

Interest group lobbying advocacy

A study of interest groups' utilization of lobbying strategies in the EU

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Abstract

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Title: Interest group lobbying advocacy – A study of interest groups' utilization of lobbying strategies in the EU	
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<p>Introduction: Is lobbying causing a democratic deficit in the European Union (EU)? This topic has many times surfaced in the academic world. Pluralism is in theory set out to be a functional coexistence of different values and interest in a modern democracy. The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the business-oriented interest groups have more influence compared to their competitors. The thesis research question is specified as following: Are there any differences between business and environmental organizations use of lobbying strategies when influencing policymakers?</p> <p>Theoretical framework: Pluralism is based on the thought that conflicts and dialogue between different parties will result in a common good. However, the apparent inequalities between the different interest groups operating within the EU suggests that the current state of the EU resembles the elitist form of pluralism.</p> <p>Methodology: The comparative design serves as the research design in this thesis. The data was collected and summarized in the form of a systematic literature study. The sample of articles were all evaluated through various inclusion- and exclusion criteria presented in chapter 3 and 4.</p> <p>Results: Factors such as organizational type, access, budget, goals, institutional setting, and the type of policy issue impacts the choice of strategy. Both the business- and environmental organizations utilize a combination of strategies. This depends on both the resource situation as well as the policy issue. Salient and less complex issues are usually lobbied through outside strategies. Inside strategies are often utilized when lobbying less popular issues.</p> <p>Conclusions: No universal theories exist that can be used in all cases involving business- and environmental NGOs (organizations without any connection to the nation-state). All the factors mentioned in the result chapter need to be taken into consideration when examining lobbying behavior. The generalizability of the results is limited due to the research design and the small sample of studies included in the thesis.</p>	
Key words: Lobbyism, Pluralism, NGO, Inside lobbying, Outside lobbying	

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1. Introduction

1.1 Scientific relevance

Since the beginning of the 1980s, there has been a rapid increase of interest groups in the European Union (EU). Policymaking in the EU has always been a complicated and long-spun process. The reason behind this is largely due to the fact that the union member states differ in many ways, therefore, this affects the political landscape. While all of this is true, there is also a large number of interest groups that seek to influence politics with the use of different means, strategies and through information exchange. The term lobbying has a somewhat negative tone, this may partly be due to the lack of transparency that surrounds lobbying. In some cases, there is a thin line between what is considered as lobbying or corruption. According to Korkea-aho (2019), interest groups or lobbying actors who engage in illegal forms of lobbying will only end up hurting their own cause and reputation (Korkea-aho, 2019). Simultaneously, it is worth to examine whether certain interest groups e.g. (business interest groups) have more means to influence policymakers compared to their peers. In recent years, climate policy has gradually received more space on the EU agenda. In this light, this new emerging policy area is both intriguing from a societal and academic perspective. The main of focus of this thesis will be aimed at clarifying which actors are most prominent in climate policy and what kind of strategies these actors adopt when lobbying climate policy.

From a social science perspective, this is also highly relevant, considering the fact that interest groups have significant abilities to influence the decision-making process. The question is if there is an unhealthy imbalance between different types of interest groups, and whether there is a democratic deficit as a result of this. The idea of a pluralistic society is not considered to be harmful towards democracy, quite the contrary, it is said to contribute to the democratic process (Van Schendelen, 2010). However, the inequalities between the business interest groups and other NGOs are so prevalent, that is practically impossible not to suspect the emergence of elite pluralism in the lobbying realm within the EU. Coen (1997) defined elite pluralism as an interest arrangement where access is generally restricted to few policy players for whom membership is competitive and strategically advisable. Based on this, it is not too far-

fetched to claim that the present lobbying platforms are skewed towards the resource heavy business interest organizations (Broscheid & Coen, 2003). Some scholars state that the interest groups' participation in today's policy-shaping is a valuable asset to the democratic process (Gullberg, 2008). Past empirical work done on lobbying has focused on understanding under which conditions interest groups influence public policy. Another important question is also how many interest groups get access to decision-makers (Beyers, 2004; Bouwen, 2002, 2004; Eising, 2007). It is also highly relevant to ask if lobbyists should focus on cooperating with likeminded, or if the attention should be aimed at potential adversaries.

1.2 Research aim

The main objective in this master's thesis is to determine if there are any apparent differences between how industrial and business organizations lobby compared to environmental organizations. The research question is presented below:

Which are the differences between business and environmental organizations use of lobbying strategies when influencing policymakers in the European Union? Strategies refer to type of arenas (*i.e.* Inside, Outside) the organizations are using and what type of influence they utilize (*i.e.* arguing, advocacy, coercion and encapsulation). These variables will be described in detail later in the thesis. The purpose of this thesis is to question the presumption that the policy process regarding climate policy is dominated by the business-oriented interest groups. In a broader sense this also raises the question whether lobbying undermines the democratic principles of the EU. As earlier stated, one of the main scientific gaps in the research field of lobbying is the long-term effects of this phenomenon. However, this will not be the objective of this thesis. The reasoning behind this has to do with the strict time frame and the limited extent of this thesis.

1.3 Disposition

The brief introduction that has been presented above provides a glimpse into what this thesis will process, as well as its relevance from a societal perspective. Chapter 2 is related to the theoretical framework of past research done regarding lobbying. The first part of the chapter will cover the past theories and definitions of relevant terms in the field as well as the EU decision-making and climate policy in general. The last part is dedicated to interest group behavior and influence and their relation to EU officials. In

chapter 3, the discussion regarding the choice of methodology and various research designs will be presented. This is followed by chapter 4 that will analyze the results of the systematic literature study. Chapter 5 summarizes all the results and the final discussion of the thesis. Finally, chapter 6 includes a Swedish summary of the thesis.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Terminology

2.1.1 Defining Lobbyism

Lobbyism can be described in a variety of ways. Perhaps the most common way to describe it is as a long-term relationship between interest groups and legislators (Ainsworth, 1997; Loomis, 2002). The information exchange between interest groups and legislators creates a strong bond between the two actors (Loomis, 2002). Past studies emphasize that effective lobbying depends on trust and credibility if it is to last (Gullberg, 2008). Building these relationships takes time (Ainsworth, 1997; Bouwen, 2004; Coen, 2004; Matthews 1960; Mazey & Richardson, 2002). The more traditional definition states that lobbying is an act to influence and shape public-policy. In spite of this, past studies on interest groups and lobbying have focused on single policy decisions within a limited period of time according to Gullberg (2008). These studies have been criticized for directing way too much attention toward visible and controversial policy decisions (Baumgartner & Leech, 1996).

2.2 Lobbying and democratic theory

In most cases, the global belief is that democracy is the preferred or the most legitimate form of governance after the survival of countless tyrannical, monarchic rules throughout history (Karr, 2007). Karr (2007, 8) states the following: *all representative systems have had to confront the opportunities offered as well as the threats posed by the formation and activities of interest groups*. Karr (2007) believes that the view of interest groups and their role in a representative system has changed. The reason behind this is believed to be a result of the growing numbers of advocates in favor of pluralist theory and the introduction of new political concepts. Karr (2007) also concludes that increased awareness and technological progress sparked public transparency on interest group lobbying. In some cases, this has also led to better regulative measures to control their influence on decision-making (Karr, 2007).

Karr (2007) questions if and how interest groups can be integrated into democratic systems without damaging the legitimacy-based grounds that democracies stand on. Despite this, in a democratic system, all interests have the right to present their demands to both the government and the public. These groups usually employ similar

methods to voice their opinions. Karr (2007, p 63) states that the main concern is the fact that there is strong evidence that the resources deployed and used for these methods are far from equally distributed. The fact is that business organizations clearly outweigh their competitors.

Since the 1990s, scientists have engaged in research regarding interest group lobbying in the EU. A large proportion of the work has been dedicated to analyzing the workings of the relevant EU institutions from the lobbying groups that are active in the Union (Mazey et al., 1993c, Buholzer, 1998). Scholars such as Decker (2002), Schmuck, (1993) and Zweifel (2002) question the lack of democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions. This criticism has led to the fact that most experts have called for the implementation of state-centric approaches. The multi-level governance system relies on policy networks that go beyond the official institutions in the consideration of political players shaping the EU democracy (Karr, 2007). According to Karr (2007) the present work aims at adding to current models by choosing an interest group focused on lobbying centric approaches. This joins the short list of works combining the question of EU democratic legitimacy and the role of public and private interest groups (Karr, 2007).

2.2.1 Democratic accountability

From a democratic perspective, the imbalance between interest groups is without question concerning. Especially since accountability is regarded as one of the key cornerstones in a democratic system (Karr, 2007). In a representative democracy, elected officials are expected to represent the people's interest. This is the reason why influential interest groups that only represent small fractions of society, may be considered a threat to the democratic principles. Karr (2007) claims that transparency, informality and negotiations in non-elected bodies such as committees and special interest representatives tend to score badly in accountability. Since the decisions cannot be traced back to the decision-makers, this in turn means that the decisions are not controlled by the public (Karr, 2007).

Karr (2007) states that corporatism and consociational democracy (the concept of power sharing between elites and other social groups) share defining characteristics such as elite cooperation, societal segmentation, restricting membership and a preference for bargaining versus competitive majoritarian processes of decision-making. Czada (2000) supports the view that consociational democracy and

corporatism are alternatives rather than substitutes. Czada (2000) describes this as consociationalism, corporatism and joint decision-making. Czada (2000) claims that corporatism and a weak government cancel each other out. Corporatism relies on a strong state counterpart to ensure its cohesion and monopoly. In contrast, joint decision-making results in governmental weakness according to Czada (2000). All in all, this indicates that it is ill advised to assume that consociational democracies cater to interest intermediation (Czada, 2000).

2.2.2 Lobbying and corruption

Despite all the literature on lobbying and corruption, the similarities and the differences between these two phenomena are widely disregarded according to Giovannoni (2011). The most plausible difference between lobbying and corruption is that lobbying is a way of seeking influence without overstepping the legal boundaries. Corruption on contrary is illegal (Giovannoni, 2011). However, this is not necessary a useful distinction in itself. Giovannoni and Campos (2007) suggest that different legal systems may disagree on specific examples. The underlying differences might be traced back to the means used when obtaining the influence. In short, lobbying can be described as a series of activities that influence the decision-making without providing the representatives with direct gains (Giovannoni, 2011, 12). However, if the politicians are paid to vote in a certain way, this is a standard example of corruption. Despite these distinctions, they may still generate confusion according to Giovannoni (2011). Therefore, it is also possible to establish the differences between lobbying and corruption is by looking at the targets of their rent-seeking activity (Giovannoni, 2011). Campos and Giovannoni (2007) propose that corruption is directed at rule enforcers while lobbying focuses on rule makers. This distinction is important for several reasons, some of which are conceptual while others may resolve the issues in empirical literature on lobbying and corruption (Giovannoni, 2011). From a conceptual standpoint it is worth questioning if lobbying and corruption are both risk-seeking activities with different targets, are they complements or substitutes? Damania et al. (2004) argue that they should be seen as complements. This is based on the fact that lobbying is primarily aimed at laws that undermine law enforcement, which opens the possibility to pursue corruption. The substitute argument is supported by Harstad and Svensson (2010). This notion is based on that lobbyists have the possibility to change the rules, therefore corruption is unnecessary. Giovannoni (2011) supports the claim

that, lobbying and corruption are substitutes. The results show that lobbying is more likely to take place in democratic countries where the media are independent and in contexts which the overall political process is democratic (Campos & Giovannoni, 2007). Political instability does not necessarily impact lobbying, but it certainly has effects on the levels of corruption according to Giovannoni (2011). Lobbying is more prevalent when the executive has less veto power. In contrast, corruption is more occurring when the executive has greater veto power according to Giovannoni (2011). The evidence also indicates that federal or decentralized states favor lobbying over corruption. Campos and Giovannoni (2007) sample point out that lobbying is the most effective way of exerting political influence for firms. The risks of corruption seem to outweigh the potential benefits (Karr, 2007). Overall, the fundamental difference between lobbying and corruption is determined by where the influence is sought.

2.3 The complex nature of lobbying

European lobbying has proven to be both diverse and complex at the same time, and this makes it very difficult to make any reliable theoretical generalizations (Bennett, 1997; Greenwood et al. 1992; Van Schendelen, 1994). Bouwen (2004) proclaims that measuring influence is problematic in the world of political science (Bouwen, 2004). Van Schendelen (1994) also underlines that access to legislators does not necessarily guarantee influence in the end. However, there is a close connection between influence and access (Bouwen, 2004). This was also mentioned by Truman (1951, 264) regarding interest group politics:

Power of any kind cannot be reached by a political interest group, or its leaders, without access to one or more key points of decision in the government. Access, therefore, becomes facilitating, intermediate objective of political interest groups. The development and improvement of such access is a common denominator of the tactics of all of them.

According to Bouwen (2007) the key to understanding lobbying activities connected to business interests in the EU is directly related to the exchange relationship between private and public actors. In other words, it is an interaction between two interdependent organizations. While taking this into account, it would be a grave mistake to regard business lobbying as a unidirectional activity of private actors trying to reach and influence the European institutions (Bouwen, 2007). However, the

European institutions are more than willing to interact with private actors, because they need to maintain the relationship in order to fulfill their purpose. This exchange relationship is based on a prior model developed by sociologists in the 1960s for the study of interorganizational relationships. Bouwen (2007) states that this serves as a starting point for the analysis of interaction between business interests and public actors in the EU. Bouwen (2007) also mentions that past scholars have used exchange theories in the past, either implicitly or explicitly, in order to study European interest intermediation (Greenwood et al. 1992; Buholzer, 1998; Pappi & Henning, 1999; Bouwen, 2007). These theories indicate that the interaction between private and public organizations can be conceptualized as a series of interorganizational exchanges. These models closely resemble the resource dependence perspective of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Resources in this case meaning information. Both theories emphasize that the resource exchange is paramount for organizations, whereas the resource dependency focuses more on the ensuing interdependence between organizations (Pfeffer, 1997). However, the resource dependence perspective suggests that organizations are not internally self-sustaining (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976). This makes them dependent on their own surroundings. Therefore, in order to survive, they ought to interact with organizations that possess the resources they desire (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This pattern also applies to the EU. The literature conducted on EU interest has pointed out what pulled interest into the European public policy, and now the scholars face the task of explaining what the current institutional demands are (Coen, 2007). This also includes political goods the EU interest organizations provide to the policy process (Coen, 2007). Coen (2007) also emphasizes that if the concentration is aimed at the formal aspects of model shaping in European interest politics, the process must be complemented with strict empirical tests of the models. This is supported by Baumgartner and Leech (1996) as they state that good theories require good data.

2.3.1 Lobbyism and the EU institutions


The interplay between EU officials and lobbyists is for many considered a natural process, where interest groups are considered as the aggressors. But is this really the case? Svendsen and Brandt (2009) states that the EU Commission is often viewed as a neutral bureaucracy with vital information to help governments find a common ground. The Commission undoubtedly plays a vital role in the EU machinery. In fact,

it has the executive role of drafting legislative proposals. The institution is also a technocratic agency with around 20000 civil servants. This in turn means that it is not a political entity (Svendsen & Brandt, 2009). Svendsen and Brandt (2009) questions if the Commission is really the neutral and independent agency as it often projected to be. This uncertainty has also led to skepticism among some scholars. George and Bache (2006) have outlined three major flaws of the Commission. Firstly, the commission has the ultimate right to initiate legislation by providing proposals to the Council of Ministers. The Council has the power to the approve the proposals, which in turn means that there is indirect democratic control involved in this process. Simultaneously, the Council also have the possibility to consult the Commission about legislative proposals in various areas, this applies to the Parliament as well. Another problem is the fact that the Council of Ministers procedures are also encased in secrecy. This may be a benefit when it comes to conducting negotiations but at the same time this means that the public have little insight. To some degree this means that the Commission have the ability to choose and not choose between different policies. Secondly, the Commission is capable to “Europeanize” a sector with the assistance of powerful interest groups. The third flaw is the Commissions ability to create new networks among producers (Svendsen & Brandt, 2009; George & Bache, 2006). Ultimately, this means that the Commission can promote the inclusion of affected interest groups during the policy formulation process in order to draw upon expert knowledge from various actors. This allows the Commission to subsidize interest groups that can support the policy forming process. This indicates that the Commission might not be the neutral body as previously projected (Svendsen & Brandt, 2009).

The reality is, out of the three central institutional organs in the EU, the Commission is the main center of decision-making. Consequently, this makes the Commission the main target for lobbyists in Brussels. The Parliament may be the financial controller of the EU Commission, but it has no real political power according to Svendsen and Brandt (2009). Svendsen and Brandt (2009) state that despite this, the Parliament has gained considerably more power since the addition of direct elections in 1979. With the addition of various inter-institutional agreements, the emergence of legislative acts and co-decision procedures, the Parliament is from now on one of the most lobbied institutions in the EU. One the of the most powerful tools that the Parliament possess

is the budget discharge. Beyond this, the Parliament must approve any newly assigned commissioners. Furthermore, The Parliament also has the ability to dismiss the Commission with a two-thirds majority (Svendsen & Brandt, 2009). However, it is not possible to dismiss individual members of the Commission. The Parliament also participates in the legislative process as a counseling body. With the increase in power, interest groups direct their attention towards EUs other institutions as well. In order to reach the policymakers, interest groups can choose between three different routes in order to reach the policymakers. This is displayed in the figure presented below.

Figure 1. Van Schendelen's (2010, 131) interest group routes to EU's policymakers.



As displayed in the figure above, it is shown that an interest group can either choose a national, international or transnational passage to the EU policymakers (Van Schendelen, 2010, 131). These three lanes allow the interest group to adapt to the EU playing field and if successful, outmaneuver other interest groups. At the same time, groups with shared interests tend to unite in transnational organizations that operate

close to the EU machinery (Van Schendelen, 2010). Other variants also exist, such as the more independent confederations as well as the ad-hoc coalitions. Gullberg (2008) conducted an empirical analysis based on interviews carried out with interest group representatives and decision-makers active in both Brussels and Oslo. The sample of interviewees consists of members of the business and environmental NGOs as well as decision-makers from the executive branch and the Parliament. Gullberg (2008) claims that business organizations lobby both the Commission and the Parliament. They also lobby the Council despite being deemed an institution difficult to influence. However, the Commission is still considered to be the main target for lobbyists in the EU according to Gullberg (2008). The development of the changing institutional balance at the EU level, have led to the plotting of reduced bureaucratic capture. In fact, the completion of 300 single market directives, gave the Commission bigger issues to cope with and hence needed less technical information according to Coen (2007). Subsequently, the Commission was able to deny access to its 300 committees and around 1200 forums from lobbyists. This indirectly led to the emergence of ad hoc alliances in the EU. These alliances had both economic and political incentives to form these coalitions (Coen, 2007). However, as stated previously, the Commission also had several reasons to include these groups in the policy process. The first reason is based on the wish to increase its direct legislative input into the markets through the implementation of directives and technical standards. Secondly, the Commission believed that firms represented a channel to the member states and could act as an intermediary in intergovernmental negotiations (Coen, 2007). The third reason is a result of the fact that many officials were convinced that the business sector represents a legitimate political constituency and that their legitimacy were reinforced by the informational exchange between the two parties. In the end, the Commissions efforts encouraged firms to continue and establish these political alliances. This in turn attracted a second wave of firms into the European public policy system according to Coen (2007).

2.4 EU climate policy

If we rewind the time a couple of decades, it becomes evident that climate policy once had very little political importance on the EU agenda. However, after the 1990s political turmoil and the financial crisis that crippled the whole continent, the climate policy issue sought to become a high-profile area in its own right (Boasson &

Wettestad, 2013). According to Boasson and Wettestad (2013), year 2005 and onwards, the pace has increased rapidly. By the end of the decade, numerous new ambitious objectives had been presented within the EU as probable solutions to the problem. This was also complemented by a heap of new binding policies for the EU members states. This transition period has been far from smooth. Global challenges like the financial crisis resulted in that climate change and all related challenges fell of the top layer of the political agenda. Boasson and Wettestad (2013) claim that the EU climate policy agenda is characterized by four central climate sub-policies. These policies are the emissions trading system (ETS), carbon capture and storage (CCS), renewables as well as the energy policy for buildings. Boasson and Wettestad (2013) state that there are significant differences and effects of these policies. The ETS creates a harmonized European market for greenhouse gas permits. However, this only indirectly induces technology development.

The EU has on its own embraced the renewable energy and in CCS, with the ultimate objective to transform the industries connected to these areas. The EU energy policy for buildings also serves as a framework for national construction of buildings, which provides the member states with guidelines on how to determine which technology standards that needs to be taken into consideration (Boasson & Wettestad, 2013). As expected, with the extent of these four policies, there is no wonder that both business- and environmental groups are keen on influencing these policy areas. Especially, considering the fact that they have significant implications for both the environment and the economy in the continent (Fagan-Watson et al., 2015). The latest IPCC report (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) indicate that the global economy faces severe consequences of climate change (Fagan-Watson et al. 2015). The business sector acknowledges that they face reputational risks and regulations that impact their operations on the continent. However, the research also suggests that forward looking businesses can create new products and services in this new transition. Climate policy is of material concern for most businesses (Fagan-Watson et al. 2015). With this established, the next section will cover the two central interest groups that attempt to influence climate policy in the EU.

2.4.2 Climate policy actors

The European field of climate policy is dominated by two central interest groups: business and environmental organizations (Greenwood 2003; Svendsen 1999,2001).

Business organizations focus on competitiveness and lobbying to achieve economically cost-effective emission reductions according to Gullberg (2008). They also state the importance of a global solution to the climate change dilemma. Which means that all developed countries should come to a common agreement on how to tackle the problem (Gullberg, 2008). The Union of Industrial and Employer's Confederations of Europe (UNICE), argues that mitigation of greenhouse gases will halter the competitiveness of EU compared to countries without any commitments. This stalemate ultimately jeopardizes the goals laid out year 2009 in the Lisbon Treaty. The counterpart, The Climate Action Network Europe, (CAN Europe) consisting of environmental NGOs working on climate change issues, demands a 60-80 % reduction in the developed countries emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050 (Gullberg, 2008). The goal is motivated by the desire to prevent the temperature to increase by more than 2 degrees celsius, and a recognition that developing countries need to increase their efforts (Gullberg, 2008). In other words, there is a cleavage between the competitiveness of European businesses and an environmental effective climate policy. This deadlock in climate policy is ultimately a causation of conflicting interests and a path of brushy decision-making (Gullberg, 2008).

2.5.1 Lobbying techniques

According to Van Schendelen (2010) it is old knowledge that in pluralist countries, every organization has some sort of capacity to influence its environment. However, this is always fragile in both scope and domain. This means that organizations are always dependent on the ever changing and challenging environment. The changing complex environment postulates that organizations adapt to change their influence behavior continuously (Van Schendelen, 2010). Specific challenges are presented in the form of friends or foes, or in short as stakeholders. Every organization has two main interest (Van Schendelen, 2010). First and foremost, at its input side, it has to acquire the means of operation it needs from the outside. This consists of a budget, support and information (Van Schendelen, 2010). Secondly, at its output side it has to deliver what is demanded from the outside, for example special products and services support and other contributions to its consumers. In this sense, every organization is in fact an interest group. This is not less true for the ministry or the EU itself than for a company or a group of citizens (Van Schendelen, 2010, 37).

According to Van Schendelen, (2002), organizations ought to seize opportunities and tackle threats in order to survive. This includes both at their input side and their output side. Only with regards to internal operations can an organization act more or less independently. However, this autonomy is not necessarily sufficient for survival (Coen, 2007). There are strong variations depending on a couple of different factors, the organizational structure, as well as type, (public or private) the quantity of resources and the organizations reputation (Van Schendelen, 2010). One central trait that is essential for all organizations is the awareness of the everchanging environment. Interest groups that seek to influence its environment in the EU can choose from four different traditional lobbying techniques according to Van Schendelen (2010). The first one is *coercion*. For instance, can a National ministry influence its home environment by issuing legislation that is ultimately upheld by police court and the countries judicial system. Private interest groups are inclined to play a less formal game in this sense. One prime example of this is the boycott campaign launched against oil and gas company Shell by environmental organization Greenpeace in the 1995 Brent Spar affair (Van Schendelen, 2010). A second old technique is *encapsulation*. For instance, stakeholders are made more dependent by giving them a budget to operate with. Another way is to give them certain procedures to follow that affect the decision-making. Van Schendelen (1998) states that this allows ministries keep independent agencies and private organizations under control. Even the EU relies on subsidy allocations to get things moving in a favorable direction. NGOs may also use a part of its budget to make other parties more dependent on them.

Advocacy is a third well established technique. The most common way to explain this is by simply labelling it as propaganda (Van Schendelen, 2010). This technique is usually manifested through advertisement or via the media channels. This tactic is frequently used by NGOs and trade organizations within the EU. The formal variant of advocacy is litigation in court where self-interest is advocated by reference to the laws (Stone Sweet & Caporaso, 1998). The fourth and final technique is *argumentation*. Here is self-interest backed up by intellectual reasoning, based on logic and empirically credible sources (Van Schendelen, 2010). However, the impact depends on the reliability of the sources. One concrete example of this is yet again the Brent Spar case where neither Shell nor Greenpeace maintained a credible position (Van Schendelen, 2010). Shell neglected the logical alternative of dismantling the platform and Greenpeace did not provide a correct estimation on the pollution levels

caused by the platform. Argumentation is frequently used when an issue goes public or when the stakeholders are almost convinced according to Van Schendelen (2010).

2.5.1.1 Environmental organizations

In the early years of the environmental groups history, most active groups in the EU were considered to be social movement groups (SMOs) rather than organizations. The question is: have these groups always had organizational traits? Diani (1996) suggests that the European environmental groups have been institutionalized since the 1970s. A sign that supports Diani's (1996) claims are the growing number of SMOs in the EU's policy network. This could also be an effect of the ongoing changes in the environmental politics. The current discussion surrounding environmental organizations are often theoretically ambiguous according to Diani & Donati (1996). Accurate reconstructions of the evolution of the specific movements or groups are not always backed up with adequate information regarding the concept of SMOs. (Diani & Donati, 1996). Diani (1999) mentions several different typologies of non-partisan political organizations. Most organizations are shaped by their response to two essential functional components. These are resource mobilization and political efficacy. In order to survive, these organizations must secure both resources and personnel. Both are necessary to survive and pursue the organizational goals according to Diani and Donati (1996).

As stated by Lanzalaco (1990), meeting these different requirements is challenging for any political organization, whether it is a party, social movement, or an interest group. Diani (1999) states that environmental SMOs are usually faced with a choice between two options. They may either try to mobilize the largest possible support from the public or gather resources that are needed for the maintenance of a semi- or quasi-professional group. In short, the basic alternatives are between mobilization (activism) or resources (Oliver & Marwell, 1992). According to Oliver & Marwell (1992), this has important effects on SMOs' abilities to act on a regular basis. Each option requires different mobilization techniques and therefore, different organizational models are required (Oliver & Marwell, 1992; Schwartz and Paul, 1992). SMOs' effectiveness as representatives of unvested interests may emerge out of either disruption or through political negotiation. It is worth to mention that SMOs that fully comply to the rules of the game may very well harm their own cause by compromising their organizational integrity (Lowe and Goyder, 1983; Richardson & Watts, 1985;

Grant, 1989). Nonetheless, the standard description of a conventional interest group is characterized by a professional staff and emphasize the use of traditional pressure strategies. Diani & Donati (1999) states that the participatory protest organization focuses mainly on participatory actions with subcultural structures, combined with a strong inclination to use tactics such as disruptive protest or boycott campaigns. This model fits the description of the decentralized grassroots SMO. Likewise, the professional protest organization emphasizes the use of activists and the mobilization of financial support, just like the public interest lobby (Diani & Donati, 1999). The participatory pressure-group is in some ways similar to the participatory organization. The members are involved in the organizational life but focus more on the conventional form of lobbying. However, Diani & Donati (1999) claim that environmental organizations have recently tilted more towards movement institutionalization. In fact, many environmental groups have always been drawn to public lobbies. In the past most organizations have preferred non-confrontational styles of action rather than more militant actions that are often characterized by the activist niched organizations.

It is also worth to mention that these organizations usually only turn issues into objects of public controversy after discussions with policymakers have proved to be in vain (Diani & Donati, 1999). Since the 1980s, time has proven that confrontational strategies have been more effective compared to conventional forms of pressure. Boycotting and protests have been skipped in favor for petitioning campaigns, lobbying, production of books and infomercials according to Diani and Donati (1999). This is executed for both public and commercial purposes (Donati, 1994). Similar trends have been seen all over Europe. In the 1990s, environmental groups started gaining access to formal policy bodies, this includes ministerial committees and hearings (Dalton, 1994).

Donati (1994) states that in order for the environmental groups to be successful with their actions, they require legitimation and respectability rather than displaying disruptive means. This indicates that institution building is replacing the past of confrontational politics. It could also possibly be the fact that confrontational means have proven to be futile in many cases. Eder (1995) suggests that a transformation from participatory to non-participatory structures have taken place within the environmental groups. Although, most of these organizations central bodies consist of campaign teams which share some basic resources such as press offices and legal

advice, they remain independent (Donati, 1994). However, this does not apply to massive organizations like World Wildlife Foundation, or Greenpeace. These groups have always been known as large bureaucratic organizations. In Greenpeace, different local branches maintain an important role when it comes to responsibility like raising funds. This is in fact the only time these local groups play a vital role. The reality is that the organization is run professionally from its headquarters (Donati, 1994).

The majority of the European environmental groups are more dependent on new sources of income other than public and corporate funding and membership fees (Szerszinski, 1995). Assignments like campaign planning and coordination are delegated to the professional staff. These are features that fits the description of the professional protest organization (Diani & Donati, 1999). A natural example is Greenpeace. Diani (1999) underlines that Greenpeace has never adopted a mass participatory model but has always been fundamentally centralized and professional. The reality is that these types of organizations are usually more dependent on material resources rather than activism (Shaiko, 1993; Rucht, 1995). While Greenpeace often engages in conventional lobbying it still has a strong inclination towards confrontational strategies like many other activist-organizations (Diani & Donati 1999). However, these actions are not accomplished to mobilize sympathizers, but rather to receive media coverage and to generate support and resources (Hansen, 1993). In addition to this, environmental NGOs are often fixated at single policy decisions rather than general lobbying. According to Gullberg (2008, 166) general lobbying is not only aimed at influencing a specific policy decision, but also future decisions and the decision-makers' views on the policy area. The question is if this proclivity depends on the resource aspect yet again.

2.5.1.2 Business organizations

In the wake of globalization there has been much debate as to whether large firms have become stateless multinationals out of national control (Kindleberger & Audretsch, 1981; Strange & Stopford 1991). Simultaneously, the question is whether they have remained embedded in national public policy systems and cultural traditions (Ruigrok & Van Tulder, 1995). According to Hirschman's (1970), distinction in how firms can express preferences via entry or exit from the market and the activities involving communication and lobbying within the market, it has proven that the change in the EU market has altered the lobbying behavior of the business sector. Coen (1998) states

that the institutional relationships with firms have evolved to fill the void created by the weakening of the members states authority over trade and business.

This in turn means that large European firms have become major actors at the top level of European politics. This further contributes to the follow up question regarding nation state theories of business representation mentioned by (Streeck & Schmitter, 1991; Mazey & Richardson (1993). This new collaboration between the EU institutions and the business sector is considered to be the emergence of transnational pluralism, which was mentioned briefly in the beginning of this thesis. The theory mixture between European corporativism and pluralism saturates the European public policy system according to Coen (2007). Coen (2007) admits that past studies have been insightful, but they examined the policy system in its time of evolutionary process and while the political economy was in a state of flux. Subsequently, many studies missed the establishment of formalized business lobbyism. This has given the birth to the hypothesis that suggests that the European Commission has institutionalized its bargaining position with business interests and by doing so, *established a form of elite pluralism in the union* (Coen, 2007, 335). In short, this means that the firms have established European credentials and political alliances in exchange for access to important policy forums (Coen, 1997). Coen (2007) states that firms have recognized the lack importance of reactive and destructive lobbying and have instead, directed their resources towards pro-active strategies.

Fagan-Watson, Elliot and Watson (2015) claim that data reported by companies and data collected by the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), indicate that the business sector use trade associations to influence climate policy. Around 61 percent of all companies that responded to CDP, and 77 percent of the largest 500 companies in the entire world, claim that they have used trade associations to lobby on climate policy in the past (Fagan-Watson et al., 2015). Fagan-Watson et al. (2015), claim that trade associations represent the interests of business, or individual industrial sectors. The reality is that these associations act as an aggregator of opinions for the business sector. In fact, policymakers are said to give greater weight to trade associations than to individual companies. Partially, this is because the trade associations claim that they represent tens or hundreds of thousands of jobs (Fagan-Watson et al., 2015). Furthermore, these associations allow their members to utilize their knowledge and

contracts in policy arenas where they may lack the suffice expertise or resources to lobby with success.

Trade associations serve as a forum for information sharing and discussion with trade association members and other companies according to Fagan-Watson et al. (2015). After conducting several interviews with members of trade associations, investors, NGOs and a former assistant to a MEP, Fagan-Watson et al. (2015) found that trade associations have substantial influence over climate policy. However, companies exert influence through other venues as well. As stated by Fagan-Watson et al. (2015), 61 percent of all companies responding to CDP in 2014, state that they influence climate policy indirectly through trade associations. Around a third of the respondents claim they directly engage with policymakers. Only less than a fifth of the responders claim to not influence policy processes related to climate change at all (Fagan-Watson et al., 2015). These numbers are displayed in detail in the table presented down below.

Table 1. Fagan-Watson et al. (2015, 18) companies influencing climate policy 2013 and 2014


	Year	Trade associations	Direct engagement	Funding research	Other	Do not influence
Global 500 (2013 n = 403) (2014 n = 411)	2013	70,9%	61,5%	37,9%	34,2%	8,4%
	2014	76,6%	64,7%	44,76%	42,3%	7,5%
Whole CDP Dataset (2013 n = 2326) (2014 n = 2292)	2013	52,8%	41,5%	19,9%	26,7%	17,9%
	2014	60,7%	50,1%	23,5%	30,8%	16,4%

Table 1 displays that a higher percentage of companies in the Global 500 (The largest companies in the world) use trade associations to voice their opinions. Out of the whole sample, this involves roughly 61 percent of all responding companies. If anything, this indicates that the larger companies utilize trade associations to influence climate policy (Fagan-Watson et al., 2015). However, it is estimated that the corporate involvement in climate policy may well be greater than reported according to Fagan-Watson et al. (2015). In addition to this, Gullberg (2008) found that the business sector focuses more on general lobbying compared to environmental NGOs.

2.5.1.3 Balance of power and transparency

Coen (2007) states that interest groups are recognized but not always considered a welcome actor in the western politics. However, the majority of political scientists are convinced that public and private interests have an important role to play in the public policy shaping process (Richardson, 2002). According to Coen (2007) is this nowhere more apparent than in the European public policy, where around 1500 commission and parliamentary officials interact with lobbyists on daily basis. The transfer of regulatory functions from the sovereign member states to the EU institutions in areas such as health and safety, employment, product quality, competition law and environmental standards, contributed to the Europeanization of interest groups (Young & Wallace 2000; Mazey & Richardson, 2006). As a result of the increasing competencies in the EU, interest groups and lobbying activities have sky-rocketed throughout 1990s (Greenwood, 2002). By the end of 2012, around 5400 organizations had register in the EU transparency register. Nearly 50 percent of the registered organizations consisted of in-house lobbyists and business organizations, while only 28 percent were NGOs (EU transparency register). Since then, the number of registrations has increased significantly.

Figure 2. Registered interest groups in the EU (EU transparency register)



According to the EU transparency register (2021), the current number of registrations lies at 12655 organizations. The majority of the organizations are unsurprisingly in-house lobbyists and trade/business organizations. Out of the estimated 3400 NGOs in the register, only a third focus on environmental issues (EU transparency register, 2021). The total number of interest groups in the EU is unclear, since interest group registration is not mandatory. According to the ECs (2013) annual report, both NGOs and public affairs consultancies among the respondents were in favor of mandatory registration for all interest groups. The implementation of clear and enforceable rules might minimize the possibility of having a selected number of resource-heavy interests dominating the decision-making process. The next section will summarize the central content of the theoretical framework as well as a specification of the research question.


2.6 Chapter summary

Lobbying is without a doubt both polarizing and hard to grasp. However, with the help of the theoretical framework, it is possible to outline several key elements. The concerns with the current state of the lobbying in the EU revolves around the lack of transparency and the disparity in resources. However, the introduction of the transparency register shows some promise. Moreover, grassroots movements and environmental NGOs struggle with funding and tying connections to officials (Diani, 1999; Gullberg, 2008). Furthermore, the field of lobbying is not equally represented. The business sector clearly outnumbers their competitors (Karr, 2007). Business organizations are also more likely to unite and form coalitions (Coen, 2007; Van Schendelen, 2010). The empirical findings suggest that the business organizations focus a great deal on general lobbying. In contrast, environmental organizations tend to focus on single policy issues. This is largely attributed to the lack of resources according to Gullberg (2008). Past studies also indicate that organizations like Greenpeace engage in both conventional lobbying and confrontational strategies (i.e. boycotting, protesting, smearing campaigns) (Diani & Donati, 1999; Van Schendelen, 2010). However, it is worth to mention that this varies depending on the organization type (i.e. participatory protest organization, professional protest organization, grassroots SMO). Past research indicate that the Commission is the main focus for the lobbyists. The reason behind is the fact that the Commission is the center of the decision-making process. However, with the Parliaments increasing competencies, the

institution is now one of the most lobbied institutions in the EU. Although, interest groups who engage in general lobbying tend to target all three institutions.

Furthermore, the theoretical framework indicates that interest groups generally can choose between four primary lobbying techniques. These techniques are summarized in the figure down below.

Figure 3. Central lobbying techniques



Van Schendelen's (2010) traditional lobbying techniques displayed in the figure above are frequently utilized by many different types of interest groups. *Advocacy* and *coercion* are similar techniques and have been used by environmental organizations in the past (Van Schendelen, 2010). *Encapsulation* is a technique that can be utilized to control subsidiaries through limiting the resource distribution. For instance, this allows ministries to keep agencies and private organizations under control. Van Schendelen (2010) states that an NGO can use a part of its budget to make its peers more dependent on them. *Argumentation* is expressed through reasoning, logic and by submitting empirical data when negotiating. All these techniques are used in two central strategy types (i.e. outside and inside). *Outside strategies* often involve visible strategies such as media campaigns. Beyers (2008, 1197) claims that gaining visibility and increasing salience is an important component of advocacy. In contrast, *inside strategies* involves argumentation and bargaining with decision-makers. However, this strategy is usually not visible to the public (Beyers, 2008).

This concludes the summary of the theoretical framework. The specified research question is formulated following: *Which strategies are utilized by business- and environmental NGOs when influencing climate policy in the EU?* The upcoming methodology chapter will discuss and compare different research designs, the data gathering method and the overall expectations.

3. Methodology

The theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter indicate that there are several factors that impact interest groups strategic choices. Hence, factors like organization type, policy issue and financial budget is believed to impact the choice. This chapter will cover the choice of methodology as well as the benefits and disadvantages with various research designs. Further along in the chapter, the data gathering process and the inclusion- and exclusion criteria will be presented. These procedures will determine which articles that will be included in the systematic literature study. The chosen studies will be compiled in a table further on in this chapter. The aim is to try and distinguish the plausible differences in business- and environmental organizations lobbying strategies. By utilizing the procedure of a systematic literature review, the prospect is to examine a suitable sample to determine if there are any notable differences between the two actors' strategical repertoires when influencing climate policy. Thus, the aim is to answer the following question: *Which strategies are utilized by business- and environmental NGOs when influencing climate policy in the EU?* In accordance with the inductive approach, the aim is to try and distinguish the results from past empirical studies. This seems reasonable considering the empirical observations that were presented in chapter 2. The following section will cover the benefits and the limits with both the systematic literature review and the traditional literature study.

3.1 Research designs

3.1.1 Literature study

This method is closely related to the systematic literature study. Therefore, it seems only logical to cover some of the benefits and flaws with this method. According to Soerensen (2004), there are several approaches that can be chosen when conducting a literature study. Soerensen (2004) claims that a number of factors may have an impact on the type of strategy that can be implemented. For instance, this determined by the type of subject or the researcher's knowledge of the subject. If the researcher has previous experience in the field, a brief look at the latest journals might be sufficient. However, if the researcher is entering uncharted territory, it is probably wise to do a more thorough review of the literature (Soerensen, 2004). Furthermore, the purpose and the aim of the study will have an impact on the time that is required to fulfill the

study, especially if the project includes a large number of studies, the process is likely to be both challenging and time consuming. To accommodate these requirements, Sorensen (2004) mentions several strategies that can be utilized.

For instance, the domain-based strategy has its starting point in a precise definition of what is being reviewed. This type of research is often executed out by researchers that are new in the field – or if the purpose is to produce an overview article classifying the literature for future research (Soerensen, 2004). The definition of domain might consist of a list of academic material, a keyword for e-database searches, news databases etc. This is usually combined with a criterion on the date of publication. The date criterion will be a result of a trial-and error process, based on the relevance and the number of contributions identified by the researcher (Soerensen, 2004). The disadvantage with this approach is the fact that the process is quite time-consuming and requires a considerable degree of discipline during the analyzing process. However, this procedure also provides several advantages. For instance, it allows the researcher to backtrack the steps taken in the work process, hence, it is easier detect potential errors done throughout the project (Forsberg & Wengström, 2010). The exception is in instances where the references are online-based and are updated regularly and seldom archived (Soerensen, 2004). Another useful approach is the trust-review strategy. According to Sorensen (2004) is this strategy best utilized when reviewing a subject area published by a trusted source, e.g. a highly ranked journal (Soerensen, 2004). The benefit of working within an established and charted field of research, is the possibility to find reviewed articles describing and classifying the contributions discovered in past studies. The trusted review strategy is a new procedure and the classification fit the purpose of the research in most cases, it will simply require the researcher to update the existing body of knowledge (Soerensen, 2004). Forsberg and Wengström (2010) claim that it is often wise to include more journals in the sample, as it may help the researcher to include and cover other categories in the study. Even if all the categories are in conflict with the intended framework, the literature study from a trusted source represents a time-saver in terms of having identified the contributions (Soerensen, 2004).

The last strategy mentioned by Soerensen (2004) is the snow-balling strategy. This procedure provides the least structured result, thereby delivering the least valid result out of the three strategies presented in this subchapter. The procedure starts with the

identification of at least one article of relevance, and then reading the sources referenced. There is a possibility that this “backtracking” either provide a clearer picture of the subject or perhaps in terms of keywords. The next step is to perform a keyword search in e-databases or in relevant the journals according to Soerensen (2004). There is also a benefit with using various internet-enabled tools. This might include using citation-based search options, personal homepages for the latest contributions or other features.

Soerensen (2004) states that there is always a possibility that the “trusted-source” study is not possible to fulfill without utilizing certain elements from the snow-balling strategy. For instance, the source might be outdated, or it could simply be the fact that the source does not cover the theme of the study. The procedure revolving the domain-based strategy is rather strict, which makes it in some cases unrealistic to complete. (Soerensen, 2004). Therefore, is the domain-based strategy more suitable for selected journals, while the snow-balling strategy suits other types of sources. However, there is always a possibility to combine strategies. Although, this is accompanied with risks on its own according to Soerensen (2004). Combining strategies could in fact confuse the requirements needed for the literature study, and thereby endanger the credibility of the study. Therefore, it is deemed wise to separately report for each sub-study in the discussion, in order to minimize the chance of any misunderstandings (Soerensen, 2004). Out of these three presented strategies, the domain-based strategy seems to have the most sensible characteristics. However, Soerensen (2004) claims that the choice of strategy will have certain dependencies to the epistemological stance in the research initiative. In general, the strategy provides the ability to give firm statements about the phenomenon or object that is being examined. (Soerensen, 2004).

3.1.2 Systematic literature study

This segment will cover the fundamentals of the systematic literature study. As stated by Bryman (2018), the purpose of a systematic literature study to provide an overview of the scientific data in a specific domain. Furthermore, it is also necessary to explain under which circumstances it is possible apply this method. A reasonable prerequisite to keep in mind when conducting a systematic literature study, is to guarantee that there is a sufficient quantity of studies available that maintain a good scientific standard, otherwise it is impossible to make any assessments or to draw any conclusions from the material (Forsberg & Wengström, 2010). Mulrow and Oxman

(1997) define a systematic literature study as a process that is based on a clearly phrased question that is answered systematically through identifying, choosing, and evaluating relevant research. The differences between a regular literature study with a systematic study, according to Cullum (1999) is the search process, the critical evaluation and the analysis of the findings. The characterization of a systematic literature study is first and foremost the attempt to identify all the relevant research within the field that is being examined. This includes both published and unpublished material. Secondly, a systematic evaluation of every study's validity is done. The last step is to use statistic methods to analyze the result from similar studies, and to carry out a meta-analysis (Cullum, 1999). Hearn et al. (1999) claim that a systematic literature study should include a clearly formulated research question, a search strategy and inclusion- and exclusion criteria. Lastly, all the central elements and findings of the study should be presented and discussed throughout the thesis. Generally, this method is often utilized in medicine studies. However, it can also be applied in other disciplines according to Forsberg and Wengström (2010). For this reason, the procedures involved in a systematic literature study appears to be a suitable choice for this thesis.

3.2 Data and systematics

This section will provide insight in the work process and all the steps taken in the data gathering process as well as the reasoning behind all the decisions. The prospect is to gather a sample of articles that have covered similar aspects of lobbying. The inclusion and exclusion criteria will be discussed later on in the chapter. The emphasis will be on studies covering business- and environmental NGOs lobbying strategies related to climate policy.

3.2.1 Databases

The data will be extracted from both Google Scholar and Ebsco. These choices are justified by the fact that Google scholar tend to provide a large variety of studies while Ebsco grants access to peer reviewed articles. The presumption is that two databases will be enough for this thesis.

3.2.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria

This procedure is necessary in order to determine that the selected articles are relevant. The focal point is on lobbying targeting lobbying and climate policy the in EU.

Therefore, any articles covering lobbying in the USA will be avoided. Another reason is the fact that the lobbying traditions is very different in USA. The biggest difference is probably the fact that the majority of the policymakers in EU institutions are not elected. This means that they do not stand for elections, thus they do need to find money to fund their campaigns (Mahoney, 2008). Therefore, the main focus will be limited to studies that cover the European Union or global events. Another important procedure is the quality assessment of all the literature. Only peer-review studies will be included in the final sample of studies. Non-scientific literature will be excluded. The level of relevance will be initially based on the articles title and abstract. Thenceforth, the rest of the contents will be evaluated.

The search terms and results will be presented in a matrix presented below. The selection of studies is based on three key steps:

1. Title relevance – first glance at the title should determine if the study is relevant.
2. Abstract relevance – the same procedure as with the previous step.
3. Body text relevance – this is the last step that confirms the relevance of the study.

Table 2. Overview of search terms

Database	Search word	Amount of hits	Abstract read	Reviewed	Selection
Google Scholar					
Google Scholar					
Ebsco					
Ebsco					

Table 3. Summary of chosen articles.

Author/Year/Title	Abstract	Results	Conclusions

3.3 Operationalization

Every study requires the operationalization of the theoretical definitions. This process provides the link to between theoretical hypotheses and the mechanism to examine the predictions. Furthermore, this procedure has a crucial impact on the validity of the results (Essaiasson, 2012). It is important to point out, that the manner in which the operationalization is conducted might shape the results of the study. Therefore, it is crucial to motivate the reasons behind the design of the operationalization. Subsequently, it also needed to acknowledge the strengths and weaknesses of both the data sample and the operationalizations.

As mentioned previously, the inductive approach of the thesis indicates that the aim is to try and derive from past studies whether inside- or outside strategies are used when lobbying salient issues like climate policy. According to Bernhard (2011, 7), inductive research *involves the search for patterns from observation and the development of explanations – theories – for those patterns through series of hypotheses*. The inductive reasoning is often referred to as a “bottom-up” strategy. This means that the researcher uses observations to describe a picture of the phenomenon that is being examined (Lodico et al., 2010). The primary hypothesis of the thesis is based on the assumption that outside strategies are more frequently used by environmental organizations, while business organizations prioritize inside strategies when lobbying. Past studies have indicated that environmental organizations and activists are indeed prone to use outside strategies (Diani, 1999; Beyers, 2008). However, there is also a possibility that both business- and environmental organizations use a combination of strategies when lobbying salient issues like climate policy. Although, the inductive

approach seems reasonable in this case when the aim to depict the differences in lobbying strategies, it is worth to mention there are obvious risks with this method. As a matter of fact, the inductive process will not necessarily prove anything if the observations are incorrect. Hence, the greatest disadvantage is the risk of not being able to generalize the results from the overview of studies. However, this risk occurs also in other methods. Fortunately, the systematic literature review tends to provide a clear and comprehensive overview of the examined topic if performed correctly. Therefore, the estimation is that the benefits outweigh the risk in this case and that they will not jeopardize the internal validity of the thesis. The selection of articles will be completed through using different search terms in both Google Scholar and Ebsco. The search terms will include various combinations of relevant key words. The conceived words will be *inside* and *outside lobbying*, *lobbying strategies*, *interest group*, *climate policy* and *EU*. This will be discussed further in chapter 4. Next chapter will summarize the entire methodology chapter.

3.4 Chapter summary

Throughout this chapter, various research designs and their benefits and disadvantages have been discussed. This process is essential when answering a research question. The literature study shares many similar features with the systematic literature review. However, the principals of the systematic literature overview are beneficial when dealing with multiple studies. The aim is to select between 5 and 10 articles to answer the research question. The studies will be retrieved from Google Scholar and Ebsco with the help of the search terms presented in chapter 3.3. The lack of established theories in regard to lobbying strategies makes the inductive approach suitable in this case. This concludes the summary of the methodology chapter. Next chapter includes the search term process and the summary of the chosen studies.

4. Results

This chapter includes the articles chosen through the inclusion and exclusion criteria presented in the previous chapter and with the help of the search terms displayed in table 4 down below. The next step is to summarize the findings from all the articles and the discuss the central content extracted from the articles. The chosen articles will be compiled in the table 5. Finally, the central contents and results will be summarized in final part of the chapter.

4.1. Search scheme results from Google Scholar and Ebsco.

Table 4. Database search results.

Database	Search words	Amount of hits	Abstract read	Reviewed	Selection
Date: 18.3.2021					
Google Scholar	Interest group lobbying AND Climate Policy* EU*	20600			
Google Scholar	Interest group lobbying And Climate Policy*EU* Exact phrase: Lobbying strategies	2980	4	3	2
Google Scholar	Interest group lobbying AND Climate Policy* EU* Exact phrase: Inside or outside lobbying	31	15	8	4
Ebsco	Interest group lobbying* Climate Policy* AND Lobbying strategies	59			
Ebsco	Interest group lobbying* Climate Policy* AND Inside or outside lobbying strategies	41	15	6	3

4.2 Chosen literature overview

Table 5. Summary of the article contents.

Author/Year/Title:	Abstract:	Summary:	Conclusions:
De Bruycker, I., & Beyers, J., (2018) Lobbying Strategies and success: inside and outside lobbying in European Union legislative politics	Examination of whether interest groups should prioritize inside or outside lobbying tactics in order to fulfill their political goals	Inside lobbying is directly aimed at policymakers through meetings. This strategy does not generate much public exposure. Outside lobbying takes the form of press releases, social media advertising, protests.	The study argues that a significant relationship between the actions (or strategies) of interest groups and their success, for which we can reasonably presume a causal link, is an indication of influence. Combining strategies and success can therefore unravel pathways of interest group influence. This paper demonstrates that interest group influence is more likely when group strategies unfold in a favorable context.
Junk, M., (2015) Two logics of NGO advocacy: understanding inside and outside lobbying on EU environmental policies	NGOs supposedly contribute to the participatory democracy in EU. It matters for this democratic surplus how NGOs foster relationships with both policymakers and publics by engaging in inside and outside lobbying on European Union policies.	Resourceful NGOs tend to have an easier time addressing the public masses through the news media. However, they seem to have no apparent advantage when it comes to addressing the policymakers.	The support base has no real effect on an NGO's inside or outside lobbying. However, NGOs are more likely to engage in inside lobbying on policy issues with a beneficiary scope. Inside lobbying seems to be prone to attract special interests rather than public good issues. Less complex issues usually involve outside lobbying. The forces driving outside lobbying seem to be based on reputation. Inside lobbying is more puzzling.
Dellmuth, M. & Tallberg, J. (2016) Advocacy Strategies in Global Governance: Inside versus Outside Lobbying	NGOs increasingly try to influence policymaking within the international organizations (IOs).	NGOs choice of lobbying strategies depends on internal organizational factors. The goals will also reflect the usage of strategies.	The result indicates that NGOs utilize both inside and outside strategies when lobbying at a global level. The choice of strategy is determined by the goals, membership, contributions and lastly access.
Dur, M., & Mateo, G., (2013) Gaining access or going public? Interest group strategies in five European countries	Interest groups differ in the strategies they use to influence public policy. Some mainly try to gain access (i.e., have direct contact with decision makers), whereas others tend to 'go public' by launching campaigns that aim to mobilize the broader public.	What explains this variety in the choice of tactics and, in turn, the strategies of the different groups to influence public policy?	The most common denominator for an interest groups choice of strategy is group type. Regardless, if it is composed of firms, professional members or acts on a behalf of a large number of individuals. This is however <i>conditional</i> on a group's endowment with material resources and the issue context is also crucial.

Author/Year/Title:	Abstract	Summary	Conclusions
Hanegraaff, M., Beyers, J., & De Bruycker I., (2016) Balancing inside and outside lobbying: The political strategies of lobbyists at global diplomatic conferences	The paper seeks to explain the use of both inside and outside lobbying at global diplomatic conferences. The analysis of the paper indicates that organizational needs affect the focus of organized interests.	The authors distinguish four different organizational forms: Business associations, specialized groups, NGOs and research organizations. Are there any differences in how these organizations balance inside and outside lobbying?	Outside lobbying might not be the most effective way in attaining policy influence, however it can still serve as a useful strategy to address resource needs. The analysis also demonstrates that the effect of group type on the choice of lobbying strategies depends on the resources organized interests have at their disposal. There is also a clear connection between the choice of strategy, group type, policy issue and the resource aspect.
Weiler, F., & Brändli, M., (2015) Inside versus outside lobbying: How the institutional framework shapes the lobbying behavior of interest groups	Different types of interest groups utilize different strategies. This paper proposes that the institutional framework of the country in which interest groups operate influence their lobbying behavior.	Classifying interest groups and dividing them into sub-categories is problematic. In spite of this, the literature suggests that group type is an important determinant of organizations lobbying behavior. Can the same thing be said about the institutional framework?	The results demonstrates that settings where direct democratic instruments are easily attainable, as in Switzerland, groups are better integrated into the policy making process and therefore use a mix of lobbying strategies. In the Germany their counterparts rely heavily on outside strategies seeking influence via the media or the public. In both countries there is a pronounced difference in how interest groups behave.
Beyers, J., (2008) Policy Issues, Organisational Format and the Political strategies of Interest organisations	This paper examines how the nature of policy issue structures the context within which interest groups operate and how this shape their strategies.	The research on influence usually hypothesizes that diffuse interests or NGOs are, compared to their business counterparts, more likely to practice outside strategies. Although this if often true, researchers still observe a large number of business interests pursuing outside strategies as well.	The study illustrates the positives of an approach of based on organization theory which considers natures of political conflicts and organizational format as key dimensions. This may explain some of the variance in the choice of different lobbying strategies.
Gullberg, A. T., (2008) Rational lobbying and EU climate policy	Environmental organizations focus on single policy decision, business organizations also invest general lobbying.	Business organizations lobby on too many single policy decisions. Environmental organizations are unable to do this because of tight budget constraints.	Both single-issue lobbying and general lobbying can provide long-term effects.
Vesa, J., et al., (2020) The quiet opposition: How the pro-economy lobby influences climate policy	The pro-economy lobby influences the policy process using strategies such as inside lobbying and by avoiding public statements.	The results indicate that studies on climate policy should focus more on strategies involving media spotlight	The business sector managed to be successful in their climate policy mitigation despite the lack of media presence.

The initial keyword searches gave a huge number of hits. However, after reviewing the results, it was quickly apparent that a great portion of the articles had very little relevance to theme of this thesis. Therefore, the search terms had to be narrowed. It is also worth mentioning that only academic articles were chosen. Simultaneously, no studies covering lobbying in the United States were included in the final sample. The majority of the studies covered lobbying specifically in the EU. However, the exception were three studies, one of them covered lobbying strategies at global conferences and the remaining two compared domestic lobbying in several European countries. The rest of the results will be presented in detail in the upcoming subchapters.

4.3 International and domestic lobbying

Hanegraaff, Beyers and De Bruycker (2016) claim that the case of the nuclear energy trade association FORATOM and Greenpeace demonstrates two different advocacy strategies. The first being outside lobbying, which is utilized by Greenpeace. This strategy includes tactics that more or less address policymakers through raising awareness among the general public. The use of public communication channels is prioritized over direct exchanges with the policymakers. The strategy may also involve public campaigns and protest demonstrations. In contrast, the trade association FORATOM used a different approach to influence the policymakers. Inside lobbying involves direct exchanges with policymakers through private communication. This includes meetings, email exchanges and telephone calls. This type of lobbying is usually not visible to the general public (Hanegraaff et al. 2016). In academic circles, inside lobbying is usually explained through an information-based exchange perspective. This ultimately means that interest groups exchange relevant information with policymakers, and in return they hopefully achieve the expected policy outcome. Outside lobbying relies on asserting pressure on policymakers through drawing support from a larger audience of stakeholders. The risk of not complying can lead to electoral damage according to De Bruycker and Iskander (2018).

Hanegraaff et al. (2016) state that combining strategies and success can unravel new pathways of interest group influences. The study also indicates that interest group influence is more likely when group strategies unfold in a favorable context. The analysis indicates that the differences between business interests and NGOs in how they balance between inside and outside are less pronounced than presumed. However,

Hanegraaff et al. (2016, 18) state that contextual conditions, group type and resource dependencies are all variables that affect the choice of strategy. In addition, Dellmuth and Tallberg (2017) also confirm that NGOs have mobilized to influence policymaking through the International Organizations (IOs). The results suggest that there are in fact similarities in lobbying both the international and domestic arena. The NGOs employ an inside strategy by providing information and communicating with stakeholders and IO representatives. At the same time, they use an outside strategy, amassing political leverage through the news and social media (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017). In short, NGOs tend to combine the strategies that best favor their interests. Dellmuth and Tallberg (2017) conclude that this pattern holds beyond the United Nations (UN) as well. It is also clear that NGOs choice of lobbying strategy is influenced by a combination of three specific factors. These factors also tend to shape the domestic interest groups. The first factor is the goals of the NGO. Dellmuth and Tallberg (2017, 15) argue that *the stronger the NGOs' ambition to influence UN policymaking, the more they rely on inside lobbying*. This logic seems to apply to NGOs that are not membership organizations. This is explained by the fact that, NGOs that are dependent on membership contributions must focus on the dual objectives of gaining influence and securing the organizations survival (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017). Consequently, this might weaken the link between goals and strategies. The third and final factor is the access to decision-makers. NGOs who consider themselves privileged in this regard tend to opt for an inside strategy according to Dellmuth and Tallberg (2017). The study also pinpoints an important difference between NGOs in global governance and interest groups that operate only at the domestic level. The international NGOs resource situation does not influence its choice of lobbying strategy in the UN. Dellmuth and Tallberg (2017, 15) found that the importance of resources for lobbying is dependent on the political context, however, this may not apply to all the interest groups operating in the EU.

4.4 Lobbying behavior in European countries.

Dur and Mateo (2013) examined the lobbying behavior of interest groups in five different European countries, Austria, Ireland, Germany, Latvia and Spain. The assumption was that outside strategies require huge amounts of resources from the interest groups, while some forms of inside strategies are relatively cheap in comparison. Dur and Mateo (2017) expected to see the resource- rich groups to be

more likely to utilize inside lobbying strategies compared to the organizations that lack resources. Business organizations were expected to employ any additional resources to strengthen their inside strategy. Meanwhile, the citizen groups and other professional associations would use the resources to engage in outside lobbying, which would ultimately aid them in maintaining their base of supporters or members (Dur & Mateo, 2013). The data from Mateo and Dur's (2013) study suggest that the distinction between business- and professional associations and citizen group explains a large part of the variation across groups when it comes choosing strategy. It is worth to mention that the effect of group type is dependent on the group resources and yet again the issue at hand. The biggest differences are found among the resource rich associations that are lobbying for distributive policies according to Dur and Mateo (2013). Another interesting finding is that the data suggest that the differences across the European countries in lobbying strategies are minor, compared to the other variables used in the study. Professional associations and citizen groups seem more inclined towards adopting an outside strategy compared to their business counterparts. This does not seem to change even for the groups that have considerable amounts of resources. Dur and Mateo (2013) state that institutional reforms that promote access to decision-makers will ultimately benefit business organizations over other NGOs. Dur and Mateo (2013) also conclude that the findings suggest that while the variation across the group types is substantial, they still have clear leeway in their choice of strategy. Therefore, Dur and Mateo (2013) emphasize the need of including studies of interest group influence when examining interest group strategies. The question is if lobbying for a specific issue is interdependent. Dur and Mateo (2013) underline that it is likely that groups select strategies in response to the strategies that previous groups have utilized in similar positions.

4.5 Institutional settings

Weiler and Brändli (2015) sought to determine whether the institutional framework of the country in which the interest groups operate may or may not influence their choice of lobbying strategy. According to Weiler and Brändli (2016) settings where direct democratic instruments are present, like in Switzerland, cause-groups (representing diffuse interests of the wider population) are well integrated into the policy-making process. This in turn means that these groups utilize a balanced mix of lobbying strategies. The results also indicate that the German counterparts tend to rely on outside

strategies. However, this does not apply to the other specific interest groups (representing a subsection of society).

The data suggests that Swiss interest groups rely just as heavily on inside lobbying strategies as their German rivals. Weidler and Brändli (2016) find that the effect of direct democracy on lobbying strategies is mainly driven by cause groups in the policy-making process. The same behavior is not found among the specific interest groups. However, there are only minor behavioral differences between the cause groups and specific interest groups in the two countries. The lack of direct democratic means to call a referendum is the main reason behind why the German cause group have to pressure policy makers through the media and by rallying support from the general public. The fact is that Switzerland stands out because of its direct democratic instruments, therefore the generalizability of the results is limited. Future studies should therefore examine whether these findings can be applied in other countries and with different levels of direct democracy.

4.6 Inside and outside arenas

Beyers (2008) contribution assesses a topic that is overlooked by a great portion of the scholars examining group politics. The study examines how the nature of policy issues affect how interest groups operate and shape their strategies. According to Beyers (2008), interest groups tend to emphasize semi-institutionalized strategies of inside lobbying and urge the necessity of expertise. Scholars that examine social movements tend to focus on the conflictual nature of politics. Political cleavages are used as the main premiss of their analyzes. Although, these approaches might differ, they still paint EU politics as both de-politicized and technocratic according to Beyers (2008). The choice interest groups must make, is the type of arena they decide to present their policy stance. These are either inside or outside arenas. The first arena consists of the world of advisory bodies, agencies and parliamentary committees. A world that is for the most part not visible to the EU constituents. While outside arena equals the communication between other interest groups, citizens and policymakers through visible channels. The goal with this strategy is to draw attention from a broader audience to assert pressure on the policymakers. Beyers (2008) state that it is a common assumption to believe that NGOs differ from business organizations because of their principled beliefs and lack of resources. In contrast, business organizations are considered to be well resourced and connected. The problem with these distinctions is

the fact that it does not illustrate the possible similarities shared by the different interest groups. Beyers (2008) states that it would be more yielding to study interest groups from one generic conceptual framework, as it is nearly impossible to design specific theories that fit each group type. Beyers (2008) points out that organizations with similar views still may adopt different strategies. In spite of this, organizations with very different views (e.g. economic interests versus environmental NGOs) in some cases may also adopt the similar strategies. This in turn may be a result of comparable organizational formats or by other relevant factors. In fact, the choice of strategy cannot be explained only by determining the organizational goals. According to Beyers (2008), it is also necessary to include the issue-specific nature of the strategies and the position that the actors maintain. Furthermore, Beyers (2008) found that NGOs are more prone to challenge the status quo. However, this does not necessarily apply to all policy issues. Beyers (2008, 1206) state that: *It is the nature of policy issues in combination with policy position and organizational format that affect an organization's political strategy, and not necessarily the a priori categorization of organizations.*

4.7 Policy issue factors

Both Beyers (2008) and Junk (2015) emphasize the importance of including policy issues as a second wave of explanatory factors in interest group literature. Beyers (2008, 1190) states that studying variation in issue characteristics is important for understanding the micro-logics of interest group behavior. Interestingly enough, Junk (2015) found that the organizational-level factor on NGO behavior, had very limited explanatory power for the usage of outside and inside lobbying. However, the issue-level factors facilitated better understanding. However, Junk (2015, 15) points out that the findings cannot be uncritically generalized to all types of lobbying, policy sectors or to NGOs from all member states. Despite this, the results indicate that resourceful NGOs are favored when it comes to addressing the public through news and media channels. Overall, the more resourceful NGOs seems to have bigger chances of playing an intermediary role between the policymakers and the civil society (Junk, 2015, 16). This is not necessarily because of their links to the policymakers, rather it is because of their close ties to the public discussion according to Junk (2015). Beyond this, the results prove that policy issues with certainty have implications on the lobbying

behavior of NGOs. Subsequently, less complex and more salient issues have higher odds of NGO outside lobbying. According to Junk (2015) is this proof that reputation is driving factor behind outside lobbying. In contrast, inside lobbying is considered to be more complex. No underlying factors were identified. However, there is some support to the claim that inside lobbying offers NGOs a venue to lobby less popular issues. Inside lobbying is usually utilized when the policy issue has a clear beneficiary scope according to Junk (2015). Furthermore, inside lobbying is definitely more prone to attracting special interests rather than public good issues (Junk, 2015). Gullberg (2008, 169) found that large business firms such as UNICE engage in general lobbying when influencing both climate policy and other fields. In contrast, environmental organization CAN Europe prioritize selected matters rather than general lobbying. According to Gullberg (2008), the main difference between business- and environmental organizations is not found in their implementation of outside- and inside strategies, rather at the scale in which they lobby decision-makers. Gullberg (2008, 175) also states that the main reason behind this difference is the fact that *many environmental organizations labor under tight budget constraints*. Vesa, Gronow and Ylä-Anttila (2020) found that the different lobbying strategies may be effective in opposing climate policy. Vesa et al. (2020, 9) state that selected economic interest groups collaborate closely with key ministries in Finland and can therefore influence policy through inside lobbying without the need to seek media attention or attacking climate science. These differences in strategy are based in the differences in institutions. Vesa et al. (2020, 9) state that:

In countries characterized by a competitive, pluralist interest group system and the existence of strong conservative media outlets, such as the United States, economic interest groups have the incentive to use the media to oppose unwanted policy proposals. In contrast, in Finland's corporatist system, a small number of key organizations that represent economic interests collaborate with like-minded ministries and enjoy an institutionalized position in policy making, which gives them leeway to influence climate policy through inside strategies.

These patterns are expected to be found in other European countries as well, particularly in countries where corporatism coexists with unambitious climate policies such as, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. However, more studies need to be conducted before this can be established (Vesa et al., 2016).

4.8 Chapter summary

The results illustrate that the implementation of outside and inside strategies varies considerably between business- and environmental organizations. The central factors are the *organizational aim, group type, access, budget, institutional setting* and also the type of *policy issue* (Hanegraaff, et al., 2016; Junk, 2015; Vesa, et al., 2020). Hanegraaff et al. (2016) found that the political context, group type, and resource situation shape the choice of strategy. Dellmuth and Tallberg (2017) state that this also applies to lobbying outside the EU. Furthermore, the organizational goal may in some cases impact the choice of strategy. Beyers (2008) claims that NGOs are more prone to challenge the status quo. However, this does not necessarily mean that it can be applied to all NGOs. Dellmuth and Tallberg (2017) found that gaining influence and organizational survival work hand in hand. Throughout the theoretical framework, the need for access was also considered a crucial for all interest groups (Van Schendelen, 2010). This is also confirmed by Dellmuth and Tallberg (2017).

Another important factor is the institutional setting where the lobbying activity takes place. Weiler and Brändli (2016) state that interest groups generally thrive in settings where direct democratic instruments are present. The results indicated that German cause groups were more likely to use outside strategies compared to their Swiss counterparts. Interestingly enough, the specific interest groups had very little differences between the two countries. Weiler and Brändli (2016) claim that the main reason why German cause groups used outside strategies more than the Swiss groups comes down to the fact that Germans cannot rely on referendums like in Switzerland. This also the reason why the possibility to generalize the results are limited. The resource dependency or the budget impacts the lobbying possibilities for the majority of the NGOs. According to Gullberg (2008) this is the main difference between environmental- and business organizations. Greenwood (2002) claims that the environmental organization's lack of resources is exaggerated. However, the majority of scholars argue that the business sector has immense resources compared to the environmental lobbyists (Coen, 2007; Mazey & Richardson, 2002; Gullberg, 2008). As stated previously, the type of policy issue shapes also the choice of strategy among NGOs. In fact, less complex and more salient issues are usually influenced by outside strategies (Junk, 2015). Inside lobbying is considered to more complex, and it requires

well-established links to the decision-makers. Junk (2015) found that NGOs have a tendency to use inside lobbying when influencing less popular issues. Inside lobbying is often associated with special interests rather than public good issues (Junk, 2015). In addition to these factors, it is also possible that the media plays a significant role when it comes to choosing strategies. Vesa et al. (2020) state that the lack of conservative mainstream media in several European countries may be the reason why the pro-economy lobbyists bypass the media. Subsequently, it is possible that both the media and political system incentivizes NGOs to prefer inside lobbying (Vesa et al., 2020). This concludes the summary of the results. The upcoming section includes a summary of the theoretical framework and the answering of the research question.

5. Discussion and conclusions

The chapter includes a summary of the central contents of the thesis and a general discussion regarding the research question and the results. The thesis is concluded with a section covering the limitations, future prospects and a Swedish summary.

5.1 Summary

The growth of interest groups has led to stricter regulation of lobbying in the EU. The bond between bureaucracies and interests have also raised questions on its own. It is established that the EU institutions does not possess the relevant expertise and resources that is needed in the policy-making process. Therefore, the decision-makers have to rely on interest groups to fill the gap. This is considered a natural part of the pluralistic democracy. However, the EU patterns of interest intermediation appears to lean towards elite pluralism (Coen, 1997). The fact is that the Commission uphold more contacts with business associations than with environmental organizations, consumer groups and trade unions (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). This touches upon the purpose of this thesis. The aim was to try and settle whether the current lobbying landscape is catered towards the business sector. The specified research question is *Which strategies are the business- and environmental NGOs utilizing when influencing climate policy in the EU?*

The empirical findings indicate that business organizations focus on general lobbying on all policy issues (Gullberg, 2008). Environmental organizations are more prone to lobby on single policy issues. According to Gullberg (2008), this difference is largely attributed to the lack of resources. Moreover, professional protest organizations like Greenpeace utilize both conventional- and confrontational strategies. The results indicate that organizational type and the aim with lobbying may impact the choice of strategy. Both business- and environmental organizations main lobby target is the EC. Although, lobbyists target the EP to a greater extent than previously. However, interest groups who engage in general lobbying tend to target all three institutions in the EU. The two main strategy types are *outside-* and *inside strategies* (Beyers, 2008). Outside strategies is characterized by visible techniques such as media campaigns. In contrast, inside strategies involves negotiation techniques outside the view of the public.

After careful consideration, the systematic literature review was chosen as the research design. The systematic literature review provides a clear and comprehensive overview of a research topic. This is beneficial when dealing with multiple studies. The inductive reasoning will be utilized to draw conclusions from the chosen studies. The data is collected with the help of several inclusion- and exclusion criteria and search terms. The searches were performed in Google Scholar and Ebsco. The results extracted from the chosen studies indicate that the implementation of outside and inside strategies varies considerably between business- and environmental organizations. As mentioned previously, organizational aim, group type, budget, institutional setting and policy issues impacts the choice of strategy (Hanegraaff et al., 2016; Junk, 2015; Vesa et al., 2020). Access is also considered a prerequisite to succeed (Van Schendelen, 2010; Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017). Next section includes a discussion of the results and the answering of the research question.

5.2 Discussion

The results from the systematic literature review outline several key factors that impact the choice of lobbying strategy among NGOs. This provides a complicated answer to the research question. The fact is that both environmental- and business organizations utilize a combination of inside- and outside strategies. The political context and resource availability are considered to have huge impact on the implementation of strategy. It is also worth to mention that this does not only apply to the EU (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017). Junk (2015, p. 16), highlight that less complex and salient issues are significantly more likely to be targeted by outside lobbying. Although environmental policies tend to benefit the public, some issues might only benefit a small fraction of society (Junk, 2015). Consequently, inside lobbying is useful when NGOs lobby less popular and special interests. Furthermore, inside lobbying is favored on policy issues with a specific beneficiary scope (Junk, 2015, p. 16-17). This is yet again dependent on institutional access. From a democratic perspective, it might be concerning that public good issues are seldom expressed through inside lobbying. The fact is that special interests are closely linked with inside lobbying according to Junk (2015).

In addition to this, it is highly likely that the media impacts this tendency. As stated previously, the lack of conservative media outlets may be a reason why business lobbyists disregard the media. For this reason, it is conceivable that certain media and political systems incentivizes inside lobbying (Vesa et al., 2020).

Furthermore, the results clearly support the claim that variation in lobbying strategies is dependent on the issue context. Junk (2015, 16) claims *that the issue context is pivotal*. This is likely combined with the resource dependencies that NGOs are faced with (Hanegraaff et al., 2016). Despite this, Hanegraaff et al. (2016, 18) claim that *depending on resource endowment and the competition for resources, the difference between business interests and NGOs in how they balance between inside and outside lobbying are less pronounced than often presumed*. De Bruycker and Beyers (2018) emphasize that the policy context mediates whether inside or outside lobbying is considered more useful. In fact, De Bruycker and Beyers (2018, 30) state that:

Outside lobbying results in more success (compared to inside lobbying) when defending a position that gains broad approval in the public sphere. When advocating positions that lack broad approval in media debates, in contrast, lobbyists can increase success if they primarily rely on inside lobbying (but decrease success when engaging more often in outside lobbying).

This indicates that there is a clear link between the strategies of interest groups and their success according to De Bruycker and Beyers (2018). In addition to this, Hanegraaff et al. (2016, 18) claim that the resource competition is a notable predictor for the use of outside lobbying. Subsequently, this means that interest groups take organizational goals into consideration when choosing strategies. Overall, the studies provided mixed descriptions. However, it is clear that both business and environmental organizations use inside and outside strategies.

5.3 Limitations

One of the most notable flaws with the thesis is the limited quantity of studies covering lobbying in the context of climate policy. In addition, only 9 studies were included in the final sample. A more comprehensive sample of studies would have been beneficiary. This could have been achieved by using more than two databases. Therefore, the generalizability of the results is limited. In general, there are many research questions of qualitative nature that are considered ill-fitted for a systematic

literature review. Furthermore, it would be beneficial to define the examined interest groups in a more exact manner since so many different variations exist. Another option would be to look at two specific organizations and examine how they balance their use of strategies. A case study would without question have its benefits. Furthermore, based on the results, future research should focus on other motives beyond the resource dependency when explaining the differences in how NGOs balance outside and inside lobbying strategies.

5.4 Final remarks

The importance of climate policy in the decision-making process has increased significantly the past year. The decision-makers have no doubt a hard time pleasing all the concerned parties. Nonetheless, a complex policy issue like climate policy is a great example, why the EU decision-making process need to have a healthy and well-balanced cooperation with the different interest groups operating within the EU. Despite the lack of ability to generalize the results, these findings may help understanding the larger picture of collective practices used by interest groups. Nonetheless, future research should thenceforth focus on including multiple issues to avoid having single issues dictate the results. The broader question is also how can power and influence be evenly distributed in a functional and fair pluralistic democracy?

6. Summary in Swedish

Titeln på avhandlingen är *Intressegruppers lobbyingpåverkan – En studie om intressegruppers användning av lobbyingstrategier inom EU*. Beslutsfattandet inom EU är på många sätt en invecklad process som i många fall kritiserats för att vara icke representativt och saknar insyn. Pluralism anses vara en naturlig del av den västerländska demokratin där flera olika parter är delaktiga i den politiska processen. Därför anses lobbying vara en naturlig del av policyprocessen inom EU (Van Schendelen, 2010). Utvecklingen under de senaste årtiondena har fått flera forskare att ifrågasätta huruvida vissa intressegrupper har bättre förutsättningar jämfört med andra intressegrupper. Är det en fråga om enbart tillvägagångssätt eller är det så att systemet tillgodoser endast vissa grupperingar? Detta skulle i sådana fall innebära att lobbyingen orsakar ett demokratiunderskott i EU (Coen, 1997). Avhandlingens syfte är att undersöka ifall det är rimligt att påstå att EU och dess institutioner favoriserar samarbetet med business- och industrivärldens intresseorganisationer. Frågeställningen är: *Finns det skillnader eller likheter i hur business- och miljöintressegrupperna väljer strategier när de försöker påverka klimatpolitiken i EU?*

Kan det vara enbart så att företagens intresseorganisationer har en mera mångsidig repertoar när det kommer till att påverka beslutsfattare? Gynnas de p.g.a. sin resursöverlägsenhet, eller är lobbyinglandskapet designat för att passa företagsvärldens behov? Denna syn delas av Broscheid och Coen (1997). För att granska både företags- och miljöorganisationernas olika strategier valdes klimatpolitiken som ett passande område att undersöka. Dessa organisationer är båda aktivt engagerade i frågor som gäller miljö och klimatet inom EU. Klimatpolitiken är både aktuell och numera en viktig del av politiken inom EU. I metodkapitlet diskuteras olika forskningsdesigner som kunde användas i en studie som denna. En fallstudie ger ypperliga möjligheter att undersöka ett eller flera komplicerade fenomen, vilket kunde ha varit användbart i denna studie. En jämförande studie lämpar sig utmärkt för frågeställningar som utreder skillnader eller likheter. Denna design har även goda förutsättningar att förklara orsakssamband, å andra sidan kräver detta att fallen är jämförbara. Annars finns det små möjligheter att generalisera resultaten (Bryman, 2018). Trots att det fanns flera möjligheter att välja mellan, så föll valet i slutändan på den induktiva metoden. Denna metod bygger på användningen av en stor mängd utfall

eller empiriskt material. Man utgår från tidigare iakttagelser och bildar en slutsats därefter. Vad beträffar datainsamlingen, utfördes en systematisk litteratursökning i databaserna Google Scholar och Ebsco. Denna sökningsmetod skiljer sig ifrån den ”traditionella” litteratursökningen på ett antal punkter. I en systematisk litteratursökning strävar man efter att samla in allt relevant material. Sökningarna görs även i flera databaser. Sökstrategin bör också presenteras i avhandlingens metodkapitel. I denna skall söktermerna, avgränsningarna och databaserna inkluderas (Forsberg & Wengström, 2016). Utgångspunkten är att systematiskt identifiera, välja och utvärdera sökresultaten (Mulrow & Oxman 1997). Söktermerna, inklusions- och exklusionskriterierna och resultaten presenteras i kapitlen 3 och 4. Själva analysen bygger på det induktiva resonemanget. Detta innebär att man inte utgår från en existerande teori. Istället drar man slutsatser på basen av de observationer som gjorts i tidigare studier. De utvalda artiklarna presenteras i en tabell i kapitel 4. Efter noggranna överväganden valdes genom utvärderingsprocessen nio olika artiklar baserat på deras relevans.

Studierna pekar på att det finns både likheter och skillnader i företags- och miljöorganisationernas strategiska preferenser. Enligt Beyers (2008) är det inte motiverat att anta att företagsgrupperna väljer inside-strategier endast p.g.a. sin resursöverlägsenhet. Även om dessa organisationer har tendenser att använda sig av denna typ av strategi. Det som är definitivt är att valen av strategier påverkas av en rad olika faktorer. Dessa faktorer är vilken typ av organisation det rör sig om, den institutionella miljön där lobbyingen äger rum, typ av policyfråga och organisationernas målsättning. I studierna nämns två olika fall där miljöorganisationerna har valt att använda sig av outside-strategin. Den första är Brent Spar-affären och den andra var FORATOM-fallet (Hanegraaff, Beyers & Iskander, 2018). I bägge fallen valde Greenpeace att använda sig av påtryckningsmetoder genom media och bojkottkampanjer. Dock är knappast dessa fall tillräckliga för att kunna generalisera resultaten till alla andra fall, miljö- eller klimatfrågor som utmanas av liknande grupperingar. Det är å andra sidan klart att Greenpeace som är en typ av aktivistorganisation har föredragit att använda sig av metoder som just förknippas med medborgaraktivism. Dock betyder det inte att alla miljöorganisationer väljer att använda sig av dessa metoder. Faktum är att alla de faktorer som nämndes ovan gör att varje fall är unikt och möjligheten till att göra breda generaliseringar är näst intill omöjligt.

Junk (2015) fann även att framträdande och mindre komplexa sakfrågor som t.ex. miljöfrågor, tenderar att lobbas med hjälp av outside-strategier. I kontrast, så brukar sakfrågor som är mindre populära påverkas med hjälp av inside-strategier. Vesa och m.fl. (2020) fann även att företagsorganisationer ofta väljer att undvika medierna när de försöker påverka beslutsfattare.

Det skulle utan tvekan vara av stor nytta ifall det skulle finnas teorier som kunde tillämpas i alla fall som berör företags- och miljöorganisationernas val av strategier. En bredare fråga för framtidens forskning är huruvida det nuvarande lobbyinglandskapet kan representera den breda massan. I synnerhet Beyers efterlyser möjligheten att utreda i vilken mån de nischade intresseorganisationerna påverkar i större policyfrågor och hur de delegerar sina påverkningsmetoder. Detta kunde avgöra ifall dessa organisationers kärnintressen kan representera allmänheten. Framsteg som dessa kunde vara avgörande i debatten rörande direkt påverkan och demokratisk representation inom EU (Beyers, 2008). Detta har även ifrågasatts tidigare från flera olika håll. Är det ett systemfel eller är det så att vissa grupper är enbart svagt representerade? Det är frågor som den framtida forskningen får ta ställning till.

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