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# STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING IN CRISIS AND WAR

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MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU – NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

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# **THE TWELFTH SUOMENLINNA SEMINAR**



**The 28<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> of April 2009  
Helsinki**



## FOREWORD

The Department of Strategic and Defence Studies at the National Defence University of Finland arranged its twelfth annual 'Suomenlinna Seminar' in Helsinki, on the 28<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> of April, 2009. Participants of the seminar included key political and military decision-makers and academics in Finland as well as a selected group of international guests, totalling about 85 persons. The topic in 2009 concerned the theme of strategic decision-making in crisis and war.

The seminar emphasised both the theoretical and practical side of the decision-making process. During the first day, we concentrated more on concepts and heard some theoretical perspectives. The presentations of the second day dealt more with case studies elaborating experiences and practical examples.

In today's world, the wars and crisis we meet are changing and becoming increasingly multidimensional. Challenges like globalisation, terrorism, economical recession and climate change create new threats that need to be answered. We have to find new ways of thinking to be able to sustain and improve our security. The changing atmosphere of international relations has created insecurity and uncertainty to old praxis. New threats and situations require new solutions and procedures to meet and overcome the challenges. Strategic decision-making in wars and crisis is in the centre of this larger picture.

The idea of concentrating on strategic decision-making in this seminar was to contribute to the development of solving conflicts. The articles of this book handle the decision-making process in various cases, presenting theoretical background for the decision-making processes as well as taking a look at some practical examples. The aim of this seminar was to promote ideas to improve strategic decision-making as a whole through exchange of experiences and views.

First, Clive Archer opens the discussion by highlighting the problems as well as possibilities of Nordic states' decision-making. He states that the historical background and the differences between the Nordic states challenge the common defence strategy in these countries. Yee-Kuang Heng and Tuomas Forsberg concentrate on the theoretical background of strategic decision-making by examining how rationality is part of the decision-making process. Dr. Heng sees that Cold War means-end rationality has been going reflexive, mainly in the areas of security, intelligence and governance. Wilhelm Agrell, in turn, tackled the question of intelligence's importance in strategic decision-making. He raises questions by arguing that intelligence cycle does not work.

Kirsten Schulze turns the discussion more into empirical research by giving a pragmatic example of difficulties met in decision-making during the crisis of 1982 in Israel. Then, Bengt Andersson speaks about the high time demands that EU decision-making process meets. He also shares some experiences from multinational decision-making, especially in the EU Battle Group concept. Pierre Schori concludes with demanding that the UN Security Council needs to be reorganised. For future peacekeeping United Nations Security Council needs to be more responsible. Dr. Schori also highlights the role of women and children as well as regional actors in conflict and war.

Altogether, it goes without saying that strategic decision-making in crisis and war needs to be discussed more. The presentations made at the seminar, most of which are published in this volume, recognise the problematic and multidimensional character of decision-making in crisis and war.

I would like to thank colleagues at the DSIDS for their efforts in organising the seminar, and Ms. Heidi Kurkinen for her work as the editor of this report.

Helsinki, January 2010

Director of DSIDS  
Colonel

Erik Erroll

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# 1

## CAN THERE BE NORDIC STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING IN CRISIS AND WAR?

*Clive Archer*

### Introduction

Of all the states in Europe, the five Nordic countries are perhaps those between which it is easiest for their citizens to move. There is a good degree of commonality and despite obvious differences – five different currencies being noticeable – there is a common feeling between governments and peoples that is unusual between the populations and political elites of other sovereign states. Perhaps such commonality has only been reflected in the attitudes of the British Dominions of the pre-1970s (before the UK joined the European Communities). These states also had a common strategic decision-making process during the Second World War, though it scarcely survived that experience and was even controversial at the time. Nevertheless are the Nordic states close enough to have Nordic strategic decision-making in war time and in a crisis? Is this imaginable and is it desirable?

A very quick survey of the region would suggest that a common strategy is not possible (at least in the near future) among five states that have had such varied security policies and are spread over such a wide geo-strategic area. Furthermore, the palpable lack of Nordic strategic decision-making in modern history (with the possible – and very arguable – exception of the three Scandinavian states on the outbreak of the First World War), would suggest that there has been and is little desire for such a confluence.

Nevertheless, perhaps for the first time since the 1930s there is an opportunity to recollect in tranquillity the possible reasons for common Nordic strategic decision-making at a time when none of the five states is threatened immediately by military forces. Also the major powers are unlikely to complain should any of the Nordic states adapt its defence and security policies in a more Nordic way.

This paper will briefly examine the defence and security elements in common between the Nordic states, to see to what extent they already have a degree of commonality. It will ask what is needed for common strategic decision-making; it will examine the three main elements as they currently

exist – strategic culture, practices and institutions – and then ask what is needed for such a common strategic decision-making process, and will finally make some recommendations.

### **The record of Nordic defence & security cooperation**

The historical record of the Nordic area up to the Napoleonic wars was one of rivalry between Stockholm and Copenhagen, with only a brief period when the area was politically united. The settlement during 1814-15 produced the dual kingdom of Norway-Sweden and a reduced Denmark. From 1815 until 1940, there were three periods when the Nordic region could have acted as one strategically. The first was that of the Schleswig-Holstein wars, especially that of 1864, where a joint Danish-Swedish response to the Austrian and Prussian armies was found to be wanting. The second was the First World War when the three monarchies of Denmark, Norway and Sweden managed a joint declaration of neutrality. However, it was clear that Norway veered towards the United Kingdom, the Swedish royal family towards Germany<sup>1</sup> and Denmark was very much squeezed by both sides. The third period that provided the opportunity for close Nordic security and defence cooperation was the late 1930s when it became clear that the League of Nations was not going to provide a shield for small states as originally hoped by the Nordic countries. However, each of the four Nordic states found themselves in quite different positions: Denmark's main worry was the power of Nazi Germany and Finland's main concern was with the Soviet Union. While both Sweden and Norway were afraid of any overt great power incursion into the Nordic region, Norway expected itself to be shielded by the UK's Royal Navy.<sup>2</sup> A repeat of the First World War's neutrality declaration was attempted but German pressure on Denmark to sign a non-aggression pact and then the Soviet invasion of Finland in the winter of 1939 put paid to this hope. Though a number of Norwegian and Swedish citizens went to fight on the Finnish side against the Soviet Union, their governments kept their countries as non-belligerents. Finnish attempts to revive discussions of Nordic defence cooperation in 1940 fell on deaf ears and, anyhow, Denmark and Norway were soon to fall victims to another predator. The Soviet invasion has been called by one Finnish academic 'the funeral of Nordic political cooperation'<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> The question of control of defence was one that divided Swedish Conservatives, backed by the monarch, from the Liberals and Social Democrats who at the time of the First World War had a majority in the second chamber. The contest was only resolved in autumn 1917 when the Liberals came back into power and with the constitutional reforms of 1918 (Ericson (2003), pp. 34-5).

<sup>2</sup> In the mid-1930s the Nordic states clearly saw the UK as a potential benevolent protector of their region but received no assurances from London (Fure (1996), p. 234).

<sup>3</sup> Kaukiainen (1984), p. 218.

Nevertheless, after the Second World War the opportunity again arose for a common Scandinavian approach to defence questions and in 1948 Denmark, Norway and Sweden entered into negotiations for what became known as the Scandinavian Defence Union. In fact these negotiations not only opened the way for a regional defence pact with binding commitments to defence assistance but also for a more limited, non-binding arrangement<sup>4</sup>. An immense amount of work was done but in the end the strategic differences between Denmark and Norway on the one hand and Sweden on the other led to the collapse of negotiations and the former two states signing the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949. However, the report went into remarkable detail about what might be done in terms of common action should one or more of the three states be attacked<sup>5</sup>. Though the pact failed at the political level as Sweden wanted a neutral union and Norway and Denmark wished for one linked with the West, a good deal of collaboration seems to have continued between the military of the three states well into the Cold War<sup>6</sup>.

Danish and Norwegian membership of NATO, together with that of Iceland, has meant that there has been close cooperation by three Nordic states on strategic matters, particularly during the Cold War period. As the Cold War progressed, Swedish strategy evolved. It depended less on NATO countries as it moved away from expecting Western help in the case of an attack. The new Swedish view saw the East and West balancing each other in any European war, so that only marginal forces would remain for any attack on Sweden<sup>7</sup>.

An important aspect of the strategic position of the Nordic region in the Cold War was its internal dynamics. Despite all that was going on around the region – the growth in Soviet forces, the increase in the US maritime presence in the north-east of the North Atlantic and the tensions on the European continent – the Nordic region was characterised as ‘a low-tension area’ where, despite having differing defence and security policies, the Nordic states ‘chose to take into account the position and interests of their neighbours when making decisions about security’. This was less ‘the product of deliberate design but rather the aggregated result of incremental decisions and adjustment’<sup>8</sup>. This has sometimes been called the Nordic Balance, though Holst points out that the Nordic states were ‘not poised against each other’, nor was there any equivalence between Finland’s 1948

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<sup>4</sup> SOU (1994), p. 11, Bilagor: 40.

<sup>5</sup> *op.cit.* pp. 71-82.

<sup>6</sup> see Dalsjö (2006), *passim*.

<sup>7</sup> Dalsjö (2006), ch.3.

<sup>8</sup> Holst (1990), p. 8.

treaty obligations to the Soviet Union and the North Atlantic treaty requirements of Denmark, Iceland and Norway<sup>9</sup>.

With the end of the Cold War, the set of opportunities open to the Nordic security decision-makers widened. The environment that had constrained them since 1948 – that of an East-West divide – disappeared and the security agenda expanded to include environmental and societal factors, with insecurities and risks being the main calculation for defence and security ministries. Sweden and Finland joined the European Union and Norway and Iceland were closely linked to the EU through the European Economic Area (EEA). NATO's nature changed and soon Swedish and Finnish forces were serving with NATO ones in former Yugoslavia and other parts of the world. Sweden and Finland contributed fully to the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Norway and Iceland made their own contributions though Denmark was limited to participating in the civilian side of ESDP<sup>10</sup>. Furthermore, the Nordic states showed themselves capable of changing their peacekeeping ideas and developing the modest cooperation they had over UN peacekeeping in order to meet the more challenging operations of the 1990s<sup>11</sup>.

### **Common strategic decision-making**

Taking any five West European states, it could not be expected that they would cooperate strategically in times of war and crisis, except through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Certainly in the Cold War period, there was a high level of strategic cooperation between the European members of NATO outside France. However, only three of the five Nordic states have been part of NATO, and one of those (Iceland) had no indigenous armed forces. Have the patterns of strategic decision-making by the five Nordic states during the Cold War, with their differing geo-strategic positions and historical experiences, endured in the post-Cold War period?

In order that these countries can be deemed to have had common strategic decision-making, there should be three elements present:

1. A common strategic culture
2. Common practices
3. Common institutions, especially for the taking and implementation of strategic decisions.

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<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> Archer (2008).

<sup>11</sup> Jakobsen (2006), pp. 1-5.

These elements will now be examined and then some attention will be given to the Stoltenberg Report which addressed the whole question of a common Nordic approach to security issues.

### **A common strategic culture?**

Neumann and Heikka<sup>12</sup> typified the literature on strategic culture as focusing on ‘how elites and decision-makers assess and interpret the main characteristics of the international system in which they operate and how these assessments influence their views about security policy, and the use of military force in particular’. They saw this as being nested in the anarchical society of the time and an interplay between grand strategy and the practices of military doctrines, civil-military relations and procurement<sup>13</sup>. Grand strategy here can be seen as ‘a political-military, means-ends chain, a state’s theory about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself’<sup>14</sup>. It can be disaggregated into those elements of military doctrines, civil-military relations and procurement.

A short examination of the strategic cultures of the five Nordic states points to important similarities but also significant differences.

*Iceland* has often been seen as the odd country out in terms of strategic culture. After all, the whole question of strategic culture was one that was sub-contracted to the United States during the Cold War. The country has had no military armed forces but through membership of NATO and its 1951 defence agreement with the United States, allowed the US to take over its defence. In practice, Iceland became part of the US national defence in the Cold War, with the US air force and then the US navy utilising the base at Keflavik<sup>15</sup>. After the end of the Cold War, the US eventually had little use for the Keflavik base, and the Icelanders have had to start thinking about issues of strategic culture. This has also been coloured by the economic downturn of late 2008 which affected Icelandic banks and assets particularly badly, and which led to an Icelandic application for EU membership. Implicitly, this suggests that at least a section of the Icelandic political elite have re-orientated their strategic culture to one that operates more in a European than North American environment and where security is to be gained in negotiation with the EU and its member states rather than with the US. It has also placed emphasis on economic and environmental rather than military security as key elements in any strategic considerations, and

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<sup>12</sup> Neumann and Heikka (2005), p. 6.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.* 18-19.

<sup>14</sup> Posen (1984), p. 13.

<sup>15</sup> Thorhallsson & Vignisson (2004), pp. 110-14.

in that context it was important that Nordic governments were some of the first to come to the rescue of the Icelandic banking system.

In *Sweden* there has been a dichotomy in developing a post-war strategic culture. On the one side was the tradition, associated with the domination of political life by the Social Democrats, of “the People’s Defence” whereby Sweden, the “People’s Home”, is defended by conscription and ‘the armed forces enjoying legitimacy in society’<sup>16</sup>. On the other side is “Hi-Tech” defence where the professionalism of the military, modernization of equipment and strategies are stressed. There has been a swing back and forth in emphasising the two strategies, with differing weight on the types of weaponry procured and the armed service favoured in the defence budget. On the whole by the 1970s and 1980s, “People’s Defence” had won out and the defence of the country was that of “deep defence” by a large conscript army<sup>17</sup>. This was deterrence by denial, making an attack on Sweden so expensive that it would not be worth while<sup>18</sup>. A major change came after the end of the Cold War and the experiences in the former-Yugoslav conflicts of the 1990s. “Hi-Tech Defence” could be seen in Network-Centric Warfare, integration of the armed services, close cooperation with armed forces of other states (not just the Nordic ones) and a decrease in the number of armed personnel<sup>19</sup>. In the 2004 defence white paper, military aggression against Sweden was seen as improbable in the coming ten years<sup>20</sup> and emphasis has been given to Sweden’s international commitments<sup>21</sup>, with an emphasis on smaller, more mobile and technologically advanced forces.

The strategic culture of *Norway* was one that during the Cold War was based on a national balanced defence that could hold out against the initial phase of an enemy invasion, which depended on NATO allies reinforcing the country, and rested on total defence and conscription<sup>22</sup>. This changed only slowly during the 1990s but more rapidly in the new century. The emphasis switched to a greater international contribution with the logic that by doing so, Norway could at least expect help from abroad when needed<sup>23</sup>. There has been a greater emphasis on Norway’s role in the world, but there still remains an important redoubt based on conscription and the defence of the realm<sup>24</sup>. In Norway’s current strategic concept, of the five security po-

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<sup>16</sup> Åselius (2005), p. 28.

<sup>17</sup> Åselius (2005), pp. 32-7.

<sup>18</sup> Wedin (2008), p. 53.

<sup>19</sup> Åselius (2005), pp. 39-41; Wedin (2008), pp. 40-54.

<sup>20</sup> Regeringen (2004), p. 12.

<sup>21</sup> Wedin (2008), pp. 51-4.

<sup>22</sup> Græger and Leira (2005), p. 49.

<sup>23</sup> Græger and Leira (2005), p. 55.

<sup>24</sup> *ibid.* p. 62.

litical goals, four involve defending Norway, its society and sovereignty, the other being support for an UN-led international legal order<sup>25</sup>.

*Danish* strategic culture can be seen as being parallel to that of Norway during the Cold War, though with some subtle differences. Norway's concern was often that of attracting allies to defend its territory in time of crisis or war; Danish governments knew their country would be in the thick of any conflict. Norway had a common border with the Soviet Union, Denmark with the Federal Republic of Germany. Denmark included the North American territory of Greenland – and its US bases – in its realm, while Norway had the Svalbard archipelago with a Soviet mining presence. At the end of the Cold War, changes in the region meant that Denmark had never been as safe as it was then<sup>26</sup>. Forces previously used for potential territorial defence were available for use elsewhere and the centre-right government that dominated Danish politics in the 2000s has followed a strategic culture than involves their use across the globe. The use of Danish forces in the Yugoslav wars seemed to reflect an “active internationalism”<sup>27</sup> that has also seen the centre-right Danish government willingly offering Danish forces in both the Iraq and Afghan wars. The 2004 Danish defence agreement saw ‘a wholesale reform of its defence’ that led to a more professionalized expeditionary force that could be ‘put in harm’s way in the combat zones where NATO now needed to be engaged’<sup>28</sup>. However, these two authors question the durability of Denmark’s strategic change, suggesting that Denmark could be ready for another development in its strategic thinking<sup>29</sup>.

*Finland’s* strategic culture is a matter of some interpretation. The traditional view has been that Finnish strategic culture has very much been moulded by its geostrategic position and that it has settled for a *realpolitik* that saw it fight beside Germany in the Second World War to hold off the Soviet Union, and then enter into the Treaty of Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with Moscow in 1948. With clever diplomacy, this negated any excuse for Soviet invasion but still allowed Finland to move closer to the West over the decades and also to maintain secret links with the US. The end of the Cold War has meant that Finland could finally join the European integration process, not least for security reasons, though it maintains conscript armed forces and the defence of the realm as insurance. An alternative view gives a longer perspective to Finnish strategic culture, claiming that it is ‘republican’, meaning it is ‘based on the principle of non-domination and manifested throughout centuries in the defence of anti-

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<sup>25</sup> Forsvarsdepartementet (2009).

<sup>26</sup> Forsvarsministeriet (1998).

<sup>27</sup> Holm (1997).

<sup>28</sup> Ringmose & Rynning (2008), pp. 55-6.

<sup>29</sup> *ibid.* pp. 72-82.

hegemonic political order in Europe<sup>30</sup>. This suggests that there is continuity in the change from neutrality of the Cold War to the post-Cold War Europeanization whilst retaining homeland defence<sup>31</sup>. Furthermore, Heikka suggests that including Finland as one theme in Nordic strategic cultures allows us to rethink what we mean by such cultures. He asks whether, by fighting so hard to belong to the Nordic group, the Finns ‘have realized what being Nordic is all about’, which is ‘a stubborn commitment to the principle of non-domination, even when it has come with a high price tag’<sup>32</sup>. This theme will be re-visited at the end of this essay.

Summarising, there does not seem to be one *Nordic* strategic culture. However, there may be elements that can be drawn from the cultures of the five states: defence of not only the realm but also society, with a tension between popular and more “hi-tech” defence; non-domination of their countries and the region; and support for efforts aimed at international peace, security and justice. Also the time factor should not be forgotten: some of the elements of the individual state’s strategic culture have been more enduring than others. There were efforts in 1948 to create a Scandinavian Defence Union (albeit excluding Finland and Iceland) and, although this failed, elements of cooperation continued, especially between groups in the armed forces of these three states. Denmark, Norway and Iceland built up their own defence cooperation within NATO. Though that took them away from Finland and Sweden, these two states have been working within the NATO framework for a number of peace operations since the ending of the Cold War. The Nordic states have also coordinated their resources closely within the context of UN peacekeeping, and the general concern that each has for the security position of the other Nordic states is rarely reflected in any other group of states not in an alliance (and in some that are).

Nevertheless, this does not reflect a common Nordic strategic culture. Differences still remain between the states over the elements of military doctrines and civil-military relations, and attempts at common procurement have only scratched the surface.

### **Common practices and institutions**

The record is much better when looking at the defence and security practices of the Nordic states. It tends to be in the field of practice that the Nordic states work together and are doing so increasingly. Also the Nordic region is one that is highly institutionalised both in the government field and

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<sup>30</sup> Heikka (2005), p. 92.

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.* pp. 92 & 94.

<sup>32</sup> *ibid.* p. 109.



in civil society. The creation of the Nordic Council in 1952 and the Nordic Council of Ministers strengthened the underlying institutional structures of the region. During the Cold War period, strategic considerations were explicitly excluded from consideration by the Nordic Council and Council of Ministers but since the early 1990s, they have been included in discussions in both institutions<sup>33</sup>. Furthermore, there have been a number of joint cooperative efforts related to defence and security.

The Nordic defence ministers, meeting in 2005 with their Baltic counterparts, boasted that ‘Nordic countries have had a comprehensive cooperation in defence and security politics’<sup>34</sup>. Early cooperation over peace-keeping has already been mentioned and this has developed into a number of examples of some of the Nordic states acting in concert in peace missions in the post-Cold War period. NORDCAPS, the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support is one striking example. This aimed at strengthening ‘existing cooperation in the Nordic Cooperation Group for Military UN matters (NORDSAMFN) with regard to military peace support operations (PSO) and expand it to cover operations mandated or lead by others than the UN’<sup>35</sup>. NORDSUP, Nordic support structures, produced a 166-page study that outlined Nordic military cooperation on land, sea and air<sup>36</sup>. In 2008 a NORDSUP report concluded that ‘Development of Nordic military cooperation should initially focus on reinforcement and enlargement of ongoing initiatives, and on actions that lay the foundation for later expansion to areas within the entire span of desired defence capabilities’<sup>37</sup>.

Nordic Armaments Co-operation (NORDAC) was started by an agreement in 1994 between the defence ministers of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden to cooperate on armaments development and procurement. The framework agreement is managed by a Leading Group and working groups are established under the Coordination Group on subjects such as light patrol vehicles, medical equipment and military clothing<sup>38</sup>. In November 2008 the Nordic defence ministers signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for enhanced cooperation on defence matters, the NORDSUP MoU, which was meant to complement NORDCAPS and NORDAC. Then in November 2009 a revised structure was created with a new MoU that included all Nordic defence cooperation activities and from December 2009 all the work of NORDCAPS, NORDAC and NORDSUP has been transferred to a new structure NORDEFECO (Nordic Defence Co-Operation). This al-

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<sup>33</sup> Dybesland (2000), pp. 31-2.

<sup>34</sup> Ministry of Defence Finland (2005).

<sup>35</sup> NORDCAPS (2009).

<sup>36</sup> NORDSUP (2008). This report only included proposals for Finland, Norway and Sweden.

<sup>37</sup> NORDSUP (2008).

<sup>38</sup> NORDAC (2008).

lows ministers of defence, forming the Nordic Defence Policy Steering Committee, to meet twice a year, junior ministers or top civil servants to meet once a year and the chiefs of defence to meet regularly with the Nordic Military Coordination Committee<sup>39</sup>. Although this cooperative effort covers a vast range of military activity and products, much of it is bilateral or trilateral and it has to compete with similar cooperative efforts within NATO and the EU or bilaterally with the US.

Another sign of practical cooperation between the Nordic states was in the creation of a Nordic Battlegroup<sup>40</sup> as one of the battlegroups set up in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)<sup>41</sup>. This was perhaps a sign that the Nordic states wanted to act collectively within this new framework. However, it falls short of what is suggested by its name. Of the five Nordic states, only three – Finland, Norway and Sweden – contribute, and other members include Ireland and Estonia. Furthermore, Finland has signed up to two battle groups, somewhat spreading its favours.

### **The Stoltenberg report**

Perhaps the highlight of post-Cold War Nordic foreign and security cooperation came with the publication of the Stoltenberg report. In February 2009 the report was presented by the former Norwegian minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, to the Nordic foreign ministers who had commissioned his report. Mr. Stoltenberg started from the basis of the ‘widely held perception that because of their geographical proximity, the Nordic countries have many foreign and security policy interests in common, despite their different forms of association with the EU and NATO’. He suggested that the Nordic area was becoming more important in geopolitical and strategic terms because of its role ‘as a production and transit area for gas for European markets and of the changes taking place in the Arctic’. He noted that modern technology made defence systems expensive and drew upon the work of the NORDSUP 2008 report. He found Nordic cooperation in the northern seas and Arctic particularly relevant<sup>42</sup>. He made 13 specific recommendations to strengthen Nordic cooperation in foreign and security policy. The first was for a Nordic stabilisation force, building on the work already done by NORDSAMFN and NORDCAPS. The proposal for cooperation on surveillance of Icelandic airspace would help fill a gap left by the departure of the US forces from Iceland and currently filled on an ad hoc basis by some NATO states. Four proposals touched on maritime and

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<sup>39</sup> NORDAC (2009).

<sup>40</sup> See also Andersson in this publication, pp. 104-108.

<sup>41</sup> Government Offices of Sweden (2007).

<sup>42</sup> Stoltenberg (2009), p. 5.

Arctic issues, while three came under the heading of “societal security” and involved ideas such as a Nordic unit for disasters response. Cooperation on materiel built on work by NORDAC and NORDCAPS, while the suggestion for a Nordic amphibious unit looked to current cooperation in the Baltic between Finland and Sweden. It was recognised that closer cooperation between Nordic foreign services could be adversely affected by EU plans arising from the Lisbon treaty. Finally, Mr. Stoltenberg suggested that the Nordic states should issue mutual declarations of solidarity ‘in which they commit themselves to clarifying how they would respond if a Nordic country were subject to external attack or undue pressure’<sup>43</sup>. The rationale behind this was that, as Nordic defence cooperation advanced, then each state would specialise more but would be less able to defend itself. Thus the countries would need a formal security policy guarantee that would spell out ‘in binding terms how they would respond if a Nordic country were subject to external attack or undue pressure’<sup>44</sup>. Thus the guarantee comes as a result of defence cooperation, not necessarily from a common strategy.

Since the end of the Cold War, progress has been made in cross-Nordic defence and security cooperation. However, much of this was bilateral or trilateral and was within the framework of NATO or the EU’s ESDP. What has been undertaken in a specifically Nordic context has been functional cooperation in practical matters<sup>45</sup>. The Stoltenberg report also suggests a number of practical steps towards a common Nordic approach, but there was little in the report to suggest a common strategy, with the possible exception of a mutual Nordic declaration of solidarity, or common strategic decision-making.

### **What is needed?**

What is needed in order to bring about Nordic strategic decision-making? In terms of a common strategic culture, practices and institutions, the most progress has been made on the latter two. Even so, much of the activity and all of the institutions (with the exception of the meetings of the ministers of defence) deal with pragmatic rather than principled issues and are at the functional rather than the strategic level.

Clearly the most positive step towards Nordic strategic decision-making would be a common strategic culture defined in terms not just of common practices of military doctrines, civil-military relations and procurement but also of grand strategy, ‘a state’s theory about how it can best “cause” secu-

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<sup>43</sup> Stoltenberg (2009), p. 34.

<sup>44</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Iceland (2009).

rity for itself<sup>46</sup>. As yet, there are different ideas about this between the Nordic states. If anything, there has been over the last decade a growing apart on how best to “cause” security. Denmark in particular has advocated a different answer to this question than the other Nordic states and, as a result, has taken a more pro-active role than even its Nordic NATO neighbour, Norway, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Norway and Finland have placed more emphasis on security through defence of the homeland than have Sweden and Denmark. Since the economic downturn of 2009, Iceland has increasingly seen the cause of security/insecurity in economic and societal terms.

Thus what is needed is a consensus on what may cause security for the Nordic region as a whole. Is it a more proactive involvement in international operations, and not just peacekeeping ones? What is needed to protect the Nordic region against any attack or threat of attack and who might provide those resources? Can the region be expanded to include the Baltic states and should it be part of a wider EU security region? What might the relationship be with the US in terms of security? Answers to all these questions currently tend to show up differences between the Nordic states. The approach towards international efforts by Denmark has already been mentioned. Sweden and Finland still show a greater concern with the Baltic states than does Norway, though on this issue Norway does recognise that the Baltic states cannot be allowed to ‘go under’ either to any military incursion or to economic collapse. Norway’s preference is to expand the region to include the maritime and Arctic interests of the Nordic states, though even there these interests may not be the same. All the Nordic states are to some degree “Atlanticist”, though over the past decade, Denmark has shown itself to be even more so than Norway, a reversal of Cold War roles. However, the United States’s relinquishing of its presence in Iceland and its heavy commitment to Iraq and Afghanistan may also lead to some reconsideration of the practical consequences of the Atlantic link.

Is there any way out of this? There are two possible answers: one involves interests, one identity<sup>47</sup>. For the Nordic region to become a security entity that can have a chance of common strategic decision-making, there should be common interests between the states that support such a move. During the 1990s such an interest seemed to develop over the Baltic states with the Nordic states providing assistance to those countries and doing so collectively as well as separately. However, it appears that the joint effort was very lightly coordinated and there were also noticeable differences between the Nordic states about their involvement in the Baltic region generally<sup>48</sup>.

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<sup>46</sup> Posen (1984), p. 13.

<sup>47</sup> Dybesland (2000).

<sup>48</sup> Archer (1998).

The Stoltenberg report advances the Arctic region as one where the Nordic states may also have common interests. Indeed all five are members of the Arctic Council and all have shown concern for the environmental degradation of the Arctic region. However, their interests in the area are quite different, with Norway and Iceland taking resources from the Arctic waters in the form of oil, gas and fish. Furthermore, Denmark has a special interest in Greenland that gave it a position at the meeting of the Arctic Ocean countries at Ilulissat in May 2008, while Finland, Iceland and Sweden were excluded. In a sense, the Stoltenberg report is trying to build up a number of common interests in areas such as the Arctic and more functional ones such as defence procurement.

A more certain way for the Nordic states to take on joint strategic decision-making, would be for them to have a common identity that was strong enough to include common ideas about best to “cause” their own security. Traditionally this has been an emphasis on Norden’s geographic proximity and its common culture and history, though this has not been sufficient to lead to a common strategic decision-making, let alone a common political system. Indeed, Wæver concludes that at least the development of a non-war community between the Nordic states has not emerged ‘by erecting common security structures or institutions, but primarily by processes of ‘desecuritisation’, that is progressive marginalisation of mutual security concerns in favour of other issues’<sup>49</sup>. When considering their own joint security, the five countries have to consider whether the “we” feeling is sufficiently strong for them to do this collectively and over and above any commitments that they may have to NATO, the EU or any other wider organization. The end of the dominance of the social democrat parties in Nordic politics, social changes within each of the countries and the effects on those societies of Europeanization and globalization may mean that they feel they have less in common than, say, at the time of the Scandinavian Defence Union negotiations. However, it may be that the Nordic societies feel that they still have distinct elements that are worth protecting and that they share what Heikka described as ‘a stubborn commitment to the principle of non-domination’<sup>50</sup>, though this is often hidden.

## **Conclusions**

This essay has shown the two sides of strategic cooperation between the Nordic states. There have been elements of cooperation, some through other institutions than the Nordic ones and involving other countries. The Nordic states – sometimes three of them, sometimes five – have discussed

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<sup>49</sup> Wæver (1998), p. 69.

<sup>50</sup> Heikka (2005), p. 109.

joint security arrangements often in detail but, as yet, this does not amount to strategic decision-making. The Stoltenberg report offers a blueprint for closer action over foreign and security matters, but the response from the Nordic capitals has been less than enthusiastic. Nevertheless, a number of the Nordic states – especially Norway, Sweden and Finland – are taking small steps that are bringing them closer together in the defence realm.

The key question arises as to whether the Nordic states have enough common interests and identity that also needs to be expressed in the form of strategic decision-making. Every report on or move towards Nordic cooperation since 1948 that has dipped its toe into that pond has drawn back from taking the plunge. However, maybe the time has come for another testing of the temperature. After all, we live in a “post-” era – post-Cold War, even post-post-Cold War, post-US unipolarism, post-industrial in much of Northern Europe, possibly even post-EU and post-NATO. Perhaps in such an uncertain world the Nordic states may consider that they prefer the company of each other, certainly to any domination from outside.

It is not the intention of this essay to recommend that such a move towards Nordic strategic decision-making is either necessary or desirable, just that it may be considered. One possible step forward could be a further consideration of the matter by the range of research institutes that study these matters in the Nordic region. This would include the institutes of international affairs, the peace research institutes and the military studies institutes, as well as independent scholars. Even if they reached no particular conclusion, at least the main arguments would have been given an airing. This may be no bad thing, given the propensity of Nordic governments to want their policies to be knowledge-based.

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## REFLEXIVE RATIONALITY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DECISION-MAKING

*Yee-Kuang Heng*

As ‘reflexive’ forms of rationality appear to be making inroads into the decision-making calculus of policy-makers in an age of global risks<sup>1</sup>, the implications for how strategic problems have traditionally been addressed in an instrumental ‘means-end’ fashion could potentially be immense. A fundamental re-think of the basic underlying assumptions the West has had of strategy in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, not to mention the ends to which military force could realistically serve, might possibly be on the cards. Rationality here is firstly defined in a Weberian sense. Doing so enables us to highlight particularly the emphasis Max Weber placed on competing ‘rationalisation’ processes; namely that different types of rationalities can co-exist and compete at any one time.<sup>2</sup> Although ‘means-end rationality’ eventually emerged to dominate modern society and also by extension strategy and warfare, its continued ascendancy is in question, given the difficulties that bedevil such linear forms of thinking in a 21<sup>st</sup> century strategic context. How a more ‘reflexive’ form of rationality could well be emerging in response to ‘rationalising’ these new strategic challenges is then illustrated by way of an empirical analysis of the Iraq crisis of late 2002 (here I mean the rationalisations provided by decision-makers before regime change).

### **Rationality, Weber, and decision-making**

How should one firstly think about the relationship between rationality and decision-making? Max Weber felt that individual human agents act with self-consciousness, possessing the ‘capacity and will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and lend it significance in a subjective sense.’<sup>3</sup> Rationality can thus be understood in terms of the way actions make sense to the actors who carry them out.<sup>4</sup> What ultimately matters the most is the

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<sup>1</sup> Rasmussen (2006) I am not the first to claim the novelty of ‘reflexive rationality’ but the deeper implications for decision-making particularly with regard to case study analysis seem to have been overlooked.

<sup>2</sup> Kalberg (1980)

<sup>3</sup> Weber cited in Oakley (1997), p. 812.

<sup>4</sup> Rasmussen (2006), p. 5.

meaning people confer on ‘reality’ as they see it. ‘The objectivity of an event is not something which it possesses “objectively”. It is rather conditioned by the orientation of our cognitive interest, as it arises from the specific cultural significance which we attribute to the particular event in a given case’.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, humans take action as a result of personal reasoning that is subjectively *perceived* to be not only rational but also logical to the individual decision-maker. This reasoning is then applied to perceived circumstances in achieving preferred goals. Thus doing certain things appears logical, and rational, to certain individuals because a certain set of rationalities shape how you act as well as the resultant decision. By extension, this also implies that an absolutely objectively universally-accepted rational decision might not necessarily exist.

Different rationalities though can pertain to different societies, time periods, and environments.<sup>6</sup> Kalberg suggests that Weber used changing forms of rationality to ‘guide him to certain critical historical watersheds.’<sup>7</sup> Like Rasmussen, this paper assumes that decision-making can also express a particular type of rationality, and can evolve in response to changing circumstances<sup>8</sup>. In other words, individuals thinking about certain issues at particular times thus can embody a certain type of rationality which ebbs and flows as time, ideas and social circumstances evolve. The different types of rationality however can be distinguished from the larger processes of ‘rationalisation’: ‘Weber’s vision of a *multiplicity* of rationalisation processes that variously conflict and coalesce with one another at all societal and civilisational levels’.<sup>9</sup> Once a particular set of ideas about the world is systematized (rationalised), it can gain greater coherence and acceptance over others, providing an internal driving dynamic which is then translated into social action. This set of ideas then provides the lens through which people view the world around them. ‘Through rationalisation ideas, as ideas, influence society.’<sup>10</sup> There is at the same time an interactive relationship with other human agents as well as the wider social environment: ‘as agents in social and economic processes, human beings are also contained within and constrained by the structured situational complex comprising their many and varied social connections with others.’<sup>11</sup> Changes in these social situations can thus also shape and influence rationalities and rationalisation processes, affecting which eventually emerges predominant.

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<sup>5</sup> Weber (1904), p. 64.

<sup>6</sup> See also Forsberg in this publication, p. 43.

<sup>7</sup> Kalberg (1980), p. 1172.

<sup>8</sup> Rasmussen (2006).

<sup>9</sup> Kalberg (1980), p. 1147.

<sup>10</sup> Swidler (1973), p. 37.

<sup>11</sup> Oakley (1997), p. 813.

Returning to how conflicting sets of rationalities characterise societies, ‘means-end’ rationality according to Weber had come out tops; it was defining modern society, displacing other forms of rationality such as value rationality and tradition rationality. Means-end rationality, argued Weber, is an ideal-type determination of action ‘by expectations as to the behaviour of objects in the environment and of other human beings. These expectations are used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends.’<sup>12</sup> What emerges from this definition, especially relevant for our purposes of decision-making, is the crucial assumption of ‘future expectations of behaviour and definite outcomes that are knowable in advance, with increasingly precise calculation of most efficient means to achieve ends.’<sup>13</sup> Weber’s famous ‘iron cage’ of bureaucracy is perhaps the ‘best known example of means-end rationality defining action, according to a set of rules and procedures which makes sense to bureaucrats and government.’<sup>14</sup> Consequently, human life increasingly became dominated by a goal-oriented rationality driven by efficiency, with ever more efficient rules and procedures devised for problem-solving purposes. Such calculations eventually became the cornerstone of military strategy as well. Strategists devised the best strategic and operational doctrines to derive maximum benefit from technology and efficiently organising their fighting forces. Indeed, Clausewitz, the most well-known of the military strategists in the modern era, and his oft-cited dictum that war was the continuation of politics with an admixture of other means, reflected such means-end rationality. Raymond Aron even suggests that ‘in the manner of Weber, Clausewitz interprets all action in war, at least that of the commander down to the level of the foot patrol, with reference to the means-end relationship.’<sup>15</sup> It is easy then to draw the conclusion, as Betts does, that ‘strategies are chains of relationships among means and ends.’<sup>16</sup> Strategists basically seek to devise concepts and doctrines that can be used to guide military action to serve particular ends as technology progressed. For instance, Nazi Germany’s *blitzkrieg* doctrine was designed to harness and maximise the firepower and mobility of armoured forces, while doctrines of deterrence were developed to deal with possible use or non-use of nuclear weapons.

### **Means-end rationality and strategic decision-making**

Means-end rationality perhaps reached its epitome during the Cold War, informing the way in which strategic planners viewed the problem as well

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<sup>12</sup> Weber (1968), pp. 24-26.

<sup>13</sup> Kalberg (1980), p. 1152.

<sup>14</sup> Rasmussen (2006), p. 5.

<sup>15</sup> Aron (1972), p. 601.

<sup>16</sup> Betts (2000), p. 6.

as how they might resolve them. As Bernard Brodie put it, these were ‘problems involving the economy of means, the most efficient utilisation of potential and available resources to the end of enhancing our security.’<sup>17</sup> Clearly there is a danger of constructing a straw man here for that particular period was remarkably complex and multi-faceted, with various dimensions of analysis from global strategic nuclear balances to more local/regional proxy ‘dirty’ wars. But at great risk of over-simplifying for the sake of discussion, what emerges from a survey of several authors on the issue reveals the relatively tangible materialist nature of the Cold War revolving around instrumental means-end rationality. This implied that an action from one’s adversary produces particular knowable calculable consequences<sup>18</sup> that we can then respond to with known (and knowable) solutions: the cause-effect sequence could be clearly mapped and predicted, and the problem ultimately could be resolved. We could identify Soviet missile or bomber gaps although these were often exaggerated, and then prescribe solutions to the problem such as allocating ever more resources into developing new weapons systems. A Soviet pre-emptive strike might be predicted to unfold in a sequential manner: we could identify tangible indicators of such a move and base our analysis on expectations of behaviour and outcomes such as mobilisation of troops or missiles.<sup>19</sup> Herman Kahn’s famous escalation ladder emerged as one of the best known Cold War metaphors, which was in his own words, ‘a linear arrangement of roughly increasing levels of intensity of crisis. Such a ladder exhibits a progression of steps in what amounts to, roughly speaking, an ascending order of intensity through which a given crisis may progress.’<sup>20</sup> It misleadingly ‘offers a linear model of a phenomenon that is actually far more complex and ambiguous’ whereby conflict may move in multiple directions.<sup>21</sup> Nonetheless, analysts believed that it was possible, at least on paper, to predict and carefully work out how a given nuclear crisis (or inter-state conflict) might escalate in a cause-and-effect sequence by moving through various rungs of the metaphorical ladder. In Stanley Kubrick’s iconic Cold War movie *Dr Strangelove*, the American war protocols that were triggered, like the equivalent Russian doomsday device that was itself set up to automatically respond to just such an American pre-emptive strike, were derived from perfectly bureaucratic rules and assumptions. Put very simply, the sequence of events and triggers could, at least conceivably, be modelled, while the stipulated reactions of one side could be programmed into computer simulations. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the intelligence community ‘emphasising clandestine and often technical collection, was comfortable with

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<sup>17</sup> Brodie (1949), p. 478.

<sup>18</sup> Rasmussen (2001), p. 288.

<sup>19</sup> Dunne & Mauer (2009)

<sup>20</sup> Kahn (1965), p. 38.

<sup>21</sup> Morgan et al (2008), p. 17.

linear predictive reasoning.’<sup>22</sup> There was a sense of ‘ontological security’<sup>23</sup> driven by the belief that the ‘nature of the threat is analytically tractable and that cause-effect relationships are identifiable.’<sup>24</sup> We also thought we knew the problem and could imagine an objective reality (such as military balances ‘out there’ that only required us to discover and precisely assess) that we could at the very least try to comprehend with some certainty using all sorts of intelligence-gathering techniques from satellite imaging to human sources.<sup>25</sup>

In terms of the expectations we had of others’ behaviour and outcomes that formed the basis of means-end rationality, the Cold War doctrine of deterrence reflected this very assumption, being as it was, ‘grounded in attribution apportioning blame and holding others to account for their actions.’<sup>26</sup> Responsibility for a sequence of cause-effect relations was attributable to expected behaviour of states and it was possible to try to predict how adversaries would act and react based on deterrence dynamics.

### **Going ‘reflexive’**

But the post-Cold war post-9/11 world is quickly becoming ‘reflexive’ as it comes to grips with ‘unattributable’ non-linear diffuse processes such as terrorism, global warming, or swine flu. Or as President Bush worried aloud, ‘secretly and without fingerprints’, Saddam Hussein could have provided WMD to terrorist groups.<sup>27</sup> While Clausewitz is often interpreted in an instrumental means-end fashion in light of his famous claim about war as an extension of politics, what in fact seals his enduring timeless relevance is his recognition that every age has its own kind of war reflecting its own peculiar logic and circumstance. Means-end rationality was one type of logic; reflexive rationality is another type of strategic logic defining 21<sup>st</sup> century war. With such momentous changes in the international environment, how human agents respond and develop new rationalisation processes as a result is an interesting question. After all, Oakley claims that Weber’s focus on a deeper subjectivist understanding of human agents, understated the contingency of human agency in responding to changing situations.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Rathmell (2002), p. 91.

<sup>23</sup> Giddens (1991), p. 36.

<sup>24</sup> Dunn & Mauer (2009), p.132.

<sup>25</sup> Dunn & Mauer (2009).

<sup>26</sup> Coker (2009), p. 75.

<sup>27</sup> State of the Union Address, January 2003.

<sup>28</sup> Oakley (1997), p. 813.

Taken together, could developments such as the end of the Cold War and the impact of 9/11 be in the process of generating a new rationality as decision-makers attempt to rationalise the events and world around them into a more systematic frame of ideas? In various fields ranging from intelligence<sup>29</sup>; security<sup>30</sup>; to governance and sustainable development<sup>31</sup>, much has been said about going 'reflexive' as a response. Sociologists argue that reflexivity arises because an agent increasingly regards its actions or inactions in terms of their potentially adverse consequences even before these have materialised.<sup>32</sup> As a whole new range of incalculable scenarios emerge with globalisation and new types of technologies, knowledge is increasingly uncertain and contested, with experts and counter-experts undermining each other on an almost routine basis. For instance, consider the ongoing red wine or mobile phone radiation debate: some days it's risky for you, some days you learn it's not as bad as you were told a few days earlier. There are many incalculable factors to be considered and it all boils down to individual actions and choices. We now also hear that even the 2006 Stern report on global warming in fact underestimated the magnitude and severity of the climate change risk. Such reflexivity means we live in an age of what Beck calls 'rule-altering politics'<sup>33</sup> and practices. The rules and practices are not yet defined and only eventually emerge as a result of decision-makers reflecting on not only the nature of the problem but also the proposed approaches and solutions to managing the problems: 'the ways in which we try to solve our problems become a theme and a problem in itself'.<sup>34</sup> As a result, decision-makers continually anguish over the consequences of their action or inactions. Beck has a wonderful phrase describing this conundrum: 'the side-effect, not instrumental rationality...becomes the motor of social history.'<sup>35</sup>

What then are the problems for decision-making? Decision-makers have become increasingly risk-averse, 'grounded on a pessimistic assumption that a gap exists between our knowledge of the world and the world itself'.<sup>36</sup> Yet they feel a great need and impetus to do something. We face more uncertainty, complexity in an age of globalisation confronted with unknowable unquantifiable risks; knowledge itself is contested and intangible. The identity, capabilities, and intentions of potential adversaries are uncertain, as well as the type of conflict to prepare for. It is also much harder to attribute responsibility: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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<sup>29</sup> Dunne & Mauer (2009).

<sup>30</sup> Rasmussen (2001).

<sup>31</sup> Voss et al (2006).

<sup>32</sup> Giddens (1991), p. 20.

<sup>33</sup> Beck (1994), pp. 34-36.

<sup>34</sup> Rasmussen (2004), p. 395.

<sup>35</sup> Beck (1997), p. 31.

<sup>36</sup> Coker (2009), p. 61.



(USSR) was marked clearly on a map; Al Qaeda is dispersed globally and even operating unbeknownst to intelligence agencies within our own local communities. Who is to blame for the global financial crisis or the swine flu outbreak? While deterrence was based on certain expectations of Soviet behaviour; these no longer apply. Unlike the Cold War, we can no longer specify in a linear fashion causes and effects. In its place are unknowable unquantifiable diffuse risks, rather than a materialist threat. As adversary behaviours are seen to be less predictable and less deterrable, there is a much less defined instrumental cause-effect relationship. This is why ‘future events that have not yet occurred become the object of present action.’<sup>37</sup> Take global warming or swine flu, the cause and effect is elusive: rather we are more concerned with the ‘bad’ scenario of what is supposed to happen that we seek to avoid. Taking a decision becomes a risk itself because it is based on a scenario which might well turn out to be wrong. As Coker observed, ‘in the modern age, cause and effect reigned supreme; today it is the non-linearity of decision-making that causes so much concern.’<sup>38</sup> This is not just about ‘bounded rationality’ but rather ‘blowback’ of which the best known instance is how US support for the Afghan resistance in the 1980s eventually helped stimulate the formation of Al Qaeda (in an indirect fashion of course). There is increasing self-awareness about our role in constructing and managing risk. Cause and effect are no longer proportional or even measurable; minute small changes can have an immeasurable huge impact. To Daase and Kessler, ‘it is the relationship between what we know, what we do not know, and what we cannot know...that determines the cognitive frame for political practice’.<sup>39</sup> Decision-makers can no longer assume predictability and control, especially when knowledge is seen as insufficient for decision-making. ‘Actors have no secure ends or rules to choose between but have to balance and manage risks.’<sup>40</sup> A clearly defined end like outright total victory in war as traditionally defined is no longer realistic. For instance the 1999 Kosovo campaign had no clearly defined strategy or long-term political goal<sup>41</sup>: it was simply to make the issue more manageable (and less problematic) for the West.

Policy-makers face the dilemma of action versus inaction, with various options for managing equally unclear scenarios. Both action and inaction are risks in themselves. Especially in a culture of blame decision-makers face blame for omission (i.e. not taking action in a sufficiently robust action soon enough) and also blame for commission (i.e. panicking and over-reacting to a problem which turned out to be less serious than thought). Since we have no absolute objective knowledge of whether the information

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<sup>37</sup> Beck (1999), p. 137.

<sup>38</sup> Coker (2009), pp. 76, 107.

<sup>39</sup> Daase & Kessler, (2007), p. 412.

<sup>40</sup> Rasmussen (2006), p. 33.

<sup>41</sup> Smith (2005), p. 291.

and intelligence we have is true or not, Dunn & Mauer conclude ‘a particular style of decision-making emerges that does not rely on the facts at hand anymore but instead constructs worst-case scenarios.’<sup>42</sup> Decision-makers embrace this approach because it confers them political cover if something really does go wrong. Preferring to err on the side of caution, they can at least point to the fact that they have tried their best. The policy choice then is to become ‘reflexive’, *averting* adverse futures without necessarily specifying in advance clear cause-effect relationships. This arises because ‘the knowledge that you might be able to prevent something bad from happening gives you a responsibility, a duty to protect the future from the present’.<sup>43</sup>

### **Reflexive rationality and decision-making during the Iraq crisis of late 2002**

These features of reflexive rationality outlined above can be seen to be manifesting during the Iraq crisis of late 2002 as decision-makers presented their rationalisations of the problem and proposed ways to manage that problem. Of course there are several ways to interpret events in the run-up to the invasion and it would be naïve and foolish to claim that there is only one singular overarching explanation for such a complex multi-faceted phenomena as war. However, reflexive rationality possibly confers us one way to gain some insights into decision-making during that crisis. To begin with the impact of drastically altered strategic circumstances after 9/11, the recognition that the rules are changing is captured in the US National Security Strategy 2002: ‘Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work’ against enemies seeking death and destruction and whose behaviour can no longer be predicted.<sup>44</sup> The rules once held to dictate Cold War strategic assumptions are no longer taken as givens. Premier Blair captured this eloquently in a speech soon after 9/11, ‘The kaleidoscope has been shaken. The pieces are in flux.’<sup>45</sup> In such a fluid situation of uncertainty, as President Bush put it, ‘we have to assume the worst and we have a duty to prevent the worst from occurring.’<sup>46</sup> Prime Minister Blair likewise mentioned his ‘fear that one day [...] mass destruction, rogue states, and international terrorism combine to deliver a catastrophe to our world. And then the shame of knowing that I did nothing to stop it’.<sup>47</sup> Both the US President and British Prime Minister hinted at what they felt was their responsibility-

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<sup>42</sup> Dunne & Mauer (2009), p.138.

<sup>43</sup> Rasmussen (2006), p. 39.

<sup>44</sup> The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Section V, Washington: 2002.

<sup>45</sup> Labour party conference speech, Brighton, England, 02 Oct 2001.

<sup>46</sup> ‘President Bush outlines Iraqi threat’, *Office of the Press Secretary*, 07 October 2002.

<sup>47</sup> Speech to the 2003 Welsh Labour Party conference.

given the knowledge that they could prevent something bad from happening- to protect the future from the present, even without specific identifiable cause-effect relationships. ‘In the twenty-first century,’ Anne Marie Slaughter and Lee Feinstein argue, “maintaining global peace and security requires states to be proactive rather than reactive. There is a ‘duty to prevent terrorists getting Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).’<sup>48</sup>

Other aspects of ‘reflexive decision-making’ calculus can be identified quite clearly. The fundamental question for decision-makers was posed in a rather insightful ‘reflexive’ way by Paul Wolfowitz. The Pentagon’s resident hawk exhibited a self-conscious appreciation of the dilemma and how one’s actions or inactions could shape the problem and ultimately affect the outcomes. Ultimately this meant trying to estimate what will happen in the future along different courses we might take. As Wolfowitz suggested, it simply boiled down to ‘how does one weigh the risks of inaction against the risks of action’.<sup>49</sup> Eventually, Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney reached strikingly identical conclusions, using the very same language and sentence structure, coming down on the side of the argument that ‘the risks of action outweigh the risks of inaction’.<sup>50</sup> George W. Bush and Tony Blair, in retrospect, did go to some length to reflect not only on the nature of the problem, but also the difficult process of generating new policy responses when previous protocols have become outmoded. Bush rationalised the problem for the American public, arguing that, ‘the risk of doing nothing, the risk that somehow inaction will make the world safer is not a risk I’m willing to take...I think of the risks, and calculated the costs of inaction versus the cost of action’.<sup>51</sup> While this was a self-conscious act of deliberation, this emphasised not so much instrumental calculation of cause and effect, but rather reflexive consideration of how to avert alternative negative futures which had not yet manifest. As Blair suggests, it was ‘possible nothing would have happened...but do we want to take the risk?’<sup>52</sup> Self-consciously grappling with how the proposed solution was itself becoming a theme and a problem is a central hallmark of reflexive rationality, together with the recognition that the proposed solution might not actually resolve the problem.

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<sup>48</sup> Lee Feinstein & Anne Marie Slaughter, ‘A duty to prevent’, *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/February 2004.

<sup>49</sup> ‘Remarks by Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Fletcher Conference’, Washington D.C, 16 October 2002.

<sup>50</sup> ‘DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld’, 03 September 2002; ‘Vice President speaks at VFW 103<sup>rd</sup> National Convention’, *Office of the Press Secretary*, 26 Aug 2002.

<sup>51</sup> President George Bush discusses Iraq in National Press Conference, 06 Mar 2003, *Office of the Press Secretary*.

<sup>52</sup> Speech to Sedgefield parliamentary constituency, England, 05 March 2004, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/mar/05/iraq.iraq>, accessed 07 May 2009.

Here, the Precautionary Principle, which has been enshrined in international environmental treaties, readily comes to mind. The 1992 Rio Declaration recommends that ‘a precautionary approach should be applied...where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation taking into account costs and benefits of action or inactions if the threat is serious enough’.<sup>53</sup> Precaution became politically explicit in February 2000 with the European Commission noting it ‘is particularly relevant to the management of risk’ by decision-makers and that ‘absence of scientific proof of a cause-effect relationship...should not be used to justify inaction’: a typically ‘reflexive’ way of thinking.<sup>54</sup> The European Environment Agency further advised in January 2002 that “forestalling disasters usually requires acting before there is strong proof of harm.”<sup>55</sup>

Combining a sense of responsibility for managing the future with such decision-making guidelines, Blair has argued that ‘responsible science and responsible policymaking operates on the same precautionary principle’.<sup>56</sup> While precaution was originally about scientific uncertainty and environmental protection, it has now jumped into crisis decision-making and strategy, ironically gaining more attention after Rumsfeld was awarded the 2003 ‘Foot in the mouth’ gong by the British Plain English Campaign for his ostensibly incoherent rambling on ‘unknown unknowns’. Far from spouting nonsense and misspeaking, Rumsfeld in fact made crystal clear sense to students of the Precautionary Principle in his rationalisation of the risks Iraq posed. The Defence Secretary in fact unwittingly or not, had hit on the core principles of reflexive rationality: how do policymakers operate under huge uncertainty about behaviour and outcomes, whilst at the same time reflecting on both the nature of the problem and how proposed solutions in turn affect the problem? Speaking like a well-versed guru on the precautionary principle in what has now become a classic speech rationalising the problem with uncertainty over Iraq’s WMD programs and links with Al Qaeda, Rumsfeld argued that ‘As we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns. We know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don't know we don't know.

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<sup>53</sup> Principle 15, available at <http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163>, accessed 06 May 2009.

<sup>54</sup> See John D. Graham, ‘A future for the precautionary principle?’, *Journal of Risk Research*, Vol. 4 No.2, April 2001, p.109-110; European Commission, *Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle*, Brussels, 02 February 2000, p. 4.

<sup>55</sup> ‘Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896-2000’, European Environment Agency, 2002, p. 8.

<sup>56</sup> Speech to the Royal Society, London, UK, 23 May 2002.

And each year we discover a few more of these unknown unknowns'.<sup>57</sup> It was of course these unknown unknowns that were to prove the main cause of anxiety and fear, propelling the Bush administration to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Rumsfeld went on to recommend that 'absolute proof cannot be a precondition for action' and that 'absence of evidence is not evidence of absence': another set of ideas that are prevalent in discussions to do with precaution and the environment. Decisions are now to be made even when we lack a sequential linear basis of assumptions about cause-effect or evidence. US strategic documents of that period similarly reflect such assessments of the strategic environment. Elevating the Precautionary Principle to the forefront of the US strategic decision-making calculus in the process, the 2002 *National Security Strategy* categorically stated that where the danger is grave, there is a need for 'anticipatory actions even if uncertainty remains as to time and place of the enemy's attack.'<sup>58</sup> Decision-makers can no longer imagine that any 'objective' reality or 'truth' out there exists with the certainty that they at least thought they might have had in the past from their intelligence analysts and scientific models. All they can try to do is make sure to the best of their ability that whatever 'reality' they subscribe to will not materialise in the worst possible way.

## Conclusion

If Weber was indeed prescient in using changing forms of rationalities as a way of identifying crucial historical turning points, then the notion of reflexive rationality reflects a potentially significant shift in how decision-makers rationalise strategic conundrums in the age of globalisation. Rather than Kahn's escalation ladder based on linear instrumental means-end logic, perhaps a reflexive loop might be a more appropriate metaphor today. Future undesirable events, without specific cause-effect sequences, are to be averted, thus reaching back to stimulate action in the present. The choices we make today over action or inaction in turn can shape the outcomes that result, although there can be no certainty that these postulated outcomes will actually materialise. Faced with the dilemma of action versus inaction, as the Iraq crisis demonstrates, decision-makers conscious of their responsibility to protect the future prefer to adopt a 'reflexive' rationality even though any 'knowledge' they have is uncertain and contested. Reflecting on both the nature of the problem and proposed solutions which have become a theme in itself, the decisions made have been geared towards averting worst-case scenarios and the associated blame for omission.

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<sup>57</sup> DoD News Briefing- Secretary Rumsfeld, 12 February 2002.

<sup>58</sup> *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington D.C: The White House, Sep 2002, Chapter V.

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## RATIONAL CHOICE AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CRISIS DECISION-MAKING

*Tuomas Forsberg*

Whether the claim is made explicit or not, instrumental rationality has been by far the most influential view of action in strategic studies.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, one may assume that if strategy is about choosing appropriate means, then it is the area which is furthest apart from value-related concerns.<sup>2</sup> Rational choice theory is simple and powerful, but its dominance does not necessarily depend on its superior performance. The continuous support for rational choice theory derives partly from the fact that there are no alternative models of rationality at hand. The critique of rational choice often ends up just in the other extreme, namely that there are as many rationalities as there are people making decisions.<sup>3</sup> Hence, people who aim at generalising explanations and predictions often think that assumptions other than instrumental rationality cannot provide a basis for such knowledge.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> One example where this is made explicit is John Garnett, "The Assumptions of Strategic Studies", in John Baylis et al. (eds.), *Contemporary Strategy*. Vol 1. Theory and Concepts (New York: Holmes & Meier 1987). For a classical criticism of these assumptions in IR, see Richard Ashley, "Three Modes of Economism", *International Studies Quarterly* vol. 27, no. 4, 1983, pp. 463-496.

<sup>2</sup> Keith Krause - Michael Williams, "From Strategy to Security. Foundations for Critical Security Studies" in Krause - Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1997), p. 40.

<sup>3</sup> According to the Foucauldian view rationalities are always local. What Foucault rejects about Enlightenment is the universal notion of rationality. For him, reason is self-created, and it has different forms, different foundations, different creations and different modifications which all oppose one other. See Lois McNay, *Foucault. A Critical Introduction* (Oxford: Polity 1994), p. 144.

<sup>4</sup> See e.g. T. Clifton Morgan, *Untying the Knot of War. A Bargaining Theory of International Crises* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1994), p. 28: "To assume that the actors are rational should not be taken as an assumption that actors are rational, or even that they behave as if they are rational; it is merely a simplifying assumption imposed to make the model more manageable. To see the usefulness of such an assumption, it is necessary only to consider the alternative. It is a simple enough task to argue that non-rational factors play an important role in decision making, but constructing a model that incorporates these factors in explanations and predictions of behavior is another story".

Rational choice theories are hence normally privileged because we seem to lack viable alternatives. The assumption that actors are rational has been prominent in realism for the same reason as in economics: it is believed that without that assumption there is no obvious path to coherent theory.<sup>5</sup> This view is highlighted by Robert Keohane according to whom, in future theory building, we should loosen the realist assumption concerning state interests, but not that of rationality.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, although rational actor models have not remained unchallenged, the usual alternatives to rational choice explanations, namely bureaucratic politics and psychological misperceptions still rely on instrumental rationality as the basic form of rationality. The normative nature of conflict behaviour has been overlooked, partly because it is assumed that conflict represents a breakdown of norms. Yet, norms and moral choices do not only prevent conflict, they may also be factors which launch them.<sup>7</sup> Communication has received attention more as a means of enhancing credibility of threats and promises than as a form of collective reasoning. Therefore, seeing conflict behaviour from the perspective of norms and communication leads us to a more fundamental recon-ceptualisation of the logic behind strategic choices.

The aim of this chapter is to introduce such a reconceptualisation as an alternative to the rational choice approach to understand strategic action and crisis decision-making. In fact, I will outline two alternatives to rational instrumental action.<sup>8</sup> Firstly, building on the basic assumptions of constructivism according to which all behaviour, including strategic behavior, is to a large extent rule-governed, I will argue that strategic choices can sometimes be seen more appropriately from a perspective that is based on normative/affective factors. Secondly, leaning on Jürgen Habermas' concept of communicative rationality, which has gained in popularity also in the study

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<sup>5</sup> Barry Buzan, "The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?", in Steve Smith - Ken Booth - Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory. Positivism & Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), p. 54.

<sup>6</sup> Robert Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond", in *International Institutions and State Power* (Boulder: Westview 1989), p. 62.

<sup>7</sup> See e.g. Stephen Kocs, "Explaining the Strategic Behavior of States: International Law as a System Structure", *International Studies Quarterly* vol. 38, no. 4, 1994, pp. 535-556. I have elaborated this view in relation to territorial disputes in Tuomas Forsberg, "Explaining Territorial Disputes. From Power Politics to Normative Reasons", *Journal of Peace Research* vol. 33, no. 4, 1996, pp. 433-451.

<sup>8</sup> This taxonomy is very much reminiscent of Anatol Rapoport's classic games, fights, and debates. According to Rapoport, "fight can be idealized as devoid of the rationality of the opponents while a game on the contrary is idealized as a struggle in which complete rationality of the opponents is assumed". In debates, in turn, "the objective is to convince the opponent to make him see things as you see them". Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games and Debates* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1960), pp. 10-11 and *passim*.

of International Relations, I will suggest that strategic choices are sometimes based on a shared argument.<sup>9</sup>

### **Rational Choice Theory and Strategic Studies**

What is rational choice theory? It is not easy to define rational choice theory exactly since it may take several variations. Yet, only a clear concept of rational choice can serve as an anchor of theorising, if theories are expected to provide the basis for concise explanations. If rational choice means that people are capable of reasoning, and choose options they prefer, it is certainly true but not of much value. It is just a place to begin, as Nicholas Onuf has argued.<sup>10</sup> Whatever can be said about the concept of rationality, it cannot simultaneously fulfil the task of being a basis for coherent explanatory theories and be wide open to all possible values and modes of reasoning.

Rational choice theories have often been supported and criticised for wrong reasons. What I will do next, is to construct a view of rational choice which is both viable and criticisable. According to one such a definition, which I regard as both representative and authoritative, we may say that the theory rests on three general assumptions. Firstly, rationality involves utility maximisation. Egoistic people and states are rational only if they act upon their interests as far as possible. Secondly, it is assumed that individuals maximise the expected value, which means that they calculate not only the value of the aim but also the likelihood of their success. Thirdly, they choose the actions which seem best to fulfil these aims. In other words, the actor chooses those actions that he or she thinks are more likely to achieve the desired goals given and are less costly than the alternatives.<sup>11</sup> As John Garnett

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<sup>9</sup> For this distinction see e.g. Robert Abelson, "The Secret Existence of Expressive Behavior" in Jeffrey Friedman (ed.), *The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1996).

<sup>10</sup> Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making, Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press 1989), p. 259.

<sup>11</sup> This definition is from Donald P. Green - Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. A Critique of Applications in Political Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1994). For other definitions and discussion of rational choice, see Jon Elster, "Rational Choice Theory", in Elster (ed.) *Rational Choice* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986); William H. Riker, "Political Science and Rational Choice", in James Alt - Kenneth Shepsle (eds.), *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990) and Kristen Renwick Monroe - Kristen Hill Maher, "Psychology and Rational Actor Theory", *Political Psychology* vol. 16, no. 1, 1995, pp. 1-21. The instrumental concept of rationality is in use in game theory. For example, Morrow has defined it in the following way: "Put it simply, rational behavior means choosing the best means to gain a predetermined set of ends." James Morrow, *Game Theory for Political Scientists* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1994), p. 17. A

notes, "man is behaving rationally when his actions are calculated to bring about the ends he desires".<sup>12</sup>

There are, of course, a number of cognitive limitations to rationality. In practice, many rational choice theorists do not expect perfect rationality. This loosening of assumptions can, however, be rejected by those who are concerned with the predictability of rational choice theories.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, rational choice theorists usually agree that in reality optimal rationality is impossible, because information is often incomplete and the capabilities of processing it are limited.<sup>14</sup> Therefore it is understandable that rational people choose options which are satisfactory rather than optimal, and that extra-rational elements such as the way issues are framed frequently influence decision making. That is why it is necessary to speak of "bounded rationality" when rational actor models are applied to real world situations.<sup>15</sup>

Psychological elements are often important in how utilities are understood. Prospect theory tells us that people are risk averse when facing gains but willing to accept substantial risks when facing losses. Prospect theory is often seen as an alternative rational choice because rational choice theory cannot explain why the utility of gains and losses leads to different outcomes in strategic behaviour. Moreover, there is no rational baseline that would tell us how gains and losses are framed. The assessment of gains and losses is often crucially important when deciding about whether it makes sense to fight or cooperate.<sup>16</sup>

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similar concept of rationality can be found also in John Harsanyi, *Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1977), p. 16.

<sup>12</sup> Garnett, "The Assumptions of Strategic Studies", p. 17.

<sup>13</sup> See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "The Benefits of a Social-Scientific Approach", in Ngaire Woods (ed.), *Explaining International Relations since 1945* (New York: Oxford University Press 1996), p. 60.

<sup>14</sup> In fact, perfect information and strategic interaction are, according to Oran Young, "fundamentally and irrevocably incompatible". Oran Young, "Strategic Interaction and Bargaining", in Young (ed.), *Bargaining. Formal Theories of Negotiation* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1975), p. 13.

<sup>15</sup> Herbert Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: Wiley 1957). See also e.g. James March, "Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity and the Engineering of Choice", in Jon Elster (ed.), *Rational Choice* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986); Amos Tversky - Daniel Kahneman, "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions", in Karen Schweers Cook - Margaret Levi (eds.), *The Limits of Rationality* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1990).

<sup>16</sup> See Jack Levy, 'Prospect Theory, Rational Choice and International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly* vol. 41, no. 1, 1997, pp. 87-112; Rose McDermott, *Risk-Taking in International Politics. Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1998) and Janice Gross Stein, "International Cooperation and Loss Avoidance: Framing the Problem", in Janice Gross Stein - Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *Choosing to Co-operate. How States Avoid Loss* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1993), pp. 4-5.

In addition to prospect theory, the two alternatives to rational choice theory which are familiar to IR students are bureaucratic and psychological (cognitive) models of decision making.<sup>17</sup> In his seminal, now classic book on foreign policy decision making, Graham Allison presents his alternatives to the rational actor model.<sup>18</sup> The first alternative - Allison's Model III - was a bureaucratic model, according to which foreign policy decisions depend on the bargaining between the most powerful interest groups within a state. Allison's Model II was labelled as organisational model. According to that model organisations typically do not calculate options rationally but make decisions on the basis of routine standard operation procedures. As some critics have pointed out, the logical structure of the models is not entirely clear. Partly because of this, the organisational model was often conflated with the bureaucratic model.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, Allison's organisational model bears some resemblance to the psychological "misperceptions" model, which has been perhaps better elaborated by Robert Jervis, Yaacov Vertzberger and others.<sup>20</sup> Despite the centrality of rational choice, both of these alternative models have supporters not only in the foreign policy-making in general but in the context of strategic decision-making in particular.<sup>21</sup>

Although psychological theories were path breaking in the study of foreign policy decision-making in challenging the dominance of the rational actor model, it may be somewhat surprising to say that both of these alternative

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<sup>17</sup> See e.g. Martin Hollis - Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding in International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991), chapter 7 and Michael Clark - Brian White (eds.), *Understanding Foreign Policy* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar 1989). In his critique of the rationality assumption in realism, Campbell also sees the rejection of the unitary-state-as-actor model as a way to overcome the problem. David Campbell, "The Problem of Rationality in Foreign Policy Analysis", *Melbourne Journal of Politics* vol. 18, no. 1, 1986, pp. 1-17, p. 12.

<sup>18</sup> Graham T. Allison, *The Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1971). See also Agrell in this publication, pp. 70-71.

<sup>19</sup> See especially Jonathan Bendor - Thomas H. Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models", *American Political Science Review* vol. 86, no. 2, 1992, pp. 301-322 and David A. Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect", *International Security* vol. 17, no. 2, 1992, pp. 112-146.

<sup>20</sup> Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1976) and Yaacov Vertzberger, *The World in their Minds. Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1990).

<sup>21</sup> For example John Garnett argues that policies and decisions are not the product of expert planners rationally determining the actions necessary to achieve desired goals. Rather they are the product of controversy, negotiation and bargaining among different groups with different interests and perspectives. John Garnett, "Defense Policy Making", in John Baylis et al. (eds.), *Contemporary Strategy. Vol II The Nuclear Powers* (London: Holmes & Meier 1987), p. 22.

approaches still assume the concept of instrumental rationality. I do not want to argue against the fruitfulness and richness of these perspectives, but in the final analysis they do not depart from the basic assumptions of rational choice. The bureaucratic model assumes the instrumental rationality of bureaucracies that try to foster their interests, and the psychological model assumes instrumental rationality as a sort of measure against which misperceptions can be judged.<sup>22</sup> In short, to some extent both bureaucratic and psychological models – prospect theory included – challenge rational choice, but they do not offer alternative ideas of what rationality is. In both models, the main image is – after all – that instrumental: decision-makers calculate utilities instrumentally.

If we regard rational choice as an explanatory theory, there are, however, some problems with treating rational choice as purely instrumental. For one thing, because the distinction between means and goals is not always clear, all action is at the same time means and end.<sup>23</sup> Secondly, when interests are given exogenously one cannot explain why they change. For rational choice theory to work one must assume that they remain stable. Moreover, when applying their theory, rational choice theorists have always some understanding of what typical interests are, since the explanatory and predictive power of rational choice theory depends on such assumptions. Here I am not saying that rational choice could not be applied to situations where people have different interests, which may even be altruistic, but I agree with those who say that there is a strong bias toward material self-interests.<sup>24</sup> For the time being, however, let me suggest that this is a strength and not a flaw, because it strongly adds to the explanatory power of rational choice. In international politics, for example, the most important goals – survival in the realist tradition and economic benefit in the liberal tradition – are often defended instrumentally. In particular, the realist view that states aim at increasing their power follows the dictates of instrumental rationality, since power is seen as a necessary means for any goals in international politics.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> This point has also been made by Bradley S. Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order. The Global Politics of Deterrence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994), pp. 76-77.

<sup>23</sup> Hans Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1946), p. 184.

<sup>24</sup> For example Abelson has contended that the grammar of rational choice employs only the instrumental case, in which everything people do is a deliberate means to a self-interested, material end. See Abelson, "The Secret Existence of Expressive Behavior", p. 27.

<sup>25</sup> Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations. Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred Knopf 1955).

Rational choice theory has certainly contributed a large amount to our strategic knowledge and to the study of international relations in general.<sup>26</sup> Foreign policy decision-making, war and cooperation are all covered by approaches that are based on rational choice.<sup>27</sup> According to rational choice theorists, the assumption that foreign policy decisions are based on some kind of rational cost-benefit calculus has stood the test for centuries.<sup>28</sup> Bruce Bueno de Mesquita has argued that in some cases rational choice models have predicted correctly up to 97 per cent of international conflict outcomes.<sup>29</sup> Can anybody reasonably think that rational choice theory would not work? Indeed, a common assumption is that rational choice theory cannot be challenged. As Garnett acknowledges, "it is very difficult to make any other assumption".<sup>30</sup>

### **Criticism of Rational Choice**

Despite these assertions, rational choice theory is also widely criticised. Let me start with normative criticism, as it has perhaps been more commonplace. This form of criticism claims that rational choice theory smuggles in certain values. To repeat, despite the fact that rational choice theorists argue that their theory is value neutral, the distinction between means and ends is so blurred that in rational choice theory instrumental means become easily ends in themselves. Although rational choice theorists are right that any values can be analysed from the perspective of rational choice, the assumption of material self-interest remains typical for rational choice theorists.<sup>31</sup> Yet, the concept of self-interest is not necessarily amoral. When the concept of self-interest was invented, it was clearly an emancipatory move, since it deliberated people from thinking that authorities, such as the church or the absolute state, can define their interests.

But more to the point here, there are also doubts that the explanatory power of rational choice theory is greatly exaggerated. Donald Green and Ian Shapiro

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<sup>26</sup> As Michael Nicholson contends, international relations theorists have used rational choice theory effectively and it is now a commonplace particularly among strategic studies. Michael Nicholson, *Causes and Consequences in International Relations. A Conceptual Study* (London: Pinter 1996), p. 151.

<sup>27</sup> One of the well established claims, for example, is the conviction that war is not irrational but that states have positive utility expectations in order to start a war. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita - David Lalman, *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1992).

<sup>28</sup> Michael MccGwire, "Drain the Bath but Spare the Child", *Journal of Social Issues* vol. 43, no. 4, 1987, pp. 135-142, p. 137.

<sup>29</sup> Bueno de Mesquita, "The Benefits of a Social-Scientific Approach", p. 69.

<sup>30</sup> Garnett, "Assumptions of Strategic Studies", p. 17.

<sup>31</sup> See e.g. Michael Hechter, "The Role of Values in Rational Choice Theory", *Rationality and Society* vol. 6, no. 3, 1994, 318-333.

argue that the analytic innovations of rational choice theory have overshadowed its empirical accomplishments.<sup>32</sup> Debra Satz and John Ferejohn have suspected that ironically, rational choice theory is most powerful in contexts where choice is limited.<sup>33</sup> Even people sympathetic to the "scientific" study of international processes such as Nicholson, have argued that "a great deal of rational choice theory in conflict (game) situations shows the ambiguity of following the rules of even the most modest forms of instrumental rationality".<sup>34</sup>

The explanatory criticism is based on three interrelated claims. Firstly, one problem in rational choice theory is that states – or state leaders – do not really seem to calculate their decisions in terms of a cost/benefit analysis. According to critics of rational choice, the conception of human rational agency in terms of maximising over a complete and consistent set of preference orderings is not psychologically realistic.<sup>35</sup> This is not a concern for those rational choice theorists who emphasise the instrumentalist role of their theory and say that they only assume that actors behave *as if* they are rational. Yet, the assumption of utility maximising is not likely to be instrumentally useful if it is not true at all.<sup>36</sup>

The second problem with rational choice theory is that the very meaning of rationality tends to be too broad and open to *ad post hoc* formulations. If the idea of utility is subjective, any action can be explained rationally. Self-interest is a problematic concept because it may mean whatever one wishes. For altruistic people, for example, utility can be other than self-interest. Yet, the more open the concept of utility is rendered, the less useful it is. When preferences are deduced from the action, they are tautological as explanations

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<sup>32</sup> Green - Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory*. For discussion see, Jeffrey Friedman (ed.), *The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconsidered* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1996) and Joseph V. Brogan, "A Mirror of Enlightenment: The Rational Choice Debate", *The Review of Politics* vol. 58, no. 4, 1996, pp. 793-806.

<sup>33</sup> Debra Satz - John Ferejohn, "Rational Choice and Social Theory", *The Journal of Philosophy* vol. 91, no. 2, 1994, pp. 71-94, p. 72.

<sup>34</sup> Michael Nicholson, "The Continued Significance of Positivism?", in Steve Smith - Ken Booth - Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), p. 129.

<sup>35</sup> E.g. Satz - Ferejohn, "Rational Choice and Social Theory", p. 74.

<sup>36</sup> See Nicholson, *Causes and Consequences*, p. 165 for some discussion. Sometimes it is really difficult to see whether rational choice theories think that people really calculate or not. Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, for example have argued that "if decision-makers do not calculate or if they rationalize their actions with foolish calculations, the assumption of rational choice theory may yet remain true (rather than useful, T.F., emphasis T.F.)". Christopher Achen - Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies", *World Politics* vol. 41, no. 2, 1989, pp. 143-169, p. 165.



of the action. The point of criticism is that if rational choice theory explains everything, it explains nothing.<sup>37</sup>

Thirdly, the critics have claimed that rational choice theorists have not been open to criticism concerning their assumptions and have been reluctant to consider alternatives to their theory. Green and Shapiro argued that a large number of rational choice propositions have not been tested empirically or if they have, they have not been contrasted with other possible explanations. They contended that empirical research has been theory driven rather than problem driven and suspected that rational choice hypothesis are often formulated in ways that are inherently resistant to genuine empirical testing.<sup>38</sup> In other words, the tendency has been to extend rational choice theory to different areas of social life rather than to think whether some other theories could be more useful. To use one familiar metaphor, rational choice theorists are too often like the boy with a hammer for whom the whole world looks as a nail. They have thus been more concerned with the question as to what they can do with the hammer than whether other tools could sometimes be more useful.<sup>39</sup>

The critics of rational choice theory often claim that its dominance depends on reasons that are not rational. According to Campbell the emphasis on rationality is inherent in the epistemological framework of realism: theory construction privileges those constituent elements which are in accordance with rationalist epistemology.<sup>40</sup> Kratochwil, in turn argues that many of the substantial assumptions of rational choice theory remain unexamined because they represent "the last tenuous link of communication among the members of the fraternity that otherwise would have precious little in common."<sup>41</sup> Although rational choice theories are pretty common in other social sciences as well, it seems that students of IR have remained particularly lodged to the idea that rationality is instrumental and failed to see alternatives other than bureaucratic and psychological theories.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> E.g. Neil J. Smelser, "The Rational Choice Perspective: A Theoretical Assessment", *Rational Society* vol. 4 no. 4, 1992, pp. 381-410, p. 403. This point is fully acknowledged by many who are defending rational choice, e.g. Nicholson, *Causes and Consequences*, p. 167.

<sup>38</sup> Green - Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory*, p. 7.

<sup>39</sup> As Kratochwil has put this point, "mastering a particular technique or method for which certain expertise can be claimed, is obviously more rewarding than working humbly in the vineyard of science." Friedrich Kratochwil, "The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-realism as the Science of 'Realpolitik' without Politics", *Review of International Studies* vol. 19, no. 1, 1993, pp. 63-80, p. 67.

<sup>40</sup> Campbell, "The Problem of Rationality", p. 1.

<sup>41</sup> Kratochwil, "The Embarrassment of Changes", p. 67.

<sup>42</sup> It is worth noting that the concept of deterrence, for example, came to the study of IR from the legal discourse, but in a time when legal discourse was almost entirely consequentialist. If we look at the extent to which legal discourse is now affected by

There is no doubt that instrumental rationality is central to much decision-making. Although its basic assumptions are simple, it can provide the basis for complex and sophisticated models of international relations. But the question is whether it can be seen as exhaustive of rationality.<sup>43</sup> Whether it is the case, as William Riker argues, that "only rational choice theory allows for explanations in terms of reasons"?<sup>44</sup> As people sympathetic to rational choice theory have reminded, "in order to justify scrapping rational choice theory, we need a viable replacement, so it is reasonable to ask critics to propose alternatives to contrast against rational choice explanations."<sup>45</sup> Hence, to some extent rational choice theories seem irreplaceable because alternatives are lacking. Indeed, Abelson has argued that the alternative modes of rationality exist "secretly".<sup>46</sup> In the following, I will therefore look at these alternatives to rational choice theory.

### **Alternatives to Rational Choice**

There are two basic points of dissatisfaction in the criticism of rational choice. The first is that instrumental rationality is too simple. Indeed, some people see that the whole idea of developing models of rationality is only a retreat to neopositivist formalism.<sup>47</sup> "Practical reason" or "situated rationality", they would argue, is rather to be depicted as something that cannot be modelled and formalised.<sup>48</sup>

Although rational choice theory may be too simple as a model, the criticism against modelling should not be taken too far. If we interpret historical events through some theoretical models, complexity can be better gained by having in mind several models than denying the need of such models. The critique is also rather ineffective. Rational choice theorists certainly admit that their theory is simple, but they will stick to it, because they cannot find any

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expressivist ideas, it would be logical to consider what they mean to the theory of deterrence in IR.

<sup>43</sup> Robert Nozick, *The Nature of Rationality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993), pp. 133-139.

<sup>44</sup> William Riker, "The Political Psychology of Rational Choice Theory", *Political Psychology* vol. 16, no. 1, 1995, pp. 23-44, p. 40.

<sup>45</sup> Dennis Chong, "Rational Choice Theory's Mysterious Rivals", in Friedman (ed.), *The Rational Choice Controversy*, p. 46.

<sup>46</sup> Abelson, "The Secret Existence of Expressive Behavior".

<sup>47</sup> See e.g. Roger Tooze - Craig N. Murphy, "The Epistemology of Poverty and the Poverty of Epistemology in IPE: Mystery, Blindness and Invisibility", *Millennium* vol. 25, no. 3, 1996, pp. 681-707 and Fred Dallmayr, "Habermas and Rationality", *Political Theory* vol. 16, no. 4, 1988, pp. 553-579.

<sup>48</sup> For a claim for "situated rationality", see Tony Lawson, *Economics and Reality* (London: Routledge 1997), pp. 187-188.

alternative model for understanding reasoning. If no alternative models are available, then we are likely to conclude that rationality is more complex than the model of it, which is trivially true. But at the same time the critique is insufficient. If it does not offer alternative models, it easily admits that as a bottom line, rational choice is in accordance with human reasoning.

The second point of dissatisfaction is exactly that rational choice theory does not include certain elements which are essential for human beings. Some mention feeling and intuition; Green and Shapiro mention "habit, blunder and alike". Anatol Rapoport, in turn, argues that "what is essentially missing from game theory proper is a rigorous analysis of situations where communicative acts are moves of the game, and where effective communication may change the game".<sup>49</sup> Thus, are there alternatives to the rational choice model which can take these neglected elements better into account?

Rational choice theorists are partly right that it is not easy to say what the alternatives to instrumental rationality are. Michael Taylor, for example, contends that the "work done on normative, expressive and intrinsic motivation and social identification does not amount to a unified, complete theory, far from it."<sup>50</sup> "Habit, blunder and alike" is certainly a vague formulation for substituting instrumental rationality. Some people find Max Weber's distinction between purposive rationality and value rationality useful.<sup>51</sup> Some other scholars have suggested the concept of appropriateness as a substitute for utility maximising. James March and Johan Olsen have depicted consequentialist action as something which is "in touch with reality" whereas "appropriate" action is something which is "in touch with identity".<sup>52</sup> Vivienne Jabri has argued that the latter logic fits better to conflict behaviour. As she puts it, "to do what is 'appropriate' suggests some element other than mere cost-benefit evaluation of options in time of conflict. It suggests that as well as role expectations, such as continuities as social norms and cultural values must be taken into account."<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Rapoport, *Fights, Games and Debates*, p. 232.

<sup>50</sup> Michael Taylor, "When Rationality Fails", in Friedman (ed.), *The Rational Choice Controversy*, p. 233.

<sup>51</sup> See also Heng in this publication, p. 20

<sup>52</sup> James March - Johan Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: The Free Press 1989), pp. 23 and 160-162.

<sup>53</sup> Vivienne Jabri, *Discourses on Violence. Conflict Analysis Reconsidered* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 71. Another recent elaboration of the logic of appropriateness in the context of IR is by Martha Finnemore. I do not, however, subscribe to her view that the logic of appropriateness differs from the logic of consequences in the sense that the former is driven by the social structures whereas the latter is driven by the agents. See Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996), pp. 29-30.

Among the very scattered literature, let me briefly present two models which have been developed further than the others: Etzioni's normative/affective model of rationality and Habermas' communicative rationality. These models stand in opposition to rational choice theory in two senses. As far as rational choice is based on instrumental calculation one is based on non-consequentialist thinking, and as far as rational choice is individualistic the other is inter-subjective.

According to Amitai Etzioni, the alternative model to instrumental rationality, or what he calls a logical/empirical model, is based on the idea that normative-affective factors shape decision-making to a significant extent. Normative/affective factors influence the selection of means by excluding the role of logical/empirical considerations in many areas. In some other areas it infuses the deliberations in such a way that logical/empirical considerations play only a minor or secondary role. Finally, normative/affective factors may define specific, often quite limited zones as appropriate for rational choice. Etzioni defends his model because it is not only often more accurate, it is even more parsimonious than the one provided by the rational choice theorists. It is so because "same normative/emotional factors may affect the extent it takes place, information that is gathered, the ways it is processed, the inferences that are drawn, the options that are being considered and those that are finally chosen". In other words, normative/effective model is superior because those factors determine by and large when and how logical/empirical factors work.<sup>54</sup>

Emotional explanations of human behaviour are not necessarily irrational. Rational action may be actually grounded in emotion.<sup>55</sup> To some extent, emotions seem namely essential to rationality. Those who have lost their emotional capabilities and have only cognitive functions cannot make rational decisions. A stable personality and thus predictability of behaviour presumes emotions. We also choose our emotions as much as we can choose between different reasons for action.<sup>56</sup> As Janice Gross Stein points

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<sup>54</sup> Amitai Etzioni, *The Moral Dimension. Toward a New Economics* (New York: The Free Press 1988); "Normative-Affective Factors: Toward a New Decision-Making Model", in Mary Zey, *Decision-Making: Alternatives to Rational Choice Models* (Newbury Park: Sage 1992) and "Normative-Affective Choices", *Human Relations* vol. 46, no. 9, 1993, pp. 1053-69.

<sup>55</sup> Randall Collins, "Emotional Energy as the Common Denominator of Rational Action" *Rationality and Society* vol. 5, no. 2, 1993, pp. 203-230.

<sup>56</sup> Nico Frijda, *The Emotions*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986); Robert Solomon, *True to Our Feelings. What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007).

out, there is strong robust evidence that most human choice is preconscious and strongly and quickly influenced by emotion'.<sup>57</sup>

Some rational choice theorists have given credit to these alternative models. According to Jon Elster, "the – as yet undeveloped – theory of social norms" holds the most promise among the alternatives to rational choice theory. The sociological, normative explanations are radically different because of their non-outcome oriented character. Elster argues that rationality tells people "If you want y do x", whereas many social norms simply say "Do x". Or, they may be hypothetical in the sense that they make the action contingent on past behaviour of oneself or others, not on future goals. These norms say "If others do y, do x" or "If you have done y do z".<sup>58</sup>

Another possibility to contrast instrumental rationality is to consider the idea of communicative rationality. For Habermas communicative rationality is to be distinguished both from instrumental and normative modes of rationality. Although Habermas did not consider his theory to be used for explanatory purposes in the first place, he was concerned also with empirical usefulness of his theory and at least some people have been willing to see the possibility that communicative rationality could do some work also at explaining political behaviour, including international politics.<sup>59</sup>

Habermas developed his ideas about rationality in his central work, *Theory of Communicative Action*, where he distinguishes four different modes of rationality.<sup>60</sup> The most original of these along, with teleological (strategic), normative, and dramaturgical modes of action, was communicative action. According to Habermas, social actions can be distinguished according to whether the participants adopt either a success-oriented attitude or one

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
<sup>57</sup> Janice Gross Stein, 'Foreign Policy Decision-making: Rational, Psychological and Neurological Models', in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (eds), *Foreign Policy. Theories, Actors, Cases*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007), pp. 101-116.

<sup>58</sup> Jon Elster, "When Rationality Fails", in Karen Schweers Cook - Margaret Levi (eds.), *The Limits of Rationality* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1990), p. 45-47.

<sup>59</sup> At least two people can be credited in bringing communicative rationality for explanatory purposes into IR: Harald Müller and Hayward Alker. Harald Müller, "Internationale Beziehungen als kommunikatives Handeln", *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* vol. 1. no. 1, 1994, pp. 15-44 and Hayward Alker, *Rediscoveries and Reformulations. Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), especially pp. 228-29.

<sup>60</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume One. Reason and Rationalization of Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1984). Although Habermas' typology of rational action is a central element of his work, there is not much secondary literature on the issue. See, however, e.g. Fred Dallmayr, "Habermas and Rationality", *Political Theory*, vol. 16, no. 4, 1988, pp. 553-579 and James Johnson, "Habermas on Strategic and Communicative Action", *Political Theory*, vol 19, no. 2, 1991, pp. 181-201.

oriented to reaching understanding. His basic point is that the aim of communicative action is to reach understanding. This understanding should meet the conditions of rationally motivated assent to the content of an utterance. Communicative action is inbuilt in the very idea of speech, which requires truth, righteousness and sincerity. In other words, participants are not primarily oriented to their own individual successes but their individual goals depend on their ability to harmonise plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions. Under suitable conditions, these attitudes should be identifiable on the basis of the intuitive knowledge of the participants themselves. In other words, communicative action does not refer to actor's interests or motives, but to the way people coordinate their actions.<sup>61</sup>



**Figure 1: Habermas' conceptions of action**

In this section I have discussed parts of the scattered research that do not buy into the assumptions of rational choice. I have presented two alternatives to the model of instrumental rationality: normative/affective rationality and communicative rationality. Let me thus conclude that the alternative to the instrumental rationality is not irrational behaviour but conceptions of rationality that contain other elements than pure cost/benefit calculation. Indeed, one of the problems which makes challenging rational choice theory difficult is that the very notion of rationality is extremely value-laden. Although it may sometimes make sense to say that people and states behave irrationally, it is difficult to prescribe any "irrational" behaviour. Moreover, it

<sup>61</sup> On this, see Erik Oddvar Eriksen - Jarle Weigard, "Strategisk og kommunikativ handling", *Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning* vol. 33, no. 5, 1992, pp. 485-492 and Eriksen - Weigard, "Conceptualizing Politics: Strategic or Communicative Action", *Scandinavian Political Studies* vol. 20, no. 3, 1997, pp. 219-241.

would be a mistake to think that rationality is incompatible with emotional involvement. And as Michael Nicholson has noted, "rational choice" is an unfortunate term, because "rational" implies approval, and therefore "goal-directed choice theories" would be a better term.<sup>62</sup>

### **Are the Modes of Rationality Separate?**

The main critique against the idea of separating different modes of rationality comes – not surprisingly – from the rationalist corner.<sup>63</sup> The critique is that the different modes of rationality can well be incorporated into the instrumental form of rationality. According to the rational choice people, critical theorists have a too narrow view of strategic action and game theory when they criticise it. As Johnson has remarked, Habermas advances an unnecessarily malign view of strategic action.<sup>64</sup> But according to the critics of rational choice, the dominant position of strategic, instrumental rationality is not justified and the danger is that it penetrates to areas which are better characterised by other forms of rationality. Moreover, the point that all concepts of rational action can be subsumed under one idea of rationality does not yet mean that instrumental rationality should be privileged.<sup>65</sup> In fact, both Etzioni and Habermas see normative/affective and communicative action respectively as more basic than instrumental rationality.

Two issues must be separated here. One question is about labels. It is possible to stretch the concept of rational action to cover all other forms of actions because all *actions* aim at something. Yet, it is not necessarily meaningful to call all action as instrumental or strategic. As Habermas pointed out, all the concepts of actions are goal-directed and involve plans of action, but it does not mean that all of them are "rational" or "strategic" in the same sense.<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, the label of strategic action is problematic, since it implies that all military (strategic) action is also instrumental (strategic), which is not necessarily the case.

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<sup>62</sup> Nicholson, *Causes and Consequences*, p. 157; similarly in Nicholson, "The Continuing Significance of Positivism", p. 138.

<sup>63</sup> Otto Keck, "Rationales kommunikatives Handeln in der internationalen Beziehungen", *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* vol. 2, no. 1, 1995, pp. 5-48; Volker von Prittwitz, "Verständigung über die Verständigung. Anmerkungen und Ergänzungen zur Debatte über Rationalität und Kommunikation in den Internationalen Beziehungen", *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* vol. 3, no. 1, 1996, pp. 133-147.

<sup>64</sup> Johnson, "Habermas on Strategic and Communicative Action", p. 191.

<sup>65</sup> For some discussion, see Raymon Boudon, "The 'Cognitivist Model'. A Generalized 'Rational Choice Model'", *Rationality and Society*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1996, pp. 123-150.

<sup>66</sup> Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, pp. 10 and 101.

The second and more important question is to do with substantial disagreements. Although rational choice theorists claim that norms, self-expressions or communication can be included in the model of strategic action, all these actions have a very different role in alternative models of rationality. Although it is possible to analyse norms, emotions and speech acts in terms of strategic action, these cannot be reduced to it. Neither can we neatly say that communicative action deals only with language, whereas strategic action counts for behaviour.

For example, normative action is often seen from the perspective of instrumental rationality in the sense that norms may have instrumental functions. According to Riker, because norms are creations of actors for some purpose, it only complicates rational choice model.<sup>67</sup> One of the rationalist arguments is that the desire for justice helps individuals ensure control over their outcomes and that, with links to social norms, such emotions stabilise social life.<sup>68</sup> Similarly, in international politics, it is possible to argue that states attempt to survive by upholding the basic norms of international law.<sup>69</sup> But there are many instances when it makes little sense to expect that norms make our life "easier". As Kratochwil and others have argued, norms can not be reduced to utility calculations, since the norms are already antecedent conditions for strategies and for the specification of criteria of rationality.<sup>70</sup>

Finally, communicative action, too, can according to the rationalists be seen as a part of strategic action. They maintain that communicative acts can be analysed within the game theoretical models. As arguments can be used strategically, communication can be seen as just a different mode of furthering interests instrumentally.<sup>71</sup> Although this may be true to a certain extent, the problem is that in those models the whole meaning of communication is seriously reduced. For game theorists communicative acts are merely signals that can give more information about the preferences and the game situation, but communication as such is not seen as a factor that would change the preferences or define the situation in the first place. But communication involves much more than mere information about static preferences; it is something that can change the rules of the game as well.

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<sup>67</sup> Riker, "The Political Psychology of Rational Choice Theory", p. 40.

<sup>68</sup> See e.g. Harry Reis, "Levels of Interest in the Study of Interpersonal Justice", in Hans Werner Bierhoff - Ronald Cohen - Jerald Greenberg (eds.), *Justice in Social Relations* (New York: Plenum Press 1986), p. 196; Jon Elster, *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989), p. 70.

<sup>69</sup> Kocs, "Explaining the Strategic Behavior of States", p. 540.

<sup>70</sup> Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms and Decisions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989).

<sup>71</sup> See e.g. Jon Elster, "Argumenter og forhandlinger", *Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning* vol. 33, no. 2. 1992, pp. 115-132.



A relatively recent but promising attempt of combining rational choice and cognitive theories of decision-making is a two-step model called poliheuristic theory developed by Alex Mintz. According to this theory, the first step in decision-making is one in which the non-rational elements govern decision-making, in particular considerations of what is politically possible by the leader of the state. Once courses of action which are not politically feasible are discarded, the decision-making process can adopt the model of rational choice. In this second stage, policy options are selected and weighed more analytically against each other on the basis of utility maximisation.<sup>72</sup>

I conclude therefore that there are conceptually distinguishable, viable alternatives to the instrumental rationality. I have focused here on two alternatives: normative/affective and communicative rationality that have been gain ground in the social sciences. These alternatives can be combined with rational choice but as models or “ideal-types” of decision-making, they are better to be seen as separate.

### **Conceptions of Rationality and International Relations**

Another line of critique against considering the significance of alternative modes of rationality in international politics is based on the claim that alternative modes of rationality may well exist in principle, but that forms other than strategic rationality do not have much relevance in international relations. In fact, following Habermas' own distinction between the system (*System*) and the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) we could contend exactly that.<sup>73</sup>

Habermas' distinction between the lifeworld and the system overlaps with his classification of modes of rationality in the sense that communicative rationality is more to do with the lifeworld whereas strategic rationality belongs to the system. If this is the case, and if international relations (relations between states) are seen as relations belonging to the system, it would follow that communicative rationality does not play an important role in international relations. Indeed, critical theorists have usually located communicative rationality in the activity of small groups and new social movements rather than in relations between bureaucracies or state actors.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Alex Mintz, ‘How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* vol. 421, no 1, 2004, pp. 3-13 and Mintz, ‘Applied Decision Analysis: Utilizing Poliheuristic Theory to Explain and Predict Foreign Policy and National Security Decisions’ *International Studies Perspectives* vol. 6, no. 1, 2005, 94-98

<sup>73</sup> Keck, "Rationales kommunikatives Handeln".

<sup>74</sup> See e.g. David Schlosberg, "Communicative Action in Practice: Intersubjectivity and New Social Movements", *Political Studies* vol. 43, no. 2, 1995, pp. 291-311 and Jürgen

Yet, Habermas' distinction between the lifeworld and the system may be too totalising. Seeing international relations purely in terms of the system neglects many important aspects of world politics. As Habermas has later concurred, communicative rationality belongs also to the system and strategic action also to the lifeworld.<sup>75</sup> "Although actual political behaviour does not seem to live up to the ideals of truth, rightness and truthfulness", Elster argues, it does not mean that "politics, even at its most savage, has no relation to the norms identified by Habermas".<sup>76</sup>

Although the very use of language contains the core principles of communicative rationality on a Habermasian account, it does not follow that communicative action would have exactly the same preconditions in international politics as in domestic contexts. Ideally, individuals who act in the name of the state share the background of humanity and recognise each others as fellow human beings. If this is the case, state leaders may strongly feel that they need to solve problems together. Moreover, the idea of the community of states provides the basis for a normative context in international relations, which requires normative responses. The realist account of international relations is, of course, very sceptical whether any of these possible grounds for communicative or normative action has much relevance. The community of state thinking is regarded as relatively thin. Despite state leaders or diplomats become close personal friends, they have a stronger obligation to act wisely and serve the interests of their own country.

The situation in international relations is however hardly as gloomy as realists want us to believe. What critical theorists can do is to argue for creating conditions which are apt for communicative action. Problem-solving workshops aided by third party mediation, which have provided key solution to some of the persistent conflicts of world politics, may be seen as one possibility of realising such structures.<sup>77</sup> But communicative rationality does not belong only to contexts which are close to the "ideal speech situation". In fact, despite prevalent barriers for communication, people often attempt practically to reason together.<sup>78</sup> And although there are problems with finding a common background needed for normatively regulated or communicative

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Haacke, "Theory and Praxis in International Relations: Habermas, Self-Reflection, Rational Argumentation", *Millennium* vol. 25, no. 2, 1996, pp. 255-289, p. 278.

<sup>75</sup> This is the main theme of Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy* (Oxford: Polity 1996).

<sup>76</sup> Jon Elster, "Alchemies of the Mind: Transmutation and Misrepresentation", *Legal Theory* vol. 3, no. 2, 1997, pp. 133-176, p. 134.

<sup>77</sup> E.g. Mark Hoffmann, "Third-Party Mediation and Conflict-Resolution in the Post-Cold War World", in John Baylis - N. J. Rengger (eds.), *Dilemmas of World Politics. International Issues in a Changing World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992). See also Haacke, "Theory and Praxis in International Relations", p. 288.

<sup>78</sup> Alker, *Rediscoveries and Reformulations*, p. 320.

action, international politics does not entirely lack such a background.<sup>79</sup> For Kratochwil, for example, international politics falls between the extremes of well-defined games and simple communicative moves.<sup>80</sup>

Explanations based on the instrumental notion of rationality have been applied across a variety of issues and they often seem to offer plausible accounts. What needs to be done, however, is to open up space for explanations based on alternative concepts of rationality. The proponents of the alternative modes of rationality do not claim that strategic rationality would be insignificant in social life in general and in crisis decision-making in particular. Although the concept of strategic action may be the most important single concept of rational action, this should not lead us to dismiss alternative concepts of rationality. The attack here is directed more towards the assumed paradigmatic privilege, characterised by the idea that rational choice theory must be seen as a necessary starting point for all explanatory theories and that other theories must be auxiliary to it.<sup>81</sup> We therefore have to discuss the usefulness of alternative models of rationality in concrete contexts. The question as to how far strategic rationality is able to make sense of real world processes remains to be answered empirically, and such empirical research should take the alternative concepts of rationality equally seriously.

### **Empirical examples: German Unification and Finland's Decision to join the EU**

The merits of the alternative concepts of rationality need to be empirically evaluated. I will here touch upon two cases that I am familiar with through my own research. The first case is the end of the Cold War and in particular the decision by Mikhail Gorbachev to accept Germany's membership in NATO even after unification. The second case is the Finnish decision to join the EU which can be seen as the biggest singular decision in the recent history of Finland. Both cases offer possibilities to study – though not any final tests – whether and how the alternative conceptions of rationality matter.

Most accounts of the end of the Cold War and German unification depict a view of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev which revolves around instrumental rationality. From that perspective, Gorbachev decided to agree on the NATO

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<sup>79</sup> See Müller, "Internationale Beziehungen als kommunikatives Handeln", p. 33.

<sup>80</sup> Kratochwil, "The Embarrassment of Changes", p. 76.

<sup>81</sup> Peter Abell, "Is Rational Choice Theory the Rational Choice of Theory", in James Coleman - Thomas Fararo, *Rational Choice Theory, Advocacy and Critique* (Newbury Park: Sage 1992), p. 203.

membership of the unified Germany because the costs of resisting it were greater than the benefits of complying. Both realist and liberal accounts rely on this basic model. The difference between them is that realists emphasise the amount of military pressure that forced Gorbachev to make concessions, whereas liberals stress the amount of economic benefits.

A number of researchers have suggested, however, that the German Soviet understanding at the end of the Cold War depended to a substantial extent on communicative rationality.<sup>82</sup> The concept of communicative rationality leads towards a picture of a much more open and argumentative negotiation process than the previous concepts of rationality. At the heart of communicative action one finds the genuine need for finding solutions to political problems through a dialogue. This sort of need clearly informed the policy of "new thinking". As Gorbachev argued, it was necessary to get away from the senseless obduracy which had led to a Soviet representative being named "Mr Nyet".<sup>83</sup>

The negotiation process between the Soviet Union and West Germany started informally, by developing the sense of mutual trust, probing ideas of cooperation and investigating the sincerity of the other. The Soviets tested their views of German reliability several times before the opening of the wall. They also consulted third parties. For example, in the autumn of 1989 Shevardnadze drew Baker's attention to Kohl's speech at the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party conference, saying that he found Kohl's remarks "very similar to statements made by German leaders in the 1930s" and added that "it is to be deplored that fifty years after World War II some politicians have begun to forget its lessons."<sup>84</sup> Gorbachev expressed similar worries when meeting Bush at Malta. According to Zelikow and Rice, Americans were able to assure their Soviet counter parties that the Germans were reliable.

More importantly, Gorbachev also tested directly Kohl's willingness to help the Soviet Union. During his visit to Germany in June 1989, he asked Kohl whether he was ready to support the reform process. As Kohl recalls, this understanding was decisive for the process that began half a year later.<sup>85</sup> Through these discussions Gorbachev was able to get assured that requests of

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<sup>82</sup> Thomas Risse, "The Cold War's Endgame and German Unification", *International Security* vol. 21, no. 4, 1997, pp. 159-185, and Müller, "Spielen hilft nicht immer", p. 386.

<sup>83</sup> Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996), p. 242.

<sup>84</sup> Philip Zelikow - Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed. A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1995), p. 72.

<sup>85</sup> Ekkehard Kuhn, *Gorbatschow und die deutsche Einheit. Aussagen der wichtigsten Beteiligten* (Bonn: Bouvier 1993), p. 34.

assistance were not seen as disgraceful or signs of Soviet weakness. The common understanding and trust between Gorbachev and Kohl was created communicatively. Gorbachev recalled that they had

three meetings, three one-to-one talks with the Chancellor, direct, serious, trustworthy. We did not negotiate as partners but as people who trusted each other. All this enabled us to achieve a high degree of mutual understanding in all fields of politics.<sup>86</sup>

What also shows the importance of the communicative action in Gorbachev's policy was that he was unusually angry when the Germans did not inform him about their moves. Kohl's ten point plan was one example of such a manoeuvre, and what irritated Gorbachev was obviously more the unilateral form than the actual content of that particular statement. When Gorbachev for the first time met Genscher after Kohl's speech he was furious:

[Gorbachev stormed:] "One should say that this is an ultimatum, a 'diktat'". The move had been an absolute surprise to Gorbachev, who thought that he and the chancellor had reached an understanding in their phone conversation on November 11. "And after that such a move!"<sup>87</sup>

The best example of the relevance of communicative rationality is the very moment when he accepted Germany's membership in NATO. This happened when Bush asked Gorbachev whether it is the case that a unified Germany had the sovereign right to choose her alliances. When Gorbachev surprisingly agreed, there was no supplementary pressure – promises or threats – that should have changed his mind. According to Chernayev Gorbachev's affirmative comments were spontaneous. Gorbachev simply noticed that he could not convince the Western leaders that changes in the German NATO membership would improve European security. Against this background, it is maybe not inappropriate to say that Gorbachev agreed, because he simply thought that Bush's argument, after all, was better than his. As Zelikow and Rice have noted,

Gorbachev's and Shevardnadze's behaviour at the meeting seemed and still seems quite unusual. It is actually very rare in diplomacy to change one's mind right at the table.<sup>88</sup>

According to Zelikow and Rice, Gorbachev violated the established practices of diplomatic conduct by allowing himself to be persuaded without pressure.

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<sup>86</sup> Kuhn, *Gorbatschow und die deutsche Einheit*, p. 35.

<sup>87</sup> Zelikow- Rice, *Germany Unified, Europe Transformed*, p. 136.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid*, p. 279.

Indeed, the harsh criticism of those diplomats and party officials who thought that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were amateurs in the field of foreign policy, who did not know the rules of diplomacy but acted in person, underscores that the change was more to do with practices than core interests themselves.

The other short example is derived from the Finnish decision-making process dealing with the EU membership application that has probably been the most important decision so far in the Finnish post-Cold War history.<sup>89</sup> Also this decision shows how the assumption of instrumental rationality as the main form of rationality distorts the decision-making process. According to one key player, Prime Minister Aho, the most important moment for the decision-makers was, when a sufficient level of self-assurance was achieved. This self-assurance was not, however, a result of any strict cost-benefit calculation but was based more on a feeling that there were no major risks with the membership. President Koivisto explained that he had the feeling that Germany and France understood Finland's position and therefore membership in the EU would strengthen rather than undermine Finland's security. It was possible to assess the effects of the membership on Finnish agriculture and the net payments to the common EU budget in monetary terms. A lot of the debate focused on these two issues probably because the numerical presentation of costs and benefits was possible. Yet, these were not the main issues for the decision-makers, who had made their decision already before they started to calculate the costs of the membership in detail. Although a number of studies on the consequences of the membership were conducted, these studies on membership mainly helped to support and legitimize the decision that was made *de facto* already earlier. The decision in itself was made on grounds that were not included in the assessments and recommendations of the commissioned studies. Moreover, such policy studies are often arbitrary in the sense that they do not determine political conclusions. As one interviewee told, in the Parliament 'we agreed on the factual content of the study, but disagreed on the conclusion that was drawn on the basis of the "facts"'.<sup>90</sup>

## Conclusions

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<sup>89</sup> Tuomas Forsberg and Christer Pursiainen, 'Crisis Decision-Making in Finland: Cognition, Institutions and Rationality', *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 41, no. 3, 2006, pp. 235-260 and Tuomas Forsberg, Raimo Lintonen, Christer Pursiainen and Pekka Visuri (eds) *Suomi ja kriisit. Vaaran vuosista terrori-iskuihin* [Finland and Crises. From the Years of Danger to the Terrorist Attacks] (Gaudeamus: Helsinki 2003).

<sup>90</sup> Raimo Lintonen, 'EU-jäsenyyshanke kriisinä' [The EU-Membership Project as a Crisis], in Forsberg et al (eds) *Suomi ja kriisit*, pp. 242-264.

In this chapter, I have contrasted instrumental rationality with alternative concepts of rationality. Rational choice theory, which relies on the notion of instrumental rationality, has been in a dominant position when crisis decision-making and strategic choices have been explained. Explanations that are based on notions other than instrumental rationality, however, may explain the choice of strategies better and are able to remove some of the anomalies left over by rational choice theory. In particular, I have distinguished and developed two alternative notions of rationality, normative/affective and communicative modes of rationality.

Explanations based on rational choice, normative/affective and communicative rationality are better seen as complementary rather than competitive. Yet, because the latter perspectives have hardly received the attention they deserve, they are likely to enhance our current understanding of sanctioning more than rational choice theories. As I see it, in order to explain Gorbachev's behaviour at the end of the Cold War or the Finnish decision to join the European Union, we have better to consider different concepts of rationality.

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## INTELLIGENCE AND DECISION-MAKING IN CRISIS – RETHINKING A LINEAR MODEL

*Wilhelm Agrell*

### **A Piece in the Jigsaw: Intelligence and Decision-making in Theory**

From a traditional positivist perspective the interrelationship between intelligence and decision-making is causal and straightforward. While the decision-makers are trying to identify the best available course of action, intelligence should supply timely, accurate and relevant data and assessments concerning other actors, whether friends or foes. In a Swedish Army intelligence manual from the early 1970s this was illustrated with a cartoon where the staff officers are assembled around a large jigsaw on a table where the pieces have names as own forces, signals communications. The intelligence officer is just adding the final piece making the jigsaw complete. The staff briefing is supposed to be a micro-cosmos of the operational world, where all relevant knowledge should be available and presented in a condensed form, thus ensuring the most rational decision.

Outside the world of field manuals, in military history and in cases of crisis management, things look different. Decision-making is far more complex and distorted by seemingly irrelevant factors and the ever-present friction of combat operations, sometimes becoming chaotic and dysfunctional. There is seldom an over-all picture to complete and if there is, it cannot be taken for granted that the remaining gap corresponds with anything that intelligence can provide.

In theory, decision-making in crisis is about controlling sudden unfolding events, limiting risks and costs and sometimes, but not always, to ensure and maximize gains. There is generally a defensive or reactive element in crisis decision-making. It is not primarily about the implementation of planned operations, what could be called a strategic game. Instead a crisis refers to a sudden unfolding situation, either by the more or less planned actions of others or by circumstances not controlled by any single actor. There is thus always an element of stress in crisis decision-making, in the sense that the decisions are forced upon the actors. In a review of definitions in the literature, Eric K. Stern observes that crisis decision-making generally is characterized by three necessary and sufficient perceptions on

the part of the responsible decision-makers:<sup>1</sup>

1. A threat to basic values.
2. Urgency.
3. Uncertainty.

So, while the field manuals might describe the role of intelligence in normal and undisturbed situations, or in the implementation of planned actions, Stern's definitions identify another and far more problematic context not only for decision-making but also for intelligence. The role of the latter is here not only to supply a segment of an information summary but far more crucial; the crisis is often about intelligence and intelligence assessments. The combination of urgency and uncertainty means by definition that there will always be a greater demand for input than the intelligence providers can supply. If they could, there would not be any major uncertainty and no urgency, thus turning the event into something else than a crisis. The intelligence deficit is therefore a vital and unavoidable element of the crisis, and the managing of this deficit the central intelligence aspect of crisis decision-making.

For an intelligence component, or intelligence system, a crisis in a corresponding way constitutes a set of intelligence demands, a situation where the demand-pull of the intelligence cycle is either activated or stepped-up in terms of delivery-times, focus and relevance of details. On the abstract level, the needs of the decision-makers will be a powerful incentive in a demand-driven structure. The sub-units of the intelligence system will focus on collection, evaluation, analysis and dissemination of factual information (raw intelligence) and/or assessments of the intelligence picture and possible future developments. In principle, the intelligence system will use its collection and analysis assets to reduce the intelligence deficit as far as possible and under the most favourable circumstances to eliminate it, thereby dissolving or at least defusing the crisis, though not necessary the strategic contingency behind it. In the best of worlds, intelligence is thus not only a vital element for the decision-makers, but an instrument to transform the crisis into a "normal" decision-making problem. This is what we could call the linear model, based on a positivist approach to decision-making, intelligence and the interrelation of the two.

### **Cuba 1962: Intelligence and Decisions-making in Reality**

The Cuban missile crisis is for a number of reasons the by far most studied

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<sup>1</sup> Eric K. Stern, *Crisis Decision-making: A Cognitive Institutional Approach*, Stockholm, Swedish National Defence College, 2003, p. 8.

case of crisis decision-making on the brink of war.<sup>2</sup> The Cuban crisis is also a well-documented and well-studied case of intelligence collection and assessments before and during a crisis.<sup>3</sup> It is therefore well suited to illustrate the assumptions about not only the conduct of but also the role of intelligence in the decision-making, at least if the perspective is limited to the U.S. side, the actor that suffered the crisis in accordance with Stern's definition (the threat to basic values under conditions of urgency and uncertainty).

Cuba is an example of a crisis that is mediated through the intelligence channels. The crisis did not erupt as a sudden *fait accompli*, where intelligence is brought in to survey and analyze a situation the decision-makers are already aware of through the course of events. In the Cuba case, Soviet build-up on the Island was already in the summer 1962 a top intelligence priority, and the crisis was in fact created – or at least unveiled – through the intelligence flow, both in terms of factual information and assessments of strategies, intentions and possible future courses of actions from the Soviet and/or Cuban side.

In August 1962, when U.S. intelligence could establish a massive inflow of Soviet weapons and instructors on the island, including the arrival of some latest generation weapons-systems as the SAM-2 missiles capable of reaching the high-altitude U-2 reconnaissance planes, the possibility of deployment of nuclear ballistic missiles was raised in U.S. Intelligence by the newly appointed DCI John McCone, a man picked from outside the intelligence community and without any previous experience in the field. McCone argued, admittedly as an amateur, that the arrival of surface to air missiles indicated an effort to conceal the deployment of nuclear ballistic missiles, even though no convincing intelligence reports indicated the existence of such missiles.<sup>4</sup> The senior intelligence analysts did not share McCone's conviction and in an intelligence estimate issued on September 19, the intelligence analysts argued that while it was possible that the Soviet Union could install nuclear missiles on Cuba, this was nevertheless unlikely, since the Soviet leaders realized that such a move could turn out

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<sup>2</sup> Among the classical works on the Cuban Missile Crisis are Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1965, Robert Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, New York: Norton, 1969. The Cuban Missile Crisis has continued to generate an extensive literature, see James G. Blight & Janet M. Lang, *The Fog of War. Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005.

<sup>3</sup> James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, London: Frank Cass, 1998.

<sup>4</sup> Blight and Welch (1998) pp. 5-6. In fact the U.S. Intelligence had been receiving a stream of humint reports about nuclear missiles, well before any such missiles had arrived. The intelligence flow was full of "noise", partly as deliberate disinformation supplied by the Cuban intelligence. See Domingo Amuchastegui, "Cuban Intelligence and the October Crisis", in Blight and Welch (1998).

to be counter-productive.<sup>5</sup> This turned out to be a classical case of mirror-imaging, where the object is assumed to act in accordance with the same logic as the observer. Since the deployment of nuclear missiles on Cuba appeared as an unreasonable gamble to the intelligence analyst, they assumed that the Soviet leadership would arrive at the same conclusion and act accordingly, even though they had no confirming evidence that this in fact was the case.<sup>6</sup>

As the U.S. intelligence estimate was issued, humint collection received the first credible report from Havana about the observation of ballistic missiles under transportation. But the intelligence cycle moved in low gear, and the report was not circulated among the analysts until the end of September. On that stage another confirming report had been received, indicating the possible staging area west of the Cuban capital. Both Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst now seriously considered the possibility of nuclear missiles on the island.<sup>7</sup> The question became how to verify the suspicion by locating a possible launching area and collecting confirming evidence. The obvious choice was aerial reconnaissance with high-altitude U-2 planes. Over-flying Cuba was a hazardous operation, due to the newly installed surface-to-air missiles, and U-2 missions had been conducted as peripheral flights along the Cuban coastline.<sup>8</sup> An over-flight of the suspected launching-area was nevertheless approved. Bad weather prevented photoreconnaissance in the first half of October and the planned mission could not be carried out until October 14<sup>th</sup>. In the evening October 15<sup>th</sup> the photos had been interpreted and confirmed the existence of missiles and a launching area under construction. President Kennedy was informed the next day and the crisis went public six days later though the speech where Kennedy demanded a withdrawal of the missiles and underlined this demand by announcing a naval blockade.

The Cuban Missile Crisis has generally been regarded as a case close to the ideal or linear model for the role of intelligence in crisis decision-making. The intelligence dimension is visible and extensive, both in the alerting

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<sup>5</sup> "The Military Buildup in Cuba", SNIE 85-3-62, declassified and reproduced in Mary S. McAuliffe, *The CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962*, Central Intelligence Agency 1992.

<sup>6</sup> The final twist to the mirror-image was supplied by the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, the veteran analyst Sherman Kent, who in retrospect argued that the course of event had proved that it was the intelligence analysts who had been right and Khrushchev who had been wrong. While having a point, Sherman Kent missed the crucial one, that the task of the intelligence is to comprehend the actions and motives of other, counterproductive or not. On Sherman Kent's remark, see Raymond R. Garthoff, "US Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis" in Blight and Welch (1998) p. 21.

<sup>7</sup> Garthoff (1998) p. 23.

<sup>8</sup> For the U-2 flights over Cuba and the political restrictions, see Pedlow, Gregory W. and Welzenbach, Donald E, *The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974*, Central Intelligence Agency 1998.

function and in delivering support for key decisions, subsequent preparations and the subsequent monitoring of the opponent's actions and responses to measures like the naval blockade. At the same time Cuba illustrates some of the frequent and possibly unavoidable limits of intelligence prior to and during a crisis.

Firstly, there is never, not even in a case like the British access to Ultra decrypts during the Second World War or the U.S. and Soviet coverage with reconnaissance satellites since the mid 1960s, a complete and immediate insight in the actions, capabilities and intentions of other actors.<sup>9</sup> No theoretically possible intelligence source could have supplied the final answer to the "what if...?" question regarding the Soviet reaction to possible U.S. courses of action. Even if the Soviet leaders had contemplated alternative scenarios (although nothing indicate that they did so), the minutes from such a meeting, though a vital piece of intelligence, would not be equivalent to knowledge about a possible future decision, since this would be affected by situational factor and the dynamics and friction of the crisis. In the end the analysts anyway had to guess the most likely course of event.

Secondly, intelligence in a crisis is generally hampered by the inevitable time-lag of the intelligence cycle, the time required both for the adaptation to new or changing demands and the processing time of the intelligence machinery to collect, evaluate, disseminate and analyze a flow of raw intelligence, as was the case with the Cuban humint reports. Furthermore, the necessity to switch back from analysis to collection to confirm or refute a hypothesis, could add a considerable delay, depending on the available means for intelligence collection.

Thirdly, stepped up collection is often connected with an element of risk, a circumstance that becomes more obvious in the run up to a crisis; The intelligence collection efforts perceived as necessary to supplement the intelligence picture might lead to a chain of events actually unleashing the crisis or unintentionally creating one. The trade-off between possible intelligence needs and possible negative fallout on the political or operational level is well illustrated by the hesitation to carry out U-2 over-flights before there were firm indications from other sources on the existence of ballistic missiles.

### **Intelligence and the Complexity of Decision-making**

However, there are some elements in the interaction between intelligence

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<sup>9</sup> While the access to the German WWII wireless traffic encrypted with the Enigma system provided British intelligence to "read over the shoulder". All traffic was not intercepted and immediately accessible and only contained the information that the Germans had operational reasons to transmit. On the potential and limits of Enigma, see John Keegan, *Intelligence in War. Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda*, London: Hutchinson, 2003, pp. 291-294 and 370-372.

and decision-making during the Cuban Missile Crisis that seems to fall outside the linear model. First there is the misconception of the top CIA analysts. While understandable in the context of what was known at the time, this is anyway an example of a recurring conceptual fallacy in intelligence; the analyst felt sure that their conclusion was solid, while it in fact was based on knowledge of the Soviet track record and reflected the consensus among the analysts on what was rational and what was not. A flawed calming assessment can be worse than no assessment at all, since it could amplify the element of surprise and urgency thereby causing the (sense of) crisis. And while the crucial U.S. decisions concerning the missiles eventually were taken, not on the ground of flawed assessments but on verified hard intelligence on weapons systems and ongoing preparations at the missile sites, the decision-making was not simply a process of rational choice based on reading the intelligence picture. The decision-making involved both a number of key players around the president and a number of influential institutions, all with their views, internal agendas and sub-goals. In the run up to the crisis this institutional dimension was illustrated by a conflict between CIA and the Strategic Air Command over which organization that would carry out the first over-flight (both operated U-2 planes).<sup>10</sup> With nuclear war just around the corner the prestige of the organizations concerned still came first.

In 1971 the Harvard professor Graham T. Allison published what was to become one of the most famous and widely used methodological textbook on crisis management and foreign policy decision-making, *Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*.<sup>11</sup> The book was not a historical account, rather a methodological post-mortem of the crisis, employing the surgical instrument of social sciences. In three “cuts” Allison applied three models for analyzing foreign policy decision-making. Model I, the rational actor model, assumes that states act strategically, trying to maximize gains and minimize risks; an international crisis thus could take the form of interacting games. Model II, the organizational process, also assumes rationality, though on a different level. Here actions are determined not by choices between strategies but by the operations and repertoires of governmental agencies and bureaucracies. Decisions are not taken, they are produced by organizational momentum, and the search for model I rationality would be futile or misleading. Model III also focuses on the sub-actors, though not the structures but individuals and groups; governmental politics highlight the kind of corridor politics where the outcome would be determined by power-games and shifting coalitions far from abstract national

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<sup>10</sup> Pedlow and Welzenbach (1998), pp. 207-208. It has often been stated in the Missile Crisis literature that this conflict never existed and that everyone cooperated smoothly. Pedlow’s and Welzenbach’s formerly classified internal project history must however be regarded as a more informed source.

<sup>11</sup> Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971. See also Forsberg in this publication, p. 37.

interests or bureaucratic logic. In a second edition, published in 1999, new historical finding was added, but it changed remarkably little of the analysis. More important was perhaps the addition of a new aspect of model III; Irving L. Janis theory of groupthink, where the outcome would not be determined by the interaction and goals of sub-actors, but by a specific form of self-regulating psychological group behaviour.<sup>12</sup>

In the light of Allison's alternative models to explain the process of crisis decision-making, the original linear model becomes much more complex and perhaps even misleading as a concept. It is one thing for intelligence to have one single and well-defined national leadership to support and quite another in a case where a decision is determined more by the interaction of sub-actors than the assumed over-arching rationale of crisis management. In fact, if we would regard the intelligence dimension of the three models, we will end up with three very different forms of interaction between decision-making and intelligence, regarding different types of pieces for very different types of jigsaws.

The Model I is the simplest one, close to the linear model discussed above. For the rational actor threats and opportunities are key elements and actors are assumed to try to minimize risk and maximize gain, using intelligence as one of the instruments. In a crisis, decisions are still guided by logic, as the choice of the U.S. president to opt for a naval blockade and not a preventive strike. Through the input of intelligence and identification of alternative courses of action, the crisis is being transformed into a strategic game – possibly creating a crisis for the opponent.

The rational actor is the axiomatic customer of an intelligence process. Lack of response from the decision-maker is therefore often confusing and frustrating for the representatives of the intelligence. They do not listen or do not understand the significance of a piece of raw intelligence, a set of indications or an assessment. This might not always be the case; instead the frustration can reflect a misconception on behalf of intelligence about the complexity of political decisions. The former head of Israeli military intelligence, Shlomo Gazit, underlines that decisions by political and military leaders should rely on intelligence, but that intelligence should not under any circumstances be the sole factor in making the decision. The intelligence analyst must understand that there are other considerations, perhaps unknown to the analyst.<sup>13</sup> Turning back to the picture in the field manual, what Gazit points at, is a situation where the analysts have an inflated belief that intelligence is in fact supplying the piece. Policymakers should act ac-

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<sup>12</sup> Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, New York: Longman, 1999. Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982.

<sup>13</sup> Shlomo Gazit, "Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker" in Michael I. Handel (ed.), *Leaders and Intelligence*, London: Cass, 1989, p. 262.

cordingly, while political decisions at the top are determined by an array of factors, ranging from public finances to internal party opposition. All are legitimate and possibly just as rational from the decision-makers perspective.

But the decision-makers could ignore intelligence for other reasons as well. Stephen Marrin notes that the literature does not provide many illustrations of many situations where intelligence analysis actually has influenced the judgement of policy-makers, if the analysis runs contrary to their preferences. In that case, the decision-makers will simply ignore the intelligence or look for some other analysis.<sup>14</sup> Loch Johnston includes the disregard of objective intelligence on behalf of policy-makers as one of seven sins of strategic intelligence.<sup>15</sup>

If the interaction between intelligence and decision-makers in the rational actor model is complicated by unclear roles and expectations, the interaction becomes far more problematic if both the intelligence organizations and the decision-making structure are regarded from the organizational perspective of model II. Here composition, agendas and goals of the institutions are the key elements. The actors are generally rational, but their rationality is influenced by institutional goals and cultural settings. Government action in a crisis can be determined rather by organizational output than by deliberate and informed choices between alternative courses of action. The bureaucracies might push the decision-makers in a given direction, for instance in a situation where no alternative contingency planning exists.

The organizational arena is where intelligence normally operates; the everyday customers are not national leaders but officials on various levels in the governmental bureaucracy. In this interaction the access to and control over intelligence is not only something concerning the use of the intelligence flow for decision-making, but intelligence as an organizational resource. The by far greatest success of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) during the Second World War had nothing to do with clandestine operations but bureaucratic politics. The ability of Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) to gain control over the distribution of German decrypts from Bletchley Park to receivers from Winston Churchill was a downward in the hierarchy.

In a similar way, intelligence received by an organization is not only used for operational purposes but also filtered through institutional interests and

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<sup>14</sup> Stephen Marrin, "Intelligence analysis and decision-making. Methodological challenges", in Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian (eds.), *Intelligence Theory. Key questions and debates*, London: Routledge, 2009.

<sup>15</sup> Loch K. Johnson, "The Seven Sins of Strategic Intelligence," *World Affairs*, Vol. 146, No 2, Fall 1983, as quoted in Marrin (2009).



often used to promote institutional goals. Is not likely that this process should cease in the emergency of a crisis, instead the crisis is often a situation where the balance between organizations becomes unstable, opening up both for hostile takeovers and institutional losses, even disasters. In such situations intelligence can become a powerful tool in competitive games and bureaucratic infighting.<sup>16</sup> There will thus be a strong reluctance to accept and act on intelligence running contrary to institutional interests and goals, something that might create a seemingly irrational output.

Model III, governmental politics, is from an intelligence perspective a variant of model II, a situation where intelligence is operating not on the arena of national decision-making, but in the jungle of political and bureaucratic infighting. Allison and Zelikow give one example of the model III interaction in crisis decision-making in the second edition of *Essence of Decision*. During the Lebanon War in 1982, the Israeli minister of defence Ariel Sharon manipulated the rest of the unwilling cabinet to accept a step by step expansion of the goals of the offensive until the Israeli forced had actually escalated the war in a way the cabinet majority had time and again had rejected.<sup>17</sup>

### **Iraq and the Politicisation of Crisis Intelligence**

The game played by Sharon was mainly confined to the cabinet. Sharon created a crisis by moving Israeli forces to positions in Lebanon where a clash with Syria would be inevitable. In such a political game, where the opponent in the cabinet was faced with a decision to either raise the stakes or loose what had been gained,<sup>18</sup> intelligence becomes a vital asset. However, not in the sense of the linear model, but as an instrument of power, both to persuade those reluctant and to prevent opponent to receive intelligence or use intelligence assets to undermine the main players strategy. The drastic implications of such a shift in the role of intelligence became visible in the aftermath of the Iraq-crisis 2002-2003 and the subsequent debate over the politicisation of intelligence.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> See Walter Laqueur, *World of Secrets. The Uses and Limits of Intelligence*, London: Weidenfelt and Nicholson, 1985.

<sup>17</sup> Allison and Zelikow (1999) pp. 282-283, referring among others to Anver Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security Politics: Politics, Strategy and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1987 and to Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1984.

<sup>18</sup> Allison and Zelikow op.cit.

<sup>19</sup> For the debate over politicisation, see among others Peter Gill, "The Politicization of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq" in Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson and Ian Leigh (eds.), *Who's Watching the Spies?* Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2005 and Olav Riste, "The Intelligence-Policymaker Relationship, and the Politicization of Intelligence" in Gregory F. Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell (eds.), *National Intelligence Sys-*

The main difference compared to the corridor politics of the 1982 Lebanon war is the role of media and public opinion in the period preceding the war. The Iraqi WMD-crisis was not a crisis in the definition of Eric K. Stern. There were certainly basic values at stake, a sense of urgency and an element of considerable (and as it turned out politically fatal) uncertainty as to the existence and extent of Iraqi weapons programs. But the crisis did not erupt through the actions of others. Unlike the Cuban Missile crisis there was no sudden move by Iraq altering the balance of forces or constituting a new threat (like in the case of the North Korean nuclear and missile programs). Neither was there an intelligence *casus belli*, the much debated “smoking gun”, in the same category as the U-2 pictures of the Soviet missile base. Intelligence did not have the role of alerting the decision-makers and supplying a vital component in the choice of strategies. But instead of being ignored or side-stepped, intelligence was mobilized for a completely different purpose. In both the U.S. and Britain, intelligence was employed to create the crisis, not through provocative actions of the kind used by Sharon, but in fostering the perception of vital values at stake, urgency and uncertainty. The official reports released from British and U.S. Intelligence in the fall 2002 underlined the threat posed by the assumed but still unknown Iraqi programs for and stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. The uncertainty was both played down in the conclusion that Iraq did possess some WMD-potential, and underscored when it came to possible threat assessments. Most widely referred to was the “45-minutes warning” in the British Governments report, compiled by the Joint Intelligence Committee in September 2002.<sup>20</sup> The report referred to intelligence indicating that an Iraqi WMD-strike could be released within the time-span of 45 minutes. This alarming information served to underline the urgency of the situations, since the range of operational Iraqi weapons, as well as the stockpiled chemical or biological agents were unknown. As subsequent investigations after the war could clarify, the intelligence report actually referred to the use of chemical artillery ammunition during the Iraq-Iran war 1980-88.<sup>21</sup> As in the case with the flawed assessments prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Western intelligence analyst relied heavily on their experience of the Iraqi track record and previous revealed weapons programs.

The Iraq crisis was thus not caused by the intelligence flow and not even by flawed or exaggerated assessments. In another decision-making context,

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tems: *Current Research and Future Prospects*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

<sup>20</sup> Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British Government (2002), [[www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/reps/iraq/iraqdossier.pdf](http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/reps/iraq/iraqdossier.pdf)].

<sup>21</sup> For the intelligence behind the “45-minutes warning”, see *Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass destruction*, Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors, July 2004 (The Butler Report), [[www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/publications/reports/intelligence/wmdreview.pdf](http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/publications/reports/intelligence/wmdreview.pdf)].

these assessments would probably have had no impact whatsoever (as was the case with the very real Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-potential prior to the Kuwait-crisis in the summer 1990). The crisis emanated from the decision-makers and was staged on the public scene (media, political parties and representatives, the UN Security Council) through the means of intelligence products like aerial photographs, reference to secret intelligence and expert assessments. The staging of the crisis was to a large extent a political success, but the backlash was inevitable once the occupying powers failed to uncover any weapons or weapons-related programs in Iraq after the war.

In the Iraq-case the Western Intelligence communities stands out as the main losers, not so much because they were unable to supply an exact and verifiable assessment of the Iraqi inventory of WMD, a task that was practically and logically impossible to accomplish.<sup>22</sup> But the senior intelligence representatives appears as politically inexperienced or even naive in their perception of the role of intelligence in what was not primarily the management of an international crisis. It was more national and international campaign of propaganda and persuasion to rally support for a decision already taken on other grounds. In one sense intelligence got tangled up in what better could be understood as the accomplishment of a strategic game than a crisis. It did certainly include central values and important uncertainties, but the urgency was not an external factor, a function of the course of events, but a central component of a strategy of persuasion. Urgency had to be created in order to rally support.

### **From the Linear Model to a Mace?**

The linear model and the concept of the intelligence cycle seem to be of limited relevance in understanding the interaction between intelligence and decisions-makers in a situation where the policy or operational level has the initiative. In a sudden unforeseen chain of events, where the situation awareness is based on the flow of incoming intelligence and assessments of the intelligence analysts, the linear model would still have some relevance. As in the case of Cuba 1962 the sometimes rather unreliable intelligence cycle might actually work. But as Stephen Marrin observes, the traditional model is far too simplistic (or perhaps idealistic) to grasp the complexity of national and international decision-making and the role actually played by intelligence.<sup>23</sup> If we, as Allison points at in Model II and III, should interpret decisions in the light of concepts and values on behalf of the decision-makers, the process does not start in the demand and collection end of the

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<sup>22</sup> See Richard K. Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence. Knowledge and Power in American National Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

<sup>23</sup> Marrin (2009) pp. 144-146.

intelligence cycle but in the prevalent perceptions and group dynamic among the policy-makers. There is no way the output of the intelligence process could cure the groupthink among decision-makers, especially not when the intelligence analysts also fall prey to the same phenomenon.

There is no obvious alternative to the linear model. Marrin suggests a model with focus on a two-way communication.<sup>24</sup> This would better reflect the realities of the Iraq-case, although that perhaps was more of a one-way process, but starting from the top. In the end it must probably be realized that both crisis decision-making and crisis intelligence are complex and transforming phenomena. If the linear model is an illusion, and the main challenge in the management of the relations between intelligence and decision-makers is probably not to try to restore it. In the Iraq case intelligence in this sense “came in from the cold” and tasted somewhat bitter fruit of politics in an age of mass media. There is probably no turning back, no route to de-politicisation of intelligence, to regain the virtues of purity and detachment that anyway has been an illusion all along. Once bitten, the apple cannot be hung back on the branch again.

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<sup>24</sup> Marrin (2009) p. 144.

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## ISRAEL CRISIS DECISION-MAKING: THE 1982 AND 2006 LEBANON WARS

*Kirsten E. Schulze*

Since its establishment in 1948 the State of Israel has fought two Lebanon wars: the First Lebanon War in 1982 and the Second Lebanon War in 2006. Contrary to Israel's victorious performance in its other major wars – the 1948 War of Independence, the 1956 Sinai Campaign, the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War – the two Lebanon wars failed to achieve their aims. This article looks at why these two wars failed, focusing on the decision-makers, the decision-making processes, and assumptions about the Lebanese arena. It will be argued that in both wars the decision-making elites succumbed to 'groupthink' which resulted in the failure to consider alternatives, in pressure for conformity, in the marginalization of critics, in excessive risk-taking, and in the perpetuation of stereotypes. It will be further argued that in both wars the aims were unrealistic and unachievable because of the widely held belief that military options are preferable to diplomatic ones, that military achievements easily translate into political ones and the failure by the decision-makers to fully comprehend the complexity of Lebanon.

### **The 1982 Lebanon War**

Israeli planning for the 1982 invasion of Lebanon was set in motion the previous year by a two-week war of attrition between Palestinian guerrillas, who were firing rockets at northern Israel, and the Israel Defence Force (IDF) and South Lebanese Army (SLA) who were shelling Palestinian positions. An estimated 5,000 Israeli civilians fled the area, putting pressure on the Israeli government to act. This two-week war was followed by an American-mediated cease-fire in June 1981, which not only deprived the IDF of the opportunity to take punitive action, but also elevated the international standing of the Palestine Liberation Organisation's (PLO). It was at this point that the decision to launch another ground operation was taken. All that was needed was an act of 'clear provocation' to which Israel could respond. This was provided by the 3 June 1982 assassination attempt on the Israeli Ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov.

Three days later, on 6 June, Israel invaded Lebanon. ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’ was announced as a 48-hour limited operation similar to the 1978 ‘Operation Litani’. Its stated aim was to push back the Palestinian guerrillas and destroy their bases in southern Lebanon. Its actual aims were much broader. The first aim was to establish a new political order in Lebanon by securing the elections of a Maronite Christian government under Lebanese Forces Commander Bashir Gemayel. This new government would then sign a full peace treaty with Israel. In terms of security, this would establish a more comprehensive security arrangement than the limited version in South Lebanon with the SLA. In a way it was like substituting a proxy-militia with a proxy-government so that a new order could be created. Attaining such a basic change in the politico-strategic situation in Lebanon, required the destruction or neutralization of all military elements which might inhibit the election of a Lebanese president who was allied with Israel.<sup>1</sup> Thus the second aim was the wholesale expulsion of the Palestinians from Lebanon. This would remove the military threat from Palestinian guerrillas to both Israel and Lebanon, would remove the demographic threat to Lebanon’s Christians, and would set-back the PLO’s state-building efforts. Closely related was the third aim, the destruction of Palestinian nationalism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.<sup>2</sup> This was based on the belief that it was the PLO that fostered Palestinian nationalism rather nationalism being a genuine expression by the Palestinian people. Thus the blow struck to the PLO would halt the growth in Palestinian nationalism. The fourth and final aim was the defeat and expulsion of Syrian troops which had been in Lebanon since 1976. The Syrian role was no longer perceived as convenient to Israeli security interests, and therefore the Syrian military presence needed to be removed. Indeed, a review of Israel’s security status ordered by Sharon in 1981 had indicated that Syria would probably attack Israel in late 1983 or early 1984. Thus Syria’s military capacity had to be reduced. It was hoped that this would even set in motion the domestic disintegration of that state as well.<sup>3</sup>

On June 9 the IDF attacked Syrian troops and maintained the offensive for four days.<sup>4</sup> On 12 June, Israeli troops reached the outskirts of Beirut. However, Sharon’s ‘grand strategy’ started to disintegrate quickly when Gemayel’s Lebanese Forces failed to link up with the advancing Israeli army and then refused to carry out their side of the bargain, namely to ‘clear out’ the PLO from Muslim West Beirut so that Israel would not be

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<sup>1</sup> Avner Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy and the Israeli experience in Lebanon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 115.

<sup>2</sup> Peleg, *Begin’s Foreign Policy*, p. 151. See also Abba Eban, *Personal Witness: Israel through my Eyes* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992), p. 604. See also Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon*, p. 122.

<sup>3</sup> Yair Evron, *War and Intervention in Lebanon* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 117.

<sup>4</sup> Gabriel, *Operation Peace for Galilee*, p. 67.



seen as occupying an Arab capital. As a result Israel laid siege to the city on 1 July. The siege ended on 22 August with the evacuation of Palestinian guerrillas and the relocation of PLO headquarters to Tunis. In the meantime, Gemayel was busy campaigning and indeed won the presidential elections on 23 August. His success, however, was short-lived. On 14 September he was killed in the bombing of his party's headquarters. The death of Gemayel was also the death-knell for Sharon's Lebanon plans. No other Maronite leader combined the ability to govern Lebanon with a political orientation acceptable to Israel. Israel had lost its key ally and the 'grand strategy' turned into a heated debate on how to extract Israeli troops from the ongoing civil war in Lebanon. Israel became bogged down in the Shouf Mountains until September 1983 and in the western Beqaa and South Lebanon until June 1985.

American efforts at mediation eventually produced a Lebanese-Israeli agreement on 17 May 1983. However, this agreement fell far short of Israel's security needs and Lebanon's political requirements. The treaty terminated the war without installing peace; it was no more than a glorified armistice which Lebanon, under pressure from Syria, decided to abrogate on 5 March 1984. Without any tangible gains, Israel withdrew its troops to southern Lebanon where they remained until May 2000 to secure Israel's northern border.

### **Accounting for Failure: Aims, Decision-makers, and Dynamics**

The decision-making dynamics played a large role in predisposing the 1982 invasion to failure. The decision-makers – Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, Foreign Minister Itzhak Shamir, Chief-of-Staff Rafael Eitan, the Cabinet and members of the Mossad and military intelligence – quickly became drawn into the dynamics of group cohesiveness, collective rationalization, and excessive risk taking. In short, they succumbed to 'groupthink'.<sup>5</sup>

#### *Pressure for Group Cohesiveness*

Central to the Israeli decision-making process preceding the Lebanon war was pressure for cohesiveness. In short, views on Maronites, Lebanon and the goals of the upcoming military operation needed to be streamlined. Right from the beginning members of the decision-making group were pressured into accepting the view favored by the key decision-makers: Begin, Sharon, Shamir and Eitan.

Subtle constraints prevented members of the group from fully exercising

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<sup>5</sup> See also Agrell in this publication, p.71.

their critical powers. Reasons for such conformity or uniformity are rooted in social approval and dependency.<sup>6</sup> The first factor leading towards conformity in the 1982 Israeli decision-making process was that open expression of doubts, when most others in the group seemed to have reached a consensus, was discouraged. The second factor was the group's propensity to accept Sharon's contribution on the basis of his evidence, its internal consistency, and consistency with past experience. His credibility was further enhanced by his strong leadership personality. As research on decision-making has shown, 'intelligent, strong, successful high status persons will induce more conformity than lower status ones.'<sup>7</sup>

The third factor influencing conformity was the desire to remain in the inner group. Members of the decision-making elite were thus pressured into supporting decisions of which they were not fully convinced. Indeed, when such extreme group cohesiveness exists or is aimed at, members of the group are more commonly engaged in developing solidarity, mutual liking, and positive feelings about attending meetings than critically discussing and evaluating controversial issues.

The perceived need for conformity is particularly strong in crisis decision-making. Often this induces members who are not in line with the group to downplay their doubts and even to revise their opinions. Such pressure was clearly exerted in June 1982 by the key decision-makers on the dissenting voices in the Cabinet and military intelligence. Moreover, dissenters who did not give in to such pressure were then excluded from the group in order to restore its unity. Such exclusionist dynamics led to the marginalization of Deputy Defense Minister Mordechai Zippori, Commander of the Northern Command Amir Drori and head of military intelligence Yehoshua Saguy.

In such circumstances most Cabinet members did not feel they had any choice except to go along with the majority which concurred with Begin, Sharon, Eitan and the Mossad resulting in deindividuation. Deindividuation increases with cohesiveness and has been described as the transformation from an aware individual into part of a mob.<sup>8</sup> Its effects upon decision-making are detrimental as deindividual groups do not carefully weigh alternatives, seek outside opinions, or otherwise critically assess decision alternatives.

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<sup>6</sup> Collins, and Guetzkow, *A Social Psychology of Group Processes for Decision-Making*, p. 42.

<sup>7</sup> D.T. Campbell, 'Conformity in psychology's theories of acquired behavioral dispositions', in I.A. Berg and B.M. Bass (eds), *Conformity and deviation* (New York, 1961), p. 119.

<sup>8</sup> Swap, *Group Decision Making*, p. 72.

In addition, Sharon, after the initiation of the war, advocated the position of 'either all of Lebanon or none at all'. Even though the Cabinet was well aware of Sharon's political goals, the members' resistance was eroded by the 'greater logic' of an all-out war in comparison to a limited incursion. They agreed that just pushing the PLO back would not really solve the problem.<sup>9</sup> From a military point of view the Syrians in the Beqaa could give the PLO sanctuary, from which it would still be able to reach the Galilee; this sanctuary had to be denied and consequently a clash with the Syrians was necessary.

The expansion of war aims, however, was not as well thought-out as it seemed. The premises on which the 'grand plan' was based, namely the cooperation of the Maronites and the capabilities of military force to achieve political aims, had been grossly overestimated. When Sharon unleashed the war in 1982, his calculations of the military balance proved correct. However, his erroneous interpretation of the Lebanese situation was to make a military victory a political disaster for both Israel and Lebanon.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, the war mirrored faithfully both Sharon's personality and his world view.

Considering the behavior of the group of decision-makers it becomes clear that the group's discussions indeed were limited to few alternatives: a limited operation or an all-out invasion. Diplomatic channels, a non-military option or a postponed military option were never considered; neither was the possibility of an alliance with the Lebanese Druze or Shi'a. Once the key decision-makers Begin, Sharon and Eitan had decided on the 'grand plan', the course of action was not reexamined, even though debates were still on-going among others involved in decision-making, such as the Cabinet and military intelligence. In fact, military intelligence's opposition to an all-out invasion was not raised again and thus all other options were discarded. Further, little attempt was made to attain information from experts, especially considering the split between Israel's two intelligence services regarding the Maronites. The Mossad supported the key decision-makers' perception of the Maronites as a reliable ally. Military intelligence, however, raised doubts with regards to this evaluation which were immediately squashed by the Mossad.

The Mossad, which had been responsible for cultivating the relationship with the Maronites, was Bashir Gemayel's most consistent supporter. Indeed, Yitzhak Hofi, head of the Mossad, advocated full alliance.<sup>11</sup> The

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<sup>9</sup> Avner Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Security and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon* (Oxford, 1982), p. 112.

<sup>10</sup> Theodor Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation* (London, 1993), p. 259.

<sup>11</sup> Ian Black and Benny Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars* (London, 1991), p. 367.

reasons for full support of such an alliance have been speculated on many times. It has been described as a psychological syndrome resulting from the sudden ability to go beyond the border and talk to people who were formally Arabs but were really like Israelis.<sup>12</sup> Along similar lines, it has been argued that the longer an agent is with his hosts the more he gets drawn into accepting their way of thinking. Thus, the Mossad presented to Israeli decision-makers exactly the picture the Maronites wanted them to present.<sup>13</sup> Others claim it was a natural development resulting from a good working relationship.<sup>14</sup> On a conceptual level many in the Mossad saw the Maronites not as Arabs but as Phoenicians.<sup>15</sup> If not going quite as far as that, the belief that 'your enemy's enemy is your friend' served as sufficient a basis for an alliance. Thus, it was not until after the missile crisis that Hofi began to suspect that Maronite leaders had received assurances from Israel, which he was unaware of.<sup>16</sup>

Military intelligence officers, in contrast, had warned time and again that the Maronites were not reliable and warned against an alliance of any sort.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, Yehoshua Saguy, head of military intelligence, opposed the invasion of Lebanon, claiming that the 'junior ally was a dubious one.'<sup>18</sup> General Saguy, during the Zahle crisis, had already suspected a plot to draw in Israel, but Begin had rejected his assessment.<sup>19</sup> Saguy had opposed the air strike against the Syrians recommended by Eitan. Later on, while Sharon, at Cabinet meetings, lectured about his 'grand strategy' and going all the way to Beirut, Saguy countered: 'We'd only get bogged down.'<sup>20</sup> With a more clear and realistic concept of Lebanon he commented that even if Bashir Gemayel was made president, the Maronites would still have to maintain their allegiance to the Arab world. As far as the Maronites were concerned, the Israelis were just a tool for purging Lebanon of an evil. They would not make peace with Israel.<sup>21</sup>

In April 1982, high-ranking IDF officers were dispatched to Beirut to coordinate plans. In May, Saguy's intelligence assessment was extremely pessimistic. He believed that if Israel invaded Lebanon, a clash with Syria would be unavoidable, the Lebanese Christians would not do anything to help, the lack of consensus within the IDF would become a problem and

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<sup>12</sup> Interview with Yossi Olmert, Tel Aviv, 9 November 1993.

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Shlomo Gazit, Tel Aviv, 21 October 1993.

<sup>14</sup> Interview with David Kimche, Jerusalem, 7 November 1993.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, p. 33.

<sup>17</sup> Black and Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars*, p. 367.

<sup>18</sup> Sofer, *Begin*, p. 202.

<sup>19</sup> Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, p. 33.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, p. 49.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p. 51.

the PLO infrastructure could not be destroyed in this way.<sup>22</sup>

The low opinion military intelligence had of the Maronites, however, was overshadowed, since 1981, by the fact that the Israeli-Maronite relationship had become a largely personal one between Ariel Sharon and Bashir Gemayel.<sup>23</sup> Faced with Sharon, Eitan and the Mossad advocating the reliability of the Maronites, the influence of military intelligence declined to such an extent that Begin simply dismissed any military intelligence's evaluation as it contradicted his own plans.<sup>24</sup>

Additional warnings about the misconceptions underlying the invasion plan were pointed out by Amir Drori, the commander of Israel's northern command, who had supervised weapons transfers to the Maronites in the late 1970s. Not only did he raise the possibility of operational problems for both a limited invasion and full-fledged one, he also said that 'it was out of the question to depend on the Christians. From a military stand-point, they were in very poor shape. Their capability was limited solely to the defensive desire, and they could not be expected to participate in a mobile war.'<sup>25</sup> Other warnings against close cooperation came from Deputy Defense Minister Mordechai Zippori, as early as the Zahle Missile Crisis.<sup>26</sup> However, Zippori's protests fell onto deaf ears as he was known to have had long-standing personal differences with Sharon and Eitan, dating back to Zippori's support of military spending budget cuts and opposition to the destruction of the Osirak reactor.<sup>27</sup> So whenever he raised objections, many interpreted this as purely an expression of this vendetta.<sup>28</sup>

### *Collective rationalization*

Shared stereotypes fed directly into a process of collective rationalization. Indeed, Begin, Sharon, Shamir and Eitan operated within a closed ideological system that made them disregard the counsel of most experts. Without consideration of Lebanon's political reality, they had decided to see to it that Lebanon became an independent state that would live in peace with Israel.<sup>29</sup> In fact, Sharon explained to his aides that, in his estimation, a successful operation in Lebanon would ensure unchallenged Israeli superiority for thirty years to come, during which time Israel would be free to establish *faits accomplis* in its best interests.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 56.

<sup>23</sup> Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon*, p. 167.

<sup>24</sup> Interview with Yossi Olmert, Tel Aviv, 9 November 1993.

<sup>25</sup> Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, p. 46.

<sup>26</sup> Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon*, p. 117.

<sup>27</sup> Eitan, *A Soldier's Story*, p. 230.

<sup>28</sup> Interview with Arye Na'or, Jerusalem, 3 November 1993.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, p. 42.

<sup>30</sup> Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, p. 43.

Begin too had an all-encompassing view of reality that did not concern itself with details. Rather, this view altered the context and events.<sup>31</sup> His Cabinet Secretary Arye Na'or recalls that Begin had been presented many times with demographic and political data on the Maronites and Lebanon by military intelligence but these did not make a serious impression on him.<sup>32</sup> Similarly, it has been claimed that Begin had no understanding of Lebanon at all,<sup>33</sup> and that from such a position he approached policy-making towards Lebanon.

Of particular importance was the Mossad's influence upon Begin. His acceptance of the Mossad's advice was not surprising since the Mossad's evaluation fit neatly into Begin's ideological worldview. Moreover, Begin's early career as the commander of the underground organization Irgun predisposed him to work closely with the Mossad. He had been engaged in the kind of activity of Mossad agents and was open to their mode of thinking.<sup>34</sup>

Begin's *weltanschauung* and his reliance upon the Mossad reinforced Sharon's position of advocating a large-scale military operation. Sharon saw Israel as under constant threat from its Arab neighbors, whose goal was the complete destruction of the country. The only way to combat this threat was by force. In this his opinion coincided with that of Chief-of-Staff Eitan who had often stated that 'the only good Arab is a dead Arab.'<sup>35</sup>

The idea of Lebanon within the decision-making elite was very similar. The Maronites were seen as an ally and were at the core of Israel's interventionist policies. Maronites and Christians according to Eitan were one and the same. He also believed that they were somewhat European, 'not really like Arabs, more educated, they spoke French and many other languages and they were European in orientation and outlook.'<sup>36</sup> Begin's views had an added, moral, twist. As his Cabinet Secretary Arye Na'or recalls: 'Begin saw the Maronites as Phoenicians. He did not see them as Arabs. ... He believed that the Maronites were the just ones, the victims of hatred, persecution and killings and therefore he believed it was the duty of the State of Israel to give them a hand.'<sup>37</sup>

Sharon based his assessment on his personal relationship with Bashir

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<sup>31</sup> Sasson Sofer, *Begin: An Anatomy of Leadership* (Oxford, 1988), p. 100.

<sup>32</sup> Interview with Arye Na'or, Jerusalem, 3 November 1993.

<sup>33</sup> Interview with Yossi Olmert, Tel Aviv, 9 November 1993.

<sup>34</sup> Interview with Arye Na'or, Jerusalem, 3 November 1993.

<sup>35</sup> Uzi Benziman, *Sharon: An Israeli Caesar* (London, 1987), p. 263.

<sup>36</sup> Interview with Raphael Eitan, Jerusalem, 9 November 1993.

<sup>37</sup> Interview with Arye Na'or, Jerusalem, 3 November 1993.

Gemayel and anyone who pointed out the failings of Bashir was countered with arguments about the new maturity of the Maronite leader. In January 1982, long before Sharon had presented the Cabinet with his plans, he had met with Bashir and had discussed the idea of linking up Bashir's quest for the presidency with a large-scale Israeli operation.<sup>38</sup>

Eitan shared Sharon's perceptions of Gemayel. Bashir Gemayel had visited him a month later in February 1982 and he had returned this visit in March. At this point Bashir laid down the plan. 'We expect you to invade Lebanon, and when you do we will denounce you. We expect you to remain here for three months.'<sup>39</sup> Eitan had already prepared such a long-term invasion. Indeed, the announcement that 'Operation Peace for Galilee' was to last only 48 hours was purely for political reasons.<sup>40</sup> Thus, Israel proceeded to return Lebanon, the second democracy in the Middle East and the land of the Phoenicians, to its rightful place.<sup>41</sup>

The miscalculations resulting from such joint uncritical views are reflected in the events surrounding the Zahle Missile Crisis in spring 1981. None of the key decision-makers believed that Bashir had deliberately sought confrontation with the Syrians in order to draw in Israel. No one considered the possibility that some Maronites were convinced that only direct Israeli intervention would help them to free themselves from Syria.<sup>42</sup> So when this suspicion was voiced, it was rejected outright. Indeed, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, another member of the elite, during the Syrian missile deployment, responded to a press query whether the Lebanese Christians had drawn the Israelis into confrontation with Syria that this was 'a superficial look at the situation in Lebanon.'

With such shared views between the decision-makers, it is easy to discern that there would be no restraining force when the invasion plan was laid on the table. Nor is it difficult to see how objections to the plan were brushed aside. The invasion of 1982 was not an aberration in foreign policy, but the culmination of it; it was not one person implementing a 'crazy idea', but foreign-policy elite collectively inclined toward interventionism.

### *Excessive risk taking*

Decision-making in crisis situations is particularly prone to under or inadequately estimate risk. One factor influencing the propensity for high risk decisions is the process of planning. Risky policies are often preceded

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<sup>38</sup> Sharon's interview with Oriana Fallaci, *The Washington Post*, 21 August 1982.

<sup>39</sup> Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, p. 52.

<sup>40</sup> Interview with Raphael Eitan, Jerusalem, 9 November 1993.

<sup>41</sup> Sofer, *Begin*, p. 211.

<sup>42</sup> David Kimche, *The Last Option* (London, 1991), p. 139.

by extensive planning, which involves a broad guiding framework for individual decisions, based on premises, beliefs, action directives and expectations. This framework removes uncertainty while, at the same time, introducing its own biases.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, it has been argued that in many cases ‘the plan becomes an anchoring point that rigidly tends to resist adjustment to changing realities, and instead imposes reinterpretation of reality to fit biased perceptions of the effectiveness of the plan itself.’<sup>44</sup>

Sharon’s ‘grand plan’ underlying the invasion of Lebanon is an interesting example of reinterpreting reality. Sharon envisaged a war whose prime purpose was the establishment of ‘a new order’ in Lebanon and in the Middle East.<sup>45</sup> This ‘grand plan’ called for invading Lebanon in order to eliminate all Palestinian presence and influence, evict Syrian troops, install a friendly Christian regime which would sign peace with Israel, destroy Palestinian nationalism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and free Israel from past national traumas such as the 1973 war.<sup>46</sup> This plan served as a framework for its architects, providing the decision-makers with a sense of confidence in its success, which, in turn, reduced their sensitivity to risks, or in Yaacov Vertzberger’s words, the plan acted as a risk absorber.<sup>47</sup>

While Sharon, Eitan and to some degree Begin engineered the environment to fit the plan, those members in the Cabinet who had not been fully briefed were drawn into making riskier decisions on a step-by-step basis, such as extending the invasion beyond the approved 40 kilometers. In the framework of such piecemeal commitment, risks are generally not considered comprehensively, but tend to be either ignored or at best incorporated incrementally.<sup>48</sup> This leads to losing sight of the comprehensive risk on the one hand, while providing the illusion of control on the other hand. Decisions such as engaging Syrian troops or entering West Beirut thus appeared to be less risky.

Increased risk taking by groups can also be explained through the tendency of individuals to shift responsibility to the group. This is compounded by the phenomenon that risky positions are often easier to defend as risk takers tend to be more persuasive personalities.<sup>49</sup> Persuasive personalities in turn,

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<sup>43</sup> Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, ‘Making and Taking Risky Decisions’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol 33, No 1 (1998), p. 12.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, p. 13.

<sup>45</sup> Schiff and Ya’ari, *Israel’s Lebanon War*, p. 43.

<sup>46</sup> Ilan Peleg, *Begin’s Foreign Policy, 1977-1983: Israel’s Move to the Right* (New York, 1987), p. 151. See also Abba Eban, *Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eyes* (London, 1992), p. 604. See further Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985* (New York, 1985), p. 122.

<sup>47</sup> Vertzberger, ‘Making and Taking Risky Decisions’, p. 13.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, p. 16.

<sup>49</sup> D. G. Marquis, ‘Individual responsibility and group decision involving risk’,



increase the propensity for risk-taking as groups often rely on strong leadership personalities, in this case Sharon, whose authority for a riskier option was based upon the so-called 'idiosyncrasy credit' derived from previous military and political leadership positions.<sup>50</sup>

The combination of planning, incremental decision-making, reliance on strong leadership personalities and the tendency to shift responsibility all biased the decision-making process in favor of high risk options. As a result the 'logic' of the 'grand plan' was able to stand up to criticism as well as to create the perception that contingency plans were unnecessary.

### **Stereotypes, Perceptions, and Misperceptions: the PLO and the Maronites**

Decision-making groups in conflict or war scenarios tend to develop stereotypical views of the opposition as weak, stupid or inhuman while maintaining their own pure self-image.<sup>51</sup> Stereotypes, in turn, lead to a closed ideological system in decision-making. The existence of such systems and the exclusivity of high power cliques, make it almost impossible to challenge the accepted assumptions. This is best demonstrated by closer analysis of the stereotyped view of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the main out-group, and the mutually reinforced ideological orientation of the key decision-makers Begin, Sharon, Eitan and Shamir. Interestingly, stereotyping applied not just to the enemy but also Israel's key ally in the war: the Maronites forces under Bashir Gemayel. And failure to fully understand their ally had even graver consequences.

#### *Stereotyping the PLO*

The stereotype of the PLO amongst decision-makers was almost universally shared. It was seen purely as a terrorist organization that wanted to destroy the State of Israel. The PLO was de-humanized and, at the same time, perceived as militarily incompetent. Eitan's attitude towards the PLO exemplifies the terrorist stereotype. In his book *A Soldier's Story: The Life and Times of an Israeli War Hero* the classic bi-polarity is evident. His own and Israel's actions are portrayed as morally superior while the PLO is equated with terrorism and indeed blamed for Israel's invasion of Lebanon. Eitan writes:

Contrary to the claims of some academics, the Argov assassination attempt was not used as an excuse to begin the war. In fact, our

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Industrial Management Review, 1962, p. 3.

<sup>50</sup> Walter C. Swap et al. (eds.), *Group Decision Making* (London, 1984), pp. 64-65.

<sup>51</sup> Swap, *Group Decision Making*, p. 83.

response was not designed to serve as the opening blow. We bombed the terrorist bases because the government felt that it was time to explain to the PLO that their interpretation of the cease-fire agreement was unacceptable and all such acts were to be considered violations of the agreement. What brought the war on was the severe response to our raid, during which the terrorists bombarded northern Israel with great intensity.<sup>52</sup>

Sharon saw the PLO in a similar way, believing that the PLO was a terrorist organization whose aim was the destruction of Israel. He also saw the PLO as the main obstacle to Israel's relations with Arabs in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. The expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon consequently was to remove the 'sinister effect of the PLO with its assassinations and pervasive threats.'<sup>53</sup>

While Eitan and Sharon resorted to dehumanisation and overplaying the security threat Begin literally demonized the PLO. He saw the PLO as 'killers of women and children.'<sup>54</sup> On a visit to New York in 1976 Begin described the PLO as follows:

What do they – the so-called PLO – do? They make the civilian population the target of their bloody attacks on men, women and children. They never show regret or sorrow when they have 'succeeded' in killing an innocent Jewish man or woman or child. On the contrary, they rejoice in it. And that is the difference between fighters and killers.<sup>55</sup>

Begin justified the 1978 'Operation Litani' as sending 'our boys into southern Lebanon to eradicate the bases of evil, of those who call themselves the PLO.'<sup>56</sup> Indeed, he 'regarded the PLO and its leadership as no less than the successors of Hitler and his Nazi hordes and used imagery drawn from another, far darker era in his references to Palestinian leaders. Similarly, he equated the aim of the PLO with Hitler's 'Final Solution' and the PLO Covenant with *Mein Kampf*.<sup>57</sup> At the end of 1981, during a visit to the United States, Begin told a high-ranking Israeli general who came to

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<sup>52</sup> Raphael Eitan, *A Soldier's Story: The Life and Times of an Israeli War Hero* (New York, 1991), p. 256.

<sup>53</sup> Ariel Sharon, *Warrior: The Autobiography of Ariel Sharon* (New York, 1989), p. 494.

<sup>54</sup> Gertrude Hirschler and Lester S. Eckman, *Menachem Begin: From Freedom Fighter to Statesman* (New York, 1979), p. 15

<sup>55</sup> Transcript of dialogue, B'nai Jeshurun Congregation, New York, 15 November 1976.

<sup>56</sup> Address to the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organisations, New York, 23 March 1978.

<sup>57</sup> Hirschler and Eckman, *Menachem Begin*, p. 301.

see him at the Waldorf-Astoria, 'I want Arafat in his bunker!'<sup>58</sup> Begin's continuous references to the Second World War have led to assertions that the motive underlying Begin's Lebanon policy and hostility towards the PLO was 'mythic' rather than military. Accordingly, Begin supported the 1982 invasion because 'he interpreted PLO shelling (of northern Israel) as a sign that the Jews were still threatened by the Holocaust.'<sup>59</sup>

### *Stereotyping the Maronites*

Israel never had official relations with its northern neighbor. Since the 1920s, however, Zionists and later Israelis had unofficial contacts with representatives of the Lebanese Maronite community.<sup>60</sup> These contacts, which were initiated by some Maronites who sought a minority-alliance against the threat of Islam, developed into an informal relationship during the 1930s and 1940s.<sup>61</sup> Manifestations of this relationship were the draft treaty of 1936,<sup>62</sup> the Maronite submission to the 1946 Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry,<sup>63</sup> the 1946 secret treaty between the Maronite Church and the Yishuv,<sup>64</sup> as well as the 1947 Maronite Archbishop Ignace Mubarak's petition to the United Nations in support of the creation of a Jewish state.<sup>65</sup> This selective contact with Maronite views formed the foundation for Israel's historical experience and perception that the Maronites were friendly, reliable and that their political dominance would ensure that Lebanon would not be a hostile state.

Relations continued in the 1950s with Israeli financial aid to the largest

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<sup>58</sup> Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, p. 39.

<sup>59</sup> Robert C. Rowland, *The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin: The Myth of Redemption through Return* (London, 1985), p. 206.

<sup>60</sup> Treaty of 26 March 1920, S25/9907, Central Zionist Archives (CZA). See also Benny Morris, 'Israel and the Lebanese Phalange: The Birth of a Relationship 1948-1951', *Studies in Zionism*, Vol 5, No 1 (1984), p. 129. See also Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, 'Desperate Diplomacy: The Zionist-Maronite Treaty of 1946', *Studies in Zionism*, Vol 13, No 2 (1992), p. 150.

<sup>61</sup> Eliyakim Rubinstein, 'Zionist Attitudes in the Arab-Jewish Dispute to 1936', *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, No 22 (1982), p. 134. See also E. Epstein, 'Report of visit to Syria and Lebanon, October 1934', S25/10225, CZA; and Victor Jacobson, 'Report on a Trip to Eretz Israel and Syria', 12 May 1933, Weizmann Archives. See further Neil Caplan and Ian Black, 'Israel and Lebanon: Origins of a Relationship', *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, No 27 (1983), pp. 48-58.

<sup>62</sup> Draft of a Pact submitted the twenty-third of December 1936 to Mr. Edde, Z4/1702b, CZA.

<sup>63</sup> Memoire de Mgr. Moubarak pour la Commission d'Enquete pour la Palestine, Private Papers of Jacques Stambouli.

<sup>64</sup> Treaty, (undated), S25/3269, CZA.

<sup>65</sup> Rapport Concernant Le Liban presente aux Membres de l'ONU par Monseigneur Ignace Mobarak, Archeveque Maronite de Beyrouth, FM 2563/23, Israel State Archives (ISA).

Maronite party in the 1951 parliamentary elections<sup>66</sup> as well as military aid during the 1958 Lebanese civil war.<sup>67</sup> While these actions were limited in scope, the thinking behind them already bears evidence of a distinct pattern of decision-making. The notion of invading Lebanon in order to change the geo-political configuration of the Middle East, similar to the 1982 ‘grand plan’, can be traced back to the 1950s. It is evident in Ben Gurion’s 1954 plan for invading Lebanon should Iraq invade Syria, and invading Lebanon as phase two of the 1956 Sinai campaign.<sup>68</sup> Moshe Dayan’s 1955 plan of recruiting a Lebanese army officer in South Lebanon<sup>69</sup> also bears remarkable resemblance to Israel’s 1978 establishment of the South Lebanon security zone under Major Saad Haddad.

In 1975, during the second Lebanese civil war Israel once again supplied Maronites with military aid, including the training of Maronite soldiers in Israel;<sup>70</sup> the Israeli-Maronite relationship started to develop into an alliance. As during preceding decades Israeli decision-makers believed that by ensuring Maronite hegemony in Lebanon they could ensure Israeli hegemony in the Levant. Equally, as during preceding decades, the voices challenging the assumptions underlying many decisions remained unheard or were marginalised – a pattern which was repeated in 1982.

Misperceptions also fed into the pattern of Israeli thinking as well as Israeli intelligence estimates on Lebanon.<sup>71</sup> The Maronites were approached on the premise that ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend.’<sup>72</sup> The Muslims were disregarded as an insignificant and powerless minority. This assumption of

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<sup>66</sup> G. Raphael to W. Eytan, 28 December 1950, FM 2565/12, ISA. See also Research Department to Foreign Minister, ‘Aid to the Lebanese Phalange’, 28 December 1950, FM 2565/12, ISA, and E. Sasson (Ankara) to M. Sasson, Foreign Ministry, 18 December 1950, FM 2565/12, ISA.

<sup>67</sup> Jacques Reinich, *Bashir Gemayel Ve Tkufato (Bashir Gemayel and his Era)*, unpublished PhD thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1988, p. 79. See Also Menachem Klein, *Prakim Be Yahasei Israel Ve HaAravim Bein HaShanim 1957-1967 (Chapters in the Relations between Israel and the Arabs in the Years between 1957-1967)* (Jerusalem, 1986), p. 38.

<sup>68</sup> Excerpt from Ben Gurion’s Diary, 19 October 1956, as quoted in Moshe Shemesh and S. Ilan Troen (eds.), *The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal* (London, 1990), p. 306.

<sup>69</sup> Avi Shlaim, ‘Israeli Interference in Internal Arab Politics’, in Giacomo Luciani and Ghassan Salame (eds.), *The Politics of Arab Integration* (London, 1988), pp. 241-242.

<sup>70</sup> Interviews with Rafael Eitan, Jerusalem, 9 November 1993; with Mordechai Gur, Tel Aviv, 8 November 1993; with Uri Lubrani, Tel Aviv, November 1993; and Joseph Abu Khalil, Beirut, 4 July 1995.

<sup>71</sup> Kirsten E. Schulze, ‘Perceptions and Misperceptions: Influences on Israeli Intelligence Estimates during the 1982 Lebanon War’, *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol 16. No1 (1996), pp.134-152.

<sup>72</sup> Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, *My Enemy’s Enemy: Lebanon in the Early Zionist Imagination, 1900-1948* (Detroit, 1994).

Christian dominance led Ben Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, to believe that Lebanon was the weakest link in the Arab chain and that, with Israeli help it could be made into an ally. The perception of Lebanon as a Christian country was accepted by most Israeli decision-makers who succeeded Ben Gurion. A critical analysis of the demographic realities of Lebanon would have shown the opposite to be true, as early as the first Lebanese civil war, which should have been a warning light. Israeli decision-makers did not realize until the 1975 civil war that the balance had shifted. Nevertheless, they continued to believe that, with Israeli help and the removal of the Muslim Palestinians, the situation could easily be rectified.

Much of the misconception of the strength of the Christian community in Lebanon was based on the perceived strength of the presidency. The fact that Lebanon's president was traditionally a Maronite was seen as the reflection of Maronite superiority. It was also generally believed that the Lebanese president was the main foreign-policy decision-maker and that if he chose to have relations with Israel, practically the whole Republic of Lebanon was part of this relationship. Friendly contacts with President Emile Eddé in 1936,<sup>73</sup> President Camille Chamoun in 1958 and President-elect Bashir Gemayel in 1982 served to reinforce this belief. Indeed, according to Begin, the Lebanese Constitution gave the Maronites an unchallengeable status in Lebanon.<sup>74</sup>

Directly related is the assumption that the Maronites as a whole wanted a Christian state. Israeli decision-makers let themselves be deceived by Maronite talk of alliance and planning revolts<sup>75</sup> as an expression of longing for a state of their own. Romantic notions of Phoenicianism which played an important role in Maronite efforts of creating an ethnic national identity, strengthened the idea of a minority alliance which some saw as the revival of an ancient Phoenician-Canaanite partnership.<sup>76</sup> Yet, Maronite striving for an alliance needs to be seen in the context of Lebanon's political system which was set up in a way that no community had an absolute majority. Thus, almost every single Lebanese community made alliances with outside forces in support of their position. Such alliances were not to overthrow the delicately balanced Lebanese system, but to give their own community sufficient leverage to dominate that system without collapsing it. Accordingly, the Israeli support was to be sufficient to assure Maronite dominance but was not intended for open cooperation and Israeli presence

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<sup>73</sup> Conversation with the President of the Lebanese Republic Emile Ede, Beirut, 22 September 1936, E. Epstein, Secret, S25/5476, Central Zionist Archives (CZA).

<sup>74</sup> Interview with Arye Na'or, Jerusalem, 3 November 1993.

<sup>75</sup> S. Seligson to Y. Shimoni, 13 July 1948, FM 3766/6, ISA.

<sup>76</sup> David Marmer to Michael Arnon, 7 August 1957, FM 3140, ISA. See also Aharon Amir, *Lebanon: Eretz, Am, Michama* (Tel Aviv, 1979).

in Lebanon. Until 1982, Israel served exactly that function for the Maronites. However, based on Israeli stereotypes of the Maronites and Lebanon, lured by Bashir Gemayel, and propelled by Ariel Sharon who had greater plans in mind, Israel invaded Lebanon and found that the Maronites were not only unwilling to fight to re-establish their dominance, but they were also renegeing on the peace plans and coalescing with the Muslims.

### **The 2006 Lebanon War**

When Israel pulled out of southern Lebanon in May 2000 Hizbollah and indeed Lebanon and the Arab World as a whole saw it as a victory. Israeli fears that Hizbollah would pursue the retreating troops across the border and would target Israel did not materialise. Instead the Israeli-Hizbollah battleground shifted to the area known as the Shebaa farms. While Israel maintained that it had fully withdrawn from Lebanon as the Shebaa farms according to UN maps were part of Syria, Hizbollah argued that it was Lebanese land as the farmers were Lebanese and thus Israel's withdrawal remained incomplete. Hizbollah's position was largely determined by its domestic position. It needed a continuing area of conflict with Israel in order to resist pressures to disarm and dissolve its military wing. And Syria supported Hizbollah in its interpretation of landownership as Syria too needed an area from where pressure could be exerted on Israel. Hizbollah also saw continuing military action against Israel as an act of solidarity with the Palestinians following the outbreak of the second *intifada*. However, until 2006 the Hizbollah-Israeli battle was sporadic, remained confined to this area, and had 'rules.' Hizbollah knew how Israel would respond to a strike against its forces and vice versa. This changed in July 2006.

On 12 July 2006 Hizbollah launched an ambush on an Israeli patrol, in which Hizbollah captured two Israeli soldiers and killed three others. In the IDF rescue mission another five Israeli soldiers killed and one tank was destroyed. Hizbollah was ecstatic as its operation had exceeded expectations. Hizbollah's attack aimed at opening a second front to take the pressure off Hamas, which was at that point on the receiving end of a fully-fledged Israeli offensive. Hizbollah also saw their ambush as an opportunity to demonstrate its own offensive capacities and to boost popular admiration, which had been fading since May 2000. Its leaders also believed that Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who had taken over after Sharon suffered a stroke and went into coma, was weak, inexperienced and too preoccupied with Hamas to strike back. Hizbollah's assessment could not have been more wrong. Israeli leaders since late 2005 were almost itching for a fight with Hizbollah. They were tired of the constant taunting over Shebaa and they perceived Hizbollah's position as having been

weakened during 2005 as a result of the pro-Western and pro-democracy 'Cedar Revolution' following the car bomb assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri on 14 February, Syria's implications in the Hariri assassination, Syria's forced withdrawal from Lebanon in April, and the victory of the anti-Syrian camp led by Hariri son Saad al-Din in May. In addition to Hizbollah's perceived weakness, there were fears that Hizbollah was developing a first-strike capacity.<sup>77</sup> Moreover, 'Israel had monitored a series of communications between Hizbollah and Hamas in which Hizbollah urged Hamas to hang tough in negotiations with Israel over the return of an Israeli soldier captured in June 2006',<sup>78</sup> which had angered Israeli policy makers. And last, but certainly not least, there seems to have been American encouragement for a more extensive Israeli operation against Hizbollah, which suited the US War on Terror. Indeed, in early summer Israeli and US officials met in Washington and made plans for a crushing attack on Hizbollah.<sup>79</sup>

A day after Hizbollah's ambush, Israel's retaliatory offensive began. By 14 July Lebanon was blockaded from the sea, Beirut airport was hit and shut down, and Hizbollah leader Nasrallah's offices were bombed. Israeli strategy relied on air power and artillery bombardment from northern Israel into Lebanon. Israel's stated goal as articulated by Olmert was the return of the two Israeli soldiers, a complete ceasefire and the deployment of the Lebanese Army all the way to the border with Israel. However, what emerged quickly was that its primary objective was to destroy Hizbollah's military capacity by destroying its rocket arsenal, cutting its supply lines, targeting its leaders, and removing its support base. In the first few days Israel had moral superiority as it was the victim of an unprovoked attack. Even Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates publicly criticised Hizbollah's action. However, sympathy for Israel disappeared quickly as it became clear that cutting off Hizbollah from its supply lines and support base meant targeting the civilian population in southern Lebanon and effectively emptying the area.

Hizbollah responded by firing rockets into Israel at a rate of around 150 per day. If Israel had thought that Hizbollah had been weakened during the previous year and would be easily subdued, it was mistaken. Not only was Hizbollah able to maintain its firing capacity, it had also acquired longer-range capabilities. It was no longer just Israeli towns and villages along the border, which were coming under attack but large coastal cities such as

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<sup>77</sup> Gary C. Gambill, 'Hezbollah and the Political Ecology of Postwar Lebanon,' *Mideast Monitor*, Vol 1, No 3, 2006, p.2.

<sup>78</sup> Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A short history*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007, p.133.

<sup>79</sup> Seymour M. Hersh, 'Annals of National Security: Watching Lebanon: Washington's Interests in Israel's War', *New Yorker*, 21 August 2006.

Haifa. Moreover, rather than undermining Hizbollah's support base, Israel's attacks on southern Lebanon bolstered it. This was result of bombings such as the 30 July Qana bombing in which 28 civilians were killed as well as Hizbollah's immediate pledges to compensate anyone losing their home with between \$10,000 and \$12,000.<sup>80</sup> There was no doubt that the Shi'a population rallied around Hizbollah during this war. The reaction of the rest of the Lebanese population was mixed with Christian voices denouncing Hizbollah and calling for its disarmament as years of post-civil war reconstruction fell victim to Israeli bombs.

In mid-August the UN finally managed to broker a ceasefire. The July War as it is referred to in Lebanon or the Second Lebanon War as it is called in Israel lasted 34 days. During this time 500,000 residents of northern Israel and 900,000 residents of southern Lebanon were displaced. Israel counted 43 and Lebanon 1,109 civilian deaths. Military casualties comprised 118 Israel soldiers, 28 Lebanese soldiers and 200 Hizbollah fighters. Material losses amounted to \$500 million in Israel and \$4 billion in Lebanon. Hizbollah's 'victory' was celebrated across the Arab World and among Islamists. However, Hizbollah admitted it was a hollow victory and that had they known what Israel's response would be like, they never would have kidnapped those soldiers. For Israel it left the bitter taste of defeat, not least because it seemed that Israel had learned little from the 1982 Lebanon War.

### **Accounting for Failure: Aims, Decision-makers, Dynamics, Stereotypes**

Many of the underlying failures in the 2006 Lebanon war bear an uncanny resemblance to those of the 1982 Lebanon War. In both the key problem was the decision-making process. The Winograd Committee, which was appointed by the Israeli government to investigate the 12 July Northern Campaign, laid the blame for the failure of the war on Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defence Minister Amir Peretz and Chief-of-Staff Dan Halutz. The prime minister was blamed for making a hasty decision without systematic consultation and without close study of the Lebanon front and for 'making a personal contribution to the fact that the declared goals were over-ambitious and not feasible.'<sup>81</sup> The defence minister was criticized for his lack of experience in military matters, for his failure to systematically consult experts outside the security establishment, and for not giving adequate weight to reservations expressed in meetings that he attended. And finally, the chief-of-staff was charged with knowing that both the prime minister and defence lacked knowledge and experience and then

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<sup>80</sup> Norton, *Hezbollah*, p.140

<sup>81</sup> Summary of the Winograd Committee Interim Report, *The Jerusalem Post*, 30 April 2007.



leading them to believe that IDF was prepared and had operational plans.<sup>82</sup>

The Committee identified six key failures in the decision-making process: First, the immediate, intensive Israeli military response was not based on a detailed military plan and careful analysis of the Lebanese arena, but was instead an impulsive reaction by the chief-of-staff. Second, as a result the whole range of available options including diplomatic ones or military strikes below escalation level, were not considered. Third, the support of the Israeli Cabinet for the operation was gained through ‘ambiguity in the presentation of the goals and modes of operation, so that ministers with different or contradictory attitudes could support it’.<sup>83</sup> Fourth, some of the declared goals were not clear and could not be achieved. Fifth, the IDF ‘did not exhibit creativity’<sup>84</sup> in proposing alternative courses of action, did not alert the political decision-makers to the discrepancy between scenarios and modes of operation, and did not demand early mobilization of reserves. And sixth, when reality on the ground became clear political leaders failed to adapt the military operation and stated that fighting would continue until the goals were achieved.

Looking at the findings of the Winograd Committee, some parallels with the decision-making in the First Lebanon War are immediately evident. In 1982 it was Sharon who misled the Israeli Cabinet into approving his ‘grand plan’ by presenting it as a limited operation. In 2006 this role was played by Halutz. Both had support from prime ministers, who were fairly inexperienced in military and strategic matters but who had personal reasons for supporting a military operation. For Begin this was his moral commitment to saving the Maronites; for Olmert it was to consolidate his weak position as prime minister. Moreover, in both decision-making processes there is clear evidence of ‘groupthink’, of marginalization of dissenters, and lack of consultation of the views of others. The Winograd Report may not have used that term, but when it states that plans were presented to the Cabinet in such ambiguous terms that anyone could support them, that no consideration was given to those who voiced reservations, that the chief-of-staff dominated the decision-making within the army and in coordination with the political echelon, and that chief-of-staff did not present to the political leaders the internal debates within the IDF - that clearly points to ‘groupthink’ dynamics.

In addition to the failures highlighted by the Winograd Committee, three further factors need to be considered. The first and second concern Halutz’ decision to hold back on the ground operation. This was partially the result

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Summary of the Winograd Committee Interim Report, *The Jerusalem Post*, 30 April 2007.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

of his personal military background. Halutz had a distinguished career in the Israeli Airforce (IAF) culminating in his being Commander of the IAF from 2000 to 2004. In 2005, he was promoted and became IDF Chief of Staff. His airforce background predisposed him to favouring the use of airpower over ground operations. This predisposition was reinforced by the second factor, namely past experience in Lebanon. One of the main lessons that Israel learned from the 1982 War was that ground operations in Lebanon could be treacherous and costly in terms of Israeli casualties. Thus after 1982, Israel had relied on airstrikes to destroy Hizbollah bases and also to punish Lebanon. This past experience and his personal doctrinal leanings towards airpower, explains Halutz's delay in authorizing the ground operation.

And last, but not least, like in the First Lebanon War, the Second Lebanon War drew heavily upon stereotypes when dealing with Hizbollah. In fact, it could be argued that after the evacuation of the PLO in 1982, Hizbollah simply took its place. Thus Hizbollah was seen as a terrorist organization without any popular legitimacy, despite the fact that Hizbollah had tremendous support on the ground as a result of its social policies and, at the time of the war, even had elected representatives in the Lebanese parliament.

## **Conclusion**

Israel's First Lebanon War in 1982 and Second Lebanon War in 2006 in a general sense both aimed at securing Israel's northern border, the first through eliminating the PLO and obtaining a peace-treaty with Lebanon, the second through eliminating Hizbollah. While the 1982 War tried to achieve this through a 'grand plan', the 2006 war appears to have had no plan at all. Both wars suffered from unrealistic and unachievable war aims based on a lack of fully understanding Lebanese realities. However, the most important failure in both wars was at the decision-making level and here they reveal remarkable similarities pointing to deeper problems within Israeli crisis decision-making and civil-military relations. The First and Second Lebanon Wars failed because the dynamics of 'groupthink' provided the decision-makers with an illusion of invulnerability. This led to ignoring risks, reinforcement of stereotyped conceptions of the PLO, the Maronites, Hizbollah and Lebanon and inadequately evaluated intelligence data combined with wishful thinking and shared rationalizations. The ill-fated decision to launch an all-out Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the 2006 July War were based on mutually reinforced misperceptions, poor judgment, and wishful thinking of a group of decision-makers who as individuals would not have taken the same risks.

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## **“NEED FOR SPEED”: CAN THE EU DECISION-MAKING PROCESS MEET THE HIGH TIME DEMANDS?**

### **Experiences from Multinational Decision-Making: The EU Battle Group Concept**

*Bengt Andersson*

When I was the so called designated Operation Commander for the Nordic Battle Group, I suspected that the political decision making process in Brussels did not fully match the high time constraints of the Battle Group (BG). It seemed challenging to reach Initial Operational Capability (IOC) 6000 kilometres away from Brussels in ten days after the order to deploy. This raised the question whether the EU decision-making process could meet the high time demands imposed on the units obviously driven by a real need for speed.

The outline of the article is as follows. Firstly, I will give some background information on the issue and secondly, I will say some words about the EU and the Battle Group structure. Thirdly, I will highlight the reasons for my choice of topic, the decision-making process, and, finally, I will try to draw some conclusions.


Dealing with the EU Battle Groups, one has to keep in mind that the Battle Group Concept was introduced at the Helsinki Summit (10-11 December 1999, focusing on the enlargement). The EU pledged itself to be able to deploy forces up to corps level (15 brigades were mentioned) within 60 days and to sustain them for a year at a distance of over 4000 km from Brussels. To this should be added a Rapid Reaction Force called the Battle Group<sup>1</sup>.

The scenarios where the EU forces should be able to solve tasks are depicted in the picture below<sup>2</sup>. It is worth to mention that in these scenarios, the European Union Force (EUFOR) should be able to take on the full range of Petersberg tasks, including the most demanding ones.

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
<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Kerttunen, Koivula and Jeppsson (2005) and Kerttunen, Koivula and Jeppsson (2006)

<sup>2</sup> The figures show the estimated number of the personnel required.



**Figure 1: Scenarios for EU forces**

The initial idea for the Battle Groups was raised at the (European Council) summit in Helsinki in December 1999. The idea was reiterated in 2003 at a Franco-British summit in Le Touquet, which highlighted the need to improve the EU's military rapid response capabilities. Building on the experiences from Operation Artemis in 2003<sup>3</sup>, France, Germany and the United Kingdom released a paper in February 2004 outlining the Battle Group Concept. The document proposed a number of Battle Groups, based on the Artemis experience, that would be autonomous, consisting of 1500 personnel, and deployable within 15 days.



**Figure 2: EU Battle Group Concept**

<sup>3</sup> The operation showed rapid reaction and deployment of forces in a short timeframe – with the EU moving from the Crisis Management Concept to operation launch in just three weeks, taking further 20 days for substantial deployment.



There are many important keywords in the short statement above: "A minimum military effective, credible, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations or initial phase of larger operations, based on a combined arms, battalion sized force, re-enforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements." The keywords are, from my perspective: Minimum, Force Package, Stand-alone, Initial Phase, Combined Arms, battalion sized, re-enforced, Combat Support and Combat Service Support. These keywords were the pillars that constituted the order of battle of the Nordic Battle Group.




Figure 3: Possible BG tasks

The Battle Groups would be used, principally, in response to a request by the United Nations (UN) at a short notice. They should concentrate on "bridging operations", preparing the ground before a larger force relieved them, or on Stand Alone Operations in emergencies such as Evacuation Operations or disaster relief. The Battle Groups should be able to work in all scenarios except for Stabilization operations.<sup>4</sup> The Battle Groups should, just like the EUFORCE, be able to take on all Petersberg's tasks in the different scenarios.

I would like to stress the high demands for deployability imposed on the Battle Groups:

<sup>4</sup> Operation Palliser: UK operation Year 2000 in Sierra Leone: NEO [Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation] under Brigadier David Richards. See, for example, [http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Sierraleone/Operation-Palliser.html].

- 10 days to Initial Operational Capability, self sustaining for its 30 days “normal” time deployed and extendable to 120 days.

It is also worth to mention that the Battle Group has to be relieved or redeployed within 120 days. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) means that parts of the force have begun solving tasks in the Area of Operations.

Before I continue with the EU chain of command and the challenges in getting an EU force or a Battle Group deployed, I would like to give a glimpse of the Nordic Battle Group 2008 and its composition. The Nordic Battle Group had a strength of 2800 personnel, formed around a mechanized battalion. It had its own Fighter Unit, Fire support and heavy airlift, but it lacked robust rotary wing assets. The Nordic Battle Group was like a division in miniature. Sweden, as the Framework Nation, stood for more than 2000 personnel with Finland as the second largest troop contributor. The reason for why the Nordic Battle Group looked like this can be found in the keywords of the BG concept. The Battle Group must be a stand-alone force which is able to rapidly enter an area with very limited, if any, infrastructure, poor Host Nation Support and no other military units to lean on.





Figure 4: Nordic Battle Group composition

The Battle Group was planned to be led from an Operation Headquarters (OHQ) in Northwood UK by me as the Operation Commander supported

by a Staff manned by personnel from the Troop Contributing Nations, UK and to some extent Augmentees. In order to meet the high military time demands, the Nordic Battle Group OHQ (formed by the five countries and by the UK) could work without the augmentees during the planning, deployment and initial parts of an operation – in this respect, the NBG 08 did not follow the Battle Group Concept.



**Figure 5: Design of Operational Headquarters**

An EU force or a battle group is ordered/controlled by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), and the Operation Commander gets his orders directly from the PSC, through the Chairman of the Military Committee. It is important to keep in mind that the Chairman and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) are not players in the chain of command. Neither is the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) nor the Director of the EUMS. The Military Committee, through the Chairman is, of course, an actor as advisor to the Political and Security Committee, but the members of the Military Committee are also the military links to the Capitals. The EUMC does, of course, use the EU Military Staff as a staff element preparing advice to the PSC.

First of all, we have the inherent difficulties in merging units from, in our case, five different nations (Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Estonia) into a coherent fighting unit<sup>5</sup>. This has not, as far as I know, been done earlier with such a small unit. For example, as shown before, we had one Fin-

<sup>5</sup> See more about difficulties integrating security and defence policy in EU: Eriksson (2006).

nish company in the core battalion, and we also had a Swedish-Finnish Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) unit. The Operation Headquarters and the Force Headquarters (FHQ) had to be shaped into two functional working teams with good internal processes as well as good co-operation between the two staffs.

What had to be overcome in order to have a rapid NBG, was that the decision-making process was different in each country. The question of caveats had to be addressed prior to deployment. In the case of the Nordic Battle Group, the five countries had decided not to have any caveats, which was unique. Of course, if activated, the question would have been raised again. The Common Rules of Engagement had to be produced; one can not have different Rules of Engagement when mixing units on battalion level. The different military planning procedures (that all rested on the GOP), had to be moulded into a common SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) for the Battle Group. One example of the questions that had to be addressed was the need for a UN mandate before deployment. All these challenges were discussed in a forum called “Political/Military Consultations” led by the Swedish Ministry for Defence. Participants came from the different Ministries for Defence and Foreign Affairs in the five battle group countries. From the military side, officers representing the nations and personnel, as well as officers representing the Battle Group (me and/or my deputy) participated. It is of particular importance to keep an eye on the different hot spots in order to shorten the national decision making time, should the question of activating a Battle Group arise.





Figure 6: General deployment process

The EU political/military decision making process formally begins, when the Political and Security Committee decides that EU action is appropriate. Thereafter, if military action is considered appropriate, a Battle Group may be selected. There are no time limits between the decision that EU action is appropriate and the Approval of the Crisis Management Concept. There is, however, a demand of a maximum of 15 days of military planning and preparations before Initial Operational Capability. This is the reason for my question. Even though there are no time demands on the political process, can it be done quickly? Another question is whether the political decision making process – during the military planning between the approval of the Crisis Management Concept and the decision to launch – can meet the five to ten days demand.



**Figure 7: Planning and Decision process on Political/Strategical Level, Step 1**

The conflict between the time demands and the political process becomes obvious. The EU Military Staff is not in the chain of command when a BG or EUFORCE is activated. However, it has an active role in the early phases of the planning process, mainly as the planning element and adviser to the EUMC, before an Operation Commander is appointed. There are many formal steps before having Initiating Military Directive (IMD) given to the Operation Commander (OpCdr). This is time-consuming; especially

if we consider that the capitals have to be informed and that the capitals have to approve the different documents (such as the Crisis Management Concept, the Military Strategic Option etc). Another fact that hampers the speed of the decision-making process is that the Operational Commander is not selected until the Initiating Military Directive is approved.

Up to this point the EUMS is the military planning element. All the steps depicted in the picture have to be walked through, according to current procedures. The PSC and the council are involved in the decisions of approving military documents like the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), the Military Strategic Option (MSO), the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN).




Figure 8: From CONOPS to conducting operation.

When the Initiating Military Directive is approved/authorised, the cumbersome road to deployment continues. The Concept of Operations, guidelines for the Use of Force and Statement of Requirements (SOR) have to be developed, and, of course, they have to be approved not only by the council but also by the capitals. This continues over the Force Generation Conferences up to the approval of the Operation Plan and the authorization of the Rules of Engagement. The Council is also supposed to approve the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), as appropriate. The fact that the Operational Commander is not in the planning cycle, until the development of the CONOPS and the OPLAN, can create problems or frictions. He has two options. He can either accept the Military Advices on the Crisis Management Concept and the Military Strategic Option (MSO) (where the order of

battle is outlined) selected by the Council. Or the Operational Commander can begin a time-consuming and perhaps impossible procedure to change them. He therefore has to produce a CONOPS, and an OPLAN with building blocks that have been decided or suggested by a different staff (and another commander).

I was involved in the work with the CMC for the Chad operation. The details in the CMC were scrutinized by the Troop Contributing Nations. This took a lot of time.

## **Conclusion<sup>6</sup>**

First of all, we have to keep in mind that even though the planning of the Artemis operation 2003 was rather fast, in later operations, like the EUFOR Congo and the operation in Chad 2008/09, the decision making and force generation took a long time.

**The formal decision-making process (intra-EU) is too time consuming**

**The economic regulations, (including the Athena process)**

**Battle group countries (internal) decision making**

The formal decision-making time, intra EU (with national consultations) is too time-consuming. The economical agreements and procedures, including the Athena process, are too time-consuming, as well. Especially the initial planning and the force generation are affected by this. Even the planning process within the troop contributing countries is too "ad hoc".

So what we need is a shorter and more effective planning process. The process within the EU and between the EU and the capitals has to be well regulated and trained. The different staffs, the EU Military Staff and/or different Operation Headquarters should have planning permission, maybe through the EU Military Committee. There should be some sort of pre-funding for initial planning and for scarce assets, such as Rotary Wing, Role 2-units and Air Lift. Regulated (as is the case just now) and well trained (as is not the case just now) planning procedures among the Troop Contributing Countries have to be developed.

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<sup>6</sup> The conclusions do not take into account the implications of the Lisbon Treaty.

Finally, am I so naive as to think that these things could be easily achieved or changed? No, of course I am not. I know that there is ongoing work with the planning process, and I believe and hope that this will produce an emergency, or rapid, planning process matching the demands on the military side. So there we have a green light.

I also hope and think that a more liberal view upon preplanning, using the EU Military Staff or an Operation headquarters on stand by could be realistic. But I am not so sure of that. I also think that the regular multinational training within the EU countries will make it possible to have regulated and well practised planning procedures among the Troop Contributing Countries.

I am, however, a little more pessimistic when it comes to a regulated and trained political planning process within the EU and between the EU and the nations/capitals. I am even more pessimistic when it comes to the pre-funding of the initial parts of an operation.

We have a long road to walk before the formal EU decision-making process meets the high time demands imposed on the military side.

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## **EXPERIENCES FROM MULTICULTURAL DECISION-MAKING: CHALLENGES TO PROTECTION IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS**

*Pierre Schori*

I would like to share some views on the topic of protection challenges based upon my own experience in Cote d'Ivoire, where I served as Special Representative of Secretary-General (SRSG) from April 2005 to February 2007. I will discuss challenges to protection in three locations: Firstly, in the field including the troop-contributing countries (TCC), secondly, at the United Nations Headquarters including United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), and finally, and perhaps the most importantly, in the Security Council (SC).

### **Challenges to protection in the field**

In the field the main priority is the protection of United Nations (UN) human and material resources. The idea that this is our first priority does not go down well with people at risk or with public opinion. When it comes to protection, speaking of mission integration is perhaps the only concept when mission integration is accepted by all members of the UN family, because the Special Representative of Secretary-General is also Deputy Commander.

The UN in Cote d'Ivoire was attacked in January 2006. For three days the UN headquarters in Abidjan and all UN agencies in the Western part of the country were under attack by violent mobs organised by local military leaders and linked to the government party (who opposed the latest UNSC resolutions). During that difficult week we found out, much to our regret, that the mission was not properly prepared for handling riots by civilians. The tear gas was not sufficient, nor efficient enough to deter or stop the constant attacks by mobs throwing stones and Molotov cocktails. Nor did we have sufficient Formed Police Units (FPUs), a kind of enhanced police units with special anti-riot training and equipment, at our disposal. We had no adequate transport for conflict situations: I, as the SRSG, was flown out (in French attack helicopters) to meet with President Gbagbo of Cote d'Ivoire and President of Nigeria, the chair of the African Union, Obasanjo.

It must be underlined that the mission and the Secretary-General himself repeatedly asked for reinforcements of troops and relevant material to United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ONUCI) but found each time the Security Council divided on the matter.

In this context I also found the Joint Mission Analysis Centers (JMAC) understaffed and under-budgeted by the Security Council. It could not provide, with the very limited resources available, the mission with good enough information or intelligence. JMAC was composed of twelve staffs (all military) instead of being headed by a civilian. As a result, JMAC has been functioning as a Joint Military cell instead of being part of a Joint Mission operation. All four JMAC Chiefs serving in ONUCI during my tenure complained about budget, personnel, too short terms of service and no continuity. The Chief of JMAC estimates JMAC's output efficiency to be 30%.<sup>1</sup>

We underestimated the toxic influence of hate media, and we realised afterwards the importance of a nation-wide mission radio. All UN agencies in the West were attacked, most of them looted, damaged or destroyed. President Gbagbo still owes the UN money for this. Following the crisis, UNSG Kofi Annan sent a letter to President Gbagbo making his government responsible, according to the Status of Forces Agreement (the SOFA agreement), for having failed to protect UN personnel and property. The material claim on the Ivorian government was 3, 5 million dollars.

The second priority in the field is to protect population at risk. The wording of Security Council resolutions (SCR), United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and ONUCI has a clear mandate in the SC Resolution to protect also the civilian population. All Chapter VII missions should have it. If we insist on implementing explicitly the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect<sup>2</sup>, we risk having long discussions and delays. With good resolution "the Nike doctrine" can be applied: just do it! Ergo: Member States who care about protection should have good drafters for the Chapter VII resolutions.

The third priority follows the second priority. Repeated reminders of Security Council resolution 1325<sup>3</sup> that women are not only victims but also essential actors in preventing and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding; and the therefore should be included at all levels of the peace process. These reminders are to no avail if the receiver of the message is not prepared for it or, even, not able to understand it. Same goes for resolu-

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<sup>1</sup> I quote one of my five JMAC superior officers.

<sup>2</sup> Responsibility to Protect, see for Instance [<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/>].

<sup>3</sup> For Security Council resolution 1325, See [<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/764/54/PDF/N0076454.pdf?OpenElement>].

tion 1820 which has more forceful language than 1325, for instance on addressing impunity<sup>4</sup>.

### **Challenges to protection at headquarters**

I believe the UN has to address this dilemma at its roots, in the troop-contributing countries themselves. And, indeed, paragraph 6 of 1820 “requests the Secretary-General... to develop and implement training programs for all peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel deployed by the UN... “.<sup>5</sup> It also urges troop and police contributing countries “to take appropriate preventive action, including pre-deployment and in-theatre awareness training... to ensure full accountability... ”.<sup>6</sup>

In this regard, a special task force led by a committed person with experience of a peacekeeping mission, preferably as Special Representative of Secretary-General, should be set up as I suggested to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in early 2006. I also believe that a gender mainstreaming course should be mandatory for all SRSGs before leaving for the mission station. Without proper gender mainstreaming awareness, senior leaders cannot be the role models they need to be in relation to national and other institutions where often gender is substantially downplayed. This would enhance protection and participation of women and children which in turn would contribute to sustainable peace.

FRIDE (Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior) organised a seminar called “Strengthening women’s citizenship in the context of state-building”. It focused on how state-building processes in fragile states can be an opportunity to strengthen women’s citizenship and how the role donors can play in supporting this right. The intensive state-building activities that take place in post-conflict and fragile state settings often include constitution drafting, institution building and reform, legal and justice reform, security sector reform, democratisation, and decentralisation of governance. Depending on the approach of those driving the state-building agenda, these processes can either be opportunities to significantly strengthen women’s rights and participation in governance, or can be used to undermine women’s rights and exclude them from decision-making.

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<sup>4</sup> For SCR 1820, see [<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/391/44/PDF/N0839144.pdf?OpenElement>] and for SCR 1325, see [<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/764/54/PDF/N0076454.pdf?OpenElement>]

<sup>5</sup> United nations paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1820 [<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/391/44/PDF/N0839144.pdf?OpenElement>]

<sup>6</sup> United nations paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 1820 [<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/391/44/PDF/N0839144.pdf?OpenElement>]

## Challenges to protection in the Security Council

Should peacekeeping forces enter a conflict area if there is no political will among the parties towards reconciliation? This is of course hard to know in advance and in a crisis situation. But again, serious analyses should be made before committing troops. And once troops are committed, the UN should come in robustly (attack helicopters, armoured vehicles, Formed Police Units) and being able to increase troop levels in case of need. This was the case in Liberia and it proved to be successful. This is not the case in Cote d'Ivoire where tasks have been piled upon tasks without adding on adequate human and material resources. Comparative figures between Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire show that if ONUCI would have the same troop levels as United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in relation to population and geography, ONUCI would have close to 100 000 military and police in relation to population or 48 000 in relation to geography.

Ending impunity, applying sanctions and referring to International Criminal Court (ICC), when needed, are measures that can enhance protection. Sanctions proved to be efficient, as the case of the gang leader Blé Goude in Cote d'Ivoire showed<sup>7</sup>. Threat of sanctions and timelines will however be reduced and ignored if there are no consequences for violators. So, one should not brandish sanctions or set precise timelines if not prepared to face the consequences of non-implementation of those sanctions or timelines.

A few words are worth mentioning on interaction with regional actors, including The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU). ECOWAS and AU are increasingly taking responsibility in continental crises, which also involves occasional turf battles among regional leaders in the pursuit of competing agendas or preoccupations. During my tenure in 2005 and 2006 the two organizations dedicated four summits exclusively on Cote d'Ivoire plus two others where Cote d'Ivoire was on the agenda.

It is all about leadership. Compare the difference in leadership between leaders like Obasanjo, Mbeki and Bashir. As President of the African Union and ECOWAS, and, of course of Nigeria, Obasanjo was a proactive enforcer of regionally accepted resolutions and agreements. South Africa's Thabo Mbeki put more emphasis on silent diplomacy as in the case of Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire, while Bashir was outright hostile to the UN and other forms of "external pressure".

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<sup>7</sup> Blé Goude was a leader of Jeunes Patriotes, the pro-government movement, which was criticised for many violent acts including the attacks on the UN in January 2006.

Western hegemony is on the decline and so is the authority of the Security Council reform. Security Council reform and expansion are required also for this reason, not only for democratic purposes.

### **Requirements and the capacity**

“If the UN has a ‘responsibility to protect’, it must also have a ‘capacity to protect’”.<sup>8</sup> This quote from Gowan represents well the situation today. The mandate assigned to UNOCI under the different SC resolutions provided for the following fifteen core tasks:

- a) Monitoring of the cessation of hostilities and movements of armed groups;
- b) Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement;
- c) Disarmament and dismantling of militias;
- d) Operations of identification of the population and registration of voters;
- e) Reform of the security sector;
- f) Protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and the civilian population;
- g) Monitoring of the arms and diamonds embargo;
- h) Support for humanitarian assistance;
- i) Support for the redeployment of State administration;
- j) Support for the organization of open, free, fair and transparent elections;
- k) Assistance in the field of human rights;
- l) Public information;
- m) Assistance in maintaining law and order, including restoring a civilian policing presence throughout Cote d’Ivoire, and ad-

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<sup>8</sup> Gowan, Richard. Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008, Center on International Cooperation at New York University.

vising the Government on the restructuring of the internal security services;

n) Assisting the Government in conjunction with the African Union, ECOWAS and other international organizations in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout Cote d'Ivoire;

o) Supporting the Government in ensuring the security of the premises of Radio Television Ivoirienne (RTI).

“In a number of peacekeeping operations, it is not clear whether the minimum conditions essential to the success of UN peacekeeping are fully met. These conditions are:

- A peace to keep and a viable peace process;
- Clear, credible and achievable mandates;
- The cohesive political support of the Membership, especially the Security Council and neighbouring states;
- Resources and capabilities to undertake mandated tasks; and the consent and cooperation of the host state and of key parties to the conflict”.<sup>9</sup>

In Cote d'Ivoire none of the five conditions mentioned by Guéhenno were really met.

In order to contribute to address these problems FRIDE has launched a project called “Understanding the implementation of Security Council resolutions for Chapter VII missions”. The general objective is to analyse how Security Council resolutions for Chapter VII missions were implemented at mission, national and regional level and to what extent they were backed up by adequate financial and human resources and sustained Security Council political pressure on the national level parties. Through a number of case studies, the project will aim to bridge the divide between Headquarters and the field, exploring to what extent the resolutions agreed upon in the Security Council were clear and met the needs of the mission on the field. Also to what extent Special Representatives of the Secretary Generals and their missions had the sustained Security Council pressure on the national level parties needed to implement these mandates. Case studies include Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Kosovo.

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<sup>9</sup> Jean-Marie Guéhenno, on March 10, 2008. In his last address as head of DPKO to the Security Council. March 10, 2008.

The 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, commonly known as the Brahimi report, constitutes the most ambitious overview of the challenges facing peace operations and the clearest analysis of the difficulties in implementing Security Council resolutions at field level<sup>10</sup>. The panel, led by Lakhdar Brahimi, openly criticises a system whereby increasingly complex UN missions are tasked with evolving responsibilities under weak, ambiguous mandates without corresponding, more robust resources. The report concludes that: “The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when recommending force and other resource levels for a new mission, and it must set those levels according to realistic scenarios that take into account likely challenges to implementation”.<sup>11</sup> Additionally, the project will include all analysis of the implementation of SC resolution 1325 across all case studies selected.

### **Core research issues**

As part of the general objective of the project it is important to consider how Security Council resolutions for Chapter VII missions were implemented at mission level, national level and regional level, as appropriate, and to what extent they were backed up by adequate resources and sustained SC political pressure. The case studies selected will analyse the following issues:

*Mission mandates:* Did mission mandates correspond with the situation they faced on the ground? Were missions given realistic time frames that encouraged a strategic approach to project implementation? Were mandates expressed clearly enough to avoid vagueness that could lead to different interpretations? Did the SC apply political pressure to the actors who were threatening the civilians whom the mandate was destined to protect? As a specific comparative study, did missions implement SC Resolution 1325 on “the impact of war on women, and women’s contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable peace?”<sup>12</sup>

*Mission resources:* Were increasing demands – in the form of SC resolutions and Presidential statements – backed up by increases

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<sup>10</sup> For the Brahimi Report, see [[http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/)]

<sup>11</sup> Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. August 2000. p. 12  
[[http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/)]

<sup>12</sup> Quote from SCR 1325. Security Council Resolution was passed unanimously on 31 October 2000. For SCR 1325, see [<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/764/54/PDF/N0076454.pdf?OpenElement>]

in the corresponding resources? Did human and material resources correspond with the needs of the mission on the ground? What kinds of resources – military, police, civilian, financial, humanitarian etc. – were most needed? Was there an appropriate balance between military and civilian resources? Did the Secretariat/Department of Peacekeeping Operations have adequate resources to handle the demands put on Headquarters by the Security Council? Were missions given enough resources to assume the important security requirements of organising national elections?

*Security Council pressure:* Was the frequency and content of the SC resolutions and Presidential statements conducive to improving the situation on the ground? If Security Council division existed, what were the reasons behind these divisions? Did the changing Security Council presidency and shifting temporary Security Council members have affect continuity and coherence? How did the context of the drafting and adoption of the demand affect its content? Were unrealistic timelines or sanctions set out in demands? Do Security Council demands avoid ambiguities and clearly spell out the relationship between Chapter VII obligations and national law and the Constitution of the State in question? Were follow up, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms foreseen for these demands? What role did the Secretariat have in this entire process?

*Mission coherence:* To what extent did the above three factors evolve cohesively? Which elements were missing in the objective of creating a cohesive policy? How did SRSGs respond to increasing demands not backed up by resources and sustained Security Council pressure? Did adequate communication channels exist between the Secretariat and the field and between the Secretariat and the Member States? What were the advantages and disadvantages of the role of regional actors in the conflict or mission? What role did civil society play?

*Implementation of Security Council resolution 1325<sup>13</sup>:* What measures and procedures were implemented to prevent sexual harassment? Were women appointed to high level positions in the mission? Were troops and civilian police sufficiently trained on gender issues? To what extent were women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution taken into ac-

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<sup>13</sup> for SCR 1325, see [<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/764/54/PDF/N0076454.pdf?OpenElement>].



count? How did amnesty clauses in peace agreements deal with war crimes related to sexual violence against women? Were provisions for women included in Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programmes? Did consultations exist with women organisations during Security Council missions? What percentage of mission reports made reference to gender concerns?

I believe that all this would be an important contribution to meet the challenges to protection in conflict situations.

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**XII Suomenlinna Seminar**

**Strategic Decision-Making in Crisis and War**

**Helsinki, 28th-29th April, 2009**

**Organized by the National Defence University of Finland,  
Department of Strategic and Defence Studies**

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**SEMINAR PROGRAMME**

*The seminar sessions will take place in the building of the Finnish National Defence Courses, Maneesikatu 6, Helsinki.*

**TUESDAY, APRIL 28<sup>TH</sup>, 2009**

- |             |  |
|-------------|--|
| 09:30-10:00 | Coffee and registration  |
| 10:00-10:10 | Welcoming remarks: Col Erik Erroll, Director of DSDS   |
| 10:10-10:30 | Opening Address: Prof Clive Archer (Manchester Metropolitan University): <i>"Can there ever be Nordic Strategic Decision-Making in Crisis and War?"</i>  |
| 10:40-12:30 | <b><i>The First Session: Problem of Rationality in Crisis Decision-Making. Chair: LtCol Mika Kerttunen</i></b><br><br>Dr. Yee-Kuang Heng (University of St. Andrews): <i>"Reflexive Rationality and the Implications for Decision-Making"</i><br><br>Prof Beatrice Heuser (University of Reading): <i>"Bureaucratic Politics, Institutional In-fighting and the Impossibility of Strategy Making in Modern Governments"</i><br><br>Prof Tuomas Forsberg (University of Tampere): <i>"Rational Choice and Psychology in Crisis Decision-making"</i> |
| 12:30-14:00 | Lunch  |

- 14:00-15:30      ***The Second Session: Intelligence Analysis and Decision-Making. Chair: Adjunct Professor Stefan Forss***
- Prof Wilhelm Agrell (University of Lund): "*Intelligence and Decision-making . Theories and Experience from Cuba to Iraq*"
- Col (rtd) Sam Gardiner (National Defense University): "*A U.S. Decision to Strike Iran: The Roles of Intelligence and Analysis.*"
- 15:30              Coffee and afterwards transportation available from Maneesikatu to Hotel Grand Marina

*Evening program:*

- 18:00-19:00      A cruise in the Helsinki archipelago (departure from Market Square)
- 19:00-22:00      Dinner in the restaurant Walhalla (Suomenlinna), transport to mainland Helsinki.

**WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29<sup>TH</sup>, 2009**

- 09:30-10:00      Coffee
- 10:00-12:00      ***The Third Session: Military Strategic Decision-Making in War***  
***Chair: Dr Antti Sillanpää***
- Dr. Kirsten Schulze (London School of Economics): "*Israeli crisis decision-making: The 1982 and 2006 Lebanon Wars*"
- Dr. Col Frans B. Osinga (Netherlands Defence Academy): "*Strategic Decision making: Learning from John Boyd and Thinking like a Fox*"
- Prof Philip Taylor (University of Leeds): "*A Cartography of Strategic Communications*"
- 12:00-13:30      Lunch

13:30-15:00

***The Fourth Session: Experiences from Multinational Decision-Making. Chair: Professor Pekka Sivonen***

MajGen Bengt Andersson (Swedish Armed Forces): "*Need for Speed: Can the EU Decision Making Process Meet the High Time Demands? Experiences from Multinational Decision-Making: The Battle Group Concept*"

Dir. Pierre Schori, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE): "*Challenges to presentation in conflict situations*"

15:10-15:40

Concluding Remarks: General Sir Rupert Smith: "*The Utility of Force*"

15:40

Farewell: Col Erik Erroll, Director of DSIDS

## **ABBREVIATIONS USED**

<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>BG</b>	Battle Group
<b>CDU</b>	Christian Democratic Union
<b>CMC</b>	Crisis Management Concept
<b>CONOPS</b>	Concept of Operations
<b>DDR</b>	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
<b>DIA</b>	Defence Intelligence Agency
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
<b>EEA</b>	European Economic Area
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>ESDP</b>	European Security and Defence Policy
<b>EUFOR</b>	European Union Force
<b>EUMC</b>	European Union Military Committee
<b>EUMS</b>	European Union Military Staff
<b>FHQ</b>	Force Headquarters
<b>FPU</b>	Formed Police Units
<b>FRIDE</b>	Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior
<b>GOP</b>	Guidelines for Operational Planning
<b>IAF</b>	Israeli Airforce
<b>ICC</b>	International Criminal Court
<b>IDF</b>	Israel Defence Force

<b>IMD</b>	Initiating Military Directive
<b>IOC</b>	Initial Operational Capability
<b>JMAC</b>	Joint Mission Analysis Centers
<b>MONUC</b>	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>MS</b>	Member State
<b>MSO</b>	Military Strategic Option
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NBG</b>	Nordic Battle Group
<b>NORDCAPS</b>	The Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support
<b>NORDAC</b>	Nordic Armaments Co-operation
<b>NORDEFECO</b>	Nordic Defence Co-operation
<b>NORDSAMFN</b>	The Nordic Cooperation Group for Military Peace UN Matters
<b>NORDSUP</b>	Nordic Support Operations
<b>OHQ</b>	Operation Headquarters
<b>ONUCI</b>	United Nations Mission In Cote d'Ivoire
<b>OpCdr</b>	Operation Commander
<b>OPLAN</b>	Operation Plan
<b>PLO</b>	Palestine Liberation Organisation
<b>PMC</b>	Private Military Company
<b>PSC</b>	Political and Security Committee

<b>PSO</b>	Peace Support Operations
<b>ROEREQ</b>	Rules of Engagement Request
<b>RTI</b>	Radio Television Ivoirienne
<b>SC</b>	Security Council
<b>SCR</b>	Security Council Resolution
<b>SIS</b>	(British) Secret Intelligence Service
<b>SLA</b>	South Lebanese Army
<b>SOFA</b>	Status of Forces Agreement
<b>SOP</b>	Standard Operational Procedure
<b>SOR</b>	Statement of Requirements
<b>SMSG</b>	Special Representative of Secretary-General
<b>TCC</b>	Troop Contributing Countries
<b>UN</b>	The United Nations
<b>UNITAR</b>	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
<b>UNMIL</b>	United Nations Mission in Liberia
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>WMD</b>	Weapons of Mass Destruction

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

### **Wilhelm Agrell**

Professor Wilhelm Agrell is a Swedish historian who works primarily on Swedish security and defence in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Since 2006 he has held the post of Professor of Intelligence Analysis at Lund University, being the first professor in this field in Sweden. He has written on the evolution of the Swedish defence doctrine, the aborted Swedish nuclear weapons project and the Nordic dimension of the Venona decoding project.

### **Bengt Andersson**

Major General Andersson is currently serving as Chief Logistic Officer of the Swedish Armed Forces. He entered military service in 1975. After graduating from the Royal Naval Academy he worked as an officer in Southern Sweden in various positions within the heavy mobile artillery units. He has been assigned to various posts in the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters and in the Naval Staff and been heavily involved in the building of the Modern Swedish Amphibious Corps. Major General Andersson graduated from Swedish Armed Forces Staff College in 1986 and is also graduate of the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College. From 2006 until 2008, MG Andersson served as designated Operation Commander for the Nordic Battlegroup 2008 (NBG 2008). The Battlegroup was on readiness for EU missions the first six months of 2008. MG Andersson has also been Vice Chairman of the Royal Swedish Society of Naval Sciences and a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.

### **Clive Archer**

Professor Clive Archer is a research professor at the Department of Politics and Philosophy at the Manchester Metropolitan University. He is also Director of the Manchester European Research Institute, of Manchester Metropolitan University, and he holds the Jean Monnet Ad Personam Chair in European Integration Studies. His research interests include European integration, with special reference to the Nordic area and small states, and Nordic-Baltic Security. He is currently undertaking a research project on the UK's interests in the Arctic. He has also undertaken more general work on international organizations. His publications include *The European Union* (2008), (Editor) *New Security Issues in Northern Europe. The Nordic and Baltic States and the ESDP* (2007) and *Norway outside the European Union. Norway and European integration from 1994 to 2004* (2005).



## **Tuomas Forsberg**

Professor Tuomas Forsberg holds the Chair of International Politics at the University of Tampere and Adjunct Professorship at the University of Helsinki and University of Lapland. Previously he worked at the University of Helsinki, at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, and at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. He gained his PhD at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth in 1998. His research has dealt primarily with European security issues, focusing on ESDP, Germany, Russia and Northern Europe, and he has published in various journals such as *Co-operation and Conflict*, *European Security*, *Geopolitics*, *Journal of Peace Research*, *Political Science Quarterly*, *Review of International Studies* and *Security Dialogue*. His most recent co-authored book is *Divided West European Security and the Transatlantic Relationship* (2006).

## **Yee-Kuang Heng**

Doctor Yee-Kuang Heng is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of St Andrews, UK. Before moving to St Andrews, he was Lecturer in Political Science at Trinity College Dublin, Ireland. He received his PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science and has published in journals such as *Security Dialogue*, *Review of International Studies*, *Survival* and *Contemporary Security Policy*. His latest book (co-authored with Ken McDonagh) *Risk, Global Governance and Security: The Other War on Terrorism*, has just been published (2009).

## **Pierre Schori**

Mr. Pierre Schori is a Swedish diplomat with vast experience in foreign affairs, development cooperation and peacekeeping operations. Schori served from 2005 to 2007 as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of Mission in Côte d'Ivoire, responsible for the 10,000 civil and military personnel that integrate the complex peacekeeping mission. After a long career at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Pierre Schori was Minister for International Development Cooperation, Migration and Asylum Policy, as well as Deputy Foreign Minister between 1994 and 1999. He has been both a Member of the Swedish Parliament and a Member of the European Parliament (for the Social Democratic Party), and he has acted as Foreign Policy spokesman for the socialist group in the European Parliament. Between 2000 and 2004 he occupied the position of Swedish Ambassador to the United Nations and was Distinguished Visiting Professor at Adelphi University between the years 2004 and 2005. Pierre Schori is author of several articles and books including *Painful Partnership: The United States, the European Union and Global*

*Governance, in Global Governance 11* (2005) and *The years of the Dragon's Teeth - September 11, the Iraq War and the World after Bush* (2008)

### **Kirsten Schulze**

Doctor Kirsten E. Schulze is Senior Lecturer in International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. After receiving her Ph.D. from Oxford University in 1994, Schulze worked as a lecturer in Politics at Queen's University of Belfast. Her research interests include security sector reform in Indonesia, ethnic conflict and conflict regulation in divided territories, peace processes and normalization of relations, as well as nationalism. She has authored a number of articles and chapters on conflict and conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, Indonesia and Israel and Lebanon. Her books include *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organisation* (2004), *The Jews of Lebanon: Between Coexistence and Conflict* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition 2008), *The Arab-Israeli Conflict* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition 2008) and *Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon* (1998). Her academic expertise has also found practical application in the form of consultancy work for the British Embassy in Jakarta, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and others.

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