Janette Huttunen

Young people, democracy and political participation

Four perspectives on younger citizens' democratic engagement in Finland

Åbo Akademi University

Janette Huttunen

Born 1992

Previous studies and degrees

Master of Social Sciences, Åbo Akademi University, 2017

Bachelor of Social Sciences, Åbo Akademi University, 2015

Photo by Säde Puusa

Young People, democracy and political participation

Four perspectives on younger citizens' democratic engagement in Finland

Janette Huttunen

Political Science
Faculty of Social Sciences, Business and Economics
Åbo Akademi University
Åbo, Finland, 2022

Supervisors

Docent Henrik Serup Christensen, Åbo Akademi & Professor Kimmo Grönlund, Åbo Akademi

Pre-examiners

Associate Professor Elina Kestilä-Kekkonen, Tampere University & Docent Staffan Himmelroos, University of Helsinki

Opponent

Professor Laura Morales, Science Po

ISBN 978-952-12-4192-5 (printed)
ISBN 978-952-12-4193-2 (digital)
Painosalama, 2022

Acknowledgments

This journey would not have been possible without the support of and help from so many people.

Most importantly, I want to thank my main supervisor Henrik Serup Christensen, who has not only supported me through this journey but whose encouragement to do a PhD in the first place was rudimental for me to actually take on this task. Thank you for asking – I needed the encouragement and for someone in academia to see the potential in me. Thank you Henrik for always having time for me and my questions, for building opportunities, for the kind manner you gave me tons of feedback when asked, but also granted me the freedom to do as I like. You taught me so many valuable and necessary skills from how to express yourself in a concise manner, how to ensure a reviewer that their opinion is correct, however… to so many more. I am truly grateful for everything you have done for me.

Thank you Kimmo Grönlund, my second supervisor, for building me opportunities beyond my dissertation: taking me onto projects to allow me to build my resources and networks. Thank you for always looking out for the future and ensuring that I have the resources to continue on this research path even after this chapter ends. Thank you also Lauri Rapeli for ensuring that I can continue my research work. It is a huge privilege to be allowed to finalize one's PhD without the stress of livelihood.

Thank you Eerika Albrecht. Our collaboration opened up a completely new world in the environmental politics field for me and broadened my thinking. Not only did I appreciate our collaboration, but also the comradery; since we met right before Covid-19 lockdowns, our Zoom sessions with wonderful discussions about the work at hand but also academia in general were very important for me and made me feel a connection to the academic world despite working from home.

Thank you Inga Saikkonen. Your fire towards democracy and democracy research is contagious. Thank you for being a great co-author, but also the best person to have passionate discussions about the future of democracy. Your passion continuously reminds me that what we do as researchers and the topics we research, are very important. Not only did I enjoy our research collaboration, but I am also thankful for the collaboration we did on other projects and all the wonderful discussions we have had.

Thank you my two pre-examiners, Associate Professor Elina Kestilä-Kekkonen and Docent Staffan Himmelroos. I truly appreciate you taking the time to help me improve the quality of my work. Thank you for all your great comments and suggestions.

Thank you all wonderful colleagues at Åbo Akademi, both in Turku and Vasa. You are inspiring people and it has been a pleasure to work with you. Just to name a few, thank you Ann-Sofie Hermanson for always helping me with teaching-related issues, Linnéa Henriksson for all our projects and fun discussions around party politics, and Maria Bäck for sharing your wisdom,

especially in the early days of my PhD when I needed someone to show me the ropes.

Thank you colleagues at the University of Turku. It was a pleasure to work on so many deliberative experiments with you. Thank you everyone from Finlandssvenska forskarskolan. I was fortunate to participate in many seminars, conferences, summer schools and events and to learn so much from so many people. Thank you all.

Thank you, my junior researcher friends. Emily Sundqvist, Nanuli Silagadze, Richard Eveli, Ran Blumgrund, Fredrik Malmberg, Rasmus Sirén, Jonas Schauman, Albert Weckman, Varvara Lahtinen, Marco Svensson La Rosa, Aleksi Suuronen and others. Your peer support made this project easier and much more fun. You are wonderful people and I am happy I got to know you and share this experience with you – without our fikas, dinners and parties, but also the opportunities to vent and complain, this would have been a much more tedious and difficult journey.

Thank you Åbo Akademi for funding my PhD, and Kunnallisalan kehittämis-säätiö for funding that allowed me to continue my academic work.

Kiitos äiti ja isä, että olette aina tukeneet kaikessa, mitä olen halunnut tehdä ja tehnyt.

Thank you friends outside of academia. You are the best hypemen/ hypepeople anyone could ask for. Thank you for making such a big deal out of me when I could never. Thank you for being so happy and excited for me. I have been extremely fortunate to be surrounded by so many people who have believed in my abilities to do anything. I am forever grateful to all of you.

22.04.2022 Helsinki

Janette Huttunen

Abstract

Young people's political participation has been a cause of concern for a long time. In this political science dissertation, contemporary young people's relationship with democracy and political participation in Finland is examined. Founded in the post-materialist perspective, this work examines whether younger citizens are less supportive of democracy and its institutions and whether younger citizens actually prefer non-institutionalized activities to institutionalized political actions. In addition, what attitudes and preferences regarding democracy and political participation do young active participants have, and finally, how external perceptions of active youth participation differ from young people's own perceptions, are explored. The focus is on different non-electoral forms of political engagement in Finland. This dissertation adds to the research field on youth participation by exploring new forms of engagement, and popular movements that have emerged in recent years and by using a unique mix of data to explore the questions.

This dissertation consists of four original articles. In article I, Millennials' support for the Finnish citizens' initiative (CI) is examined with the use of the Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) by using representative election survey data (FNES, 2015). The CI is a new form of institutionalized engagement and in the article, whether Millennials and what kind of Millennials, make use of the CI is explored. Articles II and III explore the Fridays for Future (FFF) movement. In article II, young FFF activists' attitudes and views on democracy and political participation are examined by using in-depth qualitative interviews, to gain a more youth-centered perspective on the topic. In article III, the media portrayal of the FFF movement is explored, as newspaper and Twitter material is analyzed to examine the representations of environmental citizenship within the FFF movement. In article IV, whether younger generations support democracy less than older generations do, as has been suggested, is examined by using experimental conjoint survey data that mimic real-life situations.

By using a unique mix of materials; representative survey data, experimental data, in-depth interview data, and qualitative Twitter and newspaper data; I find that contemporary Finnish young people prefer institutionalized political participation more than expected. The younger generations support democracy as much as older generations do, and Millennials are the most avid users of the CI. In contrast to the post-materialist perspective, Finnish young people participate in political institutions, and even politically active young people prefer political engagement in institutions. Instead of more, more active, engaging, or elite-challenging citizen participation, politically active Finnish young people want a better functioning representative democracy with decision-makers who listen to their demands.

Sammanfattning

I den här avhandlingen undersöker jag ungas förhållande till politiskt deltagande och demokrati. Avhandlingen grundar sig på det post-materialistiska perspektivet som förväntar sig att unga har olika preferenser för politiskt deltagande i jämförelse med äldre. Avhandlingen undersöker om unga stöder demokratin och dess institutioner till en lägre grad än äldre, och om yngre medborgare faktiskt föredrar icke-institutionaliserade former av deltagande framför institutionaliserade former av politiskt deltagande. Jag undersöker också hurdana attityder och preferenser angående demokrati och politiskt deltagande unga aktiva deltagare har, och hur externa uppfattningar av ungas aktiva politiska deltagande skiljer sig från ungas egna uppfattningar. Jag fokuserar på olika icke-valrelaterade former av deltagande i Finland. Jag kontribuerar till forskningsfältet genom att undersöka nya former av deltagande och nya populära rörelser, och genom att använda en unik blandning av material för att undersöka dessa frågor.

Avhandlingen består av fyra originella artiklar. I artikel I ser vi på finska medborgarinitiativet och mäter genom valdata (FNES, 2015) om ”millennialer”, generationen född mellan 1982-1996/1997, använder initiativet oftare än äldre människor. Vi undersöker också hurdana millennialer som använder sig av medborgarinitiativet med hjälp av ”Civic Voluntarism Model”. I artikel II och III undersöker jag klimatrörelsen ”Fridays for Future” (FFF). I artikel II undersöker jag med hjälp av intervju data hurdana attityder de unga som har deltagit i klimatrörelsen har angående politiskt deltagande och demokrati. I artikel III undersöker vi hur media diskussionen kring FFF rörelsen ser ut och analyserar hur nyhetsartiklar och Twitter diskussion representerar miljömedborgarskapet inom FFF rörelsen. I artikel IV undersöker vi med experimentella data om unga generationer stöder demokratin lika mycket som äldre generationer, så som har föreslagits.

Jag använder en unik blandning av data: representativ enkätdata, experimentell conjoint data, djupgående intervjuer samt en kvalitativ nyhetsartikel och Twitter data. Resultaten tyder på att finska unga föredrar institutionaliserat politiskt deltagande mer än vad man ofta förväntar. Unga generationer stöder demokrati lika mycket som äldre generationer och millennialer använder medborgarinitiativ mest. I kontrast till det post-materialistiska perspektivet, deltar finska unga i politiska institutioner och även politiskt aktiva unga föredrar institutionaliserat politiskt deltagande. Även om politiskt aktiva finska unga inte verkar ha preferenser för mera, mera aktiva, engagerade eller elit-utmanande former av deltagande, är de färdiga att delta aktivt vid behov. I stället för att preferera mera aktiva former av deltagande vill de unga ha en bättre fungerande representativ demokrati med politiker som lyssnar på dem.

List of original publications

This dissertation is based on the following original publications:

I. Huttunen, J. & Christensen, H. S. (2020). 'Engaging the Millennials: The Citizens' Initiative in Finland', Young, 28(2), 175-198, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1103308819853055.

II. Huttunen, J. (2021). Young Rebels Who Do Not Want a Revolution: The Non-participatory Preferences of Fridays for Future Activists in Finland. Front. Polit. Sci. 3:672362. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2021.672362.

III. Huttunen, J., & Albrecht, E. (2021). The framing of environmental citizenship and youth participation in the Fridays for Future Movement in Finland. *Fennia - International Journal of Geography*, *199*(1), 46–60. https://doi.org/10.11143/fennia.102480.

IV. Huttunen, J. & Saikkonen I. A.-L. (n.d.). Are the young undemocratic? Evidence from a conjoint experiment. Preprint. Under review.

The articles are referred to in the text by their respective Roman numerals.

Contents

1 Introduction

Citizens' active public participation in politics is considered a defining element of democratic citizenship (Dahl, 1998; Pateman, 1970; Verba et al., 1995) and necessary for the representative democracy (Mair, 2013; Stoker, 2006). Especially young people's political participation and attitudes toward democracy have been a topic of lively discussion and concern. As young people continuously participate less in political institutions (Grasso et al., 2018) and the younger generations' attachment to democracy has recently been questioned (Foa & Mounk, 2016), the topic continues to be an important research subject. In this political science dissertation, I explore contemporary young people, democracy, and political participation in Finland. The broad research question I operate with is "How do contemporary young people relate to democracy and political participation in Finland?"

Representative democracy is built on citizen participation. Political experiences during formative years have a big impact on the political behavior and attitudes in later life (Delli Carpini, 1989; Denemark et al., 2016; Dinas, 2013; Quintelier & Van Deth, 2014). Thus, how young people today engage in politics and their democratic attitudes can have long-lasting effects on the representative system in the future. To understand the future of democracy, the relationships of contemporary young people with democracy and political participation warrants investigation.

These relationships are important not only for the system but also for the young themselves. Young people may have distinct interests that are at stake in certain policy areas. Young generations today face worse economic conditions and prognoses than their parents; economic crises and increasing wealth inequalities have made it difficult for younger citizens to, for example, find secure employment, own a home, or start a family (Foa et al., 2020).

For the young generations of today, democratic systems have not ensured the same living conditions and quality of life as previous generations had in their youth (Pickard 2019, p. 380). Instead, the so-called new young precariat (Pickard 2019, p. 380) are forced to worry about, for example, indebtedness, unemployment, and lack of affordable housing while also worrying about the consequences of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and climate crisis, which will affect them more severely than older generations (Sanson & Burke, 2020). An underlying assumption is that politically inactive citizens are unable to defend their interests; thus, they are rendered invisible in the political process (Marien et al., 2010). The relationships between the young, democracy, and political participation are also a question of equality and whose voices are heard in decision making. In order to improve our democratic system to ensure that all groups of citizens are heard and able to protect their interests, examining young people can give us important insights.

Studies on youth participation in political science are typically based on two paradigms. First, studies focus on the decline of youth participation in

institutionalized forms of political engagement, and display worry over the apparent disengagement and possible apathy of the young. Second, the post-materialist generational replacement theories, the "generation school", dispute the decline thesis (Blais & Rubenson, 2013) and advocate that instead of a decline in youth participation, there has been a transformation from engagement in institutional politics into new modes and forms of political action (see e.g. Dalton, 2016, 2008; Hustinx & Roose, 2016, p. 94-95; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Norris, 2004). I acknowledge that both engagement and disengagement can be and are simultaneously occurring in young people's political activity (see e.g. Farthing, 2010) and in order to provide a comprehensive background on the issue of youth participation, the disengagement/apathy paradigm must be discussed. Herein, this will be discussed after the background and research environment of this work. However, this work is founded on the latter paradigm – on the theoretical expectations that the young do want to participate politically, only in different, more active and engaging new forms of participation compared with older people – which in this work is referred to as the "the post-materialist perspective". The name is derived from Inglehart's (1997) post-materialism theory, but here the perspective also refers to other theoretical inputs in the youth participation literature described in detail in the theory chapter.

1.1 Background and research environment

Scholars have displayed significant worry over the political and democratic disengagement of young people. The worry stems both from the perceived lack of democratic attitudes and support (see e.g. Denemark et al., 2016; Foa & Mounk, 2016, 2017), and the long-lasting trends of young people's declining participation rates in institutionalized forms of political engagement, which are evident in advanced democracies (e.g. Bennett, 2008; Chou, 2017; Furlong & Cartmel, 2007; Grasso et al., 2018).

In the democratic deconsolidation literature, younger generations, particularly Millennials, have been called "undemocratic" and to consider democracy less essential than older generations do (Foa & Mounk, 2016, 2017). These claims regarding young generations' support for democracy have been criticized (see e.g. Alexander & Welzel, 2017; Norris, 2017; Voeten, 2017), yet the claims continue to receive much media attention even today (see e.g. Bibbins Sedaca, 2020; Rosenthal, 2021). If the contemporary young generations are less supportive of democracy – they no longer believe in democratic values, become attracted to authoritarian alternatives, and vote on anti-establishment parties and candidates (Foa & Mounk, 2017) – these attitudes can present a threat to liberal democracy. If the younger generations are systematically more open to non-democratic forms of rule, the trends in generational replacement could lead to a serious decline in the support for democracy as a form of governing (Wuttke et al., 2020a).

However, even more benign tendencies may be worrisome. The lower participation rates of the young in the democratic institutions have caused concerns over young people's attachment to and support for democracy. Elections are a key defining element of a democratic system: thus, the decline in voting rates is seen as negative for the democratic functioning of society (Milner, 2010). The trends in participation have led to a belief that young citizens are especially disillusioned by the institutions of representative democracy (see e.g. Norris, 2004).

There are multiple possible theoretical explanations to why the young appear to be disengaged and less supportive of democracy. Ranging from the lifecycle effect to the acknowledgement that participation is difficult and requires a lot of cognitive skills, thus young people who have had less opportunities to develop such skills may not participate (Stoker, 2006, p. 151), different theories seek to explain the perceived lack of young people's engagement in politics. Instead of e.g. accepting the notion that democracy is demanding and boring, and most people, not only the young, would rather be home on their couch than collect signatures for petitions or attend meetings (Young, 2000), a widely used explanation has been the apathy analysis. The apathy analysis explains that since young people participate less in fundamental representative institutions than older people do, they are politically apathetic and disengaged (see descriptions from e.g. Henn, Weinstein & Forrest, 2005; Sloam, 2007). The apathy analysis is an inherently negative perspective of the young and views the lack of youth engagement in institutionalized forms of political participation as problematic and a fault of the young. Yet, young people's rejection of traditional political forms may be a legitimate response to the faulty institutions (Farthing, 2010), due to the longstanding alienation from traditional politics (e.g. Henn et al., 2002; Quintelier, 2007; Stoker, 2006), or the negative view of political parties and politicians (Chou, 2017; Pickard, 2019). In addition, there is a tendency to equate non-participation in activities that researchers consider political participation with political apathy (O'Toole et al., 2003). However, even if the young do not engage in certain forms of political actions, this does not mean that they are politically apathetic. The disengaged/apathetic paradigm overlooks young people's capacity to reinvent their own forms of politics and ignores the youth-led creation of new modes and forms of politics (Farthing, 2010; Norris, 2003). Moreover, this perspective overlooks the fact that young people are a heterogeneous group – young people as a whole are not disengaged even from the institutionalized forms of politics, rather factors such as class, education, and gender affects their political participatory habits and preferences (e.g. Chou 2017; Henn & Foard 2014).

In this dissertation, I do not focus on the disputed political apathy analysis as a theoretical basis. Instead of accommodating the idea that young people are politically apathetic or disengaged, this work is founded on the post-materialist perspective. The post-materialist perspective explains that the young are politically interested and engaged, they merely participate, and prefer to participate, in alternative forms of political activity outside of elections and party

activities and in different ways than older people do. This work is based on the idea of post-materialist generational replacement; how longstanding value, societal and technological changes have affected the political preferences, attitudes and values of different generations, forming differing patterns of political participation for the younger generations. This a widely accepted theory in the contemporary research on youth participation within political science. Instead of voting in elections, the young prefer participation in many more engaging, direct and informal ways (e.g. Dalton, 2008, 2016; Hustinx & Roose, 2016, p. 95; Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 2004). Theories on the post-materialist perspective are examined in detail in the chapter 2.2.1.

1.2 Objectives and scope

The objective of this dissertation was to examine how contemporary young people relate to democracy and how they prefer to participate in politics in Finland. This dissertation adds to the research field on youth participation by exploring the new forms of engagement and popular movements that have emerged in recent years. In addition, this doctoral thesis adds to the research field by including the youngest generation of age, Generation Z, in the analysis of young people's support for democracy. The young Generation Z is yet to receive larger scholarly attention. All theoretical concepts and materials and methods used are further discussed in the respective chapters.

In this dissertation, which consists of four original articles, I focus on different non-electoral forms of political engagement in Finland. In the articles, I examined the generational support for democracy (article IV), the Finnish citizens' initiative (CI; article I), and the Fridays for Future (FFF) movement (articles II and III). In addition to the broad research question, "How do contemporary young people relate to democracy and political participation in Finland?", this work operates with four more specific research questions as follows:

RQ1: *Are younger citizens less supportive of representative democracy and its institutions?*

RQ2: *Do younger citizens actually prefer non-institutionalized forms of engagement to institutionalized forms of political participation?*

RQ3: *What attitudes and preferences regarding democracy and political participation do young active participants have?*

RQ4: *How do external perceptions of active youth participation differ from young people's own perceptions, and what kind of impacts may it have?*

In order to explore the contemporary young people and their attitudes towards democracy and participation, the most basic level for exploration is whether the young actually support the system. The RQ1 explores whether

younger citizens are less supportive of the representative democracy and its institutions, as the democratic deconsolidation literature (Foa & Mounk, 2016) or evidence from declining rates of youth participation in, for example, elections (Grasso et al., 2018) expects. The RQ1 is explored with findings from articles I, II and III. In article I, Millennials' support for a new institutionalized form of participation, the Finnish CI was explored with representative survey data. In article II, young FFF activists' ideas and views regarding democracy and political participation were explored by using in-depth interview data. Since the claims of undemocratic young generations have received contradictory evidence (see e.g. Alexander & Welzel, 2017; Foa & Mounk, 2016; Norris, 2017; Voeten, 2017; Wuttke et al., 2020a; Zilinsky, 2019), article IV aimed to fill the knowledge gap regarding young generations' support for democracy. In article IV, whether younger generations (Generation Z and Millennials) support democracy less than older generations (Generation X and Baby boomers) do was explored by using experimental conjoint survey data.

The RQ2 examines whether younger citizens actually prefer non-institutionalized political engagement to institutionalized activities. The post-materialist perspective expects the young to prefer political engagement in direct, elite-challenging, non-institutionalized forms of politics at expense of institutionalized politics (Chou, 2017; Dalton, 2008, 2016; Inglehart, 1997). However, since a new institutionalized participatory opportunity in the form of the Finnish CI has become accessible, younger citizens' relationship with institutionalized/non-institutionalized forms of engagement deserves more attention. The relationship that contemporary young people have with institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of engagement requires further investigation since institutionalized political participation is fundamental for representative democracy and important for e.g. the quality of participation (explored in the theory chapter) (Mair, 2013; Stoker, 2006). Additionally, the question is examined by using youth-centered in-depth interview data that allows more youth-led examination of contemporary young people's preferences in this regard. The RQ2 is explored with findings from articles II and I.

The RQ3 moves the focus to young active participants in order to examine how those young people who have been mobilized by the recent surge of climate activism view democracy and political participation. To examine the RQ3, I explore Finnish FFF activists. The FFF movement is a new grassroots-level environmental protest movement that has mobilized millions of young people into protest action around the globe since its start in 2018 (de Moor et al., 2020; Wahlström et al., 2019). We expect that young people in general, but especially those who are actively participating in politics, to prefer more active and engaged forms of participation as explained by the post-materialist perspective. However, there are many reasons why people become active in politics besides certain types of preferences for engagement. To understand contemporary active young people's attitudes and views on democracy and participation we have to ask them directly – instead of expectations and assumptions, more youth-

centered approaches are needed in research (see e.g. O'Toole et al., 2003). The RQ3 is explored with a focus on findings from article II.

The RQ4 asks how external perceptions of active youth participation differ from young people's own perceptions and what impacts the differences in perceptions may have. External, typically adult-centric, perceptions of youth participation may affect how successful we are at recognizing youth participation, what forms are seen as political participation, and how encouraging we are towards different forms of engagement (see e.g. O'Toole et al., 2003). Here, this question is examined with the focus on young people who have been active in the FFF movement, which has been extraordinarily successful in mobilizing young people, received a lot of media attention (Wahlström et al., 2019), and ignited debates on suitable forms for youth engagement. By exploring the differences in perceptions, it is possible to further detect differences in the youth-centered and adult-centric conceptualization of youth participation, and help us to reject too narrow views on young people's political engagement. The RQ4 is examined with findings from the media case in article III; where the production of environmental citizenship in the media framings of the FFF movement in the early stages of the movement in 2019 is explored; and the youth-centered findings from article II.

1.3 Finland as a case

This research was conducted in Finland. Finland is an established democracy and a Nordic welfare state, with a consensus-driven political culture, where satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions are generally quite high (Bäck et al., 2016; Karvonen, 2014; Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2016; Rapeli & Koskimaa, 2020). The patterns of political participation are fairly conventional in Finland; voting is considered the most popular form of participation (e.g. Raiskila & Wiberg, 2017), even though activity in non-traditional and non-institutionalized forms of engagement has increased over the years (see e.g. Bengtsson & Christensen, 2009; Bengtsson & Grönlund, 2005; Bäck & Christensen, 2020). In European comparisons, Finland scores average to high levels of participation in e.g. elections, contacting politicians, boycotts and signing petitions (Bäck & Christensen, 2020); nonetheless, similar trends in political participation are visible in Finland as in many other Western democracies, with declining levels of general election participation and party membership. In Nordic comparisons, which often provide the most natural point of reference due to similar political and social cultures, Finland scores lower in election participation (Bäck & Christensen, 2020; Grönlund, 2016). This is noteworthy since political and social trust is at similarly high levels in Finland as in the rest of the Nordic countries (Bäck et al., 2016). Finland differs from the other Nordic countries in two ways in particular: while higher in the other Nordic countries, in Finland the level of political interest is only at the European average and the level of internal efficacy is among the lowest in Europe (Rapeli & Koskimaa, 2020). The Finnish citizens' low belief in their abilities to understand

politics is a unique phenomenon, as the level of political attachment is otherwise high and citizens believe in their abilities to influence politics. This phenomenon is sometimes explained by a political system that is difficult to understand (Rapeli & Borg, 2016; Rapeli & Koskimaa, 2020), as Finland has been an extreme case of coalition government formation (Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2016).

The generational effects on election participation have been substantially smaller in Finland than in many other advanced democracies (Nemčok & Wass, 2021). Even so, similar trends in youth participation in elections are visible in Finland than in the rest of the Western world: young people vote less than older citizens do. Particularly noteworthy is that there has been a substantial polarization of socioeconomic differences in election turnout in Finland in the latest decades (Lahtinen, 2019). Inequality in election turnout has drastically increased in Finland, especially in regard to age and education. Register data shows that not only are highly educated young citizens continuously more active in elections than their lesser-educated counterparts, but the differences have also increased: the differences in election turnout between the most and least educated young people were around 40 percent in 1987, while in 2015 the differences were around 60 percent (see Lahtinen, 2019, p. 40). Polarization can also be detected in Finnish young people's party choices. In the 2019 parliamentary elections, one-fifth of 18-24-year-olds voted for the Green Party (20%) and almost one-fifth for the right-wing populist True Finns party (19%) (Suuronen et al., 2020). While neither of these parties has been the most popular party among young voters, this emerging cleave in party support is an important notion to make. Since 2007, the Green Party has been one of the most voted parties in this age group, and since 2011, True Finns has gathered at least 19 percent of the votes of the youngest eligible voters (Suuronen et al., 2020). Both parties are also popular in the next age group, 25-34-year-olds: in 2019, 28 percent voted for True Finns and 19 percent for the Green Party (Suuronen et al., 2020).

In Finland, young people foster rather traditional views on political participation (Myllyniemi, 2014). In 2013, voting was considered the best way to influence politics, followed by active participation in e.g. organizations or youth councils (Myllyniemi, 2014). However, young age has also been proven to be a factor in participation in unconventional forms of politics in Finland (Rapeli & Leino, 2013). Empiric evidence shows that Finnish young people for example sign petitions, engage in ethical consumption and online activities more than older citizens do (Borg & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2017; Strandberg & Borg, 2020). In regards to general attitudes toward democracy and political participation, Finnish young people are skeptical of their abilities to influence political decision-making within representative democracy (Myllyniemi, 2014). Evidence from previous studies depicts the topic of Finnish young people's attitudes regarding democracy and political participation as complex and somewhat contradictory. In "Youth Barometer" 2013, Finnish young people's (15- to 29-year-olds) attitudes toward politics and participation were examined, and the study suggested that the majority of Finnish young people view politics as

important, are more interested in politics than ever before, and their trust in political institutions have strengthened since the 1990s (Myllyniemi, 2014). In European comparisons, despite being very knowledgeable in political questions, Finnish young people were, however, among the least motivated to participate politically (Myllyniemi, 2014). Thus, the trust in institutions or political interest does not transform into political activity for the Finnish young people.

The traditional views of participation and high levels of institutional trust are combined with several opportunities for active citizen participation, which should grant Finnish young people a diverse image of political engagement. In the institutionalized politics, young people can engage in, for example, mandatory youth councils at the local level (Kuntalaki 410/2015) or make use of the Finnish national-level citizens' initiative (CI). The Finnish CI, explored in article I, is of special importance in this dissertation. The CI is a form of direct democratic innovation that provides citizens with new possibilities for political participation by creating decision-making processes where citizens are given a direct say on specific political issues, shifting the decision-making power to the citizens, often to produce change (Gherghina & Geissel, 2020). The CI is the most notable form of direct democracy in Finland, and it provides eligible voters the possibility to sign and create legislative initiatives. In the modern context, direct democratic innovations are used as complementary for representative democracy. The Finnish CI was introduced in 2012. Since then, eligible voters have had the right to make legislative proposals. If a proposal gathers support from 50,000 citizens within 6 months, the initiative can be brought to the parliament, which decides on whether to implement the agenda-setting initiative (Schiller & Setälä, 2012, p. 1) into legislation. Democratic innovations such as the CI are institutions designed to create and deepen citizen participation in political decision-making processes (Setälä & Schiller, 2012, p. 2) and to enhance democracy and its quality (Geissel, 2013).

Outside the institutional realm, Finnish young people can sometimes engage in the many deliberative projects conducted in the country. Finnish young people have also made active use of e.g. the FFF movement, which spread to Finland in its early stages in the fall of 2018 (Mäkinen, 2018). In 2019, several climate strikes were held in more than 20 different municipalities in Finland (Koivisto & Nelskylä 2019; Koskinen 2019).

Finland provides a multifaceted case to address questions related to young people, democracy, and political participation. The Finnish case combines young people's high institutional trust and traditional views on the most influential forms for engagement, high educational levels and political knowledge, with diverse participatory opportunities and interest in the post-materialist climate strike movement.

1.4 Research process and ethical considerations

All articles in this dissertation were or will be published in open-access form (Gold OA, Diamond OA or Hybrid OA). All research was conducted in accordance

with The Finnish National Board on Research Integrity TENK's (2009) "Ethical principles of research in the humanities and social and behavioral sciences and proposals for ethical review", which researchers operating in Finland must comply with when conducting research with human participants. This research also adhered to the RCR principles: TENK's (2013) "Guidelines for the responsible conduct of research and for handling alleged violations of conduct", which promotes the responsible conduct of research. In accordance with the guidelines, no ethical review of the conducted research or the data collection was required. However, ethical considerations were a vital part especially of the data collection processes.

When researching minors, research ethical considerations are especially important in the data collection regarding age limits, consent and guardian permissions. These were especially important for the FFF dataset 1, which was used in article II. In Finland, a guardian has the right to decide on a child's personal matters (section 4 paragraph 1 of the Child Custody and Right of Access Act [361/1983]). However, children should also be able to influence matters pertaining to themselves to a degree corresponding to their level of development (TENK, 2009). The Finnish Constitution (section 6, paragraph 3) and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 12) (1989) state that, citing TENK (2009), "children must be treated equally and as individuals and must be allowed to influence matters pertaining to themselves to a degree corresponding to their level of development". The question of whether minors can participate as research subject without a guardian's permission is thus a question of balancing these different rights, and it forms an important practical question for the researcher. Guardians and children's interests and attitudes may be different in regards to participation in research projects. Asking a guardian for consent may endanger the collection of comprehensive research data on the behaviors of minors, which then restricts the freedom of science guaranteed by the Finnish Constitution (TENK, 2009). Especially since the research was conducted outside of schools and institutions of early childhood education and care, guardian permission was an even more important consideration (TENK, 2009).

In the collection of interview data for FFF dataset 1, the age limit of the interviewees was determined to be 15 years, as the Finnish National Board on Research Integrity (TENK, 2009)[1] guidelines state that when studying children of the ages 15 years and older, their own consent is sufficient to conduct the study. Especially because this research was on political participation in a protest movement that used civil disobedience as their method of protest, I wanted to avoid possible skewing of respondents if guardian permissions was be needed. This is because the reactions from guardians on the protest actions of the young were unknown. I also argue that since these young people, despite their age, were displaying high levels of political activity, their own consent for participation was sufficient, as they were capable of making informed decision on their participation in a research project by themselves.

[1] See the guidelines at www.tenk.fi/en

The interviewees for FFF dataset 1 were informed of their rights verbally and in writing before the interviews were conducted to ensure informed consent. They were informed of the aim of the data collection (to write a scientific article on the topic of youth participation and climate actions in Finland). They were informed that their participation was voluntary, they had the right to withdraw from the study at any stage but that their prior input can still be used in the research, they can freely decline answering a question, and that the data were to be used only for research purposes. The interviewees were informed that the interviews would be recorded and later transcribed, everything that would be published would be translated to English, all materials would be handled with confidentiality, and the anonymity of the study subjects would be ensured in the material and in the final publication. All materials were be stored in a secure way and a way, with identifiable personal information removed. The research subjects consented to participate in the study in writing and consented that the data can be used to publish results in scientific journals and this dissertation. The rights of the interviewees and the ethical considerations were provided to the subjects in a language suitable for their age and level of development. The subjects were given an opportunity to ask questions.

In the writing of article II, further ethical considerations were taken by not enclosing more detailed information about the background or other current activities of the young interviewees. As in a small country with small circles, any further details may compromise the anonymity of the study subjects.

In the FFF dataset 2, part of the material consisted of Twitter data in the form of "tweets". To follow the research ethical guidelines of the Finnish National Board on Research Integrity (TENK, 2009), no direct quotations from tweets were used in the analysis. Twitter data consist inevitably of personal information, as tweets are often accompanied by a person's real name, picture, or identifiable username. Twitter data are openly available for anyone to use; thus, all direct quotations inevitably diminish the subject's anonymity, an important principle in research ethics in human sciences.

The quantitative data used in this dissertation, were secondary data in the forms of election survey data (FNES 2015) and conjoint experimental survey data (Christensen & Saikkonen, 2020). Both datasets consisted of respondents aged 18 years or older, thus requiring no further ethical consideration in terms of age. The experimental survey data were preregistered[2] before the data collection.

1.5 Structure of this dissertation

The dissertation is structured as following: introduction, theoretical foundation and definitions, materials and methods, summary of the articles, main findings and discussion.

[2] The pre-registration is found at https://osf.io/3f49x/?view_only=41caab52a5e64697b8d7de1f69815324

The introductory part has presented the background and research environment to which this work is embedded to (1.1), the objectives and scopes of this research (1.2), Finland as a case (1.3), and the ethical consideration in the research process (1.4).

The theoretical foundation and definitions chapter starts with a discussion on one of the most important concepts for this work; the definition of "young people" (2.1). The discussion on age and generation is followed by a discussion on another important concept: what is 'political participation' (2.2). The chapter on political participation first examines the topic on a general level, followed by discussions on theories on youth participation (2.2.1) and the quality of and equality in participation (2.2.2).

In the materials and methods section the unique combination of four datasets that are used in this work are presented (3), as well as the methods used to analyze the data. The summary of the articles summarizes the research questions and findings from all individual articles (4). The main findings and discussion chapter focuses on the implications of the results as well as the takeaway of this doctoral thesis (5).

2 Theoretical foundation and definitions

This dissertation consists of four articles that all used different materials and methods to examine how young people relate to democracy and political participation in Finland. The articles were, however, built on a shared theoretical foundation. In this chapter, I discuss and examine the definitions of the most important terms related to age, generations, and political participation and the shared theoretical foundation, that is, "the post-materialist perspective", in detail.

2.1 Age and generation: How to define young people

It is not possible to precisely define who constitutes a young person, or when a person ceases to be young (García-Albacete, 2014, p. 80; Pickard, 2019, p. 45). It is difficult to clearly demarcate life stages, as life stages differ significantly over historical periods and according to institutional constraints (García-Albacete, 2014, p. 81). The transitions from childhood to adulthood are flexible, even more now than before since young people spend longer times in education, join the job market later, and have a different, more precariat experience of the labor market than previous generations (Flanagan, 2016, p. 196; Pickard, 2019, p. 46). Who is considered young is highly context dependent. Depending on the country, institution, or research project, different kinds of definitions are and can be used. This chapter discusses the definitions of "young people" and "youth" from a political science research perspective in the context of Finland.

Legislation provides some definitions of who is considered a young person, and these definitions typically reflect the social, cultural and political judgments of the issue (Pickard, 2019, p. 29). From a legislative point of view, people younger than 29 years are considered young people in Finland in regard to e.g. services reserved for the young (Nuorisolaki 1285/2016, 3**§**). Furthermore, legislation dictates who has the right to access institutional forms of political engagement, as in Finland, voting in elections, running for an office or signing CIs are reserved for citizens who have turned 18 years old. The legislative limits often affect the definition of "young people" in political science studies, due to the exclusion of underage citizens from many participatory forms that are of research interest, such as elections or the Finnish CI. The legislative and institutional limits drive the selection of respondents, and affects which ages are considered young in the research. Election studies, for example, often define young people as 18- to 24-year-olds or even 18- to 29-year-olds. Data availability is thus one influential factor in how "young people" are defined in research.

Data availability aside, when possible, the inclusion of people under the legal voting age in definitions and thereby in research projects is important for studies in political engagement. Studies suggest that political experiences that happen during the "formative years" have a great importance for later life's political attitudes and behaviors (e.g. Delli Carpini 1989; Dinas 2013; Quintelier & Van Deth, 2014; Smets & Neundorf, 2014). People can have, and do have, political

experiences before turning 18 years old. These experiences can have long-lasting effects for their future activity; hence, the formation of political attitudes and behaviors during the formative years should be studied when possible. The formative years, or "coming of age" or "impressionable" period, is typically understood to range from adolescence to early adulthood, somewhere around 15 to 25 years of age (see e.g. Grasso, 2014; Pickard, 2019, p. 29, but also Bartels & Jackman, 2014, who suggested that the impressionable period may occur earlier), which could operate as one possible definition of "young people".

Different kind of age brackets (e.g. 15- to 25-year-olds, 18- to 24-year-olds, or 18- to 30-year-olds) are typically used in political science as they allow for measurement of political participation empirically using quantitative methods. There is, however, criticism related to the use of brackets. Pickard (2019) argued, that fixed brackets can lead to seeing young people as a homogenous group, as the emphasis is put on age rather than on differences within the age group (2019, p. 27, 46). Brackets do not acknowledge that young people come from various backgrounds and have differing interests and values (Henn & Foard, 2014). Pickard suggested that ignoring the diversity amongst the young promotes "a skewed and inaccurate image of young people" and it strengthens the "young people are a problem" narrative (2019, p. 31-32). Age brackets are a useful tool in quantitative research, but it should be noted that not all young people are homogenous within the brackets, and the selection of which ages are included in the brackets is always somewhat arbitrary.

Some studies that examined young people and political participation in political science have dealt with the difficulty of defining the young by not providing a specified definition at all. Instead these studies just used a broad term, such as "young generations", without specifying who are included in this group (Wuttke et al., 2020). These studies most likely relied on the idea that we have a commonly shared idea of who are considered young person or who are the young generation(s). Alternatively, many studies have included what García-Albacete called "arbitrary delimitations of age groups in their models" (2014, p. 80): the definition of "young people" does not necessarily have a theoretical base, but the lower limit is driven by the data availability,–and the upper limit is established somewhere between 24 and 35 years without discussion (García-Albacete, 2014, p. 80).

The four articles in this dissertation operate with different definitions of young people, depending on the context, theories, data availability, and other limitations. In article II, the aim was to research the youngest respondents possible; therefore, activists between the ages of 15 and 20 years were interviewed. Including both people who were over (18–20) and under the legal voting age (15–17 years), provided an opportunity to capture possible differences in ideas regarding participation based on the political arsenal that the respondents had access to. In article III, no definition of the young was presented, as the article explored media discussions in newspapers and on Twitter and focused not on the discussants ages but on how the concept of "youth" and "adulthood" were present in the material.

The two quantitative articles, articles IV and I, operated by young generations instead of youth as a question of age. In political science studies related to age or generations, especially when examining the young, the starting point is often whether something is a lifecycle or generational effect. The patterns of lower levels of participation in institutionalized forms of engagement evident amongst the young can be due to the lifecycle effect. The lifecycle effect theory explains that the relationship between age and political participation is curvilinear; that is, it slowly increases among young adults, stays relatively stable during middle age and declines at older age (Nemčok & Wass, 2021). The lower levels of political participation among young people are due to "startup problems" that preoccupy young citizens (Smets, 2016). In the early years of adulthood, people typically prioritize other things more than politics, as they try to finish their education, start a career, find a spouse, and start their adult lives. Once these startup problems have been overcome and the factors related to adult life have been achieved, people typically find themselves having more resources for political participation as well as social networks that encourage participation (Verba et al., 1995; see also Putnam, 2000). Once people reach older age, their mobility and societal involvement in turn decrease, which leads to decreased political participation (Nemčok & Wass, 2021). However, for already some time now, young people have been suggested to face more or extended startup problems than previous generations (Smets, 2016 Kimberlee, 2002), as young people spend longer time in education and enter the labor market later in life (Pickard, 2019, p. 46). It has been questioned whether the patterns of political participation evident among the young are due to lifecycle effect, or if there are generational effects at play.

Borrowing from Mannheim's (1927/1952) seminal work on generations, "youth experiencing the same concrete historical problems may be said to be part of the same actual generation" (1927/1952, p. 304). Political generations are formed among age cohorts that have experienced the same historical events during their formative years and become permanently influenced by the events and the socioeconomic, political, and technological context, which affect individual political socialization (Mannheim, 1927/1952; Nemčok & Wass, 2021; Pickard, 2019, p. 44). Political socialization refers to a process where individuals learn of the existing social patterns that correspond with their societal position (Neundorf & Smets, 2017) and form the basis of political attitudes, engagements and behaviors (Grasso, 2014; Neundorf & Smets, 2017; Smets & Neundorf, 2014). Members of the same political generations are believed to share similar socialization experiences that shape the political patterns for the rest of their lives (Nemčok & Wass, 2021)[3]. The political generations are believed to be differentiated from each other especially in their patterns of participation (Grasso, 2014; Mannheim, 1927/1952). Thus, young people's patterns of political participation can be due to the political generation of which they are a

[3] However, the idea of how enduring the early socialization experiences have also been questioned, see e.g. Neundorf & Smets (2017) for more.

member. García-Albacete found in longitudinal studies that both the lifecycle and generational explanations had empirical support in Finland (2014, p. 229-230).

In this dissertation, it is not possible to examine whether something is a lifecycle or cohort (generational) effect, or merely a period effect, as the data used does not allow the drawing of those kinds of conclusions. Thus, these concepts are discussed only to clarify the important concepts on the field. In this work, the concept of political generations was not used to measure generational effects, but to examine how the younger generation's view participation and democracy at this time.

The younger political generations are expected to have differing patterns of political participation from older political generations. Older generations came of age at a time when mass political parties and elections were fundamental to democracy and democratic government, and shaped the social cleavages in democracy (Grasso, 2014). Thus, they are more likely to engage in electoral and party activities. Younger generations, on the other hand, have been politically socialized at times when the traditional mobilization networks have eroded (Putnam, 2000), and changes in values (e.g. Inglehart, 1997; see also Dalton, 2008, 2016), technological advancements (Pickard, 2019), and higher education levels (Dalton, 2016), among other things, have shaped their socialization and therefore their political participation. The focus here is especially on Millennials. If the period when individuals came of age was characterized by pronounced stress, epochal events or fast socioeconomic change, it is often believed to be uniquely identified in a political sense (Jennings, 1987, p. 368, as cited in Grasso, 2014). Generation Y, the Millennials (Strauss & Howe, 2000), have entered the work force in the midst of a financial crisis (Dalton, 2016, p. 42), and lived with worse living conditions and quality of life than the previous generations had in their youth (Pickard, 2019, p. 380). Yet, the generations life experiences reflect the educational, technological, and media-related advances made in societies (e.g. Dalton, 2016), which grant them more skills to participate politically. Millennials, in this work defined as those born between 1981 and 1996 or 1997[4] (Dimock, 2019), have received a lot of attention, often negative in tone. Millennials have allegedly ruined industries from napkins to diamonds (Schlossberg, 2016; "14 Industries Experts Say Millennials Are Killing — And Why They're Wrong", 2020). In political science, Millennials have been deemed as "undemocratic" (Foa & Mounk, 2016) and their political activity both in institutionalized but even in informal political activities have been questioned (see e.g. Grasso et al., 2018). This dissertation investigated the millennial generation to clarify how the members of this generation relate to democracy and political participation.

In the beginning of the 2020s, Millennials have surely reached adulthood, as the oldest Millennials have turned 40 years old and even the youngest are in their

[4] Over the years, the definition of the millennial generations' end birthdate has been specified, as the next generation, Generation Z, has reached adulthood. Thus, there are two slightly different definitions of Millennials used in this work based on the information that was available from Pew research Centre at the time.

mid-20s. The data used in article I were from 2015, when the youngest Millennials were 19 years old. This a great example of the fleeting nature of youth and how research projects have a difficult time keeping up with it, if the aim is to examine the youngest people and generations possible. The youngest generation of age today, Generation Z, colloquially referred to as "Zoomers"[5], was added to the analyses in article IV to gain further knowledge of not only Millennials support for democracy but how the younger and still largely unexplored generation views democracy.

Lastly, some words on semantics. There are multiple ways to refer to young people; including "youths", "teenagers", "adolescents"; several of which have been criticized as denominating young people (see e.g. Pickard, 2019, p. 28). Pickard (2019) noted that, for example, the term "adolescent", which is prevalent in biology, sociology, and psychology research, can easily make that period of a person's life seem as an inherently problematic because the research fields studying that period focus mostly on problems. Thus, the term may promote the "young as a problem" narrative. I want to acknowledge this discussion. The language we use is important, as it has an effect on how seriously we take the young and their political engagement; if we use condescending terms, we may undermine the young and their political efforts. However, in this work, both terms "adolescent" and "youth" has been used. The aim has not been to associate any condescending tones or negative connotations to the forms of young people's participation or the young people themselves. Rather, the terms were used as a marker for that period of time when transition from childhood to adulthood takes place, that is, the "formative years".

2.2 Political participation

The definition of "political participation", and more specifically the notion that we need to reconfigure and broaden the definition when studying the young, are important for research in young people's political activity. How we define the concept of political participation affects the knowledge we gain of young people's political engagement, because definitions guide our research choices and what arenas, form, and activities we consider when examining the topic.

Traditional conceptualizations have often defined political participation as activities that citizens take to influence the government. A definition of political participation could be borrowed from Verba and Nie (1987, p.2): "Political participation refers to those activities by private citizens that aim to influence the government, either by affecting the choice of government personnel or their choices". A similar sentiment is echoed by Milner (2010, p. 6) that "political participation is here understood to encompass a range of activities that, in one way or another, seek to affect the policies of individuals who are—or wish to be—democratically elected, and of the organisations behind them". Other

[5] See e.g. Merriam-Webster https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/words-were-watching-zoomer-gen-z

scholars, however, provide definitions that broaden the concept of political participation to also include engagement targeted towards actors other than the government or political institutions. Borrowing from Norris's definition (2002, p. 16), political participation can be defined as "any dimension of activity that are either designed directly to influence government agencies and the policy process, or indirectly to impact civil society, or which attempts to alter systematic patterns of social behaviour". Political participation can also be defines according to Brady (1999, p. 737) as "action by ordinary citizens directed toward influencing some political outcomes". Instead of aiming to influence the government, acts that aim to create political change in other arenas can also be counted as political participation, which allows us to consider a broader spectrum of activities as "political". This notion is especially important for the study of young people's participation, as many theories expect the young to engage in activities that can be seen as political but are not necessarily targeted toward the government (see e.g. Chou, 2017; Dalton, 2008, 2016).

In the seminal literature, political participation is typically distinguished between "conventional" and "unconventional" forms of politics, as introduced by Barnes and Kaase (1979, p. 409-477, as cited in Hooghe & Marien, 2013). The conventional, or traditional, forms are closely linked to the electoral process (Kaim, 2021; Marien et al., 2010), whereas the unconventional forms are traditionally defined as protest behavior (Barnes & Kaase, 1979) but have later become more of a catch-all term for modes of engagement outside the electoral process. Whether the conventional/unconventional distinction is still useful in political science studies can be debated. The "unconventional" forms have become so popular and mainstream that the label has lost its meaning in many ways (Stolle & Hooghe, 2011, p. 120). The conceptualization can be seen as problematic, as it promotes the exclusion of social actions that are deemed unconventional (Kaim, 2021). Norris (2004) argued that the conventional/unconventional division can no longer capture many of the essential features of the contemporary political participation repertoires; demonstrations have ceased to be radical political acts, while new forms of politics has become more prominent. Instead of the conventional/unconventional distinction, a distinction can be drawn along the level of institutionalization (as noted by Barnes and Kaase, 1979, in Marien et al., 2010; see also e.g. Hooghe & Marien, 2013).

The distinctions around the level of institutionalization follow the classic distinction of conventional/unconventional but makes a distinction of which arenas political participation takes place in and who the participation targets (Marien et al., 2010). Institutionalized participation refers to political activities that are linked to the existing political institutions – elections and political parties – and are typically directed towards political actors and elected officials (e.g. Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Marien et al., 2010). In addition to the typical political institutions, direct democracy in the form of citizens' initiative can also be categorized as institutionalized participation, as the goal of the tool is to affect formal political decision-making (Bäck & Christensen, 2020). Through activities

in the institutionalized politics, the participants become "part of the political system" as they try to affect the system directly (Marien et al., 2010). Non-institutionalized political activities are not typically directly related to the electoral process or the functioning of political institutions (Hooghe & Marien, 2013) but can have a broader scope of targets and keep a distance from the political system (Marien et al., 2010). Non-institutionalized participation is typically citizen-driven, bottom-up forms of engagement that include irregular activities, concerned with direct action and often focused on specific issues or themes (Bäck & Christensen, 2020). The non-institutionalized participation can attempt to impact political decisions indirectly or even circumvent the political system altogether (Marien et al., 2010). An example of non-institutionalized participation is political consumption targeted toward multinational companies.

It is sometimes difficult to determine whether a political activity is institutionalized or non-institutionalized. The distinction is, however, often important as the different types of activities have different consequences. Institutionalized politics connects people to the formal political system and channels citizens' political demands directly into the political decision-making process (Bäck & Christensen, 2020). The effect of non-institutionalized politics is more unclear, as the activities can be targeted towards many different societal actors such as corporations or organizations. As engagement in the formal political system is considered vital by many researchers (see Mair, 2013; Milner, 2010; Stoker, 2006), the distinction provides an important tool for the identification and understanding of the realities of political engagement. By using the institutionalized/non-institutionalized distinction, we acknowledge the different arenas where people engage in and can better identify the effect or consequences of the different forms of engagement and discuss the broad realities of political participation both from the individual- and system-level perspectives.

Historically in political science research, the focus has been on the conventional or the institutionalized forms of political activities, embodied by elections, which are seen as a key defining element of a democratic system (Milner, 2010). The wide focus on the institutionalized politics, elections and formal political activities can be problematic when studying the young, as focusing on the formal political arenas provide an overly narrow picture of political engagement (O'Toole et al., 2003). We as researchers may focus on political forms, issues and arenas that are familiar for older generations and expect the same issues and arenas to be familiar and of similar importance to the young, even though they may actually have only little relevance to young people, as changing societal context and political socialization have altered what the young perceive as political (O'Toole et al., 2003). Pontes et al. (2018) pointed that it is important that "the acts that they [researchers] consider to represent political engagement are likewise considered as political engagement acts by a younger audience". How we define political participation matters because definitions affects what forms of engagement we investigate in research. The contemporary understanding of young people's political participation in political

science is that the young have different ideas and preferences for political engagement in comparison to older people, which affects their participatory habits. Thus, we need to reconfigure and broaden our understanding and definitions of political participation, explore the concepts from youth-centered perspectives (O'Toole et al., 2003; see also Farthing, 2010; Pontes et al., 2018) and avoid adult-centric conceptualizations to grasp the full image of contemporary youth participation. Some approaches to ensure this are as follows: use of mixed methodology to ensure that young people's own voices and views are heard, rejection of narrow definitions of "political participation", keeping in mind the barriers that young people encounter regarding political participation (Pickard, 2019), and allowing the individuals themselves to say how they conceive of politics and what politics means to them (O'Toole et al., 2003). These ideas are implemented especially in article II.

This work operates with a broad understanding of political participation, where a variety of activities that people can engage in to bring on political change in any arena, are seen as political participation. I note that the arenas and forms of political participation are wide, many, and ever-changing, and can be targeted toward institutions or other parts of society. The most important factor in the definition of political participation is the acknowledgement that we need to keep an open mind regarding political participation and allow our study subjects to voice their own definitions. The focus, however, in this dissertation is on non-electoral forms of engagement due to the selection of study subjects. I make use of the distinction between institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of participation to note in which arenas the political engagement happens. I use the terms "political participation" and "political engagement" as synonymous in this work.

2.2.1 Theories on youth participation

The post-materialist perspective on which this work is founded on expects there to be a shift in youth participation from institutionalized forms of engagement to more direct, engaging, and elite-challenging forms of political activity. Studies made in the 1950s and 1960s approached the value change between generations very differently: it was expected that there was stability between generations and that young people were socialized into the value patterns of previous generation (Hooghe & Boonen, 2016, p. 15). Today, the idea of value change between generations is, however, very well-established in political science. The shift in youth participation is due to changes in societies, values and norms, as well as different skillsets and opportunities for political participation (e.g. Inglehart, 1997; Dalton, 2001, 2007, 2008, 2016; Chou, 2017; Pickard, 2019). In addition to continuous changes in societies, norms, and values, new digital technologies and the constant evolvement of social media sites shift participation patterns, as they enable the young to participate in a broader range of activities online (Pickard, 2019, p. 375), changing the political landscape where young people operate.

In the literature, the view on generational replacement is strongly expressed by Ronald Inglehart in the post-materialism theory (1977, 1997). Inglehart (1997) argued that due to societal modernization since the 1960s, a value shift has occurred in Western societies from materialist values to post-materialist values, which has transformed the political engagement for younger generations. Modernization, with long periods of peace and prosperity, allowed Western societies to enter an era where a growing emphasis could be put on the quality of life and individual self-expression. Instead of focusing on the maximization of economic growth, a key component of politics in the materialist era, the focus could be shifted to the maximization of well-being through lifestyle choices, which embodied a deep-rooted change in the mass worldviews (Inglehart, 1997, p. 20-28). In addition, rising education levels and easier access to political information have strengthened citizens' abilities, or at least their self-confidence in their abilities, to make political decisions without the interference from political elites (Dalton, 2007; Dalton et al., 2001). In industrial societies, political parties acted as the mobilizing force of citizens, and the role of the masses was to vote. This explains why those generations that were socialized during the 1930s and the World War II developed more authoritarian and materialist value patterns, which they held or hold even decades later (Hooghe & Boonen, 2016, p.15). Due to the societal changes, the emphasis shifted to more issue-specific forms of participation (Inglehart, 1997, p. 43). The distinct context during the primary socialization phase of the young generations led to fundamental value change, which lead to a decline in conventional political engagement (Thjissen et al., 2016, p. 2) and the emergence of new modes and forms of participation. The change from material to post-material priorities thus meant that expectations and attitudes regarding political participation across generations were transformed, which led the younger generations to prefer political participation in more direct, engaged, elite-challenging, and issue-specific forms of engagement.

Similarly, Dalton (2008, 2016) suggested that changes in citizenship norms have changed the patterns of political participation. Dalton defines citizenship as a shared set of social norms and expectations about citizens' role in politics (2008, p. 78); citizenship expresses norms of how a "good" citizen acts and thus the norm has implications for political activity. Owing to the norm changes, alongside other societal changes, the older and younger generations have developed differing preferences for political participation. Whereas the older generations are more duty-based; focused on fulfilling their citizen duty in elections, always following the law and paying their taxes; the younger generations foster a more engaged norm on citizenship (Dalton, 2016). Instead of focusing on the duty aspects of citizenship, the theory suggests that the young want to be more actively engaged in politics by e.g. contacting politicians directly, political consumerism, or working with public interest groups that operate with post-materialist themes (2008, p. 85). The changes in citizenship norms have led to young generations being more focused on self-expressive values, with preference for participating more directly in decision-making, and challenging

the elites when necessary, in a broader range of activities and in solidarity with other people (Dalton, 2008, 2016).

The societal value change and post-materialist development are expected to continue to this day. Despite some studies suggesting that the strong generational replacement have taken place in the past, while the current era displays less occurrence of the generational replacement (see e.g. Grasso, 2014; Hooghe & Boonen, 2016), younger generations and young people are still expected to have differing participation patterns from older generations and older people.

Theories on contemporary youth participation explain that instead of elections or other institutionalized forms of engagement, young people participate, and prefer to participate, in myriads of ways in alternative, new forms of political engagement. Young people have developed various capitals that enable them to participate in many forms of political engagement (Chou, 2017, p. 17; Pickard, 2019, p. 377). The young are expected to be new kinds of critical and post-modern citizens, who support basic democratic values, but are critical of the institutional system with its mediation and prefer participation in more horizontal and autonomous ways (Hustinx & Roose, 2016, p. 95; Norris, 2004). In practice, this entails an expectation that instead of engaging in democratic institutions on institutionalized arenas, the young prefer more loosely structured and decentralized networks that allow participation that is more informal and sporadic (Hustinx & Roose, 2016, p. 95; Norris, 2004), with low entry costs (Stolle & Hooghe, 2011). Their participation is more episodic and dependent on current events; instead of participation being an ongoing stream of political activity in the form of e.g. party activities, something needs to fuel their participation (Chou, 2017). The young prefer "easy-entrance, easy-exit" modes of involvement, where instead of formally joining by paying membership fees, people can simply belong by turning up or sharing political sympathies and concern about issues (Norris, 2004).

In addition to a change in the forms of political participation, the post-materialist value change led to a rise of new political issues, social movements and political parties (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). It brought new, more progressive values and political matters to the center stage. Also known as the "silent revolution" or the "new politics" (Inglehart, 1971, 1977), the post-materialist value change draw attention from economic and welfare-related themes to more emphasis on environmental protection, minority rights, LGBTQIA+ rights and gender and racial equality, among other issues (Norris & Inglehart, 2019, p. 88). The value change also led to increased support for new green and leftish-libertarian parties (Bale & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021; Ignazi, 1992, 1996; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). Because the post-materialist development changed basic socialization, the value priorities changed especially among younger generations, and a younger birth cohort is one of the strongest predictors of support for post-materialist values and progressive, socially liberal policy attitudes (Norris & Inglehart, 2019, 93). Thus, the young do not only participate in alternative ways but the political issues they engage in are often also different.

The progressive post-materialist development has been challenged by the rise in popularity of populist and extreme right parties. It appears that part of the people expresses progressive and liberal values of the silent revolution and new politics (Inglehart, 1971, 1977), while another part sympathizes with authoritarian ideas that are connected to the so-called "silent counter-revolution" (Ignazi, 1992, 1996) (see also Bale & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021). Ignazi's (1992, 1996) theory on the silent counter-revolution explains that the post-materialist value change on the left of the political spectrum led to people embracing the new values, political issues and movements, but had alternative effects on the political right. On the right, the value changes created more insecurity as traditional gender and family roles alongside kinship and community bonds were destroyed (Ignazi, 1996, p. 557), leading to more authoritarian and tradition-oriented political movements gaining popularity (Ignazi, 1992; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Especially older generations, white men and lesser-educated are more likely to exhibit these more traditional values and vote for populist parties (Norris & Inglehart, 2016). However, also younger citizens support populist parties, as is evident from e.g. young people's party choices in Finland (presented in Chapter 1.3). When discussing post-materialist development, it is therefore important to note that young people are not a homogenous group with only like-minded individuals, but a diverse group of people, who are differently affected by societal changes.

The rise of new political issues due to the post-materialist value change intertwines with political participation, as issues are expected to affect young people's political participation. The young are expected to be more issue-oriented than older people are – their political engagement is fueled by their concern of post-materialist or non-materialistic issues such as environment, human and animal rights, anti-racism, and equality (e.g. Inglehart, 1997; Kimberlee, 2002, p. 90-93). Not only are the forms or arenas of engagement but also the political issues important for young people's participation. Consequently, the young are also expected to be more cause-oriented in their participatory habits, as they are interested in particular causes and participate in a more issue-based manner (Chou 2017; Kimberlee, 2002). In cause-oriented participation, instead of having a "one size fits all" solution for all political issues, the cause determines what forms of participation is employed as different political goals are best achieved in different ways, channels, and arenas (Norris, 2004). The young decide upon the issue what is the preferred method for political engagement and use a political repertoire that includes a wide range of activities such as consumer politics (boycotts or consumption of certain products due to ethical or political reasons), demonstrations, protest, or different forms of lifestyle politics, both within and outside the electoral arena (Norris, 2004).

Concerns with lifestyle and post-materialist values have been seen as a central feature of young people's preferences for political participation (see e.g. Kimberlee, 2002). Lifestyle politics, which refers to a form of politics that foster social change by making politicized lifestyle choices and advancing alternative

lifestyles (de Moor, 2017), is familiar for many young people, who instead of voting for change are expected to make change and live their politics (Farthing, 2010). Built on the assumption that through private life decisions, by taking responsibility of the allocation of common resources and values, it is possible to foster social change and to, for example, create leverage to demand change at a larger scale from, for example, companies or governments (see de Moor, 2017; Michelette & Stolle, 2011), lifestyle politics include different kind of everyday life choices related to for example transportation, consumption, volunteer work, and housing (see e.g. de Moor, 2017; Norris, 2004). A classic example of lifestyle politics is boycotting companies who use sweatshop labor or cosmetic companies that use animal testing (Norris, 2004). The importance of lifestyle politics for youth participation is highlighted by the fact that is an accessible channel for political engagement for those underage citizens who are excluded from many political institutions. An example of how lifestyle politics have created societal change in Finland in recent years is related to food production. Due to masses making personal lifestyle changes towards vegetarian/vegan diet, the demand for vegan food alternatives has increased. To meet the demand, large dairy and meet companies have created their own vegan product lines, thus investing into more ecological food production. Lifestyle politics is explored especially in article III.

Typical examples of the new forms of participation include direct actions, street protests, activity in loosely structured social movements and informal associations (Thjissen et al., 2016, p. 2), consumer politics, donations to good causes, signing online petitions (Hustinx & Roose, 2016, p. 95), activity in single-issue movements or lifestyle politics (de Moor, 2017). Pickard suggests that "the nature of young people's non-electoral participation tends to be personalized (i.e. tailor made or custom-built) according to circumstances and values, rather than moved by self-centered benefits" (2019, p. 397). This is an important notion, as despite the more personalized forms of engagement, the young are still not expected to act from self-interest but rather are expected to engage in politics in solidarity with others (Dalton, 2016).

Young people are expected to participate actively in cause-oriented single-issue movements, which are, as the name states, movements focused on a single political issue that may use many different forms of action to influence a political issue. An important single-issue movement for this dissertation is the Fridays for Future (FFF) movement. The FFF movement (also known as e.g. "School strike 4 climate", "Skolstrejk för klimatet", "Youth for Climate") is a grassroots-level environmental movement founded in 2018 in Sweden by a 15-year-old activists Greta Thunberg. The movement uses protest tactics to demonstrate against the inadequate climate actions taken by politicians (Ernman et al., 2020). Instead of attending school, young people, especially schoolchildren, strike on Fridays to demand political responsibility and action from decision-makers in the fight against climate crisis. The movement is historical in its scope and tactics and in its ability to mobilize young people in particular into participation (de Moor et al. 2020; Wahlström et al. 2019). Millions of young people around the globe have

joined the environmental movement in over 150 countries and FFF has been characterized as one of the most remarkable mass movements of our time (Bowman 2019; Hayward 2021, p. 3). Notably, a large portion, over a third (38%), of the climate strikers have been first-timers (Wahlström et al., 2019). The FFF movement presents a new wave of environmental movements where young people not only are educated on environmental and ecological politics by adults and institutions such as schools, but are co-actors and leaders in such politics (Bowman 2019; Schindel Dimick 2015). The FFF movement provides an example of a successful single-issue movement that has truly been able to mass-mobilize contemporary young people, most remarkably those under the legal voting age. The FFF movement is explored in articles II and III.

Lastly, to highlight the importance of youth-centered approaches, even when studying the politically very active young people, I discuss some alternative theoretical accounts on young people's engagement in the new forms of participation.

This work is founded in the post-materialist perspective. However, it is important to note that despite the expectations that the young want more direct and engaging citizen activity in elite-challenging activities – and their participation in such activities – action does not automatically entail a preference for certain forms of participation. Neither does action automatically entail certain attitudes toward democracy. Herein, I use the example of the FFF movement to highlight the rationale behind this position.

A demonstration is a means of political communication (Klandermans, 2016, p. 75). However, participation in demonstrations or protests is not necessarily indicative of a person's participatory preferences. We easily make assumptions that because young people appear to be active in more direct and engaging forms of politics, those kind of political activities are also their preferred forms of participation. However, instead of an inherent desire to participate more actively in politics, there are myriad of reasons for participation in the active forms, ranging from alienation from the traditional political process (Henn et al., 2002; Quintelier, 2007; Stoker, 2006), to negative perspective on politicians and parties (Chou, 2017) and disappointment with the electoral politics (Pickard, 2019). Activity in certain active forms of politics can be driven by the lack of options. For example, many activists in the FFF movement are under the legal voting age; thus, their options for political activity are limited. Mobilization in certain activities can also be driven by the fear that the existing electoral system, political parties, and politicians fail to respond adequately to people's concerns. The theory on stealth democracy (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002) suggests that Americans (and perhaps the rest of the world) may take an active role in politics, not because they want to actively participate in politics, but because they want to make sure that power is taken away from self-serving politicians (2002, p. 130). Instead of active participation, citizens would actually just rather want a system with fair and knowledgeable elected representatives who care about their wishes (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002), and the possibility to participate in politics when they see that a political decision has a direct effect on their lives

(Stoker, 2006, p. 150). However, if this does not manifest, people are willing to participate. Thus, instead of assumptions, in order to truly understand the political preferences of the young who have become active in certain forms of political engagement, we need to ask them (see e.g. O'Toole et al., 2003).

2.2.2 Are all participations equally good participations?

The shifting pattern of young people's political participation towards more non-institutionalized forms of engagement has led many scholars to question whether the new forms of engagement can help sustain representative democracy (e.g. Mair, 2013; Stoker, 2006). Institutionalized politics channel citizen's political demands directly into the political system (Bäck & Christensen, 2020), which non-institutionalized politics may not be able achieve – potentially creating problems for the quality of participation. With the trend of declining citizen engagement in elections and political parties, the question of whether these new forms of engagement can compensate for declining engagement in political institutions, is especially important from the perspective of democracy.

The question in itself, however, can be criticized as problematic. In youth studies, whether the new forms of engagement are enough to compensate for the decline in institutionalized politics is an adult-centric view that emphasizes political institutions as the ultimate best forms of political participation in which citizens can participate. It disregards young people's own views on politics and their potentially differing evaluation of the importance of institutions. Seeing activity or activism in different forms of politics as a process of engagement with adult-centered institutional politics has been criticized for constraining young people in their ability to think or act (see e.g. Bowman, 2020, p. 9, quoting Germaine Buckley). Critics also suggest that in these types of notions, young people are seen more as subjects of political engagement rather than as political agents who can make change (Bowman, 2019, p. 299).

However, conventional and institutionalized politics are usually seen as necessary for the sustaining of democracy (Mair, 2013, p. 8), and the legitimacy of the representative political system rests on citizen participation, as democracy needs citizen engagement in collective decision-making forms (Stoker, 2006, p. 151, 163). As a criticism toward more individualized forms of participation, Stoker (2006, p. 98) notes that

> the ordinary activism of citizens too often amounts to little more than a thin and individually focused involvement: people say what they want, maybe get something they want or at least get their concern expressed, but do not have any wider engagement with the political system, or with each other.

The non-institutionalize participation cannot in similar manner ensure the impact of participation as institutionalized participation can. Engagement in especially individualized forms of politics may be too narrow for the democratic system. In complex modern democracies, citizen input is needed in different phases of the policy-making process (Stoker, 2006, p. 163). Collective politics

typically decide on larger issues in our societies that affect our personal lives, futures, and abilities regarding e.g. education, employment or health care (Stoker, 2006, p. 5). If people do not participate in political forms that channel their voices into the decision-making processes, the quality of their participation may be limited. An argument goes that buying fair-trade coffee can make some kind of changes in the world, but the change is not similar to the potential outcome of contacting a politician regarding a policy issue. Therefore, it is not only sufficient to note whether people participate in different type of political forms, but we should also be mindful of the quality of participation. Especially if the non-institutionalized politics is increasingly individualized, it runs the risk of growing policy fragmentation and failure (Stoker, 2006, p. 98). For a healthy democracy, people need to engage in issues wider than individualized issues that have an immediate effect on themselves; otherwise, they run the risk of ending up being more like customers of public services (Stoker, 2006, p. 98-99). Thus, in many ways, institutionalized politics, embodied by collective action, is still important for the quality of representative democracy. Good democratic citizenship also requires that people participate in politics by challenging the government to represent their interests (Dalton, 2016).

Because of the potential that the non-institutionalized politics cannot compensate for institutionalized politics, Mair (2013) has been critical of the broadening of the concept of democracy. Instead of attempts to reinvigorate democracy as such or to do something about the disengagement in institutionalized politics, democracy is redefined in a way that help us adapt to the decline in institutionalized engagement (Mair, 2013, p. 9). However, in works related to young people's engagement, the redefinitions and broadening of the concept of democracy are often considered necessary to ensure youth-centered approaches (e.g. O'Toole et al., 2003). They also mark the foundation of contemporary theoretical understanding regarding youth participation (see e.g. Dalton, 2008; Inglehart, 1997; Pickard, 2019).

Still, not all forms of participation are equal in the kind of possibilities they provide for citizen influence on political decision-making. Thus, determining whether the forms of engagement in which the young are expected to participate can compensate for the visible decline in youth participation in conventional politics, is important for the implications that mass participation in the new forms of engagement can have on democracy. In addition, it has implications on the equality of participation: whether people who engage in the non-institutionalized politics can get their voices heard when decision are made. However, the contemporary understanding of the new forms of engagement that the young are expected to prefer is that they do not replace the old ones but allows citizens to broaden their radius of action (Dalton, 2008; Flanagan, 2016, p. 195; Hustinx & Roose, 2016). The different forms of political activity are not mutually exclusive and the young can participate in multitude of different ways at the same time. Sentiment that e.g. Pickard echoes, as she suggests that the different forms of political participation can form a positive cycle of political engagement (Pickard 2019, p. 397).

In addition to the quality of participation, the equality of participation is important in regard to the question of whether all participations are equally good participations. The democratic theory holds that societies benefit in the long run from the participation of all its citizens; the public's needs and preferences can be overlooked if part of society is uninvolved (Dalton, 2017, p. 213). The rise of new forms of participation evokes the question of the inclusionary potential of these new participatory opportunities (Hustinx & Roose, 2016, p. 97; Stolle & Hooghe, 2011). It is a well-accepted notion that participation opportunities are unevenly distributed in the population and that individuals with more resources and skills participate more actively in traditional politics (e.g. Dalton, 2017; Verba et al., 1995). This is also true amongst the young, as politically active young people come predominantly from homes with higher socioeconomic resources (e.g. Henn & Foard, 2014). It is not necessarily a problem when people make individual choices not to take part in politics. However, it becomes a problem for democratic inclusiveness when the non-participation is rooted in factors outside of the individual's control that systematically cause biased patterns of participation (Dalton, 2017, p. 9). Citizens can opt not to use their right to participate, but the choice should be voluntary and not based on external restraints (Verba et al., 1995, p. 26-27). Inactivity is, however, often not a free choice (see e.g. Marien et al., 2010; Verba et al., 1995; Young, 2000), rather people have various amounts of capitals that assist them in political activity (Putnam, 2000). Especially education especially but also social status are strong determinants for political engagement (Dalton, 2017, p. 9-11). Verba et al. (1995) found that there are consistent patterns in who becomes politically active. In their Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM), further explored in article I, Verba et al. (1995) suggested that people do not participate because 1) they cannot, 2) they do not want to, and 3) no one asked them to (1995, p. 269). On the other hand, those with higher civic skills and resources, psychological engagement with politics (which provides a stimuli for participation), and more active recruitment networks are the ones who make use of participation opportunities (Verba et al. 1995).

The new forms of engagement can reproduce the traditional patterns of exclusion along the lines of e.g. gender, education, and income, or lower the threshold for participation of previously excluded groups (Hustinx & Roose, 2016, p. 97). The new forms of politics are largely performed in an individual manner, which may lead to erosion of the moderating effect of societal groups and consequently to even more pronounced inequalities in political engagement than in traditional forms of participation (Hooghe & Boonen, 2016, p. 14; Stolle & Hooghe, 2011). In traditional, institutionalized forms of participation, specific groups, frequently those who are less active in politics, can often be mobilized into action by e.g. trade unions or religious groups, whereas in the new forms mitigation of the patterns of social stratification may be less successful (Hooghe & Boonen, 2016, p. 14). Some suggest that people with more resources are more likely to embrace new participatory opportunities, while on the other hand, the new forms of engagement are often less time-consuming, less hierarchical, less

organized, and more focused on private or lifestyle-related issues, which could help engage not only the young (Hustinx & Roose, 2016, p. 97), but also those who are not typically active in political participatory processes. Zittel and Fuchs (2007) claim that providing new participatory forms can mobilize otherwise passive citizens, thereby helping to assure greater equality in participation. Whether the new forms mostly engage the "usual suspects" (highly educated men from higher socio-economic backgrounds), amplify the existing inequalities because the new forms may require even more intellectual and material resources for participation, or actually engage a wider range of participants, thus reducing inequalities (Stolle & Hooghe, 2011), is an important question for research. Empirical evidence from Europe suggests that the new types of participation may reduce gender and age inequalities, but reinforce traditional modes of exclusion based on education and socioeconomic status (Hustinx & Roose, 2016, p. 98; Marien et al. 2010; Oser et al., 2013; Stolle & Hooghe, 2011). Yet, Stolle and Hooghe (2011, p. 122) suggest that in participation forms that are sporadic and less time- and energy-consuming, the importance of socioeconomic resources may diminish.

It matters who participates, as governments are more likely to listen to citizens who use their political voice (Dalton, 2017). To assess young people's new forms of engagement, equality should be one factor to consider when assessing the quality of the political participation.

3 Materials and methods

Four different data and methods of analysis were used in this dissertation. I combined representative survey data with qualitative in-depth interview data, qualitative Twitter and newspaper data, and experimental data. This combination made the data unique and rich, providing more opportunities for examining young people's attitudes towards democracy and political participation and for drawing robust conclusions on the topic.

The representative survey data make hypothesis testing and generalizations possible. However, survey studies are also confined to the range of activities included in the survey. Preferences for democracy are complex issues that are difficult to translate into survey questions, as most surveys only allow respondents to evaluate how the current system is working without inquiring about possible alternative decision-making procedures (Bengtsson, 2012). O'Toole et al. (2003) argued that a key problem with many studies in the political participation literature is that they impose a conception of political participation upon respondents. They also argued that in this top-down approach where the conception of political participation comes from the researchers, only little effort has been made to examine how individuals themselves conceive politics. There is assumptions that the activities listed by researchers are also viewed as political participation by the respondents (O'Toole et al., 2003), which may not be true for the young as discussed in chapter 2.1. To counteract these potential issues, qualitative approaches can be used. Different types of qualitative data were used in this dissertation to examine experience and meaning from the perspective of the participants (Hammarberg, 2016) and to gain a deeper understanding of the respondents underlying motivations (see e.g. O´Toole et al., 2003; Pickard, 2019), and knowledge of how active youth participation was framed in media discussions.

Survey questions are also not always best suited for researching democracy, as answers to direct survey questions may suffer from "social desirability bias" (Hainmueller et al., 2014; Wallander, 2009). In sensitive questions, people may not be willing to reveal their true opinions. Respondents may misrepresent themselves in surveys in order to present themselves in a more favorable light, as has been proven in studies regarding, for example, racism (Kuklinski et al., 1997) or voter turnout (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010). In questions related to democracy, people may not be willing to expose their undemocratic attitudes and preferences when asked directly because support for democracy is a basic norm in democracies. In addition, survey questions that are traditionally used to measure democratic legitimacy might actually be better suited for measuring the satisfaction with the performance of democracy, not the support for democracy as a type of political regime (Foa et al., 2020; Linde & Ekman, 2003). Thus, using other methods may reveal us new information about citizens' democratic attitudes. Emerging studies have started to use experimental research designs to examine citizens "revealed" commitment to democracy (see e.g. Carey et al., 2020; Graham & Svolik, 2020; Saikkonen & Christensen, 2022). Experimental

data are used in this dissertation to examine generational support for democracy. The benefits and practices of survey experiments in political science and this dissertation are further discussed in the section 3.1.2.

The data and methods are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Summary of the materials and methods

Name of the data	FNES 2015	FFF dataset 1	FFF dataset 2	Elite transgressions
Description of data	Election survey data	Interview material with Finnish FFF-activists	Newspaper articles from HS and YLE & qualitative Twitter material	Experimental conjoint survey data
Type of data	Quantitative	Qualitative	Qualitative	Quantitative
Main method of analysis	Logistic regression analysis	Theory-guided content analysis	Frame analysis	Linear regression analysis
Article	I	II	III	IV

3.1 Quantitative materials and methods

Quantitative research makes generalizations possible and allows hypothesis testing. Articles I and IV make use of two types of statistical data: election survey data (FNES 2015) and experimental conjoint survey data (Elite transgressions).

3.1.1 Election survey data

The Finnish National Election Study 2015 (FNES 2015; Grönlund & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2015) was used in article I. The data are survey data, collected after the 2015 Finnish parliamentary election by the TNS Gallup Finland in the form of face-to-face interviews in a period from April 24 to July7, 2015. The data is a sample of the Finnish population (excluding the Åland Islands), with 1291 respondents. To ensure the representativeness of the data, a weighted sample was used in the analyses. The data were used to examine Millennials (citizens aged 19–34 years in 2015) support for the (CI) in comparison with the general

population and how demographic factors, family background, and the Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) can explain the use of the CI.

The dependent variable was a dummy variable that indicated whether the respondent had signed at least one national-level CI. The independent variables consisted of background variables (gender, perceived childhood class, and perceived influence of the childhood home on political opinions), and variables that measure the three aspect that CVM emphasizes for predicting participation, namely civic resources and skills, psychological engagement with politics, and networks (Verba et al., 1995). Civic resources and skills were measured by education, factual political knowledge, household income, and status regarding full-time employment. Psychological engagement was measured by political interest, political trust, internal efficacy and the two modes of citizen norm (Dalton, 2016): duty-based and engaged citizenship. Networks were measured by two standard measures of social capital (Putnam, 2000): social trust and associational involvement, and by party identification to grasp involvement within formal political parties and internet usage. We tested for multicollinearity and nothing suggest that multicollinearity affects the results from the multiple regression analysis. The data were analyzed by using logistic regression analysis due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. The dataset is available at www.fsd.tuni.fi/fnesdata.

3.1.2 Experimental conjoint survey data

Survey experiments have become a popular research tool within political science (Mutz, 2011). As studying politics is to a significant extent a study of multiple choices (Hainmueller et al., 2014), experimental designs can be used in political science to study how people make those multidimensional choices. Survey experiments combine representative samples and randomized assignment (Sniderman, 2018), providing a popular tool to produce causal conclusions (e.g. Hainmueller et al., 2015; Mutz & Kim, 2020), with especially high levels of internal validity. In survey experiments, certain aspects of a survey is randomly varied across different groups of respondents, which allows the causal inference: the randomized assignment ensures that any post-treatment attitudes and behavior can be attributed solely to the experimental manipulations (Hainmueller et al., 2014).

The experimental research data used in article IV are conjoint experiment data, or conjoint survey data. Conjoint analysis is a common tool for studying political preference, as it allows the examination of the independent effects of many features of complex and multidimensional objects on respondents' preferences (Leeper et al., 2020). In conjoint experiments, respondents are presented with sets of alternatives that have randomly varied attributes that are of interest of the study, and the respondents need to evaluate the sets (Hainmueller et al., 2014). In practice, respondents are typically presented with two profiles with randomized attributes, for example, two profiles of politicians, and they have to make a choice between these two profiles. The attributes are

different values that are theoretically relevant and they are captured by different characteristics that are assumed to affect respondent's evaluations. In the "forced choice" design of conjoint experiment, respondents have to choose which one of the two profiles they support, which mimics the similar trade-offs as in real-life elections (Hainmueller et al., 2014). Thus, the conjoint data allows us to examine the revealed attitudes people may have in regards to questions that suffer from social desirability bias. Despite some concerns of the lack of external validity due to response bias, according to Hainmueller et al. (2015), the paired conjoint design can measure real-world behavior remarkably well.

The conjoint experiment data used in article IV were secondary data from a pre-registered[6] conjoint experiment that was conducted in Finland in 2020 (elite transgressions, Christensen & Saikkonen, 2020). The dataset consisted of a conjoint experiment embedded in a survey. It is a representative sample of the population in Finland in regard to age, gender, and region of living. The sample size was 1030, and the data were collected via an online panel that was recruited by Qualtrics. The experiment tested citizens commitment to democracy by exploring how transgressions of fundamental democratic norms (see e.g. Carey et al. 2020; Graham & Svolik, 2020), policy congruence, populism and basic background characters affect a political leader's favorability. The respondents were presented with two randomized profiles of Prime Minister Candidates for Finland and asked, which profile they prefer. The profiles were randomized on seven attributes. Two of the attributes dealt with the two key democratic norms: respecting the physical integrity of political opponents and respecting the decisions of judicial officials. The rest of the attributes were ideology (leftist-centrist-rightist); position on immigration policy; gender; level of education; and whose wishes the decisions made by the candidate will reflect – ordinary citizens, political elites, or social groups. See article IV for a more detailed account of the attributes and their levels.

The conjoint data were used to measure generational democratic support. Democratic support was measured by democratic transgressions effect on a leader's favorability and the data were analyzed using linear regression with clustered standard errors to take into account that observations were clustered within individuals (Hainmueller et al., 2014). The dependent variable was whether a given profile was chosen or not in a comparison. To analyze the causal inference of interest, we looked at the direct effects by examining the effect of an individual treatment component; the average marginal component effects (AMCEs). The AMCEs are obtained by running a single regression of the choice outcome on the set of dummy variables for the attribute values for all attributes simultaneously (Hainmueller et al., 2014). The AMCE is interpreted as the average change in the probability that a profile will gain support when the profile includes the listed attribute value, not the baseline attribute value (Hainmueller et al., 2014). For sub-group differences – the generational differences – we also estimated conditional AMCEs; the AMCEs for a particular subgroup of

[6] A preregistration of the experiment was done at https://osf.io/3f49x/?view_only=41caab52a5e64697b8d7de1f69815324

respondent characteristics, in this instance generation (Bansak et al., 2021); and marginal means (Leeper et al., 2020). By estimating AMCEs, we measured the effect of democratic transgressions have on the probability of a candidate being chosen in comparisons. In addition, we examined the marginal means, which indicates the level of favorability of a profile with a particular feature level while ignoring all other features (Leeper et al., 2020). Marginal means allowed us to verify the popularity of a given attribute level without the use of a reference category (Leeper et al. 2020) and allowed us to explore the differences in means, that is, the percentage of respondents who chose that alternative every time that alternative (of profiles) was shown. The data were unweighted as recommended by Hainmueller et al. (2014). The data are available at https://osf.io/3f49x/.

3.2 Qualitative materials and methods

Qualitative approaches allow the examination of questions without pre-determined definitions of political participation, allowing the exploration of more youth-led definitions of political engagement (see e.g. Pontes et al., 2018). Open-ended approaches function when we need to answer questions that we do not necessarily know to ask in surveys (George & Bennett, 2005). By using qualitative approaches we can also e.g. avoid the under-reporting of political engagement that is due to the interpretation of surveys done by respondents.

Articles II and III make use of different types of qualitative data, including interview, newspaper, and qualitative Twitter data. The interview data (FFF dataset 1) were collected by the author in 2019. The newspaper data were collected by Eerika Albrecht in 2019, and the Twitter data were collected by the author in 2020 (FFF dataset 2).

The two articles examined the Finnish case of the FFF movement from different perspectives. Finland was among the countries where the FFF movement spread in the early stages. On October 20, 2018 the first climate march with approximately 8,000 participants was organized in Helsinki (Mäkinen, 2018). In 2019, several climate strikes were held in more than 20 different municipalities in Finland (Koivisto & Nelskylä 2019; Koskinen 2019). The largest were the two global climate strikes held on March 15 and September 27, 2019. The qualitative data used in this dissertation were from the year 2019; thus, the data capture the early stages of the FFF movement.

3.2.1 FFF dataset 1

The FFF dataset 1 data consist mostly of interview data, gathered from one-one-one in-depth theme interviews with 11 young people who participated in the FFF movement by attending at least one protest in 2019 (Huttunen, 2021). In-depth qualitative semi-structured interviews allow the young respondents to express their experiences and ideas in their own terms (O'Toole et al., 2003, p. 74). Open-ended questions leave the conceptualization to the respondents, which allows the identification of how respondents themselves think about the topics (George

& Bennett, 2005). In in-depth interviews, researchers can also interact with the respondents during the qualitative interview process to ask specifying questions, which further provides opportunities for deeper knowledge.

The interviewed activists were 15- to 20-years-old. The interviews focused on the following themes: motivation for participation in the climate strike movement, the respondent's background, and the respondent's ideas regarding politics, political participation and democracy. The interview data were combined with news material from various sources to contextualize the information. For a more detailed account of the news material, see article II.

The interviewees were identified from multiple sources: through social media with the hashtag #ilmastolakko, through the respondents' recommendations for other possible respondents, and from the international climate strike in Helsinki on September 27, 2019 (Huttunen, 2021). By identifying possible interviewees from multiple sources, it was possible to interview both participants who had been consistently active in the movement and those who had only participated in one climate strike. The broader spectrum of participants allowed us to gain a more accurate picture of the average FFF participants. The interviewees were contacted via social media (Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook) or via e-mail. Seven possible interviewees declined the interview. Out of the 11 respondents, seven were women and four were men, which is in accordance with the general gender division in the movement (de Moor et al., 2020; Wahlström et al., 2019). The most important selection variables were age and participation on the strikes: four were actively and constantly involved in the movement, whereas eight had participated in a strike once. By 11 interviewees, the data felt saturated since the interviews tended towards repetition (e.g. Hammarberg, 2016). All interviewees were from Southern Finland and were interviewed in person by the same interviewer and the interviews were recorded and transcribed.

The data were analyzed using theory-guided content analysis (Krippendorff, 2012). In theory-guided content analysis the focus was on the respondents own conceptions of and ideas on participation. The key aim in the analysis was to identify the kind of themes and ideas the respondents themselves emphasized as important when discussing the topic of political participation, and which themes were repeated throughout the interviews. The emphasized themes and ideas were compiled and matched with the theoretical framework to identify attitudes and ideas regarding political participation and democracy.

3.2.2 FFF dataset 2

The FFF dataset 2 data consist of newspaper articles from Helsingin Sanomat (HS) and Yle (Albrecht, 2019), and material from the social media platform Twitter (Huttunen, 2020). Altogether the data consisted of 195 news articles (HS 66, Yle 129) and 3,959 tweets. All of the tweets and 71 articles (HS 27, YLE 44) were included in the analysis on the basis of their relevance for the frames selected for analysis (for more, see below). HS is a liberally oriented independent newspapers and is the largest circulated newspaper in the country, while Yle

stands for the news production by the national public broadcasting company. The dataset was collected in an online format by using the search word "ilmastolakko" ("climate strike" in the majority language Finnish) from online newspapers sites. In addition, the search words "koululakko" ("school strike") and "ilmastomielenosoitus" ("climate demonstration") were used to collect additional material from the newspapers. The Twitter material was collected in June 2020. Twitter allows users to organize discussions around hashtags, or content labels of content, which allows the contribution to a broader discussion under the tag. All original tweets with the hashtag #ilmastolakko ("climate strike") were collected from the two international climate strike days, March 15 (2,023 tweets) and September 27 (1,835 tweets). All tweets were publicly available, and the material analyzed consisted only of the tweets and did not include descriptive information of the authors of the tweets. Due to the amount of Twitter material, and to make sense of the material, the tweets were divided into four categories: tweets with reactions to the climate strikes, which were divided into positive reactions and negative reactions; tweets on youth participation, and tweets related to the individual lifestyle choices and sustainable lifestyle. In addition, attention was paid to tweets regarding school attendance. The whole material was systematically categorised, keeping flexibility and an open mind on the material. The spring and fall materials were analysed separately. The newspaper articles and tweets from the climate strike in the spring were analysed first, which served as the baseline for the analysis, against which the material from the climate strike in the fall was analysed.

Using both newspaper and Twitter materials allowed us to gain a better understanding of the overall discussions around the climate strikes in Finland in 2019. Social media allows citizens to express their opinions more freely and without the restrictions of the editorial process, while newspaper material provides a snapshot of the time and what is deemed as relevant in a phenomenon from editorial perspective. Newspaper material can help answer questions such as how an event was framed, what kind of editorial perspective was taken, and how did people view the event. Both kinds of data exemplify the context in which the movement operates and how the movement was met by people at the time. Twitter has been criticized for being an elitist social media platform and it is frequently used by elites (Blank, 2017). We note that by using other social media channels, such as TikTok or Instagram as data collection sources we might have gathered different results (Huttunen & Albrecht, 2021). Twitter may also not be suitable for research where representativeness is important (Blank, 2017); however, it continues to be a place where social movements can create communities, spread their message and mobilize people (Wang & Caskey, 2016). Twitter allows democratic activism on its platform, (Small, 2011), and Twitter has served as an important platform for many social movements, such as Arab Spring or Occupy (Barrons, 2012; Wang & Caskey, 2016). The FFF movement has been capable of spreading its message while inviting others to discussions about climate change by making use of Twitter; people around the globe have made use

of hashtags related to the FFF movement (Boulianne et al. 2020). Thus, Twitter was selected as one source for data collection.

The data from FFF dataset 2 were analyzed using frame analysis. Frame analysis, introduced to social sciences by Goffman (1974), is a method that is used in the analysis of social movements (Johnston, 2002), especially in media studies. Frames are basic cognitive structures that guide our perception and representation of reality; they guide, which parts of reality becomes noticed (König, n.d.) and allow mental shortcuts (Entman, 1993) because they make complex issues manageable thought structures (Winslow, 2018). The identification of frames is never free from existing cultural conditions, and frames are adopted rather unconsciously. Frames do not produce a neutral account of the world, but always impose a specific logic on the audience, thus foreclosing alternative perspectives in subtle and taking-for-granted ways (Winslow, 2018).

Frame analysis is an analytic process by which "ordinary people make sense of public issues" (Benford, 1994, p. 1103). The analysis is done by identifying and using specific interpretive lenses that are derived from existing narratives and traditions (Allen, 2017) and that organize information drawn from real experiences (Goffman, 1974, p. 47). Frames in social movement studies are developed for strategic purposes, as they reflect policy positions (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). Framing includes naming, selecting, storytelling, sense making and categorizing (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). We used frame analysis to make sense of how discussants in the news and on social media view, understand and make sense of the FFF movement, and how environmental citizenship is produced in the discussions.

We drew from the active selection of frames (Entman, 1993) that is used in media studies and focused our analysis on 1) sustainable lifestyle, 2) active youth and 3) school attendance frames. These three frames are derived from the literature review and capture three different elements of environmental citizenship. The "sustainable lifestyle" frame captures the individualised lifestyle aspects of environmental citizenship. The "active youth" frame captures the FFF movement's message on collective action and is built on the active citizenship elements of environmental citizenship. The "school attendance" frame captures the justifications for striking and the prominent debate on school attendance. In addition, we examined the positive and negative reactions toward the movement on Twitter.

4 Summary of the articles

4.1 Engaging the Millennials: The Citizens' Initiative in Finland

The article "Engaging the Millennials: The Citizens' Initiative in Finland" examined Millennials support for the Finnish Citizens' Initiative (CI), and used the Civic Voluntary Model (CVM) to examine what type of Millennials support the CI and whether the CVM works differently for Millennials in comparison with the general population.

The Finnish CI is an agenda-setting direct democratic innovation that gives eligible voters the right to form and sign legislative agenda-setting initiatives. The CI is accessible on an online platform provided by the Ministry of Justice. If an initiative collects minimum of 50,000 signatures, it is sent to a parliamentary handling, where the adaption or rejection of the initiative into the Finnish legislation is decided by the parliament. The CI is a direct participatory channel that is fast and easy to use, focuses on single-issues, and can be participated sporadically and online. Thus, based on theories of post-materialist and cause-oriented young people (see Dalton, 2008, 2016; Inglehart, 1997; Pickard, 2019), we expected that Millennials are more likely than the rest of the population to use the CI. This is the first hypothesis of the study.

The CVM explains that citizens who have more resources and skills, higher psychological engagement and stronger networks are more likely to be politically active. Thus, we expect that Millennials who exhibit higher levels in these three elements are more likely to make use of the CI than Millennials that exhibit lower levels. Moreover, we examined the differences in the effects of the CVM for Millennials and the general population. We expect that resources and skills and psychological engagement have a stronger effect, and networks a weaker effect, on the propensity to support initiatives among Millennials in comparison with the rest of the population. The expected stronger effect of resources and skills is due to e.g. the different socialization process of the Millennials, where resources are more important than before for political engagement (see e.g. Dalton, 2017), in comparison with the rest of the population. For psychological engagement, the stronger effect is expected to be due to the novelty of the CI, and García-Albacete's (2014, pp. 158–160) findings that political interest has a stronger effect among younger people when it comes to non-institutionalized and newer forms of participation. The expected weaker effect of networks among Millennials in comparison with the rest of the population is based on García-Albacete's (2014, pp. 158–161) findings that party identification has a weaker effect among young people as a recruitment channels; thus, perhaps this is true also for other forms of engagement.

By using data from the Finnish National Election Survey (FNES, 2015), we examined Millennials (citizens aged 19–34 years in 2015) support for the CI in

comparison with the general population and how demographic factors, family background, and the CVM can explain the use of the CI by using logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a respondent has signed at least one national-level CI. The independent variables consist of background variables (gender, perceived childhood class, and perceived influence of the childhood home on political opinions), and variables that measure the three aspect of the CVM: civic resources and skills, psychological engagement with politics, and networks (Verba et al., 1995). Civic resources and skills are measured by variables indicating education, factual political knowledge, household income, and status regarding fulltime employment. Psychological engagement is measured by respondents' political interest, political trust, internal efficacy and the two modes of citizen norm (Dalton, 2016); duty-based and engaged citizenship. Networks are measured by two standard measures of social capital (Putnam, 2000); social trust and associational involvement; and by party identification to grasp involvement within formal political parties, and internet usage. We tested for multicollinearity and nothing suggests that multicollinearity affects the results from multiple regression analysis.

The results show clearly that Millennials make use of the CI more frequently than older generations do; 49 per cent of Millennials has signed at least one citizen's initiative, while the equivalent number for the general population is 28 per cent ($p<.000$). Moreover, the use of the CI is fairly egalitarian. The typical socioeconomic factors that explain participation in political institutions do not appear to explain participation in the CI. There is a statistically significant negative relationship with income in multiple regression, which shows that having a lower income than expected, when other things are considered, is associated with a higher propensity to support the CI. In addition, there is a weak relationship with education not only in multiple regression, but also in bivariate regression, which shows that education does not promote participation in the CI, as is typically found for other newer forms of political participation (e.g. Marien et al., 2010; Stolle & Hooghe, 2011). Instead, the CI also attracts Millennials with fewer resources and skills, thus promoting democratic inclusiveness. However, full-time employment has a positive effect on the use of CI for millennials, which means that a connection to the labor market is important. We did not find evidence that the CVM works fundamentally differently for Millennials than older generations; the CVM works among millennials in similar vein than in the rest of the population. The results indicate that despite the concerns of youth disengagement of formal political channels, there are formal participation channels that can mobilize the young.

4.2 Young Rebels Who Do Not Want a Revolution: The Non-Participatory Preferences of Fridays for Future activists in Finland

The article "Young Rebels Who Do Not Want a Revolution: The Non-Participatory Preferences of Fridays for Future activists in Finland" examined the Finnish Fridays for Future (FFF) movement's activists' ideas on political participation and democracy. The topic was explored from a more youth-centered perspective by using qualitative methods and examining the young respondents' own conceptualizations of political participation. The data were collected through 11 semi-structured theme interviews with 15-to 20-year-old FFF activists in Southern Finland, and the in-depth interview material was combined with contextualizing evidence from other sources.

The Finnish young FFF activists have become active in a protest movement in times when young people's participation in institutional forms of politics is declining (e.g. Grasso et al., 2018). Based on post-materialist, new forms for engagement, theories on youth participation (see e.g. Dalton, 2008; 2016; Hustinx & Roose, 2016; Inglehart, 1997), we expect that contemporary politically active young people prefer more direct, engaging, elite-challenging and active citizen participation. However, there are also alternative explanations to why people may become active in politics, which do not necessarily indicate a preference for certain forms of political engagement. The theory of stealth democracy (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002), for example, explains that people do not actually want to be more active in politics but are willing to participate in order to protect their interests from self-serving politicians. To understand the attitudes and ideas these active young people have regarding political participation and democracy, we have to ask them directly. The interview material was analyzed with theory-led content analysis.

Based on the interviews, I claim that 1) activity in the FFF movement does not necessarily equal support for more citizen participation in general and 2) activity in the FFF movement does not mean rejection of established democratic norms, practices, or political authorities. These young people, despite being active in a protest movement, do not appear to prefer more direct, active, elite-challenging, or engaging forms of political engagement, nor are they rejecting political authorities, as is expected by the post-materialism theory. Rather, they want a better functioning representative system, with politicians and decision-makers who listen to their demands.

On the basis of the interviews, the Finnish FFF activists are not motivated to participate because they necessarily want to be more active in politics in general or to participate in a broader repertoire of political activities. Instead of an inherent desire to be more active in politics, they attend the protests due to a feeling of necessity – they feel they need to defend their own and future generations' rights to habitable earth and feel that the issue of the climate crisis is not currently taken care of by the decision-makers. They attend the strikes

because they want to be heard and because they want to influence political change through their activity.

Further support for the claim that activity in the FFF movement does not equal a preference for more citizen participation is found from the ideas these activists have regarding the options for political engagement at their disposal. Most interviewees were happy with the opportunities they have for political activity and do not want more possibilities for participation. Instead of more possibilities for participation for themselves, they appear to want to participate politically by electing politicians who represent them and their interest in decision-making. They see voting as the best way to influence and participate in politics.

By viewing voting as the best way to participate in politics, the Finnish climate activists display support for the institutionalized forms of politics instead of rejecting established democratic norms, practices or political authorities. Despite participating in a protest movement that uses civil disobedience to influence political decision-making, they do not reject political authority – the rejection of political authorities would essentially mean that the climate activists would want to diminish the power of political authorities through their activity in the climate strike movement. Instead, the interviewees participate in the climate strikes in order to convince the decision-makers into action, thus displaying support for the political authorities and their capability and desire to act on the demands of young climate activists, which social movement studies suggest to be typical especially for environmental movements (see e.g. Thörn & Svenberg, 2004). Instead of rejection of authority, the young climate activists appeal to the political authorities to solve the climate crisis. They believe that their vote matters and election participation is important.

Despite not rejecting authority, the interviewed activists do want politicians to be better at listening to their demands. They feel that even though politicians might listen, politicians do not really hear young people's demands and fail to take appropriate action on the issue of the climate crisis. Through active participation, the interviewees felt that they were putting political pressure on politicians in order to make them hear young people's demands and voices.

The evidence from this article indicates that even if young people participate in active, new forms of political activities, that engagement is not necessarily driven by an inherent desire to be active in politics but rather out of the feeling of necessity, such as stripping self-serving politicians of power (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002, p. 130). Young citizens' political activity can thus not automatically be interpreted as a preference for more active and engaged citizen participation in politics.

4.3 The Framing of Environmental Citizenship and Youth Participation in the Fridays for Future Movement in Finland

The article "The framing of environmental citizenship and youth participation in the Fridays for Future Movement in Finland" examined the representation of environmental citizenship in the framings of the FFF movement in Finland. Environmental citizenship refers to the intersection of citizenship and environmentalism (Dobson, 2003) and is examined from three perspectives: 1) individual, 2) collective and 3) justice perspective. We used material collected from newspapers (Helsingin Sanomat and YLE; Albrecht, 2019) and Twitter (Huttunen, 2020) to explore the discussions around the Fridays for Future climate strikes in Finland in 2019. The data, which consists of 195 newspaper articles (HS 66, YLE 129) and 3,959 tweets, were analyzed by using frame analysis. Frame analysis is an analytic process whereby identifying and using specific interpretive lenses that are derived from existing narratives and traditions (Allen, 2017), we can make sense of public issues. In practice, framing includes naming, selecting, storytelling, sense-making and categorizing (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016), and in this article, frames are used to make sense of and name how environmental citizenship is produced and represented in the FFF discussions.

We made use of three frames: the sustainable lifestyle frame, which focuses on the individual aspects of environmental citizenship; the active youth frame, which focuses on justifications of youth participation in politics; and the school attendance frame, which is concerned about the strike action. In addition, we explored the positive and negative reactions to the movement on Twitter.

The results suggest that the FFF movement was framed in multiple ways during the year 2019 in news media and on Twitter, and the framing also changed during the year. In the spring, the discussions focused more on children's right to strike and the importance of school attendance, and the discussions on Twitter were characterized by strong emotional support from adults. In the fall, the discussions focused more on individual lifestyle choices and actual policies such as the use of peat – the focus on actual solutions on individual and policy levels can be interpreted as a change in the societal context wherein the movement operates. Instead of a need to justify the movement, as the year progressed the movement was brought the climate crisis to the forefront of political discussions.

The individual elements of environmental citizenship were captured by the sustainable lifestyle frame, which focused on individual lifestyle choices. This frame was more prominent in the discussions on Twitter than in the news media and more notable in the fall than in the spring. In the discussions on Twitter, individual lifestyle choices were visible in guidance. The young FFF participants were given guidance on how to lead more ecological lives by e.g. considering diet, public transport, food waste and recycling; and in negatively toned messages. In the negative messages, people called on the young strikers to make more concrete ecological lifestyle choices such as refraining from buying new clothes

or cleaning after themselves in fast food restaurants before engaging in strike actions. In the news media, the sustainable lifestyle frame was visible in the political demands for a fossil-free and climate-neutral society, and in young people's open-mic speeches, in which they encouraged each other to make green consumer choices (Sirén et al., 2019). The strong focus on the individual elements of environmental citizenship is notable. Lifestyle choices were seen not only as a possible way to create political change but also as something that the young FFF participants should do if they wanted to affect climate change or something they should do before they could even have a say in more traditional arenas of politics.

The active youth frame captured the collective elements of environmental citizenship. In newspapers, young people took an active role in the FFF movement as articles focused on covering topics from profiles of the demonstration organizers to young people's strike preparations and their political demands. On Twitter, this frame was mostly present in the spring. On Twitter, the most notable and largely held perspective within the active youth frame was seeing the strikes as democracy education: climate strike was seen as an excellent opportunity for children to learn about political participation, instead of a political act in itself. Thus, schools should encourage strike participation in the name of democracy education. Youth participation was also acknowledged as a basic right, and visibility was also brought to the fact that the young strikers have restricted means for political influence due to their young age and underage status. However, the idea that the strikers are citizens-to-be, or people who should learn about the political system through the strikes for future purposes, was the most prominent discussion in the active youth frame.

The justice dimension of environmental citizenship, in relation to intergenerational or global justice, did not receive further visibility in our material. However, some justice elements were explored through the school attendance frame, visible especially in newspapers. Our analysis indicates that the climate strike movement was framed in the Finnish news media as a discussion about compulsory school attendance, and news articles debating young climate strikers right to miss school in order to strike were prominent (e.g. Ervasti & Rajamäki, 2019; Grönholm, 2019). The young climate strikers interpreted the media focus on school attendance as an attempt to control the climate strikers and intervene in their activities while they were practicing their right to demonstrate (Huotari, 2019). On Twitter, school attendance evoked discussion only in the spring and then mostly in support of the school strike.

Our analysis revealed that the representations of environmental citizenship vary with a focus both on its individual and collective elements. However, the individual aspects in the form of lifestyle politics are emphasized in the framings of the Finnish FFF movement. Additional findings include the largely positive reactions toward the FFF movement, especially on Twitter, and the dominance of an adult voice. The adult voice was mostly positive, yet the dominance of an adult voice in a youth-centered movement can be disempowering if it undermines the young protestors.

4.4 Are the Young Undemocratic? Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment (Under review)

The article "Are the Young Undemocratic? Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment" examined the research question "Are younger generations (Generation Z and Millennials) less supportive of democracy than older generations (Generation X and Baby boomers) are?" by using experimental conjoint survey data (Christensen & Saikkonen, 2020). The article is set in the democratic deconsolidation literature, where Foa and Mounk (2016) suggested that democracy may be deconsolidating in advanced Western democracies and that the possible deconsolidation is due to "undemocratic Millennials". The claim is that the young generations support democracy less, they are more likely to support anti-establishment parties and are more disillusioned by liberal democracy (Foa & Mounk, 2016, 2017). The claims have been extensively debated (see e.g. Alexander & Welzel, 2017; Norris, 2017; Voeten, 2017), and our article adds to the research field and to the research field of young people's democratic attachment in political science, by addressing the issue with the help of experimental evidence.

We used experimental conjoint survey data, which mimic real-life situations with similar trade-offs (Hainmueller et al., 2014) and can limit concerns of social desirability (Wallander, 2009). The conjoint survey data, embedded in a survey, are used to examine respondents' revealed support for democracy against democratic transgressions. If citizens truly support democracy, they should be willing to support democracy against breaking of fundamental democratic norms and punish leaders who are willing to break these norms. Thus, the support for democracy is measured by the effect of democratic transgressions (inciting or failing to condemn violence against opposition or not respecting the judiciary) have on a leader's favorability. By using data from Christensen and Saikkonen (2020), we examined generational differences in support for democracy. We also used direct survey questions on democratic norms to enhance the reliability of our results and examine the direct differences in support for democratic norms. In the analysis, we examined the support for each generation separately, despite the question formulation where older and younger generations are compared.

We started the analysis by analyzing the mean differences in the direct survey questions to explore generational differences. We conclude that there were no marked differences when the respondents were directly asked about their support for democratic norms. The biggest difference can be found in the questions of respect for judiciary, where Generation Z and Baby boomers represent the opposite ends of the spectrum, but even in this measure, the mean differences were 0.46 on a scale from 0 to 3. We also observed no consistent patterns regarding the generational support for democratic norms in the direct questions, as the younger generations do not automatically and consistently score lower in direct measures despite such theoretical expectations.

The analysis was continued with the conjoint analyses. We used of linear regression (Hainmueller et al., 2014) and examined the patterns, first, in the whole population and then in the sub-group differences along generational lines. By using AMCEs and conditional AMCEs, we conclude that there are no reasons to believe that the young generations are especially undemocratic. The only statistically significant interaction between generations and the measures for democratic support can be found in the relationship between Baby boomers and the judiciary. This suggests that even though the pattern is negative for all generation, a leader's disrespect regarding judicial decisions has a pronounced negative effect on the leader's electability for Baby boomers.

Our results suggest that when support for democracy is measured with the willingness to support democracy against the breaking of core norms, the worries over "undemocratic" Millennials, or younger generations more generally, are unfounded and misplaced. The younger generations are not less supportive of democracy.

Our article provides two important contributions to the research literature: 1) the investigation of the support for democracy with the use of experimental data, and 2) the inclusion of the youngest generation of age, Generation Z, in the analyses.

5 Main findings and discussion

This chapter is dedicated to the discussion around the main findings, implications and takeaways of this dissertation.

5.1 The young support representative democracy and its institutions

Scholars and politicians have worried over young people's apparent disengagement from the representative democratic institutions and the possible lesser attachment to, and support for, democracy that could result in democratic deconsolidation (see e.g. Foa & Mounk, 2016; Grasso et al., 2018). Young people's support for democracy and their participation in democracy's key institutions is a question of democracy's sustainability as a system and democratic inclusiveness. If the young fail to support the representative democracy and its institutions, the system may lose its legitimacy, and trends in generational replacement could further lead to serious decline in the share of population that support democracy and its institutions in the future (e.g. Wuttke et al. 2020a).

The RQ1 asks if younger citizens are less supportive of representative democracy and its institutions. The findings indicate that the worry over young people, or younger generations', democratic support is overdriven.

First, the findings from article IV indicate that the vast worry over young generations, and especially Millennials, 'undemocratic' tendencies is misplaced. Despite alarmist news articles and previous research claims (e.g. Breene, 2017; Foa and Mounk, 2016; Howe, 2017) we found that the Finnish young generations support democracy. Just like older generations, they support basic democratic norms and even punish leaders who break those fundamental norms. The original claims have already been criticized for e.g. lack of robust results (Norris, 2017), overstating age differences and incomparability in the concepts of democracy across generational lines (Alexander & Welzel, 2017), or lack of similar results in other studies (e.g. Voeten, 2017; Zilinsky, 2019). Nevertheless, the claims of undemocratic Millennials are still repeated in alarmist news articles (see e.g. Bibbins Sedaca, 2020; Rosenthal, 2021). We join the researchers that have disputed the idea of less democratic young generations (Alexander & Welzel, 2017; Norris, 2017; Voeten, 2017; Zilinsky, 2019) and reject the claims made by Foa and Mounk (2016 & 2017). When using non-survey data, here conjoint experiment data, we show that the Finnish Millennials and members of Generation Z do not support democracy less, nor are they especially undemocratic (Huttunen & Saikkonen, n.d.).

Second, in addition to not being undemocratic, the Finnish young people are more interested in participating in democratic institutions than expected by the post-materialist perspective. Millennials are avid users of the Finnish citizens' initiative; an institutionalized, single-issue, direct democratic and online-accessible legislative tool; as is evident from findings in article I (Huttunen &

Christensen, 2020). Article II suggest that even young people who were active in a protest movement, the most-likely case of young people to have more direct and engaged preferences for citizen participation, actually prefer participation in democratic institutions, especially elections. These findings are discussed further in the following sections.

5.2 Younger citizens prefer institutionalized activities more than expected

The findings from articles II and I suggest that institutionalized forms of participation can be highly relevant to younger generations. Both the popularity of the CI amongst Millennials and the findings from interviews with the FFF activists indicate that younger citizens do not necessarily, or at least automatically, prefer non-institutionalized forms of engagement to institutionalized participation, as is explored by the RQ2. Rather, the young are willing to engage in a new political institution, and even young people who are very active in non-institutionalized political participation actually prefer elections as a form for political engagement. For those worried about young people's disillusion regarding the representative democratic system and its institutions (see e.g. Norris, 2004) or the quality of participation, these findings are positive. Since non-institutionalized participation cannot in a similar manner ensure the quality of participation – that people's political voices are heard in the collective decision-making processes – younger citizens' interest in political institutions is important for the sustaining of democracy (Mair, 2013; Stoker, 2006) and for the young themselves. Young people may have distinct interests that are at stake in certain policy areas, such as policies related to employment, higher education, housing market (García-Albacete, 2014, p. 2), thus how well their voices are heard in the policy processes is important for achieving their political goals.

However, younger citizens still engage less in the traditional democratic institutions, elections, and political parties. Further review of institutions that have been successful in engaging the young can reveal us new insights of the relationship between young people and democratic institutions. The Finnish CI is an agenda-setting initiative, which leaves the final decision-making power to the parliament, and a tool to suggest amendments or additions to existing legislation (HE 46/2011 vp:27). The Finnish CI combines institutional elements with features that are expected to be theoretically important for the young; the initiatives are focused on single-issues, sporadic, the participation is less time-consuming and the tool is available online. The popularity of the CI amongst young generation can indicate that the institutionalized/non-institutionalized distinction is not always useful when examining young people' engagement or differences in participations across generations. Rather, instead of level of institutionalization, i.e. in which arenas the participation takes place, the young are more interested in *how* the form of participation works. If we want to encourage further youth engagement in institutionalized forms of political

participation, we should consider how elements of new successful forms of engagement that have mobilized young can be brought to our current democratic system. The evidence of the popularity of the CI suggest that providing new, more direct, easy, online-accessible and single-issue forms of engagement within the representative institutions can be one mechanism to capture youth engagement and perhaps help bridge the gap between young people and political institutions.

Moreover, the Finnish CI appears to be a quite egalitarian form of engagement amongst Millennials. The Finnish CI was also capable of mobilizing younger citizens with lesser skills and resources. This is especially significant in the Finnish context, where socio-economic polarization in election participation among the young has increased over the latest decades (Lahtinen, 2019, p. 40). As Zittel and Fuchs (2007) suggest, this new participatory form can apparently mobilize otherwise passive citizens and therefore enhance democratic inclusiveness. Previous European research on new forms of engagement has suggested that the new forms can help fight inequalities regarding age, but not socioeconomic factors or especially education (see Marien et al., 2010; Oser et al. 2013; Stolle & Hooghe, 2011). However, this is not the case for the Finnish CI and we thereby reject the empiric evidence found by Oser et al. (2013), Stolle and Hooghe (2011) and Marien et al., (2010) in this case.

The success of the Finnish CI amongst Millennials is good news for representative democracy. It indicates that new forms of institutionalized participation can have the ability to mobilize young people, and especially those who are least active in politics, into institutionalized participation, when the institutional arrangements and characteristics are benign. If there is a desire to engage the young into more institutionalized forms of engagement, introducing an agenda-setting and online accessible citizens' initiative could be a viable option in other countries as well. The results with the Finnish CI has to, however, be taken with some caution, since the tool was still very new in 2015 when the data was collected.

Findings from the interviews with the young FFF activists suggest that the young activists, despite their activity in a protest movement, actually prefer institutionalized forms of politics. However, they are willing to adhere to non-institutionalized political activities if they feel they are not being heard by the political institutions or decision-makers. The implications of these findings are further explored in the next section. The findings regarding the FFF activist's institutionalized preferences can have important implication for youth participation in general, and they are certainly important for understanding the context dependent differences in the global FFF movement. As e.g. evidence from Britain, where the local FFF activists are committed to systemic change through non-violent direct action (Pickard et al., 2020), suggest, there are local differences in how the climate activist view democracy and participation. This is a reminder that findings from other contexts are not necessarily transferable – in order to understand the local context, local studies need to be conducted.

5.3 Instead of more citizen participation, young active participants just want a better functioning representative system

The young are supportive of democracy and more institutionally inclined than expected. The RQ3 asks what attitudes and preferences regarding democracy and political participation do young active participants have. The surge of popularity of the FFF movement gives a reason to examine how people mobilized by the movement, in times when youth participation is often seen as declining, see democracy and political participation. The most important findings from article II suggest that the active young participants, contrary to expectations, do not prefer more citizen participation or participation in new forms of engagement. They do not reject political authorities or institutions, rather, they want to select representatives in elections and they want those elected representatives to listen to their demands. They do not want a revolution or fundamental changes to democracy; they just want a better functioning representative democracy (Huttunen, 2021).

The post-materialist perspective expects that due to societal changes the young not only engage, but also prefer to engage in new forms of political action instead of engagement in institutionalized politics (see e.g. Dalton, 2016, 2008; Hustinx & Roose, 2016, p. 94-95; Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 2004). However, one important finding is that action does not necessarily equal preference. The FFF activists are in many ways an example of post-materialist young citizens that are expected to prefer the new forms of participation and more active citizen engagement. Despite protest not being a new form of engagement per se – protest became a normal part of the political toolbox in the 1960s and 1970s with student and anti-war movements (Grasso, 2014; Nemčok & Wass, 2021) – the tactics that the FFF movement uses – refusing to attend school on Fridays – are new. The young FFF activists are activated into political action by a post-materialist issue (environment and climate); they engage in new forms of elite-challenging protest activities, which use civil disobedience as a method. Their participation is sporadic, with easy-entrance, easy-exit forms of engagement without any requirements for formal commitment, and they are already showing high levels of citizen activity through their protest participation. Evidence from the interviews with the FFF participants suggests, however, that despite their activity in the climate protest movement, the young FFF participants do not actually want more citizen participation or more participation in new forms of political engagement. They do not want to be more actively involved in politics; rather, they are generally happy with the participation opportunities they have and believe voting is the best way to influence politics

That engagement in protest activities does not necessarily mean a preference for more citizen activity is a theoretically important finding. These young participants are mobilized into participation by a classic post-materialist value; environmental protection; however, their post-materialism does not appear to

have the implications that e.g. Inglehart (1997) expects in regards to political preferences. One reason why these active young people may prefer electoral and representative participation more than expected by the post-materialist perspective could be the rice of importance of material values in young people's lives. As Pickard (2019, p. 380) notes, due to many developments in societies regarding e.g. unemployment, lack of housing, indebtedness, young people are obliged to take an interest in material values. I would also argue that despite environmentalism being a typical example of post-materialist value or ideal, the climate crisis is extremely closely linked to material values. The climate crisis, with its urgent threat to both human societies and the planet (see 2015 Paris Agreement) affects our physical and economic security, disproportionately those who have contributed least to the problems on a global scale; especially children in developing countries and those yet to be born (Sanson & Burke, 2020). With rising temperatures, an increase in extreme weather events, and economic hardship (Sanson & Burke, 2020), the effects of the climate crisis are tightly connected to our materialistic needs. Maybe this contemporary reality where young generations' quality of life, material well-being and future are threatened, results in young people preferring to depend on political institutions to take necessary political action.

The findings suggest that the active young participants engage in the FFF movement out of a sense of necessity. Connected to that, but also an important finding on its own is the notion that despite the lack of preference, these young people do participate in a new form of activity and are willing to participate actively when the need arises: when they feel they are not being heard by the formal decision-makers. Disappointment in the formal political system and politicians (see Pickard, 2019, p. 377) is driving the young to the street, and they use the demonstrations to try to communicate their political message (see Klandermans, 2016, p. 75), and to make themselves heard by the decision-makers. Perhaps the engagement in this post-materialist form of action despite the lack of that kind of preference can be due to external, structural or institutional reasons. If young people are not heard in the political processes due to biases or other systemic disincentives (Chou, 2017; Kimberlee, 2002), they may turn to these newer, non-electoral activities due to disappointment with the formal system (see Pickard, 2019, p. 375), regardless of their participatory preferences.

The evidence from article II is a testament to O'Toole et al. (2003) notion that to understand young people's preferences and ideas, we need to ask them. If we truly want to understand young people's preferences, we need to give them the opportunity to formulate their preferences on their own, without preconceived alternatives.

5.4 The differences in perceptions of youth participation illuminate how we may unintentionally disregard and belittle youth engagement

Youth participation does not take place in a vacuum; rather, it is affected by different structural, institutional and external factors. RQ4 asks how external perceptions of active youth participation differ from young people's own perceptions, and further what kind of impacts this may have. The question is explored by examining the media discussions around the FFF movement in Finland in 2019. The media discussions, examined in article III, reveal that despite a general deep-rooted worry over youth participation, the reception of young people's engagement in the FFF movement in its early days in Finland was diverse. People took issue with young people not attending school to protest, visible especially in the newspapers, yet on Twitter, the discussions were mostly very positive and encouraging of the FFF movement activities and young people's right to strike. Notable was also that despite that the FFF movement is mostly a youth movement, the media discussions were dominated by an adult voice. A more detailed discussion of the full results of the media analysis can be found in article III. Here, the findings from the media discussions are compared especially to the findings from interviews with the climate activists in article II. The media analysis reveals two main differences in the perceptions of active youth participation.

First, there are differences in the perceptions regarding forms of action. The FFF activists have chosen street demonstrations, a form of non-institutional collective action (Klandermans, 2016, p. 76), as their form of political participation. The FFF movement focuses on the mass protests on Fridays to influence decision-makers and demand actual policy changes from politicians. The young are engaging in an active collective form of politics, and as the interviews suggest, the FFF young do not want to take more personal or individual level political action than they are already taking; rather they want to vote for politicians to fix the issue of the climate crisis. Yet, in the media discussions, the young FFF participants' political engagement was often met with encouragement to do individual lifestyle choices and engage in lifestyle politics (Huttunen & Albrecht, 2021). The large focus on individual politics in the reactions towards the FFF movement, and the encouragement to engage in such activities, can be interpreted as a message that the forms of action the young themselves have chosen are not sufficient or correct. Since the young people's political activity is met with guidance to do otherwise when engaging in protest activities, protest activities appear to not be seen as a suitable form of political action for young citizens. Alternatively or simultaneously, the large focus on individual lifestyle politics can be interpreted as a message that the amount of political activity the young are engaging in is not sufficient, since they are encouraged to take even more political action. Even if the focus on lifestyle choices may be well-intentioned, deriving from e.g. a desire to provide the young

forms of action on arenas accessible for the young, the focus on individual-level actions, which are insufficient to address the climate crisis (Dobson & Bell 2006; Hobson 2013), can be problematic. It fails to recognize and credit the political actions of the FFF young, who are already displaying great levels of political activity by participating in a collective movement.

Second, there are differences in the perceptions of how young people's political activity should be viewed. Youth-centered approaches in political science strive for identifying different forms of action taken by the young and recognizing these actions as inherently political (O'Toole et al., 2003; see also Farthing, 2010; Pontes et al., 2018). Climate strikes are a collective form of action taken by the young who are worried about their future living conditions, which are threatened because of the climate crisis, with the objective to affect decision-makers. In media discussions, however, the climate strike actions were defended as an opportunity for the young to *learn* about politics instead of as a political act in itself. Thus, instead of seeing the young as political citizens making political change, they were seen as citizens-to-be who could learn about politics for the future. The young FFF participants, however, are motivated to participate in the protest to bring on political change at the current time, as shown by the interviews: they do not want to affect politics only later in life – they want to be heard now. Pickard (2019) suggests that the condescending discourses we have on young people strip the young from their full citizenship and affect how we see young people's role in institutional politics. What Bowman (2019) describes as a perspective that perceives 'young people as subjects of political engagement more than agents of change' (2019, p. 299), fails to acknowledge the political activity taken by the young and may thus disempower, disregard or belittle youth engagement. Young people in general do not enjoy the same political, civil or social rights as adults (Farthing, 2010, p. 184) and especially many of the climate strike participants lack full political rights due to their young age, yet they are displaying political activity in the forms of engagement at their disposal. From the young participants' perspective, they are not learning about politics, they are acting politically.

The difference in perceptions of active youth participation can thus have negative impacts. The media discussions around youth participation show the acceptable forms of and limits for participation to the young, thus how youth engagement is discussed in the media is likely to affect actual youth participation. Evidence from Germany suggests that in media the young FFF protestors' voices are reduced to apolitical testimonies, instead of highlighting the movement's agenda, and thus the FFF movement's agenda and demands are depoliticized (von Zabern & Tulloch, 2021). Similar depoliticisation of the young protestors can be detected in the Finnish media case: despite giving room for young protestors' statements in newspapers, the discussions were dominated by an adult voice, which may disempower youth participation. It is easier to contend that critical or negative statements; such as ridiculing the young for their alleged unecological choices in their everyday lives or discouraging participation due to educational reasons; may discourage youth participation, especially when adults

are directly asking young people not to participate in strike activities. However, a dominant adult voice, no matter its tone, can shift the focus away from the young protestors' political demands to adults' opinions – instead of the movement's political objectives, the discussion revolves around adult reactions and thoughts. Adult's memories of their own youth and statements of how the 'young are not spoiled' or 'the future is in the young' may counteract the negative statements that the movement receives but do little to the movement's political objectives. Despite that the FFF movement calls for adult responsibility in the issue of the climate crisis, and adult participation in the movement, adult voices taking up the media space, especially if not used to amplify the messages of the young, can still have a disempowering impact on youth participation. The question of whether and how even a largely positive adult voice can affect youth movements should receive further scholarly focus.

Young people are also likely to be affected by the public discourses around their activity: it may affect how the young themselves see and describe their political participation and preferences. If only certain types of political action are seen as appropriate for young citizens, then smart young people are more likely to focus on those activities and display such preferences in surveys. The language we use matters. If we want to empower and encourage youth participation, we should recognize and accept the forms the young themselves choose for political influence – not try to guide them to engage in forms we may find more suitable.

5.5 Limitations

The findings in this work are based on multiple types of data and methods, which strengthens the possibility to draw solid conclusions. However, there may be some limitations especially in regards to the generalizability of these findings.

First, the case of Finland may limit the generalizability. In Finland, citizens' institutional trust is typically high (Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2016), even young citizens have rather traditional views on politics (Myllyniemi, 2014), and the decline in election participation amongst the young has not been as deep as in some other countries (Nemčok & Wass, 2021). Finland is in many ways a most-likely case for findings that young people are trusting of political institutions, support democracy, and prefer engagement in institutionalized forms of politics. In other settings, where institutional trust is lower similar results regarding, for example, the CI may not be as likely, as agenda-setting direct democracy requires trust in decision-makers willingness to listen to the citizens in order to work. Similarly, the non-post-materialist developments may not be similar in other settings. Thus, before generalizing, further research is necessary to explore whether similar results can be obtained elsewhere.

Second, this dissertation examined the topic of young people, democracy and political participation with a limited time perspective. No longitudinal data were used, thus, it is impossible to know whether similar trends are visible e.g. in 10 years' time or if these results are specific for this time.

The unique mix of different type of quantitative and qualitative data made it possible to explore the contemporary youth participation from different perspectives. However, there are some limitations related to the data. The interviewed Finnish FFF activists in FFF dataset 1 were selected based on age, participation in the FFF activities, and location (Southern Finland), which led to the interviewees being higher educated or on a path towards higher education. Thus, the interviewees represent people who are generally more active in politics. However, in regards to their sociodemographic background, the interviewees were similar to the typical climate activist, namely female, educated and young (Wahlström et al., 2019). In addition, the use of election survey data (FNES 2015), which is collected in connection to elections and is typically institutionally inclined, can affect the results since politically interested people tend to respond more frequently to election surveys.

This dissertation is also limited in its ability to make nuanced notions in regards to young people as a heterogeneous group. Young people are viewed mostly as a homogenous group, yet, young people's political engagement and attitudes of varies due to e.g. ethnic background, social class, education, and gender (see e.g. Henn & Foard 2014; Pickard 2019, p. 46). In a large part of this dissertation, I have focused on certain kinds of young people in Finland: those who are likely to have more progressive post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1977), as they are active in a climate protest movement. However, as popularity of the populist True Finns party among Finnish young people (Suuronen et al., 2020) suggest, there are likely to be larger variation within the Finnish young people not only in values but perhaps also in views regarding political participation and democracy that could be observed by researching other forms of engagement and other groups of young people.

5.6 Final remarks

The broad research question in this dissertation has been "How do contemporary young people relate to democracy and political participation in Finland?". Founded in the post-materialist theoretical foundation (e.g. Dalton, 2008, 2016; Inglehart, 1977, 1997; Pickard, 2019), this doctoral thesis found evidence suggesting that despite the popularity of theories on youth support for new forms of engagement at expense of the institutional, the representative democracy and institutionalized forms of political engagement still bear meaning for Finnish young people. Despite that studies have for long suggested that young may feel alienated from traditional politics (Henn et al., 2002; Quintelier, 2007; Stoker, 2006) and have a negative image of political parties and politicians (Chou, 2017; Pickard, 2019), the contemporary Finnish young people appear to not only support democracy but also be interested in participating in political institutions and value institutionalized politics. For democratic future, political institutions, and the quality of participation, the findings are somewhat reassuring.

The interest in institutionalized politics and preference for engagement in representative institutions, however, does not mean that the new forms of engagement would not also be important for the young. The popularity of the climate strike movement, for example, speaks for itself in terms of youth support. Many Finnish young people are willing to engage in many different forms of politics, including established democratic institutions, new institutionalized activities and new forms of more active citizen engagement in single-issue protests. The findings suggest that Finnish young people operate with a broad democratic toolbox. Perhaps contemporary youth participation is characterized by pragmatism: despite their true preferences for political activity, the young are ready to engage in multiple kinds of actions to further their political interests.

For research, the complexity of the realities of youth participation and these findings have some implications. Since young people in Finland appear to support democracy, and even active young people state to prefer participation in representative institutions, the findings entail the need to investigate alternative explanations for young people's disengagement from the political institutions besides the post-materialist perspective focused on the youth preferences for new forms of engagement. Instead of a preference for alternative forms of participation, young people might be active in some forms of political activity instead of others due to e.g. systemic biases and disincentives for political participation. Systemic biases and disincentives may lead to abstaining from formal politics and finding other forms of political activity (Chou, 2017; Kimberlee, 2002). As Pickard (2019) argues, "many young people are turning to non-electoral forms of political participation because they are disillusioned and disappointed with electoral politics, which generally fails to engage with them" (2019, p. 375). Perhaps the lack of youth participation in institutions is due to our failure to notice youth participation, lack of hearing the political demands of the young, or other system-level explanations. We need more qualitative research that explores youth participation in youth-centered ways, where the risks of defining what is and is not political from an arbitrary and adult-centric perspective (see e.g. Buckley & Bowman, 2021) are lower.

The positive news is that representative democracy and democratic institutions still appeal to the young – but there are changes to be made. If we want to fight the concerns of political disengagement, Stoker (2006, p. 14) suggests that we should expand the citizens' opportunities to have a say in issues they care about – in issues that are important for the citizens, not politicians, scientists or journalists. We should start from where people are in terms of political engagement and then seek to mold our political institutions to ensure that people can engage in politics more effectively without having to transform into new model citizens (Stoker, 2006, p. 14). We should recognize the political action taken by the young as inherently political, and learn from the institutions and movements that have been capable of mobilizing the young into political action. We should ensure that the existing democratic system truly hears the young, who instead of a radical transformation of the representative system

want mechanisms to ensure that politicians listen to the younger citizens (Huttunen, 2021). No revolution, just better representation.

References

Alexander, A., & Welzel, C. (2017). The Myth of Deconsolidation: Rising Liberalism and the Populist Reaction. *Journal of Democracy*, *28*, 1–14.

Allen, M. (2017). *The Sage Encyclopedia of Communication Research Methods (Vol. 1–4).* SAGE Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781483381411

Bansak, K., Hainmueller, J., Hopkins, D. J., & Yamamoto, T. (2021). Conjoint Survey Experiments. In Druckman, J. M. and D. P. Green. *Advances in Experimental Political Science*. Cambridge University Press.

Bale, T., & Kaltwasser, C. (2021). The Mainstream Right in Western Europe: Caught between the Silent Revolution and Silent Counter-Revolution. In T. Bale & C. Rovira Kaltwasser (Eds.), *Riding the Populist Wave: Europe's Mainstream Right in Crisis* (pp. 1–37). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009006866.002

Barnes, S. H., & Kaase, M. (1979). Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies. *Political Science Quarterly*, 95(3), 539-541

Barrons, G. (2012). 'Suleiman: Mubarak decided to step down #egypt #jan25 OH MY GOD': examining the use of social media in the 2011 Egyptian revolution. *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 5(1), 54–67. https://doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2012.645669

Bartels, L. M., & Jackman, S. (2014). A generational model of political learning. *Electoral Studies*, *33*, 7–18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.004

Benford, R. D. (1994). Review of Talking Politics, by William A. Gamson. *American Journal of Sociology,* 99(4), 1103–1104. https://doi.org/10.1086/230383

Bengtsson, Å. (2012). Citizens' Perceptions of Political Processes. A Critical Evaluation of Preference Consistency and Survey Items. *Revista Internacional de Sociología*, 70(2), 45-64. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/ris.2012.01.29

Bengtsson, Å., & Christensen, H.S. (2009). Politiskt deltagande i Finland – spridning och drivkrafter. *Politiikka* 51(2), 77–95.

Bengtsson, Å., & Grönlund, K. (2005). Muu poliittinen osallistuminen. In Heikki Paloheimo (Ed.) *Vaalit ja demokratia Suomessa*. WSOY.

Bennett, W. L. (2008). Changing citizenship in the digital age. In W. Bennet (Ed.), *Civic life Online: Learning How Digital Media can Engage Youth.* (pp. 1–24). MIT Press. doi: 10.1162/dmal.9780262524827.001

Bibbins Sedaca, N. (2021). Biden' most urgent task: Addressing waning millennial support for democracy. The Hill. 17.11.2020. [accessed 24.11.2021]

Blais, A., & Rubenson, D. (2013). The Source of Turnout Decline: New Values or New Contexts? *Comparative Political Studies*, *46*(1), 95–117. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012453032

Blank, G. (2017). The digital divide among Twitter users and its implications for social research. *Social Science Computer Review,* 35(6), 679–697. https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439316671698

Borg, S., & Kestilä-Kekkonen, E. (2017). Viisi väitettä osallistumisesta. In Elina Kestilä-Kekkonen & Paul-Erik Korvela (Eds.). *POLIITTINEN OSALLISTUMINEN Vanhan ja uuden osallistumisen jännitteitä*. SoPhi.

Boulianne, S., Lalancette, M., & Ilkiw, D. (2020). "School Strike 4 Climate": social media and the international youth protest on climate change. *Media and Communication,* 8(2), 208–218. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v8i2.2768

Bowman, B. (2019). Imagining future worlds alongside young climate activists: a new framework for research. *Fennia,* 197(2), 295–305. https://doi.org/10.11143/fennia.85151

Bowman, B. (2020). 'They don't quite understand the importance of what we're doing today': the young people's climate strikes as subaltern activism. *Sustainable Earth,* 3.

https://doi.org/10.1186/s42055-020-00038-x
Brady, H. (1999). Political Participation. In J. P. Robinson, P.R. Shaver, L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), *Measures of Political Attitudes* (pp. 737-801). Academic Press
Breene, K. (2017). Millennials are rapidly losing interest in democracy. World Economic Forum. 8.6.2017 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/millennials-are-rapidly-losing-interest-in-democracy/ [9.6.2021]
Bremmer I. (2018). "Is democracy essential? Millennials increasingly aren't sure – and that should concern us all.". NBC News. 13.2.2018. https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/democracy-essential-millennials-increasingly-aren-t-sure-should-concern-us-ncna847476 [9.6.2021]
Bäck, M., & Christensen, H.S. (2020). Minkälaisia poliittisia osallistujia suomalaiset ovat kansainvälisessä vertailussa?. In S. Borg, E. Kestilä-Kekkonen & K. Grönlund (Eds), *Politiikan ilmastonmuutos. Eduskuntavaalitutkimus 2019.* Oikeusministeriö.
Bäck, M., Kestilä-Kekkonen, E., & Söderlund, P. (2016). Suomalaisten poliittinen luottamus ja siihen vaikuttavat tekijät. In K. Grönlund & H. Wass (Eds.), *Poliittisen osallistumisen eriytyminen - Eduskuntavaalit 2015*. (pp. 379–397). Oikeusministeriö.
Carey, J., Clayton, K., Helmke, G., Nyhan, B., Sanders, M., & Stokes, S. (2020). Who will defend democracy? Evaluating tradeoffs in candidate support among partisan donors and voters. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*. DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2020.1790577
Child Custody and Right of Access Act 1983 s.361 (Fin.)
Christensen, H.S., & Saikkonen, I. (2020) Elite Transgressions. Conjoint analysis of how democratic transgressions and populist attitudes affect evaluations of political leaders. DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/3F49X
Chou, M. (2017). Disengaged, Young People and Political Disengagement in Anglo-American Democracies**.** In M. Chou, J-P. Gagnon, C. Hartung & L. Pruitt (Eds.), *Young People, Citizenship and Political Participation: Combating Civic Deficit?* (pp. 1–30). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Dahl, R. A. (1998). *On Democracy*. Yale University Press.
Dalton, R.J. (2007). Partisan Mobilization, Cognitive Mobilization and the Changing American Electorate, *Electoral Studies*, 26(2), 274-86. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2006.04.009
Dalton, R.J. (2008). Citizenship norms and the expansion of political participation. *Political Studies*. *56*(03), 76–98.
Dalton, R. J. (2016). *The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation Is Reshaping American Politics*. SAGE Publications.
Dalton, R.J. (2017). *The participation gap: Social status and political inequality*. Oxford University Press.
Dalton, R.J., Bürklin W., & Drummond, A. (2001). Public Opinion and Direct Democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 12(4), 141-153. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2001.0066
Delli Carpini, M.X. (1989). Age and history: Generations and socio-political change. In R. Siedel (ed), *Political Learning in Adulthood* (pp.11–56). University of Chicago Press.
de Moor, J. (2017). Lifestyle politics and the concept of political participation. *Acta Polit* 52, 179–197 https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2015.27
de Moor, J., Uba, K., Wahlström, M., Wennerhag, M., & De Vydt, M. (Eds.) (2020). Protest for a future II: Composition, mobilization and motives of the participants in Fridays For Future climate protests on 20-27 September, 2019, in 19 cities around the world. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339443851_Protest_for_a_future_II_Composition_mobilization_and_motives_of_the_participants_in_Fridays_For_Future_climate_protests_on_20-27_September_2019_in_19_cities_around_the_world [accessed Jan 05 2021].
Denemark, D., Donovan, T., & Niemi, R.G. (2016). Advanced Democracies: The 34 Erosion of Traditional Democratic Citizenship. In D. Denemark, R. Mattes, & R. G. Niemi (Eds.), *Growing Up Democratic: Does It Make a Difference?*. (pp. 181–206). Lynne Rienner.

Dimock, M. (2019). Defining generations: Where Millennials end and Generation Z begins*. Pew Research Center*. 17.1.2019. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/where-millennials-end-and-generation-z-begins/ [25.8.2021]

Dinas, E. (2013). Opening "openness to change": Political events and the increased sensitivity of young adults. *Political Research Quarterly*. 66 (4), 868–882. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912913475874

Dobson, A. (2003). *Citizenship and Environment*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199258449.001.0001

Dobson, A., & Bell, D. (2006). Environmental citizenship: introduction. In Dobson, A. & Bell, D. (eds.) *Environmental Citizenship,* (pp. 1–18). MIT Press.

Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication* 43(4), 51–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x

Ernman, M., Thunberg, G., Thunberg, S., & Ernman, B. (2020) *Our House is on Fire: Scenes of a Family and Planet in Crisis*. Penguin Books.

Ervasti, A-E., & Rajamäki, T. (2019). Opetushallitus: Ilmastolakko ei velvoita koulua antamaan oppilaille vapaata. *Helsingin Sanomat* 15.3.2019 <https://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/art-2000006036371.html>. 7.5.2021

Farthing, R. (2010). The Politics of Youthful Antipolitics: Representing the ´Issues´ of Youth Participation in Politics, *Journal of Youth Studies*, 13:2, 181–195. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13676260903233696

The Constitution of Finland 1999 s. 6, p.3 (Fin.)

Flanagan, C. (2016). Epilogue: Youth and the 'social contract'. In Thijssen, P., Siongers, J., Van Laer, J., Haers, J. & Mels, S. (eds.). *Political Engagement of the Young in Europe*. Routledge

Foa, R.S., Klassen, A., Wenger, D., Rand, A., & Slade M. (2020). *Youth and Satisfaction with Democracy: Reversing the Democratic Disconnect?*. Centre for the Future of Democracy.

Foa, R. S., & Mounk, Y. (2016). The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic Disconnect. *Journal of Democracy, 27*(3), 5–17.

Foa, R. S., & Mounk, Y. (2017). The signs of deconsolidation. *Journal of Democracy*, *28*(1), 5–16. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0000

14 Industries Experts Say Millennials Are Killing — And Why They're Wrong. (2020, February, 26). *CB Insights, Research Briefs*. https://www.cbinsights.com/research/millennials-killing-industries/

Furlong, A., & Cartmel, F. (2007). *Young people and social change: Individualisation and risk in late modernity* (2nd ed.). Open University Press.

García-Albacete, G. M. (2014). *Young people's political participation in Western Europe: Continuity or generational change?* Palgrave Macmillan.

Geissel, B. (2013). Introduction: On the Evaluation of Participatory Innovations - A Preliminary Framework, *Participatory Democratic Innovations in Europe: Improving the Quality of Democracy?*, Budrich Verlag

George, A.L. & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. MIT Press

Germaine Buckley, C. & Bowman, B. (2021). Not (just) a protest: the Youth Strike for Climate as cultural exchange and collaborative text. *British Council: Cultural Relations Collection.*

Gherghina, S., & Geissel, B. (2020). Support for direct and deliberative models of democracy in the UK: understanding the difference. *Political Research Exchange*. https://doi.org/10.1080/2474736x.2020.1809474

Goffman, E. (1974) *Frame Analysis.* Harper & Row.

Graham, M. H., & Svolik, M. W. (2020). Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States. *American Political Science Review*, *114*(2), 392–409. doi:10.1017/S0003055420000052

Grasso, M. T. (2014). Age, Period and Cohort Analysis in a Comparative Context: Political Generations and Political Participation Repertoires in Western Europe. *Electoral Studies*. 33, 63-76

Grasso, M. T., Farrall, S., Gray, E., Hay, C., & Jennings, W. (2018). Socialization and generational political trajectories: An age, period and cohort analysis of political participation in Britain. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, *29*(2), 199–221. doi:10.1080/17457289.2018.1476359

Grönholm, P. (2019) ”Nyt jos koskaan on aika tehdä jotain”, ja siksi osa koululaisista osallistuu Suomessakin perjantaina ilmastolakkoon. *Helsingin Sanomat* 14.3.2019 <https://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/art-2000006034879.html>. 7.5.2021.

Grönlund, K. (2016). Eduskuntavaalit 2015. In K. Grönlund & H. Wass (Eds.), *Poliittisen osallistumisen eriytyminen - Eduskuntavaalit 2015*. (pp. 58–75). Oikeusministeriö.

Grönlund, K. & Kestilä-Kekkonen, E. (2015). Finnish National Election Study 2015 [dataset]. Version 1.0 (2016-06-13). *Finnish Social Science Data Archive [distributor]*.

Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., and Yamamoto, T. (2015). Validating Vignette and Conjoint Survey Experiments against Real-World Behavior. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112*(8), 2395–2400.

Hainmueller, J., Hopkins, D.J. and Yamamoto, T. (2014). Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Experiments. *Political Analysis, 22*(01), 1–30.

Hammarberg, K., Kirkman, M. and De Lacey, S. (2016). Qualitative research methods: when to use them and how to judge them. *Human Reproduction*, 31(3), 498–501. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/humrep/dev334

Hayward, B. (2021). *Children, Citizenship and Environment #SchoolStrike Edition*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003003096

HE 46/2011 vp:27 (Fin.)

Henn, M., & Foard, N. (2014). Social differentiation in young people's political participation: the impact of social and educational factors on youth political engagement in Britain, *Journal of Youth Studies***,** 17(3), 360-380, DOI: 10.1080/13676261.2013.830704

Henn, M., Weinstein, M., & Forrest, S. (2005). Uninterested Youth? Young People's Attitudes towards Party Politics in Britain. *Political Studies*, 53, 556-578. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00544.x

Henn, M., Weinstein, M., & Wring, D. (2002). A Generation Apart? Youth and Political Participation in Britain. *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, 4, 167-192. DOI:10.1111/1467-856X.t01-1-00001

Hibbing, J., & Theiss-Morse, E. (2002). *Stealth democracy. Americans' Beliefs about How Government Should Work*. Cambridge University Press.

Hobson, K. (2013). On the making of the environmental citizen. *Environmental Politics* 22(1), 56–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2013.755388

Holbrook, A. L. & Krosnick, J. A. (2010). Social desirability bias in voter turnout reports: Tests using the item count technique, *Public Opinion Quarterly. 74*(1), 37–67, https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfp065

Hooghe. M. & Boonen, J. (2016). Youth engagement in politics: generational differences and participation inequalities. In Thijssen, P., Siongers, J., Van Laer, J., Haers, J. & Mels, S. (eds.). *Political Engagement of the Young in Europe*. Routledge

Hustinx, L. & Roose, H. (2016). Participatory versatility in Flanders: a multiple correspondence analysis. In Thijssen, P., Siongers, J., Van Laer, J., Haers, J. & Mels, S. (eds.). *Political Engagement of the Young in Europe*. Routledge

Howe, N. (2017) Are Millennials Giving Up On Democracy?. *Forbes*. 31.10.2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/neilhowe/2017/10/31/are-millennials-giving-up-on-democracy/?sh=77c2e0292be1 [9.6.2021]

Huotari, J. (2019) On helpompi vähätellä nuorten vaikuttamisyrityksiä kuin vastata kysymyksiin planeetan kunnosta*. Helsingin Sanomat* 18.3.2019 <https://www.hs.fi/mielipide/art-2000006038678.html>. 7.5.2021.

Huttunen, J. (2021). Young Rebels Who Do Not Want a Revolution: The Non-participatory Preferences of Fridays for Future Activists in Finland. *Front. Polit. Sci*. 3:672362. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2021.672362.

Huttunen, J., & Albrecht, E. (2021). The framing of environmental citizenship and youth participation in the Fridays for Future Movement in Finland. *Fennia - International Journal of Geography*, *199*(1), 46–60. https://doi.org/10.11143/fennia.102480

Huttunen, J. & Christensen, H.S. (2020). Engaging the Millennials: The Citizens' Initiative in Finland. *Young, 28*(2), 175–198. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1103308819853055.

Huttunen, J. & Saikkonen, I., A.-L. (n-d.). Are the Young Undemocratic? Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment. *Under review.*

Ignazi, P. (1992). The silent counter-revolution**.** Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right-wing parties in Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, 22, 3–34. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1992.tb00303.x

Ignazi, P. (1996). The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties. *Party Politics*, 2(4), 549–566. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068896002004007

Inglehart, R. (1971). The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies. *The American Political Science Review*, *65*(4), 991–1017. https://doi.org/10.2307/1953494

Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution: Changing values and political styles among Western publics*. Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton University Press

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash." *HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series* RWP16-026

Inglehart, R. & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. Cambridge University Press.

Johnston, H. (2002). Verification and proof in frame and discourse analysis. In Klandermans, B. & Staggenborg, S. (eds.) *Methods of Social Movement Research. Social Movements, Protest, and Contention*, *vol 16*, (pp. 62–91). University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London.

Kaim, M. (2021). Rethinking Modes of Political Participation, *Democratic Theory*, *8*(1), 50-70.

Karvonen, L. (2014). *Parties, Governments and Voters in Finland: Politics Under Fundamental Societal Transformation*. ECPR Press.

Kestilä-Kekkonen, E., & Söderlund, P. (2016). Political Trust, Individual-level Characteristics and Institutional Performance. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 39, 138-160. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12052

Kimberlee, R.H. (2002). Why Don´t British Young People Vote at General Elections?, *Journal of Youth Studies*, 5(1), 85–98

Klandermans, B. (2016). Demonstrating youth: a comparison of younger and older demonstrators. In Thijssen, P., Siongers, J., Van Laer, J., Haers, J. & Mels, S. (eds.). *Political Engagement of the Young in Europe*. Routledge.

Koivisto, J. & Nelskylä, L. (2019). Kansainvälinen ilmastolakko näkyi kymmenillä paikkakunnilla Suomessa – Tuhansia nuoria kokoontui kaupunkien keskustoihin ja Mannerheimintie tukkeutui. *Yle Uutiset* 27.9.2019 <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10991519>. 11.5.2021.

Koskinen, A. L. (2019) Jenni Haukio kehuu ilmastolakkoilevia koululaisia: "Kiitollinen näistä nuorista!". *Yle Uutiset* 15.3.2019 <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10691767>. 11.5.2021.

Krippendorff, K. (2012). *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*. Sage.

Kuklinski, J.H., Cobb, M. D., & Gilens, M. (1997). Racial Attitudes and the "New South". *The Journal of Politics. 59*(2), 323-349

Kuntalaki 2015 s. 410 (Fin.)

König, T. (nd). Frame analysis: A Primer. https://www.restore.ac.uk/lboro/resources/links/frames_primer.php

Lahtinen, H. (2019). *Socioeconomic differences in electoral participation: Insights from the Finnish administrative registers*. University of Helsinki. http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-51-3406-6

Leeper, T. J., Hobolt, S. B., & Tilley, J. (2020). Measuring Subgroup Preferences in Conjoint Experiments. *Political Analysis, 28*(2), 207–21.

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). *How Democracies Die: What History Reveals About Our Future.* Penguin UK.

Linde, J. & Ekman, J. (2003). Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator in comparative politics. *European Journal of Political Research*. 42(3), 391 – 408

Mair, P. (2013). *Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy*. Verso.

Mannheim, K. (1927/1952). The Problem of Generations. Paul Kecskemeti (ed.) *Karl Mannheim: Essays*. (1952, p. 276-322). Routledge

Marien, S., Hooghe, M., & Quintelier, E. (2010). Inequalities in non-institutionalised forms of political participation: A multi-level analysis of 25 countries'. *Political Studies,* 58(1), 187-213.

Micheletti, M., & Stolle, D. (2011) Vegetarianism – A lifestyle politics? In: M. Micheletti and A.S. McFarland (eds.) *Creative Participation Responsibility-Taking in the Political World*. (pp. 125–145) Paradigm.

Milner, H. (2010). *The Internet generation: Engaged citizens or political dropouts*. University Press of New England.

Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2013). Exclusionary vs Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America. *Government and Opposition*, 48(2), 147–174. Doi:10.1017/gov.2012.11

Mutz, D. C. (2011). *Population-Based Survey Experiments.* Princeton University Press.

Mutz, D. C. & Kim, E. (2020). The Progress and Pitfalls of Using Survey Experiments in Political Science. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia for Politics*. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.929

Myllyniemi, S. (2014). Vaikuttava osa. *Nuorisobarometri 2013*. Hakapaino.

Mäkinen, V. (2018). 8 000 marssi ilmaston puolesta Helsingissä – saamelainen Petra Laiti läksytti poliitikkoja eduskuntatalon portailla. *Helsingin Sanomat* 20.10.2018 <https://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/art-2000005870953.html>. 7.5.2021.

National Advisory Board on Research Ethics, TENK (2013). Responsible conduct of research and procedures for handling allegations of misconduct in Finland*. Guidelines of the Finnish Advisory Board on Research Integrity 2012*. Helsinki.

National Advisory Board on Research Ethics, TENK (2009). *Ethical principles of research in the humanities and social and behavioral sciences and proposals for ethical review*. Helsinki.

Nemčok, M., & Wass, H. (2021). Generations and Political Engagement. I W. R. Thompson (Red.), *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics.* Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1756

Neundorf, A., & Smets, K. (2017). Political Socialization and Making of Citizens. *Oxford Handbooks Online.* DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935307.013.98

Norris, P. (2002) *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610073

Norris, P. (2004). Young People & Political Activism: From the Politics of Loyalties to the Politics of Choice? *Paper for the conference 'Civic engagement in the 21st Century: Toward a Scholarly and Practical Agenda' at the University of Southern California, Oct 1-2 2004.* Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237832623_Young_People_Political_Activism [accessed Oct 07 2021].

Norris, P. (2017). Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks. *The Journal of Democracy*. Online Exchange. DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2933655

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781198595841

Oser, J., Hooghe, M., & Marien, S. (2013). Is Online Participation Distinct from Offline Participation? A Latent Class

Analysis of Participation Types and Their Stratification. *Political Research Quarterly*. 66(1), 91-101.
O'Toole, T., Lister, M., Marsh, D., Jones, S., & McDonagh, A. (2003). Tuning out or left out? Participation and non-participation among young people, *Contemporary Politics*, 9(1), 45–61. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569770320000072477
Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, December 12, 2015
Pateman, C. (1970). *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge University Press.
Pickard, S. (2019). *Politics, Protest and Young People*. *Political Participation and Dissent in 21st Century Britain*. Palgrave MacMillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57788-7
Pickard, S., Bowman, B., & Arya, D. (2020) "We are radical in our kindness": the political socialisation, motivations, demands and protest actions of young environmental activists in Britain. *Youth and Globalization* 2(2), 251–280. https://doi.org/10.1163/25895745-02020007
Pontes, A., Henn, M., & Griffits, M. D. (2018). Towards a Conceptualization of Young People's Political Engagement: A Qualitative Focus Group Study. *Societies*. 8(1), 17. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/soc8010017
Putnam, R.D. (2000). *Bowling alone, the collapse and revival of American community*. Simon & Schuster.
Quintelier, E., & van Deth, J.W. (2014). Exploring Causality using Panel Data. *Polit Stud, 62*. 153–171. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12097
Quintelier, E. (2007). Differences in political participation between young and old people, *Contemporary Politics*, 13(2), 165-180, DOI: 10.1080/13569770701562658
Raiskila, M., & Wiberg, M. (2017). Demokratian ritareista näppäimistösotureihin: Poliittisen osallistumisen kirjo laajenee. In Elina Kestilä-Kekkonen & Paul-Erik Korvela (Eds.). *POLIITTINEN OSALLISTUMINEN Vanhan ja uuden osallistumisen jännitteitä*. SoPhi.
Rapeli, L., & Borg, S. (2016). Kiinnostavaa, mutta monimutkaista: Tiedot, osallistuminen ja suhtautuminen vaikuttamiseen. In K. Grönlund & H. Wass (Eds.), *Poliittisen osallistumisen eriytyminen - Eduskuntavaalit 2015*. (pp. 358–378). Oikeusministeriö.
Rapeli, L., & Koskimaa, V. (2020). Kansalaisten kiinnittyminen politiikkaan. In S. Borg, E. Kestilä-Kekkonen & K. Grönlund (Eds). *Politiikan ilmastonmuutos*. Oikeusministeriö.
Rapeli, L., & Leino, M. (2013). Kansalaisten poliittinen osallistuminen ja tietämys Suomessa. *Aikuiskasvatus*, *33*(1), 4–15. https://doi.org/10.33336/aik.94014
Rosenthal, J. H. (2021). Are Americans Facing an Undemocratic Future? *Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Relations*. 6.4.2021. [accessed 24.11.2021]
Saikkonen, I., & Christensen, H.S. (2022) Guardians of Democracy or Passive Bystanders? A Conjoint Experiment on Elite Transgressions of Democratic Norms. *Political Research Quarterly*. https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211073592
Sanson, A.V., & Burke, S. E. L. (2020). Climate change and children: an issue of intergenerational justice. In Balvin, N. & Christie, D. (eds.) *Children and Peace. Peace Psychology Book Series,* (pp. 343–362). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22176-8_21
Schiller, T., & Setälä, M. (2012). Introduction. In M. Setälä & T. Schiller (eds), *Citizens' initiatives in Europe – Procedures and consequences of agenda-setting by citizens* (pp. 1-14). Palgrave Macmillan.
Schindel Dimick, A. (2015). Supporting youth to develop environmental citizenship within/against a neoliberal context. *Environmental Education Research* 21(3), 390–402. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504622.2014.994164
Schlossberg, M. (2016). Millennials are killing the napkin industry. *Business Insider*. 28.3.2016. https://www.businessinsider.com/mill

ennials-hate-napkins-2016-3?r=US&IR=T [accessed 26.11.2021]
Sirén, I., Kuokkanen, K., & Malmberg, L. (2019). ”Että ne kehtaa!” huusi tuhatpäinen joukko – Ilmastolakko valtasi Eduskuntatalon edustan ja sulki Mannerheimintien. *Helsingin Sanomat* 27.9.2019 < https://www.hs.fi/kaupunki/art-2000006252356.html>. 7.5.2021.
Sloam, J. (2007). Rebooting Democracy: Youth Participation in Politics in the UK, *Parliamentary Affairs*. 60(4), 548–567, https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsm035
Small, T. A. (2011). WHAT THE HASHTAG?, Information, Communication & Society, 14(6), 872-895, DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2011.554572
Smets, K. (2016). Revisiting the political life-cycle model: Later maturation and turnout decline among young adults. European Political Science Review, 8(2), 225-249. doi:10.1017/S1755773914000460
Smets, K., & Neundorf, A. (2014). The hierarchies of age-period-cohort research: Political context and the development of generational turnout patterns. *Electoral Studies*, 33, 41-51.
Sniderman, P. M. (2018). Some Advances in the Design of Survey Experiments. *Annual Review of Political Science*. 21, 259-275. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042716-115726
Stoker, G. (2006). *Why Politics Matters, Making Democracy Work*. Palgrave Macmillan
Stolle, D., & Hooghe, M. (2011). SHIFTING INEQUALITIES Patterns of exclusion and inclusion in emerging forms of political participation. *European societies*.
Strandberg, K., & Borg, S. (2020). Internet ja sosiaalinen media osana vaalikampanjaa. In S. Borg, E. Kestilä-Kekkonen & K. Grönlund (Eds). *Politiikan ilmastonmuutos*. Oikeusministeriö.
Strauss, W., & Howe N. (2000). *Millennials rising: The next great generation*. Vintage Books.
Suuronen, A., Grönlund, K., & Sirén, R. (2020). In S. Borg, E. Kestilä-Kekkonen & K. Grönlund (Eds). *Politiikan ilmastonmuutos*. Oikeusministeriö.
Thjissen, P., Van Laer, J., & Siongers, J. (2016). Introduction: bridging the transatlantic schism. In Thijssen, P., Siongers, J., Van Laer, J., Haers, J. & Mels, S. (eds.). *Political Engagement of the Young in Europe*. Routledge
Thörn, H., & Svenberg, S. (2016). ‘“We feel the responsibility that you shirk”: movement institutionalization, the politics of responsibility and the case of the Swedish environmental movement’. *Social Movement Studies*. 15(6), 593–609.
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 12), November 20, 1989
van Hulst, M., & Yanow, D. (2016). From policy “frames” to “framing”: theorizing a more dynamic, political approach. *American Review of Public Administration* 46(1), 92–112. https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074014533142
Verba, S., Schlozman, K.L., & Brady, H.E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Harvard University Press.
Verba, S., & Nie, N. H. (1987). *Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality*. University of Chicago Press.
Voeten, E. (2016). Are People Really Turning Away from Democracy? *SSRN Electronic Journal*. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2882878
von Zabern, L., & Tulloch, C. D. (2021). Rebel with a cause: the framing of climate change and intergenerational justice in the German press treatment of the Fridays for Future protests. *Media, Culture & Society* 43(1), 23–47. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443720960923
Wahlström, M., Kocyba, P., De Vydt, M., & de Moor, J. (Eds.). (2019). Protest for a future: Composition, mobilization and motives of the participants in Fridays For Future climate protests on 15 March, 2019 in 13 European cities. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334745801_Protest_for_a_future_Composition_mobilization_and_motives_of_the_participants_in_Fridays_For_Futu

re_climate_protests_on_15_March_2019_in_13_European_cities
Wallander, L. (2009). 25 years of factorial surveys in sociology: A review. *Social Science Research, 38*, 505–520.
Wang, Z., & Caskey, K. (2016). #Occupywallstreet: an analysis of Twitter usage during a protest movement. *Social Networking* 5(4), 101–117. https://doi.org/10.4236/sn.2016.54011.
Winslow, L. (2018). Frame Analysis. In Mike Allen (ed.) *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Communication Research Methods*
Wuttke, A., Gavras, K., & Schoen, H. (2020a). Have Europeans Grown Tired of Democracy? New Evidence from Eighteen Consolidated Democracies, 1981-2018. *British Journal of Political Science*. 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000149
Wuttke, A., Gavras, K., & Schoen, H. (2020b). Leader of the free world or pioneer in democracy's decline? Examining the democratic deconsolidation hypothesis on the mass level in East and West Germany. *Research and Politics*. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168019900822
Young, I. M. (2000). *Inclusion and democracy*. Oxford University Press.

ISBN 978-952-12-4193-2