

Men's parties in gender equal havens

The gender-representation gap in the Nordic populist radical right parties

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<p>Abstract</p> <p>Several studies confirm that there is a gender gap, i.e., an unequal proportion of men and women, within different populist radical right (PRR) parties, both in the parties' electorate and among the parties' members. The first aim of this thesis is to provide a research overview on gender and the populist radical right and identify research gaps. The second aim is to contribute to the identified least studied area within this field, i.e., to examine the <i>gender-representation gap</i> in the PRR parties in the Nordic countries that are often considered global frontrunners regarding gender equality.</p> <p>This empirical study answers three main research questions. The first question is whether the PRR parties are <i>Männerpartei</i>en ("men's parties"), with respect to their gender-representation gaps. The second question is whether the gender-representation gap in PRR parties is larger compared to in non-PRR parties and in mainstream conservative parties. The third question examines the contagion thesis and asks whether PRR parties, over time, strategically adapt their level of female representation to the level of other mainstream parties.</p> <p>The empirical study was conducted by calculating the gender-representation gap, based on the percentage of women, among the Nordic PRR and non-PRR parties' party council members, party leaders, and listed candidates and elected representatives in national and local elections. The contagion thesis was investigated by identifying changes in the PRR parties' gender gaps over time.</p> <p>The results demonstrated that a gender-representation gap exists in the Nordic PRR parties, with the male to female ratio often being around 70:30. The Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish PRR parties had notably larger gender-representation gaps compared to the non-PRR parties, even when compared to the mainstream conservative parties. The Danish PRR party's gender gaps were, in contrast, only marginally larger than the Danish non-PRR parties'. The gender-representation gap was on average considerably larger in Danish parties than in the other Nordic countries' parties. Lastly, the gender-representation gap generally did not change over time and decreased significantly only among the Sweden Democrats.</p> <p>The overall conclusion was that the Nordic PRR parties can be considered <i>Männerpartei</i>en, as their gender-representation gaps were considerably larger than in the non-PRR parties. This overrepresentation of men was also consistent over time.</p>	
Key words: Gender, populist radical right, Nordic countries, Nordic parties,	

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List of Abbreviations

DF	Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People's Party)
DKF	Det Konservative Folkeparti (Danish Conservative Party)
FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria)
FrP	Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party)
PRR	Populist radical right
PS	Perussuomalaiset (Finns Party)
RN	Rassemblement National (National Rally; previously known as National Front)
SD	Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats)

I. Introduction

1. Gender and the populist radical right

On August 14, 2021, the Finnish populist radical right party, the Finns Party, elected their first female party leader, Riikka Purra. Purra received 774 votes, or 59 percent of the votes, at the Finns Party's party congress in Seinäjoki. She thus comfortably beat Sakari Puisto, who ended up in second place with 252 votes (Yle, 2021). Both before and after Purra's election, opinion pieces in the Finnish media contemplated what the effect of a female party leader of the Finns Party would be. Eeva Lehtimäki (2021), head of the political news section at the Finnish TV channel MTV, wrote an online column stating that with Purra as leader, the Finns Party has a chance of obtaining more votes from women; votes that are needed if the party wants to increase its electoral popularity. Ann-Cathrine Jungar (2021), a political scientist with the populist radical right party family as her specialty, additionally brought up the paradoxical nature of being a female leader in a political party that adheres to stereotypical views of masculinity and femininity. Jungar also stated that the politics of the Finns Party most likely will not change under Purra's leadership.

Purra is not the only new female leader in the populist radical right family in the Nordic region. On May 8, 2021, Sylvi Listhaug became the second woman to lead the Norwegian populist radical right party, the Progress Party (Helljesen, Krekling, & Tollersrud, 2021). Listhaug replaced Siv Jensen, who led the party from 2006 until 2021. The topic of gender balance also surfaced prior to the Progress Party's party congress in May, as the congress' participants were to vote in new members to the party council. The nomination committee's candidate proposal caused discussions, both internally in the party and externally in the Norwegian media, as the committee proposed 14 men and only one woman, Listhaug, as candidates (Dorholt & Gilbrant, 2021). Two of the nominated men consequently withdrew their candidacy to give space for more women. Three women were ultimately voted into the party council, in addition to Listhaug being elected leader.

With Listhaug and Purra as party leaders, two of the four Nordic populist radical right (PRR) parties are today led by women. Additionally, the Danish People's Party had a female co-founder, Pia Kjaersgaard, who led the party from 1995 to 2012. The Sweden Democrats, the youngest Nordic PRR party, is the only one that has not had a female leader. Parties belonging to the PRR party family have nonetheless historically been associated with

charismatic male leaders like Jean-Marie Le Pen (*RN*, France), Jörg Haider (*FPÖ*, Austria) and Carl I. Hagen (*FrP*, Norway). Previous research has shown how the party's ideology (family) influences women's representation, with parties varying significantly regarding the proportion of women that represent them in parliaments (e.g., Högström, 2019; Sundström & Stockemer, 2021). Moreover, previous research has evidenced a general overrepresentation of men among the PRR parties' members of parliament, members, and voters (e.g., Mudde, 2007; Rashkova & Zankina, 2017). This overrepresentation of men, both in the parties themselves and in the PRR electorate, has led to the parties being called *Männerparteien* – men's parties (Mudde, 2007). Left parties are in contrast more likely to nominate and elect women for parliamentary positions (e.g., Högström, 2019; Matland & Studlar, 1996; Sundström & Stockemer, 2015).

Scholarship on gender in relation to the populist radical right has increased in the last decade, but several studies continue to suggest that a research gap exists, not least concerning the level of female contra male representation in the PRR parties. While the PRR parties are perceived as being dominated by men to a larger extent than other parties, few empirical studies confirm such conclusions (Mudde, 2007). The prevalence of female leadership in the Nordic PRR parties therefore raises questions regarding gender in the populist radical right. In the populist radical right parties, is there generally a significantly larger percentage of men than women? How does this proportion present itself in Nordic countries which are considered global frontrunners in gender equality? And are the PRR parties becoming more women friendly as they evolve and become more mainstream?

The concept of women's politics is often divided into three dimensions: the descriptive, the substantive, and the symbolic representation (see Pitkin, 1967). Descriptive representation concerns the numerical part of women's representation. As women comprise around 50 percent of the world's population, they should arguably also be represented in different political organs in the same proportions as men. Substantive representation concerns "the policy and procedural differences women may bring to the electoral arena," while symbolic representation concerns "the attitudinal and behavioral effects that women's presence in positions of political power might confer to women citizens" (Lawless, 2004, p. 81). Previous scholarly work in this area has thus both investigated the numerical underrepresentation of women in parliaments, as well as examined how the presence of female politicians affects decision-making (Celis & Erzeel, 2015). Numerous studies have also concluded that feminist and leftist parties have been leading advocates of women's interests in parliament, with

female members of parliament being more likely than their male colleagues to promote women's issues and further the agenda of women's movements (Celis & Erzeel, 2015). Such conclusions exhibit the importance of investigating women's representation in political parties, also in the populist radical right parties, which have gained influence in several European countries in the last decades.

When only examining the PRR parties' leaders today, the label *Männerparteien* can be questioned. The Nordic countries are also not the only PRR parties experiencing female leaders at the top, with Marine Le Pen leading the National Rally (known as National Front until June 2018) in France and Pauline Hanson heading Australia's One Nation. However, while scholarly work has established that female party leadership has a positive effect on women's representation in politics (Sundström & Stockemer, 2021), it is less clear whether the PRR parties have experienced a similar decrease in their overrepresentation of men in other areas apart from party leadership.

2. Aims and approach

Considering these introductory remarks, the aim of this thesis is twofold. First, the thesis aims to provide an in-depth research overview regarding gender and the populist radical right and identify existing research gaps. This research overview describes and discusses three prominent strands of research within the greater subject area of gender and the populist radical right: (1) the demand-side with focus on gender gaps in the PRR electorate, (2) the supply-side with focus on the gender ideology of the PRR parties, and (3) the supply-side with focus on the gender-representation in the PRR parties. While several studies have concentrated on the gender dimension of the populist radical right, most of these studies have investigated the gender gap in the PRR electorate, i.e., among the voters of the PRR parties (e.g., Coffé, 2018; Givens, 2004; Harteveld et al., 2015; Mayer, 2013; Norris, 2005; Spierings & Zaslove, 2017). Several studies have additionally examined the gender ideology in the PRR parties, i.e., on how PRR parties view gender equality and how they promote (or do not promote) policies and laws that support gender equality and women (e.g., Akkerman, 2015; Askola, 2019; Meret & Siim, 2013). Studies focusing on the gender-representation gap, i.e., on the level of female representation among the PRR parties' members, listed candidates, elected representatives, and party leaders, remain few and often not comparative. The literature review thus shows that the research gap is the greatest regarding the gender-

representation gap, i.e., the level of female representation in the PRR parties, and that few comparative studies exist within this strand of research.

The second aim of the thesis is therefore to contribute to the least studied strand of research within the populist radical right and gender by empirically observing the gender-representation gap in the Nordic PRR parties. The empirical study of this thesis thus examines the gender gap among these parties' listed candidates, elected representatives, members of party councils, and party leaders. These gender-representation gaps are observed in different political arenas (see Sjöblom, 1968), on both the national and subnational (local) level. The gender gaps are also observed over time to examine if the PRR parties have adapted their level of female representation to the level in other Nordic parties, which would entail that a contagion effect has occurred (see Högström, 2019). Additionally, the gender-representation gaps in the PRR parties are compared to the gender gaps in non-PRR parties in the Nordic countries. The research questions that the empirical study addresses will be specified later, in light of the research overview, in chapter IV.

The empirical part of the thesis approaches gender-representation gaps in PRR parties in a Nordic comparative context. There are several reasons for this. First, the PRR party family has evolved in four of the five Nordic countries in the last decades, with the founding of the following PRR parties: the Danish People's party (*Dansk Folkeparti – DF*) in Denmark, the Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet, FrP*) in Norway, the Finns Party (*Perussuomalaiset – PS*) in Finland, and the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna – SD*) in Sweden (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). Iceland is the only Nordic country that has not experienced a populist radical right-wing party like those in the other Nordic countries (Herkman & Jungar, 2021). These four PRR parties are moreover represented in their respective national parliaments, today, which enables comparisons of the gender gaps in several political arenas. Second, the Nordic countries have also generally experienced and seen the emergence of parties belonging to the same party families (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014; Nedergaard & Wivel, 2017). The Nordic countries used to have a five party-model consisting of a leftist/communist party, a social democratic party, an agrarian party, a liberal party, and a conservative party. In addition to the emergence of PRR parties, most Nordic countries have also experienced the rise of Christian democratic and green party families. It is consequently possible to compare the gender gap in the PRR parties to the gender gap in non-PRR parties that are akin to one another across the Nordic region.

Third, the Nordic countries are appropriate to study as they have come far in the strive for gender equality, especially compared to other countries. The Nordic countries were among the first ones to provide women with complete voting rights and the gender employment gaps in these countries are among the smallest amongst the members of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, the OECD (OECD, 2018). The Nordic countries have historically supported gender equality “at home, at work, and in public life, and have often moved earlier and faster than most countries in taking action to promote this goal” (OECD, 2018, p. 1). While this has been achieved through a multifaceted approach, the Nordic states notably promote a dual earner/dual caretaker model, that encourages both men and women to work outside the home and take care of children by a combination of progressive income taxation and legislative action (Tanhua, 2020). The Nordic countries support this balance of domestic and personal lives by offering subsidized and inexpensive public daycare and free education. Additionally, family planning is integrated to support both father and mother, offering paid paternal and maternal leave. Although each country has specific parental leave and family policies, fathers’ quotas have been particularly successful in Sweden, Norway, and Iceland. Such pursuits towards equality extend beyond legislature and into national paradigms as Nordic countries promote gender mainstreaming and incorporate gender equality as a vital aspect of their societies (Tanhua, 2020).

Fourth, the Nordic states have had a relatively high level of female representation in parliamentary politics. A study that compared gender equality on several levels in the Nordic countries concluded that “based on the assumption that a proportion of 40–60 percent of each sex constitutes an equal or balanced representation, the goal of gender balance has been met in Finland, Iceland, and Sweden” (Niskanen, 2011, p. 18). As of September 1, 2021, these findings remain valid within Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian national parliaments, where the percentage of women were 46 percent, 47 percent, and 44.4 percent respectively (IPU Parline, 2021). In Denmark, the percentage of women was 39.7 percent in 2021, just below the 40–60 percent balance of each sex (IPU Parline, 2021). Nevertheless, differences in gender equality between the Nordic countries exist and the development cannot be considered as linearly progressive. Each country continues battling their own series of vertical and horizontal gender segregation challenges (Niskanen, 2011). However, within the global setting and even the western world, the Nordic countries can generally be considered comparable in the context of their shared concerns of and efforts towards gender equality and balance. Arguably, the Nordic countries thus constitute a critical case to investigate the PRR

gender-representation gap in (see Flyvbjerg, 2006). If a comparatively large gender-representation gap is found in PRR parties in the Nordic countries that generally have a high level of female representation, there is reason to believe that so is the case in PRR parties in other, less gender equal countries.

Fifth, in addition to being similar regarding gender equality, the Nordic countries are also generally considered akin and comparable. They all adhere to the ‘Nordic Model’, i.e., the social and economic policies associated with the welfare Nordic states and offer their residents and citizens a similar quality of living (Simon, 2017). The Nordic countries have similar political systems and structures. They are established parliamentary democracies with a long tradition of having stable political systems and well-functioning checks and balances. The Nordics tend to have high voter turnout in elections and low levels of corruption (Nordic Co-Operation, 2020).

3. Methodology

In the first part of the thesis, the research overview, a variety of sources on the topic of gender and the populist radical right were included, mainly books, chapters in books, and scholarly articles. The sources were written in a varied time span, but the study focused particularly on sources written in the last two decades, as several PRR parties have evolved and grown in this period, thus enabling empirical observation. Included sources focused on various aspects of gender and the populist radical right, with studies divided into three strands: those concerning the gender-electorate gap, those exploring the gendered aspects of PRR ideology, discourses, and policies, and lastly, studies investigating the female representation in the PRR parties.

The empirical study investigated the descriptive representation of women among the Nordic PRR parties’ listed candidates (electoral arena), elected representatives (parliamentary arena), and members of party councils and party leaders (internal arena). Data was collected from the last ten years (internal arena) and from the last three municipal and general elections (electoral and parliamentary arenas). Additional data surrounding other main parties in the Nordic countries was gathered in order to compare the gender-representation gap in the PRR parties with the gender gap in the non-PRR parties, with particular focus on how the PRR gender-representation gap compared to the same gender gap in the conservative and social democratic parties. Högström’s (2019) reformulated contagion theory was moreover tested by observing how the gender-representation gap has changed in the PRR parties over time, and whether this gap has approached the gender gap in the main non-PRR parties.

4. Outline

The thesis is divided into five comprehensive chapters that in turn consist of several subchapters. Chapter II discusses different conceptual approaches to populism and the populist radical right, as well as outlines the definitions and categorizations of the populist radical right party family that this thesis uses. This chapter also describes the history, categorization, and ideology of the Nordic PRR parties specifically. Chapter III constitutes the first part of the thesis, i.e., the detailed literature overview on gender and the populist radical right. This chapter is further divided into three subchapters that focus on the three different strands of research conducted on gender and the populist radical right. This chapter also identifies research gaps in this scholarly area.

Chapter IV constitutes the second part of this thesis, i.e., the empirical study on the gender-representation gap in the Nordic PRR parties. The fourth chapter states the research questions considering the literature review and presents the elected research design and methodology used. This chapter also includes the presentation of the results of the empirical study. Chapter V constitutes the concluding discussion of the thesis, where the results, primarily from the empirical study, are interpreted and discussed.

II. The populist radical right party family in the Nordic region

To investigate gender in relation to the populist radical right, it is necessary to establish a clear conceptualization and definition of both populism and the populist radical right. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) assert that the concept of populism is an essentially contested one; discussions evade consensus, not only of its precise nature, but, in some cases, question its very existence. Said lack of fundamental concordance of definition and categorization has routinely impaired surrounding research, as several scholars specializing in the populist radical right have argued (Anastasakis, 2000; Merkl, 2003). However, outside its recognized nuances, Mudde (2007) states that populism has been defined as a type of political discourse, ideology, leadership, movement, phenomenon, strategy, style, and syndrome. Building upon this skeletal foundation, the following chapter clarifies the conceptualization of populism and the populist radical right used in this thesis, in addition to explaining how the populist radical right parties are categorized, both generally and more specifically in the Nordic countries.

1. Conceptualization of populism and the populist radical right

Three main approaches to the concept of populism have taken precedence in the scholarly debate in political science today: the ideational approach, the political-strategic approach, and the socio-cultural approach (Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 2017). This thesis adheres to Mudde's ideational approach to populism. Mudde (2017) considers populism to essentially be a set of ideas. Populism is here defined as a "thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *Volonté Générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 5). The thin-centered nature of populism entails that it must be attached to other ideologies to undertake political projects, appeal to a larger public, and answer to complex political questions (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Populism is thus not a "coherent ideological tradition" but rather a "set of ideas that, in the real world, appears in combination with quite different, and sometimes contradictory, ideologies" (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6). Mudde's definition of populism is the one most frequently referenced in the literature on gender and the populist radical right in Europe (e.g., Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015; Rashkova &

Zankina, 2017; Spierings & Zaslove, 2017). Given its dialectical definition and widespread utilization within the European context, this conceptualization is consequently the most applicable one for this thesis.

Regarding the definition of the populist radical right specifically, Mudde (2007) states that an ample number of terms have been used to describe this family of parties, e.g., extreme right, far right, radical right, right-wing populism, neo-populism, populist nationalism, and nativism. This thesis uses Mudde's (2007) definition of the populist radical right. This definition, in addition to being easily applicable to the cases in Europe, is the one most frequently used in scholarly work on gender and the populist radical right. It thus enables comparisons between the empirical results of this study to the results in previous studies.

The maximum definition of the populist radical right is, according to Mudde (2007), a combination of three core ideological features: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. Nativism is the key ideological link between the parties in question and maintains that "states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state" (Mudde, 2007, p. 19). Nationalism and xenophobia are integral elements to the nativist dimension of Mudde's populist radical right. The second feature, authoritarianism, is defined as "the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely. In this interpretation, authoritarianism includes law and order and "punitive conventional moralism" (Smith 1967: vi)" (Mudde, 2007, p. 23). This definition does not necessarily entail an antidemocratic attitude, but also does not exclude one, especially considering its prioritization of vertically ascribed moralistic law over individual liberty. The third and final core feature is populism, which is defined as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite" (Mudde, 2007). Populism further argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people. Mudde deems the best term for this party family to be either "radical right populism" or "populist radical right." "Radical," in this context, is defined as the opposition to some key features of liberal democracy, primarily political pluralism, and the constitutional protection of minorities (Mudde, 2007). Mudde (2007) uses Norberto Bobbio's (1994) distinction between left and right based on the key feature of egalitarianism. The "right" is thus defined as the belief in a natural order with inequalities.

2. The populist radical right-wing party family

The populist radical right emerged as a new party family in Western Europe in the 1980s, with the surfacing of parties like the French *Front National* (today known as *Rassemblement National – RN*) and the Austrian *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)*. Today, many scholars agree upon the basic features of this party family, i.e., that they hold an authoritarian position on sociocultural issues and believe in a strictly ordered society (Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2005), that they adhere to an exclusionist and ethnically based form of nationalism or nativism that finds non-native elements and people threatening to the homogenous nation-state (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014; Mudde, 2007), and that they include a populist ideology that considers society to be separated into two antagonistic groups, the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2007, p. 23). The “right” in the populist radical right is the belief in a natural order with inequalities, in accordance with Mudde’s (2007) conceptualization. While there is strong emphasis on social and political elements in its definition, this does not necessarily mean that PRR parties adhere to a typical right-wing economic policy. In fact, there is no clear consensus on whether the populist radical right has a consistent and well-defined economic policy (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). In recent years, many PRR parties have shifted leftwards, and studies have claimed that the new “winning formula” is a combination of authoritarian and a centrist position on economic policy (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014, p. 219).

Having a relatively clear conceptualization and ideology of the party family in focus, party categorization also needs to be addressed. Mudde (2007, p. 40) suggests that “only parties with a populist radical right core ideology and without any significant alternative faction(s) are classified as members of the populist radical right party family.” Mudde thereby excludes two categories of populist parties from the PRR party family: social populists and neoliberal populists, in addition to excluding the non-populist right, primarily the undemocratic and often elitist extreme right-wing parties. Social populism entails a combination of socialism and populism and is considered left-wing rather than right-wing populism (Mudde, 2007). Neoliberal populism is closely related to the populist radical right but is a combination of primarily economic liberalism and populism, rather than having nativism a core feature (Mudde, 2007). The non-populist extreme and undemocratic parties include parties that are neo-fascist or that include neo-Nazism.

This study generally uses Mudde’s categorization of PRR parties in Europe and thereby excludes social populists and neoliberal populists, in addition to excluding undemocratic and

elitist extreme right parties. However, regarding the categorization of the PRR parties in the Nordic countries, this study draws upon another article focused on PRR categorization by Jungar and Jupskås (2014). Jungar and Jupskås' work is firstly more recent than Mudde's, which is important since the populist radical right has evolved and grown since Mudde's *Populist radical right parties in Europe* was published in 2007. The emergence of the Finns Party (PS) as a populist radical right party in Finland is one critical example.

In addition to its more recent date, Jungar and Jupskås have increased focus on the populist radical right parties within the Nordic countries compared to Mudde's more generalized European study. Given their varied areas of scope, results and categorization differ between the two sources; Mudde did not include the Finns Party as a PRR party and categorized Norway's Progress Party as a neoliberal populist party rather than a PRR party. Jungar and Jupskås, on the other hand, included the Finns Party and the Progress Party as a PRR party and this thesis therefore subscribes to this categorization.

3. The Nordic populist radical right-wing parties: History and categorization

In recent decades, populist radical right-wing parties have emerged in the Nordic countries (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). Three distinct waves of Nordic populist movements can be identified (Herkman & Jungar, 2021). The first, the "agrarian populist" movement, started in Finland in the 1950s with the establishment of the Finnish Rural Party. The second wave surfaced in the 1970s, when anti-taxation protest parties found electoral success in Norway and Denmark. The third and final wave started in the 1980s when the nationalist party, the Sweden Democrats, was established, while the populist parties in Finland, Norway and Denmark concurrently adopted policies more critical towards immigration (Herkman & Jungar, 2021). The Nordic PRR parties thereby have different historical points of departure. The Finns Party (PS) was established in 1995 as a successor to the Finnish Rural Party, which combined anti-establishment sentiments with a leftist socioeconomic policy and conservative values. The Danish People's Party (DF), established in 1995 by former members of the Danish Progress Party, and the Progress Party (FrP) stem from the economically liberal anti-tax movements in the 1970s (Heinze, 2018). The Sweden Democrats (SD), on the other hand, has its roots in neo-Nazi movements (Herkman & Jungar, 2021). The SD has recently, from 1995 onwards, begun to rebuild its image and distance itself from its extremist past (Herkman

& Jungar, 2021). The fact that the SD struggled to present a more respectable image for many years can also account for the party's minimal electoral success until 2010 (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019).

The Nordic PRR parties have gathered and gained electoral support in diverging ways and to varying degrees throughout the last decades. The DF (then the Danish Progress Party) was highly successful already in the 1970s and became the second largest party in its first election (Heinze, 2018). The DF has remained a party of significance since then, securing between 12 and 14 percent of the electoral support in the elections throughout the 2000s and becoming the second largest party in the 2015 parliamentary elections (Herkman & Jungar, 2021), though the party's support dropped in the most recent general election in 2019. The DF has also supported minority governments and influenced immigration policies (Heinze, 2018). The FrP in Norway has a similarly long history of political success stemming from its electoral breakthrough in 1989 when it became the third largest party in parliament (Heinze, 2018). The FrP has since retained its relevancy in Norway, becoming the second largest party in the 1997 general election and supporting a minority government from 2001 to 2005, thereby also influencing immigration policy (Heinze, 2018). The FrP joined a minority government in 2013 but left the coalition in 2020 due to internal conflict. The party is nevertheless the most long-lived successful populist party in the Nordic region and one of only two that have been part of a ruling government (Herkman & Jungar, 2021).

While the PS's and the SD's electoral successes do not date back as far as the DF's and the FrP's, the PS and the SD have rapidly increased their support in the recent decade. Long considered an exceptional case in Europe, Sweden's PRR party did not receive any parliamentary seats until 2010 when the SD reached 5.7 percent of the total vote in the Swedish general election, trespassing the 4 percent electoral threshold (Herkman & Jungar, 2021). In 2014, the party's support increased, gaining 12.9 percent of the votes (Elgenius & Rydberg, 2019). Growing nearly exponentially, the party secured 17.5 percent of the total votes in 2018 and became the third largest party (Herkman & Jungar, 2021). Though other mainstream parties historically built up a strong *cordon sanitaire* of the SD, thus hindering the SD's inclusion in government coalitions or as a supporting party to minority governments, inter-party cooperation has, in recent years, been looked upon more favorably by center-right politicians (Heinze, 2018).

The rise of the PS's electoral power grew in the 2000s, as its leader, Timo Soini, sought opportunities to expand its base and welcomed nationalist agitators to the party (Herkman & Jungar, 2021). The party's electoral breakthrough came in 2011, when it received 19.1 percent of the vote, yet remained in the opposition (Herkman & Jungar, 2021). After securing 17.5 percent of the votes in 2015, the PS joined the conservative right-wing government (Herkman & Jungar, 2021). However, following the election of the more radical Jussi Halla-Aho as the Finns Party's chair in 2017, a faction of the Finns Party, consisting of 19 of the party's 38 elected members of parliament, decided to break off and launch their own party, the Blue Reform, (SPT/Sundberg, 2018). The more moderately conservative Blue Reform stayed in the governing coalition while the PS became part of the opposition, as the other two governing parties deemed it impossible to collaborate with the latter under its new leadership, mainly due to harboring different values (Johnson, 2017). The Blue Reform secured no parliamentary seats in the 2019 general election, while the PS retained its electoral support and became the second largest party (Bäck, 2019). The PS, with its more nativist façade, has therefore continued to attain electoral support.

The Nordic PRR parties have also converged ideologically across national borders (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014), particularly in terms of their nativist approaches. The FrP and the predecessors to the DF and the PS began to adopt anti-immigration policies as an important part of their agenda during the third wave of Nordic populist movements in the late 1980s, contemporaneously as the SD was established (Herkman & Jungar, 2021). Jungar (2017) calls this wave "new populism." The FrP's popularity increased as they started promoting anti-immigration approaches in the 1980s, as did the DF after it was established as an anti-immigration and Eurosceptic party in 1995 (Jungar, 2017). Regarding the SD, nationalism has been its main ideological pillar from the beginning, with anti-immigration being the party's most salient issue, even though social conservatism was added as a second ideological pillar in the party program of 2011 (Herkman & Jungar, 2021). The PS, on the contrary, was more of an agrarian anti-elitist party throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, but the anti-immigration issue became salient for the party after a vocal anti-immigration wing joined the party in 2007 (Askola, 2019). Not until then, and operating under that agenda, did the party begin gaining electoral popularity (Herkman & Jungar, 2021). Halla-Aho, whose rise as the leader of the PS in 2017 directly resulted in the party's splitting, is considered more radical along nativist ideology and a far greater opponent to immigration than his predecessor Soini (Stenberg, 2019).

The FrP, the DF, the SD, and the PS can be categorized as belonging to the same party family. In their party family conceptualization, Jungar and Jupskås (2014) have not only examined ideology, but also transnational linkages and party names. They conclude that these parties adhere to a distinct set of political ideologies that are typical of the populist radical right, including nationalism, conservatism, and authoritarianism, with “immigration and law-and-order issues” being the “primary focus of all four parties” (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014, p. 222). These arguments agree with Mudde’s triadic conceptualization of the populist radical right. The FrP, which considers itself economically liberal, nonetheless diverges from the other three parties, which support “shared public commitments to welfare” (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014, p. 221–222). Considering the parties’ placement in the two-dimensional space, between the socioeconomic left and right and the authoritarians and liberals, Jungar and Jupskås (2014, p. 224) state that “three of the four parties combine a centrist position on the socioeconomic dimension with an authoritarian position on the liberal-authoritarian continuum. However, the FrP is economically more liberal and slightly less authoritarian.” For the FrP, economic issues also substantially outweigh social and moral policies (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014).

These three parties are also “part of the broader PRR party family in Western Europe” (Jungar and Jupskås, 2014, p. 216). The DF, the PS and the SD have thus in particular “converged ideologically, adopted similar names, and are on the verge of becoming a more formalized transnational actor” (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014, p. 216). However, the FrP does not fit in as well in the PRR party family, as it is less authoritarian and more economically right-wing compared to the other Nordic PRR parties, though equally anti-establishment and anti-immigration (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). Contrary to Mudde (2007), Jungar and Jupskås (2014, p. 232–233) do not consider the FrP to be a neoliberal populist party, especially since the party “does share several policy traits with the other PRR parties – most notably its strong anti-immigration and populist profile.” Jungar and Jupskås (2014, p.232–233) rather consider the FrP a “hybrid between a populist radical right party and a more traditional conservative party,” but one that “might be included as the Norwegian ‘functional equivalent’ of PRR parties elsewhere.” Since the FrP has been categorized as PRR party in several other studies (e.g., Heinze, 2019; Herkman & Jungar, 2021), it is categorized as a PRR party in this thesis as well.

Jungar and Jupskås’ article was published in 2014, prior to the splitting of the PS in 2017. The categorization of the PS in their study can therefore be questioned, as it is not based on an

analysis of the *current* ideology and status of the party. This thesis nevertheless categorizes the PS as a PRR party. This categorization is based on the conclusions in a recent master's thesis by Carpelan (2020), which argues that the PS, under party leader Halla-Aho, belongs to the PRR party family. The Blue Reform party, however, is excluded from this thesis as its categorization is more uncertain, in addition to the party not having been electorally significant since its establishment as it secured no parliamentary seats in the 2019 election.

Having a clear conceptualization and categorization of the populist radical right, attention is now turned to the first aim of this thesis, i.e., the research overview regarding gender and the populist radical right.

III. Research overview: Gender and the populist radical right

While the populist radical right has been the subject of a significant amount of research in the past decades, its gender dimension has not been the subject of similar scholarly interest (Doná, 2020; Mudde, 2007). Scholarship on Western Europe's populist radical right identified a gender gap early on (Allen & Goodman, 2020). However, the gender in populism and the populist radical right has only recently been properly highlighted, with two publications: a special issue of *Patterns of Prejudice* (edited by Spierings, Zaslove, Mügge, & de Lange, 2015) and the *Symposium of West European Politics* (Erzeel & Rashkova, 2017) titled 'Gender and the Radical Right in Comparative Perspective', as well as the book *Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe* (edited by Köttig, Bitzan, & Petö, 2017), examining the gender dimension specifically. These publications, in addition to individual studies, have started to fill the research gap, but many scholars studying gender and the PRR parties continue to demonstrate the need for more research in this field.

This chapter details what previous scholarly work has concluded regarding gender and the populist radical right. Previous literature tends to examine three main strands of research. Several scholars focus on the demand-side, i.e., on the gender gap among the electorate of the populist radical right (e.g., Coffé, 2018; Harteveld et al., 2015; Spierings & Zaslove, 2017). These studies have attempted to find explanations for the existing gender gap in voting, i.e., for why more men than women vote for the populist radical right. Other scholars have instead focused on the supply-side, i.e., on the gender gap in the PRR parties themselves. These studies can be further separated into two groups: studies on the supply-side focusing on the gendered nature of the ideology, discourses, and policies of the PRR parties, and studies on the supply-side concentrating on gender-representation in these parties, i.e., on how many men versus women that are members, elected representatives, and/or leaders of the PRR parties, and whether activities, actions, and positions within the party are different for male and female members. Whereas the gendered nature of the ideology, discourses, and policies of the populist parties has been the subject of many studies (e.g., de Lange & Mügge, 2015; Ralph-Maddow, 2020; Rashkova & Zankina, 2017), studies focusing on gender representation in the populist radical right-wing parties appear to be fewer, albeit existing (e.g., Högström, 2019; Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila, 2017; Mudde, 2007; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017). This

chapter discusses these three strands of research in greater detail and ends with a discussion on the limitations of the previous studies and with suggestions for future research.

1. The demand-side: The gender-electorate gap

Several studies have concluded that a gender gap exists in the electorate of the PRR parties. Women vote for these parties to a significantly lesser extent than men (e.g., Coffé, 2018; Hartevelde et al. 2015; Immerzeel, Coffé, & van der Lippe, 2015; Mudde, 2007). Hartevelde et al. (2015) have shown that the average percentage of male PRR voters was 9 percent while it was 6 percent among female voters. Another study found the gap to be a total of 4.3 percent, with 11.1 percent of men and 6.8 percent of women voting for PRR parties (Immerzeel, Coffé, & van der Lippe, 2015). This kind of difference in electorate support from men and women has led to the populist radical right parties being called *Männerparteien* (“men’s parties”) (Mudde, 2007).

However, there appears to be considerable variation in the gender-electorate gap when comparing countries. The Norwegian Progress Party’s gender-electorate gap was concluded to be 13.3 percentage points (27.9 % of male vs 14.6 % of female voters voting for FrP), while the neighboring Danish People’s Party’s gap was only 2.9 points (10.4 % of male vs 7.5 % of female voters voting for the DF) (Immerzeel, Coffé, & van der Lippe, 2015). According to Spierings and Zaslove (2015), the gender gap in the PRR electorate may also be decreasing, or even disappearing, as these parties become more entrenched in the existing party systems and gain more support among women. They add that although a gender gap exists as more men than women vote for the PRR parties, also in relative terms when compared to the electorate of other parties, the difference is not great enough to warrant the label *Männerparteien*.

Whereas scholars agree that the gender gap among the PRR electorate exists, there has been less consensus as to why it exists. Studies investigating this aspect of the demand-side have been unable to answer this question compellingly or similarly, but rather only concluded which factors do *not* explain this gender gap (e.g., Hartevelde et al., 2015; Mudde, 2007; Spierings & Zaslove, 2015) The view that women support these parties less than men due to fewer women than men holding populist radical right views was the conventional view within feminist circles until well into the 1990s. This view asserted that women had a certain resistance towards radical right ideology (Mudde, 2007). However, empirical studies have disproved this view by showing that women and men are equally likely to hold PRR attitudes

(Mudde, 2007). Spierings and Zaslove (2017) state that there have been two main explanations as to why women are not attracted to the populist radical right as much as men: (1) due to socio-economic position, i.e., that women are more likely to be employed in the public sector instead of in labor-intensive jobs and thus less likely to be threatened by deindustrialization, and (2) due to different attitudes, most notably anti-immigration and law and order-attitudes. However, these approaches cannot fully account for the gender gap (Spierings & Zaslove, 2017). Immerzeel, Coffé, and van der Lippe (2015) similarly conclude that even though men are generally more nativist and more politically interested and active than women, political attitudes (in this case, nativist and authoritarian attitudes, political interest, and action) cannot explain the gender gap. Previous studies have suggested two other explanations: (1) that women's greater involvement in church makes them less likely to vote for the PRR, and (2) that women are deterred by the antifeminist ideology of these parties (Coffé, 2018). However, these explanations have been unable to account for the gender gap (Coffé, 2018). The paradox thus seems to be that even when women are as nativist, authoritarian, and populist as men, they vote for the PRR parties to a lesser extent.

Mudde (2007) argues that the significantly lower level of political efficacy among women can account for much of the disproportionate representation of women and men in PRR parties and their electorate. As there (assumably) is a lower level of political interest or belief in the ability to affect politics among women, women vote for more established parties rather than for new ones (Mudde, 2007). Mudde adds that the extremist image of PRR parties, rather than their conservative stances on gender issues, might keep women from voting for them. Mudde (2007, p. 16) claims that:

“This interpretation is consistent with both the low-efficacy argumentation of the delayed effect theory and empirical attitudinal research, which shows that men and women hold fairly similar views on all aspects of the populist radical right except extremism and violence, which are rejected far more by women than by men...”

Immerzeel, Coffé, and van der Lippe (2015) found no support for the political efficacy theory, as the gender gap in voting was not affected by the PRR parties' status as outsiders or by their populist discourse style. The gender gap also remained in countries where PRR parties had become more mainstream. However, other studies have reached a similar conclusion as Mudde, i.e., that other factors than ideological ones appear to affect why fewer women than men vote for PRR parties. Hartevelde et al. (2015, p. 122–123) suggest that women and men to

a great extent have the same attitudes and ideology regarding nativism, authoritarianism, and populism, but that the gender gap in PRR voting originates “partially in sex differences in the *perceived distance* between their own ideological position and that of PRR parties.” Regardless of their ideology, PRR parties appear to be especially remote to female voters and women tend to find the issues related to the PRR ideology less salient than men (Harteveld et al., 2015). The same study concludes that women employ different considerations when deciding on their party preferences. Ideological indicators are therefore better predictors concerning men’s propensity to vote for PRR parties than they are for women.

Spierings and Zaslove (2015) similarly conclude that men and women vote for the PRR parties for the same (ideological) reason, i.e., because of their opposition to immigration. They found no consistent cross-country patterns regarding sex, i.e., differences between men and women, similarly to the study by Immerzeel, Coffé, and van der Lippe (2015) which concluded that considerable cross-country variations exist concerning the gender gap in voting. The latter study also deduced that socio-economic characteristics, political interest, nativism, and authoritarianism were not sufficient for understanding the gender-electorate gap, albeit stating that structural characteristics, namely employment status, occupational type, and education, partly explain the gap. Spierings and Zaslove (2015) confirm this analysis regarding nativism and authoritarianism, but add that other ideological differences, e.g., attitudes towards gender equality, cannot explain the gender gap.

The main consensus among scholars focusing on the demand-side is therefore that the gender gap in voting cannot be compellingly explained by differences in socioeconomic positions or in political attitudes between men and women. Women do not vote for the PRR parties even when they share the same attitudes as men who vote for these parties (e.g., Harteveld et al., 2015; Spierings & Zaslove, 2015; Mudde, 2007). The reasons for this remain unclear. Whereas Harteveld et al. (2015) found that gender differences in occupational position explain part of the gender gap, i.e., that the large share of public sector workers among women explain why some of them are less likely to vote for PRR parties, the greater conclusion was that neither values nor level of discontent predict women’s propensity to vote as they do for men. While men and women similarly agree with PRR parties on their programmatic core, women are less likely to attach high salience to these topics. Additionally, Harteveld et al. (2015, p. 129) suggest that women are more strongly deterred than men by other characteristics shared by PRR parties, e.g., their “political style, occasional association with historic violence, stigmatization by parts of the elite and the general public, or

ideological issues not studied here.” Mudde in turn argues that the gender gap can be explained by differences in political efficacy between women and men, while Spierings and Zaslove’s study (2015) offers less of an explanation to the gender gap and rather conclude that the masculinity of the populist radical right may be exaggerated.

More research therefore needs to be conducted to pinpoint the actual reasons for women’s lower support for the PRR parties. Such research may fare better if it focuses on the issues that women generally *do* find salient and that *are* predictors of which parties they vote for, rather than concentrating on why women do not vote for PRR parties. Future research could also examine the political efficacy theory, specifically investigating why women are more likely than men to only vote for established parties and investigate how and at what point a party becomes “established” or “mainstream”. Lastly, future research could investigate whether the PRR parties seem more alienated to women due to the overrepresentation of men in the parties themselves.

2. The supply-side: The gendered nature of PRR ideology, discourses, and policies

Several studies have examined the supply-side of the PRR parties by focusing on the role gender plays in the ideologies, discourses, and agendas of these parties (e.g., Akkerman, 2015; De Lange & Mügge, 2015). This strand of research investigates the role of family policies and approaches to women’s and sexual minorities’ rights in the PRR parties’ politics. According to Doná (2020), this strand has gained salience in recent years as several PRR parties in European countries have attained positions of power, thereby being able to influence policymaking. Scholars have in turn been able to empirically research the gender aspect of the parties’ ideologies. Some studies within this strand also investigate the ways in which the PRR parties use the notion of gender equality in an instrumental way. Doná (2020, p. 288) states that the PRR parties adapt their position on gender equality “according to the national context and to the construct of ‘others’ based on the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy typical of populism.” These parties can therefore display contradictory positions on gender equality. Whereas they can be conservative with respect to family policies and the rights of women (e.g., be against gender quotas), they can be supportive of gender equality and argue that gender equality is essential when attempting to contest for example Muslim immigration (e.g., by claiming that Muslims are essentially anti-feminist and against gender equality).

Mudde (2007, p. 91) argues that a lot of the research conducted on the role of women in the populist radical right is flawed due to what he calls a “feminist bias.” He claims that the main assertions in this subject are based on two faulty assumptions: “(1) gender equality is the normal situation in party politics; and (2) all women hold modern (or even feminist) views on gender roles...” (Mudde, 2007, p. 91). Authors have consequently not provided empirical evidence of the populist radical right’s sexism (Mudde, 2007). Mudde adds that the stereotypical view on gender relations within this party family is not supported by (the few) content analyses of the ideologies of PRR parties. These rather show that no consistent view on family and gender within this party family exists, as the PRR parties have diverging views on issues such as gender quotas, abortion, and divorce. Mudde’s main argument is therefore that gender relations are secondary to the populist radical right and thus instrumentalized in conflicting ways in the nativist struggle, which, in contrast, is central to these parties.

Mudde (2007, p. 92) nonetheless presents some consistencies in the PRR gender ideology, namely that (1) women politics is equated with family politics, (2) there is a strong defense of the “natural differences” between the sexes, and (3) since women are the only sex that can give birth and because offspring is vital to the nation, women must be “protected”. Mudde (2007, p. 93) also presents two different views on women in the populist radical right: the “traditional” view, in which women are seen exclusively as mothers, and a “modern traditional” view, in which it is accepted that women have a career, even though they are preferred as housewives. He states that most PRR parties have a modern traditional view. De Lange and Mügge (2015, p. 71) present three different views: a “modern” view, a “modern-traditional” view and a “neo-traditional” view. They thereby add the “modern” view, stating that some PRR parties do not fit Mudde’s distinction as they “support equal pay and the labour market participation of women without espousing neo-traditional views on the family or gender issues.” De Lange and Mügge (2015) also argue that the scholarship on gender and PRR parties underestimates the variation in gender ideologies across parties, thus echoing Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s (2015) argument that the relationship between populism and gender politics is highly dependent of cultural context and on other ideological elements to which populism is attached.

The few studies that have focused on gender ideology and the PRR parties have nevertheless characterized these parties as conservative with respect to family values and traditional gender roles, according to Akkerman (2015). These parties generally promote the family as a core institution of society, supports the traditional role of women within the family, and oppose

same-sex marriage and abortion, though differences between the parties exist (Akkerman, 2015). When comparing the views and positions of the six most successful PRR parties in Europe with respect to gender issues, Akkerman (2015) concludes that in the domain of family relations, the PRR parties tend to have a conservative or a more flexible modern conservative position. This conservatism on family-related issues sets the PRR parties apart from the mainstream right-wing parties. However, gender issues in the traditional policy domain have become less salient to the PRR parties over time (Akkerman, 2015). Additionally, while gender issues have gained importance to these parties in the domain of immigration policies, making the radical-right appear more liberal due to its positive commitment to gender equality or gay rights, this is only highly instrumental to their anti-Islam agenda, as opposed to the parties becoming more liberal at their core.

Additionally, Erzeel and Rashkova (2017, p. 815) argue that the PRR parties have changed their appeal in relation to gender issues since their origin in the 1980s, following a “standardization” strategy. While still focusing on issues traditional for their party family, the radical right parties’ electoral success and participation in government have sometimes made the parties gear more towards the center and more towards the adoption of or compromise on certain issues, such as the gender equality discourse (Erzeel & Rashkova, 2017). Erzeel and Rashkova (2017, p. 815) state:

“Considering that radical right parties have to compete within the institutional and social framework of the country, just like any other party, it is likely to expect that after their initial entry into the political market, they ‘soften’ their radical rhetoric and try to appear as a more standard competitor in the party system.”

Pettersson (2017) also states that the Swedish and Finnish female PRR politicians’ discourse regarding gender is highly ambivalent. The discursive tension lies between viewing gender equality as a national trait in Finland and Sweden, and the patriarchal politics in the PRR parties. Moreover, Pettersson (2017) argues that the national context affects how the female PRR politicians talk about gender equality. In Sweden, where the SD women had to negotiate their views against a strong feminist movement, the women seemed to develop more nuanced stances on gender equality, feminism, and sexual minority rights. In Finland, a country that lacks a similarly strong feminist movement, the women in the PS were more blatant and straightforward in their opposition to feminism (Pettersson, 2017).

In addition to the cross-national and comparative scholarship focusing on the gendered nature of the ideology, discourses, and policies of the populist radical right, a few studies are single-country case studies (e.g., Bitzan, 2017; Norocel, 2013; Ralph-Maddow, 2020; Rashkova & Zankina, 2017). Most scholarly work concentrating on the Nordic countries is found in this group of articles. These studies have different aims and scopes. Norocel (2013) and Mulinari and Neergaard (2017) examine the discourses and identities that are central to the Sweden Democrats, albeit in different ways. Norocel (2013, p. 4) investigates the discursive redefinitions of the *folkhem* conceptual metaphor by the SD, which in turn “accommodates centrally located heteronormative masculinities at the intersection of gender, class, and race.” Mulinari and Neergaard (2017) have in turn interviewed women and analyzed the SD’s key policy documents to reveal the centrality of antiracist and postcolonial feminist scholarship for understanding the populist radical right, in addition to exploring how women active in the SD name and act upon their identities as members of a (by many regarded) racist party. Luhtakallio and Ylä-Anttila (2017) similarly scrutinize the gender aspect in the ideology, discourse, and policies of the Finns Party. Other articles have investigated the role of anti-egalitarianism in the populist radical right (Klammer & Goetz, 2017), the role of masculinity in German PRR parties (Bitzan, 2017) and British PRR parties (Ralph-Maddow, 2020), and possible changes in gender ideology in the National Rally in France (Scrinzi, 2017).

Lastly, whereas most of the articles mentioned above support the view that European PRR parties are conservative regarding gender issues, Rashkova and Zankina (2017) state that in Bulgaria, the radical right members of parliament have been the most active on women’s issues, both compared to female members of parliament from other parties and to male members of parliament from inside and outside the radical right. However, the authors explain this by pointing to the unique ideology of East European radical right parties which emphasizes welfare chauvinism and socialist nostalgia, which in turn makes the parties more concerned with social policy and therefore also women’s issues.

A significant amount of literature has focused on the gendered nature of the populist radical right with respect to ideology, discourses, and policies, especially in recent years. While the PRR parties approach gender ideology in somewhat similar ways, mainly by holding conservative views on family politics and gender issues, these parties nevertheless handle issues related to gender equality differently. Another trend in several European countries is the tendency of PRR parties to instrumentalize gender equality in ways they see fit, e.g., utilizing the principle of gender equality when arguing against immigration, particularly

Muslim immigration. Lastly, while this strand of research has received notable scholarly attention, most of it has been single-country case studies rather than comparative studies. Future research in this area could benefit from being more comparative and thus investigating the gendered nature of the populist radical right as a party family. More scholarship examining the role of masculinity could also bring insights into this area of research.

3. The supply-side: The gender-representation gap in the PRR parties

The third strand of research within the scholarship on gender and the populist radical right focuses on the supply of female representation in the PRR parties themselves. This strand examines gender in relation to the members, elected representatives, listed candidates, and leaders of the PRR parties. Mudde (2007, p. 97) states that: “One of the least studied subfields of the populist radical right is party membership in general, and the role of women therein in particular.” A few studies have nevertheless explored the gender-representation gap. Some studies have specifically observed the descriptive representation of women in the PRR parties (e.g., Erzeel & Rashkova, 2017; Högström, 2019; Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila, 2017; Mudde, 2007). Others, albeit not many, have investigated the role of female PRR leaders, e.g., Marine Le Pen and Pia Kjærsgaard (e.g., Dubslaff, 2017; Meret, 2015). To this author’s knowledge, only a handful of studies have investigated the reasons for the gender-representation gap in the PRR parties (e.g., Blee, 2017; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017).

Mudde (2007) argues that while the underrepresentation of women among the PRR parties’ members of parliament is large compared to the percentage of women in the population, this underrepresentation is not significantly greater than in other parties, especially compared to conservative right-wing parties. Mudde (2007) also states that while only a few women have been the leaders of PRR parties, this number is not notably lower compared to other party families. Regarding membership in the PRR parties, Mudde points to a lack of reliable data, but nevertheless concludes that based on the existing data, women constitute only a small minority of the membership of these parties. Mudde (2007) adds that one striking phenomenon of the PRR party family is the large number of female leaders and elected representatives that are related to or relatives of male leaders and male members of the party. However, no recent research appears to have examined this claim.

A few other studies have observed the gender-representation gap in the PRR parties and shown that such a gap exists, for example in Bulgaria (Rashkova & Zankina, 2017), Finland

(Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila, 2017), and Sweden (Högström, 2019; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017). Additional studies have observed women's descriptive representation more generally in European politics and included variables to analyze how this representation varies across parties (e.g., Sundström & Stockemer, 2015 and 2021). Some of these studies have found that left parties are more likely to send women to parliament and nominate and elect women for parliamentary positions (e.g., Caul, 1999; Matland & Studlar, 1996; Sundström & Stockemer, 2015). Moreover, Sundström and Stockemer (2021, p. 11) conclude that considerable differences in women's representation are "most visible between leftist, green and liberal parties, on the one hand, and rightist, conservative, and populist rightist parties on the other." This confirms "the notion that a traditional conservative ideology still limits women's access to the public sphere" (Sundström & Stockemer, 2021, p. 11). The PRR parties have thus been shown to have a lower descriptive representation of women.

Since Mudde's book was published in 2007, several PRR parties have gained power in Europe, with some parties also becoming part of government coalitions. Högström (2019) therefore investigated whether a so-called contagion effect could be observed regarding the gender-representation gap in PRR parties, focusing on the case of Sweden and the Sweden Democrats. Matland and Studlar (1996) describe the contagion effect as a process where the decisions and actions of one party leads to other parties adopting similar strategies or policies. Thus, if one party starts to nominate and elect more women, other parties feel pressured to do the same to not lose electoral support. Högström (2019) outlines the theoretical grounds of a reformulated contagion theory, i.e., that newer parties, like radical right parties, with a lower level of female representation, experience a contagion effect from established parties that already have a high level of female representation. As radical right parties like the SD are vote seekers, seeking to maximize their electoral support, they recruit female candidates to attract a broader range of voters. Parties need to do so to better compete with other parties that have a high level of female representation. Högström (2019) tested the reformulated contagion theory in Sweden, which generally has a small gender-representation gap, with women holding 46.3 percent of the parliamentary seats and 52.2 percent of the cabinet seats. Högström's (2019) results supported the contagion thesis, as the SD's gender-representation gap significantly decreased over time on the local level. The SD nevertheless still had a large gender-representation gap compared to other Swedish parties. However, the results indicated that PRR parties like the SD adapt to the other parties' level of female representation, to maximize votes.

Some studies have additionally investigated why a gender-representation gap exists, or at least touched upon this question (e.g., Blee, 2017; Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila, 2017; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017). Mulinari and Neergaard (2017, p. 22) argue that while marginalization is an important concept for understanding women's participation in the SD, it is insufficient to explain the participation of women in racist parties, adding that "women's investment in racist selves is located within an historical continuity of European colonialism in general, and the Swedish racialization regime in particular." Luhtakallio and Ylä-Anttila (2017) did not investigate the women's reasons for joining the Finns Party in the same direct way as Mulinari and Neergaard. However, they examined whether male and female members of the PS have similar opinions on politics, revealing that the PS women had more left-wing views than the PS men. Their study provided no explanations regarding motivations for joining a PRR party but gave more insight into the gendered nature of PRR representation. Lastly, Blee (2017) has investigated the similarities and differences between gender and the far-right in Europe and the USA, focusing on the supply-side/representation.

Besides observing the pure numerical part of the gender-representation gap, i.e., the proportion of male versus female members, representatives, and leaders, as well as investigating the reasons for this gender gap, some studies have concentrated on the role of female leaders in the populist radical right. These studies have focused on the effect Marine Le Pen has had on mobilizing female voters (Dubsloff, 2017) and on the role gender plays in relation to style, discourse, and rhetoric in the case of Pia Kjærsgaard, founder of the Danish People's Party (Meret, 2015). However, Meret (2015) states that only a small number of studies have explored the issue of charismatic PRR leadership from a gender perspective.

In summary, studies focusing on the supply-side of gender in the PRR parties usually examine the proportion of male versus female members and elected representatives in PRR parties. While several studies have examined this gender-representation gap, few of them observe and compare gender-representation gaps cross-nationally or longitudinally. Apart from Mulinari and Neergaard (2017), no recent study has investigated why women join PRR parties. Moreover, Mudde (2007) has stated that a striking number of female PRR politicians are related to or in a relationship with male members of the party, but no recent study appears to have investigated this aspect or its accuracy. Additionally, while male populist leaders have been the subject of a lot of research, female populist leaders have not (except for Marine Le Pen). Lastly, to this author's knowledge, only Högström (2019) has examined the contagion

effect on the gender-representation gap of the PRR parties. Future research could thus investigate the contagion theory with respect to this party family.

4. Summary and discussion

The first aim of this thesis was to provide a detailed research overview on gender and the populist radical right. This overview has shown that despite a growing amount of academic literature focusing on this subject area, many questions remain unanswered. While several studies have attempted to explain the gender-electorate gap by showing that both political efficacy and differences between the political issues that men and women find salient affect PRR voting, how these factors account for the gender gap remains unclear. Additionally, while many scholars have examined the gendered nature of the PRR parties' ideology and policies, they have done so in diverging ways. Most studies constitute single-country case studies rather than comparative studies. Whereas many of these studies examine policies related family politics and women politics, only a few of them explore the role of masculinity and discourse in the PRR parties.

The least studied area concerning gender and the populist radical right is the gender-representation gap. The few studies found in this subarea have also focused on different aspects, ranging from investigating gender and the charismatic leader to observing how many members of the PRR parties that are male versus female. These studies have also not observed changes in the gender-representation gap over time, and few of them are cross-national. Only a handful of articles have investigated why men and women join the PRR parties as members and candidates, and how these reasons might diverge depending on gender. There is generally little insight in how female members or elected representatives in the populist radical right view their own activism and political role within the party, or on an even more basic level than that, who these women are and why they have become active members of the populist radical right.

In sum, several research gaps regarding gender and the PRR party family still exist. Concerning the demand-side and the gender-electorate gap, future research could investigate the political efficacy theory, as laid out by Mudde (2007), to examine if the theory is applicable today when several European PRR parties have gained popularity and support. Such scholarly work could thereby establish if more women vote for these parties as they become more mainstream. Research focusing on this strand could potentially benefit from specifically investigating what makes women vote for a certain party, including for PRR

parties, rather than concentrating on why women do *not* vote for the populist radical right, which previous scholarly work has done. Such research could elucidate the ideologies and issues that women find salient, as well as the political styles and rhetoric that attract female voters.

Concerning the supply side and the gendered nature of the PRR ideology, discourses and policies, future research could investigate the gendered nature of the populist radical right as a party family. Research in this area could benefit from being more comparative, nationally and cross-nationally, to better exhibit to what extent the PRR parties' gender ideology varies across nations and regions and to identify similarities in gender ideology within this party family. Research within this area should also continue examining how PRR parties instrumentalize gender. More scholarship examining the role of masculinity could additionally add other layers of insight to this body of research.

The least studied area is the gender-representation gap in the PRR parties. More research investigating the proportion of male versus female members, listed candidates, elected members of parliament, and members of the highest party organs in the PRR parties should thus be conducted. Future research in this area could be more quantitative and examine general patterns in gender representation of the populist radical right. Such studies should be comparative, both nationally and cross-nationally, to establish how the gender representation in PRR parties compares to other parties in the same country as well as to PRR parties in other countries. Research in this area should also investigate changes over time to investigate the contagion thesis (see Högström, 2019), especially as PRR parties are becoming more mainstream in Europe. More qualitative research examining the gender-representation gap is also needed, i.e., studies that investigate what attracts women and men respectively to join PRR parties as members and candidates, and how PRR parties recruit men and women. The next chapter therefore contributes to filling the research gap regarding research on gender-representation gaps in PRR parties.

IV. The gender-representation gap in the Nordic PRR parties: An empirical study

The research overview showed that PRR parties have an overrepresentation of men (e.g., Högström, 2017; Mudde, 2007; Sundström & Stockemer, 2015). Generally, more men than women are active as members or elected representatives in these parties. This is nevertheless an understudied area, as shown in the previous chapter. Moreover, most studies investigating the PRR parties' gender-representation gap have only investigated it in a single country and not compared the gender gap in parties across countries or observed changes over time. Mudde (2007) has claimed that the gender-representation gap in the PRR parties is larger than in left-wing parties, but not significantly larger than in other conservative right-wing parties. He has also stated that there is a lack of reliable data regarding female membership and the importance of women internally in PRR parties. The question therefore remains: How big is the gender-representation gap in the populist radical right, if one exists compared to other parties and cross-nationally? And has the gender-representation gap in the PRR parties closed over time as the parties have become mainstream and increased their electoral support, as suggested by Högström's (2019) study on the SD? The second part of the thesis, the empirical study, aims to contribute to the scholarship in this area by empirically investigating the gender-representation gap in the Nordic PRR parties and how this gap has changed over time.

The empirical study firstly examines whether an overrepresentation of men in the Nordic PRR parties exists, and if so, how this overrepresentation compares to the gender balance in other main parties, primarily compared to the conservative parties and social democratic parties. Sundström and Stockemer (2015) found that when PRR parties had electoral success in municipal elections, the overall level of female representation in local councils decreased. This study thus also examines how the gender gaps in the PRR parties affect the national gender gap averages in the Nordic countries. Additionally, Högström (2019) has shown that the gender-representation gap in the SD decreased as the party became more established and mainstream. He thus argues that a contagion effect has occurred, with the SD strategically increasing its level of female representation to approach the higher level of female representation in more established parties, with the purpose of increasing electorate support. This study therefore investigates if a contagion effect has occurred in the Nordic PRR parties.

This chapter is divided into a number of subchapters that present the research questions, research design, methodology, and results.

1. Research questions

The Nordic countries have a high level of female representation in parliamentary politics and are considered to have come far in the strive for gender equality (e.g., Niskanen, 2009; OECD, 2018). The Nordic countries are therefore appropriate to study the PRR gender-representation gap in and arguably constitute a so-called critical case, as women generally have a high level of representation in Nordic politics. Considering the overall high level of gender equality in this region, as well as the reported lower level of female representation in the populist radical right, the *first research question (RQ1)* investigated in this thesis is to what extent a gender-representation gap exists in the Nordic PRR parties in the Nordic countries and to what extent this gender gap is alike in these nations. The research overview showed that few studies have observed the gender-representation gap in the PRR party family from a comparative perspective. The thesis thus contributes to the scholarship by comparing the female representation in the PRR parties in several countries. To this author's knowledge, no study has compared the gender gap in the Nordic PRR parties. This study thus contributes by investigating the Nordic region specifically.

The expected result regarding the first research question is that, in accordance with conclusions in previous studies (e.g., Högström, 2019; Mudde, 2007; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017), the Nordic PRR parties on average have a gender gap that is larger than 10 percentage points in most of the political arenas examined (i.e., internal, electoral, and parliamentary arenas). Thus, if the gender balance is considered equal when the female percentage is between 40–60 percent in the different political arenas (see Dahlerup, 1988; Niskanen, 2009), the PRR parties are not gender equal. They are expected to have a significant gender-representation gap, i.e., that men on average constitute more than 60 percent of these parties' party council members, listed candidates, and elected representatives. The PRR gender gaps are also expected to be larger than the gender gaps on average in the Nordic countries, in accordance with Stockemer and Sundström's (2021) conclusion that PRR parties have the lowest level of female representation in the European parliament when compared with other party families. These patterns are expected to generally be the same in all Nordic countries.

The *second research question (RQ2)* is whether the gender gap in the PRR parties is larger than in the non-PRR parties in the Nordic countries. Mudde (2007) has claimed that while the

gender-representation gaps in the PRR parties are larger compared to in left parties, they are not significantly greater than in the mainstream conservative parties. The second research question thus examines if Mudde's theory is applicable in the case of the Nordic states. This research question is answered by comparing the gender-representation gap in the PRR parties with the gap in other electorally significant non-PRR parties in the Nordic countries, and by paying special attention to differences in gender gaps between the PRR parties and conservative parties, on the one hand, and between PRR parties and social democratic parties, on the other hand.

Additionally, Högström (2019) and Sundström and Stockemer (2015) have shown that as PRR parties become more electorally successful on the local level, the overrepresentation of men in these parties affect the overall level of female representation negatively. The PRR parties' low level of female representation may therefore lead to a decrease in the descriptive representation of women in general. Related to the second research question, the Nordic countries' national gender gap averages (including the PRR parties) are thus compared with the non-PRR party national gender gap average (excluding the PRR parties). Such a comparison demonstrates how the PRR parties' gender-representation gaps have influenced the national gender gap averages.

The second research question is important to investigate as the PRR party family has grown and evolved since 2007, especially in the Nordic region where both the PS and the SD have entered parliament. Mudde's (2007) research is consequently not up to date. Second, by comparing the gender gap in the PRR parties with what the gender gap in non-PRR parties in each country, one can investigate to what extent the PRR parties' gender gaps diverge from the gender gaps in other parties. By also comparing the PRR gender gaps with the gender gaps in the Nordic conservative and social democratic parties, one can furthermore deduce how the PRR parties' gender gaps compare to parties that are both at the right end and the left end of the left-right political spectrum.

Three main expectations are evaluated with respect to the second research question. The first expectation is that one can find a consistent and, relatively speaking, larger gender-representation gap (= more men than women) in the PRR parties than in the non-PRR political parties in the Nordic countries. Second, the PRR parties are consequently expected to have an increasing effect on the national gender gap average. Third, the gender-representation gap is expected to be greater in the PRR parties than in the parties located further to the left on the left-right spectrum (i.e., compared to the social democratic parties), but not necessarily

significantly larger than in the parties belonging to the conservative right-wing party family, in accordance with Mudde's argument.

The *third research question (RQ3)* concerns how women's descriptive representation in the PRR parties has evolved over time and whether a contagion effect has occurred. The contagion effect would entail that the Nordic PRR parties have strategically adapted their level of female representation to the (higher) level of female representation in other parties, to maximize their electoral support, in accordance with Högström's conclusions (2019). This research question is relevant to investigate as the PRR parties have been electorally relevant (i.e., have had seats in the national parliament) for at least a decade in all Nordic countries apart from Iceland. It should consequently be possible to empirically observe a contagion effect, if one has occurred, in the Nordic PRR parties.

The expected results concerning the contagion thesis is that the PRR parties have increased the percentage of women in their internal party organs as well as on their candidate lists in municipal and general elections, as they have become more mainstream in their respective Nordic country, to maximize electoral support. The concept of "becoming more mainstream" is mainly operationalized by determining if the parties have increased their electoral support or already have a large support base. The Norwegian and the Danish PRR parties, which are the oldest Nordic PRR parties, can in this context be considered more mainstream generally, even if their electoral support has not increased recently.

2. Research design, composition, and methods

The empirical study used a small-N study design, comparing data from a relatively small number of cases, i.e., the established PRR parties in the Nordic countries. The study was descriptive in nature; the goal was to investigate and establish the size of the gender-representation gap in the PRR parties compared to in other parties in the Nordic countries, and to examine how this gap has changed longitudinally. The aim was therefore not to establish cause-and-effect or identify specific causal factors for this gender gap. The chosen research design, a comparative, cross-national study, was chosen as it can demonstrate to what extent the gender-representation gap consistently exists within the PRR party family. Limiting the study to the Nordic region was a tactical decision taken partly to limit the thesis' scope, partly because it is beneficial to compare PRR parties of countries and societies that are alike, and partly because of the comparatively high level of gender equality in the Nordic countries. PRR parties adapt their position on gender equality "according to the national context and to

the construct of ‘others’ based on the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy typical of populism” (Doná, 2020, p. 288). It can thus be difficult to compare the gendered aspects of these parties in between countries that have largely diverging views on gender and on the importance of gender equality. The Nordic countries were therefore elected as they are relatively similar enabling cross-national comparisons of the gender-representation gap.

The Nordic PRR parties were categorized in accordance with the conclusions in chapter II. The four populist radical right parties in the Nordic countries were consequently:

- the Danish People’s Party (*Dansk Folkeparti – DF*),
- the Norwegian Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet – FrP*),
- the Finns Party (*Perussuomalaiset – PS*), and
- the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna – SD*).

The research design only included PRR parties that had had elected members in their countries’ national parliaments. Parties that fit the PRR profile in terms of ideology, but that were only active in local governments or had never secured seats in national parliaments were consequently excluded. Moreover, the study only included PRR parties that had had elected members of parliament for at least two of the last three mandate periods, to be able to observe changes in the gender-representation gap over time and to assure that the parties included had coherently and consistently demonstrated a PRR ideology, also as elected members of parliament. The consequence of this latter decision was that some fringe parties exhibiting PRR features were excluded. One such example was the New Right in Denmark (*Nye Borgerlige*), which has exhibited PRR tendencies, mainly a harsh anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric, but has only secured seats in the national parliament in one election (Nissen & Siim, 2021). Another example was the Blue Reform (*Sininen Tulevaisuus*), which has secured no seats in the Finnish parliament.

2.1 Three arenas of political representation

The thesis investigated the gender-representation gap in three different *arenas* (see Sjöblom, 1968). The first one was the *internal arena*, which concerns gender representation in the internal party structure, e.g., among members in a party, members in the party congress and members in the party council, and in party leadership. The second one was the *electoral arena*, which concerns the gender representation among the party’s political *candidates* in different elections (municipal/regional/national elections). The third one was the *parliamentary arena*, which concerns gender representation among the *elected*

representatives in the national parliament and regional and municipal councils. The first and the second research question investigated the gender-representation gap in all three arenas, at both the local and national level, in the Nordic PRR parties. The third research question only concerned gender gaps in the internal and electoral arenas.

2.2 RQ1: The gender-representation gap in the Nordic PRR parties

The gender-representation gap in the *internal arena* was investigated by observing the gender gap in the parties' party councils (party boards) and in the party leadership. The gender composition among the members of the PRR parties or in the parties' party congress was not examined, partly to limit the scope of the study, partly because information on members of political parties is more difficult to attain. The political parties usually have to provide data on membership themselves and the reliability of such data can be questioned.

The gender gap in the *electoral arena* was investigated by observing the percentage of women and the gender gap among the PRR parties' listed candidates in parliamentary (national) and municipality council (local) elections. The *parliamentary arena* was examined by observing the percentage of women among elected representatives in the parliamentary and municipal elections. The electoral and the parliamentary arenas might seem similar but are not. A party's political candidates are largely determined by the party itself and its members. The party's elected representatives, on the other hand, can to a larger extent be determined by the voters, depending on the electoral system (closed vs. open party lists, etc.) and how many votes and secured seats the party receives in total in an election. If the number of elected representatives of a party is low, the gender gap among these representatives could fail to provide an accurate picture. For example, if a party only has one elected representative, a female, the results indicate an underrepresentation of men in the party. However, this female representative could in fact be the only female listed candidate among 20 listed candidates in total. The gender gap among listed candidates therefore assists in providing a more complete picture of the overall percentage of women in various political parties, as the number of listed candidates tends to be larger than the number of elected representatives.

Data on both the national and the local level was included to attain a more comprehensive view of the gender-representation gap, and how it manifests itself locally as well as nationally. However, data concerning elections to regional councils were excluded, mainly because Finland had not had regional elections. Throughout the study, the other electorally relevant parties in the Nordic countries served as points of comparison, i.e., the gender-

representation gap in the PRR parties in the above-mentioned arenas was compared with the same data for the Nordic main non-PRR parties and compared with averages for the non-PRR parties combined. The study also examined how the gender gaps in the internal and electoral arenas in the PRR parties had evolved over time.

As this study mostly relied on data provided by other agents, primarily by national statistics agencies (e.g., data on the sex of listed candidates and elected representatives in previous elections), no specific definition of “women” and “men” (or “males” and “females”) were proposed. The operationalization of terms like “gender”, “sex”, “men”, and “women” in each separate primary source was thus not questioned.

2.3 RQ2: PRR versus non-PRR parties’ gender-representation gaps

To answer the second research question, i.e., how the gender-representation gap in the PRR parties compared to the gender gap in non-PRR parties, data on the gender gap in every party that had been electorally relevant on the *national* level in the Nordic countries was compiled. All parties that had secured seats in the national parliament in any one of the last three general elections were included. However, when presenting the combined results for the internal arena, parties that had not elected members of parliament for at least two consecutive mandate periods were excluded. By doing so, the risk of smaller fringe parties, parties that were only relevant locally, and/or “one hit wonder”-parties skewing the results was minimized. When calculating gender gap averages in the internal arena, all parties’ gender gaps in party councils and party leadership were given equal weight since it was not possible to weigh the percentages in accordance with a party’s relevance. In the electoral and parliamentary arena, in contrast, the national gender gap averages were based on the actual numbers of women and men. In the latter arenas, the gender gap of a smaller party with fewer listed candidates and elected representatives would have less weight on the total percentage than bigger and more popular parties, compared to in the internal arena. In the final discussion of the thesis, the analysis also concentrated on parties that had secured seats in at least two of the last three elections, thus excluding New Right (*Nye Borgerlige*) in Denmark, Red (*Rødt*) in Norway, and Movement Now (*Liike Nyt*) in Finland.

2.3.1 Categorization of non-PRR political parties

Secondary sources were used to determine which Nordic parties to include and how to categorize these parties into different party families. These sources were mainly *The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics* (Nedergaard & Wivel, 2017) and *Scandinavian*

Politics Today (2nd edition) (Arter, 2008). The Nordic parties were thus placed into party families in the following manner:

- **Far-left*/Leftist socialists:** The Red–Green Alliance (*Enhedslisten – Rød-Grønne*, Denmark), Socialist Peoples’ Party (*Socialistisk Folkeparti*, Denmark), Left-Wing Alliance (*Vasemmistoliitto*, Finland), Socialist Left Party (*Sosialistisk Venstre*, Norway), and Left-Party (*Vänsterpartiet*, Sverige)
- **Social democratic:** Danish Social Democratic Party (*Socialdemokratiet*, Denmark), Finnish Social Democratic Party (*Sosialidemokraattinen puolue*, Finland), Social Democrats (*Socialdemokraterna*, Sweden), Labour Party (*Arbeiderpartiet*, Norway)
- **Green:** Green League (*Vihreät*, Finland), Green Party (*Miljöpartiet*, Sweden), The Alternative (*Alternativet***, Denmark), Green Party (*Miljöpartiet De Grønne*, Norway)
- **Agrarian/Centre:** Denmark’s Liberal Party (*Venstre****, Denmark), Finnish Centre Party, Centre Party (*Senterpartiet*, Norway), Centre Party (*Centerpartiet*, Sweden)
- **Liberal:** Danish Social-Liberal Party (*Radikale Venstre*, Denmark), Liberal Alliance (*Liberal Alliance*, Denmark), Liberals (*Liberalerna*, Sweden), Swedish People’s Party (*Svenska Folkpartiet*, Finland), Liberal Party (*Venstre*, Norway)
- **Christian democrats:** Christian Democrats (*Kristillisdemokraatit*, Finland), Christian Democratic Party (*Kristelig folkeparti*, Norway), Christian Democrats (*Kristdemokraterna*, Sverige)
- **Conservative:** Conservative Party (*Det Konservative Folkeparti*, Denmark), National Coalition (*Kokoomus*, Finland), Conservative Party (*Høyre*, Norway), Conservatives (*Moderaterna*, Sweden).
- **Populist radical right:** Progressive Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*, Norway), Danish People’s Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*, Denmark), Finns Party (*Perussuomalaiset*, Finland), Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*, Sweden).

* The far-left and leftist socialists are considered separate party families in *The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics*, but since the only far-left party in the Nordic countries is The Red–Green Alliance (Denmark), they were placed in a combined group in this thesis.

** The Danish party The Alternative was created in 2015 and in Hoff’s (2017) chapter in *The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics*, he states that it can be argued that this party belongs to the green party family. The Alternative self-identifies as “the green party of Denmark” (alternativet.dk) and is described by several sources as a green party (e.g., Maier, 2021; Eriksen, 2015). It is thus classified here as belonging to the green party family, even though it does not seem to fit the green party family profile as much as its counterparts in the Nordic countries, as it is both critical of the political system and of economic growth (Maier, 2021).

*** Hansen and Kosiara-Pedersen (2017) state that Denmark’s agrarian party, the Liberal Party (Venstre), has transformed itself into the country’s main bourgeois party, adding that it is questionable if Venstre still should be grouped with the agrarian parties. However, Venstre is categorized as an agrarian party in this thesis.

The parties and their politics were also placed and ordered in relation to one another, to enable comparisons. The parties were ordered according to the traditional left-right dimension, i.e., “the ideological continuum of economic redistribution” where the left focuses on a strong state providing equal opportunities for everyone through a welfare state, and the right focuses on individual responsibility, a small state, and low taxes (Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2017, p. 121). The left-right dimension acts as a “strong compass for Nordic voters when navigating the Nordic party space” (Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2017, p. 121), making it suitable for application here. For this categorization on the left-right spectrum, secondary sources were used, mainly *The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics* (Nedergaard & Wivel, 2017), in which the chapters by Hansen and Kosiara-Pedersen (2017) and Önnudóttir and Hardarson (2017) classify the Nordic parties based on the preferences of the parties’ voters.

Considering the initial “five party model” of the Nordic countries and putting them on the left-right spectrum, the far-left and leftist socialist parties are furthest to the left, followed by the social democratic parties. Then there are the non-socialist parties, with the agrarian (centre) parties, the liberal parties, and the conservative parties being placed in that order from left to right, with the conservative parties being furthest to the right (Önnudóttir & Hardarson, 2017). The Danish agrarian party, the Liberal Party (*Venstre*), is the main exception as it is placed to the right of both the Social Liberal Party (*Radikale Venstre*) and the Christian Democratic party (*Kristelig Folkeparti*), and thus comes right before the DF and Denmark’s Conservative Party (*Det Konservative Folkeparti, DKF*). The leftist socialist, the social democratic, and the conservative parties in the Nordic countries are placed relatively similarly on the left-right spectrum, indicating similar ideological positions (Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2017). The other parties display greater cross-national variation regarding their left-right spectrum placement, especially the green, the Christian democratic, and the PRR parties. Whereas the FrP, for example, is positioned as right of center with libertarian ideals, the DF is closer to the social democratic party regarding economy (Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2017). The green and the Christian democratic parties generally fall somewhere in the middle of the left-right spectrum in the Nordic countries, but display cross-national differences, with some green parties being further to the left and others being further to the right.

Only parties belonging to the explicit Nordic conservative party family were operationalized as “conservative parties”. Parties belonging to the Christian democratic party family, the liberal, and the agrarian party family were consequently not considered “conservative”, even though they are placed to the right on the political ideological spectrum. Thus, whereas all

parties were used as points of comparison to the PRR parties, it was only the parties belonging to the conservative party family that were used to answer whether the gender-representation gap in the PRR parties was greater than in conservative parties. The Nordic conservative parties were the following: the Danish Conservative Party (*Det Konservative Folkeparti – DKF*, Denmark), National Coalition (*Kokoomus – Kok*, Finland), the Norwegian Conservative Party (*Høyre – H*, Norway), and Conservatives (*Moderaterna – M*, Sweden). The gender-representation gap in the PRR parties were also compared with the gender gap in the Nordic social democratic parties, to establish if the PRR parties' gender gaps were larger than the gender gap in parties located further to the left. The social democratic parties were the Danish Social Democratic Party (*Socialdemokratiet – A*, Denmark), the Finnish Social Democratic Party (*Sosialidemokraattinen puolue – SDP*, Finland), the Social Democrats (*Socialdemokraterna – S*, Sweden), and the Labour Party (*Arbeiderpartiet – Ap*, Norway). Since data on the gender gap was gathered for all parties, all non-PRR parties served as points of comparison when relevant.

The gender-representation gap was thus observed in the Nordic PRR parties and compared with the gender-representation gap in other electorally relevant non-PRR parties in the Nordic countries (i.e., the parties listed above). The gender-representation gap was examined in all three political arenas in these parties. Special attention was paid to parties belonging to the conservative party family and the social democratic party family, to investigate Mudde's (2007) claim that the gender-representation gap is not significantly larger in the PRR parties than in conservative parties, but more likely to exceed the gender gaps in leftist parties, e.g., social democratic parties.

2.4 RQ3: The contagion theory and changes in the gender-representation gap over time

Lastly, this study aimed to answer the third research question: Has the gender-representation gap decreased over time as the populist radical right parties have become more mainstream and wanted to maximize their electoral support in accordance with Högström's (2019) reformulated contagion theory? To examine how the gender-representation gap has changed in the PRR parties, data on the gender gap in the internal and electoral arenas, from the last three national and local (municipal) elections, was gathered. The parliamentary arena was excluded since the PRR parties strategically increase the level of female representation mainly in the electoral arena, i.e., on the candidate lists. The internal arena was also included as an

increase of women in the top positions in a party could increase the symbolic representation of women, which in turn may attract more female electoral support. Changes in the gender composition in the party leadership and party councils, as well as among the listed candidates of the PRR parties in the last three local and general elections, were thus observed to determine if the PRR parties' gender gaps have approached the gender gaps in the non-PRR parties. The data displaying changes in the PRR parties' gender-representation gaps over time were compared with the same data for the Nordic non-PRR parties to examine whether the PRR parties' changes in level of female representation resembled changes in non-PRR parties.

2.5 Variables

The research design primarily compared gender-representational gaps for different measures (e.g., nations and party families). The gender gap itself was calculated based on the percentages of women versus men in the three arenas. The gender gap was calculated by subtracting the actual percentage of women in each arena (party council, candidate lists in municipal election, etc.) with 50 percent, as 50 percent would be the percentage of women present if there was no gender gap. To exemplify: If the percentage of women among the listed candidates of a party in a general election is 30 percent, 30 percent is subtracted from 50 percent. The difference constitutes the gender gap, measured in percentage points. In this hypothetical case, the gender gap is 20 percentage points. The closer the points are to zero, the smaller the gender gap. A gender gap of 20 percentage points indicates an overrepresentation of men and a gender gap of -20 points indicates an overrepresentation of women.

The variable in focus regarding the first research question was the gender-representation gap in the four Nordic PRR parties, encompassing the three political arenas. The gender gap in the internal arena was investigated by observing the gender gap in the parties' party councils and party leadership in 2011–2021. The electoral arena was examined by observing the percentage of women and the gender gap among listed candidates in the last three parliamentary and municipal elections. The parliamentary arena was investigated by observing the percentage of women and the gender gap among elected representatives in the last three parliamentary and municipal elections. The PRR parties' gender-representation gaps were thus established, and cross-national gender gap patterns identified, in each arena in the Nordic countries. The data was collected from the last three national and local elections to control for inconsistencies over time by assuring that gender gap sizes and patterns were persistent.

To simplify the presentation of the results, mean gender gaps were calculated for each party and each arena, based on observations of the parties' gender gaps in the last three municipal and parliamentary elections, as well as of the parties' gender gaps in the party councils and in party leadership in the period 2011–2021. For example, if the DF had the following empirically observed gender gaps among the party's listed candidates in the past three municipal elections: 20, 30, and 25 percentage points, the mean gender gap would be the sum of the three gender gaps divided by three. The DF's mean gender gap among listed candidates in the municipality elections would consequently be 25 percentage points. The gender gaps in the PRR parties were also compared with the national gender gap averages, based on the mean gender gaps in all main parties in the Nordic countries, to establish if the PRR parties' gender gaps were divergent.

The variable in focus concerning the second research question was also the gender-representation gap in political parties. Data was gathered on the gender gap in the party councils/party leadership and among listed candidates and elected representatives for the Nordic PRR and non-PRR parties. The aim was to conclude if and to what extent the PRR parties had diverging gender gaps compared with the gender gaps in parties belonging to other party families in the Nordic countries, with special focus on how the PRR gender gaps compared to gender gaps in the conservative and the social democratic parties.

The empirical study thirdly examined the contagion thesis by observing to what extent the PRR parties' gender-representation gap have decreased or adapted to the gender gap in other main non-PRR parties, as the former have become more mainstream and secured more seats in elections. The contagion thesis entails that when PRR parties secure more seats, the total level of female representation initially decreases, as the PRR parties have an overrepresentation of men compared to women. However, Högström (2019) argues that the percentage of female representation should not decrease over time, as the PRR parties will mimic the mainstream parties by recruiting more women as listed candidates and, in turn, as elected representatives. The variable in focus was therefore the changes in gender gaps in the PRR parties, compared to in the non-PRR parties, in the electoral and internal arenas. Data on the PRR parties' share of secured seats in the last three national elections was also gathered, simply to establish the PRR parties' overall level of support. Electoral support on the national level was deemed enough to draw conclusions on the parties' general popularity. Data showing changes in the gender-representation gap in other main political parties in the Nordic countries (in the internal and electoral arenas) also served as a point of comparison, making it

possible to put each respective PRR party's development in a national perspective and comparative framework.

In the full presentation of the results in appendices A–I, the percentage of women in the different parties as well as the actual numbers that the percentages corresponded to were included. The numbers were included as some gender proportions may be based on small numbers of observations. Minor changes in such gender proportions may consequently look more dramatic than they are when only regarding percentages. For example, if a certain party only has one or two elected representatives in parliament, the weight of the sex of each person is heavier than in parties that have 20-30 elected representatives.

Since the study was mainly descriptive in nature and employed no multivariate models exploring effects of different factors on gender-representation gaps (see Högström, 2019), data on more variables were not collected. Other variables were nevertheless included as contextual and explanatory factors in the discussion part of the thesis (chapter V). For example, the electoral system used in each Nordic country might affect the gender-representation gap. Percentage thresholds that parties need to surpass to become part of the national parliament, like Sweden, Norway, and Denmark employ, may affect the strategic decision-making of the parties (Norris, 2005). Additionally, while every Nordic country uses party-list proportional representation as the method through which they allocate seats in elections, they use different proportional representation methods to allocate the seats and have their specific regulations (e.g., open vs. closed party lists). This might affect both voter behavior and the strategic behavior of the politicians (e.g., Kjær & Krook, 2019; Menocal, 2011). Voluntary gender quotas that political parties can employ constitute another variable that can affect the gender-representation gap (Rosen, 2017). These are consequently variables of interest when interpreting the results of the study.

3. Data collection and methodology

The data collected to answer the thesis' research questions, in accordance with the research design, was data on the gender-representation-gap in each of the three political arenas (internal, electoral, and parliamentary) in the main parties in each Nordic country. The data covered the last three national and municipal elections that had taken place prior to January 1, 2021.

3.1 Electoral and parliamentary arena: Official election statistics

The Nordic countries have official, national statistical agencies that collect and present statistics for, amongst other things, political elections. Datasets on elections that these agencies provide were used as primary sources to investigate the gender gap in the electoral and parliamentary arenas in the PRR parties and in the other main parties in the Nordic countries. Datasets presenting the percentage of men versus women among each Nordic country's main parties' listed candidates in the last three municipal and parliamentary elections, and the gender composition among the parties' elected representatives in municipal councils and national parliaments in the last three mandate periods, were subsequently used. As mentioned in chapter IV:2, data was only gathered for parties that had had members in the national parliament.

Datasets were retrieved from the following websites, hosted by the national statistics agencies:

- Denmark's Statistics (*Danmarks Statistik*, www.dst.dk): A governmental agency which is part of the Ministry of the Interior (Indenrigs- og Boligsministeriet),
- Statistics Finland (*Tilastokeskus*, www.stat.fi): A statistical service that is part of the Finnish National Statistical Service,
- The National Election Authority (*Valmyndigheten*, data.val.se): The authority responsible for political elections, the same data can also be found on Statistics Sweden (scb.se),
- Statistics Norway (*Statistisk sentralbyrå*, www.ssb.no): The national statistical institute of Norway.

Data was moreover collected for the following elections in the Nordic countries:

Parliamentary (general) elections:

- Denmark: Parliamentary elections in 2011, 2015, and 2019,
- Norway: Parliamentary elections in 2009, 2013, and 2017,
- Sweden: Parliamentary elections in 2010, 2014, and 2018,
- Finland: Parliamentary elections in 2011, 2015, and 2019.

Municipal elections:

- Denmark: Municipal elections in 2009, 2013, and 2017,

- Norway: Municipal elections in 2011, 2015, and 2019,
- Sweden: Municipal elections in 2010, 2014, and 2018,
- Finland: Municipal elections in 2008, 2012, and 2017.

Some of the above-mentioned sources presented the number of male and female listed candidates and elected representatives, as well as the percentages. Some of them, however, only presented the numbers. The percentage was therefore calculated manually. The collected data was put in tables in country-specific appendices (Appendices B–I). The mean percentages, gender gaps, and mean gender gaps were also calculated manually. Data on the general performance of the PRR parties in each Nordic country (i.e., the percentage of secured seats in the last general elections) was additionally compiled, as part of the data collected to answer the third research question.

3.2 The internal arena: A mix of sources

The gender gap in the internal arena was investigated by examining the gender composition in the PRR parties' party councils (party boards), i.e., the parties' executive committees, in addition to researching the sex of the parties' leaders. This data was more difficult to collect compared to the data for the electoral and parliamentary arenas. Whereas municipal and general elections are held every fourth year, Nordic political parties elect their party council members and leaders annually or biannually. Therefore, a significant amount of data had to be compiled to investigate this arena. Data was collected from the last 10 years, i.e., the gender gap in the parties' party councils and in party leadership was tracked from 2011 to 2021. Data regarding the non-PRR parties' gender gap in party leadership was collected for the same time span, 2011–2021. Data regarding the non-PRR parties' gender gap in party councils was also gathered, but only for 2020–2021, to limit the scope of the study.

Most political parties provide easily attainable information on sitting party council members and leaders on their websites, but not on the members of previous party councils. The original plan was thus to collect data regarding the gender gap in party councils by asking the Nordic PRR parties to provide this information. However, other data collection methods were added as the only party that provided a complete list of members of previous party councils was the DF. The FrP, in contrast, replied that they did not keep such records. Consequently, this data was compiled by using a mix of news articles, online encyclopedias, parties' websites, and parties' annual reports found online, i.e., any source that contained information on the members in the party councils (see Appendices B–E). The number and percentage of women

in the PRR parties' party councils 2011–2021 were thus assembled, and the gender gap calculated. A council member or party leader was considered “male” or “female” according to his or her name, i.e., by determining if the name was traditionally used for women or men, and by searching for and observing pictures of the members and leaders in question.

This method of data collection had some limitations. The reliability of the sources and the accuracy of the information they provided was at times difficult to deduce. In many cases, only one news article describing newly elected party council members was found, with no source to cross-check the information with. However, when it was possible to verify facts provided in one source with information provided in another source, the sources' information matched. The data was thus generally considered accurate.

Compiling data on the gender gap in party councils was more time-consuming than establishing the gender gap in party leadership. The FrP constituted the most difficult case. The FrP elects party council members and party leadership for two years, but the party leader and three members of the party council are elected in between election years, while the first vice leader, the second vice leader, and the three remaining party council members are elected in election years (Fremskrittspartiet, 2021). The FrP's party council thus changes every year, but only half of it. A mix of online news articles, annual reports, and official documents sent out in preparation of the party's annual congress (*landsmøtet*), in addition to web pages on individual politicians in the online encyclopedia, *Store Norske Leksikon*, were therefore used to deduce each year's party council composition (see Appendix C). Data on the members was found in all but one case, as the FrP's parliamentary group leader in 2012–2013 was not identified.

Data on the gender composition in the PS's and the SD's party councils was easier to obtain, but a variety of sources still had to be used to assemble the data. News articles, party annual reports and financial statements, party press releases, and web pages containing information on the various politicians were used to collect data on the gender composition in the party councils 2011–2021 (see Appendices D–E). The data collection for the DF was more straightforward, as a student helper employed by the DF provided a complete list of names of the party council members in the last ten years (see Appendix B).

Regarding gender balance in party leadership, the sex of the party leaders of all relevant Nordic parties in the period 2011–2021 was identified. News articles and online encyclopedias (e.g., *Den Store Danske*, *Store Norske Leksikon*, *Sveriges Riksdag*) were used

to gather the data. To calculate the gender gap in party leadership, dummy variables were used. A female leader got the value of 1, while a male leader got the value of 0. This translated into 100 percent for a female leader and 0 percent for a male leader. The average percentage of female leaders for each party and the gender gap based on that average percentage were then calculated. To give an example, if a party had a female leader in 2011–2015, and a male leader from 2015 and onwards, the mean percentage of female leadership would be 40 percent, and the gender gap 10 percentage points.

Data on the gender balance in party councils was compiled for both PRR and non-PRR parties. Information concerning party council members in non-PRR parties was mostly found on these parties' websites. However, regarding the non-PRR parties, data was only collected for the party councils in 2020–2021. Changes in the non-PRR parties' party council gender balance were consequently not observed over time, as it would have been vastly more time-consuming to assemble the data needed to do so. Since this study aimed to investigate the possible contagion effect in the PRR parties specifically, collecting this data for the non-PRR parties was deemed unnecessary. Additionally, any changes in the gender composition in the party councils that occurred outside the time of the parties' internal elections (e.g., situations where a female replaced a male member due to the male member being suspended) were not included in the presentation of the results.

4. Results

This subchapter reports the results of the empirical study and is divided into three sections, with each section focusing on one of the three research questions. The first section (4.1) presents the gender-representation gap in the Nordic PRR parties. The second section (4.2) compares the PRR parties' gender gaps to the gender gaps in the main non-PRR parties in the Nordic countries. The third section (4.3) displays how the gender gap in the Nordic PRR parties has evolved over time. Appendices A–I contain all the data collected. The results, tables, and figures displayed in this chapter thus correspond to data found in the appendices, which are the following:

- Appendix A: Comparison of the gender-representation gap in the Nordic PRR parties
- Appendix B: Gender composition in Danish parties' party councils and leadership
- Appendix C: Gender composition in Norwegian parties' party councils and leadership
- Appendix D: Gender composition in Finnish parties' party councils and leadership
- Appendix E: Gender composition in Swedish parties' party councils and leadership
- Appendix F: Data regarding the gender-representation gap in Danish parties
- Appendix G: Data regarding the gender-representation gap in Norwegian parties
- Appendix H: Data regarding the gender-representation gap in Finnish parties
- Appendix I: Data regarding the gender-representation gap in Swedish parties

4.1 RQ1: The gender-representation gap in the Nordic PRR parties

The first research question was to what extent a gender-representation gap exists in the Nordic PRR parties, and whether the gender gap is similar in these parties across the Nordic countries. A party that has a gender gap between -10 and 10 percentage points can be considered gender equal (i.e., having a male to female ratio of 60:40 at most). In the presentation of the results below, the mean gender gaps of each PRR party are compared. The mean gender gaps are based on observations of the parties' gender gaps in the last three municipal and parliamentary elections, as well as on observations of the parties' gender gaps in party councils and in party leadership in 2011–2021. The PRR parties' mean gender gaps are lastly compared with the national gender gap averages (i.e., the gender gap average based on all main parties' mean gender gaps in each country).

4.1.1 RQ1: The PRR gender gaps in the internal arena

When examining the last ten years' party councils (Figure 1), the DF had the largest mean gender gap (27.3 percentage points), closely followed by the FrP (27 percentage points). The PS had the smallest mean gender gap (17 percentage points), while the SD's mean gender gap was 19.3 percentage points.





Figure 1. Mean gender gap in PRR party councils, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

When observing the gender gaps in the individual party councils in 2011–2021 (Table 1), the gender gap evidently ranged moderately and, in some cases, significantly, e.g., in the DF (range: 22.7–40.9 percentage points) and in the PS (range: 8.3–34.6 percentage points). However, since there generally were not that many members in the party councils (between 10 to 20 members in the Nordic PRR party councils), an ostensibly significant jump in gender gap often meant the addition of only one woman instead of one man. As shown in Table 1, the gender gaps remained the same size for several years in the PRR party councils. The gender gaps were therefore relatively stable in each party, despite displaying greater ranges at times. The PS was also the only PRR party that had a gender gap of less than 10 percentage points in any of its party councils (8.3 points in 2016–2017 and in 2018–2019). The gender gaps were therefore relatively large in the Nordic PRR parties throughout the last ten years.

Table 1. Gender gap in the PRR parties' party councils, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

PRR party/ Year	2011– 2012	2012– 2013	2013– 2014	2014– 2015	2015– 2016	2016– 2017	2017– 2018	2018– 2019	2019– 2020	2020– 2021	Mean gender gap
DF	22.7	31.8	22.7	22.7	22.7	22.7	22.7	22.7	40.9	40.9	27.3
FrP	22.7	20	31.8	31.8	31.8	31.8	31.8	22.7	22.7	22.7	27
PS	11.5	19.2	19.2	19.2	19.2	8.3	11.5	8.3	19.2	34.6	17
SD	25		14.7		14.7		18.4		23.7		19.3

The mean gender gap in party leadership in the PRR parties generated a more scattered picture (Figure 2). Neither the PS nor the SD had a female leader in the period 2011–2021. They thus had mean gender gaps of 50 percentage points each. The FrP, however, had a female leader, Siv Jensen, throughout the last ten years, and the FrP thus had a gender gap of –50 percentage points. The DF had a female party leader, Pia Kjærsgaard, until 2012, when Kristian Thulesen Dahl, a man, became the party's leader. The DF therefore had a gender gap of 40 percentage points.

**Figure 2.** Mean gender gap in PRR party leadership, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

The Nordic PRR parties' gender gaps thus generally exceeded 10 percentage points in the internal arena. The parties' respective mean gender gaps in party councils all surpassed 10 percentage points and were often closer to 20 and even 30 percentage points. In party leadership, the FrP was the only PRR party that had a mean gender gap inferior to 10 percentage points.

4.1.2 RQ1: The PRR gender gaps in the electoral arena

The Nordic PRR parties' mean gender gaps among listed candidates all surpassed 10 percentage points, based on the gender gaps in the last three parliamentary and municipal elections (Figure 3 and 4). The mean gender gaps among the PRR parties' listed candidates based on the last three *parliamentary* elections were 17.5 percentage points (DF), 14.4 points (FrP), 16.7 points (PS), and 21.3 points (SD) (Figure 3). The mean gender gap among listed candidates was generally larger in the municipal elections than in the parliamentary elections, with the mean gender gaps based on the last three *municipal* elections being 20.9 (DF), 22.1 (FrP), 25.3 (PS), and 25.4 percentage points (SD) (Figure 4).




Figure 3. (left) Mean gender gap, listed candidates, *parliamentary* elections, (percentage points)

Figure 4. (right) Mean gender gap, listed candidates, *municipal* elections, (percentage points)

The parties' gender gaps in the electoral arena ranged somewhat from election to election (Table 2). The DF and the SD had the greatest gender gap ranges in the *parliamentary* elections. The DF's gender gap increased from 14.1 to 19.6 percentage points from election 1 to election 2. The SD's gender gap decreased from 24.2 to 19.8 percentage points from election 1 to election 2. In the municipal elections, the gender gap generally only ranged a few percentage points, apart from in the SD (SD range: 21.9–29.8 percentage points) (Table A6, Appendix A).

Table 2. Gender gap among listed candidates in *parliamentary* elections, (percentage points)

PRR party / Election	Election 1 (2009–2011)	Election 2 (2013–2015)	Election 3 (2017– 2019)	Mean gender gap
Danish People's Party, DF	14.1	19.6	18.8	17.5
Progress Party, FrP	12.5	15.9	14.8	14.4
Finns Party, PS	16.8	14.7	18.5	16.7
Sweden Democrats, SD	24.2	19.8	19.9	21.3

The Nordic PRR parties thereby displayed comparable mean gender gaps among their listed candidates in the parliamentary elections, ranging from 14.4 to 21.3 percentage points. The mean gender gap among listed candidates in the municipal elections ranged from 20.9 to 25.4 percentage points, which was a relatively small range, thus indicating cross-national similarities. The SD had the largest mean gender gap among listed candidates, both in the general and in the municipal elections.

4.1.3 RQ1: The PRR gender gaps in the parliamentary arena

The mean gender gaps among elected representatives of the four PRR parties were on average also larger than 10 percentage points, both in the local and the general elections. The mean gender gaps among the elected representatives, based the last three *parliamentary* elections, nevertheless showed variation between the four parties (Figure 5). The DF had a relatively small mean gender gap of 13.4 percentage points among the party's elected members of parliament, while the mean gender gaps in the FrP and the SD were 26.3 and 27.9 percentage points respectively. The PS had a mean gender gap of 19.8 percentage points. The gender gap range was significant in the DF (9.5–18.2 percentage points) and in the SD (21–35 percentage points), and notable also in the FrP (24–29.3 percentage points) (Table 3).

Among the elected representatives in the *municipal* elections, there was less variation between the Nordic PRR parties, as the mean gender gaps ranged from 20.8 percentage points (DF) to 28.1 (PS) (Figure 6). The FrP and the SD had mean gender gaps of 23.4 and 26.5 percentage points respectively. The gender gap only ranged a few percentage points in the DF, the FrP, and the PS, while the SD's gender gap ranged from 21.8 percentage points (election 3) to 31.2 percentage points (election 1) (Table A8, Appendix A).





Figure 5. (left) Mean gender gap, elected representatives, *parliamentary* elections, (percentage points)

Figure 6. (right) Mean gender gap, elected representatives, *municipal* elections, (percentage points)

Table 3. Gender gap, elected representatives in *parliamentary* elections, (percentage points)

PRR party / Election	Election 1 (2009–2011)	Election 2 (2013–2015)	Election 3 (2017–2019)	Mean gender gap
Danish People's Party, DF	18.2	9.5	12.5	13.4
Progress Party, FrP	25.6	29.3	24	26.3
Finns Party, PS	21.8	18.4	19.2	19.8
Sweden Democrats, SD	35	27.6	21	27.9

In the parliamentary arena, the DF thus had the smallest mean gender gap, both in the parliamentary and the municipal elections. The other three PRR parties had mean gender gaps that were of similar size. Most importantly, all PRR parties had mean gender gaps that exceeded at least 10, but often 20 percentage points. Their level of female representation was therefore not within the gender equal balance of 40–60 percent.

4.1.4 RQ1: PRR parties' mean gender gaps versus national gender gap averages

The PRR gender gaps were also large compared to the gender gaps on average in each country. The national gender gap average was calculated for each country based on the mean gender gaps of all main parties. To exemplify, if there were four electorally relevant parties in Norway and they each had mean gender gaps of 10, 15, 20, and 25 percentage points among listed candidates in municipal elections, the national gender gap average would be the sum of the four parties' mean gender gaps divided by four. In the example, the average gender gap

among listed candidates in the municipal elections in Norwegian parties would be 17.5 percentage points.

Internal arena: PRR gender gaps versus national gender gap averages

In the internal arena, the PRR parties' gender gaps in party councils (2020–2021) and mean gender gaps in party leadership (2011–2021) were compared with the national gender gap averages. The results in Figure 7 show that the PRR parties' party council gender gaps in 2020–2021 were larger than the national gender gap averages in each state. The DF's party council gender gap was 40.9 percentage points while the Danish national gender gap average in party councils was 21.4 percentage points. In Norway, Finland, and Sweden, the national gender gap averages ranged from –1.9 to 0.9 percentage points. The Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish PRR parties' range was in contrast 22.7–34.6 percentage points. The gender gaps were therefore substantially larger in the PRR party councils compared to on average in the Nordic parties' party councils.




Figure 7. Gender gap in party council (2020–2021), PRR party vs. national average, (percentage points)

When comparing the numbers cross-nationally, the party council gender gaps were on average almost non-existent in Norway, Finland, and Sweden. The gender gaps were, in contrast, large in the Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish PRR party councils. Denmark stands out, as seen in Figure 7, as the Danish parties' party council gender gaps on average were notably greater (22.1 percentage points) than in the other Nordic countries (0.9 in Norway, 0.7 in Finland, and –1.9 percentage points in Sweden). However, there was still a marked difference between the (larger) DF party council gender gap and the Danish national gender gap average.

The mean gender gaps in party leadership showed more variation between the Nordic countries, and less of a pattern (Figure 8). The Danish, Finnish, and Swedish PRR parties had significantly larger mean gender gaps in party leadership than the parties had on average in their respective countries. The FrP's gender gap in party leadership was in contrast smaller than the national average, an effect of the FrP having a female leader in 2011–2021.




Figure 8. Mean gender gap in party leadership, PRR party vs. national average, (percentage points)

Electoral arena: PRR gender gaps versus national gender gap averages

In the electoral arena, the gender gap among the PRR parties' listed candidates in municipal and parliamentary elections was compared to the gender gap on average in each country, based on the mean gender gaps of all main parties.

The results in Figure 9 show that the mean gender gaps among listed candidates in the PRR parties, when including data from the last three *parliamentary* elections, were larger than the gender gaps were on average among the Nordic parties' listed candidates. In Sweden, Norway, and Finland, the differences between the PRR parties' mean gender gaps and the gender gaps on average were significant. Sweden had a gender gap average of 5.7 percentage points among listed candidates, while the SD's mean gender gap was 21.3 percentage points, constituting a difference of 15.6 percentage points. In Denmark, in contrast, the difference between the DF and the national average was only 2.1 percentage points. While the Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish PRR parties had a considerable overrepresentation of men among their listed candidates in the parliamentary elections, also compared to the national gender gap averages, the same pattern was not identified in Denmark. The DF still had a large

gender gap (17.5 percentage points) among its listed candidates, which was also on par with the gender gap in the other Nordic PRR parties. However, as the Danish national gender gap average was relatively large (15.4 percentage points), the difference between this gender gap average and the DF's mean gender gap was not as notable as in the other Nordic countries.




Figure 9. Mean gender gap, listed candidates, *parliamentary* elections, PRR party vs. national average, (percentage points)

The gender gap was in general larger on the local level than on the national level, i.e., there was a greater overrepresentation of men among the listed candidates in the municipal elections compared to in the parliamentary elections, in all Nordic countries (Figure 10). The results concerning the gender gap among listed candidates in the *municipal* elections were nevertheless akin to the results on the national level. There was a considerable difference between the mean gender gaps among the PRR parties' listed candidates and the national gender gap averages regarding listed candidates in Norway, Finland, and Sweden (Figure 10). The national gender gap average was 10 percentage points or less in these three countries. The mean gender gaps in the Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish PRR parties were in contrast 22 percentage points or more. The DF had the smallest mean gender gap of all PRR parties. While the DF's mean gender gap (20.9 percentage points) was larger than the Danish national average (18.5 percentage points), the difference was not of considerable size. The Danish national gender gap average concerning listed candidates in the municipal elections was also greater than the other Nordic countries' national gender gap averages.




Figure 10. Mean gender gap, listed candidates, *municipal* elections, PRR party vs. national average, (percentage points)

Parliamentary arena: PRR gender gaps versus national gender gap averages

Concerning the mean gender gaps among elected representatives, based on the last three *parliamentary* elections, the PRR parties in Norway, Finland, and Sweden had significantly larger gender gaps compared to the national gender gap average in each respective country (Figure 11). The national gender gap averages were 10 percentage points in Norway, 6.2 percentage points in Finland, and 5.1 percentage points in Sweden. The mean gender gaps in the Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish PRR parties were, in contrast, 26.3, 19.8, and 27.9 percentage points respectively. The DF had the smallest mean gender gap among elected representatives (13.4 percentage points) of the Nordic PRR parties. This gender gap was also not much larger than the gender gap on average in Danish parties (11.7 percentage points).




Figure 11. Mean gender gap, elected representatives, *parliamentary* elections, PRR party vs. national average, (percentage points)

The PRR parties’ mean gender gaps among elected representatives, based on the last three *municipal* elections, were also large (> 20 percentage points) (Figure 12). However, the PRR parties’ gender gaps were only significantly larger than the national gender gap averages in Norway, Finland, and Sweden. The national gender gap averages were 10.4 percentage points in Norway, 12.4 percentage points in Finland, and 6.7 percentage points in Sweden. The mean gender gaps in the FrP, the PS, and the SD were in comparison 23.4, 28.1, and 26.5 percentage points. The DF’s mean gender gap (20.8 points) was not much larger than the Danish parties’ gender gap on average (18.3 percentage points). Denmark’s national average was also considerably larger than the average in the other Nordic countries.




Figure 12. Mean gender gap, elected representatives, *municipal* elections, PRR party vs. national average, (percentage points)

4.1.5 RQ1: Summary of results

The Nordic PRR parties' mean gender gaps exceeded 10 percentage points in practically all arenas studied. There was an overrepresentation of men both among the parties' listed candidates and elected representatives, and in the parties' party councils in the last ten years. The gender gap was on average also larger than 10 percentage points in the parties' party leadership, apart from in the FrP. A considerable gender-representation gap thus existed in the Nordic PRR parties. Moreover, the PRR parties' mean gender gaps were of relatively similar size when comparing cross-nationally. The mean gender gaps were often larger than 20 percentage points. When adding the PRR parties' mean gender gaps in the electoral and parliamentary arena, and in the party councils, the PRR parties' combined mean gender gap was 22 percentage points and the median 21.7 percentage points (range: 13.4–28.1 percentage points). The SD generally had the largest gender gap while the DF tended to have the smallest gender gap, apart from in party councils where the DF had the largest gender gap.

Additionally, in Norway, Finland, and Sweden, the PRR parties' mean gender gaps were significantly larger (> 10 percentage point difference) than the national gender gap averages. However, this was not the case in Denmark, as the DF's mean gender gaps usually exceeded the national gender gap averages, but only by a few percentage points. The Nordic PRR parties thus had a notable overrepresentation of men in the three political arenas. In Norway, Finland, and Sweden, this overrepresentation was notably greater compared to the representation of men in other parties, whereas the DF's representation of men did not diverge considerably from the representation of men in other Danish parties.

4.2 RQ2: PRR versus non-PRR parties' gender-representation gaps

The second research question concerned how the gender-representation gaps in the PRR parties compared with the gender gaps in the non-PRR parties, especially with the gender gaps in the conservative and the social democratic parties. To answer this question, data showing the gender gaps and mean gender gaps in the three political arenas for the other electorally relevant Nordic parties was collected. The gender gap average for the non-PRR parties combined was also calculated, based on the mean gender gaps of the individual non-PRR parties in each country.

4.2.1 RQ2: PRR versus non-PRR parties' gender-representation gaps in the internal arena

In the internal arena, the gender gap in the PRR parties' party council in 2020–2021 and the mean gender gap in the party leadership 2011–2021 were compared to the gender gaps in the non-PRR parties.

Party councils: PRR versus non-PRR parties' gender gaps

The results show that the gender gap in the PRR party councils were significantly larger than in the non-PRR parties' party councils (Figure 13). The DF's party council gender gap was 40.9 percentage points, compared to the non-PRR party average of 19 percentage points. The FrP's gender gap was 22.7 percentage points, compared to the Norwegian non-PRR party average of –2.2 points. The PS's party council gender gap was 34.6 points, compared to the Finnish non-PRR party average of –5.7. The SD's gender gap was 23.7 percentage points in the party council, compared to the Swedish non-PRR average of –5.5.

The PRR parties' gender gaps were also generally larger than the gender gaps in the conservative and social democratic parties' party councils (Figure 13). This difference tended to be the greatest between the PRR parties and the social democratic parties, as the Nordic social democratic parties' party council gender gaps were smaller than both the conservative and the PRR parties' gender gaps. However, the gender gap was also considerably smaller in the conservative parties' party councils than in the PRR party councils. The smallest difference was between the FrP's and the Norwegian Conservative party's (*Høyre*) gender gaps, as the former had a gender gap of 22.7 percentage points and the latter of 13.6. Out of the four Nordic countries, the Danish parties' party councils had the largest gender gaps, both when observing the PRR, the conservative and the social democratic parties' party councils, and regarding the average for all main non-PRR parties.




Figure 13. Gender gap in party councils (2020–2021), comparison of several parties, (percentage points)

Party leadership: PRR versus non-PRR parties' gender gaps

The mean gender gaps in party leadership displayed variation between the Nordic countries (Figure 14). The PRR parties in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden had notably larger mean gender gaps in party leadership than the non-PRR parties had on average, while the FrP's gender gap was smaller than the non-PRR average.

When comparing these gender gaps with the conservative and social democratic parties, the results varied in each country. In Finland, the mean gender gap was larger in the PRR and conservative parties' leadership than in the Finnish Social Democratic party's leadership. In Norway, the opposite relationship was true. In Denmark, the Conservative Party had a larger mean gender gap in party leadership than both the DF, the Social Democratic Party, and the average for all non-PRR parties. The SD's gender gap was larger than the Conservatives' gender gap, but the same size as the Swedish Social Democrats'.




Figure 14. Mean gender gap in party leadership, comparison of several parties, (percentage points)

Two main conclusions can therefore be drawn regarding the internal arena. First, as concerns party councils, the Nordic PRR parties had larger gender gaps compared to the averages for the non-PRR parties and compared to in the Nordic social democratic and conservative parties. Second, the mean gender gaps in party leadership provided a more ambiguous picture. The PRR parties tended to have larger mean gender gaps compared with the non-PRR parties' gender gap averages, apart from the FrP. When comparing with the gender gaps in the Nordic conservative and the social democratic parties, the difference in gender gaps varied greatly cross-nationally.

4.2.2 RQ2: PRR versus non-PRR parties' gender-representation gaps in the electoral arena

Next, the gender gaps among the PRR parties' listed candidates in parliamentary and municipal elections were compared to the gender gaps in the non-PRR parties.

Listed candidates in parliamentary elections: PRR versus non-PRR parties' gender gaps

The PRR parties' mean gender gaps among listed candidates, based on the last three *parliamentary* elections, were larger than the gender gaps were on average among the Nordic non-PRR parties' listed candidates (Figure 15). In Norway, Finland, and Sweden, the difference between the PRR parties' gender gaps and the non-PRR parties' gender gaps was of significant size. The Swedish non-PRR parties combined had a gender gap average of 5.3 percentage points among their listed candidates. The SD's mean gender gap among listed

candidates was in contrast 21.3 percentage points, constituting a difference of 16 percentage points. In Norway and Finland, the difference between the PRR parties' mean gender gaps and the non-PRR parties' gender gap average was 13.7 and 13.9 percentage points respectively. In Denmark, the DF's mean gender gap was larger than the non-PRR parties' gender gap on average, but the difference (2.4 percentage points) was small.




Figure 15. Mean gender gap, listed candidates, *parliamentary* elections, comparison of several parties, (percentage points)

When observing the data for the conservative and the social democratic parties in each country, Norway, Sweden, and Finland evidently followed a similar pattern, while Denmark did not (Figure 15). In the three former countries, the difference between the mean gender gap in the PRR parties and the gender gap in both the conservative and the social democratic parties was significant (i.e., the gender gaps in the PRR parties were larger). The conservative parties in Norway, Finland, and Sweden had modestly larger mean gender gaps among their listed candidates than the social democratic parties. However, the gender gaps in the conservative parties were closer to the gender gaps in the social democratic parties than to the PRR parties' gender gaps. In Denmark, however, the DF had a smaller mean gender gap (17.5 percentage points) than the Danish Social Democratic party (20.1 percentage points) and a marginally bigger gender gap than the Conservative party (15.1 percentage points). There were only two parties in Denmark that had mean gender gaps of less than 10 percentage points: the Social Liberals (*Radikale Venstre*) (7 percentage points), and the Socialist People's Party (*Sosialistisk Folkeparti*) (8 percentage points) (Table F4, Appendix F).

Listed candidates in municipal elections: PRR versus non-PRR parties' gender gaps

Concerning the gender gap among listed candidates in the *municipal* elections, the results were akin to the results for the parliamentary elections (Figure 16). In Norway, Finland, and Sweden, there was a substantial difference between the mean gender gaps among the PRR parties' listed candidates and the non-PRR parties' gender gap averages. In these three countries, the non-PRR parties' gender gap average ranged from 5.8 percentage points (Norway) to 8.3 percentage points (Finland). In the Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish PRR parties, the mean gender gaps ranged, in contrast, from 22.1 percentage points to 25.4 percentage points. The DF had the smallest mean gender gap of the PRR parties. While the DF's mean gender gap (20.9 percentage points) was larger than the national non-PRR average (18.3 percentage points), the difference was not of the same notable size as in Norway, Finland, and Sweden. The gender gap average among the Danish non-PRR parties' listed candidates was also larger than in the other Nordic countries' non-PRR parties.




Figure 16. Mean gender gap, listed candidates, *municipal* elections, comparison of several parties, (percentage points)

In Norway, Finland, and Sweden, the mean gender gaps were also considerably larger in the PRR parties than in the conservative and social democratic parties (Figure 16). In Sweden and Finland, the conservative and the social democratic parties' respective mean gender gaps were closer in size to each other than they were to the mean gender gaps in the PS and the SD. For example, the Swedish Conservatives' mean gender gap was 12.7 percentage points, based the last three municipal elections, while the Social Democrats' mean gender gap was 3.2 points.

The SD's mean gender gap was, in contrast, 25.4 percentage points. The Conservatives' gender gap was therefore closer in size to the Social Democrats' gender gap than to the SD's. The conservative parties in Norway, Finland, and Sweden had larger mean gender gaps among their listed candidates than the social democratic parties had, but they were by far smaller compared to the PRR parties'. Denmark was again the exception to the general Nordic pattern: the DF's mean gender gap was only marginally larger than the Social Democratic Party's, and somewhat smaller than the Conservative Party's. The mean gender gaps in these three Danish parties were thus of similar size, and the differences between them cannot be considered relevant.

In sum, when examining the mean gender gaps in the electoral arena, there were considerable differences between the PRR parties' mean gender gaps and the gender gap averages in the main non-PRR parties in Norway, Finland, and Sweden. In these states, the mean gender gaps in the PRR parties were significantly larger than both the non-PRR party national averages and the mean gender gaps in the conservative and social democratic parties. Denmark stands out as the Danish non-PRR parties' gender gap average was larger compared to the other Nordic countries' non-PRR parties' gender gap. Moreover, the DF neither displayed a much larger gender gap than the Danish Conservative and Social Democratic Parties nor compared to the non-PRR party average.

4.2.3 RQ2: PRR versus non-PRR parties' gender-representation gaps in the parliamentary arena

The gender gap in the parliamentary arena was investigated by examining the gender gaps among elected representatives of the PRR and non-PRR parties in the last three parliamentary and municipal elections in each Nordic country.

Elected representatives in parliamentary elections: PRR vs. non-PRR parties' gender gaps

The mean gender gaps among the elected representatives of the PRR parties were firstly compared with the gender gap on average for the main non-PRR parties, based on data from the last three *parliamentary* elections. As Figure 17 shows, the PRR parties in Norway, Finland, and Sweden had substantially larger mean gender gaps among their elected representatives compared to the non-PRR parties' gender gap averages. The non-PRR parties' gender gap averages were 6.1 percentage points in Norway, 2.9 points in Finland, and 2.1 points in Sweden. The mean gender gaps in the Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish PRR parties were, in contrast, 26.3, 19.8, and 27.9 percentage points respectively. The mean gender gap

among the elected representatives of the DF (13.4 percentage points) was not much larger than the gender gap on average in the Danish non-PRR parties (11.8 percentage points).




Figure 17. Mean gender gap, elected representatives, *parliamentary* elections, comparison of several parties, (percentage points)

When including the Nordic conservative and social democratic parties, the results display a similar pattern as in the electoral arena. In Norway, Finland, and Sweden, the mean gender gaps among elected representatives in the conservative and social democratic parties were significantly smaller than in the PRR parties (Figure 17). The Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish conservative parties' mean gender gaps were 12, 10.2, and -1.5 percentage points respectively. The social democratic parties' mean gender gaps were 0, -11.2, and 2.3 percentage points respectively. The mean gender gaps in the Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish PRR parties were considerably greater, ranging from 19.8 to 27.9 percentage points. The DF's mean gender gap (13.4 percentage points), however, was only marginally larger than the Danish Conservative Party's mean gender gap (9.7 percentage points) and smaller than the Social Democratic Party's mean gender gap (16.8 percentage points). The DF's mean gender gap was also smaller than the mean gender gap in the largest Danish bourgeois party, the Liberal Party (*Venstre*), which was 17.5 percentage points. The only Danish parties that had notably smaller mean gender gaps than the DF were the Social Liberals (*Radikale Venstre*) and the Socialist People's Party (*Sosialistisk Folkeparti*), with mean gender gaps at -7.2 and -9.25 percentage points respectively (see Appendix F).

Elected representatives in municipal elections: PRR vs. non-PRR parties' gender gaps

The mean gender gaps among elected representatives, based on the last three *municipal* elections, were relatively large (> 20 percentage points) in all PRR parties (Figure 18). In Norway, Finland, and Sweden, the PRR parties' gender gaps were also significantly larger than the gender gaps on average in the non-PRR parties. The Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish non-PRR parties' gender gap averages among elected representatives were 9, 11, and 4.6 percentage points respectively. The mean gender gaps in the FrP, the PS, and the SD were in comparison 23.4, 28.1, and 26.5 percentage points. The DF had a gender gap of 20.8 points, which was relatively close to the Danish non-PRR parties' gender gap average of 18.1 percentage points.




Figure 18. Mean gender gap, elected representatives, *municipal* elections, comparison of several parties, (percentage points)

Next, the same data was included for the conservative and social democratic parties (Figure 18). The results show that while the mean gender gaps in the conservative parties in Norway, Finland, and Sweden were marginally larger than the non-PRR party averages, they were notably smaller than in the PRR parties. The social democratic parties in these three countries had smaller mean gender gaps than the gender gap on average in the non-PRR parties. Denmark diverges again as the DF and the Danish Conservative Party had mean gender gaps of similar size, 20.8 and 21.8 percentage points respectively, which in turn were only modestly larger than the gender gap on average among the non-PRR parties' elected representatives in the Danish municipal elections (18.1 percentage points). The Danish Social

Democratic Party had a smaller mean gender gap (16.9 percentage points) compared to both the non-PRR party average and the PRR and Conservative parties, but this difference was modest. The Danish parties thus had gender gaps of similar size. Only one party, the Socialist People's Party, had a mean gender gap below 10 percentage points (8.3 points) among locally elected representatives (Table F6, Appendix 6). The Danish parties' gender gaps were on average also larger than in the Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish parties.

To conclude, the gender gap in the PRR and non-PRR parties in the parliamentary arena displayed a distinct pattern in Norway, Finland, and Sweden. Here, the gender gap among the PRR parties' elected representatives was remarkably larger compared to both the non-PRR party average and compared to the mean gender gaps in the conservative and social democratic parties. The gender gap was generally larger in the conservative parties than in the social democratic parties in these countries. However, there was still a considerable difference between the smaller gender gap in the conservative parties and the larger gap in the PRR parties. The results for Denmark diverge from this pattern, partly because the gender gap on average was larger among the Danish non-PRR parties' elected representatives than in the other three countries, partly because the DF tended to have a smaller mean gender gap compared with the other Nordic PRR parties.

4.2.4 RQ2: The PRR party effect on the national gender gap averages

To examine whether the gender gaps in the PRR parties have influenced the national gender gap averages in the Nordic countries, the national gender gap averages (including the PRR parties) were compared with the gender gap averages for the non-PRR parties only (excluding the PRR parties).

Internal arena: PRR party effect on the national gender gap averages

In the internal arena, the national gender gap averages, based on all parties' gender gaps in party councils, were larger than the non-PRR parties' gender gap averages (Figure 19). The difference between the national gender gap average and the non-PRR party gender gap average ranged from 3.1 percentage points (Denmark and Norway) to 3.6 points (Sweden) and 5 percentage points (Finland). The larger gender gaps in the PRR party councils had thus led to an increase in the national gender gap averages. The national gender gap average in party leadership was also larger than the non-PRR gender gap average in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden (Figure 20). However, the FrP's smaller gender gap led to a decrease in the

national gender gap average in party leadership, as the national gender gap average was 3.75 percentage points while the non-PRR gender gap average was 11.4 percentage points.




Figure 19. (left) Gender gap average, party councils, all parties vs. non-PRR parties, (percentage points)

Figure 20. (right) Gender gap average, party leadership, all parties vs. non-PRR parties, (percentage points)

Electoral arena: PRR party effect on the national gender gap averages

In the electoral arena, the gender gap was on average smaller when excluding the PRR parties (Figure 21). In Norway and Finland, this difference was larger than 1.5 percentage points, both in the municipal and the parliamentary elections (Figure 21 and Figure 22). The PRR parties’ large gender gaps had thus led to an increase in the national gender gap average in Finland and Norway, or, in other words, to a decrease in the nationwide percentage of women among listed candidates. In Sweden, the difference between the national gender gap average and the non-PRR party gender gap average was small, 0.4 percentage points, based on the last three *parliamentary* elections (difference range: 0.2–0.7 percentage points), and 0.9 percentage points based on the last three *municipal* elections (difference range: 0.7–1.2 percentage points). In Denmark, the difference was not significant (0.3 percentage points on the national level and 0.2 percentage points on the local level).




Figure 21. (left) Gender gap average, listed candidates, *parliamentary* elections, all parties vs. non-PRR parties, (percentage points)

Figure 22. (right) Gender gap average, listed candidates, *municipal* elections, all parties vs. non-PRR parties, (percentage points)

Parliamentary arena: PRR party effect on the national gender gap averages

The difference between the national gender gap average and the non-PRR gender gap average was similarly significant in Norway, Finland, and Sweden in the parliamentary arena (Figure 23 and Figure 24). Concerning the *parliamentary* elections, the gender gap difference was 3.9 percentage points in Norway, 3.3 percentage points in Finland, and 3 percentage points in Sweden, with the national gender gap averages being larger than the non-PRR parties’ gender gap averages (Figure 23). In Denmark, in contrast, the non-PRR parties had a larger mean gender gap (11.8 percentage points) compared to the national average when including the DF (11.7 percentage points). However, this difference was only 0.1 percentage points.




Figure 23. Gender gap average, elected representatives, *parliamentary* elections, all parties vs. non-PRR parties, (percentage points)

Regarding the *municipal* elections, the mean gender gap was 18.1 percentage points when excluding the DF, and 18.3 percentage points when including the DF (Figure 24). In Norway and in Finland, the difference between the national gender gap average and the non-PRR parties' gender gap average was 1.4 percentage points. In Sweden, the difference was 2.1 percentage points.




Figure 24. Gender gap average, elected representatives, *municipal* elections, all parties vs. non-PRR parties, (percentage points)

To summarize, the overrepresentation of men in the Nordic PRR parties generally led to a decrease in the overall percentage of women in the internal, electoral, and parliamentary arenas in the Nordic countries. In Finland and Sweden, this was the case in all arenas. In Norway, it was the case in all arenas but not in party leadership. In Denmark, the DF's large gender gap in the internal arena increased the national gender gap average. However, the DF's gender gap had no marked increasing effect on the national gender gap average in the electoral or parliamentary arenas.

4.2.5 RQ2: Summary of results

The results show that the gender gaps in the PRR parties generally differed from the gender gaps in the non-PRR parties, both in the internal, electoral, and parliamentary arenas.

Regarding the gender gap in party councils, all PRR parties had considerably larger gender gaps both compared to the non-PRR party gender gap averages and compared to the gender gaps in the conservative and social democratic parties. Additionally, the gender gap in party councils was on average larger in the Danish non-PRR parties than in the other Nordic

countries' non-PRR parties, but the DF also had a larger gender gap in their party council than the other Nordic PRR parties had. Concerning party leadership, the DF, the PS, and the SD had large gender gaps, but several non-PRR parties also had similarly large gender gaps. The FrP's negative gender gap in party leadership, however, was smaller compared to many of the other Norwegian parties' gender gaps.

In the electoral and parliamentary arenas, the mean gender gaps in the Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish PRR parties were greater than the gender gaps on average in the non-PRR parties. The gender gaps in the PRR parties were also larger compared to the gender gaps in the conservative and social democratic parties. This was the case both in the parliamentary and municipal elections. Denmark diverged from this pattern as the mean gender gaps in the electoral and parliamentary arenas on average were larger in the Danish non-PRR parties compared to in the other Nordic countries' non-PRR parties. The gender gaps in the DF were consequently similar in size to the other Danish parties' gender gaps.

To obtain a more comprehensive view of the cross-national differences specifically, data from the parliamentary and electoral arenas was combined and mean gender gaps that encompassed listed candidates *and* elected representatives, in the last three municipal *and* parliamentary elections, were calculated, for both the PRR parties, all parties on average, and the non-PRR parties on average. The results in Figure 25 show that the gender gap on average in Danish parties, when combining the electoral and parliamentary arenas and the local and national level, was 16 percentage points. The corresponding percentage points in the other three Nordic countries were 7.5 (Norway), 8.3 (Finland), and 6.3 (Sweden). In the Danish non-PRR parties only, the mean gender gap was 15.8 percentage points. In the non-PRR parties in the other three Nordic countries, the mean gender gap was 5.4 percentage points (Norway), 6.25 points (Finland), 4.7 percentage points (Sweden). Denmark thus had larger national gender gap averages than the other Nordic states. However, out of the Nordic PRR parties, the DF had the smallest gender gap when combining the electoral and parliamentary arenas. The DF's mean gender gap was 18.2 percentage points, compared with 21.6 points in the FrP, 22.5 points in the PS, and 25.3 points in the SD.




Figure 25. Mean gender gap, combined electoral + parliamentary arenas, municipal *and* parliamentary elections, (percentage points)

The same combined mean gender gap, encompassing both the electoral and parliamentary arenas, was calculated for the conservative and social democratic parties (Figure 26). The results show that the Danish Social Democratic Party and the Conservative Party had considerably larger mean gender gaps than their party family counterparts in Norway, Finland, and Sweden. The Danish Social Democratic party’s mean gender gap (18.4 percentage points) also diverged from the other Nordic Social Democratic parties, as these parties had small gender gaps (ranging from 1.7 to 2.3 percentage points).




Figure 26. Mean gender gap, combined electoral + parliamentary arenas, municipal *and* parliamentary elections, comparison of several parties, (percentage points)

4.3 RQ3: The contagion theory

The third research question concerned how the gender-representation gap in the PRR parties have changed over time and if the gender gaps have decreased as these parties have become more mainstream and wanted to maximize their electoral support by gaining more female supporters. The contagion thesis was examined by observing how the PRR parties' gender gaps among listed candidates and in the party councils and party leadership have changed and by assessing if the PRR parties' gender gaps have approached the assumedly smaller gender gaps in the non-PRR parties. The electoral and internal arenas were examined, but not the parliamentary arena, as the contagion effect mainly concerns parties strategically increasing the percentage of women on their candidate lists to better compete with other parties (i.e., parties that already have a higher level of female representation). The internal arena was included as an increase in women in a party's executive branches can be a strategic decision taken to increase the symbolic representation of women in the parties, which by extension may attract more female electoral support. Chapter 4.3.1 demonstrates how the PRR parties' gender gaps in the electoral and internal arenas have changed over time, without comparing them to the gender gaps or gender gap changes in non-PRR parties. Chapter 4.3.2 shows how the PRR parties' gender gap changes compared to the gender gaps in the non-PRR parties.

The Nordic PRR parties have diverging histories, which is important to note. The DF and the FrP, and to a lesser extent the PS, have a longer history of political relevance and electoral success in their respective countries compared to the SD. Concerning "election 1" in Table 4 (i.e., the third latest municipal or general election), the DF, the FrP, and the PS also secured a larger share of seats (12.6, 24.2, and 19.1 % respectively) compared with the SD (5.7 %). In "election 3" (i.e., the latest election), the FrP, the PS, and the SD secured a similar share of seats (range: 16.1–17.5 %), while the DF secured 9.1 percent. The different starting points for the PRR parties, and how this might affect the contagion effect, are addressed in the final discussion of the thesis.

Table 4. PRR parties' share of seats in national parliaments, (%)

PRR party / Election	Election 1 (2009–2011)	Election 2 (2013–2015)	Election 3 (2017–2019)
DF	12.6	21.1	9.1
FrP	24.2	17.2	16.1
PS	19.1	17.7	17.5
SD	5.7	12.9	17.5

4.3.1 RQ3: Changes in the PRR gender-representation gap over time

Internal arena: Changes in the PRR gender-representation gap

Changes in the gender-representation gap in the PRR parties' internal arena was investigated by observing changes in the gender gap in the individual PRR party councils and changes in gender gap in the party leadership, in the period 2011–2021. The gender gap in the PRR parties' party councils fluctuated throughout this period; the gender gap was larger in some party councils and smaller in others (Figure 27). The PRR parties nonetheless consistently had significant gender gaps, with an overrepresentation of men in their party councils. In the DF, the PS, and the SD, the gender gap increased in the last couple of party councils, while it remained on the same level (22.7 percentage points) in the last three FrP party councils. When only comparing how the gender gap changed from the party council in 2011–2012 to the party council in 2020–2021, the gender gap increased markedly in the DF (from 22.7 to 40.9 percentage points) and in the PS (11.5 to 34.6 percentage points) (Figure 27). The gender gap was the same (22.7 percentage points) in the FrP and decreased by 1.3 percentage points in the SD. The gender gap thus did not become smaller in the PRR party councils.




Figure 27. Gender gap in party councils, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

There were also not any significant changes in the gender gap in the PRR party leadership (Figure 28). The FrP, the PS, and the SD had the same party leader from 2011 to 2021. There was consequently no change in these parties' gender gaps. The DF went from having a female to having a male party leader in 2012. The gender gap thus increased by 100 percentage

points. The party had the same male leader 2012–2021. To conclude, there were no significant patterns of decreases or increases in the gender gap in the internal arena for the Nordic PRR parties in the time span examined.




Figure 28. Gender gap in party leadership, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

The electoral arena: Changes in the PRR gender-representation gap

Changes in the gender gap among listed candidates of the PRR parties demonstrated diverging patterns in the Nordic countries (Figure 29). The SD was the only PRR party that had a net decrease (−4,3 percentage points) in the gender gap among listed candidates in the parliamentary elections, from the third latest election (“election 1”) to the latest election (“election 3”). In the DF and the FrP, the gender gap increased from election 1 to election 2 but decreased modestly again in election 3. The DF’s gender gap was 14.1 percentage points in 2011, 19.6 percentage points in 2015, and 18.8 percentage points in 2019. The FrP’s gender gap was 12.5 percentage points in 2009, 15.9 points in 2013, and 14.8 points in 2017. In the PS, the gender gap decreased between the 2011 and 2015 Finnish general election, from 16.8 to 14.7 percentage points, but increased to 18.5 percentage points in 2019.




Figure 29. Gender gap among listed candidates in last three *parliamentary* elections, (percentage points)

The gender gap among listed candidates in the last three *municipal* elections followed a similar pattern (Figure 30). Whereas the gender gap in the SD decreased from 29.8 percentage points in the 2010 election to 21.9 percentage points in 2018, the other PRR parties experienced net increases in their gender gaps, albeit marginal ones. For example, the DF had a gender gap of 20.5 percentage points in 2009, 21.5 percentage points in 2013, and 20.6 points in 2017. The net increase was thus only 0.1 percentage points.




Figure 30. Gender gap among listed candidates in last three *municipal* elections, (percentage points)

To conclude, there were in general no significant decreases in the Nordic PRR parties' gender gaps in the time span studied. Regarding the internal arena, no clear patterns of gender gap changes were identified. The PRR parties' party council gender gaps fluctuated throughout the ten years, but most recently increased, while there were no significant changes in party leadership. In the electoral arena, the SD was the only party that consistently decreased its gender gap, both on the local and national level. In the DF, the FrP, and the PS, the gender gaps remained relatively stable, especially on the local level. The gender gaps both increased and decreased in these parties, but generally only changed marginally.

4.3.2 RQ3: Changes in PRR versus in non-PRR parties' gender gaps

How do the PRR parties' gender gap changes compare to the changes in the Nordic non-PRR parties? And have the PRR parties' gender gaps approached the non-PRR parties' gender gaps over time? To answer this, the PRR parties' gender gap changes in the internal and electoral arena were compared with the gender gap and gender gap changes in the non-PRR parties.

The internal arena: Changes in PRR versus in non-PRR gender gaps

The results in Table 5 show that the gender gaps in the PRR parties' party councils generally neither decreased nor approached the non-PRR parties' (smaller) gender gaps. In the DF and the PS, the gender gap increased from 2011 to 2021. In the PS and the SD, the gender gaps were nevertheless smaller for shorter periods of time (see Table 1). In the PS, the gender gap varied between 8.3 and 11.5 percentage points in 2016–2019. In the SD, the range throughout the ten years was 14.7–23.7 percentage points. However, neither party came particularly close to the gender gap average for the non-PRR parties in 2020–2021, which was –5.7 percentage points in Finland and –5.5 percentage points in Sweden.

Table 5. Gender gap in party councils, 2011 vs. 2021, PRR vs. non-PRR parties, (percentage points)

Year	2011–2012		2020–2021		
Country/Party	PRR Party	PRR Party	Non-PRR parties, total	Conservative Party	Social Democratic Party
Denmark	22.7	40.9	19	28.8	6.25
Norway	22.7	22.7	-2.2	13.6	-2.4
Finland	11.5	34.6	-5.7	15	5.6
Sweden	25	23.7	-5.5	0	-6.7

The PRR parties' gender gaps in party leadership did not change in 2011–2021, apart from in the DF (Table 6–9). However, this was also the case in many of the Nordic conservative and social democratic parties. The non-PRR parties' gender gaps in party leadership decreased when only comparing 2011 with 2021, but notable gender gap decreases mostly occurred in

recent years (Table 6, 8, and 9). The contagion thesis was thus not supported by the results. However, as many of the Nordic conservative and social democratic parties also had large gender gaps in party leadership, there was generally no considerably smaller gender gaps that the PRR parties would necessarily feel pressured to adapt to.

Table 6. Gender gap in party leadership, **Danish parties**, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Difference 2021 vs 2011
DF	-50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	100
Non-PRR parties, total	7.1	-7.1	0	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	-12.5	-19.6
Conservative party	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Social Democratic party	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0

Table 7. Gender gap in party leadership, **Norwegian parties**, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Difference 2021 vs 2011
FrP	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0
Non-PRR parties, total	14.3	0	0	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	0
Conservative party	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0
Labour party	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0

Table 8. Gender gap in party leadership, **Finnish parties**, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Difference 2021 vs 2011
PS	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Non-PRR parties, total	7.1	21.4	21.4	35.7	35.7	7.1	7.1	7.1	-21.4	-21.4	-28.5
Conservative party	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Social Democratic party	-50	-50	-50	50	50	50	50	50	-50	10	0

Table 9. Gender gap in party leadership, **Swedish parties**, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Difference 2021 vs 2011
SD	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Non-PRR parties, total	28.6	28.6	28.6	14.3	0	0	14.3	14.3	0	-14.3	-42.9
Conservative party	50	50	50	-50	-50	-50	50	50	50	50	0
Social Democratic party	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0

Electoral arena: Changes in PRR versus in non-PRR gender gaps, parliamentary elections

Concerning listed candidates in the *parliamentary* elections, the gender gap average in the non-PRR parties decreased from election 1 to election 3 in Denmark, Norway, and Finland, while it increased in these countries' PRR parties (Figure 31–33). The SD's gender gap, in contrast, decreased from election 1 to 3, while the Swedish non-PRR parties gender gap average increased by 0.2 percentage points (Figure 34).

The net increase in the DF's gender gap was 4.7 percentage points from the 2011 to the 2019 parliamentary election. However, the gender gap also increased in the Danish Conservative Party (+2.9 percentage points) and Social Democratic Party (+5.6 percentage points), while the non-PRR parties' gender gap average decreased from 15.5 to 12.6 percentage points (Figure 31). Moreover, while the DF's gender gap did not decrease, it remained on par with the other Danish parties' gender gaps: the DF's gender gap was 18.8 percentage points in 2019, compared to 15.7, 22.3, and 12.6 percentage points in the Conservative Party, Social Democratic Party, and the non-PRR parties combined respectively. A contagion effect was thus difficult to prove; there was no substantially smaller gender gap that the DF could mimic.

In Norway, the gender gap decreased in the Conservative Party (−4.6 percentage points) and in the Labour Party (−0.5 percentage points), as well as on average in the non-PRR parties (−1.7 percentage points) (Figure 32). In the FrP, however, the gender gap increased by 2.3 percentage points from 2009 to 2017. The FrP's gender gap thus did not approach the non-PRR parties' gender gap average, as it remained considerably larger (14.8 percentage points in 2017) compared to the non-PRR parties' gender gap average (−0.6 percentage points in 2017) and increased rather than decreased.

In Finland, the gender gap decreased by 6.2 percentage points in the non-PRR parties combined and by 0.7 and 6.2 percentage points in the Finnish conservative and social democratic parties respectively, while the PS's gender gap increased by 1.7 percentage points. (Figure 33). The gender gap in the PS (18.5 percentage points in 2019) consequently did not approach the gender gap in the non-PRR parties (−0.8 percentage points in 2019).

In Sweden, there was a gender gap net increase in the Conservatives (+1.8 percentage points) and in the Swedish non-PRR parties in general (+0.2 percentage points). The gender gap decreased from election 1 to election 3 in the Social Democrats (−0.4 percentage points) and in the SD (−4.3 percentage points). The SD's gender gap thus gives indications of a contagion effect, as it decreased significantly between election 1 and 2. However, the SD's gender gap

remained notably larger than the gender gap in the other Swedish parties. The SD's gender gap was 19.9 percentage points in 2018 compared to the non-PRR parties' average of 5.8 percentage points. The SD gender gap additionally increased by 0.1 percentage points from the 2014 to the 2018 general election.




Figure 31. (left) Gender gap, listed candidates, **Danish** parliamentary elections, (percentage points)

Figure 32. (right) Gender gap, listed candidates, **Norwegian** parliamentary elections, (percentage points)




Figure 33. (left) Gender gap, listed candidates, **Finnish** parliamentary elections, (percentage points)

Figure 34. (right) Gender gap, listed candidates, **Swedish** parliamentary elections, (percentage points)

Electoral arena: Changes in PRR versus in non-PRR gender gaps, municipal elections

Regarding listed candidates in the *municipal* elections, the changes between election 1 and 3 were generally small. There was a net increase of 0.1 percentage points in the DF while the gender gap on average in the Danish non-PRR parties decreased by 0.8 percentage points

(Figure 35). The DF's gender gap among listed candidates (20.6 percentage points) was also on par with the Conservative and Social Democratic Parties' gender gaps (22.5 and 18.9 percentage points respectively) and not notably larger than the non-PRR parties' gender gap average (17.7 percentage points), in 2017.

In Finland and Norway, the gender gap among the PRR parties' listed candidates on the local level demonstrated marginal change (Figure 36 and Figure 37). The FrP's gender gap was 22.3 percentage points in the 2019 municipal election and had thus increased by 1.1 percentage points since the 2011 election. The gender gap average in the non-PRR parties, in contrast, decreased by 1.4 percentage points and was 5 percentage points in 2019. The PS's gender gap increased marginally (+0.5 percentage points) and was 24.8 percentage points at the time of election 3. There was also a small net increase in the Finnish conservative party's gender gap (+1.3 percentage points), while there were small gender gap net decreases in the Social Democratic Party and on average in the Finnish non-PRR parties (-0.1 and -0.6 percentage points respectively). The PS's gender gap (24.8 percentage points) thus remained significantly larger than the non-PRR parties' gender gap (7.8 percentage points) in 2017.

The SD's gender gap decreased notably by 7.9 percentage points from the 2010 to the 2018 election, while the gender gap decreased marginally in the Swedish non-PRR parties combined (-0.8 percentage points) (Figure 38). The SD's increase in percentage of women on the candidate lists was therefore significant compared to the other Swedish parties. The SD's gender gap nonetheless remained considerably larger (21.9 percentage points) compared to the non-PRR gender gap average (6.7 percentage points) in 2018.




Figure 35. (left) Gender gap, listed candidates, **Danish** municipal elections, (percentage points)
Figure 36. (right) Gender gap, listed candidates, **Norwegian** municipal elections, (percentage points)




Figure 37. (left) Gender gap, listed candidates, **Finnish** municipal elections, (percentage points)
Figure 38. (right) Gender gap, listed candidates, **Swedish** municipal elections, (percentage points)

4.3.3 RQ3: Summary of results

The results generally did not support the contagion thesis. The only PRR party that consistently and significantly decreased its gender gap, and thus got closer to the gender gap in the non-PRR parties in its country, was the SD. The SD’s gender gap decrease was notably larger compared to any decreases in the Swedish non-PRR parties. However, the SD continued to have a markedly larger gender gap than the Swedish non-PRR parties had at the time of the latest election. In the electoral arena, the PRR gender gaps generally increased (apart from SD’s), while the gender gap on average decreased in the non-PRR parties, albeit only modestly. Moreover, while the DF’s gender gap did not decrease in the time span examined, it remained similar in size to the gender gap in the Danish non-PRR parties.

In the internal arena, a contagion effect could generally not be identified. The PRR parties neither increased the share of women in their party councils nor in their party leadership. However, regarding the party leadership, the non-PRR parties were like the PRR parties as several non-PRR parties had male leaders only in the time span studied.

V. Concluding discussion

The first aim of this thesis was to provide a research overview about gender and the populist radical right. This research overview revealed that the gender-representation gap in the PRR parties was the least studied area. The second aim of the thesis was therefore to contribute to this understudied body of research by empirically observing the gender-representation gap in the Nordic PRR parties. With respect to the results reported in chapter IV:4, and what previous research has concluded, the question remains to what extent PRR parties can be called *Männerparteien* with reference to the parties' gender-representation gaps? Moreover, how can existing differences in gender gaps between the Nordic PRR parties be explained?

In this chapter, the results of the empirical study are discussed and interpreted in greater detail. The literature review is not subject to scrutiny in this chapter, as an analysis focusing specifically on the research overview was provided in chapter III. This chapter therefore concentrates on the results and conclusions of the empirical study with respect to the research questions posed in chapter IV. Subchapter 1 summarizes the main findings in relation to the first two research questions with focus on whether the PRR parties can be considered *Männerparteien*. The contagion theory is discussed in the second subchapter and Denmark's position as an outlier in the results is analyzed in the third subchapter. The fourth and fifth subchapters detail the limitations of the empirical study and provide suggestions for future research and conclusive remarks.

1. Are the Nordic PRR parties *Männerparteien*?

1.1 The gender-representation gap in the Nordic PRR parties

Previous research has demonstrated that a gender-representation gap exists in the populist radical right parties (e.g., Högström, 2019; Mudde, 2007; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017). The expected result regarding this study's first research question was therefore that the Nordic PRR parties display a gender-representation exceeding 10 percentage points in most of the political arenas examined. The results of the empirical study also validated the expected results, as substantial gender gaps in the PRR parties were identified. The men to women ratio was generally around 70:30 rather than 60:40 in the Nordic PRR parties, in all political arenas examined. The mean gender gaps in the internal, electoral, and parliamentary arenas also exceeded 10 percentage points in all but one case: in the FrP's party leadership. The gender gaps did not fluctuate significantly in the time span studied. Moreover, there were only a few

cases where the PRR gender gaps were less than 10 percentage points: the PS had a gender gap of 8.3 percentage points in two of its ten party councils and the DF's gender gap among its elected representatives in the 2015 parliamentary election was 9.5 percentage points. There was thus a clear and persistent overrepresentation of men in the Nordic PRR parties, also over time.

Additionally, the overrepresentation of women in party leadership in the FrP does not alter the general conclusion that the Nordic PRR parties, including the FrP, had a significant overrepresentation of men. Only a small number of people were party leaders in the time span studied. A lack of change in leadership during the last ten years thus leads to the gender gap being at extreme ends, for example -50 or 50 percentage points. Additionally, a change from a male to a female leader could affect the percentage significantly. The gender gap in party leadership thereby does not necessarily reveal much about the female representation in a party in general. As party leadership was the only area in which the FrP had a negative gender gap, and since this was due to the FrP having the same female leader during the entire time span, the results still evidenced that the Nordic PRR parties had a low level of female representation.

In general, the gender gaps in the Nordic PRR parties were of similar size in all political arenas, i.e., the gender gap remained at the same level, independently if it concerned listed candidates, elected representatives, or members in the party councils. This indicates robustness in the results. Party leadership was the only area where the gender gaps were at more extreme ends. The gender gap also tended to be modestly larger among listed candidates and elected representatives in the municipal elections compared to in the parliamentary elections. This was the case both on average in the Nordic parties and in the PRR parties specifically. Regarding how women do in municipal versus in general elections, previous research has concluded that while women in some countries do better in local elections, the opposite is true in other countries (Tolley, 2011). Kjær (2010) has moreover concluded that women did better on the national level than on the local level in Sweden, Finland, and Denmark. This study's results thus agreed with Kjær's conclusions, as the women fared better on the national than the local level, not least in the PRR parties. Dahl and Nyrup (2021, p. 221) also offer an explanation to the gender gap difference in general and municipal elections:

“Since a much larger pool of candidates is needed at the local level compared to the national level, we would expect the under-supply of women to be more evident at local elections. This is especially so because local elections receive less

attention and are less transparent and harder for outsiders to observe compared to the national elections where the public pays more attention to the gender balance (Kjær & Kosiara-Pedersen 2018).”

The results also displayed that the same pattern of male dominance exists cross-nationally in the PRR party family in the Nordic region, though to varying degrees and manifestations of gender gaps. The DF tended to have the smallest gender-representation gap while the SD tended to have the largest gender-representation gap. The between-country differences were in some cases major, e.g., regarding the gender gap among elected representatives in the parliamentary elections, where the range was 13.4 percentage points (Denmark) to 27.9 percentage points (Sweden). However, the range was for the most part around 5–7 percentage points when comparing the Nordic PRR parties’ mean gender gaps. The results were also strikingly similar in Norway, Finland, and Sweden; the gender gaps in the FrP, the PS, and the SD diverged parallel ways from the other parties in these countries, with a significantly larger overrepresentation of men.

When only considering the gender balance in the PRR parties, the label *Männerparteien* certainly seems warranted, as none of the parties were within or generally even close to the gender equal ratio. In addition, the large gender gaps in the PRR parties proved to have had a dampening effect on the total level of female representation in Norway, Finland, and Sweden. The overall level of female representation in these countries would thus have been higher if it were not for the PRR parties. This corroborates the results in a previous study by Sundström and Stockemer (2015), which found that when PRR parties had a larger vote share, women’s representation in local councils was negatively affected. However, Denmark did not experience the same notable negative effect on female representation. While the DF had mean gender gaps that were of similar size as in the other Nordic PRR parties, the DF’s gender gaps were typically only marginally larger than the national gender gap averages in Denmark. While the PRR parties in Norway, Finland, and Sweden thus can be regarded as *Männerparteien*, with respect to their overrepresentation of men in all arenas studied, the DF constitutes a more puzzling case, which will be discussed in subchapter 3.

The *second research question* concerned the applicability of Mudde’s (2007) claim that the gender-representation gap is not necessarily much greater in the populist radical right than in conservative right-wing parties in the case of the Nordic states. Another part of this question was how the PRR gender gaps compares to the gender gaps in non-PRR parties, as well as in the social democratic parties, which are placed further to the left on the left-right spectrum

and typically have smaller gender gaps (see e.g., Högström, 2019; Mudde, 2007; Sundström & Stockemer, 2021). The first expectation regarding this question was that one can find a consistent and, relatively speaking, larger gender-representation gap (= more men than women) in the PRR parties than in the non-PRR political parties in the Nordic countries. The second expectation was that the gender-representation gap is greater in the PRR parties compared to in the parties located further to the left on the left-right spectrum (i.e., compared to the social democratic parties), but not necessarily substantially greater than in the parties belonging to the conservative party family, in accordance with Mudde's (2007) line of thought.

The results in this study both bolstered and at times challenged Mudde's (2007) findings. The Nordic PRR parties' gender gaps were on average significantly larger than the gender gaps on average in the non-PRR parties and in the social democratic parties in Norway, Finland, and Sweden. The gender gap differences were typically larger between the PRR and the social democratic parties than between the PRR and the conservative parties, which agrees with previous research that has shown that PRR gender-representation gaps generally are larger than the gender gaps in parties located further to the left on the left-right spectrum (Mudde, 2007). However, the results also showed that the Nordic PRR parties' gender gaps in these countries notably exceeded the gender gaps in the conservative parties. The PRR parties had a markedly larger overrepresentation of men compared to the conservative parties, which, in contrast, often were often within the gender equal balance of 60–40 percent. The results thus disagreed with Mudde's claim that the gender gaps in the PRR parties are not significantly larger compared to the ones in conservative parties.

However, Denmark was an outlier in the results regarding the second research question. The DF tended to have a gender gap of similar size as, or only marginally larger than, the Danish non-PRR parties. The gender gap was on average also greater in the Danish non-PRR parties compared to in the other Nordic countries' non-PRR parties. Additionally, the Danish Social Democratic Party, a party situated to the left on the left-right spectrum, often had slightly larger gender gaps than the DF, thus diverging from the other Nordic countries where the social democratic parties' gender gaps were smaller than the PRR parties'. The Social Democratic Party also had considerably larger gender gaps compared to the other Nordic social democratic parties. Denmark therefore constitutes an intriguing case as the DF had the smallest gender gap on average of the Nordic PRR parties, while the Danish parties had the

largest gender gaps of the Nordic parties. The results regarding Denmark were thus more in line with Mudde's (2007) findings, which will be discussed in greater detail in subchapter 3.

1.2 Why is there an overrepresentation of men in the populist radical right?

The results agreed with previous research that has described an overrepresentation of men on the supply side in the PRR parties (e.g., Högström, 2019; Mudde, 2007). The results also proved that this gender-representation gap exists in the relatively gender equal Nordic countries and that it manifests itself in similar ways cross-nationally in parties belonging to the PRR party family. While the focus of this thesis was not to determine causality, exploring potential explanatory factors for the comparatively larger gender-representation gaps in the PRR parties and for the cross-national differences in the PRR party gender gaps is necessary.

1.2.1 Are gender-electorate gap explanations applicable for the gender-representation gap?

As the literature review in chapter III showed, previous research has concluded that a gender gap exists in the PRR electorate (i.e., in PRR voting) (e.g., Hartevelde et al., 2015; Spierings & Zaslove, 2017). The reasons for women not joining the PRR parties as political candidates or members may coincide with explanations for the lack of women in the PRR electorate. The common denominator is that the PRR parties appear to be less appealing to women compared to men. As concluded in the research overview, scholarly work on the gender-electorate gap has generated ambiguous results and conclusions and has been unable to comprehensively account for the gender gap in voting. Studies have shown that neither ideological reasons alone nor factors like occupation or religion can fully elucidate the gender-electorate gap.

A few studies have nonetheless argued for the political efficacy theory, which suggests that women become more likely to vote for PRR parties as these parties become more mainstream or start having a less extremist image (e.g., Meyer, 2002; Mudde, 2007). This line of argument is somewhat strengthened by Mulinari and Neergaard's interviews with SD women (2017) which describe how the women tended to have similar histories of both realizing that the SD was not the evil part, as portrayed by media, but the morally superior one. Mulinari and Neergaard noted a sense of progressive integration and loyalty to the SD, culminating in the time the women could finally "come out" as SD supporters. If the political efficacy theory was applicable to the supply-side, i.e., that the gender-representation gap decreases as the PRR parties become more mainstream and established, it could theoretically explain why the

gender gap in this study's results was the largest in the SD, the Nordic PRR party with the shortest history of national relevance and thus the least mainstream party, while the gender gap on average was the smallest in the DF, a Nordic PRR party that has been a relevant political actor in national politics for decades. However, this theory would fail to explain why the FrP, which is the oldest of the Nordic PRR parties, still has a large gender-representation gap.

Other studies reviewed in the literature overview have examined socioeconomic factors in explaining the gender gap in PRR voting. While a study by Spierings and Zaslove (2017) found no support for socioeconomic differences between men and women explaining the gender-electorate gap, Immerzeel, Coffé, and van der Lippe (2015) state that structural characteristics, namely employment status, occupational type, and education, partly explain the gender-electorate gap. Such factors could also influence the gender-representation gap in the Nordic countries. For example, it has been shown that a lower level of education is a strong indicator for PRR voting (Immerzeel, Coffé, & van der Lippe, 2015). More women than men are additionally likely to graduate from tertiary education in the Nordic countries (Nordic Co-operation, 2021). This could in turn explain why women are less represented in the Nordic PRR parties. Most of the SD women interviewed by Mulinari and Neergaard (2017) were also employed irregularly or part-time, unemployed, on sick leave, or dependent on welfare due to irregular employment patterns. One can of course not draw any strong conclusions based on interviews with women in the SD only, but Mulinari's and Neergaard's study nevertheless point to socioeconomic factors playing a part in women joining (and not joining) PRR parties.

Whilst the studies on the gender gap among the PRR parties' electorate have been numerous, they have reached no clear consensus as to why more men than women vote for the PRR parties. Therefore, even though there might be similar reasons to both the demand-side and supply-side gender gap in the PRR parties, e.g., socioeconomic and political efficacy differences between men and women, it remains unclear exactly which of these reasons are applicable. This could be an area for future research to investigate.

1.2.2 The PRR gender ideology

Ideological positions and political attitudes alone have been unable to explain gender-electorate gaps in the populist radical right (Immerzeel, Coffé, & van der Lippe, 2015). Women and men vote for these parties for the same ideological reasons, mainly opposition to

immigration (Spierings & Zaslove, 2017). However, differing ideological positions between men and women, or different views on the salience of ideological positions, might nevertheless explain the gender-representation gap. Regarding the gender gap in voting, a study by Hartevelde et al. (2015) has suggested that women find issues related to PRR ideology less important than men. It could thus be a factor that also influences the gender-representation gap. More importantly, the gender ideology of the PRR parties might affect the gender-representation gap as this gender ideology might be less appealing to women than to men. This could in turn explain why fewer women than men are interested in becoming active members and representatives of the PRR parties.

Mudde (2007) suggests that PRR parties simply are not as interested in gender equality as part of their politics compared to other parties, particularly compared to parties on the left. However, previous research has also confirmed that PRR parties typically have traditional conservative views on family relations (e.g., Akkerman, 2015) and they tend to support traditional gender roles, emphasize biological differences between the sexes, and be anti-abortion (Akkerman, 2015; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017). Additionally, the PRR parties are considerably more conservative compared to mainstream conservative parties (Akkerman, 2015). Previous scholarly work has also deduced that the Nordic PRR parties adhere to similar modern traditional or modern conservative views (e.g., Askola, 2019; Meret & Siim, 2013). They do not necessarily question the Nordic dual-breadwinner model or the woman-friendly welfare state, but they advocate for traditional family values and principles, defend and accentuate sex-specific differences, and oppose action that would advance gender equality, e.g., quotas (Askola, 2019; Meret & Siim, 2013; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017). Feminism and gender equality has additionally been met with suspicion in the SD and the PS (Pettersson, 2017), and the PS gender politics have been described as “conservative, if not outright anti-feminist” (Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila, 2017, p. 44).

Moreover, many of the Nordic PRR parties have discussed gender equality as something already achieved, and thus not in need of more attention, in the Nordic countries (e.g., Askola, 2019; Meret & Siim, 2013). They have consequently opposed all forms of preferential treatment or policy action privileging gender (Askola, 2019; Meret & Siim, 2013). The DF and the FrP have had strongly liberal individualist approaches to gender equality, claiming that gender equality must be achieved without state intervention and only regulated by market forces, and that politics that would promote women’s careers would be discriminatory (Meret & Siim, 2013). Moreover, gender ideology has been given no specific place in the SD’s key

policy documents and gender equality policies have been staunchly questioned (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017).

The Nordic PRR parties' conservative and arguably anti-feminist approaches to gender ideology may potentially make the parties less appealing to women compared to men. Men tend to be more optimistic regarding the future of gender equality than women (Horowitz & Fetterwolf, 2020) and less supportive of gender quotas (Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila, 2017) compared to women. While ideology might not be particularly salient for the PRR parties in general or for the PRR parties' potential male members, it could be a critical issue to potential female members.

Gender discourses have moreover been argued to influence women joining the SD. Mulinari and Neergaard's (2014, p. 46) interviews with SD women revealed that these women were "bearers of a particular form of femininity." This form of femininity was in turn difficult to reconcile with the Swedish discourse on gender equality

"...rooted as it is in women's equal participation in the labour market...on the one hand, and double-income households on the other – a discourse that is central for women politicians in all Swedish parties from the Left to Right" (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014, p. 46).

The Swedish hegemonic discourse on gender, and the SD women's marginalization due to not fitting in with this discourse, thus seemed to affect women's decisions to join the SD. Gender ideology could thereby to some extent explain women's (un)willingness to join the populist radical right and why the same large gender gaps are not found in non-PRR parties. Since gender equality has come far in the Nordic countries in quantitative terms, arguably because of sociopolitical debate and collective movements for social development (Niskanen, 2011), gender ideology is possibly more decisive to women in these countries than in other countries, making Nordic women less reluctant to join the PRR parties. This could in turn explain why there were great differences in gender gaps between the PRR parties and the conservative parties in Norway, Finland, and Sweden, differences that Mudde (2007) did not empirically observe in other Western European countries.

Several studies have lastly pointed out that the Nordic PRR parties have started to use gender as an instrument to embrace anti-immigration policies (Askola, 2019; Meret, 2015; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017). The parties do so by considering gender equality as a "national trait" in the Nordic or Western region that immigrants, mostly Muslim immigrants, do not understand

or act in accordance with. By emphasizing that forced marriages, genital mutilation, and the use of headscarves for women are migrant-imposed dangers to the gender equality achieved in the Nordic countries, as well as to the migrant women, the PRR parties have come to incorporate gender equality more in their politics (Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007; Siim & Meret, 2013). They have even become defendants of immigrant women's rights, while still having a pronounced anti-Islamic position (Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007). This switch in attitude to the gender equality debate could in theory also attract more women to the PRR parties. However, as the results in this study identified no significant gender gap changes over time, apart from in the SD, this instrumentalizing of gender in the PRR parties does not seem to have led to an increase in women, at least not in the time span covered in this study.

1.2.3 Voluntary gender quotas

Party elites and executive branches can have a direct effect on the gender-representation gap by, among other things, employing voluntary gender quotas or by considering gender equality when recruiting candidates for elections. Voluntary gender quotas in political parties have been proven to have a positive effect on the percentage of women in parliament (e.g., Rosen, 2017). Dahlerup (2011) states that while no official (legally mandated) gender quotas concerning listed candidates, elected representatives, or members of internal party organs are employed in the Nordic countries, many Nordic parties employ voluntary gender quotas internally in their party organs or, at minimum, consider gender balance when choosing listed candidates and when putting candidates in a certain order on the party lists in elections. Dahlerup (2011, p. 71) adds that not least "in Norway and Sweden the voluntary quota rules of the political parties have had considerable influence on the proportions of nominated and elected women (Freidenvall et al, 2006, table 3.2, pp 71–72)." The Nordic PRR parties, however, have not employed voluntary gender quotas (Alnevall, 2009; Hart, Kovalainen, & Holli, 2009; Langvasbråten, 2009; Niskanen 2011). This could in turn explain the differences in gender gaps between the PRR and non-PRR parties.

As mentioned earlier, the Nordic PRR parties have often argued against intervention and affirmative action in the shape of for example quotas, in addition to pointing out that gender equality is something already achieved. The PRR parties might consequently want to attract women as active members and candidates to increase their electoral support among women. However, they are generally opposed to implementing tools to achieve greater gender balance in their parties and among their politicians. The differences between the PRR parties' low level of female representation and the higher level in the non-PRR parties can therefore be a

result of differences in employing voluntary quotas or considering gender balance. This argument is particularly compelling since all Danish parties have abolished gender quotas (Niskanen, 2011), and that could in turn explain why the same large gender gap differences between the DF and the other Danish parties could not be observed.

However, the results also showed that the Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish conservative parties had significantly smaller gender gaps than the PRR parties, despite not employing voluntary gender quotas (Niskanen, 2011). Voluntary gender quotas alone can therefore not explain the differences in gender gaps. Instead, gender quotas should be seen as part of the greater ideological approach to gender that political parties have. While a party might not employ voluntary quotas, it can still strive for gender balance generally. The Swedish conservative party, for example, does not employ gender quotas, but the large share of women in the party, both as listed candidates, elected representatives, and internally in the party organs, suggest that female representation is important to and prioritized by the party. In Finland, the norm in most mainstream parties has similarly been to nominate at least 40 percent women for different elections (Hart, Kovalainen, & Holli, 2009). Voluntary gender quotas, in addition to the party's general approach to gender balance, can therefore be useful to consider when investigating the gender-representation gap.

The SD also stands out from the other Nordic PRR parties in this respect, as it has taken some formal measures to increase its share of women, albeit not voluntary quotas. In 2014, the SD included “a more pronounced and developed political programme on gender issues, advocated by a new gender-equality representative of the party, who, following accusations of antifeminism, defined herself as “essentialist feminist”” (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017, p. 16). To secure stronger support from women, the party announced new policies, e.g., “the right to full-time employment for women, who are often forced directly or indirectly to take part-time jobs, and parliamentary lists containing more women candidates (15 % to 22 %)” (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017, p. 16). When comparing the SD's and the PS's female politicians' views on gender, Pettersson (2017, p. 19) showed that the SD women were more ambivalent and not as “unanimously anti-feminist” as the PS women. Pettersson argued that this was a result of the SD having to negotiate their views against a strong feminist movement, whereas a similarly strong movement did not exist in Finland. The SD still has a large gender gap compared to the other PRR parties, but the party's actions to increase its share of women may have led to the gender gap decreasing in the last elections.

1.2.4 Electoral system effect on the gender-representation gap

Another potential structural factor that could affect the gender-representation gap is the type of electoral system. The Nordic countries all employ proportional representation (PR) systems through which parties and candidates are elected. However, they employ different types of PR systems. In Finland, voters can only cast personal votes (Hopmann & Karlsen, 2021). Denmark, Norway, and Sweden employ different open or semi-open party list systems, which means that voters can vote for a party, and consequently on the party's preferred order of candidates to be elected, but they can also give a preference vote to the candidate on the party list that they prefer (Hopmann & Karlsen, 2021). The practical effect of the preferential voting on candidates differs in each country. Denmark utilizes an open list-system where personal votes cast usually matter (Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2017). Here, the parties can choose whether they employ fully open lists or semi-closed lists. Sweden has semi-open lists where the preferential votes rarely affect the order of elected candidates, while preferential votes in Norway in practice have no consequence at all, as half of a party's voters must want to change the political party's candidate list in order for the preference votes to alter the list (Hopmann & Karlsen, 2011). The gender gap among elected representatives is consequently fully a result of the voters' decisions in Finland and partly a result of the voters' decisions in Denmark, while it is mainly a result of decisions by the party elite in Sweden and especially in Norway. In this study, however, the electoral system did not seem to notably affect the results as there were no significant differences between the gender gap among listed candidates and the gender gap among elected representatives.

While a study by Golder et al. (2017) concluded that more open systems (i.e., open lists with preference voting and panachage elections, with the possibility of casting preference votes across different parties) were associated with more votes for women, the results here did not reflect the same tendency of voter demand for female candidates outpacing elite demand. The PS, for example, generally had a larger gender gap among its elected representatives than among its listed candidates, on both the national and local level. This demonstrates that the Finnish voters prioritized women less than the PS party elite did. In the SD, on the other hand, the gender gap among elected representatives decreased while the gender gap among listed candidates remained the same, indicating that the SD party elite prioritized women and placed them higher up on their party lists in later elections. Kjær and Krook (2019, p. 449) have argued that in the case of Denmark:

“...voters – especially on the right – do compensate for negative bias on the part of elites. In the case of the Danish People’s Party, preference voting reduced the overall gap to -1.5 , suggesting that voters sought to correct the strong bias in favor of men”.

This can arguably be seen in this study’s results regarding national elections where the DF’s gender gap among elected representatives was smaller (13.4 percentage points) than among the listed candidates (17.5 points). However, on the local level, the gender gap difference was only 0.1 percentage points between DF’s listed candidates and elected representatives. Thus, both PRR voters and PRR party elites seem to prefer male representatives.

It could theoretically also be argued that the smaller gender gap in the DF, compared with the gender gaps in the other PRR parties, is an effect of the Danish voters being able to cast personal votes and thus voting more women in, which the study by Golder et al. (2017) suggests. However, as the gender gap in the PS in Finland, the Nordic country that provides its citizens with the most potential to vote women in, was not smaller compared to the other PRR parties’ gender gaps, this would be a premature conclusion. This study also did not include data on whether the DF employed open or semi-closed lists in the past elections, which would have to be researched to shine further light on the effect of the electoral system on the gender gap in the PRR parties.

Lastly, the Nordic countries employ varying legal electoral thresholds for election to the national parliaments (Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2018). Electoral thresholds mean that a party must receive a certain percentage of the total vote to obtain a seat in the parliament. The Nordic countries have the following electoral thresholds: 4 percent (Norway and Sweden), 2 percent (Denmark), and no electoral threshold (Finland) (Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2017). Norris (2005) has concluded that lower electoral thresholds facilitate the share of seats won by populist radical right parties. This could also affect the gender-representation gap in the parliamentary arena. If a PRR party can secure a greater share of seats, it could have a positive effect on the percentage of women obtaining seats if these women were on the candidate lists, but not at the top of them. However, in the results of the empirical study, there were no clear differences between the PRR gender gaps in the Nordic countries with higher and with lower electoral thresholds.

1.3 Summary: Are the PRR parties *Männerparteien*?

The results indicate that an overrepresentation of men exists in all Nordic PRR parties. In Norway, Finland, and Sweden, this overrepresentation was also significantly larger than in the non-PRR parties. The label *Männerparteien* thus seems relevant for the PRR parties, at least in Norway, Finland, and Sweden, based on the level of female representation in the last three parliamentary and municipal elections as well as in the party councils and party leadership. No other explanations were additionally identified (effect of electoral systems, quotas, etc.) that could explain the notably larger gender gaps in the PRR parties compared to in the non-PRR parties. The DF cannot as easily be considered a “men’s party,” as the DF’s gender gaps were not markedly larger compared to the Danish parties’ gender gaps on average. The DF nevertheless had significant gender gaps that were often on par with the gender gaps in the other Nordic PRR parties and could thus arguably still be considered a *Männerpartei*.

2. The Contagion theory: Have the PRR parties’ gender gaps decreased over time?

The third research question focused on how women’s political representation in the PRR parties has evolved over time, and whether a contagion effect can be observed. This contagion effect would entail that the populist radical right parties have strategically adapted their level of female representation to the (higher) level of other parties to maximize their electoral support. Högström (2019) theorizes that as a PRR party quickly increases its support, there might be an initial negative effect on the percentage of female representatives in politics as the gender-representation gap in the PRR parties is larger than in other main parties. Högström then suggests that a contagion effect occurs where the PRR parties increase their percentage of women as they become more mainstream, which means that the percentage of women increases over time.

The expectation concerning the contagion theory was that as the PRR parties have become more mainstream in their respective Nordic country, they have increased the percentage of women primarily among the parties’ listed candidates, but also in the party councils and party leadership, to approach the percentage of women in other main parties and thereby maximize their electoral support. It was consequently hypothesized that as the PRR parties have become more established or secured more seats in parliament, their gender gap has decreased to come closer to the gender gap sizes in the other main parties. An important aspect here was that the PRR parties in Norway and Denmark have a longer history of electoral success and

popularity. It can therefore be argued that the DF and the FrP as more mainstream in their respective countries, to begin with, compared with the SD and the PS.

Considering the gender gap changes in each Nordic PRR party, the results generally did not support the contagion theory. A clear and consistent gender gap decrease was nevertheless observed in the SD, especially among the party's listed candidates throughout the last three local and general elections. Since the other main Swedish parties had notably smaller gender gaps on average that the SD could adapt to, the results arguably reflect a contagion effect in Sweden, where the SD has adapted the party's percentage of women so that it has approached the level of female representation in the other Swedish main parties. The decreases in the SD's gender gaps were also significantly larger than the gender gap changes in other Swedish non-PRR parties. They moreover occurred as the SD gained more electoral support and secured more seats in the national parliament, which supports the contagion thesis.

The gender gaps in the DF, the FrP, and the PS, however, only changed marginally in the period studied. In fact, the gender gaps tended to slightly increase rather than decrease in these parties. In Norway and Finland, the gender gaps in the FrP and the PS remained notably larger than the gender gaps in the main non-PRR parties. In Denmark, the starting point was different as the main non-PRR parties in Denmark had gender gaps of similar size as the DF. The gender gaps also did not change notably, neither in the DF nor in the other main Danish parties. It was therefore not possible to prove a contagion effect in Denmark based on the data collected, as there was no higher level of female representation in the other parties that the DF could adapt to. However, that does not necessarily mean that a contagion effect has not taken place earlier in Denmark.

The results regarding the contagion theory can be viewed from another perspective. The FrP and the DF, and to some extent the PS, can be considered more mainstream and more established than the SD to begin with. The three former PRR parties have existed for a longer period of time than the SD and have secured more seats on average in the last three general elections. These three parties also had a greater share of secured seats at the time of "election 1" compared to the SD. A contagion effect can possibly have taken place earlier in these more established and mainstream PRR parties. This could in turn explain why the SD had the largest gender gap of the PRR parties. As the SD is the youngest, electorally relevant, party of the four Nordic PRR parties, it could be theorized that the party is only now in the process of adapting its gender equality ratio to the one in other main Swedish parties.

This line of thought certainly could explain the gender gap patterns seen in Denmark and Sweden: The DF would then have stabilized its gender gap at a smaller size that is comparable to the gender gap average in Danish parties, while the SD is still in the process of doing so. The percentage of women among listed candidates in the DF did indeed increase from 22 percent to 29 percent in the 2001 to 2007 (Fiig, 2009). This percentage has also remained above 30 percent in the last three elections. This could hint at a possible contagion effect having taken place earlier, when the DF was a newer, less established party, with the share of women stabilizing at the current level.

However, this explanation is not as convincing when attempting to explain the gender gap patterns observed in the Norwegian and Finnish PRR parties. The Norwegian FrP is older than the DF and has secured a large proportion of seats in the last three national and local elections in Norway. The gender gap in the FrP has despite this remained ostensibly larger than in the other Norwegian parties and showed no tendency of approaching these parties' gender gaps in the results of this thesis. The gender gap in the PS has similarly displayed no indications of decreasing over time or mimicking the level of female representation in other Finnish main parties. As this study did not include data going further back in time for the FrP and the PS, it is not possible to say that an adaptation of the level of female representation has not occurred earlier in the Norwegian and Finnish PRR parties. However, the gender gaps in the FrP and the PS evidently continue to be significantly larger than in the other main Norwegian and Finnish parties.

Additionally, it remains to be seen if the SD will continue to decrease its gender gap in the next few elections. If the gender gap stabilizes at the current level in the SD, it is possible that the Nordic PRR parties do adapt to the gender balance of other main parties, but only to a certain, arguably quite small, degree. This occurrence could be seen in light of the saturation theory, which holds that female representation in general stagnates at a point where both women and men, both in the party organizations that nominate candidates and among the voters, are satisfied with the present level of female representation (Kjær 2001). This theory has been criticized for not being empirically tested enough and because the level of female representation seems to stagnate at different levels in different contexts (Niskanen, 2011). However, it could be a helpful framework through which one can view and investigate the contagion effect in the PRR parties. Potentially, these parties adapt their level of female representation to that of other parties, as seen in the case of the SD, but are arguably satisfied at a considerably lower level than most non-PRR parties. This is an area that future research

could investigate by examining how the gender balance in the Nordic PRR parties has evolved during a longer period of time than this study did.

There might also be other explanations as to why the gender gap has decreased in the SD but not in the other Nordic PRR parties. This could be a result of (1) gender equality having a different status in Sweden compared to in the other Nordic countries and thus creating stronger incentives to increase the percentage of women, and (2) the SD's actions and decisions to promote women's role internally. The results show that the percentage of women in the electoral and parliamentary arenas generally was on a similar level in Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish parties, but Sweden was nevertheless the only country where the average percentage of women consistently was above 40 percent in the last three local and general elections. Additionally, Borchorst (2008, p. 38) emphasizes the differences between Sweden, on the one hand, and Norway and Denmark, on the other: "Gender equality as a political project has been more consistent in Sweden than in the two other countries..." From that perspective, Sweden has arguably come the furthest concerning implementing gender equality as a political project, which in turn could explain why the SD is more pressured to increase its share of women compared with the PRR parties in the other Nordic countries. This perspective is strengthened by Pettersson's (2017) comparative study of women in the PS and the SD, which demonstrated that the SD women tended to be more ambiguous and less overtly anti-feminist compared to the PS women, as a result of having to negotiate their views with a strong feminist movement that did not exist in Finland.

Secondly, the SD has also promoted gender equality internally and in their politics since 2014 (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017), which in turn may have attracted more women to become active in the party, but also led to the party prioritizing women when putting candidates on their party lists in elections. In Denmark, in contrast, gender balance is far from being achieved in all Danish parties. The debate on gender equality is also largely absent in Denmark, especially compared to in other Nordic countries (Niskanen, 2011), which will be discussed more in the next part of this chapter.

To conclude, the Nordic PRR parties generally seem to have reached a plateau regarding female representation. Besides in the SD, the gender gap in the Nordic PRR parties did not change considerably in the last three local and general elections. A contagion effect could consequently not be proved, but future research could benefit from investigating the percentage of women in the PRR parties further back in time. Within the scope of this study, measures that the PRR parties may have taken to attract female members and candidates were

not analyzed. Future research could thus also investigate the recruitment practices of the PRR parties. Examining the recruitment practices overall is important as it is generally the political parties that have “monopoly on nominating the candidates to be presented to the voters” (Dahlerup, 2011, p. 69). Another aspect that could be studied is to what extent the women in the PRR parties are related (siblings, spouses, children etc.) to male PRR politicians, since Mudde (2007) has claimed that this is a common, and particular, phenomenon in PRR parties.

3. The Danish exception

Denmark frequently diverged from the other Nordic countries in the results. The Danish results were also paradoxical: the gender gap in the DF was generally the smallest of the Nordic PRR parties, while the gender gaps in the Danish parties on average were significantly larger than in the other Nordic countries’ parties. There are a few potential explanations for this.

First, conclusions in previous research about gender in Danish politics need to be addressed. The fact that the gender balance in Danish parties is more skewed, with men significantly outnumbering the women, compared to in the other Nordic countries has been discussed by both Dahlerup (2011) and Melby et al. (2008). Melby et al. (2008) argue that while official gender-equality policies have been developed in Sweden and Norway (Finland was not included in the study), the same has not occurred in Denmark. Similarly, Christensen (2008, p. 187) has pointed out that “several studies have shown that, since the mid-1980s, gender policies have been more anonymous and more antagonistic in the Danish public sphere than in the Norwegian and the Swedish (Bergqvist et al, 1999; Fiig, 2003).” Christensen (2008, p. 187) adds that the label “feminism” is more negatively loaded in Denmark compared to in Sweden and Norway: “In Sweden the predominant attitude is that equality is far from achieved, and most political parties promote themselves as feminist. In Denmark the debate is much more ambiguous and ambivalent, and the Danish parties focus very little on equality and do not see themselves as feminist.” The lack of debate about the low percentage of women in politics has moreover been argued to be an important factor explaining the stagnation of female representation (Dahlerup, 2011). Therefore, several factors have been identified as making the hegemonic discourse on gender equality in Sweden, Norway, and Finland different from the one in Denmark. The saturation theory, which was mentioned earlier, has also mainly been applied in Denmark to explain the stagnating level of female

representation, as the level of female representation has not stagnated at similarly low levels in the other Nordic countries.

The smaller share of women in Danish parties and politics overall explains why the DF's gender gap is on par with the Danish parties' gender gap averages. However, this does not explain why the DF generally had smaller gender gaps when compared with the other PRR parties. It is important to mention that the DF's gender gaps were not significantly smaller than the other PRR parties' gender gaps, but it was nonetheless a recurring pattern that the DF's gender gap was the smallest. It also seems paradoxical that the PRR party in the country with the largest gender gaps on average would have the smallest gender gap of all the Nordic PRR parties. However, this same pattern has been documented regarding the gender-electorate gap, i.e., the gender gap among the PRR electorate. Givens (2004) found that being a woman did not have a significant effect on populist radical right voting in Denmark. Immerzeel, Coffé, and van der Lippe (2015) also found that there was only a minor gender gap among PRR voters in Denmark, while the gender gap was significant in Norway.

The small gender gaps in the DF might therefore potentially be related to the debate on gender equality largely being missing in Denmark. Since the Danish political parties in general do not emphasize or praise gender equality, the DF's stances on the subject could in this context be considered less 'extreme' and controversial, especially compared to the FrP, the SD, and the PS. The latter three PRR parties have diverged more considerably and noticeably from the ideological positions with respect to gender that the main parties in their respective countries have adopted (Melby et al., 2008; Pettersson, 2017). Consequently, the FrP, the SD, and the PS might seem more 'anti-women', compared to the DF, even if no actual significant differences between how these four parties view and relate to the gender equality discourse exist. This could, in turn, explain why women in Norway, Finland, and Sweden are less inclined to join the PRR parties than women are in Denmark. The DF might simply be regarded as a better option for women in Denmark due to the other Danish parties being equally bad as regards gender equality, or, in some cases, even worse.

Another factor that could explain the DF's comparatively smaller gender gaps is the influence of the former party leader and party co-founder Pia Kjærsgaard. Having a female leader has in the case of France and the National Rally opened the party especially to women (Dubslaff, 2017). Ladam et al. (2018) have moreover argued that prominent women in politics serve as role models for other women who are interested in political careers, inspiring them to run for office, and Sundström and Stockemer (2021) have found that parties with a female leader

have a significantly larger share of female MEPs than parties with male leaders. It could thus be argued that Kjærsgaard, who led the DF from the party's inception in 1995 until 2012, has inspired more women to join the DF compared with the PRR parties in the other Nordic countries. Kjærsgaard's time as party leader exceeds the Norwegian FrP's Siv Jensen's time as leader by several years, which could explain why a similarly strong effect has not been observed in Norway.

While Meret (2015) has analyzed the role of Kjærsgaard in detail, no study has examined the effect Kjærsgaard has had on Danish women specifically. Meret (2015, p. 96) nevertheless concludes that:

“Pia Kjærsgaard also offers an alternative to the Scandinavian model of womanhood and motherhood associated with gender equality and ‘overall’ liberal feminist approaches to questions of gender. She is portrayed as the responsible and caring mother, who stayed at home to take care of her children until they grew up, before becoming the mother of a whole party that she ‘gave birth to’ and cared for until it was well rooted in Danish politics.”

While Michel et al. (2020) have shown that voters' evaluation of PRR leaders are significantly associated with voting for PRR parties, more so than for other parties' voters, Meret's (2015) study claims that Kjærsgaard has not influenced the voting for the DF at all, and that one should thus not overstate the role of her leadership in gaining support. Considering the large gender gap in the DF's party councils over the past ten years, one cannot see a clear effect of having had a female leader on the gender gap in that internal structure. Kjærsgaard might nevertheless have inspired women to join the DF as members and listed candidates or encouraged the party to have other recruitment practices concerning women compared to the other Nordic PRR parties.

To conclude, there are several potential explanations that can explicate why the gender gap differences between the Danish PRR party and the other Danish main parties, are not as remarkable as in the other Nordic countries. This chapter has offered a few suggestions, but additional research must be conducted to provide more elaborate explanations. Another interesting aspect of the Danish position as an outlier is that Denmark fits Mudde's descriptions of the PRR party gender gaps better than the other Nordic PRR parties do. Mudde's (2007) argument that the gender gap in the PRR parties is not significantly larger than in other parties, particularly compared to conservative right-wing parties, fits the Danish

situation, as the DF's gender gaps on average were not far removed from the gender gaps in other parties. This could indicate that Denmark, in this respect, is more closely related to countries in central Europe than to the Nordic countries. Considering that Denmark also reflects the EU average of representation of women at the local level (Dahl & Nyrup, 2021) and that the level of female representation has stagnated at a similar level in the Netherlands (Dahlerup, 2011), the gendered aspects of Danish politics possibly resemble the continental European countries more than the other Nordic countries.

4. Limitations of the study and suggestions for future research

4.1 Limitations of the study

A few limitations of the study need to be addressed. First, some of the decisions taken to limit the scope of the study also limited the analysis of the data. The gender gaps in party councils, to give an example, were not observed over time for the Nordic non-PRR parties. It was consequently not possible to compare changes in the PRR parties' party council gender gaps over time with the gender gaps in the non-PRR parties. The PRR parties' party council gender gaps were compared with the gender gaps in the non-PRR parties' party councils in 2020–2021. However, it was not possible to apprehend how representative the gender composition in the most current party council was for how this gender composition had been in the non-PRR parties in the last ten years.

Another limitation of the study was that it did not cover a longer time span. This mostly affected the possibility to assess the contagion effect more thoroughly. By only focusing on the last three parliamentary and municipal elections, and the internal arena in the last ten years, it was merely possible to examine the contagion thesis in recent time. As the DF and the FrP have been electorally relevant and had influence on national politics for several decades, while the SD and the PS have shorter histories of electoral success, it thus remained hypothetically possible that a contagion effect has occurred at an earlier point in time in the older PRR parties. Moreover, the results showed that most parties, including the PRR parties, change party leaders infrequently. Covering party leadership in a time span larger than the last ten years may have presented a more comprehensive overview of the gender gap in party leadership.

Third, while data was collected on the gender gap in all the main parties in the Nordic countries, the comparative analysis was limited to the PRR parties, the conservative parties, the social democratic parties, and to the non-PRR parties combined. A limitation of the study

was consequently that it did not provide a more inclusive comparison between all nationally electorally relevant parties, which potentially could have revealed new and different insights than the ones achieved here. Moreover, the decision to categorize the DKF (*Det Konservative Folkeparti*) as the main Danish conservative party instead of the largest Danish bourgeois party, Venstre, can be questioned. In terms of ideological position, this decision was not of major importance as both the DKF and Venstre have conservative right-wing positions. However, as the DKF is a smaller party, the gender gaps observed in the party were based on smaller sample sizes than would have been the case with Venstre. Hence, the DKF was statistically more sensitive to small changes in the gender composition among listed candidates and elected representatives than Venstre. The DKF was also smaller compared to the other Nordic conservative parties used in the study.

4.2 Suggestions for future research

What should future research focus on in relation to the gender-representation gap in the PRR parties? First, and in reference to the limitations of the study established above, future quantitative research should investigate the contagion theory by examining changes in the PRR parties' gender gaps over a longer period of time. Such a study could also elaborate on the internal arena by firstly collecting data on the changes in the non-PRR parties' party councils and secondly investigating the gender gap in party *membership*.

Another possibility is to do a large-N comparative study that not only compares the gender-representation gap in the Nordic countries, but in all Western and Northern European countries. Such a study could illustrate how the gender-representation gap in the Nordic PRR parties compares to the gender gaps in the PRR parties in continental Europe. Such research could also reveal if the gender-representation gap in the Danish PRR party resembles the gender gaps in the PRR parties in Central or Western Europe more than the gender gaps in the other Nordic PRR parties.

Additionally, more studies of qualitative nature, investigating *why* there is a larger gender-representation gap in the PRR parties compared to in the other non-PRR parties, are necessary. Thus far, few studies have explored why less women than men are active members and politicians, both in the PRR parties generally, and in the Nordic PRR parties specifically. Future research could thus include interviews with women in the Nordic PRR parties to establish what has motivated them to join PRR parties. Such interviews could also test Mudde's (2007) thesis that a relatively large share of women who are active in the PRR

parties are somehow related to men who are members and politicians in these parties. Additionally, interviews could be conducted with the party elites in the PRR parties, to observe their attitudes to and opinions on gender equality in the parties' internal, electoral, and parliamentary arenas, as well as to examine their recruitment practices.

5. Conclusive remarks

To conclude, this thesis firstly provided a research overview of the scholarly work conducted on gender and the populist radical right. The overview identified that the research gap in this research area was the greatest when it came to the supply-side and the gender-representation gap. An empirical study was secondly conducted to contribute to this understudied body of research by investigating the gender-representation gap in the Nordic PRR parties and how this gap has changed over time. The results showed that the Nordic PRR parties generally had large gender-representation gaps. In Norway, Finland, and Sweden, the gender gaps were also considerably greater in the PRR parties than in the non-PRR parties on average, as well as compared to the gender gaps in the social democratic and conservative parties. The DF was an outlier in the results as its gender-representation gap, despite being of similar size as the other Nordic PRR parties' gender gaps, also was on par with the gender-representation gaps in the other main Danish parties. Lastly, the results did not support the contagion thesis as the PRR parties' gender-representation gaps did not decrease, apart from in the Sweden Democrats.

Summary in Swedish – Sammanfattning på svenska

Avhandlingens titel på svenska:

Manspartier i jämställda oaser – skillnader i manlig och kvinnlig representation i de nordiska populistiska radikalhögerpartierna

1. Introduktion

Sedan augusti 2021 leds två av de fyra nordiska populistiska radikalhögerpartierna – Fremskrittspartiet och Sannfinländarna – av kvinnor. Det är därmed endast Sverigedemokraterna som inte haft en kvinnlig partiledare, eftersom Dansk Folkeparti under många år leddes av Pia Kjærsgaard. Ändå kopplas denna partifamilj primärt ihop med karismatiska manliga ledare så som Jean Marie Le Pen (Nationell samling, Frankrike), Jörg Haider (Frihetspartiet, Österrike) och Carl I Hagen (Fremskrittspartiet, Norge). Forskning har också visat att partifamilj har en inverkan på andelen kvinnor som partierna representeras av i riksdagen (Sundström & Stockemer, 2021). Populistiska radikalhögerpartier (PRH-partier) har bevisats ha en större överrepresentation av män i jämförelse med vänsterpartier (t.ex. Mudde, 2007; Rashkova & Zankina, 2017). Denna överrepresentation av män, både bland de som röstar på PRH-partierna och bland de som är aktiva som medlemmar och ledamöter i dessa partier, har lett till att partierna kallas för *Männerparteien* – manspartier (Mudde, 2007). Forskning om genus och den populistiska radikalhögern har blivit vanligare under det senaste årtiondet, men forskare har samtidigt påpekat att det finns forskningsluckor, i synnerhet gällande forskning kring hur könsrepresentationen ser ut i PRH-partierna. Även om många har en bild av att denna partifamilj domineras av män, är detta något som inte granskats i så många empiriska studier (Mudde, 2007). Det är också därför som de kvinnliga partiledarna i Norden intresserar. Kan det vara så att PRH-partierna inkluderar fler kvinnor desto mer väletablerade och framgångsrika de är? Och finns det könsskillnader i den deskriptiva representationen i populisthögerpartierna i Norden?

Studier som berör kvinnornas representation i politiken behandlar ofta tre olika former av representation: deskriptiv representation, substantiell representation och symbolisk representation (se Pitkin 1967). Deskriptiv representation berör andelen kvinnor som representeras i olika politiska organ och utgår generellt från premissen att eftersom kvinnor utgör drygt 50 procent av befolkningen så ska kvinnor finnas representerade i olika beslutsfattande organ i ungefär samma utsträckning som män. Den substantiella

representationen handlar om vilka konsekvenser som en ökad närvaro av kvinnor i politiken faktiskt får, det vill säga bland annat vilka förändringar som kvinnliga politiker för med sig (Lawless, 2004). Den symboliska representationen handlar om de attityd- och beteendeeffekter som kvinnors närvaro i politiska maktpositioner överför på kvinnliga medborgare (Lawless, 2004). Studier har också visat att feministiska och vänsterorienterade partier har varit ledande förespråkare för kvinnors intressen i parlamentet, med kvinnliga representanter som är mer sannolika än deras manliga kollegor att föra fram kvinnors problem och förespråka kvinnorörelsens agenda (Celis & Erzeel, 2015). Detta påpekar vikten av att undersöka kvinnors representation i olika partier, inte minst i de populistiska radikalhögerpartierna.

När man enbart studerar partiledarna för PRH-partierna i dag kan man ifrågasätta begreppet *Männerparteien*. Andra PRH-partier, exempelvis Nationell samling i Frankrike och Australiens One Nation, leds också av kvinnor. Men medan kvinnligt ledarskap bevisats ha en positiv effekt på andelen kvinnor bland partiets riksdagsledamöter (Sundström & Stockemer, 2021), är det oklart om överrepresentationen av män i PRH-partierna, till exempel bland dessa partiets riksdagsledamöter, kommunfullmäktigeledamöter och i partiernas styrande organ, också minskat.

1.2 Syften och tillvägagångssätt

Denna pro gradu-avhandling har två olika syften. Det första syftet är att ge en fördjupad litteraturöversikt över området genus och populistiska radikalhögern och utröna vilka kunskapsluckor som finns. I litteraturöversikten beskrivs och behandlas tre olika delar av forskningen kring genus och den populistiska radikalhögern. Det andra syftet är att bidra till att krympa den största forskningsluckan inom området genom att empiriskt studera könsrepresentationsklyftan ("gender-representation gap") i de nordiska populistiska radikalhögerpartierna. Den empiriska studien undersöker därför könsklyftan ("gender gap") bland dessa partiets kandidater, ledamöter, partistyrelsemedlemmar och partiledare. Dessa skillnader i könsrepresentation undersöks på olika politiska arenor (se Sjöblom, 1968), på både nationell och lokal nivå. Könsklyftorna undersöks också över en längre period för att ta reda på om PRH-partierna har anpassat sin nivå av kvinnorepresentation till nivån i de övriga nordiska partierna, vilket skulle innebära att en så kallad "smittoeffekt" ("contagion effect") har ägt rum (Högström, 2019). Skillnaderna i männens och kvinnornas representation i PRH-partierna jämförs med motsvarande skillnader i övriga icke-PRH-partier i de nordiska länderna.

Den empiriska delen av avhandlingen har fokus på könsrepresentationsklyftorna i de populistiska högerpartierna i specifikt Norden av flera anledningar. De nordiska länderna har först och främst sett framväxten av populistiska högerpartier – Dansk Folkeparti (DF), Fremskrittspartiet (FP), Sannfinländarna (SAF) och Sverigedemokraterna (SD) – under de senaste 40–50 åren, med Island som enda undantag (Herkman & Jungar, 2021; Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). Dessa fyra partier har under de senaste årtiondena alla fått invalda ledamöter i sina respektive nationella parlament, vilket gör att de kan studeras ur ett komparativt perspektiv. De nordiska länderna har också generellt upplevt framväxten av partier som tillhör samma partifamiljer (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014; Nedergaard & Wivel, 2017). De nordiska länderna har haft en partimodell bestående av fem partier: ett vänster-/kommunistparti, ett socialdemokratiskt parti, ett agrarparti, ett liberalt parti och ett konservativt parti. I dag har de flesta nordiska länderna sett en ökning av partier som hör till de kristdemokratiska och gröna partifamiljerna, utöver partier som hör till den populistiska radikalhögern. Denna snarlika partipolitiska utveckling möjliggör jämförande av könsrepresentationen i PRH-partier med könsrepresentationen i icke-PRH-partier som liknar varandra i Norden. De nordiska länderna liknar också varandra på andra sätt, till exempel genom att alla har den ”Nordiska modellen”, vilket innebär de sociala och ekonomiska policyer som associeras med den nordiska välfärdsstaten och att erbjuda sina medborgare en liknande livskvalitet (Simon, 2017). De nordiska länderna har även liknande politiska system och strukturer.

De nordiska länderna utgör också lämpliga länder att undersöka könsrepresentation i eftersom dessa länder generellt ses som de främsta i världen när det gäller jämställdhet. De har historiskt sett legat i framkant gällande jämställdhet mellan könen genom att bland annat ha en dubbelförsörjarmodell (”dual breadwinner model”) som innebär att både män och kvinnor jobbar (Tanhua, 2020). De nordiska länderna har även en hög andel kvinnor i sina olika politiska organ. Per 1 september 2021 låg kvinnoandelen i riksdagen på 46 procent i Finland, 47 procent i Sverige och 44,4 procent i Norge (IPU Parline, 2021). Danmark var det enda landet som låg under 40 procent, med en kvinnoandel på 39,7 procent (IPU Parline, 2021). Avhandlingen består därmed både av en fördjupad litteraturöversikt och av den empiriska studien som undersöker klyftor i könsrepresentationen i de nordiska PRH-partierna.

1.3 Sammanfattningens struktur

Denna svenska sammanfattning av pro gradu-avhandlingen är uppdelad i fyra olika kapitel. Det andra kapitlet innehåller den fördjupade litteraturöversikten och utgör en sammanslagning av kapitel 2 och 3 i den fullständiga avhandlingen på engelska. I kapitel 3 summeras den

empiriska delen av avhandlingen. I detta kapitel presenteras forskningsfrågorna mer detaljerat, samt forskningsdesignen och metodiken. I kapitlet redogörs även för resultatet av den empiriska studien. Kapitel 4 innehåller den avslutande diskussionen och studiens slutsatser.

2. Litteraturöversikt

Den populistiska radikalhögern började växa fram på 1980-talet med frammarschen av partier som Nationella fronten (Frankrike) och Frihetspartiet (Österrike). Denna grupp av partier har haft många olika etiketter, exempelvis extremhöger, radikalhöger, högerpopulism och populistisk nationalism (Mudde, 2007). Denna avhandling använder Muddes (2007) definition av ”populist radikalhöger”, som menar att denna partifamilj innefattar tre ideologiska särdrag: nativism, auktoritarism och populism. I min kategorisering av de nordiska partier som tillhör den populistiska radikalhögerfamiljen har jag använt mig av en studie av Jungar och Jupskås (2014) där de argumenterar för att i synnerhet Dansk Folkeparti, Sannfinländarna och Sverigedemokraterna har gått samman ideologiskt och tydligt hör till samma partifamilj, men att också Fremskrittspartiet kan räknas till denna partifamilj även om FrP har vissa särdrag, främst sin mera liberala ekonomiska position och att ekonomiska frågor anses vara viktigare för FrP än till exempel sociala och moraliska frågor.

Medan PRH-partier har varit föremål för mycket forskning under de senaste årtiondena har genusdimensionen av dessa partier inte rönt samma frekventa intresse (Doná, 2020; Mudde, 2007). Forskning om Västeuropas populistiska radikalhöger identifierade en könsklyfta tidigt (Allen & Goodman, 2020). Det är dock först på senare tid som mer forskning bedrivits kring kön och den populistiska radikalhögern. Forskning inom detta ämnesområde kan ytterligare delas in i tre olika grenar: forskning kring könsklyftor bland de som röstar på denna partigrupp (t.ex. Coffé, 2018; Harteveld et al., 2015; Spierings & Zaslove, 2017), forskning kring genusaspekter i partiernas ideologi, diskurs och agenda (t.ex. de Lange & Mügge, 2015; Ralph-Maddow, 2020; Rashkova & Zankina, 2017), samt forskning kring könsrepresentationen i dessa partier (t.ex. Högström, 2019; Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila, 2017; Mudde, 2007; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017).

2.1 Könsspecifika skillnader i röstandet på PRH-partier

Flera studier har konkluderat att det finns en skillnad mellan män och kvinnor vad gäller röstandet på PRH-partier. Kvinnor röstar på dessa partier i betydligt mindre utsträckning än män (t.ex. Coffé, 2018; Harteveld et al., 2015; Immerzeel, Coffé & van der Lippe, 2015;

Mudde, 2007). Det verkar dock finnas stor variation mellan länder gällande hur stor denna könsskillnad är (Immerzeel, Coffé & van der Lippe, 2015). Det finns också indikationer på att denna skillnad mellan könen gällande röstande blir mindre, och kanske till och med håller på att försvinna, i takt med att dessa partier blir mer etablerade (Spierings & Zaslove, 2015).

Medan forskare varit överens om att fler män än kvinnor som röstar på PRH-partier har det funnits färre entydiga svar kring varför män och kvinnor röstar på dessa partier i olika utsträckning. Studier som undersökt denna aspekt har snarare enbart kunnat förklara vilka faktorer som inte kan förklara denna skillnad mellan könen (t.ex. Harteveld et al., 2015; Mudde, 2007; Spierings & Zaslove, 2015). Ända in på 1990-talet var den primära uppfattningen i framför allt feministiska cirklar att kvinnornas lägre understöd för populistradikalhögern berodde på att färre kvinnor än män innehade populistiska radikalhöger-åsikter (Mudde, 2007). Empiriska studier har dock visat att denna uppfattning inte stämmer – kvinnor är lika benägna som män att inneha sådana åsikter och attityder (Mudde, 2007). Spierings och Zaslove (2017) har påpekat att varken socioekonomisk position eller olika attityder helt kan förklara könsskillnaderna i röstandet för de PRH-partierna. Två andra förklaringar som förts fram i litteraturen är (1) att kvinnors större engagemang i kyrkan gör dem mindre benägna att rösta för populistradikalhögern, och (2) att kvinnor är avskräckta av dessa partiers antifeministiska ideologi (Coffé, 2018). Dessa förklaringar har dock inte heller kunnat redogöra för könsskillnaderna (Coffé, 2018). Paradoxen är därmed att trots att kvinnor är lika nativistiska, auktoritära och populistiska som män så röstar de i mindre utsträckning på PRH-partier.

Mudde (2007) argumenterar för att en lägre nivå av politiskt självförtroende ("political efficacy") bland kvinnor kan förklara en stor del av den oproportionella könsrepresentationen i PRH-partierna och bland deras röstare. Eftersom kvinnor har en lägre nivå av politiskt intresse eller en lägre tro på förmågan att påverka politik ("efficacy") leder det till att kvinnor röstar på mer etablerade partier i stället för på nya partier (Mudde, 2007). En studie av Immerzeel, Coffé och van der Lippe (2015) hittade inte stöd för Muddes teori, men Harteveld och kollegor (2015, s. 122–123) skriver i liknande anda att kvinnor och män till stor del har samma PRH-attityder, men att könsskillnaden i röstandet partiellt härstammar från könsspecifika skillnader i hur man ser på avståndet mellan sin egen och PRH-partiernas ideologiska position. Oberoende av ideologi framstår dessa partier som längre ifrån kvinnliga än manliga röstare. Kvinnor tänker också på andra faktorer när de bestämmer vilket parti de ska rösta på, vilket gör att ideologiska indikatorer är bättre på att förutspå om män än kvinnor

kommer rösta på populistiska radikalhögern. Immerzeel, Coffé och van der Lippe (2015) har i sin tur visat att vissa strukturella faktorer, så som anställningsstatus, yrkestyp och utbildning till viss del kan förklara skillnader i röstandet mellan män och kvinnor.

2.2 Genusaspekter av populistiska radikalhögerens ideologi, diskurs och agenda

Andra studier har undersökt vilken roll som genus spelar i PRH-partiernas ideologier, diskurser och agendor (t.ex. Akkerman, 2015; De Lange & Mügge, 2015). Denna forskningsgren undersöker bland annat vilken roll familjepolicyer och synen på kvinnors och sexuella minoriteters rättigheter har i dessa partiers politik och har karaktäriserat PRH-partierna som konservativa i förhållande till familjevärderingar och traditionella könsroller (t.ex. Akkerman, 2015). Denna konservatism skiljer dessa partier åt från övriga konservativa högerpartier (Akkerman, 2015), även om en del forskning tyder på att PRH-partierna har ändrat sitt förhållningssätt till genusfrågor där denna problematik blivit mindre viktig för partierna (Akkerman, 2015; Erzeel och Rashkova, 2017). Ett antal studier inom denna gren har också undersökt hur PRH-partier använder jämställdhet mellan könen som ett instrument i den nationella kontexten (Doná, 2020). Dessa partier kan ha en motsägelsefull position i förhållande till jämställdhet där de är konservativa i frågor som berör familjen och kvinnors rättigheter (t.ex. emot könskvotering), men understöder jämställdhet mellan könen när det tjänar olika andra syften, till exempel för att påpeka att muslimska immigranter är emot jämställdhet och därmed inte passar i västerländska samhällen.

Mudde (2007) har sagt att forskningen om genus i populistradikalhögern är bristfällig som följd av ”feministisk partiskhet”. Detta har lett till att skribenter inte ger empiriska bevis för denna partigrupps påstådda sexism (Mudde, 2007). Mudde tillägger att de få innehållsanalyser av partiernas ideologi som gjorts inte understöder den stereotypiska bilden av relationen till genus utan snarare visar att det inte finns en konsekvent syn på familj och genus inom partifamiljen. Genus är därmed inte av primär vikt för populistradikalhögern utan används på olika sätt i syfte att gynna andra frågor som är mer centrala för dessa partier. Mudde (2007) beskriver dock några överensstämmelser inom partifamiljens genusedeologi, nämligen att kvinnopolitik jämställs med familjepolitik, att det finns ett starkt försvar av naturliga skillnader mellan könen och att eftersom kvinnor är det enda kön som kan föda barn och eftersom barn är väsentliga för nationen måste kvinnor skyddas. Mudde (2007) beskriver även två olika synsätt på kvinnor inom partifamiljen: den traditionella och den moderna traditionella synen. Han påstår att de flesta PRH-partier har en modern-traditionell syn. De Lange och Mügge (2015) beskriver i sin tur att det finns tre olika synsätt: en modern, en

modern-traditionell och en neotraditionell syn. De tillägger därmed den moderna synen med argumentet att vissa partier inte passar in i Muddes uppdelning eftersom de understöder jämlik lönesättning och kvinnors delaktighet på arbetsmarknaden utan att ha en neotraditionell syn på familj eller genus och kön. De Lange och Mügge (2015) anser också att många forskare underskattar variationen i genusedologi mellan PRH-partierna.

2.3 Könsrepresentation i populistiska radikalhögerpartierna

Den tredje och sista forskningsgrenen inom området genus och den populistiska radikalhögerpartin handlar om representationen av kvinnor i dessa partier, till exempel bland dessa partiers medlemmar, ledamöter, kandidater och ledare. Enligt Mudde (2007) är partimedlemskap och kvinnornas roll i partimedlemskapet delområden som det forskats minst om. Det finns ändå ett antal studier som har undersökt den deskriptiva representationen av kvinnor specifikt i PRH-partierna (t.ex. Erzeel & Rashkova, 2017; Högström, 2019; Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila, 2017; Mudde, 2007). Dessa studier har i regel funnit att männen är överrepresenterade bland dessa partiers ledamöter och kandidater. Ett fåtal studier har också fokuserat på rollen av kvinnliga partiledare, så som Marine Le Pen och Pia Kjærsgaard (t.ex. Dubslaff, 2017; Meret, 2015). Ett antal studier har ytterligare undersökt varför fler män än kvinnor finns representerade i dessa partier (t.ex. Blee, 2017; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017).

Mudde (2007) har påpekat att medan enbart ett fåtal kvinnor varit ledare för PRH-partierna så är denna siffra inte markant lägre i jämförelse med andra partifamiljer. Mudde (2007) påpekar också att medan kvinnor är underrepresenterade bland PRH-partiernas parlamentsledamöter om man utgår från hur stor andel kvinnor utgör bland befolkningen i stort, är denna underrepresentation inte särskilt utmärkande om man jämför med hur det ser ut i andra politiska partier, i synnerhet inte i jämförelse med andra högerpartier. Samtidigt har en stor andel av kvinnorna i PRH-partierna varit släkt eller på annat sätt involverade med manliga medlemmar i partierna (Mudde, 2007). Det finns också studier som har undersökt kvinnors deskriptiva representation mer generellt i europeiska partier och som har inkluderat variabler för att se hur denna representation skiljer sig åt i olika partier (t.ex. Sundström & Stockemer, 2021 och 2015). Några av dessa studier har påpekat att vänsterpartier är mer benägna att skicka kvinnor till riksdagen och att nominera och välja kvinnor till riksdagspositioner (t.ex. Caul, 1999; Matland & Studlar, 1996; Sundström & Stockemer, 2015). Sundström och Stockemer (2021) sammanfattar att det finns tydliga skillnader i kvinnors representation mellan vänster-, gröna och liberala partier å ena sidan, och höger-, konservativa och populistiska högerpartier å andra sidan. Detta visar att en traditionell konservativ ideologi

fortfarande begränsar kvinnors tillgång till de offentliga rummen. PRH-partierna har därmed bevisats ha en lägre kvinnlig än manlig representation.

Högström (2019) har undersökt ifall en "smittoeffekt" kan påvisas gällande könsrepresentationen i Sverigedemokraterna. Matland och Studlar (1996) beskriver smittoeffekten som en process i vilken beslut och handlingar av ett parti leder till att andra partier antar liknande strategier eller policyer. Om ett parti exempelvis börjar nominera eller välja fler kvinnor leder det till att andra partier känner sig pressade att göra samma sak för att inte förlora röster. Högström (2019) beskriver i sin tur en omformulerad smittoeffekt som handlar om att nya partier, till exempel PRH-partier som har en lägre nivå av kvinnlig representation, upplever en smittoeffekt från mer etablerade partier som har en högre nivå av kvinnlig representation. Eftersom de nyare partierna, till exempel SD, eftersträvar fler röster för att maximera sitt väljarunderstöd, kommer de att rekrytera kvinnliga kandidater för att attrahera en bredare väljarbas. Detta görs för att kunna tävla med andra partier som har en högre nivå av kvinnlig representation. Högströms (2019) studie påvisade att en smittoeffekt hade ägt rum i Sverige där SD ökade sin kvinnliga representation parallellt med att partiet blev mer etablerat, och närmade sig de övriga svenska partiernas nivå av kvinnlig representation. SD hade dock fortfarande en högre andel män än kvinnor i jämförelse med övriga svenska partier.

Litteraturöversikten visar därmed att även om ett ökat antal studier gjorts kring genus och populistiska radikalhögerpartiers finns det forskningsluckor kvar. Denna forskningslucka är störst vad gäller könsrepresentation i populisthögerpartierna själva.

3. Könsrepresentation i de nordiska populistiska radikalhögerpartierna – en empirisk studie

Majoriteten av studier som undersökt könsrepresentationen i PRH-partier har endast undersökt den i fallstudier om ett land, i stället för att jämföra könsrepresentationen i flera partier och i flera länder samt se hur denna representation ändrat under en längre tid. Mudde (2007) har påstått att överrepresentationen av män i PRH-partierna är större än i de partier som ligger längre vänsterut på vänster-högerskalan, men inte nödvändigtvis betydligt större än i andra konservativa högerpartier. Frågan som kvarstår är därmed: Hur stor är skillnaden mellan männens och kvinnornas representation i PRH-partierna, om en skillnad ens existerar när man jämför med andra partier och med partier i andra länder. Och har skillnaden mellan männens och kvinnornas representation blivit mindre över tid när PRH-partierna blivit mer

etablerade och ökat sitt väljarstöd, vilket Högströms (2019) studie om Sverigedemokraterna föreslår? Den empiriska delen av pro gradu-avhandlingen adresserar dessa frågor.

De nordiska länderna har en hög andel av kvinnor representerade i sina nationella parlament och anses ha kommit långt i strävan efter jämställdhet mellan könen (t.ex. Niskanen, 2011; OECD, 2018). De nordiska länderna är därför lämpliga fall att studera könsrepresentationen i PRH-partierna i. Med tanke på den generellt sett höga nivån av kvinnlig representation i den nordiska regionen och med tanke på den låga nivån av kvinnlig representation i PRH-partierna är den första forskningsfrågan (RQ1) till vilken grad en skillnad i representation mellan män och kvinnor finns i de nordiska PRH-partierna och i vilken utsträckning denna skillnad mellan män och kvinnor ser lika ut i de olika nordiska länderna. Det förväntade resultatet i förhållande till den första forskningsfrågan är att de nordiska populistiska radikalhögerpartierna i medel har en könsskillnad som är större än 10 procentenheter på en majoritet av de politiska arenor som undersöks (dvs interna, väljar- och parlamentariska arenorna), vilket stämmer överens med vad tidigare studier har visat (t.ex. Högström, 2019; Mudde, 2007; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017). Om man anser att könsbalansen är jämställd om den ligger runt 40–60 procent åt endera håll (se Dahlerup, 1988; Niskanen, 2011) kan PRH-partierna inte ses som jämställda. De kommer att ha en könsskillnad som är större än 10 procentenheter vilket innebär att män utgör mer än 60 procent av dessa partiers partistyreelsemedlemmar, valkandidater och valda ledamöter. Jag förväntar mig också att dessa könsskillnader är större i PRH-partierna än i genomsnitt hos de övriga partierna, vilket stämmer överens med Sundströms och Stockemers (2021) slutsats att PRH-partier uppvisar större könsskillnader i jämförelse med övriga partifamiljer.

Den andra forskningsfrågan (RQ2) är ifall PRH-partierna har större skillnader i könsrepresentation än icke-PRH-partierna i de nordiska länderna. Mudde (2007) har påstått att medan skillnaderna mellan könen i dessa partier är större i jämförelse med vänsterpartier är skillnaden inte lika stor mellan PRH-partierna och de konventionella konservativa högerpartierna. Den andra forskningsfrågan undersöker därmed om denna teori får stöd i de nordiska länderna genom att jämföra könsrepresentationen i PRH-partierna med könsrepresentationen i andra nordiska partier. Jag fokuserar i synnerhet på hur könsskillnaderna i populistradikalhögern jämför sig med konservativa högerpartier å ena sidan och med socialdemokratiska partier å andra sidan. Högström (2019) samt Sundström och Stockemer (2015) har ytterligare påtalat att när ett PRH-parti når större framgång i ett val har överrepresentationen av män i dessa partier påverkat den allmänna nivån av kvinnors

representation negativt. Jag jämför därför också hur stor skillnaden i könsklyftorna är mellan alla partier i medeltal och mellan enbart icke-PRH partiernas medeltal. Detta görs för att se hur PRH-partierna har påverkat de nationella könsrepresentationstalen i medeltal. Jag förväntar mig att PRH-partierna har en större överrepresentation av män jämfört med icke-PRH-partierna i medeltal samt i jämförelse med de socialdemokratiska partierna. Däremot förväntar jag mig att denna överrepresentation inte är markant större än i högerpartierna, i överensstämmelse med Muddes (2007) tes.

Den tredje forskningsfrågan (RQ3) är hur kvinnornas representation i PRH-partierna har utvecklats över tid och om man kan se en så kallad smittoeffekt där dessa partiernas kvinnorepresentation har närmat sig den högre nivån av kvinnorepresentation i andra redan etablerade partier (Högström, 2019). Jag förväntar mig att PRH-partierna har ökat sin kvinnorepresentation i samband med att de blivit mer etablerade och mer framgångsrika i val och därmed närmat sig nivån av kvinnorepresentation i andra huvudpartier i sina respektive länder.

3.1 Studiedesign och metod

Den empiriska studien använde sig av en studiedesign med få fall och fokuserade på och jämförde data från ett relativt litet antal fall – de etablerade nordiska populistiska radikalhögerpartierna DF, FrP, SAF och SD. Studien var deskriptiv till sin natur: målet var att undersöka hur stor skillnaden mellan mäns och kvinnors representation är i denna partifamilj i jämförelse med i de övriga partierna i Norden, samt att identifiera hur skillnaden i könsrepresentation har förändrats över tid. Studien syftade därmed inte till att förklara varför könsrepresentationen eventuellt ser annorlunda ut inom den populistiska radikalhögern. Den valda studiedesignen – en länderjämförande studie – valdes för att få större insikt i hur könsrepresentationen tar sig uttryck i den populistiska radikalhögern och om det finns transnationella mönster inom denna partifamilj.

Jag valde att undersöka könsrepresentationen på tre olika politiska arenor (se Sjöblom, 1968): den interna arenan, som här behandlar könsrepresentationen i ett partis interna strukturer (t.ex. i partistyrelser, bland medlemmar, partiledare etc), väljararenan, som behandlar könsrepresentationen bland ett partis kandidater i val, samt parlamentariska arenan, som behandlar könsrepresentationen bland ett partis invalda ledamöter i nationella parlament eller lokala parlament (kommunfullmäktige). De två första forskningsfrågorna innefattade alla tre politiska arenor, medan den tredje forskningsfrågan endast gällde den interna arenan och

väljararenan. Jag undersökte den interna arenan genom att observera könsrepresentationen i partistyreiser och bland partiledarna. Väljararenan undersöktes genom att observera könsrepresentationen bland partiernas kandidater i parlament- och kommunalval. Den parlamentariska arenan undersöktes genom att observera könsrepresentation bland partiernas invalda ledamöter i parlament- och kommunalval. Jag samlade in data från både den nationella och lokala nivån för att få en mer gedigen helhetsbild av hur könsrepresentationen tar sig uttryck i populistiska högerpartierna.

För att svara på den andra forskningsfrågan samlade jag in samma data för övriga nordiska partier. Jag jämförde också PRH-partiernas könsrepresentation med de socialdemokratiska partiernas och de konservativa partiernas. Partierna Det Konservative Folkeparti (Danmark), Høyre (Norge), Kokoomus (Finland) och Moderaterna (Sverige) kategoriserades som konservativa partier (Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2017). Partierna Socialdemokratiet (Danmark), Arbeiderpartiet (Norge), Sosialdemokraattinen puolue (Finland) och Socialdemokraterna (Sverige) kategoriserades som socialdemokratiska partier (Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2017).

Den tredje forskningsfrågan undersöktes genom att observera hur könsrepresentationen förändrats under de senaste tre valen (väljararenan) och under de senaste tio åren (den interna arenan). Jag valde att inte inkludera den parlamentariska arenan eftersom smittoeffekten främst handlar om att partier tar strategiska beslut om att öka andelen kvinnor för att locka fler röstare, och det kan partierna främst göra genom att öka andelen kvinnor på sina kandidatlistor och genom att öka andelen kvinnor som är med i partiernas högsta beslutande organ. Jag jämförde också könsrepresentationen i populistiska högerpartierna med könsrepresentationen i övriga partier för att se om populistiska högerpartierna närmat sig övriga partier.

Könsskillnaden ("gender gap") i representation var den primära variabeln som undersöktes. Denna könsskillnad uträknades genom att subtrahera kvinnornas procentandel på de olika arenorna med 50 procent, eftersom 50 procent är den andel av kvinnor som de skulle vara om det inte fanns någon könsskillnad. Om procenten kvinnor bland ett partis kandidatlistor var 30 procent så subtraherade jag 30 procent från 50 procent. Könsskillnaden skulle då vara 20 procentenheter. Ju närmare noll könsskillnaden var desto mindre fanns det en klyfta mellan männens och kvinnornas representationsandel. Jag räknade också ut vad könsskillnaden var i medeltal för de olika partierna, baserat på de enskilda könsskillnaderna i de tre senaste valen eller i de tio senaste partistyrelserna.

3.2 Insamling av data och metodik

Jag samlade in data om könsrepresentationen på de tre olika politiska arenorna för samtliga nordiska partier som varit relevanta på nationell nivå (dvs haft invalda ledamöter i riksdagen) under ett av de senaste tre riksdagsvalen. Data samlades in från de tre senaste riksdags- och kommunalvalen som ägt innan 1 januari 2021. Data som berörde väljararenan och den parlamentariska arenan samlades primärt in från nationella statistikbyråer (Danmarks Statistik, Tilastokeskus, Valmyndigheten och Statistisk sentralbyrå). På dessa byråers webbsidor hittade jag all data kring könsrepresentationen bland valkandidater och invalda ledamöter. Data gällande könsrepresentation i den interna arenan och framför allt i partistyreiser var svårare att få tag på eftersom de flesta partier bara har information om sittande medlemmar i partiernas partistyreiser och inte om tidigare medlemmar på sina webbsidor. Jag använde därför en mängd olika källor, primärt webbaserade encyklopedier och nyhetsartiklar, för att hitta information om medlemmar i PRH-partiernas partistyreiser. Jag valde därför att endast inhämta data gällande könsrepresentationen i partistyreiser under de senaste tio åren för PRH-partierna. För övriga partier nöjde jag mig med att endast hämta in data om nuvarande partistyreisesammansättning.

3.3 Resultat

3.3.1 RQ1: Skillnader i könsrepresentation i de populistiska radikalhögerpartierna

Samtliga nordiska PRH-partier hade en överrepresentation av män i sina partistyreiser, bland sina valkandidater och bland sina invalda ledamöter, både på nationell och på lokal nivå. Könsskillnaden ("gender gap") i PRH-partierna var i regel större än 10 procentenheter och ofta större än 20 procentenheter när jag räknade ut medeltalen baserat på de senaste tio åren samt senaste tre riksdags- och kommunalval i respektive land. Männerna utgjorde därmed en andel som var större än 60 procent och ofta närmare 70 procent och PRH-partiernas könsbalans låg således inte inom den jämställda balansen på 60–40 procent. Medeltalet för könsskillnaden i PRH-partierna, när jag räknade ihop de enskilda partiernas könsskillnader i partistyreiser och bland ledamöter och kandidater, var 22 procentenheter och medianen 21,7 procentenheter. Denna överrepresentation av män visade i regel heller inga större variationer utan var beständig. DF, SAF och SD hade också en tydlig dominans av män bland sina partiledare under den senaste tio åren, medan FrP hade en kvinnlig partiledare under denna period och därmed en könsskillnad som låg på –50 procentenheter i partiledarskap.

När jag jämförde skillnaderna i könsrepresentation i PRH-partierna med medelskillnaden i könsrepresentation i de nordiska länderna framträdde också ett klart mönster. PRH-partierna i Norge, Finland och Sverige uppvisade alla betydligt större skillnader mellan männens och kvinnornas representation i jämförelse med vad som var normen i övriga partier i dessa länder. I Norge låg exempelvis medelkönsskillnaden bland partiernas kandidater i riksdagsvalet på 2,2 procentenheter medan motsvarande könsskillnad var 14,4 procentenheter i FrP. I Danmark, å andra sidan, var skillnaderna inte lika stora mellan DF:s könsskillnad och medelkönsskillnaden i övriga danska partier. Medan DF:s könsrepresentation ofta var i samma storleksklass som de övriga nordiska PRH-partier stack Danmarks statistik ut eftersom danska partier överlag hade betydligt större könsskillnader än de övriga nordiska länderna. DF hade en könsskillnad på 17,5 procentenheter medan de danska partierna i medel hade en könsskillnad på 15,4 procentenheter bland kandidater i riksdagsvalet. Detta mönster återkom på samtliga politiska arenor.

3.3.2. RQ2: Könsskillnader i de populistiska radikalhögerpartierna vs. i övriga partier

Resultaten gällande den andra forskningsfrågan visade att PRH-partiernas könsskillnader generellt var större än könsskillnaderna i icke-PRH-partierna, och detta på samtliga politiska arenor. PRH-partierna hade en betydligt större skillnad mellan könen i sina partistyreelser, både i jämförelse med medeltalet för samtliga icke-PRH-partier och i jämförelse med de socialdemokratiska och konservativa partierna. Gällande väljar- och den parlamentariska arenan var könsskillnaderna i de norska, finska och svenska PRH-partierna större än skillnaderna i motsvarande länders icke-PRH-partier. I dessa länder stack PRH-partiernas könsskillnader också ut som betydligt större än de konservativa och socialdemokratiska partiernas. Danska partier, å andra sidan, hade könsskillnader i väljararenan och den parlamentariska arenan som inte var mycket lägre än DF:s, men som däremot var betydligt större än i de övriga nordiska länderna. Medan det fanns ett klart mönster där de norska, finska och svenska PRH-partierna stack ut från icke-PRH-partier i sina respektive länder, låg DF:s könsskillnad betydligt närmare könsskillnaderna i övriga danska partier.

Resultatet visade också att de nordiska populistiska radikalhögerpartierna har lett till att den deskriptiva representationen av kvinnor i medeltal har minskat i de nordiska länderna. När jag jämförde vad könsskillnaderna var i medeltal för samtliga partier, inklusive PRH-partierna, med vad könsskillnaden var för enbart icke-PRH-partierna, det vill säga exklusive PRH-partierna, hade PRH-partierna en tydligt ökande effekt på exempelvis könsskillnaden bland valkandidater i Finland och Norge. I Norge var könsskillnaden till exempel 2,2 procentenheter

bland kandidaterna i riksdagsvalet medan könsskillnaden skulle ha varit 0,7 procentenheter om FrP exkluderades. I Finland var motsvarande siffror 4,7 procentenheter (inkl. SAF) kontra 2,8 procentenheter (exkl. SAF).

3.3.3. RQ3: Smittoeffekt i de nordiska PRH-partiernas könsrepresentation

Resultatet kunde i regel inte styrka att en så kallad smittoeffekt skett över tid i de nordiska PRH-partierna. Det var endast Sverigedemokraterna som tydligt och konsekvent minskade på skillnaden i könsrepresentation mellan män och kvinnor när jag undersökte de senaste tio åren (gällande den interna arenan) och kandidatlistorna i de tre senaste riksdags- och kommunalvalen (väljararenan). SD ökade andelen kvinnor betydligt i framför allt väljararenan, också i jämförelse med övriga svenska partier, men SD hade fortfarande en betydligt lägre andel kvinnor i jämförelse med de övriga partierna. I övrigt såg man ingen tydlig förändring i könsrepresentationen i de nordiska PRH-partierna. Det är dock nämnvärt att även om DF inte ökade på sin andel kvinnor hade DF en kvinnoandel som låg på ungefär samma nivå som övriga danska partier. I det danska fallet fanns det på så sätt inte direkt någon högre nivå som kvinnorepresentation i DF kunde härma och närma sig.

4. Diskussion

Det första syftet med denna pro gradu-avhandling var att presentera en detaljerad litteraturöversikt över genus och populistiska radikalhögern. Denna översikt visade att könsrepresentationen inom denna partifamilj är det minst studerade delområdet inom detta ämne. Det andra syftet var därför att bidra till denna forskningsgren genom att empiriskt undersöka könsrepresentationen i de nordiska populistiska radikalhögerpartierna. Frågan som kvarstår är om PRH-partierna kan kallas *Männerparteien* med hänsyn till partiernas könsrepresentation. En annan fråga är hur de skillnader mellan de nordiska populisthögerpartierna som identifierades i resultat kan förklaras.

Tidigare forskning har visat att det finns en skillnad i könsrepresentation i PRH-partier (t.ex. Högström, 2019; Mudde, 2007; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017). Därför förväntade jag mig att de nordiska PRH-partierna skulle uppvisa en skillnad mellan könsrepresentation som är större än 10 procentenheter, så att män utgör en majoritet på åtminstone 60 procent i dessa partier. Resultatet stämde också överens med förväntningarna – de nordiska PRH-partierna hade generellt en andel mellan män och kvinnor som var närmare 70:30 än 60:40, på alla politiska arenor som undersöktes. Det enda undantaget var FrP som hade en kvinnlig partiledare under de senaste tio åren. Det fanns således en tydlig och beständig

överrepresentation av män i de nordiska PRH-partierna. Denna överrepresentation var också av liknande storlek på samtliga politiska arenor, oberoende av om man studerade kandidatlistor, invalda ledamöter eller medlemmar i partistyrelsen, vilket indikerar ett tydligt resultat. Resultaten visade också att samma mönster med en överrepresentation av män existerade inom denna partifamilj i olika länder, även om det fanns viss variation länder emellan.

Begreppet *Männerparteien* är således relevant. Inga av dessa partier hade en könsbalans som låg på omkring 60:40, vilket brukar klassas som jämställt. De stora klyftorna i könsrepresentation i dessa partier har bevisligen också haft en effekt på den totala nivån av kvinnors deskriptiva representation i framför allt Norge, Finland och Sverige. Det innebär att andelen kvinnor i politiken skulle vara högre om PRH-partierna inte räknades med. Detta resultat stämde också överens med Sundströms och Stockemers (2015) studie som visade att när PRH-partier får ett större väljarstöd har det en negativ effekt på kvinnornas representation. Danmark stod dock ut i resultatet eftersom DF inte hade samma tydliga negativa effekt på kvinnornas representation. DF:s könsskillnad var ofta på samma nivå som de övriga nordiska PRH-partierna, men samtidigt även på samma nivå som övriga danska partiers.

Resultatet visade också att Muddes (2007) tes om att PRH-partier inte har en klart större könsskillnad i representation i jämförelse med konservativa partier inte stämde i den nordiska kontexten. PRH-partiernas könsskillnad var i Norge, Finland och Sverige markant större än de konservativa partiernas könsskillnader i dessa länder. Däremot var PRH-partiernas könsskillnader ofta närmare de konservativa partiernas än de socialdemokratiska partiernas, vilket stämmer överens med tesen att vänsterpartier har en mindre klyfta i könsrepresentation i jämförelse med högerpartier (t.ex. Mudde, 2007; Sundström & Stockemer, 2015 och 2021). PRH-partierna hade generellt en större könsskillnad i sin representation än genomsnittet i icke-PRH-partierna, vilket också stämde överens med mina förväntningar. Danmark var dock igen något av ett undantag eftersom samtliga partier, inte minst danska socialdemokratiska partiet, hade betydligt större könsskillnader än partierna i de övriga nordiska länderna. Mina resultat stämde generellt därför överens med tidigare forskning som beskrivit att det finns en överrepresentation av män i de populistiska radikalhögerpartierna (t.ex. Högström, 2019; Mudde, 2007). Det finns ytterligare inga andra förklaringar (t.ex. olika väljarsystem eller könkvotering) som kan förklara varför de nordiska PRH-partierna har en betydligt större överrepresentation av män i jämförelse med andra partier.

Gällande den tredje forskningsfrågan gav resultatet i regel inte stöd för att en smittoeffekt ägt rum i de nordiska PRH-partierna. SD var det enda parti som markant ökat andelen kvinnor medan kvinnoandelen i resten av PRH-partierna höll sig på samma nivå. Resultatet stämde därmed inte överens med mina förväntningar. Det är dock viktigt att påpeka att DF låg på samma nivå vad gäller könsskillnad som övriga stora partier i Danmark. Även om könsskillnaden inte ändrades i DF under tidsperioden jag studerat går det inte att avfärda att en smittoeffekt ägt rum i Danmark där DF tidigare i så fall anpassat sin andel kvinnor till övriga partiers tidigare. Eftersom SD är det yngsta PRH-partiet i Norden är det följaktligen möjligt att SD först nu anpassar sin kvinnoandel till övriga svenska partiers, medan en liknande process redan tidigare ägt rum i de övriga nordiska länderna där PRH-partierna har en längre historik med valframgång. Detta kunde i sin tur förklara varför SD fortfarande har de största skillnaderna i könsrepresentation av de fyra nordiska PRH-partierna – och att SD först nu håller på att anpassa sig. Denna förklaringsmodell lämpar sig bra i förhållande till SD och DF, men förklarar däremot inte varför FrP, det äldsta PRH-partiet, inte har en högre andel kvinnor. Könsskillnaderna i representation i både FrP och SAF ligger fortfarande långt från de finska och norska partiernas. Det finns också andra potentiella faktorer som kan förklara varför SD ökat sin representation av kvinnor men inte övriga PRH-partier i Norden. Detta kan till exempel bero på att Sverige kommit längre än de övriga nordiska länderna i att arbeta med jämställdhet som ett politiskt projekt (Borschorst, 2008), och att SD därmed är mer pressat att öka sin andel kvinnor i jämförelse med PRH-partierna i övriga Norden. SD har också fört fram jämställdhet i sin politik sedan 2014 (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2017), vilket i sin tur kan ha lett till att fler kvinnor känner sig välkomna i partiet.

Resultat vad gäller Danmark avvek ständigt från de övriga resultaten i min studie. Det finns också en paradox i att DF hade den minsta skillnaden mellan mäns och kvinnors representation i partiet av de nordiska PRH-partierna, medan danska partier generellt hade den största klyftan mellan mäns och kvinnors representation av alla nordiska länder. Att det finns en större överrepresentation av män i danska partier i jämförelse med i övriga nordiska partier har diskuterats (se Dahlerup, 2011; Melby et al., 2008; Niskanen, 2011). Melby och kollegor (2008) poängterar bland annat att medan officiella jämställdhetspolicyer tagits fram i Sverige och Norge har det samma inte hänt i Danmark. Feminism som begrepp är också mer negativt laddat i Danmark än i Sverige och Norge (Christensen, 2008) och den feministiska diskursen är mer tvetydig och ambivalent i Danmark i jämförelse med i Sverige. Bristen på debatt om kvinnors låga andel i politiken har också ansetts vara en faktor som förklarar att kvinnornas

representation i den danska politiken stagnerat (Dahlerup, 2011). Dessa faktorer förklarar därför varför det finns en lägre andel kvinnor i danska partier än i övriga nordiska partier, men de förklarar inte varför DF har en relativt hög andel kvinnor som representanter. En möjlig förklaring till det sistnämnda kan vara att DF:s attityder i förhållande till genus inte sticker ut på samma sätt som PRH-partiernas attityder i Norge, Finland och Sverige gör, där dessa partier framstår som mer ”anti-kvinnor”. DF kan således ses som ett fullgott alternativ för kvinnor i Danmark, eftersom de övriga danska partierna inte är mycket bättre vad gäller genus. En annan potentiell faktor som kan förklara att DF har en högre andel kvinnor är att DF leddes av en kvinnlig ledare, Pia Kjaersgaard, under många år. Partier med kvinnliga ledare har nämligen bevisats ha en positiv effekt på andelen kvinnliga ledamöter i EU-parlamentet (Sundström & Stockemer, 2021). Därför är det möjligt att Kjaersgaard också lett till att fler kvinnor gått med i DF.

4.1 Studiens begränsningar och förslag för framtida forskning

Denna studie har visat att stora klyftor mellan männens och kvinnornas representation i de nordiska PRH-partierna finns och att dessa klyftor också är större i jämförelse med motsvarande klyftor i andra partier. Några begränsningar i studien som kunnat identifieras är (1) att tidsperioden som sattes under lupp hade kunnat innefatta flera år för att undersöka om de äldre PRH-partierna, DF och FrP, har sett en ökning av andelen kvinnor och därmed upplevt en så kallad smittoeffekt i ett tidigare skede, (2) att det hade varit fördelaktigt om jag också hade data på övriga icke-PRH-partiers könssammansättning i partistyreiser under de senaste tio åren och inte bara i sittande partistyreelse och (3) att studien hade kunnat jämföra PRH-partierna med fler icke-PRH-partier i större detalj, och inte bara med de konservativa och socialdemokratiska partierna och med kombinerad data för alla icke-PRH-partier.

Gällande framtida forskning kunde studier undersöka skillnader i könsrepresentation över en längre tidsperiod och även undersöka den interna arenan mer ingående. Framtida forskning borde också i större utsträckning undersöka varför det finns stora klyftor mellan männens och kvinnornas representation i populistiska radikalhögern. Sådan forskning skulle bland annat kunna undersöka om samma faktorer som gjort att färre kvinnor röstar på PRH-partier än män också spelar en roll med tanke på att kvinnor inte blir aktiva i dessa partier. Framtida forskning skulle även kunna undersöka om dessa partiers genusideologi påverkar kvinnors beslut att bli medlemmar eller inte bli medlemmar i partierna. Sådana studier behöver i större utsträckning vara kvalitativa och innefatta intervjuer med kvinnor som är aktiva i partier som tillhör denna partifamilj.

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Appendix A. Comparison of the gender-representation gap in the Nordic PRR parties

1. Research Question 1: The Nordic PRR parties' gender-representation gaps¹

1.1 Internal arena (party councils and party leadership)

Table A1. Gender gap in the PRR parties' party councils, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Gender gap, mean	Difference gender gap, 2021 vs. 2011
Danish People's Party, DF	22.7	31.8	22.7	22.7	22.7	22.7	22.7	22.7	40.9	40.9	27.3	+18.2
Progress Party, FrP	22.7	20	31.8	31.8	31.8	31.8	31.8	22.7	22.7	22.7	27	0
Finns Party, PS	11.5	19.2	19.2	19.2	19.2	8.3	11.5	8.3	19.2	34.6	17	+23.1
Sweden Democrats, SD	25.0		14.7		14.7		18.4		23.7		19.3	-1.3

Table A2. National gender gap averages², party councils 2020–2021, (percentage points)

Country / Year	2020–2021
Denmark	21.4
Norway	0.9
Finland	-0.7
Sweden	-1.9

Table A3. Gender gap in the PRR parties' party leadership, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

PRR party / Year	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Mean gender gap	Difference gender gap 2021 vs 2011
DF	-50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	40	+100
FrP	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0
PS	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
SD	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0

¹ See appendices B–I for complete data and data references.

² National gender gap average is calculated by dividing the sum of the mean gender gaps of all nationally electorally relevant parties in each country by the number of the parties.

Table A4. National gender gap average, party leadership, (percentage points)

Country / Year	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Mean gender gap	Difference gender gap, 2021 vs 2011
Denmark	0	0	5.6	16.7	16.7	16.7	16.7	16.7	16.7	-5.6	10	-5.6
Norway	6.25	-6.25	-6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	3.75	0
Finland	12.5	25	25	37.5	37.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	-12.5	-12.5	15	-25
Sweden	31.25	31.25	31.25	18.75	6.25	6.25	18.75	18.75	6.25	-6.25	16.25	-37.5

1.2 Electoral arena³

Table A5. Gender gap among listed candidates in *parliamentary* elections, (percentage points)

Party (party combination) / Election	ELECTION 1 (2009–2011)	ELECTION 2 (2013–2015)	ELECTION 3 (2017–2019)	Mean gender gap, (based on all three elections)	Difference gender gap, election 3 vs. election 1
Danish People's Party, DF	14.1	19.6	18.8	17.5	4,7
Progress Party, FrP	12.5	15.9	14.8	14.4	2,3
Finns Party, PS	16.8	14.7	18.5	16.7	1,7
Sweden Democrats, SD	24.2	19.8	19.9	21.3	-4,3
Denmark, non-PRR parties, average	15.5	17.3	12.6	15.1	-2.9
Norway, non-PRR parties, average	1.1	1.7	-0.6	0.7	-1.7
Finland, non-PRR parties, average	5.4	3.8	-0.8	2.8	-6.2
Sweden, non-PRR parties, average	5.6	4.6	5.8	5.3	0.2
Denmark, average	15.3	17.6	13.4	15.4	-1.9
Norway, average	2.4	3.3	1	2.2	-1.4
Finland, average	7	5.3	1.8	4.7	-5.2
Sweden, average	5.8	4.8	6.5	5.7	0.7

Table A6. Gender gap among listed candidates in *municipal* elections, (percentage points)

Country and party (party combination) / Election	ELECTION 1 (2008–2011)	ELECTION 2 (2012–2015)	ELECTION 3 (2017–2019)	Mean gender gap, (based on all three elections)	Difference, gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Danish People's Party, DF	20.5	21.5	20.6	20.9	0.1
Progress Party, FrP	21.2	22.8	22.3	22.1	1.1
Finns Party, PS	24.3	26.7	24.8	25.3	0.5
Sweden Democrats, SD	29.8	24.6	21.9	25.4	-7.9
Denmark, non-PRR parties, average	18.5	18.8	17.7	18.3	-0.8
Norway, non-PRR parties, average	6.4	6	5	5.8	-1.4
Finland, non-PRR parties, average	8.4	8.7	7.8	8.3	-0.6
Sweden, non-PRR parties, average	7.5	6.4	6.7	6.9	-0.8

³ Complete data found in appendices F–I.

Denmark, average	18.6	19	17.9	18.5	-0.7
Norway, average	8.2	7.6	6.5	7.4	-1.7
Finland, average	9.2	10.9	9.9	10	0.7
Sweden, average	8.4	7.1	7.9	7.8	-0.5

1.3 Parliamentary arena⁴

Table A7. Gender gap among elected representatives in *parliamentary* elections, (percentage points)

Country and party (party combination) / Election	ELECTION 1 (2009–2011)	ELECTION 2 (2013–2015)	ELECTION 3 (2017–2019)	Mean gender gap, (based on all three elections)	Difference, gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Danish People's Party, DF	18.2	9.5	12.5	13.4	-5.7
Progress Party, FrP	25.6	29.3	24	26.3	-1.6
Finns Party, PS	21.8	18.4	19.2	19.8	-2.6
Sweden Democrats, SD	35	27.6	21	27.9	-14
Denmark, non-PRR parties, average	10.1	13.8	11.4	11.8	1.3
Norway, non-PRR parties, average	5.5	6.4	6.3	6.1	0.8
Finland, non-PRR parties, average	4.4	5.9	-1.6	2.9	-6
Sweden, non-PRR parties, average	3.2	3	0.2	2.1	-3
Denmark, average	11.1	12.9	11.1	11.7	0
Norway, average	10.4	10.4	9.2	10	-1.2
Finland, average	7.8	8.3	2.5	6.2	-5.3
Sweden, average	5	6.4	3.9	5.1	-1.1

Table A8. Gender gap among elected representatives in *municipal* elections, (percentage points)

Country and party (parties) / Election	ELECTION 1 (2008–2011)	ELECTION 2 (2012–2015)	ELECTION 3 (2017–2019)	Mean gender gap, (based on all three elections)	Difference, gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Danish People's Party, DF	22	21.8	18.6	20.8	-3.4
Progress Party, FrP	23.2	23	24	23.4	0.8
Finns Party, PS	29.2	26.8	28.2	28.1	-1
Sweden Democrats, SD	31.2	26.6	21.8	26.5	-9.4
Denmark, non-PRR parties, average	17.7	19.8	16.9	18.1	-0.8
Norway, non-PRR parties, average	9.8	9.4	7.9	9	-1.9
Finland, non-PRR parties, average	12.5	11.8	8.8	11	-3.7
Sweden, non-PRR parties, average	5.8	3.9	4.2	4.6	-1.6
Denmark, average	18	20	17	18.3	-1
Norway, average	11.4	10.6	9.2	10.4	-2.2
Finland, average	13.2	13.7	10.4	12.4	-2.8
Sweden, average	7	6.3	6.7	6.7	-0.3

⁴ Complete data found in Appendices F–I.

2. Research Question 2: PRR party gender gap vs. non-PRR party gender gap⁵

2.1 Internal arena

Table A9. Gender gap in party council, 2020–2021, (percentage points)

Year	2020–2021					
	Country / Party	PRR party	All main parties (combined average)	Main non-PRR parties (combined average)	Conservative party	Social democratic party
Denmark		40.9	21.4	19	28.8	6.25
Norway		22.7	0.9	-2.2	13.6	-2.4
Finland		34.6	-0.7	-5.7	15	5.6
Sweden		23.7	-1.9	-5.5	0	-6.7

Table A10. Mean gender gap in party leadership, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Country / party	PRR party	All main parties (combined average)	Main non-PRR parties (combined average)	Conservative party	Social democratic party
Denmark	40	10	6.25	50	-50
Norway	-50	3.75	11.4	-50	50
Finland	50	15	10	50	10
Sweden	50	16.25	11.4	20	50

2.2 Electoral arena

Table A11. Mean gender gap, listed candidates, based on last three *parliamentary* elections, (percentage points)

Country / Party	PRR party	All main parties (combined average)	Main non-PRR parties (combined average)	Conservative party	Social democratic party
Denmark	17.5	15.4	15.1	13.4	20.1
Norway	14.4	2.2	0.7	3.4	0.2
Finland	16.7	4.7	2.8	4.5	3.3
Sweden	21.3	5.7	5.3	9.2	0.4

Table A12. Mean gender gap, listed candidates, based on last three *municipal* elections, (percentage points)

Country / Party	PRR party	All main parties, (combined average)	Main non-PRR parties (combined average)	Conservative party	Social democratic party
Denmark	20.9	18.5	18.3	21.2	19.9
Norway	22.1	7.4	5.8	14.1	1.9
Finland	25.3	10	8.3	10.5	9.3
Sweden	25.4	7.8	6.9	12.7	3.2

⁵ See appendices B–I for complete data and data references.

2.3 Parliamentary arena

Table A13. Mean gender gap, elected representatives, based on last three *parliamentary* elections, (percentage points)

Country / Party	PRR party	All main parties, (combined average)	Main non-PRR parties, (combined average)	Conservative party	Social democratic party
Denmark	13.4	11.7	11.8	9.7	16.8
Norway	26.3	10	6.1	12	0
Finland	19.8	6.2	2.9	10.2	-11.2
Sweden	27.9	5.1	2.1	-1.5	2.3

Table A14. Mean gender gap, elected representatives, based on last three *municipal* elections, (percentage points)

Country / Party	PRR party	All main parties, (combined average)	Main non-PRR parties, (combined average)	Conservative party	Social democratic party
Denmark	20.8	18.3	18.1	21.8	16.9
Norway	23.4	10.4	9	14.2	5.5
Finland	28.1	12.4	11	14.2	7.6
Sweden	26.5	6.7	4.6	10	0.7

2.4 Combined electoral + parliamentary arena

Table A15. National gender gap averages, electoral *and* parliamentary arenas, (percentage points)

Country / Political arena	Mean gender gap, listed candidates, <i>parliamentary</i> elections	Mean gender gap listed candidates, <i>municipal</i> elections	Mean gender gap, elected representatives, <i>parliamentary</i> elections	Mean gender gap, elected representatives, <i>municipal</i> elections	National gender gap average (combined electoral + parliamentary arena, local + national elections)
Denmark	15.4	18.5	11.7	18.3	16
Norway	2.2	7.4	10	10.4	7.5
Finland	4.7	10	6.2	12.4	8.3
Sweden	5.7	7.8	5.1	6.7	6.3

Table A16. PRR party gender gap averages, electoral *and* parliamentary arenas, (percentage points)

PRR party / Arena	Mean gender gap, listed candidates, <i>parliamentary</i> elections	Mean gender gap, listed candidates, <i>municipal</i> elections	Mean gender gap, elected representatives, <i>parliamentary</i> elections	Mean gender gap, elected representatives, <i>municipal</i> elections	PRR party gender gap average (combined electoral + parliamentary arena, local + national election)
DF	17.5	20.9	13.4	20.8	18.2
FrP	14.4	22.1	26.3	23.4	21.6
PS	16.7	25.3	19.8	28.1	22.5
SD	21.3	25.4	27.9	26.5	25.3

Table A17. Non-PRR parties' gender gap averages, electoral *and* parliamentary arenas, (percentage points)

Country / Arena	Mean gender gap, listed candidates, <i>parliamentary</i> elections	Mean gender gap, listed candidates, <i>municipal</i> elections	Mean gender gap, elected representatives, <i>parliamentary</i> elections	Mean gender gap, elected representatives, <i>municipal</i> elections	Non-PRR parties' gender gap average, (combined electoral + parliamentary arena, local + national elections)
Denmark	15.1	18.3	11.8	18.1	15.8
Norway	0.7	5.8	6.1	9	5.4
Finland	2.8	8.3	2.9	11	6.25
Sweden	5.3	6.9	2.1	4.6	4.7

Table A18. Conservative parties' gender gap averages, electoral *and* parliamentary arenas, (percentage points)

Conservative party / Arena	Mean gender gap, listed candidates, <i>parliamentary</i> elections	Mean gender gap, listed candidates, <i>municipal</i> elections	Mean gender gap elected representatives, <i>parliamentary</i> elections	Mean gender gap, elected representatives, <i>municipal</i> elections	Conservative party gender gap average, (combined electoral + parliamentary arena, local + national elections)
Conservative Party (Denmark)	13.4	21.2	9.7	21.8	16.5
Conservative Party (Norway)	3.4	14.1	12	14.2	10.9
National Coalition (Finland)	4.5	10.5	10.2	14.2	8.9
Conservative Party (Sweden)	9.2	12.7	-1.5	10	7.6

Table A19. Social Democratic parties' gender gap averages, electoral *and* parliamentary arenas, (percentage points)

Social Democratic party / Arena	Mean gender gap, listed candidates, <i>parliamentary</i> elections	Mean gender gap, listed candidates, <i>municipal</i> elections	Mean gender gap elected representatives, <i>parliamentary</i> elections	Mean gender gap, elected representatives, <i>municipal</i> elections	Social Democratic party gender gap average, (combined electoral + parliamentary arena, local + national elections)
Social Democratic party (Denmark)	20.1	19.9	16.8	16.9	18.4
Labour Party (Norway)	0.2	1.9	0	5.5	1.9
Social Democratic Party (Finland)	3.3	9.3	-11.2	7.6	2.3
Social Democrats (Sweden)	0.4	3.2	2.3	0.7	1.7

2.5 National gender gap averages vs. non-PRR parties' gender gap averages

2.5.1 Electoral + parliamentary arena

Table A20. National gender gap averages vs. non-PRR parties' gender gap averages, electoral *and* parliamentary arenas, (percentage points)

Arena & elections	Listed candidates, <i>parliamentary</i> elections		Listed candidates, <i>municipal</i> elections		Elected representatives, <i>parliamentary</i> elections		Elected representatives, <i>municipal</i> elections	
	Country / Parties	All parties (incl PRR)	Non-PRR parties	All parties (incl PRR)	Non-PRR parties	All parties (incl PRR)	Non-PRR parties	All parties (incl PRR)
Denmark	15.4	15.1	18.5	18.3	11.7	11.8	18.3	18.1
Norway	2.2	0.7	7.4	5.8	10	6.1	10.4	9
Finland	4.7	2.8	10	8.3	6.2	2.9	12.4	11
Sweden	5.7	5.3	7.8	6.9	5.1	2.1	6.7	4.6

2.5.2 Internal arena

Table A21. National gender gap average in *party councils* vs. non-PRR parties' gender gap average, *party council*, 2020–2021, (percentage points)

Country / Parties	All parties (incl PRR)	Non-PRR parties
Denmark	21.4	19
Norway	0.9	-2.2
Finland	-0.7	-5.7
Sweden	-1.9	-5.5

Table A22. National gender gap averages vs. non-PRR parties' gender gap averages, *party leadership*, (percentage points)

Country / Parties	All parties (incl PRR)	Non-PRR parties
Denmark	10	6.25
Norway	3.75	11.4
Finland	15	10
Sweden	16.25	11.4

3. Research question 3: The contagion effect⁶

3.1 Internal arena

Table A23. Gender gap in party councils, 2021 vs. 2011

Year	2011–2012		2020–2021		
Country / Party	PRR party	PRR party	Main non-PRR parties	Conservative party	Social democratic party
Denmark	22.7	40.9	19	28.8	6.25
Norway	22.7	22.7	-2.2	13.6	-2.4
Finland	11.5	34.6	-5.7	15	5.6
Sweden	25	23.7	-5.5	0	-6.7

Table A24. Difference gender gap, party council, 2021 vs. 2011, (percentage points)

Country / Party	Gender gap difference 2021 vs. 2011
DF	18.2
FrP	0
PS	23.1
SD	1.3

Table A25. Gender gap in Danish parties' party leadership, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Mean gender gap	Difference gender gap 2021 vs 2011
	– 2012	– 2013	– 2014	– 2015	– 2016	– 2017	– 2018	– 2019	– 2020	– 2021		
DF	-50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	40	100
Non-PRR parties, total	7.1	-7.1	0	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	-12.5	6.25	-1.6
Conservative party	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Social Democratic party	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0

Table A26. Gender gap in Norwegian parties' party leadership, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Mean gender gap	Difference gender gap 2021 vs 2011
	– 2012	– 2013	– 2014	– 2015	– 2016	– 2017	– 2018	– 2019	– 2020	– 2021		
FrP	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0
Non-PRR parties, total	14.3	0	0	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3	11.4	0
Conservative party	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0
Social Democratic party	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0

⁶ See appendices B–I for complete data and data references.

Table A27. Gender gap in Finnish parties' party leadership, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011 – 2012	2012 – 2013	2013 – 2014	2014 – 2015	2015 – 2016	2016 – 2017	2017 – 2018	2018 – 2019	2019 – 2020	2020 – 2021	Mean gender gap	Difference gender gap 2021 vs 2011
PS	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Non-PRR parties, total	7.1	21.4	21.4	35.7	35.7	7.1	7.1	7.1	-21.4	-21.4	10	-28.5
Conservative party	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Social Democratic party	-50	-50	-50	50	50	50	50	50	50	-50	10	0

Table A28. Gender gap in Swedish parties' party leadership, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011 – 2012	2012 – 2013	2013 – 2014	2014 – 2015	2015 – 2016	2016 – 2017	2017 – 2018	2018 – 2019	2019 – 2020	2020 – 2021	Mean gender gap	Difference gender gap 2021 vs 2011
SD	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Non-PRR parties, total	28.6	28.6	28.6	14.3	0	0	14.3	14.3	0	-14.3	11.4	- 42.9
Conservative party	50	50	50	-50	-50	-50	50	50	50	50	35	0
Social Democratic party	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0

Table A29. Gender gap difference in party leadership, 2021 vs. 2011, (percentage points)

Country / party	PRR party	All main parties (combined average)	Main non-PRR parties (combined average)	Conservative party	Social democratic party
Denmark	100	-5.6	-19.5	0	0
Norway	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	-25	-28.5	0	0
Sweden	0	-37.5	-42.9	0	0

3.2 Electoral arena, *parliamentary* elections, changes in gender gap

Table A30. Danish parties' gender gaps, listed candidates, *parliamentary* elections, 2011–2019, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011	2015	2019	Gender gap difference, 2019 vs. 2011
DF	14.1	19.6	18.8	4.7
Non-PRR parties, average	15.5	17.3	12.6	-2.9
Conservative Party	12.8	11.8	15.7	2.9
Social Democratic Party	16.7	21.4	22.3	5.6
Denmark, mean, all parties	15.3	17.6	13.4	2.9

Table A31. Norwegian parties' gender gaps, listed candidates, *parliamentary* elections, 2009–2017, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2009	2013	2017	Gender gap difference, 2017 vs. 2009
FrP	12.5	15.9	14.8	2.3
Non-PRR parties, average	1.1	1.7	-0.6	-1.7
Conservative Party	5.7	3.4	1.1	-4.6
Labour Party	0.5	0	0	-0.5
Norway, mean, all parties	2.4	3.3	1	-1.4

Table A32. Finnish parties' gender gaps, listed candidates, *parliamentary elections*, 2011–2019, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011	2015	2019	Gender gap difference, 2019 vs. 2011
PS	16.8	14.7	18.5	1.7
Non-PRR parties, average	5.4	3.8	-0.8	-6.2
Conservative Party	5.2	3.7	4.5	-0.7
Social Democratic Party	6.7	2.8	0.5	-6.2
Finland, mean, all parties	7	5.3	1.8	-5.2

Table A33. Swedish parties' gender gaps, listed candidates, *parliamentary* elections, 2010–2018, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2010	2014	2018	Gender gap difference, 2018 vs. 2010
SD	24.2	19.8	19.9	-4.3
Non-PRR parties, average	5.6	4.6	5.8	0.2
Conservative Party	9	7.9	10.8	1.8
Social Democratic Party	0.7	0.3	0.3	-0.4
Sweden, mean, all parties	5.8	4.8	6.5	0.7

Table A34. Gender gap difference, election 1 vs election 3, listed candidates, *parliamentary* elections, (percentage points)

Country / Party	PRR party	All main parties, average	Main non-PRR parties, average	Conservative party	Social democratic party
Denmark	4.7	-1.9	-2.9	2.9	5.6
Norway	2.3	-1.4	-1.7	-4.6	-0.5
Finland	1.7	-5.2	-6.2	-0.7	-6.2
Sweden	-4.3	0.7	0.2	1.8	-0.4

3.3 Electoral arena, *municipal* elections, changes in gender gap

Table A35. Danish parties' gender gaps, listed candidates, *municipal* elections, 2009–2017, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2009	2013	2017	Gender gap difference, 2017 vs. 2009
DF	20.5	21.5	20.6	0.1
Non-PRR parties, average	18.5	18.8	17.7	-0.8
Conservative Party	19.8	21.1	22.5	2.7
Social Democratic Party	21.5	19.3	18.9	-2.6
Denmark, mean, all parties	18.6	19.0	17.9	-0.7

Table A36. Norwegian parties' gender gaps, listed candidates, *municipal* elections, 2011–2019, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011	2015	2019	Gender gap difference, 2019 vs. 2011
FrP	21.2	22.8	22.3	1.1
Non-PRR parties, average	6.4	6.0	5.0	-1.4
Conservative Party	14.0	14.5	13.8	-0.2
Labour Party	2.4	1.8	1.6	-0.8
Norway, mean, all parties	8.2	7.6	6.5	-1.7

Table A37. Finnish parties' gender gaps, listed candidates, *municipal* elections, 2008–2017, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2008	2012	2017	Gender gap difference, 2017 vs. 2008
PS	24.3	26.7	24.8	0.5
Non-PRR parties, average	8.4	8.7	7.8	-0.6
Conservative Party	9.7	10.9	11.0	1.3
Social Democratic Party	9.2	9.6	9.1	-0.1
Finland, mean, all parties	9.2	10.9	9.9	0.7

Table A38. Swedish parties' gender gaps, listed candidates, *municipal* elections, 2010–2018, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2010	2014	2018	Gender gap difference, 2018 vs. 2010
SD	29.8	24.6	21.9	-7.9
Non-PRR parties, average	7.5	6.4	6.7	-0.8
Conservative Party	13.2	12.2	12.6	-0.6
Social Democratic Party	3.6	2.9	3.1	-0.5
Sweden, mean, all parties	8.4	7.1	7.9	-0.5

Table A39. Gender gap difference, election 1 vs. election 3, listed candidates in *municipal* elections, (percentage points)

Country / Party	PRR party	All main parties, average	Main non-PRR parties, average	Conservative party	Social democratic party
Denmark	0.1	-0.7	-0.8	2.7	-2.6
Norway	1.1	-1.7	-1.4	-0.2	-0.8
Finland	0.5	0.7	-0.6	1.3	-0.1
Sweden	-7.9	-0.5	-0.8	-0.6	-0.5

Appendix B. Gender composition in Danish parties' party councils and leadership

1. The Danish People's Party (DF): Gender composition in party councils and party leadership, 2011–2021

About data:

According to the DF's *Vedtaegter*¹ (bylaws), the DF's party council consists of:

- Party leader (party leader = party council chair)
- A group board elected by the party's parliamentary group at any time but consisting of 5 people at most.
- 5 people elected at the annual meeting, not members of the parliament (elected for two years at a time, three at every other annual meeting, two at every other annual meeting)
- Leader of the Danish People's party's youth party (*Dansk Folkepartis Ungdom*).

In the data below, F = female, M = man.

DF Party council 2011–2012²

Results: 8/11 men, 3/11 women,

1. Pia Kjærsgaard F (party leader)
2. Kristian Thulesen Dahl M
3. Peter Skaarup M
4. Søren Espersen M
5. Martin Henriksen M
6. Preben Elmenhoff M
7. Kenneth Kristensen Berth M
8. Carl Christian Ebbesen M
9. Susanne Eilersen F
10. Bente Kronborg K
11. Steen Thomsen M

DF Party council 2012–2013³

Results: 9/11 men, 2/11 women

Kristian Thulesen Dahl M (party leader)
Peter Skaarup M
Søren Espersen M
Martin Henriksen M
Preben Elmenhoff M
Kenneth Kristensen Berth M

¹ Dansk Folkeparti. (n.d.). *Vedtaegter*. Retrieved July 20, 2021, from <https://danskfolkeparti.dk/partiet/vedtaegter/>

² Source: Tobias Weische, student helper at the Danish People's Party, personal communication, July 13, 2021.

³ Source: Tobias Weische, student helper at the Danish People's Party, personal communication, July 13, 2021.

Carl Christian Ebbesen M
Susanne Eilersen F
Anders Vistisen M
Steen Thomsen M
Karin Nødgaard F

DF Party council 2013–2014 ⁴

Results: 8/11 men, 3/11 women

Kristian Thulesen Dahl M (party leader)
Peter Skaarup M
Søren Espersen M
Martin Henriksen M
Preben Elmenhoff M
Merete Dea Larsen F
Carl Christian Ebbesen M
Susanne Eilersen F
Anders Vistisen M
Steen Thomsen M
Karin Nødgaard F

DF Party council 2014–2015 ⁵

Results: 8/11 men, 3/11 women

Kristian Thulesen Dahl M (party leader)
Peter Skaarup M
Søren Espersen M
Martin Henriksen M
Preben Elmenhoff M
Merete Dea Larsen F
Carl Christian Ebbesen M
Susanne Eilersen F
Anders Vistisen M
Steen Thomsen M
Karin Nødgaard F

DF Party council 2015-2016 ⁶

Results: 8/11 men, 3/11 women

Kristian Thulesen Dahl M (party leader)
Peter Skaarup M
Søren Espersen M
Martin Henriksen M
Preben Elmenhoff M
Gitte Simoni F
Carl Christian Ebbesen M

⁴ Source: Tobias Weische, student helper at the Danish People's Party, personal communication, July 13, 2021.

⁵ Source: Tobias Weische, student helper at the Danish People's Party, personal communication, July 13, 2021.

⁶ Source: Tobias Weische, student helper at the Danish People's Party, personal communication, July 13, 2021.

Lone Langballe F
Lucas Hultgren M
Steen Thomsen M
Karin Nødgaard F

DF Party council 2016-2017 ⁷

Results: 8/11 men, 3/11 women

Kristian Thulesen Dahl M (party leader)
Peter Skaarup M
Søren Espersen M
Martin Henriksen M
Preben Elmenhoff M
Gitte Simoni F
Carl Christian Ebbesen M
Lone Langballe F
Lucas Hultgren M
Steen Thomsen M
Karin Nødgaard F

DF Party council 2017–2018 ⁸

Results: 8/11 men, 3/11 women

Kristian Thulesen Dahl M (party leader)
Peter Skaarup M
Søren Espersen M
Martin Henriksen M
Preben Elmenhoff M
Freja Södergran F
Carl Christian Ebbesen M
Lone Langballe F
Chris Bjerknæs M
Steen Thomsen M
Karin Nødgaard F

DF Party council 2018–2019 ⁹

Results: 8/11 men, 3/11 women

Kristian Thulesen Dahl M (party leader)
Peter Skaarup M
Søren Espersen M
Martin Henriksen M
Preben Elmenhoff M
Freja Södergran F
Carl Christian Ebbesen M
Lone Langballe F

⁷ Source: Tobias Weische, student helper at the Danish People's Party, personal communication, July 13, 2021.

⁸ Source: Tobias Weische, student helper at the Danish People's Party, personal communication, July 13, 2021.

⁹ Source: Tobias Weische, student helper at the Danish People's Party, personal communication, July 13, 2021.

Chris Bjerknæs M
Steen Thomsen M
Karin Nødgaard F

DF Party council 2019–2020 ¹⁰

Results: 10/11 men, 1/11 women

Kristian Thulesen Dahl M (party leader)
Peter Skaarup M
Søren Espersen M
René Christensen M
Martin Henriksen M
Anders Vistisen M
Carl Christian Ebbesen M
Erik Høgh Sørensen M
Chris Bjerknæs M
Steen Thomsen M
Marie Krarup F

DF Party council 2020–2021 ¹¹

Results: 10/11 men, 1/11 women

Kristian Thulesen Dahl M (party leader)
Peter Skaarup M
Lise-lott Blixt F
René Christensen M
Martin Henriksen M
Anders Vistisen M
Carl Christian Ebbesen M
Erik Høgh Sørensen M
Tobias Weische M
Peter Kofod M
Morten Messerschmidt M

DF party leadership 2011–2021: Pia Kjaersgaard, W (2011–2012), Kristian Thulesen Dahl, M (2012–)

Female: 10 percent, Male: 90 percent.

2. Gender composition in Danish non-PRR parties' party councils, 2020–2021

Social Democratic Party (*Socialdemokratiet, A*): 18 men, 14 women ¹²

¹⁰ Source: Tobias Weische, student helper at the Danish People's Party, personal communication, July 13, 2021.

¹¹ Source: Tobias Weische, student helper at the Danish People's Party, personal communication, July 13, 2021.

¹² Socialdemokratiet. (n.d.). *Hovedbestyrelsen*. Retrieved April 22, 2021, from <https://www.socialdemokratiet.dk/om-os/organisation/hovedbestyrelse/>

Liberal Party (*Radikale Venstre, RV*): 56 men, 39 women ¹³

Conservative Party (*Det Konservative Folkeparti, DKF*): 26 men, 7 women ¹⁴

New Right (*Nye Borgerlige, D*): 10 men, 3 women ¹⁵

Socialist People's Party (*Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF*): 15 men, 12 women ¹⁶

Liberal Alliance (*Liberal Alliance, LA*): 21 men, 3 women ¹⁷

Venstre (*Venstre, V*): 21 men, 4 women ¹⁸

Red-Green Alliance (*Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne, Ø*): 14 men, 11 women ¹⁹

The Alternative (*Alternativet, Å*): 12 men, 4 women ²⁰

3. Sex of party leaders in Danish non-PRR parties

Alternativet: Uffe Elbæk, M (2013–2019), Josephine Fock, F (2020), Franciska Roskenskilde, F (2021) ²¹

Venstre: Lars Løkke Rasmussen, M (2009–2019), Jakob Ellemann-Jensen, M (september 2019-) ²²

Radikale Venstre: Margrethe Vestager, F (2011–2014), Morten Østergaard, M (2014–2020), Sofie Carsten Nielsen, F (2020-) ²³

Det Konservative Folkeparti: Lars Barfoed, M (2011–2014), Søren Pape Poulsen, M (2014-) ²⁴

Socialdemokratiet: Helle Thorning-Schmidt F (2011–2015), Mette Frederiksen F (2015-) ²⁵

Socialistisk Folkeparti: Villy Søvnald, M (2005–2012), Anette Vilhelmsen, F (2012–2014), Pia Olsen Dyhr, F (2014-) ²⁶

Liberal Alliance: Anders Samuelson M (2011–2019), Alex Vanopslagh, M (2019-) ²⁷

Enhedslisten: Johanne Schmidt-Nielsen W (2011-2016), Pernille Skipper, W (2016-2021) ²⁸

Nye Borgerlige: Pernille Vermund, W (2015-) ²⁹

¹³ Radikale Venstre. (n.d.). *Hovedbestyrelsen*. Retrieved April 20, 2021, <https://www.radikale.dk/partiet/hovedbestyrelse/> [Radikale Venstre has since changed their website]

¹⁴ Det Konservative Folkeparti. (n.d.). *Hovedbestyrelsen*. Retrieved April 21, 2021, from <https://konservative.dk/personer/hovedbestyrelsen/>

¹⁵ Nye Borgerlige. (n.d.). *Hovedbestyrelsen*. Retrieved April 22, 2021, from <https://nyeborgerlige.dk/kontakt/hovedbestyrelsen/>

¹⁶ Socialistisk Folkeparti. (n.d.). *Landsledelsen*. Retrieved April 22, 2021, from <https://sf.dk/om-sf/organisation/ledelse-naevn-og-udvalg/>

¹⁷ Liberal Alliance. (n.d.). *Hovedbestyrelse*. Retrieved April 22, 2021, from

<https://www.liberalalliance.dk/partiet/landsorganisation/hovedbestyrelse/>

¹⁸ Venstre. (n.d.). *Forretningsudvalg*. Retrieved April 27, 2021, from <https://www.venstre.dk/personer/forretningsudvalg>

¹⁹ Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne. (n.d.). *Hovedbestyrelse*. Retrieved April 22, 2021, from <https://enhedslisten.dk/hovedbestyrelse>

²⁰ Alternativet. (n.d.). *Hovedbestyrelsen*. Retrieved April 21, 2021, from <https://alternativet.dk/personer/hovedbestyrelsen>

²¹ Kosiara-Pedersen, K. (2021, October 7). *Alternativet*. Den Store Danske. <https://denstoredanske.lex.dk/Alternativet>

²² Olesen, N.W., Rüdiger, M., & Bille, L. (2020, April 24). *Venstre*. Den Store Danske. https://denstoredanske.lex.dk/Venstre_-_dansk_politisk_parti

²³ Kosiara-Pedersen, K. (2020, October 8). *Radikale Venstre*. Den Store Danske. https://denstoredanske.lex.dk/Radikale_Venstre

²⁴ Kosiara-Pedersen, K. (2020, June 3). *Det Konservative Folkeparti*. Den Store Danske

https://denstoredanske.lex.dk/Det_Konservative_Folkeparti

²⁵ Borring Olesen, T., Rüdiger, M., & Bille, L. (2021, April 23). *Socialdemokratiet*. Den Store Danske.

<https://denstoredanske.lex.dk/Socialdemokratiet>

²⁶ Kosiara-Pedersen, K. (2020, June 2). *Socialistisk Folkeparti*. Den Store Danske. https://denstoredanske.lex.dk/Socialistisk_Folkeparti

²⁷ Kosiara-Pedersen, K. (2020, May 14). *Liberal Alliance*. Den Store Danske. https://denstoredanske.lex.dk/Liberal_Alliance

²⁸ Kosiara-Pedersen, K. (2021, February 11). *Enhedslisten*. Den Store Danske. <https://denstoredanske.lex.dk/Enhedslisten>

²⁹ Kosiara-Pedersen, K. (2020, June 19). *Nye Borgerlige*. Den Store Danske. https://denstoredanske.lex.dk/Nye_Borgerlige

4. Percentage of women in Danish parties' party councils and party leadership

Table B1. Gender balance in the Danish parties' party councils, 2020–2021, (%)

Party / Sex of party council member	Male	Female
Socialdemocrats (Socialdemokratiet)	56.25 (n=18/32)	43.75 (n=14)
Social Liberals (Radikale Venstre)	58.9 (n=56/95)	41.1 (n=39)
Conservative (Det Konservative Folkeparti, DKF)	78.8 (n=26/33)	21.2 (n=7)
New Right (Nye Borgerlige)	76.9 (n=10/13)	23.1 (n=3)
Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF)	55.6 (n=15/27)	44.4 (n=12)
Liberal Alliance (Liberal Alliance)	87.5 (n=21/24)	12.5 (n=3)
Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti)	90.9 (n=10 /11)	9.1 (n=1/11)
Venstre (Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti)	84.0 (n=21/25)	16.0 (n=4)
Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne)	56.0 (n=14/25)	44.0 (n=11)
The Alternative (Alternativet)	75.0 (n=12/16)	25.0 (n=4)
Denmark	72.0	28.0

Table B2. Percentage of women in the DF's party councils, 2011–2021, (%)

Party / Mandate years	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Mean, %
DF	27.3 (n=3/11)	18.2 (n=2/11)	27.3 (n=3/11)	27.3 (n=3/11)	27.3 (n=3/11)	27.3 (n=3/11)	27.3 (n=3/11)	27.3 (n=3/11)	9.1 (n=1/9)	9.1 (n=1/9)	22.75

Table B3. Percentage of women in Danish parties' party leadership, 2011–2021, (% , (n=number)).

Party / Year (1=woman, 0=man)	2011– 2012	2012– 2013	2013– 2014	2014– 2015	2015– 2016	2016– 2017	2017– 2018	2018– 2019	2019– 2020	2020– 2021	Mean %
Social Democratic Party (A)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100
Social Liberals (RV)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	100 (n=1)	40
Conservative Party (DKF)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0
Socialist People's Party (SF)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0
Liberal Alliance (LA)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0
DF	100 (n=1)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	10
Venstre (V)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0
Red-Green Alliance (Ø)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100
The Alternative (Å)	NA	NA	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	
Denmark, total	50 (n=4/8)	50 (n=4/8)	44.4 (n=4/9)	33.3 (n=3/9)	33.3 (n=3/9)	33.3 (n=3/9)	33.3 (n=3/9)	33.3 (n=3/9)	33.3 (n=3/9)	55.6 (n=5/9)	40
Denmark, total, non-PRR parties	42.9 (n=3/7)	57.1 (n=4/7)	50 (n=4/8)	37.5 (n=3/8)	37.5 (n=3/8)	37.5 (n=3/8)	37.5 (n=3/8)	37.5 (n=3/8)	37.5 (n=3/8)	62.5 (n=5/8)	43.75

Appendix C. Gender composition in Norwegian parties' party councils and leadership

1. The Progress Party: Gender composition in party councils and in party leadership, 2011–2021

About the Frp's bylaws:

The Norwegian Progress party's bylaws¹ state that the party council consists of:

- Party leader (elected in between election years, for 2 years)
- First vice leader (*første nestleder* – elected in election years, for 2 years)
- Second vice leader (*andre nestleder* – elected in election years, for 2 years)
- Six members (three are elected in election years for 2 years, three are elected in in between election years for 2 years)
- Leader of the FrP Youth (*FrU-formann*)
- Representative from the parliamentary group (*Stortingsgruppens representant*)

About the data presented below:

- F=female, M=male, (xx) = year when elected to party council

FrP party council 2011–2012²

Results: 4/11 women, 7/11 men

Party leadership:

Party leader: Siv Jensen F (2011–2012, re-elected in 2012)³

First nestleder: Per Sandberg M (2011)⁴

Second nestleder: Per Arne Olsen M (2011)⁵

Members:

Helge André Njåstad M (2011)⁶

Hanne Blåfjelldal F (2011)⁷

Sylvi Listhaug F (2011)⁸

Anders Anundsen M (2012)⁹

¹ Fremskrittspartiet. (2021). *Vedtekter 2021*. Retrieved July 7, 2021, from <https://www.frp.no/files/Vedtekter/210508-Vedtekter-2021-FrP.pdf>

² Velkommen til Fremskrittspartiets landsmøte 24.–26. mai 2013. (n.d.). Retrieved July 15, 2021, from [Velkommen til Fremskrittspartiets landsmøte mai PDF Gratis nedlasting \(docplayer.me\)](https://www.frp.no/mediasenter/velkommen-til-fremskrittspartiets-landsmote-mai-2013)

³ Bordvik, M. (2012, April 22). Vant tøff kamp om toppverv i Frp. *Verdens Gang*. Retrieved from <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/JjJgX/vant-toeff-kamp-om-toppverv-i-frp>

⁴ Bordvik, M. (2012, April 22). Vant tøff kamp om toppverv i Frp. *Verdens Gang*. Retrieved from <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/JjJgX/vant-toeff-kamp-om-toppverv-i-frp>

⁵ Bordvik, M. (2012, April 22). Vant tøff kamp om toppverv i Frp. *Verdens Gang*. Retrieved from <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/JjJgX/vant-toeff-kamp-om-toppverv-i-frp>

⁶ Nye distriktsstemmer i Frp-ledelsen. (2011, May 15). *Nationen*. <https://www.nationen.no/article/nye-distriktsstemmer-i-frp-ledelsen/>

⁷ Nye distriktsstemmer i Frp-ledelsen. (2011, May 15). *Nationen*. <https://www.nationen.no/article/nye-distriktsstemmer-i-frp-ledelsen/>

⁸ Nye distriktsstemmer i Frp-ledelsen. (2011, May 15). *Nationen*. <https://www.nationen.no/article/nye-distriktsstemmer-i-frp-ledelsen/>

⁹ Bordvik, M. (2012, April 22). Vant tøff kamp om toppverv i Frp. *Verdens Gang*. Retrieved from <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/JjJgX/vant-toeff-kamp-om-toppverv-i-frp>

Kari Kjønaas Kjos F (2012)¹⁰
Tom Cato Karlsen M (2012)¹¹

FrU-formann
Ove Vanebo M (2011–2012)¹²
Himanshu Gulati M (2012–2014)¹³

Representative from ”stortingsgruppen”:
Ketil Solvik-Olsen M (2012)¹⁴

FrP Party council 2012–2013

Results: 3/10 women, 7/10 men

Party leader: Siv Jensen F (2012 – not up for re-election)
First nestleder: Per Sandberg M (2013)¹⁵
Second nestleder: Ketil Solvik-Olsen M (2013)¹⁶

Members:

Anders Anundsen M (2012 – not up for election)
Kari Kjønaas Kjos F (2012 – not up for election)
Tom Cato Karlsen M (2012 – not up for election)
Helge A. Njåstad M (2013)¹⁷
Sylvi Listhaug F (2013)¹⁸
Robert Eriksson M (2013)¹⁹

FrU-formann: Himanshu Gulati M (2012–2014)²⁰

Representative from Stortingsgruppens: Unknown

FrP Party council 2013–2014

Results: 2/11 women, 9/11 men

Party leader: Siv Jensen F (2014)²¹
First nestleder: Per Sandberg M (2013 – not up for election)
Second nestleder: Ketil Solvik-Olsen M (2013 – not up for election)

¹⁰ Bordvik, M. (2012, April 22). Vant tøff kamp om toppverv i Frp. *Verdens Gang*. Retrieved from <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/JjJgX/vant-toeff-kamp-om-toppverv-i-frp>

¹¹ Bordvik, M. (2012, April 22). Vant tøff kamp om toppverv i Frp. *Verdens Gang*. Retrieved from <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/JjJgX/vant-toeff-kamp-om-toppverv-i-frp>

¹² Ove Vanebo. (n.d.). Kluge. Retrieved September 6, 2021, from <https://www.kluge.no/globalassets/4-menneskene/2-cv---norsk/ove-vanebo.pdf>

¹³ Fremskrittspartiet. (n.d.). *Himanshu Gulati*. Retrieved July 12, 2021, from <https://www.frp.no/vare-folk/himanshu-gulati>

¹⁴ Velkommen til Fremskrittspartiets landsmøte 24.–26. mai 2013. (n.d.). Retrieved July 15, 2021, from [Velkommen til Fremskrittspartiets landsmøte mai PDF Gratis nedlasting \(docplayer.me\)](#)

¹⁵ Kumano-Ensby, A. L., (2014, May 4). Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen. *NRK Norge*. [Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen – NRK Norge – Oversikt over nyheter fra ulike deler av landet](#)

¹⁶ Kumano-Ensby, A. L., (2014, May 4). Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen. *NRK Norge*. [Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen – NRK Norge – Oversikt over nyheter fra ulike deler av landet](#)

¹⁷ Kumano-Ensby, A. L., (2014, May 4). Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen. *NRK Norge*. [Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen – NRK Norge – Oversikt over nyheter fra ulike deler av landet](#)

¹⁸ Kumano-Ensby, A. L., (2014, May 4). Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen. *NRK Norge*. [Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen – NRK Norge – Oversikt over nyheter fra ulike deler av landet](#)

¹⁹ Kumano-Ensby, A. L., (2014, May 4). Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen. *NRK Norge*. [Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen – NRK Norge – Oversikt over nyheter fra ulike deler av landet](#)

²⁰ Fremskrittspartiet. (n.d.). *Himanshu Gulati*. Retrieved July 12, 2021, from <https://www.frp.no/vare-folk/himanshu-gulati>

²¹ Kumano-Ensby, A. L., (2014, May 4). Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen. *NRK Norge*. [Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen – NRK Norge – Oversikt over nyheter fra ulike deler av landet](#)

Members:

Helge A. Njåstad M (2013 – not up for election)
Sylvi Listhaug F (2013 – not up for election)
Robert Eriksson M (2013 – not up for election)
Terje Søviknes M (2014)²²
Anders Anundsen M (2014)²³
Tom Cato Karlsen M (2014)²⁴

FrU-formann:

Himanshu Gulati M (2013–2014)
Atle Simonsen M (2014)²⁵

Storingsgruppens representant: Harald Nesvik M (2013)²⁶

FrP Party council 2014–2015

Results: 2/11 kvinner, 9/11 män

Party leader: Siv Jensen F (2014 – not up for election)
First nestleder: Per Sandberg M²⁷
Second nestleder: Ketil Solvik-Olsen M²⁸

Members:

Terje Søviknes M (2014 – not up for election)
Anders Anundsen M (2014 – not up for election)
Tom Cato Karlsen M (2014 – not up for election)
Helge A. Njåstad M (2015)²⁹
Sylvi Listhaug F (2015)³⁰
Robert Eriksson M (2015)³¹

FrU-formann: Atle Simonsen M (2014)³²

Storingsgruppens representant: Harald Nesvik M (2013)³³

FrP Party council 2015–2016

Results: 2/11 women, 9/11 men

²² Kumano-Ensby, A. L., (2014, May 4). Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen. *NRK Norge*. [Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen – NRK Norge – Oversikt over nyheter fra ulike deler av landet](#)

²³ Kumano-Ensby, A. L., (2014, May 4). Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen. *NRK Norge*. [Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen – NRK Norge – Oversikt over nyheter fra ulike deler av landet](#)

²⁴ Kumano-Ensby, A. L., (2014, May 4). Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen. *NRK Norge*. [Søviknes tilbake i Frp-ledelsen – NRK Norge – Oversikt over nyheter fra ulike deler av landet](#)

²⁵ Tvedt, K. A., (n.d.). *Atle Simonsen*. Store Norske Leksikon. Retrieved July 11, 2021, from https://snl.no/Atle_Simonsen

²⁶ Tvedt, K. A., (n.d.). *Harald Tom Nesvik*. Store Norske Leksikon. Retrieved July 11, 2021, from https://snl.no/Harald_Tom_Nesvik

²⁷ Velkommen tillandsmøte 2016. (2016, April 7). Retrieved July 11, 2021, from: [Velkommen til landsmøte PDF Gratis nedlasting \(docplayer.me\)](#)

²⁸ Velkommen tillandsmøte 2016. (2016, April 7). Retrieved July 11, 2021, from: [Velkommen til landsmøte PDF Gratis nedlasting \(docplayer.me\)](#)

²⁹ Velkommen tillandsmøte 2016. (2016, April 7). Retrieved July 11, 2021, from: [Velkommen til landsmøte PDF Gratis nedlasting \(docplayer.me\)](#)

³⁰ Velkommen tillandsmøte 2016. (2016, April 7). Retrieved July 11, 2021, from: [Velkommen til landsmøte PDF Gratis nedlasting \(docplayer.me\)](#)

³¹ Velkommen tillandsmøte 2016. (2016, April 7). Retrieved July 11, 2021, from: [Velkommen til landsmøte PDF Gratis nedlasting \(docplayer.me\)](#)

³² Tvedt, K. A., (n.d.). *Atle Simonsen*. Store Norske Leksikon. Retrieved July 11, 2021, from https://snl.no/Atle_Simonsen

³³ Tvedt, K. A., (n.d.). *Harald Tom Nesvik*. Store Norske Leksikon. Retrieved July 11, 2021, from https://snl.no/Harald_Tom_Nesvik

Party leader: Siv Jensen F (2016)³⁴

First nestleder: Per Sandberg M (2015 – not up for election)

Second nestleder: Ketil Solvik-Olsen M (2015 – not up for election)

Members³⁵:

Helge A. Njåstad M (2015 – not up for election)

Sylvi Listhaug F (2015 – not up for election)

Robert Eriksson M (2015 – not up for election)

Terje Søviknes M (2016)³⁶

Anders Anundsen M (2016)³⁷

Tom Cato Karlsen M (2016)³⁸

FrU-formann:

Atle Simonsen M (2015–2016)³⁹

Bjørn-Kristian Svendsrud M (2016–2020)⁴⁰

Stortingssgruppens representant: Harald Tom Nesvik M⁴¹

FrP Party council 2016–2017⁴²

Results: 2/11 women, 9/11 men

Party leader: Siv Jensen F (2016 – not up for election)

First nestleder: Per Sandberg M (2017)

Second nestleder: Ketil Solvik-Olsen M (2017)

Members:

Terje Søviknes M (2016 – not up for election)

Anders Anundsen M (2016 – not up for election)

Tom Cato Karlsen M (2016 – not up for election)

Helge A. Njåstad M (2017)

Sylvi Listhaug F (2017)

Alf Erik Andersen M (2017)

FrU-formann: Bjørn-Kristian Svendsrud M (2016-2020)

Stortingssgruppens representant: Hans Andreas Limi M

³⁴ Garvik, O. (n.d.). *Siv Jensen*. Store Norske Leksikon. Retrieved July 8, 2021, from https://snl.no/Siv_Jensen

³⁵ An article in 2018 (NTB/Aftenposten, 2018) confirms that Anundsen, Cato Karlsen and Soviknes were still in the party council in 2018, proving that they were re-elected in 2016.

³⁶ NTB. (2018, April 12). Anundsen ferdig i Frps sentralstyre. *Aftenposten*. Retrieved July 14, 2021, from <https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/politikk/i/gPBBKk/anundsen-ferdig-i-frps-sentralstyre>

³⁷ NTB. (2018, April 12). Anundsen ferdig i Frps sentralstyre. *Aftenposten*. Retrieved July 14, 2021, from <https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/politikk/i/gPBBKk/anundsen-ferdig-i-frps-sentralstyre>

³⁸ NTB. (2018, April 12). Anundsen ferdig i Frps sentralstyre. *Aftenposten*. Retrieved July 14, 2021, from <https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/politikk/i/gPBBKk/anundsen-ferdig-i-frps-sentralstyre>

³⁹ Tvedt, K. A. (n.d.). *Atle Simonsen*. Store Norske Leksikon. Retrieved July 11, 2021, from https://snl.no/Atle_Simonsen

⁴⁰ Berge, J. (January 22, 2020). FpU-formannen gir seg. *Nettavisen Nyheter*. Retrieved September 10, 2021, from <https://www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/fpu-formannen-gir-seg/s/12-95-3423913302>

⁴¹ Tvedt, K. A., (n.d.). *Harald Tom Nesvik*. Store Norske Leksikon. Retrieved July 11, 2021, from https://snl.no/Harald_Tom_Nesvik

⁴² Velkommen til landsmøte 2018. (2018, Mars 15). Retrieved September 6, 2021, from: [Velkommen til landsmøte PDF Free Download \(doeplayer.me\)](#)

About source: It shows that by 2018, the following were FrP party council members: A. Anundsen, A. Andersen, T. Karlsen, S. Listhaug, H. Njåstad, T. Soviknes, H. Limi and B. Svendsrud. Anundsen, Cato Karlsen and Soviknes are up for election (as indicated by article *Anundsen ferdig i Frps sentralstyre* (NTB, 2018)), leaving the conclusion that the members elected in 2017 were S. Listhaug, A. Andersen and H. Njåstad. Limi is the parliamentary group rep and Svendsrud FrU-leader.

FrP Party council 2017–2018

Results: 2/11 women, 9/11 men

Party leadership:

Party leader: Siv Jensen F (2018)⁴³

First nestleder: Per Sandberg (2017–2018) M, Sylvi Listhaug (2018–2019) F⁴⁴

Second nestleder: Ketil Solvik-Olsen M (2017 – not up for election)

Members:

Helge A. Njåstad M (2017 – not up for election)

Sylvi Listhaug F (2017 – not up for election)

Alf Erik Andersen M (2017 – not up for election)

Terje Søviknes M (2018)⁴⁵

Tom Staahle M (2018)⁴⁶

Ronny Berg M (2018)⁴⁷

FrU-formann: Bjørn-Kristian Svendsrud M (2016–2020)⁴⁸

Stortingegruppens representant: Hans Andreas Limi (2017-) M⁴⁹

FrP Party council 2018–2019

Results: 3/11 women, 8/11 men

Party leader: Siv Jensen F (2018 – not up for election)

First nestleder: Per Sandberg M (until september 2018), Sylvi Listhaug (2018–2019) F⁵⁰

Second nestleder: Ketil Solvik-Olsen M (replaced by Terje Søviknes in 2019)⁵¹

Members:

Terje Søviknes M (2018) (replaced by Ketil Solvik-Olsen in 2019)

Tom Staahle M (2018 – not up for election)

Ronny Berg M (2018 – not up for election)

Christian Tybring Gjedde (2019) M⁵²

⁴³ Velkommen til landsmøte 2018. (2018, Mars 15). Retrieved September 6, 2021, from: [Velkommen til landsmøte PDF Free Download \(docplayer.me\)](#)

⁴⁴ Tahseen, R., Breivik, E. M., Leraan Skjetne, O., & Mosveen, E. (2018, September 3). Sylvi Listhaug blir 1. Nestleder i Frp. *Verdens Gang*. <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/LOEAd1/sylvi-listhaug-blir-1-nestleder-i-frp>

⁴⁵ NTB. (2018, April 29). Jensen gjenvalgt som Frp-leder. *Harstad Tidende*. <https://www.ht.no/ntb/innenriks/2018/04/29/Jensen-gjenvalgt-som-Frp-leder-16591922.ece>

⁴⁶ NTB. (2018, April 29). Jensen gjenvalgt som Frp-leder. *Harstad Tidende*. Retrieved from <https://www.ht.no/ntb/innenriks/2018/04/29/Jensen-gjenvalgt-som-Frp-leder-16591922.ece>

⁴⁷ Krogstad, B. (2018, April 29). Ronny Berg inn på fast plass i sentralstyret. *Altaposten*. <https://www.altaposten.no/nyheter/2018/04/29/Ronny-Berg-inn-p%C3%A5-fast-plass-i-sentralstyret-16592136.ece>

⁴⁸ Velkommen til landsmøte 2018. (2018, Mars 15). Retrieved September 6, 2021, from: [Velkommen til landsmøte PDF Free Download \(docplayer.me\)](#)

⁴⁹ Velkommen til landsmøte 2018. (2018, Mars 15). Retrieved September 6, 2021, from: [Velkommen til landsmøte PDF Free Download \(docplayer.me\)](#)

⁵⁰ Tahseen, R., Breivik, E. M., Leraan Skjetne, O., & Mosveen, E. (2018, September 3). Sylvi Listhaug blir 1. Nestleder i Frp. *Verdens Gang*. <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/LOEAd1/sylvi-listhaug-blir-1-nestleder-i-frp>

⁵¹ NTB. (2019, May 5). Christian Tybring-Gjedde var ikke innstilt til Frps sentralstyre, vant kampvotering. *Dagsavisen*. Retrieved from <https://www.dagsavisen.no/nyheter/innenriks/2019/05/05/christian-tybring-gjedde-var-ikke-innstilt-til-frps-sentralstyre-vant-kampvotering/>

⁵² NTB. (2019, May 5). Christian Tybring-Gjedde var ikke innstilt til Frps sentralstyre, vant kampvotering. *Dagsavisen*. Retrieved from <https://www.dagsavisen.no/nyheter/innenriks/2019/05/05/christian-tybring-gjedde-var-ikke-innstilt-til-frps-sentralstyre-vant-kampvotering/>

Alf Erik Andersen (2019) M⁵³
Lill Hariett Sandaune (2019) F⁵⁴

FrU-formann: Bjørn-Kristian Svendsrud M (2016–2020)

Stortingssgruppens representant: Hans Andreas Limi (2017-) M⁵⁵

FrP Party council 2019–2020

Results: 3/11 women, 8/11 men

Party leader: Siv Jensen F (2020)

First nestleder: Sylvi Listhaug F (2019 – not up for election)

Second nestleder: Terje Søviknes M (2019 – not up for election)

Members:

Christian Tybring Gjedde (2019 – not up for election) M

Alf Erik Andersen (2019 – not up for election) M

Lill Hariett Sandaune (2019 – not up for election) F

Jon Engen-Helgheim (2020) M⁵⁶

Ronny Berg (2020) M⁵⁷

Ketil Solvik-Olsen (2020) M⁵⁸

FrU-formann:

Bjørn-Kristian Svendsrud M (2019–2020)

Andreas Brännström (2020–2021) M⁵⁹

Stortingssgruppens representant: Hans Andreas Limi M⁶⁰

FrP Party council 2020–2021

Results: 3/11 women, 8/11 men

Party leader: Sylvi Listhaug F (2021)⁶¹

First nestleder: Ketil Solvik-Olsen M (from May 2021)⁶²

Second nestleder: Terje Søviknes M (2020 – not up for election)

Members:

Jon Engen-Helgheim (2020 – not up for election) M

⁵³ NTB. (2019, May 5). Christian Tybring-Gjedde var ikke innstilt til Frps sentralstyre, vant kampvotering. *Dagsavisen*. Retrieved from <https://www.dagsavisen.no/nyheter/innenriks/2019/05/05/christian-tybring-gjedde-var-ikke-innstilt-til-frps-sentralstyre-vant-kampvotering/>

⁵⁴ NTB. (2019, May 5). Christian Tybring-Gjedde var ikke innstilt til Frps sentralstyre, vant kampvotering. *Dagsavisen*. Retrieved from <https://www.dagsavisen.no/nyheter/innenriks/2019/05/05/christian-tybring-gjedde-var-ikke-innstilt-til-frps-sentralstyre-vant-kampvotering/>

⁵⁵ Tvedt, K. A., (n.d.). *Hans Andreas Limi*. Store Norske Leksikon. Retrieved July 11, 2021, from [Hans Andreas Limi – Store norske leksikon \(snl.no\)](https://snl.no/hans-andreas-limi)

⁵⁶ Fremskrittspartiet. (2021). *Sentralstyrets årsberetning 2021*. LM SAK 02.01/21. Retrieved July 7, 2021, from <https://www.frp.no/files/Landsmote/2021/LM-sak-020121-Sentralstyrets-arsberetning-2020-2021.pdf>

⁵⁷ Fremskrittspartiet. (2021). *Sentralstyrets årsberetning 2021*. LM SAK 02.01/21. Retrieved July 7, 2021, from <https://www.frp.no/files/Landsmote/2021/LM-sak-020121-Sentralstyrets-arsberetning-2020-2021.pdf>

⁵⁸ Fremskrittspartiet. (2021). *Sentralstyrets årsberetning 2021*. LM SAK 02.01/21. Retrieved July 7, 2021, from <https://www.frp.no/files/Landsmote/2021/LM-sak-020121-Sentralstyrets-arsberetning-2020-2021.pdf>

⁵⁹ Fremskrittspartiet. (2021). *Sentralstyrets årsberetning 2021*. LM SAK 02.01/21. Retrieved July 7, 2021, from <https://www.frp.no/files/Landsmote/2021/LM-sak-020121-Sentralstyrets-arsberetning-2020-2021.pdf>

⁶⁰ Fremskrittspartiet. (2021). *Sentralstyrets årsberetning 2021*. LM SAK 02.01/21. Retrieved July 7, 2021, from <https://www.frp.no/files/Landsmote/2021/LM-sak-020121-Sentralstyrets-arsberetning-2020-2021.pdf>

⁶¹ Fremskrittspartiet. (2021). *Sentralstyrets årsberetning 2021*. LM SAK 02.01/21. Retrieved July 7, 2021, from <https://www.frp.no/files/Landsmote/2021/LM-sak-020121-Sentralstyrets-arsberetning-2020-2021.pdf>

⁶² NTB. (2021, May 8). Landsmøte: Fire kvinner inn i Frps sentralstyre. *Norge idag*. Retrieved from <https://idag.no/fire-kvinner-inn-i-frps-sentralstyre/19.36118>

Ronny Berg (2020 – not up for election) M
Ketil Solvik-Olsen (2020) M (replaced by Christian Tybring-Gjedde in 2021)⁶³
Anni Skogmann W (2021)⁶⁴
Hayley Anita Henriksen F (2021)⁶⁵
Truls Gihlemoen M (2021)⁶⁶

FrU-formann: Andreas Brännström (2020-2021) M

Stortingsgruppens representant: Hans Andreas Limi M

FrP party leadership

Siv Jensen (2011–2021) – 100 % female

2. Gender composition in Norwegian non-PRR parties' party councils, 2020–2021

Arbeiderpartiet: 10 men, 11 women⁶⁷

Høyre: 21 men, 12 women⁶⁸

Kristelig Folkeparti: 6 men, 7 women⁶⁹

Senterpartiet: 5 men, 8 women⁷⁰

Sosialistisk Venstreparti: 5 men, 6 women⁷¹

Venstre: 3 men, 4 women⁷²

Miljøpartiet de Grønne: 6 men, 6 women⁷³

Rødt: 5 men, 13 women⁷⁴

3. Sex of non-PRR parties' party leaders 2011–2021

Arbeiderpartiet⁷⁵: Jens Stoltenberg, M (2011–2014), Jonas Gahr Støre M (2014–)

Høyre⁷⁶: Erna Solberg F (2011–2021)

Kristelig Folkeparti⁷⁷: Knut Arild Hareide M (2011–2019), Kjell Ingolf Ropstad M (2019–)

⁶³ NTB. (2021, May 8). Landsmøte: Fire kvinner inn i Frps sentralstyre. *Norge idag*. Retrieved from <https://idag.no/fire-kvinner-inn-i-frps-sentralstyre/19.36118>

⁶⁴ Fremskrittspartiet. (n.d.). *Disse blev valgt til sentralstyret*. <https://www.frp.no/nyhetsdogn/disse-ble-valgt-til-sentralstyret>

⁶⁵ Fremskrittspartiet. (n.d.). *Disse blev valgt til sentralstyret*. <https://www.frp.no/nyhetsdogn/disse-ble-valgt-til-sentralstyret>

⁶⁶ Fremskrittspartiet. (n.d.). *Disse blev valgt til sentralstyret*. <https://www.frp.no/nyhetsdogn/disse-ble-valgt-til-sentralstyret>

⁶⁷ Arbeiderpartiet. (n.d.). *Sentralstyret*. Retrieved April 21, 2021, from <https://www.arbeiderpartiet.no/om/sentralstyret/>

⁶⁸ Høyre. (n.d.). *Politikere – Sentralstyret*, n.d. Retrieved April 20, 2021, from <https://hoyre.no/partiet/personer/politikere/sentralstyret/>

⁶⁹ Kristelig Folkeparti. (n.d.). *Sentralstyret*. Retrieved April 21, 2021, from <https://krf.no/partiet/organisasjonen/sentralstyret/>

⁷⁰ Senterpartiet. (n.d.). *Sentralstyret*. Retrieved April 20, 2021, from <https://www.senterpartiet.no/folk/Sentralstyret/>

⁷¹ Sosialistisk Venstreparti. (n.d.). *Sentralstyret*. Retrieved April 20, 2021, from <https://www.sv.no/partiet/organisasjonen/sentralstyret/>

⁷² Venstre. (n.d.). *Sentralstyret og landsstyret i Venstre*. Retrieved April 21, 2021, from <https://www.venstre.no/kontakt/tillitsvalgte/>

⁷³ Miljøpartiet de Grønne. (n.d.). *Sentralstyret*. Retrieved April 20, 2021, from <https://i.mdg.no/min-organisasjon/sentralstyret>

⁷⁴ Rødt. (n.d.). *Partiledelsen*. Retrieved April 29, 2021, from <https://roedt.no/partiledelsen>

⁷⁵ Garvik, O. (n.d.). *Arbeiderpartiet*. Store norske leksikon. Retrieved September 23, 2021, from <https://snl.no/Arbeiderpartiet>

⁷⁶ Garvik, O., Notaker, H., & Tvedt, K. A. (n.d.). *Høyre*. Store norske leksikon. Retrieved September 23, 2021, from <https://snl.no/H%C3%B8yre>

Senterpartiet⁷⁸: Liv Signe Navarsete F (2011–2014), Trygve Slagsvold Vedum M (2014-)

Venstre⁷⁹: Trine Skei Grande F (2010–2020), Guri Melby F (2020-)

Sosialistisk Venstreparti⁸⁰: Kristin Halvorsen F (2011–2012), Audun Lysbakken M (2012-)

Miljøpartiet de Grønne⁸¹: Hanna E. Marcussen F & Harald August Nissen M (2011–2014), Hilde Opoku F & Rasmus Hansson M (2014–2016), Une Aina Bastholm F & Rasmus Hansson M (2016-2018), Une Aina Bastholm F & Arild Hermstad M (2018-2020), Une Aina Bastholm F (2020-)

4. Percentage of women in Norwegian parties' party councils and party leadership

Table C1. Gender balance in Norwegian parties' party councils, 2020–2021, (percent, (n=number))

Party / Gender	Male	Female
Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet, A)	47.6 (n=10/21)	52.4 (n=11)
Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP)	72.7 (n=8/11)	27.3 (n=3/11)
Conservative Party (Høyre, H)	63.6 (n=21/33)	36.4 (n=12)
Christian Democratic Party (Kristelig Folkeparti, KrF)	46.2 (n=6/13)	53.8 (n=7)
Centre Party Senterpartiet (Sp)	38.5 (n=5/13)	61.5 (n=8)
Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti, SV)	45.5 (n=5/11)	54.5 (n=6)
Liberal Party (Venstre, V)	42.9 (n=3)	57.1 (n=4 of 7)
Green Party (Miljøpartiet de Grønne, MDG)	50.0 (n=6)	50.0 (n=6)
Red (Rødt, R) (not included in total)	27.8 (n=5/18)	72.2 (n=13)
Norway	50.9	49.1
Norway, total, non-PRR parties	47.8	52.2

Table C2. Percentage of women in the FrP's party councils, 2011–2021, (percent (n=number))

Party / Year	2011–2012	2012–2013 ⁸²	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Mean, %
FrP	27.3 (n=3/11)	30.0 (n=3/10)	18.2 (n=2/11)	18.2 (n=2/11)	18.2 (n=2/11)	18.2 (n=2/11)	18.2 (n=2/11)	27.3 (n=3/11)	27.3 (n=3/11)	27.3 (n=3/11)	23.0

⁷⁷ Garvik, O., & Tvedt, K. A. (n.d.). *Kristelig Folkeparti*. Store norske leksikon. Retrieved September 23, 2021, from https://snl.no/Kristelig_Folkeparti

⁷⁸ Garvik, O., & Tvedt, K. A. (n.d.). *Senterpartiet*. Store norske leksikon. Retrieved September 23, 2021, from <https://snl.no/Senterpartiet>

⁷⁹ Garvik, O., Tvedt, K. A., & Grimnes, O. K. (n.d.). *Venstre*. Store norske leksikon. Retrieved September 23, 2021, from <https://snl.no/Venstre>

⁸⁰ Garvik, O. (n.d.). *Sosialistisk Venstreparti*. Store norske leksikon. Retrieved September 23, 2021, from https://snl.no/Sosialistisk_Venstreparti

⁸¹ Jupskås, A. R., & Garvik, O. (n.d.). *Miljøpartiet de Grønne*. Store norske leksikon. Retrieved September 23, 2021, from https://snl.no/Milj%C3%B8partiet_De_Gr%C3%B8nne

⁸² Data on one member of the party council could not be found.

Table C3. Percentage of women in party leadership in Norwegian parties 2011–2021, (percent, (n=number)), (1=woman, 0=man, 0,5=shared leadership with 1 man and 1 woman)

Party / Year / Sex of party leader	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Mean %, , 2011–2021
Ap	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0
FrP	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100
H	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100
KrF	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0
Sp	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	30
SV	100 (n=1)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	10
V	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	0
MDG	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50
R (excluded in total)	0 (n=0)				0 (n=0)				0 (n=0)		NA
Norway, total	43.75 (n=3.5/8)	56.25 (n=4.5/8)	56.25	43.75	43.75	43.75	43.75	43.75	43.75	43.75	46.25
Norway, total, non-PRR parties	35.7 (n=2.5/7)	50 (n=3.5/7)	50 (n=3.5/7)	35.7 (n=2.5/7)	35.7 (n=2.5/7)	35.7 (n=2.5/7)	35.7 (n=2.5/7)	35.7 (n=2.5/7)	35.7 (n=2.5/7)	35.7 (n=2.5/7)	38.6

Appendix D. Gender composition in Finnish parties' party councils and leadership

1. The Finns Party: Gender composition in party councils and in party leadership, 2011–2021

The Finns Party's bylaws¹:

According to the Finns Party's bylaws, the party has a larger party committee that meets once annually and elects the members to the party council (party board). The party committee consists of the party leadership (party leader, vice leaders and party secretary) and 10-50 additional members. The party council, in turn, consists of the party leaders and seven members out of the 10-50 party committee members. The members of the party council are re-elected yearly, except for the party leadership which is elected every other year. The party council/board thus consists of:

- party leader/party chair (chair of the party council is the same as the party leader),
- three vice leaders (until 2021, there was a rule stipulating that at least one vice leader has to be male, and another vice leader has to be female),
- party secretary,
- seven regular members, and
- one representative of the parliamentary group.

About the data below:

- M = Male, F = Female

PS Party council 2011–2012

Results: 5/13 women, 8/13 men

Party leadership²:

Party leader: Timo Soini M

First vice president: Hanna Mäntylä F

Second vice president: Juho Eerola M

Third vice president: Reijo Ojennus M

Party secretary: Ossi Sandvik M

Members^{3 4}:

Seppo Huhta M

Pekka Laskinen M

Raimo Vistbacka M

¹ Perussuomalaiset. (n.d.). *Perussuomalaiset rp:n säämöt*. Retrieved July 20, 2021, from <https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/tietoa-meista/perussuomalaiset-rpn-saannot/>

² Hanna Mäntylä perussuomalaisten varapuheenjohtajaksi. (2011, June 18). *MTV3*. <https://www.mtvuutiset.fi/artikkeli/hanna-mantyla-perussuomalaisten-varapuheenjohtajaksi/1937734#gs.68uys9>

About source: Shows who were elected to party council leadership in 2011.

³ Tasekirja, Perussuomalaiset rp 1.1.2011 – 31.12.2011. (n.d.). Vaalirahoitusvalvonta. Retrieved July 25, 2021, from https://www.vaalirahoitusvalvonta.fi/fi/index/puoluetukiilmoituksia/ilmoituslistaus/tilinpaatostiedot/2011/1044184-6/P_TP_2011_Files/PER_tilinpaatos_2011.pdf

⁴ Perussuomalaisten hallitukseen puolet naisia. (2012, December 1). *Nelonen*. Retrieved July 20, 2021, from <https://www.nelonen.fi/uutiset/politiikka/243609-perussuomalaisten-hallitukseen-puolet-naisia>

Vuokko Lahti F
Pirita Nenonen F
Riikka Slunga-Poutsalo F
Seppo Toriseva M

Parliamentary group rep: Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner F⁵

PS Party council 2012–2013⁶

Results: 4/13 women, 9/13 men

Party leadership (not up for election):

Party leader: Timo Soini M
First vice president: Hanna Mäntylä F
Second vice president: Juho Eerola M
Third vice president: Reijo Ojennus M
Party secretary: Ossi Sandvik M

Members:

Juhani Pilpola M
Juha Väätäinen M
Raimo Vistbacka M
Vuokko Lahti F
Pirita Nenonen F
Mikko Nurmo M
Seppo Toriseva M

Parliamentary group rep: Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner F

PS Party council 2013–2014

Results: 4/13 women, 9/13 men

Party leadership⁷:

Party leader: Timo Soini M
First vice leader: Jussi Niinistö M
Second vice leader: Hanna Mäntylä F
Third vice leader: Juho Eerola M
Party secretary: Riikka Slunga-Poutsalo F⁸

Members⁹:

Martti Eskola M

⁵ Perussuomalaisten hallitukseen puolet naisia. (2012, December 1). *Nelonen*. Retrieved July 20, 2021, from <https://www.nelonen.fi/uutiset/politiikka/243609-perussuomalaisten-hallitukseen-puolet-naisia>

⁶ Tilinpäätös, Perussuomalaiset rp 2012. (n.d.). Vaalirahoitusvalvonta. Retrieved from https://www.vaalirahoitusvalvonta.fi/fi/index/puoluetukiilmoituksia/ilmoituslistaus/tilinpaatostiedot/2012/1044184-6/P_TP_2012_Files/Ps_tp_12.pdf

About source: It is a financial statement/annual report for the year 2012. It is signed by all members of the party council of the Finns Party, and thus is the source for the entire party council composition 2012–2013.

⁷ Uusivaara, T. (2013, June 29). *Perussuomalaisten varapuheenjohtajiksi Niinistö, Mäntylä ja Eerola*. Yle Uutiset. <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-6711204>

⁸ Perussuomalaiset. (2014, March 29). *Uusi puoluehallitus valittu*. Retrieved July 20, 2021, from <https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/ajankohtaista/uusi-puoluehallitus-valittu/>

⁹ PS Verkkotoimitus. (2013, April 20). *Perussuomalaisille uusi puoluehallitus*. Suomen Uutiset. Retrieved July 23, 2021, from <https://www.suomenuutiset.fi/perussuomalaisille-uusi-puoluehallitus/>

Pirita Nenonen F
Mikko Nurmo M
Juhani Pilpola M
Pekka M. Sinisalo M
Seppo Toriseva M
Raimo Vistbacka M

Parliamentary group rep: Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner F¹⁰

PS Party council 2014–2015

Results: 4/13 women, 9/13 men

Party leadership (not up for election):

Party leader: Timo Soini M
First vice president: Jussi Niinistö M
Second vice president: Hanna Mäntylä F
Third vice president: Juho Eerola M
Party secretary: Riikka Slunga-Poutsalo F

Members¹¹:

Sami Palviainen M
Juhani Pilpola M
Mikko Nurmo M
Marja-Liisa Riihimäki F
Jari Ronkainen M
Pekka M. Sinisalo M
Marke Tuominen F

Parliamentary group rep: Jari Lindström M¹²

PS Party council 2015–2016 ¹³

Results: 4/13 women, 9/13 men

Party leadership¹⁴:

Party leader: Timo Soini M
First vice leader: Jussi Niinistö M
Second vice president: Hanna Mäntylä F
Third vice president: Sebastian Tynkkynen M (removed from position and party by party council in

About source: The article details the elected members of the PS party council. The article is from the PS'S own news site, and thus not a neutral news source. Considering the content in the article, it is nevertheless trustworthy.

¹⁰ PS Verkkotoimitus. (2013, April 20). *Perussuomalaisille uusi puoluehallitus*. Suomen Uutiset. Retrieved July 23, 2021, from <https://www.suomenuutiset.fi/perussuomalaisille-uusi-puoluehallitus/>

¹¹ Perussuomalaiset. (2014, March 29). *Uusi puoluehallitus valittu*. Retrieved July 20, 2021, from <https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/ajankohtaista/uusi-puoluehallitus-valittu/>

¹² Perussuomalaiset. (2014, March 29). *Uusi puoluehallitus valittu*. Retrieved July 20, 2021, from <https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/ajankohtaista/uusi-puoluehallitus-valittu/>

¹³ Tilinpäätös, Perussuomalaiset rp 2015. (n.d.). Vaalirahoitusvalvonta. Retrieved July 21, 2021, from https://www.vaalirahoitusvalvonta.fi/fi/index/puoluetukiilmoituksia/ilmoituslistaus/tilinpaatostiedot/2015/1044184-6/P_TP_2015_Files/skannaus_1036.pdf

About source: It is an annual report signed by all members of the Finns Party council in February 2016.

¹⁴ Soini: Emme punavihreille ovea avaa – Perussuomalaisten puoluekokous hetki hetkeltä. (2015, August 8). *Yle*. <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-8212155>

October 2015)¹⁵

Party secretary: Riikka Slunga-Poutsalo F

Members¹⁶:

Aleksi Hernesniemi M

Anssi Joutsenlahti M

Terhi Kiemunki F

Osmo Kokko M

Juhani Pilpola M

Jari Ronkainen M

Marke Tuominen F

Parliamentary group rep: Jari Lindström M¹⁷

PS Party council 2016–2017

Results: 7/12 men, 5/12 women

Party leadership (not up for election):

Party leader: Timo Soini M

First vice president: Jussi Niinistö M

Second vice president: Hanna Mäntylä F

Party secretary: Riikka Slunga-Poutsalo F

Members¹⁸:

Ilpo Heltimoinen M

Anssi Joutsenlahti M

Veijo Niemi M

Mira Nieminen F

Juhani Pilpola M

Marke Tuominen F

Outi Virtanen F

Parliamentary group rep: Sampo Terho M

Party council 2017–2018¹⁹

Results: 5/13 women, 8/13 men. After June 2017: 7/13 women, 6/13 men

Party leadership:

Party leader: Jussi Halla-Aho M

¹⁵ Nieminen, I-M. (2015, October 26). *Sebastian Tynkkynen: Minut on erotettu perussuomalaisista – "Soinin giljotiini"*. Yle. <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-8407260>

¹⁶ Marke Tuominen jälleen persujen puoluehallitukseen. (2015, May 28). *Äänekosken kaupunkisanomat*. <https://aksa.fi/marke-tuominen-jalleen-persujen-puoluehallitukseen/>

¹⁷ Marke Tuominen jälleen persujen puoluehallitukseen. (2015, May 28). *Äänekosken kaupunkisanomat*. <https://aksa.fi/marke-tuominen-jalleen-persujen-puoluehallitukseen/>

¹⁸ Perussuomalaiset. (2016, March 14). *Uusi puoluehallitus on valittu*. Retrieved July 20, 2021, from <https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/ajankohtaista/uus-puoluehallitus-on-valittu/>

¹⁹ Tasekirja ja toimintakertomus, Perussuomalaiset rp, 2017. (n.d.). Vaalirahoitusvalvonta. Retrieved July 21, 2021, from https://www.vaalirahoitusvalvonta.fi/fi/index/puoluetukiilmoituksia/ilmoituslistaus/tilinpaatostiedot/2017/1044184-6/P_TP_2017_Files/skannattu_0096.pdf

About source: The PS'S annual report explains in detail which party council members that were elected in March 2017, and which members that stepped down in June 2017 following the election of Jussi Halla-Aho as party leader, as well as how these members were replaced. This source details all members of the PS party council 2017–2018.

First vice president: Laura Huhtasaari F
Second vice president: Teuvo Hakkarainen M (stepped down voluntarily in December 2017) ²⁰
Third vice president: Juho Eerola M
Party secretary: Riikka Slunga-Poutsalo F

Members:

Anssi Joutsenlahti M
Jani Kolehmainen M (stepped down in June 2017, replaced by Pia Pentikäinen F)
Veijo Niemi M
Marke Tuominen F
Jari Turpeinen M (stepped down in June 2017, replaced by Ahti Moilanen)
Irma Kemppainen F
Mira Nieminen F

Parliamentary group rep: Sampo Terho M (stepped down in June 2017, replaced by Leena Meri F)

PS Party council 2018–2019

Results: 7/12 women, 5/12 men

Party leadership (not up for election):

Party leader: Jussi Halla-Aho M
First vice president: Laura Huhtasaari F
Third vice president: Juho Eerola M
Party secretary: Riikka Slunga-Poutsalo F

Members²¹:

Ahti Moilanen M
Harri Vuorenpää M
Kaisa Juuso F
Pia Pentikäinen F
Eliisa Panttila F
Matti Mäntylä M
Marke Tuominen F

Parliamentary group rep: Leena Meri F

PS Party council 2019–2020

Results: 4/13 women, 9/13 men

Party leadership²²:

Party leader: Jussi Halla-Aho M
First vice president: Riikka Purra F
Second vice president: Arja Juvonen F
Third vice president: Juho Eerola M
Party secretary: Simo Grönroos M

²⁰ Hanhinen, H. (2017, December 19). Teuvo Hakkaraiselle vakava varoitus eduskuntaryhmältä – Luopuu itse 2. varapuheenjohtajan tehtävästä. Yle. <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-9983746>

²¹ Perussuomalaiset. (2018, May 19). *Perussuomalaisille uusi puoluehallitus*. Retrieved July 21, 2021, from <https://www.suomenuutiset.fi/perussuomalaisille-uusi-puoluehallitus-2/>

²² Sutinen, T. (2019, June 29). Tässä on perussuomalaisten uusi johto: tiukkaa maahanmuuttolinjaa, mutta pehmennyksenä myös sosiaalasioita. *Helsingin Sanomat*. <https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000006158482.html>

Members²³:

Kalervo Björkbacka M
Marko Koskinen M
Ahti Moilanen M
Matti Mäntylä M
Eliisa Panttila F
Pia Pentikäinen F
Harri Vuorenpää M

Parliamentary group rep: Ville Tavio M

PS Party council 2020–2021

Results: 2/13 women, 11/13 men

Party leadership (not up for election):

Party leader: Jussi Halla-Aho M
First vice president: Riikka Purra F
Second vice president: Arja Juvonen F
Third vice president: Juho Eerola M
Party secretary: Simo Grönroos M

Members²⁴:

Marko Koskinen M
Ahti Moilanen M
Matti Mäntylä M
Pauli Saarinen M
Heikki Tamminen M
Henri Uljonen M
Harri Vuorenpää M

Parliamentary group rep: Ville Tavio M

PS Party council 2021–2022 (not included in results in thesis)

Results: 10/13 men, 3/13 women

Party leadership²⁵:

Party leader: Riikka Purra, F
First vice leader: Leena Meri F,
Second vice leader: Mauri Peltokangas M
Third vice leader: Sebastian Tynkkynen M
Party secretary: Arto Luukkanen M

Members²⁶:

Jari Immonen M

²³ Perussuomalaiset. (2019, May 11). *Perussuomalaisten uusi puoluehallitus valittu*. Retrieved July 22, 2021, from <https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/ajankohtaista/perussuomalaisten-uusi-puoluehallitus-valittu/>

²⁴ Perussuomalaisten puoluehallitus valittu. (2020, June 13). *Suomen Uutiset*. <https://www.suomenuutiset.fi/perussuomalaisten-puoluehallitus-valittu/>

²⁵ Nalbantoglu, M. (2021, August 14). Perussuomalaisten puoluejohto meni uusiksi: Tässä ovat kaikki henkilövalinnat. *Helsingin Sanomat*. <https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000008193496.html>

²⁶ Perussuomalaisten puoluehallitus valittu. (2021, May 29). *Suomen Uutiset*. <https://www.suomenuutiset.fi/perussuomalaisten-puoluehallitus-valittu-2/>

Ahti Moilanen M
Matti Mäntylä M
Jyrki Niittymaa M
Päivi Sivenius F
Henri Uljonen M
Harri Vuorenpää M

Parliamentary group rep: Ville Tavio M

PS party leadership 2011–2021:

Timo Soini M (2011–2017), Jussi Halla-Aho M (2017–2021)

Gender composition in party leadership: 100 percent male.

2. Gender composition in Finnish non-PRR parties' party councils, 2020–2021

Social Democrats (SDP): 10/18 men, 8/18 women²⁷

National Coalition (Kok): 13/20 men, 7/20 women²⁸

Centre Party (Kesk): 15/31 men, 16/3 women²⁹

Green Party (Vihr): 4/12 men, 8/12 women³⁰

Left Alliance (Vas): 4/12 men, 8/12 women³¹

Swedish People's Party (SFP): 6/16 men, 10/16 women³²

Christian Democrats (KD): 8/22 men, 14/22 women³³

3. Sex of party leaders in Finnish non-PRR parties, 2011–2021

Social Democrats (SDP)³⁴: Jutta Urpilainen (2011–2014, F), Antti Rinne (2014–2020, M), Sanna Marin (2020-, F)

National Coalition (Kok)³⁵: Jyrki Katainen (2011–2014, M), Alexander Stubb (2014–2016, M), Petteri Orpo (2016-, M)

²⁷ Sosialidemokraattinen puolue. (n.d.). *Puoluehallitus*. Retrieved April 24, 2021, from <https://sdp.fi/fi/tutustu/paatoksenteke-puolueessa/puoluehallitus/>

²⁸ Kokoomus. (n.d.). *Puoluehallitus*. Retrieved April 25, 2021, from <https://www.kokoomus.fi/yhteystiedot/puoluehallitus/>

²⁹ Keskusta. (n.d.). *Puoluehallituksen jäsenet 2020–2022*. Retrieved April 25, 2021, from <https://keskusta.fi/meista/paatoksentekeolimet/puoluehallituksen-jasenet/>

³⁰ Vihreät. (n.d.). *Puoluehallitus*. Retrieved April 25, 2021, from <https://www.vihreat.fi/puoluehallitus/>

³¹ Vasemmistoliitto. (n.d.). *Puoluehallitus*. Retrieved April 24, 2021, from <https://vasemmisto.fi/ihmiset/puoluehallitus/>

³² Svenska Folkpartiet. (n.d.). *Partistyrelsen*. Retrieved April 24, 2021, from <https://sfp.fi/partiet/partifullmaktige-styrelse-och-utskott/partistyrelsen/>

³³ Kristillisdemokraatit. (n.d.). *Puoluehallitus ja -vastuusto*. Retrieved April 24, 2021, from <https://www.kd.fi/yhteystiedot/puoluehallitus/>

³⁴ Sosialidemokraatit. (n.d.). *Puoluekokoukset, puheenjohtajat ja puoluesihteerit 1899-*. Retrieved September 24, 2021, from <https://sdp.fi/fi/blog/puoluekokoukset-puheenjohtajat-ja-puoluesihteerit-1899/>

³⁵ Kokoomus. (n.d.). *Kokoomuksen historia*. Retrieved September 24, 2021, from <https://www.kokoomus.fi/tietoa-kokoomuksesta/kokoomuksen-historia/>

Centre Party (Kesk)³⁶: Mari Kiviniemi (2011–2012, F), Juha Sipilä (2012–2019, M), Katri Kulmuni (2019–2020, F), Annika Saarikko (2020-, F)

Green Party (Vihr)³⁷: Ville Niinistö (2011–2017, M), Touko Aalto (2017–2018, M), Pekka Haavisto (2018–2019, M), Maria Ohisalo (2019-, F)

Left Alliance (Vas): Paavo Arhinmäki (2011–2016, M)³⁸, Li Andersson (2016-, F)³⁹

Swedish People's Party (SFP)⁴⁰: Stefan Wallin (2011–2012, M), Carl Haglund (2012–2016, M), Anna-Maja Henriksson (2016-, F)

Christian Democrats (KD)⁴¹: Päivi Räsänen (2011–2015, F), Sari Essayah (2015-, F)

4. Percentage of women in Finnish parties' party councils and party leadership

Table D1. Gender balance in Finnish parties' party councils, 2020–2021, (percent, (n=number))

Party / Gender	Male	Female
Social Democrats (Sosialidemokraattinen puolue, SDP)	55.6 (n=10/18)	44.4 (n=8)
Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset, PS)	84.6 (n=11/13)	15.4 (n=2)
National Coalition (Kokoomus, Kok)	65.0 (n=13/20)	35.0 (n=7)
Centre Party (Keskusta, Kesk)	48.4 (n=15/31)	51.6 (n=16)
Green Party (Vihreät, Vihr)	33.3 (n=4/12)	66.7 (n=8)
Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto, Vas)	33.3 (n=4/12)	66.7 (n=8)
Swedish People's Party (Svenska Folkpartiet SFP)	37.5 (n=6/16)	62.5 (n=10)
Christian Democrats (Kristillisdemokraatit, KD)	36.4 (n=8/22)	63.6 (n=14)
Movement now (Liike nyt) (Not included in tota)	50.0 (n=5)	50.0 (n=5)
Finland, total	49.3	50.7
Finland, total, non-PRR parties	44.2	55.7

Table D2. Percentage of women in the PS's party councils, 2011–2021, (percent)

Party / Year	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Mean %
PS	38.5 (n=5/13)	30.8 (n=4/13)	30.8 (n=4/13)	30.8 (n=4/13)	30.8 (n=4/13)	41.7 (n=5/12)	38.5 (n=5/13)	41.7 (n=5/12)	30.8 (n=4/13)	15.4 (n=2/13)	33.0

³⁶ Keskusta. (n.d.). *Keskustan johtajat*. Retrieved September 24, 2021, from <https://keskusta.fi/meista/historia/keskustan-johtajat/>

³⁷ Vihreät. (n.d.). *Historia*. Retrieved October 24, 2021, from <https://www.vihreat.fi/historia/>

³⁸ Eduskunta. (n.d.). *Paavo Arhinmäki*. Retrieved September 24, 2021, from <https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/kansanedustajat/Sivut/917.aspx>

³⁹ Koskinen, A. L., & Vainio, J. (2016, June 6). Li Andersson on vasemmistoliiton uusi puheenjohtaja. *Aamulehti*. <https://www.aamulehti.fi/kotimaa/art-2000007359457.html>

⁴⁰ Koskinen, E-M. (2016, June 12). *Anna-Maja Henriksson är SFP:s nya ordförande – första kvinnan på posten*. Svenska Yle. <https://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2016/06/12/anna-maja-henriksson-ar-sfps-nya-ordforande-forsta-kvinnan-pa-posten>

⁴¹ Kristillisdemokraatit. (n.d.). *Puolueen historia*. Retrieved from September 24, 2021, from <https://www.kd.fi/politiikka/puolueen-historia/>

Table D3. Percentage of women in party leadership in Finnish parties 2011–2021, (percent, (n=number))

Party / Year / Sex of party leader, (1=woman, 0=man, 0,5=shared leadership with 1 man and 1 woman)	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Mean %, female party leadership, 2011–2021
Social Democrats (SDP)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	100 (n=1)	40
Finns Party (PS)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0
National Coalition (Kok)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0
Centre Party (Kesk)	100 (n=1)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	30
Green Party (Vihr)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	20
Left Alliance (Vas)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	50
Swedish People's Party (SFP)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	50
Christian Democrats (KD)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100
Movement now (NOT INCLUDED in total)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Finland, total	37.5 (n=3/8 women)	25 (n=2/8)	25 (n=2/8)	12.5 (n=1/8)	12.5 (n=1/8)	37.5 (n=3/8)	37.5 (n=3/8)	37.5 (n=3/8)	62.5 (n=5/8)	62.5 (n=5/8)	35
Finland, total, non-PRR parties	42.9 (n=3/7)	28.6 (n=2/7)	28.6 (n=2/7)	14.3 (n=1/7)	14.3 (n=1/7)	42.9 (n=3/7)	42.9 (n=3/7)	42.9 (n=3/7)	71.4 (n=5/7)	71.4 (n=5/7)	40

Appendix E. Gender composition in Swedish parties' party councils and leadership

1. The Sweden Democrats: Gender composition in party councils and in party leadership, 2011–2021

About the SD's bylaws and internal (party council) elections¹:

- Elections are held at the party's biannual party congress (mandate period = two years)
- The party's central committee consists of:
 - Party leader/party president (same person)
 - Vice leader
 - 2nd vice leader
 - 3-17 members
 - 1-10 alternate members

About the data:

- M = male, F = female

SD Party council 2011–2013²³

Results: 4/16 women, 12/16 men

Party leader: Jimmie Åkesson, M

Vice president: Jonas Åkerlund M

2nd vice president: Carina Herrstedt F

Members:

Björn Söder M

Per Björklund M

Mattias Karlsson M

Richard Jomshof M

Lars Isovaara M

Tony Wiklander M

Sven-Olof Sällström M

David Lång M

Johnny Skalin M

Erik Almqvist M

Maria Edenhager F

¹ Sverigedemokraterna. (2019). *Partistadgar*. Retrieved July 20, 2021, from <https://ratatosk.sd.se/sd/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/07122046/Sverigedemokraternas-partistadgar-2019-01-29.pdf>

² Hamrud, A. (2011, November 25). *Sverigedemokraterna valde ny partistyrelse*. Expo. <https://expo.se/2011/11/sverigedemokraterna-valde-ny-partistyrelse>

³ Sverigedemokraterna. (2011, November 25). *Sverigedemokraterna valde ny partistyrelse* [Press release]. Retrieved from <https://www.mynewsdesk.com/se/sverigedemokraterna/pressreleases/sverigedemokraterna-valde-ny-partistyrelse-709264>

Therese Borg F
Hanna Wigh F

SD Party council 2013–2015⁴⁵

Results: 5/15 women, 10/15 men

Party leader: Jimmie Åkesson, M
Vice president: Jonas Åkerlund M
2nd vice president: Carina Herrstedt F

Members:

Björn Söder M
Mattias Karlsson M
Richard Jomshof M
Sven-Olof Sällström M
Johnny Skalin M
David Lång M
Mattias Bäckström-Johansson M
Julia Kronlid F
Tony Wiklander M
Therese Borg F
Hanna Wigh F
Paula Bieler F

SD Party council 2015–2017⁶

Results: 6/17 women, 11/17 men

Party leader: Jimmie Åkesson, M
Vice president: Julia Kronlid F⁷
2nd vice president: Carina Ståhl Herrstedt F

Members:

Richard Jomshof M
Oscar Sjöstedt M⁸

⁴ Hedary, G. (2013, December 20). Landsdagar 2013. *SD Kuriren*. Retrieved July 23, 2021, from https://issuu.com/sdkuriren/docs/hela_108_n_tupplaga

About the source: An article, “Landsdagar 2013”, by Gabriella Hedary in SD-Kuriren number 108, published December 20, 2013, p.12–13, confirms that all members in the party council were elected in accordance with the nomination committee’s suggestions.

⁵ Sverigedemokraterna. (2013, November 6). *Valberedningens förslag till partistyrelse 2013–2015* [Press release]. Retrieved July 24, 2021, from <https://www.mynewsdesk.com/se/sverigedemokraterna/pressreleases/sd-valberedningens-foerslag-till-partistyrelse-2013-2015-925683>

⁶ Sverigedemokraterna. (2017). *Verksamhetsberättelse 2015–2017*. Retrieved September 6, 2021, from <http://docplayer.se/105132023-Verksamhetsberattelse.html>

About source: Details which persons that were members of the SD party council 2015–2017 (p. 3–4).

⁷ Julia Kronlid (SD). (n.d.). Sveriges Riksdag. Retrieved September 6, 2021, from https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/ledamoter-partier/ledamot/julia-kronlid_04727b66-64cd-4880-be85-dc8fe873bf8d

Comment: Under “Biography”, it says that Julia Kronlid has been vice party leader in SD since 2015.

⁸ Croneborg, M. (2015, December 17). Oscar Sjöstedt (SD): Vi är närmast Moderaterna. *Altinget*. Retrieved from <https://www.altinget.se/artikel/osacar-sjostedt-sd-vi-ar-narmast-moderaterna>

Paula Bieler F⁹
Therese Borg F¹⁰
Roger Hedlund M¹¹
Mattias Bäckström-Johansson M
Mattias Karlsson M
Anne Karlsson F¹²
David Lång M¹³
Magnus Olson M¹⁴
Johnny Skalin M¹⁵
Sven-Olof Sällström M¹⁶
Björn Söder M¹⁷
Christina Östberg F¹⁸

SD Party council 2017–2019¹⁹

Results: 6/19 women, 13/19 men

Party leader: Jimmie Åkesson, M
Vice president: Julia Kronlid, F
2nd vice president: Carina Ståhl Herrstedt F

Members:

Comment: Source says that Oscar Sjöstedt was elected to party council in November 2015.

⁹ Svensson, N. (2020, February 11). SD-toppen Paula Bieler lämnar riksdagen. *Expressen*.

<https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/sd-toppen-paula-bieler-lamnar-riksdagen/>

Comment: Article states that Paula Bieler was a member of the SD party council from 2013 until her decision to quit in 2020.

¹⁰ Borg, T. (n.d.). *Om mig* [Blog]. Therese Borg. Retrieved September 6, 2021, from

<https://thereseborg.wordpress.com/about/>

Comment: Therese Borg writes that she was a member of the SD party council from 2011–2019.

¹¹ Roger Hedlund (SD). (n.d.). Sveriges Riksdag. Retrieved September 6, 2021, from https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/ledamoter-partier/ledamot/roger-hedlund_dd0d47ea-5e71-4ec9-b987-3261320ac857?riksmote=2015/16

Comment: Source says that Hedlund had been a party council member in the SD since 2015.

¹² Mathillas, L. (2015, November 29). *Värnamopolitiker invald i SD:s partistyrelse*. SVT.

<https://www.svt.se/nyheter/lokalt/jonkoping/varnamopolitiker-invald-i-partistyrelsen>

Comment: Source says that Anne Karlsson became an elected member of the SD party council in 2015.

¹³ David Lång (SD). (n.d.). Sveriges Riksdag. Retrieved September 6, 2021, from https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/ledamoter-partier/ledamot/david-lang_1b1880b5-b042-47b6-8669-8a51e1908365?sog-c-vod-riksmote=2015/16&riksmote=2010/11

Comment: Source says that David Lång was a party council member in SD in 2006–2019.

¹⁴ Bengtsson, J. O. (2015, December 4). Problemet med Magnus Olsson [Blog post]. Retrieved July 25, 2021, from

<https://janolofbengtsson.com/2015/12/04/problemet-med-magnus-olsson/>

Comment: Source (blog post) says that Magnus Olsson became an elected member of the SD party council in 2015.

¹⁵ Jakobsson, M. (2016, January 24). Partitoppen Johnny Skalin om Elfstrand: ”Det finns en hög grad av rasism”. *Allehanda*.

<https://www.allehanda.se/artikel/partitoppen-johnny-skalin-om-elfstrand-det-finns-en-hog-grad-av-rasism>

Comment: In the news article, Johnny Skalin talks in the role of member in SD:s party council, in 2016.

¹⁶ Sven-Olof Sällström (SD). (n.d.). Sveriges Riksdag. Retrieved September 6, 2021, from

https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/ledamoter-partier/ledamot/sven-olof-sallstrom_06776272-4f62-44c7-9011-f66349279c88

Comment: Source says that Sven-Olof Sällström has been a party council member in SD since 2009.

¹⁷ Björn Söder (SD). (n.d.). Sveriges Riksdag. Retrieved September 6, 2021, from https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/ledamoter-partier/ledamot/bjorn-soder_06d7c195-c170-4103-bcc6-1d9c0d43b169?sog-c-vod-riksmote=2014/15&riksmote=2010/11.2015/16

Comment: Source says that Björn Söder has been a party council member in SD since 2005.

¹⁸ Christina Östberg (SD). (n.d.). Sveriges Riksdag. Retrieved September 6, 2021, from

https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/ledamoter-partier/ledamot/christina-ostberg_aa5e595b-e755-4a4e-a457-ca289ad1add3

Comment: Source says that Christina Östberg has been a party council member in SD since 2016

¹⁹ Sverigedemokraterna. (2017). *Årsredovisning 2017* [Annual report]. Retrieved July 23, 2021, from <https://sd.se/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/%C3%85rsredovisning-2017-2018.pdf>

Comment: Source (annual report) is signed by all members of SD’s party council per June 2018.

Paula Bieler F
Therese Borg F
Roger Hedlund M
Mattias Bäckström Johansson M
Richard Jomshof M
Mattias Karlsson M
Anne Karlsson F
David Lång M
Magnus Olsson M
Oscar Sjöstedt M
Johnny Skalin M
Sven-Olof Sällström M
Björn Söder M
Christina Östberg F
Stefan Jakobsson M
Aron Emilsson M

SD Party council 2019–2021²⁰

Results: 5/19 women, 14/19 men

Party leader: Jimmie Åkesson M
Vice president: Henrik Vinge M
2nd vice president: Julia Kronlid F
Party secretary: Richard Jomshof M
International secretary: Mattias Karlsson M

Members:

Mattias Bäckström Johansson M
Carina Ståhl Herrstedt F
Caroline Nordengrip F
Björn Söder M
Oscar Sjöstedt M
Tobias Andersson M
Hanna Nilsson F
Martin Kinnunen M
Linda Lindberg F
Bo Broman M
Heikki Klaavuniemi M
Jonas Andersson M
Aron Emilsson M
Magnus Olsson M

²⁰ Sverigedemokraterna. (n.d.). *Partistyrelse*. sd.se Retrieved September 6, 2021, from <https://sd.se/partistyrelse/>

2. Gender composition in Swedish non-PRR parties' party councils, 2020–2021

Social democrats (S)²¹: 13 men, 17 women

Centre Party (C)²²: 8 men, 10 women

Christian Democrats (KD)²³: 11 men, 9 women

Liberal Party (L)²⁴: 11 men, 14 women

Green Party (MP)²⁵: 6 men, 8 women

Conservative Party (M)²⁶: 9 men, 9 women

Left Party (V)²⁷: 7 men, 15 women

3. Sex of party leaders in Swedish non-PRR parties, 2011–2021

Social Democrats (S)²⁸: Håkan Juholt (2011–2012, M), Stefan Löfven (2012-, M)

Centre Party (C)²⁹: Annie Lööf (2011-, F)

Christian Democrats (KD)³⁰: Göran Hägglund M (2011–2015), Ebba Busch F (2015-)

Liberal Party (L)³¹: Jan Björklund M (2011–2019), Nyamko Sabuni F (2019-)

Green Party (MP)³²: Åsa Romson, F, och Gustav Fridolin, M (2011–2016), Isabella Lövin, F och Gustav Fridolin, M (2016–2019), Isabella Lövin, F och Per Bolund, M (2019–2021)

Conservative Party (M)³³: Fredrik Reinfeldt, M (2011–2014), Anna Kinberg Batra, F (2014–2017), Ulf Kristersson, M (2017-)

Left Party (V)³⁴: Lars Ohly M (2011–feb 2012), Jonas Sjöstedt M (2012–2020), Nooshi Dadgostar F (2020-)

²¹ Socialdemokraterna. (n.d.). *Partistyreelse*. Retrieved April 25, 2021, from <https://www.socialdemokraterna.se/vart-parti/om-partiet/partistyreelse>

²² Centerpartiet. (n.d.). *Partistyreelse*. Retrieved April 25, 2021, from <https://www.centerpartiet.se/vart-parti/vara-politiker/partistyreelse>

²³ Kristdemokraterna. (2019, November 9). *Ny partistyreelse för KD* [Press release]. Retrieved April 25, 2021, from <https://press.kristdemokraterna.se/posts/pressreleases/ny-partistyreelse-for-kd>

²⁴ Liberalerna. (n.d.). *Partistyreelse*. Retrieved April 25, 2021, from <https://www.liberalerna.se/partistyrelsen>

²⁵ Miljöpartiet. (n.d.). *Partistyreelse*. Retrieved April 25, 2021, from <https://www.mp.se/om/partistyreelse>

²⁶ Moderaterna. (n.d.). *Partistyrelsen*. Retrieved April 25, 2021, from <https://moderaterna.se/partistyrelsen>

²⁷ Vänsterpartiet. (n.d.). *Partistyreelse*. Retrieved April 25, 2021, from <https://www.vansterpartiet.se/kontakt/partistyrelsen/>

²⁸ Socialdemokraterna. (n.d.). *Vår historia*. Retrieved September 23, 2021, from <https://www.socialdemokraterna.se/vart-parti/om-partiet/var-historia>

²⁹ Centerpartiet. (n.d.). *Vår historia*. Retrieved September 23, 2021, from <https://www.centerpartiet.se/vart-parti/historia/2010-talet>

³⁰ Kristdemokraterna. (n.d.). *Historia*. Retrieved September 23, 2021, from <https://kristdemokraterna.se/om-oss/historia/>

³¹ Jan Björklund. (n.d.). Sveriges Riksdag. Retrieved September 23, 2021, from https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/ledamoter-partier/ledamot/jan-bjorklund_0603490586517

³² Miljöpartiet. (n.d.). *Fakta*. Retrieved from <https://www.mp.se/om/historia/fakta>

³³ Alexandersson, M. (2017, October 14). Moderaterna då och nu. *Göteborgs-Posten*. <https://www.gp.se/nyheter/sverige/moderaterna-d%C3%A5-och-nu-1.4728719>

4. Percentage of women in Swedish parties' party councils and party leadership

Table E1. Gender balance in Swedish parties' party councils, 2020–2021, (percent, (n=number))

Party / Gender	Male	Female
Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna, S)	43.3 (n=13/30)	56.7 (n=17)
Centre Party (Centerpartiet, C)	44.4 (n=8/18)	55.6 (n=10)
Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna, KD)	55.0 (n=11/20)	45.0 (n=9)
Liberal Party (Liberalerna, L)	44.0 (n=11/25)	56.0 (n=14)
Green Party (Miljöpartiet, MP)	42.9 (n=6/14)	57.1 (n=8)
Conservative Party (Moderaterna, M)	50.0 (n=9/18)	50.0 (n=9)
Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD)	73.7 (n=14/19)	26.3 (n=5 av 19)
The Left Party (Vänsterpartiet, V)	31.8 (n=7/22)	68.2 (n=15)
Sweden, total	48.1	51.9
Sweden, total, non-PRR parties	44.5	55.5

Table E2. Percentage of women in the SD's party councils, 2011–2021, (percent)

Party / Year	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Mean %
SD	25 (n=4/16)		35.3 (n=6/17)		35.3 (n=6/17)		31.6 (n=6/19)		26.3 (n=5/19)		30.7

³⁴ Schau, O. (2020, October 31). *Nooshi Dadgostar ny partiledare för Vänsterpartiet*. Svt Nyheter. Retrieved from <https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/nooshi-dadgostar-ny-partiledare-for-vansterpartiet>

Table E3. Percentage of women in party leadership in Swedish parties 2011–2021, (percent, (n=number))

Party / Year / Sex of party leader, (1=woman, 0=man, 0,5=shared leadership with 1 man and 1 woman)	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Mean %, female party leadership, 2011–2021
Social Democrats (S)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0
Centre Party (C)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100
Christian Democrats (KD)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	60
Liberal Party (L)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	20
Green Party (MP)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50 (n=0,5)	50
Conservative Party (M)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	30
Sweden Democrats (SD)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0
The Left Party (V)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	100 (n=1)	10
Sweden, total	18.75 (n=1.5/8 women)	18.75 (n=1.5/8 women)	18.75 (n=1.5/8 women)	31.25 (n=2.5/8)	43.75 (n=3.5/8)	43.75 (n=3.5/8)	31.25 (n=2.5/8)	31.25 (n=2.5/8)	43.75 (n=3.5/8)	56.25 (n=4.5/8)	33.75
Sweden, total, non-PRR parties	21.4 (n=1.5/7)	21.4 (n=1.5/7)	21.4 (n=1.5/7)	35.7 (n=2.5/7)	50 (n=3.5/7)	50 (n=3.5/7)	35.7 (n=2.5/7)	35.7 (n=2.5/7)	50 (n=3.5/7)	64.3 (n=4.5/8)	38.6

Appendix F. Data regarding the gender-representation gap in Denmark

1. Internal arena¹

Table F1. Percentage of women and gender gap in Danish parties' party councils, 2020–2021, (percent, percentage points)

Party / Percentage of women & Gender gap	Women, % of party council members (percent, (n=number))	Gender gap (percentage points)
Socialdemocrats (Socialdemokratiet, A)	43.75 (n=14)	6.25
Social Liberals (Radikale Venstre, RV)	41.1 (n=39)	8.9
Conservative Party (Det Konservative Folkeparti, DKF)	21.2 (n=7)	28.8
New Right (Nye Borgerlige, D) NOT INCLUDED	23.1 (n=3)	26.9
Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF)	44.4 (n=12)	5.6
Liberal Alliance (Liberal Alliance, LA)	12.5 (n=3)	37.5
Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF)	9.1 (n=1)	40.9
Venstre (Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti, V)	16.0 (n=4)	34.0
Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne, EL)	44.0 (n=11)	6.0
The Alternative (Alternativet, Å)	25.0 (n=4)	25.0
Denmark, total	28.6	21.4
Denmark, total, non-PRR parties	31	19

Table F2. Gender gap in the DF's party councils, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Gender gap, mean	Gender gap difference, 2021 vs. 2011
Danish People's Party (DF)	22.7	31.8	22.7	22.7	22.7	22.7	22.7	22.7	40.9	40.9	27.25	18.2

¹ See Appendix B for full data and data references regarding the internal arena.

Table F3. Gender gap in party leadership, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Mean gender gap, 2011–2021	Difference gender gap 2021 vs 2011
Socialdemocrats (A)	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0
Social Liberals (RV)	-50	-50	-50	50	50	50	50	50	50	-50	10	0
Conservative Party (DKF)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Socialist People's Party (SF)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Liberal Alliance (LA)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Danish People's Party (DF)	-50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	40	100
Venstre (V)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Red-Green Alliance (EL)	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0
The Alternative (Å)	NA	NA	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	NA	0
Denmark, total	0 (n=4/8 women)	0 (n=4/8 women)	5.6 (n=4/9)	16.7 (n=3/9 women)	16.7 (n=3/9 women)	16.7 (n=3/9 women)	16.7 (n=3/9 women)	16.7 (n=3/9 women)	16.7 (n=3/9 women)	-5.6 (n=5/9 women)	10	-5.6
Denmark, total, non-PRR parties	7.1 (n=3/7)	-7.1 (n=4/7)	0 (n=4/8)	12.5 (n=3/8)	12.5 (n=3/8)	12.5 (n=3/8)	12.5 (n=3/8)	12.5 (n=3/8)	12.5 (n=3/8)	-12.5 (n=5/8)	6.25	-19.6

2. Electoral arena (listed candidates in parliamentary and municipal elections)

Table F4. Percentage of women and gender gap among listed candidates in Danish *parliamentary* elections, 2011–2019, (percent, percentage points) ²

Party / Percent of women & gender gap	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2011	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2015	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2019	Women, Mean % of party's listed candidates, 2011-2019	Gender gap (percentage points), 2011	Gender gap (percentage points), 2015	Gender gap (percentage points), 2019	Mean gender gap (points), 2011-2019	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Socialdemocrats (A)	33.3 (n=31)	28.6 (n=26)	27.7 (n=26)	29.9	16.7	21.4	22.3	20.1	5.6
Social Liberals (RV)	41.3 (n=31)	39.7 (n=29)	48.0 (n=37)	43	8.7	10.3	2	7	-6.7
Conservative Party (DKF)	37.2 (n=32)	38.2 (n=21)	34.3 (n=24)	36.6	12.8	11.8	15.7	13.4	2.9
New Right (D)	Did not contest	Did not contest	25.4 (n=15)	25.4	NA	NA	24.6	24.6	NA
Socialist People's Party (SF)	42.4 (n=39)	35.5 (n=33)	48.0 (n=37)	42	7.6	14.5	2	8	-5.6
Liberal Alliance (LA)	23.0 (n=17)	30.0 (n=24)	18.5 (n=10)	23.8	27	20	31.5	26.2	4.5
Danish People's Party (DF)	35.9 (n=33)	30.4 (n=28)	31.2 (n=29)	32.5	14.1	19.6	18.8	17.5	4.7
Venstre (V)	29.0 (n=27)	26.9 (n=25)	30.1 (n=28)	28.7	21	23.1	19.9	21.3	-1.1
Red-Green Alliance (EL)	34.8 (n=32)	37.1 (n=33)	45.2 (n=38)	39	15.2	12.9	4.8	11	-10.4
The Alternative (Å)	No data	27.1 (n=16)	44.3 (n=35)	35.7	NA	22.9	5.7	14.3	NA
Denmark, total	34.7 (n=242)	32.4 (n=235)	36.6 (n=264)	34.6	15.3	17.6	13.4	15.4	-0.9
Denmark, total, non-PRR parties	34.5 (n=209)	32.7 (n=207)	37.4 (n=235)	34.9	15.5	17.3	12.6	15.1	-2.9

² Statistics Denmark. (n.d.). Folketingsvalg efter kandidater og parti [Data sets]. <https://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=FVKAND&PLanguage=0&PXSID=0&wsid=cftree>

Table F5. Percentage of women and gender gap among listed candidates in Danish *municipal* elections, 2009–2017, (percent, percentage points) ³

Party / Percentage of women & gender gap	Women, % of party's listed candidates, 2009 (municipal elections)	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2013 (municipal elections)	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2017	Women, Mean % of party's listed candidates, 2009-2017	Gender gap (percentage points), 2009	Gender gap (percentage points), 2013	Gender gap (percentage points), 2017	Mean gender gap (points), 2009-2017	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Socialdemocrats (A)	28.5 (n=529)	30.7 (n=509)	31.1 (n=532)	30.1	21.5	19.3	18.9	19.9	-2.6
Social Liberals (RV)	33.6 (n=273)	34.3 (n=242)	34.1 (n=238)	34	16.4	15.7	15.9	16	-0.5
Conservative Party (DKF)	30.2 (n=337)	28.9 (n=285)	27.5 (n=280)	28.9	19.8	21.1	22.5	21.2	2.7
New Right (D)	Did not contest	Did not contest	20.8 (n=50)	20.8	NA	NA	29.2	29.2	NA
Socialist People's Party (SF)	42.7 (n=498)	42.7 (n=369)	44.6 (n=365)	43.3	7.3	7.3	5.4	6.7	-1.9
Liberal Alliance (LA)	25.0 (n=21)	18.7 (n=77)	21.4 (n=93)	21.7	25	31.3	28.6	31.6	3.6
Danish People's Party (DF)	29.5 (n=176)	28.5 (n=202)	29.4 (n=222)	29	20.5	21.5	20.6	20.9	0.1
Venstre (V)	25.4 (n=451)	26.5 (n=490)	28.3 (n=486)	26.7	24.6	23.5	21.7	23.3	-2.9
Red-Green Alliance (EL)	39.9 (n=184)	38.1 (n=266)	42.1 (n=326)	40	10.1	11.9	7.9	10	-2.2
The Alternative (Å)	No data	No data	41 (n=136)	41	NA	Na	9	9	NA
Denmark, total	31.4 (n=2469)	31.0 (n=2440)	32.1 (n=2728)	31.5	18.6	19	17.9	18.5	-0.7
Denmark, total, non-PRR parties	31.5 (n=2293)	31.2 (n=2238)	32.3 (n=2506)	31.7	18.5	18.8	17.7	18.3	-0.8

³ Statistics Denmark. (n.d.). Valg til kommunalbestyrelser efter kommune, parti og stemmer/kandidater/køn [Data sets]. <https://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=VALGK3&PLanguage=0&PXSID=0&wsid=cftree>

3. Parliamentary arena (elected representatives in parliamentary and municipal elections)

Table F6. Percentage of women and gender gap among elected representatives in Danish *parliamentary* elections, 2011–2019, (percent, percentage points) ⁴

Party / Percentage of women & Gender gap	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2011	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2015	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2019	Women, Mean % of party's elected representatives, 2011–2019	Gender gap (points), 2011	Gender gap (points), 2015	Gender gap (points), 2019	Mean gender gap (points), 2011–2019	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Socialdemocrats (A)	36.4 (n=16)	38.3 (n=18)	25.0 (n=12)	33.2	13.6	11.7	25	16.8	11.4
Social Liberals (RV)	52.9 (n=9)	62.5 (n=5)	56.25 (n=9)	57.2	-2.9	-12.5	-6.25	-7.2	-3.35
Conservative Party (DKF)	37.5 (n=3)	33.3 (n=2)	50.0 (n=6)	40.3	12.5	16.7	0	9.7	-12.5
New Right (D)	Did not contest	Did not contest	50.0 (n=2)	50	NA	NA	0	0	NA
Socialist People's Party (SF)	56.25 (n=9)	42.9 (n=3)	78.6 (n=11)	59.25	-6.25	7.1	-28.6	-9.25	-22.35
Liberal Alliance (LA)	33.3 (n=3)	38.5 (n=5)	0.0 (n=0)	23.9	16.7	11.5	50	26.1	33.3
Danish People's Party (DF)	31.8	40.5	37.5	36.6	18.2	9.5	12.5	13.4	-5.7
Venstre (V)	36.2 (n=17)	26.5 (n=9)	34.9 (n=15)	32.5	13.8	23.5	15.1	17.5	1.3
Red-Green Alliance (EL)	33.3 (n=4)	35.7 (n=5)	46.2 (n=6)	38.4	16.7	14.3	3.8	11.6	-12.9
The Alternative (Å)	No seats	33.3 (n=3)	20.0 (n=1)	26.65	NA	16.7	30	23.35	NA
Denmark, total	38.9 (n=68)	37.1 (n=65)	38.9 (n=68)	38.3	11.1	12.9	11.1	11.7	0
Denmark, total, non-PRR parties	39.9 (n=61)	36.2 (n=50)	38.6 (n=61)	38.2	10.1	13.8	11.4	11.8	1.3

⁴ Statistics Denmark. (n.d.). Folketingsvalg efter kandidater og parti [Data sets]. <https://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=FVKAND&PLanguage=0&PXSid=0&wsid=cftree>

Table F7. Percentage of women and gender gap among elected representatives in Danish *municipal* elections, 2009–2017, (percent, percentage points) ⁵

Party / Percentage of women & Gender gap	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2009 (municipal elections)	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2013 (municipal elections)	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2017	Women, Mean % of party's elected representatives, 2009–2017 (municipal)	Gender gap (point), 2009	Gender gap (points), 2013	Gender gap (points), 2017	Mean gender gap (points), 2009–2017	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Socialdemocrats (A)	32.0 (n=256)	32.1 (n=248)	35.3 (n=297)	33.1	18	17.9	14.7	16.9	-3.3
Social Liberals (RV)	44.0 (n=22)	32.3 (n=20)	37.5 (n=30)	37.9	6	17.7	12.5	12.1	6.5
Conservative Party (DKF)	28.6 (n=75)	26.3 (n=54)	29.8 (n=67)	28.2	21.4	23.7	20.2	21.8	-1.2
New Right (D)	Did not contest	Did not contest	100 (n=1)	100	NA	NA	-50	-50	NA
Socialist People's Party (SF)	44.7 (n=152)	41.4 (n=48)	38.9 (n=49)	41.7	5.3	8.6	11.1	8.3	5.8
Liberal Alliance (LA)	0 (n=0)	24.2 (n=8)	28.6 (n=8)	17.6	50	25.8	21.4	32.4	-28.6
Danish People's Party (DF)	28.0 (n=52)	28.2 (n=72)	31.4 (n=70)	29.2	22	21.8	18.6	20.8	-3.4
Venstre (V)	27.2 (n=190)	27.6 (n=212)	29.1 (n=200)	30	22.8	22.4	20.9	22	-1.9
Red-Green Alliance (EL)	35.7 (n=5)	30.25 (n=36)	37.3 (n=38)	34.4	14.3	19.75	12.7	15.6	-1.6
The Alternative (Å)	No seats	No seats	50.0 (n=10)	50	NA	NA	0	0	NA
Denmark, total	32.0 (n=752)	30.0 (n=698)	33.0 (n=770)	31.7	18	20	17	18.3	-1
Denmark, total, non-PRR parties	32.3 (n=700)	30.2 (n=626)	33.1 (n=700)	31.9	17.7	19.8	16.9	18.1	-0.8

⁵ Statistics Denmark. (n.d.). Valg til kommunalbestyrelser efter kommune, parti og stemmer/kandidater/køn [Data sets]. <https://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=VALGK3&PLanguage=0&PXSID=0&wsid=cftree>

Table F8. Percentage of women and gender gap in the DF vs. in all main Danish parties, last three *municipal* and *parliamentary* elections (percent, percentage points)

Election years	2009/2011		2013/2015		2017/2019			2009/2011	2013/2015	2017/2019
	Women, %	Gender gap	Women, %	Gender gap	Women, %	Gender gap		Gender gap	Gender gap	Gender gap
DF parliament, elected reps	31.8	18.2	40.5	9.5	37.5	12.5		18.2	9.5	12.5
DF parliament, listed candidates	35.9	14.1	30.4	19.6	31.2	18.8		14.1	19.6	18.8
DF municipal, elected reps.	28	22	28.2	21.8	31.4	18.6		22	21.8	18.6
DF municipal, listed candidates	29.5	20.5	28.5	21.5	29.4	20.6		20.5	21.5	20.6
Denmark total, parliament, elected reps.	38.9	11.1	37.1	12.9	38.9	11.1		11.1	12.9	11.1
Denmark total, parliament, listed candidates	34.7	15.3	32.4	17.6	36.6	13.4		15.3	17.6	13.4
Denmark total, municipal, elected reps.	32	18	30	20	33	17		18	20	17
Denmark, total, municipal, listed candidates	31.4	18.6	31	19	32.1	17.9		18.6	19	17.9

Table F9. The DF's total share of seats in parliamentary elections, (percent)⁶

Election year	2011	2015	2019
DF total share of seats, %	12.6	21.1	9.1
%-difference since last election	-1.7	8.5	-12

⁶ Statistics Denmark. (n.d.). Folketingsvalg efter kandidater og parti [Data sets]. <https://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=FVKAND&PLanguage=0&PXSID=0&wsid=cftree>

Table F10. Danish parties' share of seats in parliamentary elections (percent)⁷

Party / Election year	2011	2015	2019
Socialdemocrats (A)	25.1 (n=44)	26.9 (n=47)	27.4 (n=48)
Social Liberals (RV)	9.7 (n=17)	4.6 (n=8)	9.1 (n=16)
Conservative Party (DKF)	4.6 (n=8)	3.4 (n=6)	6.9 (n=12)
New Right (D)	NA	NA	2.3 (n=4)
Socialist People's Party (SF)	9.1 (n=16)	4.0 (n=7)	8.0 (n=14)
Liberal Alliance (LA)	5.1 (n=9)	7.4 (n=13)	2.3 (n=4)
Danish People's Party (DF)	12.6 (n=22)	21.1 (n=37)	9.1 (n=16)
Venstre (V)	26.9 (n=47)	19.4 (n=34)	24.6 (n=43)
Red-Green Alliance (EL)	6.9 (n=12)	8.0 (n=14)	7.4 (n=13)
The Alternative (Å)	NA	5.1 (n=9)	2.9 (n=5)
Denmark, total⁸	100 (n=175)	100 (n=175)	100 (n=175)

⁷ Statistics Denmark. (n.d.). Folketingsvalg efter kandidater og parti [Data sets]. <https://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=FVKAND&PLanguage=0&PXSIId=0&wsid=cftree>

⁸ Parliament representatives from Greenland and the Faroe Islands (n=4) are excluded.

Appendix G. Data regarding the gender-representation gap in Norway

1. Internal arena (party council and party leadership)¹

Table G1. Women's percentage and gender gap in Norwegian parties' party councils, 2020–2021, (percent, percentage points)

Party	Women, % of party council members (n=number)	Gender gap
Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet, Ap)	52.4 (n=11)	-2.4
Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP)	27.3 (n=3/11)	22.7
Conservative Party (Høyre, H)	36.4 (n=12)	13.6
Christian Democratic Party (Kristelig Folkeparti, KrF)	53.8 (n=7)	-3.8
Centre Party (Senterpartiet, Sp)	61.5 (n=8)	-11.5
Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti, SV)	54.5 (n=6)	-4.5
Liberal Party (Venstre, V)	57.1 (n=4)	-7.1
Green Party (Miljøpartiet de Grønne, MDG)	50.0 (n=6)	0
Red (Rødt, R) NOT INCLUDED	72.2 (n=13)	-22.1
Norway, total	49.1	0.9
Norway, total, non-PRR parties	52.2	-2.2

Table G2. Gender gap in the FrP's party councils, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Party council - gender gap	2011–2012	2012–2013 ²	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Gender gap, mean	Gender gap difference 2021 vs. 2011
Progress Party, FrP	22.7	20	31.8	31.8	31.8	31.8	31.8	22.7	22.7	22.7	27	0

¹ See Appendix C for references and details on party council membership and gender in party leadership.

² Data on the sex of one member in the party council could not be found.

Table G3. Gender gap in party leadership in Norwegian parties, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Sex of party leader, 2011–2021, (1=woman, 0=man, 0,5=shared leadership with 1 man and 1 woman)	2011– 2012	2012– 2013	2013– 2014	2014– 2015	2015– 2016	2016– 2017	2017– 2018	2018– 2019	2019– 2020	2020– 2021	Mean Gender gap, 2011–2021	Difference gender gap 2021 vs. 2011
Labour Party (Ap)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Progress Party (FrP)	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0
Conservative Party (H)	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0
Christian Democratic Party (KrF)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Centre Party (Sp)	-50	-50	-50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	20	100
Socialist Left Party (SV)	-50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	40	100
Liberal Party (V)	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0
Green Party (MDG)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway, total	6.25 (n=3.5/8 women)	-6.25 (n=4.5/8)	-6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	3.75	0
Norway, total, non- PRR parties	14.3 (n=2.5/7)	0 (n=3.5/7)	0 (n=3.5/7)	14.3 (n=2.5/7)	14.3 (n=2.5/7)	14.3 (n=2.5/7)	14.3 (n=2.5/7)	14.3 (n=2.5/7)	14.3 (n=2.5/7)	14.3 (n=2.5/7)	11.4	0

2. Electoral arena (listed candidates in parliamentary and municipal elections)

Table G4. Percentage of women and gender gap among listed candidates in Norwegian *parliamentary* elections, 2009– 2017 (percent, percentage points)³

Party	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2009	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2013	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2017	Women, Mean % of party's listed candidates, 2009-2017	Gender gap (percentage points), 2009	Gender gap (percentage points), 2013	Gender gap (percentage points), 2017	Mean gender gap (points), 2009-2017	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Labour Party (Ap)	49.5 (n=138)	50 (n=141)	50 (n=141)	49.8	0.5	0	0	0.2	-0.5
Progress Party (FrP)	37.5 (n=106)	34.1 (n=94)	35.2 (n=93)	35.6	12.5	15.9	14.8	14.4	2.3
Conservative Party (H)	44.3 (n=125)	46.6 (n=131)	48.9 (n=138)	46.6	5.7	3.4	1.1	3.4	-4.6
Christian Democratic Party (KrF)	48.4 (n=134)	47.1 (n=132)	46.4 (n=130)	47.3	1.6	2.9	3.6	2.7	2
Centre Party (Sp)	49.1 (n=139)	49.3 (n=138)	50.9 (n=144)	49.8	0.9	0.7	-0.9	0.2	-1.8
Socialist Left Party (SV)	51.1 (n=144)	52.1 (n=147)	54.1 (n=153)	52.4	-1.1	-2.1	-4.1	-2.4	-3
Liberal Party (V)	49.6 (n=140)	44.6 (n=125)	50.5 (n=142)	48.2	0.4	5.4	-0.5	1.8	-0.9
Green Party (MDG)	46.7 (n=112)	45.3 (n=121)	51.8 (n=141)	47.9	3.3	4.7	-1.8	2.1	-5.1
Red (R)	52 (n=143)	51.1 (n=139)	52 (n=146)	51.7	-2	-1.1	-2	-1.7	0
Norway, total	47.6 (n=1181)	46.7 (n=1168)	49.0 (n=1228)	47.8	2.4	3.3	1	2.2	-1.4
Norway, total, non-PRR parties	48.9 (n=1075)	48.3 (n=1074)	50.6 (n=1135)	49.3	1.1	1.7	-0.6	0.7	-1.7

³ Statistics Norway. (n.d.). Listekandidater til stortingsvalg, etter parti/valgliste, kjønn og valgdistrikt 2005 – 2021 [Data sets]. <https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/09443/>

Table G5. Percentage of women and gender gap among listed candidates in Norwegian *municipal* elections, 2011–2019 (percent, percentage points)⁴

Party	Women, % of party's listed candidates, 2011 (municipal elections)	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2015 (municipal elections)	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2019	Women, Mean % of party's listed candidates, 2011-2019 (municipal)	Gender gap (percentage points), 2011	Gender gap (percentage points), 2015	Gender gap (percentage points), 2019	Mean gender gap (points), 2011-2019	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Labour Party (Ap)	47.6 (n=4831)	48.2 (n=5033)	48.4 (n=4489)	48.1	2.4	1.8	1.6	1.9	-0.8
Progress Party (FrP)	28.8 (n=1822)	27.2 (n=1312)	27.7 (n=1217)	27.9	21.2	22.8	22.3	22.1	1.1
Conservative Party (H)	36.0 (n=3244)	35.5 (n=3046)	36.2 (n=2665)	35.9	14	14.5	13.8	14.1	-0.2
Christian Democratic Party (KrF)	45.0 (n=2311)	46.1 (n=2224)	44.2 (n=1711)	45.1	5	3.9	5.8	4.9	0.8
Centre Party (Sp)	40.1 (n=3383)	40.4 (n=3334)	41.2 (n=3484)	40.6	9.9	9.6	8.8	9.4	-1.1
Socialist Left Party (SV)	53.0 (n=2922)	53.9 (n=2699)	55.2 (n=2916)	54	-3	-3.9	-5.2	-4	-2.2
Liberal Party (V)	42.7 (n=2835)	43.5 (n=2764)	43.1 (n=1885)	43.1	7.3	6.5	6.9	6.9	-0.4
Green Party (MDG)	no data	no data	49.2 (n=1320)	49.2	no data	no data	0.8	0.8	no change
Red (R)	44.8 (n=692)	46.1 (n=724)	49.2 (n=1399)	46.7	5.2	3.9	0.8	3.3	-4.4
Norway, total	41.8 (n=22 040)	42.4 (n=21 136)	43.5 (n=21 086)	42.6	8.2	7.6	6.5	7.4	-1.7
Norway, total, non-PRR parties	43.6 (n=20 218)	44 (n=19 824)	45 (n=19 869)	44.2	6.4	6	5	5.8	-1.4

⁴ Statistics Norway. (n.d.). Listekandidater til kommunestyrevalget, etter kjønn, parti/valgliste og alder 2007 – 2019 [Data sets]. <https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/06523/>

3. Parliamentary arena (elected representatives in parliamentary and municipal elections)

Table G6. Percentage of women and gender gap among elected representatives in Norwegian *parliamentary* elections, 2009–2017 (percent, percentage points)⁵

Party	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2009	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2013	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2017	Women, Mean % of party's elected representatives, 2009-2017	Gender gap (percentage points), 2009	Gender gap (points), 2013	Gender gap (points), 2017	Mean gender gap (points), 2009-2017	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Labour Party (Ap)	50 (n=32)	50.9 (n=28)	49 (n=24)	50	0	-0.9	1	0	1
Progress Party (FrP)	24.4 (n=10)	20.7 (n=6)	26 (n=7)	23.7	25.6	29.3	24	26.3	-1.6
Conservative Party (H)	30 (n=9)	39.6 (n=19)	44.4 (n=20)	38	20	10.4	5.6	12	-14.4
Christian Democratic Party (KrF)	40 (n=4)	30 (n=3)	25 (n=2)	31.7	10	20	25	18.3	15
Centre Party (Sp)	63.6 (n=7)	70 (n=7)	52.6 (n=10)	62.1	-13.6	-20	-2.6	-12.1	11
Socialist Left Party (SV)	27.3 (n=3)	28.6 (n=2)	36.4 (n=4)	30.8	22.7	21.4	13.6	19.2	-9.1
Liberal Party (V)	100 (n=2)	22.2 (n=2)	12.5 (n=1)	44.9	-50	27.8	37.5	15.3	87.5
Green Party (MDG)	0 (n=0)	0 (n=0)	100 (n=1)	100	NA	50	-50	0	NA
Red (R)	No data	No data	0 (n=0)	0	No data	No data	50	50	NA
Norway, total	39.6 (n=67)	39.6 (n=67)	40.8 (n=69)	40	10.4	10.4	9.2	10	-1.2
Norway, total, non-PRR parties	44.5 (n=57)	43.6 (n=61)	43.7 (n=62)	43.9	5.5	6.4	6.3	6.1	0.8

⁵ Statistics Norway. (n.d.). Stortingsvalet. Valde representanter, etter kjønn, parti/valliste og valdistrikt 1945 – 2017 [Data sets]. <https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/08219/>

Table G7. Percentage of women and gender gap among elected representatives in Norwegian *municipal* elections, 2011–2019 (percent, percentage points)⁶

Party	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2011 (municipal elections)	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2015 (municipal elections)	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2019	Women, Mean % of party's elected representatives, 2011-2019 (municipal)	Gender gap (point), 2011	Gender gap (points), 2015	Gender gap (points), 2019	Mean gender gap (points), 2011-2019	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Labour Party (Ap)	43.9 (n=1 482)	43.9 (n=1 519)	45.8 (n=1183)	44.5	6.1	6.1	4.2	5.5	-1.9
Progress Party (FrP)	26.8 (n=306)	27.0 (n=240)	26.0 (n=182)	26.6	23.2	23	24	23.4	0.8
Conservative Party (H)	35.3 (n=828)	36.0 (n=703)	36.2 (n=539)	35.8	14.7	14	13.8	14.2	-0.9
Christian Democratic Party (KrF)	36.3 (n=237)	34.8 (n=217)	34.8 (n=143)	35.3	13.7	15.2	15.2	14.7	1.5
Centre Party (Sp)	39.2 (n=557)	40.0 (n=710)	40.0 (n=907)	39.7	10.8	10	10	10.3	-0.8
Socialist Left Party (SV)	51.1 (n=185)	47.8 (n=172)	54.2 (n=249)	51	-1.1	2.2	-4.2	-1	-3.1
Liberal Party (V)	39.2 (n=251)	38.3 (n=209)	37.5 (n=99)	38.3	10.8	11.7	12.5	11.7	1.7
Green Party (MDG)	27.8 (n=5)	44.2 (n=103)	48.7 (n=151)	40.2	22.2	5.8	1.3	9.8	-20.9
Red (R)	33.3 (n=19)	40.7 (n=33)	44.0 (n=85)	39.3	16.7	9.3	6	10.7	-10.7
Norway, total	38.6 (n=3870)	39.4 (n=3906)	40.8 (n=3538)	39.6	11.4	10.6	9.2	10.4	-2.2
Norway, total, non-PRR parties	40.2 (n=3564)	40.6 (n=3666)	42.1 (n=3356)	41	9.8	9.4	7.9	9	-1.9

⁶ Statistics Norway. (n.d.). Kommunestyrevalget. Representanter, etter kjønn og parti/valgliste (K) 1979 – 2019 [Data sets]. <https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/01182/>

Table G8. Percentage of women and gender gap in the FrP vs. in all main Norwegian parties, last three *municipal* and *parliamentary* elections (percent, percentage points)

Year	2009/2011		2013/2015		2017/2019			2009/2011	2013/2015	2017/2019
	Women, %	Gender gap	Women, %	Gender gap	Women, %	Gender gap		Gender gap	Gender gap	Gender gap
FrP parliament elected reps	24.4	25.6	20.7	29.3	26	24		25.6	29.3	24
FrP parliament listed candidates	37.5	12.5	34.1	15.9	35.2	14.8		12.5	15.9	14.8
FrP municipalities elected reps	26.8	23.2	27	23	26	24		23.2	23	24
FrP municipalities listed candidates	28.8	21.2	27.2	22.8	27.7	22.3		21.2	22.8	22.3
Norway total, parliament elected reps	38.6	10.4	39.4	10.6	40.8	9.2		10.4	10.6	9.2
Norway total, parliament, listed candidates	47.6	2.4	46.7	3.3	49	1		2.4	3.3	1
Norway total, municipal, elected reps	38.6	9.2	39.4	10.6	40.8	9.2		9.2	10.6	9.2
Norway total, municipal candidates	41.8	8.2	42.4	7.6	43.5	6.5		8.2	7.6	6.5

Table G9. The FrP's total share of seats in parliamentary elections (percent)⁷

Election year	2009	2013	2017
FrP total share of seats, %	24.3	17.2	16
%-difference since last election	1.8	-7.1	-1.2

⁷ Statistics Norway. (n.d.). Stortingsvalet. **Valde** representanter, etter kjønn, parti/valliste og valdistrikt 1945 – 2017 [Data sets]. <https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/08219/>

Table G10. Norwegian parties' share of seats in parliamentary elections, (percent)⁸

Party / Election year	2009	2013	2017
Labour Party (Ap)	37.9 (n=64)	32.5 (n=55)	29 (n=49/169)
Progress Party (FrP)	24.3 (n=41)	17.2 (n=29)	16 (n=27)
Conservative Party (H)	17.8 (n=30)	28.4 (n=48)	26.7 (n=45)
Christian Democratic Party (KrF)	5.9 (n=10)	5.9 (n=10)	4.7 (n=8)
Centre Party (Sp)	6.5 (n=11)	5.9 (n=10)	11.2 (n=19)
Socialist Left Party (SV)	6.5 (n=11)	4.1 (n=7)	6.5 (n=11)
Liberal Party (V)	1.2 (n=2)	5.3 (n=9)	4.7 (n=8)
Green Party (MDG)	0	0.6 (n=1)	0.6 (n=1)
Red (R)	NA	NA	0.6 (n=1)

⁸ Statistics Norway. (n.d.). Stortingsvalet. Valde representanter, etter kjønn, parti/valliste og valdistrikt 1945 – 2017 [Data sets]. <https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/08219/>

Appendix H. Data regarding the gender-representation gap in Finland

1. Internal arena (party council and party leadership)¹

Table H1. Percentage of women and gender gap in Finnish parties' party councils, 2020–2021, (percent, percentage points)

Party / Percentage of women & Gender gap	Women, % of party council members (n=number)	Gender gap
Social Democrats (Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue, SDP)	44.4 (n=8)	5.6
Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset, PS)	15.4 (n=2)	34.6
National Coalition (Kokoomus, Kok)	35.0 (n=7)	15.0
Centre Party (Keskusta, Kesk)	51.6 (n=16)	-1.6
Green Party (Vihreät, Vihr)	66.7 (n=8)	-16.7
Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto, Vas)	66.7 (n=8)	-16.7
Swedish People's Party (Svenska Folkpartiet, SFP)	62.5 (n=10)	-12.5
Christian Democrats (Kristillisdemokraatit, KD)	63.6 (n=14)	-13.6
Finland, total	50.7	-0.7
Finland, total, non-PRR parties	55.7	-5.7

Table H2. Gender gap in the PS's party councils, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Year	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018 ²	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Gender gap, mean	Gender gap difference 2021 vs. 2011
PS	11.5	19.2	19.2	19.2	19.2	8.3	11.5	8.3	19.2	34.6	17.0	23.1

¹ See appendix D for full data and details on gender in party councils and party leadership.

² Gender composition in party council (11.5 percentage points) as it was prior to June 2017, when three men stepped down due to the election of Jussi Halla-Aho as party leader. These three men were replaced by one man and two women, thus altering the gender composition (see Appendix D).

Table H3. Gender gap in party leadership in Finnish parties, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011– 2012	2012– 2013	2013– 2014	2014– 2015	2015– 2016	2016– 2017	2017– 2018	2018– 2019	2019– 2020	2020– 2021	Mean Gender gap, 2011– 2021	Difference gender gap 2021 vs. 2011
Social Democrats (SDP)	-50	-50	-50	50	50	50	50	50	50	-50	10	0
Finns Party (PS)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
National Coalition (Kok)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Centre Party (Kesk)	-50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	-50	-50	20	0
Green Party (Vihr)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	-50	-50	30	-100
Left Alliance (Vas)	50	50	50	50	50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0	-100
Swedish People's Party (SFP)	50	50	50	50	50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0	-100
Christian Democrats (KD)	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0
Finland, total	12.5 (n=3/8 women)	25 (n=2/8)	25 (n=2/8)	37.5 (n=1/8)	37.5 (n=1/8)	12.5 (n=3/8)	12.5 (n=3/8)	12.5 (n=3/8)	-12.5 (n=5/8)	-12.5 (n=5/8)	15	-25
Finland, total, non-PRR parties	7.1 (n=3/7)	31.4 (n=2/7)	31.4 (n=2/7)	35.7 (n=1/7)	35.7 (n=1/7)	7.1 (n=3/7)	7.1 (n=3/7)	7.1 (n=3/7)	-21.4 (n=5/7)	-21.4 (n=5/7)	10	-28.5

2. Electoral arena (listed candidates in parliamentary and municipal elections)

Table H4. Percentage of women and gender gap among listed candidates in Finnish *parliamentary* elections, 2011–2019, (percent, percentage points)³⁴⁵

Party / Percentage of women & Gender gap	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2011	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2015	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2019	Women, Mean % of party's listed candidates, 2011-2019	Gender gap (percentage points), 2011	Gender gap (percentage points), 2015	Gender gap (percentage points), 2019	Mean gender gap (points), 2011-2019	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Social Democrats (SDP)	43.3 (n=103)	47.2 (n=102)	49.5 (n=107)	46.7	6.7	2.8	0.5	3.3	-6.2
Finns Party (PS)	33.2 (n=79)	35.3 (n=76)	31.5 (n=67)	33.3	16.8	14.7	18.5	16.7	1.7
National Coalition (Kok)	44.8 (n=104)	46.3 (n=99)	45.5 (n=96)	45.5	5.2	3.7	4.5	4.5	-0.7
Centre Party (Kesk)	41.2 (n=96)	39.8 (n=86)	46.3 (n=100)	42.4	8.8	10.2	3.7	7.6	-5.1
Green Party (Vihr)	51.8 (118)	56.25 (n=117)	62.0 (n=134)	56.7	-1.8	-6.25	-12	-6.7	-10.2
Left Alliance (Vas)	43.6 (n=103)	43.1 (n=93)	49.5 (n=107)	45.4	6.4	6.9	0.5	4.6	-5.9
Swedish People's Party (SFP)	44.6 (n=37)	44.2 (n=46)	53.1 (n=52)	47.3	5.4	5.8	-3.1	2.7	-8.5
Christian Democrats (KD)	42.9 (n=82)	45.6 (n=88)	51.1 (n=97)	46.5	7.1	4.4	-1.1	3.5	-8.3
Movement now (Liike nyt)	Did not contest	Did not contest	No data	No data	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Finland, total	43.0 (n=722)	44.7 (n=707)	48.2 (n=760)	45.3	7	5.3	1.8	4.7	-5.2
Finland, total, non-PRR parties	44.6 (n=643)	46.2 (n=631)	50.8 (n=693)	47.2	5.4	3.8	-0.8	2.8	-6.2

³ Statistics Finland. (2019, May 4). Age distribution of candidates by sex, party and constituency in Parliamentary elections 2019 [Data sets].

https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin/StatFin_vaa_evaa_evaa_2019/110_evaa_2019_tau_101.px/

⁴ Statistics Finland. (2015, October 4). Age distribution of candidates by sex, party and constituency in Parliamentary elections 2015 [Data sets].

https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin_Passivi/StatFin_Passivi_vaa_evaa_evaa_2015/110_evaa_tau_101.px/

⁵ Statistics Finland. (2011, March 31). Age distribution of candidates by sex, party and constituency in Parliamentary elections 2011 [Data sets].

https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin_Passivi/StatFin_Passivi_vaa_evaa_evaa_2011/110_evaa_tau_101_en.px/

Table H5. Percentage of women and gender gap among listed candidates in Finnish *municipal* elections, 2008–2017, (percent, percentage points)^{6,7,8}

Party / Percentage of women & Gender gap	Women, % of party's listed candidates, 2008 (municipal elections)	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2012 (municipal elections)	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2017	Women, Mean % of party's listed candidates, 2008-2017 (municipal)	Gender gap (percentage points), 2008	Gender gap (percentage points), 2012	Gender gap (percentage points), 2017	Mean gender gap (points), 2009-2017	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Social Democrats (SDP)	40.8 (n=3142)	40.4 (n=2825)	40.9 (n=2508)	40.7	9.2	9.6	9.1	9.3	-0.1
Finns Party (PS)	25.7 (n=473)	23.3 (n=1022)	25.2 (n=966)	24.7	24.3	26.7	24.8	25.3	0.5
National Coalition (Kok)	40.3 (n=3077)	39.1 (n=2688)	39.0 (n=2239)	39.5	9.7	10.9	11	10.5	1.3
Centre Party (Kesk)	40.3 (n=4023)	39.8 (n=3344)	39.7 (n=2961)	39.9	9.7	10.2	10.3	10.1	0.6
Green Party (Vihr)	56.8 (n=1245)	56.8 (n=1305)	57.9 (n=1505)	57.2	-6.8	-6.8	-7.9	-7.2	-1.1
Left Alliance (Vas)	36.6 (n=1505)	37.9 (n=1329)	39.8 (n=1275)	38.1	13.4	12.1	10.2	11.9	-3.2
Swedish People's Party (SFP)	42.9 (n=603)	43.5 (n=587)	43.7 (n=578)	43.4	7.1	6.5	6.3	6.6	-0.8
Christian Democrats (KD)	48.2 (n=926)	45.3 (n=848)	46.7 (n=920)	46.7	1.8	4.7	3.3	3.3	1.5
Movement now (Liike nyt)	NA	NA	No data	NA	NA	NA	No data	NA	NA
Finland, total	40.8 (n=14 994)	39.1 (n=13 948)	40.1 (n=12 952)	40.0	9.2	10.9	9.9	10	0.7
Finland, total, non-PRR parties	41.6 (n=14 521)	41.3 (n=12 926)	42.2 (n=11 986)	41.7	8.4	8.7	7.8	8.3	-0.6

⁶ Statistics Finland. (2017, April 21). Age and sex distribution of candidates by party in Municipal elections 2017 [Data sets].

https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin_Passiivi/StatFin_Passiivi_vaa_kvaa_2017_10/120_kvaa_2017_tau_104.px/

⁷ Statistics Finland. (2014, March 19). Age and sex distribution of candidates by party in Municipal elections 2012 [Data sets].

https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin_Passiivi/StatFin_Passiivi_vaa_kvaa_2012_10/120_kvaa_2012_tau_104.px/

⁸ Statistics Finland. (2008, October 31). Age and sex distribution of candidates by party in Municipal elections 2008 [Data sets].

https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin_Passiivi/StatFin_Passiivi_vaa_kvaa_2008_10/120_kvaa_2008_2008-10-31_tau_104_en.px/

3. Parliamentary arena (elected representatives in parliamentary and municipal elections)

Table H6. Percentage of women and gender gap among elected representatives in Finnish *parliamentary* elections, 2011–2019, (percent, percentage points)^{9 10 11}

Party / Percentage of women & Gender gap	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2011	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2015	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2017	Women, Mean % of party's elected representatives, 2011-2019	Gender gap (percentage points), 2011	Gender gap (points), 2015	Gender gap (points), 2019	Mean gender gap (points), 2011-2019	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Social Democrats (SDP)	64.3 (n=27)	61.8 (n=21)	57.5 (n=23)	61.2	-14.3	-11.8	-7.5	-11.2	6.8
Finns Party (PS)	28.2 (n=11)	31.6 (n=12)	30.8 (n=12)	30.2	21.8	18.4	19.2	19.8	-2.6
National Coalition (Kok)	34.1 (n=15)	43.2 (n=16)	42.1 (n=16)	39.8	15.9	6.8	7.9	10.2	-8
Centre Party (Kesk)	34.3 (n=12)	28.6 (n=14)	32.3 (n=10)	31.7	15.7	21.4	17.7	18.3	2
Green Party (Vihr)	50.0 (n=5)	46.7 (n=7)	85.0 (n=17)	60.6	0	3.3	-35	-10.6	-35
Left Alliance (Vas)	42.9 (n=6)	58.3 (n=7)	56.25 (n=9)	52.5	7.1	-8.3	-6.25	-2.5	-13.4
Swedish People's Party (SFP)	55.6 (n=5)	33.3 (n=3)	44.4 (n=4)	44.4	-5.6	16.7	5.6	5.6	11.2
Christian Democrats (KD)	50.0 (n=3)	60.0 (n=3)	60.0 (n=3)	56.7	0	-10	0.1	-3.3	0.1
Movement now (Liike nyt)	NA	NA	No data	NA	NA	NA	No data	NA	NA
Finland, total	42.2 (n=84)	41.7 (n=83)	47.5 (n=94)	43.8	7.8	8.3	2.5	6.2	-5.3
Finland, total, non-PRR parties	45.6 (n=73)	44.1 (n=71)	51.6 (n=82)	47.1	4.4	5.9	-1.6	2.9	-6

⁹ Statistics Finland. (2019, April 24). Age distribution of elected MPs by sex, party and constituency in Parliamentary elections 2019 [Data sets]. https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin/StatFin_vaa_evaa_evaa_2019/160_evaa_2019_tau_106.px/

¹⁰ Statistics Finland. (2015, April 30). Age distribution of elected MPs by sex, party and constituency in Parliamentary elections 2015 [Data sets]. https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin_Passivi/StatFin_Passivi_vaa_evaa_evaa_2015/160_evaa_tau_106.px/

¹¹ Statistics Finland. (2011, April 29). Age distribution of elected MPs by sex, party and constituency in Parliamentary elections 2011 [Data sets]. https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin_Passivi/StatFin_Passivi_vaa_evaa_evaa_2011/160_evaa_tau_106_en.px/

Table H7. Percentage of women and gender gap among elected representatives in Finnish *municipal* elections, 2008–2017, (percent, percentage points)^{12 13 14}

Party / Percentage of women & Gender gap	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2008	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2012	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2017	Women, Mean % of party's elected representatives, 2008-2017 (municipal)	Gender gap (point), 2008	Gender gap (points), 2012	Gender gap (points), 2017	Mean gender gap (points), 2008-2017	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Social Democrats (SDP)	41.0 (n=847)	41.7 (n=721)	44.4 (n=754)	42.4	9	8.3	5.6	7.6	-3.4
Finns Party (PS)	20.8 (n=92)	23.2 (n=277)	21.8 (n=168)	21.9	29.2	26.8	28.2	28.1	-1
National Coalition (Kok)	35.9 (n=726)	35.7 (n=619)	35.9 (n=535)	35.8	14.1	14.3	14.1	14.2	0
Centre Party (Kesk)	34.1 (n=1200)	35.1 (n=1079)	36.1 (n=1019)	35.1	15.9	14.9	13.9	14.9	-2
Green Party (Vihr)	64.3 (n=238)	68.1 (n=220)	67.8 (n=362)	66.7	-14.3	-18.1	-17.8	-16.7	-3.5
Left Alliance (Vas)	32.4 (n=270)	35.8 (n=229)	40.4 (n=266)	36.2	17.6	14.2	9.6	13.8	-8
Swedish People's Party (SFP)	38.2 (n=195)	38.3 (n=184)	40.1 (n=189)	38.9	11.8	11.7	9.9	11.1	-1.9
Christian Democrats (KD)	43.0 (n=151)	38.7 (n=116)	48.7 (n=151)	43.5	7	11.3	1.3	6.5	-5.7
Movement now (Liike nyt)	NA	NA	46.5 (n=147)	46.5	NA	NA	3.5	3.5	NA
Finland, total	36.8 (n=3719)	36.3 (n=3445)	39.6 (n=3591)	37.6	13.2	13.7	10.4	12.4	-2.8
Finland, total, non-PRR parties	37.5 (n=3627)	38.2 (n=3168)	41.2 (n=3423)	39	12.5	11.8	8.8	11	-3.7

¹² Statistics Finland. (2017, April 21). Age distribution of elected councillors by sex and party in Municipal elections 2017 [Data sets].

https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin_Passiiivi/StatFin_Passiiivi_vaa_kvaa_2017_05/660_kvaa_2017_tau_142.px/

¹³ Statistics Finland. (2014, March 19). Age distribution of elected councillors by sex and party in Municipal elections 2012 [Data sets].

https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin_Passiiivi/StatFin_Passiiivi_vaa_kvaa_2012_05/660_kvaa_2012_tau_142_en.px/

¹⁴ Statistics Finland. (2009, March 12). Age distribution of elected councillors by sex and party in Municipal elections 2008 [Data sets].

https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin_Passiiivi/StatFin_Passiiivi_vaa_kvaa_2008_05/660_kvaa_2008_2009-11-02_tau_142_en.px/

Table H8. Percentage of women and gender gap in the PS vs. in main Finnish parties, last three *municipal* and *parliamentary* elections, (percent, percentage points)

Election years	2008/2011		2012/2015		2017/2019		2008/2011	2012/2015	2017/2019
	Women, %	Gender gap	Women, %	Gender gap	Women, %	Gender gap	Gender gap	Gender gap	Gender gap
PS, parliament, elected reps.	28.8	21.8	31.6	18.4	30.8	19.2	21.8	18.4	19.2
PS, parliament, listed candidates	33.2	16.8	35.3	14.7	31.5	18.5	16.8	14.7	18.5
PS municipal elections, elected reps.	20.8	29.2	23.2	26.8	21.8	28.2	29.2	26.8	28.2
PS municipal, elections, listed candidates	25.7	24.3	23.3	26.7	25.2	24.8	24.3	26.7	24.8
Finland total, parliament, elected reps.	42.2	7.8	41.7	8.3	47.5	2.5	7.8	8.3	2.5
Finland total, parliament, listed candidates	43.0	7.0	44.7	5.3	48.2	1.8	7	5.3	1.8
Finland total, municipal elections, elected reps.	36.8	13.2	36.3	13.7	39.6	10.4	13.2	13.7	10.4
Finland total, municipal elections, listed candidates	40.8	9.2	39.1	10.9	40.1	9.9	9.2	10.9	9.9

Table H9. The PS's total share of seats in parliamentary elections, (percent)¹⁵

Election year	2011	2015	2019
PS total share of seats, %	19.5	19	19.5
%-difference since last election	+17	-0.5	+0.5

¹⁵ Statistics Finland. (2019, April 24). Age distribution of elected MPs by sex, party and constituency in Parliamentary elections 2019 [Data sets]. https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin/StatFin_vaa_evaa_evaa_2019/160_evaa_2019_tau_106.px/

¹⁶ Statistics Finland. (2015, April 30). Age distribution of elected MPs by sex, party and constituency in Parliamentary elections 2015 [Data sets]. https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin_Passiivi/StatFin_Passiivi_vaa_evaa_evaa_2015/160_evaa_tau_106.px/

¹⁷ Statistics Finland. (2011, April 29). Age distribution of elected MPs by sex, party and constituency in Parliamentary elections 2011 [Data sets]. https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin_Passiivi/StatFin_Passiivi_vaa_evaa_evaa_2011/160_evaa_tau_106_en.px/

Table H10. Finnish parties' share of seats in parliamentary elections, (percent)¹⁸

Party / Election year	2011	2015	2019
Social Democrats (SDP)	21.0 (n=42)	17.0 (n=34)	20.0 (n=40)
Finns Party (PS)	19.5 (n=39)	19.0 (n=38)	19.5 (n=39)
National Coalition (Kok)	22.0 (n=44)	18.5 (n=37)	19.0 (n=38)
Centre Party (Kesk)	17.5 (n=35)	24.5 (n=49)	15.5 (n=31)
Green Party (Vihr)	5.0 (n=10)	7.5 (n=15)	10 (n=20)
Left Alliance (Vas)	7.0 (n=14)	6.0 (n=12)	8.0 (n=16)
Swedish People's Party (SFP)	4.5 (n=9)	4.5 (n=9)	4.5 (n=9)
Christian Democrats (KD)	3.0 (n=6)	2.5 (n=5)	2.5 (n=5)
Movement now (Liike nyt)	NA	NA	0.5 (n=1)
Åland Coalition	0.5 (n=1)	0.5 (n=1)	0.5 (n=1)

¹⁸ Statistics Finland. (2019, April 24). Age distribution of elected MPs by sex, party and constituency in Parliamentary elections 2019 [Data sets]. https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin/StatFin_vaa_evaa_evaa_2019/160_evaa_2019_tau_106.px/

¹⁹ Statistics Finland. (2015, April 30). Age distribution of elected MPs by sex, party and constituency in Parliamentary elections 2015 [Data sets]. https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin_Passiivi/StatFin_Passiivi_vaa_evaa_evaa_2015/160_evaa_tau_106.px/

²⁰ Statistics Finland. (2011, April 29). Age distribution of elected MPs by sex, party and constituency in Parliamentary elections 2011 [Data sets]. https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin_Passiivi/StatFin_Passiivi_vaa_evaa_evaa_2011/160_evaa_tau_106_en.px/

Appendix I. Data regarding the gender-representation gap in Sweden

1. Internal arena (party council and party leadership)¹

Table I1. Gender composition in Swedish parties' party councils, 2020–2021, (percent, percentage points)

Party / Percentage of women & Gender gap	Women, % of party council members (n=number)	Gender gap
Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna, S)	56.7 (n=17)	-6.7
Centre Party (Centerpartiet, C)	55.6 (n=10)	-5.6
Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna, KD)	45.0 (n=9)	5
Liberal Party (Liberalerna, L)	56.0 (n=14)	-6
Green Party (Miljöpartiet, MP)	57.1 (n=8)	-7.1
Conservative Party (Moderaterna, M)	50.0 (n=9)	0
Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD)	26.3 (n=5)	23.7
The Left Party (Vänsterpartiet, V)	68.2 (n=15)	-18.2
Sweden, total	51.9	-1.9
Sweden, total, non-PRR parties	55.5	-5.5

Table I2. Gender gap in the SD's party councils, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Party / Year	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Gender gap, mean	Gender gap difference 2021 vs. 2011
Sweden Democrats, SD		25		14.7		14.7		18.4		23.7	19.3	-5.7

¹ See Appendix E for full data and details on gender in the party councils and party leadership.

Table I3. Gender gap in party leadership in Swedish parties, 2011–2021, (percentage points)

Party / Years	2011–2012	2012–2013	2013–2014	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019	2019–2020	2020–2021	Mean Gender gap, 2011–2021	Gender gap difference 2021 vs. 2011
Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna, S)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
Centre Party (Centerpartiet, C)	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	0
Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna, KD)	50	50	50	50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-10	-100
Liberal Party (Liberalerna, L)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	-50	-50	30	-100
Green Party (Miljöpartiet, MP)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Conservative Party (Moderaterna, M)	50	50	50	-50	-50	-50	50	50	50	50	20	0
Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0
The Left Party (Vänsterpartiet, V)	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	-50	40	-100
Sweden, total	31.25 (n=1.5/8 women)	31.25 (n=1.5/8 women)	31.25 (n=1.5/8 women)	18.75 (n=2.5/8)	6.25 (n=3.5/8)	6.25 (n=3.5/8)	18.75 (n=2.5/8)	18.75 (n=2.5/8)	6.25 (n=3.5/8)	-6.25 (n=4.5/8)	16.25	-37.5
Sweden, total, non-PRR parties	28.6 (n=1.5/7)	28.6 (n=1.5/7)	28.6 (n=1.5/7)	14.3 (n=2.5/7)	0 (n=3.5/7)	0 (n=3.5/7)	14.3 (n=2.5/7)	14.3 (n=2.5/7)	0 (n=3.5/7)	-14.3 (n=4.5/8)	11.4	-42.9

2. Electoral arena (listed candidates in parliamentary and municipal elections)

Table I4. Percentage of women and gender gap among listed candidates in Swedish *parliamentary* elections, 2010–2018 (percent, percentage points)^{2,3,4}

Party / Percentage of women & Gender gap	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2010	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2014	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2018	Women, Mean % of party's listed candidates, 2010-2018	Gender gap (percentage points), 2010	Gender gap (percentage points), 2014	Gender gap (percentage points), 2018	Mean gender gap (points), 2010-2018	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Social Democrats (S)	49.3 (n=365)	49.7 (n=392)	49.7 (n=402)	49.6	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.4	-0.4
Centre Party (C)	43.3 (n=327)	44.1 (n=362)	42.8 (n=381)	43.4	6.7	5.9	7.2	6.6	0.5
Christian Democrats (KD)	44.4 (n=342)	42.9 (n=298)	44.5 (n=318)	43.9	5.6	7.1	5.5	6.1	-0.1
Liberal Party (L)	43.7 (n=356)	43.6 (n=340)	45.3 (n=325)	44.2	6.3	6.4	4.7	5.8	-1.6
Green Party (MP)	46.3 (n=288)	50.7 (n=343)	51.0 (n=311)	49.3	3.7	-0.7	-1	1.3	-4.7
Conservative Party (M)	41.0 (n=313)	42.1 (n=334)	39.2 (n=309)	40.8	9	7.9	10.8	9.2	1.8
Sweden Democrats (SD)	25.8 (n=16)	30.2 (n=26)	30.1 (n=98)	28.7	24.2	19.8	19.9	21.3	-4.3
The Left Party (V)	51.4 (n=342)	53.3 (n=378)	53.6 (n=383)	52.8	-1.4	-3.3	-3.6	-2.8	-2.2
Sweden, total	44.2 (n=2506)	45.2 (n=2668)	43.5 (n=2741)	44.3	5.8	4.8	6.5	5.7	0.7
Sweden, total, non-PRR parties	44.4 (n=2490)	45.4 (n=2642)	44.2 (n=2643)	44.7	5.6	4.6	5.8	5.3	0.2

² Valmyndigheten. (2018, September 14). *Val till riksdagen – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2018/alkon/R/rike/alderkon.html>

³ Valmyndigheten. (2014, September 15). *Val till riksdagen – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2014/alkon/R/rike/alderkon.html>

⁴ Valmyndigheten. (2010, September 20). *Val till riksdagen – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2010/alkon/R/rike/alderkon.html>

Table I5. Percentage of women and gender gap among listed candidates in Swedish *municipal* elections, 2010–2018 (percentage, percentage points)⁵⁶⁷

Party / Percentage of women & Gender gap	Women, % of party's listed candidates, 2010 (municipal elections)	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2014 (municipal elections)	Women, % of the party's listed candidates, 2018	Women, Mean % of party's listed candidates, 2010-2018 (municipal)	Gender gap (percentage points), 2010	Gender gap (percentage points), 2014	Gender gap (percentage points), 2018	Mean gender gap (points), 2010-2018	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Social Democrats (S)	46.4 (n=6322)	47.1 (n=6320)	46.9 (n=6011)	46.8	3.6	2.9	3.1	3.2	-0.5
Centre Party (C)	40.2 (n=2722)	41.5 (n=2586)	42.0 (n=2994)	41.2	9.8	8.5	8.0	8.8	-1.8
Christian Democrats (KD)	42.4 (n=2006)	42.9 (n=1850)	42.3 (n=1738)	42.5	7.6	7.1	7.7	7.5	0.1
Liberal Party (L)	41.2 (n=2149)	41.8 (n=2089)	42.7 (n=1937)	41.9	8.8	8.2	7.3	8.1	-1.5
Green Party (MP)	48.9 (n=1604)	50.4 (n=1893)	48.8 (n=1379)	49.4	1.1	-0.4	1.2	0.6	0.1
Conservative Party (M)	36.8 (n=2987)	37.9 (n=3105)	37.4 (n=2977)	37.3	13.2	12.2	12.6	12.7	-0.6
Sweden Democrats (SD)	20.2 (n=409)	25.4 (n=513)	28.1 (n=1265)	24.6	29.8	24.6	21.9	25.4	-7.9
The Left Party (V)	47.1 (n=1841)	49.0 (n=2183)	50.1 (n=2214)	48.7	2.9	1.0	-0.1	1.3	-3
Sweden, total	41.6 (n=21 675)	42.9 (n=22 368)	42.1 (n=22 446)	42.2	8.4	7.1	7.9	7.8	-0.5
Sweden, total, non-PRR parties	42.5 (n=21 266)	43.6 (n=21 855)	43.3 (n=21 181)	43.1	7.5	6.4	6.7	6.9	-0.8

⁵ Valmyndigheten. (2018, September 14). *Val till kommunfullmäktige – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2018/alkon/K/rike/alderkon.html#valdalkon>

⁶ Valmyndigheten. (2014, September 15). *Val till kommunfullmäktige – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2014/alkon/K/rike/alderkon.html>

⁷ Valmyndigheten. (2010, September 20). *Val till kommunfullmäktige – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2010/alkon/K/rike/alderkon.html>

3. Parliamentary arena (elected representatives in parliamentary and municipal elections)

Table I6. Percentage of women and gender gap among elected representatives in Swedish *parliamentary* elections, 2010–2018, (percent, percentage points) ^{8 9 10}

Party / Percentage of women & Gender gap	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2010	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2014	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2018	Women, Mean % of party's elected representatives, 2010-2018	Gender gap (points), 2010	Gender gap (points), 2014	Gender gap (points), 2018	Mean gender gap (points), 2010-2018	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Social Democrats (S)	48.2 (n=54)	46.9 (n=53)	48.0 (n=48)	47.7	1.8	3.1	2.0	2.3	0.2
Centre Party (C)	30.4 (n=7)	40.9 (n=9)	38.7 (n=12)	36.7	19.6	9.1	11.3	13.3	-8.3
Christian Democrats (KD)	36.8 (n=7)	37.5 (n=6)	27.3 (n=6)	33.9	13.2	12.5	22.7	16.1	9.5
Liberal Party (L)	41.7 (n=10)	26.3 (n=5)	40.0 (n=8)	36.0	8.3	23.7	10.0	14.0	1.7
Green Party (MP)	56.0 (n=14)	48.0 (n=12)	75.0 (n=12)	59.7	-6	2	-25	-9.7	-19
Conservative Party (M)	47.7 (n=51)	52.4 (n=44)	54.3 (n=38)	51.5	2.3	-2.4	-4.3	-1.5	-6.6
Sweden Democrats (SD)	15.0 (n=3)	22.4 (n=11)	29.0 (n=18)	22.1	35	27.6	21	27.9	-14
The Left Party (V)	57.9 (n=11)	57.1 (n=12)	67.9 (n=19)	61.0	-7.9	-7.1	-17.9	-11	-10
Sweden, total	45.0 (n=157)	43.6 (n=152)	46.1 (n=161)	44.9	5	6.4	3.9	5.1	-1.1
Sweden, total, non-PRR parties	46.9 (n=154)	47.0 (n=141)	49.8 (n=143)	47.9	3.2	3	0.2	2.1	-3

⁸ Valmyndigheten. (2018, September 14). *Val till riksdagen – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2018/alkon/R/rike/alderkon.html>

⁹ Valmyndigheten. (2014, September 15). *Val till riksdagen – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2014/alkon/R/rike/alderkon.html>

¹⁰ Valmyndigheten. (2010, September 20). *Val till riksdagen – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2010/alkon/R/rike/alderkon.html>

Table I7. Percentage of women and gender gap among elected representatives in Swedish *municipal* elections, 2010–2018, (percent, percentage points)^{11 12 13}

Party / Percentage of women & Gender gap	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2010 (municipal elections)	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2014 (municipal elections)	Women, % of the party's elected representatives, 2018	Women, Mean % of party's elected representatives, 2010-2018 (municipal)	Gender gap (point), 2010	Gender gap (points), 2014	Gender gap (points), 2018	Mean gender gap (points), 2010-2018	Difference gender gap election 3 vs election 1
Social Democrats (S)	49.0 (n=2251)	49.3 (n=2151)	49.5 (n=1859)	49.3	1	0.7	0.5	0.7	-0.5
Centre Party (C)	42.7 (n=598)	45.7 (n=645)	46.0 (n=738)	44.8	7.3	4.3	4	5.2	-3.3
Christian Democrats (KD)	40.1 (n=237)	42.5 (n=219)	40.7 (n=275)	41.1	9.9	7.5	9.3	8.9	-0.6
Liberal Party (L)	43.4 (n=397)	44.2 (n=314)	45.6 (n=314)	44.4	6.6	5.8	4.4	5.6	-2.2
Green Party (MP)	48.4 (n=331)	51.7 (n=378)	50.1 (n=198)	50.1	1.6	-1.7	-0.1	-0.1	-1.7
Conservative Party (M)	38.8 (n=1150)	41.1 (n=1000)	40.1 (n=961)	40.0	11.2	8.9	9.9	10	-1.3
Sweden Democrats (SD)	18.8 (n=116)	23.4 (n=306)	28.2 (n=504)	23.5	31.2	26.6	21.8	26.5	-9.4
The Left Party (V)	46.1 (n=324)	50.7 (n=380)	53.2 (n=430)	50.0	3.9	-0.7	-3.2	0	-7.1
Sweden, total	43 (n=5582)	43.7 (n=5582)	43.3 (n=5494)	43.3	7	6.3	6.7	6.7	-0.3
Sweden, total, non-PRR parties	44.2 (n=5466)	46.1 (n=5276)	45.8 (n=4990)	45.4	5.8	3.9	4.2	4.6	-1.6

¹¹ Valmyndigheten. (2018, September 14). *Val till kommunfullmäktige – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2018/alkon/K/rike/alderkon.html#valdalkon>

¹² Valmyndigheten. (2014, September 15). *Val till kommunfullmäktige – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2014/alkon/K/rike/alderkon.html>

¹³ Valmyndigheten. (2010, September 20). *Val till kommunfullmäktige – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2010/alkon/K/rike/alderkon.html>

Table I8. Percentage of women and gender gap in the SD vs. in all main Swedish parties, last three *municipal* and *parliamentary* elections (percent, percentage points)

Election years	2009/2011		2013/2015		2017/2019			2009/2011	2013/2015	2017/2019
	Women, %	Gender gap	Women, %	Gender gap	Women, %	Gender gap		Gender gap	Gender gap	Gender gap
SD, parliament, elected reps.	15	35	22.4	27.6	29	21		35	27.6	21
SD, parliament, listed candidates	25.8	24.2	30.2	19.8	30.1	19.9		24.2	19.8	19.9
SD, municipal, elected reps.	18.8	31.2	23.4	26.6	28.2	21.8		31.2	26.6	21.8
SD municipalities candidates	20.2	29.8	25.4	24.6	28.1	21.9		29.8	24.6	21.9
Sweden total, parliament, elected reps.	45.0	5	43.6	6.4	46.1	3.9		5	6.4	3.9
Sweden total, parliament, listed candidates	44.2	5.8	45.2	4.8	43.5	6.5		5.8	4.8	6.5
Sweden total, municipal, elected reps	43.0	7.0	43.7	6.3	43.3	6.7		7	6.3	6.7
Sweden total, municipal, listed candidates	41.6	8.4	42.9	7.1	42.1	7.9		8.4	7.1	7.9

Table I9. The SD's total share of seats in parliamentary elections, (percent) ^{14 15 16}

Election year	2010	2014	2018
SD total share of seats, %	5.7	14.0	17.8
%-difference since last election	NA	8.3	3.8

¹⁴ Valmyndigheten. (2018, September 14). *Val till riksdagen – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2018/alkon/R/rike/alderkon.html>

¹⁵ Valmyndigheten. (2014, September 15). *Val till riksdagen – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2014/alkon/R/rike/alderkon.html>

¹⁶ Valmyndigheten. (2010, September 20). *Val till riksdagen – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2010/alkon/R/rike/alderkon.html>

Table I10. Swedish parties' share of seats in parliamentary elections, (percent) ¹⁷¹⁸¹⁹

Party / Election year	2010	2014	2018
Social Democrats (S)	32.1 (n=112)	32.4 (n=113)	28.7 (n=100)
Centre Party (C)	6.6 (n=23)	6.3 (n=22)	8.9 (n=31)
Christian Democrats (KD)	5.4 (n=19)	4.6 (n=16)	6.3 (n=22)
Liberal Party (L)	6.9 (n=24)	5.4 (n=19)	5.7 (n=20)
Green Party (MP)	7.2 (n=25)	7.2 (n=25)	4.6 (n=16)
Conservative Party (M)	30.7 (n=107)	24.1 (n=84)	20.1 (n=70)
Sweden Democrats (SD)	5.7 (n=20)	14.0 (n=49)	17.8 (n=62)
The Left Party (V)	5.4 (n=19)	6.0 (n=21)	8.0 (n=28)

¹⁷ Valmyndigheten. (2018, September 14). *Val till riksdagen – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2018/alkon/R/rike/alderkon.html>

¹⁸ Valmyndigheten. (2014, September 15). *Val till riksdagen – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2014/alkon/R/rike/alderkon.html>

¹⁹ Valmyndigheten. (2010, September 20). *Val till riksdagen – Ålder och kön* [Data sets]. <https://data.val.se/val/val2010/alkon/R/rike/alderkon.html>