Karmo Kroos

Irony as a Method of Neoclassical Sociology

Toward a Reconstruction of Iván Szelényi's Methodology

IRONY

GOOD GOOD BOOD BOD BOD BAD BAD

Åbo Akademi University

Cover artwork: Marko Mäetamm, IRONY © EAU 2022

IRONY AS A METHOD OF NEOCLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY

Irony as a Method
of Neoclassical Sociology

Toward a Reconstruction of Iván Szelényi's Methodology

Karmo Kroos

Acknowledgments

This dissertation has been a long time coming and would not have been possible without support from many people and organizations. My sincere gratitude goes to all of them.

I would like to thank fellow students in the doctoral program in sociology at Åbo Akademi. They have always made me feel very welcome despite the fact that I have had relatively few chances to spend time in Turku. I have appreciated the rare opportunities at the seminars and Christmas parties to spend (in)formal time with them more than they probably realized.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors Mikko Lagerspetz and Mika Helander. Mikko has done the heavy lifting throughout the process – ever since the writing of the thesis in a different format started at Tallinn University. I am thankful to Mikko for all these years but especially for the last few semesters during which he commented on an earlier version of the chapters of this dissertation. I cannot thank him enough for helping me to navigate the academic bureaucracy and the support that he has given me over my studies. Although Mika became the co-supervisor later, when I took up my studies at Åbo Akademi, I have benefited from the trust that he has shown toward me.

I would also like to thank Katrin Niglas who was my co-supervisor at Tallinn University and for her Mixed Methods Design courses where I was teaching assistant at the ECPR Summer School on Methods and Techniques at the University of Ljubljana. The structure of the third chapter of the dissertation, which covers different characteristics of Szelényi's 'metaphysical pathos', draws on the readings from her classes.

I have deep respect for Iván Szelenyi and thank him for opening up to a stranger, inviting me to visit him at his temporary home in Manhattan, for the nice dinner and meetings that we had at New York University. I know from these occasions that I remind him of the (story behind) *Bourdieu's Secret Admirer in the Caucasus.* No doubt, there are some similarities, but I guess the differences are actually more important – I was never part of the Soviet intelligentsia nor have I ever become a rebel fighter. Instead, the study of his works has inspired me to learn more about the sociology of intellectuals, sociology of knowledge, sociology of sociology as well as contemporary methods of social and human sciences. In other words, his works have provided the stimulus to learn more about sociology and its methods.

I am thankful Gil Eyal for being my sponsor as a visiting scholar at Columbia University and for Lawrence King for doing the same at Cambridge. The memorable semesters that I had the opportunity to spend at these institutions are still vividly in my memory and the readings that I was able to collect and notes that I took in the libraries of these universities have been invaluable and are reflected in this thesis. I thank both of them for giving me the chance to get a taste of the academic milieu of their institutions and for their critical comments on my research ideas. Larry deserves special credit for recommending me to turn the initial empirical research plan into a more conceptual one. It took me some time to

Abstract

Iván Szelényi is one of the most successful and accomplished contemporary sociologists originating from Central and Eastern Europe. His oeuvre – reflexive sociology of intellectuals – is based on what he together with his students calls 'Irony as a Method of Neoclassical Sociology'. Although this methodological approach has attracted some attention, it is still little understood. To overcome this limitation, one needs to inspect Szelényi's approach to inquiry, including the different aspects of his mental model such as his take on ontology, epistemology, methodology, training, qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, rhetoric, nature of knowledge, knowledge accumulation, goodness and quality criteria, hegemony, control, axiology, call to action, inquirer posture, ethics, reflexivity, accommodation, and commensurability. Analyses of these methodological foundations, which Bourdieu and his co-workers in their book from 1991, *The Craft of Sociology*, have also called the "system of intellectual habits", form the sub-sections of my thesis that aims at a reconstruction of Szelényi's method of ironic inquiry.

The thesis is organized into three main chapters. It starts with an overview of how 'irony' has been (ab)used in humanities and social sciences and provides the reader with a conceptual background and a comparative context. The overview ends with a brief introduction to how Szelényi together with his co-authors has explained the nature of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology. The second chapter presents the materials and methods of my research. After arguing how the "new rules of sociological method", as put forward by Giddens in 1976, are applicable in my study, I offer an overview of its underlying assumptions. This will be followed by explanations of the specifics of the theoretical research tradition followed in this research, arguments about why I flirt with rational 'reconstruction' as a research approach, how it, in turn, relates to 'ethnomethodological indifference' and to the 'sociology of sociology' as a sub-category of sociology of knowledge and science studies. I suggest that my research comes closest to the 'deviant case study' in terms of empirical research design. I will provide explanations on the selection of study material following the Quality of Reporting of Meta-analyses (QUOROM) standard for meta-analysis on data collection (in terms of selected texts and conducted interviews) and analysis techniques (applying sociological discourse analysis for the 'suspicious' interpretation and objective hermeneutics for the 'empathic' one). The second chapter will also point out some methodological limitations of my research.

The longest part of the dissertation, presented in the third chapter, is devoted to a comprehensive analysis of the methodological foundations of Ivan Szelényi's scholarship. More specifically, in order to understand and explain irony as a method of neoclassical sociology, I will classify and discuss critically his take on the above-mentioned methodological aspects from ontology to accommodation and commensurability. I call these elements collectively his metaphysical pathos – a term coined by Arthur O. Lovejoy in 1936. Although Lovejoy was reluctant to give it a precise definition, preferring to identify five principal types instead, the concept has come to signify 'unconscious mental habits' – the implicit and ex-

plicit assumptions of an individual, a generation, or an era. The term was made more widely known outside the history of ideas by Alvin Gouldner, who reformulated it as "a set of sentiments which those subscribing to the theory could only dimly sense". The concept has a more specific meaning in this thesis – I interpret it as the 'mental model' of an author of sociological and theoretical texts. In other words, I do not see the metaphysical pathos as any broader constellation of inquirer presuppositions – most of which have been covered in detail by the four dimensions of Ritzer's metatheoretical frame – but rather as the (un)conscious mental habits brought about by methodological choices, assumptions, and foundations of scholarship.

In the concluding chapter, I will reflect on my efforts to reconstruct Szelényi's metaphysical pathos, which should allow us to improve our understanding of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology. The research puzzle I wish to solve is how Szelényi's thought-provoking sociological research has benefited from an ironic edge, even if such an approach has seldom been taken seriously as a method. At a more general level, Szelényi's way of using irony as anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue that combines effectively critical theory and post-positivism, on the one hand, and elements of human and social sciences, on the other, shows that arts with its subjective qualitative analysis and sciences with its objective quantitative analysis are inseparable.

Abstrakt/Sammanfattning

Ironi som metod för nyklassisk sociologi: mot en rekonstruktion av Iván Szelényis metodologi

Iván Szelényi är en av de mest framgångsrika och etablerade samtida sociologerna med ursprung i Central- och Östeuropa. Hans verk – en reflexiv sociologi om de intellektuella – bygger på vad han tillsammans med sina elever kallar ironi som metod för neoklassisk sociologi. Även om detta metodologiska tillvägagångssätt har väckt viss uppmärksamhet är dess egentliga innebörd relativt okänd. För att bättre förstå Szelényis metod måste man undersöka den mentala modell som hans forskning utgår ifrån, dvs. hans uppfattning om ontologi, epistemologi, metodologi, utbildning, kvalitativ analys, kvantitativ analys, retorik, kunskapens natur, kunskapsackumulering, kriterierna för vetenskaplighet och kvalitet, hegemoni, kontroll, axiologi, forskningens politiska implikationer, forskarens roll, etik, reflexivitet samt förenligheten och jämförbarheten av olika vetenskapliga paradigm. Dessa metodologiska grundvalar har av Bourdieu och hans medarbetare i boken *The Craft of Sociology* från 1991 även kallats "systemet av intellektuella vanor". De analyseras i olika delar av min avhandling, som syftar till en rekonstruktion av Szelényis metod för ironisk undersökning.

Avhandlingen sönderfaller i tre huvudkapitel och inleds med en översikt över hur "ironi" har (miss)brukats inom humaniora och samhällsvetenskap, och förser läsaren med en konceptuell bakgrund och ett jämförande sammanhang. Översikten avslutas med en kort inledning till hur Szelényi och hans medförfattare har framställt ironin som metod för neoklassisk sociologi. Det andra kapitlet presenterar materialet och metoderna för min undersökning. Efter att ha argumenterat för min tillämpning av "de nya reglerna för sociologisk metod", som Giddens lade fram 1976, redogör jag för min studies underliggande antaganden. Därefter följer en närmare presentation av den teoretiska forskningstradition som den anknyter sig till, en motivering till att överväga en rationell "rekonstruktion" som forskningsmetod, en förklaring över hur den i sin tur relaterar sig till "etnometodologisk likgiltighet" och till "sociologins sociologi" som en underkategori av kunskapssociologi och vetenskapsstudier. Jag föreslår att min undersökning står närmast den "avvikande fallstudien" när det gäller empirisk forskningsdesign. Dess empiriska material har valts enligt standarden QUOROM – kvalitet på rapportering av meta-analyser (Quality of Reporting of Meta-analyses) för metaanalys, på data-insamling (när det gäller utvalda texter och genomförda intervjuer) och på analystekniker (där sociologisk diskursanalys tillämpas för en "misstänksam" tolkning och objektiv hermeneutik för en "empatisk" tolkning). I det andra kapitlet pekas också på de metodologiska begränsningarna av min studie.

Avhandlingens längsta del, som upptar det tredje kapitlet, innehåller en analys av de metodologiska grunderna för Ivan Szelényis forskargärning. För att förstå och förklara ironi som metod för neoklassisk sociologi klassificerar och diskuterar jag kritiskt hans syn på ovannämnda metodologiska aspekter – från

ontologi till förenligheten och jämförbarheten av olika vetenskapliga paradigm. Jag kallar dessa element sammanfattningsvis hans "metafysiska patos" – en term som myntades av Arthur O. Lovejoy 1936. Även om Lovejoy var ovillig att ge den en exakt definition och föredrog att istället identifiera fem huvudtyper, har begreppet kommit att hänvisa till "omedvetna mentala vanor" – de implicita och explicita antagandena som kännetecknar en individ, en gene-ration eller en epok. Utanför idéhistorien blev termen mer allmänt känd när Alvin Gouldner omformulerade den som "en uppsättning böjelser (sentiments) som de som stödjer en teori bara svagt kunde förnimma". I denna avhandling används begreppet i en mer specifik betydelse, dvs. med hänvisning till den "mentala modellen" av en författare av sociologiska och teoretiska texter. Med andra ord ser jag inte det metafysiska patoset som någon bredare konstellation av frågeställningar – varav de flesta ingår i de fyra dimensionerna i Ritzers metateoretiska schema – utan snarare som de (o)medvetna mentala vanor som utmynnar i metodologiska val, antaganden och i utgångspunkterna för forsk-ningsarbete.

I det avslutande kapitlet reflekterar jag över mitt försök att rekonstruera Szelényis metafysiska patos i syfte att bättre förstå ironi som metod inom neo-klassisk sociologi. Jag vill visa hur Szelényis tankeväckande sociologiska forsk-ning gynnats av en ironisk udd, även om ironin inte brukar tas på allvar som metod. Szelényi använder ironi som avsiktlig provokation och/eller intellektuell intrig som i praktiken kombinerar kritisk teori och postpositivism å ena sidan samt element i humaniora och samhällsvetenskap å den andra. På detta sätt visar han att humaniora och vetenskap, med subjektiv och kvalitativ respektive objektiv och kvantitativ analys, är oskiljaktiga.

Contents

Tabels

List of Figures

Introduction

> Sociology, which invites the other sciences to address the question of their social foundations, cannot exempt itself from this calling into question. Casting an ironic gaze on the social world, a gaze which unveils, unmasks, brings to light what is hidden, it cannot avoid casting this gaze on itself – with the intention not of destroying sociology but rather of serving it, using the sociology of sociology in order to make a better sociology (Bourdieu 2004a:4).

> More attention needs to be given to irony by sociologists. Literary critics search after types of ambiguity, psychoanalysts cull latent motivation from slips of the tongue, even logicians have fastidiously pinned specimens of amphiboly in glass cases like butterflies, but few sociologists have concerned themselves with irony. Simmel was drawn to the subject of tragedy and to that of play; Cooley often turned to acting for analogies, Mead to the game; Duncan has been eloquent on the virtues of irony as a release- and restraint-mechanism; Habermas has investigated 'systematically distorted communication'; and Goffman and others have taken the drama as a central metaphor. No one, however, has turned the inquiry onto irony itself (E. Wright 1978: 523).

Iván Szelényi (born April 17, 1938 in Budapest but now a US citizen) is one of the most successful and accomplished contemporary sociologists originating from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) or the Former Soviet Union (FSU).[1] His oeuvre – reflexive sociology of intellectuals – follows the tradition of neoclassical sociology that applies 'irony' as its method (Eyal et al. 2003a / 2003b). While these conceptual tools have attracted some attention (cf. Burawoy 2001, 2002), they are still hardly understood. Indeed, the method that has allowed him to make his thought-provoking contributions to the study of social stratifycation and change in the region is largely ignored and hardly recognized. To bring clarity to this paradox, a detailed analysis of the principles of research that his scholarship relies on will be conducted in this thesis.

In the initial stages of the research a meta-theory analysis as suggested by Ritzer (1988; 1991a, Ch. 1) was adopted to analyze Szelényi's reflexive sociology of intellectuals. By undertaking an M_U type of metatheorizing aimed at attaining a deeper understanding of the theory, this systematic study analyzed his professional life and works from four dimensions: (i) the major cognitive paradigms that underlie his scholarship, (ii) key concepts and silent assumptions, (iii) the historical evolution of his ideas, and (iv) how the sociocultural, political, dis-

---

[1] In 2016, a question was proposed at the "Sociology Job Market Rumors" web discussion to identify who are the most outstanding sociologists originating from outside the US. In the combined list that resulted from 62 contributions Szelényi's name was next to the following sociologists: Raewyn Connell (Australia); James Rice Fernando, Henrique Cardoso, and Roberto Unger (Brazil); Robert Brym, John Hagan, Michelle Lamont and Dorothy Smith (Canada); Gøsta Esping-Andersen (Denmark); Jens Beckert, Hans-Peter Blossfeld, Josef Brüderl, Walter Müller and Claus Offe (Germany); Luc Boltanski, Michel Callon and Bruno Latour (France); Mario Diani and Donatella della Porta (Italy); Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Mexico); Bert Klandermans, Siegwart Lindenberg, Olav Velthuis (Netherlands); Jon Elster (Norway); Zygmunt Bauman (Poland); Göran Therborn (Sweden); Andreas Diekman, Axel Franzen, Andreas Wimmer and Dirk Helbing (Switzerland); Richard Breen, Anthony Giddens, John Goldthorpe and Bryan Turner (UK).

ciplinary and methodological context have influenced the development of his works. This approach is summarized in Figure 1.

But this critical meta-theory approach does not give appropriate attention to the methodological elements of a scholar. Therefore, I have built on the M_U metatheorizing[2] and taken steps to clarify the most important (hidden) assumptions and (in)explicit propositions that can be identified in Szelényi's work. In other words, I am looking for an answer in this dissertation to the following interrelated questions: What is irony as a method of neoclassical sociology, and what are its methodological foundations? To uncover the essence of his irony as a method of neoclassical sociology, the study aims to clarify the different aspects of his mental model – including his takes on issues related to ontology, epistemology, methodology, training, qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, rhetoric(al), the nature of knowledge, knowledge accumulation, good-ness and quality criteria, hegemony, control, values (i.e. axiology), call to action, inquirer posture, ethics, reflexivity, accommodation and commensurability. These aspects form the sub-sections of the analysis of Szelényi's methodological foundations, which Bourdieu et al. (1991:2) have also called the "system of intellectual habits".

Szelényi has been living a colorful life. This has meant settling down at various stages of his academic career on four different continents, being part of numerous intellectual circles, participating in an abundance of scholarly and public debates, (co-)authoring a long list of research publications, collaborating with well-known intellectuals, working both for the Communist Party school and the top research universities, experiencing first-hand what it means to be the darling of an oppressive political regime one day and finding oneself in the position of outlaw the next, and raising three children – all of whom have joined the ranks of the 'new class' that he has been studying so closely throughout his academic career. It is not an overstatement to say that he has managed to achieve so much during his lifetime internationally as a scholar, administrator, and intellectual that few in the profession can match. Hence, it is beyond doubt that his autobiography would make very interesting reading.

However, it is not the aim of this dissertation to compose an intellectual biography of his life and works. On the one hand, he has presented some auto-biographical reflections of his intellectual development and contributions (cf. Szelényi 1979b, 1985a, 2000, 2002, 2008a, 2010b, 2012b, 2015d, 2018a, 2020) as well as given a rather detailed overview about his personal background in the interviews given to Case (2017a, 2017b), Durst (2015) and Rigó (2022). These recordings provide nuanced details about the socioeconomic background and political views of his (grand)parents for those readers who might be interested in these more personal matters and wish to speculate how they may have affected his scholarship from the sociology of knowledge point of view. On the other hand, the four dimensions of Ritzer's (1988, 1991a) meta-theory, covering the internal-external as well as intellectual-social dimensions as identified in

---

[2] In addition to Rizer (1988, 1991a), one may get additional insights of metatheorizing from Rizer (1990, 1991b, 1991c, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1998), Paterson (2001) and Zhao (1991). For critical comments see Turner (1990).

Figure 1, have been discussed in detail elsewhere (Kroos 2018). However, none of these reflections has focused on the methodological foundations of Szelényi's scholarship. In other words, despite the comprehensiveness, Rizer's typology of different types of metatheorizing does not cover these aspects. The closest anyone comes to it can be found in my paper titled "How to Become a Dominant or Even Iconic CEE Sociologist". In this paper, I (Kroos 2020:93–4) suggest, based on Rakovski (1978, Ch. 3), that Szelényi, together with Konrád, adopts irony as a calculated response to the limitations set in the controlled and politicized intellectual environment of Socialist Hungary, where career advancement in academia required compromise and conformity with the Party, while lack of it led to stagnation, and nonconformity to marginalization (cf. Konrád and Szelényi 1979, Ch. 11, Ch. 13).

Nonetheless, it is a fact that over the decades Szelényi has (co-)authored more than one hundred unique publications, consisting of books and edited volumes, original journal articles, and book chapters. (If one takes into account also the translations, reviews, reflections, and research notes of various kinds, the number is closer to two hundred).[3] While it would be impractical to list all of them here, it suffices to mention that in my previous reviews of his work (cf. Kroos 2018, Ch. 2; 2020:102) I have identified that starting from his academic career and doctoral dissertation, he has been working on five major themes related to stratification in CEE that follow the socioeconomic and political evolution of the region that can be grouped into 14 distinctive research programs – first publishing several journal articles and/or book chapters but always culminating the investigation with a major book on the topic. Not only has he been very productive and published in the leading journals and publishing houses, but many of his publications have also been widely recognized as extremely thought-provoking and, hence, discussed and debated among scholars studying the CEE societies and their change.

Szelényi's continuous interest in locating the highly educated in the socialist and post-communist social structure and his attempts to unravel the intellectual as the link between knowledge and power have been surprisingly systematic throughout his academic career. He has been developing his reflexive sociology of intellectuals step-by-step: first putting the ideas forward in a number of shorter articles or book chapters and only then culminating in the publication of a monograph on the topic, directly building on previous publications related to the research program. This, in turn, has served as a source of inspiration for the next research program within which he has been trying to decipher the limitations of the initial ideas and fine-tune these to match the changing socioeconomic, political and cultural environment of CEE. As demonstrated in the sub-sections of my previous research (Kroos 2018, 2020), which grouped his publications into various interrelated research programs, Szelényi's sociology of

---

[3] Bedecs and Angelika (2015) identify as many as 469 publications by him in different formats and languages (and 378 publications if the interviews are excluded). After eliminating the duplicates in different languages and publications that are not strictly research papers, I (Kroos 2020:102) identified that he had published 128 unique academic publications by mid–2018.

intellectuals is truly evolutionary and reflects the social change that (post-) socialist countries have been experiencing in the past half a century. At all stages of the socioeconomic and political developments of CEE societies, the intellectual has served him as a link between knowledge and power. At times, this link has been more pronounced and at times modest, but it has always been present.

More specifically, the chronological discussion on Szelényi's research leading to the discovery and crystallization of his understanding of the special role and position of intellectuals in (post-)socialist society was organized into three major periods in my previous research: early reform socialism, late reform socialism, and post-communist transformation. Szelényi's first research program, devoted to the study of early reform socialism, was largely a critical description of the socialist redistributive system based on urban studies frequently under-taken together with Konrád. As an unintended research outcome, it resulted in the identification of the structural position of intellectuals in the state-socialist societies in his PhD dissertation, which was later published under the English title *Urban Social Inequalities under State Socialism*. Nevertheless, the critical observations of the modus operandi of the ideological superstructure of the state-socialist system were reserved for the pages of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* – a book written with Konrád in *samizdat* style originally in Hungarian and then translated and published in major languages (including English, German, French, Spanish, and Japanese).

While *The Intellectuals on The Road to Class Power* remains his most widely disseminated and best-known publication, one cannot underestimate the importance of "The intelligentsia in the class structure of state-socialist societies", an article published in the special edition of the *American Journal of Sociology* devoted to Marxist inquiries and guest edited by Burawoy and Skocpol. This is his breakthrough article in US academic sociology. Without the book, there would not have been the (various versions of the) article as it provided an important platform and a point of departure. Without the article being published in the American Journal of Sociology, he would probably not have been accepted in the field of US academic sociology – at least not in the upper echelons of the institutions he has been working in for decades. In other words, without a degree from a leading academic institution in the West, and path-breaking publications in leading journals of the discipline, it is not difficult to imagine that he would have been marginalized, if not pushed out of the field, at the upper level of US professional sociology.

His second major research program was devoted to the study of late reform socialism. This socialist mixed system was again discussed in two respects: the first set of analysis was based on research into the rural economy and the second was set on the analysis of the housing economy and urban sociology. They culminated in the publication of the *Socialist Entrepreneurs* – a book he is personally the proudest of. Partly, this may be due to the external recognition the book received, but more importantly, however, because it reflects the fact that Szelényi values highly theoretically well-informed but empirically sound social research. Finally, part of the appreciation might stem from the fact that it took

some 18 years to complete due to his exile and restricted access to the Hungarian government-sponsored data sets, upon which the quantitative part of the book relies.

Szelényi's third major research program was devoted to the study of post-communist transformation. It is one of the most comprehensive research programs as it covers the stratification system both at the top and bottom of the social hierarchy, while also including papers related to the anticipated alternatives and opportunities of the transition, the emergent post-communist political system and property relations. These research programs were built around "Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989", and the international data collection effort was initiated by Treiman and Szelényi (1993). The most important direct outcome of this research was *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists*, but it offered Szelényi also some indirect impulses to clarify his position on neoclassical sociology using irony as its method. As explained elsewhere, it is logically the reference point to his works on the divergent varieties of post-communism – a research program that has so far produced a number of reflections and a coauthored monograph with Kolosi in Hungarian, titled *Hogyan Legyünk Milliárdosok?* [How to Become a Millionaire?].

In addition to these research programs that reflect the three major periods in CEE post-Stalinist history, there are two additional themes that he has addressed that can be grouped under his own synthesis of intellectuals under (post-) communism and (meta-analytical) reflections. It is not difficult to agree with the message put forward by Szelényi in one of the most renascent auto-critiques. Indeed, according to his own reflection, published under the title "An Outline of the Social History of Socialism or An Auto-Critique of An Auto-Critique", he has written three major books in his academic career, which could and should be read as a trilogy. While he (Szelényi 2002:43) argues that *Socialist Entrepreneurs* was a negation of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power,* and *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists* was the negation of the negation, he overlooks the fact that *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* was already a negation of *Urban Social Inequalities under State Socialism*. Indeed, the underlying argument of Konrád and Szelényi's masterpiece, according to which the dictatorship of the proletariat is a myth in Eastern Europe because the state redistributive political economy systematically favors the better-educated occupational groups, is actually a summary of their empirical work from the 1960s and early 1970s. In fact, it took Konrád and Szelényi over ten years of empirical research in Hungary before they began to comprehend the socialist system and the structural position of intellectuals therein.

Retrospectively, it could be said that Konrád and Szelényi discovered in Hungary a social class that was getting preferential treatment by the socialist redistributive system. In addition to acquiring higher education qualifying them for elitist positions in the increasingly bureaucratic state apparatus of the rational state-socialist redistributive economy, these young Soviet urbanized professionals received preferential treatment in compensation for their effort and loyalty. That is, they discovered that the dictatorship of the proletariat in prac-

tice is very different from its intended meaning in Marxism. In East European countries, which used to call themselves (state) socialist, it meant systematic, positive discrimination of the well-educated in terms of allocating them (and their children) the scarce private and social goods at subsidized prices – especially public housing as the most "precious achievement of socialism", ac-cording to Szelényi (1980a). The participant observation of fellow intellectuals allows Konrád and Szelényi (1979) to also describe the other particularities of the dictatorship of the proletariat in an East European fashion, which for the nomenklatura intelligentsia meant in addition to better publicly offered private goods (including education, jobs, income and public housing), health care at special hospitals and clinics, better nutrition (wider selection at cafeterias which are closed to the general public), better options at vacation resorts during the high season, better chances to travel abroad and gain access to foreign currency (thus 'imported' goods), better chances to acquire such privileged products as automobiles and building plots for summer cottages, better chances to have telephones installed or even the possibility of using the materials and labor of the organization they worked for to construct their personal (summer) homes. In a shortage economy, these members of the nomenklatura intelligentsia capitalize "on the customary unwieldiness of the bureaucracy, [and] can solicit gifts for themselves in exchange for guaranteeing timely delivery of otherwise perfectly legal orders." What is more, the socialist system becomes in practice reproductive as the professionals more easily obtain living permits to settle in cities and send their children to acquire a university education (sometimes even abroad). Finally, Konrád and Szelényi add features, per-haps more peculiar to the countries at the forefront of reform socialist economies (which had experimented with some market and foreign trade liberalization). More particularly, they (1979:172) say that one could find corrupt members of the nomenklatura in these societies in a "position to accept bribes in the course of foreign-trade negotiations" and make allegations that probably reflect the actual behavior of some morally corrupt male chauvinists who were in a powerful position to "buy themselves women through the allocation of an apartment or a soft, well-paid job." All this allows them to formulate their thesis statement that a dictatorship of the proletariat was a myth in Eastern Europe. As Szelényi (1986–1987:103) reflects, they sincerely believed that they "had discovered the secret of state socialism – the imminent emergence of a new dominant class of intellectuals".

As mentioned above, Szelényi's long-term effort to study the socialist mixed economy, in general, and Hungarian agriculture, in particular, led to the publishing of the *Socialist Entrepreneurs* – Szelényi's third major book written in collaboration with Manchin, Juhász, Magyar and Martin (and to some extent also with Konrád). It represents his break from the East European dissident *samizdat* culture – an attempt to give a more academic orientation toward theoretically well-informed empirical research and his previous research, which can be seen as little more than a provocative lament. Possibly because of the financial need to raise money for the project (to cover, for instance, the cost of a long-term stay for some of the coauthors in Wisconsin-Madison), the research plan presented in

the book has been well-developed. Even without the knowledge and terminology of mixed methods, it guides them well on how to under-take theoretically informed research that intends to combine qualitative ethnographic research with quantitative research that utilizes data collected within government-sponsored surveys. Apparently, this research innovation did not go unnoticed by the award committee of the Society for the Study of Social Problems that awarded him (along with John Sutton) the prestigious C. Wright Mills award in 1989. While most commentators do not see a direct link between this book and his sociology of intellectuals, it is, nevertheless, there. For instance, Szelényi (1988:216–8) used the conclusion of the book as a reflection on *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*.

Following his research on late reform socialism and the socialist mixed system, Szelényi initiated and helped to design and lead the international comparative research project "Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989". As mentioned above, it resulted in a number of publications, the most important of which is *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists* – the double negation of the negation, which once again placed intellectuals at the center of his understanding of social change in CEE/FSU. It also represents a landmark in his sociology of intellectuals where he adopts Bourdieu's forms of capital and Kocka's Bildungsbürgertum theories. While early research on housing classes was undertaken under the influence of Castells, Rex and Phal, and his follow-up research on the redistributive political economy was largely affected by the work of Polanyi and Djilas, it is difficult to put forward just one major theoretical influence of the socialist mixed economies that led to the publication of *Socialist Entrepreneurs*. Partly because the book took some 18 years to complete and partly because Szelényi uses his own improvised approach to competitive hypothesis testing, he is enlightened by different theorists. In the early part of the research program on the rural economy, he seems to be under the influence of Hungarian schoolars such as Bibó, Erdei, Hegedüs and Juhász. Later, however, he seems to shift to Kornai, Wallerstein and Wright, even if these names do not feature too frequently in his text(s). Indeed, he admitted during the interview (cf. Szelényi 2012a) that he has responded to all of them, even though he has more often highlighted the similarities with Kornai and suppressed the impact of Wright.

From the point of view of the evolution of Szelényi's sociology of intellectuals, it is remarkable that *Socialist Entrepreneurs* leads him to the development of the new trichotomous social structure. Indeed, the modification in his understanding of the underlying social structure is more important than the fact that he (1988:154) refers to the agricultural and mechanical engineers as well as veterinarians collectively as the "agricultural intelligentsia" due to their higher level of education than that of traditional farmers and, hence, effectively taking power in (the collective farms of) the Hungarian countryside. While he had previously accepted the argument that the state-socialist social structure is basically dichotomous, he realizes that the socialist mixed economy, characteristic of late reform socialism, has brought a new trichotomous social structure. While he had earlier identified the state-socialist stratification system, even if

challenged by the marginal intellectuals, with a single hierarchy made up of cadre and proletarian, he now realizes that it had evolved by the mid-1980s into the dual system of social stratification, where one could climb the social ladder using proto-entrepreneurial activities. That process, which he calls 'embourgeoisement' or 'bourgeoisification', means that there are three basic structural positions available to members of the late reform socialist societies: cadre, proletarian, and petty bourgeois. In that context, the role and position of intellectuals is limited to the agrarian technocrat, which corresponds most closely with the educational background, career pattern and socioeconomic and political position of the reform socialist cadre.

As I have shown in detail elsewhere (Kroos 2020:102 / Table 1), Szelényi's publications related to the role of intellectuals in the post-communist transformation and their position in its emergent socioeconomic and political structure, can be grouped into five subtopics that reflect their chronological development. These five subtopics were titled in my dissertation: (i) Alternatives and opportunities, (ii) Emergent post-communist political system, (iii) Emergent post-communist property relations, (iv) Emergent post-communist stratification system at the top of the social hierarchy, and (v) Emergent post-communist stratification system at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The analysis showed that the alternatives and opportunities for a post-communist transition identified in the first set of publications, made him realize that one should, first of all, identify at least three varieties of socialism in Central Europe. Realizing that East Germany, Hungary, and Poland had different starting positions at the beginning of the transformation allows him to identify the varieties of socialisms with respect to the economy, politics and the development of civil society. This realization becomes the basis of his typologies of varieties of actually existing reform socialisms as well as post-communisms.

The publications on the emergent post-communist political system emphasize Hungarian party politics and reflect Szelényi's continuous interest in class analysis. That is, he sees that it is time to bring class back into politics. To understand better the changes within the class structure of the CEE countries, he adopts Bourdieu's forms of capital theory. From the standpoint of the evolution of his sociology of intellectuals, he (together with his coauthors) is convinced of the leading role of the "intellectual elite" in the post-communist class/social structure and reveals his political preferences when he criticizes the Hungarian intellectuals for becoming right-wing and failing to mobilize the social democratic electorate. In that context, he locates intellectuals between social democratic and liberal in the political field and expects their political views to be, on the one hand, anti-communist and most distant from the positions of Christian nationalists, on the other.

Under the analysis of the emergent post-communist property relations, Szelényi turns the discussion of the alternatives in post-communism transition to its economic reform – paying particular attention to the privatization process in agriculture. In addition to building on his previous research on the rural economy and Hungarian party politics, he relates the alternatives of property reform

in agriculture once again to the theoretical framework of Kornai (1990) as well as Stark (1992). Finally, it is important to note that this research program, developed parallel to the above-mentioned emergent post-communist political system, allowed Szelényi to identify Szalai (1989), Hankiss (1990) as well as Staniszkis (1991) as sources of conceptual inspirations for his upcoming research program on the emergent post-communist elites – stratification at the top of the social hierarchy.

Szelényi's research on the emergent post-communist stratification system at the top of the social hierarchy is one of the largest and most important research programs in his academic career. Although he (2012a) has said that its outcome, in terms of *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists*, did not make the same impact as his previous books, it is difficult to agree with this assessment for three reasons. First, the fact that the book has been translated into Chinese, Korean, Romanian and Russian is an accomplishment that few sociological monographs on contemporary issues can compete. Second, one should not just look at the book but a number of other important publications, a number of which were published in the special issue of *Theory and Society* in 1995, which he developed on the basis of data collected within the international collaborative research project "Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989". Together with these contributions, he has received widespread international attention (cf. Treiman and Ganzeboom 2000) and left a lasting impact on the post-communist transition literature. For instance, Bozóki (2003) points out that his research on the stratification at the top of the social hierarchy became so influential that it dominated the post-communist elite studies for the entire decade. Third, it generated and stimulated one of the most visible debates in Szelényi's academic career with Burawoy (2001, 2002), within which he together with collaborators made unique contributions to neoclassical sociology and irony as a method (cf. Eyal et al. 2001a, 2003a / 2003b).

The originality of Szelényi's ideas and the attention that they attracted opened for him the doors of some of the leading academic institutions in the US. While before emigration, he worked first at the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (1960–1964) and then at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (1965–1970), giving also evening classes at the Communist Party schools, after the forced emigration from his native Hungary – first briefly to the UK, then to Australia and more permanently to the US – he has pursued an impressive academic career at the leading universities of the western world. He first worked as the Chair at The Flinders University of South Australia (1976–1980) from where he moved to the US – taking up not only the named professorships[4] but serving (with one excep-

---

[4] Google (05.04.2021) gives the following definition: "Named professorships represent the highest honor that a university can bestow upon her academic. It is also a lasting tribute to the donor who establishes the endowment or financially supports the Scheme. The donor's name is henceforth prominently associated with the Named Professorship holder." Yet, institutions are free to set their own rules and develop their own traditions. At the institutions where Szelényi has received such an honor, it was not the name of the donor but the distinguished scholar that his named professorships were associated with:

- Karl Polanyi Professor of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison (1985–1986);

tion) as the Head of the Department at the following institutions: University of Wisconsin-Madison (1981–1986), Graduate School of the City University of New York (1986–1988), University of California, L.A. (1988–1999), Yale University (1999–2010), and New York University at Abu Dhabi (2010–2014). Furthermore, he was elected President of the Hungarian Sociological Association, Vice President of the American Sociological Association, Executive Director of the Society for Comparative Social Research as well as Board Member of the Social Science Research Council, Joint Committee on Eastern Europe of the American Council of Learned Societies, American Association of the Advancement of Slavic Studies, and Research Committee of the Sociology of Urban and Regional Development. He has also been the Corresponding Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences since 1990 and an elected Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences since 2000.

His publishing record and career success have been especially remarkable considering the ironic character of his research. While for some other scholars, such as Bourdieu, the adoption of the reflexive and relational approach that is at once also critical and empirical meant a long postponement of his major works on dealing with intellectuals and the field in which they operate (cf. Bourdieu 1988a, 1996a, 2000a, 2004a), for Gouldner, it meant closed doors to a professorship at a major U.S. university and a failed attempt to become the President of the American Sociological Association (Merton 1982a:935–6); but Szelényi was able to make a major contribution to the critical sociology of intellectuals at quite an early stage of his academic career and then build on it. Although it meant entering a collision course with János Kádár's regime in Hungary, and ultimately emigration, as mentioned above, it has been a story of extraordinary professional success.

On the one hand, one may argue that similar to some other achievement-oriented sociologists; for example, Erik Olin Wright (cf. Kirby s.a. 3), Szelényi seems to have been highly conscious of the strategic choices he has been making in his academic career. As a sociologist enlightened by critical theory and equipped with the tools of empirical research, he has discovered the (un)written rules of the game and become the champion of laying the foundation of his academic career in some of the most prestigious institutions. When I interviewed Szelényi for my research, he went even so far as to suggest that one of the reasons for putting an end to his movement from one prestigious institution to another – and why it was difficult for him to obtain another appointment in the end (what he calls a "serious job") – was precisely the fact that he typically ended up at the top of the academic hierarchy (Szelényi 2012d).

On the other hand, one may also argue that without a solid methodological foundation, it is inconceivable that Szelényi could have been able to publish in the top journals and publishing houses or achieve the academic career success that he did. To put it differently, the fact that he rarely discusses methods or methodology in his publications does not necessarily mean that they lack a sol-

- William Graham Sumner Professor of Sociology Yale University (1999–2009);
- Max Weber Professor of Social Sciences NYUAD (2010–2014).

id methodological foundation. These principles can be found in the paper titled "On Irony: An Invitation to Neoclassical Sociology" which will be introduced at the end of the next chapter.

Even though there is some truth to both of these positions, they do not explain the paradox of how one of the most successful sociologists from CEE could have been relying on a method that is hardly known and even less often taken seriously. When together with his coauthors he tried to publish the above-mentioned paper on 'irony- as the defining 'method'[5] of neoclassical sociology in one of the flagship journals of the discipline, they were turned down and had to settle instead for a rather marginal *Thesis Eleven* (that was originally founded by the émigrés of the Budapest School in Australia).

Based on the possibility that one might be able to learn more about Szelényi's method(ology) from his critics than from his publications, one may ask: What about secondary literature? Although quite a few critiques and commentaries have been published about Szelényi and his scholarship, they concentrate on the content rather than the method(ology). For instance, Arato (1983 / 1993, Ch. 5) has examined the Marxian critique of Marxism in Konrád and Szelényi's seminal work *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, Demeter (2020b) has recently discussed the link between New Class theory and sociology of knowledge in his scholarship; Eyal (2020) has offered a conceptual analysis of "intellectuals" and "intelligentsia" in his oeuvre; Frentzel-Zagórska and Zagórski (1989) have evaluated the relevance of his sociology of intellectuals to the Polish context; Furåker (1982), Nove (1983), King and Szelényi (2004, esp. Introduction), Szelényi and Martin (1987, 1988, 1989, 1991) as well as Walzer (1980) have provided a series of comparative reviews of the sociology of intellectuals in the East and West based on the works of (Konrád and) Szelényi and Gouldner; Kennedy (2005, 2020) observes the relevance of the ideas of this seminal work to the understanding of the culture and class of intellectuals beyond the East European context, where it was originally developed; and last but not least Ost (2020) draws attention to the paradox that Szelényi has been presenting himself as the populist, on the one hand, but has never really done much research on the working class, on the other.

In my previous work (cf. Kroos 2018), I have covered all four dimensions of Ritzer's (1988, 1991a) metatheorizing shown in Figure 1 when I undertook a critical meta-theory analysis of his reflexive sociology of intellectuals: (i) the major underlying cognitive paradigms that underlie his scholarship, (ii) key concepts and silent assumptions, (iii) the historical evolution of his ideas, and (iv) how the socio-cultural, political and disciplinary context has influenced the development of his works.

Using Ritzer's frame, I explained in the methodological frame of the critical meta-analysis that Szelényi's reflexive sociology of intellectuals:

---

[5] In fact, the title of the article, "On Irony: An Invitation to Neoclassical Sociology", is translated and published in German as "Ironie als Methode. Ansätze und Fragestellungen einer neoklassischen Soziologie" (cf. Eyal et al. 2003b).

1. rests on the (assumptions of) New Class, elite, stratification, critical, and evolutionary theories which accept the conflict tradition of Marx and Weber as the underlying cognitive paradigm;
2. conceptualizes intellectuals as the link between knowledge and power - "knowledge monopolists," on the one hand, and flexible agents of social change, on the other;
3. has been greatly influenced by (his own intimate experiences with) the Hungarian socio-cultural, disciplinary, and political context;
4. has been surprisingly systematic throughout its historical evolution to argue that in the post-industrial societies intellectuals are on the road to the top of the social structure – despite (or because of) the transformations, they manage to stay on the trajectory as the main candidates for the highest positions in the social hierarchy;
5. is, despite (or rather because of) its dual commitment to theory and empirics, highly original and thought-provoking.

Intellectual

Cognitive Paradigms
Schools of Thought
Changes in Paradigms
Schools of Thought
Theories

Use of concepts
borrowed from:

Philosophy
Economics
Linguiostics
etc.

Internal ——————————————————— External

Communal Paradigms
Invisible Colleges
Schools
Networks
Individual Backgrounds

Impact of Society
Impact of Social Institutions
Historical Roots

Social

Figure 1. Ritzer's four dimensions of metatheorizing as a means of attaining a deeper understanding of a theory
Adopted from: Ritzer (1988:190; 1991a:18).

In a nutshell, I concluded that two somewhat conflicting conclusions can be drawn from such an immodest undertaking. According to one possible interpretation, Szelényi has been surprisingly systematic, both theoretically and methodologically, throughout his productive academic career (i.e. publishing) in his aim of presenting intellectuals as the key actors in social change. According to the other, however, he has constantly been fine-tuning the theoretical as well as

methodological foundation, using different conceptual tools and research methods, to understand communist and post-communist societies (including their economic, political, and stratification systems) as well as the transition from one type to the other to the extent that potentially many 'Szelényis' can be identifyed. Although there is some truth in both positions, it was argued in this critical meta-analysis that the different research programs are strongly interrelated, and it is not a coincidence that intellectuals emerge in his publications as the winners of social changes and as major candidates for positions of highest social importance, power, and prestige.

In addition to this critical meta-study, based on the analysis of his extraordinarily successful academic career, I (Kroos 2020) have offered an explanation of how to become a dominant or even iconic CEE sociologist by discussing his topic selection, intellectual context, intellectual rivalry, intellectual (scholarly) interest in his scholarship, effective dissemination and the number of graduate students, their research excellence and success.

In his review, Burawoy (2001) complains about the abandonment of class analysis by Szelényi and his coauthors in *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists*. On the one hand, Bohle and Greskovits (2020) try to soften this criticism by showing similarities between Polanyian political economy in his earlier studies and neoclassical sociology developed in his later ones. On the other hand, Ost (2020) extends Burawoy's critique to highlight that, contrary to the expectations of a scholar who has flirted with (the Marxist critique of) Marxism, Szelényi has not taken much interest in the workers or the working class – concentrating instead on the social classes, such as elites at the top of the social hierarchy or on their way there, as intellectuals seemed to be in the 1970s. In short, none of the critics or commentators has focused on the method(ology) in Szelényi's scholarship.

Likewise, only occasional comments on Szelényi's method(ology) can be found in the book reviews. For instance, Tar (1980:573) questions the "universal validity" of the Hungarian case to all socialist societies, despite their diversity. Furthermore, Flenley (1981:41) notes that "Konrád and Szelényi's main contribution ... lies in a stimulating call to rethink the methodology surrounding the study of the intelligentsia and other problematic areas in the examination of socialist societies." Although Flenley asks for an empirical test of the theoretical claims, it remains obscure what he means when referring to 'methodology' in his critique.

One of the most extensive comments about 'methodology' in Szelényi's scholarship has been made by Takács (2016:264) who observes that

> in the methodological part of his dissertation titled *Settlement System and Social Structure*, submitted in 1972 for his "candidate of science" degree (the equivalent of a PhD), he outlined the principles of social criticism in sociology in terms very similar to those presented in his later writings. In his dissertation, Szelényi made a sharp distinction between "social critique" and "critique of ideology," and argued that unlike the former approach, which appeals to transcendent values in order to influence the collective will and action needed to build a better society, the latter seeks to critically analyze ideology as a social

product serving actual interests. The critique of ideology is designed therefore to remain inside the field it seeks to scrutinize, and its overall objective consists not in discarding ideology as such in the name of alter-native social values, but in exploring and critically assessing it as the expression of a particular set of socio-politically promoted interests in society. The position taken by Szelényi in his dissertation is all the more important because it appears to signify a decisive shift in his sociological work. It marks a transition from his empirical studies of some social inequalities in socialist Hungary – e.g., housing conditions – to a more comprehensive and radical critique of the class structure in socialist societies, as manifested in his coauthored samizdat work *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*.

Similar to Takács' observations, Arato (1983:154 / 1993:113), who happens to be the translator of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, argues that

[i]n the book [*The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*], as well as in Szelényi's subsequent essays, the terms "immanent critique", "critique of ideology", "critical social theory" repeatedly appear whenever their own method is discussed. They [Konrád and Szelényi] define "immanent and transcendent critique" and the, for them, parallel (if ambiguous) terms "critique of ideology" and "ideological criticism" by a rather scientistic reference to the value-fact problem. The immanent critique of ideology, as against transcendent ideological criticism, does not evaluate premises, but interprets societies wholly from within their own context. Thus the aim of immanent critique is to discover the interests, conflicts and alternatives hidden by ideologies and especially by universal normative claims which are not further explored for their dimension of truth.

Important and insightful as these two observations may be, they, nevertheless, are concentrated by and large on Szelényi's early conceptual works and ignore his more empirical ones. Even when Arato recognizes Konrád and Szelényi as Marxist "empirical revisionists" or the "immanent critics of ideology" (1983: 158 / 1993:118), he refers to their "method of class analysis" (1983:155 / 1993:114) and concludes that their analysis remains "historical materialist" (1983:152 / 1993:112).

Nevertheless, Arato deserves credit for the early recognition of the difference, even if not fully differentiated in the Hungarian context at the time, between the Marxist critique of Marxism-Leninism (which does not seem to be too far from the historical materialist critique of Marxism) and post-Marxist critique of Marxism. While Konrád and Szelényi represented the former, it was the Budapest School, in general, and János Kis and György Bence (under the pseudonym Mart Rakovski), in particular, who represented the latter. As I have discussed in detail elsewhere within the presentation of intellectual rivalry between (Konrád and) Szelényi, on the one hand, and Kis (and Bence), on the other (cf. Kroos 2020:83–97), the basic critique of (Konrád and) Szelényi's *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* is offered by Rakovski. Contrary to what one might expect from the representatives of post-Marxism, who are associated with the ideological critique of Marxism, Rakovski (1978:43) reticulates the key concept used by empirically oriented "academic sovietologists" and "the official Soviet

sociologists" for defining intelligentsia based on vocational training. They say that this would make a literature teacher, for instance, who has stopped following the new contributions and discussions in the field, a member of the group. Instead, Rakovski offers the following definition: intellectuals make up "[t]he social group which is capable of forming an autonomous ideology". That is, they are "the sub-group of intellectual workers whose members are in regular contact with the process of cultural and scientific creation" – adding that "regular contact" does not imply in this context "creation" – it is enough if (s)he follows the scientific or cultural production in the field. The point here is that if Konrád and) Szelényi had defined intellectuals in their empirical studies of the new socialist housing estates so narrowly, they would never have reached the (theoretical) conclusions that they did in their *magnum opus*.

One possible explanation for the lack of information about the method(ological foundations) of Szelényi's scholarship might have to do with the general impression that his contributions are often seen as conceptual rather than empirical. Hence, there have been numerous attempts to evaluate his theoretical contributions empirically by Böröcz and Southworth (1996), Eyal (2000, 2003), Gazsó (1990), Hanley (2003), Kennedy (1990, 1991), S. Szelényi (1987, 1988, 1992, 1998) as well as Walder (1995). However, such an interpretation that Szelényi's contributions have been just conceptual is contrary to facts as it fails to recognize that they were often, if not always, made based on observations grounded in his previous empirical works.

As Szelényi confessed a few years ago in the focus group interview with Durst (2015:123):

> I am a Weberian infected by Marxism. In this sense, I have always practiced interpretive sociology throughout my life, because I cannot do anything else. Well, sometimes I did some number crunching too. Mostly, I need some support to do this. But I like it when data is available, otherwise... Eric Olin Wright said that there is this bullshit Marxism from which he wants to distance himself. I also try to keep myself at a distance from, put a bit crudely, bullshit sociology, which is not working on the basis of data. Which is not data sensitive.

Based on Szelényi's comments, one may be inclined to argue that the scholar should be in a much better position to clarify his or her method(ological) position. Indeed, in addition to the above-mentioned methodological paper, titled "On Irony: An Invitation to Neoclassical Sociology", Szelényi has, indeed, reflected on his scholarship more than once (cf. Szelényi 1985, 1986–1987, 2002, 2004, 2018a, 2020). Unfortunately, Szelényi does not comment much on method(ological) issues, and even if he did say more about it, there are limits to such self-reflexivity. As some of the most distinguished attempts to reflect upon one's craftsmanship indicate, one still ends up with a text – no matter how self-reflective and auto-critical – consciously written as testimony upon which the legacy of the scholarship is believed at least partly to depend. For instance, it is difficult to imagine that Bourdieu, who has presented one of these testimonies (cf. Bourdieu 2004b, 2008), would accept the claim that his works are ironic. Knowing which tools are regarded as credible, (social) scientists tend to legitimize their scholarship by making methodological choices and avoiding anything that

might discredit it. Therefore, one should not be surprised to learn that sociologists rarely openly rely on 'irony' as the method of their research.[6]

Given the above-presented paradox between Szelényi's academic success, on the one hand, and the reputation of irony as the 'method' (of neoclassical sociology), on the other, this thesis intends to bring some clarity to the principles that he has relied upon in his scholarship and, against the odds, has been able to use to make some of the most original and thought-provoking contributions to the study of the stratification of CEE societies and their change. Hence, scrutinizing the methodological aspects of his scholarship can be seen as the deviant case study of one of the most interesting contemporary sociologists who originates from the part of Europe that used to be called the Eastern bloc but who has made an extraordinarily successful academic career in the West. Lijphart (1971:692) defines this type of case study as follows:

> Deviant case analyses are studies of single cases that are known to deviate from established generalizations. They are selected in order to reveal why the cases are deviant-that is, to uncover relevant additional variables that were not considered previously, or to refine the (operational) definitions of some or all of the variables. In this way, deviant case studies can have great theoretical value. They weaken the original proposition, but suggest a modified proposition that may be stronger. The validity of the proposition in its modified form must be established by further comparative analysis.

This study of Szelényi and his irony as a method relates to science and technology studies (STS). On the one hand, it has been noted in the STS context that "[l]iterally defined, ethnomethodology is the investigation of 'folk methodology' for producing the innumerable practical and communicative actions that constitute recurrent social activities" (Lynch 2015:192). On the other hand, the "ethnomethodological indifference" (cf. Garfinkel and Sacks 1970:345–6; Lynch 1993:141–2) that the tradition stands for means, according to Garfinkel, that we should not simply rank methods according to their scientific reputation but should treat them all as worthy of critical study – regardless of their "scientific status, relative importance, adequacy, credibility, value, and necessity". One must admit that at least as a starting point of the study of irony as a method, that few seem to take seriously, it is not difficult to accept these principles of ethnomethodology. Furthermore, the works of Brown as well as Anderson and Sharrock, which will be covered in the literature overview chapter, indicate that some interesting analysis of irony as a technique has indeed emerged from ethnomethodological investigations.

Since there is a link between ethnomethodology and the "Strong Program in Sociology of Knowledge" (Bloor ([1976] 1991, Ch. 1; 2015),[7] the research to be

---

[6] This seems to be the case with some of the most "ironical" sociologists such as Gouldner, or Mills to whom we shall return in the next chapter.

[7] Additional comments about the link between ethnomethodology and the strong program in the sociology of scientific knowledge can be found in Lynch (2001, 2015).

undertaken almost inevitably borders also with the sociology of knowledge[8] and science studies more broadly.[9] Indeed, it responds to the message of Bloor ([1976] 1991:3) who suggested in the seminal text "Strong Program in the Sociology of Knowledge" that the traditional sociologists of knowledge have been keenly interested in the institutional structure and external factors of different disciplines in science but have, unfortunately, been reluctant to study the culture of sociology – leaving the fundamental issues to be discussed by philosophers.

The overview of the STS in Britain offered by Law (2008:626–30) offers a good way to see the link to this research on irony as a method in the context of science studies.[10] He demonstrates the heritage of Kuhn in the foundational decades of British STS in three crucial aspects. First, the interpretation of science as a form of culture (that takes Kuhn's paradigm as a form of culture as the starting point) – the STS scholars soon formulated the Strong Program within the abovementioned sociology of scientific knowledge and started to wrestle with issues related to validity, ontology,[11] and epistemology. They examined how, if at all, a critical political critique of science and ideology is possible if all knowledge is externally determined.[12] Second, the turn from inquiries dominated by the philosophy of science to empirical studies in the actual practice of scientists – how they do science.[13] Third, following Kuhn's practice of formulating the argument in the form of exemplary historical instances, the adoption of a case study as the main form of research design was used in the tradition.

While there have been other relevant turns and developments, such as the adoption of ethnomethodology in the evolution of STS (cf. Greiffenhagen et al. 2015; Lynch 1985:1993) and the more recent interest in the social life of methods (cf. Law et al. 2011; Law and Ruppert 2013; Savage 2013), the result of the above-mentioned process is summarized by Law (2008:629) as follows:

---

[8] Overviews of the sociology of knowledge field can be found in Kuklick (1983), Meja (2015), Swidler and Arditi (1994). Some of the key contemporary texts in this tradition can be found in Stehr and Meja (2017).

[9] Riesch (2014) observes, following Hull (2000) and Rouse (2005, 2011), that "science studies" is an umbrella term that designates all philosophical, historical, and social studies of science. This includes sociology of science (cf. Ben-David and Sullivan 1975; Gieryn 2010; Lynch 1993, Ch. 2; Merton 1973; Sklair 1973; Zuckerman 1988), sociology of scientific knowledge (cf. H. M. Collins 1983, 2015; Lynch 1993, Ch. 3; Shapin 1995), STS (cf. Lynch 2001, 2015) and cultural studies of science (cf. Rouse 2015). One could add that it also borders with history of sociology (cf. Hoecker-Drysdale 2004, 2005) as undertaken, for instance by Platt ([2003] 2013) and applied in the context of the sociology of sociology by Gouldner (1970), Oberschall (1972), Madge (1963) and Therborn (1976). There is a link to philosophy of (social) science (cf. Gordon 1993, Valsiner 2020, Rouse 2011) in general and the seminal contribution of Kuhn (1962) and its follow-up publications (Kuhn 1970a, 1970b, 1970c; Popper 1961, 1963, 1976 and Feyerabend 1965, 1975, 1978) and applications in the context of defining sociology as "a multiple paradigm science" and presenting the frame for metatheorizing by Ritzer (1988a, 1991a), and sociology of sociology by Friedrichs (1970) in particular.

[10] Similar chronology has been offered by Woolgar (2011).

[11] Cf. Woolgar and Lezaun (2013, 2015).

[12] Cf. Sheehan (2007), and Young (1977).

[13] Cf. Latour and Woolgar (1983).

> STS writing is not only highly theorized, but also works on and in theory. Its core concerns often have to do with epistemology (the theory of knowledge), and (more recently) ontology, the character of the real …. In theory it might make its arguments in an abstract manner (and there are some signs of movement in this direction), but its major mode of self-expression, discovery and exegesis has usually been through case studies. More strongly, its practitioners predominantly think through materials. They extend their ideas and conduct their controversies through cases, which act as an empirical (but not straightforwardly empiricist) stimulus and irritant. STS is not utterly distinctive in this respect, but it is unusual.

These developments and traditions are reflected in the nature of this study on irony as a method and its roots in the methodological foundation of Szelényi's scholarship. Despite the structure that has been adopted for the third chapter and the interconnections that its content has with philosophy of science issues – which extend the analysis from the above-mentioned epistemology and ontology to many other issues – it must be emphasized that this inquiry is not an exercise in the philosophical study of sociology. Instead, I would argue that it flirts with the sociology of sociology, as it scrutinizes the methodological foundations of irony as a method proposed by one of the most successful sociologists who originates from CEE. In Tiryakian's (1971) typology of the research traditions of the sociology of sociology, one could relate it to two traditions (out of three identified by him). One of these traditions studies the explicitly and implicitly held values as frames (ideology) of the sociological enterprise (including the tension between Weberian / (post)positivist claim of value freedom and objectivity, on the one hand, and commitment, on the other). The second is interested in the internal aspects and structures of sociology itself (including the study of the socialization and training process of sociologists, social networks, (in)formal structures).[14] The exemplary research on these traditions has been undertaken by Mills and Bourdieu.

Indeed, despite the above-mentioned classifications of the sociology of sociology offered by Tiryakian (1971) and Curtis and Petras (1972), as well as the prominent examples of the sociology of sociology offered by Mills and Bourdieu, it has remained largely a taboo to study sociology sociologically, as noted by Burkart (2003). While one can find some more publications taking interest in the

---

[14] In the typology of Curtis and Petras (1972), who differentiate between three traditions – (i) Function of the social organization of the discipline, (ii) Climates of opinion, (iii) Social background and personal values of researchers – it comes closest to the third tradition.

sociology of sociology,[15] there is no journal[16] or institutionalized research organization for the sociology of sociology. It is this paradox or controversy (cf. Pinch 2015) of the reluctance of sociology to study its own discipline sociologically that has intrigued my interest in the selected topic in general, and the wish to understand the methodological foundations in (theoretical) sociology that is overlooked in the literature in particular, that has inspired me to pursue the study of Szelényi's scholarship. If successful, it should provide an example of how to complement Ritzer's frame of metatheorizing that Fuchs (1992b) interprets as a structured approach to the study of the sociology of sociology.

This research relates most directly to the investigations within the sociology of sociology, social studies of science, and STS which have recently attracted more attention (despite the reluctance to study sociology sociologically) to learn how sociologists and social scientists more generally do research in terms of the method(ology) they use. While some commentators have labeled this research interest and related investigations as "methodography" (Buchler 1961:128; Greiffenhagen et al. 2011; Rodríguez 2020),[17] some others, such as Timans et al. (2019:213), suggest that, given the growing interest in the sociological study of methods, we are close to the development of a consistent research program that Savage (2013) calls the "social life of methods", as the elements of it are already there.[18] At this point, the overviews of existing studies on how sociologists do research published by Leahey (2008), Mair et al. (2013, 2016), and Platt (1996:11–33) emphasize the differences between qualitative and quantitative research (cf. Greiffenhagen et al. 2015; Maynard and Schaeffer 2000; Smith and Atkinson 2016). In that context, one is not surprised to learn that the recent interest among sociologists in the study of the methods that the discipline is using relates indirectly to the paradigm wars (cf. Gage 1989, Alise and Teddlie 2010) and to the debate caused by Savage and Burrows (2007) with their seminal paper, titled "The Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology",[19] and to the politics of

---

[15] Mannheim ([1936] 1982, Ch. 1) seems to be the first to flirt with "sociology of sociology" which was translated into and became available in English some sixty years after he completed the manuscript that is now known under the title *Structures of Thinking*. Although his use of the "Sociology of Sociology" appears only in the title of the first chapter and is not defined or directly explained in the text, one may nevertheless argue that he anticipated the need for structural and cognitive analysis of sociology as a discipline. The more recent examples of "sociology of sociology" have been published by Bourdieu (1975 & 1993a, Ch. 6-7), Curtis and Petras (1970 & 1972), Friedrichs (1970), Gouldner (1970), Ishwaran (1965), Halmos (1970), A. King (2007), Mills (1943 &1959), Oberschall (1972), Reynolds and Reynolds (1970) Therborn (1976 & 2000) and Wacquant (2002a). One may also note that the American Sociological Association (1967) had a special session at the 62nd annual meeting on "Sociology of Sociology" in 1967.

[16] For instance, one cannot find from the journals *Social Studies of Science* or *Science, Technology, & Human Values* an article that would directly study sociology as the scientific discipline using the sociological methods. *American Sociologist* comes closest to it, but it concentrates on just one of the above-mentioned traditions of sociology of sociology and takes interest just in the US sociologists.

[17] For critical comments, see also Hammersley (2020).

[18] For instance, see the sources referred to in Timans et al. (2019:213).

[19] Their paper has turned out to be one of the most cited publications in sociology in the past decade. One can find the contributions to the debate from the following sources: Crompton (2008),

method (cf. Babones 2016:466; Lagerspetz 2021; Platt 2012; Savage 2010; Steinmetz 2005a) and the contested role of theory in empirical research (cf. Au 2018; Swedberg 2016a, 2016b) – interrelated issues that Szelényi (2015d) has described more generally in the paper "The Triple Crisis of US Sociology".

Some scholars of the social studies of science (SSS) have raised the need to integrate different subfields of the science studies discipline. For instance, Woolgar (1989) argues that the different perspectives in the sociology of science (including "Black Boxism", "Sociology of Error", "Strong Program" and "Constitutive") that have been presented over the evolution of the discipline by sociologists and psychologists of science, need to be incorporated in order to account for the social and cultural forces that shape how science is actually done by actors. Furthermore, Nickles (1989) goes even further and suggests that an integrated theory of science, which is internally coherent and unified, would be possible only if the efforts in the history, philosophy, psychology, and sociology of sciences were integrated. However, unlike the 'happy harmonizers', who are pushing at an open door, he finds this task not just challenging but perhaps even impossible. Indeed, he (ibid:247–8) concludes that he does not see how, after centuries of development, the different disciplines that have compartmentalized themselves could be reconciled with each other and with methodology.

It should be noted within the context of the above-mentioned contemplations and the anticipation of integrated science studies, which would not be just normatively informed and empirically robust but ideally also able to combine such a diverse set of research traditions as experimental and ethnographic methods (cf. Fuller et al. 1989), that the inquiry into Szelényi's 'metaphysical pathos' will not rely on the principles of mixed-methods research. Instead of relying on mixed methods, the study to be undertaken follows the principles of multimethod research (cf. Brewer and Hunter 1989, 2006; Hunter and Brewer 2003, 2015). Even though the issues related to mixed methods in Szelényi's scholarship are discussed, the way they are studied in this dissertation is closer to multimethod research, as will be explained in more detail below.

The thesis is organized into three main chapters. First, an overview is given of how 'irony' has been (ab)used in human sciences. This part of the work offers an outline of the different ways irony has been applied in the humanities and social sciences and prepares the reader for the subsequent discussion by providing both the conceptual background and the comparative context. This overview ends with a brief introduction to how Szelényi together with his coauthors has explained the nature of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology. The second chapter is devoted to an explanation of the materials and methods applied in my research on the methodological foundations of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology as practiced by Szelényi. Having introduced the reasons why the "new rules of sociological method", as introduced by Giddens (1976), are found to be a good starting point for understanding the research principles that I have adopted, I offer an overview of the underlying assumptions of my study. This will

---

Gane (2011), McKie and Ryan (2012, 2016), Savage (2017), Savage and Burrows (2009), Stanley (2008), Burrows and Savage (2014) and Webber (2009).

be followed by the explanations of the theoretical research tradition, arguments for why I flirt with rational 'reconstruction' as the research approach, how it relates to 'ethnomethodological indifference', to the 'sociology of sociology' as a sub-category of the sociology of knowledge, and SSS as a sub-category of science studies. In terms of empirical research, it will be argued that this research comes closest to a 'deviant case study' in terms of research design. Furthermore, explanations on sampling following the Quality of Reporting of Meta-analyses (QUOROM) standard for meta-analyses, data collection (in terms of the selected texts and conducted interviews), and analysis techniques (in terms of 'sociological discourse analysis' for the 'suspicious' interpretation and 'objective hermeneutics' for the 'empathic' interpretation) will be provided. The second chapter will also offer some self-criticism in terms of the methodological limitations of the research.

The longest part of the dissertation, presented in the third chapter, is devoted to the comprehensive analysis of the methodological foundations of Iván Szelényi's exemplary scholarship. More specifically, to understand and explain irony as a method of neoclassical sociology, I will classify and briefly describe his take on ontology, epistemology, methodology, training, qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, rhetoric, the nature of knowledge, knowledge accumulation, goodness, quality criteria, hegemony, control, axiology, calls to action, inquirer posture, ethics, reflexivity, accommodation, and commensurability. I call these elements collectively his "metaphysical pathos" – a term coined by Lovejoy (1936, Lecture I). Although he was reluctant to give it a precise definition, preferring to identify five principal types instead, the concept has come to signify, according to Duffin (1980:267), "*unconscious mental habits*" – the implicit and explicit assumptions of an individual, a generation or an era. Outside the circles of the historians of ideas, the term was made more widely known by Gouldner (1955:498), who reformulated it as "a set of sentiments which those subscribing to the theory could only dimly sense". Although I follow in their footsteps, the concept is given a narrower meaning in this thesis. Similar to D. C. Phillips (1996:1008–9) and M. L. Smith (19.97:73), I interpret it as a 'mental model'. Unlike them, however, I do not see it as a broader constellation of inquirer presuppositions – most of which have been covered in detail by the four dimensions of Ritzer's metatheoretical frame – rather the (un)conscious mental habits brought about by methodological choices, assumptions and foundations of scholarship overlooked in the metatheorizing literature.

In the concluding chapter, I will reflect on all these efforts to reconstruct Szelényi's 'metaphysical pathos' that should allow us to improve our understanding of what irony as a method of neoclassical sociology is. As a conclusion of the detailed discussion of Szelényi's 'mental model', it provides the answer to the research puzzle of how his thought-provoking sociological research has benefited from an ironic edge even if the methodological soundness of irony as its underlying method has hardly been taken seriously.

1 Ironology – (Ab)use of Irony in Human Sciences

> [T]he history of thought has passed through several oases of irony; there are the epochs of 'scholastic life' and those of open jest where thought catches its breath and rests from the constricting systems which have repressed it; the generations of ironists alternate with the generations of the too serious, just as in the life of the individual the tragic alternates with the frivolous (Jankélévitch 1936:10).[20]

> A knowledge of the 'kinds' of irony that modern critics have cited – for instance, irony of manner, irony of situation, philosophical irony, practical irony, dramatic irony, verbal irony, ingénu irony, double irony, rhetorical irony, self-irony, Socratic irony, Romantic Irony, cosmic irony, sentimental irony, irony of character – hardly helps one to be ironic (Reiss 1981:211).

> [G]iven the frequent observation that much of sociology is ironic, it is perhaps surprising that irony has enjoyed relatively little detailed attention in the social sciences (Woolgar 1983:248).

This chapter aims at providing a brief overview of ironology[21] – how irony has been defined and (ab)used in human sciences. The review starts with a grand tour of the typologies of irony that have been identified in the humanities and then looks more closely at how it has been used in sociology. More originally, I offer a new classification of irony in human and social sciences – providing a discussion of irony as (i) the by-product of the Enlightenment, (ii) unintended consequence, (iii) logic of discovery, (iv) dialectics, (v) infinitized paradoxical nature of reality, and (vi) anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue. As a result, the reader should gain a better understanding of the (ab)use of irony in human sciences, on the one hand, and the unique approach to it as a method of neoclassical sociology developed by Szelényi, on the other.

Regarding the literature and its criticism, it will be demonstrated below that irony in its various forms has been used widely. Douglas Muecke, who follows in the footsteps of Thomson (1926) and Sedgewick (1913; 1935), shows in *The Compass of Irony* (1969), *Irony and the Ironic* (1970), and "Images of Irony" (1983) how rich, multi-modal and multi-dimensional the use of irony in literature and its criticism is. The reason for his detailed studies is that he (1969:7) finds the existing overviews of the uses of irony in literature limited in scope.[22] Although it would be unrealistic for any single critic to be able to comprehend the use of irony even in all the major European languages, not to speak of the minor European or non-European languages, he at least attempts to extend the

---

[20] The translation originates from Reiss (1981:211).
[21] I have adopted the label 'ironology', which does not exist in any dictionary, from Muecke (1969, Ch. 1).
[22] Muecke refers in this context to the works of Allemann (1956), Thomson (1926), Turner (1926) as well as Gurewitch's doctoral dissertation (cf. Gurewitch 2002).

analysis beyond English literature by commenting on the usage in German[23] and French.[24]

The multi-faced, multi-cultural and multi-purpose use of irony in literature is reflected in the structure of *The Compass of Irony*. It includes different elements, classifications, modes, situations, types, approaches, as well as stances and morals of irony. Given the multi-faced nature of irony as a phenomenon, it is not easy to summarize Muecke's argument if one would like to stay true to this richness. To acquire a sense of his 'mission impossible', it suffices to mention just some of the ironies that he identifies and discusses in the text. For instance, he (ibid, Ch. 3–4) distinguishes between over, cover, private, impersonal, self-disparaging, ingénue, and dramatized irony. That is not all, he (ibid, Ch. 5) also recognizes various ironic situations, such as the irony of simple incongruity, the irony of events, dramatic irony, the irony of self-betrayal, the irony of dilemma, as well as what he (ibid, Ch. 6) calls "general irony". Within the latter, he identifies general irony of events, general dramatic irony, cosmic irony, and ironies of inevitable ignorance. When he (ibid, Ch. 7) takes up the discussion of romantic irony, he, furthermore, separates between the ironies of art, proto-romantic irony, and romantic irony proper. Hence, it should not come as a surprise that commentators often pay respect to the richness of Muecke's work but do not dare to say much about it.[25]

Similar to the use of irony in literature, Muecke (1969, Ch. 1–3; 1970) finds the existing conceptualizations and classifications of the use of irony inadequate and ignorant. Although he (1969:7) says that, compared to the existing overviews of the use of irony in literature, the discussion of the history of the concept is in better shape,[26] he nevertheless objects to any existing attempts to define the concept. That is, he takes a critical position toward the scholars of irony who supply neat but inadequate definitions and classifications. He (1969:14) argues that:

> [i]t might perhaps be prudent not to attempt any formal definitions. Since, however, Erich Heller, in his *Ironic German*, has already quite adequately not defined irony, there would be little point in not defining it all over again. I shall therefore hazard something like a definition … [although] I have no brief and simple definition that will include all kinds of irony while excluding all that is not irony, that distinctions from one angle may not be distinctions from another, and that kinds of irony theoretically distinguishable will in practice be found merging into one another.

To overcome the limitations of the study of the conceptualization of irony in literature and theater, Muecke devotes an entire monograph to the matter, titled

---

[23] Additional remarks on the use of irony in German can be found in Behler (1972).

[24] He (1970:1–2) is able to make only some brief comments about the use of irony in Japanese and Chinese.

[25] Knox is exceptional in this respect as he finds Muecke's own conceptualization of irony 'confusing' (1972:54) and his entire project, despite the wish to be comprehensive, a failure as he considers all "these aspects in a very large and not very satisfactory way" (ibid:59).

[26] Muecke refers in this context to the works of Ribbeck (1876), Sedgewick (1913), and Knox (1961).

Irony and the Ironic. First, he (1970, Ch. 1) distinguishes between ironic and non-ironic. Second, he (ibid, Ch. 2) offers an overview of the evolution of the concept. Third, he (ibid, Ch. 3) discusses the basic and variable features of irony. Finally, he (ibid, Ch. 4) describes the practice of irony in its verbal, theatrical, and fictional forms.[27]

It is in this work that Muecke explains the process of how instrumental irony is being conveyed and interpreted in a socio-cultural context. These processes are summarized, in simplified form, in the following diagrams. As shown in Figure 2, the ironist takes in the dramatic structure of the role of a 'naïf' who communicates his or her message in such a way or selects for its delivery such a context that should stimulate the receiver in the audience to reject its expressed literal meaning – preferring to it the unexpressed 'transliteral or real meaning'. This basic structure and logic of communication in terms of coding and decoding is further illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 2. Roles and messages
Source: Muecke (1970:40)
Methuen & Co. Ltd was contacted on Oct. 31, 2022 about the right to use the figures in the thesis. On Nov. 7, 2022 the following reply was given by them: Muecke, Douglas C. 1970. *Irony and the Ironic*. London, England: Methuen & Co. Ltd. is "*[n]ot our title however and we regret we do not know the whereabouts of the rights holder today.*"

---

[27] For the follow-up, see also Muecke (1983).

SOCIO-CULTURAL CONTEXT

Figure 3. Coding and decoding
Source: Muecke (1970:41)
Methuen & Co. Ltd was contacted on Oct. 31, 2022 about the right to use the figures in the thesis. On Nov. 7, 2022 the following reply was given by them: Muecke, Douglas C. 1970. *Irony and the Ironic*. London, England: Methuen & Co. Ltd. is "*[n]ot our title however and we regret we do not know the whereabouts of the rights holder today.*"

In the follow-up article, titled "The Communication of Verbal Irony", he (1974: 35) addresses the basic questions that form the research puzzle for communication scientists interested in irony (cf. Dynel 2019):

      (1) How does an ironist communicate his real meaning?
      (2) On what basis do we infer that what we are reading or hearing is ironical?
      (3) What has gone wrong when we assume that an ironical message is not ironical?
      (4) What has gone wrong when we infer that a non-ironical message is ironical?

Most recently, Muecke (1983) takes up the discussion on the different images that irony can generate when someone is trying to visualize what phenomena stand for. His argument is that irony can be imagined from different perspectives. If it is visualized from the ironist's point of view, who is or sees himself or herself also as a victim, we are speaking of 'vertical' irony. However, if it is pictured from the point of view of the (potential) victim, who has lost the connection with the ironist, we have 'Protean' irony. This 'labyrinthine' irony, to use Jankélévitch's formulation, has similarities with the notion of self-irony that Muecke (1969) has mentioned quite often before but has struggled to make sense of. In addition to being the most complex form of irony, it is also psychologically unstable in the context of an endless series of mirrors and has the danger of becoming subject to infinite regression (as will be identified also below within the critical discussion of romantic irony).

    Even if Muecke's discussions of the multi-dimensional aspects of irony could be seen as one of the most authoritative elaborations on the subject, he is still just one of the literary critics, or ironologists as he (1969:14; 1970:7) likes to call himself, who have addressed the use of irony in literature or tackled the difficulties of conceptualizing the concept. Among others, Glicksberg takes up the issue in *The Ironic Vision in Modern Literature,* where he (1969) addresses the aspects

of irony ignored by Muecke: a detailed historical analysis of its paradoxical, tragic, and nihilist features. What he lacks, though, is the theoretical compass that would keep him on track.

More recently, such a theoretical compass has been introduced by Joseph Dane in *The Critical Mythology of Irony*. Namely, he (2011) argues that the different formations of irony are actually notions introduced by commentators to persuade the reader and manipulate their perception of the commented text. In other words, he says that rather than providing eye-opening commentary, critics often seem to be pushing their own agenda of various kinds, including the aim to boost their own ego, with the ironic interpretation of the text. Therefore, the history of irony has, according to Dane, many parallels to the history of criticism more generally and the changing conceptualizations of irony reflect the turns and twists in the roles that commentators have assumed for themselves in relation to the text. Although there may be some truth in this observation, the following sections will, nevertheless, give the benefit of a doubt to the use of irony with different agendas than the one presented by Dane.

Regarding the sociological investigation of the use of irony, the authoritative examples of tertiary literature, such as the five-volume *Encyclopedia of Sociology* (Borgatta and Montgomery 2000) or the two editions of the *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences* with their 18 and 26 volumes, respectively, (Smelser and Baltes 2001; E. O. Wright 2015) do not include an entry on irony.[28]

Likewise, a brief bibliometric analysis seems to suggest that irony is not widely used in sociology in general and in the publications that appear in the flagship journals in particular. Indeed, a literature search in the Web of Science (WoS) database identifies hardly any publications classified as sociological that would <u>publicly</u> acknowledge the use of irony. There are no publications that have appeared in the *American Sociological Review* or *European Sociological Review* and just six in the *American Journal of Sociology* that mention irony in the title.[29] Furthermore, the total of six articles published since 1945 in the flagship *American Journal of Sociology* that use the term in the title have received just one citation altogether over the years. That is, only one out of these six articles has ever been cited in publications covered by the WoS.[30]

---

[28] The only entries where 'irony' is identified as the key concept are found in Lambourn's (2001) article "Metaphor, Role in Social Thought: History of the Concept" where it is discussed in the context of cognitive disability to understand figurative speech and Stemmer's (2015) entry titled "Pragmatic Disorders" where it is mentioned in parallel to metaphor and its related tropes.

[29] Extending the search to 'ironic' (topic in WoS and title, abstract and keyword in Scopus) allows to identify one publication in each: Michelson (2007) in AJS and Dobbin and Dowd (2000) in ASR.

[30] It is not possible to narrowly identify articles published in the sociological journals in the Scopus database. In the wider category of Social Sciences that they use, one can identify articles mostly published in journals that are closer to linguistics and communication studies. Although there are also five articles published in the Sociology journal that mention 'irony' in the title, abstract or as a key term as of Nov. 20, 2020, the top ten journals, classified as social sciences, where such articles were published are the following (number of articles in brackets): *Journal of Pragmatics* (72), *Humour* (36), *Neophilologus* (29), *Discourse Process* (22), *Revista Transilvania* (21), *Pragmatics and*

Watson makes a point that may well explain the above trend. She (2015a: 407) notes that

> [h]umor and laughter have been regarded as suitable topics for research in the social sciences, but as methodological principles to be adopted in carrying out and representing the findings of research they have been neglected. Indeed, those scholars who have made use of humor – wit, satire, jokes etc. – risk being regarded as trivial and marginalized from the mainstream.

While this leaves the impression that sociological literature does not pay much attention to irony, nor discuss it very much or take it seriously in terms of what it may have to offer as a methodological technique, this might only be half the picture. It may well be that the above-presented bibliographical search for so-ciological literature in reference databases is oversimplified in many ways or makes assumptions that may not necessarily hold. First, it may well be that the scholars who take irony seriously are keen to communicate with their peers in the form of monographs rather than the journal articles that are by and large covered by the above-mentioned two reference databases – WoS and Scopus. Second, it may well be that "irony is seldom explicitly acknowledged", as ob-served for instance by Burger et al. (2011:187). If so, the use of irony may be much more widespread than is possible to identify with such a simplistic search as the one presented above. In other words, one needs a good knowledge of iro-ny as a methodological technique to detect the contributions that have been used in sociology.

At least three attempts have been made in English to detect the users of iro-ny in sociological research. The first of these was presented by David Matzaby (1969, Ch. 4), the second by Jay Weinstein (1982), and the third by Digby C. Anderson and Wesley W. Sharrock (1983).[31]

The first overview developed by Matzaby is part of the book titled *Becoming Deviant,* where he (1969, Ch. 4) discusses how to go beyond detecting "more than meets the eye" about the processes going on in society. Having a more specific interest in deviant behavior he points out irony, in contrast to 'overlap', as one of the two useful concepts and comments on how it has been used by the representatives of the Chicago School, Functionalism, and the neoChicagoan Vison that can be associated with Symbolic Interactionism. He (ibid:72) comments that irony is not a particularly important concept for the Chicagoans. To the extent that it was incorporated into their analytical apparatus, it entered through the general wisdom adopted from American intellectuals. The picture is very different when it comes to the representatives of functionalism in general and the investigators of deviant, criminal, and corrupt activities, including organized crime. Given the stress on latency, he notes that irony became an important conceptual tool to uncover deviant

---

Cognition (19), *Quarterly Journal of Speech* (19), *Notes and Queries* (16), *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies* (15), and *Psychology of Language and Communication* (15).

[31] With some conceptual stretching, one may add to it also Brown (1977). Since the link between irony and the linguistic turn in sociology will be discussed in section 1.3., which addresses the "Irony as a Logic of Discovery", his contributions, including both the original argument presented in the book *A Poetic for Sociology* and its follow-up publications (cf. Brown 1983, 1987, 1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1994 and 1998), will not be covered in this introductory section.

behavior and its complex relation to wider social affairs. To make his point, he (ibid:73–9) illustrates the argument with examples from research by Eric McKitrick on corruption, Kingsley Davis' work on prostitution, and Daniel Bell's analysis of organized crime. Last but not least, he discusses the relation of irony to the representatives of Symbolic Interactionism. He (ibid:80) observes that "the neoChicagoan irony is merged with the concept of deviation and their theory as to how persons come to be that way". The best example of this process can be found, according to Matzaby (ibid:80–1), in the work of Erving Goffman who notes how professionals contribute to defining and the subsequent process of becoming deviant.

A second attempt to clarify the role that irony plays in the sociological enterprise has been presented by Digby Anderson and Wesley Sharrock in the paper titled "Irony as a Methodological Theory: A Sketch of Four Sociological Variations". Anderson and Sharrock (1983:569) note in this article in the spirit of Lazarsfeld's ideas about the aim of sociological research (explained in section 1.2 below) that "[e]ssential to the practice of sociological irony … is the contrast of the world as it is allegedly seen by the members of society with the world as it is (which, conveniently, is assumed to be the same as it appears to the sociol-ogist)."

They (ibid:566) explain the essence of sociological irony in more detail as follows:

> At the center of sociology's ironic contrast is "the common understanding" and the processes of "everyday thinking" which generates that understanding. It is not unknown for sociology to introduce itself to beginning students by challenging them as the bearers of everyday thinking, showing that the understandings that they bring with them are riddled with error and mystifycation. … There is no doubt that in many sociologists' view, the main task of their discipline is the criticism of the common understanding.

Furthermore, they (ibid:568) go on to argue that:

> [t]he emphasis upon the common understanding as the domain of false think-ing, the project of debunking and demystification, creates a tension with soci-ology's prevailing humanist commitment. Revealing that every thinking is the perpetrator and perpetuator of falsehood and error does not involve just showing that it is subject to the occasional, incidental (albeit significant) mis-take. It involves treating the errors as essential, the produce of the nature of the procedures for thought, rather than arising from its particular applica-tions. It also involves treating the mode of thought as closed, as incapable of recognizing the possibility of error and engaging in self-correction: its short-comings are only recognizable to those who stand outside it. This insistence upon the proneness to error of the members of society and of their compla-cency in its face, however, invites inferences about them, to the effect that they are naïve, gullible, ignorant, obtuse: they are, to put it bluntly, dopes. Such a disparaging suggestion, however, fits poorly with sociology's thoroughgoing anti-elitist posture, and it becomes necessary to rescue the members of society from the implication of naïvete and stupidity which the ironicization of their practical understanding creates.

There are four techniques for how to practice sociological irony, according to Anderson and Sharrock: (i) Transformation of the Frame of Reference; (ii) Enrichment of the Everyday; (iii) The Decipherment of Meaning; and (iv) Moral Re-

versals. The first of these, the *transformation of the frame of reference*, builds on the approach used by sociologists who, instead of taking the position of an actor, adopt the outsider's or system level view – allowing them to identify the issues that the units of analysis are themselves not aware of. Classical examples of that approach can be seen in the works of Marx and Engels. If one were to update the list with some more contemporary social critics and their exemplary works, then the following authors come to mind: Herbert Marcuse's *One-dimensional Man*,[32] Wright C. Mills's *White Collar* and *Power Elite*, Pierre Bourdieu's *Masculine Domination* and *Homo Academicus* and Alvin Gouldner's *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*. Indeed, all of these authors have in these macro-sociological works aimed at the emancipation of the suppressed by disclosing that things are not as they appear to be.

The second approach, *enrichment of the everyday*, signifies the effort to make the seemingly tedious or dull everyday life look interesting, complicated, and / or eventful. For instance, it could mean showing the affect of daily activities or maintaining the integration of the group or social control. Of the classical sociologists, one could associate this tradition with Auguste Comte, Émile Durkheim, and Max Weber, and among the more contemporary scholars, who have adopted the social interactionist perspective, such authors as George Herbert Mead and Herbert Blumer. Even Michel Foucault with his contribution *Discipline and Punish* could be seen as representative of this approach.[33]

The third technique, the *decipherment of meaning*, builds on the understanding that "communications are obscure and encoded". Given the fact that Anderson and Sharrock (1983:575) classify themselves among ethnomethodologists,[34] their description of this kind of sociological ironizing is revealing. As they reflect: "If the members of society can be seen as poorly equipped to understand and depict their objectively given circumstances then they can equally be seen to be poorly placed and provided to grasp the full import of their own communications". Famous sociologists who are said to have practiced this kind of irony include Claude Lévi-Strauss, Erving Goffman, and Harold Garfinkel.[35]

Finally, sociologists using the fourth tactic, labeled as *moral reversals*, turn 'the bad into the good' (ibid: 577). Although Anderson and Sharrock do not mention the inspiration of Merton (cf. 1936, [1957/1949]; 1968, Ch. 3) and his notion of the socially unintended consequences and latent functions when they speak about "pornographers acclaimed as socially functional", the influence seems to be there. Indeed, while there is no shortage of exemplary sociologists who have

---

[32] For instance, Franklin (1970) and Jay (2018) have made this argument.
[33] An overview of the sociological research and contributions to the topic of social control can be found in Cusson (2001) and Janowitz (1975). It is worth noting that the research tradition related to social control has undergone significant changes throughout the history of sociology. A good overview of these changes can be found in Deflem (2015).
[34] An overview of the ethnomethodological research and contributions can be found in Attewell (1974), Atkinson (1988), and Sharrock and Anderson (1986).
[35] Furthermore, later in this chapter we will see that Richard Brown has been one of the contemporary ethnomethodologists who have not only identified irony as 'logic of discovery' but equalized the latter in his recent publications with 'narratives of conversion'.

taken an interest in deviant behavior,[36] the idea to interpret actions that are morally questionable or controversial at first sight as something that could have a positive role in the functioning of society comes from structural functionalists such as Kingsley Davis (cf. 1937, 1961).[37]

An alternative typology of the ways in which irony has been applied in sociology has been developed by Weinstein (1982) in the paper titled "Irony and Technology: A Qualitative Technique for Applied Social Science." In it, he presents the argument that irony is central to the sociological enterprise. While he acknowledges the use of the ironic method in literature/drama, for instance, in Sophocles' play *Oedipus Rex*, he mostly builds his argument directly on the ideas of Schneider (who, as will be indicated below in section 1.2 devoted to the discussion on "Irony as Unintended Consequence", stands on the shoulders of Merton). Based on Weinstein's reading, the ironic techniques that sociology has been using include (i) detachment, and (ii) explanation and prediction.

The first ironic technique, identified by Weinstein, *detachment*, builds directly on Merton's (1936) notion of unintended and unanticipated consequences and it has similarities with previously presented Anderson and Sharrock's first type – the *transformation of the frame of reference*. What Weinstein (1982:299) adds to this is the idea that by "assuming an ironic focus, the sociologist, like the dramatist" can establish the "intellectual distance between observer and observed". The much-debated sociology of knowledge argument that he makes here is that sociologists acting as ironists can assume the impartial role that Karl Mannheim (based on Georg Lukács and Alfred Weber, as will be explained in section 1.6.) associates with the "socially unattached intellectuals".

The second ironic technique, recognized by Weinstein as *explanation and prediction*, builds in addition to Merton on the ideas of Schneider (and his de-bate with Sorokin). Although Weinstein does not provide much additional detail about this category, he nevertheless clarifies how irony could provide new insights that have the potential to enrich our understanding of the phenomena under investigation. For instance, he (Weinstein 1982: 300–1) suggests the following simple technique to generate not only hypothesis but possibly also original and/or unique contributions to sociological scholarship:

> Formally, an ironic hypothesis is a declarative sentence of the form: "*a* acts in situation *k* with intent *x*, and *y* occurs," Ironic technique is employed in specifying the '*x*' and '*y*' terms in such a way that the hypothesized outcome is correctly ironic. When *x* and *y* differ as opposites, contrasts, or reciprocals (or in other dramatically dissimulated ways), such a hypothesis would be correctly ironic. Where *x* and *y* are not absurdly discrepant (though they might differ, i.e., involve latent functions or dysfunctions), such a hypothesis would be non-ironic. In cases in which the relationship between *x* and *y* is something between identity and opposition, we may speak of more ironic or less ironic outcomes.

---

[36] An overview of the sociology of deviance can be found in E. Goode (2015).
[37] Although Merton ([1957/1949] 1968:134, 259) speaks about prostitution in passing, it is more directly addressed by K. Davis (1937) and Matza (1969:77–8) as something that brings also positive outcomes. For further discussion, see also Schneider (1975b:325–6).

Unfortunately, Weinstein's overview does not include explicit examples of sociologists who could serve as the exemplary users of these two techniques of irony. Therefore, it may be interesting to identify sociologists, who have applied irony in the fashion characterized by this and other typologies. In practice, however, it may not be very easy to conduct such an investigation because the necessary information for this kind of analysis is strategically hidden. As Bourdieu (cf. 1969, 1975, 1988, 2000, 2004a) reminds us, we see in the form of academic publications only the final polished product, not the process of how it was developed and what changes were made in its evolution.

Nevertheless, an attempt will be made in the next sections to give a reasonably comprehensive overview of the conceptualization and use of irony in human sciences. The review will build on earlier analyses and typologies without directly following any of them. This overview will show the extent to which irony is at the center of sociological imagination and practice. In this context, I shall question the impression that one gets from the simple search in the citation databases. To this end, I shall build on the previous observations which claim that irony is central to the sociological enterprise as well as on the attempts to challenge this opinion. Although I took these discussions as the point of departure in the initial stages of composing the overview, I have extended and amended the earlier attempts to the point that their impact on the overview presented in the next sections can hardly be recognized. The following sections are organized around the discussion of irony as (i) the by-product of the Enlightenment, (ii) unintended consequence, (iii) logic of discovery, (iv) dialectics, (v) the infinitized paradoxical nature of reality, and (vi) anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue. The concluding section will summarize the lessons from the following analysis, as it aims to reconstruct how Iván Szelényi has used irony in his research and suggested it as the defining method of neoclassical sociology.

1.1. Irony as a By-product of the Enlightenment

Irony can be seen as a by-product of Enlightenment thinking. While the Enlightenment is, generally speaking, associated with the rationalization that was logically grounded in reason and the advancement of the (natural) sciences, it also gave birth to humor, according to Heller (2005:98). As for irony, she says that it is an invention of Scotsmen and Englishmen of the Enlightenment. While she (ibid:97–103) agrees that (Socratic) irony has been with us ever since antiquety, she also builds on Kierkegaard ([1841] 1965, [1846] 1992) to argue that irony, which can be differentiated from humor, becomes more direct during the Enlightenment. Indeed, in the context where many social sciences, including sociology, have their roots in the Enlightenment, on the one hand, and have skeptical or critical attitudes toward any kind of dogma (expressed most prominently in

the works of Descartes, Bayle, Hume,[38] and Marx[39]) and the other side of the rationalism/empiricism of the Enlightenment (as shown convincingly by Bristow (2017)), on the other, it should not be surprising to find that irony becomes more direct during this era. Therefore, it should not be completely incorrect to interpret irony as a by-product of the intellectual movement associated with scientific progress and modernity despite its long use in philosophy (cf. Miller 1983), religious writings, and literature (cf. Reiss 1981) before it.

One can find further support for the claim that irony becomes more direct during the Enlightenment from the analysis of encyclopedic writing. It is not uncommon in academic writing to turn to encyclopedias to learn in concise form what was known about the phenomenon of interest in a particular historical and cultural moment of interest. In regard to encyclopedic writing during the Enlightenment era, West (2013) argues in his paper, "Irony and encyclopedic writing before (and after) the Enlightenment", that while irony was not exceptional in encyclopedic writings before the Enlightenment, it is difficult, although not impossible, to detect.[40] It was the writing of Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke and his contemporaries that started to question the possibility of amassing all relevant information, order it and present it in an orderly fashion. Hence, the contrast between the hopes and realities of organizing knowledge in its totality before and after the Enlightenment has come to characterize the irony of encyclopedic writing.

Taking these observations as the point of departure, this section will give a brief historical overview of the attempts to offer encyclopedic writings on irony with the implicit desire to bring some order and structure to the chaos. The review will start with brief comments on the etymological studies of the origin of the concept of irony. It will be followed by a chronological overview of the use of the concept and the typologies of different kinds of ironies that have been presented in encyclopedias. The section will conclude with a note on postmodern irony in contrast to the use of irony as enlightenment in the sense that the former questions the possibility to get to the truth of the matter, and the latter has used irony as something that makes it possible to reveal reality.

There is no lack of attempts to provide overviews of different types of irony. Probably the first and still one of the most authoritative reference points in the discussions on irony, to which we still owe much of our contemporary understating of the technique in the scholarship and teaching of Socrates (but also in

---

[38] Price (1965) presents an argument in *The Ironic Hume* that the ironic outlook at the world and the ironic way of expression are central characteristics of Hume's scholarship without which one cannot comprehend it.

[39] Wolff (1988) argues that Marx, in *Das Kapital*, adopts the ironic mode of discourse established by Socrates and Plato when he ironically responds to his predecessors, from Hegel to Ricardo.

[40] West (2013:494) offers two strategies to overcome the difficulty of detecting irony in these texts:

> [t]he places to look for the ironies in early modern encyclopedias, then, are textual places in a narrative – not placeless snippets of information, as in the post-Enlightenment encyclopedic ideal, but elements that have a distinct position in a structure, whatever sort of structure that is: beginnings, endings, centers, turns. The other useful strategy in reading rather than mining is to revise insistently what each of the elements of an encyclopedia might mean in response to others, and to track how these meanings change.

the works of German romantics and Hegel), comes from Søren Kierkegaard. He wrote his master's thesis on it and submitted it to the University of Copenhagen in fulfillment of the requirements of the degree on June 3, 1841. Following Møller (cf. 1848–1850:152–8)[41] and Hegel (cf. [1840] 1892 Ch. 2B, 1, 3), Kierkegaard mediates that Socratic irony becomes apparent in the dialogues that Socrates initiated with the citizens of Athens, who claimed to have been experts on some specific topic, to explain the matter close to their expertise to him. By pretending not to know anything about the specific topic and by flattering the conversation partner for their 'expert knowledge', Socrates is told to discredit the specialist by making him look silly by being unable to answer all his follow-up questions and disclosing in the process how limited the knowledge of the 'expert' is. This is what Socratic irony refers to.[42]

Although explaining the nature of Socratic irony is not the only aim of Kierkegaard's monograph, it is his central reference point. More particularly, he offers the historical background in the form of reflections on the philosophy of Xenophon, Plato, and Aristophanes that preceded Socrates and made the development of the concept possible ([1841] 1965, Part I), and discusses in detail German Romanticism, including Fichte, Schlegel, Tieck, and Solger, and their take on the concept (ibid, Part II). While Hegel, the most influential and widely discussed philosopher of the time, who was critical of the romantic ironists, is always somewhere in the shadows of these discussions, and Kierkegaard refers to him in the text as frequently as to Socrates,[43] he, nevertheless, subtitles the main title, *The Concept of Irony*, not with reference to the former but to the latter*: With Constant Reference to Socrates*.

In Stewart's (2015) reading, Socratic irony relates also to the Greek concept of *aporia,* which means "being in loss" or "being unable to answer". In other words, Kierkegaard accepts Socrates' ironic position that true knowing starts with the acceptance of the fact of not knowing. An example of Socratic irony and *aporia* can be found in the dialogue with Euthyphro. Kierkegaard was fascinated by this, as he saw in the Danish society of his time a widespread tendency of claiming to be an expert with little to back it up. Likewise, he found Socrates' polemic with the Sophists relevant to what he observed in Copenhagen, where overly confident religious leaders and academics claimed to be in possession of the final truth and, similar to Socrates' Athens, did not hesitate to take money for their services. Like the mission of Socrates in Athens, Kierkegaard came to the understanding, based

---

[41] It has been argued that Møller as a mentor of Kierkegaard had drafted an outline for the larger work that bears the same title as Kierkegaard's thesis "On the Concept of Irony". It was only discovered and published posthumously. For further details about the relationship between the two, see Jones (1965).

[42] One can find an example of it in Socrates's dialogue with Euthyphro (cf. Plato [361–47 BC] 2010). Similar to Kierkegaard, Hegel [1840] 1892 Ch. 2B, 1, 3) offers a good overview of Socratic irony. Further details of how Kierkegaard interpreted Socrates (and Hegel) can also be found in Muench (2003), and Stewart (2015 Ch. 1, 3, 7).

[43] Therefore, Campel (1965) in his "Historical Introduction" to *The Concept of Irony* as well as Stewart (2015, Ch. 2-3) in his monograph, titled *Søren Kierkegaard: Subjectivity, Irony, and the Crisis of Modernity*, present Kierkegaard in dialogue with Hegel's reading of Socrates and German Romanticism.

on these observations, that he should become the gadfly of Copenhagen in order to keep people's mistaken views on Christianity in check and force them to examine these more self-critically (and revise them if necessary). In this process, Kierkegaard felt that he was being guided by God in the same way as Socrates was protected by his inner voice called 'daimon' which prevented him from getting into trouble (i.e., it did not tell him what to do but only activated him not to do something ill-considered). In other words, both Socrates and Kierkegaard limit their task to the negative (negation) and restrain themselves from (unfounded) positive claims. Unlike the Sophists, they keep away from telling others from the normative position how things ought to be or what they must do (Kierkegaard relates this pure negativity also to the legacy of Socrates. The heterogeneous interpretation of his message is seen as further evidence that he did not have a positive doctrine that would have been adopted by some and criticized by others, and hence limited the number of followers as a result).

Furthermore, Stewart (2015) notes that Kierkegaard learned maieutics from Socrates, which can be understood as the art of midwifery. The basic idea behind this concept is that understanding or knowledge exists within an individual. Hence, the only task that Socrates found that he must perform in this context was to help bring this knowledge out. An example of it can be found in the dialogue with Meno (an uneducated slave boy, who was able to arrive at the basic principles of geometry simply as a result of the questioning undertaken by Socrates). One can find the same approach adopted by Kierkegaard, who found that rather than teaching a believer about Christianity from the position of authority, one should find his or her own way to the truth or the inward relation to it within him or herself.

The adoption of Socratic irony by Kierkegaard relates also to the distinction between objective and subjective knowledge. For Socrates, the (objective) universalistic knowledge given by gods, which was reflected in the traditional values and customary ethics of Athens, had to be comprehended and made sense of by the individual using his or her (subjective) particularistic truths. While Socrates may not have been the first to challenge the idea that all knowledge is external and propose the internal truth as a complementary or even alternative, Kierkegaard took the idea from him.

Kierkegaard first realized it in Gilleleje in 1835 as he was contemplating what to do with his life. He ([1835] 2007:19) has recorded it in his *Journal AA* in the following way:

> What I really need is to be clear about what *I am to do*, not what I must know. … It is a question of understanding my destiny, of seeing what the Deity really wants *me* to do; the thing is to find a truth which is a truth *for me*, to find *the idea for which I am willing to live and die*.

Kierkegaard (ibid) adds in the same journal entry:

> what use would it be in this respect if I were to discover a so-called objective truth, or if I worked my way through the philosophers' systems …? And what use would it be in that respect to be able to work out a theory of the state … which I myself did not inhabit but merely held up for others to see?

Having discussed the issue in the *Concept of Irony* (both in reference to Socrates and Hegel's reading of him), Kierkegaard returns to the issue many years later in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript,* where he ([1846] 1992:184–8) discusses the 'objective truth' that can be discovered in historical records and the sources as the opposite of the 'subjective truth' that can be found in individual inward relations to the issue, such as in Christianity.

As the monograph had to wait more than a century to be translated into English (cf. Kierkegaard [1841] 1965), other scholars traced the origin of the term independently back to Aristophanes and explained its development in Classical and Medieval Latin. For instance, Sedgewick defended his PhD dissertation on the concept at Harvard in 1913[44] some 64 years after Kierkegaard.

Following Sedgewick's lead, Knox (1961) tracked the adoption and dissemination of irony through the Renaissance and the Age of Discovery. More specifically, his overview of the use of the word irony in literature (criticism) and its context covers the English classical age from 1500 to 1755 and offers the dictionary on how the word has been used as (i) pretense and deception, (ii) limited deception, (iii) blame-by-praise and praise-by-blame, (iv) saying the contrary of what one means for emphasis, the contrary being neither false praise nor false blame, (v) understatement, (vi) indirection, (vii) grave elaboration of fiction for casual satire or aimless mystification, (viii) any discourse not meant to be taken seriously, (ix) any kind of derisive attack, and (x) dramatic irony.

Standing on the shoulders of these giants and their first followers, one should not be surprised to find confirmation from the [*Online Etymology Diction-ary*](#)[45] that the English noun irony dates back to circa 1500 and has its roots in the Latin *irona* and the Greek *eironeia* and *eron*. Nevertheless, one might be surprised that unlike the explanations offered in the [modern English diction-aries,](#)[46] which stress the two possible connotations of irony – the opposite meaning of what is stated, and a trope that represents incongruity between what is expected and what occurs – the above-mentioned dictionary of etymology notes that the word was originally used as "covert sarcasm under a serious or friendly pretense".

de Man's essay, titled similarly to Kierkegaard's "The Concept of Irony", has been recognized as a ground-breaking attempt to distance himself from the interpretation of irony as one form of literary trope. He argues that instead of looking for the perfect definition of the concept, we should pay more attention to its performative function. As he (1996:165) explains:

> It helps a little to think of it in terms of the ironic man, in terms of the traditional opposition between *eiron* and *alazon*, as they appear in Greek or Hellenic comedy, the smart guy and the dumb guy. Most discourses about irony are set up that way... You must then keep in mind that the smart guy, who is by necessity the speaker, always turns out to be the dumb guy, and that he's always being set up by the person he thinks of as being the dumb guy, the *alazon*.

---

[44] See also Sedgewick (1935) – the published monograph based on his dissertation.
[45] It is actually a compilation that uses a long list of different sources, many of which are dictionaries of etymology. The full list can be found [here](#).
[46] WordNet 1.7 Vocabulary Helper might be one exception to this trend.

Given the Greek etymology of the word and its roots in Hellenic drama, it is understandable that irony as a technique to convey a powerful message has also been found in biblical texts. As suggested for example by scholars of the *Old Testament* (cf. Good 1965), *New Testament* (cf. Camery-Hoggatt, 1992) as well as the *Hebrew Bible* (cf. Sharp, 2009), irony is fundamental to an understanding of the religious text that Christians and Jews regard as sacred.[47] While Camery-Hoggatt (1992) argues that irony – especially dramatic irony – thoroughly permeates the Gospel and that this evinces a rhetorical strategy central to Mark's whole narrative, Sharp (2009, Ch. 1) suggests that a hermeneutical interpretation of the complex rhetorical irony in the Bible could offer the methodological solution for how to "overcome a naïvely realistic reading" of the ironical biblical texts with plots and characters that would otherwise mislead the reader.

In the process of decoding the text, which cannot be taken at face value, one has an advantage if one can recognize different forms of irony. One of the first attempts to provide such an overview was written by Knox (1973–1974), who identifies verbal, dramatic, cosmic, tragic, satirical, and philosophical ironies in the *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*.

Although Knox's pioneering contribution remains an important milestone in clarifying the different forms of irony and helping critics to decode the complex plots and follow the actions and psychology of the characters, it did not remain a single or isolated attempt to build such a typology of ironies. As Monson (1988:541) later ironically notes:

> The extension of the term irony has given rise to a cottage industry in taxonomy, although no two critics seem to be in agreement about their systems of classification. The varieties of irony which have been identified or suggested include verbal irony, Socratic irony, dramatic irony, satiric irony, comic irony, tragic irony, paradoxical irony, nihilistic irony, cosmic irony, romantic irony, the irony of fate, of situation, or of events, to name only a few.

Indeed, soon after the above-mentioned taxonomy was published another important typology was developed that reshaped the conceptualization of different types of ironies. More specifically, William Van O'Connor has been fine-tuning the list over decades in *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics* and *The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics,* which allows us to improve our understanding of the term. In the first edition, published in 1965, and the enlarged edition published in 1975, he distinguishes between ironies used by Classical rhetoricians and contemporary ones introduced by German romantics. In the case of the former, he (1975:407) identifies, in addition to "irony

---

[47] Additional insights can be found from German sources by Schmidinger (1990) and Voeltzel (1961). Also, Jankélévitch (1936:73ff) discusses irony in association with Christ and Domeris (2016) elaborates on the use of irony by the prophet Amos. While some theologians, such as Niebuhr (1952, Ch. 8), find that irony is not only rooted in biblical texts but has its mark on the Christian faith more generally (that allows him to interpret the role and responsibility that the US took in the aftermath of the World War II in the international arena), some scholars of humor, such as Laineste (2014:542), have suggested that irony has deep historical roots in Jewish culture and is, therefore, a particular characteristic of it. Despite globalization, she says, there have not only been examples of misunderstanding of humor but conflicts, with some rather tragic results, caused by it.

proper", the following sub-categories of Socratic irony used by classical rhetoricians: "sarcasm, meiosis and litotes (understatement); hyperbole (over-statement); antiphrasis (contrast); asterism and charientism (forms of joke); chleuasm (mockery); mycterism (the sneer); and mimesis (imitation, especially for the sake of ridicule)".[48]

In the case of German Romanticism, he distinguishes between two main categories – simulation (verbal irony) and dramatic irony – and one special form of irony, called naïveté irony, that is between the verbal and the dramatic. Moreover, according to the authors of the encyclopedic entry, "To the German romantics (Schlegel, Tieck, Solger) i[rony] was a means of expressing the paradoxical nature of reality".[49]

In the 1993 edition of the same encyclopedia, he refines the list once again and identifies the following types of ironies: classical, romantic, cosmic, verbal, situational, and dramatic/tragic. Classical irony is reported to have its origin in ancient Greek comedy and refers to the way classical and medieval rhetoricians defined the term. Unlike in the above-mentioned earlier version, however, romantic irony is now separated from simulation (verbal irony) and dramatic irony. Instead, it is said to represent the self-conscious and auto-critical form of literature. Verbal irony is explained along lines that can often also be found in general purpose language dictionaries. That is, it signifies the negation between the declared and intended meaning of the statement. Situational irony, in turn, is said to emerge from the disparity between the intended and actual result – a contradiction between reality and the desired or expected effect. Dramatic irony is often tragic as may be expected from its Greek roots. It relies on the asymmetric information between the actor and the members of the audience: when the spectators know what the actor does not. In its tragic form, spectators would understand that the main character is making a mistake that (s)he is unaware of. What is new compared to the previous version of the encyclopedia is the identification of cosmic irony as a distinct form of irony that has its genesis in the dialectics of the absolute and the relative, the general and the individual.[50]

In the fourth edition of the encyclopedia, Colebrook (2012:732–3) has further refined the list of ironies by identifying the following: simple rhetorical irony, dramatic irony, tragic irony, cosmic irony, romantic irony, and, new to this edition, postmodern irony.

Before irony in the postmodern form is discussed, some comments on irony in its modernist form are in order. This has been the topic of Matthew Stratton's book, *The Politics of Irony in American Modernism.* Contrary to the expectations

---

[48] Furthermore, the encyclopedia adds that in some contexts also "pun, paradox, conscious naïveté, parody, etc. can all be ironic".

[49] We shall return to German Romanticism's interpretation of irony in the section titled "(Romantic) Irony as Novel but Dangerous Negativity and/or Vanity that is Evil". The link between irony as a paradox in general and irony as the way of highlighting the mismatch between the expected and the observed is also the idea that relates to Merton's contribution that will be discussed in the next section titled "Irony as Unintended Consequence".

[50] Although a distinctive reference to Hegelian ideas can be found here, some critics have noted that this cosmic irony remains obscure.

of readers looking for conceptual clarity, he (2014:10) states that, "[a]ttempts to distinguish the ontologies 'modernism' and 'postmodernism' – and the forms of irony that are indexed to them – are subject to the same dynamics as attempts to distinguish between 'political' and 'apolitical' irony because the results of one's investigation are inevitably functions of what definition of 'modernism' or 'postmodernism' one adduces at the outset". Hence, instead of entering into the definitional battles of how to define (post)modern irony, he (2014:13) sets himself the goal "to think through the particular ways in which the concept of irony came to represent intersections between political and aesthetic practices in the first half of the twentieth century". He seeks to understand how the concept has been used, and his overview of the disagreements about its nature are central to the very comprehension of the different functions it can take. He (ibid:5) shows that the increased use of the concept in the first half of the past century reflects the "features not only of life and art but of the possibilities for aesthetics to orient the lives of social individuals toward political goals". The authors to whom he devotes separate chapters of the book, including Friedrich Nietzsche, Randolph Bourne, Benjamin De Casseres, Ellen Glasgow, John Dos Passos, and Ralph Ellison, led him to conclude that they "figure irony as an aesthetic politics that actively democratizes the unsayable … as a means of encouraging the transvaluation of values that have become habitual and thus invisible" (ibid:192).

Modernist irony conceptualized in such a way is a good basis for contrasting it with postmodern irony that has taken various meanings in different texts.[51] A good overview of postmodern irony can be found in the encyclopedic entry by Loredana Di Martino (2014). She explains how postmodernists overcame the nihilist attitude toward the past by embracing the ambiguity of irony, on the one hand, and are now using parodic dialogism to criticize culture from within, on the other. Furthermore, she notes that like modernist forerunners, post-modernists regard intellectuals as ironists with a moral mission to provide a critical insight into culture. Unlike the former, though, the postmodernist attitude toward culture is not 'apocalyptic' with a tendency to declare culture's authority over reality.

While post-Marxists such as Jameson (1991) question the postmodernist agenda and its willingness to engage with a political campaign against the mechanisms of capitalism, other critics, such as Hutcheon ([1992a] 1996), see postmodern irony as particularly democratic and emancipatory. According to this interpretation, it represents an ethical project that constantly revisits and criticizes the dominant narratives that shape the public imaginary. Hence, the irony is at once enlightening and emancipatory, as it allows one to make sense of the past without accepting the dominant point of view.

This is in a way the message of Rorty's much discussed *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. In this book, he takes the ironic perspective on the human condition and argues that thinkers starting with Nietzsche, followed by Freud and Wittgenstein, have portrayed human societies as historical contingencies in-

---

[51] For instance, one can get some idea of the various ways in which postmodern irony has been conceptualized from the following works: Booth (1974), Behler (1990), Lemert (2003), and Noorhani (2002).

stead of showing the 'ahistorical human nature' that realizes its 'suprahistorical goals'. To counterbalance this historized approach, Rorty (1989:73) presents a rather relativist argument:

> I shall define an 'ironist' as someone who fulfills three conditions: (1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself.
> Ironists who are inclined to philosophize see the choice between vocabularies as made neither within a neutral and universal metavocabulary nor by an attempt to fight one's way past appearances to the real, but simply by playing the new off against the old. I call people of this sort 'ironists' because their realization that anything can be made to look good or bad...

Lemert takes Rorty as a point of departure in his contribution to the edited volume *Postmodernism and Social Theory: The Debate over General Theory* under the chapter titled "General Social Theory, Irony, Postmodernism". Having reminded the reader of Rorty's definition of an ironist, he (1992:17–21) argues that the most important contemporary social theorists meet these conditions. Among them, he mentions Quentin Skinner, C. Wright Mills, Robert Merton, Anthony Giddens, and Jonathan Turner, who all in their own right ironize over the possibility of having the final vocabulary (i.e., the last day and final truth) in social theory and can therefore be regarded as postmodern ironists.

Likewise, Konstantinou (2009, 2016) gives an overview of how the position of irony has changed since World War II in American fiction – migrating from the margins of the subculture of the 1960s to the mainstream of the 1980s. Along that path, says Konstantinou, irony was absorbed into postmodernism, whose writers stated the use of 'postirony' without limitations. This meant that the cool characters in these postmodern fictions took the form of hipsters, punks, believers, coolhunters, and occupiers. Along with these cool characters, says Konstantinou, irony became the symbol that signifies cynicism and political passivity. Having grown out of the naivety of earlier generations and the irony of its reaction, postirony has come to dominate American fiction since the 1990s.

Konstantinou (2017) builds on the earlier work in his "Four Faces of Post-irony". He argues in this paper that irony has come to dominate not only fiction but has become the central feature of contemporary American culture (although it seems that his comments do not go much beyond contemporary literature and some occasional remarks about American television programs). He organizes the heterogeneity of postmodern irony in terms of form and content into four categories of contemporary artistic modes: motivated postmodernism, credulous metafiction, post-ironic Bildungsroman, and relational art. While he (ibid:100–2) admits that this list may not be exhaustive, he is confident that it represents the most frequent ways in which irony has been used in American postmodern literature in general and in fiction in particular. Nevertheless, he concludes that

the future development of these lines of post-ironic expressions is an open question. Although postirony already seems to present for him the dominant form and content of contemporary fiction in America, it is unclear if it will become hegemonic. What is clear for him in the era of postirony is the need for self-irony to write and publish under (post-)postmodernism characterized by advanced globalization and neoliberalism.

Bucholc (2013) discusses the issue of (post)modernism among two classical sociological thinkers in the essay titled "Irony as Vocation: The Fate of a Social Scientist in the Writings of Max Weber and Norbert Elias". She contrasts in this paper modernist Weber with postmodernist Elias. On the one hand, she shows how Weber's quest for objective social science contradicts his actual research practice. On the other hand, she explains how Elias's search for originality via the eclectic selection and adaptation of different ideas in his writings allowed him, despite a personal detachment from reality, not only to overcome the obstacles of departmental politics in academia and the dangers of possible disappointment in one's academic career that Weber ([1895] 1980) had warned about in his inaugural lecture given in Freiburg,[52] but to make provocative and inspiring contributions to sociological thinking. For Bucholc, Elias is at the same time a modern and objective Weberian as well as a postmodern and subjective ironist.

To sum up, it was suggested in this section that irony can be seen as a by-product of the Enlightenment. Having established that it emerged in contemporary form from Scottish and English writings from the Enlightenment era, it proceeded with an overview of how the encyclopedic entries of the concept have been extended over the decades that can be seen as a reflection of modernist progress. Finally, an overview of how the term has been conceptualized by postmodernists was given. It should be clear now that unlike the postmodernists, who are skeptical about the possibility of getting to the truth of the matter, literary scholars, philosophers, and even theologians, who represent the Enlightenment, claim (or can be interpreted) to use irony as a methodological technique to unravel reality.[53] In comparison to them, social scientists in general and sociologists in particular have not been the most passionate and active in adopting irony for the sake of learning what is going on in society. Nevertheless, several different approaches to the use of irony in human and social sciences have been used. An overview of these will be provided in the following sections.

1.1   Irony as Unintended Consequence

The recognition that irony has a place in sociological thinking and methods owes much to Robert Merton's students and followers.[54] Although Merton does not speak explicitly about irony, he (Merton 1936) contributes to its adoption and

---

[52] I shall return to this in section 1.6, where the idea of the 'socially unattached intellectual' will be discussed in relation to Lukács.

[53] As Kenneth Burke (1969:503) explicitly states: "I refer to metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. And my primary concern with them here will be not with their purely figurative usage, but with their role in the discovery and description of 'the truth.'"

[54] This includes, for instance, Weinstein (1982), who has provided one of the typologies of the use of irony in sociology that was mentioned in the introduction above.

use in sociological research by introducing the notion of 'unanticipated conse-
quences' that he (Merton [1957/1949], 1968:105) later uses interchange-ably
with 'unintended consequences'. The concept signifies for him an instance where
the social outcome is brought about by the actions of an actor that had quite dif-
ferent initial intentions.

Even though 'irony' and 'paradox' are mentioned only in passing in Merton's
most important contribution, *Social Theory and Social Structure*,[55] one can find
the first clues of his plan to work out how the concepts of irony, dialectical move-
ment, the principle of emergence, creative synthesis and unintended conse-
quences relate to each other in his essay from 1936. Indeed, it is in this paper,
titled "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action", that Merton
(1936:903) indicates that the paradox between intentions and unintended out-
comes has, among others, been used by Hegel, Marx, and Wundt, and it is the
cornerstone of Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.[56] Following
Weber,[57] Merton developed the idea behind 'unanticipated consequences'.[58] One
can find how the concept is linked to paradox and irony already in his doctoral
dissertation*, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England*, de-
fended at Harvard in 1936 and first published in 1938, where he argues that the
influence of Puritanism on science was largely unintended to its leaders, such as
Calvin. Indeed, he (1938:417) states that "[o]ne of the basic results of this study
is the fact that the most significant influence of Puritanism upon science was
largely unintended by the Puritan leaders. That Calvin himself deprecated sci-
ence only enhances the paradox that from him stemmed a vigorous movement
which furthered interest in this very field." Note that, while he uses the 'unin-

---

[55] While these concepts do not feature as the central concepts in Merton's best-known work, they,
nevertheless, do emerge in the context where he praises Veblen's extraordinary sociological gift.
More particularly, Merton mentions the above-mentioned concepts in the third chapter, titled
"Manifest and Latent Functions" in the context of when he (1968:123) characterizes Veblen "as a
social analyst gifted with an eye for the paradoxical, the ironic, the satiric". Veblen's exemplary
sociological talent to use irony in his scholarship has later been continued by Merton's students
and their students, such as Schneider (1976) and Machaiek (1979). He is also presented by Watson
(2015b) as one of the best examples of the use of the ironic method in sociology.
[56] The suggestion that Weber is using irony in some of his most well-known works and theories
has not gone unnoticed since then. Among others, R. Collins (1980), as well as Sewell and Barker
(2006a; 2006b), have drawn attention to it. For an overview of the use of the closely related con-
cept of 'paradox' in the work of Weber, see Symonds and Pudsey (2008).
[57] This has not gone unnoticed by Boudon (1990) and Mica (2018:90, 2017). Moreover, the link
and similarities between Weber's and Merton's reasoning that manifests itself in the conceptual-
ization of unintended consequences of social actions have been demonstrated in detail by
Cherkaoui (2007).
[58] Further discussion on the development and evolution of the concept can be found in Mica (2015).
The lasting theoretical relevance and comments on the concept, including the unanticipated con-
sequences and Merton's legacy, can be found in Boudon (1977), Gerlich (1998), Mica (2018 Ch. 4),
Portes (2000:18–24; 2010a:19–20; 2010b:49), Zingerle (1998), and the sources mentioned
therein. Merton's own reflections on the development of the concept can be found in the two Af-
terwords to the edited volumes on his sociological legacy (cf. Merton 1990; 1998b).

tended' in this context, he never mentions the term 'irony' – preferring to use in this work the word 'paradox', instead.[59]

Severyn Bruyn is one of the first to describe the use of irony in sociology in the paper titled "Rhetorical Devices in Sociological Analysis" and the book *The Human Perspective in Sociology: The Methodology of Participant Observation*. Remarkably, he (1964:106; 1966:152) identifies Alvin Gouldner's PhD, written under the guidance of Merton (cf. 1982) at Columbia University and published as *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* in 1954, as one of the exemplary uses of irony in sociology. Indeed, Gouldner (1954) shows that the succession of management duties from one manager to the next brings some unintended consequences – in this case, more bureaucratization. In scientific terms, the new boss cannot rely on informal rules and relationships, on the one hand, and workers are still loyal to his or her predecessor, on the other, and so the new boss must rely heavily on formalized procedures. In short, the new management brings, contrary to expectations, not less but more red tape.

A more detailed investigation of the idea to link unintended and unanticipated consequences explicitly to irony as a tool of sociological analysis is presented by Louis Schneider (1975a:xii). As another student of Merton, it is not difficult to see his mentor's influence when he introduces in more detail than other scholars, from Mandeville to Smith, the sociological approach of Weber, Veblen, and Merton as ironic in the chapter titled "Irony and Unintended Consequences", which is part of the book *The Sociological Way of Looking at the World* (Schneider 1975a), and even more explicitly in his chapter, titled "Ironic Perspective and Sociological Thought" (Schneider 1975b), published as a part of *Festschrift* edited by Coser and titled *The Idea of Social Structure: Papers in Honor of Robert K. Merton*. Indeed, the ideas presented in the first of these chapters are put into intellectual context in the second – making the influence and inspiration of Merton to identify ironic perspective as one of the most illuminating approaches in sociology more than explicit.

While Schneider uses irony as a very broad term, often equating it like Merton with paradox, it is not without qualification either. To start with he presents many social issues related to social control and deviance that have attracted the promoters of the social interactionist school, from drug addiction to prostitution, as ironic if interpreted from the structural functionalist perspective.[60] Instead of taking a stand against the former and in support of the latter, he stresses that the irony of the outcome becomes apparent only if one adopts what he calls a "sociological way of looking at the world" (1975a) in general and an "ironic perspective" (1975b) in particular. Once this approach to social analysis is adopted, he argues, many of the more general topics in the study of society, from sexual be-

---

[59] In addition to the presented citation, Merton uses the notions of 'paradox' and 'paradoxically' a few more times in the text (cf. Merton 1938:458, 591, 460).

[60] His argument relies to a large extent on the work of Matza (1969) introduced in the previous section. Likewise, it also relates to the typology of ironic approaches in sociology presented by Anderson and Sharrock (1983), in general, and the fourth tactic, labeled as "moral reversals", that they introduce, in particular.

havior across racial and ethnic groups to the operations of organizations, markets and democracy, can be interpreted as ironic.

Nevertheless, Schneider does accept the limits of the ironic analysis of social matters. As he (1975b:323) puts it so eloquently:

> ... irony is intimately bound up with a great deal of sociological thought and that ironic perspectives stimulate such thought profoundly. It would be quite absurd to go so far as to claim that thinking in ironic terms is the alpha and omega of the whole sociological enterprise. Thus, the most penetrating ironies, by themselves, could hardly yield a theory of social structure. But the sociological significance of ironic perspectives or terms is easily suggested ... by efforts to specify the meaning of irony as soon as one gets away from a very limited conception of it as a figure of speech.

What has gone unnoticed in the context of identifying irony as central to the ground-breaking contributions to the different fields and traditions of the sociological discipline, is the influence of Paul Lazarsfeld, the second key figure next to Robert Merton at Columbia University, and his understanding of the aim of modern sociology.[61] According to him, the goal of sociology should not be to confirm what common sense says – to become "the science of obvious". Instead, the goal of the discipline should be to discover the hidden and make it flaunted. This becomes clear from his extended comments on *The American Soldier* which produced a wealth of unexpected survey results about the psychological experiences among the men who served in the US armed forces during World War II (cf. Lazarsfeld 1949).[62]

In this context, it is noteworthy that when Kingsley Davis first writes about prostitution in the article titled "Sociology of Prostitution", published in 1937, the idea that providing sexual pleasures for financial and non-financial benefits could bring unintended consequences is not quite there yet, although he is not very far from expressing it. Consider, for instance, the following passage that summarizes the message of Davis (1937:755):

> Where the family is strong, there tends to be a well-defined system of prostitution and the social regime is one of status. Women are either part of the family system, or they are definitely not a part of it. In the latter case they are prostitutes, members of a caste set apart. There are few intermediate groups, and there is little mobility. This enables the two opposite types of institutions to function side by side without confusion; they are each staffed by a different personnel, humanly as well as functionally distinct. But where familial controls are weak, the system of prostitution tends to be poorly defined. Not only is it more nearly permissible to satisfy one's desire outside the family, but also it is easier to find a respectable member of society willing to act as partner. This is why a decline of the family and a decline of prostitution are both associated with a rise of sex freedom. Women, released from close family supervi-

---

[61] Note that Lazarsfeld was not formally trained as a sociologist and saw different disciplines of the social sciences as rather similar in terms of their interest in social action and the methods for studying it (cf. Boudon 1980:89, 91).

[62] Clark (2011) suggests that Lazarsfeld was ironic as a person. If so, the link between irony and sociological research in the Columbian tradition may indeed extend beyond Merton.

sion, are freer to seek gratification outside it. The more such women, the easier it is for men to find in intimate relations with them the satisfactions formerly supplied by harlots. This is why the unrestricted indulgence in sex for the fun of it by both sexes is the greatest enemy, not only of the family, but also of prostitution.

Given the fact that Merton (1936 [1957/1949], 1968, Ch. 3) first developed and published his ideas on latent functions and unintended consequences around the same time and Davis polemicized the functional tradition, including the manifested and latent functions in the paper titled "The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology", he now sees the evolution of the very functional tradition in ironic terms when he (1959:765) says that "The functionalist movement, as I see it, represents an effort to Analysis social organization and behavior from a disinterested observer's point of view. This is why the manifest-latent distinction is important. Ironically, however, the movement has fallen victim to what it sought to overcome."

In this context it should not come as a surprise that in the new version of the paper "Prostitution", published in the volume edited by Merton and Nisbet, Davis (1961:283–4) interprets the unintended consequences of the changes in tolerance toward sexual freedom in paradoxical and ironic terms as follows:

> If we reverse the prostitution that increased sex freedom among women of all classes reduces the role of prostitution, we find ourselves admitting that increased prostitution may reduce the sexual irregularities of respectable women. This, in fact, has been the ancient justification for tolerated prostitution – that it 'protected' the family and kept the wives and daughters of the respectable citizenry pure. ... Such a view strikes us as paradoxical, because in popular discourse an evil such as prostitution cannot cause a good such as feminine virtue, or vice versa. Yet, as our analysis has implied throughout, there is a close connection between prostitution and the structure of the family.

Another example of the use of irony as unintended consequences can be found in Daniel Bell's article, titled "Crime as an American Way of Life", which was originally published in 1953. He argues that the gray economy, including the racketeering and/or price-fixing in prostitution, clothing, trucking of perishable foods, waterfront loading, and especially the gambling industry, has offered the "queer ladder of social mobility" for immigrants to integrate into America's 'open' society. On top of this, the quondam racketeer – like the exemplary Frank Costello, who was not only active in the gray economy but wished to become a respectable businessman – found a 'path-breaking' way to make the voice of Italian immigrants heard with the power structures by financing opposition politicians. Not long after this, the political positions were also opened for second or third-generation immigrants of Italian ethnicity – a paradoxical and rather unintended consequence of the processes and operations produced by the (players in the) gray economy.

These telling examples of the use of irony as an unintended consequence by the representatives of functionalism are by far not the only ones. Baert (1991) offers a typology of the use of the notion and shows that even though its roots are in functional sociology, one can find examples also in rational choice theory,

and figuration sociology. His theoretical typology takes the classification to the logical end which allows him to differentiate between five dimensions that have 14 sub-features (some of which have further classifications).

Likewise, the bibliometric search for the application of Merton's 'unintended consequences' in academic literature confirms that the use of the notion is not limited to sociology.[63] Even the refinement of the search for the combined use of 'irony'[64] or 'paradox'[65] supports the hypothesis (inspired by Baert's work) that sociology is not the only subject area where one can find such examples.

To sum up the presentation of irony as an explication of the unintended it should be emphasized that much of it was pioneered by Merton and developed into its polished form by his students. It should further be reminded that Merton equated irony rather loosely with paradox.[66] Nevertheless, what differentiates him and his students from the philosophers, such as Quine (1962), who finds paradox in illogical conclusions that were reached following logical procedures, is the emphasis on unintended consequences and latent (dys)functions. It will be shown below that irony also relates to dialectic reasoning in the context of which it has been observed by social theorists of various kinds that actions can bring not just unintended or unanticipated consequences but a heterogony of ends and unforeseen social evolution or economic development.

1.2   Irony as a Logic of Discovery

One can think of irony not so much as a method but as a logic of discovery. This subsection will elaborate on this way of thinking about irony. Although one can find elements that are similar to the reasoning that Reinhold Niebuhr (1952) uses in *The Irony of American History* and the anti-realist research practices among some historians, which Adrian Kuzminski (1979) identifies (and criti-

---

[63] As of April 23, 2001, one could identify 335 publications in Scopus that mention the concept in the title, abstract, or key terms and list Merton in the references. The distribution of different subject areas within these publications is as follows: 192 in social sciences; 91 in business, management, and accounting; 48 in medicine; 47 in economics, econometrics, and finance; 35 in arts and humanities; 27 in psychology; 26 in computer science; 23 in engineering; 14 in decision sciences; and 14 in environmental sciences.

[64] The refinement of the search within this list to publications that also mention 'irony' anywhere in the text limits the number of publications down to 22. Yet, even in this subset sociology is not the only subject area as 12 publications are from social sciences; 7 from business, management, and accounting; 3 from economics, econometrics, and finance, 1 from arts and humanities; 1 from environmental sciences; and 1 from medicine. The only two publications that mention 'irony' in the title have been presented by Hoyle and Wallace (2007), who discuss educational reforms in the UK from an ironic perspective, and Rossa and Rothe (2008) who discuss the ironies of controlling state crime.

[65] The refinement of the search within this list to publications that also mention 'paradox' in the title, abstract or key terms limits the number of publications down to 16. While publications from social sciences (12) dominate in this subset, one can also find some examples from business, management, and accounting (4) as well as single examples from engineering (1), computer science (1), and decision sciences (1).

[66] The (dis)similarities and (dis)connections between paradox and irony have been discussed by Bruyn (1966:149–59) and Matza (1969:69, 77–8). The link between dialectics and irony has been investigated by Schneider (1971).

cizes) as ironists,[67] what is going to be presented in the following pages relies primarily on Richard Harvey Brown, whose successive work on the topic has given the name to the sub-category. His elaborations on irony as a logic of discovery will be illustrated using examples by other sociologists and extended by the presentation of comments from his admirers and critics. In this context, special attention will be given in the second part of the sub-section to the work of Steven Woolgar, who has used irony to discover the hidden ways of the workings of science.

Brown (1977) has suggested that sociology needs to be humanized in his monograph titled *A Poetic for Sociology: Toward a Logic of Discovery for the Human Sciences*. His argument is based on his PhD dissertation, defended at the University of California, San Diego, which also reflects the influence of Merton, which he was exposed to during his master's studies at Columbia University in the city of New York. More specifically, he does not only take a critical position on the state of the affairs of contemporary sociological theory development – finding it basically bankrupt – but suggests humanistic sociology as a viable alternative. Unlike the current state of affairs, the humanized version of sociology would be true to its subject matter, on the one hand, and able to be at the same time both objective and subjective, on the other. In other words, he (ibid, Ch. 1) argues that functionalism, both its Parsonian and Marxist versions, has reached the point of maximal utility, where any additional investigation is unlikely to provide new insight, and he proposes that sociological investigation should become closer to literary and philosophical traditions. In other words, humanist sociology should aim at eliminating the distinction between art and science – to produce a social theory that is at the same time objective and subjective. To achieve this, he (ibid:174) argues that irony as "a logic of discovery for the human sciences" needs to be employed.

There are four major modes of ironic expression that help to produce new knowledge in social theory. According to Brown (ibid:175), these are (i) rhetorical irony, (ii) irony of manner, (iii) the irony of events, and (iv) dramatic or dialectical irony. He explains that "[r]hetorical irony is, briefly, the stating of a meaning that is ambiguous, with the implication that the audience, the speaker, and the object are free to interpret the meaning in a sense opposite to the one conventionally assumed." Although it is most frequently used for putting down opponents and uplifting allies, "[t]he sweetest use of rhetorical irony is in pretending to take one's opponent's arguments seriously and then showing their absurdity by defining them beyond credible limits". Exemplary works that have implied this can be found in Hume's argument against the claim that the design of nature can be used as proof of God (cf. Price 1965) or the way Wolin (1960) extends the argument of Selznick to its logical end to show that the idea of the professed dem-

---

[67] These ironists in historical research are, according to Kuzminski (1979:317–38), questioning historical realism – the truth value of historical descriptions because of their lack of critical sophistication. For them, any historical fact, event or description in histography presents just one possible point of view, as they are constructed and therefore contestable. The exemplary works of this kind can be found in historical research by Hughes, White, Horkeheimer and Mancelbaum.

ocrat is based on the same kind of organizational theory as proposed by the autocratic Lenin.

The irony of manner refers to face-to-face interaction. Brown (1977:175) explains that "[i]n irony of manner an ambiguous act is performed, the intentions and meaning of which are referred back to the audience, the actor, and the actor's mode of expression, the implication being that the message is the opposite of its medium". He says that exemplary works in this tradition can be found in the behavioral ploys exploited by Socrates or the way individuals being studied ironize sociologists, as done by Agnes about her gender in the work of Garfinkel (1967).

The irony of events, also known as cosmic irony, refers to the situation where there is a mismatch between the actual outcome and sociological expectations, which are then explained by forces that are beyond human control such as history, fate, or the will of the gods. This is what Hegel (1896, I:400) calls "the objective irony of history".

The fourth type of irony that advances social theory, and for Brown the most interesting, is dramatic irony. The three sub-types of dramatic irony identified by him (1977:184) are as follows: (i) Unmasking – A is not (merely) A, but (also) B; (ii) Functional interdependency of contraries – A opposes, but at the same time depends on, B; and finally, (iii) Dialectical resolution of opposites – A, in opposing B, becomes (like) B. He gives multiple examples of how dramatic irony in sociological research has been conducted. Perhaps the three most telling examples in terms of unmasking the unexpected similarities, identifying the functional interdependency of contraries, and illustrating the dialectical resolution of opposites originate from the works of Edwin Lemert (mediated by David Matza), Kingsley Davis, and Friedrich Engels.

As an example of unmasking – A is not (merely) A, but (also) B – the following citation from Matza (1969:83–4), who is relying on the work of Lemert's conceptual similarity between physicians and whores as professionals, is quite revealing:

> By prostitution, Lemert means the coincidence of three features: an exchange of sexual favor for material return; more or less indiscriminate indulgence with many persons; and a dissociation of deeper feelings from the physical act. If one omits the reference to the sexual act – the special province of prostitution – the elements of Lemert's conception suggest a similarity not limited to feminine activity. The rendering of a service for a fee, the absence of dis-crimination in the choice of clientele (universalism), and a dissociation of deeper feelings from the service rendered (affective neutrality) are among the key elements of what is mainly a masculine activity – profession. There should be nothing surprising about this similarity: Prostitution is among the oldest of professions, and professionals always fear prostituting themselves.

As an example of functional interdependency of contraries – A opposes, but at the same time depends on, B – Brown draws also on K. Davis (1961:283–4):

> If we reverse the prostitution that increased sex freedom among women of all classes reduces the role of prostitution, we find ourselves admitting that increased prostitution may reduce the sexual irregularities of respectable wom-

en. This, in fact, has been the ancient justification for tolerated prostitution – that it 'protected' the family and kept the wives and daughters of the respectable citizenry pure. … Such a view strikes us as prostitution cannot cause a good such as feminine virtue, or vice versa. Yet, as our analysis has implied throughout, there is a close connection between prostitution and the structure of the family.

Last but not least, as an example of the dialectical resolution of opposites – A, in opposing B, becomes (like) B – Engels' (1939:200) observations about the relationship between ancient slavery and modern freedom are offered:

> It was slavery that first made possible the division between agriculture and industry on a considerable scale, and along with this, the flower of the ancient world, Hellenism. Without slavery, no Greek state, no Greek art and science; without slavery, no Roman Empire. But without Hellenism and the Roman Empire as a basis, also no modern Europe.

> We should never forget that our whole economic, political and intellectual development has as its presupposition a state of things in which slavery was as necessary as it was universally recognized. In this sense we are entitled to say: Without the slavery of antiquity, no modern socialism.

Given the promise of the third sub-type of the dramatic irony to resolve opposites, it should not be surprising to learn that Brown associates it with dialectical irony. Instead of putting stress on synthesis, as will be highlighted in the next sub-section, he (1983:543) explains the category as a technique that "illuminates its audience and its subject matter with dialectically ironic insights". Although he (1977:176) distinguishes it from the other types of irony mentioned above by its strict boundedness in terms of the practical limits that irony needs to be created within a few hours of a theatrical play or in fifty pages of an essay, the truly distinctive feature of it lies "in the relationship between the ironist and the audience". Similar to rhetorical irony, "[t]he ironist is aware that the true meaning of his speech or gesture is the opposite of what his ignorant victim takes it to be, and the audience is allowed to enter into his perspective". As a result, "the higher knowledge of the audience takes the form of *fore*knowledge, an awareness of the forgiveness of how the action *must* take place." The exemplary literary works are said to be Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment* and Sophocles's *Oedipus*.

Unfortunately, Brown does not provide, in addition to these examples from the literature, clarifications on how these four different types of irony (as a method of discovery) have been used in sociology. Instead, he (ibid:178–220) offers an overview of how irony in more general terms has been used by sociologists such as Weber, Merton, Goffman, and Sorokin, among others. We learn that "[w]herever sociological analysis is interesting, its basic concepts have … ironic edge. Unexpected similarities are revealed, as are unnoticed differences; opposites are seen to require each other or even to converge; sincerity is seen as bad faith, therapy as manipulation, the law as opposed to order, evil as containing hidden good" (ibid:185).

But he also reminds us that the sociologist who uses irony to unmask social reality should avoid becoming a "hypocrite who hides evil in a cloak of virtue, or

the reformer who strips away this cloak". Instead, the ironist should be "just as pleased to find goodness hiding within evil as he is to unmask evil posing as good" (ibid:184). In other words, to escape banalities, which would allow sociology to be discredited to "the science of obvious", he suggests employing the paradox – dialectical tension between the expected and the revealed. This allows him to formulate "the law of irony", which stipulates that "when the highest degree of incongruity is combined with the greatest degree of inevitability, there results a statement of the greatest theoretical value" (ibid:183–4).

While Brown has been returning to the promise of irony as the logic of discovery in his follow-up publications, it is also true that he has mostly been stressing the dialectic aspect of it. For instance, in the paper, titled "Dialectical Irony. Literary Form and Sociological Theory", he (1983:546) states, after having given a rather comprehensive overview of the use of irony in philosophy and literature, that "[d]ialectical irony encompasses and completes all the other forms". In the monograph titled *Social Science as Civic Discourse. Essays on the Invention, Legitimation, and Uses of Social Theory,* he (1989, Ch. 6) associates irony as a linguistic trope with formalism as the root metaphor and phenomenology as the historical science. He explains that form is an abstraction that mimics reality (experience). When it comes to historical sciences that intend to make sense of the relative role and importance of structure and agent in historical events and developments, it is irony that becomes the tool for finding the solution. As he (ibid, 117–8) puts it:

> The 'tension' of irony, what gives it its dramatic richness, lies exactly in its revealing the contradictions in the relationship between the intentions of human actors and the outcomes of historical events, and between the prospective awareness of historical agents in history and the retrospective awareness of writers of history. This mood is itself emancipatory since it requires for its completion the active participation of the audience: For irony to operate its auditors must resolve the intentional ambiguities of the text and impose their own determinate meaning. Thus irony not only sees the historical actors as having been agents; it also casts the contemporary reader into the role of agent, for it is she who must determine facticity and meaning of the past. It is this ironic tension between two or more modes of awareness that signals the critical self-consciousness of both the historical actors as well as historians.

In his papers devoted more directly to methodological problems he has set himself the task of unmasking how the quantitative tradition came to dominate modern social science (cf. 1990b; 1993; 1998, Ch. 2; Brown & Schubert 2002), linking the concept of irony to ethnomethodology (cf. 1990b:67–9; 1998:56–9) and allowing himself to venture into postmodernism (cf. 1990a). To the extent that he reflects on his works on irony, he conceptualizes it in these more recent publications as a method through which the essence of the subject matter becomes apparent to us. He (1990a:67) says that: "[a]s a way of knowledge, irony helps us understand things by framing them from the perspective of their antitheses. To render something ironic is to stretch it from its conventional context and place it in an opposite one. Through such a negation, we become more aware of what that thing is". Similar to the conclusion of his book, *A Poetic for Sociology: Toward a Logic of Discovery for the Human Sciences*, and in the spirit of the thesis of the

logic of discovery he notes that "[s]ituations may become new sociological problems when represented through irony."

In other words, Brown offers a perspective that differs substantially from other postmodernists like Rorty, who question the possibility of getting to the truth of the matter. Instead, Brown (1990a:188–9) sees that postmodernism offers the possibility to move beyond the questioning of the "formerly privyleged discourses".[68] More specifically, he argues that once "the deconstructive criticism has done its work … the postmodernist project has the potential to radicalize the methods, the objects, and the very conceptions of our sociological enterprise. In particular, the postmodern transvaluation of epistemology wrenches us away from our most treasured beliefs about the constitution of science, knowledge, and even reason".

Being inspired by the ethnographic work of sociologists of knowledge and science (including among others Knorr-Cetina, Latour and Woolgar), Brown comes to realize that the way science is actually done differs from the way it is portrayed by positivists. By objecting to the impression that research is conducted by an impersonal scientist, as an objective designer of experiments, who tests the hypothesis and, hence, adds another brick to the wall of science, Brown adopts the understanding that all science, sociology included, is socially constructed. To counterbalance the unrealistic picture that positivism is portraying, he subscribes to the ideas of ethnomethodology when he stresses that human sciences are not only socially constructed but need to become more reflexive. Although he occasionally refers to Bourdieu and Gouldner – sociologists who are well known for the importance that they assign to reflexivity in socio-logical research – it is clear from the writings that they are not his source of inspiration. Instead, he seems to have been inspired by Garfinkel's work[69] when it comes to reflexivity. More specifically, Brown (1990b:67–8) finds the link between irony and reflexivity in Garfinkel's (1967:116) concept of 'ironic distancing' and his exemplary application of it to unmask "his own rationality revealing it to be a social construction with no inherently superior status".

To sum up how Brown has contributed to the possible use of irony in sociology, one can restate that he (1977) initially associated the concept with the 'logic of discovery' for (human) sciences. More recently, however, he has drifted away from this to a postmodernism that does not only question the established ways of thinking but combined with the principles of ethnomethodology, such as reflexivity, has allowed him to overcome the unrealistic position of positive-ism and equate it with 'narratives of conversion' (1994:4) that could be used to "induce readers into new ways of thinking and experiencing" in a variety of fields from the humanities (like literature and philosophy), to social and natural sciences (like ethnography and astronomy).

---

[68] One example of it can be found in the work of postmodern feminism that applies, according to Berry (1995:118), irony to challenge the essentialist claims made by white, middle-class, chauvinist male thinkers.

[69] Garfinkel speaks about irony only in passing when he (1967:280–2) discusses "the rational properties of scientific and common sense activities".

There are several scholars who have found Brown's ideas on the role of irony in human sciences attractive. Among them, Watson has attempted to draw attention to the potential use of irony as a methodological tool of social sciences, including sociology, in a series of publications (cf. Watson 2011, 2015a, 2015b, 2020). Unfortunately, despite her claim of filling the vacuum by making "a sensible case for the place of humor as a methodology for the social sciences" (Watson 2015a:407) and offering something substantial "in the way of method to support the development of dialectical irony as a key analytical tool for the social sciences" (Watson 2000:91), one is left rather empty handed.

Nevertheless, one can also find some commentators who find Brown's ideas less attractive. Among them Brittan (1983:592), who problematizes the 'linguistic turn' in sociology. Instead of accepting the above-presented idea that sociology should try to escape from becoming the 'science of obvious' by presenting "the ironic insights of some of sociology's more interesting practitioners", it is totally fine for him if sociologists abandon the linguistic games that make them use abstruse language to justify their *raison d'être*. Furthermore, it does not seem to bother him much that, as a result of this process, there is an "ironic possibility that what emerges will be banal and uninteresting" (ibid:593). Quite the contrary, by clear communication without the technical jargon of the discipline, sociology as the study of society and group behavior would only benefit from becoming straightforward and accessible to the masses. The use of irony, which may be understandable only for some (more insightful parties of the conversation or with a particular sense of humor) seems to be undesirable for Brittan who argues that discipline should not aim at originality but clarity.

To achieve this, sociology should first undertake the "complete reexamination of its ideological structures, that it has forced practitioners to come to terms with their epistemological inadequacies and their commitment to this or that language game" (ibid:594). Once the restrictive use of private language, which is spoken and understood only by the professionals who have been socialized to speak its jargon as a result of their training and practice, has been given up, will sociology and sociologists be liberated. In short, according to Brittan, "the demystification of language can be seen as a precondition of emancipatory praxis" (ibid) within sociology.

Finally, there are also scholars who take the middle-of-the-road position on Brown's ideas about irony as a logic of discovery in sociology. Among them, Woolgar puts forward an argument for 'constructivist irony' in a paper titled "Irony in the Social Study of Science". Rather than supporting the idea that irony can be seen as a tool that enables one to get closer to the subject matter or bring about unexpected discoveries, he returns to his co-authored earlier work, *Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts*, which actually inspired Brown. Latour and Woolgar ([1979] 1986, Ch. 2, Ch. 4) did not only demonstrate that even the phenomena that we call facts are actually socially constructed but showed the process behind this – how with the circumstances of the lab and the career background of the researchers, initial results with a set of

equally probable explanations were transformed into finalized research outcomes. In short, how order was created from chaos.

In the follow-up reflection, Woolgar (1983:249) adds an example of why official statistics on recorded suicides are not necessarily the same as the number of actual suicides. He explains that official statistics depend greatly on how the variables are defined, and how and by whom the data is collected, described, and analyzed. As he (ibid) puts it: "… the argument of the ironists is that official statistics tell you more about the social circumstances of the contracting agency than about the extent of the phenomena they purport to measure: official statistics are to be treated as constructed rather than as reflecting the actual state of affairs."

Furthermore, he (ibid:250–1) explains the social construction of science, which applies also to the social construction of news, in three stages. First, the relevant topic to be ironized is selected. For instance, in the research tradition of the social study of science, one would expect that the issue that is taken up in the analysis would be relevant to the real world of science and/or how scientists believe it to operate. The second step is to establish that reality actually differs from what it appears to be. The above-mentioned work by Latour and Woolgar ([1979] 1986) about laboratory life and the social construction of facts by scientists serves as a good example – someone who is distant from the world of empirical research in the natural sciences would be surprised to learn how social aspects influence what is studied and how the results are produced. The third and, according to Woolgar (1983:251), the most important step in the process of ironizing is to show that the two interpretations of the issue under investigation are not simply different but they are "alternative versions of the *same* reality".

Having listed the three steps of 'constructive irony', Woolgar goes on to point out some of the troubles related to 'instrumental irony' as he (ibid:258) renames it. On the one hand, he (ibid:259) recognizes that it demands that the readers are competent enough to be able to recognize and appreciate the irony.[70] He (ibid:258–60) refers to it, based on Booth (cf. 1974, Ch. 1), as 'stable irony' because it assumes a fixed relationship between ironist and audience. This can be contrasted to Kierkegaard's irony, which is essentially dynamic because it aims to bring readers to a state of awareness (which is why it was presented in section 1.1., "Irony as 'Enlightenment'").

On the other hand, Woolgar (1983:258) flirts with the perspective of critical meta-theory analysis that Ritzer (1987, 1988a, 1989, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1991d, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 2007) developed. He also contemplates the possibility that constructive ironists could engage in auto-critical self-inquiry using the same tools of irony for this, as contemplated by critical sociologists of sociology, such as Bourdieu (1975, 1993a, Ch. 6–7), Friedrichs (1970), and Gouldner (1970). Consider, for instance, the argument that he (1983:254) makes about 'constructivist irony':

---

[70] He basically seems to suggest that irony is relational. This is in line with what he observes elsewhere in the text when he (1983:240) identifies the problem "between the objects of study and statements made about those objects".

> The question of whether or not constructivist irony is critical of extant accounts is closely linked to whether or not the ironical perspective can be applied to itself. If in principle alternative accounts can arise from the scientist's confrontation with the object of his inquiry, does it follow that alternative accounts are equally available as a result of the sociologist's work? The question is important because if the answer is 'yes' we are faced with the problem of not knowing how to evaluate the sociologist's account: it would, after all, be only one of a number of alternatives. If constructivist irony is not to be limited to instances of scientific practice, the sociologist's own account can equally well be ironized. That is, we could 'highlight' or 'discover' that the sociologist's account is not as straightforward as it seems, that it results from a process of social construction guided by the author's social and cognitive interests, in circumstances reflecting the author's place in a social hierarchy, with a view to certain political ends and so on.

Building on these comments, Woolgar points out another trouble related to ironizing by indicating that it can become a double-edged sword. More specifically, he (ibid) supports the observation that the act of ironizing makes the ironist himself a target of criticism. As Gusfield (1981:190), whose remark he reinforces, has noted: "the ironist sets himself above his subjects by claiming a higher level of insight and awareness". Being aware that this makes the ironist vulnerable within a highly competitive intellectual environment, Woolgar carefully asserts that the constructive ironist has to look for a delicate balance between the reflective (not to be confused with reflexivity[71]) and constitutive positions. Consider, for instance, how he (1983:255–6) discusses the reluctance of constructive ironists to engage in auto-critical self-inquiry as also noted by critical sociologists of sociology such as Bourdieu and Gouldner:

> The fact that in practice the ironicist [*sic*] does not address these kinds of questions to his own accounts, even though he acts considerable doubt on those of his subjects, is symptomatic of a deep tension in the constructivist perspective. In claiming to show that things are other than they appear …, the ironicist [*sic*] has to strike a delicate balance between the constitutive and reflective positions.

Furthermore, Gusfield's comments on irony seem to have inspired Woolgar later to formulate the slogan for SSS/STS which says that "It could be otherwise" (cf. Woolgar 2014; Woolgar and Lezaun 2015:462). In principle, this is not too far from Kołakowski's ([1959] 1969a) ideas on the jester, whose role is to question the presumed dogma. Similar to Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley (2003a / 2003b), who do not just adopt Kołakowski's prototype of the fool for their conceptualization of irony as an anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue but reach out to the authority of classical Greek philosophy, Woolgar also flirts with Socratic irony. Following Bloor's identification of impartiality as one of the four defining features of the strong program in the sociology of (scientific) knowledge, he (1983:253) points out that:

---

[71] Additional comments on Woolgar's ideas on reflexivity can be found in his 1988b paper titled "Reflexivity is the Ethnographer of the Text".

> [i]n many cases the ironicist [*sic*] steers clear of explicit claims about the superiority of the alternative account. But the mere fact that he points to the possibility of another account can be taken to suggest that there is something inadequate about the original. The humble sociologist may claim that he is merely outlining another way of looking at the same reality, and that he intends no discredit to the original account.

There are two more points made by Gusfield that are of interest in connection with Woolgar's notion that "It could be otherwise". First, Gusfield (1981:192–3) identifies two different types of sociological irony: 'utopian' and 'olympian'. The former stands for the research practice where the sociologist uncovers the characteristics of the currently dominant perspective that offers the opportunity to suggest that a better alternative is possible. The latter refers to the perspective that Gusfield associates with Mannheim's 'free-floating intellectuals' because, similar to them, the Olympian sociologist is said to be detached and skeptical of all points of view. "He views each occasion for the use of sociological irony as a critical act fostering the development of many perspectives, no one of which is inherently better than the others, each open to the partiality of language, interests, and sentiments."

Second, going even further than Woolgar with the stress on reflection, Gusfield (ibid:194) suggests that "[i]rony is also a facet of self-awareness, of the realization that our premises, our assumptions, are not so far from their opposite as they seem". Furthermore, perhaps even more explicitly than sociologists who have adopted a Marxist and/or Critical Theory perspective, he equates irony with sociological method – "a way of seeing, a perspective" that has political implications. As he (ibid:193) puts it: "[t]o find alternative ways of seeing phenomena is to imagine that things can be otherwise. To display the sources of belief in historical paradigms, institutional influences, power, and sentiment is to reduce a phenomenon to something else, as the ironist does. This cannot but be diminution of the legitimacy which authority gains from a belief in its facticity."

1.3   Irony as Dialectic

It has been suggested by some topologists of irony that the concept is closely related to dialectic. Among others, the connection has been suggested by Brown (1983), Hühn (2013), Jay (2018), and Schneider (1971). Nevertheless, given the diversity of meaning that both terms – irony and dialectic[72] – have attracted, it should not come as a surprise that the connection is less than transparent. Given the conceptual ambiguity, notes Frischmann (2019:182), "[i]rony can be seen as a kind of dialectical method, which does not result in a final destination, but is rather seen as the ongoing interplay between the antithetical poles without coming to a rest".

On the one hand, the *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* points out that the term dialectic, with its Greek origin, means literally "the art of conversation or debate". Basically, it is said to refer to "the process of reasoning to obtain truth and

---

[72] As Sorel (cited in Gouldner 1980:151) puts it: "There is no agreement on the meaning of the term 'dialectic' but it seems that the dialectic is a very important thing".

knowledge on any topic". Nevertheless, scholars have very different conceptions of this process. As also noted above, dialectic refers to the Socratic method of getting to the truth of the matter by asking a series of questions to make explicit what was already implicitly known anyway. For Plato, it refers to "the total process of enlightenment"; for Aristotle, it stands for "any rational influence based on probable premises"; for Kant, it signifies the "logic of illusion" that is explained as the "misuse of logic to deliver the appearance of solid belief", and for Hegel, it is the repeated process till perfection whereby one overcomes the contradiction between thesis and antithesis with the help of synthesis.

On the other hand, Schneider lists in the paper titled "Dialectic in Sociology" that there are as many as seven different ways dialectic has been used in sociology over the last two centuries. According to Schneider (1971:667), these meaning-clusters include the following: "(1) unanticipated consequences; (2) goal shifts; (3) adaptations that, once made, inhibit more effective ones; (4) development through conflict; (5) phenomena of the type of contradiction, paradox, negation; (6) the 'contradictory logic of passion' ... [and] (7) dissolution of conflict in coalescence of opposites".[73]

Similar to the argument presented in the section titled "Irony and Unintended Consequences", Schneider recognizes that actions can bring results that differ from those initially intended. Furthermore, he adds in the paper "Dialectic in Sociology" that they can also (i) be unanticipated, (ii) bring heterogony of ends, and (iii) unforeseen socio-economic evolution. Speaking of unanticipated consequences, he (ibid:670) points out, in addition to the works of Robert Merton, also Herbert Spencer, Adam Smith, and Vilfredo Pareto as exemplary scholars who have employed this tool. Consider, for instance, the argument that Smith (1937:423) presents in the *Wealth of Nations* using the metaphor of the 'invisible hand':

> Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.
>
> ...
>
> As every individual, therefore, endeavors as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such

---

[73] While the first of these meaning clusters overlaps with the content that was presented above in the section titled "Irony as Unintended Consequences", the rest of the typology presents some new insights. Although there are considerable overlaps with Schneider's other works, this typology is better arranged and explained in considerable detail. For details, see Schneider (1971:673–6). Additional comments can be found from Schneider (1975, Ch. 2).

> a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it.

The understanding that actions can bring a heterogeneity of ends can be summarized in three points. First, the consequences of action turn out to be more substantial and complex than initially anticipated. Second, "a process whereby means become ends" (Schneider 1971:671) – a recognition that what initially was regarded as just a resource than enabling something to be achieved comes to be valued in its own right. Third, the process culminates when the initially derived effects or their side effects gain primary significance. To give a simple example, one can think of regular exercise as the means to better health. Yet, it soon turns out that better health requires more than just physical exercise – it demands a lifestyle change. Nevertheless, if the fit body, which was initially just a side-effect of the regular training, then becomes valuable or desirable (possibly because the beauty standards have changed during the process in society) the process would be complete.

The third way that irony relates to dialectics, according to Schneider (1971: 672), has to do with the observation that actions can lead to unforeseen socioeconomic evolution. For instance, Veblen shows in *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* how England's investment in obsolete or obsolescent industryal equipment became a handicap in the competition with newly industrializing Germany. Likewise, Weber has demonstrated in *Economy and Society* that the regulations that originated from medieval law became an obstacle to rationalization, as well as that the areas with highly developed gas illumination works or steam railroads turned out to block electrification because of the substantial amounts of fixed capital already invested in them. In short, relative backwardness has offered its advantages for socio-economic evolution.

As mentioned, these three basic classifications of the use of dialectic in sociology find further elaboration in the seven categories identified above. While all this enriches our understanding of the dialectic in sociology, Schneider (ibid:667) has also a word of caution to share:

> There is no dialectical 'method' to expound. Gurvitch (for example, 1962:27) writes easily – we would even say, glibly – of dialectical method, but his own dialectical categories of complementarity, mutual implication, polarization of antinomies and reciprocity of perspectives suggest little or nothing of method. Kaufmann (1965:175) allows that Hegel's own dialectic is "at most a method of exposition . . . not a method of discovery." Dialectical 'bias' or 'bent' or 'perspective' is quite a different matter from method.

To complement these observations, one may rely once again on Brown, who offers, in addition to the previously mentioned sobering comments, also more en-

couraging observations that recognize the potential value of dialectic irony to sociological research. Indeed, he (1983:550) reasons along the following lines:

> There is a growing discontent with positive sociology and a new focus on the exact methods by which actors construct their worlds, or have the worlds of others imposed upon them. Yet this new wave has still to be accepted by the discipline as a whole. Social thought continues to be dominated by a method-ological dualism that posits a strict separation between the subject and the ob-ject, a standing admonition not to contaminate the data, not to shatter the value-free chrysalis in which the investigator is thought to work. In terms of this dualism, the empirical variables of social theories are taken to represent out-there naturalistic facts. Stated inversely, this entails a suppression of awareness of the transcendental and practical frameworks that are the pre-conditions of the meaning and validity of such theories in the first place. To examine reflectively the pre-suppositions of scientific objectivity does not mean that we should give it up, but rather that, epistemologically, we should transvalue objectivity and value freedom into value commitments themselves and that, existentially, we should stand accountable for the moral and politi-cal consequences of our scientific praxis.

> Dialectical irony would help us toward such a reflexivity. A central aspect of such irony is the relationship it imposes between the social scientist and the social world.

As one can see, Brown also highlights here, as was presented in the section ti-tled "Irony as a Logic of Discovery", that reflexivity is the key to 'sociological sal-vation'. One may recall that, similar to Woolgar, Brown relies on the relativist insight of Collins and Cox (1976), according to which the use of critical reflexivity strengthens sociological work rather than undermines it. Based on this he adds here that irony combined with reflexivity needs to recognize the crucial link be-tween sociologists and the social environment, which calls for critical meta-the-ory analysis as suggested by Ritzer.

In other words, contrary to the argument of Brown and his followers, who see irony as the 'method of discovery' in sociology, Schneider (1971:668) relies largely on the interpretation of Hegel by Kaufmann to make the point that dia-lectic is better understood as a world view or perspective rather than method. Indeed, Kaufman (1965:174) answers the self-imposed question: "What do we find if not a usable dialectical method?", at the end of his discussion of Hegel's *Phenomenology* that:

> We find a vision of the world, of man, and of history which emphasizes devel-opment through conflict, the moving power of human passions, which pro-duce wholly unintended results, and the irony of sudden reversals. If that be called a dialectical world view, then Hegel's philosophy was dialectical – and there is a great deal to be said in its favor. This is certainly an immensely fruit-ful and interesting perspective...

As this relies on Hegel, the discussion of irony as dialectic would be incomplete if it did not present his ideas on the topic. He is famous for the development of the concept of dialectics – possibly because Marxists picked it up and put it in front of their program of historical materialism (cf. Habermas 1975, 1976a;

Therborn 1976, Ch. 6), labeling it "materialist dialectics" (cf. Engels 1939) or "dialectical materialism" (Lukács [1923] 1971b:xxxvii, 23, 50, 189). Compared to this, he is perhaps less known for his contribution to the critique of (Romantic) irony, which will be addressed in more detail in the following sub-section. Although the issues are interrelated in his scholarship as well as among commentators addressing it, an attempt will be made here to keep the discussion separate and concentrate here on dialectics and its relation to irony.

As indicated above, Hegel was not the first among philosophers to think about dialectics or irony for that matter. The point of reference both for the previously introduced Kierkegaard as well as for Hegel was Socrates and the German romantics (Schlegel, Tieck, Solger).[74] This impression is also shared by Stewart who points out that the central issue about Hegel's view of the Socratic method and irony is whether or not Socrates really knew nothing or only pretended so. The answer, according to Stewart (2015:34), can be found in Hegel's comment in *Lectures in the History of Philosophy* ([1840] 1892:399) that reads as follows: "It may actually be said that Socrates knew nothing, for he did not reach the systematic construction of philosophy". The issue here, according to Stewart's interpretation of Hegel, is that the dialogues of Socrates do not end with a positive outcome.

Why this is a problem becomes clearer in the much more nuanced discussions that have been put forward by Mascat. Similar to the argument of Rose, a scholar of Hegel whose ideas will be introduced below, Mascat (2013:243) finds that "[i]rony ..., according to Hegel, shares the same characteristics as hypochondria, but dangerously celebrates them as artistic virtues, turning exaggerated subjectivism and the rejection of objectivity into values instead of symptoms. Yet with its negative paroxysm, irony does not allow any positive action and opens the doors wide to nihilist inaction."

At this point, one may be wondering how the abstract philosophical discussion on romantic irony relates to sociology. Although Hegel has shaped radical social theory in general and dialectical materialism in particular, the connection to mainstream sociology, let alone his take on irony, might need clarification. As shown in detail in the section titled "Irony as Dialectic", Hegel's ideas on dialectics have not only inspired scholars who flirt with irony but have been the catalyst for reactions from critics who argued that rather than being a method, it is closer to a perspective in sociology. To build on these observations, one may first further clarify the meaning of the central concept of dialectics before discussing briefly how Hegel's ideas relate to sociological research more generally.

As a point of departure, one may rely on Popper's paper, titled "What is Dialectics?", where he initially suggests that the Hegelian thesis-antithesis-synthe-sis logic of discovery, which he calls the "dialectic triad", describes well the gen-eral evolutionary process of how science works. That is, he describes the scien-tific process as follows: first, the theories are proposed, then challenged and criticized by opposing views and arguments – a crucial element in this process for the

---

[74] Nevertheless, some commentators, such as Hühn (2013:1062), have interpreted much of Kierkegaard's thesis *The Concept of Irony* relies on and, in many ways, reacts to Hegel, especially his Lectures on *Aesthetics*, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy,* and *Philosophy of Right.*

advancement of the initial ideas – and finally, they get settled as conclusions. When it comes to sociology, however, Popper notes that Marx and Engels adopted and modified Hegel's ideas to fit their political agenda. That is, with the claim of having developed tools for the 'scientific' study of society, which Popper (1940:423) labels the historical method, Marxism is turned into dogmatism that hardly accepts any progressive criticism. This becomes the foundation of Popper's critique of Marx's method in the second volume of *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (see esp. Popper 1945, Ch. 15 and 22) and *The Poverty of Historicism* (Popper 1944a and 1944b / 1957). In short, if there is an irony to this story, it is in the fact that there is no dialectics in Marxism, which is often associated with it. And without dialectics, there cannot be science, only dogmatism, according to Popper.

As one may suspect, contributors to 'histomat' scholarship have quite a different opinion about the scientific nature of their endeavors. Indeed, followers of Marx, from Engels (1939, Ch. 12–13) and Bukharin (1925) to Sztompka (1979) and others have made the case for the dialectical method in their claims about Marxism's 'scientific' study of society and its development. Unlike a typical ideologically motivated 'histomat' scholar, which Popper was attacking, Paolucci takes up the task of reconstructing Marx's position on positivism to clarify "what is 'dialectical' in Marx's method" in the paper titled "The Scientific Method and the Dialectical Method". Having shown in what aspects Marx seemed to be sympathetic toward positivism and in which respects less optimistic, Paolucci goes on to explain his take on dialectics. He (2003:101) says:

> Stated in the most succinct manner possible, Marx's dialectical reason accepted that the inner-connections between certain social structures stood in relations of negativity with one another, creating situations that tend toward a social life with inherent properties of dynamism and change. Further, extract-ed from his studies of Hegel, Marx also accepted and used a plethora of dialectical terms, such as metamorphosis, negation, quality and quantity, wholes and parts, among many others. Finally, dialectic referred only to method-logical strategies for Marx, and was stripped of any metaphysical connotations. In short, as the world is changing and dynamic, capitalism especially so, in response *scientific method has to be dialectical.*

At the practical level, however, irony as dialectics in sociology has found a positive program with the help of Marxism and its redevelopment of Hegel's ideas in the context of historical materialism and dialectical materialism. That is, as the outgrowth of Hegel's ideas on dialectics, it has been adopted for political mobilization and agitation. As noted by Gusfield (1981:193), "Irony as dialectic leads to a new synthesis but one that resolves the contradictions of the old thesis and suggests a new one. Thus, the paradigm of sociological irony results in an intensification of political action; it produces a critical attitude toward dominant authority but a supportive one toward change."

At a more abstract philosophical level, Georg [György] Lukács picks up on the role of irony in essay writing in one of his first publications titled "On the Nature and Form of the Essay" ([1908–1911] 2010, Ch. 1). More specifically, he (ibid:25) points out there that you can find irony in the work of every great essayist, although it comes in different shapes and forms. Although his examples in this early

essay concentrate on Greek authors like Plato and Socrates, he soon also addresses how the concept has been used in the works of Schlegel as well as how Hegel and Kierkegaard have responded to German Romanticism in essays titled "The Foundering of Form Against Life" (ibid, Ch. 3) and "On the Ro-mantic Philosophy of Life" (ibid, Ch. 4).[75]

Furthermore, he identifies in the latter the paradox of German intellectual life during the era following the French revolution. On the one hand, he points out that there is the triumph of the victorious bourgeoisie, which sees no limits to rationalism brought about by the revolutionary battles. On the other hand, there is the German intellectual attempt to create "a new, harmonious, all-embracing culture out of the chaos" (ibid:59).[76] For Lukács, this represents a paradox between objective reality and subjective illusion.[77]

Lukács returns to the issue of irony in the preface to "*The Theory of the Novel*". More specifically, he once again responds to romantic irony and its reception. In line with what he conceptualized already in the earlier essay "On the Nature and Form of the Essay" he points out also here that irony can be under-stood "as a modern method of form-giving" ([1916] 1971a:15). Likewise, in line with another earlier essay "On the Romantic Philosophy of Life," he recognizes also here that the notion represented "[t]he self-recognition and, with it, self-abolition of subjectivity" (ibid:74) for the early Romantics, who were theorizing about the novel and philosophizing about aesthetics.[78]

This line of interpretation by Lukács can be found, for instance, in the work of Ryan Bartholomew. He (Bartholomew 2014:54) notes that the originality of Lukács' project was to re-inject into Marxism the left-Hegelian dialectics and to integrate Germanic high-culture into the doctrine of historical materialism. According to Bartholomew, "Lukács loses his respect for irony once he makes the leap of faith into communism when he loses sight of enriching the landscape in which one is embedded through irony" (ibid:55).

In Bartholomew's reading, irony signified for Lukács, before the leap from Romanticism to Bolshevism, as Löwy (1979) puts it, the creative freedom of the author in forming the text. He cites Lukács saying in *The Theory of the Novel* (in the language that reflects the influence of German Romanticists and Kierkegaard) that "[f]or the novel, irony consists in this freedom of the writer in his relationship to God, the transcendental condition of the objectivity of form-giving" (Lukács [1916] 1971a:92). The way Bartholomew (2014:55) sees it, early Lukács

---

[75] Lukács' correspondence shows that for quite some time what he was planning to write was supposed to have become a separate book on Romanticism (Lukács [1909] 1986a:103; [1910] 1986b:113-4) – an idea that he soon dropped as he got his mind set on writing a book on Dostoevsky and 'metaphysical ethic' (cf. Lukács [1915] 1986c:244) with the working title *The Aesthetic of the Novel* (Tar 1986:21). As he also abandoned this project, only the introductory part was eventually published under the title *The Theory of the Novel*.

[76] Lukács ([1908–1911] 2010:60) adds that "[f]or Germany, there was only one way to culture: the inner way, the way of revolution of the spirit; no one could seriously envisage a real revolution".

[77] Additional comments on the French Revolution can be found in the autobiographical notes of Lukács (1971c:111).

[78] For additional insight, see Breines (1977).

represents a critic of modernism and its practice of symbolism. Irony in this context drains from reality its dialectical essence, on the one hand, and transforms it along the lines of Hegel, one may add, into "a nihilistic allegory whose final end is an impotent solipsism of absolute subjectivity and a decadent contemplation of nothingness", on the other.

Bartholomew contrasts this early Lukács to later Lukács. In Bartholomew's reading, the point of transformation here seems to be the publishing of *History and Class Consciousness,* which is seen as the turn from Kierkegaard's inwardness to the revolutionary praxis and "obedience to the earthly God of Bolshevism or even Stalinism" (ibid). Although this turn is widely known, Bartholomew seems to be at pains to link the change to what it caused in Lukács' conception of irony. Instead of citing the appropriate passages in *History and Class Consciousness,* where the concept is explained, and then compare it to the earlier conceptualizations, he simply stresses the distinction that Lukács makes between "writers of the fragment and writers of totality" – suggesting rather indirectly that the key to understanding the effect of the sudden leap to communism on his conceptualization of irony is to be found in the following out of context citation: "The ultimate goal is rather that *relation to the totality* (to the whole of society seen as a process), through which every aspect of the struggle acquires its revolutionary significance" (Lukács [1923] 1971b:22).

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Lukács develops his initial conceptualization of irony in response to the representatives of Romanticism and their reception. While his published correspondence, under the title *Georg Lukács. Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*, and the biographical analysis of these letters and other sources by Karàdi (1987) and Tar (1986) reveal that irony was never the most important conceptual problem that he wanted to address, it gradually becomes part of his broader philosophical and political program. As he (Lukács 1986b:113) writes to Leo Popper on May 28, 1910, how the initial idea to write a book on Schlegel has changed into a historical-philosophical treatise on "a *prolegomenon to a metaphysics of form*". Although he confesses that he is not able to articulate the central idea of it yet, he nevertheless describes how his ideas are evolving along the following lines:

> ... the concrete and the historical aspect is still there; concreteness and historicism, however, are mere background, the ironical background of real process; the problem itself, the symbolic nature of it, is alone important – and the trick is in what way accidents contributed to its intensification. The less significant the external circumstances and the more intensified the problem, the deeper is the trick itself.

In other words, the development of his ideas on irony as a reaction to German Romanticism and incorporation of these into his broader philosophical and political program is not easy to detect, as Lukács' own intellectual interests and motivations changed over the course of the development of his ideas and his pursuit of *Habilitation* in Heidelberg either in sociology and political economy with Alfred Weber or in philosophy with Heinrich Rickert. If one adds to this his turbulent personal life (including the dissolution of his first marriage with Yelena

Grabenko, the death of his closest friend Leo Popper, the suicide of his great love Irma Seidler, the impact of the outbreak of World War I, and him being drafted), the influence of his friendship with Ernst Bloch, failed attempt to obtain *Habilitation* at the University of Heidelberg and, last but not least, his seemingly sudden commitment to communism, all well documented in the correspondence that he had among others with Georg Simmel, Max Weber, Leo Popper, Ernst Bloch, and Karl Mannheim, it is understandable why it is difficult for commentators to detect Lukács' exact conceptualization of irony, its role in his intellectual, political and personal affairs, and its changes over the course of his life.

While it is appealing to many critics like Bartholomew to separate theory and praxis – symbolically oversimplifying Lukács before and after *History and Class Consciousness*[79] – an alternative reading is possible. This interpretation seems more consistent with his take on irony and its interconnections with his works on more substantial issues such as aesthetics, historicism, class consciousness, praxis, totality, and freedom. According to this line of argument, advanced in a way by Arato and Breines (1979) and Stahl (2018), the connecting notes of Lukács' work are to be found in his views on dialectics (cf. Lukács [1916] 1971a) and social ontology (cf. Lukács [1968] 1982, [1971] 1978a, [1971] 1978b, [1971] 1980).

Indirectly, one can get such an impression of continuity from the intellectual biographers. For instance, Tar (1986:26) constructs Lukács as an example of Gramsci's organic intellectual, and acknowledges, similar to Köves (2017), the lasting impact that the 'fate of Hector' had on Lukács. Although one faces the danger of overestimating and overinterpreting the lasting impact of one's child-hood experiences, it is nonetheless remarkable that Lukács reflects in one of his autobiographical writings on the strong impact that reading *The Iliad* made on him, the plot of which has been associated with rhetorical irony (cf. Minchin 2010). He (Lukács [1969; 1971] 1983:28) says:

> I was first influenced by a book when I was nine years old. It was the Hungarian prose translation of *The Iliad*. It made a powerful impression on me because I identified with Hector and not Achilles. At the same time I also read *The Last of the Mohicans*. Both books had great importance for me. The reason was connected with the fact that my father, although a very decent, respectable man, believed, as a bank director, that success was the right criterion of right action. I learnt from these two books that success is no true criterion and that it is the failures who are in the right.

More directly, however, this argument has been pursued by Bernstein in *The Philosophy of the Novel: Lukács, Marxism, and the Dialectics of Form*. Indeed, the argument that the key to understanding the conceptualization of irony in the works of Lukács lies in his works on dialectics and social ontology is in line with the hermeneutical analysis of *The Theory of the Novel* by Jay Bernstein. He (J. Bernstein 1984) shows that although Lukács uses the historical-dialectical method already in *The Theory of the Novel* (cf. Lukács [1916] 1971a), published before *History and Class Consciousness* (cf. Lukács [1923] 1971b), it is the open-

---

[79] See de Man (1966) for the criticism of such an oversimplification that one can often find from the comments presented by Western commentators.

ing essay, titled "What is Orthodox Marxism?" of the latter book, where he lays it down in detail.

Bernstein's (1984:xviii) starting point is the realization that Lukács' dialectic of form-giving expresses "Kantian worlds of freedom and causality, ought and is". That is, Bernstein explains that "the dialectic of the novel is the attempt to write the world as it is in terms of how it ought to be". From this, he develops his interpretation of the role and position that irony plays in Lukács' scheme. He (Bernstein 1984, Ch. 6) lays it down in a separate chapter titled "Transcendental Dialectic: Irony as Form." It is there that he (ibid:198) points out that:

> ... Lukács' treatment of irony tends, like the Hegelian theory of the state, to reify difference in an abstract harmony: the difference between meaning and reified experience in the novel repeats the difference between the state (suggesting the possibility of freedom = meaning) and civil society. Irony and the Hegelian Idea function as synthesizing operators, allowing the truly irreconcilable to find a moment of harmony in their relationship.

In Bernstein's reading, Lukács makes three substantial claims about the applications of irony in the novel. The first of these claims is the argument that irony represents "the normative mentality of the novel" (Lukács [1916] 1971a:84). In this context the 'normative' refers, according to Bernstein (1984:185), to Lukács's claim that "a particular strategic practice of novel writing is necessarily enjoined in virtue of the general problematic and intentions of the practice as a whole, and further, that this strategy emblemizes the problematic character of that practice as a whole". In other words, he (ibid) says that for Lukács irony represents "a kind of master-practice, a practice which governs the meaning of the sub-practices of the novel which simultaneously 'corrects' and instantiates their deficiencies".

The second claim about the place of irony in the novel, which can be detected in Lukács' theorizing, according to Bernstein, relates to his assertion that it offers "the objectivity of the novel" (Lukács [1916] 1971a:90). The meaning of this claim is, however, not entirely clear, as Lukács sometimes claims that irony provides unequivocal objectivity and at other times that it possibly creates just an illusion of objectivity.

The third claim, which can be found in *The Theory of the Novel,* about irony as "the highest freedom that can be achieved in a world without God" (Lukács [1916] 1971a:93), is basically an uncritical response to romantic irony and Kierkegaard. Consider the full passage where the third notation of irony originates from the key text by Lukács (ibid:92–3):

> For the novel, irony consists in this freedom of the writer in his relationship to God, the transcendental condition of the objectivity of form-giving. Irony, with intuitive double vision, can see where God is to be found in a world abandoned by God; irony sees the lost, utopian home of the idea that has become an ideal, and yet at the same time it understands that the ideal is subjectively and psychologically conditioned, because that is its only possible form of existence; irony, itself demonic, apprehends the demon that is within the subject as a metasubjective essentiality, and therefore, when it speaks of the adventures of errant souls in an inessential, empty reality, it intuitively speaks of past gods

and gods that are to come; irony has to seek the only world that is adequate to it along the *via dolorosa* of interiority, but is doomed never to find it there; irony gives form to the malicious satisfaction of God the creator at the failure of man's weak rebellions against his mighty, yet worthless creation and, at the same time, to the inexpressible suffering of God the redeemer at his inability to re-enter that world. Irony, the self-sur-mounting of a subjectivity that has gone as far as it was possible to go, is the highest freedom that can be achieved in a world without God. That is why it is not only the sole possible *a priori* condition for a true, totality-creating objectivity but also why it makes that totality – the novel – the representative art-form of our age: because the structural categories of the novel constitutively coincide with the world as it is today.

According to Bernstein (1984:186), all three of Lukács' conceptualizations of irony have their foundation in his basic understanding that there is an antinomic relationship between structure and subject: between structural limitations that leave no room for freedom or real subjectivity, on the one hand, and form-giving subjectivity, on the other hand. He adds that irony thematizes this relation and attempts to overcome this dualism, if not antagonism, by mediating the form. Although all three forms of irony share, according to Bernstein, a common concern "for the problems of transcendental subjectivity", only the first of these three claims – the conceptualization of irony as "the normative mentality of the novel" – is defendable within the philosophical program of Lukács. In other words, Bernstein (ibid, Ch. 6) sets himself the agenda to show that the second and third conceptualizations of irony that Lukács flirts with represent 'false leads' that he has borrowed and adopted from Schlegel and Kierkegaard. Having done that, Bernstein intends to provide the solution to the epistemological problem by cleaning the 'novelistic irony' from faulty objectivity – to reconstruct Lukács' genuine conceptualization of narrative irony "as freedom and self-consciousness". In short, he takes up a complicated neo-Kantian exercise to reconstruct the genuine Lukács and his irony.

Similar stress on neo-Kantianianism is undertaken by Rose, who argues in the book titled *Hegel contra Sociology* that both Durkheimian and Weberian sociology actually originate from the same neo-Kantian paradigm. She (1981:8) argues that the critique of Kant and reinterpretation of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, which gave birth to 'scientific sociology', represented a shift compared to the earlier critics, such as Fichte, the early Romantics and Hegel, who had taken Kant's *Critique of Judgement* as the point of departure in their works.

More specifically, Rose (ibid) reasons that "[t]he three Kantian critical questions 'What makes judgements of experience, of morality, of beauty objectively valid?' become [within the neo-Kantian paradigm] the questions 'What is the nature of validity in general?' and 'What is the relation between validity and its objects?' Logic is separated from cognition, and validity from representation, but not from its objects. The result is a general but not a formal logic: a methodology".

Furthermore, Rose suggests that even phenomenological and Marxist radical attempts to break away from the neo-Kantian paradigm have failed. Hence, she says that the shortcomings of the (neo-)Kantian critical method, on the one hand,

and the limitations of the sort of social and political theory it produced, on the other, require a total reform of sociology. In this context, she reminds us that Hegel with his efforts to develop the theory of objective truth and modern ethical life offers an alternative.

More specially, she (ibid:42) says that:

> [i]n their very different way, both the non-Marxist and the Marxist critiques of Hegel attempt to drop the notion of the 'absolute', but, at the same time, retain the social import of Hegel's thought. In the case of non-Marxist sociology, the attempt depends on extracting a social object from Hegel's philosophy, 'objective spirit'. In the case of Marxism, the attempt depends on extracting a 'method' whose use will reveal social contradictions. But the 'absolute' is not an optional extra, as it were.

Unfortunately, Rose does not say much about the ontological implications of irony – either as a concept or method(ology) – in the above-presented dualism. Although she (ibid:146) points out in passing that "Hegel does an injustice to the case for 'Romantic irony'", it is difficult to deduce from her highly complex reasoning,[80] which puts high expectations on the reader's knowledge of Continental philosophy and its terminology, what the implications for sociology are.[81] Nevertheless, one may take the risk of suggesting that similar to Schlegel's argument presented above, according to which one cannot separate what was 'meant' from what was actually 'said' because they complete each other, Rose seems to suggest that two different versions of neo-Kantian sociology are both one-sided and, hence, limited because their ideas do not integrate the two fundamental parts identified by Hegel's dualism.

The irony, referred to by Rose as its 'paradox', is that sociology both in its Durkheimian as well as Weberian versions relies respectively solely on social facts (objectivity) or values (subjectivity) but not on both at the same time. While Weber builds his approach to the study of society on the basis of belief (value), which constitutes the validity of the system's legitimation, Durkheim relies on the validity of a 'social being' that manifests in social facts. As Rose (ibid:21–2) puts it:

> A paradoxical result of Durkheim's granting priority to validity over values, and of Weber's granting priority to values over validity, is that Durkheim produced an 'empirical' sociology of values (moral facts) and Weber produced an 'empirical' sociology of validities (legitimate orders). In each case once the precondition had been established (validity for Durkheim, values for Weber), the object (values for Durkheim, validities for Weber) could be classified, and ex-

---

[80] As one of the reviewers puts it: "*Hegel contra Sociology* is an extraordinarily difficult book which seems, at least by implication, to demand the complete rethinking of sociology and the total abandonment of the notion of 'scientific' sociology" (Toth 1983:828).

[81] Another reviewer observes that "Gillian Rose's Hegel Contra Sociology will startle nearly all readers, especially those expecting a book on sociology". Schuler (1984:285) ironically observes that "[a]part from opening and closing indictments of social theory, the bulk of the book presents the Hegelian legacy that sociologists presumably failed to assimilate" (Schuler 1984:285).

plained or 'understood' as a natural or given object according to the rules of a general method.

Rose goes on to suggest that on the basis of these two distinctive ontologies, two different streams of sociology with idiosyncratic epistemologies emerged. As she (ibid) puts it:

> The neo-Kantian paradigm of validity and values founded two kinds of 'sociology', two logics of the social: a logic of constitutive principles for the sociology based on the priority of validity, and a logic of regulative postulates for the sociology based on the priority of values. The former identifies social reality by a critique of consciousness; the latter locates social reality within the realm of consciousness and its oppositions.

In either way, Rose seems to suggest, sociology has become one-sided. She basically takes Hegel's critique of Romantic irony, to be introduced in the next section, to the next level. It is not just that irony leads to the exaggerated subectiveism of the ego, which leads in turn to dangerous negativity and/or vanity, it seems that even if one adopts just the objective standards and ignores the subjective component, the result is equally squib or unbalanced. Based on this, one may suggest that irony as dialectics needs both of these if it is to materialize the promise of what the thesis contra antithesis would be able to deliver in the form of synthesis. As indicated above, these ideas will be further elaborated in the next section.

1.4   (Romantic) Irony as the Infinitized Paradoxical Nature of Reality

It will be explained in this sub-section that (Romantic) irony can be interpreted as the infinitized paradoxical nature of reality that some critical commentators, such as Hegel, have found to be novel but dangerous negativity and/or vanity that is essentially evil. To this end, Schlegel, as the scholar who formulated the concept of 'romantic irony', will be introduced first along with some comments on the historical background of the term. This will be followed by Hegel's reactions to these ideas along with the clarification of the role of irony in his project of developing a theory of ethical life.

To start with one has to explain what romantic irony is. Although there is no shortage of primary (cf. Schlegel 1957, [1958] 1971)[82] or secondary literature on the topic (cf. Allen 2007, de Man (1996); Garber 2008; Gurewitch 2002; Frischmann 2019; Hegel [1835] 1975; Immerwahr 1951; Kierkegaard [1841] 1965, Part II; Lukács [1916] 1971a, [1908–1911] 1971c; Mascat 2013; Muecke 1969, Ch. 7; Reid 2018; Speight 2016),[83] the concept has remained obscure.

---

[82] Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag has been making the collected works of Schlegel available in German under the title _Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe_ (KFSA). For a complete list of Schlegel's works available in English see Speight (2016).

[83] For additional secondary sources in English see Speight (2016). The comprehensive bibliography of secondary sources in German is maintained by Arbeitsstelle Friedrich and Dorothea Schlegel (2018) at the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz but some of them are listed also by Frischmann (2019).

Therefore, before we get into the critique, a few words of clarification about romantic irony are still in order. As noted by Allen (2007:4):

> Any critic who seeks to employ the term romantic irony is faced with the necessity of defining a term whose usage is so amorphous and wide-ranging as to appear inchoate. What do the words romantic and ironic mean in 'romantic irony'? Do they have a separate reference, that is, does 'irony' in 'romantic irony' serve to qualify the term romantic and describe a specific inflection of 'the romantic'? Finally, to what aspects of a text does the term apply? Is it a worldview or a way of thinking, or is it an aesthetic category, a narrative mode or form?

It goes beyond the task of this chapter to offer a better definition of romantic irony than can be found in the tertiary literature. For instance, C.N. (2005:871) defines it in *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* as follows: "Notion of irony as an attitude or ethos that calls everything into doubt, from the utterer's intentions to our knowledge of the world as given (supposedly) through a sensory acquaintance or the concepts and categories of reason." In other words, there is nothing particularly 'romantic' about romantic irony. Rather than having anything to do with being loving or erotic, one could say that it is 'infinitized' irony – as opposed to the stable or unproblematic varieties covered in previous sections.

Along the same lines, Simpson (1979:xii) clarifies the concept for readers in *Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry* as follows:

> I must, however, explain briefly what I mean by 'irony' in what follows. I do not mean that if a writer says 'X' we are to understand that he means 'Y'; this would be the stable notion of irony, irony as definitive statement, which does not seem to me to have much place in Romanticism. The situation as I see it is that, if a writer says 'X' that we question the meaning of what he says both as we receive it into our own codes and canons of significance and as it relates to the context of the rest of his utterances, their moods and voices. This double focus is likely to produce a paradox of the hermeneutic sort; how are we to be sure where one begins and the other ends? This is Romantic irony.

To comprehend the essence of romantic irony, one has to recall first that it originates from writers who, according to Nelson (2008:15), did not call themselves by that name. Nevertheless, they are associated with the word 'romantic' and their derivatives in literary works that characterize some medieval and Renaissance works. These could have been 'romances' but likely they were more than this. More specifically, the term signified "adventurous, exotic, wild narratives and landscape descriptions". Hence, notes Nelson, "[r]omantic could suggest the free and exuberant play of fantasy and inventiveness; it could also suggest a form of prose fiction, a genre, in which such artistic freedom could best be exercised and found".

While the origin of what we now call 'romantic irony' is often associated with German Romanticism, it is not actually limited geographically to one country or

period of time.[84] Nevertheless, it is widely recognized that the concept of 'romantic irony' was first formulated by Friedrich Schlegel. His intellectual biography starts, according to Speight (2016), with the recognition of Greek poetry as 'beautiful' compared to modern poetry that he found only 'interesting' (*interessant*). Moreover, we are told that the former served as an ideal while the latter was 'characteristic' and by looking for originality it was also 'individual' or 'mannered'. This is extremely important because the aim of finding the subjective means to judge each artistic work by its own criteria, rather than comparing it against the universal standard, and this becomes the target of Hegel's critique of romantic irony.

But before we can get into Hegel's critique, further terminological clarifications are in order. Speight (2016) points out that "[w]hat Schlegel meant by the term 'romantic' (*romantisch*) and its apparent *cognate Roman* (usually translated as 'novel', but having among the Romantics a much wider sense) has long been disputed". This is hardly surprising because commentators, such as Nelson (2008:15), recognize that his use of these key concepts was extremely fragmented.[85]

Indeed, one has to look for the meaning of romantic irony in different essays by Schlegel and the correspondence that he had with 'fellow travelers' over a long period of time. Based on one of these detailed analyses of his scattered remarks on the notion of (romantic) irony, Nelson (2008:16) is able to detect that the concept comes to represent for Schlegel "consciousness and self-consciousness in art and the artist, the inclusion of vast disparities and play of contradictions, and the supreme freedom and control in the artist's own inventions".[86]

This is in line with the argument of Frischmann. Having clarified that irony signifies for Schlegel a concept that calls for a philosophical program that would define its essence, functions, and possibilities (2019:176–7), she goes on to show how fragmented the notion in his work is. More specifically, she elaborates how irony in his work could be understood as a "longing for the infinite" (ibid:179–80), "criticism of philosophy as system" (ibid:180–1), and "philosophical method" (ibid:181–2). In addition to these, she also shows how it relates to skepticism (ibid:182–3), hermeneutics (ibid:183–5), poetry and incomprehensibility (ibid:185–7), romantic poetry (ibid:187–8), and education (*bildung*) (ibid:188–90). If one adds to this list also the influences of Fichte (ibid:178–9), and later transformations in the works of Schlegel (ibid:190) and Novalis (ibid:191–2), it is difficult, to say the least, to summarize what it stands for or refers to.

---

[84] Indeed, the contributions to *Romantic Irony*, edited by Garber (2008), show that the tradition had its followers in all of the major East and West-European countries (including Scandinavia and Southern Europe).

[85] It is quite telling that according to Speight (2016), he is said to have written to his brother in 1793 the following words: "I cannot send you my explanation of the word 'romantic' because it would be 125 sheets long" (cited in Beiser, 1992:410, n 67).

[86] Knox notes in the footnote to Hegel's *Aesthetics* that irony in Schlegel's works has generally become to be implied as "the writer, while still creative and emotional, should remain aloof and self-critical" (Hegel [1835] 1975:69).

Nevertheless, Frischmann does a good job by explaining what the concept of irony means in the works of Schlegel and what one can do with it. She (2019: 175) notes that

> [a]ccording to Schlegel irony does not aim to ridicule or poke fun, it is not a rhetorical technique. Rather Schlegel uses the notion of 'irony' to stress central substantive and methodological problems of philosophy, poverty, aesthetics, arts and sciences in general. According to Schlegel 'irony' can be seen as placeholder for those aspects of his thinking that characterize a modern, pluralist and anti-metaphysical worldview. In irony, the capacity for taking on multiple views is cultivated; it is itself a hovering between perspectives. To use irony is to play with ambivalence, paradox, and incomprehensibility. Irony is a universal instrument that should not only accompany every theory, but also be seen as a basic condition of self-reflective thinking and writing. Irony is also to be understood as a habit, as a distancing, and thus as sovereignty of the mind in securing a basic approach to life. Irony includes closed related concepts such as dialectic, reciprocal determination (*Wechselbestimmung*), the hovering of imagination, longing for the infinite, joke, allegory, skepticism, paradox, experimental thinking, fragment, para-basis, wit, and even love. All these issues and aspects of 'irony' are like threads that form a kind of network but cannot be brought together in one homogenous, coherent conceptualization. Consequently, there is no ultimate definition of irony and the theory of irony is not systematically developed; rather we find though, cross-references, fragments, aphorisms, and questions.

Indeed, Schlegel ([1958] 1971:266–7) offers in the essay titled "On Incomprehensibility" a list of different types of ironies. Although his inventory does not actually include a direct reference to 'romantic irony', it nevertheless includes the following types: coarse irony, fine or delicate irony, extra fine irony, straightforward irony, dramatic irony, double irony and irony of irony. While he mentions in passing that, for instance, the first kind is found in the "real nature of things" and is said to be the most widespread and distinguished, at the same time, he actually does not define or explain these categories. Instead, he asks rhetorically, "What gods will rescue us from all these ironies?" His somewhat indirect answer to this question seems to be that "[t]he only solution is to find an irony that might be able to swallow up all these big and little ironies and leave no trace of them at all."

Although he admits that he does have "a real urge to do just that", he actually gives up immediately – reasoning that this would solve the problem only temporarily. The long-term solution, however, is not spelled out in this contribution. Schlegel offers, instead, the two defining questions of the essay. First, he (ibid:268) asks: "is incomprehensibility really something so unmitigatedly contemptble and evil?" Second, he soon adds another by saying: "And isn't this entire, unending world constructed by the understanding out of incomprehensibility or chaos?"

These questions become central to Schlegel's conceptualization of 'romantic irony'. Although he does not define it explicitly, they are nevertheless central to it. As Allen (2007:5) observes:

> For Schlegel, irony is not merely a local rhetorical ploy in which you mean the reverse of what you say: it is nothing less than a cognitive instrument through which the relationship of the finite to the infinite may be grasped. … Schlegel states that irony is "constant alternation of self-creation and self-destruction," and "by its means one transcends oneself." The role irony plays as an instrument for objectively grasping this mobility is defined in Schlegel's romantic, rhetorical logic in which the either/or Aristotelian logic of non-contradiction (something cannot be both a and not a) is replaced by the both/and principle of a 'romantic logic' or 'a = a and a ≠ a'.

Since irony relates to opposites, it can, according to Schlegel ([1958] 1971:266), be seen as "the form of paradox". Rather than interpreting it as a limitation, he sees in it value or potential. In other words, he rejects the Kantian principle of non-contradiction and reasons against it by saying that "[m]ost thoughts are only the profiles of thoughts. They have to be turned around and synthesized with their antipodes. This is how many philosophical works acquire a considerable interest that they would otherwise have lacked" (Schlegel as cited in Albert 1993:825).

This sounds like an anticipation of Hegel's ideas on the relationship between thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Yet, as we shall see shortly, Hegel is actually one of the most influential critics of Schlegel's notion of romantic irony. Before we get into it, let us allow Schlegel to speak for himself once more. The following citation does not only allow us to understand better his conceptualization of irony but how it relates to Socratic irony and introduces the issue of dialectics that we shall return to inevitably in the context of Hegel's critique of (romantic) irony. Indeed, Schlegel's argumentation, presented below, shows that it is pointless to distinguish what was 'meant' from what was actually 'said' because they are two sides of the same coin – both are necessary and complete each other. As Schlegel ([1958] 1971:265) puts it:

> [Socratic irony] is meant to deceive no one except those who consider it a deception and who either take pleasure in the delightful roguery of making fools of the whole world or else become angry when they get an inkling they themselves might be included. In this sort of irony, everything should be playful and everything should be serious, everything guilelessly open and everything deeply hidden.... It contains and arouses a feeling of indissoluble antagonism between the absolute and the relative, between the impossibility and the necessity of complete communication.

One can sense from it that for Schlegel romantic irony is more than just a literary style or technique – it is a project with a distinct agenda for developing universal, yet unique, criteria for the evaluation of art and beauty. Indeed, as observed also by Speight (2016), "Schlegel's bold envisioning of the romantic and the Roman are, however, part of a larger project in poetics and aesthetics concerned with finding a standard of judgment appropriate to the individuality of artistic and literary works." He goes on to explain that:

> [t]he aesthetic standard that Schlegel develops – perhaps best expressed in his claim that "criticism is not to judge works by a general ideal, but is to search

out the individual ideal of every work" (*Literary Notebooks*, 1733 [*sic*][87]) – owes debts both to Herder's notions of the historical and cultural uniqueness of individuals (Eichner, 1970:42) and to Kant's stress in the Critique of Judgment on the impossibility of judging beauty according to some external rule (see Eichner, 1970:35–36, for an account of Schlegel's successive readings of the third Critique). Schlegel worked out his new criterion of the "individual ideal of every work" in three important early (1796) critical essays reviewing the work of Jacobi, Georg Forster and Lessing …

All this seems to have sounded outrageous, if not an act of desecration, to Hegel. To understand his critique of romantic irony, one has to first recall what his position on Socratic irony was. In addition to what was explained in the previous sub-sections, Stewart (2015:35) points out that the Socratic method attempts to clarify the meaning of universal terms such as beauty, truth or justice. Related to this, it is interesting that we use categories like this widely to communicate with others even though we all have our personal understanding of the meaning of these. However, to escape the subjectivity, on the one hand, and escape the vagueness and abstractness, on the other, Hegel saw a need to add precision to those kinds of universal categories.

Hegel takes up the critique of Schlegel's notion of romantic irony most comprehensively in his lectures on *Aesthetics,* where he devotes a separate section to it.[88] To start with, he reminds the reader that Schlegel's notion of romantic irony relies on the philosophy of Fichte. Based on this, says Hegel ([1835] 1975:64), Schlegel sets "up the *ego* as the absolute principle of all knowing, reason, and cognition, and at that the *ego* that remains throughout abstract and formal". Hegel (ibid) goes on to characterize Schlegel's romantic irony by saying that: "every content is negated in it, since everything is submerged in this abstract freedom and unity, while, on the other hand, every content which is to have value for the *ego* is only put and recognized by the ego itself".

While up to his point Hegel does not criticize, let alone reticulate, the idea that the author's own ego – without any external beauty standard – could be the instrument of the judgment of taste; what follows is quite the opposite. He (ibid) asks us to pause and think about what it would mean if "absolutely empty forms which originate from the absoluteness of the abstract *ego*, nothing is treated *in and for itself* and as valuable in itself, but only as produced by the subjectivity of the *ego*". He reasons, contrary to Schlegel, that if we leave it up to egoistically subjective ethics, nothing good can come out of it. As he (ibid) puts it: "in that case the *ego* can remain lord and master of everything, and in no sphere of morals, law, things human and divine, profane and sacred, is there anything that would not first have to be laid down by the *ego*, and that therefore could not equally well be destroyed by it." This is why (romantic) irony symbolizes evil and negativity for Hegel.

---

[87] See Schlegel (1957).
[88] Scholars of Hegel's work, such as Mascat (2013:231) have noted that additional comments by Hegel on romantic irony can be found also in his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, and "Review of Solger's Posthumous Writings and Correspondence".

Furthermore, (romantic) irony comes to represent vanity for Hegel. Given the reasoning that the ironist sees herself as divine geniality, which allows her to declare anything valuable one day and reverse the position the next, it is a short step from the subjectivity of the ego to vanity, according to Hegel. This finds its manifestation in Hegel's (ibid:66) statement that "the general meaning of the divine irony of genius, as this concentration of the *ego* into itself, for which all bonds are snapped and which can live only in the bliss of self-enjoyment".

By positioning (romantic) irony between morality and ethical life Hegel stresses the subjective character of ego and how this questionable relationship depends on individual freedom as indicated above. The irony of (Hegel's critique of romantic) irony is that the subjectivity of the ego can get no satisfaction and, hence, starts to long for objectivity. The double irony of it is that given the subjectivity of the ego, there is no escape from freedom. As Hegel (ibid:66–7) puts it in more dramatic terms:

> The next form of this negativity of irony is, on the one hand, the vanity of everything factual, moral, and of intrinsic worth, the nullity of everything objective and absolutely valid. If the ego remains at this standpoint, everything appears to it as null and vain, except its own subjectivity which therefore becomes hollow and empty and itself mere vanity. But, on the other hand, the ego may, contrariwise, fail to find satisfaction in this self-enjoyment and instead become inadequate to itself, so that it now feels a craving for the solid and the substantial, for specific and essential interests. Out of this comes misfortune, and the contradiction that, on the one hand, the subject does want to penetrate into truth and longs for objectivity, but, on the other hand, cannot renounce his isolation and withdrawal into himself or tear himself free from this unsatisfied abstract inwardness. … That longing, however, is only the empty vain subject's sense of nullity, and he lacks the strength to escape from this vanity and fill himself with a content of substance.

In short, all the above-presented aspects of romantic irony that Hegel puts forward in *Aesthetics*, his most comprehensive treatment of romantic irony, are intended to support the argument that nothing more than nihilism could come from ironic narcissism. Given the stress on subjectivity and lack of objectivity, (romantic) irony results in negativity and vanity according to Hegel.

To sum up the discussion on romantic irony and its reflections, one may come to a rather pessimistic conclusion. For instance, de Man (1996:164) rea-sons as follows:

> The German aesthetician Friedrich Solger, who writes perceptively about irony, complains at length that August Wilhelm Schlegel … although he had written on irony, really cannot define it, cannot say what it is. A little later, when Hegel, who has a lot to say about irony, talks about irony, he complains about Solger, who writes about irony, he says, but who doesn't seem to know what it is he is writing about. And then a little later, when Kierkegaard writes on irony, he refers to Hegel, whose influence he is at that moment trying to get out of, and he more ironically complains about the fact that Hegel doesn't really seem to know what irony is. He says what and where Hegel talks about it, but then he complains and says he really doesn't have much to say about it, and what he

says about it whenever he talks about it is just about always the same, and it isn't very much.

Likewise, Brown summarizes Hegel's reactions to romantic irony using words that do not depict it along the most optimistic lines. More specifically, he (Brown 1983:548) says:

> If Schlegel is the most sensitive exponent of irony as dialectical, Hegel is its most powerful critic. Hegel, like Kierkegaard and others after him, chooses to emphasize the 'buffoonery' rather than the 'transcendental' in Schlegel's formulation, and thus accuses Schlegel of not seeing that irony is merely the first moment of philosophical inquiry, the 'transition point' in the 'dialectical unrest' that Hegel himself calls 'infinite absolute negativity.' In Hegel's reading, the romantic irony of Schlegel never gets beyond this negative moment. Instead, the ironist for Hegel falls into an infinite epistemological regress, never reaching a 'synthesis.' He is aware of something, then of its contrary, then of his awareness, then of his awareness of his awareness, and so on indefinitely. By such a method everything is turned into illusion, the absolute subjectivity that irony presupposes comes to contradict itself, and: "all that is objective and of essential worth" is rendered null (Hegel 1920:vol. 1, 91–2).

Nevertheless, one may also come to a slightly more optimistic conclusion on the basis of the above-presented ideas on romantic irony and its implications for sociological research. More specifically, it is not difficult to agree with the commentators who argue that Hegel does injustice to the notion, in general, and Schlegel's ideas about it, in particular, when he suggests that irony necessarily leads to dangerous negativity and/or vanity that is inherently evil. Given this unearned injustice that Hegel and others offer toward Schlegel's ideas on romantic irony, on the one hand, and the similarity of the implications of their arguments about subjective freedom and objective truth, on the other, one may draw much wider lessons for contemporary sociology and its method(ology). Indeed, the implications of their dispute over subjective freedom and objective truth for the sociological method(ology) do not seem to differ that much, as indicated above.

In the next section, we shall build on romantic irony. As will be shown shortly, romantic irony, with its central thesis, that "the artist's arbitrary will suffer no law over itself", is the starting point for Lukács' ([1908–11] 1971c:161) works on aesthetics that he formulates into the *Theory of the Novel*. We shall look at the surprising intellectual and political developments that did not only follow from it but have given food for thought to the critical sociology of intellectuals and knowledge and calls for irony as an anticipated provocation.

1.5 Szelényi's (Way to) Irony as an Anticipated Thought Provocation and/or Intellectual Intrigue

The aim of this sub-section is to present and briefly discuss how Iván Szelényi came to understand that he had been using irony in his thought-provoking works, how he and his co-authors conceptualized it as a method of neoclassical sociology, and how this approach to irony relates to those described in the previous sub-sections – from irony as unintended consequences to irony as an infinitized paradoxical nature of reality. Although there are also elements of similarity with the approaches to the use of irony in his research for Enlightenment, as Hegelian dialectic and the logic of discovery, it will be argued in this section that he does not follow directly any of these approaches. This does not only give us reason to present his mode of irony as a unique category but motivates us to take a closer look at the 'metaphysical pathos' of his scholarship in the third part of the thesis.

Szelényi explains in one of his reflections, "Maria Markus and the (Re)invention of Hungarian Sociology", how he with Konrád was gradually radicalizing in the early 1970s. The paper that was the first step in the direction that culminated in the writing of *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, was titled "The Social Conflict of Under-urbanization". He (2010b:33) recalls the events that led to the development of irony as an anticipated thought provocation and /or intellectual intrigue as follows:

> We carefully selected the title to provoke reactions. We could taste the words 'social conflict' and 'under-urbanization' – we liked how it sounded and it had its effect. We were violently attacked in a series of articles written by some of our friends who were asked by the Communist Party to put us into our proper place and they did not have the courage to say no.

However, to understand Szelényi's approach to irony as an anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue, some brief comments on critical Marxism, in general, and its sociology of intellectuals and knowledge, in particular, would be necessary because they represent the 'thesis' against which he formulated his 'antithesis' of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology. In other words, before we can describe irony as an anticipated thought provocation and /or intellectual intrigue in the form of a method of neoclassical sociology, a short introduction to the relevant ideas and background knowledge of the ideas of the members of the (first) Budapest School, against which Szelényi can be seen to respond, are necessary.

To start with, one may recall from the introduction to this chapter that Weinstein (1982) noted in his typology that there are basically two techniques of irony used in sociology: (i) detachment, and (ii) explanation and prediction. In the case of detachment, one could expect, following Mannheim, those socially unattached intellectuals should be able to free themselves from individualistic interest and, hence, 'see beyond' not only their own agenda but also those of the units of analysis. How exactly the sociologist is supposed to be able to assume the ironic focus that enables one to achieve it, remained unclear. We are only told

by Weinstein (ibid:299–300) that "[t]he 'distancing' provided by the ironic focus is the result of seeing intent and anticipation of actors as limited by their need to act in a rational manner, by their inability to foresee an ironic outcome and still act as they do. In this way, the subjectivity of the actor is regarded as being bound by circumstance".

Vladimir Jankélévitch, a French philosopher with Russian-Jewish roots, is one of the modern philosophers who might help us to understand the technique of detachment that Weinstein identifies. That is, Jankélévitch (1936) in *L'Ironie ou la bonne conscience* offers one possible way that the use of irony may allow one to reach detachment. As summarized by Colin Smith (1964:111–2):

> The intellectual solution, or solution of contrivance, which he [Vladimir Jankélévitch] examines with most insight and sympathy, but still without wholeheartedly accepting it, is irony. Irony, like art, is a product of leisure and the relaxation of the urgency of mere animal living. Where 'bad conscience', or semi-detachment, is a condemnation, because it holds us prisoners in the 'semelfactivity' of our own experience — its once-for-all-time occurrence — and at the same time offers that occurrence as an object of saddening contemplation, irony is complete detachment, good conscience, liberating us and conferring upon us mobility and the possibility of escape. To ironize is to leave the scene of action (s'absenter). Irony enables us to prevail over our predicament, for though it recognizes the necessity of our limitation in time and place, it conceives the possibility of being elsewhere and later. It is essentially reflective and is turned in upon the self, as the intellect, which it employs, is usually turned outwards: upon a reality of which it is independent. ... It seems that Jankélévitch is here presenting once more conceptualization, but colored this time with something like humor. To bare consolation as a shared lot is added a certain feeling of freedom, in the form of awareness of necessity (which is true freedom), and through this we are made 'available' without existentialist melodrama. Irony is absence and detachment, and its language is therefore non-committal. Indeed, the ironist appears to take up a position antithetical to the one which he occupies; not, however, with the object of being believed, and making a victim of his interlocutor, but in order to be understood, and thus make a sort of accomplice of him. Irony is a kind of synthetic, intellectual consolation, but not quite a genuine one, according to Jankélévitch.

Alternatively, one may relate the idea of 'socially unattached intellectuals' with Mannheim's informal tutor – Georg [György] Lukács. Recall that Weinstein (1982:299) suggested that sociologists with ironic focus act as dramatists when they adopt the ironic technique of detachment. One can hardly think of any better example of a sociologist taking the role of a dramatist than Lukács or Mannheim – both of whom tried their hand at writing plays before they turned to social theory.[89]

---

[89] Mannheim confessed during his meeting with Lukács on June 23, 1911, his wish to write a play (Sárközi 1986:438). This plan was indeed realized – Loader (1985:33–4) summarizes this one-act play, titled "The lady from Biarritz", which has never been published, in *The Intellectual Development of Karl Mannheim*. His assessment, however, was that "Great drama this is not" (ibid:34). According to the same entry in Mannheim's diary about meeting on June 23, 1911, Lukács had replied to Mannheim's plan by saying that "while he himself lived entirely for philosophy, although he had

In anticipation of the ways (romantic) irony has been used as the infinitized paradoxical nature of reality and dialectics, it is interesting to note that Lukács ([Oct. 27, 1909] 1986a:104) writes – well before Mannheim ([1925] 1927) ever expresses his ideas on 'socially unattached intellectuals'[90] – to his fried Leo Popper:

> … Romanticism is more than mere 'yearning for the infinite'; it is also Romantic irony. F. Schlegel writes …: "Und doch kann auch sie am meisten zwischen dem Dargestellten und dem Darzustellenden, frie von allem realen und idealen Interesse auf den Flügeln der poetischen Reflection schweben, diese Reflexion immer wieder potenzieren und wiein einer endlosen Reihe von Spiegeln vervielfachen."[91] And think back to the discussion we had in Lucerne about humor and about rising above one's situation. As I see it humor is romantic, the form of Romanticism is the novel, thus the question: What is its relation to the forms? … What I offer is the *critique* of this infinite form and this critique has great importance for me. And this critique is truly mine; as you can comprehend now, it was not by accident that I cited (my) old articles (as they all came from notebooks more than three years old). I wanted you to realize that the problem touched upon here is an *organic part of my life*.

Furthermore, the transcript of Lukács' reminiscences about his marriage with Jelena Grabenko, kept in his archives in Budapest, reveals that he used the concept of socially unattached intellectual to refer to himself. More specifically, he (n.d) says: "Situation in Heidelberg: the existence of a 'free floating intellectual' with adequate financial means. The necessity of marriage because of the war: J. G. is Russian, her only protection: Hungarian citizenship" (Lukács [1902–20] 1986:105). Lukács is also cited by Tar (1986:13) as reflecting close to the end of his life on the pre-World War I intelligentsia, to which he had the possibility to belong due to the generous financial support of his father, with the following words: "At that time there was a large section of intellectuals, university intellectuals, in particular, who belonged to the rentier stratum by virtue of their pri-

---

written plays and novels in his youth" (Sárközi 1986:438). It is also interesting to note that in 1904 Lukács with his friends and with his father's financial backing had established the Thalia Theatre Company in Budapest, which operated for four years. He (1983:32-3) later reflects on this experience as follows: "I learned a tremendous amount about dramatic techniques and forms from seeing how the texts were brought to life on the stage… I realized that I had a very good grasp for the relation between dramatic action and ideas, but was quite untalented when it came to perceiving that the decision whether an actor should raise his right hand or his left might be crucial." For additional comments, on how this realization led to Lukács turning to theory, see Eörsi (1987:7).

[90] 'Socially unattached intellectuals' (or intelligentsia) that is sometimes presented also as 'relatively uncommitted intelligentsia' (*relativ freischwebende Intelligentz*) or 'socially free-floating intelligentsia' is a concept that is associated with Mannheim. It is true that he ([1927] 1964:455, 457–8; [1936] 1952:310, 317–8; 1943:36, 42; 1953:125, 127–8, 137; 1954:136–46; 1956:106, 111, 138, 169; 1986:13, 117–9, 128, 185, 214; 1993:314, 323, 392–3; [1993] 2001:166), he (1954:137, 1956:106) uses it frequently in his publications.

[91] The editors and translators of Georg [György] Lukács' *Selected Correspondence. 1902–1920* offer the following translation: "[Irony] is best able to hover between what is portrayed and what has to be presented, to float on the wings of poetic reflection free from all real and ideal interest, raising this reflection again and again to a higher power, and multiplying it as in one endless series of mirrors." (Lukács [1902–1920] 1986:105).

vate incomes, which gave them financial autonomy. This was the economic basis of Mannheim's free-floating intelligentsia."

Although Mannheim ([1925] 1986:117/213, 1956:106) says that he borrowed the notion from Alfred Weber, who served as his mentor during his *Habilitationsschrift* in Heidelberg, he does not provide any reference to support it. In secondary literature, Sárközi (1986:439) says that Mannheim got the idea from Max Weber. Although he (ibid) quotes Max Weber as stating that "The intellectual is a person who floats between the classes of society", he fails to provide reference to it. It seems possible that he mixes up Max Weber with his brother Alfred Weber, who taught sociology at Heidelberg.

In this context, it may well be that the true author of this construct is Georg Lukács. The published correspondence and reflections from the intellectual milieu, including the Sunday gatherings hosted by Frau Marianne Weber, suggest that ideas may have been circulating among the members of this informal intellectual community. Taking into account that Lukács married Grabenko in May 1914, on the one hand, and that the first time Mannheim is known to have used the concept in his publications is in his [1925] 1927 paper (titled "Das konservative Denken"),[92] as well as the fact that nobody has been able to find the concept used in the works of (Max or) Alfred Weber,[93] on the other, it seems plausible, despite the allusion, that Lukács is the true origin of the notion both symbolically as well as factually.[94]

To give credit when it is due, one could argue that Lukács provided the thesis of socially unattached intellectuals, Max Weber the first antithesis, and Mannheim the initial synthesis. This was then followed by the provision of a second antithesis by Alfred Weber and the new search for synthesis by Mannheim, who similar to Lukács, stopped halfway as he did not dare to reflect on the issue self-critically. This is the task to be completed by scholars, such as Bourdieu, Gouldner and Kołakowski, based on whom, as will be shown below, Szelényi with his co-authors builds his critique of critical Marxism and the corresponding understanding of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology.

As mentioned, Lukács seems to have formulated the notion of socially unattached intellectuals and the following research problem based on his work on romantic irony in the context of the problematization of the meaningfulness and possibility of the existence of art as a response to his middle-class socio-economic background, on the one hand, and Gramsci's distinction between traditional and organic intellectuals, on the other. This would fit with his personal ap-

---

[92] This essay, published also in English (Lukács ([1927] 1964) is part of his *Habilitation* work in Heidelberg that was later published in full as *Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge* (cf. Mannheim [1925] 1986).

[93] Loander (1997:229) notes that "[a]s far as can be determined, the term never actually appeared in any of Weber's published or unpublished writings prior to the appearance of *Ideology and Utopia*. Eberhard Demm, who is perhaps more familiar with the entire body of Weber's work than is anyone else, has not uncovered the term in his research."

[94] For additional insight on this matter see: Kecskemeti (1952:20, 24), Loader (1985, 1997), Kettler et al. (2008:94) and Mendel (2006).

proach to the unity of theory and praxis within his seemingly sudden turn to communist ideas and related political engagement.

Max Weber (1948:154) found the question raised by Lukács about the existence and possibility of meaningful art[95] intellectually intriguing and supported his wish to establish himself at the University of Heidelberg as a promising young scholar. Furthermore, Weber did not stop there – he seems to have anticipated where the disappointment in departmental politics may lead Lukács. Indeed, Weber had expressed the trap into which an intellectual may fall already in his inaugural lecture given in Freiburg in May 1895, where he ([1895] 1980) advises an imaginary young scholar against taking up an academic career as follows:

> Thus, academic life is a wild gamble. If young scholars come to ask advice before becoming a lecturer, the responsibility of encouragement is almost unbearable. If he is a Jew, one of course says *lasciate ogni speranza*. But one must in all conscience ask everyone else – do you think that you can bear to see for year after year mediocrity promoted over your head without becoming embittered and damaged. Every time, of course, the answer is, "Naturally, I live only for my vocation." But I at least have known of only few who can tolerate it without doing themselves harm.

This warning is indirectly repeated in Weber's famous speeches, published under the titles "Science as Vocation" and "Politics as Vocation".[96] One can argue that they represent (in)direct responses to and critiques of Lukács. Indeed, these speeches can be read as a culmination of the process where Weber was directly and personally involved in providing friendly support to Lukács' wish to obtain Habilitation at Heidelberg and his attempts to save him for academic philosophy by pushing him to become a 'systematic thinker'.[97] Despite the fact that Weber did not hide his dislike of Lukács' *Theory of the Novel* in his private correspondence,[98] it did not stop him from trying to help him find a publisher for it.[99] Anticipating the argument of Robert Merton, who, as was shown in section 1.2., was

---

[95] Mannheim ([1936] 1982:103) says that Kant is known for asking "How is nature possible" and Simmel of asking "How is society possible?" From this Lukács derives the question that Weber admires. More specifically, Weber (1948:154) notes: "The modern aestheticians (actually or expressly, as for instance, G. v. Lukacs) proceed from the presupposition that 'works of art exist,' and then ask: 'How is their existence meaningful and possible?'"

[96] There is some lack of clarity in the literature when the speeches were actually delivered between November 9, 1917, and January 28, 1919, as the two speeches had to be postponed several times. For an overview of this confusion, see Schluchter (1979:113–6). Nevertheless, it is clear that Weber prepared them at the time when Lukács made his last failed attempt to get the *Habilitation* at Heidelberg (cf. Lukács [May 25, 1918] 1986c:285; [Dec. 16, 1918] 1986d:289; Domaszewski [Dec. 7, 1918] 1986:289) and joined the Communist Party in mid-December 1918 – having rejected Bolshevism just a few weeks before (cf. Lukács [1918] 1977). It is also clear that soon after publishing the speeches, Weber [March ?, 1920] 1986e:281) condemned in his letter to Lukács his political preferences and engagement – asking if it was his 'calling'. Given the fact that Weber died in June 1920, Lukács did not seem to have made time to reply to Weber.

[97] For details, see: Lukács ([Dec. 30 1915] 1986e:255, [Jan. 17, 1916] 1986f:258), Weber ([July 22, 1912] 1986a:204, [Aug. 14, 1916] 1986c:264, [Aug. 23, 1916] 1986d:265).

[98] For details, see: Lukács ([Mid-Dec. 1915] 1986d:253), Tar (1986:24), Weber ([Aug. 14, 1916] 1986c:264).

[99] For details, see: Weber ([Dec. 23, 1915] 1986b:255, [Aug. 14, 1916] 1986c).

inspired to conceptualize irony as an unanticipated consequence, Max Weber wrote to his wife, Marianne Weber ([1926] 1975:490), the following telling lines about the imprisonment of Lukács and his anarchist wife:

> The fact that the *result* of good actions is so often wholly irrational and that 'good' behavior has bad consequences have made him doubt that one *ought* to act well – and evaluation of moral action on the basis of results rather than intrinsic value. For the time being he does not see that there is a fallacy here. I shall try to obtain *The Brothers Karamazov* for him and at some later time Lukács' dialogue about the poor in spirit [*sic!*], which deals with the problem …

The life history choices Lukács took, on the one hand, and the responses of the political regimes in which interest he decided to work, on the other, have been discussed elsewhere[100] and hardly need repeating here. What is of importance in the discussion of irony as an anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue, however, is the note that King and Szelényi (2004:33–4) make in the *Theories of New Class: Intellectuals and Power* that Lukács together with Korsch and Gramsci laid the foundation of critical Marxism as they took the Leninist task to change the class consciousness as the most important task of revolutionary theorizing as the point of departure. Although they made an important first step toward developing the critical sociology of knowledge and intellectuals, they did not go far enough, according to King and Szelényi. More specifically, they point out that critical Marxists lose their irony when it comes to critical self-reflection. As a case in point, they (only) draw attention to Lukács' new preface to the 1968 edition[101] of *History and Class Consciousness* where he presents himself as a naïve ivory-tower philosopher who turned into a revolutionary activist (while in reality, his behavior bordered on 'adventurism' and the criminal).

In other words, King and Szelényi find it kind of ironic that Lukács failed to have the courage to ask himself self-critically how it happened that the son of a banker and "the decadent bourgeois philosopher" became a communist[102] overnight who had just a few weeks before joining the communists rejected Bolshe-

---

[100] See, for instance, Arato and Breines (1979), Eörsi (1987), Kadarkay (1991), Kókai (2017), Köves (2017), Löwy (1979), Lukács (1971c & 1983), Marković (1985), Pike (1988), Stahl (2018), Steiner (2000), Tar (1986), and Žižek (2000).

[101] The preface was actually written in 1967 and published first in German in 1968. The English translation came out in 1971. For details see Lukács ([1967] 1971).

[102] Although Lukács' overnight turn to communism is often mentioned, he argues in the "Preface to the New Edition" of the *History and Class Consciousness* that it was not so simple and sudden. Having mentioned how he was reading Marx to establish the sociological foundation of his monograph on the modern drama at the time (i.e., in 1918), which led to the 'organic development' within which he ([1967] 1971:x) was struggling between "acquisition of Marxism and political activism, on the one hand, and the constant identification of … [his] purely idealistic ethical preoccupations, on the other". He (ibid) goes on to reflect as follows:

> If I now regard this disharmonious dualism as characteristic of my ideas at that period my intention to paint it in black and white, as if the dynamics of the situation could be confined within the limits of a struggle between revolutionary good and the vestigial evil of bourgeois thought. The transition from one class to the class directly opposed to it is a much more complex business than that.

vism publicly (cf. Lukács [1918] 1977), or why he did not hesitate when the proactive decision to execute seemingly innocent soldiers 'had' to be made.[103] Although he has addressed the role of intellectuals in some less well-known publications (cf. Lukács [1915] 1973, 1920), reflected on his moral choices in the paper titled "Tactics and Ethics" (Lukács [1919] 1972)[104] and returned to the issues in his autobiographical reflections[105], King and Szelényi find these exercises in self-criticism inadequate. They (2004:36) point out that:

> Lukács, becoming one of the 'commissars' of the 1919 Hungarian Soviet Republic – possibly to show to himself to what an extent he resolved the contradictions between theory and practice and overcame bourgeois reified consciousness – ordered the execution of solders whom, upon a visit to a battalion, he found not sufficiently disciplined. The weapon of criticism was turned into a criticism of weapons … this time, though, against ordinary soldiers of the Red Army. What a bitter irony of history, what a tragic symbol of the insanity of twentieth-century intellectuals in search of their historic mission.

Given Lukács avoided engaging in truly critical self-scrutiny and the lack of irony in the offered self-reflections[106] – as King and Szelényi put it – the task to subject the consciousness of the intellectual to the (critical) study of the sociology of knowledge was potentially left to Mannheim. In fact, Mannheim followed Lukács' advice (given in 1911) to learn to write in German, read Kant systematically and go to Heidelberg (cf. Sárközi 1986:435), where he got a *Habilitation* with Alfred Weber to enter the German academic community, which Lukács prior to him had worked so hard for but did not have the possibility to obtain (cf. Lukács [1902–1920] 1986; Tar 1986:15–26). Their common Hungarian-Jewish heritage, similar intellectual interests, possibility to study briefly under Simmel's guidance in Berlin and belonging to the same intellectual community as Alfred and Max Weber in Heidelberg and to the same weekly discussion group of intellectuals, who met on Sundays in the house of Bela Balazs in Budapest, made Mannheim the perfect candidate for the task.

And for a while, it might have seemed that he was, indeed, up for the job. Having completed his *Habilitationsschrift* on *Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge* at Heidelberg in 1925 (where he avoids mentioning Lukács) and having managed to become a *Privatdozent* there (that required the suppres-

---

[103] This seems to have earned Lukács the nickname 'Liquidator' at the Party leadership and almost led to expelling of him from it (Lukács [1967] 1971:xxx).

[104] Lukács confessed to Eörsi that he meant 'violence' (1987:10) when he was talking about 'the sin' in the following passage: "[t]here are tragic situations in which it is impossible to act without committing a sin but … even if we must choose between two sins, there remains a measure of right and wrong behavior. This measure is: the sacrifice" (ibid:9).

[105] See for instance, Lukács 1933 / 1958 / [19??] 1978; 1971c, [1969; 1971] 1983) – some of which that have, for instance, been discussed by Eörsi (1987), Marković (1986) and Tar (1986).

[106] Lukács (cited in Tar 1986:25-6), for instance, reflects as follows:

> I have to admit that I joined the CP after a certain wavering. … Although the positive role of violence in history was always clear to me and I never had anything against the Jacobins, when the problem of violence arose and the decision had to be made that I should promote violence by my own activity, it turned out that one's theory does not exactly jibe with practice.

sion of any political views), he courageously took up a year-long seminar on Lukács' Marxist writings. While the Habilitation work addressed, among other issues, the socially unattached intellectuals and social roots of German conservative thought – the consciousness of a social class shaped, to use Marxist terms here, by substructure and superstructure – he avoided mentioning the name Lukács anywhere in the text. According to Kettler et al. (1984:75–6 / 1986:7–8), he also avoided (apart from a few essays in Hungarian) voicing any political views that could have been interpreted as a mistake of mixing up the vocations of science and politics.[107] Once elected to the post of *Privatdozent*, Mannheim's scholarship can be seen as an attempt to address the 'personal issue' of Lukács and concomitant search for the final synthesis of the links between socio-economic and intellectual spheres in the case of socially unattached intellectuals.

This adventure was discouraged by Alfred Weber ([1928] 1990:89–90) who found it necessary to attack Mannheim at the meeting of the German Sociological Association more publicly than his brother before him had done in the case of Lukács, for the adoption of the materialist conceptualization of social classes. As the protocols of the joint seminars held by Mannheim ([1930] 2001, Ch. 5) and Alfred Weber on February 21 and 27 in 1929 indicate, they tried to settle their differences – using their interpretation of Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness* as the point of departure.

It is difficult to say if it was (in)directly the result of the exchange of these ideas or a combination of the escape from the anti-Semitism of the Nazi regime, on the one hand, and emigration to England, on the other, but it did not take long for Mannheim to distance himself from Alfred Weber (and therefore also from Lukács). Loader (1997:229) notes: "[i]ronically, Mannheim's movement away from Alfred Weber's cultural analysis brought him closer to Weber's brother Max and his distinction between science and politics as vocations". With the emigration to England, he also let go of any political aspirations he might have had, and together with all of it, it seems, any potential to reflect critically on the communist turn in his mentor in particular and intellectuals in general.

In this context, Mannheim's final synthesis of the much discussed socially unattached intellectuals, based on Lukács without mentioning his name, can be found in his work titled *Sociology as Political Education*. It is not the kind of critical sociology of intellectuals and knowledge that King and Szelényi were looking for, and is quite the opposite of the use of irony as an anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue. Similar to the Habilitation work on conservatism, he avoids mentioning Lukács in his other major works, such as *Ideology and Utopia*; *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* and, most importantly within the given discussion, in the 1956 essay titled "The Problem of the Intelligentsia: An Enquiry into its Past and Present Role" – despite the fact

---

[107] Kettler et al. (1986:7) point out that Mannheim's mentors, Emil Lederer and Alfred Weber, tried to convince the Inner Senate of the University of Heidelberg that he did not have any political aspirations. Yet, Kettler et al also show that by that time Mannheim had tried to establish himself as a publicist in Hungary and portrayed himself as a voluntary emigrant to save and keep the free spirit of Hungarians alive.

that it should be apparent from the context that he seems to have his mentor in mind when theorizing on the issue. Consider, for instance, the following lines from the book where Mannheim ([1930] 2001:50–1) states that we need:

> … to ask how the attitude of affiliated intellectuals is formed. One of the keenest challenges is whether the intelligentsia can in fact affiliate itself. The intelligentsia has undergone something like sublimation, self-distantiation. It has passed through this stage. And this intelligentsia undergoes it persistently— ever since it defected from its original group, when the intellectual abandoned the earliest unambiguous possibility of seeing the world and entered upon a level of consciousness with multiple possibilities. For the essence of modern cultivation (*Bildung*) is that it embraces, in principle, many alternate ways of seeing. Becoming truly cultivated means experiencing all possible ways of seeing and thinking. There is present a tendency to see multi-dimensionally, but at the same time, a great uncertainty. Simultaneously, the intellectual identifies himself with a position that is not altogether his own, but that is in some measure consonant with the dissatisfaction of the intelligentsia with the world as it is. This dissatisfaction accords with the dissatisfaction of the proletariat. This is at once the source of identification and a dualism in the intellectual's stand toward life. He is under a compulsion, especially if he affiliates himself with the most extreme group. He finds himself in a situation where he is constantly binding his consciousness to the sanctioned decision that he receives and experiences with the others. This causes the following tension. He understands that this dogmatizing, this nailing fast of certain things, is very fruitful from the standpoint of action. Collective action is possible only when the direction of action is unequivocally laid down. He also understands that this orthodoxy is prescribed on the basis of a situation that is not actually a complete fit with his own. It means the presupposition of axiomatic propositions. A new experience can only be taken in by fitting something into this axiomatic structure. Insofar as this latter is particularistic, certain things can simply not be successfully mastered.

A less naïve and more ironic approach to the critical sociology of knowledge and intellectuals is taken by Alvin Gouldner, who has expressed his concerns about the limits of 'value-free sociology' (Gouldner 1962) and dared to raise the questions: "Whose side are we on?"[108] (Gouldner 1968:103) and "Where does the cameraman fit in?" (Gouldner 1978a:160 / 1979a:9).[109] The painful reception of these critical remarks indicates that the achievement of the ironic focus may be more challenging than often believed. Indeed, given the fact that there are not too many sociologists who have followed Gouldner's (1975–1976) lead and adopted the tools of a critical sociology of knowledge/sociology to reflect on the power and privilege of intellectuals by using self-ironic reflexivity and the Cul-

---

[108] Becker (1967) raised this question originally in the Presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems in Miami Beach in August 1966.
[109] According to Szelényi, this question is said to have formulated the central question of the critical sociology of intellectuals in general and the New Class theorizing in particular.

ture of Critical Discourse, the prospects of achieving the state of social unattachment may be more distant than anticipated.[110]

Although intellectuals like to think of themselves as altruistic individuals, who are motivated by the public good instead of self-interest, scholars inspired by critical theory are skeptical of this. Similar to literary critics like Dane, sociologists find the need to get involved in public affairs to be one of the defining features of intellectuals. For instance, Confino (1973:118) identifies five defining features of intellectuals:

> (1) deep concern for problems and issues of public interest – social, economic, cultural, and political; (2) a sense of guilt and personal responsibility for the state and the solution of these problems and issues; (3) a propensity to view political and social questions as moral ones; (4) a sense of obligation to seek ultimate logical conclusions – in thought as well as in life – at whatever cost; (5) the conviction that things are not as they should be, and that something should be done.

To complement this, one may add that Gouldner (1975–1976:4) distinguishes between "technical 'intelligentsia' whose intellectual interests are fundamentally 'technical'; and intellectuals whose interests are critical, hermeneutic, emancipatory, and often practical-political".

While one should not rule out the possibility that these motives to get involved in public affairs could in principle be noble, the history of the socialist movement does not provide compelling evidence that they necessarily are. As demonstrated among others by Gouldner (1980, Ch. 5, 1982) and disputed by Therborn (1973, 1976), intellectuals did not only develop Marxist-Leninist ideas but also played a key role in the establishment of the First International and the socialist workers' parties – writing the revolutionary social theory with one hand and making sure that it was fulfilled with the other.[111] Konrad and Szelényi (1979) went even a step further and argued that intellectuals put their personal self-interest above social ones and were trying to establish for the first time in history a knowledge-based class power in existing socialist redistributive economies.

All this can be seen as a historical prelude to what Szelényi and his co-authors propose two decades later in the form of proposed irony as a method of neoclassical sociology. Although research technique is not widely known and even less

---

[110] For the additional insight, Gouldner (1962) for his ideas on the limits and possibility of value-free sociology.

[111] Although Therborn (1976:39, 318–26, 334) rather hesitantly accepts the role that Marx, Engels, and other 'radicalized intellectuals' played in the First International, he (ibid, Ch. 3) also shows how much more varied the relationship between the representatives of the founding fathers of sociology were two different political views and their representation. Gouldner as the editor of Durkheim's *Socialism and Saint-Simon*, however, reacts to this by saying that Therborn misses an important point – Marx was exposed early on to the ideas of Saint-Simon, one of the founders of not only positivist sociology but also utopian socialism. As Gouldner (1980:374–5) puts it: "Therborn maintains a stony silence about the fact that Marxism and sociology thus have at least one ancestor in common, Henri Saint-Simon".

accepted as a scientific method,[112] the idea of using it in scholarship is hardly new. As demonstrated in the previous sections, it has a long history in literary criticism, philosophy, and even sociology. In this context, it is somewhat surprising that Szelényi and his co-authors, with the exception of two references to the Socratic method (cf. Eyal et al. 2001:1121; Szelényi 2002:65), hardly recognize the rather rich intellectual tradition of using irony in human sciences.

In one of these exceptions, expressed in the paper titled "An Outline of the Social History of Socialism or An Auto-Critique of An Auto-Critique", Szelényi (2002:64) responds to Burawoy's (2001) critique of abandoning the analytical perspective of class analysis in his scholarship by saying that "since the aim of critical analysis is to raise the critical self-consciousness of actors", irony can achieve it just as well as utopia.[113] To support this claim, Szelényi (2002:64) goes on to cite how the concept is defined in *Britannica*:

> The term irony has its roots in the Greek comic character Eiron, a clever underdog, who by his wit repeatedly triumphs over the boastful character Alazon. The Socratic irony of the Platonic dialogues derives from this comic origin. Feigning ignorance and humility, Socrates goes about asking silly and obvious questions of all sorts of people on all sorts of subjects, only to expose their ignorance as more profound than his own. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1998, Vol. 6, p. 390)

The possible impact of Merton – who is not only known to have used the concept of irony to identify unintended consequences in order to signify the latent functions (i.e. dysfunctions) of social actors but happened to serve as Szelényi's formal supervisor at Columbia in 1964 (Szelényi 2012c; Case 2017, Part I) – would also need to be mentioned. Although Szelényi hardly ever refers to Merton in his publications, he nevertheless has learned to develop his key publications – starting from his PhD dissertation, later published in English as *Urban Inequalities Under State Socialism* to the *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, and continuing from *Socialist Entrepreneurs* to *Making Capitalism With-out Capitalists* – using a similar approach that employs the paradox between the generally understood/expected and the actually observed.

More specifically, in *Urban Inequalities Under State Socialism*, he shows that contrary to the expected, it was not the workers who were preferred in the distribution of the newly built flats in the so-called workers' states. Instead, the socialist system (that Szelényi calls socialist redistributive economies) preferred the *apparatchiki*, and therefore they were overrepresented among the occupants of the state-built and subsidized housing. To make the system even more unequal, the ones left out of the redistribution obtained the cooperative flats using their savings and loans. These ideas were taken a step further in the *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power,* where it was claimed that for the first time in the

---

[112] Nevertheless, Eyal et al. (2003a / 2003b) are not the first to associate irony with method. For previous approaches in philosophical scholarship see Walzel (1938/9) and Frischmann (2019:181–2).

[113] Given the collapse of socialist regimes in CEE, E. O. Wright (2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2013) later made an argument for keeping the communist 'utopia' alive.

history of mankind a system has been developed where the stratification is not based on private ownership but on knowledge and that this is of class nature. The irony of it is to be found in the claim that the communist system that was supposed to abolish stratification and exploitation on the basis of private property, was on its way to replacing it with a new class system based on knowledge. In the *Socialist Entrepreneurs,* the paradox was found in the fact that the socio-economic system that was to achieve economic equality and prosperity based on common ownership and party rule, actually experienced the continuation of the development of the local petty bourgeoisie in Eastern Europe. Although it was interrupted in 1949, it resumed again in the late 1970s and early 1980s within the opportunities offered by the second economy. Last, but not least, in *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists,* it was argued that in the CEE transition, the market economy and its institutions were in the process of being created without local capital and entrepreneurs (rather than with Western capital and former *apparatchiki*). In short, the thesis statements in Szelényi's key texts, reflected also in their titles that might sound like a contradiction in terms, at first sight, show that he is the master of irony.

Another general source of Szelényi's inspiration for irony as an approach in sociology between theoretical and empirical research may have come from the introduction to *Social Theory and Social Structure,* where Merton ([1949/1957] 1968:4) notes, quite ironically as some commentators have noted,[114] the following:

> This announced interest in consolidating the reciprocal relation between social theory and social research is suspiciously irreproachable. Where will one find a social scientist disclaiming the desirability of the 'integration' of theory and empirical research? Unless it is given some special force, this position will possess the same measure of trivial truth as the position held by Calvin Coolidge's preacher who was unexceptionally 'against sin'.

Other than these possible impacts of Merton, Szelényi's inspiration for irony as a method does not come from any of the traditions that were presented in the previous chapters. Instead, he seems to have been led to irony through his collaboration with Konrád.[115] In their co-authored book *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, they demonstrate the skillful use of irony to conceptualize the power aspirations of intellectuals. Soon after this, Szelényi publishes a rather cynical paper titled "Social Inequalities in State Socialist Redistributive Economies: Dilemma for Social Policy in Contemporary Socialist Societies of Eastern Europe" to discredit the power-hungry members of the intelligentsia in CEE who are ready to make compromises to establish their class authority in CEE.

Only after his international breakthrough with these publications, did he learn to appreciate irony as an analytical tool from Gouldner. More specifically, he (1982b, 780–8) first uses the concept to describe Gouldner's life-long interest in intellectuals whom he studied reflexively and self-critically. He then goes a

---

[114] For instance, Lemert (1992:20) makes this point.
[115] Konrád (2002:262) later reflects that "research and a sense of humor are not mutually exclusive and that you could do good work under the old system as well".

step further and describes him as an example of "[t]he better ones among New Class theorists" (Szelényi and Martin 1987:3) and identifies him as "[t]he more sophisticated among the New Class theorists" (Szelényi and Martin 1988:649), who use irony and self-reflexivity in order to produce truly novel insights "about the relationship between power, privilege and knowledge" (Szelényi and Martin 1987:3).

While commentators of Gouldner's work, such as Walzer (1980), are said to miss the irony as a crucial feature in his scholarship (cf. Szelényi 1982b:788), it is obvious that Szelényi does not make this mistake himself. He becomes so obsessed by the question proposed by Gouldner (1978a:160 / 1979a:9), "Where does the cameraman fit in?" that it starts to haunt him. In fact, he continuously repeats this question as a defining puzzle of the critical sociology of intellectuals in his publications (cf. Szelényi 1980b:189, 1982b:780; Szelényi and Martin 1987:3, 1988:649, 1989:265, 280; King and Szelényi 2004:xv).

His fascination with irony leads him with his co-authors to propose it as a kind of Socratic approach (cf. Eyal et al. 2001:1121) in their debate with Burawoy (2001) over the most appropriate paradigmatic[116] frame to study the post-communist transition. Rather than giving correct answers, this approach is said by Eyal et al. (2001:1128) to propose a set of theoretical alternatives – to make social scientists more reflexive about who they are and what they do. In the follow-up article devoted to spelling out the details of this approach, they (2003a) argue that irony is a method – something that allows intellectuals in the position of jester to fulfill one of the four possible roles in society as shown in Figure 4.

---

[116] Despite the widespread use of 'paradigm' as the term to capture the shared understanding of the research puzzle and theoretical foundation within which one is expected to look for the solution using the commonly accepted conceptual and methodological tools, it has not gone without problematization. Biesta (2010:98–9), following Morgan (2007), even calls it an 'unhelpful concept'. More specifically, although Thomas Kuhn is often cited as the authority who brought the term 'paradigm' to the lexicon of (social) scientists, it is far less known that one can find 21 different meanings of paradigm in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* as Masterman (1970:61–5) has counted. She groups these into three categories: "metaphysical paradigms, or metaparadigms, sociological paradigms, and artifact paradigms or construct paradigms. It seems that popular use merges these into one as does Ritzer (1980), whose conceptualization is followed in this research. He (ibid:7, 223) states that:

> A paradigm is a fundamental image of the subject matter within a science. It serves to define what should be studied, what questions should be asked, how they should be asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the answers obtained. The paradigm is the broadest unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one scientific community (*or subcommunity*) from another. It subsumes, defines, and interrelates the exemplars, theories, and methods and instruments that exist within it.

Figure 4. The field of social scientific inquiry in the shadow of the fall of social-ism
Source: Eyal et al. (2003a:29).

Eyal et al. took their inspiration for this typology from Kołakowski ([1959] 1969a / [1961] 1968, Ch. 1), who differentiates between priest, jester, and philosopher king as different types of intellectuals. Eyal et al. (2003a:28) add engineer to these three based on Bourdieu's reading of Weber and the archetype of magician identified by him. For Eyal et al. this fourth type represents the essence of the majority of social scientists at American universities due to their empirical ori-entation, on the one hand, and lack of critical approach, on the other. When it comes to the three original categories identified by Kołakowski, they (ibid) pre-sent them as follows:

> The priest is usually critical, since he or she specializes in developing a utopi-an or transcendent vision of a more desirable, more rational, and morally su-perior society, which is then contrasted with existing society. The priest's is not the only possible critical perspective, however. The jester produces ironic critique, but it differs from priestly ire in that it is oriented empirically rather than morally, and thus it offers immanent rather than transcendent critique. As immanent critique, the jester's analysis never contrasts the present with a vision of a more rational or more just society. Rather, the jester exposes the arbitrariness of the present, emphasizing that what appears rational, inevita-ble, just, and pure is accidental, temporary, absurd, and hybrid…. Different from both priest and jester, the philosopher king typifies the intellectual as a ruler who tries to impose on earth the perfect regime envisioned in thought. Like the priest then, the philosopher king offers transcendence, but unlike the priest the philosopher king does not perform a critical role. The jester presents an even sharper contrast with the philosopher king: not only is the jester crit-ical but also empirical, and therefore non-transcendent.

In this context, it is the jester as the archetype of the possible form of intellectual that associates most directly with neoclassical sociology, and irony as its method

of social inquiry. Given the fact that the jester is characterized in this typology as the direct opposite of the philosopher king, (s)he represents someone who combines the theoretical insights of critical inquiry with dadaistic empirical inquiry. To give an example, Szelényi with his co-authors links this kind of intellectual activity to his empirical observations of the functioning of the Budapest School within the Hungarian communist regime. Although he does not seem to have a good explanation for the ruler's occasional lack of humor when it comes to the special treatment of a clown, he clearly thinks of its members, including for instance Hegedüs, as the exemplars of that type of intellectual. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that he (1977:63) quite symbolically has called Lukács' disciples also "His majesty's opposition".[117]

It is tempting to think that the kind of irony that the jester uses echoes what Marcuse has said about politics in modern times. Although there is no evidence that Eyal et al. have been inspired by him, the link might be there through Konrád's famous work titled *Anti-Politics*. Marcuse (1969:63) notes:

> ...in some sectors of the opposition, the radical protest tends to become antinomian, anarchistic, and even nonpolitical. Here is another reason why the rebellion often takes on the weird and clownish forms which get on the nerves of the Establishment. In the face of the gruesomely serious totality of institutionalized politics, satire, irony, and laughing provocation become a necessary dimension of the new politics. The contempt for the deadly *esprit de serieux* which permeates the talkings and doings of the professional and semiprofessional politicians appears as contempt for the values which they profess while destroying them. The rebels revive the desperate laughter and the cynical defiance of the fool as means for demasking the deeds of the serious ones who govern the whole.

Nonetheless, it is clear that the identification with the jester and neoclassical sociology, which are at the same time both empirical as well as critical, corresponds well with Szelényi's own scholarship and intellectual development. While early in his career Szelényi believed strongly in data-driven positivist survey methodology (cf. Szelényi 1969) and challenged the ideological character of the Budapest School (cf. Szelényi 1979a; Kroos 2020:83–97), he later be-came much more skeptical about empiricism and adopted critical theory more openly. Following the lead of Gouldner's reflexivity stressed in the *Coming Crisis of Western Sociology,* and Bourdieu, who tried to beat the US sociological establishment, which he calls the 'Capitoline Triad' of Parsons, Lazarsfeld and Merton (cf. Bourdieu 1975:38, 1988b:773, 1990a:36–8, 1991d:378–9, 2000a:109, 2004a:10–4, 102–7, 2008a:74–7)[118] at their own home game by advancing his

---

[117] The expression, nowadays sometimes also expressed as "Her Majesty's Most Loyal Opposition", originates from John Hobhouse, who according to Foord (1954:1) stated jokingly in 1826: "It is said to be hard on His Majesty's Ministers to raise objections of this character but it is more hard on His Majesty's Opposition to compel them to take this course."

[118] Eyal et al.'s (2003a:28–9) theoretical inspiration comes from Bourdieu's (1987a) interpretation of legitimization and structured interest in Weber's sociology of religion. While Szelényi with his co-authors do refer to Bourdieu's reflexivity, they fail to identify that Bourdieu (1990a:53, 1977:2, 2004a:4) has occasionally also mentioned irony.

own relational theory and methodology (cf. Mohr 2013), Szelényi with his co-authors identifies the neoclassical approach to social inquiry with irony as its method.

Although Eyal et al. recognize that neoclassical sociology and irony as its method may sometimes share some features with postmodern inquiry, they actually make clear that its 'anything goes' approach is to their disliking. In this context, they (2003a:31) point out that:

> ...[t]he danger of postmodern critique, however, is a collapse into cynicism. We understand the distinction between irony and cynicism to be that irony is dialogic, while cynicism is monologic. Cynicism does not think that there is anybody to talk to but irony wishes to dislodge the interlocutors from their received truths in order to converse further.

In other words, they distance themselves from postmodernism and relate it to the critical approaches in the social sciences that in their understanding could appreciate irony. In this context, they (2003a:9) rely, in addition to the above-mentioned Kołakowski and Bourdieu's reading of Weber, also on Gouldner, Foucault, Habermas and Hutcheon in their discussion of irony as a method. It may come as a surprise that instead of drawing on rather rich and varied intellectual traditions for how irony could be used in human sciences, including sociology, presented in the previous sections of this chapter, Szelényi associates with the scholars who speak to the intended audience. To put it differently, instead of Gouldner, Foucault,[119] and Habermas[120] one could have built the argument up as a continuation of the kind of critical social inquiry that King and Szelényi (2004:34) found missing in the critical Marxism of Lukács.

Indeed, one could argue that the irony that he represents has its ontological and epistemological roots in the search for a sociology of knowledge developed by the first and second Budapest School (cf. Szelényi 2012c, 2020:232–3). From the former, he seems to have inherited an interest in the sociology of knowledge and problematization of socially unattached intellectuals.[121] The latter seems to have inspired him (and Konrád) to provide the same kind of critical political economy as Bence et al. (1992) had presented before him (Szelényi 1977:66).[122] However, this does not hold him back from criticizing Lukács and, it seems indi-

---

[119] While Foucault is sometimes referred to as an ironist (Jordan 2012; Rorty 1989:61, 65) who has disclosed the arbitrariness of Western political institutions, he is not typically seen as one. Referring to Foucault, Eyal et al. (2003a:32) state that "ironic critique aims to expose the arbitrariness of the present, uncovering its hybrid and accidental origins".

[120] In this context their references to Foucault (1977a), Habermas (1971), and Hutcheon ([1992a] 1996, 1995) seem to be no more than just additional "appeals for authority".

[121] A similar point is being made by Demeter (2020:61) that Szelényi (2020:234) does not seem to disagree completely. Although he stresses that *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* represents "a rejection of Lukács and Mannheim", their idea of socially unattached intellectuals was, nonetheless, an important point of departure for (Konrád) and him. One can see how the classes that he (cf. 2020:233) taught on Lukács, Mannheim, Gramsci, and Korschi at Flinders and Wisconsin echo the interest he took in these issues in the *Theories of New Class* (cf. King and Szelényi 2004).

[122] At the time the book by Bence et al. was not published yet, hence, Szelényi refers to the manuscript.

rectly, his disciples for their general lack of self-critical irony that characterizes much of their self-understanding of how intellectuals like to think about themselves.[123] Unlike the true members of the Budapest School, he (2020:235) says "[t]he sociology of knowledge that I hoped to cultivate sought to take an honest (and often painful) look at ourselves".

At the more metatheoretical level, one can argue that Szelényi synthesizes the heritage of Marx and Weber, joins the critics of Parsons, and utilizes the critical vantage points of Gouldner and Bourdieu to formulate what he, together with co-authors, calls the 'neoclassical sociology'. It is important to note that irony is identified in this context as the appropriate method of inquiry for neo-classical sociology, which is supposed to be at the same time empirical as well as critical.

Furthermore, irony as a method of neoclassical sociology should also be reflexive and relational. Eyal et al. (2003a:9) explain the nature of neoclassical sociology and its relation to irony as its method along the following lines:

> 'neoclassical sociology' is a field of critical social analysis in which the method of inquiry is *ironic*. Taking Gouldner's analysis as our point of departure, we observe that irony – as long as it is rooted in self-irony – is always undertaken in the *reflexive* mode. The researcher who engages in irony begins his or her analysis by suspending his or her own values, judgments, and knowledge about the world, and accepting as valid the point of view of 'the other'. This is done in the understanding that his or her own values and those of the other are relational, i.e. they only exist and take meaning in relationship to each other, or to put it another way, in conversation with each other. This is the reflexive premise of the ironic method, or to put it with Mannheim ([1936] 1985), this is *relational* analysis. The purpose of ironic analysis is to show the temporary nature of both positions and their determination by the relations that describe and constitute them. Thus irony begins with reflexivity but does not end there. A better world is still a goal of ironic analysis, a goal pursued in the conversation between subject and object, between alter and ego. Indeed, this is the radical promise of irony for critical social analysis. Precisely because he or she does not need a 'critical vantage point', the ironic analyst does not have to formulate a positive statement about the most desirable or the best solution. Ironic analysis only has to persuade the other that there is a range of possible solutions and there are multiple ways to perceive and rank those solutions as desirable.

In addition to the description of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology, one can and should look for exemplary works where it has actually been applied. Although it is possible that the methodologist does not follow what (s)he is preaching,[124] it is argued in the next sections that this is not the case with Szelényi. His scholarship highlights that his intellectual development follows the pattern of the Hegelian dialectic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. While his self-understand-

---

[123] See Konrád and Szelényi's (1979:3) original statement, Eyal's (2020:2–3) reflection, and Szelényi's (2020:234) comment on the latter.

[124] Cormack (1996), for instance, notes in her essay, titled "The paradox of Durkheim's manifesto: Reconsidering *the Rules of Sociological Method*", that there is contradiction between the expected on the basis of Durkheim's methodological writings and what can be observed in his empirical works.

ing about the use of irony as the method in his scholarship and the suggestion to make it the methodological foundation of neoclassical sociology, crystallized as a result of the debate with Burawoy that emerged from the critical reviews and reflections of *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists*; his other works, developed during different stages of his long and productive academic career, can be thought of as dialectical.

Indeed, Szelényi's work can be described in three stages. Similar to Chriss (1999), who interprets Gouldner's work as a critical, self-reflexive inquiry inspired by Hegel's dialectic (describing his work and life in three distinct stages: 1945–1960 – thesis; 1960–1970 – antithesis; and 1970–1980 – synthesis or new thesis), one can say that the evolution of Szelényi's ideas follows the same pattern. He (2002:44) himself describes the chronology of his intellectual development and the major landmarks along the way as follows:

> To put it rather immodestly these three 'volumes' [*Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, *Socialist Entrepreneurs*, and *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists*] follow the logic of Hegelian dialectics, although not by design, but by default. (I would have loved to be always right!) The first volume proposes a 'thesis', the second counters it with an 'anti-thesis' and the third arrives as some sort of 'synthesis' which 'transcends' the initial thesis, negating it while preserving it at the same time. An orthodox Hegelian would call this movement Aufhebung. The idea of the intellectuals constituting themselves as a cultural bourgeoisie in order to "build market capitalism from above, or by design" is the 'Aufgehebt' version of the thesis of the intellectual vanguard that sees its historic mission as the creation of a society of rational order.

One could even go a step further and argue that his own critical auto-reflections are dialectical. In this context his 1986–1987 reflection, titled "The Prospects and Limits of the East European New Class Project: An Auto-critical Reflection on The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power"[125] presented the thesis; his 2002 paper, titled "An Outline of the Social History of Socialism or An Auto-Critique of An Auto-Critique", the antithesis; and the essay from 2018, titled "A Sociologist in Search for Continuity in a Rapidly Changing Half Century: An Intellectual Autobiography", the synthesis.

While all this helps to understand his scholarship in terms of the willingness to engage with self-irony as a way to correct and develop his previous ideas to fit the changing socio-economic and political context, it does not quite capture the willingness to use irony as an anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue. His approach to irony may also have similarities with a number of approaches described in the previous sections of this chapter – from irony as enlightenment (in terms of having a skeptical/critical attitude toward any kind of dogma), logic of discovery (in terms Woolgar's notion "it could be otherwise"), unintended consequences (reflecting Merton's influence on him), and (romantic) irony as the infinitized paradoxical nature of reality.

---

[125] It is the advanced version of the reflection that was published first in Japanese as the postscript to the Japanese edition of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* under the title "Ten years later: Self-critical reflections". For publishing, details see Szelényi (1985a).

Indeed, it was the intention of this section to show that Szelényi's ideas on irony have – in addition to the inspirations observed by Eyal et al. (2003a / 2003b), for example, in Bourdieu, Gouldner, Kołakowski, and Mannhaim – some similarities with the approaches to how irony as a conceptual tool has been used in sociology. Given the fact that these different ways of using irony in sociological research were already presented in previous sections, this concentrated on highlighting the historical-intellectual background before describing his own way of conceptualizing irony as the method of neoclassical sociology. The point that I was hoping to make by providing background information from the evolution of Lukács's initial contemplations on the heritage of romantic irony to his auto-biographical conceptualization of 'socially unattached intellectuals', which Mannheim associates with Alfred Weber and has helped to make famous, is the continuation of the sociology of knowledge tradition of the Budapest School(s) – even if this continuation meant Szelényi's reaction to the lack of irony in the works of a critical sociology of knowledge and intellectuals – taking Lukács and Mannheim as the point of departure and building on Gouldner, Bourdieu, and Kołakowski in the reaction to Burawoy.[126]

When the issue came up during the interview (Szelényi 2012c), he explained that taking the Foucaultian power/knowledge dictum as the starting point, he together with Eyal and Townsley was trying to find a solution by positioning themselves as clowns (as opposed to engineers, priests or philosopher kings) and that the idea goes back to the socially unattached intellectual. Nevertheless, what he did not disclose and he (cf. Szelényi 2020:232–5) still seems to suppress, is the possible influence of Lukács (even if in reactionary form). In this context, the fact that the ground-breaking article "On Irony: An Invitation to Neoclassical Sociology" found its way to the *Thesis Eleven* – a journal started by the emigres of the second Budapest School – is quite appropriate .

Although there are some scholars who have taken up the use of irony, understood quite literally in Szelényi's work (cf. Kennedy 2020:36–7, Verdery et al. 2005[127]), and some have even looked at the roots of his sociology of knowledge (cf. Demeter 2020), his new class theorizing (cf. Eyal 2003, Ch. 1), 'immanent critique' or 'critique of ideology' (cf. Arato 1983 / 1993 Ch. 5; Takács 2016:264), none have put the irony into a comparative context or engaged critically in its foundation as a method. At best, Eyal (2020:2–3) has suggested that rather than being a 'method' irony represents a 'scholarly habitus' – an idea that Szelényi (2020:230) finds 'rather interesting' without providing any reasons for his (dis)agreement.

---

[126] See Kehal, Garbes, and Kennedy ([2019] 2021) for an overview of more contemporary contributions to the 'critical sociology of knowledge'.

[127] See especially the following contributions to the symposium that was organized to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of writing of the *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*:

- Kopstein, Jeffrey. "Irony and continuity in East European history: Thoughts on *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*" pp. 13-20;
- Stokes, Gale. "The irony of *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*" pp. 20-3;
- Kennedy, Michael D. "The ironies of intellectuals on the road to power, or not" pp. 24-33.

Given the lack of understanding of what irony as a method (or research habitus) means in his scholarship, a detailed discussion of his mental model will be taken up in the third chapter. Putting his scholarship into close scrutiny to disclose the methodological foundations that will allow us to reveal irony as a method of neoclassical sociology more explicitly (or "a method of critical inquiry" as he (ibid) more recently puts it). For this, his 'metaphysical pathos', composed of the assumptions, understandings, adaptations, values, and beliefs, will need to be analyzed in more detail. Before we get into it, the (ab)use of irony in human sciences will be summarized in the next section and the methods and materials used in this research will be presented in the next chapter.

1.6   Upshot of Ironology

While it is hoped that instead of increasing the confusion, the review helped to improve the awareness of the richness of different conceptualizations of irony and their applications for sociological research, one may still wish to ask what can be concluded from the presented different conceptualizations of different forms of irony and how they have been (ab)used in sociological research.

On the one hand, the reader may be overwhelmed – instead of being impressed – by the long and competing lists of different kinds of ironies identified in the humanities, including literary criticism and philosophy, as well as the approaches in sociological scholarship that flirt with the concept and apply it as a technique for sociological investigation. Indeed, given the fact that irony has come to refer to such a large and diverse set of phenomena, there is a danger that it will lose whatever credibility it might have as a method.[128] There might also be the feeling that there is quite a bit of overlap between these categories as they are not as exclusive as one approaching the issue from the perspective of measurement theory might wish to see.

On the other hand, there might also be a chance that applying irony in one of the above-presented ways is affecting scholarship in human sciences, including sociology, more profoundly than some sophisticated data collection and analysis techniques. Even then, one may still feel that it is an overstatement to call irony a method. While one may accept that it signifies a basic approach to offering something original in the world of the overproduction of social scientific and humanities scholarship, and it may even shape its research fundamentally, more positivistic(al)ly minded observers may find it to be closer to an art than science – more of a 'trick of the trade' than a methodological technique. While the reader may find support for both of these observations from the literature overview presented in the previous sections, it is difficult to disagree that there is more to irony than objectively measurable.

Nevertheless, this observation that some of the most interesting sociological research has benefited from an ironic edge, on the one hand, and the questionable claim that irony is a method or a methodological device, on the other, represents a *research puzzle*. One possible way to bring some clarity to the issue is

---

[128] A similar point has been made by Booth (1974).

to investigate how accomplished scholars, who claim to use irony as a method(ological) device, have conducted their research. As the literature overview presented in this part of the thesis indicated, no scholar claiming to use irony as a research device (or their commentators) has actually disclosed or identified the elements of the 'mental model' that the method relies on. To fill this gap in the literature, the aim of this thesis is to spell out these elements on the basis of the exemplary scholar who has claimed to use irony in his scholarship. This includes the investigation of the principles of ontology, epistemology, methodology, training, qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, rhetoric, nature of knowledge, knowledge accumulation, goodness and quality criteria, hegemony, control, axiology, calls to action, inquirer posture, ethics, reflexivity, accommodation and commensurability that he has adopted in his ironic works.

Before we get into these issues in the third chapter of the thesis, the materials and methods used in this research must be explained. This will be done next.

2 Materials and Methods Used in this Research

> In pursuit of eclecticism, I have for the last fifteen years tried to eradicate some obnoxious intellectual boundaries, in particular that between interpretative and positivistic work in sociology and kindred fields. I girded myself in some theory and some methods and went a-tilting at this windmill in the name of Dulcinea I called "narrative positivism". There resulted a lot of ill will from narrativists and positivists who, although deeply interested in interdisciplinarity, didn't want to be mentioned in the same breath. For each, I was the vanguard of the hated other. Indeed an eclectic is always being attacked… (Abbott 2001:x).

> Science is a social process, and social science is social in both form and substance. The idea that methods of systematic research are employed to discover truth may be a central and noble teleological goal, but it is an oversimplified, reified, and idealized conception of what we actually do. We are not mere scientific automatons programmed to follow fixed procedures for probing reality, like the Mars rovers (Spirit, Opportunity, and Curiosity), but rather we are active social agents who talk to one another, read one another's work, and debate and argue about the direction, meaning, and credibility of one another's research and our assertions about the "truth" of what we have observed (Hunter and Brewer 2015:199).

> Methodology can only bring us reflective understanding of the means which have demonstrated their value in practice by raising them to the level of explicit consciousness; it is no more the precondition of fruitful intellectual work than the knowledge of anatomy is the precondition of "correct" walking (Weber 1949:115).

The aim of this chapter is to spell out in a systematic manner the methodological choices that have been guiding my research on Iván Szelényi's approach to irony and the attempt to reconstruct his methodology. The chapter will start with the clarification of the particular kind of theoretical research tradition followed in the study. Having explained the uniqueness of the conceptual-analytical research, I shall nevertheless make an attempt to clarify the materials and methods used in this research in terms of the conventional-empirical research tradition. To this end, various aspects of the research design developed for this study, including sampling, data collection, and analysis techniques, will be explained. In this process, an argument will be made for the adoption of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and reflections on my research ethics provided along with acknowledgments of the limitations of the study.

2.1 Theoretical Research Tradition

As summarized in the previous chapter, Szelényi and his co-authors have provided some clarifications about how to think about irony as a method of neoclassical sociology (cf. Eyal et al. 2003a / 2003b) or critical inquiry (Szelényi 2020:230). Yet, a more nuanced explanation of its methodological foundations still waits to be offered. To this end, this 'deviant case study' attempts to provide a reconstruction of his mental model based on his own scholarship and com-

ments on various methodological aspects. If successful, it does not only offer an improved understanding of his approach to irony but is a key for other scholars who would like to follow his lead in how to think of irony as a research habitus. To be as clear as possible about the way this is to be achieved, this chapter will describe the materials and methods used in this research.

This research is based on Giddens' (1976) *New Rules of Sociological Method*. In it, he presents a comprehensive and compelling system of (socio)logical modes of studying and comprehending social reality. I find his rules and the supporting arguments convincing and the entire approach to social analysis well balanced because it incorporates within interpretative sociology not just the general lessons learned from some of the leading schools of thought in social philosophy but, more specifically, from ethnomethodology (including 'ethnomethodological indifference' and 'rational reconstruction' that will be discussed below in this section), language games in the form of social discourse and hermeneutic analysis (that will be explained in the next section). In other words, Giddens' 'new rules of sociological method' are in harmony with my own understanding of the fundamentals of social research and the aims of this research that can be seen as theoretical, even if one describes it in terms of an empirical research tradition.

 While the textbooks and handbooks written to guide how to do research and write dissertations in social sciences hardly mention or discuss theoretical research, there are a few exceptions. For instance, Järvinen (2001) and Niglas (2007) identify theoretical research as an option, next to empirical and design (science) research looking for lessons respectively from reality and innovations. In addition, authors such as Alexander (1990, 1992), Alexander and Colomy (1992), Calhoun (2002), Gordon (1993, Ch. 6), Järvinen (2001, Ch. 2), Markovski (2007), B. S. Turner (1989), J. H. Turner (1989) and the sources cited in Zhao (1996) also address theory construction in sociology. However, their common interest has been how to model reality in the form of sociological theory, not how to analyze a sociological theory (other than testing it empirically), let alone the mental model of a theorist. While Swedberg (2016a) in his 2014 BJS Annual Public Lecture raised the awareness that theorizing is necessary before theory (construction) and Krause (2016:25–6) recognizes that the study of "sacred texts and major figures" is still the most common way of theorizing in sociology, the subsequent responses (cf. Bertilsson 2016; Carleheden 2016; Tavory 2016; Swedberg 2016b) indicated that there is hardly any consensus about even key terms such as 'theory' and 'theorizing' in sociology (cf. Abend 2008).

Since little attention to conceptual-analytical research has been given in the literature, it follows that there is hardly any agreement about which structural components a social science dissertation in the theoretical tradition should include. Although there is an abundance of textbooks on research methods, methodology, and practical guidelines for how to conduct studies in the social sciences, including sociology, hardly any of these even mention theoretical research, and the rare ones that do fail to provide substantial guidance.

Although the concepts of research materials and methods are typically associated with the empirical research tradition, it is my intention in this chapter to provide a clear overview of the methodological choices made in this study, even if it resembles more a theoretical tradition. To this end, I shall follow in the following sections the structure suggested by Burnett (2009). Her book, titled *Doing Your Social Sciences Dissertation Research Design: Projects and Their Needs*, is exceptional in the sense that it identifies among other research designs (Case studies, Surveys, Grounded theory, Narrative research, Ethnographies, Action research, and Comparative studies) also 'Theoretical explorations' as a viable option for a PhD dissertation. Burnett (ibid:119–20) explains this from the vantage point of empirical research as follows:

> Theoretical dissertations can be attractive for those who enjoy grappling with social theory and philosophical problems. However, a true theoretical dissertation is not a literature review with an extended discussion of the main points raised. Theoretical dissertations might sound attractive, typically removing the need to collect empirical data with all that that involves, but they are stretching in their own right, and will take just as long. The explanation lies in the kinds of reasons for not doing empirical study, and the kinds of opportunity offered by doing a purely theoretical one...

While Burnett does not provide much additional advice on how to construct such theoretical studies and which structural components they should include, we are informed that one should cover them in general. Again, having in mind the structure for the empirical research, Burnett (ibid:112) further explains that "Research design should show the type of design which has been created; the researcher's role in the research and their underlying assumptions; the actual methods which are going to be used including sampling and data analysis techniques; reasons for the selections made and the limitations of the research which will result."

Before I provide an overview of the practical methodological choices made in terms of sampling, data collection, and analysis, I wish to clarify why this study flirts with the methodological attitude of 'rational reconstruction' to study Szelényi's 'metaphysical pathos'. In other words, I do realize that mentioning 'reconstruction' in the title of the dissertation builds up certain expectations.

Although one can find examples of research where the approach has been applied somewhat more loosely (see e.g., Wacquant 2013), Pedersen (2008:458) explains that Habermas, as the merciless critic of both the one-sided subjectivist and objectivist paradigms, seeks to combine with his method of reconstruction "an interpretative and explanatory approach to reality". Therefore, he explains that Habermas' "approach must be descriptive as well as normative simultaneously" and that "this entails a systematic reconstruction of competent subjects' intuitive knowledge". Furthermore, he spells out the method both in its initial seven steps (cf. Habermas 1976a) and in its complete form as a ten-step procedure (cf. Habermas 1983). The most important features of the technique that accepts "reality as symbolically structured" can, according to Pedersen (2008:466–7), be summarized as follows:

> The objective is to reconstruct the deep structures that are considered the preconditions for all utterances as they appear on the surface. This reconstruction aims at uncovering universal competences in competent language users. What is to be uncovered is a pre-theoretical competence, a competence of which the actor is not reflexively conscious. As these kinds of investigations are dependent on a posteriori knowledge, they must be described as empirical science: a science that is critical, constructive, and theoretical all at once. Rational reconstruction as methodical attitude aims at a theoretical and methodical pluralism. The hypotheses that are produced are tested by using them as input in empirical theories.

Other commentators who have tried to clarify Habermas' (rational) reconstruction have, similar to the above-mentioned principles, suggested that this approach seeks to find a balance between normative and empirical orientations. Most explicitly this interpretation has been advanced by Gaus, who has made such arguments both in the general description of the method (cf. Gaus 2019) and in the application of it to political theory (cf. Gaus 2013). More specifically, he (2016) sees Habermas' discourse theory as an exemplary work where the "sociological-reconstructive approach" is applied. According to Gaus (2013:553), the most comprehensive use of the tool can be found in Habermas' book *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*. Indeed, in this work, Habermas explains within his own attempt to apply the "reconstructive approach to law" (1996, Ch. 3–4) that "[a] social theory claiming to be 'critical' cannot restrict itself to describing the relationship between norm and reality from the perspective of an observer" (ibid:82). In other words, he says that the tension between the 'normative claims', on the one hand, and the 'facticity of their actual functioning', on the other, should find a solution which he also tries to offer at the end of the book. One cannot but interpret this as Habermas' way of applying the principle of Hegelian dialectics of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. This should not come as a surprise as he has done this even more explicitly in the earlier work titled "Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism".[129] In short, one can say that for Habermas this "rational reconstruction as a methodical attitude" represents a tool to evaluate theory and its elements.

Although this study of Szelényi's irony as a method of neoclassical sociology falls into the category of theoretical research that combines objective and subjective elements (making it therefore similar to Habermas' method), one may, nevertheless, feel that it would not be most appropriate to claim that I offer a proper 'rational reconstruction'. Indeed, given the fact that in the specific case that studies irony, which is not widely known and recognized as a method, one could argue that the analytical apparatus of ethnomethodology and its policy of 'ethnomethodological indifference' fits better with the aim of this research. Rather than denying it, I will address the issue in section 2.4. on the Limitations of

---

[129] At the beginning of this article, Habermas (1975:287) explains that "I would like to begin by introducing and critically scrutinizing the fundamental concepts and main hypotheses of historical materialism. Moreover, after indicating some of the problems, I shall also propose and illustrate a possible solution".

this Research. Before this, however, I will clarify in the next sections the research design in terms of sampling, data collection, and analysis techniques. I hope that these will balance the flirt with reconstruction and clarify how one can think of 'ethnomethodological indifference' in more empirical research terms when studying Szelényi's methodological foundations.

2.2 Research Design

This section is organized into three sub-sections. First, it will explain why and how Szelényi was selected for this 'extreme' or 'deviant' case study. Second, data collection in terms of interviews conducted and the selection of the printed sources used in this research will be explained. Third, the analysis techniques that were employed in the research will be introduced together with the reasons why the specific choices were made. The final section will be devoted to the anticipated limitations of the research.

2.2.1 Sampling Techniques

In terms of sampling, one can think of the social scientists originating from the former Eastern bloc and their scholarship as the population. In this context, the selection of Szelényi, his scholarship, and irony as its underlying methodological foundation for detailed analysis can be seen as an 'extreme' or 'deviant' case study. In terms of Krause's recent (2021) work, selecting Szelényi and his contributions to the study of human and social sciences – irony as a method of neoclassical sociology – can be seen as model cases that become canonical in terms of its research objects in the particular research field.[130]

As I argue elsewhere (cf. Kroos 2020), Szelényi represents an unusual or unique example of the most accomplished contemporary sociologists originating from CEE. Selecting him as an extreme or deviant case allows me to explore a paradoxical situation where 'irony' as a method is not widely known and even less highly respected, on the one hand, but has been relied upon by Szelényi in his scholarship to build an extraordinarily successful academic career, on the other.

Extreme and deviant case studies as separate sampling techniques are similar, and only differ from one another in terms of the detail. As Seawright and Gerring (2008:302) explain in the terminology of the variable oriented research

---

[130] However, it would in inaccurate to label these as "privileged material research objects" in Krause's terminology rather than "deviant research objects". As Lizardo (2022:655) explains in his book review of the *Model Cases: On Canonical Research Objects and Sites*:

> Privileged objects thus accrue a version of "cumulative advantage," a process sociologists of science since Merton have observed in scientific careers. This serves to structure the field, such that it acquires a center–periphery structure: The highest-status scientists at the most prestigious institutions hoarding the bulk of the funding, study a select sample of privileged material research objects, while heterodox scientists of lower status at the periphery of the field focus on deviant research objects. Like other network goods, privileged material research objects are a key mechanism generating inequalities in science.

tradition: the "extreme case method is a purely exploratory method – a way of probing possible causes of Y, or possible effects of X, in an open-ended fashion." They (ibid) add that "[t]he deviant case [sampling] method selects that case that, by reference to some general understanding of a topic (either a specific theory or common sense), demonstrates a surprising value. The deviant case is therefore closely linked to the investigation of theoretical anomalies. To say deviant is to imply anomalous." More recently, Seawright adds that extreme and deviant case studies as sampling techniques share the exploratory goal. He argues, "that the existing advice is incomplete or misleading when the goal of case study research is discovery. I develop this argument by showing that, across a wide range of goals, the alternatives with the best chances of facilitating discovery are either deviant case selection or the rarely discussed alternative of selecting extreme cases on the main independent variable" (Seawright 2016:494–5).

If it helps readers whose thinking is strongly influenced by the terminology of the variable oriented research tradition, I suggest thinking of the irony in Szelényi's research as the independent variable (X) and the thought-provoking nature of his scholarship as the dependent variable (Y). In this context, one can interpret the investigation to be undertaken about the elements of his 'mental model' as a way to shed light on the omitted variable. Indeed, it will be demonstrated in the pages to come that his 'metaphysical pathos' is the quasi-causal link between irony and his outstanding scholarship.

2.2.2 Data Collection Techniques

To meet the aim and reconstruct the methodological foundation of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology as proposed by Szelényi (and his collaborators) both primary and secondary data have been collected. The primary data in this research include the 129 published books, book chapters, and journal articles by Szelényi available in English. These were complemented by 79 supporting sources – his publications and documents related to teaching and research policy, recorded interviews, published conversations, book reviews, and endorsements. Furthermore, some additional research publications that are not available in English were also identified as supporting materials. Figure 5 summarizes the selection of these materials following the QUOROM quality standard for meta-analytic research (cf. Moher et al. 1999).

The aim was to compile as complete a set of publications as possible produced by Szelényi (especially in English). The literature collection started with his public CV (cf. Szelényi 2009d). The publication list was then cleaned from double entries and updated using several approaches. Along the research process, the entire set of databases that are available at the libraries of the following institutions were searched: Åbo Akademi University, Brown University, Cambridge University, Central European University, Columbia University, Copenhagen Business School, Estonian National Library, Estonian Business School, Helsinki University, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Open Society Archives, Tallinn University, and the University of Texas at Austin. Additional sources were also identified from literature using the so-called 'footnote chasing'

approach and more recently simply from Szelényi's ResearchGate account. The following flowchart gives an overview of this process and its outcomes.

In addition to the various sources authored by Szelényi, publications where other scholars comment on his work were also collected. This was done using expert knowledge and complemented with searches that were conducted using the electronic databases (including the Web of Science, Scopus, Google Scholar, and more recently also Lens). The same techniques were also used to collect additional reading material on topics of interest.[131]

Iván Szelényi's CV (2009) includes entries of 　- 27 authored books 　- 15 edited books 　- 127 journal articles and chapters in books Total n = 159	11 publications and documents related to Szelényi's teaching and research policy
	17 interviews and conversations with Szelényi, incl. 8 in English
82 publications = Cleaned sample frame that excludes duplicates in different languages	26 book reviews and endorsements written by Szelényi
47 additional publications identified from (the references of) Szelényi's own works and secondary literature	25 relevant non-English publications identified
82 + 47 = 129 "primary" sources	**25 + 17 + 26 + 11 = 79 supporting sources**

Figure 5. QUOROM flow-chart of Szelényi's publications on intellectuals and social change.
Composed by the author

To complement existing sources, two in-depth interviews were conducted in New York with Szelényi in the spring of 2012 (cf. Szelényi 2012c, 2012d), specifically for the research task. Prior to the interviews, we met at his NYC apartment and went out for dinner, which allowed us to get to know each other on a slightly more personal level. The semi-structured interview questions (to allow for flexibility and follow-up questions to be asked) were prepared in advance but not shared with the interviewee beforehand. The questions were developed to gain a better understanding of Szelényi's scholarship, in general, and his sociology of intellectuals, in particular. Given the fact that I had been acquainted with his life history, academic works, reflections, interviews, and other commentators' observations beforehand, the questions concentrated on issues that would allow

---

[131] If the book of interest was not available in the library, the advantage of Google Books was taken to the extent possible, and more difficult-to-access (out-of-print) books were simply purchased from various online bookstores using the BookFinder4U search engine. In the case of rare articles, the interlibrary loan system provided by the National Library of Estonia was used.

me to clarify the context and background issues, intellectual development, and social background of his scholarship from the point of view of the sociology of knowledge, sociology of sociology and science studies. At the time of the interviews, I was in the process of compiling the critical meta-theory analysis of his scholarship and, hence, the questions reflected this.

The interviews, which both lasted over an hour, took place in his office at New York University. They were administrated, digitally recorded, and then transcribed personally by me. My experience of conducting these interviews has many recognizable similarities with the descriptions by Zuckerman (1977, Appendix A) of interviewing Nobel Laureates as the 'ultra-elite' members of academia. The most significant differences between her and my experience have to do with the quantity and quality of the interviews. (Since she conducted 41 interviews on the fields of studies and scientists that she hardly knew, she obviously could not prepare for those interviews at the same level of detail and her respondents could not expect her to know the field, terminology, specific contributions etc. in detail).

The transcription followed the technique that falls between basic and exact transcription, which means that the entire interview conversation was transcribed without leaving anything out. More specifically, the transcription produced was verbatim, that is a word-for-word replication of the verbal data. Repetitions, cut-offs of words, and fillers (such as "you know") were incorporated in the transcription but the non-lexical sounds and expressions of emotion (such as laughter, emphasis or stress) were not separately noted in the transcript. As there were no disturbances or significant pauses during the interviews – not even after some of the more difficult questions were asked – it did not make sense to report these in the transcript. Although Szelényi granted me full rights to do whatever I like with the interviews, I contacted him in the fall of 2012 to ask how he would feel if I published the interviews separately. As I did not receive a reply from him, I have not made the full interviews public in any form. Since then, he has not commented or expressed his wish to read it (with the possible option to make corrections or amendments).

2.2.3 Data Analysis Techniques

Given the aim of the interpretive research to understand irony as the method of neoclassical sociology, the selected analytical tool had to enable me to reconstruct Szelényi's 'metaphysical pathos'. As for the analytical techniques used in this research, the starting point was to apply irony as a method of neoclassical sociology to itself as the second-order irony of irony. Indeed, this has been done to the extent that irony framed the research puzzle in relation to Szelényi's achievements and the reputation of the method. In other words, following Szelényi, I have allowed paradox to identify the central research puzzle. As one may recall from the introduction of the thesis that he has been identified as one of the most accomplished sociologists originating from the former socialist bloc. Yet, the method that has allowed him to make his thought-provoking contributions to the study of social stratification and change in the region is largely ignored and hardly recognized.

To explain this paradox, an interpretative study is undertaken. Following Weber (cf. [1968] 1978 Ch. 1; 1981 / 2012:273–301) and his followers, such as Rex (1971) and Ringer (1997), undertaking an interpretative research means that sociological research should merge understanding and explanation. Willig (2014:136–137) further clarifies that interpretative research in its contemporary form seeks to achieve any of the following aims and related outcomes:

1. A better understanding of the author's intended meaning (i.e. a clear sense of what he or she was trying to express).
2. A better understanding of the author's unconscious (i.e. unintended) communication (i.e. an understanding of what may have motivated the author to say what he or she said or did even though he or she may not be aware of this motivation him- or herself).
3. A better understanding of the social, political, historical, cultural and/or economic context which made it possible (or indeed necessary) for the author to express what he or she expressed.
4. A better understanding of the social and/or psychological functions of what is being expressed (i.e. an insight into what is being achieved, in relation to other people or the self, by what is being expressed).
5. A better understanding of what the account may tell us about the nature and quality of a more general concept such as "human existence", "social progress" or "human psychology".

It is not difficult to relate to all of these objectives and expected outcomes with this study aimed at understanding irony as a method. Yet, to undertake the interpretative analysis with all of these goals in mind would not be feasible within this research. It is not even necessary as I have dealt with the third, fourth, and fifth reason for undertaking the interpretative study (in the above-presented list) elsewhere in the comprehensive critical meta-theory analysis that aimed to gain a better understanding of his reflexive sociology of intellectuals (cf. Kroos 2018). In other words, to meet the aims of the research and reconstruct the methodological foundation of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology, I shall concentrate on the first two goals identified by Willig while relying on the insights of my earlier research on aspects not covered here. In doing so, I shall make reference to specific parts of that research without repeating what is presented there in more detail.

Limiting the aims of the interpretative study of Szelényi's irony to the first two aims listed by Willig, I intend to reveal the intended meaning and unintended motivations behind his scholarship. The first goal, aimed at uncovering the intended meaning, requires one to take an 'empathic' stand toward the analyzed author and his or her scholarship, and the other, aimed at revealing the unconscious motivations of the analyzed author, demands one to take a 'suspicious' position. The presentation of the methods used in this research could benefit from a clarification of what is meant by these techniques.

Grounded in Ricoeur's (1983 [1996]) work on the philosophical foundations of interpretation as the dialectic of explanation and understanding, Willig provides an especially helpful description of 'empathic' and 'suspicious' interpretations. She (2014:138–139) explains the basic characteristics of 'empathic' inter-

pretation that one can undertake to meet the aim of reaching a better understanding of the intended meaning of the researched author. It is the more objective approach of the two, as one is expected to stay close to the text. Rather than being interested in what is hidden or latent, the researcher is paying especially close attention to what is manifested. His or her task is to amplify and illuminate what has been said in the text, make connections and establish patterns. It requires special attention to details and their relation to the whole – to zoom in and out – in order to gain a better understanding of the author/text being analyzed. In a way, one may say that this technique requires the researcher to get into the topic or head of the author being analyzed in order to see it 'from within'. Nevertheless, 'empathic' interpretation, even when it is deeply grounded in the data, is not limited only to what is explicit in the material. One can, in other words, complement it with insights and information from outside the primary research data. As 'empathic' interpretation seeks improved clarification and elucidation, the goal is to establish a shared understanding, rather than opposition with the author being analyzed. To this end, the researcher who has entered the world of the unit of analysis may help him or her to realize aspects about them and their life, work, experience, etc. that they were previously not aware of.

As for the second aim of gaining a better understanding of the unconscious content of the author being analyzed, Willig (ibid:137–8) suggests that the researcher should basically assume the role of a detective when using the 'suspi-cious' technique. This means that the statements of the author being studied are not taken at face value. Instead, the researcher is looking for clues that would unmask the intended meanings, even if they are latent or hidden. Theory is used in this research process as a tool that provides the lens through which the text is read and interpreted. In other words, it is a theory-driven exercise where the researcher presupposes the usefulness and validity of the selected theory and its concepts.

As a result, says Willig, the interpreter becomes an even more knowledgeable expert on the subject (matter) than the unit of analysis. Empowered with theoretical knowledge, (s)he is able to decode and understand the phenomenon, behavior, or experience of the individual being analyzed. For instance, the patient of a psychiatrist with symptoms of depression does not understand the causes and effects of the illness as well as the doctor, a female who decides to become a nurse or teacher does not necessarily understand the socially constructed role of the caretaker that influences her career choice etc.

Despite the characteristics of 'empathic' and 'suspicious' ways of interpretation, Willig (ibid:139) points out, again relying on Ricoeur, that it would be incurrect to conclude that they are necessarily distinct or perhaps even rival methods of analysis. They may be very different approaches, but both are required, according to Ricoeur ([1983] 1996:153–4), to gain a true understanding because neither can reach it alone.[132] More specifically, based on an elaborated discussion

---

[132] This echoes the argument developed by Bourdieu in his *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977) and *The Logic of Practice* (1990) where he argues that positivist objectivism and ethnomethodological subjectivism represent a false antinomy and, hence, can only limit our thinking about social reality. For additional comments, see Fowler (1996:8–9).

of different philosophers and their positions he comes to realize that neither of the interpretative approaches can offer satisfactory results alone and both are necessary for a true understanding because of the nature of the hermeneutic circle.[133]

In addition to the general description of two approaches to interpretation, Willig (2014) presents the analytical techniques that can be utilized in interpretative studies. Despite the insightful discussion on the two general approaches to interpretation and stressing the need for the combined utilization of these for explanation and understanding, the philosophical clarifications offer little practical guidance on how to conduct an interpretative study in the sense that empirical researchers would expect. Therefore, she provides an overview of the following possible techniques: psychoanalytic case study, phenomenological research, discourse analysis, grounded theory, ethnography, action research, narrative analysis, and thematic analysis.[134]

To meet the goals of this research, aimed at gaining a better understanding of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology or critical inquiry, a version of critical discourse analysis (CDA) has been selected for the 'suspicious' interpretation, and objective hermeneutics for the 'empathic' interpretation. These two techniques are adopted and applied together to complement each other just as suggested by Ricoeur and emphasized by Willig. More specifically, I have adopted CDA because it facilitates investigating the hidden power games in the argumentation of the adoption and application of selected method(ologies) and their elements in scientific communication.

Accepting the Foucauldian dictum of 'power/knowledge' – that the two con-cepts are so interrelated that you cannot separate one from the other[135] – I have selected CDA from the abundance of different approaches, which draws on Foucault (cf. Graham 2005). This approach is explained by van Dijk (2001:96) in its more developed and contemporary formulation to have the following characteristics:

> CDA is a – critical – perspective on doing scholarship: it is, so to speak, discourse analysis "with an attitude". It focuses on social problems, and especially on the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power

---

[133] Willig (2014:138) explains the "hermeneutic circle" as follows:
> parts of a whole can only be understood on the basis of an understanding of the whole, while the whole itself can only be grasped on the basis of an understanding of the parts. For example, when we read or hear a sentence, we make sense of the meaning of individual words in the light of the meaning of the entire sentence... At the same time, however, if we did not know the meaning of individual words in the first place, we would not be able to develop an understanding of the meaning of the whole sentence. Thus, the hermeneutic circle points to an interdependence between the parts and the whole, with neither of them taking precedence.

[134] Although she (ibid:137) mentions hermeneutics, it is not listed as a separate technique. It seems possible that the reason why she leaves it out of the list has to do with the fact that this topic is covered in a separate chapter in the textbook to which she also refers (cf. Wernet 2014).

[135] Although the link is made in many other publications, which is hardly a surprise because it has in his own words preoccupied his entire scholarship (Foucault 1980:94), the way he has written the title of the 1980 book – *Power/Knowledge* – suggests that they are inseparable and, hence, must be written together as also done above.

abuse or domination. Wherever possible, it does so from a perspective that is consistent with the best interests of dominated groups. It takes the experiences and opinions of members of such groups seriously, and supports their struggle against inequality. That is, CDA research combines what perhaps somewhat pompously used to be called "solidarity with the oppressed" with an attitude of opposition and dissent against those who abuse text and talk in order to establish, confirm or legitimate their abuse of power. Unlike much other scholarship, CDA does not deny but explicitly defines and defends its own sociopolitical position. That is, CDA is biased – and proud of it.

However, rather than working very closely with the text – analyzing it almost line by line – as suggested by a number of prominent methodologists of CDA,[136] I follow what Herzog (2016a, 2016b) calls "sociological discourse analysis". This is an approach that tries to overcome the 'sociological deficit' of immanent critique (cf. Herzog and Hernàndez, 2012), symptomatic also in the more tradi-tional CDA. To overcome this deficiency, Herzog (2016a:285) reports that methodological innovation in the last decade has offered new innovative ways to take into account the "practices, material realities, power relations, social structures and even affective reactions to disrespect" within sociological dis-course analysis.

More specifically, Herzog (ibid:286) explains that thanks to these innovations in sociological discourse analysis:

> ...we can understand the (implicit) interpretations that social actors elaborate from specific situations. Discourse analysis can perform controlled interpretation, can use reflexive methods and can analyze the socio-historic context of these interpretations. For Foucault, individuals are permanently involved in social struggles, that is, in discursive struggles that are primarily struggles for truth or resources and often have normative effects. ... With the more sociological approaches, which simultaneously focus on texts and on non-textual aspects of social life, such as practices or materialities, we can make explicit the normative pretensions of individuals engaging in all types of interaction ...

In other words, Herzog (ibid:286–7) concludes that:

> ... the broader sociological discourse analytical approach can help us better understand the normative content of discursive and non-discursive practices and struggles. More sociologically-based approaches help us not only perform internal critiques on discourses, but also use immanent critique to better understand discourses and material realities.

Following Herzog's ideas on how to overcome the 'sociological deficit' of imma-nent critique by undertaking sociological discourse analysis, I have approached the research puzzle of how to make sense of the essence of irony in Szelényi's research as holistically as possible. This means that I have analyzed in the inter-pretative study not only the information found in his publications, in general, and in his comments about issues related to method(ology), in particular, but also the intellectual and political context within which these studies were con-ducted and communicated. Although space limitations do not allow me to go into all the de-

---

[136] See, for instance, the methodological guidance of CDA offered by Fairclough (1995) and van Dijk (2001).

tails of the four dimensions of metatheorizing, aimed at attaining a deeper understanding of a theory that Ritzer (1988:190; 1991a:18) has identified, I am able to rely in the analytical chapter on the relevant insights from my previous study of Szelényi's scholarship that covered all these aspects (cf. Kroos 2018). In other words, I can draw from the observations and lessons learned about the role of the internal and external as well as intellectual and social dimensions in Szelényi's scholarship, in general, and the methodological choices he has made, and the methods that he has developed, tested and applied in his works, in particular.

Although Herzog does mention, as indicated also in the above-presented citation, that sociological discourse analysis has not given up its focus on the text, one may get the impression that it has become too obsessed with context. To complement 'suspicious' with 'empathic' interpretation, to use Willig's (2014:137–42) terminology, "objective hermeneutics" will additionally be adopted as an analytical technique. While the application of the above-described sociological discourse analysis should make it possible to take into account, to the extent possible for an outside observer, the socio-political, economic, and disciplinary context, including the intellectual debates within which Szelényi developed and formulated the ideas expressed in his publications, lectures and interviews, the adoption of objective hermeneutics should make it possible, according to Wernet (2014:235), "to reveal the *latent* meaning of utterances and its relation to the intention (manifest meaning) of actors".

The recognition of the difference between manifest and latent functions builds on the heritage of Merton (cf. 1936; [1957/1949] 1968) but the philosophical foundation of objective hermeneutics is closely related to phenomenology and the sociology of knowledge. Originally developed and still predominantly practiced in Germany, it is easier to find descriptions and methodological guidelines on how to apply it in German than in English.[137]

In brief, objective hermeneutics is closely related to eidetic or descriptive phenomenology (which is why they are said to be used sometimes as synonyms), positivist in its philosophy of science orientation, and has developed out of the legitimacy deficit of qualitative research methods, according to Dowling (2004). While Oevermann as a pioneer of the technique has proposed, together with his co-developers, eight (0–7) levels of interpretation (cf. Oevermann et al. 1979),[138] Titscher et al. (2000) have reintegrated these into five concrete research steps and sets of related questions. In either case, if applied as suggested

---

[137] Association for Objective Hermeneutics has, for instance, been building the bibliography of academic publications in the tradition both in German and English. While the number of entries in the latter is growing, the list is still more extensive in German. Likewise, the methodologists who introduce the technique into English often make references to the literature that is available only in German. Nevertheless, one can get an overview of it in English from the methodological writings of Oevermann with Allert, Konau and Krambeck ([1987] 2019), Reichertz (2004), Titscher et al. (2000), and Wernet (2014). Brief comments on the "objectivist hermeneutics" can also be found in Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009:94–5).

[138] Sections of this original work in German have been translated into English and can be found in Oevermann et al. ([1987] 2019).

it would make the study extremely detailed and would make it possible to concentrate the analysis on small text segments and, hence, also put limits on the number of text corpora that can be analyzed.

To make this more manageable within the given research task, I have decided to simply follow the four basic principles of objective hermeneutics identified and clarified by Wernet (2014:239–44). These principles are: (i) to exclude the context of the text, (ii) to take the literal meaning of a text seriously, (iii) to follow the text 'sequentially'[139] in the analysis, and (iv) to prefer the depth of a small amount of selected text in analysis over its breadth – known as extensivity.

In other words, the approaches to 'suspicious' and 'empathic' interpretations, in the form of sociological discourse analysis and objective hermeneutics, will complement each other in the investigation of the methodological foundations that underly Szelényi's scholarship and his claims about irony as a method of neoclassical sociology that will be undertaken in the next chapter. This is my approach for how to overcome the same kind of challenge that Habermas is trying to overcome with his method of (rational) reconstruction by looking for a balance between normative and empirical orientations as described at the beginning of this chapter.

Although the idea of combining methods is at the heart of mixed methods research, the analysis to be presented in the next chapter is not an exercise in that tradition. Although 'empathic' interpretation in the form of objective hermeneutics and 'suspicious' interpretation in the form of sociological discourse analysis will complement each other, the inquiry is not an attempt to apply mixed methods, which in the strict sense should be concerned with developing and putting into research practice the principles and tools for the combined use of qualitative and quantitative methods. Rather, it would be more accurate to say that an attempt will be made to undertake a study in the multi-method tradition that Brewer and Hunter (1989, 2006; Hunter and Brewer 2003, 2015) define as a research practice that employs two or more methods or styles of research in the same study. Given the fact that these techniques or approaches should not represent qualitative and quantitative traditions – rather than more than one of the techniques representing either of these – it is not appropriate to speak about mixing methods.

Nevertheless, given the substantially larger effort and attention that has gone into the development of mixed methods, within which the challenge of how to combine methods at the technical level of data analysis has been raised (cf. Niglas 1999, 2010) and addressed, so far, only with limited progress (cf. Babones 2016; Bazeley 2018; LeCompte and Schensul 2013), one can benefit from these methodological discussions and innovations. To put it differently, despite the enormous attention paid to the development of the mixed methods tradition at various levels of research methodology, the largest and by now still largely unresolved challenge

---

[139] Wernet (2014:242) explains that "[t]he term 'sequentiality' … does not refer to a mere chronological order of sequences. It points out that structures in the social world are in a constant process of having to choose actions from given alternatives which then again open up new alternatives from which again one has to be chosen and so on."

is the integration of two different data analysis techniques that represent qualitative and quantitative traditions. Rather than trying to offer any relief to the challenge of how to integrate these traditions at the level of data analysis, this research returns to the mono-tradition and attempts to strengthen the analysis by combining two techniques from the same broad category of methods.

With some apparent lack of immodesty, one would like to hope that this is a humble step toward meeting the dream of Teddlie, Charles, and Tashakkori (2010:8) – influential methodologists of mixed methods research – who recognize the need for a *methodological connoisseur*, described as someone who "knowledgeably (and often intuitively) selects the best techniques available to answer research questions that frequently evolve as a study unfolds". Indeed, instead of following the hierarchical cookbook approach to the development of a research paper starting from setting the aims and ending with making inferences (and all the logical steps in between), the analysis that will be presented in the next chapter was developed intuitively and the appropriate methods were considered and adopted along the way. The advantage of approaching the research task in such a way is that the 'suspicious' and 'empathic' interpretations are truly integrated at the level of analysis.

2.3   Reflexively on Research Ethics

The aim of this sub-section is to reflect on my role in the research and briefly summarize my positions on the various elements of research methodology – paying especially close attention to the issues of research ethics faced in this study.

As I am analyzing the work and intellectual heritage of one of the most outstanding contemporary CEE/FSU sociologists who originates from Hungary but has made an outstanding career internationally (Kroos 2020), I do realize that he means a lot to many former students, collaborators as well as the colleagues and institutions that he has worked with. I also acknowledge that I have developed a dialogical relationship with him over the years. He was willing to host me at NYUAD in 2012 and when this did not materialize, supported my choice to go to Columbia University in NYC as a Visiting Scholar that was sponsored by his former PhD student and co-author Prof. Gil Eyal. Later these contacts allowed me to spend another semester at Cambridge University in 2013 under the guidance of Prof. Lawrence King, another former PhD student and co-author of Szelényi. In 2015, I was asked to present at the international conference "Intellectuals, Inequalities and Transitions: Themes from Iván Szelényi" (cf. Kroos 2015), where he was present in person and from which an edited volume (cf. Demeter 2020a), including my paper on his extraordinarily successful academic career (cf. Kroos 2020), was recently published.

Based on this information, one may ask: How have I been able to stay true to myself and develop a critical analysis worthy of academic credentials? Or also: How do I combine the tasks of not offending him and, at the same time, not concealing anything important? Likewise, one may raise the challenging issue of how to analyze the scholarship of a scholar who has not only made major contributions to the sociology of intellectuals but has, in the process of his academic ca-

reer, mastered the rules of the game in academia: How to avoid taking his claims at face value and minimize the risk of naively accepting the narrative that he has presented in his autobiographical comments and reflections? Finally, one may ask: How has the dialogical relationship affected the conclusions that I draw and, possibly, my integrity as the researcher?

To answer these and similar questions requires one to disclose self-reflexively the ethical principles followed in the research, on the one hand, and the choices made during the actual research practice to meet these norms, on the other. To start with, it may help the reader if I positioned my views within the philosophy of science traditions of post-positivism, constructivism, critical theory, participatory inquiry paradigm, and pragmatism. Given their essence and defining characteristics, I feel most closely aligned with the combined set of elements of critical theory (in terms of ontology, axiology, and control), pragmatism (in terms of epistemology, rhetoric, knowledge accumulation, quantitative analysis) and the feminist ethics of care. Further, I accept the positions of both critical theory and pragmatism on the nature of knowledge, goodness or quality criteria, voice, textual representations as well as qualitative analysis; and I selectively incorporate their understandings on action, reflexivity, inquirer posture, and training into my belief system.

Furthermore, I would like to declare that I subscribe to the ethical principles laid down by the American Sociological Association (2018) in its code of ethics. To undertake the analysis aimed at explaining Szelényi's 'mental model' as the foundation of a method for neoclassical sociology, I transcend the procedural norms of standard research ethics by adopting the moral principles from the interpretive research tradition (cf. Weber [1968] 1978, Ch. 1; 1981; Weed 2005) and critical social inquiry (cf. Cannella and Lincoln 2011). The paragraphs to follow will explain in more detail what I mean by this.

From the interpretive research tradition, I have taken on the understanding of ethics as situational (cf. Tiidenberg 2020). Given the fact that I have developed a dialogical relationship with Szelényi, the adoption of 'dialogic ethics' (Cannella and Lincoln 2007), which is sometimes also referred to as 'relational ethics of care',[140] seems more than appropriate. Similar to the (feminist) 'ethics of care' (cf. Preissle 2007; Preissle and Han 2012), it makes aiming at good the ultimate moral imperative of the research. This means that as a principle I do not think that the end would justify the means. While I present Szelényi in the next chapter as someone who is well aware of the possible consequences of his methodological choices for the way he as a scholar may be perceived – the reputation that he may gain or lose – I do not think that one should interpret it as if I am questioning his integrity as a social scientist. Quite the opposite, rather than being hypocritical about the truth and objectivity of his critical observations, on the one hand, and acting defensively out of self-interest, on the other, I think that he has simply played by the (in)formal rules of the game even if this required at times making strategic choices. That is, he has been practicing what he preaches.

---

[140] See Ellis (2007; 2017:438–40) for a brief and Clandinin et al. (2018) for a comprehensive overview of the tradition and its main contributors.

To describe this as knowledgeably and truthfully as it is accessible and understandable to me, I do not think that following the procedural requirements of traditional qualitative research, such as informed consent, is enough. Hence, I have adopted the principles of 'dialogic ethics' and 'ethics of care'.

To give a more direct answer to those critical questions in terms of the actual research practices that I have been undertaking to meet the ethical norms of these frameworks, the following comments are in order. First, to find a delicate balance between the expectations of not concealing any crucial information, on the one hand, and at the same time not offending him unintentionally, on the other, I have been 'soul searching'. In line with the American Sociological Association (2018) Code of Ethics section 12.4(a), which states that "Sociologists do not fabricate data or falsify results", and section 12.4(b), which adds that "In presenting their work, sociologists report their findings fully and do not omit relevant data…", I have no choice but to disclose the relevant information. It is not that I have discovered evidence that he wants to hide but understandably he has been careful how to present his complicated relations and dealings with the socialist regime as they could easily be misunderstood or stigmatized. Given that I may not have the complete picture, I have tried to present any such information, which might be regarded as sensitive, discreetly and acknowledge the possibility of my limited understanding of the events and access to the relevant information in order to avoid any value-laden suggestions, oversimplifications or generalizations.

In accordance with the norms of 'dialogic ethics' and the (feminist) 'ethics of care', I have set in this process the interest of the unit of analysis above my own search for truth. According to Markham (2006), dialogic ethics is compatible with the aims of reflexivity, and I give my best to combine it also with truth telling as its moral principle. I hope to be able to show that there is no antagonistic conflict of interest or intentions in these research endeavors. While I aim at doing no harm, I have tried to do my best to make a small contribution to knowledge by taking an honest standpoint that is at the same time also critical.

From the critical theory tradition, I have obtained the inspiration that re-search ought to aim at the moral proclivity toward revelation. Regarding the issue of how to analyze the scholarship of a scholar who has not only made major contributions to the sociology of intellectuals but has, in the process of his academic career, mastered the rules of the game in academia, I can only hope that my reading of the intellectual exchange, that the original contributions were part of, is sufficient to undertake the analysis of Szelényi's scholarship. Likewise, I can only hope that my insufficient knowledge of Hungarian has not hampered my attempts to make sense of Kádár's post-Stalinist regime in Hungary or that my distance from the Hungarian and the US academic institutions has not hindered my chances of interpreting the reasons why Szelényi made specific methodological choices. I also hope that my knowledge of (critical) social theory, in general, and the sociology of sociology, knowledge, and intellectuals, in particular, is sufficient to support the theory-led detective analysis of the 'suspicious' interpretation that utilizes sociological discourse analysis. This technique should provide the means that enable me to avoid taking his as well as his critics' claims at face value. Based on this, I hope to be well

equipped and minimize the risk of naively accepting the narrative that he has presented in his research publications, autobiographical comments and reflections, on the one hand, and the comments of his critics and admirers, on the other. While I do not ignore these points of view, it does not mean that I accept them at face value or reproduce them without hesitation or consideration.

I may have developed a dialogical relationship with Szelényi over the years, yet, this does not necessarily discredit the critique that I am to offer in this research. Rather than limiting its credibility, I would argue that within the context of combining the somewhat subjective approach of 'suspicious' interpretation that utilizes sociological discourse analysis with the 'empathic' technique that utilizes objective hermeneutics, the ethical challenge has been turned into an opportunity. As explained in the previous pages, 'empathic' interpretation does not only aim to clarify the intended meaning of the text by staying close to it, identifying what has been said, making connections, and establishing patterns. While special attention to detail and their relation to the whole is to be paid, it will be complemented with evidence and information from outside of the primary research data. However, rather than creating opposition with the author, the 'empathic' interpretation seeks improved clarification and elucidation – to establish a shared understanding. I may, at times, have unintentionally over-interpreted some indirect evidence. For instance, Szelényi says that has happened when I draw attention to the intellectual rivalry between (Konrad and) Szelényi and (Bence and) Kis based on their *samizdat* writings that do not mention names or offer references. Nevertheless, he (ibid:237) acknowledges that "[i]t is conceivable that Bence and Kis saw us as rivals…" – indicating that my analysis might have brought to his attention a possible aspect that he was previously unaware of.

In short, combining the value systems that underlie objective and critical social inquiry may seem challenging. Although it might appear as if I have been doing some cherry picking while failing to recognize that the selected items may not be compatible with each other, I hope this is not the case. The combination reflects the impact that Bourdieu,[141] Gouldner[142] and Merton[143] have made on my

---

[141] I recognize Bourdieu's identification with pragmatism and his long road to the acceptance of eclecticism. For details of the former, see Bourdieu (1990a:29) as well as Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992:122). For details of the latter, compare Bourdieu's initial denial of any relation to eclecticism (Bourdieu 1997:454; 2002:209) with his more recent reflections where he openly admits it (cf. Bourdieu 2008a:71; Glenn 2010:35). To put it differently, I recognize, similar to Gouldner, that pragmatism and eclecticism have been the source of Bourdieu's creativity, and can function as the foundation of meta-theoretical, mixed methods, and interdisciplinary research.

[142] I have come to accept Gouldner's position on eclecticism and critical theory. As for the former, he (1975–1976:27) adds to the opening citation of the section a note, according to which eclecticism functions as a kind of multi-lingualism for intellectuals and relates to their (search for) creativity. As for the latter, he (ibid:35) argues that "[i]t would be an essential function of a proper critical theory of intellectuals and intelligentsia – revolutionary or otherwise – to make this invisible pedagogy a more visible one, thereby inhibiting the manipulation of the proletariat. An object of such a critical theory would be to de-mystify the role of intellectuals and intelligentsia, while giving no encouragement to anti-intellectualism".

[143] I have come to accept his ideas on "theoretical pluralism" (cf. Merton 1975, 1981) which, building on Weber and Sorokin, on the one hand, and Parsons as well as Znaniecki, on the other, sees different theories pragmatically as complementary.

take on eclecticism[144] as the foundation of meta-theoretical, mixed method, and interdisciplinary research in the social sciences (Kroos 2012a), which rejects the fundamentalist position that different mental models and research paradigms are inherently incommensurable. While I acknowledge the position of Lincoln and Guba (2000:174), according to whom commensurability may be an issue if researchers want to "pick and choose" from the contradictory and mutually exclusive axioms of positivist and interpretive models,[145] I see no such problem in combining the aspects of pragmatism that underlie mixed method research[146] with the non-activist side of critical theory.[147] In other words, the subjective approach of 'suspicious' interpretation that utilizes socio-logical discourse analysis and the 'empathic' technique that utilizes objective hermeneutics are not necessarily antagonistic, but rather complementary, as both make it possible to reveal an aspect of the author's scholarship.

2.4 Limitations of this Research

There are numerous limitations to the materials and methods used in this research. Some of them are specific to the nature of the selected methods and others to my background and the choices I have made. To start with, there are the limitations related to the adopted "new rules of sociological research" that Giddens (1976) has developed. Unlike the procedural guidelines that explain and justify the use of a particular technique of the selected or preferred empirical method that can be found in the various texts and handbooks of research methods, Giddens addresses the very nature of sociological enterprise and its implications for sociological method. Namely, he is willing to face the epistemological challenges and particularities of social research that arise from the fact that active humans construct the world as 'meaningful', 'accountable' or 'intelligible' using language as the medium and take action to achieve the desired ends. Instead of ignoring the particular nature of the social sciences and seeking legitimacy from an adaptation of the norms and methods of the natural sciences, Giddens

---

[144] Merton (1975b:51; 1981:iii) calls a similar position "disciplined eclecticism", Hegedüs (1977a:33) "tolerant eclecticism", Wiley (1985:206–7) "creative eclecticism", Hammersley (1996:172) "methodologically aware eclecticism" and Therborn (2000:52) "pragmatic eclecticism" based on Rule (1997:19, 224) and his book's back cover endorsement by Wolfe. It should not be confused with the idea that anything goes or what Borch (2012) has associated with Luhmann and labeled "strategic eclecticism". Critical reflection on eclecticism can be found in Sanderson (1987, 2012, Ch. 10).

[145] More particularly, Lincoln and Guba (2000:174) ask: "Are paradigms commensurable? Is it possible to blend elements of one paradigm into another, so that one is engaged in research that represents the best of both worldviews? The answer, from our perspective, has to be a cautious *yes*".

[146] The argument that pragmatism is the foundation of mixed methods research can be found in Biesta (2010); Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and Turner (2007); Johnson and Gray (2010), Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004); Lincoln and Guba (2000:169, 179); Morgan (2007); and Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998).

[147] This is based on the understanding that philosophical continuum (cf. Onwuegbuzie, Johnson and Collins 2009; and Niglas 2010) or even eclecticism could function as the foundation of mixed methods research (Kroos 2012a). For critical discussion, see Toomela (2011).

recognizes that social scientists face the challenge of double hermeneutics when they have to interpret the interpreted and constructed social world of actors.

While I find his treatment of the contemporary forms of social and philosophical thought and its implications for sociological method comprehensive, it is not difficult to see why some critics have labeled his strategy as "misplaced eclecticism" as Giddens (2013:1) mentions in the "Introduction to the Second Edition" of the book. Contrary to these critics,[148] I do not find eclecticism necessarily problematic (cf. Kroos 2012a; Merton 1975:47–52). Hence, I subscribe to the views of sympathetic reviewers, such as Esser (1991), Gieryn (1977:536), Mullins (1983:329) and Riazi (2016:41), who find his new rules sound even when the author has become an "informed eclectic" in the process of developing these.

One could argue that the 'reconstruction' that will be presented in the next chapter does not produce an idealization of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology. More specifically, the argument could be made that what is undertaken in the next chapter is not a 'rational reconstruction'. Following the classic distinction made by Kaplan (1964:§1) between "reconstructed logic"[149] versus "logic-in-use" that has inspired pragmatists (cf. Bertilsson 2016:32), and methodologists of educational sciences (cf. Worthen 1995) and mixed methods (cf. Howe 1988 & 2002) alike, one could argue, based on the critical analysis of Szelényi's "metaphysical pathos" presented in the next chapter, that my attempt to shed light on irony as a method of neoclassical sociology is much closer to the idea of disclosing the actual "logic-in-use" than it is to the "rational reconstruction" of his mental model. Consider, for instance, how Kaplan (1964:10–1) explains the difference between the two:

> ... reconstructed logic is not meant to be merely a description of what is actually being done by scientists ... but rather an idealization of scientific practice ... The reconstruction idealizes the logic of science only in showing us what it would be if it were extracted and refined to utmost purity. ... The idealization may be carried so far that it is useful only for the further development of logic itself, and not for the understanding and evaluation of scientific practice.

Indeed, I admit that the classification of my research as "logic-in-use" rather than "rational reconstruction" may in some instances be more appropriate. Al-though it is in line with the above-presented developments in STS and science studies more generally, it must be clear from the previous sections that I have not conducted ethnographic research. Hence, I will not be able to give an eye-witness report, similar for instance to the famous study of Latour and Woolgar ([1979] 1986), on how Szelényi has actually been doing research. Given the lack of reflexivity (Bourdieu 2004:26–31), on the one hand, and the limitation of reflexiv-

---

[148] Although Giddens does not refer explicitly to any critic, one can find such comments, for instance, from Rosaldo (1979).

[149] Kaplan sometimes also uses the term "rational reconstruction" as the synonym of "reconstructed logic". Although used interchangeably in the text, he associates the former with Carnap and Reichenbach. One can find more information on the way these authors envisioned the reconstruction from secondary (cf. Davia 1998 & Richardson 2000) as well as primary literature referred therein.

ity (Fuchs 1992a:155–60), on the other, the research that I undertake faces the above-mentioned challenge of double hermeneutics when I interpret Szelényi's publications and his comments given during the interviews. That is, I should interpret the text, including the methodological justifications, produced by a strategic actor who knows the rules of the academic game in sociology very well. In this context, I have tried to find a balance between the objective and subjective, between what was actually said in the academic communication and what might be behind it or what it means in the socio-political and competitive intellectual context. Although in the literature overview and concluding part I may have 'idealized' what Szelényi's irony as a method of neoclassical sociology stands for, most of the analysis to be undertaken in the next chapter looks actually at how he has been doing research from the methodological point of view and, therefore, comes closer to the idea of (rational) reconstruction.

As for the selected research design, I must further admit that it suffers from the typical problems associated with case studies. That is, one may find the fact that research studies of a single scholar and his scholarship – no matter how outstanding and interesting his background and thought-provoking his contributions – is a limitation because it is limited to a single case from which more general lessons are difficult to draw. More specifically, deviant case studies are undertaken in order to reveal phenomenal factors that were previously overlooked. Given the fact that they have the tendency to undermine the established theoretical understandings and empirical generalizations, one should carefully study their applicability to other cases in a comparative context, as suggested by Lijphart (1971:692). Alternatively, one could argue that what is undertaken in this study is nomothetic rather than idiographic science in Windelband's ([1894] 1998) sense of the term.[150] I could not agree more – the aim of this research is not to discover, based on the single case, law-like patterns in general, but rather to understand Szelényi and his scholarship in a particular context and uniqueness. Although these aims are not necessarily inflictive, as Salvatore and Valsiner (2010b) argue, I would not have any problems if someone classified this research as idiographic.

The elements of my mental model, specified in section 2.4, reflect my values and understanding of what kind(s) of research I find methodologically valuable and reliable. Inevitably, this introduces so-called researcher bias. That is, if someone else with different positions on these matters were to conduct research on the same topic, the results would be different. This means that the research is difficult to replicate, and it is even less likely that, if a time-consuming attempt were to be made, it would produce the same results.

As for the sampling, one could argue that instead of Szelényi, I could have picked one of the two other co-authors of the paper with the English title "On Irony: An Invitation to Neoclassical Sociology", Gil Eyal or Eleanor Townsley. Both are his former PhD students and now professors and heads of departments

---

[150] See Lamiell (1998) for an overview how the contemporary usage in psychology differs from the original. Additional insights of idiographic science can be found in Salvatore and Valsiner (2009, 2010a & 2010b) and Toomela (2010).

at Columbia University and Mount Holyoke College, respectively. Again, one may reason that the results of the analysis of their methodological foundations would give different results than the ones presented in the next chapter.

In regard to the limitations on the materials, I was only able to collect and analyze Szelényi's English-language publications, lectures, and interviews, which all came from public sources (except for the interviews that I conducted myself). That is, I have had no access to his personal or professional correspondence or any other material (such as applications and reports to funding agencies or evaluators). Likewise, I have not been his student, colleague, member of his research team, his co-author, editor, or translator and cannot, therefore, share my personal knowledge, memories, or experiences. In addition to having had to exclude from analysis his publications that are available only in Hungarian (or relying on automatic translations with their own limitations), I must confess that even though I spent approximately two and half years in Hungary during my graduate studies, I am still a stranger to that society, includeing its internal intellectual and political debates (and was unable to get a sense of these just from secondary sources). Hence, one could argue that someone who had access to his correspondence and other research / professional documents and/or the proper Hungarian language abilities and knowledge of its (departmental) politics and society might have been able to do a better job.

However, having no formal link to Hungarian academic establishments and having no stake in its academic debates or departmental politics is also an advantage. The fact that I am not a relative, former student or co-author of Szelényi and an outsider to Hungarian (academic) society means, on the one hand, that I have to approach the research task without the insights that one could gain from those vantage points. Nevertheless, it also gives me the opportunity to see the issues that I am investigating with fresh eyes – to approach the phenomena through the lenses of the bystander who does not have the above-mentioned ballast on his shoulders. In short, as much as my background and position limit me in the research, on the one hand, it should allow me to be more independent and possibly even more objective in the analysis, on the other.

As for the analytical techniques of sociological discourse analysis and objecttive hermeneutics, one could argue that they are not as well-known as some other procedures and there must be good reasons why they have not been adopted more widely. One could also argue that the intuitive way that I have combined them does not go far enough or that it remains unclear how I integrated them into the multi-method interpretative study. I acknowledge that selecting less well-known techniques does involve risks and there are limitations to how far one can go with justifying the choices on methodological grounds. Nevertheless, I also value the courage to try something new and innovative for the advancement of knowledge. As they say in Ukrainian: "He who doesn't risk, doesn't drink champagne".

Last but not least, given the fact that I lack formal training in philosophy of science (or literary criticism for that matter), one could suggest that the analysis suffers from my limited understanding of how social theory and empirical

research methods relate to the terminology, debates and *modus operandi* of the philosophy of science, in general, and to its understanding of the social sciences and its methods, in particular. True as these observations are, I remind the reader that despite the interdisciplinary nature of much of the social studies (of science), this thesis is submitted for defense in sociology, not philosophy. This, of course, does not justify any misconceptions, use, representation, or under-standings of its terms, debates, or ways of reasoning. The legal principle of *ignorantia juris non excusat* holds here as well.

Despite all these limitations, one should like to hope that the methodological choices and their limitations described in this chapter do not overshadow the content of the analysis. In addition to the identified shortcomings, I also ac-knowledge the danger that methods could become something like bureaucra-cies that take on a life of their own. To avoid this trap, I remind the reader to recall the message of Weber ([1904–1905, 1917] 1949:115), presented in one of the opening citations to this chapter, that methodology offers us (at best) a reflective understanding of how the study was conducted – not that one should necessarily master abstract theory before learning how to apply it in practice.

3   Reconstruction of Szelényi's 'Metaphysical Pathos' as his 'Mental Model'

> [S]trictly speaking, knowledge of the conditions of production of the product is one of the conditions of rational communication of the findings of social science … [But typically] The finished product, the *opus operatum*, conceals the *modus operandi*… You are never taken into the back-rooms, the kitchens of science (Bourdieu 1993a:158).

> The many sociologists who deny that sociology is a science, have not persuaded their scientific colleagues that sociology is humanistic. Conversely, for every sociologist who thinks causal analysis important, there is another who pursues narrative explanations. For every sociologist who believes in objective knowledge, another denies it. For every reflective interpretivist, there is a rigorous positivist (Abbott 2001:6).

> Neutrality served as a *shield* – helping the young sociologists defend themselves against the charge that 'sociology' was only a form of 'socialism'. The German Society for Sociology required that members renounce the advocacy of "all practical, ethical, religious, political, and aesthetic goals" (Proctor 1991:265).

To clarify Szelényi's methodological foundations of irony as the method of neoclassical sociology demands the reconstruction of his 'metaphysical pathos'. In Bourdieu's terminology, one could argue that to decode Szelényi's 'mental model' – to understand how he has practised critical inquiry – a detailed analysis of his research habitus[151] is needed. Given the fact that the four dimensions of Ritzer's (1988, 1991a) meta-theory, covering the internal-external as well as intellectual-social dimensions, have been presented elsewhere (Kroos 2018), the purpose of this chapter is to clarify the most important (hidden) assumptions and/or (ex)implicit propositions that can be identified in Szelényi's scholarship that applies irony. This requires an analysis of his 'metaphysical pathos' – known

---

[151] Although Bourdieu (1985b) is well known for the adoption and development of the terms *field* and *habitus* (cf. Wacqueant 2016), one benefits more in this context from the specific connotations that he attaches to these terms when he speaks about scientific, intellectual and artistic fields and research habitus. He (2004a:41) associates the latter with principles of scientific practices and defines it as "a system of largely unconscious, transposable, generative dispositions that tends to generalize itself". He (1969:89) explains the former as follows:

> The intellectual field, which cannot be reduced to a simple aggregate of isolated agents or to the sum of elements merely juxtaposed, is, like a magnetic field, made up of a system of power lines. In other words, the constituting agents or systems of agents may be described as so many forces which by their existence, opposition or combination, determine its specific structure at a given moment in time. In return, each of these is defined by its particular position within this field from which it derives positional properties which cannot be assimilated to intrinsic properties and more especially, a specific type of participation in the cultural field taken as a system of relations between themes and problems, and thus a determined type of cultural unconscious, while at the same time it intrinsically possesses what could be called a functional weight, because its own 'mass';, that is, its power (or better, its authority) in the field cannot be defined independently of its position within it.

also as the 'mental model', which is composed of the assumptions, understandings, adaptations, values, and beliefs which underlie his scholarship and/or what seems to have guided his research. To put it more elaborately, the goal of this chapter is to classify and briefly describe his take on ontology, epistemology, methodology, training, qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, rhetoric, nature of knowledge, knowledge accumulation, goodness, quality criteria, hegemony, control, axiology, call to action, inquirer posture, ethics, reflexivity, accommodation and commensurability that Szelényi's ironic scholarship seems to come closest to.

Using a comparative overview of the underlying belief systems of contemporary research paradigms and their distinguishing characteristics (originally compiled by Lincoln and his collaborators,[152] later expanded by Heron and Reason (1997) as well as by Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) and most recently by Onwuegbuzie Johnson and Collins (2009)), Table 1 states briefly the result of the identification and classification of his mental model, which will be clarified in more detail in the subsequent sub-sections devoted to each of these defining elements.

Table 1. Szelényi's mental model – defining elements and their distinguishing characteristics[153]

Defining element	Position	Explanation
Ontology	Post-positivism	Critical realism – 'real' reality but only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehendable
	Critical theory	Historical realism – 'hyper-reality' shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender values; crystallized over time
Epistemology	Post-positivism	Researchers should eliminate their biases, remain emotionally detached and uninvolved with the objects of study, and test or empirically justify their stated hypotheses[c]
	Critical theory	Transactional / subjectivist; value-mediated findings
Methodology	Pragmatism	Thoughtful / dialectical eclecticism, pluralism of methods & perspectives; determine what works and solves individual / social problems
Training	Critical theory	Resocialization; qualitative and quantitative; history; values of altruism, empowerment and liberation
Qualitative analysis	Pragmatism	Descriptive analysis and development of ideal types. Emphasis is on understanding the phenomena by immersing oneself into

---

[152] See Lincoln and Guba (2000) and Denzin and Lincoln (2005) for details.
[153] The superscript letters (a), (b), (c) and (d) in the explanations of the table refer to the following, (a) Critical theory – extracted from Denzin and Lincoln (2005:195–6); (b) Critical theory – extracted from Lincoln and Guba (2000:172); (c) Pragmatism – extracted from Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004:14, 18–20); and (d) selection of elements from critical theory and pragmatism that were found applicable.

		the reality & getting to know the study object before the development of quantitative data collection instrument &interpretation of data
Quantitative analysis	Pragmatism	Descriptive statistics; most, if not all, forms of inferential statistics that lead to generalizations
Rhetoric	Critical Theory	Critical discourse
Nature of knowledge	Pragmatism	Intersubjectivity, emic *and* etic viewpoints; respect for nomothetic and idiographic knowledge. I.e., he complements intelligently the empiricism that symbolizes (post)positivism with his personal as well as structural/historical insights that characterizes critical theory
Knowledge accumulation	Post-positivism	Accretion – 'building blocks' adding to 'edifice of knowledge'; generalizations and cause-effect linkages
	Critical theory	Historical revisionism; generalization by similarity; internal statistical generalization; analytical generalization; case-to-case transfer; naturalistic generalization[c]
Goodness and quality criteria	Post-positivism	Conventional benchmarks of 'rigor': internal and external validity, reliability and objectivity
	Critical theory	Historical situatedness; reduction of ignorance and misperceptions; involve participants in knowledge construction and validation
Hegemony	Post-positivism	In control of publication, funding, promotion, and tenure
	Critical theory	Seeking recognition and input[154]
Control[155]	Constructivism	Shared between inquirer and participants
	Participatory	Shared to varying degrees
Axiology	Post-positivism	Excluded – influence is denied (research must be value-free)
	Critical theory	Research is value-bound; formative; seeks to reveal injustice[a]
The call to action	Post-positivism	Not the responsibility of the researcher; viewed as 'advocacy' or subjectivity, and therefore a threat to validity and objectivity
	Critical theory	Found especially in the form of empowerment; emancipation anticipated and hoped for; social transformation, particularly toward more equal and justice, is the end goal

[154] Guba and Lincoln (1994:112) extend the same characteristics also to constructivism.
[155] Lincoln and Guba (2000:175) ask: "Who initiates? Who determines salient questions? Who determines what constitutes findings? Who determines how data will be collected? Who determines in what forms the findings will be made public, if at all? Who determines what representations will be made of participants in the research?"

Inquirer posture	Post-positivism	Disinterested scientist and informer of decision-makers, policy makers and change agents
	Critical theory	Scholar equalized with the 'transformative intellectual' who is advocate and activist[156]
Ethics	Pragmatism	Extrinsic and intrinsic; justification comes in the form of warranted assertability
Reflexivity	Critical theory	Voices mixed between researcher and participants
Accommodation / commensurability	Pragmatism	Commensurable for all forms if done knowledgably

3.1 Ontology

Szelényi addresses ontological questions[157] in his scholarship only indirectly. In this context, it should not come as a surprise that his methodological writing on irony as the method of neoclassical sociology offers little clarification on these issues. It takes considerable effort to detect and comprehend from his publications what his positions might be on the ontology of social reality, including the nature of social actors, structure, their relations and underlying mechanisms. Nonetheless, it will be demonstrated below that his ontological position is a combination of the principles of post-positivism and critical theory – critical realism that regards reality as 'real' but only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehendable, on the one hand, and historical realism that regards the 'hyper-reality' to have been crystallized over time and shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender values, on the other hand.

To start with, it should be noted that Konrád and Szelényi (1979:4) state in the opening chapter of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* that "[t]he first, Marxist stage of the intelligentsia's critical self-examination was epistemological; we propose that the second, in a sense post-Marxist, the phase should be ontological." Furthermore, they go on to state that "[s]uch an ontological critique of the role and social position of intellectuals requires an analysis of the social and historical circumstances in which a class position for the intellectuals could develop." Indeed, as I have shown in detail elsewhere (cf. Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.4), much of their book and its follow-up publications examine the structural position of intellectuals in different social formations of actually existing socialism and capitalism and their role in these changes. Although Konrád and Szelényi claim that their "main task is to combine an epistemological critique with an ontological one …" and they set out to define intellectuals for it, it has been noted that the meaning of the key concept keeps changing throughout *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (Stark 1982:191) and Szelényi's scholarship more generally (Eyal 2020; Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.2.2). In other words, although Konrád and Szelényi

---

[156] While it will be argued that this characteristic is not foreign to Iván Szelényi, it is strongly suppressed in his academic publications in English.

[157] Hofweber (2013) lists the following defining questions of ontology: "first, say, what there is, what exists, what the stuff of reality is made out of, secondly, say what the most general features and relations of these things are".

(1979:3–6) make brief comments on the need for the ontological self-criticism of intellectuals that leads them to the structural analysis of their position and role in different socio-economic formations and to the never-ending effort to define properly the 'true' intellectuals, there is much that has remained unexplained in this call for post-Marxist ontology and in its manifestation in irony as the proposed method of neoclassical sociology.

It was noted in the presentation of Szelényi's (way to) irony as an anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue that according to Mannheim ([1936] 1982:103), Kant is known for asking "How is nature possible?" and Simmel for asking "How is society possible?". From this Lukács derived the question that Weber (1948:154) admires. Namely, having noted that "works of art exist," Lukács proceeded to ask: "How is their existence meaningful and possible?". As mentioned in section 1.6., these ontological questions, together with an impulse from romantic irony, gave birth to the concept of "socially unattached intellectuals".

Although the question "How are socially unattached intellectuals possible?" is in the background of Szelényi's critical reflections on Lukács, within which he notes his failure to reflect self-critically and -ironically on how the son of a wealthy banker became the theoretician and ideologist of the proletariat (cf. King and Szelényi 2004:33–4), it does not make him address the ontological issues directly. Nevertheless, it appears that Szelényi has at least been thinking about the defining questions of a critical sociology of intellectuals that he likes to cite from the works of Gouldner: "Whose side are we on?"[158] (Gouldner 1968:103) and "Where does the cameraman fit in?" (Gouldner 1978a, 160 / 1979a, 9)[159]. The fact that, together with his co-authors, he also likes Gouldner's idea of a "Culture of Critical Discourse" (Gouldner 1975–1976; 1978a / 1979, Thesis 6.1) as a way to reconstruct the critical potential of sociology by exposing the intellectuals' interests in and modes of reasoning for self-critical scrutiny (Eyal et al. 2003a, 7; Konrád and Szelényi 1979:3), gives them a further reason to stress that reflexivity is a fundamental part of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology. Unlike Gouldner, who has been criticized for failing to live up in any systematic way to the programmatic slogan of the need for self-reflexivity in his own work (Bourdieu 1992:71; Phillips 1988:139), Szelényi has reflected on his intellectual development that led to the writing and publishing of the key texts in various publications (cf. Szelényi 1979b, 1985a, 1986–1987, 1988a, 216–8, 2000, 2002, 2008a, 2010b, 2011b, 2012b, 2018a, 2020) and more recently also on his personal background in different interviews (cf. Szelényi 2012c, 2012d, 2014b; Case 2017a & 2017b).[160] However, they hardly take the form suggested by Bourdieu (2008a) in his *Sketch for a Self-Analysis*.

---

[158] Becker (1967) raised this question originally in the Presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, Miami Beach, August, 1966.

[159] According to Szelényi, this question is said to have formulated the central question of the critical sociology of intellectuals in general and the New Class theorizing in particular.

[160] This is discussed in detail in my earlier study (cf. Kroos 2018 Ch. 4.3).

In other words, despite the fact that Eyal et al. (2003a:9) note that "irony begins with reflexivity but does not end there", it does not make them take a step back and ask the fundamental questions about social ontology: from the nature of social being to what is a social reality that sociologists could study. Likewise, Szelényi avoids addressing the politically loaded question: Are social actors (such as elite, new class, intellectuals or socialist entrepreneurs), structures, and hierarchical power relations, which he keeps visualizing in his publications (cf. Kroos 2018, Appendix 15–25, 30–34; Szelényi and Mihályi 2020, Ch. 3), real or socially constructed?[161]

As will be explained in the next section that discusses epistemological issues, Szelényi (as a social scientist) probably accepts that our knowledge of theoretical constructs is socially mediated and at least in that sense socially constructed. Yet, he is careful enough not to identify with or become involved in the culture war related to social constructivism.[162] Although Szelényi and his co-authors take note of Bourdieu's position that "classes are first and foremost 'classes on paper'" (Bourdieu 1985a:725–7; 1987b:17),[163] which allows Eyal et al. (2003a:25) to deduce that "[o]ne should not overemphasize structural conditions in the making of classes", it does not make him (together with his co-authors) strictly constructivist or someone to whom the structuralist assumptions would be alien.

Despite the fact that Szelényi in his major works from *The Intellectuals to the Road to Class Power* to *Socialist Entrepreneurs*, from *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists* to *Varieties of Post-communist Capitalism* takes the position that has been associated with constructivism in international relations (cf. Martin Weber 2007:97) or evolutionary institutionalism in sociology (cf. Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1.2.6), he also flirts with structuralism. Indeed, the concurrent idea in his comparative-historical analysis – according to which actors, such as intellectuals, face structural conditions and institutional limitations that have not only evolved historically but constrain, on the one hand, and enable, on the other, just a certain kind of actions in actually existing (post-)socialisms – does not sound particularly constructivist. Instead, it seems to be in line with the structuralist premise of Marx [1852/1869] 1963:15) presented in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*:

> Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.

Let us be reminded in this context that Szelényi and his co-authors developed the ideas on irony as the method of neoclassical sociology in response to the critical

---

[161] This question echoes the suggestion to "turn to ontology" in STS by Woolgar et al. (2008) that was perceived by some critics, such as Aspers (2015), as adding very little to what is known as constructivist analysis – a detailed overview of which can be found in Kukla (2000, esp. Ch. 2). Additional comments on this debate can be found in the contributions by Law and Lien (2013), Lynch (2013), Sismondo (2007, 2015), van Heur et al. (2013), and Woolgar and Lezaun (2013, 2015).

[162] The only place in which Szelényi uses social constructivism explicitly is in his collaboration with Ladányi on the research on Roma/Gypsy ethnicity (cf. esp. Ladányi and Szelényi 2001, 2006).

[163] For further discussion, see Wilkes (1990).

review of Burawoy (2001) for abandoning the class analysis in their *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists*. Unlike Burawoy (1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1990) and Wright (1978a, Ch.1; 1985, Ch. 2; 1989c, Ch. 2; 1989e / 1994 Ch. 9; 1989d / 1994 Ch. 8), who have taken the conceptual formation and/or the ontological and epistemological issues in their methodological teachings and subsequent publications very seriously,[164] Szelényi has not addressed the metaphysical issues that underly his scholarship in general and the proposed irony as the anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue in particular.

In other words, despite the equal stress on empirical and theoretical aspects of ironic inquiry, Szelényi has not openly shown the need to address the ontological challenges related to social research. At least he has not taken the issues up openly in his theory-based empirical research publications, where the demands of qualitative and/or quantitative data collection[165] could have led him to reflect how the process of the operationalization of the key concepts was done. Hence, he has not identified how turning the abstract terms into something measurable and wording the questions, answer options and selecting the measurement scales in the questionnaires may have created measurement errors in the process. He avoids facing the ontological challenges also from the point of view of the qualitative tradition which could have led to "presenting a list of attributes or characteristics that constitute the concept" (Goertz and Mahoney 2012:207). He gets away with it by avoiding the introduction of completely new concepts, rather than adopting the attractive ones from the works of other scholars.[166]

As will be discussed in section 3.5, he is not a typical qualitative researcher whose representatives often take great interest in discussing the meaning of concepts. Furthermore, as will be shown in section 3.6, he is not a typical quantitative researcher who would be interested in the concept only to the extent that it needs to be operationalized for data collection purposes, either. His major works, including *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, *Socialist Entrepreneurs*, and *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists,* put more emphasis on the discussion of the theoretical framework in general terms than in the narrow ontological sense of how to identify or measure the conceptualized key actors and their roles

---

[164] A good overview of the fundamental differences between Burawoy's and Wright's social ontology, epistemology and the approach to class analysis can be found in Wacquant (1989b). Additional examples of how these issues have been addressed by authors working in the same field of inquiry can be found in the works of Gouldner (1980, Ch. 2) and Therborn (1976, Ch. 1).

[165] The challenge of operationalizing in empirical research from abstract theoretical terms for the practical needs of data collection (i.e. from conceptual propositions to testable propositions) is widely recognized in the quantitative research tradition (cf. e.g. de Vaus 2014, Ch. 2, 4, Lazarsfeld 1958), although the issue has been acknowledged also by some methodologists of the qualitative research tradition (cf. King, Keohane and Verba 1994, Ch. 2.3; Lazarsfeld and Barton 1951; Pawson 1996:297, 305). For a general discussion and critical review, see also Bendix (1963), Pawson (1989), and Stinchcombe (1968 Ch. 2). For textbook examples see, for instance, Ghauri, Grønhaug and Strange (2020, Ch. 3) and Sekaran and Bougie (2016, Ch. 11).

[166] As Szelényi (1982a, S311) argues in one of his most celebrated papers: "One ought to consider the need ... to try to develop a completely new terminology to describe structural positions under state socialism. For some sociologists this might be a more attractive attempt than my analysis which, more modestly, tries only to reinterpret the concept of class for state-socialist conditions."

in processes and underlying mechanisms that contribute toward the (re)production of social structure and inequalities, and affect social change, urbanization, privatization, modernization, etc.[167]

In other words, it is noticeable that even though Szelényi has undertaken different research programs and published many critical studies on different aspects of intellectuals, their position in the social structure, and their role in its change, he has not engaged in the related ontological discussions. That is, he has avoided the need to explain how one really knows that the reality of actually existing socialism differs from the theory, that the social structure and the role of intellectuals in it differ between (post-)socialist and capitalist formations, or how to spot a social change or identify (class consciousness of) the new (knowledge) class in the empirical observations. In this context, it should not come as a surprise that he has not defined clearly who the 'intellectuals' are and has been modifying the concept as the circumstances demand. Likewise, even the labeling of his approach to the social inquiry as 'irony' does not go much further than the classification of it as the method of neoclassical sociology, which begs more questions than it answers or explains.

Based on his (empirical) research and (theoretical) reflections, it seems that he takes a rather theological approach to the use of the basic concepts. For instance, his silent ontological position regarding the existence of intellectuals, classes, and social structure can be interpreted in the spirit of classical theology, according to which God exists in understanding since we comprehend the concept as such.[168] In other words, abstract concepts, such as social structure and relations, or difficult-to-define actors for empirical investigation, such as (the formation of new/middle) classes and intellectuals/intelligentsia, seem to exist for Szelényi partly at least because we understand these terms, processes or phenomena theoretically – not because we can observe or treat and control them in our empirical studies.

However, that would undermine Szelényi's commitment to empirical research. Without entering the conceptual discussions on the nature of 'ontology' and what it should and could study, the remaining part of this sub-section will limit the discussion of (the works of) Szelényi in this context to Guba and Lincoln's (1994:108) formulation of the defining ontological question that allows one to differentiate between different types of paradigms: "What is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, what is there that can be known about it?"

To answer the first part of the question, it appears that Szelényi's position is a mixture of post-positivism and critical theory. While it may sound like a contradiction to speak about post-positivism and critical theory in one sentence, Szelényi's scholarship shows that it does not need to be. On the one hand, he seems to accept the postulates of post-positivist critical realism – that the reality

---

[167] The unpublished manuscript co-authored by I. Szelényi and S. Szelényi (s.a.) is an exception.

[168] Szelényi's silent ontological position seems also to be in harmony with the more contemporary theological argument – "providing that because this is our idea of God, we stand committed to belief in its existence: its existence is a metaphysical point, or an absolute presupposition of certain forms of thought" (Blackburn 1994a, s.v. "ontological argument").

that we can empirically study is indeed 'real' even if only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehensible. On the other hand, however, his works also reflect the fact that he holds critical theory's position on ontology, according to which the observable reality reflects the historical processes of which it is the outcome.

Likewise, the historical and intellectual background of critical realism shows that the possible issue of incommensurability can be overcome. As Archer et al. (2016:4) explain:

> Critical realism is a series of philosophical positions on a range of matters including ontology, causation, structure, persons, and forms of explanation. Emerging in the context of the post-positivist crises in the natural and social sciences in the 1970s and 1980s, critical realism represents a broad alliance of social theorists and researchers trying to develop a properly post-positivist social science. Critical realism situates itself as an alternative paradigm both to scientistic forms of positivism concerned with regularities, regression-based variables models, and the quest for law-like forms; and also to the strong interpretivist or postmodern turn which denied explanation in favor of interpretation, with a focus on hermeneutics and description at the cost of causation.

Therefore, it seems reasonable that Szelényi would not find it difficult to accept the ontological realism that Archer et al. (2016:5) explained as follows:

> Sociology (and the practice of sociology) relies on certain broad beliefs about the nature of the social world which inform our investigations. Sociologists operate with certain beliefs about the nature of order, structures, processes, persons, and causes. These beliefs are not reducible to our empirical data, and are often taken for granted when we construct our theories. Many of the determinate and important features of the world are not empirically verifiable or quantifiable, and may in fact resist articulation into theory, language, numbers, models, or empirical scrutiny. In such cases, these things can only be reconstructed through retroductive or abductive inferences; arguments which move from a social phenomena [*sic*] to a theory which is able to account for that phenomenon.

In other words, Szelényi's suppressed position on the first part of the question "what is the form and nature of reality" seems to be a mixture of post-positivist 'modified objectivity' and critical theory's 'modified subjectivity'.[169] Indeed, Szelényi has always found it strategically important to study reality empirically, not just conceptually, which makes him sympathetic to the ideas of critical realism of post-positivism. While critical theorists have seldom had an interest in the empirical study of reality,[170] most of Szelényi's work has been strongly grounded in this tradition ever since he adopted that position *vis-à-vis* the disciples of Lukács. It also matched his claim of value freedom, which was a politically convenient position to adopt during the socialist period when sociology was politi-

---

[169] Accepting the argument that Szelényi's position is a mixture of two different philosophies of science that could be complementary rather than contradictory suggests that he could be seen as someone who has taken on board pragmatism both in the literal and philosophical sense of the word.

[170] Adorno (1976b) and Bourdieu et al. (1991:248) have criticized the tradition for exactly this reason and have tried in their own studies not to fall into the same trap.

cized more often than not. Furthermore, the position taken within the internal debates in contrast to Lukács' disciples within the Institute of Sociology at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, his early exposure to empiricism and the reinforcement thereof from the 1964/65 academic year in the US, along with the acquired knowledge of the rules of the game in US sociology (to be discussed in more detail in sections 3.4 on "Training" and 3.11 on "Hegemony" below), has allowed him to become someone who does not refute the ontology of post-positivism, on the one hand, while trying to keep the critical spirit of sociology alive, on the other. As a result, it can be said that these abstract phenomena that he has been interested in during his academic career – from social structure to class and intellectuals – can be studied empirically even if they exist primarily on paper and are constructed just as ideal types.

Szelényi's ontological position is that reality, crystallized over time, is shaped by social, political, and economic positions and struggles for equality. It does not only reflect his training (to be discussed in more detail in section 3.4) and teaching (cf. Szelényi 2009d, 2014a) but his flirt with histography (cf. Kuzminski 1979). It is the heritage of the teachings of Hegel, Marx, Weber, Hegedüs, K. Polányi, Kocka, Gouldner, and Bourdieu that has formed the foundation for his research and has been crystallized in collaboration projects and teaching courses related to their theoretical and methodological approach over the decades. Indeed, his training and teaching seem to have institutionalized the understanding in his methodological foundations that what we can observe is a result of historical processes. According to this ontological argument, the present is a crystallized past and, hence, one can (epistemologically speaking) learn about the former by studying (or at least not ignoring) the latter. Therefore, it is not a surprise that Szelényi grants a prominent position to historical background and developments in his analysis of intellectuals in different socio-economic formations.

Szelényi basically accepts the position of critical theory on (historical) realism (cf. Outhwaite 1987; Sayer 1984; Vandenberghe 2014; Whelan 2019) in general and the applicability of critical realism to comparative-historical research (cf. Steinmetz 1998) in particular. He does not question its axiom that to make sense of the present it is important to understand the past. This is reflected in his research that investigates the role and position of intellectuals in the class structure and transformations from one socio-political and economic formation to the next as well as the efforts to also work out what the future options may be. As a result, one can indeed observe in Szelényi's works that social reality has been shaped by norms and institutions that have developed over time and have crystallized into socio-economic structures.

This can probably be demonstrated most convincingly in his approach to class analysis and evolutionary institutionalism, which I have discussed in more detail in my earlier work (Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1). As shown there, Szelényi learns to appreciate the positions of Hegel, Marx, Weber, Hegedüs, and especially K. Polányi in his early works, and Gouldner and Bourdieu, and Kocka in his later research. More specifically, in his early works, he adopts the position that the objective functions define social actors in the social structure in any given socio-economic

formation. For instance, Konrád and Szelényi (1979:33) state the following in *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*: "Intellectuals are defined as such by the social structure. By that, we mean that whether the powers that be in society like it or not there objectively exist in the social structure functions whose executants are objectively intellectuals…." Later, with his co-authors, he anchors the analysis of the stratification mechanisms of CEE/FSU to the works of Kocka, who sees it as part of a larger socio-historical process of late modernization – conceptualized further with the insights of Bourdieu's *forms of capital* theory (cf. Eyal et al. 1997, 1998). How the adoption of the latter, which is based on Bourdieu's complicated ontological model and a mixture of objective (materialist/structuralist) and subjective (habitual/cultural) components, helps to bring the critical and historical realism together in Szelényi's work will be discussed in more detail in the sections devoted to epistemology and the nature of knowledge below.

As shown in detail elsewhere (cf. Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.2), the way Szelényi treats concepts may leave much to be desired for the reader who is looking for terminological precision and systematic use in his scholarship. However, the systematic avoidance of defining terms clearly suggests that the key actors and their empirical experiences, underlying social mechanisms, and actual events can be discovered only during empirical investigation in dialogue with theoretical knowledge. The equal stress on the empirical and the theoretical indicates that his unarticulated position on ontological issues seems to be in line with the principles of critical realism (cf. Archer et al. 1998; Archer et al. 2016; Bhaskar and Lawson 1998; Vincent and O'Mahoney 2018), including its notion of the stratified or depth ontology that distinguishes, following Bhaskar, between the empirical, the actual and the real.

Although such a position on social inquiry borders on the constructivist and post-modernist principles of social research, it is difficult to see that Szelényi would be willing to accept his association with either of these traditions. For him, scientific truth does not seem to be a social construction or hidden in the text, as he wants to distance himself from the cultural or linguistic turns in sociology. To make sense of reality with the help of theory or being guided by theory in empirical research is not the same as constructing reality or truth in the process of inquiry. Based on his theoretical, empirical, and methodological writings, it seems, instead, that he would accept the assumption that society is structured, subject to power relations and different mechanisms that, despite their invisibility, may nevertheless be open to critical or ironic investigation.

Hence, Szelényi should not have difficulty accepting the ontological position of critical realism according to which the structures and mechanisms may exist independently of your knowledge of them. As Roy Bhaskar (1975:25) clarifies:

> [Transcendental realism, which later comes to be known and is renamed critical realism,] regards the objects of knowledge as the structures and mechanisms that generate phenomena; and the knowledge as produced in the social activity of science. These objects are neither phenomena (empiricism) nor human constructs imposed upon the phenomena (idealism), but real structures

which endure and operate independently of our knowledge, our experience and the conditions which allow us to access them.

The way Bhaskar offers the clarification of the ontological position of critical realism is in the form of an immanent critique of empiricism. His argument is that there is an external validity issue with empirical research relying on lab experiments. Therefore, the findings of these studies cannot offer causal laws for open systems. To avoid the 'epistemic fallacy',[171] the aim of 'scientific knowledge' should be 'to grasp the reality beyond knowledge'. If not, the alternative would be, according to Bhaskar, that science is limited to discourse or a set of conventions that can hardly explain reality by itself. Hence, notes Cruickshank (2004:570), "[f]or Bhaskar the transitive domain of fallible knowledge claims needs to be complemented by a concept of an intransitive domain of reality in itself."

In other words, Cruickshank argues that critical realism has accepted two mutually exclusive conceptualizations of ontology. On the one hand, it represents for its followers a 'fallible interpretation of reality'. On the other hand, it is defined as 'a reality beyond our knowledge'. He notes that there is a slippage in meaning from the former to the latter – from transitive to intransitive – when critical realists pursue their hegemonic project of redoing both natural and social sciences. The problematic metaphysical issue here is the assumption that one could have the Archimedean point, if not a God's-eye view, to see and know reality beyond our knowledge. Given the fact that in Bhaskar's understanding "both knowledge and the world are structured, both are differentiated and changing [but] the latter exists independently of the former", critical realists need to rely on what Cruickshank (2004:581) calls a "dogmatic metaphysical claim" because the aim is to learn about the reality that is ultimately beyond our knowledge.

Nevertheless, when Bhaskar applies these two mutually exclusive conceptualizations of ontology to the social sciences, he (1979:39) adds that:

> ...people do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and is a necessary condition for their activity. Rather, society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions which individuals reproduce or transform, but which would not exist unless they did so. Society does not exist independently of human activity (the error of reification). But it is not the product of it (the error of voluntarism).

Such a complicated relationship between two opposing conceptualizations of ontology suggests to Joseph (2001, 507–508) that "[r]eality is constituted, not on the basis of the experiences we have, nor even on the basis of actual events, but by the underlying structures, powers, mechanisms, and tendencies that these presuppose, but which are necessarily independent of the knowledge we may have of them." In simplified terms, the ontology of critical realism implies that social research cannot be limited to empiricism – it needs to be complemented by theoretical elaborations. Szelényi would add to this that social research can-

---

[171] According to Bhaskar (1997:16), "epistemic fallacy" occurs when the questions about being are transposed into questions about knowing.

not be limited to theoretical elaborations – it needs to be complemented by empirical observations.

The balance between theoretical and empirical inquiry is at the heart of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology. It seems that, having seen the logical end where the purely conceptual-philosophical analysis may take one in the case of the members of the Budapest School(s) leads him to the recognition of the need to balance his sympathies for critical theory with not just reflexivity (as mentioned above and discussed in more detail in section 3.17 below) but also the necessity to complement the theoretical inquiry with empirical observations (cf. Szelényi 1977). This seems to have been further enforced by the understanding of how short and slippery the step is from theory to activism that led Lukács to politics in the most extreme form (cf. King and Szelényi 2004:36). Furthermore, the Eastern European experience seems to have made Szelényi aware of how easily one, without supporting empirical research evidence, may become stigmatized as an ideologist.

Nevertheless, Szelényi's professional experience in the US with the representatives of the modern quantitative tradition (see below section 3.6 devoted to the discussion on "Quantitative Analysis") seems to have made him equally aware of the importance of the theoretical background and the conceptual understanding of phenomena in social analysis. As will be explained in more detail below under section 3.10 "Goodness and Quality Criteria", this distinguishes him from many empirically oriented scholars who prioritize technical knowledge and skills in how to apply modern qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques over the theoretical understanding and contextual familiarity of the phenomena under investigation. One result is a balanced approach to social inquiry in line with Woolgar's (1983:255–6) observation that an ironist needs to find a balance between positivism and relativism. Indeed, adopting the tradition of Marx and Weber, on the one hand, and the empirical Marxist sociology (cf. Szczepański 1966), on the other, Szelényi learned already during his formative years in socialist Hungary to appreciate the principles of irony that look for a fine balance between dialectics and empirical objectivity.

Finally, identifying the ontological position of Szelényi with critical realism can find additional support from the fact that he has associated himself the comparative-historical sociology (as will be explained in more detail in section 3.3 devoted to the different aspects of "Methodology"). Indeed, Steinmetz (1998) argues, on the basis of Roy Bhaskar's works on the philosophy of science in general and their interpretation of social sciences by Andrew Collier (1994) in particular, that critical realism is an especially good fit for historical sociology. Having discussed the implications for the social sciences arising from the challenges of identifying and differentiating between the underlying structures and mechanisms that contribute toward the (re)production of actual social events that are experienced in open systems without having the possibility to conduct proper experiments, Steinmetz (1998:184) comes to the following conclusion:

> Critical realism is especially 'liberating' for historical sociology. It provides a
> rebuttal to the positivist and theoretical realist insistence on the dogmas of

empirical invariance, prediction, and parsimony (see Bhaskar 1989:184). Critical realism guards against any slide into empiricism by showing why theoretical mechanisms are central to all explanation. At the same time, critical realism suggests that contingent, conjunctural causality is the norm in open systems like society. Yet critical realism's epistemological relativism allows it to accept the results of much of the recent history and sociology of science in a relaxed way without giving in to judgmental relativism. Historical social researchers are reassured of the acceptability of their scientific practice, even if it does not match what the mainstream misconstrues as science. Critical realism allows us to safely steer between the Scylla of constricting definitions of science and the Charybdis of solipsistic relativism.

To sum up, positioning irony as a method of neoclassical sociology between critical theory and empirical research, and working within the tradition of comparative-historical research, makes Szelényi especially exposed to the ontological principles of post-positivist critical realism presented in this section. Even if he has not acknowledged it clearly and openly in his communications, the evidence presented above and those that follow in a closely related discussion on epistemology suggest that irony as an anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue relies on the principles of post-positivist critical realism. Consequentially, his pragmatic relation to post-positivism does not force him to define his approach to ontology which leads to two somewhat conflicting outcomes. On the one hand, it makes his scholarship vulnerable to criticism (cf. Rakovski 1978; Kroos 2020). On the other hand, however, it means that his key actors – such as intellectuals – become flexible agents of social change. Defining them broadly gives him flexibility in empirical observations and interpretation of data. Furthermore, his pragmatic approach to ontological questions allows him to (re)interpret his earlier works in the light of the unfolding events in CEE/FSU and beyond (cf. Kroos 2018). One could even say that it allows him to see the major works of his life as a continuation of the same "Grand Narrative of social structure and social change under socialism and post-communism" (Szelényi 2002:42) and, hence, save his intellectual heritage: *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* to have offered the basis of the negation expressed in *Socialist Entrepreneurs* and the negation of the negation in *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists*.

3.2   Epistemology

Epistemology is the study of knowledge that offers an explanation of what can be known about reality. Since it is concerned both with the nature of knowledge and the limits of knowing, it should not just set the objectives of science but explain how these are to be achieved. As the details of Szelényi's understanding of the nature of knowledge will be discussed separately in section 3.8, I shall concentrate here on the search for how irony as a method of neoclassical sociology would allow us to come closer to knowing and understanding the phenomena under investigation. To achieve this, I shall build on the previous section devoted to ontology and, in addition to the key text "On Irony" by Eyal et al. (2003a / 2003b), rely on the intellectual background of Szelényi's sociology of intellectu-

als and his actual research, where one could expect the method to have been applied and the details of his epistemological position revealed. It should show us what he believes we can know about the social world, in general, and the position and role of intellectuals in different social formations and their changes, in particular. It will be shown below that similar to ontology, his epistemological position is a combination of post-positivism, according to which researchers should eliminate their biases, remain emotionally detached and uninvolved with the objects of study in order to remain objective, on the one hand, and critical theory with its transactional or subjectivist view according to which findings are value-mediated, on the other.

To start with, let it be noted that philosophers of science distinguish between two different types of epistemologies – individual and social epistemology. While the former addresses how individuals may come to acquire propositional knowledge (beliefs, truth, and justification), the nature of justification (internalism versus externalism) as well as the extent and sources of human knowledge,[172] the latter takes an interest in how groups and other collective bodies might come to possess knowledge.[173] Although it is important to acknowledge the existence of these two types of epistemology and differentiate between them, I shall concentrate here on irony as a method of neoclassical sociology in the individual epistemology of Szelényi – addressing the social epistemology only to the extent that the proposed way to learn about social phenomena relates to his broader sociology of knowledge.

To understand Szelényi's individual epistemology, I shall be guided by Guba and Lincoln's (1994:108) formulation of the defining epistemological question: "What is the nature of the relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known?" The answer to this question is manifold. In the key text "On Irony" Eyal et al. (2003a / 2003b) argue that in order to 'rescue' sociology from becoming irrelevant during the age of the intellectual imperialism of neoclassical economics, on the one hand, and at the end of history (in terms of the collapse of socialism as a viable alternative to capitalism), on the other, the discipline has to return to its roots.[174] Although they adopt for this purpose the name 'neoclassical sociology' and even mention in passing (the need to return to) the founding fathers of sociology, including Saint-Simon, Comte, Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, Szelényi and his co-authors have hardly taken as much detailed interest in the epistemological issues/challenges as the classical sociologists or the scholars studying them.[175]

To find the answer to the defining question of individual epistemology from Szelényi's scholarship, one needs to recall once again the starting position on the

---

[172] For details, see Truncellito (2007).
[173] As one might expect, there is more consensus about the former than about the latter (cf. Goldman 2010).
[174] See also Szelényi (2015d) on these points.
[175] See, for instance, the works of Bond (2012), Bourdieu and Passeron (1967), Broady (1991), Bunge (2015), John (1984), Kienzle (1970), Israel (1990), and Robbins (2011).

very first page of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, where the authors, Konrád and Szelényi (1979:3), make the following opening statement:

> Marxist sociology of knowledge was the first major step toward the intelligentsia's critical examination of itself, for it made relative the 'objectivity' of knowledge by discovering that all knowledge is existentially based, and that intellectuals, who create and preserve knowledge, act as spokesmen for different social groups and articulate particular social interests. This essay is an invitation to our fellow intellectuals to go on to a new stage of this critical self-examination.

Konrád and Szelényi (ibid) continue with what seems to be a response to Lukács and Mannheim:

> In its search for the existential bases of knowledge the sociology of knowledge, whether Marxist or non-Marxist, has usually assumed that intellectuals have been neutral instruments in the hands of different social forces. The question of what effect the interest of intellectuals, as intellectuals, had on the knowledge they cultivated was never asked. It was assumed that they had no effect. We believe that the East European intellectual vanguard abused our epistemological innocence and, while pretending to carry out the 'historical mission of the proletariat', in fact gradually established its own class domination over the working class.

As also noted in the previous section on ontology, Konrád and Szelényi (ibid:4) also declare that "[t]he first Marxist stage of the intelligentsia's critical self-examination was epistemological; we propose that the second, in a sense post-Marxist, phase should be ontological." Nevertheless, Konrád and Szelényi soon realize that the self-ironic study of the nature and identity of intellectuals cannot be solely ontological – it has to include, combine and/or build on the epistemological critique. As they (ibid) put it:

> Such an ontological critique of the role and social position of intellectuals requires an analysis of the social and historical circumstances in which a class position for the intellectuals could develop. We must also examine what structural positions intellectuals have occupied in other socioeconomic formations. Before we can document how and to what extent the Eastern European intelligentsia has succeeded in developing its class domination, we must attempt to work out a definition of the intellectual. Since our main task is to combine an epistemological critique with an ontological one, our definition cannot be a purely generic one, like most definitions of "true" intellectuals. In the analysis that follows we will attempt to define intellectuals in terms of both their generic and genetic existence, as well as in relation to their historical determination and transcendence.

These statements do not just guide the authors in their self-ironic search for the social role and position of intellectuals in *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* but become the agenda of the research program(s) for much of Szelényi's scholarship undertaken throughout his internationally productive academic career. This is not the place to offer a summary of the lesson of his life-long search for clarity about the role and position of intellectuals in different social structures and their change. I have done this in detail elsewhere (cf. Kroos 2018 Ch.

3.4). Therefore, it suffices to state here that in his publications, Szelényi takes the position that intellectuals (loosely defined) have a special, if not privileged, position in contemporary societies. He also seems to believe that this position (and possibly also the social role in these social formations) and their changes can be detected using a historical-comparative methodology (to be discussed in the next section). Furthermore, using what he initially called "the critique of ideology" or "immanent critique" and more recently "irony" or "self-irony", he suggests that their nature can be detected. Szelényi shows that intellectuals, broadly defined, are very adaptive to socio-economic and political changes and tend to come out as the winners of the class struggle in the stratification system that emerges. Although their position in the social hierarchy and the accompanying economic power and political influence may vary between varieties of (post-)socialist and capitalist socio-economic and political formations, they know how to play the game to their advantage. In other words, the structurally defined socio-economic position of intellectuals can be revealed and their self-interest in the power games exposed even if the latter are hidden behind the pretentious claims in the name of public interest.

Since the focus of my analysis here is the individual epistemology of Szelényi and its relation to the proposed irony as a method of neoclassical sociology, a few remarks are in order about his awareness of himself as a knower (i.e. sociologist of intellectuals with knowledge about the nature of the knowledge class) and the reflections of his relationship to, if not membership of, the social/status group of intellectuals that for some time in the 1970s seemed for him to be the "dominant class *in statu nascendi*" (Konrád and Szelényi 1979:3). As will be discussed in more detail in section 3.16, this epistemologically privileged but ethically delicate position makes high demands on Szelényi as a scholar – a sociologist of intellectuals, who has a 'relational relationship' with fellow intellectuals that he observes and conceptualizes, makes high demands on his morals on how to serve science, on the one hand, and political skills on how to maneuver among the (wo)men of knowledge, on the other. This does not only take the will to reflect critically on oneself (i.e. to exercise self-irony) but, as will be discussed in more detail in section on 3.12, the courage not to self-censor oneself when ironizing about fellow intellectuals who may not be pleased to hear what the critic has to say. This is especially challenging if one takes into account the possible consequences that speaking the 'truth' may cause for one's career and personal and professional relationships with fellow intellectuals. It is the dilemma of a whistleblower.

When I inquired, slightly provocatively during our interview, how 'intellectual' Szelényi finds himself to be in the context of studying almost schizophrenically the very group or class that he is part of, this is what he (2012c) replied to this question:

> Yes, right, yeah. Well, as I said, it is hard to say, I would... The way I think I was trying to find my way out of it was to say, you know, [that] as an intellectual I can play different roles, right. And that's when, you know, we introduced this idea of an intellectual as a clown, rather than a priest or an engineer, right. So, trying to position ourselves in the role of the clown. But this is of course coming

from Kołakowski, this idea [comes] from the young Kołakowski, which is in some way a kind of self-ironic view to trying to paint yourself out of this corner. You know, if you believe in the Foucaultian dictum, right, that all knowledge is deeply entrapped in the ax of power, how can you produce knowledge without being engaged in the acts of power? So that's why, yeah… I think: is this really going back to the socially unattached intellectual in a bit more an ironic way? It's probably. It is not all that different, right, from that idea that… Yes, I mean, you can, yeah.

Indeed, Eyal et al. (2003a / 2003b) have adopted as the foundation of irony Kołakowski's ideas on the jester (cf. Kołakowski [1959] 1969a) and might even have him personally in mind as the prototype of it as someone whose position in the socialist power hierarchy, on the one hand, and lack of authority, on the other, makes it possible to challenge the establishment and hegemonic dogma. Yet, they seem to have taken no interest in the epistemological background of Kołakowski's ideas, which he calls an "epistemological utopia" of scientism, presented in *The Presence of Myth* (Kołakowski [1972] 1989, Ch. 2) as well as in his lecture "The Death of Utopia Reconsidered" (Kołakowski 1983).

Nevertheless, Szelényi's ideas on the jester as the master of irony should be seen as the continuation of the search for the social role of intellectuals. In line with his comments given during the interview, it was suggested in section 1.6 of the literature overview chapter, which introduced "Szelényi's (Way to) Irony as Anticipated Thought Provocation and/or Intellectual Intrigue", that it is against the backdrop of the ideas that emerged from the first Budapest School that one should read Szelényi's ideas on not just the structural position of intellectuals and their related social role but the very notion of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology – the epistemological way to knowledge. Given the detailed discussion of the conceptual development of the notion of 'socially unattached intellectuals' in the works of Lukács and Mannheim in section 1.6 and the opening lines of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* that were presented in the previous pages of this section, it should be clear that Szelényi develops his ideas on intellectuals in response to the first Budapest School.

In this context, it is worthwhile noting that Lukács' ontological position, presented in the three volumes of *The Ontology of Social Being* and *Studies in European Realism*[176], has been interpreted by commentators[177] as affirmative of critical realism. Although Lukács (1962:93–135) differentiates socialist realism from critical realism in *The Meaning of Contemporary Realism*, which suggests that a more nuanced interpretation might be possible, the argument that critical realism forms the foundation of his scholarship is not totally inaccurate. Nevertheless, what is more important within this part of the analysis than the exact classification of Lukács' ontological position[178] is (the linking of these to) his epistemological position and its impact, if any, on Mannheim and, more importantly within the given discussion, on Szelényi.

---

[176] See esp. Lukács (1950:6, 20).
[177] See, for instance, Duayer and Medeiros (2005), and Snedeker (1985-86:441).
[178] See, for instance, Jameson (1988:65ff), Snedeker (1985-86) and Stahl (2018:3.2-4.4).

To understand how Lukács came from his ontological position to the infamous epistemological one, a note on his intellectual background and its development is in order. As Hammersley (2021:3) summarizes:

> While, from early on, Lukács was influenced by the work of Marx, he read this from the perspective of late Romantic literature, and through the writings of Fichte, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Simmel, as well as the novels of Dostoevsky and an interest in mysticism. These influences were important for Mannheim too, but, like Lukács, his ideas were also strongly shaped as regards epistemology by neo-Kantianism and *Lebensphilosophie*, especially the hermeneutics of Dilthey. Central here was the idea of a distinctive form of cultural science and a rejection of positivism, particularly its treatment of natural science and mathematics as the model for humanistic and social inquiry.

In line with this summary, it was further mentioned in the literature overview chapter that having reformulated the ontological questions of Kant and Simmel about the existence of nature and society into the epistemological issue of how art and literature are possible and meaningful (cf. Lukács [1916] 1971a), Lukács came to the Marxist question of class consciousness (cf. Lukács [1923] 1971b). As one can learn from the correspondence of Lukács ([1902–1920] 1986), his pursuit of an academic career in Germany, despite the strong support from Weber, came to an end when his academic aspirations were crushed by the conservative establishment of the University of Heidelberg. This led him to the Leninist solution for how to bring class consciousness to the proletariat from above (cf. Lukács [1924] 1971c).

While this intellectual-political adventure, if not adventurism, into Leninism and Bolshevism is well-known to commentators, less is known about the epistemological break that Lukács makes for it in comparison with his earlier non-Marxist position. Despite Weber's suggestion and warnings to keep science and politics separate from each other, Lukács not only synthesized these two but made an important epistemological break with his earlier position and adopted the Leninist-Bolshevist idea that the working class represents the epistemically privileged standpoint. His comments about socialist realism indicate that he ([1957] 1962:93–5) is well aware of the epistemological problem of 'insiders' and 'outsiders' that becomes important not only for Mannheim but, as will be noted below, also in the work of Merton and, following the latter, of Gouldner and Szelényi.[179]

However, before we can draw conclusions about the (possible) influence that this problem of 'insiders' vs 'outsiders' has made on Szelényi's epistemology, a few additional comments are in order. Despite the association of Mannheim with the first Budapest School and of Szelényi[180] with the second, it seems fair to say

---

[179] Lukács flirts with irony also on the basis of his notes on the (im)possibility to portray the 'totality of society' – noting that even Balzac's *La Comédie humaine*, which is widely seen as deeply ironic, is able to achieve it only in general principle but not in particular (([1957] 1962:99).

[180] Szelényi has been associated with the Budapest School most directly by Palonen (2018) and a little more hesitantly by Szelényi (1977:66, 2020:233) himself. Indirectly this link can also be found in Demeter (2020b).

that both tried to distance themselves from the epistemological position of Lukács that led to his political engagement. As for Mannheim, it may well be that having witnessed the testing of Lukács in Heidelberg and finding himself an immigrant first in Germany and later in England, he became much more cautious about not only keeping scholarship and politics separate from each other but also of the very content of his scholarship – wishing essentially to show that you can study ideology without becoming an ideologist.

Scholars who are intimately familiar with Mannheim's work would agree that the epistemological problematics are central to his scholarship. Given the fact that Mannheim looked very much up to Lukács and considered him his unofficial mentor, it should not come as a surprise that experts on their scholarship have identified common roots in their scholarship. For instance, Kaiser's (1998:55–65) detailed overview of the intellectual development of Mannheim shows that the intellectual currents of early Lukács are clearly identifiable also in the works of Mannheim. One may recall from the literature overview chapter that Lukács' interest in Romantic irony inspired him to coin the concept of 'socially unattached intellectuals' that Mannheim adopts and makes famous.

In this context, it is important to remember that both Mannheim's doctoral dissertation and his habilitation were written on the epistemology of Kant. Having witnessed where the problematization of the "coupling of 'left' ethics with 'right' epistemology" (Lukács [1968] 1971:22) led his mentor, Mannheim turns to the sociology of knowledge with a strong accent on social psychology (or "sociological psychology" as he calls it). While his comments on the sociology of knowledge and socially unattached intellectuals made in *Ideology and Utopia* have attracted the most attention, experts on his scholarship have identified that epistemological issues (cf. Coombs 1966; Phillips 1974) are central to much of his scholarship. To put it differently, to understand his epistemology as fully as possible one has to take note also of his other works in addition to *Ideology and Utopia*, among them most importantly his *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology*.

Although Szelényi has never taken much interest in the detailed public discussion of the works of Lukács and Mannheim, these authors seem to have influenced his epistemology, nonetheless. This can be seen from the above-cited opening paragraphs of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*. Yet, there are also suppressed admirations (cf. Szelényi 1977), friendly collegiality (cf. Szelényi 2010b), and rivalry with their followers (cf. Kroos 2020:83–97) as well as underutilized opportunities.

Speaking of the latter, Szelényi takes little interest in the epistemological issues that Mannheim discusses in *Ideology and Utopia*[181] and in more detail in the "Structural Analysis of Epistemology" chapter in *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology*. In other words, the paper "On Irony" could have benefited from the epistemological insights of Mannheim, who identifies that epistemology offers two possibilities. First, it makes it possible to discover the ultimate presupposi-

---

[181] Although it comes up throughout the text, it becomes most central in the chapter titled "The Sociology of Knowledge".

tions of knowledge of any kind by performing the analytical task. Second, it offers possibilities for evaluation by investigating the cognitive achievement based on the presuppositions that underly it.

As shown in Figure 6, logical, psychological, and ontological elements are in triadic relation with each other and form the general theory of epistemology, according to Mannheim. He explains more clearly in *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology* than in *Ideology and Utopia* that the content of these elements varies and depends on the particular science and specific theory of knowledge. As he sees it, being in between The Knower (subject) and The To-Be-Known (object), the middle concept of The Known (knowledge) changes the most – taking the meaning of 'consciousness' (i.e. "the totality of possible experiences") in psychology or 'objectivity' (i.e. "the totality of valid propositions") in philosophical logic.

Figure 6. Elements of a typology of the theories of knowledge
Source: Mannheim (1953:59).

Having identified these concepts, Mannheim raises the issue of how 1, 2, and 3 can be related to each other – asking, for instance, "how is the subject related to the object?", or "how are consciousness and being, truth (objectivity) and reality related?" in his structural analysis of epistemology.[182]

However, when I asked Szelényi about the relation between structure and agency in his scholarship, he admitted during the interview that he does not have much to add to the problem. In fact, this is what he (2012d) said:

> … Well, it is an interesting question because, I mean, when we started our conversation, then I said that of course the book [*Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*] is driven by the idea of existential base, right, that in order to understand the ideas you have to understand the circumstances in which those ideas are being born. You may say it is a kind of structuralist way of thinking. And to some extent it is. But I have never offered anything with the assumption of over-determination, right. So, in this sense I did not think that agency does not matter, right. Yeah the work – Intellectuals book – was written before this question about the structure and agency was formed, right. But… or before it became an important topic for social sciences discussion. But I would think it is reasonable to say that the book itself is/tries to navigate, right, in the sphere in which it acknowledges the importance of the structure but does not negate,

---

[182] It has been noted by Kecskemeti (1953:1-4) that structural thinking remains central to Mannheim even when he incorporates new aspects, such as the above mentioned logical, psychological and ontological elements, in his sociology of knowledge.

right, the significance of the agency. I do not think I could really make any particular contribution, you know, beyond this pretty trivial, right, observation what one could say. So, I do not think I did believe or I do believe in the fruitfulness of separating structure and agency all that much from each another, right. It is a bit of a chicken and egg problem.

Nevertheless, one may argue that it is one thing to identify the structural position and related social role of intellectuals in society and its change, and another to ask fundamental epistemological questions about the relationship. For instance, how is the phenomenon of 'socially unattached intellectuals' (epistemologically) possible? Although Szelényi (1980b:189; 1982b:780; Szelényi and Martin 1987:3; 1988:649; 1989:265, 280; as well as King and Szelényi 2004:xv) has repeatedly found the defining question of a critical sociology of intellectuals posted by Gouldner (1978a, 160 / 1979:9) – "Where does the cameraman fit in?" – fascinating and he uses it against Lukács (King and Szelényi 2004:36), he has hardly given a thought to the epistemological issues behind it. This is reflected in the lack of attention to epistemological issues in Szelényi's publications, including the co-authored seminal methodological paper "On irony".

As will be discussed in more detail in section 3.4, the academic year that Szelényi spent in the US in 1964–1965 had a profound influence on his scholarship. For instance, he has mentioned that he really read Mannheim's work only in the US. Furthermore, he (2012c) explained that he learned much about Mannheim only once he taught a graduate seminar at the University of Wisconsin. However, in slight contradiction with this he (2020:233) acknowledged in one of the latest reflections that he first gained some understanding about Mannheim from the class that he took with Merton at Columbia in 1964 and associated the closer reading of his works not with the University of Wisconsin but Flinders in South Australia (almost a decade earlier).

As Szelényi (2020:233) reflects:

> I learned the profession mainly during my post-doctoral studies in 1964–65. As I have previously mentioned, I heard the name Karl Polany for the first time at Columbia University, and thought I knew that a scholar named Karl Mannheim existed, I only became familiar with his sociology of knowledge in Robert Merton's wonderful interpretation (see Chapter XV in his *Social Theory and Social Structure*, 1949 – which led me to read *Ideology and Utopia* for the first time). During my time in Hungary, Lukács was blacklisted. I learned about Mannheim and Lukács at Flinders University in South Australia and the University of Wisconsin in Madison. I taught a course on Mannheim at Flinders in 1978 and a very popular course on Lukács (*History and Class Consciousness*, 1923/1967, which was a real hit), Gramsci (*Selections from the Prison Notebooks* 1929–35/1971) and Korsch (*Marxism and Philosophy*, 1923/1970) in Madison in 1985.

It would be premature to conclude from the above that Szelényi has been strongly influenced by Merton's reading of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. As shown by Kaiser (1998:68–74), Merton criticized Mannheim repeatedly for the ambiguity of the conceptualization of 'knowledge' and for the exclusion of natural sciences from the extra-theoretical influences. While this critique in-

spired Bloor (cf. [1976] 1991, 2015) to develop his strong program for the SSK, Szelényi has either been immune to it, or he has taken from Mannheim and Merton the lesson that the quantitative tradition associated with empirical sciences enjoys the hegemonic position to establish the quality standards for knowledge production. Since we shall return to these issues in upcoming sections (esp. 3.6 and 3.11), there is no need to discuss them at length here.

This brings the discussion to the second part of the defining question of epistemology mentioned at the beginning of this section: "What is there that can be known about social reality?" Given the fact that Eyal et al. (2003a / 2003b) locate the ironic approach to social inquiry between empirical and theoretical traditions, there is reason to believe that in addition to the ontological principles of critical realism he, together with his co-authors, also accepts its epistemological postulates. Yet, as will be shown below, this is the case only to an extent.

As noted innumerable times above, the method that Szelényi together with his co-authors proposes for the renaissance of the renewed discipline is ironic. However, unlike the founding fathers of the discipline (e.g. Durkheim or Weber), the most outstanding of the representatives of the first Budapest School (e.g. Lukács and Mannheim), the contemporary classics (e.g. Bourdieu,[183] Giddens,[184] Merton,[185] and Mills[186]), and his contemporaries (e.g. Burawoy[187] and Wright[188]), Szelényi together with his co-authors avoids directly and clearly addressing the epistemological principles of the proposed neoclassical sociological analysis that utilizes irony as its method. Hence, the following pages will make an attempt to clarify this from the indirect suggestions that he (together with his co-authors) has made in key methodological writings.

For Szelényi 'irony' is a reflexive way to criticize ideology and utopia. His suggestion to use it as self-irony (Eyal et al. 2003a, 9, 29; Szelényi 2002:64–5) can be seen as an attempt to protect himself and his (junior) co-authors from the attacks from fellow intellectuals who may be irritated by their critical comments – violation of the unwritten code of conduct that Szelényi (2009a, Lecture 20, Ch. 4) acknowledges in his lectures on Weber's works on legal-rational authority when he speaks about limitations of bureaucratic authority that the informal rules of collegiality bring. It is hard to say how lasting and useful the defense is. It comes across as a strategic move – an attempt to take from the fellow intellectuals, who might be annoyed by his critical sociology of intellectuals, one of the possible weapons of counterattack. Given the fact that these comments are made retrospectively in the rather marginalized methodological writings and auto-critical reflections, instead of being stressed in the major works such as *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* or *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists*,

---

[183] See, for instance, Bourdieu (1977); Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1991); or Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992).
[184] See, for instance, Giddens (1976).
[185] See, for instance, Merton (1972).
[186] See, for instance, Merton (1939, 1940 / 1963 Part IV, Ch. 2 & 4).
[187] See, for instance, Burawoy (1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1990).
[188] See, for instance, Wright (1978a, Ch.1; 1985, Ch. 2; 1989c, Ch. 2; 1989e / 1994 Ch. 9; 1989d / 1994 Ch. 8).

allows one to suggest that this defense cannot be too effective. That is, I am afraid it may have come a bit late or be ignored by the vast majority of his fellow intellectuals who might not have a deeper interest in his auto-critical reflections or methodological writings.

To put it differently, it is no accident that he together with his co-authors developed the paper "On Irony" as a follow-up to the response to Burawoy's (2001) critical review of *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists* (cf. Eyal et al. 2001). Burawoy criticized Szelényi for abandoning the perspective of class analysis and the socialist utopia as a viable alternative to capitalism. It seems that this evoked Szelényi to return and reactivate the family quarrels within the second Budapest School that he had intrigued several decades earlier. As Szelényi (2012c) explained during the interview, he had split the second Budapest School along the lines of 'ideological critique' vs 'critique of ideology' – essentially playing Mannheim out against Lukács – in one of his unpublished essays written after his return from the Ford Fellowship year in the US. In more detail, this is what he (2012c) said:

> So, at one point, I think it was around 1969, I wrote an article, what I think was never published, I don't [know] whether I still have the manuscript of it, but it was about the role of critical thought. And I said that there are two different types of critical analysis. One is an ideological critique of the regime and the other was a critique of ideology. That critique of ideology – that was very much a Mannheimian take, right, – closer to Polanyi but straight out of Mannheim against Lucáks. So, I was kind of splitting the Second Budapest School along these lines. There were the Marxists who were offering an ideological critique of socialism – basically saying this socialism was not really socialism because genuine socialism should do this or that. And I said, well, but there is a possibility to have positively based social science, which rather than offering an ideological criticism of the regime, it takes the ideology of the regime and asks the question why on earth the regime is using these ideologies when it is not delivering on these ideologies. Why does the regime claim that this system is an egalitarian one when, in fact, it is an inegalitarian one, right. So, the point is not to show that the regime should be egalitarian, the point is to understand why an inegalitarian regime tries to legitimate itself as an egalitarian, right.

Although Szelényi and his co-authors say that "[t]he ironic analyst does not occupy such moral high ground, and wants to convince others that they do not occupy such high ground either" – which can be seen as an attempt to eliminate the possibility of coming across or being interpreted as normative, ideological or elitist – they are afraid of falling into relativism. Unlike cynicism, which is linked to relativism, irony is associated by Eyal et al. (2003a, 9) to relationism: "[i]rony is ... distinct from cynicism. To invoke Mannheim again, we would say that a cynical position is relativist while an ironic analysis is relationist, by which we mean that ironic analysis accepts the possibility of multiple truths, with each truth still distinguishable from untruth".

In other words, instead of sharing Kołakowski's skepticism of the possibility of discovering the ultimate "truth", they claim their ironic program to be 'relationist'. As Eyal et al. (ibid) put it:

> The researcher who engages in irony begins his or her analysis by suspending his or her own values, judgments, and knowledge about the world, and accepting as valid the point of view of 'the other'. This is done in the understanding that his or her own values and those of the other are relational, i.e. they only exist and take meaning in relationship to each other, or to put it another way, in conversation with each other. This is the reflexive premise of the ironic method, or to put it with Mannheim ([1936] 1985), this is *relational* analysis. The purpose of ironic analysis is to show the temporary nature of both positions and their determination by the relations that describe and constitute them.

Although Szelényi and his co-authors flirt with Mannheimian relationism as well as Bourdieu's and Gouldner's reflexivity, they do not go much beyond mentioning their names. That is, the brief comments given in the paper "On Irony" in terms of the association with reflexivity and relationism, on the one hand, and distancing from relativism and postmodernism, on the other, beg more questions than they answer about "What is there that can be known about social reality?".

Since we shall return to the detailed analysis of reflexivity in Szelényi's scholarship in section 3.17, we can concentrate here on the argument that irony represents 'relational' analysis. Indeed, it is interesting that Eyal et al. (2003a / 2003b) adopt the idea of relational analysis from Mannheim, who has been ignored by the propagators of Relational Sociology (cf. Dépelteau 2018; Crossley 2011).[189] Given the profound influence of Mannheim on Szelényi and his co-authors' ideas about relationism in "On Irony", on the one hand, and the fact that these insights have been ignored by scholars of Relation Sociology, on the other, let him speak for himself. Mannheim ([1929] 1954:70–1) says that:

> ... there are two separate and distinct solutions to the problem of what constitutes relabel knowledge – the one solution may be termed *relationism*, and the other *relativism*.
>
> Relativism is a product of the modern historical-sociological procedure which is based on the recognition that all historical thinking is bound up with the concrete position in life of the thinker (*Stanaortsgebundenheit des Denkers*). But relativism combines this historical-sociological insight with an older theory of knowledge which was as yet unaware of the interplay between conditions of existence and modes of thought, and which modeled its knowledge after static prototypes such as might be exemplified by the proposition 2 x 2 = 4. This older type of thought, which regarded such examples as the model of all thought, was necessarily led to the rejection of all those forms of knowledge which were dependent upon the subjective standpoint and the social situation of the knower, and which were, hence, merely 'relative'. Relativism, then, owes its existence to the discrepancy between this newly-won in-

---

[189] The attempts by Donati (2011, 2018) and Porpora (2018) to relate critical realism with "Relational Sociology" could benefit also Szelényi and his co-authors in their wish to distance themselves from relativism and connect with relationism. To put it differently, although Eyal et al. point more than once to Mannheim, given the influence of the work of Bourdieu on their scholarship, it would make more sense to attribute the link to relationism with his scholarship (cf. Papilloud and Schultze 2018).

sight into the actual processes of thought and a theory of knowledge which had not yet taken account of this new insight.

If we wish to emancipate ourselves from this relativism we must seek to understand with the aid of the sociology of knowledge that it is not epistemology in any absolute sense but rather a certain historically transitory type of epistemology which is in conflict with the type of thought oriented to the social situation. Actually, epistemology is as intimately enmeshed in the social process as is the totality of our thinking, and it will make progress to the extent that it can master the complications arising out of the changing structure of thought.

A modern theory of knowledge which takes account of the relational as distinct from the merely relative character of all historical knowledge must start with the assumption that there are spheres of thought in which it is impossible to conceive of absolute truth existing independently of the subject and unrelated to social context.

Once we recognize that all historical knowledge is relational knowledge, and can only be formulated with reference to the position of the observer, we are faced, once more, with the task of discriminating between what is true and what is false in such knowledge. The question then arises: which social standpoint *vis-a-vis* of history offers the best chance for reaching an optimum of truth?

What Szelényi together with his co-authors seems to have taken from this is the idea of distancing themselves from relativism, adopt relationism, and understand truth as historically contextual and subject to change over time. It is probably also safe to say that Szelényi shares Mannheim's skepticism toward "The Orientation Towards Natural Science as a Model of Thought" (Mannheim [1934] 1953:261) and his uneasiness toward American sociology that puts heavy emphasis on empiricism but fails to penetrate to the depths of qualitative understanding (ibid:224–5). To put it differently, while Mannheim calls for a new kind of epistemology enriched with the sociology of knowledge (ibid:264) and for "The Discovery of the Activistic Element in Knowledge" (ibid:265) in *Ideology and Utopia*, Szelényi together with his co-authors suggests that combining critical theory with empiricism is what Eyal et al. (2003a / 2003b) call irony as a method of neoclassical sociology.

In other words, if one reads Mannheim carefully, it becomes apparent that in his comments about epistemology he is raising the problematic issue of adopting the quality standards from the natural sciences for all sciences. This can be seen as an attempt to respond to the comments of Windelband ([1894] 1998) and Weber[190] about the differences between cultural and historical sciences – strug-

---

[190] For instance, according to Coser's (1971:219–22) interpretation of Weber, he held the view that social sciences are distinctive from natural sciences because the researcher can interpret the meaning and motives of the actors. Developed within the context of German academic debate over the nature of the humanities in comparison and contrast to the natural sciences (cf. Windelband [1894] 1998 and the discussion of it by Bruun and Whimster 2012), Weber basically rejected both the positivist position that there is no difference between the cognitive aims of the natural and that of the social sciences as well as the historicist contention that the subject matter of humanities does not allow one to make generalizations. Against the positivists, Weber argued that human action cannot properly be understood just by external observation of their behavior from a distance – to comprehend their doings, one has to try to interpret their motives. This represents for Weber

gling to find a way to allow subjectivity and experience to have a place in scientific knowledge production. As will be suggested in the concluding chapter, with his irony and neoclassical sociology Szelényi has been searching for a methodological solution to the same unresolved issue.

I return to the epistemological implications of Szelényi's (2012c) claim that "there is a possibility to have positively based social science" below, where the empiricism in Szelényi's scholarship and its relation to irony are discussed. Before we get to it, however, I wish to underline in the above-mentioned citation his repeated stress on formulating the central question for critical theory in the form of a "why" (rather than a "what") wording. This indicates his wish to understand the phenomenon in question – an aim that is in line with his wish to be seen as Weberian.[191]

On the one hand, Szelényi does not extend his appreciation of Weber's conceptual insights to his statements on epistemological matters. Although he adopts Weber's historical sociology of modernization as the mechanism to bridge the probabilistic/positivistic and phenomenological explanations (cf. Rex 1971, 23), he does not directly build on or justify his research approach with any of their writings related to epistemology.

On the other hand, it could be argued that it is difficult to be Weberian as his ideas and research are the source of multiple interpretations, if not contradictions. If it is correct (as some scholars have noticed) that Weber was not consistent in his definition or use of such concepts as 'methodology', 'interpretation' or 'ideal types' (cf. Bruun and Whimster 2012:xvi), his claims of a value-free social science contradicted his actual research practices of historical-comparative sociology (cf. Gerth and Mills 1948:60), and that his theoretical frame is in contradiction with his methodological one (B. Turner 1981, 9), one should not be surprised to learn that it is difficult to say whether Weber's followers, Szelényi with his co-authors among them, have adopted the epistemological position of the classic. Nevertheless, such an attempt could be made.

To reduce the ambiguity, Weber's position on the epistemological issues needs first to be very briefly clarified. Following the argument introduced by John (1984) in an essay titled "Max Weber's epistemology of the cultural sciences: Presupposition of 'Interpretive Sociology'", it should be noted that Weber's aim "was to winnow out" in the context of *Methodenstreit* the appropriate method for the advancement of knowledge in the social sciences that was epistemologically valid for positivism and historicism. Unlike the widely held (mis)understanding,[192] John clarifies that Weber took the middle-of-the-road po-

---

something that is an advantage rather than a disadvantage of the social sciences, compared to the natural sciences.

[191] It is not a coincidence that he took the title of Max Weber Professor of Social Sciences (in addition to being the Foundation Dean of Social Sciences) at NYUAD.

[192] It is often noted that Weber (1948, "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy) rejected the positivist position, according to which there is no difference between natural and social sciences, as well as the position propagated by the representatives of the humanities, according to which no generalizations can be established in disciplines like history or subjects related to culture.

sition and tried to reconcile the differences between the two opposing views.[193] While he notes that Weber adopted from positivism three important concepts, including the fact-value problem, the idea of causality, and the importance of analytical understanding, it must be stressed that Weber's writings reveal the fact that his idea of causality differs considerably from that in the natural sciences. [194]

Taking this interpretation as the vantage point against which to assess Szelényi's scholarship, he does come across as rather Weberian. Indeed, as was suggested in the previous section and will be elaborated on in more detail in the next, Szelényi adopts in his most important monographic works the historical-comparative tradition, which some say is more typical of Weber's own research than his methodological writings allow one to expect.[195] It has to be remembered in that context that for Weber the subjective interpretation is just the first step toward the establishment of causation. The subjective meanings, which the researcher attaches to the behavior and motives of actors, must be connected to the theory, aiming at causal explanation, and tested against further evidence. Following Weber, Szelényi has been implementing this protocol within his research programs by combining or complementing the anthropological techniques with survey techniques. As will be demonstrated in the discussion of qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, reflexivity, and accommodation and commensurability in the sections to come, he essentially applies developmental design in the terminology of mixed methods (Greene, Caracelli, and Graham 1989; Madey 1982; Sieber 1973) when he uses anthropological techniques to prepare for the surveys.

As mentioned elsewhere in the discussion of the major cognitive paradigm and theories adopted by Szelényi (cf. Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1), his efforts to integrate the domains of objective reality and subjective experiences into a single model can also be related to the impact that the Marx – Weber debate has had on him. One can find evidence of this in *Socialist Entrepreneurs*[196] and in some of the lat-

---

[193] This interpretation is in line with Rex (1971:23), who also notes that Weber attempted "to bridge the gap between verstehen and probabilistic and positivistic explanations".

[194] The possible reason for the misunderstanding, according to John (1984:92), may well originate from the fact that different translators of Weber have interpreted and mediated his key terms, such as 'science', 'rules', 'generalization', 'laws' and 'probability' in their own way into English. It has also been claimed by Swedberg (2005:168) that some of the essential pieces by Weber on sociological methodology that can be found in his *Economy and Society* (Weber 1968 [1978], Ch. 1) and in his essay "Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology" (Weber, 1981) have been overlooked compared to his more general writings (including the essays "The Meaning of Ethical 'Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics," "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," published in Weber's (1949) collected volume under the title *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*). Swedberg further notes that the translations of these three essays are considered problematic. Alternative translations of these (and other methodology-related) essays have recently appeared in Weber (2012).

[195] John (1984:102) clarifies that if one properly familiarizes oneself with the arguments presented during *Methodenstreit*, one will see that "[o]n balance, Weber's epistemology of the cultural sciences and his conception of "verstehenden Soziologie" placed sociology much closer to the historicist camp than positivism".

[196] Szelényi (1988a:19) states, for instance, that "[f]amily ... inheritance of entrepreneurship ... supports a Weberian 'culturalist' explanation of the origins of entrepreneurship. We are sympathetic to historical materialist explanations, and where private property is inherited, Marx's explanation

est works on the varieties of post-communism where Szelényi speculates about the possible role of religion in the emergence and development of the distinctive types of capitalist formations in CEE, Russia, and China (cf. King and Szelényi 2006; Szelényi 2008a, 147; Szelényi 2015b; Szelényi and Mihályi 2020[197]). These publications can be taken as examples that he has indeed been seeking a way to integrate the objective (materialist) and subjective (idealist) traditions in his scholarship. Regarding classical sociologists, it may seem at first glance that Szelényi has adopted his own scholarship as well as irony as a method of neo-classical sociology and only the first half of Weber's general methodological position that defines sociology as "that science which aims at the *interpretative understanding* (*Verstehen*) of social behavior in order to gain an explanation of its causes, its course, and it effects" (Weber 1962:29). That is, Szelényi may seem to accept that understanding is the aim of sociological studies, but he is very doubtful of its ability to provide causal explanations in the social sciences (Szelényi 2015d).

Instead of the widely held interpretation of Weber that emphasizes the role of ideas and motives, from which Szelényi would hardly find support for the kind of irony that he together with his co-authors is propagating, he could lay the epistemological foundation of his ironic scholarship on more contemporary contributions to the 'interpretative' human sciences such as the paper "The Problem of Historical Consciousness" by Gadamer and Fantel (1975).[198]

Szelényi and his co-authors say that irony as a method of neoclassical sociology should combine empirical social science with critical theory. If so, it allows the researcher to go beyond what is empirically observable and fill in the unobservable aspects of research with theoretical insight. Indeed, as I have shown elsewhere (Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.2), Szelényi has been seeking an understanding of the complex link between knowledge and power – the position of intellectuals in the social structure and their role in its change – in much of his academic research. If he did not believe that such a relation/phenomenon existed empirically and the understanding of it could be established by theoretically guided or enlightened empirical research, it is difficult to imagine that he would have set the research agenda around it for his entire academic career and made the outstanding contributions to its literature that he has.

More specifically, if one asks on the basis of his works what can be known about nature/culture and the position of intellectuals in the social structure and in its change from the epistemological point of view, two somewhat contradictory conclusions can be drawn. That is, in addition to suggesting that there is much to be learned, both empirically and conceptually, about the relationship between knowledge and power, two opposing views emerge from his research.

---

of entrepreneurship may be sufficient. But we find the Weberian inspiration enlightening in exploring the early origins of entrepreneurship… "

[197] It should be noted that Szelényi and Mihályi (2020:106, 130, 179, 183, 194) do mention (types of) religion in several pages of their book but seem to be somewhat hesitant to identify it as one of the key sources of the varieties of post-communist capitalism.

[198] Additional contributions can be found in the edited volume by Rabinow and Sullivan (1979).

On the one hand, Szelényi pays close attention to the actual phenomena – stressing the importance of having a good understanding of the nature and the agenda of actors, details of real events, and the hidden mechanisms operating in the social, economic, and political structures of 'actually existing' (post-)socialism. Initially, these studies concentrated on the particularities of the existing socialism in his native Hungary (cf. Konrád and Szelényi 1967, 1969a, 1969b, 1971, 1974, 1976, 1977, 1979; as well as Szelényi 1978a, 1983a, 1987a). In his more recent works, he has utilized the Weberian ideal type construction to distinguish varieties of socialism (cf. Szelényi et al. 1994) and post-communism (cf. King and Szelényi 2005, 2006; Szelényi 2008a, 2008b, 2010c, 2012a, 2015a, 2015a, 2015b; Szelényi and Mihályi 2020; as well as Szelényi and Wilk 2010). Based on all this, it could be argued that his approach to research is in line with the aims of the idiographic tradition to understand the particularities of phenomena.

On the other hand, his life work indicates that he is after establishing the general laws as the nomothetic science would find it appropriate. More specifically, it appears from his life-long dedication to the study of social structure and social change under (post-)socialism that from the lessons learned about the social mechanisms[199] underlying the production and reproduction of inequalities, the transformation from redistributive socio-economic formation to market economy, and varieties of post-communism, more general conclusions for social theory can be drawn. For instance, in his early work, he believed that he was able to discover the secret logic of the socialist society and its political economy – how the redistributive system functioned for the benefit of the well-educated (intellectuals) instead of the working class. This was the thesis of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* which offered the basis of the negation expressed in *Socialist Entrepreneurs* and the negation of the negation in *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists*. Szelényi later reflects that these three major works together offer "the Grand Narrative of social structure and social change under socialism and post-communism" (Szelényi 2002:42).[200]

While there need not be a contradiction in combining (the aims of) nomothetic and idiographic traditions, as observed by Salvatore and Valsiner (2010b), what is important in the context of discussing Szelényi's suppressed epistemological position is the fact that he together with his colleagues locates irony between empirical and critical inquiry (cf. Eyal et al. 2003a:29). Being in line with critical realism's position that avoids pushing us to make a choice between explanation and interpretation/understanding (cf. Archer et al. 2016:5), he is not in favor of rich descriptions or conceptual analysis alone – arguing for theory-informed empirical studies that would be true to the research material under investigation, on the one hand, and avoid becoming normative or ideological, on the other.

---

[199] It should not be confused with causal relationships, scientific laws, or mechanism design inspired by rational choice theory.

[200] The lessons learned from all these are auto-critically reflected by Szelényi in a series of publications discussed in more detail elsewhere (cf. Kroos 2018 Ch. 4.3).

That is, Szelényi, together with his co-authors, puts equal emphasis on empirical and theoretical aspects of ironic inquiry both in the description of it as a method of neoclassical sociology and in his empirical investigations applying it to the study of social structure and change in actually existing (post-)socialism. For instance, the result of his studies – initially based on internal information and a detailed understanding of Hungarian socialism alone, and more recently in comparison to the post-socialist realities in other CEE countries or even Russia and China – are generalized to the entire varieties of (post-)communist capitalism. While the former can be seen as in line with the goals of the idiographic research tradition aimed at understanding phenomena, the latter is in harmony with the nomothetic tradition aimed at generalization.

Although Szelényi, together with his co-authors, has also conducted data-driven research projects, which might allow one to suggest that he should accept the positivist epistemological position, according to which something that cannot be studied empirically must not exist,[201] he has claimed previously that the future can be studied on the basis of the present and, more importantly, interestingly and originally, that this can help us to understand the past. By twisting the traditional understanding of historical-comparative methodology, to be discussed in more detail in the next sub-section, he (1981:582–3) claims that:

> ...[t]he main purpose of extrapolating present trends into the future is to gain a better understanding of present and past processes. If we have a vision of the possible future we might be moving towards, we can probably re-interpret the sociological significance of some phenomena of the present or even those of the past.
>
> If we have, for example, a good understanding of the nature of the capitalist mode of production, we can quite meaningfully reinterpret some of the processes of European feudalism as pre-formations of capitalist institutions, as forces leading towards capitalism. (If I am not wrong, this is what Weber meant when he proposed that we have to search for the 'cultural meaning' of phenomena under investigation, and that the same phenomena can have different 'cultural meanings' depending on the point of view we adopt in approaching its analysis.) This means that we can explain aspects of society under feudalism that we could not understand from the analysis of feudalism alone.

Instead of positivism, Szelényi accepts the rules of post-positivist empiricism which he complements with the principles of conflict tradition. According to (post)positivism, researchers should eliminate their biases, remain emotionally detached and uninvolved with the objects of the study, and test or empirically justify their stated hypotheses. Nevertheless, he is not a naïve empiricist. As a scholar who works within the critical tradition, and hence has accepted consciously or unconsciously its research agenda, puzzles, methodology, and methods, he allows the theory to guide his empirical analysis – from planning the data collection to its analysis. As will be discussed in more detail in section 3.17, the

---

[201] For instance, Eyal (2003:16) states that "[t]he epistemological status of the globalization-as-convergence argument, to our mind, is identical to that of the Marxist insistence on the existence of a socialist alternative: there is no empirical evidence for it in the present."

solution that he suggests against naïve empiricism, in addition to the need for it to be theory-informed, is reflexivity.

To overcome the epistemological limitation of post-positivist empiricism that true knowledge can only arise from empirical testing, Szelényi has complimented in his scholarship this epistemological position with the principles of the conflict tradition according to which one of the essential components of critical social science is the need for the critical vantage point. For instance, he undertook studies of actually existing socialism and developed the thesis statement of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* from the platform of actually existing capitalism – something that Stark (1986) calls the method of 'mirrored opposition'.

Yet again, it must be emphasized that he does not quite share with the followers of the conflict tradition and the transformative / action research paradigm the epistemological position that the key to knowledge is engagement with the world one wants to understand. As there is little possibility for actual political involvement for a Marxist in US politics, for scholars like Burawoy or E. O. Wright, this has meant political involvement through presidencies of sociological associations as well as promotion of 'public sociology' in the case of Burawoy (cf. 2005a)[202] and 'real utopias' in the case of E. O. Wright (cf. 2010, 2011 & 2013).[203] Unlike many public intellectuals who have ventured into activism, Szelényi has kept his distance from direct political engagement, although he has not given up dreaming about the possibility of a better social order (as the dialectical principle of critical theory would suggest).[204]

While Szelényi has hesitantly reflected on why he, as someone close to the Hungarian (sociological) establishment and member of the intelligentsia, was able, epistemologically speaking, to arrive at the ideas and conclusions presented, for instance, in *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, he has skillfully selected and presented his works in the appropriate epistemological framework for the targeted audience (or gatekeepers such as editors of journals[205] and publishing houses). The insightfulness and thought-provoking nature of his sociology of intellectuals suggests that epistemologically speaking one does indeed need to be an 'insider' rather than an 'outsider' in Merton's (1972) terms, to be able to understand the phenomena under investigation. That is, the insightfulness of Szelényi's sociology of intellectuals shows that the 'insider' does have epistemological advantages compared to 'outsiders' in penetrating the complexity of the phenomena that the understanding requires.

---

[202] For further details (including references to books, papers, symposia, applications, and videos), see Burawoy's webpage at Berkeley.
[203] For further discussions (including Wright's comments), see:
- Discussion Forum on Erik Olin Wright's 2012. *Envisioning Real Utopias*, *Socio-economic Review* 10, 369–402.
- Williamson, T. (ed.) 2012. "Engaging Emancipatory Social Science and Social Theory: a Symposium on Erik Olin Wright's *Envisioning Real Utopias*." *New Political Science* 34(2).
[204] For Szelényi's critique of Burawoy's ideological public sociology, see Eyal et al. (2001) and for his skepticism of the real utopia project as well as his own 'advice' for a better social order, see King and Szelényi (2004, Conclusion).
[205] See, for instance, White (2005).

Having made intellectuals his research subject, on the one hand, and possessing rich personal and professional experiences from socialist Hungary and as an immigrant in capitalist England, Australia and the US, on the other, Szelényi must know both theoretically and practically that there is a price one must pay among quantitatively oriented (post)positivist peers if one publicly adopts the epistemology of critical theory (cf. Wacquant 1989b). As a result, he has made concessions to the post-positivist theory of knowledge – perhaps not so reluctantly given his initial commitment to empiricism.

In other words, being aware of the damaging effect on one's reputation as a scholar if (s)he is seen as ideologically biased, Szelényi warns against becoming normative. Hence, instead of claiming to have exclusive access to the 'truth', it is the very nature of the relationship between the ironist (rather than the knower or would-be knower of the ultimate truth) and what can be known that differentiates ironic analysis from the claims of competing traditions such as rational choice analysis or critical (Marxist) theory.

As Eyal et al. (2003a:9) explain:

> A better world is still a goal of ironic analysis, a goal pursued in the conversation between subject and object, between alter and ego. Indeed, this is the radical promise of irony for critical social analysis. Precisely because he or she does not need a 'critical vantage point', the ironic analyst does not have to formulate a positive statement about the most desirable or the best solution. Ironic analysis only has to persuade the other that there is a range of possible solutions and there are multiple ways to perceive and rank those solutions as desirable. Being ironic, then, is the opposite of being serious or earnest. Seriousness assumes faith in the supremacy of a position. The ironic analyst does not occupy such moral high ground, and wants to convince others that they do not occupy such high ground either. It is for this reason that humor or jokes are important instruments in ironic analysis.

To sum up this section, let it be restated that the intention of the analysis was to clarify the epistemological foundations of irony as can be found in the exemplary scholarship of Szelényi's own research. To that end, we discussed the relevant aspects of his individual epistemology. The analysis was coined by Guba and Lincoln's (1994:108) defining epistemological question: "What is the nature of the relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known?" To answer the first part of the question, the possible influence of the (members of the first) Budapest School, including Lukács and especially Mannheim, was discussed. It was argued that this link may easily be exaggerated on the one hand, and misunderstood, on the other. That is, Szelényi hardly takes much detailed interest in the epistemological foundations and implications of the works of Lukács and Mannheim (who both were led to their understandings on the basis of the study of Kantian epistemology). Nevertheless, Szelényi confessed that he split the second Budapest School by playing Mannheim out against Lukács. This also forms the intellectual background to irony as a method of neo-classical sociology that was explained.

As for the second part of the question, "What can be known?", it was suggested that Szelényi's life-long search for the actually existing stratification mecha-

nism(s) in CEE, in general, and the position and role of intellectuals in it and its change, in particular, provide the idea of what can be known about the social reality. It was further suggested that in principle there is no conflict if one combines the aims of the nomothetic and idiographic traditions of explanation and inter-pretation/understanding by engaging in theory and leading empirical investiga-tions. Indeed, his award-winning scholarship is not just an example of the com-bined use of theory and empirical data analysis but indicates the need to over-come the epistemological limitations of one tradition with the help of another.

To answer differently the defining question "What can we learn about social reality?" using irony as a method of neoclassical sociology, the influence that Mannheim's epistemological approach has had on Szelényi's Weberian take on understanding as the aim of social research was highlighted. It was further shown that his wish to find a balance between 'ideology and utopia' has led to a distancing from purely theoretical research (which in the social sciences can eas-ily be seen as normative), on the one hand, and to historical-comparative analy-sis that utilizes 'mirrored comparisons'[206] even at 'the end of history', on the other. All this allowed us to suggest that Szelényi, together with his co-authors, does not question the traditional methods of social inquiry with his irony as a method of neoclassical sociology, rather transcends the distinction between the nomothetic/quantitative or idiographic/qualitative research traditions. Hence, social research does not equal for him the idea of questioning the possibility of truth and method as is common among the followers of postmodernism rather than stressing its temporality and relationality.

3.3 Methodology

Methodology as the general study of research method is a very loaded term in social sciences. The tension among the followers of different research ap-proaches and traditions reflects the multi-paradigmatic nature of the social sci-ences (Ritzer 1980), which means that it is impossible to decide on the basis of *a priory* (i.e., ontological and epistemological) grounds what is the single correct way to address the selected research puzzle, answer the identified research question or solve the specific research problem in the social sciences. Given the tendency of discussions about the correct research method for the task to fall into a political struggle over its dominance within a discipline, on the one hand, and the fact that related issues will be taken up in section 3.11 on "Hegemony", on the other, I shall focus in this section on a more specific topic related to the methodology of irony. It will be argued below that Szelényi's irony as a method of neoclassical sociology relies on pragmatism which in the particular case means that its methodological foundation absorbs the principles of 'disciplined eclecticism', on the one hand, and accepts pluralism of methods and perspec-tives, on the other.

---

[206] As mentioned in the previous section on otology, it corresponds to Woolgar's (2014) ironic re-minder that "it could be otherwise".

More specifically, following Blackburn (1994b) and others,[207] I take up here "[t]he more modest task of methodology … to investigate the methods that are actually adopted [by Szelényi] at various historical stages of the investigation into different areas, with the aim not so much of criticizing but more of systematizing the presuppositions of a particular field at a particular time…" in order to comprehend irony as a method of neoclassical sociology, anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue.

If one attempted to identify the method(olog)ical approach characterizing Szelényi's research on the relationship of power and knowledge in social change, in general, and his reflexive sociology of intellectuals, in particular, it would not be simple because some of his works can be classified into the qualitative and others into the quantitative tradition. There are also some works that use both and, therefore, fit into the mixed methods tradition and yet others that are actually theoretical contributions and, therefore, do not use any empirical research method or 'simply' synthesize existing knowledge. Given such heterogeneity, one may wonder if there is (or even could be) an umbrella method under which it all fits.

It will be argued below that irony is this unifying method of neoclassical sociology *in statu nascendi* that Szelényi has been developing throughout his academic career and research practice. There should be no need to repeat that he, together with his co-authors, has labeled his method 'irony' (Eyal et al. 2003a).[208] Nevertheless, it does need to be stressed that he relates it not just to 'neoclassical sociology' but to the research tradition of the varieties of capitalism (ibid, 19). This section will build on this association in order to clarify how Szelényi uses the historical-comparative approach and how it relates to irony as a method – leaving more specific comments on the qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques, their commensurability as well as the relation to training, hegemony, quality criteria, nature of knowledge, the call to action and so on to the sections especially devoted to these topics.

In harmony with the adopted cognitive paradigm that I have explained in detail elsewhere (cf. Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1), Szelényi's method(ology) has its background in the conflict tradition. According to Tuchman (1994:307–10), this research approach emerged from and has its roots in the works of Marx and Weber. Given the fact that Szelényi uses the former as the key to read, decode and interpret the latter, it is logical that he does not see their scholarship as fundamentally incommensurable.[209] Indeed, much of Weber can be read as if he was having a

---

[207] Melia (who reflects on her adoption of Becker and the Second Chicago School in sociology) notes that "[a]lthough it has become fashionable to use the word 'methodology' when it is actually 'method' that is being discussed, the distinction between the two – the 'study of method' and the 'research procedures actually employed' – is a useful one, if only to save the researcher from climbing philosophical heights from which to fall when it comes to the discussion and analysis of data" (1997:27) and adds that "as methods debates have become more philosophical, or at least epistemological, they have become less useful for the doing of research" (ibid:35).

[208] In fact, Eyal et al. (2003b) have given the German version the title "Ironie als Methode".

[209] This matches Kelly's interpretation of the heritage of Marx on historical sociology. According to him, the difference between Marx and Weber is not as great as it might seem at first glance – some-

dialogue with Marx. While their conceptual contributions helped to establish what has come to be known in sociology as the conflict paradigm, their shared interest in the emergence of modern society has led to the development of the comparative-historical method(ology) (cf. Mahoney 2003, 2004; Adams et al. 2005; Calhoun and Van Antwerpen 2007) as one of the ways to study the varieties of capitalism (cf. Mjøset 2015; Pontusson 2007).

More specifically, Szelényi with his research program on neoclassical sociology falls into the second wave of historical sociology. As I have explained elsewhere (cf. Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1.1, Ch 3.1.2.6), his search for the historic role of intellectuals in different socio-economic and political formations and his interest in the development of capitalism in CEE, FSU, and South-East Asia makes him similar to the founders of the conflict tradition who studied the emergence of free-market economies in Western Europe. Szelényi, who conceptualizes the political and socio-economic changes in the socialist and post-communist world, comes to represent later in his career the second wave of scholars of modernity, who – much like the founding fathers of sociology[210] – aspire toward an understanding of the emergence and nature of capitalism. This may help explain and help us understand why Szelényi together with his co-authors associates his research (approach) with neoclassical sociology.

According to Stark (1986), during the socialist period, Szelényi adopts the methodological tool that he calls 'mirrored oppositions'. This allowed Szelényi to gain a better understanding of actually existing socialism by contrasting it with actually existing capitalism – to reveal what the (actually existing) socialist redistributive system and the role of intellectuals therein were in comparison to the capitalist system by understanding what they were not. With the collapse of socialism in CEE and FSU, the following issue emerged: what could function as the critical vantage point in the analysis. It is this context of the future of class analysis (cf. Grusky and Sørensen 1989; Wacquant 1989b; Wright 2005) at the 'end of history' (cf. Fukuyama 1989, 1992) in which Burawoy (2001), in his review of *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists,* accused Szelényi and his co-authors of abandoning together with the class analysis also the socialist utopia.

Burawoy's critique, in turn, becomes the impulse for Eyal et al. (2001, 2003a / 2003b) to sketch out their ideas on irony as a method of neoclassical sociology. To that end, Szelényi, together with his co-authors, mixes and matches different

---

thing that the contemporary social theorists have also come to recognize. He adds that "there is nothing necessarily deterministic in Marx's writings if he is read as a theorist of historical trajectories that have a weak tendency toward progressive development. Indeed, this is how most writers implement in practice what they see as a Weberian research strategy, with many neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian works of historical sociology in fact displaying marked signs of convergence, rather than divergence, even if this convergence is often vigorously denied" (Kelly 2003:24).

[210] Eyal et al. (2003a, 6) mention in addition to Marx and Weber also Durkheim in this context but never really discuss his influence or the impact of his thinking on them. However, the indirect connection or influence might be there through the French school in general of which scholars like Bourdieu or Foucault have become important theoretical anchors in the works of mature Szelényi – especially in the works co-authored with Eyal. There might also be a link via Braudel and Wallerstein, as they have influenced each other so deeply in terms of their scholarship, according to Peter Burke (2003:61–2).

methodological positions that are appealing to him: from empiricism to critical theory, from immanent critique to reflexivity, from developmentalism to varieties and the history of capitalism. Consider, for instance, some of the extracts from the original article by Eyal et al. (2003a:5):

> Taking the cases of Eastern and Central Europe as a laboratory, we argue against the idea of a single, homogenizing globalizing logic. Currently and historically, what we see instead is a remarkable diversity of capitalist forms and destinations. … A neoclassical approach enjoins an empirical research agenda comparing capitalisms, and an ironic, historical approach to analysis to inform an immanent critique of capitalist possibilities.

Furthermore, they (ibid:13) explain that:

> … we adopt Weber's ([1903–1917]1949:33–39) assumption of multiple rationalities rather than a single unifying capitalist rationality, and we follow his methodological commitment to a developmentalist rather than an evolutionary mode of explanation …. It is on this basis that we propose a comparative framework for analyzing the diversity of capitalist forms and relations, and we argue such a framework is absolutely necessary if we seek to pursue a critical sociology in the face of triumphalist claims of the end of history.

Their message is that the study of the emergence of capitalism in CEE makes it possible to learn about the nature of it also in the West. As they (ibid:18) put it: the "analysis of comparative capitalism in *contemporary* Eastern and Central Europe also suggests that we aim our new critical lens at the *history* of capitalism, rereading what we thought we knew about Western capitalism from the historically novel angle of post-socialism".

As mentioned in the previous section, Szelényi wants to come across as a Weberian and suppress his flirt with (critical) Marxism. Given the overwhelming range of different approaches and themes which claim to build on the insights of Weber,[211] it would not be an overstatement that Szelényi's scholarship can be seen as Weberian historical sociology. Probably, this can be demonstrated most convincingly in the adoption of the ideal case approach that Pontusson (2007:327) calls the 'typological approach' and links in the context of varieties of capitalism with the exemplary work of Esping-Andersen (1990) as well as Hall and Soskice (2001). Indeed, Szelényi's works on varieties of post-communist capitalism (cf. King and Szelényi 2005, 2006; Szelényi 2008a, 2008b, 2010c, 2012a, 2015a, 2015a, 2015b; Szelényi and Mihályi 2020), as well as Szelényi and Wilk (2010), on the one hand, and his case studies on the emergence of super-rich individuals in different varieties of post-communist countries (cf. Szelényi 2010a; Szelényi and Mihályi 2020:133–51), on the other, utilize the typological approach.

However, there is more to Szelényi's method(ology) and its relation to the Weberian tradition. While Szelényi comes close to applying the tool of concept analysis within Skocpol's (1984) typology, that does not make him identical to

---

[211] See, for instance, the entries in the *Handbook of Historical Sociology*, edited by Delanty and Isin (2003).

the scholars using Weberian interpretative analysis within historical sociology.[212] Similar to the scholars who use concepts to interpret history,[213] he applies the general theoretical models of history to a limited extent, which should not be equated with the deterministic logic of historical materialism, to understand the emergence of capitalism. Similar to the scholars who emphasize the value of the conceptual tools of descriptive inference to understand the events in contemporary history,[214] he uses well-selected concepts and metaphors to explain the changes and developments in society. For instance, he has helped to revive in his scholarship such powerful terms as 'post-communism'[215] and 'neoclassical sociology'.[216]

Therefore, it is difficult to classify Szelényi or identify him with any single methodological tradition of comparative-historical sociology. Although an alternative and more up-to-date typology of method(ologie)s associated with comparative-historical sociology, compared to the above-mentioned, has been of-

---

[212] As a reaction to Ragin and Zaret's (1983) efforts to associate the historical-comparative tradition with Weber, Skocpol (1984:360) argues that such an attempt is an act of self-justification aimed at legitimizing the approach at the expense of ignoring the other methodological approaches within the research tradition. More specifically, Skocpol says that historical sociology cannot be narrowed down to Weber and his epistemological, theoretical, and methodological legacy because (a) it is a defensive strategy and (b) it is impossible to accommodate very different approaches and scholars of historical sociology in a single category without differentiating between subtypes. Therefore, she offers her own typology (ibid:362–86), which identifies three subtypes: (i) the application of a general (theoretical) model to explain historical instances; (ii) the use of concepts to develop a meaningful historical interpretation, and (iii) the analysis of causal regularities in history.

[213] For instance, Skocpol (1984:368) says that "this strategy can be considered a self-conscious critical response to the efforts made by structural functionalists, Marxists, and many others to apply putatively very general theoretical models of history".

[214] For instance, Mahoney (2004:93–95) stresses the importance of a productive history of comparative historical sociology in the development of new concepts to understand reality. Indeed, if one considers the scholars important for Szelényi's conceptual apparatus – from Marx and Weber to K. Polányi, Gouldner, and Bourdieu as well as his contemporaries, such as Kornai or Stark – all have developed innovative conceptual understandings and supplied new and very powerful concepts to sociology and broader social science that is being used not just to label but indeed to interpret and comprehend the social world better.

[215] Szelényi (2002:53) reflects: "I began to use the term 'post-communism' in 1986, but unfortunately did not get it in print before March 1989 (so I cannot claim copyright for the term, which I think was coined by Brzezinski in 1988 – so I lost a lot of good Citations)".

[216] Szelényi (2002:65) explains: "I coined this term in a conversation I had with Victor Nee sometime in the fall of 1997 or spring 1998 at UCLA. I cannot recall anymore who used the term first, Victor or me, but nevertheless, I am grateful to him for this provocative label, which may not have occurred to me without his inspiration." Therefore, Eyal et al. (2003a:34) do not provide a direct reference to Nee in any of their publications although such an idea can be found in Nee and Matthews (1996:431). Actually, they are not the first to use this term. Before them, Therborn first uses this term to refer to American sociology in the 1930s, in general (Therborn 1973:8), and later associates it with Talcott Parsons's unsuccessful efforts to create something similar as a 'neoclassical synthesis' in economics, in particular (Therborn 2000a:52). Indeed, given the evidence that Parsons, who during his formative years helped to establish the department of sociology at Harvard, was inspired by Pareto, Marshall, and Schumpeter, it may not be an overstatement to say that his general social theory was at least partially modeled after neoclassical economics, according to Wearne (1981, 2009).

fered by Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003:20–4), it is questionable if one could classify Szelényi exclusively into one of the traditions identified by them either: comparative-historical analysis, rational choice analysis, and interpretative analysis. While one might want to classify Szelényi among the group of scholars pursuing comparative-historical or interpretative analysis, his branch of comparative-historical sociology is not the kind that would challenge the quantitative tradition. That is, he has not been applying Boolean algebra (configurational logic as an alternative to the logic of inference of the predominant inferential statistics) to sort out necessary and sufficient conditions in small-N studies. Nor has he taken advantage of the other methods that Mahoney (2004:88–93) identifies and associates with historical-comparative sociology (including process analysis, sequence, and duration arguments) or taken much methodological interest in the comparative method(ology) developed from the ideas of J. S. Mill's method of agreement and method of disagreement.[217]

One may, thus, ask the question: In what sense and to what extent is Szelényi a comparative-historical sociologist when it comes to methodology? Rather than taking an interest in the above-mentioned necessary and sufficient conditions, temporal processes, process tracing, within-case analysis, pattern matching, or causal narrative, he represents the second generation of modernization theorists who preserve the heritage of Marx and Weber's macrosociology. Indeed, he is part of the research tradition that Knöbl (2003:105) and Therborn (2000b:69) associate with modernization theory, which despite the lack of explanatory power, nevertheless, has a discourse that offers the historical sociologists' ideas about the possible developmental paths of contemporary (varieties) of capitalism.

This question is especially relevant because, with the exception of the key text "On Irony", Szelényi has largely avoided that part of the method(ological) debates within the comparative-historical sociology that criticism of the positivistic hegemony in social sciences has generated.[218] While he (2012d, 2015d) has recognized that survey as the defining element and legitimizing method of sociology

---

[217] For an overview, see Ragin (1987, Ch. 3).
[218] Adams et al. (2005:27–8) describe the tensions that the methodological debates within the comparative historical sociology have generated as follows:

> 'The methodological pull of history' and 'proper' social science are powerful forces in creating cleavages among historical sociologists. In conjunction with the whip hand of tenure, academic review, and gatekeeping more generally, these have pulled what was once a more unitary body of historical sociologists in wildly different methodological directions. Within departments, universities, and subfields, the local balance of forces between neo-positivist and various post-positivist approaches helps explain why particular individuals have taken certain scholarly paths. Thus, some are attuned to problems raised from the interpretive disciplines about texts, sources, and systems of meaning, and many have become more suspicious of claims that studies of the social can be scientific in the conventional sense. Others, however, are still attempting to speak to the critiques from the mainstream of social science – we think of James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer's (2003) edited volume, which in many ways continues the second wave's project of seeking scholarly legitimacy through emphasizing the ways in which comparative-historical sociology fulfills the requisites of social *science.*

is gone forever, questioned the relevance of experimental design[219] as a viable alternative that would give a methodological identity to the discipline, and reticulated both the widespread admiration for causality[220] among quantitatively oriented survey scholars and the desire to take the cultural turn[221] among the qualitatively oriented human and social scientists, he has avoided direct confrontation with the methodologists who promote these ideas.

Similar to other representatives of the second wave of historical sociology who have consciously or unconsciously been working on issues related to intellectuals (and class inequality, power, and the conflicts that emerge from these, more generally), Szelényi has been searching for an appropriate comparative-historical methodology (cf. Mahoney 2003, 2004; Adams et al. 2005; Calhoun and Van Antwerpen 2007). Keeping in mind the qualifications and reservations that I have presented elsewhere (Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1), he seems to have been suppressing the search for the balance between merits and limitations of historical materialism (cf. Giddens 1995; Habermas 1975, 1976a, 1979; Kołakowski 1978 Vol II, Ch. 9; Loone 1992; Sztompka 1993, Ch. 11; Therborn 1976, Ch. 6) in order to escape becoming a political ideologue and to preserve the reputation of the objective and value-free social scientist.

To achieve that aim without falling into the trap of historicism (cf. Popper 1944a, 1944b / 1957, 1945), he has read and adopted Marx with Weber's lenses – while Marx has been one of the most important, yet suppressed, sources of conceptual inspiration for Szelényi, one should also realize that the former has been 'leavened' by elements of the latter in his scholarship. Indeed, as I have explained elsewhere in more detail in the chapter devoted to the theoretical schools (cf. Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1), he entered into dialogue with Marx while being equipped with the conceptual and method(ological) insight of Weber. Szelényi adopts a metaphysical position on the method(ology) of the social sciences, which aims to establish the actual structures, relations, forces, and historical tendencies by penetrating the empirical surface of reality.

---

[219] For an overview of the use of laboratory experiments in social sciences, see Bonacich and Light (1978) and Bredenkamp (2001). For the use of field experiments in social sciences, see Al-Ubaydli and List (2019), Baldassarri and Abascal (2017), and List (2004). For the use of natural experiments in social sciences, see Dunning (2012). For an overview of quasi-experimental designs in social sciences, see Campbell (1957), Campbell and Stanley (1966a & 1966b), Shadish (2000, 2001), and Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002). For social experiments, see Bickman (2000a), Riecken and Boruch (1978), and Campbell (1969). For other remarkable contributions of the use of experiments in sociology, see Bickman (2000b), Burgess and Bushell (1969), and Chapin (1947).
[220] For an overview of the discussion, see Abell (2009), Cox and Wermuth (2001), Gadenne (2001), Goldthorpe (2000, Ch. 7), Little (1990, Ch. 1-2), and Holland (1986, 2001).
[221] For an overview of the cultural turn in sociology, see Best (2008) and de la Fuente (2007). Sociologists who are closest to Szelényi's scholarship and have been associated with the cultural turn include Alexander (1988, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2013), Alexander and Smith (2001), Bauman (1987, 1992, 1999, 2007a, 2007b, 2011) and Bourdieu (1977, 1984 [1979], 1987c, 1991b, 1993b). Other noteworthy contributions have been presented by Bonnell and Hunt (1999), Denzin (2001), Eyerman (2004), Jacobs and Spillman (2005), Raud (2016), and Steinmetz (1999).

Like other scholars who shared an analogous theoretical-methodological foundation, he then used it in the intellectual competition with the rival structural functionalism. As Abbott (2001:94) explains:

> Theoretically, historical sociology was for them a way to attack the Parsonian framework on its weakest front – its approach to social change – and a way to bring Marx into sociology. Methodologically, historical sociology damned the status attainment model for its micro focus, its antihistorical character, its reifications, its scientism.

In other words, by claiming to have adopted the methodological position of value neutrality proposed by Weber, Szelényi has been able to legitimate his flirt with Marxism without accepting the rules of the game proposed by E. O. Wright and Burawoy,[222] and distance himself from Parsons. All this has allowed him to carve out a theoretically well-informed, yet empirically supported, foundation for his comparative-historical sociology.

Still, in what sense is Szelényi Weberian regarding methodology? Szelényi is Weberian when it comes to method(ology) because of his consistent application of the popular interpretation of his ideal type as a conceptual tool to grasp the essence of the phenomena. The publishing of *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* and its translation into English by Parsons has set much of modern critical sociology on a misguided path, divorcing Weber's discourse from Marx (see e.g., R. Collins 1968, 1971, 1994a:83; Giddens 1973:14), setting Weber the theorist up against Weber the methodologist (B. Turner 1981:9) and overlooking the unified character of Weber's theory and methodology before he became world famous (Scaff 1984, 1993). However, Szelényi is not Weberian because he would have been especially cautious about applying Weber methodologically, for instance like Swedberg, rather than practicing the historical sociology of modernization. While for some Weberian scholars, ideal types do not necessarily have to be deeply rooted in empirics, this seems to be the case with Szelényi, which makes his approach closer to Platonic idealism.

In other words, if one takes the position of the 'methodological fundamentalist', some of Szelényi's works[223] can be criticized within the Weberian epistemo-

---

[222] As Wacquant (1989b:177) explains:

> As a dominated competitor in the struggle for the legitimate representation of the social world, Marxism cannot but challenge academic sociology. It can do so either by accepting the 'rules of the game' and trying to beat the latter on its own turf, or by proclaiming different rules of the game; in any case, it must take into account the social and professional dominance of orthodox sociology. This dilemma has here given rise to two distinct strategies: Wright embraces an *integrationist* stance positing the inclusion of Marxism within sociology; Burawoy flirts with *separatism* by arguing that sociology and Marxism are discontinuous and competing frameworks. Wright's assimilationist strategy is consonant with, or facilitated by, his adoption of the dominant technique of empirical investigation, survey research and statistical analysis; Burawoy's secessionist stance is signaled by his advocacy of the 'softer' methods of field research and historical comparison. In both cases, we have a reaction, or a creative adaptation, to the censoring of Marxism in the American sociological field.

[223] One could criticize that basis of his other works [cf. Konrád and Szelényi (1991:358) as well as Martin and Szelényi (1987:45)].

logical system for his misuse of the 'ideal type'. It is true that Szelényi does not engage in or respond to the methodological debates of the German academic world, within which Weber developed the analytical tool known as the 'ideal type',[224] not to mention its different sub-categories.[225] It is also true that Szelényi has not related the use of ideal types to the particularistic phenomena of the cases he has studied nor has he presented an argument on how the use of the conceptual tool, epistemologically speaking, allowing one to escape the particularities of the observed phenomena (e.g., the Hungarian intellectual circle, with its idiographic and case specific characteristics, to which he belonged and observed through participant observation) and make broader generalizations on the well-educated or how it allows one to draw inferences from the Hungarian case to Eastern Europe more generally. In that sense, he is closer to the popular interpretation of the 'ideal type' as a conceptual tool, which allows one to capture the essence of phenomena[226] and build typologies,[227] than many scholars of Weber.[228]

As shown in the previous section, Szelényi is not Weberian because he has been applying Weber's epistemological principles in his research. Rather, he can be considered Weberian because he has followed historical-comparative sociology inspired by Weber's scholarship. Szelényi's key contributions (i.e. research programs that have culminated in the publication of a monograph) have followed Weber's historical macro-sociology as the exemplar in the Kuhnian sense of the term,[229] rather than his epistemological doctrine. Since Szelényi's relation to historical-comparative methodology was discussed in detail above and it will be taken up again in the following sub-sections, it suffices to state here that Weber himself did not follow his epistemological suggestions in his empirical research (which took, instead of the above-mentioned interpretive epistemology, much

---

[224] See, for instance, Bruun and Whimster (2012, xxiv-v), Heckmann (1979), Kuckartz (1991), and Sahay (1971:72–80) for the discussion of Weber's 'ideal type' as the misunderstood analytical tool. For a different list of contributors to the debate, see also the sources referred to by Swedberg (2005:120–1).

[225] See, for instance, Becker (1940), W. J. Goode (1947), and Parsons (1947:27–41).

[226] For the overviews of the conventional interpretation of the term, see Swedberg (2005:119–121) and Coser (1971:223).

[227] See Becker (1933, 1940) for an example of a methodologist who promotes such a line of scholarship.

[228] See, for instance, the above-mentioned Sahay (1971:72–4), who stresses the fundamental role of ideal types in Weber's methodology for understanding social reality in terms of action (the logical relationship between values and results), or Bruun and Whimster (2012, xxiv-xxv), who take the history of ideas approach to the study of Weber and relate the concept to the broader Weberian epistemological system of objectivity, values ("value freedom," "value conflict," and "value relations"), logic and causality.

[229] In the "Postscript – 1969", which is added to the original publication, Kuhn (1970a:175) defines "exemplar" as "one sort of element in that [paradigmatic] constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science". For further details, see the sub-section *Paradigms as Shared Examples* of the "Postscript" (ibid:187-91), where he attempts to straighten the record with Masterman (1970). For the implications of the notion of "exemplar" for the multi-paradigmatic sociology, see also Ritzer (1980, 1991a, Ch. 8).

more the character of the comparative-historical methodology).[230] Indeed, there is a discrepancy between Weber's epistemological position, on the one hand, and his exemplar research on the other, and similarly to Weber, this also makes Szelényi's research epistemologically vulnerable. For instance, Eyal (2003a:27), his former student and co-author of important contributions, says that Konrád and Szelényi's (1991) update on their original (1979) theory is "methodologically flawed" because by introducing flexibility to their conceptual model, they confuse analytical categories with empirical cases. Although Eyal refers in this context to Roth (1971) for the correct interpretation and application of Weber's comparative method, the sin he accuses Konrád and Szelényi of seems to be closer to the argument presented by Sahay (1971). According to this interpretation of Weberian epistemology, the definitions, concepts, categories, and typologies serve as tools in the 'ideal-typical analysis' of social change. As these instruments must be formulated a priori, they cannot, according to this interpretation of the method, be valid in themselves. Furthermore, if one accepts this reasoning, Konrád and Szelényi, like many other contemporary 'theoretical' sociologists, can be criticized for their failure to "distinguish as clearly as Weber *between* the practical coincidence of definitions, concepts, categories and typologies with abstractions of empirical analysis *and* their logical separateness" (ibid:74).

Even if Szelényi does not meet all the expectations for methodological purity in the ideal type, still as a 'working sociologist', to use H. S. Becker's (1970:20)[231] labeling of scholars who worry less about methodological issues and more about content, he does apply the conceptual tool in his research. In that sense, he is close to H. Becker's (1933, 1940) non-fundamentalist approach to Weber, his methodological tool for typology construction, and Esping-Andersen's (1990) exemplary work within the welfare state typology. Szelényi uses ideal types for typology construction successfully in his comparative-historical (macro-)sociology and he worries less about the interconnections with Weber's epistemological model and interpretive methodology (cf. e.g., Swedberg 2007). In other words, Szelényi's use of the ideal type in his studies corresponds to the popular way Weber has been understood and applied in research by sociologists: "*ideal type* never corresponds to a concrete reality but always moves at least one step away from it. It is constructed out of certain elements of reality and forms a logically precise and coherent whole, which can never be found as such in that reality"

---

[230] Several scholars have made that observation. For instance, Heckmann (1979) suggests that Weber's empirical research differs considerably from his theoretical and methodological writings; Kuckartz (1991) argues that Weber's methodological invention of the "ideal type" is different from what he used in his empirical studies, and B. Turner (1981:352) observes that Weber's methodological principles about the essence of interpretative science differ from his empirical research practice. This, however, is an observation that has generated a reaction from Scaff (1984:191), who says that Weber's work contains simply two substantively different research lines: one being around the status groups, social classes, patterns of domination and material interests, and the other being the religious ethics, normative orders, patterns of legitimization and ideal interests.

[231] Elsewhere, H. S. Becker (1998:75) makes a nonspecific reference to Garfinkel saying that social sciences is a "practical activity" with the implication that "work has to get finished sometime" and for that "short cuts have to be taken" which unavoidably led to violations of "the way research is supposed to be done".

(Coser 1971:223). Freund (1968:69) further explains that this simplified understanding has the following advantage: "[b]eing unreal, the ideal type has the merit of offering us a conceptual device with which we can measure real development and clarify the most important elements of empirical reality".

For Szelényi, this has turned out to be a successful strategy. Categorization as an analysis technique, even if simplest in its technical sophistication, is powerful (in the non-statistical sense of the term). As Therborn (1999:3–4) notes:

> Typologies have a controversial odor, more now than then perhaps. They fall short of explanatory accounts, an important criterion of theorizing I have always recognized. However, social scientists and philosophers are currently, rather more than previously, prepared to accept that the way phenomena are named, labelled, characterized, and grouped together are enormously powerful tools of narration and persuasion. In other words, typologies *are* important, *are* powerful. They are ways of sniffing out reality. Furthermore, typologies differ from naming or labeling in their drive to systematicity, to laying out the field of alternatives. They are meant to be eye-openers, rather than fixtures of praise or condemnation.

As indicated above, the ideal type finds its use in Szelényi's research most apparently in his macro historical-comparative publications. This tradition began with *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, where the role and essence of intellectuals in different socio-economic formations were described in order to demonstrate the emergence of intellectuals as a class on the road to power in Eastern Europe; it followed up with *Socialist Entrepreneurs,* where the four destinations of the hypothetical life trajectories of different families in their struggles since World War II were typologized (Szelényi 1988a:171); it culminated in *Making Capitalists Without Capitalism* where social space together with the actors and dominant forms of capital under different stratification mechanisms were characterized. Finally, this tradition has been followed up further in the works on Market Transition Theory (Szelényi and Kostello 1996) about the market institutions and their effects on stratification (equality and inequality) under different historical periods in Eastern Europe and China. In other words, it relates also to Szelényi's previously mentioned works on varieties of post-communist capitalism (cf. King and Szelényi 2005, 2006; Szelényi 2008a, 2008b, 2010c, 2012a, 2015a, 2015a, 2015b; Szelényi and Mihályi 2020) as well as Szelényi and Wilk (2010) and the curtailed case studies of becoming super-rich in different types of post-communist societies (cf. Szelényi 2010a; Szelényi and Mihályi 2020:133–51).

While Szelényi (1991c) discusses almost exclusively the conceptual impact that K. Polányi has had on him, there is also a methodological one. Indeed, he has not only adopted Polányi's holistic approach of comparative-historical sociology (cf. Block and Somers 1984), which combines structural and institutional analysis and takes advantage of his masterful way of developing metaphors (such as 'redistribution', 'totalizing history' or 'commodification'), but also something that Stark (1986) has labeled 'mirrored oppositions'. Indeed, Szelényi learns about (hidden aspects) of non-market economies by contrasting them with market economies. This approach of 'mirrored comparison[s]', as Szelényi (1991c,

246) himself calls it, can be related to Polányi's (cf. [1944] 1957, 1957, 1977) empirical and anthropological study of economic history and institutions, in general, and his comparative analysis of the three systems of economic integration – reciprocity, redistribution and exchange – in particular. Szelényi was first introduced to Polányi's scholarship by Terence Hopkins at Columbia University in New York City, where he spent a term in the fall of 1964 on a Ford scholarship under his supervision.[232] Upon his return to Hungary, he built on that with his students while looking for interesting reading material for his senior thesis at the Karl Marx University in Budapest in 1968 (Szelényi 2012c).[233]

Evidence of Karl Polányi's influence on world system theory and its supporting methodology,[234] and Szelényi's introduction to Hopkins' scholarship allow us to understand better his rationale for adopting not just the comparative-historical methodology but also its foundations. Following Polányi's approach to the comparative analysis of market and non-market economies (cf. Block and Somers 1984:69–72), Szelényi contrasts in his mirrored comparisons the socialist redistributive economies with the free-market economies. Like Polányi, he places the study of institutions at the center of the analysis of different models of socio-economic integration. Unlike Polányi, however, he does not take much interest in the (continuation of the) methodological debate, known as *Methodenstreit*, between the representatives of the German Historical School and the Austrian School.[235] Also, staying out of the related "Socialist calculation debate"[236] saves Szelényi from several methodological complications faced by Polányi.

Indeed, Szelényi's methodological foundation does not include a puzzling mixture of marginalist value theory, on the one hand, or the integrated Tönniesian and Weberian ideal type analysis method, on the other, as is the case with Polányi (Dale 2010:95–108). While Szelényi adopts the popular application of the ideal type analysis, as discussed above, in his arguments made for the primary commodity producers, he seems to support the objective labor theory of value. Even though he made a point during the interview that he rejected it at the outset during his studies at Karl Marx University (Szelényi 2012c), his works are based on a rather simplistic understanding of primary commodity producers. This fits better with the overall philosophical-methodological foundation that he implicitly adopts from Polányi, who opposes the logic of pure deduction as the

---

[232] By that time, Polányi was not at Columbia anymore. [According to "The Karl Polanyi Archive Catalogue" (August 2001), he lectured there till 1953]. While Szelényi's official mentor at Columbia was Merton and he attended his seminar, he was actually guided by Hopkins as he confessed during the interview (Szelényi 2012c).

[233] More recently, a similar point that Hopkins introduced Polányi to Szelényi is made by Melegh and Szelényi (2016a:5).

[234] For details, see Block and Somers (1984:72–5, 82), Hopkins and Wallerstein (1967), and Wallerstein (2002:361).

[235] More specifically, K. Polányi ([1924] 1994) replies to von Mises (1923) within the debate on which Weil (1924) bases his critique, in turn. For a short overview and comments on the exchange of ideas by these authors, see Cangiani et al. (2005:35) as well as Dale (2010:28–31), and for follow ups, see von Mises (1928, 1951 [1962]) as well as K. Polányi (1946, 1947a, 1959).

[236] For a comprehensive overview of the "Socialist calculation debate", see Lavoie (1985).

most appropriate method for economics (cf. Polányi [1924] 1994, 1945, 1947a, 1974b, 1959, 1977, Part I A.). For instance, Szelényi's argument about the role and power of intellectuals in socialist redistributive societies builds, consciously or unconsciously, on Polányi's argument developed in response to von Mises within the socialist calculation debate. As Dale (2010:29) sums up the key point of Polányi that becomes the cornerstone of Szelényi's conceptualization of rationally redistributive economies: "property should not be equated with the right of disposition; it also involves the right of appropriation. These rights need not be invested in the same hands, and in a pluralist socialist society they would not be". Indeed, as I have demonstrated elsewhere (Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.2), Szelényi believed that he had discovered the secret of the actually existing socialist economies within which intellectuals were gaining power. Even if they did not own common property, they were, according to Szelényi, executing the right of appropriation of 'surplus value'.

Such an eclectic bundle of research traditions of theoretically informed historical macrosociology – grouped under the label of irony as the method of neoclassical sociology – may raise questions. Hence, following Eyal's (2020:2) reflection, Szelényi (2020:230) has lately said that 'irony' should not be thought of so much as a method rather than a program. Indeed, the kind of research that Szelényi has been involved in rests on the methodology of constantly searching for the balance between the originality of critical theory and the empiricism of (post)positivism. Adopting the former allows him to provide social critique on issues of great social importance. Complementing it with the latter offers him an opportunity to escape purely normative, philosophical or ideological discussions. While one may argue in the language of Wallerstein (2002) that it is an example of "how to resist becoming a theory", Szelényi says in his E. O. Wright-inspired wording that it is a way to distance oneself from "bullshit sociology" (Durst 2015:123). This relates also to his suggestion to return to the critical study of the nature of capitalism, which he calls 'neoclassical sociology'.

Bringing all these diverse traditions under the common umbrella of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology allows him to protect the legacy of his scholarship and to position himself *vis-à-vis* leading sociologists in the West – arguing against the Marxist scholars such as Burawoy and Wright, on the one hand, and opposing the methodologists of survey scholars, such as Goldthorpe and Treiman, on the other. It is also a way to challenge not only universalistic methodological individualism and new institutionalism/network analysis but also neo-Gramscianism, rational choice sociology, as well as rational choice Marxism. Siding instead with scholars such as Foucault, Giddens, Gouldner, Habermas, Kołakowski, Mannheim and Weber, and by avoiding mentioning at the same time such controversial scholars as Marx or Lukács, in the key text "On Irony" Szelényi, together with his co-authors, finds a clever way to respond to the methodological debate in sociology (cf. Burawoy 1998, Goldthorpe 2000). His message is that the neoclassical approach to sociology should be critical-reflex-

ive, on the one hand, and historical-comparative, on the other. In short, it should adopt 'irony' as its 'method' (Eyal et al. 2003a / 2003b).[237]

Although Eyal et al. (2003a / 2003b) refer to Hutcheon ([1992a] 1996, 1994) and Foucault,[238] these authors do not seem to be the real sources of inspiration regarding irony as a method. As shown in the first chapter, which offered the literature overview of the (ab)uses of irony in human sciences, Szelényi, together with his co-authors, does not build on the existing traditions of how irony has been used in literary criticism, philosophy or even sociology.[239] As noted several times above, the theoretical inspiration for Eyal et al. (2003a:28–9) comes from Kołakowski ([1961] 1968, Ch. 1[240]). His three forms of intellectuals [complemented by Bourdieu's (1987a) interpretation of legitimization and structured interest in Weber's sociology of religion[241]] allows Szelényi with his co-authors to differentiate among the sociological traditions that dominate American, and therefore Western academic sociology more generally. Among these, the archetype of the jester combines the empirical and critical traditions in his or her ironic inquiries. Although he does not seem to have a good explanation for the ruler's occasional lack of humor when it comes to the special treatment of a clown, he clearly thinks that the members of the Budapest School represent exemplary examples of that type of intellectual. Therefore, he (1977:63) quite symbolically calls Lukács' disciples also "His majesty's opposition".

In addition to irony as a practical tool that characterizes the ideal type of jester, Szelényi learns to appreciate irony as a methodological instrument from Konrád and Gouldner. Already in *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* Konrád and Szelényi demonstrate the skillful use of irony to conceptualize the power aspirations of intellectuals cynically,[242] but he learns to appreciate it as the methodological instrument only afterward. He (1984a:171) also uses the term to argue that Weber had a more ironic understanding of 'legitimacy'[243] than, for instance, Heller, but it takes on a more substantive meaning in his interpretation of Gouldner's work on intellectuals. While Szelényi (1982b:788) criticizes other commentators, such as Walzer (1980), for missing irony as a crucial fea-

---

[237] Szelényi (2002:46) has lately relabeled it as a 'critical tool'.
[238] Referring to Foucault, he, together with the co-authors, states that "ironic critique aims to expose the arbitrariness of the present, uncovering its hybrid and accidental origins" (Eyal et al. 2003a:32).
[239] Szelényi and his co-authors ignore or at least forget to mention even sociologists who might be closest to their approach to connecting irony as a methodology and research tool. Among them, one could point out Bourdieu (1990a:53, 1977:2, 2004a:4), Garfield (1994), Garfinkel (1967), Grumley (2005, Ch. 13), Lemert (1992, 2003), Lemert and Piccone (1981:164), Lukács (1971), Schneider (1975a, 1975b) as well as Wacquant (2002b:177).
[240] Reprinted in Kołakowski ([1959] 1969a).
[241] Bourdieu's discussion of the topic is limited to Weber's *Economy and Society* (esp. Weber [1968] 1978, Ch. I (sec. 8), VI & XV) and surprisingly leaves out his collection of essays on the topic published under the title *Sociology of Religion* (cf. Weber 1963).
[242] Konrád (2002:262) later reflects that "research and a sense of humor are not mutually exclusive and that you could do good work under the old system as well".
[243] One can find a more detailed explanation of Szelényi's interpretation of Weber's different types of legitimacy in his lectures. For details, see Szelényi (2009a, Lecture 18–20; 2016).

ture in Gouldner's work, it is obvious that Szelényi does not make this mistake himself.

Indeed, Szelényi (1982b:780–8) first uses the concept to describe Gouldner's life-long interest in intellectuals whom he studied reflexively and self-critically. He then goes a step further and names him as an example of "[t]he better ones among New Class theorists" (Szelényi and Martin 1987:3) or "[t]he more sophisticated among the New Class theorists" (Szelényi and Martin 1988:649) who use irony and self-reflexivity to produce truly novel insights "about the relationship between power, privilege and knowledge" (Szelényi and Martin 1987:3). He becomes so obsessed with the question proposed by Gouldner (1978a:160 / 1979:9) – "Where does the cameraman fit in?" – that it starts to haunt him. In fact, he continuously repeats this question as a defining puzzle of a critical sociology of intellectuals in his publications (cf. Szelényi 1980b:189; 1982b:780; Szelényi and Martin 1987:3; 1988:649; 1989:265, 280; as well as King and Szelényi 2004:xv). Finally, via Bourdieu's interpretation of Weber he, together with his co-authors, comes to realize in his methodological paper that irony is something that relates to the role of the intellectual as a jester (Eyal et al. 2003a:28), to which they add in truly Bourdieuian manner that "we cannot conceptualize irony without self-irony. If one loses humor about oneself and his or her own position, then there is no irony or reflexivity (ibid:34).

Szelényi has been experiencing the coming crisis in Western sociology[244] and observing the gradual decline in Parsons' hegemonic position of structural functionalism and its replacement by multi-paradigmatic sociology (cf. Ritzer 1980). While Szelényi has his own personal accounts to settle with Parsons,[245] what matters here is that he has adopted the research tradition characteristic of the followers of structural functionalism only to the extent that it stands for the stress on latent functions and discovering the unintended consequences, as suggested by Merton (1936, [1957/1949] 1968, Ch. 3) or to the extent that it converges with the conflict tradition (cf. Davis 1959; van den Berghe 1963).

---

[244] Following the footsteps of Mills' *Sociological Imagination*, Gouldner was the first to draw attention to it in *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*. While Gouldner (1970) discusses the six elements (grouped also into three) that suggest the decline in Western sociology throughout his book, one can find a more detailed discussion in part three and concisely on page 410. For the turmoil that this publication caused, see also the contributions to the review symposiums to AJS by Zeitlin (1971), Touraine (1971), Lipset and Ladd (1972), and ASR by Swanson (1971), Deutsch (1971) and Peterson (1971). Additional comments have also been made by R. Collins (1973), Hinkle (1971), Toby (1972), Walton (1971) and in the context of contemporary social theory and modern sociology by Giddens (1987, Ch. 11). Note that Gouldner (1973a, Ch. 5, 1973b) has replied to his critics, concentrating on getting the record straight with Lipset primarily. See Bakker (2011), Bourdieu (1988b), S. Cole (1994a, 1994b), R. Collins (1986, 1989, 1992, 1994b), J. A. Davis (1994), Deflem (2013), Durst (2015), Hollands and Stanley (2009), Lipset (1994), Szelényi (2015d), S. Turner (2014) as well as Turner and Turner (1990) for examples of more recent crisis talk.

[245] It is important to point out that Szelényi allows himself critical comments toward Parsons only in the reflections on András Hegedüs (Szelényi 2000) and Maria Markus (Szelényi 2010b:30) as well as in the interview (Szelényi 2012d) and the paper on irony (Eyal et al. 2003a17). The point is that Szelényi has publicly become critical of the founder of modern/mainstream US sociology only late in his life when he has close to nothing to lose in his career.

Szelényi, however, does not accept that there is just one universalistic social science (as is the case with natural sciences[246] or neoclassical economics[247]). While early in his career he believed strongly in data-driven positivistic survey methodology, later he became much more skeptical about empiricism. Unlike Bourdieu, who tried to beat the US sociological establishment, which he (1975:38; 1988b:773; 1990a, 36–8; 1991d, 378–9; 2000:109; 2004a:10–4, 102–7; 2008a:74–7) calls the Capitoline Triad of Parsons, Lazarsfeld and Merton, at their own home game by advancing his own relational theory and methodology (cf. Mohr 2013), Szelényi is less ambitious. Instead of putting forward a new social theory and methodology, he synthesizes the heritage of Marx and Weber, joins the critics of Parsons, and utilizes the critical vantage points of Gouldner and Bourdieu to formulate what he, together with his co-authors, calls neoclassical sociology. In this process, he has learned to ironize – to take advantage of paradoxes and unintended consequences that can be associated with the heritage of Lazarsfeld and Merton as was explained in the first part of the thesis.

To summarize this section, building on foundations shaped by Hegedüs, and possibly also Lukács, Szelényi learns to appreciate irony as the methodological approach characteristic of critical and reflexive social science. As will be discussed below in the section "Reflexivity", his ideas on irony as a method stand on the shoulders of Gouldner and Bourdieu. Indeed, one can say that in addition to the common theoretical foundations with these eminent critical social scientists, the methodology that Szelényi uses in his comparative-historical sociology, in general, and his works on intellectuals, in particular, takes advantage of the popular interpretation of the 'ideal type' building and bearing the stamp of what he calls 'irony'. As I have indicated elsewhere in the chapter discussing Szelényi's theoretical foundations as well as in the literature review (cf. Kroos 2018), this is most apparent in the similarities between *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class*

---

[246] It is not uncommon in sociology, though. See, for instance, Comte's classical works [summarized e.g., by Coser (1971:3–41); Käärik (2013:17–25); or Turner et al. (2012, Ch. 2-3)] as well as the original writings of Comte (2000) for the seminal works aimed at modeling sociology after the natural (and/or engineering) sciences. From a more recent history of sociology in the US, Lazarsfeld (cf. 1948) and Parsons (cf. 1979–80, 1986) have been given credit for doing especially much for the discipline to be accepted amongst other scientific fields by stressing that it follows the principles of positivist philosophy of science, which characterizes the exact sciences. Although critics have stressed how hopeless and misguided the approach to model the social sciences after the natural sciences is [cf. Bourdieu et al. (1991:6–7), von Hayek (1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1955), M. Polányi (1962)], the idea is still with us. For the general argument, see J. H. Turner (1992), and for more specific ones, Taagepera (2008), who argues that social sciences could and should be made more 'scientific' by following the example of physics, and Padgett and Powell (2012), who draw inspiration for the advancement of sociology from chemistry.

[247] Neoclassical economics should not be seen as a typical school of thought amongst others in economics, but rather the dominant one, whose principles most economists have studied in the Anglo-American / orthodox education. It can further be seen as the outcome of the *Methodenstreit,* the debate between the representatives of the Austrian and the German Historical School, which determined the character of modern economics (von Mises 1969). Since Szelényi can be seen closer in his methodological approach to the German Historical School than to the Austrian school of thought, one should not be surprised that he would be the last to adopt the rational choice perspective of sociology (cf. Eyal et al. 2003a).

Power and *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*,[248] but can also be traced in Szelényi's other major contributions, such as *Socialist Entrepreneurs*, *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists,* as well as *Theories of The New Class*.[249] Yet, even more importantly for this sub-section than the above-mentioned critical theoretical foundations discussed previously, Szelényi comes to realize that the appropriate approach for the study of intellectuals in the emergent capitalist systems in Eastern Europe is not critical, dialogic (dialectic) with an empirical foundation, but it must be ironic. In the article that presents the most detailed overview of his methodological positions, Eyal et al. (2001:1128) propose a kind of Socratic approach as a response to Burawoy on how to study the post-communist transition. Rather than giving correct answers, this approach is expected to propose a set of theoretical alternatives – to make social scientists more reflexive about their identity and role. In this debate, he shows that a great deal is to be learned from Gouldner and his prediction about the "coming crisis of (Western) sociology" as well as from his strong belief that "the critical potential of the sociological tradition could be reconstructed" (Eyal et al. 2003a:7).[250] As shown above, Gouldner and Bourdieu are presented as a symbolic link between Marx and Weber, and in the realization process, the kind of critical-reflexive sociology that Szelényi stands for is not only critical but also ironic. In this context, it is important to emphasize that rather than being cynical, irony as a method must be seen as self-irony, which can be seen as an innovative way to reflect on his fellow intellectuals – something that differentiates it from postmodernism and from much of cultural studies, on the one hand, and allows him to fulfill the social role of the intellectual in society, on the other.

Despite Szelényi's emphasis on self-irony,[251] his wish to distance himself from cynicism and his appeals to authority (such as Bourdieu, Gouldner and Kołakowski) within the critical sociology of intellectuals indicate that the adoption of irony as a method(ology) is not without its risks and costs. While Bourdieu postponed the publication of *Homo Academicus* for several decades and published *Science of Science and Reflexivity*, *Pascalian Meditations* and *Sketch*

---

[248] See, for comparative reviews, Furåker (1982), Walzer (1980), Szelényi and Martin (1987, 1988, 1989, 1991) as well as King and Szelényi (2004, esp. Introduction).

[249] While in the *Socialist Entrepreneurs,* he primarily shows interest in the emergence of dual hierarchy (one based on party state and the other on the market), in the three other books the role that the well-educated play in the emergent socio-economic and political formations have a more prominent place.

[250] In addition to his trilogy (Gouldner 1976a, 1978a, 1978b / 1979, 1985), see some of his other works hinting in the same direction. For the discussion of the heritage of Gouldner's critical-reflexive tradition see Alt (1981), Burawoy (1982b), Camic and Gross (2002), Chriss (1995, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2015), Eyerman (1987), J. Gouldner (1996), Lemert and Piccone (1981, 1982), Lipset and Ladd (1973), Merton (1982a), Miyahara (2000), Pedraza (2002), Skocpol (1982), Szelényi (1982b) as well as Wrong (1982). For critical comments see: Bourdieu (2003b:282), Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, Part I Ch. 6 – esp. 36–40) as well as Wacquant (1989a:35).

[251] This may provide an answer to Woolgar's (2004) question "What Happened to Provocation in Science and Technology Studies?" Likewise, one should realize that even self-irony, which is typically seen as little more than a lament, includes self-censorship (cf. Szelényi 2012c) as Szelényi has admitted. These issues will be further elaborated on in the sub-section "Control" below.

for a Self-Analysis only quite late in his academic career, Gouldner basically became an academic outlaw and was forced to work at a university without high academic prestige, where he devoted himself to the development of *Theory and Society* (cf. Chriss 1999), and Kołakowski withdrew to internal emigration (cf. Kołakowski and Postel 2005), Szelényi has had to pay his 'fair price' for his ionizations as well. More specifically, the reception of his publications on the critical sociology of intellectuals seems to suggest that the readers accept that he assumes a privileged epistemological position. While deep insight into a topic, combined with originality and the talented use of words is highly appreciated in academia, the claim that irony constitutes a research method, does not go down well among (post)positivist scholars – especially when the subject matter is their professional activities.[252] In that context, it is no surprise that his co-authored methodological paper, titled "On Irony: An Invitation to Neoclassical Sociology", was not accepted for publication in one of the flagship journals in sociology, and had to find refuge in the emigrated Budapest School run journal *Thesis Eleven* – a compromise that not only limited its visibility and accessibility but probably undermined its credibility in the eyes of positivist social scientists.

In short, Szelényi stands for neoclassical sociology, which is critical-reflexive, on the one hand, and historical-comparative, on the other. To this end, he suggests adopting irony as its method (Eyal et al. 2003a / 2003b) or critical tool (Szelényi 2002:46). In Table 1, this methodological approach has been categorized as pragmatism even though he supplements critical theory with post-positivist methodologies. Nevertheless, in the broader indication of pragmatism, it was felt necessary to emphasize the Weberian historical-comparative and critical-reflexive tradition of Gouldner and Bourdieu in his scholarship. These foundations of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology were explained in more detail above.

3.4 Training

Szelényi is the product of his own academic and on-the-job training. The (in)formal education in social sciences that he received in Socialist Hungary, on the one hand, and the possibility to spend a year in leading US sociology departments on a Ford Fellowship during his formative years, on the other, have left a lasting mark on his scholarship, including its content and methodological-philosophical foundations. Indeed, the kind of (in)formal training he acquired during the socialist period led to the adoption of the principles of critical theory, and along with it, the comparative-historical methodology that was discussed in the previous sub-section, as well as tolerance toward both qualitative and quantitative analysis that will be elaborated in more detail in the following sub-sections. However, before we can dig into the details of the Hungarian sociography tradition, on the one hand, and the admiration of empiricism that was enforced by the academic year spent in the US in the 1960s, we shall take note of his educational

---

[252] As Gusfield (1981:190) explains: "[t]he ironist sets himself above his subjects by claiming a higher level of insight and awareness" – it is an act that is perceived warmly by intellectuals as long as this does not concern their own 'business'.

background and professional development that formed him as a sociologist. This should add an aspect to the discussion without which it would be difficult to comprehend the background to irony as a method of neoclassical sociology.

To start with, let it be known that although before the First and the Second World War Budapest had been the home to a number of outstanding sociologists, such as Mannheim and Polányi, the attempts to set up a university program in sociology succeeded only in 1972 (Némedi and Róbert 2002:437–8). Logically Szelényi, who graduated from high school in 1956, could not study sociology as an undergraduate in Hungary. He has confessed in the interviews with Szántó (2007:166) and M. Lakatos (2009:950) that his first choice was to apply to medical school, but due to his high school grades in biology, he was not admitted. As a second choice, he enrolled in the program at the Foreign Trade Faculty of the Karl Marx University of Economics in Budapest, from which he graduated in 1960. Nevertheless, he was awarded his PhD (Candidate of Sciences) in philosophy and sociology in 1973 and D.Sc. (Doctor of Sciences) in 1990 by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

In other words, his educational background is not exactly a story of Oxbridge tutoring or Ivy League graduate training involving heavy coursework in sociological theory and methods. While in his CV he himself translates the program and the degree that he received into an "MA in economics" (Szelényi 2009d), it can be characterized as ideologically controlled training in (Marxist) political economy. Moreover, rather than being interested in economics, he was drawn to sociology, instead. As he (2000) reflects on his post-graduate times, which happened to be also the period when the Sociological Research Group, which later became the Institute of Sociology, was set up at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1963: "There were at that time about a dozen young men and women – just like me – who began to read sociological literature and train ourselves as sociologists". Rather, it is an East European story of self-education (cf. Szelényi 2012b:1156–1157), not too dissimilar from that of Kornai (2006, esp. Ch. 5 & 10) becoming a political economist,[253] as Connelly (2013) points out about the intellectual self-development of Kołakowski into philosopher[254] or how Szelényi (2000) has described Hegedüs becoming a theorist of reform communism.

Although Szelényi garnered much along the road of the lifelong learning program, he has never been forced to lock himself in a monastery like a monk nor has he been left entirely on his own while on his first on-the-job-training programs. Following university graduation, he was employed at the Library of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, where he oversaw the foreign language journal collection. It was also in that responsibility that he first met Andras Hegedüs, his future boss and mentor (cf. Robinson 1974:6), who not only shaped the major social debates in Hungarian society but, more importantly within the context of Szelényi's post-graduate training, also set the research agenda of its sociology (Szelényi 2000, 2010b:28–9). Despite the fact that Hegedüs was reluctant to offer Szelényi a full-time position immediately at the foundation of the above-

---

[253] See Stark's (2007) review of his autobiographical book that makes exactly that point.
[254] For further details, see Kołakowski (1974) as well as Kołakowski and Postel (2005).

mentioned Sociological Research Group, he got it eventually.[255] Likewise, despite different social backgrounds and, hence, somewhat reserved attitudes toward each other, the two built a mutually respectful relationship (cf. Szelényi 2000, 2010b; Robinson 1974:6). In other words, one could say that Szelényi's formal education was just as equally shaped by the politicization of the social sciences and limited attention given to research methodology during his undergraduate studies, as it was by the research agenda set up by Hegedüs, which raised the issues of (i) social structure, (ii) bureaucracy, (iii) economic reform (humanization vs optimization), and (iv) critical sociology.

Indeed, as his graduate training was organized typically for the East-European tradition by and within the academy of sciences, he was its employee doing research rather than coursework. Therefore, his colleagues became his (informal) teachers. As he reflects: "I worked with the most distinguished humanistic reform intellectuals and read whatever they wrote" (Szelényi 1986–1987:115).[256]

It is also important to realize that Szelényi had exceptional opportunities within the CEE context to benefit from contacts with some of the leading western sociologists of (all) the time. For instance, his research in new urban sociology brought him into the contact with Manuel Castells, Ray E. Pahl, Herbert Gans and Jirí Musil; and the duties at the academy of sciences with Talcott Parsons, Michael Burawoy, Amitai Etzioni, Karl Polányi, Elihu Katz as well as Franco Ferrarotti. When he was on the Ford Scholarship for a term at Columbia University in the fall of 1964 and later at Berkeley in the spring of 1965, he had the opportunity to benefit also from the seminars of Robert Merton at the former and Seymour Martin Lipset at the latter. He also had an opportunity to benefit from the meetings on the road trip, such as that with Ernst Burgess at Chicago, whom he (2012b:1157) says was the last major representative of the Chicago School and all of whose available publications he read.

While his year in the US in the mid–1960s can be seen as a turning point in his training, it can also quite easily be overemphasized. Indeed, the impact of his (under)graduate training in Hungary is actually more important for his academic development. On the one hand, he (Szelényi 2010b:31) says that when he returned from the US, he "was rather committed to empirical sociology". On the other hand, when I asked during the interview, he (Szelényi 2012c) stated that:

> I would say I was quite empirically oriented before that. And probably, you know, given, you know, my family background and early socialization, I had a

---

[255] According to Szelényi (2000), he got the position of the Scientific Secretary of the research group not because Hegedüs liked him by that time but because there was nobody else with the required "administrative skills and talent".

[256] Szelényi hardly refers to any other scholar from the Sociological Research Group but Hegedüs in his English language publications. [The list of workers he worked with at the Sociological Research Group included Ferenc Nemes, Károly Varga, András Szesztay, Ágnes Losonczy, András Gyenes and Pál Lõcsei. Although he (2000) lists them in one of his papers, their names do not appear in the list of references of his English language publications]. It may well be that when he refers to "the humanistic reform intellectuals" in his texts, he seems to have in mind either Konrád, Haraszti and/or disciples of Lukács.

big dose of resistance against Marxism. I was studying at the Karl Marx University of Economics, was admitted in 1956, you know my first reactions were really anti-Marxist. I remember when they were teaching us the labor theory of value, my first reactions were utter rejection of the labor theory of value. And, you know – having been kind of socialized into a great deal of skepticism about Marxism, I became much more open to the positivist science of society approach.

But he also added during the same interview that:

In 1964–5, I spent a year in the US with a Ford fellowship … and when I came back I was rather committed to empirical sociology. I even wrote a piece against the critical theory advocated by the Budapest School – a piece I never published but shared with my colleagues. I did not reject critical theory altogether but tried to offer an alternative to the critical theory of the Budapest School, which in my view was an 'ideological critique of socialism', and I recommended that it be replaced with a 'critique of ideology'. This was the method I applied with George Konrád in our book, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*. But in the late 1960s I was still a long way away from this book, and with Konrád I conducted survey research on social inequalities. What we did was much more in line with what the Communist Party expected from sociology.

In other words, while his trust in empiricism was reinforced by spending the academic year of 1964–65 in the US within an academic environment characterized as largely positivist and oriented toward professional sociology, he was empirically oriented (especially in comparison to the disciples of Lukács and Hegedüs) beforehand. For instance, he (ibid) admitted in the same interview that "I did not learn much in the University of Economics – it was a pretty useless exercise –", he was also quick to add that "I did learn some statistics, and in the early 60s, you know, I was one of the technically most competent sociologists in Hungary. I actually wrote the methods textbook, which I think, was used for something like ten years when people were taught in sociology (for almost ten years from my little textbook – methods textbook)" (cf. Szelényi 1969).[257] In that context, one can see the courses on survey methodology he was teaching at the evening school of the Party as part of his self-education.[258]

Furthermore, he explained during the interview (Szelényi 2012c) that he was first introduced to the ideas of Karl Polányi at Columbia University by Terence Hopkins, who was actually supervising him (as his official mentor, Robert Merton, was too busy to do it actually). Furthermore, he added in a different context in the same interview that actually: "I started to read Polányi around 1968

---

[257] This may well have been the case, even if Rév (2001:373) seems to relate the establishment of sociology as an empirical discipline with Cseh-Szombathy and Ferge's (1968) best-selling text, which had a number of reprints (in 1971 and 1975).

[258] However, once in the emigration, he must have realized quickly that his competitive advantage was not in quantitative data analysis but rather his ability to link, similar to Hegedüs, theory to empirical research. For instance, one could refer to his apologetic tone in the Preface of the English translation of his PhD work for the use of very simple the techniques of (descriptive) statistics that he used (Szelényi 1983a, v), which might explain why the work took so long to be published.

or so when I was teaching at Karl Marx University and I was running a kind of senior thesis workshop, and we, sort of, we're looking for interesting literature, which can orient us, and then we, with my students, discovered Polányi."[259] Likewise, he stated during the same interview that:

> I had read Mannheim just like I had read Gramsci. Well, I would not say I was sufficiently knowledgeable about Mannheim. I eventually taught a course on Mannheim at the University of Wisconsin, but I had to retrain myself because a lot of Mannheim I did not know. But once I taught a graduate seminar on Mannheim, yeah.[260]

The other seminars that Szelényi has directed include the Seminar on Critical Theory, Seminar on Pierre Bourdieu, and Seminar on Michel Foucault. Because of their different nature, these can be interpreted as learning devices[261] more than perhaps a list of courses mentioned in his CV.[262]

As a result, his formal as well as on-the-job training are reflected in his scholarship both in its methodological-philosophical foundations – the defining elements and their distinguishing characteristics covered in this chapter – as well as the content of his work. Wallerstein ([1991] 2001:170) has put it so eloquently: "We are all to some extent prisoners of our education". Indeed, the kind of training he acquired led to the adoption of the principles of critical theory, and along with it, comparative-historical methodology, including irony as a method discussed in the previous sub-section as well as tolerance toward both qualitative and quantitative analysis – topics that we shall turn our attention to more specifically in the following sub-sections.

3.5 Qualitative Analysis

Irony as a method of neoclassical sociology is not a data analysis technique – be it qualitative or quantitative. Although it is identified as an empirical research approach that is contrasted to logico-analytical inquiry (cf. Eyal et al. 2003a:29), it should be seen as a habitus, according to Eyal (2020) and Szelényi (2020). Unfortunately, Szelényi does not publish on analysis techniques, discuss their applications in his research or even justify his choices regarding qualitative (or

---

[259] Elsewhere, King and Szelényi (2004:80–1) relate the discovery of K. Polányi and the inspiration that Konrád and Szelényi got from it in the form of the distinction between market and distribution to their analysis of the distribution of scarce goods, such as new housing estates at the end of 1960s.

[260] Furthermore, he notes that he also learned a lot about Maoism from his colleague Bill Brugger while at the Flinders University in Adelaide and responded to Erik Olin Wright while at the University of Wisconsin Madison, even though he has suppressed the acknowledgment of his influence on his work. As was discussed elsewhere, he learned quite a lot about Bourdieu from Bill Martin and Gil Eyal.

[261] Indirectly, Szelényi (2002) suggests that in one of the reflections where he speaks about the impact of Foucault on his scholarship.

[262] Szelényi (2009d) points out in his CV the following list of courses: Varieties of Capitalism; History of Social Thought; Class, Race and Gender; Urban Poverty; Socialist and Post-communist Societies; Methods of Social Inquiry; as well as Marx and Weber. [Nevertheless, the list in his CV is not complete as it does not, for instance, include courses taught in Hungary. In addition to these, during the interview, he (Szelényi 2012d) was especially proud of the "Foundations of Modern Social Theory" (cf. Szelényi 2009a) course that he taught at Yale as well as NYUAD].

quantitative) analysis with references to him (or any other methodologist for that matter). To get a sense of irony as an analytical technique, we shall look at how Szelényi uses methods that can be associated with qualitative traditions. It will be argued below that the kind of (qualitative) methods used by Szelényi in his empirical works, in general, and on intellectuals, in particular, contrast to Burawoy's theory-driven ethnography, on the one hand, and come closest to H. S. Becker's pragmatic approach, on the other; it must be stressed that their difference and similarity are indirect as he does not distance himself from critical and logico-analytical inquiry systematically or apply the qualitative techniques associated with the Second Chicago School mechanically.

Indeed, he rarely appeals to authority by making references to highly respected methodologists nor does he engage in discussions about the applicability of the existing or the development of new techniques. Apart from the methods textbook published early in his academic career in Hungarian (cf. Szelényi 1969) and his co-authored papers on neoclassical sociology that treat irony as a method (cf. Eyal et al. 2001, 2003a / 2003b), Szelényi has not written on research methods, be they qualitative, quantitative or mixed method. Even in his empirical publications, these issues are not given high priority or much attention. If he includes the description of these issues at all in his publications, one can find them in the appendixes rather than in the main body of the text.[263]

When the qualitative analysis related topic came up during the interview (Szelényi 2012c), Szelényi recalled a contrast with Burawoy, who does research by going first to the library to formulate the hypothesis, while he himself heads to the field – an approach to social anthropology that he finds similar to the Second Chicago School.[264] Furthermore, although he has contrasted his approach with that of Burawoy in general terms, he has actually not tried to differentiate it from his reflexive ethnography (cf. Burawoy 1989a, 1998a, 2003b) on methodological grounds even though their exchange of ideas did offer opportunities for that. In addition to the expression of conceptual and/or ideological disagreements on the use of class analysis in the post-communist context, they did exchange ideas on irony as an approach to critical social research (cf. Burawoy 2001; Eyal et al. 2001, 2003a; Szelényi 2002), but they never discussed the details of their different understandings of the methods and techniques of quantitative analysis.[265]

---

[263] For details see: Eyal et al. (1998, Appendix I–III); Ladányi and Szelényi (2006, Appendix 2); Szelényi (1988a, Appendix A, B); Szelényi and Glass (2003:92–95) as well as I. Szelényi and S. Szelényi (s.a., 26–32).

[264] See in addition to H. S. Becker (1999) also the subsection "Control" below.

[265] For instance, it could have given grounds to Szelényi (and his co-authors) to take a stand concerning Burawoy's (1989a) interpretation of the comparative method (including his belief in the superiority of I. Lakatos' research program over Mill's induction – principles according to Burawoy (ibid:796) that formed the foundation for Berkeley's department of sociology graduate training in methods in the second half of the 1980s. Neither has Szelényi used the opportunities to respond, differentiate or distance himself from Burawoy's 'extended case study' method (Burawoy 1998a, 2001, 2009), theory reconstruction (Burawoy 2003a), or reflexive ethnography (Burawoy 2003b). The above-given interview extract, which is the only account (in English) where he comes closest to taking the position *vis-à-vis* Burawoy, indicates that his image of Berkley School is accurate with

Szelényi's qualitative analysis is a combination of the Hungarian sociography tradition, Weberian interpretative method intended for understanding, Husserlian phenomenological ethnomethodology and Blumerian naturalistic inquiry aimed at 'immersion' in the reality of research subjects. In addition to the above-shown adaptation of the Weberian historical-comparative method that utilizes his ideal-typical analysis, Szelényi follows the methodological principles that were first laid down by Edmund Husserl, a philosopher of German origin who made his contributions in the early twentieth century.[266] According to Husserl, a scientist must become "immersed in science" – aware of one's own non-objective (e.g. cultural) presuppositions (1960:§4) and give up his or her 'native attitude' toward social reality (which is based on the naïve premise of a non-existent human or the social construction of reality) if (s)he wants to understand the subjects of his or her studies (ibid:§64). Indeed, Szelényi emphasized during the interview (Szelényi 2012c), similar to Husserl, the importance of 'immersion' for the social context the sociologist wishes to study. Such an immersion in the local context can be detected in the descriptions of the studies (e.g. Szelényi 1983a:5) on the new housing developments (three provincial towns in addition to Budapest) that Konrád and Szelényi undertook within the urban sociology research program that led, among others, to the publication of *The Intellectuals on the Road of Class Power*, *Urban Social Inequalities under State Socialism*, and *Socialist Entrepreneurs*. Using anthropological field research techniques to collect information about collectivization and entrepreneurship in rural Hungary and the non-intended participant observation of fellow intellectuals, they are indeed immersed in the context that they wished to understand. In other words, Szelényi's qualitative research approach has Weberian undertones aimed at understanding social reality.

Szelényi's major contributions from his Hungarian period have had a solid foundation in empirical material – the primary data collected using methods that resemble social anthropology and ethnography. While Szelényi himself suggested in the interview with me that he gave at NYU (Szelényi 2012c) that his approach to empirical research comes closest to H. S. Becker's and the Second Chicago School of Sociology, given the above, it would actually be more accurate to classify him as a product of the Hungarian home-grown sociography tradition that emerged between the two world wars. According to G. Kiss (1967:141), this tradition was advanced in many provincial universities by young intellectuals

respect to arriving at the field with theoretical constructs, but does not seem to realize that it is not limited to the collection and interpretation of data. As Burawoy (ibid) explains, his approach to theory development through ethnographic work does not end with learning existing theories before going to the field but extends to the reformulation of the failing ones through empirical research – something that differentiates it from Glaser and Strauss's grounded theory.

[266] Alexander (1987, Lecture 14) characterizes him as a phenomenologist, a forerunner of ethnomethodology [before the term was introduced by Garfinkel (cf. 1967, 1974, 1996, 2002) as well as Hill and Stones Crittenden (1968:5–17)], and one may add, the predecessor of the grounded theory approach [before it was fully developed by Glaser and Strauss (1965:280–1, 1967)] who calls it in this publication "new formal theory grounded on careful comparative research" (1965:276) or in short "*grounded* formal theory" (ibid:180)].

with high national pride and social responsibility. They carried out sociographic fact finding in order to enlighten the public about the social situation of the lower strata in the form of self-publishing which was often "dressed up in literary style".[267]

In other words, it should not be difficult to demonstrate that the research programs in which Szelényi has been involved over the decades have built on the Hungarian sociography tradition. One only needs to recall how Szelényi uses individual examples of professionals and intellectuals to support and illustrate his arguments as described in the section "Disciplinary Context" and how he supports the initial hunch with evidence (i.e. descriptive statistics) in some of his most important monographs: studies on housing (cf. Szelényi 1983a), research on the rural economy (cf. Szelényi 1988a), as well as intellectuals (cf. Eyal et al. 1998). Only later does he learn and relate the qualitative methods he has applied with those already developed, advanced and promoted in the spirit of the Second Chicago School, in general, and one of its outstanding representatives H. S. Becker, in particular.

Szelényi's casual way of research that builds on the Hungarian sociography tradition, on the one hand, and his strong interest in empirical material collected with the tools of ethnographic methods, on the other, helped him make his original contributions – rather than repeat the findings of previous studies or confirm existing theories. While this makes his approach similar to the Chicago School in the fashion broadly envisioned by Blumer, Park and Hughes before H. S. Becker, he is still close to the Hungarian home-grown sociography tradition. Linking himself nevertheless up with the Chicago School, rather than that tradition, seems to indicate that he is aware of its methodical problems (in the eyes of the representatives of the (post)positivist quantitative tradition) and/or his wish to communicate in terminology and symbols understood better in the tradition of Anglo-American qualitative analysis.

This does not mean, however, that he has abandoned the principles of sociography learned in Hungary. Consider how Huszár (1981:92–3) explains the challenge of sociography and the Lukácsian solution, which Szelényi is not only aware of but also has adopted in his research:

> The trap is here the communication and interpretation of the facts cited as examples. Because sociographic reports do not – and cannot – limit themselves to the simple evocation of the facts (examples). If it does not make use of the instruments of literary typification, it must analyze the interconnections, the involved links between causes and effects. In other words, in analyzing the examples the sociographic report as well – let alone a sociography between hard covers – sizes the thought of the particular hidden in the facts, linking the individual and the typical, the contingent and the necessary. …

---

[267] This has been noticed and described by a number of scholars. For further details see: Berkovits (1975), Gángo (2008), Huszár (1981), Kolosi and Szelényi (1993:143–4), Kulcsár (1969:7–19), Némedi (2009:10–4; 2010:154), G. Schöpflin (1979:151–6), Szelényi (2010b:25), Rév (2001:370–5), Vardy (1976, Ch. 14–15) and Varga (1983:242, 255).

As Lukács argued, the expressed, perhaps described, individual case is only an example, an illustration of the interconnection which is explained more or less scientifically but always conceptually, is proven (supported statistically), and motivated by rational causes. In other words: the more thorough and comprehensive the studies are on which a sociographic report relies, the greater and more elaborate the complex of fact is that it covers, the more obvious it is that the examples mentioned merely illustrate the perceived and explained interconnections. The evoked facts must of course refer to typical interconnections in order to support and throw a correct light on the conclusions drawn from them. But this typicality differs in principle from a described, literary (poetic) typicality. The concrete totality of poetic description can bear only such individuals and individual fates which, in their lively interaction, throw light, complement, accomplish, and make each other understandable, the individual connection links of which render the whole typical. On the other hand, in a report, the individual case becomes really and perfectly typical only in the conceptual summation and explanation of those interconnection which it is called upon to illustrate, however sparing of words this conceptual summation may be. The concreteness of the report, as of every conceptual (scientific) reproduction of reality, and only be accomplished by the conceptual exploration and explanation of cause and interconnections.

However, it must be emphasized, once again, that he has not adopted any qualitative techniques mechanically or applied them systematically in his research projects. Instead of relying on H. S. Becker or some other qualitative methodologists, who have developed methods for the qualitative analysis of visual, textual and oral material or organizing participant observation and autoethnography,[268] Szelényi has just talked to knowledgeable informants and observed research subjects in their natural contexts of interest to him. Doing qualitative research in such a casual way, he seems to have cared little about the methodological advice that methodologists have developed either for the collection of primary data, such as oral history or biographical material, or the qualitative nature of using the techniques of interview and observation. Likewise, he has followed common sense rather than the advice of methodologists on ways of using secondary sources systematically, such as archival or journalistic material. Hence, one does not find references to methodologists or to the qualitative analytical frames that they have developed – be it narrative research, feminist approaches, Foucaultian (genealogy) framework, content, conversation or discourse analysis. The only qualitative approach he associated with himself during the interview (Szelényi 2012c) was the ethnomethodology of H. S. Becker's type. Nevertheless, Szelényi's interpretation of it seems to be largely limited to the understanding that it contrasts with Burawoy's (1989a, 1998a, 2003b) reflexive ethnography. This allows him to assert that he has been doing social research free from theoretical preconceptions (prior to entering the field), which he associates with H. S. Becker and the Second Chicago School, as opposed to theory-driven ethnography similar to that of Burawoy and the Berkley School.

---

[268] For examples, see Denzin and Lincoln (2011, Part IV) as well as Seale et al. (2004, Part I).

Furthermore, Szelényi's relaxed approach toward research methods developed and advanced by methodologists of qualitative analysis also flirts with Blumer's naturalistic inquiry, defined by him as "the observation of a given area of happening in terms of its natural or actual character, as opposed to the observation of a surrogate or substitute form of that area of happening" (Blumer 1979:xxiv). Just as suggested by Park and Hughes, Szelényi has not limited himself to the possibilities of qualitative analysis in general or to Blumer's two stages of naturalistic inquiry – exploration and inspection – in particular. Rather, he has advanced to the third stage of confirmation proposed by Athens (2010), to whose end he has used the findings and language observed in the first two stages of naturalistic inquiry to prepare for quantitative analysis (questionnaire development in survey research).

When naturalistic inquiry arose in the interview with Szelényi (2012c), I cited Konrád (2002:261) as saying that "Ivan taught me that walks are the sociologist's primary modus operandi..." and asked if he agrees with this as well as for his comment. He not only agreed but expanded and expanded the discussion to other above-mentioned issues related to qualitative analysis. More specifically, this is what he (Szelényi 2012c) replied in the interview to the question related to Konrád's comment on naturalistic inquiry as well as the follow-up questions:

> I.S.: ...I remember once we were hanging out [with Konrád], I think it was in Pécs, you know, we started to do some survey research on housing and we went down to Pécs and well we were walking around city and we dropped into a pub and had a drink and then we walked further and had another drink in another pub and at one point George asked me: "When will we start working today?" and I said: "We are already working". Yes, I think that's I think... I believe that, you know. Ethnomethodology or immersion, you know, you immerse yourself in reality and that's [how] you get a better understanding what is going on, right. Yeah, that's the *modus operandi* for social science. Yeah.

> K.K.: How much, in your opinion, is that kind of research really conducted by empirically oriented people?

> I.S.: Yeah, that's a good question. I mean, many empirically oriented people do that, the question [is] where your data is coming from and how you handle the data.

> K.K.: Even when you are working on survey data, I would imagine that you found that kind of very ethnographic or anthropological approach useful.

> I.S.: Yes. Well but yeah, I was in fact... Ha – let me give you another example, I think... During the 1980s I was very good friends with Michael Burawoy, and actually [when] he got to Hungary, I helped him to find his first site [where] he started to do research. So, he was visiting me in Hungary (I think it must have been in 1983 or something) and I was hanging out with him and we were talking about social issues and what the problems are. And then (Michael was actually an ethnographer but) he said: "How interesting, so, you find out what the question is by hanging out with people and asking them, and then formulating the question. We go to the library, read books and from the books we figure out what the question is, and then we go out to the field. And you do the oppo-

site, right – you go out on the field…" And I think that was correct, I think. That is not that unique what I am doing, I mean…

K.K.: But that is not mainstream – to mix the methods…

I.S.: Well, it varies. I do not think it is a revolutionary new idea, I mean people who were critical of survey research had been actually critical of it because the questions are asked from the outside and the proper way to do surveys is to try to figure out how people talk about their problems and formulate the questions how people talk, rather than me putting them as… Ethnographers of Howie [Howard] Becker type had been emphasizing, right, that you have to immerse to the reality – you should not enter the reality with preconceptions or hypothesis. The hypothesis will emerge as you immerse yourself into the reality, right. So, I mean this is just two different styles of social research. That's not in any way what I've described so far all that unique.

K.K.: But it made an impression on Burawoy.

I.S.: Yes, I mean, of course what is interesting, Burawoy's ethnography is very much theory guided ethnography, right. Burawoy does belong to a different school of ethnography. I mean at that time when we spoke about it in '83 I did not reflect on it in this way. I have not been sufficiently informed what ethnographers do but in the US there we have two different schools of ethnography. One is what I think Michael Burawoy is an eminent example of – which is a kind of theory-driven ethnography – you have theoretical conceptions and that's how you move into the field: by theoretical preconceptions. That's what I call the Berkeley School of ethnography. And then you have the kind of Second Chicago School of ethnography which is coming from Howard Becker. And Howard Becker says: No! You can't, you should not enter the field with theoretical preconceptions. You should enter the field, immerse yourself into the reality and let the data speak to you. Then you develop / may develop some theoretical preconceptions. It is an ongoing controversy, right, and I am certainly closer to the Second Chicago School rather than to the Berkeley School in conducting empirical research, right.

Given the above, Szelényi's self-identification with the H. S. Becker type of ethnomethodology demands a clarifying comment. On the one hand, the argument presented above suggested that Szelényi comes closest to the methodological principles advanced by the members of the classical Chicago School. On the other hand, as the above extract from the interview transcript shows, he suggested that his approach to research methods comes closest to the H. S. Becker type of ethnomethodology within the Second Chicago School of Sociology. As there are many myths related to the Chicago School (Harvey 1986, 1987)[269] and it is more

---

[269] See H. S. Becker (1999) for the general overview of the Chicago school(s) and Fine (1995) for a more detailed description of the Second Chicago School. For a critical position toward Chicago School(s), see Burawoy (2000); for the myths associated with it, see Harvey (1986, 1987); and for a historical and at the same time feminist analysis of the establishment and development of Chicago School, see Deegan (1988). For additional comments on the kind of sociology that was pursued in Chicago, Berkley, Columbia, and Harvard, see also Cortese (1995), Clark (1998), Gouldner (1962:207–8), Calhoun and van Antwerpen (2007:386–402).

appropriate to label it as "school of activity" (H. S. Becker 1999)",[270] it should not come as a surprise that it is not easy to find resemblances between the representatives of the school and Szelényi. Likewise, as shown by Atkinson (1988), Lynch (1993, Ch. 1), Maynard and Clayman (2015) as well as ten Have (2004), ethnomethodology incorporates a varying set of methods and techniques that researchers use to make sense of the social world. Yet, these and other reviews[271] do not even mention the Second Chicago School, in general, or H. S. Becker, in particular, as the major contributors to ethnomethodology[272] and neither does the latter use the term in his methodological writings about his own approach to sociology.[273] While the synthesis of ethnomethodology with symbolic interactionism (Denzin 1969) or Marxism (Freund and Abrams 1976) has been proposed in the methodology literature, ethnomethodologists do not like to emphasize the commonalities that they share with sociologists. This includes sociologists who are sympathetic toward their tradition because they wish to make a radical break with the intention of the mainstream sociology to objectify "the social world by developing unambiguous concepts and equally unambiguous variables for social measurement" (Attewell 1974:179).[274]

Given the above-mentioned, the kind of Weberian ethnomethodology (cf. Dawe 1971:44–5), which uses the anthropological techniques to study everyday life and language in order to prepare for the survey that Szelényi identifies himself with, is closest to Rose's restatement of Garfinkel's position. In other words, Szelényi has adopted the position according to which the "sociologist cannot get to work until after certain thinking has been done in this [ethnomethodology] line to help to provide him with a subject matter" (Hill and Stones Crittenden 1968:20–1), Cicourel's (1981, 1987) line of research that emphasizes the importance of the use of anthropological techniques to complement the discourse analysis, and in Schaeffer's (1991) and Suchman and Jordan's (1990) understanding that it represents the potential for preparing for the survey. While eth-

---

[270] H. S. Becker (1999:9–10) argues that the department of sociology at the University of Chicago has been incorporating faculty members of diverse methodological orientations, which was necessary for teaching purposes as well as for keeping the number one position within American sociology. He says that in context one could only speak of a "school of activity" within which colleagues collaborate just for practical (i.e. financial) reasons on the same research projects.

[271] See Giddens (1993:39–50) and Pollner (1991) for more critical reviews of the debates within the sociological approach.

[272] Although Mead is mentioned in passing by Schutz (1954:262) and an indirect connection between the school and H. S. Becker is suggested by Attewell (1974:208), such examples are rare. For instance, Alexander (1987, Lecture 14-15) mentions occasionally only Mead and Goffman in his lectures on ethnomethodology.

[273] H. S. Becker refers to Garfinkel only in the context of studying how scientists do research (1970:18) and (1986:38) in the context of how students imitate their teachers.

[274] A more substantial link between ethnomethodology and H. S. Becker can be found in the fact that he (2007) values different types of storytelling – from fiction, films, photographs, and maps to mathematical modeling – (some of) which have an indirect link to ethnomethodology if they are made in a documentary fashion to reveal how the study subjects themselves see, talk and/or internalize the phenomena that the social scientist is interested in. He also participated in the symposium that discussed Garfinkel's major contributions to the field (cf. Hill and Stones Crittenden 1968).

nomethodology as an approach to studying everyday sense-making by actors in the circumstances they operate, in general, and as the term, in particular, could be associated more directly with Garfinkel rather than with H. S. Becker, Szelényi actually has an indirect link to both of them.

On the one hand, Szelényi takes an equally instrumentalist approach to the (qualitative) methods of H. S. Becker. Similar to Becker, he takes a very pragmatic approach to research methods, including qualitative analysis and ethnomethodology, but for different reasons. While Szelényi appreciates originality (sparkling new ideas) over the technically skillful application of (data) analysis methods, Becker shows that award-winning sociological research is hardly a product of methodologically sound work.[275] Indeed, he seems to have taken Becker's (1970 esp. Ch. 1) message on board that one should learn how to undertake research not from methodologists, but rather from award-winning sociological works. In short, both seem to agree that truly original and award-winning research is not the product of the skillful application of technical knowledge on quantitative (or qualitative) methods, but rather creativity. In short, Szelényi shares with Becker a very down-to-earth position on the methodology of social anthropology (including ethnomethodology and case studies).

Szelényi also has an indirect link to H. S. Becker's case study methods. While Becker has made noticeable contributions to the case study research methods (cf. H. S. Becker 1968, 1990; Ragin and Becker 1992), Szelényi has been conducting empirical research mostly on a single country, which happens to be his native Hungary (even after his emigration to the West). Therefore, one could expect references to case study methods (and some of its key methodologists such as H. S. Becker) to make his methodological choices concerning qualitative analysis more transparent and the selection and generalizability of the Hungarian case more convincing for the reader. It is not Szelényi's style, however, to appeal to methodological authorities, to provide elaborate descriptions or justifications of his methodological choices (including research design, case selection, data collection, and analysis methods). While the lack of name dropping can be seen as something that shows Szelényi as an independent scholar who does not bow before the methodological authorities, it also makes the methodology less transparent. To put it differently, the problem with Szelényi is that it is not explicit from his publications from whom he has learned his methodological 'tricks of the trade' to study the (the role of) Hungarian intellectuals in social transformation.

On the other hand, Szelényi also has an indirect link to Garfinkel's ethnomethodology. In general, ethnomethodology is often found to be similar or closest to the sociological paradigm known as symbolic interactionism and phenomenol-

---

[275] Instead of preaching from a methodological higher ground, as the members of the American Sociological Association's Section on Methodology are doing, according to H. S. Becker (1970:4–7), one should take an interest to learn how the award-winning sociological research has been conducted. He (ibid:9) calls such an empirical approach to methodology "analytical methodology" and characterizes it as the study of "what real sociologists do when they do research and then tries to see what logical connection can be made among the various steps in the research process".

ogy – a philosophical approach that has its sociological variant.[276] Although Szelényi associated himself with H. S. Becker's ethnomethodological methods during the interview (Szelényi 2012c), suggesting that the latter should precede survey research, he seems to limit its use to devising the questionnaire questions in the language the study objects speak about the phenomena under scrutiny. In this respect, there is a link to Garfinkel's ethnomethodology that Szelényi himself does not make, but which, nevertheless, appears to be there. More specifically, as he implicitly emphasizes the Weberian interpretive methodology, he comes close to Garfinkel's approach of ethnomethodology. Interestingly enough, it is precisely Garfinkel's enthusiasm for applying ethnomethodology on instructional settings or 'workplaces' – first for jurors (cf. Garfinkel 1967, Ch. 4; Hill and Stones Crittenden 1968:5–11)[277] and later for (mathematicians and natural) scientists (cf. Garfinkel et al. 1981; Lynch et al. 1983) – that have contributed to the interdisciplinary research field which has come to be known as the social studies of science.

Although there is a link between Szelényi's interest in intellectuals and their daily pursuit to conceptualize the reality and propose teleological reasoning for policies, he has never pursued this connection, and unfortunately, seems to have little interest in its scrutiny, which would investigate the possible application of ethnomethodology for irony as the method of neoclassical sociology or in his empirical studies of intellectuals. What Szelényi seems to have in mind when he suggests that his brand of research has a link to Garfinkel's ethnomethodology is the kind of Hungarian sociographic tradition that he followed in his urban and regional development research projects with Konrád that led to the thesis of "Redistributive Injustice" (to use Stark's 1985a terminology) and the writing of his major monographs, including *Urban Social Inequalities Under State Socialism*, *Socialist Entrepreneurs*, and *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*. The evidence he presents about conducting participatory observations of fellow intellectuals – ideologues, philosophers, and humanists, whom he identifies in Hungary (Szelényi 1986–1987:113), and abroad, whom he met during his travels within the Eastern bloc within his urban sociology project (ibid, 115) – seems to have given him the insight to interpret the survey data they collected in a certain way: it did not lead to the construction of the data collection instrument developed before they conceived the idea, but rather, it resulted in them overemphasizing their experiences, as he himself hesitantly suggests and admits (ibid:116).

Also, elsewhere he provides evidence which suggests that the questions were not developed quite in the spirit of the above-mentioned ethnomethodology. For instance, he (1983a:5) reflects:

---

[276] See Schutz (1967) for the classical contribution and Ferguson (2006) for the contemporary one, a term that Szelényi hardly uses (apart from the above mentioned), could be associated more directly with Garfinkel (1967, 1974, 1996, 2002) than H. S. Becker, who has mentioned ethnomethodology only in passing and about Garfinkel (cf. see H. S. Becker 1970:18, 1998:75).

[277] See also Garfinkel (1974) and Rawls (2002) where the origin of the term is explained. For more general overviews of ethnomethodology see Atkinson (1988), Clayman (2015), Lynch (1993, Ch. 1), Maynard and Clayman (1991).

I conducted the first major empirical urban research in 1966–67. In late 1965 or early 1966 I met George Konrad, who at that time had just taken up a position as an urban sociologist in an urban and regional planning institute. I had a job as a sociologist at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and was expected to become a specialist in urban sociology. We were both inexperienced, but I had some knowledge of the literature and of survey methodology and Konrad had sufficient funds through his institution. We decided to join forces and conduct joint researches. We did not have a very clear idea of what we ought to do, so we did not mind when our urban planning colleagues suggested that we investigate new housing estates. We did not have a very clear idea of what we ought to do, so we did not mind when our urban planning colleagues suggested that we investigate new housing estates. In 1966 and 1967 we organized a number of fairly large-scale surveys on four new housing developments in Budapest and in three provincial towns. We did not really have a proper research design: our studies were basically descriptive; we did not know what kind of questions we should ask. In the end we put together a lengthy questionnaire which contained all sorts of foolish questions, but at least we did not forget to ask our respondents to state their occupation, incomes, etc. So we got some decent data…

As demonstrated in the previous sub-sections and to be shown in the upcoming sub-sections, especially 3.18, Szelényi's way of combining elements of critical theory and post-positivism, in general, and theoretical, qualitative and quantitative traditions, in particular, is closer to what has come to be known as mixed method research. Before turning to it, let it be restated briefly here that Szelényi's approach to Weberian macro-historical sociology is in line with his habit of constructing typologies on the basis of ideal types, as described in a previous sub-section. However, he complements the Weberian interpretative method intended for understanding with Hungarian sociography, Husserlian phenomenological ethnomethodology and Blumerian naturalistic inquiry aimed at 'immersion' in the reality of research subjects. Furthermore, despite similarities with H. S. Becker as the representative of the Second Chicago School, which he identifies mostly with, he seems to be closer to the original members of the Chicago School. Indeed, he (2012b:1157) even points out while discussing the beginning of his academic career and his (self-)education in urban sociology, which resulted in the Ford Scholarship and his meeting with Ernest Burgess – whom he read intensively. upon his return to Budapest, he even published a short book in Hungarian on the 'urban community', which he (ibid) says was "a review of the literature of the classical Chicago School". In that context, it is not surprising that his approach to ethnomethodology is closer to the spirit of the forerunner of the tradition, such as Husserl, as opposed to Garfinkel or H. S. Becker. Indeed, in the major research programs he uses the techniques of qualitative analysis mentioned and discussed above in the spirit of the Chicago tradition for the preparation of the quantitative analysis, which will now be discussed.

3.6   Quantitative Analysis

Irony as a method of neoclassical sociology is empirical but not particularly technical. Rather than being either a qualitative or quantitative technique, it should

be seen as a research approach or habitus (Eyal 2020; Szelényi 2020). Similar to Szelényi's positions on ontology, epistemology, and qualitative analysis presented in the previous sections or the content to be discussed under the nature of knowledge as well as accommodation and commensurability, his relation to quantitative analysis is non-fundamentalist. It reflects his training and the adoption of a critical theory point of view without fetishizing or being obsessed with the methods or techniques of quantitative analysis. Indeed, it will be argued in this sub-section on the basis of Szelényi's own empirical works that utilize quantitative analysis that his approach to the technique is rather pragmatic as he is not a data analytics person in the modern sense, on the one hand, and has valued the originality of the inquiry, on the other.

More specifically, Szelényi maintains that there is some value both in descriptive statistics and in the most common forms of inferential statistics if they lead to (thought) provoking conclusions or interesting generalizations. Furthermore, he and his former graduate students seem to share the position that H. S. Becker (1970:19) describes along the following lines: "Clearly, everyone agrees that there is some amount of 'trouble' worth taking with one's data, but likewise that there is some point beyond which the research will never get done for the taking of safeguards. As practical men, sociologists know that they must get their work done, and they do." The adoption of such a pragmatic point of view that does not fetishize (qualitative or quantitative) research methods is supported by the belief that the results are difficult to replicate in sociology anyway: "the errors are either too small to matter or they all cancel out" or simply that dealing with methodological matters is waste of one's time.[278]

As a reflection of this, there is little information to be found in Szelényi's publications about methodological aspects or specific details about the employed (quantitative) methods and techniques. Hence, his published works hardly include a methods (or methodological) section and if they are to be found (in the appendixes) at all, their descriptions are limited to sampling and data collection issues (cf. Szelényi 1988a, Appendix A & B; Eyal et al. 1998, Appendix I–III).

Such an utterly instrumental approach to methodology, in general, and (quantitative) research methods, in particular, reflects Szelényi's academic training. Nevertheless, once in the West, he must have realized rather quickly that his competitive advantage was not in quantitative analysis. This emerges from his apologetic tone in the Preface to *Urban Inequalities Under State Socialism*, a book based on his PhD dissertation and published in English some years after its completion in Hungarian, where he (1983a:v) says that "I hope the human ecologists will forgive the simple-minded statistical techniques I used, but at the time they seemed sufficient for this sort of policy-oriented research".

---

[278] On the one hand, this contradicts, for instance, Bourdieu's position that can be found in the following publications: Bourdieu (1990b, Ch. 1; 2000a, Introduction, Ch. 1; 2008a); Bourdieu et al. (1991, Introduction – Epistemology and methodology; Conclusion – Sociology of knowledge and epistemology); and Wacquant (1989a:35). On the other hand, it is also true that Bourdieu et al. (1991:1–2) warn against getting stuck in discussing methodological issues without actually applying them or engraining in a destructive attack on survey methodology without trying to develop something better.

Instead of re-educating himself to meet the expectations of his quantitatively oriented peers, Szelényi compensated for the lack of technical competence in his collaborative projects by teaming up with people who had good statistical skills for working with numerical data. After working with Konrád (who, given his academic background, had no training in research methods) on the survey and carrying out the ethnographic field trips and participant observations of the comrades that led to the publication of the *Urban Inequalities Under State Socialism* and *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*; he teamed up with Manchin, Juhász, Magyar and Martin[279] to complete the *Socialist Entrepreneurs*, and later prepared the "Poverty, Ethnicity, and Gender in Transitional Societies" with Emigh (cf. Emigh and Szelényi 2001) and the "Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989" with Treiman (cf. Szelényi and Treiman 1991, 1992; Treiman and Szelényi 1993).[280] More recently, he has collaborated with a number of scholars on the emergent varieties of post-communism (cf. Kroos 2018, Appendix 4, 5.1, 5.2) and has supported the planning of the major ongoing collaborative project led by L. King between economic sociologists and public health scholars about the impact of different privatization mechanisms on public health (cf. Stuckler et al. 2009; L. King 2015; Irdam et al. 2016). The latest empirical research project he has been more directly involved in, which includes primary data collection, addresses the "Migrant labor experience in the UAE" (cf. New York University Abu Dhabi 2015:90–93; Szelényi, 2018b).

As for gathering quantitative data, Szelényi has relied equally on both primary and secondary data collection techniques. As an example of the former, one can point out his data collection with Konrád for the urban sociology project which culminated in the publication of *Urban Social Inequalities Under State Socialism*. His research project on the rural economy, which culminated in the publication of the *Socialist Entrepreneurs*, also included a component of primary data collection but of a different nature. More specifically, it included a strong ethnographic component (cf. Szelényi 1988a, Ch. 4) which, unlike the logic of the above-mentioned ethnomethodology, stood alone or separate from the development of data collection instrument(s). Indeed, the *Social Mobility Study and Income Survey*[281] were prepared and carried out by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office com-

---

[279] Konrád and Szelényi (1991:359–60) refer in their paper "Intellectuals and Domination in Post-Communist Societies" to Szelényi and Konrád as the authors of the *Socialist Entrepreneurs*. Given the ethnographic work that went into it before Ivan's emigration, it may not be too far from the truth even though the quantitative data analysis was carried out by Robert Manchin and others like Robert Mare and David Grusky (Szelényi 1988a, 125, 131) with whom Szelényi collaborated while completing the project/book at University of Wisconsin.

[280] Szelényi (2014a) notes in his CV that Social stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989: A comparative survey of Russia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland" was a joint project with Don Treiman and Szonja Szelényi. In terms of output, it is true as one can see from the following publications: I. Szelényi and S. Szelényi (s.a. & 1995) and S. Szelényi et al. (1995).

[281] Szelényi (1988a:222) discloses that they also used other data sources, all composed by Hungarian CSO: Population census, the 1981-82 Agricultural Report of the Agricultural Statistics Division of the CSO, the 1982 Income Survey of the CSO, and the 1982-83 CSO Social Mobility and Life History Survey.

pletely separate from the project.[282] As with the rural project, the empirical investigations inspired by *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* and undertaken by Szonja Szelényi were conducted on the basis of the "Way of Life, Quality of Life, and Values", a survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1977 (cf. S. Szelényi 1987) and the "Hungarian Social Mobility and Life History Survey" conducted by the Hungarian Central Statistics Office in 1983 (cf. S. Szelényi 1998, Ch. 2). The primary data was collected within the "Poverty, Ethnicity, and Gender in Transitional Societies" project that led to the publication of the edited volume titled *Poverty, Ethnicity, and Gender in Eastern Europe During Market Transition* (cf. Emigh and Szelényi 2001) as well as within the "Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989" (cf. Szelényi and Treiman 1991 & 1992; Treiman and Szelényi 1993) project that served as the basis of *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists* and a number of other publications. Regarding methods of quantitative data analysis, Szelényi, together with his co-authors, relies on (standard) regression techniques in addition to simple descriptive statistics. While the survey data collected and analyzed for *Urban Inequalities Under State Socialism* was summarized using simple descriptive statistics, in addition to ethnographic insights, the analysis presented in *Socialist Entrepreneurs* relied on the data collected by the Hungarian Central Statistics Office in their "Income, Social Mobility and Life History" surveys; these were analyzed using maximum-likelihood, simultaneous, two-equation sample selection models (which were further evaluated using probit and regression analyses). Likewise, in addition to the simple frequency distributions [cf. Eyal et al. (1997, 1998), Emigh et al. (2001:18) and I. Szelényi and S. Szelényi (1995)], one can find regression analyses among Szelényi's co-authored quantitative analyses of the data collected for the "Poverty, Ethnicity, and Gender in Eastern Europe During Market Transition" (cf. Ladányi and Szelényi 2001, 2002b, 2006, Ch. 5; Szelényi and Ladányi 2005) as well as in "Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989" (cf. Hanley and Szelényi 2001; Szelényi et al. 1995; Szelényi and Glass 2003). To complement the conceptual contributions, he also uses regression techniques in the papers that analyze the emergent post-communist political system (cf. Kolosi et al. 1990; S. Szelényi et al. 1996; Szelényi et al. 1997). This allows one to generalize that among the various quantitative analysis methods and techniques available, Szelényi has limited his choice to the use of frequency distributions and regression analysis and does not provide too many details about the reasons for justifying such a methodological selection given the research task, question, type and/or quality of the data at hand.

In other words, Szelényi has been involved in data collection and analysis of survey data in his collaborative research projects. Some of these are more technical and, hence, closer to what has become standard in contemporary stratification and social mobility studies than in others. To take advantage of the methodological developments within contemporary stratification scholarship in the past decades, he has involved his doctoral students in the research programs (cf.

---

[282] Hence, Szelény (1988a:224–8) even discusses the operationalization, construct validity, and measurement problems of the secondary data that they obtained from the income survey.

Szelényi 1988a; Szelényi and Glass 2003) or collaborated with survey scholars (cf. Kolosi and Szelényi 1993; Szelényi and Treiman 1991, 1992; Treiman and Szelényi 1993; Szelényi, Treiman and Wnuk-Lipinski 1995). In other words, he is not against the (use of) quantitative survey research (in historical-comparative studies) in principle – quite the opposite seems to be the case.

But despite the advancements that have been made in quantitative methodology, the internal criticism that has been voiced within qualitative methods and the developments in mixed methods, Szelényi is skeptical about the future of sociology. Nevertheless, he seems to be aware of the historical process that Savage and Burrows (2007) describe in their paper as "The Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology" – the emergence of an abundance of administratively and routinely collected big data that is expected to make the traditional survey and ethnographic research methods used by sociologists obsolete. (They argue that the survey and in-depth interview methods do not offer an advantage to sociologists over corporate researchers working on the 'transactional data' collected routinely by private institutions). Although Szelényi has not responded to the challenge posed by big data, he seems to agree with Savage and Burrows' argument that calls for "descriptive sociology", instead of causality.

The solution that Szelényi with his co-authors proposes in the form of irony as the method of neoclassical sociology is in line with Savage and Burrows' call for "a radical mixture of methods coupled with renewed critical reflection" (2007:896). Instead of following the line of development introduced by mixed method researchers (methodologists traditionally came from more applied fields like nursing, educational studies, and policy evaluation), Szelényi's irony as a method of neoclassical sociology can be seen as an attempt to find a 'third way' between positivistic quantitative survey methodology, as found in the exemplary arguments of Goldthorpe (2000), and reflexive qualitative ethnographic methods, as proposed in the elaborations of Burawoy (1998b).

As will be argued in more detail below in the section titled "Hegemony", Szelényi is smart enough to understand that the likelihood of changing the balance of power between positivism and 'other' research traditions in sociology is slim. Therefore, Szelényi, together with his co-authors, proposes irony as the method of neoclassical sociology that seeks to find a compromise between the positivist quantitative survey tradition, represented by scholars like the above-mentioned Goldthorpe (cf. 2000), and the qualitative ethnographic tradition, represented by critical thinkers like Burawoy (cf. 1998).

Hence, irony as the method of neoclassical sociology is a way to respond both to Goldthorpe's (2000) call in the book titled *On Sociology: Numbers, Narratives, and the Integration of Research and Theory* in favor of making qualitative (ethnographic) research in sociology accountable to the same quality standards as the quantitative (survey) research, on the one hand, and to Burawoy's (1998:19) call to embrace the methodological duality that he proposes in the article titled "Critical Sociology: A Dialogue between Two Sciences". Therefore, the paper by Eyal et al. (2003a / 2003b) "On Irony" should be seen as a contribution to the debate

in sociology and the social sciences about the status and role of qualitative and quantitative research (methods).

Although Szelényi, together with his co-authors, has reflected on this delicate balance between theory and empirical material in the methodological essay "On Irony", this issue is not unique for the critical-reflexive research tradition. For instance, Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009:164–5) describe that kind of challenge to find the proper role of empirical material in critical-reflexive methodology aimed at the interpretation (i.e. understanding) of social reality in the following way:

> Even in critical projects that include empirical work personally conducted by the researcher rather than using the empirical work of others, the empirical material is still less central than in a study following textbooks on qualitative [or quantitative] methods. The focus shifts away from the empirical work itself and the data towards the interpretation and reasoned appraisal of the empirical material, which is further complemented by observations and interpretations of the surrounding societal context. ... Empirical material is not endowed with the same robust character here as in 'dataistic' qualitative research or objectivist hermeneutics.

But unlike Burawoy's call for a respectful coexistence between the quantitative and qualitative traditions, the kind of balance between the two traditions that Szelényi seeks to find with irony is theory-informed (not normative) empirical research that can but does not need to combine the qualitative and quantitative methods. Since his method(ology) is partly anchored in critical theory [as I have described in more detail elsewhere (cf. Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1) in the chapter devoted to the cognitive paradigms that underlie his scholarship], and partly in reflexivity (discussed in more detail below under the sub-section of "Reflexivity"), the kind of mix of methods supported by the critical reflection adopted by Szelényi does not represent method(ology) found in orthodox (mixed) methods textbooks.

Rather, he represents the research tradition described well by Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) as "reflexive methodology". More specifically, they (idid:166–7) note that while standing closer to the 'strictly empirical' material is the expectation of scientific enterprise, for critical theorists, this means being non-dialectical and losing their vantage point. On the one hand, abandoning dialectics would limit, if not entirely prevent, the researcher from seeing the possibilities of opening up new and imaginative lines of thinking based on the critical assessment of the dominant ways in social theory and research. On the other hand, adopting dialectics represents a real danger for becoming and being seen as an ideologist as "critical theory carries a substantial theoretical 'ballast' when it comes to interpreting empirical phenomena [which] could be taken to mean that they do not see 'reality' as it 'is', but that they blindly read into it what critical theory suggests".

In other words, Szelényi's reflexive scholarship is a constant struggle to find a reasonable balance between theoretical insight and empirical evidence. Unlike the suggestions that one can find from text(book)s about the role of theory in

social research in general (see e.g. Stinchcombe 1968, Ch. 2; Taagepera 2008, Ch. 14), and how to operationalize abstract theoretical concepts for measurement purposes in data collection process in particular (see e.g. de Vaus 2014 Ch. 2 & 4; Ghauri, Grønhaug and Strange 2020 Ch. 3; Oberauer and Lewandowsky 2019; Sekaran and Bougie 2016, Ch. 11), he has been responding to the methodological debates within comparative-historical sociology as well as social stratification and social mobility research about the proper use of theory (cf. Goldthorpe 2000 Ch. 5 & 11; Kiser and Hechter 1991).

The kind of scholarship emerging from Szelényi's adoption of this critical-reflexive methodology is primarily empirical and well-informed by theory as opposed to being dataistic. Without repeating the detailed arguments that I have made elsewhere in the chapter devoted to the cognitive paradigm and specific theories (cf. Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1), it suffices to mention here briefly that working on the stage of normal science within the paradigm of critical theory presupposes, in addition to the commonly accepted theories and terminology, the research puzzles and methodological tools believed capable of providing solutions (Kuhn 1962). Szelényi's irony is in harmony with the paradigm he has adopted, in general, and with the heritage of its key classics, such as Marx, Weber, K. Polányi, Gouldner and Bourdieu, in particular.

3.7   Rhetoric

Ironically, the rhetoric of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology does not need to be ironic (in the traditional sense of the word). Instead, it relies on a certain kind of rhetoric that Gouldner (1975–1976:20–2) calls "Culture of Critical Discourse" (CCD). While Eyal et al. (2003:23) in their paper "On Irony" make the argument that cultural capital is a discourse which needs for its operation (i.e. convertibility and accumulation) monopoly and generosity, it will be argued below that it is better to think on the basis of Szelényi's career and scholarship that for irony to operate as a method of neoclassical sociology it needs to follow Gouldner's CCD.

Gouldner's normative idea is that the only criterion applied to an argument should be its logic – the content of the argument must be detached from the social position of its maker – instead of accepting positions of the more powerful, anyone can be wrong and his or her ideas critically scrutinized. More specifically, he (1978a:176 / 1979:28) describes it as "an historically evolved set of rules, a grammar of discourse, which (1) is concerned to *justify* its assertions, but (2) whose *mode* of justification does not proceed by invoking authorities, and (3) prefers to elicit the *voluntary* consent of those addressed solely on the basis of arguments adduced." While Szelényi would not publicly object to this normative ideal as such, he must know from personal experience with party and departmental politics, editorial decision-making and observations of fellow scholars and intellectuals (including the career of Gouldner) that empirically this is not true. While it seems that Gouldner appeals for CCD because he was deprived of a position in a major American academic establishment for his radical and/or critical views and had to return to internal emigration and the invisible college of his

Theory and Society, there has hardly been a need for Szelényi to stress CCD because of his rather different position both within the Hungarian sociological establishment and after emigration to the US. To put it differently, Szelényi seems to understand that CCD is a normative aim from which real-life deviates. Being an academic, he participates in the language game that intellectuals play. Being also (Bourdieuian enough of) a sociologist, he understands that the balance of power within academia rests with (post)positivists who control publication, funding, promotion and tenure. Not only does he comprehend the hegemony, he acts accordingly and strategically by stressing objectivity and value freedom, as mentioned above.

Nevertheless, one could say that in addition to the above-mentioned CCD and claim for value freedom, Szelényi's rhetoric – his style of writing and argumentation – is characterized by his tendency to reject the 'normalization' of inquiry and his unwillingness to limit his research within the boundaries of 'normal science'. It is the creativity and questioning of prevailing or dominant ways of thinking that characterizes Szelényi in the Kuhnian frame, where accepting the dominant paradigm and working within normal science with its boundaries and puzzles would reduce him to a puzzle-solving technician. In other words, Szelényi's rhetoric is oriented toward originality – a new thought-provoking, hypothesis generating, and, hopefully, path-breaking line of research, whose details and empirical proof he has left for followers with the required technical skills. Indeed, as his monographs and other publications indicate, he has been less interested in puzzle solving within the boundaries of normal science, which requires the acceptance of dominant paradigm(s) and high technical skills, than in saying something provocative. For instance, using the analytical approach that Stark (1986) calls "mirrored opposition", he showed that the market and redistribution had inverse functions in capitalist and socialist societies, and through his major contributions (*Urban Social Inequalities under State Socialism*, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, and *Socialist Entrepreneurs*), he laid the foundation for the three core statements of "A Market Transition Theory" (Nee 1989), which has become a source of the major Market Transition Debate, where a large amount of empirical research has been conducted to test the three core hypotheses: market power, incentive, and opportunity theses.

There are elements of cosmopolitanism that introduced a less provincial and more historical-comparative character to Szelényi's rhetoric; these include a politically correct and risk-free willingness to defend the weak and disadvantaged, resulting in an emphasis on justice and equality in his discourse. While drawing on both Hungarian academic and journalistic sources, he is able to present the final outcome of the research that uses the rhetoric and theoretical frames (including the references to the literature) taken seriously by his Western colleagues who share the comparative-historical tradition (cf. Treiman and Szelényi 1993; Eyal et al. 1998). In the terminology of Chomsky, he not only speaks (correctly) the language of critical theory but is also able to speak about it. He has more than mastered the CCD. He is one of its internal critics and manipulators.

These three elements of rhetoric – CCD, claim for objectivity, and cosmopolitanism – are not always as clearly visible in his publications. This is especially evident in co-authored publications like *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* where the co-author's role has not been diminished to that of a technical data analyst. Since Konrád was the intellectual sparring partner for Szelényi during the preparation and writing phase of the book, it would not be an overstatement to claim that without him it would not have had such intellectual gunpowder, populist tone, and powerful language as the final result demonstrates. This vantage point, quite similar to Bourdieu's entrance to the field from outside the establishment, originates from Konrád's outsider perspective and experience.

As he reflects in the interview with Cohen (2007):

> A child born in the countryside, like I was, has a wider social view; he sees everything. When he comes to the city, he is better equipped to interpret social status. This was an advantage I enjoyed, an advantage I still enjoy. If you are expelled from any community, you are, in a sense, also receiving a gift. When I was 15, I was excluded from the Youth Alliance [an official, communist-sponsored organization of Hungarian youth]. And because of my views, I supported [philosopher] George Lukács against his enemies — I should say, I was provoked into expressing my views. This was an excellent experience. The period immediately following the war was formative, very important — from 1945 to 1948, or '49. It was only after this that I began to be 'problematic'.

When I asked Szelényi during our informal supper in NYC on February 11, 2012 if he was satisfied with the English translation of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, he replied that he was quite happy with it. Furthermore, he responded to my follow-up comment on the different style in this book compared to his other writings, in the sense of the long and complicated construction of sentences by suggesting that this is Konrád's style and impact. Later during the more formal interview (Szelényi 2012c), I asked also about his working habits and writing style regarding the co-authoring of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* with Konrád. This is what he said:

> … I just never had the talent that he [i.e. Konrád] had to deal with language so skillfully as he did. So, I think our division of labor was that I did most of the conceptual work and he did a great deal of improving the quality of the text that we were writing and turning it into more readable form. But almost all of the conceptual work has been my work. But once we wrote the text down he went through it very carefully and edited it. I actually discovered a couple of years ago that a copy of the book *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* was preserved, in fact, the original copy – I still have it in Budapest in my apartment. Somehow we forgot about it, when we wrote the book in Csobánka, in this village, we made only one copy on the typewriter. Once we finished the manuscript then Konrad went through the text and edited the text and that's when we rewrote the book in three copies. So…, and somehow we forgot about this, I do not know [how] this could have happened but this original copy with corrections was hidden in the place of his mother-in-law and I blocked the memory of the existence of this manuscript and a couple of years ago my brother-in-law, just gave it to me – that he found it among the stuff of my mother-in-law. It is interesting because it does show how we worked and how

many corrections he actually made with the text. So I mean, the original text is probably closer to my own text and then we can see how Konrad contributed to it. Not quite sure because the original text, you know, we wrote together – every single sentence we wrote together of the book. The way how we worked: we had been talking about the topic for a long time, tape recorded some of the conversations. (Actually we never used the tape recorder but in case we would want to go back we had lots of tapes of our conversations). And then at one point it looked like this is reasonably polished, we said: Well, let's write it down! So, one of us was sitting at the typewriter and the other one was walking up and down, and dictating; and the other one was writing. And then if one of us on the typewriter got tired, we changed.

3.8   Nature of Knowledge

When it comes to the nature of knowledge, pragmatism describes irony well as a method of neoclassical sociology. Szelényi's own application of irony as anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue in his own scholarship shows an acceptance of intersubjectivity, emic and etic viewpoints as well as respect for nomothetic and idiographic knowledge. In abstract terms, it can be said that he complements intelligently the empiricism that symbolizes (post)positivism with his personal as well as structural/historical insights that characterizes critical theory. In more practical terms, it will be argued below that his understanding of the nature of knowledge can be detected in comparison and contrast to Wright and Burawoy – resembling in its essence the Gouldnerian use of Marxist tools against Marxism, on the one hand, and the Bourdieuian skillful manipulation of classic works and the rhetoric of the conflict tradition to the extent appropriate and possible in a post-positivist search for truth, on the other.

Szelényi's views on the nature of knowledge reflect his position on ontology and epistemology described above. Indeed, his understanding is a mixture of structural/historical insights characteristic of critical theory, and empiricism as manifested by post-positivism. If these positions were easily commensurable with each other, a few additional explanations would be needed. This is not the case, however. While the way he combines emic and etic viewpoints and his relaxed approach to nomothetic and idiographic knowledge suggests that he basically accepts intersubjectivity, typical of pragmatism, he has undertaken empirical research largely without bothering much about the ontological problems or debates. To complicate issues further, Szelényi has not been accepting different viewpoints at face value. If one, nevertheless, tries to position him in these discussions, it is safe to say that his early works reflect the intellectual heritage of Marx, Weber, Lukács, Mannheim and Gramsci, while his later publications combine selective insights from the debates between Bourdieu and Gouldner, on the one hand, and Burawoy and Wright, on the other. To make that point more explicit, the following is a brief explanation of some of Szelényi's key points combined consciously or unconsciously in his methodological apparatus.

The ontological and epistemological challenge over the identification of the (middle) classes has become the key topic in class analysis, according to Wacquant (1989b). As I have discussed elsewhere (Kroos 2018, Ch. 4), this chal-

lenge has an especially long-standing history with respect to intellectuals within critical social theory (although the representatives of structural functionalism have not remained silent either). Among others, Marx, Weber, Lukács, Lenin, Kautsky, Trotsky, Luxemburg, Mannheim, Gramsci, Machajski, Kołakowski, Bauman, Rakovski, Mills, Gouldner, Bourdieu, Foucault, Habermas and E. O. Wright have made important contributions to this debate, even if at times this has been driven not by ontological and epistemological research interests per se, but rather by the *Realpolitik* of socialist/communist party politics, which has been seeking an answer on how to activate the proletariat to fulfill its historic mission. Unlike the critical theorists, politically motivated or not, who discuss the role of intellectuals in the workers' party, Szelényi has mostly examined the position of intellectuals in the class structure of the (post-)socialist societies (cf. Szelényi 1978c, 1979c, 1982a; Konrád and Szelényi 1979, Part II). Nevertheless, he has been unable to escape the ontological and epistemological issues altogether. These appear unavoidably in both the mentioned structuralist literature (cf. e.g. Konrád and Szelényi 1979, Part I) and in the context of cultural capital (cf. Martin and Szelényi 1987) and new class theories (cf. King and Szelényi 2004).

While one could not agree more with Szelényi (2002:46) that *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* is in many ways a Foucauldian book, it is also true that he avoids direct confrontation with the epistemological challenge presented by Foucault's powerful insight into the dictum of knowledge and power. If knowledge and power are, as Foucault argues, so mutually constitutive that they are basically inseparable, how is one able to study one without getting involved and being blinded by the other? Although Szelényi (ibid) says in one of his reflections, titled "An Outline of the Social History of Socialism or An Auto-Critique of An Auto-Critique", that he had been re-inventing the argument of the works of Foucault about intellectuals without knowledge, it is fair to say that even after he learns about his *pouvoir / savoir* (cf. Foucault, 1980), he does not really adopt Foucault's theoretical model or try to respond to the ontological issues related to this dual concept elsewhere in his publications.

Nevertheless, to solve the epistemological challenges, in his later works he suggests, together with his co-authors, that irony be adopted as a method of neoclassical sociology and that it be positioned in sharp contrast to both neoclassical economics and E. O. Wright's 'real utopia' project.[283] Since he has been building the Weberian ideal types primarily on the basis of desktop research, on the one hand, and implying the acceptance of the existence of varieties of capitalism that can and should be studied empirically rather than conceptually,[284] on the other, it seems reasonable to suggest that his understanding of the nature of

---

[283] Eyal et al. (2003a:11) say that "the possibility of a socialist alternative can no longer serve as the basis for a critical social science because we cannot currently detect such an alternative *empirically*. Our premise is that critical social science should be based on the detection of 'real alternatives'."

[284] For instance, Eyal et al. (2003a:34) state that "Whether or not the capitalism that is now emerging in Russia will converge with capitalism as we know it from the United States or Western Europe must be explored *empirically* rather than assumed by *theoretical fiat*".

knowledge, in general, and the relationship between knowledge and power, in particular, is the reflexive realization of the value that both nomothetic and idiographic research approaches can bring to scholarship.

In the context where Szelényi has been almost silent about these challenges per se, it is important to realize that they are central to the debate between E. O. Wright and Burawoy[285], who have been points of reference for him during his career and long before they became prominent sociologists in the contemporary US and global sociological fields and their establishments. Indeed, the comments and responses that Szelényi has made about their Marxist scholarship allow us to learn indirectly his understanding of the nature of knowledge. For instance, Szelényi's answer to the question "how can we know class when class is itself a power relation?" (cf. Wacquant 1989b:165) is a cautious search for the middle ground between the two opposing views:[286] a combined insight into the degree of classness and class formation from Marx, Weber and Bourdieu (cf. Eyal et al. 1998; King and Szelényi 2004:86–90), on the one hand, and a call for the third kind of protection of the weakest (cf. Ladányi and Szelényi 1997, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2006; Szelényi and Ladányi 2005), on the other. Likewise, in one of his most elaborate discussions on methodological issues, titled "On Irony: An Invitation to Neoclassical Sociology", a follow-up to an earlier short response to Burawoy (cf. Eyal et al. 2001), he, together with co-authors, states that their "position is empirical without being positivist since reality is indeed praxis, and we (and our analyses) are involved in it" (Eyal et al. 2003a, 10). Thus, similar to Foucault, Szelényi has not quite followed the intellectual footsteps of Wright or Burawoy – neither fish nor fowl. That is, his position has a little bit in common with them all but with none particularly or exclusively.

It was indicated in section 3.1 that Szelényi's position on the nature of knowledge overlaps with E. O. Wright's only partly. Wright's ontological position[287] implies that there is a real world about which one can make empirical

---

[285] For an overview of the debate see Wacquant (1989b).

[286] Wacquant (1989b:165) notes that "Wright's answer points to social ontology and science: because there is a world 'out there' and we can 'adjudicate' claims to know it. Burawoy points to politics: because we can enter into and transform that relation".

[287] E. O. Wright (1989e, 210–1):

> I adopt what is generally described as a realist view of science. This involves the following basic view of the scientific enterprise: science attempts to identify the underlying mechanisms which generate the empirical phenomena we experience in the world. Our ability to gain knowledge of these mechanisms is complicated by two properties of the relationship between our observations of the effects of mechanisms – our experiences – and the mechanisms themselves. First, we live in an open system in which many mechanisms are simultaneously operating. This means that the effects of one mechanism may be counteracted by another. There is not, therefore, an invariant relationship between the existence of a mechanism and empirical manifestations of its effects. Secondly, our observations of anything are simultaneously shaped by mechanisms internal to the process of observation itself (which include such things as our systems of classification and description, as well as our technologies of observation) and mechanisms that directly generate (cause) the phenomenon in question. Because of this duality, even apart from the problem of the complexity of living in an open system, it is impossible ever to inductively discover truths about mechanisms simply by generalizations

observations. As it is based on the realist ontological stand, according to which real causal mechanisms exist independently of the theorist, young Wright employed the mainstream survey methodology, which he empowered with insights from Marxism. While he admits that he could be wrong about the truthfulness of these beliefs, he also insists that knowledge of reality does not presume a personal relation to it. For instance, he says that social phenomena such as 'capitalist exploitation' or 'apartheid' exist separately from his individual relation to them, but then his research focus shifted to the theoretical approach of analytical Marxism.[288] Although there is no evidence that he would have examined the ontological and epistemological issues in such detail as Wright, it is apparent from Szelényi's publications[289] that he did try to respond to some ideas presented by Wright (cf. e.g. 1976, 1978a, 1978b, 1979, 1983, 1985, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c) without sharing his sympathies and research interests in analytical Marxism (cf. E. O. Wright 1989d,[290] 1989e). On the one hand, Szelényi does not seem to have had any problems with Wright's early empirical approach[291] as he was pursuing a similar line of inquiry in his own early works. On the other hand, during his professorship at Wisconsin, Szelényi (2012d) experienced intellectual confron-

---

from pure empirical 'facts', since those facts are necessarily shaped by the observation process itself. And this, in turn, implies that in order for observations to be intelligible, they must be embedded in theories about these mechanisms.

    Thus, I reject the view of naive empiricism that we can observe the world without categories already-embedded in theories. Observations cannot be theory-neutral, and therefore our theories can never be simple inductive generalizations from pretheoretical 'facts'. But I also reject the anti-realist view that our observations are wholly constituted by the categories of thought, by the discourses we use in describing the world. Scientific theories attempt to construct explanations based on real mechanisms that exist in the world independently of our theories-even though our observations of those mechanisms and their effects depend in part upon the theories themselves.

[288] See, for instance, E. O. Wright (1985, 1987, 1989d, 1989e) and Levine et al. (1987).

[289] Although Szelényi (2012d) admitted during the interview that he has been suppressing E. O. Wright's impact on him, the link is, nevertheless, apparent in some of his publications. In addition to what was explained in more detail in the chapter that outlined the major cognitive paradigms that underlie Szelényi's evolving sociology of intellectuals – Szelényi's attempt to respond to Wright in the *Socialist Entrepreneurs* (cf. Szelényi 1988a, Ch. 3) and publications that led to it (cf. Manchin and Szelényi 1985:263), one can find links also in the conclusions of "The Prospects and Limits of the East European New Class Project: An Auto-critical Reflection on The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power'" (cf. Szelényi 1986-1987:140–1). Unlike the English version, the original Japanese (cf. Szelényi 1985a) and especially the German version of the paper (cf. Szelényi 1988c:113–4) make references to Wright more apparent. The most important relation, however, might be established between Wright's (1979) paper "Intellectuals and the Class Structure of Capitalist Societies" and Szelényi's (1982a) paper "The intelligentsia in the class structure of state-socialist societies". [For the earlier versions of these papers see: E. O. Wright (1978b) and Szelényi (1978c, 1979c)]. It is noteworthy in that context that Szelényi relates more openly to Gouldner than to E. O. Wright when he (1982a:780) says: "The place intellectuals occupy in the social structure was for Gouldner a lifelong concern. For almost two decades he repeatedly returned to this theme with a self-critical irony".

[290] It has later been published also in E. O. Wright (1994, Ch. 8).

[291] In 1979–1982 E. O. Wright was the project leader of "Dimensions of Social Inequality in Western Societies" (cf. Wright et al. 1990) and in 1982–1985 he was heading the project "Social Structure and Class Consciousness in Contemporary Industrial Societies", both funded by the NSF.

tation with Wright and his disciples. Along with this, Szelényi became doubtful about analytical Marxism, a research program[292] that Wright was building, and later also about the 'real utopia' project[293] that describes his contemporary work cf. (King and Szelényi 2004:220–2). While there is indirect evidence that he has learned to appreciate the Bourdieuian critique that has been presented about Wright's ontology[294] and his understanding of the nature of the basic concepts, such as the (middle-)classes and their boundaries,[295] it is also clear that Szelényi has adopted some concepts from Wright, such as contradictory class locations – phenomena that he seems to assume to be real even if they are empirically difficult to observe. Furthermore, given the fact that he has been researching for decades, both theoretically as well as empirically, the abstract concepts from intellectuals to class, from social structure to social change [to mention just a few key terms that I have discussed elsewhere (Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.2)], it would be difficult to imagine that he would consider these unreal.

Szelényi's position on the nature of knowledge is not quite the same as that of Burawoy either. According to Burawoy (1987), we know that class exists because we can enter politics and transform power relations. Positioned in contrast to Wright, he (ibid:54) promotes, "an alternative which comprehends knowledge as produced and validated through transformative practices. This applies no less to scientific knowledge, which advances through the generation and then solu-

---

[292] While Szelényi refers to it as structuralist or orthodox Marxist class analysis, the group of scholars to which E. O. Wright belonged is also known as the September Group or more informally as No-Bullshit Marxism Group. See Burawoy (1989b:79) who calls it "Marxist structuralism", Kirby (s.a.) in his interview with Wright about the group, its agenda, and their meetings, as well as Parijs (2001) and the sources quoted therein for further literature on what the group has achieved and what it evolved into by the end of the millennium.

[293] This includes the public statements that the podium of the presidency of ASA has allowed him to make (cf. E. O. Wright 2010, 2011, 2013).

[294] First, E. O. Wright's approach is individualistic, which poses the impossible challenge to make aggregated generalizations at the group level, according to Carchedi (1989:10–7). Second, he ignores epistemological problems of his positivist (realist) approach altogether as he overlooks "the power dimension inherent in all knowledge production", according to Wacquant (1989b:165). Finally, his approach creates epistemologically unsolvable problems about how we can learn about the world that we are an intimate part of and which exists only in an inseparable relationship with us according to Burawoy (1989b:87). While Wright seems to have responded to some of Burawoy's criticisms by engaging in political activity, including, for instance, the building and promoting of his 'real utopia' project through the ASA precedency and reducing with it the vulnerability of the Marxist project, it has not made his ontological approach and understanding of the nature of knowledge more appealing to Szelényi.

[295] Wacquant (1989b:175) says:

> [t]he epistemocratic ambition to define once and for all the correct classification, to discover the 'real' boundaries of the middle class, is doomed to failure insofar as it rests on a mistaken conception of the ontological status of groups: the middle class does not exist ready-made in reality; it is a historically variable and reversible effect of struggles over the class as well as between classes. This is why the middle class is an ill-defined entity in objectivity itself. Theories of the middle class(es) should consciously strive to capture this inherent ambiguity, wooliness, and contestedness of their object rather than dispose of them.

tion of anomalies that emerge through engagement with the world".[296] For Burawoy, it is not just the epistemological challenge of how to gain access to better knowledge – it is also an ontological issue as he (ibid:70) rejects the naïve empiricism, arguing that Wright would not be able to defend his commitment to Marxism based on realism alone. According to Burawoy, even scientific Marxism, not to mention revolutionary Marxism, needs to be ideological at least to some extent because, "without dogmatism there is only chaos" (ibid:53). This ideological dogmatism, however, is exactly what Szelényi with his peculiar academic and biographical background wishes to escape from or at least suppress. To put it differently, if one ignored the departmental politics and his quick career within politicized Hungarian sociology, Szelényi, unlike Burawoy, has put his trust exclusively in science, and hence has avoided the more direct political action for a better understanding of the social world.

While it may appear on the basis of the positions of Wright and Burawoy described above that the only choice left for a scholar sympathetic to the new left project in (US) sociology is between Marxist science and Leninist ideology, it is actually not so. Bourdieu does offer an alternative that Szelényi adopts. Indeed, Szelényi incorporates Bourdieu's forms of capital theory into his conceptual model in his late works. Together with insights from Marx and Weber, it offers a solution to the ontological and epistemological challenges of class analysis, and the formation to its boundaries. Indeed, Szelényi (1978b) associates himself with class analysis within 'new urban sociology', King and Szelényi (2004:87–90) combine Marx's ([1852/1869] 1963) insight into the "degree of classness" with Bourdieu's (1986, 2013a) forms of capital theory, and Eyal et al. (2003a:25) take note of Bourdieu's position that "classes are first and foremost 'classes on paper'".[297] This allows Szelényi and his co-authors to deduce that "[o]ne should not overemphasize structural conditions in the making of classes". In this context, Szelényi's comments can be interpreted as if he has taken a position in the debate between Wright and Burawoy.[298] Nevertheless, instead of siding with either of

---

[296] More specifically, Burawoy (1989b:87) states that "[k]nowledge, in this framework, is a function of engagement with the world. The more thorough going, radical that engagement, other things being equal, the more profound our understanding. In seeking to transform the world we learn about the forces resisting transformation. In this sense, science requires revolution". Furthermore, he (ibid) adds that

> Instead of ... amalgam of realism and idealism, I would propose to go beyond both to embrace a different theory of knowledge. In this perspective the world is neither external to us waiting to be mapped nor is it a figment of our imagination but exists in an inseparable relationship to us. The world does not exist outside our relationship to it. We cannot separate ourselves from the world we study. We create and recreate that world and in the process develop our knowledge of it. There is no way we can catapult ourselves out of our self-made prison. Rather, we have to learn to live within it. There is no archimedean standpoint of objectivity. Or as the young Kolakowski once wrote, "in all the universe man cannot find a well so deep that, leaning over it, he does not discover at the bottom his own face."

[297] For details, see Bourdieu (1985a:725–7, 1987b:17) and for a discussion of this idea, see Wilkes (1990).

[298] Actually, this may not be too far off the mark, as he made remarks during the interviews (cf. Szelényi 2012c, 2012d) about the methods employed by E. O. Wright and Burawoy. It gave the

the two, his comments were actually not that different from some of the critical points made by Wacquant (1989c) in his critical review of the debate; this makes a call for the analysis of academic position based on which one makes one's claims about the nature of knowledge and exercises self-imposed censorship. Since this critique is based on Bourdieu's reflexive sociology of science[299] and his notion of the academic field,[300] it would be more appropriate to speak about Bourdieu's approach adopted by Szelényi.

Nevertheless, it is important to realize that Szelényi, together with his co-authors, does not accept (nor adopt) the interpretation of Bourdieu as a cultural class analyst[301] in his late works, nor does he follow his lead to become involved in politics. While Bourdieu incorporates a complicated mixture of objective (materialist) and subjective (habitual/cultural) components into his class analysis,[302] Eyal et al. maintain the view adopted in *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists*, which combines insights from Weber's distinction between rank and class with Bourdieu's (1989b) notion of forms of capital and social space. The interpretation of Weber's rank in close relationship to Bourdieu's bundle of social/political, economic, and cultural capitals (that different social groups or actors hold) functions as the key to their understanding of changes in social structure, stratification, and class dynamics. This combined position of Weber's and Bourdieu's principles of class analysis allows Szelényi in his late works to seek a middle ground between the (somewhat) opposing views of Wright and Burawoy on the nature of knowledge. On the one hand, Szelényi flirts with Wright's notion of contradictory class locations but rejects his project of analytical Marxism. On the other hand, he has not adopted the methodology that presupposes political intervention like Burawoy (1989a, 1991, 1998a, 2003a, 2005a, 2009) or entered politics to transform the power relations like Bourdieu (2003a, 2008b).

Even though he sympathizes with the empirical tradition, which is well grounded in critical theory and takes the position of the defender of the weak and vulnerable, he does not want to become involved in politics – unlike Wright, who hardly ever lost enthusiasm for building 'real utopias' (cf. E. O. Wright 2010, 2011, 2013). Burawoy, for whom engaging in politics is a matter of gaining better knowledge, or Bourdieu, for whom it is a matter of defending the intellectual field, Szelényi seeks approval from both critical and professional sociology and hence avoids direct involvement in the affairs of the state.

While his early scholarship, formed in Hungary, can be seen as a result of his proximity to the academic and political establishment and thus intimate access to sensitive information about the thinking and acting of the leading reform intelligentsia, which he then conceptualized as "intellectuals on the road to class

---

impression that he is not only aware of their positions but also this exchange of ideas between the two.

[299] For details, see Bourdieu (1968; 1990a, Ch. 1, Ch. 13; 1991c; 2004a; 2008a).

[300] For details, see Bourdieu (1969; 1975; 1988a, esp. Preface to the English Edition; 1989a; 1990a, Ch. 9; 1991a; 1991c; 1993b; 1996b, Postscript; 1997; 2000b; 2004b, 146; 2008b) as well as Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992 Part II, Ch. 3)

[301] See Grusky (2007:4814–4816) for that kind of interpretation of Bourdieu.

[302] See Weininger (2005) for that kind of interpretation of Bourdieu.

power", his works created in Australia and the US could not benefit from such a unique and dual knowledge-power position. Indeed, while his early scholarship can in itself be seen as an example of the Foucauldian intimate relationship between knowledge and power, the same cannot be said about his years as an emigré. Once in the West, he comes to realize even more the power of critical discourse, on the one hand, and learns (to manipulate) the hegemonic rules of the game in US academic sociology, on the other. It is precisely this shifting ontological and epistemological commitment, if not selective loyalty toward the socialist project that irritates Burawoy in Szelényi's scholarship. It seems that it is namely this ideological commitment (or willingness to admit it) on behalf of Burawoy, on the one hand, and the lack of ideological commitment (or unwillingness to admit it) on behalf of Szelényi that has led to a heated debate, if not a conflict between the two (cf. Burawoy 2001; Eyal et al. 2001, 2003a).[303] Although this shift in Szelényi's scholarship may appear as a strategic choice to avoid being labeled an ideologist, there is no evidence that he would accept Wright's or Burawoy's understanding of the nature of knowledge. Somewhat similar to Bourdieu, who combines the objective (materialist) and subjective (habitual/cultural) positions in his approach to the study of objective reality and subjective constructivism, Szelényi relates the positions of structural/historical insights, characteristic of the critical tradition, with empiricism that symbolizes post-positivism and intersubjectivity that signifies pragmatism, which is tolerant toward both emic *and* etic viewpoints in his analysis of the role of intellectuals in social change. As a result, his position on the nature of knowledge allows him to respect both nomothetic and idiographic knowledge.

3.9   Knowledge Accumulation

Szelényi and his co-authors do not say much explicitly about knowledge accumulation in the key text "On Irony". Nonetheless, it is argued throughout this chapter, including this subsection, that he has been combining the elements of post-positivism and critical theory. On the one hand, he seems to accept the principles of post-positivism, according to which knowledge accumulation follows accretion – the findings of single studies and research programs function as building blocks by adding to generalizations, theories and the overall 'edifice of knowledge'. On the other hand, he also seems to accept the position of critical theory that knowledge accumulation is a result of historical revisionism, generalization by similarity, internal statistical generalization, analytical generalization, case-to-case transfer and/or naturalistic generalization.

Indeed, when it comes to knowledge accumulation, one can interpret Szelényi's research program on intellectuals as an example of how to make a contribution to social theory development. His continuous research interest in the role of the well-educated in (post-)socialist society seems to suggest that sociology can be a cumulative science – an issue that has attracted quite some attention (cf. Alexander and Colomy 1992, Berger et al. 1989, J. H. Turner 1989 and B. S.

---

[303] Compare also the reflections on their research made by Burawoy (2002) and Szelényi (2002).

Turner 1989). Yet, it is not a given that he would become involved in discussions related to the philosophy of (social) sciences, which both Taagepera (2008) and J. H. Turner (1992) find so greatly disturbing and ineffective about the current nature of and prevailing trends in social sciences, including sociology. Instead of following their vision of how to develop (general) sociological theory, his approach to the accumulation of knowledge and contribution to theory development follows a different and much more developmentalist pattern, as I have demonstrated elsewhere (cf. Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.2) within the discussion devoted to the evolution of Szelényi's ideas. Under the circumstances where sociology is increasingly fragmented and divided into various camps, he provides a solution at the micro level on ways of contributing to the development of sociological knowledge and its theory building by setting up 'research programs' as conceptualized by Lakatos (1978). Although it may not have been Szelényi's conscious choice to set these up, but rather simply test out on paper yet another idea on a closely related topic of interest to him at the time, they can, nevertheless, be grouped together post factum as I have done elsewhere (cf. Kroos 2018, Appendix 7). That is, his decades of research on intellectuals in different phases of (post-)socialist societies and their change demonstrate that reflexive theoretical work and repetitive empirical assessment of the 'unit theory', as Wagner and Berger (1985:702–4) call the testable conceptual propositions that should be evaluated and re-evaluated within a given sociological research program, can make a daring but modest (Wagner 1992) contribution to theory development. It would not be an overstatement to say that Szelényi's research reviewed in the critical meta-theory analysis by Kroos (2018) elsewhere represents an even purer case of the Kuhnian *exemplar* of the sociological research program than those described by Wagner (1984) and Wagner and Berger (1985:709–23).

In their paper on post-positivism, Alexander and Colomy (1992:33–9) argued that the adoption of the above-mentioned research program's view on knowledge accumulation and theory development might indeed be the best chance to provide a solution for the accumulation of knowledge and the development of theory in sociology. To put it differently, to overcome the limitations of positivism (cf. Giddens 1974) and its anti-positivist extreme, a fundamental restructuring of positivism is needed, according to them. While their argument is abstract, Szelényi's actions toward that end are real. For instance, Alexander and Colomy argue that limited (not infinite) combinations of different research approaches and methods are available for theory development if they are combined intelligently. In this sense, Szelényi seems to have understood early on that "positivism might be the critical theorists' best friend" as J. H. Turner (1992:165) puts it. Such a combination of research approaches, which are typically seen as antagonist, is only possible because he does not find these essentially non-commensurable, as will be argued in more detail in sub-section 3.18 on accommodation and commensurability. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that, unlike J. H. Turner, Szelényi does not maintain that positivism would provide the lacking "understanding of the operative dynamics of human organization" (ibid) but rather jobs, funding and respect among peers, among whom the quantitative re-

search tradition is enjoying more prestige, as will be argued in more detail in the sub-section devoted to hegemony.

In other words, one should not infer from the above-mentioned that Szelényi is "more Catholic than the Pope" regarding theory development and accumulation of knowledge. Rather than worrying about the purity of the research approach, he adopts elements from different traditions that J. H. Turner (ibid:161–7) identifies as critics of "positivistic sociology": phenomenological solipsism, hermeneutical dualisms, historical particularism, critical discourse, and scientific policies. To begin with, his theoretical apparatus is closely related to the critical discourse and conflict tradition as I have shown elsewhere (cf. Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1) in the chapter devoted to the paradigm and theories that underlie his sociology of intellectuals. Furthermore, his approach is also historically particularistic as he works primarily on Hungarian cases and data when he analyses the role of intellectuals in the current history of the societies of CEE/FSU (and more recently also China) as demonstrated by me elsewhere (cf. ibid, Ch. 3.2.) as well as in the sub-section more particularly devoted to methodology earlier in this chapter. Furthermore, he flirts with ideas originating from phenomenology, as indicated in the previous sub-sections, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter in the sub-section devoted to Reflexivity (see 3.17). In other words, his idiographic approach to research can be seen as hermeneutical because he draws and reflects on a great deal of his own personal experiences in professional life and the Hungarian social setting, as will be shown later in this chapter. The adoption of selective elements from these approaches, which as mentioned above, are typically seen as non- or even anti-positivist in essence, allows him to accumulate knowledge and make his 'daring' but 'modest' contribution to the sociology of intellectuals and social change.

Indeed, Szelényi learned to use irony in his own major works that make up in his own words "the Grand Narrative of social structure and social change under socialism and post-communism" (Szelényi 2002:42). In other words, what he is saying is that he has been developing the same line of argument over his academic career in his key publications – starting from his PhD dissertation, later published in English as *Urban Inequalities Under State Socialism*, to *The Intellectuals On the Road to Class Power*, and continuing from *Socialist Entrepreneurs* to *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists*. One may add that in addition to the topic of social stratification that unites them is the method of irony that 'exploits' the paradox between generally understood/expected and actually observed.

More specifically, in *Urban Inequalities Under State Socialism* he shows that, contrary to expected, it was not the workers who were preferred in the distribution of the newly built flats in the so-called workers' states. Instead, the socialist system (that Szelényi calls socialist redistributive economies) preferred the *apparatchiki*, and therefore they were overrepresented among the occupants of the state-built and subsidized housing. To make the system even more unequal, the ones left out of the redistribution obtained the cooperative flats on their savings and loans. These ideas were taken a step further in *The Intellectuals On the Road to Class Power* which claimed that for the first time in the history of mankind a

system has been developed where the stratification is not based on private ownership but on knowledge and that this is of class nature. The irony of it is to be found in the claim that the communist system that was supposed to abolish the stratification and exploitation on the basis of private property, was on its way to replacing it with a new class system based on knowledge. In the *Socialist Entrepreneurs* the paradox was found in the fact that the socio-economic system that was to achieve economic equality and prosperity based on common ownership and party rule, actually experienced the continuation of the development of the local petty bourgeoisie in Eastern Europe. Although it was interrupted in 1949, it resumed again in the late 1970s and early 1980s within the opportunities offered by the second economy. Last but not least, in the *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists* it was argued that in the CEE transition, the market economy and its institutions were in the process of being created without local capital and entrepreneurs (rather than with Western capital and former apparatchiki). In short, the thesis statements of Szelényi's key texts, reflected also in their titles which might sound like a contradiction in terms, at first sight, show that he is the master of irony.

To summarize the discussion of this section, one can say that Szelényi represents a scholar who intelligently combines the positions of post-positivism and critical theory in his approach to knowledge accumulation and theory development. However, rather than taking the evangelist position toward positivism and suggesting, similar to Taagepera (2008) or J. H. Turner (1992), that social scientists should not only learn from natural scientists, in general, but they should also adopt from them the *modus operandi* if they are to achieve their aim – the comprehension of the operative dynamics of the social universe – Szelényi takes a different road. He rejects the idea that sociology should necessarily aim at the discovery of causal relationships or even laws. While he does not have high regard for conducting experiments to study issues of interest to sociologists, he still has some trust in the survey design – or at least he understands it well enough that, given the hegemonic power position of positivism among his peers, some 'number crunching' is necessary to have a chance in the highly competitive academic marketplace. His practical approach to the theoretically well-informed empirical research, pursued over decades in a way that can now be interpreted as research programs, has meant returning to his own previous research and reflexively building on it by reinterpreting both the conceptual foundation and empirical results in the face of his new theoretical discoveries/sympathies and fresh data from the changed socio-economic and political CEE/FSU context. Indeed, as I have shown elsewhere (Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.2) in the chapter, which was devoted to the discussion of the evolution of Szelényi's sociology of intellectuals, including how it has changed over time, adaptations of its original conception, and significant landmarks in its evolution, it should have become apparent that his research is truly evolving. Furthermore, as I have demonstrated elsewhere (ibid, Ch. 3.3.1–3.3.3) in the sections that discuss the impact of the sociocultural, disciplinary, and political context – especially the formative years in Hungary before his emigration – that it is also truly reflexive. This allows him to overcome the

limitations of both positivism and its antipositivist critics. On the one hand, he complements the positivist hope of empiricism (including measurement) with insights and elements from phenomenological solipsism, hermeneutical dualisms, historical particularism, critical discourse, and politics of sociology. On the other hand, he goes beyond the typical approach of the critical / conflict tradition that lacks interest in empirical research as observed by some vocal critics, such as Bourdieu (1991d:383), Bourdieu et al. (1991:248) and Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009:164–5). Unlike the 'industry average', Szelényi does not share "the phobia of empirical matters" (ibid, 3), which is so common among the scholars of critical theory (and hermeneutics). In that sense, he is not only "on the same side of the barricade" as the critics but one of the rare examples of how critical theory can indeed be merged with empirical sociological research and how the latter can benefit from the former in terms of methodology, research and concept formation (cf. Agger 1991).

In short, his theoretical apparatus is closely related to and benefits from the empirical research projects and vice versa. Thus, his empirical research is theoretically informed and his conceptual work is empirically powered. Returning to the research themes repeatedly, confronting the theory with new evidence, data, innovations and lessons from theory development, shows how accumulating knowledge and building theory – laying his bricks on the wall – can be done in practice. That is, the reflexive mode to return and reinterpret his own original ideas in the face of new socio-political and economic evidence does not only allow Szelényi to develop his partial ideas formulated and presented in articles and book chapters into monographs, but to cumulate knowledge – to make his contribution to the sociology of intellectuals and the conceptual understanding of the role of elites in social change.

3.10 Goodness and Quality Criteria

Irony as a method of neoclassical sociology puts its value in originality rather than technical rigor. Being both empirically and critically oriented, it should not come as a surprise that it appreciates both the principles of post-positivism and critical theory. On the one hand, Szelényi and his co-authors do not reject the conventional benchmarks of rigor associated with post-positivism: internal and external validity, reliability and objectivity. On the other hand, they do appreciate critical theory's emphasis on historical situatedness, the reduction of ignorance and misperceptions, and the involvement of participants in knowledge construction and validation. Nonetheless, it will be argued below that originality has an upper hand when it comes to goodness and quality for Szelényi.

Understandably, there is quite some debate over the goodness and quality criteria in academia. On the one hand, this is natural for a system that is partly defined by the pursuit and admiration of excellence. On the other hand, it is very sensitive for the parties involved, as some of them (esp. in professional fields like economics, law, and medicine) believe, rightly or not, that based on their intellectual talent they would have made a better living outside academia. Some of the actors who behave strategically take an interest in quality criteria as they

understand that it determines their position within the academic establishment – the lifeblood of their research line, the success of their academic careers, and the prospects of their followers. Given the high stakes of the parties involved in the social sciences, including sociology, that is characterized by the pre-normal science stage of development, the ancient (Lewin 1931) 'paradigm wars' (Gage 1989 and Hammersley 1992) continue to be fought despite the efforts to bridge the two traditions and overcome the dogmas of the qualitative-quantitative incompatibility thesis.[304] These clashes primarily occur between qualitatively and quantitatively oriented scholars even though the literature devoted to the quality criteria in the mixed methods research has moved beyond it and provided general quality criteria that should be applicable to all traditions.[305]

Within US academic sociology, the lack of consensus about the quality criteria can be found in the critical responses and reactions to the Capitoline Triad of Parsons, Lazarsfeld, and Merton by scholars like Sorokin (1956), Mills (1959) and Gouldner (1970). Unlike House (2019) who sees that this conflict carried over to contemporary times may lead to a split of the discipline into two – 'the scientific/empirical' and 'the humanistic/philosophical' – parting ways as one of the three options, Szelényi with his co-authored proposal "On Irony: An Invitation to Neoclassical Sociology" is suggesting a balance be found between the two. Like the founding fathers of classical sociology, we need to return to a scholarship that does not separate theory from empirical analysis. In this line of argument, he is on board with commentators like Calhoun (1995, 2005, esp. 2022) rather than Wallerstein (2003) or House (2019).

Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that Szelényi has not participated in any of these debates directly and seems to care little about their content. He emphasizes originality (sparkling new ideas) over the technically skillful application of (data) analysis methods. The latter is useful for impressing peers and being successful in applying for competitive research funding but does not necessarily produce anything valuable. To put it differently, he seems to agree with H. S. Becker (1970, esp. Ch. 1) that truly original and award-winning research is not the product of a skillful appliance of technical knowledge on quantitative (or qualitative) methods, but rather the product of creativity.

The following comment that he gave during the interview (Szelényi 2012d) on the cooperation experience with Treiman within the research project "Social Stratification in Eastern Europe" illustrates the point:

> I carried out the survey in 1992–93 with Don Treiman, who was a colleague of mine. But we did, you know… He had very good skills to write grant proposals so I think a lot of credit should go to him that we got the million dollars that we needed for this project. But I do not think that there was virtually any intellectual exchange between us, you know. He was a survey guy, you know, for him

---

[304] See, for instance, Alise and Teddlie (2010), Howe (1988; 2002, Ch. 3), Mahoney and Goertz (2006), Niglas (2010), and Toomela (2011).

[305] For details, see Bryman et al. (2008); Gelo, Braakmann and Benetka (2008); Eisenhart and Howe (1992); Howe and Eisenhart (1990); King et al. (1994); Niglas (2007:196–197); Onwuegbuzie et al. (2011) as well as Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007).

this was another survey for him to do – I was not very interested in the technical issues of the surveys but I was interested in the substance of the survey. So, there was a clear division of labor between us in this respect. But I would be... I would have difficulties digging out an idea from my mind what emerged in me by talking to him, right.

With regard to conceptual research, he has highly valued the empirical analysis of theoretical claims, but, as with positivists, he does not seem to reduce the quality of theory to falsification, predictive power or parsimony. Unlike Popper (1963, Ch. 1), who argues that the quality of a theory can only be discovered in empirical tests, he seems to also appreciate a conceptual argument that is simply elegant and/or thought-provoking. In other words, as a dominant theoretician of intellectuals and social change in CEE/FSU, he places the highest value on the originality of the ideas which can be demonstrated by his reviews. Without repeating comments I have made elsewhere (Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1), one could mention within this context that he highly appreciates, for instance, the contributions to the analysis of socialist political economy by Kornai (cf. Szelényi 1985c,[306] 1993, 2009b) and Polányi (cf. Szelényi 1991c), post-communist welfare states by Cerami and Vanhuysse (cf. Szelényi 2011a), critical theory by Fehér et al. (cf. Szelényi 1984), Gouldner (cf. Szelényi 1980b, 1982b), Hegedüs (cf. Szelényi 2000), Márkus (cf. Szelényi 2010b), and Ossowska (cf. 1988d), namely for the originality of their ideas.[307] In short, he appreciates innovative and inspiring conceptual ideas on social theory, in general, and on intellectuals, cultural capital, symbolic domination, and new class theories, in particular (cf. Martin and Szelényi 1987; King and Szelényi 2004).

Szelényi values the scholars who are conceptually original, provocative and inspiring – or alternatively – he disgraces authors who lack originality. While he sometimes gives credit for coherence (cf. Szelényi 1985b:516), consistency (cf. Szelényi 1984b:363), addressing the right issues (cf. Szelényi 1997), as well as for empirical work being well done (cf. Szelényi 1986e:1288), he seems to appreciate other scholars just for the novelty of their ideas. For instance, he (1986a) reticulates the vast majority of Marxist philosophers in the USSR (except Lotman) presented by Scanion for lacking any critical originality. He does not even hesitate to criticize his long-term friends. For instance, he (2012b:1163) concludes his obituary for an old friend with a note that "I do not know whether Jiŕi Musil was a great sociologist. By all likelihood, he was not (neither am I) – only time can tell". Likewise, he (1983b:316) sums up his review of David Lane's book *The End of Social Inequality* with a statement that it "is a sound, reliable analysis of Socialist type of Societies needed in the time of a new Cold War. This second edition is basically a restatement of the 1971 version and adds little to

---

[306] In addition to the review of Kornai's *Economics of Shortage* this critique also includes his comments on Tamas Bauer's *Tervagazdasag, Beruhazas, Ciklusok* [Planned Economy, Investments, Cycles].

[307] Likewise, Szelényi (1986d) complains about the lack of originality in some other reviewed works.

our theoretical understanding, but since it is updated with more current data it is a useful book, especially in undergraduate sociology teaching".

It must be noted that Szelényi is equally merciless toward scholars who seek originality for the sake of it. For instance, in his review of McKeown's *Marxist Political Economy and Marxist Urban Sociology*, he (1988b:506) says that the claimed theoretical contribution of the author (compared to Manuel Castells and Jean Lojkine) "will have to wait until we can judge on the basis of empirical analysis what the author can explain about the urban phenomenon". As if this is not enough to discredit someone diplomatically, he adds in the same review that "I learned lots of new words from the book, but I learned precious little about actual social processes…".

This brings the discussion to Szelényi's criteria for judging empirical research. As for research that is not only conceptual but also factual, he does not approach the issue in the above-mentioned instrumentalist-methodological manner, but rather in a pragmatic way where data and its analysis are not an aim in themselves, but rather a way to find support from empirical observations for the conceptual models and claims. Again, this can be best demonstrated based on the reviews he has written about the works of other scholars. For instance, an inspection of his many published book reviews (esp. in the *Contemporary Sociology* and *Slavic Review* but occasionally also in the *Acta Sociologica*, *American Journal of Sociology*, *American Sociological Review*, *European Sociological Review*, *Czech Sociological Review*, *Ethics*, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *Rural Sociology*, and *Telos*) reveals that he never attacks anyone on the basis of the technical issues of methodology.[308] Similarly, in his reviews of more theoretically oriented works, he pays due respect to the empirically oriented scholars primarily for their theoretical contributions. For instance, Szelényi's (2006:1624) review of *The Vanishing Hectare* by Verdery ends with the comment that "[h]er book is empirically the richest and theoretically the most ambitious work written so far on post-socialist agriculture in Europe". Even when the analysis does not seem to be so outstanding as to deserve the highest appreciation, he gives credit for raising interesting or important questions.[309]

In other words, he is skeptical about the value of dataistic social science, although not ignorant of the importance of finding sound evidence to support a theoretical proposition. For example, in addition to his generally friendly review of Ferge's *A Society in the Making. Hungarian Social and Societal Polity 1945–75*, he notes that she "is probably the most interesting Hungarian sociologist today as well as having the most impressive research record" (Szelényi 1982c:121), that

---

[308] One of the exceptions to this rule is to be found in his editorial comments on the papers by Musil as well as Csanádi and Ladányi for the special issue of the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* (cf. Szelényi 1987a:5–6).

[309] For instance, his review of Hollos and Maday's New Hungarian Peasants ends on the note that "[t]his is a fine, informative book, with few definitive answers but many good questions for future research" (Szelényi 1984c:439). Likewise, he ends the review of Petras's *Capitalist and Socialist Crises in the Late Twentieth Century* with a citation of Hugh Stretton, the distinguished Australian historian, who had told him: "I like Marxists. Though they usually have the wrong answers, they always ask the right questions" (Szelényi 1985b:517).

"the evidence Ferge uses to support her claim for the continuous decline of inequalities ... is rather poor" (ibid:124). Along the same lines, he (1986c:155) ends the review of *Peasants in Socialist Transition* by Bell on the note that "[w]hile I appreciate the accuracy of the ethnographic accounts in the book ..., I am less persuaded by the predictive power of the analysis".

Likewise, his review of David Harvey's *Consciousness and the Urban Experience: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization* criticizes the author for attempting to apply "Marx's own method" properly – to upgrade his historical materialism to "historical-geographical materialism". He says that "whenever the time horizons for the analysis become more limited, whenever Harvey moves from metatheory and philosophy of history to more concrete tasks ..., I become more skeptical about the usefulness or even the viability of the whole project". Thus, he is "unimpressed", "unpersuaded", "frustrated" as he is convinced that "it would be a terrible mistake for ... sociology to return to the mindless empiricism of the 1940s and 1950s" (Szelényi 1986b:709), on the one hand, and "identifying Marxism more with a set of concepts than with a particular method" (ibid:710), on the other. His suggestion for Harvey, as for others who wish to demonstrate the relevance of Marxism to contemporary empirical research, is to, "sacrifice most of the concepts of the doctrine (particularly dated and obscure concepts ...) and emphasize the method" (ibid). While he does not discuss his precise viewpoint, one can infer from his publications that it is not the technical data analysis techniques that he emphasizes, but rather something he seems to have borrowed from Habermas (1973),[310] who has made it his project to reconstruct historical materialism (cf. Habermas 1975, 1976a, 1979) and critical theory (cf. Habermas 1984).[311] Indeed, his solution is to undertake a Habermasian reconstruction,[312] the critical dissection and redevelopment of the basic concepts from scratch, which he later undertakes himself [cf. Eyal et al.

---

[310] Possibly, the additional collegial influences can be linked to Castells' (1977, 1983) defection from the 'Marxist fold' and Alexander's (1978) efforts to reconstruct the formal and substantive voluntarism in the theories of Parsons.

[311] For additional discussion on Habermas' reconstruction of the concepts of universality and rationality, see Bohman and Rehg (2014) and for the analysis in the context of the (new) class as well as discourse as an act of domination, see King and Szelényi (2004:163–8). For an alternative interpretation of rational reconstruction in the context of the history of science and research programs, which predates Habermas and links with what was discussed in the previous sub-sections of "Knowledge accumulation", see I. Lakatos (1970).

[312] It is not entirely clear what this entails. Pedersen (2008:457) notes that despite the prominent position of Habermas and his philosophy, his method of rational reconstruction has attracted little discussion. To clarify, he (ibid, 482) explains that "[t]he concept of reconstruction is used by Habermas in (at least) two distinct ways, without it always being equally clear what is meant. First, reconstruction is being performed in the sense that he starts with earlier theorists or theoretical positions, picks these apart, corrects them for errors, and puts them back together again. Second, reconstruction is a methodical approach...".

(1998, Ch. 1–2[313]); Eyal et al. (2003a); Szelényi (1991c, 2009a, Lecture 17); Szelényi and Kostello (1998:306) as well as King and Szelényi (2004[314])].

In addition to theoretical originality and empirical soundness, he values historical situatedness, similar to comparative sociologists. This is perhaps best illustrated by his explanation of the structural position of intellectuals in different models of economic integration (Konrád and Szelényi 1979, Part II), in general, and in the socialist redistributive system (ibid, Part III-IV; Szelényi 1978c, 1979c, 1982a) in particular. It also emerges from his synthesis of the "Market Transition Debate" (cf. Szelényi and Kostello 1996), and his attempts to measure its three thesis statements reworded by Nee (1989) – the market power, incentive, and opportunity theses in the context of CEE/FSU transition (cf. Hanley and Szelényi 2001; Szelényi and Glass 2003) and the emergence of varieties of post-communist economic models [cf. King and Szelényi (2005, 2006), Szelényi (2008b, 2008c, 2009c, 2010a, 2010c, 2015b), Szelényi et al. (1994) as well as Szelényi and Mihályi (2000)].

While Szelényi sometimes limits the value of empirical historical material to little more than something which makes for interesting reading (cf. Szelényi 1986b, 708), as a comparative-historical sociologist, he seems to value most highly innovativeness, comprehensiveness, and honesty, which comprise the quality criteria historians are evaluated by, according to Krathwohl (2004:571). Yet, it must be emphasized in that context that, similar to the above-mentioned methodological discussions between qualitative and quantitative researchers, he has not been interested in the debate between comparative methodologists (cf. Ragin 1987, 2000, 2009) and the representatives of the quantitative tradition (cf. Achen 2005). For him, the quality criterion of comparative-historical research stays at the theoretical level.

For instance, when Szelényi assesses the validity of Ferge's twenty years of comparative research of the 'capitalist' and 'socialist' welfare systems, he (1982c:124) says that:

> a comparison of the extent of inequality between two different social systems has only limited theoretical value. The more interesting task is to compare the structure and system of inequalities. After establishing that under socialism inequalities generated by profit do not exist, as I have, one needs to investigate whether the observed inequalities in socialist societies are inherent to socialism or are simply products of forces which are not integral to the socioeconomic functioning of the society under investigation, e.g. of forces linked to the stage of economic growth, the level of technological development, past history, etc. In other words, can we identify a socialist, or state socialist system of inequalities, in which the inequalities are reproducing themselves.

---

[313] See also their more specific comments on reconstruct(ion) – Eyal et al. (1998:6, 111, 187, 230, 235).

[314] Surprisingly enough, King and Szelényi do not make the point that they aim to reconstruct the theories of the new class themselves. Yet, the basic idea is nevertheless there, as some reviewers have noticed (cf. e.g. Gantman 2005:1029–30).

It should thus be clear that Szelényi appreciates empirically rich and theoretically ambitious (or at least well-informed) social research. Yet, it might be difficult to comprehend why Szelényi seems to hold almost opposing or contradictory opinions on a particular scholar. For instance, he states in one of his reviews of Campeanu: "I admire his political courage, the lucidity of his analysis, and his unusual talent for theory construction" (Szelényi 1990b:1067), and in another review: "[t]he empirical material presented in the … book helps to clarify the theory … but the quality of historical analysis does not measure up to the intellectual standards of the theory" (Szelényi 1987b:641). Furthermore, given his tendency to grant almost the same amount of significance to the political value of the contribution as to its academic merit (cf. Szelényi 1982d:220; 1987b:641; 1990b:1068), may indeed be puzzling. Yet, given the specific elements of Szelényi's 'metaphysical pathos' (sometimes categorized into critical theory, while other times into (post)positivism or simultaneously into both paradigms like his position on 'knowledge accumulation') such a vacillating position may not be that surprising anymore. Rather than reflecting a conflict of the quality standards he stands for, his views that research should have, in addition to being intellectually stimulating, political relevance, simply reflects his dual commitment to the values of these two schools of thought.[315]

Unlike the critical theorists who emphasize the transformative and emancipatory role of the intellectual, he does not accept that the results of these practical/political interventions should be used to evaluate the value of research/science. While the dialogical principle of critical theory characterizes Szelényi's research rather well, he would not accept that the actualization of the anticipated transformation ("catalytic and tactical authenticities" as they are called) should be used as the quality criteria of research.[316] On the one hand, he (1980a:133) would be happy to see that because his research measures were taken to improve the well-being of disadvantaged or marginalized groups. On the other hand, it seems logical to conclude from his insistence on value freedom that, similar to Castells (2000:390), he would find it correct to separate the evaluation of research results from its practical applications. In other words, it seems logical that he knows the balance of power within academia well enough not to fight against the post-positivist quality criteria of reliability, internal validity, external validity, and objectivity. Therefore, he has not been willing to accept the interventionalist approaches in the philosophy of science that in Lincoln and Guba's (2000:178) interpretation should be used as the validity criteria for critical social science. In short, he does not seem to appreciate their argument that this kind of research should be evaluated by trustworthiness.

---

[315] It also explains why he designed instead of a regular sociology program at NYUAD the applied "Social Research and Public Policy'' program (cf. Durst 2015:120; New York University Abu Dhabi s.a.; Szelényi 2012d).

[316] Although the saying that 'the proof of the pudding is in the eating' has been associated with Engels (e.g. Althusser 1970, Part I), actually it dates back to 1605 when William Camden is known to have put it on paper for the first time in his *Remaines of a Greater Worke Concerning Britaine*.

There is no doubt that Szelényi knows from his practical experience of holding respectable academic positions at various academic intuitions around the world that when judging the quality of someone's academic work, originality and "publishing in the right places" overshadow the importance of meeting the ideals of the above-mentioned discussions over internal or external quality criteria in the philosophy of science. Indeed, without having to learn the lessons of Latour's (1987) ethnographic study of actual science practice,[317] but based on his experience in academic and administrative roles in university organizations in Hungary, the UK, Australia, the US as well as Abu Dhabi, he knows well that what matters in the actual evaluation, hiring and promotion decisions is the reputation of journals and publishing houses. Together with the ability to apply for external/competitive research funds, they are more important than meeting the quality criteria of comparative-historical analysis, critical theory or even (post)positivism. Given the fact that he was chairing the Council of Academic Personnel at UCLA,[318] he must know very well that at best, the creativity, honesty, uniqueness of data sources, and transformative-emancipatory power of academic work is measured indirectly through publications.

What an irony that L. King (2013) recalled that Szelényi would expect from the department members at Yale/UCLA to publish in AJS and ASR, on the one hand, and admit that these journals are destroying sociology, on the other! This does not only show that he knows the rules of the game within American establishment sociology but has partly accepted its simplified understanding of the goodness and quality criteria. Unlike openly anti-establishment scholars like Mills, Bourdieu or Gouldner, he does not fight the rules, but rather maneuvers between departmental politics and academic integrity. Once again, given his insistence on value freedom and awareness of the actual evaluation practices in academia, it seems logical to conclude that Szelényi's position on goodness and understanding of quality criteria falls between post-positivism (because of departmental politics, reasons mentioned above) and critical theory (because of his intrinsic motives and ways of conducting research). Szelényi's emphasis on the

---

[317] Latour's research reveals that in real life, the ideals of positivism are hardly followed even by natural scientists [cf. Latour (1987) and Latour and Woolgar (1983)].

[318] As Szelényi (2012d) explained during the interview:

> [A]t UCLA they invited me to serve on, what they call, the Council of Academic Personnel. The University of California system has a unique academic personnel system because they have a committee, composed of 13 people who oversee every major personnel action in the university. There is a lot of personnel action: reviews and promotions in the UC system all the time. So, during my time at the UCLA, we had about 3000 faculty. So we saw about 1000 cases every year. The committee met once or twice a week and assessed about 15 or 20 cases: be it, you know, tenure or a third-year review or promotion to full professor, promotion to distinguished professor – all kinds of issues. Well, I did not know how I will do it but, you know, I quite liked it: I thought it was quite interesting you try to compare personnel cases from the medical school to the law school and colleagues between in physics and comparative literature and anthropology. It was a ..., I found it an exciting intellectual exercise. So, in the second year, they asked me to chair the committee. So, I was kind of the chief of academic personnel – on the academic side that was the most powerful person at the UCLA. And I loved it and I did a very good job.

reduction of ignorance and misperceptions, in addition to his uniqueness, makes his approach to critical analysis closest to the position of Gouldner (1980a, Introduction). While he has his heart in the right place, he is not willing to accept the call to action like Gouldner or Bourdieu and risk his position in a fight against hegemony, as I have mentioned elsewhere (cf. Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1) in the chapter devoted to the identification of the major cognitive paradigms that underlie Szelényi's evolving sociology of intellectuals. This will also be discussed in some detail in the next sub-section as well as in that devoted to the call to action. Accepting the position of positivism gives him a good alibi not to become engaged and allows him to distance himself from the disturbing creativity of Leninists (such as Lukács[319]), neo-Leninists (such as Bahro), neo-Maoists (such as Haraszti), and contemporary Trotskyists (such as Djilas, Cliff, Seezy and Bettelheim) when it occurs at the expense of ignorance and misperceptions of the social reality of 'actually existing socialism'.[320]

3.11 Hegemony

Irony as an anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue could be expected to challenge the hegemony of the (US) elite sociology establishment. One could interpret the key text "On Irony: An Invitation to Neoclassical Sociology" in this way. Yet, it will be argued below that if one takes Szelényi's own scholarship and academic career as an example, it appears that he is well aware of the power position of the post-positivists when it comes to control of the most prestigious publication outlets, funding agencies, promotion to tenure track positions at elite academic institutions, on the one hand, and the promise that the use of the tools of Marxism against Marxists can offer. Hence, irony as the method of neoclassical sociology has to be both empirical and critical – accept the hegemony in order to stay in the game, on the one hand, and have the ammunition to challenge the power relations, on the other.

Hegemony is closely related to the issues of training, methodology, quality criteria, and control discussed above. Guba and Lincoln (1994) identify paradigms also by their position in the social sciences compared to the influence of others. Although Burawoy and Wright, two American sociologists who have crossed paths with Szelényi several times both in Hungary and the US, have recently held presidencies of the American Sociological Association (ASA) and

[319] Such a claim has been made e.g. by Steiner (2000) and Žižek (2000) based on Lukács's recently discovered, and previously believed to be destroyed, manuscript that was published under the title *A Defense of History and Class Consciousness: Tailism and the Dialectic*. Stahl (2018), however, indicates that one cannot probably take all his (public) statements at face value in the context of being summoned by the CPSU to Moscow where he was working at the Marx-Engels Institute. Furthermore, he says: "The degree of Lukács' agreement with Stalinism is disputed to this day …. However, it is clear from his writings that he publicly defended Stalinist dogmas both in aesthetics and politics during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s … while criticizing Stalin and Stalinism repeatedly later on…". Additionally, one may consult his published works on Leninism (cf. Lukács [1924] 1971c), Stalinism, and Trotskyism (cf. Lukács [1962] 1963). Comments on his early position (i.e. rejection of) Bolshevism can also be found in Lukács ([1918] 1977) as well as Arato and Breines (1979), Eörsi (1987), Gluck (1985), Marković (1986), and Steiner (2000).

[320] For details see: Szelényi (1979a:196–9; 1980a) as well as King and Szelényi (2004).

Burawoy has also taken over the presidency of the International Sociological Association (ISA), these leadership changes at the top of the professional organizations do not adequately reflect the hegemonic positions of (post)positivism with regard to the control of publication outlets, funding bodies, and job opportunities in Western sociological establishments, in general, and American sociological establishments, in particular. Rather than losing the hegemonic position, (post)positivism still holds the dominant power position within American sociology, which can be observed from historical overviews. Within this context, Szelényi has not only been aware of the balance of power within academic sociology but seems to have played his cards strategically and according to the principles of *Realpolitik*. If it has been politically beneficial for his academic career, he has emphasized positivist objectivity and survey methods in his research; if the issue is to gain intellectual attention through originality, however, he has more openly displayed his critical theory together with the use of irony.

In that context, one must be reminded that Szelényi's career started in Hungary under conditions where the communist party placed high expectations on social engineering within which sociology was to play an important role (cf. Kolosi and Szelényi 1993:146–8; K.K. 1969; Robinson 1968, 1969; Tamás 1992:336–45).[321] With the death of Lukács in 1971, the influence of (renaissance-)Marxism on Hungarian sociology began to lose its hegemonic position. On the one hand, some of the disciples of Lukács turned to phenomenology and liberalism. On the other hand, the communist regime began to demand feedback for its socio-engineering programs and, hence, the survey methodology tools used by public opinion and market research became increasingly popular.

The person who effectively integrated these two sides was András Hegedüs, the former prime minister of Hungary who had turned from politics to sociology. As explained in the sub-section devoted to training, one cannot overstate his role in shaping Szelényi's career and Hungarian sociology. By serving as the founding Director of the Sociological Research Group at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, he set the agenda for the major debates within Hungarian sociology. Even though he was not properly trained in social theory or methodology, he, nevertheless, laid the foundation for both empirical and critical sociology in Hungary, according to Szelényi (2000). Possibly because of his relative disadvantage compared to the members of the Budapest School, who were properly trained in classical philosophy, Szelényi chose the empiricist position from which he derived both political and financial support from the regime's appreciation for the feedback surveys to its 'social engineering' programs, such as the new housing projects. While Hegedüs did not think much of the kind of 'number-crunching' empirical research that Szelényi was doing at the time, he was still supportive. In other words, even if he called the type of empirical urban research undertaken by Konrád and Szelényi at the time pretty useless "'sociotechnical' activity" (Hegedüs 1971:89), he is also reported to have said that Iván is a "man with a future" (Robinson 1974:6). The reason for this may not be difficult to see, as

---

[321] The politically conformist reviews of Hungarian communist sociology edited by Huszár et al. (1978a, 1978b) as well as Szalai and Kulcsár (1974) are quite instructive in that respect.

Szelényi learned to appreciate many of the same scientific positions and tools as Hegedüs and, one may speculate, also the ability to sense what the hegemonic power holders expected from an in-house sociologist[322] to an extent that his ability to judge the political context and the limits of the regime's tolerance better during the Prague Spring than Hegedüs. The fact that *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* put him on a collision course with the regime and led to his exile is not evidence that Szelényi was unable to read the expectations of the hegemonic power holders within the politicized social science in Hungary.

Szelényi's continued career in the West coincided with developments in the advanced industrial countries when sociology was searching for legitimacy within academia during the post-Second World War era. Together with other social sciences, it was seeking legitimacy among the family of more established scientific fields. Similar to Eastern Europe, in general, and Hungary, as discussed above, in particular, it was considered worthy of such a position not because of its critical or reflexive nature but because of its promise to make a noticeable contribution to social engineering. The founding fathers of institutionalized sociology in America, such as Lazarsfeld (cf. 1948)[323] and Parsons (cf. 1986)[324] realized this and made pretentious attempts to convince the policymakers, funding bodies, and members of academia that sociology deserves a place under the sun. According to Klausner and Lidz (1986b:267–8), Parsons understood especially well that if sociology were left out of the National Science Foundation, it would be marginalized – without institutional recognition by the science policymakers, it would not only lose money, but over time it would also not be able to attract talent and lose all its relevance. To avoid such an unfortunate development, Parsons (cf. 1979–1980:9) stressed, according to one interpretation, that "[t]he same philosophical principles that guided the natural sciences were at the heart of the social sciences" (Klausner and Lidz 1986a:viii). While the immediate effect of such an argument seems to have been too abstract and, hence, incomprehensible for the policymakers, in the long term he, together with some other founding fathers of sociology in America,[325] not only established sociology among other academic disciplines but also managed to institutionalize the hegemonic position of methodological positivism, structural functionalism and the survey method therein.[326]

---

[322] This title seems to have come into popular use relatively recently with Tinder, which employed Jessica Carbino, PhD in sociology specializing in online dating, in 2013.

[323] For the collection of essays and reflections on Lazarsfeld's role in the institutionalization of sociology see Merton et al. (1979b) as well as Lautman and Lécuyer (1998). For additional comments see also: Clark (2011), Jeřábek (2001, 2006), and Morrison (1976).

[324] The manuscript entitled "Social Science: A Basic National Resource" was commissioned from Parsons by the Social Science Research Council Committee in the same year (1948) as Lazarsfeld presented his positivistic answer to the question "What is Sociology?"

[325] As observed in the Methodology sub-section, Bourdieu calls in his early criticism of the US sociological establishment, the Capitoline Triad of Parsons, Lazarsfeld, and Merton. [For a more balanced up date in his later reflections, see also Bourdieu (2000a, 2004a)].

[326] See Calhoun and van Antwerpen (2007), who question if there ever was hegemony in US sociology, and Platt (1986; 1996:113–7), who doubts that the survey method is connected to functionalism.

As a result of the processes described above, hegemonic positions in academia, especially in the US, are held by individuals indoctrinated by (post)positivism, which takes objectivity, neutrality, and rigorous quantitative data analysis as the only possible methodological principles. Even though some outspoken scholars, such as Bourdieu,[327] Burawoy,[328] Gouldner[329] and Mills,[330] have occasionally voiced serious concerns, the principles of (post)positivism have served those who associate with it well. Proctor (1991:262), a historian of science, who has studied the political origins of sociology in general, and the impact of socialist ideas on contemporary sociology, in particular, has noted this also. He concludes his monograph, titled *Value-Free Science? Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge*, with the note, that the value neutrality has served as a myth, mask, shield, and sword for sociologists. Within such a general context, one may wonder if Szelényi has also been using the claim of Weberian value neutrality and appeal for empiricism in politically sensitive situations to his strategic advantage.

While Szelényi underlined his empiricist orientation, especially in the early stages of his academic career in Hungary, once in the West, he has taken a critical position against scholars, who enjoyed hegemonic power positions in the US sociological establishment, such as Parsons, and research approaches based on methodological positivism only late in his life when he has had little to lose in his career.[331] Likewise, he has, by and large, avoided defending the above-mentioned rebels and has supported the critical position of Bourdieu, Gouldner and Mills toward establishment sociology only in his late collaborative contributions on irony as a method.[332]

Szelényi's strategic management of his public position during his academic career in the East and West, as described above, matches observations made by other scholars about the changing balance of hegemonic positions in sociology. For instance, this is in accordance with Calhoun's (1996) description of the 'domestication' of historical sociology in exchange for legitimacy in the US during the last quarter of the twentieth century and Steinmetz's (2005a) characterization of its evolution from critique to partial recuperation and current dispersion. It also matches Manza and McCarthy's (2011) changing tolerance within American sociology toward Marxism – starting with no recognition before 1960 to its height in the late 1970s, when the Marxist section of the ASA peaked, and in the early 1980s,[333] when the AJS published a special issue on Marxism – with ten articles among which appeared Szelényi's paper, entitled "The intelligentsia in the

---

[327] See for instance: Bourdieu (1968; 1975; 1988a; 1988b; 1990a, Ch. 13; 1991c; 2013b), Bourdieu et al. (1991) as well as Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999).
[328] See for instance: Burawoy (1998b).
[329] See for instance: Gouldner (1962, 1968, 1970, 1973a, 1974a, 1976b).
[330] See for instance: Mills (1959, 1963, 2000, 2008).
[331] See, for instance, his reflections on András Hegedüs (Szelényi 2000) and Maria Markus (Szelényi 2010b:30) as well as in the interview (Szelényi 2012d) and the paper on irony (Eyal et al. 2003a:17)
[332] See, for instance, Eyal et al. (2003a:6).
[333] For further details see the following reflections: Burawoy (1982a), Calhoun and van Antwerpen (2007); McAdam (2007); Wallerstein (2007), and McNall (2013/2014).

class structure of state-socialist societies," – to its gradual loss of appeal, reputation, and number of followers.[334] Nevertheless, since the New Left has gradually lost its critical edge in the West and interest in actually existing socialism as an alternative to the textbook model or actually existing capitalism is on the decline, Szelényi has been forced to reinvent both his teaching and research profile. This has been reflected in his mixed positions between (post)positivism and critical theory on almost all the issues discussed above and manifested in his attempts to do more empirical research of a quantitative nature as suggested in many of the previous sub-sections.

While it is not surprising that Szelényi has accepted the terms of the hegemonic power holders and has tried to live up to the expectations of politically more powerful (post)positivists, what is astonishing is his ability to succeed. As discussed in more detail in the section devoted to training, his empiricism was partly enforced by his relative lack of knowledge of classical philosophy, compared to the true disciples of Lukács, and partly enforced by his year in the US in 1964–1965, where he was officially supervised by Merton and Lipset. Nevertheless, his collaboration with Konrád distanced him gradually from empiricism and brought him closer to critical theory, which culminated in Hungary in the preparation of the manuscript of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* and his emigration. In Australia and the US, he made his career within academic environments supportive of critical theory. What needs to be emphasized once again is the fact that he embarked on his academic career in the West during the period when the intellectual community was not only keenly interested in the socialist system but tolerant, if not encouraging in some leading departments of sociology, toward critical theory and Marxism. Given his academic training, professional background, and dissident status, one could say that his career in the West did not suffer from such an interest in the socialist system, to say the least. Rather widespread acceptance of the New Left ideas in departments of sociology, including some of the leading institutions in the UK, Australia, and US at the time of the Cold War generated a unique intellectual atmosphere and offered opportunities for someone like Szelényi, who was known to be an internal critic of Marxism.

To sum up this section, there is no doubt that Szelényi knows the rules of the game and has mastered the maneuver within the academic stormy waters irrespective of who is in the position of hegemonic power. As mentioned above, he embarked on his career in Hungary as a (post)positivist, but his collaborative projects with Konrád and his move to the West made him discover the darker side of the (post)positivist hegemony. On the one hand, he knows well enough that (post)positivists have the upper hand within academia and he has been using the empiricist's position wisely, based on the principles of methodological positivism, for the advancement of his academic career. On the other hand, he

---

[334] In addition to admitting that Marxism was influential in US academia in the 1960s and 70s, Szelényi suggested during the interview that while sociology "began to lose some of its conceptual, theoretical or methodological integrity, at least it had a political project, right. Sociology was the kind of left wing in the universities. So, one who went to do sociology wanted to do a better world. That's gone" (Szelényi 2012d).

gravitates toward critical theory because of his training and socialization. Thus, Szelényi's career demonstrates his ability to manage equally well under different hegemonic power holders within academia as well as to take advantage of exceptional interest in the socialist model and its internal critics.

3.12 Control

The issue of control should be central to irony as an anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue. The jester must enjoy the institutional protection of the king or emperor to be able to speak the bitter truth. Surprisingly in this context, Szelényi together with his co-authors does not address the issue of control too directly in the key text "On Irony". The closest they come is an endnote that connects the issue of control to Gouldner's CCD. More particularly, Eyal et al. (2003a:33) state the following:

> Gouldner argued that the power of the new class derived from its monopoly on specialized professional knowledge, as well as from its control over the means of cultural legitimation, what he called the 'culture of critical discourse'

> (CCD). This he defined as a "historically evolved set of rules, a grammar of discourse, which (1) is concerned to *justify* its assertions, but (2) whose *mode* of justification does not proceed by invoking authorities, and (3) prefers to elicit the *voluntary* consent of those addressed solely based on arguments adduced" [italics in original] (1979:28). Gouldner argued that the CCD was the basis of intellectual class identity and that it was often arraigned against traditional authority and social institutions. In the West, where the CCD was objectified as 'cultural capital' in the form of credentials and was justified by the highly successful ideology of professionalism, the New Class carried increasing weight in social affairs. New Class personnel were crucial components in the functioning of modern states, economies, and universities in which knowledge had become indispensable and the power of the old bourgeoisie was waning. Hence, New Class members were in a position to press their claims – to disrupt, subvert, and cause trouble for the old moneyed class – with little fear of retribution (Gouldner 1979:19–20).

Rather than entering into the discussion on the similarities and differences between the ideas of Szelényi and Gouldner, which is discussed elsewhere (cf. Bozóki 2022, Ch. 1.3; Furåker 1982; King and Szelényi 2004; Szelényi and Martin 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991; Walzer 1980), the analysis will concentrate on the socio-political context that seems to have played a formative role not only in the development of Szelényi's reflexive sociology of intellectuals but his ideas on control. In other words, it will be underlined in this subsection that the socialist freedom of thought and research continued only as long as the theoretical frame used, the questions asked, and the answers given, did not contradict the political dogmas. As the discussion about selecting the appropriate theoretical frame will demonstrate, it is not a total coincidence that Szelényi, as someone who was schooled in the traditions of Marx, Weber, Lukács, and Polányi, finds the conflict

tradition,[335] its conceptual apparatus, and the comparative-historical methodology (discussed earlier in this chapter) as intellectually appealing or inspirational. Instead of adopting these elements of research because he had to obtain the approval of the controlling authorities, he actually learned to appreciate it the more he matured as a scholar. It does not matter what the background of the scholar is or whether (s)he has reasons to believe that one could intellectually beat the Marxist on home ground on their own terms, as the members of the Budapest School attempted; what matters is unquestionable loyalty to the system. Those who dared to question or test it in Hungary at the time soon found themselves marginalized and out of the party's favor.

This is also the story of Szelényi. Once in the West, there is no doubt that he has been enjoying academic freedom, which includes the freedom to select research topics, set the research questions, attract collaborators and select the theoretical frames, research methodology, methods, and techniques. Unlike the direct government-imposed control on sociologists in socialist Hungary discussed above, in the UK, Australia, and the US, he has not been subject to similar pressures. Yet, it is not that these do not exist there at all. They do, but Szelényi has been writing on the socio-economic policy of the country (Hungary) and the region (CEE/FSU and China), which are physically and politically distant from the policy interest and funding mechanisms which come from the welfare state, generous or not. In that sense Gouldner's cynical answer to H. S. Becker's question "Whose side are we on?" (cf. H. S. Becker 1967), according to which the American sociologist takes the uncritical position *vis-à-vis* the state because they are on their own side (cf. Gouldner 1968), does not really apply to Szelényi. His research has hardly been of any direct policy relevance or interest to the Western host governments. Given the fact that he has not been benefiting from their policy-oriented research funding, he has not become financially or politically dependent on their support.

To start the more detailed discussion, let it be reminded that according to Lincoln and Guba (2000:175) the issue of control in the research setting is connected with the following set of questions: "Who initiates? Who determines salient questions? Who determines in what forms the findings will be made public, if at all? Who determines what representations will be made of participants in the research?" While for (post)positivists these issues do not really exist, they are often at the center of research for critical theorists and constructivists. The acceptance of the issue of control would compel (post)positivists to acknowledge the threat to objectivity and validity. Thus, they simply assume these problems away by walling them off effectively. Critical theorists are on the opposite pole – while the more critical among them wish to reveal "Who benefits?", the politically motivated would like to emancipate and empower the participants in the

---

[335] I have discussed this elsewhere (Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1) in the chapter devoted to the internal-intellectual dimension of the metatheorizing.

research.[336] Constructivists go even further as they would be keen to see that participants take an active role in nominating or even formulating interesting and important research questions. Unlike positivists, they do not assume that a hypothesis is dropped from nowhere, as it seems to be in the methods textbooks written by scholars who believe very strongly in objectivity and the separation of the researcher and the object that he or she studies. As H. S. Becker (1970, Ch. 1) argues, this is nonsense as in reality the hypothesis presented in the final research report always differs from what the researcher initially began the research with.

As an experienced scientific administrator, who has been 'tempered' in the practical implementation of socialist as well as liberal academic policy on sociology, Szelényi skillfully maneuvers between these opposing philosophy of science views and positions. Not only does he know the rules of the game, but he also masters them so well that he has become a 'control theorist'. While his testimonies indicate that his early research was not planned with any clear (working) hypotheses in mind, his later work in its published format is in better harmony with the values of (post)positivism. His frequent in person visits to research sites, interviews conducted personally with the study subjects, participant observations of fellow intellectuals and surveys carried out together with Konrád inspired him to develop the thesis statements of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*. More specifically, the inspiration he drew from an old couple during his field trips to one of the sampled villages in the remote area in Eastern Hungary (cf. Szelényi 1980a:129–30) as well as discussions with leading Hungarian humanist intellectuals and technical intelligentsia (cf. King and Szelényi 2004, Ch. 4) allowed the research objects to take a more active role, which led to the understanding of redistributive injustice as the defining characteristic of socialist society. The fact that he has allowed the research objects (participants) to have a word in his studies, which made an impact on the nature of his research, allows one to suggest that there is indeed some similarity between Szelényi's methodological position on control and that of H. S. Becker as the representative of the Second Chicago School of sociology, and whom he desires to associate himself with.

Szelényi has himself reflected on a few occasions how he came to sociological research and the role played by his employer – the Institute of Sociology at Hungarian Academy of Sciences under the leadership of Hegedüs – at the beginning of his academic career. For instance, he (1983a:5) reflects that after obtaining a position at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, where he was expected to specialize in urban sociology,[337] he became acquainted in late 1965 or early 1966 with Konrád, who had just taken up a post as an urban sociologist at the urban and regional planning institute. Given his knowledge of survey design and Konrád's access to research funds through his institute, they joined forces. More

---

[336] McAdam (2007:416) identifies these two groups within American sociology as "soft left" and "hard left". For further discussion see Bourdieu (1998, 2000b, 2003a & 2008b) and Gouldner (1972, 1980).

[337] Szelényi (2012b:1156-7) reflects on it in more detail.

specifically, their collaboration started with survey projects on new socialist housing estates, which only later led to the more theoretical conclusions about the socialist redistributive socio-economic system, in general, and the critical analysis of the position of intellectuals in that type of society, in particular. As King and Szelényi (2004:80) reflect:

> The study was ordered from them [Konrád and Szelényi] by planners who wanted to "improve planning methods" by getting sociological, or more precisely, market research, information on the product of their work. Planners were really interested in consumer satisfaction: whether they had designed the kitchen the right way, whether they had put the plugs where they ought to be, and the like. Konrád and Szelényi did not have clear idea of what would drive their study intellectually, so they followed rather closely what the planners wanted. Just to be on the safe side, however, they asked the usual sociological survey questions about occupation and education.

This reflection shows how important it is to understand the historical context which set the stage not only for intellectual activities in Hungary in the third quarter of the previous century but also for the very meaning of the control of the academic works of Szelényi and his research on intellectuals. As I have discussed the role played by the political, social, and disciplinary context in the foundation of his academic career, and the selection of the role of intellectuals in social change elsewhere (Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1.1–3.1.3), it suffices here to draw the reader's attention to the issues more directly related to (political) control. These issues go to the foundation of sociology in Hungary and elsewhere in the former Socialist bloc. Therefore, we shall briefly discuss the impact of the political context, avoiding a repetition of what will be discussed at the end of the chapter, before turning to the issue of control in more methodological terms.

To begin with, it needs to be remembered that the events following the death of Stalin in 1953 and the ensuing uprising of 1956 in Budapest and the Prague Spring of 1968 form the background to the development of sociology in post-Second World War Hungary. The control of ideas for the benefit of the regime that the establishment exercised on its philosophers and sociologists was two-faced. On the one hand, the Hungarian socialist regime can rightly be described as one of the most liberal in CEE/FSU – granting considerable freedom to its philosophers and social scientists. On the other hand, even Lukács, who initiated the renaissance of Marxism and formed the Budapest School around him, was not Marxist enough before Stalin's death in Hungary. After the passing of Stalin, Lukács (1956) was not only quick to argue for abandoning dogmatism and calling for freedom of expression[338] but he also suggested defeating the bourgeois philosophy with the progressive, or true, Marxism-Leninism (Radio Free Europe, 1964a).

The development of sociology in Hungary and the ideas that led to the writing of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* by Konrád and Szelényi were only

---

[338] For instance, he went even as far as to suggest that intellectuals should not be restricted from producing anything "as long as they did not deny socialism 'aggressively'" (Lukács cited in Radio Free Europe 1964b).

possible within the above-mentioned post-Stalinist era of relaxed ideological control. While it took time for Lukács to be rehabilitated during the de-Staliniza-tion process and for his ideas to become acceptable again (cf. Pike 1988), even-tually limited artistic and intellectual freedom of expression was granted (see the discussion around censorship below) as the socialist regime moved from charis-matic legitimization to goal-rational legitimization (cf. Becskehazi and Kuczi, 1994:40–3). In other words, despite the above-mentioned call from Lukács for freedom of expression, the unwritten rules of the cooptation game were institu-tionalized during Brezhnevism. If one accepts the thesis statement of *The Intel-lectuals on the Road to Class Power*, one could even say that the Socialist system found a way of co-opting intellectuals by supporting their artistic and intellectual ego projects in exchange for political locality in this process. The price artists and intellectuals paid was the avoidance of some taboo topics. According to Alexander Szalai, there were three taboos for Hungarian social sciences, includ-ing sociology.[339] These taboos were: (i) questioning the validity of Marxism, (ii) questioning the socialist character of Hungarian society and (iii) criticizing the Socialist Union.[340] Along the same lines, Andorka (1993:80), Berend (2009:189–90), Bozóki (2022, Ch. 2–3, esp. 67–8) and Tökés (1996:16) summarize the es-sence of the policy that the Hungarian Communist Party developed and imple-mented successfully under the leadership of György Aczél as the HSWP CC Sec-retary responsible for ideology and cultural policy until the end of the 1970s. They say that the control over intellectual and cultural activities consisted of "three Ts": Marxist and socialist works were supported (*támogatott*); openly anti-Marxist and antisocialist works were forbidden (*tűrt*); while others were mostly tolerated (*tiltott*). Once György Aczél was replaced with the hard liner, Janos Berecz, the policy appears to have been amended with the introduction of more direct threats for deviant behavior. It can be summarized in his infamous statement at the Hungarian Writers' Union congress in 1986: "If the writers will not listen to our sweet words, we shall know how to convince them by using lan-guage of another kind" (Berecz cited in Devlin 1986:50).

It seems that the Hungarian socialist regime was interested in the input that sociological research could provide for policymaking.[341] It was keen to receive feedback on the implementation of socialist policy and found the intellectual

---

[339] Andorka mentions that in several publications. While he says in the paper "Hungarian Sociology in the Face of the Political, Economic and Social Transition" that Szalai made that point at the end of the 1970s (Andorka 1991:467), he claims in the paper "Institutional Changes and Intellectual Trends in Some Hungarian Social Sciences" that Szalai had made that comment in an interview to an American newspaper around 1980 (Andorka 1993:80).

[340] J. Schöpflin (1979:100), G. Schöpflin (1990:96) and S. Szelényi et al. (1995:703) mention just the "leading role of the party" and the "alliance with the Soviet Union" as the taboos. Yet, according to Hegedüs (1981:135-6), the three taboos included: (i) second economy, (ii) discrimination against the Gypsies, and (iii) poverty.

[341] According to the Hungarian CC Secretariat, "[t]he Communists working at the Scientific, Educa-tional and Cultural Department of the CC, and in the competent state control agencies [*emphasis not original*], should see to it that adequate programs of work are prepared… laying down the most important political, ideological and research requirements to formulate concrete social demands… and serve as a standard and basis of further activities" (Robinson 1969).

freedom of thought and expression acceptable provided one did not attempt to rock the boat. While the story seems to be one of cooptation – cooperation for mutual benefit – it was more complicated and, given the variation within biographical experience, also more puzzling. Indeed, the more intriguing issue is how the mutually beneficial relationship between the regime and the intellectuals actually worked – how the communist regime exercised control over sociologists. In this context, one needs to ask more specifically: *how free was Szelényi to set his own research agenda, raise the research questions, select the appropriate theoretical frame, data collection and analysis method and interpret the results*? Related to all these is the issue of securing funding for one's research, and if one did, *to what extent was there censorship, including self-censorship, in Hungary when he was still living and working there*? The answers to these questions give us a better idea of how the control of the social sciences was actually exercised in socialist Hungary, in general, and how Szelényi responded to these ethical dilemmas, in particular.

To begin with the issue of setting the research agenda, we need to be reminded that Szelényi, along with his colleagues, was allowed to undertake sociological research that led to the development of ideas presented in *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* because the Hungarian Communist Party, similar to its sister organizations elsewhere in CEE/FSU seeking goal-rational (i.e. teleological) legitimization, had realized that sociology is not necessarily a bourgeois pseudo-science and offered it a new chance for re-establishment shortly after the death of Stalin.[342] Nevertheless, the research topics that the Party found justified to study 'scientifically', determined not only the research problems and the methodological tools that the sociologists working at the institutes of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences could use (cf. Robinson 1968b[343]), but largely also the kind of research that Szelényi would be undertaking during his academic career (not only in Hungary but later also abroad).

While the historical background and political context, which allowed sociology to re-emerge in Hungary after Stalinism, have been discussed in the literature, one cannot overemphasize the crucial role of Hegedüs. He, as a former prime minister of Hungary, was someone "who knew the measured operation of power from the inside" (Szabó 2004:54), and after returning from self-education and criticism in Moscow, became more than instrumental in the re-establishment of sociology in Hungary. As will be discussed in more detail in the sub-section devoted to the disciplinary context, as the founding director of the Institute

---

[342] This has been noted by many commentators. See, for instance, the comments made by Andorka (1991:465; 1993:86–7), Bence (1992:331–2), Becskehazi and Kuczi (1994:40–4), Bosomitu (2011:178), Hegedüs (1971), Kolosi and Szelényi (1993:145–8), Némedi (2009:14; 2010:156); Némedi and Róbert (2002:437–8; 2003), Rév (2001:373), Rézler (1974:223), Szelényi (2010b:26), Tamás (1992:339–55) as well as Varga (1983:234).

[343] Robinson (1968) actually paraphrases the arguments that were expressed by the following Party apparatchik and writer in the Hungarian press:

- Fargo, Jeno. "Szociologiai modszerek a partmunkaban" [Sociological Methods in Party Work], *Csongrad Megyei Hirlap*, 7 April 1968.
- Dr. Jozsef Gombar, "Ifjusagkutatas" [Youth Research], *Magyar Nemzet*, 10 March 1968.

of Sociology at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, he was responsible for formulating the research agenda for the entire institute and leading its members into specific research areas – among which Szelényi was directed into urban sociology (cf. Szelényi 2000, 2010b, 2012b). Even the removal of Hegedüs in 1965 from the position of Editor-in-Chief of *Valóság* [Reality], an influential journal in Hungary published by the Society for the Propagation of Scientific Knowledge, and his removal in 1968 from the position of the Director of the Sociological Research Group, after some members of the Philosophical Institute and the Sociological Research Group[344] signed the Korčula Declaration against the invasion of Czechoslovakia (cf. Antic 1968 and Szelényi 2010b, 31–2), and finally as a result of the "Trial of the Philosophers" (Radio Free Europe 1968) in 1972, his removal from public view altogether (cf. Radio Free Europe 1977:7–8; Szelényi 2000) did not put an immediate end to his impact on Hungarian sociology. Quite the opposite, even after his removal from the positions of responsibility, one can sense his lasting impact.

Not long after Hegedüs' removal, "The Three-year Plan for Sociology"[345] was presented in 1969 among other calls for the tightening of the control of sociological research.[346] This plan highlights four sociological research questions that are appropriate from the point of view of the Party. They were to tackle the following set of issues: (i) "questions on the structure of socialist society" (examining e.g. "worker's way of life" and "life models in an agrarian environment"); (ii) "What factors affect the various decisions of state and social organizations?"; (iii) "the characteristics of the urbanization process in the big cities in the provinces, as well as the problems of urbanization of village areas", and (iv) "the theoretical problems of Marxist sociology".

---

[344] According to the records, András Hegedüs did not sign the Korčula Declaration. Instead, five Hungarian philosophers did: Ágnes Heller, Zoltán Tordai, Mária Márkus, György Márkus and Vilmos Sós (Antic 1968:3; Radio Free Europe 1968). Ágnes Heller seems to have been the only one of them who attended the summer school (cf. Antic 1968:2). Szelényi (2000) says that upon the return of the Praxis conference at Korčula, the party organization of the Institute of Sociology, whose secretary, Mária Márkus, was, "also issued a statement of protest". Later Szelényi (2010b:31) claims that upon return, "Hegedüs decided to write his own open protest letter against the invasion and expressed solidarity with the Budapest School". While my attempt to locate a copy of this statement (from the Open Society Archives at Central European University) has not been successful, there are indications that Lukács wrote an individual letter of protest to the CC of the Hungarian Communist Party (DPA 4, Sept. 1968; AFT 7, Sept. 1968 as cited in Radio Free Europe 1968:3).

[345] [Author unknown]. "The Three-year Plan for Sociology", <u>Nepszabadsag</u>, 25 March, 1969. For English translation see Robinson (1969:3–4). Additional information can also be found in K.K. (1969).

[346] See also:
- Kulcsar, K. 1969. "On the Social Function of Sociology and Politics." *Tarsadalmi Szemle* [Social Review] March;
- s.a. 1969. "The Standpoint of the Presidium of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences on Some Questions of Principle Concerning Research Work in the Social Sciences." *Partelet*, March.

All the above-mentioned research questions, with some restrictions to the second theme (which appears to relate to Kálmán Kulcsar,[347] who took over the Directorship of the Sociological Research Group from Hegedüs), relate to Szelényi's research interests. This suggests that Szelényi did not have complete freedom when selecting the research topics and methods or even the international invisible college. These were rather cleverly *controlled choices* designed by the Party and Hegedüs. Given the formative years of Szelényi's sociological development, it is not a surprise that he was open to external influences, including the externally set research questions, which came along with the research projects/tasks that he was assigned. Similar to what was mentioned in the Qualitative Analysis section, he (1983a:5) reflects also in another context that:

> [w]e did not have a very clear idea of what we ought to do, so we did not mind when our urban planning colleagues suggested that we investigate new housing estates. In 1966 and 1967 we organized a number of fairly large-scale surveys on four new housing developments… We did not really have a proper research design: our studies were basically descriptive; we did not know what kind of questions we should ask. In the end, we put together a lengthy questionnaire which contained all sorts of foolish questions, but at least we did not forget to ask our respondents to state their occupation, incomes etc.

With regard to selecting an appropriate theoretical frame, I have demonstrated in detail elsewhere (Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1) that his work relates to the conflict tradition. It should not be difficult to see that he drew on the works of Castells, Kolosi, Pahl and Rex in addition to the foundational works of Marx, Weber, Lukács, Trotsky, Djilas and K. Polányi at a more operational level while working within this tradition in Hungary. Once in the West, he acquainted himself with the works of and gained additional insights from the seminal contributions of Bourdieu, Gouldner and Kocka, and with some restrictions also from Foucault, Wright, Wallerstein and Kołakowski. Therefore, without going into detail and repeating what was already discussed, it suffices to add here that Szelényi is, compared to the (former) members of the Budapest School, an empiricist in the Hungarian context. Compared to dataistic scholars, he was a critical theorist. Being between the two traditions – (post)positivism and critical theory as discussed throughout this chapter – corresponds well to his own statement that his "aim was to promote a kind of sociology, which was based on a close integration of empirical research and social theory" (Szelényi 2000:5). However, this has been both his strength and weakness – an issue that will be addressed in the concluding part of this section.

As for the data collection and analysis method, Szelényi is not a scholar who places more importance on the technical issues than the conceptual ones. He is quite relaxed about, if not nescient of, the technical issues related to sampling, data collection and analysis. Although he stated during the interview (Szelényi 2012d) that he was considered technically one of the most competent sociolo-

---

[347] For his ideas on "The Social Functions of Sociology and Polities" see K.K. (1969). Note also Szelényi's sarcastic note that his largest theoretical contribution was the replacement of the term "bureaucracy" with "management by experts" (Szelényi 2010b:29).

gists before his emigration from Hungary and his "little methods textbook"[348] had been used to educate the next generation of sociologists there for a decade, even after his departure, one can only find information related to sampling, data collection and analysis methods in the appendixes of his publications at best. Yet, even then they were worded in rather general language that disclosed few technical details. Although he would later place great emphasis on structural-conceptual issues instead of simple descriptive statistics, he still comes closest to Ferge when compared to the disciples of Lukács, Kolosi or Andorka in the Hungarian context.[349] On the one hand, he was more empirical (and technically more competent) compared to the (former) members of the Budapest School. On the other hand, he likes to emphasize his similarities with Ferge (cf. M. Lakatos 2009:951; Szelényi 2012c).

If one is inclined to think that Party officials knew little about the research methods, suggesting that researchers had more academic freedom to select an appropriate method for the issue at hand, one would be surprised to read Fargo's article titled "Sociological Methods in Party Work" and Gobar's opinion on "Youth Research".[350] Instead of showing ignorance, the former questions the methodological foundations of the questionnaire as a data collection instrument, while the latter emphasizes the need to undertake more interdisciplinary research. Fargo demonstrates an understanding that the questionnaire responses (i.e. measurement validity) are sensitive to the wording of the questions, stating that "We must caution against this from the very beginning", and emphasizes the need for proper training and experience of the people who undertake that kind of work. More importantly within the context of control, readers are informed that the Party is to select the appropriate individuals who have not just studied the methods but are also familiar with the particular research area. In other words, these public warnings against the abuse of the questionnaire as a data collection instrument, and calls for more multi-method and multi-disciplinary research in the work of the Party indicate that the responsible officials were not totally ignorant. Indeed, the Party seems to have been committed to keeping tight control over those to whom the right to engage in sociological research would be dedicated and from whose work great circumspection is expected.

---

[348] This is available only in Hungarian – see Szelényi (1969). It is interesting to note in this context once again that Rév (2001:373) says that the first method-of-sociology textbook – a "boring book" that became an instant best-seller – was authored by Cseh-Szombathy and Ferge (1968).

[349] While some commentators have identified Ferge and Szelényi as scholars who opposed each other in a major academic debate, others do not see them necessarily in disagreement with each other. For instance, Swain (1992:185), notes that "the ideas of the two protagonists in many ways complemented rather than contradicted one another". Likewise, Kolosi (1988:409) has argued that the former was built on Lukács's social ontology and his identification of the unequal distribution of power and culture, while the latter took it together with Konrád to the next level by suggesting that socialist mechanisms of control and redistribution put the intellectuals on the road to class power.

[350] As mentioned previously, these two statements were published in their original form in the Hungarian press. English language overviews of the two can be found in Robinson (1968).

While Szelényi has associated his appeal to value-free empirical research with Szalai (cf. Szántó 2007:173),[351] he has actually been part of a much larger process, in the center of which was the socialist regime's quest to move from charismatic legitimization to goal-rational legitimization[352] after the death of Stalin (cf. Becskehazi and Kuczi, 1994:40–1). As described by Szczepański (1966) in the paper "Empirical Marxist Sociology", this trend was widespread in all socialist countries (with the exception of China); it started with the 20th Congress of the CPSU[353] and the first sizable participation of socialist sociologists at the 3rd ISA World Congress of Sociology in Amsterdam in 1956. Given the fact that the new social phenomena and processes could not be explained in a reasonable manner by relying on dogmatic Marxism, despite the "enormous amount of sociologico-ideological literature" (ibid:4) produced in Eastern Europe and the USSR, empirical Marxist sociology was called into action. As Szczepanski sees it, the task of the endeavor described above was "to arrive at a theory of a socialist or socialized society" because it would be naïve to believe that the grand theories of Marx would automatically provide the theories of the middle range. According to Szczepański (ibid:10), the methodological particularities of Marxist sociology do not differ from non-Marxist sociology. What makes the difference is the "general methodological guidance" that historical materialism provides for researchers both in the implementation of the various techniques and in the interpretation of the research results. Unfortunately, the adoption of the former often meant

---

[351] For the original statements see:
- Szalai, S. 1961. "A szociológia helyzete Magyarországon." *Élet és Irodalom* 5(15):8–9; 5(17):9–10.
- Szalai S. 1962. "Módszertani megfontolások a marxista szociológiai szakkutatás egyes időszerű kérdéseihez." *Magyar Filozófiai Szemle* 6(5):663–92; 5(6):825–80.

[352] Fehér (1983:40) introduces the notion of "pragmatic goal rationality" that he contrasts to "value-rationality" in his essay published as part of the *Dictatorship over Needs* (work co-authored with Heller and Markus). The term "goal rational authority" was coined around the same time by Rigby (1982:12–6) in the introduction to the *Political Legitimation in Communist States* – a book that he co-edited with Fehér. Other scholars may have been describing a similar process using slightly different terminology. For instance, Schöpflin (1993:163–7) notes the shift from "technocratic legitimation" to "economic legitimation", and Holmes (1997:48) speaks about the substitution of "coercion" with "teleological legitimation" that she equates with "goal-rational legitimation" – correcting her earlier insistence that "goal-rationality [rather than legal-rational mode"] was the dominant mode of legitimation in the 1970s and 1980s" (Holemes 1993:290). A somewhat different point of view has been expressed by Heller (1983:154–5) who argues in her part of *the Dictatorship over Needs* that the Jacobin-Bolshevik or charismatic form of legitimation was turned into "substantive legitimation" or (new) "traditional legitimation". While a similar observation about "neo-traditionalism" is made by Walder (1988:251) in the Chinese context, it is problematized by Szelényi. On the one hand, he (1984a:170–2) agrees that "substantive rationality" was a myth in Eastern Europe and produced extreme irrationalities instead of hyperrationality. On the other hand, however, he criticizes Heller for the failure in her essay published as part of the *Dictatorship over Needs* to notice Weber's ironic approach and for undermining the importance of myth creation in the process of legitimation – including the claim for "instrumental rationality". Additional comments on the issue can be found from Arato (1987 / 1993, Ch. 6), Gellner (1991:1–4), Heller (1982), Kis (1989:17–22), Lagerspetz (1996:37–40), Rigby (1964:556–7) and Szelényi (2016a; 2016b, 15–6) and Szelényi and Mihályi (2000, Ch. 2).

[353] See also Kugel and Shelishch (1979:3) for similar comments.

low-quality research compared to the work done in the North American universities. While this may be partly associated with the lack of material resources, such as computers, and knowledge of sociometrics (cf. Varga 1983), it may also have meant nothing more than lip service to the official ideology in the presentation of the research results. This is the issue that shall now be addressed more specifically in our discussion.

In terms of the academic freedom to draw conclusions from the research results, Szelényi claims to have been one of those empirically oriented scholars more immune to control from the Party. In addition to this, he takes pride in the fact that he together with Konrád went beyond the empirical analysis and was also willing to seek more theoretical conclusions (cf. Kolosi and Szelényi 1993:153). As will be discussed in more detail below in the sub-section on "Political Context", he never joined the Party and, hence, was less directly subject to its control measures. Nevertheless, he was unable to escape the Party's control altogether. As part of the systems of socialist higher education, science and policy studies, he was indirectly subject to it anyway. For instance, one may be a non-conformist and even enjoy a favorable position in the system for a while but (s)he will sooner or later come to realize that nothing goes unnoticed, and it is easy to lose one's favorable position among the power holders.

As Konrád and Szelényi (1979:191–2) put it so eloquently, an intellectual who decides not to become a member of the Communist Party:

> may become a prize-winning artist or scholar, or an outstanding technical expert; he may live to see his works published in many large editions; party leaders will be eager to be photographed in his company and will frequently cite him as an example of the success of their cultural policies; the highest political leaders will willingly receive him when he calls and will gladly attend to requests of his, as a favor – finding an apartment for a son about to be married or seeing to a passport for a young colleague whom the police have refused one. But he has to show gratitude for such personal acts of grace, even though he will probably be proud that for his faithfulness in performing little services in return he has been received at court, as a kind of baron of intellect. The other side of the coin is that for him nothing works of its own accord; he has to ask the intervention of his friend on the Central Committee not only if he wants to accept an invitation from abroad, but even if he wants merely to have a telephone installed in his new apartment or to have his name put at the head of the list for buying a car. For that very reason, of course, the satisfaction of even his most mundane requests fills the prominent nonparty intellectual with a sense of his own exceptionalness and importance. With his telephone he also acquires a feeling of security: Somebody up there likes him, no serious ill can befall him, at least not in the near future. But if next week or next month the political police should happen to call on him and ask in the politest way possible for information about a young and apparently thoughtless friend, student, or colleague, and if he should hesitate to cooperate in a confidential inquiry, then he will soon learn form a series of little signs that his optimism was premature: Nobody up there likes him that much after all, and he had best prepare for unanticipated setbacks, because the people up there know everything there is to know about him; he is in their hands. That is how far the power of favor has gotten him, and he has no other power. He can no longer even think of ask-

ing, much less expecting to receive, something which is his professional due and which is perfectly legal. He can still intercede with his high-ranking protectors on behalf of others, but it is inconceivable that he will ever be made editor-in-chief of a periodical or publishing house or the head of a scholarly institute, and it will arouse surprise if he is even appointed to head a university department. He will never, in other words, achieve any position in which he could make decisions on his own responsibility in matters of political importance.

Szelényi largely omits from the auto-critical reflections, an analysis of the extent, if at all, the regime managed to exercise direct ideological control over the content of his research and its results. On the one hand, we know from Tamás' (1992:349) overview of the controversies related to the post–1960 Hungarian regime's science policy that sociology was given a chance for development as a reaction to the urgent need to have access to organized social knowledge. Hence, frequently, "social science programs (and not only those being directly used ideologically) were covered directly out of the party coffers or at least out of party-supervised projects". Not surprisingly within this context of the search for sociological input for policy making, implementation and feedback, Szelényi (2010b:29) also admits that much of the stratification research undertaken at the time in Hungary, was actually conducted from the generous funds made available by the Party. On the other hand, he leaves it open whether this included the line of inquiry he was personally engaged in, and the amount of control, if any, the Party exerted over him. (While the testimonies he has given elsewhere suggest that the research related to the socio-economic issues of rural-urban development was financially secured by the institution that Konrád worked for, he has not commented on the political pressure and/or control that the funder or in fact the Party exerted beyond suggesting that the urban planners were basically interested in consumer feedback on the very practical issues relating to the new housing developments). One can only guess from the lament presented above that in his case the adage 'he who pays the piper calls the tune' might be true only to some extent.

Directly related to the research funding for fundamental and policy-oriented research was a system with full and part-time employment contracts for sociologists working at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Szelényi (2000:2) reflects, in connection to the re-birth of sociology in the 1960s, that the discipline was so prestigious that there were more young scholars dreaming of the position in the newly established Sociological Research Group than there were places for the self-educating professionals in the academy. Speaking of his own struggles to enter the field, he (ibid:4) adds that Hegedüs, the former prime minister appointed to lead the re-establishment of sociology in Hungary, was initially reluctant to give him a full-time position because of his lack of proletarian background. Hence, beginning from 1963, he had to work for years on part-time contract(s) before he was finally promoted to a permanent position.[354]

---

[354] While Robinson (1974:6) says that Szelényi joined the staff of the Institute of Sociology at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Oct. 1969, according to Szelényi's CV, he started to work there

Yet, it was not only the direct control over research funding and labor contracts but many indirect measures that helped to discipline sociologists in socialist Hungary. The mere possibility of being promoted and the tight control over foreign travel did part of the job. Indeed, before Szelényi was able to gain a full-time contract at the Sociological Research Group he spent the 1964/65 academic year in leading US universities on a Ford Fellowship, for which he was nominated by Hegedüs as he has suggested in one of the interviews (cf. Szántó 2007:176) and he accompanied Hegedüs on his tour in Italy in the following year of 1966 where the former is said to have been presented by the latter as "one of his close collaborators and as a man with a future" (Robinson 1974:6).

Furthermore, one could earn points – demonstrate his or her discipline and loyalty to the regime and its personnel managers – by showing up at the ideological propaganda events, by joining first the party's youth organization and later the party itself, by taking evening courses on Marxism-Leninism, and by paying ideologically correct lip service to the regime. To be sure, these positive qualities came to be considered only when the person demonstrated some professional abilities, such as the analytical skills of sociologists considered valuable by the regime and that also had to be complemented by avoiding the negative, such as the ability to avoid taboo topics, to abstain from criticizing the 'right' individuals or party policies. Bence (1992:325) describes the indirect measures of control used by the regime to build loyalty and produce conformist behavior:

> The police were only one arm of the apparatus of political control. Within academe it was not even the most important one. The attitudes and behavior of scholars were also monitored by the Communist party organs, and by the personnel departments of the Academy and the universities.
>
> Files were kept on whether scholars joined the Communist youth organization or the party or the Workers' Guard, the para-military organization of the party. Who took part in 'social activities'? Who enrolled in courses of Marxist training? What kinds of foreign contracts did scholars have? Who attended church services? Did a given scholar belong to any politically suspect circle, advocating populism, modernistic art, the preservation of Hungarian minority culture in Romania, environmental concerns, Eastern mysticism, you name it. Or, horror of horrors, did he sign some dissident petition?
>
> Considerations of this kind were taken into account when decisions were made about the career of a scholar, when his promotion came up, when he applied for grants or asked for permission to make a study trip in the West. These decisions were rarely made, however, in a simple, mechanical way. Political criteria were usually applied together with professional ones.
>
> Time came to promote Comrade N – to a full professor. N – was a good comrade, he obtained all the certificates form Marxist-Leninist evening schools, served for many years as secretary of his Communist party chapter, but the decision was not an outcome exclusively of such political criteria, oh, no. Comrade N – had a five-foot-long list of publications and had defended his 'higher

---

several years before. More specifically, Szelényi (2014a) states that he worked at the Institute of Sociology at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences as a Research fellow between 1965–1967, as the Scientific Secretary between 1967–1970, and finally as the Head of the Department of Regional Sociology between 1970–1975.

doctorate' thesis with flying colors. Of course, publication and the 'scientific qualification' process was also politically manipulated.

Szelényi has proven to be able to compromise without losing his dignity and has always kept one foot in the science administration in addition to his own research and teaching – a strategy that might explain part of his career success under a controlled research environment. While he has hinted only indirectly how he managed to find his way in this highly politicized working environment in socialist Hungary (cf. Szelényi 1979b, 1986–1987, 2000, 2010b), judging from his publication[355] and career record one must admit that he must have possessed special talents to serve two masters – the party and the academy – at the same time. This included his ability to earn the above-mentioned permanent contract, the possibility of getting the Ford Fellowship for the year in the US, as well as relative freedom of travel within CEE, his willingness to teach at the evening school of Marxism-Leninism, his ability to stay out of trouble (such as not signing the Korčula Declaration) and to earn party support before he entered a collision course by writing *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* with Konrád that led to his emigration.

Szelényi's ability to find face-saving solutions, which were acceptable both for the Hungarian communist party and academia,[356] is even more remarkable given his ability to make an outstanding academic career in the West after publishing of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*. In the context of the formal and informal rules of the game, writing critically about the inner logic of the socialist system and ironically about the privileged position of their fellow intellectuals therein, it was a clear violation of the expected conformist behavior of an academic who was believed to have what it takes to make a research career in the socialist system. Given the well-known destiny of Djilas, Haraszti, Hegedüs, Lukács and his disciples, all of whom were outlawed and declared revisionist before *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* was written, the questions that Konrád and Szelényi raised and the kind of critical Marxist approach that they used was known to be unacceptable.

One can find evidence for it in their own text where they (1979:199) state:

> Although fairly strict ideological controls have generally been maintained over the social sciences, there is at the same time a widespread recognition that there are many questions in history, anthropology, demography, sociology, linguistics, and psychology which can only be answered empirically. Today ideological control is exercised only over research topics or findings which touch on fundamental issues of Eastern European social structure, or which have some topical political relevance. Ideological interpretation has changed funda-

---

[355] While Szelényi mentioned during the interview (Szelényi 2012c) that one of his first articles about leisure time, published in the Hungarian language *Demográfia*, is the only one written from the Marxist perspective, he has also flirted with it, trying to use its tools to analyze critically the socialist system and its ideologists.

[356] Szelényi (2000:5) says that even after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which led to the protest statement in the form of the Dorčula declaration (which he did not see the point in signing as he was not yet ready to burn his bridges) in 1968, his relationship with Hegedüs and the disciples of Lukács did not deteriorate in any sense. If anything, they went from being colleagues to friends.

mentally: Where Stalinism was a simplistic distillate of a few works by Marx, post-Stalin Eastern European Marxism offers a sophisticated interpretation of Marx's entire oeuvre, and strives to incorporate the achievements of such non-Socialist Marxist thinkers as Lukács, Gramsci, and Althusser as well. From there, however, it is an easy and alluring, but dangerous, step to go on and try to integrate portions of the work of less-orthodox Western Marxist – Block and Korsch, Adorno and Habermas, Marcuse and Bettelheim; for broadening the legitimate basis of Marxism in that way lead inevitably to a critical threshold where one must affirm that different, equally legitimate schools of thought are possible within the basic value-range and methodology of Marxism, and that the same question can have several different Marxist answers, among which only scholarly debate can decide (if anything can), not the dictates of higher authority. The leaders of the Communist Parties have recognized, however, that this notion, so modest from the standpoint of scientific method and so banal for the reader unaccustomed to communism's inner debates, represents a moral danger to the ideological leading role of the party, and for that reason they have cracked down on exponents of a plurality of Marxism just as heavily as on empirical social scientists whose findings call into question the party's basic social and economic policies.

The situation described above relates to self-censorship, which unlike the direct control over finances and labor contracts, relied more heavily on indirect means. While many observers describe socialist Hungary as a comparatively liberal regime with no official censorship, it is actually true that the above-mentioned taboo policy of three T's was implemented rather effectively. More specifically, having no clear list of taboo subjects and guidelines, a particular kind of 'mythology' was developed, which placed the entire responsibility on the author. This personal accountability for self-censorship, combined with the paternalistic socialist regime, amounted "in the final analysis, to an unlimited, uncontrollable censorship" (Radio Free Europe 1978:2). Although some uncompromising fellow intellectuals like Haraszti were reluctant to follow it,[357] there are indications that even Konrád, despite his general image as one of the most prominent non-conformists (cf. Anonymous 1983; Devlin 1986; Markos 1984; Neuburg 1976; Reisch 1983; S.K. 1976), was occasionally willing to exercise self-censorship

---

[357] Haraszti's position is most fully developed and presented in his book titled *The velvet prison: artists under state socialism*. Nevertheless, this is not the only occasion where he has explained the essence of socialist self-censorship. Indeed, before this publication, he (1980:11) explained the working relationship between authors and the authorities along the following lines:

> Those who are 'thinking otherwise', that is, those who attempt to cast off self-censorship, are exposed to a twofold pressure. In the first place, guided culture continues to rely on the assistance of the police. But, second, a public opinion permeated by self-censorship has created an ethos in which neither terror nor the unchanging taboos come into the open all that often. The 'incorporated' intelligentsia rightfully considers this a success of its own achieving. There are fewer police raids, fewer court proceedings, lighter sentences. Intellectuals are increasingly appreciated in official circles. The Hungarian paradigm develops even more daringly: through their role as advisers to the regime, leading groups of the intelligentsia feel more and more obliged to accept direction and discipline – attitudes so difficult, practically impossible, to enforce by overt terror.

(Heron 1985:16[358]). In other words, even though authors and editors were unclear about the 'obscure and transitory' limits of censorship enforced in an informal way, the policy had its impact.[359] On the one hand, this meant in practice that the vast majority of the editors played it safe. On the other hand, it boosted the development of the Hungarian *samizdat* tradition.[360]

Regarding Szelényi, he (Szelényi 2012c) admitted during the interview that self-censorship was an issue even for the intellectual who took the role of the clown – suggesting additionally that the question pointed at the weakest part of his sociology of intellectuals. More specifically, I (K.K.) asked Szelényi (I.S.) during the interview (Szelényi 2012c) to comment on the statement, originally made by Szacki (1990), that the defining feature of intellectuals is the dual nature of being between politics and culture, how 'intellectual' does he consider himself to be.

Having acknowledged Foucault's power/knowledge dictum, made reference to Kołakowski's jester, and drawn parallels to Mannheim's socially unattached intellectual, Szelényi agreed that the clown can easily lose his head if the mood of the king or the monarch changes. Moreover, this is what he had to say as a reply to my comment that this (potential) introduces probably quite a bit of self-censorship even for the clown:

> I.S.: Yes, yeah that's… Well, this is I think a weaker part of my work – I think you are pointing your finger at the weaker point of my work. Well, the way I was trying to dig myself out of it was to say, well, I am motivated by curiosity, right. It is curiosity which drives me to do what I am doing. Well, it is not a foolish idea – it is just a bit [what] you may call superficial. But, yeah… why do

[358] When Konrád was asked by Heron about his record with censors, he replied: "On this subject I choose to exercise self-censorship. At the moment, they are reconsidering *The Loser* and at last, it stands some chance of being published officially. So, it wouldn't be very tactful of me to come out now with a long list of my sufferings". The background of it is that Konrád, as one of the leading Hungarian public intellectuals was, on the one hand, enjoying freedom of movement in and out of Hungary, visiting Western countries for shorter and longer periods, and had in such a way freedom of thought and expression in practical terms. On the other hand, only his two books – *The Case Worker* and *The City Builder* – had been published along with some sociological papers by the official Hungarian press. As a result, he continued writing books that were unlikely to be published by the official publishing houses in Hungary.

[359] Indeed, as Krokovay (1980) and Mandel (1978:41) point out, Hungary did not have a legal system for the protection of free speech and censorship for the protection of public interest. Unlike the arguments made by Hampshire and Blom-Cooper (1977) in favor of censorship in the liberal democracies, they argue that having no written rules for censorship, editors of the publishing houses in Hungary had to guess what the power holders would find (un)acceptable. Furthermore, the Krokovay report states that contrary to what some government commentators, such as Lajos Ficzere, claim about the provisions in Hungarian state regulations, there was quite some censorship there – basically arguing that the provisions protecting the freedoms of expression in the state regulations of socialist countries like Hungary were there just as window-dressing – in reality, everybody knew and felt that there was control in the form of censorship (Radio Free Europe 1978:12–3).

[360] For instance, from the wording of the formal letters of rejection in the language: "Sorry but your work just does not fit into our profile" the title "Profile" for the samizdat tradition was adopted (Mandel 1978:41). For further details about the Hungarian tradition see Anonymous (1983), Haraszti (1980, 1987), Krokovay (1980), Rab (1978a, 1978b, 1980), and Szamizdatok.

you not exercise self-censorship? Because if you are really driven by curiosity, then it will be hard for you to stop. The way I had been saying this at that time was: look, I have so few good ideas that I cannot miss out on one of them when it crosses my mind, right. No matter, you know, what punishment I will have to face. Well, I just cannot miss out on it.

K.K.: Is this pretty much the story behind the writing of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*?

I.S.: Oh, yeah. Very much, very much so because I certainly was afraid…

As one can see in the answers presented above, Szelényi seemed to agree that not all intellectuals had the internal call to make public what they have come to understand at their own personal cost and tragedy.[361] Without admitting that he himself had been self-censoring, it is noticeable that he did not want to go to prison unlike Konrád, who seemed to get some kind of special kick out of the idea – who was almost longing for the experience. As Szelényi (1979b:xvii) reflects in the Preface to *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*:

> From the very beginning we were clearly aware that the task we had set ourselves was an impossible one politically. We consciously prepared ourselves for committing "scholarly suicide." We know the political establishment would never accept the book we had in mind. In fact by 1973 both Konrád and I were under almost constant police surveillance, and that was one of the reasons why we moved our "workshop" out of Budapest and rented a peasant cottage in Csobánka, where we hoped to escape police harassment. In fact we soon began to suspect that the political police were keeping the house in Csobánka under observation too. We started taking precautionary measures, burying our unfinished manuscript in the garden every evening to make sure that the police could not size it in an early-morning raid (we naïvely assumed that police raids take place only in the early-morning hours). Those were the strangest months of my life. We lived in a constant state of euphoria. We enjoyed writing the book, but in many ways, we unprepared to accept the consequences of our action. During the long, silent evenings in Csobánka we often talked about the possible sentences we might face, but I know that I at least was not ready to serve a long prison term. I was afraid, and it is difficult to explain why we went ahead with the whole project. The only explanation I can give is a bit pathetic: We wrote the book out of curiosity. We genuinely wanted to uncover the real nature of the new class oppression in Eastern Europe.

It is important to emphasize that despite the fact that Konrád and Szelényi were preparing themselves mentally for 'scholarly suicide' and possible (prison) sentences at the time of writing *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, one could suspect from their fear of the consequences of direct political control as

---

[361] For instance, Mihály Laki (cited in Rab 1978b:22) states:
> For the moment I do not think it important to find out how far and why am a Marxist, or anything else for that matter. My relationship to existing institutions (which determines how far I can express my opinions) is far more important for me. Of course, the political system in power here calls itself Marxist, but for me that is a source of concern or pleasure because it is an institutional system which makes decisions affecting my life and not because it is the real or imagined repository of a scientific or cultural tradition.

described above, which put them "under almost constant police surveillance", that it may have influenced the selection of their theoretical framework, methods, empirical material or, worst of all, the interpretation and presentation of the actual research findings. While Szelényi denies any self-censorship categorically at the very beginning of the English preface of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, later in the book where the ideological control during the first part of the 1970s is discussed, a somewhat more complex picture emerges.

More specifically, Szelényi claims in the preface to the English translation of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* that to get published he and Konrád could get away without even the mandatory citations from Marxist classics, avoiding them in their (pre–1979) works systematically. As in any effective policy, so did this (unwritten) code of conduct including sanctions against deviant behavior: scientists who failed to enforce the expected self-imposed (internalized) censorship were forced either into internal or external exile. In other words, if the sociologist became too arrogant, lost self-control and an understanding of the limits of the rules of the game, s/he was forced to leave the country, just as happened in the 1970s with such Hungarian sociologists as Ágnes Heller, Ferenc Fehér, György Márkus, Iván Szelényi and István Kemény. Szelényi (2010b:31–4; 2019:14–5) explains that in the case of the members of the Budapest School, the tension between the epistemological-ideological community and the establishment started to increase with the open letter that they wrote in protest against the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Because of this, they were gradually excluded from academia and had to earn their living from translating manuscripts. By 1976 this led to such serious financial problems that they changed their mind about being "an organic part of the Hungarian culture" that could only belong there and, hence, responded positively to Szelényi's suggestion to emigrate to Australia. As for himself, he was not yet ready to burn his bridges by agreeing to sign the open letter of protest against the invasion of Czechoslovakia that was initiated by the members of the Budapest School (cf. Heller 2018). The clash with the regime came with the writing of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, according to Szelényi (2000:5; 2010b:33; 2019:14).

While the overview of the censored works by Baets (2002:256–66) misses *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, it is important to realize that it was not the first nor the only Hungarian publication that was willing to challenge the existing dogmas, including the role of intellectuals, in Hungary at the time. For instance, one could point out from the emerging Hungarian intellectual opposition at the time, the collections were published in *samizdat* format under the titles *Marx in the Fourth Decade* (cf. Rab 1978b; J. Schöpflin 1979) and *Profile* (cf. Rab 1980). In the former, there are 21 essays[362] that in their own right provide answers to the questions proposed by the editor András Kovács (cited in Rab 1978b:21), "What in your view is Marxism and what is your attitude to it?"[363] In

---

[362] Among others, it includes the replies by Bence and Kis (1979), Endreffy (1979), Bauer (1979) and Haraszti (1979a). The complete list is included also in the overview by Rab (1978b:21).

[363] J. Schopflin (1979:103) translates the proposed question simply as "What does Marxism mean to you today?"

the latter, one can find an even more heterogeneous collection of writings – 34 in total on more than 800 pages (including sociological papers by Haraszti, a joint essay by Hegedüs and Markus as well as one by Szelényi[364]), which the official publishing houses have refused to publish.

Equally noteworthy but even more directly related to the analysis presented in *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* is the collection edited by Haraszti (1979b) and published in French under the title *Opposition = 0,1%*,[365] as well as a number of works by Lukács' disciples, who sincerely believed in the possibility of the humanization of Marxism. Perhaps most importantly in relation to *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, one has to emphasize the critical analysis of *Das Kapital* written in 1972 by Bence et al. (1992), which asked *How Is Critical Economics Possible?*[366] While it is difficult for non-Hungarian speakers to evaluate the similarities of the works, Szelényi (1977:65) describes the latter as "an attempt to offer a framework to a critical political economy of State socialism" – the very same tradition that he (ibid:66) associates with *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*. The similarities can also be found in the English work that Bence and Kis published under the pseudonym Rakovski (1978) and titled *Towards an East European Marxism*. In short, despite the fact that *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* was indeed truly seminal, Konrád and Szelényi were not the only ones who went beyond the criticism of 'histmat' and against the adversities of Stalinist historical materialism, as Szelényi (1977:62) puts it.

The above-mentioned contributions are not only important examples of how Hungarian intellectuals were questioning the theoretical foundations of the communist regime, but they also make one wonder how the Party was dealing with the internal critics of Marxism. More specifically, they represent a puzzle of why the works of scholars like Bence and Kis (e.g. Bence et al. 1992; Bence and Kis 1979, 1980; Kis 1982–1983; Rakovski 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979) seem to have been sanctioned more severely than that of Konrád and Szelényi (1979). Although both author-duos deviated from the Party line, the regime offered Konrád and Szelényi, after they completed the manuscript of *The Intellectuals on The Road to Class Power*, the possibility of emigrating, while Bence and Kis simply lost their academic jobs after discussing similar issues in more philosophical terms. It would seem that the regime cared more about the ideological critique of the system presented by Bence and Kis than it did about the empirical critique of the ideology developed by Konrád and Szelényi. Yet, to challenge the *telos* of Marxism-Leninism may only seem to be more sensitive than questioning its *techne*. On the one hand, the stories of Heller, Fehér, Maria and George [György] Márkus did not differ that much from Szelényi, as they all ended up in Australia.[367] On the other hand, the destiny of Haraszti (cf. G. Schöpflin 1974),

---

[364] The last paper in the collection that is authored by Szelényi and titled "Regional development, economic management and administration" is not listed in his CV.

[365] It was later published also in the Netherlands under the title *Oppositie 0,1%: dissidenten in Hongarije* [Translated by Ferenc Harkay], Bussum: Wereldvenster, 1983.

[366] The book became slightly more public only twenty years later – see Bence et al. (1992).

[367] The overview of the events as well as Szelényi's role in it can be found in Szelényi (2010b), C. A. (1974), and Radio Free Europe (1968).

Hegedüs (cf. Radio Free Europe 1968; 1977:7–8; Szelényi 2000), and Konrád (cf. Robinson 1974), did not differ that much from Bence and Kis (cf. Anonymous 1980; Dworkin 2004) as they were all marginalized in the Hungarian academy after the Prague Spring (cf. Szelényi 2010b).[368]

Therefore, it seems more plausible that the ability to compromise with the regime might provide a better explanation for the different destinies of these intellectuals. As Marković (1986:91) explains in the paper "The Critical Thought of György Lukács":

> The usurpers of power who are invariably extremely successful in producing "bad conscience" among intellectuals and in ideologically manipulating the rest of the population, look at those few critical intellectuals with growing apprehension: at least they surely understand what is going on in the society. Spreading that understanding would undermine the system, since it rests on false pretenses. That is why a critical thinker must sooner or later face the following options: *either* continue to walk upright no matter what, *or* one of the following three variants: 1) pretending that one does not see what one sees, 2) escaping into abstractions, which the man in the street will not be able to understand, 3) making self-criticism from time to time.

While Marković argues that Lukács, unfortunately, sought compromises in all three respects, the same cannot be said about Szelényi. He has managed with only the third option of self-criticism as the option to emigrate was offered to him (as well as to Konrád).[369] Indeed, following Hegedüs (1976),[370] he has adopted the tradition of self-criticism as demonstrated in more detail elsewhere (Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.2).[371] Without repeating this analysis, which in addition to noting that self-criticism was the strategy adopted by Hegedüs, and also the road that Szelényi learned to walk, one could add that Szelényi can be seen as a con-

---

[368] Kis was 'rehabilitated' with the help of the collapse of socialism in CEE and especially with the establishment of the Central European University in Budapest (cf. Arato 2006; Kis 2013c), his turn to liberalism (cf. Kis 1995, 1999, 2002, 2013a), constitutionalism (cf. Kis 1989:189–96; 223–9; 2003; 2013b; Kis et al. 1991), communitarianism (cf. Kis 1989a:199–220; 233–43; 2002a), and moral political philosophy more generally (cf. Kis 2008).

[369] Konrád's decision to decline the offer seems to imply that the political establishment expected it, while the intellectuals were afraid of being marginalized and becoming irrelevant in the Western context.

[370] See also Robinson (1967), who gives a detailed summary of Hegedűs, A. 1967. "Realitás és szükségszerűség. A szocialista társadalom önbírálata mint realitás és szükségszerűség." *Kortárs* 11(7), 1011–1019.

[371] There are four reflections written more or less consciously in the format of self-criticism: the Preface to *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (cf. Szelényi 1979b), "The Prospects and Limits of the East European New Class Project: An Auto-critical Reflection on The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power" (cf. Szelényi 1986–1987), "An Outline of the Social History of Socialism or An Auto-Critique of An Auto-Critique" (cf. Szelényi 2002) as well as the *Theories of the New Class: Intellectuals and Power* (cf. King and Szelényi 2004). Also, the articles titled "Whose Alternative?" (cf. Szelényi 1980a); "The intelligentsia in the class structure of state-socialist societies" (cf. Szelényi 1982a), "Intellectuals and the Politics of Knowledge (Abstract)" (cf. Szelényi 1991a), and "Intellectuals and Domination in Post-Communist Societies" (Konrád and Szelényi 1991) are highly relevant and written in the style of self-criticism. Finally, one can interpret similarly to Szelényi (2002:43) that *Socialist Entrepreneurs* was the 'negation' of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* and the *Making of Capitalism Without Capitalists* the 'negation of negation'.

formist to some extent – at least as long as self-criticism can be seen as a strategic move. It is difficult not to agree with the argument of Jacoby (1980:22–23), who in the paper "What is Conformist Marxism?" makes a point on the basis of Louis Althusser that it is not only "a fine art" but also "an effective marketing strategy" because "[w]ho wants to criticize those who criticize themselves?", is likely to admit also that Szelényi has mastered both.

One should not be surprised that among the few who believe that even self-critics should not be granted immunity, we find Kis and Bence who seem to have become the greatest intellectual competitors of both Hegedüs and Szelényi.[372] They provided under the pseudonym of Rakovski (1976, 1977, 1979) not only a criticism of the Hungarian socialist state and its 'ideological superstructure' but – especially in the work titled *Towards an East European Marxism* – a critique of the internal critics (cf. Kroos 2020:83–97). Possibly their different educational backgrounds and, hence, the actual knowledge of philosophy as the foundation of social theory contributed to the intellectual opposition (cf. Bence 1992 and Szelényi 1984a, 2000, 2010b), on the one hand, and the competition over the intellectual heritage of Lukács (cf. Anonymous 1980; Bence and Kis 1979, 1980; Szelényi 1977), on the other.

Despite the possible rivalry,[373] it is remarkable that Szelényi's essay on housing, the first typewritten *samizdat* publication in Hungary, according to Stokes (1993:88), was introduced by Kis and Bence. [374] This fact is remarkable because

---

[372] While Szelényi followed Hegedüs's somewhat naïve trust in direct democracy and argued in favor of the direct producers, Kis and Bence believed in multi-party democracy. Szelényi (2000:3) describes the politicized intellectual situation of the 1960s by saying that "Around this time and even much later I shared Hegedüs's skepticism about multi-party democracy. Once in the 1970s or early 1980s I wrote: "[O]ne party is one too many". Hegedüs believed in direct democracy, he was searching to find an alternative between formal bourgeois democracy and Kádárist paternalistic bureaucratism."

[373] This rivalry has been contested by Szelényi (2020:237), who says that I read into the lines of *Towards an East European Marxism*, written by Bence and Kis under the pseudonym of Rakovski (1978), something that is not there. This issue will be elaborated on a bit more in section 3.16 on "Ethics".

[374] Also Mandel (1978:41) states that "Iván Szelényi's article on the Hungarian system of distribution, recently published in Paris by *Cahiers de l'Est*, has been circulated in samizdat, with an introduction by Bence and Kis". One cannot confirm it based on the Hungarian Szamizdatok database which starts only with the works self-published since 1979 (cf. "A magyarországi szamizdat bibliográfiája 1979–1989"). There is no remark about it in the electronic catalog maintained by the Central and Eastern European Online Library, CV of Szelényi (2014a) or Kis (2013c), or in the National Széchényi Library catalog. Mandel may be refereeing to Konrád's (1975 & 1976) publications in the *Cahiers de l'Est* or the fact that his book *Les Fondateurs* [The City Builder] had been reviewed in this journal (cf. Silianov 1976). Nevertheless, one could have ordered according to the July 1981 catalogue of samizdat works listed in Beszélö Online (2016) two separate essays by Szelényi: "Az értelmiség helyzete az államszocialista társadalmak osztálystruktúrájában"[The situation of the intelligentsia in the class structure of state socialist societies] and "Regionális tervezés és társadalmi osztályok Kelet-Európában" [Regional Planning and Social Classes in Eastern Europe]. Given the fact that the catalog also included the edited volume by Bence and Kis (with a foreword by Haraszti) – *Antológia az 1977-ben megjelent magyar szamizdatokból* [An anthology from the Hungarian samizdatas published in 1977], the confusion may have originated from this samizdat publication. (Although I have not been able to compare the content of the Hungarian typewritten version to the French published one under the title *Opposition = 0,1%*, I would not be

it shows the insightfulness of Kis who had come to the understanding by that time that ordinary Hungarians will not be convinced by philosophical arguments, rather than augmented observations on everyday problems of socialist reality. In this context, Szelényi's essays on the public housing and socialist redistributive injustice were right on target. It makes him an important contributor to the public discussions coordinated by the emergent democratic opposition in Hungary before and even after his emigration. While it seems that for Bence (1992:332) and Hankiss (1992:361) the works by Konrád and Szelényi (and possibly also Haraszti and Hegedüs) did little more than address the taboo topics and point out the obvious, their 'moderate egalitarianism' can, nevertheless, be seen as an important step along the evolutionary path that leads, according to Fehér (1992:47–50) and Stokes (1993:87–90), from critical Marxist philosophy to the emergence of the democratic opposition in Hungary.

Indeed, Haraszti, Kis, Köszeg, Nagy and Petri (as the editors of the samizdat journal *Beszélö*, which was to become the most important media channel for the Hungarian democratic opposition) stated ironically, according Bozóki (2022:127) in the editorial of the opening issue that it is a myth that "nothing of note ever happens in Hungary". More generally speaking, they promised to give voice to the ones who dare to speak up and framed the intriguing question about the motivation behind dissidence – the willingness to go against controlling authorities. The following lines from the editorial[375] indicate it did not only provide a platform for people like Szelényi but framed the central question about their motivation to stand up against the authorities.

> *Beszélö* will speak about events that are outside the ordinary run of things: when people, either on their own or together with others, step out beyond the accepted rules of intercourse between the authorities and the subjects, when they refuse to obey humiliating commands, insist on their rights, and exercise pressure on those above them … We would like to get more information on the motives that inspire people to abandon routine ways of behavior. We would like to know what measures the authorities take to force people back into the machine-like order of daily routines. How is the conflict between the two sides resolved? How do the bystanders react to the out of the ordinary course of events?

The motivation to defect is also one of the issues which Konrád (1987) addresses in his foreword to Haraszti's book *The Velvet Prison: Artists Under State Socialism*. To start with, he says "Miklós Haraszti is a dissident who mocks himself. He mocks himself because he is a born dissident" (ibid:ix). He concludes that "… I never read a more brilliant essay on censorship and the state than this…" (ibid:xv). His assessment is based on understanding that Haraszti has written "a kind of samizdat mini-manual … blabbing the state's inner secrets" (ibid: xiv). In his reading, the book is written in a "paradoxical and parodistic style" that can be seen as diabolical irony aimed at reviving the terrible paradoxes.

Konrád (ibid:xiv) puts it perhaps even more powerfully by stating that:

surprised to find that the latter is the translation of the former or that there is at least considerable overlap between the two).

[375] The translation is adapted from Falk (2003:131).

> Haraszti's nightmare is simply this: If state socialism keeps expanding and co-opts every kind of criticism, how does a skeptic speak? A clown reveals the circus director's philosophy for taming animals and keeping order under the Big Top. Meanwhile he realizes that he also happens to belong to the troupe. Miklós, the dissident, claims that dissent is doomed, that every dissident is crazy. And yet, he persists.

These words resonate with what Szelényi later says in his reflections about 'curiosity' as his motivation, on the one hand, and willingness to enter the collision course with the authorities over *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, on the other. This is what he said in the interview (Kroos 2012a) on the topic:

> It is curiosity which drives me to do what I am doing. Well, it is not a foolish idea – it is just a bit [what] you may call superficial. But, yeah… why you do not exercise self-censorship? Because if you are really driven by curiosity, then it will be hard for you to stop. The way I have been saying this at that time was: look, I have so few good ideas that I cannot miss out on one of them when it crosses my mind, right. No matter, you know, what punishment I will have to face. Well, I just cannot miss out of it.

Moreover, one may suspect that this question about motivation also happens to be something that helps Szelényi and his co-authors to conceptualize the 'clown' as someone who adopts irony as his working tool (cf. Eyal et al. 2003a / 2003b). In other words, the idea of irony as the tool of the clown may well originate in addition to Kołakowski's and Weber's conceptualizations of intellectuals, the Foucaultian dictum of power/knowledge, and Lukács' notion of socially unattached intellectual as mediated by Mannheim, also from (Konrád's insightful description of) Haraszti and his self-ironical way of revealing how the ultimate control of creative minds operates in the socialist type of society.

To sum up the discussion on control, let it be re-emphasized that sociology was allowed to emerge in the Eastern bloc, including Hungary, but only under the very close and tight political control of the Communist Party. While the communist regime in Hungary was interested in more scientific socio-political engineering and was seeking the input of sociological research for its policy making, its relation was slightly more complicated than simply being the socio-technical toolbox for the policies inspired and formulated in line with Marxist-Leninism. The theoretical conformity with the latter was assumed and the empirical relevance to the political agenda was financially supported; sociologists were not automatically fulfilling research tasks set by the Communist Party. Furthermore, it was argued above that Szelényi actually worked on the research topics that Hegedüs had identified, and managed to receive the Party's approval. Even the questions that he was searching for answers to, before radicalizing and asking why a system that is basically inegalitarian goes out of its way to present itself as egalitarian, were given by the (urban/rural) policymakers.[376] While Szelényi's career was formulated within the research agenda formulated by Hegedüs in

---

[376] According to Kolosi and Szelényi (1993:153), it was in the first half of 1970s when more critically minded scholars, such as Szelényi moved the critical sociology "from a sociology *for* planning toward a sociology *of* planning".

harmony with the regime's policy aims, he, nevertheless, deviated from the Party line. So far, the published historical analyses of Hungarian sociology, including those written by Szelényi himself, do not give a clear and comprehensive answer. I will leave it to the Hungarian scholars to assess the extent to which his early writings in Hungarian[377] reflect the party line – the intellectual control of the political establishment.

Nevertheless, Szelényi's willingness to write with Konrád *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* and, hence, risk committing 'scholarly suicide' (Szelényi 1979b, xvii) shows the limits of the regime's ability to control the mind and conscious choices of its intellectual elite. If not more, it indicates that the Party's willingness to contribute funds to specific policy domains had only a limited ability to pre-determine the more theoretical conclusions[378] that even the carefully selected and supposedly loyal scholars would reach in the form of empirical data analysis. It suggests that even some of the most talented and privileged within the academic hierarchy were willing to deviate from the Party line. For Szelényi, it has not been his explicit aim to empower the members of the community he has been studying as research objects, as critical theory would maintain; nonetheless, he would not mind if the situation of the socially disadvantaged were improved because of the research. He used the critical tradition to empower himself – to risk everything in order to speak truth to the 0.1%.[379]

Nevertheless, a few matters still remain unsettled concerning the issue of control with respect to Szelényi. On the one hand, there is no doubt that Konrád and Szelényi were well aware that if their book could reach Hungarian readers at all,[380] it would be in the *samizdat* format and Western readers only in the *tamiz-*

---

[377] Szelényi admitted during the interview (Szelényi 2012c) that he was flirting with Marxism in one of the early articles (cf. Szelényi 1962). In addition to this, there are two publications published under the initials Sz. I. (1972a, 1972b) that could provide additional insight. Yet, it is unclear if they are authored by Szelényi or someone with the same initials. [For instance, Szelényi (1983a:53) refers to I. Szücs who had reached similar conclusions to his research on redistributive injustice in the distribution of Budapest housing in favor of the better educated].

[378] As Andorka (1993:88) reflects, "[n]o theoretical synthesis of the empirical findings of Hungarian sociology could be published in Hungary. When Konrád and Szelényi finished their manuscript, which was intended to be synthesis with theoretical ambitions on Hungarian society, they were arrested and detained for some days by the political police and it was suggested to them that they ought to apply for permission to emigrate."

[379] The metaphor refers to the title selected by Haraszti (1979b, 1979c) for the collection of essays and it denotes the proportion of the socio-political group known as intellectuals in the overall size of the population in the society.

[380] One only needs to remember the very last sentences of the book (implying that one would need the evolution of actually existing socialism to reach the stage of the withering away of the state, for their book to be published in Hungary):

> Paradoxically, no transcendent intellectual activity is thinkable in Eastern Europe so long as the intellectuals do not formulate the immanence of the intelligentsia's evolution into a class. That, however, must wait for the abolition of the ruling elite's hegemony and the consolidation of the power of the intellectual class as a whole. As to when that hypothetical third period of socialism will arrive, we can only say that when some Eastern European publisher accepts this essay for publication it will be here, not before (Konrád and Szelényi 1979:252).

dat format.[381, 382] On the other hand, he was not prepared to spend time on spreading information on the essence of the socialist regime.[383] As Szelényi was not the only one testing the limits of the system and discussing its essence, he missed a great opportunity to continue the debate that Hegedüs had commenced with Bence and Kis. Although one can find in the extended obituary (cf. Szelényi 2000) as well as in his reflections on the re-emergence of Hungarian sociology (cf. Szelényi 2010b)[384] comments on Hegedüs and in his review paper on the Budapest School (cf. Szelényi 1977) to Bence and Kis, he has not really followed up on the debate.[385] Instead of this, he has been trying to advance the public discussion with Ferge and Kornai – taking on socio-economic issues in the midway position between the anti-market views of the former and pro-market views of the latter. Once in the West, he has also responded to the ideas of Burawoy, Gouldner and Wright but missed the opportunity to debate with Hollander. Based on all this, one gets the impression that he has not only carefully selected those with whom he debates but also the position he takes – suggesting that he has exercised quite some self-control for the achievement of his strategic aims.

---

[381] Pospielovsky (1977:44) identifies three categories of publications under the Soviet regime: "*gosizdat* – literature emanating from official Soviet publishing houses and thus having the approval of the state censor; *samizdat* – unapproved material reproduced unofficially in the Soviet Union by hand, typewriter, mimeograph or occasionally by Xerography; and *tamizdat* – works also denied approval by the official censor but published abroad (either with or without their author's consent) and the smuggled back into the Soviet Union". He adds a footnote that there is also a more restricted definition of *tamizdat*, according to which it includes only works of émigré authors."

[382] Readers interested in the origin of the two words might appreciate the explanation offered by the New York based Tamizdat nonprofit organization that explains the origin of the word as follows:

> The word "Tamizdat" is a variant of the more commonly known word, "Samizdat" which was a form of dissident activity across the Eastern Bloc in which individuals reproduced censored and underground publications by hand and passed the documents from reader to reader. The word derives from sam (Russian: сам, "self," "by oneself") and izdat (Russian: издат, an abbreviation of издательство, *izdatel'stvo*, "publishing house"), and thus means "self-published".
>
> "Tamizdat" was distinct from "Samizdat" because it was work that was not produced for underground distribution within the Soviet Bloc, but rather was smuggled to the West and published there… "там," "*tam*," meaning "there."

[383] The manuscript for *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* was found by the Hungarian authorities and confiscated. Nevertheless, as the publication record of the book indicates, they did not get all copies of the manuscript – one found its way to the West and was first published in 1978 in Bern and Paris by the Hungarian emigrant publisher Európai Protestáns Magyar Szabadegyet (EPMSZ). Nevertheless, some aspects of the events that led to the confiscation of (some copies of) the manuscript and Szelényi's emigration remain a little mysterious. For instance, he disclosed during the interview (Szelényi 2012c) that recently the original copy (i.e. the first draft of the manuscript) had been discovered and returned to him by his brother-in-law – expressing at the same time his astonishment at how he had totally forgotten about its existence.

[384] For instance, Szelényi (2000:3) mentions in the debate that while Bence and Kis were arguing for the multi-party system, for him "one party was one too many".

[385] Even the previously mentioned critical introduction written by Bence and Kis to Szelényi's samizdat paper on urbanism did not evoke the reaction.

3.13 Axiology

Irony as a method of neoclassical sociology seems to be based on the contradictory values of post-positivism, on the one hand, and critical theory, on the other. The former stipulates that personal influences should be excluded as the research must be value-free, and the latter balances it with the notion that it is fine if the inquiry is value-bound, formative and/or seeks to reveal injustice. It will be argued below that this claim about the reliance of irony on the contradictory axiological foundations is based on Szelényi's own scholarship. While his actual research indicates the acceptance of the foundations of critical theory, his conscious decision to insist on value freedom and the systematic suppression of his political preferences and moral commitments in most of the publications can be reasoned and explained by the social, political, and departmental context within which he has been making his academic career. Given his dual commitment, it should not come as a surprise that Szelényi states in the preface to the English translation of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* that they were equally committed to the cause of socialism and to its critical social analysis (Szelényi 1979b:xiii), and in the paper "Whose Alternative?" that "our task is the articulation of the interest of the oppressed and disadvantaged" (Szelényi 1980a:121).

To repeat briefly the argument presented earlier in this chapter, Szelényi's values as a social scientist are reflected in his research that takes indirectly a stance against injustice or for the rights and interests of the suppressed, marginalized and socially excluded. Indeed, Szelényi's exposure to the Lukács school, on the one hand, and his teaming up with Konrád, on the other, meant that he set out to unmask the realities of the 'actually existing socialism'. Positioning himself in opposition to philosophically and theoretically oriented members of the Second Budapest School meant that he undertook empirical studies to investigate the nature of the social, political, educational, and economic inequalities of the socialist system (reflected, for instance, in the development and distribution of new housing). In these rural-urban studies, he quickly adopted from Konrád the commitment to fight against inequality and for those at the bottom. These moral commitments were further reinforced through his activities within the ISA Research Committee on Regional and Urban Development, the research network of more radical urban sociologists that broke away from the conservative Research Committee on Urban and Rural Sociology and demonstrated commitment to the values which can be associated with a willingness to fight for the suppressed and for the emancipation of the marginalized (cf. Milicevic 2001).

Despite his Rawlsian agenda that reflects the adoption of liberal values, Szelényi has publicly been trying to take an apolitical position by claiming to engage in value-free empirical social science. It allowed him to save face in socialist Hungary where sociology was largely politicized as well as in the West where the new left tended to become ideological. More particularly, in Hungary, it seems to have served him well under the socialist system *vis-à-vis* the Communist Party, in general, and the philosophically and ideologically minded disciples of Lukács within the Sociological Research Group at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in the early 1960s, in particular. While he was empirically oriented (especially in

comparison to the members of the Second Budapest School) already before spending the 1964/65 academic year in the US, his trust in the possibility of value-free social science was reinforced by the pressures emerging from the largely positivist (American) professional sociology. As a result, his emphasis on value freedom and the suppression of value commitments reflects the political and historical circumstances within which he embarked on his professional career in Hungary and his position in the Anglo-American and Australian sociological fields as a first-generation immigrant from Eastern Europe who had been working hard to make a career in Western academia where empiricism has enjoyed almost a hegemonic power position.

In other words, Szelényi seems to have acted strategically when he adopted the standpoint of value freedom early in his career in Hungary. While some might think that there is Weberian influence, Szelényi actually does not make any references to Weber's methodological works.[386] If Weberian influence is there, it was mediated by Szalai.

As he (Szelényi 2012c) explained during the interview:

> … having been kind of socialized into a great deal of skepticism about Marxism, I became much more open to positivist science of society approach. Well, I also remember there was a Hungarian sociologist, his name was Alexander Szalai – he was the only Hungarian sociologist who was a member of the Academy of Sciences – … I remember a radio interview during the revolution of 1956 with Szalai and they asked him about the possibility of being value free in sociology or in social research. And then (you know, it was 60 years ago, [but] I still remember the interview) Szalai said: Look, I mean, the Marxists are saying that being value-free is also value judgment – to say that you are value free is a choice of values. And he said: Well, if that is the case, I choose these values – I opt for value free sociology. I liked it! I was 18 when I heard that and I had no training in social research but I liked that. I thought yes! If social science wants to be science, it has to be value-free – different from Marxism.[387]

Not only did this self-proclaimed value freedom and distancing from (ideological) Marxism serve his career well in Hungary but also in US academia. As mentioned above, in Hungary it supported his position as a non-partisan empirical sociologist *vis-à-vis* the communist regime, in general, and the members of the second Budapest School, in particular. Despite his occasional flirt with the ideas of Marx(ism), his claim for the possibility of Weberian value freedom and the orientation toward empirical research has permitted him to distance himself from Lenin(ism) – something that has been associated with Lukács and his dis-

---

[386] Cf. Weber (1948, Part I; 1949; 1981 and 2012).
[387] Szelényi (2010b, 26) states very similarly elsewhere that he "first heard about him [i.e. Szalai] on the radio during the 1956 revolution. He was interviewed about sociology (I probably heard the word sociology for the first time during this interview). I still remember what he said: 'The Marxists claim there is no value-free sociology. Those who are committed to freedom make a value choice. If this is the case, my value is to value freedom.' At age 18 I decided I also would become a value-free social scientist, and in a way I did." A similar statement can be found also in his interview to Szántó (2007:166).

ciples (cf. Bence 1992:330–1)[388] as well as Bahro (cf. Szelényi 1980a).[389] In addition to claiming that facts would speak for themselves without any value-loaded ideological commitment or interpretation in the context of socialist Hungary, where sociology was tightly controlled by the Party, orienting toward theory-informed empirical research has allowed him, by and large, to escape the image of an ideologist and to make a career abroad. He must know from first-hand experience better than the majority of the commentators how difficult it must have been even for the most competitive and career-oriented scholars from CEE/FSU to make a successful career in Anglo-American academia even without being stigmatized as an ideologist.[390]

The debate of the possibility of value-free sociology signifies one of the crucial turning points in his Hungarian academic career. In September 1969, the Institute of Sociology at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences organized a conference, "Industrialization, Urbanization and Ways of Life". In addition to the issue of urbanization, addressed, among others, by Konrád and Szelényi (1971), questions related to equality and mobility were discussed by Ferge (1971), Kemény (1971) as well as Miller and Roby (1971). Most importantly, however, a lively discussion is said to have emerged from the social planning issue addressed by Pahl (1971), Kulcsár (1971a), and Hegedüs and Márkus (1971). As Kulcsár (1971a, 43) notes in the "Introduction" to the conference proceedings, "A sharp debate evolved in connection with the role of sociology, especially with reference to the interpretation of the critical functions of value orientation and sociology. The majority of the participants did not agree with Blumstock's theory, according to which sociology should be free of values". We are not told whether (Konrád and/or) Szelényi remained among the minority who supported the ideas of Blumstock (1971), but it is possible that they helped Szelényi to understand the importance

---

[388] See King and Szelényi (2004:33–7) for the argument that Lucáks, similar to Korsch and Gramsci, took Leninism as the point of departure to develop critical theory. A slightly different argument, which is not in principle in conflict with the mentioned one, is also presented by Bence and Kis (1980) who argue in their reflexive testimony on the Lucáks's school that it was supposed to represent not only the renaissance of Marxism but also genuine Leninism. Some would even go as far as to link Lucáks and Stalinism. For details on the latter, see Kołakowski (1978, Vol. III, 304–5), Löwy (1979:193–213) as well as Pike (1988), and Eörsi (1987).

[389] For an even more direct critique of Bahro's elitist model that would turn the Party into a league of intellectuals, see also Arato and Vajda (1980).

[390] There are not too many social scientists from CEE/FSU who have made a successful career in the West and who are also relaxed about their Marxist heritage. One of the exceptions is Bauman, who states: "I discovered Gramsci and he gave me the opportunity of an honorable discharge from Marxism. It was a way out of orthodox Marxism, but I never became anti-Marxist as most did. I learned a lot from Karl Marx and I'm grateful" (Bauman as cited in Bunting 2003). Likewise, Kornai (2009:982–3) admits, that he does not want to be classified into any school of thought in economics. He says: "People sometimes ask me whether I am a Marxist. My answer is a clear negative. ... If forced to name those who have influenced me most, I mention the names of Schumpeter, Keynes, and von Hayek, but first on the list comes the name of Karl Marx". Therefore, one can understand why even such outstanding CEE scholars like Kołakowski (cf. Connelly 2013; Joravsky 1981; Kołakowski 1956, [1968] 1961, 1969b, 1978), Szczepański (cf. Johnson 1966; Szczepański 1966; Platt 2010b), Sztompka (Platt 2010a) or Titma (cf. Firsov 1995; Vooglaid 1995) have been sensitive to the association with Marxism-Leninism and/or the Communist Party.

of value freedom in the North American academy. How he combined the values that respect academic value freedom and the critical role of sociology, will be explained in more detail in the next sub-section.

While Szelényi has on some occasions paid due respect to Hegedüs (1965) as well as Hegedüs and Márkus ([1969] 1971 / 1972) for their "lasting contribution" (2010b:30–1) to the debate on Hungarian economic reform, in other instances he (2000) suggests that he was partly behind the different, if not competing, ideas expressed by Kulcsár (1971b) in the debate. More specifically, he (2000) explains that after the Prague Spring, the Party leadership decided not only to repress the signatures of the protest letter and replace Hegedüs with Kulcsár, but also to change the science policy from critical to empirical and relied on Szelényi to guide this transition. He adds that Kulcsár, as the newly appointed director, not only kept him as a Scientific Secretary but he was also actually willing to seek his advice and for a while, even follow it. Given the fact that the conference took place in September 1969, quite shortly after the replacement of the director, it is not totally unimaginable that the two could have agreed at the time.[391] The additional evidence that speaks in favor of such similarities relates to the fact that Szelényi was about to embark on the path of intellectual development that would eventually combine post-positivism with critical sociology. As Szelényi (2000) explains: "I attempted to manage the transition from the Hegedüs to the Kulcsár 'regime' without negating, or rejecting the earlier achievements of Hungarian sociology. My aim was to promote a kind of sociology, which was based on a close integration of empirical research and social theory." If it is true, he may well have been behind the ideas of Kulcsár, who noted in the introduction to the conference proceedings that it is not a good idea to oppose the 'apologetic' and 'critical' features of sociology because "criticism within the realistic picture of the society is also 'apologetic', inasmuch as it promotes the development of socialism" (1971a:41). We may sense why Kulcsár interprets this claim to be the essence of "what determines the basic value-orientation of the Marxist sociology and the affirmation of socialism" (ibid) as well as why Szelényi wishes to distance himself from anything that could make his work ideological, even though the more detailed position of Kulcsár[392] may well come close to his own dual commitment to sociology and policy making.

---

[391] Kulcsár (1971a:41) sums up in the "Introduction" of the conference proceedings, the argument of his paper, titled "Social Efficiacy and Social Planning", by saying that "[t]he political commitments of sociology lies in its relations to the social system".

[392] Compare, for instance, the following argument of Kulcsár (1971b:223) to the policy-related research undertaken by Konrád and Szelényi at the time:

> [a]s far as planning is concerned, sociology has two tasks which differ, and nevertheless cannot be dividend, since they mutually effect each other. The literature on the subject, generally considered part of socially active or applied sociology examines the role of sociology or sociologists in the shaping of decisions affecting society, particularly in social planning. Two points of view are intertwined in this way of starting the issue. One of the essential tasks of sociology happens to be the investigation of the decision-process itself, in this particular case the process of social planning. The second is participating concretely in this or that particular social decision or planning process, in other works making knowledge acquired in the practice of sociology available when individ-

In this context, it is more than noteworthy, and less than incidental, that Szelényi does not relate to Gouldner's critique toward the myth of value-free sociology (cf. Gouldner 1962) or relate to his cynicism toward social scientists who, according to him, have their own vested interest in maintaining and protecting the welfare state (cf. Gouldner 1968). While Gouldner not only problematizes the notion of value freedom in the social sciences but also strongly objects to Weber's position about the possibility of value-free sociology, Szelényi (1982b:781) mentions value freedom in connection with Gouldner only in very general terms, when he discusses his conceptualization of intellectuals and their CCD. Although Szelényi recognizes Gouldner's (1978a, 160 / 1979:9) trail-blazing insight expressed in the rhetorical question "Where does the cameraman fit in?", relating it to no less than the emergence of an entire research program on new class and the sociology of intellectuals [cf. King and Szelényi (2004:xv) and Szelényi and Martin (1987:3; 1988:649)], he restrains himself from siding with Gouldner's lament over the myth of value freedom.[393]

Instead of siding with Gouldner or the members of the Frankfurt School,[394] Szelényi sides with H. S. Becker, as mentioned above in the methodology subsection. Indeed, in the exchange of ideas between H. S. Becker (1967) and Gouldner (1968), two former presidents of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, Szelényi's position on value freedom in social sciences resembles that of the former rather than of the latter.[395] In other words, he seems to understand well the balance of power within professional sociology as well as his own position in this 'scientific field'.[396] Therefore, he plays it safe by subscribing quietly to the position taken by Parsons (1950) who stresses value freedom in sociology

---

ual social problems are surveyed, particular decisions are prepared, or the effects of these decisions are investigated. One cannot, however, describe the first task as unambiguously theoretical, and eh second as practical, since the description of the social aspect of the decision process may have immediate practical consequences and participation in the planning process and research initiated in connection with a given problem, and eh application of the results, be this work of the 'social engineering' or the 'clinical' kind, means the employment of sociological theory as a whole, and it therefore also furthers the clarification of theoretical notions.

[393] It is only late in his academic career, within the development of the ideas on neoclassical sociology and irony as a methodological approach, that he together with his co-authors recognizes the value of reflexivity (more on that below under the especially devoted sub-section).

[394] Needless to add that he does not relate to the similar critical argument presented by Horkheimer and Adorno (1972) either. According to their argument presented in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, the seeming avoidance of values (i.e. the claim for value freedom that is supposed to free the claimer from any meaningful self-reflection and auto-critique) is the strongest value commitment of all. As Agger (1991:111) adds, "[i]t is in this sense that the Frankfurt School's analysis of mythology and ideology can be applied to a positivist social science that purports to transcend myth and value but, in its own methodological obsessions, is mythological to the very core".

[395] According to this literally pragmatist point of view, "[w]e take sides as our personal and political commitments dictate, use our theoretical and technical resources to avoid the distortions that might introduce into our work, limit our conclusions carefully, recognize the hierarchy of credibility for what is, and field as best we can the accusations and doubts that will surely be our fate" (H. S. Becker 1967:247).

[396] The notion of "field" is used here in the sense discussed by Bourdieu (1975, 1985b).

and Merton ([1957/1949] 1968:639–40, 644) who emphasizes "originality as a supreme value" within the institution of science.[397]

In short, one can say that Szelényi's values reflect the adoption of the views of 'democratic socialism', to use Stretton's (1981:121) terminology, as well as an understanding of the rules of the game within academia and the balance of power, including his own position on its sociological field. On the one hand, he has remained committed to his fight against injustice. Indeed, his numerous reflections as well as publications published in non-mainstream outlets indicate value relevance and the existence of formative positions that seek to reveal injustice – all of which can be associated or found to be in accordance with the accepted principles of critical theory. While he made his break-through in academic sociology with empirical studies on inequalities in the socialist system, he has extended them to studies on actually existing post-socialism and has been making value-loaded statements in the publications whose format allows him to be rhetorically less careful or neutral and use a somewhat more informal as opposed to formal writing style. Compared to the articles he has published in top journals, the publications of co-authored works with Ladányi on ethnicity, in general, and on the Roma minority, in particular, stand out as those where he does not pretend to have remained emotionally detached from or uninvolved with the objects of study. On the other hand, his publications, which aimed for acceptance in flagship journals in sociology, appear to be an attempt to meet the expectations of peers (including the colloquies and editors/reviewers of the journals) by demonstrating that the research outcomes are the result of post-positivist objective inquiry where the authors have eliminated any biases.

3.14 The Call to Action

Irony as a method of neoclassical sociology does not have a political call to action. In accordance with the argument presented above about Szelényi's values in relation to research, his position on the call to action is also a combination of the positions of (post)positivism and critical theory. On the one hand, Szelényi maintains, similar to the (post)positivists, that it is not the responsibility of the researcher to promote social action or become personally involved in politics. He understands perfectly well that within the dominant (post)positivist academic environment any call to action and especially any actual involvement in politics is seen as advocacy that is a (potential) threat to the objectivity and validity of the research. In the language of Lincoln and Guba (2000:175), "Hard-line foundationalists presume that the stain of action will interfere with, or even negate, the objectivity that is a (presumed) characteristic of rigorous scientific method inquiry".

On the other hand, Szelényi would like to see socially disadvantaged groups empowered as a result of his research – he actually anticipates and hopes for the

---

[397] For instance, there is evidence that Szelényi has institutionalized the "value of humility and modesty" (Merton [1957/1949] 1968:649), which academic peers respect as he has been sharing the authorship of his original contributions with co-authors and contributors, several of whom have been his graduate students.

emancipation of the oppressed. In other words, although he has avoided active involvement in politics himself, he does not hide his likely approval should measures be taken toward the development and implementation of more equal public policies aimed at greater social justice with the help of lessons learned from his research. To present just one example that illustrates his dual commitment to value freedom and social justice, as the Vice President Elect of the ASA, he was noted for emphasizing the plurality of the views on race shared by the members of the association as well as the importance of "the decoupling of political issues from scholarly issues" in the discussion of the ASA Statement on Race, at the ASA Council meeting on January 26–27, 2002 (American Sociological Association, 2002:3).

As I have discussed elsewhere in detail (Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.1), Szelényi avoids direct connection with the non-scientific part of the 'Two Marxisms' identified and stressed by Gouldner (1980). Szelényi sustains the image that his principal aim is to understand the world before an attempt is made to change it. Compared to the classical Marxism of Marx and Engels or the contemporary Marxism of Burawoy or Wright, Szelényi does not seem to believe that the Left has developed and perfected the scientific tools to interpret the world to the extent that the time is ripe to make an explicit attempt to change it by going into politics. Unlike Bourdieu, who feels it to be his responsibility to defend the intellectual field and acts accordingly,[398] Szelényi limits his political ambitions to the education and empowerment of social actors – just to show them (preferably based on theoretically informed empirical investigation) the available options or alternatives with the likely social outcomes. So, rather than advocating for one or another policy option, he expects policymakers and social actors to be able to learn and make decisions themselves. Accordingly, they ought to take responsibility for their actions – which logically frees the social scientist, including Szelényi.

As I have discussed in greater detail elsewhere (Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.3), this relates also to the conceptualization of the nature of the intellectual with the dual call that forces him or her to oscillate between politics and culture. It still remains somewhat unclear, however, how Szelényi has managed to suppress this temptation to stay out of politics, which according to Eyerman (1994) and Szacki (1990), is the defining feature of an intellectual. Although Szelényi has been hesitant to disclose all the details that led to his emigration from Hungary or how he managed to make a career in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences without becoming a member of the Communist Party, it is clear that he has managed to avoid direct involvement in politics. One can guess that once he had emigrated, involvement in the politics of the host countries where he has been working and living as a first-generation immigrant has hardly been an option for him. Yet, the possibility of returning to Hungary and going into politics there (similar to G. Schöpflin, for instance) should have been open for him, if he had desired to.

When I asked him during the interview how he has been able to resist the temptation of going into politics or turning down (the presumed) invitations to

---

[398] Bourdieu (2008b) devoted quite some energy during the last part of his life and intellectual engagements.

do so, he replied: "Well..., I do not think I have an answer to this question. I do not think I ever had an answer to this question" (Szelényi 2012c). In the second interview, he (Szelényi 2012d), nevertheless, gave a general explanation that may also help to understand his personal story:

> ...the bourgeoisie will always be capable of corrupting the intellectuals, right. Give them a privileged state position in society like we are in academia. So, if you can have a good life, right, teaching four hours a week and earning reasonable incomes, right, and having fun while you are doing it, you must be pretty crazy if you want to have political power. Well, there are some but I think a capitalist society has a fantastic force to co-opt intellectuals. [It] was much less so in socialist society, say the ability to co-opt intellectuals was minimal and the basic principle of legitimacy appealed to them.

Szelényi firmly supports, on the one hand, the (post)positivist viewpoint that research should be kept free from ideology and be assessed only for its "accuracy, rigor, and relevance"; given his sympathies toward the ideas of critical theory, on the other hand, he has carved out a solution which allows political action based on research results. While he has avoided direct involvement in politics, intervention, or even social movements, he has found a way to promote social action through his publications. For instance, he (1980a:133) states in reply to his critics, such as Neuburg, that he would not mind if as a result of his book, measures were taken to improve the socio-economic situation of the underprivileged. This makes his position on the call to action similar to Castells' (2000:390) point of view, who expresses hope that his contribution would promote thinking and a better understanding of the social world; Szelényi states that he would not mind if social action were also taken to promote the well-being of the less advantaged.

While these similarities are noticeable, he actually comes closer to Pahl with regard to the issue of the call to action. Given the fact that Szelényi traveled both with Castells and Pahl (cf. Milicevic 2001; Szelényi 2011b), achieving some important milestones during his formative years before and after emigration, some influence of the two is perhaps inevitable. As suggested in the previous sub-section, given the tendency for Szelényi to side with Pahl rather than Castells in the ISA Research Committee on Regional and Urban Development, including the editorial board of its *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, it is not surprising that the ideas of the former, rather than the latter, on the role of sociology in the policy process come closer to the position that Szelényi learns to appreciate.

According to Pahl's (1971:317–8) "ideal program of action", it should include the following stages:

1. Appraisal of the 'social health' of the region based on broad societal values, by analyzing the distribution of appropriate social indicators in the light of the social goals they are designed to measure.
2. Reconsideration of existing goals and the reformulation or designation of new goals in the light of this. Sociologists are not limited by society's designation of a social goal but may also suggest new ones, arising from

their understanding of social processes and the unforeseen consequences of existing policies.

3. A review of social problems and social goals in the light of the existing social and economic situation: social problems are the opposite of social goals.
4. The formulation of appropriate policies to achieve the social goals: these policies need not necessarily have a physical component and may be designed to solve a social problem analyzed for the first time or to make good existing but inadequate policies.

Finally, there is also something inherently similar between Szelényi's position on the call to action and that of Kołakowski's ability to play the intellectual double game. Since both knew the works of Marx(ists) better than the vast majority of communists (especially the party members), they have also been able to beat Marxists on their home ground. While both are well aware of the inherent connection between Marxism and intellectuals (cf. Kołakowski 1956 / 1969b; Szelényi 1982b:785),[399] they have found it important to keep their political preferences and sympathies largely to themselves. Similar to their ambiguous relations to God,[400] they have also found it to be wise enough not to disclose their views on their true relation to this political ideology, including its call to action. That is, they have opted for self-proclaimed value freedom and the avoidance of any direct political engagement in order to pursue their own political and/or ethical agenda. Both also understood that to make a career in Western academia, one needs to go beyond the appeal for compassion based on their dissident background. Instead of extrapolating for decades on their petty personal experiences, seeking every possible opportunity to criticize the communist regime, they capitalized on their comparatively better knowledge of Marx(ism) and the empirical realities of the actually existing socialist system.

The fact that Szelényi has suppressed Marxism in his publications does not mean that he has no internal call to action. His decision to distance himself from the Marxist class analysis, which seems to be a reaction to stigmatization (cf. La-

---

[399] Although one can find hints that suggest the existence of such a relationship between the well-educated and the communist party already in Konrád and Szelényi's *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, the awareness comes explicitly apparent in Szelényi's (1982b) discussion of Gouldner's work. (In addition to the sources mentioned by Szelényi (i.e. Gouldner 1968, 1970, 1974c, 1975–1976, 1978a, 1978b / 1979a) see also Gouldner's (1974b, 1976b, 1980) other relevant works such as the two essays: "Marxism and Social Theory" and "The Dark Side of the Dialectic: Toward a New Objectivity" as well as the book *The Two Marxisms* (which contains the first essay).

[400] While Kołakowski wrote a considerable amount on theological issues (cf. Kołakowski [1959] 1969a, [1972] 1989, 1990 Part II, 2012), his relation to God remained ambiguous. As Connelly (2013) reports: "[t]o the question of whether he believed in God, he answered that only God knew". Likewise, one can see on the book cover of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* a reference to Szelényi as a Catholic author, but nowhere in the book or in his other publications is the impact of religion on his academic works explained. One can get some idea from his interview where he discusses among other issues also his family background (cf. Case 2017a). The closest that he comes in his publications to disclosing his relation to religion can be found indirectly in King and Szelényi (2006), which indicates that he believes there to be a relation between the dominant religion of the country and the type of varieties of post-communist economic systems that has evolved there.

voie 1980; Andorka 1993:104–5), caused disagreements with Wright during his period at Wisconsin (cf. Szelényi 2012c) and became the center of his dispute with Burawoy (cf. Burawoy 2001 and Eyal et al. 2001, 2003a), seems to reflect his understanding of the hegemonic power of the (post)positivist in professional sociology and social sciences more broadly. As mentioned above, he said during the interview (Szelényi 2012d) that while "[i]n the late 1960s and early 1970s US social science was heavily influenced by Marxism" (Szelényi 2012c), and "… in the 70s and 80s, though it began to lose some of its conceptual, theoretical or methodological integrity, at least it had a political project, right. Sociology was kind of left-wing in the universities. So, one who went to study sociology wanted to make a better world. That's gone".

Similar to Wright and Burawoy, who entered the politics of professional sociology and became the Presidents of the American and the international sociological associations in order to save sociology and Marxism,[401] Szelényi has made major attempts to enter academic politics. In addition to the positions of Scientific Secretary of the Institute of Sociology at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, a premature attempt to become its director, he has also served as the Vice President of the ASA, Executive Director of the Society for Comparative Social Research, President of the Hungarian Sociological Association, Department Chair at Flinders, Graduate Centre of CUNY, UCLA and Yale. More recently, he also served as Chair of the Council of Academic Personnel at UCLA and was very close to becoming its Vice Chancellor – the most powerful person at UCLA on the academic side and the third person on campus after the Chancellor and Executive Vice Chancellor, known also as the Provost (Szelényi 2012d). Although this plan did not materialize and he settled instead for the position of the Foundation Dean of Social Sciences at New York University Abu Dhabi, one is, nevertheless, able to observe his erudite understanding of the appropriate balance between (post)positivist's and critical theory's position on the call to action in sociological research. More specifically, instead of the academic program on sociology, he set up one entitled "Social Research and Public Policy" (cf. New York University Abu Dhabi, s.a.) – surely not an entirely unproblematic decision in the eyes of many sociologists.

To summarize Szelényi's take on the call to action, one can note that similar to many other issues discussed in this chapter, he combines the positions of (post)positivism and critical theory. On the one hand, as with the former, he holds that it is not the responsibility of the researcher to promote social action or become personally involved in politics. On the other hand, Szelényi would like to see socially disadvantaged groups empowered as a result of his research. Furthermore, he knows the Marxist literature and nature of intellectuals well enough to use the tools of the former to auto-critique the latter. While making his career in the West, he does not overexploit his dissident background or find his call to action in personal conflicts with the socialist regime. Given the demise

---

[401] E. O. Wright (1987:76) "The theorist thus simply has to choose which of these interests is more important: is it more important to be an academic or a Marxist? As Burawoy says, "to save sociology or to save Marxism – that is the question."

of both Marxism and sociology, he retreats behind the academic walls without acknowledging the internal saviors of either. Although he does not hide his likely approval if measures are taken toward the development and implementation of more equal public policies aimed at greater social justice, he is too knowledgeable of the rules of the game within academia, socialist ideology and intellectuals to become personally involved in politics proper. That is, his knowledge and wisdom have directed him to avoid active involvement politics himself and emphasize empiricism instead. He understands that (post)positivists view the call to action as 'advocacy' or subjectivity, and therefore a threat to validity and objectivity. Nevertheless, having internalized the values of critical theory, he supports the empowerment of the less advantaged in his academic publications. Instead of immediate and personal involvement, it can be seen as a call to action with the indirect long-term aim of social transformation that should promote social justice and equality.

3.15 Inquirer Posture

Irony as a method requires the specific posture of the jester. Eyal et al. (2003a:28) explain that:

> [t]he jester produces ironic critique, but it differs from priestly ire in that it is oriented empirically rather than morally, and thus it offers immanent rather than transcendent critique. As immanent critique, the jester's analysis never contrasts the present with a vision of a more rational or more just society. Rather, the jester exposes the arbitrariness of the present, emphasizing that what appears rational, inevitable, just, and pure is accidental, temporary, absurd, and hybrid.

To expend on these ideas, it will be argued below that Szelényi's divided position on value freedom and the call to action discussed above relates also to his opinion of the inquirer posture. Seeing himself as a 'critical social scientist', who along the lines of Pahl's (1971) understanding of the role of the sociologist in policy making presented above, presents the policy options, their likely outcomes, costs and benefits [cf. Eyal et al. (2003a:32–3) and B. Szelényi and I. Szelényi (1991:29)] makes Szelényi's public position closest to a postpositivist one. While the values of critical theory with respect to the inquirer posture, according to which a scholar can be if not should be a 'transformative intellectual' and act 'as advocate and activist', he knows equally well the expectations of the (post)positivists, according to whom the proper inquirer posture is to be an objective scientist. If any relations (in addition to the warmly welcomed public funding) are allowed at all, it should be limited to the scholar as an informer of decision-makers, policymakers and change agents. In addition to this, similar to Castells (2000:389), it seems that Szelényi understands that social action and political involvement can hardly change much, if not make things worse, and therefore, simply does not deserve the effort. In other words, this historic insight into the nature of intellectuals forms a rather atypical inquirer posture among critical theorists. Unlike the members of the new left, Castells and Szelényi take a postpositivist position and have stayed out of politics proper.

Szelényi has avoided not only direct involvement in politics but also making any direct ideological statements or value-loaded arguments in his publications. Understanding the hegemonic power position of (post)positivists within Western sociology and in (social) sciences more generally, one can say that Szelényi's inquirer position, which he wishes to present to peers and the public, comes closest to the common interpretation of Weber's views on value freedom (cf. Weber 1949 / 2012:304–34) and positivist understanding of the proper role of a scientist (cf. Weber 1948, Part I, Ch. 5 / 2012:335–54).[402] Meeting these expectations, he has not taken the public role of the 'transformative intellectual' as an advocate and activist – a public responsibility together with the inquirer posture that scholars working on similar issues and broadly within the same domain, such as Bourdieu, Burawoy, Gouldner or Wright have taken. Szelényi seems to understand that while critical theorists have good reason to see it as an integral part of Marxism, getting involved is typically seen within academia as unscientific and ideological. Hence, he tries to emphasize the academic or scientific part of critical theory that makes his inquirer posture appear more post-positivist.

While it is clear from Szelényi's works that he is not as ideologically committed as Burawoy or Wright, whose Marxist commitments and real utopian programs he rejects. In most of his publications the value positions are hidden as he hardly reveals any possible political or ideological commitments. There is only a handful of examples where he has difficulties limiting his analysis just to reporting his findings. For instance, in the preface of the English translation of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power,* he (1979b:xiii) states that he and Konrád were, on the one hand, committed to the cause of socialism and, on the other, to its critical social analysis. Exceptions like these might allow one to suggest that, in principle, Szelényi seems to have (consciously or unconsciously) mastered the unity of theory and practice – the two Marxisms in Gouldner's language. Although *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* does indeed end with an acknowledgment of the need for a new global left-wing strategy and call to action, it also shows that Konrád and Szelényi (1979, Ch. 1–2) are aware of the hidden agenda of left-wing intellectuals that Gouldner describes in his trilogy in general and in his essay titled "Marxism and Social Theory" (Gouldner 1974b), in particular.

In other words, rather than being part of the hidden agenda of intellectuals or Marxists described by Gouldner, they actually do acknowledge the possible self-serving nature of the ideas of left-wing intellectuals and are highly critical of it (Konrád & Szelényi 1979:251):

> We further assume that only this kind of immanent critique of society and ideology can lead to the formulation of an international, East-West, New-Left strategy, by contrast with the efforts of the 1960s, which proved abortive precisely because they failed to set themselves off clearly from traditional, teleological leftism of the sort which leads only to rational redistribution. If the New Left cannot go beyond insisting that intellectuals should enunciate universal

---

[402] See, for instance, Coser (1971:219–22), Parsons (1947:8–29), and Sahay (1971). For an alternative view see Dawe (1971).

social goals and lead broad opposition movements, rather than give expression to their own particular interests, then there will be nothing in its thinking to distinguish it from traditional Bolshevism. ... The criteria of left-wing thinking have to be reformulated, for what once seemed to be left-wing may now turn out to be right-wing; we must discover what elements of 'left-wing' thinking are really only part of the class culture of the intelligentsia.

Furthermore, one could suggest that having discovered the contradiction in the socialist socio-economic arrangement, where the dictatorship of the proletariat means the systematic exclusion of workers from power, Szelényi might be willing to articulate an emancipatory program for them. That would actually be incorrect, however, as Szelényi is careful or clever enough not to become involved in a criticism that would be purely ideological. In other words, unlike Marx who has been criticized for writing history with one hand and trying to make sure that it happens according to the script with the other – a kind of self-fulfilling prophesy – Szelényi's program is much more modest. He seems to be aware of the conflicting tensions of social scientists described by Gouldner (1962, 1968) and acknowledges the need to understand the world before making an attempt to change it. As he sums up the collaboration with Konrád by saying that "our aim was to clarify for ourselves the kind of society we were living in (Szelényi 1979:xiii) – not to provide a blueprint for a revolution (1980a:133)''. And indeed, he maintains this position also in his later works. For instance, he (1990a:236) states in the paper *Alternative Futures for Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary* that "[s]ocial analysts are not politicians. My job, therefore, is not to offer blueprints or programs, but at best to identify, as objectively as I can, alternative future scenarios, measuring their costs and benefits, and their anticipated social consequences. I do well if readers of my analysis can think of more alternative courses of action than before". B. Szelényi and I. Szelényi (1991: 29) add in the paper on the Hungarian land reform along the same lines that "[i]t is not the task of sociologists to offer 'solutions' but it is our job to assess what the likely outcomes of struggles may be. We cannot tell what ought to be done, but if we participate in our profession well we should be able to say something about what is possible and what is likely or unlikely:"

More recently, Eyal et al. (2003a:32–3) conclude the paper on irony as a method with the following words:

> To be clear: the task of the critical theorist is to describe and appraise the possible alternative trajectories of social development empirically; to show that what exists is not inevitable; that alternative forms of conduct are open to social actors; to elucidate the costs and consequences of these forms of conduct; and to do all this without positing which of them is correct or desirable. A critical scientific social theory leaves it to social actors themselves to weigh whether or not they are willing to pay the costs of particular courses of action. Put another way, ironic critique aims to expose the arbitrariness of the present, uncovering its hybrid and accidental origins (Foucault, 1977) without trying to dictate to social actors what to do. The purpose of such irony is to enrich public dialogue by casting doubt on what was taken for granted before the dialogue began; this is precisely the role of the jester. As Habermas (1972) con-

tends, the human interest represented by social science is critical communication – a project of exchange and dialogue between social scientists and social actors that is meant to increase rationality, in part, by increasing the reflexive capacities of social actors. Irony serves the social scientist well in such an endeavor, since it requires him or her to engage in constant autocritique, not to take him- or herself too seriously, and to remain open to dialogic possibilities.

Perhaps the best example of this position comes from the paper titled *The New Social Democrats?*, where Ladányi and Szelényi (1997) seem to take the role of Gramsci's 'traditional intellectual' and follow the advice of Gouldner (1968) who suggests committing to normative principles rather than particular interests. As Ladányi and Szelényi (1997:1543) explain in the epilogue of the very article:

> [o]ur purpose was not to advocate a new social democracy, nor do we pretend that there is a coherent new political paradigm that can be attributed to New Social Democrats. We do believe, however, that the time is ripe for imaginative political theorizing. ... Today, when conservatism is in a ... process of disintegration, we see no ... theory on the left emerging. We wrote about the dual crisis of the social democratic welfare state and neoliberalism. To be fair, we should add to this a third crisis: this is the crisis of the political theory on the left.

Although Szelényi apparently tries to underline the need to understand the world before attempts are made to change it, he does promote social action from time to time. For instance, he shows little uneasiness about mixing theory with action when he replies to critics like Neuburg (cf. Szelényi 1980a:133) or about making suggestions for the actions of the leaders of the new-left: "[i]f I were an ideologue of an East European labor movement, I would recommend a political strategy in which labor tried to play off against each other the cadre elite, the technocracy with its New Class aspirations, and the new petty bourgeoisie with its capitalist aspirations" (Szelényi 1986–1987:139).[403] Also, in the paper titled *Prospects and Limits of New Social Democracy in the Transitional Societies of Central Europe*, Ladányi and Szelényi are not trying to be politically balanced and just present the crisis of (new) social democracy in comparison to neoliberalism rather than trying to persuade liberals of the need to adopt the policy package of a new social democracy in CEE. Their message is clear: "liberalism can have a future in the post-communist world, but only if it does not cast itself as 'neoliberalism', but rather accepts its place to the center-left of the political spectrum, where the new social democracy is located" (Ladányi and Szelényi 2002a:48).

In other words, he does not seem to be immune to Marx's celebrated eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, according to which, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it". Although he (1980a) makes vocal statements against Bahro's neo-Leninist ideas of bringing class con-

---

[403] More particularly, although he finds a 'classless' society an attractive idea, he does not know how this could be achieved, and hence, the (second best) and most feasible scenario for labor would be to get some more 'political space' by playing the masters against each other. He ends by stating that "From the point of view of my own political values, the best possible scenario is one in which the forces of the New Class and of the old classes balance each other" (1986–1987:139–41).

sciousness to the proletariat from above, he also pictures himself as a professional sociologist who speaks in the interests of the oppressed and seems to have no problem with the division of labor within the social democratic movement between workers and intellectuals, as Kautsky envisioned. As proof, he takes interest in the underclass; in addition to the primary commodity producers he devoted his research interest to during his early work, more recently together with Ladányi, he has conducted a series of studies on the Roma minority and poverty (cf. Ladányi and Szelényi 2001, 2002b, 2003, 2006; Szelényi and Ladányi 2005).

Since the collaborations with Ladányi also happen to be those where he shows his sympathy toward new social democracy with a strong emphasis on the functioning welfare state most explicitly, questions about the above-mentioned value freedom can be raised. As the publications in which Szelényi makes his political preferences most openly explicit are all collaborations where he is not the first author (cf. esp. Ladányi and Szelényi 1997, 2002a), one could argue that they reflect primarily Ladányi's ideological positions. Even if this is the case, Szelényi does not object to these – his co-authorship is a testimony that he agrees with these views, despite his claims elsewhere for value freedom and efforts to avoid the possibility of giving his scholarship an ideologically motivated image.

3.16 Ethics

The relationship between irony and ethics can be complicated as was pointed out in section 2.3. Eyal et al. (2003a:9) do not go much beyond stating in the key text "On Irony" that irony has to be exercised in self-ironical mode. Hence, in order to learn about how to use irony ethically as a method of neoclassical sociology, one has to dig into Szelényi's views and positions on research ethics about which not too much is known. It will be argued below that despite the lack of public information about these matters, it seems, nevertheless, plausible that he has a rather pragmatic approach to these issues. On the one hand, in the context of the word limit imposed on his publications, he does not seem to devote any space to mention, much less discuss, these issues.[404] On the other hand, he does not seem to criticize or question these principles. Rather than fighting against something that you cannot change anyway, he seems to have been committed to getting research done. In that respect, one could say that he belongs to the tradition of 'working sociologists' whom H. S. Becker (1970:20) differentiates from methodologists who merely preach about it.

As a response to various misbehaviors in academic research highlighted in the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki and the Belmont Report, research ethics has evolved into ethics codes that most, if not all, professional and academic associations have adopted (see e.g. American Sociological Association 2018). As a result, these conventional principles have been incorporated into the procedural activities of institutional review boards at least in academic institu-

---

[404] This observation is based only on his English language publications. In other words, I have not been able to access the funding applications or other documents where such issues may have come up in the university affairs.

tions in the West, and become something that funding bodies take seriously (cf. Perlstadt 2009).

Indirectly, we could try to detect it from the other characteristics of his research methodology. As described above within the sub-sections devoted to epistemology and values, he used the camouflage of value freedom during the Socialist period to avoid compromises with the political establishment, on the one hand, and to find a comfortable position *vis-à-vis* the disciples of Lukács at the Institute of Sociology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, on the other. His sympathies toward Weber's suggestion to keep science and politics separate from each other conformed well to the generally accepted value position among scientists to strive toward objectivity, value neutrality and impartiality. Although originally adopted for strategic reasons in Hungary, he must have learned even before his emigration (e.g. through contacts with such eminent representatives of functionalism, such as Parsons, Merton and Lipset) that in American academia (social) scientists are expected to suppress their political and ideological views when undertaking research, analyzing data, and publishing findings.[405]

Furthermore, one may speculate that the moral dilemmas related to the Foucauldian dictum of the power/knowledge relation as presented in inseparable ties between sociology and the political establishment in the CEE/FSU and the life story of Lukács, which he must have been aware of, may have played a role in his approach to research ethics already during the foundational years of his academic career in Hungary. One can also imagine that having found himself in a difficult position to find a job in British universities during his first year in emigration, he may have wished to distance himself from the image of an ideologue.[406] In this context, he seems to have learned quickly that the suppression of his political preferences – which could be interpreted as distorting research results and hiding the evidence, and give his critics a reason to label and stigmatize him as an intellectual whose prejudices predetermine the research outcomes in order to align with his moral point of view and/or political agenda – is not in his best career interest. Hence, it was a short step from the declaration of value freedom and critique of ideology to the distancing from ideological critique.

The declaration of value-free social science is fully compatible with the codes of ethics of the major academic associations and their conventional understanding of moral principles that should guide research. Christians (2005:144–5) identifies that there are four main principles that overlap in these codes: (the need for) informed consent, (avoidance of) deception, (the research subjects right for) privacy and confidentiality as well as (the researcher's obligation to guarantee) accuracy. Given the historical roots of these in the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki and the Belmont Report, one could also add to it that no harm must be done to the research objects.

---

[405] See, for instance, Merton's (1982b:65–7) comments on 'value-free sociology'.
[406] Szelényi (2011) reflects on his first year in emigration as a Visiting Research Professor at the University of Kent at Canterbury that "[w]hile at that time I saw myself as a left-wing critique of the communist regime some lefties at CES [Center for Environmental Studies] saw a Solzhenitsyn in me."

On the one hand, one could argue that these principles have become so universal by now that if a researcher accepts them, it does not allow a scholar to be classified according to any tradition within research ethics. On the other hand, one can also take the position that these principles of research ethics presented as universal and undeniable in all fields of research have been institutionalized as a result of the dominant (power) position of biomedicine within sciences. Such an argument is acknowledged, yet problematized, by Atkinson (2009), Dingwall (2009), and Mäkelä (2006). While they are aware of the historical developments that led to the adoption of the universal principles of research ethics by various research associations, they also say that these principles are more relevant to medical research than they are to human and social sciences. Therefore, there is an increasing concern – expressed in addition to the above-mentioned commentators also by Hurdley (2010) and Hammersley (2009) – that the ethical standards imposed by the institutional review boards are ill-suited for social sciences and humanities – especially if ethnographic methods are employed. Perhaps the most interesting argument, which goes beyond lamenting and looks for a solution, has been developed by Mäkelä (2006), who argues that the research setting faced by a sociologist is closer to the relationship between a journalist and a minister than it is to the one between a medical doctor and a patient. Hence, he questions the legal and ethical norms that social sciences, especially in the qualitative tradition, have been made to follow from the voluntary basis of research participation to the prohibition of harm to the research subjects as well as data collection, preservation and archiving.

Based on the universalized principles of research ethics derived from (bio)medical research, one could raise the ethical concerns related to the research that (Konrád and) Szelényi conducted on fellow intellectuals. One may ask, following the American Sociological Association (2018) Code of Ethics, for instance, whether there was a need for them to get informed consent as their naturalistic observations were probably not all conducted in public places, based on public records or archival research – circumstances under which, according to this ethical standard,[407] such a need can be forgone.

However, if one accepts the argument of Mäkelä (2006), in human and social sciences we should adopt the professional standards of journalism, instead of the universal principles originally developed for (bio)medical research. He argues that the nature of (qualitative) research in social sciences – especially if it involves fieldwork – makes it in practice more like journalism than (bio)medical sciences. For instance, he (ibid:8) points out that "The doctor is not allowed to act against the patient's will and interests, whereas the journalist may have a moral responsibility to disclose information that the minister wants to conceal." Based on this, he (ibid:10) questions the applicability of the principle of informed consent. Although he accepts that, similar to journalists, information should be

---

[407] For instance, its section 11.1 (b) states that "[s]ociologists may conduct research without obtaining consent for research carried out in public places where privacy is not expected. They may use publicly-available information about individuals, e.g., naturalistic observations in public places, analysis of public records, and archival research."

obtained by social scientists using transparent means, he also states that if this is not possible, special procedures should be in place – just as they are in the form of professional standards in journalism. Related to this line of argument, he (ibid:11) also challenges how the principle of no harm is interpreted to mean that research should benefit the research subjects. If one would follow this to the logical end, works that disclose corruption would not be possible as they harm the corrupt individuals and/or involved legal entities instead of benefiting them. Furthermore, one could reason that if research were not only to avoid harm but to benefit the units of analysis, we would see PR and propaganda in service of private/economic and social/political interest instead of investigative journalism. Yet, if one accepts that (critical) social science provides a service to society, similar to investigative journalism, even if it may harm the private interest of the units of analysis, shouldn't we govern them by the same professional standards?

Mäkelä's arguments are likely not to be accepted by institutions and individual researchers who have adopted the universalized standards derived from (bio)medical research. Similar to Mäkela, who argues that fieldwork in social sciences is much more difficult to plan ahead than a typical lab test, it may be difficult to draw the line where works relying on the ethically justified overt and morally questionable covert methods lay. Likewise, Roth (1962:34) asks rhetorically: "Is it moral if one gets a job in a factory to earn tuition and then takes advantage of the opportunity to carry out a sociological study, but immoral to deliberately plant oneself in the factory for the express purpose of observing one's fellow workers?" To put it differently, even these critics of conventional research ethics agree that sociologists should take seriously the rights of the individuals who allowed, co-operated or facilitated – either willingly or unwillingly – in the fieldwork. Yet, they also agree that there may be circumstances under which the violation of private rights may be morally justified for the greater social interest or benefit.

Having introduced the two different, if not opposing, views on the ethical standards, one has to admit that it is somewhat unclear which position Szelényi would take. Nevertheless, it is clear that the circumstances under which he was casually observing intellectuals, without a pre-set purpose, and later theorizing and publishing on the very social group to which he himself belonged, must have produced ethical dilemmas related to the possible expectation for informed consent, research subjects right for privacy and confidentiality as well as the need to make no harm and/or benefit the fellow intellectuals.

Indeed, he (1986–1987:113–5) has noted that he worked with the most distinguished humanistic reform intellectuals and not only read whatever they wrote but got to know them so intimately that he became 'one of them'. Hence, being so close to them, he must have faced difficult choices between making an original/provocative contribution to the literature and affecting his relations with both his fellow intellectuals and the political establishment therewith.

The few pieces of information that are public about the ethical dilemmas faced by Szelényi while making an academic career in the politicized field of the newly

established sociological research group at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, on the one hand, and studying and theorizing about his follow-intellectuals, on the other, give contradictory indications. As I have discussed in relation to the political context in greater detail elsewhere (cf. Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.3.3), Szelényi has confessed that he did make conscious strategic choices (that were in harmony with the views of the political establishment and supportive of his career interest) before writing *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*. For instance, he decided not to sign the protest letter initiated by Hegedüs against the invasion of Prague by the Soviet troops in 1968[408] – a strategic move that made him one of the prime candidates for the directorship of the Sociological Research Group.[409] While he was not ready to enter a collision course at that time in his career in Hungary, he eventually did so during the research process that led to the writing of the book with Konrád.

When I asked about self-censorship during the interview, he (Szelényi 2012c) replied that despite being "very scared", he also knew that it was likely the best book he will write in his life. Furthermore, he interpreted that it was "curiosity" which did not allow him to remain silent despite the risks. The fact that the consequences, as we now know, were somewhat less dramatic than Szelényi anticipated at the time and led to his emigration, which has worked out well for his international academic career, does not diminish the seriousness of the dilemma that he was faced with at the time. There are few among the methodological moralists who, similar to Konrád and Szelényi, have had to face the danger of imprisonment or deportation as a consequence of the political sensitivity of their research.

The above-given examples show only indirectly how Szelényi solves dilemmas concerning difficult issues related to research ethics. However, they do not explain what compromises, if any, he had to make with the political establishment or with himself to make an academic career in Hungary and/or to obtain a passport for emigration. Unfortunately, there is not much more to be added to his relation to research ethics from the emigration period.[410] While it is true that ethical issues occasionally receive widespread attention (often through scandals, which reach a wider audience), it is also true that due to their sensitivity, these issues are mostly dealt with in the closed circles of editorial boards and university management.[411]

---

[408] For more details see Heller (2018).

[409] See Szelényi (2000:4-5; 2010b:31–2) for details of his confessions and reflections on these events.

[410] The only exception is in 2011 when he signed together with other scholars close to the scholarly community of the New School for Social Research in New York and to the journal *Thesis Eleven*, an open letter of protest to Primer Viktor Orbán to complain against the supposedly government led prosecution and media campaign (cf. Thesis Eleven 2011). More specifically, he has not abstained from the protest that is seen by its initiators as a fabricated corruption case and slander – to threaten and harm the reputation of the philosophers Agnes Heller, Mihály Vajda, and Sándor Radnóti.

[411] Members of the various academic committees and editorial boards that Szelényi has served would know the details better, but it is unlikely that anyone else than Szelényi himself, or perhaps some of his closest family members, would have the complete picture.

While it is somewhat unclear how Szelényi solved the challenging ethical dilemmas *vis-à-vis* the political establishment, it is, nevertheless, clear that he is not ignorant about them. For instance, he (2009a, Lecture 20) has lately emphasized collegiality in his lecture on Weber's legal-rational authority.[412] It also emerges from Konrád and Szelényi's (1991:341) reflection, according to which the message of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* was not a particularly popular book among their fellow intellectuals, as it sounded almost insulting to them. Instead of feeling part of the power establishment, the well-educated in CEE felt "neglected, unrewarded, and sometimes even persecuted by Brezhnevism". Since Konrád and Szelényi kept the discussion in their book, written in *samizdat* style and avoiding mentioning any names of the individual intellectuals they were in abstract terms speaking and theorizing about, it must have been difficult to complain that they jeopardized the privacy of fellow intellectuals in the research process.

Despite the fact that Konrád and Szelényi chose the *samizdat* style for *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* to describe and theorize about the role and position of the intelligentsia in the soviet/socialist type of society, which does not mention any names or references to specific events/documents, some people may, nevertheless, have taken it personally. One such possibility has been elaborated by me in the paper "How to Become a Dominant or Even Iconic Central and East European Sociologist: The Case of Iván Szelényi" (Kroos 2020:83–97). In the section on "Intellectual Rivalry" I contemplate the possibility that Bence and Kis, under the pseudonym Rakovski (1978) chose to respond to Konrád and Szelényi in a similar style – putting forward their critique of the critique in the *samizdat* style where no names were mentioned or any direct references were given. Although Szelényi (2020:237) comments that I read something out of his work that was not there, he also leaves it open that it is possible that Bence and Kis (who seem to have been disturbed by the radicalism of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*) saw him and Konrád as rivals.

Likewise, one could raise the issue of how ethical it was for Konrád and Szelényi (1979) to use in their work evidence that they encountered in their empirical work on socialist housing estates as well as in dealing with their fellow intellectuals in their professional duties among Hungarian sociologists and city planners. One could, for instance, follow the American Sociological Association's

---

[412] More specifically, he (2009a, Lecture 20) explains that:

[t]here are different ways for collegiality to operate. One way--that means that you are interacting with other people in the same organization, on the basis of collegiality. You can get a good sense of this collegiality; for instance, it's very important in the medical profession. If you go to a doctor for a second opinion, this doctor is really not supposed to say that his or her colleague, the other doctor, really screwed it and he gave you the wrong diagnosis or the wrong therapy. Right? Collegiality means that you stick together--right?--that the profession sticks together. There is a very strong sense of collegiality among lawyers, or at least supposed to be. The ethic of the legal profession is very much collegiality.

And it is also incidentally in the universities. I mean, faculty are not supposed to bad-mouth each other. Right? They certainly, towards students, they have to show that they have a collegial relationship with each other. Mutual respect binds them together.

Code of Ethics (2018:17) reason that the quite explicit norms of how researchers should deal with the situation when they encounter unanticipated research opportunities[413] was violated.

Although Szelényi avoids mentioning any names in the more scandalous cases, one could argue that readers with enough contextual knowledge could probably discern who they might have been.[414] Furthermore, one could question if the fact that Szelényi (1980a:126–30; 1986–1987:108–16; 1988a, Ch. 4; 2002:47–8; King and Szelényi 2004:72–5) has revealed several decades later who the real-life archetypes were that he had in mind when developing his sociology of intellectuals in the less delicate cases, may be questioned by individuals whose names have been revealed or moralists who take the principle of informed consent very seriously. They could, for instance, not only raise the question about the informed consent at the time when observations were made but about the de-anonymization of the data decades later. Their argument might be that the researcher has the ethical responsibility to renew the consent if (s)he is unsure if the research subjects may still agree with being part of the study in the later stages of the research process or if the confidentiality was still an issue decades after the original observations.

But an equally strong, if not stronger, argument can be made that (Konrád and) Szelényi had a moral duty to disclose the knowledge of how the state socialist society has co-opted intelligentsia and how these intellectuals have been using the circumstances for their own interest – to establish for the first time the (class) domination based not on property (or nobility) but on knowledge. Indeed,

---

[413] ASA Code of Ethics section 13.02 on "Unanticipated Research Opportunities" states as follows:

> If during the course of teaching, practice, service, or non-professional activities, sociologists determine that they wish to undertake research that was not previously anticipated, they make known their intentions and take steps to ensure that the research can be undertaken consonant with ethical principles, especially those relating to confidentiality and informed consent. Under such circumstances, sociologists seek the approval of institutional review boards or, in the absence of such review processes, another authoritative body with expertise on the ethics of research.

[414] Consider for instance the following examples, which one is unlikely to be made up if there was a real story and individuals behind them:

- "[Intellectuals under the socialist redistributive system] are in a position to accept bribes in the course of foreign-trade negotiations" and to "buy themselves women through the allocation of an apartment or a soft, well-paid job" (Konrád and Szelényi 1979:172);
- "Today a leading technocrat's life is actually more pleasant than that of a high-ranking party man. His home and income are in no way inferior, he drives a better car, travels abroad more often, can move about more freely; his authority at the office will not be undermined if he is regularly seen in public with a girlfriend while his wife sits at home with the children" (ibid:208);
- "The planners/bureaucrats, but also the academic economists or research architects, or sociologists or even most of my fellow philosophers who were shaping some of the general principles with which they thought the 'good planners' ought to operate were all not that concerned with the slightly better housing they got or with the tax free scotch they could buy in the hard currency stores from the dollar savings they made from their per diem during the last World Congress of Philosophy or Sociology" (Szelényi 1980a:127).

one could argue that (Konrád and) Szelényi had a moral obligation to speak up about the 'distributive injustice' that their close association with the members of the scientific-power establishment allowed them to identify. This would allow one to suggest that Szelényi has been pursuing a rather Foucauldian ethic. According to O'Farrell's (2005:135) interpretation of Foucault, this kind of ethics justifies research that makes the repressive power relations of contemporary society visible.[415] Although developed independently[416] and contextualized in the modern CEE empirical context in general, and Hungary in particular, Szelényi's works on intellectuals (as well as on class stratification, sociology of knowledge and ideology) can be said to serve that aim.

If so, one may ask if (Konrád and) Szelényi disclosed to us the complete evidence or only a selected part of it – did they not exercise some self-censorship in this process? As mentioned within the discussion of control (Section 3.12), when the issue of self-censorship arose during the interview, Szelényi (2012c) admitted that self-censorship can be regarded as the weakest point in his scholarship and irony as its method. On the one hand, he together with Konrád could not be silenced because of their curiosity and will to contribute to the sociology of intellectuals – irrespective of the likely personal, political and professional punishment. On the other hand, even then he seems to have exercised some self-censorship – possibly for ethical reasons – about which little is known.

From the opposite point of view, one could ask how ethical it is to use irony as a tool of social critique. For instance, Miranda Campbell (2007) raises this issue in the paper titled "The Mocking Mockumentary and the Ethics of Irony", published in *Taboo: The Journal of Culture and Education*. She problematizes Sasha Baron Cohen's character of Borat Sagdiyev in the well-known 2006 mocumentary titled *Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan*. While she recognizes the pedagogical or illuminating potential of irony,[417] she (ibid, 56) also raises among other critical points the issue that the filmmakers did not disclose to all parties who appear in the movie "the true purposes and intent of the film".

---

[415] O'Farrell (2005:135) says: "Foucault, in spite of the accusations levelled against him of political and ethical nihilism, had firm views on the kind of ethical approach that he wanted to take in his work. He argued that he wanted to render certain taken-for-granted exercises of power 'intolerable', by exposing them to scrutiny. He argues that the exercise of power only remains tolerable by covering up its tracks…. He saw it as part of his task, to make people aware of how intolerable some previously taken-for-granted exercises of power actually were and show them that things could be different".

[416] As mentioned before, Szelényi (2002:46) confesses that during the formative decades of the 1960s and 1970s; that is, when he developed some of his most important works, he "was not familiar with the works of Michel Foucault". He adds that even when he "wrote *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power,* a rather Foucauldian book in more ways than one, I had not read Foucault yet. I sort of re-invented him".

[417] Campbell (2007:59) states: "Satire and irony revolve around the 'a-ha'/eureka moment of critical illumination of something that was previously hidden to the audience, and as such, is essentially a learning moment in which individuals are confronted with the disjuncture between what they thought knew and the actuality of a situation."

Likewise, the critics have condemned the journalistic (field) experiment that has come to be known as "The Grievance Studies Affair"[418] for its complete failure to follow basic principles of research ethics. Among other forms of research misconduct,[419] the initiators of the affair have been criticized for the use of deception in the correspondence with editors of the targeted journals, from whom no informed consent was asked,[420] and for misleading the (anonymous) reviewers, whose time and effort was unethically spent on it. In the process, within which disciplinary action was brought against Peter Boghossian – the only institutionally affiliated of the three initiators – for the failure to apply for the approval of the study from the Internal Review Board (IRB) of the Portland State University (cf. Flaherty 2019; Nayna 2019), it did not help the provocateurs to claim that their journalistic study should be confused with a scientific experiment. In other words, it did not convince the members of the disciplinary committee for whom it met the US federal criteria of 'research' that required clearance from the IRB. Likewise, it did not convince the opponents and critics for whom the project represents not just an example of academic misconduct but also bad investigative journalism because it misrepresented the results, did not disclose the source of funding, and seems to have been driven by a political agenda.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into the details of this affair. Nevertheless, it seems apparent that we are still quite far from willing to consider and even further from accepting in academia the code and logic of professional ethics developed for journalism, which according to some scholars, like Mäkelä (2006), offer a much better fit with the nature of social sciences than the general ethical principles adopted from biomedical research. In short, this indicates how careful one must be in the use of journalistic methods and ethical norms in social sciences – especially if the topic is politically sensitive.[421]

---

[418] This provocation involved submitting 'hoaxlike' papers to journals in gender and identity studies. After the initial failure to get the incompetent hoaxes published, the initiators changed the tactics as they did not only adopt the terminology, relate to the theories, and engage with the discussions of the field and targeted journal but they came up with as provocative ideas as they could imagine. More specifically, Boghossian et al. (2018) and Pluckrose et al. (2021) say that after the initial failed attempt to get the 'hoaxes' published, they undertook 'reflexive ethnography' to study the grievance studies field from the perspective of 'outsider within' in the second stage of the project. By that time, they had immersed themselves in the discipline and were able to fabricate articles that used the expected terminology and argumentative style of the field(s).

[419] After the investigative journalist discovered the fake identity of the authors and the affair became public, the initiators have been accused of several forms of scientific misconduct – including fabrication of data, misrepresentation of the results, exaggerating their importance in public, secretiveness about the project financing and, thus, about possible conflicts of interest. For further details, see Lagerspetz (2021) and for additional comments see G. Cole (2020) with a reply from Pluckrose et al. (2021).

[420] It is questionable if that could have been possible without paying a toll on the quality of observations. See on this matter the arguments that have been made by critics of the informed consent from methodologists of ethnographic research such as Crow et al. (2006) and Hurdley (2010).

[421] One could add that even if the methodological tools employed are not journalistic, rather than social scientific, the tension is likely to emerge as the experience of Lazarsfeld and Thielens (1958), Gouldner and Sprehe (1965) and the attempt to correct the latter by Ladd and Lipset (1975). Further observations on the sensitivity between academia, journalism, and politics can be found in

What is remarkable in the comparative context with (Konrád and) Szelényi's use of irony, is the observation that in both cases the will to provoke seems to have been adopted once the academic career of the individuals concerned was blocked. In the case of "The Grievance Studies Affair", the initiators seem to have opted for "Mean-spirited Mockery" when they found their academic career to have been blocked, that pushed them either out of academia or to its margins. While their career aspirations seem to have given them enough knowledge of the rules of the game in the field that they decided to betray in retaliation, one may ask how ethical is the use of hoax inspired provocation for such purposes – could it be justified to address the (im)balance of power or draw attention to the predominant ideological views and preferences within the social sciences. In the case of Szelényi, he found himself in the difficult position after the Prague Spring that made him the favorite of the Party, on the one hand, but made a critical study of the social reality of actually existing socialism ever more complicated, on the other, if he wanted to keep his job and/or his academic career to progress in Socialist Hungary in the 1970s (cf. Rakovski 1978:57–8, 64–5; Kroos 2020:93–4). His decision to reveal together with Konrád not just the empirically based observations about the systematic redistributive injustice in public housing allocation but (after the failed attempt to influence the decision-makers to change their minds about the punishment of the members of the Budapest School[422]) the theoretical insights about the position and (increasing) role of intellectuals in the socialist system in the form of *samizdat*, raise important ethical questions.

In the case of The Grievance Studies Affair", one could ask how precisely the critique should be targeted and how the units of analysis for the journalistic experiment should be selected. Likewise, given the politized nature of many, if not all, social issues, how forthcoming should one be about the author's own political preferences and financing sources. In the case of (Konrád and) Szelényi, judging from the moral position of the established standards of today's Western aca-

---

Lang's (1988) collection of 'files' published in the book titled *Challenges* (see esp. The Huntington Case).

[422] Szelényi (2010b:32–3) recalls:

> 1973 was a crucial year for all of us. That year the Communist Party made a statement that condemned the revisionists of the Budapest School. Lukács was already dead so could not defend them. They were easy targets since they alienated the reform communists as much as they alienated the establishment. And on top of this most of them were Jews, an easy excuse for traditionally anti-Semitic Hungarians not to stand up for them. At this point I decided to make a cautious public stand, to write a letter to the Secretary General of the Academy of Sciences and ask him to keep them in their jobs. I wanted to secure the support of Alexander Szalai, who was at that time regarded as the dean of Hungarian sociology and after the fall of Hegedüs had increasing influence on what the Party and Academy officials were likely to do. I visited Szalai at his home and asked him to sign the letter with me. He responded: 'Ivan, you are out of your mind. You are not a communist, I am not a communist. Why on Earth should we be involved when one set of communists are at the throat of another set of communists? This is their internal affair.' What a hero he was! Finally I signed the letter with Agnes Losonczy, one of my senior colleagues, and of course we were not heard. The members of the group all lost their jobs. ... My letter about the Budapest School was not reprimanded. It was a cautious act, sent to the General Secretary, but not made public.

demia, one could argue that they failed to disclose the fact that they developed the ideas for *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* on the basis of the empirical research on housing allocation funded by the very regime within which they discovered secret modes of operation that they then decided to disclose. In other words, if one were to apply today's ethical standards to their research practice, an argument could be constructed that it does not meet the requirements. But one should also ask how likely it is that they would have gotten approval for their critical work from the authorities as required by the ASA Code of Ethics section 13.02 on "Unanticipated Research Opportunities"?

Although (Konrád and) Szelényi never looked for protection from the codes of ethics developed for journalists, it seems that in the absence of institutionalized codes of ethics for *samizdat* publications (if there ever could or should be any), [423] it would not be totally inaccurate if *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* was judged from the ethical standpoint of professional journalism. Although there is not too much public information on Szelényi's position on research ethics or how he has been solving the difficult ethical dilemmas in practice when the chips come down. Since it seems that he has followed common sense in his research, rather than the procedural norms and regulations of existing standards. Nevertheless, it is likely that he would subscribe to the argument of Atkinson (2009), Dingwall (2009), Hammersley (2009), Mäkelä (2006), Lowman and Palys (2014) who have questioned the applicability of the standards derived from (bio)medical sciences to social and anthropological research.

In more abstract terms it may be added that the value neutrality Szelényi emphasizes in his works relates to post-positivism, his actual research practice is closer to pragmatism. While the former requires one to report in a frank and unfettered manner, the latter has a more contextual understanding of the obligations related to research ethics. On the one hand, post-positivist ethics places its trust in the self-policing and self-cleaning ability of the academic community within the 'Republic of Science'. Pragmatism, on the other hand, searches for practical solutions to the ethical challenges related to research. Similar to the Faulkner and Becker (2008) approach "Studying Something You Are Part of" Szelényi's pragmatic relationship to the study of his fellow intellectuals prioritizes the fact of getting the research done over ensuring that the nowadays standard principles of informed consent, privacy, confidentiality, and accuracy are followed. He understood the promise of Weberian methodological principles *vis-à-vis* Marxism within the socialist system, and the hegemonic power position of (post)positivism within professional (American) sociology enough to hold on to value neutrality. If one wanted to be cynical, one could argue that similar to the criticism presented about Becker,[424] Szelényi has used the value freedom for his

---

[423] It is beyond the scope of this analysis to offer such ethics of *samizdat* publications. Given the fact that very little has been written about it, it would be an interesting topic to pursue. One may take the work by Rhodes and Badham (2018), who address ethical irony and relational leader(ship), as an example of that kind of a task.

[424] It has been suggested that the Chicago School of sociology fails to realize that behind the sociologist's veil of 'underdog sympathies' lies his own career motives [cf. Gouldner (1968) and Burawoy (2000:20; 2001:23)];

own professional ends. However, if one wanted to be sympathetic to his project, one could say that Szelényi has stayed true to Foucauldian ethics, which makes the disclosure of the repressive power relations of contemporary society obligatory for him as a social scientist and intellectual.

Finally, one may ask on the basis of the above-presented: How does all this help us to understand the ethics of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology? In harmony with the little indirect evidence and indicators that are there (presented above), one can sense that Szelényi has taken into account the reception of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* and some other provocative publications (cf. Szelényi 1978a, 1979a), which irritated some of his fellow intellectuals. Having learned the lesson, the idea that irony has to be rooted in self-irony seems to have emerged and seems to serve his strategic interests against critics who may wish to raise the issue of how ethical it is to use irony to criticize others. Indeed, he seems to wish to play it safe and stresses that irony as a method of neoclassical sociology must be rooted in self-irony. Nevertheless, this is in contrast with "most positivist social science, which although it is the ally of critical neoclassical sociology, has difficulty subjecting its own fundamental assumptions to scrutiny or ironic self-reflection", according to Eyal et al. (2003:9). This brings us logically to the next interrelated issue, which is reflexivity.

3.17 Reflexivity

Irony should be practiced reflexively. As mentioned several times above, Szelényi together with his co-authors has adopted from Mannheim, Gouldner and Bourdieau the idea that neoclassical sociology, and irony as its method, must be reflexive. Although this idea is elaborated rather extensively by Eyal et al. in the key text "On Irony", it will be shown below that the roots of his use of reflexivity in scholarship go far beyond the seminal paper. One can find evidence of it already in Szelényi's magnum opus, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, which can and should be seen as a result of the reflexive sociological enterprise. Indeed, as will be argued below, Szelényi has not been preoccupied with the methodological issues related to reflexivity and its application to research practice. While he has been more responsive to Gouldner's call to use the powerful tools of Marxism against Marxists, including himself, he is actually closer to Gusfield when it comes to the use of irony.

Among the many different forms and connotations that reflexivity is associated with in academic literature (cf. Ashmore 1989, Ch. 2; Lynch 2000:47), Szelényi responds basically only to the sociological approaches that can be associated with Gouldner and Bourdieu. Although he has elsewhere related his approach to Becker's ethnomethodology (cf. Szelényi 2012c), chronologically speaking it would probably be even more accurate to argue that his approach to reflexivity and self-criticism goes back to Hegedüs (cf. Robinson 1967) and possibly even to Lukács (cf. Radio Free Europe 1956:1; Marković 1986:90–1). Building on this tradition, he only later adopts some of the ideas on reflexivity as a distinctive methodological approach to engage in critical social theory. While he, together with his co-authors, acknowledges the impact of Bourdieu within the

discussion on neoclassical sociology (cf. Eyal et al. 2003a / 2003b) as well as Gouldner within the discussion of the emergence of an entire research program on the new class and sociology of intellectuals (cf. King and Szelényi 2004:xv; Szelényi and Martin 1987:3; 1988:649), he and his co-authors do not realize that their viewpoint on irony is actually closest to Gusfield's position on the topic.

As I have argued elsewhere (Kroos 2018, Ch. 4.1) in the chapter devoted to the evolutionary development of Szelényi's ideas on the (sociology of) intellectuals, he was practicing reflexive analysis before beginning to reflect rather periodically on the work that brought him international fame. This sub-section builds on these arguments and adds an analysis that he has been vacillating between the kind of critical social research and theory promoted by Gouldner, on the one hand, and Bourdieu, on the other. Although Szelényi started out as an empiricist and has continued to use the arguments of (post)positivism since his departure from Hungary, one can find evidence that he has been responsive to the challenges within the discipline. As a result, his relations to the issue of reflexivity are basically his interactive responses to the processes in the (US) sociology described by Steinmetz (2005d:132) as a series of challenges to methodological positivism: from the late 1960s, the discipline has been challenged by critical sociology (including neo-Marxism), from the second half of the 1970s by historical sociology, from the 1980s by cultural sociology and from the 1990s by the epistemological turn.

Indeed, from *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* to the numerous opportunities for reflection on the emergence of the ideas presented in the book, Szelényi has responded to the challenges to methodological positivism. Since the evolutionary development of his ideas that used changes in both CEE/FSU and Chinese societies to reflect on his original argument has been discussed elsewhere (Kroos 2018, Ch. 4.1), it suffices to state here very briefly that Szelényi (1979b:xiii) first contemplates his own road to the ideas expressed in *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* in the Preface to the book written in Adelaide in March 1978. He (1980a:127) openly admits in another reflection soon afterward that his account is to some extent 'autobiographical' because it describes how he "gradually began to discover the nature of the new system of political and economic inequalities of East European socialism". While he returns to these issues generally (cf. Szelényi 1978a, 1983a) and more specifically, by placing the intelligentsia in the class structure of state socialist societies (cf. Szelényi 1978c, 1979c, 1982a), he really engages in Gouldner's type of reflexive sociology, which begins with the "very primitive assumption that theory is made by the praxis of men in all their wholeness and is shaped by the lives they lead" (Gouldner 1970:483[425]), and in the postscript to the Japanese translation of the book (cf.

---

[425] This builds on the previous contributions of scholars such as Mills (1959:195–6) who says in the essay "On Intellectual Craftsmanship" that:

> [t]he most admirable thinkers within the scholarly community … do not split their work from their lives. They seem to take both too seriously to allow such dissociation, and they want to use each for the enrichment of the other. Of course, such a split is the prevailing convention among men in general, deriving, I suppose, from the hollowness of the work which men in general now do. But you will have recognized that as a scholar you have the

Szelényi 1985a) that he (1986–1987) later calls "An Auto-critical Reflection". Although Szelényi (1979a, 1979b) makes cautious attempts to consider his own social context that led to the development of the ideas presented in *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, he comes closer to Bourdieu's kind of reflexivity[426] in his discussions on the re-emergence of Hungarian sociology (cf. Kolosi and Szelényi 1993; Szelényi 2000, 2010b). He continues to turn the instruments of critical theory on himself more consciously in his "An Auto-Critique of An Auto-Critique" (cf. Szelényi 2002), and in his attempt to place his own contribution in the wider theoretical context in *Theories of the New Class* (cf. King and Szelényi 2004, esp. Ch. 4–6), which is the result of a long-term pursuit to reflect on the three waves of new class theorizing.

Indeed, Szelényi and Martin (1988:649) first begin to contemplate reflexivity as a distinctive methodological approach to critical analysis in that context when they state:

> The more sophisticated among the New Class theorists often demonstrate a sense of irony and a kind of self-reflexivity that is typically absent in Marxist and stratificationist analyses of power and privilege of the intellectuals. Critical reflections on the New Class are critical reflections on ourselves: if there is a New Class, we the critical intellectuals are, in one way or another, more centrally or more peripherally, part of it. Gouldner formulated quite formidably the central question of New Class research when he asked: "Where does the cameraman fit in?" In other words, where do we intellectuals fit in? Where does the power of the knowledge producers - if we have any - as knowledge producers come from? Indeed, the main strength of New Class theorizing is *critical self-reflexivity*.

This is an adequate interpretation of Gouldner's reflexive sociology. Gouldner argues in *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* that it is supposed to be a liberat-

---

exceptional opportunity of designing a way of living which will encourage the habits of good workmanship. Scholarship is a choice of how to live as well as a choice of career; whether he knows it or not, the intellectual workman forms his own self as he works toward the perfection of his craft; to realize his own potentialities, and any opportunities that come his way, he constructs a character which has as its core the qualities of the good workman.

What this means is that you must learn to use your life experience in your intellectual work: continually to examine and interpret it. In this sense craftsmanship is the center of yourself and you are personally involved in every intellectual product upon which you may work. To say that you can 'have experience' means, for one thing, that your past plays into and affects your present, and that it defines your capacity for future experience. As a social scientist, you have to control this rather elaborate interplay, to capture what you experience and sort it out; only in this way can you hope to use it to guide and test your reflection, and in the process shape yourself as an intellectual craftsman. But how can you do this? One answer is: you must set up a file.

[426] Bourdieu's distinctive approach to reflexivity has been identified and differentiated from the competing conceptualizations. More specifically, Wacquant (1992:36) states that Bourdieu's reflexivity can be defined as "the inclusion of a theory of intellectual practice as an integral component and necessary condition of a critical theory of society".

ing experience that produces self-awareness[427] as it brings the theorist's super-structural elements (assumptions and ideological presuppositions) into coherence with his or her methodological elements (concepts and methodologies).[428] According to Gouldner's argument presented a decade later in *The Two Marxisms*,[429] even Marxists are not particularly eager to follow his call for reflexive sociology.[430] Szelényi stands out in this general pattern, within which even critical social theorists/scientists hardly use the potential and tools of Marxism against Marxists and their historically contextualized social theorizing, as one of the rare exceptions. Indeed, one can read *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class*

---

[427] Chriss (1999:88) makes a similar point in Gouldner's intellectual biography where he says that "Because the social world has evolved structures of domination and inequality, only a reflexive critical theorist, whose domain assumptions are explicit and thus maintain fidelity with the reality of oppressive social structures and conditions, can see these for what they are and work to liberate men and women form them".

[428] Gouldner (1970:489) argues in the *Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* that:

> a Reflexive Sociology is and would need to be a radical sociology. Radical, because it would recognize that knowledge of the world cannot be advanced apart from the sociologist's knowledge of himself and his position in the social world, or apart from his efforts to change these. Radical, because it seeks to transform as well as to know the alien world inside him. Radical, because it would accept the fact that the roots of sociology pass through the sociologist as a total man, and that the question he must confront, therefore, is not merely how to work, but how to live... The historical mission of a Reflexive Sociology is to transcend sociology as it now exists. In deepening our understanding of our own sociological selves and of our position in the world, we can, I believe, simultaneously help to produce a new breed of sociologists who can also better understand other men and their social worlds. A Reflexive Sociology means that we sociologists must - at the very least - acquire the ingrained habit of viewing our own beliefs as we now view those held by others.

[429] Gouldner (1980:10) says:

> Although Marxists would be the first to agree that a critique must view theory as a social and historical product – and thus as social and historical product – and thus as something more than the result of other and earlier theories, philosophies, or ideologies – they are not particularly eager to do this. Like 'normal' academic sociologists, who are often made uneasy by the sociology of knowledge (and downright distraught by a sociology of sociology), Marxists likewise do not hurry to their rendezvous with Marxism of Marxism; which is in part why, as Perry Anderson writes, "the history of Marxism has yet to be written." For Marxists as for sociologists, reflexive efforts at historical self-understanding are often taken as narcissistic, diverting inquiry from its proper objective of understanding (not to speak of changing the world).
>
> That Marxism, like academic sociology, is indeed an historical and social product also discomfits those Marxists who think themselves social 'scientists'. For if it is an historical product, shaped by social needs no less than reason and research, it is part of the tissue of its time, rather than an eruption without precedent or an achievement without peer.

[430] Gouldner (1970:26) states in the *Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*:

> The sociologists' task today is not only to see people as they see themselves, nor to see themselves as others see them; it is also to see *themselves* as they see other people. What is needed is a new and heightened self-awareness among sociologists, which would lead them to ask the same kinds of questions about themselves as they do about taxicab drivers or doctors, and to answer them in the same way. Above all, this means that we must acquire the ingrained habit of viewing our own beliefs as we would those held by others.

Power and his numerous reflections on it as the unconscious[431] responses to Gouldner's call to make the discipline more critical and reflexive. Beginning with the article "Social Inequalities in State Socialist Redistributive Economies: Dilemma for Social Policy in Contemporary Socialist Societies of Eastern Europe" and followed by his major books: *Urban Social Inequalities under State Socialism*; *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*; *Socialist Entrepreneurs* and *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists,* one finds the desire to reinterpret his own original ideas in the face of new evidence, and being empowered with new theoretical insights, also to reflect on them conceptually. In addition to this, the above-mentioned recurrent question by Gouldner (1978a:160 / 1979:9), "Where does the cameraman fit in?",[432] the defining question of new class theorizing and radical sociology of intellectuals[433] indicates Szelényi's admiration for Gouldner's wish to make the beliefs and self-understanding of the well-educated the subject matter of critical inquiry. To put it differently, it is a fact that Szelényi continues to emphasize that it not only frames the new class theory research program, but it also indicates a desire to link up with his critical spirit and reflexive sociology.[434]

Later, in response to the call to reflect on the mistakes of Sovietology and Burawoy's critique of *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists* (cf. Burawoy 2001, 2002), he, together with his collaborators, links Gouldner's call for critical self-reflexivity with irony and neoclassical sociology (cf. Eyal et al. 2001, 2003a). Similar to Gouldner's critique of structural functionalism and the critical-reflexive sociology as its remedy, Szelényi and his co-authors present neoclassical sociology in which they integrate reflexivity and irony, as the salvage that can rescue the discipline from the contemporary crisis.

Now, they not only admire Gouldner's reflexive sociology but also propose an argument to go beyond it as indicated in the following extracts:

> We think Gouldner's search for a way to rescue sociology from the impasse between positivism and critical social science is relevant once again. ... Gouldner argued ... that the critical potential of the sociological tradition could be reconstructed. Drawing a parallel with the Young Hegelians and their rerad-

---

[431] Szelényi (2012c) admitted during the interview that even though he knew who Gouldner was at the time of writing *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, he was not familiar with his works.

[432] Szelényi emphasizes this in addition to the above mentioned also elsewhere [cf. Szelényi and Martin (1988:649); Szelényi (1982b:780) as well as King and Szelényi (2004:xv)].

[433] For the earlier version of the claim, see Szelényi and Martin (1987:3), and for a later one King and Szelényi (2004:xiv-xv).

[434] While Eyal et al. (2001, 2003a), as well as King and Szelényi (2004), identify *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* as Gouldner's most important contribution to the reflexivity tradition, Szelényi , together with his collaborators, seems to give insufficient emphasis that this was based on the critical analysis of the life work of Parsons. As Chriss (1999:18–9) says within the discussion of Gouldner's intellectual development: other publications were hinting towards the reflexive, critical and theoretical approach already during the early stages of his academic career despite the formative years spent under the influence of the sociological tradition of Columbia. These works are: "Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology" (Gouldner 1962), a short paper criticizing the failure of authors to take a self-reflexive approach, and a monograph titled *Enter Plato* where he (1965) studies the intellectual milieu of Ancient Greece. Unfortunately, Szelényi seems to ignore these early works.

icalization of Hegelian philosophy, he suggested that sociology's radical potential lay in its commitment to *reflexivity* i.e. in using the values and weapons of the intellectual's own 'culture of critical discourse' against intellectuals themselves. If he or she is committed to reflexivity as a first principle, even the self-interested social scientists can arrive at a radical vision of a better society because reflexivity means exposing his or her own interests and modes of reasoning to self-critical scrutiny (Eyal, et al. 2003a, 6). ...

Taking Gouldner's analysis as our point of departure, we observe that irony – as long as it is rooted in self-irony – is always undertaken in the *reflexive* mode. The researcher who engages in irony begins his or her analysis by suspending his or her own values, judgments, and knowledge about the world, and accepting as valid the point of view of 'the other'... Thus irony begins with reflexivity but does not end there. A better world is still a goal of ironic analysis, a goal pursued in the conversation between subject and object, between alter and ego. Indeed, this is the radical promise of irony for critical social analysis (Eyal et al. 2003a, 9).

To live up to this promise, Szelényi has published his own auto-critical works[435] and made some serious attempts to place his contributions in the wider theoretical context. While all these communications demonstrate his determination to use the weapons of CCD against the collective actor of intellectuals, including his willingness to confess some private 'sins' (cf. Szelényi 2000, 2002), his own critical auto-biography still waits to be written.[436] Hence, the proposed neoclassical sociology, including irony as its reflexive method, has yet to deliver its promise. One can even argue that, similar to Gouldner, to whom reflexivity remains, according to Bourdieu, "more a programmatic slogan than a veritable program of *work*" (Wacquant 1989a:35), Szelényi's neoclassical sociology, including reflexivity and irony, has fallen short in the area of (critical) self-analysis of his own intellectual environment and contribution. To achieve this, Szelényi would need more than a willingness to write up the field notes or retell the anecdotal evidence that led to the development of the ideas presented in *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*. It would require even more than his neoclassical sociology and irony directed toward himself or his principal willingness to write up his autobiography. To do it properly, he would ultimately have to adopt Bourdieu's brand of sociology because "the subject of reflexivity must ultimately be the social scientific field *in toto*" (ibid:40).[437] In other words, what is missing, according

---

[435] See "The Prospects and Limits of the East European New Class Project: An Auto-critical Reflection on The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power"' and "An Outline of the Social History of Socialism or An Auto-Critique of An Auto-Critique", and where he became involved in the discussions of the re-emergence of Hungarian sociology (cf. Kolosi and Szelényi 1993; Szelényi 2000, 2010b).

[436] Szelényi admitted in a private conversation on February 2012 in NYC that he has been thinking about it for long time, he also added that despite his willingness to be cruel to himself, he is not yet ready to hurt other people. Indeed, the autobiography that he recently published (cf. Szelényi 2018a) avoided controversial topics, on the one hand, and hardly lived up to the critical self-reflection, on the other. However, one may get a bit more direct information about his personal background and development from his interviews (cf. Case 2017a, 2017b; Durst 2015; Szelényi 2012c, 2012d).

[437] More specifically, Bourdieu (2000:33) writes in *Pascalian Meditations*:

to Wacquant (1992:38), from Gouldner and all other kinds of reflexive sociological approaches except that of Bourdieu is "the idea of reflexivity as a *requirement and form of sociological work*, that is, as an epistemological program in action for social science, and as a corollary, a theory of intellectuals as the wielders of a dominated form of domination".

Instead of taking this message on board and discussing his position on the Hungarian and American sociological field in such detail as envisioned and suggested by Bourdieu in such exemplary works as *Homo Academicus* and the *Sketch for a Self-Analysis*, Szelényi has a desire to use reflexivity as a critical tool against fellow intellectuals similar to Gouldner. When it comes to the auto-critique, he links the decontextualization of the ideas to the environment where they emerged. Unlike the classical works of Garfinkel (1967, 1974, 1996, 2002; Hill et al. 1968)[438] or more contemporary reflections by Pollner (1991) on ethnomethodology, Szelényi does not emphasize its critical connection to 'radical reflexivity'.[439] Logically, Szelényi does not use reflexivity as a phenomenological analysis of what was really meant but rather as a critical tool to analyze the context within which ideas emerged. He seems to come close to the acceptance of the principles developed by Nagel (1986), Haraway (1988), Latour and Woolgar (1983) as well as Woolgar (1983) on the role of the researcher in the research process. While he would not go as far as qualitative methodologists, such as Malterud (2001), who identifies reflexivity, along with relevance and validity, as one of the key criteria for qualitative inquiry, he, nevertheless, seems to understand that "in qualitative (and maybe also in the quantitative inquiry), the question is neither whether the researcher affects the process nor whether such an effect can be prevented" (ibid:484).

In other words, this has not made Szelényi preoccupied with the methodological issues of how to legitimate qualitative inquiry by turning the inevitable role of the researcher in the research process "into a commitment to reflexivity". Although he has not taken on board the argument of qualitative methodologists, such as Malterud (ibid), who defines reflexivity as "[a]n attitude of attending systematically to the context of knowledge construction, especially to the effect of the researcher, at every step of the research process", he still recognizes it as "the knower's mirror". Mixing his post-positivist understanding of objectivity with what Haraway (1988) redefines as inevitably partial and situated, it is not surprising that Szelényi (1979b, 1980a, King and Szelényi 2004, Ch. 4) draws atten-

---

I do not intend to deliver the kind of so-called 'personal' memories that provide the dismal backdrop for academic autobiographies - awestruck encounters with eminent masters, intellectual choices interlaced with career choices. What has recently been presented under the label of 'ego history' still seems to me very far from a genuine reflexive sociology: happy academics (the only ones asked to perform this academic exercise ...) have no history, and one is not necessarily doing them a service, or a service to history, in asking them for methodological histories of uneventful lives.

[438] For further discussion about the relations between ethnomethodology and reflexivity see also: Pollner (1991), Atkinson (1988) as well as Maynard and Clayman (1991).

[439] "Radical sociology" builds, according to Pollner (1991:370), on ethnomethodology and promises the most original and exciting output because it "breaches the taken-for-granted practices of disciplines purporting to describe reality".

tion to his life experiences in the 1960s in Hungary to explain the story behind *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*. As I have discussed in detail elsewhere (Kroos 2018, Ch. 5.3), he seems to limit reflexivity primarily to the kind of reflexive work that emphasizes the author's personal experiences and the close relationship to the study object as he continues disclosing the 'anecdotal evidence' that led to the development of the ideas of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*. While this helps to assess what Malterud (2001:484) calls "metapositions" and "transferability" – concepts that she defines correspondingly as the "[s]trategies for creating adequate distance from a study setting that you are personally involved in" and "[t]he range and limitations for application of the study findings, beyond the context in which the study was done" – it still falls short of the ideals of her reflexive inquiry in terms of "preconceptions" and "theoretical frame of reference" that she defines as "[p]revious personal and professional experiences, prestudy beliefs and how things are and what is to be investigated, motivation and qualifications for exploration of the field, and perspectives and theoretical foundations related to education and interests" with reference to the former and "theories, models, and notions applied for interpretation of the material and for understanding a specific situation" with reference of the latter. The critical meta-theory analysis undertaken by Kroos (2018) elsewhere tries to put these aspects related to "the researcher's backpack", "analyst's reading classes", "participating observer's sidetrack" and "external validity" into critical scrutiny in the case of Szelényi.

Although he has been willing to take up Gouldner's self-critical question about knowledge producers that defines the sociology of knowledge and intellectuals as the new class research tradition, it does not give a complete picture of his approach to reflexivity. His involvement with the intellectual elite has unavoidably offered him an opportunity to observe fellow intellectuals, in general, and those in CEE, in particular. In other words, he does not engage in reflexivity as a conscious methodological approach to reach higher objectivity and validity of his research, but throughout his works on intellectuals rather unconsciously applies Lynch's limited notion of it.[440] Although Szelényi has not followed it systemati-

---

[440] One could argue that he comes closest to the real life example of Lynch's (2000) paper, entitled "Against Reflexivity as an Academic Virtue and Source of Privileged Knowledge", which argues, on the one hand, that "there is no particular advantage to 'being' reflexive, or 'doing' reflexive analysis, unless something provocative, interesting or reveling comes from it" (ibid:42) and on the other hand, that for a good social scientist "it is impossible to be unreflexive" (ibid:27). In this context, one could not agree more with Fuchs (1992a:155–60) who sees reflexivity as problematic because it is unable to solve the epistemological challenges when it is applied to the works that claim to be reflexive. Similar to the argument made by Ashmore (1989), Lynch (2000), Mulkay (1985), and Woolgar (1988b, 2004), I find it questionable that the claim that reflexivity is a discourse (Watsion 1987) has reached a special cognitive position, which allows its followers to gain privileged access to knowledge. While I accept Bourdieu's criticism [cf. Bourdieu (2003b:282), Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, Part I, Ch. 6 – esp. 36–40) and Wacquant (1989a:35)] of Garfinkel for his limitation of reflexivity to "strictly phenomenological" phenomenon [cf. Garfinkel (1967, 1974, 1996, 2002) as well as Hill and Stones (1968)] toward Gouldner because it remains in his works largely as a 'programmatic slogan' (cf. Gouldner 1970, Ch. 2, Ch. 13), I do not interpret the basic positions about reflexivity as a precondition of sociology of sociology that both Bourdieu and Gouldner have

cally, once his provocative ideas on intellectuals have been published, these could not be ignored by the 'community' and almost naturally generated reactions – some friendly and others more bitter. Hence, one can interpret Szelényi's return to the topic as a desire to reconcile some of these disagreements that have emerged with the representatives of the social status group in the discussions that his major works on intellectuals have generated. Nevertheless, his reluctance to take up a reflexive analysis of his scholarship, his entry to, and position in the field as suggested by Bourdieu in his numerous publications (cf. Bourdieu 1968, 1969, 1975, 1977, 1983, 1988a, 1989a, 1991c, 1991d, 2000a, 2000c 2004a, 2008a), is one of the arguments that justifies the meta-critical analysis with all its structural components that I (Kroos 2018) have undertaken elsewhere.

The same applies to 'irony' as the critical tool of the reflexive sociology of intellectuals. As was shown in detail in sub-section 3.3 titled "Methodology", Szelényi does not worry much about the methodical issues. While he is willing to go beyond the practice of the researchers of the social studies of science that Woolgar (1983) classifies as the proponents of the mediative position because they fall between (naïvely) 'reflective' and (constructively) constitutive sociologists, he still falls short of implementing Bourdieu's reflexivity fully. In addition to the hope expressed by Collins and Cox (1976), according to which the reflexive and critical character of ironic analysis does not automatically imply that it would undermine the relativist position within the social studies of science, Szelényi, together with his co-authors, stresses that "irony begins with reflexivity but does not end there", and underlines the need for 'self-irony' (Eyal et al. 2003a:9).

Other than that, he does not really bother about the methodological issues which have been raised within the discussions of the future of the constructivist social study of science, for instance, by Woolgar (1983:252–7). Among these troubles, Woolgar points out that irony is not only perceived as critical but can be turned back on itself. This is crucial because, as he (ibid:254) explains, "the sociologist's own account stands in danger of being undermined as soon as he ironicizes any other account". And this is exactly what seems to have happened to *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* and many other of Szelényi's publications on intellectuals in social structure and change, which have not only been

---

made to be that different from one another. Although Bourdieu goes further and does apply reflexivity to himself (cf. Bourdieu 1990b, Preface; 2000a, Ch. 1 Postscript 1; 2004a, Part III Ch. 2; 2008a), Gouldner fails to go much beyond calling attention to the lack of interest among intellectuals to make themselves the object of critical scrutiny (cf. Gouldner 1978a:160 / 1979:9); putting forward the program for reflexive sociology (cf. Gouldner 1970, Ch. 2, 13) and adding few remarks within bibliographical notes (cf. Gouldner 1976a), it is also true that their conceptualizations of reflexivity are not that different from one another. While the former understands it as "sociology of oneself" or "one's self-socioanalysis" (Bourdieu 2004a:94), the latter defines it as "self-awareness concerning the rules to which one submits and by which one is bound" (Gouldner 1976a:55). I think they have a similar agenda in mind when Gouldner (1970:491) argues that reflexive sociology of sociology must be empirically based, and Bourdieu (Wacquant 1989c:22) says that "*Reflexivity is a tool to produce more science, not less*".

received as essentially critical toward himself or the (socialist) system but equally much, if not more, toward the fellow (conformist) intellectuals – an act against Weberian collegiality (cf. Szelényi 2009a, Lecture 20, Ch. 4) as discussed in the sub-sections devoted to his "Axiology" and "Ethics".

To put it differently, the tendency of ironists not to live up to the expectations of Bourdieuian reflexivity by disclosing their social, political, and economic and cultural interests as well as their position in the academic hierarchy (Woolgar 1983:255), leads to the situation that the critic is perceived with considerable doubt by the very research subjects. Despite Szelényi's willingness to take the auto-critical method on board, which emphasizes the willingness to ask disturbing questions about fellow intellectuals as well as oneself, his adoption of reflexivity is non-systematic and he does not apply it as a distinctive methodological approach. While he uses self-irony as a protective tool and realizes the importance of understanding the *Zeitgeist* when the author worked on a specific publication, he hardly engages in any systematic meta-critical reflections.

Based on this it seems fair to say that Szelényi's way of exercising irony in reflexive mode comes closest to Gusfield, who equates irony with sociological method more explicitly. Long before Szelényi's (2020:230) recent reflection (based on Eyal's (2020:2) comments) about irony as a program or habitus, Gusfield associated irony with "a way of seeing, a perspective" some four decades previously. As described in detail in section 1.3, devoted to the overview of "Irony as a logic of discovery", that Gusfield (1981:192–3) identified two different types of sociological irony: 'Utopian' and 'Olympian'.

To recall, it was explained that the Utopian type of sociological irony stands for the research practice where the sociologist uncovers the characteristics of the currently dominant perspective that does not only offer the opportunity to suggest that a better alternative is possible but actually delegitimizes the unquestionable authority of the hegemony. As pointed out earlier, these ideas have inspired Woolgar, who has reflected not only on the use of irony (cf. Woolgar 1983) but also on the limits of reflexivity in the social sciences (cf. Woolgar 1988a, 1988b), to formulate one of his postulates of STS/SSS: "It could be otherwise" (cf. Woolgar 2014; Woolgar and Lezaun 2015, 462). Given the promise of intellectual provocation (cf. Woolgar 2004), the Utopian type of sociological irony can be seen to be in line with Szelényi's ideas.

On the other hand, the Olympian type of sociological irony refers to the perspective that Gusfield associates with Mannheim's "free-floating intellectuals" because, similar to them, the Olympian type of ironic sociologist is said to be detached and skeptical of all points of view. As was explained above as well as in section 1.6, it is the willingness to put one's own ideas under critical self-scrutiny that Szelényi associates with reflexivity that he finds missing in the works of both Lukács, whom he saw as a son of a wealthy banker who avoided engaging in truly critical self-scrutiny, as well as Goulnder, who despite having formulated the defining question of a critical sociology of intellectuals by asking "Where does the cameraman fit in?" (Gouldner 1978a:160 / 1979a:9), did not move much beyond articulating a program. Szelényi's reflexive attempts to address self-ironically

the emergence of his ideas on the sociology of intellectuals follow Gouldner's lead without taking the step toward self-reflexivity as envisioned in the path-breaking works of Bourdieu.

The fact that Szelényi, among such a prominent set of sociologists committed to the critical sociology of intellectuals, has failed to exercise reflexivity in his own works, also like the aforementioned prominent sociologists, only shows that it is more easily said than done. Reflexivity does not only make social science more honest and truthful but opens it up for criticism that can easily delegitimize it. It seems that the bar set by the ironist may be too high to pass even for the best of them.

3.18 Accommodation and Commensurability

In previous sub-sections of this chapter, an attempt has been made to clarify the defining elements and distinguishing characteristics of Szelényi's take on irony as the method of neoclassical sociology. More specifically, an attempt has been made to clarify his positions on the philosophy of science – his opinion on ontology, epistemology, methodology, axiology, control, calls to action, inquirer posture as well as reflexivity. It was demonstrated that to build his reflexive sociology of intellectuals, Szelényi relies on more than one school of thought in the philosophy of science by combining primarily elements from (post)positivism, critical theory and to a lesser extent also pragmatism. While some methodologists believe these two schools to be incommensurable, the above-presented demonstrates that in the case of Szelényi they can be accommodated into one. He is a positive example of 'disciplined eclecticism'[441] as the foundation of mixed methods research.[442]

Unfortunately, Szelényi does not recognize that his strength lies in mixed methods. In addition to the similarities to the Second Chicago School, presented in the previous sub section, one could argue that there are even more resemblances in his approach to social research and that of sequential or developmental research design within the mixed methods. Yet, he does not identify himself with the latter as he never (consciously) uses the techniques and terminology developed over the last decades by their methodologists. Instead, he simply follows what the Chicago School of Sociology had been doing long before the multimethod research was reinvented in social and behavioral sciences in general and educational research, evaluation, nursing and health research, in particular (cf. Brewer and Hunter 1989, 2006; Hunter and Brewer 2003, 2015). More specifically, Szelényi's continuous practice of engaging in different analytical traditions that combine traditional quantitative methods with qualitative (for instance, in *Urban Inequalities Under State Socialism* or in the *Socialist Entrepreneurs*) resembles the principles that Park and Hughes are said to have stood for when they

---

[441] This term seems to have emerged from Merton's (1975:335) comment on the work of Gerald Holton.
[442] See Kroos (2012a) for details of the argument of what eclecticism in its positive meaning could stand for.

recommended sociologists "to get their hands dirty in the real world" (H. S. Becker 1999:7).

Although this makes Szelényi's approach to social analysis close to the spirit of the proponents of the mixed method research paradigm, he never actually uses the terminology or the precise techniques developed by its methodologists. Instead, he sees himself among the scholars who are data driven (cf. Szelényi 2000). Yet, this claim holds water only if one compares him to pure theoreticians. While compared to them he may stand out as an empiricist, it is also true that his quantitative analysis benefits from his solid knowledge of theory as well as the above-mentioned qualitative ethnomethodology and critical reflexivity. This gives him a competitive edge compared to methodological purists working solely in the theoretical or empirical tradition. It also means, however, that he is not truly respected for the purity and skillful application of methods and techniques among any of them. In other words, although he has unconsciously been using mixed methods in his own works as well as in the research projects that he has been leading, it must be realized that he has done so without an explicit aim of applying something that has come to be known as the mixed methods – an alternative to qualitative and quantitative research traditions. Instead of making an argument for the use of mixed or combined methods, given the cross-fertilizing potential for the use of techniques of qualitative and quantitative research, he simply insists on being data-driven – a claim that seems to reflect the understanding of the power relations in (US) sociology. Indeed, one should look for the reasons why Szelényi holds on to the self-image of an empirically oriented scholar in his understanding of the current state of affairs in professional sociology. While he claims that academic sociology, faced with triple crises, has lost its conceptual, political and methodological core (Szelényi 2014b, 2015c),[443, 444] there is also no doubt that as an East European émigré, who has made an extraordinarily successful academic career in the highly competitive US university system, he understands the message of Bourdieu (1990a, 32) who has noted: "The scientific field is a game in which you have to arm yourself with reason in order to win". In other words, his conformist position on positivism, empiricism and quantitative analysis reflects his understanding that these traditions enjoy a hegemonic power position within the (American) sociological field even if he makes

---

[443] Eyal et al. (2003a:8) say that "[w]ith the fall of socialism, however, even the positivist 'escape route' is in danger of being overtaken by the socialist joke, i.e. that socialism is merely a long detour from capitalism to capitalism, or, in this case, that sociology is nothing but a long detour from liberal political economy to neoclassical economics."

[444] As mentioned also above, Szelényi (2012d) stated said during the interview that:

> … there is no methodology [that would unify sociology] – I mean survey research lost a lot of its credibility. The obsession with causality, the realization that we cannot really do experiments, right, adventures with field experiments, attraction of rational choice and the culture turn – it is all over the place. On top of this, you know, sociology then in the 70s and 80s, though it began to lose some of its conceptual, theoretical, or methodological integrity, at least it had a political project, right. Sociology was the kind of Left wing in the universities. So, one who went to do sociology wanted to do a better world. That's gone. Right.

calls to return to classical sociology and the adoption of reflexivity (cf. Eyal et al. 2003a; Szelényi 2015c).

While some social scientists and economists have turned to (field) experiments as a solution to the (internal) validity problems faced by traditional social science methods, Szelényi (2014b, 2015c) is skeptical of this endeavor. Although he does not blindly believe that survey methodology can offer better results, he continues to initiate or be part of research projects that use this as the primary data collection instrument. It is not that he does not believe that field experiments do not produce research results with high validity, but rather that they are very difficult, if not impossible, to undertake in the social sciences (cf. Szelényi 2012d). According to Szelényi, the theoretically enlightened survey method still seems to be the best option if it is complemented with the above-mentioned ethnomethodology and reflexivity (cf. Szelényi 2015c), which is more interested in the substantive issues than in the technical details of the survey design.

Nevertheless, Szelényi has successfully combined qualitative ethnomethodology with the quantitative survey method. Given his attraction to using multiple methodological approaches, he can be seen as a mixed methods scholar who (intuitively) believes that certain research methods are compatible with others. To put it differently, the reason he finds it worthwhile going beyond the possibilities of the mono-method research either in the theoretical, qualitative or quantitative tradition is the limitations they have if undertaken alone, on the one hand, and the possibility of combining them to overcome the limitations, on the other.

More specifically, he has combined ethnographic techniques (originating from the Hungarian tradition in sociography) with some of the most traditional quantitative data analysis techniques. Using descriptive statistics has allowed him to explain, compare and contrast different sub-groups in the data using the frequency distributions and averages. Using regression techniques has allowed him and his co-authors to go beyond the reporting of correlations. Most importantly, using both qualitative and quantitative techniques in developmental/sequential mixed methods research design, where qualitative techniques allow one to prepare for the quantitative data collection and analysis, has benefited Szelényi's research considerably.

For instance, he emphasized during the interview (Szelényi 2012d) his differences with Burawoy and the Berkley School of ethnography, linking himself to H. S. Becker and the Second Chicago School instead (on the grounds that he supports the idea of immersing in the local context and learning to speak about the problems in the language of the research subjects before planning and executing the survey). However, there is only indirect evidence of this approach in his published works on urban and rural sociology. There is little evidence in Szelényi's publications, reflections or methodological notes that he has been trying to follow the ethnomethodology (cf. Atkinson 1988; Garfinkel 1967, 1974, 1996, 2002) or naturalistic inquiry (Athens 2010). Likewise, the fact that he does not seem to be particularly conscious of the theoretical preconceptions that he takes to the field does not allow one to classify him as a follower of the principles of grounded theory as defined by Glaser and Strauss (1967:3) as well as Kelle

(2005). His reflections, in which he emphasized reflexively (Szelényi 2002) and contrasted himself with the 'survey guys' like Treiman (Szelényi 2012d), allow one to associate him with Bourdieu's brand of critical sociology instead.[445]

Given the fact that Szelényi does not make references to methodological literature in his empirical works, it should not come as a surprise that he does not relate to the discussions on accommodation and commensurability, which have been dominated by the authors of evaluation and mixed methods research (cf. Howe 1988; 2002, Ch. 3). Unlike the research fields related to educational science, political science or psychology, where mixed methods have found a considerable number of followers, the issue has hardly been mentioned in methodological discussions within contemporary sociology. This is a surprise, as it contradicts the history of the discipline. Despite the development of the two competing research traditions, it was an inherent part of the research practice of the classical works in this field which were undertaken as "an eclectic mix of quantitative ('case study') and qualitative ('statistics') methods what would now be considered multimethod studies", according to Hunter and Brewer (2003:579). Moreover, they (ibid:593) conclude their overview on a note about the future development of mixed methods research in sociology with a reference to Gouldner – suggesting that the key requirement is to think and conduct social research in a self-reflexive manner.

Szelényi fits this pattern. More specifically, compared to Becker and Burawoy, who not only take an interest in the practical as well as epistemological aspects of developing better qualitative (and to some extent also quantitative[446]) research methods, Szelényi comes closest to Gouldner for whom the (theoretical) substance takes priority over technique in his post–1960 publications. It is interesting to note that they both have an empiricist past (Gouldner was trained and supervised by Merton at Columbia). Szelényi differentiated himself in Hungary from philosophers and ideologists by claiming to do value-free empirical sociology, lecturing on survey methodology at the Party academy and receiving enforcement to the pre-exposed empiricism during his year in the US on a Ford Fellowship for the fall term of 1964 at Columbia; there, he took a course both with Merton, and in the spring term of 1965, he took a course with Lipset in Berkley.

To summarize the discussion on accommodation and commensurability, one can shortly state that Szelényi does not find the different research paradigms, traditions, methods and techniques inherently incompatible. One can argue that this might possibly have to do with his training – his learning by doing approach to sociology, which did not push him into any ready tradition to follow and al-

---

[445] For instance, Bourdieu (2000a:59) says that "to question the questionnaire or, more profoundly, the position of the agent who produces or administers it, and who has the leisure to detach himself from the self-evidences of ordinary existence in order to ask himself some extra-ordinary questions or to ask some ordinary questions in an extra-ordinary way" in order "to neutralize the distortions which the structural gap inherent in some forms of the survey relationship can introduce into communication".

[446] See H. S. Becker's discussion of survey methods and test of significance (H. S. Becker 1970, Ch. 1) and epistemology of qualitative and quantitative research in sociology (H. S. Becker 2007).

lowed to find his own way, instead. The fact that he engages in ethnographic field work to prepare for the structured data collection allows us to classify him as a sociologist who unconsciously undertakes mixed method research. He skillfully combines and incorporates elements from post-positivism (in terms of his position on ontology, epistemology, nature of knowledge, goodness and quality criteria), critical theory (in terms of ontology, axiology, ethics, control and reflexivity) and pragmatism (in terms of epistemology, rhetoric, knowledge accumulation, qualitative and quantitative analysis) in his metaphysical belief system and practical methods of inquiry. On the one hand, he wants to maintain the post-positivist position, which supports his trust in empiricism. On the other hand, he also subscribes to critical theory's emancipatory program, which manifests itself in its positions on control, values, inquirer posture, reflexivity and calls to action without actual involvement in politics or becoming teleological or normative. To understand how it all comes together as the method of neoclassical sociology one should realize that for pragmatic and strategic reasons, he basically adopts a pragmatist position, according to which different paradigms and their specific positions on different methodological issues are commensurable with each other.

Conclusions

> If one is not a positivist, she is automatically classified as a philosopher and regretted (Szelényi as cited in Papp 1983).

> The ironicist [*sic*] struggles for balance on a particularly greasy pole. If he moves too far in one direction, he could slide disastrously towards total relativism, at which point his colleagues might say that he had fallen from the pole altogether. But rhetorically he needs at least occasionally to outstretch an arm in that direction. His solution at these times is to increase the grip of his other arm, anchoring himself more firmly than ever in the reflective end of the pole. At the same time, he cannot afford to be seen to be espousing the reflective line too closely. Consequently, there are moments when he distances himself from the pitfalls of 'naïve positivism' by releasing his hold just long enough to wag an admonishing finger at the philosophy of science. But the acute observer will see that while doing this, the ironicist's [*sic*] other arm is hanging on to the relativism for dear life! The art of successful irony is to change arms in such a way that the ironicist [*sic*] appears secure. But whereas to the casual observer, the ironicist [*sic*] may never appear in danger of slipping, practitioners themselves sometimes like to characterize each other in terms of their relative position on the pole (Woolgar 1983:255–6).

It is in itself ironic that Iván Szelényi, one of the most successful and accomplished contemporary sociologists originating from CEE (Kroos, 2020), has made his contribution to sociology (of intellectuals and stratification) by relying on irony, a method that he hardly spells out and when he, together with his co-authors, finally does, few seem to comprehend or take it seriously. Indeed, his entire scholarship – including the oeuvre of the reflexive sociology of intellectuals – is methodologically based on what he and his co-authors have labeled irony within the proposed research agenda of neoclassical sociology (Eyal et al. 2003a / 2003b). While this method has attracted some attention, it is hardly understood and, hence, even less seldom cited[447] or applied.

This might be partly because Szelényi's approach to irony differs substantially, as shown in the first overview chapter, from what can be found in literature, philosophy and sociology, in general, or in literacy criticism, continental philosophy, postmodern social analysis, sociology of knowledge and intellectuals or STS, in particular. It might also partly be that the adoption of this technique is actually more demanding and the benefits less attractive than sticking with one of the more conventional research methods. It is not just that wittiness and sense of humor are difficult to train and even more difficult to master, the reaction to it is often two-faced. Indeed, even if irony is adopted successfully in a critique of some social phenomenon, the response is likely to be hypocritical – the ironist is

---

[447] While there are 11 citations in Web of Science, 43 in Scopus, and 65 in Google Scholar, as of June 16, 2022, none of them is making a reference to 'irony' as a method – discussing or relating in various ways to the proposed research agenda of neoclassical sociology, instead. Likewise, "irony" was mentioned only in passing in the conference devoted to Szelényi's scholarship and the *Festschrift* that resulted from this (cf. Demeter 2020a) without any scholar daring to discuss how they interpret it. (Some would privately admit, though, that they do not understand what Szelényi and his collaborators mean by it).

likely to be cheered by the members of the audience who recognize the power of irony but do not dare to express it themselves for intellectual, political, economic, or social reasons, on the one hand, and the likelihood of becoming socially and politically isolated and excluded from individuals and groups who held or aspire toward disciplinary power, on the other.

Indeed, it is an irony of irony that the very scholar who has adopted irony as a methodological tool or habitus is not threatened by the political establishment, but rather by his fellow intellectuals, who seem to question the scientific seriousness of the method and the academic credibility of the ironist. This is understandable, as irony assumes a higher level of epistemological awareness – it is difficult, if not impossible, to be ironic unless one understands the subject matter very well. Yet, positioning oneself above other scholars can, in addition to admiration, also bring academic rivalry. Furthermore, if the subject matter of the critique happens to be a critical study of intellectuals, the ironist must be ready for severe intellectual scrutiny. While Szelényi proposes self-irony as a possible solution, he also admits that self-censorship remains an issue even then – recognizing that it is the weakest aspect of the approach (Szelényi 2012c).

To put it differently, there is an apparent paradox where one of the most successful contemporary sociologists originating from CEE is highly praised for the originality of his ideas and academic achievements, on the one hand, and little accepted when it comes to the soundness of the method and/or methodological innovation of his scholarship, on the other. Based on this, the need to explain what irony represents for him is apparent. Hence, the aim of this research was to bring clarity to irony as the proposed method of neoclassical sociology (or as "a method of critical inquiry" as he (2020:230) lately puts it). To that end, the analysis basically had to reconstruct Szelényi's mental model based on the scrutiny of the methodological foundations of his scholarship.

Before we got into it, it was pointed out in the Introduction that there has been quite some continuity in the scholarship of Szelényi. One may, nonetheless, wonder at the irony of the fact that he has been returning to the research topics related to elites, including intellectuals, and stratification at the top of the social hierarchy, which does not match up with his self-portrayed 'populist' image of a researcher caring for the oppressed. This irony has been apparent to some commentators such as Ost (2020) and admitted even Szelényi himself (2020). But from the point of view of the evolution of his sociology of intellectuals, *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists* did not just rehabilitate *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, as suggested by Szelényi (2002:47), but reinterpreted the ideas presented in his previous major books in terms of Bourdieu's forms of capital. It seems that Szelényi tried to repeat this success story of mixed method research in the research program on Roma, which culminated in the publication of the book *Patterns of Exclusion*. While one may have the impression that this research and the several publications he wrote in co-operation with Ladányi have little to do with the sociology of intellectuals, it is not entirely true. The research program devoted to the study of stratification at the bottom of the social hierarchy simply looks at the other side of the coin. In that context, the analysis of the

underclass that Ladányi and Szelényi (2006) put forward is insightful and also has a great deal of potential to enrich his understanding of the stratification at the top of the social hierarchy. Unfortunately, the well-developed theoretical chapter, along with the subsequent empirical analysis, does not relate to *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists*. Instead of Kocka and Bourdieu, they rely on Lewes and Gans without attempting to relate the theoretical frames. The potential for a holistic theory of social stratification remained unrealized and still awaits integration.

Meanwhile, Szelényi has recently almost turned his earlier argument about the position and role of intellectuals upside-down. Given the widespread political, economic, and xenophobic developments in CEE, in one of the most recent interviews he mentioned that while he is known for his claims that intellectuals (will) have power, the problem is exactly that they do not have power in Hungary (cf. Buzna 2016). It seems that the hara-kiri that Konrád and Szelényi (1979, Ch. 13) feared they were about to commit by writing and publishing *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* did not materialize so much for them personally under reform socialism, but it did materialize for the CEE intellectuals, more generally speaking, under the mature stages of post-communism. While Konrád and Szelényi thought they had identified the imminent emergence of intellectuals as a class under actually existing socialism, and Szelényi has been trying to reformulate the theory to fit the changing socio-economic and political context throughout the ensuing decades (most distinctively in *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists*), the bottom line seems to be that in the advanced stages of post-communism, intellectuals have no class, no consciousness, no power, according to Szelényi. While this may be his way of distancing intellectuals from the current affairs of post-communist populist politics in CEE, it seems that the price for the apolitical position and intellectual autonomy of intellectuals is, indeed, their marginalization under post-communism as suggested by Bauer and Kis (cf. Bozóki 1996:179). It is the irony of Szelényi's sociology of intellectuals that, instead of being on the road to class power, intellectuals are on the road to irrelevance under the current socio-economic and political context in CEE.

Based on the overview presented in the Introduction and the information added here, it could be argued that Szelényi has continued modifying the original ideas generated in collaborative research with Konrád about the role and position of intellectuals in the socialist social structure over the last half-century. He has done so in order to reflect on and fine-tune the theory in order to keep track of the socio-economic and political changes that he and sociologists have been observing in CEE (and to a lesser extent also in the Former Soviet Union and communist East Asia). In that context, the biggest failure of the academic community interested in the post-communist transition and sociology of intellectuals has been the failure to give credit to Szelényi for his *Urban Inequalities Under State Socialism*, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, and *Socialist Entrepreneurs* as the theoretical inspiration for the "market power", "market incentive" and "market opportunity" theses of Market Transition Theory formulated by Nee (1989). Despite the fact that Szelényi (2012a) has reflected on transition

research, including the role and position of intellectuals in this process, by saying that "[h]istory marginalized the project", one could say that the Chinese and Vietnamese socio-economic and political change is still acute and, hence, attracts wide scholarly attention together with that of Cuba. That is, even if the post-communist CEE has lost much of its attractiveness in the past few years, it appears his ideas on social change, including the position and role of intellectuals, might still be relevant and be put to the empirical test in the reform of communist East Asia as well as in the Caribbean islands.

Even if the historical relevance of Szelényi's conceptual scholarship on intellectuals and empirical research on social change in CEE/FSU has lost some of its relevance, what has emerged from decades of conceptual elaborations and empirical research is irony as a method of neoclassical sociology. A brief overview of the historical evolution of his research programs, including the most important contributions, changes over time, adaptations to its original conception, and significant landmarks in its evolution, was presented in the Introduction. It was shown how he has been modifying and bringing the claims of his sociology of intellectuals to fit the changing socio-economic and political context. Indeed, it was pointed out that when his publications are grouped into various interrelated research programs the continuities are striking. Although his specific research interests may have been related to the emergent post-communist political economy or social system, the continuities in his argument and the evolution of his ideas from one publication and research program to the next are remarkable. Chronologically speaking, he began with the analysis of an housing system and regional development for the less privileged, and he soon discovered intellectuals as the real beneficiaries of the socialist redistributive system. From there on, he turned to the analysis of the working class in rural Hungary and discovered the hidden realities of the socialist second economy, and then again to the analysis of the elites – including intellectuals – in the transition to post-communisms. Without urban and rural research, no understanding of the socialist social structure and sociology of intellectuals would have emerged. Without the search for the actor with the quasi-historic mission, he would not have crystalized his critical take on intellectuals as the most likely candidates for this position in various stages of post-reform communism (before he disregards them as crucial actors in the post-communist political process altogether).

As indicated in the Introduction to the thesis, Szelényi continued to work on the original ideas generated in collaborative research with Konrád on the role and position of intellectuals in the socialist social structure. He has done this in order to fine-tune the theory to reflect on the socio-economic and political transformation that he as a sociologist has been observing in CEE. At times, it appears that he has been surprisingly systematic in his research programs, and at other times he seems to have changed his point of view without ever contradicting his previous positions. That is, his ideas are always well reasoned, and when he presents a new take on the previously discussed topic, which in one way or another has some connection to intellectuals, he demonstrates an extraordinary skilful ability to incorporate the original line of argument into the changed circum-

stances. For this, he adopts some new concepts and theoretical frames while dropping some others, but still remaining within the conflict tradition of Marx and Weber.

The empirical background of his sociology of intellectuals, which allowed him to identify the beneficiaries of the soviet redistribution system, originated from urban and rural sociology and sociography. From the simple, and one may add by today's standards, somewhat naïve surveys among the residents of the new housing estates, he, together with Konrád, reached impressive theoretical conclusions about the logic of the redistributive system. That is, once he had defended his PhD, he, together with Konrád, was willing to ask disturbing questions about the nature of early reform socialism – to study the socialist redistributive system and its injustices, apply critical theory to the redistributors that they identified as intellectuals. Having the courage to enter a collision course with the regime took him abroad where he maintained an interest in the role and position of intellectuals in late reform socialism.

However, his rhetoric about intellectuals becomes less provocative after his emigration as he begins to publish in academic outlets without Konrád's co-authorship. While he makes a short excursion to the comparative analysis of regional management systems in East and West, he soon drops this and concentrates on other issues related to late reform socialism, emergent post-communism and varieties of post-communism, instead. He studies the socialist mixed system, including the analysis based on research of the rural economy and new urban sociology, alternatives and opportunities related to the post-communist transformation, and undertakes an investigation into the emergent post-communist political system, property relations (analysis based on research on the agrarian privatization process), and stratification systems at the top and bottom of the social hierarchy. He also provides reflections on his earlier research along with the typologies of the varieties of socialist and post-communist economic systems. Consequently, his reflexive sociology of intellectuals has indeed been reflexive and has evolved along with the changes in the political and socio-economic environment in CEE, in general, and in Hungary, in particular.

Following the Introduction, a comprehensive overview of the (ab)uses of irony in human sciences was presented in the first chapter. It offered the possibility to prepare for the presentation of Szelényi's ideas on irony as a method of neoclassical sociology based on a synthesized summary of his methodological paper developed with Eyal and Townsley in response to Burawoy. It was suggested in this context that the kind of irony that Szelényi pursues, together with his co-authors, is (thought) provoking – that it can be seen as an anticipated intellectual intrigue. Furthermore, it was shown that the roots of his ideas are in the heritage of the sociology of knowledge of the Budapest School(s). Given the apparent similarities of his approach – which flirts with the Socratic method, on the one hand, and dialectics, on the other, one can also find connections between his approach to irony as a method to enlightenment (in terms of having a skeptical/critical attitude toward any kind of dogma), logic of discovery (in terms Woolgar's notion "it could be otherwise"), unintended consequences (reflecting

Merton's influence on him), and (romantic) irony as the infinitized paradoxical nature of reality (pointing toward the somewhat suppressed influence of Hegelian critique and its follow-ups in the works of Lukács, Mannheim and Gouldner) – the need for detailed analysis of his mental model as the foundation of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology was suggested.

To prepare for the detailed analysis of the elements that make up Szelényi's metaphysical pathos, an overview of the materials and methods used in this research was presented in the second chapter. First, it was explained why Giddens' "new rules of sociological method" were adopted for the interpretative study. This formed the foundation and the starting point for understanding the principles of research that I have accepted – an eclectic combination of the elements of pragmatism and critical theory as the underlying assumptions of my research. It was then explained that this research basically falls into the theoretical research tradition that intends to develop a rational reconstruction of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology or critical inquiry in Szelényi's scholarship, how it relates to ethnomethodological indifference (which accepts any method, regardless of its status, as worthy of analysis), to the sociology of sociology and SSS/STS that take interest in the social life of methods and the (social) study of methodology that some call methodography.

In addition to this, an effort was made to offer clarifications also in terms of empirical research. More specifically, it was argued that in terms of research design one can think of this research as a deviant case study. In regard to sampling, it was explained that the texts that were identified and selected for analysis, in such a way so as to follow the QUOROM standard for meta-analysis, resulted in a complete sample of publicly available sources in English. In terms of data collection, these texts were complemented with two in-depth interviews that were conducted for this research and numerous others that Szelényi has given in other contexts. In terms of analysis techniques, sociological discourse analysis (as a version of CDA) for the 'suspicious' interpretation and objective hermeneutics for the 'empathic' interpretation were adopted. The second chapter concluded with some self-criticism in terms of the methodological limitations of the research.

The third chapter offered a detailed analysis of the elements that make up Szelényi's mental model – his approach to inquiry that Bourdieu et al. (1991:2) have also called a "system of intellectual habits". This was undertaken to reconstruct irony as a method of neoclassical sociology / critical inquiry. Following the outline that has been used to distinguish different schools of thought in the philosophy of science within the mixed methods discussions, it identified the following aspects of his mental model: ontology, epistemology, methodology, training, qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, rhetoric, nature of knowledge, knowledge accumulation, goodness and quality criteria, hegemony, control, axiology, call to action, inquirer posture, ethics, reflexivity, accommodation and commensurability.

As presented in Table 1 and discussed in detail in the separate sub-sections devoted to each of these aspects, it was shown that Szelényi brings different ele-

ments of post-positivism and critical theory together in his scholarship that applies irony directly or indirectly in his search for the role of intellectuals within the social structure of different socio-economic and political formations and their role in its change. Sections 3.11–3.17 were devoted to the issues of hegemony, control, axiology, call to action, inquirer posture, ethics, and reflexivity to demonstrate how he has been searching for a methodological foundation in irony that would allow him to escape the traps of ideologies by being at the same time both empirical and critical – by taking advantage of mirrored oppositions and thinking reflexively about alternatives and acting ethically without becoming involved politically.[448]

It was argued in the third chapter that Szelényi comes across as a very skillful and effective player in the academic field, having understood the way conceptualized by Bourdieu. Knowing the rules of the game, on the one hand, and acknowledging instead of challenging them, on the other, he found a way to escape the image of an ideologist by combining the principles of critical theory with post-positivism – the result of which is irony as an anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue.

Although the seeds of Szelényi's mental model were planted within the ideological context of CEE in the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Kroos 2018, Ch. 3.3.1–3.3.3), he was even then neither ignorant nor immune to the intellectual developments and debates at the time in the West. As demonstrated in the third chapter, he learned to appreciate the position between the opposing positivism and critical theory as he combines the analytical insights of the conflict paradigm, on the one hand, and strengthened it with the findings of empirical research, on the other – especially after the 1964/65 academic year that he spent at Columbia and Berkeley.

While this is not the place to go into the details of the opposition between empiricism and critical theory that turned into the positivist-dialectic debate within the German sociological community at the beginning of the 1960s,[449] the wider international response is perhaps even more telling than the specific arguments presented by the opposing parties. For instance, it is noteworthy that Frisby (1976), who wrote the analytical introduction to the English translation of the papers originally presented at the workshop of the German Society for Sociology in 1961, Dahrendorf (1976), who made an attempt to summarize the debate, and Giddens (1974), who tried to put it into the wider context of positivist currents in sociology, have in different ways suggested that one may have been under the (wrong) impression that there was considerable consensus about the

---

[448] As indicated in section 1.1. of the first chapter, this position is also in harmony with what is known as Socratic irony – an approach that Szelényi subscribes to when he (2018:70) stresses that "The purpose of irony is not to give answers or solutions, but to pose questions".

[449] These views were originally expressed at the workshop of the German Society for Sociology, Tübingen, October 19–21, 1961. The original papers in German can be found in Sommer (1962). For the English versions, see Adorno (1977a, 1977b, 1977c) and Popper (1977a, 1977b). Additional arguments were also presented on the positivist side by Albert (1976a, 1976b, 1976c) and Habermas (1976b, 1976c) on the critical theory side. Additional insight into empiricism can be found in Popper (1940, 1944a, 1944b / 1957, 1945, 1961, 1963).

importance of theory in empirical research and about the inevitability of subjective value judgments in empirical social research aiming at objectivity. Even Habermas' contribution to the debate, within which he (1976b, 1976c)[450] tried to offer a balanced account of "the relationship between theory and factual evidence", fell short for Lazarsfeld (1970:113–6) for whom the result of the exchange of ideas remained ambivalent because of the diplomatic tone taken by contributors who decided to present just their position and to avoid any direct confrontation with the opposing party.

Given the inconclusive result of the debate, Lazarsfeld suggested that one has to look for a resolution in the parallel discussion in the French context, where Gurwitch attempted to make "dialectics something like a research operation" in his book titled *Dialectique et Sociologie.*[451] The same has been noticed by Friedrichs (1970:51–55), who finds that dialectics has the potential to become one of the sociological paradigms. Furthermore, given the stigma that comes with the noun 'materialism', which the post-Hegelian revolutionary thinkers and (wo)men of action like to attach to the adjective 'dialectic', he (ibid, 184) holds no illusions about the changes that it could materialize. At most, Friedrichs sees the potential in (a Gurvitch kind of) dialectic mode in terms of its paradoxical approach to the social sciences and its promise to advance Mannheim's sociology of knowledge.

Within this context, one may see the methodological foundation upon which Szelényi's ironic scholarship stands as an attempt to work out, within the dialectic mode, the resolution that does not only take advantage of paradox (to advance our thinking by showing that reality differs from the generally / theoretically expected or is the mirror image of the alternative in the West) but, by combining the principles of post-positivism and critical theory, to offer empirically supported critical inquiry. The small distinction between 'theory-led' or 'theory-informed' empirical research might seem insignificant, but it is not. In the case of the empirically supported critical inquiry promoted by Szelényi (1977), the originality of the conceptual contribution (intended to be thought-provoking) has the upper hand, and the empirical evidence is there to support the claims. They should allow the ironic 'jester' to escape the accusation that the kind of critical sociology he has been practicing is little more than ideological speculation that characterizes (public) intellectuals and their essayistic style in politically free societies and the *samizdat* publications that were written and published by dissidents in CEE during the years of state socialism.

Although Szelényi may be famous for his lasting theoretical contributions, the analysis of the evolution of his scholarship that I have discussed elsewhere (Kroos 2018 Ch. 3.4) shows that these conceptual works relied on his previous empirical investigations. Understanding this link is important for comprehending how he differs from the members of the Budapest School(s). When I mentioned the issue during the interview, this is how he (Szelényi 2012c) responded:

---

[450] For the additional insight, see Habermas (1963, 1976a).
[451] For the overview in English, see Bosserman (1968).

The First Budapest School was critical theory all right, but it was not anti-empirical and was not Marxist. When what I now call the Second Budapest School was emerging in the 1960s, Lukács wanted to frame it as a Marxist theory, right, as a renaissance of Marxism and that's what in sociology Ágnes Heller, Maria Márkus, György Márkus, Mihály Vajda and [András] Hegedüs represented. I, well, I was an empiricist, but I had been responding, you know, to the idea of the role of critical analysis in social research. So, at one point, I think it was around 1969, I wrote an article, what I think was never published (I don't know whether I still have the manuscript of it), but it was about the role of critical thought. And I said that there are two different types of critical analysis. One is an ideological critique of the regime and the other was critique of ideology. That critique of ideology – that was very much a Mannheimian take, right, – closer to Polanyi but straight out of Mannheim against Lukács. So, I was kind of splitting the Second Budapest School along these lines. There were the Marxists who were offering an ideological critique of socialism – basically saying this socialism was not really socialism because genuine socialism should do this or that. And I said, well, but there is a possibility to have positively based social science, which rather than offering an ideological criticism of the regime, it takes the ideology of the regime and asks the question why on earth the regime is using these ideologies when it is not delivering on these ideologies. Why does the regime claim that this system is an egalitarian one when, in fact, it is an inegalitarian one, right? So, the point is not to show that the regime should be egalitarian, the point is to understand why an inegalitarian regime tries to legitimate itself as an egalitarian, right.

When I asked a follow-up question "What was the response that you got from the other half of the School?", he explained as follows:

Well, this goes back, you know, to the question of value freedom: can you have, right, social analysis, which is value-free; can you have a critical theory, which does not have the vantage point of the good society, right. I think, well, this is basically an ongoing trend in my own work, right, that early on I was not rejecting critical analysis, but I wanted to have critical analysis which is coming from the analysis and understanding of social facts. I was struggling how can you be critical without having then an ideological point of departure. In my later work I call this "irony", right.

It must be apparent from the above-mentioned that irony for Szelényi represents a solution for how to undertake 'immanent critique' when struggling with the issue of how to do critical inquiry that is not ideological but empirical. Although one might find the argument that he presented in his major works, such as *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, *Socialist Entrepreneurs* or *Making Capitalism Without Capitalist*, as 'ironic' but to accept that this 'immanent critique' is equitable with the method of neoclassical sociology as suggested by Eyal et al. (2003a:5) and Szelényi (2018:70) may need further clarification.

While Szelényi mentions 'immanent critique' occasionally in combination with 'irony' (Eyal et al. 2003a:5 / 2003b:27), suggesting that it is not much different from what David Stark has identified in his approach as 'mirrored com-

parisons' (Szelényi 1991c:246; 2018:70),[452] may indeed require some explanation as these connections are not straightforward. As indicated in section 1.6 of the first chapter, introduced under the title "Szelényi's (Way to) Irony as Anticipated Thought Provocation and/or Intellectual Intrigue", and in section 3.3 of the third chapter that discussed his methodology, one may recall that he interprets 'immanent critique' quite conventionally (cf. Stahl 2013a, 2013b). According to this, social critique should not rely on some external (moral) principles. Instead, one should apply the phenomenon's own underlying assumptions to criticize its manifestations in social reality – just as one can learn from the above-mentioned interview extract. This did not only allow him to criticize the state socialist societies by observing that it is not what it claims to be but by relying on empirical observations to learn and understand how the system works – to disclose the role and position of intellectuals in it as well as to identify the changes in its stratification system as the system evolved. Instead of making normative statements, similar to the disciples of Lukács, who elaborated on the basis of the writings of early Marx on what socialism should be, Szelényi stressed the need to study empirically actually existing socialism and disclose its hidden power structures and *modus operandi*.

It should be clear by now that Szelényi uses this 'immanent critique' in his major works, including *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, *Socialist Entrepreneurs* and *Making Capitalism Without Capitalist*. As described in detail in the Introduction, he shows in each of these the paradox between the reality of actually existing socialism and the official Party line, on the one hand, and that the social mechanisms in the redistributive economies in Eastern Europe were a mirror image of the free-market economies of the West, on the other. As discussed in sections 3.3, 3.5 and 3.6, Szelényi's methodology is closest to the Weberian tradition. This makes his version of 'immanent critique' rather like the Weberian methodology within which nomothetic and statistical methods are not taken necessarily as antagonistic. Instead, it treats understanding and explanation as complementary within irony as a method of neoclassical sociology that combines the principles of critical theory and post-positivism in its reflexive modes of inquiry. As Frisby (1976:xxv) clarifies, the principles of this tradition in the introduction to the above-mentioned positivist-dialectic debate within the German sociological community:

> Even though Weber did not use understanding as a way of distinguishing the natural from the human sciences, and although he was critical of the notion of *Verstehen*, he did not give it a subordinate place to nomological explanation; rather understanding and explanation were seen as complementary, whilst at the same time understanding served as a connecting link between causal knowledge of social phenomena and a value relevant interpretation of social phenomena.

Along the same lines, Szelényi's irony as a method for neoclassical sociology and critical inquiry combines two methodological systems that are often presented

---

[452] As noted earlier in the text, Stark (1986) used the term 'mirrored opposition'.

and received as not only very different but incommensurable (if not antagonistic). He struggles to find a balance between these dimensions, as was elaborated in sections 3.7–3.9, devoted to the analysis of his take on such issues as rhetoric, nature of knowledge, and knowledge accumulation. Nevertheless, he finds a way to combine the seemingly incommensurable methodological systems of positivism/empiricism and critical theory, as explained in section 3.18. More specifically, it was shown there that his way of combining elements of critical theory and post-positivism, in general, and theoretical and empirical traditions, in particular, is not a direct representation of what has come to be known as the mixed or multi-method approach to research. Without any conscious identification or attempt to legitimize his research that relies on ironic habitus, he simply stresses the theoretically sound research that is supported by empirical evidence – something that he has been reinforcing in his own scholarship as well as in the reviews and debates with others, as explained in section 3.10.

It is probably safe to say that the way Szelényi was socialized into sociology has played an important part in the formulation of the methodological positions and his sociological way of looking at social reality more generally. As discussed in the previous chapter under section 3.4, the opportunity to spend a term at Columbia University and another at Berkeley in the 1964/65 academic year was quite formative in his methodological development. Although this learning experience and its related affect on his mental model should not be overestimated, he can be seen as a product of 'the Columbia sociology machine' (cf. Clark 1998) operated by Merton and Lazarsfeld. They not only appreciated empirical research methods – be they qualitative or quantitative – but these also contributed much to their development in the social sciences, in general, and to the specific applications in sociology, in particular (cf. Capecchi 1978; Lautman and Lécuyer 1998;[453] Donsbach et al. 2001; Jeřábek 2001, 2006; Merton et al. 1979a; Morrison 1976).[454] These methods were applied among others also by Lipset – their student and follower – whose class Szelényi attended at Berkeley and who "kind of liked" him (Szelényi 2012c), and who enforced the importance of empirical data analysis in his scholarship.

Apart from the American influences, it is difficult to think of any other scholar who has influenced him as much as Hegedüs in his research agenda and emphasis on concentrating on important social issues (cf. Szelényi 2000), on the one hand, and his tolerance of different approaches and methods, on the other (cf. Hegedüs 1968, 1971, 1976; Markus and Hegedüs 1976). Indeed, it is Hegedüs who, in addition to promoting critical theory and thinking, propagated the combination of otherwise conflicting literary sociographs with the sociology of sci-

---

[453] In addition to Clark (1998) see especially the contributions by Coleman (1998), Lipset (1998), and Merton (1998a).
[454] For some examples of the original contributions to the development of both qualitative and quantitative research methods, see Barton and Lazarsfeld (1955), Lazarsfeld (1941, 1948, 1962, 1972, 1993), Lazarsfeld and Barton (1951), Lazarsfeld and Lindblom (1954), Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954), Lazarsfeld and Robinson (1940), Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg (1955) and for the example of their application to the study of American university faculty – Lazarsfeld and Thielens (1958).

entific method using methodological eclecticism.[455]

Hegedüs (1971:92) himself reflects on the development of the new discipline in the following extract that reinforces the above:

> Already in this initial phase, sociological research in Hungary was up against the opinion that concrete sociological research was synonymous with symposia or interviews, or was more broadly characterized by the subjective method. The fact was that the questionnaire method – unwarranted by the many-sided study of the problem investigated, by the consideration of all the possible alternative methods, and finally by the selection of the most satisfactory technique – began to be much too prevalent. Now, however, the recognition is fast gaining ground that the casual and one-sided application of the conference and interview methods cannot be expected to yield serious results, and that they can in fact easily lead to a false orientation and discredit the vary cause of sociological research.

> Because of the complexity of social reality, sociological research demands complicated, combined methods. In the course of most types of research, in addition to the clarification of the theoretical bases and hypotheses, the available socioeconomic statistics must be utilized: statistical data have to be supplemented; the methods of opinion polls, interviews, or conferences have to be included; group discussions, observations, and experiments have to be performed. Then all the resulting material has to be collected and analyzed by the most up-to-date application of mathematical statistics.

In other words, Szelényi was socialized in this milieu to become a sociologist who appreciates both qualitative and quantitative methods to support theoretically sound research of great social importance. Later, it became combined with the above-mentioned American experience that made him not only appreciate empirical research but tolerate both qualitative and quantitative methods. Nevertheless, in his own research, he has been guided by intuition rather than his conscious effort to take advantage of the combined use of more subjective (qualitative) and objective (quantitative) methods.

Once again, this tolerance should not be equated with subscribing to what is now known as mixed method research. Although he does not take much interest in the developments of the mixed method approach – as the combined use of qualitative and quantitative methods has come to be known – he seems to have been guided by the works by classical sociologists toward reorientating the discipline back to its neo-classical form. Indeed, the combined use of qualitative and quantitative methods has been with sociology for a long time, and that is hardly emphasized and tends to be forgotten.[456] Therefore, it is understandable that he does not associate with mixed methods or use the opportunity to appeal to authority by showing that combining qualitative and quantitative traditions was common among the founders of modern sociology – from the German, French

---

[455] These are, in fact, the concepts that Hegedüs (1971:79, 81) uses.

[456] Hunter and Brewer (2003:578–9) offer a very limited overview of "multi-method" research in sociology – ignoring all the above-mentioned contributors and their contributions – concentrating only on the Chicago school, instead.

and British founding fathers (such as Tönnies,[457] Durkheim,[458] and Hobhouse[459]) to the founders of modern Russian and Polish sociology, and as émigrés to the US, also American sociology (e.g. Sorokin[460] and Znaniecki[461]). His wish to serve two Gods at the same time seems, in this context, to be a conscious or unconscious response to the positivist-dialectic discussion that was central to German sociology at the beginning of the 1960s, and relates to an even wider issue of "Irony as Dialectics" discussed in the literature overview chapter. While Szelényi has not addressed this debate directly, the analysis of his mental model presented in the third chapter revealed his dual commitment – on some issues, he seems closer to a (post-)positivist position and on other occasions to critical theory.

One can argue that this skill to play the 'double game' relates to his life experience of how to survive as a young positivist-minded researcher, on the one hand, and critically minded intellectual, on the other. As noted in the Introduction, he started his academic career at the Hungarian Central Statistical Office and was struggling to make an academic career at the Academy of Sciences while at the same time giving evening classes at the Party school. If one accepts that "university is a party", as L. King (2013) put it, we should not be surprised to learn how well Szelényi has managed to master the game in the academic field: finding a delicate balance between critical theory for originality and thought provocation, on the one hand, and (post-)positivism for credibility and legitimacy, on the other.

One could relate this unique balance back to the reply that he gave me during the interview (Szelényi 2012c) when I asked how 'intellectual' he finds himself to be – given the one possible way to define intellectuals as having the dual nature of being between politics and ideas. The answer that he gave helps to make sense of the schizophrenic situation where he has been trying to theorize about

---

[457] Oberschall (1973:165) reports that "Tönnies never failed to point out that his sociography contained elements of the older descriptive "statistics", and that in fact he regarded it as a fruitful synthesis between the older qualitative and the newer quantitative trend in social statistics". (His reference is made to page 131 of Tönnies's *Soziologische Studien und Kritiken*, Vol. III, published in Jena by G. Fischer in 1929).

[458] Nadel (1951:223) notes that:

> [o]ccasionally Durkheim's method comes as close to purely quantitative variations as possible in social enquiry, for example, in his classical study of suicide, where the correlates the frequency of suicide (among other things) with the prevalence, in the given societies, of different denominations. But often Durkheim's method is quantitative only in it preliminaries, in the collection and assessment of the data, but qualitative in it end results. We cannot otherwise interpret the kind of studies he envisages – studies concerned with the changes that occur, in different societies or historical phases, in the make-up of the family, in practices of marriage, in norms of morality or religious creeds, and so forth.

[459] See, for instance, Hobhouse et al. (1915).

[460] See, for instance, Sorokin ([1927] 1959). For his own critique of the adoption of quantitative methods that desperately try to resemble natural sciences, see Sorokin (1956).

[461] See, for instance, Znaniecki (1934). For an even earlier work, co-authored by Thomas and Znaniecki (1927), which takes advantage of the combined uses of qualitative and quantitative methods, see *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*.

the social group of intellectuals that he is part of by identifying with the role of a clown and his/her irony. As he put it:

> The way I think I was trying to find my way out of it was to say, you know, [that] as an intellectual I can play different roles, right. And that's when, you know, we introduced this idea of an intellectual as a clown, rather than a priest or an engineer, right. So, trying to position ourselves in the role of the clown. But this is of course coming from Kołakowski − this idea [comes] from the young Kołakowski–which is in some way a kind of self-ironic view to trying to paint yourself out of this corner. You know, if you believe in the Foucaultian dictum, right, that all knowledge is deeply entrapped in the axe of power, how can you produce knowledge without being engaged in the acts of power? So that's why, yeah… I think: is this really going back to the socially unattached intellectual in a bit more an ironic way? It's probably. It is not all that different, right, from that idea that…

Although the links between the Mannheimian sociology of knowledge and Szelényi's social position, personality and social critique, including the way he comes to use irony in his scholarship, were discussed to the extent possible within this research topic and task in section 3.2 devoted to epistemology, I shall leave the more detailed analysis for Szelényi or other researchers who have known him at a more personal level than I. There are, of course, clues both in his own works and memories as well as in the comments of some of his critics, students, and colleagues that could help establish this link, so that this work would not need to start from scratch. Establishing the connections between his personality and irony as a method of social critique is nevertheless best left to someone who is personally close to him.

My reservation about pursuing this line of inquiry, in addition to the fact that I do not know him personally as a family member, (former) student, co-author or colleague, has been influenced by taking on board Bourdieu's (1969, 1975, 1985b, 1993b, Ch. 5) conceptual understanding of the notions of field and habitus and their applications to the world of an intellectual. Following him, I am skeptical that one can successfully merge macro-sociology with micro-psychology as suggested by the sociologists of knowledge. Hence, I have pursued the sociology of sociology-inspired SSS/STS study of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology and/or critical inquiry. Taking the ethnomethodological indifference as a starting position, I have studied it from the perspective of his research habitus – covering different aspects of his mental model that included the following fundamental aspects of research: ontology, epistemology, methodology, training, qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, rhetoric(al), nature of knowledge, knowledge accumulation, goodness and quality criteria, hegemony, control, axiology, call to action, inquirer posture, ethics, reflexivity, accommodation and commensurability.

Let it be added as one of the final comments that it is not very clear how important co-authors have been for Szelényi's scholarship. Although little is known about it, it seems that he has been rather strategic about selecting authors to collaborate with. This started early on in his academic career in Hungary. More specifically, he got a glimpse of what it means to co-author with a scholar whose

academic credentials, knowledge and connections are beyond your own. This led to the publishing of the article in American Sociological Review (cf. Litwak and Szelényi, 1969) which was instrumental in the successful commencement of his academic career in the West, as he (Case 2017a) himself has pointed out. Likewise, Szelényi's collaboration with Konrád seems to have been rather strategic. On the one hand, in working for the Budapest Institute of Urban Planning Konrád had the means and Szelényi, being employed by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, had some knowledge of social theory and survey method, as well as international contacts among urban sociologists. Hence, the former helped fund the survey and later also the writing of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power.* The latter supplied the knowledge of sociological theory and methods and international attention to the work. When I asked Szelényi about his co-authorship with Konrád in the 'secret book project' that became his magnum opus, he mentioned among other details that "I think our division of labor was that I did most of the conceptual work and he did a great deal of improving the quality of the text that we were writing and turning it into a more readable form" (Szelenyi 2012c).

Once in the West, Szelényi continued to collaborate with scholars on larger research projects that concluded with the publication of important monographs. For instance, a research program on late reform socialism and socialist mixed systems that took some 18 years to complete, culminating with the publishing of *Socialist Entrepreneurs* emerged in collaboration with Robert Manchin, Pál Juhász, Bálint Magyar, and Bill Martin.

Likewise, the "Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989" was an international collaborative research project to which many of his graduate students contributed (including Eleanor Townsley, Matthew McKeever, Lawrence King, Eva Fodor, Eric Hanley, Gil Eyal, Eric Kostello and Christy Glass). Looking at his publishing record, it seems that contrary to what one might have expected (cf. Iván Szelényi and Szonja Szelényi. s.a.), Szelényi did not publish much with Treiman beyond the overview of the research plan of the project (cf. Szelényi and Treiman 1991, 1992; Treiman and Szelényi 1993). Instead, he co-authored a number of publications with his graduate students. This may give room for speculation that Szelényi only wrote with those with whom he already agreed, whom he could dominate or whose dispositions he was willing to absorb because of their insightfulness or position in the academic hierarchy. Plausible as these speculations may be, I am not in a position to support or deny that these could or could not be true.

Nevertheless, it is clear beyond doubt that Szelényi has done an outstanding job in attracting, teaching, advising, inspiring, fund-raising and networking for the next generation of sociologists of intellectuals, scholars of transition, stratification, and elite studies. Although it seems to have benefited all parties concerned, King (2013) has suggested that *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists* would have become an even better book if he had contributed to it, while Eyal could have made a positive impact on *Theories of the New Class: Intellectuals and Power*. Such speculations remain inevitably hypothetical. Although it is difficult

to dispute the suggestion that the book could have benefited from a more sophisticated data analysis, which can be found in other publications co-authored by Szelényi with other scholars (cf. Hanley and Szelényi 2001 as well as Szelényi and Glass 2003). Furthermore, it is not clear that without Eyal's contribution, which Szelényi (2012a) has described as his very "best experience with co-authoring", he would have made such a distinctive turn to Bourdieu. And without that turn, it is not certain that Szelényi's contributions would have come to dominate the post-communist elite studies for the entire decade as identified by Bozóki (2003) or stimulated the above-mentioned debate with Burawoy (2001, 2002), within which the unique contributions about neoclassical sociology and irony as a method were made (cf. Eyal et al. 2001a, 2003a / 2003b).

Given the fact that this thesis emerges out of a critical meta-theory analysis of Szelényi's scholarship on the relation between knowledge and power (cf. Kroos 2018), which followed Ritzer's (1988; 1991a, Ch. 1) suggestions on how to undertake such studies, the most important innovation and contribution to its methods is to be found in the recognition that the four dimensions (identified and listed in Figure 1 in the Introduction) ignore the importance of the methodological principles and choices of the analyzed scholar. Indeed, following the exemplary works of Kuhn, Lakatos, Gouldner, Tiryakian and Foucault,[462] Ritzer identifies that to undertake an M_U type of metatheorizing aimed at attaining a deeper understanding of the theory, metatheorizing means that the study concentrates on one of the following traditions of the history of ideas, philosophy of science, sociology of sociology and science: (i) the major underlying cognitive paradigms that underlie the scholarship, (ii) key concepts and silent assumptions, (iii) the historical evolution of the ideas, and (iv) how the socio-cultural, political, and disciplinary contexts have influenced the development of the works. To overcome the lack of attention to the methodological choices in any of the existing traditions of metatheorizing, I undertook the analysis of Szelényi's "Metaphysical Pathos" which highlighted the need to bring methodology back into the analytical map of metatheorizing.

I have to admit that in the process of composing the critical meta-theory analysis (Kroos 2018), writing the paper on "How to Become a Dominant or Even Iconic Central and East European Sociologist" (Kroos 2020), and this very dissertation, I may have constructed more coherence in the research programs that Szelényi has been engaging in than actually exists in his life. Partly this may be inevitable as we are trained to appreciate well-structured text with a clear line of argument. In addition to the wish to live up to the expectations of writing well, the analytical approaches that I have adopted, have enforced the structure on the paper that makes his life and work appear more ordered than it actually has been. In fact, Szelényi himself commented once to me about his academic career that he has been "navigating rocky waters without a compass".

And even if there has been more eclecticism in the research programs and

---

[462] For further details and discussion, see Bondas and Hall (2007), Paterson et al. (2001), Ritzer (1987, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1991d, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 2007), Turner (1990), Weed (2005) and Zhao (1991, 2005).

methodological foundations in the actual life of Szelényi than identified and depicted in my analysis of him, it should be pointed out that I do not find 'disciplined eclecticism' (Merton 1975b:335; 1981:iii) as an element in scholarship that would necessarily jeopardize its credibility. Quite the contrary, I (Kroos 2012a) have even suggested that it could function as the philosophical foundation for mixed methods and/or interdisciplinary research. As Szelényi's research programs, topics and disciplinary alignments (from area studies and contemporary history to political science and international relations, from philosophy and political economy to social theory and sociology) are diverse and varied, 'disciplined eclecticism' could serve and describe him well. But I am afraid that most commentators, including Szelényi who has searched for the common denominator in his own life and work (cf. Szelényi 2002, 2018a), would find it difficult to accept the association with 'disciplined eclecticism' as a compliment – not to mention an argument that it has been the methodological foundation which has served as a common nominator in his scholarship. He would likely see it as less sympathetic than being associated with irony.

This brings me to the issue of how helpful the labels are that I use in my interpretation and reconstruction of Szelényi's scholarship in relation to the research ethics that was discussed in more detail in section 2.3. As pointed out there, I have adopted something known as the (feminist) 'ethics of care' (cf. Preissle 2007; Preissle and Han 2012). It makes aiming at good the ultimate moral imperative of the research. This means that as a principle I do not think that the end would justify the means. While I present Szelényi as someone who is well aware of the possible consequences of his methodological choices for the way he as a scholar may be perceived – the reputation that he may gain or lose – I do not think that one should interpret it as if I am questioning his integrity as a social scientist. Quite the opposite. Rather than being hypocritical about the truth and objectivity of his critical observations, on the one hand, and acting defensively out of self-interest, on the other, I think that he has simply played by the (in)formal rules of the game even if this required at times making 'strategic' choices. That is, he has been practising what he preaches. At times it may have (un)intended consequences as one cannot strategically control everything. For instance, concentrating his academic interest at the top of the social hierarchy and lacking attention to the issues related to gender or race, topics that have become ever more central to American and global sociology, may have become a disadvantage at the later stages of his career and may not serve him well in terms of leaving a lasting legacy within the discipline. Therefore, I think the work "On Irony as a Method of Neoclassical Sociology" is so important for his long-term reputation as a scholar. The attempt to reconstruct the methodological foundations of it from his long-lasting and productive academic career and works should serve that aim.

One may ask does it matter that some affinities, assumptions and implications that I have brought into the light are known to Szelényi and yet some of them are not? On the one hand, there is no doubt that this is an important issue because in the theoretical sociological tradition, where the subject of the analysis is the se-

lected theory itself (without the option or wish for empirical testing), assumptions, selected terminology and references carry great significance. On the other hand, one may criticize me for associating Szelényi with schools of thought, methodologies, philosophical traditions, debates and/or scholars and their contributions unknown to him, and in so doing, the critic may jump to the conclusion that I may be treating my object of analysis unfairly or unjustly – that he may never have had these concepts, theories, scholars and other reference points in mind while developing his ideas, concepts and theoretical arguments, planning and implementing his empirical research and/or writing the reports.

Plausible as both of these arguments may be, the position that I have learned to appreciatefollows the loosely defined interpretivist-constructivist view (cf. Schwandt 1998). In its simplified form, my take on it suggests that the meaning of the text is (re)constructed by the reader during the reading process that involves the decoding of it given the wording, terminology and context of the coding. In other words, the reader interprets the text based on his or her background, education, knowledge, previous experiences etc. Given that people differ on these aspects, it is inevitable that the text coded by the specific author and decoded by the reader carries different meanings and generates different associations for the two. This can be seen from any review of any text. (Even in a continental legal system, where the law in the form of legal regulation should stipulate what is allowed and under which conditions, parties argue in court about the possible meaning and proper interpretation of the legal text – not to mention contracts or someone's public statements).

Such an interpretivist-constructivist view relates to Gouldner's position on the essence of critique. In the early stages of my dissertation work, when I was looking for methodological guidance on how to analyze theory, I came across Gouldner's ideas on the topic. His argument had a great significance on my thinking then and it has remained so ever since. Given the profound influence it has had on me and on the planning of the dissertation, on the one hand, and how rarely one comes across reflections or explanations on how to analyze sociological theory (other than perhaps putting it to empirical test), on the other, let me take the opportunity to cite him at length. He (1980:8) says in *The Two Marxisms: Contradictions and Anomalies in the Development of Theory* that:

> critique, for me, is in no way an effort to debunk or unmask a theoretical system, is never undertaken as an occasion in which the critic outsmarts his subject, and certainly never views the subject's work as the mere product of an historical mistake or ignorance. ... At the same time, a critique, seeing a theory as a human product, can have no impulse to canonize it. Conceiving theory as a doing and making by persons caught up in some specific historical era, critique searches for the limits no less than the achievements of a theory.

Furthermore, Gouldner goes on to address the above-mentioned issue about the affinities, assumptions and implications that I assign or associate with Szelényi, even if they may be unfamiliar to him. He (ibid:9) states:

> To critique a theory is a very active act; engaging the theory in dialogue, it inevitably interweaves commentary with exegesis, paying scrupulous attention

to what the theorist's text says, while at the same time recognizing that the meaning of any text (as of any life) is never limited to its author's self-under-standing. It must be interpreted, never merely recited. **A theory contains a message some part of which is surely the author's and known to him, but another part is only glimpsed and is opaque even to him.** [Emphasis not original]. It is therefore not rendered altogether intelligible simply by putting down his prefatory explanations of what his work is about. For all prefaces (yes, all) are written only after the fact, are efforts to construct an account of what has already been done, which renders it consistent and acceptable; there-fore, they are partly justifications no less than explanations, partly distorting no less than clarifying. An author's own account of himself, then, can never re-ally be altogether superior to someone else's account of him.

Gouldner goes on to say in the same passage that:

[t]o critique a theory, then, is to think about it not as a culturally privileged object but as another object of culture, to be understood as we attempt to un-derstand, say, a novel by William Gass, a cinema by Kirosawa, a play by Pinter, the layout and architecture of Red Square in Moscow, a life such as Antonio Gram sci's, or an event such as Louis Napoleon's coup. Such a view of theory, it must be admitted, is somewhat at variance with theory's own exalted self-con-ception, which tends to present itself as if it were altogether transparent to it-self and knowledgeable about what it is up to. The first commandment of the theorist's guild is, after all, know what you are doing. Critique takes note of this special requirement, sees theorists as bound by such a pledge, but yet as no more capable of living a life without shadows than anyone else.

Based on the above-mentioned, Gouldner (ibid:10) deducts that:

[a] critique sees a theory as embodying the unique talents of some intellectual craftsmen, the standards, traditions, and concerns of their craft, and also of the larger society, culture, and historical epoch in which the craft is practised. It is to see theory as a technical product, but never as that alone. To view theory as a craft object is to see it as an object in which both personality and history, individual and group, are blended into focussed statement.

Having taken Gouldner's ideas of what it means to critique a theory on board, one should not be surprised to learn that I soon found my way to Ritzer's (1988, 1991a) M_U metatheorizing, which is summarized graphically in Figure 1. Accord-ing to Fuchs (1992:532), it represents the analytical framework of the sociology of sociology, that became the structural foundation of the work, titled "Iván Szelényi's Reflexive and Ironic Sociology of Intellectuals. Critical Meta-theory Analysis of Szelényi's Work on the Relationship between Knowledge and Power Four Decades after 'The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power'" – a manuscript that I composed and submitted to Tallinn University (cf. Kroos 2018). Since the current work is not a summary of it, but a separate (even if related) work that addresses more specifically the methodological foundations of irony that Szelényi (together with his co-authors) proposed as a method of neoclassical so-ciology, I do not discuss directly in this work the meta-theoretical dimensions related to: (i) internal-intellectual (incl. cognitive paradigms, schools of thought, changes in paradigms, schools of thought, and theories), (ii) external-intellectual

(incl. use of concepts borrowed from philosophy, economics, linguistics etc.), (iii) internal-social (incl. communal paradigms, invisible colleges, schools, networks, and individual backgrounds) or (iv) external-social (incl. impact of society, impact of social institutions, and historical roots). These aspects are covered in the above-mentioned manuscript and readers interested in these topics are encouraged to find a way to this source.

On top of the wide range of issues addressed within the above-mentioned critical meta-theory analysis, I have analyzed an additional set of issues that readers may be interested in the separate publication "How to Become a Dominant or Even Iconic Central and East European Sociologist: The Case of Iván Szelényi". It covers questions from Szelényi's topic selection, intellectual context, intellectual rivalry, international (scholarly) interest in research, effective dissemination, number of graduate students, their research excellence and scholarly success. Since these issues do not directly concern irony as a method of neoclassical sociology and they are discussed elsewhere one hardly finds comments on these topics in this dissertation.

Finally, to suggest a topic that researchers interested in Szelényi's scholarship could take up in their research, I would recommend a comparative network analysis of the implications of the career strategies and academic networks of Gouldner and Szelényi as two outstanding sociologists of intellectuals and contributors to the development of irony as a method of neoclassical sociology.[463]

To conclude, I would like to hope that the reconstruction of Szelényi's 'metaphysical patho' helped to explain as much about irony as a 'method' as it did about irony as a 'research habitus' on the basis of a detailed analysis of the methodological foundations of his exemplary scholarship. To put it briefly, the reconstruction of his mental model showed that irony as anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue is a much wider research habitus than captured by the notion of the method. It relies on a strategic combination of the principles of post-positivism with critical theory. Although Szelényi has adopted the former for strategic reasons, and the latter for intrinsic motivations, his scholarship shows that they are not necessarily incommensurable. Even if they make strange bedfellows, they are the two sides of the same irony as an anticipated thought provocation and/or intellectual intrigue.

---

[463] Although the comparison with Gouldner might be more appropriate, it is my impression that Szelényi would not mind being compared to scholars such as, for instance, Bauman, Burawoy, Castells, Kis or E. O. Wright (not to mention Bourdieu, Konrád or C. W. Mills) – despite their relative inflexibility when comes to the respectful way to do social research.

Bibliography

Bibliographies essentially have to do with "proof".... (Gouldner 1976a:19).

Abbott, Andrew. 2001. *Chaos of Disciplines*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

Abbott, Andrew. 2004. *Methods of Discovery: Heuristics of the Social Sciences*. New York: Norton.

Abell, Peter. 2009. "History, Case Studies, Statistics, and Causal Inference." *European Sociological Review* 25(5):561–67.

Abend, Gabriel. 2008. "The Meaning of 'Theory'." *Sociological Theory* 26(2): 173–99.

Achen, Christopher H. 2005. "Two Cheers for Charles Ragin", *Studies in Comparative International Development* 40(1):27–32.

Adams, Julia; Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff. 2005. "Introduction: Social Theory, Modernity, and the Three Waves of Historical Sociology." Pp. 1–72 in *Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology*, edited by J. Adams, E. Clemens, and A. S. Orloff. Durham, NC and London, England: Duke University Press.

Adorno, Theodor W. 1976a. "Introduction." Pp. 1–67 in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*. Translated by G. Adey and D. Frisby, London, England: Heinemann.

Adorno, Theodor W. 1976b. "Sociology and Empirical Research." Pp. 68–86 in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology.* Translated by G. Adey and D. Frisby, London, England: Heinemann.

Adorno, Theodor W. 1976c. "On the Logic of the Social Sciences." Pp. 105–22 in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology.* Translated by G. Adey and D. Frisby, London, England: Heinemann.

Adorno, Theodor W. 1973, *Negative Dialectics*, New York: Seabury Press.

Agger, Ben. 1991. "Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, Postmodernism: Their Sociological Relevance." *Annual Review of Sociology* 17:105–31.

Albert, Georgia. 1993. "Understanding Irony: Three *essais* on Friedrich Schlegel." *MLN* 108(5):825–48.

Albert, Hans. 1976a. "The Myth of Total Reason." Pp. 163–97 in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*. Translated by G. Adey and D. Frisby, London, England: Heinemann.

Albert, Hans. 1976b. "Behind Positivism's Back?" Pp. 226–57 in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*. T ranslated by G. Adey and D. Frisby, London, England: Heinemann.

Albert, Hans. 1976c. "A Short Surprised Postscript to a Long Introduction." Pp. 283–300 in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*. Translated by G. Adey and D. Frisby, London, England: Heinemann.

Alexander, Jeffery C. 1978. "Formal and Substantive Voluntarism in the Work of Talcott Parsons: A Theoretical and Ideological Reinterpretation", *American Sociological Review* 43(2):177–98.

Alexander, Jeffery C. 1987. *Sociological Theory Since World War II*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1988. "The New Theoretical Movement." Pp. 77–101 in *Handbook of Sociology*. edited by N. J. Smelser. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publ.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1990. "Beyond the Epistemological Dilemma: General Theory in a Postpositivist Mode." *Sociological Forum* 5(4):531–44.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1992. "General Theory in the Postpositivist Mode: The 'Epistemological Dilemma' and the Search for Present Reason." Pp. 322–68 in *Postmodernism and General Social Theory: The Debate over General* Theory, edited by S. Seidman and D. G. Wagner. Cambridge, MA and Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2006. *The Civil Sphere*. Oxford, England and New York: Oxford University Press.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2008. "Clifford Geertz and the Strong Program: The Human Sciences and Cultural Sociology." *Cultural Sociology* 2(2):157–68.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2011. *Performance and Power*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2013. *The Dark Side of Modernity*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. and Paul Colomy. 1992. "Traditions and Competition: Preface to a Positivist Approach to Knowledge Cumulation." Pp. 27–52 in *Metatheorizing*, edited by G. Ritzer. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. and Philip Smith. 2001. "The Strong Program in Cultural Theory." In *Handbook of Sociological Theory*, edited by J. H. Turner. Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research. New York: Kluwer Academic / Plenum Publishers.

Alise, Mark A. and Charles Teddlie. 2010. "A Continuation of the Paradigm Wars? Prevalence Rates of Methodological Approaches Across the Social/Behavioral Sciences." *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 4(2):103–126.

Allemann, Beda. 1956. *Ironie und Dichtung*. Pfullingen, Germany: Gunther Neske.

Allen, Richard. 2007. *Hitchcock's Romantic Irony*. Edited by J. Belton. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Alt, John. 1981. "Alvin W. Gouldner (1920–1980)." *Telos* 47(March 20):198–203.

Althusser, Louis. 1970. *Reading Capital*. Translated by B. Brewster. London, England: New Left Books.

Alvesson, Mats and Kaj Sköldberg. 2009. *Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research*. 2nd ed. Los Angelis, CA: Sage Publications.

Al-Ubaydli, Omar and John A. List. 2019. "How natural field experiments have enhanced our understanding of unemployment." *Nature Human Behaviour* 3(Jan.):33–9.

Andorka, Rudolf. 1991. "Hungarian Sociology in the Face of the Political, Economic and Social Transition." *International Sociology* 6(4):465–469.

Andorka, Rudolf. 1993. "Institutional Changes and Intellectual Trends in Some Hungarian Social Sciences." *East European Politics and Societies* 7(1):74–108.

Anonymous. 1980. "Introduction." On Being a Marxist: A Hungarian View, G. Bence, and J. Kis. *The Socialist Register* 17:263–65.

Anonymous. 1983. "AB: Hungary's independent publisher. An interview with the creators of a source of uncensored writing." *Index on Censorship* 12(2):5–7.

Antic, Zdenko. 1968. "Leading Marxist Philosophers Protest Against the Invasion of Czechoslovakia." August 26, HU OSA 78–1–20; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

American Sociological Association. 1967. Program of the 62nd Annual Meeting, August 28–31, San Francisco, CA. Pp. 56 & 82, Retrieved January 10, 2021 (https://www.asanet.org/sites/default/files/1967_annual_meeting_program_c.pdf).

American Sociological Association. 2002. "Official Reports and Proceedings." 2001–2002 Council, January 26–27, 2002. *Footnotes*, September/October, pp. 12–15. Retrieved September 22, 2012 (https://www.asanet.org/sites/default/files/september-october_2002.pdf).

American Sociological Association. 2018. "Code of Ethics." Retrieved September 9, 2018 (http://www.asanet.org/sites/default/files/asa_code_of_ethics-june2018.pdf).

Anguera, M. Teresa, Angel Blanco-Villaseñor, José Luis Losada, Pedro Sánchez-Algarra and Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie. 2018. "Revisiting the difference between mixed methods and multimethods: Is it all in the name?" *Quality & Quantity* 52:2757–70.

Anderson, Digby C. and Wesley W. Sharrock. 1983. "Irony as a Methodological Theory: A Sketch of Four Sociological Variations." *Poetics Today* 4(3):565–79.

Arato, Andrew. 1983. "Immanent Critique and Authoritarian Socialism." *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory / Revue candadienne de théorie politique et sociale* 7(1–2):146–62.

Arato, Andrew. 1987. "The Budapest School and Actually Existing Socialism." *Theory and Society* 16(4):593–619.

Arato, Andrew. 1993. *From Neo-Marxism to Democratic Theory: Essays on the Critical Theory of Soviet-type Societies*. Armonk, NY and London, England: M.E. Sharpe.

Arato, Andrew. 2006. "Kis, János (b. 1943)." in *Encyclopedia of Modern Europe: Europe Since 1914: Encyclopedia of the Age of War and Reconstruction*, Vol. 4, edited by J. M. Merriman. Farmington Hills, MI: Thomson Gale.

Arato, Andrew and Paul Breines. 1979. *The Young Lukács and the Origins of Western Marxism*. New York: A Continuum and The Seabury Press.

Arato, Andrew and Milhaly Vajda. 1980. "The Limits of the Leninist Opposition: Reply to David Bathrick." *New German Critique* 19:167–75.

Arbeitsstelle Friedrich und Dorothea Schlegel. 2018. "Bibliographie." Retrieved April 22, 2021 (https://www.blogs.uni-mainz.de/friedrich-schlegel/bibliographie/).Ashmore, Malcolm. 1989. *The Reflexive Thesis: Writing Sociology of Scientific Knowledge*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Archer, Margaret, Claire Decoteau, Philip Gorski, Daniel Little, Doug Porpora, Timothy Rutzou, Christian Smith, George Steinmetz and Frédéric Vandenberghe. 2016. "What is critical realism?" *Perspectives: A Newsletter of the ASA Theory Section* 38(2):4–9.

Archer, Margaret, Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Collier, Tony Lawson, and Alan Norrie eds. 1998. *Critical Realism: Essential Readings.* London, England and New York: Routledge.

Ashmore, Malcolm. 2015. "Reflexivity in Science and Technology Studies." Pp. 93–97 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* 2nd ed., edited by J. D. Wright. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.

Aspers, Patrik. 2015. "Performing Ontology." *Social Studies of Science* 45(3):449–53.

Athens, Lonnie. 2010. "Naturalistic Inquiry in Theory and Practice." *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 39(1):87–125.

Atkinson, Paul. 1988. "Ethnomethodology - A Critical Review." *Annual Review of Sociology* 14:441–65.

Atkinson, Paul. 2009. "Ethics and ethnography." *21st Century Society* 4(1):17–30.

Attardo, Salvatore. 2000. "Irony as relevant inappropriateness." *Journal of Pragmatics* 32:793–826.

Attewell, Paul. 1974. "Ethnomethodology since Garfinkel." *Theory and Society* 1(2):179–210.

Au, Anson. 2018. "Sociology and Science: The Making of a Social Scientific Method." *The American Sociologist* 49(1):98–115.

Babones, Salvatore. 2016. *Interpretive quantitative methods for the social sciences. Sociology* 50(3):453–69.

Baert, Patrick. 1991. "Uninted Consequences: A Typology and Examples." *International Sociology* 6(2):201–10.

Baets, Antoon De. 2002. *Censorship of Historical Thought. A World Guide, 1945–2000*. Westpoint, CT: Greenwood Press.

Bakker, J. I. [Hans]. 2011. "North Central Sociological Association Presidential Address: Pragmatic Sociology: Healing the Discipline." *Sociological Focus* 44(3):167–83.

Baldassarri, Delia and Maria Abascal. 2017. "Field Experiments Across the Social Sciences." *Annual Review of Sociology* 43(1):41–73.

Baldwin, Richard. 2018a. "Hegemonic Academic Bullying: The Ethics of Sokal-style Hoax Papers on Gender Studies." Retrieved May 30, 2021 (https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SydTXKXUkr9QhLBeTaR9SK781CxXZAlx/view?usp=sharing)

Baldwin, Richard. 2018b. "When the Joke Is on You: A Feminist Perspective on How Positionality Influences Satire." *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy* [Retracted]. Retrieved May 30, 2021 (https://drive.google.com/file/d/1V7zyFi8DYopNLzOGAtsYiHYWihDk1Pl-/view?usp=sharing)

Ball, Richard A. 1979. "The Dialectical Method: Its Application to Social Theory." *Social Forces* 57(3):785–98.

Bartholomew, Ryan. 2014. *Kierkegaard's Indirect Politics: Interludes with Lukács, Schmitt, Benjamin and Adorno*, Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers.

Barton, Allen H. and Paul F. Lazarsfeld. 1955. "Some Functions of Qualitative Analysis in Social Research." *Frankfurter Beitrage zu Sociologie*, 1: 321–61.

Bauer, Tamás. 1979. "The Science of Economics and the East European Systems." Pp.144–7 in *Communism and Eastern Europe. A Collection of Essays*, edited by F. Silnitsky, L. Silnitsky and K. Reyman, Sussex, England: The Harvester Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 1987. *Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity, and Itellectuals*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 1992. *Intimations of Postmodernity*. London, England and New York: Routledge.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 1999. *Culture as Praxis*. London, England: Sage Publications.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2007a. *Consuming Life*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2007b. *Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2011. *Culture in a Liquid Modern World*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Bazeley, Pat. 2018. *Integrating Analyses in Mixed Methods Research*. London, England: Sage Publications.

Becker, Howard. 1933. "Culture Case Study and Ideal-Typical Method: With Special Reference to Max Weber." *Social Forces* 12(1):399–405.

Becker, Howard. 1940. "Constructive Typology in the Social Sciences." *American Sociological Review* 5(1):40–55.

Becker, Howard S. 1967. "Whose Side Are We On?" *Social Problems* 14(3):239–47.

Becker, Howard S. 1968. "Social Observation and Social Case Studies." Pp. 232–38 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 14, edited by D. L. Sills, New York: Free Press and London, England: Collier and Macmillan.

Becker, Howard S. 1970. *Sociological Work: Method and Substance*, London, England: Penguin Press.

Becker, Howard S. 1986. *Writing for Social Scientists: How to Start and Finish Your Thesis, Book, or Article*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Becker, Howard S. 1990. "Generalizing from Case Studies" Pp. 233–24 in *Qualitative Inquiry in Education*, edited by E. W. Eisner and A. Peshkin. New York City: Teachers College Press.

Becker, Howard S. 1998. *Tricks of the Trade: How to Think about Your Research While You're Doing It*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Becker, Howard S. 1999. "The Chicago School, So-Called." *Qualitative Sociology* 22(1):3–12.

Becker, Howard S. 2007. *Telling About Society*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Becskehazi, Attila and Tibor Kuczi. 1994. "The Sociology of Reformist Socialism: The Hungarian Model." Pp. 39–52 in *Eastern Europe in Transformation: The Impact on Sociology*, edited by M. Keen, and J. Mucha, Westport CT: Greenwood Press.

Behler, Ernst. 1972. *Klassische Ironie, romantische ironie, tragische ironie. Zur Ursprung dieser Begriffe*. Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Behler, Ernst. 1990. *Irony and the Discourse of Modernity*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Bell, Daniel. 1953. "Crime as an American Way of Life." *The Antioch Review* 13(2):131–54.

Bence, György. 1992. "Transition and Transfer in Hungarian Academe." *East European Politics and Societies* 6(3):319–35.

Bence, Gyorgy [György] and Janos [János] Kis. 1979. "After the Break." Pp. 133–43 in Communism and Eastern Europe. A Collection of Essays, edited by F. Silnitsky, L. Silnitsky and K. Reyman. Sussex, England: The Harvester Press.

Bence, Gyorgy [György] and Janos [János] Kis. 1980. "On Being a Marxist: A Hungarian View." *The Socialist Register* 17:263–97.

Bence, György, János Kis, and György Márkus. 1992. *Hogyan lehetséges kritikai gazdaságtan?* [How Is Critical Economics Possible?], Budapest, Hungary: T-Twins / MTAK Lukács Archívum.

Ben-David, Joseph and Teresa Sullivan. 1975. "A. Sociology of Science." *Annual Review of Sociology* 1(1):203–22.

Bendix, Reinhard. 1963. "Concepts and Generalizations in Comparative Sociological Studies." *American Sociological Review* 28(4):532–39.

Berend, Ivan T. 2009. *History in My Life: A Memoir of Three Eras*. Budapest, Hungary: CEU Press.

Berger, Joseph; David G. Wagner and Morris Zelditch. 1989. "Theory Growth, Social Processes, and Metatheory." Pp. 19–42 in *Theory Building in Sociology. Assessing Theoretical Cumulation*, edited by J. H. Turner. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Berghe van den, Pierre L. 1963. "Dialectic and Functionalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis." *American Sociological Review* 28(5):695–705.

Berkovits, György. 1975. "Változatok a szociogrfiá." *Valóság* 18(5):46–61.

Bernstein, Jay M. 1984. *The Philosophy of the Novel: Lukács, Marxism, and the Dialectics of Form.* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Bernstein, Richard J. 1983. *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism*. Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Berry, Wanda Warren. 1995. "Kierkegaard and Feminism: Apologetic, Repetition, and Dialogue." Pp. 110–24 in *Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity*, edited by M. J. Matuštík and M. Westphal. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press.

Bertilsson, Margareta. 2016. "Theorizing – for what?" *British Journal of Sociology* 67(1):30–35.

Best, Steven. 2008. sv "Culture Turn" in *Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology* edited by G. Ritzer, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Bhaskar, Roy. 1975. *A Realist Theory of Science*. Leeds, England: Leeds Books Ltd.

Bhaskar, Roy. 1979. *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Societies*. Brighton, England: Harvester Press Ltd.

Bhaskar, Roy and Lawson, Tony. 1998. "Introduction. Basic Texts and Developments." Pp. 3–15 in *Critical Realism: Essential Readings* edited by M. Archer, R. Bhaskar, A. Collier, T. Lawson and A. Norrie. London, England and New York: Routledge.

Bickman, Leonard. ed. 2000a. *Validity and Social Experimentation: Donald Campbell's Legacy*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Bickman, Leonard. ed. 2000b. *Research Design: Donald Campbell's Legacy*. Vol. 2, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Bierstedt, Robert. 1960. "Sociology and Humane Learning." *American Sociological Review* 25(1):3–9.

Biesta, Gert. 2010. "Pragmatism and the Philosophical Foundations of Mixed Methods Research" Pp. 95–117 in *SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioural Research*, 2nd ed., edited by A. Tashakkori and C. Teddlie. Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.

Blackburn, Simon. 1994a. s.v. "Ontological Argument" in *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Blackburn, Simon. 1994b. s.v. "Methodology" in *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Block, Fred and Margaret R. Somers. 1984. "Beyond the Economistic fallacy: The Holistic Social Science of Karl Polanyi" Pp. 47–84 in *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, edited by T. Skocpol. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Bloor, David [1976] 1991. "The Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge." Pp. 3–23 in *Knowledge and Social Imagery*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Bloor, David. 2015. "Strong Program, Sociology of." Pp. 592–97 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd ed., edited by J. D. Wright. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.

Blumer, Herbert. 1979. *Critiques of Research in the Social Sciences: An appraisal of Thomas' and Zaniecki's The Polish Peasant in Europe and America.* New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

Boghossian, Peter; Helen Pluckrose and James A. Lindsay. 2018. "Academic Grievance Studies and the Corruption of Scholarship." *Areo*, Oct. 2. Retrieved May 30, 2021 (https://areomagazine.com/2018/10/02/academic-grievance-studies-and-the-corruption-of-scholarship/)

Bohle, Dorothee and Béla Greskovits. 2020. "Neoclassical Sociology Meets Polanyian Political Economy." Pp. 146–65 in *Intellectuals, Inequalities and*

Transitions: Prospects for A Critical Sociology, edited by T. Demeter, Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers.

Bohman, James and William Rehg. "Jürgen Habermas." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Fall 2014 ed., edited by E. N. Zalta. Retrieved January 21, 2014 (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/habermas/).

Bonacich, Phillip and John Light. 1978. "Laboratory Experimentation in Sociology." *Annual Review of Sociology* 4(1):145–70.

Bonnell, Victora. E. and L.ynn Hunt, eds. 1999. *Beyond the Cultural Turn*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Bond, Niall. 2012. "Ferdinand Tönnies and Max Weber." *Max Weber Studies* 12(1):25–57

Bondas, Terese and Hall, Elisabeth O. C. 2007. "Challenges in approaching meta-synthesis research." *Qualitative Health Research* 17(1):113–21.

Booth, Wayne. C. 1974. *A Rhetoric of Irony*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Borgatta, Edgar F. and Rhonda J.V. Montgomery, eds. 2000. *Encyclopaedia of Sociology*, 2nd Ed., Vol. 1–5. New York: Macmillan Reference USA.

Borch, Christian. 2012. "Functional Eclecticism: On Luhmann's Style of Theorizing." *Revue internationale de philosophie* 259(1):123–42.

Böröcz, József and Caleb Southworth. 1996. "Decomposing the Intellectuals' Class Power: Conversion of Cultural Capital to Income, Hungary, 1986." *Social Forces* 74(3):797–822.

Bosomitu, Stefan. 2011. "Notes and Remarks on the (Re) Instituionalizaiton of Sociology in Communist Romania in the 1960s." *History of Communism in Europe, Avatars of Intellectuals under Communism* 2:169–96.

Bosserman, Phillip. 1968. *Dialectical Sociology: An Analysis of the Sociology of Georges Gurvitch*. Boston, MA: Porter Sargent.

Boudon, Raymond. 1980. *The Crisis in Sociology: Problems of Sociological Epistemology*. Translated by H. H. Davis. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Boudon, Raymond. 1977. *The Unintended Consequences of Social Action*. London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Boudon, Raymond. 1990. "The Two Facets of the Unintended Consequences Paradigm." Pp. 119–27 in *Robert Merton: Consensus and Controversy*, edited by J. Clark, C. Modgil and S. Modgil. London, England; New York; and Philadelphia: Falmer Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1968. "Structuralism and Theory of Sociological Knowledge." Translated by Angela Zanotti-Karp. *Social Research*, 35(4):681–706.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1969. "Intellectual Field and Creative Project." *Social Science Information* 8(2):89–119.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1975. "The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the Progress of Reason." *Social Science Information* 14(6):19–47.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Translated by R. Nice. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984 [1979]. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste.* Translated by R. Nice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1983. "The Field of Cultural Production, or: The Economic World Reversed." Translated by R. Nice. *Poetics* 12:311–56.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1985a. "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups." *Theory and Society* 14(6):723–44.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1985b. 'The Genesis of the Concepts of "Habitus", and "Field".' Translated by Channa Newman. *Sociocriticism* 2(2):11–24.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1986. "The Forms of Capital." Pp. 241–58 in *Handbook of Theory of Research for the Sociology of Education*, edited by J. E. Richardson New York: Greenword Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1987a. "Legitimation and Structured Interests in Weber's Sociology of Religion." Pp. 119–36 in *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity*, edited by S. Lash and S. Whimster. London, England: Allen and Unwin.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1987b. "What Makes a Social Class? On The Theoretical and Practical Existence of Groups." *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 32:1–17.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1987c. "The Historical Genesis of a Pure Aesthetic." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 46(3):201–10.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1988a. *Homo Academicus*. Translated by P. Collier. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1988b. "Vive la Crise!: For Heterodoxy in Social Science." *Theory and Society* 17(5):773–87.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1989a. "The Corporatism of the Universal: The Role of Intellectuals in the Modern World." Translated by C. Betensky. *Telos* 81(Sept. 21):99–110.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1989b. "Social Space and Symbolic Power." *Sociological Theory*, 7(1):14–25.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990a. *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*. Translated by M. Adamson, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990b. *The Logic of Practice*. Translated by R. Nice. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991a. "Fourth Lecture. Universal Corporatism: The Role of Intellectuals in the Modern World." Translated by G. Sapiro. *Poetics Today* 12(4):655–669.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991b. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Edited and introduced by J. B. Thompson. Translated by G. Raymond and M. Adamson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991c. "The Peculiar History of Scientific Reason." *Sociological Forum* 6(1):3–26.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991d. "Epilogue: On the Possibility of a Field of World Sociology." Pp. 373–87 in *Social Theory for a Channing Society*. Translated by L. Wacquant and edited by P. Bourdieu and J. S. Coleman. Boulder, CO: Westview Press and New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1993a. *Sociology in Question*. Translated by R. Nice. London, England: Sage.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1993b. *The Field of Cultural Production. Essays on Art and Literature*. Translated and edited by R. Johnson. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1996a. [with collaboration of Monique de Saint Martin] *The State Nobility: Elite School in the Field of Power*. Translated by L. C. Clough. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1996b. *The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field*. Translated by S. Emanuel. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1997. "Passport to Duke." Translated by L. Wacquant. *Metaphilosophy* 28(4):449–55.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1998. *Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action*. Translated by R. Johnson et al. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2000a. *Pascalian Meditations*. Translated by R. Nice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2000b. "For a Scholarship with Commitment." *Profession* 40–5.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2000c. "The Biographical Illusion." Pp. 297–303 in *Identity: A Reader*. Translated by Y. Winkin and W. Leeds-Hurwitz, and edited by P. du Gay, J. Evans, and P. Redman. London, England: Sage.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2002. "Response to Throop and Murphy." *Anthropological Theory* 2(2):209.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2003a. "For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi." *Politics and Society* 31(2):193–261.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2003b. "Participant Objectivation." *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 9(2):281–94.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2004a. *Science of Science and Reflexivity*. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2004b. "Algerian landing." Translated by R. Nice and L. Wacquant. *Ethnography* 5(4):415–43.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2008a. *Sketch for a Self-Analysis*. Translated by R. Nice. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2008b. *Political Interventions: Social Science and Political Action*. Translated by D. Fernbach. London, England and New York: Verso.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2013a. "Symbolic capital and Social classes." Introduced, translated and notes by L. Wacquant. *Journal of Classical Sociology* 13(2):292–302.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2013b. "In Praise of Sociology: Acceptance Speech for the Gold Medal of the CNRS." *Sociology* 47(1):7–14.

Bourdieu, Pierre and Jean-Claude Passeron. 1967. "Sociology and philosophy in France since 1945: Death and resurrection of a philosophy without a subject." *Social Research* 34(1):162–212.

Bourdieu, Pierre, Jean-Claude Chamboredon and Jean-Claude Passeron. 1991. *The Craft of Sociology: Epistemological Preliminaries*. Translated by R. Nice and edited by B. Krais. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Bourdieu, Pierre and Loïc Wacquant. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre and Loïc Wacquant. 1999. "On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason." *Theory, Culture & Society* 16(1):41–58.

Bozóki, András. 1996. "Intellectuals in a New Democracy." *East European Politics and Societies* 10(2):173-214.

Bozóki, András. 2003. "Theoretical Interpretations of Elite Change in East Central Europe", Comparative Sociology, 2(1):215-247.

Bredenkamp, J. 2001. "Laboratory Experiment: Methodology." Pp. 8226–32 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences,* edited by N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes. Oxford, England: Pergamon Press.

Bozóki, András. 2022. *Rolling Transition and the Role of Intellectuals: The Case of Hungary*. Budapest, Hungary: Central European University Press.

Breines, Paul. 1977. "Marxism, Romanticism, and the Case of Georg Lukács: Notes on Some Recent Sources and Situations." *Studies in Romanticism* 16(4):473–89.

Brewer, John and Albert Hunter. 1989. *Multimethod research: A synthesis of styles*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Brewer, John and Albert Hunter. 2006. *Foundations of multimethod research: Synthesizing styles*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Bristow, William. "Enlightenment." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* Fall 2017 Ed., edited by E. N. Zalta Retrieved April 12, 2021 (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/enlightenment/).

Brittan, Arthur. 1983. "Sociology as a Private Language." *Poetics Today* 4(3):581–94.

Broady, Donald. 1991. "Sociologi och epistemology. Om Pierre Bourdieus författarskap och den historiska epistemologin." PhD dissertation, HLS Förlag, Stockholm, Sweden.Brown, Richard Harvey. 1977. *A Poetic for Sociology*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, Richard Harvey. 1983. "Dialectical Irony. Literary Form and Sociological Theory." *Poetics Today* 4(3):543–64.

Brown, Richard Harvey. 1987. *Society as Text. Essays on Rhetoric, Reason, and Reality*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Brown, Richard Harvey. 1989. *Social Science as Civic Discourse. Essays on the Invention, Legitimation, and Uses of Social Theory*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Brown, Richard Harvey. 1990a. "Rhetoric, Textuality, and the Postmodern Turn in Sociological Theory." *Sociological Theory* 8(2):188–97.

Brown, Richard Harvey. 1990b. "Social Science and the Poetics of Public Truth." *Sociological Forum* 5(1):55–74.

Brown, Richard Harvey. 1994. "Logics of Discovery as Narratives of Conversion: Rhetorics of Invention in Ethnography, Philosophy, and Astronomy." *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 27(1):1–34.

Brown, Richard Harvey. 1998. *Toward a Democratic Science: Scientific Narration and Civic Communication*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Brown, Richard Harvey and Daniel Schubert, J. 2002. "The Contested Academy." *The American Behavioral Scientist* 45(7):1051–60.

Bruun, Hans Henrik and Sam Whimster. 2012. "Introduction." Pp. xi-xxviii in *Max Weber. Collected Methodological Writings* by M. Weber. Translated by H. H. Bruun and edited by H. H. Bruun and S. Whimster. Abingdon, England: Routledge.

Bruyn, Severyn T. 1964. "Rhetorical Devices in Sociological Analysis." *The Sociological Quarterly* 5(2):101–112.

Bruyn, Severyn T. 1966. *The Human Perspective in Sociology: The Methodology of Participant Observaiton*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Bryman, Alan, Saul Becker and Joe Sempik. 2008. "Quality Criteria for Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed Methods Research: A View from Social Policy." *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 11(4):261–76.

Buchler, Justus. 1961. *The Concept of Method*. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Bucholc, Marta. 2013. "Irony as Vocation: The Fate of a Social Scientist in the Writings of Max Weber and Norbert Elias." Pp. 143–60 in *Norbert Elias and Social Theory*, edited by F. Dépelteau, T.S. Landini. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bührmann Andrea D. and Schneider Werner. 2007. "More than just a discursive practice? Conceptual principles and methodological aspects of Dispositif analysis." *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 8(2). Retrieved September 11, 2020 (https://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/237).

Bührmann, Andrea D.; Rainer Diaz-Bone, Encarnación Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, Werner Schneider, Gavin Kendall and Francisco Tirado. 2007. "Editorial FQS 8(2): From Michel Foucault's theory of discourse to empirical discourse research." *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 8(2). Retrieved September 11, 2020 (https://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/233).

Bunge, Mario. 2015. "Sociology, Epistemology of." Pp. 984–8 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd ed., edited by J. D. Wright. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.

Bunting, Madeleine. 2003. "Passion and pessimism." *The Guardian*, April 5. Retrieved February 16, 2020 (http://www.theguardian.com/books/2003/apr/05/society).

Burawoy, Michael. 1982a. "Introduction: The Resurgence of Marxism in American Sociology." Pp. S1–30 in *American Journal of Sociology*, Supplement: Marxist Inquiries: Studies of Labor, Class, and States, Vol. 88, edited by M. Burawoy.

Burawoy, Michael. 1982b. "The Written and the Repressed in Gouldner's Industrial Sociology." *Theory and Society* 11(6):831–51.

Burawoy, Michael. 1987. "The Limits of Wright's Analytical Marxism and an Alternative." *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 32:51–72.

Burawoy, Michael. 1989a. "Two Methods in Search of Science: Skocpol vs Trotsky." *Theory and Society* 18:759–805.

Burawoy, Michael. 1989b. "The Limits of Wright's Analytical Marxism and an Alternative." Pp. 78–99 in *The Debate on Classes*, edited by E. O. Wright. London, England: Verso.

Burawoy, Michael. 1989c, "Marxism, Philosophy and Science." *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 34:223–49.

Burawoy, Michael. 1990. "Marxism as Science: Historical Challenges and Theoretical Growth." *American Sociological Review* 55(6):775–93.

Burawoy, Michael. 1991. "Reconstructing Social Theories." Pp. 8–27 in *Ethnography Unbound. Power and Resistance in the Modern Metropolis* by M. Burawoy, et al. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Burawoy, Michael. 1998a. "The Extended Case Method." *Theoretical Sociology* 16(1):4–33.

Burawoy, Michael. 1998b. "Critical Sociology: A Dialogue between Two Sciences." *Contemporary Sociology* 27(1):12–20.

Burawoy, Michael. 2000. "Introduction. Reaching for the Global." Pp. 1–40 in *Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections, and Imaginations in a Postmodern World*, M. Burawoy, J. A. Blum, S. George, Z. Gille, M. Thayer. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Burawoy, Michael. 2001. "Neoclassical Sociology: From the End of Communism to the End of Classes." *American Journal of Sociology* 106(4):1099–120.

Burawoy, Michael. 2002. "What Happened to the Working Class? Errors of an Unrepentant Marxist." *Research in Social Stratification* 19:69–76.

Burawoy, Michael. 2003a. "For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi." *Politics and Society* 31(2):193–261.

Burawoy, Michael. 2003b. "Revisits: An Outline of a Theory of Reflexive Ethnography." *American Sociological Review* 68(Oct.):645–79.

Burawoy, Michael. 2005a. "For Public Sociology." *American Sociological Review* 70(Feb.):4–28.

Burawoy, Michael. 2005b. "Conclusion: Provincializing the Social Sciences." Pp. 508–25 *The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences*, edited by G. Steinmetz. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Burawoy, Michael. 2009. *The Extended Case Method: Four Countries, Four Decades, Four Great Transformations, and One Theoretical Tradition*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Burawoy, Michael. 2011. "103rd ASA President Erik Olin Wright: Reinventing Sociology." *Footnotes* 39(7):1 & 8.

Burgers, Christian; Margot van Mulken, and Peter Jan Schellens. 2011. "Finding Irony: An Introduction of the Verbal Irony Procedure (VIP)." *Metaphor and Symbol* 26(3):186–205.

Burkart, Günter. 2003. "Über den Sinn von Thematisierungstabus und die Unmöglichkeit einer soziologischen Analyse der Soziologie" [On Taboos of Thematizing and the Impossibility of Doing a Sociology of Sociology.] *Forum, qualitative social research* Volume 4(2). Retrieved September 10, 2020 (https://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/726).

Burke, Kenneth. 1969. *A Grammar of Motives.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Burke, Peter. 2003. "The Annales, Braudel and Historical Sociology." Pp. 58–64 in *Handbook of Historical Sociology*, edited by G. Delanty and E. F. Isin. London, England: Sage Publications.

Burnett, Judith. 2009. *Doing Your Social Sciences Dissertation Research Design: Projects and Their Needs*. London, England: Sage Publications.

Burrows, Roger and Mike Savage. 2014. "After the crisis? Big Data and the methodological challenges of empirical sociology." *Big Data & Society*, 1(1):1–6.

C. A. 1974. "The New Left in Hungary and Its Concept of Socialism." November, 18, HU OSA 300–8–3–3824; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Calhoun, Craig. 1995. *Critical Social Theory: Culture, History, and the Challenge of Difference*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Calhoun, Craig. 2002. sv "Theory" in *Dictionary of the Social Sciences*. edited by C. Calhoun. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Calhoun, Craig. 2005. "The Promise of Public Sociology." *The British Journal of Sociology* 56(3):355-63.

Calhoun, Craig. 2022. "For Sociology: May Our Arguments Unite Us." *Critical Sociology* 48(2):197–203.

Calhoun, Craig and Jonathan van Antwerpen. 2007. "Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy, and Hierarchy: "Mainstream", Sociology and Its Challengers." Pp. 367–410 in *Sociology in America: A History*, edited by C. Calhoun. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Camery-Hoggatt, Jerry. 1992. *Irony in Mark's Gospel: Text and Subtext.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Camic, Charles and Neil Gross. 2002. "Alvin Gouldner and the Sociology of Ideas: Lessons from Enter Plato." *The Sociological Quarterly* 43(1):97–110.

Campbell, Donald T. 1957. "Factors Relevant to the Validity of Experiments in Social Settings." *Psychological Bulletin* 54(4)297–312.

Campbell, Donald T. 1969. "Reforms as Experiments." *American Psychologist* 24(4):409–29.

Campbell, Donald T. and Julian C. Stanley. 1966a. *Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research.* Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Campbell, Donald T. and Julian C. Stanley. 1966b. *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research*. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.

Campbell, Miranda. 2017. "The Mocking Mockumentary and the Ethics of Irony." *Taboo: The Journal of Culture and Education* 11(1):53–62.

Cannella, Gailie S. and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 2007. "Predatory vs. Dialogic Ethics. Constructing an Illusion or Ethical Practice as the Core of Research Methods." *Qualitative Inquiry* 13(3):315–35.

Cannella, Gaile & Lincoln, Yoniln. 2011. "Ethics, Research Regulations, and Critical Social Science." Pp. 81–90 in *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research* edited by N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln. 3rd ed. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.

Capecchi, Vittorio. 1978. "Paul F. Lazarsfeld: A Link between American and European Methodology." *Quality and Quantity* 12:239–54.

Capel, Lee M. 1965. "Historical Introduction." Pp. 7–50 in *The Concept of Irony. With Constant Reference to Socrates* by Søren Kierkegaard. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Carleheden, Mikael. 2016. "What conception of the theoretical does 'theorizing' presuppose? Comment on Richard Swedberg's 'Before theory comes theorizing or how to make social science more interesting'." *The British Journal of Sociology* 67(1):36–42.

Case, Holly. 2017a. "Interview with Iván Szelényi--January 21, 2017, Part I". East-Central Europe Past and Present. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. Retrieved September 10, 2020 (https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:714771/).

Case, Holly. 2017b. "Interview with Iván Szelényi--January 21, 2017, Part II" East-Central Europe Past and Present. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. Retrieved September 10, 2020 (https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:714772/).

Castells, Manuel. 1977. *The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach*. Translated by A. Sheridan. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Castells, Manuel. 1983. *The City and the Grassroots. A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements*. Berkeley & LA: University of California Press.

Cerulo, Karen A., Vanina Leschziner and Hana Shepherd. 2021. "Rethinking Culture and Cognition" *Annual Review of Sociology* 47(1):63–85.

Chapin, Francis Stuart. 1947. *Experimental Designs in Sociological Research*. New York and London, England: Harper.

Cherkaoui, Mohamed. 2007. *Good Intentions: Max Weber and the Paradox of Unintended Consequences*. Oxford: Bardwell Press.

Chriss, James J. 1995. "Testing Gouldner's Coming Crisis Thesis: On the Waxing and Waning of Intellectual Influence." *Current Perspectives in Social Theory* 15:33–61.

Chriss, James J. 1999. *Alvin W. Gouldner: Sociologist and Outlaw Marxist*. Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing.

Chriss, James J. 2000. "Alvin W. Gouldner and the Tragic Vision in Sociology." *Social Thought and Research* 23(1–2):199–225.

Chriss, James J. 2001. "Alvin W. Gouldner and Industrial Sociology at Columbia University." *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 37(3):241–59.

Chriss, James J. 2002. "Gouldner's Tragic Vision." *The Sociological Quarterly* 43(1):81–96.

Chriss, James J. 2015. *Confronting Gouldner: Sociology and Political Activism*. Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers.

Christians, Clifford. 2005. "Ethics and Politics in Qualitative Research." Pp. 139–64 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed., edited by N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage.

Cicourel, Aaron V. 1981. "The Role of Cognitive Linguistic Concepts in Understanding Everyday Social Interactions." *Annual Review of Sociology* 7:87–106.

Cicourel, Aaron V. 1987. "The Interpretation of Communicative Contexts: Examples from Medical Encounters." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 50:217–26.

Clark, Terry. 1998. "Paul Lazarsfeld and the Columbia Sociology Machine" Pp. 289–360 in *Paul Lazarsfeld (1901–1976). La Sociologie de Vienne à New York*, edited by J. Lautman and B.-P. Lécuyer. Montréal, Canada and Paris, France: Éditions L'Harmattan.

Clark, Terry. 2011. "Paul Lazarsfeld's Politics: (Dis)Engagement, Irony, and the Cigar." Presented at the Symposium on Paul Felix Lazarsfeld – His Methodological Inspirations and Networking Activities in the Field of Social Research, September 25–27, Prague, Czech Republic. Retrieved November 18, 2016 (https://www.academia.edu/attachments/38046553/download_file?st=MTQ3OTQ5ODk4MCwyMTcuNzEuNDYuMTIzLDQxNDk3MTY0&s=profile&ct=MTQ3OTQ5ODkyMCw0MDcsNDE0OTTcxNjQ=).

Clayman, Steven E. 2015. "Ethnomethodology, General." Pp. 203-06 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd ed., edited by J. D. Wright. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.

C.N. 2005. "irony, romantic." Pp. 871–72 in *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, 2nd ed, edited by T. Honderich. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Cohen, Bernard, I. 1990. *Puritanism and the Rise of Modern Science: the Merton Thesis*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Cohen, Joshua. 2007. "An Oracle of Humanism's Survival" [An interview with György Konrád], *Forward*, Fri. May 11.

Cole, Geoff. 2020. "Why the "Hoax" Paper of Baldwin (2018) Should Be Reinstated." *Sociological Methods & Research* 20(10):1–20.

Cole, Stephen. 1994a. "Introduction: What's Wrong with Sociology?" *Sociological Forum* 9(2):129–31.

Cole, Stephen. 1994b. "Why Sociology Doesn't Make Progress like the Natural Sciences." *Sociological Forum* 9(2):133–54.

Colebrook, Claire. 2004. *Irony.* London, England and New York: Routledge.

Colebrook, C[laire]. 2012. "Irony." Pp. 731–33 in *The New Princeton Encyclopaedia of Poetry and Poetics*, 4th ed., edited by R. Greene, S. Cushman, C. Cavanagh, J. Ramazani, P. Rouzer. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Collier, Andrew. 1994. *Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar's Philosophy*, London, England: Verso.

Collins H. M. 1983. "The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: Studies of Contemporary Science." *Annual Review of Sociology* 9(1):265–85.

Collins, H. M. 2015. "Scientific Knowledge, Sociology of." Pp. 308–12 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd ed., edited by J. D. Wright. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.

Collins, H. M. and Graham Cox. 1976. "Recovering Relativity: Did Prophecy Fail?" *Social Studies of Science* 6(3/4):423–44.

Collins, Randall. 1968. "A comparative approach to political sociology." Pp. 42–67 in *State and Society: A Reader in Comparative Political Sociology*, edited by R. Bendix et al. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

Collins, Randall. 1971. "Functional and Conflict Theories of Educational Stratification." *American Sociological Review* 36(6):1002–19.

Collins, Randall. 1973. Review of *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* by Alvin W. Gouldner. *American Political Science Review* 67(1):207–8.

Collins, Randall. 1986. "Is 1980s sociology in the doldrums?" *American Journal of Sociology* 91(6):1336–55.

Collins, Randall. 1989. "Sociology: Proscience or Antiscience?" *American Sociological Review* 54(1):124–39.

Collins, Randall. 1992. "The Confusion of the Modes of Sociology." Pp. 179–98 in *Postmodernism and Social Theory: The Debate over General Theory* edited by S. Seidman and D. G. Wagner. Cambridge, MA and Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Collins, Randall. 1994a. *Four Sociological Traditions*, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Collins, Randall. 1994b. "Why the Social Sciences Won't Become High-Consensus, Rapid-Discovery Science." *Sociological Forum* 9(2):155–77.

Coleman, James S. 1998. "Paul Lazarsfeld: The Interaction of His Relation to People And His Relation to Social Science." Pp. 271–287 in *Paul Lazarsfeld (1901–1976). La Sociologie de Vienne à New York*, edited by J. Lautman and B.-P. Lécuyer. Montréal, Canada and Paris, France: Éditions L'Harmattan.

Connelly, John. 2013. "Jester and Priest: On Leszek Kolakowski. How the great Polish philosopher went from being an anticlerical scourge to an apostle of John Paul II", *The Nation*. September 23. Retrieved September 10, 2020 (http://www.thenation.com/article/jester-and-priest-leszek-kolakowski/).

Comte, Auguste. 2000. *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*. Vol. 1–3. Translated freely and condensed by H. Martineau, an introduction by F. Harrison. Kitchener, Canada: Batoche

Confino, Michael. 1973. "On Intellectuals and Intellectual Traditions in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Russia" Pp. 117–49 in *Intellectuals and Tradition* edited by S. N. Eisenstadt and S. R. Graubard, New York: Humanities Press.

Coombs, Robert H. 1966. "Karl Mannheim, Epistemology and the Sociology of Knowledge." *The Sociological Quarterly* 7(2):229–33.

Cormack, Patricia. 1996. "The paradox of Durkheim's manifesto: Reconsidering *The Rules of Sociological Method*." *Theory and Society* 25:85–104.

Cortese, Anthony. 1995. "The Rise, Hegemony, and Decline of the Chicago School of Sociology, 1892–1945." *The Social Science Journal* 32(3)235–54.

Coser, Lewis A. 1971. *Masters of Sociological Thought*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Coser, Lewis A. 1993. "A Sociologist's Atypical Life." *Annual Review of Sociology* 19:1–15.

Coser, Lewis A. 1996. "The Social Role of Eastern European Intellectuals Reconsidered." Pp. 166–83 in *Culture, Modernity and Revolution: Essays in Honour of Zygmunt Bauman*, edited by R. Kilminster and I. Varcoe. London, England: Routledge.

Cox, D.R. and N. Wermuth. 2001. "Causal Inference and Statistical Fallacies." Pp. 1554–61 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, edited by N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes. Oxford, England: Pergamon Press.

Cramer, Janet M. 2009. "Critical Discourse Analysis." *Encyclopedia of Communication Theory*. Sage Publications. Retrieved October 19, 2011 (http://www.sage-ereference.com/view/communicationtheory/n85.xml).

Crompton, Rosemary. 2008. "Forty Years of Sociology: Some Comments." *Sociology* 42(6):1218–27.

Crossley, Nick. 2011. *Towards Relational Sociology*. London, England and New York: Routledge.Crow, Graham, Rose Wiles, Sue Heath, and Vikki Charles. 2006. "Research Ethics and Data Quality: The Implications of Informed Consent." *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 9(2):83–95.

Cseh-Szombathy, Lázló and Zsuzsa Ferge. 1968. *A szociológiai felvétel módszerei*. [The methods of sociological survey]. Budapest, Hungary: Közgazdasági és Jogi.

Curtis, James E. and Petras, John W. 1970. "The Development of the Sociology of Sociology: Some Components in the U.S. and Canadian Cases." *ARSP: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy* 56(3):305–23.

Curtis, James E. and John W. Petras 1972. "Sociology of Sociology – Some Lines of Inquiry in Study of Discipline." *The Sociological Quarterly* 13(2):197–209.

Cusson, M[aurice]. 2001. "Control: Social." Pp. 2730–35 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, edited by N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes. Oxford, England: Pergamon Press.

Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1976. "Remarks on the Discussion." Pp. 123–30 in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*. Translated by G. Adey and D. Frisby. London, England: Heinemann.

Dale, Gareth. 2010. *Karl Polanyi: The Limits of the Market*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Dane, Joseph A. 2011. *The Critical Mythology of Irony*. Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press.

Daston, Lorraine. 2009. "Science Studies and the History of Science." *Critical Inquiry* 35(4):798–813.

Dawe, Alan. 1971. "The relevance of values." Pp. 37–66 in *Max Weber and Modern Sociology*, edited by A. Sahay. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Davia, Gregg Alan. 1998. 'Thoughts on a Possible Rational Reconstruction of the Method of "Rational Reconstruction".' Pp. 44–50 in *The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 37.

Davis, James A. 1994. "What's Wrong with Sociology?" *Sociological Forum* 9(2):179–97.

Davis, Kingsley. 1937. "The Sociology of Prostitution." *American Sociological Review* 2(5):744–55.

Davis, Kingsley. 1959. "The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology." *American Sociological Review* 24(6):757–72.

Davis, Kingsley. 1961. "Prostitution." Pp. 262–88 in *Contemporary Social Problems*, edited by R. K. Merton and R. A. Nisbet. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Dawe, Alan. 1971. "The relevance of values." Pp. 37–66 in *Max Weber and Modern Sociology*, edited by A. Sahay. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Deflem, Mathieu. 2013. "The Structural Transformation of Sociology." *Society*, 50(2):156–66.

Deflem, Mathieu. 2015. "Deviance and Social Control." Pp. 30–44 in *The Handbook on Deviance* edited by E. Goode. Oxford, England: Wiley Blackwell.

Delanty, Gerard and Engin F. Isin, eds. 2003. *Handbook of Historical Sociology*. London, England: Sage.

Demeter, Tamás. 2012. '"Weltanschauung" as a priori: sociology of knowledge from a 'romantic' stance.' *Studies in East European Thought* 64 (1/2):39–52.

Demeter Tamás, ed. 2020a. *Intellectuals, Inequalities and Transitions: Prospects for A Critical Sociology*, Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers.

Demeter, Tamás. 2020b. "New Class Theory as Sociology of Knowledge." Pp. 52–68 in *Intellectuals, Inequalities and Transitions: Prospects for A Critical Sociology*, edited by T. Demeter. Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers.

Denzin, Norman K. 1969. "Symbolic Interactionism and Ethnomethodology: A Proposed Synthesis." *American Sociological Review* 34(6):922–34.

Denzin, N[orman] K. 2001. "Cultural Studies: Cultural Concerns." Pp. 3121–25 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, edited by N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes. Oxford, England: Pergamon Press.Denzin, Norman K. and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 2005. "Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions and emerging confluences." Pp. 191–216 in *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed. edited by N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Denzin, Norman K. and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds. 2011. *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 4th ed. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications.

Dépelteau, François, ed. 2018. *The Palgrave Handbook of Relational Sociology*. London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

DeTora, L. 2017. "Submitting Hoax Papers to Journals Outside One's Field is Unethical." *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, June 05. Retrieved May 30, 2021 (http://www.chronicle.com/blogs/letters/submitting-hoax-papers-to-journalsoutside-ones-own-field-is-unethical/).

Deutsch, Steven E. 1971. Review of *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* by Alvin W. Gouldner. *American Sociological Review* 36(2):321–26.

de Vaus, David. 2014. *Surveys in Social Research*. 6th ed. London, England and New York: Routledge.Devlin, Kevin. 1986. 'Hungarian Writers Seeking Rights, Not Challenging Regime, Says Konrad.' Pp. 47–50 in "Situation Report: Hungary, 23 December 1986", 23 December, HU OSA 300–8–47–117–13; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Dijk, Teun A. van 2001. "Multidisciplinary CDA: A Plea for Diversity." Pp. 95–120 in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by R. Wodak and M. Meyer. London, England: Sage.

Di Martino, Loredana. 2014. "Postmodern Irony." Pp. 590–92 in *Encyclopedia of Humor Studies*, edited by S. Attardo. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publica-

tions.Dingwall, Robert. 2008. "The Ethical Case Against Ethical Regulation in Humanities and Social Science Research." *21st Century Society* 3(1):1–12.

Dobbin, F., and Dowd, T.J. 2000. "The market that antitrust built: Public policy, private coercion, and railroad acquisitions, 1825 to 1922." *American Sociological Review* 65(5):631–657.

Domaszewski, v. [Dec. 7, 1918] 1986. "From Dean Domaszewski." P. 289 in *Georg Lukács Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York: Columbia University Press.

Domeris, William. 2016. "Shades of irony in the anti-language of Amos." *Hervormde Teologiese Studies* 72(4):1–8.

Donati, Pierpaolo. 2011. *Relational Sociology: A New Paradigm for the Social Sciences*. London, England: Routledge.

Donati, Pierpaolo. 2018. "An Original Relational Sociology Grounded in Critical Realism." Pp. 431–56 in *The Palgrave Handbook of Relational Sociology*, edited by F. Dépelteau. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature.

Donsbach, Wolfgang; Seymor Martin Lipest; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Robert M. Worcester. 2001. "Editorial. Paul F. Lazarsfeld (1901–1976)." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 13(3):225–8.

Dowling, Maura. 2004. "Hermeneutics: An Exploration." *Nurse Researcher* 11(4):30–9.

Dunning, Thad. *Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences. A Design-Based Approach.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.Durkheim, Émile. 1958. *Socialism and Saint-Simon*. Translated by C. Sattler and edited by A. W. Gouldner. Yellow Springs, OH: The Antioch Press.

Durst, Judit. 2015. "Lost Mission or Interdisciplinary Realignment? The plight of sociology and the role of the sociologist from the (semi-)periphery." [An Interview with Zuzsa Ferge, Miklós Hadas and Iván Szelényi.] *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics* 1(2):113–33.

Dworkin, Ronald. 2004. "Introduction." Pp. xi-xv in *From Liberalism Values to Democratic Transition. Essays in Honor of János Kis*, edited by R. Dworkin. Budapest, Hungary: CEU Press.

Dynel, Marta. 2019. "Ironic Intentions in Action and Interaction." *Language Sciences* 75:1–14.

Eckstein, H. 1975. "Case Studies and Theory in Political Science." Pp. 94–137 in *Handbook of Political Science. Political Science: Scope and Theory*, Vol. 7, edited by F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby. Reading, England: Addison-Wesley.

Eisenhart, Margaret and Kenneth Howe. 1992. "Validity in Educational Research." Pp. 643–80 in *The Handbook of Qualitative Research in Education*,

edited by M. D. LeCompte, W. L. Millroy and J. Preissle. San Diego, CA and London, England: Academic Press.

Elkana, Yehuda. 1978. "Two-Tier-Thinking: Philosophical Realism and Historical Relativism." *Social Studies of Science* 8(3):309–26.

Ellis, Carolyn. 2007. "Telling Secrets, Revealing Lives Relational Ethics in Research with Intimate Others." *Qualitative Inquiry* 13(1):3–29.

Ellis, Carolyn. 2017. "Compassionate Research: Interviewing and Storytelling from a Relational Ethics of Care." Pp. 431–45 in *The Routledge International Handbook on Narrative and Life History*, edited by I. Goodson et al. Abingdon, England and New York: Routledge.

Emigh, Rebecca Jean and Iván Szelényi, eds. 2001. *Poverty, Ethnicity, and Gender in Eastern Europe During the Market Transition*, Westport, CT and London, England: Praeger.

Endreffy, Zoltan. 1979. "What Is My Position on Marxism Today." Pp. 141–3 in *Communism and Eastern Europe. A Collection of Essays*, edited by F. Silnitsky, L. Silnitsky and K. Reyman. Sussex, England: The Harvester Press.

Engels, Friedrich. 1939. *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science (anti-Dühring)*. Translated by E. Burns and edited by C. P. Dutt. New York: International Publishers.

Eörsi, Istvan. 1987. "The Unpleasant Lukács." *New German Critique* 42(Autumn):3–16.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. *The Three World of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Esser, Hartmut. 1991. "Social Individualization and the Fate of Sociological Method." Pp. 33–59 in *Social Prevention and the Social Sciences: Theoretical Controversies, Research Problems, and Evaluation Strategies*, edited by A. Günter and O. Hans-Uwe. Berlin, Germany and New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Eyal, Gil. 2000. "Anti-politics and the spirit of capitalism: Dissidents, monetarists, and the Czech transition to capitalism." *Theory and Society* 29(1):49–92.

Eyal, Gil. 2003. *The Origins of Postcommunist Elites*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Eyal, Gil. 2020. 'Futures Present: On the Concepts of "Intellectuals" and "Intelligentsia" in Iván Szelényi's Oeuvre.' Pp. 1–34 in *Intellectuals, Inequalities and Transitions: Prospects for A Critical Sociology*, edited by T. Demeter. Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers.

Eyal, Gil; Iván Szelényi, and Eleanor Townsley. 1997. "The Theory of Post-Communist Managerialism." *New Left Review* 222(March/April):60–92.

Eyal, Gil; Iván Szelényi, and Eleanor Townsley. 1998. *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe*. London, England and New York: Verso.

Eyal, Gil; Iván Szelényi, and Eleanor Townsley. 2001. "The Utopia of Postsocial-ist Theory and the Ironic View of History in Neoclassical Sociology." *American Journal of Sociology* 106(4):1121–8.

Eyal, Gil; Iván Szélényi and Eleanor Townsley. 2003a. "On Irony: An Invitation to Neoclassical Sociology." *Thesis Eleven* 73(5):5–41.

Eyal, Gil; Iván Szélényi and Eleanor Townsley. 2003b. "Ironie als Methode. Ansätze und Fragestellungen einer neoklassischen Soziologie." *Berliner Journal für Soziologie* 13(1):5–34.

Eyerman, Ron. 1987. "Alvin Gouldner." *Acta Sociologica* 30(1):101–5.

Eyerman, Ron. 1994. "What is an Intellectual?" Pp. 1–31 in *Between Culture and Politics: Intellectuals in Modern Society*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Eyerman, Ron. 2004. "Jeffrey Alexander and the Cultural Turn in Social Theory." *Thesis Eleven* 79:25–30.

Fairclough, Norman. 1995. *Critical discourse analysis*. New York: Longman.

Faulkner, Robert F. and Howard, S. Becker. 2008. "Studying Something You Are Part of: The View From the Bandstand." *Ethnologie Française* 38(1):15–21.

Falk, Barbara J. 2003. *The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe: Citizen Intellectuals and Philosopher Kings.* Budapest, Hungary and New York: Central European University Press.

Fehér, Ferenc, Ágnes Heller, and György Markus. 1983. *Dictatorship over Needs.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Fekete, Éva and Éva Karádi. 1981. *György Lukács: His Life in Pictures and Documents.* Budapest, Hungary: Corvina Kiadó.

Ferge, Zsuzsa. 1971. "Social Mobility and the Open Character of Society." Pp. 137–59 in Industrialization, Urbanization and Ways of Life. [International Sociological Conference, Balatonfüred, 9–12.09.1969] edited by Kálmán Kulcsár. Budapest, Hungary: Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Ferguson, Harvie. 2006. *Phenomenological Sociology. Experience and Insight in Modern Society*. London, England: Sage.

Feyerabend, Paul. 1965. "Problems of Empiricism." Pp. 145–260 in *Beyond the Edge of Certainty: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy*, edited by R. G. Colodny. Englewood Cliffs: NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Feyerabend, Paul. 1975. *Against Method*, London, England: Verso.

Feyerabend, Paul. 1978. *Science in a Free Society*, London, England: New Left Books.

Fine, Gary Alan. 1995. *A Second Chicago School: The Development of a Postwar American Sociology*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Fine, Gary A. and Daniel D. Martin 1990. "A partisan view: Sarcasm, satire, and irony as voices in Erving Goffman's Asylums." *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 19(1):89–115.

Firsov, Boris [Фирсов Борис Максимович]. 1995. "Как добивались послушания." *Социологический журнал* (2):181–9.

Flaherty, Colleen. 2019. "Blowback Against a Hoax." *Inside Higher Ed*, Jan. 8. Retrieved May 30, 2021 (https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/08/author-recent-academic-hoax-faces-disciplinary-action-portland-state).

Flenley, Paul. 1981. Book review of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* by George [György] Konrád and lván Szelényi. *Journal of Area Studies Series* 1(2–3):39–41.

Foord, Archibald S. 1964. *His Majesty's Opposition, 1714–1830*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Foucault, Michel. 1972. "The discourse on language." Pp. 215–237 in *Archaeology of Knowledge*, edited by M. Foucault. New York: Pantheon.

Foucault, Michel. 1980. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, edited by C. Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books.

Foucault, Michel. 2007. *The Politics of Truth*. Los Angeles CA: Semiotext(e).

Fowler, Bridget. 1996. "An Introduction to Pierre Bourdieu's `Understanding'." *Theory, Culture & Society* 13(2):1–16.

Franklin, Mitchell. 1970. "The Irony of the Beautiful Soul of Herbert Marcuse." *Telos* 6(Fall):3–35.

Freund, Julien. 1968. *The sociology of Max Weber*. London, England: Penguin Press.

Freund, Peter and Mona Abrams. 1976. "Ethnomethodology and Marxism: Their Use for Critical Theorizing." *Theory and Society* 3(3):377–93.

Friedrichs, Robert W. 1970. *A Sociology of Sociology*. New York: Free Press.

Frisby, David. 1976. "Introduction to the English Translation." Pp. ix-xliv in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*. Translated by G. Adey and D. Frisby. London, England: Heinemann.

Frischmann, Bärbel. 2019. "The Philosophical Relevance of Romantic Irony." Pp. 173–194 in *Brill's Companion to German Romantic Philosophy* edited by E. Millan and J. Norman. Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston MA: Brill.

Fuchs, Stephan. 1992a. "Relativism and Reflexivity in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge." Pp. 151–167 in *Metatheorizing*, edited by G. Ritzer. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Fuchs, Stephan. 1992b. ["Metatheory and the Sociology of Sociology."] Review of *Metatheorizing in Sociology* by George Ritzer. *Sociological Perspectives* 35(3):531–5.

Fuente de la, Eduardo. 2007. "The place of culture in sociology Romanticism and debates about the 'cultural turn'." *Journal of Sociology* 43(2):115–30.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, 16:3–18.

Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man.* New York: Free Press.

Fuller, Steve; Marc De Mey, Terry Shinn and Steve Woolgar, eds. 1989. *The Cognitive Turn: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science, Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook 1989*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Furåker, Bengt. 1982. ["The Intelligentsia as a Class under Capitalism and Socialism."] Review of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* by George [György] Konrád and lván Szelényi and *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* by Alvin W. Gouldner *Acta Sociologica* 25(4):455–67.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg and Hans Fantel. 1975. "The Problem of Historical Consciousness." *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 5(1):8–52.

Gage N. L. 1989. "The Paradigm Wars and Their Aftermath: A "Historical" Sketch of Research on Teaching since 1989." *Educational Researcher* 18(7):4–10.

Gane, Nicholas. 2011. "Measure, Value and the Current Crises of Sociology." *The Sociological Review* 59(2 suppl):151–173.

Gángo, Gábor. 2008. "Anti-metaphysical reasoning and sociological approach: roads from nationalism to regionalism in the 19th–20th century Hungarian intellectual tradition." *Studies in East European Thought* 60(1–2):17–30.

Gantman, Ernesto R. 2005. Book Review of *Theories of the New Class: Intellectuals and Power* by Lawrence Peter King and Iván Szelényi. *Sociology* 39(5):1029–34.

Gadenne, V. 2001. "Causation (Theories and Models): Conceptions in the Social Sciences." Pp. 1561–67 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, edited by N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes. Oxford, England: Pergamon Press.

Garber, Frederick, ed. 2008. *Romantic Irony*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands and Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Garfield, Eugene. 1994. "A Tribute to Robert K. Merton On Receiving The National Medal of Science." *The Scientist* 8(20):13, October 17.

Garfinkel, Harold. 1967. *Studies in Ethnomethodology*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Garfinkel, Harold. 1974. "The origins of the term ethnomethodology." Pp. 15–8 in *Ethnomethodology: Selected Readings*, edited by R. Turner. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin.

Garfinkel, Harold. 1996. "Ethnomethodology's Program." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 59(1):5–21.

Garfinkel, Harold. 2002. *Ethnomethodology's Program: Working Out Durkheim's Aphorism*. Edited and introduction by A. Rawls. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Garfinkel, H., and Harvey Sacks. 1970. "On Formal Structures of Practical Actions." Pp. 337–366 in *Theoretical Sociology*, ed. J. D. McKinney and E. A. Tiryakian. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts.

Garfinkel, Harold, Michael Lynch, and Eric Livingston. 1981. "I.1 The Work of a Discovering Science Construed with Materials from the Optically Discovered Pulsar." *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 11(2):131–58.

Gaus, Daniel. 2013. "Rational Reconstruction as a Method of Political Theory between Social Critique and Empirical Political Science." *Constellations* 20(4):553–70.

Gaus, Daniel 2016. "Discourse theory's sociological claim: Reconstructing the epistemic meaning of democracy as a deliberative system." *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 42(6):503–25.

Gaus, Daniel. 2019. "Rational Reconstruction." Pp. 369–78 in *The Cambridge Habermas Lexicon*, edited by A. Allen and E. Mendieta. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Gazsó, Ferenc. 1992. "Cadre bureaucracy and the intelligentsia." *Journal of Communist Studies* 8(3):76–90.

Gellner, Ernest. 1991. "Islam and Marxism: Some Comparisons." *International Affairs* 67(1):1–6.

Gelo, Omar; Diana Braakmann and Gerhard Benetka. 2008. "Quantitative and Qualitative Research: Beyond the Debate." *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science* 42(3):266–90.

Gerlich, Peter. 1998. "Some Reflections on Latent Functions." Pp. 187–96 in *Robert K. Merton and Contemporary Sociology*, edited by C. Mongardini and S. Tabboni. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Gerring, John. 2007. "Is There a (Viable) Crucial-Case Method?" *Comparative Political Studies* 40(3):231–53.

Gerth, Hans H. and Mills, Wright C. 1948. "Introduction: The Man and His Work." Pp. 1–74 in *Max Weber From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Translated and edited by H. H. Gerth and W. C. Mills. London, England: Routledge.

Ghauri, Pervez; Kjell Grønhaug and Roger Strange. 2020. *Research Methods in Business Studies*. 5 ed. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Giddens, Anthony. 1973. *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*. London, England: Hutchinson University Library.

Giddens, Anthony, ed. 1974. *Positivism and Sociology*. London, England: Heinemann.

Giddens, Anthony. 1976. *New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies*. London, England: Hutchinson.

Giddens, Anthony. 1987. *Social Theory and Modern Sociology*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Giddens, Anthony. 1993. "Introduction to the Second Edition." Pp. 1–15 in *New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies*, 2nd ed. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Giddens, Anthony. 1995. *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*. Vol. 1, 2nd ed., Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Gieryn, Thomas F. 1977. Review of *New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies* by Anthony Giddens. *Contemporary Sociology* 6(5):535–7.

Gieryn, Thomas F. 2010. "Paradigm for the Sociology of Science." Pp. 113–39 in *Robert K. Merton. Sociology of Science and Sociology as Science*, edited by C. Calhoun. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Gieryn, Thomas F. and Kathleen C. Oberlin. 2015. "Science, Sociology of." Pp. 261–267 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd ed. Edited by J. D. Wright. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.

Glaser, Barney G. and Strauss, Anselm L. 1965. *Awareness of Dying*. Chicago, IL: Aldine Publ. Co.

Glaser, Barney G. and Strauss, Anselm L. 1967. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. Chicago, IL: Aldine Publ. Co.

Glenn, Ian. 2010. "The lost Bourdieu interview." *Critical Arts: South-North Cultural and Media Studies* 24(1):31–50.

Glicksberg, Charles I. 1969. *The Ironic Vision in Modern Literature*. The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

Gluck, Mary. 1985. *Georg Lukacs and His Generation, 1900–1918*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Goertz, Gary and James Mahoney. 2012. "Concepts and Measurement: Ontology and Epistemology." *Social Science Information* 51(2):205–16.

Goldman, Alvin. 2010. "Why social epistemology is real epistemology." Pp. 1–29 in *Social Epistemology*, edited by A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. Pritchard. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Good, Edwin Marshall. 1965. *Irony in the Old Testament*. Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press.

Goode, Erich. 2015. "The Sociology of Deviance. An Introduction." Pp. 3–29 in *The Handbook on Deviance*, edited by E. Goode. Oxford, England: Wiley Blackwell.

Goode, William J. 1947. "A Note on the Ideal Type." *American Sociological Review* 12(4):473–9.

Gordon, Scott. 1993. "The methodology of modelling." Pp. 100–10 in *The History and Philosophy of Social Science*. London, England and New York: Routledge.

Gossman, Lionel. 1989. "Towards a Rational Historiography." *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, New Series 79(3):1–68.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1954. *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1955. "Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy." *The American Political Science Review* 49(2):496–507.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1962. "Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology." *Social Problems* 9(3):199–213.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1968. "The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State." *The American Sociologist* 3(2):103–16.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1970. *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*. New York: Basic Books,

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1972. "A Reply to Martin Shaw: Whose Crisis?" *New Left Review* I/71(Jan.-Feb):89–96.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1973a. *For Sociology: Renewal and Critique in Sociology Today*. New York: Basic Books.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1973b. "On the Quality of Discourse Among Some Sociologists." *American Journal of Sociology* 79(1):152–7.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1974a. "Toward the New Objectivity: An Introduction to Theory and Society." *Theory and Society* 1(1):i-v.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1974b. "Marxism and Social Theory." *Theory and Society* 1(1):17–35.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1974c. "The Metaphoricality of Marxism and the Context-Freeing Grammar of Socialism." *Theory and Society* 1(4):387–414.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1975–1976. "Prologue to a Theory of Revolutionary Intellectuals." *Telos* 26(Winter):3–36.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1976a. *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins, Grammar and Future of Ideology*. London, England: Macmillan.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1976b. "The Dark Side of the Dialectic: Toward a New Objectivity." *Sociological Inquiry* 46(1):3–15.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1978a. "The New Class Project, I." *Theory and Society* 6(2):153–203.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1978b. "The New Class Project, II." *Theory and Society* 6(3):343–89.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1979. *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*, New York: Continuum Book and Seabury Press.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1980. *The Two Marxisms: Contradictions and Anomalies in the Development of Theory*. Houndmills, England: Macmillan.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1982. "Marx's Last Battle: Bakunin and the First International." *Theory and Society* 11(6):853–84.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1985. *Against Fragmentation: The Origins of Marxism and the Sociology of Intellectuals*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Gouldner, Alvin W. and Timothy J. Sprehe. 1965. "Sociologists Look at Themselves." *Trans-action* 2(May-June):42–4.

Gouldner, Janet. 1996. 'Opening Remarks: Alvin Gouldner's "Theory and Society".' *Theory and Society* 25(2):161–6.

Goldthorpe, John H. On Sociology: Numbers, Narratives, and the Integration of Research and Theory. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Graham, Linda J. 2005. "Discourse Analysis and the Critical Use of Foucault." Presented at the annual conference of the Australian Association of Research in Education, November 27 – December 1, Melbourne, Australia.

Greiffenhagen, Christian, Michael Mair and Wes Sharrock. 2015. "Methodological troubles as problems and phenomena: ethnomethodology and the question of 'method' in the social sciences." *The British Journal of Sociology* 66(3):460- 485.

Greiffenhagen, Christian; Michael Mair and Wes Sharrock. 2011. "From Methodology to Methodography: A Study of Qualitative and Quantitative Reasoning in Practice." *Methodological Innovations Online* 6(3):93–107.

Greene, Jennifer C., Valerie J. Caracelli and Wendy F. Graham. 1989. "Toward a Conceptual Framework for Mixed-Method Evaluation Designs." *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 11(3):255–74.

Grumley, John. Agnes Heller. A Moralist in the Vortex of History, London, England and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005.

Grusky, David B. 2007. "Theories of stratification and inequality." Pp. 4801–10 in *Encyclopedia of Sociology*, edited by G. Ritzer. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell.

Grusky, David B. and Jesper B. Sørensen. 1998. "Can Class Analysis Be Salvaged?" *American Journal of Sociology* 103(5):1187–234.

Guba, Egon G. and Yoanna S. Lincoln. 1994. "Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research." Pp. 105–17 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, edited by N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Gurewitch, Morton. 2002. *The Comedy of Romantic Irony*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Gurwitch, Georges. 1962. *Dialectique et Sociologie.* Paris: Flammarion.

Gusfield, Joseph R. 1980. "Foreword." Pp. v-x in *Deviance and Medicalisation: From Badness to Sickness*, edited by P. Conrad, J. W. Schneider. St. Louis, MO: Mosby.

Gusfield, Joseph R. 1981. "The Perspective of Sociological Irony." Pp. 186–95 in *The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1963. "Analytische Wissenschaftstheorie und Dialektik. Ein Nachtrag zur Kontroverse zwischen Popper und Adorno." Pp. 473–501 in *Zeugnisse. Festschrift für Thodor W. Adorno*, edited by M. Horkheimer. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Euroäische Verlagsanstalt.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1973. "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests." *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 3(March):157–89.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1975. "Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism." *Theory and Society* 2(3):287–300.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1976a. *Zur rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus*. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrakamp.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1976b. "The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics." Pp. 131–62 in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*. Translated by G. Adey and D. Frisby. London, England: Heinemann.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1976c. "Positivistically Bisected Rationalism." Pp. 198–225 in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, translated by G. Adey and D. Frisby, London, England: Heinemann.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1979. "History and Evolution." *Telos* 39(March 20):5–44.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1983. "Interpretive Social Science vs. Hermeneuticism." Pp. ?? in *Social Science as Moral Inquiry*, edited by N. Haan, R. N. Bellah, P. Rabinow, and W. M. Sullivan. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Vol. 1 & 2. Translated by T. McCarthy. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1986. *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Translated by J. J. Shapiro. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Habermas, Jürgen 1996. *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*. Translated by W. Rehg, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Halmos, Paul. Ed. 1970. *The Sociology of Sociology*. Keele, England: University of Keele, The Sociological Review Monographs 16.

Hall, Peter A. and David Soskice eds. 2001. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hammersley, Martyn. 1992. "The Paradigm Wars: Reports from the Front." *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 13(1):131–43.

Hammersley, Martyn. 1996. "The relationship between qualitative and quantitative research: paradigm loyalty vs. methodological eclecticism." Pp. 159–74 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research Methods for Psychology and the Social Sciences*, edited by J. T. E. Richardson. Leicester, England: BPS Books.

Hammersley, Martyn. 2009. "Against the Ethicists: On the Evils of Ethical Regulation." *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 12(3):211–25.

Hammersley, Martyn 2020. "From Methodology to Methodography?" *Methodological Innovations* September – December:1–8.

Hammersley, Martyn. 2021. "Karl Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia* and the public role of sociology." *Journal of Classical Sociology* 1–23.

Hampshire, Stuart and Louis Blom-Cooper. 1977 "Censorship?" *Index on Censorship* 6(4):55–63.

Hanley, Eric. 2003. "A Party of Workers or a Party of Intellectuals? Recruitment into Eastern European Communist Parties, 1945–1988." *Social Forces* 81(4):1073–105.

Hanley, Erik and Iván Szelényi. 2001. "The Changing Social Structure during Market Transition: The Case of Central Europe." Pp. 101–48 in *The Breakdown of State Socialism and the Emerging Post-Socialist Order*, edited by F. Tarifa. The Hague, The Netherlands: CESTRAD, Institute of Social Studies.

Haraszti, Miklós. 1979a. "What is Marxism?" Pp. 148–55 in *Communism and Eastern Europe. A Collection of Essays*, edited by F. Silnitsky, L. Silnitsky and K. Reyman. Sussex, England: The Harvester Press.

Haraszti, Miklós, ed. 1979b. *Opposition = 0,1%.* [Extraits du samizdat hongrois présentés par M. Hraszti]. Paris, France: Ėditions du Seuil,

Haraszti, Miklós. 1979c. "Le projet du 0,1%." Pp. 11–9 in *Opposition = 0,1%*, edited by M. Haraszti [Extraits du samizdat hongrois présentés par M. Hraszti]. Paris, France: Ėditions du Seuil.

Haraszti, Miklós. 1980. "Hungary (1): The Willing Intellectuals." *Index on Censorship* 9(2):9–12.

Haraszti, Miklós. 1987. *The Velvet Prison: Artists Under State Socialism*. Translated by K. Landesmann and S. Landesmann with the help of S. Wasserman [Foreword by G. Konrád]. New York: A New Republic Book / Basic Books.

Haraway, Donna. 1988. "Situated Knowledges: the Science Question in Femi-

nism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective." *Feminist Studies* 14(3):575–99.

Harvey, Lee. 1986. "The Myths of the Chicago School." *Quality and Quantity* 20(2–3):191–217.

Harvey, Lee. 1987. *The myths of the Chicago School of Sociology*, Aldershot, England: Avebury.

Hankiss, Elemér. 1992. "Grants and advice? Thank you. But send us also a Durkheim or a Habermas." *East European Politics and Societies* 6(3):359–63.

Have, Paul ten. 2004. *Understanding Qualitative Research and Ethnomethodology*. London, England: Sage Publications.

Hayek, Friedrich A. von. 1941. "The Counter-Revolution of Science." *Economica,* New Series 8(29):9–36.

Hayek, Friedrich A. von. 1942. "Scientism and the Study of Society. Part I." *Economica*, New Series 9(35):267–291.

Hayek, Friedrich A. von. 1943. "Scientism and the Study of Society. Part II." *Economica*, New Series 10(37):34–63.

Hayek, Friedrich A. von. 1944. "Scientism and the Study of Society. Part III." *Economica*, New Series 11(41):27–39.

Hayek, Friedrich A. von. 1955. *The Counter-Revolution of Science. Studies on the Abuse of Reason*. London, England: The Free Press of Glencoe and Collier-Macmillan Ltd.

Hegedüs, András. 1965. "Optimalizálás és humanizálás." [Optimization and Humanization] *Valóság* 8(3):17–32.

Hegedüs, András. 1968. "Management and Scientific Research." *Social Science Information* 7(5):7–14.

Hegedüs, András. 1971. "Hungary." Pp. 79–95 in *The State of Sociology in Eastern Europe Today* edited by J. J. Wiater, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press,

Hegedüs, András. 1976. "The Self-Criticism of a Socialist Society: A Reality and Necessity." Pp. 161–175 in *The Humanisation of Socialism: Writings of the Budapest School* A. Hegedüs, A. Heller, M. Markus, and M. Vajda. London, England: Allison and Busby.

Hegedüs, András. 1977a. *The Structure of Socialist Society*. Translated by R. Fisher and revised by P. Szente. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Hegedüs, András. 1977b. "Democracy and Socialism in the West and in the East." Pp. 162–83. In *The Just Society* edited by K. Coates and F. Singleton. Translated by B. Szabo and F. Singleton. Nottingham, England: Spokesman / Bradford, England: University of Bradford and the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.

Hegedüs, András. 1981. "Interview with Andras Hegedüs." *Telos* 47(March 20):132–237.

Hegedüs, András and Márkus, Maria. 1971. "The Role of Values in the Long Range Planning of Distribution and Consumption." Pp. 161–89 in *Industrialization, Urbanization and Ways of Life*, edited by K. Kulcsár [International Sociological Conference, Balatonfüred, September 9–12, 1969]. Budapest, Hungary: Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Hegedüs, András and Márkus, Maria. 1972. "The Role of Values in the Long Range Planning of Distribution and Consumption." *Sociological Review Monograph* 17:39–58.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. [1835] 1975. *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, Vol. 1. Translated by T. M. Knox and edited by H. G. Hotho. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Heller, Ágnes. 1982. "Phases of Legitimation in Soviet-type Societies." Pp. 45–63 in *Political Legitimation in Communist States*, edited by T.H. Rigby and Ferenc Fehér. London and Basingstoke, England: The Macmillan Press.

Heller, Ágnes. 2005. *Immortal Comedy: The Comic Phenomenon in Art, Literature, and Life*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Heller, Ágnes. 2018. "1968 in Hungary." *Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review* 54(3):401–4.

Heller, Louis G. 1983. "Puns, Ironies (Plural):and Other Type–4 Patterns." *Poetics Today* 4(3):437–50.

Herzog, Benno. 2016a. "Discourse Analysis as Immanent Critique: Possibilities and Limits of Normative Critique in Empirical Discourse Studies." *Discourse & Society* 27(3):278–92.

Herzog, Benno. 2016b. *Discourse Analysis as Social Critique: Discursive and Non-Discursive Realities in Critical Social Research*, London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Herzog, Benno and Francesc I Dobon Hernàndez. 2012. "La noción de 'lucha' en la teoría de reconocimiento de Axel Honneth. Sobre la posibilidad de subsanar el 'déficit sociológico' de la Teoría Crítica con la ayuda del Análisis del Discurso." [The notion of 'struggle' in the theory of recognition of Axel Honneth. About the possibility to compensate the 'sociological deficit' of Critical Theory with the help of Discourse Analysis]. *Política & Sociedad* 49(3):609–23.

Hesse-Biber, Sharlene Nagy and R. Burke Johnson. eds. 2015. *The Oxford Handbook of Multimethod and Mixed Methods Research Inquiry*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Hobhouse, L[eonard] T[relawney], Morris Ginsberg, Gerald Clair Wheeler and William Camden. 1915. *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the*

Simpler Peoples; An Essay in Correlation. London, England: Chapman and Hall, Ltd.

Hoecker-Drysdale, Susan. 2004. "Is the History of Sociology Important." *Timelines* 1(December):1, 3–4.

Hoecker-Drysdale, Susan. 2005. "What is History of Sociology?" *Timelines* 2(December):1, 3, 5–6.

Hofweber, Thomas. 2021."Logic and Ontology" *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring Ed., edited by E. N. Zalta. Retrieved November 20, 2021 (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/logic-ontology/).

Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno. 1972. *Dialectic of Enlightenment.* Translated by J. Cumming. New York: Herder and Herder.

Heckmann, Friedrich. 1979. "Max Weber alas empirischer Sozialforscher." *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 8(1):50–62.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. [1840] 1892. *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 1, translated by E. S. Haldane. London, England: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd.

Heron, John, and Peter Reason. 1997. "A Participatory Inquiry Paradigm." *Qualitative Inquiry* 3(3):274–94.

Hill, Richard J. and Kathleen Stones Crittenden, eds. 1968. *Proceedings of the Purdue Symposium on Ethnomethodology.* Institute Monograph Series No. 1, Institute for the Study of Social Change, Department of Sociology, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University.

Hinkle, Roscoe C. 1971. Review of *The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology* by Alvin W. Gouldner. *Social Forces* 49(3):497–99.

Holland, Paul W. 1986. "Statistics and Causal Inference." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 81(396):945–60.

Holland, P[aul] W. 2001. "Causal Counterfactuals in Social Science Research." Pp. 1550–54 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, edited by N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes. Oxford, England: Pergamon Press.

Hollands, Robert and Liz Stanley. 2009. "Rethinking 'Current Crisis' Arguments: Gouldner and the Legacy of Critical Sociology." *Sociological Research Online* 14(1):13–25.

Holmes Leslie. 1993. *The End of Communist Power.* Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Holmes Leslie. 1993. *Post-Communims.* Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Homan, Roger. 1980. "The Ethics of Covert Methods." *The British Journal of Sociology* 31(1):46–59.

Hopkins, Terence K. and Immanuel Wallerstein. 1967. "The Comparative Study of National Societies." *Social Science Information* 6(5):25–58.

House, James S. 2019. "The Culminating Crisis of American Sociology and Its Role in Social Science and Public Policy: An Autobiographical, Multimethod, Reflexive Perspective." *Annual Review of Sociology*. 45:1–26.

Housley, William, Bella Dicks, Karen Henwood, Robin Smith. 2017. "Qualitative Methods and Data in Digital Societies." *Qualitative research* 17(6):607–9.

Howe, Kenneth R. 1988. "Against the Quantitative-Qualitative Incompatibility Thesis or Dogmas Die Hard." *Educational Researcher* 17(8):10–6.

Howe, Kenneth R. 2002. *Closing Methodological Divides: Toward Democratic Educational Research*. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Howe, Kenneth and Margaret Eisenhart. 1990. "Standards for Qualitative (and Quantitative) Research: A Prolegomenon." *Educational Researcher* 19(4):2–9.

Hoyle, Eric and Mike Wallace. 2007. "Educational Reform: An Ironic Perspective." *Educational Management Administration and Leadership* 35(1):9–25.

Hühn, Lore. 2013.""Irony and Dialectic: On a Critique of Romanticism in Kierkegaard and Hege''s Philosophy"." *MLN* 128(5):1061–82.

Hull, David L. 2000. "The Professionalization of Science Studies: Cutting Some Slack." *Biology and Philosophy* 15:61–91.

Hunter, Albert and Brewer, John. 2003. "Multimethod Research in Sociology." Pp. 577–94 in *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioural Research* edited by A. Tashakkori, and C. Teddlie. Thousand Oaks, CA and London, England: Sage Publicaitons.

Hunter, Albert and John Brewer. 2015. "Designing Multimethod Research." Pp. 185–205 in *The Oxford Handbook of Multimethod and Mixed Methods Research Inquiry*, edited by S. N. Hesse-Biber and R. B. Johnson. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Hurdley, Rachel. "In the Picture or Off the Wall? Ethical Regulation, Research Habitus, and Unpeopled Ethnography." *Qualitative Inquiry* 16(6):517–28.

Husserl, Edmund. 1960. *Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology*. The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Huszár, Tibor. 1981. "Sociography – The Emergence of A Discipline." *The New Hungarian Quarterly* 22(83):83–96.

Huszár, Tibor, Kálmán Kulcsár and Sándor Szalai, eds. 1978a. *Hungarian Society and Marxist Sociology in the 1970s*. Budapest, Hungary: Corvina Kvk.

Huszár, Tibor, Kálmán Kulcsár and Sándor Szalai. 1978b. "Introduction." Pp. 5–18 in *Hungarian Society and Marxist Sociology in the 1970s*, edited by T. Huszár, K. Kulcsár and S.Szalai. Budapest, Hungary: Corvina Kvk.

Hutcheon, Linda. [1992a] 1996. "The Power of Postmodern Irony." Pp. 33–50 in *Genre Trope Gender. Critical Essays* by N. Frye, L. Hutcheon, and S. Neuman, edited by B. Rutland. Ottawa, Canada: Carleton University Press.

Hutcheon, Linda. 1992b. "The Complex Functions of Irony." *Revista Canadiense de Estudios Hispánicos* 16(2):219–34.

Hutcheon, Linda. 1994. *Irony's Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony*. London, England and New York: Routledge.

Immerwahr, Raymond. 1951. "The Subjectivity or Objectivity of Friedrich Schlegel's Poetic Irony." *The Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory* 26(3):173–91.

Irdam, Darja, Lawrence King, Alexi Gugushvili, Aytalina Azarova, Mihaly Fazekas, Gabor Scheiring, Denes Stefler, Katarzyna Doniec, Pia Horvat, Irina Kolesnikova, Vladimir Popov, Ivan Szelenyi, Michael Marmot, Michael Murphy, Martin McKee, and Martin Bobak. 2016. "Mortality in Transition: Study Protocol of the PrivMort Project, a Multilevel Convenience Cohort Study." *BMC Public Health* 16:672–80.

Ishwaran, K. 1965. "The Sociology of Sociology." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 6(2):278–84.

Israel, Joachim. 1990. "Epistemology and Sociology of Knowledge: An Hegelian Undertaking." *Sociological Perspectives* 33(1):111–28.

Jacoby, Russell. 1980. "What is Conformist Marxism?" *Telos* 45(Sept. 21):19–43.

Jacobs, Ronald N. and Philip Smith. 1997. "Romance, Irony, and Solidarity." *Sociological Theory* 15(1):60–80.

Jacques, Scott and Wright, Richard. 2011. "Ironies of Crime, Control, and Criminology." *Critical Criminology* 2(20):153–67.

James, David. 2004. "The Role of Modern Irony in Hege''s Philosophy of Right." *Hegel Bulletin* 25(1–2):127–38.

Jameson, Fredric. 1988. 'History and Class Consciousness as an "Unfinished Projec".' *Rethinking Marxism* 1(1):49–72.

Jameson, Fredric. 1991. *Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Jankélévitch, Vladimir. 1936. *''ironie ou la bonne conscience*. Paris, France: Alcan.

Janowitz, Morris. 1975. "Sociological Theory and Social Control." *American Journal of Sociology* 81(1):82–108.

Järvinen, Pertti. 2001. *On Research Methods*. Tampere, Finland: Opinpajan Kirja.

Jones, W. Glyn. 1965. "Søren Kierkegaard and Poul Martin Møller." *The Modern Language Review* 60(1):73–82.

Katz, Jack. 1983. "A Theory of Qualitative Methodology: The Social System of Analytical Fieldwork." Pp. 127–148 in *Contemporary Field Research* edited by R. Emerson. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland.

Katz, Jack. 2015. "A Theory of Qualitative Methodology: The Social System of Analytic Fieldwork." Méthod(e)s: *African Review of Social Sciences Methodology* 1(1–2):131–46.

Jacobs, Mark and Lynette Spillman. 2005. "Cultural sociology at the crossroads of the discipline." *Poetics* 33(1):1–14.

Jay, Martin. 2018. "*Irony and Dialectics*: One-dimensional Man and 1968." *Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales* 63(234):67–83.

Jeřábek, Hynek. 2001. "Paul Lazarsfeld – The Founder of Modern Empirical Sociology: A Research Biography." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 13(3):229–44.

Jeřábek, Hynek. 2006. *Paul Lazarsfeld's Research Methodology. Biography. Methods. Famous Projects*. Prague, Czech Republic: Karolinum Press, Charles University.

John, Robert. 1984. 'Max Weber's epistemology of the cultural sciences: Presupposition of "Interpretive Sociology".' *The Social Science Journal* 21(3):91–109.

Johnson, A. R. 1966. "Polish Sociologist Defends Empirical Marxist Sociology" 13 December. HU OSA 300–8–3–4597; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Johnson, R. Burke, Cornelis de Waal, Tres Stefurak and David L. Hildebrand. 2017. "Understanding the Philosophical Positions of Classical and Neopragmatists for Mixed Methods Research." *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 69(Suppl 2):63–86.

Johnson, [R.] Burke and Robert Gray. 2010. "A History of Philosophical and Theoretical Issues for Mixed Methods Research." Pp. 69–94 in *SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research*, edited by A. Tashakkori and C. Teddlie. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Johnson, R. Burke and Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie. 2004. "Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come." *Educational Researcher* 33(7):14–26.

Johnson, R. Burke, Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie and Lisa A. Turner. 2007. "Toward a definition of mixed methods research." *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 1(2):112–33.

Joravsky, David. 1981. "Kolakowski's Long Goodbye." Review of *Main Currents of Marxism* by Leszek Kolakowski *Theory and Society* 10(2):293–305.

Joseph, Jonathan. 2001. Review of *Critical Realism: Essential Readings* by Margaret Archer, Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Collier, Tony Lawson and Alan Norrie (eds.). *Historical Materialism* 8(1):507–17.

Käärik, Henn. 2013. *Klassikaline ja nüüdisaegne sotsiloogiline teooria*. Tartu, Estonia: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus.

Kadarkay, Arpad. 1991. *Georg Lukács: Life, Thought, and Politics*. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell.

Kaplan, Abraham. 1964. *The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science*. San Francisco CA: Chandler.

Karàdi, Éva. 1987. "Ernst Bloch and Georg Lukàcs in Max Webe''s Heidelberg." Pp. 499–514 in *Max Weber and His Contempories*, edited by W. J. Mommsen and J. Osterhammel. London, England and New York: Routledge.

Kaufmann, Walter. 1965. *Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary*. New York: Doubleday and Co.

Kecskemeti, Paul. 1952. "Introduction." Pp. 1–32 in Mannheim, Karl. *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*. Edited and introduced by P. Kecskemeti. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Kecskemeti, Paul. 1953. "Introduction." Pp. 1–11 in Mannheim, Karl. *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology*. Edited and introduced by P. Kecskemeti. London, England: Routlege and Kegan Paul Ltd.

Kehal, Prabhdeep Singh; Laura Garbes and Michael D. Kennedy. 2019. "Critical Sociology of Knowledge." In *Oxford Bibliographies in Sociology*. Edited by Lynette Spillman. New York: Oxford University Press. Retrieved September 20, 2022 (https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756384/obo-9780199756384-0221.xml?)

Kelle, Udo. 2005."Emergence", vs. "Forcing", of Empirical Data? A Crucial Problem of "Grounded Theory", Reconsidered.' *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 6(2):Art.27 Retrieved September 20, 2020 (http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0502275).

Kelleher, Myles J. 2001. "The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists Transformed: The New Political Orthodoxy in Sociology." *The American Sociologist* 32(4):70–88.

Keller, Reiner. 2005. "Analysing Discourse: An Approach from the Sociology of Knowledge." *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 6(3):Art.32. Retrieved September 20, 2020 (https://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/19).

Kelly, Duncan. 2003. "Karl Marx and Historical Sociology." Pp. 11–26 in *Handbook of Historical Sociology*, edited by G. Delanty and E. F. Isin. London, England: Sage Publications.

Kennedy, Michael D. 1990. "The Constitution of Critical Intellectuals: Polish Physicians, Peace Activists and Democratic Civil Society." *Studies in Comparative Communism* 23(3–4):281–304.

Kennedy, Michael D. 1991. *Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland: A Critical Sociology of Soviet-type Society*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Kennedy, Michael D. 2005. "The Ironies of Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power." *Theory and Society* 34:24-33.

Kennedy, Michael D. 2020. "Normative Frames and Systemic Imperatives: Gouldner, Szelényi and New Class Fracture." Pp. 35–51 in *Intellectuals, Inequalities and Transitions: Prospects for A Critical Sociology*, edited by T. Demeter. Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston MA: Brill Academic Publishers.

Kemény, István. 1971. "Restratification of the Working Class." Pp. 191–213 in *Industrialization, Urbanization and Ways of Life* [International Sociological Conference, Balatonfüred, 9–12.09.1969], edited by K. Kulcsár. Budapest, Hungary: Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Kettler, David, Volker Meja and Nico Stehr. 1984. "Karl Mannheim and Conservatism: The Ancestry of Historical Thinking." *American Sociological Review* 49(1):71–85.

Kettler, David, Volker Meja and Nico Stehr. 1986. "Introduction: The design of *Conservatism*." Pp. 1–26 in Karl Mannheim *Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge*. Translated by D. Kettler and V. Meja (from the first draft by E. R. King). Text and translation edited and introduced by D. Kettler, V. Meja and N. Stehr. London, England and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Kettler, David, Colin Loader, Volker Meja. 2008. *Karl Mannheim and the Legacy of Max Weber: Retrieving a Research Programme*. London, England: Routledge.

Kienzle, Harry J. 1970. "Epistemology and Sociology." *The British Journal of Sociology* 21(4)413–24.

Kierkegaard, Søren. [1835] 2007. *Kierkegaard's Journals and Notebooks. Volume 1: Journals AA-DD.* Edited by B. H. Kirmmse, N. J. Cappelørn, A. Hannay, and J. Stewart. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kierkegaard, Søren. [1841] 1965. *The Concept of Irony.With Constant Reference to Socrates.* Translated by L. M. Capel. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Kierkegaard, Søren. [1846] 1992. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*. Kierkegaard's Writings, XII, Volume I: Text. Edited by H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

King, Anthony. 2007. "The Sociology of Sociology." *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 37(4):501–24.

King, Gary. 1995. "Replication, Replication." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 28(3):444–52.

King, Gary; Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

King, Lawrence. 2013. Interview with Karmo Kroos, Cambridge, England: University of Cambridge, December 10.

King, Lawrence. 2015. "Privatization and the Post-communist Mortality Crisis: New Evidence from a Multi-level Survey." Presented at the conference on 'Intellectuals, Inequalities and Transitions: Themes from Iván Szelényi'. Pécs, Hungary: The Doctoral School of Demography and Sociology of the University of Pécs, October 14–17.

King, Lawrence Peter and Iván Szelényi. 2004. *Theories of the New Class: Intellectuals and Power*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

King, Lawrence Peter and Iván Szelényi. 2005. "Post-Communist Economic Systems." Pp. 205–29 in *Handbook of Economic Sociology*, 2nd ed., edited by N. Smelser and R. Swedberg. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

King, Lawrence Peter and Iván Szelényi. 2006. "Max Weber's Theory of Capitalism and Varieties of Post-Communist Capitalisms." *Angewandte Sozialforschung* 24(3–4):175–85.

Kirby, Mark. (s.a.) "An interview with Erik Olin Wright." *Social Science Teacher* Retrieved February 24, 2012 (http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/105wright.htm).

Kis, János. 1982–83. "The End of the Post-Stalin Epoch." *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe* 5(5–6):12–7.

Kis, János. 1989. *Politics in Hungary: For a Democratic Alternative*. Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs.

Kis, János. 1995. "From Costs-and-Benefits to Fairness: A Response to Richard Posner." *East European Constitutional Review* 4(3):84–7.

Kis, János. 1999. "On Liberty: A Dispute with György Márkus." *Constellations* 6(3):290–322.

Kis, János. 2002. "Nation-Building and Beyond." Pp. 220–42 in *Can Liberal Multiculturalism be Exported?*, edited by W. Kymlicka and M. Opalski. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Kis, János. 2002. "Behind the Veil of Ignorance." *Croatian Journal of Philosophy* 2(2):131–59.

Kis, János. 2003. *Constitutional Democracy*. Budapest, Hungary: CEU Press.

Kis, János. 2008. *Politics as a Moral Problem*. Budapest, Hungary: CEU Press.

Kis, János. 2013a. "Berlin's Two Concepts of Positive Liberty." *European Journal of Political Theory* 12(1):31–48.

Kis, János. 2013b. "Popular sovereignty. The classical doctrine and a revised account." Pp. 81–107 in *Critical Theory and Democracy: Civil Society, Dictatorship, and Constitutionalism in Andrew Arato's Democratic Theory*, edited by E. Peruzzotti and M. Plot. London, England: Routledge.

Kis, János. 2013c. "Curriculum Vitae" Budapest, Hungary: CEU, Department of Philosophy. Retrieved March 17, 2015 (http://philosophy.ceu.edu/sites/default/files/field_profile_cv/user-[uid]/Kis_CV-PolSci_July%202013.pdf).

Kiss, Gabor. (1967). "History of the Development of Sociology in Hungary from 1945." *The American Sociologist* 2(3):141–44.

K. K. 1969. 'The Successor to Andras Hegedus Gives his Views on "The Social Functions of Sociology and Politie".' March, 14. HU OSA 300–8–3–3679; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Klausner, Samuel Z. and Victor M. Lidz. 1986a. "Introduction." Pp. xi-xiv in *The Nationalization of the Social Sciences*, edited by S. Z. Klausner and V. M. Lidz. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Klausner, Samuel Z. and Victor M. Lidz. 1986b. "Nationalization and the Social Sciences." Pp. 267–86 in *The Nationalization of the Social Sciences*, edited by S. Z. Klausner and V. M. Lidz. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Knöbl, Wolfgang. 2003. "Theories that Won't Pass Away: The Never-Ending Story of Modernisation Theory." Pp. 96–107 in *Handbook of Historical Sociology*, edited by G. Delanty and E. F. Isin. London, England: Sage Publications.

Knox, Dilwyn. 1989. *Ironia: Medieval and Renaissance Ideas on Irony*. Leiden, the Netherlands: E. J. Brill.

Knox, Norman. 1961. *The Word Irony and Its Context, 1500–1755*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Knox, Norman. 1972. "On the Classification of Ironies." *Modern Philology* 70(1):53–62.

Knox, Norman. 1973–74. "sv irony." Pp. 626–34 in *Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, Vol. 2, edited by P. P. Wiener. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons Co.

Kögler, Hans Herbert. 1997. "Alienation as Epistemological Source: Reflexivity and Social Background After Mannheim and Bourdieu." *Social Epistemology* 11(2):141–64.

Kókai, Károly. 2017. "The Communist International and the Contribution of Georg Lukács in the 1920s." *Social Scientist* 45(11/12):63–72.

Kołakowski, Leszek. 1956."Intellectuals and the Communist Movement"" September. HU OSA 300–8–3–4119; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Kołakowski, Leszek. [1961] 1968. *Toward a Marxist Humanism: Essays on the Left Today*. New York: Grove Press.

Kołakowski, Leszek. [1959] 1969a.""The Priest and the Jester." Pp. 29–57 in *Marxism and Beyond: On Historical Understanding and Individual Responsibility*. London, England: Pall Mall Press.

Kołakowski, Leszek. 1969b. "Intellectuals and the Communist Movement." Pp. 178–192 in *Marxism and Beyond: On Historical Understanding and Individual Responsibility*. London, England: Pall Mall Press.

Kołakowski, Leszek. 1974. "My Correct Views on Everything. A Rejoinder to Edward Thompso's 'Open Letter to Leszek Kolakowski'." *Socialist Register* 11:1–20.

Kołakowski, Leszek. 1978. *Main Currents of Marxism. Its Origins, Growth and Dissolution*, Vol. 1–3, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Kołakowski, Leszek. 1983. "The Death of Utopia Reconsidered." Pp. 227–47 in *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values* [delivered at the Australian National University, June 22, 1982], Vol. 4, edited by S. M. McMurrin. Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press.

Kołakowski, Leszek. [1972] 1989. *The Presence of Myth*. Translated by A. Czerniawski. Chicago, IL and London, England: University of Chicago Press.

Kołakowski, Leszek. 1990. *Modernity on Endless Trial*. Chicago, IL and London, England: The University of Chicago Press.

Kołakowski, Leszek. 2012. *Is God Happy? Selected Essays*. London, England: Penguin Classics.

Kolakowski, Leszek and Danny Postel. 2005. "On Exile, Philosophy & Tottering Insecurely on the Edge of an Unknown Abyss." *Daedalus* 134(3):82–8.

Kolosi, Tamás. Tirsadalmi struktfirae s szocializmus [Social Structure and Socialism], Budapest: Kossuth 1974, cited in Kolosi, Tamás. 1988. "Stratification and Social Structure in Hungary." *Annual Review of Sociology* 14:409.

Kolosi, Tamás and Iván Szelényi. 1993. "Social Change and Research on Social Structure in Hungary." Pp. 141–63 in *Sociology in Europe. In Search of Identity*, edited by B. Nedelmann and P. Sztompka. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Kolosi, Tamás, Iván Szelényi, Szonja Szelényi and Bruce Western. 1990. "The Making of Political Fields in Post-Communist Transition: Dynamics of Class

and Party in Hungarian Politics, 1989–1990." Working Papers on Transition from State Socialism 90.7, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.

Konrád, György [George]. 1975. "Les Fondateurs de la Cité." [The Founders of the City.] *Cahiers de ''Est* 3:29–47.

Konrád, György. 1976. "Fragment du Roman à venir", [Fragmernt of a Forthcoming Novel]. *Cahiers de ''Est* 8:21–32.

Konrád, George [György]. 1987. "Foreword." [Translated by C. Györgyey]. Pp. ix-xvi in Miklós Haraszti *The Velvet Prison: Artists Under State Socialism.* New York: A New Republic Book / Basic Books, Inc.

Konrád, György. 2002. *A Guest in My Own Country. A Hungarian Life*. Translated by J. Tucker and edited by M. H. Heim. New York: Other Press.

Konrád, György and lván Szelényi. 1967. "Sociological Investigation of New Housing Estates." *Proceedings of the First Italo-Hungarian Meeting of Sociology*. November, Milan-Rome, Italy.

Konrád, György and lván Szelényi. 1969a. "A lakáselosztás szociológiai kérdései" [Sociological Problems in the Distribution of Housing]. *Valosag* 8:28–39.

Konrád, György and lván Szelényi. 1969b. *Az új lakótelepek szociológiai problémá*. Budapest, Hungary: Akadémiai Kiadó.

Konrád, György and lván Szelényi. 1971. "Sociological Aspects of the Location of Housing /Experiences from a socialist non-market economy/." Pp. 371–400 in *Industrialization, Urbanization and Ways of Life* [International Sociological Conference, Balatonfüred, September 9–12, 1969], edited by K. Kulcsár, Budapest, Hungary: Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Konrád, György and lván Szelényi. 1974."Social conflicts of under-urbanization." Pp. 206–226 in *Urban and Social Economics in Market and Planned Economies. Policy, Planning and Development*, Vol.1, edited by A. A. Brown, J. A. Licari and E. Neuberger. New York: Praeger.

Konrád, György and lván Szelényi. 1976. "Social conflicts of underurbanization: the Hungarian case." Pp. 162–80 in *Social Consequences of Modernization in Communist Societies*, edited by M. Field. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Konrád, György and lván Szelényi. 1977."Social conflicts of under-urbanization." Pp. 157–73 in *Captive Cities. Studies in the Political Economy of Cities and Regions*, edited by M. Harloe. London, England: John Wiley and Sons.

Konrád, György and lván Szelényi. 1979. *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power: A Sociological Study of the Role of the Intelligentsia in Socialism*. New York and London, England: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Konrád, György and Iván Szelényi. 1991."Intellectuals and Domination in Post-Communist Societies." Pp. 337–361 in *Social Theory for a Changing Society*, edited by P. Bourdieu and J. Coleman. Boulder, CO: Westview Press / Oxford, England and New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Konstantinou, Lee. 2009. "Wipe That Smirk Off Your Face: Postironic Literature and the Politics of Character." PhD dissertation, Department of English, Stanford University. Stanford, CA.

Konstantinou, Lee. 2016. *Cool Characters: Irony and American Fiction*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Konstantinou, Lee. 2017. "Four Faces of Postirony." Pp. 87–102 in *Metamodernism: Historicity, Affect, and Depth after Postmodernism* edited by R. van den Akker, A. Gibbons, and T. Vermeulen. London, England and Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Kornai, Janos. 1990. "Socialist Transformation and Privatization: Shifting from a Socialist System." *East European Politics and Societies*, 4(2):255-304.

Kornai, János. 2006. *By Force of Thought. Irregular Memoirs of an Intellectual Journey*. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.

Kornai, János. 2009. "Marx through the eyes of an Eastern European intellectual." *Social Research* 76(3):965–86.

Köves, Margit. 2017. "The Life and Work of Georg Lukács: An Introduction." *Social Scientist* 45(11/12):3–40.

Krathwohl, David R. 2004. *Methods of Educational and Social Science Research: An Integrated Approach*, 2nd ed. Long Grove: Waveland Press.

Krause, Monika. 2016. "The Meanings of Theorizing." *The British Journal of Sociology* 67(1):23–29.

Krokovay, Zsolt. 1980. "Hungary (3): Reflections on censorship." *Index on Censorship* 9(2):17–21.

Kroos. Karmo. 2012a. "Eclecticism as the Foundation of Meta-theoretical, Mixed Methods and Interdisciplinary Research." *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science* 46(1):20–31.

Kroos. Karmo. 2012b. "Becoming Conscious of the American Middle Class (Un)consciousness." *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science* 46(3):312–334.

Kroos, Karmo 2012c. "Varieties of Post-Communist Capitalisms with Their Religious Foundations." Presented at 12th Annual Aleksanteri Conference, 'Competition and Good Society – the Eastern Model', Helsinki, Finland: University of Helsinki, October 24–26.

Kroos, Karmo. 2015. "Critical Meta-theory Analysis of Szelényi's Work on the Relationship between Knowledge and Power." Paper presented at the inter-

national conference "Intellectuals, Inequalities and Transitions: Themes from Iván Szelényi" October 15–17, Pecs, Hungary.

Kroos. Karmo. 2018. "Iván Szelényi's Reflexive and Ironic Sociology of Intellectuals. Critical Meta-theory Analysis of Szelényi's Work on the Relationship between Knowledge and Power Four Decades after '*The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*'." Manuscript of the PhD dissertation, Institute of International Social Studies, School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn, Estonia: Tallinn University.

Kroos, Karmo. 2020. "How to Become a Dominant or Even Iconic Central and East European Sociologist: The Case of Iván Szelényi." Pp. 67–127 in *Intellectuals, Inequalities and Transitions: Prospects for A Critical Sociology*, edited by T. Demeter. Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers.

Kuckartz, Udo. 1991. "Ideal Types of Empirical Types: The Case of Max Weber's Empirical Research" *Bulletin de Methodologie Sociologique* 31(Sept.):44–53.

Kuge, S. A. and P. B. Shelishch. 1979. "The Scholarly Intelligentsia of the USSR: Factors and Trends of Development." *Soviet Sociology* 18(3):3–21.

Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,

Kuhn, Thomas. 1970a. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd Ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Kuhn, Thomas. 1970b. "Reflections on my critics." Pp. 231–278 in *Criticism and Growth of Knowledge*, edited by I. Lakatos and L. Musgrave. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Kuhn, Thomas. 1970c. "Notes on Lakatos." *PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association* 137–46.

Kuklick, Henrika 1983. The Sociology of Knowledge: Retrospect and Prospect, *Annual Review of Sociology* 9(1):287–310.

Kulcsár, Kálmán. 1969. "The Past and Present of Hungarian Sociology." *The Sociological Review, Special Issue: Sociological Review Monograph Series: Hungarian Sociological Studies* 17(S1):5–37.

Kulcsár, Kálmán. 1971a. "Introduction." Pp. 25–44 in *Industrialization, Urbanization and Ways of Life.* [International Sociological Conference, Balatonfüred, September 9–12, 1969], edited by K. Kulcsár. Budapest, Hungary: Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Kulcsár, Kálmán. 1971b. "Social Efficiacy and Social Planning." Pp. 215–38 in I*ndustrialization, Urbanization and Ways of Life.* [International Sociological Conference, Balatonfüred, September 9–12, 1969], edited by K. Kulcsár.Budapest, Hungary: Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Kukla, André. 2000. *Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science*. London, England and New York: Routledge.

Kuzminski, Adrian. 1979. "Defending Historical Realism." *History and Theory* 18(3):316–49.

Ladányi, János and Iván Szelényi. 1997. "The New Social Democrats?" *Social Research* 64(4):1531–47.

Ladányi, János and Iván Szelényi. 2001. "The Social Construction of Roma Ethnicity in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary During Market Transition." *Review of Sociology* 7(2):79–89.

Ladányi, János and Iván Szelényi. 2002a. "Prospects and Limits on New Social Democracy in Transitional Societies of Central Europe." Pp. 41–48 in *Communist Successor Parties a Decade After: Reform or Transmutation?*, edited by A. Bozóki and J. T. Ishiyama. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Ladányi, János and Iván Szelényi. 2002b. "The Nature and Social Determinants of Roma Poverty – A Cross-National Comparison." *Review of Sociology* 8(2):75–96.

Ladányi, János and Iván Szelényi. 2003. "Historical Variations in Inter-Ethnic Relations: Toward a Social History of Roma in Csenyéte, 1857–2000." *Romani Studies* 13(1):1–51.

Ladányi, János and Iván Szelényi. 2006. *Patterns of Exclusion: Constructing Gypsy Ethnicity and the Making of an Underclass in Transitional Societies of Europe*. New York and Boulder, CO: East European Monographs 676.

Ladd, Everett Carl Jr. and Martin Seymour Lispet. 1975. *The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics*. New York: McRaw-Hill Book Company.

Lagerspetz, Mikko. 1996. "Constructing Post-Communism. A Study in the Estonian Social Problems Discourse." PhD347 Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Turku, Turku, Finland.

Lagerspetz, Mikko. 2021. '"The Grievance Studies Affair" Project: Reconstructing and Assessing the Experimental Design.' *Science, Technology, & Human Values* 46(2):402–24.

Laineste, Liisi (2014). "National and Ethnic Differences." Pp. 541–42 in *Encyclopedia of Humor Studies*, edited by S. Attardo. Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publicaitons.

Lakatos, Imre. 1970. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." Pp. 91–196 in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, edited by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Lakatos, Imre. 1978. *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programs*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,

Lakatos, Miklós. 2009. "Beszélgetés Szelényi Ivánnal." *Statisztikai Szemle* 87(9):950–7.

Lambourn, David. 2001. "Metaphor, Role in Social Thought: History of the Concept." Pp. 9738–43 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, Vol. 14, edited by N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes. Oxford, England: Pergamon Press.

Lang, Serge. 1988. *Challenges.* New York: Springer-Verlag.

Latour, Bruno. 1987. *Science in Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Latour, Bruno. 2005. *Reassembling the Social*. Oxford, England: Clarendon.

Latour, Bruno and Steve Woolgar. 1983. *Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publicaitons.

Latour, Bruno and Steve WooIgar. [1979] 1986. *Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lautman, Jacques and Bernard-Pierre Lécuyer, eds. 1998. *Paul Lazarsfeld (1901–1976). La Sociologie de Vienne à New York*. Montréal, Canada and Paris, France: Éditions L'Harmattan.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. 1958. "Evidence and Inference in Social Research." *Daedalus* 87(4):99–130.

Levine, Andrew, Elliott Sober and Erik Olin Wright. 1987. "Marxism and Methodological Individualism." *New Left Review* 162(March-April):67–84.

Lamiell, James T. 1998. "'Nomotheti' and `Idiographi': Contrasting Windelban's Understanding with Contemporary Usage." *Theory & Psychology* 8(1):23–38.

Lavoie, Don. 1980. "Communists for capitalism." Review of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* by György Konrád and lván Szelényi. *The Libertarian Review*, August:32–5.

Lavoie, Don. 1985. *Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Reconsidered*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. 1941. "Remarks on Administrative and Critical Communications Research." *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*, 9:2–16.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. 1948. *What Is Sociology?* Oslo, Norway: Universitetets Studentkontor.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. 1949. "The American Soldier – An Expository Review." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 13(3):377–404.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. 1962."The Sociology of Empirical Social Research." *American Sociological Review* 27(6):757–67.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. 1970. "Sociology." Pp. 61–165 in *Main Trends of Research in the Social and Human Sciences.* Part 1. Paris and The Hague: Mouton / UNESCO.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. 1972. *Qualitative Analysis: Historical and Critical Essays*. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.

Lazarsfeld, Paul. 1993. *On Social Research and Its Language*. Edited and introduced by R. Boudon. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and Allen H. Barton. 1951. "Qualitative Measurement in the Social Sciences: Classification, Typologies and Indices." Pp. 155–93 in *The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method*, edited by D. Lerner and H. Lasswell. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and Charles E. Lindblom. 1954. "A Case Study of Methods in Social Science." Unpublished manuscript cited in Lazarsfeld (1993:311) and Neurath (1979:377).

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and Robert K. Merton. 1954. "Friendship as a social process: a substantive and methodological analysis." Pp. 18–66 in *Freedom and Control in Modern Society*, edited by M. Berger, R. Morrison MacIver, T. Abel, and C. H. Page. New York: Van Nostrand.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and William S. Robinson. 1940. "Quantification of Case Studies." *Journal of Applied Psychology* 24:817–25.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and Morris Rosenberg. 1955. *The Language of Social Research*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press of Glencoe.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and Wagner Thielens Jr. 1958. *The Academic Mind: Social Scientists in a Time of Crisis*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press of Glencoe.

Law, John 2004. *After Method: Mess in Social Science Research*. London, England: Routledge.

Law, John. 2008. "On Sociology and STS." *The Sociological Review* 56(4):623–49.

Law, John, Evelyn Ruppert and Mike Savage. 2011. "The Double Social Life of Methods." Working Paper No. 95, CRESC, Manchester, England. Retrieved December 16, 2020 (http://bit.ly/14Ruh3u / Goldsmiths Research Online Available at: http://research.gold.ac.uk/7987/).

Law, John and Evelyn Ruppert. 2013. "The Social Life of Methods: Devices." *Journal of Cultural Economy* 6(3):229–40.

Law, John, Marianne Elisabeth Lien. 2013. "Slippery: Field Notes in Empirical Ontology." *Social Studies of Science* 43(3):363–78.

LeCompte, Margaret Diane and Schensul Jean J. 2013. *Analysis and Interpretation of Ethnographic Data: A Mixed Methods Approach*, 2nd ed., Lanham, MD: AltaMira.

Leahey, Erin. 2008. "Methodological Memes and Mores: Toward a Sociology of Social Research." *The Annual Review of Sociology* 34:33–53.

Lemert, Charles C. 1985. "Sociology: Prometheus among the Sciences of Man." *boundary 2* [On Humanism and the University II: The Institutions of Humanism] 13(2/3):69–89.

Lemert, Charles. 1992. "General Social Theory, Irony, Postmodernism." Pp. 17–46 in *Postmodernism and Social Theory*, edited by S. Seidman and D. Wagner. Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Lemert Charles C. 2003. *Muhammad Ali: Trickster and the Culture of Irony.* Cambridge, England: Polity.

Lemert, Charles and Paul Piccone. 1981. "Alvin Ward Gouldner: 1920 – 1980." *Theory and Society* 10(2):163–7.

Lemert, Charles and Paul Piccone. 1982. "Gouldne''s Theoretical Method and Reflexive Sociology." *Theory and Society* 11(6):733–57.

Lewin, Kurt. 1931. "The Conflict between Aristotelian and Galileian Models of Thought in Contemporary Psychology." *Journal of General Psychology* 5:141–77.

Lieberson, Stanley. 1991. "Small N's and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases." *Social Forces* 70(2):307–32.

Lieberson, Stanley. 1994. "More on the Uneasy Case for Using Mill-*Type* Methods in Small-*N* Comparative Studies." *Social Forces* 72:1225–37.

Lieberson, Stanley. 1998. "Causal Analysis and Comparative Research: What Can We Learn from Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases?" Pp. 129–45 in *Rational Choice Theory and Large-Scale Data Analysis*, edited by H-P. Blossfeld and G. Prein. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Lijphart, Arend. 1971.""Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method"" *American Political Science Review* 65(September):682–93.

Lincoln, Yvonna S. and Egon G. Guba. 2000. "Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions, and Emerging Confluences." Pp. 163–188 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed., edited by N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Lipset, Martin Seymour. 1998. "Paul F. Lazarsfeld of Columbia: A Great Methodologist and Teacher." Pp. 255–70 in *Paul Lazarsfeld (1901–1976). La Sociologie de Vienne à New York*, edited by J. Lautman and B.-P. Lécuyer. Montréal, Canada and Paris, France: Éditions L'Harmattan.

Lipset, Martin Seymour. 1994. "The State of American Sociology." *Sociological Forum* 9(2):199–220.

Lipset, Seymour Martin and Everett Carll Ladd Jr. 1972. "The Politics of American Sociologists." *American Journal of Sociology* 78(1):67–104.

Lipset, Seymour Martin and Everett Carll Ladd Jr. 1973. 'Gouldner and "The Politics of American Sociologists".' *American Journal of Sociology* 78(6): 1485–93.

List, John A. 2004. "Field Experiments." *Journal of Economic Literature* 42(Dec.):1009–55.

Little, Daniel. 1990. *Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to The Philosophy of Social Science*. New York: Avalon Publishing.

Lizardo, Omar. 2022. Review of *Model Cases: On Canonical Research Objects and Sites* by Monika Krause *British Journal of Sociology* 73:654–6.

Loader, Colin. 1985. *The Intellectual Development of Karl Mannheim*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Loader, Colin. 1997. "Free Floating: The Intelligentsia in the Work of Alfred Weber and Karl Mannheim." *German Studies Review* 20(2):217–34.

Loone, Eero. 1992. *Soviet Marxism and Analytical Philosophies of History.* Translated by B. Pearce and foreword by E. Gellner. London, England and New York: Verso.

Lovejoy, Arthur O. 1936. *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lowman, John and Ted Palys. 2014. "The betrayal of research confidentiality in British sociology." *Research Ethics* 10(2):97–118.

Löwy, Michael. 1979. *Georg Lukács: From Romanticism to Bolshevism*. London, England: New Left Books.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1902–20] 1986. *Lukács, Georg: Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Coulumbia University Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1908–11] 2010. *Soul and Form*, Translated by A. Bostock, edited by J. T. Sanders and K. Terezakis, and introduced by J. Butler. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [Oct. 27, 1909] 1986a. "42. To Leo Popper." Pp. 101–5 in *Georg Lukács: Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [May 28, 1910] 1986b. "48. To Leo Popper." Pp. 112–6 in *Georg Lukács: Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. 1915a. "Zum Wesen und Methode der Kultursoziologie." *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 39:216–22.

Lukács, Georg [György]. 1915b. "Benedetto Croce, Zur Theorie und Geschichte der Historiographie." *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 39:878–85.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [Oct. 27, 1909] 1986a. "42. To Leo Popper." Pp. 101–5 in *Georg Lukács: Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Coulumbia University Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [May 28, 1910] 1986b. "48. To Leo Popper." Pp. 112–6 in *Georg Lukács: Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Coulumbia University Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [March ?, 1915] 1986c. "132. To Paul Ernst." Pp. 243–4 in *Georg Lukács: Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Coulumbia University Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [Mid-Dec., 1915] 1986d. "137. To Max Weber." Pp. 253–4 in *Georg Lukács: Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [Dec. 30, 1915] 1986e. "139. To Max Weber." Pp. 255–7 in Georg Lukács *Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1915] 1973. "Die deutschen Intellektuellen und der Krieg" *Text und Kritik* 39/40(October):65–9.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [Jan. 17, 1916] 1986f. "140. To Max Weber." Pp. 258–9 in Georg Lukács *Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1916] 1971a. *The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature.* Translated by A. Bostock. Boston, MA: The MIT Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [May 25, 1918] 1986c. "Documentation of Lukács's Attempt at Habilitation at the University of Heidelberg (1918)." Pp. 285–8 in *Georg Lukács: Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [Dec. 16, 1918] 1986d. "To Dean Domaszewski." P. 289 in *Georg Lukács: Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1918] 1977. "Bolshevism as a Moral Problem." *Social Research* 44(3):416–24.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1919] 1972. "Tactics and Ethics." Pp. 3–11 in Lukács, Georg [György] *Tactics and Ethics: 1919–1929. The Question of Parliamentarianism and Other Essays.* Tanslated by M. McColgan. London, England: New Left Books.

Lukács, Georg [György]. 1920. "Zur Organisationsfrage der Intellektuellen." [On the Issue of the Organisation of the Intellectuals] *Kommunismus* 1(3):14–8.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1923] 1971b. *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics.* Translated by R. Livingstone. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1924] 1971c. *Lenin: A Study on the Unity of his Thought.* Translated by N. Jacobs. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. 1933. "Mein Weg zu Marx." *Internationale Literatur* 2:185–7.

Lukács, Georg [György]. 1950. *Studies in European Realism: A Sociological Survey of the Writings of Balzac, Stendhal, Zola, Tolstoy, Gorki, and Others.* London, England: Hillway Publishing Company.

Lukács, Georg [György]. 1956. "The Fight between Progress and Reaction in the Culture Today" July HU OSA 300–8–3–2974; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1957] 1962. *The Meaning of Contemporary Realism*. Translated by J. Mander and N. Mander. London, England: Merlin Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. 1958. 'Postscriptum 1957 zu: Mein Weg zu Marx "La mia via al marxismo".' *Nuovi Argomenti* 33(July-Aug.):1–16.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1962] 1963. "Reflections on the Cult of Stalin." *Survey* 47:105–111.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [19??] 1978. *Mein Weg zu Marx Von der Verantwortung der Intellektuellen.* Edited by von S. Hayashi and K. Yoshida. Tokyo: Showado.

Lukács, Georg [György]. 1965. "The Sociology of Modern Drama." Translated by L. Baxandall. *The Tulane Drama Review* 9(4):146–70.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1967] 1971. "Preface to the New Edition." Pp. ix-xxxviii in *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*. Translated by R. Livingstone. London, England: The Merlin Press Ltd.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1968] 1971. *The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature*. Translated by A. Bostock. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1968] 1982. "The 'Vienna Paper': The Ontological Foundations of Human Thinking and Action." Pp. 135–48 in *Lukács's Last Autocriticism: The Ontology*, edited by E. Joós, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Lukács, Georg [György]. 1969. "On the Responsibility of Intellectuals." *Telos* Spring 2(1):123–31.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1969; 1971] 1983. *Record of a Life: An Autobiographical Sketch.* Edited by I. Eörsi and translated by R. Livingstone, London, England: Verso.

Lukács, Georg [György]. 1971c. "Lukacs on His Life and Work." *New Left Review* 68(July/Aug.):49–58.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1971] 1978a. *The Ontology of Social Being, Vol. 1: Hegel's False and his Genuine Ontology*. Translated by D. Fernbach. London, England: Merlin.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1971] 1978b. *The Ontology of Social Being*, *Vol. 2: Marx's Basic Ontological Principles*. Translated by D. Fernbach. London, England: Merlin.

Lukács, Georg [György]. [1971] 1980. *The Ontology of Social Being*, *Vol. 3: Labour.* Translated by D. Fernbach. London, England: Merlin.

Lynch, Michael. 1985. *Art and Artifact in Laboratory Science: A Study of Shop Work and Shop Talk in a Research Laboratory*. London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Lynch, Michael. 1991. "Laboratory Space and the Technological Complex: An Investigation of Topical Contextures." *Science in Context* 4(1):51–78.

Lynch, Michael. 1992. "Extending Wittgenstein: The Pivotal Move from Epistemology to the Sociology of Science." Pp. 215–65 in *Science as Practice and Culture* edited by A. Pickering. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Lynch, Michael. 1993. *Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action: Ethnomethodology and Social Studies of Science.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Lynch, Michael. 2000. "Against Reflexivity as an Academic Virtue and Source of Privileged Knowledge." *Theory, Culture & Society*. 17(3):26–54.

Lynch, Michael. 2001. "Science and Technology Studies: Ethnomethodology." Pp. 13644–7 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, edited by N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes. Oxford, England: Pergamon Press.

Lynch, Michael. 2013. "Ontography: Investigating the Production of Things, Deflating Ontology." *Social Studies of Science* 43(3):444–62.

Lynch, Michael. 2015. "Science and Technology Studies, Ethnomethodology of." pp. 192–199. in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* 2nd ed., edited by J. D. Wright. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.

Lynch, Michael, Eric Livingston, and Harold Garfinkel. 1983. 'Temporal Order in Laboratory Work." Pp. 205–38 in *Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Science*, edited by K. Knorr-Cetina and M. Mulkay. London, England and Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Machaiek, Richard. 1979."Veblen, Schneider, and the Ironic Imagination." *Social Science Quarterly* 60(Dec.):460–64.

McCullagh, C. Behan. 1980."Historical Realism." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 40(3):420–25.

Madey, Doren L. 1982. "Some benefits of integrating qualitative and quantitative methods in program evaluation, with illustrations." *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 4(2):223–36.

Madge, John 1963. *The Origins of Scientific Sociology*. London, England: Tavistock Publications.

Mahoney, James. 2003. "Strategies of Causal Assessment in Comparative Historical Analysis." Pp. 337–72 in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Mahoney, James. 2004. "Comparative-Historical Methodology." *Annual Review of Sociology* 30:81–101.

Mahoney, James and Gary Goertz. 2006. "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research." *Political Analysis* 14(3):227–49.

Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. 2003. "Comparative-Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas." Pp. 3–38 in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Mair, Michael; Christian Greiffenhagen, Wes Sharrock. 2013. "Social Studies of Social Science: A Working Bibliography." Working Paper No. 08/13, National Centre for Research Methods, Southampton, England.

Mair, Michael; Christian Greiffenhagen, Wes Sharrock. 2016. "Statistical Practice: Putting Society on Display." *Theory, Culture & Society* 33(3):51–77.

Mäkelä, Klaus. 2006. "Ethical Control of Social Research." *Nordisk Alkohol- & Narkotikatidskrift* 23(English Supplement):5–19.

Malterud, Kirsti. 2001. "Qualitative Research: Standards, Challenges, and Guidelines." *Lancet* 358(9280):483–8.

Manchin, Robert and lván Szelényi. 1985. "Theories of Family Agricultural Production in Collectivized Economies", *Sociologia Ritualis* 25(3–4):248–68.

Mandel, Stefan. 1978. "Filling the vacuum." *Index on Censorship* 7(2):40–41.

Mannheim, Karl. [1925] 1986. *Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge*. Translated by D. Kettler and V. Meja (from the first draft by E. R. King). Text and translation edited and introduced by D. Kettler, V. Meja and N. Stehr. London, England and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Mannheim, Karl. [1927] 1964. "Das konservative Denken." Pp. 408–508 in Karl Mannheim *Wissenssoziologie. Auswahl aus dem Werk*, edited by K.H. Wolff. Berlin und Neuwied, Germany: Luchterhand.

Mannheim, Karl. [1929] 1954. *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*. Translated by L. Wirth and E. Shils. New York: Horcourt, Brace Co. and London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ltd.

Mannheim, Karl. [1930] 2001. *Sociology as Political Education*. Edited by D. Kettler and C. Loader. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Mannheim, Karl. [1935] 1940. *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction: Studies in Modern Social Structure*. Translated by E. Shils. London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.

Mannheim, Karl. [1936] 1952. *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*. Edited and introduced by P. Kecskemeti. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Mannheim, Karl. [1936] 1982. *Structures of Thinking*. Collected Works of Karl Mannheim Vol. 10, Translated by J. J. Shapiro and S. W. Nicholsen. Text and translation edited and introduced by D. Kettler, V. Meja and N. Stehr. Abingdon, England and New York: Routledge.

Mannheim, Karl. 1943. *Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essays of a Sociologist*. London, England: Kegan Paul, Trench, Turner & Co. Ltd.

Mannheim, Karl. 1953. *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology*. Edited and introduced by P. Kecskemeti. London, England: Routlege and Kegan Paul Ltd.

Mannheim, Karl. 1956. "The Problem of the Intelligentsia: An Enquiry into its Past and Present Role." Pp. 91–170 in Mannheim, Karl *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*, edited by B. S. Turner. London, England and New York: Routledge.

Mannheim, Karl. 1993. *From Karl Mannheim*. Edited by K. H. Wolff, V. Meja, D. Kettler. London, England, and New York: Routledge.

Mannheim, Karl. 2003. *Selected Correspondence (1911–1946) of Karl Mannheim, Scientist, Philosopher, and Sociologist*. Edited by E. Gabor. Lewiston, NY and Lampeter, Wales: Edwin Mellen Press.

Man, Paul de. 1966. "Georg Lukác''s Theory of the Novel." *MLN* 81(5):527–34.

Man, Paul de. 1996. "Concept of Irony." Pp. 163–84 in *Aesthetic Ideology*. Edited and introduced by A. Warminski. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Marcuse, Herbert. 1969. *An Essay on Liberation*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Markham, Annette N. 2006. "Method as Ethic, Ethic as Method." *Journal of Information Ethics* 15(2):37–55.

Markos, Edith. 1984. 'Gyorgy Konrad Comes Under Attack Again After Winning Heder Prize' in "Situation Report: Hungary, 20 March 198", 20 March, pp. 16–8. HU OSA 300–8–47–115–4; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Marković, Mihailo. 1986. "The Critical Thought of György Lukács." *PRAXIS International* 1:82–94.

Markovski, Barry. 2007. "Theory." Pp. 4979–86 in *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*, Vol. 10, edited by G. Ritzer. Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Markus, Maria and Andras Hegedus. 1972. "Leisure Time and Division of Labour." *Acta Oeconomica* 8(2/3):237–51.

Markus, Maria and Andras Hegedus. 1976. "Tendencies of Marxist Sociology in the Socialist Countries." Pp. 124–139 in *The Humanisation of Socialism. Writings of the Budapest School*, A. Hegedüs, A. Heller, M. Markus and M. Vajda. London, England: Allison & Busby.

Martin, Bill and Iván Szelényi. 1987. "Beyond Cultural Capital: Toward a Theory of Symbolic Domination." Pp. 16–49 in *Intellectuals, Universities, and the State in Western Modern Societies* edited by R. Eyerman, L. G. Svensson and T. Söderqvist. Berkeley CA: University of California Press.

Martin, Graham Dunstan. 1983. "The Bridge and the River. Or Ironies of Communication." *Poetics Today* 4(3):415–36.

Marx, Karl. [1852/1869] 1963. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. New York: International Publishers.

Mascat, Jamila M.H. 2013. "When Negativity Becomes Vanity: Hegel's Critique of Romantic Irony." *Stasis* 1:230–45.

Masterman, Margaret. 1970. "The Nature of a Paradigm." Pp. 59–89 in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, edited by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Matza, David. 1969. *Becoming Deviant*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Manza, Jeff and Michael A. McCarthy. 2011. "The Neo-Marxist Legacy in American Sociology." *Annual Review of Sociology* 37(1):155–83.

Maynard, Douglas W. and Steven E. Clayman. 1991. "The diversity of ethnomethodology." *Annual Review of Sociology* 17:385–418.

Maynard, Douglas W. and Nora Cate Schaeffer. 2000. "Toward a Sociology of Social Scientific Knowledge: Survey Research and Ethnomethodolog's Asymmetric Alternates." *Social Studies of Science* 30(3):323–70.

McAdam, Doug. 2007. "From Relevance to Irrelevance: The Curious Impact of the Sixties on Public Sociology." Pp. 411–26 in *Sociology in America: A History*, edited by C. Calhoun. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

McKie, Linda and Louise Ryan. 2012. "Exploring Trends and Challenges in Sociological Research." *Sociology* 46(6):1–7.

McKie, Linda and Louise Ryan, eds. 2016. *An End to the Crisis of Empirical Sociology?: Trends and Challenges in Social Research*. London, England: Routledge.

McNall, Scott. 2013/2014. "Of one thing I am certain and that is I am not a Marxist." *Newsletter of the American Sociological Association Section of Marxist Sociology* 32(2):1–2, 16–24.

Meja, Volker. 2015. "Knowledge, Sociology of." Pp. 111–8 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, edited by J. D. Wright, 2nd ed. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.

Melegh, Attila and Iván Szelényi. 2016. "Polanyi Revisited. Introduction." *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics* 2(2):4–10.

Melia, Kath, M. 1997. "Producing 'Plausible Stories': Interviewing Student Nurses." Pp. 26–36 in *Context and Method in Qualitative Research* edited by G. Miller and R. Dinwall. London, England: Sage Publications.

Mendel, Iris. 2006. "Mannheim's Free-Floating Intelligentsia: The Role of Closeness and Distance in the Analysis of SocietyHung." *Studies in Social and Political Thought* 12(March):30–52.

Merton, Robert, K. 1936. "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action." *American Sociological Review* 1(6):894–904.

Merton, Robert, K. 1938. "Science, Technology, and Society in Seventeenth-Century England." *Osiris* 4:360–632.

Merton, Robert, K. [1949/1957] 1968. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. 1968 Enlarged ed. New York: Free Press.

Merton, Robert, K. 1970. "Paradigm for the sociology of knowledge." Pp. 342–373 in *The Sociology of Knowledge: A Reader*, edited by J. A. Curtis, J. W. Petras. London, England: Duckworth.

Merton, Robert, K. 1972. "Insiders and Outsiders: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge." *American Journal of Sociology* 78(1):9–47.

Merton, Robert, K. 1973. *The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations*. Edited by N. W. Store. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Merton, Robert, K. 1975a. "Structural Analysis in Sociology." Pp. 21–52 in *Approaches to the Study of Social Structure*, edited by P. Balu, New York: Free Press.

Merton, Robert K. 1975b. "Thematic Analysis in Science: Notes on Holton's Concept" *Science* 188(4186):335–8.

Merton, Robert, K. 1981. "Foreword: Remarks on Theoretical Pluralism." Pp. i–viii in *Continuities in Structural Inquiry*, edited by P. M. Blau and R. K. Merton. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Merton, Robert, K. 1982a. "Alvin W. Gouldner: Genesis & Growth of a Friendship." *Theory and Society* 11(6):915–38.

Merton, Robert, K. 1982b. *Social Research and the Practicing Professions*, edited and with and introduction by A. Rosenblatt and T. F. Gieryn. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Merton, Robert, K. 1990. "STS; Foreshadowings of an Evolving Research Program in the Sociology of Science." Pp. 334–71 in *Puritanism and the Rise of Modern Science: the Merton Thesis*, edited by B. I. Cohen. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Merton, Robert, K. 1998a. "Working with Lazarsfeld: Notes and Contexts." Pp. 163–211 in *Paul Lazarsfeld (1901–1976) La Sociologie de Vienne à New York*, edited by J. Lautman and B.-P. Lécuyer. Montréal, Canada and Paris, France: Éditions L'Harmattan.

Merton, Robert K. 1998b. "Afterword: Unanticipated Consequences and Kindred Socio-logical Ideas: A Personal Gloss." Pp. 295–318 in *Robert K. Merton and Contemporary Sociology*, edited by C. Mongardini and S. Tabboni. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Merton, Robert K., James S. Coleman, and Peter H. Rossi, eds. 1979a. *Qualitative and Quantitative Social Research: Papers in Honor of Paul F. Lazarsfeld*. New York: The Free Press.

Merton, Robert K., James S. Coleman, and Peter H. Rossi. 1979b. "Preface." Pp. ix-xi in *Qualitative and Quantitative Social Research: Papers in Honor of Paul F. Lazarsfeld*, edited by R. K. Merton, J. S. Coleman, and P. H. Rossi. New York: The Free Press.

Messa, L.C.S., E. Borloti and V.B. Haydu. 2020. "Estudos empíricos da ironia: Revisão sistemática e implicações para uma análise functional" [Empirical studies of irony: Systematic review and implications for a functional analysis] *Avances en Psicologia Latinoamericana* 38(1):218–236.

Mészáros, István. 1972. *Lukác'' Concept of Dialectic*. London: Merlin Press.

Mica, Adriana. 2015. "Unintended Consequences: History of the Concept." Pp. 744–9 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, edited by J. D. Wright, 2nd ed. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.

Mica, Adriana. 2017. "The Unintended Consequences in New Economic Sociology: Why Still Not Taken Seriously?" *Social Science Information* 56(4):544–66.

Mica, Adriana. 2018. *Sociology as Analysis of the Unintended: From the Problem of Ignorance to the Discovery of the Possible.* London, England and New York: Routledge.

Michelson, Ethan. 2007. "Lawyers, Political Embeddedness, and Institutional Continuity in China's Transition from Socialism." *American Journal of Sociology* 113(2):352–414.

Milicevic, Aleksandra Sasha. 2001. "Radical Intellectuals: What Happened to the New Urban Sociology?" *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 25(4):759–83.

Miller, Clyde Lee. 1983. "Irony in the History of Philosophy." *Poetics Today* 4(3):465–78.

Miller, S. M. and Pamela Roby. 1971. "Social Mobility, Education and Equality in the United States." Pp. 283–98 in *Industrialization, Urbanization and Ways of Life* [International Sociological Conference, Balatonfüred, 9–12.09.1969], edited by K. Kulcsár. Budapest, Hungary: Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Mills, Wright C. 1939. "Language, logic, and culture." *American Sociological Review* 4(1):670–80.

Mills, Wright C. 1940. "Methodological consequences of the sociology of knowledge" *American Journal of Sociology* 46(3):316–30.

Mills, Wright C. 1943. "The professional ideology of social pathologists." *The American Journal of Sociology* 49(2):165–80.

Mills, Wright C. 1951. *White Collar. The American Middle Classes*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Mills, Wright C. 1956. *The Power Elite*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Mills, Wright C. 1959. *The Sociological Imagination*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Mills, Wright C. 1963. *Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills*. Edited and introduction by I. L. Horowitz. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Mills, Wright C. 2000. *Wright Mills: Letters and Autobiographical Writings.* Edited by K. Mills with P. Mills and introduction by D. Wakefield. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Mills, Wright C. 2008. *The Politics of Truth: Selected Writings of C. Wright Mills*. Edited by J. H. Summers. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Minchin, Elizabeth. 2010. "From Gentle Teasing to Heavy Sarcasm: Instances of Rhetorical Irony in Homer's Iliad." *Hermes* 138(4):387–402.

Mises, Ludwig von. 1923. "Neue Beiträge zum Problem der sozialistischen Wirtschaftsrechnung." *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 51(2):488–500.

Mises, Ludwig von. 1928. "Neue Schriften zum Problem der sozialistischen Wirtschaftsrechnung." *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften* 60:187–90.

Mises, Ludwig von. [1951] 1962. *Socialism. An Economic and Sociological Analysis*. Translated by J. Kahane, new ed. (enlarged with an Epilogue). New Heven, CT: Yale University Press.

Mises, Ludwig von. 1969. *The Historical Setting of the Austrian School of Economics*. New Rochelle and New York City, NY: Arlington House Publishers.

Misumi, Kazuto. 2009. "Possibility of Neoclassical Sociology by Interpretive Formulation." *The Annual Reports of the Tohoku Sociological Society* 38:5–16.

Miyahara, Kojiro. 1983. "Charisma: From Weber to Contemporary Sociology." *Sociological Inquiry* 53(4):368–88.

Miyahara, Kojiro. 1986. "Beyond Instrumental Rationality: Weber's Typology of Rationality and a Critical Sociology of Values." PhD dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI.

Miyahara, Kojiro. 2000. "Alvin W. Gouldner: Studies on Bureaucracy and the New Class Project." *Kwansei Gakuin University School of Sociology Journal* 84:241–54.

Mjøset, Lars. 2015. "A Varieties Approach to the Varieties of Capitalism." Pp. 15–37 in *The Changing Worlds and Workplaces of Capitalism*, edited by S. Ó. Riain, F. Behling, R. Ciccia, and E. Flaherty. London: England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Moher, David, Deborah J. Cook, Susan Eastwood, Ingram Olkin, Drummond Rennie, and Donna F. Stroup. 1999. "Improving the quality of reports of meta-analyses of randomized controlled trials: the QUOROM statement." *The Lancet* 354:1896–900.

Mohr, John W. 2013.""Bourdieu's Relational Method in Theory and in Practice." Pp. 101–36 in *Applying Relational Sociology*, edited by F. Dépelteau and C. Powell. London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Møller, Poul Martin. 1848–50. "Om Begrebet Ironie." [On the Concept of Irony]. Pp. 152–8 in *Efterladte Skrifter*, vol. 3, edited by C. Winther, F. C. Olsen, C. Thaarup, and L. V. Petersen. Copenhagen, Denmark: C. A. Reitzel.

Monson, Don A. 1988. "Andreas Capellanus and the Problem of Irony." *Speculum* 63(3):539–72.

Morgan, David L. 2007. "Paradigms lost and pragmatism regained: Methodological implications of combining qualitative and quantitative methods." *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 1(1):48–76.

Morrison, David Edward. 1976. "Paul Lazarsfeld: The Biography of an Institutional Innovator." PhD dissertation, University of Leicester, Leicester, England. Retrieved October 13, 2016 (https://lra.le.ac.uk/bitstream/2381/9093/1/1976morrisondephd.pdf).

Morse, Janice M. 2003. "Principles of Mixed Methods and Multimethod Research Design." Pp. 189–208 in *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research* edited by A. Tashakkori and C. Teddlie. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publicaitons.

Muecke, Douglas C. 1969. *The Compass of Irony*. London, England: Methuen & Co. Ltd.

Muecke, Douglas C. 1970. *Irony and the Ironic*. London, England: Methuen & Co. Ltd.

Muecke, Douglas C. 1974. "The Communication of Verbal Irony." *Journal of Literary Semantics* 2(1):35–42.

Muecke, Douglas C. 1983. "Images of Irony." *Poetics Today* 4(3):399–414.

Muench, Paul. 2003. 'The Socratic Method of Kierkegaard's Pseudonym Johannes Climacus: Indirect Communication and the Art of "Taking Away".' Pp. 139–50 in *Søren Kierkegaard and the Word(s): Essays on Hermeneutics and Communication*, edited by P. Houe and G. D. Marino. Copenhagen, Denmark: C.A. Reitzel.

Mulkay, Michael J. 1979. *Science and the Sociology of Knowledge*. London, England: Allen & Unwin.

Mullins, Nicholas C. 1983. "Theories and Theory Groups Revisited." *Sociological Theory* 1:319–37.

Nadel, S.F. 1951. *The Foundations of Social Anthropology*, London, England: Cohen and West Ltd.

Nayna, Mike. 2019. "PSU Accuses Peter Boghossian of Ethical Misconduct." Retrieved May 30, 2021. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=thHO2btnWJA&list=PLLHyNSlsz449S Ohzpo7ClMEKe9WkXt5GO&index=15).

Nee, Victor. 1989. "A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism." *American Sociological Review* 54(5):663–81.

Némedi, Dénes. 2009. "Hungarian sociology between internal and external models." Paper presented at the Conference of the Council of National Associations of the ISA, "Facing an Unequal World: Challenges for Sociology", March 23–5, Taipei, Taiwan.

Némedi, Dénes. 2010. "Traditions and Ruptures in Hungarian Sociology 1900–2000." 152–62 in *The ISA Handbook of Diverse Sociological Traditions*, edited by S. Patel. London, England: Sage Publicatons.

Némedi, Dénes and Róbert Péter. 2002. "Sociology – Hungary." Pp. 437–51 in *Three Social Science Disciplines in Central and Eastern Europe. Handbook on Economics, Political Science and Sociology (1989–2001)*, edited by M. Kaase and V. Sparschuh. Berlin: Social Science Information Center and Budapest, Hungary: Collegium Budapest Institute for Advanced Study.

Némedi, Dénes and Róbert Péter. 2003. "More Evolution than Revolution: Sociology in Hungary, 1990–2000." Pp. 73–86 in *Sociology in Central and Eastern Europe: Transformation at the Dawn of a new Millennium*, edited by M. F. Keen and J. L. Mucha. London, England: Praeger.

Neuburg, Paul. 1976. "The novels of György Konrad." *Index on Censorship* 5(4):43–8.

New York University Abu Dhabi. 2015. "Migrant Labor Experience in the UAE." Pp. 90–93 in *NYUAD Research Report 2013–14*. Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates: New York University. Retrieved February 11, 2015 (https://nyuad.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyuad/research/reports/NYUAD-research-report–2013–14.pdf).

New York University Abu Dhabi. s.a. *Social Research and Public Policy – Program*. Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates: New York University, Retrieved July 17, 2014 (http://nyuad.nyu.edu/en/academics/academic-divisions/social-science/social-research-public-policy/Program.html).

Nagel, Thomas. 1986. *The view from nowhere*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Nickles, Thomas. 1989. "Integrating the Science Studies Disciplines." Pp. 225–56 in *The Cognitive Turn: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science, Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook 1989*, edited by S. Fuller, M. De Mey, T. Shinn and S. Woolgar. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Niebuhr, Reinhold. 1952. *The Irony of American History.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Niglas, Katrin. 1999. "Quantitative and Qualitative Inquiry in Educational Research: Is There a Paradigmatic Difference Between Them?" Paper presented at the European Conference on Educational Research, September 22–25, Lahti, Finland.

Niglas, Katrin. 2007. "Introducing the Quantitative-Qualitative Continuum: An Alternative View on Teaching Research Methods Courses." Pp. 185–203 in *Learning and Teaching of Research Methods at University*, edited by M. Murtonen, J. Rautopuro and P. Väisänen. Turku, Finland: Finnish Educational Research Association.

Niglas, Katrin. 2010. "The multidimensional model of research methodology. An integrated set of continua." Pp. 215–236 in *SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research*, 2nd ed., edited by A. Tashakkori and C. Teddlie. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

Noorhani, Piret. 2002. "Postmodernsed mängud: iroonia, paroodia, grotesk." MA Thesis, Department of Estonian Literature, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia.

Norris, Andrew. 2007. "Willing and Deciding: Hegel on Irony, Evil, and the Sovereign Exception." *Diacritics* 37(2/3):135–56.

Oberauer, Klaus and Stephan Lewandowsky. 2019. "Addressing the Theory Crisis in Psychology." *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review* 26(5):1596–618.

Oberschall, Anthony. ed. 1972. *The Establishment of Empirical Sociology: Studies in Continuity, Discontinuity, and Institutionalization*. New York: Harper & Row.

Oberschall, Antony. 1973. "The Empirical Sociology of Tönnies." Pp. 160–80 in *Ferdinand Tönnies: A New Evaluation* edited by W. J. Cahnman. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.

O'Connor, William Van. 1965. s.v. "Irony." Pp. __ in *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*., edited by A. Preminger, F. J. Warnke, O. B. Hardison Jr., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

O'Connor, William Van. 1975. s.v. "Irony." Pp. 407–408 in *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, enlarged ed., edited by A. Preminger, F. J. Warnke, O. B. Hardison Jr., London and Basingstoke, England: The Macmillan Press Ltd.

O'Connor, William Van. 1993. s.v. "Irony." Pp. 633–635 in *The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, edited by A. Preminger and T. V. F. Brogan. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Oevermann, Ulrich, Tilman Allert, Elisabeth Konau and Jürgen Krambeck. 1979. 'Die Methodologie einer "objektiven Hermeneutik" und ihre allgemeine forschungslogische Bedeutung in den Sozialwissenschaften.' Pp. 352–434 in *Interpretative Verfahren in den Sozial- und Textwissenschaften* edited by H.-G. Soeffner. Stuttgart, Germany: Metzler.

Oevermann, Ulrich with Tilman Allert, Elisabeth Konau, and Jürgen Krambeck. ([1987] 2019). "Structures of Meaning and Objective Hermeneutics." Pp. 436–48 in *Modern German Sociology*, edited by V. Meja, D. Misgeld and N. Stehr. New York City: Columbia University Press.

O'Farrell, Clare. 2005. *Michel Foucault*. London, England: Sage Publications.

Onwuegbuzie, Anthony J., and R. Burke Johnson. 2006. "The Validity Issue in Mixed Research." *Research in the Schools* 13(1):48–63.

Onwuegbuzie, Anthony, R. Burke Johnson and Kathleen M.T. Collins. 2009. "Call for Mixed Analysis: A Philosophical Framework for Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches." *International Journal of Multiple Research Approaches* 3:114–39.

Onwuegbuzie, Anthony, R. Burke Johnson and Kathleen M.T. Collins. 2011. "Assessing legitimation in mixed research: a new framework." *Quality and Quantity* 45(6):1253–71.

Onwuegbuzie, Anthony J. and Nancy L. Leech. 2007. "Validity and Qualitative Research: An Oxymoron?" *Quality & Quantity* 41(2):233–49.

Ossewaarde, Marinus. 2010. "The Continuation of the Dialectic in Sociology." *Critical Sociology* 36(3):395–413.

Ost, David. 2020. "The Ouvrierist Szelényi and the Missing Sociology of Labor." Pp. 207–226 in *Intellectuals, Inequalities and Transitions: Prospects for A Critical Sociology*, edited by T. Demeter. Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers.

Outhwaite, William. 1987. "Realism and Critical Theory." Pp. 77–91 in *New Philosophies of Social Science. Contemporary Social Theory*. London, England: Palgrave.

Outhwaite, R. W[illiam]. 2015. "Positivism, Sociological." Pp. 625–29 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, edited by J. D. Wright, 2nd ed. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.

Padgett, John F. and Walter W. Powell. 2012. *The Emergence of Organizations and Markets*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pahl, R[aymond] E[dward]. 1971. "The Sociologist's Role in Regional Planning." Pp. 299–338 in *Industrialization, Urbanization and Ways of Life*. [International Sociological Conference, Balatonfüred, September 9–12, 1969], edited by K. Kulcsár Budapest, Hungary: Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Palinkas, Lawrence A.; Sapna J. Mendon and Alison B. Hamilton. 2019. "Innovations in Mixed Methods Evaluations." *Annual Review of Public Health* 40(1):423–42.

Palonen, Emilia. 2018. 'Practicing "Europe": Georg Lukács, Ágnes Heller, and the Budapest School.' Pp. 195–217 in *Decentering European Intellectual Space*, edited by M. Jalava, S. Nygård, and J. Strang. Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers.

Paolucci, Paul. 2003. "The Scientific Method and the Dialectical Method." *Historical Materialism* 11(1):75–106.

Papilloud, Christian and Eva-Maria Schultze. 2018. "Pierre Bourdieu and Relational Sociology." Pp. 343- 56 in *The Palgrave Handbook of Relational Sociology* edited by F. Dépelteau. London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Papp, Zsolt. 1983. "Az amerikai szociológiáról. Interjú Szelényi Ivánnal." *Szociológia* 3:307–17.

Parijs, P. van. 2001. "Analytical Marxism." Pp. 484–86 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, Vol. 1, edited by N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes. Amsterdam: The Netherlands: Elsevier.

Parsons, Talcott. 1947. "Introduction." Pp. 3–86. in *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization by Max Weber*. Translated by A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons. Edited by T. Parsons. New York: Oxford University Press.

Parsons, Talcott. 1950. "The Prospects of Sociological Theory." *American Sociological Review* 15(1):3–16.

Parsons, Talcott. 1979. "On Theory and Metatheory." *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* 7(1):5–16.

Parsons, Talcott. 1986. "Social Science: A Basic National Resource." Pp. 41–112 in *The Nationalization of the Social Sciences,* edited by S. Z. Klausner and V. M. Lidz. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Paterson, Barbara L., Sally E. Thorne, Connie Canam and Carol Jillings. 2001. *Meta-Study of Qualitative Health Research. A Practical Guide to Meta-Analysis and Meta-Synthesis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Pawson, Ray. 1989. *A Measure for Measures: A Manifesto for Empirical Sociology*. London, England and New York: Routledge.

Pawson, Ray. 1996. "Theorizing the Interview." *The British Journal of Sociology* 47(2):295–314.

Pedersen, Jørgen. 2008. "Habermas' Method: Rational Reconstruction." *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 38(4):457–85.

Pedraza, Silvia. 2002. "A Sociology for Our Times: Alvin Gouldner's Message." *The Sociological Quarterly* 43(1):73–9.

Pels, Dick. 1996. "Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: Toward a New Agenda." *Sociological Theory* 14(1):30–48.

Perlstadt, Harry. 2009. "Ethics and Values in Sociological Practice." Pp. 170–84 in *Doing Sociology: Case Studies in Sociological Practice*, edited by J. Price, R. Straus, and J. R. Breese. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Peterson, Richard A. 1971. Review of *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* by Alvin W. Gouldner. *American Sociological Review* 36(2):326–8.

Phillips, D. C. 1996. "Philosophical perspectives." Pp. 1005–19 in *Calfee Handbook of Educational Psychology* edited by D. C. Berliner and R. C. New York and London, England: Routledge.

Phillips, Derek L. 1974. "Epistemology and the Sociology of Knowledge: The Contributions of Mannheim, Mills, and Merton." *Theory and Society* 1(1):59–88.

Pinch, Trevor. 2015. "Scientific Controversies." Pp. 281–286 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, edited by J. D. Wright, 2nd ed. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.

Pike, David. 1988. "Georg Lukács on Stalinism and Democracy: Before and After Prague, 1968." *Eastern European Politics and Societies* 2(2):241–79.

Plato. [361–47 BC] 2010. *The Last Days of Socrates: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo*. Translated by H. Tarrant et al. London, England: Penguin Classics.

Platt, Jenniffer. 1986. "Functionalism and the Survey: the relation of theory and method." *Sociological Review* 34:501–36.

Platt, Jenniffer. 1996. *History of Research Methods in America*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Platt, Jenniffer. 1998. *History of ISA: 1948–1997*. Madrid, Spain: International Sociological Association.

Platt, Jenniffer. 2010a. *ISA Presidents. Piotr Sztompka*. Madrid, Spain: International Sociological Association. Retrieved October 8, 2014 (http://www.isa-sociology.org/about/presidents/isa-president-piotr-sztompka.htm).

Platt, Jenniffer. 2010b. *ISA Presidents. Jan Szczepanski*. Madrid, Spain: International Sociological Association. Retrieved October 8, 2014 (http://www.isa-sociology.org/about/presidents/isa-president-jan-szczepanski.htm).

Platt, Jenniffer. [2003] 2013. *A Sociological History of the British Sociological Association*. Abingdon, England and New York: Routledge.

Platt, Jenniffer. 2012. "Making them count: How effective has official encouragement of quantitative methods been in British sociology?" *Current Sociology* 60(5):690–704.

Pluckrose, Helen, James Lindsay, and Peter Boghossian. 2021. 'Understanding the "Grievance Studies Affair" Papers and Why They Should Be Reinstated: A Response to Geoff Cole." *Sociological Methods & Research* 50(4):1916–1936.

Polányi, Karl. [1924] 1994. "The Functionalist Theory of Society and the Problem of Socialist Economic Calculability. (A Rejoinder to Professor L. von Mises and Dr. Feliz Weil)." [Translated by K. Polanyi Levitt]. *Cahiers monnaie et financement* 22:115–26.

Polányi, Karl. [1944] 1957. *The Great Transformation*, Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Polányi, Karl. 1945. "Universal Capitalism or Regional Planning." *The London Quarterly of World Affairs* 10(3):86–91.

Polányi, Karl. 1946. "Marxist Economic Thought". Review of *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* by Maurice H. Dobb. *Journal of Economic History* 206–7.

Polányi, Karl. 1947a.""On Belief in Economic Determinism"" *Sociological Review* 39(1):96–112.

Polányi, Karl. 1947b. "Our Obsolete Market Mentality." *Commentary* 3(2):109–17.

Polányi, Karl. 1957. "The Economy as Instituted Process." Pp. 243–70 in *Trade and Market in Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory*, edited by K. Polányi, C. M. Arensberg and H. W. Pearson. A Gateway ed. Chicago, IL: Henrey Regnery Co.

Polányi, Karl. 1959. 'Draft article – "Research into the Substantive Econom".' The Karl Polanyi Digital Archive. Articles, review articles, draft articles, and papers in English, German, and Hungarian, written mostly in North America, 1946–1964.; Con_37_Fol_13. Montreal, Canada: Concordia University. Re-

trieved September 10, 2018
(http://kpolanyi.scoolaid.net:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10694/986/C
on%2037%20Fol%2013.pdf?sequence=1).

Polányi, Karl. 1977. *The Livelihood of Man*. Edited by H. W. Peterson. New York: Academic Press.

Polányi, Michael. 1962. *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press / London, England: Routledge and K. Paul.

Pollner, Melvin. 1987. *Mundane Reason*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Pollner, Melvin. 1991. "Left of Ethnomethodology: The Rise and Decline of Radical Reflexivity." *American Sociological Review* 56(3):370–80.

Pontusson, Jonas. 2007. "Methods in Comparative Political Economy." Pp. 325–33 in *Capitalisms Compared* edited by L. Mjøset, and T.H. Clausen, Bingley, England: Emerald. Popper, Karl R. 1940. "What is Dialectic?" *Mind* 49(196):403–26.

Popper, Karl R. 1944a. "The Poverty of Historicism, I." *Economica*, New Series 11(42):86–103.

Popper, Karl R. 1944b. "The Poverty of Historicism, II. A Criticism of Historicist Methods." *Economica*, New Series 11(43):119–37.

Popper, Karl R. 1945. *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, *Vol. II, The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath*. London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Popper, Karl R. 1957. *The Poverty of Historicism*. London, England: The Beacon Press.

Popper, Karl R. 1961. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. New York: Science.

Popper, Karl R. 1963. *Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*. London, England: Routledge and K. Paul,

Popper, Karl R. 1977a. "The Logic of the Social Sciences." Pp. 87–104 in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*. Translated by G. Adey and D. Frisby. London, England: Heinemann.

Popper, Karl R. 1977b. "Reason or Revolution?" Pp. 288–300 in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*. Translated by G. Adey and D. Frisby. London, England: Heinemann.

Porpora, Douglas V. 2018. "Critical Realism as Relational Sociology." Pp. 413–30 in *The Palgrave Handbook of Relational Sociology*, edited by F. Dépelteau. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature.

Portes, Alejandro. 2000. "The Hidden Abode: Sociology as Analysis of the Unexpected: 1999 Presidential Address." *American Sociological Review* 65: 1–18.

Portes, Alejandro. 2010a. *Economic Sociology: A Systematic Inquiry*. Princeton, NJ and Oxford, England: Princeton University Press.

Portes, Alejandro. 2010b. "Reflections on a Common Theme: Establishing the Phenomenon, Adumbration, and Ideal Types." Pp. 32–53 in *Robert K. Merton: Sociology of Science and Sociology as Science*, edited by C. Calhoun, New York City and Chichester, England: Columbia University Press.

Pospielovsky, D. 1978. "From *Gosizdat* to *Samizdat* and *Tamizdat*." *Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne Des Slavistes* 20(1):44–62.

Preissle, Judith. 2007. "Feminist Research Ethics." Pp. 515–32 in *Handbook of Feminist Research: Theory and Praxis*, edited by S. N. Hesse-Biber. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Preissle, Judith and Yuri Han. 2012. "Feminist Research Ethics." Pp. 583–605 in *Handbook of Feminist Research: Theory and Praxis*, 2nd ed., edited by S. N. Hesse-Biber. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Price, John Valdimir. 1965. *The Ironic Hume*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Proctor, Robert N. 1991. *Value-Free Science? Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Radio Free Europe. 1956. "On Lukacs Speech to Petofi Circle", 26 June. HU OSA 300–8–3–2981; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Radio Free Europe. 1964a. "Lukacs Calls for Freedom of Expression", 22 March. HU OSA 300–8–3–3562; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Radio Free Europe. 1964b. "Lukacs Calls for Freedom of Expression, 22 March. HU OSA 300–8–3–3563; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Radio Free Europe. 1968. "Three Philosophers Expelled from Hungarian Party, 17 December. HU OSA 300–8–3–3644; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Radio Free Europe. 1977. 'Problems of Sociology' in "Situation Report: Hungary, 15 November 1977", 15 November, pp. 7–10. HU OSA 300–8–47–108–35; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Radio Free Europe. 1978. "Censorship: An English and Hungarian view, 3 August. HU OSA 300–8–3–13764; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Ragin, Charles C. 1987. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Ragin, Charles C. 2000. *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Ragin, Charles C. 2009. "Configurational Comparative Methods." Pp. 87–121 in *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques*, edited by Benoît Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin. Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.

Rab, Balazs. 1978a. "New Hungarian samizdat." *Index on Censorship* 7(4):37–43.

Rab, Balazs. 1978b. "Marx in the fourth decade." *Index on Censorship* 7(6):21–25.

Rab, Balazs. 1980. "Hungary (2): Samizdat sackings." *Index on Censorship* 9(2):13–6.

Ragin, Charles and David Zaret. 1983. "Theory and Method in Comparative Research: Two Strategies." *Social Forces* 61(3):731–54.

Ragin, Charles C. and Howard Saul Becker. eds. 1992. *What Is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Rabinow, Paul and William M. Sullivan, eds. 1979. *Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press

Rakovski, Marc. 1976. "Der Marxismus angesichts der sowjetischen Gesellschaftern." Pp. 138–68 in *Die Neue Linke in Ungarn*, edited by A. Hegedüs and M. Vajda. Internationale Marxistische Diskussion 53, Band 2, Berlin, Germany: Merve-Verlag.

Rakovski, Marc. 1977. "Marxism and the Analysis of Soviet Societies." *Capital and Class* 1(1):83–105.

Rakovski, Marc. 1978. *Towards an East European Marxism*. London, England: Allison and Busby.

Rakovski, Marc. 1979. "La société de type soviétique." Pp. 23–29 in *Opposition = 0,1%*, edited by M. Haraszti [Extraits du samizdat hongrois présentés par Miklós Hraszti]. Paris, France: Ėditions du Seuil.

Raud, Rein. 2016. *Meaning in Action: Outline of an Integral Theory of Culture*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Rawls, Anne W. 2002. "Editor's Introduction." Pp. 1–64 in *Ethnomethodology's Program: Working Out Durkheim's Aphorism* by H. Garfinkel. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Rebentisch, Juliane. 2013. "The Morality of Irony: Hegel and Modernity." *Symposium* 17(1):100–30.

Redfield, Robert. 1948. "The Art of Social Science." *American Journal of Sociology* 54(3):181–90.

Reichertz, Jo. 2004. "Objective Hermeneutics and Hermeneutic Sociology of Knowledge." Pp. 290–295 in *Companion to Qualitative Research*, edited by U. Flick et al. London, England: Sage Publications.

Reid, Jeffrey. 2018. "Hegel's Critique of Romantic Irony." Pp. 242–57 in *Brill's Companion to German Romantic Philosophy*, edited by E. Millan, J. Norman. Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers.

Reisch, Alfred. 1983. 'Another Warning to Gyorgy Konrad' in "Situation Report: Hungary, 21 June 1983", 21 June, pp. 16–18. HU OSA 300–8–47–114–9; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Reiss, Edmond. 1981. "Medieval Irony." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 42(2):209–26.

Rév, Istvan. 2001. "Retrotopia Critical Reason Turns Primitive." Pp. 364–87 in edited by S. Joan W. and K. Debra S*chools of Thought. Twenty-Five Years of Interpretive Social Science*. Princeton, NJ and Oxford, England: Princeton University Press.

Rex, John. 1971. "Typology and objectivity: A comment on Weber's four sociological methods." Pp. 17–36 in *Max Weber and Modern Sociology* edited by A. Sahay. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Rézler, Julius. 1974. "The Rebirth of Sociology in Hungary." *East European Quarterly* 8(2):223–9.

Rhodes, Carl and Richard Badham. 2018. "Ethical Irony and the Relational Leader: Grappling with the Infinity of Ethics and the Finitude of Practice." *Business Ethics Quarterly* 28(1):71–98.

Riazi, A. Mehdi. 2016. "Innovative Mixed-methods Research: Moving Beyond Design Technicalities to Epistemological and Methodological Realizations." *Applied Linguistics* 37(1):33–49.

Ribbeck, Otto. 1876. "Uber den Begriff des έίων." *Rheinisches Museum* 31:381–400.

Richardson, Alan W. 2000. "Science as Will and Representation: Carnap, Reichenbach, and the Sociology of Science." *Philosophy of Science* 67(Sept.):S151–S162.

Ricoeur, Paul. [1983] 1996. "On interpretation." Pp. 138–55 in *The Continental Philosophy Reader*, edited by R. Kearney, and M. Rainwater. London, England: Routledge.

Riecken, Henry W. and Boruch Robert F. 1978. "Social Experiments." *Annual Review of Sociology* 4(1):511–32.

Riesch, Hauke. 2014. "Philosophy, history and sociology of science: Interdisciplinary relations and complex social identities*." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 48:30–7.

Rigby T. H. 1964. "Traditional, Market, and Organizational Societies and the USSR." *World Politics* 16(4):539–57.

Rigby, T. H. 1982. "Introduction: Political Legitimacy, Weber and Communist Mono-organisational Systems." Pp. 1–26 in *Political Legitimation in Communist States*, edited by T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Fehér. London and Basingstoke, England: The Macmillan Press.

Rigó, Máté. 2022. "From Leisure Time to Oligarchs: A Conversation with Iván Szelényi about His Six Decades of Researching Social Inequality". Budapest: CEU Democracy Institute. Posted on April 21, 2022. Retrieved May 30, 2022 (https://revdem.ceu.edu/2022/04/21/from-leisure-time-to-oligarchs-a-conversation-with-ivan-szelenyi-about-his-six-decades-of-researching-social-inequality/).

Ringer, Fritz. 1997. *Max Weber's Methodology. The Unification of the Cultural and Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ritzer, George. 1980. *Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science*, Revised ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon Inc.

Ritzer, George. 1987. "The current state of metatheory." *Sociological Perspectives: The Theory Section Newsletter* 10:1–6.

Ritzer, George. 1988a. "Sociological Metatheory: A Defense of a Subfield by a Delineation of its Parameters." *Sociological Theory* 6(Fall):187–200.

Ritzer, George. 1988b. "The micro-macro link: Problems and prospects." *Contemporary Sociology* 17:703–6.

Ritzer, George. 1989. "Collins Does Metatheory (Again!): and He's (Pretty) Good at it." *Symbolic Interaction* 12(1):81–4.

Ritzer, George. 1990. "Metatheorizing in Sociology." *Sociological Forum* 5(1):3–15.

Ritzer, George. 1991a. *Metatheorizing in Sociology*, Lexington, KY: Lexington Books.

Ritzer, George. 1991b. "Reflections on the Rise of Metatheorizing in Sociology." *Sociological Perspectives* 34(3):237–48.

Ritzer, George. 1991c. "Biography: A (Still) Underutilized Metasociological Method." *Contemporary Sociology* 20(1):10–2.

Ritzer, George. 1991d. "I Never Metatheory I Didn't Like." *Mid-American Review of Sociology* 15(2):21–32.

Ritzer, George. ed. 1992a. *Metatheorizing*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Ritzer, George. 1992b. "Metatheorizing in Sociology. Explaining the Coming of Age." Pp. 7–26 in *Metatheorizing*, edited by R. George. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Ritzer, George. 1992c. "The Legitimation and Institutionalization of Metatheorizing in Sociology." *Sociological Perspectives* 35(3):543–50.

Ritzer, George. 2007. s.v. "Metatheory." Pp. 2964–67 in *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*, Vol. 6, edited by G. Ritzer, Oxford, England: Blackwell Publ.

Robbins, Derek. 2011. "John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte: A trans-cultural comparative epistemology of the social sciences." *Journal of Classical Sociology* 11 (1):51–74.

Robinson, William F. 1967. "Sociology: The Self-criticism of a Socialist Society", 13 July. HU OSA 300–8–3–3638; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Robinson, William F. 1968. "Sociology: Useful Science or Temporary Fad?", 24 April. HU OSA 300–8–3–3664; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Robinson, William F. 1969. 'A "Modest Proposal", for the Future of Hungarian Sociology', 1 April. HU OSA 300–8–3–3672; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Robinson, William F. 1974. "A new blow against Hungarian non-conformists", 6 November. HU OSA 300–8–3–3823; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary. [Also published in 1975 in *Index on Censorship* 4(1):55–7].

Rodríguez, Martín Caeiro. 2020. "Describiendo las metodografías: crear, aprender e investigar biográficamente desde la educación artística." *Artseduca* 27:20–35.

Rosaldo, Michelle. 1979. Review of New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies by Anthony Giddens. American Anthropologist 81(2):427.

Rossa, Jeffrey Ian and Dawn L. Rothe 2008. "Ironies of Controlling State Crime." *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice* 36(3):196–210.

Rorty, Richard. 1989. *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Rose, Gillian. 1981. *Hegel contra Sociology*, London, England: Athlone.

Roth, Guenther. 1971 "Max Weber's Comparative Approach and Historical Typology." Pp. 75–93 in *Comparative Methods in Sociology: Essays on Trends and Applications*, edited by I. Vallier. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Roth, Julius. 1962. 'Comments on "Secret Observation".' *Social Problems* 9(3):283–4.

Rouse, Joseph. 2005. Epistemological derangement. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* Part A, 36:835–47.

Rouse, Joseph. 2011. "Philosophy of science and science studies in the west: An unrecognized convergence." *East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal* 5(1):11–26.

Rouse, Joseph. 2015. "Cultural Studies of Science." Pp. 504–6 in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd ed., edited by J. D. Wright. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.

Rule, James B. 1997. *Theory and Progress in Social Science*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.Quine, W. V. 1962. "Paradox." *Scientific American* 206(4):84–99.

Ryan, Gemma S. 2019. "Postpositivist, Critical Realism: Philosophy, Methodology and Method for Nursing Research." *Nurse Researcher* 27(3):20–6.

Sahay, Artur. 1971. "The Importance of Weber's Methodology in Sociological Explanation." Pp. 67–81 in *Max Weber and Modern Sociology*, edited by A. Sahay. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Slaney, Kathleen L. 2001. "On Empirical Realism and the Defining of Theoretical Terms." *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psyhology* 21(2):132–52.

Salvatore, Sergio and Jaan Valsiner. 2009. "Idiographic Science on its Way: Towards Making Sense of Psychology." Pp. 9–19 in *YIS: Yearbook of Idiographic Science*, Vol. 1 edited by S. Salvatore, J. Valsiner, S. Strout, and J. Clegg. Rome, Italy: Firera & Liuzzo Publishing.

Salvatore, Sergio and Jaan Valsiner. 2010a. "Idiographic Science as a Non-Existing Object: The Importance of the Reality of the Dynamic System." Pp. 7–26 in *YIS: Yearbook of Idiographic Science*, Vol. 2 edited by S. Salvatore, J. Valsiner, S. Strout, and J. Clegg. Rome, Italy: Firera & Liuzzo Publishing.

Salvatore, Sergio and Jaan Valsiner. 2010b. "Between the General and the Unique: Between the General and the Unique Overcoming the Nomothetic versus Idiographic Opposition." *Theory and Psyhology* 20(6): 817–833.

Sanderson, Stephen K. 1987. "Eclecticism and its Alternatives." *Current Perspectives in Social Theory* 8: 313–45.

Sanderson, Stephen K. 2012. *Rethinking Sociological Theory: Introducing and Explaining a Scientific Theoretical Sociology*. Boulder, CO & London, England: Paradigm Publication.

Sárközi, Mátyás. 1986. "The Influence of Georg Lukács on the Young Karl Mannheim in the Light of a Newly Discovered Diary." *The Slavonic and East European Review* 64(3):432–39.

Savage, Mike. 2010. *Identities and Social Change in Britain Since 1940: The Politics of Method*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Savage, Mike. 2013. "The 'Social Life of Methods': A Critical Introduction." *Theory, Culture and Society* 30(4):3–21.

Savage, Mike. 2017. "Sociology and the Digital: A Response to Alphia Possamai-Inesedy and Alan Nixon." *Journal of Sociology* 53(4):885–6.

Savage, Mike and Roger Burrows. 2007. "The Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology." *Sociology* 41(5):885–99.

Savage, Mike and Roger Burrows. 2009. "Some Further Reflections on the Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology." *Sociology* 43(4):762–72.

Sayer, Andrew R. 1984. *Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach*. London, England: Hutchinson.

Scaff, Lawrence A. 1984. "Weber before Weberian Sociology." *British Journal of Sociology* 35(2):190–215.

Scaff, Lawrence A. 1993. "Weber after Weberian Sociology." *Theory and Society* 22(6):845–51.

Schaeffer, Nora Cate. 1991. "Conversation with a Purpose – or Conversation? Interaction in the Standardized Interview." Pp. 367–91 in *Measurement Errors in Surveys*, edited by R. Groves, S. Sudman, N. A. Mathiowetz, L. E. Lyberg, and P. P. Biemer. New York: John Wiley.

Schlegel, Friedrich. 1957. *Literary Notebooks 1797–1801*. Edited by H. Eichner. Toronto, Canada: Toronto University Press.

Schlegel, Friedrich. [1958] 1971. *Friedrich Schlegel's Lucinde and the Fragments*. Translated and with an introduction by P. Firchow. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Schluchter, Wolfgang. 1979. "Value-Neutrality and the Ethic of Responisbility." Pp. 65–116 in *Max Weber's Vision of History: Ethics and Methods*. Translated by G. Roth, edited by G. Roth and W. Schluchter. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Schmidinger, Heinrich. 1990. "Ironie und Christentum." *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 97:277–96.

Schneider, Louis. 1969. "On Frontiers of Sociology and History: Observations on Evolutionary Development and Unanticipated Consequences." *Social Science Quarterly* 50(June):6–24.

Schneider, Louis 1971. "Dialectic in Sociology." *American Sociological Review* 36(4):667–678.

Schneider, Louis. 1975a. *The Sociological Way of Looking at the World*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Schneider, Louis. 1975b. "Ironic Perspective in Sociological Thought." Pp. 323–37 in *The idea of Social Structure: Essays in Honour of Robert K. Merton*, edited by L. Coser. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich.

Schneider, Louis. 1976. Review of *The Theory of the Leisure Class* by Thorstein Veblen. *Social Science Quarterly* 57(June):218–21.

Schöpflin, George. 1974. "The Trial of Miklós Haraszti." *Index on Censorship* 3(1):79–84.

Schöpflin, George. 1979. "Opposition and Para-Opposition: Critical Currents in Hungary, 1968–78." Pp. 142–86 in *Opposition in Eastern Europe*, edited by R. L. Tökés. London, England: Macmillan.

Schöpflin, George. 1990. "HUNGARY. From Kádárism to democracy." Pp. 92–108 in *The Times Guide to Eastern Europe. The Changing Face of the Warsaw Pact. A Comprehensive Handbook*, edited by K. Sword. London, England: Times Books.

Schöpflin, George. 1993. *Politics in Eastern Europe 1945 – 1992*, Oxford, England and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Schöpflin, Julian. 1979. "Preface." Pp. 99–103 in *Communism and Eastern Europe. A Collection of Essays*, edited by F. Silnitsky, L. Silnitsky and K. Reyman. Sussex, England: The Harvester Press.

Schuler, Jeanne. 1984. Review of *Hegel Contra Sociology* by Gillian Rose. *Theory and Society* 13(2):285–9.

Schutz, Alfred. 1954. "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences." *The Journal of Philosophy* 51(9):257–73.

Schutz, Alfred. 1967. *The Phenomenology of the Social World*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Schwandt, Thomas. 1998. "Interpretivist Approaches to Human Inquiry." Pp. 221-59 in *The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues*, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publ.

Schwendinger, Herman and Julia R. Schwendinger. 1974. *The Sociologists Of The Chair: A Radical Analysis of the Formative Years of North American Sociology 1883–1922*. New York: Basic Books.

Seale, Clive Giampietro Gobo, Jaber F. Gubrium and David Silverman eds. 2004. *Qualitative Research Practice*. London, England: Sage Publications.

Seawright, Jason. 2016. "The Case for Selecting Cases That Are Deviant or Extreme on the Independent Variable." *Sociological Methods & Research* 45(3):493–525.

Seawright, Jason and John Gerring. 2008. "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options." *Political Research Quarterly* 61(2):294–308.

Sedgewick, G. G. 1913. "Dramatic Irony: Studies in its History, its Definition, and its Use Especially in Shakespeare and Sophocles." PhD dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

Sedgewick, G. G. 1935. *Of Irony, Especially in Drama*, Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.

Seery, John Evan. 1990. *Political Returns: Irony in Politics and Theory from Plato to the Antinuclear Moment*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Sekaran, Uma and Roger Bougie. 2016. *Research Methods for Business: A Skill-Building Approach*. 7th ed. Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons.

Sewell, Graham and James R. Barker. 2006a. "Coercion versus Care: Using Irony to Make Sense of Organizational Surveillance." *The Academy of Management Review* 31(4):934–61.

Sewell, Graham and James R. Barker. 2006b. "Max Weber and the Irony of Bureaucracy." Pp. 56–87 in *Social Theory at Work*, edited by M. Korczynski, et al., Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Shadish, William R. 2000. "The Empirical Program of Quasi-Experimentation." Pp. 13–35 in *Research Design: Donald Campbell's Legacy*. Vol. 2, edited by L. Bickman. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Shadish, W[illiam] R. 2001. "Quasi-Experimental Designs." Pp. 12655–59 *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, edited by N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes. Oxford, England: Pergamon Press.

Shadish, William R., Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell. 2002. *Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference*. Boston, MA and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Sharrock, Wesley W. and Digby C. Anderson. 1986. *The Ethnomethodologists*. Chichester, England: Ellis Horwood and London, England: Tavistock.

Shapin, Steven. 1995. "Here and Everywhere: Sociology of Scientific Knowledge." *Annual Review of Sociology* 21(1):289–321.

Sharp, Carolyn J. 2009. *Irony and Meaning in the Hebrew Bible*. Bloomington and Indianapolis IN: Indiana University Press.

Sheehan, Helena. 2007. "Marxism and Science Studies: A Sweep through the Decades." *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 21(2):197–210.

Sica, Alan. "Merton, Mannheim, and the Sociology of Knowledge." Pp. 164–81 in *Robert K. Merton: Sociology of Science and Sociology as Science*, edited by C. Calhoun. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Sieber, Sam D. 1973. "The integration of field work and survey methods." *American Journal of Sociology* 78(6):1335–59.

Siegel, Harvey. 2011. "Epistemological Relativism: Arguments Pro and Con." Pp. 201–18 in *A Companion to Relativism*, edited by S. D. Hales. Oxford, England: Blackwell Publ.

Silianov, Eugène. 1976. Review of *Les Fondateurs* by György Konrád. *Cahiers de l'Est* 6:120–2.

Simpson, David. 1979. *Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry*. London, England: The Macmillan Press.

Sismondo, Sergio. 2007. "Science and Technology Studies and an Engaged Program." Pp. 13–30 in *The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies*, edited by E. J. Hackett, O. Amsterdamska, M. E. Lynch and J. Wajcman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sismondo, Sergio. 2015. "Ontological Turns, Turnoffs and Roundabouts." *Social Studies of Science* 45(3):441–48.

S.K. 1976. "A Nonconformist Hungarian Novel Presents the Vision of a Humane Socialism", 14 May. HU OSA 300–8–3–3847; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Sklair, Leslie. 1973. *Organized Knowledge: A Sociological View of Science and Technology*. St Albans, England: Paladin.

Skocpol, Theda. 1982. "A Reflection on Gouldner's Conceptions of State Power and Political Liberation." *Theory and Society* 11(6):821–30.

Skocpol, Theda. 1984. "Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in Historical Sociology." Pp. 356–391 in *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, edited by T. Skocpol. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Small, Mario Luis. 2011. "How to Conduct a Mixed Methods Study: Recent Trends in a Rapidly Growing Literature." *Annual Review of Sociology* 37:57–86.

Smelser, Neil J. and Baltes, Paul B. eds. 2001. *International Encyclopaedia of the Social & Behavioural Sciences*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Smith, Adam. 1937. *The Wealth of Nations*, 5th ed. New York: Modern Library, Random House.

Smith, Colin. 1964. *Contemporary French Philosophy: A Study in Norms and Values*. Westpoint, CT: Greenwood Press.

Smith, Mary Lee. 1997. "Mixing and Matching: Methods and Models." *New Directions for Evaluation* 74(June):73–85.

Smith, Robin James and Paul Atkinson. 2016. "Method and Measurement in Sociology, fifty years on." *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 19(1):99–110.

Snedeker, George. 1985–86. "The Politics of Epistemology: Georg Lukács and the Critique of Irrationalism." *Science & Society* 49(4):437–50.

Sommer, Otto. ed. 1962. "Interne Arbeitstagung der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie." Tübingen, 19–21. Oktober 1961, *Sonderdruck aus Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, Heft 2.

Sorokin, Pitirim Aleksandrovich. [1927] 1959. *Social and Cultural Mobility*. [Containing complete reprints of *Social Mobility* and Ch. 5 of *Social and Cultural Dynamics* Vol. 4]. New York: Free Press.

Sorokin, Pitirim Aleksandrovich. 1956. *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences*, Chicago, IL: H. Regnery Co.

Speight, Allen. 2016. "Friedrich Schlegel." in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Winter Ed. Edited by E. N. Zalta. Retrieved January 21, 2019 (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/schlegel/).

Stahl, Titus. 2013a. "What is Immanent Critique?" *SSRN Working Papers*. Retrieved January 21, 2019 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2357957).

Stahl, Titus. 2013b. "Habermas and the Project of Immanent Critique." *Constellations* 20(4):533–52.

Stahl, Titus. 2018. "Georg [György] Lukács", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Spring 2018 Ed. Edited by E. N. Zalta. Retrieved January 21, 2019 (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/lukacs/).

Stanley, Liz. 2008. "It has Always Known, and we have Always been 'other': Knowing Capitalism and the 'Coming Crisis' of Sociology Confront the Concentration System and Mass-Observation." *The Sociological Review* 56(4):535–51.

Stark, David. 1982. "Coalition Politics at Work: New Clan Confirmation in Capitalist and State-Socialist Societies", PhD dissertation, Department of Sociology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

Stark, David. 1986. "Rethinking Internal Labor Markets: New Insight from a Comparative Perspective." *American Sociological Review* 51(4):492–504.

Stark, David. 2007. "Opportunities of constraints: A sociologist's reflections on János Kornai's By Force of Thought." Review of *By Force of Thought* by János Kornai. *Theory and Society* 36(Oct.):469–76.

Steele, Brent J. 2010. "Irony, Emotions and Critical Distance." *Millennium*, 39(1):89–107.

Stefan Titscher, Michael Meyer, Ruth Wodak and Eva Vetter. 2000. "Objective Hermeneutics." Pp. 198–212 in *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis*, London, England: Sage Publications.

Steiner, George. 2000. "True Leninist: The Apologia for Georg Lukács." *The Times Literary Supplement*, October 13, pp. 7–8.

Stehr, Nico and Volker Meja, ed. 2017. *Society and Knowledge: Contemporary Perspectives in the Sociology of Knowledge & Science*. 2nd ed. London, England and New York: Routledge.

Steinmetz, George. 1998. "Critical Realism and Historical Sociology. A Review Article." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40(1):170–86.

Steinmetz, George. 1999. *State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press

Steinmetz, George, ed. 2005a. *The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and Its Epistemological Others*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Steinmetz, George. 2005b. "INTRODUCTION. Positivism and Its Others in the Social Sciences." Pp. 1–56 in *The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and Its Epistemological Others*, edited by G. Steinmetz. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Steinmetz, George. 2005c. "SOCIOLOGY Scientific Authority and the Transition to Post-Fordism: The Plausibility of Positivism in U.S. Sociology since 1945." Pp. 276–323 in *The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and Its Epistemological Others*, edited by G. Steinmetz. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Steinmetz, George. 2005d. "The Epistemological Unconscious of U.S. Sociology and the Transition to Post-Fordism: The Case of Historical Sociology." Pp. 109–57 in *Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology*, edited by J. Adams, E. Clemens, and A. S. Orloff. Durham, NC and London, England: Duke University Press.

Stemmer, Brigitte. 2015. "Pragmatic Disorders." Pp. 788–94 in *International Encyclopaedia of the Social & Behavioural Sciences*, Vol. 18, 2nd ed., edited by J. D. Wright. Oxford, England: Pergamon Press.

Stewart, Jon Bartley. 2015. *Søren Kierkegaard: Subjectivity, Irony, and the Crisis of Modernity*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Stinchcombe, Arthur L. 1968. *Constructing Social Theories*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Stokes, Gale. 1993. *The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Stratton, Matthew. 2014. *The Politics of Irony in American Modernism*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Stretton, Hugh. 1981. Review of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* by György Konrád and lván Szelényi. ["Intellectuals and inequalities under state socialism."] *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 5(1):117–22.

Suchman, Lucy and Brigitte Jordan. 1990. "Interactional Troubles in Face-to-Face Survey Interviews." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 85(409):232–41.

Swain, Nigel. 1992. *Hungary: The Rise and Fall of Feasible Socialism*. London, England: Verso.

Swanson, Guy E. 1971. Review of *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* by Alvin W. Gouldner. *American Sociological Review* 36(2):317–21.

Swedberg, Richard [with the assistance of Ola Agevall]. 2005. *The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Swedberg, Richard. 2007. "Max Weber's Interpretive Economic Sociology." *The American Behavioral Scientist* 50(8):1035–55.

Swedberg, Richard. 2016a. "Before Theory Comes Theorizing or How to Make Social Science More Interesting." *British Journal of Sociology* 67(1):5–22.

Swedberg, Richard. 2016b. "Reply to the Commentators." *British Journal of Sociology* 67(1):57–70.

Swidler, Ann and Jorge Arditi. 1994. "The New Sociology of Knowledge." *Annual Review of Sociology* 20(1):305–329.

Symonds, Michael and Jason Pudsey. 2008. "The Concept of 'Paradox' in the Work of Max Weber." *Sociology* 42(2):223–41.

Szabó, Máté. 2004. "Hungary." Pp. 51–72 in *Dissent and Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe. Origins of Civil Society and Democratic Transition* edited by J. Wielgohs and D. Pollack. Aldershot, England: Ashgate.

Szacki, Jerzy. 1990. "Intellectuals between Politics and Culture." 229–46 in *The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals*, edited by I. Maclean, A. Montefiore and P. Winch. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Szalai, Erzsébet. 1989. "The New Elite." *Across Frontiers* 5(Fall-Winter):25-31.

Szalai, Sándor and Kálmán Kulcsár. eds. 1974. *Szociológia* 5(Supplement).

Szántó, Miklós. Hatalom, 2007. "Beszélgetés Szelényi Ivánnal." [21.07.1988] Pp. 164–180 in *Hatalom, politika, társadalomtudomány: - Interjúk a magyar szociológia újjászületésének körülményeiről az 1960-as években*, edited by T. Razgonyi and G. Budai. Budapest, Hungary: Institute of Sociology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA SZKI).

Szczepański, Jan. 1966. "Empirical Marxist Sociology", 1 January. HU OSA 300–8–3–13441; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at CEU, Budapest, Hungary.

Szelényi, Balázs and Iván Szelényi. 1991. "The Social Impact of Agrarian Reform: Social and Political Conflicts in the Post-Communist Transformation of Hungarian Agriculture." *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 10(1):12–24.

Szelényi, l[ván]. 1962. "A szabad idő vizsgálata a polgári szociológiában." [Examination of Leisure in the Bourgeois Sociology]. *Demográfia* 5(1):97–106.

Szelényi, Iván. 1969. *Bevezetés az empirikus szociológiai kutatás módszereibe*. Budapest, Hungary: Tankönyvkiadó,

Sz. I. 1972a. "A mai munkásosztály kutatásának módszertani kérdései. (Nemzetközi szimpózium)." [Methodological questions of research on the present working class (International symposium)]. *Társadalomtudományi Közlemények* 4:93–100.

Sz. I. 1972b. "A munkásosztály fogalmi meghatározása: elméleti-politikai kategória. (Beszélgetés NDK-beli társadalomkutatókkal)" [Definition of the concept of the working class as a theoretical political category. (Talk with sociologists from GDR)]. *Társadalomtudományi Közlemények* 4:105–107.

Szelényi, Iván. 1973. "Bevezetés" [Introduction] in *Társadalmi tervezés és szociológia. A VII. Szociológia Világkongresszus témájához.* [Social Planning and Sociology], edited by I. Szelényi. Budapest, Hungary: Gondolat Kiadó.

Szelényi, Iván. 1977. 'Notes on the "Budapest School".' *Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory* 8(1):61–7.

Szelényi, Iván. 1978a. "Social Inequalities in State Socialist Redistributive Economies: Dilemma for Social Policy in Contemporary Socialist Societies of Eastern Europe." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 1–2:63–87.

Szelényi, Iván. 1978b. "Class analysis and beyond – further dilemma for the New Urban Sociology." *Comparative Urban Research* 1:86–96.

Szelényi, Iván. 1978c. "The position of the intelligentsia in the class structure of state socialist societies." Pp. 67–83 in *Socialism and the new class: towards the analysis of structural inequality within socialist societies.* APSA Monograph No. 19, edited by M. Sawer. Bedford Park, Australia: Australasian Political Studies Association.

Szelényi, Iván. 1979a. "Socialist Opposition in Eastern Europe – Dilemmas and Prospects." Pp. 187–208 in *Opposition in Eastern Europe* edited by R. L. Tökés. London, England: Macmillan.

Szelényi, Iván. 1979b. "Preface." Pp. xiii-xix in *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power: A Sociological Study of the Role of the Intelligentsia in Socialism* by George Konrad and Ivan Szelényi. New York and London, England: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Szelényi, Iván. 1979c. "The position of the intelligentsia in the class structure of state socialist societies." *Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory* 10(1):51–76.

Szelényi, Iván. 1980a. "Whose Alternative?" *New German Critique* 20(Spring/Summer):117–34.

Szelényi, Iván. 1980b. Review of *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* by Alvin Gouldner. *Telos* 45(September 21):189–92.

Szelényi, Iván. 1981. "The Relative Autonomy of the State or the State Mode of Production." Pp. 565–591 in *Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Societies*, edited by M. J. Dear and A. J. Scott. London, England: Methuen.

Szelényi, Iván. 1982a. "The Intelligentsia in the Class Structure of State-Socialist Societies." [in "Marxist Inquiries – Studies of Labor, Class and States", edited by M. Burawoy and T. Skocpol] *American Journal of Sociology* 88(Supplement):S287–326.

Szelényi, Iván. 1982b. "Gouldner's Theory of the 'Flawed Universal Class' of Intellectuals." *Theory and Society* 11(6):779–98.

Szelényi, Iván. 1982c. "Inequalities and Social Policy under State Socialism". Review of *A Society in the Making. Hungarian Social and Societal Policy 1945–75* by Zsuzsa Ferge *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 6(1):121–7.

Szelényi, Iván. 1982d. Review of *Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia 1917–1941* by Kendall E. Bailes. *American Journal of Sociology* 88(1):217–20.

Szelényi, Iván. 1983a. *Urban Inequalities Under State Socialism*. Oxford, England: University of Oxford Press.

Szelényi, Iván. 1983b. Review of *The End of Social Inequality* by David Lane. *Acta Sociologica* 26(3/4):313–16.

Szelényi, Iván. 1984a. [Extract from the] "Review-Symposium on Soviet-Type Societies". Review of *Dictatorship over Needs* by Ferenc Fehér, Agnes Heller and György Márkus. *Telos* 60(June 20):166–73.

Szelényi, Iván. 1984b. Review of *The Many Faces of Socialism* by Paul Hollander. *Contemporary Sociology* 13(3):362–3.

Szelényi, Iván. 1984. Review of *New Hungarian Peasants: An East Central European Experience with Collectivization* by M. Hollos and B. C. Maday. *Contemporary Sociology* 13(4):438–9.

Szelényi, Iván. 1985a. "Ten years later: Self-critical reflections" [Postscript to the Japanese edition]. Pp. 327–415 in *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* [In Japanese] by George Konrád and Ivan Szelényi. Tokyo, Japan: Shinyo-Sha.

Szelényi, Iván. 1985b. Review of *Capitalist and Socialist Crises in the Late Twentieth Century* by James F. Petras. *Contemporary Sociology* 14(4):516–7.

Szelényi, Iván. 1985c. Review of *Recent Contributions to the Political Economy of State Socialism Planned Economy, Investments, Cycles* by Tamas Bauer; and *Economics of Shortage* by János Kornai. *Contemporary Sociology* 14(3, May, pp. 284–287.

Szelényi, Iván. 1986a. Review of *Marxism in the USSR: A Critical Survey of Current Thought* by James P. Scanlon. *Ethics* 96(4):901–902.

Szelényi, Iván. 1986b. Review of *Consciousness and the Urban Experience: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization* by David Harvey

["The Last of the Marxist Urban Sociologists?"]. *Contemporary Sociology* 15(5):707–10.

Szelényi, Iván. 1986c. Review of *Peasants in Socialist Transition: Life in a Collectivized Hungarian Village* by Peter D. Bell. *Slavic Review* 45(1):154–5.

Szelényi, Iván. 1986d. Review of *Collective Farms Which Work?* by Nigel Swain. *Slavic Review* 45(2):382.

Szelényi, Iván. 1986e. Review of *The Russian Intelligentsia* by Vladimir C. Nahirny. *American Journal of Sociology* 91(5):1284–88.

Szelényi, Iván. 1986–1987. "The Prospects and Limits of the East European New Class Project: An Auto-critical Reflection on The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power." *Politics and Society* 15(2):103–44.

Szelényi, Iván. 1987a. "Housing inequalities and occupational segregation in state socialist cities: commentary to the Special issue of IJURR on east European cities." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 11(1):1–8.

Szelényi, Iván. 1987b. Review of *The Origins of Stalinism: From Leninist Revolution to Stalinist Society* by Pavel Campeanu. *Contemporary Sociology.* 16(5):640–1.

Szelényi, Iván. (in collaboration with Robert Manchin, Pál Juhász, Bálint Magyar, and Bill Martin). 1988a. *Socialist Entrepreneurs. Embourgeoisement in Rural Hungary*. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Szelényi, Iván. 1988b. Review of *Marxist Political Economy and Marxist Urban Sociology* by Kieran McKeown. *Contemporary Sociology* 17(4):505–6.

Szelényi, Iván. 1988c. 'Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des Projekts einer neuen Klasse in Osteuropa Selbstkritische Uberlegungen zu "Die InteHigenz auf dem Weg zur Klassenmacht".' *Prokla* 18(70):94–124.

Szelényi, Iván. 1988d. Review of *Bourgeois Morality* by Maria Ossowska. *European Sociological Review* 4(3):284–5.

Szelényi, Iván. 1990a. "Alternative Futures of Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary." *East European Politics and Societies* 4(2):232–54.

Szelényi, Iván. 1990b. Review of *The Genesis of the Stalinist Social Order* by Pavel Campeanu. *American Journal of Sociology* 95(4):1066–8.

Szelényi, Iván. 1991a. "Intellectuals and the Politics of Knowledge (Abstract)." pp. 362–364 in *Social Theory for a Changing Society* edited by P. Bourdieu, and J. Coleman. Boulder, CO: Westview Press / Oxford and New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Szelényi, Iván. 1991b. "Foreword." Pp. vii-xiii in *The Dynamics of Breakthrough in Eastern Europe* by Jadwiga Staniszkis. Berkeley CA: University of California Press.

Szelényi, Iván. 1991c. "Karl Polanyi and the theory of a socialist mixed economy." Pp. 231–48 in *The Legacy of Karl Polanyi. Markets, State and Society at*

the End of the 20th Century, edited by M. Mendell and D. Salee. New York: Macmillan.

Szelényi, Iván. 1993. "Farewell to Socialism". Review of *The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism* by János Kornai. *Contemporary Sociology* 22(1):33–5.

Szelényi, Iván. 2000. "Road from Stalinist Official to Theorist of Reform Communism." *Review of Sociology* 1–2. Retrieved March 10, 2014 (http://www.szociologia.hu/dynamic/RevSoc_2000_SzelenyiI_Road_from_Stalinist_official.pdf).

Szelényi, Iván. 2002. "An Outline of the Social History of Socialism or An Auto-Critique of An Auto-Critique." *Research in Social Stratification* 19:41–67.

Szelényi, Iván. 1997. Review of *Social Theory and the Crisis of State Socialism* by Larry J. Ray. *Slavic Review* 56(4):760.

Szelényi, Iván. 2006. Review of *The Vanishing Hectare* by Katherine Verdery. *American Journal of Sociology* 111(5):1623–4.

Szelényi, Iván. 2008a. "Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Revisited." *International Political Anthropology* 1:139–48.

Szelényi, Iván. 2008b. "Varieties of Post-communist Capitalisms: Convergences and Divergences." Pp. 13–35 in *Perceptions and Images of China*, edited by H.-D. Assmann, T. M.H. Chan, K. M. v. Filseck. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlag.

Szelényi, Iván. 2008c. "A Theory of Transitions." *Modern China*, 34:165–75

Szelényi, Iván. 2009a. "SOCY 151: Foundations of Modern Social Theory". Department of Sociology, Yale University. New Haven, CT. Retrieved June 27, 2012 (http://oyc.yale.edu/sociology/socy–151).

Szelényi, Iván. 2009b. Review of *From Socialism to Capitalism* by János Kornai. *Czech Sociological Review* 45(3):611–5.

Szelényi, Iván. 2009c. "The New Grand Bourgeoisie under Post-Communism: Central Europe, Russia and China Compared." Presented at the UNU-Wider Conference on Reflections on Transition: 20 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, September 1, Helsinki, Finland.

Szelényi, Iván. 2009d. "CURRICULUM VITAE. Iván Szelenyi." Department of Sociology, Yale University. New Haven, CT. Retrieved June 30, 2011 (http://www.yale.edu/sociology/faculty/pages/szelenyi/CV.05.15.10.pdf).

Szelényi, Iván. 2010a. "The New Grand Bourgeoisie under Post-Communism: Central Europe, Russia, and China Compared." Working Paper No. 2010/63, United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland.

Szelényi, Iván. 2010b. "Maria Markus and the (Re)invention of Hungarian Sociology." *Thesis Eleven* 101(May):24–35.

Szelényi, Iván. 2010c. "Capitalism in China? Comparative Perspectives." Pp. 199–223 in *Chinese Capitalisms: Historical Emergence and Political Implications*, edited by Y. Chu. Hong Kong: Palgrave Macmillan.

Szelényi, Iván. 2011a. Review of *Central and Eastern Europe Post-Communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing Social Policy Transformations* by Alfio Cerami and Pieter Vanhuysse. *Contemporary Sociology* 40:19–20.

Szelényi, Iván. 2011b. [Extract from] "Remembering Ray Pahl." ISA RC21 – Research Committee on Urban and Regional Development. New Haven, 18.06.2011d. Retrieved April 4, 2016 (http://www.rc21.org/remember/).

Szelényi, Iván. 2012a. "The Nature of the Chinese Formation and the Making of Its Welfare Regime. A Comment on Philip Huang's "Profit-Making State Firms and China's Development Experience: 'State Capitalism' or 'Socialist Market Economy'?" *Modern China* 38(6):646–64.

Szelényi, Iván. 2012b. "Jirí Musil and the East European Origins of the New Urban Sociology." *Sociologicky Casopis* 48(6):1156–63.

Szelényi, Iván. 2012c. Interview with Karmo Kroos. Vol. 1, April 27, New York: New York University.

Szelényi, Iván. 2012d. Interview with Karmo Kroos. Vol. 2, April 30, New York: New York University.

Szelényi, Iván. 2014a. "CURRICULUM VITAE. Ivan Szelenyi. William Graham Sumner Emeritus Professor of Sociology, Yale University. Foundation Dean of Social Sciences, NYUAD", Department of Sociology, New York University, New York. Retrieved July 15, 2014 (http://www.sociology.as.nyu.edu/attach/9808).

Szelényi, Iván. 2014b. "Beszélgetés Kolosi Tamással és Szelényi Ivánnal. A Társadalmi Egyenlötlenségeröl", June 10. Retrieved February 16, 2016 (http://www.szociologia.eu/sites/default/files/hir_csatolmanyok/kolosi_sz elenyi.pdf).

Szelényi, Iván. 2014c. "Capitalism After Communism." Pp. 637–49 in *Twenty-Five Sides of a Post-Communist Mafia State*, edited by B. Magyar and J. Vasarhelyi. Budapest, Hungary and New York: Central European University Press.

Szelényi, Iván. 2015a. "Pathways from and Crises after Communism. Part 2. The Case of Former USSR and China." *Belvedere Meridionale* 27(1):5–26.

Szelényi, Iván. 2015b. "Capitalisms after Communisms." *New Left Review* 96(Nov.-Dec.):1–13.

Szelényi, Iván. 2015c. "Entzauberung: Notes on Weber's Theory of Modernity." *International Political Anthropology* 8(1): 5–14.

Szelényi, Iván. 2015d. "The Triple Crisis of US Sociology." *Global Dialogue* 5(2). Retrieved October 15, 2015 (http://isa-global-dialogue.net/the-triple-crisis-

of-us-sociology/). [Originally posted in the blog "Contexts. Understanding people in their social worlds", Retrieved https://contexts.org/blog/the-triple-crisis-of-sociology/)].

Szelényi, Iván. 2016a. "The Fourth Principle of Legitimacy" Keynote Lecture. European University Institute, June, 10, Florence, Italy. Retrieved April 5, 2021 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kzo5aU2SUI0)

Szelényi, Iván. 2016b. "Weber's Theory of Domination and Post-Communist Capitalisms." *Theory and Society* 45:1–24

Szelényi, Iván. 2018a. "A Sociologist in Search for Continuity in a Rapidly Changing Half Century: An Intellectual Autobiography." *International Political Anthropology* 11(2):69–90.

Szelényi, Iván. 2018b. *Building Nations with Non-nationals with Non-nationals. The Exclusionary Immigration Regime of the Gulf Monarchies with a Case Study of Pakistani Return Migrants from and Prospective Migrants to the United Arab Emirates*. Budapest, Hungary: Corvina Books.

Szelényi, Iván. 2019. "In memoriam of Maria Márkus." *Thesis Eleven* 151(1):9–15.

Szelényi, Iván. 2020. "Auto-critical Reflection on Intellectuals, Inequalities and Transitions." Pp. 227–52 in *Intellectuals, Inequalities and Transitions: Prospects for A Critical Sociology*, edited by T. Demeter. Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers.

Szelényi, Iván; Katherine Beckett and Lawrence P. King. 1994. "The Socialist Economic System." Pp. 234–51 in *The Handbook of Economic Sociology*, edited by N. J. Smelser and R. Swedberg. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press and New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Szelényi, Ivan; Éva Fodor and Eric Hanley. 1997. "Left Turn in PostCommunist Politics: Bringing Class Back in?" *East European Politics and Societies* 11(1):190–223.

Szelényi, Iván and Christy M. Glass. 2003. "Winners of the Reforms: The New Economic and Political Elite." Pp. 75–98 in *Inequality and Social Structure During the Transition*, edited by, V. Mikhalev. Macmillan Press.

Szelényi, Iván and Eric Kostello. 1996. "The Market Transition Debate: Toward a Synthesis?" *American Journal of Sociology* 101(4):1082–96.

Szelényi, Iván and Eric Kostello. 1998. "Outline of an Institutionalist Theory of Inequality: The Case of Socialist and Postcommunist Eastern Europe." Pp. 305–26 in *The New Institutionalism in Sociology*, edited by V. Nee and M. Brinton. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Szelényi, Iván and János Ladányi. 2005. "Poverty after the Fall of State Socialism: Over-time and cross-national comparisons." *The Analyst - Central and Eastern European Review*, (English Ed.) 2(Sept):124–40.

Szelényi, Iván and Bill Martin. 1987. "Three waves of New Class theories" in Szelényi, lván Theories of the New Class: From Bakunin to Gouldner." Presented at the Annual Convention of the Australian Sociological Association, October 22–24, Graz, Australia.

Szelényi, Iván and Bill Martin. 1988."The three waves of New Class theories." *Theory and Society* 7(5):645–667.

Szelényi, Iván and Bill Martin. 1989. "The legal profession and the rise and fall of the New Class." Pp. 256–88 in *Lawyers in Society*, Vol. 3, edited by R. L. Abel, P. Simon, and L. Coleman. Berkeley CA: University of California Press.

Szelényi, Iván and Bill Martin. 1991. "The three waves of New Class theories and a Postscript." Pp. 19–30 in *Intellectuals and Politics*, edited by C. C. Lemert. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Szelényi, Iván and Péter Mihályi. 2020. *Varieties of Post-communist Capitalism. A comparative analysis of Russia, Eastern Europe and China*. Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers.

Szelényi, Iván and Szonja Szelényi. s.a. "Introduction" to Iván Szelényi, Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski and Donald Treiman *"Circulation of Elites?" Old and New Elites in Post Communist Societies*. Pp. 3–31 [Unpublished manuscript included in L. Bruszt "Regime-Change and the Transformation of Elites in the Post Communist Societies" (Course reader Fall 1994), Department of Political Science, CEU. Budapest, Hungary. Retrieved November 22, 2010 (http://web.ceu.hu/crc/Syllabi/PolSci/Bru_RegimeCh.F94PS.v5.html).

Szelényi, Iván and Szonja Szelényi. 1995. "Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe." *Theory and Society* 24:615–38.

Szelényi, Iván, Donald Treiman and Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski, eds. 1995. *Elity w Polsce, w Rosji I na Wegrzech. Wymiana czy Reprodukcja?* [Elites in Poland, Russia, and Hungary: Change or Reproduction?] Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN.

Szelényi, Iván and Donald Treiman. 1991. "Vyvoj socialni stratifikacje a rekrutace elit ve vychodni Evrope po roce 1989." [Social stratification and elite recruitment in Eastern Europe after 1989] *Sociologicky Casopis*, 3:276–98.

Szelényi, Iván and Donald Treiman. 1992. "Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989." Grant Proposal, National Science Foundation, Washington, DC.

Szelényi, Iván and Wilk, Katarzyna. 2010. "Institutional Transformation in European Post-Communist Regimes." Pp. 565–85 in *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis*, edited by G. Morgan, J. L. Campbell, C. Crouch, O. K. Pedersen and R. Whitley. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Szelényi, Szonja. 1987. "Social Inequality and Party Membership: Patterns of Recruitment into the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party." *American Sociological Review* 52(5):559–73.

Szelényi, Szonja. 1988. "Social mobility and class structure in Hungary and the United States." PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI.

Szelényi, Szonja. 1992. "Economic Subsystems and the Occupational Structure: A Comparison of Hungary and the United States." *Sociological Forum* 7(4):563–586.

Szelényi, Szonja. 1998. *Equality by Design: The Grand Experiment in Destratification in Socialist Hungary*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Szelényi, Szonja; Iván Szelényi and Imre Kovách. 1995. "The making of the Hungarian postcommunist elite: Circulation in politics, reproduction in the economy." *Theory and Society* 24(5):697–722.

Szelényi, Szonja; Iván Szelényi and Winifred R. Poster. 1996. "Interests and Symbols in Post-Communist Political Culture: The Case of Hungary." *American Sociological Review* 61(3):446–77.

Sztompka, Piotr. 1979. *Sociological Dilemmas: Toward a Dialectic Paradigm*, New York: Academic Press.

Sztompka, Piotr. 1993. *The Sociology of Social Change*. Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Taagepera, Rein. 2008. *Making Social Sciences More Scientific: The Need for Predictive Models*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Takács, Ádám. 2016. "The Sociological Incident: State Socialism, Sociology and Social Critique in Hungary." *Divinatio* 42–43:241–99.

Tam, William L. 1984. "The Symbolic Interaction 1st "I" As Ironist: Toward Alternative Worlds." *Symbolic Interaction* 7(2):175–89.

Tamás, Pál. 1992. "Hungarian Social Research of the 1990s: Continuity and Discontinuty." *East European Politics and Societies* 6(3):336–57.

Tar, Zoltán. 1980. Review of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power: A Sociological Study of theRole of the Intelligentsia in Socialism* by György Konrad and Iván Szelényi. *Contemporary Sociology* 9(4):572–3.

Tar, Zoltán. 1986. "Introduction." Pp. 11–26 in Georg Lukács *Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York: Columbia University Press.

Tashakkori, Abbas and Charles Teddlie. 1998. *Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Tashakkori, Abbas and Charles Teddlie. 2010. Eds. *SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioural Research*, 2nd ed., edited by A. Tashakkori and C. Teddlie. Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.

Tavory, Iddo 2016. "The pragmatist wave of theory construction." *The British Journal of Sociology* 67(1):50–6.

Teddlie, Charles and Abbas Tashakkori. 2010. "Overview of Contemporary Issues in Mixed Methods Research." Pp. 1–41 in *SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research*, 2ⁿᵈ ed., edited by A. Tashakkori and C. Teddlie. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

DeTora, F. 2017. "Submitting Hoax Papers to Journals Outside One's Field Is Unethical." *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, June 05. Retrieved June 16, 2020 (http://www.chronicle,com/blogs/letters/submitting-hoax-papers-to-journals-outside-ones-own-field-is-unethical/).

Therborn, Göran. 1971. "Jurgen Habermas: A New Eclecticism." *New Left Review* 67(1):69- …

Therborn, Göran. 1973. "The Working Class and the Birth of Marxism." *New Left Review* 1(May/June):3–15.

Therborn, Göran. 1976. *Science, Class and Society: On the Formation of Sociology and Historical Materialism*. London, England: New Left Books.

Therborn, Göran. 1999. "What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules? Some Reflections On Different Approaches To the Study of Power in Society." *Critical Sociology* 25:224–43.

Therborn, Göran. 2000a. "At the Birth of Second Century Sociology: Times of Reflexivity, Spaces of Identity, and Nodes of Knowledge." *The British Journal of Sociology* 51(1):37–57.

Therborn, Göran. 2000b. "Modernization, Discourses. Their Limitations and their Alternatives." Pp. 49–72 in *Paradigms of Social Change: Modernization, Development, Transformation, Evolution*, edited by W. Schelke et al. Frankfurt am Main, Germany and New York: St. Martin´s Press.

Thesis Eleven. 2011. "An open letter to Viktor Orbán from the New School in New York." *Thesis Eleven* 105(1):98–101.

Thomas, William I. and Florian Znaniecki. 1927. *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. Vol. I-II Boston, MA: Richard G. Badger / The Gorham Press.

Thompson, James Alexander Kerr. 1926. *Irony: An Historical Introduction*. London, England: G. Allen & Unwin.

Timans, Rob, Paul Wouters, and Johan Heilbron. 2019. "Mixed Methods Research: What It Is and What It Could Be." *Theory and Society* 48(2):193–216.

Tiidenberg, Katrin. 2020. "Research Ethics, Vulnerability, and Trust on the Internet." Pp. 569–84 in *Second International Handbook of Internet Research*, edited by J. Hunsinger, M. M. Allen, L. Klastrup. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.

Tiryakian, Edward A. ed. 1971. *The Phenomenon of Sociology. A Reader in the Sociology of Sociology*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Toby, Jackson. 1972. "Gouldner's Misleading Reading of the Theories of Talcott Parsons." *Contemporary Sociology* 1(2):109–10.

Tökés, Rudolf L. 1996a. *Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Toomela, Aaro. 2010. "The Methodology of Idiographic Science: The Limits of Single-Case Studies and the Role of Typology." Pp. 13–33 in *YIS: Yearbook of Idiographic Science*, Vol. 2, edited by S. Salvatore, J. Valsiner, J.B., Travers Simon and A. Gennaro. Rome, Italy: Firera & Liuzzo Publishing.

Toomela, Aaro. 2011. "Travel Into a Fairy Land: A Critique of Modern Qualitative and Mixed Methods Psychologies." *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science* 45:21–47.

Toth, Kathleen. 1983. Review of *Hegel contra Sociology* by Gillian Rose. *American Journal of Sociology* 88(4):828–830.

Touraine, Alain. 1971. Review of *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* by Alvin W. Gouldner. *American Journal of Sociology* 77(2):317–23.

Titscher, Stefan, Michael Meyer, Ruth Wodak and Eva Vetter. 2000. "Objective Hermeneutics." Pp. 198–212 in *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis*. London, England: Sage Publications.

Treiman, Donald J., and Iván Szelényi. 1993. "Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989." Pp. 163–78 in *Transformation Processes in Eastern Europe* [Proceedings of a Workshop held at the Dutch National Science Foundation, December 3–4, 1992]. The Hague, The Netherlands: NOW.

Truncellito, David A. 2007. "Epistemology." in *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* edited by J. Fieser, and B. Dowden. Retrieved November 6, 2013 (http://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/).

Tuchman, Gaye. 1994. "Historical Social Science. Methodologies, Methods, and Meanings." Pp. 306–23 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, edited by N. K. Denzin, and Y. S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications.

Turner, Bryan S. 1981. *For Weber Essays on the Sociology of Fate*. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Turner, Bryan S. 1989. "Commentary: Some Reflections on Cumulative Theorizing in Sociology." Pp. 131–147 in *Theory Building in Sociology. Assessing Theoretical Cumulation*, edited by J. H. Turner, Newbury Park CA: Sage Publications.

Turner F. McD. C. 1926. *The Element of Irony in English Literature - An Essay*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge at the University Press.

Turner, Jonathan H. 1989. "Introduction: Can Sociology Be a Cumulative Science?" Pp. 8–18 in *Theory Building in Sociology. Assessing Theoretical Cumulation*, edited by J. H. Turner. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Turner, Jonathan H. 1990. "The misuse and use of metatheory." *Sociological Forum* 5(1):37–53.

Turner, Jonathan H. 1992. "The Promise of Positivism." Pp. 156–178 in *Postmodernism and Social Theory: The Debate over General Theory* edited by S. Seidman and D. G. Wagner. Cambridge, MA and Oxford England: Blackwell.

Turner, Jonathan H., Leonard Beeghley and Charles H. Powers. 2012. *The Emergence of Sociological Theory*. 7th ed. Los Angeles: Sage Publicaitons.

Turner, Stephen P. 2014. *American Sociology: From Pre-Disciplinary to Post-Normal*. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Turner, Stephen P. and Turner Jonathan. H. 1990. *The Impossible Science, An Institutional Analysis of American Sociology*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Valsiner, Jaan. 2020. "General Introduction: Social Sciences between Knowledge and Ideologies." Pp. 1–9 in *Social Philosophy of Science for the Social Sciences*, edited by J. Valsiner. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.

van Heur, Bas, Loet Leydesdorff, Sally Wyatt. 2013. "Turning to Ontology in STS? Turning to STS Through 'Ontology'." *Social Studies of Science* 43(3): 341–62.

Vandenberghe, Frédéric. 2014. *What's Critical About Critical Realism?: Essays in Reconstructive Social Theory*. Oxon, England and New York: Routledge.

Vardy, Steven Bela. 1976. *Modern Hungarian Historiography*. Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly.

Varga, Karoly [Károly]. 1983. "Sociology in Hungary." *International Review of Modern Sociology* 13(1/2):231–66.

Verdery, Katherine, Michael Bernhard, Jeffrey Kopstein, Gale Stokes and Michael D. Kennedy. 2005. 'Rereading "The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power".' *Theory and Society* 34(1):1-36.

Voeltzel, René. 1961. *Das Lachen des Herrn: Uber die Ironie in der Bibel*. Translated by Barbara Max-Schlunk, Hamburg, Gramany: H. Reich.

Vooglaid, Ülo. 1995. "Nõukogude Eesti sotsioloogia algus ja lõpp. Intervjuu Sirje Kiinile", [The beginning and the end of Soviet Estonian sociology. An interview with Sirje Kiin]. *Looming* 1:115–122.

Vincent, Steve and Joe O'Mahoney. 2018. "Critical Realism and Qualitative Research: An Introductiory Overview." Pp. 201–16 in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Business and Management Research Methods*, edited by C. Cassell, A. L. Cunliffe and G. Grandy. London, England: Sage Publications.

Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 1989a. "Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu." *Sociological Theory* 7(1):26–63.

Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 1989b. "Social Ontology, Epistemology, and Class: On Wright's and Burawoy's Politics of Knowledge." *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 34:165–86.

Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 1989c. 'For a Socio-Analysis of Intellectuals: On "Homo Academicus".' *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 34:1–29.

Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 1992. "Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology." Pp. 1–59 in *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, P. Bourdieu, and L. J. D. Wacquant. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 2002a. "The Sociological Life of Pierre Bourdieu." *International Sociology* 17:549–56.

Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 2002b. "An Inventive and Iconoclastic Scientist." *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 46:177–79.

Wacquant, Loïc. 2013. "Bourdieu 1993: A Case Study in Scientific Consecration." *Sociology* 47(1):15–29.

Wacquant, Loïc. 2016. A Concise Genealogy and Anatomy of Habitus." *The Sociological Review* 64:64–72.

Wagner, David G. 1984. *The Growth of Sociological Theories*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Wagner, David G. 1992. "Daring Modesty: On Metatheory, Observation, and Theory Growth." Pp. 199–220 in *Postmodernism and Social Theory: The Debate over General Theory*, edited by S. Seidman and D. G. Wagner. Cambridge, MA and Oxford England: Blackwell.

Wagner, David G. and Joseph Berger. 1985. "Do Sociological Theories Grow?" *American Sociological Review* 90(4):697–728.

Walder, Andrew G. 1988. Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Walder, Andrew G. 1995. "Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order." *American Sociological Review* 60(June):309–28.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2002. "The Itinerary of World-Systems Analysis; or, How to Resist Becoming a Theory." Pp. 358–76 in *New Directions in Contemporary Sociological Theory*, edited by J. Berger and M. Zelditch, Jr. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. [1991] 2001. *Unthinking Social Science. The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms*, 2nd ed., Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2003. "Anthropology, Sociology,and Other Dubious Disciplines." *Current Anthropology* 44(4):453–65.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2007. "The Culture of Sociology in Disarray: The Impact of 1968 on U.S. Sociologists." Pp. 427–437 in *Sociology in America: A History* edited by C. Calhoun. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Walton, Paul. 1971. Review of *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* by Alvin W. Gouldner. *The British Journal of Sociology* 22(2):214–6.

Walzel, Oskar. 1938/9. "Methode? Ironie bei Friedrich Schlegel und bei Solger." *Helicon* 1:33–50.

Walzer, Michael. 1980. "The New Masters". Review of *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* by George Konrád and Ivan Szelényi and *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* by Alvin W. Gouldner. *The New York Review of Books*, March 20.

Watson, Cate. 2011. "Notes on the Variety and Uses of Satire, Sarcasm and Irony in Social Research, with Some Observations on Vices and Follies in the Academy." *Power and Education* 3(2):139–49.

Watson, Cate. 2015a. "A Sociologist Walks into a Bar (and Other Academic Challenges): Towards a Methodology of Humour." *Sociology* 49(3):407–21.

Watson, Cate 2015b. "Irony and Ironic Imagination." Pp. 39–66 in *Comedy and Social Science: Towards a Methodology of Funny*. London, England: Routledge.

Watson, Cate 2020. Perspective by incongruity in the performance of dialectical ironic analysis: a disciplined approach." *Qualitative Research* 20(1):91–107.

Watson, Graham. 1987. "Make me reflexive – but not yet: Strategies for managing essential reflexivity in ethnographic discourse." *Journal of Anthropological Research* 43:29–41.

Wearne, Bruce C. 1981. "Talcott Parsons' Appraisal and Critique of Alfred Marshall." *Social Research* 48(4):816–51.

Wearne, Bruce C. 2009. *The Theory and Scholarship of Talcott Parsons to 1951. A Critical Commentary*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Weber, Alfred. ([1928] 1990). [Extract from the] "Discussion of Karl Mannheim's 'Competition' paper at the Sixth Congress of German Sociologists (Zurich, 1928)." Pp. 86–90 *Knowledge and Politics: The Sociology of Knowledge Dispute*, edited by V. Meja and N. Stehr. London, England and New York: Routledge.

Weber, Marianne. [1926] 1975. *Max Weber: A Biography*. Translated and edited by H. Zohn. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Weber, Martin. 2007. "Constructivism and Critical Theory." Pp. 96–108 in *An Introductionto International Relations Australian Perspectives*, edited by R. Devetak, A. Burke and J. George. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Weber, Max. [May 28, 1912] 1986a. "48. To Leo Popper." Pp. 112–6 in Georg Lukács *Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Weber, Max. ([Dec. 23, 1915] 1986b. "138. From Max Weber." P. 255 in Georg Lukács *Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Weber, Max. [Aug. 14, 1916] 1986c. "143. From Max Weber." Pp. 263–4 in Georg Lukács *Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Weber, Max. [Aug. 23, 1916] 1986d. "144. From Max Weber." Pp. 265–6 in Georg Lukács *Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Weber, Max. [March ?, 1920] 1986e. "161. From Max Weber." Pp. 281–3 in Georg Lukács *Selected Correspondence 1902–1920*. Selected, edited, translated, and annotated by J. Marcus and Z. Tar. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Weber, Max. [1904–5] 1958. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Weber, Max. 1948 . *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Translated, edited and introduced by H. H. Gerth and W. C. Mills. London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Weber, Max. [1904–5 & 1917] 1949. *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*. Translated and edited by E. Shils and H. Finch. New York: Free Press.

Weber, Max. 1963. *The Sociology of Religion*. Translated by Ephraim Fischoff, edited by J. Luther Adams, and introduced by T. Parsons. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Weber, Max. [1968] 1978. *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Vol. 1–2, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Weber, Max. 1981. "Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology." *The Sociological Quarterly*, Translated by Edith E. Grabe, 22(2):151–80.

Weber, Max. 2012. *Max Weber. Collected Methodological Writings*. Translated by H. H. Bruun and edited by H. H. Bruun and S. Whimster. Abingdon, England: Routledge.

Webber, Richard. 2009. "Response to 'The Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology': An Outline of the Research Potential of Administrative and Transactional Data." *Sociology* 43(1):169–78.

Weed, Mike. 2005. '"Meta Interpretation": A Method for the Interpretive Synthesis of Qualitative Research.' *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 6(1):Art. 37. Retrieved June 22, 2011 (http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0501375).

Weil, Felix. 1924. "Gildensozialistische Rechnungslegung: Kritische Bemerkungen zu Karl Polányi: 'Sozialistische Rechnungslegung'." *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. 52:196–217.

Weininger, Elliott. 2005, "Foundations of Bourdieu's Class Analysis." Pp. 82–118 in *Approaches to Class Analysis*, edited by E. O. Wright. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Weinstein, Jay. 1982. "Irony and Technology: A Qualitative Technique for Applied Social Science." *Social Science Quarterly* 63(2):293–311.

Weitzer, Ronald. 1977–1978. Review of *New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies* by Anthony Giddens. *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 22:199–206.

Wernet, Andreas. 2014. "Hermeneutics and Objective Hermeneutics." Pp. 234–46 in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis*, edited by U. Flick. London, England: Sage Publications.

West, William. "Irony and Encyclopaedic Writing Before (and After) the Enlightenment." Pp. 482–502 in *Encyclopaedism from Antiquity to the Renaissance*, edited by J. König and G. Woolf. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Whelan, Joe. 2019. "How Does Critical Realism Relate to Critical Theory." Social Theory Applied. Retrieved December 13, 2021 (https://socialtheoryapplied.com/2019/02/26/how-does-critical-realism-relate-to-critical-theory/).

White, Lynn. 2005. "Writers of Passage: Writing an Empirical Journal Article." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 67:791–8.

Wiley, Norbert. 1985. "The Current interregnum in American Sociology." *Social Research* 52(1):179–207.

Wilkes, Chris. 1990. "Bourdieu's Class." Pp. 108 - 131 in *An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu: The Practice of Theory*, edited by R. Harker, C. Mahar and C. Wilkes. London, England: Macmillan.

Willig, Carla. 2014. "Interpretation and Analysis." Pp. 136–49 in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis*, edited by U. Flick. London, England: Sage Publications.

Windelband, Wilhelm. [1894] 1998. "History and Natural Science." *Theory and Psychology* 8(5):5–22.

Wolff, Robert Paul. 1988. *Moneybags Must be So Lucky: On the Literary Structure of Capital*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press.

Wolin, Sheldon S. 1960. *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

Woolgar, Steve. 1983. "Irony in the social study of science." Pp. 239–66 in *Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Science*, edited by K. Knorr-Cetina and M. Mulkay. London, England and Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Woolgar, Steve, ed. 1988a. *Knowledge and Reflexivity: New Frontiers in the Sociology of Knowledge*. London, England: Sage Publications.

Woolgar, Steve. 1988b. "Reflexivity is the Ethnographer of the Text." Pp. 14–36 in *Knowledge and Reflexivity: New Frontiers in the Sociology of Knowledge*, edited by S. Woolgar. London, England: Sage Publications.

Woolgar, Steve. 1989. "Representation, Cognition and Self: What Hope for and Integration of Psychology and Sociology?" Pp. 201–23 in *The Cognitive Turn: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science, Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook 1989*, edited by S. Fuller, M. De Mey, T. Shinn and S. Woolgar. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Woolgar, Steve. 2004. "What happened to provocation in science and technology studies?" *History and Technology* 20(4):339-49.

Woolgar, Steve 2011. "Where did all the provocation go. Reflections on the fate of laboratory life (1979)." European University at St Petersburg, St Petersburg, Russia. Retrieved November 16, 2021 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gPDNptLkiyk).

Woolgar, Steve 2014. "It Could Be Otherwise: Provocation, Irony, and Limits." Center for Science, Technology, Medicine and Society, University of California, Berkeley, CA. Retrieved November 16, 2021 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=69kvaOj58so).

Woolgar, Steve and Javier Lezaun. 2013. "The wrong bin bag: A turn to ontology in science and technology studies?" *Social Studies of Science* 43(3):321–40.

Woolgar, Steve and Javier Lezaun. 2015. "Missing the (question) mark? What is a turn to ontology?" *Social Studies of Science* 45(3):462–7.

Woolgar, Steve, Tarek Cheniti, Javier Lezaun, Daniel Neyland, Chris Sugden and Christian Toennesen. 2008. "A Turn to Ontology in STS?" Position paper, Oxford Ontologies Workshop, Saïd Business School, Oxford, England, 25 June. Retrieved December 21, 2021 (https://stsontology.files.wordpress.com/2008/08/provocation.pdf)

Worthen, Blaine. 1995. "The Unvarnished Truth about Logic-in-Use versus Reconstructed Logic in Educational Inquiry." *Evaluation Practice* 16(2):165–78.

Wright, Edmond. 1978. "Sociology and the Irony Model." *Sociology* 12(3):523–43.

Wright, Erik Olin. 1976. "Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societies." *New Left Review* July-August(I/98):3–41.

Wright, Erik Olin. 1978a. *Class, Crisis and the State*, London, England: New Left Books.

Wright, Erik Olin. 1978b. "Intellectuals and the Working Class." *The Insurgent Sociologist* 3(1):5–17.

Wright, Erik Olin. 1979. "Intellectuals and the Class Structure of Capitalist Societies." Pp. 191–212 in *Between Labor and Capital*, edited by P. Walker. Boston, MA: South End Press.

Wright, Erik Olin. 1983. "Capitalism's Futures." *Socialist Review* 68, 13(2):77–126.

Wright, Erik Olin. 1985. *Classes*. London, England: Verso,

Wright, Erik Olin. 1987. "Reflections on Classes." *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 32:19–49.

Wright, Erik Olin. 1989a. "A General Framework for the Analysis of Class Structure." Pp. 3–43 in *The Debate on Classes*, edited by E. O. Wright. London, England and New York: Verso.

Wright, Erik Olin. 1989b. "Rethinking, Once Again, the Concept of Class Structure." Pp. 269–348 in *The Debate on Classes*, edited by E. O. Wright. London, England and New York: Verso.

Wright, Erik Olin, ed., 1989c. *The Debate on Classes*. London, England and New York: Verso.

Wright, Erik Olin. 1989d. "What is Analytical Marxism?" *Socialist Review* 19(4):35–56.

Wright, Erik Olin. 1989e. "Marxism as Social Science." *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 39:209–22.

Wright, Erik Olin. 1994. *Interrogating Inequality: Essays on Class Analysis, Socialism and Marxism*. London, England: Verso.

Wright, Erik Olin, ed., 2005. *Approaches to Class Analysis.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Wright, Erik Olin. 2010. *Envisioning Real Utopias*. London, England and New York: Verso.

Wright, Erik Olin. 2011. "Real Utopias." *Contexts* 10(2):36–42.

Wright, Erik Olin. 2013. "Transforming Capitalism through Real Utopias." *American Sociological Review* 21(2):1–26.

Wright, Erik Olin, et al. 1990. *Comparative Project on Class Structure and Class Consciousness: Core and Country-Specific Files*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, Institute for Research on Poverty [producer], 1989. Ann Arbor,

MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].

Wright, James D. ed., 2015. *International Encyclopaedia of the Social & Behavioural Sciences*, 2nd ed. Oxford, England: Pergamon Press.

Wright, Georg Henrik von, [1971] 2004. *Explanation and Understanding*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Wrong, Dennis H. 1982. "A Note on Marx and Weber in Gouldner's Thought." *Theory and Society* 11(6):899–905.

Yates-Doerr, Emily. 2020. "Imperialist Irony." *American Anthropologist* 122(3): 664–5.

Young, R.M. 1977. "Science is Social Relations." *Radical Science Journal* 5:65–129.

Zeitlin, Maurice. 1971. Review of *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* by Alvin W. Gouldner *American Journal of Sociology* 77(2):312–7.

Zhao, Shanyang. 1991. "Meta-theory, meta-method, meta-data-analysis: What, why, and how?" *Sociological Perspectives* 34(3):377–90.

Zhao, Shanyang. 2005. "s. v. metatheory." Pp. 501–2 in *Encyclopedia of Social Theory*, edited by G. Ritzer. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Zingerle, Arnold. "The Unanticipated Consequences of Action: Sociological and Ethical Aspects." Pp. 177–86 in *Robert K. Merton and Contemporary Sociology*, edited by C. Mongardini and S. Tabboni. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Žižek, Slavoj. 2000. "Postface: George Lukács as the Philosopher of Leninism." Pp. 151–182 in *George Lukács, A Defense of "History and Class Consciousness": Tailism and the Dialectic*. Translated by Esther Leslie. London, England: Verso.

Znaniecki, Florian. 1934. *The Method of Sociology*, New York: Rinehart & Company.

Zuckerman, Harriet A. 1977. *Scientific Elite: Nobel Laureates in the United States.* New York: The Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers.

Zuckerman, Harriet A. 1988. "The Sociology of Science." Pp. 511–74 in *Handbook of Sociology*, edited by N. Smelser. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.