

**FINNISH NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY**

**SWEDISH STRATEGIC CULTURE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: A CASE  
STUDY OF SWEDISH MILITARY STRATEGIC DOCTRINE**

Diploma Thesis

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<p><b>ABSTRACT</b></p> <p>This thesis focuses on change in strategic culture. The research studied Swedish strategic culture in its normative form as coded in military strategic doctrine. Through a study of strategic norms, the research aimed at clarifying if Swedish strategic culture has changed during the Post-Cold War era. The aim of the research was thus to identify how change in Strategic Culture can be observed, in which way, how and why Swedish strategic culture has changed.</p> <p>The research draws from a fourth-generation interpretation on theory of strategic culture focusing on subcultures and change. Following an interpretivist approach a constructivist framework was adopted where strategic norms and their relationship with state identity, interests, policy and doctrine are central. Swedish strategic culture was described through the study of norms regarding threat perception, use of force and role of doctrine. Change in strategic culture was analyzed in changes of influence from three subcultures: policy, military and academic. The study was structured as a three-case case study. Subcultures of Swedish strategic culture, as well as the role and position of the Swedish military strategic doctrine were defined in order to enable an analysis of norms and their subcultural influences in cases constructed around each of the different versions of Swedish military strategic doctrine. Thematic content analysis was adopted to analyze the doctrines, and form norms from the themes arising from the empirical data. Each norm was interpreted on its main subcultural affiliation. The observations of norms and subcultures were then compared in a between cases analysis.</p> <p>The results of the analysis show that Swedish strategic culture has changed since the end of the Cold War. Variation was identified in all three norms as well as their subcultural affiliations. The academic subculture seemed to gradually loose its influence while the military subculture grew stronger. The military and policy subcultures seemed to gradually strike a balance as the norm on threat perception became more concrete and a renewed focus in national defence of Swedish territory was restored.</p> <p>The main conclusion of the study is, at the level of analysis adopted, that Swedish strategic culture has changed. The change has been encoded into doctrine by an epistemic community of writers as a reaction to external changes in the security environment, and internal changes implemented through defence transformation. It is however plausible to regard the continuing change in defence matters to be normative in itself thus implying that Swedish strategic culture hasn't changed, rather change is the norm and a constitutive factor of Swedish state identity.</p>	
<p><b>KEYWORDS</b></p> <p>Strategic culture, Subcultures, Norms, Doctrine, Military Strategy, Swedish Security and Defence policy</p>	

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<p><b>TIIVISTELMÄ</b></p> <p>Tämä diplomityö keskittyy strategisen kulttuurin muutokseen. Tutkimuksessa tarkasteltiin ruotsalaista strategista kulttuuria sen normatiivisessa muodossa koodattuna sotilasstrategisissa doktriineissa. Tutkimalla strategisia normeja pyrittiin selvittämään, onko ruotsalainen strateginen kulttuuri muuttunut kylmän sodan päättymisen jälkeen. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli selvittää miten strategisen kulttuurin muutosta voi havainnoida, sekä millä tavalla, miten ja miksi ruotsalainen strateginen kulttuuri on muuttunut.</p> <p>Tutkimus perustuu neljännen sukupolven strategisen kulttuurin teoriaan ja keskittyy osakulttuureihin ja muutokseen. Tutkielma on luonteeltaan tulkitseva, ja tukeutuu konstruktivistiseen kehykseen, jossa strategiset normit ja niiden suhde valtiolliseen identiteettiin, intresseihin, poliittisiin käytänteisiin, sekä doktriiniin ovat keskiössä. Ruotsalaista strategista kulttuuria kuvailtiin uhkakuvien, voimankäytön sekä doktriinin roolia kuvaavien normien avulla. Muutosta strategisessa kulttuurissa analysoitiin poliittisten käytänteiden-, sotilaallisen- sekä akateemisen osakulttuurien normiin vaikutusten variaatioiden tarkastelulla. Tutkielma strukturoitiin kolmen tapauksen tapaustudkimukseksi. Osakulttuurien sekä ruotsalaisen sotilasstrategisen doktriinin rooli ja suhde määriteltiin, jolla mahdollistettiin normien sekä osakulttuurien analyysi kolmessa sotilasstrategisten doktriinien ympärille rakennetussa tapauksessa. Doktriinien analyysissa käytettiin temaattista sisällönanalyysia, jolla muodostettiin normeja empiriasta nousevista teemoista. Normien pääasiallinen osakulttuurillinen kuuluminen tulkittiin. Tehtyjä havaintoja sekä normeista, että osakulttuureista vertailtiin tapausten välillä.</p> <p>Tulokset osoittivat, että ruotsalainen strateginen kulttuuri on muuttunut kylmän sodan päättymisen jälkeen. Kaikissa kolmessa normissa sekä niiden osakulttuurillisessa kuulumisessa havaittiin variaatioita. Akateeminen osakulttuuri näytti asteittain menettävän vaikutustaan samalla kun sotilaallinen osakulttuuri vahvistui. Sotilaallisen ja poliittisten käytänteiden osakulttuurit näyttivät asteittain löytävän tasapainon samalla kun uhkakuvanormi muuttui konkreettisemmaksi, ja uudistunut fokus Ruotsin alueen ja kansalliseen puolustukseen palautettiin.</p> <p>Keskeisin johtopäätös on, että tutkielman analyysitasolla tarkasteltuna, ruotsalainen strateginen kulttuuri on muuttunut. Muutos on koodattu doktriineihin niiden kirjoittajista muodostuneen episteemisen yhteisön toimesta, reaktiona ulkoisiin muutoksiin turvallisuusympäristössä, sekä sisäisiin muutoksiin johtuen puolustuksen transformaatiosta. On kuitenkin mahdollista tulkita jatkuva muutos puolustusasioissa itsessään normatiivisena. Näin ajatellen ruotsalainen strateginen kulttuuri ei ole muuttunut, vaan muutos on itsessään normi ja perustava osa ruotsalaista valtiollista identiteettiä.</p>	
<p><b>AVAINSANAT</b></p> <p>Strateginen kulttuuri, Osakulttuuri, Normi, Doktriini, Sotilasstrategia, Ruotsalainen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikka</p>	

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## SWEDISH STRATEGIC CULTURE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: A CASE STUDY OF SWEDISH MILITARY STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

### 1 INTRODUCTION

*“Do you not know, my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed?”*

- Axel Oxenstierna, 1648

The changes in Swedish defence during the Post-Cold War era have been remarkable. A small nation changing its nationally focused Cold War defence posture to relying on an expeditionary style defence far from home has been an interesting journey to follow. The fact that the transformation didn't stop there, but it seems it made a U-turn with regained focus on national defence at home makes it even more intriguing. This thesis is an attempt to broaden our understanding of the scope of Swedish defence transformation in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Explanations for changes in defence policy, strategy and posture of the armed forces describe a nation cashing in on the peace dividend of the end of the Cold War. But why did Swedes change their defence orientation the way they did? Trying to explain this change implies one needs to understand the whole, the context, the rational analysis factors, the political interests and much more. This thesis will in no way attempt to cover all of this. It will rather offer an attempt to try to understand one perspective of it all. What is the role of Swedish Strategic Culture in all of this, and has it changed?

What is offered here is a narrow insight into a broad subject. As one of the key players in Swedish defence the Swedish Armed Forces offers an interesting entry point into studying the country's strategic culture, their Military Strategic Doctrine. This introductory chapter offers four topics to describe the logic behind the research. Firstly, an insight in the evolution of the Swedish defence in the Post-Cold War era. Secondly the introduction of a military strategic doctrine. Thirdly strategic culture is introduced as an alternative way of understanding the observed change that has happened in Sweden. And finally, the research aim and questions are minted.

## 1.1 Evolution of Swedish defence in the Post-Cold War era

The following offers some insight into how Swedish defence has changed since the end of the Cold War. It seems so much has changed that it might be difficult to effectively summarize the changes in short. But as a broad summary of the evolution of Swedish defence in the Post-Cold War era one could say that Sweden has gone from, having the capability of mobilizing close to one million citizens for the defence of the country, to lacking the capability of mobilizing a planned 50 000 soldiers.<sup>1</sup>

Now this is of course a change that seems quite large based on pure numbers, but the evolution of Swedish defence is more than a sheer numbers game.<sup>2</sup> Many of the changes are tied to the changing threat perception, the shift from having a monolith threat – the Soviet Union – to having no immediate threat of invasion to prepare for,<sup>3</sup> which made for an era of change and seeking to redefine defence altogether. What came to be a defining change for the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) was a shift of paradigm from the Cold War's defence concept to the new "insatsförsvar" a reactionary defence concept. Under pressure from the politicians to cash in the "peace dividend"<sup>4</sup> which arose from the fall of the Soviet Union, and linked to the larger Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) that was influential at the time, Sweden opted to change its stance on defence quite radically.<sup>5</sup> The new reactionary defence posture based on a slimmed down force structure meant that SwAF started opting for quality over quantity. This was intimately linked to the introduction of Network Based Defence concept.<sup>6</sup> What made this change so rudimentary was that it changed everything from policy, strategy, doctrine, force structure, procurement, etc. all the way down to recruitment and training of the soldiers. In a way the paradigm shift was a success in that the changes were massive and enforced, but it seems it might be less of a success in hindsight if one wishes to shift back, or at least grow and not just downsize.

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<sup>1</sup> Zetterberg, Kent: *Konsten att överleva – Studier i Sveriges försvar, strategi och säkerhetspolitik under 200 år*. Elanders, Vällingby 2007, p. 261.

<sup>2</sup> Taking into account that the "one million force" contained documented units which never really existed, see: Swedish Ministry of Finance: *Försvarets förutsättningar – en ESO-rapport om erfarenheter från 20 år av försvarsreformer*. Rapport till expertgruppen för studier i offentlig ekonomi 2011:2. Stockholm 2011.

<sup>3</sup> No threat in the forth-coming decade, see Börjeman, Carl *Försvarets förfall: Konsten att lägga ner försvaret utan att någon bryr sig*. Santérus, Stockholm 2011, p. 127-128.

<sup>4</sup> Agrell, Wilhelm *Fredens illusioner: Det svenska nationella försvarets nedgång och fall*. Atlantis, Stockholm 2010, p. 129.

<sup>5</sup> RMA in Sweden see Agrell (2010) p. 173-174. For a summary of RMA key points see: Freedman, Lawrence: *Strategy a history*. Oxford University Press, New York 2013, p. 214-236.

<sup>6</sup> Agrell (2010), p. 173-174.

The new slimmed down version of the SwAF seems to have been equipped and trained with expeditionary warfare in mind.<sup>7</sup> This of course meant that Swedish participation in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations were highly valued.<sup>8</sup> But at the same time it meant that a shift was occurring which changed the focus of SwAF from a territorially fixed homeland defence to defending national security interests by operating abroad. The shift came to be quite clear with the changes in force structure, abolishing local defence units, selling excess materiel<sup>9</sup>, and letting the Civil-defence fall into a slumber.<sup>10</sup> All this then meant that not only did the SwAF change to be more operationally capable in the international domain, it also effectively meant that the defence of the homeland was put aside and somewhat forgotten.<sup>11</sup>

The paradigm shift led to the downsizing of the SwAF in all aspects, one major part of which was the downsizing of personnel. The idea of having an all-volunteer force got support from the highest levels of SwAF and the defence commission, which finally led to the pausing of conscription, with the new law of total defence from 2009, and put into effect in 2010.<sup>12</sup> The decision to lay general conscription dormant came at a time when some implications of the war in Georgia 2008 had meant a renewed attempt to focus on homeland defence again.<sup>13</sup> Due to a further deterioration of the security situation the decision to abandon conscription was reversed and the draft reinstated in 2017.<sup>14</sup> The fluctuation between conscription and all voluntary recruitment is as such a good example of rather rudimentary changes implemented and then revoked in a relatively short time span.

Regarding organizational changes the Post-Cold War era saw many changes in Sweden, the most notable ones are often the types of organizational changes you can see in the table below. In such a table you can easily see some changes that have occurred since 1990 and additionally see how current policy changes have effectively changed the trend of downsizing to growing, but that the rate of growth is quite limited. But apart from a long trend of downsizing, disbandment of units and change in defence concepts the Swedish defence organization went through another rudimental change in the 1990s.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p 141. see also: Edström, Håkan & Dennis Gyllensporre (eds.): *Alike or different? Scandinavian Approaches to Military Interventions*. Santérus, Stockholm 2014.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Agrell (2010), p. 148.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 189.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 219.

<sup>12</sup> Swedish Cabinet: *Modern personalförsörjning för ett användbart försvar – vissa frågor om Försvarsmaktens personal*, Regeringens proposition 2009/10:160. Stockholm 2009, p. 191-209.

<sup>13</sup> Agrell (2010), p. 205-206.

<sup>14</sup> Decision to reactivate conscription, see: Swedish Cabinet: *Uppdrag till Försvarsmakten och Totalförsvarets rekryteringsmyndighet om mönstring och grundutbildning med värnplikt*, Regeringsbeslut Fö2016/01252/MFI, Stockholm 2017.

The creation of a single government agency: The Swedish Armed Forces, which occurred in midyear 1996. At the end of the Cold War the Swedish armed Forces were not a single government authority, but every regiment was its own agency, and the heads of the Navy, Army and Airforce were, during peace time, directly responsible to the Swedish Cabinet, not to the Supreme Commander (ÖB).<sup>15</sup> This all changed with the reorganization of over 100 authorities into one SwAF.<sup>16</sup> Interestingly enough the streamlining of the SwAF in the 2000s lead to a centralized model with all service-heads and ÖB working in Stockholm, this then was challenged in 2018 with the reformation of service headquarters located outside of Stockholm.<sup>17</sup> A decentralized model from the Cold War turns into a centralized command with fewer organizational levels which now is turning into something echoing the past. It looks like also here the pendulum has swung from one extreme to the other.

Table 1-1 Main elements of Swedish Armed Forces 1990 – 2015, and plan for 2021 - 2025.<sup>18</sup>

	1990	2009	2015	(2025->)
Army Brigade (HQ)	21	2	2	5
Army battalions	84	7	9	10
Territorial defence units	230	0	0	0
Home Guard soldiers	100 000	22 000	22 000	22 000
Main surface combatants	30	7	5	5
Submarines	12	5	5	5
Fighter aircraft	320	100	60	60

Alongside organizational and conceptual changes, there has been a continuing trend of decreased defence spending in Sweden, as displayed in the table below. This may not differ significantly from some other European countries in the Post-Cold War era, but in a Swedish context the decrease of spending is also linked to a case of loss of trust between the SwAF and the

<sup>15</sup> Swedish Ministry of Defence: *Delbetänkande av utredningen om lednings- och myndighetsorganisationen för försvaret*, SOU 1991:112. Stockholm 1991.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., & Swedish Cabinet: *Totalförsvarets utveckling till och med budgetåret 1996/1997 samt anslag för budgetåret 1992/93*, proposition 1991/92:102. Stockholm 1992, p. 6.

<sup>17</sup> Swedish Cabinet: *Inrättande av försvarsgrensstaber*, proposition 2018/19:18, Stockholm 2018.

<sup>18</sup> Numbers taken from: Swedish Cabinet, *Ett användbart försvar*, Regeringens proposition 2008/09:140. Stockholm 2009. & Swedish Cabinet, *Försvarspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges försvar 2016-2020*, Regeringens proposition 2014/15:109, Stockholm 2015. & Swedish Defence Commission: *Värnkraft – Inriktningen av säkerhetspolitiken och utformningen av det militära försvaret 2021-2025*. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds: 2019:8. Stockholm 2019.



political leadership. Economical considerations seem to have had quite a negative impact on Swedish Civil-Military Relations (CMR) in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. So not only has funding for the SwAF declined but a trend of increasing civilian micro-management of the military seems to have evolved.<sup>19</sup>




Figure 1-1 Swedish defence expenditure from 1990 to 2018.<sup>20</sup>

The existence of Black holes in the defence spending has been used to depict the failures in economic control of the SwAF.<sup>21</sup> These holes were the result of failed management of materiel requisitions, poor budgetary control, and an overall lack of credible management of the economic implications of the defence reform.<sup>22</sup> In the mid-90s the SwAF calculations showed that the need for further funds was 10,6 billion Swedish crowns, which equals roughly 25% of the annual defence budget. The struggle to find a balance between funding and defence reform has continued since then and is currently a topic of debate between the SwAF and the government.<sup>23</sup> All the changes mentioned above can be summarized under the umbrella of defence doctrine. The change in Swedish defence doctrine after the Cold War has been extensively studied by

<sup>19</sup> Regarding the management of the defence reform the Swedish government seems to have been keen on telling the SwAF *how* to implement changes. This is in some aspects contradictory to the constitutional basis of Swedish government where authorities have autonomy over their actions taken and are guided by ends and means are given, the authority decides on the ways. See: Haldén, Eva: *Den svåra konsten att reformera – Från invasionsförsvar till insatsförsvar*. Elanders. Vällingby 2007, p. 211-251.

<sup>20</sup> SIPRI Military expenditure database  
<https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>

<sup>21</sup> Haldén (2007), p. 88-102.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 100-102

<sup>23</sup> Swedish Armed Forces: *Försvarsmaktens underlag för försvarspolitisk proposition 2021-2015*. FM2019-20164:6. Stockholm 2019.

Håkan Engström and Dennis Gyllensporre.<sup>24</sup> Their categorization of different doctrinal eras is very telling of how the doctrine has evolved from 1991 to 2014 as shown in table 1-2.

Table 1-2 Swedish defence doctrine 1991–2014.<sup>25</sup>

Year	Doctrine	Ends
1991-1994	Death of neutrality	Defence of independence and territorial integrity
1994-1998	Adaptation doctrine	Develop ability for international operations
1998-2002	Operational doctrine	Create freedom of action for future challenges
2002-2006	Development doctrine	Defence of societal values, contribute to stability and strengthen international peace and security
2006-2010	Solidarity doctrine	Defence of societal values, and interests, abroad and at home, together with others.
2010-2014	Regional doctrine	Defence of sovereignty, Swedish rights and interests as well as societal values. Protection of Swedish freedom of action in case of political, military or other forms of coercion.

On the level of defence doctrine, probably the most prominent change in Sweden was changing from a Cold War era of neutrality to a doctrine of solidarity.<sup>26</sup> In the realm of strategic concepts this seems to have simultaneously meant a shift from Bandwagoning to Hedging.<sup>27</sup>

As shown above the changes in Swedish defence has not only meant a change in force structure, reorganisation of the defence sector under pressure from economic austerity, but above all a conceptual change, a change of defence policy, doctrine and strategy. In order to study the changes mentioned above one might focus on a large array of different areas of interest. This thesis will focus on the cultural aspects of change. Has the strategic culture in Sweden changed during the time period of interest? And if it has changed, then *why* and *how* has this change occurred?

<sup>24</sup> Edström, Håkan & Dennis Gyllensporre: *Svensk försvarsdoktrin efter kalla kriget. Förlorade decennier eller vunna insikter?* Santérus Academic Press, Stockholm 2014.

<sup>25</sup> The table is based on Edström & Gyllensporre (2014) and Westberg, Jacob: *Svenska säkerhetsstrategier*. Studentlitteratur, Lund 2015, p. 200-201.

<sup>26</sup> See Bo, Hugemark (ed.): *Till bröders hjälp – Med sikte på en svensk solidarisk strategi*. Kungliga krigsvetenskapsakademien, Stockholm 2014.

<sup>27</sup> Edström, Håkan, Gyllensporre, Dennis & Westerberg, Jacob: *Military Strategy of Small States. The Nordic Countries' Responding to External Shocks of the 21st Century*. Routledge, Abingdon 2019, p. 183.

## 1.2 Introduction of a military strategic doctrine

During the Swedish defence transformation outlined above a Swedish military strategic doctrine was introduced. The doctrine itself is a focal point for this thesis. Using the doctrine as a starting point for studying changes in strategic culture is derived partly from the explicit way in which the first Swedish military strategic doctrine states that it should be viewed as a starting point for implementing changes in the SwAF strategic culture. All three doctrines are introduced below followed by an overview of previous research of the doctrines.

In the process of change a new element was introduced in the strategic landscape of Swedish defence regulatory processes. The introduction of a military strategic doctrine in 2002 (MSD02).<sup>28</sup> The doctrine was introduced by the SwAF and is as such a military doctrine. But the notion of it being a military *strategic* doctrine meant the introduction of a new type of doctrine that hadn't existed in Sweden prior to 2002. In the introductory words the doctrine states that due to the extent of changes in the defence forces as well as the military geography in the vicinity of Sweden the need for a new type of doctrine had arisen.<sup>29</sup> This might in itself be true, but more interestingly it states that the introduction of this new doctrine was to act as a starting point for a process to change strategic culture in the SwAF.<sup>30</sup> The doctrine was as such intended as a tool for controlling changes in culture. The stated intent for the change was to more clearly ground the activities of the SwAF on military sciences.<sup>31</sup> This then implies that there had arisen a requirement to somehow justify the actions of the defence forces based on scientific research, in contradiction perhaps to primarily basing actions on experience and legacy. But why did the SwAF need to change its culture in this way?

The first military strategic doctrine was followed by another one in 2012 (MSD12).<sup>32</sup> The release of a new doctrine 10 years after the first one might well have been needed in updating the existing doctrine to be in line with the implemented changes in the first decade of the 21st century. The change with the largest implications for SwAF doctrine is stated to have been

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<sup>28</sup> Swedish Armed Forces: *Militärstrategisk doktrin 2002*. Fälth & Hässler, Värnamo 2002. [MSD02]

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 3. "*I och med fastställandet av Militärstrategisk doktrin startar en process för att förändra vår strategiska kultur.*" The use of the concept *strategic culture* when addressing the culture of the SwAF can be questioned. Was the intent to change "strategic culture" or in fact "military culture"? Or maybe the strategic culture in a military context?

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p.3. "*Förändringen innebär att grunden för vår verksamhet från och med nu tydligare tar sin utgångspunkt i militärvetenskapen.*"

<sup>32</sup> Swedish Armed Forces: *Militärstrategisk doktrin – med doktrinära grunder (MSD 12)*. FMLOG APSA Grafisk produktion, Stockholm 2011. [MSD12]

changing from conscript based recruiting and force generation to an all voluntary force.<sup>33</sup> The new doctrine is as such a doctrine for an expeditionary orientated all voluntary “professional” armed force. This is arguably a big change from the context of the previous doctrine. Regarding strategic culture the doctrine states that when changes in either policy or economical, ideological, geographical or social factors occur there arises a need to change strategic culture and thus doctrine.<sup>34</sup> The intent to change culture through doctrine is as clearly expressed as in the previous doctrine.

The third doctrine was minted in 2016 (MSD16) which means there was a period of a mere four years between the two doctrines.<sup>35</sup> The new doctrine states that it is derived from: Changes in the security environment, a new defence policy, allocated resources and the supreme commanders need to communicate how he intends to command the SwAF in peace, crisis and war.<sup>36</sup> The aim of the doctrine interestingly enough echoes doctrinal theory in the way it is shown in light of being a tool for education, command and change.<sup>37</sup> A more interesting aspect of the doctrine in connection with the defence reform is the launching of a new strategic concept,<sup>38</sup> a concept based on a rediscovered need of homeland defence, and the need for an ability to stand alone, but prepare to fight together with others in order to win.<sup>39</sup> With regards to strategic culture this new doctrine is more modest than its predecessors. Strategic culture is treated in the frame of cultural awareness and no explicit mention is made on changing culture through doctrine.<sup>40</sup>

All three doctrines have been objects of study by students at the Swedish Defence University for some years and different aspects of the doctrines (MSD02, MSD12, MSD16) have been studied. Mainly drawing from Harald Høiback’s theory on doctrine attempts have been made to identify whether a specific doctrine is a tool for command, change or education.<sup>41</sup> Including

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<sup>33</sup> The decision mentioned earlier, (see page 3) of changing from conscription to all voluntary recruitment, see: Swedish Cabinet (2009a), p. 191-209. Regarding the need for a new doctrine see MSD12, p. 5.

<sup>34</sup> MSD12, p. 15.

<sup>35</sup> Swedish Armed Forces: *Militärstrategisk doktrin – MSD 16*. MFV, FSV Grafisk produktion, Stockholm 2016. [MSD16]

<sup>36</sup> Definition of Strategic Culture see: MSD16, p. 7. Swedish strategic culture is described as based on a long tradition of neutrality, military non-alignment and intent to keep freedom of action. Making for a more contextual and historically based interpretation, MSD16, p.27.

<sup>37</sup> The aim of the doctrine is to (1) clarify a broader military strategic concept (2) give military strategic guidance on C2 in peace, crisis and wartime (3) communicate to others the intent of the use of SwAF in the defence of the country (4) work as a tool for change (5) educate on the link between strategy and military strategy in the context of warfare and crisis management. Ibid., p 9.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 54-55.

<sup>40</sup> MSD16, p. 15

<sup>41</sup> Høiback, Harald: *Understanding military doctrine: a multidisciplinary approach*. Routledge, London 2013. Kling, Rebecca: *Svensk doktrinserie: ett verktyg för ledning, utbildning eller förändring?* Bachelor’s thesis, Försvarshögskolan. Stockholm 2017. Persson, Emil: *Vad syftar militärstrategisk doktrin 2016 egentligen till?* En kvalitativ innehållsanalys. Bachelor’s thesis, Försvarshögskolan. Stockholm 2017.

an attempt to incorporate strategic communication as a cornerstone of doctrine.<sup>42</sup> The doctrinal dilemma of doctrine being either too descriptive or too restrictive has also been an entry point for research focusing on quality of doctrine.<sup>43</sup>

Studies have also been made focused on the influence of *theory* on doctrine,<sup>44</sup> as well as influence of security and defence policy on doctrine.<sup>45</sup> Both these approaches seem closely linked to Høibacks model of doctrine, drawing from two of the cornerstones from his model of doctrine: Rationality and Authority.<sup>46</sup> Other works include a study of doctrinal effects on operations or “operational effectiveness”,<sup>47</sup> how local conditions influence doctrine,<sup>48</sup> if the doctrine (MSD02) is relevant for irregular warfare,<sup>49</sup> and ranges all the way to a critical examination which sets out to examine the doctrine as set of beliefs.<sup>50</sup>

In summary the research of the specific Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine seems to be limited as the sources mentioned above are primarily bachelor level thesis and none of them cover all three doctrines. This thesis sets out to identify change in Swedish strategic culture, it is not a study of the quality of the doctrine itself, its connection to operational behaviour or in which way it is used or not. The focus is on identifying cultural elements in the doctrine, and then analysing in what way they either change or stay the same. The object of this thesis is Swedish strategic culture, the military strategic doctrine is used as a gateway to studying cultural elements. The fact that the doctrines express differences in the definition of strategic culture and that the expressed intent to change Culture through doctrine has been left out of the current doctrine makes one wonder, did MSD02 and MSD12 change Swedish strategic culture? Why is there no need to change culture through doctrine expressed in the currently valid doctrine?

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<sup>42</sup> Reimfelt, Gustav: *Doktrin som strategisk kommunikation*. Thesis, Försvarshögskolan. Stockholm 2018.

<sup>43</sup> Wallenburg, Paula: *Militärstrategisk doktrin – en kompass som behöver revideras?* Thesis, Försvarshögskolan. Stockholm 2018. and Olsén, Thomas: *Är doktrindilemmat verkligen ett dilemma?* Bachelor’s thesis, Försvarshögskolan. Stockholm 2017.

<sup>44</sup> Landewall, Anders: *Militärteorins influenser på svensk militär doktrin*. Thesis, Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm 2012.

<sup>45</sup> Strong connection between defence & security policy and doctrine, see: Hellquist, Joachim: *Försvars och säkerhetspolitisk resonans i militärstrategisk doktrin*, Bachelor’s thesis, Försvarshögskolan. Stockholm 2017.

<sup>46</sup> Høiback (2013), p. 56.

<sup>47</sup> Gustavsson, Alfred: *En undersökning om doktrinutveckling: Minskad operativ effektivitet i den militärstrategiska doktrinen*. Bachelor’s thesis, Försvarshögskolan. Stockholm 2016.

<sup>48</sup> Low degree of influence of local Swedish conditions on doctrine, see: Willers, Rasmus: *Små staters doktriner – anpassade efter egna förhållanden eller avskilda från staternas verklighet?* Bachelor’s thesis, Försvarshögskolan. Stockholm 2017.

<sup>49</sup> Wallentin, Nils: *Militärstrategisk doktrin – Är den användbar för dagens försvar?* Bachelor’s thesis, Försvarshögskolan. Stockholm 2009.

<sup>50</sup> Fredriksson, Madelene: *Doktrinen som religion – en undersökning om doktrinen kvalitét*. Bachelor’s thesis, Försvarshögskolan. Stockholm 2016.

### 1.3 Strategic culture as a way of understanding

As the overview of Swedish defence developments since the end of the Cold War shows a multitude of changes have occurred. This opens up for a variety of different studies to analyse what has changed, in which way has it changed and most importantly why have these changes occurred. All the before mentioned questions have relevance by themselves but it is an interest in why the change has occurred the way it has which motivated the research in this thesis.

The concept of Strategic Culture was introduced in the 1970s and has sparked an interest for a variety of scholars to study Cultural elements of Strategic behaviour. The study of cultural aspects of strategy has been shown to have something to give with relevance to understanding how states act. But the study of culture is as any aspect or entry point into a subject worth questioning.

*"Practical people, a category that should include strategists, will ask that most brutally direct of questions, "so what?" So what do we do with greater self- and other- cultural understanding? Culture matters greatly, but so do the other dimension of war, peace and strategy."*<sup>51</sup>

Regarding this "so what" question this thesis strives to further the understanding on how strategic culture changes. The relevance of any insights provided in this thesis is still nevertheless subject to this excruciating question. A cultural viewpoint can nevertheless work as a complement to other explanations and in this sense contribute to a broader understanding of how and why Swedish defence efforts have changed the way they did since the end of the Cold War. Greater self-and-other cultural understanding can in the best of worlds offer a means for understanding future changes and in some sense help planners and policymakers by making them aware of the cultural settings in which they are embedded. Awareness of context, of normative behavioural patterns and norms guiding action are elements which are part of socialization into working organizations. Being aware of them might lead to understanding them and if necessary, challenging them. Here one might find added relevance to the study of cultural aspects of strategy.

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<sup>51</sup> Gray, Colin S: Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture. *Comparative Strategy*, 26(1):1-20, 2007.

## 1.4 Research aim and questions

This introductory chapter aims at positioning this thesis in the frame of change in Swedish Post-Cold War defence reform as well as show how the military strategic doctrine could be a way in to examine strategic culture. All this leads up to the aim and of this thesis, which is to improve our understanding of contemporary Swedish strategic culture. In order to do so the thesis draws from theory of strategic culture and will focus on norms connected to the use of force. In order to do this the object of the study is strategic doctrine, and what it can tell us about the strategic culture of a small state. This is achieved through a case study of Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Research problem:

Has Swedish Strategic Culture changed during the Post-Cold War era?

Research questions:

1. How can change in Strategic Culture be observed?  
(Answered in chapter 2)
2. What do we know about Swedish Strategic Culture?  
(Answered in chapter 3)
3. In which way has Swedish Strategic Culture changed?  
(Answered in chapter 4)
4. Why has change in Swedish Strategic Culture occurred?  
(Answered in chapter 4 and 5)
5. How can change in Strategic Culture be achieved?  
(Answered in chapter 5)

## **2 THEORY AND METHOD**

This chapter outlines the theoretical grounds for the study. Starting with a discussion on epistemological and ontological approaches. This lays the foundation for examining different approaches to strategic culture and which is an essential basis for understanding the theoretical and methodological framework used in the analysis. The theoretical debate on strategic culture is initially examined based on four different schools of thought. This overview is followed by a review of the current state of research, divided into two themes: Context and Continuity & Change. This is followed by a discussion about the origins of strategic culture and the role of doctrine. All this is structured into a theoretical framework within which the methods have been utilized and the research process has been executed.

The second part of this chapter describes the research process itself and the methods used, from framing the study, analysing the data, to drawing conclusions. It lays out a pathway for a better understanding of some aspects of Swedish strategic culture, namely strategic culture as context, and change and continuity in strategic culture. The research process involves using a specific approach to strategic culture theory as a point of entry, and then forming the analytical framework based on a merge of theory driven assumptions (deduction) and variables found in the empirical data (induction). This results in an abductive research process which aims at furthering our understanding of Swedish strategic culture.

The chapter answers the first research question: How can change in strategic culture be observed.



## 2.1 Epistemology, Ontology and Methodology

A key element in order to conduct viable research is trying to understand what one is doing. To outline the fundamentals for this thesis the concepts of Epistemology, Ontology, Methodology and Method are briefly discussed below. This is not so much an attempt to clarify and/or define these concepts as they are the object of what seems to be an everlasting discussion, as it is a way of letting the reader know the basic assumptions upon which the research stands. These assumptions are summarized in the table below. This is followed by a comment on the research attitude which explains the approach in which the research has been conducted.

**Ontology** addresses what we study, the object of investigation. The philosophical question revolving around “the existence of a real and objective or a subjective world”. Pragmatically it is the “view of how the world fits together and how we make sense of it”.<sup>52</sup> **Epistemology** defines the possibility to know the objective/subjective world and the forms that knowledge takes. The philosophical discussion regarding “the nature, sources and limits of knowledge”. Pragmatically it answers the question: Is reality knowable?<sup>53</sup> **Methodology** entails the technical instruments that are used in order to acquire knowledge. The concept of defining in which way methods are used.<sup>54</sup> **Method** indicates the ways of acquiring data and analysing it.<sup>55</sup>

Depending on one’s approach to ontological and epistemological issues different labels exist to categorize researchers and research. The array of categories varies, but one approach is to talk about positivism, post-positivism, interpretivism and humanism.<sup>56</sup> Another approach could be Naturalism, Marxism, Constructionism and Constructivism.<sup>57</sup> Such categories are by themselves somewhat unpractical and the range of ontological and epistemological approaches should perhaps be viewed more as a spectrum of different approaches gliding and fading into one another than as discrete categories.

The ontological and epistemological assumptions of this thesis make for what could be described to fit into the interpretivist or constructivist category. While the positivists view the world in a way where an objective reality exists and is knowable, some interpretivist argue that

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<sup>52</sup> Della Porta, Donatella & Keating, Michael: *Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences – a pluralistic perspective*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, p. 21.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 21-22.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 28

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>57</sup> Davis, Matthew & Sutton, Carole D: *Samhällsvetenskaplig metod*. Studenlitteratur, Lund 2017, p. 78.

there might be an objective reality, but it is linked to the subjective view of the same, this means that any research might never reach the objective reality but always mirrors a subjective image of it. This then means that while the positivist might aim at finding absolute causality and natural law, the interpretivist can only aspire to gain a better understanding of contextually defined knowledge.

Being in the range of interpretivist studies this thesis draws a main assumption from constructivism (IR).<sup>58</sup> This is not to be mistaken for social constructionism.<sup>59</sup> The main assumption being that reality is socially constructed. What we can aim at achieving is a better understanding of these constructions, but they are by themselves always subjective in nature. The methodology fitting such interpretivist assumptions make for an interpretive research design which focuses on contextuality and constitutive causality.<sup>60</sup> The methods used could then be either ethnographic, practice focused, discursive, corporeal or material.<sup>61</sup> In this thesis the method is in the realm of the discursive.

For an interpretive research project focusing on studying culture one also needs to take into account the relationship between researcher and the research object in the form of reflexivity.<sup>62</sup> This will be more lengthily discussed in the closing chapter. The basic assumptions for this thesis are summarized in the table below.

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<sup>58</sup> Kratochwill, Keating: "Constructivism: What is (not) and how it matters" in Della Porta, Donatella & Keating, Michael (eds.): *Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences – a pluralistic perspective*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, p.80-97. & Wendt, Alexander: *Social Theory of international politics*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999.

<sup>59</sup> For an overview of differences between constructionism and constructivism see: David & Sutton (2017), p. 78-80.

<sup>60</sup> Constitutive causality as the "processs whose parts are contingent upon one another, rather than being logically derivable from codes themselves", see: Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine & Yanow, Dvora: *Interpretive Research Design*. Routledge, New York 2012, p. 52.

<sup>61</sup> Guillame, Xavier: Criticality, in Salter, Mark & Mutlu, Can: *Research methods in critical security studies*. Routledge, New York 2013.

<sup>62</sup> Keating, Michael: Culture and Social Science, in Della Porta, Donatella & Keating, Michael (eds): *Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences – a pluralistic perspective*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, p.99-117.

Table 2-1 Ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions.<sup>63</sup>

<b>Ontology</b>	<b>Interpretivist approach</b>	<b>Approach in this thesis</b>
Does social reality exist?	Objective and subjective as intrinsically linked	Reality is subjective, and the objective images of reality are socially (re)constructed.
Is reality knowable?	Somewhat, but not as separate from human subjectivity	Yes, the images of objective reality can be studied. But reality is in its core subjective.
<b>Epistemology</b>		
Relationship between the scholar and his/her object	Aims at understanding subjective knowledge	The researcher's understanding of reality and relationship to the data affects the conduct of research and needs to be acknowledged. (Reflexivity)
Forms of knowledge	Contextual knowledge	Strategic culture is in its core contextual. Causality is probabilistic – correlation can be observed but not determined.
<b>Methodology and method</b>		
Methodology	Relative with a focus on meanings and context	Abductive process aiming at finding meaning and further understanding of the object of study.
Method	Seeking meaning, textual analysis	Interpretive case study to further understanding of strategic culture through identifying and analysing norms connected to culture and state identity. Theory based (deductive) Empirically grounded (inductive)

<sup>63</sup> The table is based on Della Porta & Keating (2008), p. 23 & 32 and Schwartz-Shea & Yanow (2012), p. 40-43.

The metatheoretical approach of this thesis is interpretive, which is most clearly shown as an aspiration to further understanding which then overweighs the need for explaining. The methodology is abductive and the interplay between theory and empiric data is central. In some sense this resembles approaches in Critical Security Studies. For instance, the attitude in which the research data is approached might be considered to be wondering.<sup>64</sup> The “Criticality” of this thesis is however limited.<sup>65</sup> There are limited aspirations to challenging method and methodology on a conceptual level. However the use of methods which may seem to be more familiar to use in positivistic research and an atomistic model describing how to break down strategic culture into smaller elements, which will be introduced in a chapter below, doesn’t mean that the goal is to explain rather than to understand.

The research in this thesis is descriptive in the sense that it is completely dependent on the empirical data in order to be able to analyse and understand the concept of strategic culture in a Swedish context. Theory makes for an entry point, the empiric data is decisive in which way the analysis can be conducted and what results can be achieved. So *theoretically* this means that there is a balancing act between theory and empirical data, where the discussion between the two is more vital than that either one has an upper hand. This basically means that this thesis leans more towards empiricism than positivism,<sup>66</sup> and has an interpretive wondering attitude towards both theory and empirical data.

However irritating it may be to some, sometimes describing something is enough to further understanding, the goal doesn’t always have to be an explanation. Or in the words of Andrew W. Neal:

*“Sometimes describing something without explaining it is enough to say something politically and intellectually important. Sometimes documenting that something exists or is said or done is enough to contribute to our understanding of what happens in security politics and practice”*<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Lobo Guerrero, Luis: Wondering as a research attitude, in Salter, Mark & Mutlu, Can: *Research methods in critical security studies*. Routledge, New York 2013, p. 25-28.

<sup>65</sup> On Criticality in Critical Security Studies, see: Xavier Guillaume: Criticality, in in Salter, Mark & Mutlu, Can: *Research methods in critical security studies*. Routledge, New York 2013, p. 29-32.

<sup>66</sup> The difference between empiricism and positivism as discussed by Andrew W. Neal, see: Andrew W. Neal: Empiricism without positivism; King Lear and critical security studies, in Mark & Mutlu, Can: *Research methods in critical security studies*. Routledge, New York 2013, p. 43.

<sup>67</sup> Underlining added to show emphasis as per original source, see Ibid.

## 2.2 Strategic culture, different approaches

The idea of strategic culture as something which defines and effects strategic theory and behaviour was introduced during the Cold War in the 1970s. The grounds for a cultural turn in strategic studies were laid by Jack Snyder who spoke of Soviet strategic culture, and Ken Booth who discussed cultures effects on the theory and execution of strategy.<sup>68</sup> The concept of strategic culture has evolved since then, and the evolution of studies in strategic culture will be shortly outlined in the following. One of the main difficulties with studying strategic culture is the absence of a coherent definition of the concept. Snyder defined strategic culture as:

*“...the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy”*<sup>69</sup>

As scholars set out to use strategic culture the definitions have since varied. Colin Gray examined American strategic culture in the early 1980s and found that:

*“... there is a discernible American strategic "culture": that culture referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, derives from perception of the national historical experience, aspiration for self-characterization (e.g., as an American, what am I?, how should I feel, think, and behave?), and from all of the many distinctively American experiences (of geography, political philosophy, of civic culture, and "way of life") that characterize an American citizen...”*<sup>70</sup>

The quotation above serves as a good example of what later would be considered a first-generation view of strategic culture.<sup>71</sup> The essence of strategic culture as a somewhat monolithic and unchangeable or slowly changing concept was central. The notion of different generations of scholars is exemplified in the works of Alastair Johnston who fought a scholarly duel with Gray

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<sup>68</sup> Snyder, J: *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*. RAND, Santa Monica 1977. & Booth, Ken: *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*. Holmes & Meier. New York 1979.

<sup>69</sup> Snyder (1977), p. 8-9.

<sup>70</sup> Gray, Colin S: “National Style in Strategy: The American Example” *International Security*, 6(2):21-47, Fall 1981.

<sup>71</sup> Gray later refined this definition to: “Culture or cultures comprises the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience.” See: Gray, Colin S. “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back”, *Review of International Studies*, 25(1):49-69, January 1999.

in the 1990s regarding strategic culture.<sup>72</sup> A central issue of the debate was the possibility of isolating culture from behaviour in order to form a falsifiable theory of strategic culture. Gray views strategic culture as context, while Johnston sees strategic culture as a variable, making for an opposite interpretivist and positivistic stance between the two.<sup>73</sup> Johnston's definition of strategic culture highlights a structural view of culture as a system of symbols:

*"Strategic culture is an integrated "system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious."*<sup>74</sup>

Johnston's overview of prior studies of strategic culture was outlined in a set of three generations.<sup>75</sup> These have subsequently been followed by a fourth one. The main elements of each generation are briefly described below and summarized in table 2-2.<sup>76</sup>

**The first generation** sees strategic culture as contextual, drawing from historical and geographical elements. The definitions within this generation had a problem of perhaps being too broad to *explain* anything, but still seem to have utility in using culture to *understand* strategic behaviour.<sup>77</sup> The first generation's inability to explain how strategic culture influences behaviour became one of the key points separating first and third generation research.<sup>78</sup> A first generation concept of strategic culture could be described as a monolithic entity rooted in historical experience which is slow to change.

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<sup>72</sup> For an insight into the Gray-Johnston debate, see: Johnston, A. I: "Thinking about Strategic Culture". *International Security*, 19(4):32-64, Spring 1995. Gray (1999). Johnston, A. I: "Strategic Culture Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray", *Review of International Studies*, 25(3):519-523, July 1999. Poore, Stuart: "What is the Context? A reply to the Gray-Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture", *Review of International Studies*, 29(2):279-284, April 2003.

<sup>73</sup> Johnston's positivism and Gray's interpretivism, see: Bloomfield, Alan: "Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 33(3):437-461, October 2012, p. 442-447.

<sup>74</sup> Johnston (1995), p.46.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> The overview of the three first generations of strategic culture is based on: Sondhaus, Lawrence: *Strategic Culture and Ways of War*. Routledge, New York 2006. And Johnston (1995). Additional references mentioned where applicable.

<sup>77</sup> 1<sup>st</sup> generation see: Snyder (1977), Gray (1999) & Sondhaus (1995), p. 7. Other authors include Carnes Lord and David R. Jones. Lord, Carnes: "American strategic culture", *Comparative Strategy*, 5(3):269-293. 1985.

<sup>78</sup> Johnston (1995), p. 38.

**The second generation** sees a de-linkage between strategic culture and behaviour.<sup>79</sup> With an initial focus on social elites the second-generation researchers saw strategic choices made by leaders as connected to interests rather than strategic culture.<sup>80</sup> The focus here were elements such as speech acts and political discourse. With the coupling of identity and interest of states later second-generation scholars couple constructivist arguments to strategic culture and the definitions include concepts such as identity, community, norms, ideas and patterns.<sup>81</sup> This made it possible to analyse culture as a whole as well as in its different shapes or parts i.e. norms. A more current second-generation concept of strategic culture focuses on the social elements of culture, the focus is on the interplay of identity, interest and culture, and how this is communicated.

**The third generation** draws much from A.I. Johnston, who is a self-proclaimed third generation scholar. Strategic culture is viewed as a system of symbols, and the isolation of behaviour from culture is argued to make it possible to build a falsifiable theory of strategic culture.<sup>82</sup> This implies a very clear positivistic approach to the study of culture. This is well illustrated by Johnston in his “central paradigm of a Strategic Culture”.<sup>83</sup> Strategic culture as a set of ranked preferences implies that the choices and decisions made will in some way be predetermined due to a strategic culture. This set of preferences is historically grounded and consists over time.<sup>84</sup> The persistence of strategic culture over time echoes the view of the first generation which also sees change in culture to be rather slow and limited. The third generation focuses on the study of the interplay between culture and behaviour. The idea of culture itself changing is not approached in any detail.

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<sup>79</sup> Johnston (1995), p. 40

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., Johnstons view of the second generation was based on early second-generation authors Bradley Klein and Robert Luckham. Klein, Bradley: “Hegemony and strategic culture: American power projection and alliance defence politics”, *Review of International Studies*, 14(2):133-148. 1988. & Luckham, Robin: “Armament Culture”, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 10(1):1-44. 1984.

<sup>81</sup> In the words of Christoph Meyer: “*comprising the socially transmitted, identity derived norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour that are shared among a broad majority of actors and social groups within a given security community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defence goals.*” in Meyer, Christoph O: “Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms” *European Journal of International Relations*, 11(4):523-549, p. 528. Or Edward Lock’s definition: “*...expect a strategic culture to enable the articulation of particular understandings of the identity of a community, the nature of its relationship with other communities, and the appropriate role of force within the context of those relationships.*” in Lock, Edward: “Refining strategic culture: return of the second generation” *Review of International Studies*, 36(3):685-708. 2010, p.700.

<sup>82</sup> Johnston (1995). & “Culture has independent explanatory power” see: Kier, Elizabeth: “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars”. *International Security*, 19(4):65-93, Spring 1995, p.67.

<sup>83</sup> The dimensions of Johnstons central paradigm: (X) Zero-sum nature of conflict, (Y) Frequency of conflict in human affairs, (Z) Efficacy of the use of force. See: Johnston (1995), p. 47.

<sup>84</sup> Johnston (1995), p. 53.

**The fourth generation** grew out of the deadlock set in the Gray-Johnston debate and the inability of previous research to explain change in strategic culture.<sup>85</sup> In the work of Alan Bloomfield, a new approach to strategic culture is introduced which focuses on ways of analysing change in strategic culture.<sup>86</sup> Bloomfield sets out to take elements from previous generations to build a strategic cultural model that both encompasses the contextual aspects of culture as well as the idea of building a falsifiable theory.<sup>87</sup> The study of subcultures thus becomes central. This combination of an interpretive approach and a probabilistic view of building falsifiable theory makes for an interdisciplinary approach which might well be addressed in the frame of constructivism.

Table 2-2 The four generations of Strategic Culture.<sup>88</sup>

Gen	Definition	Discipline	Focus
1 <sup>st</sup>	Culture as context	Interpretive	Historical and geopolitical elements
2 <sup>nd</sup>	Culture as socially transmitted, identity derived norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour	Constructivist	Social elites
3 <sup>rd</sup>	Culture as a system of symbols	Positivist	Connection between culture and behaviour
4 <sup>th</sup>	Culture provides context and consists of competing subcultures	Multidisciplinary	Change in strategic culture Subcultures

Approaches to strategic culture vary, but they all seem to address some main themes such as.

- Connection to a nation or strategic community (context)
- Some influence on (strategic) behaviour
- Cultural attributes (ideas, traditions, values, habits, symbols, languages, metaphors, attitudes, identities, norms, practices)

<sup>85</sup> Libel, Tamir: "Rethinking strategic culture: A computational (social science) discursive-institutionalist approach", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, published online, November 2018, p.8.

<sup>86</sup> Bloomfield, Alan: "Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 33(3):437-461, October 2012.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., p. 456-457. "...From Gray we take the notion that culture provides context; that it guides and shapes interpretation: we just have to accept that culture is a disaggregated thing with contradictory elements rather than a monolithic whole. From Johnston we take the goal of building falsifiable theory..."

<sup>88</sup> This table and a similar literature review can be found in: Lassenius, Oscar: *Svensk och finsk strategisk kultur efter slutet av kalla kriget*. Master's Thesis, Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm 2020, p. 8-13.



Besides the variety of definitions and conceptual differentiability in approaching strategic culture, the views on the durability and/or changeability of strategic culture vary. Most authors on strategic culture agree (to some extent) that it can change. It is in the manner and form in which this change takes place which is the object of debate. The fourth generation of strategic culture proposes adding *context* to the study of change. This implies that knowing the context is essential in order to study change. This thesis adopts this notion and the concept of *context in strategic culture* is discussed below.

### 2.2.1 Strategic Culture and Context

Context is itself a concept which can have multiple meanings, it is therefore vital to try to narrow down an approach in which Context<sup>89</sup> will be addressed in this thesis. Context is a central aspect of interpretive studies.<sup>90</sup> In an interpretive view it not possible to completely isolate objects of study from their context, everything is contextual. Regarding strategic culture, Context can be addressed in different ways depending on one's definition of strategic culture. In this chapter the concept of Context in strategic culture is discussed in three different approaches Culture as Context, Subcultures and World Culture. This leads to a summary of how Context is addressed in this thesis.

The notion of strategic culture rose from the study of nationally framed cultures, as in the example of Snyder's focus on the Soviet Union and Gray's focus on the USA.<sup>91</sup> These have been followed by a multitude of nation specific studies by Johnston focusing on China, Longhurst on Germany, Kier on France, Farrell on Ireland and Åselius on Sweden, just to mention a few.<sup>92</sup> Strategic culture is often studied in its nationally specific form.

Culture as context relies on a view that strategic culture is in many ways unchanging, nation specific and should be studied through historical accounts.<sup>93</sup> The study of nationally specific

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<sup>89</sup> Large C intentional when discussing Context as a concept.

<sup>90</sup> Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine & Yanow, Dvora: *Interpretive Research Design*. Routledge, New York 2012, p. 53.

<sup>91</sup> Snyder (1977) & Gray (1981)

<sup>92</sup> Johnson I. A: *Cultural realism: strategic culture and grand strategy in Ming China*. Princeton University Press, Princeton 1995. Longhurst, Kerry: *Germany and the use of force*. Manchester University Press. Manchester 2004. Kier (1995). Farrell, Theo: "Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army", *European Journal of International Relations*, 7(1):63-102, 2001. Åselius, Gunnar: "Swedish Strategic Culture after 1945", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 40(1):25-44, 2005.

<sup>93</sup> Lantis, Jeffrey S: "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy", *International Studies Review*, 4(3):87-113. 2002, p.95.

strategic cultures are *per se* in many ways descriptive apart from the role of being theory building. The idea of thick description studies of empiric cases in order to further understanding of strategic culture gained some support.<sup>94</sup>

Longhurst argued that: *“The context in which a state finds itself is also crucial in determining how a strategic culture affects behaviour...”* implying that the national context was dependant on a larger context, the external environment.<sup>95</sup> This context of contexts points out the need to clarify the extent of any given Context, as such World Culture is discussed below.

But the nationally specific contextuality of strategic culture is captured quite tot the point in Gray’s definition of strategic culture, but it also highlights the next topic to be discussed, sub-cultures.

*“Culture or cultures comprises the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are **more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community** that has had a necessarily **unique historical experience**. A particular community may well contain more than one strategic culture, just as there tend to be military cultures associated with particular missions or geographical environments”*<sup>96</sup>

Regardless if one views culture as context or has a more positivistic view, strategic culture itself seems to be divisible into smaller parts, subcultures. This is an idea that follows through the different generations of strategic culture ending up becoming the focus of attention in the 4<sup>th</sup> generation. Snyder argued that it is very likely that several subcultures exist in a specific strategic culture.<sup>97</sup> He even defined subculture in the following way:

*“A strategic subculture will be defined as a subsection of the broader strategic community with reasonably distinct beliefs and attitudes on strategic issues, with a distinct and historically traceable analytical tradition, with characteristic institutional associations, and with more or less distinct patterns of socialization to the norms of the subculture...”*

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<sup>94</sup> Poore (2003), p. 284.

<sup>95</sup> Longhurst (2004), p. 21.

<sup>96</sup> Gray (1999), p. 51-52.

<sup>97</sup> Snyder (1977), p. 10.

Johnston argued that content analysis of strategic cultural objects, starting from the earliest possible point of history, could lead to conclusions whether current strategic culture is the reflection of a particular subculture.<sup>98</sup> Meaning that the influence of subcultures could be one way of explaining the emergence of current strategic culture. Elizabeth Kier's study of French military culture exemplified a different connotation of strategic culture putting emphasis on competing political-military-subcultures.<sup>99</sup> This dynamic between political and military subcultures is one of the building blocks of the frame for the empirical study in this thesis.

Colin S. Gray agreed on the existence of subcultures but also argues about the need to distinguishing between public culture, strategic culture, and military (organizational) culture.<sup>100</sup> The idea of strategic culture as a non-unitary umbrella concept consisting of different subcultures seems to have gained support through the generations of research.<sup>101</sup>

For fourth generation scholars the subcultures themselves have become the focus of attention. Alan Bloomfield argued that subcultures should be viewed through a model "*...which treats singular strategic culture as containing multiple co-existing strategic subcultures. These subcultures each present a different interpretation of a state's international social/cultural context...*"<sup>102</sup> The study of competing subcultures was introduced as the way in which to study change in strategic culture.<sup>103</sup> This approach has been adopted in different settings and can be exemplified by Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk's study of European strategic culture.<sup>104</sup> Here the umbrella concept of strategic culture is European strategic culture, and the subcultures are national strategic cultures. This encompasses a distinct context of context, World Culture, a view that will be discussed more below.

In the study of subcultures an interesting approach has been adopted connecting the concept of Epistemic communities to subcultures. Tamir Libel makes such a link and defines epistemic communities as:

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<sup>98</sup> Johnston (1995), p. 50.

<sup>99</sup> Kier (1995), p. 72.

<sup>100</sup> Gray (2007), p. 10.

<sup>101</sup> Zaman, Rashed Uz: "Strategic Culture: A "Cultural" Understanding of War", *Comparative Strategy*, 28(1):68-88, p. 82.

<sup>102</sup> Bloomfield (2012), p. 437.

<sup>103</sup> For an example of competing subcultures in an Australian context, see: Burns, Alex & Eltham, Ben: "Australia's Strategic Culture: Constraints and Opportunities in Security Policymaking". *Contemporary Security Policy*, 35(2):187-210, June 2014.

<sup>104</sup> Brockmeier, Sarah, Kurtz, Gerrit & Junk, Julian: "Emerging norm and rhetorical tool: Europe and a responsibility to protect", *Conflict, Security & Development*, 14(4):429-460, August 2014.

*“...network of professionals with recognised competence and expertise within a defined area, and an authoritative claim for policy-relevant knowledge on that topic... an epistemic community that gets hold of the policy making process will shape the symbolic discourse of the strategic elite and therefore of strategic culture itself... the core of each respective subculture...”*<sup>105</sup>

Subcultures are a vital part in framing the study in this thesis. The idea of subcultures as epistemic communities is also relevant to this thesis and the stance on subcultures will be elaborated upon in chapter 2.3 and discussed in depth in chapter 3.

As shown above a nation specific or strategic community specific context can always be viewed in a broader context. This becomes the context of contexts. The problem becomes where to draw the line. Logically speaking context of context definitions could be never ending.<sup>106</sup> Studies with context that are broader than national communities include studies of transnational organizations such as the European Union (EU)<sup>107</sup>, dual context studies differentiating between domestic context and operational context in missions<sup>108</sup>, all the way to studies of common World culture.<sup>109</sup> In this thesis, the approach to the context of context dilemma, is that no strategic culture is isolated. Interaction between different strategic cultures is possible, and relevant to take into account in order to better understand a specific strategic culture.

Based on the observations above, this thesis adopts a multi-layered approach to Context where the national Swedish strategic community is central. The notion of a world culture is accepted and influence links between world culture and national strategic culture will be addressed. The national Swedish strategic culture is divisible into differing sub-cultures or epistemic communities. Context sets the frame in which continuity and change in strategic culture can be studied. A definition of the research specific Context of Swedish strategic culture is described in chapter 2.3 and discussed in depth in chapter 3.

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<sup>105</sup> Libel (2018), p. 13.

<sup>106</sup> As Colin Gray puts it: “... all context itself has context without empirical limit, Where does one stop?” in Gray, Colin S: “Culture: Beliefs, Customs and Strategic Behaviour” in *Perspectives on Strategy*, Oxford Scholarship online 2013, p 8.

<sup>107</sup> EU strategic culture, see: Norheim-Martinsen, Per M: *European Strategic Culture revisited: The Ends and Means of a Militarised European Union*, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2007.

<sup>108</sup> Ruffa, Chiara: “Military Cultures and Force Employment in Peace Operations”. *Security Studies* 26(3):391-422, May 2017, p. 394-396.

<sup>109</sup> World culture shapes the way states generate military power, see: Farrell, Theo: “World Culture and Military Power”, *Security Studies*, 14(3):448-488, September 2005, p.448.

### 2.2.2 Strategic Culture, Continuity and Change

Strategic culture was introduced as a concept to better understanding of the actions of foreign strategic communities, or one's own. As such the idea of strategic culture itself changing may not have been central. However the concept of change in strategic culture has been debated through the generations of research, ending up being the focus of attention in the fourth generation. Snyder held that "*Culture changes as objective conditions change*"<sup>110</sup> so change in culture was seen possible. Different stances on change in strategic culture are discussed below, ending up with a summary of how change in strategic culture will be approached in this thesis.

Johnston and Gray both saw strategic culture as somewhat monolithic and slow to change.<sup>111</sup> Gray started out by stating the strategic culture is a perpetual lens,<sup>112</sup> but shifted to accept that Culture can change: "*Furthermore, strategic culture(s) can change over time, as new experience is absorbed, coded, and culturally translated. Culture, however, changes slowly.*"<sup>113</sup> Also adding that the timeframe for change should be more than decades, otherwise the concept studied should not be held as culture.<sup>114</sup> Gray saw the way in which change in culture could occur as either evolving, or shifting seismically: "*if it is assaulted by a traumatic shock of sufficient awesomeness*"<sup>115</sup> Going on to see that culture can change rapidly "*...through a process of learning and borrowing, when pressure of circumstances provides the motivation.*"<sup>116</sup> In such an interpretation strategic culture can change, either slowly through evolution, or rapidly through the effects of shocks.

David Haglund argues that researchers of strategic culture have gone wrong by holding on to either a context view or a causality stance.<sup>117</sup> In doing so he directs criticism both at Johnston and Gray. Haglund argues that both views hold merit and neither should be categorically dismissed. He then sets out to divide strategic culture into context and cognition, drawing from political culture. Methodologically Haglund argues that change can be best addressed through the concepts of path dependency and identity, thus taking a constructivist approach to the

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<sup>110</sup> Snyder (1977), p.9.

<sup>111</sup> "In this sense the, central paradigm provides information that reduces uncertainty about the strategic environment; but it is shared information that comes *from deeply historical sources, not from the current environment*" in Johnston (1995), p. 46.

<sup>112</sup> Gray (1981), p.22.

<sup>113</sup> Gray (1999), p. 52.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Gray (2007)

<sup>116</sup> Gray (2013), p.27.

<sup>117</sup> Haglund, David G. "What good is strategic culture?", *International Journal*, 59(3):479-502, Summer 2004.

study of strategic culture. Change can be observed through changes in identities and studies of symbols is key. Change is path-dependant and changes are slow.

Challenging Haglund's view, Iver Neumann and Henrikki Heikka argue that strategic culture is ever changing and should not be viewed as path-dependent *per se*.<sup>118</sup> The authors set out to connect strategic culture to practice theory. They offer three practices: Doctrines, Civil-Military Relations, and Procurement as a framework for further studies. Strategic culture is viewed as a dynamic interplay between Grand Strategy and these practices.<sup>119</sup> Change in strategic culture can best be observed through studying the practices and their interplay with Grand Strategy. This conceptualization offers that strategic culture is ever changing and does not stand still. Change can occur quickly as it is dependent on practices and is in itself a continuous interplay between strategy and practice. Their study focuses on small states and they go on arguing that poaching or "cultural loans" are key in understanding change.<sup>120</sup>

With a similar distinction of strategic culture, as fluctuating and under stress of change, as previously mentioned Alan Bloomfield set out to study change through subcultures.<sup>121</sup> He sees merit in Neumann and Heikka's view on the use of Practice theory, but criticises them for opening up for analysis which sees "*too little continuity*"<sup>122</sup>. Bloomfield argues that there had been too much focus on "*rationalist-materialist-universalist theorizing*" and that there had been an overly focus on "*strategic cultural continuity*".<sup>123</sup> Bloomfield set out to frame a research agenda that encompasses notions from both Gray and Johnston.<sup>124</sup> Adding epistemic communities to this approach as a way of looking into subcultures and study how they change makes for an interesting approach.<sup>125</sup> Subcultures will be addressed in this thesis as they seem to have influence on both Context and Change.

Kerry Longhurst argued in the study of German strategic culture, that:

*"Change in a strategic culture comes in two principal forms: finetuning and fundamental, with the former variant being the more frequent. Change in the form of fine-tuning may occur when issues have arisen, from either domestic or international sources, that have challenged*

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<sup>118</sup> Neumann, Iver B. & Heikka, Henrikki "Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of Nordic Defence", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 40(1):5-23, 2005, p. 6-9.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., p.19.

<sup>121</sup> Bloomfield (2012)

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., p. 448.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., p. 438.

<sup>124</sup> Mentioned earlier, see page 20 above, Ibid., p. 456-457.

<sup>125</sup> Libell (2018)

*or at best sat uneasily with the established foundational elements of the strategic culture...  
...**Fundamental change** of a strategic culture is a far less common phenomenon. It is more abrupt in nature, occurring when trauma is sufficiently severe as to nullify the existing strategic culture, giving rise to the establishment of new core beliefs, leading subsequently to new policies and practices...*"<sup>126</sup>

The degree or extent of change as a dimension of change will be addressed in this thesis regarding change in Swedish strategic culture.

Theo Farrell approached change in strategic culture through the study of norms and how the transplantation of norms affected the construction of Ireland's professional army.<sup>127</sup> He argues that change in culture can occur through norm transplantation. This may be generated in three ways: (1) external shock, (2) norm entrepreneurs, (3) personnel change.<sup>128</sup>

In a similar approach Christoph Meyer focused on explaining how norms change. Meyer argues that change could be achieved through three different processes. (1) Learning through changing threat perceptions, (2) learning through institutions, (3) mediatized crises learning.<sup>129</sup> The focus is on how changing external conditions affect a strategic culture and the process in which this is transmitted through changing norms.

But why would the study of norms be interesting in connection to strategic Culture? As Benjamin Zyla puts it, norms are deeply ingrained, identity-derived collective expectations of what is appropriate behaviour and the least volatile components of a strategic culture.<sup>130</sup> This would imply that if a change in norms can be observed then this could mean that strategic culture has changed. The idea of observing changes in strategic culture through the study of norms is adopted in this thesis and draws from this strain of research, mainly found in the second generation of research on strategic culture. What norms are, and which particular norms that will be studied in this thesis will be discussed in chapter 2.2.3.

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<sup>126</sup> Longhurst (2004), p. 18. Emphasis on key terms added to original text with in bold.

<sup>127</sup> Farrell (2001)

<sup>128</sup> Farrell (2001), summary and analysis by: Howlett, Darryl & Glenn, John: "Epilogue: Nordic Strategic Culture" *Cooperation and Conflict*, 40(1):121-140. 2005, p. 128. The idea of external shocks is echoed by Gray (2007), Zyla, Benjamin: "Overlap or Opposition? EU and NATO's Strategic (Sub-)Culture" *Contemporary Security Policy*, 32(3):667-687, p. 682.

<sup>129</sup> Meyer (2005)

<sup>130</sup> Paraphrasing Benjamin Zyla (2011), p. 671.

In this thesis change in strategic culture is approached as follows. Change in strategic culture is possible. Change can occur in different degrees either as fundamental change or finetuning. Change is dependent on context, both national, international and subcultural. Studying norms as expressions of culture is a viable option in order to identify change in strategic culture. Changes in norms could indicate changes in culture. In this sense this thesis will focus on initially studying the contextual factors of Swedish strategic culture in order to be able to identify relevant norms in relation to their specific context (chapter 3). This will be followed by a case study of norms emitted from the Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine (chapter 4). In order to structure a coherent study of norms and change, the concepts of Identity, Interests, Policy, Norms and the role of doctrine will be discussed in the following chapter.

The study of norms as influencing culture, but also as a product of culture means attempting to break into a circular argument. But the study of norms their influence on culture and the effect these have on strategies in certain periods of time and vice versa is what is attempted.

*“...those focusing on the nature of any one state’s strategic culture would consider those factors (such as history, geography, ideas, norms, experiences of conflict and invasion) influencing the cultural context that gives rise to particular strategies in certain periods and that in turn informs successive generations of the population.”<sup>131</sup>*

### 2.2.3 Strategic Culture, Identity, Interests, Policy, Norms and Doctrine

This thesis revolves around the relationship between Strategic Culture, Identity, Interests, Policy and Norms. The relationship between these elements and culture as well as the role of doctrine is discussed in this chapter. The discussion on the before mentioned concepts is followed by a description of the approach to identifying norms adopted in this thesis.

Regarding state identity formation this thesis follows Alexander Wendt’s thoughts of identity and its formation as a process of cultural selection which informs change in identity through a process of social learning.<sup>132</sup> The collective identity formation and interaction between states is as such accepted, but not highly relevant for this thesis, as the focus is on a specific national identity rather than the identities interaction in the international system.<sup>133</sup> The fact that states

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<sup>131</sup> Howlett & Glenn (2005), p. 129.

<sup>132</sup> “To have an identity is simply to have certain ideas about who one is in a given situation...” Wendt, Alexander: *Social Theory of international politics*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999, p. 170, Social learning see p.326 – 336.

<sup>133</sup> Collective identity formation, see: Wendt, Alexander: “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, *American Political Science Review*, 88(2):384-396, June 1994. On the international system, see Wendt,



seem to set their identities in contrast to others is also acknowledged, and as such the identities may generate interests.<sup>134</sup>

Regarding the connection between culture and identity this thesis follows an approach like the one championed by Peter Katzenstein, “...in attempting to incorporate into the analysis of national security both the cultural-institutional context of the political environment and the political construction of identity... ...both factors help to shape the definition of interests and thus have demonstrable effects on national security policies”<sup>135</sup>

The relationship between identity, interests, policy and norms were brought together in a set of arguments by Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein in the following manner:

- “1. *Effect of norms (I). Cultural or institutional elements of states’ environment – in this volume, most often norms – shape the national security interest or (directly) the security policies of states*
2. *Effects of norms (II). Cultural or institutional elements of states’ global or domestic environments – in this volume, most often norms – shape state identity.*
3. *Effect of identity (I). Variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affect the national security interests or policies of states.*
4. *Effects of identity (II). Configuration of state identity affects interstate normative structures, such as regimes or security communities.*
5. *Recursivity. State policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and institutional structure.*”<sup>136</sup>

The relationships are depicted in the figure below.

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Alexander: “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics”, *International Organization*, 46(2):391-425, Spring 1992.

<sup>134</sup> Neumann, Iver B: “Identity and Security” *Journal of Peace Research*, 29(2):221-226. 1992. The four basic interests or appetites: “1. *physical security, including its differentiation from other actors* 2. *ontological security or predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities* 3. *recognition as an actor by others, above and beyond survival through brute force* 4. *development, in the sense of meeting the human aspiration for a better life, for which states are repositories at the collective level.*” Wendt (1994), p. 385.

<sup>135</sup> Katzenstein, Peter J: *The culture of national security: norms and identity in world politics*. Columbia University Press, New York 1996, p. 26.

<sup>136</sup> Jepperson, Ronald L, Wendt, Alexander & Katzenstein Peter J: “Norms, identity and Culture in National Security” in Katzenstein, Peter J: *The culture of national security: norms and identity in world politics*. Columbia University Press, New York 1996, p. 52-53.




Figure 2-1 Causal pathways between environment, identity, interests, and policy.<sup>137</sup>

In this thesis these relationships are central. The key takeaway is that norms are a part of shaping security interests, identity and policy. There is a relationship between norms, policy, interests, and identity. Studying norms is in a sense, due to recursivity, studying a circular phenomenon. Norms help shape identity, interest and policy, however the former affect and articulate norms. As norms will be the focus of the case study in this thesis a definition of what a norm is and what kind of norms are to be located becomes key.

How norms relate to culture is of central importance in this thesis. Studying norms is an approach to studying elements of culture. The connection between culture and norms is described in a definition of norms as given by Theo Farrell, and Terry Terriff:

*“Cultural norms are intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action. Norms are intersubjective in that they are beliefs rooted in, and reproduced through, social practice... ..Norms constitute actors and meaningful action by situating both in social roles (e.g., military professionals) and in social environments (e.g., interstate war versus intrastate conflict). In addition, norms regulate action by defining what is appropriate (given social rules, moral codes, etc.) and what is effective (given the laws of science). In short, norms make meaningful action possible by telling military actors who they are and what they can do in given situations. In this way, cultural norms define the purpose and possibilities of military change.”<sup>138</sup>*

<sup>137</sup> Remake of the figure in: Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein (1996), p. 53

<sup>138</sup> Farrell, Theo & Terriff, Terry: “The Sources of Military Change” in Farrell, Theo & Terriff Terry (eds.): *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, London 2002, p. 7.

Accepting the definition of norms above as such it is relevant to mention the different types of norms mentioned in the definition. The *constitutive* and *regulatory* norms. as Jepperson et. al. put it: “*Norms are collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity... sometimes norms operate as rules defining (and thus “constituting”) an identity... In other instances, norms are “regulative” in their effect.*”<sup>139</sup>

Norms can either constitute, be the building blocks of identity, and as such culture. Or they can be regulatory, in the sense that they draw from an identity or interests and regulate actions in accordance with these factors. This thesis will try to identify both strains of norms in the study of Swedish strategic culture.<sup>140</sup> Taking into account that some norms might encompass both attributes, being constitutive in nature and regulatory in effect.<sup>141</sup>

This thesis adopts an initial definition of doctrine according to Harald Høiback which states: “... *doctrines are authoritative documents military forces use to guide their actions containing fundamental principles that require judgement in application.*”

The core point taken from Høiback is however not this definition, but his point of military doctrine in that it should be viewed from multiple angles. Doctrine, according to Høiback, consists of three elements: *Authority*, *Theory*, and *Culture*. This model of doctrine is depicted below in figure 2-2




Figure 2-2 The doctrinal triangle as per Høiback.<sup>142</sup>

<sup>139</sup> Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein (1996), p.54.

<sup>140</sup> For an institutional approach on studying norms, see: Della Porta, Donatella & Keating, Michael (eds.): *Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences – a pluralistic perspective*, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge 2008, p. 56.

<sup>141</sup> As Wendt sees it: “*I assume that norms are norms but that they vary in their balance of causal and constitutive effects. After determining empirically that a particular norm has only causal effects we might decide to call it “regulative,” but this should be taken to describe a pattern of effects, not a “kind” of norm.*” in Wendt (1999), p. 165.

<sup>142</sup> Høiback (2013), p. 56.

From this model of doctrine this thesis accepts that doctrine has cultural elements. The cultural aspect of doctrine is in the notion as Høiback writes, that: “*Doctrine tells us who we are...*”<sup>143</sup>. In connecting doctrine to norms through the shared element of culture makes for a central assumption taken in this thesis: If doctrine is in some part cultural in its essence, then these cultural aspects could be identified in the form of norms. The connection between norms, identity, interests and policy implies that by identifying norms in doctrine, one simultaneously identifies norms which either constitute an identity, or regulates action as per influence of current state identity. One can find either constitutive or regulatory norms (or constitutive norms with regulatory effects). This relationship is depicted in the figure below.

The norms identified reflect a picture of a state identity that is time specific. A continuous change of identity occurs in the interplay between state identities in the international system. Likewise state internal forces change state identity over time. This means that studying norms in a doctrine from 2002 can only further understanding of what the state identity and strategic culture looked like at that specific time. A doctrine from 2012 might show other aspects of state identity and strategic culture. If there is a difference between the observations of temporally different doctrines, this would imply that there has been a change in strategic culture.




Figure 2-3 Causal pathways between environment, identity, interests, policy, and doctrine. <sup>144</sup>

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., p.57.

<sup>144</sup> The figure is a developed version of the figure by Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein (1996), p. 53.

This thesis draws from the definitions in figure 2-1, adding doctrine as an element and illustrating the relationship between the environmental structure, state identity, interests, policy, doctrine and norms (figure 2-3). The flow of norms is intended to show that there is not a single set of norms. Norms can be identified in connection with the different elements. A norm derived from state identity might inform doctrine, just as a norm derived from state policy can be a part of shaping state identity. Single state norms are also connected with the broader international context of interacting states, thus state norms can help shape transnational norms. Any change identified can be either fundamental or some sort of finetuning. Deciding over whether observed change is fundamental or not is left to be a matter of interpretation. No attempt to operationalize change in some gradable scale will be attempted. As previously argued, change in strategic culture is also highly dependent on context, both national (organizational), international and subcultural. The research process in which context is described and change is identified is described in the following chapter.

## 2.3 Research method and process

The research method used in this thesis is based on an interpretive methodology. This means that the research is oriented to meaning making rather than measurement. This orientation strives to answer why rather than wherefore. This also means that any causality is approached as constitutive rather than mechanical.<sup>145</sup> An abductive logic of inquiry is approached through basing the initial analysis on theory derived categories of inquiry, but the empirical data provides the detailed structure. The design evolves as learning occurs through the analysis of empirical data.<sup>146</sup>

A case study design is used to form a basic frame for the study. In this case the case study design offers an overall design in which the interpretation of empirical data is addressed in its relevant context. In this sense a case study approach to design which by default emphasises the importance of context seems to fit the purpose of this thesis well.

### 2.3.1 Case study

This thesis adopts an interpretive case study design. The case study is not used in a “classical” positivistic approach where the design of the case study strives to be a mechanism that drives the research to reach conclusive generalizable knowledge.<sup>147</sup> A case study is rather used as a means of design and structure.<sup>148</sup> A case study design is adopted to enable the study of the chosen research object in its real life context.<sup>149</sup> The involvement of context is relevant as this is an interpretive study as well as due to the fact that strategic culture itself is dependant of (or even is) context. This case study encompasses three cases and as such it encompasses both in-case and between cases analysis. The design of the case study is depicted in the figure below.

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<sup>145</sup> Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine & Yanow, Dvora: *Interpretive Research Design*. Routledge, New York 2012, p. 113.

Contrasting approaches to research design. Interpretive and positivist methodology compared.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., p. 32-34.

<sup>147</sup> For a “classical” view on case-study see: George, Alexander L. & Bennett, Andrew: *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. MIT Press, Cambridge 2004.

<sup>148</sup> This thesis follows the ideas of: Yin, Robert K: *Case Study Research and Applications – design and methods 6th edition*. Sage Publications, London 2018.

<sup>149</sup> Yin (2018), p. 9-15.




Figure 2-4 Case study design.

Determining and bounding the cases is essential to lay the foundation of a case study.<sup>150</sup> In this thesis the cases are tied to the three military strategic doctrines that exist in Sweden to this date. Each doctrine is treated as its own case. The bounding of the cases is executed in chapter three where a description of Swedish strategic culture as a set of subcultures is offered, and also by positioning the doctrines in the Swedish strategic landscape. This structure makes for a multiple-case design.<sup>151</sup> The three cases offer an opportunity for comparative analysis between the cases by which it is possible to reach answers to the research questions.

Regarding collection of data this case study relies solely on documentation.<sup>152</sup> The central data in the case study is found in the doctrinal texts. While the description of Swedish strategic culture is dependent on both public documentation as well as secondary sources of prior research. The frame of each case is also dependant on a combination of primary and secondary sources. But as the case study focuses on the doctrinal texts and their relationship to strategic culture it is within the texts that the data will be mined.

<sup>150</sup> Yin (2018), Defining and bounding cases p. 28-32.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., Case design p.60-63.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., Other sources of evidence might include archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation or physical artefacts. p. 114.

Analysis of the data aims at breaking down the empirical data (doctrines), identifying norms and their subcultural belonging to enable a comparative analysis of change in strategic culture during the timeframe of the study. The basis for analysis stems from theory, the doctrines provide the data that structures the analysis, this makes for an abductive approach as the analysis is not completely ground-up but neither is it purely deductive.<sup>153</sup> The tool used to break down and analyse the doctrines is thematic content analysis.<sup>154</sup> In this thesis thematic content analysis is adopted through deductive category formation, and inductive forming of themes. The categories and the questions asked to the doctrinal texts are listed in the table below.

Table 2-3 Categories and questions to text

Category	Question to text
Threat perception	What is the threat?
Tasks and goals for the use of force	What is to be achieved?
Time	When is this to be achieved?
Location	Where should this be achieved
Ways of using force	How should it be achieved?
Means for using force	With what should it be achieved?
Preferences regarding cooperation	With whom should it be achieved?
Legal aspects	What authorizes the use of force?
Type of document	What type of document is the doctrine?
Relationship to strategic culture	What is the explicit and /or implicit relationship to strategic culture in the doctrine?

Through answering the questions stated and analysing the data found for each category three sets of norms have been identified.<sup>155</sup> The norms revolve around threat, use of force and the role of doctrine. These norms are the “themes” of the thematic content analysis. Each norm has then been interpreted as to influences of the three subcultures identified as influential in chapter 3, policy-, military- and academic culture. The difference in the norms and in their subcultural affiliation is the focus of the comparative between cases analysis.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., Strategies for case studies. p. 168-169.

<sup>154</sup> Mayring, Philipp: *Qualitative content analysis: theoretical foundation, basic procedures and software solution*. GESIS, Klagenfurt 2014, p. 104.

<sup>155</sup> Data collection conducted as a process of reading and re-reading. Data fitting as answers to the questions per category have then been axially coded and the results summarized in the text of the thesis. On coding see: Rietjens, Sebastiaan: “Qualitative data analysis: Seeing the patterns in the fog of civil-military interaction” in Soeters, Joseph, Shields, Patricia, Rietjens, Sebastiaan (eds.): *Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies*. Routledge, New York 2014, p. 129-141.



### 2.3.2 Reference materiel

The reference materiel of this thesis encompasses a variety of document sources. Using documents as the primary source of data has its strengths and weaknesses. Strengths with using documents are that they are stable and can be reviewed repeatedly, they are unobtrusive and are not created as a result of this case study. Documents are also specific and can contain the exact names, references and details of an event but also be broad and cover a long span of time, many events and many settings.”<sup>156</sup> Weaknesses with using documentation cover problems with retrievability, biased selectivity, reporting bias and access.<sup>157</sup> The form of documentation used in this thesis is described below linked to its different sections. Regarding weaknesses of using documents as sources in this thesis the aspects of retrievability and access is managed by focusing on studying the unclassified aspects of strategic culture. Undoubtedly the study of classified information might give a different picture, but this is not for this thesis to cover. As for biases the focus will be on reporting bias. The question of bias is addressed in chapter 6.

As this thesis adopts an interpretive approach the relationship to reference materiel and evidence need to be clear.<sup>158</sup> The character of evidence is treated as not being true or false or good or bad. The data found in the reference materiel is interpreted by the researcher and the aim is to form an understanding, thus the researcher is also a part of creating the evidence. As for the form of evidence the goal is to find evidence by collection and analysis of relevant data from documentation. Using sources other than documents could enhance the breadth of evidence, but this thesis limits itself to dealing with documentation. The reference materiel of this thesis is described in 3 different sub-sections: Theory of strategic culture, Context of Swedish strategic culture, and Case study references.

The primary sources used regarding the theory of strategic culture are peer reviewed articles published in scientific journals. Besides these articles some key books have been identified and complement the literature review based on the articles. Peer reviewed articles are treated as viable sources to use as they have a certain degree or reliability having gone through an academic review process which should ensure good quality. The journals in which the articles have been published also give some indication as to the quality of the articles. The reference materiel in this section of the thesis holds a high standard.

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<sup>156</sup> Strengths, Yin (2018), p. 114.

<sup>157</sup> Weaknesses, Ibid., p.114.

<sup>158</sup> On character and forms of evidence see: Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine & Yanow, Dvora: *Interpretive Research Design*. Routledge, New York 2012, p. 79-89.

The primary sources for describing the context of Swedish strategic culture are official Swedish governmental documents and policy papers. Secondary sources have been used in order to summarize historical events and developments in Sweden that are arguably of importance for understanding the historical background of the empirical study of Swedish strategic culture in the Post-Cold War era. The reference material in this section is selective and may to some extent suffer from selection bias regarding the secondary sources used.

The primary source for the case study is the Swedish military strategic doctrine. Each of the three cases frames (context) are based on official Swedish governmental documents and policy papers. Secondary sources have been used in order to give perspective to the documents analysed. The use of doctrinal texts as primary sources for data in the case study is a limiting choice. However, it is precisely through the breaking down of the doctrines and restructuring the data that an analysis can be performed to answer the research questions stipulated for this thesis.

### 3 SWEDISH STRATEGIC CULTURE

This chapter aims at uncovering some insights into what is known about the Swedish strategic culture. This is achieved through examining organizational factors of the Swedish state, followed by an analysis of sub-cultures and their role in defining a comprehensive Strategic cultural landscape. All this sums up to explaining why and how one can use the Military Strategic Doctrine to understand strategic culture. The chapter answers the second research question: What do we know about Swedish strategic culture. The answer serves as an umbrella-context in which change in strategic culture is examined in chapter four.

#### 3.1 Strategic actors in the Swedish state

The political system of the Swedish state and actors relevant to the formation of security and defence policy need to be described in order to understand how the state works from an organisational point of view. When strategic culture is examined on state level it encompasses all the different actors which work together or in conflict with one another to ultimately achieve policy recommendations and the official policy of the state. It is only through identifying and knowing the different actors one can aim at understanding change inside the strategic culture of the state.

Sweden is a constitutional monarchy. This means that the head of state is the King, but the executive political power lies with the Prime Minister as head of the democratically elected government.<sup>159</sup> As a western democracy the legislative power lies within parliament, the government executes policy, and the courts oversee and uphold the justice system.<sup>160</sup> The cabinet of the government is manned by ministers which oversee a range of specific policy sectors. Each sector has its own set of state agencies which are manned by public officials.<sup>161</sup> The Swedish model of government is based on a concept of consensus where ministerial rule is specifically banned in the constitution.<sup>162</sup> Decisions made by the cabinet are always made by a number of ministers together. The role of consensus in decision making as coded in law and is a basic element of Swedish political culture.

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<sup>159</sup> Sveriges riksdag: *Kungörelse (1974:152) om beslutad ny regeringsform*, Stockholm 1974:152, §4-6, §8.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid.

<sup>161</sup> <https://www.government.se/how-sweden-is-governed/> (viewed 29.4.2020)

<sup>162</sup> Sveriges riksdag (1974) §3, The lack of central political control over national defence in Sweden compared to other western countries, see Åselius (2005), p. 28.

State agencies execute policy as directed by the government and hold a rather autonomous status.<sup>163</sup> A state agency receives annual direction from the government in the form of tasks and budgetary means. Each agency is run by a Director General who has complete authority over the conduct of the agency. A principal rule is that the government only gives tasks and aims to any given agency as well as the means needed to execute the tasks given. The ways in which an agency executes the tasks in accordance with Swedish law cannot be influenced by any actor outside the agency, not even the government.<sup>164</sup> This autonomy over ways of executing policy is a central element in the governing of Sweden. The Director General of an agency is appointed by the government and can of course as an extreme measure be substituted by another one if the conduct of an agency is not to the liking of the government.

One of these state agencies is the Swedish Armed Forces. The Director General of the SwAF is in the same position as all other Director Generals, but has an additional task which exceeds the running of the SwAF, being Commander in Chief of the SwAF in peacetime as well as in wartime.<sup>165</sup> It is not the King, not the Prime Minister, but the Commander of the SwAF who is Commander in Chief. This has implications on the political oversight of the Armed Forces. The principal for directing the SwAF is in accordance with the direction of other agencies, but the special characteristics of the authority to use lethal force in defence of the state arguably makes the relationship between political leadership and the SwAF unique.

The political control of defence forces resides with the government as executive authority, with the ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of defence and ministry of finance as key actors. The ministry of foreign affairs controls the execution of international aspects of security and defence policy, while the ministry of defence focuses on defence policy aspect. The ministry of finance controls the finance of all agencies and therefore also the SwAF. Parliament decides upon defence whitepapers as proposed by the government. Here the parliamentary external affairs and the defence *utskott* are key actors<sup>166</sup>. Regarding the preparation and drafting of security and defence policy the Defence commission organized under the ministry of Defence is the key actor.

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<sup>163</sup> Autonomy of state agencies introduced in the 17<sup>th</sup> century by Axel Oxenstierna, see: Åselius (2005), p. 28, 38. Current state agencies <http://www.myndighetsregistret.scb.se/Myndighet> In April 2020 there were 250 different state agencies.

<sup>164</sup> Sveriges riksdag (1974), Chapter 12.

<sup>165</sup> As decided in 1992, see Swedish Cabinet (1992), p.6. In line with recommendations from 1991, see Swedish Ministry of Defence (1991).

<sup>166</sup> In Sweden the term *Försvarsutskott* refers to a sub-committee of parliament, *Försvarskommitté* was a separate actor. Both translate into Defence committee in English.

The first defence commission was organized in 1992 and took the role of policymaker from the defence committees which had this task during the Cold War.<sup>167</sup> The defence commission was structured with government officials as well as experts from all the political parties within the parliament. This parliamentary approach was taken to strive for a broad consensus for upcoming security and defence policy. Initially the defence commission worked as a link between the government and the political parties of parliament, but soon evolved to be an even more influential actor with responsibilities regarding consultations and ensuring cooperation between relevant actors.<sup>168</sup> The defence commission is the key actor in preparing governmental whitepapers and ensuring that they will pass to decision by the parliament. This makes the defence commission interesting from a sub-cultural aspect, as a meeting place for political culture, more organizationally related public servant culture and military culture. Taking one step further one could incorporate influences of other sub-cultures such as the defence industry and academia. Mapping the sub-cultures at work regarding security and defence policy is therefore the next task at hand.

### 3.2 Subcultures and epistemic communities

The existence of Subcultures has been recognized as a part of strategic culture since the introduction of the concept in the 1970-s.<sup>169</sup> A subculture can be imagined as a sub-unit of a strategic culture. A strategic culture is more than the sum of each subculture and might be better addressed as the product of the interactions between these subcultures.<sup>170</sup> If this is the case a dominant subculture could influence the strategic culture more than a non-influential subculture. It is therefore the interactions between subcultures that require attention if one is to understand change in strategic culture.

Subcultures based on organizational entities is one way of addressing the subject. From this point of view some potential subcultures relevant to Swedish security and defence policy could be described as per the figure below. Here strategic culture as an umbrella concept consists of at least the following subcultures: Political (Policy), Military subculture, Defence industry subculture, Academic subculture

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<sup>167</sup> Haldén (2007), p. 63-64.

<sup>168</sup> Haldén (2007), p. 64

<sup>169</sup> Snyder (1977), p.10, Gray (1999), p.51-21., Bloomfield (2012).

<sup>170</sup> Bloomfield (2012).




Figure 3-1 Swedish strategic culture as a set of subcultures.

The political subculture consists of political agents. There are the political parties, the Parliament, with its committees (utskott) and the defence commission which is a key actor, the Government with its ministries of which the ministry of Foreign affairs, the ministry of Defence and the ministry of Finance are central in deciding on security and defence policy.<sup>171</sup>

The military subculture consists of military agents. The main elements are the Commander in Chief (ÖB), the SwAF HQ, the Army, the Air Force and the Navy. The role of the supreme commander is central in this layout as he acts as a link between the political and the military subcultures. Also depicted in the figure is the military strategic doctrine (MSD). The doctrine serves as the Commander in Chief's strategic guidance to the SwAF and as such is influential both within the political and the military subculture.<sup>172</sup> The individuals preparing the doctrine thus compose an agent acting under the influence of military, political, defence, and academic culture.

<sup>171</sup> As discussed in chapter 3.1. above.

<sup>172</sup> On the doctrines (MSD) role in describing the connection between political, military strategic and operative levels, see: Ahlgren, Patrik & Pettersson, Ethel: Utveckling av militärstrategisk doktrin . en dokumentation av den pågående processen, *Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift*, nr. 1, p. 37-42. Stockholm 2001.

The defence industry subculture consists of a variety of commercial companies which supply the SwAF with materiel and services.<sup>173</sup> Some companies are arguably more influential than others, for instance SAAB which provides the JAS Gripen to Swedish Air Force as well as Submarines to the Swedish Navy.<sup>174</sup> However as far as subcultures goes one might rightly address the defence sector as an industrial subculture of Swedish strategic culture. A direct linkage between the industry and the military strategic doctrine is not identified and is therefore not part of the analysis in this thesis.

As a subculture the Academia might be the most resistant to definition. As academics might hold themselves to be objective, free of affiliations and guided by academic freedom, not to be categorized as a particular anything. The existence of an Academic subculture is however feasible. The Royal Academy of Sciences<sup>175</sup> for instance, best known for the Nobel Prize, as well as the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences<sup>176</sup>, are examples of organised influential groups of scientists which act within their own subculture. There is no need to consider the whole academic field in Sweden to form a united subculture. By narrowing the scope to security and defence policy then the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences as well as the National Defense University<sup>177</sup> arguably are influential even to the extent of a subculture.

Subcultures can, as shown above, be identified through an organizational perspective with a centre of gravity revolving around a shared identity by belonging to a specific organizational community. This organizational community can be either very specifically defined as structured governmental entities, or more loosely defined around other commonly shared attributes. But subcultures can also be approached as formed around specific policies and thus being cross sectional in a way where different domestic groups such as political parties, ethnic groups or institutions promote their favoured subcultures.<sup>178</sup> In this sense an institution like the Military does not by itself form a subculture of strategic culture, while a specific form of security policy does form its own subculture drawing support from different domestic groups

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<sup>173</sup> For a list of companies in the defence sector, see: The Swedish Security and Defense Industry Association: <https://soff.se/en/>

<sup>174</sup> SAAB <https://saab.com/>

<sup>175</sup> The Royal Academy of Sciences was founded in 1739: <https://www.kva.se/en/startside>

<sup>176</sup> The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences was founded in 1796: <https://kkrva.se/>

<sup>177</sup> The Swedish Defense University, is an independent government agency: <https://www.fhs.se/en/swedish-defence-university.html>

<sup>178</sup> Bloomfield (2012), p. 452, 438.

including the military. This means treating subcultures as epistemic communities<sup>179</sup>. An example of such an approach to subcultures is depicted in figure 3-2 below.




Figure 3-2 An example of epistemic communities reaching over organizational entities.

As doctrine is often written by a group of experts in different fields which have been identified as important for addressing different aspects of the doctrine, one could wonder if such a group of experts could be viewed as an epistemic community. As an epistemic community the doctrine task force would work together in formulating a commonly acceptable version of what the doctrine should compromise of, as well as drawing from the different fields of expertise, what message the content should convey to its readers. As such an epistemic community of doctrine writers hold the key to the formulating of norms, conveying of cultural elements which are encoded in the doctrine as “official truths”.

The process of change in policy from a fourth-generation perspective of strategic culture compiled by Tamir Libel suggests a process of policymaking consisting of a triggering event, four stages of change and reaching a new equilibrium.<sup>180</sup> A policy crisis leads to the collapse of a hegemonic subculture which sparks the process of change. The process of change starts with a

<sup>179</sup> An Epistemic community shares the same core beliefs about a subject, epistemic communities in research traditions see: Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine & Yanow, Dvora: *Interpretive Research Design*. Routledge, New York 2012, p. 130-137.

<sup>180</sup> Libel (2018), p. 13.



stage of policy innovation where different epistemic communities position themselves and a re-definition of subcultures occurs. This leads to a stage of policy diffusion where different epistemic communities compete for influence in the policy debate. This stage leads to policy selection where policymakers choose from proposed options. The last stage is policy persistence where policy makers adopt the strategic subculture of one epistemic community. This then leads to a new equilibrium of policy as championed by the new hegemonic subculture.<sup>181</sup>

As the process described above is intended as a conceptual framework for studying policy formation, one comes to wonder if this process is adaptable as a framework for understanding change in doctrine as well. The utilization of this process for analysing doctrinal change will be discussed further in chapter five.

### 3.2.1 Military Culture

The existence of Military culture and its role as a subculture closely linked to and part of a strategic culture warrants an examination of the concept. Elizabeth Kier defines Military Culture as an intervening variable between civilian decisions and military doctrine, as: “*the set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that shape collective understandings*”<sup>182</sup> The definition as an intervening variable implies that Military Culture affects the formation of military doctrine. The way in which a military doctrine translates political decisions and guidance into coded doctrine is dependent on the prevalent Military culture. This description manifests Military culture as the organisational culture of a military organisation.<sup>183</sup> This is a holistic view in which the military as an organization interprets political guidance.

Military Culture has been studied on a variety of levels, take as an example Andrew Bell’s research into the connection between military culture and armed-group behaviour.<sup>184</sup> Here Military Culture is “*the beliefs, customs, and institutions that socialize combatants to organizational norms*”<sup>185</sup> This study is an example of studying military culture and its effects on behaviour within the military organization, not the relationship between policy and military action. Another example of this kind of study is Chiara Ruffa’s research into military behaviour in peace operations where military culture is seen to affect variations in military behaviour on an

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<sup>181</sup> The process paraphrased from Libel (2018), p. 13.

<sup>182</sup> Kier (1995), p. 68.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> Bell, Andrew M: “Military Culture and Restraint toward Civilians in War: Examining the Ugandan Civil Wars”. *Security Studies*, 25(3):488-518, July 2016.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid., p. 489.

individual level.<sup>186</sup> This kind of research into Military culture revolves around military organizations and the actions of individuals or groups within the organization. Regarding the extent of studies into Military Culture, Professor Alastair Finlan argues that the present research of Military Culture: “... offers a synthesis of pragmatic and theoretical approaches. It defines military culture in structural and non- structural terms as an all- embracing social environment, infused with an explicit martial orientation, in which material and non- material accoutrements, actions, discourses, practices, symbols and technologies revolve around the sustenance of specific identities, histories and traditions.”<sup>187</sup> Military culture as such is, much as strategic culture, hard to define. The study of internal mechanisms in Military culture, and its effect on military behaviour is not pertinent to this thesis, but it is the relationship between Military culture and other subcultures that warrants some attention.

The link between Strategic culture and Military culture sometimes makes it difficult to separate the two. In a study of Swedish strategic culture professor Gunnar Åselius links the two concepts as he offers an overview of developments in Swedish strategic culture between 1945 and 2005.<sup>188</sup> What Åselius finds is that Swedish strategic culture has changed over time. Changes have occurred from a concept of peoples defence, via a short period of high-tech defence back to a concept of peoples defence in the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>189</sup> In the 1980's and 1990s followed changes influenced by globalization and technological advances coupled with demands on effective administration.<sup>190</sup> The loss of a Soviet threat in the 1990s led to a divergence where the larger population still viewed homeland defence as the core task of the SwAF while the leading elite in the military profession held international operations as the core task.<sup>191</sup> These differentiations between the larger population and professional military officers took place in a time of professionalization and social changes for the officer corps.<sup>192</sup> Åselius shows that Swedish strategic culture changed from a preference for homeland defence to a preference for international operations, while the military culture changed from peoples defence to defence by “professionals”. From these observations one can conclude that civic culture affects military culture. The link between strategic culture and military culture however seems to go both ways. Changes in strategic culture affects military culture as per tasking and policy guidance, but military culture also affects strategic culture through the work of higher echelons of military

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<sup>186</sup> Ruffa (2017), p. 393.

<sup>187</sup> Finlan, Alastair: *Contemporary military culture and strategic studies: US and UK Armed Forces in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*. Routledge, Abingdon 2013, p. 4-5.

<sup>188</sup> Åselius (2005)

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., p.29-37.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., p. 37-39.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid., p. 40-41.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid., p. 37-39.

command as experts regarding policy formation. In a Swedish context it seems that strategic culture is not separate from military culture but the two are clearly linked.

### 3.2.2 Political culture – Policy culture

The concept of political culture has its roots in the 1960's as a subfield of political studies.<sup>193</sup> Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba stated that: "*The political culture is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation.*"<sup>194</sup> Political culture encompasses the attitudes, norms, values, beliefs, views of reality, feelings for political phenomena, self-perception, and knowledge of political issues.<sup>195</sup> All this in the form of Political Culture is tied to specific national contexts, and for this thesis it is sufficient to state the acceptance of a Swedish political culture. Politics on the other hand is in the context of this thesis viewed as the "*constrained use of social power*"<sup>196</sup> The study of politics is therefore: "*the study of the nature and the source of those constraints and the techniques for the use of social power within those constraints*"<sup>197</sup>. The existence of a Swedish way of political interaction and specific traits of Swedish political culture is relevant to acknowledge, as Politics is the greater context in which policy is developed. Policy "*designates the behavior of some actor or set of actors, such as an official, a government agency, or a legislature, in an area of activity such as public transportation or consumer protection*".<sup>198</sup> Security- and defence policy, as public policy, is highly relevant to the study of strategic culture and the following case study of Swedish Military Strategic doctrine and is viewed in light of the definition: "... *a relatively stable, purposive course of action or inaction followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern*"<sup>199</sup> This is the point where we enter to examine the Swedish political subculture, in reference to security and defence policy as well as its relationship to doctrine. The matter of concern is the defence of Sweden, the course of action is stated in public documents such as governmental whitepapers.

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<sup>193</sup> For an in-depth overview of the study of Political Culture see: Welch, Stephen: *The Theory of Political Culture*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013.

<sup>194</sup> Almond, Gabriel, A., Verba, Sidney: *The civic culture: Political attitudes and Democracy in five nations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1963, p.14-15.

<sup>195</sup> Österud, Öyvind: *Statsvetenskap: Introduktion i politisk analys*, Natur och kultur, Stockholm 2002, p. 226.

<sup>196</sup> Goodin, Robert E. & Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (eds.) *A New Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford University Press, New York 1996, p. 7.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> Anderson, James E.: *Public policymaking eight edition*. Cengage Learning, Belmont 2014, p.6.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid., p.7.

The making of security and defence policy in Sweden in the Post-Cold War era has been extensively studied by Eva Haldén.<sup>200</sup> The before mentioned defence committee is a central security and defence policy agent, but the SwAF also has its own role in policymaking. For instance the “Perspective Studies” made by SwAF are an influential tool in directing policy.<sup>201</sup> The perspective studies offer an insight into how defence planning is and will be affected by policy decision made. The funding of the SwAF is a central factor which forces the SwAF to adapt its structure, armament and tasking sometimes with little or no regard to factual changes in the security environment. The funding of defence forces might be a dilemma shared by many nations worldwide, but in Sweden the funding issue has become quite problematic and a focal point for policy formation.

Haldén talks about black holes regarding the funding of SwAF.<sup>202</sup> The mismanagement of funds allocated to the SwAF and a continuing cutting of funds from the political level ultimately lead to a loss of trust between the armed forces and their political masters. This has then led to changes such as establishing a post for a Director General in the SwAF in 2005.<sup>203</sup> The Director General is a civilian post with the main task of overseeing the use of funds in the SwAF. But the most decisive change is the growing extent of micromanagement of the SwAF in policy papers and political decisions.<sup>204</sup> In Sweden defence policy does not only guide the SwAF and provide it with the funding required to meet its tasks. The policy papers manage the ends, ways and means of the SwAF to an extent in which little is left for the agency to manage for itself. Thus Swedish policy culture in security and defence issues is coloured by a degree of mistrust against the SwAF and a direct by micromanagement approach to political control of the main governmental agency tasked with providing security for the state. This policy culture is a part of the broader Swedish strategic culture. Such a strong policy culture would then inevitably affect the formation of doctrine. The influence of policy culture on doctrine might theoretically be either to incorporate policy guidance as given, or be seen as circumventing policy guidance in the writing of doctrine all the way to disregarding policy requirements in the doctrinal texts. In any event, policy affects doctrine, and policy culture as a dimension of policy could thus also affect doctrine.

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<sup>200</sup> Haldén (2007)

<sup>201</sup> Haldén (2007), Perspektivstudier p. 67. for examples of perspective studies reports see: <https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/om-forsvarsmakten/dokument/perspektivplanering/> with studies from 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2013 and 2018.

<sup>202</sup> Haldén (2007), p. 98.

<sup>203</sup> Director general for the SwAF, see: <https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/organisation/sa-leds-forsvarsmakten/generaldirektoren/>

<sup>204</sup> Haldén (2007), p. 227-248 and Zetterberg (2007).

### 3.2.3 Academic culture

This thesis holds that an academic subculture could exist in the Swedish strategic culture. But defining what this academic culture is becomes challenging. Does a generic academic culture exist? If yes then the attributes connected to this culture might be drawn from philosophical aspects and the relationship to reality knowledge and a systematic approach to conduct research.<sup>205</sup> But an academic culture could also be treated as organizational, differing between states with independent education systems as well as between universities and colleges.<sup>206</sup> The academies of the world create and nurture their own academic culture and international cooperation in research means that these cultures interact and thus may in some way affect each other. But the meaning of academic culture for this thesis is a Swedish understanding of it. What is it that the academic world can provide to the enhancement of Swedish defence?

A notion of academization was introduced in Sweden in the 1990s.<sup>207</sup> The idea was to benefit from an academization of the officers' profession. Reasons for striving for an academic officers corps were described as striving to gain individual capability for: *"independent and critical assessment, distinguish, formulate and solve problems, meet change in the workplace, search for and value knowledge on a scientific level, follow the development of knowledge."*<sup>208</sup> Connecting research with education was thus seen as vital.<sup>209</sup> The notion of combining military experience with research in order to generate new knowledge was one that the central motives expressed.<sup>210</sup> But an aspect of better recognition of Swedish officers internationally through academization was expressed.<sup>211</sup> A better quality of officers became the goal. But the change was not necessarily only involved in changing and reshaping the officers profession. As stated in a cabinet proposal in 2006: *"A university education for the defence sector is to be regarded as a tool to meet the new challenges that have been identified in defence, foreign and security policy."*<sup>212</sup> Broadening the issue to cover the defence sector and leading up to the redefinition

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<sup>205</sup> Such concepts as ontology epistemology, methodology, method can be viewed as "academic" in their own right, see chapter 2.1.

<sup>206</sup> An organizational view of academic culture and its management, see: Dill, David D.: The management of Academic Culture: Notes on the Management of Meaning and Social Integration, *Higher education*, 11(3):303-320, May 1982.

<sup>207</sup> Nordlund, Peter: *Officersutbildning, i Sverige och internationellt*, FOI-R-3371-SE, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm 2012.

<sup>208</sup> Swedish Ministry of Defence: *Ett reformerat skolsystem för Försvarsmakten*, SOU 2003:43. Stockholm 2003, p. 72.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid., p. 73, 78.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid., p. 78. Implying that the best way of forming knowledge is through a process of academic research.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid., p. 79.

<sup>212</sup> Swedish Cabinet: *Högskoleutbildning av officerare m.m.*, Regeringens proposition 2006/07:65. Stockholm 2007, p. 8.

of the Swedish Defence University to becoming a University equal to all other Swedish universities and being moved from under the ministry of defence to the ministry of education in 2008.<sup>213</sup> Currently the Swedish Defence University educates both civilian and military students and can award degrees of bachelor, master, and doctor. This academization of the defence sector happened at the same time as the introduction of the new military strategic doctrine in 2002 and continued as the new doctrines of 2012 and 2016 came into being. The desire to change the strategic culture in Sweden to be based more on military science expressed in the first doctrine links the two.<sup>214</sup>

The academic subculture of Swedish strategic culture is thus centralized around the Swedish Defence University, but could also contain all and any entities supporting the academization of the Swedish security and defence sector. Then most of the universities in Sweden and abroad might be included. This thesis holds that academic values, processes and education seem to be held at high regard in Sweden. An academization of personnel involved in security and defence issues, and mainly the officer corps, has been ongoing since the early 1990s and is still ongoing. This means that there are grounds to state that an academic subculture exists. The implications of such a subculture are linked with a bettering of the quality of personnel to be able to gain and develop knowledge in the support of Swedish defence efforts. This does not however mean that knowledge development becomes unproblematic or objective. It is in the interaction of policy, military and academic culture that new knowledge and its representations, such as doctrines, come to be. Academic culture is a subculture of strategic culture and is defined by the academic agents in any given state as well as through the interaction of an international academic community. Academic culture is a set of values, norms and beliefs that shape a collective understanding of standards of scientific research and education, but especially how knowledge can and should be generated.

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<sup>213</sup> Nordlund (2012), p. 13. & Swedish Cabinet (2007), p. 13.

<sup>214</sup> MSD02, p. 3.

### 3.2.4 Strategic culture as the sum of subcultures

A national strategic culture can be viewed as composed of a given set of different subcultures which interact and sometimes overlap each other. As an umbrella concept a national Strategic Culture can be held as either the sum of cross-sectional epistemic communities, or a defined set of organizational subcultures i.e. policy, military, industry and academia. In this thesis the focus is on the latter one. This division of strategic culture into subcultures is not definite, and not the only way of doing it. Any and all of the subcultures used in thesis could be rearranged or divided into even smaller sets of subcultures. For instance, the political subculture could be divided into differentiated subcultures based on policy affiliations or political parties. The military subculture is divisible into services, regiments or even smaller groups such as Headquarters, Special Forces task groups etc. Any definition of subcultures is always a limiting decision. The path chosen in this thesis regarding the division of Swedish strategic culture into subcultures serves the purposes of the case study. It is the interaction of a set of subcultures and their relationship to the Military Strategic Doctrine which is under examination.

## 3.3 Swedish Strategic culture and the Military Strategic Doctrine

Previous studies of Swedish strategic culture have focused on Swedish strategic actions and decisions. Fredrik Doeser studied Swedish participation in international peacekeeping operations and found that Swedish strategic culture put international operations before homeland defence and uses force based on moral obligations.<sup>215</sup> Swedish strategic culture was seen as internationally orientated. In another study on strategic actions in international operations Jan Ångström and Willem Honig saw that Swedish strategic culture has a distinct national and international dimension. Sweden has been able to make strategic choices in multinational operations based on its own preferences and withheld from use of force in cooperation with great powers (US&UK).<sup>216</sup> There seemed to be a trait of autonomy in strategic decision making versus great powers in Swedish strategic culture. Chiara Ruffa on the other hand lifts previous neutrality and current military non-alignment as a constitutive element of Swedish strategic culture, an element that is under stress as increased international defence co-operation.<sup>217</sup> Thus a requirement for change in Swedish strategic culture was identified. Studies such as the ones

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<sup>215</sup> Doeser, Fredrik: "Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector: The impact of strategic culture", *Comparative Strategy*, 35(4):284-297. 2013.

<sup>216</sup> Ångström, Jan & Honig J. W: "Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture and Escalation in Afghanistan". *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 35(5):663-687, November 2012.

<sup>217</sup> Ruffa, Chiara: "Sweden" in Biehl, Heiko, Giegerich, Bastian, Jonas Alexandra (eds.): *Strategic Cultures in Europe Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent 1st edition*, Springer Fachmedien. Wiesbaden 2013.

mentioned here focus on strategic culture through state behaviour and decisions made in specific situations. Through examining strategic norms which are identifiable in the Military strategic doctrine one can gain a holistic view of Swedish strategic culture.

The Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine is a focal point, drawing inputs and cultural influences from multiple directions and encoding them into explicit rules and guidelines. Changes in strategic culture should therefore in some manner be identifiable through the study of the doctrines and how they change over time. The doctrine gets its guidance from official governmental policy, legislation, as well as guidance from the supreme commander. It is through combining security and defence policy, legislative guidelines, conceptualizations of the military professions view on how to provide adequate measures to ensure that politically derived tasks and policy that the doctrine comes into being.

Any analysis of military doctrine is dependent on the theory chosen to explain or further understanding of the object of analysis. Barry Posen analysed military doctrines based on organizational and balance of power theory.<sup>218</sup> Regarding organizational theory Posen stresses the influence of Purpose, People and the Organizational Environment.<sup>219</sup> This could be interpreted to mean Military organizations form their doctrines based largely of professional attributes, soldiers are socialized in their organizational environment and doctrines as heavily affected by professional military advice and legacy. This is addressed in this thesis through the analysis of the military subcultural influence on doctrine. Posen goes on to state that balance of power theory holds explanatory power regarding civilian intervention in doctrine formation.<sup>220</sup> Civilian intervention in doctrine formation in this thesis is analysed from two perspectives. The influence of policy on the military strategic doctrine and how well it is aligned with policy goals is one aspect, where the extent to which policy affects the doctrine is analysed.<sup>221</sup> The other perspective is the extent in which policy directly dictates military ends, ways and means in Sweden. Both these aspects are addressed in the case studies by analysing the policy subculture and its influence on doctrine.

The theory for this thesis is focused on strategic culture and not explicitly organizational or balance of power theory. Thus the statements above about addressing similar issues as Barry

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<sup>218</sup> Posen, Barry R.: *The Sources of Military Doctrine – France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*. Cornell University Press, London 1986. Organizational theory p. 43-59, Balance of power theory 59-77.

<sup>219</sup> Posen (1986), p. 43-59.

<sup>220</sup> Posen (1986), p. 74-79.

<sup>221</sup> Posen sees that “*Military doctrines may or may not be integrated with the political objectives of grand strategy.*” Posen (1986), p. 33.



Posen did primarily goes to show that research into any given subject can revolve around similar phenomena but the chosen theory informs the research and thus makes it possible to reach differing answers to similar questions. In this thesis it is assumed that a generic Military Strategic Doctrine could in some way address the following questions: <sup>222</sup>

- What is the threat? (threat perception)
- What is to be achieved – (tasks and goals for the use of force)
- When is this to be achieved? (time)
- Where should this be achieved? (location)
- How should it be achieved? (ways of using force)
- With what should it be achieved? (means for using force)
- With whom should it be achieved? (preferences regarding cooperation)
- What authorizes the use of force? (legal aspects)

Answers to these questions can be approached as strategic norms. A strategic norm is a corridor within which strategic choices are made.<sup>223</sup> The stated answer provides an expectation of action that will be taken, or an expectation of how other actors actions will be interpreted. These answers thus lay the ground for normative (expected) behaviour. Take for example Threat perception which is constructed as a counter-piece for tasks and goals of the defence force.<sup>224</sup> These are the result of deliberate choices made based on informed analysis of the threat environment, and the ways and means available to counter relevant threats. There is as such no perfect answer, only choices made. This thesis draws from the assumption that changing norms signal changes in strategic culture. As the Military Strategic Doctrine is a collection of subculturally informed strategic norms it is then possible to study these norms, identify changes in them over time and analyse why this change has occurred.

In addition to the questions above the following two questions will also be addressed.

- What type of document is the doctrine? (Academic text / Field manual)
- What is the explicit and/or implicit relationship to strategic culture in the doctrine?

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<sup>222</sup> The categories of analysis are partly similar to the ones used by Christoph O. Meyer who studied: “Goals for the use of force, The way in which force is used, Preferred mode of cooperation and the threshold for Domestic and International Authorization” Meyer (2005), p. 530. However Meyer’s focus was not on military doctrine.

<sup>223</sup> Strategic norms as corridors of choice: Meyer (2005), p. 524.

<sup>224</sup> On construction of threat perception see Linnéll, Jarno: “Finnish threat perception policy in the early years of the 21st century”. *Finnish Defence Studies*, National Defence University, Helsinki. 2012.

The answers to these two questions help to provide a descriptive image of the academic sub-cultures influence on the doctrines, as well as establish if the doctrines are shaped with similar or differing views on strategic culture. The thematical content analysis of the three doctrines structured in a three case-study in the following chapter enables the analysis of subcultural influences on doctrine formation as well as furthering the understanding of how Swedish strategic culture can be understood through strategic norms.

## 4 CASE STUDY: SWEDISH MILITARY STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

This case study focuses on Swedish military strategic doctrine and its relationship with Swedish strategic culture. The study encompasses three strategic doctrines which span over a timeframe from 2002 to 2016. The doctrines however are the products of changes which occur prior to publishing and their influence spans over a changing amount of years since they have been published. This means that the timeframe that is studied covers developments from the early 1990s until 2019.

Initially the case study context is set through placing the doctrine in the Swedish strategic landscape which has been described in chapter 3. This is followed by three single case studies which each revolve around a specific military strategic doctrine. The context of each case is described as a frame based on the time specific relevant security and defence policy developments which have affected the forming of the specific doctrine. This is followed by a dissection of the doctrine through a thematic text-analysis which strives to identify what norms the doctrine addresses and in which way. The set of norms are interpreted as descriptive of a case specific image of a constructed strategic culture. Finally the results of the three case studies are compared based on context, continuity and change. The final result is an interpretation of strategic culture as derived from doctrine answering the third research question: In which ways has Swedish strategic culture changed?

### 4.1 Positioning the doctrine in the Swedish strategic landscape

The Swedish Military strategic doctrine is per initial definition a military doctrine. It is owned and maintained by the SwAF and authorized to be used by the Supreme commander of the SwAF.<sup>225</sup> The doctrine is organizationally positioned within the frame of the SwAF. In the hierarchy of documents, the doctrine is positioned below laws, whitepapers, governmental tasks and direction and is at the highest level of normative documents in the SwAF. The doctrine is however not given as an order and no sanctions are attached to not following it. The stated intent of the doctrine is to work as a guideline for military action in Sweden, not to be followed to the letter, rather to guide thinking and give direction.<sup>226</sup> The doctrine is tied to a military

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<sup>225</sup> MSD02, MSD12 and MSD16, ÖB signature in doctrines.

<sup>226</sup> Ahlgren, Patrik & Pettersson, Ethel: Utveckling av militärstrategisk doktrin . en dokumentation av den pågående processen, *Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift*, nr. 1, p. 37-42. Stockholm 2001, p. 40.

strategic level, which in Sweden links the SwAF to the government via the Ministry of Defence.<sup>227</sup> The influence of the doctrine, its output, is mainly focused in the SwAF, but other actors are affected by it as well. It is through the doctrine that legislators and policy makers can see the effects of their work. The translation of policy into guides for action in the form of a doctrine informs the political masters of the armed forces general intent regarding the use of force in military matters. The doctrine also has a broader audience within Sweden in the form of other governmental agencies, students, researchers and defence industry workers. All of these actors can study the doctrine to get insights into the presumed actions of the SwAF. There is also an international audience for the doctrine, which encompasses friendly actors as well as potential hostile actors. The doctrine informs nations seeking to cooperate with Sweden in defence matters what to expect of the SwAF as well as it informs potential aggressors what kind of defence they might be up against.

As the military strategic doctrine guides the SwAF in the context of the defence of Sweden its inputs come from a broad range of different sources. The different sources stem from varying subcultural contexts and thus the doctrine is influenced by a set of subcultural influences. This subcultural context, as described in chapter three, positions the doctrine in between two main subcultures, the policy and the military. The academic subculture influences the inputs to the doctrine either directly or via the political or military subculture. In this way the doctrine is positioned as a focal point between three main competing subcultures.<sup>228</sup> The inputs to the doctrine are funnelled through the authors of the doctrine who make informed choices about what to put into the doctrine and what not to. This community of writers of the doctrine form an epistemic community which focuses on shaping a normative image of reality shaped by multiple inputs. This image of the expected actions of the SwAF, the what, when, why aspects is coded into normative doctrine.

The Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine is thus organisationally fixed to the SwAF and culturally influenced by multiple subcultures and composed by an epistemic community of writers. The doctrine is normative as it describes expected behaviour. Acting according to doctrine is expected but there are however different parts of the doctrine. Some parts might be more of guidelines while others emphasize strict adherence i.e. national and international law. The following analysis will focus on different strategic norms embedded in the text of the doctrine. It is through the study of these norms that a picture of Swedish strategic culture is sketched.

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<sup>227</sup> MSD16, p. 18

<sup>228</sup> See figure 3-1 in chapter three above.

## 4.2 Case A – Military Strategic Doctrine 2002

The first case focuses on the first Swedish Military Strategic doctrine from 2002. As this was the first doctrine of this type to be produced in Sweden the context within which the doctrine was formed, its frame, might be addressed in different ways. The description of the frame for the doctrine from 2002 is limited to the Post-Cold War era. The choice to limit the frame in such a manner was made due to the fact that it was only after the end of the Cold War that a need for a military strategic doctrine evolved to the point that it came into being. The changes in Swedish defence policy and the SwAF in some way lead to a point where this kind of doctrine was seen as useful. The frame of the doctrine is described below followed by an abductive analysis of the doctrine in the search for strategic norms. The norms are then analysed as per where they stem from and what potential subcultural influences they contain.

### 4.2.1 Frame – From national to international defence

The development of Swedish security and defence policy during the first decade after the end of the Cold War can be described as a time of searching for a new purpose. The loss of a stable threat as a basis for security and defence considerations coupled with a broader re-arrangement of European security and defence arrangements was in a Swedish context a search for meaning. Edström & Gyllensporre describe the defence doctrines of Sweden at the time after the end of the Cold War until the release of the first doctrine in 2002, as the death of neutrality (1991-1994), the adaptation doctrine (1994-1998) and the operational doctrine (1998-2002).<sup>229</sup> Their observations speak for a development where defence of the homeland is substituted by a focus on international operations and development defence capabilities to tackle “new” security threats.

The loss of the threat from the Soviet Union<sup>230</sup> lead to a search for meaning in Swedish defence policy. An international focus was introduced at the same time as “new” threats such as terrorism international crime, environmental issues humanitarian crises<sup>231</sup> became central. International crises such as the Gulf War supported striving for quality over quantity in force structure<sup>232</sup> while the

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<sup>229</sup> Edström & Gyllensporre (2014).

<sup>230</sup> Swedish Cabinet: *Totalförsvarets utveckling till och med budgetåret 1996/1997 samt anslag för budgetåret 1992/93*, Regeringens proposition 1991/92:102. Stockholm 1992, p.8-9, 13-14. and Swedish Cabinet: *Totalförsvaret i förnyelse*, Regeringens proposition 1995/1996:12. Stockholm 1995, p.3.

<sup>231</sup> Swedish Cabinet: *Fortsatt förnyelse av totalförsvaret*, Regeringens proposition 2001/02:10. Stockholm 2001, p. 12-13. & Swedish Cabinet: *Totalförsvaret i förnyelse – etapp 2*, proposition 1996/97:4. Stockholm 1996, p. 58. & Swedish Cabinet (2001), p. 12. & Swedish Cabinet (2005), p. 8.

<sup>232</sup> Swedish Cabinet (1992), p. 13-16.

Balkan conflicts inspired an increased interest in international cooperation,<sup>233</sup> simultaneously increasing motivation for interoperability between Swedish forces and its European and US counterparts.<sup>234</sup> A development that continued and got new direction with the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and the following operations in Afghanistan.<sup>235</sup> The international dimension helped justify the existence of a Swedish Defence Force which seemed to have lost its requirement for national defence.

The use of force in the defence of Sweden changed from the SwAF being the only one to defend Sweden in the early 1990s to being part of an international defence of values and rights.<sup>236</sup> This gradually meant the shift from a conscription based quantitatively large defence force with a total defence concept deeply enrooted in national structures towards an internationalization of defence and gradual deconstruction of the total defence concept.<sup>237</sup> In the mid-1990s the requirement for the SwAF was to be able to withstand strategic surprise by a large force but simultaneously organize an international force.<sup>238</sup> The concept of neutrality in war was still present in policy in 1992, but faded from policy papers with the EU membership in 1995 and the introduction of a European security dimension in Swedish security and defence policy.<sup>239</sup> The increased cooperation with NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme also enabled a broadening of international cooperation for Swedish defence.<sup>240</sup> The developments in the 1990s and the initial years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century depict a process of internationalization and realignment of Swedish defence. The first military strategic doctrine was published in the midst of this ongoing process.

The process of academization of the Swedish officer corps was set in motion in the early 1990s this process was ongoing when the first military strategic doctrine was published and the intent stated in the doctrine to ensure the change of strategic culture to be based more on research and military science is indicative of a linkage between the requirements of academization and the doctrine.<sup>241</sup> The use of doctrine as a tool for education was also stressed by members of the team in charge of writing it.<sup>242</sup> It is against this frame as described above that the strategic norms are to be weighed.

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<sup>233</sup> Swedish Cabinet (1995), p. 5, 16.

<sup>234</sup> Swedish Cabinet (1992), p. 14-16. & (1995), p. 27-28.

<sup>235</sup> Swedish Cabinet (2001), p. 47. & (2004), p. 16. Note that the Afghanistan lessons came after the release of MSD02.

<sup>236</sup> Swedish Cabinet (1995), p. 1-2, 4-5 & (1996), p. 1-2.

<sup>237</sup> Swedish Cabinet (1992), p. 2-8.

<sup>238</sup> Swedish Cabinet (1995), p. 2.

<sup>239</sup> Swedish Cabinet (1992), p. 4-5. & (1995), p. 4.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>241</sup> See chapter 3.2.3 Academic culture and Swedish Ministry of Defence: *Försvarsmaktsgemensam utbildning för framtida krav – Slutbetänkande från Utredningen om Försvarsmaktens skolverksamhet (Fö 1996:07)*, SOU 1998:42. Stockholm 1998. & MSD02, p. 3

<sup>242</sup> Ahlgren & Petterson (2001), p. 40.

#### 4.2.2 Strategic Norms – need for a defence force

The strategic norms have been identified through a thematic content analysis of the first military strategic doctrine published in 2002. The results of the analysis are presented below as norms identified within: threat, use of force and role of doctrine. These norms are then interpreted per their subcultural affiliation. This in-case analysis is the basis for the comparative analysis between cases.

##### **Threat – Conflict is a complex but inevitable matter.**

The threats which the armed forces are to prepare for are described in a very overreaching manner. There seems to be a wide range of issues that lay the foundation for why an armed force is seen to be needed. The abstraction level of the parts of the doctrine which describe threats is reasonably high. Starting out with a description of conflict as a struggle of wills where the human factor is of vital importance<sup>243</sup> and where complexity and uncertainty are aspects which have to be managed.<sup>244</sup> Any action taken has to take into account the many frictions which arise from complex situations filled with uncertainties.<sup>245</sup> Time as a factor is linked to initiative and the need to act in a timely and decisive manner.<sup>246</sup> All these beforementioned factors are described as foundational elements of conflict, a conflict that seems inevitable and part of human nature.

The description continues with examples of mechanisms which seem to increase the likelihood of conflict to arise, these are increased globalization and societal development.<sup>247</sup> Where the increased globalization develops an increased dependency between nations but also forms new vulnerabilities and issues like mass immigration, disease and organized crime become global problems. Technological development has led to increased opportunities for various actors to gain better ways and means to meet their ends through tools like the internet and cheap world-wide communication. The ability to strike many targets simultaneously over the globe makes for a more complex security environment. It seemed that it was not sufficient only to protect geographical areas and borders, security issues are portrayed as global.<sup>248</sup> The societal development involves changes in values, political will, new actors, technology, external and internal

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<sup>243</sup> MSD02 p. 15-16. A clear connection to the thinking of Carl von Clausewitz. His book “On War” is recommended literature on page 32 in the doctrine.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid., p. 18-19.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid., p. 20. Friction in war is again closely related to Clausewitz.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>247</sup> Ibid., p. 22-23.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

relations.<sup>249</sup> Violence is seen to be directed at critical societal functions, military forces, the civilian population as well as international NGO's.<sup>250</sup> The societal changes are stated to have changed the nature of conflict in a way where it is easier to target and affect a variety of different societal structures and actors.

There seemed to be different reasons for conflict that were complex, involving multiple actors, be material or immaterial have covert goals and even change in character when conflicts evolve.<sup>251</sup> Threats can be actor driven or without an immediate aggressor, they can be catastrophes and even accidents<sup>252</sup>. All these aspects make for a very broad view on security where uncertainties are prevalent all over society and in-between societies. Regarding actors in conflict regular and irregular forces are described, as well as the concept of asymmetry between differing actors.<sup>253</sup> In this asymmetry even moral factors are seen to have a vital role if different moral views clash.<sup>254</sup> Conflict is described as involving different levels ranging from peace via armed conflict to war. The dynamics of conflict are seen as scalable from escalation via deadlocks to de-escalation.<sup>255</sup> All of this ends up with an idea of preconditions in the struggle of wills where the use of force is the outermost means to be used but should always be used in relation to standing regulations.<sup>256</sup> The defence force is of course the implied user of force in this upcoming struggle.

The description of threat in the doctrine reads as a textbook on conflict, crisis and war set in a context of a widened perspective of security. Uncertainty, Complexity and Inevitability are themes that form a picture where there is an undisputable need for a defence force. But against, what, when and where are left open for interpretation. The loss of a common threat perception on a political and policy level is circumvented in the doctrine by the use of a highly abstract description of the threat. There is a threat, there will be conflict, we need to prepare for it, but no one can say when, where or against whom.

The description of threat summarized as a norm:

Conflict is a complex but inevitable matter. It involves the whole of society and is global by nature. War is the peak of conflict.

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<sup>249</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>252</sup> Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>253</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>254</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>255</sup> Ibid., p. 29-31.

<sup>256</sup> Ibid., p. 32.



### Use of force – defend the nation

Regarding the goals and tasks for the use of force the doctrine states that the primary goal is to “*defend the nation against armed attack in any shape or form it may take*”<sup>257</sup>. This primary aim is divided into stages of growing conflict-intensity starting with preventing conflict, continuing via dampening or suppressing conflict, protecting the nation and its population and leading up to defending the nation in war.<sup>258</sup> All the before mentioned stages aim at securing “freedom of action” for Swedish state actors.<sup>259</sup> To meet the requirements of maintained freedom of action in all levels of conflict the SwAF’s ultimate task is defined as armed combat<sup>260</sup>, and the aim is to win. The tasks for the SwAF is described further as to deter, prevent, disorganize and destroy the enemy through multifunctional operations.<sup>261</sup> The total defence concept, which involves the SwAF and all other governmental agencies and civilian society, aims are to defend all of Sweden against armed attack, secure territorial integrity, add to peace and security in the world, strengthen Swedish society while under great strain.<sup>262</sup> The use of force is thus limited to the SwAF regarding combat, but the defence of the nation and its national and international interests are depicted as a matter for the whole Swedish society.

Reaching the stated goals for the use of force requires continuous action and preparation. To this end the doctrine offers an insight into the readiness of the SwAF. Initial operational readiness should be achieved in a matter of hours while rapid reaction forces should be able to act within two to ten days. For international operations select units are to be ready in a time period of 30 to 90 days, while the main defence forces for national operations should be ready within a period of months up to years. Reserve forces for continued fighting require several years to be actionable.<sup>263</sup> The depiction of readiness and preparedness divided into categories as per type of forces is straight forward and descriptive of a continuous readiness for national and international operations.

Where force is to be used is described in twofold. Initially the domains of battle and war are described as: ground, sea, air and information.<sup>264</sup> These domains are depictive of an idea of where different assets can be deployed and used to combat aggression and defend the nation.

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<sup>257</sup> MSD02, p. 1.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid., p. 1, 55. The concept of deterrence is not explicitly mentioned. The Swedish term “Avskräckning” is not used, but a more subtle word “förhindra”, to prevent, is used.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid., p. 36. “Väpnad strid” translated into armed combat. The concept involves the monopolization of violence within state agencies. The ultimate aim for the SwAF is thus to perform in combat and win battles.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>262</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid., p. 120.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

But the same domains are relevant for international operations as the doctrine states that the SwAF is to “*defend Sweden in all cases and events, in Sweden as well as in other parts of the world*”<sup>265</sup>. This clearly defines the use of force as being a matter for national as well as international concern for the SwAF.

Ways of using force are focused on manoeuvre warfare in joint operations executed under mission command.<sup>266</sup> Force can be used nationally where interagency cooperation is vital.<sup>267</sup> Internationally the use of force is centred around peace keeping operations<sup>268</sup> where Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and conduct of multinational operations is key.<sup>269</sup> Other kinds of operations are described as information and security operations, show of force and CBRN-operations.<sup>270</sup> For the conduct of these different kinds operations concepts such as decisive action, center of gravity, decisive points, lines of operations, critical vulnerabilities, indirect method, initiative, system shock and breaking the enemy’s OODA-loop are introduced.<sup>271</sup> Operations as differing ways of using force in line with manoeuvre warfare and mission command concepts are intended to be implemented with the assets available at the time. However to enable better end results the development of a network-based defence concept is introduced.<sup>272</sup> The description of ways of using force is straight forward and assertive, but questions to which extent the SwAF at the time was equipped and trained to fight according to the concepts in the doctrine arises

The means for using force are described as concepts and forces. The concepts are national defence capability, international cooperation, total defence and national service duty.<sup>273</sup> The national defence capability depends on a working total defence concept where the civilian society is organized in a manner that supports the efforts of the defence of the nation to the fullest extent possible. The total defence concept depends on the national service duty and the involvement of a broad part of the population in defence matters, both military and civilian. The international cooperation concept is a way of ensuring that the total defence measures get the international support they need while also ensuring the protection of Swedish international interests in multinational operations abroad. The forces to be used for operations are described as operational

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<sup>265</sup> Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid., Manoeuvre warfare p. 75., Joint operations p. 105., Mission command p. 81, 90.

<sup>267</sup> Ibid., p. 105.

<sup>268</sup> Ibid., p. 106-107.

<sup>269</sup> Ibid., p. 105-106.

<sup>270</sup> Ibid., p. 111-112. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN).

<sup>271</sup> Ibid., p. 77-89. Concepts most of which are well in line with NATO Guidelines for Operational Planning at the time.

<sup>272</sup> Ibid., p. 123.

<sup>273</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

units (Insatsförband), national protection forces, special operations units, local defence units (Hemvärnet) and voluntary defence organisations.<sup>274</sup> The operational and special forces units are the ones with the highest readiness and which were to be used both nationally and internationally. Whereas the national protection forces were the main asset for national defence, being more stationary and not as quick to assemble. As a part of the national protection force the local defence units (Hemvärnet) were a relatively rapid asset mainly to be used to protect vital infrastructure and support combat operations in all domains if required. The local defence organisations were an asset to ensure that the total defence concept was kept alive and integrated with civil society. The means for the use of force can be summarized as all means available and covering all aspects of society.

Preferences regarding cooperation with other nations is scarcely described in the doctrine. However the interoperability of units and troops with “*most western European units*”<sup>275</sup> is descriptive of an intention to prepare for the use of force with troops from NATO- and EU-member states. Besides the interoperability claim the concepts of multinational operations, temporary coalitions as well as Nordic cooperation are introduced as avenues of international cooperation alongside NATO and the EU.<sup>276</sup>

The authorization of the use of force is described to some detail in the doctrine and is linked to international law, human rights, the laws of war as well as national legislation.<sup>277</sup> Regarding international law the UN-charter and the right to self-defence for nations is highlighted.<sup>278</sup> The rule of law and compliance with international treaties and law is of vital importance for a non-aligned small state. The respecting of human rights as well as the requirement for following the guiding principles from the Laws of War are stressed upon as well as the requirement to follow national law and the Swedish constitution.<sup>279</sup> The detail and length in which authorization of the use of force and legal aspects are described in the doctrine implies a high level of importance of legality regarding use of force at the time.

The norm regarding the use of force in the Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine from 2002 is summarized in the table below.

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<sup>274</sup> Ibid., p. 117-119, 199.

<sup>275</sup> Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>276</sup> Ibid., p. 106.

<sup>277</sup> Ibid., p. 41-45.

<sup>278</sup> Ibid., p. 42.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid., p. 43-45. Principles for warfare such as Military necessity, Proportionality, Distinction, Humanity and Honor.

Table 4-1 Norm for the use of force in MSD02.

Question	Answer
What?	Deny enemy access to national territory (Nat) Deny enemy impact on national interest (Int)
When?	Continuous – readiness levels (Nat) Continuous (Int)
Where?	All of Sweden UN-led missions (primarily)
How?	Network based defence (to be developed) Contingents trained for UN-missions
With what?	Standing and Reserve forces (Nat) Standing forces (Int)
With whom?	EU/NATO (Nat) UN (Int)
Authorization?	Un charter, laws of war, national law (Nat+Int)
Norm:	
Force should be used to defend the nation with standing and reserve forces who are available at a set degree of readiness with a network-based defence. All of Sweden should be defended by SwAF and supporting partners (EU/NATO). Force is to be used in international operations to defend Swedish interests.	

### Role of doctrine

The doctrine reads more as an academic textbook than a field manual. Concepts are defined, suggestions for further reading are offered and there is a relatively high level of abstraction to it.<sup>280</sup> As such the doctrine fulfils the role as a book for educating the reader and to provide direction for military strategic planning.<sup>281</sup> The doctrine provides answers to all the categories and questions asked in the analysis, and quite consistently on a high level of abstraction. But regarding the relationship to strategic culture this doctrine is quite exact, strategic culture is defined, and changing strategic culture is stated as an aim of the doctrine.<sup>282</sup> So with regard to strategic culture the role of this doctrine is to be a tool for change.

Norm: Doctrine is a tool for changing strategic culture.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid., definitions such as: Strategy p. 61, Strategic culture p. 66, policy, doctrine and the strategic process p. 68, levels of war, p. 69. It seems a lot of work went into defining concepts at the time of MSD02 development. Discussion regarding definition of doctrine: Wickbom, Jan: Ny strategidoktrin för Försvarsmaktens omstrukturering, *Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift*, nr. 1, p. 131-134. Stockholm 2001. Military strategic ends: Ahlgren, Patrik: Militärstrategisk doktrin – övergripande militärstrategiska mål, *Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift*, nr. 3, p. 39-42. Stockholm 2001. Definition of Strategy: Pallin, Krister & Anderson, Markus: Militärstrategisk doktrin – strategibegreppet, *Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift*, nr. 3, p. 43-76. Stockholm 2001.

<sup>281</sup> Ahlgren & Petterson (2001), p. 40.

<sup>282</sup> MSD02, Definition of Strategic culture, p. 66.

### 4.2.3 In Case analysis

Regarding subcultural influences the norms show influences from all three anticipated subcultures. The norm regarding threat shows a high degree of influence from an academic subculture as the description of threat is very informative but highly abstract. The threat description is written in a way as to inform the reader of threats in a wide range of security issues but does not provide so much concrete evidence as to which threats are more likely than others from a Swedish perspective. This means that the description of threats in the policy papers of the time are more to the point than the doctrine. The use of force norm shows a high degree of influence from the military subculture. The descriptions regarding use of force are very depictive of the SwAF at the time and even goes into details covering ends, ways of means for the use of force. The use of force norm does however not keep up with the pace of changes in policy as the internationalisation of SwAF accelerates from the late 1990s via decisions in 2001 to a paradigm change in 2004. As for instance the structure of forces and readiness concepts change completely only a couple of years after the release of the doctrine. The military legacy weighed heavier than the winds of change in policy. Regarding the role of the doctrine as a whole one can see that the doctrine is highly influenced by an academic subculture. The doctrine is depicted as a tool for changing strategic culture, and the change should take place through education based on military sciences.

In summary the doctrine from 2002 is mostly informed by the academic and military subcultures and the connection to the political level and policy is handled via a high degree of abstraction. The doctrine was written in accordance to stated goals of changing culture in the SwAF but at the same time it works as a book on why Sweden still needed a defence force. The norms and the main subcultural influence are listed in the table below.

Table 4-2 Summary of norms and subcultural influences in MSD02

Doctrine	Norm	Subcultural influence
Threat MSD02	Conflict is a complex but inevitable matter; it involves the whole of society and is global by nature. War is the peak of conflict.	Academic
Use of force MSD02	Force should be used to defend the nation with standing and reserve forces who are available at a set degree of readiness with a network-based defence. All of Sweden should be defended by SwAF and supporting partners (EU/NATO). Force is to be used in international operations to defend Swedish interests.	Military
Role of doctrine MSD02	Doctrine is a tool for changing strategic culture.	Academic

### 4.3 Case B – Military Strategic Doctrine 2012

The second case focuses on the second Swedish Military Strategic doctrine from 2012. The frame of the doctrine arches over a timeframe from 2002 until 2012. This frame is to be seen as a continuum of the frame described in case (A) highlighting changes which have occurred with regards to prior developments. Changes in context always lay on a foundation of legacy, it is uncommon that everything changes. The description of the frame is followed by an abductive analysis of the doctrine from 2012 in the search for strategic norms. These norms are analysed as per where they stem from and what potential subcultural influences they contain.

#### 4.3.1 Frame – Cementing the change

The first post-millennial decade in Swedish security and defence policy can be described as cementing the change. A new equilibrium, a new normal, had been found. Defence reforms and new concepts were implemented and a time for implementation of the new “new” occurred. The evolution of a common European security and defence policy, unitary and multilateral solidarity and an international focus had become the new normative frame for Swedish defence. Edström & Gyllensporre talk about the development doctrine (2002-2006) and the solidarity doctrine (2006-2010). What they call the regional doctrine (2010-2014) was shaped at the same time as the doctrine from 2012 and its therefore interesting to see in which extent the regional aspects are addressed in the doctrine.

The “new” threats in Swedish defence policy continued to be relevant, but information-operations were added as well as an emphasis on the need to be able to handle regional and local crisis together with others.<sup>283</sup> International cooperation developed in concord with the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which gained a military dimension.<sup>284</sup> Cooperation with NATO deepened in PfP and the enhanced opportunities program (EOP) and participation in UN, NATO and EU led crisis management operations became regular business.<sup>285</sup> The importance of international operations and the defence of shared values in a global context grew strong and the Swedish unilateral statement of solidarity in 2009 showed a growing interest for defence together with others.<sup>286</sup> An emphasis on bi- and multilateral cooperation cemented itself in Swedish defence policy and a renewed interest for Nordic cooperation was championed.<sup>287</sup>

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<sup>283</sup> Swedish Cabinet (1995), p. 8. & (1996), p. 58. & (2001), p. 12-13. & Swedish Cabinet: *Vårt framtida försvar*, Regeringens proposition, 2004/05:5. Stockholm 2004a, p. 12, 23. & Swedish Cabinet: *Ett användbart försvar*, Regeringens proposition 2008/09:140. Stockholm 2009a, p. 8.

<sup>284</sup> Swedish Cabinet (2001), p. 20-24.

<sup>285</sup> Swedish Cabinet (1995), p. 93. & (2001), p. 23, 62, 67. (2004a), p. 12, 16-17, 29. & (2009), p.9.

<sup>286</sup> Swedish Cabinet (2009), p. 9, 37.

<sup>287</sup> Swedish Cabinet (2009), p. 9-10, 29.

These developments took place with new insight from complex warfighting by the US in Iraq from 2003 onwards, as well as participation in international operations in Afghanistan,<sup>288</sup> an operational environment that seemed to support the choice to aim for more quality and less quantity in forces.<sup>289</sup> The paradigm-shift which occurred by leaving the conscript based system and opting for a small standing force for defence of the nation and its interests manifested itself in 2004.<sup>290</sup> At the same time the concept of total defence was downgraded.<sup>291</sup> The war in Georgia in 2008 sparked some mentions in policy papers but did nevertheless not lead to any major change in the downsizing of Swedish defence.<sup>292</sup> This shifting of focus from the national to the international, from alone to together is the policy frame in which the doctrine from 2012 is analyzed.

During these policy shifts the academization of the officer corps continued.<sup>293</sup> The formalization of the academization of the officer corps was achieved in 2008 with the Swedish Defence University gaining a place as an equal among other Swedish universities.<sup>294</sup> The solution to provide the SwAF with officer-education meeting academic standards happened prior to the release of the doctrine from 2012. The extent to which the doctrine draws from academic formed subculture is under scrutiny below.

#### 4.3.2 Strategic Norms – Security abroad is security at home

The strategic norms in the military strategic doctrine from 2012 have been identified through the same thematic content analysis as for case A. The results of the analysis are presented below as norms identified within: threat, use of force and role of doctrine. These norms are then interpreted a per their subcultural affiliation. This in-case analysis is the basis for the comparative analysis between cases.

#### **Threat - Conflict is global by nature and can affect any nation at a distance.**

The description of threat in the doctrine revolves around the nature of conflict and war. Reasons for both conflict and war are seen as multiple and complex.<sup>295</sup> Forces driving conflict and/or war

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<sup>288</sup> Swedish Cabinet (2004a), p. 20-22, 29.

<sup>289</sup> Swedish Cabinet: *Försvarmaktens grundorganisation*, Regeringens proposition 2004/05:43. Stockholm 2004b.

<sup>290</sup> Swedish Cabinet (2001), p. 12-13. & (2004b) & (2009), p.1.

<sup>291</sup> Swedish Cabinet (2001) & (2004a), p. 251-252.

<sup>292</sup> Swedish Cabinet (2009), p. 24.

<sup>293</sup> Swedish Ministry of Defence (2003) & (2007) & Swedish Ministry of Defence: *Försvarshögskolan – En översyn*, SOU 2004:58, Stockholm 2004.

<sup>294</sup> Swedish Ministry of Education: *Förordning (2007:1164) för Försvarshögskolan*, Stockholm 2007.

<sup>295</sup> MSD12, p. 17.

are divided into political or economic factors, poverty and social injustice.<sup>296</sup> Different combinations of these forces can lead to conflict or war. Political factors are seen as a driving force for most conflicts, while the struggle for resources and economic factors only in some. Economic aspects can however prolong conflicts and make them even more complex.<sup>297</sup> Poverty as a factor is not viewed as enough to start a war or incite conflict, it is however viewed as a vital factor and also a ground for recruiting people willing to fight for a better life.<sup>298</sup> And finally social injustice between different groups of people can work as a destabilizing factor and be utilized by political actors to instigate conflict and even lead to war breaking out.<sup>299</sup> Besides these before mentioned factors also social identity in the form of ethnicity, culture or religion play a role in conflict dynamics. War can be seen as an expression of ideological, ethnical, cultural or religious belonging.<sup>300</sup> This description of conflict and war seems well fitted to understanding conflicts in failed or fragile states. The question is if and in which way this is applicable to interstate war between developed countries.

Conflict stages and dynamics are described with stages ranging from peace, through crisis to war and ending up in a stage of post-conflict.<sup>301</sup> Escalation and de-escalation are expressed as ways of controlling conflict and steps taken to go from one stage of conflict to another.<sup>302</sup> Differentiating between different stages of conflict and war is viewed as blurred, it seems difficult to assess in which stage one is while a conflict is ongoing.<sup>303</sup>

War is described explicitly drawing from Carl von Clausewitz as a struggle of wills.<sup>304</sup> War is a human activity encompassing extraordinary strains and frictions.<sup>305</sup> Even an interpretation of Clausewitz trinity is explicitly adapted to the doctrine to depict the relationship between politics, the people and the defence force.<sup>306</sup> The reliance on Clausewitz continues with descriptions of war as limited or unlimited.<sup>307</sup> This ends up with a description of regular war as an affair between states with organized military forces in direct confrontation.<sup>308</sup> Irregular warfare is

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<sup>296</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>297</sup> Ibid.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid.

<sup>299</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>300</sup> Ibid.

<sup>301</sup> Ibid., p. 20-22.

<sup>302</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid., p. 21-22.

<sup>304</sup> Ibid., p. 22. The struggle of wills analogy is similar to the one in MSD02.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid., p. 23-24.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid., p. 26. The adaptation of the Clausewitz trinity of people, army and government could be challenged by some as not the true trinity, or not what Clausewitz actually meant. However the interesting part for this thesis is the reliance on Clausewitzian theory as a foundation for doctrinal understanding of War.

<sup>307</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>308</sup> Ibid., p.27.



depicted inspired by NATO standards as irregular actions or activities. These can take the form of insurgency, terrorism, organized crime, riots or piracy.<sup>309</sup> Leaving Clausewitz strain of thought behind the concepts of hybrid warfare and unconventional warfare are described as well as special operations all in some part connected to the notion of asymmetry in conflict.<sup>310</sup> This description of conflict and war draws from Clausewitz but tries to expand it by adding on the asymmetrical and irregular aspects of warfare as something new or at least current and relevant.

Globalization and the developing information technology seem to challenge a more conventional image of war,<sup>311</sup> making it more complex, more agile and more difficult to define. Compression of geographical distance and time due to technological advances and ongoing globalization seem to make conflicts more likely to have an effect on nations far away.<sup>312</sup> The spectrum of conflict and degree of state involvement paint a picture of a highly complex conflict dynamics that can affect any nation at any time. Conflicts are seen to range between high intensity to low intensity and from high state involvement to low state involvement.<sup>313</sup> This globalized, technologically driven complex conflict environment forms a picture of conflict and war as multifaceted global and in some part inevitable. The internationalization of conflict in the threat perception on a political and policy level is adopted in the doctrine but on a high abstraction level. There are multiple threats abroad, there will always be conflict, we need to be continuously prepared for international conflict prevention against a multitude of different state and non-state actors.

The description of threat summarized as a norm:

Conflict ranges from high to low intensity and state involvement, is global by nature and can affect any nation at a distance. War is the continuation of politics by other means, but its evolving nature is blurring the line between war and peace.

### **Use of force – Defend the nations' international interests**

The tasks and goals for the use of force in the doctrine is set at a high abstraction level and covers the whole scale of conflict.<sup>314</sup> Here the SwAF represents the utmost means to exert power in the military dimension, although is clearly stated not to be able to reach political ends

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<sup>309</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>310</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>311</sup> Ibid., p.31.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>313</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid., p. 13.

but to be treated as a vital part of security political means.<sup>315</sup> And as the ultimate tool for use of military power the SwAF is to sustain and develop Swedish military defence and defend the nation nationally as well as internationally.<sup>316</sup> The overreaching aim for the military defence of Sweden was stated as *“preventing and managing conflicts and war to ensure Sweden’s existence, survival and independence. This should happen alone or together with others, through operations on our own territory, locally, regionally and globally. Sweden must thus be able to give and receive military support.”*<sup>317</sup> The goal for use of force is to sustain Swedish interests on a spectrum ranging from national to the fully international. The tasks of SwAF are to maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity, dampen and prevent the spreading of conflicts, protect Swedish society and ultimately to defend the nation against armed aggression, alone or together with others.<sup>318</sup>

The use of force is temporarily described linked to different concepts while the readiness-system is stated to be *“under development and ready in the next doctrine”*<sup>319</sup>. Force is to be used if necessary in all stages of conflict, ranging from peace through crisis to war.<sup>320</sup> The use of force is tied to the concepts of escalation, de-escalation, armed conflict, war and post-conflict.<sup>321</sup> Here the use of force is to be planned and executed in accordance to which stage of conflict one is in. The concept of time-compression is introduced as a mechanism where conflicts can change between stages very rapidly depending on the dynamics of the conflict.<sup>322</sup> But with the readiness-system and reaction times missing from the doctrine the matter of time and when to use force is not extensively examined in the doctrine.

Regarding where force is to be used the doctrine describes geographical as well as conceptual dimensions. The geographical aspects cover use of force in national and international operations and introduces geographical compression as a concept linking the two.<sup>323</sup> The spreading of conflict from far abroad to home is either factual in physical events taking place nationally with international roots such as terrorism and international crime or through other effects i.e. eco-

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<sup>315</sup> Ibid., p.75. Other means are i.e. diplomacy, economical etc.

<sup>316</sup> Ibid., p.76.

<sup>317</sup> Ibid., p. 76. The reference to giving and receiving military support can be seen as closely related to the Swedish unilateral declaration of solidarity in 2009. To give and to take.

<sup>318</sup> Ibid., p. 77. Prevent is again used instead of to deter and has a softer connotation.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid., p. 110. Unfinished chapter on readiness.

<sup>320</sup> Ibid., p.19.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid., p.19-21.

<sup>322</sup> Ibid., Time-compression p. 32. conflict spectrum p. 38.

<sup>323</sup> Ibid., National and international operations p. 76, geographical compression p. 32.

nomical or humanitarian aspects. This dualistic operational environment (national and international) is described as consisting of five domains: ground, air, sea, space and information.<sup>324</sup> All of which are domains in which aggressors might act against Swedish interests and thus Sweden is obliged to be able to counter threats in all these domains. To be able to do this the notion of giving and taking military support<sup>325</sup> becomes vital as building security in all these domains both nationally and internationally might arguably be too much for a small nation to handle. Linking to international support the concept of expeditionary warfare is also introduced as something SwAF is to conduct.<sup>326</sup> The international aspects of where force is to be used is very much in the forefront with the word international mentioned 98 times in the doctrine compared to 68 times for national.

Ways of using force are described as dependant on physical, conceptual and moral factors.<sup>327</sup> The basic abilities which are seen as central to Swedish warfighting are command, mobility, effect (kinetic), intelligence, security/protection.<sup>328</sup> And it is through the interaction of the opponents and one's own basic abilities that one can succeed and win a fight.<sup>329</sup> The conduct of warfighting should address eleven (11) principles of war and an additional five (5) principles for irregular warfighting.<sup>330</sup> And generic operations should follow a routine of intelligence gathering, conduct of operations and leading up to development of forces, tactics and concepts.<sup>331</sup> Operations and special operations should cover regular and irregular warfare, and be based on effect thinking.<sup>332</sup> Operations are to follow a direct or indirect approach, be based on manoeuvre warfare, led through mission command and implemented as combined arms fighting.<sup>333</sup> It is in the timely change between defensive and offensive orientation that decisive action can be taken and success achieved.<sup>334</sup> A comprehensive approach for operations where all actors in a designated conflict are involved and managed is required for conflict management and prevention to

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<sup>324</sup> Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>325</sup> Ibid., p. 76. Giving and taking military support.

<sup>326</sup> Ibid., p. 137-140. Expeditionary warfare brings into mind great power competition and historical Swedish expeditionary warfighting during an era of being a European great power. Not something one would instinctively combine with building security for a contemporary small state.

<sup>327</sup> Ibid., p. 56. Mentioned as warfighting capabilities.

<sup>328</sup> Ibid., p. 58.

<sup>329</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>330</sup> Ibid., p. 62-68. The eleven principles: Set up and stick to objectives, concentration of forces, surprise, freedom of action, initiative, security, high spirits (*esprit de corps*), simplicity, economic use of force, maintenance, coordination. And the five principles for irregular warfare: Legitimacy, Restraint, Impartiality, Transparency, Credibility.

<sup>331</sup> Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>332</sup> Ibid., p. 104. The required or wanted effect on the enemy dictates the actions to be taken.

<sup>333</sup> Ibid., p. 119-135.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid., p. 145.

succeed.<sup>335</sup> The increased need for cooperation with armed forces from other nations forms a requirement for the SwAF to have a high degree of interoperability.<sup>336</sup>

The means for using force are described both as conceptual and more concrete. The conceptual means are the total defence concept with the requirement of a working civil defence.<sup>337</sup> The main means for the use of force are warfighting units which are divided into standing units and contracted units.<sup>338</sup> The before mentioned are divided into army, navy and air-force units, and additionally into command, intelligence, information warfare, logistics, home guard, special operations and reserve units.<sup>339</sup> In addition to the set of units mentioned also the voluntary defence organizations are still counted as means for the use of force.<sup>340</sup> The conceptual change of relying on contracted instead of conscripted soldiers makes for a big change in the way means for the use of force are addressed.<sup>341</sup> Fewer units, but with higher readiness and degree of professionalisation seems to have been deemed as an appropriate response to the perceived changes in the security environment.

The different parts of the doctrine all seem to support international cooperation and bring it to the forefront. However the doctrinal text is quite silent regarding who this international cooperation should be conducted with. But as an example the comparison of command structures in the doctrine brings up NATO and the EU.<sup>342</sup> It seems to be left up to policy to dictate whom to cooperate with and for the doctrine to describe how.

The authorization of the use of force is linked to international law, human rights, the responsibility to protect (R2P), the laws of war as well as rules of engagement.<sup>343</sup> The international law aspect highlights the UN-charter, article 51 on self-defence as well as the whole chapter VII regarding conduct of peacekeeping operations as well as the concept of responsibility to protect which emphasizes the international responsibilities of all UN-member states.<sup>344</sup> The laws of war, human rights and rules of engagement are all addressed in close connection to one another.

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<sup>335</sup> Ibid., p. 86.

<sup>336</sup> Ibid., p. 79.

<sup>337</sup> Ibid., p. 80-81.

<sup>338</sup> Ibid., p. 99. Note that reserve units are not a part of the main defence concept where availability of forces and high readiness is key. The change into having standing units and contracted units is central in distinguishing this doctrine from its predecessor.

<sup>339</sup> Ibid., p. 100-106.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid., p.84.

<sup>341</sup> Ibid., p. 108-109.

<sup>342</sup> Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>343</sup> Ibid., p. 71-72, 96-99.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid., p. 71-72. Responsibility to protect as a concept can in some sense work as a tool to justify military operations in international arenas.

The notion that every conflict is unique and that legislative and regulatory measures depend on the operational environment echoes an emphasis on international operations in changing contexts rather than preparation for conflict in Sweden with a very specifically highly defined setting. The norm regarding the use of force in the Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine from 2012 is summarized in the table below.

Table 4-3 Norm for the use of force in MSD12.

Question	Answer
What?	Quick reaction to enemy threats (Nat) Secure national interests abroad (Int)
When?	Continuous – standing forces (Nat) Continuous – rotation of forces (Int)
Where?	Areas of Sweden affected by threat NATO, EU and UN-missions
How?	Operational defence concept (Insatsförsvar) Rotation of all standing forces for international missions
With what?	Standing forces (Nat) Standing forces (Int)
With whom?	NATO, EU (Nat) NATO, EU, UN (Int)
Authorization?	Un charter, R2P, national law (Nat+Int)
Norm:	
Force should be used to defend the nation in areas affected with operational standing forces, which are available at all times. Sweden should be defended by SwAF operational units and supporting partners (EU/NATO). Force is to be used in international operations to secure Swedish interests.	

### Role of doctrine

The doctrine from 2012 has a higher resemblance to a field manual and what one could consider a tool for command than its predecessor. The doctrine contains a high degree of concept definitions and even covers moral and ethical aspects of warfare.<sup>345</sup> The doctrine is well aligned with the implemented policy changes and as such gives an appearance of cementing the change, providing normative guidance as how to position oneself as a Swedish officer in the “new” SwAF. The doctrine has an inverted approach to strategic culture compared to its predecessor, as it states that changes in strategic culture require new doctrine.<sup>346</sup> The implemented changes in the SwAF are said to have changed the culture and thus new doctrine is required. Interestingly concrete changes in force structure, abolishment of conscription, a new operational defence

<sup>345</sup> Ibid., definitions such as: Military doctrine as a means of teaching, p.9., security policy dimensions, p. 77. War and forces of War, p. 22-23, 25. Strategy p. 43-45. Overall aim of military action, p.45. Levels of War, p. 47. Moral factors and the military profession, p.89.

<sup>346</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

concept, an increased dependence on international cooperation and the unilateral solidarity declaration are expressed as factors that have changed the strategic culture.<sup>347</sup> This is a clear and explicit connection between doctrine and strategic culture, but inverted compared to MSD02.

Norm: Changes in strategic culture requires new doctrine. Doctrine is a tool to translate and transfer environmental changes into normative guidelines for the SwAF.

#### 4.3.3 In case analysis

The norms identified in the analysis show influences from all three subcultures. The norm regarding threat shows a high degree of influence from the academic subculture as it mostly stays on a high abstraction level. The threat described is different from the threat in MSD02, but the way in which it is described is similarly vague as to which threats are more likely to occur than others. The widening of the security concept is well depicted and the blurring of the line between war and peace coupled to an international stance makes for an academic description of how the threats are global and Sweden can be affected from afar. The threat description in the policy papers once again offers a more concrete threat-description than the doctrine. The norm covering use of force seems to show a balanced influence of both military and policy subcultures. The changes that had taken place during the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century had been put into effect and the doctrine describes the use of force very much in line with policy papers. The internationalisation of use of force is central. As for the role of the doctrine it seems the academic influence is still strong, but the military subculture shines through more clearly. Using the doctrine to cement the changes and as a normative tool for command. The norms and the main subcultural influence are listed in the table below.

Table 4-4 Summary of norms and subcultural influences in MSD12.

Doctrine	Norm	Subcultural influence
Threat MSD12	Conflict ranges from high to low intensity and state involvement, is global by nature and can affect any nation at a distance. War is the continuation of politics by other means, but its evolving nature is blurring the line between war and peace.	Academic
Use of force MSD12	Force should be used to defend the nation in areas affected, with operational standing forces, which are available at all times. Sweden should be defended by SwAF operational units and supporting partners (EU/NATO). Force is to be used in international operations to secure Swedish interests.	Military and Policy
Role of Doctrine MSD12	Changes in strategic culture requires new doctrine. Doctrine is a tool to translate and transfer environmental changes into normative guidelines for the SwAF.	Academic (Military)

<sup>347</sup> Ibid., p.15.

#### 4.4 Case C – Military Strategic Doctrine 2016

The third case focuses on the third, and currently in-service use, version of the Swedish Military Strategic doctrine from 2016. The frame of the doctrine arches over a short timeframe from 2012 until 2016. This frame is to be seen as a continuum of the frame described in cases (A) and (B) highlighting changes which have occurred with regards to prior developments. The short period of time means that the span of influential policy describing and guiding sources is quite limited. This however does not mean that the changes are in any way smaller or less relevant than if the changes had occurred over a longer period of time, rather the opposite. The description of the frame is followed by an abductive analysis of the doctrine from 2016 in the search for strategic norms. These norms are analysed as per where they stem from and what potential subcultural influences they contain.

##### 4.4.1 Frame – Re-nationalization

A reshaping of Swedish security and defence policy occurred swiftly halfway in to the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Due to the deterioration of the security situation in Europe a shift of focus occurred making homeland defence take point over the international focus of the previous decade. Edström & Gyllensporre talk about the regional defence doctrine (2010-2014).<sup>348</sup> What to call the Swedish defence doctrine from 2014 onwards is in itself an interesting definition to make.<sup>349</sup> The re-alignment of European security and defence policy, NATO's new stance and need for hard power led to a realignment of Swedish security and defence policy.

The re-emergence of military threat against Swedish territory meant a shift of focus.<sup>350</sup> A national focus for defence emerged while the international aspects developed into an aspiration for some form of an allied defence of Swedish territory than to international crisis management.<sup>351</sup> Important partners such as Finland and the USA make for core players in this alliance without an alliance.<sup>352</sup> And the cooperation with NATO grew even deeper via the EOP and Host Nation Support (HNS) treaty making it easier to receive military support.<sup>353</sup> It was undoubtedly the Russian aggression towards Ukraine in 2014 and the illegal occupation and later

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<sup>348</sup> Edström & Gyllensporre (2014).

<sup>349</sup> Following Edström & Gyllensporre's line of thought one could venture to talk about the *national* doctrine where defence of the homeland and Swedish territory is central.

<sup>350</sup> Swedish Cabinet: *Försvarspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges försvar 2016-2020*, Regeringens proposition 2014/15:109. Stockholm 2015, p. 46-47.

<sup>351</sup> Swedish Cabinet (2015), p. 1-2, 62. However still claiming military non-alignment.

<sup>352</sup> Swedish Cabinet (2015), p. 37, 56.

<sup>353</sup> Swedish Cabinet (2015), p. 37-38, 56.

annexation of the Crimean-peninsula that sparked and fueled these changes.<sup>354</sup> Sweden was in a situation with a legacy of a small standing force for the defence of the nation, and a new cyber-domain which required attention in a security environment with a restless Russia.<sup>355</sup> It is clear that the changes in the Swedish security environment were felt to require a new doctrine. The doctrine from 2016 is analyzed in a frame of renationalization of Swedish defence.

The new requirements of the changing security environment which led to a need to grow the SwAF also led to a change in the academization process. The requirement for a larger number of officers opened up for alternative ways in to the profession.<sup>356</sup> Allowing for persons holding academic degrees to be enabled a “fast-lane” to becoming an officer with a shorter time of study required at the Swedish Defence University. This is a change that has been implemented, but only after the release of the doctrine under examination. The academization has as such reached its peak and the requirement for academic degrees has become mandatory for commission as an officer in the SwAF.<sup>357</sup>

#### 4.4.2 Strategic Norms – Complexity and national defence

The strategic norms in the military strategic doctrine from 2016 have been identified through the same thematic content analysis as for case A and B. The results of the analysis are presented below as norms identified within: threat, use of force and role of doctrine. These norms are then interpreted per their subcultural affiliation. This in-case analysis is the basis for the comparative analysis between cases.

##### **Threat – The grey-zone and nuclear weapons.**

The threat description in the doctrine starts of on a high abstraction level but quickly continues to address more concrete threats with a close geographical proximity to Sweden. The character of future conflicts is addressed two-folded as a matter of conflicts regarding Swedish interests close to home as well as part of crisis management and international operations far from home. Any antagonist is seen to use both conventional and unconventional methods as well as advanced capabilities and weapons-systems.<sup>358</sup> Different ways and means of action are depicted

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<sup>354</sup> Swedish Cabinet (2015), p. 22, 42-43.

<sup>355</sup> Swedish Cabinet (2004b) & (2009), p. 52-53. & (2015), p. 71-79, 111.

<sup>356</sup> Swedish Ministry of Defence: *En robust personalförsörjning av det militära försvaret*, SOU 2016:63, Stockholm 2016, p. 110-111.

<sup>357</sup> The discussion on the academization of the officer corps is however still ongoing at the time of writing this thesis, as the first graduates of the Higher Joint Command and Staff Programme graduated as Masters of War Studies in June 2020. For contemporary discussion, see: Sandberg, Ola: ”Akademiseringen av officersutbildningen”, *Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift*, nr. 2, p. 145-151. Stockholm 2020.

<sup>358</sup> MSD16, p. 29.



as ranging from deception and cyberattacks to usage of long range weapons-systems and highly mobile qualified combat units.<sup>359</sup> The goals for the use of force might include taking and holding terrain, but this is not seen as an end in itself. The expected aim for an aggressor is to deny Swedish forces physical access to deployment and manoeuvre areas but also deny access in cyberspace and space.<sup>360</sup> This description draws a picture of preparing for defence of the homeland against a well-equipped qualified aggressor. The struggle of wills from previous doctrines is thus depicted quite differently and more to the point.

Consequences of globalization are addressed through an overview of actor dynamics, global and local flows, cyberspace and social dynamics. The state actor is seen as a leading force in the international system. But the influence of non-state actors is on the rise and they can be both autonomous as well as front organizations for state actors. The global and local flows of transports, energy, economy and trade are depicted as vital for the survival of the state. A just in time concept adopted by Sweden and many of its European neighbours builds a vulnerability which needs to be protected. The developing dimension of cyberspace into a global avenue of influence and aggression makes for a multifaceted vulnerability.<sup>361</sup> While changes in social dynamics such as increased travel and larger migration flows open up for conflicts to spread globally.<sup>362</sup> The globalization of threats sums up to a set of vulnerabilities which are partly or wholly outside the reach of any single state to address fully.

The consequences of limited military resources and the Swedish military strategic context is described in connection to the Baltic Sea and the Arctic. The downsizing of military assets in many European states is a shared concern. While the close proximity to Russia which Sweden shares with Finland is a matter of concern. The possibility to use long-range weapons systems directly at Sweden makes for a great concern. Regarding the Baltic sea control of sea- and air lines of communication through control of the larger islands i.e. Gotland as well as control of the narrow passage through the Gulf of Finland are concerns with regards to Russia. The Arctic is seen as an area of possible heightened tensions through the economic gains which might come from the opening of a new sea line of communication. The increased Russian military activity in the area is of concern.<sup>363</sup> Also the notion that not all European states share the same security concerns as Sweden is highlighted as concern for ensuring security in areas close to

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<sup>359</sup> Ibid.

<sup>360</sup> Ibid., Quoted as Anti-Access (A2), Area-Denial (AD).

<sup>361</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>362</sup> Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>363</sup> Ibid., p. 31.

and relevant to Swedish interest.<sup>364</sup> The concerns raised summarize a picture of great interest in security issues close to home.

Conflict dynamics such as escalation, de-escalation and deterrence are addressed as vital for controlling the security situation. The threat of de-escalation through the use of nuclear weapons is introduced.<sup>365</sup> Consequences of nuclear weapons is more thoroughly examined as a part of deterrence between great powers, but also in the form of use of tactical nuclear weapons. It is in the use of tactical nuclear weapons as a means for de-escalation that forms a direct threat to Sweden.<sup>366</sup> The nuclear dimension of the threat re-emerges as something forgotten since the cold war. The threat has arguably always been there but its re-emergence as a threat to Sweden in stated doctrine is interesting as it shows a renewed interest, and worry, about Russian nuclear capabilities.

Hybrid threats, covert action and differing ways of coercion or direct aggression is addressed in a concept called the grey-zone. The grey-zone is identified as an area between peace and war, an area which allows for a wide range of actions to be taken without stepping over the threshold of war. Ultimately the grey-zone means uncertainty. Uncertainty of whether actions are aggression, who the aggressor is and what their goals are. The blurring of internal and external security and peace and war makes for a difficult and highly challenging context for conflict.<sup>367</sup> The grey-zone has been introduced as a concept to describe just how complex the threat environment seems to be. The threat is not so much the preservation of peace or the fighting of war as it is depicted as the ability to take decisive action in a grey-zone of uncertainties. There are multiple threats close to home including nuclear weapons, conflict might already be ongoing, we need to prepare for it. Russia is the main security concern.

The description of threat summarized as a norm:

Conflict has a national as well as an international dimension, is global and affects nations with little distinction. The dichotomy of war and peace is overshadowed by a grey-zone of uncertainty. Swedish interests are threatened close to home by potential overt and covert action by Russia including the use of nuclear weapons.

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<sup>364</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>365</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>366</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>367</sup> Ibid., p.35-38.

### Use of force – Defend the nation, together with others

The goals for the use of force are depicted as conceptual in a military strategic concept and in relationship to conflict stages. The military strategic concept states that *“Sweden is to be defended... an armed attack shall be met swiftly in order to win time and establish freedom of action. This shall be followed by defensive operations, in cooperation with others aiming to win the war, alternatively unaided operations aiming at avoiding losing the war.”*<sup>368</sup> So the ultimate goal for the SwAF is to defend Sweden, hopefully in close cooperation with other partner nations. As a part of this main goal a deterrence aspect is introduced as a requirement for the SwAF of building of a threshold to deter aggressors.<sup>369</sup> To deter a potential aggressor is a main message of this doctrine. The goals of controlling conflict through escalation and de-escalation, which have both been central for the doctrines from 2002 and 2012, remain.<sup>370</sup> The requirement to be able to shift between conflict levels through escalation or de-escalation is however depicted from a deterrence viewpoint. Here the ability to quickly escalate might be just as forceful a deterrent as an ability to de-escalate.<sup>371</sup>

The core tasks for the SwAF is to defend Sweden and promote Swedish security and Swedish interests through conduct of operations in Sweden and abroad.<sup>372</sup> This task is divided into six subtasks which cover the ability to: counter armed attack, defend Sweden’s territorial integrity, conflict management both nationally and internationally, interagency and international cooperation, support the civilian society. And finally, the ability to mobilize and use all warfighting units to meet any military aggression against Sweden and Swedish interests.<sup>373</sup>

As for the temporal dimension of the use of war this doctrine describes a continuous need for preparedness. Strains on society, threats to security, the threat of war and armed attack are all different stages in time when the use of force may be required.<sup>374</sup> The blurring of the imaginary line between war and peace is described in the grey-zone concept where the uncertainty of action and state of conflict demands a continuous readiness to act against a wide range of threats. The distinction between war and peace becomes more of a legislative and political

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<sup>368</sup> Ibid., p. 6. Winning together or avoiding losing unaided is the core message of the doctrine from 2016. As such this is an interesting statement to make as it can be interpreted in the sense that SwAF will not even attempt to win a war alone. A statement of realities on one hand as the resources and capabilities of the state to win a war might rightly be insufficient. But on the other hand the notion of fighting on not to lose, but with no way of winning alone might be noble, but is a rather grim statement.

<sup>369</sup> Ibid., p. 6. Building a threshold through offensive action in peace and wartime.

<sup>370</sup> Ibid., p.32.

<sup>371</sup> Ibid., p. 6. The conceptual requirement for swift action and ability to shift between offensive and defensive modus operandi can be seen in the light of building an ability to de-escalate through rapid escalation.

<sup>372</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>373</sup> Ibid., p. 40-41.

<sup>374</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

problem, than a factor for the SwAF regarding readiness for operations. The grey-zone implies that some threats are imminent or already active, inaction is not a viable option.

Where force should be used is described divided into geographical aspects and domains. The geographical aspects cover homeland defence, regional defence and operations far away from the homeland.<sup>375</sup> The national defence focus is on maintaining territorial integrity which might include cyberspace.<sup>376</sup> Domains that require attention and ability to act are defined as: ground, sea, air and cyberspace.<sup>377</sup> In summary the SwAF should have the ability to defend Sweden and its interests nationally, regionally and internationally on the ground, at sea, in the air and in cyberspace.

Ways of using force are described based on type of operations, basic abilities and the concepts of manoeuvre warfare, systems- and comprehensive approach to warfare. Operations are to be conducted as joint operations, rely on combined arms fighting and be led through mission command.<sup>378</sup> The systems approach indicates a treating of units and capabilities as interlinked and the interaction between a friendly (own) system and a hostile (enemy) systems are what battles are about.<sup>379</sup> The battles and operations should be conducted on the principles of manoeuvre warfare and concepts such as centre of gravity and culmination points are seen as essential.<sup>380</sup> The aggressor's point of culmination is stressed to be essential to identify.<sup>381</sup> A comprehensive approach to warfighting is also stressed, as part of crisis management operations, while national defence should rely on manoeuvre warfare.<sup>382</sup> On the highest abstraction level it is the shifting between offensive and defensive stances that a military strategic balance is to be achieved.<sup>383</sup> This balancing act is a key element of deterrence and threshold-effect which are sought after. The means for the use of force are described on a conceptual level, but not in the form of tangible assets such as units or forces. The main concepts of the means for using force are the will to defend the nation and a total defence concept.<sup>384</sup> Other means are not described at any length as it seems this military strategic doctrine intends to leave the means part to be described in the

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<sup>375</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>376</sup> Ibid., p. 55-56.

<sup>377</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>378</sup> Ibid., p. 6, 58.

<sup>379</sup> Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid., p. 41, 58.

<sup>381</sup> Ibid., p. 42. The aggressors culmination point is described as decisive for Swedish warfighting.

<sup>382</sup> Ibid., p. 58, 63.

<sup>383</sup> Ibid., p.6, 58.

<sup>384</sup> Ibid., p.44-45. The will to defend the nation is described as a means by its own right. It seems the will to fight is conceptualized into something one has to focus on, how to build it, maintain it and use it. This is tightly connected to the total defence concept where all of society has to work together to meet all the different threats.

operational level doctrine for joint operations.<sup>385</sup> But undoubtedly the means to be used in accordance with the doctrine are the available forces at the SwAF disposal. It seems a choice was made not to list them in the doctrine.<sup>386</sup>

The preferences regarding cooperation revolve around partnerships with high relevance for the military defence of Sweden. The explicitly named partners are the EU, USA, NATO and the Nordic countries.<sup>387</sup> The spectrum of international cooperation is described according to 13 different ways of cooperation.<sup>388</sup> Solidarity seems a vital part of the international cooperation described in the doctrine. Showing of solidarity and ultimately relying on the solidarity of others to help Sweden in its defence efforts is a key ingredient of the military strategic concept the doctrine champions. Cooperation is viewed with respect to the military defence of Sweden, not as something primarily to do with international crisis management.

The authorization of the use of force is not described in detail or at great length. Only a few mentions regarding legislation are to be found in the doctrine. A mention of the right to self-defence as based of the UN-charter and the right to defend Swedish interest internationally as part of crisis management operations are mentioned in connection to the right to use military force.<sup>389</sup> Besides this some legislation references to national Swedish law are made in connection to a comprehensive approach to crisis management.<sup>390</sup> No mention of the laws of war or rules of engagement are reiterated, but a mention of the need for ethical leadership in battle and war is offered.<sup>391</sup> It seems the rule of law and the legislation are to some extent taken for granted and a more detailed description of legislation or rules regulating the use of force has been deemed unnecessary.

The norm regarding the use of force in the Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine from 2016 is summarized in the table below.

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<sup>385</sup> Ibid., p. 9-10. see also Swedish Armed Forces: *Doktrin för Gemensamma operationer – DGO20*, FM HRC, Stockholm 2020.

<sup>386</sup> Any user of the doctrine within the SwAF is undoubtedly aware of which assets are available at any given time. But leaving out the means part is an example of trying to keep MSD16 on a military strategic level and more abstract. The concepts seem important, but linking them to concrete measures is left up to the reader.

<sup>387</sup> MSD16, p. 48. Partners that are deemed important for the military defence of Sweden.

<sup>388</sup> Ibid., p. 48-49. (1) Treaties, partnerships and cooperation (2) Visits (3) Defence attaché networks (4) Capability development (5) International exchange of personnel (6) Observers (7) Contributions to international crisis management (8) Training and mentoring of other nations defence efforts (9) Internationally recognized training programs (10) Security Sector Reform (11) Combined exercises (12) Defence industry cooperation (13) Maintaining territorial integrity and show of solidarity.

<sup>389</sup> Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>390</sup> Ibid., p. 64-65. Laws regulating civil military and interagency cooperation.

<sup>391</sup> Ibid., p. 72.

Table 4-5 Norm for the use of force in MSD16.

Question	Answer
What?	Deny enemy freedom of action in and against Swedish territory (Nat) Protect national interest (Int)
When?	Continuous – ongoing (Nat) Continuous – ongoing (Int)
Where?	Areas of Sweden affected by threat including cyberspace (Nat) Vital crisis management operations (Int)
How?	Operational defence concept, winning together avoiding losing alone Rotation of standing forces for international missions
With what?	Standing and reserve forces (Nat) Standing forces (Int)
With whom?	NATO, EU, USA and the Nordic countries especially Finland (Nat) NATO, EU, UN (Int)
Authorization?	UN charter, national law regarding comprehensive approach (Nat+Int)
Norm:	
Force should be used to defend the nation in areas affected, at all times, with all available forces. Sweden should be defended by SwAF operational units and supporting partners (NATO, EU, USA, Finland and other Nordic countries). Force is to be used in international operations to protect Swedish interests.	

### Role of doctrine

The doctrine from 2016 could be described as a military strategic field manual. It appears in its essence to be a tool for command providing normative guidance for the SwAF on a military strategic level. The doctrine as its predecessor contains a high amount of concept definitions and has a baseline of keeping a rather high abstraction level through the text.<sup>392</sup> The doctrine seems to be well aligned with implemented policy changes and appears to be a normative guide for implementation of the realignment of the defence of Sweden. The doctrine has a much more implicit relationship to strategic culture than its predecessors. Strategic culture is approached as something that does exist, and influences doctrine, but not as an essential tool for changing behaviour.<sup>393</sup> Factors such as a long experience of neutrality, military non-alignment as well as will to preserve freedom of action are mentioned as central parts of Swedish strategic culture and identity.<sup>394</sup> This description is very fitting with a first generation interpretation of strategic culture where contextual slowly changing factors are the central elements of strategic culture. The doctrine also clearly aims at separating the military strategic level from the operational which can be seen among other things in the shallow description of means for the use of force.

Norm: Doctrine is culturally influenced and is to be used as a command-tool to provide normative strategic guidance for the SwAF regarding defence of the nation to be implemented as per operational and tactical level doctrine.

<sup>392</sup> Ibid., definitions such as strategy, military strategy p. 16-17, warfighting ability p. 25.etc.

<sup>393</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>394</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

#### 4.4.3 In case analysis

The norms identified in the analysis of the doctrine mainly show influences from the military and some from the policy subculture. The norm regarding threat shows a high degree of influence from the military subculture as it is quite concrete and to the point. The threat description is tied to clear areas, actions and actors. The threat description is also in line with the contemporary policy papers. The introduction of the grey-zone as a concept bridges the gap between the policy and military subculture as all state agencies are and can be influenced by hostile actions at any given time. Regarding the norm of the use of force there seems to be a balanced influence of policy and military subcultures. Here the military strategic concept shows how the military strategic level intends to do what policy demands.<sup>395</sup> As for the role of doctrine the military subculture seems to have the main influence on the norm. Doctrine is seen as culturally influenced but strategic culture is not considered to be something as instrumental as a tool. The downplaying of the academic subculture regarding this doctrine is also partly due to the manner in which it is written. The to the point summarized expressions of normative truths echoes more of a military order than academic insights. Academic influences are however plentiful even in this doctrine. A good example is the military strategic direction given in the doctrine which reads as a list of problems to solve and the implications of these problems.<sup>396</sup> Defining what the problem is and asking the right questions can be seen as an academic way of addressing complex issues. The norms and the main subcultural influence are listed in the table below.

Table 4-6 Summary of norms and subcultural influences in MSD12.

Doctrine	Norm	Subcultural influence
Threat MSD16	Conflict has a national as well as an international dimension, is global and affects nations with little distinction. The dichotomy of war and peace is overshadowed by a grey-zone of uncertainty. Swedish interests are threatened close to home by potential overt and covert action by Russia including the use of nuclear weapons.	Military (Policy)
Use of force MSD16	Force should be used to defend the nation in areas affected, at all times, with all available forces. Sweden should be defended by SwAF operational units and supporting partners (NATO, EU, USA, Finland and other Nordic countries). Force is to be used in international operations to protect Swedish interests.	Military and Policy
Role of doctrine MSD16	Doctrine is culturally influenced and is to be used as a command-tool to provide normative strategic guidance for the SwAF regarding defence of the nation to be implemented as per operational and tactical level doctrine.	Military

<sup>395</sup> The expression of not losing alone might be interpreted as a statement aimed at the political masters.

<sup>396</sup> MSD16, p. 55-57.

## 4.5 Comparative analysis

This chapter contains two different aspects of a comparative analysis of the doctrines examined. Initially the difference in context (the frames) of the doctrines are analysed. This is followed by an analysis of continuity and change within the strategic norms identified in the cases. These two sets of analysis are then summarized in the final chapter, comparing the different points of view describing the changes in strategic culture and outlining arguments for why the changes have occurred.

### 4.5.1 Context

Changes in contextual elements with reference to strategic culture as context might well follow the definition adopted in MSD16 where strategic culture is viewed as historical experience of neutrality, non-alignment and a pursuit to maintain freedom of action as a state. Such factors including geographical, historical and in some way formative of a Swedish experience have not been the focus of attention in this thesis. The contextual factors compared here are the changes in what has been depicted as the frames of the three cases. Observations of changes in threat perception, ways of using force and a developing academization count as contextual factors which have changed in the timeframe covered by this thesis. The change in threat perception during the Post-Cold War era in Sweden is observed to have changed from a loss of a concrete national threat, through a widening of security threats and internationalization to a renewed experience of a military threat to the nation and its territory. The changes observed are seemingly closely related to changes in doctrine which mirrors and evolves according to the documented changes in the security environment in the policy papers and political direction provided to the SwAF. Change in perceived threat seems to affect policy which drives change in structures and concepts which then are documented in normative form in the military strategic doctrines.

Change in the use of force with regards to policy decisions were also observed, an internationalization of use of force ranging from peacekeeping and crisis management all the way to an explicit description of expeditionary warfare has been noted. A perception of quality of forces as more relevant than quantity was also observed in connection to the internationalization of the use of force. The changes in the use of force do not follow the same logic as the changes in threat perception. As the downsizing of SwAF units had continued for decades the legacy of few, small operational units doesn't enable a quick return to large units and greater quantities. Either the image of war has actually utterly changed since 1990 rendering a larger mass of units



unnecessary, or the fact of legacy and slowness of rebuilding caught up with the norms. The use of force norm did not change as a requirement for mass increases in SwAF means as much as it changed into a requirement for military support from friendly nations in order to stand a fighting change in a future war close to or at home.

The process of academization that was observed does not seem to have had direct implications to the degree of influence of the academic subculture. The attempt in MSD02 to change culture and push for academization through education faded with MSD12 to completely vanish with MSD16. The observations actually indicate that the further the academization of the officer corps evolved the lesser the impact of the academic subculture was on doctrine. Now these observations are undoubtedly challengeable. There is a difference between basing doctrine on knowledge gained from scientific research coupled with practical knowledge and the way in which one documents this. One might argue that all the doctrines draw from research-based knowledge and it is only the way the information is presented that changed.

Contextual factors have changed in Sweden since the end of the Cold War. Geographically Sweden is in a different position surrounded by friendly nations as compared to the times of the Soviet Union. European security arrangements have evolved, the EU membership, NATO PfP, EOP, HNS, bi- tri- and multilateral agreements and a unilateral solidarity declaration. However the historical experience of the nation has arguably not changed that much yet. There is most certainly something to gain in looking into the transfer of norms between nations, the transnational norms. Observations of internationalization and downsizing of armed forces seem to have been more the rule than the exception in Europe since 1990. This was however not covered in the case study but will be discussed to some extent in chapter 5.

#### 4.5.2 Continuity and Change

The continuity and/or change aspects of norms connected to the military strategic doctrines show a clear evolution of the norms connected to threat and role of doctrine.<sup>397</sup> The evolution of the main subcultural influence on the norms in the doctrines is depicted in the table below.

Table 4-7 Evolution of subcultural influence on the Swedish Military Strategic Doctrines.

<b>Norm</b>	<b>MSD02</b>	<b>MSD12</b>	<b>MSD16</b>
Threat	Academic	Academic	Military (Policy)
Use of force	Military	Military and Policy	Military and Policy
Role of doctrine	Academic	Academic (Military)	Military

<sup>397</sup> A summary of the observed norms and main subcultural influence is listed in appendix 2.

The most stable norm is shown to be the use of force norm where the military subcultural influence is clearly influential in all three cases. The alignment of policy and military cultural influences in the doctrines from 2012 and 2016 can be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to align policy and doctrine to give an image of factuality, legality and clarity to the use of force. As the analysis of the use of force norms in the three cases show, there have been clear fluctuation in most of the categories analysed regarding use of force. However the interesting observation here is the seemingly clear alignment between policy and doctrine. The changes made have been expressed in a growing degree of harmony between policy and doctrine starting from MSD12.

The threat perception norm seems to have had a stable academic influence in the two earlier doctrines while a flip to military influence occurred in MSD16. This observed change includes a change in the relationship between strategic culture and the doctrine. The first two doctrines have a clear definition of strategic culture and its utility in change while MSD16 holds a contextual understanding of strategic culture. This does not by itself account for the change in subcultural influence, but is an interesting observation. The change from academic to military subcultural influence can perhaps best be understood through examining MSD16 as a whole, where the military subcultural influence is strong regarding all norms and the doctrine is very much a tool of command rather than of explicit change in strategic culture. This does of course not mean that a new stance to doctrine doesn't in reality inflict the same kind of change to cultural elements as did the doctrines which explicitly aimed at changing culture or cementing change. The role of the doctrine seems to have gradually changed from an academic venture in MSD02, an academic but militarily coloured normative document in MSD12 to a military tool of command in MSD16.

The fluctuation in subcultural influences observed can also be explained as expressions of choices made by the team of writers who wrote the doctrine. The manner in which the text is written, the disposition, the level of abstraction, alignment with policy and normative or informative degree of the doctrine are undoubtedly all choices which are made either intentionally or unintentionally. As the threat perception becomes clearer and more to the point all the norms align in accordance with a military influence and a balance between military policy culture is found. The clearer the threat, the more militarily influenced the doctrine.

#### 4.5.3 Summary: Context, Continuity and change

Both the context and the norms that have been observed share a commonality in that they seem to have changed more than shown signs of continuity. Contextual changes might lead to re-definition of norms and thus change ripples through the strategic cultural system of a nation. If one is to single out a single defining trait of Swedish strategic culture based on the observations in this case study it is: Swedish strategic culture is prone to change. One can address this statement in two different ways. The initial way follows the logic presented in MSD02 and MSD12 where strategic culture is considered to some extent as a tool for change. Then change in strategic culture is something central and descriptive of Swedish strategic culture. But another way of viewing the same statement is that Swedish strategic culture actually is stable. It is rather that the culture nurtures and drives change. Change in interests, change in policy, change in doctrine, change in concepts, ends, ways and means. The changes always manifest themselves as new sets of norms, norms which are coded in doctrine, policy papers and legislation. Such a view of Swedish strategic culture puts emphasis on the connection between identity and culture. Perhaps the Swedish state identity is in some way opportunistic and allows for flexibility on lower levels such as interests and policy leading to a continuous variation and what has been observed as a tendency to embrace change.

## 5 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter provides conclusions from the case study, linking the observations to the theoretical framework as well as evaluating the research process itself. First the conclusions made of the Swedish military strategic doctrines role in changing Swedish strategic culture are discussed. This is followed by a discussion regarding using doctrine as a tool for changing strategic culture. Finally a critical examination of the research process is delivered as well as some proposals for further studies. In addition to serving as a critical examination the chapter aims at answering the fourth and fifth research question: Why has change occurred? And how can change in strategic culture be achieved?

### 5.1 Conclusions

The study of Swedish strategic culture in this thesis ultimately aimed at finding answers to if Swedish strategic culture has changed during the Post-Cold War era. The summarized answer to this research problem based on the observations in the case study is yes, and no, it depends. At the doctrinal level you can identify change in norms and extend this to be change in strategic culture. The norms identified at this level are most likely to be regulatory norms which regulate action, but do not constitute identity.<sup>398</sup> The use of doctrine as a tool for change where MSD02 aimed at changing the strategic culture of the SwAF, which might more precisely mean that it intended to change the way SwAF approaches strategic matters as a part of its Military culture. And the MSD12 set out to convey changes in strategic culture through a new set of norms for the SwAF. Then finally the MSD16 stated not to aim at changing, but embracing strategic culture, thus for the third time changing the definition and normative approach to strategic culture for the SwAF. An interpretation of change on this level implies that Swedish strategic culture has changed more than once since the end of the Cold War. Some of the changes can be regarded as finetuning while the change of defence concept which occurred in between MSD02 and MSD12 might even be considered a fundamental change.<sup>399</sup>

However, when the analysis shows a high degree of change and fluctuation on several indicators this can itself be interpreted as normative behaviour. By treating proneness for change as a constitutive norm one ends up concluding that Swedish strategic culture has not changed since the end of the Cold War, rather it has nurtured and driven change in Swedish defence issues quite successfully. Such an interpretation means that there are some other elements on the level

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<sup>398</sup> Constitutive and regulatory norms. Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein (1996), p.54. & Wendt (1999), p. 165.

<sup>399</sup> Kerry Longhurst on finetuning and fundamental change. Longhurst (2004)

of state identity that might well be contextual and historically stable. Such elements have not been studied in this thesis. This dualism in interpretation shows that different levels of analysis can lead to different answers. This thesis has however focused on the relationship between norms, the military strategic doctrine, and three subcultures thus exploring a mechanism of change where the initial answer “yes Swedish strategic culture has changed” becomes valid.

Change in strategic culture has been observed through the comparing of strategic norms and their relationship to three different subcultures. Swedish strategic culture has been shown to be divisible into subcultures and that the norms coded into the doctrines differ over time. The case study shows that an initial academic influence on the doctrine has been replaced with a military cultural influence and that a balance between military and policy subculture has been reached in the latest doctrine. The loss of a clear connection of the academic subculture on the doctrine does not mean that such a subculture doesn't exist, but the further the academization of the officer corps got the lesser the doctrine resembles an educational and “academic” text.

As for why the Swedish strategic culture has changed the processes of learning through changes in threat perception, institutions and crises can account for changes in security and defence policy.<sup>400</sup> The changes in policy have led to concrete changes in the SwAF. The changes in policy as well as in the organization has sparked a need for normative guidance which has been coded into the military strategic doctrines. As circumstances in the policy and military dimensions have changed need for a new doctrine has arisen. The difference in norms between the doctrines can be explained by differing external shocks in the security environment leading to recoding of the doctrine. But the team of writers writing the doctrine at any given time are central for both why and how Swedish strategic culture has changed on the military strategic level. The doctrine writers can be held as an epistemic community conveying their own interpretation of new norms to be adopted as per doctrine, even working as norm entrepreneurs in some cases.<sup>401</sup> This community selects which subcultural influences will prevail and be a part of the doctrine. To the most part this should be an intentional process and not happen by chance.<sup>402</sup> In summary Swedish strategic culture has been changed through doctrine by an epistemic community of writers as a reaction to external changes (the security environment) and internal changes (defence transformation).

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<sup>400</sup> Meyer (2005), These mechanisms of learning work on an international level. The World context, the EU and NATO contexts as well as the bi-, tri- and multilateral defence agreements mean that some degree of norm transfer has occurred to and from Sweden via transnational norms.

<sup>401</sup> External shocks and norm entrepreneurs. Farrell (2001), Howlett & Glenn (2005), Zyla (2011)

<sup>402</sup> Libel (2018), p. 13. Process of change in policymaking.

## 5.2 Using doctrine as a tool for change

The case study focusing on Swedish military strategic doctrine shows that attempts to change strategic culture (MSD02), convey changes in strategic culture (MSD12) as well as adopting a neutral position towards strategic culture have been made. Doctrine at its purest could be a collection of normative guidance for its audience. In some ways a new doctrine will always entail new or changed norms and this will in some way affect cultural aspects, among others. Therefore, using doctrine as a tool for change can be held as logically sound, but there is hardly any way of controlling the actual change in culture a doctrine sets into motion.




Figure 5-1 The relationship between policy, military advice, research and doctrine.

The conclusions from the case study outlines a model of doctrine as a point where policy, academic research and military professional experience and legacy meet. Doctrine is on one hand informed by policy which is shaped by political opinion and opportunity. On the other hand, doctrine is informed by military advice which stems from military professional experience and legacy. Between the two there is a third factor which is the objective analysis provided through the process of academic research. These three subsets, as depicted in the figure above, all play varying parts in doctrine formation, where the weight of each pillar depends on choices made by the team writing the doctrine.

But the interaction between the three pillars makes the seemingly straightforward process more complex. As political opinion as well as military professional experience and legacy both may affect any given research project in various aspects depending on how the research is conducted. Funding, tasking, ownership issues as well as researcher bias may influence the research process which might lead to biased results. Research results may inform policy as well as military advice which makes it difficult to separate the research pillar to an independent entity. The relationship between military personnel and policy makers might lead to policy informing military advice and vice versa. All these aspects make for a complex model in which the military strategist finds himself involved in a balancing act. Or as Colin S. Gray put it as a keeper of the Strategy Bridge.<sup>403</sup> Any strategist as part of a team working with doctrine development will find himself entangled in this strategist's dilemma. Which influences are to be considered, which aspects weigh heavier than others, what are the biases and where do they come from?

In writing doctrine one can choose between chasing perfection or going for good enough. But what is good enough? This question becomes key. Is it good enough to write a doctrine to provide the intended audience with the knowledge and direction one wishes to convey? Trying to change culture through doctrine might be a bit overreaching.<sup>404</sup> Be this as it may, arguably the only *perfect* doctrine is the one that will never be finished. And only a finished doctrine can enforce change. It seems no matter whether the doctrine writers in Sweden expressed an intent to change culture, inform of cultural change or imply that cultural change is slow and not in the scope of the doctrine, strategic culture can be said to have changed between each doctrine making two of three doctrinal statements on strategic culture to the point. On the other hand, if Swedish strategic culture is unchanging and upholds continuous change then all the doctrine writers were wrong. This strain of thought supports the notion that control of cultural change is difficult if not impossible to gain and maintain. Using doctrine to change strategic culture will work. It is however not certain the change will be what the writers expected.

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<sup>403</sup> The strategists role as keeper of the bridge between policy and military strategy, see: Gray, Colin S.: *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*, Oxford University press, Oxford 2010.

<sup>404</sup> Even though doctrine and culture share a connection, the control over the cultural changes that actually occur by implementation of new doctrine is not easily maintained. Doctrine developers in the US and UK have expressed that doctrine can be based on science, but the main gain of doctrine is as a coordinating tool for military organizations to reduce friction and manage uncertainties. see: Thunholm, Peter & Palmgren, Anders: "Doktrinutvecklares syn på doktriners roll och syfte", *Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift*, nr. 2, p. 15-33. Stockholm 2018.

### 5.3 Evaluating the research

This thesis attempts to study the relationship between strategic norms that are indicative of a strategic culture and doctrine. The concept of strategic culture is multifaceted and shares differing definitions. The chosen interpretation of strategic culture highlights subcultures as elements of a strategic culture. The competition between subcultures can lead to change. To observe culture a theory which states the connection between state environment, identity, interests and policy was adopted. This theoretical framework was then developed to contain doctrines and show an indicative picture of how norms flow in this system. All these theoretical assumptions combined with the ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions lay the ground for this interpretive case study. The study and its results are to be evaluated in the context of this framework.

An interpretive multiple-case case study of single documents is to some extent limited right from the outset. The analysis relies heavily on the interpretation of data in each document. The method of thematic content analysis was adopted to provide for a systematic approach to categorizing data and construct thematical norms. But the description of differing subcultures in a Swedish strategic context and the positioning of the doctrinal documents in their context aimed at adding depth to the analysis. The choice to analyse the doctrines based on three different subcultures was made in order to observe change and the dynamics at work on the level where military doctrine and policy meets. Even though the case study is in some way complex it was possible to draw some relevant conclusions from it.

The sources used in the research were addressed in chapter 2.3.2. As mentioned above the main sources were the military strategic doctrines and this led to a heavy reliance on researcher interpretation of single documents. Secondary and supporting sources were used to some extent, and the internet sources were treated as supportive not decisive, even though they mostly hold a high reliability. But based on the sources used and the focus on military strategic doctrine of one small state there is little to say about generalization on a higher level. As this was an interpretive study this is self-evident, as all observations rely on the context in which they are observed.



In evaluating the research concepts such as validity, reliability and replicability become problematic.<sup>405</sup> If one were to criticise the validity of this study one might question whether the strategic norms and subcultures studied actually are indicator and elements of strategic culture. How valid are the definitions of the subcultures? Reliability might be addressed by asking in which way it would be possible for a different researcher to perform the same analysis in the case study and reach similar results, while replicability is connected with the possibility of repeating the whole study. All these aspects are however challenged in an interpretive study by allowing for different interpretations in the study of any given object. A view of subjectivity of knowledge and reality means that in some sense all results are subjective, in some form biased, and different interpretations are thus inevitable. The flexibility of the research frame allows for interpretation but at the same time softens any conclusions made away from central positivistic concepts such as causality and generalizability.

This thesis should however be evaluated on its trustworthiness, systematicity, reflexivity, transparency and engagement with positionality.<sup>406</sup> The trustworthiness can be evaluated depending on to which extent the study is conducted with a clear systematicity. The systematic reporting of observations, transparent argumentation, clear disposition and structure of this thesis aims at showing a degree of systematicity clear enough to strengthen its trustworthiness. Besides systematicity a central concept to engage with here is reflexivity. Reflexivity addresses issues such as how the researcher affects the research and its results. The identity of the researcher, the reasoning, relationship to data-generation and analysis, as well as the coherence of sense-making are to be addressed in some way.<sup>407</sup> Of these elements the identity of the researcher might bring about at least two forms of author bias. Firstly the nationality of the researcher, being Finnish, might bring about a national bias as the research is about Swedish culture and doctrine. This form of bias has been attempted to be mitigated via a transparent documentation of the argumentation behind explanations and conclusions.<sup>408</sup> The other form of author bias is connected with the researcher's identity as an officer in the Finnish Defence Forces. The role of being an officer opens to bias in connection with interpretation of policy with what can be perceived as negative effects on defence matters, but also with the interpretation of how defence forces act in relation to political agents. A civil-military relations bias. This bias has also been attempted to be mitigated by keeping the research process as transparent as possible.

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<sup>405</sup> On validity, reliability and replicability in interpretive studies see: Schwartz-Shea & Yanow (2012), p. 92-95, 113.

<sup>406</sup> Comparing evaluative standards between positivistic and interpretivist research. *Ibid.*, p.113.

<sup>407</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99-100.

<sup>408</sup> Transparency in documentation as a way of mitigating bias. *Ibid.*, p. 100-101.

The conduct of data-generation and analysis also affects the trustworthiness of the research.<sup>409</sup> Admitting to weaknesses, such as limits in source material with a focus on a few doctrinal texts, but also opening up to differing results of the analysis are ways to try to enhance the transparency of the research process. This includes opening up to potential source bias, as many of the documents studied might themselves emit conscious or unconscious author bias. The problems with this kind of source bias was mitigated by avoiding treating the data as true or false, good or bad.

Finally, the coherence of explanations should be addressed.<sup>410</sup> Any explanation is as good as its coherence and the soundness of argumentation that lies behind it. Different forms of argumentation bias might develop when choosing a theoretical and methodological framework in which to work. On one hand the framing of the study allows for limiting the scope of it thus making it manageable. On the other hand, this process might lead to a proneness to only see explanations that fit the problem, but also only see problems that fit the explanations. This form of argumentation bias has in one way been mitigate by admitting to tensions in the conclusion of the thesis and opening up for rival explanations. Swedish strategic culture has and has not changed since the end of the Cold war. As such different interpretations are central in interpretive studies, which interpretation that is more right, or more wrong, might best be evaluated through a weighing of the trustworthiness of the research which led to the different explanations.

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<sup>409</sup> Sense making in Data generation and analysis. *Ibid.*, p. 104-106.

<sup>410</sup> Explanatory coherence. *Ibid.*, p. 107-109.

## 5.4 Proposals for further studies

The study of strategic culture has evolved through different generations of research and as such deal with the problem of having one too many definitions. Much of the theoretical work on strategic culture calls for more empirical studies to put the theories to the test, but also generate descriptive data of different strategic cultures. From this point of view small states such as Sweden have much to give and the Swedish strategic culture is yet to be described in the sense of “thick-description”. An initial proposal for further research might thus be conducting a thorough descriptive study of Swedish strategic culture. Such a study might be well off by adopting a contextual view of strategic culture. This could then be complemented by a mapping of subcultures of Swedish strategic culture. Any such could be highly informative as well as lay the grounds for further research on the mechanisms of change in strategic culture. In a broader and more general approach the development of theory connecting norms with doctrine and finding clarity into if there are different levels of norms, and if they might be connected to state identity, interests, policy and doctrine in similar or differing ways. In addition to these proposals for further studies, some comparative work on strategic cultures of small states might enable shedding light on what drives continuity and change in different national contexts, and how these may or may not interact with each other. In summary the work in this thesis have led to proposing the following research projects:

- A thick-description study of Swedish strategic culture.
- Mapping of the subcultures of Swedish strategic culture.
- Norms in strategic culture: Exploring the relationship between identity, interest, policy doctrine and norms.
- A comparative study of small state strategic culture

Continued research in strategic culture can still have much to give to further the understanding of strategy in many of its forms. This said, one can still question the relevance of the study of strategic culture and answering the “so what?” question remains central. The answering of why strategic culture matters might be the hardest research project to attempt.

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## List of observed norms and main subcultural influence

Table A2-1 List of observed norms and subcultural influence.

<b>Doctrine Norm</b>	<b>Norm</b>	<b>Subcultural influence</b>
Threat MSD02	Conflict is a complex but inevitable matter. It involves the whole of society and is global by nature. War is the peak of conflict.	Academic
Threat MSD12	Conflict ranges from high to low intensity and state involvement, is global by nature and can affect any nation at a distance. War is the continuation of politics by other means, but its evolving nature is blurring the line between war and peace.	Academic
Threat MSD16	Conflict has a national as well as an international dimension, is global and affects nations with little distinction. The dichotomy of war and peace is overshadowed by a grey-zone of uncertainty. Swedish interests are threatened close to home by potential overt and covert action by Russia including the use of nuclear weapons.	Military (Policy)
Use of force MSD02	Force should be used to defend the nation with standing and reserve forces who are available at a set degree of readiness with a network-based defence. All of Sweden should be defended by SwAF and supporting partners (EU/NATO). Force is to be used in international operations to defend Swedish interests.	Military
Use of force MSD12	Force should be used to defend the nation in areas affected, with operational standing forces, which are available at all times. Sweden should be defended by SwAF operational units and supporting partners (EU/NATO). Force is to be used in international operations to secure Swedish interests.	Military and Policy
Use of force MSD16	Force should be used to defend the nation in areas affected, at all times, with all available forces. Sweden should be defended by SwAF operational units and supporting partners (NATO, EU, USA, Finland and other Nordic countries). Force is to be used in international operations to protect Swedish interests.	Military and Policy
Role of doctrine MSD02	Doctrine is a tool for changing strategic culture.	Academic
Role of Doctrine MSD12	Changes in strategic culture requires new doctrine. Doctrine is a tool to translate and transfer environmental changes into normative guidelines for the SwAF.	Academic (Military)
Role of doctrine MSD16	Doctrine is culturally influenced and is to be used as a command-tool to provide normative strategic guidance for the SwAF regarding defence of the nation to be implemented as per operational and tactical level doctrine.	Military

## Key definitions

### Identity

To have an identity is to have an understanding of oneself in any given situation.<sup>411</sup> State identities are shaped in the interaction between states but has an internal dimension which shapes and is shaped by norms constructed in the interaction of government and its agencies.

### Interest

An interest defines what one wants for a certain reason. State interests stem from self-interest, something the state wants for itself. State identity generated interests are: physical security, ontological security, recognition as an actor by others, development for a better life.<sup>412</sup>

### Policy

Policy designates the behaviour of a government agency or a legislature and is a relatively stable. Policy is a purposive course of action or inaction followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem in a matter of concern.<sup>413</sup>

### Norms

*“Cultural norms are intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action.”*<sup>414</sup> A norm describes what is expected and is the basis for social rules and expectations. Norms can be confined to single states or multiple states as transnational norms.

### Strategic norms

A strategic norm is a corridor within which strategic choices are made.<sup>415</sup> The stated answer provides an expectation of action that will be taken, or an expectation of how other actors actions will be interpreted. These answers thus lay the ground for normative (expected) behaviour.

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<sup>411</sup> “To have an identity is simply to have certain ideas about who one is in a given situation...” Wendt, Alexander: *Social Theory of international politics*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999, p. 170

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**Strategic culture**

Strategic culture involves the culture of a given strategic community, often a nation state. It affects strategic choice and has contextual roots in geography and historical experience. Strategic culture is divisible into competing subcultures and is also constituted by state internal organizational elements. State identity, interest and policy are connected to strategic culture via norms.

**Policy culture**

Policy culture is a subculture of political and strategic culture. Policy culture is shaped by the social behaviour of government agencies and legislators and is relatively stable. Policy culture influences policy making and sets a standard for interaction between government and its agencies.

**Military culture**

Military culture is a subculture of strategic culture and is defined by social interaction in military organizations. Military culture is a “*set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that shape collective understandings*”.<sup>416</sup> Military culture is informed by organizational legacy, affects military advice and influences strategic culture.

**Academic culture**

Academic culture is a subculture of strategic culture and is defined by the academic agents in any given state as well as through the interaction of an international academic community. Academic culture is a set of values, norms and beliefs that shape a collective understanding of standards of scientific research and education, but especially how knowledge can and should be generated.

**Doctrine**

Doctrine tells us who we are, it conveys values as well as norms and is a part of identity shaping of both individuals and organizations. Doctrine can be coded into normative documents which regulate the activities of a given actor. As such, a doctrine encodes norms that are aimed at controlling or guiding the actions of personnel affiliated with the organization which the doctrine represents.

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<sup>416</sup> Kier, Elizabeth: “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars”. *International Security*, 19(4):65-93, Spring 1995, p.68.