According to Friedrich Kratochwil, Wilson seemed to have hoped that the spread of democracy and the "preponderance of the economic and military potential of democratic states in the aftermath of the war would make peace possible." See also Jackson and Sørensen (2007), pp. 31–33.

In addition to Neoliberalism, the so-called *English School theory*⁸⁶ may be considered as a derivative of Idealism as well. The English School theory relies on ideationalist ontology by stressing the social dimension of the international system. The ‘flagship’ of the English School Theory is *international society* (interstate society, according to Barry Buzan),⁸⁷ which is about shared interests and identity amongst states. The English School theory partly⁸⁸ departs from the traditional Hobbesian *international system* that refers to interactions among states, “being about traditional realist power politics amongst states within a political structure of international anarchy.” The further dimension that the English School theory offers is the concept of *world society* that reaches beyond the state “towards more cosmopolitan images of how humankind is, or should be organized.” The *English School’s three key concepts are associated with three different methodological approaches: the international system with positivism, international society with hermeneutics and interpretivism, and world society with Critical theory.* My focus is on the international system and international society, not on world society. However I have made room for world society as well in the last chapter of this thesis.⁸⁹

The English School theory puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of IR. Institutions are an essential concept in the English School’s three domains (the international system, international society and world society), and it is through institutions, according to the English School’s writers, that order in international relations will be achieved. *The Neoliberal approach is close to the English School’s approach in this regard, but the English School is concerned with the shared beliefs and cultural elements that precede rational cooperation.*⁹⁰

Critical Realism can be considered as a new holistic philosophical approach to scientific thinking and as a totally new approach in IR. Critical Realism tries to question the perception of stability predominant in Western political philosophy by stressing, in much the same way as the Constructivist and the English School approach, the need for understanding the deeper

⁸⁶ Jackson and Sørensen (2007), p. 47. Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen call the English School theory simply International Society. See also Hoffmann (1995), p. vii. According to Stanley Hoffmann, Hedley Bull, one of the “founding fathers” of this orientation, called it a British approach, even though several of its leading figures were not English, but Australians, Canadians and South Africans.

⁸⁷ Mearsheimer (2005), p. 144. John Mearsheimer, as a realist, has criticized “Cold War idealists” like Colin Wight and Hedley Bull for being hostile to Realism, even though they believed that the “balance of power played a role in international politics.”

⁸⁸ Partly, because it treats the international system as the thesis that is to be tackled by the antitheses of international society and world society with more or less ‘socialised’ and even idealist, normative and emancipatory goals of global human society.

⁸⁹ Buzan (2004), p. xvii, p. 1 and p. 23.

⁹⁰ Buzan (2004), pp. 161–162.

structures of social reality(-ies) for conducting more meaningful and future-orientated social research. I have used CR as a ‘philosophical toolbox’, and as a future-orientated normative social theory. The key philosophical theses of CR (see Chapter 1.4) are (1) Realist ontology, (2) Epistemological relativism, (3) Judgemental rationality (4) the Incommensurability thesis, and (5) a theory of emancipation.⁹¹

The theory of emancipation is ethico-political judgement to change practices, which hold false understanding and theory. Emancipation enables us to strive for the flourishing of humanity and to take into account other values such as pluralism, justice, democracy and so on. Emancipation relates to the possibility of eliminating social and natural injustice as a precondition for social change (the elimination of war, militarism, structural violence, ecological exploitation etc.). What is left after emancipation forms the basis to create something new.⁹²

Critical Realism does not neglect positivism totally, since *“Positivism as a valid philosophy of science is accepted and only the boundaries of its legitimate use within social science are disputed. As such, a critical theory approach [CR] to social science will incorporate elements of positivism as well as hermeneutics, but attempts to go beyond them in terms of emancipatory potential.”*⁹³ That relates the possibilities of CR especially in the field of future studies.

Critical social sciences must be involved in making better futures. Although a society would be improved if its illusions, contradictions, violence and injustices were reduced, we do not know how this could be achieved. Purely negative and normative criticism is not sufficient for concrete action. Criticism presupposes the possibility of better practices. To handle this issue Roy Bhaskar has introduced the term *“concrete utopia”* as a state of affairs that actually does not exist, but could be politically possible to achieve, and could offer an alternative way for organizing social relations.⁹⁴

According to Roy Bhaskar, we should have vision of a better world and about what should be done. However, the more essential question is what

⁹¹ Patomäki (2005); Bhaskar (2005). It has to be noticed that the task of the philosophy of science is not to research normative or future-orientated questions, but questions related to being (ontology) and knowledge (epistemology). By leaning on explicitly and clearly defined philosophical statements CR is well-equipped to make future-orientated and critical societal statements, and as such it has at least the potential to be the vanguard post-positivist IR-theory, even though there may be doubts about the status of CR as an independent IR theory.

⁹² Bhaskar (2005).

⁹³ Wight (2002), p. 33.

⁹⁴ Patomäki (2004). Compare the question setting of a *“concrete utopia”* (what could be done?) with a purely normative question setting: what should be done?

could be done. Our visions and ideas should be based on reality, but what is this reality? We could get rid of poverty but reality is not the same for rich people as it is for poor people. Thus, everything is relational. But each of us can be mentally open to a utopia. As a starting point of critical future studies Bhaskar offers two presuppositions. First, we should be capable of understanding all the people (universal solidarity and equality); even Hitler should be understood, without of course accepting his actions. Every general should first understand terrorist, if s/he is to be able to destroy them or change their behaviour. The second presupposition is actional rationality, which means that every culture or individual learns to act in some way (e.g. how to use a weapon).⁹⁵

Seizing the middle ground - Constructivist 'via media'

Constructivism has usually been considered as a complement to Neorealism (Wendtian (Social) Constructivism). Constructivism seizes the middle ground, since it can enter a discussion with the incommensurable theoretical standpoints of non-reflectivism (e.g. the Realist paradigm) and reflectivism (e.g. the English School theory and CR).⁹⁶ The Constructivist approach in IR argues that international reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures that give meaning to the material world. It does not make sense to abandon reason or rationality totally, but we should try to rediscover “how rational considerations are brought to bear in collective human enterprises and situations.”⁹⁷

There are many Schools in the Constructivists' camp (see Chapter 3) and Social Constructivism is only one of these Schools. However, all of those Schools share at least an ontology “*that depicts the social world as intersubjectively and collectively meaningful structures and processes. In this*

⁹⁵ Bhaskar (2005); Patomäki (2004).

⁹⁶ Wiener (2006), p. 14.

⁹⁷ Adler (1997), p. 319 and pp. 348–349. By cognitive Emanuel Adler means “approaches that study political beliefs and belief systems in International Relations from a perspective that takes individual human acts of cognition, such as perceptions, as independent variables that explain foreign-policy behaviour.” See also Jackson and Sørensen (2007), p. 166. According to Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, “*Constructivism is an empirical approach to the study of international relations – empirical in that it focuses on the intersubjective ideas that define international relations... the well-known billiard ball image of international relations is rejected by [C]onstructivists because it fails to reveal the thoughts, ideas, beliefs and so on of the actors involved in international conflicts. Constructivists want to probe the inside of the billiard balls to arrive at a deeper understanding of such conflicts.*”

See also Pettman (2000), p. 11. According to Ralph Pettman, “[C]onstructivism can be defined ... in terms of the reality we make, not find.”

world, material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded."⁹⁸

*I am a Constructivist, but I understand Constructivism in its widest sense. This widest sense includes the possibility to consider Constructivism as a philosophy,*⁹⁹ *((c)onstructivism then), as a complement to Neorealism, but also as a moderate normative approach of IR. In its widest sense I have considered Constructivism as currently the vanguard identity theory of IR.* In picture 3, Constructivism is presented in the middle of ontological and epistemological axes, just to show that it can be used as a nexus, or 'via media' between different approaches of IR, or as an independent approach in itself. To be honest, Constructivism can be located in the right upper corner of picture 3 as well, since in its widest sense it may be considered as a constitutive and non-foundationalist as well as a holistic approach like CR. Constructivism has been dealt with more thoroughly in Chapter 3; the following paragraphs illustrate only its basic features.

The aim of Constructivism is to advance a sociological perspective on world politics by emphasizing the importance of the role of identity in the constitution of interests and action, but also, the importance of material and normative structures, as well as the mutual constitution of agents and structures.¹⁰⁰ From the Constructivist perspective, states seek security for their citizens (this is one of the Neorealists' argument as well), which seem to be a more plausible behavioural driving force than a continuous power struggle. At least liberal democratic states (as well as individuals) have basically good ideational purposes, but those usually collide with material restrictions, whether economic or nature-orientated (e.g. dependence on raw materials, and subject to pandemic diseases and natural catastrophes). Good ideational purposes may also be challenged by other states from other cultures with other values.

Constructivism treats both the state and the international system as social constructions that are under constant change. In today's world, states will no longer die away, in accordance with the rules of natural selection. Failed

⁹⁸ Adler (2002), p. 100.

⁹⁹ Jackson and Sørensen (2007), pp. 164–165. In considering Social Constructivism as a philosophy, it may be understood explicitly as follows: "*The social world is not a given: it is not something 'out there' that exists independent of the thought and ideas of the people involved in it. It is not an external reality whose laws can be discovered by scientific research and explained by scientific theory, as positivists and behaviouralists argue. The social and political world is not part of nature. There are no natural laws of society or economics or politics. History is not an evolving external process that is independent of human thought and ideas. That means that sociology or economics or political science or the study of history cannot be objective 'sciences' in the strict positivist sense of the word.*"

¹⁰⁰ Price and Reus-Smit (1998), p. 260.

states can be saved by the international community or they can be ‘born again’ (e.g. the rise of Germany and Japan after WWII, or Poland, which has been divided many times during her history). *Constructivists consider that materiel capabilities are still relevant and worth reaching for, but the priority of these capabilities, and corresponding action, is based on shared, intersubjective ideas.* But the surface appearance of intersubjectivity is typically distinct from its underlying and potentially hidden, reified, or mystified essential relations (e.g. hidden personal, national and even cultural identities).¹⁰¹

Constructivism does not deny the importance of the state as one of the essential actors in the international system: “it makes no [more] sense to criticize a theory of international politics as “state-centric” than it does to criticize a theory of forests for being “tree-centric””,¹⁰² but usually researchers have ignored how the actors in world politics have been socially constructed. According to Constructivism, all social structures include at least three fundamental elements: (1) ideas (the ideational structure), (2) interests (the structure of interests) and (3) material conditions (the material structure). Without ideas there wouldn’t be interests, without interests there wouldn’t be appropriate material conditions, and without material conditions it is hard to imagine the existence of any kind of reality at all.

What Constructivism and the Realist paradigm have in common, is that they share the Weberian state-idea, according to which a state is an autonomous actor; it has a legitimate monopoly on using violence; it has an institutional judiciary; it is a sovereign actor; society also exists, and states possess territories of their own. The most distinctive difference between these traditions is the social ‘base-structure’ that Constructivism explicitly, but the Realist paradigm only implicitly stresses.¹⁰³ Constructivism bases its beliefs vis-à-vis world politics on ideational factors (world, states and societies are based on ideas and language), not on material grounds as foundationalists argue.¹⁰⁴ Constructivists argue that the international system does not exist on its own, but only as a creation of inter-subjective consciousness among people. The international system is a human creation, not of a physical or material kind, but of a purely intellectual and ideational kind; it’s a matter of ideas and a system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place.¹⁰⁵ Constructivists share the view that Neorealism and Neoliberalism are “undersocialized”, because

¹⁰¹ Patomäki and Wight (2000), p. 225.

¹⁰² Wendt (1999), p. 9. See also Waltz (2001 [1959]), p. 6. According to Kenneth Waltz, “As men live in states so states exist in a world of states.”

¹⁰³ Kauppi (2005).

¹⁰⁴ Wendt (1999), p. 6. See also Marx (2007 [1845]).

¹⁰⁵ Jackson and Sørensen (2003), p. 253.

they pay insufficient attention to the ways in which the actors in world politics are socially constructed.¹⁰⁶

One distinctive difference between Constructivism and Neorealism concerns their views on inter-state anarchy. While Neorealists argue that inter-state anarchy makes international politics a necessarily conflictual self-help world, Constructivists argue that “*anarchy is what states make of it*”,¹⁰⁷ and that change is always possible. Constructivists admit that there is of course the reality of states’ material basis, but simultaneously take the stand that this basis has been formed and shaped by an ideational basis, meaning, for example, that we won’t use the forces of destruction if we agree amongst ourselves not to do so.¹⁰⁸

Constructivism and CR shares the view of realist ontology as well as epistemological relativism and judgemental rationality. But it is Critical Realism here that offers emancipatory power and reflectivism for creating a ‘better future’ with the help of science. Constructivism does not possess emancipatory power, but teleological progress based on the “desire for recognition” (see Chapter 3).¹⁰⁹ The task of Constructivism is basically meant to be an attempt to bridge the gap between non-reflective and reflective theories.¹¹⁰ Critical Realism is a fascinating and sound philosophy, but its normative emancipation tends to be some sort of an obstacle to me, if understood in extreme postmodernist ways.¹¹¹ We do know that the world is not a fair place and the games that state agents play in different contexts of the global “Grand Chessboard”¹¹² are sometimes very cruel, but who could

¹⁰⁶ Wendt (1999), p. 4 and p. 141.

¹⁰⁷ Wendt (1992), p. 395 and Wendt (1999), p. 6.

¹⁰⁸ Wendt (1992), p. 394. According to Alexander Wendt, “self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure.”

¹⁰⁹ Fukuyama (1992), p. 162.

¹¹⁰ Smith (2001), pp. 225–249.

¹¹¹ See, for example, Jackson and Sørensen (2007), pp. 294–295. Postmodernism tries “to make scholars aware of their conceptual prisons.” The most important ‘prison’ is modernity itself, and the idea that modernization would lead to a better life for all. See also Foucault (1995), pp. 200–202. Prison refers to a Foucauldian *Panopticon*; a tower that is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring. The peripheral building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building. They have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower, and one on the outside, allowing light to cross the cell from one end to the other. “*All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy ... in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen.*”

¹¹² See, for example, Brzezinski (1997), p. xiv. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, it is the United States that has more or less the task to define rules for the world, but not in a unilateral way.

define better and more fair rules for that game, so that those rules would be commonly understood as more fair and more equal? The concrete utopia, offered by Critical Realism, is an intelligent way to bypass the ultimately normative effort of traditional Idealism.

Constructivists, at least Alexander Wendt, have by-passed the question of emancipation by using a macro-teleological perspective when analyzing the opportunities for humankind to establish a world state in the future. Wendt argues that “at some point in the future individual and state agents will have ‘no choice’ but to form a world state” based on the historical tendency of political authorities to consolidate into larger units.¹¹³ However, this is only a tendency and we do not know whether this tendency will continue in the future, but this is, in any event based on some analysis, whereas the cosmopolitan emancipation of the CR is not based on anything, but a wishful hope. I agree with Wendt here, but since one never knows the future I want to give emancipation a chance, as well.

2.2.3. *Frame(s) of Reference and Research Frame(s)*


The overall purpose of the frame of reference of the thesis (See Picture 4) is an effort to enhance our understanding of the significance of identity as a ‘root cause’ for the state’s interests and behaviour. This has been done by using various processes and methods. The frame of reference used in this thesis is modified from the decision-making model of K.J. Holsti (I am not a rational choice theorist myself anyhow).¹¹⁴ Holsti’s decision-making model was an attempt to analyze the internal variables (the domestic context) and external variables (the systemic factors) that affect a state’s decision-making processes and interests. Holsti’s decision-making model has been used in this thesis as a general reference point only, since Holsti did not mention the word identity at all, which is, however, the dependent variable of this thesis.

The external material restraints presented in pictures 4 and 5 refer to material restrictions that have been presumed to have an influence on state behaviour and national identity, with only a limited possibility for a state to affect those restraints. External social restraints and enablers are those fac-

¹¹³ Wendt (2005), p. 595. See also Wendt (2003), p. 503. According to Alexander Wendt, there are three kinds of empirical evidence supporting the teleological view of the inevitability of the world state: (1) the history of the international system to date (“in 1000 BC there were 600,000 independent political communities on the earth, whereas today there are about 200”), (2) the tendency seems to be similar at the regional level (states merge into regional sub-systems at least partially), and (3) the tendency may be tested by a “computational model.”

¹¹⁴ Holsti (1995), p. 253.

tors that the state can influence, and thus the causal arrow running from the external social factors to the state agent and identity is two-headed. Even though the external social factors influence an actor's identity and behaviour, the actor's identity and behaviour also influences the external social world as well; they are mutually constitutive, not levels of analysis as such.¹¹⁵ *Internal constitutive restraints and enablers in picture 4 take the form of national constitutive habituation in picture 5, since it is presumed that to some extent Polish national 'grand-narratives', world-view, as well as political and strategic cultures are impenetrable to international contextual discursive interactions.*




Picture 4: General frame of reference and research frame

I have already presented my philosophical stand in Chapter 2.1, and come to the conclusion that since there are many ways to understand 'realities', and since ultimate knowledge is unattainable, the best possible and useful knowledge basis (*moderate pragmatism*) is enough for us. 'For us' means here the Poles and various Polish communities, who have been offered the possibility to express their truth claims and world-views.

In Chapter 2.2.2, I stated that traditional IR theories of the Realist paradigm are based on different ontological and epistemological stands to those of Constructivism and reflective theories like the English School theory and CR. Constructivism has been used here as a primary social theoretical ap-

¹¹⁵ See, for example, Kratochwil (2006), p. 14.

proach, but in commensurable ways it is possible to use both traditional as well as normative approaches in deducing the best possible understanding of the relationship between national identity construction, the international processual structure (external social restraints and enablers) and external material restraints. Tolerant and intolerant national identities are here assumed to be enablers and/or restrictions vis-à-vis the three main models of the world order (the international system, international society and world society), which have been analyzed in this thesis mostly through a combination of Constructivism and the English School theory.



Picture 5: Frame of reference and research frame – ‘the Polish case’

The ‘Polish case’ (Picture 5) has been analyzed here by mirroring the general frame of reference of the thesis (Picture 4). The overall research frame stresses the *double-hermeneutical understanding* (*philosophical hermeneutics*) and commensurability vis-à-vis different paradigms and approaches. Otherwise, I could not say I was a Constructivist at all.

The dependent variable in the empirical part of the thesis, the ‘Polish case’ (Picture 5) is *Polish defence identity, understood here as a core component of national identity*. The overall assumptions behind the ‘Polish case’ is that Polish national identity has its roots somewhere in history (*the genealogy of Polish national identity*), it is under constant modification through

contextual interactions (*the interactionist perspective*) with Others (nations, states and other actors), but it has a cultural dimension as well (*the cultural perspective*). This means that internal constitutive habituation into past narratives, world-view, forms of political and strategic culture, and attitudes towards national minorities by national ‘sub-identity holders’ and the nation, may have become such reified ‘truths’ and modes of sentiment that international contextual interactions may not have deep access to those at all. While ‘time’ in Picture 5 presents the overall mental orientation of considering international relations and identity formation as a never halting process, the “new world order” presents the ever prevailing possibility of the emancipatory potential of communitarian and cosmopolitan tolerance.

2.2.4. *Double Hermeneutics*

The basic principle of hermeneutics (single-loop hermeneutics) means simply that we should try to understand everything that can be understood.¹¹⁶ In distinction to double-hermeneutics (philosophical hermeneutics), single-loop hermeneutics (from now on simply hermeneutics) operates on a common horizon, on a single hermeneutic circle, which is common to the researcher and his/her subject. In hermeneutics, the researcher’s pre-understanding ‘negotiates’ with another pre-understanding in a common space. This can be, for example, a normal interactive situation, where two individuals talk with each other on some subject. Both of them have a pre-understanding of the subject they are talking about. Pre-understanding(s) are supplemented through the process of conversation. Another, similar kind of hermeneutic situation can be met, for example, when interpreting a political speech. A political speech can be analyzed as it appears to us. If we are sufficiently interested in the text to read it, we already have a pre-understanding about the issue concerned, which may then be strengthened or weakened after reading the text, but the text is still unchanged, and we are not conducting intervention to the spatio-temporal frame of the text in this hermeneutical phase; the text is still a text without an identity.¹¹⁷

Double hermeneutics is generally about the idea that “all social research has a necessarily cultural, ethnographic or anthropological aspect to it”, meaning that our research subjects are not just there to be explained or interpreted, they have already been “constituted as meaningful”; they have an identity of their own, which we try to interpret on the basis of our own cultural preoccupations. It is my task here to discuss how a research subject, in my case Polish defence identity, has been constituted as meaningful.¹¹⁸ In

¹¹⁶ Gadamer (2004), p. 31.

¹¹⁷ Nørreklit (2006), pp. 4–7.

¹¹⁸ Giddens (1986), p. 284.

double hermeneutics the researcher or discussant uses the outer hermeneutical circle “as a vehicle to come in touch with the inner circle.” Then the researcher or discussant not only observes and interprets what the other (discussant) is saying, but also how the other says it, using body language and other signals as well. This can be called *the active intervention phase that distinguishes double hermeneutics from hermeneutics*. Double hermeneutics is then constructive in its nature, since it “switch of the position of the pre-understanding from being behind to being in front” (‘reason is cause’), meaning that, for example, to understand a state agent’s security policy and behaviour one does not merely observe the superficial causalities, but intervenes in the ‘back-scene’ of unconscious and conscious elements (such as beliefs and values as reasons for state behaviour) as well, because these back-scene elements may be even more crucial than day-to-day observations for holistic understanding.¹¹⁹

The fields of application of double hermeneutics consist of situations, in which we encounter meanings that are not immediately understandable, but require an interpretative effort, such as the possible contradictions between the official statements of state-officials and the actions the state conducts in the playground of world politics. Double hermeneutics uses the researcher’s own inner hermeneutic circle, an outer hermeneutic circle (context; e.g. world order) and another’s inner hermeneutic circle (e.g. the Polish ‘Self’). In order to understand the connection between the outer hermeneutic circle (world order) and another’s inner hermeneutic circle (the Polish ‘Self’), one has to intervene in the Polish ‘I’ as well (see Chapter 4.1.1). The researcher’s own inner hermeneutic circle is about understanding one’s own position as part of this intervention process in another’s ‘I’, meaning that even though the researcher may be an outsider (as a foreigner) vis-à-vis another’s ‘I’, in this process of intervention his/her interpretation may have outcomes on another’s ‘Self’.¹²⁰

Double hermeneutics is not a method; it offers only a general approach on how to operate (in the social sciences) between objectivism and subjectivism by underlining the cultural aspects of both the researcher and the research subject. For double-hermeneutics the question is not what we do or what we should do, but what happens beyond our willing and doing.¹²¹ Thus, in world politics it is not solely the causal interactions between state agents that interests me, but the hidden ‘identity worlds’ or ‘identity layers’ of the collective actors that gives meaning to their behaviour. My purpose is to grasp a more holistic understanding of a nation’s, Poland’s, identity

¹¹⁹ Nørreklit (2006), pp. 4–8.

¹²⁰ Gadamer (2004), p. 31. See also Nørreklit (2006), p. 5.

¹²¹ Gadamer (2004), p. xi.

world in order to be better equipped to try to understand and explain Poland's foreign and defence policy in the post-Cold War era.

Cultural prejudices and traditions (*cultural habituation*) are obstacles for our openness to the world. Shaped by the past, the present situation can be understood as a 'given', in which understanding is rooted, and which makes reflection difficult.¹²² Since one is part of one's own culture, and even though we may feel that the origins of the binding forces of, for example, the Christian traditions (Sunday Mass, christening, confirmation, marriage, funeral etc.) are currently alien to our consciousness, these traditions are still vital to us and they still determine our cultural being, at some point at least, even though we may be atheists or agnostics.

We face the same situation basically in the field of science, where it is easier to conduct research by adopting the prevailing paradigm of the scientific community to which one belongs, than trying to emancipate oneself from that paradigm. It is harder to conduct critical research on the identity constructions of the national culture into which the researcher has been socialized. As a Finn, I do not mind challenging the myths and narratives of my own culture; I have probably internalized my own culture's narrative world in a way that would perhaps make it impossible to conduct critical and neutral research on, for example, Finnish defence identity. Thus, I have chosen Poland as the empirical case of this thesis in order to increase the objectivity of the thesis, bearing in my mind, however, that total objectivity is never possible in the social sciences; one always is, or becomes part of one's research subject, but distance helps.

The Polish nation, Polish national identity and its core, national defence identity, have already been interpreted by the Poles; they are identity-holding phenomena themselves. My interpretation of these phenomena is my own. What someone else understands as the Polish nation, Polish national identity and Polish defence identity will provide another interpretation. In practice this means that any interpretation would be correct or incorrect. To avoid this kind of ultimate, post-modern relativism we can decide (*judgemental rationalism*) that some interpretations are incorrect anyhow on a pragmatic basis; it is not plausible to claim, for example, that all Poles are Martians, and that they possess Martian identity.

Even though I have been part of my research subject from the very beginning of this research process (I have intuitively had some pre-knowledge of the subject, since otherwise I would not have chosen Poland as the empirical case of this thesis at all), I have, at the same time, stood outside the phenomenon. On a spatio-temporal axis, I share time with today's Poles, but

¹²² Gadamer (2004), p. xv and p. 31.

not their national, or regional, space. I am a Finn, and thus an outsider for Poles. Thus, my cultural background only allows me a superficial grasp of the essence of the unconscious beliefs behind Polish foreign and defence policy actions; I am incapable of understanding this essence totally, but I have tried to make as deep an intervention as possible with the use of iconic modelling (see Chapter 2.2.7).

2.2.5. Language

Through our language and words we may instruct, for example, our children to believe in God, or that God does not exist. Language is the signifier of our social reality.¹²³ It is also language that tackles the problem of how we can speak about ontological realism, and about a shared world view, since in fact there may be as many world views as there are human beings. One critique of ontological realism is that it may well be only ontic realism that we are talking about.¹²⁴ This means that there is no transcendental ego or ‘I’ in this world. This brings us to the problem of intersubjectivity.¹²⁵ How can we speak about identity of a nation or layers of national identity, if we all occupy different ontic ‘realities’? There has to be some unifying element, through which the collection of our ontic perceptions can be transformed into an intersubjectively understood and shared ‘reality’. That element is the language by which we have been socialized into some culture, including this particular culture’s narratives, myths and conceptions of Others; “*language is the house of being.*”¹²⁶

We are born into the language we use in our culture, and our thinking is based on the language we use.¹²⁷ Many things have been named in accordance with the first sensation without thorough research and reasoning. There are fishes that can fly and birds that cannot fly. Why is it that we call a flying fish a fish at all or the Emu (bird) a bird at all? Shouldn’t they have their own genres accordingly? And furthermore, why are states called states even though we at the same time confess that there is no universal meaning of that word; the same counts with the words, order, world order and identity. I’m not saying that we should *deconstruct* all the words in Derridean

¹²³ Wittgenstein (1972 [1949–51]), p. 16e.

¹²⁴ Gadamer (2004), pp. 191–193. See also Heidegger (2006 [1926]), pp. 21–35. The ontological vs. ontic discussion is based on Heidegger’s concept of *Dasein* (‘Being-there’ or ‘Being-in-the-world’).

¹²⁵ Gadamer (2004), p. 160.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 208. See also Kratochwil (2006), p. 17.

¹²⁷ Dewey (1997 [1910]), pp. 170–174. For John Dewey, language and thought were identical, but words are not necessary for thought; they are necessary only for conveying our thoughts. Language includes much more than oral and written speech. Gestures, pictures, monuments, visual images, finger movements, all of which employ signs, are logically part of language, according to Dewey.

or structuralist ways and give them a new and more precise content; that is not possible. I am only stating here that there exists a relativity between currently used words and their meanings in the same way that relativity exists in all the social sciences.¹²⁸

Language consists of cultural ideas, will and words. Ideas may be considered as symbols of things and words as symbols of ideas, as well as mediators of the will. Nations and human communities are led naturally to preserve the memory of customs, rules and laws through language, which hold them within this or that society. *National myths and 'grand-narratives' are used on purpose to educate offspring in homes, schools, churches, armed forces, etc., to maintain certain national characteristics that we want to preserve as distinct from other nations or human communities.*¹²⁹

The language of the political community differs from the language of the scientific community. The language of politics is not the language of a single disciplined paradigm in the way that the language of the scientific paradigmatic community is. Political speech “invokes values, it summarizes information, it suppresses the inconvenient; it makes many kinds of statements at once.” Political language operates in several contexts and on many levels simultaneously. This means that it is probably not possible to trace the exact meanings of political messages, since the language of politics refers not only to the institutions and values of a wider (national and international) arena, but also to all the activities and cultural forms of the particular political paradigmatic community the speaker identifies him-/herself belonging to.¹³⁰

Thus, languages are constructed conventions as is our whole social life. *A Structural, Derridean approach could only offer a limited perspective to the texts, narratives and discourse of the relevant Polish 'sub-identity holders'; it would be like tracing the meaning and content of the word tree, whereas I am actually trying to understand the whole forest.*¹³¹ My overall

¹²⁸ Culler (1983), pp. 85–86. As an interpreter of Jacques Derrida, Jonathan Culler defines the aim of the Derridean deconstruction as being “to reverse the hierarchy”, whereby, “To ‘deconstruct’ philosophy is thus to work through the structured genealogy of its concepts in the most scrupulous and immense fashion.”

¹²⁹ Pompa (ed.) (1982), p. 51, p. 119 and p. 128. According to Giambattista Vico, nations communicate with one another in wars, commerce and politics through their symbolic language (coats-of-arms and flags), and religions, values and laws proper to nations are defended through their symbolic language.

¹³⁰ Pocock (1989), pp. 16–21.

¹³¹ Derrida (1997), pp. 10–13. Jacques Derrida argues that words are relative and culture dependent signifiers of our overall thinking. Phone (*phonè*) creates the thought, that is, speaks it. The voice is a producer of the first symbols. The written sign (*gramme*) is a convention, even a law, of voice. Words and speech (*logos*) are composed of signs, based on conventions; they are written signifiers of thoughts. Writing (incl. language

purpose is to emphasize a holistic understanding of Polish identity construction through discourse analysis, without totally denying the basic tenets of the structural approach. Words are composed of signs, based on conventions and they are written signifiers of thoughts as structuralists argue, but *for me language is basically only a mediator of thoughts between individuals and human collectives. The layer that the structural approach lacks is holistic interpretation; it atomizes 'reality' into words and may at best only trace the hidden meaning of words.*

2.2.6. Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is only one of many types of competing message analysis. There are at least seven different analysis methods that may be applied to the research of human messages: the content, rhetorical, narrative, semi-otic, interpretative, conversation and discursive methods. Some of them have been regarded quantitative in nature (*e.g. content analysis*), but most of them are qualitative. The emphasis of the *rhetorical method* is on how the message is presented, not so much on what the message says. Through the *narrative method* the researcher tries to focus on the characters of the carriers of the story. The focus of the *semiotic method* is on the deeper meanings and structures of messages as well as on latent meanings and the signifying process of the signs.¹³² Rhetorical or narrative analysis can be preliminary to this semiotic process. The basic assumption of the semiotic method is that the researcher is a member of the culture s/he is conducting research in. The *Interpretative method* is a technique by which the researcher pursues theory formation through the observation and coding of messages. This method has its roots in social scientific inquiry and it involves theoretical sampling, analytical categories as well as cumulative and comparative analysis. *Conversation analysis* is a method for analyzing

composed of words) is held as a major signifier of thought by Derrida. Our Western culture is held as *logocentric*, meaning that our philosophies and thinking is based on these word-centric premises. Thus, we have given law-like meanings to words; for example, the word science refers to a certain way of constructing an interpretation of truth(s), meaning in this case that the natural scientific approach is the only proper path to reach the truth.

¹³² Pearsall (2001), p. 1691: “*Semiotics means the study of signs and symbols and their use or interpretation (in human practices).*” The most common of our signs are probably the words of our languages, tones of music, visual messages, commercial advertisements, traffic signs, national emblems, military regalia etc. Semiotics can be divided into Philosophical Semiotics (Peircean Semiotics), Linguistic Semiotics (the relationship between the spoken and written language (Ferdinand de Saussure), Empirical Semiotics (*e.g.* the symptoms of diseases rehearsed by a medical doctor) and Cultural Semiotics (Culture as texts; Juri Lotman). See also Kristeva (1980 [1969]), p. 37. According to Julia Kristeva, the semiotic method refers to the practice in which the novel, seen as a text, synthesizes several possible utterances.

naturally occurring conversations, used by researchers of psychology, communication and sociology.¹³³

Through the *discourse method* the researcher tries to focus on the characteristics of manifest language as well as the words and messages used, connecting them to their precise context. The discourse method is generally about the interpretation of the language used (see Chapter 2.2.4). Through discourses, social actors constitute social roles, identities and relations between different social groups and those who interact with them. Discursive acts (texts and speeches) have been understood here as socially constitutive in at least the following ways: (1) they are responsible for the construction of certain social conditions; (2) they contribute to the restoration and legitimation of a social status quo (internal or international status quo), but they may be effective in destroying the status quo as well. The problem of the discourse method is that the researcher should be competent in the language used.¹³⁴ Consequently, I should be fluent in Polish, but I am not. However, I know the basics of Polish, so that I can read original Polish texts with the use of dictionary, but I can not claim always to understand the hidden meanings of words.

The discourse method may be divided into at least three main categories: critical, poststructuralist and constructivist discourse analysis. *Critical discourse analysis* (CDA) has been used as a method for analyzing media messages, for example. The main purpose of this method is “to unmask ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control, and dominance, as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language use.” CDA is also “committed to an emancipatory, social critical approach, [and] allies itself with those who suffer political and social injustice.”¹³⁵

Poststructuralist discourse analysis considers identity and, for example, foreign policy as ontologically inseparable “and this inseparability is enacted through discourse.”¹³⁶ Representations of identity and foreign policy discourses are considered as constituting each other, and they cannot be staged in cause-effect terms.¹³⁷ In poststructuralist discourse analysis everything is reduced to language, much in the Derridean way of juxtaposition, where one element of language is valued over its opposite, meaning that in claiming to be a Western nation, one should then define what an Eastern nation is. Language is not understood as a meditative tool in discourses, but as “a field of social and political practice, and hence there is no objective or

¹³³ Neuendorf (2002), pp. 4–7.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 4–7; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart (2005), p. 8.

¹³⁵ Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart (2005), p. 8; Neuendorf (2002), pp. 4–7.

¹³⁶ Hansen (2006), p. 27.

¹³⁷ Buzan (2006), p. xiii.

‘true meaning’ beyond the linguistic representation to which one can refer.”¹³⁸ Post-structuralist discourse analysis is close, even identical, to the idea of the so-called *Copenhagen School*, according to which everything may be securitized (or de-securitized) in discursive ways. This would mean that a state agent’s geographic position would not be a security issue, if it had not been defined as such. I agree, at some point it is a valid argument, but since the totality is larger than the sum of its parts, the defined idea needs to be internalized as being relevant by everyone involved in the issue.¹³⁹

Constructivist discourse analysis, while approving that representations of identity and foreign policy constitute each other, assumes, however, that identity has some causal influence on foreign policy, and is even partly non-discursively constituted.¹⁴⁰ This means that even though I rely more on a tradition of understanding than on a positivist tradition of explaining, I have not given up the explanatory power of identity in contextual foreign and defence policy. Even though I generally approve of the tenets of post-structuralist discourse analysis, I argue that national identity includes pre-structured elements that are not to be defined away in contextual discourses, or that they change only very slowly during the “*longue durée*.”

In this thesis discourse analysis has been understood holistically, consisting then of the elements from content analysis (repeated messages), narrative analysis (carriers of the story), and semiotic analysis (deeper meanings of messages), the post-structuralist discourse method (identity and e.g. foreign policy discourses constitute each others), and even the critical method (who are the Others in Polish narratives and discourses?). Thus, I do not consider, for example, content analysis as necessarily quantitative in nature, but only as a way to reveal messages from Polish identity discourses. The main difference between the narrative and discourse method is that whereas narratives have ‘carriers of the story’, or those who try to create, to invent

¹³⁸ Hansen (2006), pp. 18–19.

¹³⁹ See, for example, Waever (1999), p. 334. Ole Waever, as a leading figure of the so-called Copenhagen School, or the ‘speech act’ theory of security points out that any designation of security issues is political in its nature, and “thus it [the ‘speech act’ theory of security] puts an ethical question at the feet of analysts, decision-makers and political activists alike: why do you call this a security issue? What are the implications of doing this – or of not doing it?” See also Aalto (2003), p. 573 and p. 578 and p. 581. Pami Aalto has used an “intensive fieldwork method, Q methodology” (“*Q-methodological discourse analysis*”) in analyzing discursive security/identity linkages between the Estonians and Estonia’s Russophones. He then answers the call of Waever and the Copenhagen School by arguing that “Compared to many widely used methods, the peculiarity of Q methodology is that it shifts the focus from our own scholarly constructions to those of the human subjects whose actions and their consequences we are studying (e.g. members of the political elite, intellectuals and opinion leaders).”

¹⁴⁰ Hansen (2006), p. 27.

or to think up cognition in the ‘pre-collective, empty identity field’, discourses necessitate and are been conducted between two or more cognitive individuals or groups.¹⁴¹

Whatever the discourse, it includes two or more points of views and two or more cognitive carriers of the story as its components. *Narratives have been understood here as spatio-temporal meta-narratives (e.g. national birth-myths) and grand-narratives of the nation (e.g. historical victories and defeats of a nation). These spatio-temporal narratives have been presumed to be part of a mutually shared collective memory of a nation. They may be modifiable through national ‘sub-identity holders’ who may possess competing discourses over them.* It is essential therefore to clarify whose discourse prevails over other in a domestic context, or whether the discourses are congruent.¹⁴²

There is still something missing from the picture vis-à-vis discourse analysis. And that is John Searle’s *speech act theory*, which refers to the power of someone to influence someone by discourse. This is actually the main argument for selecting the Polish state, the Catholic Church and the Armed Forces of Poland as the dominant sub-identity-holders in Poland. *Discourse has been understood here as an act of communication which actually has no specific starting point and no conclusion. Discourse is socially constructed and constitutes situations, social identities and relationships between people and groups of people. Discourse is capable of sustaining and reproducing the social status quo, and it contributes to transforming it.* This necessitates an intertextuality of a kind that holds that even though possible congruencies between various texts and messages are important to clarify, so too are excluded or hidden messages (see e.g. Chapter 7.1.4; ‘Polish anti-Semitism’).¹⁴³ The meanings of texts (statements, speeches, interviews and wider societal discourse) are never fully given by the texts themselves, but are products of readings and interpretations. This “highlights that texts are situated within and against other texts, that they draw upon them in constructing their identities and policies, that they appropriate as well as revise the past, and that they build authority by reading and citing that of others.”¹⁴⁴ This means that since it is not possible to reach the

¹⁴¹ Adler (1997), p. 349. One has to be careful with the word cognitive, since identity is also something other than pure cognition; it is also about unconscious feelings, meaning that we, as individuals or nations, are not rational all the time (perhaps never), even though we think we are; we are ‘victims’ of habituated and reified beliefs as a “root cause” of our interests and believed rationalist cognitions.

¹⁴² Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart (2005), pp. 23–28.

¹⁴³ Kristeva (1980 [1969]), p. 36. According to Julia Kristeva, intertextuality is about texts that occupy semiotically several possible utterances taken from other texts, which intersect and neutralize each other. See also Fairclough (2006), p. 192.

¹⁴⁴ Hansen (2006), p. 55.

origin of, for example, the grand-narrative of Poland as a “Christian rampart”, I have to lean on numerous studies by native Polish or otherwise distinguished Poland-orientated social scientists by “*reading readings of original texts.*”¹⁴⁵

Speech act theory operates on two dimensions: a locutionary and an illocutionary dimension. The *Locutionary dimension* is the simplest dimension; it is simply about “saying something”, whereas the *illocutionary dimension* is about “doing something by saying something, e.g. making a promise.” When it comes to the illocutionary dimension, an agent with some kind of *status function* (e.g. the head of state, a politician, bishop, the Pope, a general, journalist etc.) may have the power to make somebody, individual or collective, to act or modify their opinions by his/her speech. This concerns the content of John Searle’s speech act theory. Searle divides status functions into four categories of power, namely, the symbolic, deontic, honorific and procedural. *Symbolic power* enables “us to represent reality in one or more of the possible illocutionary modes”, meaning that someone has power over someone by saying something; to say is to have influence on, or even make something happen. *Deontic power* is having the power to regulate relations between people by imposing rights, responsibilities, obligations, penalties etc. Deontic power in this context is not brute physical power, but the power to authorize, for example, the police, or the armed forces to use physical force. The deontic status function is about conventional power. *Honorific power* is to have status(es) that are valued for their own sake (e.g. winning a sports competition, elections, a medal, or even a war). *Procedural power* is closely connected with honorific power in the sense that, for example, to win an election is actually nothing in itself; what is more important is that winning the elections is to have influence on individuals and collectives; winning gives new rights and responsibilities to the winner.¹⁴⁶

Speech act theory is not capable of operating on the third necessary dimension, namely, the *perlocutionary dimension*, which refers to the effects a statement/message has on the audience.¹⁴⁷ Thus, social reality is more complicated than speech act theory presumes. *People may possess status functions what so ever, and on that basis may make other people act in some way, but there is never a guarantee that people will truly internalize the message of the sources of symbolic, deontic or honorific power. It is not only about semantics when analyzing narratives and discourses as messages, but also about the effects of those.*¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 52. See also Nabers (2006), p. 306.

¹⁴⁶ Searle (1995), pp. 99–103.

¹⁴⁷ Kratochwil (1991), p. 8.

¹⁴⁸ Kratochwil (1991), pp. 29–30.

The perlocutionary dimension needs some additional tools or methods to be used in order to be able to analyze the effects of messages. And this brings us to *iconic modelling*, which is needed when trying to reach, not only the content of messages, but also the responses to these messages among the people, in my case the Polish people. My intention is to concentrate on all the mentioned dimensions (locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary). However, to avoid being simply descriptive vis-à-vis the messages of Polish ‘sub-identity holders’ it is necessary to realize that there may be (and usually are) elements of ‘hidden meanings’ in those messages. Why say, for example, in official statements that Russia is not been considered a military threat, if she really isn’t considered a threat? Might it be that Russia is been considered as a military threat, but it is not diplomatic to say so? Another good example is the often heard ‘mantra’ of ‘credible defence’ in the Finnish security policy discourse. If we Finns believe that we have a credible defence, why does this have to be stated, if it is so obvious to us? One of the reasons may be that we do not actually believe in our defence’s credibility ourselves, or that by stating it frequently deep masses of the people will internalize that message. I am expecting to find the same kind of elements in Polish narratives and discourses as well.


2.2.7. Contexts, Iconic Modelling and Causal Complex

I have understood the change of the world order and Polish foreign and defence policy actions after the Cold War era as parts of *the global meta-context*, which includes two *regional sub-contexts*: (1) *European integration and CFSP*, and (2) *NATO-cooperation* (see Chapter 8). Every social context can be understood as a particular moment, which all the participant actors of that moment have at least partly in common for,¹⁴⁹ but this kind of definition may limit the potential of the idea of context, since then we have to stop time and concentrate on analyzing only a certain event of history. If contexts are defined as *processual and social ones*, as I have done, we are able to handle longer periods of time. We may then have more variables to analyze, but that would satisfy the basic need to understand time as an ever moving element in our research.

Iconic modelling refers to double hermeneutics and is understood here as being about the construction of a “window of causal complex” to intervene in the belief-side, or unconscious side (“lay meanings”) of the state agent’s external behaviour. An iconic model is “*a descriptive picture of a possible real world ... In other words, the source of a model is usually a field that is assumed to be better known, or to be more familiar, in the given context,*

¹⁴⁹ Patomäki (2002), p. 119.

and hence of help in constructing in imagination a possible mechanism or structured complex that can explain the phenomenon in question.”¹⁵⁰



Picture 6: Iconic modelling

Iconic modelling offers the possibility of operating between explaining and understanding, but I prefer operating more on the understanding side. Iconic modelling is focused on offering a set of causes as a “causal complex”, or as a transparent window between the ‘real’ world and the world of theories to understand, for example, the deep structure of a pre-interpreted national identity structure. The term ‘icon’ itself means “a symbolic and metaphoric window between two worlds: the world of theories and the real world we are trying to describe and understand, but which must remain always partially alien or uncovered.”¹⁵¹

A “window of causal complex” may be understood as a method, since for making intervention into the ‘real’ world of lay meanings, one needs to thematise the information s/he is seeking from the sources used. Generally, a “window of causal complex” may include the following five social components¹⁵² that can be used in any social scientific inquiry: (1) *actors* who are capable of producing events, episodes and tendencies; (2) regulative and constitutive *rules*; (3) relational and positioned *practices*; (4) *resources* as competencies and facilities, and (5) *meaningful action (mode of action)*. The basic meaning here is that there is never just a single cause, for exam-

¹⁵⁰ Patomäki (2002), p. 126 and p. 136. See also Kratochwil (2006), p. 14. According to Friedrich Kratochwil “the actors’ understanding influences the world. Therefore, the causal arrows run from our (or the agent’s) understanding to the world and not from ‘the world’ to our understanding or theory.”

¹⁵¹ Patomäki (2002), p. 129. Critical Realism (as well as Social Constructivism and the English School theory) relies on social ontology. The necessary element of iconic modelling, as a method, is also social ontology, and necessarily then a realist ontology as well.

¹⁵² Patomäki (2002), p. 119. Heikki Patomäki uses the expression: “There are five necessary...”, instead of my “may include...the following five.”

ple, in trying to understand the processes of change in the world order or the reorientation of national security policy, but many.¹⁵³

I have considered *actors* as constructors of national identity (see Chapter 4.2) in the sense that their *actions* are always a meaningful and productive enterprise, meaning that when acting they produce a “novel or conventional interpretation that has potential to co-cause and/or co-constitute elements of social worlds.” There is always a variety of possible actions in a given context in the sense that an actor could have done otherwise as well. This is precisely the situation when Poland chose her future political orientation after the Cold War (see Chapter 6.1).¹⁵⁴ There are three categories of actors judged to be the most relevant constructors of national identity, namely: the Others, conscious elites and the state itself. Furthermore, there are three categories of national collective actors understood as ‘sub-identity holders’: the Polish State itself, the Catholic Church of Poland and the Armed Forces of Poland.

Constitutive and regulative rules are necessary for social structures, as well as for external and internal relations. Constitutive rules (or even the lack of them) imply internal relations and are “action-dependent in a sense that actors have the power to reflect upon, criticise, deviate from and change the constitutive rules.” Internal constitutive rules make external relations and action possible. External relations can be understood as outcomes of the action generated by rules, resources and intentional reasons for action. *Constitutive rules give meaning to regulative rules*. Rules are often analyzed metaphorically through games, such as chess. Thus, the constitutive rule of chess is how to define the conditions of checkmate, whereas regulative rules are about the identity of individual chess pieces; how they are allowed to move. Constitutive rules have mostly the form ‘X counts as Y’, or ‘X counts as Y in context C’, whereas regulative rules follow the mode ‘Do X’, or ‘If Y, do X’.¹⁵⁵ This means that international institutions like state sovereignty, war, international law and diplomacy should be considered as regulative rules, since it is up to the state agent how to internalize those rules. International institutions can be constitutive only if the actors have internalized the *practices* that have been defined and produced by those institutions; a state agent may still consider war as a legitimate way to conduct its foreign policy strategy regardless of possible international sanctions.

¹⁵³ Patomäki (2002), pp. 76–77. Heikki Patomäki calls these social components as INUS components (“Insufficient but Non-redundant element of a complex that is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the *production* of the result” [Patomäki’s boldings and italics]).

¹⁵⁴ Patomäki (2002), p. 87 and p. 119.

¹⁵⁵ Giddens (1986), pp. 17–20; Searle (1995), pp. 27–28 and pp. 43–51; Patomäki (2002), pp. 102–103 and p. 119.

Resources refer to the actors' "embodied capabilities and position-endowed facilities." It is also about the actor's competence and capability to produce events, episodes and tendencies.¹⁵⁶ *Meaningful action* is a somewhat problematic part of the causal complex, since causal complex "does not disclose the layers of social beings and systems ... [that] have to be studied as well."¹⁵⁷ Even though action may be rational without needing to mobilize lay meanings (i.e. identity structure), contextual defence and foreign policy actions usually have the power to mobilize these.

Since Polish defence identity is the real essence of this thesis, causal complex has to be amended by some further elements in order to be able to make full intervention into the Polish identity world. The first 'missing' element is Anthony Giddens's Structuration theorem, and the second one is thematizing the messages of Polish 'sub-identity holders'.

2.2.8. *Structuration Theorem and the Thematized Messages of National 'Sub-Identity holders'*

Anthony Giddens's structuration theorem focuses on the duality of structure and social systems.¹⁵⁸ Structure is about a set of rules and resources that are out of time, space and subjects. Structures that guide social action do not determine actors' action in mechanical, Neorealist ways; actors (states) can transform structures in discursive ways. Thus, structuration gives an *interactionist view* to the relationship between domestic and international structures and actors. Both domestic and international structures have been understood here as processual compositions of "rules and resources, or sets of transformation relations, organized as properties of social systems", whereas social systems have been understood as "Reproduced relations between actors [individuals] or collectivities, organized as regular social practices." Structuration is then about "Conditions governing the continuity or transmutation of structures, and therefore the reproduction of social systems."¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ Patomäki (2002), p. 117. See also Dessler (2005), pp. 391–392. According to David Dessler, "regulative rules prescribe and proscribe behaviour in defined circumstances", whereas "constitutive rules...create or define new forms of behaviour." Dessler treats constitutive rules as conventions, which are "relatively unchanging practices that constitute a "vocabulary"... for international communication."

¹⁵⁷ Patomäki (2002), p. 119.

¹⁵⁸ It is to be noted that the 'home field' of Anthony Giddens's structuration theorem is sociology, not IR. However, I have widened the scope of this theorem and considered it as highly relevant when trying to elaborate the mutual relationship between domestic and international structures.

¹⁵⁹ Giddens (1986), p. 25 and p. 377. See also Ruggie (1998), p. 875; Jackson and Sørensen (2007), pp. 313–314.

I have understood domestic social rules and resources as institutionalized collective *Dasein* (understood here as ‘being-in-the-world’)¹⁶⁰ that exists as memory traces, and is actualized in action.¹⁶¹ This means that a nation may intersubjectively share a timeless and spaceless unconscious world view that constitutes and gives meaning to action; thus, domestic social structure has been understood here as an identity structure that enables or disables certain possibilities (e.g. approval or disapproval of the Other’s foreign policy actions).¹⁶² Constructing a collective world view may be the conscious project of some individual(s), or collective(s), for example, of ‘conscious elites’, for creating nation(hood), or for maintaining certain beliefs that are considered politically appropriate. This relates also to the *habituation thesis*, meaning that even though every identity structure (individual or collective) is rather stable, it may change and evolve over time. More layers may appear in it and some layers may disappear, but the core is rather stable. What is the core then? It has to be clarified in every identity-related research project.

Domestic and international structures are mutually constitutive and they are both social structures above all.¹⁶³ In international contexts social systems comprise the situated activities of state agents, reproduced across time and space.¹⁶⁴ Structure affects social systems domestically as deeper layers of meanings, namely, as identities, whether consciously or unconsciously. The importance of an identity’s unconscious side is that it may get actualized in action in unexpected ways and cause unexpected consequences. For example, we do not know how national identities eventually will operate vis-à-vis, for example, global warming, but it can be presumed at least that the currently highly tolerant identity structure will not adopt war as an approved institution for resolving the problem of possibly huge immigration waves from areas suffering from drought, even if one of the basic needs, perhaps even the most essential one, is individual and collective survival.

From picture seven one can see that by combining CR’s concepts of context, relevant INUS components as the “window of causal complex” as well as Giddens’s structuration theorem, it is possible to conduct research into how national identity affects, and participates in, some particular contexts. The aforementioned global meta-context and regional contexts offer the opportunity to find at least sufficient causal relations by deciding who and what are the contextual relevant actors, resources and competencies of

¹⁶⁰ Heidegger (2006 [1926]), p. 65.


¹⁶¹ Giddens (1986), p. 25 and p. 377.

¹⁶² See, for example, Patomäki (2002), p. 115. According to Heikki Patomäki, “social rules and resources usually only enable or allow certain possibilities and disable, disallow or exclude certain others.”

¹⁶³ Ruggie (1998), p. 879.

¹⁶⁴ Giddens (1986), p.25.

the relevant actors, and regulative rules as institutional practices. There may be relevant actors participating in the context(s) who do not consider other relevant actors as Others at all (see Picture 7; broken lines around structures A, B and C), or who have at least partially internalized the same value worlds. On the other hand, there may be relevant actors participating in the context(s) whose identity structure does not allow any kind of penetration, and who consider all the other actors as Others (see Picture 7; structures D and E).



Picture 7: Causal complex, contexts and structure

In order to make a ‘full intervention’¹⁶⁵ into the national identity structure, one has to ascertain the dominant ‘sub-identity holders’ of the society and thematize their messages. I have decided that the Polish State itself (including key politicians and political parties), the Catholic Church of Poland and the Armed forces of Poland are the relevant ‘sub-identity holders’ of Polish

¹⁶⁵ See, for example, Shapiro and Wendt (1992), pp. 218–219. According to Ian Shapiro and Alexander Wendt, the “use of intervention as a criterion of theoretical success encourages ... social scientists to build “critical” theories, that is, theories that can only be assessed by calling into question the institutional structures that generate the observable regularities of everyday society.”

national identity and its core defence identity. This judgement is based on the readings of Polish academic and societal discourses and on the notion that these ‘sub-identity holders’ are the main reference points and carriers of Polish identity narratives. At this point I take departure from Carl Schmitt and his argument that the state is the only “political” that has the power to distinguish public enemies from friends.¹⁶⁶ I argue that a nation can distinguish public enemies from friends without the state as well, and in the current globalized post-modern information era ‘sub-identity holders’ may not be congruent on this issue. For that reason, Polish people, who occupy several identity fields (gender, class, professional, regional etc.), have been treated as supporting or opposing the identity expressions of the national ‘sub-identity holders’ (public opinion).

	State	Church	Armed forces	Public opinion
World view/ constitutive narratives and discourses as identity expressions	Sources: Academic and societal discourse, constitution, security political “White Books”, speeches and statements of key politicians (Presidents, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers)	Sources: Academic and societal discourse, speeches and statements of the Pope and the Polish Catholic Community	Sources: Academic and societal discourse, speeches and statements of the Presidents, Defence Ministers and military	Sources: Opinion polls
Borders of Otherness External & internal	”	”	”	”
Priorities of the contexts: Global context NATO-cooperation EU-integration	”	”	”	”
Conclusions	What are the Poles defending? = match-points and noticeable divergences (‘sub-identity holders’ vs. public opinion)			
International system – ‘Prepare for the self-help’	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Identity defence (the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national identity of Poland) ▪ Unchanged borders of Otherness 			
International society – ‘Changing borders of Otherness through adaptation and learning’	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Regional cooperation and security community (EU, NATO and USA) ▪ Changed borders of Otherness 			
World society – ‘Give whoeverism a chance’	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Global solidarity (communitarianism)/global equality (cosmopolitanism) ▪ No borders of Otherness 			

Table 1: The thematized narratives and discourses of national ‘sub-identity holders’

There are some problems related to survey-methods, including opinion polls. For example, opinion polls in different periods may not be compara-

¹⁶⁶ Schmitt (1996 [1932]), pp. 29–30 and p. 51. The public enemy is another state (“the political”), according to Carl Schmitt. “The political enemy need not be merely evil or aesthetically ugly ... but he is nevertheless, the other, the stranger ... something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.” But the reverse is also possible: “the morally evil, aesthetically ugly, or economically damaging need not necessarily be the enemy”, and furthermore: “the morally good, aesthetically beautiful, and economically profitable need not necessarily become the friend” in a political sense. See also Camus (1989). A human being may consider him-/herself as a stranger even to him-/herself on some occasions, as Albert Camus has shown in his novel, but surely as the Other as well. See also Neumann (1998), p. 2.

ble, and it may be difficult to collect fully comparable material for the entire period under research. Furthermore, the formulation of the questions may not allow the respondents to express their opinions freely, and even the time of conducting the questionnaire may affect the result. The results of opinion polls can be seen only as an aggregate of individual opinions, not as discursively comprised public opinion.¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, just as states do not act alone in the processual international structure, neither do human beings comprise their individual opinions over various issues independently from their social sphere; individual opinions are affected by the media and spatio-temporal societal discourses. This means that the results of opinion polls may be considered (as I have considered in this thesis) at least as indicators of shared opinions and of societal norms, which policy makers and national ‘sub-identity holders’ have to take into account, at least in liberal democracies.

The following sub-topics have been judged as capable of revealing the essential characteristics of the Polish identity structure: *world view* (constitutive narratives and discourses as identity expressions), *borders of Otherness* (external and internal), and *priorities of the contexts* (global meta-context, EU-integration and CFSP, and NATO-cooperation). Conclusions, based on the ‘match-points’ and divergences vis-à-vis the world views, expressions concerning borders of Otherness, and priorities of the contexts found, would then be a general comprehension of Polish national identity and of defence identity in particular.

The expected result may be that Polish defence identity simultaneously includes elements of the *international system* (*‘prepare for self-help’*) that represents cultural habituation (identity defence and unchanged borders of Otherness), elements of *international society* (*‘changing borders of Otherness through adaptation and learning’*) that represents the effects of contextual discursive interactions (regional, contextual cooperation), and elements of *world society* (*‘give whoeverism a chance’*) that represents altruism and normative emancipation (communitarianism and/or cosmopolitanism without borders of Otherness).

¹⁶⁷ Jacobsson (1997), p. 75. According to Kerstin Jakobsson, “public opinion is thus the result of communication, and not of the aggregation of individual opinions in surveys.”

3

FROM IMPLICIT TO EXPLICIT IDENTITY THEORIES IN IR

The basic tenet of identity theories is that every identity (whether e.g. sex/gender, regional, national or collective) is based either on something that one does not want to be or represent, or on something that one wants to be; it is a matter of cognitive will and socially necessary convention to belong or not to belong to some group, community or society. National or collective identity plays a large role in the discussion of modernity and post-modernity. The national identities of the existing nation-states have been constructed and upheld as solid and stable, but the post-modern era of globalization, or of “liquid modernity”/“post-modern information age” challenges the basis of established identity structures. National identity and belonging to a nation are no longer set in stone and ‘secured by a lifelong guarantee’, since nowadays there are more alternative categories for belonging, whether individually or collectively.¹

Attempts to map out the use of identity in IR are difficult, since identity seems to be at least implicitly present in any IR theory. Neorealism, for example, takes identities and the interests of actors as given, meaning that the processes of, for example, institutions affect the behaviour but not the identities and interests of actors.² But in order to explain or understand Poland’s decision to join NATO and the EU as well as establish close military cooperation with the USA, or Poland’s commitment to its territorial defence, one has to know what Poland is, what a Pole is, and why Poland evaluates its self-interest in a certain way, regardless of the perspective of any chosen IR theory. Otherwise our explanations would only be superficial.

Identity as an explicit concept moved into the mainstream of IR research about 20 years ago through Constructivism. Identity as a dependent variable is usually used in studies of national identity, national attitudes and studies of ethnic identity, and then almost exclusively leaning on the Constructivist framework. Even some other explicit identity theories, like *Feminism*, use identity as an independent variable, meaning, for example, that international relations should be understood from the point of view of gender and focus then on the oppression of women. Whilst not saying that

¹ Castells (1997), pp. 2–3; Neumann (1999), p. 228; Vecchi (2006), pp. 6–8; Bauman (2006), pp. 11–12; Forsberg and Herd (2006), p. 30.

² Baylis (2001), pp. 243–244. See also Ruggie (1998), p. 862.

gender studies would not have any value in IR, the point is that gender should be understood then as socially constituted through ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’, not as a non-changeable and exogenously given independent variable.³

Just as it is difficult to map out the use of identity in the IR, it is also difficult to categorize different IR Schools and approaches into their own ‘camp’; many relevant researchers of the IR have almost changed ‘the camp’. For example Alexander Wendt as probably the most influential Constructivist seems to have become a representative of the English School in his later writings.⁴ Another good example is Barry Buzan, who was previously labelled a Neorealist, and now as a representative of the English School.⁵ Furthermore, there are signs that sociology is moving towards IR.⁶ One conclusion that can be drawn from this development is that by ‘socializing’ IR, Constructivism has paved the way for IR scholars from various ‘camps’ to conduct research in commensurable ways over various social issues, like the state, national identity and the international structure by using non-traditional theories (e.g. *psychoanalytic identity theory*),⁷ without the need to commit themselves to ontological and epistemological debates.

Thus, I do not consider that Constructivism is the only identity theory in IR; the English School theory and CR may also be considered alongside Constructivism.⁸ But it is Constructivism as a ‘via media’ that combines the

³ Horowitz (2002). See also Zalewski (1995), p. 339; Enloe (2000), pp. 3–5. According to Cynthia Enloe, “Conventionally both masculinity and femininity have been treated as ‘natural’, not created.” Foreign policy, according to Enloe, has been considered as men’s business, since usually women have not had the opportunity to participate and as a result international politics has remained relatively untouched by feminist thought.

⁴ Wendt (2003), (2005).

⁵ Buzan (2004). See also Jackson and Sørensen (2007), p. 46.

⁶ See, for example, Castells (1997).

⁷ See, for example, Heikka (1999), pp. 57–108; Freud (1959 [1922]), pp. 37–38; Lacan (1977 [1966]), p. 5 and p. 17. See also Miller (1999), p. 119. Henrikki Heikka has interpreted Russian Foreign Policy by using Sigmund Freud’s and Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theories. Using Freud’s thesis, Heikka argues that Russia has stayed in a pre-oedipal phase, not giving up the mythical ‘mother-Russia’, struggling against all the challengers (especially West) of this safe, habituated and reified world-view. Furthermore, using Lacan’s argument, Heikka argues that Russia has also narrated new nationalist identity layers (e.g. “Russia’s historical destiny of uniting the major civilizations of the world”) that actually further distinct herself from the Others (especially West).

⁸ See, for example, Buzan (2004), p. 7. According to Barry Buzan, international society (the society of states) is about the “institutionalisation of shared interest and identity amongst states, and puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory.” See also Buzan (2004), pp. 7–8. According to Barry Buzan, world society “takes individuals, non-state organisations and ultimately the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements, and puts transcendence of the states at the centre of IR theory.”

main notions of the Realist paradigm (e.g. that brute material facts count at some point), Critical theory (e.g. that the major driving forces of world order change, albeit slowly) and the reflectivism of the English School (international structure's normative possibilities) and CR (the possibility of cultural emancipation and concrete utopia). It is also Constructivism that can negotiate with the psychoanalytic identity theories of Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan and Herbert Mead. It is also Constructivism that stresses the importance of the social construction of 'reality', as sociology does.

3.1. Constructivism

The common story, often heard, is that Constructivism was a result of IR's 'third debate' of the 1970s and 1980s between positivism (explaining) and post-positivism (*Verstehen*, or understanding). The other common story is that Constructivism was presented to IR in late 1980s and early 1990s by the writings of Nicholas Onuf and Alexander Wendt as a counter-reaction to the Realist paradigm.⁹ However, the philosophical roots of Constructivism may be traced to the ideas of the eighteenth-century Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico. He presented the basic tenets of Constructivism under the label "New Science", which basically meant social science and the social construction of reality, based on history, philology and the cultural customs of men. His "New Science" was actually an effort to build a coherent basis for the social sciences by placing it on a level with the natural sciences. Vico claimed that individual man acts out of what he takes to be his own self-interest. But what man takes to be his self-interest is also connected with man's social role. This means that an individual's actions may have consequences he neither foresaw nor desired. In a given context then, the individual will act out of what s/he takes to be her/his own particular ends, but the social nature of these ends may bring unexpected changes to the social system itself.¹⁰

⁹ Adler (2002), pp. 98–99. See also Wendt (1999), pp. 3–4. Before the evolution of Social Constructivism the approach called Neoliberalism was generated as a competing theory to Neorealism. Neoliberals accepted Neorealism's individualism, but argued that international institutions could dampen or even displace the effects of power and interest in world politics.

¹⁰ Pompa (ed.) (1982), pp. 13–15.

Constructivism may be divided into many Schools,¹¹ but the most valid deviation vis-à-vis this thesis is, however, to divide these Schools into three main categories according to perspectives on the sources and processes of national identity construction, namely, the *interactionist perspective*, the *endogenous perspective* and the *cultural perspective*. This allows me to deal with previous writings and authors of Constructivism in commensurable ways without the need to categorize representatives of a particular perspective too narrowly; one may present one's ideas from the interactionist perspective in some particular writing whilst at the same time presenting ideas from the endogenous, cultural or even normative perspective in another writing. This commensurable approach allows me to adopt ideas from other IR theories as well.

All of the aforementioned perspectives include at least one common element, namely, the conception of Otherness and the way we tend to see someone, an individual or another nation, as a stranger or as the Other. How do we define Otherness is about how we see ourselves in distinction from others. This affects our policies towards the Other (an individual or a group, like a nation). Politics is also about identity, based on particular sets of beliefs and values that we often refer to as culture. Just as people with different material interests can clash over their differences, people with different identities, whether religious or secular, may also disagree in politics.¹²

It is important to clarify how states define Otherness (Who is the Other for us?) in identity researches, since it gives us at least a prognosis of the possible future actions of states. Otherness is connected to fear and love (hu-

¹¹ See, for example, Pettman (2000), pp. 11–21. Ralph Pettman has divided Constructivists into three categories: *Conservative Constructivists* (those who criticize postmodernists for their rejection of research into world affairs in social scientific terms and those who want to highlight that the state system is an international society and that ideational factors have causative force in world affairs), *Social Theory Constructivists* (those who see Conservative Constructivists talking about e.g. states as if they were all the same, “despite the manifest differences between them in terms of their “identities”, for example.”), and *Commonsense Constructivists* (those who try to bring people back in, “not as “societies”... but as holistic, world-knowing social selves ... [for] understand[ing] how world affairs feel to ordinary people and not only elites”). See also Wendt (1992), p. 394; Wendt (2006), p. 21; Jackson and Sørensen (2007), p. 167; Price and Reus-Smit (1998), p. 272; Campbell (1998), p. 4; Pettman (2000), pp. 11–25. Constructivist Schools may also be divided into *Conventional Constructivism* and *Critical Constructivism*, or into *Modern* and *Postmodern Constructivism*. ‘*Conventionalists*’ (and ‘*Modernists*’) deny the possibility of making ‘Big-T’ truth claims about the world, but not ‘small-t’ truth claims about the subjects they have investigated. *Critical Constructivists* (and ‘*Postmodernists*’) argue that truth claims are not possible in open and non-neutral social systems.

¹² See, for example, Kopstein and Lichbach (eds.) (2000), p. 12.

man beings naturally favour those they love).¹³ We do not have to fear the Other necessarily, but, for example, saying as a Christian that the Other to me is a Muslim (or vice versa) is in a way a question of fear; that the Other endangers something that I value as important to me. But this does not mean that we have to get rid of that Other in order to continue to live as we have been used to live. We also may tolerate the Other, compete with it, be a friend even, but not necessarily wage war. It is a question of how dangerous the existence of this Other is considered collectively by us.¹⁴

3.1.1. The Interactionist Perspective and Learning

The interactionist perspective is the ‘core perspective’ of Constructivism. By this I mean Modern, Conservative or Conventional Constructivism, which was analyzed above, and which could also be called Wendtian (Social) Constructivism. The word social is a bit misleading here, even though it is widely used, since all the perspectives or ‘strands’ of Constructivism are social in their nature.¹⁵ *Thus, from now on I prefer to use only the term Constructivism instead of Social Constructivism.* Generally, the interactionist perspective focuses on how inter-subjective practices between actors result in identities and interests formed in the processes of interaction, and stresses that national identity develops mainly through social interaction and learning. Learning is understood here as the reinterpretation of one’s interests which occurs when actors adopt new norms and rules of behaviour based on previous experiences and/or new information and knowledge. Learning refers to new internalized beliefs signifying ‘appropriate’ behaviour, whereas mere adaptation to contextual norms does not necessitate fundamental learning.¹⁶

¹³ Spinoza (1996 [1677]), p. 86. According to Benedict de Spinoza, “If we imagine that someone loves, desires, or hates something we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall thereby love, desire, or hate it with greater constancy.” See also Booth (1998), p. 35. According to Ken Booth, Fear is closely related to enemy images.

¹⁴ Spinoza (1996 [1677]), p. 157. According to Benedict de Spinoza, “fear arises from the weakness of mind.”

¹⁵ Wendt (1992), p. 393. According to Alexander Wendt, “The irony is that theories which seek to explain identities and interests do exist. Keohane has called them “reflectivist”; because I want to emphasize their focus on the social construction of subjectivity and minimize their image problem, following Nicholas Onuf I will call them “constructivists.””

¹⁶ Haas (2005), p. 89 and p. 99. See also Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (2001), p. 146; Rieker (2006), pp. 509–514. Pernille Rieker has conducted research on French foreign and defence policy by asking how and to what extent has the EU’s foreign and security policy lead to adaptation and change in national foreign and security policy and to what extent we can speak about learning through interaction.

Increased international interactions have eroded the ‘hard shell’ of nation-states, increasing their sensitivity and vulnerability to events and actions taking place beyond their borders. The fear of conflict may stimulate forms of cooperation, such as “banding together in the face of a common enemy.” This may foster “a sense of community and collective identity among the cooperative parties.”¹⁷

Interactions are basically processes of signalling, interpreting and responding. Interaction rewards participant actors for “holding certain ideas about each other and discourages them from holding others”; it is to a large extent about learning what ideas are agreeable and productive.¹⁸ *Discursive interaction* affects national identity and interests through negotiative cooperation (the foreign policy statements and meetings of states’ political elites on various external social contexts,¹⁹ like globalization, NATO-enlargement and EU-integration), but also through international norms (i.e. institutions like state sovereignty, diplomacy and international law), and bargaining, enforcement and soft persuasion by other states or organizations.²⁰ *Non-discursive interaction* (i.e. war) has been understood in this thesis as a possible foreign policy tool between interactionist states. War itself is understood here as a social event, even though the main methods of war are bullets and rockets, not discourse.²¹ Furthermore, external material factors, like global warming, geographic location (geopolitics and geostrategy) and material dependencies, such as dependency on oil and natural gas, have been considered as being capable of having an influence, not only on the interests and behaviour of the state, but also on national identity.

Discursive interaction - cooperation and spill-over- effect

One of the key concepts in cooperation between states is “*incentives*” to *engage in joint action*. Even if states recognize each others as sovereign they need incentives to engage in joint action. One important incentive is the growing density of interactions among states due to the need to survive economic competition and external threats like terrorism. Enhanced cooperation reduces Otherness, not necessarily totally, but at least to some de-

¹⁷ Kratochwil and Mansfield (2005), p. x and 1.

¹⁸ Wendt (1992), p. 405.

¹⁹ Krasner (2005), p. 77. According to Stephen Krasner, “Elites act within a communications net, embodying rules, norms and principles, which transcends national boundaries.” See also Nye (2005), p. 372.

²⁰ Adler (1997), p. 341. Persuasion is “a struggle to define mutual understandings”, and an attempt “to control behavior through a wide range of social sanctions, only one of which is the use of force.” See also Schoppa (1999), pp. 316–317.

²¹ Adler (1997), p. 347. War is a social event, since people wage wars, not machines. Discourse, in the form of diplomacy, is present in war, even during the bullets and rockets-phase.

gree, meaning that “each learns to form relatively stable expectations about the other’s behaviour, and through these, habits of cooperation ... form.”²² Taking departure from the traditional game-theory analysis of cooperation, Constructivist analysis on the forms of cooperation concentrates on “how the expectations produced by behaviour affect identities and interests.” In other words, Constructivism bases its cooperation analysis on cognition, because identities and interests have been created to some extent before the interaction; states have endogenous identities and interests before they enter the interaction. Thus, cooperative behaviour is not merely about incentives; incentives are tempting only if the domestic identity structure allows them to be incentives.

Constructivist analysis on EU-integration and NATO-cooperation suggests that five decades of European and transatlantic cooperation may have transformed a positive interdependence, not only into a collective “European identity”, but also to some extent into a “transatlantic identity”, in terms of which cooperative states define their self-interests. The process of evolving cooperation redefines the originally egoistic (e.g. ‘to keep Germany constrained’) reasons for that cooperation by reconstructing identities and interests “in terms of new intersubjective understandings and commitments.”²³ This is largely about the spill-over-effect then at least when it comes to the EU, in that European integration, based on the 1957 Treaties of Rome,²⁴ has had two fundamental characteristics: the EU’s enlargement has been a continuous process and European integration has continuously deepened and spread functionally into new areas (the spill over -effect), such as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).²⁵

From the Constructivist perspective, joining and belonging, for example, to a security community,²⁶ like NATO, has long term effects on national iden-

²² Wendt (1992), p. 416.

²³ Ibid., p. 417.

²⁴ European Commission (1997a), pp. 9–10. On 25 March 1957 the six founder States of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) signed the so-called *Treaties of Rome*, which established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).

²⁵ The original Treaties of Rome have been revised four times: in 1987 by the *Single European Act* (SEA), in 1992 by the *Treaty on European Union* (Maastricht Treaty), in 1997 by the *Amsterdam Treaty* and in 2001 by the *Nice Treaty*. By the SEA the member states decided to increase the cases in internal markets in which the Council could take decisions by qualified majority instead of unanimous agreement among the twelve Member States. The SEA also established the European Council, which formalises the conferences or summits of the Heads of States and Governments (see the European Union (1987)).

²⁶ Deutsch (et al.) (1969), pp. 5–7. A *security community* “is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.” An *amalgamated security community* is the “merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with

tity, but membership sometimes necessitates persuasion, not necessarily enforcement, of a member state. Persuasion succeeds, because the more institutionalized a collective defence arrangement, such as NATO, the less likely the member states are to abandon each others.²⁷ Persuasion as a discursive interactionist practice is probably best understood through an example from Maja Zehfuss's research on the change in Germany's security policy behaviour as a result of "persuasion" by the United States. According to Zehfuss, Germany was softly forced to change her 'never again war'-principle in 1999, when the Bundeswehr was authorized to participate in operation 'Allied Force' in Kosovo. It was the context that allowed, or forced Germany to rearticulate the 'never again war-principle', but the previous request of the USA to Germany to participate in the Gulf operation in 1990 also affected the 1999 Kosovo-case. Maja Zehfuss has called this process "*altercasting*", meaning that other states (mainly the USA) behaved towards Germany as if she already had a new role "in the hope that [Germany] would do what this new role, rather than the old demanded of it."²⁸

International regulative and constitutive rules, norms and values

I identified earlier (see Chapter 2.2.7) four main points concerning rules: (1) constitutive and regulative rules are a necessary condition for social structures, and for external as well as internal relations, (2) internal constitutive rules make external relations and action possible, (3) international institutions like state sovereignty, war and international law should be considered as regulative rules, since it is up to the state agent how to internalize those rules, and (4) international institutions can only be constitutive, if actors have internalized the practices that have been defined and produced by those institutions. At this point I wish to explain these ideas further in order to clarify the mutual constitutive relationship between international and domestic structures.

Both rules and norms aim to regulate behaviour. Rules can be seen as more formal and written legal ends, whereas norms are more like the customs of

some type of common government after amalgamation [e.g. USA]." *A pluralistic security community* "retains the legal independence of separate governments [e.g. USA and Canada functioning as a security community without being merged]."

²⁷ Wallander (1999), p. 29. Collective security means that the threat to any member of the arrangement is considered a threat to all the others.

²⁸ Zehfuss (2001), pp. 322–323 and p. 329. See also Adler and Barnett (2000), p. 323; Wiberg (2000), p. 296. Security communities like NATO evolve around "cores of strength", according to Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. However, the Scandinavian "security community" has evolved around a common religion and language, rather than around a core of strength, according to Håkan Wiberg; there is no core of strength in the Scandinavian security community.

the international or domestic society, or “expectations for the proper behaviour of the actors with a given identity.”²⁹ International and domestic norms can be seen as unwritten rules of accepted and expected modes of behaviour, which reflect a culture’s values, either prescribing a given type of behaviour, or forbidding it. Norms, like written rules, can be backed by sanctions of one kind or another, varying from informal disapproval to physical punishment; commitment to the common good reduces the need for coercion.³⁰ *Values are culture-based ideas about what is desirable, proper, good or bad.* Values also determine which principles and material goods are negotiable and which are not. As to what values individuals deem to be important, this is influenced by the specific culture in which they happen to live.³¹

Constitutive norms and values are the ones that define the identity of an actor. Norms may operate like written rules, but rules are not necessarily internalized deeply as a part of identity. Rules can be seen as regulative norms that define standards of appropriate behaviour. Rules and norms may change an actor’s behaviour, but not necessarily its identity. One may, for example, behave according to international law, or according to the state’s internal law codex, but only because others do so as well, or out of fear of being sanctioned if one acted otherwise. Thus, rules and norms are much about obedience, based on coercion, or on cognitive expectations of obedience; one need not obey rules or norms if those are not internalized as part of one’s identity.³² A state may behave according to some international norm (such as the non-violation of another state’s territorial sovereignty), but only because otherwise it would lose its prestige, or the level of *positive recognition* it has reached in the eyes of other states.³³ At this point a norm may become an internalized institution (institutionalization) that affects not only behaviour, but also identity as part of one’s values. Thus, a state may consider war, for example, as a totally impossible institution for resolving disputes with other states, meaning that a state has internalized this mode of normative behaviour as a constitutive part of its identity struc-

²⁹ Katzenstein (1996), p. 5. See also Wiener (2006), p. 9; Krasner (2005), p. 73. Stephen Krasner defines norms as positive and rules as negative: Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations, whereas rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for certain action.”

³⁰ Onuf (1998), p. 7; Giddens (2004), p. 695. See also Buzan (2004), pp. 163–164; Johnson (2006), p. 12.

³¹ Giddens (2004), p. 701. See also Johnson (2006), p. 14.

³² Buzan (2004), pp. 152–157.

³³ Fukuyama (1992), p. 135. According to Francis Fukuyama, “For Hegel, the primary motor of human history is not modern natural science or the ever expanding horizon of desire that powers it, but rather a totally non-economic drive, the *struggle for recognition*.” See also Wendt (2005), p. 589.

ture voluntarily, because even today war is still a possible way to achieve foreign policy objectives.³⁴

Non-discursive interaction - war

From the interactionist perspective, national identities are constructed through material clashes as well, meaning for the most part wars. For example, it has been argued that Australian national identity was created on the beaches of Gallipoli in 1915,³⁵ and it would be fair to say that some characteristics of Finnish national identity were constructed through the Winter War in 1939. There are lots of examples like these, and surely some can be found in Poland's past as well.

War is still an approved foreign policy institution. What is, for example, the multilateral military crisis management in its nature, but war? From the postmodernist point of view, it depends on how one defines war, but at least some of the methods used in military crisis management operations are not discursive ones, but bullets and rockets.³⁶ The same can be said about humanitarian interventions. What is humanitarian intervention actually, but 'another kind of war', during which bullets and rockets are used at least to some extent instead of discursive interaction. This is a cynical view, I admit, since there are cases when the interest in conducting humanitarian interventions have really been humanitarian, but even then interaction has based at least partly on bullets and rockets.³⁷

³⁴ Katzenstein (1996), p. 5. See also Goertz and Diehl (1992), p. 641. According to Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl, there are "cooperative norms", "hegemonic norms" and "decentralized norms" and none of them is necessarily constitutive in nature. See also Price and Tannenwald (1996), p.115 and p. 117 and p. 142 and p. 150. As an example of norms' constitutive effects Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald's research on the development of prohibitory norms concerning weapons of mass destruction offers a good example. They argue that the norm of the non-use of chemical ("*chemical weapons taboo*") and nuclear weapons have become a normative understanding through actors' practices and interpretations. The norm of non-use of these weapons has been reified and become an intersubjective international norm, which further shapes actors' conceptions of their interests and identities.

³⁵ Hoffenberg (2001), p. 114.

³⁶ Grotius (2005 [1625]), Chapter I, Paragraph II. According to Hugo Grotius, war is merely the state or situation of those who dispute by force of arms, regardless of whether it is a question of single combat or "Publick Wars" [sic].

³⁷ See, for example, Finnemore (1996), pp. 153–158. Martha Finnemore has analyzed how the word humanitarian has been used as a justification to "disguise baser motives in more than one intervention." According to Finnemore, "motives for intervention are mixed; humanitarian motives may be genuine but may be only part of a larger constellation of motivations driving state action." For example, the U.S. intervention in Grenada was one of the cases in which humanitarian justifications for military action were doubtful. But when it comes to the U.S. operation in Somalia, in December 1992, it is hardly

3.1.2. *The Endogenous Perspective and Domestic Constitutive Narratives*

The endogenous perspective concentrates mainly on internal constitutive narratives and discourses, answering the question: *Who are the internal constructors (narrators) of national identity and how have we become as we are with the kind of identity construction we have?* The endogenous perspective is based on the mediation of chosen narratives by someone to somebody with the purpose of constructing something. It is about becoming a self-conscious collective instead of being many individuals.³⁸ Alexander Wendt has explicitly argued that modern and postmodern Constructivists “share the cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioural one in which they are exogenous.”³⁹ According to James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, Constructivism is concerned with identity-formation, but has really focused “*on the construction of variation within a given actor class (type or role identities), rather than on explaining how organizational actors come into being in the first place (corporate identities).*”⁴⁰ However, Constructivism “*is equipped to show how national [identities] and interests are born.*”⁴¹

The endogenous perspective is about the one-way mediation of narratives told by conscious elites to create collective cognition on an otherwise empty collective identity field. The endogenous perspective may be called a narrative theory of identity, with the content that action becomes meaningful in the process of narrating a constitutive story of the ‘Self’.⁴² Emanuel Adler sees the endogenous perspective as a theory of “*cognitive evolution*”, whose task is to explain how institutional facts become accepted. Cognitive evolution can be seen as the purposeful construction of national identity, meaning that it may not be the “best-fitted ideas” that become “naturalized” or reified, but those ideas that prove to be the “most successful at imposing collective meaning and function on physical reality.”⁴³

a case where the military goals would have been disguised by the word humanitarian; USA did not use the opportunity to rearm the fighting clans in Somalia, even though the UN pressured her to “pacify” the country.

³⁸ See, for example, Browning (2002), p. 47. In relation to the question of becoming or being, Christopher Browning has investigated how historical revisionism became popular in Finland after the Cold War by claiming that “central to such revisionism has been the notion that Finland has come home to assume its natural place in the Western European family.”

³⁹ Wendt (1992), p. 394.

⁴⁰ Fearon and Wendt (2002), p. 63.

⁴¹ Adler (1997), p. 337.

⁴² Browning (2002), p. 49.

⁴³ Adler (1997), p. 340.

I argue that nations have become nations at some stage of history (understood as a process, not as an exact temporal point) through the purposeful meditative efforts of someone, whether by conscious individuals or conscious groups of people. This does not mean that the ‘target audience’ is not conscious, but that the consciousness that the audience possesses has been evaluated as insufficient by the above mentioned mediators. From this basis, national identity as part of the domestic structure enters into contextual interactions with the international structure consisting of various other national identities as endogenously constructed prior to such interactions. Even though the national narratives are usually based on previous historical experiences, and at the same time on previous interactionist cycles, these experiences may not have been felt collectively as national ones. For example, when Sweden and Russia waged war in 1808–1809 the operations were mainly conducted on what is now Finnish soil. The war was not a Finnish effort as a nation. There was no Finnish nation at that time; Finns were subjugated to the Swedish crown. But later the War was endogenously narrated by Johan Ludvig Runeberg as being part of the Finnish nation’s shared experience.⁴⁴

The narratives of a society’s past condition what that society thinks of itself now, but also point to directions for future development, by shaping what relations and actions with Others are acceptable to the ‘Self’. Thus, identity reconstruction is highly politically loaded.⁴⁵ In this respect, the Polish case is much like the Finnish one; my task is then to expose the legacy of the past by explaining what the past for really was for Poles as narrated by the Poles themselves.

In this thesis, the endogenous perspective has been understood in the sense that a state agent’s participation in international contexts already has some kind of pre-structured and narrative-based collective identity construction, constructed spatio-temporally by endogenous conscious elites. It is a question, then, about how the corporate identity came into being in the first place, by whom was it created and on what narratives does it lean?⁴⁶ Pre-existing identity constructions include such elements like founding myths and narratives of external as well as internal Other(s).⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Runeberg (1928), pp. 5–6. The very first poem, “Maamme” (“Our Land”) in Johan Ludvig Runeberg’s book “*Vänrikki Stoolin tarinat*” (“*Tales of Ensign Stål*”; 1848–1860) became the Finnish national anthem. It was the patriotic heroism of this book (among other novels, poems and books of various other poets and artists) that coloured and still colours Finnish attitudes towards Russia.

⁴⁵ Browning (2002), p. 48.

⁴⁶ Fearon and Wendt (2002), p. 63. See also Cederman and Daase (2006), p. 122.

⁴⁷ See, for example, Hopf (2002), p. 155.

3.1.3. The Cultural Perspective and Habituation

“The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.”⁴⁸

The cultural perspective is about sustaining past narratives of the nation. These are presented in official identity expressions of the nation (e.g. the constitution and security political doctrines), in literature, in the media, and these can be noticed in everyday culture (material symbols like national flags, coats-of-arms, memorial statues and social symbols as ideas), all of which represent the shared experiences and concerns, triumphs and destructive defeats of the nation. National identity is represented in these expressions as original, unchanging and unbroken, and as a uniform identity.⁴⁹

Once the basis for national or larger collective identity formation has been created this basis tends to become culturally habituated and reified forms of thinking and believing about something, like “*diacritica*”, or “*boundary markers*” between the ‘Self’ and the Other(s).⁵⁰ But even these boundary markers may be under constant domestic modification; it may be a cultural phenomenon to redefine continuously the collective boundary markers vis-à-vis the Others. For example, David Campbell has argued that it is more or less cultural habituation of the USA to find new enemies and threats through narrative interpretations of danger, which have been used to secure the boundaries of the identity in whose name it operates.⁵¹

Domestic constitutive norms, rules and values

The constitutive authority of the nation is diffused to many ‘sub-identity holders’ such as various state organs, the church, the armed forces and eventually to the citizens of the state itself.⁵² *De jure*, constitutions are the highest authority in liberal democratic states, but *de facto* the constitutions of all states are merely the regulative rules of those states. It is a domestic rule to behave and act according to the constitution and an international rule to act according to the codex of international law. *But a constitution is a crucial vis-à-vis national identity, since it can be seen as the main official*

⁴⁸ Wittgenstein (1972 [1949–51]), p. 21e.

⁴⁹ Checkel (2001), p. 553; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart (2005), p. 24.

⁵⁰ Barth (1969), p. 14 and p. 26; Neumann (1998), pp. 4–5.

⁵¹ Campbell, 1998), pp. 5–6.

⁵² See, for example, Milner (2005), p. 10.

*identity expression of the nation, consisting of statements about the national world view.*⁵³ *In this respect national security political doctrines have been treated here like constitutions.*

Values are also diffused throughout the elites and the mass of ordinary citizens. Correspondingly, the same value may be strongly supported by one particular political party, and strongly opposed by another. The same value, or values, may also be widely supported among the elites, but considered with suspicion by the population. Shared values may take a transnational form as well, since when political elites meet each other regularly on a particular issue, like the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), or NATO's strategic concept, there is the possibility that the values of the national elites become amalgamated horizontally with other national values despite the fact that national populations may hold totally different values.⁵⁴

Even though the values of the nation are diffused, some intersubjectively shared values (like religion) that unite the nation can be found; otherwise there would not be a nation at all. Shared values are assumed to be internalized more by intersubjective beliefs than by calculation or coercion. *The key issue vis-à-vis values is then to ask what values are intersubjectively shared, and how strongly do those who share the values do so.*

Strategic culture, political culture and military doctrines

As distinct from political culture as a wider concept, strategic culture can be understood as an elite-centric characteristic national culture that shapes a state agent's approach (particular response and patterns of behaviour) to the use of force in international relations. It is about "specific state-centric beliefs, attitudes and practices [of civilian and military elites] that have developed and evolved over time." Civilian and military strategic communities may be congruent or divergent in their beliefs, attitudes and

⁵³ Ruggie (1998), p. 866. There are at least three types of ideas that may become deeply institutionalized domestically: world views, principal beliefs and causal beliefs. *World views* are "entwined with people's conceptions of their identities evoking deep emotions and loyalties." *Principal beliefs* are about criteria that distinguish right from wrong and just from unjust. *Causal beliefs* are beliefs about "cause-effect relations, derived from the situated consensus of recognized authorities."

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 867–868. There are emerging cultural bonds of 'we-feeling' among nations at least regionally. These cultural bonds are largely about the "epistemic communities" of national security political elites that meet frequently in various contexts, define their mutual agreements and take them to the national discourses, which then may or may not affect national identity as institutionalized 'truths'. See also Deutsch (et al.) (1969), p. 5.

practices,⁵⁵ but what is crucial here from the cultural point of view is that both communities are at least hypothetically committed to remembering and sustaining the national narratives told by previous generations. Strategic culture is then to a large degree about decision-making, which is “often driven by historical analogies and other lessons learned from the past.”⁵⁶ Jeannie L. Johnson grasps nicely the nexus between strategic culture and identity as follows: “*Strategic culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions and modes of behaviour, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.*”⁵⁷

Strategic culture was initially introduced to the IR by Jack Snyder.⁵⁸ He tried to explain why the elites of the Soviet Union and the USA thought differently about nuclear strategy. The scholars that followed Snyder’s footsteps (“*the first generation*”) argued that the differences were caused by “unique variations in macro-environmental variables such as deeply rooted historical experience, political culture, and geography.” The issue then was to find the common basis for a rational dialogue over nuclear arsenals.⁵⁹ Snyder referred to the national organizational culture as a cognitive system of how the world is experienced and seen. Strategic culture was also seen as a boundaries (*diacritica*)-issue concerning the roles of the civilian and military side in military strategic or doctrinal decision making. According to Snyder, the absence of clear boundaries between the civilian

⁵⁵ See, for example, Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (2001), p. 149. A strategic community is analogous here to an epistemic community being a “network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”

⁵⁶ Forsberg and Herd (2006), pp. 29–30.

⁵⁷ Johnson (2006), p. 5. See also Kratochwil (2006), p. 17. According to Friedrich Kratochwil, narrated historical events may have “particular meaning and obligatory force for a society as a whole and for security political elites especially.” For example, “‘Remember the Maine’, ‘remember the Boyne’ (the battle of 1690 between Protestants and Catholics in Ulster), ‘remember St. Vitus’ day’ (1389, battle of Kosovo), ‘remember Auschwitz’, ‘never again must Masada fall’ etc. – all those exhortations refer to recollections of particular relevance to a given group, but they are at the same time powerful sources of obligations.” See also Gray (1999), p. 55. According to Colin Gray, “culture shapes the process of strategy-making, and influences the execution of strategy.” See also Johnson (2006), p. 18. According to Jeannie Johnson, “Traumatic historical events are particularly important as they often imprint a nation’s social psychology. In addition, tracking interactions with other nations over time often reveals themes and consistent patterns of behaviour.”

⁵⁸ Snyder (1977), p. 8. According to Jack Snyder, “Strategic culture can be defined as the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other.” See also Desch (1998), p. 152.

⁵⁹ Johnston (1995), p. 36.

and military side vis-à-vis Soviet strategic culture allowed their military to adopt doctrines that served the military alone.⁶⁰ That problem has been tackled at least in Western European liberal democracies by establishing civilian authority over the military.

*There are second and third generation strategic culture scholars as well, but “all [the cultural generations] take [Realist foundationalism] as target, and focus on cases where structural-materialist notions of interest cannot explain a particular strategic choice.”*⁶¹ The difference between second and third generation scholars is that while sharing the ‘social nature’ of the first and third generation researchers, second generation researchers are concerned with the manipulation of the strategic cultures by elites, whereas third generation scholars, like Elizabeth Kier, concentrated narrowly on particular strategic decisions as dependent variables.⁶²

First generation theorists, like Colin Gray, considered domestic culture as a context, much like I treat it as a domestic structure, meaning that we all are part of that structure, its symbols (ideas) and practices, and that there is an international/external social structure and material world as well, which affects not only domestic ideas and practices, but also the national identity structure. Second generation scholars claim that political elites are as constrained by the symbolic myths of the nation as the rest of the citizens of the state; myths that their predecessors have created. Political elites cannot escape the symbolic discourses⁶³ that they may manipulate in their domes-

⁶⁰ Snyder (1977), p. 30; Kier (1996), p. 188. See also Johnston (1995), p. 32. According to Alastair Iain Johnston, the American strategic culture of the time did not manage any better: “The United States ... tended to exhibit a tendency towards a sporadic, messianic and crusading force that was deeply rooted in moralism of the early republic and in a fundamental belief that warfare was an aberration in human relations.”

⁶¹ Johnston (1995), p. 41; Desch (1998), p. 143 [my italics].

⁶² Poore (2003), p. 284. See also Kier (1996), p. 186 and p. 208 and p. 213. Changes, for example, in a nation’s military doctrine “are best understood from a cultural perspective”, according to Elizabeth Kier. States’ interests are not given, but cultural; “culture and the meanings that actors attach to certain policies shape actors’ interests.” This means that, for example, geographic factors and technological innovations, even though important, are not so important as cultural factors in, for example, trying to understand how Germany defeated France in 1940. According to Kier, France was defeated largely because of the French diffused internal strategic culture. The reason for the French Left’s refusal to adopt a professional army and shorten the length of conscription (issues that the French military proposed), was *a cultural and shared belief* [Kier’s Italics] that a longer term of service would “be a danger for republican liberties, that is to say for *domestic peace* [Kier’s Italics].”

⁶³ Johnston (1995), p. 57. According to Alastair Iain Johnston, the “use of symbols by elites is directed at other members in the group”, meaning that “elites create an “official language” of discourse which excludes alternative strategies, undermines challenges to their authority, mobilizes support and otherwise upholds their hegemony in the decision process.”

tic sub-cultures (e.g. foreign policy elites and defence policy elites), but they cannot escape the national symbolic myths either, if wish to hold on to their political positions as, for example, members of parliament; it may be political suicide to challenge national myths ('Finland has always been defended by Finns; therefore it is not necessary to align with NATO'). A problem of global significance then is that if political elites are 'victims' of national myths, largely stressing 'us-them' type differences, one can only expect cross-national differences to prevail in the future as well. But non-political elites can escape the symbolic discourses and can modify them freely.⁶⁴

Second and third generation analyses do not pay attention to the material world's restrictions on and enablers of state interests, behaviour and identity, as first generation analyses do. But overall I can't see any reason why all these generations should be considered as separate approaches; they just put their focus on different areas. However, it might be reasonable to take the first generation's 'thick' cultural perspective (both the ideational and the material world affect strategic culture, although the ideational world may be more important)⁶⁵ as one's basic orientation and then focus on the second generation's 'manipulation of the strategic cultures by the elites' – thesis,⁶⁶ with one additional element, namely, cultural habituation and reification.⁶⁷

In this thesis strategic culture has been understood as political and military elite-centric beliefs, attitudes and practices that have developed and evolved over time. Strategic culture does not concern merely the issue of how to use military force, but also how cultural habituation prohibits the use of chance. It also refers here to practices concerning how identity ex-

⁶⁴ Johnston (1995), pp. 39–41.

⁶⁵ See, for example, Ruggie (1998), p. 864. According to Gerard Ruggie, "the origins of strategic cultures and military doctrines ... are not simply functionally determined either by external or internal factors, but reflect broader cultural and political forces." But the internal forces (e.g. the overall political culture of the state) are in some cases more imperative than the external forces (e.g. "the Revolution in Military Affairs; RMA"), even if the state's security policy elite recognized the impacts that external forces would have on the nation due to the habituated national ways of thinking and acting. See also Adler (1997), p. 347. According to Emanuel Adler, the "Membership in the [security] community is shaped not only by the state's external identity and associated behaviour, but also by its domestic characteristics and practices."

⁶⁶ Poore (2003), p. 284.

⁶⁷ See, for example, Johnston (1995), p. 34; Snyder (1977), p. v. According to Alastair Iain Johnston, strategic culture is largely about how individuals in the national security policy elites have been socialized into a distinctively national strategic thinking, and thus it "is not fully responsive to others' choices. According to Jack Snyder, as a result of this socialization process, "a set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavioural patterns" with regard of e.g. military strategy or doctrine will achieve a state of "semipermanence" that places it on the level of culture rather than mere policy."

pressions such as security policy doctrines have been produced by small political and military elites. *Political culture has been considered as overall political codes, rules and assumptions, which impose a rough order (or disorder) on conceptions of the political environment.* Political culture is a wider concept than the strategic one, since political culture refers to the general behavioural side of national political decision-making practices and to the ‘political atmosphere’, whereas strategic culture is a more focused concept referring specifically to national foreign and defence policy practices and interests that have their basis in national identity construction.⁶⁸

Teleological evolution and the need for recognition

The cultural perspective does not neglect the possibility of change; there is a possibility for change, but not necessarily on a voluntary basis due to the habituation thesis.⁶⁹ From the cultural perspective change is about external necessities or factors that force us to change our cultures, interests and national identities. The evolution of the culture, national identity and state interests are largely about teleological evolution. Teleological explanations point to an end or purpose towards which a system is directed.⁷⁰

According to Alexander Wendt, the international system is moving towards a global world state.⁷¹ The inevitability of the emergence of this world state

⁶⁸ Weldes (1996), p. 277 and p. 282. According to Jutta Weldes, national interests need a shared language of the political elites and the audience for whom state action must be legitimate. However, the basis of national interests is national identity.

⁶⁹ Berger (1996), p. 318; Ruggie (1998), p. 863. For example, rapid changes in Germany’s and Japan’s culture of antimilitarism are currently likely to change only, if they are challenged by a major external shock, for example, a direct military attack on Germany’s or Japan’s population centres, the collapse of their alliances with the USA and the West, combined with new security threats (like terrorism and vast, uncontrollable and continuous migration flows caused, for example, by global warming). This has actually happened already, since Germany has increased her participation in NATO-led operations and Japan has increased her rearmament, largely due to the external threat that North Korea poses for her. But at least in the case of Germany, soft persuasion has affected her in that Germany has adopted a new and more active role in NATO. See also Wallander (1999), p. 25. According to Celeste Wallander, there are “security lemons” (states that seek and enter multilateral arrangements on a highly competitive and aggressive basis just to exploit other states) like North Korea that has an interest in “maintaining uncertainty and misinformation about her capabilities and interests.” It does not help much, then, if a state like Japan defines North Korea as not being a threat; it is there and can shoot missiles over or towards Japan’s soil.

⁷⁰ De Rond and Thietart (2007), p. 536. According to Mark De Rond and Raymond-Alain Thietart, teleological determinism “is the belief that the world is governed by purposes, or some underlying design.”

⁷¹ Wendt (2003), p. 493 and p. 593. See also Shannon (2005), pp. 582–583. According to Vaughn Shannon, Alexander Wendt considers that all states behave alike. But some states may consider even the prevailing international anarchy as desirable. Furthermore,

is based on states' *need for positive recognition*. Recognition takes the place of the states' need to continuously increase their power in the Realist paradigm's thesis about states. The recognition thesis makes a lot of sense, since it assumes that states tend to adopt international institutions and construct their domestic structures (identities, interests and social systems) in the hope of earning "universal recognition" in the eyes of other states.⁷²

The purpose of recognition may be understood negatively as well. In that case recognition may be understood as seeking prestige by increasing military spending, which does not fit Wendt's original idea of recognition. As an example of negative recognition one may mention Dana Eyre's and Mark Suchman's research concerning national purchases of high technology weapons simply to increase prestige. Thus, being a recognized nation is about, among other things, "having a flag" and "having a high-tech military", even though a high-tech military would not have true value in waging war, due to the small amount of high-tech weapons systems. High-tech military capability is then to be seen only as a status symbol so that a state can fulfil its need to be recognized by others.⁷³

There is not much difference between Wendtian teleology and a normative perspective, since Wendt includes intentionality in his teleology; the need for recognition is not merely an unintentional evolutionary process.⁷⁴ But if a world state is the ultimate goal of a teleological process, we are talking about normativity and thus we may ask: *Whose goal is the world state? It probably should be the goal of all mankind, but since there might always be some (individuals or collectives) that do not agree on that, the world state may only be the end state of an unintentional evolutionary process, for example, due to global natural disasters.* However, since we do not know how nations and states will act when faced with such disasters, there is always a possibility that global natural disasters would cause a major world war, not a tolerant world state.

3.1.4 The Normative Perspective and Shared Need for Change?

The normative perspective unites ideas presented by interactionist, endogenous and cultural perspectives. This means that even though contextual inter-state interactions may change the national identity through learning, and even though there are endogenous national narratives that support cultural habituation and resistance to a change of national identity, there are exter-

states may choose not to create a world state. A world state is not then teleologically inevitable, since the future is always open and history may move forward or backward.

⁷² Wendt (2005), p. 590 and p. 596.

⁷³ Eyre and Suchman (1996), pp. 79–98.

⁷⁴ Wendt (2003), p. 496.

nal pressures (whether material or social/ideational) that may necessitate a change of national identity.

Contrary to the teleological argument, normative perspective suggests that it is largely about our will to make our world better. The normative perspective argues that there is a need to reconstruct national identities and interests with an increased level of tolerance in order for us to be able to create a better world. We do not have to wait until the ‘material world kills us’ as a result of natural catastrophes like global warming. It would be rational to modify people’s minds towards the idea of a world society without negative attitudes and sentiments toward Others, but domestic political elites are composed of egoistic individuals as are we all, it would not be rational to express such ideas publicly. In order to be elected to Parliament and maintain the status of being a credible politician in the eyes of the people, it is necessary to express ideas that people want to hear. It is not useful then to argue that people should stop using cars, not use natural oil to heat their houses and try not to travel by air etc., in order to avoid global warming. Firstly, this is not what people actually want to hear. And secondly, they will not seriously commit themselves to such measures, because they are too radical. Thus, for political elites it is wiser to express ideas on how, for example, national security and domestic living standards will be improved during this or that electoral period; that’s what people want to hear, but there are exceptions.⁷⁵

If there is a globally shared need to change habituated and reified ‘truths’ and attitudes, as well as the overall political space and states’ and nations’ identity boundaries, it is not necessarily political elites that are in a position to do so, since the people that elected those politicians basically voted for their candidates because of the individual need for security. On the other hand, it is precisely a political elite’s task to change attitudes, even though this might threaten their chances of re-election to their domestic parliaments. However, the mass media, as well as academic communities and cultural elites are politically neutral enough, at least in Western liberal democracies, to be used to spread ‘new ideas’ in our culturally habituated minds.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Herman (1996), pp. 271–283; Booth (1998), p. 32. Probably the most famous example of a politician’s acceptance of the need to reconstruct, or change, a nation’s identity was the advent of “New Thinking” (*novoye myshleniye*) introduced by the secretary general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Michail Gorbachev in the late 1980s. Gorbachev’s idea was to show the rest of the world that the Soviet Union had a vision suitable for all mankind. However, it can not be said for sure whether the “New Thinking” that Gorbachev presented was merely an exercise to disguise the economic weakness of the Soviet Union or a truly idealist effort based on a normative need to change the East-West relations. In any event it was one of the factors that made liberation and ‘rebirth’ of the Eastern Europe possible.

⁷⁶ Cederman and Daase (2006), p. 138.

3.2. Methodological Conclusions

I ended my philosophical survey (Chapter 2.1) by stating that philosophically I am a scientific realist, meaning that I consider the world to be real, but relative since the real world is independent of our knowledge and perceptions. In order to conduct research on national identity, scientific realism needs to be amended by social ontology, meaning that even though a world independent of our knowledge and perceptions exists, it is possible to consider some elements as socially real, albeit that those elements vary from culture to culture. It is the people and ‘sub-identity holders’ of Poland who will have a voice in expressing their social realities in the empirical part of the thesis.

Epistemologically, I stated that I have a relativist epistemology with a pragmatic flavour, meaning that since ultimate knowledge is unattainable to us, we have to be satisfied with only a partial knowledge (e.g. inductive and deductive ways) vis-à-vis our research subject. And to avoid post-modern ‘whateverism’, it is again the Polish people and ‘sub-identity holders’ who will have a voice in defining the conditions, according to which I may argue that something is true. This means that national identity, which I am trying to understand as a meaning-giver and signifier for national interests and behaviour, has already been pre-interpreted by the Poles, as double-hermeneutics suggests. Thus, my task as a social scientist is to analyze the identity narratives and discourses of Polish sub-identity holders by thematizing Polish identity narratives and discourses, and to discover what discourses the Polish people in general support or oppose. The themes I am looking for in my use of ‘primary identity sources’ (constitution, security policy ‘White Books’, speeches, public statements and opinion polls) are: the Poles’ world view (constitutive narratives and discourses as identity expressions), the external and internal borders of Otherness, and the priorities of various contexts (the global meta-context, EU-integration and CFSP, and NATO-cooperation), hoping then to be able to make small (t)ruth statements about whom the Poles consider as Others and what Poles seek to defend, discursively and in practice.

In Chapter 2.2, I stated that in the empirical part of the thesis I will operate with three contexts (see above). All these three contexts are ones where domestic structures, consisting of the identities, social systems and organizational characteristics of the state, meet each other, but EU-integration and CFSP, and NATO-cooperation are more concrete than the global meta-context, because they are capable of producing events and tendencies, at least regionally, and are capable of modifying national identities, mostly through discursive interactions, whereas the global meta-context operates as a general framework for regional contexts. In addition to discursive interactions, international rules and norms, non-discursive interactions (wars

and crises) do have an influence on national identities. But before the domestic structures enter various contexts of the international structure, every identity construction involved has been endogenously structured during history. Furthermore, these endogenously constructed identities tend to become habituated and reified beliefs, which have, at least to some extent, a semi-permanent nature.

Even though I lean theoretically on a combination of Constructivism, the English School theory and CR, I am not totally abandoning causality. For example, the change in the world order before and after the Cold War can be partly explained by causal complex, meaning that it is necessary to trace causes vis-à-vis a change of circumstances or behaviour, but clarifying all the possible causes is not sufficient in order to reach the 'truth', since other causes that can better explain the social phenomenon one is researching can always be found. In every social context, a causal complex of the actors, rules, resources, practices and meaningful action involved that is sufficient for the production of a (credible) result can be found.

Before the empirical part of the thesis, I will analyze and operationalize more thoroughly the core concepts of the thesis, namely, the concepts of state agent and identity (Chapter 4), as well as the concept of world order (Chapter 5). In the following two chapters, as a Constructivist, I will analyze the empirical realities (e.g. global warming, geographic location of the state (geopolitics and geostrategy) as well as the economic dependencies (especially the dependency on raw materials such as oil and natural gas)), which affect national identities.

PART II

Structuring the State, Identity and World Order

4

STATE AGENT AND IDENTITY – NATIONAL ETHOS AND CULTURAL HABITUATION

“What may have been an ad hoc response to historical necessities at one time becomes hallowed social truth at another.”¹

In this chapter I will try to answer the question: *How does national identity develop and how permanent can it be?* I will put the focus on the relationship between the state, the nation and national identity (including defence identity). My purpose is not to abandon the common-sense and anthropomorphised usage of the state, but to open the ‘black box’ of the state and national identity and to ask also: *To what extent may the state, state identity and national identity be considered as one phenomenon?* In the last sub-chapter I will discuss the concept of defence identity, but as I have argued earlier, I do consider it as being the essence of national identity, informing us about *what the nation is defending and what the boundaries of the nation’s collective ‘Self’ are.* In other words, it has been understood here as informing us *how open and tolerant national identity is toward various other world views and cultures.*

Identity has been on the research agendas of psychology, social psychology, social anthropology and sociology for decades. In this respect I am not trying to ‘reinvent the wheel’.² I deal with these disciplines here under the loose framework of sociology, which I have considered as a direct link to the identity theories of IR. What is common to the sociological framework and to the identity theories of IR, is the constitutive relationship between individual and group identity and the surrounding environment.

4.1. ‘Socialized’ State Agency and National Identity

It is common to consider the state as a single actor (e.g. ‘according to Poland this should be done this way, but Brussels has a different opinion’). This kind of simplified understanding of the state as a unified actor has been called *anthropomorphization*, meaning that states are understood as

¹ Berger (1996), p. 307.

² Jung (2001), p. 446. See also Eriksen and Neumann (1993), p. 233; as Neumann (1998), p. 5.

though they were human beings (“*states are people too*”).³ However, states as actors are not so comprehensive or integrated as human beings, since states have many functional levels and they can commit themselves to many situations simultaneously. The anthropomorphization of the state is common in IR, maybe because it makes it easier to predict, understand and explain the behaviour of the state. It is also normal for us, as human beings, to categorize and simplify complex phenomena, which may be the most important reason for the state-centricism of IR. But it makes no more sense to criticize theories of IR for being “state-centric” than it does to criticize a theory of forests for being “tree-centric”.⁴

The traditional Weberian concept of the state, which Constructivism shares, is that the state is “*an organization possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence within society.*” In addition to its monopoly of force, the state possesses five other fundamental qualities: (1) institutional-legal order, (2) organization and sovereignty, (3) society (understood constitutively: there is no state, if there is no society),⁵ (4) territory (understood constitutively; there is no state, if there is no territory), and (5) some sort of identity construction. The state possesses legitimacy that is constituted by a political authority that empowers some people as members of society to enforce the rules and obligations for others to obey. To be fully sovereign, a state’s sovereignty has to be recognized by other states “in a society of states.” *The element that Constructivism emphasizes is the socialized nature of the state. This means that the state as an agent is made up of individuals, a structure of collective identity, and a social system. This structure of the state constitutes a collective intentionality, meaning an ability of its members to act, in some occasions, as a single agent. Individuals may challenge a state’s legitimacy, but the state may survive through coercion, if necessary. To be internally strong a state needs to have, in addition to a stable social system, “a shared belief among its members that they constitute a collective identity or ‘We’, to which they are willing to subordinate their private judgment. The result is a ‘group mind’, in which individuals define their identities and interests in terms of membership in a group, enabling them to engage in institutionalized collective action.”*⁶

³ Wendt (1999), pp. 193–224; Neumann (1998), p. 2. According to Iver Neumann, “almost the entire social theory literature on collective identity formation depends on an anthropomorphization of human collectives.” See also Bloom (1999 [1990]), pp. 1–2.

⁴ Wendt (1999), p. 9.

⁵ Giddens (2004), p. 686 and p. 699. According to Anthony Giddens, society is a system of structured social relationships connecting people together according to a shared culture (the values, ceremonies and ways of life characteristic of a given society). Societies may be small, for example, those of hunters involving a few dozen people, or large like modern Chinese society involving hundreds of millions of people.

⁶ Wendt (1999), pp. 224–233 and pp. 505–506. See also Giddens (2004), p. 700.

An anthropomorphised state as an ontological convention or fictitious person⁷ may have a unitary identity (*a corporate identity*), combining the state's interests and a national 'we-feeling'. This identity may be considered as a product of historical socialization processes through interactions with other actors (*the interactionist perspective*) and as a product of intentional identity building efforts by conscious elites (*the endogenous perspective*). However, we can not be sure that these internal and international interactions, discourses and cultural modes of action will form a corporate identity structure, similar to the identity construction of individuals, although that is one possibility, and if it is possible, it may be presumed that every state and its nation (if there is one nation under the state) may have that kind of unitary and shared meta-identity as well.

4.1.1. Socialization Process – Creating Identity

Identity may be understood as referring “to who or what actors are. Identities by themselves do not explain action [merely], since being is not the same thing as wanting. Without interests identities have no motivational force and without identities interests have no direction.”⁸ For a given individual, or for a collective actor, there may be a plurality of identities. Identity differs from roles and role sets. Roles (e.g. one may be a father, a husband, a neighbour, an officer and a social scientist at the same time), are defined by norms that are structured by the institutions and organizations of society. However, a role may be part of an individual's identity (e.g. being an officer is part of my individual identity construction), but roles, as well as institutions, become identities only if actors internalize them, “and construct their meaning around this internalization.” Identities are “stronger sources of meaning than roles [and] identities organize the meaning while roles organize the functions.”⁹

Sociology, Constructivism and reflective IR theories share at least one thing, namely that all identities are constructed, but this raises the following question: How, from what, by whom and for what is identity constructed. The building material of identities consists of history, geography, biology,

⁷ Wendt (1999), p. 215. According to Alexander Wendt, “States are People too.” See also Tönnies (2000 [1887]), p. 216.

⁸ Wendt (1999), pp. 230–231. See also Giddens (2004), p. 691. According to Anthony Giddens, identity is as a collection of “*distinctive characteristics of a person's character, or a character of a social group, which relate to who they are and what is meaningful to them. Some of the main sources of identity include gender, sexual orientation, nationality or ethnicity, and social class. An important marker of an individual's identity is his/her name, and naming is also important for group identity.*”

⁹ Castells (1997), p. 7.

productive and reproductive institutions, collective memory, personal fantasies, power apparatuses and religion.¹⁰

Constructivism stresses that human life and all human products (incl. societies, states and the world order) are based on social interactions. Societies and states are based on *intersubjective sub-universes of meaning* between individuals, that is, we (at least two individuals) first normalize certain kinds of typical behaviour and as a result create a norm which in turn creates an expecting that all behave according to that norm. Norms have been created in almost every area of social life. We may institutionalize and reify the various norms that guide our life. Thus, we may have agreed upon a presidential institution and a particular form of government as an institute etc. Throughout this entire historical process, we have created our common social world by *externalizing* ourselves in the products (institutions and symbolic things like flag of a nation)¹¹ of human activity and the process continues today; we renew and modify our world continuously. This can be called a process in which the externalized products of human activity acquire an objective nature (*objectification*). This objectified social world becomes embedded in our consciousness through various socialization processes.¹²

Socialization (or cultural selection, when operating at state- or system-level), including the adoption of a particular identity has at least two mechanisms, imitation and social learning. Identities and interests are acquired by imitation when agents adopt the self-understandings of those whom they consider successful. Successful here means material success (acquiring power or wealth) or social success or status (function of prestige). Social learning may be just a matter of adaptation, but may also have a constitutive effect on identities and interests.¹³

All of us as individuals are born in an objective social structure, where we meet our significant Others (usually parents) who take care of our *primary socialization*. We can't choose these significant others ourselves. We are also born in a certain nation, located at a certain geographical spot, with such and such political relations. These aspects represent a certain situation, which constitutes 'Me'. We are also in the midst of a constant process


¹⁰ Castells (1997), pp. 6–7.

¹¹ Durkheim (1983 [1914]), Eighteenth Lecture – The different types of truth. The flag of the nation represents totemism. According to Emile Durkheim, “*Society cannot become aware of itself in the absence of any relationship with things. Social life demands agreement between individual consciousness. In order to notice it, each one must express what it experiences. It can only do so, however, by means of things taken as symbols.*”

¹² Berger and Luckmann (2005), pp. 64–65 and p. 74 and p. 99.

¹³ Wendt (1999), pp. 324–327.

in which we continuously adjust ourselves in advance to different kinds of situations, and we in turn react to those. This is a continuous process where *the sensitive 'Me' and reactive 'I'* become part of the whole social process and makes a more highly organized and progressive society possible. By adopting this social-psychological way of thinking to an analysis of inter-state and international relations we may say that states can't choose their place of birth either, nor can they choose their neighbouring states, which then may be considered as significant Others.¹⁴



Picture 8: Constructing the 'Self'¹⁵

A conscious human individual and national 'Self' are not initially there at birth, but arise in the process of continuous social experience and activity. *The 'Self' indicates that we, as individuals or nations, can be both subjects ('I') and objects ('Me') at the same time.* Anthropomorphically it can be said that states too can be both subjects and objects at the same time.¹⁶ In other words, national identities (as well as interests) are consciously constructed and construed through interactionist experiences and learning, in response to how nations and states are treated by Others. If Others treat the 'Self' as though the 'Self' were an enemy, rival or friend, then in principle the 'Self' is likely to internalize that same belief vis-à-vis the Other.¹⁷

There are two general stages in the full development of the 'Self'. First, the individual's 'Self' is constituted by organizing the particular attitudes of other individuals toward her/himself and their attitudes towards one another in the specific social context, in which s/he participates with them. Sec-

¹⁴ Mead (1992), p. 182. See also Berger and Luckmann (2005), p. 147; Paden (2003), p. 29. According to William Paden, people are born into societies that give them "lenses through which the world takes on shape and symbolic meaning."

¹⁵ Mead (1992), pp. 135–137 and p. 182.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 135–137.

¹⁷ Wendt (1999), p. 327.

only, the individual's 'Self' is constituted not only by the organization of these particular individual attitudes, but also by the organization of the social attitudes of the social group as a whole to which s/he belongs. The essential method of this socialization process is generally based on the use of language.¹⁸

The self-conscious human individual takes or assumes the organized social (generalized) attitudes of the given social group or community to which s/he belongs. In politics, an individual identifies her/himself with an entire political party and takes on the organized attitudes of that party toward the rest of the given social community and toward the problems which confront the party within a given social situation. This also applies to other social groups, such as religious and ethnic communities, the armed forces of the state, as well as the whole nation as a social construction of various sub-communities.¹⁹

Every individual strives to *self-preservation* and to increase his or her individuality, against the threat of being overcome and absorbed by external forces. The drive to self-assertion, and to an aggressive sense of one's own power and distinctiveness as a person, is always present, and some of this sense of unity and aggressiveness is transferred to human communities (like churches and states), which then become objectified things, with their own drive to self-preservation. Every social entity, whether a nation or a religious group, will sustain uniformity by trying to extend its freedom of action as far as it will go, exactly as an individual human being does.²⁰

An organized community, or social group, which propagates unity, may be called as a "generalized [O]ther"²¹ to an individual of that group. Thus, the political parties, church/religion and the armed forces of a country, may be seen as generalized Others in so far as they enter the consciousness of their individual members. In the same way we may think that Poland as a unitary and socialized state has become aware of her 'Self' in the course of continuous historical interactions with other states, institutions and organizations, which may be considered as the generalized Others for Poland, in so far as they enter into the consciousness of the Poles. However, it is obvious that not all generalized Others are as important to states as others, if the particular state was even aware of their existence. It is obvious that the Polish 'Self' does not have to acknowledge the assumed foreign policy attitudes of Vanuatu or Fiji, simply because Vanuatu and Fiji are geographically so far away from Poland and they do not play as important a role in world politics as Germany or the Russian Federation. However, Vanuatu

¹⁸ Mead (1992), p. 158.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 157.

²⁰ Spinoza (1996 [1677]), p. xiii.

²¹ Mead (1992), p. 154.

and Fiji may have at least a loose contextual control over Poland through the United Nations, since all of the mentioned states belong to the UN.²²

From the psychological point of view, the Polish ‘Self’ is structured in a socialization-process by neighbouring states (significant Others; usually parents for a child) and the external environment (generalized Others; usually other relatives, friends, neighbours etc. for a child) in which it has developed.²³ But Poland’s current neighbouring states, for example, are not the original significant Others of Poland, since the political map of Europe has changed so many times during history. Poland’s current neighbours are Lithuania, the Russian Federation (Kaliningrad), Belarus, Germany, Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. As a hypothesis the Russian Federation and Germany could be named as the significant others of Poland, when considering Poland as a ‘reborn nation’. If one adopts this narrow idea of the development of the Polish ‘Self’ it could be possible to adopt a hypothesis that the generalized Others of Poland may be other more distant states (e.g. the USA) or global and regional organizations (such as the UN, the EU, NATO, OSCE etc.), but this is too narrow a perspective, even though it makes some sense.

4.1.2. Nation, Society and Community

As social groups (such as nations) are complex, it is difficult to accept that nations have a single perception of their own identity. However, it is assumed here that the people of every nation collectively share some crucial identity elements, like the perception of a common history, which makes it possible that nations can commit unitary actions as state agents. A nation does have shared understanding of its identity, which individuals belonging to that particular nation have internalized (habituated) through socialization (family and school education, politics, media, sports and other everyday practices). Thus, in this context, it is assumed that the common conceptions shared by Poles include the idea of Polishness (*Polkość*), meaning a shared understanding of their collective past, present and future, a common culture, a distinct national territory, attitudes towards national ‘sub-identity holders’ (e.g. political parties, church/religion and the armed forces of the state) as well as shared attitudes towards other nations.²⁴

Following the ethnic or cultural definition of a nation, Benedict Anderson has considered *a nation as a “large imagined [and created] community”* and as a mental construct of ideas containing at least the defining elements

²² Mead (1992), p. 155.

²³ Berger and Luckmann (2005), pp. 147–166.

²⁴ Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart (2005), pp. 3–5.

of collective unity and sameness. The nation is imagined because the “members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” Thus, it follows that basically “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined”, which can be considered real anyhow, if one is convinced of it, believes in it and identifies with it emotionally.²⁵ This imagined community of a nation is constructed and conveyed in the narratives and discourses of national culture. The nation is also a felt and lived community whose members share a homeland and a culture.²⁶

A nation can also be considered as “a named human population sharing historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.”²⁷ But since there are nations without a recognized territory of their own (e.g. the Kurds), a nation is better perceived as Benedict Anderson’s large imagined community, or as “a social group whose individual members, being convinced rightly or wrongly of their common descent and destiny, share that common sense of identity.”²⁸

Adrian Hastings, even though criticizing Anderson’s definition of the nation for being based merely on ethnicity, has amended Anderson’s definition as follows: “*A nation is a far more self-conscious community than an ethnicity. Formed from one or more ethnicities, and normally identified by a literature of its own, it possesses or claims the right to political identity and autonomy as a people, together with the control of a specific territory, comparable to that of ... other independent entities in a world.*”²⁹

Thus, the overall idea of a nation is about a unifying idea. It expresses the idea of peoplehood, which transcends divisions like class and regional differences as well as inequalities. However, it can be noted that usually there are some individuals or groups of people (e.g. the gentry, the intelligentsia-

²⁵ Anderson (1991), p. 6.

²⁶ Auer (2000), p. 228; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart (2005), pp. 20–21; Fenton (2005), pp. 17–18; Smith (2007 [2001]), p. 12.

²⁷ Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart (2005), pp. 20–21.

²⁸ Davies (2005b), p. 8.

²⁹ Hastings (2006 [1997]), p. 3. Thus, Hastings proposes that a nation can consist of more than one ethnicity, which at first seems implausible, but in terms of the “*longue durée*” it is not, since nations have been more or less created from various smaller tribes, clans, small communities or groups around some unifying idea by somebody (e.g. one tribal king, land-lord, or artistic and/or politically conscious elite etc.) by something (e.g. religion, or literature based on historical myths or narratives, like a long struggle against an external threat). See also Smith (2007 [2001]), p. 13.

elite, key politicians and historians) who claim ‘the right’ to define the idea of a nation on behalf of the rest of society.³⁰

If the concept of a nation can be considered as a large imagined community, the concepts of ethnicity, nationality, national consciousness, nationalism and national identity operate on the same belief. In its simplest form *ethnicity* (*ethnic identity*) is about “descent and culture”, and ethnic groups can be thought of as “descent and culture communities.”³¹ Steve Fenton has connected the concept of ethnicity to race and nation, meaning that to be a nation, a large imagined community has to be ethnically homogeneous and share myths about the past and beliefs about ‘who we are’ based, for example, on history and language. Adrian Hastings shares this view of a shared cultural identity with Fenton as a basis for defining ethnicity, but also argues that the spoken language is another important element in the concept of ethnicity.³² E.J. Hobsbawm, on the other hand, states that ‘common blood and kinship’ is not enough as a basis for a modern nation, since “the populations of large territorial nation-states are almost invariably too heterogeneous to claim a common ethnicity, even if we leave aside the modern immigration.”³³

Since purely homogeneous nations probably do not exist, a nation has to be considered on the majority’s terms. But how large, in percentage terms, does this majority have to be for one to be able to speak about a nation? This question probably cannot be resolved conclusively, but *one can argue, for example, that as ethnic Poles constitute 97% of the population of Poland the Poles comprise an exceptional nation with only 3% of its population consisting of ethnic minorities.* The difference between ethnic and national minorities is that even though both categories possess their own cultural forms (how we do things and how we express ourselves symbolically) that are distinct from the majority’s, the ethnic minorities are of different race as well (e.g. Jews and Gypsies in Poland). The treatment and size of national and ethnic minorities is a significant element when researching the internal cohesion of states and it has been treated as a vital element in this thesis.

Traditionally, *nationalism* has been understood as referring to language and symbolism, to a socio-political movement and as the ideology of nations. Language and symbolism overlap, since, for example, any other name for the Polish nation, would “never smell as sweet” as it does for the Poles. Proper names for the nations may have been chosen, or retained from the past, for expressing the nation’s distinctiveness, heroism and sense of des-

³⁰ Fenton (2005), p. 162.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³² Hastings (2006 [1997]), p. 3.

³³ Hobsbawm (2000), pp. 63–65.

tiny. The past and narratives of the past have been united by national symbols; flags, anthems, coats-of-arms and so on. Nationalism as an ideology “serves to give force and direction to both symbols and movements.” For Anthony Smith, nationalism is “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential “nation”.”³⁴ For Adrian Hastings, nationalism is “*a movement which seeks to provide a state for a given ‘nation’ or further to advance the supposed interests of its own ‘nation-state’ regardless of other considerations. It arises chiefly where and when a particular ethnicity or nation feels itself threatened in regard to its own proper character.*”³⁵

Nationalism may be understood negatively or positively. *Negative nationalism (ethnic nationalism)* is about ethnocentrism, or a national ethos, which is culture-bound, implying the inability of an individual or collective to see the world through the eyes of others. It is also about the possession of attitudes of national superiority, which are defined by birth, blood and ethnicity, and which denies a nation’s own deficiencies. But in modern industrialized or post-modern information societies the traditional content of nationalism has been challenged by the more general concept of collective identity, based on a sense of common destiny, or the concept of *patriotism*, or *positive nationalism (liberal nationalism)*, that underlines the possibility of being proud of one’s country’s virtues, but also the ability to correct its deficiencies. Patriotism is close to the concept of *civic nationalism (Western nationalism)* that bases its legitimacy on the idea of membership in a community, defined primarily by civic virtues, not by ethnicity, common culture, or even common language. The only means of exclusion in civic nationalism is through the territorial boundaries of the country. For that reason, everyone, at least in theory, may become, for example, an American citizen by acquiring the necessary civic virtues.³⁶

Quoting Norman Davies, the concepts of nationality, national consciousness and nationalism relate to each other as follows:


³⁴ Smith (2007 [2001]), pp. 6–7.

³⁵ Hastings (2006 [1997]), p. 4.

³⁶ Booth (1998), p. 32 and p. 45; Geertz (2000), p. 239 and p. 253; Auer (2000), p. 217, p. 223 and p. 244. See also Hobsbawm (2000), pp. 46–47. E.J. Hobsbawm uses the term “proto-nationalism” in trying to find the universal elements of collective belonging to a nation, understood as an Andersonian imagined community. He finds two crucial elements: supra-local forms of identification with the power of historical bondage between generations, and “political bonds and vocabularies of select groups more directly linked to states and institutions, and which are capable of eventual generalization, extension and popularization.”

*Nationality is... essentially a belief – a deep conviction concerning one’s personal identity... National consciousness refers to the degree of people’s awareness of belonging to their nation. Nationalism, in consequence, is a doctrine shared by all political movements that seek to create a nation by arousing people’s awareness of their nationality, and mobilize their feelings into a vehicle for political action. In this sense a nationalist is someone who approves or advocates the aims of nationalism.*³⁷

In order to understand state agency and national identity in more holistic ways, the question about the meaning of society and community still remains to be resolved. Generally understood, society is more or less about agreed arrangements concerning expected behaviour (rules, norms and institutions), whereas community is essentially about shared feeling.³⁸



Picture 9: State, Nation, Society and Community³⁹

Traditionally, *society* (“*Gesellschaft*”) has been considered as a contractual, large-scale way of organizing different identity groups (or even humankind) as a society based on agreements about rational self-interest. Following Benedict Anderson’s thinking, society may be defined as a large-

³⁷ Davies (2005b), p. 8.

³⁸ Buzan (2004), p. 111.

³⁹ Tönnies (2002 [1887]), p. 33 and p. 42. See also Fenton (2005), pp. 10–18 and pp. 88–90; Anderson (1991), p. 6.

scale imagined community as well, based on shared interests, but the distinction between society and nation is that a nation is to be considered a truly unifying idea and image of shared “commonness”, whereas a society operates on interest side. *Community* (“*Gemeinschaft*”) refers to a primordial “*Gemeinschaft by blood*” (e.g. family, small-scale primordial clans and tribes or small communities in general), implying membership of an identity group, but also some sort of responsibility and communality towards and between other members of the group. Thus, community requires some degree of group cohesion and a shared sense of ‘Self’ or affection among members of the community, a quality that is not necessary in a society. Society is less demanding in the sense that it is based on shared norms, whereas community includes shared values as well. In this sense community precedes society; there may not be a society, if communities do not exist. Community is thus “more historic” than society.⁴⁰

Anthony Smith has used the term “*ethnic community*”, or “*ethnie*” as a concept for “a human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, elements of shared culture, an association with a specific ‘homeland’ and a measure of solidarity.” Nation, for Smith, is simply development of “*ethnie*”, and a “community of mass public culture, historic territory and legal rights”, meaning that the nation “shifts the emphasis of community away from kinship and cultural dimensions to territorial, educational and legal aspects, while retaining links with older cultural myths and memories of the “*ethnie*”.”⁴¹

In communities people can be considered as “*consociates*”, individuals who meet and who encounter one another somewhere in the course of daily life. They share a community of time and space. Consequently, “*contemporaries*” are people who share a community of time, but not of space. They live at the same period of history, but they do not necessarily meet. This refers to Benedict Anderson’s concept of an imagined community (society as a collection of many communities). Contemporaries are linked through a general set of symbolically formulated (i.e. cultural) assumptions about each other’s typical (expected) modes of behaviour.⁴²

⁴⁰ Tönnies (2002 [1887]), p. 33 and p. 42. According to Ferdinand Tönnies, “*All intimate, private, and exclusive living together ... is understood as life in Gemeinschaft (community). Gesellschaft (society) is public life – it is the world itself.*” Tönnies divides *Gemeinschaft* into three categories: (1) *Gemeinschaft by blood*, (2) *Gemeinschaft of locality*, which is based on a common habitat, and (3) *Gemeinschaft of mind*, which refers to co-operation and co-ordinated action for a common goal. See also Buzan (2004), p. 66 and pp. 110–116.

⁴¹ Smith (1993), p. 130. See also Smith (2007 [2001]), p. 4.

⁴² Geertz (2000), pp. 365–366. Clifford Geertz continues from the concepts of *consociates* and *contemporaries* by suggesting the concepts of *predecessors* and *successors*, that is those who do not share even a community of time because they cannot interact. But

It is probably too narrow interpretation to claim that communities are the only intra-state identity holders and that society of the state would mean only regulative rules, norms and institutions. Combining the concepts of intra-state communities and society under the concept of nation has been considered here as a holistic way to escape the debate over the community-society-identity problem. It has been noted that there is a unifying element of a nation as a historic and imagined ‘wider’ community that is based on ethnicity or/and culture (rules, norms, beliefs, common history and language). A nation may be ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous, but the historical interactions with other nations as well as an endogenously constructed narrative basis, reified from generation to generation, offer the wider identity or ‘we-feeling’ required for defining ourselves in distinction from Others. Identifying who are the Others for the Polish nation is one of my empirical tasks.

4.1.3. Corporate Identity, State Identity and National Identity

Corporate identity distinguishes an actor from other actors and is characterized by consciousness and memories of ‘Self’. This identity type (the state as a “group Self”) forms a basis or platform for other identity types.⁴³ It is comprised of state identity, collective identity and national identity. It is about boundaries, or *diacritica*, and the membership criteria of the people belonging to the nation, constituted by an actor’s birth myths and grand-narratives, territory, legal frameworks and other institutions (e.g. *Poland cannot be a nation-state or a nation’s state without the joint narratives of the Poles*).⁴⁴

State identity is comprised of type identity and role identity. *Type identity* is about types of government/governance (democracy, autocracy, dictatorship). For example, *Poland cannot be a capitalist state without her citizens having the right of private ownership, and she cannot be a Western liberal democracy without a transparent democratic, administrative structure*. *Role identity* exists only as a relationship towards Others, meaning, for example, that a state is a sovereign actor only if other actors acknowledge its


one should remember that predecessors, having already lived, can have an influence on the lives of their successors.

⁴³ Wendt (1999), p. 225.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 103–125 and pp. 224–233. From the perspective of corporate agency, a state can be defined in three ways, depending on its attitude towards the allocation of power in the international system: (1) *a status quo –state* (is satisfied with its current position, and does not wish to fight for power with other states), (2) *a revisionist state* (is trying to gain power by non-democratic ways, or is trying to change “the rules of the game”), and (3) *a collective actor* that will help others even if its own security would be threatened. See also Zehfuss (2001), p. 322; Giddens (2004), p. 700. According to Maja Zehfuss, a state may have several social sub-identities but only one corporate identity.

sovereignty. States may play many processual roles simultaneously, and during these processes some separate role identities may merge. A state may play these roles, for example, by having its national political elites occupy different roles in different contexts.

Corporate identity is not necessarily needed or recognized in all contexts, because the context where one particular role identity has been manifested does not necessarily necessitate political mobilization. For example, situations where Poland has played a ‘hard game’ with the other EU members over the EU-Constitution are highly political and necessitate political mobilization among the Polish people, but the State may still ‘play the game’ in its role identity (e.g. ‘arrogant new-European’), whereas the nation may be more open towards, for example, the new European identity layer and more mature than the State in emancipating itself from the previous legitimizing narratives of the corporate ‘Self’.



Picture 10: State identity, collective identity, national identity and the Other(s)

Collective identity is a relationship between the “group Self” and Others, which requires cognitive identification from, and shared qualities between its actors. Collective identity formation deals with state identity, national identity and even larger identity layers, such as regional and sub-regional identities (e.g. *Poland cannot be a nation-state or a nation's state without mutual identification between state and nation, and Poland cannot be a member state of the West without solidarity towards other Western states*).

States may play various roles with each other simultaneously and the international collective identity level may never be reached.

National identity is primarily internal and describes the processes by which a nation (if such exists), as well as its elites, acquire, modify and shed its collective identity ('we-feeling'). Since national identities are human creations, they can and do change through contextual discursive interactions.⁴⁵ *Regional identity* (e.g. European regional identity) and *sub-regional identity* (such as the Scandinavian sub-regional identity) complement, rather than replace, evolving national identity. National identity is layered, is under constant construction and may coexist with regional and sub-regional identities, but identification, for example, with Europe does not necessarily (it may, but it is not likely) supplant national identity, or create a purely unified post-national European identity, even among the national political elites participating in numerous EU-forums.⁴⁶

4.2. Constructors and Sources of National Identity

*"The relation of blood produces the strongest tie the mind is capable of in love of parents to their children, and a lesser degree of the same affection ... we love our countrymen, our neighbours, those of the same trade, profession, and even name with ourselves."*⁴⁷

One of the basic assumptions of this thesis is that nations seek to secure their identity in *statehood*. According to William Bloom, the "nationalist cry – 'this nation demands an independent state' ... emerges as the utterance of certain particular political activists who already identify with nation." This notion supposes that the audience is "mystically or subconsciously awaiting this call to bring their nation to the Hegelian ... statehood."⁴⁸ However, not all peoples necessarily respond to this call, although for some people this nationalist call may provide a useful ideology or basis for a national meta-identity. But the idea of *nationhood* and national identity do not have intrinsic power in themselves to create a national identity.

⁴⁵ Auer (2000), p. 228.

⁴⁶ Katzenstein (2005), pp. 77–85. An important constitutive element of European identity lies in "unity in diversity." Differing in their historical experiences and overall cultures, the EU member states have adopted some symbolic signifiers of unity (without, however, replacing existing state and national forms of identification), such as a common anthem (Beethoven's Ode to Joy), an almost common currency (the euro), a newspaper (the European), a university (the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence), a Parliament, a bureaucracy, a court and last but not least, a common flag. There is also a heroic birth myth of European identity in the acts of the three visionary founding fathers of the EU: Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi.

⁴⁷ Hume (1985 [1739–40]), p. 401.

⁴⁸ Bloom (1999 [1990]), pp. 60–61.

Nation-building needs some additional element. Symbolic representatives of the state (e.g. monarchs, constitutions, flags, coats of arms etc.) alone do not provide that missing additional element. Shared experiences, on the other hand, can do so; at least provide the basis for legitimitive narratives that can be used for creating a national ego.⁴⁹ *Thus, it is necessary to discern historical circumstances, events and episodes which have created such identification with the nation-state. It is presumed here that such episodes usually take the form of wars and conflicts, where a state, or candidate state, has acted to defend itself against a threat and in that way serve as a basis for conscious individuals 'to cry for' national identity.*

A nation-state “is a state which identifies itself in terms of one specific nation [or a single ethno-national group] whose people are not seen simply as ‘subjects’ of the sovereign but as a horizontally bonded society to whom the state in a sense belongs.”⁵⁰ *To establish a nation-state consisting of a nation and a state one operates on at least two fields; a rational interest field (the state) and deeper, identity field (the nation).* The rational interest field is necessary to establish a state apparatus for advancing common interests. An identity field consists of factors like primordality (‘common blood’), ethnicity, religion, language, region and custom that are used to legitimate the need for promoting common interests. *Identity factors are more or less constructed, meaning that a politically, intellectually and/or artistically sophisticated and conscious group sees itself as the bearer of ‘civilization’ and experience and thinks that it has ‘the mission’ to unite the people under the banners of a nation by the past narratives based on, for example, the historical victories and defeats which offer the basis for national myths as part of national identity.*⁵¹

It can be said that the essence of a nation precedes the reality of a state, and also that the identity of a nation as an “imagined political community” is the basis for the legitimacy of the state and its practices. But since national consciousness has to be created first, I would say that the forms of a state precede the nation. Nationalism is also to be seen as a construct of the state in pursuit of its legitimacy. Any coordinated, hierarchical and territorial entity may be understood as a “*national state*”, but only few national states have become or currently are nation-states, whose “sovereign territorialisa-

⁴⁹ Bloom (1999 [1990]), pp. 60–62.

⁵⁰ Hastings (2006 [1997]), p. 3. See also Smith (2007 [2001]), p. 123.

⁵¹ Geertz (2000), pp. 261–263. See also Cederman and Daase (2006), p. 128 and p. 136; Hoffenberg (2001), p. 114. For example, the battle of Gallipoli in 1915, according to Peter Hoffenberg, is part of the myth of Australian national identity by legitimating the bravery of the Australian soldier when compared to his British counterpart: “the British sacrificed the heroic Australian soldiers at Gallipoli to divert the enemy from where the British were disembarking in one of Winston Churchill’s many military follies and, in doing so, revealed to the world the brave and plucky Australian soldier.”

tion is perfectly aligned with a prior and primary form of identification, such as religion, language, or symbolic sense of self.”⁵² A national state is “a state where the great majority of the population belongs to a single or dominant ethno-national group, even though other small ethnic groups are found within the state’s borders, and where the political community is legitimated in terms of the tenets of nationalist ideology.”⁵³

Every nation has its own versions of historical events in general and of the origins of the nation in particular. Mythology often provides a genealogy of a nation’s ancestors. These mythologies take us back to the ‘great events’ that founded our societies. *Meta-narratives*, like religious creation-myths, show how our world came about. Our more secular *national grand-narratives*, for example, the mythical battles against foreign intruders onto ‘our holy soil’ show how we still have a legitimate right to exist as a special nation, society, tribe or group. All nations have myths and narratives that can be, and indeed are used, in creating and legitimating the very existence of the nation.⁵⁴ The birth myth of a nation is often set “so far back in time that it is lost in the fog of time and is no longer ‘real’, that is, it ‘exists’ somewhere in ‘mythical’ times.”⁵⁵

We signify national grand-narratives by means of national symbols, consisting not merely of national flags, coats of arms, national anthems etc., but also of ideas. This is about a ‘thick’ definition of culture, which includes more than behavioural norms; it also includes symbol systems, by which we confer significance upon our experiences. The meaning of such symbols is constructed, shared and learned by the people belonging to that particular culture providing them with a meaningful framework for positioning themselves in relation to one another, to other nations and to the world around them. Thus, in Clifford Geertz’s words, “*The everyday world*

⁵² Campbell (1998), pp. 11–12. According to David Campbell, even modern Great Britain, France, and Germany, the USA, Australia, and Canada cannot be considered as nation-states, even though they are national states.

⁵³ Smith (2007 [2001]), p. 123. See also Foucault (1995), p. 30. According to Michel Foucault, “A soul inhabits him [man] and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body.” This statement can be understood here in three ways: (1) the state (soul) and nation (body) are in corporate relationship with each other, (2) the state exercises identity mastering power over the nation, and (3) more generally as a two-way relationship between the state and nation. Thus the relationship between a state and a nation (if a nation can be said to exist; otherwise it’s the relationship between a state and society; see Picture 9) is like a two-way road; the state is the effect and instrument of the nation, but the state is also the prison of the nation. This raises the question of which existed first, the state as the soul, or the nation as the body?

⁵⁴ Paden (2003), p. 32.

⁵⁵ Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhart (2005), p. 24.

*in which the members of any community move, their taken-for-granted field of social action, is populated not by anybodies, faceless men without qualities, but by somebodies, concrete classes of determinate persons positively characterized and appropriately labelled. And the symbol systems which define these classes are not given in the nature of things – they are historically constructed, socially maintained, and individually applied.”*⁵⁶

So far I have explained ‘the birth’ of national identity as a project of endogenous conscious elites and as a cultural tendency of reification of the borders of Otherness generation by generation. An interactionist perspective on identity construction offers us the possibility of modifying and reconstructing Otherness, especially through contextual discursive interactions with the Others. This is largely the task of political elites, but we should not forget the increased consciousness of the people due to their access to the global media either. People are much more conscious nowadays than their ancestors were vis-à-vis the alternative narratives available in global media. Even though I consider that national identity can be modified by political elites, I do not deny the role of non-political elites either. Non-political elites may be much more open to new ideas than political elites, but the essential question is whether there is any need to reconstruct national identity structures. Surely there is, thinking globally, but since we tend to be ‘victims’ of our past narratives and since we seek individual and collective security above all else, *we tend to be egoistic and prefer the national past to possibilities of a global future.*

4.3. State Agent and the Limits of Good Intentions

Liberal democratic states tend to promote the general good of their citizens. Unlike liberal democratic states, authoritarian states are remote from the interests of civic society. This means that rather than pursuing the broader concerns of their society, the political leaders and administration of an authoritarian state tend to promote and formulate their own preferences and define their own goals at civic society’s expense. A liberal democratic state needs to be sensitive to the demands of domestic society and various communities.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Geertz (2000), pp. 363–364. See also Paden (2003), pp. 29–30. The content of the ‘thick’ concept of culture is close to the concept of totemism, which means the principle of bonding ourselves with some culturally defined sacred item/idea. A totem may be an animal or plant ancestor with whom a group like a clan believes itself to be spiritually kin. A totem may also be a flag or coat-of-arms of a nation as marks of a nation’s existence and tradition. A totem provides stories that can be told to bind the members of a nation around ‘our flag’; it is a signifier of our mythical origin as a nation.

⁵⁷ Kopstein and Lichbach (eds.) (2000), pp. 13–15.

But states and nations may also intentionally pursue a normative, communitarian or cosmopolitan world view as well, which could help us to avoid possible future “clashes of civilizations.” However, since the international system is not merely based on our ideas, the pursuit of the global or regional good of any particular state and nation always collides with the restraints of the material world (e.g. the problematic geographic location of the state, the need for energy, or the miseries of climate change, which may have unforeseeable cumulative effects). The pursuit of the general good may be horizontally wide cultural phenomena (a norm- and value-structure shared by many states), but it can be divergent as well (e.g. a Polish understanding vis-à-vis the normative good may differ from e.g. the Russian one).

4.3.1. Internal Constitutive Restraints and Enablers

Just as people with different economic or material interests can clash over their differences, people with different identities may also disagree politically. The Soviet Union, for example, was a state, but it also consisted of many different nations who never managed to overcome the feeling that their own national identities were stronger than the Soviet Union’s corporate identity (“*Homo Sovieticus*”). Thus, people may possess several competing identities rather than just one identity, and it is not clear at all which identity will be the dominant one or on what identity field people in the end will base their actions. Charismatic and powerful leaders may play an important role in mobilizing some identities and neutralizing others.⁵⁸

A human being cannot separate his/her mind from his/her body, but at least theoretically society as a large imagined community can remove the state if it does not answer the needs of society. If people voluntarily commit themselves to be citizens of a state they have to have some benefits from that commitment, for which they are “contented to resign their native liberty.” When a despotic government or ruler destroys this voluntary interest, it also removes the natural obligation to obedience. Thus, it is protection and security of its citizens that should be the basic function of any state towards its citizens.⁵⁹

Saying that one of the state’s main functions is to advance the general good and interests of its citizens raises difficulties when despotic, selfish or merely cruel rulers govern their subjects only to further their own status, protect their privileges and enjoy a rich life style.⁶⁰ To some extent, this

⁵⁸ Kopstein and Lichbach (eds.) (2000), pp. 12–14.

⁵⁹ Hume (1985 [1739–40]), pp. 600–602.

⁶⁰ Geertz (2000), pp. 318–319.

applies to Western liberal democracies as well, even though the people are considered as co-citizens with the ruling political elite. In Western liberal democracies the executive and legislative bodies of the state exercise their power for a certain term only (normally four to six years). People elected to such bodies may be considered as normal egoistic individuals who want to keep their privileges (e.g. a good salary), once they have obtained approval from their co-citizens through the electoral process. Whilst I am not saying that they do not try to advance the general good, it is surely the case that, reflecting the egoistic side of the human nature, they are also seeking their own benefit. *The main point here is that political elites in all state organs are habituated, during their term in office, into certain kinds of internal cultures (including e.g. identity perceptions and a common world view), which the elites may consider as legitimate and right in defining the state's and nation's interest, even though the general cultural forms of the society/nation may differ from those of political elites totally.*

4.3.2. External Social and Material Restraints and Enablers

External social and material restraints on, and enablers of, the good intentions of the state and nation are hard to divide into separate categories since they are interlinked. Lessons learned from the past have a spatio-temporal influence on national identity in the form of material restrictions such as a state's geographic location. It has been assumed here that geography still counts in international relations and affects national identity construction at least in Brzezinskian "geopolitical pivots", or rimlands, like Poland (and Finland).⁶¹

Geopolitics reflects a combination of the size, geographic location and material resources of a state as well as their usability for the political purposes of the state.⁶² However, in this thesis the geopolitics and geopolitical position of Poland has been analyzed holistically in order to avoid the deterministic flavour of the traditional geopolitical approach. According to *deterministic geopolitics*, states behave only according to their geopolitical position⁶³, whereas Polish social scientists, for example, have stressed the im-

⁶¹ Brzezinski (1997), p. 41. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, geopolitical pivots are those states "whose importance is derived not from their power and motivation but rather from their sensitive location and from the consequences of their potentially vulnerable condition for the behavior of geostrategic players. Most often, geopolitical pivots are determined by their geography, which in some cases gives them a special role either in defining access to important areas or in denying resources to a significant player. In some cases, a geopolitical pivot may act as a defensive shield for a vital state or even a region."

⁶² See, for example, Visuri (1997), pp.163–169.

⁶³ Ó Tuathail (1999), p. 107. According to Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "Geopolitics can be described as problem-solving theory... It takes the existing power structures for granted..."

portance of economic and cultural factors when analyzing the state's behaviour in the framework of geopolitics. In this context they have used the term *geo-economy*.⁶⁴ *Critical geopolitics* has subjected all established geopolitical explanations to critical evaluation by pointing out in post-structuralist ways that geopolitical practices are based on spatio-temporal discourses, not on material 'facts'.⁶⁵

National identity narratives represent the past and habituation, whereas Europeanization and globalization represent modernity and adaptation.⁶⁶ This means that even though the geographic location of states still has an influence on national identities, they have more affect on the immediate priorities of states. However, cultural narratives tend to be stigmatized to geographic Otherness and in this way to national identities as well, meaning that every nation tends to hate or love their closest neighbouring nations no matter what. But thinking globally there are much more serious threats to traditional state sovereignty than merely geographic location, namely, globalization.⁶⁷ State sovereignty and corporate identity is currently 'under attack' from globalization. The world is becoming smaller as a result of the spread of the media and technology, but at the same time it is becoming too large to be controlled. As a reaction against that:

Social actors aim at shrinking it back to their size and reach. When networks dissolve time and space, people anchor themselves in places, and recall their historic memory. When the patriarchal sustainment of

Its dominant modes of narrative are declarative ('this is how the world is') and then imperative ('this is what we must do'). 'Is' and 'we' mark its commitment to, on the one hand, a transparent and objectified world and, on the other hand, to a particular geographically bounded community and its cultural/political version of the truth of that world."

⁶⁴ Halizak (1995), p. 112. See also Halizak (2001), p. 474; Tuomi (1996), p. 257; Ó Tuathail (1999), p. 107.

⁶⁵ See, for example, Visuri (1997), p. 169; Tuomi (1996), p. 44 and p. 143. Osmo Tuomi criticizes traditional and deterministic geopolitics by stating, largely in post-structuralist fashion, that geography should never be seen as a distinct phenomenon, or in isolation from ideologies and politics, but as part of a power-related discussion. However, one cannot call Tuomi a critical geopolitician, since his "New Geopolitics" still focuses mainly on the cultural and economic patterns which would guarantee, for example, the competitiveness of the EU in relation to other parts of the world.

⁶⁶ Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001), p. 1 and p. 4 and p. 7. Europeanization is about "domestic adaptation with national colors in which national features continue to play a role in shaping outcomes." But over the "*longue durée*", Europeanization may lead to learning and truly internalized normative forms of behaviour and even a common European identity, even though Europeanization tends to "threaten deeply rooted collective understandings of national identity" in the short run. Europeanization may respond to "globalization processes by reinforcing their trends or by shielding EU member states against their undesired effects."

⁶⁷ Bauman (2006), p. 28.

*personality breaks down, people affirm the transcendent value of family and community, as God's will.*⁶⁸

There are three possible forms and origins of identity reconstruction as a counter-reaction to globalization: legitimizing identity, resistance identity and project identity. Regardless of the developmental status of a country, all governments pursue security through foreign and security policies. Some states pursue security through global revolution (the Soviet Union), some pursue global counterrevolution (USA during the Cold War) and others align themselves to these camps or remain outside these camps. As a consequence of globalization, nations are seeking security, either by leaning on the dominant institutions of society instead of the state (*legitimizing identity*), or by trying to preserve a coherent national identity structure by means of domestic corporate efforts (*resistance identity/identity defence*) or by joining and forming larger collective security communities, like the EU and NATO, in which it is not only possible to preserve traditional forms of national identity, but also possible to find collective avenues to reconstruct national identities in a collectively agreed direction (*project identity*).⁶⁹

In the international structure, material interests and events (e.g. consciousness of global warming) still trump national identities. Consequently, we may notice that it can't be 'ideas all the way down', since power politics still prevail in the areas like the energy supply of states, because there are no renewable energy sources yet that could meet the needs of every state. But it is easy to be cynical and think that states care only about their material interests and that it is the material world then that defines our ideational perceptions and ambitions. In today's world there are countries that struggle to satisfy basic material needs, like some of the poorest African countries, but there are countries, like those in the West, that have already fulfilled their basic material needs and have moved into the so-called modern or post-modern developmental stage. These modern or post-modern countries can be called '*fine adjustment societies*', meaning that there is plenty of room for the ideational pursuit of progress, since all the basic material needs and structures of society have been fulfilled and societies are, albeit not perfectly, working.

By combining its domestic identity structure and foreign and security policy choices, an individual state produces what we may describe as a grand (survival) strategy. Thus, all states have their internal constitutive and external social and material restrictions and enablers that influence their strategic opportunities to promote not only the general good of their domestic

⁶⁸ Castells (1997), p. 66.

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 7–10. According to Manuel Castells, religious fundamentalism, territorial communities and nationalist self-affirmation are all expressions of "the exclusion of the excluders by the excluded."

society, but also that of the international society, based on friendly competition, or of the world society, based on normative mutual coexistence with other actors in friendly ways and without competition.⁷⁰

4.4. Defence Identity and Security Policy Practices

No clear definition of defence identity is available. However, it is usually used in connection with the concept of a defence culture. It is confusing, for example, to note that even the content of the widely used and known concept of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) does not refer to identity at all, but to culture.⁷¹ Defence identity is close to the concept of *culture*, which generally answers the question: *How do we do things and express ourselves through our symbolic forms (especially ideas)*,⁷² but it is not the same thing; culture (and defence culture) is about doing and expressing, whereas identity (and defence identity) is about sentiments. Thus, identity is a deeper concept than culture; it signifies culture and makes it meaningful.

Defence identity has been understood here as the core of national identity, since if people feel a collective sameness as a nation they are habituated to sustain and defend that more or less reified sentiment in the same way that an individual human being tends to defend layers of his/her personal identity structure. Defence identity *tells us what a nation is defending and what the boundaries of the nation's collective 'Self' are*, but it does not reject the possibility of reconstructing or even totally getting rid of these boundaries. In other words, defence identity tells us how open and tolerant a particular national identity is towards various other world views and cultures.

Security identity, like the concepts security and security policy, may include various aspects of security: political, military, economic, social and

⁷⁰ See, for example, Buzan (2004), p. 9. According to Barry Buzan, the World Society model is actually possible only through revolution (Kantian revolutionism).

⁷¹ See, for example, NATO (2002), Chapter 4. According to this chapter, ESDI is about the European pillar of NATO “which could respond to European requirements and at the same time contribute to Alliance security.” In short, ESDI is about “ensuring the development of effective mutual consultation”, about participation and practical arrangements; it does not tell us anything about, for example, common values or a world-view that are essential parts of a collective identity.

⁷² See, for example, Swidler (1986), pp. 273–274. See also Johnston (1995), p. 51. According to Alastair Iain Johnston, “symbols are the vehicles through which shared decision rules, axioms, and preferences are manifested empirically, so that culture can be communicated, learned, or contested.” See also Geertz (2000), p. 90. According to Clifford Geertz, religion is a system of symbols. See also Snyder (2002), p. 14. According to Jack Snyder, culture is a system of symbols (ideas) that creates meaning within a social group.

environmental. *Security identity tells us about what has been considered threats.*⁷³ I have understood security in accordance with Barry Buzan, as political, military, economic, social and environmental threats against a state's national security.⁷⁴ I argue that actually all these threats may affect national identity as well, and as a Constructivist I do not share Buzan's view that threats must be analyzed on the international-, state- and individual-level. Constructivism tackles this 'levels of analysis problem' by arguing that the international- and state-level are mutually constitutive; there is no international, if there are no states and vice versa. Individuals do count (in this thesis as politicians, churchmen, military, or ordinary citizens), but it is not necessary to locate them on a particular level, since they are part of some larger social construction, namely their nation and state.

What a nation considers worth defending is usually expressed in national security policy 'White Books'. From the Constructivist perspective, the Polish security policy 'White Books' may be seen as the nation's official world view, as intended regional and global roles, as perceptions of the nation's eventual destiny, as expressions of beliefs (who do we think we are (ego) and how do we tend to see 'the world out there') and as desires.⁷⁵

In this thesis, defence identity has been analyzed by using Katarina Brodin's 'doctrinal method' (see Picture 11).⁷⁶ According to Brodin, a doctrine consists of argumentation and strategy. Argumentation and strategy are subjugated to doctrine, which is a higher level concept. Argumentation consists of a state's fundamental goals (e.g. peace and democracy) and world view. A world view may be divided into universal and regional dimensions. A strategy defines the instrumental goals of a state's foreign and


⁷³ Rieker (2006), p. 514. Pernille Rieker has analyzed French foreign and security policy discursively from the *security identity point of view*. Even though she has operated with the concept of security identity, instead of defence identity, she deals with her issue like me and has focused on politico-military issues.

⁷⁴ Buzan (1991), pp. 118–122 and p. 328 and p. 369. *Political threats* are threats against a state's organizational stability and *military threats* are threats against a state's territorial integrity. Political and military threats are interconnected. *An economic threat* is a threat that a state might be driven into a state of economic dependency, instead of the ideal state of economic interdependency. *Social threats* are threats against national identity.

⁷⁵ Agrell (1985), pp. 19–24; Visuri (1989), p. 18; Visuri, (1997), p. 237; Johnson (2006), p. 1.

⁷⁶ Nurmi–Rekiaro–Rekiaro (1992), p. 56 and p. 261; Aikio–Vornanen (1994), p. 349; *Krasnaya Zvezda* (1997), p. 2. According to most dictionaries, a doctrine can be understood as a theory, discipline and tenet set out in documents. The word concept has sometimes used as a synonym for doctrine. A concept means basic idea, birth of basic idea or factual understanding. It also means an idea or thought or the association, assimilation or understanding of a basic idea by intuition.

security policy (e.g. military alignment and good relations with neighbouring countries) as well as its means (e.g. active foreign policy).⁷⁷



Picture 11: Doctrine, argumentation and strategy⁷⁸

A defence identity that includes intersubjectively shared borders of Otherness, might take centuries to construct. Main characteristics of national identity are deeply embedded among a nation's citizens, and in national institutions ('sub-identity holders') like the Church and the Armed Forces, since these national institutions are comprised of citizens. This is not to say, however, that the boundaries of a collective national 'Self' may not change, or be modified through discursive interactions. In the event that they do change, it is possible to identify any such change by studying official documents, speeches and foreign policy behaviour. Changes in national defence discourse and foreign policy behaviour can be understood as indicative of a change in a nation-state's defence identity. However, any change in national defence discourse and foreign policy behaviour has to be reflected in public opinion to be able to ascertain whether the change is only a matter of strategic adjustment (*adaptation*), or true a identity change (*learning*).⁷⁹

4.5. Conclusions

Scientifically thinking, states and nations are mental constructions; we do not see states and nations, but we do feel that they exist. In everyday language, states are treated in anthropomortised ways, as identical and human-like '*speaking billiard-balls*' which just act and speak. To some extent it is easier to operate in IR with these anthropomortifications, as indeed the traditional Realist paradigm does. But even though we treat states as similar '*speaking billiard balls*' without intervening in the identity world of states,

⁷⁷ Brodin (1971), p. 20.

⁷⁸ Brodin (1971), p. 20.

⁷⁹ Rieker (2006), p. 514.

we should at least try to understand that they are not similar, nor do they possess similar identities.

While identity in general answers the question: *Who am I?* collective identity answers the question: *Who are we?* Consequently, national identity answers the question: *Who are we as a nation and what are our intersubjectively shared symbols (ideas)?* State identity consists of type identity (the form of government) and of role identities (the state may possess several roles in various contexts that do not necessarily have the power to mobilize the deep emotions of national and defence identity). To be a nation-state, collective identity and national identity merge into corporate identity, which answers the question: *Who are we as a nation-state?* However, most of the contextual international interactions do not necessitate corporate agency; a state may operate on the level of role identities merely, but such contexts as EU-integration and the CFSP, and NATO-cooperation have the power to mobilize corporate identity.

Nations and national identities have been narrated into existence by conscious elites (painters, composers, writers etc.). Some of the origins of those narratives have been forgotten, some have not; some are consciously recognized and some unconsciously. In any event, history is the key element in these narratives. The legitimacy of a nation's existence has usually been narrated through the Others. The point here is that we are habituated into some reified beliefs about Others and these beliefs change very slowly. The mental borders 'between us and them' have been understood here as the core of national identity. National defence identity answers the question: *What are we defending and what are the boundaries of the nation's collective 'Self'?* Defence identity informs us generally about how open and tolerant a national identity is towards various other world views and cultures. Even though I consider national defence identity to be rather stable, it may change due to interactions with other states in various international contexts. Since I have considered international and domestic structures as being mutually constitutive, I will focus during the next chapter on the international structure and will analyze it under the label 'world order'.

5

THE “NEW WORLD ORDER” AND THE QUEST FOR GLOBAL TOLERANCE

“In brief, the New World Order is a utopian system in which the U.S. economy [along with the economy of every other nation] will be “globalized”; the wage levels of all U.S. and European workers will be brought down to those of workers in the Third World; national boundaries will for all practical purposes cease to exist; an increased flow of Third World immigrants into the United States and Europe will have produced a non-white majority everywhere in the formerly white areas of the world; an elite consisting of international finances, the masters of mass media, and managers of multinational corporations will call the shots; and the United Nation’s peacekeeping forces will be used to keep anyone from opting out of the system.”¹

In this chapter I will try to answer the question: *What does the “new world order” mean, and what are the limits for the normative world society of world order model?* In trying to answer this question, one basically is dealing with a question about global scale society (*Gesellschaft*) and community (*Gemeinschaft*). This issue was dealt with earlier in a domestic context (see Chapter 4.1.2). Even though we may have a pessimistic view of this world order (“new world disorder”),² I argue here that we should at least discuss the idea of a communitarian, or even cosmopolitan model.

Order is largely about maintaining and defining common interests and goals by means of rules, which describe the pattern of behaviour that sustains them, and by institutions, which make these rules effective (see Chapter 5.1.1).³ *World order* as a concept leads us into the highly problematic field of the joint management of world politics, and raises questions such as on whose terms should this management be exercised, and how just the management would be.⁴ It sounds rational to answer that such management should be exercised on international society’s terms, but what is interna-

¹ Castells (1997), p. 84.

² Onuf (1998), p. 35.

³ Bull (1995 [1977]), p. 51.

⁴ Wæver (1992), p. 122. See also Clark (2001), p. 636. World order is still a largely state-centric research subject in IR. This means that we still conduct research on world order in terms of the structure of the balance of power, the polarity of the international system and the current forms of collective security. But the agenda has been widened after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and especially after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. The scope of world order-related research has increased due to globalization to include areas like human rights and environmentalism.

tional society, and what principles are universal and acceptable to all states and nations?

Order, whether global or regional, is often imposed at the expense of the freedom and sovereignty of smaller states. For example, Napoleon may be considered an advocate of freedom (to some extent) for the suppressed nations of Europe at that time, whereas the opposing alliance provided order, but not necessarily liberty. Another example was the West in the Cold War which may be considered as promoting order and freedom, whereas the East tried to promote order alone. Order in that case was a kind of negation of justice and freedom.⁵

Currently we tend to give the main role in maintaining world order to the UN and the rules of the international law. But forms of world order have existed in the past without international organizations, or rules of international law, and might exist in the future as well. In this respect the UN and its predecessor, the League of Nations, are and were important providers of order, but so would be the functional international institutions (e.g. the principle of non-war policy and peaceful settlement of disputes) that would, or would not, continue to define our lives even if the UN ceased to exist. This is not to say that the UN, or international law, would not be important elements vis-à-vis a new world order, but the UN, not to mention the League of Nations, has not been able to enforce the principles of international law to be followed by all states and nations; it has been up to states and nations themselves to follow, or not follow, these principles.⁶

The “new world order” as a concept refers to the somewhat idealist idea after WWI of preventing wars by establishing a worldwide collective security system (the League of Nations).⁷ However, the world was not ready for this idea then. The next time the concept was envisioned was after WWII by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, when he tried to construct a more sustainable stability and peace through a new international sovereign, the UN. Later, on 11 September 1990 the administration of the then President of the USA, George Bush (Sr.), revisited this abstract concept in line with the effort to reverse Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 1990.⁸

⁵ Bull (1995 [1977]), pp. xvi–xviii.

⁶ Ibid., pp. xvi–xviii.

⁷ Dunne (2001), pp. 225–249.

⁸ Miller and Yetiv (2001). Bush’s concept was based on three related dimensions: (1) the aggressive use of force was unacceptable, (2) it would be rejected through collective security, and (3) to meet that goal, great power cooperation was necessary. See also Judis (1990).

It has been said that “There is a new world order, as long as the USA and the majority in the UN agree” that there is.⁹ This means that this new world order no longer exists, since the USA took another direction to that of the majority in the UN when it attacked Iraq in March 2003.

Should the UN take on the role of a Leviathan then in international affairs? I would answer yes; at least its role in conferring collective legitimization should be maintained.¹⁰ But since the UN, or more precisely, all the member states of the UN are not able or willing to give that role to the UN, largely for egoistic reasons, there is probably no hope for a world state, or world society, emerging at least in the foreseeable future.

After the Cold War, liberals celebrated both the West’s victory over the Soviet-led East and the strength of the transatlantic relationship, based on liberal democratic political cultures as well as common interests and goals (liberty, human rights, democratization and stability). It was proof of the validity of Karl Deutsch’s “security community” then, according to which shared values would eventually triumph over a repressive style of governance.¹¹ However, the West’s victory was not the end of history, but only a new phase of a possible future, as Samuel Huntington predicted in his famous monograph *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. According to Huntington, the most important distinctions among peoples in the post-Cold War world were not ideological, political, or economic, but cultural.¹²

I strongly prefer Liberalism, as an overall theoretical perspective that relies on human rationality in the sense that we are able to articulate and pursue our interests, understand moral principles and the rule of law. In this sense individual liberty is the core value above all else, in addition to international institutions, in order to change the world and international relations. But since institutional theory has not provided a sustainable explanation “for turbulence and disruption in cooperative efforts”, we have to assume that our task will be hard and may only be realized during the “*conjunctural*” time trend of many decades, or even during the *very long run* (“*longue durée*”) that may extend over a number of centuries. The eventual goal is a better future and a better world regardless of whether you are Realist, Rationalist or Liberalist. Even hard-edged Realists have to agree on that, I presume. The point is, however, that there is ‘something out there’ (especially colliding world views and natural phenomena like global warm-

⁹ Waeber (1992), p. 123.

¹⁰ Claude (2005), p. 205.

¹¹ Deutsch (et al.) (1969), p. 5. A security community is “one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.” See also Forsberg and Herd (2006), p. 20.

¹² Huntington (1996a), p. 21; Forsberg and Herd (2006), p. 20.

ing and its various impacts on our good intentions) that we are not capable of dealing with however much we try, and which may disrupt all our good intentions.¹³

5.1. About Current and Future World Orders

Many kinds of world orders can be found throughout history: *orders based on revisionist states and powers* (e.g. ancient Rome and the Axis powers during WWII), *status-quo world orders* (e.g. the Congress of Vienna and the Cold War era), *collective world order*, based on principles of the rule of law and universal norms and institutions (e.g. the efforts of the League of Nations and the United Nations), and the *current uni-multipolar world order*, based on one superpower (the USA), many less powerful states (e.g. China, the Russian Federation, India and Japan), regional arrangements and communities (e.g. the EU, the African Union and NATO) and numerous cross-border global corporations (e.g. Shell, Exxon-Mobil, Daimler-Chrysler, Mitsubishi). We do not know what the next model of world order will be, but surely it will not be the same as the current one. Nor do we know when this current, more or less USA-dominated and status quo-type of order will decline. What we do know is that history does not necessarily repeat itself. We also know that every global order, at least so far, has involved competition in space and time that affects the evolution of states and their identities.¹⁴

The current world order consists of relevant actors like the EU, NATO and the UN as organizations, as well as the Russian Federation, Germany and the United States as states. These are the actors with whom or through which (NATO and the EU) Poland has largely conducted discursive foreign and defence policy interactions. These are also the actors that are capable of affecting and modifying Poland's identity structure. All these actors have resources and competencies to produce events, episodes and tendencies, especially the USA. There are still no generally accepted constitutive rules in international relations, although there are regulative ones. Even war is still an acceptable way to conduct foreign and security policy. There are variations in the meaningful action of the above mentioned actors. While the USA and the Russian Federation can be seen as still leaning on power politics (at least partially), this is not the case with, for example, the EU (as an international actor), or with Germany.¹⁵

¹³ Forsberg and Herd (2006), pp. 25–26; Cox and Sinclair (2001), p. 4.

¹⁴ Kopstein and Lichbach (eds.) (2000), p. 9.

¹⁵ This does not exclude the notion that there may exist power political features inside the EU. See, for example, Risse (2001), pp. 202–203. We may assume, for example, that national political elites try to promote national ideas in the EU “with an eye on gaining power or remaining in [national] government.”

In the global context, the USA and Europe have different views on the sources of legitimacy. The USA’s beliefs have been rooted largely in the will of democratic majorities in constitutional nation-states, whereas Europeans tend to believe that legitimacy is based on sources of international law rather than the will of particular nation-states. According to Francis Fukuyama, the above mentioned views are deeply rooted in national histories. But the discussion about a “New-Europe” and an “Old Europe” may be correct in the sense that at least the ex-Warsaw Pact countries of Central Europe (including Poland) may be more prone to lean on the USA’s vision of legitimacy than on “Old Europe’s” vision.¹⁶

According to Francis Fukuyama, it is about Europeans’ belief that we still live at “*the end of history*”, based on assumption that the world can be governed by laws, norms and international agreements, whereas the USA, not forgetting the Russian Federation, is still living in the historical tradition of power-politics for dealing with, for example, the threat of global terrorism. Europe has created its own “end of history” world view, at least within the EU, by empowering supranational organization at the expense of state sovereignty. But, on the other hand, Realists might argue that the peace and safety of Europe is still guaranteed by the USA’s military power. This statement is not totally wrong, since, for example, the settlements at the end of the Balkan wars in the 1990s proved to be largely due to the USA; Europe, leaning on diplomacy and embargoes, was unable to manage to decide collectively to deploy a decisive military force to defeat Slobodan Milosevic and democratize Serbia. It was only the USA and some like-minded states who pacified Kosovo in 1999 under the umbrella of NATO.¹⁷ However, the Balkan question still has the potential to burst into flames again, and not only because of the proclamation of the independence of Kosovo on 17 February 2008. Furthermore, it is still the presence of foreign military forces that holds the Balkans together with simultaneous diplomatic efforts.

According to a *Constructivist and reflectivist standpoint*, the EU as well as NATO may currently be considered as projects of peace. The EU has also

¹⁶ Fukuyama (2004), p. 114. See also Hulsman (2003). The former U.S. Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfelt, caused “a political storm” in France and Germany in January 2003 when he said that France and Germany was “Old Europe” and the new eastern NATO member states were “New Europe.” In this context, he also argued that the focus of NATO’s development lay in the east and that the USA could find lots of new friends there. See also NATO (2007). “Old-Europe” is itself heterogeneous: the United Kingdom and Spain in particular supported the US action in Iraq, whereas France and Germany vigorously opposed it. NATO was not used in combat operations in either Afghanistan or Iraq. After the Afghanistan War the stabilization operation (ISAF; International Security Assistance Force) under the mandate of the UN was transferred to NATO command in January 2002.

¹⁷ Fukuyama (2004), pp. 114–117.

been called the most developed of postmodern security systems, based on the idea that “when the dividing line between foreign and domestic policy is being erased, states are giving up their traditional monopoly on violence, and [internal] borders are increasingly irrelevant.” The original purpose of the foundation of the EU was the desire to maintain the peace in Europe by integrating Germany into tight cooperation with the other West-European states. Currently, the EU may be seen as a regional security community, characterized by a similarity of values as well as a belief in the ability to settle disputes peacefully. The ever deepening economic and political integration of the EU is believed to bind the member states into mutual cooperation, interdependency and collective responsibility. According to this kind of vision, the EU can be seen as enlargening, in the name of peace and stability, democracy, as well as economic prosperity in Europe, much like NATO’s terminology in its 1995 “Why and How” –research (see Chapter 8.2.1).¹⁸

From the Constructivist and reflectivist standpoint the purpose of NATO enlargement is congruent to that of the EU’s: to strengthen common European security and stability by enlargening the community of mature democracies and market economies. NATO has been considered as a kind of mixture of a military alliance and a security community, because its original purpose was to repel external threats as well as prohibit the use of armed force between member states of the Alliance. Soon after the end of the Cold War it became clear that NATO as a Euro-Atlantic security community was also a proper element in resolving the instability of Central Europe and in finally ending the divide of the Cold War era in Europe.¹⁹

As a counter-point to the Constructivist and reflectivist stand, *the Realist paradigm* assumes that the main reason for EU-enlargement has been about a classic power struggle between states. The anthropomortized state actors consider that they have vital interests to be controlled even outside their own geographic areas. In this way, the EU-enlargements can be seen as a way to increase the influence of the European Great Powers, that is, Germany and France. Thus, Realists interpret enlargement as a geopolitical power struggle between the European Great Powers to control Central Europe, even though there is a tendency in Western Europe to avoid speaking about a geopolitical struggle in this context.²⁰

Realists also consider the enlargements and ever deepening integration of the EU as a project for creating a new European Great Power; enlargement increases the political significance of the EU. The more states that back the

¹⁸ Rieker (2006), p. 513. See also Świącicki (2000), pp. 2–3.

¹⁹ See, for example, Mattox (2001), pp. 107–124; Weber (2001), pp. 97–101.

²⁰ See, for example, O’Loughlin (2000), pp. 48–52.

common European foreign policy, the stronger the position the EU will occupy in the world.²¹ In addition to enlargement, the EU is simultaneously trying to strengthen its international role by creating a military and crisis management capability of its own. Its inability to control regional crises in Europe can be seen as a rationale behind the development of these capabilities. Thus, by developing these capabilities the EU is trying to strengthen its credibility in the eyes of its member states as well as of other states and international organizations. On the other hand, the attempts to create a Federal EU or transform the EU into a Great Power necessitate that the Union has a credible and common security policy as well as armed forces of its own.

Consequently, the Realist paradigm would claim that the survival of NATO after the Cold War, as well as its eastward expansion, reflects the strong possession of the USA and the mighty of her power alone. Without a will on the part of the USA to preserve NATO it would probably no longer exist. Through NATO-enlargement, the USA has strengthened the victory she won after the Cold War. The real purpose of NATO, according to the Realist paradigm, is to maintain and promote the USA’s influence in Europe and at the same time to reduce Russia’s influence in Eastern and Central Europe. Thus, according to Realists, it is a question of a power struggle between the Great Powers over the dominance of Eastern and Central Europe.²²

From the identity perspective, combining the English School theory’s three domains, *the international system*, *international society* and *world society* and Wendtian Constructivism’s three types of international social structures, *Hobbesian*, *Lockean* and *Kantian cultures*, one has a good basis to try to understand the constitutive and processual relationship between domestic and international structures.²³ Even though the three domains of the English School have been analyzed separately in the following chapters, the foundation of the English School theory, which Constructivism shares, is the idea that elements of the international system, international society and world society all exist simultaneously as objects of discussion and as aspects of international reality.²⁴

²¹ See, for example, Stubb (2001).

²² Waltz (2001), pp. 29–30 and p. 35. See also Crawford (2001), pp. 39–40 and pp. 56–57; Rauchhaus (2001), pp. 176–185 and pp. 190–191.

²³ Buzan (2004), p. 102. See also Wendt (1999), pp. 246–308. The main message of Alexander Wendt’s concepts of three types of international social structure (“cultures of anarchy”): “Hobbesian”, “Lockean” and “Kantian” cultures, is analogous to that of the English School’s three domains.

²⁴ Buzan (2004), pp. 7–10. See also Wendt (2003), pp. 517–528. Wendt’s category is a bit more ‘fine-tuned’, since it includes five variants through which the world eventually ends up in a world state: (1) the system of states (= international system), (2) the society of states (= international society), (3) the world society (= cosmopolitan world society),

5.1.1. Institutions and Institutionalisation

*“An institution is a relatively stable set or “structure” of identities and interests. Such structures are often codified in formal rules and norms, but these have motivational force only in virtue of actors’ socialization to and participation in collective knowledge. Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors’ ideas about how the world works.”*²⁵

I elaborated on regulative and constitutive rules, norms and values briefly in Chapter 3. Referring to institutions, I said that a norm may become an internalized institution that affects not only behaviour, but also identity as part of one’s values.²⁶ *To be a truly constitutive part of national identity, an international institution needs to have long socialization process (institutionalization) of habituation and reification.*²⁷

The international environment in which states operate is considered here as more cultural and institutional than just material. Interactions with other states affect state behaviour, but also national identity. There are at least three approaches to regulate state behaviour in international relations: *the amity-enmity approach, the regime approach, and an institutional approach*, but these approaches are mixed. Furthermore, a regime and an institution is largely the same thing:²⁸ “Any bounded set of rules and related practices constitutes a regime, and any regime identifiable as such is an institution,”²⁹ For example, rules referring to international intervention constitute an international regime that can also be called an international institution. If one wants to draw distinction between an international regime and an institution, one may state that regimes operate more on states’ behaviour side, whereas international institutions operate on both, the behaviour as well as the identity side; *institutions are internalized regimes and thus become part of the national identity structure*. I call these institutions fundamental or primary international institutions (a war/non-war policy, sovereignty of the state and international law), as distinct from an institution like Law of the Sea conferences held under the auspices of the UN.³⁰

(4) collective security as a distinct phase (a NATO-kind of global arrangement) and (5) the world state (“global monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence”).

²⁵ Wendt (1992), p. 399. See also Searle (2005), pp. 26–27. John Searle even considers rules as institutions: “An institution is any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts.”

²⁶ Bull (1995 [1977]), p. 71.

²⁷ Wendt (1992), p. 399. See also Wiener (2006), p. 9. According to Antje Wiener, socialization is “the process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community.”

²⁸ Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996), p. 33.

²⁹ Onuf (1998), p. 145. See also Snyder (2002), p. 15.

³⁰ Jackson and Sørensen (2007), p. 108.

The amity-enmity approach refers to power politics of the international system, based largely on the possibility of war. Survival is seen here as the main motive for states. The amity-enmity approach is the most primordial of these approaches in the sense that each nation has historically inherent and endogenous beliefs about the Others; personally you just like or dislike someone and the same thing can be said about communities and societies as well. It would be a normative project to tackle the amity-enmity problem in the international structure, which will necessitate emancipation and tolerance.³¹

The regime approach refers to all kinds of organized efforts to regulate inter-state behaviour. Even though a regime may be understood as an institution, it also refers to security organizations like the UN, NATO and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) that are based on states’ rational decisions to reduce the threat of violence in the international system. Mutual rules and norms as regimes have been used to tackle the problems of primordial enmity and *ressentiment* that still affect inter-state relations.³² For maintaining regimes it is not necessary to use coercion, even though a coercive element is at least implicitly included in all regimes: if you do not belong to the sphere of a particular regime, you are outside it and that may threaten your external security.

The institutional approach refers to emancipation and a voluntary change of behaviour. The main message of this approach is that nations and states may voluntarily and intersubjectively adopt collective forms of behaviour, without coercion or rational calculation. This means that fundamental institutions like a war/non-war policy, the sovereignty of the state and international law are approved ways in and the basis for, conducting interactions between states. The institutional approach, as distinction from the calculated rationalism of the amity-enmity approach and regime approach is more social in its nature, meaning that it stresses the role of “impersonal social forces as well as the impact of cultural practices, norms and values that are not derived from calculations of interests.”³³ Understood in this way, the institutional approach is actually a Constructivist approach as well.³⁴

³¹ Buzan (2004), pp. 190–191.

³² Keohane (2005), p. 57. See also Haas (2005), p. 101. According to Ernst Haas, “regimes are norms, procedures and rules agreed to in order to regulate an issue-area”, or single issues.

³³ Keohane (2005), p. 57.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 58. According to Robert Keohane, “Institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and the power. Institutions are therefore *constitutive* of actors as well as vice versa [Keohane’s italics].”

Primary institutions and the need for tolerance

Human societies are based on sociological functionalism “in which all human societies must be founded on understandings about security against violence, observance of agreements, and rules about property rights.” Whatever type of rules they are, they all come under three principles: (1) constitutional/constitutive principles, (2) rules of coexistence and (3) rules to regulate cooperation. *Constitutional/constitutive principles* are the basic ordering principles concerning, for example, society of states and a cosmopolitan community (in the domestic structure this category comes under internalized values and norms, and in the international structure under the key principle of state sovereignty).³⁵ *Rules of coexistence* are regulative in nature and concern the institutions of diplomacy, international law, the balance of power, war and the role of great powers. *Rules to regulate cooperation* concern politics, strategy, society and economy, and they are also regulative in nature. This category includes rules concerning, for example, arms control treaties as well as regimes and institutions for managing trade, finance and environment.³⁶ All the previous principles simultaneously affect the international structure. States (and national ‘sub-identity holders’) may collectively assign a certain function (assignment of function) to some particular regime, or secondary institution, to coordinate their mutual interactions (e.g. UN).³⁷

³⁵ Wendt (1992), pp. 412–413. According to Alexander Wendt, “Sovereignty is an institution, and so it exists only in virtue of certain intersubjective understandings and expectations; there is no sovereignty without the other.” States’ identity as “sovereigns” would disappear, if states stopped acting according to the norms of taxing their citizens, protecting their markets against foreign “imports” and killing “thousands of Iraqis in one kind of war and then refuse to “intervene” to kill even one person in another kind, a “civil” war, and when they fight a global war against a regime that sought to destroy the institution of sovereignty and then give Germany back to the Germans, they are acting against the background of, and thereby reproducing, shared norms about what it means to be sovereign state.”

³⁶ Bull (1995 [1977]), pp.64–68. See also Buzan (2004), p. 52.

³⁷ Searle (2005), pp. 7–14. There are three underlying principles which help us to understand and explain social and institutional realities, namely, collective intentionality, the assignment of function and status functions. *Collective intentionality* is simply about collective intentions, but it also covers such forms of intentionality as collective beliefs and collective desires. *The assignment of function* is about “the capacity to impose functions on objects where the object does not have the function” [e.g. war is an approved way to resolve disputes only if we agree upon it being so]. *Status functions* refers to the process whereby we impose a status and a function on “something that cannot perform that function in virtue of its physical structure alone” [e.g. a state can be a state only if its status of sovereignty is externally recognized, or, for example, to possess a status of credible defence other states have to evaluate and accept the efficiency and credibility of that defence].

States (and national sub-identity holders) may also share intersubjective understanding on the status of *primary international institutions* (status function). This means that *the sovereignty of a state, war/non-war policy, and international law* would be part of a state’s institutionalized belief as part of its national or even its civilization’s collective identity.³⁸

The principle of state sovereignty was introduced by the *Treaty of Westphalia* in 1648 and was strengthened by the Metternichean concert of Europe (1816–1848), as well as through the European wars of unification (1849–1870).³⁹ State sovereignty involves the agreement between all states on recognizing each other as sovereign, each others’ geographical territory and the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. In this system *war became an institution alongside diplomacy*. Limited war was seen as an available instrument whenever a sovereign state found its use reasonable, and limited war is still seen as an institution for maintaining international order. This means that sometimes war is an approved institution even at the expense of state sovereignty (international crisis management operations).⁴⁰

The idea of a fundamental basic principle of international law (i.e. *ius gentium*; there are rights and limits that should be respected because they should be known to any man through the faculty of reason) was reintroduced especially with the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, but the question remains: what really are the sources of this law?⁴¹ The constitutive nature of war, the sovereignty of the state and international law as primary institutions can easily be understood through the negations of these, meaning that if war is internalized globally as totally unacceptable, the international system would change; if there would be no sovereign states, international system changes; if the rules of international law were neglected, the international system changes.

In addition to the primary institutions of state sovereignty, war, and international law, I take a relative normative step, and argue that the master institution in inter-state affairs should be *tolerance*, because whatever world order model we possess, it is always basically a question of tolerance due to the heterogeneous world views of states and nations; even a world society

³⁸ Buzan (2004), p. xviii and pp. 175–181. Primary institutions are “the institutions talked about by the English School as constitutive of both states and international society in that they define both the basic character and purpose of any such society.” Secondary institutions are “the institutions talked about in regime theory [as] the products of certain types of international society ... and are for the most part consciously designed by states.”

³⁹ Raymond (1997), p. 209.

⁴⁰ Waever (1992), p. 117 and pp. 113–114.

⁴¹ Ibid.

would include various coexisting world views. Tolerance does not mean that we should accept, for example, the suicide flights against the twin-towers on 9/11 2001; they were against all principles of human coexistence, which no religion can, or should, justify. *What tolerance generally means is that deviating behaviour of states, nations or human communities, or world views that do not threaten the lives of other people, should be tolerated.*⁴² It also means that we should first understand the motives of terrorists, or a new Hitler or Stalin, before commencing proper action against them.⁴³

5.1.2. International System and the Struggle for Power

*“Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as if of every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather.”*⁴⁴

The international system represents the field of power politics amongst states. It could be described as a “society without government”, or governance without government.⁴⁵ The international system refers here to Hobbesian and Machiavellian Realism, to a pessimistic view of human egoistic nature as well as to the conviction that international relations are conflictual with a constant fear of war. In this context, Realism also refers to a high regard for national security and state survival as well as to a basic scepticism that there can be progress in international politics at all.⁴⁶ Hobbesian and Machiavellian Realism treats nations as still being at the level of the biological individual; they have not yet attained moral selfhood; their ‘I’ does not yet act on a stage set by an international ‘Me’.⁴⁷

⁴² See, for example, Weil (1983), pp. 413–442. International law and tolerance are both relative concepts, since one always needs to ask: on whose terms are we speaking? International law deals basically with inter-state relations, but its principles and sources are usable in all international human interactions (e.g. *ius cogens*; always and everywhere binding principles; e.g. the prohibition of genocide, piracy, slavery, the slave trade, torture, wars of aggression and territorial aggrandizement).

⁴³ See, for example, Coram (2004), pp. 334–339. This is actually the normal procedure in military planning as well (OODA-loop): Observe, Orient, Decide, Act.

⁴⁴ Hobbes (1985 [1651]), pp. 185–186.

⁴⁵ Waever (1992), p. 99.

⁴⁶ Buzan (2004), p. 7. See also Jackson and Sørensen (2007), p. 312.

⁴⁷ Morris (1992), p. xxxv.

Human nature and the concept of power

If there was total freedom for us to do whatever we wish to do, without a common, regulative and powerful authority (sovereign) sufficient to prevent us from doing so, we would be in a state of perpetual war. This is basically what Hans Morgenthau and his successors in the Classical Realist Paradigm thought, when they argued that since there is no such authority at international level, states tend to maximize their power and always make use of situations to increase their power.⁴⁸

According to Thomas Hobbes, human motivation is related to appetites (desire) and aversions. Some appetites, like food, are innate and some, like love and hate, proceed from experience and the “*triall [sic] of their effects.*” Furthermore, appetites change continually, are different in different men and possess different strengths in different men.⁴⁹ These appetites or desires are tightly linked to the concept of power in Hobbes’s thinking, when he states: “*The POWER of a Man (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good.*” [sic]⁵⁰ Any future apparent good is always a subjective experience in its nature, but every man (and state as a socially constructed intersubjective convention) must always seek to have some degree of power to guarantee his basic material needs in such a way that there would also be opportunities to develop his mental needs.

According to Hobbes, everything in human societies and relationships is about power: to have servants, is power; to have friends, is power; nobility is power, sciences are power etc. Hobbes seemed to think that every man’s (and state’s) power resists and hinders the effects of another man’s (and state’s) power, and that all acquired power consists in command over some of the powers of another man (or state). However, this might not be true, because even if one had power in having slaves, these slaves would also have power over their masters, since without slaves there would be no masters.⁵¹ In today’s world, we call this kind of power-relationship interdependency between human beings and state agents. However, Hobbes stated that competitive struggle for power over others was universal and that some men’s desires for power are limitless: “*So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire for Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death. And the cause of this, is ... because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.*”⁵²

⁴⁸ See, for example, Mearsheimer (2005), pp. 139–140.

⁴⁹ Hobbes (1985 [1651]), pp. 118–119.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 150–151. See also Aristotle (1992), p. 67.

⁵² Hobbes (1985 [1651]), p. 161.

From this follows the main conclusion of Hobbes's analysis of human nature and power; that some (human beings and state agents) always have immoderate desires to gain more power or maintaining the power-status they have acquired, and others are pulled into constant competitive struggles to resist these immoderate purposes: "*So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation.*"⁵³

This logic of the struggle for power seems to be eternal; there have always been those who want more power over others, if something cannot be done to prevent them. Some may say that individuals do not count in world politics, but actually they do, since sometimes individuals, like the dictators Hitler and Stalin, have had the power to define 'the correct path' into the future in revisionist ways, in the sense that they believed that 'our nation and cause' should be the objective truth for the rest of the world as well. A revisionist way to change the world or power relations in the world is not possible even if one possesses 'universally good intentions', since these universally good intentions are always relative, if we can not agree upon universal ethics of right and wrong, defined by some higher sovereign body, binding all nations, religions and state agents of the world.

5.1.3. *International Society and the Status Quo World Order*

*"Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself ... [and] when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he ... to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not ... take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another."*⁵⁴

International society is about the "institutionalisation of shared interest and identity amongst states, and puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory." International society refers here to a Grotian kind of Rationalism, which adopts a more optimistic view of human nature than Realists do. In this context, Rationalism takes states as "legal organizations that operate in accordance with international law and diplomatic practice; international relations are therefore norm-governed policies and activities based on mutually recognized authority of sovereign states." International society is in parallel with the international system, since it is also based on a state-centric ontology,

⁵³ Ibid., p. 185.

⁵⁴ Locke (2003a [1690]), p. 102. See also p. 107 where John Locke argues that "*I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction.*"

but international society is “generally approached with a constructive epistemology and historical methods.”⁵⁵

International society is associated with the pluralist view of rules about co-existence, but it may also be associated with a solidarist view that states share values that are beyond concerns about mere survival and coexistence (EU). What values then are shared becomes a central question. Pluralism does not rule out an element of community, since states in a pluralist society may share at least a weak common identity, as the “Atlantic states” (NATO and the EU countries) share the idea of being Western. But NATO members also share solidarity towards each other as a constitutive rule (“One for all, all for one” –principle), not based on coercion, but on an inherited fear of the previous Soviet-led bloc or ‘Other’. At the global level it is unclear at what point solidarity might become so progressive that it calls into question the existence of the state-system and the principle of state sovereignty.⁵⁶

On some occasions, a pluralist international society may be called an *international community* (e.g. Western liberal democracies and probably the community of Islamic states as well), that is a community based on shared identity, or at least some sort of ‘we-feeling’ among states. On some occasions, an international community may be called a *security community* as well. This may apply to NATO countries (perhaps even EU countries), which share type (democracies), role (mutually recognized sovereign agents) and collective identity fields (solidarity between members).⁵⁷

The status quo as a concept refers to a state of affairs that is to be preserved in its current form; who then wants to preserve the current state of affairs in the world? The winners of WWII or the states that benefit most from the current state of affairs might be the best answer to that question, since they do not need to challenge the current world order, at least in revisionist ways. Philosophically *a status quo* refers to tolerance, legitimate governance and justice as ways to preserve the current state of affairs. It has been connected to the Lockean conceptions of tolerance and legitimate governance, with structural amendments by Kenneth Waltz. The treatment of justice has been excluded here, since it refers more to the concept of a collective world order, dealt in Chapter 5.1.4.

⁵⁵ Buzan (2004), p. 7 and p. 66 and p. 110. A society of states (international society) is an idea of second-order society (which members are not individual human beings, but states) that has not generally attracted sociologists, and therefore this issue has been left mostly to IR. See also Jackson and Sørensen (2007), p. 312; Wæver (1992), pp. 97–98.

⁵⁶ Buzan (2004), p. 21 and p. 139 and p. 146.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 121–122.

Tolerance and legitimate governance

The Lockean International society may be called a *'live and let live - model'*, since basically there is no force among states and nations that would authorize them to destroy each other. What prohibits states and nations then to subordinate each other, or try to subordinate each other, is mainly the current global economic interdependence between states supported by various rules and norms, set down by interacting states as well as international organizations and institutions. In a *status quo* world order model states may possess differing religious world views and types of government. They may also compete with each other, but basically interstate wars should be impossible in today's world due to the economic interdependence and structural pressure of homogenization by the international structure. However, this applies mainly to non-revisionist states at a similar stage of (economic) development, and even between those wars still may occur.

Locke separated secular and ecclesiastical power from each other. Lockean tolerance is about religious tolerance, based on the idea that all *human beings are equal under God's eyes*; they are bound by the laws of nature, but there is no absolute freedom to act as they please. The main task of true religion is to regulate men's lives according to the rules of virtue and piety and no person should have any right to prejudice another person because of his/her religion. Following this idea, religions should not be institutionalized at all, or if institutionalized they should be separated from the secular power structures of the state. The main task for the secular power (*civil magistrate*) is to secure all the citizens in general and individual properties in particular, as well as to guarantee the execution of equal laws for all citizens. All the civil power should be committed to promote the public good and not to be "extended to the salvation of souls" at all. The "care of the salvation of men's souls" was entrusted to God and God alone, according to Locke, since "God has never given any such authority to one man over other" and no man should ever leave the salvation of his/her soul to the choice of any other, whether prince or civil magistrate.⁵⁸

The principle of democracy and majority rule is a key element in Lockean thinking vis-à-vis secular governance. Locke's analysis was basically limited to the domestic context only, but it is usable in international contexts as well. However, the problem is how to consider majority rule in international governance; can it be understood as the application of the majority principle in voting procedures in the UN as a normative legislative body of our world, or could it mean economic, political and military actions conducted by the most powerful (economically, politically and militarily)

⁵⁸ Locke (2003b [1689]), pp. 215–219.

states, legitimated only by themselves?⁵⁹ I will deal with this issue more thoroughly later, in Chapter 5.1.4.

Interdependence and the balance of power

Despite growing interdependence and regulative international regimes, states tend to maintain a military force just in case, or as a means of last resort for use in an unforeseeable future, because even in most cooperative actions, where all agree on the goal and have equal interests, one cannot rely on others. But by preparing in this way for an unforeseeable future, states endanger the global or regional future as well, since the nature and logic of the Waltzian balance of power game necessitates that every participant state preserves its relative military power as it currently is, otherwise the game can't be called a balance of power game based on *the status quo*. The current uni-multipolar world order model may be called a *status quo* model, if the participating states approve the hegemonic status of the United States and at the same time maintain their own relative status in the system. However, since we know that there are revisionist states, like Iran, that try to challenge the United States-led Western politico-economic-military hegemony, we probably cannot call the current world order model a *status quo* model.⁶⁰

As a result of this balance of power process, the participating states tend to become “like units.” Strictly speaking, the Waltzian balance of power game is about competition between states, where states that do not possess a sufficient capacity for organized violence will ‘die away’. This is a ‘survival of the fittest’ situation, according to which natural selection will remove weak states from the system. The Cold War bi-polar international system, based on sovereign states and/or alliances would be the best world order model for the Neorealist paradigm, because this option includes less unforeseeable potential threats and risks to global peace than a multi-polar or the current uni-multipolar system.⁶¹

A pure *status quo* world order has probably never existed in human history, since there always seems to be states that aim at regional hegemony (sometimes aiming at conquering the whole world), while others simply wish to be left alone. All states however wish for their own survival. Consequently, many states prefer to take part in a game in which all states cooperate to at-

⁵⁹ Locke (2003a [1690]), p. 184. In Lockean thinking, war is at the same time considered legitimate and forbidden. The use of force is legitimate, and necessary even, only if there exists a threat that endangers one's own existence. Only just wars (defensive) are legitimate, whereas wars of conquest are unjust and non-legitimate.

⁶⁰ Waltz (2001 [1959]), pp. 198–210.

⁶¹ Ibid.

tempt to solve the problems of egoistic maximization. Some states may prefer to play no game at all, but all in all the freedom of choice of any state is limited by the actions of all the others. The means of this game can be divided at least into three main categories: (1) the means of the international system and revisionist world order (the use of force and politico-military coercion, ‘do whatever you must in order to win the game’), (2) the means of international society and the status quo world order (bi-lateral and multilateral cooperation between states and institutions that moderate inter-state competition), and (3) the means of a world society and collective world order (the normative principle of non-violence and friendship).⁶²

5.1.4. World Society and Collective World Order

*“The improvements in reason and philosophy can only be owing to a land of toleration and of liberty.”*⁶³

A world society is ‘*idealist non-violence and team-play*’ or ‘*equality among the nations*’ –model. World society “takes individuals, non-state organisations and ultimately the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements, and puts the transcendence of states at the centre of IR theory.” World society refers here to revolutionism (or Liberalism these days) of a Kantian kind, by adopting belief in the ‘moral unity’ of humankind beyond the state.⁶⁴ The aim of revolutionism is progressive change, or the elimination of the international state system to create a better world by peaceful means. Revolutionism believes in the achievability of human perfection.⁶⁵

In its extreme form, a world society refers to cosmopolitanism, in that we should get rid of national boundaries and adopt an identity as world citizens. Understood in this way the *world society is actually about a world*

⁶² Ibid., pp. 203–204.

⁶³ Hume (1985 [1739–40]), p. 44.

⁶⁴ Jackson and Sørensen (2007), p. 309. According to Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, “*The liberal tradition in IR emphasizes the great potential for human progress in modern civil society and the capitalist economy, both of which can flourish in states which guarantee individual liberty. The modern liberal state invokes a political and economic system that will bring peace and prosperity. Relations between liberal states will be collaborative and cooperative.*” See also, for example, Plato (1996), Book I, Paragraph 330. Plato was a man of emancipation, or revolution even. He saw Athenian Government and society as dominated by ignorance, pride, envy and falsehood, which are topical issues in current society as well.

⁶⁵ Buzan (2004), pp. 7–8. See also Jackson and Sørensen (2007), p. 309 and p. 312. See also Hegel (1977 [1807]). G.W.F. Hegel also deals with the concept of world order in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, stating that “it’s not clear why one does not speak merely of the eternal, of the moral world order, and so on, or, as the ancients did, of pure notions like ‘being’, ‘the One’, and so on.”

community, about a shared sense of ‘Self’ that implies a cosmopolitan belief in the oneness of humanity.⁶⁶ The problem here is that if people try to develop a world society on the basis of cosmopolitan individuality, the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and equality will be contested and the freedom of manoeuvre of states disturbed, which hampers a state-based society of states (international society), and dialogue among states will be muted.⁶⁷

If the nature of a shared identity requires an Other, it is problematic to discuss a universal, cosmopolitan identity, since there probably cannot be an ‘Us’ without a ‘Them’, which is the core of any conceptualization of identity. Furthermore, how would the entire world’s population ever establish the necessary communication with each other without intermediary collective units, such as states.⁶⁸ Thus, highly cosmopolitan ‘whoeverism’ seems to be irrelevant vis-à-vis this thesis, but I will devote some space to this perspective in the empirical part of the thesis.

A collective world order (a world society) is an idea based on the rule of law and on universal norms and institutions. The idea of a collective world order is usually associated with Immanuel Kant (Kantian order), republicanism as well as to universal tolerance and friendship among nations, but it can easily be connected to Eastern philosophies, like Buddhism, as well. Friendship among nations needs a consensus of all mankind (*consensus gentium*), or at least some sort of mutually and universally understood principles of law and justice, that is, some things that all men will be found to agree upon as right, real, just or attractive. This may be an impossible goal to be reached by today’s nations and states, since there are so many world views and ideas like equity, law, justice and moral virtue.⁶⁹

A world society is reflective, solidarist and normative in nature. The roots of solidarism can be found in cosmopolitan values, meaning that humanity would (or should) be one, and “the task of diplomacy is to translate this latent or immanent solidarity of interests and values into reality.”⁷⁰ Kant tended, at least implicitly, to answer the same question which Aristotle had already presented in 300 BC: What is (or should be) the chief or primary good for man? Aristotle equated the chief human good with happiness. What did he mean by happiness was probably the mental state, where a

⁶⁶ Buzan (2004), p. 7 and p. 115.

⁶⁷ Waever (1992), p. 104.

⁶⁸ Buzan (2004), pp. 122–123.

⁶⁹ See, for example, Hobbes (1985 [1651]), p. 314. According to Thomas Hobbes it is the sovereign power that obliges men to obedience and it is the sovereign power that has the power to declare what is equity, justice and moral virtue. See also Geertz (2000), p. 38.

⁷⁰ Buzan (2004), p. 47.

human being understands that s/he is not merely capable of observing the external world, but capable of reflective activity (theoretical constructions of her/his social reality) as well. Thus, for Aristotle, the chief human good was not material wealth, but ideational and philosophical happiness.⁷¹

World society has been understood here as a normative idea, based on a transnational element that does not rest entirely on the ontology of states, or entirely on individuals. It has been understood as a historically possible alternative image of the international system as a whole. A world community, which is even more demanding to imagine than a world society, has been understood here as a more or less utopian idea, or at least not a very likely world order model in the 10–50 years that is the time frame for this thesis.⁷²

Kantian republicanism

According to Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), human beings are obliged to pursue a well-ordered system of relations among nations, which is a necessary condition for the fulfilment of the human condition. However, he pessimistically recognized the practical obstacles to creating a world order as follows:

*Now even if the practical man admits that we can do what we ought to do, he bases his disconsolate rejection of our fond hope on the following consideration: He asserts that, human nature being what it is, we can predict that man will never want to do what is required to achieve the goal of perpetual peace. The solution to so difficult a task requires that civil society become a whole. Implementing this state of right (in practice) can begin only with force.*⁷³

Thus, Kant argued that even though man as a rational being has all the capacity to pursue the end state of perpetual peace, one nevertheless thinks implicitly (not necessarily acts alike) as follows: (1) Act first, then justify (*Fac et excusa*), (2) If you are a perpetrator, deny it (*Si fecisti, nega*) – deny always that the guilt is yours, and (3) divide and conquer (*Divide et impera*) – destroy the unity of those who have chosen you to be their leader. According to Kant, publicity should be the context and goal of political life in seeking and preserving peace.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Aristotle (2002), p. 9 and p. 445. See also Smith (2001), pp. 225–249.

⁷² See, for example, Cox (2001), pp. 3–9.

⁷³ Kant (2003 [1795]), pp. 27–28.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 2–35.

All in all the main message of Kant seemed to be that when trust and respect has been established between nations they can, and ought to, give up their armies, coercive financial measures, and attempts at acquiring other nations as if they were mere property. Thus, nations have to establish their internal civil conditions because that underlies the possibility of perpetual peace in the future. Kant’s solution to these internal civil conditions has been called republicanism (“the civil law of every nation should be republican”). Republican legislation is based on three fundamental principles:⁷⁵

*For first it accords with the principles of the freedom of the members of a society (as men), second, it accords with the principles of the dependence of everyone on a single, common legislation (as subjects), and third, it accords with the law of equality of them all (as citizens). Thus, so far as right is concerned, republicanism is the original foundation of all forms of civil constitution. Thus, the only question remaining is this, does it also provide the only foundation for perpetual peace?*⁷⁶

There may be confusion between a republican form of constitution and a democratic one, since, according to Kant, even a democracy is despotic, because “it sets up an executive power in which all citizens make decisions about and, if need be, against one (who therefore does not agree); consequently, all, who are not quite all, decide, so that the general will contradicts both itself and freedom.”⁷⁷ But can anybody seriously declare, for example, that the Republic of Poland is a despotic country, because Poles have adopted majority voting in their parliament? What about the Kingdom of Sweden then? According to Kant, we should also define Sweden as a despotic country. There are no purely republican states in this world, in the original Kantian sense. But the basic Kantian idea of republicanism stressed the separation of executive, legislative and judiciary powers from each other, as well as the transparency of decision-making processes and the equality of citizens.

Kant stressed the importance of the force of law and justice at both the intra- and inter-state level, and considered a state of lawless international freedom as “mad freedom.” This mad freedom is the state of nature, where savage nations are in a constant state of war with each other. Rational freedom is a state of republican peace, where all nations govern themselves by the principles explained above. Furthermore, this rational freedom requires

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 7. Under a non-republican constitution, where subjects are not considered citizens, “the easiest thing in the world to do is to declare war.” In this model, the ruler is not a fellow citizen, but the nation’s owner and (s)he can decide to go war as “if it were a kind of pleasure party.”

⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 8–9.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

that all republican states form a federation of nations (idea of federalism), whereby the nations involved would guarantee a state of peace among them. This federation of nations could extend further and further, spreading the message of tolerance and mutual understanding of republican principles.⁷⁸

The current message of the EU, which is under a constant process of enlargement, represents the Kantian model of a federation of nations, not a world society, but a solidarist international society at the regional level. Actually one might see the current EU as ‘a peace process’, or as a federation of nations, because nations that join the EU have to have fulfilled certain economic and political requirements (see Chapter 8.1.2) before they acquire membership. There is also some form of ‘Leviathanian power’ in the EU (i.e. federative legislation over national ones) based on a mutual contract between the member nations. The UN is another case comparable to the EU. The UN consists of many kinds of type identities (from autocracies, like Saudi-Arabia to democracies like the EU-nations, from despotic ones, like Belarus, to republican ones, like the EU-nations), and does not have real power over its member states. Thus, the UN is not a federation of nations in the Kantian sense.

Universal laws

“And law was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit the naturall liberty of particular men, in such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and joyn together against a common Enemy.”⁷⁹

When dealing with the rule of law we possess at least three kinds of law that world order could be based on: (1) divine law, (2) civil law, and (3) the law of opinion.⁸⁰ The fourth, international law, may be considered a mixture of all the above mentioned laws.

Divine law is a law given to us by God. This is based on the idea that God has given us rules whereby men should govern themselves. God has a right to do what he wants, “*since we are his creatures: He has goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to which is best and he has the power to enforce it by rewards and punishments in another life for nobody can take us out of his hands.*”⁸¹ But what if a human being constantly conducts horrible crimes in this secular life? Shall God forgive all the horrible crimes that (s)he has conducted in this life? Doesn’t this mean that one can commit

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 12–14.

⁷⁹ Hobbes (1985 [1651]), p. 315.

⁸⁰ Locke (1979 [1689]), pp. 352–355.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 352.

whatever crimes one wishes in this secular life, providing one is a ‘true believer’ of one’s church? Such a person will surely be sentenced for his/her secular crimes under civil law, but such a criminal might not repent his/her actions at all, since ultimately it is God who will forgive him/her.

For Hugo Grotius divine law and the law of nature were the same, since God, for Grotius, was the creator of nature. As a comparison to Grotius, the Hobbesian law of nature had nothing to do with God; it was merely the notion that the empirical and primordial right of ‘kill or be killed’, needed a social contract for us to be able to live together. Grotius believed in divinity, which has care for the affairs of men, and which God gave to all mankind three times, namely by the creation of man, by the restoration of mankind after the flood, and through the Gospel of Christ.⁸² Nature was created by God and thus, the law of nature was the same as God’s law, according to which we should all live. However, it was the Christian God and Christian religion for Grotius that commanded us to live according to natural law (i.e. the Bible): “Things which are forbid by the Gospel, as Concubinage, Divorce, Polygamy, are likewise condemned by the Law of Nature.”⁸³

The civil law means the rules set by the state (or commonwealth according to John Locke) for the citizens of the state. This is the codex of law that no citizen should be able to escape. Under the civil law, the state may punish or reward its citizens, or, in other words, engage to protect the lives, liberties and possessions of those who live according to its principles. Under the civil law, the state also has the power to take life, liberty or goods away from someone who disobeys the law.⁸⁴

The law of opinion focuses on virtue (= vertue) and vice, expressed by John Locke as follows: “Men every where should give the Name of Vertue to those actions, which amongst them are judged praise worthy; and call that Vice, which they account blamable: Since otherwise they would condemn themselves, if they should think any thing Right, to which they allow’d not Commendation; any thing Wrong, which they let pass without Blame.”⁸⁵ The basic idea of this model was that men still have the power of thinking, to approve or disapprove the actions of those amongst whom they live, even though open resistance would be against the civil law of the state.

The problem of these law models, when applied to a global context, is the relativity of their ideational basis. In the case of divine law, there is no universal and unanimous understanding of the divinity, God or God’s message to mankind. On the other hand, most men do not take the penalties

⁸² Grotius (2005 [1625]), Chapter I, Paragraph XV. See also Waever, p. 118.

⁸³ Grotius (2005 [1625]), Chapter II, Paragraph V.

⁸⁴ Locke (1979 [1689]), p. 352; Kant (2003 [1795]), p. 7.

⁸⁵ Locke (1979 [1689]), p. 357.

God possesses seriously. If they break the law of God they “entertain thoughts of their future reconciliation.” Civil laws (constitutions) differ worldwide at least as much as divine law, and it might be impossible to adopt, for example, the civil laws of European liberal democracies as a universal model for all the world’s nations. One problem with the law of opinion is that what is considered vice and blameworthy in one country, may be considered virtuous and praiseworthy in another.⁸⁶

Current *international law* and its sources (treaties, International Customary Law, general principles of law, judicial decisions, learned writers, and other possible sources of legal norms, such as *Ius cogens* – always and everywhere binding principles; for example, prohibition of genocide, piracy, slavery, the slave trade, torture, wars of aggression and territorial aggrandizement – and acts of international organizations and equity) may be considered as an effort to construct a universal codex of law to be obeyed in interstate relations. Basically, it is not meant to be applied domestically, but *Ius cogens* might be applicable in domestic contexts.⁸⁷ But shouldn’t we try to enact a universal constitution that could serve as a domestic constitution in all the member countries of such an arrangement? Probably so, at least it could be our goal, even though it is not very likely that we will achieve this kind of an arrangement in the foreseeable future: “Families, clans, tribes and nations mostly shine strongly, whereas humankind, or members of the planetary ecosystem, are still little more than background glow ... universal scale identity remains strikingly weak.”⁸⁸

5.2. ‘Order Is What States Make of It’?

Since Alexander Wendt’s statement “anarchy is what states make of it“ is still basically a Rationalist statement, I have modified the statement in order to create a more Idealist form, “order is what states make of it”, in order to bring the English School’s normative institutionalism closer to Constructivism’s Rational teleology. Following Wendt’s ideas, it is up to states to transform their interests and identities in mutually constructed ways: “*If states find themselves in a self-help system, this is because their practices made it that way. Changing the practices will change the intersubjective knowledge that constitutes the system.*”⁸⁹ Neorealists argue that self-help and power politics are essential features of inter-state anarchy, and come from the lack of an international Leviathan to prevent states from killing and hurting each other. Contrary to the Neorealist conception of anarchy,

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 353.

⁸⁷ Weil (1983), pp. 413–442; Jennings and Watts (eds.) (1996), pp. 22–52; Malanczuk (1999), pp. 35–60.

⁸⁸ Buzan (2004), p. 210.

⁸⁹ Wendt (1992), p. 407.

Constructivism considers self-help and power politics as institutions, not essential features of inter-state anarchy.⁹⁰

The international structure not only includes cooperative states, but also states that are predisposed toward aggression. The aggressive behaviour of these ‘predator’ states may force other states to engage in competitive or war-prone politics, ‘to meet fire with fire’, in order to avoid their own destruction. Thus, there is always the possibility of war, as Realists assume, unless we can create a Lockean- or Kantian-kind of global collective identity basis. This seems to be utopian at least at the moment, since it would necessitate global tolerance towards Others be they individuals, nations, states or religions. Regionally we are progressing in tolerating each other, at least what comes to Europe, but since the ‘good’ that European states represent and the ‘good’ that non-European cultures and civilizations represent often collide, it is hard to believe that we can ‘heal’ the world simply by means of our normative efforts, but one has to give that belief a chance anyhow. These various colliding social ‘goods’ cause scepticism and a tendency to continue national, or regional self-help policies.

The unexpectedness of the social and material world (nature) does not help us very much either in our efforts to increase overall tolerance and mutual trust between cultures and civilizations. The Realist notion of the basic need for survival seems to be stronger than ideational reflectivism at this point of history.⁹¹

5.2.1. The Process of Continuous Change and Identity Reconstruction

“Your appeal to past experience decides nothing in the present case; and at the utmost can only prove, that that very object, which produc’d any other, was at that very instant endow’d with such a power; but can never prove, that the same power must continue in the same object or collection of sensible qualities.”⁹²

Changes in our social and material environments are continuous and complex. We tend to live at the moment and often think that today’s world or-

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 395. See also Wiener (2006), pp. 11–12. According to Antje Wiener, Waltzian anarchy is not exclusively the result of material capabilities, but depends on national identities which are the result of interaction among states.

⁹¹ See, for example, Waltz (2001 [1959]), p. 233. According to Kenneth Waltz, ideational reflectivism (world society) is a dangerous project: “As the Western democracies became more inclined to peace, Hitler became more belligerent. The increased propensity to peace of some participants in international politics may increase, rather than decrease, the likelihood of war.”

⁹² Hume (1985 [1739–40]), pp. 139.

der, essentially based on states, will continue as such in the future also.⁹³ In reality, there have been many world orders in the history of mankind and today's modern states have existed only for the last 200–300 years (the era of modern states).⁹⁴ The world orders of the era of modern states have been characterized by the cultural, economic and politico-military hegemony of a few individual states. This was considered a guarantor for peace within individual civilization, or even between civilizations (e.g. “*Pax Britannica*” and “*Pax Americana*”). The Roman Empire was considered “a hegemonic guarantor of peace” before the era of modern states (“*Pax Romana*”).⁹⁵ Rome exercised its rule through military and cultural hegemony; ancient China relied on bureaucracy “to rule an empire based on shared ethnic identity”; the Mongols relied mostly on military and advanced tactics; whereas the British empire was based on trade and its navy that “ruled the waves”, as was the case with the earlier empires of Spain, the Netherlands and France.⁹⁶ The danger here is that the individual hegemonic state usually forces her ‘identity euphoria’ on other agents as a normative truth. This may be done in economic, political and military ways. Thus, “*Pax Romana*” may also be presented in the form of “*Bellum Romanum*”, and the other previously mentioned hegemonic state-based orders in the forms of “*Bellum Britannicum*” and “*Bellum Americanum*.”⁹⁷

From the Constructivist point of view, the international structure is never stable, it is under continuous structuration. There have always been stronger and weaker states throughout history, and usually one power is superior to all the others. To explain variable for the behaviour of the states is not enough, or valid even, since states do, for example, donate development aid for the weaker states, which cannot be connected to the power struggle-thesis of the Realist paradigm, but rather to the need for recognition thesis of Constructivism.

We may with certainty say that the world order we currently face is not a Kantian one, but this uni-multipolar order model is not the final one either. Change is continuous, but we can't say what kind of order model we may face, for example, in ten years time. Everything is possible, since all ‘or-

⁹³ This was also the basic idea during the Cold War, when Classical Realism and Neorealism were the main paradigms of IR.


⁹⁴ The modern state is understood here in terms of the possibility of citizens to choose their form of government (e.g. representative monarchy or republic).

⁹⁵ See, for example, Gilpin (1987), p. xii. Robert Gilpin has analyzed, largely from the Realist perspective, the relationship of economics and politics in what can be called an IR approach of (global) political economy. According to Robert Gilpin, “*Pax Britannica*” and “*Pax Americana*” have provided political frameworks “within which economic and other transnational activities were taking place.”

⁹⁶ Brzezinski (1997), p. 21.

⁹⁷ See, for example, Keohane (ed.) (1986), pp. 224–225

ders’ and identities are structured in social processes and in open systems that are different to the physical systems of nature.



Picture 12: Variants of international order and possible futures⁹⁸

Classical Realism and Neorealism as products of the post-WWII era saw the international order as more or less stable, based on a bi-polarity between the USA (and her allies) and the Soviet Union (and her allies). According to the Realist paradigm, the international order was based on a balance of power between these two superpowers, just as the international order before WWII was based on the hegemony of Great Britain (“*Pax Britannica*”) and the USA (“*Pax Americana*”).⁹⁹ However, the Realist paradigm could not explain such a radical change in the international order as the collapse of the Soviet Union, or if it tried, the explanation was that the material forces of the United States was overwhelmingly larger than that of the Soviet Union. Thus the deep structure of ideas and *identities of the states* and nations were ignored, which in my view would have deepened the explanation of this change.

When analysing the world order through the ‘glasses’ of Constructivism, one focuses on processes of social interactions, ideas and identities. As states’ behaviour may change, so can the international structure. This is based on the Constructivist argument that actors’ identities and interests are not given as Realists argue, but developed and sustained, or transformed, in

⁹⁸ Wendt (1999), pp. 246–312.

⁹⁹ Keohane (ed.) (1986), pp. 224–225. Currently we are speaking about a “*Bellum Americanum*” instead of a “*Pax Americana*”, referring to the USA’s intention to annihilate her national security threats by using her military force.

contextual discursive interactions.¹⁰⁰ Developing one's identity presupposes the recognition of Others and a questioning as to what is the difference between Me (or We) and those Others.¹⁰¹

Constructivism holds that structural change occurs when actors redefine who they are and what they want. The four “master variables” of Alexander Wendt (interdependence, a common fate, homogeneity and self-restraint) may cause structural change in evolutionary ways from one order to another.¹⁰² In contrast to “master variables” that suggest that progress is evolutionary, there are unexpected social and material events as well that may affect world order and identities in revolutionary ways.

5.3. Social and Material Unexpectedness as Sources of Identity Reconstruction

“A new era - freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which nations of the world... can prosper – a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak” (President George Bush (Sr.) on 11 September 1990).¹⁰³

As I mentioned earlier (Chapter 2.2.7), contexts are to be understood as processual and social phenomena. A stable social environment reinforces international society, whereas “dramatic shocks in the [social and material] environment loosen commitments to existing [wider] identities and behavioural norms.” This mechanism clearly links social contexts, like the global

¹⁰⁰ Zehfuss (2002), p. 38.

¹⁰¹ ‘We and the others’ -thinking may be considered the main cause for conflicts and wars. It is also important vis-à-vis the development of an individual's, a society's, an ethnic group's or a state's identity.

¹⁰² Wendt (1999), pp. 343–362. See also Katzenstein (2005), p. ix and pp. 13–17. *Interdependence* means that the actors of the international structure are interdependent when the result of interaction depends on the choices of all actors. Interdependency may include a spill-over effect, in that integration (or deeper cooperation) in one functional area (e.g. *the trade policy of EU*) may also lead to integration in other functional areas (e.g. *the CFSP of the EU*). A *common fate* means a collective survival struggle, for example, in the face of global warming as a collective material threat. *Homogenization* refers to *globalization*, which includes the concept of *internationalization*. *Homogenization* is about the homogeneity or similarity of actors (not only by regime types, but also by identities and social systems), whereas *internationalization* is a process that refers to territorially based social and material exchanges across state borders (e.g. ideas to tackle the negative effects of globalization and material means to fight global warming). It also refers to the evolution of the state-based international system (discursive and non-discursive global and regional arrangements, such as collective crisis management, EU-integration and NATO-enlargement). *Self-restraint* involves the idea that states trust that their needs will be respected and not sacrificed by or to other states.

¹⁰³ Miller and Yetiv (2001).

meta-context (world order) and regional contexts (EU-integration and the CFSP, and NATO-cooperation) with the material restrictions vis-à-vis the pursuit of a regional and global good.¹⁰⁴

5.3.1 Revolutionary Structural Changes

The current world order, still largely a state-based international system, can be thought and imagined “as regions organized by America’s imperium.” The meaning of imperium has shifted historically. In ancient Rome imperium referred to non-territorial power, but by the time of Augustus imperium came to be understood as power exercised over Rome’s newly acquired lands. Imperium has been understood in this thesis as “*the conjoining of power that has both territorial and non-territorial dimensions.*” The current American imperium (the “New World”) has a profound effect on various geographical regions of the world¹⁰⁵, but the “Old World of Europe” and the “Ancient World of Asia” is reshaping America itself.¹⁰⁶

Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, in December 1991, the world and especially the United States were lulled into euphoric expectations about a better and more peaceful world. However, this ‘more peaceful world’ witnessed the USA-led coalition’s massive air campaign against Iraqi occupation forces in Kuwait on 22 January 1991, and the Balkans was also ‘in flames’. This hopeful atmosphere continued after the Gulf War, even though the Balkans was still in turmoil. These crises and the unexpected terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 endangered the post-Cold War structural change towards a Kantian culture of collective security. Pragmatically, state agents had to choose sides, or, constructively speaking, redefine their identities (“the bad ones or the good ones”) in a way defined by the President of the United States, George Bush (Jr.), as follows:

You're with us or against us... Every nation and every region now has a decision to make, either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. Al-Qaida is to terrorism what the Mafia is to organized crime ... Freedom and fear are at war ... The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends... It is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports

¹⁰⁴ Schoppa (1999), pp. 316–317.

¹⁰⁵ Katzenstein (2005), p. 2. According to Peter Katzenstein, regions have both material and symbolic dimensions in patterns of behavioral interdependence and political practice; regions reflect the power and purpose of the states.

¹⁰⁶ Katzenstein (2005), p. ix and pp. 1–2 and p. 247.

them. Our war on terrorism begins on al-Qaida, but it does not end there. (President George Bush (Jr.), 21 September 2001).¹⁰⁷

According to Alexander Wendt, “with each change (e.g. WWI and WWII) the international system has achieved a qualitatively higher capacity for collective action, despite its continuing anarchic structure.”¹⁰⁸ We might not agree that the USA and her allies had a higher qualitative capacity to counter the new threat of international terrorism, but they did possess a high capacity for collective action (a shared and high agreement on collective desires and beliefs). From the Constructivist perspective, we may say that the speech of George Bush on 21 September 2001 forced the USA’s allies and rivals to rethink their identities; forced, because the USA as the most powerful state in the ‘uni-multipolar’ post-Cold War system had sufficient credibility to do so.

President Bush’s speech may be seen as a test of the USA’s credibility, in that states were tested as to whether they believed in the USA’s material success (capability to acquire power and wealth) and status success (prestige).¹⁰⁹ Only some states seemed to pass this test, since ‘old allies’ of the USA (e.g. Germany and France) tended to be first ‘with’ the USA, but eventually became more restrained in their support, largely due to the failure to obtain UN legitimacy when the USA launched its military operation against Iraq in February 2003. ‘New allies’, like Poland, were with the USA from the very beginning, after the 11 September terrorist attacks. Thus, we may say that these ‘new allies’ shared the active and efficient causes of collective identity (master variables of interdependence, common fate and homogeneity) with the USA,¹¹⁰ but it may be an exaggeration to say that these ‘new allies’ shared a collective identity with the USA., even though they committed into collective intentionality. One could as well argue that the collective intentionality of the ‘new allies’ was based simply on rational calculation (expected benefits from their alliance with the USA).¹¹¹

After the described ‘credibility or collective identity test’, the USA declared a War on Terror, which first materialized in Afghanistan (*Operation*

¹⁰⁷ Fornek (2001).

¹⁰⁸ Wendt (1999), p. 314.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 324–327.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 343–363. See also Brzezinski (2005), p. 1. It was Great Britain, a traditional ally of the USA, and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair that gained a major voice in Washington in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 when promptly embraced America’s declaration of war against global terrorism. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “worldwide declarations [like] “We are all Americans” were not only expressions of genuine empathy; they were also expedient affirmations of political loyalty.”

¹¹¹ Searle (2005).

Enduring Freedom) in 2001, which was legitimated by the UN. The purpose was to remove the fundamentalist Taliban regime from power and catch the terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden. As a result of this operation, the Taliban regime was replaced by an interim UN administration. The War on Terror reached its climax as a USA-led coalition attacked Iraq in February 2003 (*Operation Iraqi Freedom*). Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq of that time, was deposed. This operation was not conducted under a UN mandate, which caused disagreements between the USA and her allies, as well as within the USA-NATO-EU axis. The USA had managed to get together a large coalition, which consisted of ‘willing and capable’ allies (e.g. Great Britain). The offensive was conducted in two weeks. However, resistance proper did not start until the coalition had managed to occupy the whole of Iraq and divide her into three occupation zones (USA-led, British-led and Polish-led). The internal situation of Iraq was chaotic and this may continue many years.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 radically changed the world order. The reason for these attacks may be traced to ideas and identities. Ever intruding globalization in the clothes of internationalization and homogenization,¹¹² in accordance with Western or American culture and the idea of liberal democracy, were not felt to be legitimate in Muslim-cultures of the Middle-East and Central-Asia; these were regarded intersubjective threats to their own ideas and identities. Thus we may say that socially constructed ideas and identities were threatened in these Muslim-cultures, which in turn provided them with a *Casus-Belli*. Reaction to the attacks in the USA and in Western Europe was almost identical. The attacks were identified in the USA and Western Europe not only as a direct attack on individual American and Western European lives (lots of West-Europeans died in attacks as well), but also as a threat to Western ideas of freedom and liberal democracy. Furthermore, it was felt that the same kind of attacks would be possible in Europe too. As we have seen this omen was fulfilled in Madrid, in March 2004 and in London, in July 2005. We may argue, of course, that these attacks were a consequence of the USA’s (and Western Europe’s) commercial policy in exploiting the natural resources of the oil fields of Iraq, Saudi-Arabia etc. But the USA and Europe (even Russia) were now ideologically closer than ever. The aforementioned attacks were predicted as early as the late 1990s, when Samuel Huntington described an impending clash of civilizations.¹¹³

¹¹² Kratochwil (2005), p. 115.

¹¹³ Huntington (1996b), pp. 4–5. Samuel Huntington argued that this clash would be based on the six following propositions: First, *differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic*. Civilizations differ from each other in their history, language, culture, tradition and above all religion. Second, *the world is becoming a smaller place* and increasing interactions strengthen the consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations. Third, *the process of economic modernization and globalization,*


According to Samuel Huntington, the word civilization means the widest cultural entity to which we feel we belong, and in which we could include other individuals, nations and states, even though they might previously have been defined as Others or strangers to our culture. According to Huntington, this kind of sentiment of belonging is based on history, prevailing customs and especially religion. There are nine civilizations currently (Western, Latino-American, African, Islamic, Shintoistic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist and Japanese), according to Huntington, and Poland belongs to Western civilization (see Picture 13). Culture is considered here as a subordinate to civilization, meaning that, for example, Western civilization may be divided into European and North-American cultures, and Islamic civilization into Arabic, Turkish and Malay cultures. Culture may also be understood as a synonym for civilization, if the whole idea-structure (including values and norms) of the culture and civilization are congruent, or at least very close to being so.¹¹⁴

Sometimes there are no common cultural patterns at all in inter-state relations. The first encounter between the Spaniards and Aztecs offers a very good example of this. The first encounter of the Spaniards and Aztecs was a collision of ritual worlds and a unique event for the Aztecs. The Aztecs, whose culture was based on omens, were in a situation which would have necessitated improvisation. The Spanish invasion had already been prophesied in the eleventh century by a Mayan prophet, or at least so the narrative goes. But whereas the Aztecs believed that the Spaniards were the gods of their omens, the Mayas believed that the Spaniards were only strangers. It is easy to imagine then that the Spaniards could take the initiative and suppress the Aztecs without much resistance. The Aztecs were prisoners of the paradigm (code of omens), habituation ('conformity-to-order') and the

as well as global social change, weaken the significance of nation-states as a source of identity modifier. Religions may be considered here as an "*identity gap filler*", often in the form of movements that are labelled "fundamentalist". Fourth, *global economic regionalism is increasing*. Post-industrial Western societies (the core) specialize in the products of highly technological innovations and transfer less demanding and simpler production to other geographic areas (*periphery*). Fifth, *civilization-consciousness is enhanced* especially as a result of actions taken by Western civilization. Sixth, *cultural characteristics and differences are more permanent* than political and economic ones. See also Toffler (1980), pp. 436–443. According to Alvin Toffler, the future "decisive super-struggle" will be waged between those who wish to maintain the structures of industrial societies (traditional parties, mass-education and labour organization –systems) and those who argue that the current and crucial problems related to energy, wars, environment, poverty and the breakdown of traditional family relationships are not solvable by the "remedies" or the "politics as usual" approach of traditional industrial societies. According to this 'new thinking', these current problems can only be faced by more direct democracy, transnational actions, by the dissolution of traditional bureaucratic structures, by renewable natural resources and especially by a more tolerant attitude (e.g. legitimate alternatives to the nuclear family).

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 4 and pp. 13–29.

past, whereas the guiding principle of the Spaniards in general and Cortés in particular was to practice the art of adaptation and improvisation. In other words, the Spaniards favoured syntagm (context) over paradigm, adaptation (‘efficacy-of-the moment’) over habituation, and the present over the past.¹¹⁵



Picture 13: The Eastern border of Western civilization, according to Samuel Huntington¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Todorov (1999), p. 74 and p. 87. The Spanish Conquistadors, led by Hernando Cortés landed in Mexico in 1519 in the hope of conquering more lands and natural treasures for the Spanish royal family. Montezuma, the seventh king of the Aztecs, thought that Cortés was *Quetzalcoatl*, a God that was removed from the throne by the Aztecs and replaced by Aztec kings like Montezuma. Thus, it was important now to appease Quetzalcoatl by offering him all kinds of treasures like gold just to avoid him taking his revenge. See also Wendt (1999), p. 56.

¹¹⁶ Huntington (1996a), p. 159.

Despite its critics,¹¹⁷ Huntington's clash of civilizations may be the most significant global threat in the future; indeed, it may be with us already. This clash can only be avoided with tolerance and by learning "*to live side by side in peaceful interchange, learning from each other, studying each other's history and ideals and art and culture, mutually enriching each others' lives.*"¹¹⁸ The problem here is that peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding require the joint efforts of all individuals, states and civilizations. If, for example, rational, liberal and more secular Western civilization should take into account the 'spiritual pain spots' of the more spiritual Islamic civilization, one could ask whether it is possible to demand some sort of reciprocal understanding on the part of Islamic civilization towards Western civilization? Is the clash of civilizations avoidable only by a one-sided understanding? Of course not, but the interpretative, Constructive approach helps us to understand, for example, the radicalization of Islamic civilization, which consequently seems to have the power to radicalize the Christian tradition in the USA.¹¹⁹

5.3.2. Global Climate Change

*"All we know for sure about the fog of the future is that it conceals things that we do not expect."*¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ See, for example, Katzenstein (ed.) (1996), pp. 533–535. According to Peter Katzenstein, Huntington's theory is too short-sighted, since the outcomes of such a clash may lead to some sort of positive absorption and hybridization of civilizations as well. His theory also regards identities as static phenomena, while they should be understood as being under constant evolutionary change due to discursive contextual interactions. Furthermore, the dominant state, the USA itself is an actor of cultural diversity.

¹¹⁸ Huntington (1996a), p. 321.

¹¹⁹ See, for example, Kamen (2005). According to Al Kamen, George Bush attacked al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, because God ordered him to do so: "*God inspired me to hit al Qaeda, and so I hit it. And I had the inspiration to hit Saddam, and so I hit him.*" See also Castells (1997), p. 13. Currently, religious fundamentalism is increasing in Islam and Christianity. According to Manuel Castells, for fundamentalists it is impossible "to argue or settle anything with people who do not share their commitment to an authority ... [like] inerrant Bible, an infallible Pope, the *Shari'a* codes in Islam, or the implications of *Halacha* in Judaism." For more about Medieval Islamic rationalism, see Cox (2001), pp. 156–168 and pp. 162–163; Mahdi (2006), pp. 196–199. For more about the mental revolution of Buddhism, see Mehrotra (ed.) (2006), pp. xi–xii. According to Rajiv Mehrotra, Buddhism (Buddhahood) is not a religion as such: "*Buddhahood ... is ... a state of insight and being [ontology], accessible to all; it is not religion as such.*" See also the Dalai Lama (2006b), p. 5. Even the Dalai Lama (the fourteenth Dalai Lama) does not consider himself as a mediator-priest between human beings and God, but as "an ordinary human being who can be erroneous."

¹²⁰ European Defence Agency (EDA) (2006), p. 33.

I have considered global climate change as the most important trend affecting not only on states’ behaviour and interests, but also their identities. Global warming is a test for traditional national egoism; it is a huge threat, but probably not radical and sudden enough to be capable of generating a truly normative mental world-state among nations and states based on solidarity and tolerance.

The future will happen over the “*longue durée*”, which unites the past, the present and the future, but surprises will continue to dominate our global future.¹²¹ In the global strategic trends analysis of Britain’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), the analytical focus has been put on “robust judgments across various alternative futures” that have not been anchored in the familiar present, meaning phenomena that are already taking place. Global warming is a long-term trend which in the foreseeable future can be mitigated, but probably not stopped, because the dissolution of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere takes at least several decades.¹²² In this regard global warming is not a novelty, since it is already here, but its consequences for national identities have been analyzed less.

Climate change will most probably intensify, and its consequences will vary in time, incidence and geographical extent. I am not analyzing global warming in detail, but accepting its features as given. What is more important to me vis-à-vis this thesis are the social consequences of this process. There will be winners and losers in this process, at least in the short term. Geographical areas that are currently poor and dry will remain so, or become even poorer and drier in the future. Global warming will reduce the land available for habitation due to desertification, and largely because of this it will remain highly politicized with consequences that will probably be contested by self-interested sovereign states.¹²³

Food and water insecurity may prompt mass migration from the driest areas, which will continue to trigger conflicts and crises even in the heart of Western and Central Europe.¹²⁴ But the consequences of climate change may be positive as well: human societies, nations and states may combine their efforts in this ‘climate struggle’, and, as a consequence, we may come closer to the ideal of a world society. It is also largely because of climate change that humankind has truly started to invent revolutionary technological innovations to replace the ‘oil-economy’ with renewable energy sources (e.g. hydrogen energy), which may change the ideational basis of the international structure; this would make it easier to criticize authoritarian and

¹²¹ The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) (2007), pp. iv–v.

¹²² European Union’s Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (2006), p. 75.

¹²³ The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) (2007), p. 2.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

repressive governments, many of which happen to be oil-producers as well (e.g. Saudi-Arabia, Venezuela and Russia).

5.4. About Possible Future World Orders

The world has become smaller through the media and technology, but at the same time it has probably become too large to be controlled. As a reaction to that confusion:

*Social actors aim at shrinking it [the world] back to their size and reach. When networks dissolve time and space, people anchor themselves in places, and recall their historic memory. When the patriarchal sustainment of personality breaks down, people affirm the transcendent value of family and community, as God's will.*¹²⁵

Trade, war and conflict as well as violence and instability are still important aspects of the world. The world is still divided territorially into states, which cooperate and compete, exchange goods and services, fight militarily for absolute and relative advantage, and spend a lot of money on arms and armed forces.¹²⁶

States do not however act in vacuum; they are products of their own historical legacies and international contextual interactions with other actors. In open systems we have many possible futures and possible ways towards a better or worse future. These paths are not predictable, even if there is a need for predictability. One utopian possibility for avoiding clashes between states during the next structural changes would be the concept of 'whoeverism', meaning that no-one would have any special national-, or "ethnie"-related identity at all. Everybody would possess the shared cosmopolitan identity of a 'world citizen', meaning that nobody would have any enemies and would not have to be frightened about being killed anymore. A more concrete utopia (that is a utopia which has a reasonable chance of becoming a reality) would be based on the need for global tolerance and a communitarian idea of a universal civilization. The idea of a universal civilization is based on the notion that since markets, technologies and the media have been globalized, there is also a need for global ethics, which in its concrete utopian meaning may be understood as a culture of tolerance that would respect cultural and religious differences and minorities in pluralist ways. Thus, there would be a variety of specific cultures of particular tribes, nations and states with their histories, languages, customs, beliefs, laws and art in the future, but everyone would agree upon

¹²⁵ Castells (1997), p. 66.

¹²⁶ Kopstein and Lichbach (eds.) (2000), pp. 8–9.

the need for global ethics.¹²⁷ However, one question would still be unresolved: who would define the necessary ethical rules and norms, and how could individuals, tribes, nations and states voluntarily agree upon these?

Superficially it seems that the early twenty-first century global political economy offers opportunities for a better future, at least for developed countries. However, there might be no room for ‘whoeverism’ even in these countries, since supranational enterprises and financial markets are more or less faceless entities without ethic or cultural values. Furthermore, the growing internationalization of modern politics, connected with the effects of a non-national global political economy, may have resulted in an even greater reliance on national identities. The alienation of the global political economy from the states may lead to an even more parochial and narrower interpretation of nationalism as well as a return to some sort of primordial national identities in the future.

Change in the international system is always diachronic (historical), meaning that it is based on previous and current (and possible future) societal forces. Change may be divided into at least three categories: (1) *day-to-day changes*, which directly effect us as individuals, (2) longer term changes, or “conjunctural” cycles (10–50 years), which has been the focus of social scientists, and (3) very long time trends (“*longue durée*”) that covers centuries and which focuses on the broadest patterns. There have been and will to continue to be many such changes, and the preconditions of their existence, constitutive principles and norms have and will vary.¹²⁸

We cannot predict the future, but it is possible to construct partial knowledge of it, meaning that we may guide our actions normatively in the direction that seems politically possible to conduct. Understanding historical change helps us in this process.

Even if we do not know our future, we may identify the following world orders either individually or in combination with each other as possible futures, all based mainly on the ideas of an international system, international society and world society elaborated earlier:¹²⁹

A posthegemonic world order is a model which is based on a change from the prevailing Westernized hegemonic global culture to another one. A new hegemony would arise when the old hegemony declines, or when the challenging hegemony wins out in the struggle with the old. However, the world would be comprised of several civilizations, or continental-size re-

¹²⁷ Küng (2002), pp. 580–581.

¹²⁸ Sinclair (2001), p. 4.

¹²⁹ Cox (2001), pp. 150–156.

gions, with some collective identity elements even in this new situation.¹³⁰ The greatest challenge to the current and any future hegemony is the ability to understand other prevailing points of views in world politics. Thus, nothing forces us to approve the current world order, based on the USA's supremacy, but we still do.

A post-Westphalian world order is a model where world politics is not based solely on the state system, but also on many transnational enterprises and entities (including ethnic groups/nations, e.g. Kurds). The fundamental manifestation of the Westphalian system is territoriality, but the number of entities or nations without the status of a state increased after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the global economy is already, to a large extent, under the control of transnational enterprises and financial markets.¹³¹ States that are able to provide a flexible flow of labour and tempting investment opportunities will do well in this future world order model (e.g. USA and China).

This model is characterized by the worldwide competition of markets. Whereas state's role was formerly conceived as a buffer protecting the domestic economy from harmful external influences, it can now be understood as helping or adjusting the domestic economy to integrate into the world economy as well. This trend will continue in the future. It will become increasingly meaningless to speak about 'the state' being limited by its external borders. States have become international (*internationalized*) social constructions based on external competitiveness. It might be more useful to think of the state in terms of its forms: how will different societies, pressure groups and the entire civic society of a state link themselves together in global cooperative forms?¹³²

A postglobalized world order is a model that represents continuity, meaning that globalization would continue as it does now (including e.g. the internationalization of production and the new international division of labour), but it may include the possibility of change and the beginning of new concessions between actors. However, it seems rational to expect that conflicts would also arise in the future. They would arise from ideational and ideological differences (largely in Huntingtonian ways) and from ecological disasters. Conflicts would arise also as a consequence from mass-migration and from ethnic and other group differentiations.¹³³

Kenneth Booth has offered a somewhat more pessimistic view regarding the emergence of future world orders than these three. In his analyzis

¹³⁰ See, for example, Booth (1998), pp. 48–53.

¹³¹ Cox (2001), pp. 150–156.

¹³² *Ibid.*, pp. 150–156.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 150–156.

global order may be reached through collective security arrangements, based mainly on the UN, but there are restrictions to this, namely, Western and especially the USA’s egoism. Thus, “the new world order”, offered as a concept by the former President of the USA, Georg Bush (Sr.), may be seen as a disguised form of the USA’s need for hegemonic primacy and the overall Western triumphalism (“West is best”). In this disguised new world order model, the USA would continue to be the policeman of international law, but could go even further and offer a more aggressive “*Pax Americana*” –type of this version of the new world order, which would be based on the USA ruthlessly furthering its own interests by unilateral actions.¹³⁴ I am not saying here that we should always blame the USA for the world’s problems, on the contrary, the USA has helped the world, or at least Europe, many times. But I am saying that a truly “new world order” that equates with a Kantian world society would be something like that presented by Emanuel Castells earlier in the introduction of Chapter 5, and I argue that at least the rich North or West is not ready to adopt the true essence of this Kantian new world order, at least in the foreseeable future.

5.5. Conclusions

In this chapter I have concentrated on the international system, international society and a world society as general world order models through the writings of Thomas Hobbes (international system), John Locke (international society) and Immanuel Kant, as well as Hugo Grotius (world society). I have argued largely in Realist terms that whatever world order model we currently possess, and whatever model we will construct in the future, there will be two kinds of clashes: first, clashes between colliding good ideational purposes of states and nations, and, second, clashes between the ideational world and the material world (unexpected effects caused by the material world of nature as well as globalization). The basic question still concerns individual and collective survival. The Constructivist approach, on which I mostly rely, occupies a stance that human social power is able to construct an international structure that could bear the burden of future unexpectedness, even though our national identities tend to offer for the most parts only egoistic solutions, based on cultural habituation and reification. However, increased interactions between states and nations may affect national identities by increasing tolerance towards each other in that the borders of Otherness (*Diacritica*), would over a period of 10–50 years, or over even longer time cycles (“*longue durée*”), vanish, or at least become more transparent.

¹³⁴ Booth (1998), pp. 48–53.

The domestic order and external security of each and every state of the world are prerequisites to reach real order in this world. Since we know that there are multiple ontologies, religions, systems of governance, needs and desires, it is probably impossible to find one single solution for the just governance of the world. Thus, justice and order do not constitute each other. I am not saying that a justice-based world order is not possible, but I am saying that it seems to be a utopian dream at this point of history. But I have adopted the view that if something is possible it may become realized, meaning that all utopias may become concrete utopias and eventually become a reality. Tolerance is needed more than ever in inter-state relations, but it seems to me that only unexpected external social or material shocks, for example, the collapse of the Chinese social system, more rapid global climate change than expected, or the complete exhaustion of oil and natural gas reserves without alternative sources of energy, would force states and nations onto a really tolerant path of behaviour. But development may also proceed in precisely the opposite direction; under the impact of these unexpected shocks, states may turn more egoistic isolation and identity defence.

The original Wilsonian “new world order” as a concept refers to the idealist and even utopian idea of preventing wars by a worldwide collective security system. However, the Bush (Sr’s) “new world order” has also been understood as a disguised pretext for Western civilization’s domination over the rest of the world. The third meaning of the “new world order” refers to world society in terms of ‘idealist non-violence and team-play’ or ‘equality among nations’. The world society takes individuals, non-state organisations and ultimately the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements and puts the transcendence of states at the centre of IR theory. A world society is about the moral unity of humankind beyond states. Thus, the “new world order” understood as it should be understood is about a highly utopian cosmopolitanism, meaning that we should get rid of national boundaries and adopt a cosmopolitan identity as world citizens. Understood in this way, the world society is actually about the world community. I argue that the world is not ready for that, but despite how utopian this idea may sound now, it may become a reality at some point in the future over the “*longue durée*.” *However, reducing my analysis to a conjunctural time frame of 10–50 years, it is precisely the unexpected material and social shocks that I consider as setting limits to the changes of the world society actually becoming a reality, but since we do not know the effects of these unexpected shocks on national identities, the development may be the opposite to this as well.*

Taking a somewhat more moderate approach to the possibilities of a “new world order”, I argue normatively that we should give a more communitarian order-model based on internalized common rules, norms and values among international actors a chance, even though that project may be uto-

pian as well. The problem here is that even if we try to construct a globally shareable collective identity-structure, there will always be those who do not share our reflectivism. Furthermore, those who do not share this reflectivism may even make use of our 'weakness' and become more belligerent. Thus, a collectively increased propensity to peace and tolerance might even increase, rather than decrease, the likelihood of war. This was pretty much the case, for example, in Europe in the late 1930s when Hitler made use of Western reflectivism.

Order as such in the international structure is largely about maintaining and defining common interests and goals by rules, which describe the pattern of behaviour that sustains them, and by institutions, which make these rules effective. *A world order (even without the word "new") as a concept always leads us into the highly problematic field of the joint management of world politics, raising such questions as, on whose terms should this management be implemented, and how just would this management be.* I have ignored the relationship between world order and justice, because justice in world order is worth another thesis. However, *I argue (largely with the voice of Western man) that even though the current world order model is unjust from the perspective of the poorest states and nations, it is at least a model based on liberal democracy, the equality of the sexes, religious tolerance (at least to some extent) and above all on human rights, which together could be the basis for constructing a more tolerant international structure.* It is precisely the West that has been capable of constructing such security communities as NATO and the EU, whose member states would hardly wage war against each other (even though NATO includes such longtime enemies as Turkey and Greece). Membership of NATO and the EU is not open to all states, but all states may belong to the UN. The problem of the UN is that its membership criteria are not so tight as NATO's and the EU's, meaning that one need not comply, for example, with democratic values when joining the UN, but countries need to be a liberal democracy when joining the EU. At this point I will leave this issue and come back to it in the empirical part of the thesis.

PART III

The Polish Case

6

CONSTRUCTING A NATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY – THE ENDOGENOUS PERSPECTIVE

“Whoever becomes the master of a city accustomed to freedom, and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed himself; because ... such a city justifies itself by calling on the name of liberty and its ancient institutions, never forgotten despite the passing of time.”¹

In this chapter I am trying to answer two questions: (1) *What made Poland adopt a Western-orientated identification rather than an Eastern-orientated one?* and (2) *What is the genealogy of the Polish national identity structure?* I start the chapter by elaborating first on the unexpected social change in the international structure of the late 1980s and then come back to the ‘roots’ of Polish national identity, meaning its constructors and sources.

6.1. ‘Rebirth of the Nation’

Poland’s ‘return to the West’ became a concrete utopia at the beginning of the 1980s due to a warming of the international atmosphere. Leading Western states did not actively support Poland or other *Visegrad Countries* (Poland, Czechoslovakia (now Czech Republic and Slovakia) and Hungary) in their efforts during the midst of the Cold War. The actions of the Soviet Union in 1956 during the Hungarian uprising and in 1968 during the Czechoslovakia-crisis were condemned in diplomatic terms, but Western help for Hungary and Czechoslovakia was limited to verbal support. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was a relief for Poland and other *Visegrad Countries* as repressed states and nations.² On the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union also brought relief for the Western powers, since now it was possible to support Poland’s and other *Visegrad Countries’* efforts more openly.

¹ Macchiavelli (1995 [1514]), pp. 16–17.

² Prizel (1998), p. 98. There was a need for Poland to separate her cultural identity from the political identity of the Polish state and strive for the broadest possible definition of Polishness. See also Wendt (1999), p. 220. Alexander Wendt sees that “when norms are not internalized people have an instrumental attitude toward them; they may go along with the group, but only because they have calculated that it is useful for them as individuals at that moment to do so”. That may be considered as a Constructivist “deep explanation” of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc as well in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

In Poland dissatisfaction with prevailing societal conditions resulted in strikes throughout the 1970s. The new generation did not think that the Polish State or the prevailing societal order was legitimate any more. In 1980, the strike movement was institutionalized as a countrywide, politically organized workers' movement, Solidarity (*Solidarność*). The growing power of Solidarity forced the Polish Government to outlaw it and to declare martial law on 13 December 1981.³ The leader of the Polish Government, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, justified this action by pointing to the threat of Soviet intervention, as occurred in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.⁴

The last period of Poland's political liberation started in May-August 1988 with large-scale strikes, organized by Solidarity.⁵ To halt the strikes, the Polish Government legalized Solidarity by signing the *Gdańsk Treaty* with Solidarity on 31 August 1988.⁶ Timothy Garton Ash has called this liberation-process a "refolution", since it can be seen as a mixture of reform and revolution, unlike the Romanian-style bloody revolution of 1989.⁷ The final episode of Poland's liberation occurred in July 1991, when the Warsaw Pact was dissolved and shortly after the Soviet Union collapsed (December 1991)⁸. The decision to dissolve the Warsaw Pact was made in Prague on 1 July 1991.⁹

The main precondition for Poland's refolution was the Soviet Union's own liberation-process (*glasnost*) and re-structuring of her society (*perestroika*). Officially the Soviet Union let it be known, that the East-European countries were entering a new era, when Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1989 informed Erich Honecker, the leader of the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), that the Soviet Union would not use her troops to prop up the G.D.R. regime.¹⁰ Some sources call this new attitude of the Soviet Union

³ Davies (2005b), p. xxiii and 491. Martial law lasted until July 1983.

⁴ Goertz (1994), p. 158; Smoke (1996), pp. 90–91.

⁵ Prizel (1998), p. 101. Solidarity cooperated with the Czechs. In July 1988, representatives of Solidarity met with their Czechoslovak counterparts in the mountains along the Polish-Czechoslovak border and committed themselves to abolish the "Iron Curtain" between their countries as well as between the Western and Soviet-led blocs.

⁶ Ash (1989), pp.12–66.

⁷ Ibid., p.12.

⁸ Fitzmaurice (1992), p. 154. As a consequence of an unsuccessful *coup d'état* by the communists on 19 August 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved and replaced by the Russian Federation (Russia) and numerous other independent states in December 1991.

⁹ Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej Biuro Prasy i Informacji (1995), p. 9.

¹⁰ Ash (1989), pp. 18–70. Hungary had already abolished border formalities on the Hungarian-Austrian border in May 1989. Hungary no longer observed the bilateral agreement, signed in 1989 between Hungary and East Germany, which required each state to expel to the other those who illegally crossed the border. As a consequence of this deci-

the “*Sinatra Doctrine*” quoting the then Soviet Government’s spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov’s when he “half-jokingly hailed the arrival of the “*Sinatra Doctrine*”, in which Warsaw Pact states were free to do things their own way.”¹¹

The then leader of Poland, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, persuaded the Central Committee of the United Workers’ Party of Poland to enter so-called round-table negotiations with Solidarity on 6 February 1989. As a result of these negotiations, a so-called round-table agreement was signed on 5 April 1989. According to the agreement, Solidarity was to be allowed to compete for 35% of the seats in the Lower House of Parliament (*Sejm*) and for all the seats in the Upper House (*Senate*). The introduction of the agreement included an added text, approved by both the parties involved, according to which the agreement was “the beginning of the road towards parliamentary democracy.”¹²

Semi-free parliamentary elections were arranged in Poland in June 1989. Solidarity won all seats it contested in the *Sejm*, namely, 35% of the total number of seats.¹³ As a consequence of the election, the Solidarity-leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki became Prime Minister of Poland. He was the first non-communist Prime Minister in Eastern Europe for 40 years.¹⁴ The triumph of Solidarity came to an end in the 1993 free parliamentary elections, which the Social Democratic Party won; Solidarity was voted out of parliament.¹⁵

Unexpected social change in Europe opened at least five options for Poland to improve her external security: (1) neutrality, (2) a sub-regional alliance, (3) a pan-European security arrangement, (4) a security and economic alliance with Russia, and (5) joining existing Western security and economic organizations. A Swedish-, Finnish- or Swiss-kind of *neutrality* never really arose due to Poland’s historical experiences and sensitive geopolitical position. A *sub-regional alliance* between Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine might have had the potential to prevent a military threat from the Russian side. It would also have acted as a counter balance to Germany. A *pan-European security arrangement* was a Russian

sion thousands of East-German refugees found themselves in refugee camps in Budapest. Hungary let all the East-German refugees, who arrived into Hungary in September 1989 to go to the West through the Hungarian – Austrian border. Thus, Hungary contributed to the dissolution of the G.D.R. The Berlin Wall was then opened on 9 November 1989.

¹¹ Herman (1996), p. 307.

¹² Ash (1989), p.16.

¹³ Kozłowski (1994), p. 37.

¹⁴ Ash (1989), p.17.

¹⁵ Lang (1994), p. 25.

idea, which basically meant giving a more significant role to the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) at the expense of NATO. This idea was rejected in Poland as was the idea of *a security and economic alliance with Russia*. *Western security and economic organizations soon became the only desirable option for the Poles*. However, caution was required by the Poles, because the “East still continued to exist and Soviet troops were stationed on Polish territory”,¹⁶ but Poland managed to make “*full use of her historical five minutes [i.e. historical chance]*”, benefiting from her contribution to the dissolution of the communist bloc and ending the Cold War.¹⁷

At the beginning of the post-communist era, the Polish political elite set four goals for Poland. First, Poland’s long-term independence needed to be guaranteed. Most Poles agreed that this would need the democratization of the Soviet Union. Second, any outstanding disputes with Germany would have to be settled if Poland wished to free herself from Russian hegemony. This concerned especially the status of Poland’s German minority. Third, Poland was to integrate fully into Western Europe. Fourth, Poland should join NATO in order to break the Berlin-Warsaw-Moscow triangle. It was the U.S. presence in NATO that Poland hoped to use as leverage against her most powerful neighbours. Poland feared that the USA’s withdrawal from Europe might create sense of insecurity in Germany, which would in turn seek a rapprochement with Russia.¹⁸

Integrating into Western Europe, including NATO, was seen as the best option for guaranteeing Poland’s politico-military, societal, economic and environmental security. There were four main reasons for this assumption: (1) Poles consider that they have always been part of Western civilization, (2) Poland was not as economically developed as West European countries. By returning to Europe, Poland’s economy was expected to grow, (3) West European countries had bound themselves together in many political and economic organizations, institutions and regimes, which had created general societal stability after WWII, and (4) the United States was tightly committed to Western Europe’s security structures. Furthermore, integrating into Western Europe was also based on the idea of “*Nothing about us without us*” as a basis for creating a new Europe that would include Poland as well.¹⁹

¹⁶ Stefanowicz (1995), p. 60; Godzimirski (1998), pp. 6–7; Kuźniar (2001b), p. 32.

¹⁷ Kuźniar (2001a), p. 16.

¹⁸ Prizel (1998), pp. 110–111.

¹⁹ Gazdag (1997), p. 59. See also Auer (2000), p. 239. Quoting Polish sociologist, Jerzy Jedlicki, Stefan Auer argues that “Poland has always been returning to Europe [West], although it has actually never been there.”

The assumption that Poland had always been part of Western civilization was based on the historical narrative idea of the Polish nation. In the late 1980s and early 1990s it was seen that the only way Poland could become a modern state was to accept the fact that, if Poland wished to be part of Western civilization, this would necessitate tolerance and pluralist world view. The collective self-image of the Poles before WWII was mainly based on the idea that Poland marked the frontier of European civilization facing Russians, and all of Poland's eastern neighbours. This idea and the Poles' belief that "Europe ends on the Bug" should also be revisioned, if Poland wished to be part of the West. It was noted that Poland could be of importance to the West only if she maintained close links with the East.²⁰

6.2. The Genealogy of Polish National Identity

The Poles comprise a nation, which has acquired its modern sense of national identity in active opposition to the partitioning states (Russia, Prussia, and Austria), in which they lived. Polish nationality is a belief, which at various times partitioning states tried to suppress. The established order of the Polish State has been overturned many times over history. At the end of each disembodiment the new order which came into being obliged the Poles to make a fresh start, in new conditions and under new management. In circumstances where Poles lived as subjects of Russia, Prussia, or Austria (there were three Partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793 and 1795) it was largely the role of active 'narrative owners' to propagate Polish national consciousness for political reasons. These 'narrative owners' drew their inspiration from four primary sources: religion, language, ethnicity and history.²¹

At least four owners of the identity narratives (paradigms) of Polishness upto the end of the Cold War may be identified. The first and oldest narrative owner was the Polish gentry, or *Szlachta*²² ('a romantic Polishness as the property of the gentry'); the second was the *Polish intelligentsia-elite* ('a positivist Polishness as the property of the intelligentsia-elite'); the third was the *nation itself* ('an ethnonationalist Polishness as the property of the nation'), and the fourth was *international socialism* ('an enforced Polishness without a yesterday'). What is common to all of these narratives is that

²⁰ Prizel (1998), p. 102. See also Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), p. 25.

²¹ Davies (2005b), p. 9. See also Davies (2005a), p. ix.

²² Davies (2005a), p. 166. By 1569, at least 500,000 people belonged to the *Szlachta*, representing 6.6 percent of the total population of 7.5 million. In the late seventeenth century, their share rose to about 9 percent, and in the eighteenth century even higher. In France the gentry represented about 1 percent of the population, and in England 2 percent.

they include political, scientific and cultural myths, and historical facts that were used in various ways for creating a consciousness of Polishness.

Polish national identity has historically been influenced by Catholicism, the Polish language, Polish ethnicity and Polish history.²³ The Polish language was obliged to take second place during the First Republic (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, *Rzeczpospolita*, 1569-1791).²⁴ The royal court had been Italianate, Francophile, and Germanophone in turn, while both the Church and the State promoted Latin. Strangely, the Polish language occupied a stronger position in Lithuania than in Poland during the First Republic. While the gentry was Latinized in the Kingdom of Poland, the gentry of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy used the Polish language to set themselves apart from the Lithuanian or Ruthenian peasantry. After the three Partitions of Poland, the Polish language became a force of unity by unifying the gentry and the peasantry, Catholics and non-Catholics, pushing them together towards a common cultural heritage. It became “*a language of freedom*” and “*an essential touchstone of Polish nationality.*”²⁵

After the last Partition of Poland, in 1795, Poles came under pressure from German racialists on the one hand and from the Pan-Slavic racialists on the other. Thus, to protect the memory of the First Republic, Poles invented fantasies and myths about their own ethnic exclusiveness²⁶ and tried to reject all thoughts of kinship with other peoples in the region, except other Slavs. Even though the Poles might have felt under pressure from Pan-Slavic racialists after the last Partition, they had the basic *national birth myth (meta-narrative)* in their narrative inventory. According to the Polish meta-narrative, three Slav brothers, Lech, Czech and Rus founded respectively the Polish, Czech, and Ruthenian peoples (Ukrainians). According to this meta-narrative, Lech saw an old oak tree and a white eagle at the top of

²³ Kosicki (2003), p. 63. See also Ash (1989), p.100; Hobsbawn (2000), pp. 67–68. According to E.J. Hobsbawn, “*the links between religion and national consciousness can be very close, as the examples of Poland and Ireland demonstrate. In fact, the relation seems to grow closer where nationalism becomes a mass force than in its phase as a minority ideology and activists’ movement.*”

²⁴ Davies (2005a), p. 247. In 1385 the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania signed a personal union (both signatory parties were recognized as equals). In 1569 (by the *Union of Lublin*) the separate sovereignties of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were voluntarily dissolved and merged into a new sovereign entity, the united Republic (the First Republic), or *Rzeczpospolita*.

²⁵ Davies (2005b), p. 16. See also Hobsbawn (2000), pp. 59–62. According to E.J. Hobsbawn, elites have the power to introduce a certain language as a unifying element of an incipient nation.

²⁶ Such as the myth that Poland was one of the oldest nations in Europe. At a general level this may be so, and it is still held as an official Polish narrative. However, Poland, as a true nation, with a developed Polish consciousness, only emerged in the twentieth century.

a hill and adopted a white eagle as the symbol of his tribe. He established his stronghold (“Eagle’s Nest”) around the oak tree where the eagle had its nest (in Polish *Gniezno*). The other brothers continued on their way to find a place for their own tribes: Czech went south and established the Czech lands, whereas Rus went east and established Kievan Rus (predecessor of the current Belarus, Ukraine and Russia). Gniezno, a Polish town in central-western Poland, about 50 kilometres east of Poznan (see Picture 16), became the capital of the founder of the first Polish state, Mieszko I, in 966. Gniezno lost its status as the residence of the Polish kings by the end of tenth century to the city of Cracow, which has its own mythical birth narrative, which was widely adopted by Poles as part of their identity construction. According to legend, the founder of Cracow, King Krak, killed the dragon of the Vistula, which allowed the building of Krak’s castle above the dragon’s cave on Wavel Hill in Cracow. Later, Wanda, who was Krak’s daughter, jumped to her death from Wavel castle into the Vistula, because she did not want to marry a German prince.²⁷

Polish history offers a rich source for the construction of narratives, especially in artistic and imaginative forms, since Poland has been at the focus of political, scientific and cultural events of Central Europe throughout her history. In world literature many of us recognize such names as Henryk Sienkiewicz (*Quo Vadis?*, published in 1896) and perhaps to a lesser extent Adam Mickiewicz (the epic poem, *Pan Tadeusz*, published in 1834), and in the world of painting figures as Jan Matejko (at least in Poland). In science, Maria Skłodowska-Curie and Nicholas Copernicus (even though he has been celebrated as the great German scientist, Nikolaus Koppernik; in Polish Mikołaj Kopernik) are the common property of all Poles, as indeed is Fryderyk Chopin in music (even though he was half French).²⁸

6.2.1. Romantic Polishness as the Property of the Gentry

Until the late nineteenth century, Poland’s national identity ‘remained in the hands’ of a small social and political elite that built a collective memory for the rest of the nation, the idea of Poland. This idea was rooted in a Commonwealth with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, established as the result of the *Union of Lublin* in 1569, which covered vast areas from the Bal-

²⁷ Davies (2005a), p. 52; Davies (2005b), p. 19. See also *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland* (1997), Article 28. “*The image of a crowned white eagle upon a red field shall be the coat-of-arms of the Republic of Poland ... White and red shall be the colours of the Republic of Poland.*”

²⁸ Davies (2005b), p. 19.

tic Sea to the Black Sea, including areas in what is today Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus.²⁹

This aristocratic Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth (*Rzeczpospolita Szlachecka*; the First Republic) was a great military power of its time. It was ruled by a multiethnic but polonized gentry (8 percent of the population). As a racially superior class it adopted a messianic mission to act as a Christian rampart (“*Antemurale Christianitatis*”) of Western civilization against the Tartars, Turks and Russians. The First Republic was a state that had a Constitution, long before the French and American revolutions, which stressed religious and political tolerance. As a consequence, the First Republic became a centre of migration for Jews and one of the largest concentrations of Jews in Europe. The Commonwealth was dissolved in three Partitions by Russia, Austria and Prussia. The last Partition took place in 1795.³⁰

Even before the three Partitions of the late eighteenth century, Russia’s policy was to corrupt Poland’s elite, preventing reforms, and interfering in Polish domestic affairs. In 1768, the Polish gentry formed the so-called *Confederation of Bar*, which fought Russia for four years, even though there was not much hope of victory. When the fighting stopped, Russia initiated negotiations with Prussia and Austria, which, in 1772, resulted in the First Partition of Poland, whereby Russia, Austria and Prussia seized 30% of the Commonwealth’s territory and 35% of its inhabitants. However, the Poles managed to reform their political system by the *Constitution of 3 May 1791* introducing a modern constitutional parliamentary monarchy. Dissatisfied with these developments, Russia once again revived the “Russian party” in Poland and group of traitors organized the pro-Russian *Confederation of Targowica* in St. Petersburg to overthrow the May Constitution. These so called “Targowicians” officially requested Russia to invade Poland in order to save old gentry liberties which Russia did and together with Prussia committed the Second Partition of Poland in 1793. Even though Poles resisted the Partition under the leadership of General Tadeusz Kościuszko and managed to chase the Russians out of some parts of the country, the result was the Third Partition of Poland in 1795, which lasted until 1918.³¹

²⁹ Prizel (1998), pp. 38–41. See also Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), p. 1020. See also Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), p. 7.

³⁰ Prizel (1998), pp. 38–41. See also Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), p. 1020. According to Marcin Zaborowski and Kerry Longhurst, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was in constant conflict with Russia from the seventeenth century onwards over their spheres of influence in the Eastern borderlands (Ukraine and Belarus), which only ended in the defeat and collapse of the Commonwealth at the end of the eighteenth century. See also Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), p. 7.

³¹ Nowak (1997), p. 5.

During the latter period of the gentry's rule and soon after the Third Partition of Poland, the Poles became enthusiastic supporters of the universal cause of freedom, taking part in the American Revolution and in Napoleon's wars. Thousands of Poles died in battles in Russia, Italy and even Haiti during this period. Furthermore, Poland might be the only country whose national anthem (*Dąbrowski's Mazurka*) praises Napoleon, even though he probably didn't seriously consider creating an independent Polish state and limited himself to establishing the autonomous Duchy of Warsaw in 1807:

Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła, Póki my żyjemy... Przejdziemy Wisłę, przejdziemy Wartę, Będziemy Polakami, Dał nam przykład Bonaparte, Jak zwyciężać mamy... [Poland has not perished yet, So long as we still live ... We cross the Vistula and Warta, And Poles we shall be, We've been shown by Bonaparte, Ways to victory...].³²

The identity of the gentry was based more on class and geography than ethnicity. The gentry had traditionally expanded into the Eastern borderlands (*Kresy Wschodnie*), and they even considered themselves as genealogically different from the ordinary peasantry (*Lud*). The gentry thought of themselves as the offspring of Noah's son Shem and believed that the peasants were the offspring of Ham.³³ This narrative has found expression in Adam Mickiewicz's *Pan Tadeusz*, and also reflects a suspicious attitude towards Germans and Jews:

*'The Judge,' he said, 'has mentioned liberty,
But what has that to do with the peasantry!
I Fear there's something German in this plan!
Freedom's for gentlemen, not every man!
We are all Adam's children, I know well,
But peasants are from Ham, or so they tell,
The Jews from Japheth, gentlemen from Shem,
Who being senior rule o'er bot of them.'*³⁴

The significance of the *Kresy* was so important and the power of its gentry (*Szlachta Kresowa*) so dominant in Poland in 1815 that the gentry was able

³² Davies (2005b), p. 13 and pp. 217–223. Poland's national anthem is originally the hymn of General Jan Henryk Dąbrowski's first Polish Legion of about 4,000 men, recruited for Napoleon's Army in Italy in 1797, but eventually decimated in Santo Domingo (Haiti) in 1802–1803 when crushing the rebellion of Negro slaves there. This hymn has been Poland's national anthem since 1926. In 1812 there were over 100,000 Poles serving in Napoleon's Grande Armée of 600,000 soldiers. See also Prizel (1998), p. 41. See also *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland* (1997), Article 28.

³³ Prizel (1998), p. 42.

³⁴ Mickiewicz (2007 [1834]), p. 556. See also, for example, Sienkiewicz (2005 [1900]).

to reject the Congress of Vienna's plan for a Polish Kingdom (*Kongresówka*; 1815-1864) and offers of autonomy under the Russian rule. This power (and pride) was part of the reason for the revolt of 1830, when the Poles rose up against Russian rule. However, the Poles discovered that the West did not show any significant support for Poland's holy mission as the saviour of Western Christianity.³⁵

It was the gentry that considered themselves collectively as the carrier of "Polish Messianism." The Poles' suffering was justified, according to this narrative, because it was God's will. It was believed that the Polish nation would eventually be redeemed and that Poland would rise again. However, this narrative can be considered as a pretext only because it was precisely the gentry that were to blame for the loss of Poland's independent statehood. Instead of openly admitting that the loss of the Polish statehood was its fault, the gentry invented a mystified narrative of Poland as the "Jesus Christ of Nations", which suffered on behalf of all Christian nations.³⁶

After the unsuccessful revolts of 1830, 1846-48 and 1863, France became the model for the Polish elite; France was the leading anti-status-quo country in Europe and Russia was considered a repressive source of pan-Slavism. Most Poles (gentry) rejected the idea of pan-Slavism and cherished romantic visions of past heydays of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This romanticism continued until the late nineteenth century.³⁷

6.2.2. Positivist Polishness as the Property of the Intelligentsia-Elite

Being a Pole until the late nineteenth century meant membership of the gentry, which lived in isolation from the *Lud*.³⁸ Based on the consciousness of the Polish intelligentsia-elite (not merely *Szlachta*) and the rise of the Materialist-Positivist social sciences in the late nineteenth century, the traditional theological-metaphysical world-view was slowly abandoned. In

³⁵ Prizel (1998), pp. 41–43. See also Nowak (1997), p. 6.

³⁶ Osa (1989), pp. 278–279.

³⁷ Prizel (1998), pp. 43–47.

³⁸ Davies (2005b), p. 52. The ordinary *Lud* did not necessarily identify themselves with any specific nation, at least in *Kresy* areas. Davies describes the illuminating example of an ethnographer who interviewed a local shoemaker in Kaunas (in Lithuania) in 1885 as follows:

- *What tribe do you belong to?*
- *I am a Catholic.*
- *That's not what I mean. I'm asking you whether you are a Pole or a Lithuanian.*
- *I am a Pole and a Lithuanian as well.*
- *That is impossible. You have to be either one or the other.*
- *I speak Polish, the shoemaker said, and I also speak Lithuanian. And that was the end of the interview.*

practice this meant that confrontation with powers like Russia was avoided from now until the 1920s. The focus of the Polish intelligentsia-elite turned to internal problems, like industrialization and the need to create a common Polish identity among the elite, the peasants and minorities, like the Jews, in order to succeed in the future “universal struggle for life” as a nation.³⁹

By 1880 the homogenization effects of Polish identity were displaced by an ethnonationalism with a very narrow definition of ethnicity and society. The positivist notions of the time, according to which progress leads to improvement, proved disappointing in a divided Poland. The “Jewish-question” returned to the discussion of Polish identity. It was generally felt that the Jews had benefited most from Poland’s post-1863 industrialization. The rise of narrow ethno-nationalism was a general tendency in the whole of nineteenth century Europe, but in Poland the return of the “Jewish-question” and the rise of narrow ethno-nationalism was largely due to the external threat posed by the partitioning powers to the rise of a collective consciousness of the Polish nation. For example, in Prussian Poland, efforts to Germanize the education system paradoxically resulted in enhancement of re-Polonization among many previously Germanized Poles. This tightened the alliance between the Polish national movement and the Roman Catholic Church as well.⁴⁰

6.2.3. Ethnonationalist Polishness as the Property of the Nation

The Poland that emerged as an independent country (*Second Republic*) after WWI was a heterogeneous society, divided along ethnic, class, urban and rural lines.⁴¹ At first, the elite was divided between a romantic camp (“*the Piłsudskians*”) that pursued the old idea of a confederate structure with Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus and a camp (“*the Dmowskians*”) that assumed that Poland could guarantee its survival only by building internal institutions and developing links with other Slavs. Józef Piłsudski, the leader of the first camp, and “the founding father of modern Poland”, believed that Poland was doomed to perpetual struggle with Russia, which required Poland to be powerful, but on a multi-ethnic basis. The Poland he

³⁹ Prizel (1998), pp. 48–50. See also, for example, Darwin (2004 [1859]), p. 1–19. Not that the idea of a “universal struggle for life” was a new one (the same kind of idea was presented by Thomas Hobbes in 1651 in his *Leviathan*), but connected with the idea of evolution and the survival of the fittest in the struggle “between individuals of the same species...” it was probably one of the the main reasons why the peasants as well as Jews in Poland were included in the concept of being a Pole from the late nineteenth century on.

⁴⁰ Prizel (1998), pp. 50–55 and Segel (2002), pp. 5–6.

⁴¹ Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), pp. 1020. Poland’s post-1918 eastern provinces were heavily populated by Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Belarusians.

pursued, needed Western support to defend “*Antemurale Christianitatis*” against Soviet Bolshevism. Piłsudski was convinced that the Poles were a chosen people to fight against a demoniacal Bolshevism, which was one of the reasons for the war between Poland and Bolshevik Russia in 1919-1921 (see chapter 7.1.2). Roman Dmowski, the leader of the second camp and of the right-wing National Democratic Party (*Endecja*), opposed Piłsudski’s romantic vision about recreating the Commonwealth-era borders of Poland. “*Dmowskians*” criticized the idea of a multi-ethnic Commonwealth and promoted the idea of a “*Poland of and for Poles*”, according to which minorities would be tolerated but ultimately assimilated. Dmowski also considered Poland as a partner of Russia in containing “*the real Other*”, namely Germany. However, both leaders believed that it was desirable to assimilate Ukrainians and Belarusians into what they considered the superior Polish culture.⁴²

Józef Piłsudski refrained from using anti-Semitism as a means for nation-building, but Dmowski used it as part of his ideology. But even Piłsudski considered the 3,500,000 Jews in Poland as a collective Other. Eventually, diminishing hopes of recreating the Commonwealth lead to the triumph of the Dmowskian concept of Poland as an ethnonational state. The main question in interwar Poland was Poland’s inability to include Polish minorities in the corridors of power. More than 30% of Poland’s citizens were not ethnic Poles, and they did not attain any ministerial rank in any of the thirty-one Governments of interwar Poland. As Piłsudski’s dream of recreating a First Republic-kind of Commonwealth with the Lithuanians failed, he chose to incorporate parts of Western Ukraine and Lithuania into Poland (see Chapter 7.1.2). However, Piłsudski still favoured a multi-ethnic state, which also was defined in Poland’s 1935 Constitution.⁴³

After Piłsudski’s death, in 1935, his party continued to hold power but moved towards a Dmowskian position. The general attitude towards minorities became intolerant, and anti-Semitism was widespread. Millions of Ukrainians and Belarusians were to be Polonized, but the attitude towards the Jewish minority had more sinister implications: their number was to be reduced to a “tolerable” level. The “Jewish question” was not only a religious issue since Jews also were considered as to be another race in Poland in the late 1930s.⁴⁴

By the 1930s Poland’s minorities were seeking their own freedom outside the Polish state; the Ukrainians wanted an independent Ukraine, the Germans a return of German authority and the Belarusians looked to the Soviet

⁴² Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), p. 3 and 7; Prizel (1998), pp. 54–68.

⁴³ *Ustawa Konstytucyjna* (1935), Artikuł 1 [Article 1]: “Państwo Polskie jest wspólnym dobrem wszystkich obywateli” [The Polish State is a common good of all the citizens].

⁴⁴ Prizel (1998), pp. 61–66. See also Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), pp. 7–11.

Union. Regarding ethnic Poles, the Second Republic managed to give a new identity and a new confidence to the Polish nation, even though it was ethnocentric in nature. By 1939 there was a Polish nation, albeit multinational, with a collective identity structure that included not only the elite, but the peasantry as well.⁴⁵ But it might be argued that the construction process of national identity could not be regarded as complete until a homogeneous Polish population took control of its national territory, which did not occur until 1945.⁴⁶

The experiences of 1939–1945 showed that Poland’s previous attempts to assimilate the Ukrainians and the Belarusians had merely fostered nationalism among them, which finally resulted in their collaborating with the Soviets as well as with the Germans. These assimilation efforts also led to later ethnic cleansing of the ethnically Polish population in *Kresy* areas, which finally showed that “the Poles were left with no alternative but to reverse nearly 500 years of national experience and abandon the lands and the concepts that had shaped the Polish identity since the Reformation.”⁴⁷

6.2.4. Enforced Polishness ‘Without a Yesterday’

As a consequence of the Yalta Congress the composition of Poland’s population changed from being one of the most heterogeneous to one of the most homogeneous in Europe. Between 10,000,000–12,000,000 Germans were expelled from Poland’s new Western border areas. German brutality against the Poles and the ethnic cleansing campaign by the Ukrainians during the war had aroused Polish fear and hatred towards these ethnic groups in Poland. The new State borders, however, were welcomed in Poland, despite the Polish romantics’ “deep emotional attachment to the eastern borderlands and the obvious pain caused by the loss and de-Polonization of historically Polish cities such as Lwów (Lviv) and Wilno (Vilnius).”⁴⁸

Unlike Piłsudski’s struggle for independence, WWII was a truly national war concerning every layer of Polish society, which resulted in a powerful collective experience. But the new post-WWII communist elite was totally different from its interwar counterpart. The moral authority of the Home Army (*Armia Krajowa; AK*) and the Government-in-Exile in London was degraded and eliminated as a political force in Polish society. The Soviet-backed People’s Army (*Armia Ludowa; AL*) and the new political intelligentsia, indoctrinated by the Soviets, seized power in Poland.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Prizel (1998), pp. 66–68.

⁴⁶ Davies (2005b), p. 11.

⁴⁷ Prizel (1998), p. 73.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 77–79.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 75–77.

Stalinization and the outbreak of the Cold War resulted in growing disillusionment among the Polish working class, which had initially benefited from the communist transformation. While some amongst the broad mass of ordinary people may have initially welcomed the new order in Poland, due to the years of suffering during the war, there were also those, mostly AK-veterans, who openly fought the new order with arms.⁵⁰ Landless rural Poles were to be moved to the newly acquired, formerly German areas, and thousands of Poles benefited from better job opportunities and from wider access to education. But it was also an era when the ‘wrong’ individual thinking, social class, and personal history caused thousands of innocent civilian deaths in purges between 1944–47.⁵¹

After the death of Stalin, in 1953, both Catholic and leftist intellectuals believed (between 1956 and 1968) that they could change the nature of the Polish state from above by engaging it.⁵² At the same time the Soviet Union started to be seen as a single, unified Other confronting all the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. As a result a distinct Central European identity began to emerge in Poland. One of the first attempts to loosen Soviet constraints in Poland was the proposal by Adam Rapacki, Poland’s Foreign Minister, (*the Rapacki Plan*) to denuclearize Central Europe, which could have ended the Cold War in the region. However, the plan was rejected by the West and the Soviets.⁵³

⁵⁰ See, for example, Torańska (1988), p. 266. Interviewed in the early 1980s by Teresa Torańska, Jakub Berman (the Deputy Premier of the People’s Republic of Poland in 1954–55) said that “in the first of these stages [the years 1944–48, 1949–53 and 1954–56] things were not yet stabilized; we were fighting a civil war, we weren’t recognized and we had no authority.” See also Miłosz (2001 [1953]), p. 89. According to Czesław Miłosz, “the number of Communists in Poland had always been insignificant; and the cooperation between the Russians and the Germans after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact created conditions particularly unfavorable to the activity of Moscow followers.”

⁵¹ Torańska (1988), p. 139. Interviewed in the early 1980s by Teresa Torańska, Stefan Staszewski (Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of Poland in 1954–55) said that “*good Lord, there was nothing to compare with the period of violence, cruelty and lawlessness that Poland experienced in the years 1944–7. Not thousands but tens of thousands of people were killed then, and the official trials that were organized after 1949 were merely an epilogue to the liquidation of the Home Army, of activists of independent parties and of independent thought in general.*”

⁵² Prizel (1998), pp. 79–82. See also Torańska (1988), p. 357 and p. 359. From 1956 on, the communists allowed the existence of the non-communist intelligentsia-elite, consisting of Catholic “Kraków” intellectuals and a group of writers and journalists, *Znak* (Sign), who believed that although the romantic national mythology could unify the Poles, the continuation of that tradition would be inappropriate. But as a ‘counter force’ to *Znak*, the communists established their own cultural association, *Stowarzyszenie Pax* (Association Pax), whose aim was to infiltrate the church and act as a fake opposition to the communists.

⁵³ Prizel (1998), pp. 82–89.

In October 1956 the communist regime and the Catholic Church reached a temporary compromise, which improved the position of the Catholic Church in society. But already in 1961 the regime conducted assaults on the Church, and these assaults spread to the universities as well in 1966. The “Prague Spring of 1968” destroyed reformist efforts throughout the Soviet bloc. In the 1970s the Catholic Church gained a central position in Poland’s intellectual and moral life. The Church was politically active, but did not embrace revolutionary ideologies. Instead, the Church sought to “re-Catholicize” the Poles. Eventually the Catholic Church became Poland’s largest and most trusted political entity, which no government dared ignore. Between the years of 1970 and 1990 the intelligentsia, the Church, and the working class shared a common vision of marginalizing the communist regime, forcing it onto the defensive.⁵⁴ During that period romanticism regained its position, but without its traditional commitment to Poland’s universal mission. This was based on the evaluation assessment that if Poland tried to play the role of the “*Antemurale Christianitatis*”, defending the West against Russia (Soviet Union then), Poland would never be important to Europe, since Russia had always been more important to the West than Poland could ever be. The position chosen was to “Europeanize” Russia, which would enable Poland to escape from being Russia’s satellite. By the early 1990s a new Polish self-image emerged and the so-called “three pillars of the modern Polish orientation” (support for an independent Ukraine, normalized relations with Germany and the recognition of Poland’s current borders) were thoroughly internalized as was the dismissal of the notion that Poland was a great West European power.⁵⁵

6.3. Conclusions

The unexpected revolutions throughout the Central and Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991 opened at least five options for Poland to improve her security: (1) *neutrality*, (2) *a sub-regional alignment*, (3) *a pan-European security arrangement*, (4) *a security and economic alliance with Russia*, and (5) *joining existing Western security and economic organizations*. A Swedish, Finnish or Swiss-kind of neutrality never really arose due to Poland’s historical experiences and sensitive geopolitical position. It seems that geopolitics, and especially a perceived threat from Russia and Germany pushed Poland into initiating Western-orientated foreign and defence

⁵⁴ Davies (2005b), p. 498. One of the most well-known defensive measures taken by the Polish Communist regime was the tragic murder of the Solidarity priest, Father Jerzy Popiełuszko in October 1984. Father Popiełuszko organized weekly “Masses for the Homeland” provoking the fury of the Polish Communist regime. In October 1984 three agents of the Ministry of the Interior ambushed Popiełuszko’s car, strangled him “and threw his body into a reservoir.”

⁵⁵ Prizel (1998), pp. 89–96 and p. 103.

policy that eventually led Poland's membership of NATO in 1999, while *the need for EU membership can be seen more in terms of the Polish self-image of being a Western nation with a Western identity*. A sub-regional security arrangement with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine was considered as one option to counterbalance both the 'Russian threat' and for Germany's power. The Russian idea of a Pan-European security arrangement, based on a more visible role for the OSCE was rejected by Poland. *NATO soon became as the only desirable option for the Poles. But for the fact of Poland's geographic location between Germany and Russia, it is not at all certain that Poland would have chosen NATO as her main option*. I will come back to this issue later.

Polishness (*Polkość*) is a narrated and intersubjectively shared belief among Poles, which at various times neighbouring states have tried to suppress, without succeeding in doing so. *Historically, identity narratives have been the property and project of the Polish gentry and intelligentsia-elite until urbanization, industrialization and the rise of education made them the property of the whole nation. The sources of and inspiration for these identity narratives have been taken from the Christian religion, the Polish language, Polish ethnicity and Polish history*. The Polish nation was ethnically more homogeneous than ever after WWII. This made it easier to become habituated into certain historical narratives and borders of Otherness (I will come back to this issue later as well).

During the First Republic, the Polish nation consisted of the gentry (*Szlachta*). The peasants were for the most part illiterate and the gentry held the opinion that the peasants differed even genealogically from the gentry. *The idea of Poland and the Polish nation can literally be considered as a kind of 'Phoenix-bird' that has died many times, but which has also risen up from the ashes many times*. During and after the three Partitions of Poland, in 1772, 1793 and 1795, the Polish gentry ('*a romantic Polishness as the property of gentry*') and the Polish intelligentsia-elite ('*a positivist Polishness as the property of the intelligentsia-elite*' in the late nineteenth century) were the two main 'identity constructors' until after WWI, when the whole nation itself ('*an ethnonationalist Polishness as the property of nation*') participated the 'construction process'. After the WWII, international socialism ('*an enforced Polishness without a yesterday*') became the main constructor of Polish national identity until 1989. The Catholic Church took on the role of an identity constructor and upholder during the Cold War, but its influence became even stronger after the refolution of 1989 alongside the new Catholic intelligentsia-elite.

7

INTERNAL CONSTITUTIVE HABITUATION – THE CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

“Whenever and however national identity is forged, once established, it becomes immensely difficult, if not impossible (short of total genocide) to eradicate.”¹

In this chapter I try to answer the question: *How does internal constitutive habituation restrain and/or enable the development of Polish defence identity?* I will also try to find an answer to the question: *What are the Poles discursively defending?* So far I have tried to paint an overall picture of the construction process of Polish national identity and argued that it has been a historical process that leans largely on the efforts of the gentry and the intelligentsia. In this chapter I offer a cultural perspective and argue that the narrative legacy of the past and the most inherent part of the external borders of Otherness are deeply rooted in the national consciousness. I also argue that there are also past narratives and historical facts that the Polish nation would probably like to forget. After reading Polish (mainly) academic and societal writings, it has become clear that there are three essential ‘sub-identity holders’ in Poland, which are responsible for sustaining the narrated identity heritage, namely, the Polish State itself, the Armed Forces of Poland and the Polish Catholic Church. The Armed Forces of Poland is part of the state in Poland, whereas the Catholic Church is not. However, all of these ‘sub-identity holders’ possess their own characteristics, which may not always be congruent with each other, or with Polish public opinion.

I start my analysis by discussing the constitutive Polish grand-narratives as a legacy of past. Next, I turn my focus on these three ‘sub-identity holders’, after which I turn to the Constitution and the security policy ‘White Books’ as official expressions of Polish identity. Last, but not least, I deal briefly with the internal borders of Otherness, meaning Poland’s national minorities, just to show that even the most ethnically homogeneous nations, like Poland, have their own minorities, whose treatment informs us at some point about the overall tolerance-level of society. Some may criticize my decision to include national grand-narratives in this ‘cultural chapter’, as they could easily have been included in the Chapter 6. But since a cultural perspective informs us as to what has been chosen to be preserved as part of the national heritage, or as part of the legacy of the past, I have thought it best to deal these narratives in this chapter.

¹ Smith (1993), p. 131.

7.1. National ‘Grand-Narratives’ – A Legacy of the Past

“Historic narratives are being reinterpreted to fulfil the requirements of the present, and fierce polemics within a nation often determine which parts of its history are to be seen as highlights and which as a national shame.”²

By leaning on Polish (mostly) academic and societal discourse at least four Polish grand narratives that have been inherited from the past and which constitute Polishness, and whose contents make Poland’s post-Cold War contextual behaviour meaningful can be identified: (1) ‘*Antemurale Christianitatis and the Marian cult*’, (2) ‘*The miracle of the Vistula*’, (3) ‘*Between East and West – the Katyń Forest, the Warsaw Uprising and the betrayal of Yalta*’, and (4) ‘*Poland as a haven of religious tolerance*’. These narratives are not merely part of Polish history, since their contents still affect current Polish societal discourse and Poland’s foreign and defence policy since Cold War. These grand-narratives include fundamental elements of Poland’s external borders of Otherness, for example, Russia as the ‘Essential Other’ and Germany as the ‘Secondary Other’, which are essential for the Polish defence identity, and which still affect current policy-making (I argue). I will deal with those narratives more thoroughly in Chapter 8, where I try explicitly to find out whether discursive interactions in NATO- and the EU-contexts have changed or modified these borders of Otherness. These four grand-narratives are considered here as more or less unchangeable parts of Polishness, informing the Poles of their past and roots.

The fourth narrative, ‘Poland as a haven of religious tolerance’ is a myth, the ‘true’ content of which Poles would probably like to forget.³ The ‘true’ content of this narrative is *Polish anti-Semitism*, which was explicit State policy between the late 1940s and mid-1950s⁴ as well as in 1968.⁵ The

² Auer (2000), p. 229.

³ See, for example, Wandycz (2001), p. 134. According to Piotr Wandycz, “The Polish monopoly on tolerance is a myth, just as the myth of playing the role of *Antemurale*. Historical mythology in Poland is deeply rooted in “polonocentrism”: “we are not guilty of our failures” – wrote Henryk Wereszycki years ago – “however we place to our credit all the efforts and sacrifices made for the struggle for freedom.” We are deeply convinced, that Poland is “the hub of Europe”.”

⁴ Torńska (1988), pp. 320–321. According to the Deputy Premier of the People’s Republic of Poland in 1954–55, Jakub Berman (Interviewed by Teresa Torńska in the early 1980s), between the late 1940s and mid-1950s anti-Jewish propaganda (“the struggle with cosmopolitanism”) began to be noticeable in State propaganda, and it fell on “fruitfull soil, because Polish society as a whole is very anti-Semitic.” See also Mrozinski (2008). According to Michel Mrozinski, in 1968, the head of the Communist Party, Władisław Gomułka, used a spontaneous revolt by the students of Warsaw University “as a pretext to eliminate his rivals [many of whom were Jews] in the seat of power.” Mrozinski continues by stating that “Forty years ago an anti-Semitic purge by Poland’s communist regime exiled thousands of Polish Jews [about 20,000]: intellectuals, students, communists or average citizens, some were Holocaust survivors.”

post-Cold War Polish State has occasionally been openly anti-Semitic as well, at least during Jarosław Kaczyński's government (see Chapter 7.2.3), but generally the post-Cold War Polish State can be described as trying to suppress open debate over the still haunting anti-Semitic sentiments of the Polish nation, until Jan Gross published his books *Neighbors* in 2001,⁶ and *Fear* in 2006.⁷ Nevertheless, by critically comparing the discourses of the Polish State and the Catholic Church with the actions they have committed on this issue (*critical method*; see Chapter 2.2.6), there is good reason to believe that the Polish State and the Catholic Church implicitly share the anti-Semitic attitudes of the Polish nation (see Chapters 7.1.4 and 7.2.3).

The meta-narrative of the birth of the Polish nation (see Chapter 6.2) belongs to the same category of national myths as, for example, *Kalevala* in Finland, *El Cid* in Spain and *the Nibelungenlied* in Germany. These myths do not affect day-to-day politics and cannot be recognized, in terms of legitimizing these nations' existence in current societal discourses as such, but can still be used, at least symbolically (e.g. in media), to inform us about the spatio-temporal continuity of 'our nation'.

7.1.1. 'Antemurale Christianitatis and the Marian Cult'

*"Modern Polish national identity, much due to the heritage of the stateless nation, is firmly linked to religious identity, specifically Catholic, and based on a very strong victimization ethos emphasizing both the factor of external threats and moral qualities of the suffering nation."*⁸

Poland has been described as the "last outpost of western civilization", the "bastion of Christianity" (*przedmurze chrześcijaństwa*),⁹ "Christian rampart", or as a "Christian Bullwark of Christianity" ("*Antemurale Christianitatis*") against the Orthodox East (Russia), or against the Turks. These narratives have been created on purpose to legitimize the existence of the narrative's creator (in this case the Roman Catholic Church and the Polish gentry). A similar "*Antemurale Christianitatis*" narrative also exists in Hungary, where the Hungarian Catholic Church shares much of its founding history with the Polish Catholic Church. The Polish version of the "*Antemurale Christianitatis*" narrative has a long history. It has its embodiment in the Battle of Vienna, fought on 12 September 1683, when a combined Polish-Lithuanian army under the Polish king, Jan III Sobieski,

⁵ Torańska (1988), p. 368.

⁶ Gross (2001).

⁷ Gross (2007).

⁸ Zarycki (2004), p. 624.

⁹ Gross (2001), p. 136.

beated the Turkish army.¹⁰ Jan III Sobieski is remembered throughout Europe as the Polish King who saved “Christendom from the Infidel.”¹¹ The point here is that the “*Antemurale Christianitatis*” mentality still exists in Poland and constitutes Polishness. As Prime Minister Leszek Miller stated in his speech on 13 April 2002 at the International Academic Conference, “Dialogue Between Civilizations”, “The battle of Vienna is the subject of teaching for every single Polish child.”¹²

Other religion-related narratives in the construction of Polish identity, such as ‘Poland as the haven of religious tolerance’, can also be found. For example, the Prime Minister of Poland, Leszek Miller, stated in the same speech on 13 April 2002 that:

*Over the centuries Poland was one of the few countries on our continent, where Catholics, Protestants and Orthodox Christians, Moslems and confessors of Judaism lived next to each other ... The former Polish Republic was a multinational and multiethnic state of numerous different nations and ethnic groups enjoying liberties and the right to have their own corporate self-government. When our country was open and tolerant – it blossomed politically and in terms of culture. It began to decline together with the break-down of the spirit of tolerance in the 18th century.*¹³

Religious tolerance seems to be more or less a myth, in contrast with the “Christian rampart against the Turks” narrative. Norman Davies, for example, has dealt with the issue as follows:

*In 1569, at the Union of Lublin, the Roman Catholic establishment had commanded a dominant minority in a population of multifarious denominational allegiances. In 1791, on the eve of the final Partitions, it commanded a clear majority. The Lutherans, Orthodox, and Arians had virtually been eliminated ... This “Triumph of Counter-Reformation” in Poland is sometimes cited as the only instance of a country where the Roman Catholic Church successfully attacked and reversed the gains of the Reformation.*¹⁴

Thus, initially, during the First Republic, the Roman Catholic Church did not enjoy a monopoly in the religious affairs of Poland. It established this monopoly by a form of Counter-Reformation. Today, the Roman Catholic Church clearly enjoys a religious monopoly in Poland. The Catholic

¹⁰ Osa (1989), pp. 275–276.

¹¹ Davies (2005a), pp. 357–370.

¹² The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2002b).

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Davies (2005a), p. 153.

Church has been a source of inspiration for the Poles, especially during periods when Poles lacked their own state; that is 1795–1918, during WWII and during the era of ‘Enforced Polishness without a yesterday’; 1945–1989.¹⁵

The essentially important identity layer in Poland is the Marian Cult, which is a blend of Catholicism and nationalism. During the seventeenth century, more than a thousand Marian shrines were consecrated throughout the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, each with its miraculous icon of the “*Matka Boska*”, “*The Virgin Mother of God, Queen of Heaven.*” One of the principal Marian shrines was and still is at the spiritual centre of Polish Catholicism, the monastery of the Pauline Fathers, in Częstochowa (see Picture 16), called *Jasna Góra* (the Mountain of Light). The *Matka Boska* at *Częstochowa* was crowned ceremonially as the “*Regina Poloniae*” (The Queen of Poland) in 1717, which this constitutive icon of Polishness still holds, verbally and mentally.¹⁶

As a blend of Catholicism and nationalism, the Marian Cult is a fine example of the ‘Polish civil religion’, meaning “a set of religio-political symbols and rituals regarding a nation’s history and destiny.” During the three Partitions of Poland, the alien states (Russia, Austria and Prussia) were delegitimized “by rallying Polish society around a counterview of a past and future free, independent Poland.” *It was a question of national religious ideology having its sources in the Romantic literary and Catholic mysticism that helped the Poles to bear the burden of the lost Commonwealth. Catholic mysticism refers here to the Matka Boska at Częstochowa as the ‘true Catholic ruler of Poland’ having her mental shrine deep inside the Polish hearts and minds.*¹⁷

¹⁵ Davies (2005b), pp. 14–19. According to Norman Davies, after the three partitions of Poland (1772, 1793 and 1795), for the Poles in Russia and Prussia as well as in Austria, the celebration of the Mass traditionally ended with the singing of the same patriotic hymn (*Boże coś Polskę*): *O God who through the ages hast girded Poland with power and fame, Whose shield hath kept Her in Thy care from evils that would cause her harm. Before Thy altars, we bring our entreaty: Restore, O Lord, our free country.* In 1918–1939 and after 1945 the last line was officially changed to read “*Bless, O Lord, our free country*”, but many people still kept to the traditional words “*Restore, O Lord, our free country.*”

¹⁶ Davies (2005a), pp. 134–135. See also Hannan (2004), p. 6. Pope John Paul II stated in 1978, on being elected Pope, and whilst on a visit to *Jasna Góra* that “if we want to learn how history works in the hearts of Poles, it is necessary to come here, it is necessary to put one’s ear to this place, to hear the echo of the whole life of the nation in the heart of its Mother and Queen.” On the connection between nationalism and holy icons, see also Hobsbawm (2000), pp. 71–72.

¹⁷ Osa (1989), pp. 276–277.

7.1.2 'The Miracle of the Vistula'

On 11 November 1918, Poles disarmed the German army of occupation on the streets of Warsaw. This was soon followed by the Polish-Soviet war.¹⁸ Battles on the Western front ceased with the armistice on 11 November 1918. The Eastern front had been quiet since March 1918, when Soviet Russia made a separate peace with Germany and Austria-Hungary by the *Treaty of Brest-Litovsk*. After this the "White" Russian armies of Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin fought the "Red" Soviet forces around the periphery of the Russian empire. The Western allies (*Entente* powers) sent limited forces to guard their interests in Archangel, Murmansk and the Caucasus (Great Britain) as well as in Odessa (France) and Vladivostok (USA and Japan). Then the successor states of the Russian Empire began to fight each other; for example, the Poles fought the Ukrainians in Galicia and the Germans in Posen (Poznan). Thus, Eastern Europe was still 'in flames' when the Western Europe was preparing for the Peace Conference in Versailles. The Polish-Soviet war was different compared to other armed disputes in post-WWI Eastern Europe; it was not only a small border dispute, but something more, since it raised wider issues such as the clash of ideologies and the possible export of revolution to Western Europe through Poland.¹⁹

The first clash between the Soviets and the Poles occurred on 14 February 1919 in *Bereza Kartuska* (Byaroza; see Picture 16) in current Belarus. There were at least four reasons for the conflict between the Soviets and the Poles: (1) the border between the newly independent Polish Second Republic and Soviet Russia had not yet been defined, (2) there was a 'power vacuum', caused by the retreat of German forces from the area, and (3) Marshal Piłsudski was convinced that the Poles were 'the chosen people' to fight 'demoniacal Bolshevism'. The fourth and perhaps main reason for the war was that Poland's eastern border area raised deep emotions amongst the Poles, especially the city of Vilnius (in Polish Wilno), which was considered as a 'holy land' for the Poles, since many famous Polish national figures were born and settled there (e.g. Adam Mickiewicz, Tadeusz Kościuszko as well as Józef Piłsudski himself).²⁰

¹⁸ Davies (2003), p. 19. See also Davies (2005b), p. 291; Prizel (1998), pp. 54–68.

¹⁹ Davies (2003), pp. 20–22.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 22–30. The Bolsheviks, on their part, regarded the Western borders of the Soviet Russia as an ideal territory for political experiment and considered the frontiers of Poland to be those of the Tsarist "Congress Kingdom." Actually today's Polish Eastern border roughly follows the Congress Kingdom's equivalent along the river Bug.

Polish forces seized Vilnius/Wilno on 19 April 1919 and resumed their offensive northwards in late summer by seizing Minsk on 8 August 1919.²¹ The Red Army stumbled eastwards in full retreat. On 8 October 1919 the Supreme Allied Council proposed that the border between Poland and Soviet Russia be along the so-called “Curzon line.”²² The Curzon line would have meant that Vilnius/Wilno would not have been part of Poland any longer.²³

On 4 July 1920 the Soviets initiated their counter-offensive on the Northern Front towards Poland, and in the second week of August the Red Army stood on the banks of the Vistula near Warsaw. The offensive of the Red Army succeeded albeit with vast losses. The Red Army did not have the necessary reserves to make use of this opportunity to capture Warsaw and advance even further westward. Although Warsaw was on the verge of collapse during the battle, *the Poles managed to halt the advance of the Red Army on 15 August 1920* (*‘The Miracle of the Vistula’*). On 16 August Polish troops managed to take the initiative in a series of counter offensives, securing the victory of 15 August, thus saving Warsaw and the whole of Poland from occupation. By 18 October Polish troops had captured Minsk and Wilno, thereby returning to the same position they had occupied in August 1919. For now the Red Army was beaten and the Soviet dream of spreading socialist revolution to the West through Poland had been thwarted.²⁴

The battle of the Vistula has a similar constitutive status in Poland as the Finnish Winter War has in Finland. Today, Marshal Józef Piłsudski is regarded as the hero of the war, but at the time the French General Maxime Weygand and God were hailed as the official heroes (at least in Western Europe) and granted the honour of saving Warsaw and Poland on the banks

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 50–59. The problem of Vilnius/Wilno was that the Lithuanians kept the city as their historical capital and were at least as deeply emotional toward it as the Poles.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 90. The Curzon line was named after Lord Georg Nathaniel Curzon, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain in 1919.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 84–90 and pp. 105–127. Polish operations continued after the winter with an offensive towards Kiev, which the Poles seized on 25 April 1920. From the Polish perspective it was a struggle between David and Goliath, which necessitated quick and decisive blows against the Soviet forces on Ukrainian soil to provide assistance to the western oriented Ukrainian forces, to get allies from them, and to deceive the Bolsheviks about the real area of the main Polish operational effort, the Northern Front (Lithuania – Belarus). Diplomacy would not have been fast enough to guarantee Poland’s survival as a new democracy. This kind of rapid and organized offensive with massive troops meant a campaign first in the south, where the winter ended sooner. On 5 June 1920 the Poles were thrown back from Kiev and by 10 July the front returned to the line Poland had occupied a year earlier. Poland was now threatened from two directions (north and south-east).

²⁴ Zarycki (2004), p. 613; Davies (2003), pp. 145–186 and pp. 226–237 and p. 273. The 15th of August is still celebrated as the anniversary of the battle of Warsaw in Poland.

of the Vistula in 1920. Weygand was the head of the French military delegation to Poland and the Chief of Staff of Marshall Foch, the Supreme Commander of the victorious Entente. Piłsudski was a highly respected figure among his troops, but he was also known as “an associate of revolutionaries and socialists, a friend of Jews and atheists.”²⁵ Thus the glory was given to General Weygand. In his memoirs Weygand admitted, that it was a Polish victory, with Polish troops and Polish planning. The legend of “Weygand’s victory on the banks of the Vistula” in 1920 is an excellent example of the principle of history that *what really happened in history is less important than what people believe to have happened*.²⁶

Piłsudski was not really respected among the Western powers even though he saved Poland from the hands of the Bolsheviks. Allied representatives in Poland thought him arrogant and described him as “not a great man, but a remarkable man.” The Allied powers thought that Poland, as an allied country itself, would participate in the Allied intervention in Russia which was to aid White counter-revolutionary Russian forces, but Piłsudski had no intention of doing that; he knew that a renewed Tsarist Russia would be ready to acknowledge only a small and dependent Poland, and ruling out any hopes of independence for Ukraine, Belarus or Lithuania.²⁷ Piłsudski went on his own path, independently of the advice and warnings of the Western powers, but he was aware that merely defeating the Soviet forces would not benefit Poland. If the Soviet regime was to be replaced by a “White” Denikin, Yudenich or Kolchak, supported by the Western Powers, Poland’s independence would be even less secure than before. Thus, Piłsudski probably thought that Poland would have to wage her war against Soviet Russia alone, without necessarily following the advice of the Western powers, but hopefully with their political and material help. On 3 February 1921, six months after the armistice between Poland and Soviet Russia was signed, Piłsudski travelled to Paris to prepare a Franco-Polish treaty. There he noticed, in a remark which reveals his suspicions about the promises and value of Western diplomacy, that the “military convention

²⁵ Davies (2003), p. 19 and pp. 20–21 and pp. 62–63 and p. 86. Józef Kiemens Giniet-Piłsudski was a Lithuanian of Polish culture, educated in Wilno, where he was introduced to Polish romanticism and Polish nationalism. For twenty years he was a member of the Polish Socialist Party, but after 1907 his enthusiasm for socialism waned. During WWI he lead Polish legions in the Austrian Army against the Russians, but since he refused to swear the required oath of fraternity with the armies of Germany and Austria-Hungary, he was arrested on 22 July 1917, and was not liberated until 18 November 1918 due to the armistice between the Entente and the Central Powers. After that he went to Warsaw where he was appointed as Chief of Staff of the Polish Armed Forces and as Commander-in-Chief of the Second Republic, thus being the first independent ruler of Poland since the partitions of the eighteenth century. On 19 March 1920 Piłsudski was given the rank of Marshal.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 221–223.

²⁷ Nowak (1997), p. 7.

was established at the time when aid was not longer urgently needed and when French policy of encouraging anti-Bolshevik operations has been completely abandoned.”²⁸

Both France and Great Britain provided some material and financial assistance for Poland during the war, but their assistance amounted to little more than expressions of support and even this was couched in vague terms.²⁹ They did not approve of the Polish operation towards Kiev. The British Prime Minister Lloyd George even proposed that “Bolshevism should be killed by kindness”, whereas kindness was probably the last thing the Poles had in mind regarding the Bolsheviks. The idea behind Lloyd George’s statement was that by re-opening trade and restoring Russia’s prosperity, the Allied powers could benefit themselves and at the same time remove the chaos in which Bolshevism thrived. This sounds a bit like Chamberlain’s peace policy just before WWII, which actually encouraged German enlargement step by step in Europe in the late 1930s.³⁰

An armistice between Poland and Soviet Russia was signed on 12 October 1920. The Bolsheviks offered the Poles as much territory on their eastern borderland as they cared to take, on condition that the Poles halt their operations within ten days. The armistice took effect on 18 October 1920 and the final terms were agreed and confirmed by the *Treaty of Riga* on 18 March 1921.³¹

The end of the Polish-Soviet war was also confirmed by the “*German-Russian Agreement*” (*Treaty of Rapallo*), signed by Germany and the Soviet Union on 16 April 1922. According to the treaty, the signatory parties renounced all territorial and financial claims against each other. The parties also agreed to “co-operate in a spirit of mutual goodwill in meeting the economic needs of both countries.”³² This treaty was amended by a secret annex on 29 July 1922, according to which Germany was allowed to train her military in Soviet Russia.³³ The *Treaty of Rapallo* came as a shock to the Western powers, including France. The treaty aroused fears about the possibility of coalition of Russia and Germany against the status quo, which indeed it was, since Germany refused to accept her eastern frontiers

²⁸ Davies (2003), p. 65 and p. 244.

²⁹ *The New York Times* (1920). Even though Western Europe and the USA did not seriously oppose Poland’s “imperialistic projects” in 1920, when she managed to take a vast amount of territory back from Russia in the Polish-Russian war, Western Europe and the USA did not seriously help the newly independent Poland in midsummer 1920 when she was in trouble against the Bolsheviks on the banks of the Vistula.

³⁰ Davies (2003), pp. 84–90.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 237. See also Davies (2005b), p. 297.

³² *German-Russian Agreement [Treaty of Rapallo]* (1922), Article 1 and 5.

³³ Mueller (1976), p. 113.

and both Germany and the Soviet Union considered Poland as a common threat; the whole treaty can be considered a Russo-German pact against Poland.³⁴

The Locarno Agreements, negotiated in 1925, by the Western powers in response to the shock of Rapallo, were to re-integrate Germany into Europe as a great power without demanding a German commitment to her eastern frontiers.³⁵ Poland felt that it had been abandoned by its Western allies, even though one of the Locarno Agreements was signed between France and Poland on 16 October 1925, according to which France and Poland would aid each other, if threatened by Germany.³⁶ In Poland the response to the agreements were summed up in Piłsudski's bitter statement, "every good Pole spits with disgust at the name [Locarno]."³⁷

Undoubtedly, the Polish victory of 1920 gave a breathing space for the whole of Eastern and Central Europe, even though Belarus and Ukraine were partitioned between Russia and Poland. However, this partition was not only destructive, since today the most nationally conscious people in Ukraine and Belarus come from the former interwar Polish provinces comprising the core of the Belarusian (and Ukrainian) democracy-eager movements. The Miracle of the Vistula is not celebrated annually on 15 August then in vain.³⁸

7.1.3. *'Between East and West: the Katyń Forest, the Warsaw Uprising and the Betrayal of Yalta'*

The historical dilemma of Poland has been its geographical location between two great powers, Russia and Germany. As early as the interwar era, the Polish political leader Roman Dmowski stated that "*To anyone who had even the slightest understanding of the political geography of Europe, it should have been clear that the region where Western Europe ends and the vast Plains of the East begins, in a region placed as of fate between two great powers, Germany and Russia, there is no room for a small state (państwsko).*"³⁹

On 31 March 1939 the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Neville Chamberlain, promised military help for Poland in the event of a German attack. Po-

³⁴ See, for example, Mueller (1976), pp. 109–117.

³⁵ Fenwick (1926), p. 111.

³⁶ *Treaty of Locarno between France and Poland* (1925), Article 1.

³⁷ Smoke (ed.) (1996), p. 90. Piłsudski was raised to power as head of state in 1926 in a bloodless coup d'état. His rule lasted until 1939. See also Prizel (1998), p. 71.

³⁸ Zarycki (2004), p. 613.

³⁹ Prizel (1998), p. 69.

land also had a military agreement with France, signed in 1921. On 23 August 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union concluded a “*Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*” (*Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact*),⁴⁰ and on 1 September 1939, Germany attacked Poland, followed by a Soviet attack on 17 September 1939.⁴¹ Poland was soon defeated, and, according to the *Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact*, Germany and the Soviet Union divided Poland along the Vistula river. On 25 September 1939 the border was redrawn along the river Bug, which was confirmed by a “*German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty*”.⁴²

Even though the Poles had traditionally promoted Poland’s value to Europe as “the Western rampart of Christendom”, from 1939 to 1945 its commitment to the West remained unreciprocated.”⁴³ While the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, was appeasing Hitler at other nations expense in 1937–1938, Poland’s Foreign Minister, Colonel Józef Beck considered a preventive war against Hitler. In 1939 Józef Beck refused to make concessions to the Soviet Union, while the appeasers of Hitler were hoping that Western Europe might be rescued from Hitler by the Red Army. The policy of appeasement and empty promises of Western Europe before WWII culminated on 31 March 1939, when Neville Chamberlain guaranteed that Great Britain “would do everything possible to resist an attack by Germany on Poland’s independence”, knowing, however, at the same time that there would be no means available whatsoever for Great Britain to assist Poles.⁴⁴

From the perspective of military strategy Poland’s geopolitical position is troublesome. Poland may be regarded as a kind of gateway both to the west and the east. Poland does not possess any significant natural obstacles in the east other than the river Bug, nor in the west other than the rivers Oder and Neisse, following the Polish-German border, and the river Vistula flowing through Cracow and Warsaw to the Baltic Sea.⁴⁵ In 1941, the main thrust of German operations against the Soviet Union went through Poland (see Picture 14), and in 1944–1945 the advance of the Soviet Army on Germany went through Poland following the Sudetian and Carpathian Mountains in southern Poland and across the wide open plains in northern Poland (see Picture 15).⁴⁶

⁴⁰ *Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics German-Russian Agreement [Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact]* (1939)

⁴¹ Bauer (1993), pp. 37–38.


⁴² *German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty* (1939); Smoke (ed.) (1996), p. 90; Davies (2005b), p. 344; Gross (2007), pp. 3–4.

⁴³ Epstein (2006), pp. 259–265.

⁴⁴ Davies (2005b), pp. 318–319.

⁴⁵ Liber Kartor AB and Lindman Produktion (1995), p. 13.


⁴⁶ Ogarkov (ed.) (1983), p. 74.



Picture 14: Geopolitics – Poland as a gateway to the east (Operation Barbarossa, 22 June 1941)⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Pitt (ed.) (1994), pp. 72–83; Bauer (1973), pp. 511–554; Liber Kartor AB and Lindman Production (1995), p. 20; Guderian (1996 [1952]).

Poland's geographic location is part of the Polish narrative legacy, and geography still counts and affects Poland's foreign and defence policy. One may try to narrate, or *de-securitize*, away the significance of geography through domestic discourses, by using the so-called Copenhagen School's terminology, but since nations have been narrated to hate and love each other these habituated and reified feelings are still there in the national memory.⁴⁸



Picture 15: Geopolitics – Poland as a gateway to the west (the Soviet thrust towards the west in 1944–45)⁴⁹

The Katyń Forest

The Katyń Massacre in 1940 represents a central constitutive symbol of Polish suffering at the hands of the Russians. After attacking Poland on 17 September 1939, the Soviet Union initiated political purges in her occupation zone in Eastern Poland. As a result of these purges about 22,000 Polish

⁴⁸ For more about the securitizing-de-securitizing problematique see, for example, Waever (1999). See also Hansen (2006), p. 35; Halizak (2001), p. 474.

⁴⁹ Ogarkov (ed.) (1983), pp. 74–99; Liber Kartor AB and Lindman Produktion (1995), pp. 13–14.

officers, non-commissioned officers (NCO's), representatives of the Polish intelligentsia as well as ordinary Poles were shot in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine by the Soviets. In April 1943, the Germans found 4,421 corpses in the *Katyń Forest*, nearby Smolensk in Russia (look Picture 14). Each of them had a German bullet in the base of their skulls and many had their identification documents in their pockets. The Germans claimed that they had been killed by the Soviets in April 1940, but the Soviets claimed that they had been killed by the Germans in the winter of 1941. Since the victims were wearing summer uniforms, the International Commission, which was invited by Germany, was inclined to believe that the Soviets were guilty ones. The fate of the missing 22,000 Poles remained unconfirmed until April 1990, when on the 50th anniversary of the crime, the President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev confessed to Stalin's guilt and even revealed the locations of two other mass graves. On 14 October 1992, the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin "passed copies of the 1940 Politburo decision to the Polish President Lech Wałęsa", confirming that the Soviet Politburo had issued an order to have 21,857 Poles (about 15,000 of them POWs) executed. The killings took place in Smolensk, Kharkov, Kalinin, Kiev and Minsk; 4,421 officers were executed and buried in Katyń.⁵⁰

The name of Katyń and the 21,857 Poles executed by the Russians are still in the Polish collective memory. On 13 April 2008 Poles celebrated *Katyń Massacre Victims Memorial Day* for the first time, based on a resolution adopted by the *Sejm*. According to this resolution, the aim of the Memorial Day is "to commemorate the Victims of the Katyń Massacre and all persons murdered by the NKVD based on the decisions of the Soviet authorities."⁵¹ What is particularly painful about the Katyń massacre is that the issue remained a taboo throughout the Cold War until 1989, and the Russians are still reluctant to ask for forgiveness, or even admit that it was a question of genocide (see Chapter 8.2.1).⁵²

⁵⁰ Gross (2007), pp. 7–10. See also *Warsaw Voice* (2007). The Polish officers were at first interned in prisoner of war camps in Kozelsk, Ostashkov and Starobelsk in Western Russia. The Soviets at first started to look for collaborators, but most of the officers were described as "self-declared enemies of the Soviet authorities beyond hope of improvement", by the NKVD chief, Lavrenti Beria. Therefore, "it was recommended" that they be shot and killed. Josef Stalin and a few other high-ranking Soviet officials approved and signed Beria's recommendation.

⁵¹ CBOS (2008b), pp. 2–3.

⁵² Nowak (1997), p. 7; Zarycki (2004), p. 626; Davies (2005b), pp. 334–336; Engel (2007), pp. 535–541; *Warsaw Voice* (2007).

The Warsaw Uprising and its aftermath

In August-October 1944, the Polish resistance movement, the Home Army (*Armia Krajowa; AK*), backed by the Western powers, rose in open rebellion in Warsaw against the Germans, trying in this way to help the advancing Red Army in its westward advance. However, the Red Army halted its advance on the eastern bank of the Vistula and waited, until the Germans had destroyed the Western-orientated resistance movement. Only after the Germans had eventually destroyed the rebellion did the Red Army continue its westward advance to and through Warsaw.⁵³

During and after the war the Soviets, who engineered a wave of arrests of members of the AK and their families, occasionally committed organized mass-murders (*pogroms*). For example, in the Suwałki area, in north-eastern Poland, between 12 and 25 July 1945, the Soviets killed 600–800 people during a ‘search and arrest’ operation. Turkmenistan was one of the main areas to which arrested AK members and their families were deported. It has been estimated that in 1948 alone there were 25,000 Polish deportees in Turkmenistan. The massacres of Katyń and the tragedy of the Warsaw uprising were considered taboos until the late 1980s in Poland. As such this weakened the cohesion of the Polish people, because people were aware of these tragedies anyhow.⁵⁴

‘The Betrayal of Yalta’

*“[O]ur country’s placement on the European geostrategical axis causes the problems of defensibility and security to be key issues in Poland’s national interest.”*⁵⁵

Historically, at all of Europe’s main peace conferences (Vienna 1814–15, Paris 1919–20, Yalta and Potsdam 1945) Poland’s future was one of the main issues.⁵⁶ In February 1945, the Allies held a Conference at Yalta in the Crimean peninsula, at which the USA and Great Britain agreed to Soviet demands to move Poland’s borders westward. Significant areas of Poland to the east of the river Bug were annexed to become part of the Soviet Republics of Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania. Traditionally, these had been part of Poland’s eastern borderlands, and had caused many disputes between Poland and her neighbours. At the same time they were essential

⁵³ Fitzmaurice (1992), pp. 55–56. See also Davies (2005b), p. 346. The *Armia Krajowa* was directly supported by the Polish Government-in-Exile in London. The Soviet Union supported another Polish resistance movement, the People’s Army (*Armia Ludowa; AL*).


⁵⁴ Tyszkiewicz (2000), p. 1; Szejnoch (2007), p. 1.

⁵⁵ Ministry of National Defence Press and Information Office (1995), p. 13.

⁵⁶ Davies (2005b), p. 11.

parts of Polish national identity (especially the cities of Vilnius/Wilno, Grodno (known also as Hrodna) and Lviv (in Polish Lwów)). As compensation for this loss of territory Poland was given the following previously German areas: Silesia (now Śląsk), East-Prussia (now Pomorze), excluding Königsberg (now Kaliningrad), which was annexed by the Soviet Union as an avant-garde military strongpoint.⁵⁷ The current borders of Poland match approximately the borders of Poland under its first king, Bolesław Chrobry (the Brave) in 1000 AC.⁵⁸

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill, persuaded the Polish representatives of the Government-in-Exile to accept the Soviet claims in 1945, by stressing that “You are on the verge of annihilation”, and “*Unless you accept the frontier you are out of business forever. The Russians will sweep through your country and your people will be liquidated.*” The presented borders of Poland were approved and confirmed at Yalta on the basis of the Curzon Line.⁵⁹



Picture 16: The National borders of Poland before and after WWII⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Smoke (ed.) (1996), pp. 90–91. See also Kornacki (1995), p. 9.

⁵⁸ Smoke (1996), p. 109.

⁵⁹ Davies (2005b), p. 379.

⁶⁰ Kornacki (1995), p. 15.

7.1.4 ‘Polish Anti-Semitism’

“Do not underestimate the power of the Dark Side.”⁶¹

Polish anti-Semitism does not belong to Poland’s self-image of the “beautiful soul”⁶² of the Polish nation; its content is not in step with the narrative of Poland as a haven of religious tolerance, which has proved to be only a myth (see Chapter 7.1.1). But if a nation is bonded together by common historical experiences, can it just select suitable narratives from its national heritage as it pleases? Or “Can a young German reflecting today on the meaning of his identity as a German simply ignore twelve years (1933–1945) of his country’s and his ancestors’ history?” Usually, national grand-narratives are exceptional in nature, which makes them worth remembering generation after generation. For Poles, Mikołaj Kopernik, Fryderyk Chopin and King Jan III Sobieski are unusual and constitutive national figures that are still remembered. All of them are part of Polishness in the fields of science, music, heroism or religiousness. Is it possible then just to deny that unusual figures like *Jedwabne’s* mayor of 1941, or the other Poles of *Jedwabne* who committed pogrom of Jews in the Polish city of *Jedwabne* during WWII, or Poles that committed similar pogroms after WWII, are also part of Polishness?⁶³

Every nation’s history includes events that one might prefer to forget. The massacres of the Jews by Poles during and after WWII represent the dark side of Polishness that Poles surely would like to forget, but it is my ‘privilege’ as a foreign social scientist to present the dark side of Polishness and hereby ensure it is not forgotten. I am not saying that the collective identity structure of my own culture does include similar dark sides that could be revealed, but I leave this to other researchers, perhaps even Polish ones. It often seems that a nation is only willing to open a discourse on such issues after the dark sides of a nation’s narratives have been revealed from the outside. This has been the case in dealing with the uncomfortable issue of Polish anti-Semitism and Polish participation in anti-Jewish pogroms and the mass murder of Jews.

On 10 July 1941 half of the residents of the Polish city of *Jedwabne* murdered the other half, all 1,600 of the town’s Jews, men, women and children, except seven survivors, some of whom witnessed this pogrom and told their story after the war. In 2001 Jan Gross published his impressive

⁶¹ Quoted in Waever (1999), p. 334.

⁶² Hegel (1977 [1807]), p. 406. According to G.W.F. Hegel, “The ‘beautiful soul’, lacking an actual existence, [is] entangled in the contradiction between its pure self and the necessity of that self to externalize itself and change itself into an actual existence.”

⁶³ Gross (2001), pp. 135–137. See also Auer (2000), p. 229.

tiny monograph, *Neighbors*,⁶⁴ about this incident, which provoked fierce debate in Poland, because he accused the Polish residents of Jedwabne of being “willing executioners” in the same way that huge numbers of ordinary Germans were during WWII, in committing the holocaust.⁶⁵ In his next book, *Fear*, Jan Gross continued his ‘crusade’ against Polish anti-Semitism concentrating on pogroms in Poland after WWII. *Fear*, first published in 2006 raised a fierce debate in Poland as well.⁶⁶ Gross’s main argument in both of his books was that nobody forced the Poles to commit the *pogrom of Jedwabne* or other pogroms; Poles committed those crimes by their own will. Poland surely was not “God’s playground”, as Norman Davies has called Poland, but rather the Devil’s.⁶⁷

Jedwabne’s pogrom started on 25 June 1941, two days after the Germans entered the town in connection with *operation Barbarossa*. The pogrom reached its peak on 10 July 1941, when the remaining Jews were burned alive in a local barn or butchered at a nearby Jewish cemetery by local Poles. Jedwabne was annexed by the Soviets in the autumn of 1939. According to the Secret Additional Protocol of the “Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact” signed on 23 August 1939, “the spheres of interest of both Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.” Jedwabne was thus under Soviet occupation from the autumn of 1939 to 24 June 1941.⁶⁸

The pogrom of Jedwabne was preceded the pogroms in the nearby villages of *Wąsosz*, on 5 July 1941, and *Radziłów* on 7 July 1941. In both villages hundreds of Jews were massacred. According to the few who survived, the number killed in *Wąsosz* was 600-1,200, and in *Radziłów* 800-1,500. At least some of the murderers of *Wąsosz* and *Radziłów* took part in the killings in Jedwabne as well. It has not been possible to confirm the ‘death toll’ of the Jews of Jedwabne exactly, due to the small number of survivors, but according to Jan Gross that should not be a pretext for forgetting these terrible crimes; there are always only a few, if any, survivors from massacres or genocides.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Gross (2001).

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 121. See also Polonsky and Michlic (eds.) (2004). Antony Polonsky’s and Joanna Michlic’s *The Neighbors Respond – The Controversy over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland* includes analyses and speeches concerning *Jedwabne*, which revealed that Poles are either ready to liberalize their past and start discussing it openly, or tend to deny that Poles committed mass-killings of Jews during and after the war.

⁶⁶ Gross (2007). Concerning the debate in Poland that *Fear* caused, see, for example, Beylin (2008).

⁶⁷ Gross (2001), p. 7.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 16–20 and pp. 41–42.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 57 and p. 67.

The pogrom of Jedwabne seems to have been a sudden, short-lived incident of ethnic cleansing akin to those in the Balkan wars of the 1990s and in Rwanda, both of which involved neighbours on apparently good terms, despite belonging to different clans, tribes or ethnic groups, suddenly killing members of the other group. The difference between ‘the cases’ of Jedwabne, the Balkans and Rwanda is that pogroms of Jews in Poland occurred periodically from at least the late nineteenth century up to the immediate post-WWII period. For example, on 7 August 1945, 16 Jews were killed in *Leżajsk* by a bomb placed under their house, and on 4 July 1946, 40 Jews were killed in a pogrom in *Kielce* by ordinary Poles in response to a suspected kidnapping of a Polish boy by Jews, supposedly for ritual purposes.⁷⁰ It is hardly correct to argue that Nazi or the Soviet totalitarianism made the Polish community of Jedwabne and Kielce to kill their Jewish compatriots. Probably that is precisely the main problem; the Jews were not ethnically Poles, even though they were citizens of Poland. Similar killings also occurred also just after the establishment of the Second Polish Republic, between November 1918 and May 1919, during which period Poles killed about 125 Jews. Between August 1944 and August 1946 Poles killed a total of 250 Jews. In both periods, according to David Engel, the Poles were threatened by an external enemy; in 1918–1919 the threat was Ukrainian nationalists and Bolsheviks, and in 1944–1946, the Soviets. In both periods the Poles thought that the Jews were making common cause with the enemy against the Poles. Much of the killing in 1918–1919 was conducted by military forces, whereas between 1944 and 1946 it was largely perpetrated by ordinary Poles.⁷¹

There are two extremely interesting points here which allow one to argue that anti-Semitism was an inherent phenomenon even in post-WWII Poland. The first is that Poles ‘haunted’ their Polish compatriots who helped Jews during WWII, hiding Jewish survivors of pogroms. It was a general phenomenon, according to Jan Gross, that Poles who helped Jews during the war encountered hostility and fear in their own communities if their actions became known. Indeed this hostility forced some of them to emigrate to the USA, or other countries after the war. Another interesting point is that the participants in the Kielce pogrom in 1946 were condemned publicly in Polish newspapers, which caused protest strikes by ethnic Polish

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 124 and pp. 236–237. See also Gross (2007), pp. 81–94.

⁷¹ Engel (2007), pp. 535–541. See also Gross (2001), pp. 236–237. According to Jan Gross, “Polish Catholics believed ... that Jews who hated Catholics and called them ‘goyim’ [non-Jew] added a little blood of Catholic children to their matzoh [cracker-like flatbread] ... It is not known how this belief originated, but it was there, and Catholic mothers used to discipline their unruly children by invoking it, telling their children, in other words, that Jews would kill them if they misbehaved.”

workers at least in *Lublin* and *Łódź* in support of the participants who had committed that pogrom.⁷²

But it is not to be blamed the whole Polish nation for the mass-killings of Jews in Poland; there is always some core group that participates, or manages to agitate the others for the ‘right cause’ to kill the Others, not belonging to ‘our group’. That was probably the case in Jedwabne, Wąsosz and Radziłów as well in the summer 1941. In Jedwabne the ‘improviser’ was the mayor of the town, and the probable reason to kill the Jews of the town, according to Gross, was only to steel their assumed riches and to “rob the Jews once and for all.” But it was also the deep belief among the many Polish Catholics that Jews used the fresh blood of innocent Christian children in their rituals.”⁷³

What makes groups of people commit massacres such as the Jewish genocide by the Germans during WWII, or pogroms by the Poles in the summer 1941 in Poland, or the massacres of Bosniaks by Serbs in 1995 in Srebrenica, or the massacre of the Tutsi minority by the Hutu majority in 1994 in Rwanda? This is one of the key questions of humanity to be researched, but at least for me it is too hard a nut, and it is not the task of this thesis. Furthermore, can we find a law to explain such massacres or genocides? Probably not. What we do know in Jedwabne is that if Jews were collaborators with the Soviets as ethnic Poles may have thought, so were local ethnic Poles with Germans. The Germans were received generally as liberators by local ethnic Poles in areas, including Jedwabne, that had been annexed in 1939 by the USSR and then occupied by Germans. This was noticed also by the commander of the underground Polish Home Army, who sent a dispatch to London on 8 July 1941, informing the Polish Government-in-Exile of this particular issue.⁷⁴

7.2. National ‘Sub-Identity Holders’

There are three ‘sub-identity holders’ which are carriers of the Polish narrative legacy (*narrative method*; see Chapter 2.2.6): (1) Polish State itself (including key political figures like the President and the Prime Minister as well as the political parties), (2) the Polish Catholic Church and (3) the Armed Forces of Poland. This does not mean that these ‘sub-identity holders’ own this narrative legacy; the people of Poland do. But the State, the Catholic Church and the Armed Forces of Poland symbolically and discursively express this narrative legacy in many ways and use this narrative

⁷² Gross (2001), p. 131 and pp. 148–149 and p. 238.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 109 and p. 123 and pp. 236–237.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

legacy to legitimize their own existence, as well as the existence of the people of Poland.

7.2.1. The State and Political Culture

The Polish State is a Western liberal democracy, based on the constitutional separation of, and balance between, the legislative, executive and judicial powers.⁷⁵ Poland is headed by the President of the Republic, elected by the people in universal, equal and direct elections for a 5-year term of office. S/he can only have two terms.⁷⁶ *The supreme legislative power* belongs to a two-chamber Parliament (National Assembly; *Zgromadzenie Narodowe*) consisting of the 460-seat lower house (*Sejm*) and a 100-seat upper house (*Senate*). The Senators and Members of *the Sejm* are elected for four-years term. *The supreme executive power* in Poland belongs to the President and the Government (the Council of Ministers) headed by the Prime Minister (the President of the Council of Ministers). The government is, in parliamentary terms, responsible to the Senate. *The supreme judicial power* in Poland belongs to the Constitutional Tribunal, the judges of which exercise their office independently and are subject only to the Constitution.⁷⁷

The political culture of Poland has been characterized by loud arguments and surprises. This may have some thing to do with the era of the First Republic, during which the *Sejm* and the Royal elections were all governed by the principle of unanimity. It sounds incredible now that such an ideal was taken seriously. The State was handicapped due to a unanimous voting system, according to which a single voice of dissent was equivalent to total rejection of the decision. Majority voting was consciously rejected. This system known by the term *Liberum Veto* made the Republic ‘famous’ throughout Europe, and was at least partly responsible for the three Partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793 and 1795 as it gave Russia, Prussia and Austria opportunities to intervene in the voting process.⁷⁸

The political culture of Poland has been blamed for being inefficient and unstable for five reasons. *First*, there was a lack of cooperation between the President, the Government and Parliament especially under President Lech Wałęsa (Solidarity).⁷⁹ The Western powers were confused by constant

⁷⁵ *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland* (1997), Article 10.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, Article 127. See also Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej Biuro Prasy i Informacji (1995), p. 29.

⁷⁷ *Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (1997), Rozdział VIII, Artykuł 190 [Chapter VIII, Article 190].

⁷⁸ Davies (2005a), p. 259. See also Epstein (2006), p. 263.

⁷⁹ Prizel (1998), p. 103; Polish Institute of International Affairs (1993), p. 134.

changes of government and dismissals of ministers prior to the 1993 parliamentary elections. All this was actually about a power struggle between leftist ministers, who supported slower transition politics, and President Wałęsa, who supported more rapid transition politics. However, even though there were six Governments between 24 August 1989 and 6 March 1995, none of the Prime Ministers could really be labelled ‘leftist’ as such (see Table 2). The Presidential election campaign in 1990 was an indication that Poland was not fully cured of its pre-WWII nationalism. Wałęsa repeatedly accused the leftist Government of endangering the Western orientation of the country and of representing a tendency to return to the politics of the communist era. But at the same time, he resorted to anti-Semitic attacks on his opponent Tadeusz Mazowiecki (Solidarity), the first non-communist Prime Minister of Poland. The third candidate, Stanisław Tymiński (nonpartisan), made xenophobia a theme of his electoral campaign. The presidency of Lech Wałęsa was characterized by conflicts between him and the Government of the country.⁸⁰

Secondly, Polish Parliamentary democracy has been incapable of reaching sustainable compromises and of creating enduring and strong governments. Between the semi-free parliamentary elections of 1989 and the end of 2007, the Government of Poland has changed 15 times, meaning that none of the post-Cold War governments has stayed in power for the full 4-year term in the last 18 years (see Table 3).⁸¹

Thirdly, there have been problems concerning the relationship between the legislative, executive and judiciary powers. The so-called “*Small Constitution*” was in force until 2 April 1997, and the principles of the separation of powers were not sufficiently clearly defined. According to the “*Small Constitution*”, the Prime Minister was obliged to hear the proposals of the President before naming new Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs as well as a new Minister of Defence. In Practice this meant that the President was able to appoint three important ‘ministers of his own’ thus bypassing the ruling parliamentary coalition.⁸² According to the new Constitution of Poland (2 April 1997), the Prime Minister is allowed to submit his proposal to the President vis-à-vis the composition of a new government.⁸³

⁸⁰ Kornacki (1995), p. 6; Prizel (1998), p. 103; Polish Institute of International Affairs (1993), p. 134.

⁸¹ Polish Institute of International Affairs (1993), p. 134; *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland* (1992), Article 98; The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2008a).

⁸² *Constitution of the Republic of Poland* (23 November 1992), Article 61.

⁸³ *Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (1997), Rozdział VI, Artykuł 154 [Chapter VI, Article 154].

Presidents		
Name	Period	Party
Lech Wałęsa	22 December 1990 – 23 December 1995	Solidarność
Aleksander Kwaśniewski	23 December 1995 – 23 December 2005	SdRP/SLD
Lech Kaczyński	23 December 2005 –	PiS
Prime Ministers		
Tadeusz Mazowiecki	24 August 1989 – 4 January 1991	Solidarność
Jan Krzysztof Bielecki	4 January 1991 – 6 December 1991	KLD
Jan Olszewski	6 December 1991 – 5 June 1992	PC
Waldemar Pawlak	5 June 1992 – 8 July 1992	PSL
Hanna Suchocka	8 July 1992 – 26 October 1993	UD
Waldemar Pawlak	26 October 1993 – 6 March 1995	PSL
Józef Oleksy	6 March 1995 – 7 February 1996	SdRP/SLD
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz	7 February 1996 – 17 October 1997	SdRP/SLD
Marek Belka	17 October 1997 – 31 October 1997	SdRP/SLD
Jerzy Karol Buzek	31 October 1997 – 19 October 2001	RS AWS
Leszek Miller	19 October 2001 – 2 May 2004	SLD
Marek Belka	2 May 2004 – 31 October 2005	SLD
Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz	31 October 2005 – 14 July 2006	PiS
Jarosław Kaczyński	14 July 2006 – 16 November 2007	PiS
Donald Tusk	16 November 2007 –	PO
Legend		
SdRP (<i>Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej</i> ; Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland); absorbed into the SLD in 1999		
SLD (<i>Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej</i> ; The Polish Social Democratic Party)		
KLD (<i>Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny</i> ; The Liberal Democratic Congress)		
PC (<i>Porozumienie Centrum</i> ; The Centre Party)		
PSL (<i>Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe</i> ; The Polish People's Party)		
UD (<i>Unia Demokratyczna</i> ; The Democratic Union)		
RS AWS (<i>Ruch Społeczny Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność</i> ; The Social Movement for Solidarity Electoral Action)		
PiS (<i>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</i> ; Law and Justice)		
PO (<i>Platforma Obywatelska</i> ; The Civic Platform)		

Table 2: The Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Republic of Poland between 24 August 1989 and 2008⁸⁴

Fourthly, the Polish political elite has been criticized for promoting its own interests, instead of those of society, hence the creation of expedient and temporary coalitions.⁸⁵ Especially Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński evoked many critical comments during his premiership (14 July 2006 – 16 November 2007). The debate over Prime Minister Kaczyński's personality and style was reminiscent of the 1990s debate and confusion over the Austrian leader of the far-right Freedom Party, Jörg Haider, whose opinions

⁸⁴ The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2008a); President of the Republic of Poland (2008a).

⁸⁵ See, for example, CBOS (2004a). In January 2004, a majority of Poles believed that state officials and politicians often accepted bribes (84%), and are guilty of nepotism (81%).

and such comments as “in the Third Reich they had an orderly employment policy”, horrified many around the world. The problem was that simultaneously he was considered a patriot among his supporters and a man “who dared to speak uncomfortable truths.”⁸⁶ The Polish liberal newspaper, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, accused Kaczyński in July 2007 of consistently having strived:

*To introduce a personal system of government and his success in this field has been stunning – no head of government after 1989 exercised such power as he does ... He has been using this power to radically transform Poland’s political system and its foreign policy for nearly two years now, enjoying the unswerving support of about one in three voters throughout the process. His policy has to be described as a great personal success and a catastrophe for the Polish democracy.*⁸⁷

Fifthly, even though political parties have to cross a 5% threshold to have representatives in Parliament (for electoral alliances the threshold is 8%, and for national minorities there is no threshold at all) the percentage share the parties received in parliamentary elections has varied a lot. At no time during the post-Cold War era has the same party won parliamentary elections twice without an electoral coalition (see Table 3).⁸⁸

As was stated earlier, Solidarity won all 35% of the seats it was allowed to contest in 1989 semi-free parliamentary elections (see Chapter 6.1.). In the 1991 parliamentary elections the UD (*Unia Demokratyczna*; Democratic Union) won, but only with 12,3% share of the votes. The next parliamentary elections, in September 1993, was significant largely because Poles voted for the first time in 54 years in a country that was free of foreign military forces; the last Russian soldiers had left the country on 17 September 1993.⁸⁹ The winner of the 1993 parliamentary elections was the SLD, which got 20,4% of the votes.⁹⁰ The SLD’s main message was to take care of the people who had been impoverished during the shock therapy of state economy. The SLD promoted the process of economic transformation, but it stressed that the process had been too fast and that it should be slowed down to prevent those impoverished becoming even more wretched. The SLD also promoted the rapprochement of Poland with the EU and NATO.⁹¹

⁸⁶ See, for example, BBC (2000), p. 1; Connolly (2001).

⁸⁷ Michnik (2007a), p. 1.

⁸⁸ Polish Institute of International Affairs (1993), p. 137; Lang (1994), p. 29. See also Jasiewicz (1994), p. 404.

⁸⁹ Pawlak (1993/94), p. 37.

⁹⁰ Kornacki (1995), p. 2. In 1993 the chairman of the SLD was the former president of Poland, Alexander Kwaśniewski.

⁹¹ Lang (1994), p. 29.

Party	1989	1991	1993	1997	2001	2005	2007
Solidarność (Solidarity)	100	5,1	-	-	-	-	-
UD (<i>Unia Demokratyczna</i> ; The Democratic Union)	-	12,3	10,6	-	-	-	-
SLD (<i>Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej</i> ; The Polish Social Democratic Party)	-	12,0	20,4	27,1	-	11,3	-
AWS (<i>Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność</i> ; Solidarity Electoral Action)	-	-	-	33,8	5,6	-	-
SLD+UP (<i>Unia Pracy</i> ; The Union of Labour)	-	-	-	-	41,0	-	-
PiS (<i>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</i> ; Law and Justice)	-	-	-	-	9,5	27,0	32,1
PO (<i>Platforma Obywatelska</i> ; The Civic Platform)	-	-	-	-	12,7	24,1	41,5
MN (<i>Mniejszość Niemiecka</i> ; German Minority)	-	1,2	0,7	0,6	0,4	0,3	0,2

Table 3: Parliamentary (*Sejm*) elections in Poland between 1989 and 2007; the winners and shares of the vote of the German minority⁹²

The author of the democratization process of Poland and the ‘grand winner’ of the 1989 semi-free parliamentary elections, Solidarity, was voted out of parliament in 1993 elections. There are at least three reasons for this radical change. First, the GDP of Poland was lower than in 1989, the unemployment rate had reached a peak of 15%, and the free market economy, pursued by the Government and President Wałęsa, did not please the people.⁹³ The SLD promised a ‘smoother’ change for the people and people believed that. Secondly, representatives of the parties that leaned on religion lost in the election, which can be interpreted as a sign of some sort of secularization of politics, even though religion has had and still has a significant role in society anyhow.⁹⁴ Thirdly, the parties that won the election were well organized and went into the election with a large number of candidates.⁹⁵

⁹² CSPP (2007), pp. 1–2; National Electoral Commission (2005); National Electoral Commission (2007).

⁹³ Lang (1994), p. 22. The leading figure of the Solidarity movement, President Lech Wałęsa, promoted a rapid “shock therapy” programme for the economy, as did the Solidarity movement. However the shock therapy programme lasted too long in voters’ opinion and the people’s confidence in Solidarity vanished. Solidarity won only 4,9% of the votes cast in the parliamentary elections of 1993.

⁹⁴ Jasiewicz (1994), pp. 405–406.

⁹⁵ Tworzecki (1994), pp. 180–185.

Cooperation between the next President of Poland, the SLD's Aleksander Kwaśniewski and the Government was obviously easier than the cooperation with President Lech Wałęsa, because of the SLD's victory in the 1993 parliamentary elections, even though in the 1997 parliamentary elections Solidarity (AWS; *Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność*; Solidarity Electoral Action) was voted back into Parliament, as well as into the Government. In the 2001 elections, the SLD formed an electoral coalition with the UP (*Unia Pracy*; Union of Labour) and won the election with a huge 41% of the votes. Aleksander Kwaśniewski was a popular President. He brought Poland into NATO in 1999, which must have helped the SLD gain such a clear victory in the 2001 parliamentary elections.⁹⁶

During the negotiations on the draft Constitution of the EU, Poland struggled unsuccessfully for the weighting of votes in the Council she was given by the *Nice Treaty*.⁹⁷ There was scepticism towards the EU Constitution in Poland, but in November 2004, 64% of the Poles would have definitely (42%), or rather/most probably (22%), voted for the Constitution in a Polish referendum, which never took place since France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitution in their own referendums.⁹⁸ At this point the SLD-led Government's popularity was not high due to the weak economy and high unemployment rate. The final blow for the Government was the decision by a group of the SLD's own MPs to form a new party, the Social Democracy of Poland (SDPL; *Socjaldemokracja Polska*). Prime Minister Leszek Miller announced his resignation as Prime Minister, which became effective in May 2004. Marek Belka from the same party (SLD) replaced him as a caretaker Prime Minister until the autumn 2005 parliamentary elections.⁹⁹

In the September 2005 parliamentary elections, Law and Justice (PiS; *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*) secured victory with 27,0% of the vote. The presidential elections, held in the same year, saw Lech Kaczyński (23 December 2005 –) win a surprising victory in the second round over Donald

⁹⁶ Polish Institute of International Affairs (1993), p. 134; Electoral Geography (1997); Fitzmaurice (2000), pp. 93–95; Ratajczyk (2006); CSPP (2007), pp. 1–2.

⁹⁷ European Union (2001), p. 80. According to the *Nice Treaty*, Poland was to get 27 votes in the Council. This was just two fewer than the four largest countries, namely, France, Britain, Italy and Germany. See also the European Union (2004), p. 87. By the *Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* the EU adopted a new “qualified majority” voting in the Council. This means that a decision in the Council is achieved if “at least 55% of the other members of the Council, representing Member States comprising at least 65% of the population of the participating Member States” decide so. Thus, it would be easier for Germany, for example, than for Poland, to organise a majority in Council, since over 18% of the EU population lives in Germany, more than twice as much as in Poland.

⁹⁸ CBOS (2004e), p. 1.

⁹⁹ Freedom House (2006), pp. 1–2.

Tusk (PO), who had beaten Lech Kaczyński in the first round. Lech Kaczyński and his twin brother Jarosław Kaczyński were leading figures of the PiS. When it appeared that Lech Kaczyński might win the Presidency, and that the Poles might react sceptically to having twin brothers as Prime Minister and President of the country simultaneously, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (PiS) was named as Prime Minister instead of Jarosław Kaczyński. However, Jarosław Kaczyński eventually took the Premiership on 14 July 2006 and remained in that post until 16 November 2007.¹⁰⁰

The first Government established by the PiS after the 2005 election, headed by Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, enjoyed strong public support for several months, but it dropped into 42% in May 2006.¹⁰¹ In September 2007, support for the PiS's second Government, headed by Jarosław Kaczyński, was poor as well; the number of its opponents grew to 46%, especially due to the lack of success or poor conduct of foreign policy, whereas only 29% of Poles supported the Government.¹⁰²

The Civic Platform (PO), as the main competitor of the PiS, won the next parliamentary elections in 2007 with 41,5% share of votes.¹⁰³ The new Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, and his “educated” Government will face many internal, foreign and defence policy challenges, of which the least important will be the personal relations with Donald Tusk and President Lech Kaczyński.¹⁰⁴ EU officials “breathed a collective sigh of relief” over Poland's election results on the 22 October 2007. The previous Prime Minister, Jarosław Kaczyński challenged and spooked the EU, especially with his “66 million Poles” speech, as well as a generally critical opposition to EU policies, which made Poland “Europe's laughing stock.”¹⁰⁵ In his victory speech, the new Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, thanked his supporters for “showing all of Europe that in times of difficulty Poles can take care of their country in an extraordinarily responsible fashion.”¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁰ National Electoral Commission (2005); CSPP (2007), pp. 1–2; Freedom House (2006), pp. 1–2.

¹⁰¹ CBOS (2006e), pp. 1–2.

¹⁰² CBOS (2007i), p. 2.

¹⁰³ National Electoral Commission (2007).

¹⁰⁴ CBOS (2007i), p. 2 and *The Economist* (2007a), p. 1. Jacek Rostowski, the Finance Minister in Tusk's government is a graduate of the London School of Economics, whereas the Defence Minister, Radek Sikorski is an Oxford graduate, who was Defence Minister in Jarosław Kaczyński's Government.

¹⁰⁵ Kurski (2007).

¹⁰⁶ *New Europe – The European Weekly* (2008).

7.2.2. *The Armed Forces of Poland and the Strategic Culture*

The Armed Forces of Poland (*Wojsko Polskiej; WP*) is a proud and respected ‘sub-identity holder’ in Poland. Its annual parades on 15 August and public ceremonial oaths may be considered as representing a symbolic discourse (*Semiotic method*; see Chapter 2.2.6) that reflects the Armed Forces’s traditional identity of being the defender of the country’s territorial, political and cultural integrity.¹⁰⁷ Parades and public ceremonial oaths unite the people’s intersubjective consciousness, and the Polish State has used this opportunity in mediating a ‘proper message’ to the Poles. For example, on 3 August 2008, 500 conscripts swore public oath on Cracow square. This was the last of its kind before introduction of a professional army. In his speech, at this ceremony, Prime Minister Donald Tusk emphasized that:

*The army which is soon to go fully professional faces serious challenges. In today’s world what wins is, first of all, modern thought, technology and economic drive, hence also our army, our soldiers need to stand up to these challenges and win over forces that want to gain dominant power. Alliances and international position are of great importance to us, but Polish independence and security must, in a first row, be defended by Polish soldiers.*¹⁰⁸

It is largely due to historical habituation in the significance of Poland’s geographical location as well as in the “knightly-soldierly” myth, accompanied by a “*Gloria victis*” mentality (Glory to the defeated; lost causes, heroism and martyrology) that prevented Poland from building a modern strategic culture in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The civilian and military strategic communities were separate entities in the late 1980s and early 1990s; the civilian strategic community was frequently neglected, and regular debates regarding democratic control over the military occurred during those years. Poland’s inability to construct a ‘Western-kind’ of strategic culture, which stresses civilian democratic control over the military and viable civil-military relations between the two cultures is somewhat characteristic; the same phenomena could be found in other post-communist countries in the 1990s as well. The Military did not provide much opportunity to “nurture civilian expertise in foreign and defence ministries in security and defence matters” during the early years of the 1990s.¹⁰⁹ I will come back to this issue later in Chapter 8.3.1 and will now focus on the ‘nature’ of the Polish Armed Forces.

¹⁰⁷ Epstein (2006), p. 254.

¹⁰⁸ Ministry of National Defence (2008).

¹⁰⁹ Longhurst (2003), pp. 59–60. See also Wandycz (2001) p. 134.

Polish military traditions lean on three pillars: (1) “the imperative to protect Polish autonomy”, (2) “to perform the duties of a patriotic Polish soldier” and (3) “to remain loyal to the military’s leaders.” It is the last pillar that caused problems for Poland before Poland’s accession to NATO in 1999. The Polish military tradition has contributed significantly to the construction of Polish national identity, especially during the three Partitions that obliterated Poland from the map of Europe.¹¹⁰

The last of the above mentioned pillars, “*to remain loyal to the military’s leaders*”, is the most archaic one. Before the First Partition of Poland (in 1772), the standing army was small because of popular resistance to a centralized and powerful state. Aristocratic houses preferred to maintain their own private armies to defend *Kresy* areas. As a consequence of this decentralized strategy the “Polish soldier was loyal to a military leader not to the government.” This decentralized strategy to protect the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s integrity was doomed to fail, not merely due to the small size of the standing army, but rather due to the *Liberum Veto tradition*.¹¹¹

The second pillar, “*to perform the duties of a patriotic Polish soldier*”, is based on Poland’s “insurrectionary tradition” as Poles launched numerous rebellions against the occupying powers during and after the three Partitions. The Poles fought for Poland in Napoleon’s Polish legions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as well as in the Allied armies during WWII, but the Poles have been deeply indoctrinated into the “The Miracle of the Vistula” narrative (see Chapter 7.1.2) as an integral part of their national identity. After the victory of the Vistula, Marshal *Józef Piłsudski*, the commander of the Polish army, led the 1926 *coup d’état* against the democratically elected Government and governed from ‘behind the scenes’ until his death in 1935, by enhancing the public perception that the military alone “could act ultimately only in the country’s best interest.”¹¹²

The first pillar of the Polish military tradition, “*the imperative to protect Polish autonomy*”, was constructed especially during the 1920s. This pillar held fast even during the Cold War era, when the Polish Armed Forces managed to maintain an independent military ethos and promote the “use of pro-communist and non-communist military victories and “glorious” defeats in developing Polish military mythology.” Consequently, the Polish Armed Forces were considered unreliable from the Soviet perspective, especially during the political crises of 1980 and 1981, due to the Polish military’s unwillingness to enforce the sanctions of martial law against the Pol-

¹¹⁰ Epstein (2006), pp. 259–265. According to Rachel Epstein, “one source of Poland’s military tradition is the country’s history of aspiring to great power status in Europe.”

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 260.

ish people.¹¹³ This pillar still holds fast and it has been explicitly interconnected with Polish religious and geopolitical grand narratives, as can be noticed in a letter sent by President Lech Kaczyński to Evangelical [*sic*] chaplains, 17 August 2008:

*These days we recall the courage of our soldiers who stopped the Bolshevik march towards Western Europe near Warsaw in August 1920 ... The courage and unprecedented sacrifice of the Polish soldiers in the Battle of Warsaw saved Poland, reborn after long years of enslavement under partitions, and also saved Europe, and not only in the political and civilisational sense. It also saved Europe's spiritual and axiological legacy whose foundation rests on values deriving from the Christian thought.*¹¹⁴

7.2.3. The Catholic Church – “State Church” vs. “Activist Church”

The Roman Catholic Church is a formidable organization and ‘sub-identity holder’ in Poland. Its enormous political influence is based largely on its close alliance with the Polish State dating back to 966. This alliance is currently regulated by the “*Concordat between the [Papal] Holy See and the Republic of Poland.*”¹¹⁵ *Statistically a clear majority, about 96%, of the Poles are Catholic (2006) and almost the same proportion (95%) “describe themselves as believers.” Furthermore, 63% of the Poles do not only believe, but also claim to follow the teachings of the Catholic Church, headed by the Pope, who has been considered as having the greatest influence on world history as a single person among the Poles.* Catholicism in Poland has been described as an onion with the core ‘truths’ of heaven and earth, which are grounded into the heart and mind of every Catholic Pole in the way that the core (spirit/religious identity) of the onion is only thinly separated from its exterior (body/politics) “by layers of fine onionskins.”¹¹⁶ Poles may be described at this point as having two Leviathans: the Polish State as the body and the Holy See as the soul, or as temporal and heavenly powers. In 1996, President Aleksander Kwaśniewski described relations with the Holy See as follows: “*Our relations with the Holy See are of sin-*

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 262–264. See also Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej (1983), pp. 11–17. In this publication, even though published during the socialist era, one can find photographs and texts concerning Polish soldiers’ commitments on various fronts (including the western-orientated Home Army during WWII, which shows that even during the socialist era, the Polish Armed Forces upheld its traditions.

¹¹⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland (2008).

¹¹⁵ *Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Poland* (1993/1998).

¹¹⁶ CBOS (1999g), p. 1; Hannan (2004), p. 1; CBOS (2006f), pp. 2–3; Puhl (2007).

gular importance. We highly value the Vatican's work in promoting the cause of reconciliation, peace and friendly coexistence among nations."¹¹⁷

The Catholic Church fiercely opposes, for example, abortion and so do some key politicians. It is a question of core values and reified habituation that seems to be deeply inherent in the Polish identity structure as can be noticed, for example, in Pope John Paul II's message that "The nation who kills its own children is the nation without the future."¹¹⁸ The same message was expressed by Roman Giertych, the deputy Prime Minister of Jarosław Kaczyński's Government, during an unofficial conference of European Ministers of Education in Heidelberg, in March 2007, when he stated that "Europe was founded on the basis of Christianity, Greek culture and Roman law." According to Giertych, it is not possible to build Europe without common European values. The sovereignty of nations, the right to life of unborn children and the traditional family (based on marriage as a union between a man and a woman) as the basic unit of society, are the foundations of the common European values, which should at least be debated in European context, according to Giertych.¹¹⁹

During the Second Republic, the Catholic Church was the "*State Church*", which maintained close ties with the authoritarian Piłsudski regime, and the regime used this as a political instrument for extending Polish hegemony over national minorities in the Polish heartland as well as in the *Kresy* areas. Owing to the Church's politicized nature, it experienced a loss of support during the 1920s and 1930s. However, during the Cold War, the Catholic Church and the Christian religion not only survived Stalinism in Poland, but even became a major political force during the late phases of the Communist regime.¹²⁰ This was possible largely due to the Nazi terror during WWII, because even though it decimated the Church leadership, it also forced the remaining junior clergy (the rank-and-file "soldiers of Christ") to learn underground, activist methods to resist German occupation with the western-orientated Polish Home Army.¹²¹

The Church survived the German occupation as a popular "*Activist Church*". And even though the post-WWII Communist terror took the landed property of the Church away and threatened its overall existence,

¹¹⁷ Kwaśniewski (1996).

¹¹⁸ Nowicka (1997), p. 2. See also Hannan (2004), p. 6. Pope John Paul II (Polish Bishop Karol Wojtyła) was elected as Pope in October 1978.

¹¹⁹ Szczęch (2007). See also the Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2006). In his exposé, Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński strongly defended the values and moral code of the family and marriage as a union of a man and a woman.

¹²⁰ Paden (2003), p. 28. Religion is understood here as an expression of collective values, rather than as an expression of divine revelation.

¹²¹ Osa (1989), p. 287.

the Church managed to reconstitute a formal two-tiered organizational structure. This structure consisted of a higher leadership, which was able to bargain and compromise strategically with the state, and a politically and socially active lower hierarchy, which could, for example, affirm the peasants' rights of ownership, sponsor various literary and intellectual publications as well as support factory workers' demands for decent housing and living conditions.¹²²

The source of Catholicism's constitutive strength in Poland ("Polish exceptionalism", or "the peculiarity of Poland") rests on the historical and social roots of weak state power and on a vivid political culture (the three Partitions of Poland and the *Liberum Veto*) as well as on 1000 years of Catholic history in Poland. The Catholic Church became the natural carrier of national identity with the simultaneous creation of the Christian State and the conversion of Poles to Christianity in A.D. 966 by one of the first monarchs in Europe, King Mieszko I. This "Polish exceptionalism" has been considered as both the cause and result of the "failure of totalitarianism" and communism in Poland.¹²³

In communist Poland, the Roman Catholic Church was the only institution whose opinions and views, independent of the state, could be manifested publicly. By the early 1980s, the Polish Catholic Church was already on the offensive against the state, but it was openly activated in 1988 and 1989 to support the struggle of the Solidarity-movement in its societal democratizing efforts. During the 1989 "refolution", and even before it, the Catholic Church became an "Activist Church" again. People gathered in the churches, where political sermons were made against the socialist system, and in the 1995 Presidential election, the Polish Catholic Church openly supported President Lech Wałęsa.¹²⁴

Since the collapse of the communist regime it has been noticed, however, that when touching societal matters, such as abortion and the Presidential elections, the Catholic Church has lost its support, even though most of the Catholic Poles are believers and follow the teachings of the Church. Before 1989, most Poles wanted to preserve or increase the Church's influence on

¹²² Ibid., pp. 268–269 and p. 284 and pp. 297–299. See also Boss (1996), p. 2. One of the most capable bargainers with the state was Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński (1901–1981). Some say his resistance to communism in Poland saved the Polish Church and probably even the Polish national identity. One of his sermons, in 1972, proposed commemorating the soldiers of the 1st Division of Polish Grenadiers who fought in France in 1940, describing these grenadiers as having been morally righteous and loyal to the homeland when recruited into the British army during WWII.

¹²³ Osa (1989), pp. 270–276.

¹²⁴ Ash (1989), p. 100; Osa (1989), p. 273; Lang (1994), p. 19; Kornacki (1995), pp. 20–21; CBOS (1999d), p. 3.

political affairs, but, for example, in May 1999, 35% of Poles thought the political influence of the Church should be weaker, or ‘definitely weaker’ (26%).¹²⁵ However, an opinion poll conducted by the CBOS (*Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej*; Public Opinion Research Center) in May 2006 shows that 95% of Poles “describe themselves as believers” and that 63% of Poles do not only believe, but also follow the teachings of the Catholic Church. Thus, there is good reason to believe that Poles have become more ‘spiritualized’ between 1999 and 2006. But this picture is somewhat ‘blurred’ by the fact that an opinion poll, conducted in June 2006 by the CBOS, shows that 70% of Poles held the family as the most important constitutive factor in their life (67% valued their own and their family’s health as the most important), whereas faith in God occupied ‘only’ fifth place with 40% share of the respondents’ answers.¹²⁶ However, those Poles who are faithful to the Catholic Church and religious ontology are persistent in their faith; neither scandals inside the Church nor the EU’s more relativist ontology have had an impact on the faith of such people.¹²⁷

It is often said that the Catholic Church has lost “sight of where religious authority ends and civil government begins.” This was the case when the core values of the EU were debated during the work of the EU’s Legislative Convention in 2003¹²⁸. The SLD-led Government needed all the support it could find for Poland’s EU membership, especially from the Catholic Church. The SLD won the 2001 parliamentary elections on a campaign agenda that included a promise to liberalize the anti-abortion law, but this proved hard to push through because of the opposition of the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church made use of this situation and promised to support Poland’s EU membership, if representatives of the Polish state proposed that God and Christianity (*Invocatio Dei*; Invocation of God) be included as official core values of the envisaged European Constitution. So far, the ‘war’ over the European core values is over, and the union between the Polish state and the Catholic Church lost at least the first battle. However, domestically the Polish Catholic Church was the winner, since it managed to maintain its influence by showing its capability to bargain between the interests of the secular world and the spiritual world.¹²⁹

There is no real need for an “Activist Church” in Poland any longer, but there is a tendency among ultra-conservative Catholics (‘fundamentalists’), mediated by their primary media-channel, *Radio Maryja* (RM), “to expect

¹²⁵ CBOS (1999d), p. 4.

¹²⁶ CBOS (2006f), pp. 2–3; CBOS (2006g), p. 4.

¹²⁷ Müller (2007), p. 2.

¹²⁸ The European Convention (2003), Preface. According to the “*Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe*”, the values of the core values of the EU underline humanism: “equality of persons, freedom, respect for reason.”

¹²⁹ Eberts (2004), pp. 5–7.

the Church to speak in the name of the nation, to provide guidance in all realms of life, and to eliminate the need for individuals to consider theological and political issues themselves.” This does not sound like a tolerant attitude on the Catholic Church’s side. In any event, both supporters and opponents of Poland’s accession to the EU feared that membership would dilute the values traditionally associated with the national and religious identity of Polish society. Anti-integrationists saw the EU as an amoral, secular and even “Orwellian entity” prior to Poland’s EU membership.¹³⁰

Radio Maryja, headed by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk (2008), has its centre in *Toruń* and it claims to have 5,000,000 listeners. The populist message of RM is that “Poland is given away for free”,¹³¹ that is to the rich EU-member countries, and this appeals to a large portion of the Polish people. The other repeated theme of RM and Father Rydzyk is anti-Semitism. Father Rydzyk told his students privately (which the Polish weekly magazine *Wprost* managed to record and publish) in 2007 that the Jews were responsible for the communist-era’s repression. He accused the Jews of using the Holocaust to leverage compensation payments from Poland, saying that “You know that it’s about \$65 billion [to the Jews who] will come to you and say give me your coat, take off your pants, give me your shoes.”¹³²

A similar message was spread publicly by a commentator of RM, Stanisław Michalkiewicz, on 27 March 2006. He attacked Holocaust restitution efforts and questioned, for example, the existence of the Jedwabne and Kielce massacres of Jews by non-Jewish Polish citizens as follows:

*And while we here are occupied with implementing democracy in Ukraine and Belarus, the Judeans are sneaking up from the back, trying to force our government to pay protection money, concealing that fact by calling it a compensation ... As a result of such ‘humbling’ we had Jews making scenes in the Auschwitz concentration camp, the exaggeration about the incident in Jedwabne and now the preparations for the propaganda event in Kielce to commemorate the anniversary of the so-called ‘pogrom’ ... In order to soften the Poles and extort at least \$65 billion on one hand you have to damage our reputation by calling us a nation of killers and on the other make us defenceless against Jewish claims by taming us in the spirit of so-called ‘tolerance’ and ‘dialogue’.*¹³³

¹³⁰ Kosicki (2003), p. 63. See also Ash (1989), p.100.

¹³¹ Eberts (2004), p. 6.

¹³² *Wprost* (2008). See also Eberts (2004), p. 6; Anti-Defamation League (2006); BBC (2007); Polish Radio (2007). Radio Maryja also runs a television channel (*TV Trwam*) and a newspaper (*Nasz Dziennik daily*). See also Lisiewicz (2007), pp. 5–6.

¹³³ European Jewish Congress (2006).

From the Catholic Church's perspective the problem here is not only the anti-Semitic message of Father Rydzyk and RM, but also that RM at the same time spreads accepted teachings of the Catholic Church as well. What should the Church do? The Polish liberal newspaper, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, claims that the Polish Catholic Church, despite officially attacking the message RM is spreading, may simultaneously support the message: the pro-Radio Maryja faction in the Polish Catholic Church may be even stronger than was suspected. Furthermore, this may indicate that the Catholic Church is decentralizing, since RM does not even follow the Papal message of warm dialogue with Judaism. Pope Benedict XVI met Father Rydzyk in August 2007. According to the Papal information service in the Vatican, the "Pope had merely greeted several pilgrims at the audience, Rydzyk among them, and that the meeting was without special significance." However, RM's daily newspaper, *Nasz Dziennik*, printed photographs of the meeting and stated that the Pope blessed *Radio Maryja* and its work.¹³⁴ It is difficult to say then, whether the Holy See is truly against the message RM is spreading or implicitly approves of the message. Using the *critical method*, it can be argued that the Polish State and the Catholic Church may share hidden anti-Semitic sentiments with the Polish nation. *The Polish State and the Catholic Church has agreed on the "elimination of all forms of intolerance and discrimination on religious grounds",¹³⁵ but still the parties allow Father Rydzyk and his RM to spread its anti-Semitic message. I have interpreted this as a sign of the 'hidden anti-Semitic union' between the signatory parties. Thus, it seems that the Holy See and the Polish State implicitly approve of the message of Father Rydzyk and RM; otherwise it would have been 'toned down'. At this point there seems to be no change in the policies of the governments of Jarosław Kaczyński and Donald Tusk; RM or Father Rydzyk has not been 'toned down' by the government of Donald Tusk either.*

Radio Maryja played a decisive role in the Polish Presidential and parliamentary election by supporting Law and Justice (Pis) in 2006, even though later, in 2007, Father Rydzyk accused "Jews of being greedy and the Polish Government of bowing to the Jewish lobby." After the elections the leaders of the PiS, President Lech Kaczyński, and the Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz as well as PiS party officials participated in RM's radio programmes and its 14th anniversary celebrations on 7 December 2006. On 14 July 2007, Jarosław Kaczyński, heading the next Government of the PiS, took part in a pilgrimage of RM's listeners to Jasna Góra, where he explicitly informed 150,000–200,000 pilgrimages about the alliance with RM and Tadeusz Rydzyk by saying "Poland is here" (*"Dzis Polska jest*

¹³⁴ Eberts (2004), p. 6; Polish Radio (2007); Turnau (2007); Fisher (2007).

¹³⁵ *Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Poland* (1993/1998), Preamble.

tutaj”).¹³⁶ Even though Jarosław Kaczyński declared his devotion to Christian values, those values he expressed were peculiar and in the spirit of Father Rydzyk’s teachings, containing dialectical and suppressive arguments:

*If you oppose universal lustration – you are a communist collaborator; if you oppose harsher anti-abortion laws – let alone the penalisation of abortion – you’re a child killer; if you’re worried by the Central Anticorruption Bureau’s omnipotence – you’re a defender of corruption; if you’re critical of Father Rydzyk’s ideology – you’re an enemy of the Church and of the Catholic religion.*¹³⁷

It is true that there is a tendency from the EU’s side to intrude into socio-political structure of member countries, such as the question of the right to an abortion, which the Catholic Church denies: “and life, especially human life, belongs only to God: for this reason whoever attacks human life, in some way attacks God himself.”¹³⁸ So far, at least partial legalization of abortion has been approved in every EU member state except Ireland.¹³⁹ The 4 June 1989 as the symbolic date of the end of Communism in Poland, was a sad day for women’s right to have an abortion, if they so wished. Abortion was legalized in Poland in 1956. Open attacks against abortion were initiated between 1991 and 1992 by Catholic fundamentalist MPs, which resulted in a restrictive *Anti-Abortion Law* in 1993.¹⁴⁰ Even though there was “a grassroot movement” that managed to collect 1,300,000 signatures for a referendum “on abortion so that people themselves could decide whether abortion should be criminalized or not”, Parliament ignored the idea of holding such a referendum. According to the Abortion Law of 1993, “abortion was legal only if a woman’s life and health were threatened, when pregnancy is the result of a crime, or in the cases of severe fetal abnormality.” Abortion is still illegal in Poland even though the Law was liberalized in 1996; it is legal only “on social ground, i.e. when a woman is living a hard life or in a difficult personal situation.”¹⁴¹

¹³⁶ Catholic News Agency (2006); *Polityka* (2007), pp.22–23; Fisher (2007); Michnik (2007b). See also Sakiewicz (2007), p. 2.

¹³⁷ Michnik (2007b). *Lustration* in Jarosław Kaczyński’s usage meant a painful legacy of the communist regime that should be got rid of by lustrating the backgrounds of key officials of Polish society. See also Smith (2007). One of the “lustrated” was Warsaw’s archbishop Stanisław Wielgus, who abruptly resigned at a Mass that was meant to celebrate his nomination to that post two days earlier. He admitted himself that he had worked with Poland’s Communist-era secret police.

¹³⁸ Pope John Paul II (1995a), p. 6.

¹³⁹ Kosicki (2003), p. 66.

¹⁴⁰ See, for example, *Keesing’s Record of World Events* (1996), p. 41381. An abortion law was adopted in Poland on 20 November 1996, which the Polish Catholic Church opposed.

¹⁴¹ Nowicka (1997), p. 1. See also, for example, Murphy (2003). As a consequence of the strict abortion law in Poland, women wishing to have an abortion have managed to

The views of Polish society on abortion have been quite stable. The results of a CBOS opinion poll in August 1997 were similar to the results of September 1996. About half (41%) of the respondents believed that abortion should be allowed with some restrictions or without any restrictions. Furthermore, 63% of the respondents supported the view that there should (definitely, or rather) be a referendum on abortion and that it is society's task to decide this issue, not Parliament's. Ten years after these opinion polls, a significant increase in support for the legalization of abortion can be detected. While in October 2007 Poland was still divided vis-à-vis this issue (47% of Poles were 'pro-legalizers' of abortion and 45% were against it), in June 2008 already 66% of Poles suggested to "leave these [abortion] matters to the individual."¹⁴²

7.3. The Constitution as a 'Primary Official' Identity Expression

*"We, the Polish Nation – all citizens of the Republic, Both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, As well as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from other sources, Equal in rights and obligations towards the common good – Poland, Beholden to our ancestors for their labours, their struggle for independence achieved at great sacrifice, for our culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation and in universal human values, Recalling the best traditions of the First and the Second Republic, Obligated to bequeath to future generations all that is valuable from our over thousand years' heritage."*¹⁴³

The Constitution of Poland (2 April 1997) may be divided into two parts: into an identity-related constitutive part that makes Poland's external relations and actions meaningful and possible as a state agent, as well as a regulative part, concerning the organizing principles of the state and society. My primary interest is the constitutive part, since it gives meaning to the regulative part. Starting from the *constitutive part* of the Constitution, its preamble leaves little room for questions concerning the world view of the Polish State: *A Christian God's ontological supremacy*. However, the Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience and religion, even though the relations between the Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church are mentioned separately stating that those relations "shall be determined by international treaty concluded with the Holy See, and by statute [i.e. the "*Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Poland*", signed on 28 July 1993 and ratified on 23 February 1998]."¹⁴⁴

do so, for example, on a ship ("a floating abortion clinic"), which visited Poland and was organized by the Dutch-based campaign group "Women on Waves".

¹⁴² CBOS (1997c), pp. 3–4; CBOS (2007j), p. 2; CBOS (2008e), p. 3.

¹⁴³ *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland* (1997), Preamble.

¹⁴⁴ *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland* (1997), Articles 25 and 53. See also the *Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Poland*.

The *Invocatio Dei* of the 1997 Constitution is most interesting, since the previous Constitution of Poland, the so-called “Small Constitution” of 17 October 1992, did not include such a preamble.¹⁴⁵ This gives one to understand that the Catholic Church has obtained more political power in Polish society since 1992, as the adoption of a restrictive Abortion Law in 1993 shows as well. Furthermore, *Invocatio Dei* has become a kind of normative ‘trade mark’ of Polishness in the EU-context as well, as I showed in the previous chapter. On the other hand, *Invocatio Dei* may inform us that Polish society has simply become more morally informed, based, for example, on the mystical narrative of Poland as the “Jesus Christ of Nations”,¹⁴⁶ which suffered on behalf of all Christian nations, and thus having a moral mission to spread the message of a Christian God to ‘infidel’ Western Europe.

However, all in all the constitutive part of the Constitution looks rather liberal and pluralist, stressing tolerance, despite the preamble, which stresses the omnipotence of a Christian God. The religion-based ontology of the Polish world view is supplemented by notions of the general duty of every Polish citizen to defend the homeland as a democratic and unitary state, which shall be the common good of all of its citizens, of men and women as equal sexes and of children under the protection of the whole of Polish society and of the Commissioner for Children’s rights especially.¹⁴⁷ This common good is extended to national and ethnic minorities as well, by guaranteeing them the freedom to maintain and develop their own languages, to maintain their customs and traditions and to develop their own cultures as well as giving them the right to establish educational and cultural institutions of their own to protect their own identity.¹⁴⁸

The *regulative part of the Constitution*, consisting of issues like the sharing of power between state institutions, the tasks and composition of the legislative, executive and judicially bodies of the state has already been dealt in Chapter 7.2.1 to a point appropriate for the purposes of this thesis. As an introduction to the next chapter it may be stated that the Constitution of Poland and Poland’s political history together form the basis for Poland’s security policy doctrines and strategies.

¹⁴⁵ *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland* (1992).

¹⁴⁶ Osa (1989), pp. 278–279.

¹⁴⁷ *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland* (1997), Articles 1–3, 72 and 85.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Article 35.

7.4. Security Policy ‘White Books’ as ‘Secondary Official’ Identity Expressions

*“Poland, a nation with a thousand year tradition of statehood, joined western civilization upon receipt of Christianity from Rome. After a half-century interruption, the Polish nation seeks the return of a general civilization orientation towards the West.”*¹⁴⁹

Since the Cold War, Poland has introduced and updated her security policy ‘White Books’ five times (2008). The first post-Cold War security policy White Book was published on 21 July 1990 as *“The Defence Doctrine of the Republic of Poland”*, which was shortly afterwards replaced, on 2 November 1992, by two-part document *“Tenets of the Polish Security Policy”* and *“Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland.”* The third update was made in 2000 when the Poles published two documents, *“Poland’s Security Strategy”* (4 January 2000) and *“Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland”* (23 May 2000).¹⁵⁰ These documents were supplemented in February 2001 by the *“Programme for the Reconstruction and Technical Modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces 2001–2006.”* This document was called a “White Paper”, but I consider it to be merely an administrative strategy paper of the Defence Ministry of Poland, due to its limited focus on the military development programme.¹⁵¹ On 22 July 2003, the Poles updated their national strategy paper for the fourth time with the *“National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland”*.¹⁵²

While the 1990 White Book was still called a doctrine, the 1992, 2000 and 2003 White Books looked like, and were structured like, Western strategies (e.g. *“The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”*).¹⁵³ The latest White Book (5 November 2007) has been named in accordance with its predecessor of 2003, as *“National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland”*.¹⁵⁴

All these doctrines and strategies deal, not only with political, military, economic, environmental and societal threats to the national security of Po-

¹⁴⁹ Ministry of National Defence Press and Information Office (1995), p. 13.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 8–13; Zawistowska (2001), pp. 552–566.

¹⁵¹ Ministry of National Defence (2001).

¹⁵² *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (2003).

¹⁵³ See, for example, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2006). See also Liddell Hart (1991 [1957]), p. 322. In this context, strategy refers to the Western concept of a Grand Strategy.

¹⁵⁴ *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (2007). See also Koziej (2001), p. 421. According to Stanisław Koziej, the 1992 White Book emulated the typical NATO-style, “where supreme state conceptions are known as strategies, and the term “doctrine” refers to the executive sphere, particularly the military one. The concept of a “defence strategy”, introduced for the first time, replaced the heretofore concept of a “defensive strategy”.”

land, but also the issues considered worth defending. All these documents, especially the 1990 “*Defence Doctrine of the Republic of Poland*” and the 1992 “*Principles of Poland’s Security Policy and Poland’s Security Policy and Defence Strategy*”, are focused on politico-military security and especially on elaborating the novel geopolitical situation Poland faced after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union. At that time official treaties concerning Poland’s frontiers and bilateral agreements of friendship were signed between Poland and her ‘new’ neighbours, but at the same time there was a degree of suspicion on Poland’s part towards her ‘new’ neighbours.¹⁵⁵ For example, on 17 June 1991 Poland signed a Treaty of friendship and cooperation with Germany, but little more than a year later the Poles were suddenly informed officially in the 1992 “*Tenets of the Polish Security Policy*” that even though there were no perceived threats “from any of the existing states”, Poland was prepared “to force back an attack from any direction”, meaning then Germany as well.¹⁵⁶

The language of the security policy White Books is largely couched in expressions of belonging to some larger society, the desire to become part of some larger society, or about the desire to create something, for example, communitarianism among European nations. The repeated message (*content analysis*; see Chapter 2.2.6) of Poland’s various White Books is that Poland identifies herself as being part of Europe, the European Union, European civilization or the broader Western community of free nations. The statement concerning Poland’s identification with the Western community of free nations has a close analogy to Finnish “Westernizing” foreign policy narratives after the Cold War. In the Finnish case, the narrative was about Finland coming home “to assure its rightful and natural place in the Western European family”, even though it may have been a question about moving home. Poland has also been narrated as coming home to Western civilization (of which she has always been a part, according to the Poles) after about 50-year period of subordination, even though she might just as well have been ideationally and geographically located between East and West. In any event, what is certain is that Poland wishes to be labelled (geographically) as a Central European state, not an Eastern European one.¹⁵⁷

In the following analysis, the 2007 “*National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*” will be my analytical point of departure, since even though it contains the same elements as the 2000 and 2003 security strategies, it is the latest and updated version, and its content has been presented more systematically than in the earlier versions. I will deal with the 1990

¹⁵⁵ Stefanowicz (1995), p. 58; Prizel (1998), p. 118.

¹⁵⁶ Ministry of National Defence Press and Information Office (1995), p. 11. See also Osica (2003), p. 28.

¹⁵⁷ Browning (2002), p. 47 and p. 49.

Defence Doctrine and 1992 documents as well, but only when they offer something significant vis-à-vis Polish national and defence identity. What is common to the strategies of 2000, 2003 and 2007 is that they all stress a wider concept of security than merely its military and national dimension. They also include at least references to a more reflective attitude towards the development of security issues in both a global and regional context.

7.4.1. World View and Fundamental Goals

“The ‘Solidarity’ movement invoking Christian values, which formed European civilization and the idea of sovereignty of nations and independence of states, changed the face of Europe.”¹⁵⁸

The Argumentation of Polish security strategies has been formed around the fundamental goals of the nation. The argumentation also consists of references to universal and regional world views. The introduction of the 2007 *“National Security Strategy”* can be considered as an expression of the overall Polish world view, analogous to the preamble of Poland’s 1997 Constitution. Christian values, Christianity and God comprise the essential and universal elements of the Polish world view. These are essential parts of the repeated message, expressed in both the 1992 and in 2007 White Books, not forgetting the preamble of the Constitution of Poland.¹⁵⁹

Regionally Poland considers herself as a safe country and that her security is the result of the “profound geopolitical transformations that swept across Europe at the end of twentieth century.” Poland stresses that she managed to seize the short moment in the late 1990s before she campaigned for NATO membership in 1999. EU membership in 2004 made Poland fully integrated in the “Western community of free nations.” Already in 1989, however, Poland faced with the prospect of winning her freedom initiated the process of developing the Polish nation in civilizational terms and becoming a full participant in the European and global international community. However, Poland’s current safer security environment is not the end of history, but offers new challenges as well: “like the lives of individual people nothing should be taken for granted [and] international order is not a frozen, rigid form.”¹⁶⁰ Poland, in addition to wanting essentially to safeguard her own national well-being and security, also wants “to contribute to the preservation of common values and the cooperation mechanism within the European Union framework, in the Euroatlantic area and on a

¹⁵⁸ *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (2007), Introduction.

¹⁵⁹ Ministry of National Defence Press and Information Office (1995), p. 13; *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland* (1997), Preamble; *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (2007), Introduction.

¹⁶⁰ *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (2007), Introduction.

global scale to guarantee lasting global security.” In this regard, the EU has broadened Poland’s national interests by giving rise “to the need to consolidate the national and European identity of Poland and its citizens in a united Europe ... based on respecting common democratic and social values.”¹⁶¹

The fundamental goals (interests) of a nation do not change, or if they do they change very slowly. Analogously to the 1997 Constitution of Poland, the 2007 White Book presents the fundamental goals of the Polish nation as follows: “protecting independence, territorial inviolability, freedom, security, respect for human and civil rights as well as the preservation of the national heritage and protection of the natural environment in conditions of sustainable development.” Poland’s national interests have been divided into three categories in the 2007 White Book, namely, vital, important and significant. *The vital interests* of Poland consist of guaranteeing the survival of the state and its citizens, state independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of state borders, and ensuring the citizens’ security, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as consolidating the democratic political order. *The important national interests* are guaranteeing that Poland develops civilizationally and economically and to create conditions for a more prosperous society, the development of science and technology as well as the protection of Poland’s national heritage, identity and natural environment. Poland’s *significant interests* are those that have not been mentioned in the categories of vital or important interests, such as, “international relations based on respect for law and effective multilateral cooperation in line with the goals and principles laid down in the UN Charter.”¹⁶²

7.4.2. Instrumental Goals

Since 1992 Poland’s official instrumental goal has been membership of NATO, the WEU and the EU (EC). In 1992 Poland did not consider EU membership simply in terms of economic rapprochement with Western Europe, but as an enabler for Polish participation in a common Western security architecture as well, meaning the WEU and NATO.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (2007), pp. 4–5.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁶³ Ministry of National Defence Press and Information Office (1995), pp. 8–12. See also: Western European Union (1948), Article V, and Western European Union (1954), Article V. The member states of the WEU were obliged, according to article V of the WEU’s founding act (*Brussels Treaty*) and according to article V of the *Modified Brussels Treaty*, to defend a member state that was under attack by all available military and other means. The defence obligation was more binding than that of NATO’s. The WEU

As Poland has secured her instrumental goals (integration in the EU, (WEU), NATO, OECD and WTO), she has widened her security scope geographically and recognizes explicitly that her security is affected primarily by processes and developments occurring not only regionally but also globally (terrorism, the worsening security situation in the Middle East, African wars and HIV/AIDS epidemics, the growing rivalry for energy, and global climate change). EU membership increases Poland's opportunities to create favourable conditions for her economic development and "civilizational progress." Together with EU- and NATO membership, and due to Poland's close relations with the USA, it is possible for Poland to affect the *divide et impera* politics of the Russian Federation. I will deal with the Russian aspect in Poland's identity construction later more thoroughly, but the 2007 White Book clearly states that, "*The Russian Federation, taking advantage of rising energy prices, has been attempting intensively to reinforce its position on a supraregional level. Russia's efforts to establish closer contacts with selected Western countries [Germany] go hand in hand with the imposition of selective restrictions on and discrimination towards some NATO and EU members [Poland].*"¹⁶⁴

Despite emphasizing the importance of the global security environment, it is still imperative for Poland to maintain good neighbourly relations with Lithuania, Russia (but on equal terms), the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and especially Ukraine. Poland implicitly refers to Ukraine when advocating further enlargement of the EU. Poland is also looking forward to Belarus's democratic transformation and wishes that eventually Belarus will be linked with the community of the Western world. Good relations with Germany has also been mentioned as being essential for Poland even though the 1992 White Book mentioned that Poland was prepared "to force back an attack from any directions."¹⁶⁵ The same 1992 White Book also states, however, that there is a chance of a historical reconciliation; "*The prejudices rooted in the traditional system of thought must be overcome. This is not only a challenge for both states, but for both nations, as well.*"¹⁶⁶ Poland also intends to tighten regional, multilateral cooperation in the framework of the *Weimar Triangle* (Poland, France and Germany) and the *Visegrad Group*.¹⁶⁷

was called "a paper tiger" due to its lack of true military capabilities, but despite this membership of the WEU was considered worthwhile.

¹⁶⁴ *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (2007), pp. 6–7. See also: Gazdag (1997), p. 20.

¹⁶⁵ Ministry of National Defence Press and Information Office (1995), p. 11. See also Osica (2003), p. 28.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁶⁷ *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (2007), pp. 12–13. See also Vukadinović (1990), p. 6 and Smoke (ed.) (1996), p. 100. Poland, Czechoslovakia (currently the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and Hungary concluded so-called *Visegrad Agreement* in the city of Visegrad, in Hungary, on 15 February 1991. The purpose of

On a macro-level, the national security of Poland is based on the principles of international law, UN collective security and OSCE's cooperative security, as well as on other international agreements. Even though Poland had already recognized the UN and the UN Charter as important elements of the global order in its 1990 Defence Doctrine,¹⁶⁸ the UN occupies only minor role in the 2007 Security Strategy paper; Poland still officially considers NATO and the USA as the main guarantors of her fundamental goals. In this regard, Poland seems to be disappointed, or frustrated, with the UN's ineffective decision making, but "Efforts are made to adapt the UN to the changing international situation and to new challenges."¹⁶⁹

7.4.3. Means

Means have been understood here as the functional system of foreign policy, defence policy and other policies that can be functional only if the executive subsystems are effective and functional. These executive subsystems "comprise forces and resources controlled by government ministers, central government agencies, *Voivodes* [provinces], local government authorities and other entities responsible under law for national security." The Constitution of Poland has been dealt with earlier, mainly as an official Polish identity expression, but it gives guidance on the mutual relationship between the legislative, executive and judiciary branches of the state as well (see Chapter 7.3). Poland occupies explicitly "A comprehensive vision of security", meaning that even though foreign and defence policies have priority in Polish security discourse, other executive subsystems (e.g. home affairs and the economy) have a significant role in promoting foreign and defence policy interests in global and regional contexts as well.¹⁷⁰ However, I have left the other executive subsystems out of this thesis, since they refer primarily to the organizing principles of the state, not to Polish identity discourses.

agreement was to strengthen mutual economic ties, coordinate and strengthen relations with European organizations and institutions, international organizations and foreign powers as well as increase mutual cooperation upon security issues. After the ratification of the *Visegrad Agreement*, the original signatories of agreement were called the Visegrad Triangle, which was replaced by the Visegrad Group after the disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 1993. See also *Wspólna deklaracja ministrów spraw zagranicznych Polski, Francji i Niemiec* [Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Poland, France and Germany] (1993). The Weimar Triangle was formed in Weimar in 1991 and at Bergerac in 1992 to deepen co-operation between Poland, France and Germany.

¹⁶⁸ Zawistowska (2001), pp. 552–553. Małgorzata Zawistowska sums up the 1990 Defence Doctrine in a nutshell.

¹⁶⁹ *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (2007), pp. 12–13.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 20 and p. 22.

Foreign policy

Realists may say foreign policy is essentially focused on promoting one's material and security interests around the world. Structuralists may say that to explain how countries behave, one needs to evaluate their place within the international system. Both views are relevant in the Polish case for at least two reasons. First, Poland has Polish interests to be defended and promoted, whereas other states defend and promote theirs. Second, given the distribution of power in the world today, Poland can only make an impact if she works together with her allies and friends bilaterally, or within the various frameworks of the EU, NATO and the UN. This means that Poland has to be active in the EU in order to be able to promote her own interests on issues like the "control of foreigners entering Poland's territory and the Schengen area", as well as on issues like the common European energy policy and common principles vis-à-vis the relations with Russia.¹⁷¹

But this is not the whole story. The Realist and Structuralist accounts omit one crucial factor, namely, the impact of identity on foreign and defence policy. For what a state, like Poland, does in various international contexts is also a function of her identity – of how she defines herself and the values she seeks to promote abroad. In this respect it may be said that foreign policy is also a means to express one's identity, a means to affect the identity structures of other actors, as well as a means to construct and enhance larger collective identity structures, such as a collective European identity.

Defence policy

The 1992 White Book was highly *defensive* in nature. Poland announced that the Polish Armed Forces, as a precondition of Poland's security, will be kept in constant readiness to guarantee Poland's sovereignty, independence and peace. The armed forces were also to be kept in constant readiness to take part in multinational operations. It was also stressed that Poland would not refuse to receive political or material assistance from other states if needed "in the event of local conflict". The war time strategy of the Polish Armed Forces was to delay any invader for as long as possible in order to gain time for a response by other states and international organizations.¹⁷²

The defensive tone of the 1992 White Book was changed in the 2007 White Book with the arrival of the concept of *pro-active defence*, due to Poland's accession to NATO and the EU and the acceptance of their values (see

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁷² Ministry of National Defence Press and Information Office (1995), pp. 10–11.

Chapter 8); hardly traditional defensive arguments can be found in the 2007 White Book. However, the protection of the Polish borders will still be carried out independently, or as part of a collective defence, “as well as outside of [Poland’s] borders, pursuant to Article [5] of the Washington Treaty.” The transformation of Poland’s armed forces continues in order to ensure its effective operation in times of peace, crisis or war. The need to develop special forces especially vis-à-vis counter-terrorist operations was mentioned separately. The size of the Armed Forces will not be reduced significantly any more. *The 150,000 manning level will be maintained, and their development will lead gradually to professional Armed Forces.* As a result of the plan to change to professional Armed Forces and the reductions of its strength during the last twenty years, Poland has stressed the need to create effective, modern and well equipped National Reserve Forces.¹⁷³

Other policies

Other policies for reaching the fundamental goals of Poland refer the domestic means by which all states try to construct favourable conditions for preserving a coherent national (not necessarily nationalist) identity. Internal societal and political threats weaken the coherence of the state and make it vulnerable to external pressures. An internally weak state possesses a loose national identity, whereas a strong state possesses a more communitarian one. The ‘grand mission’ of domestic policy is then to promote national identity and communitarianism. It is difficult to say whether a particular state is a strong one, but as a point of departure one can argue that a state like Poland, whose population is ethnically one of the most homogeneous in Europe, can be considered a strong state.

In the 2007 White book, domestic means were dealt with extensively. The main reference points consisted of the need to have an efficient public administration to be able to tackle, for example, transborder crimes, modern information technology, the development of judiciary, a balanced and stable economy, a more effective disbursement of EU structural funds,¹⁷⁴ the

¹⁷³ *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (2007), p. 24. See also the Ministry of National Defence (2006). According to the President of Poland, Lech Kaczyński, Poland will have a professional army within a few years (2010-2012). The total strength of the Armed Forces will be 150,000 troops. Of these, 120,000 will be professional and contract soldiers, “while the remaining 30,000 will sign special contracts and after intensive training will go into the reserves making up the national reserve forces.”

¹⁷⁴ See, for example, *Warsaw Voice* (2008c). According to the *Warsaw Voice*, the new Government, headed by Donald Tusk, “has removed a college owned by Tadeusz Rydzyk, the controversial head of the ultra-Catholic Radio Maryja broadcaster, from a list of projects the Ministry of Science and Higher Education recommends for EU subsidies.”

need to guarantee self-sufficiency in food production, social security and family policy, as well as the importance of protecting the Polish national heritage, the development of the national culture and the preservation of national identity (even though it was stated in the document that national identity was not a vital, but only an “important” issue).¹⁷⁵

Poland has tried to promote her societal and political security by speeding up the transformation of her society since the early 1990s, but this ‘*speeding up strategy*’ may be criticized, because it has increased the unemployment level and people’s frustrations, and weakened national cohesion. The Polish Third Republic has tried to create attractive investment markets by renewing and privatizing the nation’s industry. Before Poland joined the EU, she was categorized as an “Economy in Transition”, that is, a country undergoing transformation from a socialist planned economy towards a market economy. This process touched all structures of society and required vast privatization of industry, which caused unemployment, emigration, societal frustration and expansion of crime.¹⁷⁶

The favourite metaphor in mid-1990 was to call the Polish economy “*the soaring eagle of Europe*” expressing Poland’s extraordinary economic development.¹⁷⁷ Entering the EU, in May 2004, gave a boost to the Polish economy. Owing to Poland’s fulfilment of the basic structural changes (via the privatization process) required, whilst simultaneously remaining on a level where her GDP per capita was below 45% of the EU average, Poland has recently been called a “*catch-up economy*.” According to the World Bank, Poland may even need thirty years to catch up with the rest of the EU, even though the Polish economy is growing occasionally about 6% per year.¹⁷⁸

Since the end of the Cold War, Poland has strived to switch over to a free market economy by reducing price controls and industrial subventions, privatizing industry and by the conversion of its military industry. The conversion of its military industry means lowering the production volume and converting parts of this oversized military industry to civilian production (*‘from arms to ploughshares’*). While price controls and industrial subventions were abolished in Poland between 1990 and 1991, the Polish Government simultaneously sold out or gave up the production of tens of enter-

¹⁷⁵ *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (2007), pp. 22–36.

¹⁷⁶ Ministry of National Defence Press and Information Office (1995), p. 17. This ‘*speeding up strategy*’ was seen as increasing the functional ties between Poland and her neighbours, as well as reducing traditional military threats.

¹⁷⁷ Koen (December 2006), p. 1.

¹⁷⁸ OECD (2006), p. 3; Hunter Jr. and Ryan (2005), p. 1; Koen (December 2006), p. 2.

prises in the military industrial sector, except 31 enterprises that were deemed vital to national security.¹⁷⁹

The privatization of industry and the conversion of the military industry caused huge unemployment in Poland. The *unemployment rate* is still one of the highest among the OECD countries, and it has not significantly fallen since Poland's EU membership.¹⁸⁰ At the beginning of the 1990s the high unemployment rate led into dissatisfaction and subsequently to the return to power of the socialists in the 1993 parliamentary elections.¹⁸¹

While Poland has not managed to reduce the unemployment rate, she has succeeded in keeping her *inflation rate* under control. In 1996 the inflation rate was still as high as 19,9%, but, overall, developments in the 1990s have been favourable. In 2004, after Poland's accession to the EU, the inflation rate was 3,5%, falling to 0,4% in 2006 and rising to 3,5% in 2007.¹⁸² However, Poland's *Gross Domestic Product per capita* (GDP/capita), as a third standard economic indicator in addition to the unemployment/employment rate and inflation, was still only \$ 8,190 by the end of 2006, which is about 2,5 times lower than, for example, that of Finland's.¹⁸³ It cannot be said that the subsidies Poland has received from the EU have not had any effect on the Polish economy, but as the high unemployment rate and the low GDP per capita figure show one may agree with the World Bank that the Polish economy may need thirty years to catch up with the rest of the EU.¹⁸⁴

7.5. National and Ethnic Minorities

Unlike many of her Central European neighbours, Poland is ethnically an overwhelmingly homogeneous nation. Of her 38,500,000 population about 95–96,4% are ethnic Poles.¹⁸⁵ The largest national minorities in Poland are Belarusians, Ukrainians and Germans. In 1939 the largest ethnic minority

¹⁷⁹ Polish Institute of International Affairs (1993), pp. 115–122.

¹⁸⁰ OECD (2007), p. 2. In 2004 the unemployment rate was 18,2% and in 2007, 17,7%.

¹⁸¹ Kornacki (1995), p. 3. See also the European Commission (1997b), pp. 20–22.

¹⁸² OECD (2007).

¹⁸³ World Bank (2006). See also the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (1996); the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (1997); European Commission (1997c), pp. 32–33.

¹⁸⁴ European Commission (1997b), p. 10. See also Commission of the European Communities (2002), pp. 12–18. Before EU membership, the EU subsidized Poland and her transition process by so-called *Phare-programme* (Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy) since 1989, *the SAPARD-programme* (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development) since October 2002, and *ISPA-programme* (The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession) since 2000.

¹⁸⁵ Godzimirski (1998), p. 20.

in Poland was the Jewish community, consisting of some 3,500,000 people, whereas the current Jewish community in Poland consists of only about 1,000 individuals.¹⁸⁶

The north-eastern part of Poland, historically one of the poorest regions in the country, borders on Belarus and is home to a *Belarusian national minority* of about 48,000 people, concentrated around their cultural capital, *Białystok*. There are no signs in my sources that the Belarusian minority have been ‘mistreated’ by the Poles, even though the use of the Belarusian language was forbidden during the Communist era. Currently, the Belarusian minority have several newspapers and magazines published in Belarusian, as well as a radio station of their own, *Radio Racja* (Truth).¹⁸⁷

During the communist period, the Polish regime almost denied the existence of a *Ukrainian national minority* in Poland.¹⁸⁸ Half a million Ukrainians were sent to the Soviet Union by mid-1946 and another 120,000–150,000 during *Akcja Wisła* (Operation Vistula; i.e. the military operation against Ukrainians living on Polish territory) in 1947.¹⁸⁹ In turn Poland received more than a million Poles from the border areas incorporated into the Soviet Republics of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus. Despite *Akcja Wisła*, there is still a Ukrainian minority of about 27,000 people living in south-eastern Poland, around towns like *Przemysł*. In August 1990 the Polish Senate passed a resolution that officially condemned *Akcja Wisła*.¹⁹⁰ This was a clear message of ethnic tolerance, which was confirmed by the new Polish Constitution of 1997 which guaranteed Poland’s national and ethnic minorities the right to have their own language, religion and cultural values.¹⁹¹

A *German national minority* of about 147,000 people populate mainly what used to be the eastern regions of Germany, areas such as Silesia (in Polish *Śląsk*), Pomerania (in Polish *Pomorze*), as well as East-Prussia (in Polish *Mazur*).¹⁹² Up to 7,000,000 Germans either fled or were deported from these areas after WWII.¹⁹³ However, the Silesian town of *Opole* (see Picture 16) was treated differently; many of the Germans living there were allowed to stay. Currently *Opole* is a centre of German national sentiment.

¹⁸⁶ Lang (1994), p. 24; Godzimirski (1998), p. 20; Nieuwsma (1999), p. 3; Segel (2002), p. 1 and 16. See also Ministry of Interior and Administration (2008).

¹⁸⁷ Segel (2002), p. 1. See also Ministry of Interior and Administration (2008).

¹⁸⁸ Prizel (1998), p. 99.

¹⁸⁹ See, for example, *The Ukrainian Weekly* (2002).

¹⁹⁰ Gross (2007), p. 22; Nieuwsma (1999), pp. 2–3.

¹⁹¹ *Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (1997), Artikuł 35 [Article 35]. See also Ministry of Interior and Administration (2008).

¹⁹² Kornacki (1995), p. 10; Nieuwsma (1999), p. 1.

¹⁹³ Gross (2007), p. 22.

The German minority has the right to be represented in the Polish Parliament and its special status was guaranteed even before the adoption of the 1997 Constitution. In December 1989, during the visit of the German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl to Poland, the Government of Poland recognized that Polish Germans should be considered as Polish citizens of German origin. Poland and Germany also signed an agreement on good neighbourly relations on 17 June 1991, according to which Polish citizens of German ethnicity (by virtue of their native language or birth) have the right to choose their own cultural identity.¹⁹⁴

However, Poland does not allow the German minority officially to use the former German names of their areas. On the other hand, these agreements have not restrained the demands of Poland's German minority for larger autonomous rights. Especially, the German minority in the Opole region has demanded recognition of its local autonomy as well as the possibility to have German and Polish dual citizenship. Furthermore, the authorities in Opole have received hundreds of requests from expelled Germans and their descendents who are intent on getting back their previous properties in Poland. This has mobilized an identity discourse in Poland, including, for example, the view that the "Germans should first return the lives of the six million murdered people."¹⁹⁵

Public opinion on national and ethnic minorities

General opinion on national and ethnic minorities in Poland is probably shaped by the media and habituated stereotypes, rather than by personal contacts with representatives of these communities. However, of all the minorities the Germans were the most liked in September 1999 (by 32% of the Poles), whereas Ukrainians were the least liked (by 19% of the Poles). The Belarusians received a favourable 'ranking' of 28%. Even though the Jewish community in Poland is very small, and only a few Poles have had personal contacts with Jews, they were the most disliked community, at least in September 1999, holding the same position as gypsies (favoured by 16% of the Poles).¹⁹⁶

The tolerance that Poles have showed towards their Ukrainian, Belarusian and German minorities during the post-Cold War era has come too late for the Jews, and even though there is now only a small community of 1,000

¹⁹⁴ *Traktat między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Republiką Federalną Niemiec o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy* (1991), Artikuł 20 [Article 20]; Kornacki (1995), p. 10; Ministry of Interior and Administration (2008).

¹⁹⁵ Kornacki (1995), p. 10; Nieuwsma (1999), p. 2.

¹⁹⁶ CBOS (1999f), p. 2. See also CBOS (2000c), p. 3. In July 2000 as much as 70% of the Poles said that they have not had personal contacts with Jews.

Jews in Poland, there are signs that anti-Semitism is still haunting Polish society. One example of this is the dispute between the organizers of Cracow's annual Jewish festival and the city council, "with some expressing displeasure that the city provides money to support a Jewish festival when it should be supporting a "Polish" one instead." Another example, more illuminating perhaps, relates to Pope John Paul II's visit to Poland shortly after he was elected as a Pope in 1978. He gave a mass at Auschwitz-Birkenau (*Oświęcim-Brzezinka*) to commemorate 153 Polish political prisoners killed by the Germans there in 1941. To mark the event, a wooden cross was erected in a gravel heap on the field outside the camp where the murders were committed. The cross attracted criticism from Jews, who pointed out that "Jewish law prohibits Jews from praying near non-Jewish religious symbols." They also argued that the ban on religious symbols should even be extended to the area surrounding the camp. A large proportion of Poles were ready to remove the Papal cross, but one Catholic Polish fanatic called on other Poles to plant more crosses "to protect the Papal cross, and now a swarm of smaller crosses surround it."¹⁹⁷

7.6. Conclusions

By leaning on Polish (mostly) academic and societal discourse, at least three Polish grand narratives, inherited from the past that constitute Polishness can be identified: Poland as a "Christian bulwark of Christendom" (*'Antemurale Christianitatis'*), 'Poland as a saviour of the West' (*'The miracle of the Vistula'*), as well as 'Poland as betrayed by the West and 'mistreated' by the Soviet Union/Russia and Germany' (*'Between East and West – the Katyń Forest, Warsaw Uprising, and the betrayal of Yalta'*). The fourth narrative, 'Poland as a haven of religious tolerance' seems to be only a myth. While Poland might have been a religious haven, especially for the Jews during the First Republic (1569–1795), it was also during the First Republic that the Catholic Church seized a monopoly in religious affairs. Intolerance towards the Jews reached its peak during and shortly after WWII. That's why I have named the fourth narrative as '*Polish anti-Semitism*'.

Common elements of these narratives are (1) the Catholic religion, (2) Poland's geographic location, and (3) the external borders of Otherness towards Russia and Germany. Christian values, Christianity and God probably comprise the most constitutive elements of the Polish world view. By leaning on *content analysis*, these have been identified as being the most

¹⁹⁷ Nieuwsma (1999), pp. 3–4. See also CBOS (1998c), p. 3. In September 1998, 27% of the Poles thought that the crosses, which are already there should stay, but that new ones should not be added, whereas 35% of the Poles thought that only the so-called papal-cross should remain and that the other ones should be removed.

essential parts of the repeated messages of Polish ‘sub-identity holders’, expressed in both 1992 and in 2007 White Books, not forgetting the Constitution of Poland either.

Three ‘sub-identity holders’ can be identified as carriers of the Polish narrative legacy: the Polish State itself, the Armed Forces of Poland and the Polish Catholic Church. It can be argued that none of them are striving to challenge discursively the current status quo of Polish society, but it can be argued that the Polish State and the Catholic Church may implicitly share hidden anti-Semitic sentiments with the Polish nation. According to the *Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Poland*, both signatory parties have agreed on eliminating all forms of intolerance and discrimination on religious grounds. Nevertheless they still allow the Catholic Father, Tadeusz Rydzyk and his Radio Maryja to spread anti-Semitic views, which I have interpreted as a sign of a ‘hidden anti-Semitic union’ between the parties. The post-Cold War Polish State has also explicitly tried to suppress any public treatment of anti-Semitism in Polish society, until Jan Gross published his monograph, *Neighbors*, in 2001. Gross revealed that the mass-murder of the Jewish population of the Polish village of Jedwabne in 1941 was conducted by Poles, not Germans as the prevailing ‘official truth’ had claimed. This provoked fierce debate in Poland, which has continued ever since.

The Armed Forces of Poland represents here a more ‘quiet’, but proud and respected ‘sub-identity holder’. It is a ‘symbolic discussant’, whose annual parades of 15th August and public ceremonial oaths represent a symbolic discourse that reflects the Armed Forces’s traditional identity of being the defender of the country’s territorial, political and cultural integrity.

Of the three Polish ‘sub-identity holders’, *the Catholic Church* is probably the most influential. The Catholicism of Polish society has been described as the centre (spirit/religious identity) of an onion that is only thinly separated from its exterior (body/politics) by layers of fine onionskins, meaning that Catholicism has intruded into every aspect of Polish society. *The Polish State* and Polish political culture has been blamed as being inefficient and unstable (government has changed 15 times during the last 18 years, between 1989 and 2007), whereas the Catholic Church is a more stable institution committed to spreading the *religious world view and Christian religious ontology, which almost all segments of Polish society share*.

Perhaps, in this respect Poland may not be described even as a sovereign state, since even if the Polish State is a *Leviathan* for the Poles, so is the Papal Holy See. *Even though the Polish Catholic Church and Matka Boska of Jasna Góra as “Queen of Poland” have always been there to protect Poles against external intruders and to offer relief during politico-military*

turmoils, it is the Roman Catholic Church that restrains the more relativist individual thinking by discursively leaning on habituation to religious dogmas. This is not to say that Poles are not capable of challenging religious dogmas, but since religious indoctrination is generally part of primary socialization, religious dogmas get reified from generation to generation. However, individually many Poles may display little interest in Catholic or other religious dogmas, and may be tolerant towards other faiths and ontologies, but the apparent impossibility of liberalizing the restrictive Abortion Law and the anti-Semitic discourse of the Polish Catholic Church, as well as of some politicians, inform one about Polish society's lack of tolerance towards alternative world views.

Poland is a 'victim' of her geographic location, which still affects, not only her foreign and defence policy interests and behaviour (geopolitics), but also her national identity structure; geography is the essential element of Polish grand-narratives and also signifies the respected status of the Polish Armed Forces in Polish society. One may argue that geographic location can be narrated away, but even if some emancipated Polish individuals try to do so, the bulk of the Polish nation may not be ready for that due to its habituation into reified past narratives.

The seemingly most distinctive Polish external borders of Otherness concern Russia and Germany (I will come back to that later in Chapter eight), whereas the internal borders of Otherness concern primarily Jews and Germans, even though the Jewish minority in Poland consists of only about 1,000 people, and despite the fact that all Poland's minorities have been guaranteed wide freedoms by the Constitution of Poland. The anti-Semitic atmosphere of Polish society belongs to the 'dark side' of the Polish State, the Catholic Church and the nation, similar to the 'dark sides' of all nations. Nations usually choose to sustain only those narratives or events of the past considered suitable, which is also the case for the Poles. It is usually only outsiders that are able to open the discussion over these 'dark sides' and thereby increase societal tolerance and change the internal borders of Otherness. This was the case with Polish anti-Semitism, when Jan Gross, as an outsider, burst 'the bubble' in 2001.

The Constitution of Poland and Polish security policy White Books, which have been updated five times over the last 17 years, express *the congruent Christian world view shared by the Polish State, the Polish Catholic Church, the Armed Forces of Poland and the Polish nation.* Poland's security policy White Books expressed a wider perspective on security issues, excluding the 1990 "*Defence Doctrine of the Republic of Poland*" which stressed the traditional geopolitico-military perspective. The common and repeated message of all these documents is that *Poland is prepared to defend her territorial integrity, independence and national identity by na-*

tional efforts, alone if necessary, not only by the nation's Armed Forces, but also by the efforts of other sectors of civic society. Poland defends her national interests and values by cooperating actively with NATO, the EU and the UN (crisis management operations as well as political and economic cooperation).

Even though the UN Charter has been mentioned as being an important element in upholding global order, and even though Poland has actively participated in UN-peacekeeping operations since 1973, it is NATO and especially the USA that the Polish State considers as the main guarantor of Poland's fundamental goals. On this issue the Polish Catholic Church has made no particular stand, except vis-à-vis the EU which has offered perhaps unexpected relativist resistance to the Catholic Church's mission to 'bring Christianity back to Europe'. The Armed Forces of Poland goes along with the State on this issue.

8

RECONSTRUCTING POLISH DEFENCE IDENTITY – THE INTERACTIONIST AND NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE

“We need national solidarity. As its basis we must have respect for differences, diversity, and pluralism. As a condition for it we must have concern for the positive development of our nation, for its collective ethos and its spiritual dimensions. The threat that hangs over it consists in hatred for other nations, contempt for other cultures, and a megalomaniac belief in one’s own perfection.”¹

In this chapter I will try to answer the question: *To what extent have contextual interactions changed Polish collective perceptions of Otherness?* This chapter will continue the evaluation of the overall tolerance of Polish national identity, initiated in Chapter 7. While Chapter 7 concentrated on the contents of Polish grand-narratives, the nature of Polish ‘sub-identity holders’, official identity expressions of the Constitution and security policy doctrines, as well as on the internal borders of Otherness, *this chapter also gives a chance to contextual, discursive emancipatory power over the external borders of Otherness* (Chapter 8.4.). Thus, my aim is to clarify whether there has been any truly internalized change in Polish defence identity (learning) during the past twenty years (almost) that the Polish Third Republic has been in interaction with other states in both the NATO- and EU-context, or whether Poland has only adapted her foreign and defence policy interests and behaviour due to social pressure from these contexts.²

8.1. Regional Contexts

8.1.1. NATO-Cooperation

During its Summit between 7 and 8 November 1991, NATO expressed its will to continue dialogue with the Soviet Union and Central European countries to enhance mutual understanding and to strengthen stability in

¹ Auer (2000), p. 239. Stefan Auer quotes here the Polish journalist Adam Michnik.

² It has to be noticed that I am not really dealing with a ‘pure’ interactionist perspective in this chapter, because the thesis is a case study. I do not wish to say that I ignore the impact of Polish defence and foreign policy actions on the international structure completely, but I have to keep them on the sidelines in order to be able to focus more clearly on ‘my case’ and keep the length of the thesis in check as well.

Europe.³ The decision about NATO's Eastern enlargement was made at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 10–11 January 1994. The heads of states of the NATO member countries characterized this decision as an evolutionary process, during which the general security development of Europe would be taken into account.⁴

In September 1995 NATO published its so-called “Why and How” research paper (*Study on NATO Enlargement*), according to which a unique opportunity for improving and developing the security architecture of the whole Euro-Atlantic area had been opened.⁵ According to NATO, the decision about enlargement to the east would enhance the Euro-Atlantic security architecture⁶ as well as the freedom and security of NATO member countries by enhancing the *transparency* of defence planning, good neighbourly relations and by supporting the continuity of democratic reforms as well as democratic control over the armed forces.⁷

In its “Why and How” research paper, NATO presented the political and military criteria which an applicant country must meet before gaining NATO membership. *The political criteria for applicant countries* were: (1) commitment to the norms and principles of the OSCE, (2) peaceful resolution of possible disputes related to ethnic problems as well as state borders, (3) the applicant should prove that it was a stable democracy and respectful of societal justice, (4) the applicant should prove that it was taking responsibility for environmental protection, (5) approval of all those principals and procedures of the Alliance that were in force at the moment when the applicant was approved as a member, and (6) civilian control over the armed forces. The new member country was also expected to establish a

³ NATO (1995a), p. 235. See also the Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2003). In their common statement on 30 January 2003, the Prime Ministers of Spain, Portugal, Italy, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Poland (Leszek Miller) and Denmark, expressed their commitment to the USA's Iraq policy by starting the communiqué with the words: “*The real bondage between the United States and Europe is the values we share: democracy, individual freedom, human rights and the Rule of Law. These values crossed the Atlantic with those who sailed from Europe to help create the USA. Today they are under greater threat than ever.*”

⁴ NATO (1995a), pp. 235–272.

⁵ NATO (1995b), Chapter 1, Paragraph 1. According to NATO, the Euro-Atlantic security architecture consists of European organizations and institutions, such as the EU, (the WEU; Western European Union), the OSCE and the Transatlantic body, NATO.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Chapter 2, Paragraph 12.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Chapter 1, Paragraph 3. See also Voigt (1996). In December 1995 the Foreign Ministers of the NATO member countries decided that the NATO-enlargement process would consist of three phases: (1) bilateral negotiations with the applicant *Partnership for Peace* -partners (PfP-partners), (2) negotiations upon guaranteeing the efficiency of the Alliance even in the future, and (3) enhancing the PfP-programme by helping the applicant countries to understand the responsibility of full membership of the Alliance as well as strengthening cooperation with other PfP-countries.

permanent representation at NATO headquarters as well as at other appropriate headquarters of NATO. Furthermore, the new member was expected to participate in the Alliance's common budgets and in the exchange of intelligence information.⁸

Militarily, a new member country was supposed to be ready to share the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits and commitments of common security. Its armed forces should correspond to NATO standards. New members should also try to reach *interoperability* vis-à-vis weapon- and signal-systems. At the minimum, the new member country should approve of NATO's doctrine and try to reach a sufficient level in military training and arms systems. For improving the interoperability of its arm systems, NATO recommended that the applicant country choose some of its best military units as core units to be developed more extensively than the others. However, NATO stressed that it was the responsibility of the applicant country to fund and develop the expected level of interoperability by itself. Furthermore, this process should be conducted as fast as possible.⁹ The *PfP-programme* (initiated in 1994) was a channel to promote interoperability by familiarizing the applicant countries with modern arms- as well as command and control systems. New applicant countries could also prepare themselves for membership through deepening their *Individual Partnership Programmes* (IPP).¹⁰

NATO took into account the negative attitude of the Russian Federation vis-à-vis the enlargement process, but stressed at the same time that the Russian Federation did not have any authority over the decisions of other countries concerning their security decisions. On 20 March 1996 the secretary general of NATO, Javier Solana, paid a visit to Moscow during which he announced that NATO aimed to commence enlargement to the east regardless of Russian opposition. At the same time, Solana stated that new members would be granted full membership of the Alliance: "And I think everybody will agree that the right for true self determination, the right for each country freely to choose its alignments, is the very foundation on which the new Europe will be based."¹¹ These statements by Javier Solana put an end to speculation concerning NATO enlargement. However, Russia's fierce resistance towards NATO's eastern enlargement was 'softened down' by regulating NATO-Russia relations by the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation",¹² signed in Paris on 27 May 1997.¹³

⁸ NATO (1995b), Chapter 5, Paragraph 68–72.

⁹ Ibid., Chapter 5, Paragraph 73–78.

¹⁰ Ibid., Chapter 3, Paragraph 38–41.

¹¹ Solana (1996).

¹² NATO (2002a), Paragraph 3.

¹³ Kuźniar (2001b), p. 82; Menkiszak (2001), p. 163.

As part of the Alliance's vision, the purpose of NATO from 2002 on was to "strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, and help to achieve our common goal of a Europe whole and free, united in peace and by common values." NATO membership, it was decided, would remain open to European democracies in the future as well. The most important impetus to the renewal of NATO was perhaps the events of 11 September 2001. NATO decided to strengthen its ability "to meet challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come."¹⁴

In order to carry out the full range of missions, NATO decided to create a NATO Response Force (NRF) consisting of a "technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed." It was also decided that the NRF-concept will go hand in hand with the EU's *Headline Goal* (see next chapter), mutually reinforcing each other, and respecting the autonomy of both organizations. The other modification of NATO concerned the rationalization of the military command structures, and approving the *Prague Capabilities Commitment* (PCC) as part of the alliance's effort to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern warfare.¹⁵

8.1.2 European Integration and the CFSP

The European Union was established by the "*Treaty on European Union*" (*Maastricht Treaty*), on 7 February 1992 (entry into force: 1 November 1993).¹⁶ Since then European integration has had two fundamental characteristics: EU enlargement has been a continuous process and integration has continuously deepened and spread functionally into new areas (spill over - effect), such as the CFSP (look Chapter 3.1.1).

A political decision on the EU's eastern enlargement was made already in 1993 during the EU's Copenhagen Summit. According to the final communiqué of the Summit, an applicant country was eligible to join the EU as soon as it was able to meet the economic and political requirements of the Union.¹⁷ *The political requirements* consisted of: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. *The economic requirements* were: the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Applicants were also expected to be able to adopt the EU's effective regulations (*acquis commun-*

¹⁴ NATO (2002b). See also NATO (1999).

¹⁵ NATO (2002b).

¹⁶ European Union (1992).

¹⁷ Kosterna (1998), p. 32.

autaire).¹⁸ The fourth, but less visible criterion was that the EU itself should be capable of accommodating its functions to an enlarged Union.¹⁹

By the *Nice Treaty* on 26 February 2001 (entry into force: 1 February 2003),²⁰ the EU constructed the necessary institutional changes for future EU-enlargement. The European Council set up a Convention for preparing the work on simplifying the EU basic treaties in December 2001 at the Laeken Summit. The Convention presented its work, the “*Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe*”, to the European Council in Thessaloniki on 20 July 2003. The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) adopted the draft treaty,²¹ with modifications (i.e. “*Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe*”; *Constitutional Treaty*), in Rome on 29 October 2004, but it never came into effect, since the Netherlands and France rejected it in their referendums.²²

The already rejected *Constitutional Treaty* were taken ‘onto table’ again in 2007. After the long and difficult negotiations especially over the issue of the weight of the member states’ qualified majority votes in the Council of Ministers, the agreement was reached on 3 December 2007. The Conference of the representatives of the governments of the member states signed so-called “*Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community*” (*Treaty of Lisbon*). However, on 12 June 2008 Ireland voted against the Treaty.²³

The *Maastricht Treaty* had already included a vision of the CFSP, which “shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.”²⁴ This vision was updated by the *Amsterdam*

¹⁸ European Commission (1997c), p. 14.

¹⁹ Commission of the European Communities (2002), p. 19 and p. 33. See also Kosterna (1998), pp. 32–33.

²⁰ European Union (2001).

²¹ The European Convention (2003).

²² European Union (2004). The modified draft Constitution included the following amendments to be included into the ESDP: (1) *A solidarity clause*, meaning the use of all military and other resources of the EU Member States in the case of a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disasters (Article I-43); (2) The establishment of the *European Defence Agency* (EDA; Article I-41); (3) *Structural cooperation*, meaning that the militarily most capable Member States could tighten their mutual cooperation in this field (Article I-41); and (4) *The obligation to assist other Member States under armed aggression* on their territory by all the means in their power (Article I-41).

²³ Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2007); European Commission (2008).

²⁴ European Union (1992), Title V, Article J.4.

Treaty on 2 October 1997 (entry into force: 1 May 1999).²⁵ A Comprehensive European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was amended into the CFSP. The European Security and Defence Policy was shaped by the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the *Amsterdam Treaty*,²⁶ “which shifted the focus from the development of ‘common defence’ towards ‘international crisis management’, and then with establishment of a civilian crisis-management component in parallel to the military one.”²⁷

Following a Franco-British agreement, in December 1998, in Saint Malo, the EU decided gradually to enhance its crisis management capability further.²⁸ At its Cologne Summit, in June 1999, the EU decided to create crisis management capabilities of its own, including the necessary decision-making and planning systems. At the same time it was decided to reduce the WEU as an independent organization by the end of 2000 and transfer its functions to the EU, excluding the security guarantees of article V of the WEU’s *Modified Brussels Treaty*.²⁹

In December 1999, the Helsinki Summit of the European Council set a general goal (so-called *Headline Goal*) to gather a 60,000 strong crisis management pool of forces by the year 2003 for fulfilling, if necessary, all the Petersberg tasks. According to this plan, the goal was to be able to launch a military operation and begin the implementation of a mission on the ground within 60 days, if necessary.³⁰

In addition to the decision to create the necessary institutional changes for future EU-enlargement, the *Nice Treaty* also gave forms to the Political and Security Committee (PSC)³¹ and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC)³² as permanent military structures of the EU. Furthermore, in 2005 the Council of the European Union amended these permanent military

²⁵ European Union (1997).

²⁶ According to the *Amsterdam Treaty*, missions of military crisis management belong to the authority of the EU. See also Ryter (2002), pp. 15–16. Military crisis management meant in this context the so-called Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking), which originally were defined as tasks of the WEU at a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the WEU in Petersberg near Bonn in June 1992.

²⁷ Rieker (2006), p. 512.

²⁸ Assembly of Western European Union (2007). From the Franco-British St. Malo Summit in December 1998 on, the principle of a European Defence Identity (ESDI) has been accepted as a crises management “bridge” between NATO and the EU.

²⁹ Tiilikainen (2001), p. 104.

³⁰ EU News, Policy Positions & EU Actors Online (2007), p. 1. Such an operation should be sustainable for at least one year.

³¹ The Council of the European Union (2001a).

³² The Council of the European Union (2001b).

structures by establishing the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) as a provider of military expertise to EU bodies as directed by the EUMC.³³

The rejection of the *Constitutional Treaty* and the *Treaty of Lisbon* has not marked the end of the EU's efforts to be a significant security provider. The EU's ambitions in the field of security have been expressed further in at least in two other ways: in the European Security Strategy (ESS)³⁴ and in the sequential capability Headline Goals, including the development of the Battlegroup concept.³⁵

By the ESS the EU tried to inform the world of its significance as a responsible global security provider. It was also a normative message to the member states to unite their efforts in the face of the new threats (which were almost analogous to the official threat perceptions of the USA and the NATO) of global terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. The ESS also deals briefly with the need to develop an efficient strategic culture for the EU that would foster "early, rapid and, when necessary, robust intervention." The need for this kind of a strategic culture does not only mean more intense civil-military cooperation within the EU, or in member countries, but also a more flexible strategic culture between the EU and NATO, meaning the so-called "Berlin Plus" arrangement between the EU and NATO, according to which the EU was allowed to use NATO's capabilities for operations in which NATO was not willing to participate.³⁶

The EU Battlegroup concept, as a tool to foster rapid intervention, was actually a realization of the original idea of the Headline Goal set at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. It was noticed that the whole package of the Headline Goal 1999 was too ambiguous and too loose an arrangement for a rapid European response in crisis situations. Instead of the large 60,000 strong force pool, the EU decided to develop an operational first entry-force ('spearhead') consisting of various 1,500 strength Battlegroups (including a land-, maritime- and air-component). The first Battlegroup was gathered around UK, French and German contingents in February 2004. On 22 November 2004, at the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, member states committed themselves to the formation of 13 Battlegroups (2 to be deployable simultaneously).³⁷

³³ The Council of the European Union (2005).

³⁴ European Commission (2003).

³⁵ Rieker (2006), p. 513. See also EU News, Policy Positions & EU Actors Online (2007).

³⁶ European Commission (2003), pp. 1–4 and p. 11.

³⁷ EU News, Policy Positions & EU Actors Online (2007), p. 1. The EU Battlegroup is a rather small force of 1,500 troops (equivalent to one reinforced battalion). One cannot

8.2. International System – ‘Prepare for Self-Help’

The Katyń massacres, the failure of the Polish uprising in 1944 and the fact that even though the Poles participated in Allied war efforts during WWII (participating in such battles as Monte Cassino, Normandy, the Battle of Britain etc.), the West left Poland alone at Yalta. It was bitter to notice for the Poles that the West did not grant Poland ‘victory power’ status as was done with France. Instead of granting Poland ‘victory power’ status, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, participating in the Yalta Conference informed the world that “Poland ...has been a source of trouble for over 500 years.” Poland was not considered of central importance to the international structure by the Western Allies.³⁸

It is a widespread view in Poland that the West should pay debt for letting Poland fall into Soviet hands at Yalta, and after WWII. This is not without historical factual basis, but at the same time Poland’s aggressive behaviour towards her neighbours have been downplayed.³⁹ One could argue that the West has already paid off this historical debt by granting Poland NATO membership in 1999 and EU membership in 2004. Leaving Poland isolated during and after WWII has had its consequences on Polish national identity, as well as on Poland’s foreign and defence policy. I will deal with these issues more thoroughly later, but first I will focus on Russia’s role in Polish defence identity. Russia is perhaps the most essential single factor when trying to understand Poland’s post-Cold War foreign and defence policy preferences and behaviour.

8.2.1. Russia as the ‘Essential Other’

“966 beginning, 1772 Russians entered, 1793 Russians entered, 1795 Russians entered, 1831 Russians left but they entered again, 1863 Russians left but they have entered again, 1918 Russians have left, 1920 Russians entered but left soon, 1939 Russians entered, 1944 Russians entered, 1981 allegedly Russians were about to enter, 1992 Russians say they will leave in a moment, 1993 Russians have left, 1994 Russians say they will come again, 1995 Russians say it is too early for NATO, 1996 Russians have invented the corridor to have a way to enter.”⁴⁰

do much with such a force. Therefore one Battlegroup has to be rotated soon after the beginning of the operation with another, to be withdrawn after the initial entry-operation, or to be reinforced, for example, by other troops from the EU force pool, or from the NATO force pool. A Battlegroup can be formed by one nation, or a group of nations.

³⁸ Prizel (1998), pp. 73–74.

³⁹ Zarycki (2004), p. 614.

⁴⁰ Quoted in Zarycki (2004), p. 608; published originally in *Gazeta Polska* 16 (1996).

Russia represents a seemingly unchanging border of Otherness in Polish national identity construction. Russia has been the driving force in Poland's efforts to integrate herself into Western organizations throughout the post-Cold War era, even though the negative image of Russia may not be 'carved in stone' over the "*longue durée*." It is precisely the 'Russian threat' that has slowed Poland's adaptation to NATO's push to develop highly mobile and deployable forces, capable of taking part in out-of-area operations with other NATO countries. This is not to say that Poland has not developed such troops, or that Poland has not participated in demanding operations, but Poland has been persistent, at least up to 2008, in preserving its traditional territorial defence system, based on compulsory conscription.

In Polish foreign and defence policy discourse Russia is mostly presented as a threat only implicitly, but in a way that the audience has no doubts about the content and target of the message. For example, the Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (PiS) stated on 10 November 2005 that "*our foreign policy becomes more realistic. We shall concentrate on concrete, clearly defined national interests, primarily geopolitical and economic ones, rather than celebrating empty diplomatic ritual.*"⁴¹ Russian threat represents a classical 'prepare for self-help' case, even though the prevailing trend in NATO- and EU-contexts is to develop global "security provider" -capabilities and leave past injustices and xenophobia to history. However, in countries like Poland and Estonia, this is much easier to say than to implement.

Poland was the first country outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to recognize the independence of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in December 1991. Poland signed an agreement on good neighbourly relations with the Russian Federation on 22 May 1992.⁴² The mutual relations between Poland and the Russian Federation are still influenced by the traumatic experiences of Poland during WWII and the Cold War, and although the physical wounds inflicted upon the Poles by the Germans during WWII may be deeper than those inflicted by the Soviets, the psychological wounds inflicted by the Soviet Union and earlier by the Russian empire are more deeply ingrained in the Polish national identity.⁴³

⁴¹ The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2005).

⁴² Kukulka (1995), p. 94.

⁴³ Prizel (1998), pp. 124–129.

Negative ‘uses of Russia’

Both Poland and Russia, can be understood as peripheries of a generally defined West. In this regard Polish (as well as Russian) national identity suffers from an “*inferiority complex*”, which is characteristic of almost all peripheries. An “*inferiority complex*”, based on a feeling of weakness and lack of respect from the centre (i.e. the West), gives rise to psychological discomfort. Both Polish and Russian identity structures include elements that use the Other to enforce their own feeling of superiority (“*superiority complex*”; material or moral). This refers to the historical struggle over the ownership of the borderlands between Russia and Poland. Russia defeated Polish troops that occupied Moscow in 1610–1612, on 7 November 1612 and concluded a protracted war with Poland. This victory is still celebrated in Russia as a national holiday “commemorating the chasing away of the Polish invaders from Moscow.” In Poland, 15 August is celebrated as the anniversary of the battle of Warsaw and victory over the invading Soviet Bolsheviks (“The Miracle of Vistula”).⁴⁴

Polish negative “uses of Russia” fulfil at least four major functions: (1) it strengthens Poland’s European identity by considering Russia as the ‘Essential Other’, or as Asia, the East, “the underdog”, or even as the ‘Eastern Barbaricum’, (2) it creates unity in Polish society as Russia in effect becomes a unifying threat, (3) it plays the role of oppressor in Polish moral superiority and victimization-based identity, and (4) it legitimizes the Polish self-image of being an expert in understanding mystical and mythical Russia. All these functions are connected with Poland’s “inferiority complex” towards the West, that is with the Polish “culture of complaining” about her own weakness, Poland’s feeling of backwardness, and the poverty, corruption and general frailty of civil society. But the main point here is that Russia is seen as having even more serious, even gigantic, social problems, and can be represented as a backward society compared to Poland, which consequently strengthens Poland’s identity and creates unity in Polish society. The negative uses of Russia in Polish identity discourse enable Poles to feel a moral and cultural superiority (“superiority complex”) towards Russia, a feeling that is connected with Poland’s “imperial complex”, namely sentiments about the glory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Even though this “imperial complex” does not include any territorial ambitions towards or claims over ex-Polish territories, a conviction of Poland’s special status in Central Europe has survived and is clearly visible at least among Polish political elites.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Zarycki (2004), p. 597; Nowak (1997), p. 3.

⁴⁵ Zarycki (2004), pp. 599–602. Despite of the Poland’s “inferiority complex” Poles declare a high level of national pride.

Russia as the East

A mystical and mythical ‘East’ has historically been an important element in European national identities. Usually this East has been Russia and Turkey. Polish national identity is no different in this respect; Russia is still the Eastern Other in Polish identity discourse, even though some Poles think that the geographical border between West and East runs along the rivers Oder and Neisse (the Western border of Poland).⁴⁶ Poland can be represented in this discourse by the words mind, civilization, democracy, European, free and defence, whereas Russia can be represented by the words body, nature, barbarian, totalitarian, Asian, unfree and offensive. But the East-West dichotomy is probably common to all national identity discourses; it is not unique to the Polish discourse. There are numerous other Easts in European, and even Polish, identity discourses. For example, in the discourses of the Central and Eastern European countries, the East tends to begin just beyond the eastern border of any given country. So, for example, in Southern Europe the Balkans begin beyond each South-European country’s eastern border, while the discussant nation itself prefers to be identified as Central, or Western, European. In Germany, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer believed that the eastern border of Europe was the river Elbe, whereas in Poland the East generally starts either from the river Bug or the Vistula. In Warsaw, the river Vistula divides the city into two parts, some Warsawians think that the *Praga* (or eastern half of Warsaw), located on the right bank of the Vistula, is too Asiatic, eastern-like and exotic to be visited frequently.⁴⁷

The East-West discourse in Poland also refers intimately to the three Partitions of Poland; the ex-Russian partition zone is represented in terms of backwardness, whereas the former Austrian partition zone has a more positive image. The Russian legacy in Polish culture has frequently been rejected as unattractive and superficial, even though this legacy has at least as long a tradition as the three Partitions of Poland. Denying or underestimating the Russian influence on Polish culture constitutes part of the same “*grassroots censorship*” as the silence about anti-Semitism in Polish society.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ CBOS (1998b), p. 1. In July/August 1998, 17% of the Poles thought that the true eastern border of Europe runs along the rivers Oder and Neisse, 19% thought that it runs along the Ural mountains, 6% thought that it runs along the steppes of Ukraine and the majority, 30%, thought that it runs along the river Bug (the eastern border of Poland).

⁴⁷ Zarycki (2004), pp. 602–603.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 603–607.

Russia as a unifying threat and as an oppressor

While Russia's geographical proximity and narrative and historical Otherness have been the main reasons for Poland's integration into NATO and the EU, Poland's dependency on Russian oil and natural gas has been the reason behind Poland's desire to establish a uniform European voice regarding European energy policy. The Polish political elite has been extremely critical in its political rhetoric regarding Russian energy policy, which it considers as an instrument in Russia's attempt to divide and weaken European policies towards Russia. For example, in a speech, on 23 September 2008 at the 63rd session of the UN General Assembly in New York, the President of Poland, Lech Kaczyński, appealed to the need for a uniform European CFSP and energy policy stand towards Russia in the following way:

*Poland is following with concern developments in Georgia [referring to the Georgian-Russian war in August 2008]. We take the view that conducting dialogue, as well as acting in the spirit of solidarity and consistency in pursuing energy policy should become a priority for all European states, and especially for the EU members. Only in this context can Europe's energy security be guaranteed. Faced with complete unpredictability of the current major energy suppliers - I am referring to Europe at this point - Poland is concerned about certain states, especially about one very powerful state [i.e. the Russian Federation], using energy supplies as a tool in achieving political goals in relation with its neighbours as well as with all states which it provides with energy.*⁴⁹

Thus, compared to other EU member states, Poland can hardly be described as having conducted a foreign or defence policy of appeasement towards Russia, but has treated Russia like any other sovereign state. As a consequence, Russia, for example, banned imports of Polish meat in 2005, and implicitly threatened Poland, if she accepts missiles as part of a U.S. ballistic missile shield on Polish soil. Poland managed to lift the meat ban on 19 December 2007, but the missile issue is much more serious.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ President of the Republic of Poland (2008b).

⁵⁰ *News Daily* (2007); *Warsaw Voice* (2008f). See also Lisicki and Subotic (2007), p. 2. Even though Russia claimed that bad quality was the reason for banning the import of Polish meat, it seems that Russia was simply using this as a sanction to indicate its opposition to the possible deployment of U.S. interceptor missiles on Polish soil. The Poles certainly understood it in this way and opposed Russia's sanctions for contravening the rules of the EU-Russia agreement which say that "Russia must not use sanctions with regard to the European Union."

On 21 January 2008, General Yuri Baluyevski, the chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces implicitly threatened Poland in connection with Poland's likely acceptance of the planned launching pad and ten interceptor missiles on Polish soil, saying that "Russia will use any military means including nuclear weapons if necessary to protect itself and its allies." However, Poland, faithful to her foreign policy style, responded with her Defence Minister (Bogdan Klich) saying that the "Polish Government is not fearful of Russia and wants to conduct an open dialogue." Defence Minister Klich downplayed Baluyevski's comments as "pre-election rhetoric", but added that "such threats simply confirm Poland's need for upgrading its air defence systems."⁵¹

By combining the discursive and material threats that Poles experience from the Russian side, the Poles have become very sensitive to "any traces of Russian expansionism." The Chechen war, for example, was perceived very critically in Poland. The Chechen war is interesting in this context, since it transcended traditional Polish conceptions of being the Christian rampart of Europe.⁵² *The point of reference of the Christian rampart-narrative is and was Russia. But the other dimension of the narrative has been Turkey and Islam, which proved to be weaker than the Russian dimension, at least during the Chechen war. While Poles have been somewhat silent over the Yugoslavian conflicts nearby, without clear sympathies towards any of the parties involved the various conflicts in the Balkans, the small Muslim nation in the more distant Caucasus was keenly supported in Poland.*⁵³

For most of the Poles the threat of Russia is simply "biographical." Many Poles were deported to Russia during the Partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century and many Poles today have relatives who were deported during the Soviet occupation between September 1939 and June 1941. Many of the deportees, or prisoners of war (POW), never came home, which is one of the main "biographical" signifiers of negative sentiment towards Russia. The massacres of Polish POWs and civilians in 1940 by the Soviets still haunt Polish hearts and minds (see Chapter 7.1.3). Even more recently, in 1956 and 1980–81, Poles asked "Will they [the Soviets] enter or not?" It is not hard to imagine why Poles expect Russia at least to apologize for this 'bad past'. But when did this 'bad past' begin? The three Partitions of Po-

⁵¹ *Warsaw Voice* (2008d), (2008e).

⁵² CBOS (2002e), p. 1. According to an opinion poll conducted by the CBOS in 2002, only 26% of the respondents were sympathetic to the Chechen side (9% to the Russian), whereas in 1995 as many as 61% of Poles sympathized with the Chechens in this conflict (1% with the Russians), and in 2000 48% sympathized with the Chechens and 4% with the Russians. Thus, Polish sympathy for the Chechens is diminishing at the same time when sympathy for Russia in this context has grown.

⁵³ Zarycki (2004), p. 607.

land might reasonably be seen as the beginning of this ‘bad past’, thereby placing it in the reign of Catherine the Great. The drive behind this Polish need for a Russian apology is quite simple: *The Poles have not attempted to restrict Russia’s sovereignty (with an exception that the Poles occupied Moscow between 1610 and 1612), whereas Russia has restricted Poland’s sovereignty many times.* But the Poles should probably apologize themselves too, for their attempts to propagate Catholicism in Orthodox lands.⁵⁴

It is very unlikely that the Poles will ever be able to come to terms with the atrocity of Katyń, unless Russia sincerely asks forgiveness. The President of Poland, Lech Kaczyński, expressed implicitly his wish to deal thoroughly with the issue, whilst visiting the Katyń cemetery, in western Russia on 17 September 2007, by describing the massacre as “an act of genocide committed against officers of a foreign army”, and continued by stating that “Let us live with the future in mind, but let us also remember the past and look at it in peace, prudence and respect for the truth.” The Russian *Duma’s* (the lower house of the parliament) chairman of the foreign affairs committee, Konstantin Kosachev, considered the visit of the Polish President to Katyń as a prelude to normalized relations between Poland and Russia by stating that “The more openly we speak about that tragedy, without turning it in to a political affair, the less it disturbs our relations.” *Even though Russia has accepted responsibility for the massacre, she has repeatedly refused Poland’s demands that Russia acknowledge the Katyń massacre as genocide.*⁵⁵

One of the key issues in the current Polish-Russian relationship is the Polish insistence that Russia abandon her claims over former Soviet-Republics, especially Ukraine: “Without Ukraine and Belarus, Moscow would not be able to maintain an aggressive posture toward Central and Eastern Europe.” Poland probably sees herself as occupying the moral high ground on this issue as she has herself abandoned her own imperial, territorial ambitions and claims over what used to be Poland’s eastern borderlands and now located in Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. From the perspective of the Polish “moral superiority complex”, Poland prefers to present herself to Russia as being a model of modernization and Europeaniza-

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 608–609.

⁵⁵ *Warsaw Voice* (2007). At the same time, on 17 September 2007, a new movie concerning the Katyń massacre by the Polish director Andrzej Wajda had its premier in Warsaw. See also *The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (1948). According to the Convention, genocide is “any of a number of acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

tion by stressing that “*Poland’s Eastern fever is over but Russians, despite the disintegration of the USSR, still are not able to decide, what kind of Russia they want to build. They still can’t get rid of the dreams of the reconstruction of the union of the Slavic states, if not with the Ukraine, then at least with Belarus.*”⁵⁶

In this context Poles have appealed to a common European conscience (implicitly to the Russian one) to define history without controversies. While Germany has more or less admitted that the outbreak of WWII on 1 September 1939 was based on a “conspiracy” between two totalitarian regimes, the Poles argue that Russia should admit this as well. The Prime Minister of Poland, Donald Tusk, sent a message to the Russian Federation, as a successor state of the Soviet Union, on 1 September 2008, at Westerplatte, Gdańsk, when he gave a speech commemorating the 69th anniversary of the outbreak of WWII as follows:

*We have been and shall be building our national identity based on the memory of our heroes. There would be no Polish identity if we renounced this memory. We do want that history, which is interpreted in numerous ways, not be the subject of conflicts, both in Poland and in Europe.*⁵⁷

Poland as a bridge between Russia and West

Poland’s geographic location and long history of wars with and suffering under Russia are perceived in Poland as giving Poles a special status by virtue of their possession of “first hand knowledge about the “nature of Russia.””⁵⁸ This assumption has some relevance, since Poland really has experienced Russia (and the Soviet Union) at her worst. Furthermore, Poland is a Slavic country which may deepen Poland’s level of understanding of the spirituality of Russia, which the Poles consider is a phenomenon unknown to and thus difficult to understand in the materialistic West. *The West is seen as naïve in its relations with Russia, an attitude which Poland would like to “correct”*. Poland’s Catholicism would allow her to justify this Polish idea of being a mental bridge between Russia and the West. But the problem here is that Russia does not currently need mediators with the West.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Zarycki (2004), p. 616.

⁵⁷ The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2008b).

⁵⁸ Zarycki (2004), p. 617. See also the Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2002a).

⁵⁹ Zarycki (2004), p. 617.

President Lech Kaczyński explained this sense of Otherness that Russia occupies in Polish identity construction, in a nutshell on 29 December 2006 to the Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera*:

*There is an ongoing historical dispute, concerning the Katyń massacre of 1940 for example, where over 20,000 Polish officers were murdered on Stalin's orders. Until recently, there had also been a controversy over Ukraine's Orange Revolution. Furthermore, there is the issue of the Baltic gas pipeline, but the main problem is one of a psychological nature. Moscow must acknowledge the fact that the time when the region remained under its powerful influence is over.*⁶⁰

The supply of oil and natural gas is a geopolitical issue in Poland as she is heavily dependent on Russia for both. The biggest problem in Poland in this regard is the *Nord Stream pipeline*, through which Russia is aiming to pump natural gas directly to Germany under the Baltic Sea, bypassing Poland. However, oil and natural gas only constitute 15 percent of Poland's total energy supply.⁶¹ But about 70 percent of Poland's oil supply is imported from the Russian Federation. In terms of geopolitics, Poles fear that Russia will try to use the Nord Stream pipeline to divide Europe politically. Almost all Poland's politicians oppose the project, which has already become an obstacle to warmer relations between Poland and Russia. On 25 September 1996 Poland and the Russian Federation signed a 25-year agreement on exporting 250 billion cubic meters of gas to Poland. The deal was called the agreement of the century, but the opposition parties criticized the agreement, since it would lead Poland into dependency on Russian gas. Poland has tried to ensure the availability of oil and natural gas by importing them from independent sources. For example, in 2007, the President of Poland, Lech Kaczyński, hoped to construct an alliance with some ex-soviet states, especially with Kazakhstan, to help Poland diversify her energy sources. However, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of Kazakhstan, cancelled his trip to a Polish-sponsored energy summit that year.⁶²

The Baltic gas pipeline was on the agenda of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, when he paid an official visit to Russia in February 2008 as the first Polish leader since President Aleksander Kwaśniewski's visit to Moscow in

⁶⁰ President of the Republic of Poland (2006c). See also *Wspólna Deklaracja Polsko-Rosyjska* [Joint Polish-Russian Declaration] (1993). According to this Joint Declaration, the President of Poland Lech Wałęsa and the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin agreed upon a "rapid signing of the Agreement on the Protection of Graves and Places of Remembrance Dedicated to the Victims of War and Repression."

⁶¹ *The Economist* (2008) According to *the Economist*, Poland depends on coal for about 95% of her electricity.

⁶² *Keesing's Record of World Events* (1996), p. 41284; Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej Biuro Prasy i Informacji (1995), p. 24 and *the Economist* (2008), p. 1.

2004. Prime Minister Tusk presented a proposal to build an alternative pipeline through the Baltic countries and Poland to Germany, instead of building the pipeline under the Baltic Sea from *Vyborg* to *Greifswald* in Germany, according to the Russian plan. Russia rejected the Polish proposal as “difficult and much more costly from the economic point of view”,⁶³ which seems implausible, since it would surely be precisely the seabed pipeline that would be the more expensive option. Thus, the gas pipeline is a serious political issue in Polish-Russian relations.

The dispute over the gas pipeline has its roots in the November-December 2004 Ukrainian Presidential election and the Orange revolution. The President of Poland supported the Ukrainian Orange revolution and supported Viktor Yuschenko, the current President of Ukraine during the Ukraine’s Presidential crises. Shortly after, Russia withdrew from a previous agreement to build a gas pipeline (*Yamal 2*) through Poland to Germany.⁶⁴ Even though the then President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, as well as Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk, confirmed the mutual need to normalize relations during Tusk’s visit to Russia in February 2008, little real progress appeared to have been made. President Putin “agreed to disagree over Poland’s plan to host a U.S. missile defence shield”, according to Tusk, and consequently “Poland would uphold its veto over EU-Russia partnership talks for the time being.” Radosław Sikorski, the Foreign Minister of Poland, added that “the EU first had to agree to include energy security as part of any partnership deal with Russia”, pointing to the bilateral agreement between Germany and Russia to build a gas pipeline that bypassed Poland, as representing the ghost of the pre-WWII bilateral agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union over Poland.⁶⁵

Public opinion – Russia as the ‘essential Other’

While the interwar Polish elite saw Poland as a Christian rampart against Russia, the new post-Cold War elite recognized that Poland’s integration into the West should be in line with Russia’s Europeanization and even integration into Europe.⁶⁶ The tone changed in the late 1990’s, at least according to opinion polls. *In 1993, 30% of the Poles thought that the biggest threat to Poland was posed by Russia (56% believed it was Germany), whereas in September 1997 the opinion was totally different: now it was 40% of the Poles that thought the biggest threat was Russia, whereas only 6% believed it was Germany.*⁶⁷ This change reflected recent favourable po-

⁶³ *Warsaw Voice* (2008k).

⁶⁴ Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), p. 62.

⁶⁵ *Warsaw Voice* (2008l).

⁶⁶ Prizel (1998), p. 128.

⁶⁷ Młyniec (2001), p. 54.

litical developments; the last Soviet troops left Poland in 1994 (leaving a trail of devastation behind them in garrison towns like *Legnica*).⁶⁸ As a sign of the change in the political situation, in January 1993, the Polish newspaper *Rzeczpospolita* published a plan, according to which the gravity of the Polish Armed Forces was to be transferred a bit eastward by the year 2000.⁶⁹ In 1990, 50% of the units of the Polish Armed Forces were located in Western Poland, 30% in Central Poland, and 20% in Eastern Poland. According to the plan, 40% of the units were to be located in Western Poland, 30% in Central Poland, and 30% in Eastern Poland by the year 2000. The Polish Ministry of Defence managed to implement the plan, at least partially, already by the year 1995.⁷⁰

This negative image of Russia still holds fast in Poland and one could even say that Polish fears about Russia has increased; in September 1997, 40% of the Poles were afraid of Russia, in June 2001, 64% of the Poles thought so, whereas in June 2006 the figure was 59%.⁷¹ The official Polish discourse over relations with Russia is more or less congruent with the results of Polish opinion polls; in June 2007, 54% of the Poles thought that relations with Russia were bad not only because Poles thought that Russia did not treat Poland as an equal partner, but also because Poles thought that Russia still wasn't reconciled to the loss of her influence in Poland.⁷²

Are friendlier relations between Poland and Russia possible?	Time of the conducted opinion poll					
	May 2000	Sept 2002	July 2003	April 2005	May 2006	June 2008
	Percentage					
Possible	69	81	77	75	69	69
Not possible	30	17	22	23	27	19
Difficult to say	1	2	1	2	4	12

Table 4: Public opinion on Polish-Russian relations⁷³

Opinion polls conducted between 1997 and 2007 among Poles clearly show that the historical 'Russian Other' has also remained almost unchanged in current Polish identity construction. The lack of trust towards Russia has had a significant impact on Polish security and defence policy, which still (Autumn 2008) rests considerably on territorial defence. This has been difficult to understand in Western Europe and the USA, particularly in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. In a way Poland is trapped between "*old world defence thinking*", which is based on the pri-

⁶⁸ Davies (2001), p. 430.

⁶⁹ Davies (2005b), p. 516.

⁷⁰ *Rzeczpospolita* (1993), p. 8; Michta (2003), p. 41.

⁷¹ CBOS (2001b), p. 3 and CBOS (2006g), p. 2.

⁷² CBOS (2007d), p. 2.

⁷³ CBOS (2008f), p. 3.

macy of national territorial defence (‘prepare for self-help’ thinking), and “*new world security thinking*”, based on a larger security concept and on an aspiration to become a key member of NATO and the most favoured ally of the USA in the region.⁷⁴

However, the negative image of Russia, or the historical ‘Russian Other’, is not necessarily ‘carved in stone’, even though it has largely been Polish fears about Russia that explains Poland’s rapprochement with NATO and the EU. According to opinion polls, Poles have also been, somewhat paradoxically, optimistic about friendlier relations between Poland and Russia, as Table 4 shows.

8.3. International Society – ‘The Changing Borders of Otherness Through Adaptation and Learning’

“The question that we face now is how to adapt the existing legal norms to new requirements? How to change the mentality of people? How to modify the functioning of international organizations so that they were able to efficiently fight new threats at the time and place of their origin. How to prevent the evil before it kills?”⁷⁵

One of the dimensions of Polish foreign and defence policy is a “proactive attitude when confronted with the threat of regional instability”, derived at least partially from the ‘treachery’ of West European pre-WWII pacifism and the appeasement of Hitler by Great Britain and France in 1938–1939. This is related to a scepticism towards the EU, as well as towards multilateral security institutions like the UN (with the exception of NATO), attitudes that are quite similar to those of the USA towards these institutions. According to Marcin Zaborowski and Kerry Longhurst, “There remains a strong Polish conviction that the League of Nations not only proved unable to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War but effectively strengthened German revisionism in Central Europe.”⁷⁶

European integration and NATO-cooperation as regional contexts have proved capable of mobilizing Polish national identity structure. NATO and EU membership have been the essential goals of Polish foreign and security policy since the late 1980s, even though “the Atlanticist option was embraced officially for the first time by the Government of Jan Olszewski in 1992.”⁷⁷ These contexts have been able to affect Polish defence identity by modifying the borders of Otherness, especially vis-à-vis Germany, but they have also affected Polish borders of Otherness vis-à-vis Ukraine, Bela-

⁷⁴ Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), p. 1022.

⁷⁵ Kwaśniewski (2003).

⁷⁶ Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), pp. 1010–1014.

⁷⁷ Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), p. 27.

rus and Lithuania. Negative sentiments towards Russia have remained strong among the Poles, despite increased discursive contextual and bilateral interactions.

8.3.1. NATO-Cooperation and Strategic Culture – ‘Adaptation Through Persuasion’

Poland signed her IPP-agreement with NATO on 5 July 1994.⁷⁸ Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary received approval to start membership negotiations at NATO’s Madrid Summit on 7–8 July 1997. On 16 December 1997 these countries signed the membership protocols, after which approval for these countries to become full members of the Alliance was submitted to the parliaments of the member countries.⁷⁹ Finally, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary received membership of NATO in April 1999, on NATO’s 50th anniversary, and at the same time as NATO approved the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept that envisaged a more capable and flexible Alliance to meet current and future challenges.⁸⁰ The latest enlargement round took place on 1 April 2004, when Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania obtained NATO membership. They had already been invited to begin accession talks on 21 November 2002, at NATO’s Prague Summit.⁸¹

In September 1996, the President of Poland, Lech Wałęsa sent a letter to the General Secretary of NATO, Manfred Wörner, in which he stated that

⁷⁸ Kukulka (1995), p. 100. See also Epstein (2006), p. 266.

⁷⁹ *Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Czech Republic* (1997); *Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Hungary* (1997); *Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Poland* (1997).

⁸⁰ NATO (1999).

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Part II, Paragraph 18. NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept and 2002 Prague Summit were important, not only regarding the alliance’s future enlargement, but also because they defined a vision of the future, as well as the means to construct a more efficient Alliance, capable of responding to the new challenges of the twenty-first century. As part of this vision, the 1999 Strategic Concept in particular can be seen as a bridge-building effort between NATO and the EU’s evolving crises management capabilities. In its 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO announced that the “*Alliance fully supports the development of the European Security and Defence Identity [ESDI] within the Alliance by making available its assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations. To this end, the Alliance and the WEU have developed a close relationship and put into place key elements of ESDI as agreed in Berlin [in 1996 at the meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers].*” See also NATO (2001), Part I, Chapter 4; NATO (2003). The integral part of ESDI is to develop an autonomous European crises management capability, not independent from NATO, but one that makes it possible for the EU to use NATO assets in operations where NATO is not willing to participate. This EU-NATO framework is called the “*Berlin plus*” agreement and was adopted in March 2003.

“Our aspiration to membership of NATO does not result from fear of specific threats, although the situation in the area close to Poland remains often unpredictable.”⁸² The implicit message of the President Wałęsa’s letter was that actually it was precisely the traditional military threat Poles feared; compare the message with the 1992 “*Tenets of the Polish Security Policy*”, which informed that Poles are prepared “to force back an attack from any directions”, meaning then Germany as well (see Chapter 7.4).⁸³

It is understandable that the NATO membership was considered as one of the primary instrumental goals of the Poland’s security policy during the late 1990’s, since according to 1949 *Washington Treaty* (“*The North Atlantic Treaty*”) NATO granted nuclear deterrence for its members. However, the execution mechanism of collective defence is not as unquestionable as that offered by the now disbanded WEU. Even though an attack against one member country of NATO “shall be considered an attack against them all”, military measures against the aggressor are only one option among others (political and economic). Furthermore, NATO currently is a totally different organization than it was earlier in the Cold War. Even though Article 5 of the *Washington Treaty* still exists,⁸⁴ NATO has become a ‘security provider’, rather than being an organization prepared for traditional territorial defence, which Poland expected when she joined NATO. NATO today prepares for a wider range of tasks, starting with expeditionary operations outside the NATO area to prevent the outbreak or escalation of crises and ending with tasks such as providing security for the Olympic games. The traditional defensive *raison d’être* of NATO became a secondary issue in November 2002, and this was announced publicly at NATO’s Prague Summit.⁸⁵

Just two weeks after her accession to the Alliance, Poland became part of the Balkans conflict as NATO initiated preventive air raids against Serbian targets in Serbia and Montenegro, in response to the tragedy that befell the Albanian population of Kosovo in April 1999. It was the first time that NATO had initiated a military out-of-area operation of this kind.⁸⁶ Poland did not expect that she would be in such a situation immediately after her accession to the Alliance. What Poland expected from NATO was an Alliance with defensive guarantees against Russia. The Prime Minister Leszek Miller, expressed this explicitly in his announcement on 25 October 2001: “We believe NATO should retain its original function of a defensive alliance.”⁸⁷

⁸² Wałęsa (1993).

⁸³ Ministry of National Defence Press and Information Office (1995), p. 11.

⁸⁴ NATO (1949), Article 5.

⁸⁵ See, for example, NATO (2002b), Paragraph 4.

⁸⁶ CBOS (1999b), p. 1; CBOS (1999a), p. 1.

⁸⁷ The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2001).

However it was soon realized in Poland that there was not much to do but adapt to this new role of NATO. In May 2002, Polish Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz already stated that “The basic conclusion to be drawn, is that NATO needs to increase its focus on the ability to act against immediate and unpredictable threats...and...to expand its geographical mandate.”⁸⁸ The need to adapt especially touched the Armed Forces of Poland and civil-military relations of Polish strategic culture. In Post-Communist Poland, the Armed Forces of Poland struggled between two institutional forces: (1) the Polish tradition of the military’s autonomy and the defence of Polish territory alone, and (2) pressure from NATO increasingly to orientate itself towards being a security provider. But Poland’s deeply rooted suspicion of the Russian Other poses an obstacle that stands in the way of her becoming a constructive security provider.⁸⁹

As NATO became interested in admitting new members in the 1990s, it also became clear that the Alliance would have to alter or accommodate the military traditions of the applicant states. The Polish Armed Forces would probably not have voluntarily changed its functional or organizational practices, or even tried to modify the three traditional pillars of the Polish military (“the imperative to protect Polish autonomy”, “to perform the duties of a patriotic Polish soldier” and “to remain loyal to military leaders”), if Poland had not joined NATO. Even though the military supported the collapse of communism, it did not signal its readiness to adapt to the Western model of civilian control over the military. It was the first post-communist era President of Poland, Lech Wałęsa and the Polish General Staff (*GS; Stab Generalnego Wojsko Polskiej*) who pursued together a model of civil-military relations which threatened to marginalize the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Parliament, even though it was known that NATO pursued a basic principle of democratic civilian control over the military.⁹⁰

NATO and the Polish reformists together ‘refashioned’ Polish military tradition, but the foreign media made its contribution as well. The long Polish tradition of keeping military and political guidance separate combined with the civilians’ reluctance to exercise authority over the military in planning, budgeting and personnel. The military’s long aristocratic-like traditions posed a serious problem for the Polish aim to join the NATO. NATO has used its ideological power and training capacity to shape the interests of civilian reformers in the framework of the PfP-programme in the way that they would pursue the democratic authority over the military more than they would have otherwise done. Another important aspect was NATO’s

⁸⁸ Cimoszewicz (2002). See also Kwaśniewski (2002). According to the then President of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski, “From the perspective of Polish security interests, NATO’s objectives should primarily be those of a classical defense alliance.”

⁸⁹ Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), p. 1021; Epstein (2006), p. 282.

⁹⁰ Epstein (2006), pp. 256–268.

officer training programme. This was also a value-laden effort, since it was not only about the transfer of military information to the Poles, but was also an expression of how power relations should be organized in accordance with Western norms. However, it was NATO's study on enlargement (1995) that explicitly informed states that wanted to join the Alliance about membership requirements and strategies for doing so (see Chapter 8.1.1).⁹¹

There was not actually much in Polish history that could provide guidelines for institutionalizing democratic civil-military relations in accordance with the model proposed by NATO. The following three examples illuminate well the difficulties of changing the course of cultural habituation. The first example of the effort to democratize civil-military relations in Poland came in the form of the so-called "*Zabinski report*" produced by the "Inter-Ministry Committee for the Reform of the organization of National Defence", headed by Krzysztof Zabinski,⁹² which, however, left excessive planning powers to the military. Reformers initially supported Zabinski's guidelines, but mostly because they did not know how to reform the civil-military relations differently at that point; in fact there was not much agreement on what civilian control meant in practice.⁹³

The second example came with the so-called "*The Parys Affair*" and was a reformist politician's effort to challenge the President of Poland. In 1992 Poland's first civilian Minister of Defence, Jan Parys, appointed in December 1991, challenged President Wałęsa's efforts to concentrate supervision over the military into his own hands, including, for example, the appointment of the GS. However, as a consequence of challenging the authority of Wałęsa, Parys was forced to resign.⁹⁴

A third example, the so-called "*Drawsko Affair*", illuminates even better than the previous example, the clash between President Wałęsa and the MoD. In 1994 Wałęsa and the Chief of the GS, Tadeusz Wilecki, were in the midst of a long lasting struggle with the MoD about whether the GS should be subordinate to the MoD, or not. On 30 September 1994, at a meeting of military cadres at the *Drawsko Pomorskie* training facility, Wałęsa conducted a vote among the attending generals on whether the Minister of Defence, Vice-Admiral (ret.) Kołodziejczyk was the right man for the job. The generals voted to dismiss Kołodziejczyk and Wałęsa asked him to resign, which he did shortly afterwards.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Epstein (2006), p. 256 and p. 266 and p. 274.

⁹² See, for example, Kowalewski (1997), p. 22. The report consisted of two regulations: Regulation No. 67 (29 December 1990) and Regulation No. 5 (21 February 1991).

⁹³ Epstein (2006), pp. 266–267.

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 268–269.

⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 269–270. See also Balcerowicz (2001), p. 451; Karkoszka (2001), p. 532.

Wałęsa continued to consolidate his authority over the military throughout his tenure, and refused to comply with NATO standards of ‘proper’ civilian control over the military. This resulted in the growing autonomy of the military and by 1995 the Polish GS had acquired greater influence vis-à-vis the MoD in personnel policy, financial policy, military intelligence, military education and the press. *It may be not far from the ‘truth’ to say that if the Polish identity structure had not included such an inherent dislike and suspicion of Russia, Poland would not have joined NATO.* For example President Wałęsa, disappointed with the announcement of the PfP-programme in 1994 because he thought that this was only a delaying tactic regarding the decision on Poland’s membership, considered abandoning the Alliance altogether. However, eventually he decided to carry on the cooperation with NATO due to the possibility of Russian revanchism.⁹⁶

In 1995, President Wałęsa vetoed the law that was designed to subordinate the GS to the MoD (“*Law on the Office of the Ministry of Defence*”). However, President Kwaśniewski, his successor, signed the law, which entered into force on 14 February 1996. Kwaśniewski signed the law at least partly because of the 1995 U.S. Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) report, according to which the Polish military was only capable of conducting peace-keeping operations, not waging war. The report was received with embarrassment in Poland and was widely dealt with in the Polish media. CRS’s report is a good example of a soft persuasion, and is in line with Francis Fukuyama’s and Alexander Wendt’s theories of states’ need for (positive) recognition.⁹⁷ As the CRS’s report was not considered as positive recognition in Poland, it paved the way for Kwaśniewski to sign the above mentioned law and implementation of ‘proper’ civilian control over the military.⁹⁸

The reforms of the “*Law on the Office of the Ministry of Defence*” included a new command structure that weakened the GS’s power over the Armed Forces of Poland, as the GS was now subordinated to the MoD. The command structure was now based on the U.S. model of separate commands for the Army, Navy and Air Force. This was a significant reform, since it weakened the influence of the GS on domestic politics, because the three commanders would now report directly to the MoD, bypassing the GS altogether. Although the “*Law on the Office of the Ministry of Defence*” was fully in effect by 1997, Polish officers were still refusing to carry out NATO and MoD directives. To increase pressure on the Polish

⁹⁶ Epstein (2006), pp. 273–274.

⁹⁷ Fukuyama (1992), p. 135 and Wendt (2005), p. 590 and p. 596.

⁹⁸ Epstein (2006), pp. 275–278; Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), p. 1022; Kuźniar (2001b), p. 78; Menkiszak (2001), p. 160. The “*Law on the Office of the Ministry of Defence*” was also known as the Dobrzański/Karkoszka reforms after Defence Minister Stanisław Dobrzański and Deputy Minister of Defence Andrzej Karkoszka.

military, NATO insisted that President Kwaśniewski move the chief of the GS, General Tadeusz Wilecki aside, because he was considered the main hindrance to further Westernization of the Armed Forces. Kwaśniewski was reluctant to do this, because Polish officers thought that civilians repeatedly mistreated Wilecki. However, it was the U.S. media this time, namely an article in *The New York Times*⁹⁹ that claimed that Poland's top General (i.e. Wilecki) was resisting NATO's terms, which forced Kwaśniewski to "rotate" Wilecki out of his office in the spring of 1997.¹⁰⁰

In 1997 the new Constitution of Poland (see Chapter 7.2.1) institutionalized the democratization of Polish civil-military relations by making the Minister of Defence the commander-in-chief of the armed forces during peacetime with presidential prerogative. This legislation further paved the way for Poland's NATO membership, but in March 1999, NATO suggested that Poland still had to improve civilian control over the military. This meant that transparency of the defence budget should be increased, and that authority relations should be changed in such a way that Polish officers would not make policy or criticize civilian leaders in public.¹⁰¹

From NATO's perspective, Poland, to be a "useful ally", should develop her armed forces to be more capable of taking part in combined and joint out-of-area operations, and thus be a reciprocal "security provider", instead of being a "traditionalist defender of national borders." To become a "security provider" and a meaningful ally, whom NATO and the USA can depend on, Poland still faces at least two challenges. First, Poland must become a constructive player among the former Soviet Union satellite states, with the capability and will politically to shape Eastern Europe. Second, Poland should put every possible effort into "modernizing" her grand strategy and to make the swift into security thinking required by the post-11 September 2001 security environment.¹⁰² This issue will be dealt with in the next chapter more thoroughly.

Public opinion – preferred defensiveness to global preventive strategy

Support for NATO membership has traditionally been high in Poland, but largely due to the belief, or hope, that NATO would still be the same defensive Alliance it used to be during the Cold War era. In July 1997, after NATO's Madrid Summit, 73% of Poles considered that entering NATO was the best way of ensuring Poland's security. In February 2000, 66% of Poles supported NATO membership; 56% thought that NATO would guar-

⁹⁹ Perlez (1997).

¹⁰⁰ Epstein (2006), pp. 279–280.

¹⁰¹ Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), p. 1022; Epstein (2006), pp. 272–273.

¹⁰² Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), pp. 1020–1024.

antee Poland's independence, and 60% that it would secure peace and safety for Poland. In April 2005, 81% of Poles supported Poland's membership in NATO.¹⁰³

For or against the Polish participation in the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan	Time of the conducted opinion poll						
	Dec 2001	Feb 2002	April 2002	Jan 2007	Dec 2007	Feb 2008	April 2008
Percentage							
For	45	47	57	20	14	22	18
Against	44	42	32	75	83	73	77
Not clear opinion	11	11	11	5	3	5	5

Table 5: Public opinion on Polish participation in the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan¹⁰⁴

Poland had 1,200 troops in NATO's operation in Afghanistan in November 2007, and 900 troops in the U.S.-led operation in Iraq.¹⁰⁵ Public support for both of the operations had initially been high among the Poles, but not the sending of Polish troops (see Tables 5 and 6). In April 2002, 57% of the Poles supported Polish participation in Afghanistan, but by December 2007 it had already dropped to 14%, at least partly because in November 2007 seven Polish soldiers, serving in Afghanistan, were jailed and accused of killing six Afghan civilians in the village of *Nangarkhel*. The Defence Minister of Poland, Bogdan Klich commented on the event with the words, "We were convinced that our contribution was not only stable and militarily significant, but also that we stand for international law and humanitarian needs", and continued, "From that point of view, what happened in Afghanistan is a shock for Polish public opinion." This really was a shock in Poland, not only against the 'crown jewels' of Polish patriotism, the Armed Forces of Poland, but also against the legitimacy of Polish participation in international operations. Many ordinary Poles wanted 'their soldiers' out of such an exotic place like Afghanistan. The Polish media also joined in the criticism; for example, on 13 November 2007 the weekly newsmagazine *Polityka* rang out: "What Are We Doing There?"¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ CBOS (1997a), p. 1; CBOS (2000a), p. 1; CBOS (2005c), p. 1.

¹⁰⁴ CBOS (2007m), pp. 1–2; CBOS (2008d), p. 2.

¹⁰⁵ Kulish (2007).

¹⁰⁶ Kulish (2007); CBOS (2007k), p. 3.

8.3.2. *The United States as the ‘Instinctive and Primary West’?*

“We are products of the same history, reaching from Jerusalem and Athens to Warsaw and Washington. We share more than an alliance. We share a civilization. Its values are universal, and they pervade our history and our partnership in a unique way.”¹⁰⁷

Poland’s strategic considerations vis-à-vis the USA are bolstered by cultural, historical and pragmatic factors. Such *cultural and historical factors* include the role played by the Polish generals Tadeusz Kościuszko and Kazimierz Puławski in the American War of Independence in 1776. They also include some sense of gratitude in Poland for the USA’s role in recreating the Polish state in 1918 (President Wilson’s 14-point declaration)¹⁰⁸ and in ending the Cold War, as well as the *religious closeness between Polish and American societies*.¹⁰⁹

Poland and the USA are directly linked by the presence of about 6.5–10 million Polish-Americans in the USA (*‘American Polonia’*) concentrated in Chicago (Chicago has the second largest Polish population outside Warsaw), Milwaukee, Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia and Baltimore.¹¹⁰ This minority factor may have played a role in Poland’s joining (together with the Czech Republic and Hungary) NATO in 1999, even though some sources indicate that as an organized group Polish Americans cannot compete in influence with, for example, the three million Jewish Americans, or that the votes or lobbying of the Polish American minority would have inspired U.S. foreign policy to defend Poland’s interests.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ The White House (2001).

¹⁰⁸ *President Wilson’s Fourteen Points* (1918), Point XIII: “An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.”

¹⁰⁹ Zaborowski (2004), pp. 7–8. See also Coker (2004), p. 31; Davies (2005b), pp. 202–206. See also, for example, *National & World Religion Statistics – Church Statistics – World Religions*. In 2002, 82% of Americans professed Christianity (52% Protestants, 24% Catholics). See also Wolfe (1998), p. 48. Alan Wolfe describes the general attitude of the American Christian middle-class as follows, “This nation was not formed by Buddhist framers of the Constitution; it was formed by Christians”, and continues, “Our whole nation was founded on the principles of God, and God’s principles are absolute, not relative.”

¹¹⁰ The U.S. Census Bureau (2000); Dunn (2003), p. 65; Zaborowski (2004), pp. 7–8; Davies (2005b), pp. 202–205; Müller (2007), p. 2. By 1939 some 1.5 million Poles had settled in the USA. Especially the Polish upheavals of 1772–1795, 1831, 1846–46, 1864, 1905 and 1944 propelled patriots and rebels to emigrate to the West. Currently about 6.5–10 million Polish Americans constitute not only the largest single Polish community abroad, but also one of the largest ethnic minorities in the USA. The approximate global figure of emigrants of Polish origin is about 9–15 million.

¹¹¹ Davies (2005b), pp. 207. See also Kupiecki (2001), pp. 260–261; Polish American Congress of Eastern Massachusetts homepage. According to Kupiecki, “the Polish-

By historical and pragmatic factors, I refer to the ‘betrayal of Yalta-narrative’ in the sense that even though the USA should be blamed for the Yalta agreement alongside the United Kingdom, the USA is not part of that narrative, probably because the USA is not to be blamed for the pre-WWII policy of appeasement. The United States was not obliged to assist Poland during the German-Soviet assault in September, unlike the United Kingdom and France. Pragmatically, the USA was seen as the only power in the post-Cold War world willing and able to oppose Russian ambitions as well as restrain Germany; “the lesson of the Second World War was that France could not be trusted and that it did not make a credible ally.”¹¹² On the other hand, if France has sometimes dismissed Polish foreign and defence policy interests, it is because France has considered those as being “archaic geopolitics.”¹¹³

Best allies on a pragmatic basis

In various speeches and statements, Polish Presidents and Prime Ministers have almost without exception praised the special attitude of the Poles towards the USA. For example, in his speech to the Diplomatic Corps on 15 January 1996, President Aleksander Kwaśniewski expressed the Poles’ attitude towards the USA by stating that “the United States – the world’s greatest power – [is] presently the main guarantor of peace, both globally and regionally.”¹¹⁴ One may argue that foreign policy rhetoric may not be congruent with deeper sentiments, but in the case of Polish-U.S. relations, rhetoric and deeper sentiments seem to be congruent. I will come back to that later. The discursive legacy on relations with the USA that the Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński left to his successor Donald Tusk was that: “Tightening our cooperation with the USA is an implementation of the Polish *raison d’état*.”¹¹⁵

The USA’s relations with Poland are at least as good as Poland’s relations with the USA, at least discursively. In the summer of 2001, during his visit to Poland, U.S. President George W. Bush in a speech, at Warsaw Univer-

American community which rallied behind the cause of Poland’s accession to the Alliance began to make their presence felt more and more distinctly.” There are some influential American individuals of Polish descent, like Zbigniew Brzezinski, who may have promoted Poland’s interests at least vis-à-vis her accession to NATO. Brzezinski has been a chairman of the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) and participated in forming U.S. foreign policy and attitudes towards Poland during the presidency of Jimmy Carter between 1976 and 1980.

¹¹² Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), pp. 12–13. See also Dunn (2003), p. 65.

¹¹³ Knowles (2003), p. 97.

¹¹⁴ Kwaśniewski (1996). See also Cimoszewicz (1996), p. 4; The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2001).

¹¹⁵ The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2007a).

sity described Poland as “a bridge to the new democracies of Europe.” Poland was to be considered especially as a bridge and as an example to Ukraine, which President Bush described as a “nation struggling with the trauma of transition”, and which “we must extend our hand to..., as Poland has already done with such determination.” President Bush stressed in the same speech that the United States and Poland are “linked by culture and heritage, kinship and common values” referring explicitly to the cultural heritage of the first Polish immigrants to America, who sailed to and settled in Virginia at the beginning of the seventeenth century.¹¹⁶ Despite the speech’s symbolic and diplomatic nature Poland took a step towards fulfilling its role as an example with its so-called Riga Initiative in 2002¹¹⁷ for a new form of regional security cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe, which was cherished by the U.S. President.¹¹⁸

Between 13 and 14 January 2003, during his visit to the USA, the President of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, stated that “*Poland does not rule out the possibility of becoming engaged in the conflict in Iraq*” and “*Poles are reliable allies... If after all the talks and proceedings are held, and all other possibilities are exhausted, we will have to stand up and fight, we will do it.*”, to which President Bush answered by stating Poland was the best friend the USA had in Europe. During the same visit the main topics in discussions between Kwaśniewski and Bush focused on the Iraq Conflict, Poland’s possible purchase of 48 F-16s¹¹⁹ and the abolition of entry visas for Poles travelling to the USA. During the visit some units of the Polish Special Forces were already in the Persian Gulf region and later took part in the Iraq War proper.¹²⁰

During the same visit President Kwaśniewski described in more detail the relationship between Poland and the USA, as well as Poland’s commitment

¹¹⁶ The White House (2001).

¹¹⁷ Kwaśniewski (2003). President Aleksander Kwaśniewski presented the so-called *Riga initiative* during a meeting of the Heads of State and Governments of the Vilnius Group. *The Riga initiative* is a platform for the exchange of experiences and consultations on security and other regional issues between members of NATO and the EU and those who still remain outside these organizations in the region.

¹¹⁸ Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), pp. 1011. See also *Riga Initiative - Baltic Sea Region Defence Environmental Co-operation*. *The Riga Initiative* is “a forum promoting Baltic Sea Region Defence Environmental Co-operation (BALTDEC) with the overall goal of sustainable use and development, without hindering military readiness.”

¹¹⁹ Głowacki and Sobczak (2003). The planes were to replace ageing MiG 21s and all the purchased F-16s were to be operational by the end of 2008. In 2003 Poland accepted a \$ 3.8 billion loan from the US Congress to purchase the planes from Lockheed Martin. According to the agreement, during the first eight years of the deal Poland will have to pay only modest interest charges, with repayment of the loan deferred to between 2011 and 2015. There were European fighter manufacturers that could have been chosen, but the Poles chose an American plane.

¹²⁰ *Warsaw Voice* (2003).

to transatlantic security issues in a speech, at the National Defence University, in Washington, as follows:

We witness a gradual evolution of a notion of “defence.” We also participate in this process. Until recently defence was understood as protection of one’s own territory against an enemy. This approach allowed to develop such concepts as detention, deterrence or forward defence. However, these assumptions turned out to be outdated in the new security environment. The most fearsome enemy of civilization – terrorists – do not attack and do not occupy any territory.... What is then our new security agenda? To defend against such an enemy, we have to change the philosophy of our action: first, it is us who have to find the enemy...; second, once found, the enemy should be neutralized before they grow in strength; third, the means to achieve these ends are not tanks, but political, military, economic and financial measures, all combined; fourth, our efforts are worth nothing if done single-handed even by a great power.¹²¹

Thus, even though President Kwaśniewski explicitly stated that Poland stood together with the USA on the issue of a possible future Iraq war, he also implicitly criticized the USA for engaging in too unilateral a foreign policy. This becomes even more evident in the following extracts from the same speech:

And the international law must be observed. It is true even in the case of powerful states... Today’s leadership of the US in the world is not questioned and it should be exercised. But it should be clearly said that in order to be effective it has to be cooperative and based upon the rules acceptable by all the parties. If these rules are not applied then leadership can be perceived as hegemony or dominion.¹²²

Reciprocal loyalty?

There is no doubt that Polish-American relations have been close since the end of the Cold War, and especially since 11 September 2001, even though the political elite of Poland has occasionally expressed open criticism of the USA’s unilateralism. Poland’s open Atlanticism has not just been declaratory; Poland was prepared to back her pre-Iraq War diplomacy with a substantial military contribution to the USA-led coalition, first by joining the coalition with Special Forces, and later by leading the 9,000 troop Multinational Division Center-South (Stabilization Force) in Iraq from the begin-

¹²¹ Kwaśniewski (2003).

¹²² Ibid.

ning of September 2003, even though only 34% of Poles supported the Polish troops' participation.¹²³ Poland's own share of this Force was initially 2,500 soldiers. Together with Great Britain, Poland was the only European ally of the USA with a considerable political consensus over the invasion of Iraq. Even though it is true that public opinion was divided over the war, Poland experienced no mass anti-war demonstrations.¹²⁴ Poland has not been necessary to "*altercast*" in Zehfussian ways (see Chapter 3.1) by the USA.¹²⁵ Poland has always been willing to participate in foreign operations, whether under the command of Napoleon, Eisenhower and Montgomery, or currently under the command of the USA or NATO.¹²⁶

On 22 December 2006 Poland's President, Lech Kaczyński, extended the tour of the Polish Contingent in the International Stabilisation Force in Iraq until 31 December 2007. Already on 7 February 2006, during his visit to the USA, President Kaczyński stated that Poland would extend her military commitment in Iraq, even if other nations were withdrawing their troops or making plans to do so.¹²⁷ The strength of the Polish contingent was reduced from the initial 2,500 troops to 1,600 then to 1,400 and eventually to 900 troops by the end of 2007. On 21 December 2007, Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced that the mission of Polish troops in Iraq would be extended until 31 October 2008.¹²⁸

Poland expected material benefits in return for supporting the USA during the Iraq war, even though during his visit to the USA, in February 2007, President Kaczyński said that Poland had no second thoughts about joining the multinational invasion and occupation of Iraq. President Kaczyński expressed his hope that Poland's strong support for the USA would be rewarded with military aid, increased trade and other benefits: "*Poland is, and knows how to be, a loyal ally...but we also want a similar loyalty*

¹²³ CBOS (2003c), p. 2. See also CBOS (2003d), p. 1. In September support for Polish participation in Iraq rose to 40%. Nevertheless, the figure against was even higher at 53%.

¹²⁴ Zaborowski (2004), p. 11; *Warsaw Voice* (2008a).

¹²⁵ Zehfuss (2001), p. 329.

¹²⁶ Zaborowski (2004), pp. 7–8. See also Davies (2005b), pp. 202–206. In 1941–45 Polish Americans comprised 17 percent of America's enlisted men in the U.S. Armed Forces.

¹²⁷ Whitlock (2006).

¹²⁸ President of the Republic of Poland (2006b). See also Whitlock (2006); Wroński (2007); *Warsaw Voice* (2008a). See also Rubin (2008). Polish mission in Iraq ended already on 1 October 2008, even though some regular officers remained in Iraq to continue training of Iraqi forces.

shown toward us... We hope we will have a strategic partnership with the United States in areas that are most important for Poland as well."¹²⁹

But it would seem that Poland's 'cry for benefits' from the USA was unnecessary. The USA has provided Poland more bilateral military assistance than to any other country in Europe, even though the Poles have been disappointed with the USA's help. Between September 2003 and June 2006, the USA supported the Polish deployment in Iraq with \$450 million, in addition to \$1,000 million during the same period for supporting the Multinational Division Center-South, not forgetting the subsidized purchase of the F-16 interceptor fleet from the USA.¹³⁰

From territorial defence to global responsiveness – The Polish Armed Forces on the way to professionalism

Regardless of Poland's disappointment with the USA, there is still an "instinctive Atlanticism" at least among the Polish security policy elite, which rests mainly on the experiences of Polish (geo)political history.¹³¹ The turbulent history of Poland situated as she is between Germany and Russia/Soviet Union is characterized by inherent insecurity and vulnerability to external aggression. Official identity narratives (security policy doctrines) have been strongly concerned with and committed to the traditional issue of territorial defence ('Prepare for self-help'), at least up to November 2007, when Poland published her updated National Security Strategy. Poland has been a captive of her habituated tradition to maintain universal conscription and large armed forces, mostly capable only of homeland defence, even though the USA and NATO had both stressed the need to modify the Armed Forces of Poland so that they could become "a security provider", meaning that from the USA's and NATO's perspective Poland should develop the bulk of her armed forces so as to be more capable of participating in out-of-area operations jointly with her allies. The other message of the USA and NATO is that since the security threats of the new century are not those traditionally envisaged, large conscription-based armed forces, which do not produce the skills and capabilities that are needed in this new era, are a waste of money. Poland has responded to that 'call', albeit slowly, and President Lech Kaczyński has announced that Poland will

¹²⁹ Whitlock (2006). It is noteworthy that Kaczyński had criticized his predecessor, President Kwaśniewski, for not winning more concessions from Washington, such as contracts for Polish firms to help rebuild Iraq.

¹³⁰ *Warsaw Voice* (2006b).

¹³¹ Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), pp. 1009–1010. Poland's involvement in Iraq has brought Poland few benefits: for example, very few Polish companies have been involved in the reconstruction programmes and Poles still need visas when travelling to the USA.

have professional Armed Forces by 2010–2012. This statement was confirmed by the Polish 2007 National Security Strategy in November 2007.¹³²

The question of conscription versus professional Armed Forces in Poland is not merely about efficiency or the capability of participating in out-of-area operations jointly with her allies. Conscription is a highly identity-related issue. The question is not what benefits conscription can offer (the traditional approach), but what it signifies (the identity approach).¹³³ By promoting universal conscription in a period of new threats, Poland implicitly shows that she is prepared to defend her sovereignty and territorial integrity against some Other. Armed forces based on conscription are primarily meant for large scale traditional warfare, based on broad masses of people and territorial defence, but territorial defence is not an effective tool against new threats like global terrorism. In the Polish case, this means that Poland is still prepared to defend her sovereignty and territorial integrity above all against the Russian Other. This also means that the decision to pursue professional armed forces has been only partly adopted, since Poland would hardly have taken this decision on her own initiative. A conscription-based system is cheaper than a professional one, and Poland is not a state which could afford to maintain a force of 150,000 professional soldiers, at least not as well equipped and as operationally ready as, for example, the professional Armed Forces of the United Kingdom. Even the United Kingdom has had to cut down the strength of her armed forces, of about 100,000 troops, to uphold operational efficiency and readiness, largely due to ever more expensive military technology. However, Poles support the idea of professional Armed Forces. In December 1999, public support for the idea was 35%, whereas in January 2007 it was already 51%.¹³⁴

According to David Dunn, a member of Clinton's National Security Council (NSC), "*Poland's fixation on territorial defence was misplaced and that Warsaw needed to move on because there is Article 5. They could not stop them [Russians] even if they came, and they are not coming.*" The Bush administration, on the other hand, adopted a more understanding attitude towards the Polish insistence on territorial defence, realizing that Poland was "in a tough neighbourhood." However, even the Bush administration adopted the attitude that since Poland was a member of NATO, Poland should see things as being a part of an Alliance, and "Part of that means starting to think more about twenty first century threats." The fact was that Poland could initially offer only 80 Special Forces soldiers to the coalition

¹³² *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (2007), p. 24. See also Ministry of National Defence (2006).

¹³³ See, for example, Joenniemi (2006), p. 6.

¹³⁴ CBOS (2007b), p. 2.

effort in Afghanistan and not until January 2002, after they had had their first English language course.¹³⁵

Binding the USA to Poland - Security guarantees, Bases and Ballistic Missile Defence

Some traditional promoters of Poland's Atlanticist orientation, like Zbigniew Brzezinski, have expressed criticism regarding what he called "a too-excessive and divisive demonstration of loyalty", which he saw as unnecessary and damaging to Poland's relations with Germany and France. According to Brzezinski, Poland should never forget where it is and who its closest economic partners are – not the USA, but Germany and France. But the traditional Russian threat still haunts the hearts and souls of the Poles, and this makes them turn towards the USA. This is especially the case with the issue of Ballistic Missile Defence and possible U.S. bases on Polish soil. The Ballistic Missile Defence shield aims to protect the USA and her allies from attacks by countries like Iran. The Shield includes possible launching pods in Poland and a radar station in the Czech Republic. In December 2007 Prime Minister Donald Tusk wanted a 100-percent guarantee of Poland's security, if Poland accepted the interceptor missiles on Polish soil. Tusk did not specify what these guarantees meant, but there are at least four possibilities: (1) possible further U.S. bases in Poland, (2) strengthening Polish air-defence capabilities, (3) U.S. help in modernizing Poland's armed forces, and (4) more binding politico-military security guarantees to Poland by the USA.¹³⁶

When visiting the USA on 1 February 2008, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski stated that Poland wished to have a major NATO military base as part of the wider security relationship between Poland and the USA: "The prospect of American troops on our soil ... is something that we would welcome." That is actually nothing new, but the argument behind his remark lets one to understand that the Russian Other is still a haunting presence as one of the major signifiers of Polish foreign and defence policy interests and behaviour:

The only thing we have is a conference center. And we are a border country of NATO ... As many of you know, Poland has come under po-

¹³⁵ Dunn (2003), pp. 72–73.

¹³⁶ Zaborowski (2004), p. 11 and p. 27; *Warsaw Voice* (2008h). See also Applebaum (2003), p. A23; *WTOPnews.com* (2007). Poles were already enthusiastically waiting for U.S. military bases to be constructed in Poland in 2003. According to Anne Applebaum, "In one opinion poll, 72 percent of the population supported the idea, in another 89 percent. So powerful was this sudden upsurge of enthusiasm that the State Department felt compelled to deny that any "official talks" were taking place."

*litical pressure, and has even been blackmailed by some of our neighbours [Russia], who fiercely oppose this project [locating 10 interceptor missiles in Poland].*¹³⁷

Sikorski also stated that “*Poland has received U.S. promises of assistance in modernizing its armed forces. This brings the two countries closer to an agreement on deploying the U.S. anti-missile shield on Polish soil.*” Details regarding the agreement over the deployment of the ballistic missile shield installation on Polish soil were left open, but the USA promised to host a missile defence system (based on the Patriot or THAAD -systems) on Polish territory thus increasing Polish air-defence capability. To calm Russian opposition Sikorski stated that, “*The reinforced Polish air defences are not directed against anybody ... they are to enable Poland to be a stronger NATO ally with the U.S., to enable Poland to take part in operations, in out-of-area operations, in joint operations.*”¹³⁸ However the USA was not willing to sign a more binding bilateral treaty with Poland then because, as the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated: “*Poland already had strong security guarantees by dint of its NATO membership.*”¹³⁹

It was not until 20 August 2008, that the missile defence agreement was signed between Poland and the USA.¹⁴⁰ The Poles managed to get everything that Prime Minister Tusk had asked for in December 2007. According to the agreement and a Polish-U.S. declaration of strategic cooperation adopted at the same time,¹⁴¹ the USA will deploy ten ground-based ballistic missile interceptors in the *Ślupsk-Redzikowo* (see Picture 16) area and a U.S. Army Patriot battery (interim range air-defence) with the aim of establishing a garrison to support the Patriot battery by 2012, and will remain committed to assist Poland in modernizing her armed forces. In addition to these written politico-military security guarantees, the U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, stated, as a counter-argument to an earlier threat from a Russian general to target Poland,¹⁴² that:

It's also the case that when you threaten Poland, you perhaps forget that it is not 1988 ... It's 2008 and the United States has a ... firm treaty guarantee to defend Poland's territory as if it was the territory

¹³⁷ *Warsaw Voice* (2008h).

¹³⁸ *Warsaw Voice* (2008i).

¹³⁹ *Warsaw Voice* (2008j).

¹⁴⁰ *Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Deployment of Gound-Based Ballistic Missile Defense Interceptors in the Territory of the Republic of Poland* (2008).

¹⁴¹ *Declaration on Strategic Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Republic of Poland* (2008).

¹⁴² Hines (2008). It was the deputy chief of staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Anatoly Nogovitsyn, who threatened Poland on 15 August by saying that “*Poland, by deploying [the ballistic missile interceptors] is exposing itself to a strike - 100 per cent.*”

*of the United States. So it's probably not wise to throw these threats around.*¹⁴³

Public opinion – ‘West is best and the best West is the USA?’

Americans had been the most liked nationality in the Poles' hearts, in addition with the Italians and the French, until the end of 1990s. In the 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1998 opinion polls conducted by the CBOS, Americans were ranked first or second in the most favoured nations ranking. In October 1997, 64% of the Poles ranked the Americans as the most liked nation (Italians were second, the French third and Britons fourth). It is noteworthy that Germans were eleventh and Lithuanians twelfth in this ranking, whereas Russians, Belarusians or Ukrainians did not even get onto the list at all. The list consisted of 12 nations. In November 1998, 61% of the Poles thought the Americans were the most favoured nationality, Germans were the 11th, Lithuanians 12th, Belarusians 16th, Russians 18th, and Ukrainians 20th in a list totalling 22 nations. Other opinion polls of likes and dislikes, such as the one of July-August 2002, conducted by the CBOS, also clearly show that the USA is close to the Poles' heart; Poland may be the only country in Europe where the U.S. President, George Bush, has been the most liked foreign politician. George Bush was the most liked foreign politician among the Poles in July 2003, and in November 2007 was still in fourth place after Tony Blair, Angela Merkel and Viktor Yushchenko.¹⁴⁴

Poles expressed their strong support (69% of the Poles) for the American-led coalition's operations against terrorism in Afghanistan in December 2001. However, the Polish contingent's participation in the operation was not so popular among the Poles (see Chapter 8.3.1). A slight majority of the Poles initially supported the war in Iraq against Saddam Hussein's regime as well; in June 2003, 53% of the Poles were in favour of the war,¹⁴⁵ but the attitude towards Polish participation in the operation was much lower. In August 2003, 34% of the Poles supported Polish participation in the Iraq

¹⁴³ *Newsweek* (2008).

¹⁴⁴ CBOS (1997e); CBOS (1998d), p. 1; CBOS (2002a); CBOS (July 2003), p. 1; CBOS (2007h), pp. 1–2; CBOS (2007l), p. 1. See also Applebaum (2005), p. 35. According to Anne Applebaum, “In Poland, which is generally pro-American, people between the ages of 30 and 44 years old are even more likely to support America than their compatriots. In that age group, 58,5% say they feel the United States has a “mainly positive” influence in the world.” This is largely because this age group experienced American support during the period of martial law in the early 1980s. In the age group of 15 to 29 years old, ‘only’ 45,3% “say they feel the United States has a “mainly positive” influence in the world.” This age group knows the USA as a country for which it is difficult to get visas, contrary to the EU, where they no longer need visas at all.

¹⁴⁵ CBOS (2003a), p. 2.

Operation, whereas 60% were against. In October 2007, only 19% of the Poles supported Polish participation, and 81% were against.¹⁴⁶

From November 2003 on, the status of America as the Poles' favourite nation started to decline. This was caused, at least partly, by fear among the Poles that Muslim fundamentalists might commence terrorist attacks in Poland due to Poland's commitment to Iraq (75% of the Poles thought so in November 2003).¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, the status of Americans in the eyes of the Polish people was also getting lower due to unfulfilled hopes about the benefits from Poland's alliance with the USA. All this resulted in positive feelings for the Americans falling below 50% in 2004; the figure had never been so low, but went even lower in October 2006 (49%), and in September 2007, when it fell to 44%. *Even though Americans occupy a lower and lower position in these opinion polls, Americans are still seen in a positive light. However, this may imply that Poles are becoming more European in their sentiments.*¹⁴⁸

The possible establishment of American or NATO military bases and installations on Polish soil, especially the U.S. anti-missile installations as part of the U.S. anti-missile shield, divides Polish opinion. In February-March 1999, 32% of the Poles accepted the idea of NATO-bases on Polish soil, whereas in February 2000 the figure was 35% and in February 2004, 40%.¹⁴⁹ In September 2004, 47% of the Poles supported the idea of U.S. anti-missile installations being placed in Poland, and in December 2005, 52%. This support had already declined by February 2007, when only 28% of the Poles supported the project.¹⁵⁰ In May 2008 support for the project was still only 32%.¹⁵¹

8.3.3. The European Union as the 'Secondary West'?

*"The stronger Poland felt and shared the family feelings of Europe, the happier and more glorious it was; the more it separated itself from Europe, the more visible its weakness became."*¹⁵²

Poland presented her EU application on 5 April 1994.¹⁵³ On 15 July 1997 the European Commission presented evaluation statements (*avis*) vis-à-vis

¹⁴⁶ CBOS (2007k), p. 3.

¹⁴⁷ CBOS (2003f), p. 1.

¹⁴⁸ CBOS (2007h), pp. 1–2. See also CBOS (2006g), p. 2; CBOS (2006i), p. 1. In June 2006, the USA was ranked as the most reliable country in Poland.

¹⁴⁹ CBOS (2004b), p. 2.

¹⁵⁰ CBOS (2006b), pp. 3–4; CBOS (2007a), p. 1; CBOS (2007g), p. 5.

¹⁵¹ CBOS (2008c), p. 3.

¹⁵² Buzek (1999), p. 1. Jerzy Buzek quotes here the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz.

¹⁵³ European Commission (1997b), p. 110.

the individual applicant countries about their chances of gaining membership.¹⁵⁴ The Commission recommended that membership negotiations should be started with Poland, Hungary, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Slovakia was initially excluded since she did not meet the political criteria (i.e. instability of her institutions).¹⁵⁵ On 1 April 2004 Poland obtained EU membership together with the Baltic countries, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia as well as Malta and Cyprus. The latest enlargement round of the EU took place in 2007, when Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU.

Poland's current policies towards the EU and on occasion 'arrogant' behaviour and statements concerning, for example, common European values (European Convention, 2003), the debate over the voting weight of Poland in the European Council of Ministers (*Treaty of Lisbon*, 2007), as well as Poland's concern to create a common energy policy for the EU, mirror deep Polish emotions reflecting her historical experience when she has tried to find her place on the European map of nations. Norman Davies has described the situation as follows:

When a Pole presumed to express exactly the same opinions, or to demand the same rights for the Poles as other nations enjoyed, he [she] was regularly treated as a "rebel", a "dreamer", an "extremist", a "fanatic". By challenging the authority of the major continental empires, he [she] provoked much greater hostility, and a very special response. Thus, whereas the nineteenth century was an Age of Reform and Improvement for Britain, of Expansion for America, of Might and Empire for Prussia and Russia, and of national liberation for the Germans and Italians, it was, for the Poles, an era of defeat, isolation, and humiliation. It was "the Babylonian Captivity", "the Sojourn in the Wilderness", "the Descent into the Tomb", "the Journey through Hell", "the Time on the Cross".¹⁵⁶

In the early 1990s, Poles considered Western Europe as being their "European home", or family, even. Soon it was realized that Western Europe was actually a "European house" of relativity, pluralism and secularism.¹⁵⁷ For Poland, EU-integration has been largely about adaptation, but EU membership, as well as NATO membership, has offered Poland the possibility of engaging with Russia diplomatically without fear of renewed Russian domination.¹⁵⁸ The Polish State and the Catholic Church in Poland have of-

¹⁵⁴ European Commission (1997c), pp. 14–60.

¹⁵⁵ Kosterna (1998), p. 33. Slovakia was considered as fulfilling the economic criteria.

¹⁵⁶ Davies (2005b), p. 14.

¹⁵⁷ Sztompka (2000), p. 2; Mach (2000a), p. 1.

¹⁵⁸ Dunn (2003), p. 67.

ficially recognized and approved the core values of the EU,¹⁵⁹ even though they have not managed to include *Invocatio Dei* in the core values of the EU. As Poles feel a morally superior towards Russia (“moral superiority complex”), the same sentiment prevails towards the EU and Western Europe as well. The Polish Christian nation is God’s chosen one on earth, and it is Poland’s task to propagate Christian values among the “more sinful members of the Western European members of the Christian family.”¹⁶⁰ The same “moral superiority complex” unites the Polish Catholic Church and the State in such a way that it is far from clear which one owns the primary discourse towards Europe.¹⁶¹ Or is it that these discourses are congruent and in union, which seems more probable. Prime Minister Marek Belka crystallized this union in the following, on 24 June 2004:

*I am convinced – and this is the stance which the Polish delegation defended – that a respect for history dictated that the Christian traditions in Europe should have been included in the preamble to the Constitutional Treaty. That is a piece of truth about us. It’s a pity that we remained alone in this matter. But at the same time, guarantees for a respect of the identity, rights and status of churches and religious associations and communities have been included in the Treaty in a manner that has no precedent in the EU legal system.*¹⁶²

The “moral superiority complex” also refers to a historical “complex of betrayal by Europe” (i.e. the grand-narrative, ‘Between East and West, the Katyń Forest, Warsaw uprising and Yalta’), which can be traced in the discourses of all the ‘sub-identity holders’ of Polish society.¹⁶³ The third ‘complex’ of Poland vis-à-vis EU integration is an “inferiority complex”, which refers to Poland’s lower GDP/capita and overall weaker economy compared to Western European Member States of the EU; Poland does not quite fit into the group of large member states like the United Kingdom, Germany and France, even though she has a population of about 40 million. Poland is large but economically weak. The “inferiority complex” has some reference points to the general attitude and behaviour towards Germany as well (see Chapter 8.3.4).¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁹ The European Convention (2003), Preface.

¹⁶⁰ Eberts (2004), p. 3.

¹⁶¹ See, for example, Hobsbawn (2000), p. 124.

¹⁶² The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2004). See also Buzek (1999), p. 12.

¹⁶³ Osica (2003), p. 23.

¹⁶⁴ See, for example, Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), p. 88.

The “moral superiority complex” and the regional context – the EU Constitution and the debate over European values

Even after a short study of Polish societal discourse, one may easily notice that religion and the traditional concept of a family as the union of a man and a woman prevails, indicating that, despite Poland’s steady Europeanization, it may be difficult for some Polish core values to obtain wider approval or acceptance. The general trend of secularisation in many countries in Western and Northern Europe has not affected Poland.¹⁶⁵

To the Polish Catholic Church, the EU is a challenge *par excellence*. The Catholic Church sees the EU primarily as a historical and cultural community “based on the lasting ideas and tradition of Judeo-Christian values, Roman law and Greek philosophy.”¹⁶⁶ The Catholic Church has conditionally supported EU-integration, but the secularization, or pluralism, of the EU must have been a disappointment for the Church. From the point of view of defence identity, the Polish grand-narrative of “*Antemurale Christianitatis*” is still alive in Poland, and Poles have tried to include the message in Europe’s core values. Even though the whole of Europe would then be the “*Antemurale Christianitatis*”, it is Poland, however, which has inherited the original task and moral responsibility, given by God, as something exceptional among other nations, of the outer bastion of Christianity:

*May they [Poles] continue to hold fast to their ancestral faith in the face of all the attacks. May they strive earnestly to live up to the Christian moral code. They should attentively consider this the greatest glory of their country: to imitate the unbreakable constancy of their ancestors and make Poland ever faithful, the outer bastion of Christianity ... God Himself seems to have entrusted this special task to the Polish people.*¹⁶⁷

Poles saw and see themselves as citizens of Christian Europe, but actually there is no Christian Europe anymore, as Poles discovered during the process of the Legislative Convention, in 2003. The basic argument of Polish pro-EU integrationists in support of *Invocatio Dei* was that the “founding fathers” of the EU, Jean Monet, Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi, and Konrad Adenauer were all Catholics.¹⁶⁸ The content of Poland’s proposal of *Invocatio Dei* was analogous to the statement of her 1997 Constitution: “The Union’s values include the values of those who believe in God as the

¹⁶⁵ CBOS (2005b), p. 2.

¹⁶⁶ Eberts (2004), p. 4.

¹⁶⁷ Pope Pius XII (1957), Paragraph 32.

¹⁶⁸ Kosicki (2003), p. 67; Koronacki (1994), p. 2.

source of truth, justice, good and beauty as well as those who do not share such a belief but respect these universal values from other sources.”¹⁶⁹

The idea that a Christian God was a basic European value was eventually rejected.¹⁷⁰ The EU is essentially forcing Poland to confront its own ideas about religious toleration, which is desirable sooner rather than later, since “it will minimize the long-term confusion generated by globalization and libertarianism.”¹⁷¹ According to Joseph Borrell Fontelles, a member of the Legislative Convention, the Pope’s demand of *Invocatio Dei* would have meant “*an important change in a political project, which is inherently secular from the beginning ... This was the only way to build a shared future for communities with catholic, orthodox or protestant Christian dominants, among which there are already 10 million Muslims.*” And even though Europe has “deep Judeo-Christian” roots we believe in many Gods in Europe and elsewhere as well: “It is true that the Polish Constitution proclaims God as a source of truth and justice; the Scandinavian countries are officially Lutheran; the British trust that God will save the Queen; and the Americans print on their currency “In God we trust”.” Furthermore, Fontelles continues, “If we are to celebrate historical heritages we should remember the whole story: with its religious wars; the massacres of the Crusades; ... and the Inquisition’s *autos-da-fé* [burning at the stake for heresy]; Galileo and the forced evangelisations; the pogroms and the turning of a blind eye to fascism.”¹⁷²

Finally coming home?

Nevertheless, EU integration has been a regional success story by forcing Poland at least to adapt her behaviour to shared norms, which during the “*longue durée*” may lead to an internalized change of the borders of Otherness. In this context the common currency and frontier-free Schengen-Europe are to be considered as identity issues as well. Poland has not adopted the Euro as her currency yet (2008), but the “inferiority complex” vis-à-vis the ‘old’ Member States of the EU is weakening as Poland joined the Schengen area on 21 December 2007. Checkpoints at Poland’s borders were abolished with four of her seven neighbours (Germany, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) on the same day, which marked Poland’s full integration into the EU (except for the common currency). President Lech Kaczyński stated in his speech on 21 December that:

¹⁶⁹ The European Convention (2003), suggestion for amendment of Article 2.

¹⁷⁰ CBOS (2003e), p. 1. In October 2003, 56% of the Poles still insisted on including Christian values in the Constitution.

¹⁷¹ Kosicki (2003), p. 67; Koronacki (1994), p. 2.

¹⁷² Fontelles (2003), p. 2 [my Italics].

*A dream that 20 years ago seemed impossible has come true ... Integration is complete. Every Pole will be able to travel within Europe far and wide ... The citizens of Poland are no longer second-class citizens of the European Union.*¹⁷³

At the same time Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated that “The extension of the Schengen area is a triumph of freedom”, and that “The bad times for Europe are gone for good.” However, while checks on internal borders have been abolished, Poland now has EU borders with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. This does not significantly change travelling to the east for the Poles, but has already changed travel arrangements for Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, who have to pay more for visas.¹⁷⁴ From the identity point of view, the more tightly guarded frontiers between the EU (Poland), Ukraine and Belarus may weaken the mental bondages of the Polish minorities in Belarus and Ukraine with Poland.¹⁷⁵

ESDP as pragmatic form of cooperation

The crisis in transatlantic relations that erupted post-9/11 presented Poland with a choice that it did not want to make. Poland based her response on two sorts of arguments, the first historical and the second a mixture of political and economic calculations, based on a seemingly ‘rational’ cost-benefit assessment of the current situation. The open support of Poland for the USA’s action in Iraq surprised many of Poland’s European allies, causing irritation in Germany and France and a new label on ‘Poland’s forehead’: “America’s Trojan donkey.”¹⁷⁶ But the political calculations, which led Poland to become one of the USA’s closest allies during the war in Iraq, were challenged by a string of disappointments after the war. After EU membership in 2004, Poland increasingly adopted, at least during the era of President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, a more positive attitude towards deepening the CFSP as well as developing the ESDP.¹⁷⁷

As the EU is becoming an important security provider, as well as being more integrated than other multilateral frameworks, one might reasonably expect that the EU’s security approach will also have impacts on the na-

¹⁷³ *Warsaw Voice* (2008b).

¹⁷⁴ *Warsaw Voice* (2008g). Polish border inspections have tightened at Poland’s eastern border crossings since Poland entered the Schengen zone, which has had unwelcome effects on the smoothness of cross-border traffic. According to *The Warsaw Voice*, Ukrainian “truck drivers are up in arms over a situation in which they have to wait up to 60 hours just to cross into Poland from Ukraine.”

¹⁷⁵ *Warsaw Voice* (2008b).

¹⁷⁶ Zaborowski (2004), p. 11.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

tional level. The national content of security and the borders of Otherness are under at least discursive pressure by the EU. In many ways the EU is to be seen as a ‘process of peace’, not only because it forces the member-states to adapt their national interests and behaviour to the larger social rationale, but also because EU-integration is largely about hope of learning, and thus it may affect national identities as well.¹⁷⁸

The problem here is that countries like Poland, who still tend to hold tight to the traditional definition of security, at least implicitly, may also tend to ignore the EU as a significant security actor. Poland surely has good historical reasons for this view, and when it comes to European military capabilities and European defence identity, Poles for the most part are engaged in a discourse about NATO. However, Poland has explicitly expressed the adoption of security in its wider sense, meaning that the EU’s “potential to coordinate diverse tools of security policy – economic, political and military – makes it one of the most important security actors of the post-Cold War world.”¹⁷⁹

The crucial concern for Poland has been that the rhetoric of the ESDP, without an economic commitment to build up military capability, may alienate the USA without offering anything instead. Given this concern, the Polish position on ESDP has been one of conditional acceptance only. Before EU membership the then Defence Minister Bronisław Komorowski explained Poland’s security policy priorities by saying that:

*We want to maintain ties with the USA and its involvement in Europe. At the same time we support development of the European security and defence system. We want these activities to be harmonious.*¹⁸⁰

Nevertheless, Poland actively takes part in, for example, EU Battlegroups “as a consequence of our support to ESDP”, as the Chief of the Polish GS, General Franciszek Gągor, said in his presentation on 4 February 2008 in London. Between 2010 and 2015 Poland will participate in three Battlegroups: in 2010 in the German-Latvian-Lithuanian-Polish-Slovak Battlegroup, in 2013 in the “Weimar Battlegroup” comprising German-French-Polish troops, and in 2014 in the “Visegrad Battlegroup” comprising Czech-Slovak-Hungarian-Polish as well as Ukrainian troops.¹⁸¹

Public Opinion – towards being a constructive European

¹⁷⁸ Rieker (2006), p. 511.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 512.

¹⁸⁰ Dunn (2003), p. 77. See also Lang (2003), p. 108.

¹⁸¹ Gągor (2008).

Despite the “moral superiority complex” of the Polish State and the Catholic Church vis-à-vis European integration, the Polish people in general have supported the idea of Poland’s integration into the EU, at least since September 1997, when 72% of the Poles would have voted “for” in a referendum concerning EU membership.¹⁸² In August 2004, 39% of the Poles considered the EU has brought Poland more gains than losses; in May 2005, 46% of the Poles thought so, and in April 2006 54% of the Poles thought so.¹⁸³

After EU membership support for the EU did not decrease among the Poles, quite the reverse. In April 2005 support for the EU was 79% and reached its highest figure ever in April 2007, when 86% of the Poles supported membership, whereas only 7% were against it. The tendency has been clear from the very beginning of Poland’s accession to the EU. Immediately after accession, in April 2004, 64% of the Poles supported membership, whereas in September 2006, the figure was already 83%.¹⁸⁴

Poles are satisfied with the EU primarily because EU membership brought with it a stable market economy, law and order, and human rights. Being part of the Christian European tradition is not mentioned so frequently, according to the CBOS. It seems that the elementary Western values of law and order, and human rights are more important than formally having a democratic system, “which just means compliance with democratic procedures and mechanisms of electing the government.”¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, opinion polls show that Poles in general do not long for any special status in the EU as was promoted especially by Jarosław Kaczyński’s Government; 60% of the Poles consider that Poland’s position in the EU should be equal with the other member-states.¹⁸⁶

When Poland joined the EU, public opinion showed that Spain was perceived as Poland’s best ally in the EU (45%), whereas France (54%) and Germany (57%) were perceived as limiting Poland’s ambitions of playing a significant role in Europe. In September 2006, however, 49% of the Poles thought that Poland should cooperate “on a permanent basis” in the EU with Germany, whereas the figure for France was 31%, the United King-

¹⁸² CBOS (1997d), p. 1.

¹⁸³ CBOS (2005d), p. 1; CBOS (2006d), p. 2.

¹⁸⁴ CBOS (2005c), p. 1; CBOS (2006h), p. 2; CBOS (2007c), p. 1. See also the European Commission (2007), p. 3. Eurobarometer 68 opinion poll, conducted during the autumn of 2007, records ‘only’ 71% support for the EU by the Poles. However, Poles support the EU and place their trust in the EU much more than Europeans on average (48%).

¹⁸⁵ CBOS (2004b), p. 2.

¹⁸⁶ CBOS (2007c), p. 2. Only 1% of the Poles would prefer Poland to be one of the states with the strongest position and biggest influence in the EU.

dom 25%, and Spain only 6%. On the other hand, Spain was the most liked nation among the Poles in October 2006, which suggests that even though Spain is the most liked nation, Germany is seen as offering more pragmatic cooperation. The United Kingdom (28%), the Czech Republic (22%), France (19%), Lithuania (16%), Germany (14%), as well as Ireland (14%) are considered (July-August 2007) the best allies of Poland in the EU among the Poles.¹⁸⁷

8.3.4. Germany as the ‘Secondary Other’

Polish-German relations go back about 1,000 years. These relations have been characterized by Polish perceptions of Germans as expansionists. For almost ten centuries the Germans expanded to the east until a combined Polish-Lithuanian army, under the command of the Polish king Władysław Jagiełło defeated the Teutonic knights¹⁸⁸ in the battle of *Grunwald* (Tannenberg; in Polish *Stebark*, in north-eastern Poland; formerly East-Prussia), on 15 July 1410, which is one of the cornerstones of Polish national identity.¹⁸⁹

The calamity of WWII left Poland with a fear of a resurgent Germany, and current relations are still affected by historical disputes concerning such issues as mutual financial claims and the construction of the Centre against Expulsion by the Germans. Different views over the European Constitution and military intervention in Iraq have also been dividing issues, as well as the agreement between Russia and Germany on the construction of the Baltic gas pipeline bypassing Polish territory.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ CBOS (2006c), p. 1 (multiple choice poll); CBOS (2006h), p. 2; CBOS (2006i), p. 1; CBOS (2007f), p. 2.

¹⁸⁸ Davies (2005a), p. 72. The Teutonic knights were invited to Poland in 1226, but soon posed a threat to the stability and integrity of Poland. They called themselves *Deutschritter* (German Knights), but the Poles called them *Krzyżacy* (the Black Crusaders) due to the black cross on their mantles. The full name of the organization was “The Order of the Hospital of the Blessed Virgin Mary of the German House of Jerusalem.”

¹⁸⁹ Davies (2005a), pp. 98–99. According to Davies, in German mythology the battle was a catastrophe not avenged until the German victory over the Russians at nearby Tannenberg in August 1914. See also, for example, Sienkiewicz (2005 [1900]), p. 30 and p. 38 and p. 103. Sienkiewicz’s novel, *The Knights of the Cross* (*Krzyżacy*), a story of the battles and hatred between the Polish-Lithuanian *Szlachta* and the Teutonic order over Lithuania in fourteenth and fifteenth centuries belongs to the national heritage of Polish literature. Like Adam Mickiewicz’s *Pan Tadeusz*, *Krzyżacy* also reveals something about Polish attitudes towards the Germans: “Therefore, gracious lady, I think that if there be another war, even if all Germans help the Knights of the Cross, we will overcome them, because our nation is greater and the Lord Jesus will give us more strength in our bones.” (p. 30); “It is evident that God gave them [Germans] stones for hearts.” (p. 38); “We are not like the Germans, who take back what they give.” (p. 102)

¹⁹⁰ Prizel (1998), pp. 112–114; CBOS (2006a), p. 2; CBOS (2006e), p. 2.

At the end of the Cold War, Poles understood that the only way to guarantee normal relations with Germany was to support East-Germany's integration into the West, and later the ever tighter integration of the new unified Germany into the EU to avoid Poland's historical dilemma of being in between two "expansionist" powers.¹⁹¹ A Polish-German agreement on their national borders came into force on 14 November 1990.¹⁹² On 17 June 1991 this was followed by a treaty of friendly relations and cooperation.¹⁹³

After the Cold War, Poland's foreign and security policy was affected by at least three factors that primarily involved Germany, which had the power to mobilize Polish defence identity. The first was Germany's demographic and economic power in Central and Eastern Europe. The second was the Polish assumption of a natural and deeply rooted German "*Drang nach Osten*" mentality. The third reflects one of Poland's historical dilemmas; namely, that whereas Poland is a gateway to the east for Germany (see Picture 14), she is at the same time a gateway to the west for Russia (see Picture 15).¹⁹⁴

Germany has played the key role in making Poland's NATO and EU membership possible. It was in Germany's interest to promote NATO's eastern enlargement up to 1999, and the EU's eastern enlargement up to 2004; after the NATO enlargement of 1999, Germany no longer stood on the eastern rim of NATO, and the same can be said about her place in Europe after the EU's eastern enlargement of 2004.¹⁹⁵

Polish-German relations improved immediately after the ending of the Cold War, with agreements on their national borders and neighbouring treaty. But nobody expected that the German Bundeswehr would commence joint military exercises on Polish soil as early as 1994, which was accepted "as something natural" in Poland. Germany has also participated in the process of modernizing the Armed Forces of Poland by transferring 128 Leopard tanks ("Leopardisation") from Germany to equip the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade in *Świętoszów*, in south-western Poland.¹⁹⁶ A more important example of the improvement in their relations was Poland's warm reception of President Roman Herzog's statement during ceremonies marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising to the effect that "*the German nation asks for forgiveness.*" At the same occasion *Russia did not ask for forgiveness over the same issue*, even though it was expected in Poland, for obvious reasons. Russia in so doing would have admitted that the Soviet

¹⁹¹ Prizel (1998), p. 117.

¹⁹² Kukulka (1995), p. 95. See also Drozd (2001), p. 99.

¹⁹³ Stefanowicz (1995), p. 58; Prizel (1998), p. 118; Drozd (2001), p. 99.

¹⁹⁴ Stefanowicz (1995), p. 57.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 58; Zaborowski (1998), p. 462.

¹⁹⁶ Michta (2003), p. 45. See also Lang (2003), p. 111.

Union had stopped its summer offensive in 1944 on the east side of the Vistula in Warsaw and let the Germans kill the Polish resistance fighters first, before continuing the offensive towards Berlin.¹⁹⁷

Over the “*longue durée*” Germany’s and the Germans’ role in Polish identity construction has varied and is still in flux. During the Second Republic, the “*Piłsudskian*” elite considered Russia as the ‘essential Other’ and Poland as doomed to fight a perpetual struggle with Russia, whereas the “*Dmowskian*” elite perceived Germany as the ‘essential Other’, and other Slavs as possible friends to help in containing Germany (see Chapter 6.2.3). However, the narrated threat of Russia seems more permanent than the German one; Russia is the current ‘essential Other’, whereas Germany has turned out to be Poland’s most sought after trading partner, even though Poles are still very sensitive to anything concerning German-Polish relations during WWII. There are at least two history-related issues that attract attention in the Polish identity discourse, capable of mobilizing the negative nationalist side of the Polish defence identity, namely, the status of the German expellees from the current Polish areas of *Pomorze*, *Śląsk* and *Gdańsk* (see Picture 16) as well as the German-Russian Baltic gas pipeline.

The Deportee-question and German claims regarding lost properties

In the Polish identity and security discourses, it has recently been argued that there a radical change in the nature of German patriotism has occurred; Germans are more nationally conscious nowadays.¹⁹⁸ After WWII, 15 million ethnic Germans were pushed out of their homes in Eastern Europe by the Polish and Czech Governments. The German League of Expellees established a foundation called the Centre against Expulsions (*Zentrum Gegen Vertreibungen*) on 6 December 2000, “in the spirit of reconciliation with all neighbouring peoples.”¹⁹⁹ The establishment of the centre in Berlin to commemorate the agonies of the expellees, not only Germans, raised a public debate in Poland in 2003 over the justification of commemorating the German expellees, and the debate has continued ever since.²⁰⁰ There is also the issue of German accusations against the Poles for crimes they committed against German expellees in 1945.

¹⁹⁷ Stefanowicz (1995), p. 58; Zaborowski (1998), p. 462.

¹⁹⁸ Rak and Muszyński (2007), pp. 1–3.

¹⁹⁹ *Zentrum Gegen Vertreibungen*.

²⁰⁰ Tzortsis (2003). See also Bartoszewski (2003), pp. 35–36. According to Bartoszewski, “we could also establish a centre to deal with the history of Polish-German relations since 1772, i.e. since the first partition of Poland, and everything that followed, which includes Germanisation, fighting against the Catholic Church, ... the ban to speak Polish or the closing down of Polish schools.”

During his visit to Saarland, Germany, in December 2006 President Lech Kaczyński stated that “while the expulsion was undoubtedly a very painful experience, it was certainly incomparable with the Holocaust and with the losses suffered by those countries that had been invaded [Poland among others]”, and that “one ought to have regard to the fact that the expulsion came as a consequence of the war started by Germany.” President Kaczyński also pointed out that he considered the establishment of the centre as promoting some kind of revisionism and obscuring the definition of victims and perpetrators. He did not deny “that there were subjective sufferings also among the German population”, but “the expellees did survive, while millions of Polish citizens who were not guilty of the war did not.”²⁰¹

In September 2004, the Polish Sejm, referring to German property claims against Poland, adopted a resolution stating that to date Poland had not received war reparations from Germany. The Sejm urged Prime Minister Marek Belka’s Government to take action in this respect, but Belka refused to do so.²⁰² This issue has constantly upset Polish-German relations in the last decade. In 2006, the “Prussian Trust”, an organization representing German post-war expellees, submitted a claim against Poland to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, accusing Poland of crimes during the forced evacuation of Germans in 1945 from what is now Polish territory. Poland’s Foreign Minister Anna Fortyga replied to the accusations by stating that it was the German attack on Poland that began WWII, which caused “irreparable losses and sufferings to the Polish state and nation”, meaning that the right address for seeking compensation for the crimes mentioned by the “Prussian Trust”, would be the German Government. Furthermore, the Polish discourse on this issue raised the question as to whether any Member of the Polish Parliament had ever made similar claims against the Ukrainians because of the massacre of Poles in *Volhynia*, in western Ukraine (see Picture 16), by the Ukrainians between 1942 and 1945, and because of the loss of Polish properties in Ukraine.²⁰³

Ghosts of the past - the gas pipeline issue

In December 2006, President Lech Kaczyński was asked why he had insistently objected to German-Russian plans to build a gas pipeline on the seabed of the Baltic Sea. President Kaczyński replied that it would be “naïve to believe that Russia could not use energy as a vehicle of control”, and that “Gazprom is not a special case among private-sector enterprises.” President Kaczyński also wondered why “*nobody has explained to us as yet why*

²⁰¹ The President of the Republic of Poland (2006a). See also Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), p. 81.

²⁰² CBOS (2004d), pp. 1–2.

²⁰³ Rak and Muszyński (2007), pp. 1–3.

Germany has chosen the more expensive option, i.e. a submarine pipeline, rather than an overland pipeline. Also, the proposed leg to Poland would only make us more dependent on Russian energy.” Moreover, President Kaczyński stated: *“the most dangerous thing out of what I have recently heard is a claim that Russia has two strategic partners, the European Union and Germany. And I had believed that Germany was part of the EU.”*²⁰⁴

Public opinion – pragmatic cooperation, but deep negative sentiments

Liking and disliking other nations is largely based on stereotypes, which can be detected in opinion polls. There are stereotypes like the rich and civilized ‘West’ and the poor, underdeveloped ‘East’ and ‘South’. In Polish opinion polls, the ‘West’ has positive connotations.²⁰⁵ In September 2007 Poles liked the Irish, English, Czechs, French and Italians most, whereas the Germans were ranked half-way in the table. Polish attitudes to the Germans have changed during the last few decades. In early 1990 Poles clearly disliked Germans, whereas in the late 1990s a majority now liked the Germans; in November 1993, 56% of the Poles thought that the biggest threat to Poland was posed by Germany (30% believed it was Russia), whereas in September 1997 opinions had totally changed: only 6% of the Poles thought that the biggest threat was Germany whilst 40% believed it was Russia. Germany’s position in this discussion changes, since in June 2001, 35% of the Poles pointed to Germany as a potential threat. But even then it was Russia that the majority of the Poles (64%) held as the major threat.²⁰⁶

For now, Germany has become Poland’s largest trading partner, and joint military exercises between Polish and German troops have become commonplace. On the political level, both countries have agreed, despite occasional suspicions and anxieties in both countries, that in order to sustain their post-WWII European identity layer, they must accept one another. However, in Polish public opinion Germany still occupies quite a low position in their ranking of most liked nations, even though Germany is undoubtedly part of the West. One could find several reasons for this, but what attracted attention in the Polish media (as well as in the German media) lately, was Jarosław Kaczyński’s statement in June 2007 that Poland’s

²⁰⁴ President of the Republic of Poland (2006a).

²⁰⁵ See, for example, CBOS (1997b). In August 1997, 58% of the Poles were convinced that in the event of a direct threat to Poland’s independence, western countries would help her (28% were sceptical).

²⁰⁶ Prizel (1998), pp. 123–124 and Młyniec (2001), p. 54. Ireland, even though quite distant and not generally recognized in Poland, opened her labour markets to the Poles immediately after Poland’s accession to the EU, and consequently many Poles went to work in Ireland. See also CBOS (2001b), p. 3.

population would be 66 million instead of the current 38 million, if Germany had not invaded Poland in 1939 and committed terrible crimes against the Poles between 1939 and 1945.²⁰⁷

Is Polish-German reconciliation possible?	Time of the conducted opinion poll													
	Feb '90	Feb '91	May '92	June '94	May '95	May '96	Apr '99	May '00	Sept '02	Oct '04	June '05	May '06	June '07	June '08
	Percentage													
Possible	47	63	51	58	60	65	73	76	80	62	74	80	80	71
Not possible	50	34	46	41	39	33	26	23	19	30	24	16	14	18
Difficult to say	2	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	2	4	6	11

Table 6: The chances for Polish-German reconciliation?²⁰⁸

Nevertheless, Poles are optimistic regarding the future of Polish-German relations. In January 2006, 37% of the Poles thought that relations would improve in the near future, 46% thought they would remain unchanged and only 4% thought they would deteriorate.²⁰⁹ Currently, the vast majority of Poles believes in the possibility of Polish-German reconciliation. This sentiment has not been always so strong throughout the whole post-Cold War era. There have been sharp variations in Polish sentiments on this issue. For example, in September 1997 (even though not shown in the Table), 25% of the Poles considered that reconciliation with Germany was absolutely, or rather impossible, although a majority of the Poles (58%) considered that Germany should be Poland's main economic partner; the second desirable partner was the USA and the third, Russia. Germany was also considered as desirable a political partner as the USA (militarily the most preferred partner for the Poles was the USA).²¹⁰

8.3.5. *Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Poland's "Imperial Complex"*

Most member-states of the EU, with the exception of the Baltic States, probably do not share Poland's view that the EU should stop prioritising Russia, and start to consider Ukraine, Moldova and potentially even Belarus as equal partners. For example, Germany rejects the idea of even a remote prospect of granting EU membership to Ukraine. Despite these difficulties, it is unlikely that Poland will abandon the idea of westernising her

²⁰⁷ CBOS (2007h), pp. 1–2; *New Europe – The European Weekly* (2007).

²⁰⁸ CBOS (2008f), p. 10.

²⁰⁹ CBOS (2006a), p. 2.

²¹⁰ CBOS (1997b).

eastern neighbourhood, which has come to be seen in Poland as a *raison d'état*.²¹¹

As was stated earlier, one of the key issues in the Polish-Russian relationship is the Polish insistence on highlighting Russia's unwillingness to abandon her claims over the former Soviet-Republics, especially over Ukraine, but it may be hypocritical to say that Poland does not have any such claims of her own, at least implicitly (i.e. Poland's "imperial complex"). There is still the living concept of "*Kresy identity*" in the Polish identity structure, which refers to the mythical eastern borderlands (*Kresy Wschodnie*) of the former Poland, meaning areas of current Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. Especially the Ukrainian city of Lviv (Polish Lwów) and the Lithuanian capital Vilnius (Polish Wilno) raises deep sentiments and longing for Poland's glorious past among the Poles. Furthermore, belonging to the Poland's "imperial complex", the mythical "*Kresy identity*" is not only living among the former inhabitants of those areas, but also among Poles who were born after WWII.²¹²

The Polish "imperial complex" has included a paternalistic, or even arrogant, attitude toward Poland's eastern neighbours that were historically part (or rather partially part) of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. According to Zdzisław Mach, Poles believe that they brought western civilization to these former Polish eastern provinces, inhabited by large Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian populations."²¹³ Even though Poland officially has good neighbourly relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, as well as official cooperative forms, for example, in the field of peace-keeping/crises-management, this attitude is entrenched in Polish culture, especially in literature, and it can be noticed in opinion polls as well. Poland signed neighbouring treaties with Ukraine on 22 May 1992, with Belarus on 23 June 1992 and with Lithuania on 26 April 1994, but due to these largely historic reasons Poland must still be cautious not to tread on anybody's toes, when acting in the east. However, Poland's eastern policy has been relatively successful in Lithuania and Ukraine, but the same cannot be said vis-à-vis the Russian Federation and Belarus.²¹⁴

What keeps up the Polish "*Kresy identity*" is, at least partly, the large ethnic Polish minorities still living in Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. After WWII, as a consequence of the drawing of new borders, half a million

²¹¹ Zaborowski (2004), p. 24.

²¹² Zarycki (2004), p. 619. In the immediate pre-WWII period, *Kresy* areas were settled largely in the ancient Roman way by Polish ex-soldiers (with their families), who fought under the Polish flag against the Bolsheviks in 1919–1921.

²¹³ Mach (200a), p. 10.

²¹⁴ Zarycki (2004), p. 602; Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), p. 1021; Kukulka (1995), p. 94.

Ukrainians were sent to the Soviet Union from the new Poland by mid-1946, and some 150,000 were settled internally in 1947. By the end of 1946, more than 1,000,000 Poles were repatriated from the ex-Polish areas incorporated into the Soviet Union. At the same time, by 1950, 6,000,000 Poles were resettled into the newly incorporated western provinces (up to 7,000,000 Germans had fled or been deported from those areas). However, as a living reminder of these new post-WWII borders, there are still a Polish minorities in Ukraine (approximately 200,000 people), in Belarus (about 400,000) and in Lithuania (about 250,000).²¹⁵

Ukraine –The ‘eastern Other’ and democratic buffer against Russia

An independent and truly pro-Western Ukraine is one of the main objectives of Poland’s Eastern policy. One might think that Poland would be the last state in the EU to support Turkey’s accession to the EU, but, on the contrary, Poland supports this largely because Turkey’s accession would pave the way for Ukraine’s accession. On 29 December 2006, President Lech Kaczyński stated in an interview with *Corriere della Sera* that Poland supports Turkey’s accession “particularly in strategic terms, even though we do appreciate the fact that the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU must take time, and cultural differences may be an obstacle, [but] why should there be a ‘yes’ [e.g.] for Serbia and ‘no’ for Ukraine, not to mention Georgia or Moldova.”²¹⁶

For centuries the current territory of Ukraine has been the central stage of Polish and Russian claims. Western Ukraine came under Russian rule after the Second Partition of Poland in 1793.²¹⁷ Up to the twentieth century Poles and Russians denied the Ukrainians a separate national identity, and the loss of the Ukraine has been a hard nut for Russia to swallow. There have occasionally been disputes between Poland and Ukraine, but an official rapprochement has been evident since the December 2004 Ukrainian *Orange revolution*. One of these disputes has concerned the renovation of the Polish *Lychakov* cemetery in Lviv. Polish volunteers, who died defending Lviv (*Lwów*) in 1918 against Ukrainian forces, have been buried in *Lychakov*. After noticing the Polish involvement in and support for the Ukrainian “Orange revolution”, Ukraine finally completed the renovation of the cemetery, which was reopened in June 2005. Poland’s support for the “Orange revolution” may have even more deeper effects on Polish-Ukrainian

²¹⁵ Godzimirski (1998), p. 20; Gross (2007), p. 22.

²¹⁶ President of the Republic of Poland (2006c). See also Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), p. 85.

²¹⁷ Nowak (1997), p. 4. See also Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), p. 64.

relations in that Ukrainian nationalism might become less anti-Polish and Ukraine might begin to perceive Poland as an ally.²¹⁸

Another dispute, superficially a minor one, but actually wider in scope than that over the Lychakov cemetery, is related to frescoes found in South-Western Ukraine in 2001. The general borderland area between Poland and Ukraine is called *Galicia* (see Picture 16). The eastern part of *Galicia*, now belonging to Ukraine, has traditionally been inhabited by three national groups, Ukrainians, Poles and Jews, which although sharing a common history, do not share a common understanding of it. According to Denise Powers, the collective identities of these groups are “built upon a belief of mutually exclusive victimhood.” One revealing piece of evidence for this is related to a dispute in 2001 between Poland, Ukraine and *Yad Vashem*, the Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Authority, over some rediscovered WWII-era frescoes painted on the walls of an apartment located in South-Western Ukraine, in the city of *Drogobych*, about 100 kilometres from Lviv (see Picture 16). Drogobych belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire for about 150 years, having been taken from Poland during the First Partition of Poland, in 1772. Felix Landau, the town’s Gestapo commander in the 1940s, forced a Jew called Schulz who was born in Drogobych and who is known for his Polish and German literary works, as well as paintings and drawings to decorate his home with frescoes.²¹⁹

For Ukrainians and Poles, their suppression by the Austrian state for 150 years consolidated their Polish and Ukrainian identity, but in opposition to each other. Jews, on the other hand, were not recognized as a separate nationality either among the Ukrainians or the Poles, even though Jews constituted 11% of East Galicia’s population in the late twentieth century (Ukrainians 60% and Poles 25%). The Austrians had encouraged the development of Ukrainian national consciousness in Galicia, largely because the Ukrainians counterbalanced the more nationalistic Poles and were useful to Austria against Russia. For both Poles and Ukrainians, the Jews remained the Other, around which both Polish and Ukrainian national identities were at least partially constructed. During WWI, the Jews were caught between both Polish and Ukrainian nationalist claims on East Galicia. Anti-Ukrainian and anti-Jewish Polonization campaigns included the burning of Ukrainian churches and limiting the numbers of Jews admitted to the universities and professions, as well as establishing Polish settlements in Ukrainian-dominated areas. World War II drove Galicia’s national groups even further apart and the mutual bloodletting by Polish and Ukrainian partisans in East-Galicia deepened the feeling of loss of the area among the

²¹⁸ Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), p. 67.

²¹⁹ Powers (2003), p. 623.

Poles, and sensitivity regarding the re-establishment of Polish influence in the area among the Ukrainians.²²⁰

After the frescoes were rediscovered, on 9 February 2001, Polish officials were willing to help in their restoration and to support the establishment of the Schulz museum in Drogobych. However, in May 2001, officials of *Yad Vashem* paid only \$100 to the apartment owner for the frescoes and removed them to Israel to be displayed in the Holocaust Historical Museum. For Jews, Schulz is not only a resistance fighter or a religious martyr, but a symbol of heroism who managed to struggle to maintain the dignity of normal life in dehumanizing circumstances. For Poles, despite Schulz's Jewishness, he is also a hero, but due to his role of being a representative of the generation of the Polish intelligentsia that perished in WWII. For Ukrainians, on the other hand, Schulz does not possess such emotional feelings as he does for Poles and Jews; the frescoes just happened to be painted in a town that is now part of Ukraine.²²¹

At least two identity-related conclusions can be drawn from the 'fresco-case'. The first conclusion is that open and official Polish claims to the frescoes would open Poland to accusations of Polish insensitivity about Jewish suffering during the Holocaust. It would also reopen the 'wounds' of Polish-Ukrainian relations' traumatic past, especially the mutual violence of pre- and post-WWII. The second conclusion is that if such a seemingly 'trivial' issue as the 'fresco-case' can mobilize the deep sentiments of national identities, there may be more serious issues that could mobilize these sentiments as well. As Ukrainians and Jews have been mentioned as "constituting Others" in Polish national identity, Ukraine is probably the softer target for Polish anger and frustration at letting the frescoes go to Israel, because accusing Jews of taking the frescoes would more likely produce a negative counter-reaction among outsiders observing the debate. On the other hand, there are still Jews living in Ukraine, who speak Polish, maintain a Polish cultural presence and are nostalgic about the Polish Second Republic as a reminder that these borderlands were formerly part of Poland.²²²

Ukraine is an issue where Poland's official national interest overcomes sentiment, largely for the same reasons that Germany promoted Poland's accession to NATO in the late 1990s; 67% of the Poles supported Ukrainian membership of NATO in April 2008.²²³ Even though there prevails a seemingly warm relationship between Poland and Ukraine in their official discourse, Ukraine has been widely considered as an external threat by Poles.

²²⁰ Powers (2003), pp. 627–629.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 633–638.

²²² Powers (2003), pp. 642–643.

²²³ CBOS (2008a), p. 3.

However, largely due to the need to democratize the areas to her east, Poland has been the major advocate of efforts to anchor Ukraine in the West since the Cold War. The Polish State sees Ukrainian accession to the EU (and NATO) as increasing Poland's security in relation to Russia. The then Prime Minister of Poland, Jarosław Kaczyński, said it implicitly in his announcement, on 19 July 2006, as follows: "we are still in favour of Ukraine joining the European Union. This is a matter of the Union's completeness, [and] its security."²²⁴

Is Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation possible?	Time of the conducted opinion poll											
	June '97	Apr '99	May '00	May '01	Sept '02	July '03	May '04	Dec '04	Jun '05	May '06	June '07	June '08
	Percentage											
Possible	58	57	67	64	73	63	60	81	74	77	79	75
Not possible	39	40	32	35	25	37	35	14	22	18	10	13
Difficult to say	3	3	1	1	2	0	5	5	4	5	11	12

Table 7: The chances for Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation?²²⁵

Poles have considered a reconciliation between Poland and Ukraine more possible than impossible.²²⁶ The Ukrainian *Orange Revolution* between December 2004 and January 2005 produced even more favourable sentiments towards the Ukrainians (see Table 7). Furthermore, even though the President of the USA, George Bush, was the most popular foreign politician for the Poles in 2004, the Ukrainian President, Viktor Yushchenko, was ranked as the second most popular.²²⁷ But even these examples do not change the finding that the Poles consider that Ukraine still belongs to the East, together with Belarus. In September 2007 Ukraine was 26th (out of a total of 35 listed nations) in the ranking of most favoured nations in an opinion poll conducted by the CBOS, whereas Belarus was 25th position.²²⁸

Belarus as "a virtual black hole in Europe"

Belarus has been portrayed as "a virtual black hole in Europe" and as "an anomaly in the region" by the Poles. The essential part of Belarus developed within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but during the First

²²⁴ The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2006).

²²⁵ CBOS (2008f), p. 11.

²²⁶ CBOS (2008f), p. 11.

²²⁷ CBOS (2005a), p. 1.

²²⁸ CBOS (2007h), p. 1.

Partition of Poland, in 1772, the territory that now constitutes Belarus went to Russia and remained part of Russia and then the Soviet Union until she got her independence on 25 August 1991. Belarusians can hardly be considered as a people with a strong national identity. According to Grigory Ioffe, many Belarusians consider themselves as Slavs without a clear national identity (“*Tuteishiya*”) and feel either that they live on Russia’s north-western fringe (“*Severozapadnyi krai*”) or on Poland’s eastern periphery (“*Kresy Wschodnie*”). Those “*Tuteishiya*”, who identify themselves in terms of living on Russia’s north-western fringe worship their God in Orthodox churches (*tserkov*) and those who identify themselves as living on Poland’s eastern periphery worship their God in Polish Catholic churches (*kościół*).²²⁹

The Polish State has a working relationship with Belarus based on the neighbouring agreement, signed on 23 June 1992, but occasionally official relations deteriorate whether related to Poland’s efforts to ‘democratize’ Belarus, or to the status of the Polish minority in Belarus.²³⁰ There are two regional centres of western Belarus, namely *Grodno* and *Brest*, that are centres of Polish minorities. The Polish minority has occasionally suffered open repression by the Belarusian State, largely due to its fear that a movement like the Ukrainian *Orange revolution* might spread to Belarus as well. For example, on 3 July 2005, the day Belarus celebrates her independence, the leaders of the Union of Poles in Belarus were accused of organizing a concert of traditional Polish music at the Polish Centre in *Szczuczyn* and sentenced to jail. In August 2005 the Sejm Vice-Speaker and PO leader Donald Tusk visited Grodno to reassure the Polish minority that “Poland stands behind them.” The UN’s human rights envoy as well as the European Commission reacted to this case by calling on the authorities in Minsk to respect human rights, including minority rights. In February 2006, the Polish Government increased its efforts vis-à-vis ‘the problem’ of Belarus by deciding to fund an independent radio station (Radio Racja (Truth)) in *Białystok*, in order to promote democracy and freedom of speech in Belarus.²³¹

Like Ukraine, Belarus belongs to the East in Polish opinion polls. Belarus is on the same line with Ukraine, at least in an opinion poll conducted by the CBOS in September 2007. In most favoured nations list Belarus occu-

²²⁹ Ioffe (2007), pp. 349–355. According to Grigory Ioffe (p. 352), in 2003, 62% of the Belarusians preferred economic improvement to national independence, whereas 25% of them supported national independence to economic improvement. Ioffe argues that such a dichotomy is unthinkable in countries like Russia, Poland, Latvia, or Lithuania, because “in those countries statehood, the way it is thought of, is of existential importance and not an option to be traded for a better life.”

²³⁰ Kukulka (1995), p. 94. See also *Warsaw Voice* (2005a), (2005b), (2005c), (2006a).

²³¹ Ioffe (2007), p. 370. See also Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), p. 70.

pied 25th (Ukraine 26th) position of all the listed 35 nations. Western nations were the most preferred, but even the Americans only occupied 12th position.²³²

Lithuania as an equal partner

Poland and Lithuania were equal parts of the same state for nearly 400 years, which is probably one of the reasons Lithuania occupies a special status in Polish sentiments and discourses; “Polish-Lithuanian friendship is above-standard”, according to the Prime Minister of Poland, Donald Tusk.²³³ To the Poles, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, or the First Republic, is one of the high points of their history; it was a period when Poland was among the largest states in Europe. However, to the Lithuanians the period has been represented as a period of Polonization of Lithuania’s nobility and cultural deprivation. Lithuania, even though one of the Baltic States is not like Estonia and Latvia. Estonia and Latvia have historically been connected first with Sweden and the German Order of the Knights of the Sword (the archaic enemy of Poland) and then with the Russian empire during the reign of Peter the Great, whereas Lithuania’s connections have been more closely tied to, even integral with, Poland and Catholicism. Furthermore, unlike the other Balts and unlike Belarus and Ukraine, Lithuania was a state-nation already in the sixteenth century and constitutionally equal with the Polish state-nation in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (“*the old Rzeczpospolita*”).²³⁴

There have been disputes and armed conflicts over Lithuania’s capital, Vilnius, between Poland and Lithuania. Poland annexed Vilnius by force during the Russo-Polish war in 1920 and forced Lithuania by ultimatum to recognize Poland’s sovereignty over Vilnius in 1938.²³⁵ Despite their different attitudes vis-à-vis the history of Poland and Lithuania, both countries are committed, according to their neighbouring agreement of 1994, to “fully fulfil the lingual, cultural, religious and educational needs of their respectful minorities.”²³⁶ But at the end of the Cold War the anti-Polish orientation of the Lithuanian national movement was still present and has been apparent in the dispute over the status of the Polish minority in Lithuania.²³⁷

²³² CBOS (2007a), p. 1.

²³³ The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (2007c).

²³⁴ Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), p. 1021; Szporluk (1991), pp. 467–468.

²³⁵ Prizel (1998), pp. 148–151. Many Polish interwar political leaders, including Józef Piłsudski, came from Lithuania.

²³⁶ Kornacki (1995), p. 12.

²³⁷ Zaborowski and Longhurst (2003), p. 1021.

Today in Poland, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is even considered as a predecessor of the current EU, as the most democratic state of Europe in the fifteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and as the saviour of Europe. Consequently, these visions are based on three notions. First, in 1600 the envoys of the Polish King Sigismund III Wasa in Moscow proposed a close union between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovite-Russia. According to the proposal, “both rulers were to be free to serve the other ruler, travel his country, contract marriages with the other ruler’s subjects, own land and go to school in the other ruler’s country”, and furthermore, “provision was to be made for a future personal union.”²³⁸ Second, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth comprised of the highest share of the ennobled population as full citizens among the European states of the era (8% of the population). However, the First Republic as the Poles call the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was actually ruled by the king together with the gentry (democracy of the nobility).²³⁹ Third:

*There is little doubt that without the Polish-Lithuanian Catholic union the “fault line” between civilizations in Europe, the line that was recently [1993] redrawn by Samuel P. Huntington, would have been pushed westward, taking Belarus, Ukraine, all Baltic nations, and probably the whole Central Europe with Poland, Slovakia and Bohemia, away from Europe ... and cutting all these countries off from the common experiences of European history: the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment.*²⁴⁰

Lithuania occupies a “special status” in Polish opinion polls when compared to Belarus and Ukraine. In October 2000, Lithuanians occupied 11th position in the ranking of most favoured nations in an opinion poll conducted by the CBOS, Belarusians were 19th, Russians 21st, and Ukrainians 22nd. There were 24 nations in the list. In October 2006, Lithuanians were again the most favoured (15th) when compared to Ukrainians (24th) and Belarusians (25th). In this list there were 34 nations. In September 2007 the ranking was analogous to that of the October 2006 opinion poll.²⁴¹

8.4. World Society – ‘Give Whoeverism a Chance’

*“Our idea is to read the UN Charter as the Bible. The Bible gives us Ten Commandments, fundamental principles of human relations. Just as the UN Charter gives us the principles of relations between the states.”*²⁴²

²³⁸ Nowak (1997), p. 3.

²³⁹ Zarycki (2004), p. 615.

²⁴⁰ Nowak (1997), p. 2.

²⁴¹ CBOS (2000e), p. 1; CBOS (2006i), p. 1; CBOS (2007h), p. 1.

²⁴² Kwaśniewski (2003).

During the previous chapters I have operated mostly in regional sub-contexts (EU-integration and NATO cooperation). In this chapter I will focus on the global meta-context and will try to reveal the general level of tolerance of Polish society in four sub-chapters, which all deal with religion in one way or another. I start this chapter by briefly looking at Poland's attitudes towards the UN-based collective world order (*Collective world order and Polish defence identity*). In the next sub-chapter I deal with the normative message Poland promotes (*Christian 'tolerance' and global equality?*), after which I focus on the relationship of adaptation due to pressure of globalization and the "moral superiority complex" of Polish society (*Globalization and the "moral superiority complex"*). In the fourth sub-chapter I will turn to Francis Fukuyama's and Alexander Wendt's theory of universal recognition and try to evaluate to what extent the Polish identity construction has already been modified through the need for recognition (*The power of recognition and teleological evolution*).

8.4.1. *Collective World Order and Polish Defence Identity*

Poland signed the UN Charter on 14 October 1945, which was ratified by Poland on 25 October 1945. Even though Poland prefers regional contexts and bilateral security arrangements over the UN, she has not lost her interest in the collective world order; for example, in 1997 Poland was among the "top five contributors of troops to UN missions" with 1,095 troops operating in UN field missions. By 1999 almost 50,000 Polish troops had served in UN operations around the world. Currently about 3,500 Polish troops serve abroad; mostly in UN, NATO and U.S.-led operations. So it cannot be said that Poland is not taking her share of responsibility for the collective world order, but the issue here is that Poland prefers to legitimate her global commitments through regional contexts.²⁴³

Traditionally references to regional security guarantees, geopolitics and security mechanisms in Euro-Atlantic contexts have exceeded references to the UN-led collective world order (and global 'whoeverism') in official Polish foreign and defence policy discourses, at least in the early 1990s. For example, the then Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, argued in 1994 that "the European continent as well as the Euro-Atlantic region are the [only] areas of strategic importance."²⁴⁴

However, Poland also sends other kinds of messages vis-à-vis the UN's role. For example, on 12 November 1997, the then Minister for Foreign Af-

²⁴³ Popiuk-Rysińska (2001), pp. 378–379. See also *UN Chronicle* (1997); Gagor (2008).

²⁴⁴ See, for example, Popiuk-Rysińska (2001), p. 379. Irena Popiuk-Rysińska argues that Poland "defines its security interests mainly in the Euro-Atlantic dimension."

fairs, Bronisław Geremek emphasized that globalization forces Poland to abandon her Euro-centricism, which makes Poland “strengthen [her] active presence in the UN.” The tone was the same when the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Władysław Bartoszewski pointed out, at the Millennium Session of the UN’s General Assembly, on 15 September 2000, “the necessity of international and joint action in solving global problems that endanger peace and security.” According to Bartoszewski, “the awareness of one earth and one humanity calls for a joint and responsible action by all the members of the system.” This change of tone in official Polish messages between 1994 and 2000 may imply Poland’s gradual rejection of a “militarized understanding of security.” But 2000 was still in the era of ‘global hope’, before 9/11 which brought about the “global war on terror”. Poland has turned its attention back to regional contexts and away from the UN-led collective world order. What needs to be done to the UN, according to Bronisław Geremek, is to renew its decision-making capability and structures: “*The world needs an organization such as the UN more than ever. At the same time the organization is useless, as it functions in historically based structures.*” From the Polish perspective, the renewal of the UN means a limited increase of the Council’s members, meaning at least Japan and Germany as well as one additional place for Central and Eastern Europe.²⁴⁵ This message was also conveyed to the world by the President of Poland, Lech Kaczyński, on 23 September 2008 at the 63rd Session of the UN General Assembly in New York as follows:

*One of the fundamental principles governing the democratic management within the United Nations is expressed in the following words: “one state one vote.” Each state should be granted the possibility to decide in which direction the United Nations is heading. We advocate a quicker pace of reforms of the Security Council, which have been conducted for many years so far. The number of non-permanent members of the Council should be increased so as to reflect the true image of the contemporary world. Let us remember that certain rules in this respect were defined in a world utterly different from today’s.*²⁴⁶

8.4.2. Christian ‘Tolerance’ and Global Equality?

Since Poland, like any other democratic state, promotes, at least implicitly, above all its own national interests in order to deal with the effects of globalization, which challenge the traditional expressions of national identity, there is not much room to promote a truly global equality. The Catholic Church (not only of Poland) has promoted a normative message of toler-

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 380 and pp. 398–399.

²⁴⁶ President of the Republic of Poland (2008b).

ance and solidarity, but the message can also be understood as one of intolerance. In the Polish case this message has a corporate dimension as well, due to the close relationship between the Polish Catholic Church, the State, the Armed Forces of Poland and a majority of the entire Polish nation.

Poles tend to think that their society is tolerant towards different world views,²⁴⁷ but the tolerance that the Polish Catholic Church and the Polish State discursively promote seems to be only tolerant superficially. The tolerance they promote is in practice a defence of Christian identity; God is “the source of truth, justice, good and beauty”, as stated in the Polish Constitution of 1997 (look Chapter 7.3). Even though other ontologies are explicitly accepted in the Constitution as well, the Christian God seems to be the true Hegelian “beautiful soul” of the Polish nation, which normatively should be the soul of at least the whole of the Europe as well; otherwise the Polish Catholic Church and the Polish State would not have tried to introduce *Invocatio Dei* into the EU Constitution in 2003.

Since a majority of the Poles are Catholics and the Pope is their spiritual leader (especially Karol Wojtyła, a Pole, who was elected as Pope and took the name and title of John Paul II in October 1978) it is above all the Papal discourse that the Poles are following vis-à-vis the normative world society. The Polish State has suggested reading the UN Charter like the Bible. The UN Charter is based on “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”²⁴⁸ To read the UN Charter like the Bible also means a commitment to the declaration of universal human rights.²⁴⁹

The death of the Polish Pope John Paul II, in May 2005, touched almost every Pole; 95% of the Poles thought then that s/he owed something special to John Paul II, and 98% of the Poles believed that the Pope played a positive role in the world. Poles mentioned that the liberation of Poland and the overthrow of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Poland’s and the whole world’s political transformation were largely because of John Paul II’s work. His continuous efforts to unite the Christian Churches and believers, as well as his attempted reconciliation with the followers of other religions were considered as significant among the Poles. Furthermore, his efforts to ease conflicts between nations and ethnic groups and achieve peace in the world are worth mentioning. The Pope was also praised for forming the conscience of the Poles, teaching them moral val-

²⁴⁷ See, for example, CBOS (2000d), p. 1. In August 2000, 57% of the Poles thought that Polish society is tolerant towards different views.

²⁴⁸ *Charter of the United Nations* (1945), Preamble and Article 55.

²⁴⁹ General Assembly of the United Nations (1948), Article 1: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”

ues and principles, respect, tolerance and understanding for others; he was simply considered as a model character for the Poles, the highest moral authority, a spiritual leader and a holy person.²⁵⁰

Pope John Paul II expressed his wish to unite all the Christian Churches under a truly tolerant Christendom in his Apostolic Letter, “*Orientalis Lumen*” (Eastern Light) in 1995. He was a highly respected religious figure in Polish society and the leading figure of the Polish identity discourse, honoured by all Poles largely due to his *Polkość* (Polishness); he was “a Pope, son of a Slav people”, and a spiritual leader of all the Catholic Poles.²⁵¹

The message of tolerance of the Apostolic Letter was “to avoid the recurrence of particularism as well as of exaggerated nationalism.” The other message was to stress the importance of cultural traditions, but in tolerant ways: “Tradition is never pure nostalgia for things or forms past, nor regret for lost privileges ... each Church must struggle against the temptation to make an absolute of what it does.”²⁵² The tone of John Paul II’s message was totally different compared to the message that Pope Benedict XVI sent to the world in his speech to South-American Indians in Brazil in May 2007. He argued then that the Catholic Church had purified these Indians and that a revival of their religions would be a backward step. What most outraged the Indians was a statement concerning the arrival of the European (Catholic) priests at the time of the Spanish and Portuguese Conquest, which, according to the Pope, was welcomed by the Indians as they were “silently longing” for Christianity. In reality, it is thought that millions of tribal Indians died as a result of European colonization, backed by the Catholic Church since 1492.²⁵³

But even John Paul II’s message concerning tolerance turns into one of intolerance, if one analyzes his message concerning the right of women to have an abortion. John Paul II stated after the adoption of a liberalized abortion law in 1996 in Poland that “The nation who kills its own children is the nation without the future.”²⁵⁴ This means that an abortion at any stage of the pregnancy and in any circumstances would be murder. Since a human being is created by God, it is only in God’s hands to take life. Comparing then the previous messages of Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI, and taking into account the overall dominance of the Catholic Church in Polish society, at least over the issue of abortion, it may be stated that the normative message the Catholic Church propagates is not relativist or plu-

²⁵⁰ CBOS (2005e), pp. 2–3.

²⁵¹ Pope John Paul II (1995b), p. 2.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²⁵³ See, for example, Colitt (2007).

²⁵⁴ Nowicka (1997), p. 2.

realistic, but a message of objective values (defined by Catholic dogma alone) to be accepted as *a priori* truths and norms by every human being. This is not to say that, for example, the Biblical command, do not kill, would not be a proper normative guidance for the whole of humankind, but the interpretation of its content may be a bit dogmatic in Catholic Poland.

There is no evidence that the Polish Catholic Church or Poland as a corporate agent would voluntarily emphasize a cosmopolitan equality of human beings. Individual equality in the Polish domestic context is an even ‘harder nut’ to crack than in a global context, since equality refers among other things to sexual equality, which is something the Catholic Church opposes. *Equality in the messages of the Polish State and the Catholic Church of Poland means solidarity to sameness, not equality between differences.* For example, the Council of Europe’s tolerance campaign “All different – all equal” that began in 1995, was changed in Poland in 2006 to “All different – all in solidarity we stand.” The term equality, according to the Council of Europe, means actions against discrimination, intolerance and xenophobia. It also means that “he or she has the right to expect equal treatment by public authorities, regardless of his or her nationality, religion, origin or sexual orientation.”²⁵⁵ The term equality was omitted in Poland, since it was thought that it was associated with the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) parades organized in 2004 and 2005 in Warsaw, which the mayor of the town, Lech Kaczyński, had intended to ban. In March 2007, Human Rights Watch continued its campaign against the PiS-led Government by expressing its concern about the proposed legislation, the purpose of which, according to the Deputy Minister of Education, Mirosław Orzechowski, was to “punish everyone who promotes homosexuality or any other deviance of a sexual nature in education establishments.”²⁵⁶ This was not the first time that official dom in Poland had openly attacked what it regarded as deviations; on 15 March 2007, the President of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Poettering, officially blamed the Polish MEP, Maciej Giertych, for publishing an anti-Semitic pamphlet, which violated European values, the principles of the EU Parliament, as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.²⁵⁷

The Polish Catholic Church and the Polish state as the dominant ‘sub-identity holders’ in Poland do not promote a message of institutionalized tolerance. The Armed Forces of Poland does not have a particular stand on this issue. Public opinion seems to support this attitude, at least when it comes to religion. Following Pope John Paul II’s guidance, Polish people generally believe that reconciliation and “lowering the existing barriers” is

²⁵⁵ Siedlecka (2006).

²⁵⁶ Szypula (2007).

²⁵⁷ Siedlecka (2006); Szypula (2007); *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union* (2000).

possible between Christian Churches, but to a less extent with Judaism and Islam. In June 2001, 60% of the Poles considered reconciliation would be possible with the Orthodox Church and 53% with the Protestant Church. Establishing closer relations with Judaism and especially Islam were seen as much more difficult; 36% of the Poles considered reconciliation with Judaism was possible, but only 29% thought so with Islam. However, individually, Poles, it would seem, would easily accept a member of the Orthodox Church, a Protestant, or a Jew as his/her colleague, neighbour, boss, or even as a daughter-/son-in-law. Only Muslims seem to instigate negative sentiments more frequently than positive ones, when considering a Muslim as a daughter-/or son-in-law.²⁵⁸

8.4.3. Globalization and the “Moral Superiority Complex”

The globalization discourse generally assumes that the pressure of homogenization by the post-modern information age and globalized Western culture challenge state sovereignty and traditional national identities based on the unity of nation and state (if a nation has a state). As a consequence nations may try to strengthen the national defences of collective resistance, for example, on behalf of God, nation and ethnicity. The second way to resist the homogenization effect of globalization is to get access to larger cooperative forms, or security communities, like the EU or NATO. The third way is to withdraw into smaller identity collectives, especially the family and one’s locality.²⁵⁹

In the late 1990s and early 2000s the Polish globalization discourse assumed that the more open national traditions were to alternative cultural pressures, especially to Westernized global culture, the more easily Polish society would free itself from the socialist legacy.²⁶⁰ In this regard access to the EU in 2004 was not a “coming home” for Poland, since Western Europe was not the uniform Christian civilization Poles probably expected, but a European house of tolerance and relativism. In this regard Poland seemed to lack “*civilizational competence*”, at least up to the time of Donald Tusk’s Government (see Chapter 7.2.1).²⁶¹ “Civilizational competence” means the capability to face the values, norms and symbols that spread from, or prevail in, Western Europe, if Poland wishes to be part of the European house. This does not mean that all the participant state agents should be identical units. On the contrary, they may be different, but equal,

²⁵⁸ CBOS (2001a), p. 2. In this opinion poll 39% of the Poles would accept a Muslim as a daughter-in-law or son-in-law; 49% would accept a Jew as such, 58% a Protestant and 63% an Orthodox believer.

²⁵⁹ Castells (1997), pp. 7–10.

²⁶⁰ Sztompka (2000), pp. 11–12.

²⁶¹ Ibid, p. 14.

and equality should not be understood as showing solidarity towards sameness, but as accepting pluralism and relativism even at the individual level. During the two PiS-led Governments between October 2005 and November 2007 the “*lustracja*” (lustration), ‘witch-hunt’, or “*sanacja*” (moral renewal) of state-officials (including Church and the Armed Forces) that had a communist past, characterized the Fourth Republic.²⁶² Prime Minister Donald Tusk took Poland back to the normal trend of the post-Communist Third Republic by stating, on 23 November 2007, that the PO-PSL (Civic Platform-Polish People’s Party) coalition would “guarantee the Polish people’s liberty and the freedom of action in every sphere of social and economic life.”²⁶³

Regardless of the pressure of global homogenization, the dominant institutions of Polish society – the Polish state, the Catholic Church of Poland and the Armed Forces of Poland – have generally managed to sustain a coherent national identity heritage of Polish corporate agency. It has largely been about “identity defence”, or “resistance identity”, as well as habituation into the grand-narratives of a glorious and unfortunate past, which can be found in various complexes towards Others: for example, both an “inferiority complex” and a “moral superiority complex” towards Western Europe; a “moral superiority complex” towards Russia, and a Polish “imperial complex” towards Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania as a legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s great power status. If any of these slowly fade away, it probably will be the “inferiority complex” towards Western Europe, as a result of Poland’s EU membership and accession to the Schengen-zone.²⁶⁴

²⁶² See, for example, President of the Republic of Poland (2005). President Lech Kaczyński as well as the previous Prime Minister, Jarosław Kaczyński, called Poland the Fourth Republic, by which they generally meant the new moral order and “social contract” in Polish society. See also the Commission of the European Communities (2002), p. 30. See also Longhurst and Zaborowski (2007), p. 18. The concept “*Sanacja*” and its content was introduced in the 1930s by Józef Piłsudski.

²⁶³ The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (23 November.2007).

²⁶⁴ See, for example, President of the Republic of Poland (2006c). The estimated accession of Poland into the euro-zone in 2010 will probably not reduce Poland’s “inferiority complex”, as one might have assumed, quite the opposite. Poland has no opt-out vis-à-vis joining the euro-zone, but it is largely about timing. According to President Lech Kaczyński, “The introduction of the euro in Poland will be preceded by a referendum. The key point vis-à-vis the euro is that: *“Poland is a poor country [and] the introduction of the euro would slow down its growth because of a rigid monetary policy, on which the government has little impact. Moreover, there is a risk of sharp price rises, as experienced by Italy. The living standards of the Polish people remain low, so lowering them even further, as may happen, would bring negative results. My doubts over the euro result from the above considerations. If the euro does function in other member states, it will be introduced in Poland, too, as a matter of course. The only question that remains is the date of its introduction.”*”

In spite of the overall homogeneity of Polish national identity construction there are signs of strong regional identities as well in Polish society, which may be one way of resisting the homogenization of globalization. For example, in the south of Poland, in the Żywiec region, a distinct “*Góral* (mountainous) *identity*” has probably existed for centuries. Poland faced enormous economic difficulties and social tensions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led to a decline in interest in politics in general and in the government in particular. In the Żywiec region, which possessed a distinct regional identity, this led people to search for local solutions to their problems. One local resource which the Żywiec region people could draw on was their regional-ethnic identity, the “*Góral identity*”, which was shared by the people of the neighbouring regions of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. According to Deborah Schneider, class dynamics in the post-socialist era split the elites in Żywiec into a group that favoured globalization (“neocapitalists”), attempting to lure foreign investors to the region, and into a group that favoured defensive regionalism (“pre-war elite”). The first group claimed that the “*Góral identity*” was a thing of the past whilst the second group claimed that the “*Góral identity*” would tie the region together regardless of national borders. Ironically, as Schneider has found, both of these are the result of class politics and “involve a pulling away from nationalist politics, bolstering other claims on identity – regionalist or pan-European.”²⁶⁵

The ‘Żywiec-case’ is a good example of a wider general trend. A growing global cultural system of symbols and meanings pulls in two directions: toward global (suprastate) systems of meaning, politics and economics, and, on the other hand, toward intrastate backlashes. Both of these processes seem to resist the ideological constructions of the nation-state, undermining them by moving ahead on a trajectory of their own. It is not the case that regionalism would lead to separate state creations, not at least in the ‘Żywiec-case’, but the Polish State has not been considered useful by either the pro-globalization group or the pro-regionalism group of the people in Żywiec. According to Schneider, “national economic policy is designed to force communities, business, and individuals to be self-sufficient – with radical effect.”²⁶⁶

²⁶⁵ Schneider (2006), pp. 4–8.

²⁶⁶ Schneider (2006), p. 5.

8.4.4. *The Power of Recognition and Teleological Evolution*

“Z Czasem wszystko się zmienia” (*time changes everything*)²⁶⁷

According to the need for recognition thesis, states try to develop their societies, as well as their domestic and international behaviour in such a way that they will be as universally acceptable as possible. In other words, states would compete to be the best in every area of human life, which eventually would lead humankind into a world society. Even though I slightly criticized the Wendtian recognition thesis in Chapter 3.1.3, it seems, nevertheless, to make a lot of sense in the ‘Polish case’. Even though there have been backward steps in Poland’s foreign policy behaviour, the clear tendency has been that whenever some problematic, or delicate, issue has been revealed by the media or by foreign observers, the Poles have responded with corrective measures, the only exception being the abortion law. There are three distinctive notions concerning the power of the media in the Polish case. The first is that there is a domestic critical media and associations that provide alternative interpretations that focus on even the most delicate of domestic issues.²⁶⁸ The second is that the foreign media has been perhaps more powerful than the domestic one in turning Poland onto the ‘proper course’ when necessary. The third notion concerns the rooting of “civilizational competence”,²⁶⁹ which includes internalizing tolerance, pluralism and relativity as core European values without external pressure.

Even though Poland has had to face an unwelcomed need to adapt her national identity heritage to European pluralistic values, norms and symbols, the pressure of Europeanization has not been able to remove the “moral superiority complex” of Polish identity construction, based on Christian (Catholic) values and moral codex; it has been the task of the Polish corporate agency to bring the Christian values and Christian God of the centre (Western Europe) back to the centre.²⁷⁰ However, there are some signs of a more pluralistic, relative and cosmopolitan spirit in the Polish media. For example, one of Poland’s leading newspapers, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, has con-

²⁶⁷ Polish American Congress of Eastern Massachusetts (2004).

²⁶⁸ See, for example, Polish Association of Rationalists (2008). In its “Open Letter”, the Polish Association of Rationalists stressed that Polish society is “mature enough to conduct public discussions about the challenges and problems they face without uninvited “spiritual guidance”.” The Association has also stressed that in many cases public opinions are “significantly different from what the Catholic hierarchy is trying to impose (For instance, a survey found that 64% of Poles were in favour of abortion “on demand”).” It is also worth mentioning that, according to the Association, “Catholicism is mainly a matter of tradition and social convention.” For these reasons, and many others, the Association advocates the separation of State and Church in Poland.

²⁶⁹ Sztompka (2000), p. 14.

²⁷⁰ Mach (2000a), p. 14.

tinuously criticized Polish anti-Semitism, intolerance, the treatment of sexual minorities, religious dogmatism and political culture of the post-Cold War era, and one of the most critical voices of *Gazeta Wyborcza* has been Adam Michnik.²⁷¹

As the need for recognition may be universal or regional in nature, and positive as well as negative, it has largely been in a regional context (NATO) that Poland has consciously tried to increase her prestige by trying to adapt her foreign and defence policy practices to NATO's strategic culture and military force structure – by 'rotating' military elites aside opposing Westernization of the Polish Armed Forces (look Chapter 8.3.1) – as well as by modernizing and downsizing her military. However, the Polish need for recognition in the NATO-context does not refer to the proper Wendtian world society through seeking universal prestige; it refers to a kind of international society of common rules, norms and practices, namely a Western security community. This process that Poland has embarked on has been about adaptation only, not an intentional effort to seek universal prestige by sending alternative signals to the world; for example, by promoting an openly cosmopolitan equality, not communitarian solidarity.

Poland's participation in the Iraq Stabilization Force with a contingent of 2,500 troops is an example of seeking prestige, but the target of this need for recognition was, above all, the USA, and, again, it was about showing communitarian solidarity towards the USA. It may also be interpreted purely in *realpolitik* terms as Poland's wish to make economic use of her participation by obtaining American approval to take part in Iraqi reconstructing projects.

If adaptation or any learning has occurred in Polish foreign and defence policy behaviour, it has largely been because of foreign pressure. From the perspective of defence identity, the construction and maintenance of friendly relations with all of Poland's neighbouring states and nations was already a precondition for access to NATO and the EU. But as I have discussed earlier, Poland still possesses many complexes towards her neighbouring states and nations. Poles do not love all, if any, of their neighbours, and they may still be trapped in a legacy of "civilizational incompetence", that is, a general incompetence to approve of the world's relativity and plurality. According to Piotr Sztompka,

The hope to break this vicious circle must rest with an initially small elite group of citizens, highly educated, cosmopolitan, young at least in spirit, ready to contest established ways who have already escaped the

²⁷¹ See, for example, Siedlecka (2006); Michnik (2007a); Michnik (2007b); Beylin (2008).

*grip of “real socialism” or who have never succumbed to it in the first place. And the hope must also be placed in those universal mechanisms and processes which embrace the global society and engulf the post-Communist enclave in their salutary influence.*²⁷²

But as a matter of fact, all nations may be trapped in a legacy of “civilizational incompetence”; it is highly unlikely that any nation collectively loves all its neighbours. The message of Piotr Sztompka (above) is to be understood more holistically rather than merely as a reference to the backwardness of a ‘reborn’ nation suffering from the trauma of its Communist past; I am not sure whether Poland even suffers from that. Sztompka’s message should be understood as referring to the collective identity narratives and discourses of exclusion, as well as to the habituated sentiments of “*ressentiment*” that prohibit the evolution of tolerance. Sztompka’s other message is that emancipation from the legacy of the past will take several generations. That is until it is adopted from the educated ‘elite’ by the rest of the people. The hope of a world society lies then on teleological evolution, not without any intention, or goal, but without the restrictive normative message of *a priori* truths that, for example, the Catholic Church promotes. World society is about difference, equality, pluralism and relativism. Its content lies then on the emancipatory message of the Council of Europe: “All different – all equal”, not on the Polish message of communitarian habituation: “All different – all in solidarity we stand.”

8.5. Conclusions and Discussion

8.5.1. Conclusions of the Polish case

The 1989–1991 unexpected refolution-movements throughout Central-Eastern Europe opened up at least five options for Poland to improve her security: (1) neutrality, (2) a sub-regional alignment, (3) a pan-European security arrangement, (4) a security and economic alliance with Russia, and (5) joining existing Western security and economic organizations. *Whereas a general cultural identification towards the West was, and still is, the main characteristic of Polish corporate identity, it is not at all certain that NATO would have been chosen as the main defence policy option by the Poles without the narrated significance of Poland’s problematic location between German and Russian Others and especially without fear of revanchism of the Russian Other.*

For most of Poland’s history, Polish identity narratives had been the property and project of the Polish gentry and intelligentsia-elite until urbaniza-

²⁷² Sztompka (2000), p. 16.

tion, industrialization and better education made them the property of the whole nation. The sources of and inspiration for these identity narratives have been taken from the Christian religion, the Polish language, Polish ethnicity and Polish history.

Three ‘sub-identity holders’ can be identified as carriers of the Polish narrative legacy: the Polish State itself, the Armed Forces of Poland and the Polish Catholic Church. None of these, it can be argued, have sought discursively to challenge the current status quo of Polish society, but it can be argued that the Polish State and the Catholic Church implicitly share hidden anti-Semitic sentiments with the Polish nation. The Armed Forces of Poland represent a more ‘quiet’, but proud and respected ‘sub-identity holder’. It is a ‘symbolic discussant’, whose annual parades on 15th August and public ceremonial oaths may be considered as representing a symbolic discourse that reflects the traditional identity of the Armed Forces as the defender of the country’s territorial, political and cultural integrity.

Poland’s religious ontology, Polishness (*Polkość*), and enemy images are signified by four national grand-narratives: (1) ‘Poland as a Christian bulwark of Christianity’/‘Poland as a saviour of the West against the Eastern Other’ (*Antemurale Christianitatis*), (2) ‘The Miracle of the Vistula’, (3) Poland as ‘betrayed by the West and mistreated by the Soviet Union/Russia and Germany’ (‘Between East and West, the Katyń Forest, the Warsaw uprising, and the betrayal of Yalta’), and (4) ‘Poland as a haven of religious tolerance’, the ‘true’ content of which seems to be Polish anti-Semitism. Generally speaking the post-Cold War Polish State tried to suppress open debate over the still haunting anti-Semitic sentiments of the Polish nation, until Jan Gross published his books *Neighbors* in 2001 and *Fear* in 2006. However, by critically comparing the discourses of the Polish State and the Catholic Church with the actions they have committed or not committed (i.e. not ‘toning down’ the openly anti-Semitic messages of Radio Maryja and Catholic Father Tadeusz Rydzyk), there is good reason to believe that the Polish State and the Catholic Church implicitly share anti-Semitic attitudes with the Polish nation.

Polish national grand-narratives include at least three mental ‘complexes’. Even though Poles may suffer from an economic “*inferiority complex*” in relation to a more prosperous Western Europe they simultaneously have a “*moral superiority complex*” towards Western Europe and Russia, not only due to historical ‘betrayals’ and ‘mistreatment’, but also due to Poland’s solidarity with the West during WWII, despite these ‘betrayals’ and ‘mistreatment’. The third complex, albeit less visible, is the Polish “*imperial complex*” which refers to the great power status of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569–1795), which included what is today Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus and parts of Western Russia. These ‘com-

plexes' make Poland's foreign and defence policy behaviour meaningful and predictable.

The first priority of Polish foreign and defence policy is still the international system - a kind of 'prepare for self-help situation', the rationale of which consists of a mixture of Poland's geographic location and traumatic history between Germany and Russia as well as a reified narrative construction of German and Russian Others in Polish identity structure; Poles have not narrated the significance of geography or history away. The Russian Federation (and her predecessors) has historically been and still is the 'Essential Other' (the 'Russian Other') for the Poles. During and after the Cold War, up until 1997, Germany was considered as the 'essential Other', but currently holds the status of 'secondary Other', belonging at the same time to the identity category of the 'secondary West' as well. Since Germans and Russians are still considered as Others it seems that the only hope for reconciliation with these Others would be through a more coherent European CFSP (majority decisions on all foreign, defence, energy and commercial policy issues). This means, for example, that from the Polish perspective, Germany should withdraw from its bilateral Nordstream gas pipeline treaty with Russia, which consequently should be replaced with a treaty between the EU and Russia.

	State	Church	Armed forces	Public opinion
World view/ constitutive narratives and discourses as identity expressions	1. Christian world view and religious ontology <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty" • Poland as 1. the "Christian Bullwark of Christianity" (<i>Antemurale Christianitatis</i>), 2. the "last outpost of western civilization", 3. the "Bastion of Christianity" (<i>przedmurze chrześcijaństwa</i>), and 4. a "Christian rampart" 2. 'Poland as a saviour of the West' ('moral superiority complex') <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'The miracle of the Vistula' 3. 'Betrayed by the West, mistreated by the Soviet Union/Russia and Germany' ('moral superiority complex') <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>'Between East and West, the Katyń Forest, the Warsaw uprising and the betrayal of Yalta'</i> 4. 'Poland as a haven of religious tolerance' <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Polish anti-Semitism' 			
Borders of Otherness External & internal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia as the 'Essential Other' ("moral superiority complex" + "imperial complex") • Germany as the 'Secondary Other' ("moral superiority complex" + "inferiority complex") • Ukraine and Belarus as 'Secondary Others' ("imperial complex") • Jews and Germans as internal Others • USA + NATO as the 'Primary West' • The EU as the 'Secondary West' ("moral superiority complex" + "inferiority complex") 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jews as internal Others • The EU as 'infidel' ("moral superiority complex") 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia as the 'Essential Other' • USA + NATO as the 'Primary West' • The EU as the 'Secondary West' 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia as the 'Essential Other' • Germany as the 'Secondary Other' • Ukraine and Belarus as 'Secondary Others' • Jews as internal Others • USA as the 'Primary West'? • EU/NATO as the 'Secondary West'
Priorities of the contexts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NATO-cooperation - European integration - Global meta-context 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - European integration - Global meta-context 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NATO-cooperation - European integration - Global meta-context 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EU/NATO - Global meta-context
Conclusions (What are the Poles defending? = match points and noticeable divergences) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. International system: Identity defence (State, Church, Armed Forces + public opinion) 2. International society: Transatlantic security community next, the EU then (State, Armed Forces), the EU as equal as NATO (public opinion) 3. World society: No room for cosmopolitan equality 				

Table 8: Conclusions regarding the thematized narratives and discourses of national 'sub-identity holders'

Ukraine and Belarus have belonged to the identity category of ‘secondary Others’ for the whole of post-Cold War era, even though official relations at least between Polish and Ukrainian States are warm. Ukrainian and Belarusian Otherness has been organized through post-WWI and post-WWII territorial disputes, but also through the Polish “imperial complex”, that is, the sense of loss regarding the border areas (*Kresy; Kresy identity*) of the medieval Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth. Even though the Polish State supports Ukrainian membership of the EU and NATO, this is not due to sentimental reasons only, but due to geopolitical calculations, that is, the need to create a ‘buffer-zone’ against the Russian Other. Polish State’s support for Turkish membership of the EU is also related to this issue, since once Turkey is granted membership there would be no reason to reject Ukraine’s membership either. Lithuania is an exception among the Poland’s eastern neighbours, since Poles consider Lithuania and Lithuanians as equal partners, largely due to the fact that they are both members of the EU and NATO, not forgetting the historical heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in which both Poland and Lithuania were equals.

Poland’s internal borders of Otherness primarily concern the Jews and to a lesser extent Germans, even though the Jewish minority in Poland consists of only about 1,000 people. All minorities have been guaranteed wide freedoms by the Constitution of Poland, but, for example, the German minority is not allowed to use the former German names of their areas. The Otherness experienced concerning the German minority is not shared by the ‘sub-identity holders’, but if connected to Polish-German relations overall, it can be stated that Germans are considered as Others at least by the Polish State as well as by the Polish nation. The Otherness experienced concerning the Jewish minority in Poland is shared by all the ‘sub-identity’ holders as well as the Polish nation, with the exception of the Armed Forces of Poland, which has no explicit stand on this issue. The Belarusian and Ukrainian minorities in Poland have not given rise to the same kind of sentiments among Poles as the Jewish and German minorities have, at least this has not been evident from the sources I have used.

There are ‘two Wests’ that are under constant modification in the Polish identity construction: the ‘USA - NATO -West’ and the ‘EU-West’. While the ‘West is best’-sentiment prevails among all the Polish ‘sub-identity holders’ and the Polish nation, the USA is not considered unreservedly as ‘the best West’ or as the ‘instinctive and primary West’ among the Poles, nor is the EU considered unreservedly as the ‘secondary West’. Poland’s Atlanticist foreign and defence policy orientation is only superficially ‘instinctive’ in nature, contrary to Marcin Zaborowski’s view on this issue. It has been above all the State’s (including the Armed Forces of Poland) rational project to guarantee Poland’s territorial sovereignty between the

German and Russian Others by leaning on the USA. Among ordinary Poles, support for the USA has been declining since 2004, largely due to unfulfilled hopes about the benefits expected from Poland's alliance with the USA. However, Zaborowski is partially right in his 'instinctive' statement, since the USA does not belong to the '*Between East and West, the Katyń Forest, the Warsaw uprising, and the betrayal of Yalta*' -narrative, even though the USA was as 'guilty' of betraying of Poland at Yalta as Great Britain.

While Poland has partially left her Eastern European nationalist ethos behind, she has not become a constructive Western European either; Poland's wish to return to her European home in fact saw her entering a European house of relativeness and pluralism, which did not fit well with the Polish notion that there is no room for a religious ethos in Western Europe, or the notion that Western Europe does not focus on the defence of national territories anymore but on the defence of the universal rights of liberal democracy. However, Poles still consider themselves as Westerners despite disappointments vis-à-vis the EU. Discursive interactions in the EU context have penetrated Polish grand-narratives by making it possible for the Polish nation to emancipate itself from the 'betrayed by the West' -narrative; the Polish State and the Catholic Church of Poland have been much more sceptical towards the EU than the Polish nation, which supports Poland's EU-orientation as much as it supports the NATO-orientation. Thus, if Poland has turned into a constructive European, as Marcin Zaborowski has stated, it is not Poland as a corporate state-agent that has done so, but the Polish nation.

There are no signs that the Polish 'sub-identity holders' or even the nation in general would have adopted a more cosmopolitan world view, even though official identity discourse stresses the importance of the UN-centric collective world order and even though Poland has actively participated in UN peace-keeping operations. Even the Papal Holy See, as the spiritual Leviathan of the Poles and patron of the Polish Catholic Church, has not internalized the content of global tolerance based on equality, even though the Catholic Church proclaims a normative message of world peace and tolerance. Global equality means transatlantic solidarity in Poland. Solidarity recognizes only sameness, whereas equality approves of differences (e.g. equality between individuals, sexes, sexual orientation and, above all, equality between sources of 'truth').

As perhaps the main 'carrier' of the Polish self-image, the Catholic Church is not the only obstacle on Poland's path to being 'avantgardist' on the way towards universal 'whoeverism'; the incoherent European CFSP is also an obstacle to promoting a more cosmopolitan world-view. *What the Polish State expects from the EU is above all a truly 'common' CFSP and a uni-*

form foreign policy stand towards Russia, which would at least partially 'liberate' Poland from her 'geopolitical captivity' and from the fear of being 'sandwiched' between Russia and Germany again. Actually, a truly 'common' CFSP would serve the whole EU; the more coherent the EU, the less meaningful Poland's geographic location and strategic dependencies, and the less meaningful the Polish identity narratives of the past that are full of national ethos and borders of Otherness. But the problem here is that one cannot be sure whether any other perspective than the Polish one, on a common stand towards Russia, would satisfy the Poles themselves.

8.5.2. Discussion and Avenues for Further research

In this thesis I have tried to answer three calls presented in the Introduction of the thesis (Chapter 1.1). *First*, I have tried to show that even though enemy images and military threats can be understood as socially constructed by past narratives (which in the Polish case are based on Polish history, ethnicity, religion and language, even though I have treated language mostly as a mediator between past and present), these enemy images and military threats are also constructed by Poland's geographic location between her 'historical Others', Germany and Russia (Chapters 6–8). One could argue that geographic location as a material fact may be discursively defined away, but in the Polish case this would necessitate a highly emancipatory "civilizational competence" from the Polish people as well as Poland being freed from dependency on Russian oil and natural gas. *Second*, I have also tried to offer a deeper analysis on the Polish identity world as well as on Poland's foreign and defence policy interests, desires and behaviour by decentering Polish subjectivity into three 'sub-identity holders' on the one hand and the Polish nation on the other (Chapter 7). In this way it was possible to analyze those issues where Poland forms the corporate agency and those issues where that agency is split among the 'sub-identity holders' and the Polish nation overall. *Third*, I have tried to show how the current Polish organizational agency came into being in the first place by the endogenous and intentional narrative efforts of identity construction of the elites of previous generations (Chapter 6).

I have also argued (Chapter 8) that the more or less habituated and reified content of the Polish defence identity is nevertheless subject to the pressure of constant reconstruction due not only to contextual restraints and enablers (e.g. functional institutions, inter-state discursive and non-discursive interactions), but also to the external material world (e.g. the state's geographic location, globalization and global climate change). I have argued that the domestic structure (identities and social system) and the international structure (identities, social systems and contexts) are mutually constitutive, and therefore there is no 'level of analysis -problem'; both levels are important

vis-à-vis national identity. By using the Wendtian ‘need for recognition’ thesis, one could argue that domestic and international structures are as important vis-à-vis national identity, but in the Polish case cultural habituation to past identity narratives seems to be stronger and more important than international structural and emancipatory pressure. In the Polish case it became clear during this research process that even though the Polish nation has managed to emancipate itself from its habituation to the ‘betrayal of Europe’ narrative it does not unconditionally favour the Polish State’s rational foreign and defence policy project to lean on the USA, there are still elements in Polish identity construction that can be labelled corporate. All the Polish ‘sub-identity holders’ and the Polish nation are still habituated to the narrated external borders of ‘German and Russian Others’ as well as internal borders of Otherness towards Jews, despite about a decade long adaptative and emancipatory project of Europeanization from the EU’s side.

There are at least two points on which may question the value of this thesis. First, one may criticize my philosophical and social theoretical orientation as being eclectic. Second, one may criticize the findings presented in the thesis; what novelty can I offer when comparing the findings of this thesis to those of previous researchers?

It may be argued that my decision to lean methodologically on critical realist philosophy of science and in terms of social theory on Constructivism, the English School Theory and Critical Realism denotes an excessive eclecticism. However, in making this decision I just wanted to overcome the barriers of our epistemic communities and offer a possible model of how one may conduct research in commensurable ways. This means that there are competing ‘Schools’ and theories in IR, which may be ontologically and epistemologically incommensurable, but by leaning mostly on Constructivism I have figuratively positioned myself first at the centre of various alternative approaches and then tried at an analytical level to deal with those in commensurable ways. Constructivism as an IR theory focuses on the constructed and shared beliefs and ideas to which we have become habituated. But as I have said already in the introduction of this thesis, this does not mean that our ideas would go all the way down for developing a better world to live in, which probably should be one of the main tasks of the social sciences. I also explained this idea further in the introduction by arguing that our ideas usually (perhaps always) collide with the material restraints and other ideas of other actors. But it cannot be said that material restraints alone cause the behaviour of human societies.

I could have conducted this research by leaning merely on Constructivism, but then I would have had to concentrate solely on the socially constructed Polish identity world, without ‘giving Poles a normative and emancipatory

chance of their own'. Constructivism allows one to operate with both the material and the ideational realm, it is a 'via media' between those, but in addition I wanted to go further and lean more on the ideational side, because the content of the concept "New World Order" (with apostrophes) is a normative one and necessitates some additional theoretical element than mere Constructivism could offer. Identity as an integral concept of Constructivism is probably under-theoretized in the English School Theory, but both theories deal with the international system, international society and world society more or less analogously, except that Constructivism does so in teleological ways whereas the English School Theory does so in normative ways. And even though I wanted to give normativity due weight in my thesis by using the critical realist philosophy of science, these choices are not in contradiction with each other, they complement each other; Constructivism and the English School Theory share the main tenets of a critical realist philosophy of science.

When comparing the results of this thesis with previous research on Polish foreign and defence policy, I would say that this thesis does not necessarily go deeper into the Polish identity world than, for example, the works of Iver Neumann, Ilya Prizel, Marcin Zaborowski, Kelly Loghurst and Norman Davies. But what makes this work different, I would say, is the philosophical and theoretical holism and decentered subjectivism in its empirical part. There is also the normative perspective that the aforementioned researchers did not use in their work, but to which I gave at least some attention in this thesis by trying to clarify whether there are any signs of discursive emancipatory power among the Polish 'sub identity holders' (see Chapter 8 and 8.4). It is also the definition and use of the concept of defence identity as a dependent variable that makes this work different (see Chapter 4.4) in at least two ways. First, the concept of defence identity has not been used in previous research as a dependent variable. Second, by using my definition of defence identity one can argue, for example, that such a widely used concept as ESDI does not refer to identity at all. It refers to culture and its content is cultural; it informs the audience about what Europe and NATO are doing in the field of security and defence, but it does not inform the audience about European or transatlantic values, identities or borders of otherness.

As double-hermeneutics presumes (see Chapter 2.2.4), our research objects are not just there to be explained or interpreted; they have already been interpreted. In the Polish case this means that I had to take the interpretations of Polish or other distinguished Poland-related researchers' (sociologists, historians and social scientists like Zdzisław Mach, Norman Davies, Ilya Prizel, Iver Neumann, Marcin Zaborowski, Kerry Longhurst and many others) interpretations as a 'pre-ground' on which I then tried to construct my own re-interpretation with some amendments (e.g. normative perspective)

of Polish defence identity by using various methods of discourse analysis (see Chapter 2.2.6).

Thus, by using previous research, by analyzing the post-Cold War Polish societal discourse and by using so-called iconic modelling (see Chapter 2.2.7), it became clear that the ‘carriers of the story’/‘Polish sub-identity holders’ (*narrative analysis*) may be categorized into three discursive categories: the Polish State, the Polish Catholic Church and the Armed Forces of Poland, not forgetting the Polish people in its totality either. These ‘sub-identity holders’ are capable of producing events, episodes and tendencies in the Polish domestic processual structure. They have an influence on defining Polish regulative rules and practices. They also have resources to do so. But most of all they are carriers of the constitutive Polish identity world (including the Polish nation) that makes Poland’s contextual (NATO-cooperation and EU-integration and CFSP) foreign and defence policy behaviour meaningful.

By analyzing Polish documents, speeches, statements and opinion polls it became clear that the repeated messages of these ‘sub-identity holders’ are more or less focused on the Christian (Catholic) world view and the various borders of Otherness explained in Chapter 8.5.1 (*content analysis*). While it also became clear during the research process that the Armed Forces of Poland does not actively take part in societal discourse, it can be considered semiotically as being a ‘silent discussant’ which participates in this identity-related societal discussion just by virtue of its existence (*semiotic method*). That a state maintains armed forces is itself a sign of the existence of borders of Otherness; otherwise there would be no need to maintain any armed forces at all (see Chapter 7.2.2). I also used the *critical method* when making my argument concerning the shared anti-Semitism of the Polish State, the Catholic Church of Poland as well as the Polish nation (see Chapter 7.2.3). My intention was to apply a *post-structuralist discourse method* as well, but actually I did not in the end do so. Since I used language simply as a meditative tool in analyzing discourses, I criticized the so-called Copenhagen School, which argues that everything can be securitized or de-securitized by the language used. I argued that this is not the case, since efforts to define away the significance of the material fact of Poland’s geographic location seem to be in vain, because of the Poles’ habituation to their grand narratives, which are reified from generation to generation.

By using iconic modelling and by thematizing the narratives and discourses of the Polish ‘sub-identity holders’, I was able to intervene in the Polish identity world in trying to offer a holistic understanding of the Polish narrated past, discursively presented cultural habituation of the present, as well as the emancipatory potential of the ‘sub-identity holders’ and the Polish nation. In this way this thesis has been able to falsify (to some extent) the

arguments of, for example, Marcin Zaborowski and Kerry Longhurst who argued in 2003 that Poland has turned from being an “instinctive Atlanticist into a constructive European”. By decentering Polish subjectivity, I was able to argue that it is the Polish nation that has turned into a more constructive European, while the Polish State still leans ‘instinctively’ on the USA. But this thesis also offers a methodological model for any analogous case studies, I would say, and it expands the focus of European integration studies. This means that while the focus of European integration studies has been on the impact of the EU on the identities, domestic institutions and political cultures of the member states, the EU should not be considered as the only ‘political mover and shaker’ of the member states; NATO and the whole global processual structure can be so considered as well. This has been taken into consideration in this thesis. However, in the spirit of self-criticism I have to admit that even though I have considered domestic and international structures as mutually constitutive, I have not dealt extensively with the impact Poland may have had on the international structure, except that she has shaken the EU by trying to include *Invocatio Dei* into the EU Constitution (2003), and with President Lech Kaczyński’s ‘66 million Poles speech’.

Due to my own cultural background my research could have been a comparative study as well. Then I could have compared the differences and similarities between Polish and Finnish identity structures (including defence identity). Actually, I was initially thinking about conducting comparative research, planning to focus on the differences and similarities of the Visegrad Countries’ identity structures, but eventually a case-study seemed to be more productive, and I focused on the Polish national and defence identity. It is hard to try to understand even one’s own nation’s identity construction. What makes it even harder is that I am not socialized into the culture that I have researched. I may have been ‘unplugged’ from the most delicate and language-dependent identity structures of the Polish identity discourses. However, distance may help, since it is probable that for Polish social scientists it would have been much harder to present all that I, as a Finn, have presented about Poland and the Polish world view. However, I cannot claim that I have been totally objective, since objectivity is almost impossible in the social sciences; the researcher is always part of his/her research, or he/she becomes so, at least partially. I am not saying that during the research process I became a Pole, of course not, but on some issues my eyes and thoughts may not have been so neutral toward the attitudes, narratives, myths and discourses of the Poles in general, or toward the official ‘sub-identity holders’ of the Polish nation-state.

What made me particularly interested in further research, including comparative research over Polish and Finnish identity structures as well as comparative research on the Visegrad Group’s identity structures, was the

normative need for global tolerance and the likelihood of it gaining ground among nations that are still ‘victims’ of their geographic location and their past nationalist narratives that legitimize their existence. This especially relates to the EU as a ‘grand peace project’, as well as to the UN as concrete utopian Leviathan of the world. If a ‘coherent European voice’ is the final goal of European integration, it probably cannot be based on the shared traditions, cultures and languages that characterize nation-states; Europe is too diverse for that. The key issue is that in order to be a truly politically integrated and tolerant actor, the EU and European citizenship must rely on a ‘post-national’ constitutional patriotism, which would leave little if any room, for example, for nationalist calls to the Christian, or any other, faith. The other option is to maintain the idea of a pluralist EU with heterogeneous national identities, which in the “*longue durée*” will lead to European citizenship and tolerance through widening the Schengen-area and allowing people to move into whatever European country they wish. This supports the Wendtian idea of evolutionary change that will lead to a world society at least regionally. However, European integration also necessitates mutually shared and internalized norms and rules for a common foreign and security policy, if we are talking about the EU as a true ‘grand peace process’. In the Polish case this is related to the historical fear of being ‘sandwiched’ between Russia and Germany – a fear only exacerbated by Russo-German bilateral agreements, and especially by their agreement over strategic energy supplies of natural gas and oil.

Even though in this thesis I have extensively discussed tolerance and a normative world order, I was not able to offer a solution to the normative problem of how we should live together peacefully. We know, for example, that global natural disaster in the form of global warming is here already, but even that has not led us toward a genuinely tolerant world society; wars and conflicts between nations still rage around the world. Is it the case that only some total catastrophe will unite nations and pave the way towards a communitarian or cosmopolitan world society? There are some historical precedents, namely, both world wars, and the shared ‘never again’ understanding after those wars that resulted in the establishment of the League of Nations and the United Nations. But even those institutions have not ‘tamed down’ civilizations and egoistic national identities. Will it be a sudden encounter with aliens from outer space that will unite us globally? Even in that case states and nations might negotiate their own solutions with these strangers. Analogously, the first encounter between the Spaniards and Aztecs in 1519 may have been a total shock for both parties. The Aztecs saw the Spaniards as the gods of their prophecies, whereas the Spaniards saw the Aztecs as something strange to their culture. This first encounter ended in armed clashes between two civilizations, not in collective identity formation.

It is hard to imagine an individual without an identity at all. Every one of us defines her-/himself by his profession (e.g. professional soldier), social status (e.g. father), nationality (e.g. Pole) or by his/her larger cultural milieu (e.g. European). Without identity-construction we would drift on without a destination and without purposeful goals. This kind of condition may be called 'whoeverism'. However, it may also be considered a positive state of affairs, since then we probably would not brand others as 'Others' so easily. If we consider normatively that 'the overall grand mission' of the sciences is to build up a better world for us to live on, the social sciences should promote 'whoeverism' in world politics. But since we are not able to free ourselves of national identities we should still make sure that the nations of the world do not promote ethnic, religious- or nationalist intolerance ('we against the Others'), but consciously try to promote tolerance and economic, political as well as military interdependence with other nations and state agents. By adopting a more holistic world-view and foreign and defence policy practices we would pave the way towards a more mature handling of future shocks and consequences caused by the material world. Whoeverism and tolerance include the idea that we understand the diversity and multiplicity of the various religions, human races and social systems of the world. But even though we might understand this diversity we do not need to approve of everything. The problem here is that we still do not have 'a Sovereign Leviathan' that would define for us a collectively shareable future state of affairs to be reached, or the things that we should not approve of; for one, liberal democracy means liberty and a life worthy of a human being, but for another it may be a sign of cultural weakness.

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